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Discourse within the culture of sociology : a study in sociological knowledge Thomas, Jill F. 1977

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DISCOURSE WITHIN THE CULTURE OF SOCIOLOGY: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE JILL FRANCES THOMAS B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1975 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS J50R THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1977 J i l l Frances Thomas, 1977 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requ i rement s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumb ia , I a g r e e that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s tudy . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i thou t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date £ 6 /V 7 i ABSTRACT This thesis i s an exploration into the creation and perpetuation of s o c i o l o g i c a l knowledge. There are three main areas of discussion: sociology as a c u l t u r a l system, a presentation of some of the concepts of A l f r e d Schutz, and i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse as an example of s o c i o l o g i c a l knowledge. The f i r s t section explores C l i f f o r d Geertz's concept of c u l t u r a l systems as applied to the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise. This includes a discussion of such related concepts as Thomas Kuhn's ideas of paradigms, and Fredrik Barth's notions of boundary creation and maintenance. The d i s c i p l i n e of sociology i s seen as constructing knowledge within a loose, but integrated, framework. The boundaries of t h i s knowledge system are found i n the everyday practices involved i n the d i s c i p l i n e . The second section i s a presentation of some of A l f r e d Schutz's ideas. This includes concepts such as t y p i f i c a t i o n , i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of meaning, and multiple r e a l i t i e s . The t h i r d section takes a look at secondary source material that deals with the works of Schutz. These a r t i c l e s are viewed as examples of the i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse constructed by and used i n the d i s c i p l i n e of sociology. They are also seen as examples of the concepts presented i n Chapter I I . Thus the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise i s seen as a s o c i a l l y constructed r e a l i t y that i s produced and maintained by the members of the c u l t u r a l system of sociology. i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction • ^ v 1) Works dealing, with sociology V 1 1 2) Choosing Schutz 1 s concepts v i i i 3) Choosing secondary source materials 1 X 4) Exclusion of possible topics x I. Sociology as a C u l t u r a l System 1 I I . Some Ideas of A l f r e d Schutz 11 1) Everday R e a l i t y 16 2) Intersubj e c t i v i t y 17 3) The r e c i p r o c i t y of perspectives 19 4) The s o c i a l o r i g i n of knowledge 19 5) The s o c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of knowledge 20 6) Common-sense constructs 20 7) Predecessors 21 8) The "We-relationship" 22 9) T y p i f i c a t i o n . . . 24 10) Relevance and Meaning 26 11) Language 28 12) Verstehen 30 13) M u l t i p l e R e a l i t i e s 31 III:.. Discourse within the Culture of Sociology 35 1) Writing as a creating a c t i v i t y 35 2) Credentials 42 2(a) Creating the reviewer's credentials 42 2(b) Creating Schutz's credentials 48 3) Incorporating Schutz into Sociology 50 4) Doing i n t e r p r e t i v e work 56 4(a) Interpreting Schutz. 56 4(b) Re-Stating Schutz 59 4(c) Reviewer as Expert 60 5) Debate 65 5(a) Praise & C r i t i c i s m 66 5(b) Decision-making as an i n v i s i b l e process.. 71 Concluding Remarks 75 Footnotes 78 Bibliography. 79 i i i Acknowledgement In a t h e s i s , the "Acknowledgement" provides an opportunity for the expression of gratitude to those involved i n making t h i s thesis a r e a l i t y . Although they can sound l i k e academy award acceptance speeches, I know that the people involved w i l l r e a l i z e the s i n c e r i t y with which I acknowledge t h e i r help and support. I would l i k e to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. E l v i W. Whittaker for supervision and assistance that she provided, as w e l l as the encouragement and guidance that helped i n the formation of t h i s work. I would also l i k e to thank my committee members Dr. Helga Jacobson and Dr. Kenneth Stoddart for t h e i r assistance i n strengthen-ing the f i n a l version of t h i s t h e s i s . Their cooperation has been greatly appreciated. I would also l i k e to thank Dr. Dorothy Smith for her l a s t minute advice and help on the t h e s i s . For the help and support given i n numerous ways I would l i k e to thank Jeanette Auger, Fran Isaacs, and Diane Thomas. They have seen me through t h i s very d i f f i c u l t period with u n f a i l i n g support, which was needed and t r u l y appreciated. I would also l i k e to thank my t y p i s t , June Galindo, who has done an excellent job of deciphering additions, changes, and l a s t minute i n s e r t i o n s . Her help i n format decisions has been greatly appreciated. F i n a l l y , I would l i k e to extend a s p e c i a l thank you to Lorena Vicente. I greatly appreciate her proof reading and suggestions, which have added to improving the c l a r i t y and ..conciseness of the f i n a l version of t h i s work. i v Introduction This thesis w i l l explore three areas within the d i s c i p l i n e of sociology: sociology as a c u l t u r a l system, some concepts of A l f r e d Schutz, and the production and presentation of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse. The f i r s t section w i l l discuss the concept of sociology as a c u l t u r a l system. This w i l l include notions such as Kuhn's concept of paradigms, and Geertz's ideas on c u l t u r a l systems. The second section w i l l be a discussion of some of A l f r e d Schutz's concepts on the construction of s o c i a l r e a l i t y . This w i l l deal with ideas such as t y p i f i c a t i o n , i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , and multiple r e a l i t i e s , to name a few. These ideas w i l l be regarded as contributing to the notion of sociology as a c u l t u r a l system, and w i l l also exemplify one aspect of the d i s c i p l i n e of sociology, namely, the exploration of an author's concepts. The t h i r d section w i l l involve an exploration of the a c t i v i t y of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse as exemplified by the production of a r t i c l e s by secondary sources dealing with the writings of Schutz. This w i l l be regarded as an example of the construction and perpetuation of the discourse i t s e l f and, thereby, as a contributing factor i n the growth and continuation of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise. This study began as a broad-based research of several of my i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t e r e s t s i n c l u d i n g the sociology of'knowledge, the works of A l f r e d Schutz, phenomenology, s o c i a l i z a t i o n , and the sociology of sociology. The academic enterprise, as a focus of V research, has held my i n t e r e s t f o r some time, and I wanted to combine some of these areas into a major piece of work. The fundamental problem encountered was merging these i n t e r e s t s into a cohesive framework. In October 1976, I began by looking through the So c i a l Sciences and Humanities Index and the S o c i a l  Sciences C i t a t i o n Index to see i f there was a h i s t o r y of secondary source material dealing with the works of A l f r e d Schutz. Unfortunately, the a r t i c l e s were not very numerous, but they did provide me with some thematic threads. This i n v e s t i g a t i o n was further r e s t r i c t e d due to my i n t e r e s t i n the s o c i o l o g i c a l aspects of Schutz's ideas rather than the ph i l o s o p h i c a l notions. Some recurrent themes began to emerge. There seemed to be a hi s t o r y of i n t e r e s t i n . e x p l i c a t i n g some Schutzian notions such as the world of everyday l i f e , t y p i f i c a t i o n s , and the problem of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . Secondly, there seemed to be two main categories of reviewers: those who fundamentally agreed with Schutz's concepts, notably, Maurice Natanson, Robert Bierstedt, and Richard Zaner; and those who b a s i c a l l y disagreed with Schutz's p h i l o s o p h i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l stance such as Robert Gorman and Ronald Best. As I read these a r t i c l e s , the focus on the development, presen-t a t i o n , and perpetuation of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse as an i n t e g r a l part of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise began to emerge. I found i t very i n t e r e s t i n g to observe the s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences i n s t y l e s of presentation, choice of concepts discussed i n the a r t i c l e s , and the v i presentation of the a r t i c l e s as vehicles of displaying c u l t u r a l competence. The connections between sociology, the works of Schutz, journal a r t i c l e s on Schutz, and i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse began to emerge through a process of creating interconnections. As I developed one area of i n t e r e s t , f o r instance, understanding some Schutzian concepts, i t seemed to overlap and have implications f o r another area of i n t e r e s t , such as sociology as a c u l t u r a l system. This, i n turn, would a f f e c t my thinking i n the f i r s t area, and connections would continue to emerge. Thus, there was a dynamic growth of conceptualizations that were being created and revealed during the course of my research and w r i t i n g of the t h e s i s . Eventually, the emergent focus of the thesis began to revolve around the notion of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse as being the major feature of the culture of sociology. The journal a r t i c l e s provided the data f or the analysis of t h i s aspect of the d i s c i p l i n e of sociology, and the works of A l f r e d Schutz provided the c e n t r a l focus f o r the a r t i c l e s chosen. In this way, I was able to narrow my f i e l d of i n v e s t i g a t i o n to the a r t i c l e s that would provide me with the s o c i o l o g i c a l dimensions of Schutz's work. As previously mentioned, t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n l i m i t e d the data material a v a i l a b l e , but i t helped to determine the boundaries of my t h e s i s . This enabled the organizational task of producing the thesis to become a manageable enterprise. Within t h i s framework I was able to concentrate on and develop the three main v i i sections of the t h e s i s : Sociology as a c u l t u r a l system, some notions of A l f r e d Schutz, and the demonstration of journal a r t i c l e s as examples of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse. One of the processes involved i n creating the boundaries of a thesis involves choosing secondary source material and also choosing c o r o l l a r y material that w i l l help to construct and define the areas of i n t e r e s t . Thus, two major groups of writings emerged within t h i s context: writers such as Geertz, Kuhn, and Barth that were h e l p f u l i n d i r e c t i n g my thinking on the c u l t u r a l aspects of sociology; and reviewers of Schutz's works such as Natanson, Gurwitsch, and Zaner. The following i s an exploration of various reasons for choosing each author. 1) Works dealing with sociology The decision-making processes involved choosing works that would help to explicate and c l a r i f y the issues that are being addressed. This i s part of the s o c i a l i z a t i o n process of becoming a s o c i o l o g i s t . I have learned to 'see' various works i n ways that are h e l p f u l i n developing my i n t e r e s t s and ideas i n t h i s area. For example, C l i f f o r d Geertz's work on c u l t u r a l systems was useful i n thinking about aspects of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise such as 'in-group' membership, b e l i e f s , and values held regarding the 'legitimate' i n t e r e s t s of the d i s c i p l i n e of sociology. The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that define 'appropriate' ways of accomplishing the task of sociology are part of that c u l t u r a l system. I found the works of Barth, Kuhn, Empson, Lovejoy, v i i i and Hanson h e l p f u l i n beginning to make sense of the s o c i o l o g i c a l construction of r e a l i t y . These authors came to my attention through the conventional research route of discussions with my advisor and l i b r a r y research. The decision to use these works came from my previous i n t e r e s t s i n theory and the sociology of knowledge. This enabled me to s e l e c t works which addressed issues such as boundaries and boundary maintenance of c u l t u r a l systems, paradigm construction which enables the recognition of 'legitimate' i n t e r e s t s , and the s o c i a l i z a t i o n processes that enable one to 'see' concepts i n p a r t i c u l a r ways. Thus the authors chosen display a range of i n t e r e s t s , and yet can be used to 'make sense' of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise as an ongoing accomplishment of r e a l i t y maintenance. 2 ) Choosing Schutz's concepts The next task involved dealing with A l f r e d Schutz's work. What concepts would I choose? What were the cues I would use to determine t h i s choice? How would I organize t h i s section to present the concepts i n a way that would make sense, and that could be used as a foundation for the t h i r d chapter? These questions, and others, engaged my attention throughout the period of w r i t i n g t h i s chapter. My f i r s t method of approach consisted of reading Collected Papers I. Concepts such as t y p i f i c a t i o n , i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y and the o v e r a l l concept of the s o c i a l construction of r e a l i t y began to emerge as themes running throughout the works. This sense of key ideas was corroborated through reading the other works and through reading secondary source material, such as Natanson's work. Such notions ix-' as t h e s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f meaning, r e c i p r o c i t y o f p e r s p e c t i v e s , and t h e " w e - r e l a t i o n s h i p " were d i s c u s s e d i n s e v e r a l p l a c e s . Thus I began t o 'see' t h e n o t i o n s t h a t were c e n t r a l t o my e x p l o r a t i o n o f S c h u t z ' s work and o f t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l d i s c i p l i n e . Thus t h e c o n c e p t s p r e s e n t e d i n C h a p t e r I I a r e t h e m a j o r i d e a s t h a t have emerged f r o m t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 3) C h o o s i n g Secondary Source M a t e r i a l s The s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e m a t e r i a l used i n C h a p t e r I I I was o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l r o u t e o f l i b r a r y r e s e a r c h . As was mentioned e a r l i e r , t h i s i n c l u d e d a s y s t e m a t i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e S o c i a l S c i e n c e s C i t a t i o n I n dex. Most o f t h e works appeared i n t h i s s o u r c e , b u t a few were f o u n d i n b i b l i o g r a p h i c r e f e r e n c e s o f t h e se c o n d a r y s o u r c e s . An i n t e r e s t i n g a s p e c t o f t h i s r e s e a r c h i n v o l v e d t h e c u l t u r e o f s o c i o l o g y i t s e l f . Many s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e s were known as r e v i e w e r s o f S c h u t z ' s work b e f o r e t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n began. T h i s i n c l u d e d N a t a n s o n , B i e r s t e d t , G u r w i t s c h , P s a t h a s , and Zaner. These w r i t e r s formed a c o r e o f 'known' S c h u t z i a n r e v i e w e r s ; 'known' m a i n l y t h r o u g h c o u r s e l e c t u r e s and r e a d i n g l i s t s , d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h f a c u l t y members, and b i b l i o g r a p h i c r e f e r e n c e s . Thus my s o c i a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s a l l o w e d me t o s e l e c t v a r i o u s a u t h o r s as p r e s e n t i n g and d e v e l o p i n g S c h u t z ' s c o n c e p t s . O t h e r w r i t e r s s u c h as B e s t , Gorman, S t o n i e r and Bode, H i n d e s s , Okuda, P e r i t o r e , and Bregman were chosen because t h e y d e v e l o p e d S c h u t z ' s i d e a s . They a r e r e l a t i v e l y unknown compared t o t h e c o r e o f r e v i e w e r s above, w h i c h enhances t h e i r p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g my r e s e a r c h . I wanted t o e x p l o r e t h e f u l l range o f j o u r n a l a r t i c l e s d e a l i n g w i t h t h e works o f S c h u t z and found t h a t t h i s was p o s s i b l e w i t h i n t h e bounds o f r e s e a r c h t e c h n i q u e s a v a i l a b l e t o me. The c o r p u s o f s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e m a t e r i a l served, a d u a l p u r p o s e : i t p r o v i d e d me w i t h d i f f e r e n t v i e w s o f S c h u t z ' s work, and i t demone s t r a t e d some o f t h e c o n c e p t s o f S c h u t z as o u t l i n e d i n C h a p t e r I I " . 4) E x c l u s i o n . o f p o s s i b l e t o p i c s I n any p i e c e o f work, b o u n d a r i e s must be drawn i n o r d e r t o make t h e t a s k manageable. Thus, c e r t a i n a r e a s o f p o s s i b l e i n t e r e s t a r e e x c l u d e d . I n d e f i n i n g t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f t h i s t h e s i s a r e a s s u c h as ethnomethodology, and an i n - d e p t h d i s c u s s i o n o f phenomenology were e x c l u d e d . These s u b j e c t s , a l t h o u g h i n t e r e s t i n g t o me, remained o u t s i d e t h e scope o f t h i s t h e s i s m a i n l y because t h e y w o u l d have i n v o l v e d a d i f f e r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e . Ethnomethodology uses and d i s c u s s e s t h e works o f S c h u t z i n v a r i o u s ways, but I f e l t t h a t I wanted t o r e s t r i c t my i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o j o u r n a l a r t i c l e s t h a t were a v a i l a b l e t h r o u g h c o n v e n t i o n a l r e s e a r c h r o u t e s . T h i s e n t a i l e d t h e e x c l u s i o n o f p o s s i b l e a r t i c l e s f o und i n o t h e r s o u r c e s s u c h as books on ethnomethodology. Thus t h e v i s i b i l i t y f a c t o r o f ethnomethodology formed a c o n s t r a i n t t o my d e c i s i o n , s i n c e t h i s a r e a o f t h e d i s c i p l i n e was n o t f r e q u e n t l y f ound i n t h e j o u r n a l s t h a t were examined. Phenomenology i n v o l v e s an e x t e n s i v e a r e a o f r e s e a r c h . A l t h o u g h -xi Schutz's i n t e r e s t s included phenomenology, I r e a l i z e d that the focus of the thesis did not center around t h i s subject, thus, t h i s area was excluded. These aspects of research reveal, to some extent, the s o c i a l i -zation processes by which I have learned to se l e c t and develop concepts within the s o c i o l o g i c a l framework. The following i s the r e s u l t of t h i s research and i s a demonstration of the processes involved i n learning to do sociology. CHAPTER I SOCIOLOGY AS A CULTURAL SYSTEM The d i s c i p l i n e of sociology can be viewed as a c u l t u r a l system that embodies c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that help to define the d i s c i p l i n e i t s e l f . For instance there are 'legitimate' predecessors that are referred to as foundational to understanding the s o c i o l o g i c a l d i s c i p l i n e such as Comte, Spencer, Marx, Saint Simon, Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, to name but a few. This tends to set the boundaries of the d i s c i p l i n e i n various ways. I t allows a sense of h i s t o r y to be gained by the student of the d i s c i p l i n e , which i s important i n defining the d i s c i p l i n e by providing the student with works and thought systems that have been i n f l u e n t i a l i n creating the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise. I t points out the various areas of 'legitimate' i n t e r e s t that forms the framework of the d i s c i p l i n e , and how those frameworks might be viewed within the confines of the d i s c i p l i n e . This provides a sense of what i s and what i s not available to an a s p i r i n g s o c i o l o g i s t to think about, write about, t a l k about, and, i n many fundamental senses, believe. Speaking on common sense as a c u l t u r a l system, C l i f f o r d Geertz maintains that common sense . . . i s , i n short, a c u l t u r a l system, though not usually a very t i g h t l y integrated one, and i t rests on the same basis that any other such system r e s t s ; the conviction by those whose possession i t i s of i t s value and v a l i d i t y . Here, as elsewhere, things are what you make of them. (Geertz, 1975: 8) In t h i s sense, Geertz i s addressing himself to the i d e o l o g i c a l aspects of any c u l t u r a l system. Sociology i s no exception. The -1--2-b e l i e f s , v a l u e s , and i d e o l o g i e s that are found i n s o c i o l o g y are not uniform, throughout, but nonetheless there i s a body of knowledge and research that f i t s under the heading 'sociology'. F r e d r i k Barth's ideas on the subject of e t h n i c groups can help to i l l u m i n a t e the n o t i o n of s o c i o l o g y being a c u l t u r a l system. His general d e f i n i t i o n of an e t h n i c group i s , a p o p u l a t i o n which: 1. i s l a r g e l y b i o l o g i c a l l y s e l f - p e r p e t u a t i n g 2. shares fundamental c u l t u r a l v a l u e s , r e a l i z e d i n overt u n i t y i n c u l t u r a l forms 3. makes up a f i e l d of communication and i n t e r a c t i o n 4. has a membership which i d e n t i f i e s i t s e l f , and i s i d e n t i f i e d by o t h e r s , as c o n s t i t u t i n g a category d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from other categories of the same order. (1969: 10-11) In some ways, an analogy could be drawn to s o c i o l o g y , except f o r the f i r s t statement, and even then i t could be argued that i t i s i n t e l l e c t u a l l y and conceptually s e l f - p e r p e t u a t i n g w i t h i t s many networks of i n t e l l e c t u a l kin-groups and schools of thought that produce generations of f o l l o w e r s . Barth goes on t o describe other features t h a t are important i n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of e t h n i c groups. He f e e l s that there are o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and i n t e r a c t i o n a l features of any e t h n i c group that serves to i d e n t i f y members of the group as d i s t i n c t from non-members. Seen i n t h i s way, the f o u r t h category i n the general d e f i n i t i o n becomes the primary feature. (1969: 13). Given t h i s , Barth claims that The c r i t i c a l focus of i n v e s t i g a t i o n from -3-t h i s point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the c u l t u r a l s t u f f that i t encloses. (1969: 15) Boundaries and boundary maintenance become e s s e n t i a l " c r i t e r i a f o r determining membership and ways of s i g n a l l i n g member-ship and exclusion" (1969: 15). The boundaries referred to here are s o c i a l boundaries. They are the taken for granted aspects of everyday l i f e that A l f r e d Schutz refers to i n Collected Papers I: The f i r s t set (of experiences) consists of the actor's experiences and h i s opinions, b e l i e f s , assumptions, r e f e r r i n g to the world, the p h y s i c a l and the s o c i a l one, which he takes f o r granted beyond question at the moment of h i s proj e c t i n g . (1973: 74) Knowledge of a group as a group i s , i n th i s sense, s o c i a l l y constructed and organized, but t h i s organization remains i n v i s i b l e u n t i l i t i s brought into recognition by a concept such as s o c i a l boundaries. The d i s c i p l i n e of sociology i s also made up of a world of shared meanings. I t also has i t s s o c i a l boundaries that distinguishes i t from other i n t e l l e c t u a l groups. Sociology can be seen as a c u l t u r a l system that has b u i l t up an elaborate, yet f l e x i b l e , set of formal and informal i d e n t i f i c a t i o n signs. I think i t i s h e l p f u l to view sociology i n t h i s way, as i t serves to br i n g i n t o focus various aspects of the d i s c i p l i n e that otherwise remain i m p l i c i t . Becoming a s o c i o l o g i s t i s a s o c i a l i z a t i o n process. One has to be i n i t i a t e d and/or indoctrinated i n t o the profession. A world view that i s somewhat -4-unique to the enterprise must be accomplished i f a person i s to ?. consider him/herself, and i s to be considered, a member of the society of s o c i o l o g i s t s . This s o c i a l i z a t i o n process i s constructed and maintained i n various ways, both v i s i b l e and i n v i s i b l e . The formal education process i s the most conventional method of i n t e g r a t i o n . It forms the basis of the current paradigm that the profession i s thinking i n and using. Thomas Kuhn, r e f e r r i n g to s c i e n t i f i c education, points to the ways i n which paradigms are taught: S c i e n t i s t s , i t should be already c l e a r , never learn concepts, laws, and theories i n the abstract and by themselves. Instead, these i n t e l l e c t u a l tools are from the s t a r t encountered i n a h i s t o r i c a l l y and pedagogically p r i o r unit that displays them with and through t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n s . ... A f t e r i t has been accepted, those same applications or others accompany the theory i n t o the textbooks from which the future p r a c t i t i o n e r w i l l learn h i s trade. (1970: 46) Thus, a student incorporates and i s incorporated i n t o a c e r t a i n p r o f e s s i o n a l paradigm. This i s not to say, of course, that a paradigm i s uniformly accepted by a l l of i t s p r a c t i t i o n e r s . As Kuhn states, What quantum mechanics means to each of them (the p r a c t i t i o n e r s ) depends upon what courses he has had, what texts he has read, and which journals he studies. ... In short, though quantum mechanics i s a paradigm for many s c i e n t i f i c groups, i t i s not the same paradigm f or them a l l . (1970: 50) -5-So, too, with sociology. Many times we f i n d that within a c e r t a i n paradigm there are fundamental differences of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of writings within the same framework. This does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean that they are working from within the same paradigm, but, conversely, the differences need not point out separate paradigms. Both of these s i t u a t i o n s can be seen i n the continuing debate regarding the works of A l f r e d Schutz. Proponents and opponents display the e l u s i v e q u a l i t i e s of the boundaries of paradigms. Interpretations of the same works d i f f e r r a d i c a l l y from one reviewer to the next, as do the conclusions regarding the o v e r a l l importance of h i s work. This area w i l l be dealt with i n greater d e t a i l i i r i : Chapter I I I . S u f f i c e i t to say that paradigms form part of the notion of sociology as a c u l t u r a l system, despite the f l e x i b i l i t y of t h e i r boundaries. In sociology, the problem with the concept of paradigm i n the Kuhnian sense i s that the d i s c i p l i n e seems to be i n a pre-paradigm(atic). stage. As Kuhn says, When the i n d i v i d u a l s c i e n t i s t can take a paradigm f o r granted, he need no longer, i n his major works, attempt to b u i l d h i s f i e l d anew, s t a r t i n g from f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s and j u s t i f y i n g the use of each concept introduced. (1970: 19) This raises the question of the state of sociology. As w i l l be shown i n greater d e t a i l i n Chapter I I I , the discussion surrounding the works of Schutz centres around the basic conceptualizations explicated by Schutz. Is t h i s a case of the i n a b i l i t y to agree -6-upon the basic framework of a paradigm, or i s i t part of the normal aspects of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse? Perhaps i t i s u n f a i r to pose t h i s question i n t h i s way. As a concept linked with Geertz's concept of c u l t u r a l system, I think a case can be made for sociology having a broad-based paradigm. Within the system i t s e l f , there seems to be some d i f f i c u l t y i n de l i n e a t i n g the above-mentioned aspect of paradigm construction. In general, sociology does exhibit many of the facets that Kuhn reserves for paradigm-based d i s c i p l i n e s , for example, ...the formation of s p e c i a l i z e d journals, the foundation of s p e c i a l i s t s ' s o c i e t i e s , and the claim f o r a s p e c i a l place i n the curriculum have usually been associated with a group's f i r s t reception of a single paradigm. (1970: 19) This could be seen to be the case for sociology, but as Richard Martin points out, .. . s o c i o l o g i s t s come to create a v a r i e t y y of orientations and perspectives, many of which lack a common fund of meaning. The s o c i o l o g i s t , from this.perspective, i s confronted, then, with s o c i o l o g i e s , not simply sociology. (1974: 17) Martin feels that t h i s r e s u l t s i n "a plethora of disorganizing and d i s o r i e n t i n g tendencies". (1974: 18). To overcome t h i s , he maintains that the d i s c i p l i n e involves i t s e l f i n the construction of various c u l t s . He seems to be using t h i s term i n the sense of a paradigm within a paradigm, or a sub-paradigm. Some c u l t i c aspects he refers to are p i e t y , mystique, r i t u a l , secular prayer, and conversion. -7-According to Martin, Kenneth Burke says "Piety i s the sense of  what properly goes with what". I t i s "a system b u i l d e r , a desire to round things out, to f i t experiences together i n a u n i f i e d whole". (Martin, 1974: 18). Martin says that t h i s does not imply dogma, but rather, as Santayana sta t e s , "as l o y a l t y to the sources of our being". (Martin, 1974: 20). Thus i t forms part of the foundation for one's thought system. Of mystique, Martin sta t e s , In the process of i n t e r a c t i o n , there emerges a realm of meaning which i s communicable and understandable yet which i s d i f f i c u l t to put in t o words. ...Such a realm of knowledge and i t s recognition are here referred to as 'mystique', which refers to the whole meaning that a person gets from an experience, without being able to f u l l y describe i t . (Martin, 1974: 21) This concept can be compared to Schutz's notions of a world of shared meanings, an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e world, a world that i s s o c i a l l y constructed. This notion i s also i m p l i c i t i n Barth's concept of s o c i a l boundaries. The word 'mystique' does bring into focus the vagueness of these concepts, and alludes to the d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent i n t r y i n g to deal with t h i s aspect of knowledge. According to Martin, Orrin Klapp defines r i t u a l as 'non-discursive gestural language, i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d for regular occasions, to state sentiments and mystiques that a group values and needs' (1969: 121). Thus, r i s k i n g the charge of some o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , r i t u a l can be thought of as a 'medium' for the conveyance of mystique. (1974: 23) For Martin, sociology displays many r i t u a l s , for instance, -8-The use of p a r t i c u l a r methodological techniques i n research, such as path an a l y s i s , sampling procedures, ethnomethodological techniques; the w r i t i n g and p u b l i c a t i o n of l i t e r a r y products; the intonation of professional conversations; the pr o f e s s i o n a l f e s t i v a l s i n the form of conferences and conventions... (1974: 23) These are part of the aspects that.make sociology a c u l t u r a l system. They help to form the s o c i a l boundaries that define the membership of the d i s c i p l i n e ; to create what Berger and Luckmann re f e r to as "commonsense knowledge" (1966: 23). The successful adoption of a paradigm, or thought system, can be i l l u s t r a t e d by N.R. Hanson's remarks "Looking for the clover i s a task; seeing i t i s an achievement.. L i s t e n i n g i s a job; hearing i s a successful outcome of that job." (1969: 61). The 'seeing' and 'hearing' referred to here i s the conceptual framework that Kuhn refers to when speaking of paradigms, and Geertz ref e r s to as a c u l t u r a l system. The s o c i a l i z a t i o n process includes the successful a b i l i t y of the i n i t i a t e to acquire t h i s sense of 'seeing*. Expressing t h i s a b i l i t y through the language of the paradigm can be seen as an i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s accomplishment. As Hanson observes, Another influence on observations rests i n the language or notation used to express what we know, and without which there would be l i t t l e we could recognize as knowledge. (1958: 19) Language i s one of the most important aspects of the c u l t u r a l -9-system of sociology. It serves to give the sense of a cognitive boundary to the d i s c i p l i n e , however loosely t h i s may be so. I t allows the p a r t i c i p a n t s to be p a r t i c i p a n t s , and to demonstrate t h e i r p r o f i c i e n c y of s p e c i a l i z e d communication that helps to l a b e l them as part of the ' i n ' group. The taking on of the language of the group forms part of the i n i t i a t i o n r i t e s of the group. The language of a paradigm r e f l e c t s the way that that paradigm makes sense of the world. An elaborate and complex network of meanings i s inherent i n the p a r t i c u l a r language of a culture, which allows i t to recognize i t s members without much d i f f i c u l t y . The important point here i s that language i s not only a signpost for recognition, but i t i s the basis for the p a r t i c u l a r construction of r e a l i t y that forms the world view that i s held by the p a r t i c i p a n t s . As Benjamin Whorf noted: The background l i n g u i s t i c system ( i n other words, the grammer) of each language i s not merely a reproducing instrument for vo i c i n g ideas but rather i s i t s e l f the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the in d i v i d u a l ' s mental a c t i v i t y , for h i s analysis of impressions, f o r h i s synthesis of h i s mental stock i n trade. (Curtis & Petras, 1970: 41) Thus, not only does language form the basis for a shared c u l t u r a l system, i t also helps to maintain that s o c i a l r e a l i t y , and enables the world of the paradigm to continue to make sense. For sociology, language performs these functions also. Generally, one can be i d e n t i f i e d as a ' s o c i o l o g i s t ' by his/her use of the language of the d i s c i p l i n e . Within the larger framework of -10-t h e d i s c i p l i n e a r e f o u n d t h e sub-groups o r s p e c i f i c paradigms w h i c h h e l p t o s e p a r a t e s o c i o l o g i s t s i n t o p a r t i c u l a r s c h o o l s o f t h o u g h t , f o r i n s t a n c e q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e s o c i o l o g i s t s , o r m a i n s t r e a m and r a d i c a l s o c i o l o g i s t s . Through l a n g u a g e , t h e p a r a d i g m becomes i d e n t i f i a b l e ; p a r t i c u l a r words t a k e on p a r t i c u l a r meanings, w h i c h a r e sometimes s h a r e d o n l y by t h o s e who a r e f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e p a r a d i g m . Thus, knowledge o f and about the w o r l d becomes s o c i a l l y o r g a n i z e d t h r o u g h s p e c i f i c language use. Words and terms i n and o f t h e m s e l v e s have no i n h e r e n t meaning. We c o n s t r u c t t h a t meaning and d i s t r i b u t e t h e sense o f t h a t meaning t h r o u g h o u t t h e c u l t u r a l s y s t e m , as does, i n t h i s c a s e , s o c i o l o g y . I n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n I w i l l p r e s e n t some o f t h e n o t i o n s o f A l f r e d S c h u t z . T h i s i s t o be seen as an example o f t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l e n t e r p r i s e as a c u l t u r a l s y s t e m t h a t p e r p e t u a t e s i t s e l f , i n p a r t , by t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n and d i f f u s i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t s o f an a u t h o r . I n t h i s s e c t i o n I w i l l be e x p l i c a t i n g b r i e f l y some o f S c h u t z ' s i d e a s as I u n d e r s t a n d them. Thus, I w i l l be engaged i n d o i n g i n t e r p r e t i v e work by r e p r o d u c i n g t h e s e i d e a s . -11-CHAPTER II SOME IDEAS OF ALERED SCHUTZ A l f r e d Schutz (1899 - 1959) was a philosopher who was interested i n the construction of the s o c i a l world from the viewpoint of the "natural a t t i t u d e " or the "everyday r e a l i t y " as he c a l l e d i t . His i n v e s t i g a t i o n s and explanations are very revealing to an understanding of the notion of sociology as a c u l t u r a l system, i n that he deals with problems such as r e a l i t y construction and maintenance, the communication of understanding with others of the same 'in-group', and the ways i n which the s o c i a l sciences accomplish t h e i r work. The following i s an outline of some of h i s basic concepts, and the r e l a t i o n of those concepts to sociology. In t h i s sense sociology can be seen as an example of the construction of a s o c i a l r e a l i t y , since the impression of sociology as a d i s c i p l i n e i s accomplished through the taken-for-granted use of such Schutzian notions as t y p i f i c a t i o n , relevance, and the epoche of the natural a t t i t u d e . The work of Schutz can be seen as part of the culture that makes up the d i s c i p l i n e of sociology, since i t adds to the production of knowledge that can be used within the d i s c i p l i n e , and creates a sub-paradigm of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise. The choice of the concepts discussed i n t h i s chapter was accomplished through the s o c i a l i z a t i o n process of my learning to do sociology. This includes learning to 'see' key concepts of Schutz's work, which i s demonstrated by t h e i r i n c l u s i o n i n t h i s section. The recognition of key concepts emerges from three main areas: l e c t u r e s i n which c e r t a i n concepts are presented and i - 1 2 -stressed; reading the author's works i n which p a r t i c u l a r concepts become themes running throughout the writi n g s ; and reading secondary sources which explain and elaborate major ideas found i n an author's works. Therefore, the concepts I have chosen to discuss r e f l e c t the presentation of these notions from a combination of the above sources. This i s not to say that these are the only ways I have learned the s e l e c t i o n process, but they are the most v i s i b l e learning procedures u t i l i z e d i n acquiring the c r a f t of sociology i n the area of l i b r a r y research. Schutz examined and explained how 'we'"'"go about constructing t h i s common sense world. How do 'we' make things 'make sense'? How i s i t possible that 'we' can i n t e r a c t with other human beings i n meaningful ways? How i s i n t e r a c t i o n possible at a l l ? These questions, and others, formed the basis of h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . Schutz s t a r t s from the basic premise that 'we' l i v e i n a world of day-to-day a c t i v i t i e s that make sense. This 'making sense' i s 'our' common-sense knowledge of the world. 'We' 'know' the things i n which 'our' d a i l y l i f e i s wrapped. 'WeT know there are other beings; 'we' know that 'we' w i l l usually be understood when 'we' speak to others; 'we' know that 'our' actions w i l l be understood by others and.that t h e i r actions w i l l be understood by us. These are 'our taken-for-granted' aspects of d a i l y l i f e . According to Schutz, our s o c i a l r e a l i t y i s constructed before and during 'our' own l i f e t i m e . The important aspect of t h i s -13-construer.ion i s i t s s o c i a l d e r i v a t i o n , which i s important i n two senses: f i r s t l y , there was an organized world before ' I ' existed, and, secondly, that 'my' world i s being s o c i a l l y constructed as an ongoing process. This theme i s threaded throughout Schutz's wri t i n g s , and forms the foundation f o r h i s examination into the ways i n which t h i s construction of r e a l i t y i s po s s i b l e . Thus, fo r Schutz, We s t a r t from an examination of the s o c i a l world i n i t s various a r t i c u l a t i o n s and forms of organization which constitute the s o c i a l r e a l i t y f o r men l i v i n g within i t . Man i s born i n t o a world that existed before h i s b i r t h , and t h i s world i s from the outset not merely a p h y s i c a l but also a s o c i o c u l t u r a l one. The l a t t e r i s a preconstituted and preorganized world whose p a r t i c u l a r structure i s the r e s u l t of an h i s t o r i c a l process and i s therefore d i f f e r e n t f o r each culture and society. (1964: 229) The world of sociology i s a s o c i a l l y constructed world also. It i s formed on the same basis as other everyday a c t i v i t i e s . There was an organization w i t h i n the d i s c i p l i n e before 'our' exposure to i t , and we are s o c i a l i z e d into the profession through a dynamic process of being influenced and in f l u e n c i n g . The becoming of a s o c i o l o g i s t , then, can be seen as an example of Schutz's concept of the construction of a s o c i a l world. Related to t h i s notion of r e a l i t y development are, h i s ideas on concepts such as epoche of the n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e , n u l l point, i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , multiple r e a l i t i e s , paramount r e a l i t y , stock of knowledge at hand, the "we-relationship", r e c i p r o c i t y of -14-perspectives, and t y p i f i c a t i o n . These concepts, and others, are i n t e r r e l a t e d to form h i s explanation of how s o c i a l r e a l i t y i s constructed and maintained without continuous and conscious e f f o r t on 'our' part. This explanation, f o r Schutz, i s the task of the s o c i a l sciences, Thus, the exploration of the general p r i n c i p l e s according to which man i n d a i l y l i f e organizes h i s experiences, arid e s p e c i a l l y those of the s o c i a l world, i s the f i r s t task of the methodology of the s o c i a l sciences. (1973: 59) According to Schutz,£social s c i e n t i s t s use second degree constructs to explain the workings of the common-sense r e a l i t y , which are "constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the s o c i a l scene" (1973: 6). Learning to see and use these second degree constructs i s part of the s o c i a l i z a t i o n process of s o c i o l o g i s t s and other s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s . The s o c i o l o g i s t , by c a l l i n g him/herself a s o c i o l o g i s t , has agreed to accept the 2 boundaries of the d i s c i p l i n e . Speaking of science i n general Schutz notes, . . . s c i e n t i f i c a c t i v i t y i t s e l f occurs within the t r a d i t i o n of s o c i a l l y derived knowledge, i s based upon co-operation with other s c i e n t i s t s , requires mutual corroboration and c r i t i c i s m and can only be communicated by s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . ...the s c i e n t i s t has entered a f i e l d of pre-organized knowledge, c a l l e d the corpus •;of ' h i s science. (1973: 37) This forms part of the c u l t u r a l system of sociology, i n Geertz's sense. I t also becomes part of the taken-for-granted aspect of the s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c world, which then becomes an unexamined feature - 1 5 -of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise. As Schutz says, "The s c i e n t i s t takes f o r granted what he defines to be a datum, and t h i s i s independent of the b e l i e f s accepted by any in-group i n the world of everyday l i f e . " (1973: 39). In one sense, t h i s can allow the s c i e n t i s t to be a d i s i n t e r e s t e d observer, but, i n another, i t can indi c a t e a framework that has been created within the p a r t i c u l a r confines of the d i s c i p l i n e . a n d that only r e f l e c t s the constructed r e a l i t y of that d i s c i p l i n e . Schutz ref e r s to t h i s problem i n h i s discussion of puppets or homunculi. (1973: 40) Schutz suggests that the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t creates a model of the s o c i a l world through the use of an imaginary actor-model, which he terms the "puppet" or "homunculous". The e s s e n t i a l problem here i s found i n the notion of 'creation'. As Schutz explains, S t r i c t l y speaking, they (homunculi) do not have any biography or any h i s t o r y , and the s i t u a t i o n into which they are placed i s not a s i t u a t i o n defined by them but defined by t h e i r creator, the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t . He has created these puppets or homunculi to manipulate them for h i s purpose. (1973: 41) This creation leads to an outcome that, i n some ways, has been pre-defined by the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t through the formation of clo s e l y regulated s i t u a t i o n s . Schutz maintains that t h i s process i s not grounded i n the everyday r e a l i t y of b i o g r a p h i c a l l y situated s o c i a l beings whose r e a l i t y i s not the construction of the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t . For Schutz, then, the realm of some s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c endeavors i s too enclosed within the boundaries of t h e c d e f i n i t i o n s -16-used by the s c i e n t i s t s themselves. Schutz maintains that there i s an a r t i f i c i a l harmony created since the puppet and the environment under study are created by the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t . (1973: 47). Schutz proposes that the taken-for-granted aspects of the s o c i a l sciences, such as presented above, are the very areas that should be seen as problematic. These are the areas that should become the focus f o r s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 'We' should be t r y i n g to outline and explain such problems as how 'we' go about constructing everyday l i f e , how 'we' explain the existence of others, and what constitutes 'our' common sense understandings of 'our' d a i l y existence. 1) Everyday R e a l i t y In Schutz's view, a major s t a r t i n g point for attempting to understand the construction of everyday l i f e i s found i n the areas of t h i s l i f e that are taken for granted. It consists of a sense of 'knowing' that re f e r s to a suspension of doubt i n the existence of the world and the objects that make up the world including other human beings.. Schutz refers to t h i s view of the world as the "epoche of the natural a t t i t u d e " . (1973: 229). This attitu d e encompasses a l l the taken-for-granted aspects of d a i l y l i f e . It constitutes 'our' way of knowing, and enables 'us' to move throughout d a i l y l i f e without having to ascertain and r e f l e c t upon the existence of every d e t a i l of t h i s l i f e . This a t t i t u d e constitutes the "paramount r e a l i t y " . As Schultz explains, -17-Th e world of working as a whole stands out as paramount over against the many other sub-universes of r e a l i t y . I t i s the world of p h y s i c a l things, including my body; i t i s the realm of my locomotions and bodily operations; ...the world of working i s the r e a l i t y within which communication and the int e r p l a y of mutual motivation becomes e f f e c t i v e . (1973: 227) and, ...(paramount r e a l i t y i s ) the world of the senses or physi c a l "things" as experienced by common sense. (1964: 135) An important aspect of t h i s concept i s that i t i s a s o c i a l l y constructed world. The r e a l i t y that 'we' experience i s made meaningful because of 'our' i n t e r a c t i o n with others. This feature forms part of the taken-for-grantedness of the paramount r e a l i t y . I t i s an unacknowledged part of 'our' existence. For Schutz, and for other s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , t h i s notion provides a key to understanding the.problem of s o c i a l r e a l i t y , and also provides a focus f o r s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c work. 2) I n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y One of the major areas of i n t e r e s t for Schutz was the problem of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . For Schutz, (the world) i s from the outset an in t e r s u b j e c t i v e world of culture. I t i s inte r s u b j e c t i v e because we l i v e i n i t as men among other men, bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others and being understood by them. It i s a world of culture because, from the outset, the world of everyday l i f e i s a universe of s i g n i f i c a n c e to us, that i s , a texture of meaning which we have to int e r p r e t i n order to f i n d our bearings within i t and come to terms with i t . (1973: 10) -18-As a common-sense construct, i n t e r s u b j e c t l v i t y i s a taken-for-granted phenomenon. 'We' 'know' there are other.human beings; 'we' i n t e r a c t with them every day of 'our' l i v e s . For the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t , however, i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y constitutes one of the most d i f f i c u l t problems with which to deal. In the f i r s t place, the very concept of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y presupposes the existence of the Other. For the p h i l o s o p h i c a l side of Schutz's work, t h i s assumption i s problematic. He discusses other's writings such as those of Scheler, Sartre, and Husserl, a l l of whom dealt with t h i s problem to some extent. Schutz suggests that the problem of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y has not been solved, but that t h i s and rela t e d problems such as the accomplishment of meaningful acts, the p o s s i b i l i t y of mutual under-standing and communication, and the p o s s i b i l i t y of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s can be f r u i t f u l l y analyzed from a phenomenological viewpoint (1973: 117). Schutz stresses the notion that 'our' knowledge of the.fworid i s not priv a t e but shared with other beings within 'our' c u l t u r a l system. For Schutz, then, "...my knowledge of i t (my world) i s not my private a f f a i r but from the outset i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e or s o c i a l i z e d " (1973: 11). In Schutz's view, t h i s s o c i a l i z i n g process has three basic aspects: 1. 2. 3. the r e c i p r o c i t y of perspectives the s o c i a l o r i g i n of knowledge the s o c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of knowledge -19-3) The r e c i p r o c i t y of perspectives This concept r e f e r s to the common sense knowledge that " i f I were to change places with my fellow-man I would experience the same sector of theworld i n s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same perspectives as he does" (1973: 61). This takes into account the problem that 'my' perspective, i n Schutz's terms, 'my' "here and now", can never be exactly the same as another person's "here and now". But f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes 'we' take i t for granted that the perspectives are e s s e n t i a l l y the same, and thus, r e c i p r o c a l . This allows 'us' to i n t e r a c t without constantly r e f l e c t i n g on theCOther's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 'our' actions; 'we' automatically assume, within 'reasonable' boundaries that the other person understands 'us' and that 'we' understand his/her actions. 4) The s o c i a l o r i g i n of knowledge As Schutz states, Only a very small part of my knowledge of the world originates within my personal experience. The greater part i s s o c i a l l y derived, handed down to me by my fr i e n d s , my teachers and the teachers of my teachers. (1973: 13) Schutz then goes on to explain that the teaching involved includes such things as s o c i a l l y approved ways of l i f e and ways of defining the environment. Thus, 'we' are born into and learn to see 'our' world i n s p e c i f i c ways that are s o c i a l l y derived. This enables 'us' to become part of the in-group of a c u l t u r a l system. -20-5) The s o c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of knowledge Schutz notes that there i s an uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n of knowledge throughout a society. By t h i s he i s r e f e r r i n g to the idea that each of 'us' has p a r t i c u l a r areas of expertise and other areas of mere acquaintanceship of knowledge. Furthermore, 'we' employ t h i s notion i n 'our' d a i l y l i v e s with the acknowledgement of experts such as doctors, lawyers, e t c . Thus, each of 'us' knows only a sector of the world, and 'we' are aware of t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n of knowledge. (1973: 14-15). 6) Common-sense constructs These notions of the s o c i a l i z a t i o n process form part of what Schutz c a l l s "common-sense constructs", which he defines as "a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, i d e a l i z a t i o n s s p e c i f i c to the respective l e v e l of thought organization". (1973: 5). These constructs are used to gather a stock of knowledge that 'we' can r e a d i l y r e f e r to without further r e f l e c t i o n . They help 'us' to b u i l d a r e a l i t y that makes sense to 'us'; one that 'we' can take for granted. So-called ' f a c t s ' are often a product of these common-sense constructs. According to Schutz 'we' s e l e c t facts by i n t e r p r e t i n g the world around 'us' i n c e r t a i n ways. This enables 'us' to grasp c e r t a i n aspects of r e a l i t y which 'we' use i n d a i l y l i f e . Thus, 'we' choose the relevant aspects that are of concern to 'us', and proceed to view them as ' f a c t s ' . (1973: 5). These concepts of the s o c i a l i z a t i o n process are foundational to -21-seeing sociology as a c u l t u r a l system. I t enables 'us' to see the importance and a function of gaining a sense of h i s t o r y and, thus, of acknowledging the roots of s o c i o l o g i c a l thought. This does not mean that 'we' necess a r i l y have to agree with the idea systems of the past, but i t does give s o c i o l o g i s t s a background t h a t . i s needed to understand where 'we' are now and what has contributed to the sense of sociology as a c u l t u r a l system. 7) Predecessors Schutz acknowledges both the concept of predecessors i n the formation of knowledge, and h i s own ph i l o s o p h i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l predecessors. Since knowledge i s s o c i a l l y organized, i t i s , to some extent, dependent upon predecessors "upon whom I cannot act, but whose past actions and t h e i r outcome are open to my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and may influence my own actions" (1973: 15). Predecessors form part of the :'_in-group' along with contemporaries, consociates, and successors. A l l of these groups have an influence on 'our' view of the world, and on 'our' actions within the world. Thus, predecessors form part of 'our' knowledge both i n a common-sense way and i n the more formal sense of learning the c r a f t of sociology. Throughout h i s writings, Schutz refers to h i s own i n t e l l e c t u a l predecessors. In speaking of the problem of the s e l f and the Other, Schutz mentions some s o c i o l o g i s t s who have attempted to deal with t h i s problem, such as Georg Simmel, Emile Durkheim, Charles H. Cooley, and George H. Mead (1973: 18). Among the philosophers who have -22-influenced him are Husserl, Heidegger, and Hegel. Husserl, p a r t i c u l a r l y , has affected Schutz's thinking on subjects such as phenomenology, phenomenological reduction, t y p i c a l i t y , i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , and Lebenswelt or l i f e - w o r l d . He uses much of Husserl's philosophy as a basis for h i s own thought development. Schutz also r e l i e s on the psychological works of William James to illumi n a t e h i s own ideas on such concepts as common-sense constructs, stock of knowledge at hand, multiple r e a l i t i e s , and paramount r e a l i t y . Thus, Schutz traces some of the i n t e l l e c t u a l background of the thoughts with which he i s working. In this way he i s incorporating h i s idea of s o c i a l l y derived knowledge into h i s own work. Schutz, i n t h i s sense, can be seen to be creating the boundaries of the paradigm i n which he i s s p e c i a l i z i n g . He i s i n d i c a t i n g some of the 'in-group' community that forms part of his i n t e l l e c t u a l world view, and he i s acknowledging h i s own membership and a l l i a n c e to t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l c u l t u r a l system. -8) The "We-relationship" This concept i s part of the notion of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . In Schutz's view, 'we' share our world with contemporaries and consociates. Contemporaries are those "with whom a mutual i n t e r p l a y of action and reaction can be established" (1973: 15), while con-sociates are contemporaries "with whom I share, as long as the r e l a t i o n l a s t s , not only a community of time but also of space" (1973: 16). This i s a common^sense construct which Schutz i s -23-> bringing into focus to illuminate an aspect of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y which he terms the "we-relationship" or the "face-to-face" r e l a t i o n s h i p . This i s a s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p that can r e f e r to friends and strangers a l i k e (1973: 16), as long as i t involves a sharing of time and space . I t i s i n this r e l a t i o n s h i p that the notion of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i s most evident. In the common-sense world the presence of the Other i s indisputable during the face-to-face r e l a t i o n s h i p . For Schutz t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p brings together many i n t e r r e l a t e d notions such as n u l l point, v i v i d present, growing older together, and t y p i c a l i t y . In the world of everyday l i f e , 'my' experience of the world begins with 'my' place i n i t , i n r e l a t i o n to time and space. 'My' ';'here and now" constitutes the co-ordinates from which 'I' view the world, which Schutz terms the " n u l l point", a term which he borrows from Husserl (1973: 133). 'My' ongoing experience i s car r i e d out i n the " v i v i d present" (1973: 172). This v i v i d present can be shared by a consociate, He and I, we share, while the process l a s t s , a common v i v i d present, our v i v i d present, which enables him and me to&say: "We experienced t h i s occurrence together." By the We-relation thus established, we both ... are l i v i n g i n our mutual v i v i d present, directed toward the thought to be r e a l i z e d i n and by the communicating process. We grow older together. (1973: 219 - 220) Thus, the concept of growing older together captures the immediate r e a l i t y that i s shared by consociates i n the we-relationship. The - 2 4 -i communication mentioned above can refer to verbal and non-verbal communication. As Schutz says, "Whoever has played a game of tennis, performed chamber music, or made love has caught the Other in his immediate vivid present" (1973: 174n). 9) Typification In the world of common-sense, 'we' take i t for granted that 'we' understand and are understood by others. This makes the idea of a world of shared meanings possible. If this were not the case, i t would be necessary to consciously question every word and action with which 'we' are presented. According to Schutz, 'we' accomplish this tacit understanding through the use of typifications. 'My' stock of knowledge at hand is composed of objects and situations that ' I ' have previously encountered. They have, therefore, acquired a sense of familiarity, or a sense of typicality. As Schutz explains, 'we' experience objects, not as undifferentiated and unique objects, but as known objects such as trees, mountains, animals, other human beings, etc. (1973: 59). The acceptance of typifications allows 'us1 to categorize new objects into a pre-conceived framework. Thus, to use Schutz's example, i f 'I' see an animal, 'I' perceive i t to be a certain kind of animal, for instance a dog. Furthermore, ' I ' assume that i t w i l l act in certain ways without i t actually performing any actions, since 'I' refer to my own previous experiences or stock of knowledge (1973: 281 -282) . -25-Th i s a b i l i t y to categorize enables 'me' to make assumptions about the p h y s i c a l world around 'me', and of the mental world a l s o . I t permits 'me' to assume that there i s indeed a certain amount of mutual understanding that takes place between 'myself' and other human beings. Schutz i s c a r e f u l to stress the l i m i t s of t h i s communication and understanding, but he i s also very interested i n explaining that i t does e x i s t and how i t i s possible f o r i t to e x i s t . The s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise exhibits featuresoof t y p i c a l i t y , as i s evident i n our cognitive mapping out of the d i s c i p l i n e . We try to l a b e l people according to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , t h e i r friends i n the d i s c i p l i n e , t h e i r research, and t h e i r academic t r a i n i n g , etc. Are they quantitative or q u a l i t a t i v e s o c i o l o g i s t s ? Are they Marxists, i f so, what kind? Are they 'mainstream' or ' r a d i c a l ' s o c i o l o g i s t s ? These and many other questions can be asked of a person i n sociology, and a l l are an attempt to employ the various t y p i f i c a t i o n s that we have constructed. In some senses Kuhn's concept of paradigm i s s i m i l a r to Schutz's concept of t y p i f i c a t i o n . T y p i f i c a t i o n s are agreed upon ways of seeing the world, while paradigms are accepted sets of boundaries i n which one can work. Our desire to t y p i f y s o c i o l o g i s t s into various categories i s an attempt to define the paradigm i n which they work. Using our notions of how the world i s constructed, 'we' are seeking to reinfor c e our own t y p i f i c a t i o n s by f i t t i n g others i n t o them. In the above sense s o c i o l o g i s t s are adopting the natural a t t i t u d e . - 2 6 -Th ey are making t h e i r own world make sense by using t y p i f i c a t i o n as a common-sense construct. This i s an example of the c u l t u r a l system of sociology at work. I t i s an instance of taken-for-granted notions being employed to construct a p a r t i c u l a r r e a l i t y , namely, the r e a l i t y of the culture of sociology. 10) Relevance and Meaning An important aspect of t y p i f i c a t i o n i s the s e l e c t i o n process involved. There are myriad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s that can be given to the world of objects and ideas. T y p i f i c a t i o n involves choosing c e r t a i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and not others. Thus, 'we' choose those aspects of r e a l i t y that are relevant for 'our' p a r t i c u l a r uses. For Schutz, Relevance i s not inherent i n nature as such, i t i s the r e s u l t of the s e l e c t i v e and i n t e r p r e t i v e a c t i v i t y of man within or observing nature. (1973: 5) Relevance, as such, can r e f e r to the appropriate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that i s given to the object under consideration at a p a r t i c u l a r time. For instance, i n choosing a flower to paint, the colour may be the important aspect, but i n choosing a flower to grow, 'my'system of relevances changes. * I ' am interested i n i t s a b i l i t y to survive, rather than i t s immediate colour. Therefore, the meaning that the flower has f o r 'me' i n the two instances i s d i f f e r e n t . I t can be the same object, but 'my' i n t e r e s t i n i t w i l l define the relevance-structure that ' I ' use to determine i t s value to 'me'. The determination of relevance i s not i s o l a t e d to 'my' perspective alone. ' I ' know that the meaning 'I' give to an object w i l l be shared, for the most part, by the people who share 'my' c u l t u r a l system. ' I ' take i t f o r granted that 'my' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l coincide with t h e i r s , and that i t w i l l be meaningful to them. As Schutz states, ...I assume everything which has meaning f o r me also has meaning for the Other or Others with whom I share t h i s , my l i f e - w o r l d . . . . T h i s l i f e - w o r l d presents i t s e l f also to them f o r i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n . I know about t h e i r perspectives of relevance and t h e i r horizons of f a m i l i a r i t y or strangeness; indeed I also know that with segments of my meaningful l i f e I belong to the l i f e - w o r l d of Others as Others belong to my l i f e - w o r l d . (1973: 135) This quote points to many notions that are i m p l i c i t and e x p l i c i t i n Schutz's w r i t i n g s . I t points to the s o c i a l construction of 'our' r e a l i t y : of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y and necessity of shared meanings i n everyday l i f e . I t emphasizes the assumptions of meaning that 'we' continually make, and the assumption of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y that makes communication p o s s i b l e . I t also refers to the overlapping q u a l i t y of 'my' l i f e with the l i f e of Others. In t h i s sense, ' I ' can share various parts of 'my' l i f e with d i f f e r e n t groups of Others, without much cognitive d i f f i c u l t y . Therefore, ' I ' have various worlds of meaning that compose 'my' l i f e - w o r l d . The culture of sociology can be viewed from d i f f e r e n t angles i n t h i s regard. I t forms one part of the l a r g e r l i f e - w o r l d that we a l l i n h a b i t . From a common-sense point of view we r e a l i z e that, f o r most -28-o f u s , s o c i o l o g y c o n s t i t u t e s t h e w o r l d o f work, w h i c h i s one o f many a s p e c t s o f o u r l i v e s . O t h e r a r e a s o f i m p o r t a n c e might i n c l u d e home l i f e , p h y s i c a l a c t i v i t y , and o t h e r non-academic i n t e r e s t s . I n each o f t h e s e a r e a s , t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s o f r e l e v a n c e may change, and t h e m e a n i n g s t t h a t a r e d e v e l o p e d i n each o f t h e a r e a s may be s h a r e d o n l y by t h e group t h a t i s i n v o l v e d w i t h t h a t a s p e c t o f t h e l i f e - w o r l d . W i t h i n t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l d i s c i p l i n e t h e r e a r e a r e a s o f s h a r e d meanings t h a t form b o u n d a r i e s t h a t a r e used i n an i n c l u s i v e and e x c l u s i v e manner. These b o u n d a r i e s h e l p t o d e l i n e a t e segments o f t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l e n t e r p r i s e t h a t may o r may n o t o v e r l a p w i t h o t h e r a r e a s o f s o c i o l o g y . I n o u r e n c o u n t e r s w i t h o t h e r s o c i o l o g i s t s , we use t h i s knowledge t o d e t e r m i n e t h e tone and c o n t e n t o f our i n t e r a c -t i o n w i t h them, as a f i r s t - d e g r e e c o n s t r u c t , t h a t i s , as an a c t o r i n t h e n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e . T h i s n o t i o n i l l u s t r a t e s t h e c h o o s i n g o f r e l e v a n c e s t h a t h e l p t o f o r m t y p i f i c a t i o n s . 11) Language Language i s t h e prime agent o f communication and c o g n i t i o n . I t c r e a t e s a w o r l d o f s h a r e d meanings on w h i c h t y p i f i c a t i o n s a r e b a s e d . 'We' c o n s t r u c t t h e r e a l i t y o f e v e r y d a y l i f e t h r o u g h t h e use o f l a n g u a g e , b o t h w i t h i n t h e n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e and w i t h i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f s o c i o l o g y . As Schutz n o t e s , The t y p i f y i n g medium p a r e x c e l l e n c e by w h i c h s o c i a l l y d e r i v e d knowledge i s t r a n s m i t t e d i s t h e v o c a b u l a r y and t h e s y n t a x o f e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e . The v e r n a c u l a r o f e v e r y d a y l i f e i s p r i m a r i l y a language o f named t h i n g s and e v e n t s , -29-and any name includes a t y p i f i c a t i o n and generalization r e f e r r i n g to the relevance system p r e v a i l i n g i n the l i n g u i s t i c in-group which found the named thing s i g n i f i c a n t enough to provide a separate term f o r i t . (1973: 14) In t h i s sense, language makes s o c i a l r e a l i t y a v a i l a b l e to the members of the.society. This does not mean that there are no prob-lems involved i n the in t e r s u b j e c t i v e understanding of the structures of r e a l i t y that are represented by the language, but, as with t y p i f i c a t i o n s , 'we' choose the relevant frameworks during language use that w i l l promote sharing and understanding. 'We' assume that Others w i l l comprehend enough of 'our' meaning to enable meaningful communication to take place. Language also e x h i b i t s the f l e x i b i l i t y necessary for 'us' to manipulate 'our' world of meanings. I t allows 'us' to expand or ref i n e d e f i n i t i o n s as the occasion demands. In t h i s way, 'we' can construct and reconstruct r e a l i t y to f i t the purpose at hand. For instance, new conceptions are usually explained by using f a m i l i a r words i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. This extends 'our' knowledge, and also allows 'us' to understand things i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t . This use of language permits the construction of general and s p e c i f i c knowledge to take, place. By th i s I mean that the s o c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of knowledge can be enhanced by the d i f f u s i o n of ideas throughout a culture, but i t can also be used to exclude segments of a society from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the comprehension of s p e c i f i c knowledge. Thus, language can be used to i d e n t i f y members of a c u l t u r a l system, and -30-a l s o to i d e n t i f y non-members of that system. The language o f s o c i o l o g y can be used i n the above sense. I t allows a unique system of relevances and t y p i f i c a t i o n s to be organized i n s p e c i f i c ways, which i s commonly r e f e r r e d to as the d i s c i p l i n e of s o c i o l o g y . This incorporates an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n system that determines the i n c l u s i o n and e x c l u s i o n of group members. I n t h i s way, the c u l t u r e of soc i o l o g y can assume a more or l e s s pre-defined world of shared meanings that enables a c e r t a i n type of discourse t o take p l a c e . 12) Verstehen Inherent i n Schutz's concepts on how 'we' make sense of the world i s Max Weber's no t i o n of 'Verstehen'. Schutz uses t h i s concept to e n r i c h the understanding of h i s own work. For Schutz, Verstehen i s . . . t h e p a r t i c u l a r e x p e r i e n t i a l form i n which common-sense t h i n k i n g takes cognizance of the s o c i a l c u l t u r a l world. (1973: 56) Schutz goes on to e x p l a i n t h a t Verstehen i n v o l v e s the l e a r n i n g processes o f a s o c i e t y and that mutual understanding w i t h i n a c u l t u r a l system i s p o s s i b l e through the use of Verstehen. According to Schutz, then, Verstehen i s a method of understanding t h a t i s formed through the s o c i a l i z a t i o n process (1973: 56). This process i s performed w i t h i n the n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e and.is a common-sense construct used f o r the e x p e r i e n t i a l content of the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e world of d a i l y l i f e . This forms part of Max Weber's concept of the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of meaning. According to Schutz, -31-s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c explanations can and must r e f e r back to the subjective meaning that.;the actor has regarding h i s actions. (1973: 62). In t h i s sense, Schutz i s emphasizing the grounding of s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c work within the world of everyday, r e a l i t y . The understanding of t h i s world i s an important task for sociology and other s o c i a l sciences. 13) Multiple R e a l i t i e s The concept of multiple r e a l i t i e s i s important throughout the writings of Schutz. This, i n part, alludes to the complexities of the everyday world of s o c i a l r e a l i t y , and to the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n explanations of s o c i a l r e a l i t y . Some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved are based on the various perspectives held by 'myself and Others. These perspectives usually overlap to the extent that makes communication and understanding pos s i b l e . Among the d i f f e r e n t views that Schutz mentions are those in v o l v i n g time and space, for instance, past, present, and future worlds that may be within 'my' reach. By t h i s he indicates that there may be experiences within the world that are conceivably possible that include past and future actions. In r e l a t i o n to the past, a c t i v i t y can be re-performed, a l b e i t not the i d e n t i c a l a c t i v i t y , but reasonably s i m i l a r a c t i v i t y f o r the purpose at hand to be referred to as the same a c t i v i t y . Schutz r e f e r s to t h i s i d e a l i z a t i o n as 'I can do i t again', a term he borrows from Husserl (1973: 224). Real i t y i n the present usually constitutes the paramount -32-r e a l i t y ; the r e a l i t y of everyday l i f e that i s known to 'us' i n the v i v i d present. This i s the common-sense r e a l i t y that i s experienced i n the natural a t t i t u d e (1973: 223). This does not mean, however, that the paramount r e a l i t y holds 'our' f u l l attention during 'our' waking hours. Other r e a l i t i e s such as r e f l e c t i n g on past events, p r o j e c t i n g future actions, day-dreaming, e t c . can be intermingled with 'our' paramount r e a l i t y (1973: 233n) According to Schutz, 'we' are constantly s h i f t i n g 'our' attention to various aspects of r e a l i t y . He terms these r e a l i t i e s " f i n i t e provinces of meaning" (1973: 230), to which 'we' give an accent of r e a l i t y when 'we' focus our attention on each one. For Schutz, the important aspect of these provinces i s the meaning that 'we' give to each of them (1973: 230). Thus, 'our' experience and the way 'we' make sense of that experience i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r understanding the various f i n i t e provinces of meaning. Among the provinces of meaning, Schutz ref e r s to the world of everyday l i f e , or the paramount r e a l i t y ; the world of dreams, of imageries and phantasms: the world of a r t ; the world of r e l i g i o u s experience; the world of s c i e n t i f i c contemplation; the play world of the c h i l d ; and the world of the insane (1973: 232). He f e e l s that the paramount r e a l i t y " i s the archetype of our experience of r e a l i t y " (1973: 233), and that the;other f i n i t e provinces of meaning are modifications of t h i s r e a l i t y , although, not reducible to i t . Thus there i s a wide range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s of r e a l i t y a v a i l a b l e to -33-'us' w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f 'our' d a i l y l i v e s i n c a r r y i n g out 'our' a c t i o n s and as e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r 'our' a c t i o n s . The c o n cept o f m u l t i p l e r e a l i t i e s i s v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g i n r e l a t i o n t o 'our' c o n s t r u c t i o n o f r e a l i t y . I n 'our' e v e r y d a y a c t i v i t y t h e c h o i c e s 'we' have t o make t o s u c c e s s f u l l y f u l f i l l any a c t i o n must t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t a common-sense n o t i o n o f m u l t i p l e r e a l i t i e s . T h i s i s i m p l i e d i n S c h u t z ' s d i s c u s s i o n on r e l e v a n c e s . 'We' a t t e n d t o c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f 'our' s t o c k o f knowledge a t hand i n o r d e r t o make a d e c i s i o n t h a t w i l l s a t i s f y t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e 'we' have i n mind. T h i s may i n c l u d e d i v e r s e , and sometimes c o n t r a d i c t o r y , p o s s i b i l i t i e s , w h i c h w i l l have an e f f e c t on 'our' e v e n t u a l a c t i o n . T h i s does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t a k e p l a c e . o n a ' c o n s c i o u s ' l e v e l , b u t forms p a r t o f 'our' knowledge about t h e w o r l d 'we' l i v e i n . T h i s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s has i m p l i c a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e r e t r i e v a b l e n a t u r e o f t h a t p r o c e s s . E x p l a n a t i o n s o f d e c i s i o n s i n c l u d e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t was a v a i l a b l e at t h a t t i m e as w e l l as t h e knowledge 'we' have a c c u m u l a t e d s i n c e t h e d e c i s i o n was made. Add t o t h a t t h e s u b t l e t i e s o f 'knowing' w i t h o u t t h e need t o e x p l a i n t o o u r s e l v e s t h e 'how' o f 'knowing', and t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f any e x p l a n a t i o n becomes a p p a r e n t . I n t h i s way, r e a l i t y can be seen as an a c t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f th o u g h t and deed i n v o l v i n g i n t r i c a t e and dynamic p r o c e s s e s . Throughout a l l t h i s c o m p l e x i t y , the amazing f e a t o f making sense of 'our' w o r l d i s done e v e r y minute o f 'our' l i v e s . T h i s , i n p a r t , can be a t t r i b u t e d t o 'our' use o f t y p i f i c a t i o n s and -34-t h e t a k e n - f o r - g r a n t e d n e s s o f everyday s i t u a t i o n s . For S c h u t z , i t i s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e v a r i o u s p r o c e s s e s t h a t i s o f i n t e r e s t t o t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , and t h e f o c u s f o r h i s own work. -35-CHAPTER III DISCOURSE WITHIN THE CULTURE OF SOCIOLOGY -The preceding chapter has dealt with some of the concepts of the works of A l f r e d Schutz. The presentation of concepts becomes problematic when one begins to consider the various processes involved i n the actual production of a piece of work, both from the point of view of the o r i g i n a l author and that of the secondary source. As has been shown i n Chapter I I , the production of knowledge involves a complicated and dynamic course of action that i s constructed and reconstructed. This takes-place within the natural a t t i t u d e and forms part of the c r e a t i v i t y of knowledge formation. The following i s a c l o s e r look at some of the implications of w r i t i n g as a construction of knowledge. 1) Writing as a creating a c t i v i t y In t h i s s ection I propose to look at the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a w r i t e r and his/her works, and between a reader and the writer's works. Writing i s a creative and creating a c t i v i t y ; creative i n the sense of a tal e n t and a s k i l l , and creating i n the sense that the thoughts produced are s o c i a l l y constructed by and within the boundaries of the s o c i a l world i n which we l i v e . It i s dependent upon many t a c i t and unknowable factors that are impossible to reveal due to such problems as the intangible sum t o t a l of his/her background, or i n Schutz's terms, the stock of knowledge at hand, and to what Lovejoy refers to as the dim emergence of ideas (1960: x i v ) . These -36-features of i n t e l l e c t u a l production are important i n understanding the nebulous q u a l i t y of grasping and o u t l i n i n g that production. Michael Polanyi explores t h i s aspect of knowledge formation i n hi s book The Ta c i t Dimension. According to Polanyi, "we can know more than we can t e l l " (1967: 4 ) . This phrase addresses the problem of explanation. For instance, a face i n a crowd i s recognizable, but the process by which t h i s i s accomplished eludes explanation. Polanyi describes the act of constructing a face from p o l i c e f i l e s of pictures of various parts such as noses, eyes, mouths, etc. However, as Polanyi points out, But the a p p l i c a t i o n of the p o l i c e method does not change the fact that previous to i t we did know more than we could t e l l at the time. Moreover...we cannot t e l l how we do t h i s . This very act of communication displays a knowledge that we cannot t e l l . (1967: 5) I n t e l l e c t u a l production can be seen to possess these d i f f i c u l t i e s . Communicating knowledge through w r i t i n g involves 'knowing that', but i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to outline 'how' we 'know'. Thus the element of the " t a c i t dimension" remains i n the ideas that emerge during i n t e l l e c t u a l production. There i s a set of problems dealing with the emergence of ideas that can be dealt with by the concept of ambiguities. Empson defines ambiguity as "any verbal nuance, however s l i g h t , which gives room for a l t e r n a t i v e reactions to the same piece of language" (1947: 1 ) . In dealing with the emergence of thought, I think i t would be h e l p f u l -37-to extend t h i s d e f i n i t i o n to thought processes as well as verbal statements. The production of thoughts i s necessarily ambiguous. A notion i s grasped and developed by thinking and re-thinking that notion. By the time i t gets printed, the notion has gone through several revisions that are i r r e t r i e v a b l e . Thus, ideas are created, and emerge from a very i n t r i c a t e process, which i s dependent on Schutz's concepts of a world of shared meanings, i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , and t y p i f i c a t i o n , to name a few. For instance, thought formation and communication could not take place i f we1 did not assume that there would be i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e understanding by an 'in-group' audience. The thoughts produced must be communicated by language, and are also produced by the language. This creates a further source of ambiguity, closer to the sense which Empson uses. Ambiguity i n language i s one of the most obstinate dilemmas with which to deal. The richness of a language l i e s i n the d i v e r s i t i e s of meaning that are inherent i n i t . This poses a problem regarding understanding and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n that the multidimensional aspects of meaning allows for the development of a l t e r n a t i v e , and sometimes contradictory, d e f i n i t i o n s of words and phrases. Thus, there i s a creative process taking place between a reader and a writer's works. A reader's response to a work involves the reader's own stock of knowledge, and the meaning he/she imputes to a work cannot be the same as the writer';s. In t h i s sense we 'use' written works to further our own understanding of various ideas rather than understanding a work from the author's point of view. -38-Th e work done i n Chapter II r e f l e c t s my attempt to create an understanding of Schutz's work for myself. In doing so, I am t r y i n g to grasp some of Schutz's ideas both through what he says and through my own sense of what he says. Thus the concepts that emerge i n my understanding represent an a c t i v e blending of Schutz's concepts and my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of them. This aspect of knowledge formation i s perhaps i n e v i t a b l e even at the very basic l e v e l of i n v o l v i n g two people: the w r i t e r and the reader. A dynamic process i s taking place that involves the stocks of knowledge possessed by the two people. Thus, when I. read Schutz's works, I am a c t i v e l y involved i n feeding those ideas into my own cognitive map that includes my understanding based on the sum t o t a l of my previous experience. For instance, on page 15 I state Schutz suggests that the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t creates a model of the s o c i a l world through the use of an imaginary actor-model, which he terms the puppet or homunculus....This creation leads to an outcome that, i n some ways, has been pre-defined by the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t through the formation of c l o s e l y regulated s i t u a t i o n s . (p. 15) This quote demonstrates how I have taken an idea of Schutz and have li n k e d i t to a conception of the d i f f i c u l t i e s that can a r i s e i n the s o c i a l sciences. Other readers may not agree with t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but disagreement would point out the very a c t i v i t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that takes place through the interchange between a writer's work and the reader. By presenting Schutz's notions i n t h i s way, I am displaying the -39-use of his ideas. For instance, I am assuming there i s a r e c i p r o c i t y of perspectives since I am taking i t for granted that my thoughts s t i l l overlap Schutz's notions as he presented them, and I am also assuming that the reader of my work w i l l e s s e n t i a l l y understand t h i s work. Thus I am working w i t h i n the natural a t t i t u d e at one l e v e l of r e a l i t y while questioning the a c t i v i t y I am engaged i n at another l e v e l of r e a l i t y . Thus, Schutz's concepts are at work throughout t h i s process. This cognitive a b i l i t y to use and understand a work involves the s o c i a l i z a t i o n processes of one's c u l t u r a l system possibly more than what the work i t s e l f says. Our a b i l i t y to in t e r p r e t works i n ce r t a i n ways i s a demonstration of competence and membership i n par-t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l systems. This does not mean that uniformity of agreement i s obtained within a d i s c i p l i n e , but i t does r e f e r to an i m p l i c i t understanding of the boundaries within which i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse can take place. A r t i c l e s can be seen as instances of t a c i t and ongoing 3 accomplishments of c u l t u r a l competence . If viewed t h i s way, c e r t a i n assumptions enter i n t o the w r i t i n g of an a r t i c l e that help to make that a r t i c l e acceptable to the proposed audience. In many ways t h i s i s a subtle manner of presentation that implies a common-sense knowledge of 'how to play the game'. For instance, an a r t i c l e must have the appearance of a piece of academic w r i t i n g . - 4 0 -This can include such things as references to other academic w r i t i n g s , a defining of the boundaries of the a r t i c l e , acknowledgement of help from colleagues, and a c e r t a i n modesty regarding the l i m i t a t i o n and scope of the ideas presented. These signs indicate that the w r i t e r i s an accomplished member of the society of academics. Of course, these are by no means the only signs of expertise, but they help to i d e n t i f y the author as someone who 'knows' how to present an a r t i c l e , and also 'knows' that the presentation i s an important part of academic work. This knowledge works within the realm of the natural a t t i t u d e . I t i s part of the i m p l i c i t s o c i a l i z a t i o n process that contributes to the formation of a member of a c u l t u r a l system. Thus, a r t i c l e s become taken-for-granted instances of both knowledge development and member recognition. A r t i c l e s , i n t h i s sense, can be analyzed from the point of view of what they say and how they say i t . This can reveal the d i f f u s i o n of notions as w e l l as the perpetuation and development of a c u l t u r a l system. The following i s an exploration i n t o some of the ways which a r t i c l e s produce and deal with knowledge. A l l of the a r t i c l e s selected are p r i m a r i l y concerned with the works of A l f r e d Schutz. These a r t i c l e s date from 1937 to 1976, most of which were written i n the 1960's and early 1970's. As was mentioned i n the "Introduction" the works were chosen through conventional research routes including a thorough examination of the works c i t i n g A l f r e d Schutz as found i n The S o c i a l Sciences C i t a t i o n Index. Some a r t i c l e s present Schutz's - 4 1 -work, while others include a c r i t i q u e of h i s ideas. S t i l l others use Schutz as a springboard into t h e i r own areassof i n t e r e s t . These aspects of a r t i c l e s w i l l be traced, as w e l l as the ways i n which they display themselves as products of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse. This thesis contains many of the q u a l i t i e s that w i l l be dealt with throughout t h i s chapter, f o r instance creating c r e d e n t i a l s , both the writer's and Schutz's by c i t i n g works read and by l i n k i n g Schutz with other i n t e l l e c t u a l luminaries. The s e l e c t i o n and portra y a l of some Schutzian notions, as was presented i n Chapter .II of t h i s t h e s i s , and as presented by secondary sources w i l l be referred to throughout t h i s chapter, as w i l l the work of r e - s t a t i n g some of these ideas through my understanding of them. There w i l l be also an exploration of how Schutz's works are seen to be within the framework of sociology, which also serves to perpetuate s o c i o l o g i c a l discourse through the creation of a r t i c l e s that explain and use Schutz's works. This chapter w i l l explore some of the ways that the decision-making process of the creation of a r t i c l e s i s concealed. This l a s t area should be regarded not as an abnormal or deceptive p r a c t i c e , but as part of the normal p r a c t i c e of organizing thoughts into a coherent presentation. This work forms part of the taken-for-granted aspects of i n t e l l e c t u a l communication, and as such, I think i t has been a neglected area of s o c i o l o g i c a l s c rutiny. The following order of examination has been created through my own sense of what makes sense. I t represents my own thought develop-ment regarding a systematic presentation of the concepts under -42-i n v e s t i g a t i o n . A l t e r n a t i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s were considered, and a review of the order of presentation was an ongoing process i n the creation of the f i n a l decision. 2) Credentials The term 'credentials' i s being used i n two senses. F i r s t , I want to see how, i f at a l l , the authors of a r t i c l e s e x h i b i t a sense of t h e i r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s for w r i t i n g the a r t i c l e i n the f i r s t place; secondly, I want to see how the reviewers e s t a b l i s h the credentials of A l f r e d Schutz. a) Creating the reviewer's credentials In displaying t h e i r own c r e d e n t i a l s , how do they give the impression of expertise, of being seen as a 'legitimate' reviewer of the works of A l f r e d Schutz? I should mention that t h i s i s done, unobtrusively, and that we 'know' that t h i s i s the case since we use t h i s notion of expertise i n our everyday a c t i v i t y . For instance, when speaking of Schutz and h i s followers, writers such as Maurice Natanson, Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, Aron Gurwitsch, and Helmut Wagner come to mind. Thus, we have a sense of competency and authority. One of the ways by which t h i s reputation i s established i s through the p u b l i c a t i o n of a r t i c l e s . The a r t i c l e s themselves indicate accep-table knowledge of a c e r t a i n subject, since, presumably, they would not have been published had they displayed gross incompetence. Of course t h i s i s an assumption that sometimes proves f a l s e , but, nonetheless, reputations are made through t h i s method. -43-One of the hidden factors of t h i s aspect of the creation of credentials i s the s o c i a l organization involved i n the p u b l i c a t i o n of a r t i c l e s . What a r t i c l e s get accepted f o r publication? How are these decisions made? What types of a r t i c l e s get published i n which journals? Is there discrimation regarding subject matter; author; academic credentials such as place of graduation, present u n i v e r s i t y employment; and the academic networks that involve e d i t o r i a l boards as w e l l as other u n o f f i c i a l network connections? These questions, among others, focus on some of the problems involved i n researching a r t i c l e s as a means of exploring facets of sociology as a c u l t u r a l system. This very problem points to one facet of the academic enterprise: publications are co n t r o l l e d , but that c o n t r o l , although 'known', remains t a c i t knowledge that i s d i f f i c u l t to substantiate. Within the a r t i c l e s themselves are signposts leading to the impression of expertise. For instance, the writer may r e f e r to the extensive use that he/she has made of the author's works. This occurred p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the ea r l y reviews of Schutz's work. For example, Richard Zaner acknowledges, i n part, the following, The material f o r t h i s a r t i c l e has been taken mainly from the body of A l f r e d Schutz's work i n English, e s p e c i a l l y the following: "Choosing Among Projects of Action", i n Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (hereafter referred to as PPR), v o l . 12, no. 2 (December 1951) pp. 161-84; "Common-sense and S c i e n t i f i c Interpretation of Human Action", i n PPR, v o l . 14, no. 1 (September 1953) pp. 1-37; ... (Zaner, 1961: 71) - 4 4 -Several other a r t i c l e s are referred to i n t h i s footnote, denoting a f a m i l i a r i t y with Schutz's works. This type of l i s t i n g became unnecessary when many of Schutz's writings were incorporated into the Collected Papers s e r i e s . But t h i s did serve to show that the reviewer was well acquainted with the subject matter, which v i s i b l y adds to the impression of extensive knowledge i n the area. This form of c r e d e n t i a l creation exhibits some concepts of A l f r e d Schutz. The s o c i a l i z a t i o n process within academia demonstrates that the world of everyday a c t i v i t i e s of the enterprise become unquestioned p r a c t i c e s . In t h i s instance the taken-for-grantedness of the establishment of credentials i s a first-degree construct i n that the reviewer, i n t h i s case, Richard Zaner becomes not only an analyst of s o c i a l a c t i o n , but also an actor within the world of d a i l y l i f e . In t h i s way, the a c t i v i t i e s of academia can be studied as examples of Schutz's notions of the construction of a s o c i a l r e a l i t y . Thus, the a c t i v i t y of l i s t i n g a r t i c l e s becomes a demonstration of the concept of the paramount r e a l i t y at work, and involves the recognition of an in-group audience that w i l l acknowledge t h i s procedure as a legitimate, and perhaps, necessary part of c r e d e n t i a l creation. Another e a r l y method of e s t a b l i s h i n g authority was employed by Stonier and Bode: We are greatly indebted to Dr. Schutz who read our manuscript most c a r e f u l l y at one stage and corrected several mistakes of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and emphasis. I t must be - 4 5 -stressed, however, that our exposition i s not i n any sense a u t h o r i t a t i v e . (1937: 406n) In t h i s instance, the authors are accomplishing two in t e n t i o n s . F i r s t , they are grounding the source of t h e i r comments with the o r i g i n a l author. Secondly, they are i n d i c a t i n g the boundaries of t h e i r discourse. In so doing, Stonier and Bode are creating t h e i r credentials without s e t t i n g themselves as d e f i n i t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s . This allows f l e x i b i l i t y , yet also provides b e l i e v a b i l i t y f o r t h e i r account. This displays a modesty which i s appropriate within the academic d i s c i p l i n e and which, at the same time, allows a margin of error to be claimed by the reviewers. Robert Bierstedt creates i n d i r e c t credentials by r e f e r r i n g to secondary writers such as H. L. Van Breda and Maurice Natanson: One should pay a deserved t r i b u t e , f i r s t of a l l , to H. L. Van Breda, who o f f e r s a s e n s i t i v e preface i n which he writes a b r i e f biography of t h i s unusual sociologist....The next t r i b u t e belongs to Maurice Natanson, who was Schutz's student at the New School for S o c i a l Research. Professor Schutz's writings are not - l e t us admit i t - easy to grasp i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y . (1963: 116) This passage i s i n t e r e s t i n g f o r several reasons. The a r t i c l e i s mainly a book review, thus, acknowledgement of preface and introduction e x h i b i t knowledge of the book as a whole, rather than of j u s t a few chapters. B i e r s t e d t , by r e f e r r i n g to Van Breda and Natanson, and commenting on the q u a l i t y of t h e i r work, displays an appreciation of t h e i r knowledge about Schutz. By s t a t i n g that Natanson was Schutz's student, he i s giving Natanson credentials of h i s own, -46-which, by association i f he agrees with Natanson, w i l l further validate h i s own a r t i c l e . Bierstedt's l a s t comment i s very i n t e r e s t i n g . By admitting the d i f f i c u l t y of Schutz's writings, he i s suggesting two notions: that Natanson has dealt with these d i f f i c u l t i e s , and that, since he has also dealt with these d i f f i c u l t i e s , he i s i n a p o s i t i o n to sympathize with Natanson, and-,-therefore, can know and appreciate Natanson's "Introduction". This displays Schutz's concept of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . Bierstedt i s showing that there i s a world of shared meaning between himself and Natanson that he i s r e l y i n g on to create a background of legitimacy for h i s remarks. A further way of constructing credentials i s used by Bierstedt i n the following passage: As h i s followers know, Schutz was a l i f e - l o n g opponent of naturalism i n s o c i a l thought... (emphasis mine) (1963: 117) The phrase "as h i s followers know" implies that there i s a community of thought that 'knows' Schutz's works, and that Bierstedt i s part of that community by h i s awareness of the h i s t o r y within t h i s sector of academia. In t h i s way, he demonstrates h i s knowledge and competence. Maurice Natanson establishes h i s credentials i n a va r i e t y of ways. In one a r t i c l e he states, I must leave to others, less c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d with phenomenology than I am, the task of a c r i t i c a l evaluation of Schutz's work. (emphasis mine) (1966: 155) -47-This indicates such a close association with Schutz's ideas that he has to acknowledge the possible bias of h i s own evaluation, which displays an appropriate academic humility. This technique informs the reader that he/she i s dealing with a well-acquainted w r i t e r , that i s i f we believe the writer's point of view. The comment also alludes to what Schutz c a l l s the " s o c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of knowledge." This refers to the acknowledgement of a c e r t a i n group of scholars who are i i n the know'. In another a r t i c l e , Natanson includes: Author's Note - This a r t i c l e i s based on the A l f r e d Schutz Lecture of the American Ph i l o s o p h i c a l Association, presented on November 7, 1969, before the Graduate Faculty of the New School at the New School for S o c i a l Research. (1970: In) Although t h i s speaks for i t s e l f , I would l i k e to point out two q u a l i t i e s that add to the impact of t h i s statement. One, that i t gives credence to Natanson as an expert since i t i s a lecture devoted p a r t i c u l a r l y to A l f r e d Schutz, and, secondly, i t i s impressive because the audience was the Graduate Faculty of the New School for S o c i a l Research, which was the home of Schutz's work i n America. Knowledge of the implications of t h i s l a s t statement i s necessary to i n t e r p r e t the implications of the information that Natanson provides. Thus he i s again s t r e s s i n g the assumption that there i s an 'in-group' that w i l l grasp t h i s implication without a f u l l explanation. This demonstrates a 'Verstehen-like' understanding of the s i t u a t i o n . - 4 8 -In summary, there are diverse strategies that can be used to evoke and maintain the necessary impression of cr e d e n t i a l s . This i s an important, but subtle image management that enhances the p o s i t i v e reception of a reviewer's work. b) Creating Schutz's credentials The second type of c r e d e n t i a l construction involves the wr i t e r of the a r t i c l e providing credentials f o r the author with which he/ she i s dealing. Although t h i s seems to be done less frequently, I would l i k e to note a few examples that indicate some of the ways by which t h i s i s accomplished. In the introduction to h i s a r t i c l e , Aron Gurwitsch states, In these pages I propose to concentrate on a c e r t a i n group of problems that not only were of primary importance i n A l f r e d Schutz's thinking but also hold a c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n i n contemporary p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought, e s p e c i a l l y i n the work of Edmund Husserl and l a t e r authors who belong to what may be c a l l e d the phenomenological movement i n the broad sense of the term....In pointing out the o r i g i n a l i t y of Schutz's contributions i n t h i s area of thought I hope also to in d i c a t e , though perhaps i n a rather sketchy way, h i s p o s i t i o n within contemporary p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought. (1962: 50) This rather extensive quote i s important for disp l a y i n g several c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of cr e d e n t i a l creation. By l i n k i n g Schutz with Husserl and the phenomenological movement, Gurwitsch i s i n d i c a t i n g where, i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l m i l i e u , Schutz should be seen. Through Husserl, whose reputation i s assumed, Schutz i s placed among the i n f l u e n t i a l group of philosophers. This also points to Schutz's - 4 9 -i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y , which creates and adds to the importance of Schutz's writings as w e l l as a r t i c l e s about Schutz's ideas. This i s true e s p e c i a l l y i n the early 1960's when Schutz was not well known. Gurwitsch i s also exemplifying Schutz's concept of relevance i n choosing to place Schutz within the phenomenological movement. For Gurwitsch t h i s . i s the important perspective i n which to present Schutz's w r i t i n g s , which also points to the 'in-group' to which Gurwitsch belongs. Gurwitsch also alludes to Schutz's o r i g i n a l i t y and h i s place i n current philosophy i n the l a s t part of t h i s passage. This establishes Schutz as an important contemporary figure who i s contributing to the understanding of phenomenological philosophy, as opposed to merely r e i t e r a t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought. Thus, Schutz's credentials are extended beyond h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t alone; they become the foundation for an intensive and dynamic examination of h i s concepts. Maurice Natanson also constructs credentials f or Schutz i n h i s beginning remarks: It has taken American philosophers and s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s t h i r t y - f i v e years to catch up with the e a r l y work of A l f r e d Schutz....It i s c l e a r that the German e d i t i o n (of The Phenomenology  of the S o c i a l World) was cl o s e l y studied by  some of the ablest minds of the ' t h i r t i e s and ' f o r t i e s who were concerned with problems of the philosophy and methodology of the s o c i a l sciences. References to Schutz's book appear i n the writings of such thinkers as Jose Ortega y Gasset, Ludwig von Mises, Raymond Aron, and F e l i x Kaufmann. (emphasis mine) (1968: 217) This quote reveals two main notions: that Schutz has been -50-i n t e l l e c t u a l l y a c t i v e for more than three decades, and that he has made a s i g n i f i c a n t contribution to German scholarship, which has been ignored, through u n a v a i l a b i l i t y , by the American i n t e l l e c t u a l community. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to speculate the implications of these remarks for American scholars, but there i s a reprimand q u a l i t y to the comments. Nevertheless, Schutz's credentials are documented by t h i s information, and a world of meaning i s being created by t h i s a c t i v i t y . The i n t e l l e c t u a l community that i s being evoked i s evidence of Schutz's ideas on the s o c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of knowledge, both by r e f e r r i n g to the German scholars and by extending t h i s community to American academics. 3) Incorporating Schutz into Sociology One of the methods for creating credentials f or Schutz i s done by giving him a l i n k with the s o c i o l o g i c a l d i s c i p l i n e . Many secondary writers evoke s o c i o l o g i c a l predecessors such as Max Weber and George Herbert Mead. This accomplishes two actions: i t provides Schutz with a background conducive to e s t a b l i s h i n g him as a r i g h t f u l figure within sociology, and i t displays the appropriate h i s t o r i c a l knowledge of the reviewer. Thus, the c u l t u r a l competence of the reviewer i s demonstrated by both the knowledge of the h i s t o r y of sociology and the knowledge that t h i s i s an important aspect to v i s i b l y demonstrate wi t h i n the parameters of an a r t i c l e . This aspect of credential creation was most evident i n the e a r l i e r a r t i c l e s on Schutz. For example, Stonier and Bode, who wrote -51-i n 1937, develop the l i n k between Schutz and Weber as a fundamental grounding of t h e i r a r t i c l e : Dr. Schutz takes as h i s starting-point the  methodological writings of Max Weber and he t r i e s to develop further the system of analysis l a i d down by the l a t t e r more than a decade ago. (emphasis mine) (1937: 406) This statement indicates two developing themes: that Schutz based h i s writings on Weber, i n part, and that he went beyond Weber's p o s i t i o n . Stonier and Bode emphasize t h i s point further i n t h e i r discussion: But i n contrast to Weber Dr. Schutz poses  e x p l i c i t l y the problem how f a r i t i s possib l e , i n s c i e n t i f i c enquiry or i n ordinary s o c i a l l i f e , to interpret adequately the subjective meaning of other people's actions. (emphasis mine) (1937: 407) and, This i s the f i r s t attempt to analyse Weber's  basic problems i n terms of Husserl's theory  of time.... The book (Schutz's) begins with a  c r i t i c a l analysis of Weber's fundamental concepts i n Wirtschaft und Ge s e l l s c h a f t . (emphasis mine) (1937: 407) These quotes i n d i c a t e that Schutz uses Weber's work, but does not merely promote t h i s work, as suggested i n the?phrase " i n contrast to Weber". The reviewers also imply that Schutz goes beyond Weber by s t a t i n g that he "poses e x p l i c i t l y the problem. ..". This indicates that Schutz i s making a contribution to the i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse by providing a " c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s " of Weber's work and by using that -52-analysis as a s t a r t i n g point for h i s own ideas. In t h i s way, Stonier and Bode are supplying Schutz with a h i s t o r y within the d i s c i p l i n e of sociology, d i s p l a y i n g t h e i r own c u l t u r a l competence by showing t h e i r a b i l i t y to do t h i s , and creating a framework within which the reader i s to receive t h e i r a r t i c l e and the works of Schutz. At the same time, they are making use of Schutz's notion of t y p i f i c a t i o n . By l i n k i n g Schutz with Weber and Husserl they are drawing the reader's attention to overlapping concepts of the three w r i t e r s ' works. This creates a necessary atmosphere for the development of a sub-paradigm within the p h i l o s o p h i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise. By mentioning philosophers and s o c i o l o g i s t s , Stonier and Bode are demonstrating Schutz's idea of multiple r e a l i t i e s . Schutz's works can be seen as p h i l o s o p h i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l , depending on the perspectives one chooses. By noting the two d i s t i n c t d i s c i p l i n e s , I wish to stress two points: that there are s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences i n the conception of the two enterprises, and that the notion of multiple r e a l i t i e s i s at work i n our everyday i n t e l l e c t u a l l i v e s , as are other concepts of Schutz such as t y p i f i c a t i o n , i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , and paramount r e a l i t y . The incorporation of Schutz i n t o sociology continued i n the 1960's. Perhaps t h i s need began to diminish i n the 1970's since fewer references to s o c i o l o g i c a l h i s t o r i c a l figures were found i n these a r t i c l e s . One could speculate that t h i s was due to the increasing f a m i l i a r i t y of Schutz's works i n the 1970's, thus the necessity of -53-r e f e r r i n g to h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l foundations was reduced. The main reviewers mentioning Schutz's s o c i o l o g i c a l predecessors were Robert Bierstedt, Richard Zaner, Maurice Natanson, and Aron Gurwitsch. For example, Bierstedt notes, Now Schutz, of course, did not stand alone i n h i s preference f o r action over perception. F l o r i a n Znaniecki and Talcott Parsons too, to say nothing of  Max Weber, placed t h e i r s o c i o l o g i c a l theory fir m l y i n the context of action and r e s i s t e d the e f f o r t s of the behaviorists to exclude the subjective ... (emphasis mine) (1963: 117) This i s an exc e l l e n t demonstration of placing Schutz within the i n t e l l e c t u a l arena of the ' c e l e b r i t i e s ' of sociology. By in c l u d i n g the phrase "of course", Bierstedt i s giving Schutz a grounding i n the h i s t o r y of s o c i a l thought. Thus, Schutz's uniqueness does not l i e i n the topic i t s e l f , but contributes to that discussion of the subject. This passage also indicates the everyday use of Schutz's concepts of predecessors, contemporaries and the s o c i a l o r i g i n of knowledge. The knowledge that Schutz i s developing was grounded i n the works of previous and cb-existing scholars such as Weber, Parsons and Znaniecki. Richard Zaner includes i n h i s a r t i c l e a discussion of G. H. Mead's concepts of meanings and gestures. In t h i s context, he provides Schutz with a starting-point by i n d i c a t i n g that Schutz goes beyond t h i s point with the concept of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y : To be sure, Mead's p r i n c i p a l point i s w e l l taken: meanings and even new sets of objects of common sense a r i s e i n and because of the -54-social.-process., and e s p e c i a l l y the conversation of gestures. What i s at issue, however, i s the foundation of the s o c i a l process. Mead's response that i t i s communication...presupposes a more fundamental phenomenon: i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . (1961: 77-78) Zaner goes on to discuss Schutz's concept of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . In t h i s way, Zaner i s producing the continuity of thought within the s o c i o l o g i c a l d i s c i p l i n e , which, i n turn, gives Schutz a background and a l i n k to sociology. Thus, Zaner i s doing the work of producing academic credentials for Schutz, and contributing as an example of Schutz's notions of the s o c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of knowledge and the s o c i a l construction of r e a l i t y . The sense of h i s t o r y as being an important element i n the growth of i n t e l l e c t u a l thought i s alluded to by Gurwitsch and Natanson. As Gurwitsch notes: Since about the turn of the century, the problems rel a t e d to the p h i l o s o p h i c a l foundations of the s o c i a l or humane sciences-both t h e i r difference from the n a t u r a l sciences and t h e i r proper nature - have been much discussed by thinkers l i k e Windelband, Rickert, Max Weber, Simmel, and Dilthey. (1962: 71) This passage i s i n response to Schutz's discussion regarding the tasks and work of the s o c i a l sciences. It provides a framework of i n t e l l e c t u a l thought that gives Schutz's work grounding within the i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse. Natanson also alludes to t h i s aspect of Schutz's ideas: -55-In i t s h i s t o r i c a l focus, The Phenomenology  of the S o c i a l World i s an attempt to vindicate and deepen Max Weber's theory of s o c i a l action by providing f o r i t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l grounding which derives from some of the central ideas of Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson. (emphasis mine) (1968: 219) Schutz's "attempt to vindicate and deepen" Weber's thought by incorporating the ideas of Husserl and Bergson provides the impression of h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l breadth and depth through t h i s i n d i c a -t i o n by Natanson. Thus, Natanson provides the l i n k s l o r Schutz, between sociology and philosophy. This i n t e g r a t i o n complements Schutz's c r e d e n t i a l s as a scholar i n the academic community, and, again, demonstrates Schutz's conception of multiple r e a l i t i e s by inc l u d i n g members of the two d i s c i p l i n e s . These examples i n d i c a t e the methods used by reviewers to create an i n t e l l e c t u a l past f o r Schutz by evoking the well known and respected figures within the d i s c i p l i n e s of sociology and philosophy. This demonstrates the importance of di s p l a y i n g credentials both for the reviewer and f o r Schutz. I t creates a sense of belonging to the d i s c i p l i n e of sociology, and provides an important and necessary aspect of the production and maintenance of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse. Thus, c r e d e n t i a l establishment i s an important part of e x h i b i t i n g membership wit h i n a c u l t u r a l system. Reputation and expertise are constructed by the very presence of t h i s p r a c t i c e . This i s one method used to display c u l t u r a l competence i n that i t reveals a working knowledge of one of the rules of the game: presenting c r e d e n t i a l s . -56-4 ) Doing Interpretive work This section i s d i f f i c u l t to organize s i n c e x i t deals with many connected issues such as i n t e r p r e t i n g Schutz's writings, making Schutz's notions c l e a r e r , dealing with t r a n s l a t i o n problems, and, i n some ways, making Schutz make sense i n general. These ideas are interconnected, and i n some senses, overlapping; yet they are not synonymous with each other. Each deals with s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t d i f f i c u l t i e s , but i t must be kept i n mind that t h i s scheme of conceptualizations has been developed through my thinking and re-thinking about the various aspects of sociology as a c u l t u r a l system as shown through a r t i c l e s dealing with the works of Schutz. Having stated some of my organizational d i f f i c u l t i e s , I w i l l now proceed to present a, hopefully, coherent account of some of the ways i n which i n t e r p r e t i v e work i s revealed. The organization of t h i s section exemplifies Schutz's idea of 'our' world being s o c i a l l y constructed. My making sense of these ideas involves my stock of knowledge at hand i n the " v i v i d present" to use Schutz's term. This involves a decision-making process that i s done within the "here and now" of my experience. Thus, the process becomes a "common-sense construct" of the world of academia. These l a s t sentences demonstrate how Schutz's concepts are constantly employed i n our everyday l i f e , both i n the "natural a t t i t u d e " and/or " d i s i n t e r e s t e d observer" a t t i t u d e . a) Interpreting Schutz One of the reasons for creating credentials i s to validate the -57-ideas and comments that w i l l form the major part of an a r t i c l e . This includes the presentation of some of the ideas of the author that the reviewer i s discussing. Although t h i s happens generally, I w i l l be r e s t r i c t i n g t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p to Schutz's works and those of h i s reviewers. The presentation of Schutzian notions immediately presents d i f f i c u l t i e s . Does a w r i t e r use extensive quotes? Does paraphrasing s u f f i c i e n t l y separate the thoughts of the reviewer from those of Schutz? This i s one d i f f i c u l t y that was evident i n Chapter II of t h i s thesis. For instance, on page 18, I state: As a common-sense construct, i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i s a taken-for-granted phenomenon. We 'know' there are other human beings; we i n t e r a c t with them every day of our l i v e s . This quote i s based on Schutzian ideas, but how much of i t i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Schutz, and how much of i t i s Schutz's work? This problem becomes more pressing when the work i n question does not r e l y as heavily on Schutz's terminology. For example Stonier and Bode note, The chief methodological problem with which the s o c i a l sciences are faced i s the construction of adequate i d e a l types. In order to be adequate, i d e a l types must f u l f i l l two conditions. On the one hand they must s a t i s f y the rules of formal l o g i c . In other words no i d e a l type or system of i d e a l types may contain i n t e r n a l contradictions, and when the nature of the problem demands that the i d e a l type used s h a l l be changed or enlarged, t h i s must be made quite e x p l i c i t . (1937: 421-422) Ambiguities are created i n t h i s passage. There i s no i n d i c a t i o n of the o r i g i n of t h i s comment. Is t h i s mainly a Schutzian concept -58-or a comment of Stonier and Bode? I f i t i s paraphrasing Schutz, then i n t e r p r e t i v e d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e , since the meaning, of necessity, i s a l t e r e d . This produces d i f f i c u l t y for the reader of the a r t i c l e , since he/she has to decide whether i t i s Schutz's or Stonier's and Bode's work to which they are responding. This difference becomes more v i t a l i n cases such as the following: If the actor acts i n terms of meanings, of h i s d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n , these meanings are never, as far as the.social s c i e n t i s t i s concerned, d i r e c t l y observable. Yet the s c i e n t i s t must re f e r to these meanings i n order to account for the actions which he observes. The s c i e n t i s t observes things, actions, events to which he assigns objective meanings. (Hindess, 1972: 16) In t h i s passage, Hindess seems to be r e f e r r i n g to Schutz's concept, but i t remains unclear as to whether or not t h i s i s the case. I t may be read as Hindess's Schutz, but t h i s also complicates the issue. This i s not an unusual aspect of i n t e l l e c t u a l work, but i t does add to the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n dealing:with secondary sources. Interpretation becomes a convoluted enterprise of meaning construction i n v o l v i n g a guessing-game of who s a i d what. Thus, ambiguity i s an important, and, perhaps, i n e v i t a b l e feature of secondary source a r t i c l e s . This d i f f i c u l t y brings into focus Schutz's concept of subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of meaning. 'We' make sense of the works being read by p l a c i n g them within 'our' own framework of knowledge. Thus, the meanings that 'we', derive are 'our' inte r p r e t a t i o n s of works rather than some 'objective' state of knowledge. In t h i s sense 'we' are t r u l y constructing our world of meaning. -59-b) Re-Stating Schutz A necessary part of disseminating knowledge throughout a c u l t u r a l system such as sociology, i s having writers explain Schutz's notions. This i n t e r p r e t i v e technique i s based d i r e c t l y on Schutz's work by such introductory phrases as "according to Schutz", "Dr. Schutz i s concerned with", " i n Schutz's view", etc. This tends to conceal any i n t e r p r e t i n g that might be taking place. For example, As regards the present problem, •Schutz believes that appresentation provides the clue for understanding how the Other i s f i r s t constituted as such i n my experience. (emphasis mine) (Zaner, 1961: 79) and, According to Schutz, the pragmatic motive dominates our d a i l y l i f e i n the common-sense world. Hence, as long as the recipes permit us to obtain desired t y p i c a l r e s u l t s , they are unquestioningly applied and complied with; they are not put into question or doubt unless the r e s u l t s f a i l to m a t e r i a l i z e . (emphasis mine) (Gurwitsch, 1962: 57) This method of dealing with Schutz's notions performs three main functions: i t displays the author's f a m i l i a r i t y with Schutz; i t establishes a d i r e c t l i n k to Schutz by mentioning him; and i t provides the reader with an explanation of Schutz's idea. These are important aspects of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse. They enable concepts to be incorporated i n t o the culture of sociology by providing a place for the examination of the concepts through the various viewpoints of the reviewers involved. By r e - s t a t i n g Schutz i n t h e i r own language, they are providing d i f f e r e n t angles -60-of approach to Schutz's work. The reader must decide how to incorporate the a r t i c l e ' s discussion into t h e i r own cognitive map of the i n t e l l e c t u a l world, and into t h e i r own understanding of Schutz's work, which i s problematic, but i t also gives the reader a chance to explore various nuances of Schutz's work. In t h i s way, a dynamic exploration of i n t e l l e c t u a l ideas can occur. This, again, demonstrates Schutz's notion of the subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of meaning, which does not imply an i s o l a t i o n of understanding. On the contrary, the very explanation given i s p a r t l y performed to create a world of shared meaning. This concept i s not contradictory to that of the subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In t h e i r own way, both are attempting to create an 'in-group' where the understanding of ideas i s shared. c) Reviewer as Expert An important aspect of a r t i c l e s i s the presentation of the reviewer as an expert i n the area of his/her discussion. This i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n the maintenance, and perpetuation of an active c u l t u r a l system. Without the appearance of expertise, the sense of membership i s diminished. There are many ways to create the appearance of expertise. As mentioned previously, creating credentials i s one method. Another i s incorporated i n the multiple areas of i n t e r p r e t i v e work. For instance, i n the above quotes, by r e - s t a t i n g Schutz the.writers are creating the impression that they know Schutz's work well enough to -6 in-adequately paraphrase h i s ideas, which i m p l i c i t l y includes i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The following quote displays t h i s feature: However, fundamental to Schutz's view i s the fac t that whereas the world of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n s can be a product only of experiences-as-past, the universal basis f o r t h i s world i s the fact of our experience i n the mode of the duree: t h i s occurs every time we have an experience which Schutz c a l l s a "we-relationship". (Bregman, 1973: 197) This seems a f a i r l y straightforward statement regarding Schutz's ideas, but i t t a l s o t i e s these ideas together i n a way that d i f f e r s from Schutz, even at the basic l e v e l of creating a Bregman sentence as opposed to a Schutz sentence. Bregman i s dis p l a y i n g her c u l t u r a l competence by being able to p u l l Schutz's ideas together into a form that makes sense to the reader; at l e a s t to t h i s p a r t i c u l a r reader. As well as displaying her competence, a r t i c l e s such as t h i s allows the reader to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the development of understanding of Schutz's work, i n the sense that i f I think I understand what i s being said by the reviewer, then perhaps I understand Schutz's notion. Of course,I, too, am doing i n t e r p r e t i v e work when I read the a r t i c l e , which adds another degree of d i f f i c u l t y to the process, but i f a sense of understanding i s created, then one aspect of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse i s accomplished, namely the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e transmission of sense-making, which demonstrates the creation of a " s o c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of knowledge" i n Schutz's term, and adds to the development of a sub-paradigm within the d i s c i p l i n e . An i n t e r p r e t i v e feature of expertise i s incorporated i n the - 6 2 -notion of the w r i t e r defining what Schutz ' r e a l l y meant'. A var i e t y of s t y l e s i s used to present t h i s impression. For instance, i n the following quote, an a i r of knowledge and authority i s created through such phrases as " i t must be stressed", and " s t r i c t l y concerned": It must be stressed, f i r s t of a l l , that Schutz's analysis of the "meaning structures" of human experience and action i s the immanent d e s c r i p t i o n of s u b j e c t i v i t y p r i o r to the s c i e n t i f i c observer (the t h e o r e t i c a l a t t i t u d e ) . His discussion here i s  s t r i c t l y concerned with the actor's perspective of how he (the subject) himself makes his l i v e d experiences thematic or meaningful. (emphasis mine) (Okuda, 1976: 175) This type of statement presents Okuda as an able representative of Schutzian thought; as someone who understands the essence of-his subject matter, by h i s choice of 'relevant' issues and h i s " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of meaning", to use Schutz's term. This i s important i n an i n t e l l e c t u a l culture such as sociology, since the presentation of knowledge i s a major part of the continuation of t h i s d i s c i p l i n e , and others. Knowledge i n t h i s sense i s not synonymous with 'truth', but rather with 'opinion'. By making emphatic statements, though, the inference of 'truth' i s accomplished. For instance, Whatever i t i s that Schutz found , i t s foundations are not phenomenological. Furthermore, as the following sections  w i l l show, these foundations, and the basic project they involve, are incompatible  with Husserl's phenomenology. Thus, when Schutz c a l l s upon Husserl to do h i s turn, i t i s only the l a t t e r ' s words that are brought into play. Husserl's concepts cannot enter the space that Schutz provides f o r them, (emphasis mine) (Hindess, 1972: 8) This quote demonstrates the presentation of an opinion as ' f a c t ' . -63-By s t a t i n g that the "foundations are not phenomenological" and "are incompatible with Husserlis phenomenology", Hindess i s creating the impression of an uncontestable t r u t h . This p a r t i c u l a r t a c t i c i s an i n t e g r a l part of impression maintenance within the culture of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse. Such statements are seldom f u l l y accepted, but i t i s important that a writer displays t h i s type of firmness i n his/her work. The culture of sociology involves making statements and taking stands on issues, and the above passage demonstrates t h i s a b i l i t y . The creation and management of expertise can be accomplished by p r e f a c i n g remarks with q u a l i f i e r s such as "I think", "I submit", "I b e l i e v e " , etc. This has the dual advantage of separating the subsequent statements from the works of Schutz,. and i n d i c a t i n g to the reader that the w r i t e r i s well enough acquainted with Schutz's ideas that he/she can contribute his/her own thoughts to the discussion. This tends to elevate the w r i t e r from a mere reviewer to the p o s i t i o n of a contributor, which displays c u l t u r a l competence and promotes the a c t i v i t y of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse. For example, In my view, t h i s i s equivalent to saying that these elements are fundamental or c o n s t i t u t i v e properties of subjective experiences ... (emphasis mine) (Psathas, 1975: 511) and, With h i s concept of "stock of knowledge at hand" Schutz, I submit, made an important contribution toward further e l u c i d a t i n g our s p e c i f i c f a m i l i a r i t y with the world of d a i l y experience ...(emphasis mine) (Gurwitsch, 1962: 58) -64-These two quotes demonstrate the w r i t e r s ' p o s i t i o n regarding Schutz's work. In the f i r s t quote, Psathas i s i n t e r p r e t i n g Schutz by f i t t i n g Schutz's notion.into h i s own cognitive s t y l e , while simultaneously agreeing with Schutz's p o s i t i o n . Thus, he i s making Schutz make sense i n ways that were not captured by Schutz's o r i g i n a l statement. In the second quote, Gurwitsch i s making a clear statement of support for Schutz. This indicates both the i n t e l l e c t u a l paradigm that Gurwitsch sees Schutz as belonging to, and h i s own support of and membership i n that paradigm, thereby creating an 'in-group' that can i d e n t i f y with a c e r t a i n framework of conceptualization. Within t h i s framework an assumption of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e meaning can "take place that aids i n the development of the 'in-group' sense. Q u a l i f y i n g remarks can be used to maintain the impression of r a t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m that i s expected within the bounds of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse, for instance, There i s , I f e l t , some deadness i n the experience of reading these passages r_Schutz's passages chosen by WagnerJ. I did not f e e l confronted with a l i v i n g ' and changing thought, but rather that I was being shown around a somewhat l i f e l e s s museum. (Birksted, 1976: 407) This quote reveals a method of presenting a personal opinion within the confines of a book review. Although much of the review was favourable, Birksted did include c r i t i c i s m , but usually i t was presented i n the above manner, which q u a l i f i e d the remarks. This i s an example of Schutz's concept of "multiple r e a l i t i e s " at work i n the "mundane sphere" of everyday r e a l i t y . C r i t i c i s m within a favourable review does not represent inconsistency, but -rather displays the various perspectives that can be dealt with simultaneously within a review. More of t h i s form of presentation w i l l be seen i n the following section on debate as a p a r t i c u l a r device of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse. 5) Debate Debate within the d i s c i p l i n e of sociology creates a fundamental method of encouraging the discussion of opposing views, which perpetuates i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse. It allows a dynamic exchange of ideas within an acceptable format: a r t i c l e s i n jou r n a l s . Of course not every a r t i c l e ensures debate, but when t h i s occurs c e r t a i n presentational techniques are used to inform readers as to t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the debate, t h e i r professionalism and expertise, and t h e i r r a t i o n a l i t y governing t h e i r construction of t h e i r statement. In t h i s sense, the debate format perpetuates i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse, and creates tension within and between paradigms. This i s a necessary aspect of the culture of sociology, since part of i t s raison d'etre i s the discussion and argument of ideas. In t h i s sense debate i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of Schutz's notion of "relevance and meaning". It appears that within the debate format there are c e r t a i n 'rules of the game' which a i d i n the display of c u l t u r a l competence. The following i s a discussion of the 'rules' among which are praise f o r the author being reviewed, c r i t i c i s m of the works involved, and, sometimes, a p a r t i c u l a r format o u t l i n i n g the points under discussion. -66-This creates the impression of ' o b j e c t i v i t y ' , ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' , and 'academic s c r u t i n y ' . Whether or not t h i s i s a c t u a l l y accomplished depends, i n large part, on one's p a r t i c u l a r point of view, or paradigm. a) Praise & C r i t i c i s m There are at least two d i s t i n c t ways i n which praise f o r Schutz i s used. One, when the a r t i c l e i s generally p o s i t i v e towards Schutz, the other, when the o v e r a l l tenor of the a r t i c l e i s c r i t i c a l . The i n t e n t i o n of each i s d i f f e r e n t . In the f i r s t case, the comments are providing a constructive framework i n which the ideas of Schutz are to be seen, for instance, With h i s notion of "stock of knowledge at hand", his theory of the s o c i a l o r i g i n of that knowledge and his "general thesis of the r e c i p r o c i t y of perspectives" Schutz makes a most important  contribution toward the phenomenon of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . (emphasis mine) (Gurwitsch, '1962: 63) and, The career of Schutz was a unity devoted to an exploration of the true p h i l o s o p h i c a l grounds of s o c i a l r e a l i t y i n the i n t e n t i o n a l structure of human consciousness. Within that career, the Phenomenology (of the S o c i a l World) marks a major event i n the h i s t o r y of the philosophy and methodology of the s o c i a l sciences. (Natanson, 1968: 241) These passages acclaim the works of Schutz as important additions to the culture of academia. The language used signals the extent to which the reviewers regard these contributions. For example, "a most important contribution", "an exploration of the true p h i l o s o p h i c a l -67-grounds", and "a major event" denote the high esteem i n which the works are held. This type of review promotes not only the ideas of Schutz, but also the sub-culture s i g n i f i e d by such terms as "the followers of Schutz", and "Schutz's d i s c i p l e s " . These a r t i c l e s are the beginning of the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of in-group members: those who agree with the major notions and approach that i s being advocated, and who acknowledge the existence of a "world of shared meanings" that help to define the boundaries of the i n t e l l e c t u a l community to which they belong. Commendations f o r Schutz are also found i n a r t i c l e s that b a s i c a l l y disagree with Schutz's p o s i t i o n . In t h i s case, praise i s used to balance o f f the negative remarks contained within the a r t i c l e which i s also a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 'appropriate' book reviewing techniques. This i s a necessary action within the i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse, since i t presents the reviewer as a ' r a t i o n a l ' , 'objective', 'honest', and ' f a i r ' i n t e l l e c t u a l . This forms part of a t a c i t convention within the culture of sociology as w e l l as other academic d i s c i p l i n e s . Thus, i t becomes an i n t e g r a l part of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise. For instance, A l f r e d Schutz's phenomenological sociology represents the most consistent and consequential  attempt to give authentic p h i l o s o p h i c a l grounding to the s o c i a l sciences. Standing as i t does at the boundary between phenomenological philosophy and empirical s o c i a l science, Schutz's work raises  c r u c i a l questions f o r both d i s c i p l i n e s . (emphasis mine) (Peritore, 1975: 132) Compare t h i s statement to h i s "Conclusion": -68-However o r i g i n a l and l u c i d Schutz's systematic  sociology i s , i t f a i l s to s a t i s f y the p e r s i s t e n t  need of the s o c i a l sciences f o r rigorous p h i l o s o p h i c a l foundation i n an e i d e t i c science of the social....Although h i s s o l u t i o n to the  problem turns out to be no s o l u t i o n at a l l , he has indicated some ways i n which transcendental phenomenology can j u s t i f y i t s e l f by works and not by f a i t h alone. (emphasis mine) (Peritore, 1975: 140) These two quotes are very i n t e r e s t i n g i n revealing the tension created, within a c r i t i c a l a r t i c l e . I t seems that i t would be unacceptable f o r the reviewer to present an unrelentingly c r i t i c a l review. As a comparison, debate within the p o l i t i c a l arena would display a very d i f f e r e n t form. Severe and.open c r i t i c i s m i n i t s most vigorous form would be the appropriate mode df presentation. This i l l u s t r a t e s Schutz's concept of the "knowledge at hand" used to define the appropriate boundaries of a s i t u a t i o n , which takes place as a "common-sense construct" of the world of d a i l y l i f e . C u l t u r a l competence i s demonstrated by an a b i l i t y to temper the argument with acknowledgements of worth, which works i n two ways. I t preserves the impression of reasonableness on the part of the reviewer, and i t also j u s t i f i e s the time and e f f o r t taken to comment on the ideas of Schutz. Thus, Schutz must appear as a worthy opponent, since i t would degrade the reviewer to be dealing with an inconsequential work. This c o n f l i c t of presentation becomes part of the foundation f o r r e b u t t a l , as was done by Kazuhiko Okuda: -69-In a recent a r t i c l e . . . M r . Peritore advances the thesis that, i n s p i t e of h i s elaborate and "the  most consistent" attempt at a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  grounding of s o c i a l science methodology, Schutz's  sociology lacks, i n the end, a rigorous foundation... In t h i s b r i e f note, I wish to refute Peritore's thesis which e n t a i l s c e r t a i n glosses and misreading of both Husserl and Schutz ( t h i s i s , I think, due p a r t l y to leaving out Schutz's l a t e r works from Peritore's consideration i n h i s a r t i c l e ) . . . (emphasis mine) (1976: 174-175) Okuda took advantage of the d u a l i t y of Peritore's remarks to imply a confusion on Peritore's part. This implication i s used to point to, i n Okuda's opinion, Peritore's misinterpretation of the works under discussion. This type of r e f u t a t i o n ensures vigorous continuation of various interpretations of Schutz's work. I t i s an i n e v i t a b l e consequence of the academic enterprise, which constitutes the discussion and elaboration of idea paradigms. This includes the explanation by writers of 'what Schutz r e a l l y means', which forms the c e n t r a l core to i n t e r p r e t i v e work, as discussed above. This work i s also accomplished within the debate forum, as can be seen by the exchange between Okuda and P e r i t o r e , which demonstrates Schutz's notion of the "subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of meaning" since two quite d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s can.be derived from the same work. C r i t i c i s m of Schutz's foundational concepts, as demonstrated i n Peritore's a r t i c l e , i s often used to refute an i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n . C r i t i c i s m can also be used, constructively, i n the exploration and elaboration of ideas. This also serves a dual purpose, as did acclamation. I t informs the reader that Schutz i s -70-an important, but not perfect, figure i n academia, and i t also presents the reviewer as an 'honest', ' c r i t i c a l ' supporter of Schutz's notions. ' I n t e l l e c t u a l honesty' i s an important aspect of c u l t u r a l competence. C r i t i c i s m , i n t h i s sense, adds the dimension of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y and r e l i a b i l i t y to the reviewer's work, which adds to the creation of c r e d e n t i a l s . The following examples i l l u s t r a t e t h i s type of c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s : It would do the reputation of Schutz no service  i f we implied that h i s phenomenological approach  to sociology i s free of d i f f i c u l t i e s , or that he was always v i c t o r i o u s i n h i s jousts with the members • of opposing, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the p o s i t i v i s t i c schools, or even that he met with e n t i r e success i n h i s enterprise. (emphasis mine) (Bierstedt, 1963: 119) This quote demonstrates the recognition of the importance of presenting Schutz's work i n a c r i t i c a l l i g h t . I t shows that Bierstedt i s aware of t h i s aspect of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise, and of the importance of presenting himself as a cre d i t a b l e reviewer. This technique has two purposes: i t heightens Bierstedt's own c r e d i b i l i t y by displaying 'independent' and 'objective' evaluation of Schutz's work, and i t also provides him with a rationale for w r i t i n g the a r t i c l e . Maurice Natanson displays t h i s q u a l i t y i n h i s analysis of Schutz's work: I t i s not altogether c l e a r why Schutz r e s t r i c t s h i s transcendental glance to inner-time consciousness....It i s d i f f i c u l t to see how -71-t the question of the very p o s s i b i l i t y of the We-relationship can be given i t s f u l l weight within the r e s t r i c t i o n s Schutz imposes, (emphasis mine) (1968: 236) and, Set t i n g aside transcendental questions and  method also has serious implications for Schutz's conception of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y and h i s approach to an account of the ego's knowledge of h i s fellow-man. (emphasis mine) (1968: 237) Natanson i s providing a framework not only to create the necessary o b j e c t i v i t y , but also to enable h i s own thought development i n t h i s area to be exhibited. As a student of Schutz, i t may be important to e s t a b l i s h t h i s independence of thought to increase his reputation as a scholar i n h i s own r i g h t . This treatment of Schutz's ideas can only add to the depth and s i n c e r i t y of the paradigm. I t demonstrates an a b i l i t y to further the notions that Schutz,has outlined, thus, disseminating and perpetuating t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l system. At the same time, i t provides an example of the ways i n which the i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse i s accomplished. Natanson i s i l l u s t r a t i n g Schutz's concept of the " s o c i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of knowledge" by creating an a r t i c l e that draws on the works of Schutz and that adds to t h i s work, thereby constructing and disseminating knowledge that w i l l help to define the parameter of the s u b - d i s c i p l i n e to which he ascribes. b) Decision-making as an i n v i s i b l e process Throughout t h i s discussion, the decision-making aspects of the creation of a r t i c l e s has been a hidden process. I referred to t h i s -72-area of my own w r i t i n g i n the section on i n t e r p r e t i v e work. But I also think i t should be mentioned as an i n t e g r a l part of the construction of knowledge throughl.the presentation of a r t i c l e s . Natanson shows an awareness of t h i s phase of i n t e l l e c t u a l work i n r e f e r r i n g to Schutz's conceptualizations: Obviously, i t i s the author's right to circumscribe the province of h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n . (1968: 236) Circumscription and s e l e c t i o n are a necessary part of the work, and to the creation of a s o c i a l r e a l i t y . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the methods by which the boundaries of an a r t i c l e are made v i s i b l e , and also how other boundaries are simply assumed without any need for explanation. For example, boundaries are created by giving a short synopsis of the area of i n t e r e s t : This paper i s divided unevenly into three parts. The f i r s t and shortest section i s devoted to an exposition of a few central concepts i n Schutz's work. The second... to an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of some of Schutz's fundamental convictions....The f i n a l  p a r t . . . i s concerned with the fundamental theme of the modes of t y p i f i c a t i o n . (emphasis mine) (Natanson, 1970: 1-2) and, I w i l l i d e n t i f y several of the major topics of the four chapters published i n the Structures of the  Life-World, r a i s e some questions which may as yet be considered unanswered, and comment on the contribution of A l f r e d Schutz i n t h i s and h i s other works. (Psathas, 1975: 507) These outlines i n d i c a t e the knowledge that within the c u l t u r a l system i t i s advisable to e s t a b l i s h the parameters of the discussion, thus -73-incorporating Schutz's idea of the s e l e c t i o n of relevant and meaningful areas of knowledge as defined by the reviewer. This can be seen as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of c u l t u r a l competence on the part of the reviewers, since i t delimits his/her r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , which displays appropriate notions of boundary and boundary maintenance. However, the method of decision i s unclear. It does not seem to be a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of knowledge production that needs to be d i s t i n c t l y revealed, and, perhaps, cannot be f u l l y explicated. Referring back to my own problems on t h i s matter, I think that i t i s , perhaps, impossible to re t r i e v e those processes, as was discussed i n the "Introduction" to this t h e s i s . I do think, though, that closer attention should be given to our methods of deciding what we are presenting and how we are presenting i t . This would make ava i l a b l e to the reader some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n knowledge production. I t i s a tenuous process, and I think that t h i s aspect should be revealed more often. One could argue, I suppose, that one of the 'rules' of the d i s c i p l i n e i s to make these processes i n v i s i b l e to some extent. I f so, then I think that t h i s area of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse should come under closer scrutiny. Perhaps i t should be incorporated into the discourse, rather than be excluded from i t . This would allow the opportunity of understanding various processes that occur i n the construction of an a r t i c l e , and would also enable the reader to 'see' some of the c u l t u r a l l i n k s such as sub-paradigm a f f i l i a t i o n s that are incorporated i n t o the d i s c i p l i n e of sociology as an -74-everyday p r a c t i c e . This would reveal the " t y p i f i c a t i o n s " and " r e c i p r o c i t y of perspectives", to use Schutz's terms, that are at work i n the learning and p r a c t i c e of sociology. Thus the "world of shared meanings" would become a more v i s i b l e aspect of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise, which would reveal how the culture of sociology i s constructed and accomplished. -75-Concluding Remarks The work done i n t h i s thesis has been an attempt to incorporate and i l l u s t r a t e some facets of the d i s c i p l i n e . o f sociology such as the production and presentation of knowledge. The thesis i t s e l f i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s aspect of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise. I t demonstrates the use and construction of thought systems, and the creation of connections of ideas that were not developed i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r format before t h i s endeavor. For me, t h i s i s part of the everyday work of academia. The -production of knowledge i s part of our task within the d i s c i p l i n e , as i t i s with other academic enterprises. With t h i s i n mind I have developed a thesis centering around three issues: sociology as a c u l t u r a l system, the works of A l f r e d Schutz as an example of s o c i o l o g i c a l conceptualizations, and i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse as a primary facet of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enters p r i s e . The f i r s t chapter was mainly concerned with exploring some aspects of the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise. A c e n t r a l concept that helped me to create a focus f o r t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n was C l i f f o r d Geertz's concept of c u l t u r a l systems. By applying t h i s to sociology, I was able to 'see', i n Hanson's terminology, ways i n which sociology could be conceived of as a c u l t u r a l system. Barth's concept of boundaries was useful i n developing t h i s notion, and i n showing how sociology, as any other group, i d e n t i f i e s i t s members, and also how i t excludes others from membership. Sociology can be seen as - 7 6 -composing various sub-paradigms, to use Kuhn's term. In t h i s way, the diverse branches of the d i s c i p l i n e can be seen to e x i s t without an encompassing conformity. Thus the contradictory facets of any d i s c i p l i n e i s seen to be part of the aspect of the d i s c i p l i n e . The second chapter involved a presentation of some of Schutz's concepts i n c l u d i n g i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , everyday r e a l i t y , t y p i f i c a t i o n , Verstehen, and multiple r e a l i t i e s . This was done as an exploration of these concepts and as an introduction to the t h i r d chapter. The t h i r d chapter looked at i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse, as exemplified by a r t i c l e s as one of the main a c t i v i t i e s accomplished within the boundaries of the culture of sociology. These a r t i c l e s were chosen because t h e i r primary focus was a discussion of the works of A l f r e d Schutz. Such notions as w r i t i n g as a creating a c t i v i t y , the creation of c r e d e n t i a l s , doing i n t e r p r e t i v e work, and decision-making processes were discussed. The a r t i c l e s were seen as creating and perpetuating the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise through the concepts chosen and through the i n t e r p r e t i v e process inherent i n the production of a r t i c l e s . These works were also seen as examples of Schutz's concepts as presented i n Chapter I I . Therefore, the processes by which s o c i o l o g i c a l knowledge i s created and maintained was examined throughout t h i s chapter. One of the aims of t h i s thesis has been to reveal the possible r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse and the construction of knowledge. This has been done by providing a discussion of some aspects of the culture of sociology, and using that as a framework -77-within which the development of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse could be examined. The work of i n t e l l e c t u a l discourse was i l l u s t r a t e d by the presentation of some concepts of A l f r e d Schutz by myself, and then by an analysis of secondary sources dealing with Schutzian notions. Thus, t h i s thesis i s in t e g r a t i n g these parts of the d i s c i p l i n e of sociology from my perspective. It has been a creating a c t i v i t y that, f o r me, has been a s e n s i t i z i n g experience. It has heightened my awareness of the work that i s being done within the s o c i o l o g i c a l enterprise, and i t has focused my attention on my own p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the d i s c i p l i n e , i n that I am not merely a receiver of ready-made knowledge, but an active i n t e r p r e t e r of that knowledge. This dual aspect of the thesis embodies what could be seen as the primary theme of the work, namely, the accomplishment of the production of knowledge. In some sense, I think i t s success or f a i l u r e can only be assessed by the i n t e r p r e t i v e work done by the reader. For myself, I think i t has been a successful endeavour that has enabled me to explore and understand areas of the s o c i o l o g i c a l d i s c i p l i n e , that have been an i m p l i c i t part of my i n t e l l e c t u a l growth u n t i l the systematic i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the issues that have been developed i n t h i s t h e s i s . -78-Footnotes 1. In dealing with the notions of 'my' world, 'our' understanding, the world 'we' share, e t c . , there i s a l i n g u i s t i c d i f f i c u l t y i n v o l v i n g the separation of 'my', 'we', 'our' i n a conceptual sense, as opposed to the personal sense such as I think, my opinion, e t c . Schutz does not make a v i s i b l e d i s t i n c t i o n here, but f o r my purposes, I w i l l be using the conceptualizing terms i n quotes, for example, 'my' world i s a shared world. My personal comments w i l l be presented without any emphasis, such as I agree, or I think, etc. 2. An i n s i g h t f u l discussion of some of the problems inherent i n the creation and maintenance of second degree constructs within the boundaries of the s o c i a l sciences i s found i n Dr. E l v i Whittaker's paper e n t i t l e d "Explanations and R e a l i t i e s : The World of The Mainland Migrant to Hawaii". Unpublished manuscript, 1973. 3. For a discussion of some of the concepts found i n t h i s section, see Dr. Kenneth Stoddart's paper e n t i t l e d "The Presentation of Everyday L i f e : Strategies for 'Adequate Ethnography'". Unpublished manuscript, 1977. -79-BIBLIOGRAPHY Armstrong, Edward G. 1976 On phenomenology and s o c i o l o g i c a l theory. B r i t i s h Journal of Sociology 27(2): 251-254. Barth, Fredrik, e d i t o r 1969 Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The S o c i a l  Organization of C u l t u r a l Differences. London: George A l l e n & Unwin. Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann 1966 Best, Ron E. 1975 B i e r s t e d t , Robert 1963 Birksted, Ian K. 1976 Bregman, Lucy 1973 Empson, William The S o c i a l Construction of R e a l i t y : A Treatise  i n the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor Books. New d i r e c t i o n s i n s o c i o l o g i c a l theory? A c r i t i c a l note on phenomenological sociology and i t s antecedents. B r i t i s h Journal of Sociology 26: 133-143. The common sense world of A l f r e d Schutz. S o c i a l  Research 30(1): 116-121. Extended Review on.Alfred Schutz on Phenomenology  and S o c i a l Relations. E d i t o r Helmut R. Wagner. S o c i o l o g i c a l Review. New Series 24: 404-411. Growing older together: Temporality, mutuality, and performance i n the thought of A l f r e d Schutz and E r i k Erikson. Journal of Religion 53: 195-215. 1947 Seven Types of Ambiguity. London: New Directions Publishing Corporation. ( F i r s t published i n 1930). -80-BIBLIOGRAPHY cont'd Geertz, C l i f f o r d 1966 1975 Gorman, Robert A. 1975 Gurwitsch, Aron 1962 Religion as a c u l t u r a l system. In Anthropological  Approaches to the Study of Religion. Michael Banton, e d i t o r . London: Tavistock Publications, pp 1-46. Common sense as a c u l t u r a l system. The Antioch  Review 33(1): 5-26. A l f r e d Schutz - an exposition and critque. B r i t i s h Journal of Sociology 26: 1-19. The common-sense world as s o c i a l r e a l i t y : A discourse on A l f r e d Schutz. S o c i a l Research 29(1): 50-72. Hanson, Norwood Russell 1958 1969 Hindess, Barry 1972 Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962 Lovejoy, Arthur 0. 1960 Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the  Conceptual Foundations of Science. London: Cambridge University Press. Perception and Discovery: An Introduction to  S c i e n t i f i c Inquiry. San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper and Co. The 'phenomenological' sociology of A l f r e d Schutz. Economy and Society 1(1): 1-27. The Structure of S c i e n t i f i c Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Essays i n the History of Ideas. New York: Capricorn Books; G.P. Putnam's Sons. ( F i r s t published i n 1948) -81-BIBLIOGRAPHY cont 1d Martin, Richard J . 1974 Natanson, Maurice 1966 1968 1970 Okuda, Kazuhiko 1976 C u l t i c aspects of sociology: arspeculative essay. B r i t i s h Journal of Sociology 25: 15-31. The phenomenology of A l f r e d Schutz. Inquiry 9: 147-155. A l f r e d Schutz on s o c i a l r e a l i t y and s o c i a l science. S o c i a l Research 35(2): 217-244. Phenomenology and t y p i f i c a t i o n : A study i n the philosophy of A l f r e d Schutz. S o c i a l Research 37(1): 1-22. The s o c i a l phenomenology of A l f r e d Schutz. The American P o l i t i c a l Science Review 70(1): 175-180. P e r i t o r e , N. P a t r i c k 1975 Polanyi, Michael 1967 Psathas, George 1975 Schutz, A l f r e d 1962 1964 Some Problems i n A l f r e d Schutz's Phenomenological Methodology. American P o l i t i c a l Science Review 69(1): 132-140. The T a c i t Dimension. New York: Anchor Books, ( F i r s t published i n 1966) V i s i t i n g Schutz. Sociology 9: 507-513. Collected Papers I. The Problem of S o c i a l Reality, The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f . (Fourth unchanged e d i t i o n , 1973). Collected Papers I I . Studies i n S o c i a l Theory. The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f -82-BIBLIOGRAPHY cont'd 1970 Collected Papers I I I . Studies i n Phenomenological Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f . 1970 A l f r e d Schutz On Phenomenology and S o c i a l Relations. Edited with an Introduction by Helmut Wagner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Schutz, A l f r e d and Thomas Luckmann 1974 The Structures of the Life-World. London: Heinemann Educational Books. Stonier, A l f r e d and K a r l Bode 1937 A new approach to the methodology of the s o c i a l sciences. Economica n.s. 4: 406-424 Zaner, Richard M. 1961 Theory of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y : A l f r e d Schutz. S o c i a l Research 28(1): 71-93 

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