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Li Te-yű and the campaign against Chao-i (Tse-Lu) 843-844 Mark, Kenneth Young 1977

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i LI TE-YU AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST CHAO-I (TSE-LU) 8^3-^ KENNETH YOUNG MARK B.A., University of Toronto, 1969 M.A., University of Toronto, 1970 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS We accept t h i s thesis as•conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1977 /T\ KENNETH YOUNG MARK, 1977 i n the Department of Asian Studies In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requ i rement s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumb ia , I ag ree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s tudy . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i thout my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Kenneth Young Mark Department o f Asian studies The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia 2 0 7 5 W e s b r o o k P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , C a n a d a V 6 T 1W5 D a t e May 25, 19,77 i i ABSTRACT Owing to his achievements of defeating the rebellion in the province of Chao-1, eliciting the cooperation of the semi-independent military governors of Ho-pel, defeating the Uighurs, and overseeing the dissolution of the Buddhist Church during the Hul-oh'ang reign period (844-6) when he served as chief minister, Ll Te-yu (787-8^9) became one of the most powerful political figures in T'ang China. This study will focus on how the imperial government In 8^ 3-^  put down the rebellion In Chao-1 which arose when the court refused to allow Liu Chen to succeed to his uncle1s position of military governor. The An Lu-shan rebellion (755-62) resulted in the loss of the rich northeastern provinces of contemporary Ho-pei. Further defeats there In 782-4- forced the court to allow hereditary succession among its military governors. During the Yuan-ho restoration (805-20) this region briefly returned to court control but again rebelled. Their new leaders were, however, a lesser breed of men. Chao-i was not a part of Ho-pei but an integral province of the empire which, except for the' twenty-three years of Liu family rule, had remained loyal to the court. Furthermore, It occupied the strategic position as the buffer zone between Ho-pel and the vital canal system—the economic lifeline of the empire. i i i At court, in the confusion after the An Lu-shan rebel-lion, the emperor began to rely Increasingly on the eunuchs to carry out military and administrative duties. By usurp-ing other powers, they were able to interfere in the succes-sion of every subsequent T'ang emperor, thereby becoming the powers at court. Whichever eunuch clique prevailed and established the reigning emperor, also controlled the vicis-situdes of the factions among the officials. The eunuch connection with Ghao-i was close for they especially hated Liu Ts'ung-chlen who had openly opposed Ch*iu shih-llang, the leading court eunuch, for taking revenge on the plotters and others after the Sweet Dew incident of 835. On the borders, a weakened Uighur nation was defeated by the T'ang while other non-Chinese tribes, owing to internal dissension, posed few problems. With peace on the frontier, Te-y i i took advantage of the animosity of Ho-pei and eunuch hatred for Chao-i to gain military cooperation and to establish a unified court so that the court could concentrate its efforts on defeating Chao-i. He accomplished this by surrounding i t and then forcing its generals to betray Liu Chen and surrender themselves. The presentation is in two parts. Part one Is the thesis as outlined above. Part two is an annotated translation of Li Te - y i i 's biography taken from chapter 17^ of the o l d T'ang  History which provides the historical 7 context of his whole career as background to the campaign. iv The success of the campaign did help to re-assert Imperial authority after i t had been badly weakened, but i t did not provide any long term solutions to the court's problems and could not prevent the subsequent f a l l of the dynasty. This study provides, however, an opportunity to examine how Te-yii was able to take advantage of the shifts in the political situation in the years 84-0-6 to re-assert court authority, however temporarily, by defeating Liu Chen in Chao-i. V TABLE OP CONTENTS Introduction vii Prefatory A r t i c l e 1 Footnotes 65 Translation of the Biography of 69 LI Te-yu as taken from Chapter 17^ of the Old T'ang History. Footnotes 115 Character L i s t 166 Bibliography 175 Maps: 1. Sketch map of Chao-1 and 1&4 surrounding area 2. General map with names and locations of provinces taken from D. C. Twitchett, F i n a n c i a l  Administration In the T'ang Dynasty." : ~ T~ ( v i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am very grateful for a l l the encouragement and cooperation that I have received during the,preparation of this thesis. While In Taiwan, I was able to use the library facilities of National Taiwan University, the National Central Library, and of the Academla Sinlca. I would like to thank them for the help they rendered. At National Taiwan University, Professors Pu Lo-oh'eng, Hsu Hsien-yao and T'ao-Chin-sheng of the History Department were extremely helpful and patient. Their support was of the greatest importance in gaining an understanding of the structure of Chinese history. M. Rene Goldman and Mr. Tim Lee were kind enough to offer me the hospitality of their home during the writing of. this thesis. My gratitude to them is both deep and sincere. Finally, Professor E. G. Pulleyblank who fi r s t suggested this topic has supervised this work from its beginnings. Without his help, this work would never have been completed. The mistakes which remain, however, are mine and mine alone. v i i INTRODUCTION L i Te-yii (787-84-9) was a towering p o l i t i c a l figure of the f i r s t half of the 9 t h century i n China. While serving as chief minister from 84-0-4-6 during the Hul-oh'ang period of Wu-tsung, he was able to regain the support of the f o r -merly independent province of Xu-chou, bring about the de-feat of the Ulghurs, recapture the b r i e f l y independent province of Chao-i and help the emperor dissolve the Buddhist 'state within a state.' P r i o r to his assuming o f f i c e as chief minister, the court faced threats from various non-Chinese tribes on i t s borders, paralysing f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e i n the outer court, eunuch usurpation of power within the inner court and the continuing existence of independent m i l i -tary governors i n the northeast. This Hul-oh'ang period, then, was a 'brief interlude' during which Te-yii, aided by the complete support of Wu-tsung, was able to harness the power of the central government to deal with the immediate problems fa c i n g the court. Te-yii* s eminence derives from the achievements gained during his tenure as chief minister. Concerning these achievements, the f i r s t part of thi s paper w i l l centre i t s attention on his leadership of the b r i e f m i l i t a r y campaign i n 843-4- against the contemporane-ous provinoe of Chao-i or Tse-lu as i t i s also known ( s i t u -ated approximately where the modern provinces of Ho-pel, Shansi, and Ho-nan converge) to block L i u Chen's attempt to 1 v i i i succeed his uncle, Liu Ts'ung-chien, as military governor. Heretofore, this campaign has not been treated in detail i n any western language, although there are several references to i t i n Relschauer's two books, Ennln's Diary and Ennln's  Travels In T'ang China, sincevthis Japanese monk happened to be i n China at this time. In Chinese, however, this campaign forms an important part of chapters 247-8 of Ssu-ma Kuang's monumental Tzu Chlh T'ung Chlen—the Comprehensive Mirror  for Aid i n Government. Although aae of Te-yu's minor accomplish-ments, the campaign does allow us a key-hole view of the man, his times and the connection between the two. Part two consists of the chronicle of the man, as taken from chapter 17^ of the old T'ang History, translated and annotated with the exception of two long passages which have deleted since they are not pertinent to the campaign. These two parts are linked by the hope that an examination in some detail of an aspect of the o f f i c i a l career recorded in the biography w i l l permit us to gain some feeling about Te-yii as an individual, an, understanding of his ideas, and a grasp of his connection to the social and p o l i t i c a l conditions of the times during which he lived. The translation of the biography, then, provides us, within the limits of Confucian biographical writing, an historical context to which an account of the campaign can be tied. Going back even further, one must understand that the An Lu-shan rebellion weakened the central government p o l l t i -ix c a l l y and f i n a n c i a l l y with the loss of the r i c h northeastern provinces of Ho-pei adjacent to the c a p i t a l areas. In order to carry on i t s everyday functions, the court had to make economic and p o l i t i c a l concessions which allowed the dynasty to continue f o r another 150 years. To handle the c i v i l and m i l i t a r y administration within the palace, the emperors came to r e l y increasingly on the eunuchs who i n i t i a l l y were servants but l a t e r became masters. The f a c t i o n a l struggles among the o f f i c i a l s of the outer court during the f i r s t h a l f of the 9 t h century were but an , outward manifestation of cliques among the eunuchs themselves. On the f r o n t i e r , various non-Chinese tribes took advantage of the domestic weakness to invade and otherwise enrich them-selves at China's expense. Economically, the court had to develop the a g r i c u l t u r a l and other p o t e n t i a l of the southern regions and transport the products northward along the canal system to the two c a p i t a l s , replacing what would have e a r l i e r been supplied by Ho-pel. As a r e s u l t , the court was very vulnerable s h o u l d 1 i t s economic l i f e l i n e be threatened or cut o f f . F i s c a l l y , the expedients of the llang-shul tax system and the establishment of the government monopoly on the production and sale of s a l t pro-vided the court with funds f o r i t s administration, but i t l i m i t e d the scope of the court's m i l i t a r y operations while the requirement that the tax be paid i n cash caused monetary hardship f o r the whole empire. After the court's failure to cope with the independent military governors in the wake of the revolt of the 'four princes' in 782-4, both sides came to an understanding that the military governorships in the northeast could be directly inherited without Interference from the court, in return for nominal support of the emperor as supreme ruler and certain responsibilities for frontier defense. This was no abandoning of the court's mandate to rule the empire, but a cold realiza-tion that i t lacked the power to intervene. Despite a l l these limits to court power caused by the disruption of the An Lu-shan rebellion, the goal of recapturing Ho-pei and achieving the ideal of a restoration (ohung-hslng) remained. Por the twenty years after the short-lived Yuan-ho (805-20) Restoration of Hsien-tsung, in which the northeast briefly accepted direct court rule only to rebel again, these earlier problems of a leaderless court dominated by eunuchs usurping power and officials fighting among themselves and against the eunuchs plus incursions and threats from non-Chinese enemies on its borders remained unchecked. Te-yii, upon assuming the chief ministership in 841 had to deal with such an array of longstanding problems before the rebellion in Chao-1 broke out. This paper will foous on Te-yu's contributions to the swift defeat of the problem in Chao-1 which constituted an integral part of the court's avowed policy of reasserting imperial authority. To be able to comprehend this more fully, and in order to place this whole matter in its proper histori-xi cal perspective, i t will be necessary to review, in some detail, the geographic and strategic position of Chao-i and the three succession crises in Chao-1 within the wider frame-work of the court's relations with the whole northeast. .. Although this paper is concerned with a military campaign, i t will not dwell in inordinate detail on the tactical manoeu-vres involved but rather with the overall strategy, especially, the diplomatic moves to isolate Chao-i from the Independent military governors in Wel-po and Ch'eng-te, the deployment of the court's own troops and those ''borrowed" from Ho-pel, and finally, the solutions for handling longstanding problems which had plagued earlier such campaigns. x i i A NOTE ON THE SOURCES The modern student i s g r a t e f u l f o r the f a c t that the h i s t o r i c a l sources f o r the T'ang dynasty are adequate f o r research but not overwhelming i n volume. The major source of the h i s t o r i c a l data f o r this study was Ssurma Kuang's monumental Tzu Chlh T'ung Chlen—"The Comprehensive Mirror f o r Aid i n Government," e s p e c i a l l y chapters 238-4-8. Clear explanations of the scope and v i r t u o s i t y of this work are i n E. G. Pulleyblank's a r t i c l e on the T'ung Chlen K'ao-l (of. bibliography) and his a r t i c l e on Ssu-ma Kuang's h i s t o r i -ography i n Beasley and pulleyblank (eds.), Historians of  China and Japan, e s p e c i a l l y pages 151-66. Equally useful were the relevant parts of the old and New T'ang H i s t o r i e s . Por further discussion of these two works the reader i s r e -ferred to the annotated bibliography i n M. Robert des Rotours' T r a l t e des Examens. As f o r L i Te-yii 1 s own writings, his c o l l e c t e d works, the Hul-Ch'ang I P 1In Chi, also known as the L i Wen-jao Wen Chi, were indispensable, since a s i g n i f i c a n t portion of L i ' s biography taken from chapter 174- of the old T'ang History Is composed of extensive quotations from his own writings, an attempt was made to compare the excerpts i n the biography with the o r i g i n a l versions i n the extant editions of his c o l -l e c t e d works. Por this purpose, the Ming dynasty copy of the Ch'iifamily l i b r a r y ^ r e p r i n t e d i n the Ssu pu Ts'ung Kan f i r s t series was used. This i s the e d i t i o n referred to i n x i i i the Imperial Catalogue (Ssu K'u Ch'iian shu Tsung Mu) notation on Te-yii»s collected works. For the limited scope of this thesis, the comparison of texts did clarify a number of points which were otherwise obscure and hard to translate. For geographical names the Chung-Kuo Ku Chin Tl-Mlng Ta  Tz'u Tien was generally used, supplemented by the Tu Shlh Fang  Yu. Chi Yao and Aoyama Sadao's excellent index.to i t , the shlna (or Chugoku) Rekidal Chlmel Yoran. The maps collected In the Li Tal Yu Ti Yen-ko T'u, compiled during the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty, provided, within the limits of traditional Chinese cartography, a general layout of the relative positions of the T'ang dynasty places pertinent to the military campaign. A brief note on spelling of place names. Hyphenated forms such as Ho-pei and Ho-nan refer to the areas in T'ang dynasty geography while the modern spellings of Hope! and Honan refer to the modern provinces. The following equivalents have been used for administra-tive terms: chou pref ec ture chun ( l i t . army) military region, i.e., the geographical base for an army chun commandery fu grand prefecture hsien sub-prefecture > tao circuit or province -1-L l Te-yii and the Campaign Against Chao-i 843-4 The T'ang dynasty province of Chao-i or Tse-lu as i t is also known straddled the T'ai-hang Mountains where the modern provinces of Hopel, Honan and Shansi meet north of the Yellow River. These mountains divided the province Into two regions. The western part contained Tse-chou and Lu-chou and commanded the entrance to T'ai-hang or T'ien-chlng pass leading to Huai-chou in contemporaneous Ho-yang province. Prom there, i t was only a short distance across the Yellow River to Lo-yang, the eastern capital and plen-chou, the northern terminus of the Grand Canal system. The eastern region of foothills and lowlands contained the prefectures of Hsing, Ming, and Tz'u, which guarded T'u-men or Ching-hsing pass which was the major east-west route connecting contemporaneous Ho-pel and Ho-tung Provinces. For these reasons, this area was of great strate-gic importance not only during this period but also throughout the whole of Chinese history as one of the most Important Intersections of north-south, and east-west, t r a f f i c in North China. The development of Chao-i as a province spanning the T'ai-hang mountains was largely shaped by politics and geo-graphy. For most of the dynasty, the five prefectures governed by Chao-i were divided into two distinct areas separated by the mountain barrier. The eastern prefectures -2-had always been governed by the court. During the rebellion of An Lu-shan, they had remained loyal and fought against the rebels. Geographically, the prefectures of Tse and Lu had a closer relationship with the adjacent area In Ho-tung and Ho-chung, rather than with the areas to the east from which they were separated by mountains. The prefectures on the other side of these mountains were closer to, and often grouped with, those in the neighbour-ing province of Wei-po. In ?62 after the non-Chinese general Pu-ku Hual-en recaptured Lo-yang with the aid of Uighur troops, he proposed to the court that surrendered rebel generals be appointed as governors in the former rebel strongholds of Ho-pe!; furthermore, fearing that his own standing in court would wane with the end of the rebellion, he also hoped that by establishing these generals he could count upon them later as potential supporters for his own political aspirations. Tired of war, and unable to dislodge these former rebels, the court agreed to pu-ku's suggestion.* Later, these provinces of Yu-chou, Wei-po, Ch'eng-te, and p'lng-lu became Independent of the court's control, free from its taxation, its appoint-ment of officials, and its Interference in matters of succes-sion. In this way, Hsiieh sung became the prefect of Hslang-chou and governor of the prefectures of Hsiang, Hsing, Tz'u and Wei. After Sung died in 773, he was succeeded briefly by his 12 year old son P'ing who was forced by his troops into -3-naming his uncle Hsiieh E as Interim-governor. Two years later, E was forced to flee when his subordinate general p'ei Chin-ch' ing rebelled to join forces with T'len Ch'eng-ssu of Wel-po. LI Pao-chen, the brother of Li Pao-yu, who had served as governor of the court-held prefectures In the western part, was then named to command the eastern region, thus uniting the two regions under a single jurisdiction. The name Chao-1 dates from this time. Until his death in 794, pao-chen ruled over both parts of this newly-created province and continued to render loyal service to the court, especially during the rebellion of the so-called "four princes" in 782-4. After the rebellion was finally suppressed and the two capitals recaptured, the court, lacking the necessary military power, pardoned the rebelling governors. As a result of this insurrection, the court and the inde-pendent military governors struck a bargain—border defense and nominal acceptance of the emperor's supreme position in return for autonomous control over taxation, administration, and hereditary succession within Ho-pei.2 This compromise, in Mirsky's persuasive thesis/allowed the T'ang court to continue for another 150 years at the cost of surrendering control over the rich and powerful northeast. , Under these circumstances, later T'ang emperors settled for maintaining a buffer zone be-tween the areas under direct court control and Ho-pei to pro-tect the vital canal system to the south from possible attack, -4-as well as preventing the contagion of Independence from spreading beyond the areas already Infected, owing to its geographic location and its traditional political ties with the court, Ghao-i played a pivotal role in maintaining the viability of this dynasty-saving compromise as the buffer between the empire and independent Ho-pei. Hereditary succession,which was tantamount to the court's abdication of its fundamental control over provincial armies and a tacit acknowledgement of its political impotence in the internal matters of a province, was acceptable in Ho-pei because i t had successfully defied the court, but i t was un-acceptable In Ghao-1 which had no connection with the special situation in adjoining Ho-pei and only a brief history of being beyond the court's control. Of the three claims for hereditary succession in Ghao-1, one involved Li Pao-chen's son and the other two, the descendants of Liu Wu. Occurring at different times and reflecting different political situa-tions and military postures, these three incidents and the court responses they elicited sheds light on the political re-lationship between the central government and the provinces. Investigating these three crises will show the similarity of approaches by both sides to this problem and thereby place the rebellion of Ghao-i in 84-3 in its proper historical and political perspective. The f i r s t controversy occurred in Yiian-ohen 10 [794] -5-following the death of LI Pao-chen, when his son L i Ghien sought to succeed him. Chien plotted with h i s fellow clans-man Yuan Chung-chlng to keep the news of his father's death secret and to forge an address to the throne requesting that he, Chien, be named Interim governor. In addition, the con-spirators dispatched a subordinate general, Ch'en Jung, to Wang Wu-chiin i n Ch'eng-te to seek support against the throne, but Wang refused. Te-tsung was aware that Pao-chen was dead and sent the eunuch Ti-wu shou-chin to investigate. Chien r e p l i e d that his father was too sick to receive v i s i t o r s . Soon thereafter Chien marshalled his army to c a l l on shou-chin who then said that he too knew pao-chen was already dead and that he had been ordered to put general Wang T 1ing-kuei temporarily i n charge of m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s f o r Chao-i and to have Chien observe the prescribed funeral r i t e s . Chien sub-mitted when he r e a l i z e d that his own troops would not support him i n his defiance of the Imperial command, since e a r l i e r , unknown to him, they had backed down when Wang T'ing-kuei dared them to rebel. He then handed over the seals of o f f i o e and the keys to the yamen and accompanied h i s father's body to Lo-yang. Yuan f l e d but was l a t e r caught and executed. The court's decisive action and i t s unwillingness to accept Chien's u n i l a t e r a l action helped to prevent him from gaining l o c a l and outside m i l i t a r y support to defy the court's deci-sion. ^  In p a o - l i 1 [825] following the death of L i Wu, a s i m i l a r -6-situation arose. Wu's son, Ts'ung-chlen, also tried to hide the news of his father's death and plotted with his personal troops to send a request to the emperor that he be made in-terim governor during his father's "Illness"; however, one of his subordinate officials, Chia Chin-yen, upbraided him for being unfilial and un-<3onfucian and thereby shamed him into announcing the news. The court's reaction to his request has been recorded as follows: When the court received Liu Wu's posthumous report, the majority of those discussing i t said that i t could not be granted since shang-tang (i.e. Chao-i) was an inner commandery and different from Ho-shuo. The left vice-president of the Department of state Affairs, Li Chiang-memorialised: 'In military strategies speed is most important, in making decisions, firmness is vital. Before people's opinions have been solidified, one should plan and attack. Liu Wu has been dead several months [but] the court s t i l l has not disposed of this matter, people in and out of court a l l would be sorry to see this opportunity missed.» 'Now the soldiers and people of Chao-i are certainly not in complete accord with Ts'ung-chien. Supposing half cooperate, there is s t i l l half which will submit to the court. Ts'ung-chlen has not been, in control of his troops for very long and he has not established his authority over the people. Moreover, this province is naturally poor and except in the proper season they have no means of of fering-generous rewards. Now i f only the court will quickly appoint a general who is close to Tse-lu to serve as military governor of Chao-1 and order him to his post quickly, before Ts'ung-chien has made his dispositions, the new envoy will have arrived and i t will be an example of what has been termed 'being f i r s t to capture the hearts of the_people.' After he arrives, the hearts of the soldiers will natu-rally have a point of attachment. Without any position, without any name, can he take charge? Even i f he has plans for disturbing the mandates of the court, the generals and officers will not be willing to follow. -7-Por some time now, the court has not settled this matter and the army is unclear about the court's in-tentions. If they want to be loyal and submissive, then they are afraid we will suddenly appoint Ts'ung-chien. If they want to join in rebellion, then they are afraid that we will appoint someone else. •If during the period of indecision, there is a traitor drawing up plans for them, emptily promising rewards and offering sums of money, the troops will be covetous, expectant, and hard to control. I humbly hope that you quickly announce to them your decision and further, fi r s t send down an enlightened edict to be proclaimed to the troops commending them for their past loyalty, granting the new envoy 500,000 pieces of silk to give to them, and continue to have Ts'ung-chlen serve as pre-fect. Ts'ung-chien, having roughly what he seeks, will see where his advantage lies and chances are he will not oppose. Even i f he does not follow orders, I feel also we do not need to avail ourselves of military attack. Why? I have heard that Ts'ung-chlen has banned soldiers in the three prefectures in the region 'east of the mountains' from personally storing arms. It is sufficiently clear that the hearts of the people are far from united and that in his own camp there are plots that he does not suspect. After thoroughly calculating the advantages and disadvantages of this situation, there is no good reason for appointing Ts'ung-chien right away.'5 Despite these reservations, Ts'ung-chien was appointed, some say because Li Peng-chi and Wang Shou-ch'eng were heavily bribed. This view, however, is not universally accepted.** In Hul-oh'ang 3 [843], when Liu Chen sought to succeed his uncle Ts'ung-chien as Military Governor of Chao-1, Generals Kuo I and Wang Hsieh, in addition to advising Chen to hide the news of his uncle's death, also counselled him to receive the expected eunuch overseers with dignity, to treat the commis-sioner bearing the edict generously, and not to send out troops to the border but merely to make secret preparations within cities so that the insignia of offioe would arrive just the -8-way i t had for his father in pao-11 1.? When Wu-tsung aslced the officials at court to discuss the matter, most of them said that the borders had to be de-fended against the remnants of the Ulghur threat, and thus the court did not have the strength to attack Tse-lu as well. Consequently, they requested Liu Chen be placed temporarily in charge of military affairs for Chao-i. L i Te-yii alone saidt The structure of the situation in Tse-lu, and that in the three commanderies of Ho-shuo is not the same. The practice of rebellion in Ho-shuo is already long-standing, and the hearts of the people will be hard to change. Therefore the past several courts have dismissed i t as being beyond the court's control. Tse-lu [however] is close at hand and a loyal ally. The whole army has always proclaimed its loyalty. It once put Chu T'ao to flight, and [later] captured Lu Ts'ung-shih. Recently, they have frequently had Confucian officials as generals. Even though Li Pao-chen had put together this army, Te-tsung s t i l l did not permit heredi-tary succession but had Li Chien observe mourning and return [with the body] to Lo-yang. Chlng-tsung was not concerned with affairs of state, and the chief ministers, moreover, did not have farslghted plans, [so that] when Liu Wu died, they temporized and appointed Ts'ung-chien, who became contrary and hard to control, repeatedly send-ing up memorials, threatening and intimidating the court. Now, as he hovers near death, he again arbitrarily hands over military authority to this boy. If the court again follows the precedent and appoints Liu Chen, then who among the various commanders within the empire will not think of imitating what Ts'ung-chien has done! And the stern commands of the son of Heaven will never again be carried out! When asked i f Tse-lu could be conquered and how It could be controlled, Te-yii replied: What Chen relies on are the three commanderies of Ho-shuo. If only we can prevent Chen f-chou] and Wei f-chou] from allying themselves with him, then Liu Chen will not -9-have the capability for anything. If we dispatch an important official to go there and proclaim to Wang Yiian-k'uei and Ho Hung-chlng that since the period of difficulties (i.e. the An Lu-shan rebellion) the fact that successive emperors have allowed hereditary suc-cession [Iin Ho-shuo] has already become an established practice and that [their situation] is not the same as that in Tse-lu; now when the court is raising an army against Tse-lu, we do not Intend to send out palace armies to the area east of the [T'ai-hang] mountains; that these three prefectures belonging to Chao-i (i.e. Hsing, Ming, and Tz'u) will be deputed to the comman-deries of Wei and Chen to attack, i f at the same time, we proclaim to a l l the generals and officers that on the day that the rebels are pacified, they will be generously awarded offices and rewards and i f the two commanderles respond to the order, and do not stop or harass the court armies from the sides, then Chen will certainly f a l l into our hands. In the f i r s t crisis, the decisiveness of the oourt not to allow Li Chien to succeed his father, Li Pao-chen, and the would-be rebel's inability to e l i c i t the support of his own soldiers or to secure outside military aid prevented Chien from defying the court. Ultimately, he had no choice but to submit to the court's will. The second crisis was not a confrontation for the oppo-site reasons, for the court lacked the decisiveness and leader-ship to face the challenge of Liu Ts'ung-chien. It dallied almost 4- months after the death of Liu Wu before allowing Ts'ung-chlen to succeed his father. The vulnerability of Chao-i as outlined in Li Chiang's memorial was never put to the test since neither Chlng-tsung nor his Chief Ministers, most of whom were opposed to the use of military force, advocated such positive action. This was not surprising, coming as i t did after the uprising in Ho-shuo whioh resulted in the region re--10-lapsing Into semi-independence a f t e r the ephemeral restora-t i o n of Hsien-tsung. Bribe or no bribe, the court's r e l u c -tance to oppose Ts'ung-chien's claim f o r hereditary succes-sion i n Chao-i r e f l e c t e d the p r e v a i l i n g p a s s i v i t y of the court o f f i c i a l s and the lack of i n t e r e s t of Chlng-tsung i n matters of state. F i n a l l y , In Hul-oh'ang 3 [84-3], a l l the factors necessary f o r a clash of arms over hereditary succession met head on. For the f i r s t time since Hsien-tsung there was a concerned emperor and an a c t i v i s t Chief Minister to provide decisive leadership at court. Te-yii's lone stand against the fears of the other o f f i c i a l s that the central government laoked the strength to safeguard the border regions against the remnants of the Uighur menace and simultaneously to put down the r e b e l -l i o n i n Chao-i was s u f f i c i e n t to carry the day since he had the t o t a l support of Wu-tsung. The rebels, f o r t h e i r part, had s o l i d i f i e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n Chao-i and presented at the outset at l e a s t a m i l i t a r i l y prepared front to the court. E a r l i e r , i n response to Ch'iu Shlh-llang's alleged interference with Ts«ung-chlen's g i f t of a nine oh'lh t a l l horse to the emperor, L i u Ts'ung-chlen be-gan preparing f o r war, and r e l a t i o n s between Chao-i and the court became strained.9 Consequently, i t was reported thats L i u r e c r u i t e d and took i n vagrants, repaired and com-pleted his store of m i l i t a r y weapons and secre t l y de-fended his borders with his neighbors. He taxed horsebreeders and t r a v e l l i n g merchants, sold i r o n and s a l t to b u i l d up his t r e a s u r y . 1 0 11-Liu»s goal is nowhere explicitly stated but i t may be guessed. He sought to maintain the semi-autonomous status of non-interference from court in military, fiscal, and ad-ministrative matters that he shared with his neighbors, Wei-po and Ch'eng-te. After a l l , i t had been said of his father, Liu Wu: "After this [the confrontation with the eunuch super-visor Liu Ch'eng-ohleh] Wu became very unrestrained and sought to imitate the three garrisons of Ho-shuo."11 Unfortunately, Ts'ung-chien died suddenly at the age of 42 and the leadership of the province of Chao-i f e l l to his eighteen year old nephew. Nevertheless, Ts'ung-chien made the necessary military appoint-ments prior to his death to assure that Chen would receive adequate military support and advice. With these generals, arms, troops, and funds, Chao-i posed a serious threat to the court. One assessment of Liu Chen's response to the court's de-cision to oppose his request is as follows: At f i r s t , Chen did not think that the emperor was angry and that he would be punished. When Wang Mao-yuan's transcribed edict was announced to Chen, the whole clan howled and grieved, wanting to submit themselves to court; but being stupid and weak, he did not decide. 1 2 Military governors sought court acceptance of their own positions in order to mollify the demands of local troops with the legitimacy of the court's mandate. The mutual acceptance of this situation sustained the position of the governor in return for adequate material rewards for the troops. If one governor was not generous enough, the army would find.someone 12-else. In the succession crises of Li Chien and Liu Chen, the fate of the rebellion hinged on support of the local troops. In the f i r s t Instance, its absence prevented a confrontation. In the second, its presence guaranteed a struggle. As for Liu Ts'ung-chlen, the court had essentially decided to accede to his demands without a fight and the question of military support for Ts'ung-chien was never put to any test. A recent study of this general problem concluded that: Ho-pel governors depended on the approval of their soldiers rather than on imperial sanation. The hereditary 'right' was intimately connected with the army's 'right' to choose its commanders. Very likely none of the independent governors, save during the long rule of the Wang family in Ch'eng-te, ever felt secure in their positions, for the armies they com-manded ultimately decided the fate of their comman-ders. 13 The court's standard approach to such succession ques-tions has been summarized as follows: Previously when one of the various Ho-pei generals set himself up, the court f i r s t had to send a commissioner to offer condolences and sacrifices, then commissioners to convey a farewell message, and commissioners for consolation to go in succession and estimate the state of the army. If the insignia of command ought not to be bestowed upon him, then the general was appointed to a different office. Only i f he remained in the army and would not obey, would the court use troops. There-fore, i t frequently took half a year for the army to put its things completely in order and to make prepara-tions. At this time, the Chief Minister would also want to despatch envoys to announce i t publicly and the emperor would then immediately order the issuance of an edict to attack him. 1^ The only time the court could bring its leverage of legit-imacy to bear on the potentially fragile relationship between the Military Governor and his military forces occurred during -13-thls transitional period, between the death of one military governor and the appointment of his successor, when the in-ternal situation was s t i l l in flux. Under such circumstances, although the provincial armies were the final arbiters of their commander's fate, withholding or at least delaying the announcement of the court's sanction could significantly in-fluence the stability of the domestic situation within the province, not to mention the fate of a prospective military governor. The court's classic response to adversity: in Ho-shuo dur-ing the latter half of the T'ang dynasty was to declare simply that since the An Lu-shan rebellion this region had been beyond the control of the court and then to acquiesce to the various changes within i t or to oppose such changes at its own great peril. Owing to the complete breakdown of the military in the wake of the An Lu-shan rebellion, the court forces with the help of their Uighur allies were able to bring about only a partial recovery of the empire and were unable to dislodge the rebel generals from their northeastern bases. These areas re-mained autonomous from court in such vital matters as tax collection, appointment of c i v i l officials, and military com-mand, acknowledging merely the emperor's theoretical control over the whole empire. After peace had been restored these three garrisons of H&pel--Lu-lung [Yu-chou], Wei-po, and Ch'eng-te as well as the enormous province of p'ing-lu, modern Shantung province—the richest and closest area to the adminl--14-s t r a t i v e center of Kuan-nei, were I r r e t r i e v a b l y l o s t . The importance of the f a l l of Ho-pei to the structure and continuity of the T'ang dynasty has been described i n the following manner: I t would appear that the v i r t u a l Independence of Hopei and shantung had a very serious e f f e c t upon T'ang central finances. By d r a s t i c a l l y reducing the central government's available revenues i n grain and i n s i l k c l o t h , I t made i t extremely d i f -f i c u l t f o r the government to re-assert i t s e f f e c t i v e authority over these provinces. At the same time, the almost t o t a l loss of revenue i n s i l k also helped to force the government to adopt f i n a n c i a l and monetary p o l i c i e s which although they enabled the T'ang regime to survive and even recover a measure of central authority, were none the less premature and inherently unstable. Just as these r e s u l t s de-ri v e d i n the main from the loss of the products of ce r t a i n key industries, the possession of these key I n d u s t r i e s — s a l t production, s i l k t e x t i l e s , and i r o n and bronze metallurgy—provided the governors of the north eastern provinces with a stable economic founda-t i o n to maintain t h e i r own administrative machinery5/ and t h e i r large standing armies without imposing an int o l e r a b l e burden of d i r e c t taxation upon the popu-l a t i o n of t h e i r provinces. When the court sought to re - e s t a b l i s h suzerainty over t h i s area during Te-tsung's reign, i t resulted i n the emperor being driven from the court i n Ch'ang-an. This "r e v o l t of the four princes" further strengthened Ho-shuo's p o s i t i o n as an impregnable bastion of anti-court sentiment and m i l i t a r y might. The ignominy of the emperor seeking sh e l t e r from the rebels f i r s t i n Peng-t'ien and then i n szechuan marked the nadir of court authority over the northeast. The pendulum swung v i o l e n t l y i n the other d i r e c t i o n a f t e r Hsien-tsung's protracted campaign against various dissident -15-milltary governors along the route of the oanal system. His successes in Huai-hsi, Shu,.and p'ing-lu exuded an aura of military power and political vitality which had important consequences for Ho-shuo. T'ien Hung-cheng (ne Hsing) of Wei-po f i l l e d a power vacuum in that pivotal province and served the court loyally from Yuan-ho 8-15 [812-19] until he was transferred to Ch'eng-te. More pertinent to the fortunes of the Liu family was the fate of p'ing-lu and its military governor, Li Shih-tao. Por betraying Li and submitting to court, Liu was rewarded with the governorship of I-ch'eng and given various other titles. Later he was transferred to Chao-1. P 1ing-lu was then divided up into three smaller provinces and never again caused any trouble for the court. This mid-dynasty restoration (ohung-hsing) barely survived Hsien-tsung's reign. Ill-considered appointments, misguided military ap-pointments , lack of foresight by the chief ministers, and a lack of imperial leadership led to successful rebellions during the reigns of Mu-tsung and Ching-tsung in the three garrisons of Ho-shuo, resulting in their regaining their former indepen-dence. Only one of these rebels, Wang T'ing-tsou of Ch'eng-te, set up a government which lasted until the end of the dynasty. The significance of these rebellions was the fact that they shattered the previous stability within this area, making its new and insecure leaders susceptible to pressure from a united court. -16-The upheavals In the strategic province of Lu-lung in 841 and the emergence of Chang Chung-wu as military governor produced a further foothold In Ho-shuo which helped the court establish the necessary modus vivendi with Wel-po and Ch'eng-te to put down the rebellion in Chao-i. This incident was another testing ground for Li Te-yii's military ability and political s k i l l . After the military governor of Lu-lung, Shih Yuan-chung, was killed by his rebellious troops led by Ch'en Hslng-t'ai, he sent a subordinate of the eunuch supervisor to court with a memorial from the ssnior officers officially requesting the sym-bols of office, in response, Te-yii said: The situation in Ho-shuo ls one with which I am very familiar. Recently because the court's dispatching envoys granting decrees has often been too fast, the sentiments of the military have consequently firmed up. If we shelve the matter for a few months and do not make [further] inquiries, certainly they themselves will start a coup. Now I request that you keep the eunuch overseer's man here and do not send any officials there to observe them.3-" Soonyafterwards, the army killed Hsing-t'ai and set up Chang Chiang and requested that he be invested as military governor. A similar request from the Hsiung-wu army on behalf of its leader Chang Chung-wu was presented to court by Wu Chung-shu, claiming that Chiang was cruel and requesting that Wu use the Hsiung-wu army to punish him. In a subsequent ex-change, Wu argued persuasively that gaining support of the populace and cutting off the supply routes to Yu-ohou would be sufficient to defeat a larger army. In his final decision, -17-Te-yii stated: Since Hslng-t'ai and Chiang both made high o f f i c e r s send up memorials and threatened the court requesting the symbols of o f f i c e , we cannot grant i t . Now Chung-wu himself has f i r s t raised an army to punish the re-b e l l i o n on the court's behalf. If we grant i t to him, i t w i l l appear that he i s acting with our authority. He then made Chung-wu interim governor i n charge of Lu-lung. Soon thereafter, Chung-wu conquered Yu-chou. 1? Except f o r some l a t e r disagreements with L i u Mien and the r army from Ho-tung, Chang rendered great service to the court i n helping to defeat the Uighurs and by remaining neutral during the r e b e l l i o n i n Chao-i. By throwing the support of the court to Chang, Te-yii had chosen a winner and at the same time established a fi r m base of court support i n Ho-pei. With Yu-chou supporting the court and p'ing-lu safely i n the court's corner, the formerly monolithic structure of the three g a r r i -sons was reduced to just Wei-po and Ch'eng-te, now both crowded i n by these two l o y a l areas. Te-yii gained the support of these two provinces by per-suading them that helping the court would be i n t h e i r long-term best i n t e r e s t s . He t o l d Wang Yuan-k'uel of Ch'eng-te and Ho Hung-ohlng of Wel-po: "The s i t u a t i o n i n the oommandery of Chao-i and yours i s not the same. There i s no need to make long range plans on behalf of your descendants or a l l i a n c e s of mutual a i d . Merely openly demonstrate achievements and merits and your good fortune w i l l of i t s own accord reach down to your descendants." 1^ A f t e r accomplishing the neat t r i c k of -18-simultaneously preventing Wei-po and Ch«eng-te from allying themselves with Ghao-i and enlisting them instead as supporters of the court, the central government was ready to turn its attention to the urgent matter of defeating the rebels. In gaining the active military support of the two provinces in Ho-pei against the rebellion in Chao-i, the court, on the one hand, had to reassure them that the court had no designs beyond regaining Ghao-i, and on the other, had to convince them that aiding the court was in their best interests. The f i r s t objective was accomplished by Te-yii's disclaimer that the court did not intend to send its armies into Ho-pei. This point was likely also reiterated by Li Hul during his personal diplo-matic mission to these two areas. These diplomatic assurances aside, no casus belli existed at this time between the court and the north-east. Although these two areas were, in fact, separate and adversary states, both were content to live side by side in peace unless there was an issue which either side thought It could exploit to its own advantage. At this time, the court's ambitions were restrained by its limited financial resources and military strength. The mili-tary governors in Ho-pei, for their part, were somewhat inse-cure since they were new in their positions. Ho Hung-ohing, for example, had only just assumed his post in Hui-ch'ang 1 [84-1], Under such circumstances, they were more likely to be browbeaten by a forceful and persuasive chief minister. The court appealed to the self-interest of these governors -19-when Te-yii formally acknowledged that hereditary succession i n Ho-pei had become a longstanding practice and that the court would not i n t e r f e r e . By doing so, he was not giving up anything Inviolate, f o r the court had long passed the point of having the wherewithal to involve i t s e l f i n the Internal a f f a i r s of the northeastern provinces. If Wei-po and Ch'eng-te p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the campaign against Chao-i, t h e i r armies would be e l i g i b l e f o r payments from the court f o r f i g h t i n g be-yond t h e i r own f r o n t i e r s , f o r a share i n the booty from cap-tured rebel c i t i e s , and f o r rewards and honours from the court. I t remains to be seen whether or not such standard inducements were enough to entice the governors into supporting the court. The unanswerable question, nevertheless,, remains: d i d the court o f f e r the three commanderies of Hslng, Ming, and Tz'u to them and, i f so, how did the court prevent them from coll e c t i n g ? Nevertheless, these two governors d i d lend t h e i r support to the court, although i n Ho's case i t was somewhat reluctant. At t h i s point, the court had gained a remarkable degree of cooperation from the independent governors i n Ho-pel. The former province of P'ing-lu had been reconquered, arid then had been divided up into three smaller ones. Chang Chung-wu, now i n command of Yu-chou, pledged his support to the court out of gratitude f o r i t s e a r l i e r backing, while remaining beyond i t s t i g h t control, Wei-po and Ch'eng-te were s t i l l unconquered and unrepentant although they had agreed, f o r the duration of -20-the campaign against Ghao-i, to aid the court against Liu Chen and his rebellious army. Thus Te-yii was able to take advantage of earlier court military success (P'ing-lu), his own shrewd klngmaking (Yu-chou) and, l a s t l y , his own persua-siveness (Wei-po and Ch'eng-te) to have a l l the provinces of Ho-pei cooperate with the court to surround Chao-i, thereby increasing the court's chances of success. Without the sup-port of Wei-po and Ch'eng-te, or at least their neutrality, subduing Liu Chen would have been an extremely d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, task. In a long memorial,rp u ^ U f like L i Chiang before him, pinpointed the areas where Chao-i was vulnerable m i l i t a r i l y and suggested to the court ways i n which i t could take advan-tage of such deficiencies and suppress Liu Chen. The problem with Hsien-tsung's campaign against Huai-hsi was that since the assembled provincial armies were so disparate they failed to develop into a cohesive fighting unit and the war dragged on. On the other hand, the rebels had been bandits for f i f t y years, their customs had become entrenched, their arrogance was set and they considered that no army in the world was their equal. Furthermore, their roots were deep and their resources ample. Chao-1, i n contrast, had only been outside court con-tr o l for twenty years and the rule of the Liu family had not taken a firm hold. The Liu family's support came mainly, Tu alleged, from the remnants of the 2000 troops Liu Wu had o r i g i --21-n a l l y brought over from his home d i s t r i c t of Yiin-chou i n P'lng-lu when he took up the post. Ch'eng-te and Wei-po, Chao-i's neighbors to the east, had been Chao-i's enemies fo r over s i x t y years because Chao-1 had remained l o y a l to the court throughout the An Lu-shan Re-b e l l i o n and had fought against the other two during the sub-sequent r e b e l l i o n of the 'four princes' (782-4). Chao-i thus marked the d i v i d i n g l i n e between the provinces controlled by the court and the independent northeast. In terms of m i l i t a r y strategy, Tu suggested defending T'ien-ching Pass to prevent the rebels from crossing into Ho-yang and then moving on to Lo-yang. In addition, Tu's memorial contained the following observation on how the court could ex-p l o i t the difference between the two d i f f e r e n t parts of Chao-1: . . . A l l the m i l i t a r y provisions are i n [the area] east of the mountains, while the two ohou of Tse and Lu are within the mountains. There the s o i l i s i n f e r t i l e and the land i s narrow. Since the grain stored there has been exhausted, the military* governor s i t s i n Hsing-chou, ostensibly to be near the provisions. The provisions and grain stored there ( i . e . east of the mountains) cannot be transported. The s o l d i e r s and o f f i c e r s i n the western region are c e r t a i n l y i s o l a t e d . Indeed th i s i s where to s t r i k e at an empty p l a c e ! 2 0 As events w i l l show, Tu Mu's suggestions were p a r t i a l l y implemented during the court's campaign against Chao-1. Analyses and suggestions were one thing, but i t was yet another to translate them into action and carry them out to a success-f u l conclusion. I t was i n this l a t t e r more active capacity that Te-yii made his signal contribution to the defeat of Chao-1. -22-T h e c o u r t ' s o v e r a l l m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y was t o b l o c k o f f t h e r e b e l s o n f o u r s i d e s a n d t h e n g r a d u a l l y t i g h t e n t h e r i n g u n t i l f i n a l v i c t o r y was a c h i e v e d . T o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s , t h e c o u r t o r d e r e d t h e m i l i t a r y g o v e r n o r o f H o - y a n g , Wang M a o - y i i a n , t o l e a d 3 , 0 0 0 i n f a n t r y a n d c a v a l r y t o g u a r d Wan S h a n . I n t h e n o r t h w e s t , t h e m i l i t a r y g o v e r n o r o f H o - t u n g was s e n t t o p r o -t e c t M a n g - c h ' e P a s s ( a l s o c a l l e d A n g - c h ' e P a s s ) . I n t h e n o r t h , Wang Y u a n - k ' u e i g u a r d e d L i n - m i n g a n d p i l l a g e d Y a o - s h a n . . F i n a l l y , i n t h e s o u t h e a s t , C h ' e n I - h s i n g , t h e m i l i t a r y g o v e r n o r o f H o - o h u n g , l e d 1 0 0 0 men t o p r o t e c t I - c h ' e n g a n d 5 0 0 i n f a n t r y t o a t t a c k G h i - s h i h . Wang Y u a n - k ' u e l was g i v e n t h e t i t l e o f n o r t h e r n c o m m i s s i o n e r f o r a t t a c k i n g a n d s u b d u i n g T s e - l u a n d Ho H u n g - c h i n g o f W e i - p o was g i v e n t h e same t i t l e f o r t h e s o u t h . L i Y e n - t s o was named c o m m i s s i o n e r i n c h a r g e o f d e m a n d i n g s u r -r e n d e r a n d commander o f t h e v a r i o u s a r m i e s i n t h e e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e f r o m C h i n a n d C h i a n g ( H o - c h u n g ) . 2 1 I n H u l - o h ' a n g 3/6 p l n g - t z u [843] i t was d e c r e e d t h a t o w i n g t o t h e u n i f i e d a d -v a n c e o f t h e f i v e p r o v i n c i a l a r m i e s , t h e c o u r t w o u l d o n l y a c -c e p t t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r o f L i u C h e n . 2 2 T h e s e t e r m s , w h i l e s e t t i n g f o r t h v e r y c l e a r l y t h e c o u r t ' s u l t i m a t e a i m s f o r t h e c a m p a i g n , a l s o r e s t r i c t e d t h e means b y w h i c h w a r c o u l d b e w a g e d . T h e c o m m a n d e r s h a d b e e n n a m e d , t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s o u t -l i n e d , t h e a r m i e s h a d b e e n d i s p a t c h e d , a n d t h e w a r h a d b e g u n . T h e m i l i t a r y s t r u g g l e f o r t h e s t r a t e g i c p r o v i n c e o f H o -y a n g o n t h e n o r t h e r n s h o r e o f t h e Y e l l o w R i v e r w h i c h s e p a r a t e d - 2 3 -the rebels In Chao-i from Lo-yang, Pien-chou, and the oanal system marked the fi r s t major encounter between the court and rebel armies. If the rebels were able to make a light-ning raid to knock out and occupy the termini of the canal system, they would be able to sue for peace on their own terms, i.e., insure that their semi-autonomous status would continue without interruption. Apparently, the rebels in Chao-i sought no wider war. The court then had to hold the line In Ho-yang against the rebels or face disruption of the supply of goods shipped from the south and give in completely to the rebel»s demands. At this time, court armies had been deployed on the other three sides of Chao-1. However, this plan was weakened by the fact that Ho Hung-ching of Wel-po was secretly supporting Liu Chen and had not committed his troops to battle. This lapse allowed the rebels to redeploy troops from the border with Wel-po to attack Ho-yang to the south. In order for the court to weaken the rebel march on Ho-yang, i t would be necessary to move Ho's troops into action in order to relieve the pressure on the other fronts. Lacking the strength and perhaps the authority to issue a direct order to Ho to move his troops into battle, which could result in an outright refusal and other unforeseen prob-lems, Te-yii resorted to indirect means. The method he chose was simplicity itself—he would scare Ho by ordering another -24-general to cross his province in order to attack Chao-i. Te-yii proposed to the emperor: [The province of] Chung-wu, in a series of battles, has gained merit; their army's reputation ls very resounding. Wang Tsai in age and strength is now very robust, his plans and strategies are commendable. I request sending Hung-ching this edict: *Ho-yang and Ho-chung are both blocked off by the mountain passes and cannot advance their armies. The bandits have repeatedly sent out troops to burn and pillage Chin and Chiang. Now we will dispatch Wang Tsai to lead the entire Chung-wu army across Wei-po and directly attack Tz'u-chou in order to split up the power of the rebels.' Hung-ching will certainly be frightened. This is the technique of 'striking and attacking his mind and attacking his planning.' It was followed. An imperial edict commanded 'Tsai to select the best troops from his infantry and cavalry and hurry to Tz'u-chou from Hslang and Wei.' The results were not long in coming for later i t was recorded that: When Ho Hung-ching heard that Wang. Tsai would arrive, -he was afraid that i f the Chung-wu troops entered the borders of Wei, there would be a coup in his army, but he vacillated about sending out his troops. On the plrig-tzu , day of the 8th month [ten days after the order to Wang Tsai was issued] [Hung] himself led his whole army across the Chang liver and hurried to Ts'u-chou.2y Te-yii's assessment of the military situation in Ho-yang was not encouraging. The strength of the Ho-yang army had de-clined after the court defeat at Tadpole Inn (K'o Tou Tien) inflicted by the rebel general Hsiieh Mao-ch'ing. The military governor of Ho-yang, Wang Mao-yuan, was continually i l l . Te-yii analyzed rebel strategy and court response as follows: I humbly note that since the Yuan-ho era [805-820] the various bandits, frequently when they see where the court armies are isolated and weak, combine their -25-strength to attack i t . If one army i s inadequate, afterwards they then attack another place. Now Wel-po has not engaged the enemy i n b a t t l e , the western armies are obstructed by the passes and cannot advance. Therefore the bandits are able to combine t h e i r strength and come southward. I f Ho-yang f a l l s , not only w i l l i t harm the reputation of the army, but also, I am a f r a i d , i t w i l l s t a r t l e and f r i g h t e n Lo-yang. I hope you w i l l Issue an edict to Wang Tsai not to go to Tz'u-chou, but Instead to go quickly with the Chung-wu army to support and r e l i e v e Ho-yang. Not only would thi s protect and screen Lo-yang, but also we may observe and control Wei-po. The entire army would be d i f f i c u l t to supply and provision; i f , f o r the moment, you order him to send a vanguard of 5000 men to Ho-yang, t h i s w i l l also be s u f f i c i e n t to display t h e i r reputation and power. On the chia-shen day, he also memorialised re-questing an edict be issued to Wang Tsai to follow with his whole army and, as before; urgently- a i d ; t h e d e f i c i e n -cies i n Ho-yang with weapons and c l o t h . The emperor accepted a l l - of t h l s . 2 ^ : - " Deficiencies and r i v a l r i e s within the rebel m i l i t a r y com-mand were more d i r e c t l y a cause of the rebel f a i l u r e to capture Ho-yang than the s u p e r i o r i t y of the court forces. The great defeat of the rebel army at T'ai-hang Slope near Wan Shan was the r e s u l t of panic within the rebel ranks rather than any spe c i a l strategy used by the pursuing court f o r c e s . 2 ^ i n the same way, the recapture of T'ien-ching pass, the key pass be-tween TserChou and Ho-yang, was the r e s u l t of Hsueli Mao-ch' ing's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the way he was treated by L i u Chen and not of Wang Taai's aggressiveness. The unfolding of t h i s Important event has been recorded as follows: "Hsueh Mao-ch»ing, owing to his achievements at K'o Tou Sai expected rapid promotion. Someone said to L i u Chen, 'What an interim governor seeks i s the symbol of o f f i c e . Mao-ch'ing penetrated too deeply, often k i l l i n g court troops and [thus] has angered -26-th e court. This i s why the coming of the symbol of o f f i c e has been l a t e r and l a t e r . ' Since there had been no reward,iMao-ch'Jingwas indignant.' Secretly he communicated his plans to Wang Tsai. On the ting-ssu day of the 12th month, Tsai l e d his troops to attack T'ien-ching Pass; Mao-ch'lng fought a l i t t l e but abruptly l e d his troops away. Tsai then captured T'ien-ching Pass and guarded i t . When the palisades to the east and west of the pass heard that Mao-ch'lng was not guarding i t , they a l l withdrew and l e f t . Tsai then burned the v i l l a g e of Ta-hslao c h ' l . Mao-ch'lng entered Tse-ohou and sec r e t l y sent a spy to summon Tsai to advance and attack Tse-chou, at which time he would betray the c i t y . Tsai was suspicious and did not dare advance. When he missed the chance and did not a r r i v e , Mao-ch'ing struck h i s breastplate and stamped his foot f i n f r u s t r a t i o n ] . When L i u Chen learned of t h i s , he trick e d Mao-ch'ing into coming to Lu-chou and had him k i l l e d together with his clan..."26 The capture of T'ien-ching pass by the court troops struck a f a t a l blow to the rebel's hopes of a l i g h t n i n g s t r i k e against Lo^yang or plen-chou and the canal system. The four sides of the rebel lands were now completely surrounded and i t would be only a matter of time before the r e b e l l i o n would be completely choked o f f . As chief minister and de facto supreme commander of the imperial forces, Te-yii's major concern was to try to avoid the mistakes of past campaigns. The most co s t l y i n both time and money were the d i l a t o r y t a c t i c s adopted by p r o v i n c i a l armies on campaign beyond the borders of t h e i r own province, who entered into c o l l u s i o n with the enemy to prolong the f i g h t i n g so that these armies could continue c o l l e c t i n g subsidies from the court. His solution to thi s problem was as follows: When I look a t the use of troops i n Ho-shuo during former days, the various provinces benefitted from -27-b e i n g s u p p l i e d b y t h e O f f i c e o f N a t i o n a l a e v e n u e when t h e y w e n t [ o n c a m p a i g n s ] b e y o n d t h e i r b o r d e r s , s o m e -t i m e s t h e y w e r e s e c r e t l y i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h t h e e n e m y , " b o r r o w i n g " a s u b - p r e f e c t u r e o r a s t o c k a d e a n d o c c u p y i n g i t , c l a i m i n g i t a s a n a c h i e v e m e n t w h i l e s i t -t i n g a n d e a t i n g w h a t t h e t r a n s p o r t s b r o u g h t , p r o l o n g i n g t h e t i m e i n t o m o n t h s o r y e a r s . Now I r e q u e s t g i v i n g t h e v a r i o u s a r m i e s t h e command ' o r d e r Wang Y i i a n - k ' u e i t o t a k e H s l n g - c h o u , Ho H u n g -c h i n g , M i n g - c h o u , Wang M a o - y u a n , T s e - c h o u a n d L i Y e n -t s o t o g e t h e r w i t h L i u M i e n , L u c h o u . Do n o t c a p t u r e s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s I ' 2 7 T h i s m e e t i n g o f m i n d s b e t w e e n t h e e m p e r o r a n d h i s c h i e f m i n i -s t e r i s f u r t h e r e x e m p l i f i e d b y t h e e v e n t s a t c o u r t i n t h e wake o f t h e s e t b a c k a t K ' o T o u S t o c k a d e s c o u r t o f f i c i a l s a g a i n f e l t t h a t " L i u Wu i n d e e d h a d m e r i t a n d t h e c o u r t o u g h t n o t t o d i s r u p t h e r e d i t a r y s u c c e s s i o n w i t h i n t h e L i u f a m i l y ; f u r t h e r -m o r e , t h e y b e l i e v e d t h a t s i n c e C h a o - i h a d 100,000 c r a c k t r o o p s a n d h a d s t o r e d away s u f f i c i e n t p r o v i s i o n s f o r t e n y e a r s , how c o u l d i t b e d e f e a t e d . » T h e e m p e r o r d o u b t e d t h i s a n d a s k e d T e - y i i , who r e p l i e d : " M i n o r a d v a n c e s a n d r e t r e a t s a r e t h e c o m m o n p l a c e s o f m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g i s t s . I h o p e t h a t t h e e m p e r o r w i l l n o t l i s t e n t o o u t s i d e d i s c u s s i o n , f o r t h e n a c h i e v i n g s u c c e s s i s c e r t a i n . " T h e e m p e r o r t h e n s a i d t o t h e c h i e f m i n i s t e r s : " T e l l t h e C o u r t o f f i c i a l s o n my b e h a l f , I w i l l c e r t a i n l y h a v e t h o s e who s e n d u p o b s t r u c t i v e d i s c u s s i o n b e -h e a d e d o n t h e r e b e l b o r d e r . " s u c h d i s c u s s i o n s t h e n s t o p p e d . * " 0 N e i t h e r t h e e m p e r o r n o r T e - y i i , who w e r e b o t h t o t a l l y c o m -m i t t e d t o t h e w a r , w o u l d a c c e p t a n y c r i t i c i s m o r o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e i r p o l i c i e s f r o m a n y q u a r t e r . T h i s u n i t y o f p u r p o s e , -28-concentration of power, and decisiveness at court were i n -strumental i n the swift r e s o l u t i o n of the r e b e l l i o n . Te-yii 1 s l e g a l i s t tendencies, summed up i n the phrase, " i n great matters of state, rewards and punishments must be carri e d out," 2? was a major reason why court generals put forward t h e i r best e f f o r t s and why the court was so success-f u l In e l i c i t i n g defections from disgruntled rebel leaders. He went to great lengths to appear benevolent and generous i n order to entice rebel generals to defect. When the grand general, L i P'l came to submit, Te-yii's assessment of the s i t u -a t i o n was contrary to the general court opinion that P ' i had been d e l i b e r a t e l y sent by the rebels to disrupt the court from within. Te-yii s a i d to the emperor: "In h a l f a year of f i g h t -ing, there have been no defectors; now how can we ask whether or not thi s defection i s true or counterfeit. I t i s just that we ought to reward them l i b e r a l l y i n order to encourage them i n the future. Just don't put them i n a st r a t e g i c place."3° Acceptance of the f i r s t defector would be a test of the s i n -c e r i t y of the court's intentions. If L i P'i were rejected, the court's avowed p o l i c y of welcoming defectors would have become suspect. By placing L i i n a f a r - o f f place away from the f i g h t i n g he could be observed and prevented from under-mining the court's m i l i t a r y e f f o r t . Te-yii understood the minds and expectations of his own soldie r s well enough to reward successful generals and troops with o f f i c e s , ranks, money, and clo t h . When Wang Yiian-k'uei -29-had taken Hsuan-wu Cha and attacked lao Shan, he was rewarded with an honorary chief ministership as a lure to the other generals. As ready as he was to reward successful generals, Te-yii was equally decisive about cashiering and replacing incompetent ones. When he was d i s s a t i s f i e d with the achievements of L i Yen-tso, he named the more aggressive sh lh Hsiung as his deputy and replacement. About Yen-tso, Te-yii said: "He i s d i l a t o r y , v a c i l l a t i n g and r e a l l y has no intention of punishing the rebels. Everything he wishes cannot be granted. I ought to issue an edict to reprimand him severely and to order him to advance his army to Chi-cheng."31 Wang Mao-yuan of Ho-yang was only given administrative duties to look a f t e r owing to h i s contin-uing i l l health and lack of e f f o r t . When he died, his command was given to the more capable Wang Tsai.32 with the exception of the generals from Wel-po and Ch'eng-te, Te-yii exercised d i s c i p l i n a r y a ction over generals under his command. The court's diplomatic breakthrough was i n convincing the two provinces of Wei-po and Ch'eng-te that i t was i n t h e i r long-term i n t e r e s t to support the court against Chao-i. The 80 year old autonomy of Ho-shuo had not changed. One opinion states that, at this time, Te-yii guaranteed the court would not i n t e r f e r e In future hereditary succession i n these two provinces.33 While the f i n a l outcome of court non-interference i n these matters was the same, i t i s l i k e l y more accurate to -30-say that Te-yii was merely formally acknowledging a long-standing p r a c t i c e , admitting that at this time the court lacked the means to do anything about i t . I t cost nothing to recognize t h i s p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y , but i t d i d help the court gain invaluable a l l i e s i n the struggle against Chao-i. With armies and generals who were more cl o s e l y controlled by the court, Te-yii redeployed them as need and circumstance required. A f t e r Shih Hsiung had replaced L i Yen-tso as m i l i -tary governor of the Ho-chung expeditionary force, he was ordered to move from Chih Shih to take Lu-chou. As before, he was to s p l i t h i s army to camp at I-ch'eng to guard against i n -vasions and r a i d s . At that time there was a hunchback i n the marketplace of Lu-chou singing •Shih Hsiung and 7,000 men are coming,' whereupon L i u Chen had him beheaded f o r u t t e r i n g treasonous t a l k . In order to f u l f i l l t h i s b i z a rre p r e d i c t i o n , Te-yii named s h i h to capture Lu-chou. ^  In a more s i g n i f i c a n t move, he transferred L i u Mien of Ho-tung i n order to prevent his personal differences with Chang Chung-wu of Yu-chou from undermining the unity of the court's m i l i t a r y e f f o r t . E a r l i e r these two had argued over the rewards f o r defeating the Uighurs and recapturing the T'ai-ho Princess. The court sent L i Hui to mediate, but to no a v a i l . Consequently, Mien was trans-ferred to I-ch'eng and L i Shih, formerly m i l i t a r y governor of Ching-nan, replaced him as m i l i t a r y governor of Ho-tung. At the time, t h i s change seemed innocuous and even wise, but -31-u l t l m a t e l y i t l e d t o t h e s h o r t - l i v e d r e b e l l i o n i n T ' a i - y i i a n . A f t e r t h e a c t u a l o u t b r e a k o f t h e r e b e l l i o n I n T ' a i - y i i a n t h i s r i v a l r y a g a i n c a u s e d a c h a n g e i n m i l i t a r y a s s i g n m e n t s . T e - y i i was a f r a i d o f s e n d i n g C h u n g - w u a n d h i s Y u - c h o u a r m y t o H o - t u n g , l e s t C h u n g - w u t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f t h i s f o r m e r r i f t t o r u n w i l d a n d w r e a k h a v o c among t h e p o p u l a c e . E v e n t h o u g h h e was f u r -t h e r a w a y , Wang Y i i a n - k ' u e i was summoned I n s t e a d t o l e a d a r e -l i e f c o l u m n f r o m C h e n g - t e v i a t h e T ' u - m e n P a s s . U l t i m a t e l y l o c a l t r o o p s s e t t l e d t h e m a t t e r f o r t h e c o u r t . T h e c o u r t ' s i n s i s t e n c e o n u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r was f u l l y I n k e e p i n g w i t h i t s a v o w e d g o a l o f r e s t o r i n g c o u r t c o n -t r o l o v e r t h e w h o l e o f t h e e m p i r e . T h e c o u r t ' s t e r m s t o L i u w e r e v e r y s i m p l e — t h a t h e a n d h i s w h o l e c l a n b e b o u n d a n d d e -l i v e r e d t o c o u r t . T o a c c e p t t h e s u r r e n d e r o f Chao-1 u n d e r a n y o t h e r t e r m s w o u l d h a v e c o m p r o m i s e d t h e s e a n n o u n c e d g o a l s a n d w o u l d h a v e u n d e r m i n e d t h e c r e d i b i l i t y a n d s t r e n g t h o f t h e c o u r t i n t h e e y e s o f t h e o t h e r m i l i t a r y g o v e r n o r s , some o f whom may h a v e a l s o h a r b o u r e d s e c e s s i o n i s t t h o u g h t s . L i u C h e n ' s m o t i v e s f o r s e e k i n g a c o n d i t i o n a l p e a c e w e r e e s s e n t i a l l y t h o s e o f s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n . U n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r meant d e a t h a n d t o t a l e x t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e L i u f a m i l y a n d a l l t h e i r s u p p o r t e r s . C o n v e r s e l y , t o a c h i e v e a c o n d i t i o n a l p e a c e , t h e r e b e l s d i d n o t h a v e t o d e f e a t t h e c o u r t f o r c e s b u t m e r e l y h a d t o p r o l o n g t h e c a m p a i g n u n t i l i t became s o c o s t l y i n b l o o d a n d t r e a s u r e t h a t i t w o u l d b e a d v a n t a g e o u s f o r t h e c o u r t t o a c c e p t a t r u c e o n / -32-less demanding terms. The unwillingness of Te-yii to compromise on the court's terms f o r L i u Chen's surrender may be explained, i n part, by Te-yii 1 s attempt to curry favour with the court eunuchs, since L i u Ts'ung-chien had been an outspoken c r i t i c of eunuch I n f l u -ence i n the.court of Wen-tsung and l a t e r a champion of the Innocence of Wang Yal and Chia su i n planning the Sweet Dew Incident,35 he had allowed many of the family members of these victims of the eunuch's revenge to seek refuge i n Chao-i a f t e r the Sweet Dew Incident. This motive of placating the eunuchs has been attributed more frequently to the rebel general Kuo I, for he had a l l these p o l i t i c a l refugees executed along with L i u Chen's family a f t e r his f i n a l coup In Chao-1.36 ijhe e v i -dent motive f o r k i l l i n g the former was to strengthen his case f o r seeking a m i l i t a r y governorship from the court as a reward f o r betraying L i u Chen and thus ending the r e b e l l i o n . Te-yii, who never intended to grant such an appointment, took the cre d i t f o r these executions, i n order to improve his own stand-ing among the court eunuchs by removing the l a s t vestiges of t h e i r former enemies, while at the same time taking the oppor-tunity to gain revenge on the remnants of the sweet Dew p l o t -ters and t h e i r supporters who had driven him from the chief ministership i n 834. Despite the absence of a major figure at court a f t e r the death of Ch'iu Shlh-liang, and the acquie-scence of thee other eunuchs with court p o l i c y , the eunuchs -33-remained nevertheless a major force and one whose needs and wishes had to be catered to. E a r l i e r , L i u Chen r e a l i z e d the extent of the court's en-mity when he t r i e d to explain his reasons f o r defying the court edict i n these terms: The reason why I did not lead my whole clan to submit to the court was because when my l a t e father, Ts'ung-chien, vindicated L i Hsun f i n the aftermath of the Sweet Dew incident] he said that Ch'iu s h l h-llang was criminal and e v i l ; therefore, he was hated by the powerful and i n f l u e n t i a l , who said that my father and I harboured rebellious Intent. I beg your majesty to condescend to show lenience and enquire into the mat-te r , and allow me to l i v e i n one corner! 37 Neither t h i s memorial nor the one Ho Hung-ching sent i n sup-port received a reply. By sending "peace f e e l e r s " to m i l i t a r y governors and court generals having r e l a t i v e s ssrving i n Chao-1, Chen hoped to c i r -cumvent the harsh terms the court had imposed f o r accepting his submission. His l e t t e r to the newly-installed m i l i t a r y governor of Ho-tung, L i Shih, was a further test of the court's resolve to maintain: i t s p o l i c y of unconditional surrender. Chen dispatched a general to T'ai-yiian bearing a l e t t e r from Shih's older b r o t h e r L i T 1 ien,who was serving as prefect of Ming-chou. I t said; "Chen wishes to lead his clan to you noble s i r and to observe mourning f o r Ts'ung-chien and accom-pany the body to Lo-yang."38 sh ih then imprisoned the envoy and memorialised the throne. Te-yii then said to the emperor: •Now the court forces are c l o s i n g i n on four sides and the dispatch announcing v i c t o r y w i l l a r r i v e -34-wlthin days. Since the power of the rebels i s ex-hausted and weak, therefore they f a l s e l y send us t h e i r protestations of s i n c e r i t y , hoping to slow down our armies, so that they can restore them-selves a l i t t l e to invade and attack again. I look forward to an edict ordering Shih to reply to ;T»ien's l e t t e r saying: "I have not dared to report your e a r l i e r l e t t e r to court. I f you can sincerely re-gret your errors, together with your whole clan t i e d and bound wait f o r your punishment on the f r o n t i e r , then shih w i l l c e r t a i n l y personally go and accept your surrender, and send you under guard to court. I f you make empty protestations of s i n -c e r i t y , we f i r s t require you to disband your army before we w i l l exonerate you; then Shih w i l l cer-t a i n l y not dare use 100 mouths to protect one man." Further, I hope< that you w i l l issue an edict to the various provinces to take advantage of the d i s a f -f e c t i o n between those above and those below, to ad-vance our troops quickly to attack and invade. In ten days or a month's time, Internally, they w i l l c e r t a i n l y s t a r t a coup.39 The Immediate coup, however, occurred i n T'ai-yiian and was yet another example of material rewards d i c t a t i n g the l o y a l t y of s o l d i e r s . Theprelimlnary events leading up to the uprising were as follows: "Wang Feng, the commissioner i n charge of horses and men f o r the expeditionary force from Ho-tung, re-quested reinforcements f o r the Shu-she Army. An edict ordered Ho-tung to send 2000 men there [Heng-shul Stockade], At t h i s time, Ho-tung did not have any troops. Granary guards and workmen were a l l sent out to j o i n the army. When L i Shih summoned the 1500 garrison troops from Heng Shui, he had the subordinate general Yang pien lead them to Feng... Previously when soldi e r s went out on campaign, each man was given two pieces of uncolored s i l k . When L i u Mien l e f t , he emptied the treasury and took i t s contents with him. When Shih ar r i v e d , the army re-sources were exhausted and he added his own personal uncolored s i l k to pay the troops, but each man got only one piece. At t h i s time, the year was almost over and the troops sought to celebrate New Year's before going out [on campaign], [but] the eunuch supervisor, Lii I-chung, repeatedly sent warrants to -35-hurry them on. Yang Pien, because of the anger of the throng and also because he knew the c i t y was empty, then rebelled.4-° After he took over the c i t y , Shih was forced to f l e e to nearby Fen-chou. Among the f i r s t things that Yang did was to free the envoy general from L i u Chen and send him back to Chao-i, together with h i s own nephew, to swear a treaty of brotherhood.^ The p o s s i b i l i t y that the r e b e l l i o n i n Chao-1 could spread to adjoining Ho-tung demanded that the court forces focus t h e i r f u l l attention on this rag-tag group of malcontents i n T ' a i -yiian. Other court o f f i c i a l s once again sought to abandon the two campaigns and r e c a l l the troops. L i P ' l , the defected rebel general who had been sent to Che-chou a f t e r submitting, informed the court that he had executed the people that Yang Pien had sent out to proselytize and had taken steps to cut off t h e i r northern route of escape. Furthermore, he was r a i s -ing an army to f i g h t them. ^ 2 The o v e r a l l strategy f o r hand-l i n g this r e b e l l i o n was s i m i l a r to that of the l a r g e r insurrec-t i o n i n Chao-i—contain i t i n i t s o r i g i n a l area and then mar-shal other court-controlled forces to put i t down. The harmful effects of eunuch Interference i n the uprising i n T'ai-yiian were exposed by Te-yii's cross-examination of the court appointed envoy, Ma Yiian-kuan, who had been sent to ob-serve the uprising i n T'ai-yiian. A f t e r accepting bribes from Pien, Ma t r i e d to convince the court that he had seen a column of armed troops f i f t e e n l i long l i n e d up f o r inspection. His -36-statement that these troops had been recruited l o c a l l y was re-futed when Te-yii r e p l i e d that i f L i Shih had not been able to reward the soldiers of the garrison generously enough to pre-vent them from r e b e l l i n g , how could Yang pien f i n d the resources to a t t r a c t new t r o o p s . ^ A f t e r the true state of the rebels' p o s i t i o n had been found out, the court began a f o r c e f u l cam-paign to quash the r e b e l l i o n . The end of the uprising, however, occurred Independently of court plans. Te-yii had wanted several court generals to lead t h e i r armies against the rebels. However, when the Ho-tung army garrisoned at Yu-she heard that the court had ordered "guest" armies to. recapture T'ai-yiian, they were a f r a i d that t h e i r womenfolk and children would be butchered and murdered so they urged t h e i r eunuch overseer Lii 1-chung that they re-take T'ai-yiian themselves. Subsequently, Yang Pien was cap-tured and a l l the rebel s o l d i e r s s l a i n . ^ Personal r i v a l r i e s among various court generals as well as generals and o f f i c i a l s whose r e l a t i v e s were being held as hostages by Chao-i further complicated the campaign against L i u Chen. The feud between Wang Tsai and sh ih Hsiung, two ambitious and capable generals, i s an excellent example of the former. Just p r i o r to the outbreak at T'ai-yiian, Tsai reported to the throne that he had sent an envoy to Tse-lu who was t o l d that the rebels Intended to submit. Tsai then sought an imperial edict allowing him to accept the surrender. Te-yii r e p l i e d : -37-When Tsai a r b i t r a r i l y accepted Chen's l e t t e r , he sent an envoy Into the midst of the rebels without inform-ing [the court] with a memorial. When we observe Tsal's Intentions, i t appears that he wishes to grab f o r himself the c r e d i t f o r subduing and paci f y i n g [the re b e l s ] . In the past when Han Hsin defeated T'ien Heng and L i Ch'lng apprehended Hsieh L i , they both took advantage of the request to surrender to hide troops f o r a secret attack. I f this causes only Wang Tsai to lose c r e d i b i l i t y , how can thi s harm the authority of the court! Today i s the day f o r the es-tablishment of exceptional merit. We c e r t a i n l y ought not lose this opportunity because of this minor d i s -turbance i n T'ai-yiian. I hope you w i l l send a supply o f f i c e r immediately to the expeditionary force to urge on t h e i r advancing armies and take advantage of the enemy's lack of preparations, f o r we must require that L i u Chen, a l l h i s various generals, and t h e i r entire clans be t i e d and presented face to face before t h e i r surrender i s acceptable. Concurrently, we w i l l also send a supply o f f i c e r to the expeditionary force from Chin and Chiang [Ho-chung] to suggest s e c r e t l y to them that i f Wang Tsai accepts the surrender of L i u Chen, Hsiung w i l l have no merit which may be recorded. Since Hsiung i s on the brink of achieving [success], he ought to take some spec i a l achievement f o r himself and not miss t h i s chance.^5 Wang Tsai was the son of Wang Chih-hsing, with whom Te-yii had had a disagreement over the establishment of a platform f o r private Buddhist ordination i n ssu-chou.^° Nevertheless, t h i s family connection d i d not prejudice Te-yii's f a i t h In Tsal's m i l i t a r y a b i l i t i e s , f o r Tsai was one of the court's most ag-gressive and successful generals. Hsiung, on the other hand, had not got along well with Tsal's father and i t i s l i k e l y that t h e i r disagreements stemmed from t h i s . Te-yii, of course, was aware of t h i s . Although the court d i d allow p r o v i n c i a l armies wide l a t i t u d e i n t a c t i c s used i n the f i e l d , o v e r a l l strategy was devised and controlled by the court. Thus, Te-yii did not want an over-anxious or over-ambitious f i e l d commander -38-rashly adopting a plan of action detrimental to the ultimate goals of the court. The means available to him for controlling court armies were somewhat limited by distance and court power and fre-quently had to be supplemented by his imaginative use of re-wards and punishments and his thorough understanding of the generals, their professional rivalries, personal relationships, and the overall military situation. The continuing rivalry between Wang and s h i h was further complicated by Wang's own - - 47 . s o n , 'Yen-shlh, being held captive by Liu Chen. Te-yu's analysis of this complicated situation and his orders to the principals is worth examining: •Wang Tsai ought to have captured Tse-chou long ago. Now he has procrastinated for two months. Prom the beginning there has been no mutual cooperation be-tween Tsai and Shih Hsiung. Now i f he took Tse-chou, he would s t i l l be 200 l i distant from shang-tang, but where Shih Hsiung is camped ls just 150 l i [away], Tsai is afraid that i f he attacks Tse-chou and then goes on to meet the major army of Chao-1, Hsiung then will be able to take advantage of this void, enter Shang-tang and the victory would be his. Wang's -own s o p L \ Yen-shin, whom the^> father, Chih-hsing, cherishes jand treats like a son, is prefect of Tz'u-chou and is being held hostage by Liu Chen, some say this is the reason for Wang's indecision and his not daring to advance. • The emperor ordered Te-yii to draft a decree to Wang to urge him to advance, and to say *I regard these as minor thieves, in the end I will not pardon them. Moreover,. I know that Yen-»shlh is your beloved 'younger-brother.'' The demonstration of great righteousness lies in repressing one's per-sonal feelings•.«48 This memorial outlined Te-yii's grasp of the situation as well as his concern for the personal feelings of his gene-rals; yet, he fully realized that an imperial order could be -39-simply Ignored or otherwise sidestepped. A more concrete and e f f e c t i v e method of a c t i o n was required. Por t h i s purpose, he returned to his e a r l i e r ploy of dispatching another court general to the region occupied by a hesitant one to observe his actions and to prod him into attacking the enemy. He said: There are d e f i n i t e l y a f f a i r s i n which one must act with urgency to achieve success. Your majesty ordered Wang Tsai to hasten to Tz'u-chou but had Ho Hung-chlng send out troops and dispatched "guest" troops to attack T | vai-yuan but the f r o n t i e r garrison [under Lu 1-chung] captured Yang pien f i r s t . For a long time now Wang Tsai has not advanced his army. I request you to transfer L i u Mien to garrison Ho-yang and further to order 2000 crack troops from I*ch'eng to attack Wan Shan d i r e c t l y and occupy the area under Tsai's armpit. I f Tsai r e a l i z e s the court's Intent, he w i l l c e r t a i n l y not dare to tarry long. I f Tsai moves his troops forward, Mien w i l l be to the south with a powerful army and our re- . nown and force [ i n that d i r e c t i o n ] w i l l also be strong. ° This t a c t i c was also successful f o r , l e s s than a month l a t e r , Wang Tsai advanced and attacked Tse-chou. Te-yii had again found a way to get r e s u l t s . x The worsening m i l i t a r y and domestic situation: i n Chao-i as shown by Chen's uncertain leadership, which permitted favored generals to amass fortunes while neglecting success-f u l and deserving ones, plus the increasing economic hardships on the common people brought on by the ever tightening;? r i n g of court troops, and the growing awareness among the generals that t h e i r cause was hopeless and that some means of coming to terms with the court was necessary to save t h e i r own l i v e s , l e d to more defections to court and marked the beginning of the -40-end of the r e b e l l i o n . These defections eroded the rebel capacity to r e s i s t i n two s i g n i f i c a n t ways. F i r s t , i t deprived the rebels of t h e i r most competent leaders and commanders. As i f this were not damaging enough, these defecting generals provided Invaluable information concerning the general state of a f f a i r s within the rebel realm as well as s p e c i f i c advice on the best ways of attacking m i l i t a r y objectives. An extended quotation from one such defector w i l l provide a clearer understanding of the contribution such defections made to the court's f i n a l v i c t o r y : When L i u Chen's trusted general Kao Wen-tuan surrendered, he said that the rebels were running short of food and had ordered women to rub ears of grain between t h e i r hands to remove the husks and give them to the army. When Te-yu asked Wen-tuan about a plan f o r defeating the rebels, Wen-tuan considered that, 'If the Imperial army straightaway attacks Tse-chou, I am a f r a i d many o f f i c e r s and men w i l l be k i l l e d , f o r the walled f o r t i -f i c a t i o n w i l l not be ea s i l y taken. The army at Tse-chou numbers around 15,000. The rebels often divide the army and send the greater part to hide i n the h i l l s and v a l l e y s . When they see the court army weaken a f t e r attacking the f o r t r e s s , they j o i n up from a l l directions to rescue i t . The imperial army w i l l c e r t a i n l y be de-feated. Now I request that you order the Ch'en-hsii army to cross the dried up r i v e r and establish a stockade. From the stockade connect and extend the building to enclose the walled f o r t i f i c a t i o n and surround Tse-chou. During the day dispatch a large army to display them-selves i n the open i n order to ward off the r e l i e v i n g armies. When the rebels see that the f o r t i s about to be surrounded they w i l l oombine and c e r t a i n l y w i l l come to f i g h t i n great numbers. Walt u n t i l they are defeated and withdraw; then afterward, i f you take advantage of the s i t u a t i o n , [the f o r t i f i c a t i o n ] may be taken.5° Wen-tuan also said: ...Liu Chen has already wiped out Hsiieh Mao-ch'ing* s clan and has also executed T'an Chao-i, the commissioner -41-of the relief forces from .Ching-chou, and his [two] brothers, three altogether. [Wang] Chao was naturally suspicious and afraid. When Chen sent a messenger to summon him, Chao was unwilling to enter [the capital]. His officers and men were a l l in an uproar. He cer-tainly was not going to be used by Chen. But his family and those of his officers were in Lu-chou [where they were subject to reprisals from Chen]. If they submit,, they will also be afraid that they would be killed by the imperial forces. If you invite them, they will not be willing to come. Just make your inten-tions known to Chao and have him lead his army to Lu-chou and capture Chen, promising that on the day the deed is done, you will appoint him to be military governor in another circuit and additionally grant generous gifts. Chances are he will willingly submit. 51 Liu Chen's inability to control some generals and satisfy others was another reason for these defections. Favorites such as Li Shlh-kuei and Liu Hsl were allowed to accumulate great wealth and undermine the command structure of the rebel army for their own grasping purposes. On two occasions, P'el Wen, the younger brother of Liu Ts'ung-chien*s wife and a com-petent general, was the victim of their machinations. Once when Wen was about to be summoned to Lu-chou to supervise military policy, shih-kuel considered him a threat to his own position and leaked the news of the appointment saying that the military situation in--'the area east of the mountains was dependent on p'el and i f he were summoned, the region would be lost. The appointment was then stopped.52 Another time, after Li Hsl arrived in Hsing-chou, a post he had gained through bribery, he seized the rich merchants whose sons made up P'el's unit, the so-called "Night Flyers." These soldiers complained -42-to Wen who, on t h e i r behalf, requested the release of t h e i r fathers. Hsi would not allow i t and r e p l i e d with i n s u l t i n g language. Wen was angry and secretly plotted with his sub-ordinates to k i l l Hsi and surrender to court. They also t o l d Ts'ui Ghia who followed them. Later they barred the gates of the walled c i t y , beheaded the four grand generals within i t , and sought to surrender to Wang Yiian-k'uei. Their actions had further repercussions, f o r when Kao Yiian-wu at Yao Shan heard about t h i s , he also defected.53 The collapse of the rebel forces i n Hsing, Ming, and Tz'u-chou—the prefectures on the other side of the T'ai-hang mountains—sealed the fate of Chao-i. With a remarkable pre-science borne of a thorough understanding of the strategic importance of the two separate regions of Chao-1, Te-yii said, "Chao-l's trunk and roots are a l l i n [the area] east of the mountains. Not long a f t e r the surrender of the three prefec-tures, there w i l l be a coup d'etat In shang-tang." The emperor said, "Kuo I w i l l c e r t a i n l y k i l l L i u Chen i n order to redeem himself."5^ These three prefectures were the granary f o r a l l Chao-i, i n addition to being the outlying northern bastion against attacks from Wei-po and Ch'eng-te. Their collapse meant not only the loss of provisions f o r the rebels but also reduced the area under rebel control to the administrative centres of Tse-chou and Lu-chou. The announcement of the f a l l of these three prefectures -43-caused panic among the rebel forces and engendered a f e e l i n g of a sauve qui peut among the remaining generals who r e a l i z e d that presenting L i u Chen either dead or a l i v e to the court was the only way to ensure t h e i r own s u r v i v a l . For his part, L i u Chen demonstrated his v a c i l l a t i o n and lack of leadership when he a l l but agreed to his generals* outrageous suggestion that he surrender to the court, t i e d and bound as the court had demanded. The c r i t i c a l exchange went l i k e t h i s : Li u Chen said, 'Now within the c i t y there are s t i l l 50,000 men. We s t i l l ought to bar the gates and stoutly defend them.* [Tung] K'o-wu r e p l i e d : 'This l s not a good plan. I t would not be as good as having you t i e d up and submitting to court l i k e Chang Yuan-i, who did not f a i l to serve as a prefect. Would I t not be a good idea to make Kuo-i interim governor and, while waiting f o r the symbols of o f f i c e , to o f f e r quietly your wife and household wealth to Lo-yang?• Chen said, 'How can Kuo-i be w i l l i n g to do this?* K'o-wu said, *He and I have already made a solemn oath. Certainly he w i l l not renege.• Chen then c a l l e d [Kuo] I In. After he and [Kuo] I s e c r e t l y agreed, Chen then explained i t to his mother, she said, 'Submitting to court i s indeed a good idea, only the enmity [between us] i s already of long-standing. I have a younger brother ( i . e . p'ei Wen) I cannot protect. How can you protect [Kuo] I? How could you consider doing this to yourself?55 The following day, a f t e r a bout of drinking, L i u was murdered by Tung K'o-wu and Ts'ui Hsiian-tu. Chen and L i u K'uang-chou's clans were wiped out down to infants, along with families of the victims of the sweet Dew Incident who had sought refuge i n Chao-i. The a r r i v a l of L i u Chen's;-head - 4 4 -i n the c a p i t a l marked the formal end of the r e b e l l i o n i n Chao-i; however, L i u Chen had been nothing more than a figurehead while the true i n s t i g a t o r s , who were l a t e r his murderers, s t i l l had to be brought to j u s t i c e . The execution of Kuo I and the other rebel generals, while consistent with Te-yii's l e g a l i s t values and the court's o v e r a l l goal of strengthening i t s presence i n Ho-shuo, has s t i r r e d up a great, deal of controversy among l a t e r h i s t o r i a n s . Kuo believed that he, l i k e L i u Wu, who had been rewarded f o r betraying his commander, L i Shih-tao, would also be granted a m i l i t a r y gover-norship f o r his treachery. In response to an e a r l i e r query from the emperor about what to do about Kuo I, Te-yii summed up the court's case against him by saying: Li u Chen was just a f o o l i s h adolescent. As f o r obstruct-ing ("court] troops and opposing edicts, i n each case, [Kuo] I was the mastermind f o r him; when t h e i r power was Isolated and t h e i r strength exhausted, [Kuo] I also sold out Chen to gain his reward. If we do not execute him fo r t h i s , how can we repress e v i l ? While the various armies are not on the f r o n t i e r , we ought at the same time k i l l [Kuo] I and the others.5° Elsewhere i t has been argued that Kuo I had the relations of the victims of the sweet Dew Incident k i l l e d i n order to placate the eunuchs at court and thus to make i t easier f o r him to receive a m i l i t a r y governorship.57 In contrast to such pragmatic vindictiveness as c a r r i e d out by Te-yii, Ssu-ma Kuang, i n his "historian's comments" (ch' en Kuang yiieh) i n T'ung-chlen, sets out a more sternly -45-moralistic view: To Tung Chung-chin i n Huai-hsi, and to Kuo I i n Chao-i, Wu Yuan-chi and L i u Chen [ t h e i r respective military-governors] were l i k e puppets i n the hands of a manipu-l a t o r . They f i r s t encouraged others to rebel, then f i n a l l y sold out t h e i r leaders f o r personal gain. Even t h e i r deaths c e r t a i n l y l e f t t h e i r g u i l t unpunished. But Hsien-tsung i n the f i r s t Instance used him, ( i . e . Tung) and Wu-tsung i n the second executed him. I f e e l that i n both instances they were mistaken. Why? Re-warding t r a i t o r s i s an act of impropriety, but k i l l i n g those who surrender i s a breach of f a i t h . How can one rule the nation by throwing away c r e d i b i l i t y and Justice [shih h s i n yii 1] [there follow a number of Han dynasty precedents]...As f o r Kuo I and the others, i t would have been proper f o r them to escape death and be banished to some distant place to the end of t h e i r days whence they could not return. To k i l l them, No!58 In contrast, Wang Pu-chih (1619-92), who was less concerned with the p r i n c i p l e s of Justice and humanity i n the abstract than with the p r a c t i c a l concerns of implementing government p o l i c y and achieving domestic order, supported Te-yii 1 s po s i -t i o n with the following arguments: ...During L i u Chen's r e b e l l i o n , Kuo served as his master-mind. A f t e r being completely surrounded and a f t e r the three commanderies had surrendered, and as the l a s t re-maining fortress was weakening by the day, Chen accepted Kuo and Wang Hsieh's advice to have himself bound up and submit to the court. Wu-tsung and Te-yii planned to have Kuo executed f o r taking advantage of such naivete to k i l l Chen f o r his own benefit. Was this not s a t i s f y -ing the popularly accepted idea of e v i l to carry out the law? Ssu-ma Wen Kung, however, s a t i r i z e d t h i s as a breach of f a i t h . His idea of f a i t h , was i t not that which would mislead, cheat, and destroy? I f rebels are not extirpated, rebellions w i l l never be stopped. I f we bear humaneness i n our hearts, others w i l l Just take advantage of i t to invade. I f we deal with them i n good f a i t h , they w i l l use i t to cheat us. On account of t h i s , a l l the rebellions of T'ang m i l i t a r y governors have flourished... -46-Humaneness consists of k i l l i n g one or two people to preserve the empire, while faith l i e s in k i l l i n g men who lack constancy,Moreover, how could Kuo be spared and Chen alone not be allowed to surrender? Kuo was the one who k i l l e d the one who had submitted. Executing Kuo was the way to k i l l 1 the one who k i l l e d the one who had submitted,' How can Wu-tsung and Te-yii be blamed for this?->9 The court's military successes against the rebels had to be transformed into administrative reforms in order to provide permanent expression for the court's long-term objectives of peace and s t a b i l i t y . These changes had two Immediate aims. Fir s t , to reduce the vulnerability of Lo-yang and the canal system to attack from the north-east, second, to prevent Chao-i from becoming strong enough to menace the court again. To achieve the former, the court proposed separating Tse-chou from Chao-i and attaching i t to Ho-yang so that the T'ai-hang Pass would be administered from Ho-yang with the result that this whole area would be able to screen and protect Lo-yang. To achieve the latter, the court had exercised i t s p o l i t i -cal authority and military might to appoint a loyal and depen-dent military governor. Thus i t had to resist any demands from Wel-po and Ch'eng-te to annex the region. Equally the court did not want to f a l l into the earlier short-sighted policy of awarding the governorship to defeated rebel generals. The court had to make a sharp distinction between military o f f i c i a l s who defeated the rebels in war and the c i v i l i a n of-f i c i a l s who would administer the province in peace. In Hui-- 4 7 -oh 1ang 3/7 [ 8 4 3] >even before the court had designated m i l i -tary targets f o r the various generals, Lu Chun, the m i l i t a r y governor from Shan-nan Tung-tao had been named p a c i f i c a t i o n Commissioner f o r Chao-i.60 chun had been selected because i n his previous post, Hsiang-yang, his benevolent government had captured the hearts of the people. The court purposely sought someone who could soothe and comfort the people of Chao-i a f t e r the rigours of war. When the r e b e l l i o n was over and the de-feated generals had been car r i e d off to the c a p i t a l , Lu took up his post i n Chao-i with the following r e s u l t s : "Hul-oh'ang 4/9 [ 8 4 4 ] Tlng-ssu. Lu Chun entered Lu-chou. He was naturally tolerant and kind; even before the p a c i f i c a t i o n of L i u Chen, Chun held the post of m i l i t a r y governorship of Chao-i. Often when the o f f i c e r s and men of Hsiang-chou i n his expeditionary force fought against men from Lu-chou, they exalted his v l r t u r e s . When he arriv e d at his post by way of the T'len-ching Pass, Chun generously comforted a l l those who had been scattered and who had come home. The mood of the people was one of great harmony and Chao-i was consequently at peace. "1 In addition to appointing a benevolent governor and i s s u -ing the customary post-rebellion tax remissions f o r the people of Chao-i, Te-yu»s concern f o r the welfare of sold i e r s and non-combatants throughout the empire was sincere and consistent. In his o r i g i n a l order f o r punishing L i u Chen, he cautioned his troops about to go on campaign: The armies put forward by the various c i r c u i t s must not burn down cottages and huts, r a i s e and disturb graves and tombs, arrest and capture the common peo-ple and make them prisoners. As f o r the c u l t i v a t i o n of hemp and the r a i s i n g of sprouts, i n a l l cases -48-allow the o r i g i n a l household to be the master. Punish only the greatest e v i l and s t r i v e to calm the common pe o p l e . 0 2 Similar sentiments were echoed In his instructions to Wang Tsai : You have recently served In Tse-chou where you to a great extent exhibited benevolent government to the common people. Of course, [what you have done] i s i n keeping with reason. You ought to a-great extent spread s i n c e r i t y and c r e d i b i l i t y , and moreover s t r i v e to soothe t h e i r feelings [but] must not burn t h e i r houses and cottages or destroy t h e i r native places... In his assessment of the s i t u a t i o n i n Chao-1, Te-yii cautioned, I have already ordered the two provinces of Tse-lu and Ghl-shih to send troops to capture Kuo I, Wang Hsieh and t h e i r i l k who are equally e v i l ; do not Inquire a f t e r the other sol d i e r s at a l l . . . I have already Issued an edict to Shih Hsiung and Wang Tsai s t a t i n g that when they a r r i v e there they should not disturb and harass the ordinary people In."the army. I f there i s the s l i g h t e s t h i n t of transgression then they w i l l be dealt with according to m i l i t a r y law. Each one must make the e f f o r t to think up plans and together protect t h e i r l o y a l t y and s i n c e r i t y . Don't be aroused by t r a i t o r s . . Prom these examples I t i s clear that Te-yii distinguished be-tween leaders and followers i n the rebellious Chao-i army and that i n h i s l e g a l i s t scale of values, I t was the former who were to be punished while t h e x l a t t e r , although not neces-s a r i l y to be rewarded, were at le a s t to be protected and com-forted. The o f f i c i a l accounts of this r e b e l l i o n c oldly depict the unfolding of events as an orderly and smooth process; how-ever, waging war i s a complex undertaking and i s subject to -49-setbacks as well as advances. In T'ai-yiian, as we have seen, troops balked at going out to guard duty at New Year's and mutinied when their expected s i l k payment was reduced by half. Less optimistic but more informative are the grumblings and feelings of the people in the capital as recorded by Ennin, a Japanese Buddhist monk who happened to be in Ch'ang-an at this time. These reveal some interesting popular views about the war which the formal histories do not mention. One such report, t e l l s of a ruse used by soldiers to cover up their own failures: The army attacking Lu-fu [i. e . Lu-chou] has not been able to penetrate i t s borders and ls only at the boundary. There were frequent Imperial edicts of importunement, expressing surprise at the lack of news and wondering why after so many punitive expedi-tions, there had been no word at a l l of the chastise-ment [of the rebels]. The soldiers, fearing [the Imperial wrath] seized the herdsmen and farmers of the border region and sent them to the capital, claim-ing they were captured rebels. The Emperor gave . ceremonial swords, and right in the streets [the prisoners];were cut into three pieces. The troops of the two armies surrounded and slaughtered them. In this way, they kept sending prisoners and there was no end of troops...°-> A further comment records a system of asking the o f f i c i a l s to contribute part of their salaries to- pay for the war: The troops attacking Lu-fu are using 200,000 strings of cash [worth of supplies every day]. What the various prefectures send is not enough and the store-houses in the capital are on the point of giving out, so there was an Imperial edict assessing sums from the o f f i c i a l s . They paid much or l i t t l e money i n accordance with their rank, and i t was used for the army attacking Lu-fu. The .officials of the various provinces, prefectures, and commanderies a l l did the same.00 -50-Te-yii's own post-rebellion analysis of the reasons f o r the swiftness of the court's success focused on the problems of the command structure of the court and eunuch p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the m i l i t a r y campaigns. He outlined them as follows: Since Han Ch'uan-i, concerning the frequent defeat of generals going out on campaign there are three d e f i -ciencies. One: chief ministers often did not have p r i o r knowledge of the three or four d a i l y edicts and commands sent down to the army. Two: the eunuch overseers used t h e i r [own] ideas to take command of mi l i t a r y a f f a i r s . Generals and commanders were unable by themselves [to issue orders] to advance and with-draw. Three: each army had eunuchs acting as over-seers. They always chose several hundred of the strongest and bravest soldiers i n the army to become t h e i r personal troops. A l l those l i n i n g up f o r ba t t l e were the cowardly and weak. At every b a t t l e , the over-seers had t h e i r own signal f l a g s . They occupied high ground, set up,their horses, and used personal troops to protect themselves. When they saw a minor reverse* i n the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n , they would abruptly s t r i k e the f l a g and leave f i r s t and the l i n e of bat t l e would follow them and scatter. 0"? 7 Wu-tsung's great f a i t h and trust i n Te-yii combined with Te-yii's own s k i l l and personality put him at the absolute center of both m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l power during the whole Hul-oh'ang period. Wu-tsung invariably acceded to Te-yii's suggestions and proposals. Te-yii added further to his reputation f o r aloofness by working alone and not allowing the other chief ministers or court o f f i c i a l s to p a r t i c i p a t e i n planning or decision making. His analyses of the s i t u a t i o n i n Yu-chou v i s - a - v i s Chang Chung-wu, his d i f f e r e n t approaches to the Uighur problem, f i r s t suc-coring them and f i n a l l y attacking them, and his decision to oppose Chao-i, a l l demonstrated his independence of mind. -51-Equally, his stubbornness was evident in his unprecedented demand for unconditional surrender, his absolute refusal to deviate from It during the numerous occasions when Liu Chen offered to capitulate on compromised terms as well as his adamantine' sense of moral Justice which demanded that Kuo I, Wang Hsieh and the others in the rebel high command be exe-cuted for fomenting rebellion. With such close imperial co-operation and support there could be no mistake that Te-yii was in virtual control of the court and its policy-making functions. Whatever he said was law and was disobeyed only at one's peril. It was on this anvil of cooperation between an activist chief minister and a strong-willed emperor that the quick and successful campaign against Liu Chen was forged. Since the eunuchs were the most powerful political force at court and throughout the empire at this time, i t was natural that their long reach would extend down to Chao-1. In fact, they were closely connected with the fortunes of the Liu family. Just after Liu Wu became military governor in 821, he had to fight off the harassments of the eunuch overseer Liu Ch'eng-chieh. Later his son, Liu Ts'ung-chien, was allowed in 825 to succeed directly to the military governorship after allegedly bribing Wang shou-cheng, the leading eunuch at court. Follow-ing the abortive attempt to wipe out the eunuchs during the Sweet Dew incident of 835. Ts'ung-chlen openly condemned Ch'iu Shih-liang, Wang's successor as eunuch leader, for his indis--52-criminate revenge on the p l o t t e r s , t h e i r f a m i l i e s , and many innocent people. Chao-i provided sanctuary f o r r e l a t i v e s of. the victims and Ts'ung-chien championed the innocence of Wang Yai and Chia Su et a l . to the point of o f f e r i n g to r a i s e troops to r i d the court of eunuchs. L i u Chen, himself, recog-nized that the reason f o r the.court's unwillingness to accept his surrender on compromised terms was because of the court's eunuch-inspired hatred f o r his uncle. Although Chao-i was small and distant from Ch'ang-an, i t s connections with the eunuchs throughout the r u l e of the L i u family were nevertheless very close. Eunuch p o l i t i c a l might rested on the f i r m base of control-l i n g various palace armies and e s p e c i a l l y the key imperial guards i n Ch'ang-an, the various organizations which ran the inner palace, and the s e m i - o f f i c i a l but increasingly Important Shu-ml yuan, the so-called s e c r e t a r i a t of secret documents, whose members, because of t h e i r access to the emperor and power came to r i v a l the authority of the chief ministers. In addi-t i o n , owing to the lack of a s e t t l e d procedure f o r imperial succession, the eunuchs took advantage of t h e i r proximity to the emperor to become involved In the succession of every emperor a f t e r Tai-tsung, often k i l l i n g one before putting the next one on the throne. Despite t h e i r power, the eunuchs were f a r from a united -53-group and factions existed among them, such d i v i s i o n s i n t h e i r ranks gave r i s e to the cliques among the o f f i c i a l s i n the outer court. In Ch'en Yin-k'o's t e l l i n g phrase, cliques among the o f f i c i a l s were simply the appendages of eunuch fac-tlons. ° During the f i r s t h a l f of the ninth century, then, the ascendancy of which eunuch f a c t i o n indicated which group had placed the current emperor on the throne and which of the Niu or L i factions ruled the outer court. Te-yii owed his elevation to the chief ministership to the support of Ch'iu s h i h - l i a n g and Yu Hung-chih, who had ear-l i e r placed Wu-tsung on the throne and had either k i l l e d or banished t h e i r enemies. A modern comment on the connection between Te-yii's career and the eunuchs further states: In f a c t , then, Te-yii's entering m i n i s t e r i a l rank appar-ently was not e n t i r e l y because of Ch'in-i's strength. Por L i u Hung-1, Hsiieh Chi-llng's party and the Niu f a c t i o n chief minister L i P'i who supported the Empress Dowager's son Ch'eng-mei [Prince of Ch'en] had en-countered defeatj then the successful f a c t i o n of Ch'iu Shih-liang and others naturally had /to push out the chief ministers from the Niu f a c t i o n and replace them with the L i f a c t i o n . Moreover, f o r 30 years, the Niu f a c t i o n had frequently opposed the use of troops. Wu-tsung, however, did not l i k e t h i s . This was the major reason f o r Te-yii's entering the chief ministership.°° This connection between Te-yii's "debt" to the eunuchs as the motive f o r the subsequent campaign against Chao-i poses some int e r e s t i n g questions. F i r s t , Wu-tsung and Ch'iu had a s e r i -ous disagreement which caused Ch'iu to seek retirement. A f t e r Ch'iu died, the court condemned his actions, posthumously re-moved his t i t l e s , and confiscated his property. This did not -54-reduce eunuch power at court but the lack of a leader of Ch'iu's standing made t h e i r presence and interference at court less noticeable. The campaign against Chao-1 i t s e l f occurred a f t e r Ch'iu's death so that neither was personally-involved i n the ensuing struggle, but l i k e l y Ch'iu's c o l -leagues s t i l l pushed f o r the campaign against Ts'ung-chlen's heir. To Te-yii's avowed motives of reasserting imperial power by recapturing Chao-i, one must add acknowledging the eunuchs' favour as well as seeking his own personal revenge against the families who had pushed him out of the o f f i c e i n 834 and who had found sanctuary i n Chao-i. By doing so, Te-yii was playing pragmatic p o l i t i c s while giving vent to his p o l i t i c a l activism and his own petty vindictiveness. Te-yii was no dupe or f o o l of the eunuchs, f o r he retained the usual anti-eunuch prejudices of a Confucian o f f i c i a l . In f a c t , a f t e r the defeat of the Uighurs and Chao-i and the sup-pression against Buddhism had begun, Wu-tsung and he sought to s t r i p the eunuchs of t h e i r control over the court armies. In an incident recorded by the Japanese monk Ennin,? 0 but not i n the Standard H i s t o r i e s , the court i n 84-5 requested that the two commanders of the Army of Inspired strategy hand over t h e i r seals of o f f i c e . The Commander of the L e f t , Yang Ch'in-i, Te-yii's old colleague, complied but Yu; Hung-chin, the Commander of the Right, who had been Ch'iu Shlh-liang's accomplice i n -55-puttlng Wu-tsung on the throne, refused. The court, lacking the m i l i t a r y force to support t h e i r demand further, had to back down and eunuch control over these armies remained i n -tact. Te-yii was not a pawn of the eunuchs but was" simply aware of t h e i r great p o l i t i c a l power and recognized that they both shared a common intere s t In defeating Chao-i. Later when he thought he had a chance to l i m i t t h e i r power he t r i e d , only to f a i l . Contrasted with h i s l a t e r f a i l u r e to l i m i t eunuch m i l i t a r y power at court, Te-yii was able to solve the longstanding prob-lem of eunuch meddling i n p r o v i n c i a l m i l i t a r y campaigns by s a t i s f y i n g the material needs of the eunuch supervisors. The o r i g i n a l function of eunuch supervisors was to keep an eye on court armies i n the f i e l d and report t h e i r findings to the emperor "himself. In a word, they were court spies. As stated e a r l i e r , owing to t h e i r propensity to i n t e r f e r e with the regu-l a r l y appointed f i e l d commanders, they were considered a serious Impediment to the successful prosecution of the campaign against Chao-i. An e a r l i e r reference to the favourable results of withdrawing eunuch supervisors during Hsien-tsung's reign stated that: Previously when a l l the various c i r c u i t s had eunuch envoys observing troop formations, orders f o r ad-vancing and withdrawing did not come from the p r i n -c i p a l generals. I f there were v i c t o r i e s , the eunuchs were the f i r s t to o f f e r up prisoners [to the court], but i f this were not personally advanta-geous , they then r i d i c u l e d and humiliated every--56-thing. i t was only a f t e r [p'ei] Tu memorialized that a l l the eunuch envoys be disbanded that the various generals gained exclusive control over m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s and that they were frequently successful i n battle.71 As f o r the more pressing problem of solving the eunuch ques-t i o n i n h i s own time, Te-yii f e l l back on his basic b e l i e f i n the l e g a l i s t practices of rewards and punishments i n order to gain t h e i r support and cooperation. His soluti o n has been recorded as follows: Te-yii then discussed this with the eunuch councillors > Yang Ch'in-i and L i u Hsing-shen, agreeing that the eunuch overseers ought not to in t e r f e r e i n the admini-s t r a t i o n of m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s . Prom each 1000 s o l d i e r s , a eunuch supervisor could select 10 men to be his personal bodyguard. In accordance with precedent, when there was success, they were granted rewards. When both the councillors agreed, Te-yii informed the emperor to have i t c a r r i e d out. Prom the defence against the Ulghurs to the disbanding of the Tse-lu army a l l [success] came from observing these regulations... 72 ~ The continuation of close personal relations with Yang Ch'in-i and a r e a l i s t i c appeal to the material wants of the eunuchs i n the f i e l d enabled Te-yii to overcome this long-standing ob-stacle to m i l i t a r y success, thereby providing the court with the means of defeating Chao-i without undue eunuch interference. Te-yii r e a l i z e d that the crux of the relationship between the court and the provinces was the court's holding the man-date of heaven and i t s consequent a b i l i t y to confer p o l i t i c a l legitimacy, t i t l e s , and material rewards on the various m i l i -tary governors. In areas other than the northeast where the court exercised t i g h t e r control, i t maintained a po l i c y of -57-frequently alternating governors and not allowing hereditary succession. After the surrender of Chao-i and the execution of the remaining ringleaders, Te-yii announced to the assembled envoys from Ho-pei the successful conclusion of thi s campaign and used r h e t o r i c a l and moral terms to re-emphasize the supremacy of the court as the ultimate source of legitimacy and material reward, f o r the court at t h i s time d i d not have the m i l i t a r y power to reimpose i t s w i l l more f o r c e f u l l y i n these areas. I t was recorded: After the deployment of troops, whenever the three garrisons of Ho-pei sent envoys to the c a p i t a l , Te-yii often proclaimed to t h e i r faces: »The armies of Ho-shuo, a l b e i t strong, cannot stand by themselves. They must r e l y upon the court's o f f i c i a l ranks and august commands i n order to placate the sentiments of t h e i r armies. When you return say to your gover-nors, rather than seeking o f f i c e s and ranks by d i s -patching grand generals to intercept imperial com-missioners f o r p a c i f i c a t i o n or f o r conveying edicts, would i t not be better i f you yourselves promoted l o y a l t y and righteousness, established achievement and service, and maintained contact with your en-lightened r u l e r , causing favour to come forth from the court. Would th i s not be glorious? Moreover, to c i t e examples that are within your own d i r e c t knowl-edge, L i T s a i - i i n Yu-chou, with t o t a l l o y a l t y , s e t t l e d on behalf of the empire the r e b e l l i o n [of L i T'ung-chieh i n T'al-ho 3 (829)] i n Ts*ang-ching. When he was driven out by his troops, he did not cisase being a m i l i t a r y governor. Later he served i n T*ai-yuan and his p o s i t i o n reached [that of] chief minister. YangvChih-ch'eng [of Yu-chou] sent a grand general to intercept the horse of a commissioner bear-ing a decree i n order to request an o f f i c e . When he was driven out by the army, the court, i n the end, did not pardon his crimes. The fortunes of these two men are worthy of your inspection. * When Te-yii again used these words to inform the emperor, the emperor said, -58-'We must c l e a r l y t e l l them i n this manner.' A f t e r th i s the three garrisons did not dare have rebellious intentions.73 Te-yu's a l l u s i o n to the e a r l i e r coup i n Yu-chou i n T'al-ho 7 [833] involving L i T s a i - i and Yang Chlh-ch'eng had a double signi f i c a n c e . The f i r s t and most obvious one was a reminder to the commanders of Ho-pei that the court was the f i n a l ar-b i t e r of ranks and o f f i c e s . Thus i f these commanders were somehow turned out by t h e i r followers, i f they had rendered l o y a l and meritorious service to the court, they could be compensated with other t i t l e s and o f f i c e s . Te-yii's other point, aside from attempting once again to d i s c r e d i t Niu Seng-ju, was to object to the court's passive p o l i c y of automatically accepting v i c t o r i o u s generals as m i l i -tary governors, without examining more cl o s e l y the s i t u a t i o n to see whether or not the court could gain some leverage or advantage by withholding or delaying imperial sanction. He had done so i n Yu-chou when he named Chang Chung-wu Interim governor (llu->shou) at a time when the s i t u a t i o n was f a r from clear. This was not advocating that the court intervene m i l i -t a r i l y but rather that I t use i t s p o s i t i o n as the sole d i s -penser of p o l i t i c a l legitimacy to influence who would achieve power i n the provinces. He had been lucky enough to accomplish this with Chang Chung-wuj now he was f a u l t i n g seng-ju f o r not having the same success when he had a s i m i l a r opportunity. Ssu-ma Kuang i n his 'historian's comments' at the end of -59-th e c i t a t i o n of this incident argued that by accepting seng-ju's p o s i t i o n , the emperor was allowing the fate of generals -to be s e t t l e d by t h e i r junior o f f i c e r s and men. His f i n a l statements weres . . . I f there are no investigations at a l l and we take [ L i Tsal-i»s] lands and t i t l e s and bestow them on Yang Chlh-ch'eng, then the fate [ l i t . dismissal, ap-pointment, death, and l i f e ] of these commanders w i l l be decided by t h e i r o f f i c e r s and men. The emperor, a l b e i t i n the highest p o s i t i o n , what function does . he have! Does the nation have regional garrisons merely to exploit t h e i r wealth and taxes? Words such as Seng-ju's which are no more than the methods of c o n c i l i a t i o n and complacency, can they be any way f o r a chief minister to help the son of Heaven rule the world!74 -60-CONCLUSION A great man Is the product of his times, but a measure of his greatness i s his a b i l i t y to make the most of those times. The key to T e - y i i 1 s accomplishments was his a b i l i t y of knowing what could be achieved and how to achieve i t . The Uighur nation had been r e e l i n g from the attacks of the Kirghiz and re-quired only a judiciously applied blow at an opportune time to end forever t h e i r threat to China's f r o n t i e r s . Equally v u l -nerable and defenseless was the Buddhist Church, which required only a concerted e f f o r t from the court to put to an end i t s economic drain on the empire. In handling the transfer of power i n Yu-chou, Te - y i i exercised his c l e a r understanding of the dynamics of court leverage on the p o l i t i c a l structure with-i n the provinces and was also astute enough to recognize Chang Chung-wu's po t e n t i a l , such i n i t i a t i v e paid handsome dividends when Chung-wu repaid the court favour by supporting i t during the campaigns against the Ulghurs and Chao-i. In these matters, Te - y i i was sustained by good luck and propitious timing. Within the court, Te - y i i achieved the chief ministership by means of eunuch Influence and t h e i r enmity towards the L i u family i n Chao-i helped him to gain p o l i t i c a l cooperation at court and non-interference from eunuch super-visors i n the f i e l d . At the same time, Te - y i i took advantage of h is power to banish a l l his partisan enemies to p r o v i n c i a l -61-posts, thereby saving the court from the paralysis of p a r t i -san struggles. Within Ho-pei, he did not have to deal with the aggressive leaders of old who had successfully defied the court, but with a l e s s e r breed of compliant leaders. In Chao-1 i t s e l f , he faced an e s s e n t i a l l y Incompetent and juvenile leader, L i u Chen, whose f a i l u r e s to insp i r e and command his troops were i n contrast to Te-yii* s deft handling of the com-bined court forces. L i u Ts'ung-chien, had he l i v e d , would have posed a more formidable adversary, since Te-yii had the com-plete support of the emperor and arrogated to himself a l l the powers of the chief ministership, he could claim with some jus-t i f i c a t i o n that he was the a r c h i t e c t of the court's v i c t o r y . The recapture of Chao-i, as dramatic and important as i t was at the time, was nevertheless a domestic housekeeping measure f o r the court, f o r t h i s was simply re-exercising con-t r o l over an area which, except f o r the twenty-three years when i t was ruled by the L i u family, had been an i n t e g r a l part of the empire and not of independent Ho-pei. Although the suc-cess of the campaign did not a l t e r the independent status of Ho-pel, the cooperation that this region provided during the campaign marked a s i g n i f i c a n t change i n Its r e l a t i o n s h i p with the court. The fac t that these provinces did not pose further serious threats to the su r v i v a l of the T'ang court afterwards was due more to the increasing concern i n Ho-pei over int e r n a l mutiny from i t s own troops than from any residual e f f e c t of -62-the court*s reassertion of authority as shown by i t s recap-ture of Ghao-i. Te-yii* s activism was the major reason f o r the s t r i n g of successes during his tenure as chief minister. I t i s u n l i k e l y that any of his opponents would have been able to take advan-tage of the various opportunities of the s h i f t i n g balances of power on China's borders, within Ho-pei, and within the court i t s e l f , to s e t t l e , however temporarily, some of i t s major problems. Por the opposing Niu faction's period of service as chief minister, there i s no comparable l i s t of accomplishments. Furthermore, Te-yii's use of l e g a l i s t rewards which helped him to gain the best e f f o r t s from the court armies, defections from discontented rebel generals, and cooperation from eunuch super-v i s o r s , helped to bring the campaign to a swift and successful conclusion. In achieving his successes, then, Te-yii brought together various strains of Confucian moralism, l e g a l i s t prag-matism, and p o l i t i c a l activism to deal with the problems he faced as chief minister. As the chief decision-maker at court during the s i x years of the Hul-oh'ang period, Te-yii had a s u f f i c i e n t understanding of the various s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l forces of his day to leave his imprint on his times and on Chinese history. The partisan struggles had embittered him and brought out his pettiness and vindlctiveness. He rode the crest of eunuch support to the chief ministership but remained independent enough to try to -63-destroy t h e i r base of power when he thought he had the chance. Aided by luck and by propitious timing, as well as h i s own clear understanding of the important s h i f t s of power i n his time, he was able to reassert court authority a f t e r i t had f a l -l e n into neglect. With the announcement of L i u Ts'ung-chien's request to allow his nephew, Chen, to succeed to the m i l i t a r y governor-ship of Chao-1 i n 843 , Te-yii's p o l i t i c a l activism and h i s under-standing of the dynamics of court-province r e l a t i o n s made him r e a l i z e that t h i s was the time to reassert imperial authority while the succession question i n Chao-i remained unsettled, so that the court by withholding or delaying i t s mandate could force the m i l i t a r y forces within the province to make t h e i r own choice. A f t e r gaining a l l i e s i n the north (Yu-chou) and i n the eastv(Wei-po and Ch'eng-te), he was able to surprise L i u Chen by denying him what hi s uncle had received without a struggle i n 825. Por a b r i e f moment, then, there was a suf-f i c i e n t change i n the T'ang p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n to allow the court to act f o r c e f u l l y . The borders were quiet, there was close cooperation with the three provinces of Ho-pei as well as unity and decisiveness at court. None of these had existed i n 825. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the v i c t o r y i n Chao-i lay not i n Its s o l u t i o n of any of the court's longstanding problems, f o r Ho-pei remained independent and eunuch power remained i n t a c t , but -64-that f o r a short time i n 8 3 4 - 4 , these disparate forces some-how found common cause with the court, allowing i t to act with swiftness and dispatch. As f o r Te-yii personally, he brought together a l l his own m i l i t a r y experiences, p o l i t i c a l a b i l i t i e s and s o c i a l connections to focus on the campaign against L i u Chen. The defeat of Chao - 1 i s overshadowed by the l a t e r suppression of Buddhism as the most memorable event of Wu-tsung's reign, but a study of t h i s minor incident has permitted us to see how Te-yii used the sum of his a b i l i t i e s and experiences to take advantage of the temporary cooperation of previously destructive forces to bring about v i c t o r y . -65-FOOTNOTES TO THE PREFATORY ARTICLE 1. Tzu Chlh T'ung Chien, p. 7 l 4 l . Hereafter c i t e d as TCTC. cf. also Jonathan Mirsky, "Structure of a Rebellion: A Successful Insurrection during the T'ang," JAOS, v o l . 8 9 . 1 9 6 9 . PP. 7^-5. Hereinafter c i t e d as Mirsky, Structure. 2. Mirsky, "structure" p. 84. 3. TCTC, pp. 7 5 6 0 - 1 . cf. also LI pao-chen's biography i n the Old T'ang History, chap. 132/3b-4a. Hereinafter c i t e d as CTS. And, the New T'ang History, chap. 138/5&. Hereinafter c i t e d as HTS. 4 . TCTC, p. 7 8 4 4 . 5. i b i d . , pp. 7845-6. 6. Ibid., K'ao-i note on p. 7 8 4 6 . 7. i b i d - . P- 7979. 8 . Ibid., p. 7 9 8 0 . 9 . Ibid., pp. 7 9 7 8 - 9 . 1 0 . CTS, chap. I 6 l / 8 b . 1 1 . HTS, chap. 2 l 4 / 9 a . 1 2 . i b i d . , p. 1 2 b . 13. Mirsky,''structure", p. 83. 14. TCTC, p. 7984. 15. Denis C. Twitchett, "Provincial Autonomy and Central Finance i n Late T'ang," Asia Major (N.S.), v o l . x i , 1964, p. 231. 16. TCTC, pp. 7955-6. 17. i b i d . , p. 7956. 18. i b i d . , p. 7981. cf. also Hul-oh'ang I p ' l n - c h l , SPTK edition, chap. 6/32. V 4 * 1%. *_ i&, £,* 4 *ff *~fy0 Hereinafter c i t e d as HCIPC. -66-19. Ibid., p. 79.82. For the f u l l text of the memorial cf. the Complete T'ang Prose (€h'uan T'ang Wen), chap. 75l/Ha-l6a (pp. 9«08-50). Hereinafter c i t e d as CTW. 20. 'CTW. chap. 75lA5b (p. 9850). 2 1 • TCTC, p. 7984. 22. i b i d . , p. 7986. 23. i b i d . , p. 7989. 24. i b i d . , pp. 7989-90. 25. i b i d . , p. 7990. 26. i b i d . , pp. 7993-4. 27. i b i d . , p. 7987. 28. i b i d . , p. 7989. 29. HCIPC, chap. 6/33. iSi <- ^ # , *T fj * t , 30. TCTC. p. 7988. 31. i b i d . , p. 7987. 32. i b i d . , pp. 7990-1. 33. Wang Shou-nan, A Study of the Relations Between the  Regional Commanders and the Central Government During  the T'ang Dynasty, p. 5^. 11...The central government l o s t the power to control the three garrisons of Ho-p e i , During the Hui-ch'ang period, the chief minister, L i Te-yii, p u b l i c l y recognized hereditary succession i n Ho-pei and thus admitted that the central govern-ment did not have the strength to control the three garrisons i n Ho-pei." 34. TCTC, p. 7992. 35. For a b r i e f account of the sweet Dew Incident, c f . foot-note #245 accompanying the t r a n s l a t i o n of the biography. 36. Wang Ming-sheng, Discussions on the Seventeen H i s t o r i e s , Ts'ung Shu Chi-ch'eng edition, chap. 91/1022-3. - 6 7 -37. TCTC, pp. 7987-8. 38. i b i d . , p. 7994. 39. i b i d . , pp. 7994-5. 40. i b i d . , p. 7995. 41. loo, c i t . i P l d . , pp. 7996-7. 4-3. GTS, chap. 174/lla. c f. also TCTC, p. 7997. TCTC, pp. 7997-8. ^5. Ibid., pp. 7995-6. 46. CTS, chap. 174/3b. 47. Wang Yen-shin was Tsal's son. "In his youth, Yen-shin was sharp and quick-witted. Since Chih-hsing personally raised him, his name was considered on the same l e v e l as his father's." HTS 172/3b. 48. TCTC, p. 7998. 49. i b i d . , pp. 7998-9. 50. i b i d . , p. 8004-. 51. i b i d . , pp. 8004-5. 52. i b i d . , p. 8005. 53. l o c . c i t . 54. i b i d . , p. 8006. 55. i b i d . , p. 8007. 56. i b i d . , p. 8008. 57. of. #36 58. TCTC, p. 8011. \% &. jjfo 59. Wang Pu-chih, Tu T'ung Chien Lun, shih-chieh Shu Chu modern punctuated edition, chap. 26/558. -68-6 0 . TCTC, p. 7987. 6 1 . Ibid., p. 8010. 6 2 . HCIPC, chap. 3/14. 63. i b i d . , chap. 7/40. 64. i b i d . , chap. 6/31. 6 5 . Edwin Relschauer (trans.), Ennln's Diary, pp. 344-5. 66. i b i d . , p. 345. Relschauer himself questions the accuracy of these figures, c f . p. 337, footnote #1292. 6 7 . TCTC, p. 8009. 68. Ch'en Yin-k'o, " P o l i t i c a l Change and D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n Among the Cliques," taken from his book The Draft Narra-t i v e of T'ang P o l i t i c a l History reprinted i n his Collected Works, p. 179". This a r t i c l e provides a de-t a i l e d and persuasive analysis of how the eunuchs con-t r o l l e d court p o l i t i c s i n post-An Lu-shan China. 6 9 . Lan Wen-cheng, "Relics of the Hul-oh'ang period," i n Min-ohu P'ing-lun, v o l . 5, 1948, p. 5 6 . 7 0 . Relschauer, Ennln's Diary, pp. 36O-I. 71. TCTC, p. 7738. 7 2 . Ibid., pp. 8009-1°. 73. i b i d . , p. 8010. 1 74. i b i d . , p. 7874. TRANSLATION OP THE BIOGRAPHY OP LI TE-YU AS TAKEN FROM CHAPTER 174 OF THE OLD T'ANG HISTORY - 6 9 -f -70-L l Te-yii (tzu Wen- jao) was a man from the commandery of Chao.1 His grandfather Hsi-yiin had been President of the Board of Censors, 2 while his father Chi-fu, who had been [en-feoffed a s p the Duke of Chao Kuo, served as Chief Minister-* at the beginning of the Yiian-ho era ( 8 0 5 - 2 0 ) . Both have their k own biographies. In his youth, Te-yii had firm determination. He was pain-staking and diligent i n his studies, and particularly well-versed In the History of the Western Han Dynasty , and the Tso (commentary on) The Spring and Autumn Annals.' He was ashamed to be part of the local tribute to the capital along with a l l the students, and did not l i k e examinations. By the time he reached adulthood, his character and studies had been largely formed. After his father had been censured and banished to the lands of the southern barbarians during the Chen-yuan, era, Te-yii followed and served by his side without seeking advancement.-5 At the beginning of the Yiian-ho era, when his father was again chief minister ( l i t . held the balance of state), to avoid sus-picion, he did not hold office in the major departments at the capital, but took appointment on the staffs of one provincial o f f i c i a l after another. In [Yiian-ho] 11 [ 8 1 6 ] , Chang Hung-ching^ gave up the of-fice of chief minister and served [as military governor of Ho-tung with headquarters] in T'ai-yiian. [Chang] appointed Te-yii a s ; his Recorder.7 Prom the rank of secretary of Inquiry for -71-the Supreme Court 0 he advanced to become Court Censor f o r Palace A f f a i r s . ? In Yiian-ho 14 [819], when the s t a f f was. d i s -banded, he followed Hung-ching to the court, receiving the substantive o f f i c e of Examining Censor. 1 0 In the f i r s t month of the following year, when Mu-tsung ascended the throne, Te-yii was summoned to f i l l the o f f i c e of Scholar i n the Han-lln Academy.** Previously when the emperor l i v e d i n the Eastern palace [the o f f i c i a l residence of the Crown Prince], he had heard of Chi-fu's reputation. When he saw Te-yii, he p a r t i c u l a r l y favoured him, and often ordered him to draft l e t t e r s and documents requiring a great hand with a brush f o r the inner palace. In the same month, Te-yii was sum-moned f o r an audience i n the Ssu-cheng P a l a c e 1 2 and presented with gold and purple garments. 13 one month l a t e r , he was trans-ferred to the p o s i t i o n of A u x i l i a r y Secretary i n charge of M i l -i t a r y Colonies. 1** Mu-tsung, who did not uphold the p r i n c i p l e s of good govern-ment, granted many favours. The various imperial in-laws cor-ruptly schemed to make requests and intercessions. Te-yii loathed t h i s s i t u a t i o n of transmitting the intentions of the eunuchs and associating with powerful o f f i c i a l s . In Ch'ang-oh1 ing 1/1 [821] Te-yii sent up a memorial 1^ stating: I humbly observe that according to the precedents of the present dynasty, the rel a t i o n s h i p of the imperial sons-in-law being close, they ought not to associate - 7 2 -with Important court o f f i c i a l s . Hsuan-tsung during the K'al-yuan era £ 7 1 3 - 4 2 ) prohibited this with par-t i c u l a r s e v e r i t y . ^ 0 Upon investigation, I heard that, recently, imperial sons-in-law have v i s i t e d 1 ? the private homes of chief ministers and high o f f i c i a l s . This l o t has no other q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r being received other than ( l i t . only) to leak palace secrets and com-municate between the inner and outer courts, popular sentiment^ 0 considers t h i s a serious abuse. In the case of those whose court positions are of the miscel-laneous category, 1? there i s no objection to t h e i r coming and going, but i f they are o f f i c i a l s of the "pure" 2 0 ranks, how can we tole r a t e t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n such matters? I humbly hope that your majesty pro-claim to the chief ministers that henceforth when the various r e l a t i v e s [ i n the category of] imperial sons-in-law have public business, that they go to see the chief ministers i n the Imperial s e c r e t a r i a t . I request that they not be allowed to v i s i t private homes. 2 1 The emperor agreed, soon thereafter, Te-yii was transferred to the post of Senior Secretary f o r the Board of Examining Merit [while maintaining h i s position] i n charge of edicts and p r o c l mations. 2^ i n Ch'ang-oh 1ing 2 / 2 [822] he was transferred to [the post of] Grand secretary i n the imperial s e c r e t a r i a t 2 ^ re mainlng a scholar as before. P r i o r to t h i s , when Chl-fu was i n m i n i s t e r i a l ranks, Niu Seng-ju 2^ and L i Tsung-mln 2^ responded to the s p e c i a l examina-t i o n c a l l e d the "Worthy, Virtuous and Righteous Men Capable of speaking frankly and c r i t i c i z i n g without r e s t r a i n t . . . 2 7 I n answering the questions put by the emperor, they b i t t e r l y at-tacked the f a i l u r e s of the government of the day. As a r e s u l t of Chi-fu t e a r f u l l y complaining to the emperor, a l l of the o f f i c i a l s In charge of the examination were demoted. 2^ The matter i s Included i n L i Tsung-min's biography. 2 9 -73-At the very beginning of the Yiian-ho period, (beginning with Tu Huang-shang's campaign i n Shu), troops were used to suppress rebellions.3° Chi-fu drew up plans3 1 and wanted to pacify the area of the two Ho's (Ho-pei and Ho-nan). When he was about to send out troops, he died. 32 The campaign was carried on by [Wu] Yiian-heng33 and p'el Tu. 3^ However, Wei Kuan-chih35 and L i Feng-chi3^ were opposed (to the campaign),, firmly maintaining that the use of troops was wrong. When Wei and L i successively resigned t h e i r chief ministerships, Feng-chi f e l t undying anger towards Chi-fu and p'ei Tu. For a long time during the Yiian-ho era, Te-yii was not promoted. Feng-chi, Seng-ju and Tsung-min continued to block him because of t h e i r personal grudges. At this time, Te-yii, L i Shen,37 a n<i yuan Chen3°* were a l l i n the Han-lin Academy. Because they had s i m i l a r attitudes, learning a b i l i t i e s , and reputations, they were very close. Feng-chi's f a c t i o n deeply hated them. That month,39 Te-yii l e f t his post as Scholar and became vice-president of the Board of Censors. 2 + 0 At this time, Yuan Chen l e f t the palaae and was appointed vice-president of the Board of public Works2*1 and Minister of S t a t e . 2 + 2 In the th i r d month rch'ang-oh' ing 2] [822] p'ei Tu l e f t T'ai-yiian and again became chief minister..^3 That month, when L i Feng-chi also entered the court from Hsiang-yang,^ he secretly bribed a corruptible man to concoct the Yii Fang case.^5 -74-In the s i x t h month, when both Yuan Chen and p'el T u ^ were dismissed from t h e i r positions as chief ministers, Chen became prefect^? of T'ung-chou, and Peng-chi replaced P'ei Tu as vice president of the Imperial C h a n c e l l o r y ^ and chief minister.^? Afte r he gained a p o s i t i o n of authority, Feng-chi showed great zeal i n seeking revenge. At this time when Te-yii and Niu Seng-ju both had hopes of becoming chief minister, Peng-chi wanted to promote Seng-ju but feared that L i Shen and Te-yii would use t h e i r influence i n the palace to stop him. In the ninth month, when Te-yii was sent out to become the C i v i l Governor of Che-hsi,-^ 0 seng-ju was soon thereafter pro-moted to [the post of] chief minister. Because of t h i s , the mutual hatred between Te-yii and Seng-ju became deeper and deeper. Jun-chou-51 was [ s t i l l ] s u f f e r i n g from the aftermath of the re v o l t of Wang Kuo-ch'ing's^ 2 troops. When the previous gover-nor, Tou I-chih53 emptied the treasury [to pay] f o r rewards, the army became increasingly arrogant and the resources were exhausted. Te-yii being frugal i n his own expenditures, used the whole of the prefectural share of taxes5^ to pay the army. Although the disbursements were hot bountiful, the o f f i c e r s and men did not complain. Two years l a t e r , the m i l i t a r y was again w e l l - d i s c i p l i n e d ( l i t . the chariots of war were again reined i n ) . Having achieved his post i n the prime of his l i f e , Te-yii was zealous i n his conduct of government, reforming a l l the -75-t r a d i t i o n a l customs which had harmed the people. In southern C h i n a , p e o p l e believed i n shamanism and exorcism and were misled by tales of s p i r i t s and miracles. Because of th i s be-l i e f , there were cases i n which whole households f l e d , abandon-ing parents and brothers who were seriously i l l . seeking to change these customs, Te-yu chose those with learning among the r u r a l people to persuade them with words and r e c t i f y them with laws; within a few years the corrupt customs were put i n order and changed. According to the l o c a l gazeteer, famous o f f i c i a l s and wor-thy emperors of previous dynasties were worshipped i n the temples of the attached prefectures. In four prefectures, he removed 1010 improper temples and tore down 1460 f o r t s and mountain dwellings i n order to get r i d of bandits and robbers. The peo-ple appreciated his administration and the emperor Issued a con-gratulatory edict. The Chao-mlng Emperor [Ching-tsung] ascended the throne while s t i l l a boy5? devoting himself mainly to extravagant l i v -ing. In the seventh month of the year of his accession, an edict was issued ordering Che-hsi to manufacture and send to court twenty s i l v e r cosmetic containers.$® Te-yii sent up a memorial:59 With the great good fortune of a hundred l i f e t i m e s , I have managed to encounter such a prosperous period and to be entrusted with such a noteworthy d i s t r i c t to govern. I am always 0 0 a f r a i d of neglecting my duty so that I work t i r e l e s s l y day and night to re--76-pay the country's favour. For several years, disas-ters and floods have followed one another. Even though I have exhausted a l l my minute attention, the inhabitants of t h i s area barely avoid becoming va-. grants. They have not yet f u l l y recovered t h e i r productive capacity from recent calamities. I hum-bly note that i n the amnesty dated 3/3 of this year, i t was ordered that we not send up goods 0 1 beyond ordinary t r i b u t e . This, then, i s an example of your majesty's great wisdom and enlightenment reaching down to the minutest d e t a i l . On the one hand you feared that tax c o l l e c t o r s would take advantage [of the calamities,] to carry on i l l i c i t practices and on the other hand 62 y o u feared that the distressed people would be unable to withstand such malfeasance. Above, you magnified the v i r t u e of f r u g a l i t y and below you displayed a compassionate humanity.°3 The people throughout the empire have been extremely happy ( l i t . beat the drum and dance without rest) [to learn of t h i s amnesty]. . 1 Recently, I have received an edict dated 5/23 ordering that I seek a Taoist recluse on Mao shan,°^ i n order to make him your teacher i n the ways of dwelling i n humility and maintaining f r u g a l i t y as well as to en-courage the v i r t u e of s t r i v i n g f o r the e s s e n t i a l and discarding the f r i v o l o u s . Although there i s no such recluse to send up to f u l f i l l the imperial command; In r e a l i t y , the whole world already bows to your profound Influence; how could i t be that I, your i n s i g n i f i c a n t servant, alone send up p r a i s e , - ' ^ the more so, since the matter of sending up t r i b u t e i s the constant pre-occupation of a subject or a c h i l d and although there should be an edict p r o h i b i t i n g t h i s , s t i l l , i t would be proper to devote the whole of one's energies to sending t r i b u t e . However, o r i g i n a l l y my province was known f o r i t s wealth and abundance, but, i n recent years, i t has been d i f f e r e n t from what i t was i n the past. During the l a t e Chen-yuan era when L i Ch'i°° served as c i v i l governor, his d a i l y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s were concurrently those of S a l t and Iron Commissioner. The common peo-, pie i n addition to putting f o r t h the l i q u o r tax money0' according to the s t r i n g , 0 0 also established an o f f i c e fo r the government monopoly f o r alcohol. The tax was c o l l e c t e d i n two ways. The receipts were extremely high. Moreover a f t e r investigation, I have learned that, at that time, the extra t r i b u t e included the sur--77-plus from the s a l t and Iron Monopoly. The tribute rendered was very great. Since then, no one has achieved t h i s extreme figure. When Hsueh P ' l n g ^ was C i v i l Governor, he also sent up a memorial'?'0 f o r the establishment of a tax on l i q u o r . In addition to the portion sent to the c a p i t a l there was a large surplus. What was a v a i l -able f o r m i l i t a r y needs, was, i n f a c t , completely adequate. The edi c t of Yiian-ho 14/7/3 [819] put a stop to the l i q u o r monopoly. Moreover, according to the Act of Grace of Yiian-ho 15/5/7 [820]71, the surplus from the various prefectures was not to be sent to the p r o v i n c i a l c a p i t a l . ' 2 There were only 500,000 strings as funds to be kept f o r the commis-sioner. The budget i s s t i l l 130,000 short and i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r our regular needs. In these mat- . ter s , even i f one makes a hundred schemes f o r saving' 4" and t r i e s to f i l l up [gaps] and make ends meet, there i s no way of avoiding a budgetary d e f i c i t . Thin s i l k and the l i k e are what this prefecture pro-duces and are easy to handle while s i l v e r and gold are not a v a i l a b l e here i n t h i s prefecture and must be purchased and brought from elsewhere. Last year?5 during the second month, I received an imperial com-mand to present twenty cosmetic containers which, calculations show, w i l l use over 9400 ounces of s i l v e r . At that time, the prefectural reserves did not amount to more than 2-300 ounces, so that only a f t e r a l l the items had been procured from the market could they be manufactured and sent to court. Recently, I again re-ceived an imperial decree ordering the presentation of twenty [more] cosmetic containers which I figure w i l l use 13,000 ounces of s i l v e r and 130 of gold. Subsequently, I have been t o l d to combine i t with the contributions of gold and s i l v e r f o r the Imperial b i r t h -day? 0 to manufacture the boxes and complete the presen-t a t i o n to court of both orders. Now we have sent men to Huai-nan to buy what i s needed. As soon as the materials a r r i v e , they are used. There i s no time to rest even at night. Though I am exert-ing a l l my energy to manage this a f f a i r and s t r i v i n g to achieve what has been ordered, I greatly fear that I w i l l f a l l short. I f I were to proceed routinely with-out memorializing, I would be f a l l i n g to repay your majesty's favour i n appointing me to this o f f i c e . I f I s t r i v e excessively to exact what has been ordered, I -78-would be bringing embarrassment to your majesty's v i r -tues of kindness and f r u g a l i t y . I humbly beg that your majesty review the aforementioned items of the l i q u o r monopoly and the surpluses from the various pre-fectures and understand that the whole matter of de-f i c i e n c i e s of my m i l i t a r y resources have t h e i r o r i g i n s . I humbly calculate that when your majesty looks at the arguments contained In my memorial you w i l l graciously comprehend f u l l y my t o t a l commitment to the virtues of loving the emperor, and carrying out my duties, as well as my feelings of complete l o y a l t y and t o t a l frankness. I humbly beg that your majesty order the chief ministers to discuss how I w i l l (be directed to) proceed, on the one hand, preventing me from disobeying imperial d i r e c -tives and on the other hand, from exhausting the army stores, so that I t w i l l not cause hardship f o r the weary people and not arouse public censure.77 i f e a r l i e r and l a t e r edicts and decrees must both be honoured and car-r i e d out, I am i n Imminent r i s k of the imperial wrath, and cannot overcome: my extreme fear and trembling. At that time, according to the amnesty, sending up t r i b u t e was prohibited. L i t t l e more than a month l a t e r , commissioners i n charge of levying tr i b u t e were hard on each other's heela on the road. Therefore, Te - y i i made a complaint containing v e i l e d c r i t i c i s m s about i t . The matter was memorialized but received no reply. Again an edict was issued [ordering] 1000 r o l l s of " t h i n s i l k capable of being made into ribbons and sashes" be sent up. Te - y i i also discussed this:7® Recently, because of imperial r e q u i s i t i o n s , I have already drawn up [documents concerning] the m i l i t a r y budget and the productive capacity of recent years and made thi s known i n a memorial. I humbly think that the emperor has c e r t a i n l y deigned to review i t . Again, I received an edict ordering me to have gowns and robes woven from t h i n s i l k and [another] 1000 r o l l s of " t h i n s i l k capable of being made into ribbons and sashes." After reading the [new] edict, my fears were doubled. -79-I humbly note that i n the court of [T'ang] T'al-tsung when a censor arrived i n Liang-chou?? and saw a note-worthy hawk, he hinted to L i T a - l i a n g 8 0 that i t be presented to the emperor. Ta-liang demonstrated his uprightness i n a secret memorial and T'al-tsung issued an edict saying " i f there i s an o f f i c i a l l i k e t h i s , what more i s there to worry about!" 8 1 Twice and t h r i c e have I sighed i n admiration. This matter i s recorded i n the h i s t o r i c a l records. Furthermore, when Hsiian-tsung ordered eunuchs to go to Chiang-nan 8 2 to capture egrets and such birds, the prefect of pien-chou 83 Ni Juo-shui 8 4 , protested. A f t e r the emperor issued an edict congratulating him and ac-cepting his view, the birds were a l l immediately re-leased. He [also] ordered Huang-fu Hsiin 85 i n i-chou 8° to have a half-sleeved jacket woven, a g i l t case f o r a guitar pick 87 made and an ivory box carved, etc. Su T'ing 8° did not accept the edict and a r b i t r a r i l y had the weaving stopped. Neither T'al-tsung nor Hsuan-tsung 89 meted out punishment. They happily accepted [the c r i t i c i s m ] that was expressed to them. In my hum-ble opinion, these rare birds and carved i v o r i e s are extremely I n s i g n i f i c a n t . Jo-shui and the others s t i l l considering that these matters burdened the people and harmed Imperial v i r t u e , made earnest pleas and mani-fested t h e i r l o y a l t y . In the courts of your divine ancestors, there were such o f f i c i a l s as these. How could i t be that your reign alone could lack such men? It must be that those i n high positions conceal t h e i r words and do not speak out. I t could not be a matter of your majesty r e s i s t i n g [ t h e i r proposals] and not accepting [ t h e i r ideas], I humbly note that the Act of Grace? 0 of [Pao-11 1] 4/23 [822] states: 'As f o r the nobles? 1 and o f f i c i a l s occupying high o f f i c e , l e t them not abandon me c a l l i n g me one who i s deaf to remonstrances.? 2 I f some of my actions are improper and contrary to reason or i f I am following my own desires and cherishing my peace and quiet, come and c r i t i c i z e me face to face i n open court. Hold nothing back. ( l i t . do not hide anything or con-sider anything taboo) This i s an example of the emperor receiving i n s t r u c t i o n and the acceptance of the ways of v i r t u e ? 4 , i l l u m i n a t i n g one's ancestors. I f [ i n response] admonitions are not t o t a l l y sincere, then the f a u l t w i l l be with the o f f i -c i a l s . Moreover, the sashes made with the pattern of -80-th e dark goose, the heavenly horses95 and the cypress panther are c o l o u r f u l l y decorated and unusual ( l i t . rare and strange), and are only f i t to be worn by the imperial person. The cost of the 1000 bolts which are now to be woven i s extremely great. This i s also something of which I am ignorant and do not understand.9° In former times, Han Wen-ti wore black s i l k ? ? and Han Yuan-ti stopped the wearing of t h i n silk.9° Their humaneness, v i r t u e , kindness, and f r u g a l i t y are cele-brated to the present day. I humbly beg that your majesty model yourself on the openness and a c c e s s i b i l i t y of T'ai-tsung and Hstian-tsung i n recent times and fur -ther contemplate the rule by example99 i n e a r l i e r times of Han Wen-ti and Yuan-ti. I humbly suggest that your majesty show my e a r l i e r memorials to the o f f i c i a l s and have them disouss what i s appropriate f o r my province's resources. I f a reduction [ i n taxes] i s granted, then the common people i n a distant corner of the world w i l l a l l c e r t a i n l y receive you g i f t . I cannot overcome my deep feelings of sincere supplication and awe. A favourable edict was issued i n response and the sending up of l i g h t s i l k was halted. Since the beginning of the Yuan-ho era, there had been numerous occasions of edicts banning the private ordination of Buddhist monks and nuns i n the prefectures of the empire. The mi l i t a r y governor of Hsii-chou, 1 0 0 Wang C h i h - h s i n g 1 0 1 was i n -sa t i a b l e i n accumulating wealth. On the occasion of the emper-or's birthday celebrations, he requested permission to establish an ordination platform i n Ssu-chou 1 0 2 i n order to accumulate good fortune by ordaining people, thereby hoping to obtain great p r o f i t s . Many people from [the region of] the Chiang and Huai Rivers crossed the Huai River i n groups. Te-yii sent up a memorial 1 0^ discussing t h i s : Wang Chlh-hsing has established platforms f o r I n i t i a t i n g Buddhist p r i e s t s and nuns i n his attached 1 0 2 4' administrative -81-unit of Ssu-chou. Since l a s t winter, he has hung up signs everywhere south of the Chiang and Huai Rivers i n v i t i n g the inhabitants. Since Yuan-ho 2 [807] no one i n the Chlang-Huai region has dared to ordain pr i v a t e l y , since hearing that there i s a platform i n Ssu-chou, each household of three adult males makes one of t h e i r number shear his h a i r . Their i n -tention l s to s e e k 1 0 < to avoid imperial l e v i e s and protect t h e i r wealth. Since the beginning of the year, the number of those who have shorn t h e i r h a i r i s an incalculably large number. 1 0 0 Recently at Suan Shan C r o s s i n g 1 0 ? I counted over 100 who crossed In one day. After investigation, [ I learned that] only fourteen were formerly Buddhist n o v i c e s , 1 0 " the rest were commoners from Su-chou 1 0? and Ch'ang-chou 1 1 0 without documents from t h e i r home d i s t r i c t s . Having compelled them to return to t h e i r places of o r i g i n , I investigated and learned about the de t a i l s of ordina-t i o n i n Ssu-chou. A l l the would-be monks pay two strings of cash per person, are.given a c e r t i f i c a t e and then are sent home without any further Buddhist ceremony. Unless there are extraordinary measures [taken] to prevent t h i s by the time of the imperial birthday celebrations, I estimate that we w i l l lose 600,000 adult males from the tax r o l l s from the region south of the Chiang and Hual Rivers. This i s no i n s i g n i f i c a n t matter / i n r e l a t i o n to the laws and regulations of the court. On the very day the memorial was sent up, an edict was sent to Hsu-chou stopping, i t . Ching-tsung was becoming more and more dissolute by the day, making haphazard imperial tours, keeping aloof from the worthy and the able, and associating with companies of les s e r men. When he convened court but two or three times a month, great o f f i c i a l s were rarely able to speak to him. The empire was i n great danger and i t was feared that i t might a f f e c t the imperial a l t a r s . While occupying the po s i t i o n of a C i v i l Governor 1 1 1 and devoting himself completely to the Imperial house, Te-yii sent -82-a messenger with h i s Remonstrance of S i x Headings W r i t t e n on a Red s c r e e n ' 1 1 2 to c o u r t . I have heard t h a t 'when there i s l o v e i n the h e a r t , how can i t be l e f t unexpressed?'! 13 T h i s i s how the worthies of o l d served the emperor with d e v o t i o n . Those who are f a r away but speak i n t i m a t e l y are In danger. Those whose p o s i t i o n s are f a r away and who are I n t e n t on being l o y a l may be c o n t r a r y . But .1 humbly r e c a l l t h a t I was r a i s e d up ( l i t . plucked up) by the former emperor and r e c e i v e d e x t r a o r d i n a r y im-p e r i a l f a v o u r . I f I do not show l o v e f o r the r u l e r with my l o y a l t y , then I w i l l be t u r n i n g my back on t h i s d i v i n e example from a n t i q u i t y . I r e c e n t l y served the p r e v i o u s c o u r t which was f u l l of e v i l I n f l u e n c e s . I .sent up the - Ta-mlng f u 1 1 ^ i n order to s a t i r i z e [ t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s ] , I r e c e i v e d many c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s from the e a r l i e r c o u r t . Now, p u t t i n g f o r t h a l l my l o y a l t y to e n l i g h t e n my r u l e r , I am p r o c e e d i n g from the same motive.115 i n the p a s t , d u r i n g Chang Ch'ang's 1 1" defence of d i s t a n t commanderies, and Mel F u ' s 1 1 ? wander-i n g s , they p l a c e d the h i g h e s t v a l u e on complete s i n c e r i t y 1 1 ^ and t o t a l l o y a l t y and d i d not seek to a v o i d g i v i n g r i s e to c r i t i c i s m 1 1 " ( l i t . blame and i n s t r u c t i o n ) . How much the more must I have s t u d i e d the a n c i e n t h i s t o r i e s and f u l l y comprehended the warnings of the o f f i c i a l s . 1 1 ? Although I am f a r away, I s t i l l take thought to o f f e r up my a d v i c e . I r e s p e c t f u l l y lower my h e a d 1 2 0 and p r e s e n t t h i s Remonstrance of S i x Headings, and having prepared precedents f o r our descendants and l o o k i n g upwards to the exemplar of d i v i n e wisdom on e a r t h , I bow down i n g r e a t f e a r and dread. (The remonstrance I t s e l f has been omitted.) The emperor wrote a r e p l y 1 2 1 i n h i s own hand: Your w r i t i n g i s very r e f i n e d . You are i n a f a r - o f f c o r n e r of the empire with g r e a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s e t t i n g an example and being a l e a d e r . A l l the areas (under your Command) are t r a n q u i l . A l l of Wu 1 2 2 has been p a c i f i e d and transformed. Your i n f l u e n c e i s such t h a t on your s p r i n g i n s p e c t i o n the atmosphere [ t h e r e ] i s so calm ( l i t . c l e a r ) you may s i t and w h i s t l e [ y o u r work done]. Your s o l i c i t o u s words and good government, I r e f l e c t upon and s i g h over, keeping them In my bosom. Your f a m i l y have s u c c e s s i v e l y manifested n o t a b l e a c h i e v e --83-ments. Por two generations, they have headed the inner court and during s i x reigns 1 2 3 they have held hereditary noble t i t l e s . The poet's meaning was not to forget, though f a r away, to report l o y a l l y , to suggest c r i t i c i s m s to the r u l e r and constantly to show, deep concern f o r small beginnings. You broaden [my knowledge] i n order to r e c t i f y me. You r e s t r a i n me so that I w i l l follow the '11'. Twice and th r i c e you have sent c r i t i c i s m s . I have praised them and sighed over them night a f t e r night. I place them on the corner of my seat. Their u t i l i t y i s comparable to the ' s i l k bow s t r i n g and leather g i r d l e , , 1 2 5 i w i l l carve them on my heart. Surely they w i l l be more ef-ficacious than medicine and acupuncture. Since you have presented your sincerest thoughts, I s h a l l always keep my heart open to c r i t i c i s m . I f there are any f a u l t s , do not forget to send up secret memorials. Even though mountains and r i v e r s keep you f a r away, how can concern and attachment [ f o r the throne],cease? Now I w i l l c e r t a i n l y exert myself i n order to match your s i n c e r i t y . Te-yii intended to c r i t i c i z e sharply but he did not wish to use scolding words, entrusting to these remonstrances the whole of his intentions. The one on 'dressing i n the dark' hinted that the court sat infrequently and l a t e . The one 'Im-proper dress 1 alluded to the f a c t that the emperor's dress and carriages were Irregular. The one on 'stopping tr i b u t e ' censured the quest f o r frivolous c u r i o s i t i e s . The one on 'ac-cepting i n s t r u c t i o n ' c r i t i c i z e d the r e j e c t i o n of good advice. The one on 'distinguishing the vi c i o u s ' c r i t i c i z e d placing trust on common petty-minded people. The one on 'guarding against going incognito' c r i t i c i z e d i l l - c o n s i d e r e d imperial excursions. Although the emperor could not make use of a l l this advice, he did order the [Han-lin] Scholar Wei Ch'u-hou 1 2° to compose c a r e f u l l y an edict i n r e p l y . 1 2 ? I t said that the -84-emperor was very pleased to receive i t and that he would de-vote much thought to i t s contents. Te-yii remained i n the Yangtse region f o r a long time but longed f o r -the c a p i t a l , taking advantage of every opportunity to express these fe e l i n g s , hoping to return to a s s i s t the em-peror. At this time, when Feng-chi was at the pivot of the government, he blocked his path with slanderous and g l i b talk. In the end, Te-yii was unable to move inward.' In Pao-li 2 [826] It was said that po-chou 1 2 8 produced holy water which could cure the diseases of those who drank i t . Te-yii memorialized: 1 2? I have learned upon investigation that the o r i g i n of these s t o r i e s about the water comes from a sorcerer-' monk's larceny and his crafty plan to beg for money. For several months, men from Chiang-nan have been running [to get i t ] and blocking the road. Out of every t h i r t y householdsj 13° one hires a man to fetch the water. When the sick resolve to take i t , they stop eating meat and strong-smelling foods ( i . e . g a r l i c and onions). For twice seven days a f t e r taking i t , they eat vegetarian meals. The gravely i l l look to i t to cure t h e i r i l l n e s s . The pri c e i s three strings of cash per tou. Those fetching i t , mix i t with other water and s e l l i t from place to place along the roadsides.!31 The old and sick who drink i t are frequently on the verge of death. Recently, I counted 30-5° people from Liang Che 133 a n a Fu-chien 134 crossing the Yangtse per day. I have a l -ready been apprehending them at Suan Shan Crossing but unless the source of the trouble i s stopped, i t w i l l ultimately be of no benefit to the common people. In former times, there were periodic reports of holy water13-> i n Wu and during the [Liu] Sung period 136 there was [ t a l k of] divine f i r e . 1 3 r X l l these things were weird and ab-surd and as such were rejected by the ancients. I im-plore your majesty to order the c i v i l governor of the province i n question, Ling-hu Ch'u 13 8 to put an immedi-ate end to i t i n order to stop this source of supersti-t i o n . -85-v It was carried out. Ching-tsung was lectured by the 'learned doctor and pro-fessor of Taoist learning for the two streets of the palace in the capital,' Chao Ruei-chen, 1 3 9 on the art of achieving immortality. The latter said that the emperor ought to seek unusual men who could teach this Tao. The Buddhist monks Wei Chen, Ch'l Hsien, and Cheng Chien expounded the view that one could gain good fortune with prayer and so achieve long l i f e . 1 * * 0 A l l four frequented the inner court and daily expressed their heretical teachings. The mountain recluse Tu Ching-hsien 1^ 1 sent up a memorial requesting that unusual men be sought in Chiang-nan. In Che-hsi, i t was said that there was a recluse Chou Hsiu-yiian 1 2* 2 who was reputedly several hundred years of age. The emperor immediately sent a eunuch, Hsiieh Chi-ling, to Jun-chou to welcome him, and also ordered Te-yii to( provide a government carriage for transport. Te-yii sent back a memorial1*^ with the eunuch. It said: I have heard that among the highest achievers of the Tao. none can be compared with Kuang Ch'engl^ and Hsiian Y i i a n 1 ^ (Lao Tzu) and that among the sages of mankind, none is equal to the Yellow Emperorl46 or Confucius. Long ago, the Yellow Emperor asked Kuang Ch'eng: "How does one regulate the essentials of one's body in order to achieve long l i f e ? ' 1 2 * ? He replied, *Don't look, don't listen, hold in your s p i r i t in order to gain inner peace. Your form w i l l correct i t s e l f ; your mind w i l l 1 ^ 0 cleanse i t s e l f . Do not exhaust your body, do not arouse your essence, then you w i l l have the possibility of long l i f e . Cautiously guard your oneness in order to repose in -86-i t s harmony. So, I have cared for my body for 1200 years and-my form has not experienced degeneration.' He added, 'Of those who comprehend my Tao, the superior ones become emperors, the lesser ones, [mere] kings.' Lao-tzu said to Confucius: 'Rid yourself of arrogant feelings and excessive desires of attraction to out-ward appearances and of licentious ambitions. They bring no benefit to your body. What I have to say to you is just that.• As a result of this the Yellow Emperor l e t out a sigh calling on Heaven. Confucius . expressed his feeling that Lao-tzu resembled a dragon.1^? The Tao of the former sages^O w a s supreme, was i t not? I respectfully submit that your majesty 1^! seek the in -struction of your mysterious ancestor and cultivate the art of the Yellow Emperor. Congeal your s p i r i t i n a tranquil palace, seek unusual people and gaze upon their countenances of snow and ice (i.e. those of immortals). If you make humble requests, out of respect for your divine feelings, an immortal w i l l be brought down. Sup-posing Kuang Ch'eng and the Yellow Emperor were to ar-rive one after the other, the way they would expound to you, the words that they would give to you, based on my calculations would not go outside of this range. What I am concerned about is that those who w i l l answer your summons w i l l l i k e l y be eccentric scholars and sycophants who do petty tricks of turning things Into mud or ice and boastfully display false and depraved things so as to deceive-and cheat one's senses.. Like the claims of gene-rals Wen Ch'eng 1^ and Wu L i , n o t one w i l l l i k e l y be proven. The reason why I have never dared to offer one man in response to the four edicts which I have received in three years is that I really did have something to be afraid of. I have also heard that although former kings favoured adepts, they never swallowed the medicines [which they prepared], therefore, the Han Shu said i f gold could be produced and be used to make drinking and eating utensils, then i t would increase longevity. Also, while both Liu Tao-hol55 at the court of T'ang Kao-tsung and sun Tseng-sheng 1^ a t the court of Hsuan-tsung were able to produce gold, s t i l l , your two ances-tors, in the end, did not venture to swallow i t . F o r 1 " i t was because caring for the ancestral temples and national altars was of great Importance and could not be slighted and made light of. These matters are luminously recorded on the pages of the national history. -87-In my humble opinion, i f your majesty thinksrshrewdly and seeks with f i n e discrimination,l->8 i t i s c e r t a i n that he w i l l produce a genuine recluse. The emperor should only then ask about the methods of maintaining harmony and not seek the benefits of e l i x i r s . I f you i n s i s t that they produce r e a l gold, i t w i l l only serve for diversion and c u r i o s i t y . I f you follow my advice, then the divine i n t e l l i g e n c e of the nine ancestral temples w i l l c e r t a i n l y be comforted and made happy, and who among the common people of the empire w i l l not be content? I intend to use the whole of my s i m p l i c i t y and s i n c e r i t y to a s s i s t the [emperor's] mysterious [powers of] transformation. I cannot bear the extrem-i t y of my dread and anxiety. When [Ghou] Hsl-yuan a r r i v e d In the c a p i t a l , the emperor put him up i n a mountain lodge and asked him about the method of the Tao. He said of himself that he had known Chang Kuo159 and Yeh Ching-nung. 1 0 0 The emperor ordered the court p o r t r a i t -ist L i Shin-fang 1** 1 to ask him about t h e i r form and appearance and paint them and present them to the throne. Hsi-yuan was a common man from the mountain wilderness and b a s i c a l l y had no Taolst learning. What he said was extravagant and lacking i n common sense. After Ching-tsung 1 0 2 died at the hands of b r i g a n d s , W e n - t s u n g sent him back south of the Yangtze. Te-yu's profound knowledge and moral standards ( l i t . guarding uprightness) were a l l of t h i s sort. When Wen-tsung ascended the throne, he awarded Te-yii the , t i t l e of Acting President of the Board of Rites. 1*' 4' In T'al-ho 3/8 [829], Te-yii was summoned [to the c a p i t a l ] to be Vice-president of the Board of War, 1 0^ and p'ei Tu recommended that he become Chief Minister, but when, with the a i d of eunuchs, the Vice-president of the C i v i l Service Board, L i u Tsung-mln, -88-was promoted to be c h i e f m i n i s t e r t h a t same month, he f e a r e d t h a t Te-yii would be p l a c e d i n an important p o s i t i o n . In the n i n t h month, the l a t t e r was made A c t i n g P r e s i d e n t of the Board of R i t e s and was [ a g a i n ] sent out to become the M i l i t a r y Governor of Cheng-hua. 167 Te-yii had a l r e a d y been blocked by -i Z T Q L i Feng-chi and had remained i n Ghe-hsi f o r e i g h t y e a r s . 0 0 Although he was f a r away from the c a p i t a l and the c o u r t , he had c o n s t a n t l y sent up memorials d i s c u s s i n g matters. Wen-tsung, who had o r i g i n a l l y been aware of h i s l o y a l t y , p lucked h i s name from among those recommended by the c o u r t and summoned him. W i t h i n t e n days of h i s a r r i v a l [ I n the c a p i t a l ] he was a g a i n d r i v e n out by L i Tsung-min. Te-yii kept h i s f e e l i n g s l o c k e d up and had no way to express h i m s e l f , r e l y i n g on Cheng T ' a n 1 0 ^ who was s e r v i n g as a L e c t u r e r w i t h i n the p a l a c e , 1 ? 0 to p r a i s e h i s v i r t u e s from time to time. D e s p i t e the rumours from the f a c -t i o n , the emperor's regard f o r Te-yii never ceased. Tsung-min soon brought i n Niu S e n g - j u 1 ? 1 to share the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of government. A f t e r these two combined t h e i r enmity a g a i n s t Te-y i i , a l l those who supported Te-yii were banished to d i s t a n t p o s t s . 1 ? 2 I n T'ai-ho 4/1° [83°].1?3 Te-yii was appointed A c t i n g P r e s i -dent of the Board of War, 1? 4 - P r e f e c t 1 ? ^ of [ t h e grand p r e f e c -t u r e o f ] Ch'eng-tu 1?^ and Deputy Grand M i l i t a r y Governor of Chien-nan 1?? Hsi-ch'uan i n Charge of M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s , 1 ? 8 Respon-s i b l e f o r S u r v e i l l a n c e and Appointments W i t h i n t h i s J u r i s d i c t i o n -89-[as w e l l as] p a c i f i c a t i o n Commissioner f o r the E i g h t Kingdoms 1?? of H s l - s h a n 1 ® 0 and Yun-nan. l o > 1 [ E a r l i e r ] , p ' e i Tu had shown fav o u r t o Tsung-min. When p ' e i Tu was campaigning i n H u a i - h s l , he requested t h a t T s u ng-min 1® 2 become h i s Duty O f f i c e r Responsi-b l e f o r D a l l y A f f a i r s and I n v e s t i g a t i o n 1 ^ i n the Changei Army Region. 1 0* 2* T h e r e a f t e r , Tsung-min*s r e p u t a t i o n and p o s i t i o n rose d a i l y . At t h i s time, Tsung-min hated Tu f o r h e l p i n g Te-yii and had Tu d i s m i s s e d as C h i e f Minis t e r 1 ®-5 and sent out as M i l i -t a r y Governor of Hsing-yuan. l o ^ T n e a u t h o r i t y of the N i u - L i c l i q u e overawed the world. 1®? Hsi-ch'uan s t i l l s u f f e r e d from the a f t e r - e f f e c t s of the p i l l a g i n g [ o f goods] and [ t h e ] c a r r y i n g o f f [ o f i n h a b i t a n t s ] by the b a r b a r i a n s . Kuo Chao 1®® l a c k e d the s k i l l t o comfort [ t h e people] and or g a n i z e [ t h e i r d e f e n s e ] . The people d i d not have the means f o r a l i v e l i h o o d . Te-yii then mended the border de-fe n s e s , r e b u i l t the army and a l s o sent ambassadors to Nan Chao 1®? to seek the r e t u r n of the workmen and a r t i s a n s who had been c a r r i e d o f f . The ambassadors got more than 4000 c r a f t s m e n , * ? 0 Buddhist and T a o i s t p r i e s t s and brought them back to Ch'eng-tu. In [ T a i - h o ] 5/9 [ 8 3 1 ] , 1 9 1 the T i b e t a n g e n e r a l i n Wei-chou, 1? 2 Hsi-ta-mou, requested p e r m i s s i o n to su r r e n d e r h i s c i t y . H is p r e f e c t u r e ' s southern boundary was the Min Shan 1?^ north of the Yangtze. I t went westward, range upon range, and i t s l i m i t s were unknown. In the n o r t h , i t looked out a t the Lung Mountains 1? 2* where accumulated snow resembled jade. I n the ea s t , i t looked -90-down upon Ch'eng-tu as i f i t were at-the bottom of a well. On one side there was a s o l i t a r y peak, and on the other three sides i t overlooked the Yangtze. This was the key area i n eastern Shu f o r c o n t r o l l i n g the Tibetans. After the Ghih-te era [756-7] ( i . e . the beginning of the An Lu-shan r e b e l l i o n ) , H o f - h s i ] 1 ? ^ and Lung^yu] 1?^ f e l l to the barbarians and only this prefecture was preserved. Valuing the strategic import-ance of Wei-chou, the Tibetans 1?? married off a g i r l to a gatekeeper i n this prefecture. Twenty years l a t e r her two boys, who were now grown up, responded from within to t h e i r c a l l and the c i t y surrendered. After capturing i t , the Tibetans c a l l e d i t , "the c i t y without g r i e f . " During the Chen-yuan era [785-805] while Wei Rao 1? 8 was Governor of Shu and controlled the Eight Kingdoms of Hsi Shan, he devised countless plans to take this c i t y but never succeeded. When Hsi-ta-mou dispatched an envoy to d e l i v e r his terms, Te-yii, suspecting a t r i c k , sent an ambassador bearing a brocade gown and a b e l t of gold, who presented them with the message, 'wait f o r further instructions.' After Hsi-ta-mou le d a l l the people i n his prefecture to Ch'eng-tu to surrender, Te-yii sent troops to garrison and protect Wei-chou. In a memori-a l , he set fort h the advantages and disadvantages of going forth and attacking. At the time, Niu seng-ju was opposed [to accepting the surrender], arguing that China had recently con-cluded a treaty with the Tibetans and ought not to v i o l a t e i t . The words are to be found i n his biography. 1?? Te-yii was ordered - 9 1 -to send back Hsi-ta-mou 1s people and to return Wei-chou. Af-ter the K i n g 2 0 0 of the Tibetans got them back, they were a l l c r u e l l y punished. In [TJ_ai-ho] 6 [832], Te-yii again repaired the f o r t i f i c a -tions at the Ch'lung-hsla p a s s 2 ° l » 2 0 2 and moved the administra-t i o n of Sul-chou 2 0^ to T'ai-teng 2 0 4" c i t y to r e s i s t the attacks of the barbarians. In successive m i l i t a r y campaigns and g a r r i -son service he became known f o r his achievements i n good govern-ment. During his service i n Shu, he defended against the Tibetans i n the west, and p a c i f i e d the Man and Yen 2°5 In the south. Within a few years, dogs did not bark at night to r a i s e alarms, while the bruised and sick gradually recovered. At t h i s time, the Eunuch Overseer 2 0? Wang Ghien^yen 2 0 8 en-tered the court to become a Eunuch C o u n c i l l o r . 2 0 ? On one occa-sion i n the presence of the emperor, he said that Hsi-ta-mou had been bound and delivered to please the barbarians, thus put-ti n g to an end any thoughts of submitting and surrendering. } The emperor put much of the blame f o r t h i s on Seng-ju. 2 1° In the winter of that year, Te-yii was summoned to become the president of the Board of War. 2 1 1 Seng-ju was dismissed as Chief Minister and sent out to become the M i l i t a r y Governor of H u a l - n a n * 2 1 2 ' 2 1 3 In T'al-ho 7/2 [833]. with this same o f f i c e , Te-yii served as Chief Minister and was promoted and enfeoffed as the Marquis of Tsan-huang with an estate of 700 households. In the 6th month, Tsung-min was also dismissed and Te-yii replaced -92-him as V i c e - p r e s i d e n t of the Department of s t a t e A f f a i r s 2 1 2 * and Grand s c h o l a r of the Academy of Assembled W o r t h i e s . 2 1 5 During the 12th month, the.emperor s u f f e r e d a s t r o k e 2 1 " and f o r over a month he was unable to speak. Not u n t i l T'al-ho 8/1/17 [834] d i d he proceed t o the Tzu-ch'en H a l l , 2 1 ? and, though s t i l l weak, h o l d an audience with the v a r i o u s o f f i c i a l s . When the c h i e f m i n i s t e r s withdrew, they asked whether o r not the emperor was w e l l . The emperor si g h e d t h a t f o r a l o n g time there had been no one of notable t a l e n t among h i s d o c t o r s . Consequent-l y , Wang S h o u - c h 1 e n g 2 1 ® i n t r o d u c e d Cheng C hu 2 19 to him. Pre-v i o u s l y , when Cheng c o n t r i v e d the Sung S h e n - h s l 2 2 0 a f f a i r , the emperor re s e n t e d him so much t h a t he wanted to o r d e r the P r e f e c t of the C a p i t a l D i s t r i c t 2 2 1 to have him beaten to death. At t h i s time, only because the medicine [he p r o v i d e d ] was somewhat e f f i -c a c i o u s d i d the emperor b e g i n t o t r e a t him w e l l . Shou-ch'eng had a l s o recommended L i H s u n 2 2 2 as an expert on the 1-chlng. In the f a l l , the emperor wished to appoint him to a remon-s t r a n c e o f f i c e . Te-yii memorialized: "Hsiin i s a p e t t y man who ought not stand by the emperor's s i d e . The sum accumulation of h i s r e c e n t wrongdoings i s known to a l l . If- you use him without reason, you w i l l c e r t a i n l y s t a r t l e p u b l i c o p i n i o n . " The emperor r e p l i e d , "Who among men i s without f a u l t ? one must wait f o r them to change; because he was recommended by Feng-chi, I cannot bear t o go back on my word." Te-yii answered, "Sages have the ri g h t e o u s n e s s t o c o r r e c t -93-t h e l r f a u l t s . Hsun's l s b a s i c a l l y c r a f t y and perverse and he has not the p r i n c i p l e s to change and reform." The emperor turned to Wang Y a i 2 2 3 and said, "Discuss t h i s matter and give him another post." subsequently, he was appointed Assistant Professor i n the Academy of the Pour Gates. 2 2 4" When the edict was issued, the Grand secretary of the Imperial C h a n c e l l o r 2 2 ^ Cheng s u 2 2 ^ and Han Tz' u22 7 sealed i t but did not send i t down. Wang Yal summoned Su f o r a face-to-face explanation and ordered him to send i t down. Then Cheng Chu also suddenly ar r i v e d from Chiang-chou. 2 2 8 Hsun and he hated Te-yii f o r f o r c i n g Hsiin out. On 9/10, when- Tsung-min was summoned from Hsing-yiian and again appointed Vice-president of the Imperial s e c r e t a r i a t and Minister of state replacing Te-yii, Te-yii was sent out to be M i l i t a r y Governor of Hsing-yiian. On the day that he came to thank the emperor fo r his appointment, he himself expressed his longing f o r the c a p i t a l and h i s unwillingness to go out to the f r o n t i e r . An imperial decree was issued making Te-yii A c t i n g 2 2 ? Vice-President of the Board of War. Tsung-min memorialized: "Once imperial orders and edicts have been issued, they ought not to be changed at one's convenience. Shortly thereafter, he was transferred to be T i t u l a r 2 ^ 0 Vice-president of the Depart-ment of state A f f a i r s , Prefect at Jun-chou, 231 M i l i t a r y Governor of the Chen-hul M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t 2 ^ 2 and C i v i l Governor, etc., fo r Su, Chang, Hang, and Jun-chou, replacing Wang Pan. When -94-Te-yii arrived at the post, he received an imperial edict [or-dering him] to place the palace lady Tu Chung-yang i n a Taoist temple and provide her with sustenance. She had been prince Chang's foster mother, and had been exiled to Jun-chou because the prince had committed a crime. 23 2 On r T ' a i - h o l 9/3 [836] the L e f t Assistant of the Depart-ment of state A f f a i r s , 2 3 3 Wang Fan, and the Vice-president of the Board of F i n a n c e , 2 ^ L i Han, sent up a memorial sta t i n g that when Te-yii was at his command, he had l i b e r a l l y bribed Chung-yang and thrown i n his l o t with prince Chang to p l o t something i l l e g a l . In the 4th month, when the emperor was i n the P'eng-lai Palace, 235 he summoned Wang Yai, L i Ku-yen,236 L u s U i , 2 3 ? Wang Fan, Cheng Chu, and others to give .- personal testimony about this matter. Fan and Han's f a l s e testimony that Te-yii had formed a conspiracy was extremely damaging. Lu Sui memorialized: "Te-yii t r u l y would not stoop to t h i s . I f indeed i t i s as Fan and Han claim, I too ought to be capable of such crimes." The group's discussions gradually stopped. Te-yu was soon a f t e r appointed Chief Counsellor 238 to the Crown . Prince at Lo-yang. That month, he was further degraded to the post of the Administrator-in-chie f 239 of Yiian-chou. Lu Sui was convicted of giving testimony on behalf of Te-yii and was dismissed from m i n i s t e r i a l ranks and sent out to serve i n Che-h s i [as M i l i t a r y Governor]. In the 7th month, Tsung-min was i n -volved i n [the case of] rescuing Yang Wu-ching 2^ 1 and was exiled -95-to Ch»u-chou. 2 Z + 2 L i Han2** 3 was implicated i n the crime of being i n a f a c t i o n along with Tsung-min and was banished to P e n - c h o u . I n the 11th month, Wang Pan 2 2 4 , i + a and L i Hsiin started an i n s u r r e c t i o n 2 ^ but were executed. Wen-tsung then became f u l l y aware of the truth of this e a r l i e r matter and understood that Te-yii had been slandered by the fac t i o n . In the t h i r d month of the following year [836], Te-yii was appointed Yin-oriing Kuang-lu T a l - f u ^ ^ a n d through the practice of llang-l 2**? was transferred to be prefect of Ch'u-chou. 2 /* 8 In the seventh month, he was promoted to Chief Counsellor to the Crown prince. Pour months l a t e r , he again became acting President of the Treasury Board and C i v i l Governor of Che-hsl. Altogether, he served i n Che-hsi three times f o r a period of more than ten years. I n K'ai-cheng 2/5 [837], he was appointed Administrator-in-chief to the Governor General of the Senior Prefecture of Yang-chou2/*9 and Deputy Grant M i l i t a r y Governor of Huai-nan i n charge of M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s replacing Niu seng-ju. E a r l i e r when Seng-ju heard that Te-yii was going to replace him, he handed over the administration to his deputy Chang L u 2 ^ 0 and thereupon immediate-l y entered the court. At this time, the treasury [allegedly] contained 800,000 strings [worth] of cash and bolts of cloth. When Te-yii arrived at the garrison, he memorialized that he had received only 400,000 and [the other] h a l f had been completely - 96 -spent by Chang Lu. Seng-ju sent a report demanding j u s t i c e i n this matter. Te-yii was ordered to restore the wealth to Seng-ju 1 s figures. Te-yii claimed that when he f i r s t reached the garrison he had been i l l and had been s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y cheated by his cl e r k s , but nevertheless requested punishment. An edict exonerated him. The Imperial Ommissioners2-51 Wang Chi, 2-5 2 Wei Mu, 253 r p s i u i T a n g , 2 ^ Wei Yu-i 2 ^ 5 and the Imperial Reminders 2^ Ling-hu T'ao, Wei Ch'u-lao, 2^? Pan Tsung-jen, 2^® and others, one a f t e r the other, petitioned that Te-yii had slanderously memorialized about the money i n order to topple Seng-ju. In the end, the emperor did not inquire further. In K'ai-ch'eng 4/4 [839] • Te-yii was given the t i t l e of acting L e f t Vice-president of the Department of State A f f a i r s . On 5/1 [ 840] , Wu-tsung as-cended the throne. In the seventh month, he summoned Te-yii from Huai-nan.. Two months l a t e r , he was promoted to be Vice-president of the Imperial Chancellory and Minister of State. P r i o r to t h i s , when Te-yii's father Chi-fu was f i f t y - o n e years old, he had gone to serve i n Huai-nan. At age f i f t y - f o u r , he l e f t Huai-nan and returned to m i n i s t e r i a l rank. Now Te-yii, having served i n Huai-nan, was returning to enter m i n i s t e r i a l rank at exactly the same age as h i s father. This was indeed a coincidence ( l i t . an unusual thing). In Hui-ch'ang 1 [840] , Te-yii was given the concurrent post of Vice-president of the Department of State A f f a i r s . At the end of the K'ai-ch'eng period, the Uighurs were -97-attacked by the Kirghiz. 2-59 After being defeated i n b a t t l e , the t r i b e broke up and scattered. Chieh Kaghan2**0 captured the T'al-ho p r i n c e s s 2 * 5 1 and came south. In Hul-oh'ang 2/2 [842], the camped on the f r o n t i e r and sent a messenger to seek aid i n the form of arms and provisions i n order to regain t h e i r home-land. They sought to borrow the T 1ien-te Army i n order to com-f o r t the princess. At this time, the Commissioner f o r the T 1 i e n -te Army,2**2 Tien Mou,2*5^ requested to attack them with the armies of the various tribes of sha-t'o 2 0^" and T'ui-hun.2**5 undecided, the emperor sent the matter down to the various o f f i c i a l s to be discussed. The majority of those discussing i t said to do just as Mou had memorialized. Te-yii said, "A short time ago, when the empire was i n d i f f i c u l t y ( i . e . during the An Lu-shan Rebellion), the Uighurs on successive occasions established great merit. Now that t h e i r empire has been destroyed and t h e i r royal house defeated with nowhere to f l e e , since they have been on the f r o n t i e r , they have not come to Invade and transgress, but because of t h e i r poverty, have come to submit. I f suddenly we carry out the practice of k i l l i n g and attacking, i t w i l l not be the way Han Hsiian-tl handled Hu-han-hsieh. 2 ° ° I t would be better to a i d them and quietly observe t h e i r movements." Chief Minister Ch'en' I-hslng 2°7 said, "this would be loaning an army to Invaders and aidin g robbers with provisions; i t i s not a [good] plan. I t would be better to attack them." Te-yii r e p l i e d , T'ien Mou and Wei Chung-p' ing 2*' 0' stated that the Sha-t'o and T'ui-hun both want to attack the barbarians. In a c r i s i s they would not be r e l i a b l e . When they see an advantage, they advance; when they encounter an opponent, they scatter; this i s the normal behaviour of mixed barbarians. Certainly, they w i l l not, on be-half of our state and r u l i n g house, defend and protect -98-our border regions. T'len-te i s [but] one walled c i t y and the border troops are few and weak, so i f they contract the enmity of the strong barbarians, [the f r o n t i e r ] w i l l c e r t a i n l y f a l l . I t would be better to use reason and show them mercy and wait f o r them to go too f a r and then use troops when i t would be convenient. Suddenly, the Uighur Chief Minister Wa Mo-ssu 2? 0 slew the other Chief Minister, Chih H s i n , 2 ? 1 and brought his throng to surrender. The Ch'ih Hsln tribes also surrendered i n Yu-chou. 2? 2 Since Wu-chieh's power was i s o l a t e d , they did not give him any r i c e , and his group was starving and i n want. When they grad-u a l l y approached Pao Ta 2?3 Cha and pa T'ou peak2?** i n Chen-wu2?5 and unexpectedly entered the prefectural borders of shuo-chou, 2?^ both the sha-t'ou and T'ui-hun, along with t h e i r f a m i l i e s , de-fended the mountain strongholds. In Yun-chou, 2?? Chang Hsien-chieh 2?® defended himself within the c i t y . The barbarians plun-dered very f r e e l y , f o r there were no troops to oppose them. The emperor was concerned over t h i s and together with his ministers and o f f i c i a l s deliberated over t h i s matter. Te-yii said, North of pa T'ou Peak i s merely desert. To f i g h t there i n the wilderness, we must use cavalry. I f We use infantry to oppose them, i t would be hard to ensure v i c t o r y . The princess i s what Wu-chieh now r e l i e s on. I f we order a brave general to make a s o r t i e to seize the princess, the barbarians w i l l naturally be defeated. The emperor agreed. He thereupon ordered Te-yii to d r a f t an edict and make d i s -positions. The various armies from the area north of Tai-chou 2? 9 -99-were sent to secure the passes. The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the s o r t i e was given to L i u M i e n . 2 8 0 Mien ordered a great o f f i c e r , Shih Hsiung, o x to make a sudden attack on the kaghan at Sha Hu S h a n , 2 8 2 where he defeated him. The words recording the reception of the princess back to the palace are found i n Shih Hsiung's biography. 2 83 soon thereafter, he was promoted to the p o s i t i o n of Director of Public Works. 2 8 4 - On rHui-ch'ang] 3/2 [843], Gh'ao Fan28-5 memorialized that the Kirghiz were at-tacking the m i l i t a r y protectorates of A n - h s i 2 8 ^ and P«ei-t'ing 2 8? and that the troops ought to be sent out to respond [to the c r i s i s ] and r e l i e v e [the beleaguered s i t u a t i o n ] . Te-yii memorialized: According to the gazeteer, the distance from An-hsi to the c a p i t a l i s 7100 l i ; from p ' e i - t ' i n g , i t i s 5200 l i . During the period of great t r a n q u i l i t y ( i . e . before the An Lu-shan Rebellion) the western road went from Ho-hsi and Lung-yu and wound i t s way through the Yii-men p a s s . 2 8 8 Everywhere there were " t h e °hou and hsien of our country and they a l l had major armies. Th~e strategic armies of An-hsi and P'ei-t'ing were l e v i e d and raised from nearby areas. After the [period of] d i f f i c u l t i e s , Ho[-hsi] and Lung[-yu] both f e l l to the Tibetans. If we wanted to get through to An-hsi and P'ei-t'ing, we had to take the Uighur road. The Uighurs how have been destroyed and exterminated; moreover, we do not know for sure whether or not i t ( i . e . this road) i s under the control of the Kirghiz. Supposing we do succeed i n rescuing the besieged f o r t s ; then we must re-estab-l i s h m i l i t a r y p r o t e c t o r a t e s 2 8 ? and must use Chinese sold i e r s to garrison and defend them. Each place w i l l need no less than 10,000 men. These 10,000 men, where are we to levy and rai s e them? What paths and roads w i l l we take to supply them? Now T*ien-te and Chen-wu are extremely close to the c a p i t a l , yet t h e i r m i l i t a r y strength often suffers from i n s u f f i c i e n c i e s , and even when there are no m i l i t a r y actions the provisions which -100-they have stored up w i l l not l a s t three years. I f the strength at court i s s t i l l not up to standard, how much less can we defend An-hsi which i s 7000 11 away? What I am saying i s that even i f we recover these l o s t t e r r i t o r i e s , they w i l l be of absolutely no use. Formerly, i n the time of Han Hsiian-ti, Wei H s i a n g 2 0 0 requested the a b o l i t i o n of the m i l i t a r y f i e l d s at Chu-shih. 2 9 1 i n the time of Han Yuan-ti, Ghia Chiian-c h i h 2 ? 2 requested the abandonment of Chu-ya Chun.293 This dynasty's worthy minister T i J e n - c h i e h 2 1 ^ also c a l l e d f o r the abandonment of the four garrisons 295 and the establishment of Hu-se-lo 29° as kaghan. He also requested the abandoning of An-tung 297 and set-t i n g up of K a o [ ^ l i as chie f t a i n s again]. 29° He did not wish to covet external t e r r i t o r y while weakening the i n t e r i o r of the country or to waste and exhaust the strength of the common people. These two o f f i -c i a l s , at the time when we possessed these lands, s t i l l wanted to abandon them i n order to strengthen ( l i t . fatten) China. How much more should we wish to do so when we are separated from them by more than 10,000 11? How can we save them? I am a f r a i d that the border tribes are f u l l of schemes and are aware that the strength of our nation" i s not adequate. They may deceptively allow i t [ i . e . our recovery of An-hsi and P'ei-t'lng] i n order to demand our gold and s i l k s . Your majesty w i l l not be able to repent of i t once i t i s already i n operation. If so, this w i l l be exchanging substantive expenditures f o r empty matters. This would be simply exterminating one Uighur and bringing another to l i f e [ i . e . the K i r -ghiz]. I fear that this plan i s not suitable. I t was then stopped. Te-yii again raised the matter of T'al-ho 5 [®31] when the Tibetan resident general i n Wei-chou surrendered his f o r -tress but Nlu Seng-ju blocked i t , r e s u l t i n g i n the loss of Wei-chou. Te-yii's memorial 299 discussing the matter reads: During the previous reign when I was sent out to serve i n Western Shu, the Tibetan commander i n Wei-chou, Hsi-ta-mou, a l b e i t a Tibetan chieftain3°0 had long appreci--101-ated the august influence of the imperial throne and surrendered this stoutly defended city to me in my circ u i t . Soon thereafter, I dispatched the prefect responsible for Wei-chou, Yu Ts'ang-chien,301 to lead forces to enter and take possession of the city. When I sent an urgent dispatch reporting this, the previous emperor was surprised and happy.302 A t that time, those who were opposed303 to me, after hearing the news, were jealous and quickly presented doubting words which confounded the emperor's perceptions, say-ing that because we had just concluded a treaty with the Tibetans,304 w e could not violate i t , and that we must be afraid that the Tibetans would use this as an excuse to approach and attack our frontiers and bor-ders. It was decreed that I return this city at once, and at the same time, seize and send back Hsi-ta-mou and the others, bringing about their annihilation. And, in addition, eunuch envoys were sent to compel me to send them back. In times past, Po Ch'i3°5 k i l l e d prisoners and u l t i -mately met death in Tu-yu.3°6 when Ch'en T'ang3°7 was banished,308 i t w a s r evenge for Chih:.Chih.309, Having been moved by, and having sighed over, these previous matters, my heart w i l l be f u l l of shame un t i l my dying day. Now when I have encountered a heroic ruler and am unworthily occupying high office, I ven-ture to recall the matter, hoping that you w i l l re-examine i t . Moreover, Wei-chou occupies the summit of a high moun-tain overlooking a river on three sides at the strate-gic point where the Tibetans govern a prefecture.31° It is the route for invading armies into Chinese t e r r i -tory. Earlier when Ho[-hsi] and Lung[-yu] both f e l l , this prefecture alone was preserved. The Tibetans secretly married off a maiden to a gatekeeper from this chou. Twenty years later when the two boys grew up, they stealthily opened the gate of the rampart, letting in the troops at night. Consequently, the city f e l l and was called 'the one taken without grief.'311 After-wards, 312 the Tibetans were able to combine their strength on the western borders. Consequently, they had nothing to worry about on the southern road and en-croached on the outskirts [of the capital], causing anxious nights for several reigns. During the Chen-yuan era [785-805] when Wei Kao planned313 to conquer Ho and Huang^l4" he had to start with this fortress. A l l his well-trained divisions furiously at--102-tacked It f o r several years. The Tibetan concern f o r i t was so strong that the king's maternal uncle315 Lun Mang-je3l6 was despatched to come with aid . The inaccessible walls of the fo r t r e s s were high and steep, overlooking a strategic place. Into layers of mist, a narrow path ( l i t . a b i r d t r a i l ) twisted and wound. Many of the courageous soldiers were crushed by the boulders. No one was able to contrive a clever device a f t e r the fashion of a Kung Shu.317 We vainly captured Mang-je and returned. When the southern barbarians ( i . e . the Nan Chao) turned t h e i r backs on our favour, they swept the earth, and drove off plunder and captives.318 when I f i r s t a r r i v e d In Western Shu, the hearts of the peo-ple were s t i l l not at ease. Without, I raised up our nation's prestige. Within, I repaired the border de-fenses. When Wei-chou received my l e t t e r , they sent t h e i r wishes to me. I t o l d them that they would have to wait u n t i l I reported t h i s i n a memorial. What I hoped f o r was to see i f t h e i r intentions were false.319 Hsi-ta-mou and the others3 2 0 soon thereafter l e d out the' people and troops of t h i s f o r t r e s s , together with the administrative seal f o r the chou, t h e i r armour and weapons. Blocking up the road, they came one a f t e r the other, emptying the f o r t r e s s , and submitted to me. I then sent out a large number of personal sol d i e r s to accept the ceremony of surrender. None of the southern barbarians i n the f i l e dared look up. Wei-chou] i s a l l the more [a matter of concern] since he eight countries of the Western Mountains are cut off by t h i s prefecture. In recent times, the reference to them i n the t i t l e of M i l i t a r y G o v e r n o r 3 2 1 [of this region] has become an empty phrase. Por a long time, the various Ch*lang3 2 2 have suffered from the conscription and taxation of the Tibetans and they have wanted to become royal subjects.323 After the surrender of Wei-chou, i t was said that they only needed to receive my l e t t e r and hat to induce them to come one a f t e r another and enter my j u r i s d i c t i o n . Ho-shui32H- and ch'l-ohi3 25 and other fortresses i n the barbarian realm having l o s t t h e i r s t r a t e g i c importance, could naturally be withdrawn and return home. We could have reduced the garrison troops i n eight places and regained a thousand 11 of our former t e r r i t o r y by [ j u s t ] s i t t i n g . I f e l t that there was no greater benefit [than -103-t h i s ] and I t [the acceptance of the surrender of Wei-chou J would become the opportunity326 f o r o u r great r e v i v a l . What I agreed to with him i n person,327 j reported to the throne i n a memorial [as well as recom-mending] that each be rewarded.328 j personally be-stowed upon him an embroidered robe and be l t of gold. Respectfully, I waited f o r the court edict.329 Moreover, f o r over a year p r i o r to the surrender of Wei-chou, the Tibetans had encircled and harass ed330 Lu-chou.331 Arguing from t h i s , how can i t be said that they were honouring the treaty? S t i l l more, I had never once used troops to attack [ t h e i r lands] and cap-ture [ t h e i r people]. I t was they themselves who res-ponded to our influence and came to submit. Furthermore, the men who argued against i t , can they have thought332 about the substance of this matter? The barbarians are slow and dull-witted, t h e i r lands are barren and t h e i r people few. Each time they wish to take advantage of the autumn to v i o l a t e our borders, they require several harvests to gather333 [enough] food. For over a month a f t e r taking possession of Wei-chou, no envoy entered my t e r r i t o r y . Then came this t e r r i f y -ing news, surely they ( i . e . court o f f i c i a l s ) cannot have thought of the resentment they would cause when they drummed up these i d l e words. At fir s t , 3 3 4 when I accepted the surrender, I pointed to heaven and swore an oath saying, 'How could I bear to abandon my good faith335 i n regard to these more than,300 men.' In memorial a f t e r memorial, I implored33o y o u r majesty to send down a compassionate pardon. The imperial decree i n reply was stern and harsh. F i n a l l y , I was ordered to hand them back, have t h e i r bodies bound by fetters337 and carted o f f i n bamboo baskets. When they reached the road, they grievously c r i e d out to heaven. A l l the o f f i c e r s and minor o f f i -c i a l s were crying towards me [ i n protest]. When this group encountered the Tibetan leader, he mocked and r i d i c u l e d them, saying 'They have already surrendered, why must you send them back?' Then these men who had defected were massacred on Chinese t e r r i t o r y . Wantonly, the Tibetan leader car r i e d out t h e i r murder and destruc-tion338 i n order to prevent further d i s a f f e c t i o n . Then they threw t h e i r babies [ i n t o the a i r ] and caught them on t h e i r spears and lances. I have heard that when King Ling of Ch'u339 k i l l e d the southern barbarians, the Spring and Autumn Annals p l a i n l y r i d i c u l e d him. When -104-Chou Wen-?4'u sent Teng Shu-5 away, the records and annals scorned him g r e a t l y . How much more when our g r e a t country breaks f a i t h with those of another race and cuts o f f the road of l o y a l submission i n order to p l e a s e the h e a r t s of e v i l v i l l a i n s . S i n c e a n c i e n t times, t h i s has been unprecedented. I am t r u l y g r i e v e d t h a t Hsi-ta-mou was c r u e l l y punished f o r having g i v e n up t h i s c i t y . T h i s a l l stemmed from my entrapment of an innocent person. I beg the emperor to comfort h i s l o y a l s o u l and e s p e c i a l l y grant him a t i t l e . The emperor's h e a r t g r i e v e d f o r him and, soon t h e r e a f t e r , granted him a posthumous t i t l e . ^ Z That year, i n a d d i t i o n , Te-yii be-came a c t i n g D i r e c t o r of i n s t r u c t i o n s . 3 ^ 3 In [Hul-ch'ang] 3/4 [843], the M i l i t a r y Governor of Tse-1^ .344 L i u T s ' u n g - c h l e n ^ 1 ^ d i e d . His troops took i t upon them-s e l v e s to make h i s nephew Chen i n t e r i m g o v e r n o r . 3 ^ The t h r e e armies requested the sending down of the o x - t a i l e d pennant and axe.3^7 When the emperor to g e t h e r with h i s m i n i s t e r s and o f f i -c i a l s d i s c u s s e d whether or not t h i s should be done, Te-yii s a i d , T s e - l u i s an a r e a w i t h i n [ t h e c o n t r o l o f ] the country and i s not the same as Ho-shuo.348 I n e a r l i e r and more re c e n t times, we always used Confucian o f f i c i a l s as c o u r t - a p p o i n t e d commanders. A s h o r t while ago, a f t e r the death of L i Pao-chen, who had put t o g e t h e r t h i s army, Te-tsung350 s t i l l d i d not permit h e r e d i t a r y suc-cess ion351 and ordered L i Ch ien352 to accompany the c o f f i n and r e t u r n to Lo-yang. During the Ch'ang-ch'ing era [821-25], a f t e r L i u Wu353 a r r i v e d there to serve i n the g a r r i s o n , he too became ve r y Independent. Ching-tsung temporized and consequently p e r m i t t e d Ts'ung-chien to succeed h i s f a t h e r . At the b e g i n n i n g of the K'al-ch'eng p e r i o d [836-40], he s t a t i o n e d an army a t Ch'ang-tzu,354 i n t e n d i n g to r a i s e the arms of Chin-yang355 i n order to purge those by the emperor's slde.35& j j e w a s ± n c l o s e c o n t a c t with Cheng Chu and L i Hsiin. outwardly, he pretended to be o f f e r i n g up h i s t o t a l l o y a l t y to the emperor, [ b u t ] i n f a c t he was h a r b o u r i n g thoughts of s p y i n g and w a i t i n g [ f o r an ad--105-vantage]. At the o u t s e t of h i s [ f i n a l ] i l l n e s s , he ordered L i u Chen to command h i s f o r c e s . I f we do not mount a p u n i t i v e e x p e d i t i o n , how can t h i s be c a l l e d commanding China ( l i t . the f o u r q u a r t e r s ) ? I f we temporize and grant i t [ o f f i c i a l s a n c t i o n ] to him, the [ o t h e r ] independent M i l i t a r y Governors w i l l i m i -t a t e i t . T h e r e a f t e r , the awe and commands [ o f the son of heaven] w i l l be l o s t . When the emperor asked,357 I I Q 0 you c o n s i d e r t h a t u s i n g troops w i l l b r i n g c e r t a i n v i c t o r y ? " he r e p l i e d , What L i u Chen r e l i e s upon i s o n l y the three g a r r i s o n s i n Ho-shuo. I f only we can get Wei[-chou]358 and Chen[-chou]359 ( i . e . Wei-po and Ch'eng-te) not to j o i n together with Chen, d e s t r o y i n g him i s a c e r t a i n t y . I request d i s p a t c h i n g one man, an important o f f i c i a l , b e a r i n g an i m p e r i a l decree s t a t i n g , 'The commander of T s e - l u i s not [ i n ] the same [ p o s i t i o n ] as those of the three commanders [ o f H o p e i ] . S i n c e the d i f f i c u l -t i e s , s u c c e s s i v e emperors have always p e r m i t t e d them h e r e d i t a r y s u c c e s s i o n . T h i s has a l r e a d y become an es-t a b l i s h e d p r a c t i c e . Now the empire wishes to r a i s e an army and punish Chen [ b u t ] the p a l a c e Armies do not I n - . tend to go out to [ t h e r e g i o n ] E a s t of the Mountains.'3°0 ( i . e . Ho-pei) As r o r the three chou east of the moun-t a i n s [ o f T s e - l u , v i z . Tz'u, Hslng, and Ming], have Chen-chou and Wei-chou send out troops to a t t a c k and capture them. The emperor agreed. He then ordered the V i c e - p r e s i d e n t of the Censorate, L i H u i , 3 o 1 ^ Q g 0 ^ n e three g a r r i s o n s to p r o c l a i m the i m p e r i a l e d i c t . The e d i c t to Wei and Chen s a i d ; Gentlemen, there i s no need to make long-range plans f o r your descendants, o r a l l i a n c e s of mutual a i d . I f you merely m a n i f e s t l y e s t a b l i s h achievements and r e -s u l t s , your good f o r t u n e w i l l of i t s own a c c o r d reach down to your descendants.3°2 Ho Hung-ching3°3 a n c i Wang Yiian-k'uei3°^ accepted the e d i c t , and, out of f e a r , they obeyed the order. P r e v i o u s l y , when the sending out of troops was d i s c u s s e d , c o u r t o f f i c i a l s sent up memorials one a f t e r the o t h e r r e q u e s t i n g - 1 0 6 -t h a t t h e e x a m p l e o f T s ' u n g - c h i e n b e f o l l o w e d , a n d t h a t h e r e d i -t a r y s u c c e s s i o n b e g r a n t e d t o C h e n . Among t h e f o u r C h i e f M i n i s t e r s , t h e r e w e r e a l s o t h o s e who c o n s i d e r e d t h a t s e n d i n g o u t t r o o p s w o u l d n o t b e a p p r o p r i a t e . T e - y i i m e m o r i a l i z e d : I f t h e a r m y g o e s o u t a n d i s u n s u c c e s s f u l , I a s k t h a t I m y s e l f i n c u r t h e b l a m e a n d t h a t L i S h e n a n d [ L i ] Jang-i365 a n d t h e o t h e r s n o t b e i m p l i c a t e d . When H u n g - c h i n g a n d Y i i a n - k ' u e i s e n t o u t t r o o p s , T e - y i i a g a i n m e m o r i a l i z e d : D u r i n g t h e C h e n - y u a n a n d T ' a l - h o e r a s when t h e c o u r t , i n p u t t i n g down r e b e l l i o n s , o r d e r e d t h e v a r i o u s p r o v i n -c e s t o j o i n f o r c e s , a s s o o n a s t h e y w e n t b e y o n d t h e i r [ o w n ] b o r d e r s , t h e y e x p e c t e d t h e r a t i o n s t o b e p r o -v i d e d b y t h e o f f i c e o f p u b l i c revenue.366 T h e y d e l a y e d , a v o i d i n g enemy a c t i o n , a n d t h e r e b y s t r a i n e d t h e c o u n t r y ' s r e s o u r c e s , some s e c r e t l y c o n f e r r e d w i t h t h e r e b e l s , c a p t u r i n g s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s a n d p a l i s s a d e s , u s i n g t h e s e a s a n n o u n c e m e n t s o f v i c t o r y . T h a t i s why when t h e a r m i e s w e n t f o r t h , t h e y h a d no s u c c e s s . Now I r e q u e s t t h a t i n y o u r d i s p o s i t i o n s t o Y i i a n - k ' u e i a n d H u n g - c h i n g , y o u o r d e r t h e m t o a c c e p t o n l y [ t h e s u r r e n d e r o f ] p r e f e c t u r e s , a n d n o t t o a t t a c k s u b - p r e f e c t u r a l s e t t l e m e n t s . T h e e m p e r o r a g r e e d . A f t e r Wang Tsai3^? a n d S h i h Hsiung3^8 a d v a n c e d a n d a t t a c k e d , a w h o l e y e a r p a s s e d a n d t h e y d i d n o t c a p t u r e T s e - l u . When H u n g -c h i n g a n d Wang Y i i a n - k ' u e i c a p t u r e d t h e t h r e e p r e f e c t u r e s o f Hsing,3*>9 M i n g , 3 7 ° a n d T z ' u . 3 ? 1 C h e n ' s f o l l o w e r s d e s e r t e d h i m ; t h e n p a c i f i c a t i o n a n d e x t e r m i n a t i o n w e r e a c h i e v e d j u s t a s T e - y i i h a d c a l c u l a t e d . J u s t when t h e i m p e r i a l a r m i e s w e r e a t t a c k i n g Tse3?2 a n d Lu3?3 i n [ H u i - o h a n g ] 3/12 [843], t h e b o r d e r d e f e n s e t r o o p s o f T ' a i - y i i a ^ ? 4 ' 107-and Heng-shui375 mutinied because they were being transferred to guard Yii-she.376 They reversed t h e i r attack and entered the c i t y of T'ai-yiian, drove out the M i l i t a r y Governor [of Ho-tung], LI Shih,377 elevating the group commander Yang Pien3?® to be interim governor. Because the rebel Chen had not yet been defeated, and also because mutiny had broken out at T'ai-yiian, Wu-tsung was extremely grieved. A eunuch envoy, Ma Yiian-kuan,379 w a s despatched to T'ai-yiian to proclaim an imperial edict and to observe the rebels' a c t i v i t i e s . A f t e r accepting Yang pien's bribes, Yiian-kuan sought to protect and defend him. In [Hul-oh'ang] 4//1 [844], he returned with a memorial saying: "Yang pien's army and horses are extremely numerous. From his yamen to Llu-tzu3®° which i s more than f i f t e e n l i away, he had l i n e d up his companies with t h e i r bright and shining armor t r a i l i n g to the ground." Te-yii stated i n a memorial: " L i Shih recently withdrew 1500 men from the Heng-shui army and had them go to Yii-she be-cause there were no troops within the walled c i t y of T'ai-yiian. How could Yang produce f i f t e e n l i of troops overnight?" Yiian-kuan said: " A l l the men of Chin are brave and daring and are capable of becoming s o l d i e r s . Generous rewards were used to r e c r u i t them." Te-yii said: "Recruitment requires wealth. The Heng-shui army recently rebelled merely f o r the lack of a bolt of un-coloured s i l k . I f L i Shih did not have the means of obtaining any, where could Yang pien get i t from? Moreover, T'ai-yiian -108-has on l y one m i l i t i a u n i t 3 ® 1 and i t too i s with the expedi-t i o n a r y f o r c e . 3 ® 2 HOW c o u l d i t produce a d a z z l i n g d i s p l a y t h a t i s f i f t e e n 11 lo n g ? " Yuan-kuan's arguments had been r e -f u t e d . Te-yii f u r t h e r added, "Yang P i e n i s a minor b a n d i t and c e r t a i n l y ought not t o be pardoned. I f our 'nation's s t r e n g t h i s not adequate, I would r a t h e r abandon [ t h e campaign a g a i n s t ] L i u C h e n . " 3 8 3 Immediately he requested t h a t an e d i c t be i s s u e d o r d e r i n g Wang Feng 3® 2 4 , to r a i s e the Yii-she army and to order Wang Yiian-k ' u e i ' s army from T'u-men 3®^ [ p a s s ] t o e n t e r and assemble i n T ' a i - y i i a n . A f t e r Lii l-chung, 3®° the eunuch ov e r s e e r f o r Ho-tung, heard t h i s , on the very day he summoned the Ho-tung army i n Y i i -she, he r e p o r t e d [ t o the c o u r t ] t h a t they had k i l l e d Yang P i e n . I n a l l , i t was f i v e years from the a r r i v a l of the Uighurs a t T ' i e n - t e i n the w i n t e r of K'al-oh'eng 5 [84-0] to the d e f e a t of T s e - l u i n Hul-oh'ang 4/8 [844-]. His plans were opportune and a p p r o p r i a t e , and he s e l e c t e d and deployed generals and com-manders. M i l i t a r y d i s p a t c h e s , e d i c t s , memorials and requests accumulated l i k e clouds g a t h e r i n g . The i n i t i a l d r a f t i n g was i n a l l cases s o l e l y decided by Te-yii. The v a r i o u s other c h i e f m i n i -s t e r s d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n them [ a t a l l ] . Owing to h i s a c h i e v e -ments, he was c o n c u r r e n t l y g i v e n the p o s i t i o n o f Grand Marshal 3®? and was promoted t o , and e n f e o f f e d as, Duke of Wel-kuo 3®® with an e s t a t e of 300 households. In [Hui-ch'ang] 5 [845], a f t e r Wu-tsung was presented with -109-an h o n o r i f i c t i t l e , 3 8 9 through a series of petiti o n s Te-yii sought to r e t i r e , but was refused. When Te-yii was sick f o r over a month, he firmly requested to be rel i e v e d of his o f f i -c i a l duties while retaining his e x i s t i n g rank as Minister of State. Concurrently, he was made Prefect of Chiang-ling^? 0 and M i l i t a r y Governor of Hsing-nan.391 A f e w m 0 n t h s l a t e r , he was r e c a l l e d to resume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r governmental a f -f a i r s . When Hsiian-tsung assumed the throne,392 h e dismissed Te-yii as chief minister and sent him out to become Regent3?3 (Hu-shou) i n Lo-yang and defense commissioner f o r the Eastern Imperial Do-main, Ju-chou and the [Eastern] Capital D i s t r i c t . 39^ " Te-yii had especially received grace and favour from Wu-tsung. He had been delegated to manage state a f f a i r s , to decide p o l i c y and discuss m i l i t a r y [ a c t i v i t i e s ] , none of which had l e f t cause f o r regret. Because he personally warded o f f d i f f i -c u l t i e s ( i . e . the Ulghurs and the r e b e l l i o n i n Tse-lu), achieve-ments flowed to the a l t a r s of the nation. Afte r Wu-tsung died395 ( l i t . abandoned the earth), the d i s -gruntled factions resented his achievements. During the Hui-oh 1 ang period, Te-yii had never suspected po Mln-chung39° and Ling-hu T*ao397 Q f being f a c t i o n a l members and had appointed them to the Department of state A f f a i r s , 3 ? 8 t r e a t i n g them ex-tremely generously. When Te-yii f e l l from power, they clapped t h e i r hands together and pointed s c o r n f u l l y [at him] -and schemed -110-t o g e t h e r to make a c c u s a t i o n s and d r i v e him out. Moreover, T s ' u i Hsuan399 who had been d i s m i s s e d from the c h i e f m i n i s t e r -s h i p a t the end of Hul-oh'ang a l s o bore grudges a g a i n s t Te-y i i . 2 * 0 0 At the b e g i n n i n g of the Ta-ohung p e r i o d [846-60], Mln-chung a g a i n recommended Hsiian f o r a post i n the I m p e r i a l S e c r e -t a r i a t . 2 * 0 1 They then j o i n e d t o g e t h e r to a t t a c k Te-yii and con-s p i r e d to have t h e i r [ f e l l o w ] c l i q u e member L i H s i e n 2 * 0 2 charge t h a t when Te-yii had a s s i s t e d i n the government, there had been s i n i s t e r deeds ( l i t . shady a c t s ) , 2 * 0 3 whereupon he was a g a i n d i s -missed from h i s p o s t and made Minor P r o t e c t o r to the Grown P r i n c e i n Lo-yang 2* 0 2* i n the f a l l of Ta-chung 1 [846]. 2 1 0 5 s h o r t -l y t h e r e a f t e r , he was a g a i n e x i l e d to Ch'ao-chou 2* 0 0 as S e n i o r Administrator. 2* 0'' 7" 2* 0® MIn-chung and the others a l s o had the former Chief of Subordinate S t a f f i n Yung-ning 2* 0 0 h s i e n , Wu Ju-n a , 2* 1 0 send up a r e p o r t c h a r g i n g t h a t when L i Shen was s e r v i n g i n Yang-chou, he had improperly decided a c o u r t c a s e . 2 * 1 1 I n the w i n t e r of the f o l l o w i n g year, he too was banished to be the t r e a s u r y o f f i c e r 2 * 1 2 i n Ch'ao-chou. A f t e r b e i n g banished, i n Ta-chung 2 [84-7], Te-yii t r a v e l l e d a l o n g the Grand Canal, c r o s s e d the Yangtze and Huai R i v e r s and a r r i v e d i n Ch,'ao-chou. In the w i n t e r of t h a t year, when he reached Ch' ao-yang 2* 1 3 he was a g a i n demoted to being the Treasury O f f i c e r of Yai-chou, 2* 1 2* a r r i v i n g t here i n Ta-chung 3/1 [848], The f o l l o w i n g month, he reached the commandery of Chu Y a i . 2 * 1 ^ - I l l -He died there i n the twelfth month at the age of s i x t y - t h r e e . 2 + 1 ^  Te-yii was personally very proud of his talent and scholar-ship. As a man of d i s t i n c t i o n who did not associate with the common l o t , he enjoyed writing l e t t e r s and composing essays, promoting the good and hating the e v i l . Although he occupied the highest positions i n government, he did not abandon his read-ing of books. There was a L i u san-fu, 2* 1? s k i l l e d at composing memorials, whom Te-yii treated extraordinarily well. Prom Te-yii's f i r s t appointment i n Che-hsi to his service i n H u a l - t i e n , 4 - 1 8 San-fu was always a s s i s t i n g at his side as his guest. After m i l i -tary and government matters were finishe d , the two of them would r e c i t e and chant [poetry] the whole day. In his private residence i n Ch'ang-an, Te-yii had the Ch'l Tsao Yuan b u i l t separately. In t h i s park there was a p a v i l i o n of E s s e n t i a l Thought, wherein he handled a l l the court's edicts and orders f o r using troops. While he resolutely drafted govern-ment documents, those attending at his side were not able to p a r t i c i p a t e . At the Eastern Ca p i t a l , south of Yin-ch'iieh, 2 4' x9 he b u i l t his v i l l a 'p' Ing-ch'iian' . 2 + 2 ° Fresh flowing water, king-fisher-coloured miniature bamboos, trees and rocks, made i t mysterl-ous and exotic. x Previously when he was not serving i n o f f i c e , he talked and studied i n t h e i r midst. When he l e f t to serve on the f r o n t i e r [ i n Shu], he departed a general and returned a Chief Minister. For t h i r t y years he did not come back fo r a return -112-v l s i t but a l l the songs and poems which he wrote were sent back and Inscribed on stone. At present there are the Record  of Flowers and Trees 2* 2 2 and The Collected Songs and poems, which had been preserved on two stones. His works are c o l -lected i n .twenty chapters. Among his extant records and narra-tives of ancient matters, there are the Secondary Ancient Matters  on the L i u Family,** 23 The Essential outline of a Censorial O f f i -c i a l , 2 * 2 2 * and the Chronicles of Suppressing a Rebellion and the Co l l e c t i o n of persuasions and Dissuasions. P r i o r to being ban-ished to Ch'ao-chou, although his l i f e was i n confusion and dan-ger, he s t i l l paid attention to his writing. Several tens of his miscellaneous essays and prefaces have been edited and are c a l l e d The Record of My Distress and Melancholy. 2* 25 ^His essay On Fate (Lun Mang Shu) has been deleted. Te-yii had three sons. Yeh concurrently served as Au x i l i a r y ho/ Secretary i n the Board of S a c r i f i c e 4 ^ " and Commissioner of Sur-v e i l l a n c e and Current A f f a i r s i n p'ing, Sung, and Hao ( i . e . Hsiian-wu Chun Chieh Tu Shih). In Ta-chung 2 [ 847 ] , he was im-pl i c a t e d i n his father's disgrace and was banished to be Chief of subordinate Staff at L i Shan2*2? i n Hsiang-chou. 2* 2 8 The [other] two sons, being too young, followed t h e i r father and died i n Yai-chou. At the beginning of the Hsien-t'ung era [861], through the practice of l i a n g - i , 2* 29 Yeh was transferred to be Chief of Subordinate s t a f f f o r Ch'en Hsien i n Ch 1 en-chou.^30 H e died i n Kuei-yang,2*31 leaving a son, Yen-ku. -113-The H i s t o r i a n s a i d : When my h a i r was i n b r a i d s , ( i . e . b e f o r e b e i n g capped) I f r e q u e n t l y heard the aged and v i r t u o u s t e l l s t o r i e s about the Duke of Wei ( i . e . L i T e - y i i ) . At t h a t time, the emperor was g i f t e d with m i l i t a r y t a l e n t s , and was e n l i g h t e n e d about l i s t e n i n g [ t o h i s m i n i s t e r s ] and de-c i d i n g [ p o l i c y ] . Moreover, because Te-yii had person-a l l y c o n f r o n t e d d i f f i c u l t i e s , he thereby r e p a i d the s p e c i a l treatment he r e c e i v e d from the c o u r t . H i s ad-v i c e was c a r r i e d out and h i s plans f o l l o w e d , from which r e s u l t s were achieved and matters accomplished, such a d i v i s i o n [ o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ] between r u l e r and m i n i -s t e r occurs [ o n l y ] once i n a thousand y e a r s . When we examine h i s admonitory a d v i c e to the i n n e r p a l a c e and h i s memorials to the outer c o u r t , h i s estimates of the enemy and h i s o r g a n i z i n g of v i c t o r y , [we can see t h a t ] he decided e v e r y t h i n g independently u s i n g h i s own i n n e r judgment. J u s t l i k e [Yang] Y u - c h i , 4 ^ 2 he h i t the t a r g e t with never a miss. T r u l y , h i s was a remarkable t a l e n t J Speaking of h i s l i t e r a r y works, Yen [ C h u ] 4 ^ a n& s s u -m a k3 k [ H s i a n g - j u ] must walk b e s i d e h i s c a r r i a g e . I n h i s d i s c u s s i o n s on matters of government, H s l a o 4 ^ [Ho] and T s ' a o ^ o [shen] must r i s e from t h e i r mats. Censur-i n g him f o r a r r o g a t i n g h i s p l a c e i s going too f a r . 4 ^ ? What may be c r i t i c i z e d i s t h a t he c o u l d not get r i d of the h a t r e d i n h i s h e a r t , f o r g i v e h i s enemies, or repay grudges with g e n e r o s i t y ; furthermore, he c o u l d not stop i n s i s t i n g on r i g h t and wrong when the matter was beyond s e t t l i n g or make an e q u a l i t y between h i m s e l f and others w i t h i n the same c i r c l e . He fought v i g o r o u s l y with the r a b b l e from the marketplace over t r i v i a l m a tters. 4 -3" His f a l l from power and h i s banishment to [areas by] the p e s t i l e n t i a l sea, may be regarded as h e a r t - r e n d i n g . T h i s i s what the a n c i e n t s meant by ' s n a t c h i n g g o l d and i g n o r i n g the others i n the market 1 4'39 and by L i Lao 4' 4' 0 not s e e i n g what was i n h i s eyebrows and eyelashes. As f a r as t a l e n t i s concerned, he was t a l e n t e d , but i t would be d i f f i c u l t to say t h a t he had the Way. The Commendation says: H i s wisdom and d e c i s i v e n e s s were as sharp as the sword •green duckweed' . ^ l D e f e a t i n g the b a r b a r i a n s [ t h e Uighurs] and s u p p r e s s i n g the r e b e l l i o n [ i n Chao-i] were [as easy] as smashing r o t t e n s t u m p s 4 , 2 2 and l e t t i n g s p i l t water run -114-down roof tiles. Despite achievements at imperial audiences, his bones are buried In the southern bound-lessness. Alas, who will place his portrait in the Pavilion of pre-eminence!444 - 1 1 5 -FOOTNOTES 1. Chao Chun Is now Chao-hsien In Hope! p r o v i n c e . Chung Kuo  Ku Chin TI Ming TaTz'u T i e n , p. 1355. H e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as CKKCTMTTT. 2. Yu S h i h T a l - f u was an o f f i c i a l with the rank of 3rd degree, 1st c l a s s . Robert des Rotours, T r a l t e de f o n c t l o n n a l r e s et de l'armee., p. 281, h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as TFA. The grand-f a t h e r h e l d t h i s p o s i t i o n d u r i n g the r e i g n of T a i - t s u n g . HTS 146, p. l b . 3. L i C h i - f u assumed the c h i e f m i n i s t e r s h i p on Yiian-ho 2/1 1-ssu [807] upon the r e s i g n a t i o n of Tu Huang-shang. TCTC 237, P. 7639. 4. L i C h i - f u (758-814) has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 148, HTS 146. The gra n d f a t h e r ' s i s i n HTS 146. The gr a n d f a t h e r ' s b i o g r a -phy i n the extant CTS has a p p a r e n t l y been l o s t . C h i - f u ' s biography, CTS 148/3a r e f e r s t o i t ag a i n . 5. One must remain s k e p t i c a l t h a t Te-yii's d e v o t i o n t o h i s f a t h e r harmed h i s c a r e e r , s i n c e he was born i n Chen-yuan 3 f787]. so t h a t even a t the end of t h i s p e r i o d he was only 18 years o l d . 6. Chang Hung-ching (760-824) was appointed Ho-tung Chieh Tu Sh i h on Yiian-ho 11/1/oMa-ssu [816] a c c o r d i n g t o TCTC 239. p. 7721. " T ' a i - y i i a n was the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c e n t r e f o r t h i s p r o v i n c e . Chang has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 129, HTS 127. 7. Chang Shu Chi was a General S e c r e t a r y a t t a c h e d t o the s t a f f of a p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l . TFA 646, 655, 658 and 669. 8. Ta 11 P'lng S h i h (Shih) was one of the 24 C o p y i s t s of J u d i -c i a l I n q u i r y . TFA, p. 405. ' " y 9. T i e n Chung S h i h Yii S h i h were o f f i c i a l s with the rank of 7th degree, 4th c l a s s , r e s p o n s i b l e f o r e t i q u e t t e and c e r e -mony i n the throne room. TFA, p. 307. These l a s t 2 posts were t i t u l a r o nly, s i n c e Te-yii was s t i l l s e r v i n g i n Ho-tung. 10. Chien Ch'a Yii S h i h , Court Censors of E x t e r n a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n , h e l d the rank of 8th degree, 2nd c l a s s , and were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r d i v i d i n g up among themselves the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r s u p e r v i s i n g o f f i c i a l s and f o r making i n q u i r i e s i n the pr e -f e c t u r e s and commanderies, e t c . TFA, p. 309. -116-11. The Han-lin Academy was an extra-governmental o f f i c e attached to the palace, whose functions changed over the course of the T'ang dynasty. At t h i s p a r t i c u l a r time, i t served as a personal s e c r e t a r i a t to the emperor. Its s e c r e t a r i a l functions of d r a f t i n g edicts, etc., l a t e r de-veloped into executive r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of advising the emperor on matters of p o l i c y and thereby usurped many of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the Imperial Chancellory and chief ministers, c f . sun Kuo-tung, "Development of the Three Department system," Hsin-ya Hsueh pao, v o l . 3, 1957, especially pp. 108-112. Also P.A. Bischoff, La Foret des  plnoeaux, Introduction. 12. Ssu-cheng Palace. TCTC 24l, p. 7777, i n a note states that this palace was i n the western inner (palace), i . e . the T'al-ch'i palace compound, perhaps It was north, i . e . be-hind, i t . 13. Chin-'tzu, l i t . gold [seal and] purple [sash] ^as an abbre-v i a t i o n f o r the sinecure Chln- ;tzu Kuang-Tu Tai°»fu This t i t l e was held by o f f i c i a l s with the rank of 3rd degree, 1st class. TFA, p. 35. 14. T'un T'len Yuan Wai-lang. This o f f i c i a l was i n charge of m i l i t a r y colonies f o r the whole empire as well as f o r f i e l d s given to active o f f i c i a l s . TFA, p. 126. 15. The text of the o r i g i n a l memorial has been preserved In Te-yii's c o l l e c t e d works, the L l Wen-jao Wen-ohl, also known as Hul-ohang I p ' l n - c h i , hereinafter c i t e d as HCIPC, Ssu Pu Ts'ung-k'an Ch'u pien edition, Pleh-chl 5, p. 139. The contents of this memorial as well as others inserted i n the biography w i l l be compared i n order to distinguish between various readings i n order to provide a clearer version of c e r t a i n passages. The spTK e d i t i o n uses the Ming dynasty copy taken from the l i b r a r y of the Ch'ii family. 16. This statement refers to an edict issued by Hsuan-tsung i n 722. The b r i e f TCTC account i s i n E.G. Pulleyblank, The  Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan, p. 4-4, herein-a f t e r c i t e d as An Lu-shan. "In the eighth month of the following year, a decree was issued forbidding members of the Imperial family and the imperial sons-in-law to v i s i t any persons except t h e i r closest r e l a t i v e s . " The accompany-ing footnote gives the source as TCTC 212, p. 6751, K'ai- yiian 10/8 ohl-hal [722]. 17. The p a r a l l e l text does not have the character ohe,ofefcj 0 c -117-18. The p a r a l l e l text deletes suo ohlh. P^ 'p? • 19. T s a - l l u . Des Rotours considers t h i s bureaucratic designa-t i o n to indicate low positions, e.g., private secretary to .an important o f f i c i a l . Robert des Rotours, T r a l t e des  examens, Paris, 1932, p. 2 2 6 , footnote 2. Hereinafter c i t e d as TE. c f . Llu-wal designating bureaucratic rankings below those o f f i c i a l s who f i l l e d positions as Copyists, etc. op. c i t . , p. 2. 20. Ch'Ing kuan indicated o f f i c i a l s having a ranking above the 4th l e v e l , or at l e a s t the 8th, and who held positions which were p a r t i c u l a r l y h o n o r i f i c . Here i t can be consid-ered simply as designating high o f f i c i a l s . TE, p. 2 3 4 , footnote 3. 21. This l a s t sentence i s a truncated version of the one i n the p a r a l l e l text. I t reads: "Aside from t h i s , then, they may not go to the residences of chief ministers and high o f f i c i a l s . " 22. K'ao Kung Lang-ohung. Both the senior Secretary and the A u x i l l i a r y Secretary (Yuan Wal-lang) of the Office of Examining Merit were responsible f o r evaluating the per-formance and conduct of a l l c i v i l and m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l s . TFA, p. 5 9 . 2 3 . Chih ohih kao, l i t . "responsible f o r e d i t i n g imperial edicts and announcements," was the name given to an informal group of advisors within the palace. These 6 Grand Secretaries [of the Imperial Secretariat-Chung Shu she-jenl were some-times themselves helped i n t h i s task of e d i t i n g imperial proclamations and edicts by o f f i c i a l s belonging to other sections and who were blessed with l i t e r a r y talent. The l a t t e r were c a l l e d ' O f f i c i a l s Responsible, i n addition, f o r the E d i t i n g of Imperial Proclamations and E d i c t s . . . ' TE, p. 9, cf. also TFA 18, 182. 24. Chung Shu she-jen. These s i x Grand Secretaries of the Im-p e r i a l s e c r e t a r i a t holding the"rank of 5th degree, 1st c l a s s , were required to remain close to the emperor, to present documents to him, and to take part i n the discussion of the documents sent to the throne. TFA, p. 180. 2 5 . Niu seng-ju ( 7 7 9-847) (tzu Ssu-an) came from Lung-rhsi. He was the nominal leader of the Niu f a c t i o n , the sworn p o l i t i c a l enemies of L i Te-yii. The f a c t i o n a l struggles between these two cliques dominated court p o l i t i c s f o r over 3 0 years. Among the major disagreements between t h e i r two parties was the matter of an a c t i v i s t court. These matters w i l l be d i s -cussed as they develop. He has biographies i n CTS 172 and HTS 17^. -118-26. L I Tsung-min (d. 845) ( t z u sun-chin)was a descendant of the P r i n c e of Cheng, Yiian-i o f the' r o y a l house. He was a s u p p o r t e r o f N i u and another sworn enemy of Te-yii. He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 1?6 and HTS 174. 27. Chih Yen Chi Chlen K'o was a s p e c i a l examination indepen-dent of the r e g u l a r examinations, c a l l e d p e r i o d i c a l l y by the emperor. Candidates composed essays i n response to questions put by the emperor. TE, pp. 4l-2. T'ang Hui-Yao, chap. 76, p. 1930, h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as THY, r e f e r s to i t by i t s f u l l name Hsi e n L i a n g Pang Cheng Nung Chlh  Yen Chi Chien K'o and gi v e s the date f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r examination as Yuan-ho 2/4 [807]. However, Hsien-tsung pen-chi CTS 14-/12b g i v e s the date as Yuan-ho 3 / V l - c h ' ou I 8 0 8 ] ' TCTC 237, PP. 764-9-50 g i v e s the same date. 28. A c c o r d i n g t o TCTC, l o c . c i t . Yang Y i i - l i n g and Wei Kuan-c h i n marked the papers and p ' e i Chi and Wang Y a i l a t e r remarked them. 29. Tsung-min's biography s t a t e s t h a t p r e s i d e n t of the C i v i l S e r v i c e Board Yang Y i i - l i n g became m i l i t a r y governor of Ling-nan, the A u x i l i a r y S e c r e t a r y of the C i v i l S e r v i c e Board Wei Kuan-chin became P r e f e c t of Kuo-chou and then of Pa-chou. The S c h o l a r Wang Y a i became P r o v i s i o n a l Secre-t a r y of the Bureau of p r i s o n s and l a t e r was banished to be the s e n i o r A d m i n i s t r a t o r (Ssu-ma) i n Kuo-chou. The S c h o l a r P ' e i C h i became P r o v i s i o n a l V i c e - p r e s i d e n t o f the M i n i s t r y of Finance. CTS"176/la-b. 30. Tu Huang-shang a l o n g w i t h h i s f e l l o w Chief M i n i s t e r Kao Wen-ch'ung defe a t e d the r e b e l l i o u s .Military'Governor o f Hsl-ch'uan (modern day w. Szechuan) L i u P ' i . The campaign a g a i n s t L i u which ended with h i s b e i n g sent to the c a p i t a l i n a cage i s c h r o n i c l e d i n TCTC 237, p. 7626, b e g i n n i n g with the e n t r y f o r Yuan-ho 1/1/chla-shen [806]. c f . Charles A. Peterson, "The R e s t o r a t i o n Completed: The Em-p e r o r Hsien-tsung and the P r o v i n c e s , " i n Wright and Twit-c h e t t , eds., P e r s p e c t i v e s on the T'ang, e s p e c i a l l y pp. 158-9. H e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as Peterson. Tu has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS I69 and.HTS 14-7. 3!« TCTC 237, P. 7706, g i v e s the date of L i C h l - f u ' s advocacy of a p u n i t i v e campaign a g a i n s t Hopei as Yuan-ho 9/9/wu-hsii [814], c f . Peterson, p. 166 e t seq., concerning the b e g i n -n i n g of the campaign a g a i n s t H u a i - h s i and i t s r e b e l l i o u s governor Wu Yuan-chi. -119-3 2 • TCTC 237, p. 7707, gives the date of Chi-fu«s death as Yuan-ho 9/10/plng-wu [8l4], approximately 47 days l a t e r . 33. Wu Yiian-heng (758-815) served as chief minister along with Chl-fu at this time. He was assassinated on Yuan-ho 10/6/ kuei-mao [815]. c f . TCTC 237, P. 7713. He has biographies i n CTS 158 and HTS 15^1 3 k. p'ei Tu (765-839) (tzu Chung-li) was a man from Wen-hsl i n Ho-tung. At t h i s time, he was the most f o r c e f u l advocate of a strong m i l i t a r y p o l i c y against the rebels and became the chief a r c h i t e c t of the subsequent court v i c t o r y , since they both shared this point of view, he l a t e r supported Te-yu against his enemies. He has biographies i n CTS 170, HTS 173. 35. Wei Kuan-chin (773-828) was an a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t who served b r i e f l y at t h i s time as chief minister. His dismissal i s recorded i n TCTC 239. p. 7724, Yuan-ho 11/6/jen-wu [8l6], He has biographies i n CTS 158 and HTS 169. 36. L i Feng-chi (tzu Hsu-chou) was a man from Lung-hsl. He was an a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t and a supporter of the Niu f a c t i o n , r a i s i n g other f a c t i o n a l members to high positions when he served as chief minister while banishing Te-yii and his sup-porters to the provinces. He has biographies i n CTS l67 : and HTS 174. 37. L i Shen (d. 846) (tzu K fung-ch'ui) was a man from Wu-hsi i n Jun-chou, i . e . contemporaneous Che-hsi. He was a close supporter of Te-yii and as such his career followed almost i d e n t i c a l ups and downs. He has biographies i n CTS 173 and HTS 181. 38. Yuan Chen (779-831) (tzu Cheng-oh.ih) was a man from Ho-nei i n Ho-nan. He was a noted poet, an intimate of Po Chii-i and an a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t Chief Minister, cf. Arthur Waley's L i f e and Times of Po Chii-i, p. 140. Yuan has biographies i n CTS 166 and HTS 17*. 39. These events are chronicled i n TCTC 242, p. 7809, Ch'ang- oh'ing 2/2/hsln-ssu [822]. 40. Yii Shih Chung Ch'eng. Vice-president of the Board of Censors, held the rank of 3rd degree, 1st c l a s s . TFA 281. 41. Kung Pu Shih-lang was an o f f i c i a l with the rank of 4th degree, 3rd class. -120-42. p' Ing Chang Shih or more f u l l y "Chung Shu Men Hsla p'ing  Chang Shih (Grand Overseer of the Imperial s e c r e t a r i a t and Imperial Chancellery) indicated that the holder held rank equal to the heads of the Imperial s e c r e t a r i a t and the Imperial Chancellery, and thus was allowed to p a r t i c i -pate i n the d a i l y conferences of the emperor and his Chief Ministers.' Holders of this t i t l e can be referred to as Chief Minister or Minister of S;tate. TFA, pp. 7-10. 4-3. This transfer was done, apparently, at the request of Yuan Chen who had become chief minister. Since he wanted to end the m i l i t a r y campaign against the commandery of Ch'eng-te, the simplest way was to r e c a l l i t s commander, P'ei Tu. cf. TCTC 242, p. 7210, Ch'ang-oh'ing 2/2/tlng-hai [822]. 44. Hsiang-yang i s now Hsiang-yang hsien i n Hupei. CKKCTMTTT, p. 1299. 4-5. This was a rather complicated a f f a i r . Yu. Fang, a Tutor to Prince Ho, suggested to Yuan Chen that he could help re-l i e v e the pressure on Niu Yiian-i, iPrefect of shen-chou i n Ch'eng-te by the rebel governor Wang T'ing-tsou with the help of twenty forged documents to be Issued to those who could be of help. This turned out to be unnecessary since Han Yii, who was at t h i s time Vice-president of the Board of War, was able to convince Wang to l i f t the siege, cf. TCTC 24-2, p. 7813, Ch'ang-ch'ing 2/3/ping-wu [822], L i Feng^chT, with the help of a clique of o f f i c i a l s and eunuchs inside the palace, used the knowledge of the scheme to further h i s own ambitions, by claiming that Yuan Chen had intended to assassinate P'ei Tu. Although they were both serving as chief ministers at the time, they were s t i l l great r i v a l s . An o f f i c i a l Inquiry was held but nothing was proven. Never-theless, both were dismissed and L i was promoted to f i l l one of the vacancies, c f . HTS 173/8a-b. 46. p'ei became Right Head of the Department of State A f f a i r s (Yu p'u-yeh) and Yuan became governor of T'ung-chou ( i . e . modern day Ta-hslen hsien i s Shensi). CKCKTMTTT, p. 294. cf. TCTC 242, p. 7818. 47. Ts'e Shih was the chief o f f i c i a l i n a superior prefecture (shang ohou) having the rank of 3rd degree, 2nd class. TFA, p. 720-21. ^8. Men Hsla Shlh-lang were the two Vice-presidents of the Im-p e r i a l Chancellory holding the rank of 3rd degree, 1st c l a s s . They were responsible f o r a s s i s t i n g the presidents of the department (Shih Chung) with t h e i r functions. TFA, p. 139. -121-49. Kuan Ch'a Shih. C i v i l Governor. This o f f i c i a l c a r r i e d out the orders of the M i l i t a r y .Governor (Chleh Tu Shih). The l a t t e r was i n charge of c i v i l a f f a i r s ; however, i n practice, the Chieh Tu Shih also held the p o s i t i o n of Kuan Ch'a Shitu TFA, pT 380, footnote 1. For a s i m i l a r point of view, cf. Denis Twitchett, F i n a n c i a l Administra-t i o n under the T'ang Dynasty, p. 120. Hereinafter c i t e d as F i n Admin. According to TCTC 243, p. 7825, the date of Te-yii's appointment was Ch' ang-oh' ing 3/3/ jen-hsii [823]. 50. Che-hsi. Name of a contemporaneous province occupying what i s now the eastern part of Chekiang. cf. map f o r location. 51. Jun-chou i s i n present day Chen-chlang hsien i n Kiangsu on the southern shore of the Yangtze River opposite Yang-chou. CKKCTMTTT, p. 1174. I t was the administrative centre f o r contemporaneous Che-hsi. 52. Wang does not have a biography i n either T'ang hi s t o r y . cf. TCTC 242, p. 7821, Ch'ang-oh'ing 2/9/wu-tzu shuo [822]. 53. Tou's CTS biography recounts the following story. "After Tou had captured and Imprisoned Wang, several thousand of his followers clamoured f o r his release. Tou climbed atop a building and promised a reward of 100,000 cash f o r each rebel captured. The crowd mutinied against i t s leaders and captured them. Wang and more than 300 of his followers were beheaded." CTS l67/2b. c f . HTS 151/6b. 54. Liu-chou was the portion of the taxes retained by the pre-fecture. F i n Admin, p. 4 l , also 164. 55. Chiang-ling, l i t . between the Yangtze River and the Five Ling, i . e . southern China. 56. Ching-tsung J u l Wu Chao Mln Hsiao Huang T i was the complete posthumous temple name f o r Ching-tsung. THY, chap 1, p. 11. 57. He was 16 years old [Chinese s t y l e ] upon accession. op. c i t . p. 12. 58. Wu JLMorohashi T e t s u j i , Dai Kan Wa J i t e n , v o l . 8, charac-t e r no. 23019, compound no. 5, kobako—small box. Herein-a f t e r , characters taken from t h i s dictionary w i l l be ci t e d as follows: M8-23019..5. This amnesty i s preserved i n TFYK. chap. 90, T i wang pu, she yu,9.p. 1°79. The date i s given as Ch'ang^bh'ing 4/3/j en-tzu [824]. -122-59. The contents of t h i s memorial are preserved i n Te-yu's col l e c t e d works, pleh-chi, chap. 5, pp. 140-41. 60. The p a r a l l e l text has mei Jj$r instead of oh'ang. 61. The p a r a l l e l text has wu >#Q instead of h s l en. y|£ 62. The p a r a l l e l text does not have a p a r a l l e l i kung - but i t would be better to r e t a i n i t f o r the sake of the pa r a l -l e l structure. 63. The p a r a l l e l text reads jen \~ not hsln. 64. Mao Shan i s 45 11 southeast of Chii-jung hsien i n present day Kiangsu province, cf. Aoyama sadao, Chugoku Rekidal  Chimel Yoran. p. 525. This book i s an index to the Tu Shih Fang Yii Chl-yao. Hereinafter they w i l l be c i t e d as CKRDCMYR and TSFYCYT respectively. According to the l a t -ter , chapter 20, pp. 943-4, Mao Shan was considered i n ] Taoist writings to be no. 8 'cave heaven' out of a t o t a l of 36 and no. 1 'blessed abode' out of a t o t a l of 72. Thus being i n contemporaneous Chiang-nan close to Te-yii's post, i t was a l i k e l y place to send him i n search of an immortal. 65. The p a r a l l e l texts have mang >\c and pien -[j- rather than Sien , The l a s t named meaning 'to clap' or 'beat a rum.» 66. L i Chi, according to 'The C o l l a t i o n of Dates of T'ang Re-gional Commanders' by Wu T'ing-hsleh i n the Erh Shih Wu  Shih Pu pien, p. 7417. served as governor of Che-hsi [_806], Hereinafter c i t e d as ESWSPP. His CTS biography says: "He frequently used valuable goods to bribe L i Ch'i-yiin, there-fore he was transferred to be prefect of Jun-chou and con-currently the commissioner f o r s a l t and iron. He accumula-ted wealth and sent i t to court i n order to contract f o r favours. Te-tsung especially favoured him." CTS 112/4a, \ HTS 224 shang/lOb. 67. Chiieh ohlu oh'ien.y Each province was assessed a quota fo r i t s wine monopoly money to be sent to the c a p i t a l . In some areas this money was raised by o f f i c i a l l y ' controlled dealings i n l i q u o r as envisaged i n the o r i g i n a l measure. //\ In others^there was simply a government monopoly on the pro-duction of ferments, and i n many provinces i t became the normal practice to Impose the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c o n t r i -buting the wine monopoly money as a supplementary money tax upon households other than those a c t u a l l y engaged i n the -123-67. (continued) business. In addition, Twitchett mentions that from Chen-yuan onward, certain provincial officials collected this tax arbitrarily in an attempt to enrich themselves and to outdo other officials in sending tribute to court. Fin Admin., p. 60 and footnote 84 cited on page 284. It was this abuse which Te-yii, among others, opposed. 68. I have been able to arrive at a definitive explanation for sul kuan ; however, Professor Chou Ya-shu of the History Department of National Taiwan University suggests that this may mean that the tax was collected in cash instead of in kind. -69. Hsiieh P'ing. According to his HTS biography, he was also a censor in Che-hsl in addition to his duties as Civil Governor. HTS l64/5b. He also has a biography in CTS 164-. He served in Che-hsi from Yuan-ho 10 [814]. cf. ESWSPP, p. 7418. — - L  70. This imperial edict appears to be In response to a memorial sent by the prefect of Hu-chou, Li Ying, who argued that earlier, "when officials replaced the people as collection agents for the liquor tax, there was, for a long period of time, great corruption. He hoped that i f the emperor agreed and ordered the common people themselves to sell liquor, the old quotas could be met and, as before, could be inclu-ded in the double tax system. Consequently, funds could be produced to an equal amount and could use the older practice of converting what had been collected [grain] into 'light commodities' (i.e. goods which were light in weight but high in value, which then could be sent to the capital). The emperor agreed." THY, chap. 88, p. 1608. 71. There is no amnesty recorded under this date in the TFKY, chap. 90/1073. There is one, however, for Yuan-ho 15/2/5 ting-ch'ou [820] containing the phrase: "Let today's re-straining order be taken back to every prefecture, sub-prefecture and province so that except for taxes based on the properly ordered rates, there should be no reckless contributions to the court." TCTC 24l, p. 7778 gives the same date. 72. Sung shih was the portion of tax collected and retained for use In the province. Fin Admin, pp. 4 l , 42, cf. foot-note 46. This was one of a series of moves by the court to reduce provincial control over tax collection and to Increase its own share of tax revenue by allowing the provinces to retain only the taxes collected in Its home prefecture while ordering i t to send to the capital the taxes collected from its subordinate prefectures, cf. Peterson, pp. 178-80. -124-73. The p a r a l l e l text lacks mei n i e n , ^ , 74. The p a r a l l e l text lacks oh'ang , adds ohu before shih ^ and has yung ;fl instead of chien. ^  ^ 75. The p a r a l l e l text has oh'ii nien,, -h ^ , 76. The p a r a l l e l text has sheng-> f o r ssu >S7 . 77. The p a r a l l e l text has pu chao wu i 7\- \v }^ rather than pu l i e n wu yuan, ^ jfc yfy _ 78. This edict i s preserved i n Te-yii's c o l l e c t e d works, 'pieh c h l , ' chap. 5, 141. 79. Liang-chou i s i n present day Wu-wel hsien i n Kansu province CKKTMTTT, p. 821. 80. L i Ta-liang (586-644). This anecdote i s found i n both versions of his biography. His reasons f o r refusing to comply with the order was the f a c t that the emperor had banned hunting and the eunuch i n requesting the b i r d was v i o l a t i n g t h i s order. In addition to the congratulatory edict, he was awarded 1000 pieces of gold. GTS 62/8b and HTS 99/2b. The text of the edict i s to be found i n CTW 37o"a-b, p. 115. 81. The memorial i n the p a r a l l e l text reads: yu oh'en 1u tz'u oheh ho yii % *l, 0 ^ -k. ? CTS 62/8b has /}& -if This i s l i k e l y the o r i g i n a l version and therefore i t has been followed. 82. Chiang-nan. province name. cf. map f o r lo c a t i o n . 83. Pien-chou i s i n modern day K'ai-feng hsien i n Honan provinc CKKCTMTTT, p. 395. I t was the terminus of the canal system and during the Sung dynasty i t was the c a p i t a l . 84. The g i s t of N i f s argument was the f a c t that the emperor was misusing the canal system i n order to s a t i s f y his curio s i t y f o r playthings, c f . CTS 185 hsia/3a; HTS 128/5b; TCTC 211, p. 6717 K tal-yiiarn?/2/kuei-chiu [713]. In addi-t i o n to having the birds released, the emperor granted Juo-shui 40 tuan of cloth, c f . CTW 27/6a-b, p. 365. 85. Huang-fu Hsiin has no biography i n either T'ang history. -125-86. 1-chou i s northeast of present day Feng-chieh prefecture i n Szechuan province. GKKGTMTTT, p. 738. According to Su Shih 1s memorial, Chlen mai che teng ohuang, 1 Remon-st r a t i n g against buying the lamps from Che,1 i£ *f ^-xt i t was a place noted f o r i t s half-sleeved jackets, cf. M2-2707..243. 87. Han po, according to M5-12143..12, i s a guitar pick guard. M. uses a variant character \%- instead of as does HTS l80/2a. 1 88. su T fing's CTS biography states: "K'ai-yuan 8 [749]... the former Senior Administrator (Ssu-ma) Huang-fu Chun squandered goods stored i n the treasury, and had new kinds of brocades woven to be sent up. When T'ing had this com-p l e t e l y stopped, someone asked him, "...Now that you are so f a r away, surely i t i s not possible f o r you to disobey the imperial wishes? T'ing r e p l i e d , 'The enlightened r u l e r does not use his s e l f i s h Indulgences to encroach upon mat-ters of supreme j u s t i c e ; surely i t i s not possible that I w i l l a l t e r my uprightness as l o y a l o f f i c i a l on account of distance?" GTS 88/12a; HTS 125/3b. 89. The p a r a l l e l text does not have T'ai-tsung, ^ ^ . However, i t makes more sense to leave i t i n . 90. TFYK, chap. 90, Ti-wang Pu. She Yu 9, p. 1081, preserves an amnesty dated~"pao-ll l/4/kuei-"ssu• (20th day) [826]. TCTC 243, p. 7843 gives the same 'date. The major purport of t h i s amnesty was to allow L i Shen to take advantage of the administrative practice of l l a n g - i , i . e . , reducing the distance from the c a p i t a l of the place of e x i l e of an o f f i c i a l previously banished. Since Shen was cl o s e l y a l l i e d with Te-yii, Feng-phi sought to deny shen this p r i v i -lege. There i s none of the self-deprecatory requests by the emperor seeking guidance from his o f f i c i a l s . 91. The p a r a l l e l text does not have fang chao Q . 92. The p a r a l l e l text has chien iJ^ and not ohlao, Jfr 93. The p a r a l l e l text does not have p i hsla- ^ \ . 94. The p a r a l l e l text does not have hui ts'ung, 95. T'len ma' were the famous blood-sweating heavenly horses of Ferghana. " c f . Arthur Waley, "The Heavenly Horses of Ferghana," History Today, v o l . 5 (1955). PP. 95-103. -126-96. The parallel text reads: "oh'en yu' 1 so wei hsiao" £ i - , ft a i • f T ^ 1 1 c o m e s from the following citation praising Han Wen-ti's frugality: "...[HQis personal clothing was black silk, the clothes of his beloved shen fu-jen did not touch ( l i t . drag on) the ground. The curtains and screens did not have decoration or embroidery. By stating his ad-vocacy for simplicity, he became a model for the whole world." HS V l 6 b . 98. P'ei Wen Yun Fu, p. 1477, cites this passage as the locus  classicus. 9 9 • Kung chi alludes to the phrase from the Confucian Analects, chap. l5.4, r Wei Ling Kung." Legge translated It: "The Master said: ^H^y" no't' Shun be Instanced as having governed efficiently without exertion? What did he do? He did nothing but gravely and reverently occupy his royal seat*." The following notes added: "kung chi—made himself rever-ent..,All that shun did was by his grave and sage example. This is the lesson—the influence of a ruler's personal character." Legge Classics, vol. 1, p. 295. 100. Hsii-chou is in the region of modern day T'ung shan hsien in Kiangsu; since Hsii-chou, CKKCTMTTT (p. 698) , was the T'ang dynasty name for P'eng Ch'eng of the sui and the lat-ter is now in T'ung-shan hsien. cf. CKPJJCMYR, p.^296, Hsii-chou in Kiangsu. The f u l l t i t l e should be Hsii-chou  Chleh Tu Shih. 101. Wang Chih-hsing came from a long line of generals and held high military office from the reign of Te-tsung through to Wen-tsung. The reason for his greed is given as follows: "...thereafter, Chi-hsing accumulated wealth in order to bribe the influential and powerful. His own resources were inadequate for buying influence, so he taxed the inhabi-tants of ssu-chou in order to increase i t . " CTS 156/6b, HTS 172/2b, states this was to benefit the army. 102. Ssu-chou is situated southeast of Su-ch'ien hsien in modern day Kiangsu province. CKKCTMTTT, p. 521. 103. This memorial is preserved in Te-yii's collected works, pieh-chi, chap. 5, pp. 14-1-4-2. 104. The parallel text reads hsin, ^ . 105. The parallel text has yu instead of tsai.. A- . -127-106. The p a r a l l e l text reads wu l u shu wan /§, . 107. suan-shan Is now situated 9 l i west of present day Chen-chiang hsien i n Klangsu, CKKCTMTTT, p. 1124. 1 0 8 . Sha ml i s the Chinese t r a n s c r i p t i o n f o r the Sanscrit 'sramSinera. I t i s the same as sha-men ^ , Buddhist monic "16-17212. .213. 1°9. Su-chou i s now situated i n Wu hsien i n Kiangsu province. CKKCTMTTT,p. 1370. This was under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of Hsu-chou. 110. Ch'ang-chou i s situated i n Wu-chin hsien i n modern day Klangsu, CKKCTMTTT, p. 797. This too was under the j u r i s -d i c t i o n of the Hsu-chou Chleh Tu Shih. 111. Llen-chen i s an alternate name f o r Kuan Ch'a Shih or C i v i l Governor, cf. M4-9436..81. This refers then to Te-yii's p o s i t i o n at this time of Che-hsi Kuan Ch'a shih. 112. These remonstrances are preserved i n Te-yii*s c o l l e c t e d works, pieh-ohl chap. 8„ pp. 154-55. 113. This i s a l i n e from the Book of Songs, Hsiao Ya Hsi Sang,, section, Book 8, ode 4. Legge translates i t : "In my heart I love them, And why should I not say so, In the core of my heart I keep them, And never w i l l forget them." The accompanying note adds: "The writer speaks of h i s admiration and love f o r some man or men of noble charac-ter. ..but the preface and i t s supporters manage to f i n d In Yew's [Yii's] f o r c i n g good men Into obscurity and the de-s i r e or the writer to see them i n o f f i c e . " Legge C l a s s i c s , v o l . 4, p. 415. There i s elsewhere a t r a n s l a t i o n of the L i t t l e Preface: "The Shi Sang [Hsl Sang] i s directed against King Yew [Yu]. Mean men were i n o f f i c e and supe-r i o r men, whom he would serve with a l l his heart." op. c i t . p. 72. The second, more p o l i t i c a l , i n terpretation appears to f i t the present context better. 114. Ta-mlng fu. This poem I have not been able to f i n d i n any c o l l e c t i o n of his works or any modern compendium of T'ang poetry. 115. The date of the submission i s given as pao-11 1/2 jen-wu [825]. TCTC 243, p. 7842. -128-116. Chang Ch'ang. ( t z u Tzu-kao)was a man from P'ing-yang In Ho-tung. During the r e i g n s of Han H s i i a n - t i and Wen-ti, he was a prominent o f f i c i a l . The d i s t a n t commandery i n q u e s t i o n must r e f e r to Chi-chou where Chang served as p r e -f e c t and helped to put down bandits who had invaded the p a l a c e of Kuang Ch'uan Wang. HS ?6/l6b. 117. Mel Pu (d. 2 A.D.) ( t z u Tzu-chen) was a man from Shou-Ch'iin i n Ch'iu-chlang. "In Yuan-ohlh 1 [1 A.D.] when Wang Mang took over the government, one morning Pu aban-doned h i s w i f e and c h i l d r e n t o go to Ch'iu-chlang...HS 6 7/12a. x 117a. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads k u e i i n s t e a d of ohung . 118. Yu hu i s an a l l u s i o n to a phrase from the A n a l e c t s Book 2, chap. 18.2 Wei Ching. Legge t r a n s l a t e s i t : "77.When one gives few occasions f o r blame i n h i s words and few occasions f o r repentance i n h i s conduct, he i s i n the way to get emolument." Legge C l a s s i c s , v o l . 1, p. 151. 119. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads p'o c h i h kuan cheji Mi h° '% and adds the phrase • ohu l i e h yu hou JL £ - f V ; f £ _ . 120. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads - c h i n c h i chou shang, -if ^ j_ . 121,. T h i s memorial has been p r e s e r v e d i n the CTW. chap. 715/ l a - b , p. 93,01, i n the s e c t i o n devoted to Wei Chu-hou's works. 122. Wu had been a f e u d a l s t a t e d u r i n g the Chou p e r i o d which now comprises mainly the modern p r o v i n c e of Kiangsu. T h i s was a p o e t i c way of r e f e r r i n g t o the a r e a governed by Te-yii a t t h i s time. 123. S i n c e Te-yii's g r a n d f a t h e r had been p r e s i d e n t of the cen-s o r a t e d u r i n g the r e i g n of T a i - t s u n g , the g r a n d f a t h e r , son and grandson d i d i n f a c t serve through s i x r e i g n s , i . e . T a i - t s u n g , Te-tsung, Hsun-tsung, Hsien-tsung, Mu-tsung, and Ching-tsung. 124. Po... Yiieh i s a c o n t r a c t i o n of a s a y i n g from the A n a l e c t s Yung Yeh • chapter. Legge t r a n s l a t e s i t : "The s u p e r i o r man e x t e n s i v e l y s t u d y i n g a l l l e a r n i n g and keeping him under the r e s t r a i n t of the r u l e s of p r o p r i e t y may thus not l i k e w i s e overstep what i s r i g h t . " Legge C l a s s i c s , v o l . 1, p. 193. -129-125. Wei hsien- i s taken from the Kuan h s i n g chapter of Han F e i - t z u ; H s l An-pao's nature was nervous, t h e r e -f o r e he t i e d a l e a t h e r thong around h i s w a i s t to slow h i m s e l f down; Tung An-yii's nature was slow, t h e r e f o r e he wore a s i l k bow s t r i n g to urge h i m s e l f on. c f . Tzj.u~hai. 126. Wei Ch'u-hou (773-828) was a b r i l l i a n t s c h o l a r and h i s -t o r i a n . He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n GTS 159; HTS l k 2 . 127. As i t stands, the biography gives the m i s l e a d i n g impres-s i o n t h a t there were two r e p l i e s t o Te-yii*s remonstrances, i . e . one w r i t t e n by the emperor i n h i s own hand and another by Wei Ch'u-hou. The one quoted, however, i s i d e n t i c a l with the one recorded i n the CTW. 128. Po-chou i s near the p r e s e n t Shang-ch'lu h s i e n i n Honan p r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 679. 129. T h i s memorial on h o l y water i s p r e s e r v e d i n Te-yii's c o l -l e c t e d works, p i e h c h i 5, p. Ikl. 130. The p a r a l l e l t e x t d e l e t e s the number two. 131. The p a r a l l e l t e x t i n HTS l80/2b i s more e x p l i c i t on t h i s p o i n t . I t reads: "Those f e t c h i n g i t , add o t h e r water to i t which has been drawn from a w e l l . They have turned to s e l l i n g on the roadways, mutually c h e a t i n g and d e c e i v i n g one another. Those coming to buy i n one day a r e counted i n the thousands." 132. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads ch' l e n ^ i n s t e a d of s h i h , -j~ . T h i s sounds unreasonable. 133. L i a n g Che r e f e r s to the two regions s p l i t by the Ch'ien T'ang R i v e r , Che-tung and Che-hsi. c f . map f o r l o c a t i o n . 13 k. Fu-chien was the name of a p r o v i n c e under the T'ang dy-nasty, c f . map f o r l o c a t i o n . 135. I have been unable to f i n d a l o c u s c l a s s i c u s f o r e a r l i e r r e f e r e n c e s to h o l y water mentioned i n the t e x t . In f a c t , the p ' e l Wen Yiin Fu, chap. 3 ka 4 c h i h , p. 15 k8 c i t e s t h i s episode. 136. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads s h i h ^ i n s t e a d of ch' i -130-137. An e a r l i e r account records: " E a r l i e r , there were rumours of red f i r e i n the t e r r i t o r y of Wei. I t came from the south and destroyed the state. In that year, there was a Buddhist monk who came from the north bearing this f i r e . The red colour i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t when compared with o r d i -nary f i r e . I t was said to cure disease. The worthy and the rabble fought to get i t . often a f t e r getting i t , the people tested i t f o r more than twenty days. In both the c i t i e s and the countryside I t was very popular. Some c a l l e d i t 'divine f i r e ' . There was a decree banning i t , but i t did not stop i t . " Nan Shih, Chap. 4. Gh'l ohi,the basic  annals of Wu-ti, Yung ming 11 [493]. 138. Ling-hu Ch'u was a high o f f i c i a l during the reigns of Te-tsung through Wen-tsung. At this time, P a o - l i 2 [826], he was m i l i t a r y governor of PI en-sung whlch^hstd j u r i s d i c -t i o n over Po-chou. of. YHCHTC, chap. 7, p. 189 , also his biographies i n GTS 172/4b and HTS l66/10a. 139. Chao Kuei-chen has no biography i n either T'ang history. As a Taoist adept, he showed up from time to time at court. He was an i n f l u e n t i a l figure In the suppression of Buddhism during the Hui-ch'ang era. Upon the accession of Hsuan-tsung, he was caned to death. TCTC, 240-8 passim. 140. This incident involving a l l the Buddhists as well as the Taoist Chao Kuei-chen i s c i t e d i n TCTC 243, p. 7 8 5 L Pao-l i 2/6 jen-ch'en [826]. 141. Tu Ching-hslen has no biography i n either T'ang history. This incident, however, i s recorded i n TCTC 243, p. 7851. l o c . c i t . 142. The a f f a i r of Chou Hsu-yuan i s c i t e d i n TCTC 243, p. 7851. l o c . c i t . , HTS l80/2b and HTS 17 shang/9a, Ching-tsung Pen-chi. The l a s t account has the following entry: "The c i v i l governor f o r Che-hsi, L i Te-yii, sent up a memorial which said: This matter concerning [Chou] Hsu-yuan i s [much] other extravagant talk. He i s no d i f f e r e n t from [any man." 1 4 3 . This memorial i s preserved i n Te-yii's c o l l e c t e d works, pleh-ohl 5 , p. 297. 1 4 4 . Kuang Ch'eng (-tzu) was an immortal of high antiquity whom the Yellow Emperor once asked about the importance of the ultimate way. M 4 - 9 4 9 3 . . 1 8 5 . -131-1^5. Hsuan-yiian (-^ Huang-ti) was the tit l e given to Lao-tzu during the T'ang dynasty, since the imperial surname Li was the same as Lao-tzu's, the T'ang honoured'him as their founder. M7-20814..120. 146. Hsiian Huang. A name for the Yellow Emperor. He was sup-posed to have lived on the hillock of this name in Hsln-cheng hsien in Honan. M7-20557..28. cf. SC 'Basic Annals of the 5 Emperors'. "The Yellow Emperor was the son of Shao Tien surnamed Kung-sun. His personal name was Hsien Yuan." Chapter 1/la. 147. Much of the following exchange is taken from Chuang-tzu Book 11 -Tsai Yu cf. Legge's translation, Tao Te-chlng and the Writings of Chuang-tzu. Wisdom of the East series, P. 346-7. 148. The parallel text reads ohlang T1f- not p_i, . 149. This is an allusion to Confucius' remark that he understood birds, fish, beasts, etc., but could not understand dragons for they rode the winds and flew up into the heavens. " I have just seen Lao-tzu this day and how he resembles a dragon." SC 63/2a. i.e. an expression of admiration. 150. The parallel text reads ohih ^_ not y_u -qtr t 151. This is the honorary name for Ching-tsung. THY, chap. 1, p. 12. 152. The parallel text reads chi not yung. )f| 153. For this episode cf. HS 25 shang/17a-b. 154-. For the related incident cf. HS 25 shang/24-a. 155. Liu Tao-ho was a Taoist adept whose achievements caught the attention of T'ang Kao-tsung. He has biographies in CTS 192, HIS 196. 156. Sun has no biography in either T'ang history. 157. The parallel text reads kal jf^ instead of oh'i pu ^ 158. The parallel text reads '< jul ssu ohlng oh'luf ^  ^ ,\; t 159. Chang Kuo was a Taoist adept during the reign of Empress Wu and Hsuan-tsung. He has biographies in CTS 191 and HTS 204-. -132-160. Yeh Ching-nung was another Taoist adept. M9-31387..90. 161. Li Shih-fang has no biography in either T'ang history. 162. Chao Ming. This was part of the posthumous t i t l e for Ching-tsung. THY, chap. 1, p. 11 163. This refers to the circumstances of Ching-tsung's death. After a night of drinking with his eunuch companions, he was murdered in his room by Su Tso-mlng and others. TCTC 2k3, pp. 7851-2 pao-li 2/12 hsln-ch'ou [826]. CTS 17 "~ shang/9b Ching-tsung Pen-ohi says much the same thing only providing more names. Ching-tsung pen-ohi HTS 8/4a states simply that the emperor died in the 12th month, aged eighteen. 164. The President of the Board of Rites was an official with the rank of 3rd degree, 1st class. TFA, p. 79. This was a titular appointment for Te-yii, who was s t i l l serving in Che-hsi. 165. Vice-president of the Board of War was an official with the rank of 4th degree, 2nd class. TFA, p. 96. This was a substantive post, since Te-yii was being summoned to the capital for service. 166. TCTC 244, p. 7866, gives the date of Li Tsung-min's appoint-ment as T'ai-ho 3/8 shen-hsii [829]. 167. Cheng-hua Ghleh Tu Shih is an alternate name for I-ch'eng Chieh Tu Shih. cf. citations for I-cheng chun, CKKCTMTTT, p. T0T£6^nd~Yung P'ing Chun, p. 222. cf. map for loca-tion. cf. TCTC, loc. cit. 168. Under the entry in TCTC 243, p. 7825 Ch'ang-ch'ing 3/3 jen-hsu [823], states: "Te-yii was sent out to become Civil Governor of Che-hsi and for eight years was not promoted." The accompanying note adds: "Not until Wen-tsung T'ai-ho 3 [829], owing to the recommendation of P'el Tu, was Te-yii summoned from Che-hsi [when] he was again pushed out by Li Tsung-min and sent to serve as commander in Hua-chou." By my reckoning, this adds up to only six years. 169. Cheng T'an was an official and scholar during this period. He was opposed to the antagonistic policies of Tsung-min and seng-ju and supported Te-yii against them. He has biographies in CTS 173 and HTS 165. -133-170. The Shih Chiang Hsiieh Shih was a scholar responsible f o r explaining the Classics i n the University f o r the Sons of the state. TFA, p. 445 note. Cheng was removed from t h i s post f o r supporting Te-yii, but Wen-tsung who loved l i t e r a -ture and was fond of Cheng l a t e r reappointed him. c f . CTS 173/la. 171. The date of Niu's appointment to the chief ministership i s c i t e d under the entry f o r T'ai-ho 4/1 hsin-mao [830], TCTC 244, p. 7869. 172. Examples of the banishment of Te-yu 1s supporters include P'ei TUt footnote no. 185, and Cheng T'an, footnote no. 169. 173. The date of Te-yii's appointment as m i l i t a r y governor of Hsl-ch'uan replacing Kuo Chao i s given as T'ai-ho 4/10/wu-shen [830], TCTC 244, p. 7872. 174. President of the Board of War was an o f f i c i a l with the rank of 3rd degree, 1st c l a s s . TFA, p. 96. 175. Ch'eng-tu, being a grand prefecture (fu), was headed by a Prefect (yin) who was an o f f i c i a l with the rank of 3rd de-gree, 2nd class. TFA 682 , no. 4. cf. also 684. 176. The old administrative seat i s now i n the two hsien of Ch'eng-tu and Hua-yang i n Szechuan. CKKCTMTTT, p. 386. 177. Chien-nan was a province during the T'ang dynasty, c f . map f o r l o c a t i o n . For a b r i e f resume of the h i s t o r y of this t i t l e , cf. THY 78, p. 1431. 178. Deputy M i l i t a r y Governor i n Charge of M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s f o r Chien-nan and Hsi-ch'uan. "...[T]hey were :de facto M i l i t a r y Governors while the princes who were c a l l e d 'Grand Mi l i t a r y Governors' (ohleh tu ta-shih) a l l re-mained at the c a p i t a l . " TFA, p. 669. 179. In a note a f t e r a memorial submitted by Wei Kao, then Mi l i t a r y Governor of Hsi-ch'uan i n TCTC 232, p. 7840, under the entry f o r Chen-yuan 3/1/ping-wu [787]. the names of the eight kingdoms are given as follows; "Po Kou Chun, Ko L i n Chun, Pu Tsu Chun, Nan Shui Chun, Juo Shui Chun, Hsl Tang Chun, Ching Yuan Chun and Tu Pa Chun." These eight t r i b a l kingdoms and Yiin-nan ( i . e . Nan Chao) sought an accommodation with China to escape the exactions of conscription and taxes demanded by Tibet. Wei Kao, then, on behalf.of the court accepted Nan Chao's inten-t i o n to submit and be transformed (kuei hua ohih h s i n i f >i^^.c-) i n order to take them away *f rom the Tibetans, thereby weakening the Tibetans' resources. -134-180. Hsi Shan is west of Hua-yang hsien in szechuan, GKKGTMTTT, p. 345. 181. Yiin-nan of the T'ang period is centered on what is now Yunnan hsien (T'eng-yiieh Tao) in Yunnan province. CKRDCMYR, p. 26. As the home of the Nan Chao, i t was often called 182. Tsung-min's biography states: In Yuan-ho 12 [816], Chief Minister P'ei Tu was sent out to campaign against Wu Yiian-chi and memorialized that Tsung-min become the Duty Officer in Charge of Daily Events and Investigation for the Chang-i Army Region." CTS l?6/lb. 183. Por p'an kuan cf.! TFA 646 and also 568, no. 3. -184. Chang-i Military Region was originally called the Huai-ning Military Region, cf. map for location. 185. This incident is also recorded in TCTC 244, p. 7872, under the entry for T'ai-ho 4/7 jen-wu [F^CTJ. The t i t l e that P'ei Tu assumed was Shan-nan Tung Tao Chieh Tu Shih. 186. Shan-nan Hsi Tao was also known as Hsing Yuan Chieh Tu Shih, the name of a T'ang province, cf. map for location. 187. The parallel text in HTS l80/3a has a slight variation: "Thereupon the authority of these men shook the empire and" the [position of their] faction was Impregnable." (lao 188. Kuo Chao was the grandson of the famous T'ang general Kuo Tzu-i. He has biographies in CTS 120/l4b; HTS 137/8b. 189. Nan Chao was an independent kingdom occupying the area south of modern day Szechuan, centering on what is now Yunnan province. Chao in their language meant 'king.' Of the six kingdoms in this region, Ming-she, which united the rest, was southernmost, hence the name. cf. TCTC 235. p. 7651* note following the citation for Chen-yuan 10/6 jen-yin shuo [794], cf. no. 203 for Nan Chao's earlier attempts to a l l y with China to escape the exactions of the Tibetans. For their raids on Hsi-ch'uan cf. TCTC 244, p. 7867, for the entry under T'ai-ho 3/11 ping-shen j 829], 190. The modern historian Hsiang Ta disputes the accuracy of this figure of 4000 Chinese being carried off by Nan Chao. T h e K'ao-i cited in TCTC 244, p. 7877, cites Te-yii's own Hsi-nan Pei pien Lu [a work since lost] as stating that T a - l i . -135-190. (continued) 53^6 prisoners were repatriated. However, the Wen-tsung s h i h - l u quotes a figure of ' around 4-000'. This then was accepted as correct and used i n both of Te-yii 1 s biographies and the account i n TCTC. In contrast, Te-yii i n h i s second memorial seeking a reinstatement of Tu Yiian-ying's former t i t l e s , wrote: "After I, Te-yii, a r r i v e d at my post, I dispatched o f f i c i a l s to the prefec-tures and sub-prefectures traversed by the barbarians, and one by one I made a thorough Investigation. In each case, they got and brought i n the names. On the l i s t s which were prepared [ i t was said that] the barbarians had ca r r i e d o f f 9000 people altogther...» HCIPC 12/p. 95. I f t h i s figure i s accurate, how can these people be ac-counted for? F i r s t there are the 5346 who were recovered. Then Tu Yiian-ying's biography states 1000 or so died at Ta-to Ho [the demarcation between China and Nan Chao], cf. CTS 163/4b. F i n a l l y there i s a note i n TCTC 244-, p. 7873. that Nan Chao sent 2000 Chinese plus goTcT~and s i l k s to the Tibetans. These figures come to about 9000 a l t o -gether. Te-yii's reason f o r bringing down the figures was to lessen the blame on Tu Yiian-ying so that the court would restore his former t i t l e s , of. HsiangTa Man Shu  Chiao Chu, e s p e c i a l l y pp. 178-80. 191. This whole matter of Hsi Ta-mou's surrender of Wei-chou was the subject of a lengthy memorial which Te-yii presented to court a f t e r he became chief minister under Wu-tsung. To avoid r e p e t i t i o n , i t s contents and i t s ramifications w i l l be treated i n f u l l d e t a i l at that time. cf. HCIPC 12 j. pp. 6 4 * 5 . 192. Wei-chou. The old c i t y i s situated 10 l i west of L i - f a n hsien i n modern szechuan province. CKKCTMTTT, p. 1117. 193. Min Shan was 500 l i northwest of Wu-chou (Hui-chou of T'ang), i . e . Ch'eng-tu of the Ch'ing. I t was the source of the Yangtze River. The mountain range continued f o r 1000 l i without a break. TSFYFY, chap. 6 6 , p. 2829. 194-. Lung Shan i n Lung hsien i n modern Shensi Province, p. 1358. TSFYCY, p. 2830 states that i t Is north of Min Shan. The descriptions of the eastern and southern boundaries of Min Shan are exactly the same as those i n the biography. 195. Ho-hsi i s a province name, cf. map f o r l o c a t i o n . 196. Lung-yu i s a province name. cf. map f o r l o c a t i o n . -136-197. The Tibetans were the most dangerous threat to China's southwest and western f r o n t i e r s . During the r e b e l l i o n of An Lu-shan, they occupied Ch'ang-an f o r a few days. At this p a r t i c u l a r time, t h e i r camps were close enough to the c a p i t a l f o r the chief minister NiuSeng-ju to be a f r a i d that they would use the surrender of Wei-chou as a pretext to attack, cf. no. 224-. The Tibetans have t h e i r own chapters i n the T'ang h i s t o r i e s . CTS 196 shang, hsla; HTS 216 shang, hsla. 198. Wei Kao (746-806) was f o r 20 years the semi-autonomous m i l i t a r y governor of Hsi-ch'uan. Despite t h i s , he was l o y a l to the court and on t h e i r behalf s t a b i l i z e d t h i s s t r a t e g i c area during a p a r t i c u l a r l y disruptive time. He has biographies i n CTS 140; HTS 158. 199. Niu's arguments against accepting the surrender of Wei-chou may be summarized as follows: 1) China had recently con-cluded a treaty with the Tibetans and should not v i o l a t e i t thereby antagonizing them; 2) Wei-chou i t s e l f was unim-portant and i t s loss would not materially weaken them; 3) the Tibetans were camped close enough to Ch'ang-an that accepting the surrender might provoke them into attacking; CTS 172/7b-8a.< c f . TCTC 24-4-, p. 7878 T'ai-ho 5/9 [831]. An unstated reason was, of course, his jealousy of Te-yii's diplomatic achievement. In addition to t h i s ad hominem argument was t h e i r fundamental difference over the court's a c t i v i s t i n i t i a t i v e i n state a f f a i r s . 2 0 0 * Tsan-p'u was the Tibetan name f o r t h e i r king. MlO-36395.. 61. 201. Ch'iung Hsia pass i s west of Jung-ching hsien i n modern Szechuan. CKKCTMTTT, p. 362. cf. TCTC 24-4, p. 7897 T ' a i -ho 6/5 ohla-oh'en 1 832"!. 202. This incident i s also chronicled i n TCTC 244, p. 7878 T'ai-ho 5/9 [831]. 203. Sui-chou i s i n the d i s t r i c t of Hsi-ch'ang i n modern Sze-chuan province. CKKCTMTTT, p. 1336. cf. also TSFYCY, chap. 7^, p. 3185, f o r the move from Sul-chou to T'ai Teng. 204. T'ai Teng i s now i n the area east of Yen-ning Hsien i n Szechuan province. CKKCTMTTT, p. 1121. 205. Yen i s the name of a southern barbarian t r i b e . M10-33H9. 206. cf. TCTC 244, p. 7873 comments on the t r a n q u i l i t y of Shu. -137-207. Eunuch Overseers were eunuchs attached to the s t a f f s of f r o n t i e r commanders by the central government to monitor t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . This was a major source of the eunuchs' m i l i t a r y power and a source of eunuch interference i n m i l i t a r y f i e l d commands, cf. An Lu-shan, p. 7k» 'eunuch c o n t r o l l e r s ' . 208. The p a r a l l e l text f o r Wang's return to the c a p i t a l i s i n TCTC 244, p. 7880 T'ai-ho 6/11/i-mao [832]. Wang does not have a biography i n either T'ang history. 209. Shu Mi (-^Shlh) were o r i g i n a l l y eunuchs who transmitted docu-ments within the palace. Later s e c r e t a r i a l and delibera-t i v e functions were added so that i t became s i m i l a r to the Imperial Chancellery i n early T'ang. cf. Sun Kuo-tung, "The Development of the Three Department System of the T'ang Dynasty" gives a b r i e f description of t h e i r functions, es p e c i a l l y 1124-6. 210. The emperor's evident displeasure at Seng-ju i n the wake of the Wei-chou incident so upset Seng-ju that he was soon provoked into resigning from the chief ministership and was sent out to become the m i l i t a r y governor f o r Huai-nan. cf. TCTC 244, p. 7880 T'ai-ho 6/11/1-mao [832]. 211. According to CTS 17 hsia/7b, the Basic Annals of Wen-tsung, the date of Te-yii's appointment as president of the Board of War was T'al-ho 6/12 ting-wei [832]. 212. Huai-nan i s the name of a contemporaneous province, c f. map f o r lo c a t i o n . 213. According to ESWSPP, p. 7^13. the date of Niu Seng-ju's appointment as m i l i t a r y governor of Huai-nan was T'ai-ho 7/12 1-ch'ou [833]. 214. Chung Shu Shih Lang. (Two) Vice-presidents of the Imperial Grand Secretariat. They held the rank of 3rd degree, 1st clas s , and were responsible f o r helping the presidents of the department (ling) i n the exercise o f i t h e i r duties. TFA, p. 179. 215. Grand Scholar of the Academy of Assembled Worthies. They helped with the increased paperwork i n the Imperial Grand Secretariat. TFA 16-7. 216. This phrase i s l i k e l y s i m i l a r to feng huan )1L which i s defined as a disease i n which freedom [of movement] of the limbs has been l o s t ( i . e . paralysis caused by a stroke). M12-43756..143. -138-217. The Tzu-chen h a l l was one within the Ta-ming palace used f o r imperial audiences, c f . TFA, p. 154, no. 3; also l 6 l , no. 1. cf. map of the Ta-ming palace complex (no. 4) at the end of v o l . II taken from Hsu Sung's T 1ang Liang Ching  Ch'eng Fang K'ao. The Tzu-ch'en H a l l i s p r a c t i c a l l y i n the centre. 218. Wang Shou-ch'eng was a powerful eunuch who, allegedly, together with Ch'en Hung-Chih (or -ch'ing) poisoned Hsien-tsung. Owing to his contribution i n putting Mu-tsung on the throne, he was placed i n charge of the Shu-mi Yuan, the so-called Eunuch s e c r e t a r i a t . His two proteges L i Hsiin and Cheng Chu (q.v.) discovered Sung Shen-hsi*s a n t i -eunuch plots and exposed him by arguing that he was tr y i n g to replace Wen-tsung with one of his younger brothers. Sung was t r i e d , convicted and banished. Wang l a t e r became a v i c t i m of L i and Cheng's own plots to remove the eunuchs when these two forced a confrontation between Wang and his own arch r i v a l Ch'iu shih-liahg, which resulted i n Wang being given poison. He has biographies i n CTS 184 and HTS 208. 219. Cheng Chu, o r i g i n a l l y surnamed Yii, came from I-ch'eng i n Chiang-chou. When Wang Shou-ch'eng was on tour, Cheng caught his eye. Cheng was well versed i n medicine. His rol e i n the 'sweet Dew' Incident (q.v.) was to lead the troops from nearby shen-yang to reinforce L i ' s massacre of the eunuchs at court. Relations between the two soured and communications at the c r i t i c a l moment broke down so that Cheng's forces played no part i n the insurrection. He was l a t e r hunted down and ambushed. Cheng has biogra-phies i n CTS 169 and HTS 179. 220. The Sung Shen-hsi a f f a i r . Concerning t h i s matter are the following c i t a t i o n s from TCTC: "The emperor was distressed that the eunuchs were strong and f l o u r i s h i n g . The fac-tions which rebelled against, and murdered, Hsien-tsung and Ching-tsung were s t i l l by his side. Wang Shou-ch'eng, the General of the Army of Divine Strategy, was espe c i a l l y despotic and overbearing, abusing power and accepting bribes. The emperor was unable to control t h i s . Once when the emperor secretly talked of t h i s with the Han-lin Scholar Sung shen-hsi, Shen-hsi requested that t h i s pres-sure be gradually removed. The emperor raised him up to ,be the l e f t a ssistant i n the Department of State A f f a i r s because he was very l o y a l , very cautious and r e l i a b l e f o r carrying out matters. In the 7th month on the. kuei-wei day, he was appointed Minister of State." TCTC 244, T ' a i -ho 4/6 ting-wei pp. 7871-2 [830], "The emperor and Sung Shen-hsi planned to exterminate the eunuchs, shen-hsi -139-220. (continued) r a i s e d up the v i c e - p r e s i d e n t of the C i v i l S e r v i c e Board Wang Fan to be P r e f e c t of the C a p i t a l D i s -t r i c t and used a s e c r e t memorandum to i n f o r m him. Fan l e a k e d the plans and when Cheng Chu and Wang Shou-ch'eng heard of i t , they s e c r e t l y made p r e p a r a t i o n s . The em-peror's younger b r o t h e r , Tsou, p r i n c e of Chang, was up-r i g h t and had the r e s p e c t of the people. Chu had the g e n e r a l s u r v e i l l a n c e o f f i c e r i n command of the Army of D i v i n e S t r a t e g y Tou Lu-shu make the f a l s e a c c u s a t i o n t h a t Shen-hsi planned to s e t up the P r i n c e of Chang [as emperor]. The emperor c o n s i d e r e d t h i s to be t r u e and was deeply angered...On the keng-tzu day of the t h i r d month, Shen-hsi was d i s m i s s e d from m i n i s t e r i a l rank to become one of the P r e s i d e n t s of the Grand S e c r e t a r i a t of the R i g h t f o r the Crown P r i n c e . " pp. 7875-6. "There was a subsequent attempt to review the case but the p l o t t e r s were a f r a i d t h a t the t r u t h would be r e v e a l e d , so t h a t they merely pushed f o r a f u r t h e r banishment. The p r i n c e of Chang became the Duke of Tsao-hsien and s h e n - h s i became the A d m i n i s t r a t o r - i n - c h i e f i n K'ai-chou where he d i e d . " l o c . c i t . F i n a l l y , a f t e r the Sweet Dew I n c i d e n t ( q . v . ) , Wen-tsung s a i d , "For a l o n g time, I have known t h a t t h i s matter was a mistake. Treacherous men p r e s s u r e d me s i n c e i t was a coup a g a i n s t the s t a t e . I was almost not a b l e to p r o t e c t my b r o t h e r ; moreover, Shen-h s i b a r e l y avoided e x e c u t i o n . The eunuchs.and a l s o the o u t e r c o u r t helped them. A l l t h i s stemmed from my misunder-s t a n d i n g . I n the p a s t , had t h i s o c c u r r e d to Han C h a o - t i , there c e r t a i n l y would not have been t h i s i n j u s t i c e ! " TCTC 245, K'ai-ch'eng 1/9/tlng-ch'ou [836], p. 792?. CTS 1WT' 6a-7aT~HTS 152/9b-10a. 221. p r e f e c t of the C a p i t a l D i s t r i c t . They h e l d rank of 3rd degree, 2nd c l a s s . TFA, p. 668, a l s o f o o t n o t e no. 2. 222. L i Hsun. O r i g i n a l l y named Chung-yen. Grandson of the same c l a n as L i K ' u e l , c h i e f m i n i s t e r under s u-tsung, and nephew of L i Feng-chi. He used h i s s e s s i o n s with Wen-tsung d i s c u s s i n g the 1-ching to h i d e t h e i r machinations to wipe out the eunuchs. When the sweet Dew p l o t was d i s -covered a t the p a l a c e , he t r i e d to c a l l i n f o r c e s from the o u t s i d e to salvage the s i t u a t i o n . He was l a t e r k i l l e d when he t r i e d to escape. He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 169. HTS 179. 223. Wang Y a i or Ya (d. 835) (tzu. Kuang-chin) was a man from T'ai-yuan. He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 169, HTS 179. 224. The Academy of the Four Gates. W i t h i n t h i s group t h e r e were (6) A s s i s t a n t P r o f e s s o r s h o l d i n g the rank of 8th degree, 3rd c l a s s . TFA 452-53. -140-225. Grand S e c r e t a r y of the I m p e r i a l C h a n c e l l o r y . These f o u r o f f i c i a l s who h e l d the rank of 5:1 a c t e d as p e r s o n a l s e c r e t a r i e s to the emperor h a n d l i n g incoming d i s p a t c h e s and outgoing decrees. TFA, p. 147. 226. Cheng Su. Came from Hsing-yang. As a o h i n - s h i h of Yuan-ho 3 [807], he was w e l l v e r s e d i n l i t e r a t u r e . He was a c l o s e s u p p o r t e r of Te-yii. He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 176 and HTS 182.' 227. Han Tz'u has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . 228. Chiang-chou i s i n H s i n - c h i a n g h s i e n i n modern Shansi p r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT. p. 932. I t was i n contemporaneous Ho-tung Chieh Tu S h i h . 229. Shou 'jp occupying p r o v i s i o n a l l y . TFA, p. 3. 230. T i t u l a r V i c e - p r e s i d e n t of the Department of S t a t e A f f a i r s . Although o f f i c i a l l y o n l y V i c e - p r e s i d e n t , these (2) o f f i -c i a l s were a c t u a l l y i n charge of d i r e c t i n g the .Presidents of the S i x Boards of the Department of S t a t e A f f a i r s , f o r no p r e s i d e n t ( l i n g ) had been named s i n c e 626 out of d e f e r -ence to T'ang T ' a i - t s u n g , who had once h e l d t h i s p o s t . The rank h e l d was 2:2. TFA.4, p. 27. 231. P r e f e c t of Jun-chou was a s u b s i d i a r y t i t l e to the major one, M i l i t a r y Governor of the Chen-hui Army D i s t r i c t . T h i s Chen-hui M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t was a contemporaneous p r o v i n c e name. c f . TSFYCY, chap. 25, pp. 1174--75, f o r i t s background, c f . map f o r i t s l o c a t i o n . The date of Te-yii's appointment was T'ai-ho 8/11/i-hai [834-], a c c o r d -i n g to ESWSPP, p. 7418. 232. The c l a i m t h a t Te-yii was i m p l i c a t e d i n the a l l e g e d p l o t to s u pplant Wen-tsung with h i s b r o t h e r Tsou, P r i n c e of Chang, was p a t e n t l y f a l s e . The p l o t supposedly took p l a c e i n T'ai-ho 5 [831] when Te-yii was s e r v i n g i n Shu. A l s o , the p a l a c e l a d y Tu was not sent home u n t i l T'ai-ho 8 [834], t h r e e years l a t e r . The f a c t t h a t a t the time when these charges were made the p r i n c e was a l r e a d y dead made these charges more d i f f i c u l t to r e f u t e , c f . H s i n  Chiu T'ang Shu Hu Cheng, chap. 17, pp.7290-91. 233. L e f t A s s i s t a n t (of the Department of S t a t e A f f a i r s ) . Wang's f u l l t i t l e i s g i v e n as shang Shu Tso-ch'eng i n TCTC T'ai-ho 8/12 kuel-mo, p. 7901 [834]. T h i s p o s i t i o n KeTd" the rank of 4"-X TFA, p. 28. .-141-234. Vice-president of the Board of Finance. They held the rank of 4:2.' They were responsible f o r looking a f t e r the grain, money, people, and lands of the empire and thus the d i s t r i b u t i o n of taxes and tri b u t e . TFA, p. 71. 235. The p'eng-lai palace was another name f o r the Ta-ming Palace. TFA 335-3.6, no. 4. 236. L i Ku-yen. (tzu Chung-shu) was a man from Chao-chun. He was a member of the Niu fa c t i o n . He has biographies i n CTS 173 and HTS 182. 237. Lu Sui 1 (tzu Nan-shih). His ancestors came from Yang-p'ing.' He Has biographies i n CTS 159 and HTS 142. 238. Chief Counsellor to the Crown Prince. There were four i n a l l with the rank of 3:1. Their function was to accompany the Crown prince to correct and reprove him and to advise and help him i n matters of etiquette and the observance of r i t u a l . A further note adds that these o f f i c i a l s c a r r i e d out only h o n o r i f i c functions. TFA, p. 572; also no. 3. 239. Administrator-in-chief. This o f f i c i a l and the Senior Ad-ministrator (Ssu-ma) were responsible f o r helping with the administration of a superior prefecture (fu) and pre-fectures (chou) i n order to .maintain control over a l l things and to d i r e c t a l l current matters of the various services. Since Chiang-nan Hsi-tao Kuan Cha shih was a governorship of middle rank (cf. YHCHTC, chap. 25, p. 743). the rank held by thi s o f f i c i a l was 5:1. TFA,pp. 6 8 4 and 705. 240. Yuan-chou i s i n 1-ch'un hsien i n modem day Kiangsi Prov-ince. A note i n TCTC, p. 7923, adds that i t was 3580 l i southeast of the capital. 1 241. Concerning t h i s incident there i s the following account: "In the c a p i t a l i t was f a l s e l y stated that Cheng Chu was making a golden p i l l f o r the emperor to swallow which re-quired the hearts and l i v e r s of small children. The people were alarmed and a f r a i d . When the emperor heard t h i s , he was appalled. Cheng Chu, Who had d i s l i k e d from the beginning the prefect of the Capital D i s t r i c t Yang Wu-ch'ing, said that these words came from a person i n Wu-ch'ing's household. The emperor was angry and i n the 6th month sent Wu-ch'ing to be t r i e d by the censors. When Chu sought a post i n the two mi n i s t r i e s , the v i c e -president of the Imperial Grand s e c r e t a r i a t and Minister of s t a t e , L i Tsung-min, d i d not allow i t , and Chu made slanderous statements about him to the emperor. At this time, when Tsung-min came to the a i d of Wu-ch'ing, the -142-241. (continued) emperor angrily upbraided him and had him sent away, on the jen-yin day, he was demoted to become the prefect of Ming-chou." TGTO 245 T'ai-ho 9/4/wu-oh'en (835], p.! 7904; also cf. CTS~175/7P-8a and HTS 175/4a. 242. This is an error in the SPPY text. In comparing the read-ing with the same passage in the Po-na edition, p. 15537» the character; given is Gh'u yj^ not Yu . Gh'u-chou was in contemporaneous Che-tung Kuan' Ch'a'shlh. It is present day Chekiang province, 7 l i southeast of Li-sui hsien. CKKCTMTTT, p. 851. 243. Li Han (tzu Man-chi) was a 7th generation descendant of Tao-ming,"Prince of Huai-yang. He was a chin-shlh of Yuan-ho 7 [811]. He has biographies in CTS 171; HTS 78, appended to that of Prince Huai-yang. 244. Fen-chou was the administrative centre for contemporaneous Fen-ning Ch'ing Ghieh Tu Shih. It is in Hsi-an fu, Fen Hsien in present day Shensi province. CKKCTMTTT, p. 397. 244a. Wang Fan (tzu Lu-yu) was a ohin-shih of Yuan-ho 5 [809]. The part of his biography pertinent to the sweet Dew Inci-dent is translated as follows: ...In the eleventh month of T'ai-ho 9 [835] when Li Hsiin was about to k i l l the eunuchs, he had Fan recruit thieves and bullies (hao-hsia <J^  < and appointed him military governor in T'ai-yiian, entrust-ing him with the task of summoning henchmen. On the day Hsiin was defeated, Fan returned to his residence in Ch'ang-hsing Li . That night he was arrested by the palace army and his whole family thrown in, ;jail. After Fan was beheaded in Tu-liu Shu, his family, young and old alike, a l l died. CTS l69/7a. He also has a biography in HTS 179. 245. This insurrection is better known in history as the Sweet Dew Incident. It was the culmination of the plans made by Wen-tsung and two of his minor officials, Li Hsiin and Cheng Chu, to rid the court of eunuchs. Following the failure of Sung shen-hsi's similar intentions (cf. no. 220), the court became increasingly dominated by the eunuchs. Cheng, whose medicines had provided some relief for the effects of Wen-tsung's stroke and Li who was an expert in the I-ching, secretly conspired with the emperor to eradi-cate the eunuchs using the sessions discussing the I-ching as a cover. They promoted Ch'iu Shih-liang in order to offset the power of Wang Shou-ch'eng, their benefactor and the most powerful eunuch at court. With support from the emperor, Li and Cheng were able to dismiss chief ministers and banish eunuchs alike. They took away a l l but Wang's -143-245. (continued) ceremonial powers and f i n a l l y had him k i l l e d . A l l the key positions at court and in the area surround-ing the capital were given to trusted subordinates. Cheng himself occupied the strategic post of Military Governor of Feng-hsiang, while L i controlled the capital, Hoxfever, there was a mild r i f t between the two and on the fateful day the actions of the two were not completely coordinated. On the jen-wu day T'ai-ho 9/11 [835]. i t was announced that 'sweet dew* had been found on the palace grounds. This was the sign from Heaven that the world had achieved the state of 'supreme peace' (t'ai-p' I n g ^ v ; ) . 1 The emperor was urged to see i t for himself and receive heaven's blessing, but he ordered the chief ministers to go f i r s t . L i announced that he thought i t was false and that i t s discovery ought not to be announced. The eunuchs Ch'iu Shih-liang and Yii Chih-hung went to see i t . After they l e f t , L i ordered two supporting armies to advance, but only one came. The plot was discovered when Ch'iu Shih-liang, standing by the em-peror's side, noticed Han Yuen turning pale and sweating. Then a gust of wind blew aside a curtain and he could see a group of armed soldiers and hear the clang of their weap-ons. Ch'iu-liang then hurried the emperor back to the safety of the palace and called out the palace armies to k i l l the rebels. L i and Cheng were both k i l l e d ; the l a t -ter had not been informed of the last-minute change in plans, so that he remained in Feng-hsiang and did not par-ticipate. The chief ministers Wang Yai and Ku Su and most of their families were slain. The eunuchs took advantage of the ensuing panic and confusion to harass and eliminate their enemies.1 In a l l , over a thousand people were slain. As a result, Wen-tsung was shut up in the palace and the eunuchs more than ever were in control of the court, cf. TCTC 7900-21 passim as well as biographies of L i Hsiin and Cheng Chu and the other participants. For Wang Fan's connection, cf. no. 244a.; 246. According to TFA, p. 823, a l l c i v i l o f f i c i a l s holding t i t l e s which did! not bear any relation to an office, i.e. a sinecure, were divided into 29 groups. Those having rank of 3:2 carried the t i t l e of Yin-ch'ing Kuang-lu Taj- fu. According to CTS 17 hsia/8b, the Basic Annals of  Wen-tsung, Te-yii already had"this t i t l e in T'ai-ho 7/2 [832]: 247. cf. footnote no. 90.; 248. Ch'u-chou was located in contemporaneous Huai-nan Chieh  Tu Shih and i s i n Ch'u Hsien i n modern Anhwei province. CKKCTMTTT, p. 1032. According to a note in TCTC 245, p. 7923, i t was 2564 l i from the capital. -144-249. Yang-chou was the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c e n t r e f o r contempora-neous Huai-nan tao. I t i s now governed from Chiang-tu h s i e n i n Kiangsu p r o v i n c e . 250. Chang Lu has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . 251. I m p e r i a l Omissioners. These (6) o f f i c i a l s of the l e f t , r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p i c k i n g up omissions of the emperor, were o f f i c i a l s with the rank of 7:3. They belonged to the I m p e r i a l C h a n c e l l e r y . Those of the r i g h t belonged to the I m p e r i a l Grand s e c r e t a r i a t , c f . TFA, p. 151, I 8 7 . c f . Waley, po Chu-i, pp. 41-2, f o r r e n d e r i n g t h i s t i t l e i n t o E n g l i s h . 252. Wang Chi has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . 253. Wei Mo has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . 254. T s ' u i Tang has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . 255. Wei Y u - i has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . 256. Imperial Reminders. These (6) o f f i c i a l s were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p i c k i n g up what the emperor f o r g o t . They h e l d the rank of 8:3. Those of the l e f t belonged t o the I m p e r i a l C h a n c e l l e r y and those of the r i g h t to the I m p e r i a l Grand S e c r e t a r i a t . TFA, pp. 151-52, I 8 7 . 257. Wei Ch'u-lao has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . 258. Fan Tsung-jen has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . 259. The K i r g h i z were the name of a T u r k i s h t r i b e , one of the n o r t h e r n T i who submitted to China e a r l y In the T'ang dynasty. During the f i r s t p a r t of the Chen-yuan era they were def e a t e d by the Ulghurs and separated from China. At the end of the K'al-oh'eng p e r i o d , when they became s t r o n g and f l o u r i s h i n g , they defeated and s c a t t e r e d the Ulghurs, a f t e r which they a g a i n s t a r t e d sending envoys with t r i b u t e to the T'ang co u r t . ^ During the F i v e Dynas-t i e s p e r i o d , they were absorbed .by the C h ' i - t a n . They were a l s o known as the _ Chieh-ku $.% ,>fr , .HQ-ku v^.f , or Chii-wu /£ . TSFYCY, chap. 45/1892. 260. Wu Chieh Ko Kaghan became K'o Kaghan a f t e r the d e f e a t of the Ulghurs by the K i r g h i z . A f t e r r e c a p t u r i n g the T'ai-ho P r i n c e s s from them, he t r i e d to use her to get the T'ang to l o a n him the f o r t r e s s of T ' i e n - t e to help r e g a i n h i s l o s t homeland. S h i h Hsiung a t t a c k e d and defeated him a t - 1 4 5 -260. (continued) sha Hu Shan, thereby recovering the princess. Eventually, he was k i l l e d by I Yin-ch'o at Chin Shan. ' c f . CTS 195/12b; TCTC 246 Hul-Ch'ang 1/8 [84l] 7953-4 and - following K'ao-1 note. 261. The T'ai-ho Princess, the 19th daughter of Hsien-tsung, had been married o f f to a yighur kaghan i n 821. cf. CTS 195/10b. After her recovery by court troops, her t i t l e was changed to the An-tung Ta-ch»ang Princess. cf. THY 6/ 77-8 and TCTC 247 Hul-ch'ang 3/2 keng-yln [843] pp. 797^-5. 262. T'ien-te (-Kin'eng) i s now northwest of Wu La T'e Ch'i i n Inner Mongolia on the border with Sui-yuan. CKKCTMTTT, P. 137. 263. T'len Mou. The p a r a l l e l text Is to be found i n TCTC 246 Hui-oh'ang 1/8 [841] p. 7952. He has a biography i n HTS 148 attached to that of T'ien Hung-cheng. 264. The Sha-t'o were a barbarian t r i b e , the alternate name for the western tribes of Turks. At f i r s t they were part of the eastern-western Turks but then divided and ruled over the former lands of Wu-sun. There was "a .desert called. Sha-t'o and therefore they'were c a l l e d by- this name. c f . HTS 218/ 2b f o r t h e i r contribution to border defense at this time. 265. T'ul-hun « Tu. Y U Hun were a barbarian t r i b e , cf. PWYP, p. 537; CTS 198; HTS 221 shang. 266. Hu iHan-y.a Kaghan, whose personal name was Chi Hou-ts'e, was a Hsiung rnu c h i e f t a i n who submitted to, and came to the court of, Han Hsiian-ti i n Kan-lu 3 [51 B.C.]. Rather than f i g h t with him, Hsuan-tl gave him many r i c h g i f t s and treated him with great dignity i n return f o r his l o y a l t y to the Han. The conversion of the Hsiung-nu brought over a great deal of support from other border tribes to the Han. cf. TCTC Kan-lu 3/1 [51 B.C.] pp. 887-88; also HS 8/19a-b. 267. Chen I-hslng. (tzu Chou-tao)was a man from Ying-chou. He received the ohin-shih degree i n Yuan-ho 7 [811]. He has biographies i n CTS 173 and HTS 181. 268. Wei Chung-p'ing has no biography i n either T'ang history. 269. 1 shih equals 1.75 bushels, cf. F i n Admin., p. XIII, Weights and Measures. -146-270. Wa Mo-ssu was a Uighur g e n e r a l . O r i g i n a l l y , he- was a supporter of Wu Chieh Kaghan but he broke away and sub-m i t t e d to China. As a r e s u l t , he was named L e f t General of the Chin-wu Army and was awarded the i m p e r i a l surname L i and the name Ssu-chung.. of. TCTC 246, p. 7952 e t s e q . and CTS 195/12b. 271. Ch'ih H s i n was a Uighur c h i e f m i n i s t e r who belonged to the f a c t i o n opposed to Wu Chieh. Together with P'u Ku and Na Chih-ch'o he d i d not submit to China. F i n a l l y , he was t r i c k e d by Wa Mo-ssu i n t o v i s i t i n g Wu Chieh and k i l l e d i n h i s t e n t a l o n g with p'u Ku. CTS 195/12b. 272. Yu-chou. I t i s now southwest of Ta-hsing h s i e n i n Ching-chao, Hopel P r o v i n c e , i . e . p r e s e n t day Peking. CKKCTMTTT, p. 613. 273. Pao Ta Cha i s i n Fu h s i e n i n modern day s h e n s i P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 576. 274. Pa T'ou Feng i s now south of Ch'ung-shan h s i e n i n the v i c i n i t y of Chiang Tu Ssu i n Shansi p r o v i n c e . CKRDCMYR, p. 509. There i s no entry i n CKKCTMTTT. 275. Chen-wu Chieh Tu S h i h . c f . map f o r l o c a t i o n . 276. Shuo-chou was i n contemporaneous Ho-tung Chieh Tu Sh i h . I t i s i n Shuo-p'ing f u i n modern'day Shansi P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 706. 277. Yiin-chou was a l s o i n contemporaneous Ho-tung Chieh Tu  Sh i h . I t i s now governed from Ta-t'ung h s i e n i n modern day Shansi P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 968. 278. Chang H s i e n - c h i e h has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . 279. Tai-chou belongs now to Ying-men Tao ( T a l hsien) i n s h a n s i P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 179. 280. L i u Mien, ( t z u Tzu-wang) was a man from P'eng-ch'eng i n Hsu-chou. His c o n t r i b u t i o n to the campaign i n Chao-i i s d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l i n the p r e f a t o r y a r t i c l e . He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS l 6 l , and HTS 171. 281. S h i h Hsiung was another m i l i t a r y man from Hsu-chou. c f . P r e f a t o r y A r t i c l e . He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS l 6 l and HTS 171. } -147-282. sha Hu Shan i s b e t t e r known as Hei Shan. of. TCTC 247, p. 7972 note. I t i s 10 l i south of Y i i - l i n i n Shensi P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT. p. 991. 283. P a r a l l e l t e x t s concerning the r e c a p t u r e of the T'ai-ho P r i n c e s s are to be found i n S h i h Hsiung's b i o g r a p h i e s , CTS 1 6 1 / l l a - b and HTS 171/7a-b, as w e l l as CTS 18 shang  Wu-tsung pe n - c h i , p. 7a. TCTC 247 Hul-ch'ang 3/1/keng-t z u , p. 7971-2 [8431. 284. Ssu-k'ung ^ D i r e c t o r of p u b l i c Works > was one of the Three Dukes, who h e l d the h i g h e s t ceremonial o f f i c e s i n the empire. They h e l d the rank of 1:1, which was equal to t h a t of Grand Marshal ( T ' a i - w e i ) . c f . no. 387 and D i r e c -t o r of I n s t r u c t i o n s ( S s u - t ' u ) , no. 343. 285. Ch'ao Pan has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . The p a r a l l e l t e x t i n TCTC 247 Hui-ch'ang 3/3 [843], p. 7975. s t a t e s t h a t he became the commissioner f o r subduing and p a c i f y i n g the K i r g h i z . 286. An-hsi was one of the p r o t e c t o r a t e s e s t a b l i s h e d to handle b a r b a r i a n a f f a i r s i n the border p r o v i n c e s . A f t e r the de-f e a t of Kao Ch'ang a t the b e g i n n i n g of the dynasty, the T'ang e s t a b l i s h e d An-hsi p r o t e c t o r a t e i n the w a l l e d c i t y of Chlao-ho. I t i s 20 l i east of T u l u Fan h s i e n i n modern day S l n k i a n g P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 3°4. 287. P e i - t ' i n g fchen) i s i n Fu-yuan h s i e n i n modern day S i n k i a n g P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT. p. 185. 288. Yii-men Pass i s 15° l i west of Tun-huang h s i e n i n p r e s e n t day Kansu P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 234. In a n c i e n t times, i t was an important road c o n n e c t i n g China with the Western Region ( H s i - y u ) . 289. Grand M i l i t a r y P r o t e c t o r a t e , c f . TPA, pp. 718-20. 290. Wei H s i a n g ! ( t z u Jo-weng)' was a man from T i n g Tao i n C h i -y i n . Por h i s warnings a g a i n s t the dangers of m i l i t a r y expansion, c f . HS 74/llb. 291. Chu-shih were one of the 36 s t a t e s i n the Western Region d u r i n g the Han dynasty. They were a l s o known as the Ku S h i h . They l i v e d i n what i s now T u r f a n chang c h i i n s i n k i a n g P r o v i n c e ( i . e . the a r e a under d i s c u s s i o n ) . 292. Chia Chuan-chih ( t z u Chien-fang) was the grandson of the famous Han statesman Chia I. For h i s warnings c f . HS 64/ 12a-b and TCTC 28 Ch'u-yuan 2 [47 B.C.] pp. 9°3-5. -148-293. Ghu-ya Chun. E s t a b l i s h e d as a Han oommandery i n Yiian- feng 1 [110 B.C.], i t i s now southeast of Hsiung-shan h s i e n (on Hainan Island) i n Kwangtung Pro v i n c e , p. 738. I r o n i c a l l y , t h i s was where Te-yii d i e d i n e x i l e . 294. T i Jen-chieh, (607-700) (tzu,Huai-ylng), came from Ching-chou, T ' a i - y i i a n . He was an important o f f i c i a l who openly c r i t i c i z e d Empress Wu's p l a n s , i n c l u d i n g those to expand the empire. c f . GTS 89/4a-b; HTS 115/3a-b; TCTC 206 Sheng-kung 1/winter 10 [897], PP. 6524-5. 295. The f o u r G a r r i s o n s of S u - l e . These were the f o u r T'ang . g a r r i s o n s i n H s i - y i i , Chiu-tzu.; TSFYCY 65/2786, Y i i - t ' i e n , (65/2792) Yen-shih/(65/2787) and Su - l e (65/2794). They were outposts f o r a d m i n i s t e r i n g the Western Region and defending the empire a g a i n s t the Ti b e t a n s . F o l l o w i n g the T'ien-pao e r a [742-755], a l l . f o u r f e l l t o the T i b e t a n s . CKKCTMTTT, pp. 202-3. They were northwest of the a n c i e n t f o r t i f i e d c i t y of Sha-che, 9350 11 from Ch'ang-an. 296. (Ah Shih Na):.: Hu-se-lo was the son of Ah Shih Na Pu Chen of the Pu L i She t r i b e . At the beg i n n i n g of the Ch'ui- kung era [685-9], he was appointed g e n e r a l i n the Yu-chin Guard and c o n c u r r e n t l y Meng-ch'ih Tu-hu. CTS 194 hsia/6a; -HTS 215 hsia/9a. 297. An-tung Tu-hu hu. "At the beg i n n i n g of the Tsung-ohang e r a [668] a f t e r the d e f e a t of the Korean kingdom of K a o - l i , the An-tung Tu-tu f u was e s t a b l i s h e d i n Gh'ao-hsien govern-i n g the c i t y of p ' i n g - j a n g i n order to c o n t r o l the v a r i o u s s t a t e s of the e a s t e r n sea. ...At the beg i n n i n g of the T'ien-pao e r a [742], i t was a g a i n moved to the o l d p r e f e c -t u r e of L i a o - h s i . A f t e r the Ghih-te e r a [756-7~], i t was a b o l i s h e d . I t belonged to the m i l i t a r y p r o v i n c e of P'ing-. l u . I t i s 270 l i e a s t of Ch'ao-yang h s i e n i n modern J e h o l P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 306. 298. The o r i g i n a l t e x t reads: " [ T i ] Jen-chieh requested a b o l - , i s h i n g An-tung and r e s t o r i n g the Kao-shih as c h i e f t a i n s (Chun-chang)." GTS 89/4b. In TCTC 206 Shen-Kung 1 / i n t e r -c a l a r y 10/ohln-yln [697] p. 6525, Kao-shih i s g l o s s e d as K a o - l i . The p e r t i n e n t sentence reads: "...then, Kao-shih b e i n g a d i s t a n t country, have i t p r o t e c t An-tung." The o b j e c t here i s very c l e a r — a b a n d o n d i s t a n t commanderies to China's b a r b a r i a n a l l i e s to defend, and conc e n t r a t e men and s u p p l i e s on c l o s e r , more e a s i l y defended ones. 299. Th i s memorial has been p r e s e r v e d i n Te - y i i 1 s c o l l e c t e d works. HCIPC, chap. 12/64-5. -149-300. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads Tu-fan oh'lu-ohang- o£ Jfe ^ i n s t e a d of t s a - i u -jfjj y| . 3°1. The p a r a l l e l t e x t adds: : h s i n g Wei-ohou t s ' e - s h i h Yii  Ts'ang-chlen p i e n l i n g . ^ H | ^  ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^| ^  302. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads h s i -4~ r a t h e r than t'an;-"j 303. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads oh' ou tfu r a t h e r than pu tsu- :f> >c . 3°4. I t was recorded: "The c h i e f m i n i s t e r and [ a number o f ] hi g h o f f i c i a l s , seventeen i n a l l , were ordered to swear a t r e a t y with the T i b e t a n [ P r e s i d e n t of the Board of R i t e s ] Lu Na-lo west of the c i t y . L i u Yuan-ting and Na-lo were sent back to T i b e t to swear the t r e a t y with t h e i r c h i e f m i n i s t e r and h i s subordinate o f f i c i a l s . " TCTC 243 Ch'ang- oh ' i n g 1 Winter 10/kuei-ohiu [821] p. 78OO. 305. T h i s a l l u s i o n r e f e r s to the i n c i d e n t i n 51/11 of the r e i g n of Ch'in Chao Wang [252 B.C.] i n which Po was f o r c e d to commit s u i c i d e f o r ex e c u t i n g the troops of Chao K'uo who had surrendered a f t e r the b a t t l e of Shang-tang i n or d e r t o prevent f u t u r e r e b e l l i o n s , c f . SC 73/4b. 306. Tu-yu i s 5 l i east of Hsien-yang i n modern s h e n s i Prov-i n c e . The "Shih Chi biography of Po Ch' i s t a t e s : "He went out 10 I I beyond the western gate of Hsien-yang. When he a r r i v e d a t Tu-yu, he was ordered to k i l l h i m s e l f . " CKKCTMTTT, p. 393. 307. Ch'en T'ang ( t z u T s u - k u n g ) a man from C h i a - c h ' i u i n Shan-yang, was a Han o f f i c i a l d u r i n g the r e i g n of Han Y i i a n - t i who hunted down and beheaded the Hsiung-nu l e a d e r Chih';-Chih. L a t e r he was banished t o Tun-huang f o r a v a r i c e . He was then r e c a l l e d to Ch'ang-an where he d i e d . He was c e l e b r a t e d f o r h i s f o r c e f u l n e s s and h i s m i l i t a r y a c h i e v e -ments which extended the awe and might of the Han to the v a r i o u s border t r i b e s of the Western T e r r i t o r i e s . D e s p i t e h i s s e r v i c e to the c o u r t i n d e f e a t i n g ChihCC.hih, he was going to be executed f o r c a l l i n g an I m p e r i a l p r i n c e an imposter; however, he was only banished, c f . HS 7°/3a. 308. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads a n ^ - r a t h e r than h s l 309. Chih Chih was the o l d e r b r o t h e r of the Hsiung-nu shan-yii Hu Han Ya ( c f . no. 295) who submitted to the Han. He r e -fused to submit as had h i s b r o t h e r and went westward to s e t up h i s own kingdom. During the r e i g n of Han Y i i a n - t i , Kan Yen-shou and h i s c o l l e a g u e Ch'en T'ang, et a l . , r a i s e d an army and entered K'ang Chii and executed him. TCTC, chap. 28-29 passim. -150-310. T h e p a r a l l e l t e x t r e a d s o h o u •)•)•) n o t o h ' uan. )i| . 3 1 1 . T h e C i t y T a k e n w i t h o u t G r i e f . T h e r e i s a n o t h e r p o s s i b i l -i t y f o r e x p l a i n i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f t h i s t i t l e : " T h e s e two w o r d s |wu y u 1 - i n C h i n e s e mean t o s l e e p i n p e a c e (Kao c h e n wu y u Jj fa J$k -J^ ) . I t c a n a l s o come f r o m t h e S a n s k r i t , : wu y u w a n g - ° - A s o k a . I n T i b e t a n m y t h o l o g y , A s o k a i s t h e s h i h wang :-tfe i ( R o i U n i v e r s e l ) j u s t , l i k e H a i - l u n g ."wang ( N a g a d a n u n l a c ) . K u a n L a o - y e h l a t e r g o t i t m i x e d u p . S u p p o s i n g t h e name o f t h e w a l l e d c i t y o f W e i - c h o u ' w u y u ' w e r e n o t a C h i n e s e n a m e , t h e n I s u s p e c t i t c a n n o t b u t b e c o n n e c t e d w i t h A s o k a . " j a o T s u n g - i , " T h e P o s i t i o n o f W e i -c h o u i n t h e H i s t o r y o f S i n o - b a r b a r i a n r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e T ' a n g d y n a s t y , " B I H P S , V o l . 39, p a r t 2 , 1969. L i . F a n g -k u e i F e s t s c h r i f t , p p . 07-88. 312. T h e p a r a l l e l t e x t r e a d s c h ' e n g t s ' u n g t z ' u t e •' j/fc 4J£_ ,jrb \\ . 3 1 3 . T h e p a r a l l e l t e x t r e a d s 1 y\ r a t h e r t h a n y_u.; '4k . 314 . H o - h u a n g . " I s a y t h a t ' H o - h u a n g ' I n d i c a t e s t h e r e g i o n n o r t h e a s t o f C h ' I n g - h a l . " T s ' e n C h u n g - m i e n , T ' u n g - o h i e n  S u l - T ' a n g C h i P i S h i h C h i h - i , p . 291. C h ' i n g - h a i i s i n C h ' i n g - h a i p r o v i n c e more t h a n 300 l i w e s t o f H s i - n i n g h s i e n . CKRDCMYR, p . 338. 3 1 5 . T h e p a r a l l e l t e x t r e a d s o h ' i e n c h ' 1 c h i u $ i n s t e a d o f s u i o h ' i e n c h i u , ^ ^ ; | 3 1 6 . L u n M a n g - j e . T h i s i n c i d e n t i s d e s c r i b e d i n T C T C 236 C h e n -y u a n 1 8 / 1 [ 8 0 2 ] , p . 7599. A l s o W e i K a o ' s b i o g r a p h i e s , CTS l40/3a a n d HTS 1 5 8 / 2 b . A n o t e i n T C T C c a l l s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e d i s c r e p a n c y i n t h e d a t e b e t w e e n t h e T C T C a c c o u n t a n d t h e b i o g r a p h i e s . I n t h e l a t t e r i t i s s a i d t o b e t h e 1 0 t h m o n t h . T h e f o r m e r f o l l o w s t h e d a t e i n t h e s h l h - l u . 317. K u n g S h u was a f a m o u s c a r p e n t e r f r o m c l a s s i c a l t i m e s . L e g g e t r a n s l a t e s t h e p e r t i n e n t p a s s a g e f r o m M e n o i u s ' L i  L b u S e c t i o n A ' a s f o l l o w s : " T h e p o w e r o f v i s i o n o f L i L a u [ L o u j , t h e s k i l l o f h a n d o f K u n g S h e [ S h u ] w i t h o u t t h e c o m p a s s a n d s q u a r e c o u l d n o t f o r m c i r c l e s a n d s q u a r e s . " I n a f u r t h e r n o t e , L e g g e a d d s , " K u n g S h e , named P a n o r Awas a c e l e b r a t e d m e c h a n i s t o f L u . . . " L e g g e C l a s s i c s , V o l . I I , M e n o i u s B o o k I V , L i L a u P a r t I , p . 2 8 8 . 3 1 8 . T h i s r e f e r s t o t h e N a n . C h a o r a i d i n T a l - h o 3 [ 8 2 9 ] , c f . n o . 1 8 9 . 3 1 9 . T h e p a r a l l e l t e x t r e a d s } p a o k u e i f a n o h ' i n g w e i -flsl \ i£ -\% ify n o t wen s%> c h i f a n c h ' i o h ' i n g w e i „ ;yj ^ % f f j - jfy -151-320. The p a r a l l e l t e x t adds teng, t 321. c f . no. 179 f o r the e i g h t s t a t e s . 322. Ch'iang i s a g e n e r a l name f o r b a r b a r i a n s on China's western borders. 323. The p a r a l l e l t e x t does not have t a kuo, ^ i$] , 324. Ho-shui i s the p l a c e where the Ch'ing R i v e r enters the Yangtze. I t i s i n P'eng-shan h s i e n i n p r e s e n t day szechuan Pr o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 290. c f . TCTC 7077 note s t a t e s t h a t i t was i n contemporaneous I-chou i n Chien-nan S h i - ch'uan Chieh Tu S h i h . 325. C h ' i - c h i (Lao Weng ch'eng) i s i n Wei-wu c i t y i n Ch'eng-tu f u i n Mao-chou i n Szechuan P r o v i n c e . CKRDCMYR, p. 3k7. There i s no entry i n CKKCTMTTT. 326. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads oh i ^ not o h i 327. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads s^ HT 1 mien hsu 0f |^ not .chi -328. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads ko c h i a ^ fi0 not c h ' i n g i , %\ 329. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads oh'ao c h i h j j ^ % r a t h e r than chao shu 330. The p a r a l l e l t e x t adds p_i m 331. Lu-chou, a c c o r d i n g . t o a note i n the p a r a l l e l t e x t i n TCTC, p. 7977, was one of the s i x b a r b a r i a n p r e f e c t u r e s i n Ho-ch'u on the western border of Yu-chou i n contempo-raneous H s i a - s u i - y i n Chieh Tu S h i h . p. 613. 332. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads c h ' i ssu ^ (vf, r a t h e r than pu e h l h - ^ g . 333. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads chu,|£. 334. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads oh'u j</l not s h i h ^ t 335. The p a r a l l e l t e x t does not have t'ou an, & . 336. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads ' l e i p i a o ch'en lun" ^ ^ p)jt %*H r a t h e r than : l e i p i a o shang ch'en.,% ^ t ^ 337. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads p e i san mu y i i ^ j t , j. ^ j f c - r a t h e r than f-p'l c h i h ku yoi.^/fe ^ m -152-336. The p a r a l l e l t e x t reads jen ohou ?h )&} r a t h e r than h a i 339. Ch'u L i n g : Wang. T h i s a l l u s i o n i s taken from the S p r i n g  and Autumn Annals' account f o r p r i n c e Chao of Lu, 4 t h year [65b 1 B .G.J. "Autumn. 7 t h month. The V i s c o u n t of Ch'u, Marquis of T s ' a i , the Marquis of Gh'en, Baron of Hsu, V i s c o u n t of Tun, V i s c o u n t of Hu, and H u a i - i a t t a c k e d Wu, s e i z e d Ch'ing-feng of Chi and k i l l e d him." The Ku-l i a n g commentary to the above has the f o l l o w i n g p e r t i n e n t exchange: "King L i n g sent men to b r i n g Ch'ing-feng a l o n g and had him p l a c e d among the s o l d i e r s . He s a i d , 'Are you the Ch'ing-feng of Ch'i who k i l l e d h i s p r i n c e ? ' Ch'ing-feng s a i d , ' s i r , wait, I too have a l i t t l e to say. Are you Wei, the Duke of Ch'u who murdered h i s e l d e r b r o t h e r ' s son and r e p l a c e d him as p r i n c e ? ' A l l ' the s o l d i e r s laughed u p r o a r i o u s l y . . . " "The meaning of the S p r i n g and Autumn Annals i s to use the noble to c o n t r o l the i g n o b l e , the worthy to c o n t r o l the degenerate and not use the r e b e l l i o u s to c o n t r o l the r e b e l l i o u s . Confucius said.'When one a t t a c k s one's enemies with e v i l i n one's h e a r t , even though they are dead they have not submitted.' Is t h i s not what t h i s means?1' Harvard Yenching Index s e r i e s , No. 1 1 . Ch'un G h ' l u P. 3 5 3 - 4 . ' ' — " : ~ 340. Chou Wen. I have been unable to f i n d the source of t h i s a l l u s i o n . 3 4 1 . Teng Shu. idem. 3 4 2 . Hsi-ta-mou was g i v e n the posthumous p o s t of General of the Right Palace Guard. TCTC 24-7 Hui-oh'ang 3/3 [ 8 4 3 ] , p. 7 9 7 8 . 3 4 3 . D i r e c t o r of I n s t r u c t i o n s was one of the 'Three Dukes. 1 They h e l d the rank of 1 : 1 . "The three Dukes helped the emperor keep y i n and yang i n harmony and to uphold peace w i t h i n the country. They d i r e c t e d a l l matters..." TFA, p. 19. They were, of course, the h i g h e s t honorary posts which the emperor c o u l d bestow. 3 4 4 . T s e - l u was a p r o v i n c e under the T'ang dynasty, c f . map f o r l o c a t i o n . I t i s e q u a l l y w e l l -known by i t s a l t e r n a t e name Chao-i. 3 4 5 . L i u Ts'ung-chien was the son- of L i u Wu. In a move .". s i m i l a r t o L i Chien," he" suppressed news of h i s f a t h e r ' s death and t r i e d to g a i n c o u r t concurrence to b e i ng named h i s f a t h e r ' s s u c c e s s o r as m i l i t a r y governor of Chao-i. D e s p i t e o b j e c t i o n s by L i Chiang which a n t i c i --153-345. (continued) pated those of Te-yu, Ching-tsung allowed hereditary succession, Por the whole of his tenure as m i l i t a r y governor, he was an i r r i t a n t to the court. He has biographies i n CTS l 6 l and HTS 214. 346. Liu-hou. TFA, p. 825, note no. 2, explains i t as follows: "The tit l e ~ i T U - j i o u , word for word means * o f f i c i a l l e f t be-hind' ... Af t e r T ? ™ . • i t Indicated the o f f i c i a l l e f t his post and designated his successor or who anticipated d i r -e c t l y a vacancy before receiving imperial assent...I trans-l a t e liu-hou' as provisional o f f i c i a l . " Por reasons of r e a d a b i l i t y , i t w i l l be rendered as interim governor or governor-designate. 34?. The ox-tailed pennant and broad axe were the symbols of the imperial mandate given to a general. M5-13642..2. cf. also Legge, Chinese C l a s s i c s , Vol. I l l , Shoo King, pp. 300-1. 348. Ho-shuo. According to TFA, p. 826, note no. 1, Ho-shuo indicated the area north of the Yellow River, i . e . con-temporaneous Ho-pei. cf. map. 349. L i Pao-chen was the nephew of L i Pao-yii, a l o y a l i s t gene-r a l during the An Lu-shan r e b e l l i o n who served as m i l i t a r y governor of Chao-i. During Tai-tsung's reign, he changed his surname from An to L i . He helped to put down the re-b e l l i o n of P'u-ku Huai-en and eventually became c i v i l governor of Hual, Tse, and Lu-chou, serving f o r eight years i n a l l . Realizing that Shang-tang (Lu-chou) occupied a strategic m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n , he b u i l t up the army to a strength of 20,000 men. "By t r a i n i n g a c i t i z e n army during the a g r i c u l t u r a l off-season, and promoting archery competi-tions and practice, within three years, he produced an i n -strument of war-which was the best i n the empire." CTS 132/2b and HTS 138/4a. During the "revolt of the four princes" (782-4) he remained l o y a l to the court. 35°. The p a r a l l e l text f o r this report i s to be found i n TCTC 247 Hui-oh'ang 3/4 hsln-wei [843], p. 7980. 351. For a detailed analysis of this succession c r i s i s , cf. the prefatory a r t i c l e to this t r a n s l a t i o n . 352. L i "Chien loo, c i t . He also has a biography appended to his father's biography i n HTS 138. 353. L i u Wu was the grandfather of L i u Chen. He came from a family which f o r a long time served the m i l i t a r y governors of P'ing-lu (modern Shantung). In Yuan-ho 15 [820] he k i l l e d his commander L i Shlh-tao and brought to an end the re v o l t i n P'ing-lu. As a reward, he was made M i l i t a r y -154-353. (continued) Governor of I-ch'eng. In Gh'ang-ch'ing 1/10 [821] he was t r a n s f e r r e d to be M i l i t a r y Governor of Chao-i. 354. Ch'ang-tzu (hsien) i s west of Ch'ang-tzu h s i e n i n modern day Shansi prov. CKKCTMTTT, p. 549. 355. Chin-yang i s how the c i t y of Lung-shan, T a i - y i i a n h s i e n , T ' a i - y i i a n f u , Shansi P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 3°6. 356. T h i s i s an a l l u s i o n to L i u Ts'ung-chien's championing of Wang Y a i ' s innocence, h i s c o n t i n u i n g o p p o s i t i o n to the eunuchs, and h i s w i l l i n g n e s s to h e l p the c o u r t purge them. " . . . I f treacherous o f f i c i a l s a r e d i f f i c u l t to c o n t r o l , I w i l l swear to the death to c l e a r them from the emperor's s i d e . " TCTC 245 K'al-oh'eng 1/2/kuei-wei [836], p. 7023. 357. The p a r a l l e l t e x t f o r t h i s exchange i s to be found i n TCTC 247 Hul-oh'ang 3/4 hsin-wel [843], p. 7980. 358. Wei-chou was the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c e n t r e f o r contemporane-ous Wel-po Chieh Tu S h i h . I t i s east of Ta-ming h s i e n i n modern Hopei. CKKCTMTTT. p. 1338. 359. Chen-chou was the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s e a t f o r contemporaneous Ch'eng-te Chieh Tu S h i h . I t i s a d m i n i s t e r e d by Cheng-c h i n g h s i e n i n modern day Ho-pel P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 1326. 360. The s t r a t e g i c importance of the three commanderi.es i n the r e g i o n E a s t of the Mountains i s summed up i n Tu Mu's ad-v i c e t o Te-yii: " . . . A l l of Chao-i's m i l i t a r y p r o v i s i o n s are [ i n the area] east of the Mountains. The two chou of Tse and Lu a r e s i t u a t e d e n t i r e l y w i t h i n the mountains where the e a r t h i s b a r r e n and the l a n d narrow. The g r a i n which had been put away i s a l l gone, t h e r e f o r e the m i l i -t a r y governor o f t e n s i t s i n Hslng-chou o s t e n s i b l y to be c l o s e to the g r a i n . The p r o v i s i o n s and g r a i n from [ t h e a r e a ] E a s t of the Mountains cannot be t r a n s p o r t e d ; moreover, the s o l d i e r s [ i n the area] West of the Mountains a r e indeed few and i s o l a t e d . T r u l y t h i s i s where to s t r i k e a t an empty p l a c e ! . . . " CTW, chap. 751/Ha-l6a, p. 985°. A l s o TCTC ,247 Hul-oh'ang "3 [843], pp. 7982-3 has a t r u n c a t e d v e r s i o n . 361. L i Hui .(tzu Chao-tu) , o r i g i n a l l y c a l l e d C.h'an but was changed to a v o i d the taboo of Wu-tsung's temple name. He was a c h l n - s h i h of the Ch'ang-oh'ing p e r i o d . Por h i s mis-s i o n to Ho-pei, c f . h i s b i o g r a p h i e s , CTS 173/8a-b; HTS 131/8b-9a; HCIPC 6/fr,32. Tzu Ho Chung-hsiin chao and TCTC 247 Hui-oh'ang 3/4 [843],. p. 7981. - 1 5 5 -362. The Chinese t e x t reads 'Wu wei t z u sun c h i h mou yu ts'un  f u ohe ohih s h i h . , ^ 4 3 . |.ft ^ feifck l o c . c i t . , r 1 3 6 3 . Ho Hung-ching. His o r i g i n a l name was Chung-hsiin, but i t was changed a t the b e g i n n i n g of;' the Hui-ch'ang era. He was the son of Ho Chin-t'ao who; became the m i l i t a r y gover-nor of Wei-po i n T'ai-ho 3 [ 8 2 9 ] a f t e r the murder of S h i h Hsien-ch'eng. During the campaign-against Chao - 1 , Hung-c h i n g was named Southern Commissioner f o r summoning pun-ishment. At f i r s t , he was r e l u c t a n t to j o i n i n the f i g h t -i n g but he was e v e n t u a l l y goaded i n t o i t when Te-yii ordered Wang T s a i t o march a c r o s s Wei-po. He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 181 and HTS 2 1 0 . 3 6 4 . Wang Yiian-k'uei was the son of Wang T ' i n g - t s o u who r e -v o l t e d a g a i n s t T ' i e n Hung-cheng i n Wei-po d u r i n g the Ch'ang- oh'ing e r a . A f t e r a s h o r t s t r u g g l e with the c o u r t , he was named m i l i t a r y governor. O r i g i n a l l y , they were of Uighur s t o c k — t h e Ah Pu Ssu t r i b e . In the campaign a g a i n s t Chao-i, Yiian-k'uei was one of the c o u r t ' s most s u c c e s s f u l and de-pendable g e n e r a l s . He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 142 and HTS 2 1 1 . 3 6 5 . L i J a n g - i . ( t z j p T a - h s i n ) was a man from Lung-hsi. He achieved h i s c h i n - s h i h i n Yuan-ho 14 [ 8 1 9 ]... Being a sup-p o r t e r of Te-yti, he too was demoted when Hsiian-tsung came to the throne. He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 1 7 6 , HTS 181. 3 6 6 . Tu-chih, the O f f i c e of P u b l i c Revenue,was one of the f o u r s e c t i o n s of the M i n i s t r y of Finance. TFA, pp. 7 1 , 7 4 . The p a r a l l e l t e x t i s TCTC 247 Hui-ch'ang 3 / 7 ohla-chen [843], 7 9 8 7 . 3 6 7 . Wang T s a i . H i s o r i g i n a l name was Y e n - t s a i . He was^the son of Wang Chih-hsing, an important g e n e r a l from Hsii-chou. D u r i n g the campaign a g a i n s t Chao-i, i n a d d i t i o n to b e i n g m i l i t a r y governor of Chung-wu, he was a l s o Commissioner f o r A t t a c k i n g and P u n i s h i n g f o r the E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e from Ho-yang. T s a i >was the instrument which ended Ho Hung-ching's v a c i l l a t i o n . U l t i m a t e l y , he captured Tse-chou and had L i u Chen's head sent back to the c a p i t a l . He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 1 5 6 ; HTS 1 7 2 appended to h i s f a t h e r ' s . 3 6 8 . shih Hsiung was another m i l i t a r y man from Hsii-chou. During the Hui-ch'ang e r a , he helped L u i Mien d e f e a t the Uighurs and r e c a p t u r e the T',ai-ho P r i n c e s s a t Sha Hu Shan. A g a i n s t Chao-i, he was appointed L i Yen-tso's deputy i n order to urge him on to f u r t h e r a c t i o n , u l t i m a t e l y r e p l a c i n g him as -156-368. ( c o n t i n u e d ) m i l i t a r y g o v e r n o r o f G h i n - h s i a n g . O w i n g t o h i s g r e a t g e n e r o s i t y , h i s t r o o p s w e r e e x t r e m e l y d e -v o t e d a n d l o y a l . I n o r d e r t o f u l f i l l t h e b i z a r r e p r e -d i c t i o n o f t h e h u n c h b a c k i n t h e m a r k e t p l a c e o f L u - c h o u , h e was named t o c a p t u r e t h e r e b e l c a p i t a l . He h a s b i o g r a p h i e s i n GTS l 6 l ; HTS 171. 369. H s i n g - c h o u I s i n H s i n g - t ' a i h s i e n G h i h - l i ( i . e . H o - p e i ) P r o v i n c e . C K K C T M T T T , p . 669. 370. M i n g - c h o u i s i n Y u n g - p ' i n g h s i e n i n C h i h l l ( i . e . H o - p e i ) P r o v i n c e . C K K C T M T T T , p . 6 4 7 . 371. T z ' u - c h o u i s i n T z ' u H s i e n i n C h i h l i ( i . e . H o - p e i ) p r o v -i n c e . C K K C T M T T T , p . 1184. 372. T s e - c h o u i s i n C h i n - c h ' e n g h s i e n i n m o d e r n S h a n s i p r o v -i n c e . C K K C T M T T T , p . 1222. 373. L u - c h o u ( S h a n g - t a n g ) i s i n C h ' a n g - c h i h h s i e n i n m o d e r n S h a n s i p r o v i n c e . C K K C T M T T T , p . 1176. T h i s was t h e a d -m i n i s t r a t i v e c e n t r e f o r c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s T s e - l u ( C h a o - i ) C h i e h T u S h i h . 374. T ' a i - y i i a n i s i n T ' a i - y i i a n h s i e n i n m o d e r n S h a n s i P r o v i n c e . C K K C T M T T T , p . 1 4 3 . T h i s was t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c e n t r e f o r c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s H o - t u n g P r o v i n c e . 375« H e n g - s h u i i s e a s t o f P e n - y a n g h s i e n i n m o d e r n S h a n s i P r o v i n c e . C K K C T M T T T , p . "1217. 376. Y u - s h e ( h s i e n ) i s i n Y i i - s h e h s i e n ( C h i - n i n g T a o ) i n m o d e r n S h a n s i P r o v i n c e . CKRDCMYR, p . 632. c f . C K K C T M T T T , p p . 377. L i S h i h ( t z u C h u n g - y u ) was a man f r o m L u n g - h s i . He a c h i e v e d h i s c h i n - s h i h i n Y i i a n - h o 13 [817]. D u r i n g t h e d i f f i c u l t d a y s f o l l o w i n g t h e s w e e t Dew I n c i d e n t , h e s e r v e d a t c o u r t a s a c h i e f m i n i s t e r . I n o r d e r t o o v e r c o m e t h e d i f f i c u l t y p o s e d b y t h e c o n t i n u i n g d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n C h a n g C h u n g - w u a n d L i u M i e n , h e was summoned t o r e p l a c e t h e l a t t e r a s m i l i t a r y g o v e r n o r o f H o - t u n g . I n t h i s p o s i -t i o n , h e was d r i v e n o u t o f T ' a i - y i i a n b y t h e r e b e l s l e d b y Y a n g P i e n . L i was l a t e r s e n t t o L o - y a n g w h e r e h e o c c u p i e d v a r i o u s m i n o r p o s i t i o n s . He h a s b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 17 2 a n d HTS 131 i n t h e s e c t i o n o n c h i e f m i n i s t e r s f r o m t h e i m -p e r i a l h o u s e . -157-378. Yang p i e n has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . The p a r a l l e l t e x t for t h i s r e b e l l i o n i s to be found i n TCTC 247 Hui-ch'ang 4/1/i-yu shuo [844], pp. 7995-8. 379. Ma Yiian-kuan has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y , c f . the aforementioned p a r a l l e l t e x t . 380. L i u - t z u L i e h . The p a r a l l e l t e x t op. c i t . , p. 7997. s t a t e s t h a t t h i s was the name of the p l a c e . A f u r t h e r note s t a t e s t h a t the p l a c e name d e r i v e s from the f a c t i t was l i n e d and p l a n t e d with w i l l o w t r e e s . In T ' a i -yiian h s i e n i n modern Shansi P r o v i n c e t h e r e i s a p l a c e c a l l e d L i u - t z u Yu.. CKKCTMTTT. p. 632. 381. Lien-ho i s an a g r a r i a n group which maintained p u b l i c o r -der and l i n k e d t o g e t h e r [groups o f ] t e n f a m i l i e s . M9-29153..8. 382. H s i n g r y i n g was a m i l i t a r y camp f o r an e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e , i.e". f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t the r e b e l l i o n i n Chao-i. TFA, p. 17-6. 383. Hu San-hsing's comment concerning Te-yii's r h e t o r i c a l f l o u r i s h s t a t e s : "At t h i s time, the i n t e n t i o n s of the emperor and m i n i s t e r s were harmonious and t h e i r d i s c u s -s i o n s agreeable. L i u Chen's power was a l r e a d y weak, c e r t a i n l y the c o u r t was not w i l l i n g to abandon [ t h e cam-paign] and not punish him. Te-yii s a i d t h i s to arouse Wu-tsung i n order to make i t c l e a r t h a t Yang P i e n c o u l d not be pardoned." TCTC 247 Hui-ch'ang 4/1 hsin-ch'ou [844], pp. 7997-8 noEeT 384. Wang Feng was a t t h i s time commissioner i n charge of horses and men f o r the e x p e d i t i o n a r y f o r c e from Ho-tung. He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n CTS 161 appended to t h a t of Wang P ' e i . A l s o i n HTS 171. 385. T'u men Pass i s a l s o known as Ching-hsing Pass. " I t i s on Ching-hsing Mountain southeast of Ching-hsing h s i e n i n C h i h l i , (Hp-pel), t o u c h i n g on the border with" Huo-lu h s i e n . I t i s a l s o c a l l e d T'u-men Pass. ...Since Ch'in-Han times, i t has been, m i l i t a r i l y speaking, a s t r a t e g i c p l a c e . " CKKCTMTTT, p. 119. 386. Lii l-chung has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . 387. Grand Marshal had the rank of 1:1. "There were no d e s i g -nated f u n c t i o n s but i f there were no worthy i n d i v i d u a l s to bear t h i s t i t l e , then no one bore i t . " TFA 19-20. -158-388. According to CTS 18 shang, the Basic Annals of Wu-tsung, 11a, i t says To"0*0 households. Te-yii 1 s other biography i n HTS l80/8a gives a d d i t i o n a l information concerning the o r i g i n of this t i t l e : "Te-yii again stated that his ancestors had been enfeoffed i n Chao. When the eldest grandson, Kuan-chung, was born, he was given the tzu ; San-chao. The intent was to hand i t down to the f i r s t born and not to the younger brothers. When I was enriched and ennobled e a r l i e r , i t had been already changed to Chung-shan. A l l my ancestors l i v e d i n Chi and wanted to be en-feoffed as Wei. The emperor allowed t h i s , and then, i t [Te-yii 1 s t i t l e ] was changed to Duke of Wei-kuo." 389. The date of the bestowal of Wu-tsung1s ho n o r i f i c t i t l e was Hui-ch'ang 5/1 i-yu shuo, i . e . the f i r s t day of the new year. CTS 18 shang/12b. 390. Chiang-ling (-fu) i s now governed from Chiang-ling hsien i n Ho-pei province. CKKCTMTTT, p. 328. 391. Hslng-nan Chieh Tu Shih. c f . map f o r l o c a t i o n . 392. According to TCTC 248, p. 8023, Hsiian-tsung 1 s accession took place on Hui-ch'ang 6/3 ting-mao [846], three days a f t e r the death of Wu-tsung. cf. also CTS 18 h s i a / l a Hsiian-tsung pen-chl. 393. Liu-shou was the o f f i c i a l i n charge of the c a p i t a l during imperial absences. TFA, p. 686. 394. Imperial Commissioner f o r the defense of the d i s t r i c t of the Eastern Imperial Domain, Ju-chou and the [Eastern] c a p i t a l . The Tung-ohi-tu Fang Yii Shih'" was the admini-s t r a t i v e area f o r the eastern c a p i t a l , ju-chou was just ' beyond i t s borders i n neighbouring Shan-kuo Chieh Tu Shih. TFA, p. 714, note no. 2, quotes CTS 44; "After the Chih-tg. period [756] i n the large commanderies (chun) and i n places of great s t r a t e g i c importance, Imperial Commission-ers f o r Regional Defense (fang yii shih) were created i n order to d i r e c t m i l i t a r y matters. The Prefects held most of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , but they were not granted the f i e l d colours (ohihg and the i n s i g n i a of command (chieh) ^ 7 . That i s to say,'they did not have the same powers as M l l i -tary Governors (Chieh Tu Shih) but had more or less the same assignment. In other words, the t i t l e of Imperial Commissioner f o r Regional Defense gave to the Prefect the m i l i t a r y power to organize resistance against "rebellions." -159-395. T h i s i s a shortened form of Wu-tsung 1s f u l l i m p e r i a l t i t l e 1 Wu-tsung Chih-tao [Shao-su] Hsiao Huang-ti*. THY, chap. 2, p. 13. 396. Po Min-chung,(tzu^Yung-mei) . was the nephew of the famous poet, pb Chu-i, and a c h i n - s h i h of the Ch'ang- c h 1 i n g e r a . When Wu-tsung assumed the throne, he was summoned to be H a n l i n S c h o l a r and l a t e r Grand S e c r e -t a r y of the Imperial S e c r e t a r i a t . D u r i n g Hsiian-tsung's r e i g n , he u l t i m a t e l y served as C h i e f M i n i s t e r . He has b i o g r a p h i e s appended to those of po C h i i - i i n CTS 166 and HTS 119. 397. Ling-hu T'ao, (tzu. Tzu-chih) was the nephew of Ling-hu Ch.'u. He achieved h i s c h i n - s h i h i n T'ai-ho 4 [83OJ. He has b i o g r a p h i e s appended to Ling-hu Ch'u's . i n CTS •\172 and HTS 166. 398. T'ai-k'O. - A c c o r d i n g to TFA, p. 185, i t c i t e s Tz'u Yuan's d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s as the Department of S t a t e A f f a i r s . 399. T s ' u i Hsuan. ( t z u T'al-shou) was a l s o a c h i n - s h i h . In Hui-ch'ang 5/3, owing to h i s i n a b i l i t y to get a l o n g with Te-yii, he was sent out to become the C i v i l Governor of Shan-huo. He has b i o g r a p h i e s appended to t h a t of T s ' u i Liieh i n CTS 163 and HTS 160. 400. A c c o r d i n g to TCTC 248 Hui-ch'ang 5/5 jen-hsu [845], p. 8°15. CTS 18 shang Wu-tsung pen-ohi says the 3rd month. N e i t h e r of h i s b i o g r a p h i e s g i v e s a date. 401. T h i s recommendation by po Min-chung was not a c t e d upon s i n c e T s ' u i continued to serve i n the p r o v i n c e s u n t i l much l a t e r . 402. L i H s i e n has no biography i n e i t h e r T'ang h i s t o r y . 403. Concerning these f a c t i o n a l machinations a g a i n s t Te-yii, the T'ung Chien K'ao-i c i t e d on page 8029 of TCTC c i t e s t h i s passage v e r b a t i m and g i v e s i t s source as the Wu-tsung S h i h - l u . "However T'ao and Hsiian were not a t the c a p i t a l a t t h i s time and these events d i d not take p l a c e a t t h i s time. The s h i h - l u Us wrong." 404. Minor P r o t e c t o r of the Crown P r i n c e , one of the three to h o l d t h i s p o s i t i o n which h e l d the rank of 2:2. TFA, P. 571. -160-405. The date of Te-yu 1s demotion i s g i v e n i n TCTC 248 Ta-chung 1/2 kuei-wei 847. GTS 18/3a Hsiian-tsung pen-ohi g i v e s ting-mao. 406. Ch'ao-chou i s i n Ch'ao-an h s i e n i n modern Kwang-tung P r o v i n c e . GKKGTMTTT, pp. 1 1 7 8 - 9 . I t was i n contempora-neous Ling-nan Chieh Tu S h i h . 407. S e n i o r A d m i n i s t r a t o r was a member of the s t a f f a d m i n i s t e r -i n g a chou. I t h e l d the rank of 5:4. TFA, p. 7°5. 408. A c c o r d i n g to TCTC 248 Ta-ohung l/winter/12/wu-hsii [847], t h i s was the date of T e - y i i 1 s demotion. T h i s was 48 days a f t e r the announcement of the d e c i s i o n of the censorate's review of the case. 409. Yung-ning h s i e n i s i n Lo-ning h s i e n i n Honan P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 2 2 9 . A c c o r d i n g to CTS 173/7b, Wu Ju-na had served as C h i e f of s u b o r d i n a t e S t a f f (wei) i n Yung-ning h s i e n i n Ho-nan f u . 410. Wu Ju-na came from Feng-chou. He was a c h i n - s h i h , and a nephew of the former P r e f e c t of Ch fao-chou Wu Wu-ling. E a r l i e r , when h i s u n c l e had been c o n v i c t e d of t a k i n g b r i b e s , Te-yii, as C h i e f M i n i s t e r , had had him banished and Ju-na d i d not advance. He then a t t a c h e d h i m s e l f to the f a c t i o n of L i Tsung-min and Yang S s u - f u to make slanderous a t t a c k s a g a i n s t Te-yii. A f t e r the a c c e s s i o n of Hsiian-tsung when the f a c t i o n r e g a i n e d power, he served i n many import-ant p o s t s . He has a biography i n CTS 173 a t t a c h e d to t h a t of L i Shen. 411. T h i s case i n v o l v e d Ju-na's younger b r o t h e r Wu Hsiang when he served as c h i e f of subordinate s t a f f i n Chiang-fu. A c c o r d i n g to the f a c t s of the case, he had been charged o r i g i n a l l y with misusing funds a l l o c a t e d f o r t r a v e l l i n g expenses (ch'eng l i a n g ch'ien) and t a k i n g advantage of h i s o f f i c e t o marry a c e r t a i n commoner, Yen Yiieh. When , L i Shen had h i s duty o f f i c e r , Wei Hsing, i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s matter, the crime of b r i b e r y was c l e a r and obvious and Wu was executed a c c o r d i n g to the law. When the censor T s ' u i Yiian-tsao reviewed the case, he decided t h a t the charge of b r i b e r y had been c o r r e c t , but Yen Yiieh was the daughter of an o f f i c i a l f a m i l y and the d e t a i l s of the case were not q u i t e the same as those o r i g i n a l l y s t a t e d . S i n c e Yiian-tsao d i d not come to a d e f i n i t e d e c i s i o n , Te-yii had him banished to Yai-chou. When Ju-na had the case reviewed a second time, Yiian-tsao, who now hated Te-yii, was used and m i s l e d by T s ' u i Hsiian, Po Min-chung and Ling-hu T'ao, and i i -161-411. (continued) s a i d t h a t although Hsiang had been g u i l t y of a c c e p t i n g b r i b e s , the crime was not punish a b l e by death. A f t e r three o f f i c i a l s were sent down to examine the case i n d e t a i l , Te-yii and those who had supported him were a l l banished. Ju-na and Yiian-tsao were both rewarded by T s ' u i , Po and Ling-hu, and f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s , occupied h i g h o f f i c e . TCTC, p. 8014, 8031 and GTS 173/?b. c f . Wang Mang-sheng's D i s c u s s i o n s on the Seventeen H i s -t o r i e s , chap. 91, p. 1021, "A few from the crowd sought to t o p p l e Shen i n order to get a t T e - y i i . " 412. Treasury O f f i c e r . TFA, p. 694. " A d m i n i s t r a t o r of the O f f i c e of Finance'.' 413. Gh'ao-yang i s i n Ch'ao-yang h s i e n i n Kwangtung p r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 1179. 414. y a l - c h o u i s southeast of Ch'ing-shan h s i e n (Ch'iung-yai h s i e n ) , i . e . on Hainan I s l a n d , i n Kwangtung p r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 795. 415. Chu-yal chain i s southeast of Ch'iung-shan h s i e n i n Kwang-tung P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 738. CKRDCMYR, p. 286, adds the f a c t t h a t i t i s 30 l i southeast of Ch'iung-shan h s i e n . 416. Wang Ming-sheng i n h i s a r t i c l e 'The date of L i Te-yii's banishment and death' ( L i Te-yii p i e n Ssu Nien Yiieh) i n h i s D i s c u s s i o n s on the Seventeen D y n a s t i c H i s t o r i e s , chap. 91» pp. 1023-4, argues t h a t Te-yu d i e d a year l a t e r , i . e . Ta- chung 4 [850] a t the age of 64 ( s u i ) . The key argument s u s t a i n i n g t h i s t h e s i s i s based on Te-yii's 'Eulogy to Wei C h i h - i * (Ghi-wei Hsiang C h i h - i Wen) i n Te-yii's c o l l e c t e d works, HCIPC>,Pleh-ohi 7/153, which uses the date Ta-chung 4. In r e f u t a t i o n , Ch'en Yin-k'o i n h i s a r t i c l e ' D i s c e r n -i n g and C o r r o b o r a t i n g Hearsay about the Date of L i Te-yii's Banishment and Death and the Return of h i s Body f o r B u r i a l ' i n Ch'en Yin-k'o hsien-sheng Lun-ohi s e i z e s upon the f a c t t h a t Te-yu r e f e r s to Wei as P'u-yeh. A f t e r an exhaustive examination of the r e l e v a n t m a t e r i a l , p r o f e s s o r Ch'en con-cludes t h a t t h i s t i t l e of p'u-yeh c o u l d not have been used to r e f e r to Wei p r i o r to Ta-chung 10 [856] so t h a t t h i s eulogy i s a f o r g e r y , c f . pp. 323-4. D e s p i t e such persua-s i v e arguments s u p p o r t i n g the v a l i d i t y of the date g i v e n i n the biography, the r e c e n t punctuated e d i t i o n of GTS pub-l i s h e d i n the people's Republic c i t e s Wang's date as b e i n g c o r r e c t , c f . p. 4531. note no. 2. In TCTC, the announce-ment of death i s dated ' " Ta-chung 3 i n t e r c a l a r y 11th m o n t n ohia-hsii". " [849]. -162-417. L i u San-fu was T e - y i i 1 s f a i t h f u l s e r v a n t . He has b i o g r a -phies i n GTS 177 and HTS 183. 418. Huai T i e n r e f e r s to the r e g i o n of the Huai R i v e r . M7-7682.. 31.v T h i s a l l u d e s to Te-yii's s e r v i c e i n H u a i - h s i . 419. Yin-ch'ueh h s i e n i s south of Loyang h s i e n i n modern Ho-nan P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT. p. 285. CKRDCMYR, p. 13, adds t h a t i t i s 55 l i south. 420. There were i n f a c t two v i l l a s of t h i s name s e t up by Te-yii. The other one was i n Tsan-huang h s i e n ( i . e . h i s home d i s -t r i c t ) i n modern Ho-pei p r o v i n c e . A c c o r d i n g to the Chu T'an Lu w r i t t e n by'K'ang P i n g i n 895, the p'ing-ch'iian e s t a t e i n q u e s t i o n was 30 l i south of Lo-yang. M4-3902.. 389. 421. For f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n concerning the contents of t h i s e x o t i c garden, c f . P'ing-ch'iian shan ohii ts'ao mu c h i  HCIPC p i e h - c h i 9/15&~. 422. E. D. Edwards, Chinese Prose L i t e r a t u r e , V o l . I , pp. 150-51 has a t r a n s l a t i o n of what i s l e f t of t h i s p i e c e . Here-i n a f t e r c i t e d as Edwards, Prose L i t . 423. T h i s work a l s o known as T'Ing S h i h was presented to c o u r t on T'ai-ho 8/9 [834]. Gf. CTS 17 hsla/12a, the B a s l e  Annals of Wen-tsung. For a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s work, c f . The I m p e r i a l Catalogue (Ssu K'u Ch'iian Shu  Tsung-shu T ' l - y a o ) , chapter 140. c f . a l s o Edwards op. c i t . pp. 92-93. 424. T h i s work e x i s t s v e s t i g i a l l y i n Hsu T'an Chu, e d i t e d by Gh'ao T s a i - c h i h , chapter 3, PP. 49-50. 425. A c c o r d i n g to the e n t r y i n the I m p e r i a l Catalogue, chap. 150, t h i s work c o n t a i n s Te-yii's w r i t i n g on d i s c u s s i o n s of h i s t o r y w r i t t e n when he l i v e d i n r e t i r e m e n t a f t e r h i s s i t u a t i o n had changed. I t now comprises the w a i - c h i sec-t i o n of h i s c o l l e c t e d works. 426. The A u x i l i a r y S e c r e t a r y of the Board of S a c r i f i c e s , c f . TFA, p. 87. 427. L i Shan i s 50 11 west of Ts'ang-yii h s i e n i n modern KWang-h s i P r o v i n c e . CKRDCMYR, p. 661. There i s no e n t r y i n CKKCTMTTT. This was i n contemporaneous Kuei-kuan c h i n g - lueh s h i h . 428. Hsiang-chou i s i n H s i a n g - h s i e n i n modern Kwangsi P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 943. 1 -163-429. The r e t u r n of Te-yii's t i t l e s . The remonstrance o f f i c i a l L i u Yeh, the son of L i u s a n - f u ( c f . note no. 417) from Chu-jung, s a i d to the emperor, "The f a t h e r and son, L i Te-yii [and L i C h i - f u both] served as c h i e f m i n i s t e r , they have m e r i t o r i o u s achievements and t r a c e s of t h e i r r e p u t a -t i o n s , a f t e r b e i n g banished t h e i r b l o o d r e l a t i o n s are about to d i e out and h i s c a r e e r i s a l r e a d y a v o i d . I t would be f i t t i n g to take p i t y on him and bestow on him an o f f i c e . " W inter/lOth month, t l n g - h a l , an e d i c t r e s t o r e d to Te-yii the t i t l e s of T ' a l - t z u Shao-pao, Duke of Wei kuo, and granted him the t i t l e of V i c e - p r e s i d e n t of the Depart-ment of S t a t e A f f a i r s (P'u-yeh). : : TCTC 250 Hsien-t'ung 1/9/hsin-hai [860], pp. 8090-1. T h i s i s a v e r y t r u n c a t e d v e r s i o n of Yeh's memorial pr e s e r v e d i n h i s CTS biography 177/22b-23a. The K'ao-i d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s , to be found a f t e r the above c i t a t i o n from TCTC, argues a f t e r an i n -v e s t i g a t i o n of the v a r i o u s h i s t o r i c a l sources t h a t t h i s memorial may be a l a t e r f a b r i c a t i o n s i n c e i t r e f e r s to ' l a s t year' oh'ii n l e n when t a l k i n g of Te-yii's son being promoted because of an amnesty from I-tsung. A l l t h i s o c c u r r e d i n Hsien-t'ung 1, not 2. T h i s p o i n t need not de-t a i n us here; however, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i t d i d take the death of Hsiian-tsung and the absence of Po Min-chung and Ling-hu T'ao from c o u r t a f f a i r s to b r i n g about the r e s t o r a t i o n of Te-yii's t i t l e s and o f f i c e s . 430. Ch'en-chou was i n contemporaneous Hu-nan Kuan Ch'a S h i h and i s now i n Ch'en h s i e n i n Hunan. CKKCTMTTT, p. 861. 431. Kuei-yang Chun i s now a d m i n i s t e r e d by Ch'en h s i e n i n modern Hunan P r o v i n c e . CKKCTMTTT, p. 709. 432. [Yang] Yu- c h i . Prom the biography of Mei-§heng of the Han dynasty, there i s the f o l l o w i n g account: "Yang Yu-c h i was an expert i n a r c h e r y from Ch'u. s t a n d i n g 100 paces away from p o p l a r l e a v e s , he had, out o f 100 t a r g e t s thrown up, 100 bull,'s-eyes. For h i t t i n g 100 b u l l ' s - e y e s the s i z e of p o p l a r l e a v e s , he may be c a l l e d s k i l l e d a t a r c h e r y . But what he stopped a t was s t i l l o n l y w i t h i n 100 paces." c f . HS 51/19b. 433. Yen Chu came from Hui-chou i n Wu. He was the son of Yen Pu-tzu (Yen Chi ,f;. ). Por a b r i e f comment.on h i s l i t e r a r y t a l e n t s , c f . HS 64/9a. 434. Ssu-ma Hsia n g - j u . ( t z u Ch 1ang-ching) He came from Ch'eng-tu i n modern'Bzechuan. He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n SC 117 and HS 57. -164-435. Hsiao Ho was the f i r s t C h i e f M i n i s t e r of the Han dynasty. He has b i o g r a p h i e s i n SC 39 and HS 53. 436. Ts'ao Shen succeeded Hsiao Ho as C h i e f M i n i s t e r . , SC 5^/ 6b; HS 39/10b. 437. T h i s i s an a l l u s i o n to a l i n e from the A n a l e c t s , Book X V , Wei L i n g Kung, chap. 13, which Legge t r a n s l a t e s as f o l -lows: "The Master s a i d , 'Was not Tsang Wan-[Wen-]chung l i k e one who had s t o l e n h i s s i t u a t i o n ? He knew the v i r -tue and t a l e n t s of Hui of L i u - h s i a , and y e t d i d not pro-cure t h a t he should stand with him i n c o u r t . " The phrase oh'ieh wei i s g l o s s e d 'as i f he had got i t by t h e f t and s e c r e t l y h e l d p o s s e s s i o n of i t . 1 The f o l l o w i n g note en-t i t l e d t h i s s e c t i o n , 'Against the j e a l o u s y of o t h e r s ' t a l e n t s , ' Legge, Chinese C l a s s i c s , pp. 298-99. T h i s l i k e l y a l l u d e s to the charges of Te-yii's reputed haughtiness and undeserved h i g h rank made by h i s many d e t r a c t o r s . t h i n g s . M l l - 4 0 5 3 . . 1 4 . 4 3 9 . T h e f o l l o w i n g a n e c d o t e i s t h e s o u r c e o f t h i s p h r a s e : " O n c e t h e r e was a man f r o m C h ' i who s o u g h t a f t e r g o l d . On a c l e a r m o r n i n g , h e d r e s s e d a n d p u t o n h i s h a t a n d w e n t i n t o town. A r r i v i n g a t a g o l d s m i t h ' s , h e s n a t c h e d some g o l d a n d r a n . When a c o n s t a b l e a p p r e h e n d e d h i m , h e a s k e d , ' w i t h a l l t h o s e p e o p l e t h e r e , why d i d y o u t a k e s o m e o n e e l s e ' s g o l d ? ' ' W h e n I g r a b b e d t h e g o l d , I d i d n o t s e e t h e o t h e r s , I saw o n l y t h e g o l d , ' h e s a i d . " L i e h - t z u , c h a p . 8 / l 6 a , SPPY e d i t i o n . T h i s a l l u d e s t o T e - y i i ' s b l i n d n e s s t o a l l b u t h i s own g o a l s . M e n o i u s B o o k I V , p a r t 1 , c h a p . " 1 . L e g g e t r a n s l a t e s i t a s f o l l o w s : " T h e p o w e r o f v i s i o n o f L i L a u , a n d t h e s k i l l o f h a n d o f K u n g S h u , w i t h o u t t h e c o m p a s s a n d s q u a r e c o u l d n o t f o r m s q u a r e s a n d c i r c l e s . " c f . n o t e n o . 3 4 7 . A f u r t h e r n o t e a d d s : " L i L a u c a l l e d a l s o L i C h u c a r r i e s u s b a c k t o a v e r y h i g h C h i n e s e a n t i q u i t y . He w a s , i t was s a i d , o f t h e t i m e o f H w a n g - t i , a n d s o a c u t e o f v i s i o n , t h a t a t t h e d i s t a n c e o f 100 p a c e s , h e c o u l d d i s c e r n t h e s l i g h t e s t h a i r . " L e g g e , C h i n e s e C l a s s i c s , V o l . I I , p . 2 8 8 . T h i s a l l u s i o n r e i n f o r c e s t h e p o i n t o f n o . 4 3 9 . 4 4 1 . C h ' i n g - p ' i n g : -|f -fy t h e name o f a f a m o u s s w o r d . M 1 2 - 4 2 5 6 4 . . s a m e t a p h o r f o r t r i v i a l 4 4 0 . L i L p u , n o r m a l l y i s a n a l l u s i o n t o t h e 4 4 2 . T s ' u i k u s m a s h i n g r o t t e n s t u m p s i s a m e t a p h o r f o r s o m e t h i n g e a s i l y d o n e . M 5 - 1 2 6 0 9 . . 2 0 . -165-443. Chien-ling J$L i s also a metaphor f o r something e a s i l y done. M4~^ 95744. .167. 444. Concerning t h i s there i s the following account: "Chen-kuan 17/2 [643] i t was decreed that the likenesses of the Director of Instructions, Duke of Chao, Chang-su Wu-chi and others, 24 meritorious o f f i c i a l s i n a l l , be sketched and painted i n the 'Pavilion of Pre-eminence'.'* CTS 3/7b, Basic Annals of T'ai-tsung, part b. cf. TCTC 196 Chen- kuan 17/2 wu-shen [643], p. 6185. \ -166-GHARACTER TEXT AND GLOSSARY Chang Chiang ^ J t Chang Chung-wu Chang Shu Chlh ' . J % 1 6 Chang Shui -'-'I Chang Yuan-I Ch'ang shih Chao-i Chen-ohou Chen-hai ohiin ohieh tu Ch»en Hsing-t«al jjfc F4 ff jf ti Ch*en-hsu Chun Ch1 eng-te Cheng Chu Chi Ch»eng Chi Chla Ssu Chi hsien Ta-hsiieh shih Chi Shih j | _ t \ Chi Shih Chung i *j? Ch»i ts»ao Yuan ^ ^ f'ji Chia su Chlang-ohou 4 ^ ,1 pr. n. pr. n. recorder Chang River pr. n. Senior Administrator pl. n. pl. n. pl. n. and t i t l e pr. n. pl. n. pl. n. pr. n. pl. n. Kirghiz, Turkish tribe Grand scholar of the Academy of Assembled Worthies pl. n. Grand secretary of the Imperial Chancellery pl. n. pr. n. pl. n. - 1 6 7 -C h i a n g - l i n g y i n f Chieh L i Chieh Tu shih Chieh Tu Ta Pu S h i h K I'j ^ Chih Chieh Tu Shih /I ^ Chien Ch'a Yu S h i h & #r ^ Chien chun Chin-chou Ching-ssu T ' i n g C h ' i n g - l i u •A Ch'ing-p'ing *>• Chih Chih Kao Chih Yen Chi;Ch'ien K'o fx. i £ #f C h i n - t z u Kuang-lu T a i - f u ^ # i t * $ k Ch'iu S h i h - l i a n g 4 ^ ^_ Chou -M] Ch'iieh c h i u c h ' i e n ^ vgjj Chung Shu She-j en ^ ^ P r e f e c t of C h i a n g - l i n g pr. n. m i l i t a r y governor deputy grand m i l i t a r y governor i n charge of m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s examining censor eunuch overseer p i . n. P a v i l i o n of E s s e n t i a l Thought 1 pure' ranks 'green duckweed'—the name of a famous sword r e s p o n s i b l e f o r e d i t i n g i m p e r i a l e d i c t s and p r o c l a m a t i o n s . a b b r e v i a t e d form f o r the examina-t i o n f o r speaking f r a n k l y and c r i t i c i s i n g without r e s t r a i n t s i n e c u r e t i t l e p r. n. p r e f e c t u r e l i q u o r tax grand s e c r e t a r y of the i m p e r i a l s e c r e t a r i a t -168-Chiin Chung Shu s h i h-lang v f ^ ^ /ft ohun fu Han Hsln Han-lin Hsiieh shih Han-lin Yuan Ho-ohung Ho Hung-ching Ho-pei Ho-shuo Ho-tung Ho-yang Hsi-ta-mou Hsien ''I Hsien Liang Pang Cheng Chih Yen Chi ChUen K*o ^ f<- % & A n Hsien-tsung Hsing-ohou Hsing-yuan Hsiung-wu Chun Hsuan-wu Cha Hsiieh E V><7 *5 Vice-president of the Depart-ment of state Affairs military region, i.e. the geographic base for an army oommandery grand prefecture pr. n. Han-lin scholar Han-lin Academy pi. n. > pr. n. pi. n. pl. n. pi. n. pl. n. pr. h. sub-prefecture examination for those worthy, virtuous, and righteous men capable of speaking frankly and criticising without restraint pr. n. pl. n. pl. n. pl. n. pl. n. pr. n. -16,9-Hsiieh Mao-ch • Ing fa pr. n. Hsiieh P»ing - t pr. n.. Hsiieh Sung pr. n. Hu pu Shang Shu President of the Board Treasury Huai-hsi Pi. n. Hui-ch^ng reign t i t l e Hui-ho Uighurs Jun-chou pi. n. K*ao Kung Lang-chung Senior secretary of the Board t for Examining Merit Kao Wen-tuan pr. n. Kao Yiian-wu pr. n. K*o Tou Tien Pi. n.' Ku liquor monopoly > Kuan Gh»a Shih of. Llen-ohen #L ^ ^ Civil .-Governor Kung Pu shih^LangA Vice-president of the Board of public Works Kung Shu pr. n. Kuo I pr. n. Li Chi-fu pr. n. Ll Chiang pr. n. Li Chien pr. n. Li Ching 4 ^ i - pr. n.' Ll Peng-chi pr. n. Ll Hul pr. n. Li Pao-chen 4- it h pr. n. -170-Li Pao-yii ^ £• Li Pu shang Shu i Li Pu Shih Lang L% •f Sp Liang-i Li Shih 4 Li Te-yii 4-Li Tsai-i 4 Li Tsung-min 4 Li Yen-tso 4 Lien-ohen -^ K of. Kuan-ch»a shih Lin-ming Liu Chen *£• Liu-hou % Liu Hsi Liu Hsing-shen Liu Hung-I Liu K*uang-chou Liu Mien !•! liu-shih % liu-shou Liu Ts'ung-chien fA pr. n. pr. n.' President of the Board of Rites "Vice-president of the Civil Service Board the administrative practice of reducing the distance from the capital of an official previously banished pr.1 n.< pr. xi. pr. n. pr. n, pr. n. Civil Governor pi. n. pr. n. interim or acting governor pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. portion of the taxes retained for use In the prefecture Regent pr. n. - 1 7 1 --6 Liu Wu Lu Chun Lu I-chung Ma Yiian-kuan i> "| Mang-ch' e (Ang-ch»e) JKuan~ £ 4 (% 4 ^ M Ming-chou -X M-| Mao-yiieh ^ Men Hsla s h i h Lang Nan'' Chao < /7 Niu seng-ju '-f 4'a 3-P'an-kuan ^-J pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pl. n. pl. n. ox tailed pennant and ax Vice-president of the Imperial Chancellery pl. n. pr. n. officer in charge of daily-events attached to the staff of an expeditionary army pao-li ' q reign t i t l e P'ei Chih-ch'lng i- pr. n. p'ei Wen *> pr. n. P'eng-lal Tien Ta-ming Palace t L **• & pl. n. pien-chou •M-| pl. n. Ping Pu shang Shu * f ti Ping Pu Shih Lang ^ ? 4 P'ing Chang Shih Jfc or \ " i < Chung Shu Men'Hsia P'ing Chang Shih President of the Board of War Vice-president of the Board of War Chief Minister, Minister of state -172-P*lng-ch'uan P»ing-lu Pu-ch'ueh. P»u-ku Huai-en Sha Hu Shan (9 4 1 ifi ^ Sha-ml or Sha-men i-y m H ^ Sha-t'o Shan-nan Tung-tao • J-) ^ >£• ^ Shan-tung Shang-ohou Shen-ts»e chun Shih Chiang Hsiieh Shih 4 i i - f ± Shih Chung Shih Hsiung Shih Hui Kuan Shih-1 Shu Shu Mi Yuan (shih) p i . n. p i . n. Imperial Commissioner pr. n. p i . n. Buddhist 'monk Turkish t r i b e p i . n. p i . n. superior prefecture Army of- Inspired strategy Scholar responsible f o r explaining the text of the Classics President of the Imperial Chancellery pr. n. p l . n. Imperial Reminder p l . n. Eunuch Secretariat Ssu-chou Ssu-hu ssu-ma Ssu-men Chu-chiao i f i J t\ 9J) fa p l . n. Treasury o f f i c e r Chief Administrator Assistant Professor i n the Academy of the Pour Gates -173-S s u c R u Yuan Mai Lang u 4? a 4 H Ssu-t'u >0 ^ Sung-shih A Ta :L1 p« Ing s h i h ^ i f I f f T'ai-hang shan A_ ^ j _ , T'ai-hang Pan J\ 1^ py^ T'ai-ho Kung-chu i \ . _ j , T'al-kd M T'ai-tzu Pin-k'o X 4 - % T'ai-tzu Shao-pao A * y T'ai-wel Jk^ T'ai-yiian Tao *Jt„ Tien Ch'eng-ssu l# 7 ^ Tien Chung shih Y u s h i h Tlen-ohing T'ai-hang K u a n K T'len Hung-cheng T'ien Jung % T s a - l i u # - i~ T s a i Hsiang n Tsan-huang Po ** i Tsan-p'.u Hi Auxiliary Secretary In the Board of s a c r i f i c e Director of Instructions portion of the taxes retained f o r use i n the province Secretary of Inquiry f o r the Supreme Court T'ai-hang Mountains T'ai-hang Slope T'ai-ho Princess Department of state A f f a i r s Chief Counsellor to the Crown Prince Minor Protector to the Crown Prince Grand Marshall p l . n. province, c i r c u i t pr. n. Court Censor f o r Palace A f f a i r s ; > p l . n. pr. n. pr. n. miscellaneous ranks Chief Minister Marquis of Tsan-huang Tibetan king - 1 7 4 -t « /SL L '1 Tse-lu Tz'u.-shih Ts'ui KU Ts'ui Hsuan-tu TU-chih T'ui-hun Tu-yii-hun T'u-men T'u-t'u Ch»eng-ts'ui *X & ^ Tun-t'len Yuan WaliLang Tung .Chi, Ju [-ohou] Tu Pang Yii Shih 4 $i :Ar M ?* % ^ Tung K»o-wu T ^ Tung-tu Liu-shou ^ c$ <p Tzu-chen (Hall) Tz'u-chou Wan Shan Wang Chlh-hsing Wang Feng, Wang Hsieh Wang Mao-yuan Wang shou-ch'eng ^-Wang T'lng-tsou £~ ^ <|> Wang Tsai j£- ^ Wang Yai ;y| t i /X' £i pl. n. Prefect of a superior prefecture pr. n. pr. n. Office of Public Revenue western barbarian tribe pl. n. pr. n. Auxiliary Secretary in Charge of Military Colonies Defence Commissioner for the Eastern Domain, Ju-chou and the [Eastern] Capital District pr. n. Regent for the Eastern Capital pl. n. pl. n. pl. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. -175-Wang Wu-chiih pr. n. Wang Yiian-k'uei pr. n. Wei c h i e f of subordinate s t a f f Wei-chou 4& P l . n. Wei Kuo Kung Duke of Wei Kuo Wei-po P l . n. Wu Chung-wu & A; pr. n. Wu-tsung >-» p r . n. Yang Ch i h - c h 1 e n g if? p r . n. Yang C h 1 i n - i p r . n. Yang P i e n pr. n. Yao-shan P l . n. Y e h - f e i "Night F l y e r s " - name of a m i l i t a r y u n i t Yen-ko p a v i l i o n of pre-eminence p l . Yen-t' i e h s h i h s a l t and i r o n commissioner Y i n p r e f e c t of a grand p r e f e c t u r e Yin'Ch'ing Kuang. Lu T a i Fu Yu-chou Yu (tso) P'u Yeh h o n o r i f i c t i t l e H| p l . n. .1^ Yu-she Yii s h i h Chung ch' eng Yii s h i h T a i .fu ^  ^ Yuan-chou >| Right ( L e f t ) Head of the Depart-ment of S t a t e A f f a i r s p l . n. v i c e - p r e s i d e n t of the Board of Censors p r e s i d e n t of the Board of Censors p l . n. -175a-SUPPLEMENTARY CHARACTER LIST Chang Chiang Chang Yiian-i Ch'en I - h s i n g Ch'en Jung Chia Chih-yen chung-hsing Ho-tung Ho-yang H u a i - h s i I-oh'eng Kao Yiian-wu Kuan-nei L i S h i h - k u e i L i S h i h - t a o L i T ' i e n v L i T s a i - i L i T'ung-chieP L i Yen-tso l i a n g - s h u i L i u H s i Lu Chun pr. n. Ik pr. n. pr. n. •t p r . n. 1 p r . n. V \ mid--dynasty rest02 p l . n. P l . n. m h. p l . p l . n. n. A pr. n. P l . n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. pr. n. » ^ double tax system • * l i f p r . n. «'l >* pr. n. j-l pr. n. 1-1 pr. n. 4 pr. n. -175b-SUPPLEMENTARY CHARACTER LIST (continued) Lu-lung p i . n. P ' i n g - l u A p i . n. Shang-tang c f . Lu-chou X p i . n. Shih Yuan-chung pr. n. s u i kuan fit " a c c o r d i n g t o the T'an Chao-i •> •>< p r . n. Ti-wu Shou-chin pr. n. T ' i e n Hung-cheng Hsing i t p r . n. Ts'ang-ching It P l . n. T s ' u i Ku. . pr. h. T s ' u i Hsuan-tu * pr. n. Tung Chung-chih 4 t pr. n. Tung K'o-wu f A pr. n. Wang Chao X pr. n. Wu Chung-shu It pr. n. Wu Yuan-chi pr. n. yamen o f f i c i a l ' s o f f i c e or general* s camp Yang Chih-ch'eng a- pr. n. Yang Chung-ching. ** pr. n. Yu'Hung-chih pr. n. -Yiian-ho fa r e i g n t i t l e Yiin-chou M •)i| p l . n. -17 6-BIBLIOGRAPHY Older Works In Chinese Chao I JL . Nlen-erh Shih Cha Chi -tt — %'\ 16 36 Chap. 1795. Modern punctuated e d i t i o n of shlh-ohleh shu chii, T a i p e i . Ku Tsu-yii &> . Tu Shih Fang-yii Chl-yao tjf ^  4^ %L 1 3 ° Chap. Kuo-hsiieh Chl-pen Ts'ung-shu e d i t i o n . L i Chi-fu ^ •£ i l . Yuan-ho Chun-hslen T'u-ohih j ^ l f j f U (YHCHTC) 40 Chap, completed 813-15. 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" T h e G o v e r n m e n t o f T ' a n g i n t h e E a r l y 8th C e n t u r y . " BSOAS v o l . 13 (1956) p p . 322-30. A r e v i e w o f p u l l e y b l a n k ' s A n L u - s h a n . " • " P r o b l e m s o f C h i n e s e B i o g r a p h y . " I n W r i g h t , A . F . a n d T w i t c h e t t , D . C . ( e d s . ) , C o n f u c i a n  P e r s o n a l i t i e s , p p . 2 4 - 4 2 . . " L u - c h i h (754-805), I m p e r i a l A d v i s o r a n d C o u r t O f f i c i a l . " I n W r i g h t a n d T w i t c h e t t ( e d s . ) , C o n f u c i a n p e r s o n a l i t i e s , p p . 84-122. . " P r o v i n c i a l A u t o n o m y a n d C e n t r a l F i n a n c e I n L a t e T ' a n g . " A s i a M a j o r ( N . S . ) v o l . 11 (1964), p p . 211-32. -18'+-SfCpTCH MAP OF CHAO-I AND SURROUNDING AREA LEGEND MOUNTAINS / \ CANAL P R O V I N C I A L BOWMOARIRRS CRt>J CHISH TV SHIH • PASS PREFECTURAL 0 CAPITALS 0_|.;.V-C!W<» Map i . Provincial boundaries in 742. At this date civil provinces had no centralised administration, and the frontier governors no territorial civil jurisdiction. Until 733 Shan-nan hsi-tao and Shan-nan tung-tao formed the single province of Shan-nan; Chiang-nan hsi-tao, Chiang-nan tung-tao and Ch'ien-chung formed the single province of Chiang-nan; the Metropolitan Districts Ching-chi and Tu-chi formed parts of Kuan-chung and Ho-nan respectively. x i v X**" Ve&*vd frontier (c^prawtutz) ' Pnrvuwial bcrunSorio frfttrYHCHC) Canal* frligmnint affreximatx) W i n n d r a t UM1 TYPES or FRWIMOAl MMlNim*nSH I I Chufi-tu (MA (tmStanj j J W i w ) KuAit-dt'a sfdh (tivil jownwr) CUnj-Uud <Mh (loot gamer) Tu- hu-fu (pretetora**) I C Map 2. Provincial boundaries in 810. Some provinces were commonly known by alternative names (see note on Province-Names). X V 

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