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Lloyd George and the Turkish question : an examination of Lloyd George’s Turkish policy, 1918-1922 Hind, Joseph Winton 1978

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LLOYD GEORGE AND THE TURKISH QUESTION: AN EXAMINATION OF LLOYD GEORGE'S TURKISH POLICY, 1918-1922 by JOSEPH WINTON HIND B . A . (Honours), Simon Fraser U n i v e r s i t y , 1974 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES In the Department of HISTORY We accept th is thes is as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May, 1978 © Joseph Winton H i n d , 1978 In presenting t h i s thes is i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of the r e q u i r e -ments f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y . s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s thesis f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representa t ives . I t i s understood that p u b l i c a t i o n , in par t or in whole, or the copying of t h i s thes is f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. Joseph Winton Hind Department of H i s t o r y The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 ABSTRACT The events i n Turkey i n the years 1918-to 1922 are covered by a v a r i e t y of works. Lloyd George's, part in these events has received some a t t e n t i o n , but most w r i t e r s e i t h e r r e f e r to his r o l e only b r i e f l y as part o f a general study of the post-war Middle East or focus on a small part of the four year p e r i o d . No comprehensive study o f Lloyd George's Turkish p o l i c y has y e t been w r i t t e n . This thes is examines the motivations behind and the execution of Lloyd George's p o s t - F i r s t World War Turkish p o l i c y . The main sources f o r t h i s study have been the p r i v a t e papers o f government minis ters and f u n c t i o n a r i e s , published government documents and various books and a r t i c l e s . A chronological s t ruc ture has been employed. By the end of the F i r s t World War, the Ottoman Empire and Imperial Russia no longer e x i s t e d . This required a r e v i s i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s f o r the Eastern Mediterranean. The m o d i f i c a t i o n . i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y and the course of the war are out -l i n e d i n Chapter Two, as i s Lloyd. George's part i n forming that p o l i c y . The o r i g i n s of his a t t i t u d e towards Greece and Turkey are also examined here. The course of events in post-war Turkey may be d i v i d e d into four d i s t i n c t per iods . The f i r s t p e r i o d , from the s i g n i n g of the Mudros Armist ice on 30 October 1918 to the Greek landings at Smyrna on 19 May 1919, i s covered i n Chapter I I I . The negot ia t ions which l e d to the Treaty of S e v r e s - - n e g o t i a t i o n s in which Lloyd George played so important a r o l e — a r e examined i n the fourth chapter. Chapter Five explores the period from August 1920 to September 1922. During t h i s time, L loyd George's Turkish p o l i c y was to pass from the peak of success at Sevres to to ta l ruin with the defeat of the Greeks by the Turkish N a t i o n a l i s t s . The f i n a l debacle - - the confrontat ion between the Turkish N a t i o n a l i s t s and the B r i t i s h garr ison at Chanak.and i t s e f f e c t s on Lloyd George 1 career are examined i n Chapter V I . In the f i n a l chapter an attempt i s made to determine the foundations and manner of executing Lloyd George's Turkish p o l i c y . ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The author wishes to express his gra t i tude to Drs. G. Egerton and.D. Gool.d f o r t h e i r guidance throughout the preparat ion of the t h e s i s . T h e i r encouragement, help patience have been i n v a l u a b l e . V TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 I I . TURKEY BEFORE 1918 . . 7 I I I . MUDROS TO SMYRNA 28 IV. THE TREATY OF SEVRES 43 V. THE REVIVAL OF TURKEY 64 V I . CHANAK 78 V I I . CONCLUSION 93 FOOTNOTES 103 BIBLIOGRAPHY 132 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION At 5.00 p.m. on 19 October 1922, Lloyd George resigned as Prime M i n i s t e r of Great B r i t a i n , ending one of the most c o n t r o -v e r s i a l premierships i n B r i t i s h h i s t o r y . The Lloyd George C o a l i t i o n of L i b e r a l s and Conservatives had endured i n t e r n a l dissension and many c r i s e s both during the l a s t two years of the F i r s t World War and the f i r s t four years of peace. One of these c r i s e s , however, convinced • Conservatives that they would be a par t of Lloyd George's government no longer . On 19 October 1922, by a vote of 187 to 87, they decided to withdraw t h e i r support from Lloyd George's c o a l i t i o n . The Prime M i n i s t e r had l i t t l e a l t e r n a t i v e but to r e s i g n . The c r i s i s which occasioned the Conservat ives ' d e c i s i o n has become known as the Chanak A f f a i r . In l a t e September of 1922, Lloyd George committed a small B r i t i s h force to holding a v i r t u a l l y i n d e f e n s i b l e piece of Turkish t e r r i t o r y against .a much l a r g e r force of Turkish n a t i o n a l i s t s . This he d i d with the support of only a small number of his colleagues and i n the face of opposi t ion from w i t h i n his government, from the B r i t i s h press and from B r i t a i n ' s former a l l i e s . The c r i s i s passed and 2 the B r i t i s h government agreed to most of the n a t i o n a l i s t s ' demands, but the apparent rashness and b e l l i g e r e n c e of the Prime M i n i s t e r during the c r i s i s gave the Conservative party the impetus i t needed to detach i t s e l f from Lloyd George. The Chanak A f f a i r not only brought about Lloyd George's d o w n f a l l ; i t s i g n i f i e d the end, or at l e a s t the beginning of the end, of the p e r s i s t e n t problem of control of the S t r a i t s , the waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. This issue and the question of control of the other possessions of the moribund Ottoman Empire had been known as the Eastern Quest ion. Throughout the nineteenth century t h i s had been the cause of much t e n s i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y between B r i t a i n , France and Russia . Though r i v a l s , the i n t e r e s t s of B r i t a i n and France had often forced them i n t o partnership to face the common threat of Russian designs on the S t r a i t s and the c i t y of Constant inople . The problem p e r s i s t e d i n t o the twentieth century , i t s most c r u c i a l per iod being the four years immediately succeeding the F i r s t World War. By t h i s t ime, the Eastern Question had been r a d i c a l l y changed by the e l i m i n a t i o n of two of i t s p r i n c i p a l components, the Ottoman Empire i t s e l f and T s a r i s t Russia , but the s i t u a t i o n s t i l l d e f i e d easy s o l u t i o n . The v i c t o r i o u s a l l i e s , led by Great B r i t a i n , attempted to impose the severest condi t ions on the defeated Turks , i n c l u d i n g a permanent occupation of the area around the S t r a i t s and of much of Asia Minor. I t was 3 intended that t h i s would be accomplished with the compliance o f a powerless figurehead Sultan i n Constant inople . The very s e v e r i t y of these c o n d i t i o n s , however, prevented t h e i r implemen-t a t i o n and s t a r t e d a sequence of events which was to see the r i s e of a vigorous Turkish n a t i o n a l i s t movement, the eventual defec t ion of I t a l y and France from what was to become an i n c r e a s i n g l y B r i t i s h p o l i c y , and the i s o l a t i o n of Great B r i t a i n and her c l i e n t , Greece. The arrangement made at Chanak r e s u l t e d i n the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 which gave a rejuvenated Turkey control of the S t r a i t s , subject to i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u p e r v i s i o n . The Montreux Convention of 1936 gave Turkey complete c o n t r o l . During the years 1918-1922, i n the face of the gradual estrangement of France and I t a l y , i t was p r i m a r i l y B r i t i s h p o l i c y which shaped events i n Turkey. This p o l i c y was formulated and implemented mainly by the Prime M i n i s t e r , of ten over the s t r i d e n t objec t ions o f h is cabinet colleagues and other p o l i c y -making groups wi thin the government. In the l i g h t of the un-fortunate consequences of Lloyd George's p o l i c y , the question as to why he pursued i t i s an i n t e r e s t i n g one. To date , i t has not a t t rac ted the a t tent ion which i t seems to j u s t i f y . The matter has not escaped a t tent ion e n t i r e l y , but f o r a number of reasons the s tudies at present a v a i l a b l e do not t r e a t the matter as completely as might be hoped. . The major works which do cover the events are e i t h e r o b s o l e t e , — s u c h as Harry N. 4 Howard's The P a r t i t i o n of Turkey^—deal with them as only one aspect of the post-war Middle Eastern s i t u a t i o n , - - s u c h as Mudros to Lausanne, by B r i t o n Cooper Busch - - t r e a t only a part of the per iod from 1918 to 1922,--as does Paul C. Helmreich i n his book From Paris to Sevres —or cover only one aspect of the whole 4 issue—as does Michael L lewel lyn Smith's Ionian V i s i o n . Several good a r t i c l e s on the t o p i c have been published i n recent y e a r s , i n c l u d i n g A . L . MacFie 's "The B r i t i s h Decision 5 Regarding the Future of Constant inople" and A . E . Montgomery's "L loyd George and the Greek Q u e s t i o n . " Yet , e i t h e r because they- deal with only one aspect of the question or simply because of the l i m i t a t i o n s of space, they o f f e r no comprehensive over-view of L loyd George's Turkish p o l i c y throughout the whole four year p e r i o d . I t i s therefore the purpose of t h i s thes is to provide a comprehensive study of David Lloyd George's Turkish p o l i c y from the time of the a rmis t i ce at Mudros i n 1918 to the Chanak c r i s i s of 1922. There are two fundamental issues to be faced. The f i r s t concerns the formulation of the p o l i c y , the second i t s execut ion . Regarding the formulation of the p o l i c y , i t must be determined where and when Lloyd George developed hi s a n t i -Turkish frame of mind. He might w e l l , i n his younger days, have absorbed some of the Turco-phobia of the l a t e nineteenth 5 century and never r e l i n q u i s h e d i t . Some aspects of Turkish behaviour during..-the war, such as the Armenian massacres, would have done l i t t l e to a l l a y such sentiments. Or i t might have been the r e s u l t of Turkey 's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war, f o r t h i s f r u s t r a t e d Lloyd George's earnest des i re to br ing the c o n f l i c t to an e a r l y c l o s e . Lloyd George's hatred of the Turks stands i n contrast to his a f f e c t i o n f o r the Turks ' t r a d i t i o n a l enemies, the Greeks. These opposing a t t i t u d e s might have been c l o s e l y r e l a t e d , one having been born out of the o ther , or they might have been c o i n c i d e n t a l ; his patronage of Greece was not a l -together a l t r u i s t i c , f o r he saw her as a future guardian of B r i t i s h sea routes through the Mediterranean. The second issue i s the execution of the p o l i c y . A l -though Lloyd George was never completely without support f o r his Turkish p o l i c y , he met with strong and c o n s i s t e n t o p p o s i t i o n to i t throughout the four years from 1918 to 1922. Despite t h i s , and the p o l i c y ' s i n c r e a s i n g i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f success , the Prime M i n i s t e r was r e s o l u t e . Within the government, much of the opposi t ion came from the Foreign and War O f f i c e s . I t i s p o s s i b l e that part of the reason f o r his pers is tence was that his habitual d i s t r u s t of the ' exper ts ' of these departments l e d him to bel ieve that the opposite of what they recommended would be the best course to f o l l o w . Another considera t ion i s the amount of time which he was able to devote to the whole q u e s t i o n . 6 During t h i s t ime, he had to deal with many nat ional and i n t e r n a -t i o n a l c r i s e s , most of which must have seemed f a r more important than what was happening i n f a r - o f f Turkey .^ I t could be that he formulated his p o l i c y towards Turkey at the outset and during the f a i r l y wel l -spaced c r i s e s of the p e r i o d , he merely reverted to his o r i g i n a l ideas without e i t h e r t r o u b l i n g or being able to take the time to devise a new s t ra tegy . This suggestion does not seem al together u n l i k e l y given L l o y d George's ignorance on some of the f i n e r points of the matter. At a meeting with the I t a l i a n delegates at the Par is Peace Conference, he used a contour ' map i n the mistaken assumption that the d i f f e r e n t o colours represented e t h n o l o g i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n . These are some o f the explanations f o r L l o y d George's post-war Turkish p o l i c y . They are as diverse as they are numerous. I t i s hoped that an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the events w i l l determine what the real foundations of the p o l i c y were. In order to comprehend the events of 1918 to 1922, however, i t i s f i r s t necessary to gain some apprec ia t ion of the s i t u a t i o n i n Turkey immediately before and during the war, and the development of B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e s to Turkey during that t ime. 7 CHAPTER II TURKEY BEFORE 1918 To f o i l Russia ' s designs on the S t r a i t s and Constantinople had been a common B r i t i s h and French p o l i c y throughout the nineteenth century , the maintenance o f the Ottoman Empire being the core of that p o l i c y . Russia 's motivations, f o r her expansionism had been a mixture of r e l i g i o n , s t rategy and commerce. Constantinople was the c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c home of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and as the Church's importance as one of the p i l l a r s of decaying Tsardom grew, so d i d Russ ia ' s ambition to possess Constant inople . S t r a t e g i c a l l y , guaranteed freedom o f passage through the S t r a i t s - -a freedom that only Russian domination would ensure--would have made Russia a great Mediterranean naval power. From a commercial point of view, passage through the S t r a i t s was v i t a l to Russia ' s growing merchant f l e e t . ^ For her p a r t , B r i t a i n was forever a f r a i d of Russian domination of the waterway. A strong Russian naval force i n the eastern Mediterranean would have upset the balance of power i n an area which was c r u c i a l to B r i t i s h imperial communications, endangering access to the Suez Canal , the s i n g l e most important 8 and vulnerable part of the routes to India and A u s t r a l a s i a . B r i t a i n ' s concern over Russian designs on the Ottoman Empire were heightened by the f a c t that by the f i r s t decade of the twentieth century , she 2 had considerable commercial i n t e r e s t s there . France 's i n t e r e s t s , though s i m i l a r to those o f Great B r i t a i n , d i f f e r e d i n emphasis. L ike B r i t a i n , she feared the naval consequences of Russ ia ' s ambit ions , but her main concerns were f i n a n c i a l . By the beginning of the F i r s t World War, she had b u i l t 3 up large investments i n Turkey. These investments, l i k e those o f the B r i t i s h , were made a l l the more l u c r a t i v e by a system o f f i n a n c i a l and legal concessions known as the C a p i t u l a t i o n s . These r i g h t s guaranteed Europeans legal e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y and exemption from Ottoman taxes. As well as the i n t e r e s t s of these powers, two other fac tors i n pre-war Turkey deserve c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The f i r s t was the aftermath of the 'Young Turk' r e v o l u t i o n of 1908. A group of army o f f i c e r s c a l l i n g themselves the Committee o f , U n i o n and Progress (CUP) had taken power i n Turkey, t h e i r aims being a r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the i n e f f i c i e n t government of Sultan Abdul Hamid and a greater degree o f t o l e r a n c e : f o r the non-Turkish sub-j e c t s of the Ottoman Empire. By 1914, there was cause f o r 4 disappointment on both these counts , but the main cause of worry i n B r i t a i n and France was the pro-German a t t i t u d e of some of the Committee's members. The second f a c t o r was the i n -9 crease of German i n f l u e n c e w i t h i n the Ottoman Empire, to some extent a r e s u l t o f the CUP's encouragement, but which had been growing 5 f o r over a decade before 1908. . This was the background to the events which brought Turkey into the F i r s t World War on the s ide of the Central Powers, an event which was to have such t r a g i c consequences f o r the Entente. In the l i g h t of the disas t rous r e s u l t s of Turkey 's b e l l i g e r e n c e , i t has been the tendency of h i s t o r i a n s to portray B r i t i s h a c t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y between the beginning of the war i n Europe and the d e c l a r a t i o n s of war on Turkey e a r l y i n November 1914, as a compound of i n e p t i t u d e and s t u p i d i t y . Indeed, the main events do make, i t d i f f i c u l t to expla in otherwise B r i t a i n ' s a t t i t u d e towards a once f r i e n d l y state whose n e u t r a l i t y would have grea t ly helped B r i t a i n ' s war e f f o r t . . ^ On 20 J u l y 1914, Winston C h u r c h i l l , as F i r s t Lord of the Admira l ty , se ized two Turkish warships in Newcastle on Tyne. These ships had been b u i l t f o r the Turkish government and had already been paid f o r . The s e i z u r e , the arrogant explanation and the lack of compensation f o r i t , i n f u r i a t e d the Turks and provided the Germans with an e x c e l l e n t chance, to buy Turkish good-w i l l . They replaced the two warships taken by B r i t a i n with two of t h e i r own, the Goeben and the B r e s l a u . 10 To woo the Turks f u r t h e r , B e r l i n o f f e r e d a b o l i t i o n of the h u m i l i a t i n g C a p i t u l a t i o n s and f u r t h e r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . The pro-German war f a c t i o n i n the Turkish cabinet , l e d by Enver Bey, was given every assis tance to increase i t s i n f l u e n c e . B r i t a i n and France did l i t t l e to reverse the process and the war party j u s t i f i e d B e r l i n ' s patronage by s a i l i n g the Goeben and the Breslau i n t o the Black Sea on 28.October 1914. There they bom-barded Russian naval bases at Odessa and Novorossisk, provoking a Russian d e c l a r a t i o n of war which came on 1 November. B r i t a i n and France followed s u i t a few days l a t e r . However, i n l a t e 1914, Turkey 's entry i n t o the war on the s ide of the Central Powers might not have appeared so un-fortunate f o r the Entente as i t d i d l a t e r . With Turkey and Germany defeated, , the tiresome Eastern Question might be s e t t l e d once and f o r a l l . B r i t a i n might gain undisputed possession of the Mesopotamian o i l f i e l d s ; the anomaly of de facto B r i t i s h possession of c e r t a i n Ottoman t e r r i t o r i e s — s u c h as Egypt—could be resolved and the issue o f the S t r a i t s and Constantinople could g be amicably s e t t l e d among the v i c t o r s . From t h i s point of view, even the manner of Turkey 's entry into the war was advantageous; i t was Turkey who had struck the f i r s t blow, a l lowing the Entente to appear the i n j u r e d p a r t y , something which both the B r i t i s h and the French considered, important i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with the m i l l i o n s of Moslems i n t h e i r dominions. 11 There are signs that f o r some years before the war, the t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h p o l i c y of shoring up the Ottoman Empire was being quest ioned. As f a r back as 1908, the Committee of Imperial Defence had produced a report s t a t i n g that i f t h i s p o l i c y were abandoned,, the r e s u l t s would not be as d r a s t i c as f e a r e d J 0 By 1914, the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y s t i l l had a large number of pro-p o n e n t s , ^ but from the outset of the war, there was a d i s t i n c t d i f f e r e n c e . between B r i t i s h war aims regarding the Ottoman Empire and those regarding the other Central Powers. In Europe, during the f i r s t two years of the war, the Asquith government seems to have looked-no, f u r t h e r than the 12 defeat of Germany and the r e s t o r a t i o n of Belgium.. This was not the case f o r Turkey. . . .Even,before she-entered the war, the idea that she would pay d e a r l y . f o r taking the s ide of the Central Powers had already taken root . On .20 October, Asquith conveyed to King George V a cabinet d e c i s i o n that B r i t a i n must f i n a l l y 13 abandon the p o l i c y of Ottoman i n t e g r i t y , i n Europe and A s i a . Only a few days a f t e r the dec lara t ion ; of war on Turkey, Asquith s t a t e d . i n his G u i l d h a l l speech, " I t i s the Ottoman Empire and not we who have rung the death knel l o f Ottoman dominion, not 14 only i n Europe but i n A s i a . " Given the r e l a t i v e l y e a r l y dates of these statements, i t i s questionable whether they are to be regarded as p o l i c y or j u s t s p e c u l a t i o n . And though these aims f o r the most part 12 were to be r e a l i s e d , there were, throughout the war, several bodies of opinion which were opposed to meddling with Ottoman i n t e g r i t y . The two most prominent groups were the War O f f i c e and the India O f f i c e . The War O f f i c e was u n w i l l i n g to consider invasions of Ottoman t e r r i t o r y mainly because of the s t r a i n on manpower which such adventures would i n c u r . The India O f f i c e ' s opposi t ion was born of the fear that any i n t e r f e r e n c e with the Ottoman Empire and p a r t i c u l a r l y any meddling with the status of Constantinople as the seat of the Caliph of Islam would have a d i s t u r b i n g e f f e c t { 15 on the m i l l i o n s of Moslems w i t h i n the B r i t i s h Empire. Recommendations f o r moderation came from other d i r e c t i o n s . In the f i r s t two months of the war, the Cabinet e s t a b l i s h e d a committee to determine the best d i s p o s i t i o n of Ottoman lands con-1 g s i s t e n t with B r i t i s h imperial i n t e r e s t s . This Committee, known as the de Bunsen Committee a f t e r i t s chairman, produced i t s report i n June 1915. The report a n t i c i p a t e d that most of the non-Turkish areas of the Ottoman Empire would be s t r i p p e d away and contemplated 'an i n e v i t a b l e increase of [ B r i t i s h ] imperial r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , ' p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to the s e c u r i t y of the Persian G u l f J ^ Yet while the de Bunsen Committee envisaged the d e s t r u c t i o n of the Ottoman Empire, i t recommended a sovereign Turkish kingdom i n A n a t o l i a . This might have been suggested out of a l t r u i s m or i n the hope that such a state would provide a useful counterpoise to Russian power, but whatever the reason, 13 the recommendations of the Committee regarding Turkish A s i a Minor were to be set a s i d e . The course of the war had already made these counsels of moderation unacceptable. Within a short time a f t e r the d e c l a r a t i o n of war on Turkey, various members of the B r i t i s h government were debating 18 how the s i t u a t i o n could be turned to advantage. One opportunity which Turkey's b e l l i g e r e n c e afforded was a s t r a t e g i c one. Lloyd George f o r one opposed the War O f f i c e contention that the only 19 place to win the war was i n France. He was a l l f o r "knocking the props" from under Germany, and Turkey was one of the props 20 he had i n mind. The idea of i n f l i c t i n g a crushing m i l i t a r y defeat on the Turks gave him intense pleasure . C P . Scot t has recorded that on 14 November 1914., Lloyd George remarked that he was "not s t rongly anti^German [but that ] he should have much 21 greater pleasure i n smashing Turkey than in smashing Germany." In the f o l l o w i n g March, he would s t i l l much rather have crushed 22 the Turks than the Germans. Another advantage was. that o f f e r s of Turkish lands could be made to gain new a l l i e s and to keep o l d ones e n t h u s i a s t i c . While e a r l y dreams of e x p l o i t i n g the s t r a t e g i c advantage soon foundered on the beaches of G a l l i p o l i and i n the Mesopotamian deser ts , the p r a c t i c e of o f f e r i n g b i t s and. pieces of the Ottoman Empire to whomever i t was thought expedient was soon put i n t o e f f e c t . Between A p r i l 1915 and the end of the war, B r i t a i n and 14 France were to promise much of the Ottoman domains to other nations and groups; i n the process they snared themselves i n a network of overlapping and c o n t r a d i c t o r y secret agreements and t r e a t i e s . The l i s t o f these arrangements i s a long one. I t includes the Hussein-McMahon correspondence between B r i t a i n and the Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s ; formal recogni t ion of Russ ia ' s r i g h t to the S t r a i t s and Constantinople ( A p r i l 1915),; the Treaty of London by which I t a l y was induced to enter the war ( A p r i l 1915); the Sykes -Picot Agreement which d i v i d e d c e r t a i n areas i n the Levant between B r i t a i n and France (May. 1916);.. the Treaty of S a i n t Jean de Maurienne i n which I t a l i a n r i g h t s were c l a r i f i e d (August 1917); and the B a l f o u r Declara t ion whereby the B r i t i s h government promised a national home f o r the Jewish people (May 1 9 1 7 ) . 2 3 A l l o f . t h e s e agreements a f f e c t e d B r i t i s h p o l i c y towards Turkey. The Hussein-McMahon correspondence had.a great e f f e c t on B r i t a i n ' s attempts to formulate a s t r a t e g i c plan f o r the area ; i t a lso complicated and embittered negot ia t ions f o r a post-war settlement of the Middle East between B r i t a i n and France. This b i t t e r n e s s and suspic ion on the part of. France was to have a profound e f f e c t on the settlement of post-war Turkey. Another agreement, the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n , was to have a great e f f e c t on the future of the Middle East . At the time, however, i t d id not have much e f f e c t upon the post-war settlement of Turkey. 15 I t was the other agreements which were to have the major impact. These agreements represented the compromise of former B r i t i s h and French p o l i c i e s and were to preclude a l l hope of an easy Turkish settlement at the war's end. The f i r s t concession was the most i n d i c a t i v e of B r i t a i n ' s abandonment of her t r a d i t i o n a l Turkish p o l i c y . A f r a i d that Russia might leave the war, the B r i t i s h and French, governments granted Russia not only the S t r a i t s and Constant inople , but the i s l a n d s of Tenedos and Imbros, at the entrance to the Dardanel les , 24 as w e l l . Quid pro quos were extracted from the Russians; B r i t i s h and French i n t e r e s t s were not to be compromised, Russia recognised B r i t i s h r i g h t s i n Egypt and an extension of her i n f l u -ence i n P e r s i a , and France was to receive support f o r her claims i n the Rhineland. But these concessions were unimportant compared to the immense s i g n i f i c a n c e of Russian ownership of the S t r a i t s and Constant inople . Hard on the heels of the agreement with Petrograd came the Treaty of London, which was not designed to keep an e x i s t i n g a l l y , but to r e c r u i t a new one. The negot ia t ions preceded the Treaty of London which brought I t a l y i n t o the war were c l o s e l y connected to those leading to the S t r a i t s agreement with Russia as the Turkish s i t u a t i o n d i d play a s i g n i f i c a n t part i n the d e a l i n g s . Despite her previous t reaty with the Central Powers, I t a l y had demurred from enter ing the war on t h e i r s i d e , and i n 16 the e a r l y stages of the war she seemed undecided as to whether n e u t r a l i t y was the best course, o r , i f not , which of the two 25 camps she should j o i n . I t a l i a n entry into the war was n o t . t o prove s t r a i g h t -forward. B r i t a i n was the main protagonis t f o r I t a l i a n e n t r y , as Grey b e l i e v e d that the purpose of the a l l i e s should be to f i n i s h the war as. q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e and that an I t a l i a n a l l i a n c e would f a c i l i t a t e t h i s . An a d d i t i o n a l advantage would be that an I t a l i a n presence i n A s i a Minor would help balance 26 French i n f l u e n c e there . The ambitions of France and Russia were stumbling blocks to a s w i f t agreement, and negot ia t ions l a s t e d from February to A p r i l 1915. In the end, France's fear of the worsening s i t u a t i o n on the Western Front led her to agree to I t a l y as an a l l y , and unwill ingness to endanger the S t r a i t s negot ia t ions caused the Russians to drop t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s . On 26 A p r i l , the Treaty of London was s igned . Among other t h i n g s , i t gave I t a l y the Turkish v i l a y e t s (provinces) of Smyrna and A i d i n . I t a l y declared war against the Central Powers on 26 May 1915. Although Greece was not t o . e n t e r the war. u n t i l 1917, she too was o f f e r e d a substant ia l por t ion o f Asia Minor to br ing her in to the war. In January 1915, Grey sent a note to Athens to t h i s e f f e c t . There i s strong evidence to suggest that had 17 27 t h i s o f f e r been made e a r l i e r i t might have been accepted, but oo i n January 1915 i t was not . Despite e n t h u s i a s t i c support by E l u t h e r i o s V e n i z e l o s , the Greek Prime M i n i s t e r , i t was re jec ted by King Constantine , who contended that Greece was exhausted by the two recent Balkan wars. Needless - t o say, the A l l i e s d i d not agree. For the f i r s t , but not the l a s t t ime, Greek p o l i t i c s had a f f e c t e d the war and the post-war set t lement . The l a s t of the agreements made before L loyd George came to the premiership was the S y k e s - P i c o t Agreement, which arose as a r e s u l t of the agreements with I t a l y and Russia . The S t r a i t s Agreement, i f r e a l i s e d , would r a d i c a l l y a l t e r the European balance of power, and i t followed that B r i t a i n and France should wish to increase t h e i r holdings to o f f - s e t the 29 Russian ga ins . To do t h i s , i t was necessary that the two nations reach an agreement over the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the remainder of the Ottoman Empire. On the face of i t , a r r i v i n g at such an agreement should not prove too d i f f i c u l t s ince the i n t e r e s t s of 30 B r i t a i n and France lay l a r g e l y i n d i f f e r e n t areas. B r i t a i n was predominantly i n t e r e s t e d i n the Persian G u l f , parts of Mesopotamia, and the s e c u r i t y of Egypt and the Suez Canal . France had long-s tanding t i e s with the coast of the eastern Mediterranean; her a s s o c i a t i o n could be traced as f a r back as the Crusades. 18 Negotiat ions began i n l a t e 1915 between S i r Mark Sykes — a Member of Parliament and the Cabinet S e c r e t a r i a t — a n d George Pi cot—an ex-French Consul-General i n Beirut—and were supplemented from time to time by the assistance of Grey and Cambon. Tentat ive agreement was reached i n January 1916. The next few months were 31 l a r g e l y taken up meeting -Russian objec t ions to the p l a n . Agreement was reached among a l l three powers i n an exchange of 32 l e t t e r s i n A p r i l and May 1916. Under the terms of the agree-ment, France would have e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a ' B l u e ' zone which inc luded C i l i c i a and S y r i a as f a r south as Acre and paramount i n f l u e n c e i n a region east of the Blue zone to a p o i n t beyond Mosul , 33 known as 'Area A ' . B r i t a i n ' s 'Red' zone of e x c l u s i v e possession was i n southern Mesopotamia, her area of paramount i n f l u e n c e , area B, being to the south and east of the French area A. H a i f a and Acre were to go to B r i t a i n , the area to the south being under i n t e r n a t i o n a l adminis t ra t ion (see map). Russia was to gain Trebizond, Armenia and K u r d i s t a n . ******** This was the s i t u a t i o n when Lloyd George became Prime M i n i s t e r i n December 1916. Exac t ly when he had begun to d i s l i k e the Turks i s not exac t ly known. During the Balkan War of 1912, he had s t rongl y supported the Bulgarians and had d e l i g h t e d . i n the 34 defeats i n f l i c t e d upon the Turks . P r i o r to t h a t , however, there i s no record of his f e e l i n g s on Turkey and we are l e f t with con-19 j e c t u r e . Perhaps during his youth he had absorbed some of the Turco-phobia prevalent i n B r i t a i n i n the l a t e nineteenth century. Such specula t ion i s not completely without foundat ion ; Gladstone 's thundering denunciations of 1876 are echoed by some of Lloyd George's own pronouncements over four decades l a t e r . I t was also i n 1912 that he i n d i c a t e d a strong a f f e c t i o n f o r Greece. John S t a v r i d i , the then Greek Consul General i n London has recorded several conversations with Lloyd George in which Lloyd George not only a n t i c i p a t e d expulsion o f the Turks from Europe but suggested that Greece pursue her t e r r i t o r i a l 35 ambitions on the Ottoman Empire. On 12 December 1912, he met Venizelos f o r the f i r s t time. Venizelos was i n London f o r naval discussions and he and Lloyd George e s t a b l i s h e d a l o n g - l a s t i n g f r i e n d s h i p . " ^ We have seen how Lloyd George i n d i c a t e d his ant ipathy 37 towards the Turks i n the e a r l y months of the war.. His f e e l i n g s can hardly have been changed by the events of the next two y e a r s . The c losure of the S t r a i t s was to be a great impediment to the Russian war e f f o r t and the B r i t i s h campaigns i n Mesopotamia and at G a l l i p o l i required forces which might have been used more e f f e c t i v e l y elsewhere. The defeat at G a l l i p o l i can have done l i t t l e to strengthen his arguments f o r a second f r o n t . It i s not s u r p r i s i n g that on more than, one occasion i n his f i r s t two 38 months as Prime M i n i s t e r he demanded the break-up of Turkey. 20 At the close of 1916 he was not alone i n his views. I t was general Cabinet opinion that no separate peace be negotiated 39 with Turkey. Of the more prominent members of the Cabinet , B a l f o u r , Curzon, Chamberlain and sometimes Montagu favoured a 40 f i g h t to the f i n i s h . A j o i n t A l l i e d reply to Pres ident W i l s o n ' s proposals , i ssued on 10 January 1917, contained a clause r e q u i r i n g ' the s e t t i n g free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks , and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire 41 as decidedly fore ign to western c i v i l i s a t i o n . However, i t was not long b e f o r e . t h i s near unanimity began to d i s s o l v e . There were a number of r e a s o n s . f o r t h i s , the two main ones being the changing condi t ions of the war and the growing c o n v i c t i o n that , when the end came, B r i t a i n should stand to gain by the changed s i t u a t i o n . To deal with the l a t t e r f i r s t , i n the d i f f e r e n t theatres of the war, d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s were predominant. In the Turkish theatre , the main o b j e c t i v e was the creat ion of a s table environment i n which imperial communications would be secure. These imperial considerat ions must have i n f l u e n c e d Lloyd George i n his formulation of a Turkish p o l i c y . Lloyd George's premiership was one of the most contro-v e r s i a l i n B r i t i s h h i s t o r y . His approach to and methods of government have ra ised questions which are s t i l l unresolved. His apparent subordination of the regular channels; of government and his c reat ion of his own s e m i - o f f i c i a l adminis t ra t ive bodies 21 have l e d a good number of h i s t o r i a n s to conclude Lloyd George concentrated an unprecedented amount of executive power i n the 42 o f f i c e of the premier. Others maintain that t h i s was not the case. They point to h is precarious p o s i t i o n i n the Commons and suggest that he was a captive of the Conservatives i n his c o a l i t i o n , the conclusion being that he was compelled in most 43 cases to carry out t h e i r wishes. The complexit ies of t h i s debate f a l l beyond the scope of t h i s study, f o r i n e i t h e r case, he would, have been subject i n his decision-making to considerat ions of imperial s e c u r i t y . I f he d i d l a r g e l y run the government through his s e c r e t a r i a t s , he would have been subject to the persuasion of P h i l i p K e r r , W. Astor and Lionel C u r t i s i n his Personal S e c r e t a r i a t and Maurice 44 H a n k e y , L . S . Amery and Mark Sykes i n his Cabinet S e c r e t a r i a t . A l l o f these f igures were i m p e r i a l i s t s . On the other hand, i f he were a p r i s o n e r of the Conservat ives , then he would have been compelled to carry out t h e i r imperial p o l i c y . This does not take i n t o considerat ion any i m p e r i a l i s t persuasions which the Prime M i n i s t e r might have had of his own. He was long associa ted with the doct r ines .of S o c i a l Imperial ism, that brand of the doctr ine which advocated an i n v i g o r a t i o n of government and the hope that i m p e r i a l i s m would a l l a y the dangers 45 of domestic s t r i f e . 22 For both the members of the War Cabinet and the S e c r e t a r i a t s , imperial s t rategy was of great importance i n the eastern Mediterranean. The p r i n c i p l e was that the sea routes to the East and the land bridge from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf be secure. Regarding the Turkish homeland,, however, the idea does not seem to have been t r a n s l a t e d i n t o any i d e n t i f i a b l e p o l i c y . During the l a s t two years of the war, there seems to have been l i t t l e o v e r a l l agreement on the future of Turkey. What ideas the B r i t i s h government had on Turkey seem to have ranged from complete subjugation by the A l l i e s to a negotiated peace i n which the Turkish part o f the Ottoman Empire would remain i n t a c t . This i n d e c i s i o n was p a r t l y a r e s u l t o f the agreements made i n the f i r s t two years o f the war. There was considerable a c t i v i t y i n 1917 over the legacy of these agreements. The Treaty of London, was, at I t a l i a n i n s i s t e n c e , modified in the abort ive 46 Treaty of S a i n t Jean de Maurienne. In the negot ia t ions p r e -ceding t h i s second t r e a t y , Lloyd George confirmed the cession of Smyrna and A d a l i a to I t a l y . This he d i d without c o n s u l t i n g the Foreign O f f i c e , which reacted f u r i o u s l y because of the large 47 amount of B r i t i s h investment there . Yet even before these negot ia t ions had begun, events occurred i n the f i r s t four months of 1917 which d i v i d e d the Cabinet on i t s hard a t t i t u d e towards Turkey. The event which began t h i s process was Russ ia ' s v i r t u a l 23 withdrawal from the war. This r a i s e d again the question of the 48 future of Constant inople . At l e a s t one member of the government began to suggest that the major obstacle to peace with Turkey had been removed. By A p r i l 1917, Lord Milner was arguing f o r a negotiated peace with Turkey. In t h i s he was supported by the General S t a f f , to whom a settlement with the Turks had never been the anathema i t had been to some, o f the p o l i t i c i a n s . Robertson suggested that Russia 's withdrawal ' . . . would shut out the Constantinople obstacle which has done more than anything to keep 49 the Turks i n the f i e l d . " The notion gained currency as i t was r e a l i s e d that the release of German troops from the Eastern Front would press the Entente even harder. Attempts were made by Lloyd George and Robert C e c i l , the M i n i s t e r of Blockade, to reduce the concessions 50 given to I t a l y i n Asia Minor. By the summer of 1917, the notion of a separate peace with the Turks had strengthened to the extent 51 that ser ious e f f o r t s were made to come to terms. Contact was made through various avenues. But the Cabinet swayed t h i s way and t h a t , seemingly unable to reach a f i r m d e c i s i o n . In September, Lloyd George and the Cabinet favoured peace with Turkey. Only a month l a t e r , the consensus was that the Turks be given as hard a knock as 52 p o s s i b l e . Later i n the f a l l , the s i t u a t i o n changed again . Hopes of an agreement with A u s t r i a faded and the B r i t i s h govern-24 ment, i t s hand strengthened by A l l e n b y ' s success i n P a l e s t i n e , once 53 again became e n t h u s i a s t i c over a negotiated Turkish peace. One thing which had i n f l u e n c e d the change was that the I t a l i a n rout at Caporetto had made the government d i s t i n c t l y less sympathetic to I t a l y ' s claims i n A s i a Minor.. L loyd George went so f a r as to declare p u b l i c l y that the Bolshevik Revolution had precluded a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of Turkey 's 54 l o s i n g her c a p i t a l and that a separate peace was now p o s s i b l e . 55 He r e i t e r a t e d t h i s i n a speech to the Commons on 20 December. Highly secret ta lks between Turkish agents and. P h i l i p Kerr took place i n S w i t z e r l a n d . At the same time, Lloyd George attempted what would have been, i f s u c c e s s f u l , one of the most b i z a r r e and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c coups of his career . Through the dubious i n t e r -mediary of S i r B a s i l Zaharoff , he o f f e r e d Enver Pasha, the leader of the CUP, ten m i l l i o n d o l l a r s as a bribe to take Turkey out of 56 the war. The o f f e r was r e f u s e d . In the e a r l y part of the new y e a r , B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n a Turkish peace waned again as hopes of a separate Austr ian peace rose . The Turks ' a t t i t u d e hardened too, because the Russian col lapse had afforded a golden opportunity f o r expansion into the Caucasus. This area was inhabi ted by peoples of Turkish stock and the chance could not be ignored by the pan-Turanian elements i n the CUP. Furthermore, optimism over the impending German o f f e n s i v e i n the west gave the Turks a l i t t l e more hope i n the outcome of the war. 25 By the spr ing of 1918, the B r i t i s h government had f i n a l l y 57 abandoned the idea of peace with the Turks . Turkish domination of Russian Armenia would no doubt mean f u r t h e r massacres and any such eastward expansion would menace the s e c u r i t y of northern I n d i a . ^ At one p o i n t Lloyd George d i d waver; he contemplated making the same o f f e r to Turkey as he had thought of making to Germany; a free hand i n the east i n return, f o r peace i n the west. The suggestion was given some support by B a l f o u r , but the s t r i d e n t objec t ions of Curzon put a stop to any f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f 59 the matter. For most of the res t of the war, there was l i t t l e support 60 f o r more n e g o t i a t i o n . In l a t e September the sudden col lapse of B u l g a r i a cut Turkey o f f from any support .which the other Central Powers might have been able to give her. Within the B r i t i s h government, debate began immediately as to what should be done. There was no agreement on e i t h e r the terms to be o f f e r e d or whether peace should be embodied i n a t reaty or an a r m i s t i c e . An armist ice was f i n a l l y decided upon and although Turkey was not n e c e s s a r i l y to be deprived of Constant inople , control o f the S t r a i t s . w o u l d res t in other h a n d s . ^ Lloyd George determined that B r i t a i n should be i n a pre-eminent p o s i t i o n in the Middle East at the expense of France and the other a l l i e s . He.regarded the S y k e s - P i c o t Agreement as a dead l e t t e r , arguing that the B r i t i s h had borne the brunt of the f i g h t i n g against Turkey and 26 that B r i t i s h inf luence should therefore remain ascendant. Ba l four C O did not agree, but in the end, Lloyd George had his way. The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s a t t i t u d e i s perhaps understandable, f o r B r i t i s h objec t ives had remained b a s i c a l l y unchanged since the time o f the de Bunsen Committee's report three years b e f o r e : the s e c u r i t y of land and sea routes i n the eastern Mediterranean and the freedom of act ion i n Mesopotamia which was required by the growing importance of the o i l deposits there . What had changed i n the past three years was that the imagined p o s i t i o n from which these aims were to be r e a l i s e d bore l i t t l e resemblance to the actual s i t u a t i o n at the war's end, when B r i t a i n found h e r s e l f i n an immeasurably strong p o s i t i o n i n the Middle East . B r i t i s h forces occupied not only those areas which B r i t a i n d e s i r e d , but also most of the region which France c laimed. This l a s t was to be useful i n the post-war negot ia t ions with France, but i n l a t e September of 1918, the French considered B r i t a i n to be ac t ing i n 64 an arrogant , high handed and devious manner.. When Turkish emissaries a r r i v e d at the B r i t i s h naval base at Mudros, the French were excluded from the n e g o t i a t i o n s . Despite Clemenceau's b i t t e r o b j e c t i o n s , the t a l k s were conducted between the Turks and the B r i t i s h , and on 30 October Admiral 65 Gough Calthorpe signed the A r m i s t i c e . The Armis t i ce contained twenty-f ive c l a u s e s , the most important of which required complete demobil isa t ion of the Ottoman armies save f o r a small force to maintain law and o r d e r , the r i g h t of the A l l i e s to occupy any s t r a t e g i c p o i n t , the opening of the S t r a i t s and secure A l l i e d access to the Black Sea. H o s t i l i t i e s were to cease at noon, 31 October 1918. Turkey was out of the war. 28 CHAPTER III MUDROS TO SMYRNA May 19, Monday. Most of the Cabinet have come over from London to discuss the future of Turkey. I am summoned to the Rue N i t o t , but not asked to attend the meeting. I s i t o u t s i d e , but as there i s only a glass p a r t i t i o n between me and the Cabinet I hear what they say. Curzon presses f o r e j e c t i o n of Turkey from Europe, and accepts Greek zone at Smyrna although with deep r egr e t . Montagu and M i l n e r are a l l against d i s t u r b -ing the Turk s t i l l f u r t h e r . Winston wants to leave him as he i s but to give America the mandate over Constantinople and the S t r a i t s , with a zone extending as f a r as Trebizond. A . J . B . wants Constantinople under an American mandate, Smyrna to Greece and the res t of Turkey as an independent kingdom, supervised by f o r e i g n ' a d v i s e r s . 1 L I . G .is non-commi t t a l . No d e c i s i o n come to i n so f a r as, through the glass d a r k l y , I can a s c e r t a i n . Harold Nicol son, Peacemaking, 1919. 1 Harold Nicol son's observations of the meeting of several of the members of the B r i t i s h cabinet on May 19,. 1919, show how undecided the cabinet was over a settlement with Turkey, and t h i s almost seven months a f t e r the s i g n i n g of the Mudros A r m i s t i c e . That no f i r m consensus had emerged during t h i s time i n d i c a t e s not only the i n d e c i s i o n i n the cabinet , but also the complexity of the whole Turkish i s s u e . 29 The terms of the Mudros Armist ice and the exc lus ion of France from the attendant negot ia t ions had been aimed at p r o v i d i n g a s i t u a t i o n favourable to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s in the eastern Mediterranean. The next step was to arrange a peace settlement which would e s t a b l i s h supremacy on a permanent b a s i s ; choosing the means to t h i s end was to prove a d i f f i c u l t and d i v i s i v e task. With the demise of the Ottoman Empire, B r i t a i n had l o s t her t r a d i t i o n a l means of i n d i r e c t control over the S t r a i t s and the land route from the Mediterranean to the Persian G u l f . I t was imperative that some other means of control be secured. But t h i s r a d i c a l change i n the Levant d i d not mean that B r i t i s h p o l i c y -makers could s t a r t with a clean s l a t e . For one t h i n g , the s h i f t i n the European balance of power i n France's favour had made her r i v a l r y i n the East a greater menace than before . There were also the wartime agreements to be taken into account and the l i m i t a t i o n s on a settlement which might r e s u l t from W i l s o n ' s Fourteen p o i n t s . With these fac tors i n mind, any approach to the Turkish question seemed to confront a twofold problem: the d i s p o s i t i o n of Constantinople and Thrace and the adminis t ra t ion of the S t r a i t s . One s o l u t i o n would be B r i t i s h possession of the area, but to t h i s France would never have agreed, nor , in f a c t , would have many 3 w i t h i n the B r i t i s h government. A l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s f o r Constantinople and Thrace were leaving the Turks i n f u l l possess ion , 30 i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s i n g the c i t y and g i v i n g Thrace to B u l g a r i a and Greece, or d r i v i n g the Turks out of Europe a l together . As f o r the adminis t ra t ion of the S t r a i t s , the p o s s i b i l i t i e s inc luded vest ing t h e i r control i n one of the other powers by way of mandate, an i n t e r n a t i o n a l commission, or p l a c i n g the area i n the t r u s t of a small n a t i o n , p r e f e r a b l y one which was responsive to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . The end of the European war and preparat ion f o r the general e l e c t i o n occupied Lloyd George f o r most of the autumn of 1918. I t was not u n t i l December that he seems to have taken some i n t e r e s t i n the problems of the Turkish set t lement . Notwithstand-ing t h i s , the debate wi thin and between various B r i t i s h government departments which had begun before the Mudros Armist ice continued f o r the res t of the year . Within the Foreign O f f i c e , suggestions as to how to best secure the S t r a i t s and dispose of Constantinople came from a v a r i e t y of sources . On 9 September, Arnold Toynbee, then employed as a Foreign O f f i c e c l e r k , produced a p o s i t i o n paper which proposed an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the S t r a i t s with s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r Turkey and a curtai lment of the C a p i t u l a t i o n s . This was one of the milder proposals . The r e v u l s i o n over Turkish a t r o c i t i e s during the war had revived the o l d Gladstonian notion of e x p e l l i n g the Turks 'bag and baggage' from Europe, a sentiment 5 now held not only by L i b e r a l s . An approach representat ive of t h i s view came from S i r Eyre Crowe, an a s s i s t a n t under-secre tary . 31 Crowe favoured not only e x p e l l i n g the Sultan from Constant inople , but ending Turkish power i n Europe once and f o r a l l . ^ Lord Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary , was more or l e s s i n agreement with t h i s l a t t e r point of view. ' 7 This p o l i c y debate wi thin the B r i t i s h government did not go on without r e l a t i o n to the aims of the other powers. Through-out the l a t t e r part o f 1918, account was taken i n p a r t i c u l a r of the p o s i t i o n s of France and the United S ta tes . . France's f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s i n Turkey and her m i s t r u s t o f B r i t i s h motives tended to make her caut ious . Referr ing to the Sykes -Picot Agreement as a 8 s t a r t i n g point f o r any Middle Eastern set t lement , the French were 9 to agree to the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and were eager to see that no form of B r i t i s h adminis t ra t ion be i n s t a l l e d . ^ However, i n the few months before the Conference, there was l i t t l e f r i c t i o n between B r i t a i n and France apart from the resentment by the French over t h e i r exc lus ion at Mudros and wrangles over the c i v i l a n d . m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . ^ In f a c t , 12 France accommodated some B r i t i s h desires i n Middle Eastern i s s u e s . During his v i s i t to London i n December 1918, Clemenceau ceded 1 3 Mosul and parts of the Levant to B r i t a i n . I t was probably France's need f o r support f o r h e r c l aims on Germany which forced her acceptance of t h i s a t t i t u d e . The American p o s i t i o n was based on the t w e l f t h of W i l s o n ' s Fourteen P o i n t s , namely that the S t r a i t s be placed under 32 . i n t e r n a t i o n a l guarantee and that Turkish sovereignty be assured. In September, Secretary of State Lansing a m p l i f i e d t h i s in a d i r e c t i v e to the American peace commissioners. He recommended expulsion of the Turks from Constant inople , an i n t e r n a t i o n a l ;,; adminis t ra t ion or a mandate f o r the c i t y and the S t r a i t s and a 14 Greek enclave at Smyrna. The American Delegation to the 15 Conference seems to have been d i v i d e d on the matter of a mandate. Day, Seymour and Lyber wanted e i t h e r a B r i t i s h or .American mandate. Wilson favoured a small power-or consortium of powers to run the S t r a i t s and Constantinople and expulsion of the T u r k s . ^ These ideas the President conveyed to Lloyd George when they met i n London on 26 December .^ The concept of an American mandate was gaining currency i n some sect ions o f the B r i t i s h government, by the end o f the •I Q year . Hardinge f o r one supported i t . Such an arrangement would take any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y from B r i t a i n ; , and, i f the S t r a i t s were to be administrated by another power, the United States was f a r more acceptable than France. The development of the notion of an American mandate was, as we s h a l l see, to have a considerable i n f l u e n c e on the Turkish set t lement . Expulsion of the Turks from Europe became Foreign O f f i c e p o l i c y . I t was r e s i s t e d by the India O f f i c e and the War O f f i c e , and t h i s inter-departmental debate found a forum i n two 33 meetings held i n l a t e December 1918. The f i r s t , on 20 December, was a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet . Although the meeting was somewhat i n c o n c l u s i v e , i t i s worthy of note i n two respects . F i r s t , the War O f f i c e opposed expulsion on the grounds that i t s execution would be extremely d i f f i c u l t . Second, Lloyd George i s recorded as opposing the proposal of an American mandate f o r 19 Turkey, a p o s i t i o n which he was soon to change. The second meeting, on 23 December, was one of the Eastern Committee. I t was here that Curzon, soon to be A c t i n g Foreign Secre tary , clashed with E . S . Montagu of the India O f f i c e . Because he b e l i e v e d that expulsion would ensure a greater degree of s t a b i l i t y i n the area, Curzon adopted the same stance as 20 Crowe. Montagu contended that such an act would upset the Moslems of India and aggravate an already d e l i c a t e s i t u a t i o n 21 there . The two renewed t h e i r f i g h t at the beginning of the new year . On 2 January 1919, Curzon c i r c u l a t e d a memorandum out-l i n i n g his posi t ion . . In his grandiloquent s t y l e , he based his argument on two premises. The f i r s t was that i n the past the Turkish presence i n Europe had been a continual menace to peace and had caused great s u f f e r i n g not only to the subject peoples but to the major i ty of the Turkish people as w e l l . Secondly, the future s t a b i l i t y of the region could only be guaranteed i f the Turks were forced from Europe. As he put i t : 34 We can e a s i l y imagine the atmosphere i n which . . . an i n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission (of which there could hardly f a i l , in these c o n d i t i o n s , to be a Turkish member) would pursue i t s work--an atmosphere o f . incessant conspiracy and c a b a l . The w i l y Turk would revel i n such a s i t u a t i o n as a f f o r d i n g r e -newed scope to his heredi tary t a l e n t s ; and. round the p i v o t of his own p l o t s would revolve a whirlwind of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t r i g u e , i n which the representa-t i v e s of a l l the n a t i o n s , who s t i l l a s p i r e d to his i n h e r i t a n c e , would eagerly mix. 22 Montagu's reply was not long i n coming. On 8 January his memorandum claimed that the expulsion would be an a f f r o n t to I n d i a ' s Moslems, an a f f r o n t made a l l the greater by the f a c t that v i c t o r y over the 23 Turks had been achieved with the help, of Moslem.arms. The debate continued through January and was taken up i n two meetings at the A s t o r i a Hotel on the 30th and 31st of the month, held by representat ives of the B r i t i s h Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. At the f i r s t meeting, the Foreign O f f i c e proposed an American mandate, f o r the S t r a i t s and Constant inople . A l l three of the armed services o b j e c t e d , the view of the Admiral ty holding good f o r the other two: 'In p a r t i c u l a r , a mandate given to the United States of .America by the League of Nations would a f f o r d opportunity and pretext f o r basing a strong American f l e e t i n the Mediterranean; a danger which, from a s t r a t e g i c point o f view, must at a l l cost be a v o i d e d . ' On t h i s issue the Foreign O f f i c e gave way and i t was agreed that Constantinople and the S t r a i t s should.be i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s e d with s u f f i c i e n t land on e i t h e r s ide of the waterway to make i t 24 m i l i t a r i l y d e f e n s i b l e . 35 The second meeting r a i s e d another issue which was to be of great importance in the f u t u r e . In the area of Smyrna on the western Anatol ian coast , the Greeks and the I t a l i a n s had c o n f l i c t -ing t e r r i t o r i a l c la ims . The I t a l i a n s r e f e r r e d to the Treaty o f Saint Jean de Maurienne, the Greeks to the r e g i o n ' s e thnic and h i s t o r i c a l t i e s with Greece. Major General Thwaites of the War O f f i c e argued that Smyrna should stay with the T u r k s , s ince g i v i n g i t to Greece would cause great resentment among the Turkish p o p u l a t i o n . However, Crowe's suggestion that the Greeks be 25 given Smyrna was the one to be c a r r i e d . Despite the agreements reached at these two meetings, the B r i t i s h government was f a r from united on a Turkish set t lement . The p r i n c i p l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l adminis t ra t ion f o r Constantinople and the S t r a i t s had been agreed upon, but f o r months to come, various members of the government were to advocate an American mandate. The issue of expulsion.was not s e t t l e d at a l l and the Smyrna issue d i v i d e d the cabinet , f o r although Crowe had proposed Greek possession of the town, some of his super iors f l a t l y opposed the i d e a . 2 6 Crowe's support o f Greek possession o f Smyrna ran counter to- the wishes of Hardinge, his s u p e r i o r . Why Crowe f e l t free t o . a c t in t h i s way has given r i s e to the suggestion that he must have been supported by a greater power than Hardinge, namely Lloyd George. I t i s p o s s i b l e that the Prime M i n i s t e r , while wai t ing f o r the Americans to declare t h e i r p o s i t i o n . o n a mandate, was e i t h e r t r y i n g to force t h e i r hand or was p r o v i d i n g a p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e should the United States decide i n the negat ive . E a r l y support of Greece's claims would ensure t h e i r goodwill l a t e r . Lloyd George's p o s i t i o n i n these events i s d i f f i c u l t to determine. In December he had been unenthusias t ic about an American mandate, but by January, he and B a l f o u r had jo ined Curzon i n his support of the i d e a . Several times during 1919 he was to advocate an American mandate,, despite W i l s o n ' s discouragements. His a t t i t u d e i s not easy to e x p l a i n . He must have been aware, as 29 Curzon was, that the plan.had l i t t l e chance of success , and i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how someone with- his p e r s p i c a c i t y could have so completely misread the s i g n s . One explanation i s that his support of an American mandate was a ploy to put Wilson i n a d i f f i c u l t posi t ion . . By o f f e r i n g the President a mandate which he could not accept , Lloyd George might have been t r y i n g to 30 weaken W i l s o n ' s objec t ion to B r i t i s h mandates elsewhere. Yet t h i s argument does not account f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p e r s i s -tence. Nor does i t expla in the note of disappointment and f r u s t r a t i o n which Lloyd George expressed on the subject in his The Truth About the Peace T r e a t i e s , wr i t ten sixteen years , , 31 l a t e r . 37 On the matter of e x p u l s i o n , the Prime M i n i s t e r was i n agreement with Curzon and Crowe. Despite his pronouncements a 32 year e a r l i e r i n the House of Commons, i n e a r l y 1919 he maintained that the Turks had to be driven from Europe. Of the two p o s i t i o n s he had taken, there i s no doubt which one sat more comfortably with him. His l o a t h i n g f o r the Turks did not end with the f i g h t i n g . Indeed, Lloyd George's hatred f o r the Turks was comparable i n i t s i n t e n s i t y only to C h u r c h i l l ' s f e e l i n g s f o r the B o l s h e v i k s . Notwithstanding a l l t h i s pre-Conference a c t i v i t y , the Par is Peace Conference d i d not produce a quick settlement on the Turkish q u e s t i o n . The d i f f e r e n c e s i n p o l i c y between the powers and w i t h i n t h e i r delegations impeded a s o l u t i o n : so d i d hope on the part of B r i t a i n and France that the United States would 33 accept a mandate f o r the. S t r a i t s and Armenia. Throughout 1919, the s o l u t i o n s o f f e r e d at the Conference were r e a l l y only s t o p -gaps to buy time u n t i l a permanent s o l u t i o n was drawn up. Despite the p r i o r i t y given at the Conference to the other set t lements , a good deal of work was done i n committee regarding the claims of some nations on. the corpse o f the Ottoman Empire. The Greek d e l e g a t i o n , led by E l e u t h e r i o s V e n i z e l o s , was one of the more notable s u p p l i c a n t s . In presenting his country ' s c l a i m s , the Greek Prime M i n i s t e r e x p l o i t e d h is two main advantages: the debt which some of the a l l i e s f e l t they 38 owed him and his own p e r s o n a l i t y . He was aware that his p o s i t i o n at home depended upon a successful annexat ionis t p o l i c y at the 34 Conference and he worked t i r e l e s s l y to that end. Although Greece had not entered the war u n t i l 1917, Venizelos had campaigned f o r the Entente from the beginning , but he had been thwarted by King Constantine and his supporters . I t was only a f t e r an a n t i - r o y a l i s t r e b e l l i o n , l a r g e l y i n s t i g a t e d by 35 V e n i z e l o s , that Greece had entered the war. Because of these e f f o r t s , many of the delegates , p a r t i c u l a r l y from B r i t a i n and France, f e l t that they owed a debt to V e n i z e l o s , i f not to his 36 country. V e n i z e l o s 1 second asset was his p e r s o n a l i t y , which 37 seems to have charmed almost everyone who met him. I t was probably due to t h i s that the strong bond of f r i e n d s h i p e x i s t e d between him and Lloyd George. In many ways the two men were quite a l i k e , and i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that at one stage the B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r r e f e r r e d to Venizelos as the Lloyd George of Greece. Both men had been, born in s i m i l a r circumstances and had entered the legal profession. . One was Welsh, the other Cretan; both t h e i r homelands being considered somewhat apart from and subservient to the main.body of the parent n a t i o n . Despite t h i s , the two had broken into the e s t a b l i s h e d order and had achieved great success . The two had s i m i l a r temperaments. Venizelos to a large extent mirrored Lloyd George's mercurial 39 character and he had the same i n t u i t i v e approach to the problems which confronted him. These fac tors , worked to cement a strong f r i e n d s h i p between them, a f r i e n d s h i p which was to have f a t e f u l consequences f o r them both.. On 3 and 4 February, Venizelos presented his demands to the Council of Ten. He asked, among other t h i n g s , that both eastern and western Thrace be turned over to Greece and that i n A s i a Minor , major parts of the vi1ayets of Brusa and A i d i n , t o -gether with the town of Smyrna, become Greek.. He d i d not push too f a r , and he r e f r a i n e d from.asking f o r Constant inople , suggest-ing that i t be administered by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l S t r a i t s Commission. Instead of these matters being debated in the Council of Ten, i t was decided on Lloyd Goerge's suggestion that the s i t u a t i o n be examined by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l committee of experts which would 39 submit i t s f i n d i n g s to the C o u n c i l . The Greek Committee convened on 12 February and produced i t s f i n d i n g s on 8 March. This report was not conclusive and the Big Four could not agree. They agreed on g i v i n g Greece western Thrace despite the predominance o f Turks i n the area, and a l l but the I t a l i a n s recommended the same f o r Eastern Thrace. The B r i t i s h and French delegation accepted with reservat ion the Greek claims i n A n a t o l i a ; the Americans and I t a l i a n s re jec ted 40 them. A f t e r some n e g o t i a t i o n , the United States e v e n t u a l l y came to s ide with B r i t a i n and France , 4 ^ but I t a l y d i d not, f e a r -40 f u l that her claims under the S a i n t Jean de Maurienne Treaty would be l o s t . The report of the Greek Committee seemed to show that B r i t a i n and France were working to prevent I t a l y from c la iming 42 what had been promised to her i n the wartime agreements. I t was not only the report that worried the I t a l i a n s . Lloyd George, among o t h e r s , was maintaining that as the Treaty of S a i n t Jean de Maurienne was never r a t i f i e d by Russia , i t was v o i d , and that i n any case I t a l y had l i t t l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r her claims on Turkey since she had not s u p p l i e d a s i n g l e s o l d i e r f o r the Middle Eastern 43 campaign. To prevent the loss of what had been promised to her i n the wartime agreements, I t a l y began landing forces on the Adal ian coast la te i n March 1 9 1 9 . ^ . In the space of a few weeks, these forces were nearing Smyrna. The Par is Peace Conference at f i r s t d i d l i t t l e to protest these a c t i o n s , f o r i n A p r i l , I t a l y was h e a v i l y i n v o l v e d i n the acrimonious debate over the future of Fiume. I t was only a f t e r Orlando and Sonnino., the I t a l i a n Prime M i n i s t e r and Foreign M i n i s t e r , piqued by W i l s o n ' s appeal , to the I t a l i a n people i n Le Temps on A p r i l 24 had l e f t the conference, that the other three major powers turned t h e i r a t t e n t i o n to Asia Minor . The behaviour of the I t a l i a n s over t h e i r c la im to Fiume and the manner of t h e i r l eaving the Conference caused a great deal of f r u s t r a t i o n and resentment among the other powers. Wilson had l o s t a l l patience and on 2 May he even contemplated m i l i t a r y ac t ion against them. His frame of mind was not improved by a report received three days l a t e r which a l l e g e d that the 46 I t a l i a n s had been abusing the Greek populat ion of Rhodes. Lloyd George, aware that Orlando and Sonnino were due to return to the Conference on 7 May, at t h i s point proposed that Greek forces be held i n readiness to land i n Smyrna should the Greek populat ion there be threatened. W i l s o n , whose d i s l i k e of the I t a l i a n s by t h i s time seemed to know no bounds, went even f u r t h e r and suggested 47 that the Greeks land as soon as p o s s i b l e . This suggestion to land Greek forces i n Smyrna went f u r t h e r than Lloyd George's p r o p o s a l . The P r e s i d e n t ' s suggestion might have come as a s u r p r i s e to the-Prime M i n i s t e r or i t might have been the r e s u l t o f shrewd manipulation on the Welshman's p a r t . Whatever the reason, L l o y d George d i d not f i n d i t unwelcome and gave i t his f u l l support , f o r i t ensured a Greek presence i n the Smyrna area without having to wai t f o r a peace set t lement . I t was one concrete step to the r e a l i s a t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s hope that the region be administered by an impar t ia l power or by one which was sympathetic to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . Whether his c a l l f o r an American mandate was genuine o.r a p l o y , the United States was proving r e l u c t a n t to accept the burden. This being so , Lloyd George's support of Greek claims can.be understood. B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , he thought, would be well served by a c l i e n t state 48 which would be gra teful to B r i t a i n and dependent on her. 42 Objections to t h i s development came from several sect ions of the B r i t i s h government, and from Curzon and the War O f f i c e in 49 p a r t i c u l a r . Although they were i n sympathy with Lloyd George's ult imate goal o f imperial s e c u r i t y , i t was his means to that end which they d i s l i k e d . Both Curzon and the War O f f i c e b e l i e v e d that the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s method would cause more d i f f i c u l t i e s than i t would s o l v e . However, the Prime M i n i s t e r was adamant. The arrangements were made and the eager Greeks landed at Smyrna on 14 May 1919 under the protec t ion of B r i t i s h , French and American warships . 43 CHAPTER IV THE TREATY OF SEVRES You must decide whom you are going to back. David Lloyd George The Greek invasion of A s i a Minor d i d l i t t l e to s i m p l i f y the problems of a settlement of the Turkish ques t ion . The operation was to have both short and long term e f f e c t s i n c l u d i n g increased I t a l i a n resentment, a growing d i s t r u s t of B r i t i s h motives on the par t of France and the r i s e of a strong Turkish n a t i o n a l i s t movement which would one day confound the plans of Lloyd George and the G r e e k s J One immediate r e s u l t o f the landings which should have been foreseen was increased tension between I t a l y and Greece, p a r t i c u l a r l y between t h e i r forces i n the disputed r e g i o n . Throughout June 1919, the s i t u a t i o n i n A s i a Minor became more and more pre -2 carious and on 10 J u l y , the Greeks f i r e d on the I t a l i a n s . The I t a l i a n s protested immediately to the Supreme Council in P a r i s , which recommended, on B a l f o u r ' s sugges t ion , tha t General Al lenby 3 should be responsible f o r d e l i n e a t i n g the two areas of occupat ion. The I t a l i a n delegation balked at t h i s , f o r not without reason, 44 they suspected the B r i t i s h of being pro-Greek. T i t t o n i , the new I t a l i a n Foreign M i n i s t e r , suggested a conference between I t a l y and 4 Greece to s e t t l e the matter d i r e c t l y . The outcome of t h i s conference was that on 18 J u l y the T i t t o n i - V e n i z e l o s agreement was announced. Under i t s terms, I t a l y would support Greek claims in Thrace and i n parts of A l b a n i a , while Greece agreed to an I t a l i a n mandate f o r the res t of A l b a n i a . I t a l y ceded Smyrna to Greece i n return f o r a free hand i n other 5 parts of A n a t o l i a . The weak c r i e s of protes t from Washington went unheard i n an atmosphere i n c r e a s i n g l y unreceptive to the m o r a l i s i n g of the American Pres ident . The landings had other e f f e c t s . A t r o c i t i e s committed by the Greeks against Turkish c i v i l i a n s and prisoners of war began with the landings and continued f o r some time af terward. Reports from both B r i t i s h government and press representat ives i n d i c a t e d the extent and nature of the depredat ions .^ Questions were asked i n Parliament and the government was hard put to f i n d a s u i t a b l e r e p l y . In P a r i s , the Supreme Council recommended that a Commission of Inquiry be sent to Smyrna to . invest igate reports that thousands of Moslems had been massacred and that many more had been driven g from t h e i r homes. The Commission took several months to r e p o r t . Its f i n d i n g s were preceded on 2 October by the report of General M i l n e , 45 G . O . C . Constantinople and Commander of the B r i t i s h Army of the Black Sea, on the boundaries of the I t a l i a n and Greek zones. His report recommended that the Greeks consol idate t h e i r p o s i t i o n around Smyrna and that the abandoned t e r r i t o r y be occupied by an i n t e r -9 a l l i e d f o r c e . But fear by the powers of such a commitment caused t h i s part of the proposal to be a b a n d o n e d . ^ A much more damning indictment o f the Greek occupation came on 8 November with the Smyrna Commission's r e p o r t . I t s tated that s ince the A r m i s t i c e , C h r i s t i a n residents of the area had been secure under the governance of Izzet Bey, the Turkish governor. Neither i n Smyrna nor i n i t s environs .had the c i v i l or m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n j u s t i f i e d the Greek l a n d i n g s . 1 1 The Commission held the Greek commander responsible f o r a v a r i e t y of excesses which included the maltreatment of large numbers of c i v i l i a n s and the murder o f pr isoners of war. Among other t h i n g s , the report recommended that A l l i e d forces replace the Greek troops and that t h i s A l l i e d force 12 be i n turn replaced by the Turkish gendarmerie. These f i n d i n g s were v igorously > disputed by Venizelos and Colonel Mazarakis , the Greek member of the Commission, on the 13 grounds that the Commission had been p a r t i a l i n i t s procedure. This argument was supported by:.Eyre Crowe, who claimed that the Commission had not only been p a r t i a l . , but that i t had exceeded 14 i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n . Despite t h i s , the Greeks were to stand censured. On 12 November, the Supreme Council sent a note to 4 6 V e n i z e l o s . While the Council recognised V e n i z e l o s ' arguments, i t upheld the Commission's f i n d i n g s . The note allowed that Greek forces could remain, but p o s s i b l y only u n t i l the Eastern Question 15 was s e t t l e d permanently. As might be expected, a l l these a c t i v i t i e s d i d not take place against a background of complete T u r k i s h . p a s s i v i t y . Since May 1919, a Turkish n a t i o n a l i s t movement had been growing. An occupation by B r i t a i n , France or the United States might have been accepted by the Turks f o r even an extended per iod of time. An invas ion by the Greeks, a former subject people , was i n t o l e r a b l e . This i n d i g n a t i o n caused s u p p o r t . f o r the n a t i o n a l i s t s to grow. In the mountains of central A n a t o l i a , Mustapha Kemal, a veteran of the G a l l i p o l i campaign, was b u i l d i n g up a n a t i o n a l i s t army. Old caches of arms were opened up and B r i t i s h troops guarding dumps of weapons which had been surrendered under the Mudros Armis t i ce were driven o f f or captured and the contents of the dumps were appropriated by the N a t i o n a l i s t s . ^ Despite these developments during the summer and f a l l of 1919, i t was not u n t i l November that the f i r s t real steps were taken towards s o l v i n g the Turkish ques t ion . One of the main reasons f o r t h i s delay was the expectation on the par t of B r i t a i n and France that the United States would play an ac t ive role i n 1 o the set t lement . By November, however, W i l s o n ' s health and the 19 mood of the Republican-dominated Senate had crushed these hopes. 47 B r i t a i n and France were now i n a p o s i t i o n to resolve the matter between themselves. Thus, on 10 November, when Poincare and Pichon, the French President and Foreign Secretary v i s i t e d London, the matter was broached to Curzon, who had succeeded B a l f o u r as Foreign Secretary a l i t t l e more than two weeks before . P ichon 's suggestion that B r i t a i n and France r e c o n c i l e 21 t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s i n Turkey was r e a d i l y agreed to by Curzon. A meeting between the B r i t i s h and French Prime M i n i s t e r s was set f o r 11 December. There were to be many obstacles to an amicable set t lement ; these inc luded the t r a d i t i o n a l mis t rust between the two great European powers, a fundamental d i f f e r e n c e between them on major issues of the Turkish q u e s t i o n , and a lack of agreement wi thin the B r i t i s h Cabinet . The French were suspic ious o f the motives f o r Lloyd George's support of the Greeks. They also suspected the manifes t ly p r o - B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e of the Turkish government i n Constant inople . From the time o f the Mudros A r m i s t i c e , the Turkish government had adopted a p r o - B r i t i s h stance i n s p i t e of B r i t a i n ' s s u p p o r t . f o r Greece. In March 1919, f o r example, the Grand V i z i e r had s tated that Turkey would submit only to B r i t a i n . This sentiment might have been genuine or i t might have been an attempt by the Turks to d i v i d e t h e i r conquerors. Whether i t , was rec iprocated i s doubt-f u l . However, i n the f a l l of 1919, p e r s i s t e n t rumours of a secre t 22 Anglo-Turk t reaty d i d l i t t l e to a l l a y French s u s p i c i o n s . By 48 the same token, the B r i t i s h were aware of a meeting which had taken place between Georges Pi cot and Kemal at Sivas on 6 December, and suspected that France might be drawing away from the Entente to seek her own advantage. Fur ther , there were marked d i f f e r e n c e s between B r i t i s h and French p o l i c i e s . The French aimed at maintaining Turkish i n t e g r i t y and imposing s t r i c t f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l s . Lloyd George and Curzon, while agreeing with the French on the need to keep the S t r a i t s open, s t i l l advocated expulsion of the Turks from Constant inople , c rush-ing the Turks f o r a l l time and enhancing the r i g h t s of the m i n o r i t y 23 peoples . Nor were things made any e a s i e r by the f a c t that Lloyd George and Curzon had l i t t l e support f o r . t h e i r hard l i n e from the B r i t i s h cabinet . Despite a considerable amount of popular support f o r e x p u l s i o n , there was resolute opposi t ion to i t w i t h i n the 24 cabinet . Montagu had not changed his stance of almost a year before and i n t h i s he was supported by C h u r c h i l l who was now 25 Secretary of State f o r War. However, the fears of the a n t i -e x p u l s i o n i s t s were calmed on 10 December at a meeting of m i n i s t e r s . Here, Lloyd George and Curzon suggested that even a f t e r e x p u l s i o n , the Sultan would be allowed to remain i n the c i t y as the C a l i p h o f Islam and to f u l f i l l a r o l e somewhat s i m i l a r to that of the Pope 9 ft i n the V a t i c a n . Despite t h i s compromise, the B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r was as determined as ever that the Turks should be e x p e l l e d completely 49 from Europe. A . E . Montgomery sums up Lloyd George's f e e l i n g s at the time as f o l l o w s : Turkey had cost Great B r i t a i n dearly i n blood and t reasure , and she must be made to pay the p r i c e . Her b a r b a r i c treatment o f her C h r i s t i a n minor i ty populat ion had shocked the c i v i l i s e d w o r l d . For t h i s too she must be punished. Lloyd George h i m s e l f , a strange amalgam o f Gladstonian L i b e r a l and Welsh v i s i o n a r y , envisaged a settlement based upon two complementary p r i n c i p l e s : The A l l i e s should suppress Turkish power once and f o r a l l by d e p r i v i n g Turkey of her heredi tary guardianship of the S t r a i t s ; and they should wrest from her control a l l t e r r i t o r i e s which were not e x c l u s i v e l y peopled by Turks . I t was to achieve t h i s end that he had s u c c e s s f u l l y c o n t r i v e d to ensure B r i t i s h naval and m i l i t a r y predominance at Constantinople and had l e n t his encouragement and support to the ambitions of the Greek premier, V e n i z e l o s . 27 Thus, when Clemenceau opened the discuss ions i n London on 11 December by saying that he considered Constantinople separate from the S t r a i t s and that the c i t y should remain part o f Turkey, Lloyd George countered by saying that the B r i t i s h government objected 28 to l e a v i n g the c i t y i n the hands of the Turks . He maintained that to be a s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g economic u n i t , any i n t e r n a t i o n a l S t r a i t s Zone would have to depend on Constantinople f o r i t s revenue. He d i d mention the ' V a t i c a n ' p r o p o s a l , but o n l y o b l i q u e l y and w i t h -29 out any great enthusiasm. Clemenceau's reply was almost a c a p i t u l a t i o n . He agreed to expulsion but not to the Vatican p r o p o s a l , saying that i t should be forgotten as ' I t was qui te bad 30 enough to have one Pope i n the West . ' 50 Lloyd George and Curzon were thus able to overcome a major obstacle i n t h e i r f i g h t to deprive Turkey of i t s c a p i t a l . Exac t ly why Clemenceau gave i n on t h i s point i s not c l e a r . I t may be surmised, however, that the French premier was prepared to be con-c i l i a t o r y i n the hopes of B r i t i s h support i n e n f o r c i n g the terms 31 of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . Negotiations were.resumed on 22 December in London between B e r t h e l o t , the General Secretary to the French Foreign O f f i c e , and Curzon. The ta lks were held i n an attempt, to b u i l d a common p o l i c y between B r i t a i n and France before the Supreme Council met to discuss Turkey. From Curzon's p o i n t o f view, the meeting went s u c c e s s f u l l y . Without Lloyd George present to push Greek claims on Smyrna, agree-ment was q u i c k l y reached on l i m i t i n g not only I t a l i a n , but also 32 Greek i n f l u e n c e i n A s i a Minor. I f Lloyd George d i d not l i k e that arrangement, the second point which Curzon won must have been to his l i k i n g . Ber thelot had agreed e a s i l y to the Foreign S e c r e t a r y ' s proposal that the Turks would lose Constant inople , which together with the S t r a i t s Zone would become an independent . . 33 s t a t e . At t h i s p o i n t , i t seemed that Lloyd George and Curzon had every reason to congratulate themselves. Curzon had won points which he considered to be very important . With the p o s s i b l e exception of Armenia, A n a t o l i a would be e n t i r e l y under Turkish s o v e r e i g n t y , but the Turks would lose Constant inople . The new state on the shores of the S t r a i t s would be j o i n t l y 51 administered by several n a t i o n s , but the real power would rest with " l e s deux pays qui possedent en Turquie des i n t e r e t s et une i n f l u e n c e 34 preponderante," that i s B r i t a i n and France. Lloyd George, a l - • though faced with the l i k e l i h o o d that his Greek c l i e n t s would be d i s a p p o i n t e d , could take solace i n the f a c t that the agreement, i f r e a l i s e d , would secure B r i t i s h imperial i n t e r e s t s and crush the Turks at the same time. Yet any s a t i s f a c t i o n which Lloyd George and Curzon might have f e l t was s h o r t - l i v e d . Those elements in the B r i t i s h government opposed to expulsion soon came to the at tack. Montagu was the f i r s t to voice his disapproval of the agreement. Annoyed that Lloyd George had misrepresented the i n t e n t of the cabinet when he had met Clemenceau, the Secretary o f State 35 f o r India c i r c u l a t e d a memorandum on 1 January 1920. In the memorandum,Montagu r e i t e r a t e d his views on expulsion and maintained that the Foreign Secretary had not pursued his negot ia t ions i n accordance with what had been agreed to at the meeting of minis ters of 10 December. Five days l a t e r , Montagu repeated these arguments-when the cabinet met to discuss the i s s u e . He was opposed by Lloyd George,Curzon and B a l f o u r , but he received help from the War O f f i c e . General W i l s o n , Chief of the Imperial. General S t a f f , put forward the argument that , given the s i t u a t i o n i n India and the Bolshevik menace occasioned by D e n i k i n ' s c o l l a p s e , B r i t a i n would f i n d i t 52 hard to muster a large enough force to expel 1 the Turks and maintain order . Another f a c t o r was that i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d , imperia l troops would have to be used, and because a large number of them would be Indian Moslems,, d i f f i c u l t i e s could a r i s e . A f u r t h e r condi t ion which might have had some bearing on the outcome of the meeting was that the French press had proclaimed that the B r i t i s h government, not the French, would have to take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the e x p u l s i o n . Montagu, supported.by the War O f f i c e , c a r r i e d the day. The cabinet voted to leave the Turks .and t h e i r Sultan i n Constantinople 37 and to run the c i t y by some form of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . From that day, expulsion of the Turks from Europe ceased to be a part of the proposed Turkish sett lement . As might be expected, Curzon protested vigorously , but short o f r e s i g n a t i o n there was l i t t l e that he could do but accept the d e c i s i o n and r e i t e r a t e his f e e l i n g s i n a memorandum which he wrote the next day. Although the cabinet d e c i s i o n was s e c r e t , the Quai d 'Orsai r i g h t l y suspected a d i v i s i o n in . the B r i t i s h cabinet . B e r t h e l o t ' s note of 11 January reopened the issue of Constant inople . He p r o -posed that the Turks r e t a i n the c i t y with a small f o o t h o l d in Europe, the res t of Eastern Thrace going to Greece. However, as 39 part of t h i s arrangement, the Greeks would lose Smyrna. Both Montagu and the Foreign O f f i c e draf ted r e p l i e s , and Lloyd George, favouring the Foreign O f f i c e p o i n t of view, showed Montagu's d r a f t to V e n i z e l o s . The Greek protested l o u d l y and p u b l i c l y at the suggested exc lus ion of Greece from S m y r n a . ^ This ac t ion by Lloyd 53 George c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d his pro-Greek b i a s . In an attempt to have his own way, he used the i n f l u e n c e of an o u t s i d e r to resolve the d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n his cabinet . The r e s u l t o f t h i s device was another d r a f t which was never sent to France. Prepared by the Foreign O f f i c e , i t suggested Greek evacuation of A n a t o l i a with Smyrna a free port and that i n return Greece should be given an. enlarged Eastern Thrace. Matters rested at t h i s point u n t i l February and the London Conference. This Conference was i n f a c t a meeting of the Supreme Council i n which the main p r i n c i p l e s of the Turkish settlement were to be agreed on. Although the Anglo-French meetings of the previous December had been meant to smooth the way f o r t h i s conference, several events had taken place i n the i n t e r i m which would a f f e c t the course of the n e g o t i a t i o n s . The tensions between B r i t a i n and France, e f f e c t i v e l y con-cealed at the December meetings, were now much more apparent and 41 severe. Lloyd George's and Curzon's p o s i t i o n had been weakened by the c a b i n e t ' s r e j e c t i o n of t h e i r agreement with B e r t h e l o t . Clemenceau was no longer Prime M i n i s t e r of France. He had been replaced by Alexandre M i l l e r a n d , who, despite his r a d i c a l s o c i a l i s t 42 beginnings , was now a conservat ive . Beyond these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , an event i n A n a t o l i a i n January had changed the French a t t i t u d e to Turkey qui te s i g n i f i c a n t l y . Kemal, the n a t i o n a l i s t leader., had attacked the town of Marash i n French-held C i l i c i a . The town was defended b y . a force of Armenian l e v i e s who were a n n i h i l a t e d i n a 54 b i t t e r f i g h t . The b a t t l e was followed by the s laughter of the 43 town's twenty thousand i n h a b i t a n t s . The shock of t h i s defeat , together with France's fear f o r her large f i n a n c i a l holdings i n Turkey and her growing d i s t r u s t of B r i t i s h motives, caused France 44 to reconsider her p o l i c y towards the N a t i o n a l i s t s . The London Conference f i r s t met on 12 February and con-tinued u n t i l 10 A p r i l , although most of the important work was done i n the e a r l y stages. There were many issues to be s e t t l e d , s ince the purpose of the Conference was to d r a f t a sett lement not only f o r Turkey proper but f o r the res t o f the Ottoman Empire as w e l l . During the f i r s t two weeks i t was the heads of the delegations who discussed the i s s u e s , but a t - the end of the month a s e r i e s of committees was e s t a b l i s h e d to deal with the matters i n d e t a i l . The recommendations of these committees were to be reviewed by a committee of Foreign M i n i s t e r s and Ambassadors. The issues touching Turkey proper inc luded the S t r a i t s and Constant inople , Smyrna and the f i n a n c i a l adminis t ra t ion of the new s t a t e . Since the matter of Constantinople seemed the e a s i e s t to s e t t l e , i t was deal t with f i r s t . Although Lloyd George and Curzon would s t i l l have had the c i t y separated from the res t o f Turkey, there was l i t t l e that they could do i n the face of the c a b i n e t ' s d e c i s i o n . M i l l e r a n d . . opened the negot ia t ions by suggesting that i t was d e s i r a b l e to keep the Turks i n the c i t y . He maintained. that u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of the r e s u l t s o f expulsion both i n Turkey and on French Moslem possessions made Turkish 55 possession of Constantinople i n d i s p e n s a b l e . He was supported by N i t t i , the new I t a l i a n Prime M i n i s t e r . At t h i s , L loyd George launched into another of his a n t i - T u r k i s h d i a t r i b e s , but i n the l i g h t of the cabinet d e c i s i o n , there was l i t t l e that he could do 45 but accept the French p r o p o s a l . A f t e r some f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n , B r i t a i n , France and I t a l y came to the conclusion that i n t e r n a t i o n a l occupation o f the area around the S t r a i t s was necessary i n order to guarantee freedom of passage. A f t e r recommendations.from the m i l i t a r y advisors of the three powers and Japan, the conclusion was incorporated into the Draf t Synopsis of the Peace with Turkey. Under the terms of t h i s document, a commission was to be e s t a b l i s h e d which would be respon-s i b l e f o r shipping and would have j u r i s d i c t i o n on both shores of 46 the waterway. Lloyd George might have l o s t the b a t t l e f o r Constant inople , but he d i d win i n the negot ia t ions on the fate of Smyrna. Both the 47 French and the I t a l i a n s wished to see the Greeks gone from Smyrna. So too d i d some members of the B r i t i s h government, the Foreign 48 O f f i c e and the War O f f i c e . Against t h i s o p p o s i t i o n , Lloyd George put up a s p i r i t e d f i g h t f o r Greek possession o f the c i t y . That the Turks had been allowed to r e t a i n Constantinople was, he argued, concession enough to them. The Greeks had a j u s t c la im on Smyrna 49 and i t was r i g h t that they be allowed to keep i t . He continued that the Greeks i n Smyrna would be a guarantee against an upsurge of Turkish h o s t i l i t y and would be a bridgehead i f war broke out 56 50 again . The Prime M i n i s t e r was prepared to allow nominal Turkish sovereignty over the area ' i n order to save t h e i r f a c e , ' but that was as f a r as he was prepared to go. He e s t a b l i s h e d a committee which confirmed his view. The a l l i e s r e l u c t a n t l y accepted the Greeks into Smyrna and agreed to Greek possession o f almost the 51 whole of Eastern Thrace. Another i s s u e , which to the French was most important , was the future f i n a n c i a l adminis t ra t ion of Turkey. The tremendous loss to France occasioned by the c o n f i s c a t i o n of f o r e i g n assets i n the Sovie t Union made the French delegation resolute i n i t s aim to secure French investments i n Turkey. The French delegation proposed a scheme which would give them f a r - r e a c h i n g powers i n the p o l i t i c a l and 52 f i n a n c i a l adminis t ra t ion of the new Turkish s t a t e . Because of s t r i d e n t B r i t i s h objec t ion to t h i s p r o p o s a l , France agreed to a compromise i n which a commission would supervise the economic recovery of Turkey. The matter did not res t there , f o r i n e a r l y March the French negotiators withdrew t h e i r consent and demanded that negot ia t ions be reopened. In the end, the B r i t i s h gave more 53 ground and an agreement was reached. . The issue of f i n a n c i a l control of the new Turkey led d i r e c t l y to an a l l o c a t i o n o f zones o f i n f l u e n c e wherein the power concerned could pursue i t s i n t e r e s t s without i n t e r f e r e n c e from the o thers . This arrangement came i n the form of the T r i p a r t i t e Agreement. In order to avoid any objec t ion by the United S t a t e s , 54 the pact took the form of a s e l f - d e n y i n g ordinance. Each power 57 was to r e f r a i n from i n t e r f e r i n g with the r i g h t s of the other i n t t s designated area. For Turkey proper, i t was France and I t a l y who d i v i d e d most of the l a n d . B r i t a i n ' s share f e l l outside the Turkish part o f the Ottoman Empire. The boundaries of the zones of i n f l u e n c e were roughly those of the Sykes—Picot Agreement and the Treaty of S t . Jean de Maurienne. France was to gain permanent control of C i l i c i a and other parts of south eastern Turkey. Those parts of southern A n a t o l i a which f e l l outside the French area and a large part o f western A n a t o l i a went to I t a l y . The only important m o d i f i c a t i o n i n the I t a l i a n zone from the o r i g i n a l plan i n the S t . Jean de Maurienne Treaty was the enclave at Smyrna which was to go to the Greeks. In t h i s f a s h i o n , the main issues were s e t t l e d f a i r l y q u i c k l y . I t seemed that the Turkish peace was to be to Lloyd George's l i k i n g ; the safety of the S t r a i t s was assured and he had got the Greeks most of what they had wanted. Furthermore, although the Prime M i n i s t e r had l o s t the f i g h t f o r e x p u l s i o n , there was even to be a temporary consolat ion f o r that l o s s , f o r the A l l i e s agreed to occupy Constant inople . On 16 March., the d e c i s i o n was c a r r i e d o u t . There were several reasons, which caused the A l l i e s to come to t h i s d e c i s i o n . A l l o f them stemmed from fear of the growing power of the Kemalis ts . The rout of the French forces i n Marash had proven Kemal's c a p a b i l i t i e s i n A n a t o l i a , and i n the l a s t week of January, an A l l i e d arms dump i n G a l l i p o l i had been raided and 58 eighty-thousand r i f l e s taken. The government i n Constantinople 55 was suspected of c o l l a b o r a t i o n with the N a t i o n a l i s t s . This was not an unreasonable assumption, s ince i n the e l e c t i o n of the previous September, a large number of N a t i o n a l i s t s had been e l e c t e d to the Chamber of Deputies . S a l i h Pasha, the Grand V i z i e r , had himself signed an agreement with the N a t i o n a l i s t s which recognised t h e i r 56 aims. The Chamber of Deputies had even appointed Kemal as governor of Erzerum, an i m p l i c i t i f not an e x p l i c i t sanction of his . . . . . 57 a c t i vi t i e s . The occupation of Constantinople would accomplish several t h i n g s . It would be a lesson i n d i s c i p l i n e to the Turks and would prepare them f o r the imposi t ion of the forthcoming t r e a t y . I t would strengthen the S u l t a n ' s p o s i t i o n , on whom the A l l i e s placed t h e i r hopes f o r the future of Turkey and i t would control the a c t i v i t i e s of the N a t i o n a l i s t s . Using these arguments, Lloyd George, with the help of Curzon, was able to persuade, the French and I t a l i a n delega-58 t ions to a s s i s t in the occupation of the. c i t y . On 16 March, A l l i e d forces occupied Constant inople . The Chamber of Deputies was d i s s o l v e d and suspected N a t i o n a l i s t s were interned and taken to Mal ta . The Grand V i z i e r was arrested and replaced by the more p l i a b l e Damad F e r i d . In t h i s f a s h i o n , the A l l i e s thought they had secured Constantinople f r o m . N a t i o n a l i s t i n t r i g u e . The wisdom of t h i s occupation i s open to question on several p o i n t s . The seat of N a t i o n a l i s t power was A n a t o l i a , not Constant inople . The occupation o f the c i t y did nothing to diminish 59 Kemal's power; i n f a c t the i l l - f e e l i n g caused by the occupation r e s u l t e d i n a steady flow of N a t i o n a l i s t r e c r u i t s from the c i t y . Nor d i d i t strengthen the S u l t a n ' s power. He now appeared to be more a puppet of the A l l i e s than ever . One suggestion i s that Lloyd George and Curzon, both of whom had argued i n favour of the occupat ion , saw i t as a temporary measure which, with l u c k , might 59 become permanent. At the close of the Conference, the draftsmen were put to work to assemble the terms of the Turkish peace p r i o r to o f f i c i a l r a t i f i c a t i o n by the powers. . As a venue f o r the next meeting, the French, already piqued at having to meet outside France at a l l , suggested P a r i s . The B r i t i s h , i n the l i g h t of the a n t i - B r i t i s h atmosphere i n that c i t y , had no wish to return there . To t h i s end, the B r i t i s h shrewdly suggested that the meeting be held i n I t a l y , a suggestion to which the I t a l i a n s r e a d i l y agreed. The French had l i t t l e option but to comply. When the Supreme Council met i n San Remo on 19 A p r i l , they did l i t t l e to change the d r a f t o f the t reaty concerning Turkey i t s e l f . Although the growing strength of the N a t i o n a l i s t s worried the French and I t a l i a n s , they accepted the d r a f t without much o b j e c t i o n . I t was not signed f o r another four months, how-ever , and i n the i n t e r i m i t sometimes seemed that i t might never be. A c e a s e - f i r e between France and the N a t i o n a l i s t s i n May was followed by a rapid N a t i o n a l i s t advance to the Sea of Marmora. For a time i t looked as i f the d r a f t t reaty might have to be r a d i c a l l y r e v i s e d . 60 Enraged at the T r e a t y ' s terms and at the f a c t that Constan-t i n o p l e was contemplating i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n , Kemal launched an attack on the Ismid peninsula i n e a r l y June. As A l l i e d forces there had been reduced to a minimum and i t was so near to Constant inople , t h i s advance caused a p a n i c . L loyd George was determined that a l l he had fought f o r should not so e a s i l y pass away. On 20 June, he accepted V e n i z e l o s ' o f f e r of the s e v e n t y - f i v e thousand strong Greek fil army to crush the N a t i o n a l i s t s . I t seemed to .be only Lloyd George who shared V e n i z e l o s ' confidence . The French and B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y representat ives on the Supreme Council . , Marshal Foch and S i r Henry W i l s o n , maintained that ventures against n a t i o n a l i s t s with i n t e r i o r l i n e s of communication.could prove d i s a s t r o u s . Winston C h u r c h i l l t r i e d to dissuade the Prime M i n i s t e r by w r i t i n g : "On t h i s world so torn with s t r i f e I dread to see you l e t loose 6 3 the Greek armies. For a l l sakes and c e r t a i n l y f o r t h e i r sakes . " But Lloyd George remained adamant. "You must decide whom you are going to back," he declared to Lord R i d d e l l . "The Turks near ly brought about our d e f e a t . i n the war . . . you cannot t r u s t them and they are a decadent race. The Greeks on the other hand are our f r i e n d s and they are a r i s i n g people . . . o f course the m i l i t a r y are against the Greeks . . . the m i l i t a r y are confirmed T o r i e s . I t i s Tory p o l i c y to support the Turks . They hate the 64 Greeks . " On June .22 he f i n a l l y persuaded the A l l i e s to sanction 65 a general Greek advance. Not even France and I t a l y wanted the N a t i o n a l i s t s to se ize Constantinople with the probable consequence 61 of the s laughter of C h r i s t i a n s and the r i s k s to f o r e i g n i n v e s t -men t s . A day l a t e r , the Greeks began a short but amazingly successful campaign. In a few weeks they had taken Brusa , one hundred and f i f t y miles i n l a n d , occupied Thrace and driven the CC N a t i o n a l i s t s from the Sea of Marmora. The news was received with great d e l i g h t by Lloyd George. The v i c t o r y had v i n d i c a t e d his support of the Greeks and seemed to show that the m i l i t a r y exper ts , whom the Prime M i n i s t e r had always d i s l i k e d , were l a c k i n g i n judgement. There were f u r t h e r delays i n the s i g n i n g of the t r e a t y . Another G r e c o - I t a l i a n quarrel broke out and the Turks delayed the s igning as much as p o s s i b l e . However, on ,10 August 1920, the delegates of the powers and the representat ives of the S u l t a n ' s government signed the Treaty of Sevres . The Treaty of Sevres was one o f the most p u n i t i v e t r e a t i e s o f modern times. John Maynard Keynes' soubriquet of a Carthaginian, peace was more a p p l i c a b l e to t h i s t reaty than to the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . Under i t s terms, Turkey was o b l i g e d to surrender Eastern Thrace , her Arab lands , the i s l a n d s i n the Aegean and the G a l l i p o l i p e n i n s u l a ; Smyrna and i t s surrounding region were to be given to Greece. The only foothold Turkey would have i n Europe was the c i t y o f Constant inople , over which the Turks would have only nominal control and which would be well wi thin range of Greek 62 a r t i l l e r y from the new Greek possession of Eastern Thrace. On the Anatol ian mainland,, the Treaty "imposed an e l a b o r -ate g r i l l w o r k of r e s t r i c t i o n s and servi tudes on the country as to ex t inguish i t s sovereign independence i n f a c t i f not i n name."^ 7 The C a p i t u l a t i o n s were restored i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y . A n a t o l i a was d i v i d e d into spheres of i n f l u e n c e among the European powers. Despite the r i g h t s the powers had given themselves, however, i t was undoubtedly Greece which p r o f i t e d most from the Treaty of Sevres . The Treaty of Sevres represented a considerable v i c t o r y f o r Lloyd George. Against the objec t ions of the other A l l i e s and some members o f his own government, he had secured a. predominance of B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e i n the S t r a i t s and physical possession of one side of them f o r a very gra teful Greece. I t seemed that the Turks were crushed once and f o r a l l . Nor was the Prime M i n i s t e r wrong i n his a n t i c i p a t i o n of gra t i tude from Greece. Venizelos wrote to say: "I fee l that I am qui te unable to give adequate support to my f e e l i n g s , f o r indeed, a l l that Greece has now r e a l i s e d of her l e g i t i m a t e claims i s due i n major .par t to your powerful and e f f e c t i v e support and no words of mine can e f f i c i e n t l y express 68 my country ' s deep sense of thankfulness to y o u . " As Venizelos returned to a rapturous welcome i n Greece, another feature of the Treaty of Sevres had not y e t become apparent. As the High Commissioners i n Constantinople and the m i l i t a r y had 69 warned, the Treaty was a t reaty which could not be enforced . 63 By the time i t was s igned , whatever unity...of purpose there had been amongst the A l l i e s was f a s t d isappear ing . The Treaty could not paper over the cracks i n the s p l i t t i n g facade of a l l i e d uni ty and i t ignored the ever-growing strength of the N a t i o n a l i s t s . The very s e v e r i t y of the terms was to make the Treaty d i f f i c u l t to enforce . T . E . Lawrence commented: "Sevres was a happier t reaty than V e r s a i l l e s i n that i t would not be r e v i s e d - - i t would be f o r g o t t e n . " 7 ^ 64 CHAPTER V THE REVIVAL OF TURKEY Mr. L loyd George has put his money on the wrong horse . We s h a l l never get peace i n P a l e s t i n e or Mesopotamia, or Egypt or I n d i a , u n t i l we make love to the Turks . I t may be very immoral, or i t may not . It i s a f a c t . Can anyone t e l l me why Mr. Lloyd Goerge backed the Greeks? I know i t was not upon the advice of Curzon, or the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Constant inople , or Lord Reading. I was at the Quai d 'Orsai when Lloyd George gave Smyrna to the Greeks and I had to arrange f o r troops to go there . Why d i d Lloyd George back them? Was i t to please Zaharoff , or was i t because Venizelos t o l d him that the Greeks were so p r o l i f i c that they could r e b u i l d the Near East i n two or three years? S i r Henry W i l s o n J S i r Henry Wilson 's concern was shared by the War O f f i c e and by many Conservatives both i n and out of government. To them i t seemed that Lloyd George, i n an attempt to ensure the s e c u r i t y of the Empire, was f o l l o w i n g a course which was sure to endanger that s e c u r i t y . As time went by, the events in Turkey seemed to confirm t h i s . The unfortunate consequences of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p o l i c y and i t s i m p o s s i b i l i t y of success became i n c r e a s i n g l y apparent, ye t Lloyd George was to c l i n g tenac iously to his purpose. Besides the s e v e r i t y of the Treaty of Sevres , two other fac tors were to work against i t s implementation. One was the Turkish N a t i o n a l i s t army, the other the i n s t a b i l i t y of Greek p o l i t i c s . . Had the Greek domestic s i t u a t i o n remained s t a b l e , the 65 course of events might have been qui te d i f f e r e n t . However, at the time of the s i g n i n g of the Treaty of Sevres , King Alexander was b i t t e n by a pet monkey. The b i t e brought on blood poisoning from which the king died on 25 October. An e l e c t i o n had been set f o r the la te f a l l and the k i n g ' s death brought a new element in to the campaign. While Venizelos was r e l u c t a n t to allow Alexander 's fa ther Constantine to return from his Swiss e x i l e , the opposi t ion campaigned f o r his r e s t o r a t i o n . The r o y a l i s t s were supported by a l l those who were d i s s a t i s f i e d with V e n i z e l o s ' a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Despite the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s success i n P a r i s , i n Greece he was unpopular to a degree which was g r e a t l y 2 underestimated by a l l but a few i n the A l l i e d governments. His very success i n Paris had e n t a i l e d a prolonged absence from Athens and important domestic matters had been neglec ted . The c i v i l adminis t ra t ion was. corrupt and the mart ia l law which had not been rescinded since the war had given the Venizelos government an aura of tyranny. Thus, i n the e l e c t i o n of 14 November, Venizelos won less than o n e - t h i r d of the seats i n the National Assembly. These r e s u l t s may not seem s u r p r i s i n g in r e t r o s p e c t , but they were received with shock and i n c r e d u l i t y . i n London, Par is and Rome. 3 Lloyd George despaired of democracy. The l i k e l i h o o d that the new Greek government would r e c a l l Constantine caused great concern among the A l l i e d governments. The A l l i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the B r i t i s h , d i s l i k e d Constantine i n t e n s e l y because of his supposed sympathies f o r the Central Powers during 66 the war. However, L loyd George was quick to recover from his shock. In Parl iament , he pointed out that t h i s unfortunate circumstance should not wreck a long-term p o l i c y of f r i e n d s h i p and mutual s e l f -i n t e r e s t between Great B r i t a i n and G r e e c e . 4 In t h i s he had Curzon's support . The Foreign Secretary had opposed the Greek presence i n A s i a Minor, but he f e l t o b l i g e d to uphold i t now that i t was p r o -5 vided f o r i n the Treaty of Sevres. The French and the I t a l i a n s d i d not see i t i n qui te the same l i g h t . I t was j u s t one more f a c t o r which made them d r i f t c l o s e r to Kemal's N a t i o n a l i s t s . In l a t e November and e a r l y .December 1920, the A l l i e s met in London to discuss the Greek s i t u a t i o n . The French delegat ion proposed a s e r i e s of strong measures which inc luded a r e v i s i o n of the Treaty of Sevres i n Turkey 's favour , a rupture of d iplomat ic r e l a t i o n s with Greece and the termination of f i n a n c i a l and m i l i t a r y a i d . This put Lloyd George i n an awkward p o s i t i o n . He would not contemplate re turning Smyrna to the Turks , but his d i s l i k e of Constantine was as strong as that of the French,.^ A compromise was reached on 4 December when i t was decided that should the Greeks accept Constant ine 's r e t u r n , m i l i t a r y and economic a i d to Q Greece would be cut o f f . Two days l a t e r , Constantine d i d return and the A l l i e s c a r r i e d out t h e i r t h r e a t . As i f t h i s was not a s u f f i c i e n t hindrance to the Greek m i l i t a r y e f f o r t in A n a t o l i a , i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s was f u r t h e r impaired by the act ions of the new government. In an attempt to consol idate 67 i t s power, the government c a r r i e d out a r igorous purge of the c i v i l s e r v i c e and had restored r o y a l i s t o f f i c e r s to the army. The manner i n which t h i s r e s t o r a t i o n took place caused a great deal of resentment among the o r i g i n a l o f f i c e r s of the Army o f A n a t o l i a . 9 Many resigned and others were removed from ac t ive s e r v i c e . The r o y a l i s t s who replaced them were, i f not incompetent, c e r t a i n l y inexper ienced ; many of them had not seen s e r v i c e s ince the Balkan Wars. P a r t l y as a r e s u l t o f t h i s , the Greeks sustained a ser ious defeat i n the v a l l e y of Inonu i n -the c l o s i n g weeks of the y e a r . The defeat d i d not diminish Lloyd George's hope f o r a Greek, i f not a C o n s t a n t i n i s t v i c t o r y , i n A n a t o l i a . There i s evidence to suggest that i n the f i r s t weeks o f 1921, he was t r y i n g to engineer a change i n the domestic, p o l i t i c s of Greece. In January 1921, P h i l i p Kerr met three V e n i z e l i s t s from Constant inople . The l a t t e r proposed using the V e n i z e l i s t d i v i s i o n s i n Turkey to e s t a b l i s h a H e l l e n i c s tate i n Turkey which, l i k e the P r o v i s i o n a l Government in Salonika during the war, would be independent of Constantine i n Athens. Through K e r r , L loyd George encouraged the Greeks, although he d i d not o f f e r any concrete s u p p o r t . ^ Other pressures were working on the Prime M i n i s t e r at t h i s time. The War O f f i c e was suggesting that some accommodation be made between the Greeks and. the T u r k s . ^ This view was endorsed by the French and I t a l i a n governments and Lloyd George f i n a l l y succumbed to the pressure . The Supreme Council met i n London on 21 February, having i n v i t e d not only representat ives 68 from Athens and Constant inople , but from Ankara as w e l l . At t h i s stage both the B r i t i s h and French governments were undecided as to the best course to f o l l o w . There were several options open to Great B r i t a i n . Harold Nicol son suggested turning Turkey into a q u a s i - B r i t i s h colony with the same status as Egypt had before the war. T h i s , he b e l i e v e d , would cause a d i p -lomatic break with France., but i t would be the p r i c e to be paid f o r 12 a successful Middle Eastern, pol icy . . On the other hand, S i r Horace Rumbold, B r i t i s h High Commissioner i n Constant inople , along with the War O f f i c e suggested using Constanine's return as an excuse f o r abandoning Greece and making a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with the T u r k s . 1 3 Neither Lloyd George nor Curzon favoured e i t h e r o f these extreme s o l u t i o n s . They were not prepared to f o r f e i t the advan-tages of the Treaty of Sevres , but n e i t h e r were they w i l l i n g to f i g h t f o r them and. r i s k a l i e n a t i n g France. At the Conference, Lloyd George wished not to appear to. be n e g o t i a t i n g with the N a t i o n a l i s t s f o r peace. He was supported by Curzon, who was determined to preserve the substance of the Treaty by making minor 14 concessions. A r i s t i d e Bri and,, the new French premier, a lso had r e s e r -vations about abandoning the Treaty of Sevres . But the harsh treatment which the French forces had received i n C i l i c i a at the hands of Kemal's N a t i o n a l i s t s had convinced him that the Greeks could not be r e l i e d upon to uphold the Treaty against the N a t i o n a l i s t s . 1 3 The I t a l i a n s were by now prepared to give Kemal a l l that he wanted. On 24 February, the A l l i e s proposed a plan which i t was hoped would resolve the issues of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace i n a peaceful manner. Briand proposed that a p l e b i s c i t e be held i n the two areas to determine the preference of the populations f o r Greek or Turkish r u l e . ^ Lloyd George concurred and B e k i r Sami Bey, the N a t i o n a l i s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , agreed to the proposal provided that the referenda.be i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y s u p e r v i s e d . ^ 7 The quid  pro quo f o r t h i s would be that the Treaty of Sevres would be r e -opened f o r n e g o t i a t i o n . On 4 March the Greeks turned the proposal down. They were a f r a i d that once they evacuated the areas f o r 1 o the p l e b i s c i t e s , i t would not be easy to r e t u r n . On 10 March, L loyd George put forward another p l a n , one in which the Greeks would make the s a c r i f i c e s . In t h i s scheme, Greece would remain i n Thrace and G a l l . i p o l i but t h e i r tenure i n Smyrna would be severely r e s t r i c t e d . This plan was not received favourably by e i t h e r the Greeks or the Turks , who l e f t the Con-ference without g i v i n g a r e p l y . The Greeks' responses to these proposals were only p a r t l y due to t h e i r own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n . For Lloyd George was p l a y i n g a double game: not with the V e n i z e l i s t s t h i s time but with the Constant inis ts . . At the same time as he was agreeing p u b l i c l y to the various peace proposals at the Conference, he was p r i v a t e l y encouraging the, Greeks to resume the c o n f l i c t . 70 On 1 and 9 March, Kerr and Hankey r e s p e c t i v e l y transmitted messages 19 from Lloyd George to the Greek representa t ives . These messages were to the e f f e c t that a f resh Greek advance would not be d i s c o u r -aged by the B r i t i s h government, On 10 March, Lloyd George himself confirmed Hankey's message to Kalageropoulos, the head of the Greek 20 d e l e g a t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , on 19 March, he again t o l d Kalageropoulos that the Greeks were at l i b e r t y to undertake whatever operations 21 they thought necessary without fear of A l l i e d i n t e r f e r e n c e . Several fac tors caused the Prime M i n i s t e r to act i n t h i s f a s h i o n . F i r s t l y , there was the hope that what could not be gained at the Conference could be achieved on the b a t t l e f i e l d . Perhaps j u s t as important was that other developments at the Conference had made necessary the f o r c i n g of a d e c i s i o n as soon as p o s s i b l e . Count S f o r z a , the I t a l i a n Foreign M i n i s t e r , concluded an agreement with Bekir. Sami i n which I t a l y would evacuate south western A n a t o l i a i n 22 return f o r economic concessions . As i f t h i s was not bad enough f o r Lloyd George and Curzon, Briand made an agreement whereby French forces would be withdrawn from C i l i c i a i n return f o r c e r t a i n guarantees f o r S y r i a and the safety of France's commercial i n t e r e s t s 23 i n Turkey. This agreement, besides i t s i m p l i c a t i o n that the Treaty of Sevres had been, abandoned, released large numbers of Turkish troops to f i g h t the Greeks. This meant that any Greek attack should. take place before these forces reached the l i n e s . The Greek attack which began on 23 March was a f a i l u r e . A Kemalist v i c t o r y at the second b a t t l e of Inonu brought to an 71 end any hope f o r an e a r l y Greek v i c t o r y . In the B r i t i s h government, nervousness was expressed i n several q u a r t e r s . In the War O f f i c e , Kemal's strength was f u l l y appreciated and the concept of a strong Turkey as a bulwark against Bolshevism was gaining ground. A memorandum w r i t t e n on 25 March by General Harington—Mi 1 ne 1 s replace -ment as m i l i t a r y Commander of Constantinople—recommending a complete B r i t i s h withdrawal from Turkey received support a day l a t e r i n a 24 memorandum from Wilson. To discuss the problem a spec ia l Cabinet Committee on the Future .of Constantinople met on 1, 2, and 9 June. I t was decided that the proposals of the London Conference would 25 be put forward again , with an o f f e r of B r i t i s h a id to enforce them. But the Greeks refused and this , time Lloyd George d i d not have much to do with t h e i r d e c i s i o n . They had decided on a major summer o f f e n s i v e under the nominal command of the k i n g , who had s a i l e d f o r Smyrna on 11 June. Yet Lloyd George s t i l l supported the Greeks, both p u b l i c l y and i n p r i v a t e . In a l e t t e r to. Curzon wri t ten on 16 June, he cas t igated the Turks , p r a i s e d the Greeks and cast scorn on the War O f f i c e . " I t i s not safe to assume," he wrote, " that B r i t i s h and French m i l i t a r y opinion about the value of the morale of the Greek army can always be depended upon. They were c l e a r l y wrong i n t h e i r estimate of the army a year ago. I t i s j u s t p o s s i b l e that the same people may have made the same mistake now." A month l a t e r , a f t e r a Greek v i c t o r y at Eski S h e h i r , he wrote a b i t i n g l e t t e r to 72 Worthington Evans, the War M i n i s t e r , i n which he wondered whether 27 or not the War O f f i c e had an I n t e l l i g e n c e Department. But i t was not his p r i v a t e l e t t e r s which were to have so much an e f f e c t on the course of events as his verbal d e c l a r a t i o n s . The Prime Minister .proceeded to intimate that B r i t i s h support f o r the Greeks would be forthcoming i n the near f u t u r e . He explained his f e e l i n g s to C h u r c h i l l i n the f o l l o w i n g manner. The Greeks are the people of the future i n the Eastern Mediterranean. They are p r o l i f i c and f u l l o f energy. They represent C h r i s t i a n i t y and c i v i l i s a t i o n against barbarism. T h e i r f i g h t i n g power i s grotesquely underrated by our generals . A greater Greece w i l l be an invaluable asset to the B r i t i s h Empire. . . . They are good s a i l o r s ; they w i l l develop a naval power; they w i l l possess a l l the most important i s l a n d s i n .the Eastern Mediterranean! These i s l a n d s are the p o t e n t i a l submarine bases o f the f u t u r e ; they l i e on the f lank of our communications through the Suez Canal and with I n d i a , the f a r East and A u s t r a l a s i a . 28 These sentiments were not l o s t upon the Greeks. Arnold Toynbee was to r e c a l l l a t e r , "Nothing struck me more f o r c i b l y during the e ight months that I was i n touch with the Greek army and p u b l i c than the universal b e l i e f that Great B r i t a i n would see them through. I t was the one point on which a l l Greeks were i n e n t h u s i a s t i c 29 agreement." This was unfortunate f o r the Greeks. C h u r c h i l l noted, "This .was the worst of a l l p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n s . The Greeks deserved at the l e a s t e i t h e r to be backed up through t h i c k and thin with the moral or diplomatic support of a uni ted B r i t i s h government, 30 or c h i l l e d to the bone with repeated douches of cold water . " 73 In the end, i t was to be the War O f f i c e which was to be proven r i g h t , not the Prime M i n i s t e r . An i n d e c i s i v e b a t t l e fought on the Sakaria River i n August was to be the beginning of the end f o r the Greeks. Given t h e i r advanced p o s i t i o n and extended l i n e s of communication, a v i c t o r y was v i t a l f o r the Greeks, but the most they could do was to f i g h t the Turks to a s t a n d s t i l l . The Greeks had to withdraw to Eski Shehir to wait out the w i n t e r . In B r i t a i n a growing o p p o s i t i o n to Lloyd George's and Curzon's p o l i c i e s pointed out that defeat f o r the Greeks would now not only mean a f r u s t r a t i o n of B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y , but that B r i t i s h economic i n t e r e s t s i n 31 the area would be threatened. To add to these problems, a b i g setback to the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p o l i c y came.from France i n the October of 1921 i n the form of the Treaty of Angora. For several weeks, the B r i t i s h government had been aware, o f negot iat ions between the French agent F r a n k l i n B o u i l l o n and the N a t i o n a l i s t s . The denials of the French government had done l i t t l e to a l l a y B r i t i s h a n x i e t y , but the announce-32 ment of the Treaty s t i l l came as a shock. Under the Treaty , France agreed to end the o f f i c i a l s tate of war between her and the N a t i o n a l i s t s , to cede some ten thousand square miles of Syr ian t e r r i t o r y and to give diplomatic support to the Kemalis ts . In r e t u r n , more economic concessions were given 33 to France by the N a t i o n a l i s t s . The Treaty marked f o r France the end of a long d r i f t away from any support f o r B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Many fac tors had caused th is e v o l u t i o n ; there was the o r i g i n a l 74 b i t t e r n e s s over the B r i t i s h behaviour at the s i g n i n g of the Mudros A r m i s t i c e , the i n c r e a s i n g cost of the campaign i n C i l i c i a , the return of Constantine to the throne, fear f o r the large investments i n Turkey and pressure from C a t h o l i c i n t e r e s t s which feared the r i s e o f i n f l u e n c e o f the Orthodox Church which a Greek v i c t o r y would 34 b r i n g . Further cause came from suspic ions of B r i t i s h i n t e n t regarding the execution of the S y k e s - P i c o t Agreement. The defeat at Sakar ia had pushed the French, over the b r i n k , and had convinced them that the best guarantee f o r French i n t e r e s t s would be N a t i o n a l -i s t g o o d w i l l . The s i g n i n g of the Treaty of Angora also meant that the implementation of the Treaty of Sevres would be v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e . The t reaty also meant that France had abandoned the notion of using the Turkish s i t u a t i o n . a s a l e v e r to pressure B r i t a i n into accepting French aims i n the Rhi.neland and p r o v i d i n g guarantees against a future German a t tack . A year before , B e r t h e l o t had 35 admitted to Hardinge that th is was the case. The s i g n i n g of the Treaty of Ankara put an end to t h i s s t ra tegy . Despite t h i s , the hope that B r i t a i n would guarantee French s e c u r i t y d i d not d i e . S h o r t l y before and a f t e r the Treaty was announced, Briand revived the i d e a . In l i g h t o f the poor r e l a t i o n s between France and B r i t a i n at that time, there was l i t t l e chance that such a scheme 3fi would be r e a l i zed. Perhaps as a r e s u l t of t h i s setback, perhaps because o f the d i f f i c u l t domestic s i t u a t i o n which Lloyd George faced at t h i s 75 t ime, the Prime M i n i s t e r seems to have temporari ly l o s t i n t e r e s t i n the Turkish q u e s t i o n . He refused to see Gounaris , the Greek M i n i s t e r of war, and d i d not at tend the unsuccessful Near East 37 Conference i n March of the f o l l o w i n g year . Thus, f o r a period of several months, the burden of the Near East settlement f e l l upon Curzon. The Foreign Secretary began his work on 5 November by w r i t i n g a l e t t e r to the French government which b l u n t l y s tated that France, i n . s i g n i n g the Angora Treaty , had v i o l a t e d the war-time agreement that no a l l y should make a separate peace with a 39 common enemy. S t i l l hoping to maintain a primacy of B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e through a Greek v i c t o r y , he authorised a loan f o r Greece. On the other hand, only a few weeks l a t e r , he persuaded . the French and I t a l i a n governments, to consider a compromise peace 41 p l a n ; i f accepted the plan would have meant the complete reversal of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . I t allowed f o r the gradual w i t h -drawal of Greek forces from A s i a Minor , the indigenous m i n o r i t i e s populations being guaranteed s a f e t y . , The A l l i e s agreed to t h i s and Athens was pressured i n t o . g i v i n g a r e l u c t a n t acceptance. The Turks , sensing ultimate v i c t o r y , re jec ted i t out of hand. Curzon had to contend with other o b s t a c l e s . Opposit ion was growing i n B r i t a i n . In March 1922, Edwin Montagu gave the Indian Viceroy permission to p u b l i s h a note which stated that the K i n g ' s Moslem subjects would not stand f o r a continued a n t i -42 Turkish p o l i c y . I t was a gesture which cost Montagu his 76 career , but i t helped create an atmosphere i n which i t was impossible f o r Greece to ra ise the loan she needed to continue the f i g h t . Yet , i n the face of these setbacks and o b s t a c l e s , Curzon s t i l l encouraged 43 Gounarisr. to hold on to A n a t o l i a . This advice was not .so dubious as i t seems at f i r s t s i g h t . By the end of March 1922.events had come almost f u l l c i r c l e from the previous March.. Despite the diplomatic and m i l i t a r y setbacks which B r i t a i n ' s Turkish, p o l i c y had s u f f e r e d , i t was s t i l l p o s s i b l e that a successful m i l i t a r y operation would cut the Gordian Knot and break Turkish r e s i s t a n c e . But the chances of a Greek success were now i n f i n i t e l y more remote. The Greek army had not stood up well to the severe Anatol ian w i n t e r . Weary a f t e r three y e a r s ' f i g h t i n g , i l l - f e d and poorly equipped, the army's morale had sunk to a very low p o i n t . The Turks , on the other hand, had been s t e a d i l y gaining strength throughout the winter months. I t was at t h i s point that several Greek generals decided to wri te o f f A n a t o l i a and salvage what they could by holding Eastern Thrace. General Hajianestes b e l i e v e d the taking of Constantinople would scare the Turks in to a set t lement . On 22 . July 1922, to the chagrin of the A l l i e d governments, twenty thousand Greek troops were withdrawn from Smyrna and were landed i n Thrace . T h e i r march on Constantinople was thwarted by General Harington, who on his own a u t h o r i t y toTd the Greeks that any advance on Constantinople would be r e s i s t e d by armed f o r c e . 77 This ac t ion was r e l u c t a n t l y endorsed by a f u r i o u s Lloyd George, who had been hoping f o r such a deus ex machina to the impasse i n 44 Turkey. However, as Harington's act was a proper enforcement of the Treaty of Sevres , the Prime M i n i s t e r could not o b j e c t . Some days l a t e r , however, Lloyd George r a l l i e d to the Greek cause once more and returned to his f a t e f u l p o l i c y of implying support when none was to come. In a speech i n the Commons on 4 August, he d e c l a r e d ; I forgot who i t was who s a i d that we were not f a i r as between the p a r t i e s . I am not sure that we are . What has happened? Here i s a war between Greece and Turkey. We are defending the c a p i t a l of one of the p a r t i e s against the other . We must not overlook that f a c t , and i t i s a very important f a c t . I f we were not there , there i s absolute ly no doubt that the Greeks would occupy the c a p i t a l i n a very few hours, and that would produce a d e c i s i o n . . . . We cannot allow t h i s sor t of thing to go on i n d e f i n i t e l y . That i s the p o s i t i o n . We only want to see a j u s t peace e s t a b l i s h e d . 45 This was one of the l a s t such speeches that the Prime M i n i s t e r was to make on the matter. I t was to have immediate and f a r - r e a c h i n g consequences. In. both Athens and Ankara, i t was assumed to be a s ignal f o r the Greeks to renew t h e i r s t r u g g l e . Parts of i t were incorporated into Greek army orders , but i t was not they who struck f i r s t . Taking advantage of the f a c t that the twenty thousand Greek s o l d i e r s despatched to Thrace had not ye t returned to A n a t o l i a , the N a t i o n a l i s t s struck along the e n t i r e f r o n t of t h e S a k a r i a R i v e r . I t was the beginning of a rout . In l e s s than a month there was not a. s i n g l e Greek s o l d i e r l e f t i n A n a t o l i a save f o r the pr isoners and the dead. 78 CHAPTER VI CHANAK The Greek evacuation of Smyrna and i t s subsequent occupa-t ion by Kemal's forces were accompanied by a t r o c i t i e s s i m i l a r i n nature and scope to those which had marred the Greek landings of three years before . This time, however, the e n t i r e Greek part o f the c i t y was destroyed by f i r e . 1 The Greeks and Turks accused each other of s t a r t i n g the f i r e , but whoever was r e s p o n s i b l e , the i n c i d e n t was not unwelcome to the Turks . To crown t h e i r v i c t o r y of c l e a r i n g A n a t o l i a of the Greeks, the seat of Greek commercial power had now been destroyed. The Turks ' e l a t i o n was not shared i n London. Even before the f i n a l debacle at Smyrna, the B r i t i s h government was preparing f o r Kemal's next move. Once he had c leared the Smyrna area of Greeks, there was l i t t l e doubt that Kemal would turn north to the S t r a i t s . There he would face the A l l i e d forces who occupied the Neutral Zone, the area designated by the Treaty of Sevres as running along the shores of the S t r a i t s and the Sea of Marmora. Kemal was most l i k e l y to probe t h i s zone at the town of Chanak on the south side of the Dardanel les . The boundaries of the zone had been drawn i n such a way that. Chanak could not be e a s i l y defended. Any defending force would have to be s u p p l i e d from 79 the other side of the Dardanel les . Chanak was garrisoned by a B r i t i s h force of l e s s than one thousand men, which, even with the support of the warships in the S t r a i t s , would be hard put to delay Kemal's f o r t y - f i v e thousand man army. The p o s s i b i l i t y o f such a confronta t ion caused a great deal of consternation in the B r i t i s h government. A d e c i s i o n had to be reached as soon as p o s s i b l e and t h i s would be d i f f i c u l t . There was more i n v o l v e d than a simple d e c i s i o n whether to make a stand at Chanak or not ; the consequences of both a l t e r n a t i v e s were u n a t t r a c t i v e . I f i t were decided to show Kemal that the B r i t i s h govern-ment s t i l l intended to enforce the Treaty of Sevres and hold the Neutral Zone around Chanak, large numbers of troops would have to be found. L i t t l e help could be expected from the small garr ison at Constant inople . B r i t i s h troops could be brought i n from the other parts of the Empire, but most of these were hard pressed to keep 3 order i n t h e i r own assigned areas , and the use of the Dominions' troops had not y e t been considered. . Another p o s s i b i l i t y was a general m o b i l i s a t i o n at home, but t h i s would have been an extremely 4 unpopular measure. The Royal Navy could support the Chanak g a r r i s o n , but naval guns, f i r i n g . o n t h e i r f l a t t r a j e c t o r i e s , would 5 have been of l i t t l e use on the h i l l y t e r r a i n around Chanak. The react ions of France and I t a l y were unpredic table . Could any support be expected from the A l l i e s at a l l ; would they remain neutral or would they even undermine the operation i n some way? 80 The other a l t e r n a t i v e , that of surrendering Chanak without a f i g h t , was fraught with d i f f i c u l t i e s of a d i f f e r e n t nature. For one t h i n g , the pres t ige o f the B r i t i s h Empire would s u f f e r t e r r i b l y by surrendering to a man who u n t i l recent ly had been considered l i t t l e more than a bandit c h i e f . A l s o , Kemal's possession o f the Asian s ide of the S t r a i t s would mean loss of freedom of navigat ion i n the waterway. With t h i s gone, i t would only be a matter of time before the N a t i o n a l i s t s were on the European side of the water. I f t h i s happened, one of the great hopes of the A l l i e s , that a c i v i l i s e d p o l i t y would replace the b a r b a r i c regime o f the Turks i n Europe, would disappear . Large numbers of Greeks and Armenians l i v i n g i n Constantinople and Eastern Thrace would be i n a dangerous p o s i t i o n . To address these problems, the cabinet met on 7 September. Lloyd George s t i l l touted the Greeks. He hoped that with new leadership they could be r e l i e d upon f o r support i n t h i s emergency. But whatever became of the Greeks, the Turks must not pass. The Prime M i n i s t e r pointed out to the cabinet , ' In no circumstances could we allow the G a l l i p o l i peninsula to be held by the Turks . I t was the most important s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n i n the world and the c l o s i n g of the S t r a i t s prolonged the war by two y e a r s . ' ^ The Prime M i n i s t e r was supported in t h i s a t t i t u d e by Curzon and C h u r c h i l l . The Foreign Secretary s a i d that N a t i o n a l i s t possession of Thrace would mean that the 'whole of the f r u i t s of the war as to the Balkan s i t u a t i o n would be thrown away.' C h u r c h i l l , now Colonial Secre tary , echoed t h i s by saying that the l i n e of deep water separat ing Europe from A s i a was of great s i g n i f i c a n c e and that th is "lineshould be made as secure as p o s s i b l e . " As at t h i s time any threat to the Neutral Zone was s t i l l only a p o s s i b i l i t y , the r e s u l t s of the meeting were somewhat i n c o n -c l u s i v e . The main outcome was that f u r t h e r naval reinforcements were to be brought i n t o the S t r a i t s and that Curzon should do his best to persuade the I t a l i a n s and the French to provide support . I f the N a t i o n a l i s t s were to challenge Chanak, i t was to be given up without a f i g h t , and strong forces on the opposite shore would keep the waterway open to s h i p p i n g . These ambivalent dec is ions were made almost a week before the Greek evacuation of Smyrna allowed Kemal to turn his forces northward. The Cabinet next met to discuss Chanak on 15 September. This meeting was a l together more urgent. Despite Curzon's hopes of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference to s e t t l e matters between the Greeks and Turks , the main worry was the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n at 9 Chanak. . . . A c t i n g on his own i n i t i a t i v e , General Harington had r e i n f o r c e d the Chanak garr ison with troops from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . ^ He had also accepted some reinforcements from his French and I t a l i a n col leagues , Generals Charpy and M o m b e l l i . ^ But even a f t e r these a d d i t i o n s , the A l l i e d garr ison stood at only seven thousand men, hardly a match f o r Kemal's f o r t y - f i v e thousand. L loyd George was s t i l l eager to h i t the Turks as hard as p o s s i b l e . He began searching f o r new a l l i e s . Now that the Greeks were crushed, he suggested an a l l i a n c e made up of Czechs, 82 Roumanians and Serbs. In t h i s the Prime M i n i s t e r was supported by 12 the C o l o n i a l Secre tary , who,, despite his previous opposi t ion to Lloyd George's Turkish p o l i c y , was to be one of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s staunchest a l l i e s during the Chanak c r i s i s . The reasons f o r C h u r c h i l l ' s change of. view seem,to have been a combination o f an unwil l ingness to see B r i t a i n lose pres t ige and a desi re to confine 13 any f i g h t i n g to Asia Minor. C h u r c h i l l wished the Cabinet to fo l low the advice of General Harington that i f the S t r a i t s were to be h e l d , they should be f o r t i f i e d on both s i d e s . There seems to have been l i t t l e i n the way of d i s s e n t i n g opinion at the meeting. Austen Chamberlain was co ld at f i r s t , but l a t e r , along with Hamar Greenwood, he suggested that the Dominions be asked to provide support . Several dec is ions were reached at the meeting. Arrange-ments were made to send reinforcements from Egypt and Malta . The Balkan nations were to be asked f o r a s s i s t a n c e . F i n a l l y , C h u r c h i l l was to d r a f t a telegram f o r Lloyd George which asked the Dominions f o r help in a p o s s i b l e war with the Turkish N a t i o n a l i s t s . At the same time that the telegram was despatched, i t was released by C h u r c h i l l as part of a press communique on the Turkish 14 s i t u a t i o n . This communique,which had been composed at L l o y d George's request , o u t l i n e d the present dangers in the s trongest 15 terms. A l l of B r i t a i n ' s wartime e f f o r t s were to be set at nought, and new p e r i l s would a r i s e i f Kemal crossed into Europe. 83 The communique claimed that 'The reappearance of the v i c t o r i o u s Turk on the European shore would provoke a s i t u a t i o n of the gravest character throughout the Balkans,, and very l i k e l y to lead to b l o o d -shed on a large scale i n regions already c r u e l l y devas ta ted . ' But , the release s a i d , B r i t a i n would stand resolute to prevent t h i s occurrence. In t h i s they would be supported by France and I t a l y , 15 and the Dominions had been asked f o r h e l p . The statement that France and I t a l y would help was o p t i m i s t i c i n the extreme, i f not a downright l i e . The reference to the Dominions' telegram was unfortunate . Due to the time d i f f e r -ences, some of the Dominion Prime M i n i s t e r s found out about the telegrams from t h e i r newspapers before they had read the message i t s e l f . Mackenzie King was unaware of the existence of the telegram u n t i l he was asked about i t by a rep o r t er . King was cool to the request , viewing i t as "an e l e c t i o n scheme by Lloyd George & C o . " A Cabinet meeting i n Ottawa on 18 September produced a r e p l y to the telegram s t a t i n g " that p u b l i c opinion i n Canada would demand author isa t ion on the part of Parliament as a necessary i ft prel iminary to the despatch of a cont ingent . " The r e p l i e s from the other Dominions were almost as d i s a p p o i n t i n g . Of the three other Dominions and the .colony of Newfoundland, only one, New Zealand, o f f e r e d help . I t was t h i s one favourable reply that the B r i t i s h government chose f o r release to the press . 84 For the most p a r t , press reac t ion to these manoeuvres was not encouraging f o r Lloyd George. The D a i l y Mail ran a campaign over the next few days to turn p u b l i c opinion against the p o s s i b l e war, p u b l i s h i n g the Canadian and A u s t r a l i a n r e p l i e s to the telegram. The Times urged caut ion . Only the D a i l y Express and the D a i l y  Chronicle supported the Prime M i n i s t e r . 1 ^ The mood of the press at t h i s time mirrored the general unpopulari ty of the Lloyd George C o a l i t i o n . Throughout the year i t had been subject to attack on several f r o n t s . The B r i t i s h economy had shown l i t t l e s ign o f vigour s ince the end o f the war. I n f l a t i o n was s t i l l running at a f a i r l y high rate and wages had not kept pace. The unemployed t o t a l l e d well over a m i l l i o n . The Honours Scandal of the previous June was to cast doubt on Lloyd George's i n t e g r i t y f o r the r e s t of his l i f e . Once an a l l y of the working c l a s s e s , the Prime M i n i s t e r was now despised by labour as 1 8 he appeared to be in the pockets of the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . Those Conservatives who had d i s l i k e d and d i s t r u s t e d him f o r years now found t h e i r numbers growing f a s t . They c r i t i c i s e d him f o r heavy overspending on c e r t a i n government p r o j e c t s , of which the Housing Scandal was one example. Furthermore, these Conservatives argued that their, party had clung to the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s coat t a i l s f o r too l o n g , and that i f a move were not made soon to break away from the C o a l i t i o n , the party could lose i t s separate i d e n t i t y f o r good. 85 As well as being embattled at home, Lloyd George had to face more unfavourable developments overseas. On 19 September, the B r i t i s h i n Chanak found themselves more i s o l a t e d than ever . Kemal's forces were advancing on them, and on that day the French and I t a l i a n contingents were withdrawn, and sent back to Constant inople . This d i d not i n d i c a t e a change of p o l i c y on the part o f France and I t a l y ; the home governments had been against any kind of confronta -t i o n with Kemal from the beginning. What seems to have happened i s that t h e i r generals on. the spot had o f f e r e d assistance to Harington on t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e and when the home governments 20 found t h i s out the order was rescinded immediately. Despite t h i s , the hard-working Curzon was i n Paris on 20 September attempting to create some semblance of A l l i e d u n i t y . He held several stormy meetings with the t r u c u l e n t Poincare , now President of France. P o i n c a r e . s a i d that he would not prevent Kemal from crossing to Europe and Curzon accused Poincare of bad f a i t h . At one point the Foreign Secretary was reduced to tears , but he d i d manage to persuade the French and I t a l i a n s to send a j o i n t note with B r i t a i n asking Kemal to discuss the future of the 21 S t r a i t s at an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference. On the same day as the note was sent , 23.September, Lloyd George made a major concession to Kemal. In cabinet he r e l u c t a n t l y agreed to cede 22 Eastern Thrace to Turkey. Notwithstanding t h i s concession and the other obstacles with which he was faced , Lloyd George was s t i l l determined to h i t the Turks as hard as he c o u l d / 0 He was not qui te alone. He had the support of Lord Birkenhead, S i r Robert Home and o f course C h u r c h i l l . C h u r c h i l l was to record l a t e r , "The government might break up and we might be r e l i e v e d of our burden. The nation might not support us : they could f i n d others to advise them. The press might howl, the A l l i e s might .bo. l t . We intended to force the 24 Turk to a negotiated peace before he set foot in Europe." Preparations f o r war went ahead.. On 23 September, the cabinet ordered A i r Force units and more.warships to the area. Two days l a t e r , the cabinet met again. Present were the Chiefs of S t a f f o f the three armed.services . Although there had as .yet been no shots f i r e d between the two sides at Chanak, the s i t u a t i o n there was very tense. Hugh Trenchard, the A i r Chief M a r s h a l l , s tated that although the A i r . F o r c e , could be o f some a s s i s t a n c e , i t . c o u l d not prevent an eastward Kemalist advance towards the Ismid Peninsula and. thence to Constant inople . Admiral Brock expressed s i m i l a r l i m i t a t i o n s f o r h i s naval, f o r c e . I t was then proposed by Lord Lee and accepted by the cabinet that the two eastern garrisons would be withdrawn i f necessary and that a l l the forces be concen-25 t ra ted at Chanak and G a l l i p o l i . I t i s not easy to understand the l o g i c behind t h i s de-c i s i o n . . The waterway from the Aegean to the Black Sea has two narrows; those at G a l l i p o l i and at Constant inople . For safe passage, control of both narrows i s e s s e n t i a l . The cabinet d e c i s i o n 87 contemplated the surrender of one of those narrows. What was the purpose of holding the other? Having crossed to Europe, Kemal could have approached the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n at G a l l i p o l i from the rear and have recreated the s i t u a t i o n of 1915. Aside from the s t r a t e g i c aspects of the matter, such a s i t u a t i o n would have had d r a s t i c p o l i t i c a l consequences. L loyd George was unpopular enough. His p o s i t i o n would have been untenable were B r i t a i n embroiled in a war which had no purpose and which there was no chance o f winning. The only p o s s i b l e explanation f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s d e c i s i o n must be that his ingra ined hatred o f . t h e Turks was such that even under these circumstances he could not bear to lose face by admitt ing defeat . Another f a c t o r which made Lloyd George's opponents more anxious was that on 27 September a r e v o l u t i o n occurred i n Greece. For the f i r s t time but not the l a s t , a junta of colonels came to power and Constantine was deposed. The k i n g ' s removal was not unwelcome i n western Europe, but t h e . l e a d e r of the j u n t a , Colonel P l a s t i r a s , began t a l k i n g of reorganis ing the army to combat the Of Turks . What was j u s t as d i s t u r b i n g was that the new government sent Venizelos to London to gain support f o r the venture. The p o s s i b i l i t y of a renewed a s s o c i a t i o n between Lloyd George and his o l d f r i e n d made even some of his supporters q u a i l . Beaverbrook 27 f o r one moderated the Express ' support for the Prime M i n i s t e r . From.the 27 September, the cabinet met almost c o n t i n u a l l y . Several of these meetings were i n c o n c l u s i v e , but the meeting of 88 the morning of 28 September produced the most warl ike measure to date. A telegram was despatched to Harington to the e f f e c t that i f the Turks were not withdrawn from the Chanak perimeter by a se t hour on 30 September, Harington was to open f i r e . The l o c a l 28 Turkish commander was to be informed of t h i s . Over the next few days the tension increased . The Prime M i n i s t e r , C h u r c h i l l and Home were a l l for f a c i n g Kemal down and they were more than ready to go to war. Others showed more r e -s t r a i n t . Curzon was f o r g i v i n g the Kemalists more time. General Harington delayed g i v i n g the ultimatum to the Turks i n the hope 29 that the danger of war would pass . F rankl in B o u i l l o n , a French agent, ta lked to Kemal i n Ankara and t r i e d to persuade him to accept the terms of the note of 23 September. Although Harington was f o r g i v i n g the Turks more time, his s u p e r i o r was not . At a meeting of the cabinet on 29 September, Worthington Evans, the M i n i s t e r of War, maintained that delay only helped Kemal, as he was b u i l d i n g up his forces f o r an a l l - o u t a t tack . The outcome was that another telegram was sent to 30 Harington urging him to present the ultimatum without delay . The atmosphere at the meetings of 30 September was f o r the most part even tenser than the previous day. This was the day on which Harington was to open f i r e on the Turks i f they had not moved. But the Turks had not moved and Harington had not opened f i r e . Hankey records that there were f u r i o u s outbursts 31 from Lloyd George, C h u r c h i l l and t h e i r supporters . A telegram 89 from Harington which asked f o r more time did not help matters . However, a ray of hope,came from Paris i n the form of a telegram from Hardinge. As a r e s u l t of F r a n k l i n B o u i l l o n ' s per-33 suasions , Kemal was prepared to negot ia te . On the f o l l o w i n g day, the cabinet sent a telegram to Constantinople to inform Harington that he was to go to the small town of Mudania on the southern shore of the Sea of Marmara. There he was to negotiate with Kemal.. The focus of a c t i v i t y moved from London to Mudania, and the cabinet could now meet less f r e q u e n t l y . The tone of the cabinet meetings of the l a s t few days of September and .the 1 October i s .perhaps best described by Curzon. He r e l a t e d his experiences to Hardinge i n a l e t t e r on 1 October. I can hardly describe to you the atmosphere i n which I have l i v e d during the l a s t few days. A sec t ion of the Cabinet i n c l u d i n g the P . M . , C h u r c h i l l and the Lord Chancel lor with Chamberlain, Home and others i n hot p u r s u i t have been w i l d f o r ultimatums, advances, gunfi re and war. L . G . has also revived his p a r t i c u l a r passion f o r dragging i n the Greeks. The General S t a f f l o s t t h e i r heads and advised that we were going to be f i r s t netted i n and subsequently beaten at Chanak. . . . . I have fought alone against t h i s Ephesian band. They even wanted to f a l l upon poor Harington.who has shown f a r s u p e r i o r judgement and d i s c r e t i o n to t h e i r s , and tear him i n p i e c e s . Last night they proposed to veto Mudania, to censure Harington, and l e t the guns go at Chanak. We have spent the whole day hammering over i n s t r u c t i o n s to Harington and I have sent them to you . . . . I mean at a l l costs i f I can to avoid war and above a l l war with Greece on our s i d e ; but the s t ruggle i s not ye t over f o r some of my colleagues l i t e r a l l y smell o f gunpowder. 34 90 The conference at Mudania did not go smoothly and the smell o f gunpowder must have been stronger there than i n London. Instead of Kemal a t t e n d i n g , he had sent his l i e u t e n a n t , Ismet Bey, who had made his reputat ion commanding the N a t i o n a l i s t s at t h e i r two v i c t o r i e s i n the v a l l e y of Inonli. As Eastern Thrace had already been granted to Kemal i n 35 the note of 23 September, a l l that was l e f t to negotiate was the t r a n s f e r of power and the length o f time the B r i t i s h would remain i n Chanak. The N a t i o n a l i s t s wanted to move immediately; the B r i t i s h wanted at l e a s t a month's delay i n order to arrange f o r the safety of Greek and other C h r i s t i a n m i n o r i t i e s . The t a l k s broke down several times and i n B r i t a i n anxiety increased as i t seemed that war was imminent. On 7 October, Bonar Law, the former leader o f the Conservatives wrote a l e t t e r to The Times and the Express which cas t igated the government f o r or i t s stance on the Chanak a f f a i r . As well as a challenge to the government, the l e t t e r was a r a l l y i n g c a l l f o r the Conservatives i n the C o a l i t i o n to reform the Conservative party as an independent p o l i t i c a l f o r c e . Although i t d i d r a l l y the Conservat ives , the l e t t e r d i d not have any e f f e c t on Lloyd George and his supporters . They remained as t r u c u l e n t . a s ever . They responded to the deter -i o r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n at Mudania. and the menacing posture o f the Turks by sending.Harington .a telegram which ordered him to open 37 f i r e immediately. Harington. received the message on 8 October. With the telegram i n his pocket , he faced Ismet. Harington's 91 terms were that t h i r t y days must.pass before the N a t i o n a l i s t s were allowed i n t o Eastern Thrace and Constant inople ; he wanted Chanak to be held by the B r i t i s h f o r a. l i t t l e longer . The f i n a l d e t a i l s of the negot ia t ions would be agreed upon at a conference at Lausanne 38 l a t e r i n the year . A f t e r a tense pause, Ismet gave i n and the Chanak C r i s i s was over . The Mudania Convention was signed on 11 October and came i n t o e f f e c t a t midnight on 14/15 October. Save f o r one l a s t f i e r y 39 a n t i - T u r k i s h speech at the Manchester Reform Club on 14 October, Lloyd George made no more utterances on Turkey when he was Prime M i n i s t e r . The agreement at Mudania had ext inguished any l i n g e r i n g hopes he might have, had f o r the success of his Turkish p o l i c y . In f a c t , the Chanak C r i s i s was the o c c a s i o n , i f not the cause, of his d o w n f a l l . The sudden danger of a p o i n t l e s s war had f r ightened the p u b l i c . Lloyd George's rash arrogance had compared poorly with Harington's moderation. Bonar Law's l e t t e r , too, had l e f t i t s mark. The Times, the Express and the D a i l y Mail a l l proposed Bonar Law as an a l t e r n a t i v e to Lloyd George. Conservat ives , long resentful of the l i t t l e Welshman's t u t e l a g e , now found cause to withdraw t h e i r support f o r his c o a l i t i o n . On 19 October, the Conservative party, met at the Carleton C l u b ; by a vote of 187 to 87 i t was decided to leave the C o a l i t i o n . By 5 p.m. on the same day, Lloyd George resigned his premiership . He was replaced by Bonar Law and never regained the power he loved so much. Curzon sur -92 vived him and as Foreign Secretary i n the Conservative government; he was to take much of the c r e d i t f o r the f i n a l settlement of the Eastern Question at the Conference of Lausanne which began i n December 1922. 93 CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION A l l the major powers i n f l u e n c e d the events i n post-war Turkey. To assess the importance of the role of each of these powers i s d i f f i c u l t ; to estimate the i n f l u e n c e of i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n the d i f f e r e n t governments i s even more so. There i s l i t t l e doubt, however, that of a l l who were i n v o l v e d , Lloyd George bears a major part o f the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the outcome of the course of events . The fore ign p o l i c y of a nation cannot often be explained adequately i n terms of the r o l e o f one i n d i v i d u a l ; how-ever , Lloyd George was. the c h i e f a r c h i t e c t and executor of B r i t a i n ' s post-war Greek and Turkish p o l i c i e s . The f i n a l outcome was f a r from Lloyd George's a s p i r a t i o n s . A defeated, exhausted Greece, and a v i g o r o u s , rejuvenated Turkey were the opposite o f the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s wishes. This i s not to mention the f a c t that the f i n a l , c r i s i s at Chanak s i g n a l l e d the end of his premiership . Throughout the post-war p e r i o d , Lloyd George had cont r ived at a strong.Gree.ee which would serve B r i t i s h imperial i n t e r e s t s — c o n t r o l of the S t r a i t s and the des t ruc t ion of Turkey. He pursued t h i s p o l i c y despite o p p o s i t i o n from w i t h i n the B r i t i s h government, from the B r i t i s h press and from B r i t a i n ' s a l l i e s . In the e a r l y stages, some m i t i g a t i o n of his demands might well have 94 secured a good part of what he wanted. Yet the zeal with which he pursued his ambitions was to prevent their real isat ion. The question as to why he adopted this policy s t i l l remains. There are several possible explanations, but three in particular deserve closer consideration. The f i r s t is Lloyd George's fondness for the Greeks, the second his hatred for the Turks, and the third his perception of the needs of Br i t ish imperial security. His affection for Greece can be traced back to before the war and was founded in old l iberal notions, religious sentiment and democratic i d e a l s J These feelings found a focus in Venizelos, to whom the Welshman became firmly attached. Yet even after Venizelos fe l l from power in 1920, and the chances that Greece would ever realise her goal grew steadily more remote, the Prime Minister remained constant. Both .publicly. an.d privately, Lloyd George encouraged the Greeks in their operations against the Turks. In the face of scepticism from various government departments and from other governments, he supported the Greeks in the summer of 1920 in launching what was to be a successful campaign against the Kemal i s ts . At the London Conference of the following March, he secretly told the Greeks to try their luck against the Turks once 3 more, in spite of the.peace negotiations which were in progress. Publ icly , his support for Greece never wavered, as his speech to 4 the Commons on 4 August 1922 indicates. It has been remarked that, despite i ts constancy, Lloyd George's support for Greece was only super f ic ia l , that it -never went beyond words. No B r i t i s h troops were ever dispatched to a i d the Greeks even when, under the Treaty of Sevres , t h i s might have been p o s s i b l e . I t might seem that Lloyd George's support stopped where i t would have cost men and money to go f u r t h e r . Yet such suggestions disregard the f a c t that the domestic s i t u a t i o n i n B r i t a i n precluded the p o s s i b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y and f i n a n c i a l a i d f o r the Greeks. A l s o , given the o p p o s i t i o n to his Greek p o l i c y , there was a l i m i t as to how f a r he could go. Lloyd George 's .hatred f o r the Turks stemmed from the same roots as his love f o r the Greeks, and the Turks were everything the Greeks were not . They were not democratic , even a f t e r the . Young Turk r e v o l u t i o n ; they were of an a l i e n r e l i g i o n and i t was a l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n to hate the Turks and t h e i r b r u t a l i t y . T h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war only magnified i n Lloyd George a h o s t i l i t y g to them which had been apparent, before the war. How c l o s e l y r e l a t e d were Lloyd George's f e e l i n g s towards these people? Was his love f o r Greece born out of his hatred f o r Turkey, or was his p u n i t i v e Turkish p o l i c y a r e s u l t of his wish to see Greece prosper? A good case could be made i n support o f both these p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The most l i k e l y explanation i s that at f i r s t — b e f o r e the F i r s t World War-^-these f e e l i n g s were only l o o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d , and that during the war the chance to defeat Turkey and subsequently punish her gave him the opportunity to indulge his l i k i n g f o r the Greeks. L loyd George's f e e l i n g s f o r Greece and Turkey gradual ly became so entwined as to become i n e x t r i c a b l e . 96 These sentiments f i t t e d very comfortably into Lloyd George's perception of the needs of B r i t i s h imperial s e c u r i t y i n the eastern Mediterranean. It. has been s a i d , in a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r -ent context , that , in the Middle East , Lloyd George sought B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r e s t and God's p u r p o s e . 7 Whether t h i s was because of genuine C h r i s t i a n convictions. , or a readiness to impress his non-conformist supporters i s a moot p o i n t . Nevertheless , the notion o f f o s t e r i n g the growth of a c l i e n t C h r i s t i a n s ta te at the expense of the Moslem Turks sat well with him. As e a r l y as 1912, he had adopted the notion of an enlarged Greece as an agent of B r i t i s h 8 imperial i n t e r e s t s i n the eastern Mediterranean. Over the years., t h i s idea took deep root i n Lloyd George's mind. Nine years l a t e r , i n 1921, he was s t i l l advocating the idea as s t r o n g l y as ever . He saw the Greeks as a vigourous people representing g C h r i s t i a n i t y against b a r b a r i s m . - He saw them as a p o t e n t i a l l y strong naval power, who, i f supported and c u l t i v a t e d , would be i n -valuable i n p r o t e c t i n g B r i t a i n ' s communications. I t i s debatable whether t h i s v i s i o n o f L loyd George was grounded i n r e a l i t y . Her r e l a t i v e l y small p o p u l a t i o n , and a f t e r the war, her i n c r e a s i n g m i l i t a r y and economic d e b i l i t a t i o n , made i t doubtful that Greece could have expanded to the extent that Lloyd George wished. Even had she done so , the i n s t a b i l i t y of her governments made i t u n l i k e l y that her f r i e n d s h i p and grat i tude to B r i t a i n would have l a s t e d l o n g . C r i t i c i s m to t h i s e f f e c t came from S i r Henry W i l s o n , Chief of the Imperial General 97 S t a f f . Wilson questioned Greece's a b i l i t y to f u l f i l l such a r o l e . He a lso suggested that B r i t a i n ' s real i n t e r e s t s lay i n strong t i e s with Turkey. He argued t h i s not only from the aspect of s e c u r i t y i n the Mediterranean, but with regard to the sentiments of B r i t a i n ' s Moslem subjects throughout the E m p i r e . 1 ^ Moreover, a f t e r the establishment of the Bolsheviks i n Russia , a good case was made that B r i t a i n should c u l t i v a t e a f r i e n d l y Turkey as a bulwark against Russia . I f Lloyd George's support of Greece was f o r the combination of reasons s tated above, two other questions remain. The f i r s t i s concerned with the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s pers is tence in a p o l i c y . w h i c h had such unfortunate r e s u l t s on B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s with her former a l l i e s , which showed i n c r e a s i n g i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f success , and which drew strong opposi t ion from w i t h i n the B r i t i s h government. The second asks how he was able to f o l l o w such a course at a l l . 1 1 The reason f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s adherence to the p o l i c y seems to have been a combination o f ignorance and stubborness. Given the events , i t i s hard to see how someone so astute as Lloyd George could have so completely misread the s i g n s . He overestimated the strength and endurance of the Greeks and he completely misunder-stood the strength and nature of the Kemalist movement. With t h i s i n mind, the conclusion must be drawn that once Lloyd George had e s t a b l i s h e d a p o l i c y f o r Greece, and Turkey, he never revised i t , no matter how much t h i s might have been required by the circumstances. Whenever a c r i s i s occurred i n the area he reverted to his o r i g i n a l 98 plan without e i t h e r t r o u b l i n g or being able to take the time to devise a new one. This seems a l l the more l i k e l y when one considers a l l the other issues which confronted the Prime M i n i s t e r during those y e a r s , a good many o f which must have seemed more urgent than what was happening to the Turks or to the Greeks. I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , there were innumerable conferences concerning the post-war 12 t r e a t i e s . At home, the s i t u a t i o n was no less demanding. There was the problem of his p o s i t i o n wi thin the C o a l i t i o n , Labour problems, the housing and honours scandals , and the I r i s h question to name only some. Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George's s e c r e t a r y , 13 r a r e l y mentions Turkey i n her d i a r y o f the time. L l o y d George's lack of preparedness on the f i n e r points of the issue confirms that 14 he had taken l i t t l e time to learn the complexi t ies o f the i s s u e . Another f a c t o r which contr ibuted to the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s t enac i ty was the nature and ..source of the opposi t ion to his p o l i c y w i t h i n the government. The c h i e f sources were the U n i o n i s t s , the Foreign O f f i c e and the War O f f i c e . L loyd George had l i t t l e l i k i n g f o r the Unionists and he held the Foreign O f f i c e i n con-tempt. His experience during the war had taught him to d i s t r u s t the advice of the ' e x p e r t s ' at the War O f f i c e . The o p p o s i t i o n from these groups made Lloyd George a l l the more determined to carry out his p o l i c y , and give him g r a t i f i c a t i o n when events seemed 15 to prove him r i g h t . There i s s t i l l the question as to how the Prime M i n i s t e r was able to carry out his p o l i c y i n the face of o p p o s i t i o n 99 from B r i t a i n ' s a l l i e s and from w i t h i n his own government. None of the other major powers encouraged Lloyd George i n his Greek p o l i c y , but f o r several reasons, t h e i r i n f l u e n c e had l i t t l e e f f e c t on the Prime M i n i s t e r . The p o s s i b i l i t y that the United States might play an important r o l e i n the future of Turkey i n t r i g u e d Lloyd George f o r the greater part of 1919. However, the American abdicat ion i n November 1919 of any such involvement l e f t . France as the only major power which might have i n f l u e n c e d him. France d i d oppose . L loyd George's p o l i c y , as her gradual rapprochemehltwith the N a t i o n a l i s t s shows. On the other hand, c e r t a i n other consider -at ions forced France to co-operate with B r i t a i n , f i r s t i n d r a f t i n g the Treaty of Sevres and l a t e r i n enforc ing i t , however r e l u c t a n t l y . 1 ^ This ambivalent behaviour mit igated the e f f e c t that any French c r i t i c i s m might have had. The unusual nature of Lloyd George's premiership i s s t i l l a subject of controversy. The amount of executive power he had i s d i f f i c u l t to determine. In the context of the Turkish s i t u a t i o n a f t e r the war, however, i t i s evident that he enjoyed a considerable amount of freedom, i n imposing his wishes. This i.s not to say that he was free to carry out his Greek and Turkish p o l i c i e s without i n t e r f e r e n c e . The Cabinet d e c i s i o n of January 1920 to abandon the notion of e x p e l l i n g the Turks from Constant inople , the withdrawal of f i n a n c i a l support to Greece i n 1921, General Harington 's repulse of the Greek advance on Constantinople i n 100 J u l y 1922 a l l show that there were l i m i t s to the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s power. Against th is must be weighed what Lloyd George was able to accomplish.. His work i n framing the Treaty of Sevres , his support of the Greek landings i n Smyrna, and his subsequent encouragement of t h e i r campaigns,, a l l in. the face of s t r i d e n t opposi t ion from many sources w i t h i n the government, i n d i c a t e that his a b i l i t y to execute an unpopular p o l i c y was much greater than that enjoyed by other B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r s of t h i s century. Lloyd George d i d have, some support f o r his Greek p o l i c y . We have seen that he received support from Eyre Crowe. He was also aided by P h i l i p Kerr , the member of the.Prime M i n i s t e r ' s S e c r e t a r i a t who was responsible f o r , f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . L ike Lloyd George, Kerr was contemptuous of the Foreign O f f i c e and he was 19 as much a p h i l - h e l l e n e as the Prime Minister , . He worked hard to j u s t i f y the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Greek p o l i c y to. i t s many c r i t i c s . Another source of support was S i r Maurice Hankey of the Cabinet S e c r e t a r i a t . Although Hankey had expressed misgivings about the Greek landings at Smyrna, he was subsequently a strong p r o -20 ponent o f the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p o l i c y . Such support from his advisors was no doubt of assis tance to Lloyd George. However, the freedom which enabled him to prosecute his p o l i c y i s d i r e c t l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to the d i s u n i t y of 21 the o p p o s i t i o n from w i t h i n the government. The Foreign O f f i c e 101 had been weakened during B a l f o u r ' s term as Foreign Secretary . Curzon, his successor , lacked the r e s o l u t i o n to successful ly oppose the Prime M i n i s t e r . Moreover, once the Treaty of Sevres was s igned , he worked to preserve i t s substance. Within the Foreign O f f i c e , 9 ? there was d i s u n i t y over the Turkish i s s u e . I t was not only the. Foreign O f f i c e which was d i v i d e d . Over several important i s s u e s , the main sources of opposi t ion to Lloyd George's p o l i c y f a i l e d to reach an agreement among themselves. The intra-government debate over Turkey before the Paris Peace Conference and the sharp exchange 23 between Curzon and Montagu show t h i s c l e a r l y . Thus, while Lloyd George was u l t i m a t e l y circumscribed i n the scope o f h is a c t i o n s , he d i d enjoy a great amount of freedom to carry out his p o l i c y . I t could be argued that the o p p o s i t i o n , disorganised as i t was, impeded Lloyd George s u f f i c i e n t l y to ensure the f a i l u r e of his p o l i c y . Yet had the Greeks been as strong and r e s i l i e n t , the Turks as weak as Lloyd George b e l i e v e d , the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s plan would have succeeded despi te the o p p o s i t i o n . The fundamental flaw i n Lloyd George's plan was his overestimation of the Greeks and his underestimation of the Turkish N a t i o n a l i s t s . The Chanak C r i s i s and the f a l l o f Lloyd George ended the period i n which Anglo-Turkish r e l a t i o n s were at t h e i r worst . The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on. 24 J u l y 1923. Curzon played a 24 major part i n d r a f t i n g the T r e a t y , and i t s terms s a t i s f i e d most of the N a t i o n a l i s t s ' demands. Complete control of the S t r a i t s 102 passed to Turkey i n 1936 under the terms of the MontreuxConvention, to which Great B r i t a i n was a s i g n a t o r y . By t h i s time, under Kemal's tu te lage , the Turkish Republic had e s t a b l i s h e d i t s e l f as a s table and peaceable democracy. None of L loyd George's fears of Turkish barbarism i n Europe or his concern over the freedom of the S t r a i t s had proven j u s t i f i e d , and f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s had developed between B r i t a i n and Turkey. The rapprochement continued and in 1938 and 1939, B r i t a i n gave loans to Turkey f o r her economic development.' S h o r t l y a f t e r the beginning of the Second World War, B r i t a i n , France and Turkey signed the Treaty of Mutual A s s i s t a n c e . Among other t h i n g s , t h i s agreement gave Turkey guarantees against German aggression. I t was signed on.19 October 1939, w i t h i n a few days of the twenty f i f t h anniversary of Turkey 's entry into the F i r s t World War. 103 F O O T N O T E S 104 FOOTNOTES CHAPTER I Harry N. Howard, The P a r t i t i o n of Turkey, A Diplomatic H i s t o r y (New York: 1933). o B r i t o n Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 1918-1922 (New York: New York State U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1976). Paul C. Helmreich, From Par is to Sevres (Ohio: Ohio State U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1973). 4 Michael Llewel lyn Smith, Ionian V i s i o n (London: Penguin , 1973). A . L . MacFie, " B r i t i s h Decisions Regarding the Future of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , " H i s t o r i c a l Journal 18 (June 1975), pp. 391-400. A . E . Montgomery, " L l o y d George and the Greek Q u e s t i o n , " Lloyd  George: Twelve Essays, ed . A . J . P . Taylor (New York: Athaneum, 1971). ^Between June 1920 and 1921, Lloyd George conducted over twenty major conferences with fore ign heads of s t a t e : see Kenneth 0. Morgan's " L l o y d George's Premiership: A Study i n Prime M i n i s t e r i a l Government," i n H i s t o r i c a l Journal 13 (1970), p. 146. Harold Nicol son, Peacemaking 1919 (London: London U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1967), p. 333. FOOTNOTES CHAPTER II By 1912, t h i r t y seven per cent of Russia ' s exports passed along the waterway; W.W. G o t t l i e b , Studies i n Secret Diplomacy (London: A l l e n & Unwin, 1957), Chapter I, passim; W i l l i a m A. Renzi , "Great B r i t a i n , Russia and the S t r a i t s , 1914-1915," i n Journal of  Modern H i s t o r y 42 (March 1970), p. 1. 2 These included the National Bank of Turkey, the Constan-t i n o p l e Telephone Company, railways and diverse mining and manufacturing i n t e r e s t s ; G o t t l i e b , Diplomacy, Chapter 1, passim; U l r i c h Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918 (Princeton Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1968), pp. 9-12. 3 Among other things these investments inc luded a t h i r t y per cent i n t e r e s t i n the Bagdad Railway, the tobacco monopoly and s i x t y two per cent of the Ottoman Debt, which i n 1914 t o t a l l e d £ 1 4 3 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 ; G o t t l i e b , Diplomacy, Chapter 1, passim; Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, pp. 9-12. 4 For an account of the a c t i v i t i e s of the CUP between 1908 and 1914, see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1968), pp. 210-230; Andrew Mango "The Young T u r k s , " i n Middle East Studies 8 (January 1972), pp. 107-117. 5 F . G . Weber, Eagles on the Crescent , Germany, A u s t r i a , and  the Diplomacy of the Turkish A l l i a n c e 1914-1918 (London, Cornell U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1970), pp. 5-16; Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman  Empire, pp. 3-20. c The c losure of the S t r a i t s i n September 1914 had a d i s -astrous e f f e c t on Russia , as i t starved her of v i t a l war m a t e r i a l s . With the B a l t i c c losed by the German F l e e t , the only other routes open to the western a l l i e s were the d i f f i c u l t one to Archangel and the impossibly lengthy one from the P a c i f i c through S i b e r i a . A short but comprehensive account of Turkey's entry into the F i r s t World War i s given i n Z . A . B . Zeman's A Diplomatic H i s t o r y  o f the F i r s t World War, pp. 49-60; see a lso Trumpener, Germany and  the Ottoman Empire, pp. 21-6:1; Weber, Eagles on the Crescent , pp. 16-58. Q Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, p. 28; Harry N. Howard, The P a r t i t i o n of T u r k e y . - A Diplomatic His tory , , 1913-1923 ( U n i v e r s i t y of Oklahoma Press , 1931), pp. 102-106. g G o t t l i e b , Diplomacy, pp. 46-53. 1 0 C i t e d i n Howard, Turkey, p. 131; see a lso C. Jay Smith J r . "Great B r i t a i n and the 1914-1915 S t r a i t s Agreement with Russia , The Promise of November 1914," i n American H i s t o r i c a l Review 70 ( J u l y , 1965), pp. 1015-1016. ^When r e f e r r i n g to. the p e r i o d , Grey has recorded; ".. . . I t had always been our p o l i c y to keep Russia out of Constantinople and the S t r a i t s . We fought f o r that object i n the Crimean War . . . and i t was our main p o l i c y under Beaconsf ie ld . . . o f course i t was our p o l i c y s t i l l . " Edward Grey, Twenty Five Years 1892-1916 (London: 1925), V o l . I I , pp. 180-181. 1 2 V . H . Rothwell , B r i t i s h War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1971), p. 2. 1 3 J . A . Spender and C y r i l A s q u i t h , .Life o f the Earl of  Oxford and Asguith (1932), V o l . I I , p. 129, c i t e d i n Rothwell , B r i t i s h War Aims, p. 25; C.Jay Smith, "Great B r i t a i n and the S t r a i t s Agreement," p. 1025. 1 4 R o t h w e l 1 , War Aims, p. 25. 15 In the e a r l y months of the war the Turkish S u l t a n , i n his fear of repercussions among, the Moslems i n the Empire caused con-s t e r n a t i o n i n several government departments, but p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the India O f f i c e . When Montagu became Secretary of State f o r India i n 1917 he took up the cry that B r i t a i n ' s Turkish p o l i c y should , as f a r as p o s s i b l e , be such as to avoid upsett ing the Moslems of the Empire. I t i s d o u b t f u l , however, whether the d e c l a r a t i o n of a J ihad had any e f f e c t at a l l upon the course of the war. 107 16 For an account of the de Bunsen Committee's d e l i b e r a t i o n s , see A . S . K l i e m a n ' s , " B r i t a i n ' s War Aims i n the Middle East i n 1915," i n Journal o f Contemporary H i s t o r y 3 ( J u l y , 1968), pp. 237-251. ^ M a x B e l o f f , Imperial Sunset (London: Methuen, 1969), V o l . 1, p. 259; C . J . Lowe and M . L . D o c k r i l l , The Mirage of Power (London: Routledge, Kegan P a u l , 1972), p. 212; Klieman, " B r i t i s h War A i m s , " pp. 243-244. •j o C h u r c h i l l has claimed that the planning f o r an attack on G a l l i p o l i was a c t u a l l y under way before the A l l i e d d e c l a r a t i o n s of war on Turkey. Winston C h u r c h i l l , The World C r i s i s , 1915.(London: 1923), pp. 46-47, c i t e d i n Klieman, " B r i t a i n ' s War A i m s , " p. 238. 19 Peter Lowe, "The Rise to the P r e m i e r s h i p , " i n Lloyd  George; Twelve Essays, ed. A . J . P . Taylor (New York, Athaneum, 1971), p. 99. 20 In a memorandum dated 1. January 1915, Lloyd George p r o -posed sending an expedit ion to S y r i a to defeat the Turks, , arguing that every p o s s i b l e means of b r i n g i n g the war to a successful con-c l u s i o n should be explored . Klieman, " B r i t i s h War A i m s , " p. 239. 2 1 C P . Scot t , . J o u r n a l s , 27 November 1914, 50901 , c i t e d i n Rothwell , B r i t i s h War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, p. 126. 2 2 L o c . c i t . , 15 March, 1915. 23 The negotiat ions l e a d i n g up to and the s i g n i f i c a n c e of these agreements have been e x t e n s i v e l y covered i n many works and a r t i c l e s . These i n c l u d e : ETie Kedourie , England and the Middle  East (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1956); (The Hussein McMahon Corres -pondence and the Sykes -Picot Agreement with Russ ia , the Promise of November 1914," i n American H i s t o r i c a l Review 70 ( J u l y , 1965), pp. 1015-1034 and W i l l i a m A. Renzi , "Great B r i t a i n , Russia and the S t r a i t s , 1914-1915," i n Journal o f Modern H i s t o r y 42 (March,. 1970), pp. 1-20; (The S t r a i t s Agreement with Russ ia ) ; C J . Lowe, " B r i t a i n and I t a l i a n I n t e r v e n t i o n , " i n The H i s t o r i c a l Journal 73 (June, 1968), pp. 1414-1432; (The Treaty of London); Leonard S t e i n , The  B a l f o u r Declara t ion (London: V a l l e n t i n e , M i t c h e l l & C o . , 1961 (The B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n ) . 108 OA M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (London: MacMil lan , 1966), p. 324. 25 C . J . Lowe and F. M a r z a r i , I t a l i a n Foreign P o l i c y 1870- 1940 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul., 1975), pp. 133-159; C . J . Lowe, " B r i t a i n and I t a l i a n I n t e r v e n t i o n , " pp. 533-548; W i l l i a m A. Renzi , " I t a l y ' s N e u t r a l i t y , " pp. 1414-1415. G o t t l i e b , Diplomacy, pp. 317-318. 27 On 19 August 1914, Venizelos had sent a message to Grey i n which, seemingly with Constant ine 's approval , he placed the Greek forces at the disposal o f the Entente. Grey, wishing to avoid complications i n the Balkans , had p o l i t e l y d e c l i n e d the o f f e r . This refusal was l a t e r to be r e g r e t t e d ; Lloyd George wrote, "The p r a c t i c a l refusal o f t h i s o f f e r of an e f f e c t i v e Greek a l l i a n c e was therefore a stupendous e r r o r of judgement. I t turned out to be a calamitous e r r o r , not only f o r both B r i t a i n and Greece, but .also f o r the w o r l d , f o r i t prolonged t h i s devastat ing war f o r two y e a r s . " David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace T r e a t i e s (London: G o l l a n c z , 1938), V o l . I I , p. 1209. See a l s o , Michael L lewel lyn Smith, Ionian V i s i o n (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 35; C. Jay Smith J r . , "Great B r i t a i n and the S t r a i t s , " p. 1019. 28 M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (London: MacMil lan , 1970), p . 321; Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , pp. 35-54. 29 Kedourie , England and the Middle East , pp. 31, 34-35. 30 However, some areas were, under d i s p u t e . Ki tchener , f o r one, favoured strong B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e i n southern Pales t ine i n order to protec t the Suez Canal . Kedourie , England and the- Middle Eas t , p . 34. 31 Anderson, The Eastern Quest ion, p. 340. 32 The Sykes Pi cot Agreement can be found i n . D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . IV, pp. 245-247, Grey to Cambon, 16 May 1916. The Mosul v i l a y e t was included in the French area A in order to provide a b u f f e r between Russian and B r i t i s h possessions . See Rothwell , B r i t i s h War- Aims, p. 29. 109 34 Lucy Masterman, C . F . G . Masterman (London, Case, 1967), pp. 244-246. 35 Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , pp. 13-14. Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , p. 18. 3 7 S e e nn. 21 and 22. Rothwell , B r i t i s h War Aims., pp. 126-127. 39 This i l l - f e e l i n g towards the Turks was no doubt heightened by the f a c t that at t h i s time, the Turks were car ry ing out an almost successful attempt at genocide on the Armenian people . See Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, pp. 67, 125, 361, 369. 4 ( ^There were some d i s s e n t e r s , i n c l u d i n g Bonar Law and the War O f f i c e . See Rothwell , War Aims, p. 127; Memo, by Hardinge, 1 November 1916, F . O . 371/2780/173725/48. 41 Rothwell , War Aims, p. 65. 42 Two of the more recent a r t i c l e s i n t h i s vein are ; Kenneth 0. Morgan's " L l o y d George's Premiership - A Study i n Prime M i n i s t e r i a l Government," i n H i s t o r i c a l Journal 13 (1 , 1970), pp. 130-157; Roberta M. Warman's "The Erosion of Foreign O f f i c e Influence i n the Making of Foreign P o l i c y 1916-1918," i n H i s t o r i c a l Journal 15 (1, 1972), pp. 133-159. 43 Rothwell , War,Aims, p. 5. 44 Several of these men were members of the Round Ta ble . For an i n s i g h t in to th is 'open conspiracy 1 o f i m p e r i a l i s t s , i t s aims and e f f e c t i v e n e s s , see E l i z a b e t h Monroe's "The Round Table and the Middle Eastern Peace Set t lement , " Round Table .60 (November, 1970), pp. 479-490. 45 For a thorough e x p l o r a t i o n o f t h i s aspect o f L loyd George, see R . J . S c a l l y ' s The Or-igin Q-F the Lloyd George C o a l i t i o n :  The P o l i t i c s of Soc ia l Imperialism (Pr ince ton : P r i n c e t o n : Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1975). no 46 In the post-war negot ia t ions over a Turkish peace set t lement , i t was argued that as the Russian government had never r a t i f i e d the Treaty of S a i n t Jean de Maurienne, I t a l y ' s claims were therefore v o i d . See below, Chapter I I I . 4 7 C a b 23/2, V . C . 124, p . 5, 23 A p r i l 1917: Hardinge to B e r t i e , 24 A p r i l 1917, Hardinge Papers, HP 31/295; Hardinge to B e r t i e 27 A p r i l 1917. Hardinge Papers, HP 31/297. 48 An account of the s i t u a t i o n at t h i s time between the western A l l i e s and Russia i s given i n L . P . M o r r i s ' "The Russians, the A l l i e s and the War, February - J u l y 1917," S l a v o n i c and Eastern  European Review 50 (January, 1972), pp. 29-48. See also Hardinge to Beaumont, 1 February 1917, Hardinge Papers., H . P . 29/332; Hardinge to H i r t z e l 14 A p r i l 1917, HP 31/147. Rothwell , War Aims, p . 131. 50 As well as the des i re f o r a separate Turkish peace, t h i s might have been prompted by a growing r e a l i s a t i o n on the part of B r i t a i n that the I t a l i a n c o n t r i b u t i o n to the a l l i e d war e f f o r t had not l i v e d up to o r i g i n a l expecta t ions . 5 1 Rothwell , War Aims, pp. 135-136. 5 2 G r a n v i l l e to Hardinge, t e l , 30 October 1917, F .0 . / 371 / 104218/17/127. Minute by C e c i l , 6 November 1917, F . O . 371/129; G r a n v i l l e to Hardinge, 30 October 1917, F .O. 371/128. 53 Hardinge to G r a n v i l l e , 19 November 1917, Hardinge Papers HP 35/178. Minute by Drummond, 15 December 1917, F .O. 371/104218117/ 132; Minute by C e c i l , 15 December 1917, F . O . I b i d . ^Rothwel l , War Aims, p. 176. 5 5 P a r l i a m e n t a r y Debates, Ser ies 5, V o l . C, p. 2220. ° R o t h w e l l , War Aims, p. 175. 57 Gwynne Dyer, "The Turkish Armist ice of 1918," Middle  East Studies 8 (October, 1972), p. 313; Jacob to Graham, 6 A p r i l 1918, F . O . 146/18; Hardinge to Wingate 28 February 1918, Hardinge Papers, HP 36/324. I l l 58 Wingate to Hardinge, 25 January 1918, Hardinge Papers, HP 36/106. Wingate to Sykes, 13 March 1918, F..0. 271/53608/18; Hardinge to Wingate, 23 A p r i l 1918, I b i d . 5 9 W a r Cabinet 24/6/18 Cab 23/6. fid Wingate to Hardinge, 16 J u l y 1918, Hardinge Papers Hp 38/ 149-53; Memo by George L l o y d , August 1918, C e c i l Papers RCP 51094/55: Memo by N i c o l s o n , August 1918, RCP 51094/25-37. fil Gwynne Dyer, " T u r k i s h A r m i s t i c e , " pp. 318-319. 6 2 P a u l Guinn, B r i t i s h Strategy and P o l i t i c s 1914 to 1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1965), pp. 318-319. 6 3 H a n k e y to B a l f o u r , 12 August 1918, Ceci l Papers, RCP 51094/16. 64 Hardinge to Acton, 5 Nobember 1918, Hardinge Papers, HP 39/274; Stephen R o s k i l l , Hankey, Man of Secrets (London: C o l l i n s , 1972), V o l . I , pp. 619, 622. 65 Busch, Mudros, pp. 12-20. For the text of the Mudros A r m i s t i c e , see Dyer, "Turkish A r m i s t i c e , " Appendix I. FOOTNOTES CHAPTER III 1 Harold Nicol son, Peacemaking 1919 (London: Methuen, 1967), p . 343. Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres (Ohio: Ohio State U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1974), p. 16. B r i t o n Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, 1918^1923 (New York: New York State U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1976), p. 81. 4 Toynbee Memorandum, 9 September 1918, .Foreign O f f i c e 371/3411 , c i t e d i n Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p.. 75. 5 See above, p. 20. c Memo by S i r Eyre Crowe on the fate of Constant inople , 9 December 1918, F . O . 371/3417, London, P u b l i c Record O f f i c e . 7 Memo by Hardinge on the fate of Constant inople , 13 December 1918, F . O . 371/3417. o Harry N. Howard, Turkey, The S t r a i t s and U . S . P o l i c y (Bal t imore : Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1974), p. 52. 9 Helmreich, Sevres , p . 16. ^ H e l m r e i c h , Par is to Sevres , l o c . c i t . ^ D e r b y to Curzon, 23 February 1919, Curzon Papers, Box 65, F /6 /2 ; Memo by Toynbee, 17 February 1919, F . O . 608/108; Busch, Mudros  to Lausanne, p. 63. 12 But not a l l . They were adamant that S y r i a be t h e i r s . See Helmreich, Par is to Sevres , pp. 64-65; Busch, Mudros to  Lausanne, p. 85. 113 1 -3 A . J . Meyer, P o l i t i c s and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, pp. 95-96. 14 Harry N. Howard, Turkey, the S t r a i t s and United States  Pol i c y (Bal t imore , Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1974), p. 45. 15 Helmreich, From Par is to Sevres , p. 22. 1 c Howard, Turkey, the S t r a i t s and U . S . P o l i c y , p. 53. 1 7 L o r d Hankey, Supreme Control at the Par is Peace Conference (London: A l l e n & Unwin, 1963), pp. 16-17. 1 8Drummond to B a l f o u r , 5 December 1918, F . O . 371/3385. 1 9 I m p e r i a l War Cabinet Minutes, 20 December 1918, Cab. 23/42. (London, P u b l i c Record O f f i c e ) . 20 Harold N i c o l s o n , Curzon; The Last Phase (London: Constable & C o . , 1934), p. 76. 21 Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, p. 79. 22 Memo by Curzon on the future of Constant inople , 2 January 1919, Cab. 29/2. 23 Memo by E . S . Montagu on the future of Constant inople , 8 January 1919, Cab. 29/2. 24 The Future of Constantinople and the S t r a i t s : Recommen-dations of a Conference Held at the A s t o r i a , 30 January 1919, F . O . 374/20, pp. 110-111. 25 C o n f l i c t i n g Claims of I t a l y and Greece i n the Near East : Views of a Conference Held at the A s t o r i a , 31 January 1919, F . O . 374/20, pp. 111-112. Curzon, B a l f o u r and Hardinge a i l opposed Greek possession of Smyrna. See 'A Note of Warning About the Middle E a s t 1 by Lord Curzon, 25 March 1919, F . O . 608/7037: B a l f o u r to Crowe, 26 March 1919, F . O . 608/94. 2 7 P a u l C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres (Columbus, Ohio State U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1974), p. 45. po A . L . Macf ie , "The B r i t i s h Decision Regarding the Future of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , " in H i s t o r i c a l Journal 13, 2 (1975), p.393. 2 9 C u r z o n to Bryce, 24 January 1919, F . O . 374/20. 30 Helmreich, Par is to Sevres , p. 29. 3 1 L loyd George, The Truth About the Peace T r e a t i e s 2, pp. 1266-1267. 32 See Chapter I I , n . 55. 33 C . J . Lowe and M . L . D o c k r i l l , The Mi rage of Power (London Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1972), V o l . I I , p. 364. 34 Venizelos had spent most o f October and November 1918 i n London o r g a n i s i n g support f o r the Greek c la ims . See M . L . Smith, Ionian V i s i o n (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 62. Smith, Ionian V i s i o n (London: Penguin, 1973), pp. 35-61; Busch, Mudros, pp. 72-74. 36 Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , pp. 67-68; Helmreich, Par is to  Sevres , p. 39. 37 Venizelos seems to have charmed almost everyone who met him, whether or not they sympathised with his aims. Harold Nicolson wrote: "I c a n ' t t e l l you the p o s i t i o n Venizelos. has here! He and Lenin are the only two r e a l l y great men i n Europe . " Peacemaking 1919, p. 136: see also Hardinge to G r a n v i l l e , F . O . p r i v a t e , 28 November 1918, HP 39/283. oo Donald McCormick, The Mask o f M e r l i n (New York: . H o i t , Rhinehart & W i l s o n , 1964), p. 214. 39 United States Government, Papers Rela t ing to the Foreign Relations of the United Sta tes , Par is Peace Conference (hereaf ter r e f e r r e d to as F . R . U . S . ) , V o l . I l l , 3 February 1919, pp. 859-876. 115 4 0 H e l m r e i c h , From Paris to Sevres , pp. 84-86; Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , pp. 75-77. 4 1 N i c o 1 s o n , Peacemaking, pp. 284-285, pp. 290-291. 42 I t i s probable that the I t a l i a n s ' i n s i s t e n c e on t h e i r r i g h t s i n A s i a Minor was not motivated s o l e l y by a determination to enforce the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne f o r i t s own sake. At t h i s same time, I t a l y was involved i n contentious negot ia t ions over her claims i n the A d r i a t i c . I t i s l i k e l y that she intended to use Asia Minor as a bargaining counter i n these n e g o t i a t i o n s . This supposi t ion i s supported by some o f Harold Nicol son's o b s e r v a t i o n s ; "General T a l b o t , the " f r i e n d of V e n i z e l o s , " comes to t e l l me i n s t r i c t secreceythat Sonnino has o f f e r e d the Greeks a deal under which the I t a l i a n s would support Greek claims to the Dodecanese and Smyrna, provided the. Greeks w i l l give up a l l - c l a i m to northern Epirus and thus give to Albania ( i . e . , I t a l y ) the coast opposite C o r f u . I suggest that Sonnino . . . wishes to get "compensation" f o r a surrender which he may have to make i n any case . " N i c o l s o n , Peacemaking, p. 246. 4 3 F . R . U . S . , V o l . V, pp. 483-484; Lowe & M a r z a r i , I t a l i a n  Foreign P o l i c y 1870-1940 (London: Boutledge & Kegan P a u l , 1975), p. 171. 44Lowe and M a r z a r i , I t a l i a n Foreign P o l i c y , p. 170. 45 / Paul Mantoux, L e s - D e l i b e r a t i o n s du Conseil des Quatre (Paris Centre National de La Recherche S c i e n t i f i q u e , 1955), V o l . 1, p. 455. 46 1 Mantoux, D e l i b e r a t i o n s , V o l . I , p. 485. The report a l leged that the I t a l i a n s had massacred Greeks who favoured union with Greece. 4 7 M a n t o u x , D e l i b e r a t i o n s , V o l . I , p . 499. AO See below, Chapter V, n . 28; Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , p. 15. Constable , 1934), pp. 94-95. 49 Harold N i c o l s o n , Curzon: The Last Phase (London: FOOTNOTES CHAPTER IV S.R. Sonyel , Turkish Diplomacy (London: Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s L t d . , 1975), p. 9; Lord K i n r o s s , A t t a t u r k , the Rebirth o f a Nation (London: Weidenfeld & N i c o l s o n , 1964), pp. 174-185. Message from Fitzmaurice to Cal thorpe , TO J u l y 1919, r e f e r r e d to i n Calthorpe to B a l f o u r , TO J u l y 1919, Documents on  B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y (hereaf ter r e f e r r e d to as D . B . F . P . ) . F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . IV, p. 680; Message from Fitzmaurice to Cal thorpe , 14 J u l y 1919, F . O . 608/91. 3 B a l f o u r to Cal thorpe , 21, J u l y 1919, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . IV, p. 691; I b i d . , p. 14: United States Government,. Papers Rela t ing to the Foreign Relat ions of the United States (hereaf ter r e f e r r e d to as F . R . U . S . ) , V o l . V I I , p . 122. 4 F . R . U . S . , V o l . V I I , pp. 158, 194. 5Crowe to Curzon, 2 August 1919, F . O . 608/54. Good accounts of the Smyrna landings may be found i n David Walder, The Chanak A f f a i r (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 70-74; Michael Llewel lyn Smith,, Ionian V i s i o n (London: Renguin, 1973), Chapter V; Lord K i n r o s s , A t t a t u r k , the Rebirth of a Nat ion , pp. 180-188. ^Bri ton Cooper Busch, From Mudros to Lausanne (Albany: New York State U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1976), p. 162. Q Meeting between Heads of Delegations of Powers at Quai d ' O r s a i , 18 J u l y 1919, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . I , pp. 130-131, 142. g Appendix H to No. 70, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , Vol.. I , p. 879: Crowe to Curzon, 7 October 1919, I b i d . , V o l . IV, p. 796. 117 1 0 P a u l C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres (Columbus: Ohio State U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1974), p. 167. . . depuis I 'antree en fonc t ion du V a l i actuel Izzet bey tous les h a b i t a n t s , sans d i s t i n c t i o n de races , avaid eta-ient t r a i t e s avec i m p a r t i a l i e t . . . . La s i t u a t i o n i n t e r i e u r e ne moti.va.it pas davantage le debarquement de troupes a l l i e s a Smyrne." 'Commission I n t e r a l l i e e Sur 1'Occupation, greque de Smyrne et des T e r r i t o i r e s a d j a c e n t s . ' D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . I I , p . 239, Document 3. 1 2 F . R . U . S . , V o l . IX, p. 72. 1 3 D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . I I , pp. 232-235. 1 4 D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . I I , pp. 262, 263. 15 Note to M. Venizelos r e l a t i v e to Report o f Smyrna, Commis-sion o f I n q u i r y , D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . I I , pp. 295-296. 1 C Telegram from Calthorpe to Curzon, "Greek Advance i n Western A n a t o l i a , 1 J u l y 1919, F . O . 608/89. ^ 7 B u s c h , Mudros to Lausanne, p. 171; Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , . pp. 104-106; S o n y e l , Turkish Diplomacy, p. 24; K i n r o s s , A t t a t u r k , pp. 203-204. 1 8 F . R . U . S . , V o l . IV, June 27, 1919, p. 723. 19 Kerr to Lloyd George, " E f f e c t s , o f Senate R e s o l u t i o n , 15 November 1919," Lloyd George Papers, F/89/4/23; Busch, Mudros , . to Lausanne, p. 177; Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , p.. 118; Seth T i l l m a n , Anglo-American Relations at the Peace Conference of 1919 (P.rinceton: Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1961), pp. 366-371. 20 Record by Curzon of a conversation with the French Foreign M i n i s t e r , 12 November 1919, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . IV, p. 879. 21 Loc. c i t . 22 Helmreich, Par is to Sevres , pp. .180-182. 118 0 o A . E . Montgomery, "The Making of the Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1922," i n H i s t o r i c a l Journal 15, 4 (1972), p. 779. Helmreich, Par is to Sevres , p. 191. 2 5 M a r t i n G i l b e r t , Winston S. C h u r c h i l l : The S t r i c k e n  World, 1916-1922, V o l . IV (Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n , 1974), pp. 477-478. Conference of M i n i s t e r s , 10 December 1919, Cab. 23/35. Montgomery, " S e v r e s , " pp. 776-777. p Q Notes of a Conversation at 10 Downing S t r e e t , 11 December 1919, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . I I , p. 728. 2 9 D . B . F . P . , . . I b i d . , pp.. 729-730. 3 0 D . B . F . P . , I b i d . , p. 731. 31 A . E . Montgomery, " L l o y d George and the Greek Q u e s t i o n , " i n Lloyd George: Twelve Essays , ed . A . J . P . Taylor . (London: Hamilton, 1971), pp. 263-264. 3 2 D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . IV, pp. 964-965; "Anglo-French Conference on the Turkish Settlement" 22 December 1919, Curzon Papers, 375. 33 Constantinople er les D e t r o i t s , D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . IV, pp. 945-946. 34 A . L . Macf ie , . "The B r i t i s h Decis ion Regarding the Future of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , " i n H i s t o r i c a l Journal 18, 2 (1975), p. 397. 35 "The Turkish Peace I I , " Memorandum by Montagu, 1 January 1920, Curzon Papers 382. 3 6 M e e t i n g of 6 January 1920, Cab. 23/20. Meeting of 6 January 1920, Cab. 23/20; Busch, Mudros to  Lausanne, p. 195; Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , p. 119; M a c f i e , "Constantinopl pp. 398-399; Stephen R o s k i l l , Hankey, Man of Secrets (London: C o l l i n s , 1972), V o l . I I , pp. 142-143. 38 "I ask to place on record my earnest and emphatic dissent from the d e c i s i o n a r r i v e d at by the major i ty of the Cabinet y e s t e r d a y — i n opposi t ion to the advice of the Prime M i n i s t e r and two successive Foreign S e c r e t a r i e s — t o r e t a i n the Turk i n Constantino, o p l e . I be l ieve t h i s to be a short s ighted and, i n the long run, a most unfortunate d e c i s i o n . " Harold N i c o l s o n , Curzon; the Last Phase (London: Constable , 1934), p. 113. 39 Note to Curzon from B e r t h e l o t , 11 January 1920, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , Vol. . IV, pp. 1016-1025. The core of the French p o l i c y was that France should have a predominant i n f l u e n c e i n , t h e adminis-t r a t i o n of the new Turkish s t a t e , and given her large investments i n Turkey, t h i s was l i k e l y . I t was i n her i n t e r e s t s , t h e r e f o r e , to see that the new Turkey was as large as p o s s i b l e ; to t h i s end, Clemenceau's c a p i t u l a t i o n of the previous month notwithstanding, the French e f f o r t s were d i r e c t e d . 40 Helmreich, Par is to Sevres , p. 219; Busch, Mudros to  Lausanne, pp. 196-197. 41 As a r e s u l t o f the extremely a n t i - B r i t i s h tenor of the French p r e s s , the B r i t i s h had refused to hold the conference i n P a r i s : Memorandum, by V a n s i t t a r t on French a c t i v i t i e s i n Constan-t i n o p l e , 12 January 1920, F . O . 608/272; Hardinge to Grahame, 12 February 1920, Hardinge Papers, HP 42/130; Grahame to Campbell, 13 February 1920, F . O . 800/153. 42 Helmreich, Par is to Sevres , p. 222. 43 Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , p. 104; Helmreich, Par is to  Sevres , p. 253; Sonyel argues that reports of the massacre were merely rumours g r o s s l y exaggerated f o r p o l i t i c a l purposes. See Turkish Diplomacy, p. 26. 44 S o n y e l , Turkish Diplomacy, p. 24. H Notes of A l l i e d Conference, 14 February 1920, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . V I I , pp. 45-46. 4 6 I b i d . , p. 50. 4 7 I b i d . , p. 54. AO Curzon to Lloyd George, " A s i a Minor and Greece , " 9 A p r i l 1920, Curzon Papers, CP F / 3 / 3 ; Curzon to K e r r , 12 March 1920, CP F /3 /3 . 4 9 N o t e s of A l l i e d Conference, 14 February 1920, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . V I I , pp. 55-56. 5 0 G i v e n the intense h o s t i l i t y between the. Greeks and Turks , a Greek occupation was the l a s t thing to guarantee against an up-surge of Turkish h o s t i l i t y . 5 1 D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . V I I , p. 121. 5 2 I b i d . , p. 119. 5 3 I b i d . , pp. 341-350. 5 4 I b i d . , pp. 128-133. 55 Busch, Mudros to Lausanne, pp. 201-203. 56 S o n y e l , Turkish Diplomacy, p. 19. 57 Helmreich, Sevres , p. 278. 5 8 D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . V I I , pp. 298-299. 59 *-Helmreich, Sevres , p. 282. 6 0 S e e p. 4 , n41. 61 Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , p. 125. 6 2 G i l b e r t , Churchi11, pp. 485-486; Helmreich, Par is to  Sevres , pp. 317-318. 121 6 3 C i t e d i n Walder, Chanak, p. 84. CA Lord R i d d e l i , Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference (London: G o l l a n c z , 1923), p. 308. 6 5 D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . V I I I , p . 26. fifi Smith, Ionian Vision- , p. 127. CJ Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East , 1914-1922, p. 326. 6 8 I b i d . , p. 330. 6 9 Ro b eck to Curzon, 8 March 1920, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . X I I I , p,. 17; Robeck to Curzon, 1 A p r i l 1920, I b i d . , , p. 53; General S t a f f Memo, on the Turkish Peach T r e a t y , 1 A p r i l 1920; I b i d , pp. 54-57: G i l b e r t , C h u r c h i l l , p. 485. 7 0 T . E . Lawrence, c i t e d i n E . G . Mears' Modern Turkey (New York: Macmil lan, 1925), p. 516. 122 FOOTNOTES CHAPTER V ^Donald McCormick, The Mask of Mer l in (New York: H o l t , Rhinehart & W i l s o n , 1964), p. 219. Michael L l e w l l y n Smith, Ionian V i s i o n (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 150. 3 David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treat ies (London: V i c t o r G o l l a n c z , 1938), V o l . I I , pp. 1344-1345. 4 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 22 December 1920, V o l . 136. 5 "The Greek P o s i t i o n , " Memorandum by Curzon, 27 November 1920, Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as D . B . F . P . ) , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . V I I I , p . 839. 6 K . G . Larew, "Great B r i t a i n and the Greco-Turkish War," i n The H i s t o r i a n 35 (February 1973), p. 259. 7 A . E . Montgomery, " L l o y d George and the Greek Q u e s t i o n , " i n Lloyd George, Twelve Essays, Ed. A . J . P . Taylor (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 268-269; Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , p. 165. 8 D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . V I I I , p. 100. q Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , pp. 171-179. 1 0 L l o y d George Papers, F90/1/34, c i t e d i n Smith, Ionian  V i s i o n , pp. 185-186; Montgomery, " L l o y d George and the Greek Q u e s t i o n , " p. 269. ^ C h u r c h i l l , World C r i s i s , V o l . V, pp. 418-419; Major-General S i r C . E . C a l l w e l l , F i e l d - M a r s h a l l , S i r Henry Wilson (London: Cassel l & C o . , 1927), pp. 280-282. 123 1 2 Memorandum by Nicolson on the Greek Quest ion, 8 January 1921, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . XVII , pp. 7-8. 1 3 Rumbold to Curzon, 20 January 1921., D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . XVII, pp. 21-22; "The Treaty of Sevres : General S t a f f ' s Views on M o d i f i c a t i o n of Terms," General S t a f f , War O f f i c e , CP 46/2599. ^ C o n c l u s i o n s o f a Conference of M i n i s t e r s , 18 February 1921, Cab. 23/24/14, Appendix I . 1 5 S . R . Sonyel , Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923 (London: Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1975), p . 96; Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , p. 193; K . G . Larew, "Great B r i t a i n and the Greco-Turkish War," p. 260. 1 6 D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . XV, p . 193. 1 7 R e p l y of the Angora Delegation (App. to No. 24), 24 February 1921, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . XV, pp. 202-203. I o Conversation between Lloyd George and Kalageropoulos, 4 March 1921, D . B . F . P . , I b i d . , pp. 265-266. 19 Interview between the Greek Delegation and Mr. Kerr , 1 March 1921, India O f f i c e L i b r a r y , 10L Mss Curzon, F / T / 7 ; Stephen R o s k i l l , Hankey, Man of Secrets (London: C o l l i n s , 1972), p. 222. D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . XV, p. 370; Smith, Ionian  V i s i o n , p. 197; Montgomery, "Greek Q u e s t i o n , " p. 273. 21 Final Interview between the Greek Delegation and Mr. L l o y d George, 19 March 1921, India O f f i c e L i b r a r y , 10L Mss Curzon, F / l / 7 . 2 2 D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . XV., p . 215; Larew, "Greco-Turkish War," p. 263; S o n y e l , Turkish Diplomacy, p. 103. 2 3 L a r e w , "Greco-Turkish War," p. 264. 2 4 C P 46/2981, 1921. 124 Montgomery, "Greek Q u e s t i o n , " pp. 275-276; Smith, Ionian Vis i o n , p p . 216-217; Martin G i l b e r t , Winston C h u r c h i l l : The  S t r i k e n World, 1916-1922 (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n , 1975), V o l . IV, pp. 590-592. 2 6 L l o y d George to Curzon, 16 June 1921, India O f f i c e L i b r a r y , 10L Mss Eur Curzon, F /4/3 G - L . 27 Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , pp. 225-226. 2 8 C h u r c h i l l , World C r i s i s , p. 415. Walder, Chanak, p. 120. 3 0 W . S . C h u r c h i l l , World C r i s i s (London: 1923-31), V o l . V , p. 417. For a summary of C h u r c h i l l ' s reasons f o r opposing Lloyd Goerge's p o l i c y at t h i s time, see G i l b e r t , S t r i c k e n World, pp. 590-591. 31 Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle Eas t , 1914-1924 (New York: 1969), p. 430. 32 For Curzon's f e e l i n g s on the matter, see Curzon's l e t t e r s to Hardinge, 2 November 1921, Harding Papers HP 44/251-4; 28 and 29 November 1921, HP 44/277-80. 33 Sonyel , Turkish Diplomacy, pp. 137-138; N i c o l s o n , Curzon, pp. 137-138. 34 J H S a c h a r , Middle E a s t , p. 430. 35Lowe & D o c k r i l l , Mirage , p. 369. 3 6 A b o v e , p. 371., 37 Montgomery, Greek Quest ion , p. 279. 3 8 A b o v e , p. 284. 39 Correspondence between His Majesty 's Government and the French Government Respecting the Angora Agreement o f 20 October 1921, Command Papers, CP 1970, 1922. 125 40 Minutes of a F i f t h Meeting Between Lord Curzon, MM Gounaris , B a l t a z z i s and Ragnabe, 19 November 1921, Command Papers, CP 3504. 41 Montgomery, Greek Quest ion, pp. 277-278. 42 Larew, Greco Turkish War, p. 267. 43 H J A b o v e , p. 268. 44 Montgomery, Greek Quest ion , p. 282; Larew, Greco- Turkish War, p. 268. 45 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 4 August 1922, V o l . 157. 0 126 FOOTNOTES CHAPTER VI 'For d e s c r i p t i o n s of these events see ; David Maider , The Chanak A f f a i r (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 168-177; Michael L lewel lyn Smith, Ionian V i s i o n (London: Penguin, 1973), pp. 305-311; Lord K i n r o s s , A t t a t u r k , the Rebirth of a Nation (London: Wiedenfeld & N i c o l s o n , 1964), pp. 320-329. See attached map. 3 Since the end of the F i r s t World War, both India and Egypt had experienced n a t i o n a l i s t d is turbances . 4 War-weariness and the economic s i t u a t i o n would have made th is an extremely unpopular choice . See above, p. 52. 5 A f u l l grasp of the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n seems to have eluded the cabinet f o r qui te some time. As l a t e as 25 September they were unaware that the Chanak parameter was f o u r , not f i f t e e n miles l o n g . Cab 24/39,: 25 September, CP 4235. c Martin G i l b e r t , Winston S. C h u r c h i l l : The S t r i c k e n World, 1916-1922 (Boston: Houghton, M i f f l i n , 1974), pp. 277-478. 7 Cab 23/31/48 7 September 1922. 8 Cab 23/31/48; G i l b e r t , C h u r c h i l l , p. 820. 9 / Stephen R o s k i l l , Hankey, Man of Secrets (London: W i l l i a m C o l l i n s & C o . , 1972), pp. 283-284. ^Rumbold to Curzon, 14 September, 1922, Documents on  B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y (hereaf ter r e f e r r e d to as D . B . F . P . ) , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . XVIII , pp. 21-22. Rumbold to Curzon, 14 September 1922, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . XVIII , p. 21 n . 2. 127 1 2 G i l b e r t , C h u r c h i l l , pp. 827-829. 13 An explanation f o r this, vo l te face i s to be found i n C h u r c h i l l ' s The World C r i s i s : The Aftermath, pp. 445-448. "But s u r e l y the l a s t word had not ye t been spoken; sure ly there was s t i l l t ime, not indeed to r e t r i e v e the d i s a s t e r , but at l e a s t to br ing about a peace which would leave the A l l i e s some vestiges of respect and would protect Europe from a new c o n f l a g r a t i o n . . . . I f indeed unhappily he [the Turk] re-entered Europe, i t could be by Treaty , and not by v i o l e n c e . Defeat i s a nauseating draught: and that the v i c t o r s i n the greatest o f a l l wars should gulp i t down, was not r e a d i l y to be accepted. . . . So having done my utmost f o r three years to procure a f r i e n d l y peace with Mustapha Kemal and the withdrawal of the Greeks, from A s i a Minor , and having c o n s i s t e n t l y opposed m y ' f r i e n d the Prime M i n i s t e r upon t h i s i s s u e , I now found myself whole-heartedly upon his side i n r e s i s t i n g the consequences of a p o l i c y which I had condemned." See a l s o ; R o s k i l l , Hankey, p. 289; Walder, Chanak, p. 191; G i l b e r t , C h u r c h i l l , p. 285. 14 Curzon's ideas were not a v a i l a b l e to t h i s meeting. He was bedridden as a r e s u l t o f a p e r s i s t e n t back a i lment . 15 The working of the communique was approved by the p r i n -c i p a l members o f the Cabinet , although the a i l i n g Curzon's o p i n i o n was not sought. See Walder, Chanak, p. 224. ^ R . MacGregor Dawson, W i l l i a m Lyon Mackenzie K i n g , 1.874-1923, pp. 410-411. Lloyd George countered t h i s rebuff by requesting Canada to i n d i c a t e that she would "stand by the- Empire , " to which King c h i l l i n g l y responded that "we have not thought i t necessary to reasser t the l o y a l t y of Canada to the B r i t i s h Empire . " Dawson's Mackenzie K i n g , l o c . c i t . . ^ 7 The Dai ly Express , 18 September 1922, The D a i l y C h r o n i c l e , 18 September 1922. ' " 18 Peter Rowland, L loyd George (London: B a r r i e & Jenkins , 1975), pp. 505-508, 528-530. 1 q R. Kinnear , The F a l l of L loyd George (London: Macmillan 1973), " L l o y d George and the Conservative Central O f f i c e , 1918-1922," D . D . Cuthbert , L loyd George, Twelve Essays , Ed. A . J . P . T a y l o r (New York: Athaneum, 1971), pp. 167-188. 128 20 Telephone message from Hardinge, 20 September 1922, Cab 24/139. 21 Telephone message from Curzon to Cabinet and Prime M i n i s t e r , 20 September 1922., CP 4202; Harold N i c o l s o n , Curzon .The Last Phase (London: Constable , 1934), pp. 272-274; B r i t o n Cooper Busch, From Mudros to Lausanne . (Albany: New York State U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1976), pp. 348-351. 2 2 C a b i n e t Committee, 23 September 1922, Cab 23/31; R o s k i l l , Hankey, p. 288. 2 3 W a l d e r , Chanak, p. 255. 24 Winston S. C h u r c h i l l , The World C r i s i s : The Aftermath (New York: Charles S c r i b n e r ' s Sons, 1929), p. 449. 2 5 C a b 24/139, 25 September 1922. 7 ft Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , pp. 312-316; Walder Chanak, pp. 266-268. 2 7 T h e D a i l y Express , 26 September 1922. The Dai ly  Chronic le remained s t e a d f a s t l y l o y a l throughout the whole of the Chanak C r i s i s . C i t e d in Curzon to Hardinge, 30 September 1922, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . XVIII , p. 118. 29 Curzon to Hardinge, 1st October 1922, Hardinge Papers, HP/45. For a f u l l account of General Harington's part in the Chanak C r i s i s , 30 Curzon to Rumbold 1 October 1922, D . B . F . P . , pp. 120-123. 3 1 R o s k i l l , Hankey, p. 291; G i l b e r t , C h u r c h i l l . , pp. 845-848; f o r documentation of Cabinet minutes, see Busch, p. 355, n. 83. 3 2 Rumbold to Curzon, 30 September 1922, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . XVIII , p. 118, n . 1. 129 3 3 T e l e g r a m from Hardinge, 1 October 1922, D . B . F . P . , F i r s t S e r i e s , V o l . XVIII , pp. 125-135 HP/45. 3 4 C u r z o n to Hardinge, 1 October 1922, Hardinge Papers, 35 See above, p. 85. 3 6 T h e Times, 7 October 1922; The D a i l y Express , 7 October 1922 3 7 W a l d e r , Chanak, p. 315. 3 8 W a l d e r , Chanak, p. .316. 3 9 N i c o l s o n , Curzon, p. 279; H a i d e r , Chanak, p. 322.. The f u l l text of the speech can be found i n The D a i l y C h r o n i c l e , 16 October 1922. FOOTNOTES CHAPTER VII 'See above, pp. 18-19. 2 A b o v e , pp. 60-61. 3 Above , pp. 69-70. 4 Above, p. 77. 5 A . E . Montgomery, " L l o y d George and the Greek Q u e s t i o n , " L loyd George, Twelve Essays , Ed. A . J . P . T a y l o r (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971), p. 280. ^Lucy Masterman, C . F . G . Masterman (London, Case, 1967), pp. 244-246. ^Michael G. F r y , L loyd George and Foreign P o l i c y (Montreal McGi11-Queens U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1977), V. 1, p. 258. 8 Michael L lewel lyn Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , pp. 11-18. 9 A b o v e , p. 72, n. 28. ^ D o n a l d McCormick, The Mask o f Mer l in (New York: H o l t , Rinehart & Winston, 1964), p. 219. 1 ] A b o v e , pp. 20-21. 12 Chapter I , p. 6, n . 7. 13 Frances Stevenson, L loyd George - A D i a r y , Ed. A . J . P . T a y l o r (London: Hutchinson, 1971). 131 14 Chapter I , p. 6, n . 8. 1 5 A b o v e , p. 70, n . 26; p. 71, n . 27. 1 6 A b o v e , Chapters III and IV. 1 7 A b o v e , p. 31. For c o n f l i c t i n g views on the nature of Lloyd George's premiership , see Kenneth 0. Morgan's " L l o y d George's Premiership -A Study i n Prime M i n i s t e r i a l Government," H i s t o r i c a l Journal (1970 (13)) , p. 1 and V . H . Rothwell 's B r i t i s h War Aims and Peace  Diplomacy 1914-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1971), p. 5. 19 / B r i t o n Cooper Busch, Mudros to Lausanne (Albany: New York State U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1976), p. 164; A . E . Montgomery, " L l o y d George and the Greek Q u e s t i o n , " L loyd George, Twelve Essays , Ed. A . J . P . T a y l o r , p. 263. 20 Smith, Ionian V i s i o n , p. ; Stephen R o s k i l l , Hankey, Man of Secrets (London: C o l l i n s , 1972), V o l . I I , pp. 142-143, 174, 198. Paul C. Helmreich,, From Par is to Sevres (Ohio: Ohio State U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1974), p. 324. 22 Above p. 35. 2 3 A b o v e , p. 34. 24 Harold N i c o l s o n , Curzon, The Last Phase (London: Constable , 1934), pp. 281-350. 25 Richard D. Robinson, The F i r s t Turkish Republic (Harvard: Massachusetts , 1964), p. 107. 132 B I B L I O G R A P H Y 133 BIBLIOGRAPHY A. PRIMARY SOURCES * Government Records Cabinet Papers, Series 23, 24 and 29. 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ZONE OF \ , Eskishehp \ A^ngora _ f *Erzeruni /^TvosUNDER RUSSIAN \ \ ADMINISTRATIONS <Z>\ ITALIAN \ • / \ « i ; « . « i » i « / i / i u n •f INFLUENCE \ I UNDER \ I 0 £ £ ; Smyrna \ ^ / F R E N C H , \ } S i / Diarbekr^ ^ ~ ^ /ADMINISTRATION \ \ / "v \ 142 UN DER I T A L I A N A D M I N I S T R A T I O N s ~ » - — — - , . v y A 1 e x a n 3 r e t t a / , ZONE OP F R E N C H /•Aleppo / I N F L U E N C E »Mosul X CYPRUS i«Homs Seirut THE PARTITION OF TURKEY BY THE SECRET AGREEMENTS Haxa OF 1915-17 (British] ^Damascus s M /Acre ZONE OF B R I T I S H I N F L U E N C E / JBoghdcd ^ UNDER To Russia by the agreements of March'April 1915 csi v^Sjsz UNDER INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION \ \ BRITISH )ADMINI$TRA'I •Jerusalem \ \ ... * -! £STERW R T h r ! ^ .'The Qaidshah BLACK SEA Bosohorus ^AEGEAN^;.^ Reproduced from M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, London: MacMillan, 1966. Reproduced from David wilder. The Chanak A f f a i r , London: Hutchinson, 1969. 

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