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The Nagasaki Naval Training School in the context of Japanese-Dutch relations in mid nineteenth century 1978

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THE NAGASAKI NAVAL TRAINING SCHOOL IN THE CONTEXT OF JAPANESE-DUTCH RELATIONS IN MID NINETEENTH CENTURY by T a d a t o s h i H o s o i B.A., Yokohama C i t y U n i v e r s i t y , 1973 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department o f H i s t o r y ) We a c c e p t t he t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g t o the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1978 Q T a d a t o s h i H o s o i , 1978 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Brit ish Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of Brit ish Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date Oct. 1st., 1*77-8 i i ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis is to study the origin of Japan's modern navy, the history of which began when the ruling Tokugawa Bakufu (Shogunate) opened a naval training school at Nagasaki in 1855. The thesis is therefore concerned primarily with this school, the Nagasaki Naval Training School. From the very beginning, the Dutch, as the only Europeans in Japan in those days, were involved as promoters of the School. The earliest Dutch suggestion that the Bakufu look to the improvement of Japan's defenses was made in 1844 by a delegate who brought a royal letter from King William II to the Shogun. The Dutch King in his letter advised the Japanese to open the country to the world. Again in 1852, prior to the v i s i t of Perry, the Dutch government dispatched an envoy on a steamer, warning of imminent dangers for Japan. The presence of the well-armed steamer worked as a demonstration of modern naval power for the Japanese. After Perry's naval mission of 1853, responding to the Bakufu's request, the Dutch actively made suggestions for the creation of a modern Japanese navy. They initiated the idea of the School and took the responsibility for naval training. The f i r s t half of the thesis tries to answer the question why the Dutch worked hard for the creation of a modern navy for the Japanese in the mid- 1850 's by presenting Dutch act i v i t i e s injdiplomatic negotiations with the Japanese. The argument among some interested Japanese over the issue of national defense i s also discussed, since the Bakufu's decision to build a modern navy was one of the responses that the Japanese made to the enforced opening of Japan's doors to the world in 1853. The Nagasaki Naval Training School provided not only Bakufu samurai students but also local domain students with opportunities to pursue systematic Western- style naval training. The students gradually overcame language and other barriers and learned various modern naval s k i l l s and marine technology and organization. Under the guidance of Dutch instructors, the Bakufu built a factory for the repair of naval ships as a part of the School's supporting f a c i l i t i e s . i i i This was the f i r s t modern factory in Japan u t i l i z i n g machinery from Europe. In spite of successful operation, the Nagasaki Naval Training Schol was o closed in the spring of 1859. The decision to terminate the School was made for p o l i t i c a l reasons, arising from the Japanese side as well as from the Dutch side. While the Dutch feared that the other Western powers would suspect that they were helping the Japanese accumulate naval power to repulse Westerners, the Bakufu became reluctant to give samurai from traditionally anti-Bakufu domains opportunities to learn modern naval technology. These anxieties coincided in the second half of 1858 and f i n a l l y brought the School to an end. Although the School was short-lived, i t had considerable direct and indirect influence on Japanese society. The School educated many naval officers and engineers who would later become not only founders of the Japanese Imperial Navy but also promoters of Japan's shipbuilding and other industries. A medical school with the f i r s t Western-style hospital, started as a part of the Nagasaki Naval Training School, contributed to the education of many medical doctors. Both Bakufu and local domain samurai were sent to the School, and through naval training, they got acquainted with each other. They gradually became aware of the integrity of Japan as a country among other nations, a notion which tended to supplant their exclusive concern with their origins in Bakufu or other domains. The thesis concludes that while many young men from the School became leaders of the new society after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, various f a c i l i t i e s built for the School provided Meiji Japan with a valuable industriallinheritance. TABLE OF CONTENTS P r e f a c e i v C h a p t e r 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n : M a r i t i m e A f f a i r s i n the Tokugawa P e r i o d and the Development o f the D i s c u s s i o n o f M a r i t i m e Defense p. 1 Ch a p t e r 2 The ..Dutch R o y a l L e t t e r o f 1844 p. 19 Chapt e r 3 The Opening o f Japan and N e g o t i a t i o n s on N a v a l M a t t e r s p. 37 Ch a p t e r 4 The N a g a s a k i N a v a l T r a i n i n g S c h o o l p. 5 7 Ch a p t e r 5 C o n c l u s i o n : Reasons f o r the C l o s u r e and the S i g n i f i c a n c e o f the N a g a s a k i N a v a l T r a i n i n g S c h o o l p. 102 F o o t n o t e s F o r . C h a p t e r 1 p. 119 F o r C h a p t e r 2 p. 122 F o r C h a p t e r 3 p. 125 F o r C h a p t e r 4 p. 127 F o r C h a p t e r 5 p. 133 L i s t o f Works C o n s u l t e d • p. 136 V PREFACE In the l a s t 400 years, Japan's naval p o l i c y has varied greatly according to the attitude of the governments of the time towards the rest of the world. Shortly before the Tokugawa period (1603-1867), the Japanese were ocean-going people. Both as traders and r a i d e r s , they t r a v e l l e d a l l along the coasts of Southeastern Asian countries as well as nearby Korea and China. Shipbuilding technology developed r a p i d l y during t h i s period, and, i n the early 17th century, many ships b u i l t i n Japan were said to have compared well with t h e i r European counterparts. But i n the middle of the 17th century the r u l i n g Tokugawa govern- ment adopted a p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n from the rest of the world mainly because i t feared the spread of C h r i s t i a n i t y i n Japan. Doors to the outer world were almost completely closed and the b u i l d i n g of ocean-going ships was s t r i c t l y prohibited. Naturally, no s i g n i f i c a n t development i n the f i e l d of naval a f f a i r s " w a s seen i n this period. The i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y was maintained un- changed u n t i l the middle of the 19th century. In the second h a l f of the 19th century, however, the tendency was d r a s t i c a l l y a l t e r e d . F i r s t f o r the purpose of national defense and then for aggressive advances towards neighbouring i countries, the Japanese devoted themselves to the rapid development of sea power. In less than h a l f a century since the Japanese adopted an offensive p o l i c y towards neighbouring countries, Japan's modern navy grew large enough to dominate the eastern h a l f of the P a c i f i c ocean with v i c t o r i o u s experiences i n the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars and World War I. But i t s glorious h i s t o r y ended i n World War II when almost a l l Japan's naval ships were wiped off the surface of the P a c i f i c Ocean. In less than one century, Japan's modern navy developed from v i r t u a l l y nothing to i t s culmination i n the 1930's and early 1940's. Although many studies have been done on Japan's modern navy, almost a l l of them are about v i the development a f t e r the M e i j i Restoration of 1868. Very few have been presented, even i n Japanese, concerning the o r i g i n of Japan's modern navy i n the middle of the 19th century. The purpose of t h i s thesis i s to f i l l part of thi s gap i n the naval h i s t o r y of the l a t e Tokugawa period. This purpose w i l l be achieved by a study of the Nagasaki Naval Training School, as i t was the f i r s t modern naval i n s t i t u t i o n i n Japan. In other words, the actual develop- ment of Japan's modern navy began when the Nagasaki Naval Training School was opened i n 1855. The School was, however, not an idea s o l e l y of the Japanese. The Dutch at Nagasaki, as the only Europeans i n Japan at that time, were deeply involved i n th i s scheme. Due to the i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y , the shipbuilding technology of Japan was far behind i t s European counterpart. In the develop- ment of a modern navy, the Japanese had to obtain technological and organi- za t i o n a l aid from the Dutch. Therefore, t h i s thesis deals with the r e l a t i o n - ship between Japan and the Netherlands, e s p e c i a l l y i n the middle of the 19th century. By way of introduction, the early Tokugawa maritime defense a f f a i r s w i l l be b r i e f l y discussed, since knowledge of general Tokugawa maritime p o l i c y may help readers understand the development of naval a f f a i r s i n the 19th century. This thesis i s written based on information a v a i l a b l e i n Japanese and English. Because of my lack of knowledge of the Dutch language, I used Dutch materials only when Japanese tr a n s l a t i o n s were a v a i l a b l e . This language problem was, I bel i e v e , to a great extent overcome by the use of r e l i a b l e Japanese t r a n s l a t i o n s , v e r i f i e d from rel a t e d studies. As mentioned above, there are very few studies on the early development of Japan's modern navy. Perhaps Bakumatsu n i okeru Waga Kaigun to Oranda (Japan's Navy and Holland i n the Late Tokugawa Period) published by Mizuta Nobutoshi i n 1929 i s the only work which t r i e d to cover t h i s subject i n d e t a i l . The author says h i s study u t i l i z e d various Dutch documents found i n archives i n the v i i N e t h e r l a n d s . Some of the i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s a t N a g a s a k i between th e Japanese and Dutch i s v e r y v a l u a b l e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , however, the book has some wrong i n f o r m a t i o n and m i s p r i n t s , and i t has no r e f e r e n c e s a t a l l . B e s i d e s M i z u t a ' s s t u d y , K a i g u n R e k i s h i (The H i s t o r y of the Navy) by K a t s u K a i s h u i s a l s o v e r y i m p o r t a n t . I t i s a c o l l e c t i o n of o l d documents w i t h h i s comments, r a t h e r t h a n a d e s c r i p t i v e h i s t o r y . As we s h a l l s e e , K a t s u was one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t f i g u r e s n o t o n l y a t the N a g a s a k i N a v a l T r a i n i n g S c h o o l b u t a l s o i n l a t e Tokugawa and e a r l y M e i j i p o l i t i c s , and h i s K a i g u n R e k i s h i and r e l a t e d w r i t i n g s a r e e s s e n t i a l f o r t h i s s t u d y . Y e t t h e c h r o n o l o g y of some documents i n t h i s book i s i n c o r r e c t and i n f o r m a t i o n of d o u b t f u l v a l i d i t y i s p r o f f e r e d . The p o r t i o n of v a n K a t t e n d y k e ' s d i a r y w r i t t e n i n Japan i s t h e most u s e f u l s o u r c e of i n f o r m a t i o n on how he and o t h e r Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s a t the S c h o o l saw Japanese s t u d e n t s . W i t h r e g a r d t o d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s between the Japanese and D u t c h , the most v a l u a b l e s o u r c e i s the Bakumatsu G a i k o k u K a n k e i Monjo (Documents C o n c e r n i n g F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s i n the L a t e Tokugawa P e r i o d ) , a s e c t i o n o f D a i N i h o n Komonjo ( H i s t o r i c a l Documents o f J a p a n ) , a l t h o u g h t h i s t h e s i s c o u l d u t i l i z e i t ' b t i l y t o a l i m i t e d e x t e n t due t o the u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of c e r t a i n volumes i n Vancouver. T h i s d e f i c i e n c y was compensated f o r by use of works w h i c h made p a r t i a l use of i t s d o c u m e n t a t i o n , and t h e s e a r e l i s t e d i n t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y . I n t h i s t h e s i s Japanese p e r s o n a l names a r e g i v e n i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l form w i t h f a m i l y names p r e c e e d i n g g i v e n names. Japanese words have been u n d e r l i n e d e x c e p t f o r a few common words l i k e " s a m u r a i . " I n the case of a n g l i c i z e d Japanese words, macrons have n o t been used; : f o r example: "shogun" i n s t e a d o f "shogun." A l l t r a n s l a t i o n s were made by the w r i t e r , e x c e p t where a work p u b l i s h e d i n E n g l i s h i s c i t e d as t h e s o u r c e f o r t h e q uoted Japanese m a t e r i a l . v i i i In t h is t h e s i s , dates aire a l l converted to Gregorian calendar equivalents. But f o r convenience i n further research, Japanese dates are added i n brackets: f i r s t year-period (nengo) and then month•and day. Conversions were made based on Gaimu-sho (ed.), Kindai In-yo Reki Taisho-hyo (Conversion Tables of Japanese and Gregorian Calendars for Modern Times, Gaimu-sho, 1951). F i n a l l y I wish to express my s p e c i a l appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. W. Donald Burton, who have p a t i e n t l y rendered assistance and advice to me. I am also g r a t e f u l to Dr. John Howes of the Department of Asian Studies who gave me many important suggestions. I owe my s p e c i a l thanks to Mr. Tsuneharu Gonnami of the Asian Studies Library who help me make f u l l use of the c o l l e c t i o n of the l i b r a r y . T.H. 1 CHAPTER -it Introduction: Maritime A f f a i r s i n the Tokugawa Period and the Development of the Discussion of Maritime Defense The Tokugawa Bakufu"'" governed Japan for more than two and a h a l f centuries (1603-1867). During t h i s period, the Tokugawa Shoguns spent great energy to e s t a b l i s h a s o l i d r u l i n g system. Many regulations and orders were proclaimed i n i t s early stage, and, as time passed, they gradually came to be understood as soho (ancestral laws) that nobody was allowed to change. This was so i n maritime a f f a i r s , too. The regulations and orders of the early 1600's were to remain i n e f f e c t w ell into the 1800's, causing many contradictions i n Bakufu foreign and defense p o l i c i e s . The i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y adopted by the Bakufu and the development of the argument on maritime defense a f f a i r s are the most important issues i n the h i s t o r y of maritime a f f a i r s i n the Tokugawa period. In the l a t e 16th and early 17th centuries, because of p o l i c i e s for the promotion of foreign trade taken by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and h i s successor Tokugawa Ieyasu, the t r a f f i c between Japan and other Asian countries and Europe increased greatly, and t h i s tendency accelerated the development of Japan's shipbuilding industry. As European and Chinese ships often v i s i t e d Japan, Japanese shipwrights a c t i v e l y learned from them. E s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 1604 (Keicho 9), when Ieyasu commenced the Go-shuin-sen Seido (Red Seal Vessel System), which authorized c e r t a i n daimyo, merchants and others to engage i n foreign trade, more and more sturdy ocean-going vessels were required, thus encouraging shipwrights to learn more from advanced foreign technology. The size of Go-shuin-sen varied from 100 tons to more than 700 or 800 tons; however, most ships were about 200 to 300 tons. They were s t i l l b a s i c a l l y t r a d i t i o n a l Japanese-type ships, rather weakly structured ones designed pr i m a r i l y f o r coastal routes, but they already showed many, modifications and 2 innovations learned from European and Chinese ships. 2 On the other hand, as early as 1605 (Keicho 10) Ieyasu already possessed two ships of European design. William Adams, the English pilot/engineer of a Dutch vessel that stranded i n Kyushu i n 1600, b u i l t these two-masted schooners. Their tonnage was said to have been 80 and 120 r e s p e c t i v e l y . The larger one 3 suc c e s s f u l l y s a i l e d across the P a c i f i c Ocean to Mexico i n 1609. Four years l a t e r i n 1613, the l o r d of Sendai han (domain) sent one of h i s retainers to 4 Mexico and Spain. The ship for t h i s mission was also a European-style ship with a company of 180 men."* It was b u i l t under the d i r e c t i o n of Mukai Tadamasa, the f i r s t hereditary admiral of the Funate (water force) of the Bakufu, and probably i t made use of the experience and knowledge obtained from the construction of Adams' ships. These cases ind i c a t e that the Tokugawa Bakufu had been very eager to develop shipbuilding technology i n i t s early stage, and the Japanese a c t u a l l y attained a r e l a t i v e l y high standard of shipbuilding. Along with the development of shipbuilding technology, navigation tech- nology was also greatly advanced during the same period. For voyages of Go-shuin-sen, at f i r s t Japanese often hired European p i l o t s and then learned techniques for open-sea navigation and the knowledge of world geography from them. Their standard was soon raised to a high l e v e l and a very comprehensive navigation manual appeared i n Japanese i n 1618 (Genna 4).^ While the Bakufu encouraged foreign trade, i t paid l i t t l e attention to the development of a naval force. Ieyasu's p o l i c y was to promote foreign r e l a t i o n s through trade but not by m i l i t a r y means. The m i l i t a r y threat from outside Japan could be more e a s i l y ignored i n those days than i n the l a t e 18th and 19th centuries. The only naval achievement was the creation of the Funate ( l i t e r a l l y ship hands, i . e . water f o r c e ) . There were f i v e groups of Funate, and each of them was led by an i n d i v i d u a l Funate admiral with t h i r t y doshin (perhaps g equivalent to petty o f f i c e r s ) and about f i f t y to eighty s a i l o r s . This Funate system was f i r m l y established by the t h i r d Shogun, Iemitsu. Although h i s 3 enthusiasm did not l a s t very long, Iemitsu i n h i s early years planned the expansion of the Funate and had h i s men b u i l d two s p e c i a l warships, the Tenchi Maru i n 1630 (Kan'ei 7) and the Ataka Maru i n 1631. Along with a l l the daimyo i n Edo, Iemitsu even held a review of the f l e e t o f f the town of Shinagawa near ':9 Edo, now Tokyoin'1635. However, as the f i r s t e d ict on the sakoku (closing of the country, i s o l a t i o n ) p o l i c y was issued i n 1633, the Funate, f ar before i t obtained s u f f i c i e n t power to be regarded as a naval force, gradually l o s t i t s raison d'etre i n the Tokugawa m i l i t a r y system. The enforcement of the i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y was not very d i f f i c u l t i n those days. Westerners were usually i n East Asia f o r the propa- gation of C h r i s t i a n i t y and trade without aggressive m i l i t a r y designs. The series of edicts concerning the l i m i t a t i o n s on foreign contacts were imposed between the years 1633 and 1639. In 1635 the Bakufu forbade the Japanese to leave the country, and Japanese residents i n foreign lands were also prohibited from coming back to t h e i r native country. Offenses against the edicts were punishable by death."^ The i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y was actually, completed i n t h i s year. Some Portuguese s t i l l remained i n Nagasaki, a port town i n Kyushu, but they as well were expelled from Japan i n 1639 because of suspected c o l l u s i o n i n the Shimabara Rebellion i n which farmers and samurai revolted against the Bakufu under the banner of Christianity."'""'" As the Shimabara Rebellion was led by Japanese Catholics, the Bakufu f i e r c e l y oppressed missionaries and devotees, and eventually i t cut the t i e s with Catholic countries l i k e Portugal and Spain. Only England and the Netherlands from Europe and China and Korea from Asia were allowed to send t h e i r people f o r trade with the Japanese. After English traders l e f t Japan due to unsuccessful business, the Dutch and Chinese stayed i n Japan 12 ' - i n very small designated areas i n Nagasaki. As one of the means of completing the i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y , the Bakufu placed a p r o h i b i t i o n on the b u i l d i n g and possession of any ships that were more than 4 500 koku capacity (about 50 tons) i n the 1635 version of the Buke Shohatto 13 (Laws f o r the M i l i t a r y Houses). At the same time, the Bakufu imposed r e s t r i c t i o n s on the structure of ships, banning the use of keels and more 14 than one mast on a ship. Later, i n 1638 and 1663, the Bakufu s l i g h t l y relaxed the regulations and allowed ships larger than 500 koku for commercial transportation. The s t r u c t u r a l r e s t r i c t i o n s were, however, not removed."*"^ After that Japan's marine transportation was l i m i t e d to coastal routes served 16 by t r a d i t i o n a l ships such as bezai-bune, or sengoku-bune. And due to the weak structure of the t r a d i t i o n a l ships, Japanese seamen suffered repeatedly from shipwrecks, causing great damage to the national economy. The Bakufu completed the i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y , but the.pQlicy.,was notiguaran- teed by the backup of defense f a c i l i t i e s . The authority of the Bakufu, the moat-like ocean around the country, and perhaps the kamikaze (divine wind) i n case of emergency were considered to be enough to enforce the i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y . By the order of the Bakufu, a l l the Europeans except for the Dutch and English l e f t Japan, and eventually only a Dutch "factory" remained at Dejima (Deshima) i n Nagasaki harbour. The people seldom saw foreign ships i n Japanese waters u n t i l the second h a l f of the 18th century. Almost no coastal defense was provided during t h i s period. The only exception was Nagasaki. As the sole doorway to the outer world, i t was d i r e c t l y governed by the Nagasaki Magistrate, who was responsible to the Bakufu for external trade and defense as well as the administration of t h i s port town."*"̂  The actual defense of Nagasaki was taken care of by Saga han and Fukuoka han, but few improvements were made a f t e r some inadequate defense f a c i l i t i e s were constructed i n the middle of the 17th century. Some changes i n defense arrangements elsewhere were the i n s t a l l a t i o n s of the Uraga Magistracy at the mouth of Edo Bay (Tokyo Bay) i n 1721 (Kyoho 6) and the Ezo Magistracy (or Hakodate Magistracy) i n 1802 (Kyowa 2). Yet these were mere additions of Bakufu posts without any e f f e c t i v e improvement of defense f a c i l i t i e s . Only two s h i p s w h i c h c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d as o c e a n - g o i n g v e s s e l s and had t h e p o t e n t i a l t o be c o n v e r t e d t o n a v a l s h i p s were b u i l t under the Bakufu's a u t h o r i t y , and t h e s e had s h o r t l i v e s and no o f f s p r i n g due t o v a g a r i e s 19 i n the p o l i t i c a l f o r t u n e s o f t h e i r s p o n s o r s . As one c l e a r l y s e e s , the Ba k u f u c o n c e r n e d i t s e l f m a i n l y w i t h d e f e n s e f a c i l i t i e s on l a n d and even where i t was on f i r m ground, o n l y t o a v e r y modest e x t e n t . The Funate c o u l d have been the b a s i s f o r a modern navy, b u t because of the n e g l i g e n c e o f the B a k u f u , i t showed no development a f t e r the 1630's. I n 1842 (Tempo 1 3 ) , the B a k u f u d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l l e d the f o l l o w i n g v e s s e l s : 9 s h i p s w i t h 60 o r more o a r s 16 ' " " 50 25 " " 40 3 11 " 30 n 11 171 " " l e s s t h a n 29 o a r s 20 224 s h i p s i n t o t a l under the Bakufu's d i r e c t c o n t r o l The T e n c h i Maru, the f l a g s h i p o f Tokugawa I e m i t s u ' s f l e e t , had 100 o a r s , and th e s i z e o f the s h i p was s a i d t o be about 100 t o n s . Assuming t h a t t h i s r a t i o o f o a r s t o tonnage c o u l d be a p p l i e d t o o t h e r s h i p s , a l l the above s h i p s t h a t the B a k u f u d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l l e d i n 1842 were much s m a l l e r than 100 t o n s . A n a v a l e x p e r t e x p l a i n s the v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f the B a k u f u w a t e r f o r c e as f o l l o w s : S h i p s w i t h a t l e a s t f o r t y - o a r s were r e q u i r e d f o r n a v a l s t r u g g l e s . However, as t r a d i t i o n a l s h i p s were v e r y p o o r l y c o n s t r u c t e d , once th e y came i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h a Western s h i p , t h e n they w o u l d be b r o k e n i n t o p i e c e s . ^ The Japanese ' w a r s h i p s ' were n o t a t a l l s u i t e d t o modern n a v a l f i g h t i n g . F o r t u n a t e l y f o r the B a k u f u , i t was n o t drawn i n t o s e r i o u s m i l i t a r y con- f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h f o r e i g n e r s t h r o u g h the 17th and e a r l y 1 8 t h c e n t u r i e s . A f t e r the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y , _the B a k u f u d e v o t e d i t s e l f s o l e l y t o the c o m p l e t i o n o f i t s d o m e s t i c r u l i n g s y s tem. But d u r i n g the same p e r i o d , Western c o u n t r i e s were e x p e r i e n c i n g the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n and t h e y were 6 about to go around the world with much more aggressive m i l i t a r y designs. The i n d u s t r i a l development of Russia was slower than the rest of the Western countries, but under the strong leadership of czars l i k e Peter the Great and Catherine II t h i s huge Eurasian country also a c t i v e l y advanced to i t s eastern t e r r i t o r i e s . In the New World, English colonies were gradually accumulating t h e i r powers in t o one united country with t h e i r abundant resources and strong desire f o r independence. The world was changing, whereas most of the Japanese had l i t t l e opportunity to know of i t s progress. The so-called kaibo-ron (argument concerning maritime defense) was born i n the second h a l f of the 18th century when the peaceful reign of the Tokugawa Bakufu was disturbed by the Russian approach from the north. There are two climaxes i n the h i s t o r y of the kaibo-ron; the f i r s t came i n response to increased Russian a c t i v i t y soon a f t e r the kaibo-ron i t s e l f was born, and the second h i t Japan a f t e r the v i s i t of American Commodore Perry i n 1853. At f i r s t the kaibo-ron was an argument among some concerned people who had been studying various matters concerning foreign countries through Dutch books and t h e i r t r a n s l a t i o n s . The most important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the argument .was-it's..'.advocacy of the creation of a nationa l defense system. Under the Tokugawa Bakufu, each han was responsible only for the defense of i t s own domain and sometimes nearby s p e c i a l zones designated by the Bakufu. Although the l o c a l lords were vassals of the Tokugawa, as f a r as defense was concerned, they were responsible f o r the 22 defense of t h e i r own domains. There was no u n i f i e d command against threats from overseas. Under such circumstances, the idea of national defense was quite unique i n those days. Besides t h i s , the kaibo-ron i n general dealt with suitable m i l i t a r y systems f o r Japan, the f i n a n c i a l means to b u i l d an e f f e c t i v e defense system, and the Bakufu-han r e l a t i o n s h i p i n defense a f f a i r s . These ideas were seldom taken into serious consideration by the Bakufu. Instead, i t 7 had a tendency to suppress t h i s sort of discussion i n non-Bakufu c i r c l e s . S t i l l , the necessity for a nation a l defense system gradually came to be under- stood by the Bakufu, and, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r Perry's challenge, national defense became one of the most urgent issues f or the Bakufu to solve. The long campaign of the- kaibo-ron advocates was rewarded when the Bakufu took many dr a s t i c measures for the r e a l i z a t i o n of an e f f e c t i v e national defense system including the creation of a modern navy. Now we w i l l look at the development of the kaibo-ron i n d e t a i l with an emphasis on opinions concerning a modern navy. As early as the l a t e 16th century, the Russians began to explore t h e i r eastern t e r r i t o r i e s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the early 18th century, they became very active under the rule of Peter the Great. In h i s reign, the Russians had already reached the eastern edge of S i b e r i a and proceeded farther down to the Kamchatka Peninsula. Under these circumstances, Peter the Great planned the exploration of the Northern P a c i f i c Ocean and the opening of sea routes to Japan, China and India from S i b e r i a . His plans were r e a l i z e d a f t e r h i s death, during the 1730's. As a part of Admiral Vitus Bering's Northern P a c i f i c Ocean expedition, Captain Martin P. Spanberg commanded a voyage to Japan i n 1739. His ships s a i l e d down along the K u r i l e Islands and then to the c e n t r a l part of Japan on the P a c i f i c side. They several times t r i e d to trade with Japanese 23 ships o f f the coast and eventually v i s i t e d some f i s h i n g v i l l a g e s . In 17.11, Russians f i r s t opened a settlement on the northernmost i s l a n d of the K u r i l e s , and by 1768 they had reached Etorofu Island which was located about 150 kilometers away from Ezo proper (today Hokkaido). After that Russian ships came to v i s i t Ezo more and more frequently. Matsumae han, which ruled Ezo, was to a c e r t a i n extent informed of Russian a c t i v i t i e s on the borders of i t s domain, but i t reported l i t t l e on these to the Bakufu i n Edo. This was because Matsumae han was a f r a i d of i n v i t i n g interference by the Bakufu i n 8 domain a f f a i r s . Although Matsumae han t r i e d to keep the information concerning the Russian a c t i v i t i e s from leaking to the Bakufu, i t came to l i g h t through an unexpected a f f a i r . In 1771, Russian prisoners i n Kamchatka revolted under the leadership of Moritz Aladar von Benyowsky, a Hungarian nobleman, and managed to obtain a 2 5 small Russian ship. On t h e i r way back to Europe, the ship was stranded several times on Japanese shores. While he stayed at Amami Oshima Island, o f f the southern t i p of Kyushu, von Benyowsky wrote several l e t t e r s to the Dutch at Nagasaki. These l e t t e r s were f i r s t sent to the hands of the Bakufu from the i s l a n d e r s , but nobody could read the l e t t e r s because they were written i n German. The Dutch at Nagasaki were requested to translate the l e t t e r s f o r the Bakufu. I t was i n one of these l e t t e r s that von Benyowsky informed the Japanese of a f a l s e Russian plan to invade Japan. He mentioned that he has "important information to d i s c l o s e , " and then he continues that " t h i s year, i n accordance with a Russian order, two g a l l i o t s and a f r i g a t e from Kamchatka s a i l e d around Japan and set down a l l t h e i r findings i n a plan, i n which an attack on Matsma [Matsumae] and the neighbouring islands l y i n g under 41°38' N. Lat. has been 2 6 fixed f o r next year." I t was completely f a l s e information, but a very urgent and concrete warning to the Japanese. Yet nothing was done by the Bakufu. In other words, i t seems that none of the Bakufu o f f i c i a l s could comprehend what von Benyowsky meant i n h i s l e t t e r s . The Bakufu was too poorly informed about the s i t u a t i o n i n the northern t e r r i t o r i e s to take any action based on the warning and i t had very l i t t l e m i l i t a r y preparation f or such a case anyway. P r i o r to the Benyowsky case, a rumour that u n i d e n t i f i e d foreigners from the north engaged i n smuggling with some Japanese i n Ezo had spread among some interested Japanese. As i t was impossible to keep the Dutch and i n t e r p r e t e r s at Nagasaki from confiding the Benyowsky warning to these knowledge-seeking Japanese, the i d e n t i t y of the men from the north was revealed and the concern 9 about the n o r t h was s u d d e n l y h e i g h t e n e d . The k a i b o - r o n was b r o u g h t t o the main s t a g e o f h i s t o r y as a r e s u l t of the Benyowsky w a r n i n g . Some o f t h e e a r l y and most i m p o r t a n t t h e s e s on m a r i t i m e d e f e n s e were w r i t t e n by Kudo H e i s u k e and H a y a s h i S h i h e i . / Kudo H e i s u k e was a d o c t o r f r o m S e n d a i han. When he completed h i s Akaezo F u s e t s u - k o (A Study of Red A i n u [ R u s s i a n s ] R e p o r t s ) i n 1783 (Tenmei 3 ) , the Ba k u f u a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was i n the hands o f Tanuma O k i t s u g u . As Tanuma promoted 27 i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e d u r i n g h i s d a y s , more and more i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e West f l o w e d i n t o Japan w i t h t h e i n c r e a s e o f t r a d e . The main s o u r c e was of c o u r s e the Dutch N a g a s a k i P o s t , and the s t u d y o f the West was c a l l e d Rangaku (Dutch s t u d i e s ) . The k a i b o - r o n was a l s o c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e development o f Rangaku. Kudo v i s i t e d N a g a s a k i t o s t u d y Dutch m e d i c i n e i n 1780. W h i l e i n N a g a s a k i , he l e a r n e d about the Benyowsky w a r n i n g and n o r t h e r n a f f a i r s t h r o u g h some Japanese 28 i n t e r p r e t e r s and t h e S u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f t h e Dutch P o s t . B e i n g alarmed p a r t i c - u l a r l y by the Benyowsky w a r n i n g , he c o n c e n t r a t e d h i s i n t e r e s t much more i n n o r t h e r n a f f a i r s t h a n m e d i c i n e . He c o l l e c t e d f u r t h e r d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n about Ezo and R u s s i a n a c t i v i t i e s t h r o u g h some r e t a i n e r s f r o m Matsumae han, w h i l e he asked some Rangaku-sha ( s c h o l a r s i n Dutch s t u d i e s ) t o t r a n s l a t e some 29 Dutch books about R u s s i a n a f f a i r s . Based on t h e s e , he com p l e t e d the Akaezo F u s e t s u - k o . H a v i n g s t u d i e d R u s s i a n a f f a i r s , Kudo i n h i s book c o n s i d e r s t h a t " t h e R u s s i a n s have h e a r d o f t h e abundance o f p r e c i o u s m e t a l s i n Japan and w i s h 30 t o t r a d e w i t h u s . " And he a d v o c a t e s the development o f Ezo and R u s s i a n t r a d e from the v i e w p o i n t o f m a r i t i m e d e f e n s e and t h e e n r i c h m e n t o f Japan. T h i s book 31 was d i r e c t l y p r e s e n t e d t o Tanuma O k i t s u g u i n 1783 and Kudo's o p i n i o n s were adopted by the B a k u f u , r e s u l t i n g i n t h e d i s p a t c h o f e x p e d i t i o n s t o Ezo i n 1785 and 1786. The i d e a s i n the Akaezo F u s e t s u - k o a c c o r d e d w e l l w i t h Tanuma's p o l i c y of i n d u s t r i a l and c o m m e r c i a l development. By t h e time the e x p e d i t i o n b r o u g h t back i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m the n o r t h , however, Tanuma had d i s a p p e a r e d f r o m the main 10 s t a g e of p o l i t i c s . H i s s u c c e s s o r , M a t s u d a i r a Sadanobu, showed l i t t l e i n t e r e s t 32 i n the i n f o r m a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n the r e p o r t of t h e e x p e d i t i o n . L i k e Kudo, H a y a s h i S h i h e i of t h e same S e n d a i han was a l s o s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h e Benyowsky w a r n i n g when he v i s i t e d N a g a s a k i i n 1772 ( A n ' e i 1 ) . He d e v o t e d h i m s e l f t o the s t u d y of m a r i t i m e d e f e n s e . H i s s t u d y was f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1786 (Tenmei 6) as Sangoku T s u r a n Z u s e t s u (An I l l u s t r a t e d G e n e r a l Review of Three C o u n t r i e s ) i n w h i c h the geography of K o r e a , t h e Ryukyus (Okinawa), and Ezo was e x p l a i n e d . H a y a s h i p a i d most c a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n t o Ezo i n t h i s book, e x p l a i n i n g the R u s s i a n c o l o n i z a t i o n of t h e e a s t and p r e d i c t i n g a p o s s i b l e i n v a s i o n of Ezo. As a countermeasure t o R u s s i a n i n v a s i o n , he a d v o c a t e d t h e development of Ezo. U n l i k e Kudo, who c o n s i d e r e d t h e v i s i t s o f R u s s i a n s as e x p r e s s i o n s of a w i s h t o t r a d e , H a y a s h i t h o u g h t t h e R u s s i a n s were a g g r e s s i v e i n v a d e r s . T h e r e f o r e , he was d e s t i n e d t o s t u d y the p r o b l e m of m a r i ^ 33 time d e f e n s e more d i r e c t l y . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r o f 1787, H a y a s h i p u b l i s h e d t h e f i r s t volume o f t h e epoch-making K a i k o k u H e i d a n ( M i l i t a r y T a l k s f o r a M a r i t i m e N a t i o n ) w h i c h aimed a t the s t u d y of d e f e n s e a g a i n s t t h r e a t s f r o m o v e r s e a s . P r i o r t o t h i s book t h e r e had been many ' a r t of war' books based on d o m e s t i c w a r f a r e i n C h i n a and J a p a n , b u t none of t h o s e books had d e a l t w i t h m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s r e s u l t i n g f r o m e x t e r n a l t h r e a t . A t the v e r y b e g i n n i n g of t h i s book, H a y a s h i s t a t e s the i m p o r t a n c e of c o n s i d e r i n g the g e o g r a p h i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f J apan. What i s meant by a m a r i t i m e n a t i o n ? I t i s a c o u n t r y n o t c o n n e c t e d by l a n d t o any o t h e r , b u t b o r d e r e d on a l l s i d e s by the s e a . There a r e d e f e n s e p r e p a r a t i o n s t h a t a r e s u i t e d t o a m a r i t i m e n a t i o n , and t h a t d i f f e r i n k i n d f r o m t h o s e p r e s c r i b e d i n C h i n e s e m i l i t a r y w o r k s , as w e l l as from t h o s e t r a d i t i o n a l l y t a u g h t i n Japan by v a r i o u s s c h o o l s . 3 4 H a y a s h i f u l l y u n d e r s t o o d t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s between d o m e s t i c and e x t e r n a l w a r f a r e f o r an i s l a n d c o u n t r y l i k e J a p a n , and he a d v o c a t e d the c r e a t i o n of a modern navy modeled a f t e r a European one. W h i l e he was i n 11 Nagasaki, he c a r e f u l l y studied the structure and equipment of Dutch ships. A r e s u l t of the study appeared i n the form of a p i c t o r i a l explanation of a Dutch 35 ship. S o l i d l y - b u i l t and well-equipped warships as well as Dutch-style cannons were his goal for the nation a l defense. M i l i t a r y preparation for Japan means a knowledge of the way to repel foreign invaders, a v i t a l consideration at present. The way to do t h i s i s by naval warfare; the e s s e n t i a l factor i n naval warfare i s cannons. To be well prepared i n these two respects i s the true r e q u i s i t e of Japanese defense, unlike the m i l i t a r y p o l i c i e s appropriate to such continental countries as China and Tartary. Only when naval warfare has been mastered should land warfare be considered.36 In Kaikoku Heidan Hayashi did not d i r e c t l y oppose the Bakufu order that prohibited the b u i l d i n g of large warships, but, explaining Dutch ships very c a r e f u l l y , he claimed that no naval warfare was possible without ones l i k e them. One of the most important demands i n his book was the creation of a modern navy. It i s hard to believe that Hayashi agreed with the Bakufu p r o s c r i p t i o n . Rather, he hesitated to oppose the p r o s c r i p t i o n when he thought the p u b l i c a t i o n of the 37 book i t s e l f might not be acceptable to the a u t h o r i t i e s . Hayashi strongly emphasized the importance of defense around Edo Bay, which was the centre of Tokugawa Japan. As mentioned before, defense f a c i l i t i e s were l i m i t e d to the Nagasaki area i n those days. He writes: A f r o n t i e r l e s s sea road leads from the Nihon Bridge i n Edo to China and Holland. Why i s i t that there are defense i n s t a l l a t i o n s only i n Nagasaki? My suggestion here i s to s t a t i o n some daimyo i n the provinces of Awa and Sagami [now Chiba-ken and Kanagawa-ken] to guard s t r i c t l y the entrance to the [Edo] Bay.;, jWhen the defense 3 g f a c i l i t i e s are being arranged, the Bay area should be given p r i o r i t y . By saying t h i s , Hayashi predicted the p o s s i b i l i t y of invasion d i r e c t l y into Edo Bay by foreign ships and strongly i n s i s t e d on the i n s t a l l a t i o n of b a t t e r i e s around Edo Bay. The defense of Edo Bay would be one of the most serious 39 problems when external a f f a i r s turned out to be urgent, he claimed. Nobody 12 before Hayashi had pointed out the necessity of the defense of Edo Bay. Hayashi completed the e n t i r e 16 volumes of Kaikoku Heidan i n 1791 (Kansei 3), but, as he had anticipated, i t brought a great deal of trouble to him. Soon a f t e r the l a s t volume was published, he was arrested by the Bakufu and h i s books were a l l banned i n the summer of 1792. I t was Matsudaira Sadanobu, the chief roju ( c o u n c i l l o r ) , who ordered the arrest of Hayashi and the ban of h i s writings. Hayashi was considered to have published books that dealt with national a f f a i r s , causing disturbances i n the public mind. Matsudaira once said i n one of h i s writings that "a man of v i r t u e must devote h i s mind to worry 40 about the country, but must not express h i s worry." He could not think of allowing an ordinary man to speak out h i s opinion on nation a l p o l i t i c s . Although Matsudaira sent Hayashi to prison, i t did not mean the former was able to ignore the necessity of improved national defenses strongly advocated by the l a t t e r . The defense of Ezo, e s p e c i a l l y , became a subject of argument among Bakufu o f f i c i a l s as well as interested people. The v i s i t of Russian Lieutenant Adam Laxman on the Ekaterina to Nemuro i n Ezo on October 17, 41 1792 (Kansei 4, 9/2) put further spurs to the argument. Matsudaira began giving serious consideration to the improvement of defense; he inaugurated a cannon range i n the suburbs of Edo, made a personal inspection t r i p around Edo Bay, authorized the construction of observation points around Edo Bay and so 42 on. In f a c t , Matsudaira Sadanobu had to accept Hayashi's opinions. Matsudaira studied foreign a f f a i r s s e r i o u s l y and wrote many theses on maritime defense. In addition, he ordered some of the Japanese scholars 43 of Dutch studies to translate m i l i t a r y books from the Netherlands. However, Matsudaira's fundamental idea on maritime defense concerned not the defense of Japan as a whole but the defense of the Tokugawa Bakufu i t s e l f from the external threat and domestic confusion caused by i t . Nothing that could be u t i l i z e d to destroy the Bakufu system should be b u i l t even though external 13 powers t h r e a t e n e d the c o u n t r y o f J a p a n , he t h o u g h t . I n f l u e n c e d by H a y a s h i ' s w r i t i n g s and a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s around J a p a n , many o t h e r s w r o t e books and me m o r i a l s c o n c e r n i n g n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e and w o r l d geo- graphy, e s p e c i a l l y about R u s s i a . Some o f t h e s e s t u d i e s a r e c a r e f u l l y i n t r o - duced by Donald Keene i n The Japanese D i s c o v e r y o f Europe, 1720-1830. Among some t h a t a r e n o t mentioned by Keene, t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l w r i t e r s i m p o r t a n t t o - 44 our s u b j e c t . Ohara S a k i n g o , a man from S e n d a i , w r o t e H o k u c h i K i g e n (Warnings about the N o r t h Land) i n 1797 ( K a n s e i 9 ) . M a i n themes of h i s book were t h e d e f e n s e o f t h e n o r t h and t h e improvement of m i l i t a r y equipment. Among t h e t h i r t e e n c h a p t e r s on t h o s e s u b j e c t s , C h a p t e r 5, e n t i t l e d ' S o l i d W a r s h i p s S h o u l d be B u i l t i n V a r i o u s Han,' e x p l a i n e d t h e advantages o f W e s t e r n - s t y l e s h i p s and ur g e d t h e Japanese t o b u i l d c o m m e r c i a l - c u m - m i l i t a r y s h i p s i n t h e Wes t e r n way. He c o n s i d e r e d i t b e s t f o r l o c a l han and the B a k u f u t o c o n t r o l t h e s e s h i p s d i r e c t l y and engage them i n c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t i e s i n o r d i n a r y t i m e s . However, he r e a l i z e d t he i m p o r t a n c e o f h a v i n g a u n i f i e d command i n an o c c a s i o n o f emergency. He w r i t e s t h a t " t h e y [new s h i p s ] a r e o r d i n a r y c o m m e r c i a l s h i p s t h a t b e l o n g t o i n d i v i d u a l l o c a l h a n, b u t , i n an emergency t h e y s h o u l d b e l o n g t o 45 nobody [but come under a u n i f i e d command]." T h i s book seems t o have been w e l l r e a d among h i g h - r a n k i n g B a k u f u o f f i c i a l s , c a l l i n g t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o the problems o f n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e and n o r t h e r n a f f a i r s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , h i s p r o p o s a l f o r t he improvement o f m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s was y e t r e g a r d e d as a mere d e s k - t o p t h e o r y . The P h a e t o n i n c i d e n t i n 1808 (Bunka 5) was a s e r i o u s shock f o r the B a k u f u . On O c t o b e r 8 ( 8 / 1 9 ) , the B r i t i s h f r i g a t e P h a e t o n , d i s g u i s e d as a Dutch s h i p , s u d d e n l y anchored i n N a g a s a k i h a r b o u r and abducted some Dutch o f f i c i a l s as h o s t a g e s t o en s u r e the prompt s u p p l y o f p r o v i s i o n s . I n f a c t , t h i s h o s t i l i t y by the P h a e t o n was a p a r t o f w a r t i m e o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t Napoleon's e m p i r e , t o 47 w h i c h the Dutch b e l o n g e d i n t h o s e days. I t was n o t an a t t a c k d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t 14 Japan, yet t h i s incident caused a great commotion throughout the whole country as well as within Bakufu councils. In the following year, even among Bakufu o f f i c i a l s arose voices demanding changes i n the Bakufu m i l i t a r y system. Koga S e i r i , a Confucian professor at - - 48 the Shoheiko, the Bakufu college , wrote a memorial to Bakufu executives. In this memorial he urged Bakufu men to learn naval warfare and help augment defense f a c i l i t i e s . The most important point i n h i s memorial was Koga's advocacy of the suspension of the p r o h i b i t i o n on b u i l d i n g large warships so 49 that an actual naval force could be b u i l t . Less than two decades before, Hayashi Shihei could not advocate t h i s openly. Now, even a Bakufu o f f i c i a l came to speak out i n favour of d r a s t i c changes i n the ancestral law. Although gradually many people began urging the suspension of the pro- h i b i t i o n of large warships, major Bakufu figures t o t a l l y ignored them. Yet people a l l over the country were to experience the foreign presence around them more than ever. Russian Captain V a s i l i Golownin was stranded at Kunashiri Island i n Ezo and captured by the Japanese i n 1811 (Bunka 8). He was returned i n 1813 i n an exchange for some Japanese castaways i n R u s s i a . ^ B r i t i s h ships repeatedly v i s i t e d Japanese waters. In 1818 (Bunsei 1) and 1821 they entered 51 Edo Bay to unsuccessfully seek trade with the Japanese. Their behaviour became more and more h o s t i l e as they were not accepted by the Japanese. In 1824 some English s a i l o r s from whalers landed on the shore i n Mito (now Ibaraki- ken) and were captured. Moreover, some other English foragers s t o l e cows on 52 Takara-jima Island off Satsuma proper (now Kagoshima-ken). In such an atmosphere, pioneers i n the f i e l d of national defense pursued studies of new m i l i t a r y technology and foreign a f f a i r s , despite negative pressure from the Bakufu on most of these private scholars. Sato Nobuhiro, Takano Choei, and Suzuki Shunzan were some of the other famous m i l i t a r y pioneers i n those days. Sato, known as an economist whose main 15 proposal was a c e n t r a l i z e d , u n i f i e d nation based on s t r i c t l y c o n t r o l l e d i n d u s t r i e s , became known as a m i l i t a r y t h e o r i s t and technologist i n h i s early days. Around the years of the Phaeton incident, he wrote several books on a r t i l l e r y , Western geography, and maritime defense p o l i c i e s . Sato's concern then s h i f t e d into the f i e l d of a g r i c u l t u r a l economics u n t i l he concentrated h i s 53 i n t e r e s t once again i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s i n the l a t e 1840's. Suzuki Shunzan's most important achievement was the completion of Heigaku Shoshiki (Ideas on M i l i t a r y Science). Together with Takano Choei, also a Dutch scholar, Suzuki translated several Dutch books i n the f i e l d of m i l i t a r y science and compiled 54 them into t h i s 45 volume work cn contemporary m i l i t a r y science. Covering almost a l l aspects of current m i l i t a r y science including the b u i l d i n g of war- ships, t h i s opus was completed before 1839 (Tempo 10), but, perhaps because of the Bansha no Goku (Imprisonment of Western Scholars) i n 1839, i n which Takano and h i s associate Watanabe Kazan were arrested by the Bakufu, the work was not published u n t i l 1846 (Koka 3 ) . 5 5 After Koga S e i r i wrote h i s memorial i n 1809, few unconventional opinions concerning the b u i l d i n g of a modern navy appeared, though some men l i k e Sato, Takano, and Suzuki mentioned the importance of modern ships. This quiescence was, a f t e r a l l , due to the strongly oppressive attitu d e of the Bakufu against any private a c t i v i t i e s i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s by non-Bakufu people. The b u i l d i n g of large warships was prohibited by the ancestral law which was the supreme sanction that regulated a l l Bakufu a c t i v i t i e s . Besides, the cost required to b u i l d large sea-worthy ships was almost p r o h i b i t i v e to l o c a l han,' :most•Of which suffered serious f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . Therefore, when few approaches were made by foreigners, l i t t l e room existed to allow the growth of opinion i n favour of a modern navy. Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito han was one of the most powerful advocates who argued the necessity of large warships for the defense of Japan. Unlike the 16 a f o r e m e n t i o n e d a d v o c a t e s among t h e s a m u r a i c r i t i c s o f t h e B a k u f u , he p o s s e s s e d power t o p u r s u e the b u i l d i n g of a modern navy. A f t e r he t o o k the l o r d s h i p o f M i t o han i n 1829 ( B u n s e i 12) he e a g e r l y d e v o t e d h i m s e l f t o the r e a l i z a t i o n of m i l i t a r y r e f o r m s n o t o n l y i n h i s own domain b u t a l s o a t t h e B a k u f u l e v e l . I t was he who r e p e a t e d l y demanded th e s u s p e n s i o n of the p r o h i b i t i o n o f t h e b u i l d i n g of l a r g e w a r s h i p s . A c c o r d i n g t o M i t o han S h i r y o ( H i s t o r i c a l Documents o f M i t o Han), as e a r l y as t h e f i r s t h a l f of t h e 1830's, he p l a n n e d the b u i l d i n g of a l a r g e w a r s h i p . He employed s e v e r a l Rangaku-sha and had them t r a n s l a t e Dutch 5 6 books about s h i p b u i l d i n g . When N a r i a k i w r o t e a m e m o r i a l t o t h e B a k u f u i n 1834 c o n c e r n i n g the development of t h e Ezo a r e a , he d i d n o t f o r g e t t o m e n t i o n t h a t t h e s h i p s t o promote n o r t h e r n development s h o u l d be D u t c h - s t y l e d . ^ ^ I n 1838 (Tempo 9 ) , he w r o t e a m e m o r i a l c o n c e r n i n g t h e b u i l d i n g of l a r g e w a r s h i p s , p l a n n i n g t o send i t d i r e c t l y t o the Shogun. N a r i a k i h e r e emphasized t h e p r o b l e m o f the f r e q u e n t s h i p w r e c k of t r a d i t i o n a l Japanese s h i p s as w e l l as the 58 e x t e r n a l c r i s i s i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n the s u s p e n s i o n of t h e a n c e s t r a l law. T h i s m e m o r i a l was n o t s u b m i t t e d u n t i l the n e x t y e a r , b u t N a r i a k i q u i c k l y advanced h i s p l a n i n h i s own domain. Soon a f t e r he w r o t e t h i s m e m o r i a l , he o r d e r e d h i s men t o b u i l d a m i n i a t u r e model of a Dutch s h i p . As a r e s u l t , a n i n e - f o o t l o n g model s h i p was c o m p l e t e d and used by h i s r e t a i n e r s t o s t u d y t h e s t r u c t u r e , 59 c o n s t r u c t i o n and n a v i g a t i o n of a W e s t e r n - s t y l e s h i p . He a l s o e n j o i n e d h i s men t o s e c u r e s u f f i c i e n t t i m b e r f o r f u t u r e s h i p b u i l d i n g . The m e m o r i a l was t h e n handed o v e r t o the Shogun i n t h e summer of 1839. But i t seems t h i s m e m o r i a l was s h e l v e d by the B a k u f u . A f t e r t h e Japanese h e a r d t h e news of the Opium War, Tokugawa N a r i a k i . became even more e n t h u s i a s t i c f o r t h e b u i l d i n g of l a r g e w a r s h i p s . I n 1843 — 60 (Tempo 14) he r e p e a t e d l y r e q u e s t e d t h e s u s p e n s i o n of t h e a n c e s t r a l law. The B a k u f u , though i t had by t h e n r e a l i z e d t h e danger of e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , r e j e c t e d N a r i a k i ' s r e q u e s t , s a y i n g t h a t " i t c o u l d be immeasurably h a r m f u l i f the daimyo 17 of the w e s t e r n p r o v i n c e s and o t h e r s c o u l d p l a n and f r e e l y b u i l d e x t r a o r d i n a r y 61 s h i p s " as a r e s u l t o f t h e s u s p e n s i o n o f t h e a n c e s t r a l law. M o r e o v e r , i n 1844, N a r i a k i was p u n i s h e d and o r d e r e d t o c o n f i n e h i m s e l f t o h i s mansion, r e t i r i n g f r om an a c t i v e r o l e . The B a k u f u became s u s p i c i o u s o f h i s m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s 62 and f e l t u n e a s i n e s s w i t h t h i s a m b i t i o u s l o r d o f M i t o . The l a s t i m p o r t a n t m e m o r i a l c o n c e r n i n g m a r i t i m e d e f e n s e b e f o r e the Dutch government s e n t a m i s s i o n i n 1844 was w r i t t e n by :Sakuma Shozan. Sakuma was a C o n f u c i a n i s t f r o m M a t s u s h i r o han (now Nagano-ken), t h e l o r d o f w h i c h was Sanada Y u k i t s u r a , a son of M a t s u d a i r a Sadanobu. Sanada was a p p o i n t e d t o be a r o j u i n 1841 and too k charge o f c o a s t d e f e n s e a f f a i r s . Sanada chose Sakuma as h i s a d v i s o r f o r d e f e n s e a f f a i r s and o r d e r e d him t o make a s u r v e y o f f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . As a r e s p o n s e , i n 1842, Sakuma s u b m i t t e d a r e p o r t t o h i s l o r d . T h i s was t h e s o - c a l l e d K a i b o Hassaku ( E i g h t Measures f o r C o a s t a l D e f e n s e ) . Sakuma h e r e e s p e c i a l l y s t r e s s e d t h e n e c e s s i t y o f Western f i r e a r m s and t h e c r e a t i o n o f a modern navy. He i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e B a k u f u s h o u l d s t o p e x p o r t i n g copper t o the Dutch i n o r d e r t o found as many W e s t e r n - s t y l e cannons as p o s s i b l e . W i t h r e g a r d t o a navy, he recommended t h e p u r c h a s e o f some twenty modern war- s h i p s from the N e t h e r l a n d s b e s i d e s i n v i t i n g m i l i t a r y e n g i n e e r s and s h i p w r i g h t s t o b u i l d a s t r o n g navy. He a l s o denounced t h e B a k u f u a n c e s t r a l law t h a t banned the b u i l d i n g o f l a r g e w a r s h i p s , s a y i n g t h a t a modern navy was the o n l y means t o 63 d e f e n d the c o u n t r y from the e x t e r n a l t h r e a t . Not much i s known about how Sanada and the B a k u f u under c h i e f r o j u Mizuno T a d a k u n i e v a l u a t e d t h e s e p r o p o s a l s , b u t the d o w n f a l l o f Mizuno i n 1843 w i p e d out t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a d o p t i n g them. As a r o j u who had s u p p o r t e d M i z u n o ' s v a r i o u s r e f o r m s , Sanada a l s o l o s t power a f t e r Mizuno l e f t t he B a k u f u . C o n s e q u e n t l y , Sanada r e s i g n e d i n 1844, thus b r i n g i n g a f i n a l b l ow t o Sakuma's d r a s t i c p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e c r e a t i o n o f a modern navy. As we have se e n , by 1844 many p e o p l e i n c l u d i n g some B a k u f u men i n v o l v e d 18 themselves i n the kaibo-ron discussions and advocated changes i n the ancestral laws which had been obstacles to changes i n Bakufu p o l i c i e s on foreign and defense a f f a i r s . However, none of t h e i r proposals were taken into serious consideration by Bakufu executives. By t h i s time they had been informed of the Opium War i n China. S t i l l they merely considered i t was 'a f i r e on the other side of the r i v e r , 1 and they were unwilling to change the ancestral laws. In the 200 years of peaceful reign, the Tokugawa Bakufu had become too obtuse to adjust i t s e l f to the changes of the world. On the other hand, some l o c a l han, e s p e c i a l l y i n the southwestern part of^. the country, gave more serious attention to the proposals on coastal defense and the creation of a modern navy. For instance, at a han school i n Choshu (today Yamaguchi-ken), the study of Hayashi Shihei's once-prohibited w r i t i n g 64 Kaikoku Heidan became compulsory. Some southwestern domains were much more se n s i t i v e to the changes of the world than the Bakufu i n Edo, and i t was i n these domains that the kaibo-ron discussion on maritime defense thrived. Outside stimulus was necessary to s h i f t Bakufu foreign and defense • '. p o l i c i e s , and such stimulus was on i t s way over the horizon. 19 CHAPTER 2 The Dutch R o y a l L e t t e r o f 1844 I n h i s K a i g u n R e k i s h i (The H i s t o r y o f the N a v y ) , K a t s u K a i s h u ( a l s o c a l l e d R i n t a r o , Y o s h i k u n i , Awa,^Yasuyoshi) w r o t e : I n t he s e v e n t h month of t h e f i r s t y e a r o f Koka ( A u g u s t , 1844), the Dutch K i n g s e n t h i s w a r s h i p Palembang t o N a g a s a k i . The C a p t a i n , H.H.F. Coops, b r o u g h t a r o y a l l e t t e r [ t o t h e B a k u f u ] . The l e t t e r was c o r d i a l a d v i c e , f r o m w h i c h Japan o b t a i n e d not a l i t t l e b e n e f i t . T h i s v i s i t u r g e d the Japanese t o c o n s i d e r t h e b u i l d i n g o f a navy....-'- K a t s u i s w e l l known today n o t o n l y as one of the most i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e s who made the smooth t r a n s f e r of power from the Tokugawa B a k u f u t o the M e i j i govenment p o s s i b l e i n t h e c o n f u s i o n o f t h e l a t e Tokugawa and e a r l y M e i j i p e r i o d s b u t a l s o as a f o u n d e r o f Japan's modern navy. The Japanese navy grew v e r y q u i c k l y a f t e r f u l l - s c a l e W e s t e r n i z a t i o n began i n t h e 1870's. But p r i o r t o t h i s , t h e r o l e p e r f o r m e d by K a t s u i n the f o u n d i n g of a modern navy was f a r more i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f o t h e r s . When K a t s u v i r t u a l l y r e t i r e d from M e i j i p o l i t i c s i n t h e l a t e 1880's, he d e v o t e d h i m s e l f t o the w r i t i n g o f h i s memoirs and t h e c o m p i l i n g of i m p o r t a n t documents o f t h e l a t e Tokugawa p e r i o d . The K a i g u n R e k i s h i i s one o f h i s endeavours i n t h o s e days. T h i s i m p o r t a n t f i g u r e , K a t s u K a i s h u , acknowledged t h a t t h e v i s i t o f t h e Palembang o f the N e t h e r l a n d s w i t h a r o y a l l e t t e r i n 1844 gave a g r e a t impetus t o t he Japanese i n the c r e a t i o n o f a modern navy. I t i s t h e r e f o r e n e c e s s a r y f o r us t o r e v i e w t h e back g r o u n d o f t h i s Dutch m i s s i o n t o Tokugawa Japan. The main emphasis w i l l be p l a c e d on why the Dutch' government d e c i d e d t o send an envoy t o Japan a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e , and what k i n d o f impact was c r e a t e d i n the c h a n g i n g p o l i t i c s o f the l a t e Tokugawa p e r i o d as a r e s u l t o f t h e v i s i t o f the Dutch envoy. F o r more t h a n 200 y e a r s a f t e r t h e c l o s u r e o f t h e c o u n t r y i n the 1630's, 20 Dutch merchants c o n t i n u e d t r a d e w i t h t h e Japanese a t N a g a s a k i . The D u t c h , t o g e t h e r w i t h C h i n e s e m e r c h a n t s , m o n o p o l i z e d the Japanese t r a d e a f t e r the B a k u f u i n s t i t u t e d t h e i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y . As t h e D u t c h were the o n l y Europeans i n Japan t h r o u g h most of t h e Tokugawa p e r i o d , t h e y e n j o y e d a monopoly i n t h i s p r o f i t a b l e b u s i n e s s . Because o f t h e h i g h p r o f i t , the Dutch merchants s u b j e c t e d t h e m s e l v e s t o poor t r e a t m e n t by the B a k u f u a t Dejima (Deshima), the t i n y a r t i f i c i a l i s l a n d i n N a g a s a k i h a r b o u r . They were a c t u a l l y c o n f i n e d on the i s l a n d and always watched by B a k u f u o f f i c i a l s . The Dutch t r a d e w i t h J a p a n , however, d e t e r i o r a t e d y e a r a f t e r y e a r , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the e a r l y 1 8 t h c e n t u r y . The b i g g e s t r e a s o n f o r t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f t h e t r a d e were the r e s t r i c t i o n s on f o r e i g n t r a d e and monetary p o l i c i e s o f t h e B a k u f u . The number of Dutch t r a d i n g s h i p s was o r d e r e d t o be c u t g r a d u a l l y ; t h e i m p o r t a t i o n o f some v e r y p r o f i t a b l e goods was f o r b i d d e n ; moreover, r e p e a t e d r e - c o i n a g e of g o l d c u r r e n c y caused a 2 ( s e r i o u s d i s a d v a n t a g e f o r the Dutch merchants i n money exchange. B e s i d e s t h e s e r e a s o n s t r a c e a b l e t o the J a p a n e s e , the Dutch merchants a l s o seem t o have s h a r e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the poor t u r n o v e r of t r a d e . S i r Thomas St a m f o r d R a f f l e s of B r i t a i n c e n s u r e d the c o r r u p t conduct of t h e Dutch merchants a t N a g a s a k i i n h i s H i s t o r y o f J a v a . He j u d g e d t h a t " t h e Dutch f a c t o r y [ a t "... N a g a s a k i ] was, and i s , i n f a c t , a s i n k o f t h e most d i s g r a c e f u l c o r r u p t i o n and 3 p e c u l a t i o n w h i c h e v e r e x i s t e d . " As R a f f l e s was an E n g l i s h m a n who had been t r y i n g t o t a k e o v e r t h e p o s i t i o n h e l d by the Dutch a t N a g a s a k i , h i s a c c o u n t s were v e r y h o s t i l e t o the D u t c h . Y e t t h e m i s c o n d u c t of b u s i n e s s was q u i t e common a t N a g a s a k i . A Japanese h i s t o r i a n s ays t h a t " t h e Dutch E a s t I n d i a Company p u r s u e d o n l y i t s p r o f i t s , s a c r i f i c i n g t h e d i g n i t y o f the c o u n t r y and 4 the honour of i t s p e o p l e . " And he c o n t i n u e s t h a t " t h i s f a c t made th e Japanese s c o r n the Dutch m e r c h a n t s , c r e a t i n g a s e r i o u s b a r r i e r when t h e Japanese and Dutch needed a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of each o t h e r . The s o - c a l l e d Tempo Reforms (1841-1843) by Mizuno T a d a k u n i , w h i c h 21 prohibited the use of imported luxuries as w e l l as domestic ones, further worsened the Dutch-Japanese trade, since imported goods i n those days were mainly expensive luxury items from China and European countries. Under such circumstances the Dutch gradually came to consider that free trade, though they might face severe competition with the other Western countries, would be much more p r o f i t a b l e i n the long run than the current monopoly system under the s t r i c t c o n t r o l of the Bakufu. In the f i e l d of foreign a f f a i r s , the f i r s t few decades i n the 19th century ushered i n considerable confusion i n r e l a t i o n s with Western countries. Many contradictory orders were issued one a f t e r another by the Bakufu. The Mu-ninen (No Second Thought) Expulsion Order i n 1825 (Bunsei 8) r e f l e c t s t h i s confused foreign p o l i c y . The order enjoined a l l the l o c a l han and Bakufu a u t h o r i t i e s to destroy any foreign ships which came close to Japanese shores and capture or k i l l any crews who might l a n d . 7 This order was one of the countermeasures against troubles caused by the increasing number of foreign ships i n Japanese g waters. Before the issue of th i s order, the fundamental Bakufu p o l i c y towards foreign ships approaching the Japanese coastlines was found i n an 1806 (Bunka 3) order which instru c t e d the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s to supply foreign ships with necessary provisions, water and f u e l , and to ask them to leave Japan by 9 explaining the Bakufu's i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y . The d r a s t i c change i n i t s foreign p o l i c y i n 1825 was a r e s u l t of the troubles caused by foreign ships, but i t did not s i g n i f y that e i t h e r the Bakufu or l o c a l han held s u f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y power to carry out the new order. When the Morrison of the United States came to Japan i n 1837 (Tempo 8) to bring back some Japanese castaways as well as to open trade with Japan, the ship was shelled by the Japanese. The Morrison, because of i t s peaceful intent, did not carry any e f f e c t i v e weapons against the bombardment, so i t was obliged to leave Japan without a t t a i n i n g i t s purposes. This case, however, did not 22 p r o v e t h a t the c o a s t a l d e f e n s e s y s t e m of Japan under the new o r d e r was w o r k i n g . R a t h e r , the Japanese were f o r t u n a t e because the M o r r i s o n d i d n o t c a r r y any weapons w h i c h would a l l o w i t t o r e s o r t t o f o r c e . The M o r r i s o n case c r e a t e d s e r i o u s arguments n o t o n l y among B a k u f u o f f i c i a l s b u t a l s o among Rangaku-sha such as Watanabe Kazan and Takano C h o e i . They o p e n l y o r c o v e r t l y denounced the B a k u f u f o r e i g n p o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y the Mu-ninen E x p u l s i o n Order. F o r example, Watanabe i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h m i g ht r a i d J a p an, c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y was a n t i - h u m a n i t a r i a n . W h i l e the M o r r i s o n case d e v e l o p e d i n t o one of t h e most s e r i o u s p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e s b e t - ween the f a c t i o n s p r o and con Western s t u d i e s , the n e i g h b o u r i n g C h i n e s e e m p i r e , w h i c h a l s o m a i n t a i n e d a s t r o n g i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y , was about t o be i n v o l v e d i n a war a g a i n s t G r e a t B r i t a i n . News c o n c e r n i n g t h e Opium War i n C h i n a f r e q u e n t l y came t o N a g a s a k i t h r o u g h Dutch and C h i n e s e s h i p s . The Dutch news was s e n t t o t h e B a k u f u i n the form of B e t s u d a n F u s e t s u - g a k i ( E x t r a News R e p o r t s ) . I n 1840, 1842, and 1843, a t o t a l o f f o u r Dutch E x t r a News R e p o r t s about the Opium War r e a c h e d t h e B a k u f u . They were based on the i n f o r m a t i o n a p p e a r i n g i n S i n g a p o r e E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e news- p a p e r s , and they e x p l a i n e d t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e war, from t h e cause of t h e con- f l i c t t o the Nanking T r e a t y . The r e p o r t s i n p a r t i c u l a r a n a l y z e d the C h i n e s e d e f e a t by the B r i t i s h Navy. As the r e p o r t s were based on p r o - B r i t i s h news- p a p e r s , the d e f e a t s of C h i n e s e t r o o p s were p r o m i n e n t l y m e n t i o n e d . On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e C h i n e s e s e n t more r e p o r t s t h a n the Dutch d i d , b u t t h e y were l e s s a c c u r a t e u n t i l Chapu i n C h e k i a n g P r o v i n c e , t h e base of the C h i n e s e s h i p s t o N a g a s a k i , was r a i d e d and o c c u p i e d by the B r i t i s h . The C h i n e s e r e p o r t s of t h a t e v e n t c o n t a i n e d v i v i d i m p r e s s i o n s of w a r f a r e w h i c h p i t t e d modern Western 12 weapons a g a i n s t t r a d i t i o n a l and o b s o l e t e C h i n e s e ones. The B a k u f u l e a r n e d from t h e r e s u l t o f t h e Opium War t h a t the i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y was dangerous and c o u l d n o t c o n t i n u e i n the f a c e of modern Western 23 weapons. S t i l l , the Bakufu hesitated to change i t s foreign p o l i c y fundamentally. The only clear step of r e - o r i e n t a t i o n that the Bakufu took was to discontinue the Mu-ninen Expulsion Order. Instead of th i s anachronistic order, the Bakufu 13 resuscitated the old 1806 order. The 1842 change of Bakufu p o l i c y was soon reported to the Dutch Nagasaki 14 Post. In a l e t t e r to the Superintendent of the Post, the Bakufu said: From now on, when foreigners come ashore to obtain provisions, water and f u e l , they s h a l l not be expelled by force; instead, amicable arrangements are to be made so that they w i l l be able to leave Japan. Thus, the Dutch people can v i s i t Japan with a sense of se c u r i t y . Foreigners should be thankful f o r such probity and f u l l y understand t h i s benign treatment.15 Reading t h i s l e t t e r , the Superintendent considered the re-adoption of the 1806 order a good opportunity to improve the a i l i n g Dutch-Japanese trade, and, at the same time, he understood that he had been asked to make the order widely known to other Western peoples. This was an example of how the o r i g i n a l rather vague Japanese could be misinterpreted as a r e s u l t of inadequate t r a n s l a t i o n . 16 He immediately wrote a report on th i s matter to the Dutch government. In the Netherlands, J.C. Baud, the Minister of the Colonies, led i n the formulation of p o l i c y towards Japan. After examining the report on the Bakufu's new p o l i c y , he decided not to make i t known to the other Western countries. He was a f r a i d that the others might regard the Bakufu's adoption of the new p o l i c y as an i n d i c a t i o n of the suspension of the i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y . I f the order were to be understood by other Westerners to mean that the Japanese welcomed f o r - eigners, more Western ships would be v i s i t i n g Japan, thus creating problems for both the Dutch and Japanese; while the Japanese might face unexpected c o n f l i c t s with the other Westerners, the Dutch would become involved i n strong trade competition with other Westerners. The Dutch, as mentioned e a r l i e r , were 24 gradually changing t h e i r trade p o l i c y with Japan from monopoly to free trade. But the change had to be done slowly under the leadership of the Dutch them- selves i n order to keep t h e i r superior p o s i t i o n i n Japanese trade. Baud had s u f f i c i e n t reasons to keep the information from leaking to the other Western countries. Instead, he decided to send an envoy to Japan to suggest the spontaneous opening of the country, explaining the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n and warning of possible future c o n f l i c t s i n case Japan remained wedded to the t r a d i t i o n a l i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y . A f t e r a l l , i t was a very good chance f o r the Dutch to r e - e s t a b l i s h better commercial r e l a t i o n s with Japan. While Baud, as the minister responsible f o r Japanese a f f a i r s , elaborated his plan, a medical doctor was also considering the future r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Netherlands and Japan. Dr. P h i l i p p Franz von Siebold was one of the few people i n Europe who understood the p o s i t i o n of Japan i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s at that time, and the role he performed i n Netherlands-Japan r e l a t i o n s was very important. As i s now well-known, he f i r s t went to Japan i n 1823 (Bunsei 6) as a medical doctor for the Nagasaki Post and stayed there u n t i l 1829. Besides h i s medical and other s c i e n t i f i c contributions to the Japanese, a f t e r h i s return from Japan, he came to be known i n Europe as an expert i n the study of Japan and the Japanese. His most important p u b l i c a t i o n , based on researches 18 i n Japan, was published i n Leiden i n 1832 under the t i t l e of Nippon. Von Siebold understood that f o r the Japanese the i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y was not only commercially unprofitable but also m i l i t a r i l y dangerous. He was convinced that many Japanese hoped f o r the spontaneous opening of the country. During his stay i n Japan, he once reported to the Dutch government that some Japanese were hoping for the a b o l i t i o n of the i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y i n order f o r them to have 19 better access to the Western world. After he returned to the Netherlands from Japan, he made approaches to the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of government to promote diplomacy i n favour of the opening of Japan. His conviction was further 25 strengthened by the r e s u l t of the Opium War. In October, 1840, King William (Willem), whose confidence von Siebold had won, ascended to the throne. Von Siebold thus obtained an opportunity to r e a l i z e h i s long-held wish to devote himself to the establishment of a new r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Netherlands and Japan. The Dutch government f i n a l l y decided to send an envoy with a royal l e t t e r to Japan to advise the a b o l i t i o n of the i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y and the opening of the country. In November, 1843, Baud o f f i c i a l l y requested von Siebold to draft 20 a royal l e t t e r to the Shogun. There are many factors that motivated the Dutch government to send a mission to Japan. The t r a d i t i o n a l close r e l a t i o n s h i p , even describable as 21 friendship, between the two countries greatly influenced the process of decision-making. Yet, the most important f a c t o r was of course economic. The Dutch government, l i k e the other Western countries, pursued the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e a l i z i n g the f u l l opening of Japan. It understood that free trade, instead of the current r e s t r i c t e d trade with Japan, would be a more r e a l i s t i c way to improve the poor turnover of i t s business i n Japan i f i t could be the leader i n Japanese a f f a i r s by f i n d i n g an opportunity to open Japan. Later i n 1846, when von Siebold heard that warships from France and the United States had v i s i t e d Japan, he set f o r t h proposals i n h i s private magazine for the p o l i c y that the Dutch government should take towards Japan. Although he wrote a f t e r the Dutch King sent h i s l e t t e r to Japan i n 1844, s t i l l we can assume that the attitude held by von Siebold and the Dutch government on t h i s a f f a i r changed l i t t l e i n those years. He would write: Under these circumstances [the v i s i t s of the warships of France and the United States], our government should continue to extend further endeavours and kind advice for the opening of Japan. Thus, when Japan opens i t s doors to the world, our country s h a l l n a t u r a l l y receive benefits from i t as other countries s h a l l do.22 26 On August 15, 1844 (Koka 1, 7/2), the f r i g a t e Palembang c a r r y i n g the r o y a l l e t t e r o f K i n g W i l l i a m I I appeared i n N a g a s a k i h a r b o u r . About two weeks b e f o r e t h i s a r r i v a l , a n o t h e r Dutch s h i p had r e p o r t e d the coming v i s i t o f t h e Palembang t o the B a k u f u N a g a s a k i o f f i c i a l s , so w a r r i o r s from Saga han were on a f u l l a l e r t t o guard t h e h a r b o u r . R e s p o n s i b l e o f f i c i a l s i n N a g a s a k i s t i l l remembered 23 the b i t t e r case o f the Phaeton i n 1808. The t o p B a k u f u N a g a s a k i o f f i c i a l who f e l t d i s g r a c e d by the i n c i d e n t had committed s u i c i d e . However, the Palembang, though i t was a l s o a w a r s h i p , b e l o n g e d t o the N e t h e r l a n d s w i t h w h i c h Japan had p r e s e r v e d a good r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r more th a n two hundred y e a r s . C a p t a i n H.H.F . Coops, the o f f i c i a l envoy o f the K i n g , was welcomed by P i e t e r A l b e r t B i k , the S u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f the Dutch N a g a s a k i P o s t . Izawa M a s a y o s h i , the N a g a s a k i M a g i s t r a t e , i m m e d i a t e l y d i s p a t c h e d a messenger t o Edo t o ask i n s t r u c t i o n s f r o m the B a k u f u r o j u c o n c e r n i n g t h e Dutch m i s s i o n . I n Edo, - - 24 the r o j u , i n c l u d i n g Abe M a s a h i r o and Mizuno T a d a k u n i , a g r e e d t o r e c e i v e the r o y a l l e t t e r and s e n t back n e c e s s a r y i n s t r u c t i o n s t o the N a g a s a k i M a g i s t r a t e ' s O f f i c e . One and a h a l f months a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l a t N a g a s a k i , C a p t a i n Coops, t o g e t h e r w i t h B i k , f i n a l l y p r e s e n t e d t h e r o y a l l e t t e r t o Izawa on O c t o b e r 1 ( 8 / 2 0 ) . The l e t t e r was soon f o r w a r d e d t o Edo i n the hands of o f f i c i a l s and an i n t e r p r e t e r . C a p t a i n Coops r e p e a t e d l y a sked the B a k u f u t o p r e p a r e a r e p l y f r o m the Shogun as soon as p o s s i b l e , s a y i n g h i s s h i p had t o l e a v e N a g a s a k i by t h e end o f November ( 1 0 / 2 1 ) , m a i n l y because of w e a t h e r c o n d i t i o n s . Izawa u n d e r s t o o d Coop's r e q u e s t , and he asked the B a k u f u r o j u f o r e a r l y i n s t r u c t i o n s . The r o j u approved the r e q u e s t and s e n t C a p t a i n Coops a l e t t e r t o acknowledge the r e c e i p t of K i n g W i l l i a m ' s l e t t e r . I t p r o m i s e d t h a t the B a k u f u would c a r e f u l l y examine 25 the message and t h e n w r i t e back t o the Dutch government. Thus, a f t e r more t h a n t h r e e months s t a y , C a p t a i n Coops and h i s Palembang ended t h e i r m i s s i o n u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y and l e f t N a g a s a k i on November 27 ( 1 0 / 1 8 ) . 27 The r o y a l l e t t e r was d a t e d F e b r u a r y 15, 1844, and b o r e t h e s i g n a t u r e s o f the K i n g and J.C. Baud. I t f i r s t m e n tioned t h e e a r l y h i s t o r y o f Dutch-Japanese r e l a t i o n s and t h e n gave d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n about r e c e n t A n g l o - C h i n e s e c o n - f l i c t s i n w h i c h the C h i n e s e empire had been e a s i l y d e f e a t e d and r e q u i r e d t o open f i v e p o r t s f o r t r a d e as a r e s u l t o f t h e Nanking T r e a t y . The l e t t e r warned the B a k u f u o f t h e p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s o f the Opium War on Japan. T a k i n g t h e C h i n e s e c a s e as an example, t h e r o y a l l e t t e r c a r e f u l l y e x p l a i n e d the n a t u r e o f the f o r e i g n p o l i c y o f G r e a t B r i t a i n , and t h e cause and t h e r e s u l t o f t h e Opium War. And t h e n i t p r e d i c t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n f l i c t between the Japanese and W e s t e r n e r s w h i c h m i g h t l e a d t o w a r s , i n c a s e t h e B a k u f u chose t o r e m a i n i n i s o l a t i o n . The l e t t e r c o n c l u d e d t h e argument by s a y i n g t h a t t h e B a k u f u s h o u l d a m e l i o r a t e t h e laws a g a i n s t f o r e i g n e r s , u r g i n g t h e o p e n i n g o f t h e c o u n t r y and 26 the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f u n r e s t r i c t e d t r a d e . A f t e r r e c e i p t o f t h e l e t t e r , t he B a k u f u r o j u h e l d a s e r i e s o f d i s c u s s i o n s . B e s i d e s t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s , o p i n i o n s from t h e d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s o f B a k u f u o f f i - c i a l d o m were a l s o sought on t h i s m a t t e r . T h i s q u i t e u n u s u a l p r a c t i c e t e l l s us how the B a k u f u was a t a l o s s t o d e a l w i t h t h e r o y a l l e t t e r . On t h i s o c c a s i o n , Mizuno T a d a k u n i a g a i n s e r v e d as the c h i e f r o j u , b u t he no l o n g e r k e p t the 27 s t r o n g l e a d e r s h i p he had e n j o y e d i n t h e days o f the Tempo Reforms. The d e t a i l s of t h e Ba k u f u ' s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s c o n c e r n i n g t h e r o y a l l e t t e r have n o t y e t been s t u d i e d w e l l . A c c o r d i n g t o w r i t i n g s by Tokutomi I i c h i r o (Soho) and Kudo T a k e s h i g e , on r e c e i v i n g t h e r o y a l message Mizuno o p i n e d t h a t i n c r e a s i n g i n t e r c o u r s e between c o u n t r i e s was a t r e n d of t h e w o r l d so t h a t i t would be i m p o s s i b l e f o r Japan a l o n e t o r e m a i n i n i s o l a t i o n . He c o n c l u d e d t h a t Japan s h o u l d adopt the p r e - s a k o k u p o l i c y w i l l i n g l y r a t h e r t h a n open the c o u n t r y as a r e s u l t o f f o r e i g n p r e s s u r e . The B a k u f u s h o u l d encourage t h e a i l i n g m o r a l e of t h e p e o p l e and make a p r o g r e s s i v e l o n g - r a n g e p l a n f o r t h e c o u n t r y . U n f o r t u - n a t e l y h i s i n f l u e n c e was t h e n t o o weak t o persuade e i t h e r t h e o t h e r r o j u and 28 Bakufu o f f i c i a l s or the Shogun Ieyoshi, a strong e x c l u s i o n i s t . F i n a l l y he gave up h i s plan. This disagreement on foreign p o l i c y was one of the main reasons _ _ 28 for h i s second resignation from the post of roju. Most of the Bakufu o f f i c i a l s at t h i s stage seem to have f a i l e d to r e a l i z e the importance of the l e t t e r , and they hesitated to take any immediate action which, whatever i t might be, would cause a d r a s t i c change i n the Bakufu's fo r e i g n p o l i c y and i t s basic system. The f i n a l decision about the royal l e t t e r was probably made a f t e r the resignation of Mizuno. As he was the only i n f l u e n t i a l f i g u r e who advocated an affir m a t i v e response to the l e t t e r , h i s resignation n a t u r a l l y meant the adoption of a conservative p o l i c y , namely the r e j e c t i o n of the advice. On May 14, 1845 (Koka 2, 4/9), Abe Masahiro, who became the chief r o j u a f t e r Mizuno's departure, handed down the answer to h i s junior o f f i c i a l s . At Nagasaki, Izawa Masayoshi forwarded the answer to Bik on September 14 (8/13). Thus, the Dutch King and government had to wait for the Bakufu's answer for almost one year. The Bakufu l e t t e r answered the royal l e t t e r by saying that the Bakufu could not expand r e l a t i o n s with the Dutch because of i t s ancestral laws. The Bakufu argued that the Dutch were allowed only to have trade (tsusho) but not intercourse (tsushin) 29 with Japan, claiming these two to be e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t matters. In t h i s way, the c a r e f u l l y prepared Dutch plan f a i l e d to a t t a i n i t s o r i g i - n a l goal, the opening of Japan to unr e s t r i c t e d trade. Although everything seemed to have been prepared w e l l , the Dutch government received a courteous but f l a t negative answer from the Bakufu. Although the Bakufu r o j u at that time were well aware of possible c o n f l i c t s with foreigners i n Japanese waters, they were reluctant to take any new concrete countermeasures. They ignored the Dutch advice about possible encounters and evasively answered only about trade a f f a i r s . The Bakufu responded to the Dutch by saying that the extension of the l i m i t s of trade and intercourse would be 2 9 a g a i n s t the a n c e s t r a l l a w. The B a k u f u l e t t e r was w r i t t e n t o say t h a t the Japanese s i d e had no i n t e n t i o n o f n e g o t i a t i n g the m a t t e r w i t h the D u t c h , even though the two c o u n t r i e s had had a p e a c e f u l r e l a t i o n s h i p o v e r t h e p a s t two c e n t u r i e s . A l t h o u g h i t was the s o l e c h a n n e l between Japan and t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , t h e Dutch N a g a s a k i P o s t d i d n o t r e a l l y f u n c t i o n as a d i p l o m a t i c c h a n n e l . P r o b a b l y i t was u n a b l e t o do so beca u s e o f t h e u n p o p u l a r i t y o f t h e P o s t b o t h among the g e n e r a l Japanese p o p u l a c e and among B a k u f u o f f i c i a l s . As R a f f l e s m e n t i o n e d , t h r o u g h i t s p r e v i o u s two h u n d r e d - y e a r h i s t o r y , the P o s t g r a d u a l l y became 30 c o r r u p t and the Dutch l o s t t h e i r c r e d i t a b i l i t y w i t h the Japanese. As the Ba k u f u d i d n o t f u l l y t r u s t t h e Dutch a t N a g a s a k i , i t was n a t u r a l t h a t t h e r o j u were r e l u c t a n t t o f o l l o w the Dutch a d v i c e on such i m p o r t a n t m a t t e r s as d i p l o m a t i c and t r a d e p o l i c i e s . Tokugawa N a r i a k i ' s l e t t e r t o Abe M a s a h i r o i n 1846 (Koka 3) about the Dutch r o y a l l e t t e r c l e a r l y shows how one of t h e l e a d i n g f i g u r e s o f t h e t i m e c o n s i d e r e d i t : The Dutch p e o p l e a r e c l e v e r ; we must be on an a l e r t f o r them. The l e t t e r o f t h e K i n g shows the s o - c a l l e d " s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d k i n d n e s s " w h i c h we do n o t need. They say th e y do n o t pur s u e t h e i r own i n t e r e s t , b u t by r e a d i n g t h e l e t t e r c a r e f u l l y we can u n d e r s t a n d t h a t i t i s t h e i r p o l i c y t o seek f o r t h e i r i n t e r e s t n o t o p e n l y b u t c o v e r t l y . 3 1 The f o r m a l i t i e s t h a t had been e s t a b l i s h e d a t N a g a s a k i between the two c o u n t r i e s a l s o worked t o p r e v e n t i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s f r o m b e i n g p r o c e s s e d s m o o t h l y . Many c o m p l i c a t e d and t r o u b l e s o m e p r o c e d u r e s hampered,trade,, and t h o s e f o r m a l i t i e s g r a d u a l l y i n f l u e n c e d d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s . The same p e o p l e were i n charge of b o t h a f f a i r s , and t h e y m a i n t a i n e d the f o r m a l i t i e s f o r t h e i r own sake. The case o f the r o y a l l e t t e r p r o v e d t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s o v e r an i m p o r t a n t i s s u e such as t h e o p e n i n g of t h e c o u n t r y w o u l d be r e a l i z e d w i t h d i f f i c u l t y t h r o u g h the c h a n n e l of t h e Dutch N a g a s a k i P o s t and the B a k u f u o f f i c e o f t h e N a g a s a k i M a g i s t r a t e . 30 The B a k u f u i n Edo, a l t h o u g h i t a l r e a d y r e a l i z e d t h e danger of t h e i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y a f t e r t h e Opium War, had not y e t been d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n g e d by an advanced Western power w i t h modern w a r s h i p s and f i r e a r m s . The Dutch m i s s i o n r e s p e c t e d the t r a d i t i o n a l r o u t e of n e g o t i a t i o n and chose N a g a s a k i i n s t e a d of the c a p i t a l , Edo. More t h a n one thousand k i l o m e t e r s away f r o m N a g a s a k i , B a k u f u o f f i c i a l s i n Edo d i d not e x p e r i e n c e t h e d i r e c t i m p a c t of t h e v i s i t o f the Palembang. The Dutch a t N a g a s a k i were, p e r h a p s , imbued t o o much w i t h Japanese ways. The w a r s h i p Palembang was o b l i g e d t o s t a y i n N a g a s a k i h a r b o u r f o r t h r e e months w h i l e t h e B a k u f u T^ent t h r o u g h l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n s i n Edo. W h i l e t h e B a k u f u t o o k l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n t h e e q u i p a g e of the Dutch m i s s i o n , the s h i p i n the h a r b o u r n a t u r a l l y a t t r a c t e d many co n c e r n e d Japanese. The most c o n c e r n e d , o t h e r t h a n l o c a l B a k u f u o f f i c i a l s , were t h e l o r d o f Saga han, Nabeshima Naomasa (Kanso) and h i s men. He thought t h a t i t was a g o l d e n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r him t o s t u d y a W e s t e r n - s t y l e w a r s h i p . So he asked f o r p e r m i s s i o n o f t h e N a g a s a k i M a g i s t r a t e t o b o a r d t h e s h i p , c l a i m i n g t h a t he had t o see t h e i n s i d e and t h e 32 equipment of t h e w a r s h i p f o r the sake of h i s d u t y t o guard N a g a s a k i . Izawa M a s a y o s h i f i r s t h e s i t a t e d t o g r a n t p e r m i s s i o n t o Nabeshima, m a i n l y because 33 Nabeshima was a tozama daimyo , b u t f i n a l l y he y i e l d e d t o Nabeshima and a u t h o r i z e d t h e v i s i t t o the Palembang. As the l o r d o f Saga han, Nabeshima Naomasa, i n h i s t h i r t y y e a r s o f r u l e , a c c o m p l i s h e d many a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e f o r m s i n h i s han. The r e f o r m s i n c l u d e d the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a new a g r i c u l t u r e system t o s t a b i l i z e t h e income of the han; the encouragement o f d o m e s t i c i n d u s t r i e s s u c h as p o r c e l a i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g and c o a l m i n i n g ; and t h e i m p o r t of Western t e c h n o l o g y l i k e r e v e r b e r a t o r y f u r n a c e s , cannon f o u n d i n g and s h i p b u i l d i n g . Saga han f i n a n c e s were r e s t o r e d by t h e s e v a r i o u s measures and p r o v i d e d t h e domain w i t h funds f o r m i l i t a r y r e f o r m s t h a t were t o come. As Nabeshima's domain was one of t h o s e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r g u a r d i n g 31 Nagasaki harbour, he was always concerned about coastal defense. He encouraged Dutch studies and treated scholars favourably i n h i s own domain. Nabeshima was warmly welcomed on board the Palembang on October 31, 1844 (Koka 1, 9/20). He was much impressed by the navigational control mechanism of 35 the ship and i t s m i l i t a r y equipment, the firearms. This bright l o r d of Saga must have had some idea of powerful Western cannons, but l i k e any other Japanese at that time he could have had no concrete idea about Western-style warships. The pictures Hayashi Shihei had once d i s t r i b u t e d showed a Dutch ship, 36 but i t was a mere commercial f r e i g h t e r . The v i s i t to the Palembang created a great i n t e r e s t i n Western-style warships i n Nabeshima's mind. In w r i t i n g a memorial on maritime defense to Abe Masahiro i n 1846, Nabeshima r e c a l l e d h i s v i s i t to the Palembang and pointed out that "the mission's ship was heavily equipped with many cannons, and the t o t a l appearance of the ship was l i k e that 37 of a c a s t l e on the ocean." This v i v i d l y t e l l s us how amazed he was at the advanced warship from Europe. As a response to the v i s i t of Bakufu o f f i c i a l s and Nabeshima Naomasa, Bik made a suggestion to the Bakufu through the Nagasaki Magistrate's O f f i c e about the creation of Japan's own naval force. This idea originated with Captain Coops and was then forwarded by Bik to the Bakufu. But the suggestion seems to have been neglected by Bakufu o f f i c i a l s . When the main purpose of the mission was rejected, the suggestion was doomed to a s i m i l a r f a t e . Yet, i n contrast to the Bakufu o f f i c i a l s i n Edo, the people at Nagasaki began to learn more about Western-style ships. From Qur point of view, the most s i g n i f i c a n t point- i n the dispatch of the Dutch mission to Japan was the fa c t that a warship was used to bring the royal l e t t e r . The content of the l e t t e r was no doubt important to Japan. S t i l l , .the s i t u a t i o n explained i n the l e t t e r was not at a l l new to the Bakufu leaders. They had known about the Opium War and had feared possible threats to 32 Japan. However, the presence of the warship might cause disturbances among the Japanese. The Bakufu had to explain even to commoners what the Dutch were expecting i n Japan, a kind of explanation i t was not accustomed to make. Although the Bakufu did not change i t s basic p o l i c y , i t was obliged to accept various small changes i n maritime defense p o l i c i e s as more and more Japanese came to encounter foreign ships along the c o a s t l i n e s . With the increasing threat around Japan, the Japanese r e a l i z e d the importance of defense. Many scholars had been advocating the strengthening of defense, and the Bakufu and l o c a l han could no longer ignore the need. Many expeditions to the north and surveys along the important coastlines were made by both the Bakufu and l o c a l han. In some s t r a t e g i c places, b a t t e r i e s had been authorized and constructed. At t h i s stage, however, the foremost need was seen to be the construction of b a t t e r i e s along more of the important c o a s t l i n e s . A t y p i c a l example i s found i n the m i l i t a r y reforms planned by Mizuno Tadakuni as part of h i s Tempo Reforms. The main emphasis i n h i s m i l i t a r y reforms was the adoption of Western a r t i l l e r y f o r the f o r t i f i c a t i o n of Edo Bay. As a part of the reforms, i n 1843 Mizuno created a new p o s i t i o n c a l l e d the Magistrate of 38 Haneda who was responsible f or the defense of Edo Bay. Moreover, Mizuno t r i e d to obtain supreme and sole command over the Edo Bay and Osaka areas for 39 the Bakufu by means of the J o c h i - r e i . Two of the most important purposes of th i s order by the Bakufu were f i r s t to strengthen the Bakufu's economic base by obtaining h i g h - y i e l d i n g land around Edo and Osaka and second to acquire strong m i l i t a r y command over the same area. Mizuno's m i l i t a r y reforms were very progressive and ambitious for h i s time, but he has l e f t no i n d i c a t i o n that he r e a l i z e d the importance of a naval force f or defense against external threats. What he planned was to defend Edo and Osaka, the core of the Tokugawa Bakufu, not the en t i r e country of Japan. After Mizuno's resignation, the Bakufu was shaken several times by v i s i t s 33 of Western ships. On March 24, 1845 (Koka 2, 2/17), the American whaler Manhattan appeared i n Edo Bay to return Japanese castaways as well as to obtain provisions. After about one month's stay at Uraga, a port town at the gateway to Edo Bay, the ship l e f t s a f e l y on A p r i l 21 (3/15). During i t s stay, however, the whole Bakufu was put into confusion. The order of the Bakufu i n 1843 about the acceptance of Japanese castaways said that a l l castaways were to be 40 received only at Nagasaki, not anywhere e l s e . Because of t h i s order, most of the Bakufu o f f i c i a l s were against making any exceptions i n the case of the Manhattan. Nevertheless, Abe Masahiro gave way to the Americans, accepted the 41 eighteen castaways and provided the ship with water, food and f u e l . Abe's concession to the American ship was apparently due to information and knowledge that he had about the Opium War and other i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , but the Manhattan incident was a very minor one. After the Manhattan, the Bakufu showed a more p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e towards maritime defense by creating the Kaigan Bogyo Jimu Toriatsukai Kakari (Committee f o r Coastal Defense), or Kaibo-gakari f or short. Abe himself and another r o j u d i r e c t l y presided over t h i s committee for a while. But at f i r s t the committee was a group of o f f i c i a l s that only discussed future p o l i c i e s . No further concrete measures were developed by the Bakufu a f t e r the Manhattan v i s i t , though i t was a simple forerunner of bigger events inv o l v i n g the Americans. Before the v i s i t of the U.S. Indian Fleet i n 1846, Bakufu o f f i c i a l s did not f u l l y appre- ciate the r e a l i t y of Western m i l i t a r y power, but they now had to r e a l i z e that Japan faced a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t and much more advanced m i l i t a r y system than they had h i t h e r t o imagined. On July 20, 1846 (Koka 3, i n t e r c a l a r y 5/20), the Columbus and Vincennes under American Commodore James Biddle were met by the Japanese when the two ships were approaching the Uraga area, the entrance to Edo Bay. The purpose of the v i s i t of the American ships was to e s t a b l i s h diplomatic r e l a t i o n s and 34 begin trade.with'Japanv^As,--Commodore Biddle understood that h i s mission was not to force the Japanese to open the country but to determine whether the Japanese would trade with the United States, the attitude of the f l e e t was not 42 aggressive. However, the impact of the appearance of the two huge warships i n Edo Bay upon Bakufu o f f i c i a l s was tremendous. According to an order of the Bakufu i n 1844, i f foreign ships entered f a r - ther into Edo Bay than the Uraga area against Bakufu orders, they were to be shelled and destroyed. And once foreign ships anchored i n a harbour, a l l weapons on board were to be handed over to Bakufu o f f i c i a l s u n t i l t h e i r 43 departure. I t was of course impossible for v i r t u a l l y unarmed Bakufu o f f i c i a l s to order the American f l e e t to follow these regulations. The defense f a c i l i - t i e s of Edo Bay were t o t a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t and inadequate to enforce the 44 i n s t r u c t i o n s . The only way the Bakufu could deal with the American ships was to persuade them to leave Japan by explaining the t r a d i t i o n a l Japanese i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y . The v i s i t of the U.S. f l e e t taught the Bakufu that the ground forces arid b a t t e r i e s along the coastlines of Edo Bay could not deal with American ships. During the v i s i t , about 600 small Japanese ships were temporarily disguised as m i l i t a r y ships for the Bakufu, but such ships were incapable of engaging i n -,45 actual b a t t l e . The U.S. f l e e t l e f t Japan peacefully without any further disturbance, but the warships had an immeasurable influence on Bakufu o f f i c i a l s , daimyo and other members of the r u l i n g c l a s s . The defense of Edo Bay became one of the biggest issues that Abe would t r y to deal with during h i s administration. In the autumn of 1846, the Bakufu sent a s p e c i a l inspection group to the Edo Bay area to investigate defense conditions. This inspection was the most extensive one of t h i s kind since Mizuno Tadakuni had sent h i s men to the same area i n 1843. According to reports prepared by some o f f i c i a l s of the Uraga 35 Magistrate's O f f i c e who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the inspection tour, these o f f i c i a l s were obviously aware of the necessity for m i l i t a r y ships to guard the Bay. But they also knew that the construction of Western-style ships was extremely d i f f i c u l t for Japanese shipwrights. So they recommended that the Bakufu b u i l d 46 Japanese-style m i l i t a r y ships instead. P r i o r to the dispatch of the inspection group, Abe indicated h i s i n t e n t i o n to work for the construction of m i l i t a r y ships. In a l e t t e r to Tokugawa Nariaki, who had written to Abe about warships he wrote: You have been sending memorials on warships to which I am quite agreeable. Of course, Japanese cargo ships are vulnerable not only to attack by Western ships but also to bad weather. In the future, i f Western ships stayed off the coast of the Uraga area and cut off the shipping routes, this place [Edo] would be pressed for provisions very soon. 47 And Abe concluded that the construction of warships was one of the most urgent issues. In f a c t , the l e t t e r t e l l s us that Abe now f u l l y understood the neces- s i t y of warships for the defense of Edo Bay before he received any report from the inspection group. I t seems that by the end of 1846 Bakufu o f f i c i a l s at a l l l e v e l s were well aware of the importance of warships. The impact of the Ameri- can f l e e t of Commodore James Biddle on the Bakufu i s c l e a r l y seen. Nevertheless, the construction of warships was not possible at t h i s stage. The fundamental reason for t h i s was technological, a low standard of basic p r a c t i c a l studies i n the Bakufu of f i c i a l d o m . Such l o c a l domains which had been continuing basic research i n shipbuilding as Mito and Satsuma were w i l l i n g to b u i l d large war- ships by themselves, but the Bakufu refused to give them any formal permission 48 u n t i l 1853. When Abe r e a l i z e d that he could not improve the defense system i n a short time, he was forced to s a t i s f y foreign demands i n order to avoid m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t . To persuade Western ships to leave Japan, he issued orders to supply 36 them with necessary provisions. The Bakufu i n the l a t e 1840's became not only less active i n defense p o l i c y but also imbued with a reactionary mood. The number of Western ships that entered Japanese waters also temporarily decreased, giving those who advocated the expulsion of foreigners influence among Bakufu executives. In 1849 (Kaei 2) the Bakufu even suggested suspending the 1842 49 order which relaxed regulations concerning the treatment of foreign ships. Furthermore, i n 1850, the Magistrate of Finance reviewed the defense f a c i l i t i e s around Edo Bay and sent a report to the Bakufu i n which he concluded that the current defense f a c i l i t i e s would be s u f f i c i e n t even when foreign ships came deep into Edo Bay."^ As there had been no s p e c i a l construction of defense f a c i l i t i e s there i n the l a t e 1840's, we can assume h i s report r e f l e c t e d the reactionary mood i n the Bakufu i n those days. A l l the way from the Netherlands, the Dutch King had sent considerate advice to the Japanese. Even penetrating Edo Bay, foreign ships were v i s i t i n g Japan frequently, and Bakufu executives were forced to r e a l i z e that the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n was changing. Yet, s u r p r i s i n g l y enough, the att i t u d e on the part of Bakufu executives towards defense and foreign p o l i c i e s remained unchanged. Rather, Bakufu executives as a whole grew more conservative than before a f t e r they knew, more about the rest of the world. While the Bakufu floundered i n conservatism, Nabeshima Naomasa of Saga han and h i s men saw a rev e l a t i o n of a new world. The warship Palembang i n Nagasaki harbour taught him a lesson which others were to appreciate only slowly. The Bakufu needed a Palembang i n Edo Bay to wake i t up, and the Americans were soon to provide the necessary provocation. 37 CHAPTER 3 The Opening of Japan and N e g o t i a t i o n s on N a v a l M a t t e r s The rumour t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s was a g a i n s e n d i n g a f l e e t t o Japan t o n e g o t i a t e t h e o p e n i n g o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s s t r o n g l y s t i m u l a t e d t h e Dutch government. The Dutch i m m e d i a t e l y began w o r k i n g so as t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n i n J a p a n , y e t t h e i r e f f o r t s were t o be u n s u c c e s s f u l . On the o t h e r hand, Commodore P e r r y f u l f i l l e d h i s d u t y much more e f f e c t i v e l y t h a n any Dutch N a g a s a k i S u p e r i n t e n d e n t had e v e r done. The U n i t e d S t a t e s became t h e l e a d e r among the w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s w h i c h had been t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h J a p an. W h i l e t h e Dutch l o o k e d f o r a way t o r e c o v e r t h e i r s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n i n J a p a n , the B a k u f u was o b l i g e d t o c o n s i d e r i t s d e f e n s e a f f a i r s more s e r i o u s l y t h a n e v e r b e f o r e . The h i g h - r a n k i n g o f f i c i a l s o f t h e B a k u f u , f a c e d w i t h the m i l i t a r y t h r e a t by P e r r y ' s f o u r b l a c k s h i p s i n Edo Bay, f u l l y r e a l i z e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f o b t a i n i n g advanced Western m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y t o e n a b l e i t t o s u r v i v e . N a t u r a l l y the B a k u f u had t o r e l y on the f a v o u r s o f the Dutch i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s , b ecause the Dutch were t h e o n l y p e o p l e f r o m whom t h e a i l i n g government of t h e Shogun c o u l d e x p e c t any a s s i s t a n c e . The Dutch a t N a g a s a k i who were a t t h a t t i m e r e p r e s e n t e d by Donker C u r t i u s , a c a p a b l e d i p l o m a t , d i d n o t mi s s t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y . I n t h i s c h a p t e r , the emphasis w i l l be p l a c e d on the development of d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n s between Japan and t h e N e t h e r l a n d s i n r e l a t i o n t o a t r e a t y between them c o n c e r n i n g n a v a l t r a i n i n g . As e a r l y as 1850, t h e rumour t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p l a n n e d t o send a f l e e t t o Japan t o n e g o t i a t e t h e o p e n i n g o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s r e a c h e d Japan t h r o u g h the Dutch N a g a s a k i Post."'" I n the f o l l o w i n g y e a r , F. Rose, the S u p e r i n t e n d e n t of the P o s t , c a u t i o n e d t h e B a k u f u about a p o s s i b l e A m e r i c a n v i s i t by e x p l a i n i n g the development of the Am e r i c a n w e s t , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e g o l d r u s h i n C a l i f o r n i a 2 and the c o m p l e t i o n o f a r a i l r o a d a t t h e Panama Isthmus. But the i n f o r m a t i o n 38 from N a g a s a k i , as u s u a l , had l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e on B a k u f u f o r e i g n p o l i c y . E a r l y i n 1852 ( K a e i 5 ) , the U n i t e d S t a t e s government o f f i c i a l l y d e c i d e d t o • d i s p a t c h a s p e c i a l m i s s i o n t o Japan. The Am e r i c a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the N e t h e r l a n d s t o l d t h e Dutch government about the U n i t e d S t a t e s p l a n and r e q u e s t e d the Dutch t o g i v e the Am e r i c a n m i s s i o n e v e r y p o s s i b l e a s s i s t a n c e i n Japan 3 t h r o u g h the Dutch o f f i c i a l s a t t h e N a g a s a k i P o s t . As the rumour about the d i s p a t c h o f t h e U.S. f l e e t t o Japan had s p r e a d w i d e l y i n Europe b e f o r e the o f f i c i a l announcement of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s g o v e r n - ment, C h a r l e s F e r d i n a n d Pahud, the M i n i s t e r o f t h e C o l o n i e s o f t h e Dutch government, f o l l o w i n g h i s p r e d e c e s s o r Baud, r e a c h e d t h e c o n c l u s i o n 'that the 4 Dutch government s h o u l d a d v i s e Japan's B a k u f u t o a b o l i s h i t s i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y . Dr. P h i l i p p von S i e b o l d was a l s o i m p r e s s e d by the same rumour, and as a p a r t o f h i s a c t i v i t i e s t o r e a l i z e t he o p e n i n g o f J a p a n , he p r e p a r e d a d r a f t o f a t r e a t y between the N e t h e r l a n d s and Japan."* He s u b m i t t e d i t t o Pahud i n A p r i l w i t h the a d v i c e t h a t the Dutch government s h o u l d a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e coming n e g o t i a t i o n s between Japan and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . Von S i e b o l d c o n s i d e r e d t h a t by so d o i n g the Dutch would be a b l e t o keep t h e i r s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n i n J a p a n , and e v e n t u a l l y would be thanked by the o t h e r Western c o u n t r i e s when Japan p e a c e f u l l y opened i t s d o o r s t o them. I n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e h i s g o a l , von S i e b o l d s u g g e s t e d t h a t the Dutch government send a n o t h e r r o y a l l e t t e r t o t h e B a k u f u , a s k i n g t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s be e n t e r e d i n t o f o r a p r o p o s e d t r e a t y w i t h the Dutch. D e s p i t e the a c t i v e s u g g e s t i o n s by von S i e b o l d , s u p p o r t e d by Pahud and some o t h e r s a t c o u r t , t h e Dutch government was r e l u c t a n t t o become d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n Japan-U.S. n e g o t i a t i o n s . 7 As a r e s p o n s e t o t h e r e q u e s t by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , the D utch government s i m p l y answered t h e Ame r i c a n s t h a t i t would send a m i s s i o n t o Japan and t e l l t he B a k u f u t o r e l a x i t s r e s t r i c t i v e i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y . D e s p i t e t h i s somewhat c a s u a l a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y e d f o r Am e r i c a n b e n e f i t , however, the Dutch began w o r k i n g a c t i v e l y towards t h e improvement o f N e t h e r l a n d s - J a p a n e s e r e l a t i o n s . 3 9 The government soon adopted von S i e b o l d ' s d r a f t o f a t r e a t y w i t h Japan and s e n t i t w i t h s p e c i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s t o the G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l o f the Dutch E a s t I n d i e s i n B a t a v i a . The G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l a t B a t a v i a t h e r e u p o n a p p o i n t e d J.H. Donker C u r t i u s , a j u d g e o f the H i g h e r C o u r t o f the Dutch E a s t I n d i e s , t o be the new Super- i n t e n d e n t o f t h e N a g a s a k i P o s t and i n v e s t e d him w i t h f u l l powers t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h t h e B a k u f u on t h e m a t t e r o f t r e a t i e s . U s u a l l y the S u p e r i n t e n d e n t s o f t h e N a g a s a k i P o s t were chosen f r o m among s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s who had been w o r k i n g t h e r e f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s , so the appointment o f a h i g h - r a n k i n g o f f i c i a l l i k e C u r t i u s was q u i t e e x c e p t i o n a l . I t e v i d e n t l y showed the z e a l o f the Dutch g o v e r n - ment t o improve r e l a t i o n s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s p r i o r t o the v i s i t o f t h e Ame r i c a n m i s s i o n . The G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l p r e p a r e d an o f f i c i a l l e t t e r t o t h e Ba k u f u a c c o r d i n g t o the i n s t r u c t i o n s of Pahud and e n t r u s t e d i t t o C u r t i u s w i t h t h e p r o p o s e d t r e a t y . On J u l y 21, 1852 ( K a e i 5, 6/5), Donker C u r t i u s a r r i v e d a t N a g a s a k i on t h e steamer Soembing. F i r s t o f a l l , C u r t i u s d i s c u s s e d w i t h h i s p r e d e c e s s o r Rose and some Japanese i n t e r p r e t e r s p r o c e d u r e s f o r p r e s e n t i n g the o f f i c i a l l e t t e r t o t he B a k u f u . R e c a l l i n g t h e c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r r e c e i p t o f t h e 1844 r o y a l l e t t e r , t h e N a g a s a k i M a g i s t r a t e , M a k i Y o s h i n o r i , r e f u s e d t o r e c e i v e t h e l e t t e r a t f i r s t . B u t , as C u r t i u s e x p l a i n e d t h a t " t h e G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l o f t h e Dutch E a s t I n d i e s , r e c e i v i n g an o r d e r o f t h e K i n g of t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , w r o t e t h i s l e t t e r t o t h e N a g a s a k i M a g i s t r a t e , ~ b e c a u s e the a f f a i r t h a t i s d e a l t w i t h i n t h i s l e t t e r i s 9 so i m p o r t a n t t o y o u r c o u n t r y t h a t we cannot keep s i l e n t about i t , " M a k i f e l t t he B a k u f u s h o u l d see t h e l e t t e r . Y e t he h e s i t a t e d t o r e c e i v e i t w i t h o u t p r i o r c o n s e n t f r o m Edo. He t h e r e f o r e asked f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s from the B a k u f u r o j u . W h i l e C u r t i u s began n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h M a g i s t r a t e M a k i about t h e o f f i c i a l l e t t e r , he a l s o s u b m i t t e d an E x t r a News R e p o r t as u s u a l . T h i s r e p o r t a g a i n warned the Ba k u f u o f the v i s i t of an A m e r i c a n f l e e t t o Japan i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e . " ^ 40 I n Edo, M a k i ' s message f r o m N a g a s a k i was soon s e n t t o the Committee f o r C o a s t a l D e f e n s e t h r o u g h the c h i e f r o j u , Abe M a s a h i r o . The members of t h e Com- m i t t e e a d v i s e d t h a t the N a g a s a k i M a g i s t r a t e s h o u l d r e c e i v e t h e o f f i c i a l " w r i t i n g ( k a k i t s u k e ) " of t h e G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l . They supposed t h a t t h e o f f i c i a l " w r i t i n g " would be c r i t i c a l o f Japan j u d g i n g f r o m the c o n t e n t o f t h e E x t r a News R e p o r t , and t h e r e f o r e t h e B a k u f u s h o u l d see t h e " w r i t i n g " as w e l l . And t h e y went on t o say t h a t the o f f i c i a l " w r i t i n g " was s i m i l a r t o a news r e p o r t and n o t a l e t t e r ; i f i t was n o t a l e t t e r , i t s r e c e i p t d i d n o t i n f r i n g e t h e a n c e s t r a l law t h a t p r o h i b i t e d t s u s h i n ( c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ) w i t h t h e Netherlands."'""'" Thus the s a c r e d a n c e s t r a l law was k e p t u n s p o i l e d , w h i l e t h e B a k u f u i n a c t u a l i t y was a b l e t o r e a d the l e t t e r f r o m B a t a v i a . A f t e r he r e c e i v e d the i n s t r u c t i o n s from Edo, M a k i a c c e p t e d t h e " w r i t i n g " from B a t a v i a on September 11 ( 7 / 2 8 ) . The f u n d a m e n t a l i d e a s i n t h e l e t t e r were t h a t : t h e B a k u f u s h o u l d change i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y so t h a t p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e coming U.S. f l e e t would be a v o i d e d ; the B a k u f u s h o u l d make a c o m m e r c i a l t r e a t y w i t h the N e t h e r l a n d s p r i o r t o the a r r i v a l o f t h e U.S. f l e e t , as p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the U.S. d i p l o m a t i c o f f e n s i v e ; t h e B a k u f u s h o u l d a p p o i n t i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o n e g o t i a t e t r e a t y a f f a i r s w i t h C u r t i u s ; t h e B a k u f u s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h i s a d v i c e d i d n o t come from s e l f - i n t e r e s t on t h e p a r t o f t h e Dutch government b u t f r o m s i n c e r e good 12 w i l l w h i c h a r o s e from the 200 y e a r l o n g f r i e n d s h i p between t h e two c o u n t r i e s . The p r o p o s e d t r e a t y was n o t i n t e n d e d t o be a l o n g - t e r m one. The main purpose o f the Dutch government was t o t a k e p r e c a u t i o n a r y measures a g a i n s t the coming U.S. f l e e t . The a t t a c h e d e x p l a n a t i o n c l a i m e d t h a t the p r o p o s a l was p r e - p a r e d r e s p e c t i n g t r a d i t i o n a l Japanese laws and customs. I n o t h e r words, the p r o p o s a l was, t h e Dutch s a i d , a p o s s i b l e example of a t r e a t y w i t h Western 13 c o u n t r i e s . The r e s p e c t f o r Japanese laws and customs might seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t the Dutch f u l l y honoured t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y o f t h e B a k u f u , b u t the r e a l aim of the Dutch seems t o have been t o p r e v e n t any o t h e r Western c o u n t r i e s from 41 b e i n g g r a n t e d more p r i v i l e g e s as a r e s u l t of t r e a t i e s t h a n the D u t c h had e n j o y e d 14 t r a d i t i o n a l l y i n J a p an. R e c e i v i n g t h e p r o p o s e d t r e a t y , M a k i , who d i d n o t have f u l l power t o d e a l w i t h the Dutch on t h i s m a t t e r , s e n t t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e p r o p o s a l t o Edo. The t r a n s l a t i o n was s u b m i t t e d f o r t h e d i s c u s s i o n of the Committee f o r C o a s t a l Defense as u s u a l . The members s i m p l y r e p l i e d t o t h e r o j u t h a t t h e y c o u l d h a r d l y u n d e r s t a n d the d e t a i l s of t h e m a t t e r f r o m t h e p r o p o s a l , so t h a t t h e y s h o u l d w a i t f o r t h e r e t u r n of M a k i t o Edo. Soon M a k i was b r o u g h t back t o Edo on r o t a t i o n and r e p o r t e d t o t h e r o j u : The Dutch S u p e r i n t e n d e n t i s a greedy man. He knows t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l n o t be a l l o w e d t o open t r a d e w i t h Japan because the U n i t e d S t a t e s has had no c o m m e r c i a l r e l a t i o n s b e f o r e . T h e r e - f o r e , he p l a n s t o t a k e more goods f r o m Japan i n t o t h e N e t h e r l a n d e r s ' hands and s e l l them t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s , scheming t o b a r t h e v i s i t s of t h e A mericans t o Japan.15 M a k i ' s answer shows how p o o r l y a h i g h - r a n k i n g B a k u f u o f f i c i a l i n charge o f f o r e i g n a f f a i r s u n d e r s t o o d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . However, t h o s e were the days when the B a k u f u had l i t t l e c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e Dutch a t N a g a s a k i . M a k i ' s o p i n i o n was n o t s t r a n g e t o the r o j u , so t h e y d e c i d e d t o d i s r e g a r d b o t h the o f f i c i a l " w r i t i n g " from B a t a v i a and t h e p r o p o s a l of a t r e a t y . L a t e r , on O c tober 26, 1853 ( K a e i 6, 9/24), s e v e r a l months a f t e r t h e a r r i v a l o f Commodore P e r r y of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , C u r t i u s would r e c e i v e a l e t t e r f r om Abe M a s a h i r o w h i c h n o t i f i e d him t h a t t h e B a k u f u had a p p o i n t e d an o f f i c i a l o f the N a g a s a k i M a g i s t r a t e ' s O f f i c e as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r t r e a t y a f f a i r s w i t h the D u t c h . The a p p o i n t m e n t , w h i c h was one of t h e d i r e c t e f f e c t s of t h e v i s i t of P e r r y on t h e B a k u f u ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y , gave C u r t i u s hope f o r t h e f u t u r e o f the n e g o t i a t i o n s . However, what was done i n m e e t i n g s w i t h C u r t i u s was t o c o n s u l t o v e r Japan's t r e a t y a f f a i r s w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s , n o t the N e t h e r - l a n d s . 42 Afte r the v i s i t of Commodore Perry i n 1853, the Bakufu was obliged to take many measures to develop a new nationa l defense system. On July 27 (6/22), a junior c o u n c i l l o r (wakadoshiyori) was ordered to inspect the coastlines of s t r a t e g i c a l l y important areas. On August 6 (7/2), the Bakufu sought the opinions of Bakufu o f f i c i a l s and l o c a l daimyo including tozama about the v i s i t of Perry and possible countermeasures. The decision to b u i l d eleven gun bat t e r i e s i n Edo Bay was made on August 25 (7/21). The f i r s t d r a s t i c change i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s which affected the e n t i r e country came on September 16 (8/14) when the Bakufu f o r the f i r s t time since the 17th century allowed daimyo to-bring guns into t h e i r residences i n Edo. A further innovation was an order of f i f t y cannons by the Bakufu to Nabeshima Naomasa of Saga han. And f i n a l l y on October 17 (9/15) , the Bakufu suspended the c o n t r o v e r s i a l ancestral law which had prohibited the b u i l d i n g of large warships f o r more than 200 years. Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito han and Shimazu Nar i a k i r a of Satsuma han performed important roles i n r e a l i z i n g the suspension of the ancestral law. As mentioned i n the f i r s t chapter, Nariaki had been ready to b u i l d a Western-style ship since 1838. Soon a f t e r the Bakufu decis i o n , he began to b u i l d one at a shipyard i n Edo. On the other hand, Shimazu Nar i a k i r a had already s e c r e t l y begun the construction of Western-style ships p r i o r to the suspension of the law. He needed s o l i d l y - b u i l t warships f o r the defense of h i s southern t e r r i t o r y . Satsuma shipbuilding w i l l be discussed l a t e r i n the following chapter. The Bakufu also began i t s own shipbuilding program with the construction of the Ho'o Maru at Uraga, but for some time i t was to r e l y on assistance from Satsuma and Mito han as well as the Dutch f o r most of i t s new ships."'"7 Meanwhile, on October 15 (9/13), Mizuno Tadanori, the new Nagasaki Mag- i s t r a t e , v i s i t e d Curtius at Dejima. He met Curtius to discuss the matter of the adoption of a Western naval system for the Bakufu. Mizuno mentioned that 43 due t o t h e c r i t i c a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n t he B a k u f u would a l t e r t he t r a d i - t i o n a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y and wanted t o adopt a more advanced n a v a l s y s t e m f r o m Europe; f o r t h i s p u r p o s e , the B a k u f u would l i k e t o o r d e r some s h i p s from t h e N e t h e r l a n d s . I n a d d i t i o n , M izuno sought C u r t i u s ' p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n on t h i s 18 m a t t e r . On t h e same day, C u r t i u s r e p l i e d t o Mizuno i n w r i t i n g . C u r t i u s j u d g e d t h a t t h i s B a k u f u r e q u e s t c o u l d be an e x c e l l e n t o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t h e Dutch t o r e c o v e r a s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n i n Japan b o t h i n d i p l o m a c y and i n t r a d e . The t r a d e between the N e t h e r l a n d s and Japan was e x t r e m e l y poor a t t h a t t i m e . The i s o l a t i o n p o l i c y m a i n t a i n e d by t h e B a k u f u had n o t been b r o k e n by t h e f r i e n d l y Dutch b u t by the m i l i t a r y t h r e a t o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h i s r e s u l t e d i n a l o s s o f Dutch supremacy i n t h e f i e l d o f d i p l o m a c y c o n c e r n i n g Japan. The chance t o improve t h e i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n o f t h e Dutch u n e x p e c t e d l y came t o C u r t i u s f r o m the B a k u f u . He e x p l a i n e d n e c e s s a r y p r o c e d u r e s t o b u i l d a.modern navy. What C u r t i u s emphasized most i n h i s l e t t e r t o Mizuno was the i m p o r t a n c e o f e x t e n s i v e n a v a l t r a i n i n g f o r young Japanese p e o p l e under Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . He w r o t e t h a t many s t u d e n t s would have n o t o n l y t o l e a r n v a r i o u s s u b j e c t s r e l a t e d t o n a v a l a f f a i r s b u t a l s o t o p r a c t i c e t h e a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n o f s h i p s . C u r t i u s added t h a t i t would r e q u i r e many months and perhaps even y e a r s f o r Japan t o c r e a t e a modern navy. A f t e r e x p l a i n i n g t h e c o n t e n t s o f n a v a l t r a i n i n g , he went on 19 about s h i p s , the p r o c e d u r e s o f p u r c h a s e , monetary s e t t l e m e n t s and so on. D u r i n g the month of O c t o b e r , Mizuno and C u r t i u s r e p e a t e d l y exchanged l e t t e r s and d i s c u s s e d n a v a l a f f a i r s . Two of the most d i s c u s s e d i s s u e s were the method of monetary s e t t l e m e n t f o r t h e p u r c h a s e o f s h i p s and the t r e a t m e n t o f Dutch n a v a l i n s t r u c t o r s i n Japan. The B a k u f u wanted t o pay t h e c o s t o f s h i p s by e x p o r t i n g commodities t o the Dutch whereas the Dutch e x p e c t e d t o r e c e i v e payment i n g o l d , s i l v e r and c o p p e r . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e Dutch endeavoured t o improve t h e i r t r e a t m e n t i n Japan i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the s t a r t o f n a v a l 44 t r a i n i n g by Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . The Bakufu refused to change t h e i r treatment, claiming that i t accorded with an ancestral law of the Bakufu, yet both p a r t i e s gradually made mutual concessions and reached a c e r t a i n measure of agreement. The Japanese urgently needed a modern naval force, and the Dutch wanted to recover t h e i r f i r m p o s i t i o n i n diplomacy and trade i n Japan. According to the agreement, the Bakufu ordered about a dozen ships, t h e i r equipment, various cannons and technological books. Also the agreement stated that the Bakufu would pay the cost of those items with various commodities, instead of gold, 20 s i l v e r or copper. Although the agreement was made, i t was not a formal arrangement. Rather i t was a statement of the Bakufu's expectations, for i t did not show, for example, ei t h e r the number of ships or t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l p r i c e s . S t i l l the Bakufu side believed that several ships would be coming to Japan the following year as mentioned i n the agreement. Curtius sent the agree- ment to Batavia to obtain consent from the Dutch East Indies' and home govern- ments. He wrote to the Governor-general at Batavia that the Dutch had to be c a r e f u l to f o s t e r the enthusiasm of the Japanese i n the creation of a modern navy by sending them some ships, including steamers.^ 22 On July 29, 1854 (Ansei 1, 7/5) , the Sara Lydia a r r i v e d at Nagasaki. The ship brought Curtius s p e c i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s from Batavia concerning the Bakufu's naval plans. Curtius soon wrote a l e t t e r to Mizuno according to the i n s t r u c t i o n s . F i r s t of a l l , he had to explain why the Dutch could not bring any ships for the Bakufu at t h i s time. He claimed two basic reasons f o r the d i f f i c u l t i e s : one was the Crimean War i n Europe; another was the Dutch fear that other Western countries might consider them to be helping the Japanese become more e x c l u s i o n i s t by providing them with firearms and warships. Curtius knew that h i s answer would be t o t a l l y unsatisfactory to the Bakufu. Therefore, he included some c o n c i l i a t o r y sentences to the e f f e c t that, 45 The Dutch King i s f u l l y aware of the int e n t i o n of the Japanese [to b u i l d a modern navy]. Therefore, i n order to a s s i s t i n the improvement of the Japanese naval system for the e t e r n a l security of your country, the King ordered arrangements to be made for a commercial steamer to be sent. However, by the time t h i s ship [the Sara Lydia] l e f t [Batavia] for Japan, the above-mentioned ship could not be obtained. We expect i t w i l l be a v a i l a b l e soon, and then i t w i l l be forwarded to Nagasaki v i a Batavia.23 This arrangement by the Dutch seems to have made Bakufu o f f i c i a l s very unhappy, as the Japanese were expecting to see several warships a r r i v e f or .them. Yet, as the l e t t e r explained, the arrangement was perhaps the best possible one under the circumstances. In the same l e t t e r , Curtius noted that the Dutch government had dispatched the steamer Soembing to Japan f o r some s p e c i a l purpose. The Dutch government was very much concerned with the progress of diplomatic negotiations between Japan and Western countries such as the United States, Russia and Great B r i t a i n . Commodore Perry had appeared i n Uraga on July 8, 1853 (Kaei 6, 6/3), and Rear Admiral P u t i a t i n of Russia had v i s i t e d Nagasaki on August 22 (7/18) of the same year. Nevertheless, the Dutch had not been informed of the contents of those negotiations. Curtius mentioned to Mizuno that one of the main reasons for the dispatch of the Soembing t h i s time was to obtain i n t e l l i g e n c e on those a f f a i r s . He explained i t i n the following way: What our government wants to know now i s the Japanese response towards the requests by the Americans and Russians. The reason why we ask for t h i s i s that the Dutch government expects Japan to promise to give the same treatment to us i n case other countries are to be given more favourable treatment than we enjoy today. 2^ This was an e x p l i c i t statement of the demand for "most-favoured nation" t r e a t - ment which was t y p i c a l of the importunities of advanced Western nations i n Asia at t h i s time. The Dutchwere impatient at having f a l l e n behind the United States, Russia and other countries i n negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic 46 r e l a t i o n s with Japan. To catch up with the others, the Dutch would not hesitate to take advantage of the i n t e r e s t of the Japanese i n naval a f f a i r s . Curtius therefore offered the Japanese a plan to carry out temporary naval t r a i n i n g while the Soembing was i n Japan. According to Mizuta Nobutoshi, this o f f e r was made s o l e l y by Curtius without any consent e i t h e r from the King or the Governor-general i n Batavia. Of course the captain of the ship was not informed of Curtius' plan. Curtius needed something r e a l l y s p e c i a l to keep 25 a l i v e the enthusiasm of the Japanese for the creation of a modern navy. The steamer Soembing under Captain Gerhardes Fabius anchored i n Nagasaki 26 harbour on August 21 (7/28). Mizuno sent an i n t e r p r e t e r to Dejima to confirm the Dutch intentions concerning naval t r a i n i n g . Curtius soon answered Mizuno on August 24 ( i n t e r c a l a r y 7/1) , t e l l i n g him that the Dutch were well prepared 27 to work for the sake of Japan. Receiving t h i s favourable answer from the Dutch, Mizuno sent an explanation of the progress of the negotiations to the — — 28 roju, asking f or approval of the plan f o r temporary naval t r a i n i n g . After t h i s , naval a f f a i r s at Nagasaki began to develop quickly. On August 27 ( i n t e r - c a l . 7/4), Curtius sent Mizuno, i n response to h i s request, the f i r s t memorial on the creation of Japan's modern navy by Captain Fabius. Katsu Kaishu wrote i n h i s Kaigun Rekishi about the memorials prepared by Captain Fabius at t h i s time as follows: The o r i g i n of Japan's [modern] navy, of course, r e f l e c t s the leaders' deep concern with the tendencies of the time and the future. Yet the contribution of the Dutch cannot be forgotten: the kind advice of the Dutch King who considered the long f r i e n d - ship between the two countries; the dispatch to Japan of J.H. Donker Curtius who explained the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n to the Bakufu i n 1852; and f i n a l l y the presentation of precise and deta i l e d memorials about a modern navy by Captain G. Fabius of the Gedeh [sic] i n 1854. They a l l promoted discussion within the Bakufu and eventually led to the Bakufu's r e s o l u t i o n to b u i l d a modern navy.^ 9 47 The f i r s t Fabius memorial began with examples of some of the Western countries such as Russia and the United States whose navies had recently been developed very quickly. Fabius said that "the seagirt country Japan, with i t s 30 strong and brave people," should never ignore the examples of these countries. He recognized the p o t e n t i a l of naval power i n Japan and described the kind of ships Japan should obtain. For the preparation of a naval force, the purchase as well as b u i l d i n g of s a i l i n g vessels would be f r u i t l e s s . The ships must be steamers. Among them, paddle steamers are no longer s a t i s f a c t o r y ; only steamers with screw propellers are suitable.31 This was a very r a d i c a l suggestion i n 1854. Even Fabius' own ship was not a screw propellered one but a paddle wheeler. This single suggestion by Fabius t e l l s us that he was s i n c e r e l y presenting h i s memorials as a professional navy o f f i c e r . Unlike a diplomat or a p o l i t i c i a n who might recommend an obsolete system to foreign countries, Fabius straightforwardly t o l d the Japanese what he thought best, but h i s own government would not act according to the o f f i c e r ' s p r e s c r i p t i o n . Fabius then recommended that the Japanese adopt wooden ships rather than iron-clad ones. "The reason for t h i s recommendation i s that i n Japan f a c i l i t i e s such as a b u i l d i n g s l i p and dry dock are not yet a v a i l a b l e . Without these f a c i l i t i e s , the cleaning of the bottom of ships and the s c a l i n g of rust could 32 present a l o t of d i f f i c u l t i e s . " He went on to mention the necessity of dock- yards and explained that Nagasaki was a suitable place for them because of the good tides and geographical surroundings. He also presented a plan for complete naval f a c i l i t i e s at Nagasaki. Taking many examples from other countries, Fabius argued that the Japanese ought to employ many Dutch engineers to help construct the Nagasaki naval f a c i l i t i e s . And then he urged the Bakufu to e s t a b l i s h naval t r a i n i n g schools. He l i s t e d necessary subjects that students would have to 48 learn and outlined the importance of naval education. He warned e s p e c i a l l y of a possible naval d i s a s t e r i f naval t r a i n i n g were ignored or done u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Furthermore, Fabius added h i s opinions concerning study abroad for the Japanese; he said that young Japanese should go to Europe as that was the way to learn not only naval a f f a i r s but also customs i n European countries. He concluded the f i r s t memorial by saying that he would l i k e to teach the Japanese whatever they wanted to learn during h i s stay i n Nagasaki because the Dutch had enjoyed good r e l a t i o n s with t h i s prosperous country of Japan for more than • 33 250 years. Mizuno Tadanori, a f t e r reading the f i r s t memorial, sent many questions to Captain Fabius. As a r e s u l t , Fabius sent the second memorial on September 4 ( i n t e r c a l . 7/12). I t began by replying to some of Mizuno's questions about the proposed naval t r a i n i n g school. Fabius mentioned the important subjects that should be learned at the school, the necessity of good i n s t r u c t o r s , and to Mizuno's question about the wages for i n s t r u c t o r s , he i n return questioned what kind of treatment the Bakufu would give to the i n s t r u c t o r s . The Dutch side was se r i o u s l y concerned with t h e i r future status at Nagasaki and i n Japan. And i t seems Fabius was insp i r e d by Curtius to argue t h i s issue whenever possible to remind the Japanese of i t s importance. A f t e r he answered Mizuno's questions about the necessity of a dockyard and about the a r t i l l e r y problem, Fabius expressed h i s opinion on language t r a i n i n g . He cautioned Mizuno about possible troubles, waste and inconvenience at naval t r a i n i n g i f students could not understand Dutch. If the Magistrate's O f f i c e agrees to my explanations [about the importance of language t r a i n i n g ] , f i r s t of a l l the Bakufu should open a Dutch language school at Nagasaki. It i s important that young candidates for naval t r a i n i n g be sent to the school f i r s t to learn the language.34 49 The second memorial ended with encouragement for the Japanese to follow the examples of the Netherlands and Great B r i t a i n . Look at a world map! The Netherlands i s a small country; however, i t has naval power with many experienced men. Therefore, i t preserves the independence of the country, and i n addition, i t holds vast lands overseas. The existence of the Japanese Islands at the eastern part of Asia i s l i k e that of the B r i t i s h I s l e s at the west of Europe. Consequently, l i k e today's B r i t a i n , Japan, when i t develops a naval and a coastal defense system, i s assured of becoming r i c h and strong through trade with the world.35 Mizuno eagerly proceeded with h i s duty by asking further questions on naval t r a i n i n g . On September 5 ( i n t e r c a l . 7/13), he wrote to Fabius f i r s t to ask about a possible wage range for i n s t r u c t o r s and i n q u i r i n g about the p o s s i - b i l i t y of obtaining quick p r a c t i c a l naval t r a i n i n g instead of s t a r t i n g from the 36 very beginning to learn basic subjects such as physics and astronomy. As the Bakufu desperately needed a naval force at that moment, Mizuno's idea repre- sented those of the e n t i r e Bakufu which, as they thought, required capable seamen but not school students. Fabius wrote a l e t t e r to answer Mizuno's questions and i t was forwarded by Curtius to Mizuno on September 9 ( i n t e r c a l . 7/17). This was the t h i r d and l a s t memorial on the creation of Japan's modern navy by Fabius. Showing the average wage levels, of the Dutch naval o f f i c e r s i n the East Indian region, Fabius wrote that the Bakufu had to be prepared to pay a good amount of wages to a t t r a c t capable i n s t r u c t o r s a l l the way from Europe to Japan. And Fabius again emphasized the importance of the study of Dutch p r i o r to any naval t r a i n i n g . He reaffirmed that "the teaching [of naval subjects] to those who could not 37 learn Dutch would be a waste of time and money." The Bakufu wanted to t r a i n some seamen quickly and e a s i l y . In other words, the Bakufu expected that the Dutch would teach some rudimentary knowledge of naval operations to some of i t s men. It seems the Bakufu did not ignore the 50 d i f f i c u l t i e s of mastering modern naval technology, but, rather, could not under- stand that the advanced naval technology of the West had been b u i l t on an under- standing of the fundamentals of many subjects. As a r e s u l t Bakufu executives : considered short-term naval t r a i n i n g possible. Fabius f e l t obliged to give some examples of naval t r a i n i n g schools and mercantile marine schools i n the Netherlands to explain to Mizuno how a modern naval t r a i n i n g program was hard 38 to master i n a short time. As the conclusion of the t h i r d memorial, Fabius chose the subject of t r e a t - ment for Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s i n Japan. He claimed that when some European countries r e c r u i t e d foreigners f o r c e r t a i n kinds of i n s t r u c t i o n , those govern- ments treated the i n s t r u c t o r s very p o l i t e l y and arranged to eliminate a l l the inconveniences f o r them. This argument, of course, was added to prevent a possible problem with the Japanese when Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s began teaching i n Japan. At the same time, i t indicated that one of the most important points i n negotiations for a treaty would be the same issue. In our examination of the memorials, we have noticed a fundamental difference between the Dutch and Japanese plans for naval t r a i n i n g . While the Bakufu b a s i c a l l y aimed at obtaining temporary t r a i n i n g i n naval technology, the Dutch, who knew the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n mastering the technology, p a t i e n t l y t r i e d to persuade the Japanese of the necessity for comprehensive t r a i n i n g by presenting many actual examples. Consequently, when Mizuno sent h i s opinions on the creation of a modern navy to the roju i n Edo, he had become the f i r s t man to be aware of the necessity of comprehensive rather than temporary t r a i n i n g . While the Dutch and the Bakufu continued further negotiations on formal t r a i n i n g , the purchase of warships, and treaty problems, temporary naval t r a i n i n g was given to about 200 people from the Nagasaki Magistrate's O f f i c e , Saga han, Fukuoka han and others during the summer of 1854. Judging from various documents i n these days, i t was mainly a demonstration of the operation 51 of t he s h i p by the Dutch crew. On October 23 (9/2), Mizuno n o t i f i e d C u r t i u s of t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e B a k u f u c o n c e r n i n g the t r e a t m e n t o f Dutch n a t i o n a l s i n Japan. He d e c l a r e d t h a t the Dutch would e n j o y the same p r i v i l e g e s w h i c h were g r a n t e d t o A m e r i c a n s as a r e s u l t o f the T r e a t y o f Peace and A m i t y between Japan and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . R e f l e c t i n g on the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n o f t h e Dutch i n J a p a n , the B a k u f u p r e s e n t e d 40 a l e t t e r p r o m i s i n g them f r i e n d l y t r e a t m e n t . There were s t i l l some d i s c r e - p a n c i e s between the a c t u a l t r e a t m e n t of t h e Dutch a t N a g a s a k i and the t r e a t m e n t p r o m i s e d i n the Japan-U.S. t r e a t y even a f t e r t h i s l e t t e r , b u t t h e Dutch c o n - s i d e r e d t h e c o n t e n t s of the l e t t e r s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r a w h i l e . The n o t i c e con- c e r n i n g the t r e a t m e n t of t h e Dutch i n Japan was i m p o r t a n t , s i n c e i t was one of t h e key i s s u e s t h a t had been an o b s t a c l e t o t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f n a v a l t r a i n i n g f o r t h e J a p a n e s e . I n the f i r s t h a l f o f 1854, the B a k u f u was s e r i o u s l y making a c o n c r e t e p l a n f o r t he c r e a t i o n of a modern navy. The l e a d i n g f i g u r e i n t h e p l a n n i n g was Tokugawa N a r i a k i , the r e t i r e d l o r d o f M i t o han, who now was a B a k u f u a d v i s o r f o r n a v a l a f f a i r s . C o n c e r n i n g n a v a l t r a i n i n g , he s u g g e s t e d i n a l e t t e r on J u l y 28 (7/4) t h a t B a k u f u s a m u r a i s h o u l d o b t a i n i t f i r s t and t h e n l o c a l han s a m u r a i would l e a r n f r o m t h e B a k u f u s a m u r a i . Y e t , he c o n t i n u e d , i f t h e r e were many s h i p s on w h i c h n a v a l t r a i n i n g c o u l d be c a r r i e d o u t , s a m u r a i f r o m l o c a l han such as h i s own domain s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o j o i n . The most i m p o r t a n t s u g g e s t i o n i n t h i s l e t t e r was N a r i a k i ' s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n of modern s h i p s s h o u l d n o t be k e p t s e c r e t among a s m a l l number of p e o p l e . He s a i d t h a t r e a l c o a s t a l d e f e n s e would be v e r y d i f f i c u l t i f the B a k u f u and each l o c a l han k e p t t h e know- 41 how of the o p e r a t i o n o f s h i p s t o t h e m s e l v e s . A c c o r d i n g t o M i t o Han S h i r y o ( H i s t o r i c a l Documents of M i t o Han), the B a k u f u c o m p l e t e d a b a s i c p l a n f o r n a v a l t r a i n i n g i n mid-1854, b u t the c o n t e n t of t h e p l a n i s n o t known. P r o b a b l y i t was s t i l l v e r y vague as the B a k u f u i n Edo had 52 not yet heard any suggestions from the Dutch. When th i s Bakufu plan was f o r - warded to Nagasaki, the Nagasaki Magistrate had already informed the Bakufu of the information brought by the Sara Lydia. Therefore, the Bakufu then suspended i t s o r i g i n a l plan and convened to draw up a new plan based on the information from the Dutch and the Nagasaki Magistrate. Again according to Mito Han Shiryo, there were two groups i n the Bakufu. One, comprised of inspectors (metsuke), supported the plan by the Nagasaki Magistrate, Mizuno Tadanori. He i n s i s t e d on the beginning of the purchase and construction of warships as well as naval t r a i n i n g even though they would be c o s t l y . The other group, which consisted of o f f i c i a l s responsible f or f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s , were reluctant to bear the burden of creating a modern navy. They even i n s i s t e d on the ca n c e l l a t i o n of naval t r a i n i n g and warships. The negative p o l i c y was, however, overturned by Tokugawa Nariaki. He wrote a l e t t e r based on the aforementioned arguments to Bakufu executives on October 13 (8/22) i n which he f i e r c e l y c r i t i c i z e d the negative 42 p o l i c y . Nariaki said that some s p e c i a l measures, namely creation of a strong naval force, were needed without the consideration of expense, j u s t as "medicine 43 was prepared regardless of expenses when the master of a family be very i l l . " A f t er the l e t t e r by Nari a k i , the Bakufu was brought under h i s sway to the p o s i - t i v e view favouring the b u i l d i n g of two warships every eighteen months to a t o t a l of eight, and the s t a r t of naval t r a i n i n g under Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . On October 24 (9/3), the Bakufu formally ordered the Nagasaki Magistrate to ask 44 the Dutch for warships and naval t r a i n i n g . Curtius learned of t h i s discussion on November 10 (9/20). Captain Fabius had l e f t Nagasaki on October 26 (9/5), but the Dutch seem to have been informally apprised of the Bakufu order before his departure. When Captain Fabius l e f t Nagasaki, he took a l e t t e r from Curtius to the Governor-general at Batavia. This l e t t e r outlined Curtius',plan to take advantage of t h i s opportunity to r e - e s t a b l i s h the supreme p o s i t i o n of the Dutch 53 i n Japan. It would be almost impossible to f i n i s h the construction of the ships that the Japanese ordered from us by the time they expect. Therefore, what do you think of a plan to present a commercial steamer to the Shogun i n 1855 as a g i f t from our King? If a warship i s a v a i l a b l e , I think, i t would be even more a t t r a c t i v e f o r them than a commercial steamer. Once the Japanese own a steamer and learn how to operate i t , surely they w i l l order more ships from us. Then the cost of the g i f t ship w i l l be e a s i l y recovered.45 Curtius saw that h i s most important task i n Japan, to secure a superior . diplomatic p o s i t i o n f o r the Netherlands, would be attained by taking advantage of naval t r a i n i n g , which would also benefit the Dutch by expanding t h e i r trade. He knew that the creation of a naval force and the b u i l d i n g of supporting f a c i l i t i e s would bring tremendous business to the Netherlands. This diplomat of foresight p r e c i s e l y predicted that the Japanese would buy more and more ships i n the near future, and i t was important for the Dutch to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r status as a r e l i a b l e ship supplier f o r Japan. The proposal of Curtius was soon agreed to by the Governor-general of Batavia and i t was sent to the Netherlands to obtain the approval of the home government. The Dutch government endorsed the plan and decided to present the Soembing to the Shogun as well as formally giving i t s consent to send some Dutch in s t r u c t o r s to Japan for naval t r a i n i n g . I t also approved the plan to b u i l d 46 two steamers for the Japanese at t h i s time. On July 20, 1855 (Ansei 2, 6/7), the steamers Gedeh and, once more, the Soembing under Captain Fabius arr i v e d at Nagasaki. Four days l a t e r , Curtius wrote a l e t t e r to Arao Narimasa, who had succeeded to the post of Nagasaki Magistrate i n the previous year. In t h i s l e t t e r , Curtius n o t i f i e d the Bakufu that h i s status at Nagasaki had been changed to that of "Netherlands Commis-•"• sioner i n Japan." In the same l e t t e r , he reported that the Dutch King would present the steamer Soembing to the Shogun. Although the Bakufu was supposedly eager to obtain steamers, about three-months were to pass u n t i l the Dutch heard of the Bakufu's acceptance of the ship. On August 29 (7/17), Arao asked Curtius i f the Dutch were prepared to spare some of the men under Captain Fabius for the naval t r a i n i n g of the Japanese i n case the Bakufu accepted the Soembing. Arao was anxious to know about the r e a l i n t e n t i o n of the Dutch i n presenting a steamer and about t h e i r diplomatic plans on t h i s . v i s i t . Curtius r e p l i e d that he was given power to order some of the Dutch seamen to stay i n Japan f o r naval t r a i n i n g . However, the "Netherlands Commissioner i n Japan" to l d the Nagasaki Magistrate that the Bakufu had to agree to conclude a treaty between the two countries p r i o r to the s t a r t of naval t r a i n i n g . Here, the Dutch revealed t h e i r intentions to secure a treaty from the Bakufu i n exchange f o r naval t r a i n i n g . Then Arao asked about the main concept of the proposed treaty. Curtius simply answered that he would explain 48 i t i n wr i t i n g when the Soembing was received by the Bakufu. On September 5 (7/24), the report that the Bakufu had decided to accept the Soembing arrived at Nagasaki, and t h i s was conveyed to Curtius. At th i s time Arao suggested that Curtius should present the proposal of the treaty as soon as possible. Three days l a t e r , on September 8, Curtius turned over the proposal with a l e t t e r to Arao. In the accompanying l e t t e r , "Curtius repeatedly emphasized that the'Dutch were well prepared to begin .naval, t r a i n i n g f or' the . Japanese: at any time, but the treaty-between the two countries had to be con- cluded before the s t a r t of t r a i n i n g . He urged the Japanese to consider the proposal as soon as possible, and Arao i n return promised to send i t to Edo 49 immediately. The formal ceremony of the presentation of the Soembing was car r i e d out on October 5 (8/25). The ship had been b u i l t i n the Netherlands i n 1850 and i t s measurements were 58 meters i n length and 10 meters i n width. I t was equipped 55 with a 150 horsepower steam engine, and i r o n i c a l l y , had paddle wheels instead of the highly recommended screw p r o p e l l e r . With s i x cannons on board i t was an armed commercial ship rather than a w a r s h i p . ^ The Soembing was not an old ship. However, e s p e c i a l l y i n those years, technical innovations i n shipbuilding were advancing r a p i d l y . The merit of the screw pr o p e l l e r was already v e r i f i e d by every naval authority. Although i t was contradictory to send a paddle wheeler to Japan a f t e r the Dutch themselves recommended screw propellered ships, the Dutch must have been happy to f i n d such a good way to dispose of t h e i r outdated steamer. Despite the explanation by the Nagasaki Magistrate that the Bakufu was working on the treaty proposal, no concrete progress was seen a l l through the autumn. On November 3 (9/24) , Curtius met Arao to ask about the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e t t l i n g the a f f a i r by drawing up a temporary treaty on a l l the proposed issues. As Arao was worrying about the delay of naval t r a i n i n g , and had the power to negotiate on a temporary treaty, he immediately agreed to Curtius' idea. The . . ' ^ 51 negotiations between the two soon began. The most important issue i n the negotiations was the freedom of the Dutch to walk unhampered outside Dejima i n Nagasaki. As Curtius and Fabius repeatedly mentioned i n the l e t t e r s they sent to the Nagasaki Magistrates, they had been most anxious about obtaining freedom of movement i n Nagasaki. Both partie s discussed the matter i n t e n s i v e l y . They reached a conclusion i n a short time. In f a c t , as the Japanese had already concluded s i m i l a r t r e a t i e s with the United States and others, the negotiation with the Dutch must have been r e l a t i v e l y easy. The delay i n agreeing on the Japan-Netherlands treaty was most probably caused by the complicated bureaucratic system of the Bakufu i t s e l f . The signing ceremony of the temporary treaty was held on November 11 (10/2). Later t h i s temporary treaty was reviewed and formally approved by the Bakufu. On January 30, 1856 (Ansei 2, 12/23), the formal treaty, which almost duplicated the 56 temporary treaty, was signed at Nagasaki. The treaty recognized the exclusive r i g h t s of the Netherlands over Dejima and the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Dutch consul over h i s people i n Japan. I t also relaxed the regulations about movements of the Dutch outside Dejima. The complicated regulations about the entry and departure of Dutch ships at Nagasaki harbour were also eased considerably. Although the treaty was an unequal one for the Japanese on the model of the American treaty, the two countries f i n a l l y 52 established formal diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . Three days p r i o r to the signing ceremony of the formal treaty, the Nagasaki Magistrate o f f i c i a l l y proclaimed that the Dutch would no longer have any guard 53 ( a c t u a l l y surveillance) while they were outside Dejima. The Dutch were very successful i n t h i s negotiation. They were triumphant not only i n concluding the treaty with Japan but also i n being commissioned for the naval t r a i n i n g of the Japanese. The Dutch also became the sole supplier of the n e c e s s i t i e s f o r the t r a i n i n g and b u i l d i n g of a navy, and t h i s was big business. Of course, t h e i r voice i n Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s was strengthened by the f a c t that they were working as a kind of m i l i t a r y advisor. The Dutch f i n a l l y concluded the treaty with Japan, and they simultaneously achieved something that the other Western countries had hoped for but could not r e a l i z e . 57 CHAPTER 4 The Nagasaki Naval Training School The Bakufu acted quickly to e s t a b l i s h a naval t r a i n i n g program and build.: a .modern navy. Since the b i r t h of the kaibo-ron i n the l a t e 18th century, about h a l f a century had passed without any naval development i n Japan. The conservatism among Bakufu o f f i c i a l s could not be r e a l l y shaken except by m i l i t a r y threats. Yet, once the Japanese determined to b u i l d a modern navy af t e r the strong American demonstration of power, they began b u i l d i n g i t very r a p i d l y . We w i l l cover i n t h i s chapter the operation of the Nagasaki Kaigun Denshu-jo (Nagasaki Naval Training School), e s p e c i a l l y the a c t i v i t i e s of i t s students. Furthermore, i n conjunction with the main n a r r a t i v e , the programs and p o l i c i e s of c e r t a i n l o c a l han such as Satsuma, Saga and Mito with regard to naval a f f a i r s w i l l be examined to help analyze the context i n which the Bakufu's program took place. As negotiation over treaty a f f a i r s between Japan and the Netherlands pro- gressed, both p a r t i e s began to make f i n a l arrangements to s t a r t the actual t r a i n i n g . Although the Dutch did not reveal i t to the Japanese, they made a l l the necessary preparations, including the s e l e c t i o n of possible i n s t r u c t o r s , before they l e f t Batavia. Captain Fabius of the Gedeh was f u l l y authorized to work on naval t r a i n i n g with Commissioner Donker Curtius. While Curtius was working hard on negotiations with Bakufu Nagasaki o f f i c i a l s , Fabius worked s t e a d i l y to make the coming naval t r a i n i n g successful by wr i t i n g several further memorials to the Nagasaki Magistrate. They concerned such important matters as the contents of t r a i n i n g and regulations on board."'" As w e l l , he in v i t e d non-Bakufu men to h i s ships and l e t them witness naval exercises before the s t a r t of formal naval t r a i n i n g . As we r e c a l l , the Bakufu i n the previous year i n s i s t e d on having only 58 rudimentary t r a i n i n g for i t s men. This plan was rejected by Captain Fabius. He repeatedly explained the complexity and d i f f i c u l t i e s of naval operation by writing three s p e c i a l memorials to the Nagasaki Magistrate. The Japanese seem to have been convinced of the need for a more extensive program and had agreed to comprehensive t r a i n i n g . However, Fabius again had to persuade the Japanese, who had expected to have only four or f i v e general i n s t r u c t o r s , to accept a 2 f u l l - s c a l e t r a i n i n g program with many more able i n s t r u c t o r s . On September 7, 1855 (Ansei 2, 7/26), two days a f t e r the Bakufu t o l d the Dutch that i t gladly accepted the Soembing as a g i f t from the Dutch King, Fabius wrote a memorandum to Curtius. This was Fabius' response to the Japanese plan. One by one he outlined the contents of lessons and explained the neces- s i t y of i n v i t i n g highly p r o f e s s i o n a l i z e d i n s t r u c t o r s i n the d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s of study. He did not forget to stress that he had brought an excellent commander 3 for the t r a i n i n g . Nagai Iwanojo (Naomune), the metsuke (inspector), who was responsible for actual negotiations with the Dutch over naval t r a i n i n g a f f a i r s , f i n a l l y gave i n to Fabius' plan and recommended i t to the Bakufu i n Edo for f i n a l approval.^ The negotiation of a temporary treaty came to a conclusion, and the two parties o f f i c i a l l y signed i t on November 11 (10/2). The problem of the t r e a t - ment of i n s t r u c t o r s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e i r pay, was also solved on November 9. After t h i s , Fabius formally appointed the captain of the Soembing, G.C.C. Pels Rijken, to be the commander and head i n s t r u c t o r of the t r a i n i n g team, and gave him some direc t i o n s concerning the t r a i n i n g . Some of the main points i n the agreement between the Japanese and Dutch appeared i n these d i r e c t i o n s to Pels Rijken. As of October 5, 1855, G.C.C. Pels Rijken i s appointed as commander of the detachment. The mission of the detachment i s to i n s t r u c t the Japanese i n the operation of the steamer Soembing. A l l the members of the detachment w i l l be temporarily regarded as attaches to the Netherlands Commissioner i n Japan. 59 The detachment constitutes a part of the Royal Dutch Navy, not a part of the Japanese m i l i t a r y forces.5 Fabius then personally chose i n s t r u c t o r s , mainly from the crew of the Soembing, and assigned them to c e r t a i n f i e l d s of naval t r a i n i n g . He was very c a r e f u l i n h i s s e l e c t i o n , earnestly examining the character of each candidate to see i f he was suitable f o r teaching. For i n s t r u c t i o n i n engineering, f o r instance, he found no adequate lieutenant, and had to r e j e c t a sub-lieutenant because he judged the character of the man unsuitable for teaching. Consequently, Fabius appointed two midshipmen.-., f or t h i s duty. Another of h i s d i r e c t i v e s explained the treatment that the i n s t r u c t o r s were to receive at Nagasaki. Besides free accommodation at Dejima, the members of the detach- ment w i l l be given s p e c i a l allowances by the Japanese government i n addition to t h e i r normal payments by the Royal Dutch Navy. The schedule of the allowances per month from the Japanese government i s as follows: G.C.C. Pels Rijken, Commander 450 guilders (2,812.50)* A.A. 'sGraeuwen, Deputy Commander 250 Sub-lieutenant C. Eeg 225 C.H. Parker de Yonge, Paymaster 225 Engineer Midshipmen 125 Chief Petty O f f i c e r s 100 Petty O f f i c e r s 75 Stokers 75 Sai l o r s 65 * i n s i l v e r monme (3.75 grams) 7 (1,562.50) (1,406.25) (1,406.25) ( 781.25) ( 625.00) ( 468.75) ( 468.75) ( 406.25) The payment from the Bakufu was set at a s l i g h t l y higher l e v e l than the i n s t r u c - tors received from the Dutch Navy. This meant that i n Japan they received twice as much pay as they received on t h e i r usual duties. In 1855, one koku of r i c e (180 l i t e r s ) was valued at about 84 s i l v e r monme. So the highest paid Pels Rijken received the equivalent value of about 33.48 koku of r i c e a month or about 400 koku a year. Even the lowest paid s a i l o r s made about 4.8 koku monthly or 58 koku annually. Compared to the r i c e stipend that a Tokugawa samurai 60 received from the Bakufu or h i s l o r d , these were s u b s t a n t i a l sums. A samurai's stipend had to be shared by himself, h i s family and h i s r e t a i n e r s . On the other hand, what the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s received was of course net payment. Therefore, the payment made to Pels Rijken could have been equal to at l e a s t 1,000 koku regular r i c e stipend. And a Bakufu samurai with 1,000 koku could be 9 a candidate for a r e l a t i v e l y high p o s i t i o n such as Nagasaki Magistrate. The Bakufu considered that " i t was not a very good idea to l e t spread a rumour to foreign countries that would a f f e c t the honour of the kokutai (national p o l i t y ) i n order to save a l i t t l e money here.""^ Subsequently the Japanese paid very high wages for various kinds of i n s t r u c t o r s from the Netherlands. This was r e a l l y the only way the Japanese could a t t r a c t many good i n s t r u c t o r s i n those days. A f t e r the Tokugawa period, the succeeding M e i j i government also followed the same p o l i c y . I t seems that the p o l i c y paid off w e l l i n the long run. A t o t a l of twenty-two i n s t r u c t o r s , more than h a l f of whom were to be i n charge of teaching p r a c t i c a l techniques such as carpentry, stoking, s a i l i n g and s a i l sewing, were ready to s t a r t naval t r a i n i n g whenever the Japanese were ready. After the Bakufu confirmed the i n t e n t i o n of the Dutch, i t began making formal arrangements to begin a naval t r a i n i n g school at Nagasaki."^ On Septem- ber 10 (7/29), the chief r o j u , Abe Masahiro, appointed as school d i r e c t o r Nagai Iwanojo, one of the most knowledgeable and experienced men i n naval a f f a i r s . As students, the Bakufu f i r s t d i r e c t l y selected three prominent young Bakufu men. They were candidates to be captains of a future Bakufu f l e e t : Nagamochi Kyojiro, a kachi-metsuke (sub-inspector) at the Nagasaki Magistrate's O f f i c e , Yatabori Keizo, a student at the Shoheiko college, and Katsu Rintaro (Kaishu), a young Dutch scholar i n the Bakufu O f f i c e for Foreign A f f a i r s (Ikoku Osetsu-gakari). Among these three, Katsu was to perform the most outstanding -role i n the coming schooling at Nagasaki, so i t i s proper for us to discuss how 61 he had paved the way for h i s future success i n the Bakufu system. Katsu, l a t e r regarded as one of the founders of Japan's Imperial Navy, was born into a poor hatamoto ( d i r e c t vassal of the Tokugawa) family i n 1830 (Tempo 1). His father c o l l e c t e d only 41 koku of r i c e stipend and never held any o f f i - c i a l p o s i t i o n i n h i s l i f e t i m e . Rintaro himself led a t y p i c a l poor hatamoto l i f e of Confucian studies, swordsmanship, and most importantly, side jobs. He began to study Rangaku (Dutch studies) i n 1845, and he worked very hard at i t for the next f i v e years. By 1850 (Kaei 3) he had studied enough to open h i s own private school for the Dutch language and Western m i l i t a r y science. On the occasion of Commodore Perry's v i s i t i n 1853, a chance came to young Katsu. After r e c e i v i n g a l e t t e r sent by the President of the United States from Perry, the agonized roju Abe, breaking with common p r a c t i c e , sought opinions concerning the future Bakufu foreign and domestic p o l i c i e s from high- ranking Bakufu o f f i c i a l s and l o c a l daimyo. At t h i s time, besides these members of the e l i t e , many low-ranking Bakufu o f f i c i a l s , Bakufu samurai without any o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n s , ronin (masterless samurai) and even commoners submitted 13 t h e i r opinions to the Bakufu executives. ' And among a great number Of memo- r i a l s , Katsu's was one of the best. The basic proposals that Katsu made i n h i s memorial were a l l l a t e r r e a l i z e d i n the administrative and m i l i t a r y reforms i n i t i a t e d by Abe. For example, two of the most s i g n i f i c a n t proposals were the creatioji of a modern navy and the reform of the m i l i t a r y system, including the opening of a m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g school. Katsu's plan was very concrete and p r a c t i c a l and demonstrated great conviction. His opinions were well supported by h i s extensive knowledge of Western general and m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s . It i s d i f f i c u l t to say whether the Bakufu executives adopted Katsu's ideas as they were. But i t i s c e r t a i n that Katsu 14 was able to forsee what the Bakufu would soon need. Early i n the spring of 1855, Katsu was appointed to a Bakufu p o s i t i o n at 62 the Off ice of Foreign A f f a i r s . His f i r s t achievement there was to d r a f t a basic plan to e s t a b l i s h a Bakufu research i n s t i t u t e f o r Western studies (YOgaku-sho). After t h i s , he spent a few months inspecting the important coastal areas along the P a c i f i c Ocean. Then i n September he was chosen for naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki. For the s e l e c t i o n of other students, the Bakufu turned to the Uraga Magis- trate's O f f i c e , Egawa Tarozaemon (Hidetatsu) of Izu (today Shizuoka-ken), and the Funate. The Uraga O f f i c e was probably requested to help because i t had directed the construction of the f i r s t large Bakufu ship, the Ho'o Maru, i n 1853 and 1854.^ The Bakufu was very astute i n asking Egawa to send some of hi s men, since t h i s Governor of Izu commanded some of the most experienced men i n a r t i l l e r y , metal work, and shipbuilding. The Nirayama reverberatory furnace was under h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n . Furthermore, Egawa and h i s men had j u s t f i n i s h e d a s s i s t i n g i n the b u i l d i n g of the schooner Heda, the Russian-designed ship b u i l t for Admiral P u t i a t i n a f t e r h i s ship Diana had been badly damaged by a tsunami i n the previous year and eventually sank off the Izu Peninsula. P u t i a t i n asked the Bakufu to help the Russians b u i l d t h e i r own ship to return to t h e i r home country. With the Bakufu's f i n a n c i a l assistance and many shipwrights directed by Egawa, the Russians completed the construction of the f i r s t modern Western- s t y l e ship i n Japan, leaving invaluable shipbuilding experience with the 16 Japanese. Eventually, a t o t a l of nine, excluding non-samurai such as ship- wrights, were sent to Nagasaki from Egawa's j u r i s d i c t i o n . The Funate, on the other hand, sent only two doshin (petty o f f i c e r s ) and ten s a i l o r s to Nagasaki. The t r a d i t i o n a l Bakufu "water force" had deteriorated so badly that i t could not f i n d many adequate men to pursue modern naval t r a i n i n g . According to Katsu's Kaigun Rekishi, at l e a s t 48 Bakufu samurai were enrolled i n the f i r s t - t e r m naval t r a i n i n g program. The positions of these 48 men before j o i n i n g the Nagasaki Naval Training School: 63 A r t i l l e r i s t s * From the Uraga Magistrate's O f f i c e Bakufu Astronomers A Shoheiko College Student From the Nagasaki Magistrate's O f f i c e From the Foreign A f f a i r s O f f i c e Unknown 19 (39.6%) 9 (18.8%) 3 ( 6.3%) 1 ( 2.1%) 1 ( 2.1%) 1 ( 2.1%) 14 (29.2%) *Five men were from Egawa of Izu, and the others were from two d i f f e r e n t schools of the Bakufu a r t i l l e r y masters. 1 7 (Total percentage i s more than 100 because of rounding.) Judging from t h e i r o r i g i n s , very few students could have known the Dutch l a n - guage. Most of the a r t i l l e r i s t s knew only t r a d i t i o n a l a r t i l l e r y and had studied neither Western a f f a i r s nor languages. The Egawa men, l i k e the Bakufu astronomers and Nagamochi Kyojiro from the Nagasaki Magistrate's O f f i c e , must have had a c e r t a i n knowledge of the language. But generally speaking, t h e i r l e v e l of competence seems to have been very low. Katsu could read and write to a c e r t a i n extent but could not speak the language. Aside from the lack of a basic knowledge of science, the language would l a t e r turn out to be the most serious b a r r i e r i n naval t r a i n i n g directed by non-Japanese-speaking Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . As the f i r s t modern m i l i t a r y school, the Nagasaki Naval Training School accommodated at l e a s t 86 Bakufu samurai students during i t s operation. On the other hand, i t also admitted 129 students known to have come from l o c a l han during the same period. To our surprise, 124 non-Bakufu students (96.1%) out of the 129 were from the han of tozama (non-hereditary vassals of the Tokugawa) daimyo, those of the provinces' to the west with the exception of Tsu han i n Ise Province (today Mie-ken). The remaining f i v e students (3.9%) were from the fudai (daimyo i n hereditary vassalage to the Tokugawa before 1600) han of 18 Fukuyama and Kakegawa. 64 As i s well known, one of the serious concerns of the Tokugawa Bakufu i n i t s 250-year reign was the a c t i v i t i e s of the tozama daimyo, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the southwestern provinces of the Kyushu, Chugoku and Shikoku regions. They were often considered to be a possible menace to the Tokugawa regime. The attitu d e of the Bakufu was t y p i c a l l y shown i n a l e t t e r to Tokugawa Nariaki from Mizuno Tadakuni i n 1843 a f t e r the former had requested the suspension of the p r o h i b i - t i o n against b u i l d i n g large warships. Mizuno rejected t h i s request because he considered that i t would be very harmful to the Bakufu i f the tozama daimyo 19 could f r e e l y b u i l d large warships. Then what were the reasons for the change of a t t i t u d e of the Bakufu towards the tozama daimyo? Undoubtedly the biggest reason for t h i s was the d r a s t i c change i n Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s i n the l a t e 1840's and early 1850's. The Bakufu was s t i l l able to manage minor incidents without m i l i t a r y threats, such as the v i s i t s of Dutch missions i n 1844 and 1852, the v i s i t of Commodore James Biddle i n 1846, and other appear- ances of Western ships. However, i t revealed i t s t o t a l inadequacy when Perry m i l i t a r i l y threatened the Bakufu i n demanding the opening of the country. For the f i r s t time i n i t s h i s t o r y , the Bakufu openly sought opinions and proposals for countermeasures not only from Bakufu men but also from l o c a l daimyo, including tozama. Without securing cooperation from l o c a l han, e s p e c i a l l y powerful southwestern daimyo such as Shimazu (Satsuma han), Nabeshima (Saga han), Kuroda (Hizen han), and Mori (Choshu han), who had been accumulating r e l a t i v e l y high standards of m i l i t a r y knowledge and equipment i n t h e i r own domains, the Bakufu had l i t t l e independent power to deal with aggressive Westerners. The more Bakufu executives knew about Western a f f a i r s and the Western presence i n Asia, the more they r e a l i z e d that the Bakufu did not have the necessary power to deal with the changing i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . In f a c t , the southwestern daimyo had been much more s e r i o u s l y concerned with external a f f a i r s than the Bakufu i t s e l f . This resulted i n the main from the geographical fa c t that they 65 were more d i r e c t l y exposed to the- foreign approach than anybody else i n Japan. In addition, these han had lords who i n i t i a t e d many progressive measures i n 20 defense and foreign a f f a i r s based on successful economic reforms. Abe 21 Masahiro, understanding the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n f a i r l y well , had l i t t l e choice other than to foster cooperation between the southwestern tozama daimyo and the Bakufu. Among the tozama han mentioned, Satsuma and Saga were p a r t i c u l a r l y impor- tant. Later, i n the M e i j i period, men from these two han would form the most i n f l u e n t i a l factions i n the Imperial Navy. Sixteen Satsuma and fo r t y - e i g h t S aga'samuraia t o t a l of 64 students, went to Nagasaki during the operation of 22 the School. Therefore, we should glance at the naval a f f a i r s of Satsuma and Saga han b r i e f l y i n order to see how the a c t i v i t i e s of the Bakufu and these two domains were rel a t e d to each other. Satsuma, as the southernmost province i n Japan, kept a s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n - ship with neighbouring Okinawa and China". Okinawa was a kind of colony of Satsuma, and brought a great amount of trade to Satsuma proper, mainly i n the 23 form of sugar. Okinawa was also very important f o r Satsuma as a trading post with China and other countries. This important i s l a n d colony, however, extended far into the southern sea where i n the early 19th century an increasing number of Westerners passed, often threatening the security of the Okinawa area and the sea routes. In the l a t e 1840's, Satsuma s e r i o u s l y began working on the development of i t s own naval force to secure the sea routes i n the south. This p o l i c y was strongly led by Shimazu Nariakira, one of the most progressive and enlightened lords i n the matter of defense preparations. Satsuma's endeavour i n naval development was f i r s t seen i n the b u i l d i n g of a steamer. In 1848 (Kaei 1), Mitsukuri Genpo, a Rangaku-sha, was requested by Shimazu to translate a Dutch book on steam engines for ships; The t r a n s l a t i o n 66 was completed i n the following year and Satsuma engineers started the b u i l d i n g 24 of the f i r s t steamer i n Japan. The b u i l d i n g of the Western-style s a i l i n g ship Iroha Maru was also begun i n the autumn of 1851 (Kaei 5). As t h i s was well before the Bakufu permitted the construction of Western-style ships, Satsuma c a r e f u l l y designed and disguised the Iroha Maru as a Japanese-style ship on the outside with a completely Western structure i n s i d e . Next year i n 1852 (Kaei 5, 12/27), Shimazu sought permission from the Bakufu to b u i l d a warship c a l l e d the Shohei Maru. In i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , the southernmost province argued that large warships were absolutely necessary for the defense of the southern sea routes and Okinawa. The Bakufu understood Satsuma's s p e c i a l s i t u a t i o n i n the south, but i t did not o f f i c i a l l y give i t s approval to Satsuma because of the ancestral law which prohibited the construction or possession of warships larger than 500 koku. Instead, the Bakufu simply t o l d Satsuma that i t acknowledged the a p p l i c a t i o n . It was a t a c i t approval of the plan by the 25 Bakufu. This ease indicates to us that the Bakufu adopted the p o l i c y of u t i l i z i n g Satsuma to secure the defense i n the south rather than causing a c o n f l i c t with i t as well as jeopardizing the Satsuma rule of Okinawa. On July 5, 1853 (Kaei 6, 5/29), s l i g h t l y before Perry's v i s i t , Satsuma began con-- s t r u c t i n g the Shohei Maru, the f i r s t t r u l y Western-style warship i n Japan. In the autumn of the same year, the Bakufu at l a s t suspended the ancestral law against b u i l d i n g large warships. After t h i s , Shimazu Nar i a k i r a became more ambitious and planned to b u i l d f i f t e e n large warships including three steamers. The Bakufu not only approved t h i s scheme but also asked Satsuma to spare a few 26 ships for the Bakufu. In the summer of 1854 (Ansei 1), Satsuma began b u i l d i n g four of i t s planned ships on Sakura-jima Island, two for Satsuma and two for the Bakufu at the same time. Two of them were about 36 meters long and the other two were about 44 meters long. The structure of these ships was t o t a l l y Western. This shows that Satsuma had obtained a r e l a t i v e l y high standard of 67 shipbuilding technology and already employed many men with considerable know- ledge and experience. I t i s natural for us to assume that Satsuma surpassed the Bakufu i n shipbuilding i f we take note of the scale of operations i n 1854 and 1855. P r i o r to the aforementioned four ships, the Iroha Maru was f i n i s h e d and the Shohei Maru was launched i n the spring of 1854. While Satsuma leaders endeavoured to b u i l d Western-style ships by them- selves, they f u l l y u t i l i z e d every opportunity to obtain more advanced technology and information. For example, i n 1851, Satsuma o f f i c i a l s i n v i t e d Nakahama Manjiro (John), a castaway to the United States who had come back to Okinawa, 27 to i n s t r u c t them i n the b u i l d i n g of Western-style ships and other matters. And i n 1854, several Satsuma men were sent to Nagasaki along with Saga, Fukuoka and Bakufu men to learn about steam engines, shipbuilding , and ship operations from the crew of the Soembing. The Shohei Maru was f i n a l l y completed on January 29, 1855 (Ansei 1, 12/12). This ship was then s u c c e s s f u l l y t r i e d out on a voyage to Edo i n A p r i l , taking 26 days. On September 23 (8/13), the ship was duly presented to the Bakufu. In the same month, the Bakufu had decided to accept the Dutch Soembing, so the Shohei Maru became the t h i r d Western-style ship for the Shogun together with the Ho'o Maru. Satsuma's e f f o r t to b u i l d a steamer was r e a l i z e d when the Unko Maru was given t r i a l s on a r i v e r i n Edo on October 3 (8/23). These two con- secutive achievements by Satsuma were reviewed by high-ranking Bakufu o f f i c i a l s and must have strongly impressed them with the advanced Satsuma shipbuilding technology. To the eyes of Bakufu o f f i c i a l s such as Abe Masahiro and Hotta Masayoshi, another r o j u , Satsuma han, though a tozama, appeared to be one of the most r e l i a b l e han with which the Bakufu dealt i n a s i t u a t i o n of immeasurable d i f f i c u l t i e s i n defe n s e - a f f a i r s . On the other hand, of course, some Bakufu people must have feared that Satsuma han would eventually obtain an extremely strong p o s i t i o n i n Japan. 68 S i m i l a r l y , Saga han had been exposed to Western influence, as i t was one of the two major han that were responsible for the defense of Nagasaki. U n t i l the early 1840's, however, Saga han did not r e a l l y take t h i s task s e r i o u s l y . Warriors from Saga han were not able to put up any defense at a l l when the Phaeton invaded Nagasaki harbour i n 1825. This tendency was reversed by Nabeshima Naomasa a f t e r he succeeded to the lordship i n 1830 (Tempo 1). In addition to t r a d i t i o n a l endeavours i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s such as the t r a i n i n g of warriors and the a c q u i s i t i o n of firearms, Nabeshima improved-various aspects of hi s domain's defense f a c i l i t i e s . His concern was already directed to the creation of a modern navy when the Dutch Palembang v i s i t e d Nagasaki and 1 28 Nabeshima himself had an opportunity to see the ship and i t s equipment. Many Of h i s Saga followers with a knowledge of Western studies who v i s i t e d the ship l a t e r formed the core around which Saga han developed i t s m i l i t a r y i n d u s t r i e s . Geographically-favoured Saga men repeatedly studied the basic operation of Western ships, a r t i l l e r y , engineering and other features as they watched Dutch ships i n Nagasaki harbour. Their experience was very l i m i t e d , yet few others had been in s p i r e d to take advantage of the opportunity before. Even during the summer of 1855, before the Bakufu o f f i c i a l l y opened the Nagasaki Naval Training School, Saga men were already learning naval a f f a i r s from Dutch o f f i c e r s and s a i l o r s . In other words, the Saga men had already been i n i t i a t e d 29 into naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki well before the School started. Following Saga's contingent to the Nagasaki Naval Training School, Fukuoka han of the Province of Chikuzen (today Fukuoka-ken) i n Kyushu sent twenty-eight students, the second biggest number among the l o c a l han students. But the contribution of Fukuoka han students was not very noteworthy. Their number seems simply to have r e f l e c t e d Fukuoka's r o l e as the other major han i n charge of the defense of Nagasaki. Only f i v e students from non-tozama han studied at Nagasaki. Four of them 69 were from Fukuyama han, of which the chief roju of the time, Abe Masahiro, was the l o r d . While he c a r r i e d out m i l i t a r y reforms at the Bakufu l e v e l , he did not ignore the defense of h i s own domain and encouraged h i s men to take naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki. As we have seen, most of the southwestern han which had been ale r t e d by the foreign presence around Japan sent t h e i r men to Nagasaki. However, there was one han which had been very active i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s but did not send any students to the School. I t was Tokugawa Nariaki's Mito han. Opinions and suggestions made by Nariaki were very i n f l u e n t i a l i n the decision-making process concerning the i n i t i a t i o n of naval defense preparations, including naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki. Nariaki was p a r t i c u l a r l y eager to obtain naval t r a i n i n g under Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . He f i r s t suggested i t i n 1853, 30 soon a f t e r the v i s i t of Perry, when he wrote a memorial to the Bakufu. Since then he had been involved i n various aspects of the naval t r a i n i n g a f f a i r s of the Bakufu. When he heard of the temporary naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki i n 1854, 31 he dispatched three samurai and some s a i l o r s from h i s domain. When the Russian crew of the Diana stayed at Shimoda i n Izu, Nariaki asked permission from the Bakufu to send some of h i s men to receive naval t r a i n i n g there, but the tsunami that destroyed the Russian ship f r u s t r a t e d the scheme. Later, however, when the Heda was being b u i l t , Nariaki sent some of h i s men to Izu to "help" i n ( a c t u a l l y , to observe) the construction. While he was busy with the construction of h i s own ship, the Asahi Maru, i n Edo i n the summer of 1854, he expressed h i s wish to the Bakufu to send some Mito s a i l o r s to Nagasaki i f naval 32 tr a i n i n g were to be ca r r i e d out at Nagasaki under Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . Despite these f a c t s , Mito han did not send any students to the Nagasaki Naval Training School during i t s e n t i r e period. I t i s probable that some s a i l o r s , carpenters and other non-samurai people v i s i t e d the School, but no 33 samurai names from Mito han could be found among personnel l i s t s . Therefore, 70 i t i s perhaps correct to say that Nariaki wanted to send some of h i s men to Nagasaki, but something prevented him. The most p l a u s i b l e reason i s that Mito han was f u l l y u t i l i z i n g those of i t s men f a m i l i a r with shipbuilding technology for the construction of the Asahi Maru, Nariaki's longtime dream. The construction of the ship started i n January, 1854, and ended i n June, 1856. 34 The ship underwent i t s sea t r i a l i n June, 1857. A l l through these years, Mito men may have had to spend t h e i r f u l l time with the Asahi Maru, without having any time to go to Nagasaki. The Bakufu, moreover, opened the Kobu-sho ( M i l i t a r y Academy) i n Edo i n A p r i l , 1856, and, as a part of the M i l i t a r y Academy, the Gunkan Kyoju-sho (Naval Training I n s t i t u t e ) was opened i n the spring of 1857. Almost a l l the i n s t r u c t o r s and assistants were graduates of the Nagasaki Naval Training School. The i n s t i t u t e used the Soembing (then the Kanko Maru) for regular t r a i n i n g . Mito men no longer had much reason to go a l l the way to Nagasaki for naval t r a i n i n g . After the Bakufu selected a l l i t s own students, early i n October, i t gave f i n a l d i r e c t i o n s to them before t h e i r departure for Nagasaki. F i r s t , the Bakufu ordered the chosen men to work very hard so that they would form an i n t e g r a l part of a Bakufu navy as soon as possible, and then repeatedly exhorted them to behave as men of i n t e g r i t y . The Bakufu gave d i r e c t i o n s concerning the students' r e l a t i o n s h i p with various men of l o c a l han. The Bakufu students were a chosen e l i t e who could be expected to obtain i n f l u e n t i a l positions i n the Bakufu m i l i t a r y system l a t e r . Therefore, some people from l o c a l han, both samurai and merchants, might treat them favourably i n various ways or o f f e r them bribes so that they would benefit some day. This was what .the "Bakufu feared most as a possible r e s u l t of the schooling. Further, the Bakufu, although i t allowed the students from l o c a l han to take the same course at 71 Nagasaki, d i s l i k e d the idea of having i t s own men involved too c l o s e l y i n 35 r e l a t i o n s with l o c a l han. So ins t r u c t e d , the Bakufu students l e f t Edo for Nagasaki. About h a l f of them went by land, and the other h a l f s a i l e d from Edo on the Shohei Maru on ' October 13 (9/3). More than 110 men were on board including the students, t h e i r servants, and s a i l o r s from Uraga and Shiwaku-jima,Van i s l a n d on the Inland Sea where the people had been seamen for centuries. The ship was operated by 36 Satsuma men and these s a i l o r s . Due to storms along the route, the ship sus- tained serious damage and almost a l l the crew was said to have suffered from seasickness. Despite the hardships on t h i s voyage, Katsu i n h i s Kaigun Rekishi simply recorded that "the ship s a i l e d very slowly for days, and f i n a l l y arrived 37 at Nagasaki harbour on November 29 (10/20)." Nevertheless, Katsu and the Bakufu students were probably very r e l i e v e d to s e t t l e into the more stable accommodation of the N i s h i O f f i c i a l Residence of the Nagasaki Magistrate's O f f i c e a f t e r perceiving the might of the sea. The N i s h i O f f i c i a l Residence was used as the Nagasaki Naval Training School. I t was an extra residence for the Nagasaki Magistrate; inspectors dispatched [from Edo] to t h i s place used to l i v e there. In those days, Mr. Nagai was .using i t as h i s dwelling. The N i s h i O f f i c i a l Residence was p a r t l y converted into the School and no s p e c i a l b u i l d i n g [for naval training] was b u i l t . A fter landing at Nagasaki, I myself [Katsu] also l i v e d i n t h i s residence.38 Like Katsu, most of the Bakufu students were given accommodation i n the Nish i O f f i c i a l Residence. Four days a f t e r the landing from the Shohei Maru, on December 3 (10/24), Nagai gave s p e c i a l d i r e c t i o n s to the three leading students, Yatabori, Nagamochi and Katsu, saying that they should devote themselves to naval t r a i n i n g and work very hard. He also emphasized the need for cooperation among the students and required each Bakufu student to write a pledge to the 39 Bakufu, s t a t i n g that he would do h i s best at the School. 72 A w r i t t e n p l e d g e was a l s o r e q u i r e d f r o m each s t u d e n t f r o m l o c a l han. However, the purpose of a s k i n g w r i t t e n p l e d g e s from the l o c a l han s t u d e n t s was q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t f o r the B a k u f u s t u d e n t s . The d i a r y of Nakamuda Kuranosuke, one o f t h e l e a d i n g s t u d e n t s f r o m Saga han, i n c l u d e s t h e c o n t e n t s o f 40 the w r i t t e n p l e d g e he s e n t t o t h e B a k u f u . I t t e l l s us what the B a k u f u i e x p e c t e d of the l o c a l han s t u d e n t s . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s d i a r y , we can see t h a t one of t h e Bakufu's i n t e n t i o n s was t o s e g r e g a t e the l o c a l han s t u d e n t s f r o m t h e Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . The non-Bakufu s t u d e n t s were o r d e r e d n o t t o t a l k t o Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s e x c e p t i n the p r e s e n c e of B a k u f u o f f i c i a l s . They were a l s o t o l d t h a t t h e y s h o u l d l e a v e i m m e d i a t e l y when t h e y f i n i s h e d t a l k i n g about c e r t a i n s u b j e c t s w i t h Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . I n o t h e r words, no f r i e n d l y c h a t between the l o c a l han s t u d e n t s and Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s was a l l o w e d . I t was s t r i c t l y f o r - b i d d e n f o r them t o a c t as go-betweens w i t h the Dutch f o r t h e i r r e l a t i v e s and a c q u a i n t a n c e s . The B a k u f u e x e c u t i v e s were w e l l aware of t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h l o c a l han i n d e f e n s e a f f a i r s , y e t t h i s d i d n o t mean t h a t t h e N a g a s a k i N a v a l T r a i n i n g S c h o o l s t u d e n t s were a l l t r e a t e d e q u a l l y . R a t h e r , a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between the two groups was made so t h a t the B a k u f u c o u l d d emonstrate i t s s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r l o c a l han. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the e x a c t d a t e of t h e n y u m o n - s h i k i ( e n t r a n c e ceremony) o r the f o r m a l o p e n i n g day of t h e N a g a s a k i N a v a l T r a i n i n g S c h o o l i s n o t known. K a t s u a l s o does n o t remember e x a c t l y when t h e S c h o o l s t a r t e d ; he s i m p l y w r o t e i n h i s K a i g u n R e k i s h i t h a t " f i v e o r s i x days a f t e r the l a n d i n g , Mr. N a g a i t o o k 41 everybody t o the Dutch D e j i m a P o s t and had an e n t r a n c e ceremony." T h i s was p r o b a b l y the f o u r t h o r f i f t h o f December (10/25 o r 2 6 ) , as t h e S h o h e i Maru a r r i v e d a t N a g a s a k i on November 29 ( 1 0 / 2 0 ) . The s i t e o f t h e N i s h i R e s i d e n c e was a t a wharf n e x t t o D e j i m a . As i t was the f i r s t s c h o o l of i t s k i n d , the B a k u f u t o o k g r e a t c a r e t o i n s u r e s u c c e s s by a l l o c a t i n g q u i t e a few o f f i c i a l s f o r i t s management. W h i l e 73 at the beginning the School,accommodated about one hundred students, i t also employed a t o t a l of fourty-one administrative o f f i c i a l s i n f u l l service besides Nagai, the School d i r e c t o r , twenty-two Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s and fourteen i n t e r - 42 preters. D e t a i l s of the schooling under Pels Rijken are not clear today, since he and the other Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s l e f t very few written records. We must, therefore, r e l y heavily on Katsu's Kaigun Rekishi and Mizuno Nobutoshi's Bakumatsu n i Okeru Waga Kaiguh to Ofanda (Japan's Navy and Holland i n the Late 43 Tokugawa Period) to review the f i r s t - t e r m naval t r a i n i n g . Almost everything was new to the students at the School. The classes were held on a weekly basis and there was a timetable. Everybody was required to : take a l l the basic subjects before he was allowed to concentrate on his own subject. These features are too common to be noteworthy today, but were not at a l l so for 19th century Japanese students. Usually i n s t r u c t i o n started at eight o'clock i n the morning and las t e d t i l l noon, mainly i n the classroom. From one to four i n the afternoon, the students were taught i n various d r i l l s outdoors. There were actual practices on the Soembing,limited at f i r s t , and then more frequent. Only Sundays were free from school lessons. Katsu wrote to h i s f r i e n d i n Edo: "We have naval t r a i n i n g day a f t e r day. We are very busy 44 and could take only one day off even at New Year's." The subjects taught during the f i r s t - t e r m naval t r a i n i n g under Pels Rijken were navigation, ship operation, shipbuilding, a r t i l l e r y , ship's f i t t i n g s , surveying, mathematics and steam engineering. As the head i n s t r u c t o r , Pels Rijken was i n charge of teaching navigation, ship operation and shipbuilding. The course i n shipbuilding was assis t e d by 'sGraeuwen, who also t'aught a r t i l l e r y . Eeg concentrated on surveying and ship's f i t t i n g s . De Yonge instructed i n mathematics. Doornickx and Everaars were responsible f o r engineering, espe- c i a l l y steam engines. Besides the t h e o r e t i c a l teaching by these o f f i c e r s , petty 45 o f f i c e r s , s a i l o r s and stokers taught and supervised actual d r i l l s . 74 Soon a f t e r the School started, every Bakufu student was assigned to a c e r t a i n f i e l d of s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g besides basic studies. The Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s had not expected the students to be assigned to a s p e c i f i c f i e l d of study from the very beginning of t r a i n i n g , but t h i s had been planned before the students l e f t f o r Nagasaki. The Bakufu considered that many of the students at Nagasaki would have to become i n s t r u c t o r s for m i l i t a r y schools i n the future. According to Katsu, the Bakufu students were assigned to ten d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s : Captain Candidates 3 (6.3%) General O f f i c e r s 4 ( 8.3%) Shipbuilding 5 (10.4%) Steam Engineering 5 (10.4%) S a i l Operation 5 (10.4%) A r t i l l e r y 17 (35.4%) Astronomy, Geography and Surveying . 4 ( 8.3%) S a i l Sewing, Rope Tying 1 ( 2.1%) Accountant 1 ( 2.1%) Drumming 3 ( 6.3%) These were a l l samurai students and were to become eith e r o f f i c e r s or petty o f f i c e r s . S a i l o r s were ^ r e c r u i t e d among ordinary seamen who were not samurai. The allotment of d i f f e r e n t kinds of t r a i n i n g r e f l e c t s the urgent needs of the Bakufu at the time. About a t h i r d of the students were assigned to study a r t i l - l e r y . Without doubt they would be very important on Bakufu warships, but highly-trained a r t i l l e r i s t s were also s e r i o u s l y needed at that very moment at various shore b a t t e r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y along Edo Bay. In t h i s sense, the Nagasaki Naval Training School performed the r o l e of a m i l i t a r y academy, the f i r s t school to introduce the Japanese systematically to Western m i l i t a r y science. For other s i g n i f i c a n t f i e l d s , students were evenly d i s t r i b u t e d . In order to master the operation of modern Western-style warships, the studies of shipbuilding, steam engineering, s a i l operation, astronomy, geography and surveying were a l l equally important. A t r a d i t i o n a l Japanese custom sent three men to learn Western drumming. 75 Those who were chosen to study drumming considered that they were highly honoured because in, Japan drumming was t r a d i t i o n a l l y a s p e c i a l l y c l a s s i f i e d task for high-ranking o f f i c e r s . As a r e s u l t , the Dutch petty o f f i c e r who taught 47 drumming was sa i d to have been highly respected by the students throughout. Everything was new and d i f f i c u l t at the School i n Nagasaki. It was f i l l e d with agony for the students who had to face serious problems one a f t e r another. Among them, the most serious problem i n class was language. V i r t u a l l y none of the students at f i r s t understood what the in s t r u c t o r s were teaching i n Dutch. In the previous year, 1854, when Captain Fabius was asked h i s opinion about the creation of a modern navy and a naval t r a i n i n g school f o r Japan, he repeatedly urged the Bakufu to open a Dutch language school f i r s t so that candidates f o r naval t r a i n i n g could obtain a knowledge of Dutch. Yet the Bakufu did not adopt h i s suggestion, saying that time was very l i m i t e d . When the School started, i t was quite apparent that the Bakufu had made a grave mistake. A l l the lectures had to be translated into Japanese by i n t e r p r e t e r s . And, to make matters worse, quite often the in t e r p r e t e r s could not understand the naval and s c i e n t i f i c terminology used i n lect u r e s . The only way that an i n s t r u c t o r could teach was to explain the meaning of various terms to his i n t e r p r e t e r before beginning a lecture to the students. Katsu reminisces about the language problem as follows: As the language could not be understood by the students, several int e r p r e t e r s translated the lect u r e s . Therefore, both i n s t r u c t o r s and students f e l t l i k e 'having an i t c h that one could not scratch.' The i n s t r u c t o r s struggled i n teaching, and the students had to make great e f f o r t s i n learning. Even Yatabori, Tsukamoto and Nagamochi, who had studied c l a s s i c a l Chinese at the Shoheiko [college] and were famous f or acuteness, were t o t a l l y perplexed studying [ i n Dutch]. No wonder those who were less talented suffered from serious problems at the School.48 The students, e s p e c i a l l y the Bakufu ones, were not chosen on the basis of mathematical and s c i e n t i f i c talents needed for naval t r a i n i n g . Basic require- 76 merits that the Bakufu imposed were e i t h e r achievements i n Confucian studies, 49 experience i n shipbuilding and a r t i l l e r y , or a knowledge of the Dutch language. The Bakufu standard f o r the s e l e c t i o n of i t s students f o r the School was in s u f - . f i c i e n t l y high and often i r r e l e v a n t . Most of the students had l i t t l e idea about Western mathematics and science. Some students who were Bakufu astrono- mers seem to have been quite talented i n Japanese mathematics, but even they had to struggle i n i t s Western counterpart f o r studies l i k e navigation ..and surveying. Katsu was also one of those who suffered i n the study of Western mathematics: I am studying navigation now; th i s subject i s impossible to understand without a knowledge of mathematics. As you know, however, I am not at a l l talented i n i t , so I have r e a l l y a tough time these days. S t i l l , having studied a l o t , I f e e l I am learning i t gradually....50 The Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s often found other kinds of serious problems i n teaching besides problems caused by the lack of knowledge i n language and science. One was the strong class consciousness of the students; although every formal student was a samurai, each of them could be c l a s s i f i e d into a ce r t a i n group according to his family standing i n the Bakufu system. When a student f e l t h i s family standing was too high to expect him to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a c e r t a i n task at the School, he simply did not attend that part of the t r a i n i n g . And some m i l i t a r y s k i l l s were t r a d i t i o n a l l y c l a s s i f i e d as too important f o r low-ranking samurai to p a r t i c i p a t e i n . For instance, the s k i l l of a r t i l l e r y was only for high-ranking samurai i n Japan. So, v o l l e y f i r i n g by a l l the students was impossible.^"'" A kind of c o n f l i c t between Bakufu and l o c a l han students was another pro- blem. Although the School accepted not only Bakufu but also l o c a l hah,samurai, i t was a Bakufu school intended mainly for Bakufu samurai. The two groups of students were given t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t treatment at the School. The case of the 77 written pledge was one example. Treatment i n the classroom was another. Usually two Japanese-style rooms were combined into one by removing s l i d i n g doors between them for ordinary le c t u r e s . In the f i r s t room were a Dutch i n s t r u c t o r , h i s i n t e r p r e t e r and Bakufu students. The blackboard was of course i n this room. Whether there was enough space l e f t i n the f i r s t room or not, the l o c a l han students had to audit the lecture i n the second room. It was much easier, therefore, for the Bakufu students to approach the i n s t r u c t o r to ask various questions, whereas the l o c a l han students were very r e s t r i c t e d i n doing so. Nevertheless, generally speaking, l o c a l han students were superior to most of the Bakufu students i n various subjects. This was so because l o c a l han students were c a r e f u l l y selected by han which were much keener i n defense a f f a i r s than the Bakufu i t s e l f . Among the l o c a l han, Saga was outstanding; the students from Saga han had studied science and other r e l a t e d subjects before the School started. Furthermore, many of them had p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the preliminary naval t r a i n i n g i n the summer of 1854 and 1855. Katsu himself was deeply impressed by the Saga han students and wrote: As the l o r d of Saga han was very knowledgeable and farseeing, Dutch studies i n his han were very popular i n those days. There had already been a reverberatory furnace i n Saga. It was b u i l t based on Dutch books. Even the Bakufu asked Saga han to found several cannons. Therefore, there were many well-educated men. As the leader, Sano Eijuemon arranged a l l a f f a i r s such as the se l e c t i o n of students and ships f o r Saga han. The students from Saga han were the quickest to learn i n naval t r a i n i n g among those who were from l o c a l han.52 Some of the 'students from Saga han were said to have shown t h e i r talents i n the f i e l d of medicine and chemistry, so the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s provided them with 53 a s p e c i a l series of lectures on such subjects as the production of gunpowder. At the end of 1856 (Ansei 3), a f t e r one year of schooling, Nabeshima Naomasa even sought unsuccessfully for permission from the Bakufu to have separate 78 naval t r a i n i n g f o r Saga han students under some Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . He f e l t that i t was i n e f f i c i e n t and inconvenient for h i s advanced students to study with the 54 Bakufu and other l o c a l han students. It was very d i f f i c u l t for the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s to carry out proper naval t r a i n i n g under these circumstances. There was no way for them to prevent f r i c t i o n between the Bakufu and l o c a l han students, but they t r i e d to eliminate errors and inconvenience caused by the t r a n s l a t i o n of t h e i r l e c t u r e s . For example, they prepared miniature ship models and sketches for teaching, and the idea worked very w e l l . Yet teaching with mere models and sketches was quite unsatisfactory for the d i f f i c u l t and complicated study of naval a f f a i r s . As one of the means to improve the q u a l i t y of teaching, the students and i n s t r u c - tors found that the b u i l d i n g of a small ship at Nagasaki would be h e l p f u l . So they asked School d i r e c t o r Nagai to obtain an extra fund from the Bakufu to b u i l d a cutter. Nagai agreed to t h i s proposal and wrote a l e t t e r to Abe i n February, 1856, requesting permission and a fund of 2,000 ryo. Nagai added i n h i s l e t t e r that the b u i l d i n g of a cutter would be quite b e n e f i c i a l not only to the ordinary students but also to the shipwrights and blacksmiths who had come a l l the way from Edo to Nagasaki. In March, the Bakufu approved the plan. The d i r e c t i v e from the Bakufu admitted the merit of b u i l d i n g an actual ship and t r a i n i n g on i t . It also said that the Bakufu did not want to see naval t r a i n i n g b a f f l e d at the s t a r t by saving a mere 2,000 ryo when both the i n s t r u c t o r s and students were very eager 56 to pursue successful t r a i n i n g . A cutter was l a t e r completed by the hands of Bakufu students, shipwrights and blacksmiths, with the assistance of Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . Details concerning the cutter w i l l be discussed l a t e r . ^ For the sake of t r a i n i n g , another important f a c i l i t y was prepared at the School. The students and non-samurai s a i l o r s needed intensive operational t r a i n i n g on actual masts and yards, but i t was dangerous for them to do so on 79 the Soembing at f i r s t . So a set of model masts and yards for a f r i g a t e was 5 8 b u i l t i n the School yard for p r a c t i c a l t r a i n i n g with s a i l s and ropes. Although most of the s a i l o r s were re c r u i t e d among the very experienced people of Shiwaku-jima Island on the Inland Sea i n the Province of Sanuki (now Kagawa- ken), they s t i l l needed a great deal of t r a i n i n g to work e f f i c i e n t l y on Western-style ships. As mentioned i n a previous chapter, a f t e r the p r o h i b i t i o n of the b u i l d i n g of large warships and the imposition of s t r u c t u r a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on ships i n the 17th century, a l l the Japanese ships were equipped with only one mast and a large rectangular s a i l . Naturally Japanese s a i l o r s were t o t a l l y at a loss when they f i r s t came aboard a modern Western-style ship with t a l l masts and many s a i l s . As the naval t r a i n i n g was well on i t s way, i n the l a t e summer of 1856 the Bakufu sent a t o t a l of twelve new students to Nagasaki i n c l u d i n g a few who l a t e r would perform very important roles i n Japan's naval and p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . The leader of t h i s group was Izawa Kingo, a son of former Nagasaki Magistrate Izawa Masayoshi. He was dispatched as another captain candidate. Apart from t h i s son of a high-ranking Bakufu o f f i c i a l , four students came from Egawa of Izu, two from Bakufu o f f i c e s i n Edo, and four from various l o c a l magistrate's 59 o f f i c e s . They were the formal members of t h i s group. Enomoto Kamajiro (Takeaki, Buyo), who would l a t e r lead the Bakufu f l e e t and f i g h t against the troops of the new M e i j i government u n t i l the very end of the resistance, came to Nagasaki at t h i s time. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , he was not a formal student. He was an attendant to Izawa Kingo, a classmate at the Shoheiko. Enomoto himself also applied f or the Nagasaki Naval Training School, but he i s said to have been turned down because of h i s poor achievement at the Bakufu college f or Confucian studies. Though rejected, Enomoto did not give up t h i s opportunity to study naval a f f a i r s under Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . He inquired through various connections 80 and f i n a l l y obtained a permit to go with Izawa. It was an arrangement made by 60 Izawa's father Masayoshi. Egawa of Izu dispatched an. important man, Hida Hamagoro, at this time. He would emerge as one of the most prominent ship engineers i n the l a t e Tokugawa and early M e i j i p e r i o d s . ^ Katsu f a i l e d to record when these students arr i v e d at Nagasaki. As Hida, who had been i n Edo for study, l e f t the c i t y soon a f t e r he received the order to take naval t r a i n i n g on July 14 (6/13), he must have a r r i v e d at Nagasaki some- 6 2 time i n late August or early September. We can assume that the other students also joined the School around the same time. These students were usually regarded as second-term students, although apparently no s p e c i a l arrangement was made for them at the School. The newly arrived students j u s t joined the others at lectures which had already been under way for more than ten months. We can imagine from t h i s fact how inadequately the Bakufu or the Japanese understood the Western schooling system at Nagasaki. The Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s at the School may have shown t h e i r displeasure at t h i s kind of i r r e g u l a r i t y per- petrated by the Bakufu, but i t i s not on record. • As time passed, many academic problems arose one a f t e r another. Together with the language problem, they caused the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s much confusion and f r u s t r a t i o n . But some of the students gradually overcame the d i f f i c u l t i e s and showed some progress. Pels Rijken v i v i d l y recorded the s i t u a t i o n i n h i s report to the Dutch government. He noted that the most serious academic problem the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s perceived was the lack of basic s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of most of the students. As the i n s t r u c t o r who was i n charge of navigation, Pels Rijken seriously regreted that he "had no way to teach the rudiments of geometry and 6 3 ship operations as the students t o t a l l y lacked a basic knowledge." He had been t o l d that most of the students had a c e r t a i n knowledge of science before the School started. He found, however, that t h e i r knowledge was very fragmentary 81 and not at a l l systematic. Pels Rijken admitted that there were some students who were quite knowledgeable, s t i l l he was sure that a l l the students s e r i o u s l y needed a systematic knowledge of basic science and other r e l a t e d subjects. So, for the f i r s t time i n Japan's h i s t o r y , systematic Western science education from the very fundamentals was offered to students at the Nagasaki Naval Training S c h o o l . ^ Despite many b a r r i e r s i n study, students gradually became accustomed to the language and then came to understand various subjects. "After one year, many students were able to calculate figures such as square root and cube root quickly and c o r r e c t l y . They were able to solve very d i f f i c u l t questions i n 65 mathematics, too." Pels Rijken thus reported the improvement of the students with s a t i s f a c t i o n . Besides the lectures i n the classroom, t r a i n i n g cruises were also t r i e d many times. But i t seems that the Bakufu hesitated to give permission for the i n s t r u c t o r s and students to set out on long-distance cruises. Probably the Nagasaki Magistrate was not f u l l y assured of the progress of the students and was reluctant to take the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n case the School l o s t a Bakufu ship i n t r a i n i n g . Training cruises were, therefore, l i m i t e d to the seas not f a r from Nagasaki. Pels Rijken explains the s i t u a t i o n as follows: In 1855, only fourteen t r a i n i n g cruises could be made; the longest one l a s t e d only three days. The commander of the detach- ment [Pels Rijken h i m s e l f ] , under these circumstances, c a l l e d t h i s to the attention of Japan's naval magistrate [perhaps Nagasaki Magistrate or the School d i r e c t o r ] i n a report on naval t r a i n i n g submitted to him. However, t r a i n i n g cruises beyond Nomo Peninsula and the Goto Islands were not permitted.^6 In p r a c t i c a l f i e l d s such as engineering and s h i p b u i l d i n g , the students showed great improvement i n one year. Pels Rijken praised them as follows: A l l the students showed impressive improvement i n knowledge of steam engineering. Generally, they showed great enthusiasm i n the study of steam engines and had the a b i l i t y to master i t . In 82 shipbuilding, when the students learned the structure of ships and the names of various parts, they studied further and t r i e d to b u i l d a ship by themselves.67 The b u i l d i n g of the cutter was, i n f a c t , one of the most recognizable f r u i t s of the f i r s t - t e r m naval t r a i n i n g . As mentioned before, the School obtained approval and a fund to b u i l d a cutter from the Bakufu i n the spring of 1856. Very l i t t l e i s known about t h i s cutter. The construction i t s e l f began perhaps i n the late spring or summer of the same year. It was su c c e s s f u l l y launched on November 18 (10/21) i n the presence of most of the important members from the Nagasaki Magistrate's Office and the School. About a h a l f year a f t e r t h i s , sometime i n the summer of 1857 (Ansei 4), i t was f i n a l l y completed. As most of the f i r s t - t e r m Bakufu students had l e f t f o r Edo i n the spring of 1857, i t was brought to completion mainly by several remaining Bakufu students including 6 8 Katsu and the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . The Saga han students were stimulated by the construction of t h i s cutter and they also b u i l t a s i m i l a r one i n 1858. The Saga han cutter was about 24 69 meters long and 6.3 meters wide and the tonnage was about 50 tons. Most probably the Bakufu cutter measured very close to th i s Saga han cutter. No name of the Bakufu cutter i s recorded. Sappan Kaigun-shi (The History of the Satsuma Han Navy) simply c a l l s i t the Nagasaki-style cutter. The home-built cutter was not ready f o r t r a i n i n g cruises by the f i r s t - t e r m students, yet i t s construction provided them with invaluable opportunities to design, prepare, b u i l d and f i t out a Western-style ship under the s t r i c t supervision of the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . This cutter was to be frequently u t i l i z e d f o r t r a i n i n g a f t e r 185 7. Neither Japanese nor Dutch accounts of those days t e l l much about how well the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s taught at Nagasaki. One of the rare accounts was given by School d i r e c t o r Nagai i n the autumn of 1856, about a year a f t e r the 83 School started. He expressed h i s opinion i n a short memorial to the Bakufu concerning the m i l i t a r y education of Bakufu samurai. Though he was the d i r e c - tor of the Bakufu naval t r a i n i n g school, he recommended that the Edo executives send samurai abroad i n order to have them study naval a f f a i r s rather than asking for the expansion and upgrading of h i s school. Why did Nagai do so? According to h i s memorial, the biggest concern was the cost of operation of the School. As the School d i r e c t o r , he was not yet convinced of the success of t r a i n i n g when he wrote the memorial. His worry over the expense was further amplified when he thought of the q u a l i t y of education. For Nagai, the q u a l i t y of the ins t r u c t o r s seemed to be unsatisfactory; he thought that not a l l of the Dutch in s t r u c t o r s were r e a l l y capable of teaching and providing the students with reasonable e d u c a t i o n . ^ It i s d i f f i c u l t for us to know to what extent Nagai's assumption was correct. In fact the School had great d i f f i c u l t i e s as the f i r s t one of i t s kind i n Japan. Both the Japanese and Dutch sides were responsible for the d i f f i c u l t i e s . While many Japanese students revealed t h e i r incompetence i n naval a f f a i r s , the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s also showed that they were not always capable of teaching w e l l . Although Captain Fabius c a r e f u l l y chose them, they were by no means perfect. No i n s t r u c t o r s understood the Japanese language. Many of them may have been arrogant towards the Japanese who did not understand e i t h e r the Dutch language or basic science and other subjects. Many in s t r u c t o r s may have behaved poorly at Nagasaki, missing t h e i r native country at the other end of the world. However, the r e s u l t of the f i r s t - t e r m naval t r a i n i n g under Pels Rijken should be judged by what prowess the Japanese students showed l a t e r 7 ^ On January 31, 1857 (Ansei 4, 1/6), Nagai Iwanojo met Donker Curtius and G.C.C. Pels Rijken and discussed a f f a i r s .of.', the School and i t s future plans. At t h i s meeting, Nagai t o l d the Dutch that the Bakufu would soon c a l l back a l l the Bakufu students to Edo. He said that a l l the f i r s t - t e r m Bakufu students 84 would be operating the Kanko Maru (Soembing) "~ by themselves on the return to Edo. Pels Rijken was amazed at th i s plan. He acknowledged the achievements of the students, s t i l l he hesitated to say that they were f u l l y capable of operating the -Kanko Maru a l l the way to Edo. He asked Nagai to make arrange- ments with the Bakufu i n Edo to postpone the students' departure i n order to , allow them to study further. The Bakufu did not accept the suggestion by Pels Rijken. Instead, i t confirmed i t s order to the students, commanding them to return to Edo i n A p r i l . The Bakufu had been operating the M i l i t a r y Academy (Kobu-sho) since the spring of 1856 at T s u k i j i i n Edo. The main subjects taught at the academy were t r a d i t i o n a l martial arts such as swordsmanship and archery and r e l a t i v e l y modern 73 a r t i l l e r y . The Bakufu o r i g i n a l l y planned to have a naval t r a i n i n g school as a part of the academy, but i t s opening was delayed as no Japanese i n s t r u c t o r s could be found. As the Bakufu executives heard of the progress of naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki, they became convinced that i t was time to open a naval t r a i n i n g school as a part of the M i l i t a r y Academy. On March 26 (3/1), before leaving Nagasaki, a l l the Bakufu students led by School d i r e c t o r Nagai v i s i t e d the Dutch Nagasaki Post on Dejima to pay th e i r respects to the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . It was a sort of graduation ceremony for the f i r s t - t e r m students. Three days l a t e r , on March 29 (3/4), the Kanko Maru, under acting Admiral Nagai and Captain Yatabori Keizo, with most of the 74 Bakufu students on board, set out for Edo. The Bakufu students s a f e l y operated the ship and arriv e d at Kanagawa (now Yokohama) on A p r i l 20 (3/26). Although ships b u i l t i n Japan on obsolete Western models had made such voyages before, t h i s was the f i r s t operation of a modern Western ship by a purely Japanese crew. The Bakufu was s a t i s f i e d with the fact that the Japanese students su c c e s s f u l l y operated the ship without the help of Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . It immediately dispatched a s p e c i a l messenger to 85 Nagasaki to inform the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s of the safe a r r i v a l of the ship. In addition, a great number of g i f t s followed the messenger as tokens of appreci- ation. Perhaps t h i s successful voyage was the most s i g n i f i c a n t achievement of the Bakufu students i n t h e i r one and a h a l f years of naval t r a i n i n g . And this may have convinced Nagai of h i s school's success. While most of the f i r s t - t e r m Bakufu students l e f t Nagasaki for Edo and worked as i n s t r u c t o r s and assistants at the newly opened Gunkan Kyoju-sho (Naval Training I n s t i t u t e ) ^ , Katsu Rintaro and several other students remained at Nagasaki. When the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s heard that a l l the students were to return to Edo, they requested Nagai to choose at l e a s t one student who would work to f a c i l i t a t e future naval t r a i n i n g . As the two-year contract with the i n s t r u c t o r s under Pels Rijken came cl o s e r to the end, the Bakufu had made a new agreement with the Dutch government concerning a new group of i n s t r u c t o r s . At the same time, i t also began choosing the next group of Bakufu students to send to Nagasaki. Under such circumstances, Pels Rijken was worrying about possible problems and d i f f i c u l t i e s s i m i l a r to the ones he and h i s i n s t r u c t o r s had experienced i n case a l l the experienced students l e f t Nagasaki. Nagai and Katsu discussed t h i s matter and the l a t t e r , who was about to leave Nagasaki by land, decided to stay at the School to work as a l i a i s o n man between the new j . 76 students and i n s t r u c t o r s . Although most of the Bakufu students l e f t Nagasaki, the lectures and naval t r a i n i n g continued for the remaining students, but they found l i f e d u l l at the School. Now the Nagasaki Naval Training School had neither a d i r e c t o r nor the Kanko Maru. D i s c i p l i n e lapsed without strong leadership, and lectures and t r a i n i n g made l i t t l e sense without a t r a i n i n g ship. The Nagasaki-style cutter had not yet been completed. In June, Kimura Yoshitake, who would l a t e r become the leader of the voyage of the Kanriri Maru to the United States i n 1860, came to Nagasaki and took o f f i c e as School d i r e c t o r . Under Kimura, the School 86 was g r a d u a l l y b r o u g h t back t o l i f e . I n p a r t i c u l a r , he clamped down on the s t u d e n t s , who had been p l a y i n g t r u a n t by g o i n g t o the r e d - l i g h t and o t h e r d i s t r i c t s i n N a g a s a k i . ^ In the e a r l y summer of 185 7 ( A n s e i 4, 6/3, 4 and 5 ) , t h r e e r e g u l a r Dutch t r a d i n g s h i p s , the Jan D a n i e l , the Anna D i g n a , and t h e C a t h a r i n e T h e r e s i a , , a r r i v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y a t N a g a s a k i f r o m B a t a v i a . B e s i d e s o r d i n a r y t r a d e i t e m s , the s h i p s b r o u g h t v a r i o u s machines and o t h e r equipment f o r a p l a n n e d n a v a l f a c i l i t y a t N a g a s a k i . They a l s o b r o u g h t news t h a t a steamer the B a k u f u o r d e r e d 78 from t h e N e t h e r l a n d s was coming t o Japan w i t h i n a few months. The Dutch merchants on t h e s e s h i p s e n j o y e d v e r y s u c c e s s f u l b u s i n e s s w i t h the Japanese t h i s y e a r . A p a r t f r o m the i t e m s t h a t had been o r d e r e d , t h e y s o l d two o f the t h r e e s h i p s t o the Japanese. The C a t h a r i n e T h e r e s i a was p u r c h a s e d by the B a k u f u and the J a n D a n i e l by Saga han. A l t h o u g h b o t h o f them were r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l s a i l i n g v e s s e l s , the Japanese bought them because t h e y were 79 s a i d t o be v e r y u s e f u l n o t o n l y f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n b u t a l s o f o r t r a i n i n g seamen. The steamer, l o n g a w a i t e d by the B a k u f u , f i n a l l y showed up i n N a g a s a k i h a r b o u r on September 22 ( 8 / 5 ) . T h i s s h i p , named the Japan by the D u t c h , was one of t h e s h i p s the B a k u f u had o r d e r e d i n 1854 i n the a f t e r m a t h o f P e r r y ' s v i s i t . The o r i g i n a l p l a n s c a l l e d f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n a t B a t a v i a due t o the i n t e r - n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n i n Europe, b u t t h e Dutch government l a t e r changed i t s p o l i c y and had a Dutch s h i p b u i l d e r i n R o t t e r d a m b u i l d t h e s e s h i p s . I n t h e e a r l y s p r i n g o f 1857, the f i r s t s h i p was f i n i s h e d . I t was a t h r e e - m a s t e d steamer w i t h a screw p r o p e l l e r . The s i z e and tonnage o f t h e s h i p were r e c o r d e d t o be 55 meters 80 l o n g , 8 meters wide and 625 t o n s . I t was the Japan t h a t w o u l d l a t e r be used f o r a t r a n s - P a c i f i c voyage by a Japanese crew i n 1860 (Man'en 1) w i t h the new name of the K a n r i n Maru. The Japan was b r o u g h t by a new group o f Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s f o r the N a g a s a k i 87 Naval Training School. It l e f t the Netherlands on March 26 (3/1) and arr i v e d at Nagasaki about h a l f a year l a t e r on September 22. According to Captain van 81 Kattendyke, the ship was tested on i t s way to Japan and proved to be excellent. The new i n s t r u c t o r s of the second detachment were s p e c i a l l y organized by the Dutch government i n response to the request by the Bakufu. The i n s t r u c t o r s , led by W.J.C. Ridder Huyssen van Kattendyke, numbered thirty-seven, f i f t e e n more than i n the f i r s t detachment. Most s i g n i f i c a n t was the addition of i n s t r u c t o r s i n the f i e l d s of p r a c t i c a l mechanical engineering. Besides ordinary seamen, i t brought several s k i l l e d artisans such as lathe operators, a metal 82 caster, blacksmith, p r i n t e r and others. Two highly p r o f e s s i o n a l i z e d men were also included i n t h i s detachment; Pompe van Meerdervoort, the medical doctor, and H. Hardes, the engineer o f f i c e r who would be responsible f or the construc- t i o n of a naval f a c i l i t y at Nagasaki. The Nagasaki Seitetsu-sho would become an important f a c i l i t y for the Bakufu navy. Although the Japanese name of t h i s works means "Nagasaki Iron M i l l , " i n fact i t was a large-scale machine shop for naval r e p a i r s . Katsu •• t e l l s i n d e t a i l i n h i s Kaigun Rekishi about t h i s f i r s t Western-style naval 83 f a c i l i t y i n Japan. Based on advice by the f i r s t group of Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s , the Bakufu ordered a set of machines and other necessary equipment to b u i l d 84 a repair f a c i l i t y i n December, 1855. According to an outline plan that appears i n Katsu's Kaigun Rekishi, we can t e l l that the Bakufu had a quite 85 ambitious plan to b u i l d a large-scale naval f a c i l i t y at Nagasaki. The duties of G.C.C. Pels Rijken and h i s i n s t r u c t o r s at the Nagasaki Naval Training School were duly taken over by the second detachment i n October. The Bakufu rewarded the i n s t r u c t o r s of the f i r s t detachment who had served i n Japan for more than two years with generous amounts of s p e c i a l bonuses. Besides t y p i c a l g i f t s such as Japanese swords and clothes, a l l the i n s t r u c t o r s including 88 s a i l o r s r e c e i v e d s p e c i a l a l l o w a n c e s e q u i v a l e n t t o a t l e a s t two y e a r s ' s a l a r y . The head i n s t r u c t o r , P e l s R i j k e n , was g i v e n a bonus e q u a l t o f i v e t i m e s h i s 86 annual s a l a r y . T h i s shows n o t o n l y how the B a k u f u e v a l u a t e d t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s a t the S c h o o l b u t a l s o how a n x i o u s i t was f o r a good r e p u t a t i o n among W e s t e r n e r s r e g a r d i n g the t r e a t m e n t o f f o r e i g n i n s t r u c t o r s i n Japan. B a k u f u e x e c u t i v e s must have ba s e d t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n o f the Dutch s e r v i c e s on what t h e y saw a t t h e N a v a l T r a i n i n g I n s t i t u t e a t T s u k i j i , a l l f r u i t s o f the t r a i n i n g a t N a g a s a k i . The f i r s t detachment l e f t N a g a s a k i on the Anna D i g n a on November 2 ( 9 / 1 6 ) . The B a k u f u and l o c a l han s t u d e n t s and new i n s t r u c t o r s were a l l on b o a r d t h e Japan and tugged t h e s a i l i n g s h i p t o the o u t s i d e of 8 7 N a g a s a k i h a r b o u r t o see i t o f f . Huyssen van K a t t e n d y k e , A l y e a r s o l d when he t o o k command o f t h e second detachment t o J a p a n , was an e x c e l l e n t seaman who had e x p e r i e n c e i n about h a l f 88 a dozen w a r s h i p s on the A t l a n t i c and I n d i a n Oceans. L i k e h i s p r e d e c e s s o r P e l s R i j k e n , van K a t t e n d y k e a l s o r e c e i v e d a monthly wage e q u i v a l e n t t o 450 g u i l d e r s , w h i l e o t h e r members r e c e i v e d wages a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r j o b d e s c r i p t i o n s b a s e d on the pay s c h e d u l e f o r t h e f i r s t detachment. The a r t i s a n s were v e r y w e l l p a i d compared t o o r d i n a r y s a i l o r s . E x c e p t f o r the p r i n t e r who r e c e i v e d the r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l amount of 75 g u i l d e r s , a l l - o f them e a r n e d 180 g u i l d e r s a month. Dr. Pompe van M e e r d e r v o o r t was p a i d 225 g u i l d e r s . The e x c e p t i o n t o the e s t a b l i s h e d pay s c a l e was t h e e n g i n e e r o f f i c e r , H. H a r d e s , who was a s s i g n e d t o be i n charge o f the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the machine shop. H i s monthly pay was the e q u i v a l e n t of 600 g u i l d e r s . A c c o r d i n g t o K a t s u , the payment f o r the i n s t r u c t o r s 8< t o t a l l e d 447 kanme (1,676.25 k i l o g r a m s o r about 3,700 pounds) of s i l v e r a n n u a l l y . 89 During the months of October and November, new Bakufu and l o c a l han students gradually arrived at Nagasaki. The number of the students was less this time, and only a t o t a l of twenty-six new Bakufu students came to Nagasaki. Their positions i n the Bakufu before j o i n i n g the School were as follows: Men f iroTn ths Bciirb3.1*13.11 Books Research I n s t i t u t e * 6 (23.1%) Men from an Edo O f f i c e of the Hakodate Magistrate's Office 4 (15.4%) Men from the Uraga Magistrate's Of f i c e 3 (11.5%) Bakufu Astronomers 2 ( 7.7%) Bakufu Medical Doctor 1 ( 3.8%) Others** 10 (38.5%) *Bansho Shirabe-sho **These included some people without any permanent Bakufu positions.90 While there were nineteen students (39.6%) whose o r i g i n a l major occupation was a r t i l l e r y among the f i r s t - t e r m students, there was none i n t h i s group. Instead, a t o t a l of ten students had been studying foreign books at o f f i c e s l i k e the Barbarian Books Research I n s t i t u t e and the Hakodate Magistrate's Edo o f f i c e . They had been working with Western books covering various f i e l d s of study. Matsumoto Ryojun, a Bakufu medical doctor, came to Nagasaki as one of the formal Bakufu students. But h i s main concern at Nagasaki was not naval t r a i n i n g but medical study under Dr. van Meerdervoort. The Nagasaki Naval Training ' School was about to change i t s e l f into something more than a m i l i t a r y school with the addition of medical courses and the machine shop. Four students, including Katsu, remained at Nagasaki from among the f i r s t - term Bakufu students. A l l the students from the second-term group, except for one who had died i n the previous year due to i l l n e s s , continued at the School. When van Kattendyke started the school program sometime i n November, therefore, a t o t a l of forty^-one Bakufu students was studying. Very l i t t l e i s known about l o c a l han students. Saga Han Kaigun-shi (The History of the Saga Han Navy) 90 t e l l s us that twenty-one of i t s students p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the naval t r a i n i n g , j i 91 Further d e t a i l e d research i s necessary to learn about under van Kattendyke. students from other l o c a l han, although t h e i r role was r e l a t i v e l y minor. Commander van Kattendyke and h i s i n s t r u c t o r s offered courses very s i m i l a r to the ones given by Pels Rijken. But, as had been planned, he f u l l y u t i l i z e d various i n s t r u c t o r s he had brought to make h i s courses more d i v e r s i f i e d than before, in c l u d i n g more de t a i l e d courses for basic science and more applied technology. Dr. van Meerdervoort mainly taught medicine at Dejima, but he also taught a basic medical course and demonstrated p r a c t i c a l techniques such as bandaging as part of naval t r a i n i n g . The courses of physics and chemistry were also taught by t h i s active young doctor. A l l the artisans were busy i n the construction of the machine shop at Akunoura i n Nagasaki harbour, but, whenever time permitted, they also taught the students t h e i r own trade at the School. One of the Japanese i n t e r p r e t e r s was said to be always with the Dutch p r i n t e r 92 and learned Dutch p r i n t i n g methods. - ; ~.' •'* '. Under the d i r e c t i o n of van Kattendyke, the students experienced more t r a i n i n g cruises than before. Being convinced by the success of the f i r s t - t e r m students, the Bakufu executives f i r s t purchased a s a i l i n g vessel for the School and then allowed the School to use the Bakufu ships for t r a i n i n g voyages of varying duration. During the autumn and winter of 1857, the i n s t r u c t o r s and students made frequent short-distance cruises on these ships. The Bakufu's a c q u i s i t i o n of the Catharine Theresia (re-named the Hosho Maru), a s a i l i n g v e s s e l , was found to be very e f f i c a c i o u s , as the ship was useful for t r a i n i n g the Japanese students i n the operation of s a i l s . S a i l i n g vessels were much more d i f f i c u l t than steamers to operate, thus providing novice Japanese students with more opportunities to p r a c t i c e ^ the general operation of ships. Even today, t h i s i s regarded as true and t r a i n i n g on s a i l i n g vessels i s very common 91 p r a c t i c e a l l o v e r the w o r l d . F u l l - s c a l e t r a i n i n g c r u i s e s began i n the s p r i n g o f 1858 ( A n s e i 5) a f t e r the w i n t e r s t o r m s e a s o n was o v e r . Numerous t r i p s were c a r r i e d out m a i n l y around the n o r t h w e s t e r n p a r t o f Kyushu, the major s o u t h w e s t e r n i s l a n d o f Japan. Among th e s e c r u i s e s i n 1858, the most s i g n i f i c a n t one was a c i r c u m n a v i g a t i o n o f Kyushu 93 i n A p r i l . E a r l y i n A p r i l , the Japan s a i l e d out o f N a g a s a k i h a r b o u r t o t h e n o r t h . On b o a r d t h e s h i p were more than 120 Japanese s t u d e n t s and s a i l o r s and n i n e t e e n Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . K a t s u R i n t a r o was the c a p t a i n and Izawa K i n g o p e r f o r m e d the r o l e o f v i c e - c a p t a i n . Enomoto K a m a j i r o had a l r e a d y become an i m p o r t a n t member o f t h e s h i p as an e n g i n e e r o f f i c e r . There were o n l y f o u r s t u d e n t s f r o m l o c a l han; one each f r o m Saga and Fukuoka and two f r o m Satsuma. The Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s i n c l u d e d the commander van K a t t e n d y k e , e n g i n e e r o f f i c e r H. Hardes and Dr. Pompe van M e e r d e r v o o r t . The Japan f i r s t v i s i t e d H i r a d o where a Dutch t r a d i n g f a c t o r y once e x i s t e d i n the 17th c e n t u r y . And t h e n i t p r o c e e d e d t o S h i m o n o s e k i , an i m p o r t a n t p o r t town on the w e s t e r n t i p o f Honshu, Japan's l a r g e s t i s l a n d . Van K a t t e n d y k e w r o t e i n h i s d i a r y t h a t " K a t s u p r o p o s e d a p l a n t o c i r c u m n a v i g a t e Kyushu I s l a n d and v i s i t Kagoshima, c a p i t a l o f Satsuma h a n , 94 when the Japan was a t S h i m o n o s e k i . 1 T h i s s t a t e m e n t sounds as i f K a t s u and o t h e r Japanese h i t upon the p l a n t o v i s i t Kagoshima w h i l e a t S h i m o n o s e k i . The t r u t h was, however, t h a t the p l a n had been c a r e f u l l y made b e f o r e t h e N a g a s a k i d e p a r t u r e o f t h e s h i p . The Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s were n o t t o l d o f t h e p l a n a t . a l l . Shimazu N a r i a k i r a o f Satsuma han was,as mentioned b e f o r e , one o f the most k n o w l e d g e a b l e l o r d s about Western a f f a i r s , e s p e c i a l l y m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y . He had w r i t t e n t o S c h o o l d i r e c t o r K imura Y o s h i t a k e a s k i n g t h a t the Japan be s e n t t o Kagoshima so t h a t the m i l i t a r i l y e n l i g h t e n e d l o r d o f Satsuma c o u l d p e r s o n a l l y 95 o b s e r v e a W e s t e r n - s t y l e w a r s h i p . Two Satsuma men on the Japan were t o p i l o t t he s h i p when t h e y a r r i v e d i n Kagoshima Bay. I t i s p r o b a b l y n o t c o r r e c t t o say t h a t the Japanese d e c e i v e d t h e Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . R a t h e r , i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e 92 for us to assume that the Japanese regarded the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s purely as technical advisors and i n s t r u c t o r s . On A p r i l 9 (3/15), the Japan arr i v e d at Yamagawa, a port town about 55 kilometers south of Kagoshima at the mouth of Kagoshima Bay. Shimazu Nariakira, who had been at nearby hot springs, v i s i t e d the ship on the following day. At Yamagawa the l o r d formally gave an i n v i t a t i o n to the crew to s a i l up the bay to Kagoshima. Early i n the evening of A p r i l 10 (3/16), the ship anchored i n Kagoshima harbour where the crew was greeted by Satsuma han samurai and hundreds 96 of curious townspeople who had never seen Europeans before. For the next few days, the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s and Japanese crew were per- sonally guided to various places i n Kagoshima by Shimazu. His inte n t i o n was to obtain technological and s t r a t e g i c advice about h i s i n d u s t r i a l f a c i l i t i e s and cannon b a t t e r i e s from the Dutch experts. He openly showed them many impor- tant m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s , and. the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s earnestly made valuable 97 comments and suggestions. A l l the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s seem to have been very impressed by the numerous i n d u s t r i a l f a c i l i t i e s at Kagoshima. According to van Kattendyke's diary, they were e s p e c i a l l y impressed by the Shusei-kan factory, where Satsuma men worked with various metals, glass, machines and so on., Thomas C. Smith describes i n his'book, P o l i t i c a l Change and I n d u s t r i a l 98 Development i n Japan, how busy the factory was i n the l a t e 1850's. Van Kattendyke also observed a tiny ship r i g h t next to the Japan an the harbour. It was the Unko Maru, the f i r s t steamer b u i l t by the Japanese. He found the steam engine of the ship could y i e l d only 10 to 20 per cent of i t s t h e o r e t i c a l maximum power due to several mechanical defects and poor workman- ship. However, he was r e a l l y amazed at seeing the t i n y steamer at Kagoshima: I was very much surprised at the extraordinary talent of the people who had b u i l t t h i s sort of engine based on a very b r i e f b l u e p r i n t . They had never a c t u a l l y seen a single steam engine before. It requires a l o t of e f f o r t even for us Dutch to f u l l y 99 understand the function of a steam engine! Later the Dutch instructors advised Satsuma men to send the steamer to Nagasaki so that the former would be able to repair and improve the function of the engine. Indeed, the steam engine was repaired in the summer of the same year at Nagasaki and used until the end of the Tokugawa period. Satsuma han samurai were very eager to seek opinions about their batteries and their cannons around Kagoshima harbour. The Dutch instructors were taken to many construction sites of new batteries. They were also shown various cannons that Satsuma han was founding, including those made of both bronze and iron. Van Kattendyke recorded that the bronze cannons were very well made, while the iron cannons were not yet s k i l l f u l l y done."'"̂ "'" On April 12 (3/18) , the Japan l e f t Kagoshima and stayed for a day at Yamagawa before i t sailed off to Nagasaki. Shimazu invited the ship there again because he really wanted to see i t once more. This time the lord held a party on board the Japan and invited the Dutch instructors, Katsu and Izawa. There should be no need to mention that Shimazu enjoyed seeing various parts of the ship's equipment as well as the party i t s e l f at which he even listened to vi o l i n •, , 102 music played by van Kattendyke. Van Kattendyke says that he was impressed by two of the people whom he met at Kagoshima: the lord Shimazu Nariakira and a man named Matsuki Koan. Shimazu was described by van Kattendyke as one of the most powerful lords in Japan who was promoting social reforms and the development of industrial technology. Van Kattendyke thought Shimazu very affable, though he looked much 10 3 older than his actual age. Matsuki Koan, later known as Terashima Munenori, 104 became one of the most important diplomats in the early Meiji period. He was a teacher of the Dutch language and often translated Dutch writings into Japanese. Van Kattendyke wrote that "this man did not speak Dutch but wrote i t 94 f a u l t l e s s l y . " He was also amazed that Matsuki's c u r i o s i t y was so broad that often Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s were not able to s a t i s f y him. Dr. van Meerdervoort also noted h i s impression of the v i s i t to Satsuma i n hi s diary. It t e l l s us how he saw Shimazu: What we f e l t very strange [when meeting the l o r d Shimazu] was the extremely f r u g a l clothes of the l o r d and h i s servants. The l o r d hated extravagance. He looked very f r i e n d l y , but, at the same time, he seemed to be s t i f f . I thought he was older than 55 years of age, but, i n a c t u a l i t y , I overcounted by about ten years. Perhaps he was the most important man i n Japan i n those days.106 After observing various f a c i l i t i e s and meeting many people at Kagoshima, the young Dutch doctor concluded that " t h i s domain w i l l be the most prosperous and strongest one i n Japan i f i t i s allowed to have intercourse with Europeans * <-1 " 1 0 7 more frequently. The o f f i c e r s and Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s promised Shimazu that they would be v i s i t i n g Kagoshima again i n the near future and l e f t Yamagawa on A p r i l 13 (3/19). The Japan arr i v e d s a f e l y at Nagasaki on the following day. The v i s i t of the Japan to Kagoshima created an opportunity for Katsu Rintaro to meet several important figures i n one of the most i n f l u e n t i a l han. It i s not inappropriate to say that a f t e r t h i s time Katsu began to r e a l i z e a new role for himself as a man to work between l o c a l han lords and the Tokugawa Bakufu i n Edo. Several l e t t e r s written by Shimazu Nariakira a f t e r the v i s i t of the Japan show us how frankly Shimazu and Katsu discussed various a f f a i r s such as m i l i t a r y development, domestic p o l i t i c s and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . For example, i n a l e t t e r to Matsudaira Shungaku (K e i e i , Yoshinaga) of Echizen han (today Fukui-ken), Shimazu mentioned the development of the naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki. He s a i d that Katsu confessed to him that the Japanese students were then capable of operating the Japan, a steamer, quite well but were not — — 108 r e a l l y p r o f i c i e n t i n the operation of the Hosho Maru, a s a i l i n g v essel. 95 (In f a c t , the Japanese students had never t r i e d a long-distance cruise on a modern Western-style s a i l i n g vessel before by themselves. The only previous long-distance cruise was that of the Kanko Maru , the steamer, to Edo the year before.) A l e t t e r to one of Shimazu's subjects indicates that Katsu personally 109 made arrangements with Shimazu to discuss many m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s . The most important l e t t e r was written on May 24 (4/12) by Shimazu to Katsu i n Nagasaki. Besides naval t r a i n i n g a f f a i r s , Shimazu candidly expressed h i s opinion about the proposed commercial treaties."*""^ Judging from t h i s l e t t e r , Katsu and Shimazu seem to have become quite intimate with each other through the meeting at Kagoshima. It i s possible f or us to assume that Shimazu and other Satsuma o f f i c i a l s a f t e r that time expected Katsu to achieve prominence i n the future Bakufu system. In February, 1858, before the circumnavigation of Kyushu, the Bakufu had ordered School d i r e c t o r Kimura to send the Hosho Maru with a Japanese crew to Edo as soon as possible. Kimura chose Katsu as the captain of the ship and prepared for the voyage. This scheme was, however, postponed because of the opposition by van Kattendyke who claimed that the operation of the Hosho Maru would s t i l l be too d i f f i c u l t for a Japanese crew at that time. On June 15 (5/5), the School again heard from Edo that the Hosho Maru was needed i n the c a p i t a l region so that the ship must be brought to Edo immediately. Nobody opposed the Bakufu decision t h i s time and Kimura ordered Izawa Kingo to d i r e c t the operation of the ship. Katsu was very unhappy about Kimura's decision as he was being replaced as captain of the Hosho Maru. But he had no choice but to obey the decision and stay at Nagasaki. Katsu was sorry f or the decision, not only because he missed an opportunity to operate the Hosho Maru but also because he lost.a-chance to return to Edo. He had become much more interested i n p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s i n Edo and Kyoto than naval t r a i n i n g i n those days. 9 6 Although van Kattendyke did not oppose the voyage of the Hosho Maru under Izawa, he was s t i l l doubtful about the a b i l i t y of a Japanese crew to s a i l the ship. So he proposed a plan to use the Japan to tug the Hosho Maru to the south of Kyushu where Edo-bound ships could catch the r i g h t wind. The two ships l e f t Nagasaki on June 21 (5/11) i n stormy weather and some- how managed to reach Yamagawa. While the Hosho Maru was waiting f or the storm to calm down, the Japan again v i s i t e d Kagoshima. The crew of the ship was led th i s time by Kimura Yoshitake. At Kagoshima harbour, the Bakufu crew and Dutch in s t r u c t o r s were warmly greeted by Shimazu on the Mannen Maru, one of the four 112 ships Satsuma had b u i l t i n 1854. Shimazu expected to hear comments from the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s about the Satsuma-built ship. Two months before, the ship had been under repair and could not be examined by the professionals from Europe. Van Kattendyke wrote what he t o l d Shimazu about the Mannen Maru i n h i s diary: I saw a three-masted ship with a tonnage of about 1,000 i n the harbour. It was a ship b u i l t at Satsuma four years ago. Because the blueprint they used was from a very old book on shipbuilding, the ship looked very inadequate. The appearance and the construction were, i f I may be allowed a l i t t l e exageration, l i k e a ship of the old East India Company..... The ship was named the Mannen Maru.H3 This must have been a sad comment to Shimazu who had been bravely promoting the b u i l d i n g of Western-style ships i n h i s own domain. Soon Satsuma han would cease to-: b u i l d ships and begin buying them from Western countries. The Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s were again asked to give t h e i r opinions concerning the defense f a c i l i t i e s of Kagoshima. To t h e i r surprise, Shimazu even showed them a c l a s s i f i e d map which d e t a i l e d defense f a c i l i t i e s of the harbour. On t h e i r tour, they were again astonished when they found some of the suggestions they had made i n A p r i l had ; ̂ already' "materialized. The Dutch had never seen the Japanese carrying out any plans or suggestions so quickly. The Japan weighed anchor on June 27 (5/17) and proceeded to Yamagawa where i t found the Hosho Maru had already l e f t f o r Edo. A f t e r one day's stay, the Japan l e f t Yamagawa i n a heavy storm and arr i v e d at Nagasaki. Both the Japanese and Dutch at Nagasaki worried about Captain Izawa and other members on the Hosho Maru u n t i l they f i n a l l y heard from Edo of t h e i r safe a r r i v a l . The ship s a i l e d through stormy weather f o r s i x days to reach Edo and proved the capa- b i l i t y of the crew i n the operation of a s a i l i n g v e s s e l . ^ " * The Hosho Maru was henceforth kept at the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e at T s u k i j i and used for naval t r a i n i n g and p a t r o l l i n g Edo Bay. Most of the o f f i c ers worked at the i n s t i t u t e as i n s t r u c t o r s and teaching a s s i s t a n t s . From about that time on, the t r a f f i c between Edo, Osaka and Nagasaki increased and often the Kariko Maru and the Japan were used to make up a shortage of other transportation means. The Japan went to Edo for the f i r s t time i n July, soon a f t e r i t returned from Kagoshima. It t r a v e l l e d a few times between Nagasaki and Edo during 1858. The Bakufu needed a quick and trustworthy means of transportation, e s p e c i a l l y between Kyoto/Osaka and Edo, as the negotiations 'between the Bakufu and the Imperial Court became intense i n r e l a t i o n to the commercial treaty bargaining with the United States i n the spring and summer. The Nagasaki Naval Training School suffered from the lack of t r a i n i n g ships because the Japan was often pressed into service f o r transportation between Edo and the Kyoto/Osaka area. The second ship from the Netherlands for the Bakufu arr i v e d at Nagasaki on October 9 (9/3). The new ship Edo was l a t e r renamed the Choyo Maru and used mainly for naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki. The Japan and t h i s new ship were s i s t e r ships. A f t e r a month, on November 10 (10/5), Saga han f i n a l l y obtained a steamer from the Netherlands. The Nagasaki, a three-hundred ton screw propel- lered ship, was s l i g h t l y smaller but very s i m i l a r to the Japan and the Edo. — 116 It was l a t e r renamed the Derifyu Maru. The Nagasaki Naval Training School was best served by t r a i n i n g ships at the end of 1858 with such ships available 98 as the Kanriri Maru "(Japa n ) 1 1 / , the Choyo Maru, the Denryu Maru, the Hiun Maru (Jan Daniel), and two Nagasaki-style cutters. A t r i p to Fukuoka han i n l a t e November was perhaps the f i n a l and most impressive t r a i n i n g cruise the Dutch in s t r u c t o r s and students made during the e n t i r e period of the School. Two of the newest and most advanced steamers, the Karirin Maru and the Choyo Maru, v i s i t e d Hakata, c a p i t a l of the domain, at the request of l o r d Kuroda Narihiro. The crew and the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s on the two ships enjoyed the stay at Hakata, and oh t h e i r way back to Nagasaki, the Japanese crew demonstrated t h e i r w e l l - 118 trained a b i l i t y to operate the ships. Although both lectures and t r a i n i n g cruises went on continuously i n the second h a l f of 1858, the attention of the students was s h i f t e d from naval t r a i n i n g to p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s i n Edo and Kyoto. In t h i s year, the commercial treaty with the United States was concluded on July 29 (6/19) and then i t was followed by s i m i l a r t r e a t i e s with the Netherlands, Russia, Great B r i t a i n and France. On the other hand, more and more a n t i - f o r e i g n f e e l i n g spread a l l over Japan, backed by the Imperial Court i n Kyoto, causing a serious c o n f l i c t between the pro-and a n t i - t r e a t y f a c t i o n s . This s i t u a t i o n was further complicated by the problem of succession; the thirteenth Shogun Iesada was a i l i n g and expected to die soon without an h e i r . In f a c t , the matter of the succession may have been the bigger reason for the contemporary p o l i t i c a l confusion. The s e l e c t i o n of the successor to Iesada was urgent, and two candidates were considered. One was Tokugawa Yoshitomi of K i i Province (now Wakayama-ken), nearest to the Shogun by descent but s t i l l only thirt e e n years old. The other was Hitotsubashi K e i k i , seventh son of Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito han. He was adopted into the Hitotsubashi house and was regarded as a promising young f i g u r e . The supporters of K e i k i were people who had been advocating various administrative and m i l i t a r y reforms to cope with 99 changing i n t e r n a t i o n a l and domestic s i t u a t i o n s . They were so-called reforming lords, including Reiki's own father, and a number of Bakufu o f f i c i a l s , espe-:.\." c i a l l y among those of middle rank. On the other hand, Yoshitomi's claim was 119 strongly based on descent. Most of the Bakufu senior o f f i c i a l s and fudai daimyo found t h e i r own power i n the p r i n c i p l e of heredity and considered that Re i k i might bring a d r a s t i c change i n t h e i r p r i v i l e g e s . They needed a f i g u r e - head rather than an able, active shogun i n order to carry out t h e i r own conserv- ative p o l i c i e s . A f t e r I i Naosuke, the l o r d of Hikone han (now Shiga-ken) and l a t e r the leader of the R i i f a c t i o n , was appointed by the Shogun to the p o s i t i o n of . t a i r o (grand c o u n c i l l o r ) , the most powerful p o s i t i o n among the Bakufu o f f i c i a l s , on June 4 (4/23), pro-Hitotsubashi lords and o f f i c i a l s were ignored and gradually ousted from important Bakufu p o s i t i o n s . Under these circumstances, the so-called Ansei no Taigoku (the Purge of the Ansei Period) began under the d i r e c t i o n of I i i n October and sent many a n t i - I i men to prison. P o l i t i c a l resentment towards I i Naosuke spread among the students at the Nagasaki Naval Training School and naval t r a i n i n g seems, to have become a minor issue compared to p o l i t i c s . Ratsu himself decided to leave Nagasaki f o r Edo as he heard of p o l i t i c a l changes and new developments i n treaty a f f a i r s . At t h i s time, however, he was much more interested i n v i s i t i n g Europe and the United States than i n domestic p o l i t i c s . And he considered that he would be able to create an opportunity to do so by proposing a plan to send a Japanese diplomatic mission abroad on a Japanese ship. The ChOyb Maru commanded by Gaptain Katsu l e f t Nagasaki on February 7, 1859 (Ansei 6, 1/5). The ship proceeded through a severe winter storm and 120 managed to reach Edo Bay on February 17 (1/15). Katsu had been away from Edo for nearly three and a h a l f years. He was no longer a mere samurai with a knowledge of Dutch studies. He had experienced extensive naval t r a i n i n g , 100 learned many Western subjects, obtained the most recent news of Western coun- t r i e s , and, most importantly, got acquainted with various lords and t h e i r men i n the southwestern provinces which were about to emerge on to the stage i n the main stream of Japan's modern h i s t o r y . Upon h i s return, Katsu was appointed to be the head i n s t r u c t o r at the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e at T s u k i j i . Katsu was c e r t a i n l y a pro-Hitotsubashi man, and he was favoured by Bakufu middle-ranking o f f i c i a l s such as Mizuno Tadanori and Nagai Naomune (Iwanojo), who were being purged by I i Naosuke. But Katsu did not hold an important Bakufu p o s i t i o n and had been away from Edo for the l a s t three years during which the p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t between the K i i and Hitotsubashi factions had become most f i e r c e . Therefore, despite h i s pro-Hitotsubashi i n c l i n a t i o n s , he could obtain the p o s i t i o n of head i n s t r u c t o r at the I n s t i t u t e and was chosen to be the captain of the Kanrin Maru on i t s voyage to the United States i n the following year of 1860. The Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s were informed by the Nagasaki Magistrate's O f f i c e on March 10, 1859 (Ansei 6, 2/6), that the Bakufu i n Edo had decided to discon- tinue the operation of the Nagasaki Naval Training School. Van Kattendyke wrote i n h i s diary that the notice was unexpected by a l l the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s : This strange notice that nobody anticipated gave us a very unpleasant f e e l i n g . Because many of us suspected that the Japanese government decided to discharge us as soon as possible since i t was not s a t i s f i e d with our t r a i n i n g . However, I myself do not think that way. Rather, as some students explained, the government must have reached the conclusion that no further assistance and education by Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s i s necessary because the Japanese students were successful i n the operation of steamers and proved that they could make voyages s a f e l y . It i s the character of the Japanese people to t r y to do everything a l l by themselves. The students who were angry at the government [decision] accused the newly appointed t a i r o of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the closure of the School. The t a i r o belongs to a conservative party.^21 101 In A p r i l , most of the Bakufu and l o c a l han students other than those from Saga han l e f t Nagasaki. And on the 18th of the same month, regular operation of the School was terminated. A f t e r that, the i n s t r u c t o r s continued only a few courses for Saga han samurai, and they spent most of t h e i r time on the repair of the Kanko Maru. The ship had been used for more than eight years and i t s engine needed a complete overhaul. Some students from Saga han were always at the s i t e of the overhaul since they were ordered by t h e i r l o r d to learn every d e t a i l of the Kanko Maru. Special arrangements had been made between the Bakufu and Nabeshima Naomasa concerning the use of the Kanko Maru a f t e r the School was closed. As the f i r s t steamer he had seen, Nabeshima never gave up hi s dream of possessing the KankO-Maru'and f i n a l l y obtained permission to borrow 122 i t f o r the use of h i s domain. The t r i a l of the refurbished Kanko Maru was completed i n October and the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s f i n i s h e d t h e i r duty i n Japan. Aft e r more than two years' stay i n Japan, van Kattendyke and other leading members of the second detachment to Japan made t h e i r farewells to the Nagasaki Naval Training School, the town of Nagasaki, Japan and i t s people. The Kanrin Maru, which was at Nagasaki then, flew the Dutch n a t i o n a l emblem and f i r e d a seven-gun salute to the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s outward bound f o r Batavia. It was November 4, 1859 (Ansei 6, 10/10). Thus, i n amity yet with some d i s - appointment, ended the a c t i v i t i e s of the Nagasaki Naval Training School. i 102 CHAPTER 5 Conclusion: Reasons for the Closure and the Significance of the Nagasaki Naval Training School In the midst of Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l and domestic confusion i n the l a t e 1850's, the Nagasaki Naval Training School was formally operated for about three years. But i n s t r u c t i o n continued almost four years because informal schooling started i n the summer of 1855 and ended i n 1859, also i n the summer. The School trained a t o t a l of about 200 samurai students and an unknown number of non-samurai students from various parts of the country. It d i f f e r e d from t r a d i t i o n a l schools i n Japan. Although the Bakufu established i t , many samurai from l o c a l domains were allowed to attend. The School was the f i r s t one i n Japan to employ a systematic Western method i n teaching. Tokugawa teachers did not customarily devise teaching plans, c u r r i c u l a and timetables. The many private schools for Western studies (Dutch studies) i n the early 1800's u t i l i z e d t r a d i t i o n a l Japanese methods, i n which students studied a l l by them- selves with l i t t l e methodical assistance from t h e i r masters. The Nagasaki Naval Training School was one of the l a s t large-scale endeavours of the a i l i n g Toku- gawa Bakufu. We have dealt i n the previous chapter with the operation of the School, and now we w i l l examine the reasons for i t s termination and the legacy l e f t a f t e r i t s closure i n 1859. Several authors i n d i f f e r e n t books have presented various reasons for the closure of the School. Those reasons can be categorized into two groups, one from the Japanese side and the other from the Dutch side. Fumikura H e i j i r o , the author of Bakumatsu Gunkan Kanrin Maru (The Kanrin Maru, Warship i n the Late Tokugawa Period), considers that the School was closed as a r e s u l t of the i n s t a l l a t i o n of I i Naosuke as t a i r o . He says that I i , the strong conservative p o l i t i c i a n , decided to end the operation of the School at 103 Nagasaki because the Hikone l o r d d i s l i k e d anything Western."*" He quoted one of I i ' s short poems (waka): Why should we learn foreign ways 2 When we have i n h e r i t e d our t r a d i t i o n a l way of the samurai. Fumikura thus accuses I i of a conservative m i l i t a r y p o l i c y i n cl o s i n g the Nagasaki Naval Training School. Despite Fumikura's assumption, however, i t i s not ri g h t to conclude that I i ' s conservatism brought the School to an end, since he maintained the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e at T s u k i j i , which offered naval t r a i n i n g courses based on the system of the Dutch navy. Although he was the l o r d of Hikone han, an inland domain without d i r e c t access to the ocean, h i s knowledge of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s and technological development i n Western countries was far superior to that of many other lords. This i s proven by h i s memorial .submitted to the 3 Bakufu i n r e l a t i o n to the v i s i t of Perry i n 1853. If h i s conservatism could abide continuation of the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e at T s u k i j i , i t was hardly strong enough to be the main reason for the closure of the Nagasaki School. In Nihon no Gunkoku-shugi (Japanese M i l i t a r i s m ) , Inoue Kiyoshi also says that I i was a very conservative, even reactionary figure who suspended many 4 reforms i n i t i a t e d by h i s predecessors such as Abe Masahiro and Hotta Masayoshi. But he at t r i b u t e s the cessation of the t r a i n i n g program of the School rather to recognition of the anti-Bakufu f e e l i n g among tozama han samurai i n the south- western provinces than to I i ' s conservatism.^ Detecting the r i s i n g anti-Bakufu mood among the samurai from the h i s t o r i c a l l y anti-Tokugawa domains i n Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu, Inoue considers that I i Naosuke f e l t i t would be harmful for the Bakufu to l e t them continue studying modern naval a f f a i r s . This p o l i t - i c a l astuteness of I i i s a much more persuasive reason than h i s conservatism. One piece of evidence for th i s i s the fact that the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e at 104 T s u k i j i was open only to Bakufu and fudai han samurai, not to tozama han samurai at a l l . Inoue points out another reason f o r the closure of the School. He says that the Bakufu was quite content with the success achieved by the Japanese students at Nagasaki. The steamer Kanko Maru was brought to Edo by a Japanese crew i n 185 7, and another Japanese crew suc c e s s f u l l y s a i l e d the Hosho Maru i n 1858. So i t i s not amiss f o r us to think that the Bakufu was s a t i s f i e d with the t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki. Furthermore, i t i s natural to assume that Bakufu executives came to entertain the idea of carrying out a l l naval t r a i n i n g under the d i r e c t i o n of Japanese alone.^ In addition, we must not overlook the a c t i v i t i e s of the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e at T s u k i j i . The Bakufu opened the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e as a part of the M i l i t a r y Academy (Kobu-sho) on May 4 (4/11). Almost a l l the i n s t r u c t o r s and assistants g at the i n s t i t u t e were graduates of the Nagasaki Naval Training School. The actual operation of the i n s t i t u t e began on September 7 (7/19), and the contents of the t r a i n i n g were n a t u r a l l y very s i m i l a r to those of the e a r l i e r counterpart at Nagasaki. When i t started operations, the Kanko Maru was the only t r a i n i n g ship. But by the time Katsu Rintaro was appointed head i n s t r u c t o r i n 1859, the i n s t i t u t e d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l l e d the Kanrin Maru, the Choyo Maru, the Hosho Maru, and the Banryu Maru.^ A c t i v i t i e s at the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e we're expanding r a p i d l y . After t r a i n i n g at the i n s t i t u t e , the graduates served on various Bakufu missions such as p a t r o l l i n g important coast l i n e s , e s p e c i a l l y Edo Bay. At the same time, they were often u t i l i z e d to take ships transporting men and cargo between Edo and the Kyoto/Osaka area, although this was not what they had been trained f o r . The services provided by graduates of the i n s t i t u t e at T s u k i j i could have persuaded Bakufu executives that the Nagasaki Naval Training School under Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s was no longer necessary. 105 Following van Kattendyke, some authors such as Ikeda Kiyoshi and Kurihara Ryuichi say that the f i n a n c i a l predicament of the Bakufu was one of the main reasons that brought about the closure of the School. The School was a fi n a n - c i a l burden. As mentioned i n a previous chapter, the annual wages for the in s t r u c t o r s of the f i r s t detachment t o t a l l e d 19 7.25 kanme (739.69 kilograms) of s i l v e r and the figure was more than doubled to 447 kanme (1,676.25 kilograms) for the i n s t r u c t o r s of the second detachment. Besides the wages to Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s , the management cost of the School rose year a f t e r year as the i n s t r u c t o r s and students advanced i n t r a i n i n g . The most expensive part was the price paid for the purchase of ships from the Netherlands. The Kanrin Maru and the Choyo Maru, f o r instance, cost the Bakufu 100,000 s i l v e r d o l l a r s (720 kanme or 2,700 kilograms of silver)"^each.. Moreover, the Bakufu had to prepare a repair f a c i l i t y f o r the maintenance of the ships. The construction of the repair f a c i l i t y and the purchase of i t s equipment were of course very costly."'""'" A l l i n a l l , the wages for the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s were less s i g n i f i - cant compared to the other costs f o r the operation of the School and i t s f l e e t . When the f i r s t detachment completed i t s mission and l e f t Nagasaki, the Bakufu rewarded the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s f or t h e i r e f f o r t s by giving s p e c i a l bonuses which equalled two to f i v e times t h e i r annual s a l a r i e s . For two years' service, Pels Rijken received a bonus equal to f i v e years' salary! The Bakufu could afford i t . Even a f t e r the closure of the Nagasaki Naval Training School, naval t r a i n i n g i t s e l f was continued at T s u k i j i , and the repair f a c i l i t y at Akunoura was being u t i l i z e d for repair of ships and machine manufacturing. The only saving the Bakufu attained by abolishing naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki was the wages needed for the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . According to van Kattendyke's diary, he understood that the cost involved i n the operation of the School was one of the main reasons for the closure. He knew how much money the Bakufu had spent for the t r a i n i n g . Yet i t was a'^rS- 106 cost of a modern navy, not that of a school alone. The cost of the School cannot be said to have been the determining reason for i t s closure. An episode involving Nabeshima Naomasa and I i Naosuke i s quoted i n Fumikura's book. The author says that I i t o l d Nabeshima that the Bakufu would close the Nagasaki 12 Naval Training School due to i t s high cost. S t i l l we should not conclude that I i ' s concern was the cost of the School j u s t because of t h i s statement. He was reluctant to spend enormous amounts of money for an enterprise which he believed to be harmful to the Bakufu because of the p o t e n t i a l for p o l i t i c a l conspiracy among i t s students. Whereas some people place the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the closure of the Nagasaki Naval Training School on the Bakufu, others believe that the Dutch side was responsible. According to Mizuta Nobutoshi and Numata J i r o , the Dutch side suggested to the Bakufu that some changes i n the naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki were necessary i n r e l a t i o n to the negotiations i n 1858 concerning a commercial treaty. The Netherlands Commissioner i n Japan, Donker Curtius, t r a v e l l e d to Edo and stayed there between A p r i l and July of the year for t h i s purpose. There he repeatedly met the American consul, Townsend Harris, and hi s interpreter/factotum Henry Heusken, a Dutch-born American, and obtained information about the contents of the U.S.-Japanese commercial treaty. At the same time, he seems to have learned the treaty proposals of the B r i t i s h and 13 Russian delegates, too. During the negotiations, Curtius was obliged to reconsider the naval t r a i n i n g under Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s at Nagasaki. Unlike the early 1850's when the Dutch s t i l l enjoyed s u p e r i o r i t y i n r e l a t i o n s with the Japanese over the other Western countries, i t was now very d i f f i c u l t for the Dutch to i n s i s t on t h e i r own p o l i c i e s without considering the r e l a t i o n s h i p with powerful countries such as the United States, Great B r i t a i n and Russia. It i s very probable that 107 Curtius, i n h i s discussion with h i s American counterpart, was put under pressure to change the system of naval t r a i n i n g from governmental to private sponsorship. The U.S.-Japanese commercial treaty said i n i t s a r t i c l e 10 that " i t [the Japanese government] s h a l l have the r i g h t to engage i n the United States s c i e n t i f i c , naval and m i l i t a r y men, artisans of a l l kinds, and mariners to 14 enter i n t o i t s s e r v i c e . " According to I s h i i Takashi, t h i s a r t i c l e was a very unusual one i n t h i s kind of treaty. No other commercial t r e a t i e s i n 1858 have a s i m i l a r a r t i c l e . Indeed, i t was not at a l l necessary to have an a r t i c l e l i k e t h i s , since the content of the a r t i c l e was a part of diplomatic courtesy which did not require any provision i n a t r e a t y . I s h i i thinks that Harris knew the a r t i c l e was unnecessary but put i t i n the treaty to impress the ' f r i e n d l i n e s s ' 16 of the Americans upon the Japanese. Perhaps, besides I s h i i ' s assumption, Harris purposely inserted t h i s a r t i c l e to r e s t r a i n the others, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Dutch, from preempting any p r i v i l e g e s i n Japan by providing s p e c i a l services. In other words, the m i l i t a r i l y more powerful Americans wanted to check the a c t i v i t i e s of the Dutch i n Japan. This tendency was seen even during the v i s i t of Perry, too."^ The Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s at Nagasaki were not merely Dutch c i t i z e n s but also members of the Royal Dutch Navy. The dispatch of the in s t r u c t o r s was d i r e c t l y organized by the Dutch government. The presence of the detachment i n Japan of course ensured the Dutch a great advantage, e s p e c i a l l y i n deals i n v o l v i n g m i l i t a r y equipment such as warships and cannons. As the naval t r a i n i n g went on, i n f a c t , Dutch business with Japan fl o u r i s h e d and showed more promise than ever. Further pressure came upon Curtius from a d i f f e r e n t quarter. As the negotiations over t r e a t i e s with Western countries advanced, the a n t i - f o r e i g n f e e l i n g among pro-Imperial Court groups of Japanese became more and more f i e r c e . Under such circumstances, Curtius feared that the other Western powers would suspect the Netherlands of helping the Japanese arm themselves to repulse the 108 further advance of Western powers. This fear among the Dutch had existed since they began working for the improvement of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with Japan i n the 1840's. Curtius was worrying about possible misunderstanding among the other Western countries with regard to the Dutch-organized naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki. I f the Dutch government continued helping the Japanese d i r e c t l y i n naval t r a i n i n g , Curtius feared, i t could be dangerous for both the Netherlands and Japan. However, the complete suspension of assistance i n Japan's naval development would not be b e n e f i c i a l for the two countries, e s p e c i a l l y for the 18 Dutch when they were enjoying good sales of warships, machinery and firearms. In such a dilemma, Curtius proposed an a l t e r n a t i v e idea to the Bakufu; the Dutch government would discontinue the dispatch of any m i l i t a r y i n s t r u c t o r s , but i t would allow the Japanese to h i r e Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s f r e e l y among those 19 who volunteered. The Bakufu was perplexed by the proposal of Curtius, but i t was obliged to accept i t . When Curtius mentioned h i s proposal, i n the early summer of 1858, the Bakufu apparently had no plan to discontinue naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki f o r soon a f t e r i t asked Curtius to secure some Dutch naval i n s t r u c - 20 tors who would be able to stay i n Japan as private c i t i z e n s . Curtius was happy to accept the request by the Bakufu. If the Nagasaki Naval Training School could be continued even with private Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s , a s p e c i a l t i e between the two countries could be maintained. Ikeda Kiyoshi's Nihon no Kaigun (Japan's Navy) and Kurihara Ryuichi's Bakumatsu Nihon no Gunsei (The M i l i t a r y System of Late Tokugawa Japan) both t e l l us that the u n i l a t e r a l withdrawal of the detachment from Japan as well as the Bakufu's f i n a n c i a l problems brought an end to the Nagasaki Naval 21 Training School. But as has been mentioned, what the Dutch side expected to ! do was to change the status of the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s from that of an o f f i c i a l detachment to that of a group of private, c i t i z e n s . Curtius wanted to keep as many Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s as possible at Nagasaki. Later, from Nagasaki, he made 109 arrangements with the Governor-general at Batavia concerning i n s t r u c t o r s . Batavia r e p l i e d to Curtius that those who would volunteer to stay i n Japan could do so, and Curtius was ready to make new arrangements with the Bakufu 22 for those who volunteered. Instead, Curtius was informed on March 10, 1859, of the Bakufu's decision to abolish the Nagasaki Naval Training School. Judging from the information we have examined, i t seems that the Bakufu p o l i c y over naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki changed greatly i n the second h a l f of 1858. Actually, the proposal by Curtius and the i n s t a l l a t i o n of I i Naosuke as ta i r o coincided i n the early summer of 1858. When Curtius discussed naval t r a i n i n g a f f a i r s , fundamental Bakufu p o l i c i e s were not yet strongly influenced by I i Naosuke. With some continuity of purpose, the Bakufu requested Curtius to make sure to keep some volunteer i n s t r u c t o r s f o r further naval t r a i n i n g . However, within a few months a f t e r I i became t a i r o , h i s p o l i t i c a l ideas came to be r e f l e c t e d i n a l l aspects of Bakufu p o l i c i e s . Naval Training was no excep- ti o n . During the summer and autumn, I i Naosuke must have informed himself of the conditions and other aspects of the Naval Training School at Nagasaki. Undoubtedly, he must have considered a l l the merits and demerits of having the School at Nagasaki. And as a r e s u l t , he took the proposal by Curtius as a good opportunity to terminate the four-year-old Nagasaki Naval Training School which he considered useful but p o t e n t i a l l y harmful f o r the Bakufu because i t was open even to anti-Bakufu samurai. Thus, i n the early summer of 1858, Curtius made h i s proposal to the Bakufu that the Dutch government send private c i t i z e n s rather than government men for the naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki due to the changing i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . The Bakufu at that time was s t i l l led by the so-called reformists such as Hotta Masayoshi, Mizuno Tadanori and Nagai Naomune. They wanted to continue the Nagasaki Naval Training School under Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . The Bakufu there- 110 fore asked Curtius to spare some volunteer i n s t r u c t o r s for the School. Just around t h i s time, however, the Shogun elevated I i Naosuke, the leading figure of the Ki f a c t i o n , to the most powerful p o s i t i o n i n Bakufu officialdom. This meant the purge of most of the reformists from the Bakufu as they were mostly members of the Hitotsubashi f a c t i o n . Gradually I i ' s influence spread to a l l the projects and p o l i c i e s of the Bakufu including naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki. After considering various aspects of the t r a i n i n g , he made h i s decision to close the School. He found that the naval t r a i n i n g at Nagasaki had already brought s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t s f o r the Bakufu. And th i s success was demonstrated i n the a c t i v i t i e s at the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e at T s u k i j i . On the other hand, I i judged that the School, which was open to samurai from a l l over the country, might be harmful to the Bakufu i n the future, because i t was providing samurai from t r a d i t i o n a l l y anti-Bakufu han with opportunities to learn advanced Western m i l i t a r y technology. There was l i t t l e reason f o r I i to preserve the Nagasaki Naval Training School. Despite i t s r e l a t i v e l y short period of operation, the Nagasaki Naval Training School contributed greatly to the rap i d l y changing i n d u s t r i a l and s o c i a l aspects of Japan i n the lat e Tokugawa and early M e i j i periods. The contributions of the School, d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t , were roughly divided into two major f i e l d s : the academic, i n d u s t r i a l and m i l i t a r y f i e l d , and the School's impact on s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s through i t s students. As a school f o r modern naval t r a i n i n g , of course, the most important role of the Nagasaki Naval Training School was to t r a i n naval experts f o r Japan's modern navy. As we have seen, the achievements of the students at the School were l a t e r demonstrated i n various ways. The successful operation of the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e at T s u k i j i was one such example. Most of i t s courses were independently organized and taught by graduates of the Nagasaki Naval I l l T raining School. Moreover, the Bakufu l a t e r allowed Katsu Rintaro to organize another naval t r a i n i n g school. In 1863 (Bunkyu 3), Katsu, who was the Gunkan Bugyo (Naval Magistrate) at that time, opened t h i s school at Kobe and inaugurated i n s t r u c t i o n there. Although the l i f e of the school at Kobe was very short, i t extended the experience of the Nagasaki Naval Training School; the Kobe school was open to a l l samurai i n Japan regardless of t h e i r o r i g i n . Sakamoto Ryoma, who worked hard to bring about the M e i j i Restoration, was one 23 of those who studied at the Kobe school. While the Kobe school was ordered closed i n 1864 due to i t s p o l i t i c a l l y v o l a t i l e nature, the Naval Training I n s t i - tute at T s u k i j i continued to o f f e r more modern and advanced naval t r a i n i n g with newer ships. A f t e r the M e i j i Restoration i n 1868, the new government reopened the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e on the same s i t e at T s u k i j i . In 1870, i t was renamed the Kaigun Heigaku-ryo, the predecessor of the Kaigun Heigakko (Naval Academy), which was established i n 1876 and existed u n t i l the end of World War II i n 1945. One of the graduates of the Nagasaki Naval Training School, Kawamura Sumiyoshi (Jungi) of Satsuma, who would draw up shipbuilding plans looking towards the Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars, headed the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e for a while u n t i l he was succeeded by Nakamuda Kuranosuke of Saga, another 24 graduate of the School. Nakamuda presided over the academy a f t e r 1871 for f i v e years and greatly contributed to the establishment of i t s t r a i n i n g systems. This Naval Academy would rear many naval o f f i c e r s who l a t e r became the core of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Through naval t r a i n i n g , the School provided a place where the Japanese received for the f i r s t time i n t h e i r h i s t o r y systematic education based on modern science. Quite novel i n comparison with the t r a d i t i o n a l knowledge of the Japanese, the education given at the School was, though imperfect i n a contemporary sense, advanced and methodical. The Japanese had usually 112 obtained very fragmentary education i n the way of p r a c t i c a l t r a i n i n g through most of the Tokugawa period. The science education given by the f i r s t European i n s t r u c t o r s at the School was r e a l l y epoch-making. One of the best examples of a naval engineer educated at the School i s Hida Hamagoro of Izu. He was one of the few students praised as a promising 25 naval engineer by van Kattendyke. After graduating from the School, he served at the Naval Training I n s t i t u t e at T s u k i j i as an i n s t r u c t o r i n engineer- ing i n 1859 and then was chosen for the crew of the Kanrin Maru dispatched to the United States i n 1860. His most s i g n i f i c a n t achievement was the b u i l d i n g of a steam engine for the Chiyoda-gata, the f i r s t steamer warship b u i l t by the 26 — Japanese. The construction of the ship i t s e l f was directed by Ono Tomogoro 27 and Haruyama Benzo, both graduates of the Nagasaki Naval Training School. After the M e i j i Restoration, Hida worked at the Yokosuka shipyard and eventually took over the en t i r e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the shipyard from French engineers. He assumed the highest engineering p o s i t i o n i n the Imperial Japanese Navy i n the early M e i j i period. As a part of the School curriculum, the second detachment provided some Japanese students with an opportunity to study systematic Western medicine. P r i o r - to the i n s t r u c t i o n by Dr. van Meerdervoort of t h i s detachment, some medical doctors such as von Siebold taught Western medicine i n Japan. While von Siebold spent h i s time i n the p r a c t i c e of medicine and research on Japanese a f f a i r s , van Meerdervoort devoted himself not only to medical treatment but also to f u l l - s c a l e medical education for the Japanese students. He continued hi s service at Nagasaki u n t i l 1862, even a f t e r most of the members of the second detachment under van Kattendyke had l e f t Japan i n 1859. During h i s stay, he opened the Nagasaki Yojo-sho (Nagasaki H o s p i t a l ) . His medical school and h o s p i t a l were taken over by other Dutch doctors and became the most 28 advanced medical complex i n Japan at the time. It was the predecessor of the 113 present-day medical school of the Univ e r s i t y of Nagasaki. Godai Tomoatsu of Satsuma also studied at the Nagasaki Naval Training School. He i s an example of a man who applied s c i e n t i f i c knowledge learned at the School to business ventures i n the M e i j i period. Besides the shipbuilding business which was d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to h i s School studies, he c a r r i e d on business on a large scale, i n c l u d i n g mining, metal r e f i n i n g , spinning and the 29 production of indigo. While Godai u t i l i z e d h i s School t r a i n i n g for business purposes, Sano Tsunetami (Jomin) of Saga went into philanthropic work as the founder of the Japanese Red Cross Society. In the early M e i j i period, he worked f or the b u i l d i n g of the -Japanese Imperial Navy on the basis of h i s experience at the School, but l a t e r h i s i n t e r e s t s h i f t e d to f o s t e r i n g the s p i r i t 30 of i n t e r n a t i o n a l benevolence exemplified by the Red Cross Society. It was perhaps as a r e s u l t of h i s background at Nagasaki, where he learned general Western a f f a i r s as well as naval subjects, that he nourished an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s p i r i t . The Nagasaki Naval Training School s u c c e s s f u l l y educated many students who would be able to work not only i n Tokugawa society but also i n a new society about to be born. In fact t h e i r talent was f u l l y u t i l i z e d because the society was transformed into a c e n t r a l i z e d and r e l a t i v e l y democratic one from the decentralized feudal one of the Tokugawa period. It may be true to say also that these people contributed much to change the old society. The Nagasaki Naval Training l e f t an invaluable legacy i n the f i e l d of modern industry, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n shipbuilding. The opening of the Nagasaki Naval Training School was the advent of Japan's modern navy, and i n e v i t a b l y the navy needed repair f a c i l i t i e s f o r i t s ships. Soon a f t e r the School started, therefore, the Japanese ordered equipment necessary to b u i l d a repair factory. The second detachment under van Kattendyke brought t h i s set of machinery, as well as an engineer o f f i c e r and several a r t i s a n s . The s i t e for the factory 114 was chosen i n N a g a s a k i h a r b o u r w i t h a v i e w t o f u r t h e r e x p a n s i o n . I t was n o t an easy t a s k f o r the Dutch t o b u i l d a n a v a l f a c i l i t y w i t h the Japanese a r t i s a n s and l a b o u r e r s who had l i t t l e i d e a about what t h e y were t r y i n g t o a c c o m p l i s h . T h i s f i r s t modern f a c t o r y i n J a p a n , w i t h s o p h i s t i c a t e d machines i n c l u d i n g steam e n g i n e s , l a t h e s , a steam hammer and o t h e r s , was c o m p l e t e d i n 1861. Then the B a k u f u b u i l t a f u l l - s c a l e s h i p y a r d n e a r the f a c t o r y i n 1864. But t h e s e modern f a c i l i t i e s a t N a g a s a k i were n o t f u l l y u t i l i z e d under t h e B a k u f u , f o r i t b u i l t l a r g e r n a v a l f a c i l i t i e s a t Yokohama and Yokosuka, b o t h n e a r Edo. The B a k u f u had e x p e r i e n c e d d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n t r o l l i n g the w e s t e r n p a r t of the c o u n t r y where N a g a s a k i was l o c a t e d , so i t d e c i d e d t o b u i l d n a v a l f a c i l i t i e s n e a r Edo where the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y c o u l d e x e r c i s e more d i r e c t c o n t r o l t h a n i n N a g a s a k i . T h i s i s e v i d e n c e d t h a t a f t e r a l l the Tokugawa B a k u f u i n t h e s e days was l o s i n g c o n t r o l o v e r t e r r i t o r i e s o t h e r than t h o s e around Edo, Osaka, and a few o t h e r p l a c e s . Because of t h i s s i t u a t i o n , i n the l a t e 1860's the N a g a s a k i f a c i l i t i e s b u i l t o n l y a few s m a l l steamers and r e p a i r e d some Japanese and f o r e i g n s h i p s . These h i s t o r i c a l N a g a s a k i n a v a l f a c i l i t i e s were, however, r e v i v e d under a p r i v a t e company i n 1884 when the M e i j i government s o l d them t o the r i s i n g M i t s u b i s h i . No l o n g e r d e s t i n e d t o be a minor r e p a i r f a c i l i t y , t he N a g a s a k i s h i p y a r d grew r a p i d l y . L i k e the Yokosuka s h i p y a r d , i t l a t e r d e v e l o p e d i n t o one of t h e most i m p o r t a n t s h i p y a r d s i n Japan b e f o r e World War I I . The M u s a s h i , one o f t h e two l a r g e s t b a t t l e s h i p s e v e r b u i l t i n the w o r l d , was l a u n c h e d on the v e r y s i t e where van K a t t e n d y k e and h i s men r e p a i r e d the Kanko Maru. N a g a s a k i , l i k e Y o k o suka, i s one of t h e p r o m i n e n t c e n t r e s of the s h i p b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y i n t o d a y ' s Japan. W i t h r e g a r d t o the c r e a t i o n o f a modern navy, E t o Jun s a y s i n h i s Umi wa Yomigaeru (The Ocean R e s u r g e n t ) : A modern navy must be a modern i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h know-how r e l a t e d t o s h i p b u i l d i n g and e n g i n e e r i n g t e c h n o l o g i e s as 115 i t s core. Therefore, the creation of a modern navy implies that a society chooses to adopt a modern i n d u s t r i a l organization into i t s system; i n addition, i t also s i g n i f i e s that the society i s i n v o l v i n g i t s e l f inan experiment, whether or not i t can bear the burden of i t s choice.31 Eto means that the creation of a modern navy i s possible only when a society has advanced i n d u s t r i a l organizations with s u f f i c i e n t c a p i t a l to support such a complicated and large-scale venture. He also suggests that the society must be a c e n t r a l i z e d one with s o c i a l mobility among classes. The Tokugawa society met none of these conditions, but the Bakufu determinedly launched a plan to b u i l d a modern navy and eagerly continued i t s expansion u n t i l the very end of i t s regime i n 1867. This was the Bakufu's response to the upsurge of debate over the defense needs of the country as a r e s u l t of c l o s e r Western contacts a f t e r the opening of the country i n 1853. The t r a d i t i o n a l Bakufu-han system was badly shaken by foreign intervention and trade. While i n almost a l l m i l i t a r y f i e l d s the Bakufu t r a i l e d the southwestern provinces, i t took the leadership i n naval development with a new t r a i n i n g system and advanced equip- ment. Unlike reforms df land forces, which could incur tremendous resistance from Bakufu t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s , the b u i l d i n g of a modern navy was generally • • • • regarded as a new scheme which would disturb nobody except for the no longer s i g n i f i c a n t Funate water force. Although i t was f i n a n c i a l l y a i l i n g , the Bakufu, with one t h i r d of the e n t i r e land holdings of Japan under i t s authority, could afford the enormous expenses for warships and various naval f a c i l i t i e s , at l e a st at the early stages of the plan. For the construction of the Yokosuka shipyard, however, the Bakufu had to obtain f i n a n c i a l assistance from French sources. The f i n a n c i a l requirements for a large shipyard l i k e that of Yokosuka exceeded the f i n a n c i a l resources of the Bakufu. Tokugawa society could not 'bear the burden of i t s choice.' Although Tokugawa society could not sustain a modern navy, the Bakufu s u c c e s s f u l l y introduced i t to Japan. A part of the 116 'modern i n d u s t r i a l organization' could be purchased from Western countries but could not be f r u i t f u l l y adopted into Tokugawa society." "A t r u l y modern navy system would be achieved i n the M e i j i period when economic and p o l i t i c a l modernization were being attained under the guidance of the ce n t r a l i z e d govern- ment. Yet the legacy of the Bakufu navy was i n h e r i t e d almost i n i t s e n t i r e t y by the M e i j i government. The standard of naval t r a i n i n g , warships, and naval f a c i l i t i e s brought to Japan by the Bakufu was high enough that i t could be duly taken over with great benefit by the new government. The s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l impact of the Nagasaki Naval Training School i n the la t e Tokugawa period was also important. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y obvious when we consider that the School was open to samurai from a l l over the country and provided them with opportunities to become r e a l professionals i n a modern sense. In the Tokugawa system, where almost a l l the important positions were held by people of high rank by b i r t h , modern education was e s p e c i a l l y necessary for those born in*low-ranking fa m i l i e s to enable them to seek some avenue to success. There was a tendency i n the 1850's under Abe Masahiro for talented people to be picked up for important Bakufu p o s i t i o n s . It was so i n some l o c a l han as we l l . But i t could not become permanent because the f u l l - s c a l e adoption of t h i s system meant the destruction of the t r a d i t i o n a l class system i n Tokugawa Japan. In a modern navy, neither s e n i o r i t y nor family status serve o f f i c e r s w e l l unless they possess a true a b i l i t y to carry out various com- p l i c a t e d duties on ships. Katsu Rintaro and Enomoto Kamajiro were two of those who benefited from the so - c a l l e d "merit system (jitsuryoku-shugi)" i n those days. Both of them were sons of very poor hatamoto families with r i c e stipends of less than 100 koku, yet Katsu attained a p o s i t i o n equivalent to prime minister and Enomoto held the p o s i t i o n of vice-admiral of the Bakufu f l e e t i n the days when the r i g i d Tokugawa system was about to collapse. Although the merit 117 system could not be u n i v e r s a l l y implemented i n the Bakufu, the Nagasaki Naval Training School made some people r e a l i z e that i t s day must come soon to Japan. Furthermore, the School provided students from d i f f e r e n t parts of the country with opportunities to get to know each other. A l l through the Tokugawa period, a l l samurai, except for ronin (masterless samurai), belonged e i t h e r to the Bakufu or to a l o c a l domain, and t h e i r mobility was extremely l i m i t e d . In other words, the samurai had v i r t u a l l y no place to communicate f r e e l y with each other outside t h e i r own domains. This fa c t had long prevented the Japanese from acquiring the concept of a united country. Naturally, most of the students at the School merely considered themselves as Bakufu or l o c a l han samurai at f i r s t . However, the School gradually must have brought a sense of nation a l unity to a l l the students regardless of t h e i r o r i g i n . Admitting the importance of having a single emblem to symbolize the entire country, the Bakufu had adopted the r i s i n g sun f l a g (Hinomaru) as Japan's 32 n a t i o n a l f l a g i n 1854. When the School started, however, every Bakufu and l o c a l han ship s t i l l flew i t s own banner, j u s t as every si n g l e Western ship coming to Nagasaki showed the n a t i o n a l emblem of i t s country. As long as the students were preoccupied with t h e i r o r i g i n s e i t h e r i n the Bakufu or l o c a l han, i t was hardly possible f or them to r e a l i z e the meaning of nation a l unity. Yet, as r i s i n g sun flags began to be flown on t h e i r t r a i n i n g ships, they were gradually obliged to admit the existence of a Japan above the Bakufu and l o c a l han. A man l i k e Katsu developed from being a Bakufu man to a man of Japan through h i s experience at the Nagasaki Naval Training School. As one of the captain candidates of a Bakufu f l e e t , he held an important p o s i t i o n at the School and often worked as a l i a i s o n man between the students and the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s . Through these experiences he strengthened h i s sense of being Japanese rather than a man of the Bakufu. He was trusted by a l l the students 118 of the School, and the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s also considered him as the represent- 33 ative of the students. The role performed by Katsu i n mediating between the Bakufu and anti-Bakufu forces during the l a s t days of the Tokugawa i s imbedded i n the minds of Japanese people. A c t u a l l y , Katsu was then one of the very few people who could work with the two forces. He knew many i n f l u e n t i a l people i n the southwestern provinces through naval t r a i n i n g . Before Nagasaki, Katsu was merely one of the low-ranking Bakufu o f f i c i a l s who excelled i n Western a f f a i r s . P o l i t i c a l l y speaking, h i s influence was n i l i n the Bakufu. But he slowly but st e a d i l y accumulated p o l i t i c a l power f i r s t i n the f i e l d of naval a f f a i r s and then i n nationa l a f f a i r s . V i s i t s to Kagoshima, c a p i t a l of Satsuma han, on the Japan (Kanrin Maru) greatly changed h i s outlook. As a leader of the Bakufu f l e e t , Katsu was able to get acquainted with Shimazu Nariakira, one of the most i n f l u e n t i a l lords i n those days. Katsu must have learned various important aspects of p o l i t i c a l ' a f f a i r s , both domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l , from the b r i l l i a n t Shimazu. Aft e r study and service at the naval t r a i n i n g schools, Katsu entered the world of p o l i t i c s . He f u l l y u t i l i z e d h i s power base i n the navy and h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p with people i n domains i n the southwestern provinces. 'We can see i n Katsu's experience the elements of a surge towards modern Japan i n the l a s t days of the Tokugawa period. A f t e r a l l , the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Nagasasaki Naval Training School l i e s i n the fact that the School educated some modern men for new Japan. Because of the nature of the School, i t s influence would survive even a f t e r the sponsor, the Bakufu i t s e l f , died out and was succeeded by the M e i j i government. It was a school i n a modern sense, so we can recognize that i t did what i t should have done for the future of a r a p i d l y changing country. 119 FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 1 1. "Shogunate: the t e r m used t o d e s c r i b e the de f a c t o c e n t r a l government of Japan under a Shogun. The Shogun's o f f i c i a l s ( c o l l e c t i v e l y the B a k u f u ) c a r r i e d out the a c t u a l d u t i e s o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the I m p e r i a l C o u r t r e t a i n e d o n l y a n o m i n a l a u t h o r i t y . " W.G. B e a s l e y , S e l e c t Documents on Japanese F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1853-1868,. O x f o r d U n i v . P r e s s , 1955, p. 321. 2. Iwao S e i i c h i , Sakoku ( N a t i o n a l _ I s o l a t i o n ) , N i h o n no R e k i s h i (A H i s t o r y o f Japan) s e r i e s , v o l . 14, Chuo K o r o n - s h a , 1966, pp. 195-208. 3. Sugimoto I s a o ( e d . ) , K a g a k u - s h i ( H i s t o r y o f S c i e n c e ) , T a i k e i N i h o n - s h i Sosho (An O u t l i n e H i s t o r y o f Japan) s e r i e s , v o l . 19, Yamakawa Shuppan-sha, 1967, p. 132. 4. The l o r d was Date Masamune and the r e t a i n e r was H a s e k u r a Tsunenaga. 5. Iwao, o p . c i t . , pp. 187-188. 6. I b i d . , pp. 208-209. 7. I t was Genna K o k a i - k i ( N a v i g a t i o n Manual o f Genna) c o m p i l e d by I k e d a Koun, a n a v i g a t o r o f N a g a s a k i . Sugimoto ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 132-133. 8. Kasama Y o s h i h i k o , Edo B a k u f u Yakushoku S h u s e i (A C o m p i l a t i o n o f O f f i c i a l P o s t s i n t h e Tokugawa B a k u f u ) , Yuzankaku, 1974, pp. 339-341. 9. K a i g u n Y u s h u - k a i ( e d . ) , K i n s e i T e i k o k u K a i g u n S h i y o (A H i s t o r y o f the I m p e r i a l Navy i n Modern T i m e s ) , K a i g u n Y u s h u - k a i , 1938,pp. 7-8. 10. G.B. Sansom, The Western W o r l d and J a p a n , New Y o r k , 1950, p. 177. 11. Nakamura T a d a s h i , "Shimabara no Ran t o Sakoku_(The Shimabara R e b e l l i o n and N a t i o n a l I s o l a t i o n P o l i c y ) , " i n Iwanami Koza Nihon R e k i s h i (Iwanami H i s t o r y o f J a p a n ) s e r i e s , v o l . 9, Iwanami S h o t e n , 1975, pp. 228-262. 12. The Koreans d i d n o t s t a y i n Japan but i n f o r m a l l y c o n t i n u e d t r a d e w i t h the l o r d o f Tsushima han, So, r e g u l a r l y . See, Asao N a o h i r o , Sakoku ( N a t i o n a l I s o l a t i o n ) , N i h o n no R e k i s h i (The G r e a t H i s t o r y o f Japan) s e r i e s , v o l . 17, Shogakkan, 1975, pp. 242-257. 13. Shimonaka Yasaburo ( e d . ) , S e k a i R e k i s h i J i t e n ( E n c y c l o p e d i a of World H i s - t o r y ) , H e i b o n - s h a , 1955, v o l . 22, p. 321. 14. K a i g u n Y u s h u - k a i ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , p. 8. 15. Kawai H i k o m i t s u , N i h o n - j i n H y o r y u - k i (Records of Japanese C a s t a w a y s ) , S e k a i S h i s o - s h a , 1967, p. 264. 16. I b i d . , pp. 289-293. F o r the s t r u c t u r a l problems o f t r a d i t i o n a l Japanese s h i p s , see pp. 293-294. 17. Kasama, o p . c i t . , pp. 272-275. There were two N a g a s a k i M a g i s t r a t e s ; one 120 at Nagasaki and the other at Edo (now Tokyo). They served at the two places i n one-year a l t e r n a t i n g s h i f t s . 18. Ibid ., pp. 278-279, 281. 19. I s h i i K enji, "Suetsugu Heizo no Kara-bune (The Chinese-style Ship of Suetsugu Heizo)," i n Nihon Rekishi Gakkai (ed.), Nihon Rekishi (Japanese Hi s t o r y ) , Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, No. 180, 1963, pp. 30-33, and "Sakoku J i d a i no Koyo-sen Kenzo (The Construction of_Ocean-going Ships during the Period of National I s o l a t i o n ) , " i n Miyamoto J o i c h i (ed.), Nihon no Kaiyo-min (Oceanic People of Japan), Mirai-sha, 19 74, pp. 194-197. 20. Ogasawara Chosei, Nihon Teikoku Kaijo Kenryoku-shi Kogi (Lectures on the Naval Power of the Japanese Empire), quoted i n Dito Toshio, Bakumatsu Heisei Kaikaku-shi (A History of M i l i t a r y Reforms i n the Late Tokugawa Period), Hakuyo-sha, 1939, pp. 51-53. 21. L o c . c i t . 22. With regard to the a l l o c a t i o n of defense duties_during the Tokugawa period, see Kitajima Masamoto, Edo Bakufu no Kenryoku Kozo (The Power Structure of the Tokugawa Bakufu), Iwanami Shoten, 1964, and Fujino Tamotsu, Baku- han T a i s e i - s h i no Kenkyu (A Study of the History of the Bakufu-Han System), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1961. 23. Sugimoto (ed.), o p . c i t . , p. 296, and George Alexander Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan, Princeton Univ. Press, 1959, pp. 50-60. 24. Sugimoto (ed.), o p . c i t . , p. 29 7. 25. L o c . c i t . , and Donald Keene, The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830, Stanford Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 31-35. 26. Keene, i b i d . , p. 34. 27. Oishi Shinzaburo, Bakuhan-sei no Tenkan (Changes i n the Bakufu-Han System), Nihon no Rekishi (The Great History of Japan) s e r i e s , v o l . 20, p. 355. Almost a l l through the Tokugawa period, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l balance of pay- ments was unfavourable to Japan. Only during Tanuma's days did i t change i n favour of Japan. The main commodities of trade were the so - c a l l e d tawara-mono (straw-bag products), namely dried seafood from Nambu (now Iwate-ken), Tsugaru (Aomori) and Matsumae i n straw-bags. Ibid. 28. Keene, o p . c i t . , p. 37. 29. Such scholars as Otsuki Gentaku and Katsuragawa Hoshu helped Kudo Heisuke. Sugimoto (ed.), o p . c i t . , p. 298. 30. Keene, o p . c i t . , p. 38, and Kudo Heisuke, Akaezo Fusetsu-ko (A_Study of Red Ainu [Russians] Reports) i n Otomo_Kisaku (ed.), Hokumon Sosho (Books about the North) s e r i e s , v o l . 1, Hokko Shobo, 1943, p. 217. 31. According to Oishi Shinzaburo, the book was written at the request of one of Tanuma's men. See o p . c i t . , p. 358. 121 32. The report was c a l l e d Ezo Shui(Ezo Mi s c e l l a n y ) . See i b i d . , p. 359. 33. Sugimoto (ed.), o p . c i t . , pp. 298-300. 34. Keene, o p . c i t . , p. 39. 35. Yamamoto Yutaka (ed.), Hayashi Shihei Zenshu (Complete Works of Hayashi Shihei), Seikatsu-sha, 1943, v o l . 1, pp. 397-408. 36. Keene, op . c i t . , pp. 39-40. 37. Ibid., p. 43. 38. Ibid., p. 42. However, the t r a n s l a t i o n a f t e r "My suggestion.." i s by the w r i t e r , from Hayashi Shihei Zenshu, v o l . 1, p. 126. 39. Ibid., pp. 126-127. 40. Matsudaira Sadanobu, Bashin-roku (Records of Advice), quoted i n Inoue Kiyoshi, Nihon no Gunkoku-shugi (Japanese M i l i t a r i s m ) , revised e d i t i o n , Gendai Hyordn-sha, .1975, v o l . 1, p. 20. 41. Keene, o p . c i t . , pp. 53-54. 42. Inoue, o p . c i t . , p. 20. 43. For instance, Oranda Chikujo-sho (Treatise on the Dutch Art of F o r t i f i - cation) was translated by Maeno Ryotaku i n 1790, and Ensei Gunki-ko (On Weapons of the Far West) was translated and edited by I s h i i Shosuke i n 1799. These tr a n s l a t i o n s were two of the e a r l i e s t examples i n this f i e l d . See i b i d . , p. 21. 44. Otomo Kisaku, Hokumon Sosho, v o l . 3, p. 15. 45. Ohara Sakingo, Hokuchi Kigen (Warning about the North Land) i n i b i d . , pp. 407-408. 46. Otomo, op . c i t . , pp. 41-44. 47. W.G. Beasley, Great B r i t a i n and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858, London, 1951, p. 8. 48. The college was started as a private school for the study of Confucian theories by Hayashi Razan who directed the educational and c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s of the early Tokugawa Bakufu. In 1790, when Matsudaira Sadanobu was the chief r o j u , i t was re-established as a Bakufu college. It was p a r t l y open to non-Bakufu samurai, too. Besides, s p e c i a l courses were available not only for samurai but also for commoners. Main subjects taught at the college were Chinese c l a s s i c s . Nihon Rekishi D a i - j i t e n (Encyclopedia of Japanese H i s t o r y ) , Kawade Shobo, 1968, v o l . 5, p. 590. 49. Inoue, op . c i t . , p. 22. 50. For the story of Captain Gblownin, see h i s Narrative of My C a p t i v i t y i n 122 Japan, London, 1818 and Recollections of Japan, London, 1819. With regard to the Japanese castaways returned from_Russia at t h i s time, see Kamei Taka- yoshi, Dajkokuya,. Kodayu, Yoshikawa Kobun-kan., 1964. 51. Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai Nihon Gaikoku Kankei-shi (A History of Japanese Foreign Relations i n the Tokugawa Period), revised and enlarged e d i t i o n , Toko Shoin, 1943, pp. 281-284. 52. Ibid., pp. 377-392, and Inoue, o p . c i t . , p. 22. 53. Inoue, i b i d . , p. 23. 54. L o c . c i t . 55. For one of_the best pieces of research about the Bansha no Goku, see Sato Shosuke, Yogaku-shi Kenkyu Josetsu (Introduction to Research i n the History of Western Studies), Iwanami Shoten, 1964. 56. Tokugawa Koshaku-ke (ed.), Mito Han Shiryo ( H i s t o r i c a l Documents of Mito Han), Tokugawa-ke, 1915, v o l . 4, pp. 393-396, v o l . 5, p. 228. 57. Ibid ., v o l . 5, pp. 225-226. 58. Ibid., v o l . 5, pp. 227-228. 59. Ibid ., v o l . 5, pp. 231-232. The model ship was c a l l e d the Hit a c h i Maru. 60. Ibid., v o l . 4, pp. 172-182. 61. Ibid., v o l . 4, pp. 182-183. Concerning correspondence between Tokugawa Nariaki and the Bakufu, see Conrad Totman, " P o l i t i c a l R e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n the Tokugawa Bakufu: Abe Masahiro and Tokugawa Nariaki, 1844-1852," i n Albert M. Craig e_t a l . (eds.), P e r s o n a l i t i e s i n Japanese History, Univ. of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1970. 62. Inoue, o p . c i t . , p. 27. 63. Ohira Kimata, Sakuma Shozan (Sakuma Shozan), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1959, pp. 62-68, and Miyamoto Chu, Sakuma Shozan, Iwanami Shoten, 19 32, pp. 96- 101. For an English t r a n s l a t i o n of the Eight Measures, see Sansom, The Western World and Japan, pp. 25 3-254. 64. Inoue, o p . c i t . , p. 31. CHAPTER 2 1. Katsu Kaishu, Kaigun Rekishi, Works of Katsu Kaishu), Keiso i s hereafter c i t e d as KKZ. 2. T.S. R a f f l e s , History of Java, xxxii-xxxv. vol._12 of Katsu Kaishu Zenshu (Complete Shobo, 1971, p. 15. Katsu Kaishu Zenshu London, 1830, pp. xx-xxv, x x v i i i - x x i x , 123 3. Ibid., p. x x v i i . 4. Tabohashi, Kindai Nihon Gaikoku Karikei-shi, p. 261. 5. L o c . c i t . 6. Shoji Mitsuo, "Bakumatsu Nichi-Ran Gaiko no I c h i Kosatsu (A Consideration of the. Diplomatic History of the Relation Between Japan and Holland i n the Last Days of the Shogunate)," i n Nihon Gaiko-shi Kenkyu, Bakumatsu Ishin J i d a i (Studies on the Diplomatic History of J a p a n L a t e Tokugawa and Early M e i j i Periods), Yuhikaku, 1960, pp. 59-60. 7. Sansom, The Western World and Japan, p. 246. 8. See page 14 of th i s t h e s i s . 9. Tabohashi, op. c i t . , p. 379. 10. Ibid., pp. 319-320. 11. Suzuki Seisetsu (ed.), Kazan Zenshu (Complete Works of Watanabe Kazan), Kazan-kai, 1940, pp. 8-9. 12. Sato,. Yogaku-shi Kenkyu Josetsu, pp. 303, 319-320. With regard to the fusetsu-gaki i n general, see Itagaki Takeo, "Oranda Fusetsu-gaki no Kenkyu (A Study of the Dutch News Reports)," i n Nichi-Ran Bunka Kosho-shi no Kenkyu (Studies on C u l t u r a l Exchanges between Japan and the Netherlands), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1959, pp. 178-200. 13. Tabohashi, op . c i t . , p. 388. 14. The Superintendent at t h i s time was Edward Grandison. 15. Shoji, o p . c i t . , p. 59. 16. Ibid ., pp. 59-60. 17. Ibid ., p. 60. 18. The en t i r e name of the book i s Nippon. Archiv zur Beschreinburg sudlichen Kurilen, Sachalin, Korea und den Liukiu-Inselen. An English t r a n s l a t i o n i s Manners and Customs of the Japanese i n the Nineteenth Century, Harper, New York, 1841. See Itazawa Takeo Shiboruto (Siebold), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1960, pp. 15 7-175 for the contents of the book i n Japanese. 19. Itazawa, i b i d . , pp. 181-182. 20. Shoji, o p . c i t . , p. 61. 21. During the Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch national emblem flew only at Naga- s a k i . A f t e r the wars, Hendrik Doeff, the Superintendent of the Dutch Nagasaki Post, was s p e c i a l l y decorated by King William I for h i s extra- ordinary service at Nagasaki during the hardship. Because of t h i s , the Dutch had a s p e c i a l f e e l i n g towards Japan and the Japanese. 124 22. Shoji, o p . c i t . , p. 61. 23. Tabohashi, o p . c i t . , pp. 275-281. 24. He was re-appointed to the p o s i t i o n on August 4, 1844 (Koka 1, 6/21). Perhaps the Bakufu needed Mizuno for the s p e c i a l occasion of the Dutch Royal l e t t e r a f f a i r . See Kitajima Masamoto, Mizuno Tadakuni (Mizuno Tadakuni), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1969, pp. 492-497. 25. Tabohashi, i b i d . , pp. 350-351. 26. D.C. Green, "Correspondence Between William II of Holland and the Shogun of Japan, A.D. 1844," i n Transactions of the A s i a t i c Society of Japan, f i r s t s e r i e s , V o l. XXXIV (1907), pp. 99-132. 27. For a b r i e f introduction to the Tempo Reforms, see Sansom, o p . c i t . , pp. 242-243. In Japanese, see Kitajima, o p . c i t . 28. Tokutomi I i c h i r o , Yoshida Shoin (Yoshida Shoin) , Minyu-sha, 1908, pp. 281-283, and Kudo Takeshige, Mizuno Chikuzen (Mizuno Tadakuni), 1897, pp. 128-130. 29. Green, o p . c i t . , pp. 128-130. 30. Tabohashi, o p . c i t . , pp. 334-342. In addition, an incident i n 1828 (Bunsei 11) that involved the Post and von Siebold made the impression of the Dutch among Bakufu o f f i c i a l s even worse. See Itazawa, Shiboruto, pp. 97-149. 31. Tokutomi I i c h i r o , K i n s e i Nihon Kokumin-shi (A National History of Modern Japan), J i j i Tsushin-sha, v o l . 29, p. 74. 32. Nakano Reishiro (ed.), Nabeshima Naomasa Ko Den (The Biography of Lord Nabeshima Naomasa), Koshaku Nabeshima-ke Hensan-jo, 1920, v o l . 3, p. 173. 33. "Those feudal lords of daimyo status whose ancestors had not submitted to Tokugawa r u l e u n t i l a f t e r Ieyasu's v i c t o r y at Sekigahara [in 1600]. They were always regarded by the Tokugawa as possible r i v a l s and were permanently excluded from a l l Bakufu o f f i c e s . Sometimes ref e r r e d to i n English as the 'outside feudatories'." Beasley, Select Documents on Japanese Foreign P o l i c y , p. 329. 34. Saga-ken-shi Hensan-kai (ed.), Saga-ken-shi (A History of Saga-ken), Saga- ken, 1972, v o l . 3, pp. 328-337, 338-344. 35. Nakano (ed.), o p . c i t . , pp. 174-178. 36. See page 11 of t h i s t h e s i s . 37. Hideshima Naritada (ed.), Saga Han Kaigun-shi (The History of the Saga Han Navy), Chishin-kai, 1917, pp. 27-28. 38. Sato, o p . c i t . , p. 312. U n t i l recently, Haneda, as Japan's main i n t e r - national a i r p o r t , was the main port of entry f or foreigners i n the l a s t few decades. 39. Ibid ., pp. 332-333. 125 40. Tabohashi, o p . c i t . , pp. 325-328, and Tanji. Kerizo, "Koka-ki n i Okeru Edo- wan Bobi Mondai to.Ikoku-sen T o r i a t s u k a i - r e i (The Problem of the Defense of Edo Bay and Bakufu Regulations Concerning Foreign Ships i n the Koka Period)," i n Shigaku Ronshu, Taigai Kankei to S e i j i Bunka, #3, S e i j i Bunka (Papers on History Studies: International Relations and Domestic P o l i t i c s and Culture, #3, P o l i t i c s and Culture), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1974, p. 225. 41. Tabohashi, o p . c i t . , pp. 327-328, and T a n j i , o p . c i t . , pp. 224-227. 42. Tabohashi, op. c i t . , pp. 409-416. 43. T a n j i , o p . c i t . , pp. 228-229. 44. For example, while the Columbus alone, had 83 cannons (loading 37.5 kilo-^ grams or heavier s h e l l s ) , a l l of the Japanese cannons around Edo Bay t o t a l l e d only 70 (loading 0.375 kilograms or heavier s h e l l s ) and nearly a l l of them were old-fashioned. I b i d . , pp. 229-230. 45. Ibid., pp. 230-232. 46. Ibid., pp. 234-239. 47. Watanabe Shujiro, Abe Masahiro J i s e k i (A Biography of Abe Masahiro), private e d i t i o n , 1910, v o l . 2, pp. 649-652. 48. See pages 65-67, 69-70 of t h i s t h e s i s . 49. Sato, o p . c i t . , pp. 353-354. 50. .Ibid., p. 354. CHAPTER 3 1. Tabohashi, Kindai Nihon Gaikoku Kankei-shi, pp. 450--45 3. 2. L o c . c i t . 3. Ibid., pp. 450-451. 4. Ibid., p. 451. 5. Shoji, "Bakumatsu Nichi-Ran Gaiko no I c h i Kosatsu," p. 61. 6. Tabohashi, o p . c i t . , p. 451. 7. L o c . c i t . 8. Ibid., pp. 451-452. 9. Ibid., p. 453; 10. Ibid., pp. 453-454. 126 11. I b i d . , p. 454. 12. L o c . c i t . 13. S h o j i , o p . c i t . , pp. 61-62. 14. I b i d . , pp. 62-63. 15. T a b o h a s h i , o p . c i t . , p. 469. 16. I b i d . , pp. 542-544, S h o j i , o p . c i t . , p. 63, and I t a z a w a , S h i b o r u t o , pp. 213-214. 17. Watanabe S h u j i r o , Abe M a s a h i r o J i s e k i , v o l . 1, p. 368. 18. M i z u t a N o b u t o s h i , Bakumatsu n i Okeru Waga K a i g u n t o Oranda (Japan's Navy and H o l l a n d i n the L a t e Tokugawa P e r i o d ) , K a i g u n Y u s h u - k a i , 1929, pp. 8-9. 19. I b i d . , pp. 9-15. 20. I b i d . , pp. 41-47. 21. I b i d . , p. 48. 22. The date h e r e i s ba s e d on K a t s u ' s K a i g u n R e k i s h i and K a t a g i r i Kazuo, Sakoku J i d a i T a i g a i O s e t s u K a n k e i S h i r y o ( H i s t o r i c a l Documents C o n c e r n i n g _ the R e c e p t i o n of F o r e i g n e r s D u r i n g the Y e a r s o f N a t i o n a l I s o l a t i o n ) , Kondo Shuppan-sha, 19 72, p. 205, a l t h o u g h M i z u t a N o b u t o s h i m e r e l y says i t was the 2 1 s t day of t h e 7th month. 23. K a t s u , KKZ, v o l . 12, p. 71, and M i z u t a , o p . c i t . , p. 62. 24. M i z u t a , i b i d . , pp. 64-65. 25. I b i d . , pp. 66-67. 26. I b i d . , p. 67. 27. Tokutomi, K i n s e i N i h o n K o k u m i n - s h i , v o l . 33, pp. 319-320. T h i s and the f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n i s t a k e n from documents q u o t e d i n Tokutomi's work. 28. I b i d . , pp. 320-333. 29. K a t s u , KKZ, v o l . 12, p. 69. 30. T o k u t o m i , o p . c i t . , p. 80. 31. I b i d . , pp. 332-333. 32. I b i d . , p. 334. 33. I b i d . , pp. 340-341. 34. I b i d . , p. 349. 127 35. Ibid., pp. 350-351. 36. Ibid., pp. 353-354. 37. Ibid., pp. 359-361. 38. Ibid., pp. 360-361. 39. Ibid., pp. 365-368. 40. Ibid., pp. 371-372. 41. Tokugawa Koshaku-ke 42. Ibid., P- 460. 43. Ibid., P- 468. 44. Ibid., pp. 469-471. 45. Mizuta , op i . c i t . , p. 46. Ibid., P- 95. 47. Tokutomi, op . c i t . , 48. Shoji, op. c i t . , p. 49. Ibid., PP. 64-65. 50. Fumikura H e i j i r o , B i n the Late Tokugawa Period), Meicho Kanko-kai, 1969, p. 753. The Soembing l a t e r became the Kanko Maru. See footnote 72 of Chapter 4. 51. Shoji, o p . c i t . , p. 65. 52. L o c . c i t . 53. Tokutomi, o p . c i t . , v o l . 33, p. 421. CHAPTER 4 1. Mizuta, Bakumatsu n i Okeru Waga Kaigun to Oranda, pp. 102-106. 2. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 84-87, 94-112. 3. Ibid., p. 86. 4. Ibid., pp. 88-91. 5. Mizuta, o p . c i t . , pp. 109-110. The sentence "The mission of the detachment i s to i n s t r u c t the Japanese i n the operation of the steamer Soembing"'• i n th i s quotation, i s not consistent with Fabius' recommendations. Fabius planned to i n s t r u c t the Japanese i n a l l aspects of modern naval t r a i n i n g , 128 but the above-mentioned sentence suggests that the Dutch i n s t r u c t o r s were to teach only the operation of the Soembing. Most probably, t h i s attenuation occurred when the o r i g i n a l Dutch sentence was translated into the Japanese on which the writer's English sentence r e l i e d . 6. Ibid. , p. 110. 7. Ibid., pp. 111-112, and Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 117-119. 8. Suzuki Naoji, Edo J i d a i n i Okeru Kome T o r i h i k i no Kenkyu (A Study of the Rice Market i n the Tokugawa Period), revised and enlarged e d i t i o n , Kashiwa Shobo, 1965, p. 174. 9. Kasama, Edo Bakufu Yakushoku Shusei, p. 44. 10. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, p. 89. 11. Some people i n the Bakufu i n s i s t e d on having a naval t r a i n i n g school near Edo. They thought the Bakufu could control the school e a s i l y i f i t was located at a place l i k e Uraga. But most of the Bakufu executives at that time were not fond of the idea of a school which employed Westerners near Edo. Further, a man l i k e Arao Narimasa strongly i n s i s t e d that the school be at Nagasaki. He feared d i r e c t interference from top Bakufu executives i n naval t r a i n i n g i n case the school was set up near Edo. _. _ Tsuchiya Shigeaki, Kindai Nihon Zosen Kotohajime, Hida Hamagoro no Shogai (Hie B i r t h of Shipbuilding i n Modern Japan, the L i f e of Hida Hamagoro), Shin Jinbutsu Orai-sha, 19 75, p. 83. 12. For the l i f e of Katsu Kaishu, the writer mainly referred to I s h i i Takashi, Katsu Kaishu (Katsu Kaishu),Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1974. 13. General opinions by various lords are found i n Beasley, Select Documents on Japanese Foreign P o l i c y 1853-1868,pp. 112-119, and Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century, second e d i t i o n , New York, 1970, pp. 34-38. A suggestion made by an Edo merchant i s introduced by Konishi Shiro, Kaikoku to J o i (The Opening of the Country and Exclusionism), Nihon no Rekishi (A History of Japan) s e r i e s , v o l . 19, Chuo Koron-sha, 1966, pp. 48-49. 14. I s h i i , o p . c i t . , pp. 5-6. For the f u l l text of the memorial, see KKZ, v o l . 14, pp. 413-420. 15. For the h i s t o r y of the ship, see Fumikura, Bakumatsu Gunkan Kanrin Maru, p. 786. 16. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 36-53. 17. Ibid., pp. 115, 127-128, 134-138. 18. Ibid., pp. 122-126. 19. See pages 16-17 of t h i s t h e s i s . 20. Westerners, e s p e c i a l l y Russians frequently v i s i t e d Ezo, but Matsumae han had neither strong han leadership nor the r e l i a b l e economic basis f o r d r a s t i c m i l i t a r y reforms. 129 21. While some interested people depended on the t r a n s l a t i o n of Dutch books, most people inc l u d i n g Bakufu bureaucrats were said to have obtained current information through Chinese books. One of the most important Chinese books of t h i s kind i n those days was Haiguo Tuzhi (or Hai-kuo T'u-chih) compiled by Wei Yuan i n 1847. For more d e t a i l s , see Ayuzawa Shintaro and Okubo Toshiaki, Sakoku J i d a i Nihon-jin no Kaigai C h i s h i k i (Japanese Knowledge of Foreign Countries during the Years of National I s o l a t i o n ) , Kangen-sha, 1953, pp. 130-153. 22. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 122-126. 23. Miyagi Eisho, Okinawa no Rekishi (A History of Okinawa), Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai, 1968, pp. 86-98. 24. Koshaku Shimazu-ke Hensan-jo - (ed.), Sappan Kaigun-shi (The History of the Satsuma Han Navy), Shimazu Koshaku-ke, 1929, pp. 603-621. See page 609 for the main engineers of the steamer. 25. Ibid ., pp. 679-681. 26. Ibid ., pp. 749-753. 27. Nakahama To i c h i r o , Nakahama Manjiro Den (A Biography of Nakahama Manjiro), Fuzanbo, 1936, pp. 151-155. 28. See pages 30-31 of t h i s t h e s i s . 29. Kurihara Ryuichi, Bakumatsu Nihon no Gunsei ( M i l i t a r y Systems of Late Tokugawa Japan), Shin Jinbutsu Orai-sha, 1972, pp. 114-115. 30. Tokugawa Koshaku-ke (ed.), Mito Han Shiryo, v o l . 1, p. 54. 31. Ibid. , pp.. 125, 464-466. However, by the time they arr i v e d at Nagasaki, the Dutch ship had already l e f t . Therefore, the only thing they could do was to c o l l e c t information about the ship and i t s operation at the Dutch Nagasaki Post. 32. Ibid., pp. 125-126, 459, 471-472. 33. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 122-126. 34. Tokugawa Koshaku-ke (ed.), o p . c i t . , pp. 126-127. 35. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 114-115, and Tokutomi, K i n s e i Nihon Kokumin-shi, v o l . 33, pp. 424-428. 36. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, p. 117. 37. Loc.cit". , and : Tokutomi, op.•cit., v o l . 33, p. 431. 38. Katsu, op. c i t . 39. Ibid ., pp. 128-129. 40. Hideshima Naritada (ed.), Saga Han Kaigun-shi, pp. 98-99. 130 41. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, p. 117. 42. Ibid., pp. 117-122. 43. The author of the 1929 book was a.career diplomat who served i n the Netherlands and other European countries. The book i s said to have been written based on various Dutch documents, but no source i s indicated i n i t . 44. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 14, p. 347. 45. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 119-120. 46. I b i d . , pp. 134-138. 47. Mizuta, o p . c i t . , pp. 124-125. 48. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, p. 126. 49. Tokutomi, o p . c i t . , v o l . 33, pp. 424-425. 50. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 14, p. 347. 51. Mizuta, o p . c i t . , p. 117. 52. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, p. 126. 53. Numata J i r o , Bakumatsu Yogaku-shi (A History of western Studies i n the Late Tokugawa Period), Toko Shoin, 1952, p. 95. 54. L o c . c i t . 55. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 138-139. 56. Ibid., pp. 139-140. 57. See page 82 of t h i s t h e s i s . 58. Mizuta Nobutoshi ( t r . ) , Nagasaki Kaigun Denshu--jo no H i b i ('Days at the Nagasaki Naval Training School), Heibon-sha, 1964, p. 11. This i s a Japanese t r a n s l a t i o n of Huyssen van Kattendyke, U i t t r e k s e l u i t het dagboek van W.J.C. Ridder H.v. Kattendyke gedurende z i j n v e r b l i j f i n Japan i n 1857, 1858 en 1859, The Hague, 1860. 59. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 127-128. 60. For the l i f e of Enomoto Takeaki, see Iguro Yataro, Enomoto Takeaki, Shin Jinbutsu Orai-sha, 1975. 61. For the l i f e of Hida Hamagoro, see Tsuchiya, op. c i t . 62. Ibid., pp. 82-83. 63. Numata, o p . c i t . , p. 90. 64. L o c . c i t . 131 65. Ibid., p. 93. Some i n t e r e s t i n g experiences of Bakufugastronomer Ono Tomo- goro i n Lectures are introduced i n Numajiri Geri'ichiro (ed.), Mito no Yogaku (Western Studies i n Mito), Kashiwa Shobo, 1977, pp. 260-262. 66. Numata, o p . c i t . , p. 92. 67. Ibid., p. 94. , 68. The information about the Bakufu cutter i s obtained from Saga Han Kaigun-shi, Kaigun Rekishi, Sappan Kaigun-shi, and Bakumatsu n i Okeru Waga Kaigun to Oranda, as none of them s a t i s f a c t o r i l y explains the cutter b u i l d i n g i n i t s e n t i r e t y . 69. Fumikura, o p . c i t . , p. 790. 70. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 140-411. 71. See. the following. . 7 - . 72. The Soembing was renamed the Kanko Maru i n May, 1856. The name "Kanko" comes from the I-ching, a Chinese c l a s s i c . Fumikura, o p . c i t . , p. 31. 73. Katsu, Rikugun Rekishi (The History of the- Army) i n KKZ, v o l . 16, pp. 445-454. 74. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 152-153. 75. Ibid., pp. 153-162. 76. Ibid., p. 153. 77. Fumikura, o p . c i t . , pp. 44, 48-51. 78. K a t a g i r i , Sakoku J i d a i Taigai Osetsu Shiryo, pp. 221-223. 79. According to K a t a g i r i , the Catharine Theresia was 170 tons and the Jan Daniel, 338 tons. Ibid., pp. 221-222. 80. K a t a g i r i Kazuo, "Kanrin M a r u — J a p a n — n i kansuru Shin Shiryo(New Ma t e r i a l Concerning the Kanrin Maru—Japan)," i n Geppo (Monthly News), no. 2, of KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 1-10. 81. Mizuta ( t r . ) , op. c i t . , p. 7. 82. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 162-165. 83, Ibid. , pp. 172-222. 84. Ibid. , pp. 177-179. 85. Ibid., pp. 195-200. 86. Ibid., pp. 167-168. 87. The commanders of the Dutch detachments 132 o f f i c e r s . Pels Rijkerr rose to vice-admiral and served as a naval minister of the Dutch government. Van Kattendyke r e t i r e d from the Navy as a com- mander and went into p o l i t i c s . ; . He also served as a naval mini- ster and for a while held the p o r t f o l i o for Foreign A f f a i r s concurrently. Mizuta ( t r . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 230-231, 88. Takahashi Kunitaro, Gun j i ( M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s ) , Oyatoi Gaikoku-jin (Foreigners i n Government Services) s e r i e s , v o l . 9, Kashima Kenkyu-jo Shuppan-kai, 1968, p. 45. 89. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, p. 165. 90. Ibid., pp. 168-172. 91. Hideshima (ed.), Saga Han Kaigun-shi, pp. 145-146. 92. Nihon Rekishi D a i - j i t e n , v o l . 9,.pp. 266-267. 93. With regard to the dates of t h i s circumnavigation, I used the ones i n Sappan Kaigun-shi which I understand to be most r e l i a b l e . 94. Mizuta ( t r . ) , o p . c i t . , p. 90. 95. Fumikura, o p . c i t . , p. 68. 96. Details here are based on Mizuta ( t r . ) , o p . c i t . , and Sappan Kaigun-shi. 97. Mizuta ( t r . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 96-98. 98. T.C. Smith, P o l i t i c a l Change and I n d u s t r i a l Development i n Japan: Govern- ment Enterprise, 1868-1880, Stanford Univ. Press. 1955, p. 5. It i s mentioned i n this book that "twelve hundred workers were being employed, at the Shusei-kan i n 1858." 99. Mizuta ( t r . ) , o p . c i t . , p. 96. 100. Koshaku Shimazu-ke Hensan-jo (ed.), Sappan Kaigun-shi, pp. 617-619. According to the same book, the steam engine of the ship was preserved at the Kaigun Heigakko at T s u k i j i , Kaigun Kikan Gakko (Naval Academy of . Engineering) at Yokosuka, and then at Kaigun Heigakko at Etajima, Hiroshima, u n t i l 1891 or 1892 when i t was scrapped there. 101. Mizuta ( t r . ) , o p . c i t . , p. 97. 102. Ibid., pp. 99-100. 103. Ibid., pp. 92-93. 104. Nihon Rekishi D a i - j i t e n , v o l . 7, p. 93. 105. Mizuta ( t r . ) , o p . c i t . , p. 93. 106. Numata J i r o and Arase Susumu ( t r s . ) , Pompe Nihon T a i z a i Kenbun-ki (Pompe's Records i n Japan), Yusho-do Shoten, 1968, p. 258. This i s a Japanese \ 133 t r a n s l a t i o n of Jhr. Johannes L i j d i u s Catharinus Pompe van Meerdervoort, V i j f Jaren i n Japan (185 7-1863): B i j dragen. tot de kennis van het Japansche k e i z e r r i j k en z i j n e bevolking, 2 v o l s . , Leiden, '1867-1868. 107. Numata and Arase ( t r s . ) , o p . c i t . , p. 261. 108. Koshaku Shimazu-ke Hensan-jo (ed.), o p . c i t . , pp. 1019-1020. 109. Ibid., pp. 1021-1024. 110. Ibid., pp. 1024-1026. 111. Mizuta ( t r . ) , o p . c i t . , p. 109. 112. See page 66 of t h i s t h e s i s . 113. Ibid., p. 110. 114. Ibid., pp. 111-112. 115. Ibid., pp. 118-119. 116. Hideshima Naritada (ed.) Saga Han Kaigun-shi, p. 163, and Fumikura, o p . c i t . , p. 81. 117. K a t a g i r i , Geppo, p. 10. 118. Mizuta ( t r . ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 134-141. 119. Daimyo whose ancestors had supported Tokugawa Ieyasu before 1600. 120. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, p. 175. 121. Mizuta ( t r . ) , o p . c i t . , p. 162. 122. Fumikura, o p . c i t . , p. 82. CHAPTER 5 1. Fumikura, Bakumatsu Gunkan Kanrin Maru, p. 84. 2. L o c . c i t . The waka i n Japanese i s "Imasara n i Totsukuni b u r i o Narawame ya, Koko n i Tsutauru Mononofu no Mi c h i . " 3. Tabohashi, Kindai Nihon Gaikoku Kankei-shi, p. 524, and Okudaira Shoji, Hinawa-ju kara Kuro-fune made (From the Matchlock to therBlack Ships), Iwanami Shoten, 1970, pp. 114-117. 4. Inoue, Nihon no Gunkoku-shugi, p. 39. 5. L o c . c i t . 6 . Ibid., p. 89. 134 7. Ibid., p. 39. 8. Katsu, KKZ, v o l . 12, pp. 153-154. The only exception here was Nakahama Manjiro, the American-educated castaway. 9. The Banryu Maru was presented to the Bakufu i n 1858 by Queen V i c t o r i a . Its o r i g i n a l name was the Emperor. Fumikura, o p . c i t . , pp. 755-758. The Kanko Maru was then on loan to Saga han a f t e r 1860. 10. One s i l v e r (or Mexican) d o l l a r weighed approximately 7.2 monme. Hora Tomio, Bakumatsu Is h i n - k i no Gaiatsu to Teiko (Foreign Pressure and Japan's Re s i s t - ance i n the Late Tokugawa and Early M e i j i Periods), Azekura Shobo, 1977, p. 149. 11. There i s no document about the'financial aspects of the early Tokugawa Bakufu navy today. One of the few monographs i n th i s f i e l d i s Oyama Shikitaro, Bakumatsu Z a i s e i Kinyu Shiron ( H i s t o r i c a l Essays on the Late Bakufu Finance), Mineruba Shobo, 1969. 12. Fumikura, o p . c i t . , p. 82. 13. I s h i i Takashi, Nihon Kaikoku-shi, (A History of the Opening of Japan), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1972, pp. 356-361. 14. Beasley, Select Documents on Japanese Foreign P o l i c y 1853-1868, p. 188. 15. I s h i i , o p . c i t . , pp. 352-353. 16. L o c . c i t . 17. Although the United States government seems, to have intended to ask for help from the Dutch Nagasaki Post i n negotiation with the Japanese, Commodore Perry t o t a l l y ignored the Post. 18. Mizuta, Bakumatsu n i Okeru Waga Kaigun to Oranda, pp. 154-155. 19 . L o c . c i t . 20. Ibid., pp. 155-156. 21. Ikeda Kiyoshi, Nihon no Kaigun (Japan's Navy), Shisei-do, 1963, v o l . 1, pp. 19-20, and Kurihara Ryuichi, Bakumatsu Nihon no Gunsei, p. 131. 22. Mizuta, o p . c i t . , p. 156. 23. For the l i f e of Sakamoto Ryoma, see Marius Jansen, Sakamoto Ryoma and the M e i j i Restoration, Princeton Univ. Press, 1961. 24. For the l i f e of Nakamuda Kuranosuke, as well as Kawamura Sumiyoshi, see Tamura E i t a r o , M e i j i Kaigun Soshi-sha, Kawamura Sumiyoshi, Nakamuda Kuranosuke Den(Biographies of Kawamura Sumiyoshi and Nakamuda Kuranosuke, Founders of the M e i j i Navy), Nihon Gunji Tosho, 1944. 25. Mizuta ( t r . ) , Nagasaki Kaigun Denshu-jo no H i b i , p. 85. 135 26. Fumikura, o p . c i t . , pp. 766-777. 27. Numajiri (ed.), Mito no Yogaku, pp. 265-268. 28. About the medical school, see Ishibashi Choei, et a l . , Igaku (Medicine), i n Oyatoi Gaikoku-jin (Foreigners i n Government Service) s e r i e s , v o l . 9, Kashima Kenkyu-jo Shuppan-kai, 1969, pp. 54-63. 29. About the l i f e of Godai Tomoatsu, see Godai Ryusaku, Godai Tomoatsu Den (A Biography of Godai Tomoatsu), private e d i t i o n , 1933. 30. About the l i f e of Sano Tsunetami, see Honma Gakukan, Sano Tsunetami Den (A Biography of Sano Tsunetami), J i d a i - s h a , 1943. 31. Eto Jun, Umi wa Yomigaeru (The Ocean Resurgent), Bungei Shunju Shin-sha, 1973, v o l . 1, p. 236. 32. Watanabe Shujiro, Abe Masahiro J i s e k i , v o l . 1, p. 377. 33. Mizuta ( t r . ) , o p . c i t . , p. 84. 136 LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED English Books Alcock, S i r Rutherford, The C a p i t a l of the Tycoon: A Narrative of a Three Years' Residence i n Japan, 2 v o l s . , London, 1863. Beasley, W.G., Great B r i t a i n and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858, London, 1951. , The M e i j i Restoration, Stanford, 1972. , Select Documents on Japanese Foreign P o l i c y 1853-1868, London, 1955. Consenza, M.E. (ed.), The Complete Journal of Townsend Har r i s , F i r s t American Consul General and Minister to Japan, New York, 1930. Craig, Albert M. and Donald H. Shively (eds.), Personality i n Japanese History, Berkeley, 1970. Dore, R.P., Education i n Tokugawa Japan, Berkeley, 1964. Dennett, Tyler, Americans i n Eastern Asia, A C r i t i c a l Study of United States Policy i n the Far East i n the Nineteenth Century, New York, 1941. Harris, Townsend. See M.E. Consenza (ed.) Hawks, F.L. (ed.), Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed i n the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M.C. Perry, 3 v o l s . , New York, 1856. Jansen, Marius, Sakamoto Ryoma and the M e i j i Restoration, Princeton, 1961. Keene, Donald, The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830, revised e d i t i o n , Stanford, 1969. Norman, E.H., Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, New York, 1940. R a f f l e s , Thomas Stamford, History of Java, London, 1830. Sansom, G.B., The Western World and Japan, New York, 1950. Siebold, P h i l i p p Franz von, Manners and Customs of the Japanese i n the Nineteenth Century, New York, 1841. This i s an English t r a n s l a t i o n of h i s Nippon i n German. Smith, Thomas C , P o l i t i c a l Change and I n d u s t r i a l Development i n Japan: Govern- ment Enterprise, 1868-1880, Stanford, 1955. English A r t i c l e Green, D.C., "Correspondence Between William II of Holland and the Shogun of Japan, A.D. 1844," i n Transactions of the A s i a t i c Society of Japan, 1st s e r i e s , XXXIV (1907), pp. 99-132. 137 Japanese Books Asao Naohiro, Sakoku (National I s o l a t i o n ) , i n Nihon No Rekishi (The Great His- tory of Japan) s e r i e s , Shogakkan, 1975. Ayuzawa Shintaro e_t a l . , Sakoku J i d a i Nihon-j i n no Kaigai C h i s h i k i (Japanese Knowledge of Foreign Countries During the Years of National I s o l a t i o n ) , Kangen- sha, 1955. Eto Jun, Umi wa Yomigaeru (The Ocean Resurgent), Bungei Shunju Shin-sha, 1976. Fujino Tamotsu, Baku-Han T a i s e i - s h i no Kenkyu (A Study of the Tokugawa Bakufu- Han System), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1961. Fumikura H e i j i r o , Bakumatsu Gunkan Kanrin Maru (The Kanrin Maru, Warship i n the Late Tokugawa Period), Meicho Kanko-kai, 1969. Gaimu-sho (ed.), Kindai In-Yo Reki Taisho-hyo (Conversion Tables of Japanese and Gregorian Calendars for Modern Times), Gaimu-sho, 1951. Hideshima_ Naritada (ed.), Saga Han Kaigun-shi (The History of the Saga Han Navy), Chishin-kai, 1917. Hora Tomio, Bakumatsu Is h i n - k i no Gaiatsu to Teiko (Foreign Pressure and Japanese Resistance i n the Late Tokugawa and Early M e i j i Periods), Azekura Shobo, 1977. Iguro Yataro, Enomoto Takeaki (Enomoto Takeaki), Shin Jinbutsu Orai-sha, 1975. Ikeda. Kiyoshi, Nihon no Kaigun (Japan's Navy), 2 v o l s . , Shisei-do, 1963. Inoue, Kiyoshi, Nihon no Gunkoku-shugi (Japanese M i l i t a r i s m ) , 3 v o l s . , Gendai Hyoron-sha, 1975. Ishibashi Choei. e_t a l . , Igaku (Medicine), i n Oyatoi Gaikoku-jin (Foreigners i n Government Service) s e r i e s , v o l . 9, Kashima Kenkyu-jo Shuppan-kai, 1969. I s h i i . Takashi, Bakumatsu Boeki-shi no Kenkyu (A Study of the History of Trade i n the Late Tokugawa Period), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1942. ,, Katsu Kaishu (Katsu Kaishu), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1974. , Nihon Kaikoku-shi (A History of the Opening of Japan), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1972. Itazawa Takeo, Nichi-Ran Bunka Kosho-shi no Kenkyu (Studies on C u l t u r a l Ex- changes Between Japan and the Netherlands), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1959. , Shiboruto (Siebold), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1960. Izu Kimio et al". , Nihon Gunji Hattatsu-shi (A History of the M i l i t a r y Develop- ment of Japan), Mikasa Shobo, 1938. 138 Kaigun Yushu-kai (ed.), Kinsei Teikoku Kaigun Shiyo (A History of the Imperial Navy i n Modern Times), Kaigun Yushu-kai, 1938. Kamei Takayoshi, Daikoku-ya Kodayu (Daikoku-ya Kodayu), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1964. Kamo G i i c h i , Enomoto Takeaki (Enomoto Takeaki), Chuo Koron-sha, 1960. Kanekor, Haruji, Bakumatsu no Nihon (Japan i n the Late Tokugawa Period), Hayakawa Shobo, 1968. Kasama, Yoshihiko, Edo Bakufu Yakushoku Shusei (A Compilation of O f f i c i a l Posts i n the Tokugawa Bakufu), revised and enlarged e d i t i o n , Yuzankaku Shuppan, 1974. Ka t a g i r i , Kazuo (ed.), Sakoku J i d a i Taigai Osetsu Kankei Shiryo ( H i s t o r i c a l Documents Concerning the Reception of Foreigners During the Years of National I s o l a t i o n ) , Kondo Shuppan-sha, 1972. Katsube , Mitake and Eto , Jun-(e:ds . ),Katsu Kaishu Zenshu (Complete Works of Katsu Kaishu), Keiso Shobo, 1971-. Kattendyke, W.J.C. Ridder van, see Mizuta ( t r . ) Kawai Hikomitsu, Nihon-jin Hyoryu-ki (Records of Japanese Castaways), Shakai Shiso-sha, 1967. Kitajima Masamoto, Edo Bakufu no Kenryoku Kozo (The Power Structure of the Tokugawa Bakufu), Iwanami Shoten, 1964. , Mizuno Tadakuni (Mizuno Tadakuni), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1969. Konishi.. Shiro, Kaikoku to J o i (The Opening of the Country and Exclusionism), i n Nihon no Rekishi (A History of Japan) s e r i e s , v o l . 19, Chuo Koron-sha, 1966. Koshaku Shimazu-ke Hensan-jo (ed.), Sappan Kaigun-shi (The History of the Satsuma Han Navy), 3 v o l s . , Shimazu Koshaku-ke, 1929. Koyama Hirotake, Kindai Nihon Gunji-shi Gaisetsu (An Outline History of M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s i n Modern Japan), Ito Shoten, 1944 , Nihon Gunji Kogyo no Shi t e k i Bunseki ( H i s t o r i c a l Analysis of Japan's M i l i t a r y Industries), Ochanomizu'Shobo, 1972. Kudo Takeshige, Mizuno Chikuzen (Mizuno Tadakuni), 189 7. Kurihara Ryuichi, Bakumatsu Nihon no Gunsei ( M i l i t a r y Systems of Late Tokugawa Japan), Shin Jinbutsu Orai-sha, 1972. Meerdervoort, . Jh'r. J.L.C. Pompe" van, see Numata and Arase ( t r s . ) : •- Miyagi, Eisho, Okinawa no Rekishi (A History of Okinawa), Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai. 1968. Miyamoto Chu, Sakuma Shozan (Sakuma Shozan), Iwanami Shoten, 1932. 139 Mizuta Nobutoshi, Bakumatsu n i Okeru Waga Kaigun to Oranda (Japan's Navy and Holland-in the Late Tokugawa Period), Yushu-kai, 1929. Mizuta Nobutoshi ( t r . ) , Nagasaki Kaigun Denshu-jo no H i b i (The Days of the Nagasaki Naval Training School), Heibon-sha, 1964. This i s a Japanese t r a n s l a - tion of Willem Johan Cornells Ridder van Kattendyke, U i t t r e k s e l u i t het Dagboek van W.J.C. Ridder H. v. Kattendyke Gedurende z i j n V e r b l i j f i n Japan i n 1857, ' 1858 en 1859, The-Hague, 1860. Nakahama. To i c h i r o , Nakahama Manjiro Den (A Biography of Nakahama Manjiro), Fuzanbo, 19 36. Nakano Reishiro (ed.), Nabeshima Naomasa Ko Den (A Biography of Lord Nabeshima Naomasa), Koshaku Nabeshima-ke Hensan-jo, 1920. Nihon Rekishi D a i - j i t e n Hensan-kai (ed.), Nihon Rekishi D a i - j i t e n (Encyclopedia of Japanese H i s t o r y ) , Kawade Shobo, 1968. Numajiri, Gen'ichiro (ed.), Mito no Yogaku (Western Studies i n Mito), Kashiwa Shobo, 1977. Numata , J i r o , Bakumatsu Yogaku-shi (A History of Western Studies i n the Late Tokugawa Period), T5ko Shoin, 1952. Numata- J i r o e t a l , ( t r s . ) , Pompe Nihon T a i z a i Kenbun-ki (Pompe's Records i n Japan), Yusho-do Shoten, 1968. This i s a Japanese t r a n s l a t i o n of Jhr. Johannes L i j d i u s Catharinus Pompe van Meerdervoort, V i j f Jaren i n Japan (1857-1863: B i j dragen tot de kennis van het Japansche k e i z e r r i j k en zijne bevolking, 2 v o l s . , Leiden, 1867-1868. Ogasawara Chosei, Nihon Teikoku Kaijo Kenryoku-shi Kogi (Lectures on the Naval Power of the Japanese Empire), date unknown. Ogata Tomio (ed.), Rangaku to Nihon Bunka (Dutch Studies and Japanese Culture), Tokyo University Press, 1971. Ohara Sakingo, Hokuchi Kigen (Warning about the North Land), i n Hokumon Sosho (Books about the North) series edited by Otomo Kisaku, Hokko Shobo, 1943. Ohira., Kimata, Sakuma Shozan (Sakuma Shozan), Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, 1959. Oishi. Shinzaburo, Bakuhan-sei no Tenkan (Changes i n the Tokugawa Bakufu-Han System), i n Nihon no Rekishi (The Great History of Japan) s e r i e s , v o l . 20, Shogakkan, 19 75. Oito Toshio, Bakumatsu Heisei Kaikaku-shi (A History of M i l i t a r y Reforms i n the Late Tokugawa Period), Hakuy5-sha, 1939. Okumura; Shoji, Hinawa-ju kara Kuro-fune Made (From the Matchlock to the Black Ships), Iwanami Shoten, 1970. Otomo Kisaku (ed.), Hokumon Sosho (Books about the North), Hokko Shobo, 1943. Oyama Shikitaro, Bakumatsu Z a i s e i Kinyu Shiron ( H i s t o r i c a l Essays on Finance i n the Late Tokugawa Period), Mineruba Shobo, 1969. 140 Saga-ken-shi Hensan-kai (ed.)Saga-ken-shi (A History of Saga-ken), Saga-ken, 1972. Sakanoue Nobuo, Nihon Kaibo-shi (A History of Maritime Defense of Japan), Taiko- do, 1942. Sato. Shosuke, Yogaku-shi Kenkyu Josetsu (Introduction to Research i n the His- tory of Western Studies), Iwanami Shoten, 1964. Shimonaka. Yasaburo et_ a l . (eds.), Sekai Rekishi J i t e n (Encyclopedia of World Hi s t o r y ) , Heibon-sha, 1955. Sugimoto Isao (ed.), Kagaku-shi (History of Science), i n Ta i k e i Nihon-shi Sosho (An Outline History of Japan), Yamakawa Shuppan-sha, 1964. Suzuki. Naoji, Edo J i d a i n i Okeru Kome T o r i h i k i no Kenkyu (A Study of the Rice Market i n the Tokugawa Period), enlarged e d i t i o n , Kashiwa Shobo, 1965. Suzuki Seisetsu (ed.), Kazan Zenshu (Complete Works of Watanabe Kazan), Kazan- k a i , 1910. Tabohashi,- Kiyoshi, Kindai Nihon Gaikoku Kankei-shi (A History of Japanese Foreign Relations i n the Tokugawa Period), Toko Shoin, 1943. Takahashi / Kunitaro, Gunj i ( M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s ) , i n Oyatoi Gaikoku-jin (Foreigners i n Government Service) s e r i e s , v o l . 6, Kashima Kenkyu-jo Shuppan-kai, 1968. TakimotOj S e i i c h i (ed.), Sato Nobuhiro Kagaku Zenshu (Complete Works of Sato Nobuhiro), 3 v o l s . , Iwanami Shoten, 1925. Tamura. E i t a r o , M e i j i Kaigun Soshi-sha, Kawamura Sumiyoshi Nakamuda Kuranosuke Den (Biographies of Kawamura Sumiyoshi and Nakamuda Kuranosuke, Founders of the M e i j i Navy), Nihon Gunji Tosho, 1944. Tokita , E k i c h i , Sato Nobuhiro (Sato Nobuhiro), Daikan-do, 1941. Tokugawa Koshaku-ke (ed.), Mito Han Shiryo ( H i s t o r i c a l Documents of Mito Han), Tokugawa-ke, 1915. Tokutomi, I i c h i r o , K insei Nihon Kokumin-shi (A National History of Modern Japan), J i j i Tsushin-sha, 1960. , Yoshida Shoin (Yoshida Shoin), Minyu-sha, 1908. Tsuchiya Shigeaki, Kindai Nihon Zosen Kotohajime, Hida Hamagoro no Shogai (The B i r t h of Shipbuilding i n Modern Japan and t h e - l i f e of Hida Hamagoro), Shin Jinbutsu Orai-sha, 1975. Tsuda Hideo, Tempo Kaikaku (The Tempo Reforms), i n Nihon no Rekishi (The Great History of Japan) s e r i e s , v o l . 22, Shogakkan, 1975. Watanabe Shujiro, Abe Masahiro J i s e k i (A Biography of Abe Masahiro), 2 v o l s . , private e d i t i o n , 1910. 141 Yamamoto Yutaka (ed.), Hayashi Shihei Zenshu (Complete Works of Hayashi Shihei), Seikatsu-sha, 1943. Zosen Kyokai ( e d j ^ Nihon Kinsei Zosen-shi (A History of Shipbuilding i n Modern Japan), Kodo-kan, 1911. Japanese A r t i c l e s Goto Y o i c h i , "Abe Masahiro (Abe Masahiro)" i n Daimyo Retsuden (Biographies of Daimyo), v o l . 8, Jinbutsu Orai-sha, 1966. I s h i i Kenji, "Sakoku-jidai no Koyo-sen Kenzo (The Construction of Ocean-going Ships During the Period of National I s o l a t i o n ) , " i n Miyamoto J o i c h i et a l . (eds.), Nihon no Kaiyo-min (Oceanic People of Japan), Mirai-sha, 19 74. , "Suetsugu Heizo no Kara-bune (The Chinese-style Ship of Suetsugu Heizo)," i n Nihon Rekishi Gakkai (ed.), Nihon Rekishi (Japanese H i s t o r y ) , Yoshikawa Kobun-kan, No. 180, 1963. Kat a g i r i . Kazuo, "Kanrin M a r u — J a p a n — n i Kansuru Shin Shiryo (New H i s t o r i c a l M a t erial Concerning the Kanrin Maru, Japan) ," i n Geppo (Monthly News), no. 2 of Katsu Kaishu Zenshu, v o l . 12. Keiso Shobo, 1971-. Nakamura Tadashi, "Shimabara no Ran to Sakoku (The Shimabara Rebellion and National I s o l a t i o n P o l i c y ) " i n Iwanami Koza Nihon Rekishi (Iwanami History of Japan), v o l . 9, Iwanami Shoten, 19 75. 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