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Theories of reference Hahn, Martin 1978

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THEORIES OF REFERENCE by MARTIN HAHN B.A., Simon Fraser U n i v e r s i t y , 1976 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Dept. of Philosophy) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February, 1978 (c) M a r t i n Hahn, 1978 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Brit ish Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of j^L;[Q£ Q^U^ The University of Brit ish Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date FehTUf / I til 8 - i -ABSTRACT The aim of t h i s t h e s i s i s t o put i n both h i s t o r i c a l and l o g i c a l p erspective c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s o f current t h e o r i e s o f ref e r e n c e . The theory of reference came to l i f e as a separate subject around the t u r n of the century i n the w r i t i n g s of G o t t l o b Frege and Rertrand R u s s e l l . Although t h e i r t h e o r i e s are q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i n d e t a i l , they have some important f e a t -ures i n common. One of these i s the methodological commitment to study language on i t s own, as a set o f sentences more or l e s s . This i s r e f l e c t e d i n the theory of reference by t h e i r determination to des c r i b e how expressions r e f e r without regard f o r the l i n g u i s t i c or n o n - l i n g u i s t i c context they occur i n . Another important common fe a t u r e of the two " c l a s s i c a l " t h e o r -i e s , as I w i l l c a l l them, i s that expressions accomplish reference by s p e c i f y i n g a set of c o n d i t i o n s such t h a t the r e f e r e n t and only the r e f e r e n t s a t i s f y them. In recent years these two assumptions have been question-ed by philosophers such as Saul K r i p k e , K e i t h Donnellan, David Kaplan, and others who have been developing what can f a i r l y be c a l l e d the "new" theory o f reference. I n f o l l o w i n g the develop-ment from the c l a s s i c a l t o the new t h e o r i e s , I concentrate on the set of problems generated by the phenomenon of r e f e r e n t -i a l l y opaque contexts. A f t e r s e t t i n g out, i n Chapter I , the main features of R u s s e l l ' s and Frege fs t h e o r i e s , I devote a - i i -chapter to W. V. 0. Quine's considerable c o n t r i b u t i o n to our understanding of these contexts. I d i s c u s s , among other t h i n g s , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a c e r t a i n understanding of modal contexts and the metaphysical theory of e s s e n t i a l i s m and t r y to determine to what extent Quine was r i g h t i n con-demning q u a n t i f i e d modal l o g i c on the grounds t h a t i t i s committed to e s s e n t i a l i s m . The t h i r d and f i n a l chapter i s devoted to the new t h e o r i e s of reference. Throughout the t h e s i s I am concerned to r e l a t e a whole range o f important d i s t i n c t i o n s whose in t e r c o n n e c t i o n s have not been s u f f i c i e n t l y w e l l understood. Apart from the d i s -t i n c t i o n between reference accomplished by means of a set of con d i t i o n s and reference l i n k i n g term and object d i r e c t l y , t h e r e i s Quine*s d i s t i n c t i o n between opaque and transparent contexts, Frege's between oblique and d i r e c t ones, R u s s e l l ' s between primary and secondary scopes of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s , Saul Kripke's between r i g i d and n o n - r i g i d d e s i g n a t o r s , K. Donnellan's between r e f e r e n t i a l and a t t r i b u t i v e uses of d e f i n -i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s , and the various i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the medieval De Re - De Di c t o d i s t i n c t i o n . I t h i n k that there i s a general agreement t h a t a l l these and some other d i s t i n c t i o n s are r e l a t e d i n various ways. I n t h i s t h e s i s I d e s c r i b e j u s t some of these r e l a t i o n s . My aim i s not to come t o any d e f i n i t e conclusions about r e f e r e n c e , but merely t o understand how the d i f f e r e n t conclusions which philosophers have already reached r e l a t e t o one another. - i i i -CONTENTS I . The C l a s s i c a l Theories 1 A. The Meaning of I d e n t i t y Statements 2 B. The Puzzle of Opaque Contexts 8 C. Context and D i r e c t Reference 23 I I . Quine and R e f e r e n t i a l Opacity 39 A. S i n g u l a r Reference and F a i l u r e s of S u b s t i t u t i v i t y 39 B. Transparent P r o p o s i t i o n a l A t t i t u d e s 50 C. Reference, M o d a l i t y , and E s s e n t i a l i s m 60 I I I . The New Theories of Reference 70 A. What i s E s s e n t i a l i s m ? . 70 B. R i g i d Designation 91 C. D i r e c t Reference 1 103 D. Context 109 IV. Conclusion 2.16 V. Footnotes 123 VI. B i b l i o g r a p h y 131 - i v -ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish t o thank Steven Davis f o r i n t r o d u c i n g me t o Philosophy of Language, T. E. Patton f o r h i s h e l p f u l comments, and e s p e c i a l l y my Supervisor, J . F. Bennett f o r a l l h i s a s s i s t a n c e . I . THE CLASSICAL THEORIES; RUSSELL AND FREGE 1 There are s e v e r a l well-known puzzles about reference which Frege and R u s s e l l attempted to solve i n t h e i r t h e o r i e s . These puzzles are more than j u s t some problems which any-s u c c e s s f u l theory of reference must deal w i t h ; to a l a r g e extent i t i s the s o l u t i o n s to puzzles l i k e the problem of negative e x i s t e n s i a l s , of opaque contexts, or o f contingent i d e n t i t y which c o n s t i t u t e a theory of reference. This i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e of both R u s s e l l ' s and Frege's t h e o r i e s . In t h i s s e c t i o n , I s h a l l present the c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i e s as s o l u t i o n s t o two o f the most notorious puzzles o f re f e r e n c e , the problem of contingent i d e n t i t i e s or the meaning o f i d e n t i t y statements, and the puzzle which we w i l l c a l l f o l l o w i n g W. V. 0. Quine, t h a t of r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y . I have chosen these two i n t e r - r e l a t e d problems because Frege*s and R u s s e l l ' s s o l -u t i o n s to them c o n s t i t u t e the very core of t h e i r t h e o r i e s , and because i t i s i n connection w i t h these problems t h a t the con-t r a s t between the c l a s s i c a l and the new approaches i s c l e a r e s t . Although there are deep t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s between Frege and R u s s e l l , the l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e i n which I want to put t h e i r t h e o r i e s demands t h a t I emphasize the aspects which are a l i k e ^ . A. THE MEANING OF IDENTITY STATEMENTS What do i d e n t i t y statements mean? What are they about? Our f i r s t , and no doubt almost c o r r e c t , i n t u i t i o n i s tha t they are about the objects which the r e f e r r i n g expressions f l a n k i n g the i d e n t i t y s i g n denote (I am using 'denote', ' r e f e r t o ' , 'pick out', and other such expressions i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y ) . But t h i s view leads us immediately i n t o t r o u b l e . Consider: 1) Hesperus - Phosphorus 2) Phosphorus - Phosphorus On the view t h a t i d e n t i t y statements are simply about o b j e c t s , ( 1 ) , and (2) ought t o mean the same t h i n g because they are about the same object namely Venus, and c e r t a i n l y a s s e r t the same t h i n g about i t , namely t h a t i t i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h Phosphorus, which i s not very i n f o r m a t i v e . But w h i l e we may agree that (2) i s not very i n f o r m a t i v e because i t merely a s s e r t s a s e l f - i d e n t i t y , (1) appears to be i n f o r m a t i v e , con-t i n g e n t , and f a r from t a u t o l o g i c a l because i t took an empir-i c a l d i scovery t o f i n d out tha t i t i s t r u e . F a l s e i d e n t i t y statements obviously are s i m i l a r l y problematic. As Wittgen-s t e i n put i t i n the T r a c t a t u s : Roughly speaking, to say of two things t h a t they are i d e n t i c a l i s nonsense, and to say of one t h i n g t h a t i t i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h i t s e l f i s t o say nothing at all->. - 3 -The problem i s the same f o r proper names, d e f i n i t e des-c r i p t i o n s , and even demonstratives (imagine a very prolonged utterance of 'This = t h a t ' , p o i n t i n g at Venus i n i t s morning and evening presentations r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . The i d e n t i t y p u z z l e , t h a t i s the puzzle as to the meanings and f u n c t i o n o f i d e n t i t y statements, challenges our f i r s t , naive in t u i t i o n s about r e f e r -ence, namely t h a t the purpose o f r e f e r r i n g expressions i s p u r e l y to p i c k out, t o draw our a t t e n t i o n t o , the r e f e r e n t , t e l l us what p r o p o s i t i o n s are about. As I have sketched above, i f r e f e r r i n g expressions d i d f u n c t i o n i n t h i s simple way, and on l y introduced the subject i n t o p r o p o s i t i o n s , then i d e n t i t y statements would appear t o be of dubious meaning, and even more dubious u s e f u l n e s s . A s o l u t i o n o f f e r s i t s e l f almost immediately: semantic ascent. I f i d e n t i t y statements cannot be about o b j e c t s , per-haps they are about expressions. To say t h a t a i s i d e n t i c a l t o b i s to say that 'a' i s c o r e f e r e n t i a l w i t h 'b', nothing more or l e s s . This s o l u t i o n i s a t t r a c t i v e at f i r s t , and Frege proposed i t h i m s e l f i n the e a r l i e r B e g r i f f s s c h r i f t V There are two t h i n g s wrong w i t h i t . F i r s t , i t makes the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of statements l i k e (1) a matter of language, or semantics not a r e s u l t of an astronomical i n q u i r y . That i s , (1) appears to be a statement concerning a heavenly body, w h i l e (3) below, i f t r u e , i s so at l e a s t p a r t l y because of some f a c t s - 4 -about how we use, or what we mean by, c e r t a i n expressions^. But, more s e r i o u s l y , i f (1) i s a covert way o f saying: 3) 'Phosphorus' and 'Hesperus' are c o - r e f e r e n t i a l . We have a r e a l problem i n e x p l a i n i n g why (3) i s not synonymous w i t h : 4) The denotation of 'Phosphorus' equals the denotation o f 'Hesperus' which i n t u r n i s covert f o r : 5) "The denotation of 'Phosphorus'", and "the denotation o f 'Hesperus'", and so on ad i n f i n i t u m . So we are not any c l o s e r t o the goal of e x p l a i n i n g why (1) i s i n f o r m a t i v e , contingent, and u s e f u l , w h i l e (2) i s t a u t o l o g i c a l , n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , and o f marginal i n t e r e s t even though both a s s e r t the same t h i n g about the same o b j e c t . We want t o f i n d a d i f f e r e n c e between ( 1 ) , and ( 2 ) , w h i l e maintain-i n g t h a t the r e f e r r i n g expressions which occur i n them f u n c t i o n the same way they f u n c t i o n i n other contexts, they denote t h i n g s . Fregefe s o l u t i o n i s to deny t h a t the only f u n c t i o n , or meaning o f a r e f e r r i n g expression i s to r e f e r to an o b j e c t . - 5 -Expressions r e f e r always under a d e s c r i p t i o n , i n some manner. Thus, to know the meaning o f a r e f e r r i n g expression we have to know not only what i t denotes, but also how i t denotes. The manner of pre s e n t a t i o n of an object i s c a l l e d the sense o f an expression. The reference of an expression i s determin-ed by i t s sense. There i s no pure re f e r e n c e , o n l y reference mediated by sense. The puzzle i s solved. ( 1 ) , and (2), are i d e n t i c a l i n ref e r e n c e , but they d i f f e r i n sense. Thus, we see how they can have d i f f e r e n t meaning even though they say the same t h i n g about the same o b j e c t . Fregefs s o l u t i o n i s both t h e o r e t i c a l l y e f f i c i e n t , and i n t u i t i v e l y p l a u s i b l e . The most important f e a t u r e o f the d o c t r i n e o f sense,, and refe r e n c e i s the d e n i a l of the p o s s i b i l i t y o f reference not mediated by what I s h a l l c a l l a r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n . I n the case o f d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s , the r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n or sense i s e x p l i c i t , but t h i s i s not so f o r other kinds of terms. I t i s a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l to what I w i l l go on t o say here t h a t we keep i n mind th a t Frege's, and other s i m i l a r t h e o r i e s don't j u s t c l a i m that every expression has both a sense, and a refe r e n c e . The l a t t e r i s always accomplished by_ means of the former. R u s s e l l ' s s o l u t i o n i s r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t , at f i r s t s i g h t . U n l i k e Frege, he does not want to r e j e c t the n o t i o n o f a " l o g i c a l l y proper name", or " l o g i c a l s u b j e c t " . There are - 6 -cases of pure, unmediated reference f o r R u s s e l l , of the k i n d t h a t leads to the puzzle of i d e n t i t y . To solve the puzzle, however, he i s f o r c e d to deny t h a t d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s f u n c t i o n i n t h i s way, and, f o r that matter, that we normally c a l l proper names can be l o g i c a l l y proper e i t h e r s i n c e the puzzle can be set up w i t h them. There i s a b i t of a problem w i t h demonstratives which R u s s e l l wants to say are l o g i c a l l y proper denoting phrases, but which a l s o l end themselves, as we have seen, t o the puzzle. Grammatical s u b j e c t s of sentences of n a t u r a l language are not r e a l l y subjects at a l l , and have no meaning i n i s o l a t i o n . I n the deep or l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the sentence there i s no element which corresponds to the grammatical s u b j e c t , the natural-language r e f e r r i n g expression. Denoting phrases, unless they are l o g i c a l l y proper names, only have meaning i n the whole context o f a sentence. Thus, the c o n t e x t u a l e l i m i n a t i o n of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s i s born. Sentences which appear on the s u r f a c e t o have a s i n g u l a r form t u r n out, on the R u s s e l l i a n a n a l y s i s , t o express general p r o p o s i t i o n s e x i s t e n t i a l l y q u a n t i f i e d . Such p r o p o s i t i o n s are not o f the s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e form the n a t u r a l sentences ex-p r e s s i n g them appear t o have. Rather they a s s e r t the e x i s t -ence of a t h i n g of which a c e r t a i n p redicate i s t r u e , and a l s o i t s uniqueness. I d e n t i t y statements don't t u r n out t o be of the form we expect them to be, i . e . * two r e f e r r i n g expressions - 7 -which serve t o p i c k out r e f e r e n t s which are then a s s e r t e d t o be i d e n t i c a l . Rather, they are general statements a s s e r t i n g t h a t two complex pr e d i c a t e s have extensions which are i d e n t i c -a l . The puzzle o f i d e n t i t y i s solved simply by denying t h a t i d e n t i t y statements have the form they appear t o have on the su r f a c e . They are not about one or two objects i n the sense t h a t gave r i s e t o Wit t g e n s t e i n ' s worry, they are not s i n g u l a r i n form at a l l . There i s nothing t o puzzle us i n the general a s s e r t i o n t h a t there i s an object which i s both uniquely Phosphorus, and uni q u e l y Hesperus. There i s nothing t o tempt us to a s s i m i l a t e t h i s a s s e r t i o n t o the a s s e r t i o n t h a t there i s an object which i s uniquely Hesperus, and i s s e l f i d e n t i c a l . Indeed, there i s not even a temptation t o t h i n k that t h i s l a s t a s s e r t i o n expresses a necessary t r u t h as i t s misleading s u r f a c e form (2) suggests^. I have not emphasized, so f a r , one s t r i k i n g common f e a t u r e o f R u s s e l l ' s and Frege's t h e o r i e s . There are many ways t o r e f e r , even i f we r e s t r i c t ourselves to the l i n g u i s t i c means, there are names, demonstratives, d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s , per-7 haps i n d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s , pronouns l i k e 'you', ' I ' , or ' i t ' . But both R u s s e l l and Frege concentrate on one type of r e f e r r i n g d e v ice, a l b e i t , perhaps the most common one, the d e f i n i t e des-c r i p t i o n . This i s no a c c i d e n t , I b e l i e v e . For R u s s e l l , d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s are c e n t r a l because they have an e x p l i c i t - 8 -d e s c r i p t i v e component which can be made i n t o a predicate o f a bound v a r i a b l e . For d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s , R u s s e l l ' s context-u a l e l i m i n a t i o n works smoothly and n a t u r a l l y . But t h i s very same fe a t u r e of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s which makes them s u i t -able f o r R u s s e l l ' s purposes, i . e . , the existence o f an e x p l i c i t r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n , makes Frege's theory p l a u s i b l e i n t h e i r case. For d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s , i n contrast t o names or demonstratives, have an e x p l i c i t sense they can p l a u s i b l y be seen t o r e f e r by means o f a r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n . As d i f f e r -ent as t h e i r t h e o r i e s are i n d e t a i l , R u s s e l l and Frege agree on the ba s i c mechanism of re f e r e n c e . A d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n r e f e r s by s p e c i f y i n g a c o n d i t i o n which the r e f e r e n t must s a t i s f y . Furthermore, they agree that d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s provide a paradigm of re f e r e n c e , other r e f e r r i n g expressions which on the face o f i t do not s p e c i f y a r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n being nothing but d i s g u i s e d d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s , the r e f e r r -i n g c o n d i t i o n they s p e c i f y i m p l i c i t , and to be made e x p l i c i t d i n the l o g i c a l l y p e r f e c t language . B. THE PUZZLE OF OPAQUE CONTEXTS This puzzle i s without the s l i g h t e s t doubt the most d i f f i c u l t . Both R u s s e l l and Frege worried about i t , but n e i t h e r managed to so l v e one aspect of i t . The depth of the problem of t h i s aspect — that of q u a n t i f y i n g i n t o opaque - 9 -contexts — has been brought out most f o r c e f u l l y i n the w r i t -ings of W. V. 0. Quine, who i n s p i r e d the current vogue t h i s problem i s enjoying i n p h i l o s o p h i c o - l i n g u i s t i c c i r c l e s . Con-nections with the puzzle of i d e n t i t y statements are both obvious, as an i d e n t i t y statement, plays a c e n t r a l r o l e i n the present-a t i o n of the puzzle, and important, as we w i l l see l a t e r . Be-cause of the complexity of the problem, our f i r s t look at i t , and R u s s e l l ' s and Frege's p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n s , w i l l be sketchy. An i n t u i t i v e l y important, and d e s i r a b l e law of l o g i c i s t h a t i f a ? b, then whatever i s t r u e o f a i s a l s o t r u e o f b. This i s one o f L e i b n i t z ' s laws, that o f i n d i s c e r n a b i l i t y o f i d e n t i c a l s . C e r t a i n l i n g u i s t i c contexts provide prima f a c i e counter-examples to t h i s law. Consider: 6) George IV wished to know whether Scott the author of Waverly. 7) S c o t t =• the author of Waverly. t h e r e f o r e : 8) George IV wished to know whether Scott = S c o t t . As R u s s e l l somewhat c o n f u s i n g l y puts i t : w h i l e (6) i s t r u e , "an i n t e r e s t i n the law of i d e n t i t y can h a r d l y be a t t r i b u t e d to the f i r s t gentleman of Europe"^. The problem here i s - 10 -c l e a r l y how to block the argument from (6) to (8) without f l a t l y r e j e c t i n g L e i b n i t z ' s law. Frege's way out of the problem has o f t e n been presented i n an unfortunate l i g h t . I t goes l i k e t h i s . The argument from (6) to (£) v i a the L e i b n i t z law does not go through be-cause (7) i s i r r e l e v a n t t o (6 ) , and t o take i t as r e l e v a n t simply because the same shape o f i n k occur i n i t i s t o commit a f a l l a c y o f equivocation. I n c e r t a i n contexts, the meaning of expressions s h i f t s from t h e i r normal one so t h a t , f o r ex-ample, w h i l e i n normal contexts 'Scott', and 'the author of Waverly' denote the same man as i n (7), i n other contexts, such as (6 ) , they denote q u i t e d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . I n these contexts, c a l l e d 'oblique', expressions denote what i s normal-l y t h e i r sense. Oblique contexts are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the presence of an obliqueness-forming operator, such as "A b e l i e v -es t h a t ' , or ' N e c e s s a r i l y ' . Prima f a c i e , i t seems th a t Frege i s c l a i m i n g t h a t a l l expressions of our language are ambiguous, sometimes having t h e i r d i r e c t sense and r e f e r e n c e , sometimes i n d i r e c t or o b l i q u e . But i s ambiguity r e a l l y what we have here? With normal ambigu-ous expressions we can f i n d sentences i n which they occur, which are themselves ambiguous, and are disambiguated when the ex-pressions are. With the Fregean s h i f t , however, there can be - l i -no a c t u a l ambiguity s i n c e a l l contexts are al r e a d y disambigu-ated by the presence, or absence of the obliqueness-forming operator. A prima f a c i e o b j e c t i o n to Frege fs d o c t r i n e of the great meaning s h i f t , as I j u s t presented i t , i s th a t i t i s hopeless-l y ad hoc. To solve a s i n g l e s e r i e s o f puzzles Frege i n t r o -duces a t r u l y enormous t h e o r e t i c a l complication. (What happens to the sense when reference s h i f t s ? I t s h i f t s too. Now take any oblique context and add 'John b e l i e v e s t h a t ' i n f r o n t o f i t . The r e f e r r i n g expressions i n s i d e the o r i g i n a l context now denote not t h e i r normal sense, but t h e i r o blique sense, or t h e i r doubly-oblique sense. The ontology of the theory i n -cludes an i n f i n i t e h i e r a r c h y of senses which a l l have to be manipulated s e p a r a t e l y . The complications are enormous.) I t seems r a t h e r much f o r such a s m a l l t a s k , and i f we b e l i e v e d the standard p r e s e n t a t i o n o f Frege's theory, a l l t h i s was introduced w i t h the s o l e purpose o f s o l v i n g the oblique-con-t e x t p u z z l e . Which are the obliqueness-forming operators? P r e c i s e l y those which would prove troublesome i f we d i d not so designate them. To be f a i r to Frege, we should go back and look at the f i r s t few pages of On Sense and Reference. I have been taught, i n my undergraduate courses, t h a t Frege had to introduce the n o t i o n of a s h i f t of meaning because that was the o n l y way f o r - 12 -him to deal w i t h oblique contexts given h i s dictum t h a t the reference of an expression ( i n the case of sentences, t h e i r t r u t h - v a l u e ) i s always a f u n c t i o n o f the reference of i t s p a r t s . A good example o f t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Frege i s found i n Q u i n e 1 0 : F a i l u r e s of s u b s t i t u t i v i t y of i d e n t i t y , moreover, were i n Frege fs view unallowable; so he nominally r e c t i f i e d them by decreeing t h a t when a sentence or term occurs w i t h i n a c o n s t r u c t i o n of p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e or the l i k e i t ceases t o name t r u t h value, c l a s s , or i n d i v i d u a l and comes to name a p r o p o s i t i o n , a t t r i b u t e or " i n d i v i d u a l concept". But Frege h i m s e l f does not w r i t e l i k e t h i s at a l l . He introduces the d o c t r i n e o f i n d i r e c t reference immediately a f t e r i n t r o d u c i n g the notions o f sense and ref e r e n c e . The d o c t r i n e i s not preceded by a d i s c u s s i o n o f the puzzle of obli q u e con-t e x t s and occurs before any mention i s made of the d o c t r i n e t h a t the reference of a sentence i s i t s t r u t h value, or t h a t the reference o f the whole i s a f u n c t i o n o f the reference o f i t s p a r t s . The theory of i n d i r e c t reference i s c l e a r l y taken to be acceptable on i t s own merit i n the f o l l o w i n g key passage from "On Sense and R e f e r e n c e " 1 1 : I f words are used i n the o r d i n a i r y way, what one , intends to speak of i s t h e i r r e f e r e n c e . I t can a l s o happen, however, t h a t one wishes t o t a l k about words themselves or t h e i r sense. This happens, f o r example when the words of another are quoted . . . In order t o speak o f the sense of an exp r e s s i o n 'A' one may simply use the phrase 'the sense of the - 13 -expression "A" 1. In reported speech one t a l k s about the sense, e.g., o f another person's remarks. I t i s qu i t e c l e a r that i n t h i s way of speaking words do not have t h e i r customary sense. I n order to have a short expression, we w i l l say: I n reported speech words are used i n d i r e c t l y or have t h e i r i n d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e . I n d i r e c t reference i s thus not a t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i n t r o -duced to deal w i t h some i n t e r n a l problems o f a theory. Rather, i t i s " c l e a r l y " the case that reference s h i f t s on c e r t a i n occasions. We c e r t a i n l y have no t r o u b l e a c c e p t i n g t h i s i n the case of quotation, as Frege notes, and there are good reasons t o b e l i e v e t h a t i n i n d i r e c t speech and the very s i m i l a r r e p o r t s o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s r eference does i n -deed s h i f t t o what i s normally the sense. I t i s no accident that when we want t o speak o f a p r o p o s i t i o n , we use the same c o n s t r u c t i o n : 'The p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t . . .' as we do i n such contexts. The i n i t i a l i n s i g h t which leads Frege to h i s theory o f the r e f e r e n t i a l s h i f t i s quite p l a u s i b l e , I t h i n k , and shared 12 by, f o r example, Donald Davidson i n "On Saying That". Though Davidson would c e r t a i n l y not agree w i t h the t e c h n i c a l device of r e f e r e n t i a l s h i f t to implement the i n s i g h t , he does agree w i t h Frege i n one important p o i n t . I n i n d i r e c t speech and other such contexts, the content sentence, i . e . the t h a t -c l a u s e , has the f u n c t i o n of s p e c i f y i n g what was s a i d i n the sense i n which what was s a i d can be b e l i e v e d , expressed i n - H -language i n a v a r i e t y of ways, e t c . In t h i s sense, what was s a i d i s p r e c i s e l y what Frege thought a sentence i n oblique contexts r e f e r r e d t o , a p r o p o s i t i o n . Davidson r e j e c t s Frege's idea t h a t the way the p r o p o s i t i o n i s s p e c i f i e d was that each i n d i v i d u a l word r e f e r s t o i t s sense, and so does the whole sentence. Instead, he takes "that' i n t h a t - c l a u s e s to be a demonstrative r e f e r r i n g not t o content sentence t but to the p r o p o s i t i o n which i s expressed by the speaker i n u t t e r i n g the sentence. I n Davidson's terminology, which a p p l i e s only t o i n d i r e c t speech, i n u t t e r i n g the content sentence I make my-s e l f - and the person t o whom I am a t t r i b u t i n g the speech samesayers. R u s s e l l ' s s o l u t i o n i s , on the face of i t , much s i m p l e r . I t i s already embodied i n h i s p r i n c i p l e t h a t denoting phrases ought to be e l i m i n a t e d i n sentences. (6) i s ambiguous. I n a d d i t i o n to (6) i t s e l f , there i s another sentence, the subordin-ate clause which happens to be i d e n t i c a l w i t h (7), i n which the d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n to be e l i m i n a t e d v i z . 'the author of 'Waverly' occurs. ( I am i g n o r i n g , f o r the moment, the compli-c a t i o n t h a t on R u s s e l l ' s own theory 'Scott' ought t o be e l i m i n -ated as w e l l . R u s s e l l ignores t h i s too.) Thus two e l i m i n a t i o n s are p o s s i b l e , a primary one using (6) as a whole, and a seconds ary one us i n g (7) i n s t e a d . I n E n g l i s h combined w i t h the device of q u a n t i f i e r s and bound v a r i a b l e s t o s i m p l i f y the f o r m u l a t i o n s 1 they are: - 15 -(6Pa) (Ex) (x i s the author of Waverly) and G IV w (Scott - x) (6S) G IV w (Ex) (x i s the author of Waverly and S c o t t - x) (•G IV w' i s an a b r e v i a t i o n f o r 'George IV wished to know whether', and the 'a' i n (6Pa) i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t i s the d e s c r i p t i o n 'the author of Waverly' t h a t i s given primary scope.) There are, t h e r e f o r e , two arguments which (6)-(8) could be expressing. One w i t h (6Pa) , and the other w i t h (6S). The l a t t e r argument i s simply not v a l i d , as i t turns out. R u s s e l l claims t h a t (6S) i s the c o r r e c t v e r s i o n o f how i t was w i t h George IV and S c o t t . In t h i s he agrees w i t h Frege, f o r l i k e him, he has George IV ruminating over the p r o p o s i t i o n that S c o t t i s the author of W a v e r l y ^ . Such p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s a r e , so t o speak, c l o s e d to our s u b s t i t u t i o n a l t i n k e r i n g . Even though we know Scott i s the author of Waverly, or t h a t he i s John's most hated author, we cannot s u b s t i t u t e e i t h e r d e s c r i p t -i o n because the p r o p o s i t i o n George IV i s wondering about i s h i s and no other w i l l do. In f a c t , even i f George IV b e l i e v e d , f o r example, t h a t Scott was the most important w r i t e r o f h i s time, s u b s t i t u t i o n would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e because i t s t i l l would have him ruminating over a d i f f e r e n t p r o p o s i t i o n . The context i s simply c l o s e d t o s u b s t i t u t i o n s except f o r those which preserve p r o p o s i t i o n a l i d e n t i t y , such as, perhaps, s u b s t i t u t i o n s o f synonyms f o r synonyms. - 16 -The argument which s t a r t s w i t h (6Pa) i s , on the other hand v a l i d and y i e l d s ( c o n s i s t e n t w i t h R u s s e l l ' s p o l i c y i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r d i s c u s s i o n of not e l i m i n a t i n g proper names): 15 (8Pa) S c o t t i s such t h a t G IV w (Scott = Scott) • The argument may be v a l i d , but according t o R u s s e l l , (6Pa), and hence (8Pa) do not c o r r e c t l y describe George's s t a t e of mind i n the s i t u a t i o n , which was that George, suspecting t h a t S c o t t wrote Waverly, asks him at the dinner t a b l e one evening: •Are you the author of Waverly?' R u s s e l l ' s suggested scenario about which (6Pa) would be t r u e i s t h a t of George's seeing a person at a d i s t a n c e , and asking 'Is t h a t S c o t t ' . This i s s i m i l a r to the s t o r i e s I suggest i n footnote 9, and i t seems q u i t e c o r r e c t . Is George i n R u s s e l l ' s s t o r y about Scott at a d i s t a n c e showing signs of i n t e r e s t i n the law of i d e n t i t y ? I t h i n k not. I t i s w e l l worth no t i n g t h a t R u s s e l l i s almost c e r t a i n l y making a mistake i n not c o n s i d e r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f con-t e x t u a l l y e l i m i n a t i n g 'Scott' as w e l l as 'the author of Waverly'. Since both of these could then be i n the primary-scope p o s i t -i o n outside the opaque context, there are f o u r , and not two p o s s i b l e versions of ( 6 ) , and one of them i s : (6Ps) (Ex) (x i s Scott) and G IV w (x = the author of W a v e r l y ) l b - 17 -which y i e l d s when used as the premiss- i n the (6)-(8) type of argument, a v e r s i o n o f : 9) George IV wished t o know whether the author o f Waverly i s the author of Waverly. namely, the v e r s i o n i n which one of the occurrences of the d e s c r i p t i o n has primary, and the other secondary scope. Now, i t so happens th a t (6Ps) i s at l e a s t as good, and probably b e t t e r than (6S) when i t comes to d e s c r i b i n g George's s t a t e o f mind at the dinner t a b l e . A f t e r a l l , George would probably agree t h a t : 10) George IV wished to know whether the man s i t t i n g next to la d y F at the t a b l e i s the author of Waverly. i s as good a way o f g e t t i n g at what he was wondering about as (6), and i n f a c t says the same t h i n g . But, i f (6S) i s the way to construe (6) then such s u b s t i t u t i o n f o r 'Scott' as lead t o (10) are not allowed. Another way o f p u t t i n g t h i s point i s t h a t George IV was wondering not j u s t about a c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t - i o n , he was wondering whether something was t r u e of a c e r t a i n person, and .'Scott' i n (6) has the r o l e of r e f e r r i n g to tha t person. Any other expression r e f e r r i n g t o Sco t t would have done as w e l l . I t w i l l be remembered that R u s s e l l ' s s t r a t e g y i s to block the argument from (6) to (8) by i n t e r p r e t t i n g the former as (6S). - 18 -U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r R u s s e l l , and others who p r e f e r scope d i s -t i n c t i o n s as a way of b l o c k i n g such arguments, there are sentences which do not a l l o w s u b s t i t u t i v i t y of i d e n t i c a l s s a l v a v e r i t a t e , and do not fea t u r e a contained sentence from which to e l i m i n a t e the d e s c r i p t i o n . A secondary-scope e l i m i n a t i o n i s only p o s s i b l e i n cases i n which there i s a subordinate c l a u s e which i s the scope of the d e s c r i p t i o n . There are opaque contexts which do not contain such a c l a u s e . Take, e.g., 11) Schliemann sought the s i t e of Troy. Suppose th a t the s i t e of Troy i s at G r a n v i l l e and Georgia S t r e e t s . R u s s e l l cannot stop the poor German from l o o k i n g f o r a Vancouver s t r e e t corner. The s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem i s to f i n d , p r e f e r a b l y embedded i n the deep s t r u c t u r e of the sentence, a p r o p o s i t i o n which, when embedded i n some ob l i q u e context, w i l l provide a t r a n s l a t i o n of the o r i g i n a l non-p r o p o s i t i o n a l context. Thus (1) might be t r a n s l a t e d (as by Quine i n " Q u a n t i f i e r s and P r o p o s i t i o n a l A t t i t u d e s " ^ ) } a s 12) Schliemann strove t h a t he f i n d the s i t e o f Troy. But can we f i n d such a p r o p o s i t i o n a l r e - w r i t e i n every t r o u b l e -some case? Take, f o r example, the t r u e statement: 13) John admires h i s teacher. - 19 -which, i f we suppose t h a t unbeknownst to John, h i s teacher i s the person who h i t John's car, and l e f t the scene of the a c c i d -ent, can be turned i n t o the falsehood: 14) John admires the d r i v e r of the hit-and-run v e h i c l e . using L e i b n i t z ' s law; and even i f we can f i n d r e - w r i t e s , w i l l they be more than j u s t ad hoc attempts t o f i t the f a c t s to the theory? The aspect o f the puzzle which continues t o draw p h i l o -sophical a t t e n t i o n , the problem of q u a n t i f y i n g i n t o opaque con-t e x t s , has already been touched upon i n d i s c u s s i n g the primary e l i m i n a t i o n o f 'Scott' i n ( 6 ) . The problem i s j u s t what t o make of sentences i n which a q u a n t i f i e r o u t s i d e binds a v a r i -able i n s i d e an obl i q u e context. Now one of the problems w i t h what R u s s e l l presents i n "On Denoting" i s that a l l he has to say about p r o p o s i t i o n s l i k e ( 9 ) , or (8) i s tha t hasty remark about a t t r i b u t i n g an i n t e r e s t i n the law o f i d e n t i t y t o the f i r s t gentleman o f Europe. He has the resources to block the argument from: 6) George IV wished to know whether S c o t t was the author o f Waverly, t o : 8) George IV wished to know whether Sc o t t was S c o t t , - 20 -or. (9) where we s u b s t i t u t e 'the author of Waverly' f o r 'Scott' i n s t e a d o f v i c e versa. But at the same time he concedes that t h e r e i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f (6); on which (8) f o l l o w s (though the s i t u a t i o n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n describes i s d i f f e r e n t ) , and ought t o a l s o concede t h a t there i s another i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t which f i t s the case of George's wondering about Scott at the dinner t a b l e , and from which (9) f o l l o w s . I f there i s something wrong w i t h ( 8 ) , there ought.to be something wrong w i t h (9). But i f the two primary-scope i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f (6) are not problematic, then n e i t h e r should be ( 8 ) , and (9) . So what R u s s e l l does not t e l l us i s what i s r i g h t about (8) and (9) . Why i s i t th a t these prima f a c i e p a r a d o x i c a l sentences can express something true? The account we can o f f e r on R u s s e l l ' s b e h a l f i s t h a t i n (9) we are r e p o r t i n g a b e l i e f George has about the person S c o t t , whom we r e f e r t o as 'the author of Waverly'. F u l l s u b s t i t u t i v i t y i s assured as l o n g as the expressions we s u b s t i t u t e r e f e r to the same person. But t h i s short e x p l a n a t i o n does not get R u s s e l l out of the problem of q u a n t i f y i n g i n t o opaque contexts. Granted, R u s s e l l has the l i n g u i s t i c or t e c h n i c a l resources t o express q u a n t i f y i n g i n , and he even has ah explanation of what such sentences mean. But t h i s does not get him out o f the problem t h a t i n (6Ps) we seem to be a t t r i b u t i n g t o Charles a p r o p o s i t -i o n a l a t t i t u d e about an obj e c t , not an object under some des-- 21 -c r i p t i o n , but an object s i m p l i c i t e r . Can people have such p r o p o s i t i o n a l " a t t i t u d e s ? And, i f they can, i s n ' t i t a b i t odd th a t they can have c o n t r a d i c t o r y b e l i e f s about the same person? Suppose George IV had been corresponding w i t h a per-son he knew was the author o f Waverly, but d i d not know was Sco t t ? Then i t would seem t h a t he d i d not wonder whether t h i s person was the author o f Waverly. So d i d he, or d i d he not wish t o know whether t h i s person wrote Waverly? Frege's problem i s o f q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t order. For him q u a n t i f y i n g i n simply makes no sense. This i s because when the v a r i a b l e - b i n d i n g q u a n t i f i e r i s outside the obliqueness-forming operator, a l l we get i n s i d e are things l i k e 'x' Scott , and i t i s impossible f o r 'x' to denote i t s normal sense s i n c e i t does not have one. This i s c e r t a i n l y a problem because we want to be able t o describe p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s which are De Re, i . e . , about o b j e c t s . There i s a way o f g e t t i n g Frege out o f t h i s , which a l s o helps R u s s e l l without committing him to the t h e s i s t h a t s i n g u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n s can be objects o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s . We can c l a i m that i n ( 6 P s ) , George IV does have some d e s c r i p t i o n i n mind under which he i s wonder-i n g about S c o t t , i t ' s j u s t t h a t we have not s p e c i f i e d t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n . But the problems of working out the d e t a i l s o f such a proposal are. enormous. In order to keep the advantages o f the - 22 -De Re i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t must be p o s s i b l e to s u b s t i t u t e other d e s c r i p t i o n s f o r ' S c o t t ' . The beauty and u t i l i t y of (6Ps) i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t i t doesn't r e s t r i c t George to wondering about Scott qua S c o t t , and allows him to wonder about the man at the t a b l e or about anything e l s e so l o n g as i t i s the t h i n g he meant by 'you'. On the other hand, on t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , George IV i s once again (as i n the case of (6S)) wondering about the t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n i n which the subject i s p i c k e d out i n the Fregean way, v i a a r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n . So he i s c e r t a i n l y not wondering whether the author o f Waverly i s the author of Waverly. The range of p o s s i b l e d e s c r i p t i o n s must, t h e r e f o r e , be l i m i t e d . The f u l l e s t attempt at c a r r y i n g out the programme of s p e c i f y i n g the range of d e s c r i p t i o n s s u b s t i t u t a b l e s a l v a v e r i t a t e i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l - a t t i t u d e contexts i s David Kaplan's 18 i n " Q u a n t i f y i n g I n " . Apart from the t e c h n i c a l devices r e -q u i r e d , such as q u a n t i f i e r s ranging over denoting phrases, and a s p e c i a l k i n d of quotation marks c a l l e d 'Frege-quotes', the the programme i n v o l v e s s p e c i f y i n g a complex three-place r e l a t -i o n between a person, an o b j e c t , and a denoting phrase which determines whether or not a d e s c r i p t i o n i s i n f a c t o f the s u b s t i t u t a b l e k i n d , or not. Although the programme i s both i n t e r e s t i n g , and important, a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n i s beyond the scope of the present work. - 23 -C. CONTEXT AND DIRECT REFERENCE Nowadays, an important question i n the theory of r e f e r -ence i s whether i t i s expressions, or people t h a t r e f e r , or at l e a s t which one of the two kinds of reference i s more b a s i c . This question i s conspicuously absent from the two c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i e s j u s t considered. B r i e f l y , we should look at some of the reasons why t h i s should be so, and what e f f e c t i t had on the t h e o r i e s . Both R u s s e l l and Frege concerned themselves w i t h how expressions r e f e r to the e x c l u s i o n of speaker r e f e r e n c e . This outlook was not confined to reference, of course, but c o n s t i t -uted a part of a general approach to the study of language. Sp e c u l a t i n g a b i t about what motivated t h i s approach, one could point out t h e i r d e s i r e to be, above a l l , s c i e n t i f i c i n t h e i r methods. This d e s i r e could exclude speaker-reference i n two d i s t i n c t ways. F i r s t , i t was imperative to have general r e s u l t s . To study speaker r e f e r e n c e , one would have to con-s i d e r p a r t i c u l a r uses of expressions, even uses on p a r t i c u l a r occasions of reference. But there i s something about language which transcends mere p a r t i c u l a r utterances. Language has a t i m e l e s s s t r u c t u r e , an independent syntax and semantics. I t was t h i s l o g i c a l (perhaps u n i v e r s a l ) s t r u c t u r e o f language which was being i n v e s t i g a t e d . - 24 -In s t u d y i n g speaker-reference, one has to look at express-i o n s - i n ^ a - c o n t e x t . A.context i s a very vague t h i n g which i n -cludes a l l the "surroundings" o f an occurrence of. an expression. These i n c l u d e the l i n g u i s t i c context (other expressions i n the v i c i n i t y ) , but a l s o such things as the i n t e n t i o n s of the speak-er, the time of the utterance, the p l a c e , the p h y s i c a l surround-i n g s , the i d e n t i t y o f the speaker and the audience, and per-haps more. A l l o f t h i s i s part of the context because a l l of i t i s sometimes r e l e v a n t when we t r y to determine uniquely the meaning of a sentence on a p a r t i c u l a r occasion. A l l of i t i s necessary to see what p r o p o s i t i o n a sentence l i k e : 15) I t o l d you yesterday t o put that i n t h e r e . expresses on an occasion of i t s utterance. The context i s then a r a t h e r enormous grab-bag of phenomena. Anyone i n t e r e s t e d i n a s c i e n t i f i c study of language w i l l n a t u r a l l y shy away from s t u d y i n g so much at the same time. One of the keys to s c i e n t i -f i c success i s the a b i l i t y t o i s o l a t e phenomena, and study them one by one. This may be the other reason the t h e o r i s t s stayed away from speaker r e f e r e n c e . Another c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r may be t h a t the two t h e o r i s t s took great pride i n p r i z i n g l o g i c and meaning away from mental phenomena, and i t i s hard to deal w i t h context without i n v i t i n g i n t e n t i o n s back i n t o the f o r e -ground . - 25 -Thus, language was a set o f sentences t o R u s s e l l and Frege, and reference something which was part of the meaning of c e r t a i n expressions, independent of any contextual con-s i d e r a t i o n s . But s u r e l y , i t w i l l be objected, R u s s e l l and Frege must have r e a l i z e d that sentences of our language are c o n t e x t - r e l a t i v e . S u r e l y the fat h e r s of formal semantics were observant enough to n o t i c e t h a t c o n t e x t - f r e e sentences, or even j u s t r e f e r r i n g expressions are the exception r a t h e r than the r u l e . I n what was i n e f f e c t the f i r s t d i r e c t c r i t i c i s m o f R u s s e l l ' s theory o f d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s a f t e r decades o f general unquestioning acceptance, P. F. Strawson a t t a c k s R u s s e l l p r e c i s e l y on the above poin t i n the opening s e c t i o n s 19 o f h i s "On R e f e r r i n g " . Strawson complains t h a t R u s s e l l f a i l e d to d i s t i n g u i s h between expressions, uses o f expressions, and utterances of them. R e f e r r i n g according to Strawson, i s something we do when we use an expression. R u s s e l l ' s mistake, we are t o l d , i s t h a t he confused meaning (something expressions have independently of t h e i r use on p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n s ) , and reference (something they have only when used on a n : o c c a s i o n ) . Strawson t h i n k s , then, that the reason R u s s e l l i s so wrong about reference i s j u s t that he confuses what I have c a l l e d expressions-in-a-context w i t h expressions s i m p l i c i t e r . - 26 -This i s qu i t e u n f a i r as a c r i t i c i s m of R u s s e l l , and he defends hi m s e l f v i g o r o u s l y i n h i s "Mr. Strawson on Refer-on r i n g " . The g i s t o f R u s s e l l ' s argument i s t h a t he, o f course, knew very w e l l there was a problem o f " e g o - c e n t r i c i t y " , as he c a l l s what I would c a l l context-dependence. And indeed, as he points out, he d i d make some moves t o deal w i t h i t i n , f o r example, I n q u i r y Into Meaning and Truth2-**-, and d i d so along the very l i n e s that Strawson proposes. R u s s e l l argues t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e between him, and Strawson i s t h a t u n l i k e the l a t t e r philosopher, R u s s e l l does not confuse the problem o f e g o - c e n t r i c i t y w i t h the problem of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s . ( R u s s e l l and Strawson are both being u n f a i r . I t i s Strawson's t h e s i s , not confusion, that reference can only be d e a l t w i t h i n c onjunction w i t h e g o - c e n t r i c i t y , and s i m i l a r l y i t i s R u s s e l l ' s t h e s i s t h a t the two are separate problems, t h a t by the time we s t a r t d e a l i n g w i t h reference, we need not worry about context-r e l a t i v i t y . ) But how does R u s s e l l envisage a theory of refe r e n c e which need not deal w i t h context? R u s s e l l points out t h a t the problems he t r i e s to deal w i t h i n "On Denoting" e x i s t j u s t as much i n the case o f con t e x t - f r e e r e f e r r i n g expressions. I n -deed, the puzzle about the present k i n g of France (the puzzle of non-denoting terms) i s j u s t as p u z z l i n g i f we make i t the puzzle about the k i n g o f France i n 1905, and the problem of - 27 -f i n d i n g the c o r r e c t account of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s i s no l e s s severe i f we consider d e s c r i p t i o n s l i k e 'the l e a s t i n t e g e r ' . A l l t h i s i s perhaps r i g h t , but anyone i n t e r e s t e d i n r e f e r -ence cannot ignore the f a c t t h a t most of the expressions we a c t u a l l y use are context-dependent, t h a t i s , t h e i r reference i s determined i n part by the context they occur i n . R u s s e l l ' s , and probably Frege's view on t h i s i s that before we perform our a n a l y s i s o f a c o n t e x t - r e l a t i v e sentence or expression, we transform i t i n t o a c o n t e x t - f r e e one. Thus: 16) The guy t y p i n g t h i s . i s r e p l a c e d by: 16 ' ) The guy t y p i n g such-and-such at 7 :35, September 15, 1977 at 4467 Marine, West Vancouver. or even (though I'm not sure about t h i s ) : 16'•) The guy at spatio-temporal co-ordinates abed. But what, e x a c t l y , i s going on when we do t h i s ? I t can not be t h a t we r e p l a c e one synonymous sentence with.another f o r ' t h i s man' and i t s e x p l i c i t c o n t e x t - f r e e expansion are most emp h a t i c a l l y not synonymous. Indeed the o n l y t h i n g t h a t could be going on i s t h a t we take the context of the sentence i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , f i n d out what p r o p o s i t i o n i t expresses, - 28 -and then come up w i t h another sentence, which i s such that i t can express nothing but t h i s l a s t p r o p o s i t i o n under any c i r -cumstances. But now consider how strange t h i s procedure i s . We propose to provide an a n a l y s i s of r e f e r e n c e , but as a f i r s t step we e l i m i n a t e the vast m a j o r i t y o f r e f e r r i n g expressions i n our language by r e p l a c i n g them a l l w i t h non-synonymous con-t e x t - f r e e counterparts. And a l l t h i s at a r a t h e r i n t u i t i v e , n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l . We then proceed t o analyze these new, very a t y p i c a l , sentences constructed on the basis of what we thought t o be the occasion-meanings o f the r e a l sentences o f our language. The preceding paragraph i s d e l i b e r a t e l y u n f a i r to the approach t o language adopted by the c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i s t s . To be f a i r , we must consider another f a c t o r which Strawson over-looked. The goals Frege and R u s s e l l had i n mind i n co n s t r u c t -i n g t h e i r t h e o r i e s o f reference were e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from the ones which I presupposed i n the above paragraph, and which formal (and not so formal) s e m a n t i c i s t s set themselves today. Today we approach semantics as an e m p i r i c a l study o f our n a t u r a l language. But t o R u s s e l l and Frege, n a t u r a l language was hop e l e s s l y vague. What they were working on was a b e t t e r , more p r e c i s e language. A s c i e n t i f i c language of mathematics, and, at l e a s t f o r R u s s e l l , philosophy. I t was not t h e i r i n -t e n t i o n t o describe how we speak, they wanted t o construct a - 29 -new, t e c h n i c a l way to speak. Thus i t was p e r f e c t l y l e g i t i m a t e f o r them to s t i p u l a t e t h a t the new, more i d e a l , language should "reduce to a minimum the ego-centric element i n an a s s e r t i o n " 2 2 , or c l a i m , f o r example, t h a t c e r t a i n v a r i a t i o n s i n sense "may be t o l e r a t e d , although they are to be avoided i n the t h e o r e t i c -a l s t r u c t u r e o f a demonstrative science and ought not t o occur i n a p e r f e c t language" 2^. I t i s very important, I b e l i e v e , to keep i n mind Fre g e 1 s and R u s s e l l ' s goals, t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n f i n d i n g a l o g i c a l l y per-f e c t language. R u s s e l l agrees w i t h Strawson*s concluding r e -mark tha t o r d i n a r y language has no exact l o g i c , h i s aim i s not t o f i n d t h i s l o g i c , nor yet to f o r c e o r d i n a r y language i n t o some l o g i c a l mould. I n "On Denoting" he i s i n the process of t r y i n g to f i n d a language more p e r f e c t than n a t u r a l language. In such a language, there need be no c o n t e x t - r e l a t i v e sentences. This i s much more p l a u s i b l e i f we r e a l i z e t h a t both R u s s e l l and Frege had a s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t i n the segment of language i n which mathematics i s done. I n the case of mathematical d i s -course, the e l i m i n a t i o n of c o n t e x - r e l a t i v e expressions can o n l y b r i n g more p r e c i s i o n . Nothing e s s e n t i a l i s l o s t i f we get r i d o f them. In c o n t r a s t t o R u s s e l l and Frege, the more recent seman-t i c i s t cannot ignore the f a c t t h a t the reference of an express-i o n o f t e n depends on the context of i t s utterance, t h a t speakers - 30 -r e f e r u s i n g expressions. For t h i s reason, the c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i e s cannot be expected t o work f o r n a t u r a l language without m o d i f i c a t i o n . They were not designed f o r i t . Never-t h e l e s s , u n t i l q u ite r e c e n t l y , many philosophers were content to f o l l o w i n R u s s e l l ' s and Frege's f o o t s t e p s , f e e l i n g perhaps t h a t c o n t e x t u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are too b e w i l d e r i n g l y complex (as i s n a t u r a l language, as a whole) to t>e s u s c e p t i b l e to the k i n d o f formal a n a l y s i s t h a t p r e c i s i o n demands. This i s not to say that u s e f u l , i n t e r e s t i n g , and even c o r r e c t models f o r aspects of n a t u r a l language cannot be, or have not been, found f o l l o w i n g such a r e s t r i c t e d method. My only c l a i n i s tha t i f we are to study reference i n n a t u r a l language, we cannot ignore the importance of demonstratives, pronouns, and d e f i n i t e des-c r i p t i o n s which are uniquely r e f e r r i n g o n l y i n a given context. Unfortunately, u n t i l only a few years ago, there was general agreement t h a t context i s j u s t too much t o work w i t h , too complex, or even without s t r u c t u r e . Thus, one e i t h e r d i d formal work and ignored c o n t e x t u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , or one be-longed to the " n a t u r a l language s c h o o l " and d i d not t h i n k formal a n a l y s i s u s e f u l . Theory of reference l a y dormant. Apart from the above f e a t u r e , which I t h i n k turns out to be a methodological r e s t r i c t i o n r a t h e r than a t h e s i s of the c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i e s , Strawson attacks R u s s e l l on a p h i l o s o p h i c -a l l y deeper p o i n t , a l b e i t one tha t he, as w e l l as myself, have some t r o u b l e expounding. - 31 -In c o n s i d e r i n g the puzzle of i d e n t i t y , I h i n t e d at i t s underpinnings by saying t h a t i t challenges our f i r s t i n t u i t -ions about how reference works. I l e f t t h i s d e l i b e r a t e l y vague at that point because much more w i l l be s a i d about i t both now, and i n l a t e r s e c t i o n s . The ide a t h a t the i d e n t i t y puzzle a r i s e s i n t h i s way i s due to David Kaplan, and I would l i k e to take h i s way o f approaching "our f i r s t i n t u i t i o n s about re f e r e n c e " as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t . I b e l i e v e t h a t the Frege -R u s s e l l t h e s i s I w i l l be d i s c u s s i n g below i s r e l a t e d i n s e v e r a l ways to the methodological r e s t r i c t i o n I already discussed. I w i l l t r y to l o c a t e these points of contact be-tween them. 1 In h i s l e c t u r e s on R u s s e l l ' s and Frege's t h e o r i e s of re f e r e n c e , David Kaplan claimed that the reason the i d e n t i t y puzzle a r i s e s i s a c e r t a i n theory of meaning which he c a l l s 'naive'. I hope that by 'naive' he d i d not mean that i t i s of n e c e s s i t y s i m p l i s t i c and inadequate, but only t h a t i t i s a theory which, to someone who has not thought about these matters a great d e a l , i s prima f a c i e p l a u s i b l e or even "obvious". The basis of the naive theory, i t s i n i t i a l , and perhaps o n l y , c l a i m i s that when we a s s e r t a d e c l a r a t i v e sentence (express a p r o p o s i t i o n , i n other words), we f i r s t somehow i d e n t i f y the object of our di s c o u r s e , and then (so to speak, i t ' s not c l e a r that t h e r e i s always a temporal or d e r i n g - 32 -of the two a c t s ) , go on to say something about i t . This i s r a t h e r vague and indeed the naive theory i s more a pre-t h e o r e t i c a l b i a s or approach than a f u l l theory of meaning. However, the d e n i a l of t h i s approach gives r i s e to some q u i t e s p e c i f i c t h e o r e t i c a l r e s u l t s , as we w i l l h o p e f u l l y see l a t e r . The naive theory might be seen to be incompatible w i t h the approach the c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i e s took t o language because, as s t a t e d above, i t i s a c l a i m about what speakers do.;,and not about expressions. Consequently, a t h e o r i s t who holds t h a t the a c t i o n s of speakers are o f no concern to semantics can j u s t c l a i m t h a t the naive theory i s i r r e l e v a n t to h i s enter-p r i s e . But naive theory i s only most n a t u r a l l y s t a t e d i n terms o f the a c t i o n s of speakers, another way of d e s c r i b i n g the approach i s as one which holds t h a t the grammatical d i s t i n c t -i o n between subject and p r e d i c a t e i s a r e f l e c t i o n o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between the speech acts of reference and pre-d i c a t i o n and has repercussions i n the semantics of our language. In other words, t h a t subject and predicate are more than j u s t a c c i d e n t a l categories of the surface s t r u c t u r e of our language. So the connection between the d e n i a l o f naive theory and the o v e r a l l approach to language which concentrates on meanings of sentences i s not c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h i s way, though there might be something t o i t s i n c e the naive theory i s , I t h i n k , most at home when we express i t i n terms o f what people do i n expressing p r o p o s i t i o n s . , - 33 -But another connection e x i s t s . As we have seen, Frege and R u s s e l l both have f a v o r i t e r e f e r r i n g expressions, and both ?the same ones - d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s . I t h i n k there i s a deeper reason f o r t h i s than t h a t d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s j u s t happened to f i t best i n t o t h e i r t h e o r i e s (which, as I have already s t a t e d , they do). The t h e s i s of the naive theory i s that to r e f e r i s j u s t to p i c k out an o b j e c t . I n n o n - c o n t e x t - r e l a t i v e terms, i . e . , i n terms not o f speakers and t h e i r a c t i o n s , but o f express-ions and t h e i r meanings, t h i s means that the expression i n the s u b j e c t - p a r t of a sentence has no meaning other than what i t r e f e r s t o . This l a s t statement can be read i n at l e a s t two ways. R e l a t i v e l y harmlessly (and perhaps vaguely) as saying t h a t the only c o n t r i b u t i o n the subject-term makes to the mean-i n g o f the whole sentence i s that i t points out what the sent-ence i s about. Or r a t h e r more dangerously (and c l o s e r t o how R u s s e l l or Frege may have read i t ) , as saying t h a t the meaning of the denoting phrase c o n s t i t u t i n g the subject term j u s t i s i t s r e f e r e n t . So, f o r the t h e o r i s t who wants to deal w i t h reference on the l e v e l o f expressions, not speakers, the naive theory might appear to e n t a i l the once-popular t h e s i s t h a t the meaning of a name i s i t s r e f e r e n t (where 'name' i s used i n the o l d f a s h i o n as roughly equivalent to the modern-day expression ' s i n g u l a r - 34 -term'). Though I t h i n k t h a t naive theory need not, and indeed should not, e n t a i l t h i s t h e s i s , I b e l i e v e t h a t f o r R u s s e l l and Frege, and a l s o t h e i r contemporary W i t t g e n s t e i n i t d i d . I f we accept the t h e s i s that the meaning of a term i s i t s r e f e r e n t , we are indeed i n deep t r o u b l e w i t h i d e n t i t y s t a t e -ments. The c l a s s i c a l statement of the dilemma we f i n d ourselves i n comes from Wittgenstein's Tractatus 2^" where, i t w i l l be r e -membered, there i s a one-to-one correspondence between names ( l o g i c a l l y simple ones), and ( l o g i c a l l y or me t a p h y s i c a l l y simple) objects which c o n s t i t u t e the former's meaning. W i t t -genstein was forced t o r e j e c t the usefulness of i d e n t i t y , and si n c e i n h i s i d e a l language no object could have more than one name, nothing was l o s t . I d e n t i t y cannot have much of a r o l e i n languages where 'a - a' i s the only form a t r u e i d e n t i t y statement can have. This i s not so f o r most languages, and c e r t a i n l y not n a t u r a l ones. Thus, Frege r e j e c t s the t h e s i s t h a t the mean-i n g of a term i s i t s r e f e r e n t , and replaces i t w i t h h i s doct-r i n e t h a t every expression has both a sense and a ref e r e n c e . There i s some question whether he s t i l l takes reference t o be a k i n d o f meaning (Kaplan b e l i e v e s he does, Michael Dumm^tt cautions against such a view 2-*), but even i f i t i s a kind o f meaning, i t i s mediated by sense. R e f e r r i n g terms s p e c i f y what I have c a l l e d r e f e r r i n g - c o n d i t i o n s . Reference i s achieved - 35 -v i a , or by_ means of these c o n d i t i o n s . This amounts to a r e -j e c t i o n not o n l y o f the s t r o n g c l a i m t h a t the meaning of a term i s i t s reference, but a l s o of the weaker c l a i m t h a t the c o n t r i b u t i o n of the subject term i s t h a t i t p i c k s out the t h i n g the sentence i s about. For Frege, subject terms a l s o d e s c r i b e what they r e f e r t o , and f u r t h e r more, the d e s c r i p t -i o n i s e s s e n t i a l t o the determination o f the r e f e r e n t . 26 For deeply t h e o r e t i c a l reasons , as w e l l as because of a deep seated c o n v i c t i o n t h a t without terms t h a t are d i r e c t l y l i n k e d to t h e i r r e f e r e n t s ( l o g i c a l l y proper names) our langu-age w i l l loose connection w i t h the world, and o s t e n s i v e de-f i n i t i o n s w i l l make no sense, R u s s e l l does not go as f a r as Frege i n r e j e c t i n g the naive theory. He sees j u s t as c l e a r l y as Frege does th a t i f i d e n t i t y statements are t o make sense, and be u s e f u l , i t cannot be t h a t the meaning o f terms i s j u s t t h e i r r e f e r ence. But s i n c e he b e l i e v e s t h a t the meaning of terms must be r e f e r e n t i f there i s to be a connection between language and the world, t h i s o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e i s to c l a i m f i r s t t h a t d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s are not r e a l l y terms, can not r e a l l y occur as subject-term i n a sentence, and then t h a t proper names can't do t h i s e i t h e r , e t c . , u n t i l every r e f e r r i n g phrase of n a t u r a l language i s d e a l t w i t h i n t h i s f a s h i o n . As I have already noted, R u s s e l l seems to b e l i e v e t h a t the only natural-language l o g i c a l l y proper names are demon-- 36 -s t r a t i v e s l i k e ' t h i s 1 or ' t h a t ' . As I have a l s o noted, he seems to be mistaken i n t h i s b e l i e f . Demonstratives cannot be l o g i c a l l y proper names because the puzzle of i d e n t i t y , which was one of the reasons why t h i s s t a t u s was denied to d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s , and proper names l i k e 'Socrates', can be s e t up w i t h demonstratives as w e l l . An even more s e r i o u s reason f o r denying the s t a t u s o f l o g i c a l l y proper names to demonstratives i s that they are c o n t e x t - r e l a t i v e . Indeed, they are among the paradigmatic examples of expressions used i n " e g o - c e n t r i c " sentences. On the t h e s i s t h a t e g o - c e n t r i c i t y i s a separate problem, from reference such expressions have to be transformed i n t o c o n t e x t - f r e e ones p r i o r t o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s . But i n such a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , demonstratives w i l l be r e p l a c e d by d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s s i n c e the only technique we have of expressing c o n t e x t - f r e e , or e t e r n a l sentences i s to add as many r e f e r r i n g conditions as are needed to s p e c i f y the r e f e r e n t uniquely r e g a r d l e s s of context. I t would seem then, t h a t be- f o r e we s t a r t w i t h the l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s which would prove demonstratives to be l o g i c a l l y proper names we have to t r a n s -form them i n t o r e f e r r i n g expressions which most d e f i n i t e l y are no such t h i n g , namely d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s . The only places l e f t f o r l o g i c a l l y proper names i n R u s s e l l ' s theory are some-where i n the deep s t r u c t u r e of language. We c e r t a i n l y cannot f i n d any on the s u r f a c e . R u s s e l l ' s l o g i c a l l y proper names be-g i n to l o o k more l i k e W i ttgenstein's i n the T r a c t a t u s . - 37 -Consequently, w h i l e the assumption of l o g i c a l l y proper names i s a t h e o r e t i c a l l y important part of R u s s e l l ' s l o g i c a l 27 theory, as f a r as what i n t e r e s t s us here, i . e . , the a n a l y s i s o f reference i n n a t u r a l language, R u s s e l l and Frege o f f e r sub-s t a n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l t h e o r i e s i n the respect under d i s c u s s i o n . They both r e j e c t the t h e s i s t h a t the meaning of a term i s i t s r e f e r e n c e , and w i t h i t (thus, as I w i l l t r y to show, throwing the baby out w i t h the bath water) the naive theory o f r e f e r -ence. While Frege says t h a t the meaning of terms i s t h e i r sense which determines t h e i r reference (or a s u i t a b l y modified view i f reference i s a k i n d of meaning), R u s s e l l holds that the meaning of "terms" i s only t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the mean-i n g o f the sentences they occur i n . But t h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n i s very d i f f e r e n t from the c o n t r i b u t i o n the naive theory would a s c r i b e to them. I t i s more l i k e what Frege d e s c r i b e s . In so f a r as a sentence i s about anything, the t h i n g i s picked . out v i a a d e s c r i p t i o n . There i s , s t r i c t l y speaking, no r e f e r -ence f o r R u s s e l l (since we speak mostly or wholy i n general p r o p o s i t i o n s ) , but what replaces i t has much i n common w i t h Frege's r e f e r e n c e . To f i n d the object we are t a l k i n g about we look f o r the object s a t i s f y i n g some c o n d i t i o n we s t a t e . And the object we are t a l k i n g about must s a t i s f y the c o n d i t i o n s . I f i t changes i n the r e l e v a n t aspect, we are not t a l k i n g about i t any more. This i s c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e ; i t i s not i n our power to determine what we r e f e r t o , i t i s up to the sense of - 38 -the expression we use. Consequently, we can r e f e r t o t h i n g s unknowingly, or f a i l to r e f e r because the d e s c r i p t i o n we use s p e c i f i e s more than one object or none at a l l and t h i s i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t we know p e r f e c t l y w e l l what i t i s we want to t a l k about. There i s more to the question of whether reference i s always c o n d i t i o n a l , as R u s s e l l and Frege would have i t , or sometimes d i r e c t and not mediated by a c o n d i t i o n than meets the eye. There are, connected w i t h i t questions i n the p h i l o -sophy .of mind such as whether or not we can have b e l i e f s , hopes, wishes, e t c . d i r e c t e d to an object not an object-under-a-des-c r i p t i o n , but object s i m p l i c i t e r . A more famous and much-dis-cussed metaphysical i s s u e i s that of A r i s t o t e l i a n e s s e n t i a l i s m , the theory t h a t objects can have necessary p r o p e r t i e s . We w i l l r e t u r n l a t e r to the question of j u s t how c l o s e the connection i s between these issues and the theory of reference. - 39 -I I . QUINE AND REFERENTIAL OPACITY In the period between R u s s e l l ' s and Frege's i n t r o d u c t i o n of theory o f reference i n t o standard p h i l o s o p h i c a l l o r e and the present burst of i n t e r e s t i n i t , no one made a greater c o n t r i b u t i o n to the subject than V/. V. 0. Quine. His i n f l u -ence i s enormous both because he c l a r i f i e d many aspects of the theory, such as the r e l a t i o n s h i p between q u a n t i f i c a t i o n , s u b s t i t u t i v i t y , reference, and oblique contexts, and because h i s views on i n t e n s i o n a l objects (e.g., p r o p o s i t i o n s , a t t r i -butes and concepts), and on model l o g i c sent many an able philosopher l o o k i n g f o r a b e t t e r understanding and, perhaps, a defence o f these important p h i l o s o p h i c a l n o t i o n s . I n the present s e c t i o n I w i l l attempt to set out some of the import-ant aspects of Quine's views. A. SINGULAR REFERENCE AND FAILURES OF SUBSTITUTIVITY Terms, according t o Quine, can occur i n two very d i s t i n c t ways. In c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n s a term i s p u r e l y r e f e r e n t i a l . What t h i s means i s that the term (whether i t i s i n object or subj e c t p o s i t i o n i n the sentence) i s used only to s p e c i f y what the r e s t of the sentence i s about 2**. When a term i s i n such a p o s i t i o n , any term which s p e c i f i e s the same object can, of course, be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r i t , p r eserving t r u t h value. Thus - 40 -terms i n p u r e l y r e f e r e n t i a l p o s i t i o n s a t i s f y "one of the fund-amental p r i n c i p l e s governing i d e n t i t y " , the law o f i n d i s c e r n -i b i l i t y of i d e n t i c a l s 2 ^ . The law s t a t e s t h a t i f 'a' i s i d e n t -i c a l w i t h 'b' then whatever i s t r u e of 'a' i s t r u e o f !b' as w e l l . Examples of p u r e l y r e f e r e n t i a l occurrences o f r e f e r r i n g expressions are abundant, most simple E n g l i s h s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e sentences w i l l do. One can determine whether or not some p o s i t i o n i s p u r e l y r e f e r e n t i a l (or transparent) by a p p l y i n g the s u b s t i t u t i v i t y t e s t . I f the sentence remains t r u e under any s u b s t i t u t i o n o f c o - r e f e r e n t i a l terms then the context i s transparent, otherwise i t i s opaque (not p u r e l y r e f e r e n t i a l ) . Quine c a l l s s u b s t i t u t i v i t y "a c r i t e r i o n " of transparency. This i s somewhat misleading, I t h i n k , as i t suggests that there i s something to a p o s i t i o n ' s being transparent over and above s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y o f c o - r e f e r e n t i a l terms s a l v a v e r i t a t e . I n f a c t we are not presented w i t h any other e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e o f transparent contexts, nor are there any examples i n which sub-s t i t u t i v i t y does not e n t a i l transparency. The r e l a t i o n s h i p of transparency and s u b s t i t u t i v i t y i s not t h a t of phenomenon and c r i t e r i o n f o r r e c o g n i z i n g i t , i t i s r a t h e r that o f definiendum and d e f i n i e n s . The law of i n d i s c e r n i b i l i t y o f i d e n t i c a l s , fundamental as i t may be to the theory of i d e n t i t y , has some r a t h e r ordina and frequent instances of f a i l u r e , or at l e a s t apparent f a i l u r e . We have already seen one such case which R u s s e l l considered and attempted to r e s o l v e , namely: - 41 -6) George IV wished to know whether Scott = the author of Waverly. which does not seem to y i e l d a t r u e sentence i f we s u b s t i t u t e • S c o tt' f o r 'the author of Waverly' even though: 7) Scott - the author o f Waverly. And there are numerous other cases. Quine's own famous example of an opaque context i s : 17) N e c e s s a r i l y 9 i s greater than 7. which f a i l s to r e s u l t i n a t r u e sentence i f we s u b s t i t u t e 'the number of p l a n e t s ' f o r '9' d e s p i t e the well-known f a c t t h a t : 18) 9 the number of p l a n e t s . And j u s t to add a f r e s h example to the two c l a s s i c ones above, there i s the sentence: 19) The l a c k o f proper u t e n s i l s i s explained by the f a c t that the man who was supposed to b r i n g them i s i l l . which becomes f a l s e i f we change the d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n f o r the c o - r e f e r e n t i a l 'Jack Smith' s i n c e the ex p l a n a t i o n would be l o s t . With a l l three o f the above examples, there might be readings on which they t u r n out to be transparent, i . e . , such th a t the s u b s t i t u t i o n s can be performed on ( 6 ) , (17), or (19), - 42 -and t h e i r t r u t h maintained. Thus f a r , a l l t h a t matters i s th a t there are opaque reading o f them, that there are instances o f E n g l i s h appear, i f taken i n one p o s s i b l e way, to provide counter-examples to L i e b n i t z ' s law o f i n d i s c e r n i b i l i t y of i d e n t i c a l s . I n these sentences, expressions which otherwise would have a r e f e r e n t i a l r o l e occur i n a n o t - p u r e l y - r e f e r e n t i a l p o s i t i o n , according t o Quine's d o c t r i n e . Having noted, w i t h Quine's help, that terms i n c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n s are not s u b s t i t u t a b l e f o r other terms r e f e r r i n g t o the same o b j e c t , why not leave the s i t u a t i o n as i t i s ? A f t e r a l l , our language works p e r f e c t l y w e l l d e s p ite i t s opaque con-t e x t s , we recognize the contexts e a s i l y as such, and moreover, we have some i n t u i t i v e understanding of why s u b s t i t u t i v i t y f a i l s i n any given contexts and which s u b s t i t u t i o n s would not f a i l i n i t . So what i s the problem o f r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y which has ex e r c i s e d so many philosophers l a t e l y ? Obviously, one o f the t o p i c s f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a t -i o n i s the above-mentioned i n t u i t i o n s as to the reasons f o r f a i l u r e o f s u b s t i t u t i v i t y i n p a r t i c u l a r c o ntexts. One of the time-honoured and important t a s k s of a philosopher i s render more perspicuous and p r e c i s e i n t u i t i o n s which people share but cannot c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e . But t h a t cannot be the s o r t o f problem we are faced w i t h here s i n c e the i n t u i t i o n s we have about the reasons f o r f a i l u r e of s u b s t i t u t i v i t y are o f t e n - 43 -i n t u i t i o n s on epistemology or on m o r a l i t y or perhaps n e c e s s i t y , whereas the problem of r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y i s regarded as being a semantic one. Furthermore, r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y i s o f t e n s a i d to engender something of quite a d i f f e r e n t order than the problem of c l a r -i f y i n g some already e x i s t e n t i n t u i t i o n s . Instead r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y i s supposed t o present us w i t h a s e r i o u s dilemma. On the one hand we have our language which appears t o c o n t a i n r e f e r e n t i a l l y opaque contexts, and on the other there i s L e i b n i t z ' s law which ex p r e s s l y f o r b i d s such contexts. L e i b n i t z ' s law i s fundamental and about as easy to r e j e c t as the law of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n . Opaque co n s t r u c t i o n s such as i n d i r e c t speech r e p o r t s and p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e r e p o r t s as w e l l as c o n t r a r y - t o -fact conditionals are an important and indi s p e n s a b l e part o f n a t u r a l language and i t would be, to say the l e a s t , undesirable to l a b e l them a l l l o g i c a l l y d e f e c t i v e . Thus we have seen R u s s e l l and Frege t r y i n g to r e c o n c i l e L e i b n i t z ' s law w i t h our language not by g r a n t i n g exceptions to the former or by r e j e c t i n g i t a l t o g e t h e r , but by arguing t h a t n a t u r a l language only appears to provide counter examples to the law. So, w h i l e R u s s e l l went to f i n d beneath the grammat-i c a l surface of sentences a deeper, more s i g n i f i c a n t l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e which d i d not e x h i b i t the same f a u l t s , Frege argued t h a t n a t u r a l language does not have the f a u l t even on the s u r -- 44 -face s i n c e reference i n oblique contexts " c l e a r l y " s h i f t s . Both R u s s e l l ' s and Frege's s o l u t i o n s can be seen as addressed to the above-described dilemma t h a t n a t u r a l language and L e i b n i t z ' s law are, prima f a c i e , i n c o n f l i c t and n e i t h e r can be coherently dismissed. But despite the example of those two great minds, we need not be convinced yet o f the seriousness o f the dilemma. Af,ter a l l , ' L e i b n i t z ' s law i s a metaphysical p r i n c i p l e governing i d e n t i t y and as yet we have not seen a reason f o r t h i n k i n g that language must conform to i t i n the way which the famous examples o f r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y challenge. What, p r e c i s e l y , does L e i b n i t z ' s law have to do w i t h the l i n g u i s t i c p r i n c i p l e o f e x t e n s i o n a l i t y which our examples a l l e g e d l y f a i l to i n s t a n t -i a t e ? Why should we j u s t accept t h a t the i n d i s c e r n i b i l i t y of i d e n t i c a l s e n t a i l s that c o - r e f e r e n t i a l terms are everywhere s u b s t i t u t a b l e s a l v a v e r i t a t e ? Indeed, we could take the e x i s t -ence o f opaque contexts to prove, given that L e i b n i t z ' s law holds, t h a t i t does not e n t a i l the p r i n c i p l e o f e x t e n s i o n a l i t y . That there i s some connection between the p r i n c i p l e o f exten-s i o n a l i t y and L e i b n i t z ' s law i s f a i r l y c l e a r . What the con-n e c t i o n i s , and why we should accept the former on the streng t h o f the l a t t e r i s harder to formulate. W. V. 0. Quine has gone some way i n g e t t i n g c l e a r about t h i s , though he has not succeed-ed i n h i s endeavour to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of every philosopher. - 45 -I n e x t e n s i o n a l contexts, s i n g u l a r terms are i n p u r e l y r e f e r -e n t i a l p o s i t i o n . So f a r , a l l we have are two ways of des-c r i b i n g the same l i n g u i s t i c phenomenon. The other two idioms Quine uses are th a t o f transparency and s u b s t i t u t i v i t y of i d e n t i c a l s . But t a l k of pure reference has the advantage o f enabling us to escape t h i s extremely t i g h t conceptual c i r c l e . I n p u r e l y r e f e r e n t i a l p o s i t i o n s a s i n g u l a r term " i s used as a means simply of s p e c i f y i n g i t s o b j e c t , or p u r p o r t i n g t o , f o r 30 the r e s t of the sentence to say something a b o u t . M > The pure-ly: r e f e r e n t i a l context par excellence i s p r e d i c a t i o n . "Pre-d i c a t i o n j o i n s a general term and a s i n g u l a r term t o form a sentence t h a t i s t r u e or f a l s e according as the general term i s t r u e or f a l s e of the o b j e c t , i f any, to which the s i n g u l a r term r e f e r s . " - ^ 1 I t i s the t r u e - o f r e l a t i o n , the no t i o n of an object s a t i s f y i n g a predicate-^ 2 which makes pure reference so important. In p r e d i c a t i o n , the s i n g u l a r term has the s o l e f u n c t i o n o f p o i n t i n g out the object a s s e r t e d t o s a t i s f y the p r e d i c a t e . So long as the same object i s s p e c i f i e d the t r u t h -value of the sentence can not change. The connection w i t h L e i b n i t z ' s law becomes c l e a r when we r e a l i z e that one of the many ways of s t a t i n g t h a t law i s : i f a = b then whatever i s t r u e of *a' i s t r u e of 'b'. But sentences a s s e r t i n g that something i s tru e of an object are instances of p r e d i c a t i o n and thus of pure reference and e x t e n s i o n a l i t y . So i f L e i b n i t z ' s law holds, then the p r i n c i p l e of e x t e n s i o n a l i t y does as w e l l , - 46 -at l e a s t f o r p r e d i c a t i o n . The only question t h a t remains i s why we should regard a l l contexts as e x t e n s i o n a l . Why have c o - r e f e r e n t i a l terms s u b s t i t u t a b l e s a l v a v e r i t a t e i n a l l contexts. A f t e r a l l might there not be contexts which are u n l i k e p r e d i c a t i o n ? Quine, u n l i k e R u s s e l l or Frege, allows f o r such contexts: " I do not d i s a l l o w f a i l u r e of s u b s t i t u t i v i t y , but only take i t as evidence of n o n - r e f e r e n t i a l p o s i t i o n ; nor do I envisage 33 s h i f t s of reference under opaque c o n s t r u c t i o n s " ^ . What are f o r Quine f a i l u r e s of s u b s t i t u t i v i t y are f o r Frege in s t a n c e s o f s h i f t e d reference and so s u b s t i t u t i v i t y o f c o - r e f e r e n t i a l terms doesn't f a i l a f t e r a l l . R u s s e l l does away w i t h such f a i l u r e s by e l i m i n a t i n g the n o t - p u r e l y - r e f e r e n t i a l term by paraphrase. Quine seems content t o simply note the d e v i a t i o n . Nonetheless, he i s not happy about r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y . I t i s not at f i r s t easy to see why, i f Quine i s simply content to note the phenomenon of r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y , he c a l l s i t "an i n f i r m i t y worth worrying about"^^, includes i t i n W & 0 under the heading "vagaries of r e f e r e n c e " , argues against model l o g i c on the b a s i s t h a t i t i n v o l v e s d e a l i n g w i t h opaque contexts i n improper ways and worries about p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e contexts f o r much the same reason. Quine may be content t o note the e x i s t e n c e of r e f e r e n t i a l l y opaque contexts, but he i s not pre-pared to pass over i t l i g h t l y . R e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y may be j u s t a f a c t of language but i t i s a deeply t r o u b l i n g one. - 47 -Quine i s w i l l i n g to give up what Frege could not, the e x t e n s i o n a l i t y of a l l contexts. He i s not w i l l i n g t o give up something more important, however. We have already seen the connection between pure reference and the f u n c t i o n of s i n g u l a r terms i n p r e d i c a t i o n . While Quine w i l l a l l o w t h a t not a l l contexts are l i k e p r e d i c a t i o n i n being e x t e n s i o n a l , he w i l l not a l l o w e x t e n s i o n a l i t y and s i n g u l a r reference to be 35 separated. L i n s k y ^ says the p r i n c i p l e o f s u b s t i t u t i v i t y i s e x p l i c a t i v e of the idea of s i n g u l a r reference, and argues t h a t the p r i n c i p l e i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of ref e r e n c e . This i s no doubt close to Quine's own view. The p r i n c i p l e i s "one of the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s governing i d e n t i t y " - ^ says Quine, and we might add f o r him t h a t i t i s the fundamental p r i n c i p l e which r e l a t e d i d e n t i t y and s i n g u l a r reference. Where exten-s i o n a l i t y f a i l s , there can be no reference. Indeed i t i s hard to see what Quine has i n mind when he c a u t i o u s l y reminds us that n o t - p u r e l y - r e f e r e n t i a l contexts need not be n o t - r e f e r e n -t i a l - a t - a l l - ^ . We are l e f t i n the dark about what t h i s "im-pure" reference might be and Quine hi m s e l f o f t e n h i n t s at a s s i m i l a t i n g n o n - r e f e r e n t i a l occurrences of expressions to merely a c c i d e n t a l o n e s ^ . Thus he speaks of a s s i m i l a t i n g of a l l opaque contexts to quotation as being not n e c e s s a r i l y de-39 s i r a b l e but perhaps p o s s i b l e . But i n quotation-contexts expressions occur a c c i d e n t a l l y and can be e l i m i n a t e d by para-phrasing the sentence u s i n g the device of s p e l l i n g . - 43 -The reason there i s no need to f o r c e a l l n o t - p u r e l y - r e f e r -e n t i a l contexts i n t o the q u o t a t i o n a l mode i s t h a t "we are not unaccustomed to passing over occurrences t h a t somehow 'do not count' — 'mary' i n 'summary', 'can' i n 'canary'; and we can a l l o w s i m i l a r l y f o r a l l n o n - r e f e r e n t i a l occurrences of terms, once we know what to look f o r " ^ . While I wholeheartedly agree w i t h Kaplan^- t h a t "the f u r t h e r evidence of Word and Object b e l i e s any s i m p l i s t i c c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f Quine's a t t i t u d e s toward intermediate ( i . e . , n o t - p u r e l y - r e f e r e n t i a l ) occurrences", I do f i n d i t r a t h e r d i f f i c u l t to see what a l t e r n a t i v e s there are f o r Quine to t r e a t i n g n o t - p u r e l y - r e f e r e n t i a l occurrences of expressions as m e r e l y - a c c i d e n t a l . So Quine's a t t i t u d e toward f a i l u r e of e x t e n s i o n a l i t y i s t h a t he allows t h a t i t happens, but t r e a t s such f a i l u r e s r a t h e r s e r i o u s l y as f a i l u r e s o f r e f e r e n c e . Such at l e a s t i s h i s strongest tendency. The t i g h t connection which e x i s t s between s u b s t i t u t i v i t y and s i n g u l a r reference a l s o e x i s t s between sub-s t i t u t i v i t y and q u a n t i f i c a t i o n . On the standard o b j e c t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f q u a n t i f i e r s , the v a r i a b l e s perform the f u n c t -i o n of s i n g u l a r r e f e r e n c e . ' ( E x ) F x ' i s t r u e j u s t i n case the p r e d i c a t e F i s t r u e of at l e a s t one object i n our domain of d i s c o u r s e . The p r i n c i p l e embodied i n the operations of u n i v e r -s a l i n s t a n t i a t i o n and e x i s t e n t i a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n i s what l i n k s q u a n t i f i e d statements and s i n g u l a r statements which are t h e i r - 49 -i n s t a n c e s . But t h i s l i n k can operate only i n cases where we are genuinely speaking of o b j e c t s . I f i t were not f o r the f a c t t h a t i n saying t h a t Socrates i s a man we say t h a t Socrates, under whatever name or none, s a t i s f i e s the pr e d i c a t e is-a-man, we could not go on to i n f e r that some object s a t i s -f i e s t h a t p r e d i c a t e . Such are the notions o f object and s a t i s f a c t i o n . E x i s t e n t i a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n only works i n t r a n s -parent contexts. And since opaque contexts are c h a r a c t e r i z e d as i n v o l v i n g some operator which we w r i t e at the beginning o f the context and which creates the o p a c i t y , we get the famous dictum t h a t we cannot q u a n t i f y across the operator and i n t o an opaque context. Whether or not we are s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w s from Quine's arguments, i t c e r t a i n l y r e -a f f i r m s our e a r l i e r claim t h a t opaque contexts are a s s i m i l a t e d t o contexts i n which expressions occur a c c i d e n t a l l y . I f we cannot q u a n t i f y i n t o an opaque context, we cannot s i n g l e out parts o f what occurs i n i t and r e l a t e them to expressions out-s i d e . What appears i n s i d e an opaque contexts i s t r e a t e d s e m a n t i c a l l y as a u n i t without s i g n i f i c a n t s t r u c t u r e . This i s evident when Quine claims t o f i n d "as appealing as any" the a l t e r n a t i v e of t r e a t i n g p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e sentences as being of simple s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e form so t h a t i n : 20) Tom b e l i e v e s t h a t Mary i s d e c e i v i n g him. •Tom* i s the subject and the r e s t i s a simple p r e d i c a t e ^ - 2 . - 50 -B. TRANSPARENT PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES The contrast between t h i s and Frege's view o f ob l i q u e contexts i s i n t e r e s t i n g . L i k e Quine, Frege t r e a t s o b l i q u e contexts as i n one sense opaque. Q u a n t i f y i n g i n t o such con-t e x t s makes no sense t o Frege and thus any cross-reference between what would normally be regarded as c o - r e f e r e n t i a l expressions i n s i d e and outside the context i s i m p o s s i b l e . S i m i l a r l y s u b s t i t u t i o n s which Tom would approve of i n (20) above as r e p o r t i n g the same st a t e of mind such as the one y i e l d i n g : 21) Tom b e l i e v e s t h a t h i s g i r l f r i e n d i s d e c e i v i n g him. are j u s t not allowed on Frege's or Quine's view. But a f t e r t h i s s i m i l a r i t y , two d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s appear, one i n favour o f Frege's view, one i n favour o f Quine's. Frege, but not Quine, at l e a s t as f a r as I can see, allows t h a t whatever occurs i n s i d e opaque contexts has semantical s t r u c t u r e , i t r e f e r s t o a p r o p o s i t i o n composed of senses. T h i s , apart from being i n t u i t i v e l y b e t t e r than t r e a t i n g e v e r y t h i n g i n the con-t e x t en b l o c , allows f o r embelishments of Frege.'s theory such as I already discussed and were c a r r i e d out to t h e i r f u l l e s t by David Kaplan i n " Q u a n t i f y i n g I n " . This embelishment, we w i l l r e c a l l , c o n s i s t s very roughly of s p e c i f y i n g a range o f d e s c r i p t i o n s , or more g e n e r a l l y : c o n d i t i o n s , under which the - 51 -person who has the p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e "perceives" the ob j e c t of h i s a t t i t u d e . This allows f o r l i m i t e d s u b s t i t u t -a b i l i t y and moves l i k e the one from (20) t o (21) above. A l -though the d e t a i l s of such a programme are not n e a r l y worked out y e t , i t s p o s s i b i l i t y speaks s t r o n g l y i n favour of the Fregean approach t o p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e context. Quine 1s theory, on the other hand, has an advantage which R u s s e l l was perhaps on the b r i n k o f d i s c o v e r i n g w i t h h i s n o t i o n t h a t primary e l i m i n a t i o n s were p o s s i b l e i n sentences l i k e : 6) George IV wished t o know whether Scott •= the author of Waverly. y i e l d i n g sentences l i k e : 6p ) One and only one man i s Scott and George IV wished t o know whether t h a t man the author of Waverly. Now R u s s e l l was not e x a c t l y sure what one would mean to say by a sentence which brought the object of a p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e o u t s i d e the opaque context, so to speak. Quine brought to a f i n e a r t such e x p o r t a t i o n of terms and i n s i s t e d , furthermore, that such exported terms are no longer i n an opaque p o s i t i o n . Herein l i e s one o f the l a r g e d i f f e r e n c e s between Frege and Quine. Both o f them saw o p a c i t y as some-' t h i n g o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n a l i n g u i s t i c context formed by an o p a c i t y - c a u s i n g operator. But while Frege saw the presence or - 52 -absence of such an operator as f u l l y determining the o b l i q u e -ness or d i r e c t n e s s o f the context, Quine does not. Thus, he remarks t h a t quotation does not n e c e s s a r i l y destroy the r e -f e r e n t i a l i t y of a context, i t only can do s o ^ . Not o n l y are some p r o p o s i t i o n a l - a t t i t u d e contexts t r a n s -parent, according t o Quine, some are both transparent and opaque, though of course w i t h respect to d i f f e r e n t terms. ( 6 P S ) above i s one such example. 'The author of Waverly' occupies a n o n - r e f e r e n t i a l p o s i t i o n , w h i l e 'Scott' has been exported and so does not, even though i t s t i l l occurs w i t h i n the context i n the form of a v a r i a b l e r e f e r r i n g back outside the context. In the E n g l i s h v e r s i o n above, I render the v a r i a b l e as 'that man'. So i n a sense you can q u a n t i f y i n t o an opaque context and the context stays opaque but the p o s i t -i o n bound by the outside q u a n t i f i e r becomes transparent. A l a r g e part o f the famous " Q u a n t i f i e r s and p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t -udes" and the s e c t i o n s on p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s i n Word and  Object^* are devoted to working out the d e t a i l s of a technique o f "so-phrasing our statements of p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e as to keep s e l e c t e d p o s i t i o n s r e f e r e n t i a l and others not". The p o s s i b i l i t y o f doing t h i s i s a l a r g e point i n favour of Quine's, and perhaps R u s s e l l ' s t h e o r i e s . The d i s t i n c t i o n between opaque and transparent p r o p o s i t -i o n a l a t t i t u d e s (or n o t i o n a l and r e l a t i o n a l r e s p e c t i v e l y t as - 53 -Quine sometimes c a l l s them) i s , thanks to Quine, "part of the conventional wisdom of our p h i l o s o p h i c a l tiraes"^5. Neverthe-l e s s , a b r i e f e x p o s i t i o n and i l l u s t r a t i v e example are i n order here. Quine's own examples have mostly i n d e f i n i t e terms i n the c r u c i a l p o s i t i o n . Thus we have the r e l a t i o n a l : 22) There i s someone such t h a t Ralph b e l i e v e s t h a t he i s a spy. and the n o t i o n a l : 23) Ralph b e l i e v e s t h a t there i s someone such t h a t he i s a spy. With 'he' r e f e r r i n g back to 'someone', not t o 'Ralph', the marked co n t r a s t between the two sentences i s t h a t (23) a s c r i b e s t o Ralph a b e l i e f most of us share, t h a t there are s p i e s ; w h i l e (22) says that Ralph knows of a p a r t i c u l a r person who he t h i n k s i s a spy. Since the only d i f f e r e n c e between d e f i n i t e and i n -d e f i n i t e terms i s , on Quine's view ( f o l l o w i n g R u s s e l l ) the presence of a uniqueness-clause i n the case of the former, we can see how the d i s t i n c t i o n c a r r i e s over to cases i n v o l v i n g d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s and names. Taking existence to be a predicate f o r the moment, we can con s t r u c t the f o l l o w i n g h i s t o r i c a l l y r e l e v a n t p a i r o f examples: 24) The being greater than which none can be conceived i s such t h a t Anselm b e l i e v e s t h a t i t e x i s t s of n e c e s s i t y . - 54 -25) Anselm b e l i e v e s that the being greater than which none can be conceived e x i s t s of n e c e s s i t y . I n (24) 'God' can r e p l a c e the i n i t i a l d e s c r i p t i o n thus making i t c l e a r t h a t the sentence a s c r i b e s to S t . Anselm the b e l i e f t h a t the c o n c l u s i o n of h i s o n t o l o g i c a l argument i s t r u e . (25), on the other hand, says that he b e l i e v e s one of the e s s e n t i a l premisses of h i s argument, the d e s c r i p t i o n cannot be r e p l a c e d by the simple term as i n (29). The b e l i e f we a s c r i b e t o Anselm i n (25) i s not about God, but could be b e t t e r expressed as the b e l i e f t h a t t o be the being than which none greater can be conceived i s t o e x i s t of n e c e s s i t y . While the c o n c l u s i o n o f Anselm's argument i s that a c e r t a i n object e x i s t s o f n e c e s s i t y , the premiss which we say he b e l i e v e s i n (25) expresses a c e r t -a i n r e l a t i o n between the notions o f a being g r e a t e r than which none can be conceived and of necessary e x i s t e n c e . (24) and (22), the a s c r i p t i o n s o f r e l a t i o n a l b e l i e f take the p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e to be a three (or more i f we "export" more terms) place r e l a t i o n between the believer, the o b j e c t r e -f e r r e d to by the exported term, and the complex p r e d i c a t e i n s i d e the p r o p o s i t i o n a l - a t t i t u d e context. The b e l i e f a s c r i b e d i s b e l i e f about an o b j e c t . I n the n o t i o n a l cases, what i s be-l i e v e d i s some p r o p o s i t i o n . This i s why i n a d d i t i o n t o the r e l a t i o n a l - n o t i o n a l and transparent-opaque terminology the medieval De Re- De D i c t o one i s sometimes used. - 55 -Quine recognizes that De Re p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s are necessary i f we want t o express c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s which r e q u i r e cross-reference between terms i n s i d e and outside the context, but he does have qualms about such c o n s t r u c t i o n s . We have already seen t h a t one might have misgivings about: (6P S) One and only one man i s Scott and George IV wished to know whether t h a t man » the author of Waverly. as an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f : (6) George IV wished to know whether Scott - the author of Waverly. s i n c e appropriate s u b s t i t u t i o n would y i e l d a sentence which, p r i o r t o rephrasing i n t o q u a n t i f i c a t i o n a l form reads: 26) George IV wished to know whether the author of Waverly •= the author of Waverly. The problem i s perhaps not as great as i t i s made out to be. While co n s t r u c t i o n s l i k e (26) are somewhat unusual, esp-e c i a l l y i f they are to be i n t e r p r e t t e d De D i c t o , i n the De Re v e r s i o n which i n t e r e s t s us here they c e r t a i n l y do occur. In such occurrences the f i r s t 'the author o f Waverly' would q u i t e n a t u r a l l y be taken as merely p o i n t i n g out the ob j e c t o f George's b e l i e f t o the audience w i t h no r e f l e c t i o n on how he r e f e r s to the o b j e c t . The case i s s i m i l a r to the much more f a m i l i a r s o r t of example such as when I comment on the confusion of a misguided f r i e n d : - 56 -27) He t h i n k s t h a t cold-blooded monster i s h i s dearest f r i e n d . Read De Dicto, (27) i s almost c e r t a i n l y f a l s e , indeed a s i m i l a r case could be made out where the d e s c r i p t i o n used to r e f e r to the object o f my f r i e n d ' s b e l i e f was c l e a r l y l o g i c - a l l y incompatible w i t h what i s s a i d of i t . But read De Re (27) makes p e r f e c t sense and might indeed be t r u e . I t i s obvious t h a t 'that cold-blooded monster' i s my. d e s c r i p t i o n of the person, not my f r i e n d s . Cases l i k e (27) are frequent and not very p u z z l i n g . The more unusual (26) ought t o be seen only as an u n f a m i l i a r instance o f a f a m i l i a r way of speaking. Quine sees something e l s e odd about transparent b e l i e f . I f a l l the f o l l o w i n g sentences are read as De Re b e l i e f a s c r i p t -i o n s , an apparently p a r a d o x i c a l c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w s . 28) Fred b e l i e v e s t h a t h i s neighbour's cat i s a w i t c h i n d i s g u i s e . 29) Fred b e l i e v e s t h a t h i s own cat i s not a w i t c h i n d i s g u i s e . But unbeknownst to Fred, M i t z i has simply been s w i t c h i n g houses and so: 30) Fred's neighbour's cat =- Fred's own c a t . and so, w i t h appropriate s u b s t i t u t i o n i n (29), we get both (28) and - 57 -31) Fred b e l i e v e s t h a t h i s neighbour's cat i s not a w i t c h i n d i s g u i s e . Quine suggests t h a t perhaps t h i s i s a l r i g h t so l o n g as we don't take (28) and (31) as j o i n t l y i m p l y i n g : 32) Fred b e l i e v e s t h a t h i s neighbour's cat i s and i s not a w i t c h i n d i s g u i s e . Kaplan claims that such an i m p l i c a t i o n can e a s i l y be blocked and shows how to do i t i n h i s neo-Fregean way of g e t t i n g sub-s t i t u t i v i t y and q u a n t i f y i n g - i n back i n t o oblique c o n t e x t s . But as I have already attempted t o show, Kaplan's programme, important as i t i s , i s not the same as the e q u a l l y important programme of rendering s e l e c t e d p o s i t i o n s t r a n s p a r e n t . I f we are to s e r i o u s l y pursue the idea of De Re b e l i e f a s c r i p t i o n s , we must allow (32) as a consequence o f (28) and (31). I f (38) and (29) are r e - w r i t t e n as unambiguously De Re, then together they e n t a i l : 33) Fred's neighbour's cat and Fred's own cat are such th a t Fred b e l i e v e s of the former and does not b e l i e v e of the l a t t e r t h a t i t i s a w i t c h i n d i s g u i s e . But given (30) and the f u l l e x t e n s i o n a l i t y of everything be-f o r e ' b e l i e v e s ' as w e l l as of the p o s i t i o n s occupied by the v a r i a b l e s 'former' and ' l a t t e r ' how can the move to (32) poss-i b l y be blocked? - 53 -I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that w h i l e Quine i n s i s t s i n " Q u a n t i f i e r s and P r o p o s i t i o n a l A t t i t u d e s " that we can somehow block the inference from: 34) Ralph b e l i e v e s t h a t O r t c u t t i s a spy. and 35) Ralph b e l i e v e s that Ortcutt i s not a spy. t o : 36) Ralph b e l i e v e s t h a t O r t c u t t i s and O r t c u t t i s not a spy. t h a t we are f r e e to deny t h i s i m p l i c a t i o n , at any r a t e , i n Word and Object he seems to have r e t r e a t e d from t h i s p o s i t i o n and maintains merely t h a t we can block the i m p l i c a t i o n from (36) t o : 37) Ralph b e l i e v e s t h a t O r t c u t t i s and i s not a spy. What Quine seems to be doing here i s s p l i t t i n g h a i r s i n order to avoid what he thi n k s are i n t o l e r a b l e c o n c l u s i o n s . But why, e x a c t l y , i s (37) i n t o l e r a b l e ? I t i s c e r t a i n l y not l o g i c a l l y d e f e c t i v e i n any way. I t a t t r i b u t e s a n e c e s s a r i l y f a l s e b e l i e f to Ralph, but t h a t i n i t s e l f i s not odd at a l l . I t i s an unfortunate but t r u e c o n d i t i o n o f the human mind th a t i t holds i n c o n s i s t e n t b e l i e f s . One might also point out tha t - 59 -o l d Ralph would not agree that he hold the b e l i e f . But we do have b e l i e f s which we would most vehemently deny h o l d i n g i f they were presented i n a d i f f e r e n t , perhaps more perspicuous, form than the one we use to a f f i r m them. I t i s o n l y i f we show a person t h a t what he b e l i e v e s i s i n c o n s i s t e n t t h a t he w i l l admit i t and, i f he i s r a t i o n a l and honest w i t h h i m s e l f , do h i s best not to b e l i e v e i t any more. The c l a s s i c a l examples of t h i s process are found i n the S o c r a t i c dialogues. Thus Thrasymachus claims i n the Republic 338c t h a t j u s t i c e i s the advantage of the stronger and by 339d Socrates shows tha t Thrasymachus b e l i e v e s not only t h a t , but a l s o i t s d e n i a l , t h a t j u s t i c e i s what i s not the advantage of the stronger. We f i n d nothing i n t o l e r a b l e about Thrasymachus* both h o l d i n g an incon-s i s t e n t b e l i e f and vehemently denying that he does. Perhaps there i s a more complex reason why Quine f i n d s (37) so odd. In the case of Thrasymachus, the l o g i c a l l y de-f e c t i v e b e l i e f a r i s e s because he has an i n c o n s i s t e n t d e f i n i t i o n of j u s t i c e . He b e l i e v e s two non-empirical p r o p o s i t i o n s which are i n c o n s i s t e n t because t h e i r s ubjects are, of n e c e s s i t y , i d e n t i c a l . But Ralph b e l i e v e s two e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , (34) and (35) and the only reason he b e l i e v e s them both i s t h a t he i s mistaken about an e m p i r i c a l , contingent i d e n t i t y v i z . t hat the s u s p i c i o u s - l o o k i n g man i n the brown hat i s O r t c u t t , the p i l l a r of the community o f t e n seen at the beach. Ralph, - 60 -u n l i k e Thrasymachus, i s on l y making a l o g i c a l l y harmless em-p i r i c a l mistake and i t should not saddle him w i t h l o g i c a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t b e l i e f s . In view of the f a c t t h a t '2 + 3 - 5, and 2 -v 3 ^ 5', and •I am t y p i n g , and I am not t y p i n g 1 express e q u a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t p r o p o s i t i o n s , the above reasoning i s a b i t odd. I t doesn't matter whether the i n c o n s i s t e n t components are e m p i r i c a l or non-empirical i n themselves, the law of n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n a p p l i e s i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y . This i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e but we can s t i l l d i s t i n g u i s h between cases where someone b e l i e v e s two i n c o n s i s t e n t p r o p o s i t i o n s because o f a l o g i c a l mistake he i s making, i n which case we are e n t i t l e d to a t t r i b u t e a s e l f -c o n t r a d i c t o r y b e l i e f to him, and cases l i k e Ralph's where he i s merely wrong about a matter of f a c t . C. REFERENCE, MODALITY AND ESSENTIALISM A major development which Quine could be s a i d to have pro-voked r a t h e r than i n i t i a t e d i s the renewed i n t e r e s t in,and approval of, a theory f o r which he coined the name " A r i s t o t e l i a n e s s e n t i a l i s m ' , "subject t o c o n t r a d i c t i o n by s c h o l a r s , such being the penalty f o r a t t r i b u t i o n s to A r i s t o t l e " ^ . Quine f i n d s the existence o f such a d o c t r i n e i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a -d i t i o n "curious"^'* 7 and the d o c t r i n e i t s e l f ' i n d e f e n s i b l e " ^ . To f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t e h i s a t t i t u d e towards i t , we can quote h i s c a l l i n g i t "unreasonable"^, " b e w i l d e r i n g " ^ , a "metaphysical - 61 -jungle"5 1 , and at the very l e a s t "uncogenial" to hlm:?(~. The most c l e a r and succinct d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s d o c t r i n e i s perhaps found i n "Three Grades of Modal Involvement": A r i s t o t e l i a n e s s e n t i a l i s m i s the d o c t r i n e t h a t some of the a t t r i b u t e s o f a t h i n g (quite independently of of the language i n which the t h i n g i s r e f e r r e d t o , i f at a l l ) may be e s s e n t i a l to the t h i n g , and others a c c i d e n t a l . E.gr. , a man, or t a l k i n g animal, or f e a t h e r -l e s s biped ( f o r they are i n f a c t a l l the same things) i s e s s e n t i a l l y r a t i o n a l and a c c i d e n t a l l y two-leg.pred and t a l k a t i v e , not merely qua man but qua i t s e l f 53 We w i l l r e t u r n to what Quine and other philosophers t h i n k i s wrong w i t h the d o c t r i n e of A r i s t o t e l i a n e s s e n t i a l i s m , but f i r s t l e t us see how the theory came to p l a y such a l a r g e r o l e i n the d i s c u s s i o n of q u a n t i f i e d model l o g i c . Quine i s convinced that a l o g i c of n e c e s s i t y and possib-i l i t y i s doomed from the s t a r t . The n o t i o n o f n e c e s s i t y i s , a f t e r a l l , based on the notion of a n a l y t i c i t y "as f o l l o w s : a statement of the form ' N e c e s s a r i l y . . . ' i s t r u e i f and o n l y i f the statement which ' n e c e s s a r i l y ' governs i s a n a l y t i c . . . and mutatis mutandis f o r statements of the form 'Possibly., . . of.course. Quine was t h e r e f o r e not predisposed toward model l o g i c t o s t a r t w i t h due to h i s w e l l known s c e p t i c i s m concern-i n g the a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n . But even i f a n a l y t i c -i t y i s t e m p o r a r i l y accepted as i n t e l l i g i b l e , Quine has the f o l l o w i n g argument against q u a n t i f i e d modal l o g i c . - 62 -I f q u a n t i f i e d modal l o g i c i s to be of any more use than p r o p o s i t i o n a l modal l o g i c , i t must be p o s s i b l e to have the n e c e s s i t y operator embedded i n the formulae, not merely a t t a c h -ed to complete sentences. Unfortunately, f o r reasons we have alr e a d y discussed, t h i s i s quite impossible. We w i l l r e c a l l t h a t a modal context l i k e : 17) N e c e s s a r i l y 9 i s greater than 7. i s opaque si n c e s u b s t i t u t i o n of c o - r e f e r e n t i a l terms w i l l y i e l d : 38) N e c e s s a r i l y the number of planets i s gr e a t e r than 7. which i s a manifest falsehood s i n c e there could have been 5 pla n e t s , or any other number of them. We have a l s o seen t h a t one can not q u a n t i f y across an opacity-forming operator i n t o the opaque context. The problem, we have seen, i s not .that such a procedure would y i e l d f a l s e statements, i t i s tha t i t would not y i e l d any i n t e l l i g i b l e ' statements at a l l . Quantify-i n g i n t o opaque contexts simply does not make sense. I t i s c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t we cannot q u a n t i f y i n t o modal contexts and thus t h a t q u a n t i f i e d modal l o g i c i s doomed. There are at l e a s t two ways i n which the preceding argu-ment i s incomplete. One of them we have l o c a t e d already i n the not e n t i r e l y convincing argument against q u a n t i f i c a t i o n i n t o opaque contexts. I t s weakest part i s the move from L e i b n i t z ' s - 63 -law o f i n d i s c e r n a b i l i t y of i d e n t i c a l s to the r u l e t h a t co-r e f e r e n t i a l expressions are everywhere s u b s t i t u t a b l e s a l v a v e r i t a t e . Quine's con c l u s i o n was, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , t h a t where s u b s t i t u t i v i t y doesn't hold the expressions are not pu r e l y r e f e r e n t i a l . There i s an absence of a theory of impure reference and some i n d i c a t i o n t h a t such reference i s no reference at a l l . Although Quine's arguments are l e s s than e n t i r e l y convincing, and there c e r t a i n l y are ways o f having reference i n opaque contexts, h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t reference and transparency go hand i n hand i s i n t u i t i v e l y a t t r a c t i v e not o n l y to me, but to most of the t h e o r i s t s who are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the important changes i n the semantics o f reference I w i l l d i s c u s s . One of the ways o f a v o i d i n g Quine's c o n c l u s i o n i s , of course, Kaplan's i n " Q u a n t i f y i n g - i n " . This provides f o r impure reference i n oblique contexts w i t h the device of s p e c i f y i n g which terms w i l l and which w i l l not r e f e r , r e s t r i c t i n g s u b s t i t u t i v i t y t o standard names of objects i n modal contexts. A somewhat s i m i l a r theory seems to be t h a t o f R. B. Marcus who uses the name 'tag' f o r her terms which e s s e n t i a l l y denote an object the way standard names do f o r Kaplan. She doesn't q u a n t i f y over expressions l i k e Kaplan, but her s u b s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of q u a n t i f i e r s (roughly: 'Ex . . . x . . .' i s t r u e i f there i s a s u b s t i t u t i o n instance *... a of i t which i s true) accomplishes much the same r e s u l t : t h a t some but not a l l denoting expressions can be - 64 -substituted i n modal contexts salva v e r i t a t e and reference i n opaque contexts i s thus possible, i f impure'*''. For our pur-poses, l e t us assume along with Quine and many others that reference and s u b s t i t u t i v i t y do go together and so quantif i e r s ranging over objects and not expressions or intensions cannot reach across opacity-forming operators. For convenience, I w i l l c a l l t h i s assumption 'Quine's thesis'.'1' i n what follows. The other problem with the argument against q u a n t i f i c a t -ion into modal contexts i s that i t i s not a c t u a l l y shown that modal contexts are opaque. After a l l , there i s a pe r f e c t l y legitimate and prima f a c i e harmless reading of (38) which takes i t to be transparent. 3&T) The number which i n fac t numbers the planets i s necessarily greater than 7. Arthur Smullyan noticed t h i s i n his 1948 "Modality and Descript-ion"-*^. In that paper he does what Russell could not have done because modal l o g i c was not i n i t i a t e d by C. I. Lewis u n t i l many years aft e r "On Denoting"-''''. Russell's d i s t i n c t i o n between primary and secondary scopes of descriptions applies to Quine's famous example (38): (3#P) (Ex) (x i s the no. of planets) & N (x i s greater than 7). (38S) N (Ex) (x i s the no. of planets & x i s greater than 7). (38P) i s , of course, just a t r a n s l a t i o n (38T) into i t s proper - 65 -R u s s e l l i a n form (where, however, 'the 1 i s used i n s t e a d o f R u s s e l l ' s uniqueness-condition which i t would be merely cumber-some t o w r i t e out i n f u l l every t i m e ) . In t h i s v e r s i o n o f (38), the term r e f e r r i n g t o 9 has been "exported" out of the opaque context i n much the way Quine i s w i l l i n g t o s e l e c t i v e l y render transparent c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n s i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l - a t t i t u d e con-t e x t s . Quine does not, however, want t o a l l o w such e x p o r t a t i o n i n the case of modal contexts. There are two p o s s i b l e and e q u a l l y c o n c l u s i v e reasons f o r t h i s u n w i l l i n g n e s s to do i n the case o f modality what he s t r o v e to do f o r p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s . Both reasons have to do w i t h Quine's b e l i e f , q u i t e common among other 20th century philosophers, t h a t f o r a l l sentences £, No. i f and only i f '£» i s a n a l y t i c . I n the f i r s t p o s s i b l e reason t h i s t h e s i s f i g u r e s r a t h e r d i r e c t l y . D e f i n i t -ions o f a n a l y t i c i t y vary and seldom are p r e c i s e , but one t h i n g emerges from them. Whether a n a l y t i c i t y i s d e f i n e d as t r u t h i n v i r t u e of the meaning of the words, or t r u t h r e v e a l e d by a c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s of the sentence at hand, or as W i t t g e n s t e i n envisages i t i n the T r a c t a t u s , a t r u t h which i s shown by the s t r u c t u r e o f our language, a k i n d of by-product of our n o t a t i o n , i t i s evident t h a t a n a l y t i c i t y i s a property o f sentences dependent as i t i s on the very words used (or at l e a s t t h e i r meanings). C l e a r l y , s u b s t i t u t i o n of c o - r e f e r e n t i a l terms i s - 66 -not going t o preserve a n a l y t i c i t y unless the terms happen t o be synonymous. Q u a n t i f i c a t i o n i n t o modal contexts i f these are to be mere s t y l i s t i c v a r i a n t s f o r a t t r i b u t i o n s o f a n a l y t -i c i t y makes about as much sense as q u a n t i f y i n g i n t o q u o t a t i o n -a l contexts and d e r i v i n g from (Quine's example): 39) 'Cicero' contains s i x l e t t e r s . 40) (Ex) ('x' contains s i x l e t t e r s ) . The a n a l y t i c i t y o f a sentence depends j u s t as much on the meanings of i t s words and i t s grammatical s t r u c t u r e as what a phrase i n qu o t a t i o n marks r e f e r s to depends on the l e t t e r -types and t h e i r concatenation. I f 'Np' i s j u s t another way of saying 1'p' i s a n a l y t i c ' then i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g or d i f f -i c u l t to see th a t 'N' forms an opaque context. Quine doesn't use t h i s short argument. Instead he conced-es t h a t p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n the modal context can be rendered transparent, but only at the p r i c e of A r i s t o t e l i a n e s s e n t i a l i s m . I t i s not hard t o see t h a t he i s r i g h t , given the way he d e f i n -ed A r i s t o t e l i a n e s s e n t i a l i s m . I f a p o s i t i o n i s transparent then the term occupying i t i s p u r e l y r e f e r e n t i a l , i t s f u n c t i o n i s to p i c k out an o b j e c t . This a f t e r a l l i s why any other term w i l l , i f i t i s c o - r e f e r e n t i a l , preserve t r u t h - v a l u e . Since i t i s an object we are t a l k i n g about, and what we are saying about i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , what we are doing i s - 67 -a t t r i b u t i n g a necessary property to an object qua i t s e l f , as Quine says. This i s A r i s t o t e l i a n e s s e n t i a l i s m , as Quine de-f i n e s i t . The view th a t a n a l y t i c i t y i s the mother o f n e c e s s i t y comes i n again i n the way Quine dismisses e s s e n t i a l i s m as a meta-p h y s i c a l j u n g l e : Perhaps I can evoke the appropriate sense of bewilder-ment as f o l l o w s . Mathematicians may conceivably, be s a i d to be n e c e s s a r i l y r a t i o n a l and not n e c e s s a r i l y two-legged; and c y c l i s t s n e c e s s a r i l y two-legged and not n e c e s s a r i l y r a t i o n a l . But what of an i n d i v i d u a l who counts among h i s e c c e n t r i c i t i e s both mathematics and c y c l i n g ? . . . i n s o f a r as we are t a l k i n g r e f e r -e n t i a l l y o f an o b j e c t , w i t h no s p e c i a l b i a s o f back-ground grouping o f mathematicians as against c y c l i s t s or v i c e versa, there i s no semblance of sense i n r a t i n g some of h i s a t t r i b u t e s as necessary and others as contingent58. Necessary a t t i b u t e s can o n l y have one b a s i s , Quine i s s a y i n g . They must be based on a c e r t a i n way of s p e c i f y i n g an i n d i v i d u a l as opposed to o t h e r s . This man i s n e c e s s a r i l y r a t i o n a l because he i s a mathematician and ' A l l matematicians are r a t i o n a l ' i s a n a l y t i c . In arguing against e s s e n t i a l i s m , Quine doesn't a l l o w the e s s e n t i a l i s t t o a t t r i b u t e necessary p r o p e r t i e s t o objects under whatever d e s c r i p t i o n or none as he h i m s e l f says the e s s e n t i a l i s t must. Since n e c e s s i t y i s based on a n a l y t i c i t y t h e r e must be a d e s c r i p t i o n under which the necessary property i s a t t r i b u t e d to the o b j e c t . I t i s t r u l y absurd to then pre-tend t h a t the necessary a t t r i b u t e i s o f the o b j e c t , e l i m i n a t i n g - 68 -the n e c e s s i t y - p r o v i d i n g d e s c r i p t i o n once i t has been used. Quine doesn't a t t a c k an e s s e n t i a l i s t view, there cannot be one f o r him to at t a c k . I f n e c e s s i t y i s based on a n a l y t i c i t y , e s s e n t i a l i s m doesn't get o f f the ground. I discussed the d i f f e r e n c e between the goals o f R u s s e l l and Frege and the more recent attempts to study n a t u r a l l a n g -uage. I t would be an o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n to say t h a t Quine i s i n search of a l o g i c a l l y p e r f e c t language of s c i e n c e . He i s not, however, .just l o o k i n g f o r the semantics o f n a t u r a l language. He i s w i l l i n g t o say that our n a t u r a l language i s incoherent, i n some areas, and he would have to say t h i s about our n a t u r a l propensity to speak i n e s s e n t i a l i s t sentences. We a s c r i b e modal a t t r i b u t e s t o o b j e c t s , i . e . , t r e a t modal contexts as transparent, a l l the time. For example when we say such things as that Nixon could have l o s t the e l e c t i o n , or t h a t Ann Landers could not have learned to swim. I t could be argued t h a t these natural-language instances o f a s c r i p t i o n s of modal a t t r i b u t e s to objects are not cases of genuine A r i s t o t e l i a n e s s e n t i a l i s m s i n c e the n e c e s s i t i e s i n v o l v e d are not of the metaphysical a l e t h i c k i n d , but i n s t e a d p s y c h o l o g i c a l , p h y s i c a l , or otherwise c o n d i t i o n a l n e c e s s i t i e s and p o s s i b i l i t i e s . This i s undoubtedly t r u e but i t has been argued q u i t e p l a u s i b l y t h a t these n e c e s s i t i e s are not d i f f e r -ent i n ki n d but only i n streng t h from the hard l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y - 69 -o f A r i s t o t e l i a n e s s e n t i a l i s m . But even i f t h i s i s not so, the i s s u e of kinds or strengths of n e c e s s i t y i s quite d i f f e r -ent from the iss u e of a t t r i b u t i o n s o f (any k i n d of) n e c e s s i t y t o o b j e c t s . The o n l y reason strong e s s e n t i a l i s m doesn't occur i s t h a t the metaphysical or l o g i c a l sense of ' n e c e s s a r i l y ' does not occur i n n a t u r a l language, i t i s a philosopher's n e c e s s i t y . But i f the concept o f l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y i s s u p p l i e d t o the n a t u r a l language speaker, he has no problems extending h i s e s s e n t i a l i s t tendencies to l o g i c a l l y necessary a t t r i b u t e s o f o b j e c t s . He w i l l not be taken aback by the f a c t t h a t 9 i s e s s e n t i a l l y odd and c o n t i n g e n t l y the number o f planets or t h a t Socrates ceases t o e x i s t when he dies but not when he gets a ta n and so i s e s s e n t i a l l y a l i v e but c o n t i n g e n t l y p a l e . Essen-t i a l i s m seems t o be not j u s t an e x o t i c metaphysical theory, but a f a c t about n a t u r a l language t o be i n v e s t i g a t e d . - 70 -I I I . THE NEW THEORIES OF REFERENCE I t would be impossible to cover more than a f r a c t i o n o f what has r e c e n t l y happened i n the f i e l d of reference i n t h i s s e c t i o n . Some of the most important new ideas about reference have to do w i t h a whole s e r i e s of d i s t i n c t i o n s , v a r i o u s l y r e -l a t e d , c u l m i n a t i n g , I b e l i e v e i n the d i s t i n c t i o n between d i r e c t and c o n d i t i o n a l reference. In the f o l l o w i n g pages, I w i l l t r y t o f i n d my way through what has become a maze of d i s t i n c t i o n s . A. WHAT IS ESSENTIALISM? When Smullyan a p p l i e d the n o t i o n of the scope of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s to modal contexts, he was merely t r y i n g to f i n d a f o r m a l i z e d equivalent of an i n f o r m a l d i s t i n c t i o n we can make between the f o l l o w i n g two statements: 41) The so-and-so s a t i s f i e s the c o n d i t i o n t h a t i t i s necessary t h a t Fx. 42) I t i s necessary t h a t the so-and-so s a t i s f i e s the c o n d i t i o n t h a t Fx. Smullyan's two formulations succeed on the i n f o r m a l l e v e l i n c a p t u r i n g the d i f f e r e n c e between the transparent and opaque senses of modality, or r a t h e r they succeed i n being examples of sentences which are most n a t u r a l l y construed as opaque and transparent r e s p e c t i v e l y . What R u s s e l l ' s theory allowed him - 71 -to come up w i t h were what he took t o be formal equivalences of what he took t o be sentences expressing the e s s e n t i a l i s t and n o n - e s s e n t i a l i s t c o n s t r u a l s o f n e c e s s i t y ^ 0 . An unfortunate t h i n g happened, however. Smullyan's c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the d i s t i n c t i o n i n terms o f the order o f q u a n t i f i e r s and modal operators has l e d many philosophers to equate e s s e n t i a l i s m w i t h the s y n t a c t i c property of p r e d i c a t e -c a l c u l u s sentences of having the modal operator anywhere but at the f r o n t ( f o r an outstanding example of t h i s misconception see T. Parsons and R. B. Marcus ). The s i t u a t i o n d i d not become any c l e a r e r when to the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of transparency, e s s e n t i a l i s m , and a c e r t a i n order of operators i n q u a n t i f i e d modal sentences, De Re modality was added. The medieval De Re - De D i c t o d i s t i n c t i o n , i n t u i t i v e l y f a i r l y c l e a r , i s i n f a c t not at a l l simple and c l e a r - c u t . I w i l l now attempt t o d i s -entangle t h i s mass of d i s t i n c t i o n s at the r i s k o f appearing to be merely s p l i t t i n g h a i r s . What we are t r y i n g t o do i s to l o c a t e the d i f f e r e n c e between the two senses o f : 38) The number o f planets i s n e c e s s a r i l y g r e a t e r than 7. In one sense, (38) i s t r u e and says ( i n the language o f p o s s i b l e -world semantics which I w i l l simply take f o r granted here) t h a t the number of planets i n t h i s w o r l d , that i s the number 9, i s - 72 -i n every p o s s i b l e world greater than 7. In another sense, (38) i s f a l s e and says that i n every p o s s i b l e w orld, there are more than seven p l a n e t s . Thus f a r there i s no problem, save the problem o f i d e n t i t y through p o s s i b l e worlds. This i s the problem of how i t i s p o s s i b l e (or what i t means) f o r one object to e x i s t i n many p o s s i b l e worlds or perhaps how we could ever t e l l t h a t we have the same object i n these worlds. Philosophers are d i v i d e d i n t o two camps on t h i s problem. Those who t h i n k there i s a problem (David Lewis, R. Chisholm, B. Brody, and formerly D. Kaplan) ,. and those who don't (A. P l a n t i n g a , S. K r i p k e , D. Wiggins, and l a t e l y D. Kaplan). The l a t t e r camp seems to be g e t t i n g l a r g e r , the switch-over of David Kaplan i s j u s t one example of t h i s . I count myself among those who have never been able to see what the problem i s supposed to be, over and above the problem of what i t i s to be the same object i n t h i s world, and t h e r e f o r e w i l l not d i s c u s s the matter. In the f i r s t sense of (38) we are a t t r i b u t i n g a necessary property to an o b j e c t , the d e s c r i p t i o n 'the number of p l a n e t s ' o n l y serves to f i x on the object we wish to p r e d i c a t e something of . The d e s c r i p t i o n plays no part i n the n e c e s s i t y which binds the a t t r i b u t e t o the o b j e c t . The n e c e s s i t y i s thus not based on a n a l y t i c i t y which i s something wholly dependent on the sense of the expressions i n a sentence. The denoting phrase i s i n a transparent p o s i t i o n here and to preserve t r u t h - v a l u e i t i s enough to preserve i t s reference. - 73 -In the other sense of (38), the n e c e s s i t y we are a t t r i -b u t i n g i s o f a d i f f e r e n t k i n d . 'The number o f p l a n e t s ' i s i n an opaque p o s i t i o n s i n c e i f we s u b s t i t u t e d ' 9 ' the t r u t h - v a l u e would change. This k i n d of n e c e s s i t y i s based on a n a l y t i c i t y and (38) i s f a l s e because 'The number o f planets i s greater than 7* i s not a n a l y t i c . As Quine puts i t : "Being necessar-i l y or p o s s i b l y thus and so i s i n general not a t r a i t of the object concerned, but depends on the manner of r e f e r r i n g t o the o b j e c t " 6 2 . What s o r t of a d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h i s ? On the s u r f a c e , we are merely d i s t i n g u i s h i n g two s o r t s of ways of reading 'the number o f p l a n e t s ' , i . e . , n o t i n g an ambiguity i n c e r t a i n con-s t r u c t i o n s i n E n g l i s h . But j u s t as t o note the ambiguity of 'bank' i s i n one way to d i s t i n g u i s h r i v e r banks from f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s so making the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two read-ings of (38) i s a l s o i n part d i s t i n g u i s h i n g two r e a l phenomena. And s i n c e Quine c a l l s one o f these a metaphysical jungle i t would seem t h a t i t i s the e s s e n t i a l i s t view of r e a l i t y t h a t Quine i s o b j e c t i n g t o , not to the readin g o f (38) i n t h i s way per se, but only because i t i s an inst a n c e of an e s s e n t i a l i s t statement (as noted i n I I (C), Quine doesn't use the "short argument" against transparent n e c e s s i t y ) . I n disambiguating (38) we could be d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between two kinds of n e c e s s i t y , which we w i l l f o r now c a l l 'opaque* - 74 -and 'transparent', or between two ways of c o n s t r u i n g c e r t a i n c o n s t r u c t i o n s . The two d i s t i n c t i o n we could be making happen to be co-extensional i n t h i s i nstance because one reading o f the c o n s t r u c t i o n e x e m p l i f i e s opaque n e c e s s i t y , the other the transparent k i n d . But there i s no reason t o suppose t h a t a l l and o n l y opaque c o n s t r u c t i o n s w i l l exemplify opaque n e c e s s i t y and a l l and o n l y transparent w i l l y i e l d transparent n e c e s s i t y . One d i s t i n c t i o n i s l i n g u i s t i c , the other metaphysical. I n what f o l l o w s we w i l l keep i n mind t h a t i t i s the metaphysical d i s t i n c t i o n that matters, l i n g u i s t i c expressions of transparent n e c e s s i t y being nonsense only because the metaphysics o f e s s e n t i a l i s m are incoherent. F i r s t l e t us look at some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t r y i n g t o f i n d an easy l i n g u i s t i c c r i t e r -i o n of transparent vs. opaque n e c e s s i t y . In the course of our search we w i l l a l s o t r y t o j u s t i f y our u s i n g the terms 'transparent' and 'opaque' which p r o p e r l y apply t o l i n g u i s t i c contexts f o r a metaphysical d i s t i n c t i o n . Can R u s s e l l ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between primary and secondary scope capture the ambiguity o f : 3#) The number of planets i s n e c e s s a r i l y greater than 7? I don't t h i n s so, at l e a s t not as e a s i l y as i s sometimes thought;. The t r o u b l e i s w i t h the opaque reading which, to f o l l o w Smullyan and keep the modal operator o u t s i d e , i s - 75 -(38S) N (Ex) (x i s the number of planets and x i s greater than 7) Now i t may be argued t h a t t h i s r e ndering i s r i g h t , but I t h i n k t h i s would be a mistake caused by paying to c l o s e an a t t e n t i o n t o the s p e c i a l f eatures o f the example. The rendering only works i f what we are t a l k i n g about are a b s t r a c t o b jects(such as numbers) or God. Nothing e l s e e x i s t s n e c e s s a r i l y . I f we t a k e : 43) N (Ex) (x i s the bachelor next door and x i s unmarried) as the c o r r e c t way of expressing i n pr e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s the opaque and t r u e reading o f : 44) The bachelor next door i s n e c e s s a r i l y unmarried. the mistake becomes more apparent. The problem i s that (43) a t t r i b u t e s more n e c e s s i t y than ( 44 ) . I f we l e a v e (43) as i t i s , i t reads t h a t t h e r e i s something i n every p o s s i b l e world which i s the bachelor next door. We could attempt to get around t h i s by changing (43) t o : 45) N (Ex) ( i f x i s the bachelor next door, then x i s unmarried). Now we are no longer saying t h a t i n every p o s s i b l e world the bachelor next door e x i s t s , but o n l y that something e x i s t s which has the complex a t t r i b u t e s p e c i f i e d by the open sentence - 76 -f o l l o w i n g •(Ex)'. But everything s a t i s f i e s t h a t a t t r i b u t e , we don't s p e c i f y even the object i n t h i s world which i s the bachelor next door and s u r e l y we want to do t h i s . Otherwise why would we use a d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n at a l l ? We want, then, t o r e t a i n the reference to an object i n t h i s world but not make i t necessary that the d e s c r i p t i o n we use r e f e r i n every world. We can t r y : 46) (Ex) N (x i s the bachelor next door and x i s unmarried). I f we take (46) as the c o r r e c t way t o render (44) we abandon the imperative t h a t the modal operator precede the q u a n t i f i e r . But c l e a r l y we must abandon i t i f we don't want to p r e d i c a t e necessary e x i s t e n c e . I n (46) we are q u a n t i f y i n g i n t o an opaque context, i n c o n t r a s t t o the primary scope read-i n g where the context we qu a n t i f y i n t o i s tr a n s p a r e n t . We can ask f o l l o w i n g Quine: Who i s t h i s person who i s n e c e s s a r i l y both a bachelor and unmarried, i s i t George, the man whose wedding we are going to c e l e b r a t e t h i s Friday? Apart from t h i s problem, (46) a l s o has the disadvantage of s t a t i n g t h a t there i s an object i n t h i s world which i s i n every world both the bachelor next door and unmarried. This i s not only not what we mean by the opaque reading of (44)> i t i s a l s o f a l s e and (44) i s not. I f we attempt to combine the fea t u r e s of (45) and (46) we get: - 77 -47) (Ex) N ( i f x i s the bachelor next door then x i s unmarried). which can't capture the opaque sense of n e c e s s i t y s i n c e i t i s trans p a r e n t . Not o n l y w i l l every s u b s t i t u t i o n i nstance pre-serve t r u t h value so lo n g as the s u b s t i t u t e d terms are co-r e f e r e n t i a l , t r u t h value i s preserved u s i n g any term so long as i t r e f e r s t o a l l . But perhaps t h i s i s too f a c i l e a c r i t i c i s m . Granted, (47) w i l l not do f o r the opaque reading of (44). But the reason f o r t h i s i s that the open sentence f o l l o w i n g 'N' i s simply t r u e of every object and the reference t o George which plays some r o l e i n (44) i s l o s t . Furthermore, the f a c t t h a t the open sentence i s t r u e of every object seems to play some r o l e i n the reason the opaque reading of (44) i s t r u e . Perhaps we can combine these two i n s i g h t s i n t o a new t r a n s c r i p t i o n : 48) (Ex) f ( x i s the bachelor next door) and N ( i f x i s the bachelor next door then x i s unmarried)^. This may not be the c o r r e c t r endering, but I t h i n k i t i s at l e a s t very c l o s e to i t . There i s reference to George but no claims o f necessary e x i s t e n c e . The necessary property George i s s a i d t o have i s shared by a l l o bjects and i s based on the a n a l y t i c a l r e l a t i o n between being the bachelor next door and being unmarried. Also i n t u i t i v e l y r i g h t i s the f a c t t h a t (48) e n t a i l s both t h a t George i s a bachelor and tha t he i s unmarried, but not tha t he i s e i t h e r o f these n e c e s s a r i l y . - 78 -The most obvious l e s s o n to be drawn from the f a c t t h a t (48) i s at the very l e a s t much c l o s e r to the c o r r e c t v e r s i o n o f the opaque reading of (44) than (43) i s that nothing as simple as the primary-scope secondary-scope d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l do as the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the d i f f e r e n c e between our two senses of n e c e s s i t y . But much more serious lessons f o l l o w as w e l l . (48), as we have seen i n the case of (47), i s an instance o f a transparent modal context. We are q u a n t i f y i n g i n t o the context and there i s no l a c k o f sense because of i t . Worse than t h a t , our serch f o r a n o n - e s s e n t i a l i s t reading o f (44) has l e d us to an e s s e n t i a l i s t sentence. We are c l e a r l y a s c r i b i n g to a necessary a t t r i b u t e to an o b j e c t , v i z . George, under any d e s c r i p t i o n . What was supposed to be the De D i c t o v e r s i o n of (44) i s De Re on two separate and quite d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a o f what i t i s to be De Re. According to one c r i t e r i o n , a sentence i s De Re i f the d e s c r i p t i o n r e f e r r i n g t o i t s subject has primary scope, i . e . , the modal operator i s w i t h i n the scope of the d e s c r i p t i o n . According to the more t r a d i t i o n a l c r i t e r i o n a p r o p o s i t i o n i s De Re. Have we simply c o l l a p s e d the d i s t i n c t -i o n we were t r y i n g t o make more pr e c i s e ? I don't t h i n k so. A f t e r a l l , there are s t i l l two senses to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d o f : 44) The bachelor next door i s n e c e s s a r i l y unmarried. - 79 -One on which the sentence i s t r u e , one on which i t i s f a l s e . There i s some sense i n which the f a l s e v e r s i o n i s De Re and transparent. The sense i n which i t i s transparent i s c l e a r . •The bachelor next door' can be replaced by a c o - r e f e r e n t i a l expression without changing the t r u t h value. There i s a l s o some sense i n which the t r u e v e r s i o n i s De D i c t o and a c l e a r way i n which i t i s opaque. Vie have t r i e d to f o l l o w out the t r u e v e r s i o n and came t o what seems l i k e a good approximation, (48). Without even going i n t o r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f (48) as e s s e n t i a l i s t , transparent and De Re, we can see tha t i t does not c o l l a p s e i n t o the f a l s e v e r s i o n o f (44), because (48) i s c l e a r l y t r u e . We can take t h i s as a reason t o doubt t h a t (48) i s the r i g h t t r a n s l a t i o n o f the t r u e reading of (44). I p r e f e r to take i t as very good evidence t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n s which so many philosophers seem to take as reasonably c l e a r and e a s i l y a p p l i c a b l e , the d i s t i n c t i o n between De Re and De D i c t o , e s s e n t i a l i s t and n o n - e s s e n t i a l i s t , and between opaque and transparent modality, are i n f a c t e i t h e r incoherent or more l i k e l y much too crude f o r the ki n d of work we would l i k e to put them t o . That I a l s o see our r e s u l t s as showing th a t the d i s t i n c t i o n s are not i d e n t i c a l w i t h R u s s e l l ' s s c o p e - d i s t i n c t -i o n goes without saying. - 80 -I t appears that we have been u s i n g two d i s t i n c t c r i t e r i a o f transparency i n the above d i s c u s s i o n . Take, f o r example: 46) (Ex) N (x i s the bachelor next door and x i s unmarried). I s the n e c e s s i t y transparent or opaque? The e x i s t e n t i a l q u a n t i f i e r i s outside the context and so i f (46) makes sense and we are q u a n t i f y i n g i n t o the modal context, i t must be t r a n s p a r e n t . (46) makes sense and says t h a t there i s something i n t h i s world which i s both a bachelor and unmarried i n every p o s s i b l e world, thus i t i s transparent. On the other hand, i f we ask the question Quine asks , i . e . , "Who i s t h i s person who i s n e c e s s a r i l y both a bachelor and unmarried?" we see that the context i s opaque. The open sentence f o l l o w i n g the q u a n t i -f i e r becomes tru e when c e r t a i n r e f e r r i n g expressions are i n -s e r t e d , e.g., 'the bachelor next door', and f a l s e w i t h other c o - r e f e r e n t i a l ones. We wanted to f i n d the t r u e v e r s i o n of (44) so the necess-i t y i n (46) cannot be transparent. But can we go through w i t h the opaque reading? Of course not, because ex hypothesi on t h i s r e a d i n g the p o s i t i o n occupied by 'x' i s opaque so cannot be occupied by a v a r i a b l e bound by the e x i s t e n t i a l q u a n t i f i e r . Bound v a r i a b l e s are the paradigamtic v e h i c l e s of reference (the on l y ones f o r Quine) and i f a term r e f e r s , i t i s i n a t r a n s -parent p o s i t i o n . Furthermore, w h i l e we want a t r u e sentence, - 81 -the attempted opaque reading would be at best indeterminate (depending as i t does on what r e f e r r i n g expression goes i n the p o s i t i o n occupied by 'x f f o r i t s t r u t h value) and at worst, as w e l l as i n f a c t , j u s t nonsense. In (47) the conjunction i s replaced by a c o n d i t i o n a l , making f o r a t r u e sentence. But now the sentence must be t r a n s p a r e n t , s i n c e i t i s t r u e and a f o r t i o r i makes sense. The p a r a d o x i c a l f a c t t h i s e x e r c i s e presents us w i t h i s t h a t t o express s i n g u l a r statements of opaque n e c e s s i t y we must put them i n transparent form. Upon r e f l e c t i o n , t h i s i s not sur-p r i s i n g s i n c e to express anything i n p r e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s we must allow the bound v a r i a b l e s to be i n transparent p o s i t i o n s . I t i s of the essence of bound v a r i a b l e s t h a t they only occur t r a n s p a r e n t l y . This holds t r u e even i n sentences where the e x i s t e n t i a l q u a n t i f i e r f o l l o w s the n e c e s s i t y operator, s i n c e i t i s simply a consequence of the o b j e c t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f q u a n t i f i e r s and Quine's t h e s i s . The o p a c i t y o f the t r u e reading of (44) cannot then be expressed by the o p a c i t y o f the p r e d i c a t e - c a l c u l u s sentence. The r e f e r r i n g expressions of p r e d i c a t e - c a l c u l u s sentences do not occur i n opaque p o s i t i o n s . Perhaps the f o l l o w i n g way o f l o o k i n g at o p a c i t y w i l l help us gain some understanding of how o p a c i t y i s expressed i n transparent sentences. I have a l -ready noted the s i m i l a r i t y , or perhaps i d e n t i t y , o f Frege !s - 82 -sense and the part of the denoting phrase R u s s e l l analyses as a p r e d i c a t e . I have c a l l e d t h i s f e a t u r e of the phrase the r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n and argued t h a t both R u s s e l l and Frege maintain that i t i s by. means of t h i s c o n d i t i o n t h a t reference i s accomplished. On the b a s i s of t h i s s i m i l a r i t y , we might p r o f i t a b l y s w i t c h from d i s c u s s i n g the problem from Quine's b a s i c a l l y R u s s e l l i a n point of view t o the vocabulary o f sense and r e f e r e n c e . Whether or not a given occurrence of a r e f e r r i n g express-i o n i s opaque or transparent can be seen as a matter o f the importance of the expressions sense t o the t r u t h - v a l u e o f the sentence. I n transparent contexts the sense determines the t r u t h value only t o the extent that i t determines the refe r e n c e . The p a r t i c u l a r sense of the expression i s n ' t e s s e n t i a l and any other sense would do as w e l l so lo n g as i t determine the same r e f e r e n t . This i s not the case i n opaque contexts. There the p a r t i c u l a r sense i s ins t r u m e n t a l i n deter-mining the t r u t h - v a l u e . (This way of p u t t i n g i t i s o f course c l o s e r to Carnap i n Meaning and N e c e s s i t y 6 ^ than t o Frege f o r whom on l y reference determines t - v a l u e . Frege achieves the same end by h i s d o c t r i n e of i n d i r e c t reference.) The r e f e r - ence o f the denoting phrase remains the same reg a r d l e s s of transparency or o p a c i t y , o n l y the importance of the sense changes. Now i n the case of opaque n e c e s s i t y , what determines - 83 -the t r u t h value i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the sense o f the denot-i n g phrase t o the sense of the r e s t of the sentence. A n a l y t i c -i t y i s j u s t a c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n between the meanings of express-i o n s . What we want to do then i s to express t h i s r e l a t i o n be-tween the senses i n the part o f the a n a l y s i s which, f o r R u s s e l l , corresponds to the sense of denoting phrases. We see from t h i s another inadequency o f what i s normally taken t o be the opaque rea d i n g : 43) N (Ex) (x i s the bachelor next door and x i s unmarried). The a n a l y t i c r e l a t i o n between the two predicates i s not c l e a r l y shown. S u r e l y the reason the opaque reading of (44) i s t r u e i s because i t i s qu i t e g e n e r a l l y the case t h a t : 49) N (x) ( i f x i s a bachelor then x i s unmarried). This r e l a t i o n between being the bachelor next door and being unmarried i s not expressed i n (43) which j u s t says t h a t i n every p o s s i b l e world there i s something which i s both the bachelor and unmarried whereas what we want to say i s tha t bachelorhood e n t a i l s unmarriedness. I t i s not necessary t h a t something e i t h e r i n t h i s world or i n every p o s s i b l e world i s both unmarried and the bachelor next door. What i s necessary i s t h a t whatever i s a bachelor next door i s a l s o unmarried. - 84 -We see then how to represent opaque n e c e s s i t y , i . e . , how to c o n struct opaquely necessary sentences, i n transparent contexts. Our best rendering o f (44) does t h i s . 48) (Ex) (x i s the bachelor next door and N ( i f x i s the bachelor next door then x i s unmarried). We a l s o see why we can c a l l the transparent (48) a statement o f opaque n e c e s s i t y , s i n c e we have found a broader concept o f opaque n e c e s s i t y as t r u t h i n v i r t u e o f the r e l a t i o n of the senses of the words c o n s i t u t i n g the sentence. I t w i l l c r e a t e opaque contexts only i n sentences where the r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n and the " v e h i c l e " of r e f e r e n c e are i d e n t i c a l . This i s not the case i n p r e d i c a t e c a l c u l u s . I t i s worth n o t i n g the d i s p a r i t y between Quine's concept-i o n o f r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y and Frege's view of oblique contexts. For Quine s u b s t i t u t i v i t y o f c o - r e f e r e n t i a l terms s a l v a v e r i t a t e i s the c r i t e r i o n o f transparency and any context which f a i l s i n t h i s i s opaque. Frege's conception i s much more s p e c i f i c . We don't have to subscribe to h i s d o c t r i n e o f s h i f t e d r e f e r -ence to agree w i t h h i s i n s i g h t t h a t i n opaque contexts senses p l a y a more important r o l e and help determine the t r u t h - v a l u e . There seems to be a world of d i f f e r e n c e s i n c e Frege's concept-i o n has enabled us to speak of opaque n e c e s s i t y independently of whether the context i s opaque or transparent i n Quine's sense. (I'm u s i n g 'opaque' even f o r Frege's conception because - 85 -'o b l i q u e 1 r e f e r s to contexts where a s h i f t i n reference occurs and I c e r t a i n l y don't want to commit myself to t h i s theory o f the troublesome contexts by us i n g t h i s terminology.) But t h i s great d i f f e r e n c e i s only i l l u s o r y . Quine's conception of o p a c i t y and transparency can be extended t o cover more than j u s t the behaviour of r e f e r r i n g expressions. There are co-extensional predicates as w e l l c o-extensional terms and Frege's opaque contexts are the same as Quine's i f we o n l y stop i n s i s t i n g that i t i s the e x c l u s i v e property o f r e f e r r i n g expressions to be opaque or transparent. Perhaps we can get away from both Frege's and Quine's biases by us i n g the terminology ' e x t e n s i o n a l ' and ' i n t e n s i o n a l ' which doesn't prejudge the i s s u e e i t h e r i n favour of Frege's r e f e r e n t i a l s h i f t s or i n favour of Quine's tendency t o concentrate on r e f e r r i n g expressions. That Quine d i d have t h i s tendency i s apparent i n h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t q u a n t i f y i n g i n t o opaque con-t e x t s w i l l i n e v i t a b l y r e q u i r e an e s s e n t i a l i s t metaphysics. T h i s , of course, i s not t r u e s i n c e i n (48) we q u a n t i f y i n t o the i n t e n s i o n a l context, 'N ( i f x i s the bachelor next door then x i s unmarried)*, and the r e s u l t makes sense and i s not an instance o f the metaphysical jungle of e s s e n t i a l i s m but o n l y o f the not too s u r p r i s i n g f a c t t h a t we can compound pre-d i c a t e s which are a n a l y t i c a l l y t r u e of everything. Q u a n t i f i e d modal l o g i c per se does not commit us to e s s e n t i a l i s m . There - 86 -are i n t e n s i o n a l contexts we can q u a n t i f y i n t o because they are not opaque. Quine outlaws q u a n t i f i e d modal l o g i c because he f a i l s to take note that when analysed s i n g u l a r non-essent-i a l i s t statements w i l l i n v o l v e q u a n t i f y i n g across the necess-i t y operator i n t o a transparent but i n t e n s i o n a l context. This i s not t o say t h a t Quine was wrong i n i n s i s t i n g that t o read (42) as: (38/>) (Ex) (x i s the number of planets) and N (x i s "greater than 7) • i s to commit o n e s e l f to an e s s e n t i a l i s t metaphysics, at l e a s t when one takes (38P) t o be t r u e . (38P) i s t r u e not because the p r e d i c a t e i s not a n a l y t i c a l . So w h i l e (38P) could be a f a l s e statement of n o n - e s s e n t i a l i s t n e c e s s i t y , i f i t i s t r u e , then the n e c e s s i t y i t a t t r i b u t e s i s e s s e n t i a l i s t . Our suggested d e f i n i t i o n of e s s e n t i a l i s t n e c e s s i t y makes i t the kind of n e c e s s i t y not determined by the r e l a t i o n be-tween the senses of the expressions i n a p a r t i c u l a r sentence, i . e . , n e c e s s i t y not based on a n a l y t i c i t y (or any other l i n g -u i s t i c f e a t u r e , f o r t h a t matter) but inherent i n , or determin-ed by the nature of what i s r e f e r r e d t o . This may agree w i t h the s p i r i t of what Quine says, but i t does not w i t h h i s a c t u a l d e f i n i t i o n of e s s e n t i a l i s m . E s s e n t i a l i s m i s , according t o Quine's o f f i c i a l statement, the d o c t r i n e t h a t o b j e c t s , under - B7 -whatever d e s c r i p t i o n or none at a l l , have some of t h e i r proper-t i e s e s s e n t i a l l y and others a c c i d e n t l y . But on t h i s d e f i n i t i o n George next door has e s s e n t i a l l y the property of being un-m a r r i e d - i f - a - b a c h e l o r . I f we f o l l o w what Quine says i s o b j e c t -i o n a b l e i n s t e a d of what he seems to mean, then our (48) i s an e s s e n t i a l i s t statement and so i s every other s i n g u l a r statement o f n e c e s s i t y . The very point o f s i n g u l a r reference i s t o p i c k out an object under whatever d e s c r i p t i o n or none ( i . e . , so t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r sense or r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n are not essen-t i a l ) , and so by Quine 1s own d e f i n i t i o n o f s i n g u l a r reference (Quine's t h e s i s ) , every such sentence must be e s s e n t i a l i s t . But what Quine i s worried about i s not p r o p e r t i e s which are had e s s e n t i a l l y simply because t h e i r l o g i c a l form makes them tr u e of e v e r y t h i n g , he i s worried about deeper e s s e n t i a l i s m , one t h a t cannot be explained by the meanings of words. There are p r e d i c a t e s , such as ' i s unmarried i f a bachelor', which exclude no p o s s i b l e or a c t u a l objects from t h e i r exten-s i o n . Other p r e d i c a t e s , such as ' i s both a bachelor and married' exclude a l l the o b j e c t s . S u r e l y Quine doesn't mean to suggest t h a t t h i s f a c t i s part of the metaphysical j u n g l e of e s s e n t i a l i s m . E s s e n t i a l i s m i s the view t h a t there i s a k i n d of n e c e s s i t y which i s not as o b v i o u s l y v e r b a l as a n a l y t i c i t y . The view which (3#0) commits us to i s that 9, the o b j e c t , has a necessary property not because the senses of the words ' 9 1 , ' i s ' , 'greater', 'than', and ' 7 ' i n t e r a c t i n c e r t a i n ways but j u s t because that i s the nature of the o b j e c t . - 83 -The working of our language which make c e r t a i n p r e d i c a t e s necessary of every object may be too complex and/or mysterious to allow us to d i s t i n g u i s h p r edicates of t h i s s o r t from ot h e r s . That Quine t h i n k s so i s w e l l known and documented i n "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". But t h i s view i s no part of A r i s t o t e l -i a n e s s e n t i a l i s m , which has more of a c l a i m to being a "metaphysical j u n g l e " . Although i t i s not as much of a jungle as Quine t h i n k s i t i s , e s s e n t i a l i s m does have some very d i f f i c u l t questions to answer. I t would go beyond my present purposes t o explore these, but I w i l l b r i e f l y e x h i b i t some of them i n t h i s para-graph. The c l a i m t h a t there are objects i n the world which, even i f we don't s i n g l e them out and describe them i n language, have s i m i l a r l y language-independent e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , has r e c e n t l y seen a r e v i v a l i n the work of Putnam, K r i p k e , Wiggins, and others. The e s s e n t i a l i s t theory of n a t u r a l kinds i s c e r t a i n l y promising. Nevertheless, there i s the nagging question which A r i s t o t l e already asked i n the Metaphysics: What i s substance? I n i t s more r e a d i l y d i g e s t i b l e form, the question i s asked i n On Generation and C o r r u p t i o n : Is there u n q u a l i f i e d coming to be and passing away? The white t h i n g i s n e c e s s a r i l y white. I f i t gets painted green i t ceases t o be white. But are there things which have e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s such t h a t i f they l o s t them they would u n q u a l i f i e d l y cease to - 89 -be? Why when Socrates d r i n k s the poison and d i e s do we want to say tha t something ceased to be? Doesn't i t j u s t cease t o be Socrates? A f t e r a l l , are not the f o l l o w i n g statements e x a c t l y p a r a l l e l ? 50) When Socrates gets a t a n the white t h i n g ceases to e x i s t . 51) When the white t h i n g i s shot Socrates ceases t o e x i s t . I f they are, what i s the sense of saying that some ob j e c t j u s t of i t s e l f i s e s s e n t i a l l y Socrates but a c c i d e n t a l l y white? I f they are not, why e x a c t l y are they not? What makes Socrates a substance and the white t h i n g not? These questions don't have as much to do w i t h s i n g u l a r reference as w i t h the problem o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n of o b j e c t s , the theory of n a t u r a l - k i n d terms, e t c . They are l a r g e l y beyond the scope of my present endeavour. We have found two senses of the opaque/transparent d i s t i n -c t i o n . One i s Quine's, where o p a c i t y or transparency are p r o p e r t i e s of a context occupied by a term of s i n g u l a r r e f e r -ence and the other b e t t e r c h a r a c t e r i z e d as i n t e n s i o n a l / e x t e n -s i o n a l , has t o do w i t h the r o l e of the senses of expressions i n determining the t r u t h value of a sentence. Corresponding t o t h i s , we have e s s e n t i a l i s t sentences on the one hand as ones expressing n e c e s s i t y not determined by the sense of the expressions used, and on the other as ones i n which d i f f e r e n t - 90 -c o - e x t e n s i o n a l r e f e r r i n g expressions can be s u b s t i t u t e d s a l v a v e r i t a t e . Thus the e s s e n t i a l i s t by the second c r i t e r i o n : 52) George i s n e c e s s a r i l y unmarried i f a bachelor. i s not e s s e n t i a l i s t because, even though they do not occur i n the r e f e r r i n g expression, the senses of 'unmarried' and 'bach-e l o r ' make the n e c e s s i t y t r u e . This i s e a s i l y v e r i f i e d by supposing, e.g., t h a t a l l and only bachelors l i v e d i n V i r g i n -i a . I n t h i s case the c o - e x t e n s i o n a l ' i n V i r g i n i a ' could not be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r 'a bachelor' without changing the t r u t h -value of the sentence. I n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i t e r a t u r e of e s s e n t i a l i s m , the two very d i f f e r e n t conceptions are not kept c l e a r l y separate. P l a n t i n g a , f o r example, f e e l s that (52) i s e s s e n t i a l i s t w h i l e Wiggins when he speaks of " i r r e d u c i b l e " e s s e n t i a l i s m means, I t h i n k , to exclude i t . Quine e x p l i c i t e l y defines e s s e n t i a l i s m as i n c l u d i n g sentences l i k e (52), but h i s best arguments only hold against the stronger e s s e n t i a l i s m which takes n e c e s s i t y to be other than s t r i c t l y language-based. Obviously, the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f very d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of phenomena, v i z . opaque occurrences of n a t u r a l language r e f e r r i n g expressions, n e c e s s i t y based on a n a l y t i c i t y , secondary scope of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s i n R u s s e l l ' s a n a l y s i s , e t c . have not helped to keep the d i s t i n c t i o n s c l e a r . Even though there i s a good - 91 -sense i n which the d e f i n i t i o n o f e s s e n t i a l i s m which excludes (50) i s more bas i c because i t defines an e s s e n t i a l i s t k i n d of n e c e s s i t y , i . e . , n e c e s s i t y i n v i r t u e of the nature of the object to which i t i s a t t r i b u t e d , f o r the purposes of a d i s -c u s sion o f reference i t i s b e t t e r to concentrate on the other sense of e s s e n t i a l i s m which, as i t turns out, i s based on the way the r e f e r r i n g expressions i n modal sentences f u n c t i o n . Out of the p r o f u s i o n of a v a i l a b l e terms I w i l l , more or l e s s a r b i t r a r i l y , p i c k 'De Re* to l a b e l t h i s k i n d of e s s e n t i a l i s t sentences. But f i r s t we must do some c l a r i f y i n g o f the uses the De Re - De D i c t o terminology i s sometimes put t o . B. RIGID DESIGNATION The medieval De Re / De D i c t o d i s t i n c t i o n has l a t e l y been used a great d e a l w i t h l i t t l e or only very sketchy and i n t u t i -t i v e understanding of j u s t what s o r t s of things i t can d i s -t i n g u i s h . Because i t has never been c l e a r what i t a p p l i e s t o and has been used r a t h e r i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y , i t has been one of the main reasons R u s s e l l ' s s c o p e - d i s t i n c t i o n has been t a c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y suposed to be adequate to deal w i t h a range of i s s u e s i n c l u d i n g some of the problems j u s t d i s c u s s e d . One o f the ways of i n t u i t i v e l y understanding the phrase "De D i c t o n e c e s s i t y 1 i s as i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the n e c e s s i t y attaches t o sentences as a whole. There i s only a s m a l l step from t h i s view to regarding only modal sentences i n which the n e c e s s i t y - 92 -operator occurs at the f r o n t (or at most a f t e r a negation-sign or other one-place operator t a k i n g whole sentences as values) o f complete q u a n t i f i e d sentences. Q u a n t i f y i n g - i n , De Re n e c e s s i t y and other r e l a t e d phenomena are thus e a s i l y , and as I hope to have i n d i c a t e d , s u p e r f i c i a l l y l i n k e d i f not i d e n t i -f i e d . At the other extreme o f the s c a l e o f p o s s i b l e i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n s ranging from s u p e r f i c i a l s y n t a c t i c a l t o deep metaphysical phenomena, the De Re / De D i c t o d i s t i n c t i o n can be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the important d i s t i n c t i o n between essent-i a l i s t } and opaque or language-based n e c e s s i t y we have j u s t f i n i s h e d l o o k i n g a t . Again, there i s a good i n u i t i v e b a s i s f o r t h i s . E s s e n t i a l i s t n e c e s s i t y r e l a t e s p r o p e r t i e s t o o b j e c t s , w h i l e n o n - e s s e n t i a l i s t n e c e s s i t y i s an accident of the way we speak which happens when words w i t h c e r t a i n senses are s t r u n g together i n a s p e c i f i c order. There are at l e a s t two, perhaps more, ways of drawing the d i s t i n c t i o n at intermediate l e v e l s between the two extremes. Before t u r n i n g to my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , I want to discuss one t h a t i s f a i r l y current and found, e.g., 65 i n P l a n t i n g a . The i n t u i t i v e b a s i s f o r t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n goes as f o l l o w s . An a s s e r t i o n of De D i c t o n e c e s s i t y a t t r i b u t e s n e c e s s i t y to a sentence, one o f De Re n e c e s s i t y does not. We can s t a r t by seeing the d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s and some of the other d i s -t i n c t i o n s we have seen al r e a d y . The present De Re / De D i c t o - 93 -d i s t i n c t i o n i s meant to apply t o sentences i n the n a t u r a l l a n g -uage, I t h i n k , w i t h r e f e r r i n g expressions l e f t i n t a c t and not subjected to R u s s e l l i a n a n a l y s i s . Thus the d i s t i n c t i o n i s not the same as the one based on the order o f operators i n analyzed sentences s i n c e , as we have seen, the De D i c t o : 53) I t i s necessary that the bachelor next door i s unmarried. does not analyze i n t o a sentence w i t h the n e c e s s i t y operator i n f r o n t . That i t i s not the same as the deep metaphysical d i s t i n c t i o n between kinds of n e c e s s i t y i s a l s o c l e a r from the f a c t t h a t : 50) George i s n e c e s s a r i l y married i f a bachelor. i s both De Re, and not e s s e n t i a l i s t by the deep c r i t e r i a . The other d i s t i n c t i o n mentioned above i s the e s s e n t i a l i s t / n o n - e s s e n t i a l i s t d i s t i n c t i o n as d e f i n e d by Quine. E s s e n t i a l i s t , or De Re as I w i l l c a l l them, sentences are- ones a t t r i b u t i n g to an o b j e c t , under whatever d e s c r i p t i o n or none, a necessary a t t r i b u t e . The other sentences are De D i c t o or n o n - e s s e n t i a l -i s t . An obvious d i f f e r e n c e between the two De Re / De D i c t o d i s t i n c t i o n s i s t h a t P l a n t i n g a ' s defines De D i c t o and leaves the r e s t De Re whereas t h i s l a s t d i s t i n c t i o n does the reverse. There i s c l e a r l y a p o s s i b i l i t y o f cases which l i e i n between the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and are thus De Re on one d i s t i n c t i o n , - 94 -De Di c t o on the other. Such a c l a s s of sentences does indeed e x i s t and i s very important and i n t e r e s t i n g . This c l a s s of sentences i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n part because there have been various e f f o r t s t o reduce De Re n e c e s s i t y t o ^66 De Di c t o which i s considered l e s s troublesome . The reason De Re n e c e s s i t y i s considered so troublesome i s , i n a n u t s h e l l , e i t h e r t h a t i t i n v o l v e s i d e n t i f y i n g an i n d i v i d u a l across poss-i b l e worlds, or tha t i t i s supposed to commit us t o e s s e n t i a l -ism. We have already seen t h a t the l a t t e r s u p p o s i t i o n i s f a l s e . The problem of i d e n t i t y across i s one which I w i l l not d i s c u s s here, as I have already i n d i c a t e d i n the preceding s e c t i o n . But do these e f f o r t s at r e d u c t i o n r e a l l y succeed i n e l i m i n -a t i n g the supposedly troublesome De Re nec e s s i t y ? They i n v a i r -a b l y reduce what are, on anyone's c r i t e r i o n , De Re sentences to what are De Dicto sentences on the c r i t e r i o n favoured by P l a n t i n g a . Thus: 54) The teacher of A r i s t o t l e i s n e c e s s a r i l y human. which on on-one's reading would be taken t o mean tha t A r i s t o t l e couldn't have been schooled by a t r a i n e d poodle, becomes: 55) I t i s n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e that P l a t o i s human. which i s d e f i n i t e l y De Dicto on Plantinga's c r i t e r i o n and does indeed capture what we would normally mean by (54). But c l e a r l y - 95 -j u s t because (54) and (55) say the same t h i n g , i f (54) a t t r i -butes a necessary property to an object then so does (55); so i t too must be De Re d e s p i t e appearances. I t would seem th a t P l a n t i n g a ' s way o f drawing the d i s t i n c t i o n does not cut as deep as the other way s i n c e h i s allows f o r two sentences which say the same t h i n g t o d i f f e r , w h i l e the d i s t i n c t i o n I favour i s between the p r o p o s i t i o n s expressed and so w i l l not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between two ways of saying the same t h i n g on the b a s i s o f t h e i r surface s t r u c t u r e . I t h i n k i t i s d e s i r a b l e t o l o c a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n at the l e v e l o f what i s s a i d r a t h e r than how i t i s s a i d , i f only because i f we l o c a t e i t at the l e v e l o f p r o p o s i t i o n s r a t h e r than sentences we can make the notions more p r e c i s e w i t h i n the apparatus of p o s s i b l e - w o r l d semantics. I have already s a i d that I want my De Re - De Dicto d i s -t i n c t i o n to r e f l e c t Quine's e x p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n of e s s e n t i a l i s m . On t h i s view a p r o p o s i t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l i s t or De Re i f a nec-essary property i s a t t r i b u t e d t o an o b j e c t . This means t h a t a De Re sentence s t a t e s that some t h i n g i s ' s u c h t h a t i n every p o s s i b l e world i t has such-and-such a property. C l e a r l y , the problem of i d e n t i t y through p o s s i b l e worlds e x i s t s f o r t h i s sense of 'De Re', but we have already decided not to spend time on t h i s . - 96 -I t should also be c l e a r t h a t every e s s e n t i a l i s t statement as defin e d by the "metaphysical" c r i t e r i a some pages back i s a l s o De Re. On the other hand, there are De Re statements of opaque or n o n - e s s e n t i a l i s t n e c e s s i t y , i n p a r t i c u l a r a t t r i b u t -ions of a n a l y t i c a l l y necessary p r o p e r t i e s . The s i t u a t i o n o f t h i s De Re / De Dicto d i s t i n c t i o n and the d i s t i n c t i o n s between the two kinds of n e c e s s i t y i s the same as the one j u s t noted between P l a t i n g a ' s and my notions of De Re and De D i c t o . One defines opaque n e c e s s i t y and leaves the r e s t e s s e n t i a l i s t , the other defines De Re and leaves the r e s t De D i c t o . There i s an overlap of sentences which a t t r i b u t e opaque n e c e s s i t y to an ob j e c t . The three d i s t i n c t i o n s are so arranged that there are sentences l i k e : 56) I t i s n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e t h a t P l a t o i s a t r i a n g l e -i f - a - t h r e e - s i d e d - f i g u r e . which are De Dicto on the surface c r i t e r i o n favoured by P l a n t -inga, De Re on the c r i t e r i o n that we are a t t r i b u t i n g a necess-ary property to an object and De Dicto ( n o n - e s s e n t i a l i s t ) again on the deepest c r i t e r i o n of two kinds of n e c e s s i t y . I f we favour the c r i t e r i o n of R u s s e l l ' s s c o p e - d i s t i n c t i o n s , the sentence i s once again De Re (with some r e s e r v a t i o n s ) . The d i s t i n c t i o n I wish to c a l l De Re / De Di c t o i s the most r e l e v a n t to t h e o r i e s o f re f e r e n c e because, as i t turns b u t , i t i s the one where whether a sentence i s De Re or De Dicto - 97 -i s determined simply by how the r e f e r r i n g expression f u n c t i o n s , t h i s f e a t u r e being i r r e l e v a n t to e i t h e r the d i s t i n c t i o n s be-tween the two kinds o f n e c e s s i t y or Plantinga's De Re / De D i c t o d i s t i n c t i o n . I t i s a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n of a p r o p o s i t i o n being De Re t h a t the r e f e r r i n g expression which denotes the "Re" be r i g i d . A r i g i d designator, f i r s t d efined and t h e o r i z e d about by Saul Kripke 6"^, i s a r e f e r r i n g expression which designates the same i n d i v i d u a l i n every p o s s i b l e world. (There i s an i n t e r e s t i n g problem of whether a r i g i d designator r e f e r s t o the same t h i n g i n every p o s s i b l e world or only i n the worlds were i t s r e f e r r e n t e x i s t s . Kripke maintains the second t h e s i s w h i l e Kaplan presents convincing arguments to show tha t Kripke's d e f i n i t i o n i s d e f e c t i v e . Though I tend to s i d e w i t h Kaplan on t h i s i s s u e , I w i l l not discuss i t at t h i s p o i n t . ) In a De Re sentence we want t o pred i c a t e a necessary a t t r i b u t e of an object no matter how r e f e r r e d t o . This i s why i t i s important t h a t the same object be denoted by the r e f e r r i n g expression i n every p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n and i r r e l e v -ant what the expression i s so long as i t picks out t h i s o b j e c t . R i g i d designators are always i n transparent p o s i t i o n s , co-e x t e n s i o n a l i t y i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of t r u t h -v alue. Quine's t h e s i s a l s o t e l l s us that r i g i d designators are v e h i c l e s of pure r e f e r e n c e . The bound v a r i a b l e i s the 69 paradigmatic r i g i d designator >. - 98 -We are now i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n to understand our t r o u b l e s w i t h Quine's opaque-transparent d i s t i n c t i o n and R u s s e l l ' s s c o p e - d i s t i n c t i o n . Quine's d i s t i n c t i o n , i n so f a r as i t a p p l i e s as i t seems to the r e f e r r i n g expressions or the p o s i t -ions occupied by them, i s the same as our De Re - De D i c t o d i s t i n c t i o n . I n a transparent p o s i t i o n c o - e x t e n s i o n a l i t y i s enough f o r s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y because the term's o n l y f u n c t i o n i s to r e f e r while i n opaque contexts the terms do not r e f e r r i g i d l y t o one object i n every p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n but to any o b j e c t which happens to s a t i s f y the r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n or the sense of the expression. Obviously, i f the sense i s changed, so w i l l the reference i n some p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n and hence the t r u t h - v a l u e of the whole. But i t i s of the essence of s i n g u l a r reference t h a t the r e f e r r i n g expression i s i n transparent p o s i t i o n , i . e . , be a r i g i d designator, at l e a s t i f the context i s a modal one. What f o l l o w s from t h i s i s a b i t s u r p r i s i n g , though. No s i n g u l -ar statement can be opaque. Statements which are genuinely about an o b j e c t can never be De D i c t o . Once t h i s i s seen, we can a l s o see why we had such problems c a p t u r i n g the De D i c t o reading of: 44) The bachelor next door i s n e c e s s a r i l y not married. Once we decided that 'the bachelor next door' ought to r e f e r - 99 -t o George, we could not have a De Dicto reading i n the sense we are d i s c u s s i n g now. The only De Dicto sentences p o s s i b l e are ones which are not s i n g u l a r but general l i k e : (43) N (Ex) (x i s the bachelor next door and x i s unmarried). which doesn't purport to r e f e r to any object but only a s s e r t s t h a t a c e r t a i n k i n d i s n e c e s s a r i l y i n s t a n t i a t e d . In so f a r as there i s a purely De Di c t o reading o f (44), i t ought t o be t r a n s c r i b e d something l i k e : 57) N (x) ( i f x i s the bachelor next door then x i s unmarried). but t h i s makes the f u n c t i o n of the d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n i n (49) very d i f f e r e n t from how R u s s e l l thought d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p -t i o n s worked. There i s no a s s e r t i o n of existence i n v o l v e d i n i t . But the more l i k e l y a n a l y s i s of (44), the one we have already g i v e n , makes the f u n c t i o n of the d e s c r i p t i o n t w o - f o l d . I t works i n the normal way of r e f e r r i n g expressions to pu r e l y r e f e r to an o b j e c t , but i t a l s o f u n c t i o n s i n the way we have i t f u n c t i o n i n g i n (57). This i s why i t occurs once i n s i d e and once out s i d e the scope of the n e c e s s i t y operator i n our a n a l y s i s (48) as w i l l be r e c a l l e d . I t i s now g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t proper names are r i g i d d e s i g n a t o r s . The arguments f o r t h i s can be found i n K r i p k e , - 100 -Donnellan, and others' . A proper name r e f e r s to the same t h i n g i n every p o s s i b l e world, namely t o whatever i t i s used to r e f e r t o i n t h i s world. We see why the r e d u c t i o n o f De Re to De Dicto sentences works i f we def i n e De D i c t o simply as a t t r i b u t i n g n e c e s s i t y to a whole sentence. I f a r i g i d design-a t o r , l i k e the proper name 'P l a t o ' i s used, i t makes no d i f f e r -ence what form the sentence takes, the r e f e r r i n g expression w i l l s t i l l p i c k out the same object i n every p o s s i b l e world. I t makes l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e whether, as i n (54)> the c l a i m i s th a t the object has a necessary a t t r i b u t e or that a c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n i s n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e of i t as i n (56). This same property of c e r t a i n r e f e r r i n g expressions accounts f o r the importance of standard names i n Kaplan's and tags i n Marcus' theory of intermediate or semi-transparent, as they might w e l l be c a l l e d , contexts mentioned e a r l i e r . I t appears then t h a t there are c e r t a i n kinds o f r e f e r r i n g expressions, l i k e proper names, which f u n c t i o n i n such a way that they are always r i g i d d e s i g n a t o r s , i . e . , w i l l only f i g u r e i n De Re statements of n e c e s s i t y . The reason proper names f u n c t i o n i n t h i s way i s t h a t they are u n l i k e anything which Frege or R u s s e l l would describe as a r e f e r r i n g expression. They do not denote by means of a r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n which the r e f e r e n t must s a t i s f y , i n s t e a d they are l i n k e d to the r e -f e r e n t by a s o r t o f "causal c h a i n " going from an i n i t i a l - 101 -"baptism" or some other kind o f "dubbing", which l i n k s an object t o the name without any i n t e r v e n i n g sense or i n t e n s i o n , t o the present use. Consequently, r i g i d designators l i k e proper names must denote the same t h i n g i n every p o s s i b l e world s i n c e they don't have any way of denoting anything e l s e . The only f u n c t i o n they have i s to r e f e r t o the p a r t i c u l a r object they r e f e r t o . Are a l l r i g i d designators l i k e t h i s ? I t would seem th a t they are not. To designate r i g i d l y i s to r e f e r to the same t h i n g i n every p o s s i b l e world. One of the ways an expression can do t h i s i s to be d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l . D i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l ex-pre s s i o n s do not r e f e r by means of a r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n but in s t e a d are l i n k e d to the r e f e r e n t d i r e c t l y . Aside from proper names, other d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l expressions would appear t o be demonstratives and perhaps other kinds of phrases as w e l l . But d i r e c t reference and r i g i d i t y are not the same t h i n g s . As we have seen, d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s can be r i g i d d e s i g n a t o r s . Saul Kripke denies t h i s , i f I understand him r i g h t , but he seems to be p l a i n l y wrong about i t . As we have seen, such sentences as: 38) The number o f planets i s n e c e s s a r i l y greater than 7. have a transparent or De Re reading. On t h i s reading, the d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n 'the number o f pla n e t s ' i s i n a transparent - 102 -p o s i t i o n which means that i t r e f e r s t o the same t h i n g i n every p o s s i b l e world. I t s f u n c t i o n i n (44) i s to r e f e r t o an o b j e c t , the number 9, and i t i s t h i s very object which has the a t t r i -bute i n question i n every p o s s i b l e world. I t i s true t h a t the d e s c r i p t i o n a l l by i t s e l f does not r e f e r to the same t h i n g i n every p o s s i b l e world but r e f e r s i n each world t o whatever s a t i s f i e s i t s r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n , but w i t h i n the context o f (38) read De Re the d e s c r i p t i o n i s r i g i d , though i t i s not d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l . I t i s by means of a c o n d i t i o n that i t r e f e r s , and the reason i t i s r i g i d i s tha t i t r e f e r s i n every p o s s i b l e world to whatever s a t i s f i e s i t s c o n d i t i o n i n t h i s world. I t i s t h i s f e a t u r e of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s which en-ables us to capture the De Re reading of sentences i n v o l v i n g d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s i n R u s s e l l ' s way and get at some of these d i s t i n c t i o n s u s i n g the no t i o n of scope. What we do i s i n e f f e c t f i x the reference of the d e s c r i p t i o n i n t h i s world before e v a l -u a t i n g the whole sentence i n every p o s s i b l e world. So d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s do f u n c t i o n as r i g i d designators i n some contexts, though they are not d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l . There i s an easy method o f transforming any d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t -i o n i n t o a r i g i d designator which w i l l denote the same t h i n g i n every p o s s i b l e world i n any context. A l l we have to do i s add t o the d e s c r i p t i o n the clause ' i n the a c t u a l w o r l d ' . Such a d e s c r i p t i o n w i l l be r i g i d r e g a r d l e s s of i t s scope or any other f a c t o r . I t w i l l nevertheless not r e f e r d i r e c t l y , but c o n d i t i o n -a l l y . - 103 -The d i s t i n c t i o n between r i g i d and n o n - r i g i d designators i s an important one f o r our understanding of reference i n modal contexts. I t i s even more important f o r our purposes, however, t h a t i n c o n s i d e r i n g why i t i s t h a t c e r t a i n express-ions are always r i g i d we come to n o t i c e d i r e c t as opposed to c o n d i t i o n a l r e f e rence. A f t e r a l l , s i n c e d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s are capable of f u n c t i o n i n g as r i g i d designators even though they r e f e r c o n d i t i o n a l l y , a theory along the t r a d i t i o n a l l i n e s of R u s s e l l ' s or Frege's could conceivably deal w i t h the prob-lems of r i g i d d e s i g n a t i o n and modal l o g i c by a s s i m i l a t i n g a l l r e f e r r i n g expressions to d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s as i t tends to do and, combining w i t h the possible-worlds view o f n e c e s s i t y , use the idea of c o n d i t i o n a l reference i n the a c t u a l world f i x i n g the object i n every p o s s i b l e world. C. DIRECT REFERENCE A l l d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l expressions are r i g i d d e signators. This i s c l e a r l y so because they l a c k sense or a r e f e r r i n g con-d i t i o n which could be s a t i s f i e d by d i f f e r e n t o bjects i n d i f f e r -ent p o s s i b l e worlds. T h e i r only "meaning" (read ' f u n c t i o n i n a sentence') i s to designate the r e f e r e n t so when sentences which they occur i n are evaluated i n d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b l e worlds, the r e f e r e n t remains the same. As we have seen, not a l l r i g i d designators are d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l . Some occurrence of d e f i n -i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s are the former but not the l a t t e r . - 104 -Proper names are the best known d i r e c t l y - r e f e r e n t i a l ex-pre s s i o n s . Others i n c l u d e demonstratives, which R u s s e l l a l -ready thought are d i f f e r e n t but d i d not seem to t h i n k t h i s through. A theory of demonstratives as w e l l as of d i r e c t reference i n general i s presented by David Kaplan i n h i s Demonstratives manuscript, the d e t a i l s of which are f a s c i n a t -i n g and i l l u m i n a t i n g but beyond the scope of a sweeping pres-e n t a t i o n such as t h i s one. One of the most h o t e l y debated t h e s i s i n recent semantics i s Donnellan's claim which i s , i f I understand "Reference and D e f i n i t e D e s c r i p t i o n s " ^ c o r r e c t l y , that d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s are sometimes (or even f r e q u e n t l y or mostly) used as d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l expressions. In some ways, Donnellan's d i s t i n c t i o n i s r a t h e r b e w i l d e r i n g . I t c l a s s i f i e s uses of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t -i o n s , l e a v i n g us i n the dark about the r e l a t i o n s h i p of these d i f f e r e n t uses to the l i n g u i s t i c contexts i n which d e s c r i p t i o n s occur. I t would seem, f o r example, that p r o p o s i t i o n a l - a t t i t u d e contexts could gain some i n t e r e s t i n g b i t s of explanatory theory from Donnellan's d i s t i n c t i o n but i t i s not c l e a r how t h i s would go. Nor do we know whether we are to conclude t h a t d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s are ambiguous or not. Rather than go on l i s t i n g the problems, l e t us look at the d i s t i n c t i o n i t s e l f and see i f any of the d i f f i c u l t i e s which people tend t o f i n d i n i t can be cleared up. Take the sentence: - 105 -58) The man who s t o l e my w a l l e t i s dishonest. there are two ways i n which t h i s sentence can be taken depend-i n g on whether the d e s c r i p t i o n i s used a t t r i b u t i v e l y or r e f e r -e n t i a l l y . I n the f i r s t case, what we are saying i s that who- ever s t o l e my w a l l e t i s dishonest. We could say the same t h i n g more c l e a r l y by s w i t c h i n g t o : 59) The man, whoever he i s , who s t o l e my w a l l e t i s dishonest. I n the other case, what we would be saying i s t h a t some p a r t i c -u l a r man, whom we are r e f e r r i n g t o as the man who s t o l e my w a l l e t but could j u s t as e a s i l y have used any other means of drawing the audience's a t t e n t i o n t o , i s dishonest. This time we have a p a r t i c u l a r person i n mind and want to say about him t h a t he i s dishonest, i n the f i r s t case we assumed th a t there was someone s a t i s f y i n g the r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n we s p e c i f i e d and a t t r i b u t e d dishonesty to t h i s person, whoever he might be. I t h i n k t h a t i t i s not hard to see that the a t t r i b u t i v e use o f d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s i s very close to the understanding of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s which the t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s had. A d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s p e c i f i e s a r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n which determines the r e f e r e n t . I t i s tempting to i d e n t i f y the r e f e r -e n t i a l use w i t h d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e , but t h i s may w e l l be a mis-take. Is i t r e a l l y t r u e that there i s no r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n - 106 -which plays a s i g n i f i c a n t part i n determining the r e f e r e n t i n cases of r e f e r e n t i a l use? One o f the problems i s that Donnellan o f f e r s a mixed s o r t of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . I n the r e f e r e n t i a l use a l l t h a t matters i s t h a t the.speaker have a p a r t i c u l a r object i n mind he intends t o r e f e r t o and intends the audiences r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s i n t e n -t i o n to be i n part what leads the audience to f i x on the o b j e c t 72 i n question. T h i s ' Gricean character of r e f e r e n t i a l uses of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s or r a t h e r o f the act of reference no matter what l i n g u i s t i c or other impliments i t uses, has o f t e n been noted and worked out to i t s f u l l e s t i n M. Beebe's Phd. d i s s e r t a t i o n A Gricean Theory of Reference*^. The a t t r i b u t i v e use o f d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s seems ha r d l y t o depend on i n t e n t -ions at a l l . The success of an a t t r i b u t i v e r eference i s meas-ured purely by whether there i s an object which s a t i s f i e s the c o n d i t i o n s p e c i f i e d by the meaning of the d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n , much as i t i s measured on R u s s e l l ' s or Frege»s view. Because the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s mixed, there i s l i t t l e reason t o suppose t h a t i t provides us w i t h e x c l u s i v e c a t e g o r i e s . I n t u i t i v e l y , t h i s i s as i t should be. There i s no reason to suppose th a t j u s t because we have some p a r t i c u l a r object i n mind we i n t e n d to r e f e r t o and use the d e s c r i p t i o n i n say: 60) The i d i o t who s t o l e my w a l l e t i s dishonest. - 107 -r e f e r e n t i a l l y , the d e s c r i p t i o n does not f u n c t i o n c o n d i t i o n a l l y as w e l l . That i s , our Gricean i n t e n t i o n s concerning an object do not e n t a i l that our reference i s d i r e c t and the r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n plays no r o l e i n the utterance. I t i s not the s o l e f u n c t i o n o f the d e s c r i p t i o n to r e f e r , i t might a l s o be a t t r i b -u t i n g . Conversely, i f the Gricean i n t e n t i o n concerning a p a r t i c -u l a r object i s missing we can't conclude t h a t what the speaker wished t o say w i l l be such t h a t success o f the d e f i n i t e des-c r i p t i o n ' s reference depends s o l e l y on the existence of an object which s a t i s f i e s the c o n d i t i o n .which a normal understand-i n g of the d e s c r i p t i o n gives us. Remarking on the l u x u r i o u s -ness o f a yacht, we might say: 61) The owner of t h i s yacht i s very r i c h . What we meant t o say doesn't become f a l s e or t r u t h - v a l u e - l e s s because the yacht i s owned by three people and no-one who could be described as the owner of the yacht e x i s t s ( f o r more examples of t h i s kind as w e l l as some other kinds o f f a i l u r e of e x c l u s i v i t y o f Donnellan's d i s t i n c t i o n see Margolis and F a l e s : "Donnellan on D e f i n i t e D e s c r i p t i o n s " ^ ) . Donnellan's d i s t i n c t i o n s t r a d d l e s two very d i f f e r e n t s o r t s o f t h e o r i e s . One i s the theory of speech-acts t o which h i s d e f i n i t i o n of the r e f e r e n t i a l use belongs and the other i s - 108 -semantics which i s what we have been d i s c u s s i n g i n t h i s work. The f i r s t i s concerned w i t h what i t i s f o r a speaker to r e f e r , the second w i t h what i t i s f o r an expression t o r e f e r . We can l o c a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n f i r m l y i n e i t h e r theory by simply t a k i n g the h a l f that i s already lodged i n i t and making an e x c l u s i v e and exhaustive c l a s s i f i c a t i o n by proclaiming simply t h a t what-ever doesn't f i t t h i s h a l f , belongs i n the other. The d i s t i n c t i o n i n the speech-act theory would put to one s i d e those uses o f d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s where the speaker has an object i n mind which he wants to r e f e r to and put t o the other s i d e a l l the other uses. I n semantics, one would have the d i s t i n c t i o n between occurrences of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s where the r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n determines the r e f e r e n t d i s -t i n g u i s h e d from a l l the other occurrences. Although w i t h i n each theory the d i s t i n c t i o n s would be both exhaustive and ex-c l u s i v e , t h i s would not be the case across t h e o r i e s . Thus (60) would appear to be both r e f e r e n t i a l and a t t r i b u t i v e , w h i l e (61) i s n o n - r e f e r e n t i a l and n o n - a t t r i b u t i v e , or so i t seems at f i r s t glance. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the d i s t i n c t i o n doesn't come out t h i s clean f o r the r a t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g reason t h a t semantics and speech-act theory are r e l a t e d i n various ways. For example, i f the r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n doesn't determine the r e f e r e n t on a p a r t i c u l a r occasion, what does? I t would seem th a t the only t h i n g t h a t can determine the r e f e r e n t i n such a case i s the context of which the speaker's i n t e n t i o n s p l a y a - 109 -l a r g e p a r t . A l l t h a t the sense of the r e f e r r i n g expression gives on such occasion are some necessary c o n d i t i o n s . Thus the expression 'he' provides us w i t h the necessary c o n d i t i o n the r e f e r e n t i s t o s a t i s f y of being male, and perhaps a l s o human. The p a r t i c u l a r object r e f e r r e d to i s found by v a r i o u s c o n t e x t u a l clues as to the speaker's i n t e n t i o n s . S i m i l a r l y , the context i n general and speaker's i n t e n t i o n s i n p a r t i c u l a r are o f t e n i n s t r u m e n t a l i n determining the r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n the object has to s a t i s f y . We have already seen t h i s i n our d i s c u s s i o n of how R u s s e l l and Frege thought they could do semantics without regard t o context. An understanding of how context r e l a t e s to reference would seem to be c r u c i a l t o the theory o f reference, both d i r e c t and c o n d i t i o n a l . D. CONTEXT Even the l i n g u i s t i c context of an expression can have a c r u c i a l e f f e c t on how the expression r e f e r s . R u s s e l l thought t h a t one could t e l l j u s t by l o o k i n g at a d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t i t was used f o r reference while the same d e s c r i p t i o n was not so used i f 'a' replaced 'the' and an i n d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n emerged. But Charles Chastain shows, i n h i s a r t i c l e "Reference and C o n t e x t " ^ t h a t i n c e r t a i n contexts i n d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s do r e f e r and could not even be replaced i n t h i s f u n c t i o n by d e f i n i t e ones. Take, f o r example, the l i n g u i s t i c context: - 110 -62) I met a man I have always admired l a s t Thursday. Though i t was the l a s t place I would expect to f i n d him. W. V. 0. Quine came to the discoteque t h a t n i g h t . n , \ f a man' r e f e r s to the same object i n the anaphoric chain 'a man . . . him . . . W. V. 0. Quine . . . ' a s the other terms i n i t . S i m i l a r l y , anyone convinced that demonstratives always r e f e r d i r e c t l y should t h i n k about the prime facie'"counter examples of contexts l i k e : 63) A l l night I could only t h i n k of her — tha t woman, as yet unknown t o me, who w i l l one day j o i n me i n holy matrimony. I t i s c l e a r t h a t a theory of how context determines r e f e r -ence i s needed, s i n c e c o n t e x t u a l clues play at the very l e a s t as much of a r o l e i n reference as semantical ones. As I have already s a i d , i t was b e l i e v e d u n t i l f a i r l y r e c e n t l y t h a t the r o l e context played i n determining reference was the same i t plays i n determining the meaning of predicates or of any other l i n g u i s t i c d e v i c e s . This r o l e i s very simple. Context j u s t f i l l s out what we are too l a z y (or e f f i c i e n t ) to say e x p l i c i t -l y . Thus context f i l l s out the d e s c r i p t i o n 'the man i n the corner' i n such a way as to make i t uniquely d e s c r i p t i v e of something. The usual way i s to add an i n d i c a t i o n of time and p l a c e . S i m i l a r l y , context w i l l f i l l out the meaning of ' t h i s ' i n such a way tha t i t s p e c i f i e s a uniquely s a t i s f i e d r e f e r r i n g  c o n d i t i o n . No doubt context o f t e n performs t h i s f u n c t i o n . I n - I l l -(65), f o r example, i t i s c l e a r t h a t 'her' i s an a b r e v i a t i o n o f , and t h e r e f o r e means the same as,'the woman who w i l l one day j o i n me i n matrimony'. But the c l a i m of the t r a d i t i o n a l seman-t i c i s t s i s tha t a l l c o n t r i b u t i o n s of context t o meaning are of t h i s k i n d and the plan was to get on w i t h the semantics s i n c e a l l the c o n t r i b u t i o n the context makes w i l l be i n g e t t i n g some o f the i m p l i c i t d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s i n t o e x p l i c i t form. The context j u s t brings more of the same to semantics and so i f we f i g u r e out how d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s r e f e r we w i l l have a l l the theory we need. The problem of context, or of egocent-r i c p a r t i c u l a r s can and should be kept as a separate s u b j e c t . Unfortunately, there are problems. Take our o l d d e s c r i p t -i o n 'the man i n the corner'. What d e t a i l s does the context provide t o make i t uniquely s a t i s f i e d ? I t w i l l add s p a t i o -temporal co-ordinates at which the object occurs. Now the o r i g i n a l d e s c r i p t i o n seems to be i d l e . The c o n d i t i o n t h a t the object i s a man and stands i n the corner i s now unnecess-ary s i n c e spatio-temporal co-ordinates determine the reference a l l by themselves. S t i l l , we might admit the o r i g i n a l con-d i t i o n s i n c e the t r u t h - v a l u e of: 64) N e c e s s a r i l y the man i n the corner i s clo s e to two w a l l s . i s a f f e c t e d by the presence or absence of the c o n d i t i o n . - 112 -But what of such expressions as demonstratives i n contexts where there i s an object we are r e f e r r i n g t o , not i n ones l i k e (63;)? There i s no very good way t o choose r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t -ions the demonstrative i n such a case stands f o r and so i t might be best to s t a y w i t h the spatio-temporal co-ordinates as the meaning of the term. But do we r e a l l y g e n e r a l l y mean by ' t h i s 1 , 'the object at co-ordinates wxyz'? Are the two expressions synonymous given a context? I f so, i t i s p a r t o f the meaning of ' t h i s ' u t t e r e d on an occasion t h a t the o b j e c t r e f e r r e d to i s , say, present. I t w i l l be a n a l y t i c a l to say, f o r example, that t h i s i s here. While i t i s t r u e t h a t we are not being very i n f o r m a t i v e when we poin t at an object i n our presence and say t h a t i t i s i n bur presence, i t i s c e r t a i n l y not necessary. We want to be able to express the c o u n t e r f a c t -u a l c l a i m t h a t t h i s object could have been elsewhere at t h i s time. But i f context r e a l l y only s p e c i f i e s c o n d i t i o n s the r e f e r e n t must s a t i s f y , such c o n t r a r y to f a c t s u ppositions w i l l be n e c e s s a r i l y f a l s e . The p l a i n f a c t t h a t they are not i s alone s u f f i c i e n t to show that the r o l e of context i n determin-i n g r e ference i s at l e a s t sometimes q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . Quite r e c e n t l y s e v e r a l philosophers have developed a theory of how context, l i n g u i s t i c e n t i t i e s and t r u t h - v a l u e s ; are r e l a t e d . The theory i s suggested by Gr i c e ' s work on con-76 v e r s a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t u r e , worked out i n s u b s t a n t i a l d e t a i l - 113 -by StaSriaker i n h i s various a r t i c l e s on pragmatics , formal-78 i z e d by Segerberg i n "Two-dimensional Modal L o g i c " , and a p p l i e d t o the problems of demonstratives and d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e 79 by David Kaplan . The b a s i c idea i s t h a t i n determining the t r u t h - v a l u e of a sentence, r e a l i t y plays two r o l e s which ought t o be kept separate and i n order. F i r s t we look at r e a l i t y when we exam-ine the context of the utterance t o f i n d out what p r o p o s i t i o n the sentence i s expressing on t h a t occasion. Only a f t e r we have determined the p r o p o s i t i o n do we evaluate i t s t r u t h . I n modal l o g i c , the idea gets g e n e r a l i z e d from r e a l i t y , or the a c t u a l world, to a l l the p o s s i b l e worlds. The term 'two-dimensional modal l o g i c ' r e f l e c t s the f a c t t h a t the same sent-ence can be true or f a l s e i n the same p o s s i b l e world depending on the p o s s i b l e world i t was u t t e r e d i n . Part of determining what p r o p o s i t i o n a sentence expresses i s f i n d i n g out how i t s r e f e r r i n g apparatus f u n c t i o n s . The two-step theory o f the e v a l u a t i o n o f sentences gives us a new, c l e a r e r way o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g d i r e c t from i n d i r e c t reference. D i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l expressions combine w i t h the context o f the utterance and determine the r e f e r e n t on the f i r s t l e v e l a l r e a dy. There i s a very good sense i n which the object the sentence i s about i s already i n the p r o p o s i t i o n . In the case - 114 -o f c o n d i t i o n a l r e f e r e n c e , the context accomplishes what the t r a d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c i s t s would have i t do i n a l l cases. I t s p e c i f i e s the p r o p o s i t i o n i n such a way as to a l l o w i t t o un i q u e l y s p e c i f y the r e f e r e n t on the l e v e l of the "circumst-ance o f e v a l u a t i o n " as Kaplan c a l l s i t , i . e . , when the t r u t h value of the p r o p o s i t i o n i s being determined at the second occasion of checking the sentence against r e a l i t y , on the model o f p o s s i b l e worlds. Perhaps we can now get c l e a r e r about Donnellan's d i s t i n c t -i o n . The context determines whether a d e s c r i p t i o n i s being used d i r e c t l y or c o n d i t i o n a l l y since i t i s at the l e v e l o f determining the p r o p o s i t i o n expressed that i t i s already de-cided whether there i s a r e f e r e n t o f only a means of determin-i n g the r e f e r e n t i n the p r o p o s i t i o n . I t i s not c l e a r what the c r i t e r i a are on the b a s i s of which t h i s d e c i s i o n i s made. They seem to be mixed. Sometimes the type of expression i s s u f f i c i e n t to determine t h i s . Proper names i n v a r i a b l y put the r e f e r e n t r i g h t i n the p r o p o s i t i o n . Other times the l i n g -u i s t i c context i s c r u c i a l , such t h i n g s as the p r o x i m i t y o f a 'whatever i t may be' clause are s u f f i c i e n t to secure t h a t only a r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n goes i n the p r o p o s i t i o n . But s t i l l other times the i n t e n t i o n s o f the speaker p l a y the c r u c i a l r o l e . This i s the case i n Donnellan's r e f e r e n t i a l use of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s . - 115 -That much of what Donnellan has to say seems to f i t our p i c t u r e . The r e f e r e n t i a l use i s always a case o f d i r e c t r e f e r -ence. But e q u a l l y c o r r e c t l y , Donnellan claims t h a t the a t t r i -b u t i v e use i s always a matter of c o n d i t i o n a l r e f e r e n c e . The r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n does indeed play the c r u c i a l r o l e i n determining the r e f e r e n t i n the circumstance o f e v a l u a t i o n . But t h i s does not mean t h a t the meaning of a d e s c r i p t i o n cannot pl a y a r o l e , even the d e c i s i v e r o l e , i n determining the r e f e r -ent i n the r e f e r e n t i a l case. Indeed one may f u l l y depend on the meaning o f an expression t o place the r e f e r e n t r i g h t i n the p r o p o s i t i o n . This may very w e l l be what i s happening i n (60). I n (61) on the other hand, there i s no problem so long as we l e t the context do one of i t s j o b s , i . e . , s p e c i f y the p r o p o s i t i o n . I f (61) i s r e a l l y s t i l l regarded as true by the speaker i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t the yacht has no s i n g l e owner, then i t cannot be part o f the p r o p o s i t i o n he was t r y i n g , u n s u c c e s s f u l l y perhaps, t o express t h a t there .is o n l y one owner. We cannot take (61) alone to s p e c i f y the p r o p o s i t i o n i n the a t t r i b u t i v e case any more than we can i n the r e f e r e n t i a l one. The context, and that means i n part the i n t e n t i o n s o f the speaker, always must be considered. - 116 -IV. CONCLUSION I t appears that some, i f not most, o f the occurences o f r e f e r r i n g expressions are d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l . To c l a i m t h i s i s to agree w i t h Strawson and Donnellan who c l a i m t h a t i n r e f e r r i n g our i n t e n t i o n s i s to p i c k out some p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g we have i n mind, the f u n c t i o n of the subject of a sentence being p r i m a r i l y t o draw the a t t e n t i o n of the audience to that t h i n g . The p r o p o s i t i o n such sentences express i s about the t h i n g already, i t contains the object so to speak. One of the i n t e r e s t i n g t h i n g s we might conclude from t h i s i s that some sentences are De Re already before they are embedded i n an opaque context. The sentence: 65) Socrates i s human. f o r example, or any other sentence where 'Socrates' i s re p l a c e d by a c o - r e f e r e n t i a l d i r e c t l y r e f e r r i n g expression cannot poss-i b l y f i g u r e i n a De Dicto opaque context. This i s easy t o see i n the case of modal contexts s i n c e a r e f e r r i n g expression which i s d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l i s always a r i g i d d e s i g n a t o r . This e x p l a i n s one of the prominent features of the r e t e r e n t i a l use of d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s , the f a c t t h a t sentences l i k e : 66) I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the teacher o f P l a t o does not teach P l a t o . - 117 -make sense and are not n e c e s s a r i l y f a l s e . A s i n g u l a r propos-i t i o n i s De Re o f i t s e l f . With the d e s c r i p t i o n 'the teacher o f P l a t o ' read a t t r i b u t i v e l y or c o n d i t i o n a l l y , however, (66) i s n e c e s s a r i l y f a l s e and to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from: 67) The teacher of P l a t o i s such that he p o s s i b l y does not teach P l a t o . (66) w i t h a d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l term has the same tr u t h - c o n -d i t i o n s as (67). Both say t h a t there i s a world i n which an i n d i v i d u a l i n the a c t u a l world, v i z . Socrates, does not teach P l a t o . But there i s a d i f f e r e n c e between the ways the terms s p e c i f y that i n d i v i d u a l . (66) has the i n d i v i d u a l d i r e c t l y i n the p r o p o s i t i o n , w h i l e (67) has i n i t the complex c o n d i t i o n which i t s r e f e r e n t must s a t i s f y of being the teacher of P l a t o i n t h i s w o rld. So, w h i l e modal sentences i n v o l v i n g c o n d i t i o n a l reference can be e i t h e r De Re or De D i c t o , ones w i t h d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l terms can only be De Re. Perhaps t h i s o f f e r s some expl a n a t i o n o f why there i s some confusion as t o the d i f f e r e n c e between Kripke's and Donnellan's d i s t i n c t i o n s . But i f some expressions are d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l , the sentences they occur i n are t o be understood along the l i n e s of what we have c a l l e d the "naive theory" (Chapter I , Se c t i o n C). I n p a r t i c u l a r , i d e n t i t y statements such as our f a m i l i a r : - 118 -1) Hesperus = Phosphorus ought to be construed along the very way which l e d W i t t g e n s t e i n t o complain that i f they are about two things they are nonsense, i f about one they say nothing at a l l . Frege was l e d t o abandon the naive theory on these grounds and i f we are to maintain the no t i o n of d i r e c t reference we have some e x p l a i n i n g to do here. F i r s t of a l l , we might c o r r e c t W i t t g e n s t e i n and point out t h a t t o say of two things t h a t they are i d e n t i c a l i s not non-sense but something n e c e s s a r i l y f a l s e and s i m i l a r l y , t o say i t of one t h i n g i s not t o say nothing at a l l but to say some-t h i n g n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e . One might wish t o defend W i t t g e n s t e i n on the grounds that i n the Tractatus W i t t g e n s t e i n defends the t h e s i s that t a u t o l o g i e s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s are without sense and so h i s dictum about n e c e s s i t y r e a l l y i s no d i f f e r e n t from the cor r e c t e d v e r s i o n j u s t s t a t e d . He does say, at 4,461, t h a t t a u t o l o g i e s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s l a c k sense, but he a l s o says i n the next paragraph, 4,46ll, t h a t " t a u t o l o g i e s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s are not, however, n o n s e n s i c a l " . Although the n i c e t i e s of Wittgenstein's d i s t i n c t i o n s are not a proper sub-j e c t f o r t h i s work, i t seems reasonably c l e a r that h i s dictum about n e c e s s i t y ought t o be correct e d as I have i n d i c a t e d even w i t h i n the system of the T r a c t a t u s . - 119 -Nonetheless a problem remains. (1) appears to be a con-t i n g e n t t r u t h , was c e r t a i n l y a s c e r t a i n e d by an astronomical d i s c o v e r y , not a l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n and i s more i n f o r m a t i v e than the sentence w i t h which i t i s synonymous on the naive theory: 2} Hesperus - Phosphorus. The proponents of d i r e c t reference have a s o l u t i o n to these p r o b l e m s ^ . Although i t i s r a t h e r complicated i n d e t a i l , the b a s i c moves are these. We must d i s t i n g u i s h between n e c e s s i t y and a p r i o r i c i t y . The f a c t t h a t (1) i s n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e does not e n t a i l t h a t we must be able to l e a r n i t s t r u t h without appeal to things e m p i r i c a l . The f a c t t h a t when we found out t h a t (1) i s t r u e we found out something about t h i s , the a c t u a l , world should not b l i n d us t o the f a c t t h a t because of the way proper names f u n c t i o n , i f (1) i s t r u e i n t h i s world then i t i s t r u e i n every other p o s s i b l e world. So the naive t h e o r i s t ' s defence against the problems r a i s e d by Frege i s simply to accept that i d e n t i t y statements are necessary, i f t r u e , but deny that t h i s makes them uninformative or a p r i o r i . The question of how (1) d i f f e r s from (2) on t h i s account can a l s o be r e s o l v e d . The two sentences express the same, n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , p r o p o s i t i o n i n contexts where 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' r i g i d l y designate the same o b j e c t . (2) but not (1) expresses a n e c e s s a r i l y true p r o p o s i t i o n i n every context {on the - 120 -assumption t h a t a name has only one r e f e r e n t i n any given con-t e x t ) because of i t s s p e c i a l form, 'a = a' . One would expect, s i n c e s i n g u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n s i n modal contexts always y i e l d De Re, and thus transparent n e c e s s i t y , the same would apply to p r o p o s i t i o n a l - a t t i t u d e contexts which ought t o a s c r i b e De Re b e l i e f s , hopes, wonderings, e t c . , when co n t a i n i n g s i n g u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n s . Unfortunately, the i s s u e s are more complex than t h i s . The problem i s t h a t such a context, e.g., 68) George b e l i e v e s t h a t R. C. Barcan i s a l o g i c i a n . w h i l e c e r t a i n l y De Re i n contrast to the De Di c t o (with the d e s c r i p t i o n read a t t r i b u t i v e l y ) , 69) George b e l i e v e s that the author of the book re q u i r e d i n P h i l . 203 i s a l o g i c i a n . s t i l l has two p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . One, on which i t i s t r u e because we are a s c r i b i n g to George the same b e l i e f about the same person as i n : 70) George b e l i e v e s t h a t R. B. Marcus i s a l o g i c i a n . The other on which i t i s f a l s e s i n c e George, being ignorant of R. B. Marcus 1 former name, b e l i e v e s what we a s c r i b e to him i n (70) but has no b e l i e f s about R. C. Barcan as he h i m s e l f would i n s i s t . - 121 -I t i s not p o s s i b l e to do much more, at t h i s p o i n t , than p o i n t t o some of the questions and ideas the above f a c t s sug-gest. F i r s t of a l l , i t would appear t h a t w h i l e we can t r e a t the object of George's b e l i e f as an object under whatever d e s c r i p t i o n or none, George's r e l a t i o n i s not to the o b j e c t s i m p l i c i t e r , but r a t h e r to the o b j e c t - d e s i g n a t e d - b y - a - c e r t a i n -range-of-terms. The f a c t t h a t some 6f these terms don't pre-sent a r e f e r r i n g c o n d i t i o n which George b e l i e v e s the o b j e c t s a t i s f i e s doesn't matter. In f a c t , s i n c e there i s an object which George has i n mind, a l l the terms d e s i g n a t i n g , to George, the object must be d i r e c t l y r e f e r e n t i a l as i s c l e a r from Donnellan's d e f i n i t i o n o f the r e f e r e n t i a l use o f d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s . So d i r e c t reference does not seem t o commit us to a theory o f mind on which people can have p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s about ob j e c t s under no name at a l l . The problem of s p e c i f y i n g the range of terms which design-ate R. B. Marcus to George i s , o f course, s t i l l the problem already mentioned s e v e r a l times which David Kaplan t r i e s t o d e a l w i t h i n " Q u a n t i f y i n g i n " . I t would appear to be a quest-i o n more w i t h i n the philosophy of mind than w i t h i n semantics, but (68) - (70) c l e a r l y show that no such d i v i s i o n o f the f i e l d i s p o s s i b l e s i n c e the question c l e a r l y bears upon both. A minor, but no l e s s i n t e r e s t i n g question i s whether there are two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of (70) corresponding to the two of ( 6 8 ) . - 122 -Both these v e r s i o n s would be t r u e i n the case of (70) o f course, which would not speak i n favour of making such a dual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . On the other hand, i t does seem t h a t t h i s i s o n l y because the v e r s i o n where we do the r e f e r r i n g and the one where we l e t George do i t c o i n c i d e i n (70). The problem of p r o p o s i t i o n a l - a t t i t u d e contexts has c e r t a i n l y s t i l l not been solved, although some progress has been made sin c e R u s s e l l ' s and Frege's i n i t i a l attempts a t s o l u t i o n s . -123-V. FOOTNOTES 1 , • The two t h e o r i e s i n question are those expressed by Gottlob Frege i n "On Sense and Reference", i n Geach and Black, ed., T r a n s l a t i o n s from the P h i l o s o p h i c a l Works of Gottlob  Frege (Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1970), pp. 56-73, and by Bertrand R u s s e l l i n "On Denoting", Mind, v o l . XIV (1905), pp. 479-493. I am indebted to David Kaplan whose seminar on the c l a s s i -c a l t h e o r i e s at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia i n 1976-7 has g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d the approach I am t a k i n g t o these theo-r i e s . 2 For an account of some of these fundamental d i f f e r e n c e s see David Kaplan, "How to R u s s e l l a Frege-Church", J o u r n a l of Philosophy, v o l . LXXII (1975), pp. 716-726. 3 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1961), 5.5303. 4 " B e g r i f f s s c h r i f t , a Formula Language Modelled upon th a t of A r i t h m e t i c , f o r Pure Thought", i n J . van H e i j e n o o r t , ed., From Frege to R u s s e l l , a Source Book i n Mathematical Logic (Cambridge, Mass., 1967T, pp. 1-82. 5 An obvious o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s argument i s t h a t every s t a t e -ment's t r u t h depends at l e a s t i n part on how the component ex-pressions are used. We can a n t i c i p a t e a d i s t i n c t i o n to be made i n sec. I l l by r e p l y i n g t h a t w h i l e the t r u t h of every sentence depends on the meanings of i t s component expressions because these determine what p r o p o s i t i o n the sentence expresses, i n the case of (3) the meanings play the a d d i t i o n a l r o l e of determin-i n g whether the p r o p o s i t i o n expresses a t r u t h . 6 For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s see, apart from R u s s e l l ' s own w r i t i n g , David Kaplan, " W h a t i s R u s s e l l ' s Theory; .of D e s c r i p t i o n s ? " , i n Bertrand Russell". ed.^D. Pears~ (New^ork: Doubleday & Co., 1972), and L.Linsky, R e f e r r i n g (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1967)., as w e l l as P. T. Geach, f R u s s e l l ' s Theory of Des-c r i p t i o n s " , A n a l y s i s , v o l . 10 (1950), pp. 84-88. - 1 2 4 -.Cf. C. Chastain, "Reference and Context", i n Language, Mind, and Knowledge, ed. K. Gunderson (Minneapolis: U n i v e r s i t y of Minnesota Press,' 1 9 7 5 ) . 8 • . " We have already noted t h a t R u s s e l l claimed t h a t demon-s t r a t i v e s l i k e ' t h i s ' and •that' are i n f a c t l o g i c a l l y proper names and not d i s g u i s e d improper terms. Apart from the pro-blem t h a t i f t h i s i s so, a puzzle of i d e n t i t y can be construc-ted f o r them,there are d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h i s c l a i m which we w i l l r e t u r n t o near the end of ch. I . 9 "On Denoting", p. 486. The reason I say " c o n f u s i n g l y " i s t h a t i t i s very hard t o imagine a s i t u a t i o n i n which, when we s a i d t h a t George IV wondered whether Scott was S c o t t , we would mean to a t t r i b u t e an i n t e r e s t i n the law of i d e n t i t y t o the f i r s t gentleman of Europe. More l i k e l y , the s t o r y would go l i k e t h i s : George, seeing a vaguely f a m i l i a r - l o o k i n g man, asks "I s t h a t S c o t t ? " . T then report t h i s using ( 8 ) , since the man indeed i s Scott as both George and I know now. Alternat,. . George could have pronounced the words 'Is Scott ( r e a l l y ) S c o t t ? ' because he suspected t h a t the man everyone c a l l s 'Scott' i s r e a l l y S c o t t ' s i d e n t i c a l t w i n , or f o r some other reason i s not the man who r e a l l y i s S c o t t . Other s t o r i e s can be invented, but i t i s hard t o see how George IV could have been wondering about a law of l o g i c i n s t e a d of about some person. 10 Word & Object (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, I 9 6 0 ) , P . 1 5 1 . 11 Pp. 5 8 - 5 9 . 12 Synthese. v o l . 19 ( 1 9 6 8 / 6 9 ) , pp. 130-146. 13 The fo r m u l a t i o n s are, of course, o v e r - s i m p l i f i e d . I t i s an important part of R u s s e l l ' s view t h a t a f t e r a n a l y s i s , the d e s c r i p t i o n 'the author of Waverly' does not appear. Thus the occurences of the d e s c r i p t i o n i n p r e d i c a t e s such as ' i s the author of 'Waverly'should be seen as a b b r e v i a t i o n s f o r what on R u s s e l l ' s a n a l y s i s would come out as an i n d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n plus a uniqueness-clause. As f a r as the d i s c u s s i o n of scope i s concerned, w r i t i n g the a n a l y s i s out i n d e t a i l would be merely cumbersome. -125-To attempt to disentangle whether Russell was dealing with propositions or sentences at this point would be sheer f o l l y . The strange t r i p l e occurence of 'Scott' in this sentence i s explained by the fact that i f 'Scott' i s not eliminated when i t i s substituted for 'the author of Waverly' then we are treat-ing i t as a logically proper name and one of the occurence of the name within the opaque context functions rather as a variable bound by the outside occurence. 16 The predicate'is Scott' can be seen simply as part of the "Socratized"name in the manner suggested by Quine in, eg. Word & Ob.ject, pp. L 7 6 - I 8 6 . It would be more in accordance with Russell's thought, however, to see i t as an abbreviation of a long complex description which the name 'Scott' presumably means. Which view of this predicate we choose does not appear to make any difference from the point of view of the present discussion. 17 In W.V.O. Quine, The Ways of Paradox. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp.185-196. 18 In Words and Objections, ed. D. Davidson & J. Hintikka (Dortrecht -Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. I 7 8 -2 1 4 . 19 Mind, vol. LIX ( 1 9 5 0 ) , pp.3 2 0 - 3 4 4 . 2 0 Mind, vol. LXVI (1957), pp. 385-3°"9. 2 1 New York, 1 9 4 0 , ch. v i i . B. Russell,"Mr. Strawson on Referring", Mind, vol. LXVI (1957). PP. 335-339. 2 3 Frege, op.cit., p.58. 24 Wittgenstein, op. cit, - 1 2 6 -25 Kaplan expressed h i s view i n l e c t u r e s , f o r Dummett's see Frege, Philosophy of Language. (London: Gerald Duckworth & Go., T973T, ch . 5 . 2 6 See Kaplan, "How t o R u s s e l l a Frege-Church", Journa l of  Philosophy. LXXII (1975) pp. 716-723. 2 7 See Kaplan, op. c i t . 28 Word & Ob.iect. sec. 30. 29 From a L o g i c a l P o i n t of View (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1953), p. 139. 30 Word & Ob.iect. p. 141. 31 I b i d . , p. 99. 32 Cf. Leonard L i n s k y , "Reference, E s s e n t i a l i s m and M o d a l i t y " , Jour n a l of Philosophy, v o l . LXVI (1969), pp. 687-700. See esp. pp. 687-"6"90. 33 Word & Ob.iect. p. 151. 34 From a L o g i c a l Point of View, p. 145. 35 Op. c i t . 36 From a L o g i c a l P o i n t of View, p. 139. 37 See eg. Word & Ob.iect, p. 142. 38 This has been pointed out, f o r example, by David Kaplan at the beginning of "Qu a n t i f y i n g i n " and L. Li n s k y , o p . c i t . - 1 2 7 -39 From a L o g i c a l Point of View, p. 143, Word & Object, p. 144. 40 Word & Object, p. 144. 4 1 Op. c i t . , p. 179. 4 2 Word & Object, p.216. 43 From a L o g i c a l Point of View, p. 140. 44 Sections 3 1 , 3 2 , 35, and 44. 45 David Kaplan, op. c i t . , p. 180. 46 Word & Object, p. 199. 47 Loc. c i t . 4 3 Loc. c i t . 49 From a L o g i c a l Point of View, p. 156. 50 Word & Object, p. 199. The Ways of Paradox, p. 1 7 6 . 52 Op. c i t . , p. I 8 4 . 53 Op. c i t . , p. 1 7 5 . 54 From a L o g i c a l Point of View, p. 1 4 3 . -128-55 For Marcus' theory see "Essentialism'in Modal Logic", Nous, vol. I (1967), pp. 95-96, and "Modalities and Intension-al Languages", Synthese, vol. 13 (1961), pp. 303 -411. For more on the possibility of rejecting Quine's thesis see Plantinga, The .Nature of Necessity (Oxford University Press, 1974), sect-ions 3 & 4 of the appendix. 56 Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 13 (1948), pp. 31-37* the Survey of Symbolic Logic was not published unti l 1918. 58 Word & Object, p. 199. 59 Two very different such arguments are found in D. Wiggins, "Essentialism, Continuity, and Identity", Synthese, vol. 23 (1974), pp. 321-359, and B. Van Fraassen, "The Only Necessity is Verbal Necessity", Journal of. Philosophy, vol. LXXIV (1977), pp. 71-85 . 60 This i s , of course, a very anachronistic description of what Smullyan was doing. His primary interest was not essen-t i a l i s t vs. non-essentialist modality but the formal device of scope which allowed him to block Quine's argument in the same way Russell was able to stop the one about George IV. 61 Mareus.,.op. c i t . , T. Parsons, "Essentialism and Quantified Modal Logic", Philosophical Review, vol. 78 (1969), pp. 35-52. 62 From a Logical Point of View, p. 148. 63 Loc.cit. 64 The University of Chicago Press, 1947 and 1956, ch. I. 65 See especially "De Re et De Dicto", Nous, vol. 3 (1969), pp. 235-258. 66 For the best developed one.of these see Plantinga, op.cit. -129-67 "Identity and Necessity", in Identity and Individuation, ed. M.K. Munitz (New York/University Press, 1971) , pp. 135- -< I 6 4 . "Naming and Necessity", in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. D. Davidson & G. Harman (Dortrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Pub-lishing Co., 1972), pp. 178-214. 68 See S. Kripke, op.cit., and D. Kaplan, "Bob & Carol & Ted & Alice" in Approaches to Natural Language , ed. J. Hintikka, P. Suppes, and J. Moravcsik (Dortrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 490-518. See also the chapter on rigid designators in D. Kaplan, Demonstratives (unpublished). 69 Cf. D. Kaplan, op. c i t . 70 S. Kripke, op. c i t . K. S. Donnellan, "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions", Synthese. vol. 21 (1970), pp. 335-353. See also G. Evans, "The Causal Theory of Names", Aristo-telian Society Suppliment, vol. XLVII (1973), pp. l87-20o\ 71 Philosophical Review, vol. 75 (1966), pp. 291 - 3 0 2 . 72 By Gricean' we mean involving the mechanism of reciprocal intentions f i r s t described by H.P. Grice in his article "Meaning", Philosophical Review, vol. 66 (1957), pp. 377 - 3 8 8 . 73 University of British Columbia, 1973. Philosophia, vol. 6 ( 1 9 7 6 ) , pp. 2 8 9 - 3 0 2 . In Language, Mind and Knowledge. ed. K. Gunderson (Minnea-polis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975). 76 H.P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation", in Syntax and Sem-antics, ed. P. Cole (New York: Academic Press Inc., 1975), pp. 41-58. 77 "Pragmatics", in Semantics of Natural Language. pp. 38O-3 9 8 . "Assertion" (unpublished). -130-n . . J o u r n a l of P h i l o s o p h i c a l L o g i c , v o l . 2 (1973), pp. 77-96. 79 Demonstratives (unpublished). 80 See S. Kripke,-"Identity and Neces s i t y " , D. Wiggins, " E s s e h t i a l i s m , C o n t i n u i t y , and I d e n t i t y " , and J . M a r g o l i s , " I d e n t i t y and the Necessity Operator", Logique et Analyse, v o l . 16 (1969), PP. 527-533. 81 For more on these i n t e r e s t i n g s o r t s of sentences see R. St a l n a k e r , " A s s e r t i o n " . -131-VI. BIBLIOGRAPHI Beebe, M.D. A Gricean Theory of Reference. PhD Thesis. Univer-sity of British Columbia, 1974. Brody, B.A. "De Re and De Dicto Interpretations of Modal Logic or a Return to an Aristotelian Essentialism." Philosophia. vol. 22 (1972), pp. 117-136. Ghastain, Charles* "Reference and Context." Language. Mind and  Knowledge. Ed. K. Gunderson. Minneapolis: Universtiy of Minnesota Press, 1975. Davidson, D. "On Saying That." Synthese, vol. 19 (1968/69), pp. 130-146. Donnellan, K.S. "Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions." Synthese. vol. 21 (1970), pp. 335-358. . "Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again." Philosophical Re- view, vol. 77 (1968), pp. 203-215. "Reference and Definite Descriptions." Philosophical Re-view, vol. 75 (1966), pp. 281-303. Dummett, Michael. Frege. Philosophy of Language. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1973. Fales, E. "Definite Descriptions as Designators." Mind, vol. 85 (1976), pp. 225-233. Geach, P.T. "Russell's Theory of Descriptions." Analysis, vol. 10 (1950), pp. 84-88. Geach, P.T. & Max Black, ed. Translations From the Philosophi-cal Works of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970. Grice, H.P. "Logic & Conversation." Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3. Ed. P. Cole & J.L. Morgan. New York: Academic Press Inc., 1975, pp. 41-58. . "Meaning." Philosophical Review, vol. 66 (1957), pp. 377-338. Kaplan, David. "Bob & Carol & Ted & Alice." Approaches to  Natural Language. Ed. J. Hintikka, P. Suppes, and J.M.E. Morvacsik. Dortrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publish-ing Co., 1973, PP. 490-518. -132-Kaplan, David. Demonstratives. Unpublished manuscript. "Dthat.", forthcoming in Syntax and Semantics, vol. 4 Ed. P. Gole. New York: Academic Press Inc. . "Quantifying In." Words and Objections. Ed. D. Davidson & J. Hiritikka. Dortrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972, pp. 178-214. Kripke, Saul. "Identity and Necessity." Identity and Indivi-duatioh. Ed. M.K. Munitz. New York University Press, 1971, PP. 135-164* . "Naming and Necessity." Semantics -c-f:- Natural Language. Ed. D. Davidson & G. Harman. Dortrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972, pp. 235-355. Linsky, Leonard. "Reference, Essentialism, and Modality." Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXVI (1969), pp. 687-700. . Referring. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967. Marcus, R.B. "Essentialism In Modal Logic." Nous, vol. 1 (1967), pp. 91-96. . "Modalities and Intensional Languages." Comments by W.V.O. Quine, discussion by Marcus, Quine, S. Kripke, J. McCarthy, and D. Follesdal, Synthese. vol. 13 (1961), pp. 303-411. Margolis, J. "Identity and the Necessity Operator." Logique et Analyse, vol. 16 (1967), pp. 527-533. Margolis, J. and E. Fales. "Donnellan on Definite Descriptions." Philosophia. vol. 6 (1976), pp. 289-302. Parsons, T. "Essentialism and Quantified Modal Logic." Philo-sophical Review, vol. 78 (1969), pp. 35-52. Plantinga, Alvin. "De Re et De Dicto." Nous. vol. 3 (1969), pp. 235-258. _. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford University Press, 1974. Putnam, Hilary. "Meaning and Reference." The Journal of Phil- osophy, vol. LXX (1973), PP. 699-711. ._. "The Meaning of 'Meaning'." Language, Mind and Knowldege. Ed. K. Gunderson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota -133-• Press, 1975,-pp. 131-193. Quine, W.V.O. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass-achusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953. . The Ways of Paradox. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. . Word and Object. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, I960. Russell, Bertrand. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1919. . "On Denoting." Mind, vol XIV (1905), pp. 470-493. . "Mr. Strawson on Referring." Mind, vol. LXVI (1957), pp. 385-389. Segerberg, K. "Two-dimensional Modal Logic." Journal of Philo-sophical Logic, vol. 2 (1973), pp. 77-96. Smullyan, A.F. "Modality and Description." The Journal of Symr-bolic Logic, vol. 13 (1948), pp. 31-37. Stalnaker, R.C. "Pragmatics." Semantics of Natural Language. Ed. G. Harman and D. Davidson. Dortrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972, pp. 380-397. . "Assertion." Unpublished. Strawson, P.F. "On Referring." Mind, vol. LIX (1950), pp. 320-344. Van Fraassen, Bas C. "The Only Necessity i s Verbal Necessity." The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXIV (1977), pp. 71-85. Wiggins, David. "Essentialism, Continuity, and Identity." Synthese, vol. 23 (1974), pp. 321-359. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961. 

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