Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

The Theravāda Buddhist conceptual map of bondage and freedom Kreag, John Paul 1977

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1977_A8 K74.pdf [ 5.42MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0094093.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0094093-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0094093-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0094093-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0094093-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0094093-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0094093-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0094093-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0094093.ris

Full Text

THE THERAVADA BUDDHIST CONCEPTUAL MAP OF BONDAGE AND FREEDOM by JOHN PAUL KREAG .A., C a l i f o r n i a State University, F u l l e r t o n , 19 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Religious Studies We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May, 1977 John Paul Kreag, 1977 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumb ia , I ag ree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s tudy . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d tha t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i thout my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f VfltjjifftlS ^ j^t'^S The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date l/WUl 1, 1*111 i ABSTRACT T h i s paper i s an e x a m i n a t i o n of the Theravada B u d d h i s t c o n c e p t u a l map of bondage and freedom. I t a n a l y z e s i n d e t a i l the c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h cause the o c c u r r e n c e o f bondage and the c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y t o cause i t s n o n o c c u r r e n c e and the o c c u r r e n c e o f freedom. R e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s v i e w the human c o n d i t i o n as a s e r i o u s p r o b l e m and f i r m l y b e l i e v e i t can be r e s o l v e d . They f u n c c i o n i n p a r t by d r a w i n g c o n c e p t u a l maps wh i c h e x p l a i n "where" man i s and "where" he s h o u l d be h e a d i n g , i . e . , they p r o v i d e t h e i r a d h e r e n t s c o n c e p t u a l schemes or doc-t r i n a l p a t t e r n s w h i c h e x p l a i n the dichotomy o f problem and r e s o l u t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o Theravada B u d d h i s t d o c t r i n e , t h i s dichotomy i s spoken o f as "bondage" and "fre e d o m , " t e c h n i c a l l y termed samsara- and n i b b a n a - (San-s k r i t n i r v a n a - ) . Bondage r e s u l t s from two i n t e r r e l a t e d c o n d i t i o n s : (1) i g n o r a n c e , i . e . , i n a c c u r a t e knowledge of one's c a p a b i l i t i e s i n a s i t u a t i o n o r the l a c k o f s e l f - k n o w l e d g e , and i n a d e q u a t e awareness o f the f u l l n a t u r e o f the s i t u a t i o n , and (2) the l a c k o f s e l f - c o n t r o l . Because o f i g n o r a n c e man sees the w o r l d as s u b s t a n t i a l , e t e r n a l , and c a p a b l e o f p r o v i d i n g l a s t i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n . Man b e l i e v e s t h i s s u b j e c t i v e v i s i o n i s o b j e c -t i v e l y t r u e and thus e s t a b l i s h e s h i m s e l f i n disharmony t o r e a l i t y . I n Buddhism, n o t h i n g i s s u b s t a n t i a l , e t e r n a l , or s a t i s f a c t o r y . The l a c k of s e l f - c o n t r o l i s the i n a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l one's own a c t i o n s . I t r e f e r s t o one a t the mercy of h i s own h a b i t s . Freedom r e s u l t s from two i n t e r r e l a t e d c o n d i t i o n s : i n s i g h t and s e l f -c o n t r o l . I n s i g h t i s the o b j e c t i v e , c l e a r , d i r e c t , p e n e t r a t i v e knowledge of o n e s e l f and the w o r l d . S e l f - c o n t r o l i s c o m p l e t e m a s t e r y over one's i i a ctions, bodily, vocal, and mental. The heart of the paper i s the chapter t i t l e d The Epistemological  and Psychological Evaluation of Bondage and Freedom because bondage and freedom are explained i n those terms. Its body i s the introductory chap-ters which discuss the Theravadain conception of r e a l i t y and causation, conceptual mapping, and habitual behavior and i t s a n t i t h e s i s renunciation. This paper was written as i f i t ware to be read by a student of re-l i g i o u s studies. The topic i s at a l l times established within the confines of that f i e l d . The method of research consisted i n the study of o r i g i n a l Buddhist works, at times t r a n s l a t i n g myself, and i n the study of books and a r t i c l e s published by contemporary experts i n Buddhism. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION p. 1 CONCEPTUAL MAPPING p. 5 THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF REALITY p. 9 CAUSALITY (PATICCASAMUPPADA-) p. 12 UNSUBSTANTIALITY (ANATTAN-) p. 19 •THE CONCEPT OF THE MIDDLE WAY p. 24 HABITUAL BEHAVIOR (KAMMA-) AND RENUNCIATION (NEKKHAMMA-) p. 30 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF BONDAGE AND FREEDOM pp. 37-78 Consciousness or Discriminative Knowledge (Vinnana-) p. 37 Papan^a- and Sense-perception p. 41 M Nondifferentiation (Nippapanca-), Insight or Penetrative Knowledge (Panna-), and Freedom (Vimokkha-) p. 52 Knowledge and V i s i o n (Nanadassana-) p. 60 Two Truths i n Buddhism p. 64 CONCLUSION: NIBBANA- THE ANTITHESIS OF SAMSARA- p. 79 BIBLIOGRAPHY p. 88 i v ABBREVIATIONS D . . . Digha-nikaya M . .•. Ma j jhima-nikaya S . . . Samyutta-nikaya A . . . Afiguttara-nikaya Abhs . . . Abhidhammasangaha Atthas . . . A t t h a s a l i n i Dhs . . . Dhammasangani Vis . . . Visuddhimagga Compendium0 . . . Shwe Zan Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, London, 1972. Psychological A t t i t u d e 0 . . . Lama Anagarika Govinda, The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy, New York, 1971. BP . . . David J . Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy, Honolulu, 1976. C a u s a l i t y 0 . . . --, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Hono-l u l u , 1975. BE . . . G.P. Malakasekera, ed., Encylopaedia of Buddhism, v o l . I, Ceylon, 1961. Concept and R e a l i t y 0 . . . Nanananda, Concept and R e a l i t y in Early Buddhist Thought, Kandy, 1971. Presuppositions 0 . . . K a r l Potter, Presuppositions pf India's Philosophies, Westport,'1975. BPT . ... . James A. Santucci, A Dictionary of Buddhist P a l i Terms, F u l l e r t o n , 1971. ' * ' . _ • IPTB . . . --, The Importance of Psychology i n Theravada Buddhism, F u l l e r t o n , 1974. Emptiness 0 . . . Frederick Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, New York, 1967. 1 INTRODUCTION To begin, l e t ' s e s t a b l i s h the topic within the confines of r e l i g i o u s studies. Religious man may be regarded as one who sees the human condition .or e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n as a serious problem, firmly believes that this condition can be overcome, and regards i t s r e s o l u t i o n as his highest aspi-r a t i o n . ^  R e l i g i o n provides a means for overcoming the human condition i n two senses: " . . . 1) i t i s the power for achieving the transformation, i . e . , i t i s not only an idea or hope, but claims to be expressive of the very nature of r e a l i t y ; and 2) i t i s a p r a c t i c a l technique for achieving the transformation."' 1 To f a c i l i t a t e the transformation from problem to reso-l u t i o n , r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s draw conceptual maps to explain "where" man i s , "where" he should be heading, and "how" he i s to get there,, For our purpose, the dichotomy of problem and r e s o l u t i o n , or "where" man i s and "where" he should be heading, i s spoken of i n Theravada Buddhist^ t r a d i t i o n i n terms of "bondage" and "freedom,"^ t e c h n i c a l l y termed samsara- and nibbana-. Bondage (bandha-) ref e r s to inadequacies i n man's responses to chal-lenges which continually confront him, inadequacies which r e f l e c t his d i -lemma. "A challenge i s a f e l t tension in a s i t u a t i o n , " ^ i . e . , the mere awareness ("felt") of the d i s p a r i t y ("tension") between one's c a p a c i t i e s and his performance or expected performance i n a r e a l context ("in a s i t u -ation") . (Tension) implies one's f a i l u r e to control what he has the capacity to c o n t r o l , though one i s not usually c l e a r about one's capacities when one feels a tension. The d i s p a r i t y between possible and actual i s the source of discomfort, f r u s t r a t i o n , and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n - - t o greater or lesser decree depending on one's s e n s i t i v i t y , i.e.-, his awareness and involvement.6 This d i s p a r i t y , d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , d i s t r e s s , or dis-ease i s what Buddhism c a l l s dukkha-. It points n o t o n l y to the fact of bondage, but expresses 2 i t s felt-experience as well. Inadequacies occur as a re s u l t of two i n t e r r e l a t e d conditions: (1) the lack of s e l f - c o n t r o l and (2) ignorance, i . e . , both inaccurate know-ledge of one's c a p a b i l i t i e s in a s i t u a t i o n or the lack of self-knowledge, and inadequate awareness of the f u l l nature of the s i t u a t i o n . To succeed i n the a f f a i r s of the world requires the buil d i n g of habits on man's part, habits which enable him to overcome the obstacles which l i e i n the way of material success „ '. „ . These habits ^ . . c o n s t i -tute a source of bondage. For as one becomes more and more successful through the development of these habitual responses, he tends to be-come less and less capable of adjusting to fresh or unusual contingen-c i e s . Insofar as this hardening of habits does take place, one comes to be at the mercy of his habits, as he w i l l f i n d out to his dismay when a fresh or unusual s i t u a t i o n does occur. And to be at the mercy of one's habits i s to be out of control, that i s to say, i n bondage.7 Habits i n h i b i t man's a b i l i t y to respond successfully to a l l types of challenges because they compel man to act _by_ habit i n p a r t i c u l a r patterns which may or may not be appropriate to the challenge at hand. "In each case, a man of pe r f e c t l y good w i l l seeks success with respect to a challenge, and in each case f a i l s despite his best effort--even though he appears to have achieved his goal--because habits of mind and action are set up within him through his apparent success which, as i t develops, he is unable to c o n t r o l . " Habits or habitual behavior, known in Indian thought as karman- ( P a l i kamma-), continue a f t e r the conditions that engendered them have disappeared, i n turn to engender new habits. This round of habits breeding new habits is the continuum c a l l e d samsara-, the "Wheel of Rebirth" governed by kamma-. Man lacks the f l e x i b i l i t y to act appropriately and i n c i s i v e l y when contin-u a l l y conditioned by habits which pattern his behavior. His capacity to discriminate what he i s capable or incapable of performing and his power of awareness to adequately assess the s i t u a t i o n have become polluted by kamma-. This want of self-knowledge and awareness ( a v i ) j a - , "ignorance") i s iden-3 t i f i e d with kamma- as the cause of bondage. Complete freedom (vimutti-) is the ex t i n c t i o n (nibbana-) or nonoccur-rence of avi j j a - and kamma- and the occurrence of insight and s e l f - c o n t r o l . It is "freedom-from" the r e s t r i c t i o n s of ignorance and habitual behavior and "freedom-to" anticipate and control any event to which one directs his e f f o r t s . These two aspects are i n t e r r e l a t e d because i n order to master everything pertaining to oneself ( i . e . , freedom-to), which includes one's r e l a t i o n s with nature, with other people, and with himself, one must be in complete control of one's f a c u l t i e s , not at the mercy of forces beyond one's control ( i . e . , freedom-from). "Complete freedom (moksa) may now be explained as the stage where one is free to and free from with respect to every event that occurs i n his subsequent h i s t o r y , i . e . , every possible occurrence and nonoccurrence that q concerns him." In this way, the man who i s completely free i s no longer distressed (in dukkha-) when confronted by a challenge because ultimately a l l challenges have become inappropriate or ir r e l e v e n t to him. He i s with-out challenges and feels no tensions. Such a state coincides with spon-taneity, since he is free from the l i m i t a t i o n s or r e s t r i c t i o n s previously self-imposed and free to act successfully or at ease (sukha-), because he has become s e l f - c o n t r o l l e d and i n s i g h t f u l . No longer does he aimlessly wander (samsara-) through a world where his awareness i s inadequate, and he lacks self-knowledge and f u l l c o n t r o l . Notes •'•Non-religious man may be regarded as one who (1) sees no dilemma or considers i t as inconsequential, or (2) who sees the dilemma and regards i t as serious, but i s ske p t i c a l that there i s a solution or that he can achieve c e r t a i n hoped-for r e s u l t s , or (3) one who no longer needs r e l i g i o n because he has transcended the s i t u a t i o n . 4 ^Empt i n e s s 0 , p. 156. •^Theravada Buddhism, the "School of the Elders," i . e . , orthodox Bud-dhism, is a l i v i n g t r a d i t i o n present today i n S r i Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Chittagong in Bangal Desh. Its written authority i s the P a l i Canon or T i p i t a k a ("Three Baskets"), v i z . , the Vinaya-Pitaka, Sutta-Pitaka, and Ahhidh amma-Pitaka, plus several p r i n c i p a l noncanonical works, e.g., the Malindapahha, Visuddlviiiiagga, A t t h a s a l i n i , and Abhldhamma-sangaha. ^In his book Presuppositions 0, Karl Potter discusses at lenght the notions of bondage and freedom as developed by the various schools of Tndian philosophy. The following discussion on bondage and freedom c l o s e l y follows Potter's analysis (see pp. 1-55 and 93-79), an analysis I f e e l i s extremely h e l p f u l i n grasping these two c e n t r a l conceptions. 5 I b i d . , p. 26. 6 I b i d . , p. 27. 7 I b i d . , pp. .11-12. 8 lb i d . , p. 12. 9 lb i d . , p. 49. 5 CONCEPTUAL. MAPPING Buddhism draws c o n c e p t u a l maps r e g a r d i n g the n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y and the rouCe c o n d u c i v e to complete freedom, because (1) they s e r v e as c o n v e n i e n t a i d s w h i c h ..assess the s i t u a t i o n , i . e . , p r o j e c t judgments about the c o n d i -t i o n s w h i c h cause the dilemma and the c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y t o overcome i t , and (2) they p r o v i d e g u i d a n c e , i . e . , o u t l i n e a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n o r d i s c i p -l i n e w hich s e r v e s as a means t o a c h i e v e c e r t a i n h o p e d - f o r r e s u l t s . Buddhism draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between " n o b l e " and " n o r m a l " somewhat s i m i l a r t o E l i a d e ' s paradigm o f " s a c r e d " and "profane."-' What i s normal o r o r d i n a r y i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the human c o n d i t i o n o f i n c o m p l e t e n e s s and f r u s t r a t i o n ( i . e . , s a msara-). The a r a h a n t - ("noble one") denotes one who has t r a n s c e n d e d h i s s e l f - i m p o s e d l i m i t a t i o n s and who has f u l l y r e a l i z e d h i s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ( i . e . , n i b b a n a - ) . The purpose o f Buddhism, f o r t h a t m a t t e r a l l r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s , i s " t o p r o v i d e a means t o c o r r e c t an e x p e r i e n c e d d e f i c i e n c y i n human e x i s t e n c e , a r a d i c a l l y s a l u t a r y power by whi c h man i s saved from h i m s e l f . " z To f a c i l -i t a t e the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n from n o r m a l i t y to n o b i l i t y , Buddhism p r o v i d e s i t s a d h e r e n t s w i t h a c o n c e p t u a l map or scheme, i . e . , d o c t r i n a l p a t t e r n s , to c l a r i f y the b a s i s o f man's f e l t - e x p e r i e n c e o f d i s p a r i t y , whereby he can b e g i n to r e c t i f y h i s s i t u a t i o n t h r o u g h r e c o n s i d e r e d v i e w s , a commitment t o purpose , and a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n s . The c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a c o n c e p t u a l map or scheme, one whi c h c l a r i f i e s the n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y and man's p o s i t i o n i n i t so t h a t he may p l o t a r o u t e to c o mplete freedom, i s ana l o g o u s t o a geographer p r o j e c t i n g a round w o r l d onto a f l a t map.^ Under these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e r e i s no s i n g l e p r o j e c t i o n which would not be d i s t o r t e d , i . e . , w h i c h does not n e g l e c t some f e a t u r e 6 which may be r e f l e c t e d i n another projection. However, to get on with the task of map-making, the geographer has to make do with his projection for whatever purpose the map i s intended. It i s the purpose that provides the c r i t e r i o n of relevance for mapping. It endows with value c e r t a i n d i s t i n c -tions and renders others n e g l i g i b l e as long as that purpose is paramount. One of the reasons why the Buddha was not interested i n discussing meta-physical questions, for instance,was because " i t was not u s e f u l , not re l a t e d to the fundamentals of r e l i g i o n , and not conducive to revulsion, dispassion, cessation, peace, higher knowledge, r e a l i z a t i o n and Nirvana."^ S i m i l a r l y , just as the geographer's f l a t map i s a d i s t o r t e d p r o j e c t i o n of a round world, so too i s the character of any conceptual map or scheme which attempts to express absolute truth into a r e l a t i v e c r i t e r i o n of judg-ments. The d i s c i p l e should recognize three things regarding the nature of conceptual schemes or d o c t r i n a l patterns: (1) they translate r e a l i t y into conventional modes of expression which can be apprehended by the "normal" person; (2) they are symbolic structures which f a c i l i t a t e transcendence. . . . the symbol not only makes the world "open" but also helps r e l i -gious man to a t t a i n to the uni v e r s a l . For i t i s through symbols that man finds his way out of his p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n and "opens himself" to the general and the u n i v e r s a l . Symbols awaken i n d i v i d u a l experience and transmute i t into s p i r i t u a l act, into . . . comprehension of the world.^ And (3), since they are d i s t o r t e d r e f l e c t i o n s of r e a l i t y , one should never' c l i n g to them as i f they t r u l l y r e f l e c t e d r e a l i t y . "I preach you a dhamma comparable to a r a f t for the sake of crossing over and not for the sake of c l i n g i n g to i t . . . ."° The awareness of this inherent i n s u f f i c i e n c y coupled with the necessity for mapping i s i n t e g r a l to symbolic knowledge. Buddhist dhamma-7 ("doc-tine") should be understood as a-convenient means to apprehend and organize 7 the stream of human existence into meaningful symbolic structures; struc-tures which f a c i l i t a t e the transformation from normality to n o b i l i t y . In summary, conceptual maps of r e a l i t y and man's po s i t i o n i n i t are necessary to Buddhism as a r e l i g i o n , because (1) they adequately assess the s i t u a t i o n i n terms that can be understood; (2) they provide an acces-s i b l e route to overcome the human condition of bondage, i n this case, a provision which dissipates the doubts and fears of skepticism and fatalism, i . e . , . . on the one hand, the fear that nothing one can do can bring about hoped-for r e s u l t s , and on the other, the fear that nothing one can do can a l t e r what i s bound to occur." ; and (3) they epitomize an ide a l for man to concern and commit himself to. The i d e a l or ultimate concern i n Buddhism is complete freedom (vimutti- or vimokkha-) equal to nibbana-Tlie Buddhist, as with a l l r e l i g i o u s men, must recognize the inherent problems of expressing ultimate truth i n conventional-relational terms. It is the e s s e n t i a l recognition that a l l conceptual maps or schemes are necessary for the sake of transformation, yet are only limited expressions of r e a l i t y and man's po s i t i o n i n i t ; l i mited, but adequate for mapping pur-poses. In this way, Buddhist dhamma-, as symbolic conceptual structures, beckons i t s adherents to gain that knowledge which exceeds a l l l i m i t a t i o n s , which can never be reduced to human thought structures, and which is equal to ultimate truth No te s •'•See Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, New York, 1959. Thera-vlda Buddhism wouldn't, however, concern i t s e l f with any metaphysical con-siderations which the terms "sacred" and "profane" might imply. 2Emptiness 0, p. 173. The analogy and analysis f o l l o w 1 s Presuppositions 0, pp. 29-30. 8 ^M.1:431., t r a n s , by J a y a t i l l e k e , E a r l y B u d d h i s t 0 , p. 357. Ten t h e s e s were i n c i r c u l a t i o n a t the time of: the Buddha. R e g a r d i n g t h e s e t e n the Buddha r e f u s e d t o e x p r e s s an o p i n i o n , v i z . : 1) the w o r l d i s e t e r n a l , 2) the w o r l d i s not e t e r n a l , 3) the w o r l d i s f i n i t e , 4) the w o r l d i s i n f i n i t e , 5), the s o u l i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h the body, 6) the s o u l i s d i f f e r e n t from the body, 7) the T a t h a g a t a ("Thus-gone") e x i s t s a f t e r d e a t h , 8) the T a t h a g a t a does not e x i s t a f t e r d e a t h , 9) the T a t h a g a t a does and does not e x i s t a f t e r d e a t h , and 10) the T a t h a g a t a n e i t h e r e x i s t s nor does not e x i s t a f t e r d e a t h . These te n t h e s e s were not r e g a r d e d as p r a g m a t i c o r " g o a l " o r i e n t e d by the Buddha. K.g., " t h e p a r a b l e o f the arrow o c c u r s i n r e f e r e n c e t o the a v y a k a t a - t h e s e s and the g i s t o f i t i s t h a t a man s t r u c k w i t h a p o i s o n e d a r r o w s h o u l d be con-c e r n e d w i t h removing the a r r o w and g e t t i n g w e l l r a t h e r than be i n t e r e s t e d i n p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l q u e s t i o n s (about the n a t u r e o f the ar r o w , who sh o t i t , e t c . ) , w h i c h have no p r a c t i c a l u t i l i t y . The m o r a l i s t h a t man s h o u l d o n l y be i n t e r e s t e d i n t r u t h s w h i c h have a p r a c t i c a l b e a r i n g on h i s l i f e . " From E a r l y B u d d h i s t 0 , p. 357. ^ E l i a d e , The S a c r e d and the P r o f a n e , p. 211. 6M. 1:134, t r a n s , by J a y a t i l l e k e , Early_ B u d d h i s t 0 , p. 357. 7 F o r the m a n i f o l d meanings o f the term dhamma- see Magdalene and W i l -helm G e i g e r , P a l i Dhamma, V e r n e h m l i c h i n der K a n o n i s c h e n L i t e r a t u r , M unich, 1920. ^ P r e s u p p o s i t i o n s 0 , p. 23. . 9 S e e F r e d e r i c k S t r e n g , "The Pro b l e m o f S y m b o l i c S t r u c t u r e s i n R e l i g i o u s A p p r e h e n s i o n , " H i s t o r y o f R e l i g i o n s , IV, N o . l (Summer, 1964), pp. 126-53. 9 THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF REALITY Buddhism draws a conceptual map of r e a l i t y to explain the conditions which cause bondage (bandha-) and the conditions necessary to achieve free-dom (vimutti-). This map projects three judgments regarding the character of the world: A l l conditioned things are A l l conditioned things are A l l phenomena (both mental Impermanence (anicca-) i s the nonenduring c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a l l causally conditioned things (samkhara). Herein, the f i v e aggregates are impermanent. Why? Because they r i s e and f a l l and change, or because of. t h e i r non-existence a f t e r having been,, Rise and f a l l and change are the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of impermanence; or mode a l t e r a t i o n , i n other words non-existence a f t e r having been (i s the c h a r c t e r i s t i c of impermanence).3 Impermanent indeed are conditioned things, A r i s i n g and passing away, that i s t h e i r nature; Having come into being they cease to e x i s t , Their p a c i f i c a t i o n i s b l i s s . 4 Impermanence i s a synonym for " a r i s i n g and passing away," " b i r t h and des-t r u c t i o n , " to which a l l conditioned things are subject. If a l l things are impermanent, then i t stands to reason that there i s no "thing" which i s s u b s t a n t i a l . Unsubstantiality (anattan-, l i t e r a l l y "no-s e l f or soul") means that a thing cannot e x i s t - i n - i t s e l f (sabhava-), i„e., as an independent, enduring entity,, "In essence, anattan r e f e r s to the negation of a s t a t i c i z e d or permanent underlying substance that makes a thing what i t i s . In other words, there i s no 'thing' that completes the sum of i t s parts, no l a s t i n g substance that can be pointed to as being iden-t i f i e d with the name i t i s called."-' anicca-dukkha-„ and physical) are anattan-. If the nature of a l l causally conditioned things i s both and u n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y , i t would follow that the man who craves impermanence for eternal 10 or permanent, (nicea-) happiness and hopes to derive such happiness from things which are themselves impermanent as well as unsubstantial w i l l i n due course f a l l short of his expectation of l a s t i n g happiness, because the s a t i s f a c t i o n derived from things impermanent and unsubstantial would surely be of a temporary nature. The consequence of an u n s a t i s f i e d expectation i s su f f e r i n g (dukkha-). The things from which he endeavors to derive s a t i s -f a c t i o n (sukha-, "ease") are ultimately unsatisfactory (dukkha-, "dis-ease"). Suffering i s partly due to one 1s attachment to things that are themselves unsatisfactory, or, to crave for "ease" from things that are in r e a l i t y " d i s -ease" breeds only "dis-ease" in return. The nature of the human condition i s such that our subjective under-standing of r e a l i t y doesn't correspond o b j e c t i v e l y (tathata-) to the way • things are, chough we c l i n g i n thought and action as i f f t does. Thus man psychologically sets himself in disharmony (dukkha-) to r e a l i t y "as i t r e a l l y i s " (yathabhuta). Disharmony r e f l e c t s the inadequacies (p. 1) which represent the human condition of bondage. Because o f these, man i s unable to a n t i c i p a t e and control events which concern him. The d i s p a r i t y or ten-sion which occurs when one f a i l s to control what he has the capacity to con-t r o l is also dukkha-. .Dukkha- not only refers to the human condition of disharmony, disjointedness, or d i s e q u i l i b r i u m to r e a l i t y "as i t r e a l l y is" and incompleteness when one's potentials are unrealized, but expresses the felt-experience of those e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n s as well. According to Buddhist analysis, what we conventionally term "human be-ing" i s a- conditioned phenomenon, a compounded unit composed of f i v e aggre-gates. He is impermanent, unsubstantial, and as such unsatisfactory, l i a b l e to dis-ease. He i s conditioned by attachment (upadana-) and ignorance (a-v i j j a -) which continually generates compulsive behavior (kamma-) and which, 11 i n t u r n , r e g e n t e r a t e s a t t a c h m e n t and i g n o r a n c e anew. T h i s c y c l e s o f c o n d i -t i o n a l r e g e n e r a t i o n i s e q u a l t o samsara-, the "Wheel o f R e b i r t h , " governed by one's kamma -., e x p e r i e n c e d as dukkha-, and w h i c h b i n d s us t o the c o n t i n u -um o f " r e b i r t h , a g e i n g , d y i n g , s o r r o w , l a m e n t a t i o n , b o d i l y p a i n , m e n t a l g r i e f , and d e s p a i r . " That too i s dukkha-. A what, brothers., i s the Noble T r u t h C o n c e r n i n g Dukkha-? B i r t h i s dukkha-, a l s o a g e i n g and d y i n g , a l s o s o r r o w , l a m e n t a t i o n , b o d i l y p a i n , m e n t a l g r i e f , and d e s p a i r a r e dukkha-. A l s o , what one d e s i r e s , but does not o b t a i n , t h a t t o o i s d_ukkha-. I n b r i e f , the f i v e a g g r e g a t e s o f c l i n g i n g a r e dukkha-. Notes ^•Dhamma pa da XX, 5-7. I n t h i s p assage, I t r a n s l a t e d dhamma- as "phenom-ena." The term d e f i n e d i n t h i s way i s d i s c u s s e d by D a v i d K a l u p a h a n a , C a u s a l -ity°, pp. 67-88. On pp. 84 & 85 he d i s c u s s e s dhamma-in r e l a t i o n w i t h sam-k h a r a ' s . ^The f i v e a g g r e g a t e s (khandha-) c o n s i s t i n g o f a g g r e g a t e s o f m a t e r i a l i t y and m e n t a l i t y (namarupa-) compose what we know as the human p e r s o n a l i t y . E v e r y t h i n g i s composed o f e i t h e r elements or m a t e r i a l i t y or m e n t a l i t y or b o t h i n v a r i o u s c o m b i n a t i o n s . o A/ ^ V i s . 2 1 : 6 , t r a n s , by N yanamoli. A l s o see V i s . 8 : 2 3 4 . 4D.2:157. 5BPT, pp. 6-7. 6M.3:249. A c c o r d i n g t o V i s . ( P T S ) , p. 499, the c o n c e p t i o n o f dukkha-may be c o n c e i v e d of as t h r e e f o l d : (1) dukkha- as o r d i n a r y s u f f e r i n g (dukkha-d u k k h a - ) , i . e . , " b i r t h a g e i n g , d y i n g , s o r r o w , l a m e n t a t i o n , b o d i l y p a i n , men-t a l g r i e f , and d e s p a i r ; " (2) dukkha- as a consequence of change o r t r a n s -f o r m a t i o n ( v i p a r i n a m a - d u k k h a - ) , i . e . , "what one d e s i r e s but does not o b t a i n ; " and (3) dukkha- as c o n d i t i o n e d phenomena (samkhara-dukkha-), i . e . , " t h e f i v e a g g r e g a t e s of c l i n g i n g . " F o r an a n a l y s i s o f t h e s e see S a c c a - v i b h a n g a - s u t t a or V i s . 1 6 : 3 2 - 6 0 . 12 CAUSALITY (PATICCASAMUPPADA-) The c o n c e r n to u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e o f c a u s a l i t y i s the c o n c e r n t o u n d e r s t a n d the c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h cause the o c c u r r e n c e of bondage and the c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to cause i t s n o n o c c u r r e n c e and the o c c u r r e n c e of freedom. A man. i s " f r e e " i f he i s a b l e to b r i n g about the o c c u r r e n c e and n o n o c c u r r e n c e o f any event about which he i s c o n c e r n e d ; and by the n a t u r a l e x t e n s i o n of the term, the o c c u r r e n c e or n o n o c c u r r e n c e i s " f r e e " because i t s c a u s a l agent i s f r e e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h a t o c c u r r e n c e or non-o c c u r r e n c e . The r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h i s scheme a r e d e t e r m i n e d by the n a t u r e o f freedom-to and freedom-from, i . e . , by the c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h cause the o c c u r r e n c e o f f r e e e v e n t s . F i r s t , t h e r e i s the r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t i n o r d e r f o r the o c c u r r e n c e or n o n o c c u r r e n c e of an event to be c a l l e d " f r e e , " i t - m u s t have a t l e a s t one n e c e s s a r y or one s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n . T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t I c a l l the r e q u i r e m e n t o f " f r e e d o m - t o . " I f an o c c u r -r e n c e does not have a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n then t h e r e i s no way f o r any-one t o a v o i d i t , f o r to a v o i d an o c c u r r e n c e one must see t o i t t h a t a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r the o c c u r r e n c e does not o c c u r . And i f an o c c u r -rence does not have any s u f f i c i e n t - c o n d i t i o n , t h e r e i s no way f o r us to e f f e c t i t , i . e . , t o see to i t t h a t i t o c c u r s , f o r t o be a b l e to see to i t t h a t an event o c c u r s presupposes t h a t t h e r e i s a s u f f i c i e n t c o n -d i t i o n f o r t h a t event the o c c u r r e n c e of w h i c h w i l l b r i n g about the event i n q u e s t i o n . ! S e c o n d l y , t h e r e i s the r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t i n o r d e r f o r an e v e n t t o be c a l l e d " f r e e , " the n e c e s s a r y or s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n o f t h a t o c c u r r e n c e o r n o n o c c u r r e n c e must be i n the a g e n t ' s c o n t r o l as w e l l . I - c a l l t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t the r e q u i r e m e n t of "freedom-from." I t i s not m e r e l y a n o t h e r way o f d e s c r i b i n g f r e e d o m - t o ; r a t h e r i t presupposes freedom-to but exceeds the former r e q u i r e m e n t . . . . Freedom-from says " p r o v i d i n g t h e r e i s freedom-to, then a t l e a s t one n e c e s s a r y o r one s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n o f a f r e e event must be i n someone's c o n t r o l , i . e . , such t h a t he c o u l d have done o t h e r w i s e . " 2 T h e r e f o r e , f o r the B u d d h i s t to u n d e r s t a n d the c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h cause 13 the occurrence of bondage and the conditions which bring about i t s nonoccur-rence and the occurrence of freedom, presupposes an understanding of the nature of causal patterns, e s p e c i a l l y those which make up the sequence of events which pertain to his ultimate concern for complete freedom. The map which projects the nature of c a u s a l i t y must allow for the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l f - c o n t r o l and i n s i g h t , and must steer a course clear of skepticism and fatalism. . . . (It must) on the one hand be loose enough to allow.for freedom-from, to allow us to enter into events as causal agents, and thus to insure that we are not at the mercy of forces beyond out c o n t r o l ; never-theless, i t must not be so loose that the events we care about, those events which enter into the types of sequence through which we may hope to move toward freedom, are i r r e g u l a r l y related, unpredictable, and chaotic in t h e i r pattern. We must be able to count on the recurrence of c e r t a i n sequences, but at the same time we must have confidence that our decisions and deliberate actions influence events s i g n i f i c a n t l y . 3 To s a t i s f y the above requirements and the judgments projected regard-ing the nature of things (dhammata-), the Buddha i n his "Discourse on Causal Relations'"^ mentions four c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of causation: (1) o b j e c t i v i t y (ta-thata-), (2) necessity (avitathata-), (3) i n v a r i a b i l i t y (anafTnathata-), and (A) c o n d i t i o n a l i t y (idappaccayata-). The f i r s t emphasizes the o b j e c t i v i t y of the causal r e l a t i o n . It was, in fact, intended to refute the claim of some i d e a l i s t philosophers who belonged to the Upanisadic t r a d i t i o n and who maintained that change, and therefore causation, are mere matters of words, nothing but names . . . they are mental fab r i c a t i o n s having no objective r e a l i t y . For. the Buddha causation was as r e a l as anything else . . . . The second and t h i r d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , "necessity" (avitathata) and " i n -v a r i a b i l i t y " (ananffathata), stress the lack of exception or the exis-tence of r e g u l a r i t y . The fact that a c e r t a i n set of conditions gives r i s e to a c e r t a i n e f f e c t and not to something completely d i f f e r e n t , i s one of the basic assumptions of the causal p r i n c i p l e . If this feature is not recognized, the basic pattern of events perceived in the phenom-enal world cannot be explained . . . . The fourth c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of causation, " c o n d i t i o n a l i t y " (idappaccayata), is by far the most s i g n i f i c a n t in that i t steers clear of the two ex-tremes—the unconditional necessity implied in s t r i c t determinism and the unconditional a r b i t r a r i n e s s assumed by accidentalism. Hence i t was 14 used as a synonym for causation.5 The expression for causation is paticcasamuppada- ("dependent o r i g i n -a t i o n , " l i t e r a l l y "dependent co-up-rising"). Buddhaghosa comments that the word denotes the presence of a p l u r a l i t y of conditions and t h e i r occur-rence together brings about a r e s u l t : "And i t i s c a l l e d a 'co-arising' (samuppado) since i t causes states that occur i n unresolved mutual i n t e r -dependence to a r i s e a s s o c i a t e d l y . H e also says that the p l u r a l i t y of conditions which cause the occurrence of an event or things " a r i s e s as a togetherness (saha), thus i t is a c o - a r i s i n g (samuppada); but i t does so having depended (paticca--ger.) in combination with conditions, not regard-less of them. Consequently: i t having depended (paticca), i s a c o - a r i s i n g (samuppada), thus i n this way also i t is dependent o r i g i n a t i o n (paticca-samuppada)." 7 For a seed to sprout, grow up, and a t t a i n maturity, i n turn, to repro-duce new seeds., three conditions must be present: (1) a seed which w i l l germinate provided (2) i t i s planted properly, and (3) that i t has the benefit of good s o i l , ample water, and plenty of sunshine. The cause of change from seed to sprout is dependent upon these conditions being present together. The t o t a l i t y of conditions as "cause" consists of several r e l a -tionships between the s p e c i f i c conditions and the e f f e c t . There are 24 causal r e l a t i o n s (£a£cayJ.) outlined in the Patthana. For our purpose we need not examine them. 8 The example 9 establishes several empirical facts : (1) causation re-quires that c e r t a i n conditions be s a t i s f i e d before an event or thing occurs ( i . e . , c o n d i t i o n a l i t y ) . A seed w i l l not become a mature plant i f planted i n poor s o i l , nor w i l l i t sprout i f i t is broken or rotten; (2) because of these facts ( i . e . , o b j e c t i v i t y ) , the farmer i s able to predict what auspi-15 cious conditions are needed for successful c u l t i v a t i o n ( i . e . , necessity). He i s also aware that a l l seeds do not produce the same r e s u l t s , e.g., wheat seeds w i l l not produce r i c e plants ( i . e . , i n v a r i a b i l i t y ) ; (3) the process of causation is a continual process of becoming to which a l l things are subject ( i . e . , samsara-). The sprout w i l l become a plant, therefore, the sprout i s a necessary condition for the plant's becoming. . The plant w i l l become a condition for the production of new seeds, and so on. It i s a continual cycle. The sprout does not endure, i t changes ( i . e . , imperman-ence); (4) the sprout i s dependent on a p l u r a l i t y of conditions for i t s be-coming, as such, i t does not exi s t independent of them ( i . e . , unsubstantial-i t y ) . Further, there must be a mutual interdependence of conditions to pro-duce an e f f e c t , and that e f f e c t w i l l then become a condition, together with others, which w i l l produce further e f f e c t s and further dependence and i n t e r -dependence; and (5) there i s uniformity to a l l causal r e l a t i o n s (dhammat-t h i t a t a - , dh amma n iy ama t a - , and dhanimata-) . which conforms to the four char-a c t e r i s t i c s of causation and the three c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (tilakkhanani), anic-ca-, anattan-, and dukkha-, of existence The general formula for the occurrence and nonoccurrence of an event i s : When this i s present, that becomes; from the a r i s i n g of t h i s , that a r i s e s . When this is absent, that does not become: from the cessation of t h i s , that ceases. ^ This formula is u n i v e r s a l l y applicable as the causal p r i n c i p l e which ac-counts for the occurrence and nonoccurrence of a l l phenomena.''-''' This ex-plains the Buddha's statement, "He who perceives the dependent co-origina-t i o n (paticcasamuppada-) perceives the dhamma- (dhamma- here taken i n the sense of truth, the truth regarding the nature of r e a l i t y ) . " 1 2 i n s i g h t into 16 c a u s a l i t y , then, reveals the nature of r e a l i t y (dhammata-), e s p e c i a l l y an understanding of what causes the occurrence of bondage and how one can bring about i t s nonoccurrence and the occurrence of freedom, i . e . , the Buddhist c h i e f r e l i g i o u s concern. The formula which s a t i s f i e s that concern i s the twelvefold causal account of the disharmonious and unsatisfactory nature (dukkhata-) of the human condition, namely: Because of ignorance, v o l i t i o n a l formations (occur); because of vo-l i t i o n a l formations, consciousness or d i s c r i m i n a t i v e knowledge (occurs); because of consciousness, mentality and m a t e r i a l i t y (occur); because of mentality and m a t e r i a l i t y , the s i x sense spheres (occur); because of the six sense spheres, contact (occurs); because of contact, sensa-tion (occurs); because of sensation, t h i r s t or craving (occurs); be-cause of t h i r s t , becoming (occurs); because of becoming, r e b i r t h (oc-curs) ; because of r e b i r t h , ageing, dying, sorrow, lamentation, bodily pain, mental g r i e f , and despair occur. In this way does this e n t i r e pervading aggregate of dukkha- arise.13 This twelvefold chain of causation i s a chain of necessary conditions, whereby the opposite of each member in the chain i s a s u f f i c i e n t condition for the cessation of the next. There are two places where one. can success-f u l l y enter and break the chain, either at ignorance ( a v i j j a - ) or t h i r s t (tanha-), both regarded as the e s s e n t i a l or "most s t r i k i n g " ^ conditions of the disharmonious and unsatisfactory nature which characterizes the hu-man condition. Insight or penetrative knowledge (pann^a-) replaces ignor-ance and nonattachment (viraga-) or s e l f - c o n t r o l replaces t h i r s t . The presence of i n s i g h t and s e l f - c o n t r o l causes the cessation of dukkha- and also s a t i s f i e s the conditions necessary for freedom-from and freedom-to.^ In summary, f i r s t , an i n s i g h t into paticcasamuppada- gives one an understanding of the nature of dukkha- (dukkhata-)• Second, because a l l causally conditioned phenomena are impermanent, unsubstantial, and unsatis-I factory, the Buddhist doctrine of paticcasamuppada-, then, substantiates 17 t h e i r judgments regarding the nature of existence. It demonstrates that a l l things are impermanent (anicca-) because they a r i s e and decease. It demonstrates further that a l l things are dependent upon a mutual i n t e r r e l a t e d -ness of conditions for their temporary existence. Their becoming (bhava-), i n turn, become conditions correlated with others which cause the occurrence of new events or things. Because a l l things are impermanent and interde-pendent or i n t e r r e l a t e d , no "thing" can e x i s t - i n - i t s e l f (sabhava-) as an enduring, independent e n t i t y . Everything is unsubstantial (anattan-). F i n a l l y , whatever is impermanent i s unsatisfactory (dukkha-) because what-ever s a t i s f a c t i o n occurs i s only short l i v e d . In short, paticcasamuppada- = dhammata- ("the nature of things"). Notes ^-Presuppositions 0, pp. 48-49. 2 I b i d . , p. 49. -^Ibid, , p. 93. The proceeding remarks were extracted from Presupposi-t i o n s 0 , pp. 47-52 and 93-97, and adopted to f i t the n e c e s s i t i e s of t h i s discussion. 4Paccaya-sutta°, S.2:25f. Cited i n BP, p. 27. 5BP, pp. 27-28. Tathata-, " o b j e c t i v i t y , o n t o l o g i c a l i t y , " l i t e r a l l y "correspondence," means that causation is not merely an idea without objec-t i v i t y , but corresponds to what i s occuring in nature. Avitathata-, "neces-s i t y , " l i t e r a l l y "no-non-objectivty," means that no exception i s allowed i n causation. It always takes place, without f a i l u r e . There i s no break-down between the cause-effect r e l a t i o n . It does not d i v e r t from o b j e c t i v i t y . Anannatathata-, " i n v a r i a b i l i t y , u n a l t e r a b i l i t y , " l i t e r a l l y "not-other-ness," means that there i s a consistency between cause and e f f e c t , i . e . , there i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between cause and e f f e c t that remains constant (but this does not imply i d e n t i t y between cause and e f f e c t ) . Idappaccayata-, "condition-a l i t y , dependence," means that there i s a necessary condition or group of conditions for an event to occur. "The commentary explains these terms as follows: ' "Objectivity," etc. are synonyms of what i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of causation. As those alone neither more or le s s , bring about this or that event, there i s s a i d to be " o b j e c t i v i t y " ; since there i s no f a i l u r e even for a'moment to produce the events which a r i s e when the conditions come to-gether, there i s said to be "necessity"; since no event d i f f e r e n t from (the 18 ef f e c t ) arises with (the help of) other events or conditions there i s said to be " i n v a r i a b i l i t y " ; from the condition or group of conditions which give r i s e to such states as decay, etc., as stated, there i s said to be "condi-t i o n a l i t y " . ' " S.2:4l, trans, and c i t a t i o n from Early Buddhisto, pp. 447-48. For a d d i t i o n a l analysis see C a u s a l i t y 0 , pp. 91-95. "Vis.17:18, trans, by Nyanamoli. 7 I b i d . , 17:16. 8 F o r a d d i t i o n a l analysis see Vis.17:66-100; Narada, A Manual of Abhi-dhamma, Ceylon, 1968, pp. 372-78; Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, Ceylon, 1972., pp. 114-19; or BPT, pp. 44-49. 9Example taken from S.3:54. 10M.2:32 and S.2:28. •'••'•Causality operates i n f i v e spheres: (1) physical (inorganic) order (utaniyama-), (2) physical (organic) order (bi janiyama-), (3) psychological order (cittaniyama-), (4) moral order (kammaniyama-), and (5) i d e a l s p i r i t -ual order (dhammaniyama-). These f i v e groups are a l l - i n c l u s i v e so that no-thing i n experience is excluded. In short, everything i n this universe comes within the operation of c a u s a l i t y . For add i t i o n a l analysis see Causal ity°, pp. 110-46. 12M.1:190-91. l-*This f u l l formula appears i n works l i k e S.2:lf., 26f., 42f., and 94; M.l:261f; A.1:177; Dhs.1336; Vis.17:2; Atthas.395; Abhs.8:2. For a de t a i l e d exposition of the 12 links and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s see Vis.17:58-272. ^See Aung's discussion on paccaya-, Compendium0, pp. 261-62. 1^Presuppositions 0, pp. 102 and 129-20, here Potter discusses the neces sary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions of the Buddhist causal chain. The preceedin analysis follows Potter's. 19 UNSUBSTANTIALITY (ANATTAN-) What we conventionally designate as "human being" i s i n r e a l i t y a com-pounded unit composed of several i n d i s c r e t e and discontinuous factors which are connected and continuous by way of c a u s a l i t y . That which we term as " i n d i v i d u a l personality" (pudgala-), " s e l f " or " s o u l " (attan-^) i s a c t u a l l y t h i s group of factors or part of this group, which through th e i r mutual i n t e r -action, together with other causal conditions, co-originate and become actual, but there exists no enduring, s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , independent e n t i t y or substance underlying change. In this way, the paticcasamuppada- may be viewed as a theory of dynamic "becoming," opposed to those theories which.try to estab-l i s h a s t a t i c "being" as the grounds underlying change. Becoming (bhava-) should be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from the common notion of change. According to the paticcasamuppada-, change i s a continuous occur-rence, but the common view of change regards i t as pertaining only to the a l t e r a t i o n of form of some more basic, unchanging substance. When a person passes through the stages of b i r t h , ageing, and dying, the mistaken assump-tio n i s that there i s some underlying r e a l i t y , designated by name, which continues throughout the process of transformation.2 "Or, empirical exis-tence in general i s considered to be r e a l , while forms change. To the con-trary, the- t r a d i t i o n a l Buddhist view i s that the world 'becomes' continual-l y - - i t ' i s ' nothing."3 The i n d i v i d u a l personality, according to Buddhist doctrine, i s a causal-ly condition phenomenon (samkhara-) composed of f i v e aggregates, which con-t i n u a l l y become as a r e s u l t of the presence of the samsaric forces of ignor-ance and t h i r s t . These f i v e aggregates, t e c h n i c a l l y termed pancupadanak-khandha ("the f i v e aggregates of c l i n g i n g " ) , are m a t e r i a l i t y (rupa-), sensa-20 tion (vedana-), perception (sanna-), d i s p o s i t i o n s (samkhara), and consci-ousness (vinnana-). No ego, s e l f , or soul (attan-), no person (pudgala-), or any s t a t i c entity can be found under close inspection and introspection in either one or a l l of these aggregates. . . . just as when the component parts such as axles, wheels, frame, poles, etc., are arranged in a c e r t a i n way, there comes to be the mere term of common usage "c h a r i o t , " yet i n the ultimate sense when each part i s examined, there i s no chariot, and just when the compon-ent parts of a "house" ( f i s t , lute, army, c i t y , tree, or anything) . . • . so too, when there are f i v e aggregates of c l i n g i n g , there comes to be the mere term of common usage "a being," "a person," yet i n the ultimate sense, when each component i s examined, there is no being as a basis for the assumption "I am" or " I " ; i n the ultimate sense there is only mentality-materiality. The v i s i o n of one who sees i n this Way is c a l l e d correct vision.4-Nor should one mistakenly assume that these aggregates are s u b s t a n t i a l . They too are causally conditioned phenomena subject to r e b i r t h , ageing, and dying, and dependent upon each other and upon other conditions for their temporary becoming. Verbal designations a l l have a p r a c t i c a l purpose in everyday l i f e . Whether i t be words used singly or arranged i n a l o g i c a l sequence to con-vey a concept, idea, judgment, name, etc.; or set of concepts, ideas, judgments, names, etc. They are subjective expressions used to r e l a t e the objective world into conventional modes of communciation. This i s done by d i v i d i n g a dynamic world into s t a t i c things in order to d i s c r i m i n -ate what is mine and what i s yours, to d i s t i n g u i s h or i d e n t i f y things as d i f f e r e n t from myself and d i f f e r e n t from each other, or to point out what-ever s i m i l a r i t i e s might ex i s t between c e r t a i n things and myself and things with each other, and so on. In every case, they are verbal signs which point to something outside of themselves. It is ignorant from the Buddhist point of view to: (1) equate verbal designations with the things they point at, (2) to i d e n t i f y them as the 21 grounds underlying change, (3) to assume that verbal designations have an existence outside the mind, or (4) to assume that these designation are substantial e n t i t i e s , or that the things they point to are s u b s t a n t i a l . To the contrary, no "thing" i s substantial since a l l things are cau-s a l l y conditioned, including mental phenomena. A l l mental phenomena, whether i t be a member in the conscious process or one of i t s cognitive products, are impermanent and unsubstantial. They a r i s e and decease faster than you are reading and comprehending the words on this page. In fact, the Buddhist would say that human existence l a s t s only as long as a thought moment, i . e . , as fast as the mind turns. The human dilemma arises through the conscious process when one mis-takenly presupposes phenomena to be s u b s t a n t i a l , as well as mistakenly i d e n t i f y i n g the continuum of conscious states as an abiding ego underlying the process. "In Buddhism there i s no actor apart from action, no p e r c i p i -ent apart from perception. In other words, there i s no conscious subject behind consciousness."^ Nor do things e x i s t i n r e a l i t y as substantial en-t i t i e s , except when mistaken as such by a mind conditioned by delusion and attachment. The correct p o s i t i o n with regard to the question of Anatta i s not to take hold of any opinions or views, but to try to see things objective-ly as they are without mental projections, to see that what we c a l l " I , " or "being," is only a combination of physical and mental aggre-gates, which are working together interdependently i n a flux of momen-tary change with the law of cause and e f f e c t , and that there i s no-thing permanent, eve r l a s t i n g , unchanging, and eternal i n the whole of existence.^ The term sunnata- ("emptiness" or "voidness," l i t e r a l l y "zero-ness") serves as a c o r o l l a r y to the doctrines of c a u s a l i t y and u n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y . A l l causally conditioned phenomena are empty.^ This is empty of s e l f or of what belongs to s e l f . ^ 22 He (the adept) sees a l l causally conditioned phenomena as unsubstan-t i a l , because they are a l i e n , empty, vain, void, ownerless, with no Overlord, and with none to exercise power over them, etc.9 Because of c a u s a l i t y , everything i s impermanent and interdependent, and, as a r e s u l t , a l l things are empty (sunna-) of sabhava- ("self-existence," i . e . , s u b s t a n t i a l i t y ) and empty of any quality that can provide l a s t i n g s a t i s f a c -t i o n . Whereas f i r e does not e x i s t i n f u e l nor independent from i t , neither f i r e or i t s fue l nor t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p can e x i s t as s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t e n t i t i e s . In this same way, the twelvefold causal chain i s empty of any s e l f - e x i s t e n t e n t i t i e s , whether taken as a whole, singly, or i n respect to the r e l a t i o n s between members. .. . . ignorance--and likewise the factors c o n s i s t i n g of formations, e t c . - - i s neither s e l f nor selves, nor in s e l f , nor possessed of s e l f . That is why this Wheel of Becoming should be understood thus "Void with the twelvefold voidness."10 Even verbal designations are empty of sabhava- because they a r i s e de-pendent upon a number of factors. Therefore, concepts l i k e bandha- and samsara-, v i m u t t i - and nibbana- are not d i f f e r e n t from each other, because ultimately a l l berbal designations are empty. Conventionally there is a difference, but from the standpoint of emptiness there i s no d i f f e r e n c e . Their r e a l i t y i s r e l a t i v e no absolute. In this way, the four Noble Truths " i n an absolute sense '. . . should be understood as empty, because of the absence of any knower, actor, one who is extinguished, and goer. Thus i t •is said. 'For there i s dukkha-, but no one in dukkha-; acting e x i s t s , but no actor; there i s e x t i n c t i o n , but no man i s extinguished; there i s a path, yet no goer e x i s t s . . 'Or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y : Empty of s t a b i l i t y , beauty, pleasure, and s u b s t a n t i a l i t y i s the f i r s t -pair; empty of s e l f i s the deathless state; empty of s t a b i l i t y , plea-sure, and s u b s t a n t i a l i t y i s the path; in these are emptiness.'"11 23 Emptiness t e l l s us that everything, whether p h y s i c a l or mental, can-not be s e l f - e x i s t e n t or s u f f i c i e n t (sabhava-) or s u b s t a n t i a l (attan-) be-cause of paticcasamuppada-. The human p e r s o n a l i t y i s not a s t a t i c e n t i t y , but a sequence of events, free or not depending on whether the person i s i n s i g h t f u l and s e l f - c o n t r o l l e d or not. There i s no s e l f or soul that i s i n bondage or f r e e , rather events that are free or not. Notes l " I n the texts and the commentaries the words a t t a and a t t a are used i n s e v e r a l senses: (1) c h i e f l y meaning ' o n e - s e l f or 'one's own,1 e.g., a t t a h i t a y a patipanno no parahitaya ( a c t i n g i n one's own i n t e r e s t , not i n the i n t e r e s t s of others) or attana va katam sadhu (what i s done by one's own s e l f i s good); (2) meaning 'one's own person,' the p e r s o n a l i t y , i n c l u d -in g both body and mind, e.g., i n attabhava ( l i f e ) , a t t a p a t i l a b h a ( b i r t h i n some form of l i f e ) ; (3) s e l f , as a s u b t l e metaphysical e n t i t y , ' s o u l , ' e.g. a t t h i me a t t a (do I have a ' s o u l ' ? ) , sunnam idam attena va a t t a n i y e n a va ( t h i s i s v o i d of a ' s e l f or anything to do with a ' s e l f ) , e tc. I t i s w i t h the t h i r d meaning that we are here concerned, the e n t i t y that i s con-ceived and sought and made the subject of a c e r t a i n c l a s s of views c a l l e d i n e a r l y Buddhist t e x t s a t t a d i t t h i , a t t a n u d i t t h i ( s e l f - v i e w s or heresy of s e l f ) and attagaha (misconception regarding s e l f ) . " From BE, v o l . I, p. 567. For t h e i r a n a l y s i s on anattan- see pp. 567-76; f o r a n i c c a - see pp. 657-63. 2See Emptiness 0, p. 36. 3 I b i d . , pp. 36-37. 4 Vis.18:28, tr a n s , by Nyanamoli ^Compendium0, p. 7. 6Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, New York, 1962, p. 66. ?S.3:167. 8M.2:263. 9Vis.21:48. 1 0 V i s . 1 7 : 2 8 3 , t r a n s , by Nyanamoli. 1 1 V i s . 1 6 : 9 0 . 24 THE CONCEPT OF THE "MIDDLE WAY" The doctrines of c a u s a l i t y and unsubstantiaiity are highly regarded as the c e n t r a l or chief " r e l i g i o u s " doctrines of Buddhism, because: (1) they explain the nature of r e a l i t y and account for the human condition of bondage and i t s cessation, (2) they steer clear of the extremes of eter n a l -ism and annihilationism, and s t r i c t determinism and indeterminism or a c c i -dentalism, and (3) they s a t i s f y c e r t a i n key concerns that a " r e l i g i o n " must f u l f i l l to be " r e l i g i o u s . " (1) Because of c a u s a l i t y , everything i s said to be characterized by impermanence, unsubstantiaiity, and dis-ease (anicca-, anattan-, and duk-kha-) . Causality or.dependent c o - o r i g i n a t i o n (paticcasamuppada-) says, "Whever A i s present B w i l l occur, and whenever A is absent B w i l l not occur." This uniform causal law has four c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : (1) the causal process is as r e a l as the occurrence and nonoccurrence of events, i . e . , " o b j e c t i v i t y ; " (2) without f a i l u r e B w i l l become when A i s present and w i l l not become when A i s absent, i . e . , "necessity;" (3) A w i l l not pro-duce C or D, etc., only B, i . e . , " i n v a r i a b i l i t y ; " and (4) A as the ante-cedent of B represents the mutual i n t e r a c t i o n of conditions which cause B to become actual, i . e . , " c o n d i t i o n a l i t y . " B then becomes a condition, which through i n t e r a c t i o n with other conditions, causes C to become, and so on. In this way, ignorance i s the necessary condition for v o l i t i o n a l formations, etc., which through i n t e r a c t i o n with other conditions, causes C to become, and so on. In this way, ignorance i s the necessary condition for v o l i t i o n a l formations, etc., which through th e i r mutual interdependence and cd-origination are the conditions which cause the disharmonious and un-s a t i s f a c t o r y nature (dukkhata-) of the human condition. This causes the 25 r e g e n e r a t i o n o f i g n o r a n c e , e t c . , h e r e e q u a l t o the "Wheel o f Becoming," i . e . , samsara-. Bondage (bandha-) i s the c o n t i n u a l r e g e n e r a t i o n o f dukkha-. To end t h i s c y c l e o f rebecoming (panubbhava-) one must cause the non-o c c u r r e n c e o f i g n o r a n c e and t h i r s t t h r o u g h the o c c u r r e n c e o f i n s i g h t and s e l f - c o n t r o l . T h i s w i l l l e a d t o t h e n o n o c c u r r e n c e o f the o t h e r members o f the t w e l v e f o l d c a u s a l c h a i n and the c o m p l e t e c e s s a t i o n ( n i r o d h a - ) o r non-rebecoming (apunabbhava-) o f dukkha-. Based on t h e i r t h e o r y o f c a u s a l i t y , t h e B u d d h i s t m a i n t a i n s t h a t the w o r l d i s empty (sunna-) o f s e l f - e x i s t e n t (sabhava-) or s u b s t a n t i a l ( a t t a n - ) e n t i t i e s . What we c a l l " t h i n g " a r e a c t u a l l y m e n t a l f a b r i c a t i o n s whose r e a l i t y a r e p u r e l y s u b j e c t i v e , s i n c e the o b j e c t i v e w o r l d i s empty o f t h i n g s as s u b s t a n t i a l e n t i t i e s . F o r c o n v e n t i o n a l and r e l a t i o n a l p u r p o s e s , we d i v i d e a dynamic w o r l d i n t o s e e m i n g l y s t a t i c c a t e g o r i e s f o r c o m m u n c i a t i o n , y e t i n an a b s o l u t e or u l t i m a t e s e n s e , even t h e s e c a t a g o r i e s a r e impermanent and u n s u b s t a n t i a l , i . e . , empty, because they too a r e c a u s a l l y c o n d i t i o n e d l i k e the e x t e r n a l w o r l d they r e p r e s e n t . (2) A c c o r d i n g t o B u d d h i s t d o c t r i n e , one s h o u l d never s l i p i n t o h o l d -i n g onto the extremes o f e t e r n a l i s m ( s a s s a t a v a d a - ) and a n n i h i l a t i o n i s m ( u c c h e d a v a d a - ) , and s t r i c t d e t e r m i n i s m and i n d e t e r m i n i s m or a c c i d e n t a l i s m . E t e r n a l i s m p o s i t s a s e l f - s u b s t a n t i a t e d e n t i t y as the grounds f o r c o n t i n u i t y ( o r as c a u s a l a g e n t s ) , i n the c a s e o f an i n d i v i d u a l , an u n c h a n g i n g , immut-a b l e " s e l f " or " s o u l " ( a t t a n - ) ; w h i l e a n n i h i l a t i o n i s m d e n i e s c o n t i n u i t y a l t o g e t h e r ( t h i s d e n i a l by e x t e n s i o n l e a d s t o the d e n i a l o f kamma- and sam-s a r a - ) . Buddhism d e n i e s the e x i s t e n c e o f a permanent s e l f o r s e l f - e x i s t e n t t h i n g s as c a u s a l a g e n t s , y e t i t does not go t o the o t h e r extreme and deny c o n t i n u i t y a l t o g e t h e r . On the c o n t r a r y , the t h e o r i e s o f c a u s a l i t y and un-s u b s t a n t i a i i t y oppose " b e i n g " and " n o n - b e i n g " w i t h "becoming."'-S t r i c t determinism (niyativada-) maintains that everything which occurs i s r i g i d l y determined by what one did in the past (S.4:230), or that the i n d i v i d u a l has no control over his destiny or nature (a denial of s e l f -causation and free w i l l ) . Buddhism d i f f e r s in that i t maintains that i n -d i v i d u a l e f f o r t is sometimes a factor in causal r e l a t i o n s , and this i s not s t r i c t l y determined. "The proof of this was the empirical fact that we f e e l free to act and exercise our e f f o r t , c a l l e d our. ' i n i t i a t i v e ' (arab-bhadhatu) in many situa t i o n s (A. III,337,338). 1 , 2 Indeterminism, accidentalism, or n i h i l i s m maintains that a l l events are fortuitous (adhiccasamuppada- or yadrccha-), and. that the world i s chaotic and unpredictable, denying any uniform causal process (ahetuvada-). A theory which believes that moral degradation and purity are due to f o r -tuitous circumstances (S.3:69). Buddhism maintains that n i h i l i s m doesn't e x i s t , rather ignorance of causes does e x i s t . I t counters with the four c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of causation ( o b j e c t i v i t y , necessity, i n v a r i a b i l i t y , and c o n d i t i o n a l i t y ) . The doubts and fears of s t r i c t determinism and indeterminism become manifested as fatalism and skepticism. The fear of f a t a l i s m i s "the fear that in fact the necessary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions of events leading to freedom are not such that they can be within my c o n t r o l , so that I 'have a choice, 1 as we say." 3 i t i s the fear that nothing one can do can a l t e r what is bound to happen. This does not allow the p o s s i b i l i t y of freedom-from, since the person i s at the mercy of forces out of his c o n t r o l . Skepticism fears that "the occurrences and nonoccurrences that are involved in the attainment of complete freedom are not regularly connected to necessary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions."^ It i s the fear that nothing one can do can bring about hoped-for r e s u l t s . This does not allow the p o s s i -27 b i l i t y of freedom-to, since the person cannot an t i c i p a t e and control those events which concern him because those events are i r r e g u l a r l y connected. To c o n t r o l events he must be able to count on the recurrence of c e r t a i n sequences and be confident his decisions and actions w i l l be successful.^ Causality and unsubstantiaiity are termed the "Middle Way" because they steer c l e a r of the above extremes. T should add here that the Noble E i g h t f o l d Path (ariya-attangika-magga-) or in general the 37 Constituents of Enlightenment (bodhi-pakkiya-dhamma, l i t e r a l l y "truths which are parts of enlightenment") are regarded as the "Middle Way" which steers c l e a r of the extremes of s e l f - m o r t i f i c a t i o n and addiction to sensual pleasures. I f one s l i p s into holding onto any of these extremes, he w i l l continue to wander in samsara- and hot gain release. (3) In the Introduction I said that: "Religious man may be regarded as one who sees the human condition or e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n as a serious problem, firmly believes that this condition can be overcome, and regards i t s r e s o l u t i o n as his highest a s p i r a t i o n . " (p. 1) Religious t r a d i t i o n s provide i t s adherents with conceptual maps or schemes that project the nature of r e a l i t y and man's p o s i t i o n in i t to explain "where" man i s , "where" he should be heading, and "how" he i s to get there, i . e . , they ex-pl a i n the conditions which cause the human dilemma and the conditions necessary to overcome i t , and provide guidance as to achieve c e r t a i n hoped-for r e s u l t s . On the contrary, a "non-religious man may be regarded as one who (1) sees no dilemma or considers i t as inconsequential, or (2) who sees the dilemma and regards i t as serious, but i s s k e p t i c a l that there i s a sol u t i o n or that he can achieve c e r t a i n hoped-for r e s u l t s . . . ." (foot-note #1, p. 3) The chief doctrines of Buddhism, pat ice asamuppada- and anattan-, are 28 " r e l i g i o u s " because they s a t i s f y the concerns of " r e l i g i o u s man," and be-cause they avoid the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , doubts and fears of "non-religious man." They e s t a b l i s h bondage as a serious dilemma and i n s i s t that man has the capacities to gain freedom-from ( i . e . , s e l f - c o n t r o l ) and freedoin-to ( i . e . , i n s i g h t ) , i . e . , complete freedom. The fact that Gotama Buddha had attained freedom makes freedom not only possible, but actual. In this way, the central doctrines of Buddhism become buttresses of f a i t h because (1) they attempt to resolve the doubts and fears of f a t a l i s m and skepticism, and (2) they generate a deep conviction to purpose. Since everything is impermanent, unsubstantial, and unsatisfactory, even these doctrine should be understood as empty of permanence, substan-t i a l i t y , and l a s t i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n . One should never grasp onto them as absolute, truths,, but rather recognizes that they are but. r e l a t i v e truths employed to guide the person from normality to n o b i l i t y . In the same way as one having used a map to reach a desired-destination no longer needs that map for further d i r e c t i o n , or, just as a person who builds a temporary r a f t to cross a torrent r i v e r never c a r r i e s that r a f t with him afterwards, so too, once a person has gained absolute understanding of r e a l i t y as i t r e a l l y is', he no longer needs to- rely on those r e l a t i v e truths to d i r e c t his thoughts and actions. Thus, the c e n t r a l doctrines beckon the Buddhist to gain that knowledge which transcends the normal realms of knowledge (see the chapter on conceptual mapping and on two truths in Buddhism). Notes ^Buddhaghosa comments on the contemporary theories of his time which did not correspond to fact: "The f i r s t component w i l l deny the false view of eternity and so on, and the second w i l l prevent t h e - n i h i l i s t i c type of view and others l i k e i t , while the two together show the true way that is meant. 29 "The f i r s t : the word 'dependent (paticca)' indicates the combination of conditions since states i n the process of occuring e x i s t i n dependence of the combining of the i r conditions; and i t shows that they are not eternal, etc., thus denying the v a r i o u s ^ i o c t r i n e s of Eternalism, No-cause, F i c i t i t i o u s -cause, and Power-wielder (see Nyanamoli's footnote). What purpose indeed would the combining of conditions serve, i f things were eternal, or i f they occurred without a cause, and so on? "The second: the world ' o r i g i n a t i o n (samuppada)' indicates the a r i s i n g of states, since these occur when the i r conditions combine, and i t shows how to prevent annihilationism, etc., thus preventing the various doctrines of A n n i h i l a t i o n (of a Soul), Nihilism, ('there is no use in giving,' etc.,) and for when states (are seen to) a r i s e again and again, each conditioned by i t s predecessor, how can the doctrines of Annihilationism, N i h i l i s m , and Mor a l - i n e f f i c a c y - o f - a c t i o n be maintained? "The two taken together: since any given states are produced without int e r r u p t i n g the (cause-fruit) continuity of any given combination of con-d i t i o n s , the whole expression 'dependent o r i g i n a t i o n (paticca-samuppada)', represents the middle way, which rej e c t s the doctrines 'He who acts is he who reaps' and 'One acts while another reaps' ( S . i i , 2 0 ) , and which i s the proper way described thus 'Not i n s i s t i n g on l o c a l language, and not overrid-ing normal usage 1 (M. i i i , 234).." V i s . 17-21-24, trans, by Nyanamoli. Also for a discussion on the doctrines of eternalism and annihilationism see BE, v o l . I, pp. 567-76. 2 E a r l y Buddhist 0, p. 445. For a discussion on the notion of "free w i l l " see C a u s a l i t y 0 , pp. 123-24. 3Presuppostions 0, p. 50. 4 l b i d . , p. 49. The analysis follows Potter's, Ibid., pp. 49-50. 30 HABITUAL BEHAVIOR (KAMMA-) AND RENUNCIATION (NEKKHAMMA-) According to Buddhism, human behavior i s determined by one of three factors: (1) external s t i m u l i , (2) conscious motives, or (3) unconscious motives. The f i r s t i s a r e f l e x response caused by sensual contact with an external stimulus, e.g., "an innocent l i t t l e baby l y i n g on i t s back quickly draws back i t s hand or foot i f i t happens to touch a l i v e ember."'-Because such behavior i s unmotivated (asancetanika- or acetanika-), caused e n t i r e l y by physical stimulation, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t i s not l a i d on the person himself. Second, there is that a c t i v i t y which i s v o l i t i o n a l (cetanika-) i n nature, determined by either conscious motives, such as attachment or greed (raga-), aversion or hatred (dosa-), and delusion (moha-), or t h e i r absence (alobha-, adosa-, and amoha-); or, t h i r d , by unconscious motives such as the desire to perpetuate l i f e (jivitukama-) and the desire to avoid death (amaritukama-) (both re l a t e d to what Freud c a l l e d the " l i f e i n s t i n c t " ) , and the desire for pleasure (sukhakama-) and aversion to pain (dukkha pa t ikku1a-) (both r e l a t e d to what Freud c a l l e d the "pleasure p r i n -c i p l e " ) . These motives r e s u l t from a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of existence and of the human personality complex. Since the la t e r types of behavior are purely motivational or v o l i t i o n a l , the i n d i v i d -ual may be held responsible for his behavior. It i s this v o l i t i o n a l type of a c t i v i t y to which we w i l l be addressing ourselves. "While human behavior i s i t s e l f conditioned by cause, i t i s followed by correlated consequences. This c o r r e l a t i o n between action (karma) and consequence (vipaka or phala) constitues the doctrine of karma i n Buddhism." Depending on the nature of kamma- and the circumstances i n which i t is com-31 mitted, there w i l l be appropriate consequences. The determinism between kamma- and phala- is condi t i o n a l upon the circumstances in which the action is done. .. In this way, kamma- is i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , because i t i s dependent upon the p a r t i c u l a r personality of the i n d i v i d u a l at that moment and the circumstances in which the i n d i v i d u a l is personally involved.3 Kamma- may be defined as " i n t e n t i o n a l or w i l l f u l a c t i v i t y with r e s u l -tant e f f e c t s . " It is a c t i v i t y motivated by conscious and unconscious motives that desire to achieve desired r e s u l t s . V o l i t i o n or conation (cetana-) arises from the mental concomitants, co-operatives, or activators (samkhara, " d i s -positions or a t t i t u d e s , " " v o l i t i o n a l formations") and acts in attempting to obtain desired r e s u l t s or accomplishing tasks, i . e . , cetana- determines the action and the aim of action. Cetana- functions as the determination of what i s determined ( i . e . , d e s i r e d ) . 4 According to H.V. Guenther: That which arouses and sustains a c t i v i t y on the part of the human psyche is c a l l e d ce tana. Broadly speaking, i t is a stimulus, and i n a sense, may be considered as a motive and also as a drive. A drive i s a stim-ulus that arouses persistent mass a c t i v i t y , and a motive i s a stimulus that sustains a c t i v i t y u n t i l the stimulus i s removed, as by eating in the case of hunger, or u n t i l the organism has moved out of the range of the stimulus, as in the case of a pin-prick. Since cetana and Karman are synonymous . . . this idea of motive and drive applied to Karman would mean that the i n d i v i d u a l is bound and fettered to the e f f e c t i v e range of Karman, hence the equation of attainment of Nirvana and ces-sation of a l l Karman.5 " V o l i t i o n i s action, thus I say, bh_ikkhus, for as soon as v o l i t i o n a r ises one does the action, whether bodily, v o c a l l y , or mentally. Kamma- is action which s t r i v e s to gain desired r e s u l t s , done for the sake of the doer,'and ignorant that in r e a l i t y there is no doer, l e t alone any object or r e s u l t that i s permanent, sub s t a n t i a l , and s a t i s f a c t o r y . When the motives and drives are removed by insight and s e l f - c o n t r o l , then there occurs the cessation of a l l kamma-. We may contrast kannia- as " f o r c e f u l " a c t i v i t y i n comparison to the 32 " n o n f o r c e f u l n e s s " o f s p o n t a n e i t y ' ; or the a c t i v i t y o f one who i s bound by h i s h a b i t s i n c o m p a r i s o n to the man who i s c o m p l e t e l y f r e e . By f o r c e f u l -ness i s meant e s s e n t i a l l y two t h i n g s . F i r s t , kamma- i s c o m p u l s i v e b e h a v i o r c aused by the f d r c e o f h a b i t ( s ) . The i n d i s p e n s a b l e key t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the Buddha's t h e r a p e u t i c a t t a c k upon s u f f e r i n g i s b e s t g r a s p e d i n the West t h r o u g h the c o n c e p t o f c o m p u l s i v e b e h a v i o r , u n d e r s t o o d as b e h a v i o r d r i v e n by u n c o n s c i o u s m o t i v a t i o n s which e x p l o i t a l l powers o f s e n s a t i o n and t h o u g h t and thus p e r m i t t h e i n d i v i d u a l no a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e o f a c t i o n . I t i s as though the b a s i c needs o f the i n d i v i d u a l were b l o c k e d and t u r n e d i n t o n e u r o t i c , i . e . , r i g i d and c o m p u l s i v e demands . . . . b e h a v i o r i s c o m p u l s i v e as l o n g as i t i s m o t i v a t e d , i . e . , a r o u s e d , d r i v e n , and c o n t r o l l e d by f o r c e s o f whose i d e n t i t y a p e r s o n i s u naware. 8 B e h a v i o r o f t h i s n a t u r e i s c o n d i t i o n e d by i g n o r a n c e ( a v i j j a - , i . e . , the l a c k o f s e l f - k n o w l e d g e and i n s i g h t ) and by c e r t a i n a c q u i r e d d i s p o s i t i o n s (sam-k h a r a ) w h i c h a f f e c t e i t h e r an a t t r a c t i o n - t o o r r e p u l s i o n - f r o m or n e u t r a l r e a c t i o n towards an o b j e c t . As l o n g as d i s p o s i t i o n s a r e p r e s e n t , c o u p l e d w i t h i g n o r a n c e , h a b i t u a l , a c t i v i t y w i l l c o n t i n u a l l y o c c u r . Second, h a b i t u a l b e h a v i o r (kamma-) i s f o r c e f u l because i t causes i n r e t u r n e i t h e r new h a b i t s or r e i n f o r c e s p r e v i o u s ones. T h i s r e g e n e r a t i o n o f h a b i t s f o r c e s man i n t o h a b i t u a l p a t t e r n s or r u t s w h i c h deny him f l e x - ' i b i l i t y and s p o n t a n e i t y . T h i s c y c l e o f h a b i t s b r e e d i n g new h a b i t s i s p e r -p e t u a t e d by the i m p u l s e o f i g n o r a n c e and by the d r i v e o f t h i r s t or c r a v i n g ( t a n h a - ) w h i c h causes i n t e n t i o n a l s t r i v i n g (kamma-) d i r e c t e d towards o b j e c t s m i s t a k e n l y p r e s u p p o s e d as permanent, s u b s t a n t i a l , and s a t i s f a c t o r y . By i g n o r a n c e the b e i n g f a i l s t o v i e w the t r u e impermanent and sub-s t a n c e l e s s n a t u r e of e x i s t e n c e . He r e l i s h e s the t h i n g s o f the w o r l d , t a k i n g them to be r e a l and l a s t i n g and c r e a t e s a c r a v i n g f o r them. Due t o h i s c r a v i n g s , he g r a s p s t o a t t a i n one and a v o i d the o t h e r . T h i s c r a v i n g l e a d s t o t h e c o n t i n u i t y of h i s l i f e - p r o c e s s , a c h a i n o f s t r u g g l e f o r l i v i n g . H i s c r a v i n g s and g r a s p i n g s do n o t end w i t h the d e s t r u c t i o n o f h i s p h y s i c a l frame, but they keep the s t r u g g l e on i n a n o t h e r b i r t h . 9 I g n o r a n c e and t h i r s t l e a d to subsequent a t t a c h m e n t or c l i n g i n g (upa-3 3 dana) to sensual objects. The behavior which we c a l l kamma- i s the be-havior of one attached (by habit) to the f r u i t s of action or to the objects which his actions are directed. The counterpart of kamma- i s renunciation (nekkhamma-) and the counterpart of attachment or c l i n g i n g i s nonattach-ment (viraga-, l i t e r a l l y "dispassion"). The necessary condition for both i s the f a i t h born of the conviction that one i s capable of mastering what-ever challenge confronts him. Without f a i t h , even though the person maybe aware of his dilemma, he may refuse to exert his powers. This i s resigna-tion not renunciation. The c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e between these two polar a t t i t u d i n a l concepts is that while the resigned man doubts his a b i l i t y to master that which he i s resigned to, the man who renounces i s confident of his a b i l i t y to gain that which he renounces but finds more mastery-greater free-dom—in meeting the challenge of not exerting his power for gain. The man who renounces has f a i t h i n his powers, while the resigned man does not have f a i t h and doubts his capacity to e f f e c t a l l that he wish-es . . . . And that which s i g n i f i e s lack of f a i t h i s doubt, that doubt born of an inadequate conception of s e l f , a conception of s e l f broken o f f from others and from the world i n which we l i v e i n some way sets l i m i t s on man's cap a c i t i e s in general. This doubt i s manifested inwardly as fear, the fear that one i s at the mercy of some or a l l of one's environment since i t i s i r r a d i c a b l y other than oneself and thus incapable of being brought under control.10 Again, i n this way Buddhism may be distinguished as a r e l i g i o n and i t s adherents r e l i g i o u s (as opposed to the non-religious man) because they possess the firm conviction that man can overcome his present inadequate condition. The Buddhist has f a i t h that complete freedom i s possible, and that f a i t h becomes the ultimate concern which d i r e c t s h i s a c t i v i t i e s . Renunciation re f e r s to man's capacity to give up or renounce what-ever gain or loss might r e s u l t from exerting that capacity. This leads to nonattachment to the f r u i t s of one's action. We saw that as one succeeds i n gaining c o n t r o l over nature, over others, and over himself, one i n e v i t a b l y runs the r i s k of being bound by his own success . . . . One who can manipulate the things of this world i s tempted to use hi s a b i l i t y to gain more goods, and so f a l l s into bond-34 age to the very a b i l i t y which could be used by him as a lever toward self-improvement; the thing that i s lacking i n him i s the r i g h t a t t i -tude toward wealth, namely, nonattachment to i t s presence or absence. Likewise, one who by his a t t r a c t i v e personality can wield c o n t r o l over other human beings, who i s loved by many, i s tempted to use th i s a b i l -i t y for the g r a t i f i c a t i o n of his desires; he once again lacks the r i g h t a t t i t u d e of nonattachment to the f r u i t s of his a b i l i t y . And f i n a l l y , even one who has mastered himself, who has self-knowledge and self - c o n -t r o l , may f a l l prey to the error of pride, and become s e l f - s a t i s f i e d and content in his own righteousness. Once again the source of error i s a lack of the r i g h t a t t i t u d e , for the proud man i s here, perhaps without himself knowing i t , forming a picture of himself and gives a fa l s e sense of security and contentment--false because i t .habituates him to ruts which rob him of r e s i l i e n c y i n novel s i t u a t i o n s . The- a n t i -dote to this i s once more nonattachment to the s a t i s f a c t i o n he derives from his a b i l i t y to form this p i c t u r e . H Although there i s a d i s t i n c t i o n drawn between "good" and "bad" kamma-, from the standpoint of complete freedom a l l kamma-and karmic forces must be eliminated i n order for complete freedom to occur. Even the adherent who i s well on his way on the road to freedom w i l l not reach his d i s t i n a -tion so long as his actions are directed towards desired results.. The habits developed to gain a firmer footage on the path must eventually be dissolved, since they too deny f l e x i b i l i t y and spontaneity. A person can become bound just as e a s i l y by good habits as by bad ones. Whatever one does or r e f r a i n s from doing i n a s i t u a t i o n i s an action. Unless i t i s an act of renunciation i t i s bound to breed ka_mma-, bondage (bandha-), and s u f f e r i n g (dukkha-). For Buddhism, the choice of action i s not between which action w i l l have consequences which are desirable or not, but rather between acting attached to the f r u i t s of action or acting unat-tached. The l a t t e r choice i s the most c r u c i a l , since one leads to bondage, while the other, renunciation or nonattachment, leads to freedom. The u l -timate value of action does not rest i n the f r u i t s of action, i . e . , whether there r e s u l t s personal gain or l o s t , but i n t r i n s i c a l l y i n acting f r e e l y , i . e . , acting according to one's c a p a c i t i e s , unrestrained by habitual forces. 35 Renunciation is the maximum concern for freedom alone. A necessary condition for renunciation or s e l f - c o n t r o l i s in s i g h t . It is necessary to have self-knowledge of one personality make-up and one's capacities i n a given s i t u a t i o n , and f u l l awareness of the nature of the s i t u a t i o n in. order to succ e s s f u l l y renounce and become free. One must be able to anticipate the res u l t s of his actions, as opposed to wait-ing i n a n t i c i p a t i o n , i n order to have f u l l c ontrol over his actions. In-sight, which replaces ignorance, and renunciation, which replaces t h i r s t and c l i n g i n g , are both the s u f f i c i e n t conditions for complete freedom. The man endowed with ins i g h t ( i . e . , what amounts to freedom-to) and s e l f - c o n t r o l ( i . e . , freedom-from), his behavior i s of a nonforceful nature. By nonforcefulness is meant two things. F i r s t , i t i s spontaneous a c t i v i t y because i t is free from the karmic forces of ignorance and t h i r s t compelling the person to s t r i v e a f t e r desired objects; objects which i n r e a l i t y are empty (suffna-). Spontaneity is the action of one who is at ease, r e s i l i e n t , i n s i g h t f u l , and in f u l l c ontrol of himself and the s i t u a t i o n . This i s in contrast to one whose actions are compelled by forces out of his c o n t r o l . Spontaneity is action free from attachment. Second, the man who i s completely free, his behavior is nonforceful because i t does not reproduce new kamma-, which leads to bondage, etc. From the proceeding analysis of kamma- and renunciation . (nekkhamma-), one can surmise that the Buddhist conceives of man as one who possesses the sole a b i l i t y to determine the nature of his personality and behavior. Ig-norance, t h i r s t , attachment, habits of mind and action are a l l of his own accord. Likewise, i t i s he alone who r i d s himself of these self-imposed forces which rob him of f l e x i b i l i t y and spontaneity. It i s the i n d i v i d u a l who causes his own bondage and brings about his own freedom. 36 Notes Hi.1:324, trans, by Kalupahana, BP, p. 47. 2 I b i d . , p. 47. JThe proceeding paragraphs follow the explanation i n B_P, pp. 46-47. ^See Compendium0, pp. 235-36. ^Guenther, Philosophy and Psychology of Abhidharma, Lucknow, 1957, p. 62. ^A.6:13. In respect to the f i v e aggregates, the samkhara's activa t e the other four. 7The idea of " f o r c e f u l " and "nonforceful" are taken from Presuppositions° pp. 131-35. ~~ Q Nolan Jacobson, Buddhism: The Rel i g i o n of Analysis, London, 1966, pp. 72-73.. ^Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, The Abhidhamma Philosophy, p. 212, c i t e d by Jacob-son, J_bid. , p. 72. ^ P r e s u p p o s i t i o n s 0 , pp. 15-16. U I b i d . , pp. 38-39'. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF BONDAGE AND FREEDOM This chapter i s an examination of the word papanca- as i t occurs i n the P a l i Canon and i t s p o s i t i o n within the Theravadin conception of the i n t e r n a l conscious process and the external perceived and interpreted world. It i s also an examination of the Theravada Buddhist analysis of the nature of d i s c r i m i n a t i v e knowledge (vinnana-) i n r e l a t i o n to the hu-man condition or e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n ( i . e . , samsara-) and penetrative knowledge (pafma-) i n r e l a t i o n to transcendence ( i . e . , nibbana-). Consciousness or Discriminative Knowledge (Vinnana-) The human dilemma of bondage arises from the conscious process and the forces which condition and regenerate i t , when man mistakenly pre-supposes phenomena to be permanent, s u b s t a n t i a l , and s a t i s f a c t o r y , as well as mistakenly i d e n t i f y i n g the continuum of conscious states as an abiding ego-entity underlying the entire process. As previously stated, "In Buddhism there i s no actor apart from action, no p e r c i p i e n t apart from perception. In other words, there i s no conscious subject behind consciousness."1 Consciousness (vinnana-) may be defined as "a subject cognizant of an object," i . e . , the subject (arammanika-)-object (arammana-) r e l a t i o n -ship. It is conditioned by the delusion that an abiding subject under-' l i e s i t and by the delusion that objects outside oneself can be conceived-of as objective r e a l s , i . e . , that one's cognitions o b j e c t i v e l y r e f l e c t r e a l i t y ; and i t i s conditioned by c e r t a i n acquired d i s p o s i t i o n s (samkhara 2) that a f f e c t either an a t t r a c t i o n - t o or repulsion-from, or neutral r e a c t i o n towards a phenomenon. It i s c o n t i n u a l l y regenerated by the impulse of 38 ignorance, or i n this case, the want of insight into the nature of r e a l i t y , whereby a l l cognitions by th e i r inherent nature are seen as delusions or empty, because both subject and object, as well as the judgments projected onto the world are held to be s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e a l , while i n truth they are empty. Consciousness i s also regenerated by the drive of t h i r s t or craving, which causes habitual a c t i v i t y directed towards objects mistakenly, presup-posed as s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t e n t i t i e s . Vinriana- may also be described as " d i s c r i m i n a t i v e knowledge" or as "cognition" ( i . e . , awareness + judgment).-^ i t i s r e l a t i v e because i t i s the i n t e r a c t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between the external perceived world and the i n t e r n a l conceived world. These r e l a t i o n s h i p s manifested as.some sort of mental image, e.g., concepts, ideas, judgments, words, etc., r e l a t e the objective world into subjective terms. Because of ignorance, these r e l a -t i v e notions are held by the i l l u s i o n a r y s e l f as o b j e c t i v e l y r e a l . The word papauca- as found i n the Nikayas^ represents this i n t e r a c t i n g r e l a -tionship. It serves the function of conceptualizing or d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g the world into phenomena. In i t s subjective aspect i t i s consciousness, i n i t s objective aspect i t is the phenomenal world. I w i l l have more to A/ say about papanca- in the succeeding sections of this chapter. The tr a n s i t o r y character (aniccalakkhana-) of the human existence i s represented i n t e r n a l l y by the f l e e t i n g moments of thought or states or consciousness, and externally by the slow, yet continous change of the body. The Buddhist compare this to the flow of a r i v e r having.its source i n b i r t h and i t s mouth in death. Since b i r t h and death are merely communicating doors from one l i f e to another, the stream of causally connected processes — that i s , continuous processes of consciousness (in which alone existence i s represented)--is the medium un i t i n g the d i f f e r e n t l i v e s of an i n -39 d i v i d u a l (as w e l l as the d i f f e r e n t moments and phases w i t h i n one l i f e ) . . . . t h e r e c a n be no q u e s t i o n about t h e r i v e r ' s e x i s t e n c e , and d o u b t l e s s one can speak o f i t s r e a l i t y i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e . But t h i s i s not o b j e c t i v e i n a m a t e r i a l sense. I t i s the r e l a t i o n s o f m a t e r i a l , t e m p o r a l , and s p a t i a l k i n d , e x i s t i n g among the c h a n g i n g components, t h a t form the c o n s t a n t element. I n t h e same way, t h e c o n s t a n c y o f r e l a t i o n s i n the e v e r r e n e w i n g p r o c e s s o f becoming c o n s c i o u s (being, c o n s c i o u s does not e x i s t i n r e a l i t y , but o n l y c o n s t a n t becoming con-s c i o u s ) , c r e a t e s the i l l u s i o n o f an ' e g o - e n t i t y ' or an u n changeable p e r s o n a l i t y . 5 C o n s c i o u s n e s s i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Govinda's a n a l y s i s , " a phenomenon o f r e s i s t e n c e - - a n o b s t r u c t i o n o f the s t r e a m o f b e i n g . . . ."^ a r e s u l t o f the t e n s i o n between two components: movement and i n e r t i a . Movement r e p r e -s e n t s the r a d i c a l becoming o r t r a n s i t o r i n e s s of a l l t h i n g s . I n e r t i a i s the d e s i r e l a t e n t i n the c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s f o r permanence, s u b s t a n t i a l i t y , arid s a t i s f a c t i o n ; and the d e s i r e f o r s e l f - m a i n t e n a n c e - o r the d e s i r e f o r d u r a t i o n i n c o n s c i o u s b e i n g s r e p r e s e n t e d by the n o t i o n o f a p e r s i s t i n g " s e l f " i n man. F i g u r a t i v e l y s p e a k i n g , The Stream of B e i n g , t h e n , i s an i n d i s p e n s a b l e c o n d i t i o n or f a c t o r , the £ine qua* non of p r e s e n t c o n s c i o u s e x i s t e n c e ; i t i s the r a i s o n d ' ^ t r e of i n d i v i d u a l l i f e ; i t i s the l i f e - c o n t i n u u m ; i t i s , as i t were, the background on which thought p i c t u r e s a r e drawn. I t i s comparable to the c u r r e n t o f a r i v e r when i t f l o w s c a l m l y on, un-h i n d e r e d by any o b s t a c l e , u n r u f f l e d by any w i n d , u n r i p p l e d by any wave; and n e i t h e r r e c e i v i n g t r i b u t a r y w a t e r s , nor p a r t i n g w i t h i t s c o n t e n t s t o the w o r l d . And when t h a t c u r r e n t i s opposed by an ob-s t a c l e of thought from the w o r l d w i t h i n or p e r t u r b e d by t r i b u t a r y streams o f the senses from the w o r l d w i t h o u t , then t h o u g h t s ( v i t h i -c i t t a ' s ) a r i s e . But i t must not be supposed t h a t the s t r e a m o f b e i n g i s a s u b p l a n e from w h i c h thoughts r i s e t o the s u r f a c e . There i s j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f momentary s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , s u b l i m i n a l and s u p r a l i m i n a l , t h r o u g h o u t a l i f e - t i m e and from e x i s t e n c e t o e x i s t e n c e . But t h e r e i s no s u p e r p o s i t i o n o f such s t a t e . 7 The t e n s i o n o r v i b r a t i o n between movement and i n e r t i a s e e m i n g l y i n t e r r u p t s the s t r e a m of b e i n g . The l o n g e r t h i s i n t e r r u p t i o n c o n t i n u e s the more i n t e n s i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s becomes. Because c o n s c i o u s n e s s i t s e l f , as a phenomenon o f r e s i s t e n c e , i s a c o n s t a n t l y renewed e f f o r t to p e r s i s t , and i n t h i s r e s p e c t , i n e v e r y phase i d e n t i c a l w i t h the p r e v i o u s ones. Hence the e x p e r i e n c e " I am I . " One c o u l d d e f i n e f u r t h e r m o r e : i f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s a phenomenon 4 0 of resistence i t must appear the most intensive in those forms of existence which are exposed to the greatest o b s t a c l e s . 8 The more change, the more movement, the more o s c i l l a t i o n of form, the stronger the desire for persistency becomes. It i s under this tension between movement and the desire for i n e r t i a that consciousness operates. The tension caused by an apparent obstruction to the Stream of Being, then, is the disharmony, disequilibrium, disjointedness, or dis-ease (duk-kha-) created when man psychologically sets himself in opposition to r e a l i t y as i t r e a l l y i s . This mental disharmony i s c a l l e d a v i j j a , ignorance, or " S e l f - d e l u s i o n . Under i t s influence everything w i l l be valued from the egocentric stand point of desire (tariha) . . . . The very essence of l i f e i s change, while the essence of c l i n g i n g i s to r e t a i n , to s t a b i l i z e , to prevent change. This i s why change appears to us as s u f f e r i n g . . . . It i s therefore not the "world" or i t s t r a n s i t o r i n e s s which i s the cause of s u f f e r i n g but our a t t i t u d e towards i t , our c l i n g i n g to i t , our t h i r s t , our ignorance.^ Human behavior, whether i t be craving ( i . e . , a t t r a c t i o n - t o ) , aversion or r e j e c t i o n ( i . e . , repulsion-from), or freedom from both extremes, depends on whether one is in harmony or disharmony with himself and the world, or whether one i s endowed with insight and s e l f - c o n t r o l or ignorance and t h i r s t A t t r a c t i o n - t o and repulsion-from are attempts to adjust the tensions between a mistakenly presupposed s e l f - e x i s t e n t " I " or "ego" and s e l f - e x i s t e n t " t h i s ' and "that's," either for the s a t i s f a c t i o n of one's desires or to a n n i h i l a t e opposing forces. Every such v o l i t i o n a l action (kamma-) occasions, i n return an equally strong' reaction back to the source of action, i . e . , back to the causal agent. Every desire begets more w i l l i n g , every act of obstruction begets more resistence to change. Every act done for the sake of s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n is the seed sown which y i e l d s as i t s f r u i t more seeds to be sown l a t e r . Harmony or equilibrium between subject and object cannot occur so long 41 as (1) the delusion of mistaking subject and object, and the judgments superimposed on both, as substantial e n t i t i e s ' o c c u r s ; so long as (2) con-sciousness continues to d i f f e r e n t i a t e the world into " I ' s , " "this'.s" and "that's" which have no objective basis; and so- long as (3) an obsession for the so-called "things" of the world is present. The i m p o s s i b i l i t y of the equilibrium of the state of tension, the t o t a l discrepancy between subjective w i l l i n g and o b j e c t i v e l y given facts, the disharmony between ideation and a c t u a l i t y , i s what we c a l l s u f f e r i n g . The conquest of this disharmony, of these idiosyn-c r a s i e s , the lo s i n g of the above-mentioned t i e , i n short, the re-lease into the state of inner freedom, does not come about through the suppression of the w i l l , but through the removal of the vaccum, that i s , through the a n n i h i l a t i o n of the i l l u s i o n (consisting pre-c i s e l y i n the taking of the ego for an absolute). A l l s u f f e r i n g arises from a fa l s e a t t i t u d e . The world i s neither good nor bad. It i s s o l e l y our r e l a t i o n s h i p to i t which makes i t either the one or the other.10 The world i s never what we conceptually make i t . The r e l a t i o n s h i p of the "normal" person to the world is that of ignorance and t h i r s t , of disharmony with himself and the external world, of personal struggle for and against forces s u b j e c t i v e l y interpreted as permanent, s u b s t a n t i a l , and s a t i s f a c t o r y . The objects of one's perceptions become "I"-conditioned, d i f f e r e n t i a t e d as "things," clothed i n a t t r i b u t e s desirable and undesirable, s e t i n contrast to other so-called "things" and from one's imaginary " s e l f , " a l l due to the presence of ignorance and t h i r s t . The human dilemma arises from the conscious process, since for consciousness to function i t must as-sume that both subject and object are s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e a l . Objectively this does not correspond to fa c t . As such, the normal man can never see r e a l i t y as i t r e a l l y is because he sees the world through the workings of the con-scious mind, a mind conditioned by ignorance and t h i r s t . " Papanca- and Sense-perception 42 Buddhism recognized that a l l average and normal in d i v i d u a l s gain knowledge from the i n t e r a c t i o n of t h e i r sense-faculties (of which ma no- is one), and respective sense-objects. The resultant type of knowledge a r i s i n g , from this i n t e r a c t i o n i s c a l l e d papanca-" d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , m u l t i p l i c i t y , expansiveness." This term ref e r s more or less to the mental and material organism as perceiver and the external world as perceived.12 Papanca- (pa + pane-: "to spread out, expand, d i f f u s e , manifest, etc.") may be translated as either " d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , or pro-l i f e r a t i o n (of concepts)." It is the generic term used i n the Nikayas for the i n t e r n a l mental apparatus and the external world perceived and interpreted subjec t i v e l y by the i n d i v i d u a l . In the Madhupindika-sutta^ paparfca- i s connected with the process of sense-perception.I 4 1) Because of sight and material shapes, Brothers, v i s u a l consciousness ( a r i s e s ) ; the coming together of the three i s sensual contact: be-cause of sensual contact sensation ( a r i s e s ) ; . . . An impersonal, nonsubjective tone i s found only up to the point of f e e l -ing or sensation (vedana-). The process now takes on a personal, subjec-tive tense suggestive of deliberate or v o l i t i o n a l a c t i v i t y (kamma-), evident, by the change in grammatical struture. 2) . . . what one senses, one perceives; what one perceives, one reckons or r e f l e c t s on ( v i t a k k e t i ) ; what one reckons, one d i f f e r e n t i a t e s or p r o l i f e r a t e s (conceptually) (papanceti); . . . Vitakka- (reckoning, reasoning, r e f l e c t i n g ) denotes the i n i t i a l a p p l i c a t i o n of thought, while papanca- refe r s to the consequent p r o l i f i c i t y i n ideation. The tendency towards d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of concepts i s the fundamental sense A/ of papanca- as applied here. The p r o l i f e r a t i o n of concepts envisaged by papanca- tends to obscure o b j e c t i v e l y given facts received i n i t i a l l y i n the process of perception, inasmuch as i t i s an unwarrented deviation which eventually gives r i s e to an obsession-'--' for the so-called "things" d i f f e r -entiated. 43 The deliberate a c t i v i t y implied by the t h i r d person verbs, v i z . , v e d e t i (he senses), sanjanati (he perceives), vitakketj. (he reckons), and papanceti (he d i f f e r e n t i a t e s ) , ends at papanceti. What occurs next is the most t e l l i n g stage of cognition. "Apparently, i t is no longer a mere contingent process, nor i s i t an a c t i v i t y d e l i b e r a t e l y directed, but  an inexorable subjection to an objective order of things. At this f i n a l stage of sense perception, he who has h i t h e r t o been the subject now becomes the hapless o b j e c t . " l ^ 3) . . . what one d i f f e r e n t i a t e s or p r o l i f e r a t e s (conceptually), because of that, concepts characterized by obsessed perceptions a s s a i l a man i n regard to the v i s i b l e objects cognized by sight belonging to the past, present, and future . . . . (M.1:111) This f i n a l passage refe r s to the world perceived by the p r o l i f i c conceptual-i z i n g tendency of the conscious mind (papanca-sanna-samkha). The person becomes overwhelmed or subjected by the concepts he has evolved. This i s p a r t l y due to c e r t a i n p e c u l i a r i t i e s inherent in the medium of language. Language is composed of conventional-relational verbal designations which are'but symbolic representations of the r e a l objective world, i . e . , they are subjective expressions used to r e l a t e the objective world into conven-t i o n a l - r e l a t i o n a l modes of communication, whose r e a l i t y i s purely subjective, existent only i n the mind. These designations enjoy a sense of r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y i n that they divide a dynamically becoming world into seemingly s t a t i c beings. Because of ignorance, one w i l l equate verbal designations with the things they point at, etc. (see pp. 20-21). Conditioned either by one or a l l of these mistaken presuppositions, and because of the constant d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g tendency inherent in consciousness, papanca- weaves i n the person "a labyrinthine network of concepts connecting the three periods of time through processes of recognition, retrospection, and speculation. The 44 t a n g l e maze w i t h i t s a p p a r e n t o b j e c t i v i t y e n t i c e s the w o r l d i n g and u l t i m a t e l y o b s e s s e s and overwhelms him. The Buddha has compared the a g g r e g a t e o f con-s c i o u s n e s s t o a c o n j u r o r ' s t r i c k o r an i l l u s i o n (may!') . . . . "'The Kinsman o f the Sun', ( t h e Buddha) has compared c o r p o r e a l i t y t o a mass o f foam, f e e l i n g s t o a b u b b l e , p e r c e p t i o n s t o a m i r a g e , v o l i -t i o n a l - a c t i v i t i e s t o a p l a n t a i n - t r e e , and c o n s c i o u s n e s s t o an i l l u s i o n . " (S.3:142)17 What d i f f e r e n t i a t e s the man who i s f r e e from the man who i s bound i s t h a t the man who i s c o m p l e t e l y f r e e t r u l y u n d e r s t a n d s the n a t u r e o f a l l c o n -c e p t i o n s , and as s u c h , does not become o b s e s s e d by them. The man who i s i g n o r a n t , a t the mercy o f h i s own " I " - c o n d i t i o n e d t h i r s t s , b e l i e v e s t h a t c o n c e p t s — e . g . , w e a l t h , fame, w o r t h , p r e s t i g e , p o s i t i o n , p o v e r t y , b e a u t y and u g l i n e s s , r i g h t and wrong, good and e v i l , money, and so o n — a r e o b j e c -t i v e l y r e a l , when i n t r u t h t h e y a r e but r e l a t i v e s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e s . F o r i n s t a n c e , p e o p l e o f t e n argue over what they p e r c e i v e t o be " r i g h t " and "wrong," from a p o s i t i o n they b e l i e v e i s a b s o l u t e l y t r u e . A c o n f r o n t a -t i o n o f o p p o s i n g p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s o f t e n l e a d s t o v e r b a l and sometimes p h y s i c a l c o n f l i c t . When the c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s e l e v a t e d t o the l e v e l o f a n a t i o n a l i d e o l o g y o p p o s i n g a n o t h e r n a t i o n a l i d e o l o g y o f t e n the outcome i s armed c o n f l i c t . Wars a r e f o u g h t over m e n t a l l y f a b r i c a t e d v a l u e s , o p i n i o n s , p r i o r i t i e s , e t c . , because the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d a r e o b s e s s e d by what t h e y p e r c e i v e as r i g h t and wrong, v a l u a b l e or d e s i r a b l e , e t c . , and a c t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s . A l l v e r b a l d e s i g n a t i o n s a r e m e n t a l f a b r i c a t i o n s whose r e l a t i v e r e a l i t y v a r i e s from p e r s o n t o p e r s o n and from time t o t i m e . They a r e n e i t h e r e t e r n a l nor s u b s t a n t i a l , and by no means would t h e B u d d h i s t m a i n t a i n , can t h e y p r o -v i d e l a s t i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n . Even v e r b a l d e s i g n a t i o n s such as t h e f o u r Noble T r u t h s , or samsara- and n i b b a n a - , s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d as s y m b o l i c r e p r e -45 sentations of the human condition, i t s r e s o l u t i o n , and the nature of exis-tence, not as representations i n an absolute sense. To penetrate beyond their inherent l i m i t a t i o n s , most important, to penetrate to the absolute truth beyond a l l r e l a t i v e projections one must gain that penetrative know-ledge or insight (panria-) which transcends the operations of the conscious mind. What occurs i n the process of sense-perception i s that the mind (mano-) receives a sensation from a sense facu l t y (indriya-) having come i n contact with i t s respective object (visaya-). After the point of sensation (vedana-), the ego-consciousness intrudes thereafter fashioning the remaining process. The i n d i v i d u a l personality, then, s u b j e c t i v e l y interprets the sensation ac-cording his d i s p o s i t i o n and his ide a t i o n a l and cognitive processes inherent in consciousness. In this case, papanca- refers to (1) the subject as per-ceiver obsessed by his own perceptions, and (2) the objective world as con-ceived by one's perceptions. ". . . we are tol d that the s i x spheres (aya-tana-) of contact between the. senses and the i r respective objects conduce to the operation of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n and that both lead to disharmony or dukkha-: Anguttara-Nikaya II.162-3: So long as the s i x spheres of contact operate, brother, so too does d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ; so long as d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n operates, so too do the six spheres of contact. Brother, the cessation and calming down of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i s due to the complete and passionless cessation of the six sense spheres of contact. Other passages that may be rel a t e d to the above are the following: Sutta Nipata 530: Having severed each and every d i v e r s i f i e d mental and material (com-ponent) both i n t e r n a l l y and externally (as) the root of sickness, u t t e r l y freed from the bonds, of the root of every sickness, such a person is proclaimed to be in r e a l i t y the one who has found out. 46 Maj jhima-Nikaya 1.65 Monks, whatever t o i l e r s or brahmans do not penetratively know the a r i s i n g and disappearance of these two f a l s e opinions ( i . e . , of a n n i h i l a t i o n and becoming), as well as (their) r e l i s h , danger, and escape as they r e a l l y are, (they) are attached, (they) have aversion, (they) are deluded, (they) have craving, (they) have c l i n g i n g , (they) are ignorant, (they) have approved (this attachment) and are obstructed (by anger), they take pleasure i n d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ; (as such) they are not u t t e r l y freed from ( r e - ) b i r t h , ageing, sorrows, lamentations, phys-i c a l pains, mental g r i e f s , despairs, I say they are not u t t e r l y freed from disharmony. Samyutta-Nikaya IV.71: Men i n general are possessed of the notion of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . Pos-sessed of this notion they approach the a r t i f i c e of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . Having d i s p e l l e d a l l that consists of mano- (the thinking organ or process) and ( a l l that) i s connected to the l a y - l i f e , he approaches that which is connected to renunciation. . Sutta Nipata 734: Whatever disharmony a r i s e s , a l l (of i t ) comes from conditioned con-sciousness; with the cessation of conditioned consciousness d i s -harmony also ceases. "These passages reveal that empirical, sensual perception—indeed, the mental p r o c e s s — l e a d man to bondage i n samsara- or papanca-. The object of this process is ideated as the phenomenal world."I 8 Turning back to the Madhupindika-sutta, M.1:109: If, 0 monk, one neither delights in, nor asserts, nor c l i n g s to, that which makes one subject to concepts characterized by the p r o l i f i c ten-dency, then that i t s e l f i s the end of the p r o c l i v i t i e s to attachment, views, pride, ignorance, and attachment to becoming. That i t s e l f i s the end of taking the s t i c k , of taking the weapon, of quarreling, con-tending, disputing, accusation, slander, and l y i n g speech. Here i t i s that these e v i l u n s k i l l e d states cease without residue.19 What one should neither delight i n , nor assert, nor c l i n g to are the con-ceptions which a r i s e from the process of sense-perception, here a process which comprehends the objective world from a subjective point of view. The obsessions generated by sense-perception are craving or t h i r s t (tanha-), conceit (mana-), and dogmatic views ( d i t t h i - ) or speculations, a l l bound up 47 with the notions of " I " and "mine." The notion of an abiding ego or sub-ject underlying consciousness i s a fundamental presupposition of the subject-object r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s the very essence of vi?nfena-. From the stage of vedana- (sensation), the dichotomy or tension between subject and object is maintained u n t i l f u l l y c r y s t a l i z e d and j u s t i f i e d at the l e v e l of concep-tion. The paradox i s the objective fact that the ego-notion i s an extension (paparfca-) in thought and not ,true to objective f a c t s . Given the ego-consciousness, the e v e r - p r o l i f i c process of conceptuali-zation in a l l i t s complex r a m i f i c a t i o n s , sets i n . From one aspect, the notion of " I " with i t s concomitant notions of "my" and "mine," develops towards craving (tanha). Viewed from another aspect, as i n e v i t a b l y and inextrincably bound up with the notions of "not-I," of "thou" and "thine," i t i s a form of measuring or value-judgment (mana). Yet another aspect i s the dogmatic adherence to the concept of an ego as a t h e o r e t i c a l formulation. Thus Craving, Conceit, and Views (tanha, mana, d i t t h i ) are but three aspects of the self-same ego-consciousness, and we find these alluded to i n the Madhupindika Sutta by the expressions, "abhinanditabbam," "abhivaditabbam," and "ajjhosetabbam" ("delights i n , asserts, c l i n g s " ) . . . . Of s i m i l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e are the three standpoints from which the worlding i s said to view each of his Five Aggregates when he thinks of them as "This is mine" ("etam mama"), "This am I" ("eso' ham asmi"), "This is my s e l f " ("eso me atta") . . . . . . . the three terms Craving, Conceit, and Views . . . a r i s e from the self-same matrix of the super-imposed ego, they are not to be considered mutually exclusive. Now the p r o l i f i c i t y i n concepts suggested by the term "papanca" manifests i t s e l f through the above three main channels, so much so that, the term has been t r a d i t i o n a l l y associated with them Craving, Conceit, and Views . . . these are therefore " d e f i n i t i o n s of extension," seeking to define "paparfca" by giving i t s most notable i n -stances. 20 We may now summarize the message of the Madhupindika-sutta. One may become free from the yoke of p r o l i f e r a t i n g concepts, thereby eradicating the tension between subject and object, i . e . , dukkha- (disharmony, d i s -equilibrium, dis-ease), provided that one does not entertain or become obsessed by way of t h i r s t , conceit, and dogmatic views with regard to the 48 phenomenal world as perceived sub j e c t i v e l y through the process of sense-perception. As such, the person w i l l not become entangled i n disputes or c o n f l i c t s with-another over personal wants, value judgments, or speculations, theories, points of view, etc.; and free from personal biases and prejudices, and the p r o c l i v i t i e s towards objects believed to be eternal, s u b s t a n t i a l , and s a t i s f a c t o r y , the person is free to see r e a l i t y as i t r e a l l y i s . According, then, to the Madhupindika-sutta's formula of sense-percep-ti o n , which may be regarded as the locus c l a s s l c u s for our examination of papa'nca-, papa*nca- is used as a generic term to describe (1) the i n d i v i d u a l as perceiver obsessed with (2) what he has conceived, i . e . , the phenomenal world. The habitual or inveterate tendency towards d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n which leads to the threefold obsessions (tanha-, mana-, and d i t t h i - ) estranges the person from nibbana-. He who is given to d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , d e l i g h t i n g i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , he f a i l s to gain nibbana-, the unsurpassed freedom from bondage. And he who having given up d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , d e l i g h t i n g on the path to n o h d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , he gains nibbana-, the unsurpassed freedom from bondage.21 According to James Santucci: The person in bondage . . . i s incapable of seeing the world as i t r e a l l y i s . His v i s i o n of i t i s li m i t e d by his mental apparatus (veda-_na, sa^rTa-, samkhara-, vinnana-) which i n turn i s clouded and made im-pure by the defilements (J5.ile£a-), tai n t s (asava-), c l i n g i n g s (upadana-), etc. The general conclusion we a r r i v e at concerning papanca-, therefore, is that i t is nothing but a perceptual or psychological technical term equivalent to samsara.22 The V e p a c i t t i - s u t t a , S.4:202f., brings into c l e a r r e l i e f the v i c i o u s d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g tendency in the c o g n i t i v e - i d e a t i o n a l processes implied by papanca-, and the bondage i t causes. . . . so subtle, monks, is the bondage of V e p a c i t t i , yet even more 49 subtle is" the bondage of Mara. He who imagines, monks, i s bound by Mara; he who does not imagine i s freed from the E v i l One. "I am," this i s imagination. "I am t h i s , " this i s imagination. "I w i l l become," . . . "I w i l l not become," . . . "I w i l l become embodied," . . . "I w i l l become formless," . . . "I w i l l become perceptually aware or conscious (sa*nni, "having perception")," . . . "I w i l l not become perceptually aware," . . . "I w i l l become neither perceptually aware nor unaware," . . . . Imagination, monks, i s a disease, imagination is an abscess,imagination i s a barb. Whereby, monks, (you must say:) "we w i l l abide with minds free from imagination." In this way, you must d i s c i p l i n e yourselves. "I am," monks, this i s a g i t a t i o n . . . . "I am," monks, this i s p a l p i t a t i o n . . . . "I am," monks, this i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n or p r o l i f e r a t i o n (of concepts) " I am," monks, th i s i s conceit . . . . The delusion of an ego as the agent behind a l l action i s the root of papanca-as well as imagination (mannita-), a g i t a t i o n ( i n j i t a - ) , p a l p i t a t i o n (phandita-), and conceit (managata-). The notion " I am" i s none other than t h i s concept of an abiding ego which must be eliminated else the problem of bondage w i l l continue. This is brought out c l e a r l y i n the Tuvataka-sutta, Sutta Nipata 915-16: I ask.you, .who are a kinsman of the Adiccas and a great sage, about seclusion and the state of peace, with what manner of i n s i g h t , and not grasping anything in this world, does a bhikkhu r e a l i z e Nibbana? Let him completely cut o f f the root of concepts tinged with the pro-l i f i c tendency, namely, the notion " I am the thinker." So said the Buddha, "Whater inward cravings there be, l e t him t r a i n himself to subdue them being always mindful.23 The mistaken assumption "I am" i s said to be the root of a l l disharmony. It leads to attachment or passion (raga-), aversion or hatred (dosa-), and delusion (moha-), as well as t h e i r symptomatic manifestations i n society as quarrels (kalaha-), s t r i f e (viggaha-), dispute (vivada-), conceit (manatimana-), slander (pesurma-), jealousy and avarice (issamacchariya-), etc. "'To know' means to have a conditioning (and conditioned) apparatus 50 for i n t e r i o r i z i n g existence. Existence becomes human existence when i t i s interpreted; and human existence includes the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e scheme provided by cognition. A person apprehends that aspect of existence which his patterns of s e n s i t i v i t y permit him to perceive . . . ."24 Papanca-re f e r s to the conscious a c t i v i t i e s which in t e r p r e t the world according to one's personal p r o c l i v i t i e s , as well as the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n themselves trans-lated into conceptions. In t h i s case, papanca- i s the i n t e r a c t i o n between-"subject" and "object" established on the f a l s e c r i t e r i a that endows both subject and object with s e l f - e x i s t e n c e (sabhava-). - Consciousness cannot occur without the subject-object r e l a t i o n s h i p ( i . e . , the perceptions co-alesce to form a phenomenon), whereby the three elements, v i z . , subject, object, and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p , are mutually interdependent for t h e i r momentary occurrence. As such, they cannot be Considered as s u b s t a n t i a l e n t i t i e s , but as merely mental constructions or f a b r i c a t i o n s (paparfca-). When ignorance and d i s p o s i t i o n s ( a v i j j a - and samkhara) are absent, then the inveterate tendency to p r o l i f e r a t e conceptually and to become over-whelmed by either an a t t r a c t i o n - t o or repulsion-from what one conceived ceases to occur. The conscious mind cannot ex i s t independent of the "objects of know-ledge" that appear to be external to the mind. It i s t h i s h a b i t u a l ten-dency inherent i n the conscious process to construct phenomena and to become obsessed by one's own constructions that, i s the source of bondage. From a subjective o r i e n t a t i o n , the construction of the phenomenal world was seen to depend on craving (trsna) for i l l u s i o n a r y "things;" t h i s construction, however, resulted i n binding the energies of l i f e , and this bondage i s experience as sorrow (duhkha).25 In contrast, when one f u l l y r e a l i z e s that h i s mental constructions A/A/ are empty (sunna-), then the f a l s e c r i t e r i a which establishes d i f f e r e n t i a -51 tion (papanca-) dissipates freeing him from the net of his own thoughts. One becomes completely aware that there i s no "thing" dis s i p a t e d nor a d i s s i p a t o r asided from the conventional-relational notions regarding these concepts. In this way, the l i b e r a t e d man i s released from t h i r s t i n g for and a f t e r i l l u s i o n a r y ultimates and converts his energies from binding constructions to l i b e r a t i n g d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . The man endowed with " r e l i g i o u s " or "saying knowledge" understands that there i s no "being" outside of "being v e r b a l l y designated." He knows this not because such knowledge melts away the frozen d i s t i n c t i o n s of con-cepts back to some preexisting essence, nor because i t r e l a t e s facts and feelings to an i n d i v i d u a l self-consciousness or ego, rather, because the i n s i g h t f u l and s e l f - c o n t r o l l e d man sees that a l l things are empty of sabhava-(s e l f - e x i s t e n c e ) . There i s no ultimate essence or essences and no abiding subject behind consciousness. And because the man endowed with saving knowledge sees a l l things as empty, he neither has hatred or desire for them. He has no desire to control them and r e a l i z e s that they cannot con-t r o l him. According to Buddhist doctrine, then, man must r e a l i z e that there are no d i s t i n c t i o n s between things because that which i s distinguished has some kind of i n t r i n s i c r e a l i t y which "marks" i t o f f from something else, and this i s contrary to f a c t . What human beings perceive as d i s t i n c t i v e e n t i t i e s or segments of existence is a r e s u l t of mental f a b r i c a t i o n s . These e n t i t i e s . . . do not exist i n themselves; they exist because they are "named"--distinguished from something else. And the names given to that conglomerate of impulses, perceptions, and sensations c a l l e d "things" are useful only for p r a c t i c a l , conventional l e v e l of l i f e . 2 6 The dilemma of papanca- i s that the person s l i p s into the error of regard-ing these conventional-relational d i s t i n c t i o n s as absolute f a c t s , unable 52 to see that these d i s t i n c t i o n s are a c t u a l l y empty of objective r e a l i t y . Every object of perception or imagination requires a mental f a b r i c a -tion, and therefore every d i s t i n c t i o n p a r t i c i p a t e s i n this f a b r i c a -t i o n . . . . I f , on the other hand, this d i s t i n c t i o n is accompanied by the assumption or conviction of an absolute r e a l i t y , then psychic energies are stimulated which bind the person to the f a b r i c a t i o n . It is being bound to f a b r i c a t i o n which i s samsara. Because of the danger in language to posit an e s s e n t i a l r e a l i t y with ideas, mental a c t i v i t y has been regarded with disfavor as a means for r e a l i z i n g Ultimate Truth.27 It i s ignorance and t h i r s t which lead to attachment in regard to con-cepts and the habitual tendency to conceptualize and become obsessed with one's own mental constructions that i s the source of bondage. In this way, papanca- is a technical term used as a synonym for samsara-. The route to freedom from bondage to concepts is the path of n o n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . To gain freedom, we must t r a i n ourselves not to think of an " I " d i s -t i n c t from a "that," and . to do that, we must t r a i n ourselves not to think of "thats" clothed in d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s . By doing t h i s , we gain freedom; we also gain a d i r e c t i n s i g h t into things-in-themselves which constitutes the stream of r e a l i t y N o n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n (Nippapanca-), Insight or Penetrative Knowledge (Panna-), and Freedom (Vimokkha-) The path of n o n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n or n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n of concepts (nip-papanca-) i s discussed in the Sakkapanha-sutta of the Digha-Nikaya.^ In this discourse, the Buddha traces the o r i g i n of disharmony through a causally connected series of mental stages, v i z . : enviness and selfishness (issa-macchariya-) a r i s e because of p r o c l i v i t i e s towards things l i k e d and d i s l i k e d (piyappiya-); things l i k e d and d i s l i k e d a r i s e because of desire (chanda-.) ; desire from r a t i o c i n a t i o n or reckoning (vitakka-); and r a t i o c i n -A/ <*V~ ation from concepts characterized by obsessed perceptions (papanca-sanna-A/ <*V samkha-). The.path leading to the cessation of papanca-sanna-samkha- con-s i s t s of a method of mental c u l t i v a t i o n (bhavana-) aimed at the progressive elimination of vitakka- and v i c a r a - ( i n i t i a l and sustained thought). 3^ 53 According to the Sakkapanha-sutta: But how, s i r , has that bhikkhu gone about, who has reached the path suitable for and leading to the cessation of concepts tinged with the p r o l i f e r a t i n g tendency? Happiness, r u l e r of gods, I declare to be twofold, according as i t is to be followed a f t e r or avoided. Unhappiness too, I declare to be twofold . . . . Equanimity, too, I declare to be twofold . . . . And the d i s t i n c t i o n I have affirmed i n happiness, was drawn on these grounds: When in following a f t e r happiness one perceives that bad qualities, develop and good q u a l i t i e s are diminished that kind of happiness should be avoided. And when following a f t e r happiness one perceives that bad q u a l i t i e s are diminished and good q u a l i t i e s develop, then such happiness should be followed. Now of such happi-ness as i s accompanied by r a t i o c i n a t i o n (vitakka) and of such as i s not accompanied, the l a t t e r is more excellent. Again, r u l e r of gods, when I declare Unhappiness to be twofold . . . the l a t t e r i s the more excellent . . . . Again, r u l e r of gods, when I declare equanimity to be twofold . . . the l a t t e r i s the more ex-c e l l e n t . And i t i s i n this wise that a bhikkhu, 0 r u l e r of gods, must have gone about, who has reached the path suitable for the leading to the cessation of concepts tinged with the p r o l i f e r a t i n g tendency.31 It is important to note, that although vitakka-and v i c a r a - are used to develop the c u l t i v a t i o n of wholesome mental states and conducive to the elimination of unwholesome mental states, they themselves, i n turn, must be eliminated to make way for penetrative knowledge or ins i g h t (panna-This i s achieved much in the same way as a carpenter d r i v i n g out a blunt peg with a succession of sharper ones, whereby each successive peg i s re-placed by a sharper one u n t i l f i n a l l y the carpenter is able to p u l l out with ease the sharpest of them a l l . A d e s c r i p t i o n of the progressive elimination of the tendency to d i f f e r e n t i a t e appears in the Potthapada-sutta, D.l:184f.: So, from the time Potthapada, that the bhikkhu i s thus conscious i n a way brought about by himself ( i . e . , from the time of the F i r s t Rapture-^), he goes on from one stage to the next, and from that to the next, u n t i l he reaches the summit of consciousness. And when he i s on the summit of consciousness, i t may occur to him: "To be 54 thinking at a l l , i s the i n f e r i o r state. It were better not to be thinking. Were I to go on thinking and fancying these ideas, these states of consciousness, I have reached, would pass away, but other coarser ones, might a r i s e . And so I w i l l neither think or fancy any more." And he does not. And to him neither thinking any more, nor fancying, the ideas, the states of consciousness he had, pass away; and no others, coarser than they a r i s e . So he touches (the state of) Cessation. Thus i s i t , Potthapada, that the mindful attainment of the cessation of perceptions takes place step by step.34 The sutta- explains how the person steps out of the obsessive c e n t r i p e t a l forces of papanca- having gone through the l e v e l s of consciousness u n t i l he transcends that mode of knowledge with the highest sphere of knowledge, i . e . , penetrative knowledge (paruVa-) which penetrates the v e i l s of i l l u s i o n - - i . e . , mental constructions — to see r e a l i t y as i t r e a l l y i s . This sense of transcendence i s evident in the Uraga-sutta of the Sutta Nipata, 7 -8: From whom ( a l l ) reckoning (vitakka-) which has been sub j e c t i v e l y fabricated are destroyed without residue, that bhikkhu renounces the higher and lower realms just as a snake (sheds) i t s worn-out skin. He who neither goes beyond (or trangresses) or lags behind, he has transcended a l l obsession (papanca-), that bhikkhu renounces the higher and lower realms.just as a snake (sheds) i t s worn-out skin. E t h i c a l l y speaking, the person who has su c c e s s f u l l y renounced the f r u i t s of action, sees that those once conceived f r u i t s or aims of inten-t i o n a l action (kamma-) are a c t u a l l y empty. He "neither transgresses nor lags behind," i . e . , he no longer i n t e n t i o n a l l y acts overwhelmed by his projections of what he d i f f e r e n t i a t e s as desirable and nondesirable. The consummation of the d i s c i p l i n e of sense-restraint develops the mental capacity to >refrain from thinking " i n terms of" (mannana-) sensory data. According to the Bodhivagga of the Udana: Then, Bahiya, thus must you t r a i n yourself: "In the seen there w i l l be just the seen; in the heard, just the heard; in the sensed ( i . e . , the sense impressions received by smelling, t a s t i n g , and touching), just the sensed; i n the cognized, just the cognized. That i s how, 0 Bahiya, you must t r a i n yourself. Now, when, Bahiya, i n the seen 55 there w i l l be to you just the seen, in the heard . . . just the cog-nized, then Bahiya, you w i l l have no 'thereby;' when you have no 'thereby,' then Bahiya, you w i l l have no 'therein;' as*you, Bahiya, w i l l have no 'therein' i t follows that you w i l l have no 'here' or 'beyond,' or 1 midway-between. 1 That i s just the end of 111."35 Bhikkhu Nanananda comments on this passage: The f i r s t part of the exhortation presents s u c c i n c t l y the sura-total of sense-restraint, while the l a t t e r part interprets the philosophy behind i t . This sense-restraint consists i n "stopping-short," at the l e v e l of sense-data without being led astray by them. He who succeeds in t h i s , has tr u l y comprehended the nature of sense-data so that he no longer thinks in term.9 erf them ('na tena' - no 'there-by;' 'na tattha' = no 'therein'). He has thus transcended the super-s t i t i o n s of the grammatical structure as also the verbal dichotomy (nev* idha, na huram, na ubhayamantare = 'neither here nor beyond nor midway-between 1). In short, he has attained the Goal.36 In this way, nippapanca-, the aim of sense-restraint, i s used as a synonym for nibbana- much l i k e papanca- for samsara-. As a r e s u l t of the consum-mation of the path of n o n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n the parson d e s i s t from vain s t r i v i n g (kamma-) caused as a r e s u l t of the habitual tendency to p r o l i f e r a t e concep-t u a l l y , whereby one c l i n g s to his subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s s l i p p i n g into u n r e a l i t y and disharmony. The path of nippapanca- enables the d i s c i p l e to stand aloof and view a l l sense-data o b j e c t i v e l y . Such a v i s i o n i s free from attachment, aversion, and delusion (_raga-, dosa-, and moha-) . The c l e a r , immediate, i n t u i t i v e , objective (,etc.) discernment or v i s i o n of r e a l i t y as i t r e a l l y i s i s known as panna-: "penetrative know-ledge, ins i g h t , (the highest) knowledge or understanding, wisdom, etc." Wisdom i s a "means of knowing" which releases a person from the at-tachment to things . . . wisdom is the presupposition for, and the culmination of, the negation of s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t e n t i t i e s . The aim of wisdom is to melt the chains of greed and t h i r s t for possession of "things." Or to state the same thing from the viewpoint of a r e l i g i o u s goal, i t s aim i s to r e l a t e oneself to a l l "things" i n a ipty r e l a t i o n s h i p , i . e . , t o t a l freedom.37 em According to Buddhaghosa, £ann|- " i s knowledge c o n s i s t i n g in insight associated with wholesome thought." 3 8 He continues i n a lengthy descrip-56 tion of (1) " i n what sense is i t penetrative knowledge?", and (2) "what are i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , function, manifestation, and proximate c a u s e ? " ^ It i s understanding (pan'na) i n the sense of act of understanding (pajanana). What i s this act of understanding? It i s knowing Qanana) in a p a r t i c u l a r mode separate from the modes of perceiving (sarfjjnana) and cognizing (v i janana). For though the state of know-ing (janana-bhava) i s equally present i n perception (sanrfa), i n con-sciousness (virfnana), and in understanding (panna), nevertheless perception i s only the mare perceiving of an object as, say, "blue" or "yellow;" i t cannot bring about the penetration of i t s character-i s t i c s as impermanent, p a i n f u l , and no t - s e l f . Consciousness knows the object as blue and yellow, and i t brings about the penetration of i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , but i t cannot bring about, by endeavouring, the man-i f e s t a t i o n of the (supermundane) path. Understanding knows the object i n the way already stated, i t brings about the penetration of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and i t brings about, by endeavouring, the manifesta-tion of the path. That i s why this act of understanding should be understood as "know-ing i n a p a r t i c u l a r mode separate from the modes of perceiving and cognizing." For that is what the words " i t is understanding i n the sense of act of understanding" refer to. Understanding has the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of p e n e t r a t i n g ^ the i n d i v i d u a l essence of states ( i . e . , their i n d i v i d u a l nature). Its function i s to abolish the darkness of delusion, which conceals the i n d i v i d u a l essences of states. It is manifested as non-delusion. Because of the words "One who i s concentrated knows and sees c o r r e c t l y " i t s proximate cause i s concentration (samadhl).41 From this passage four things can be established: (1) paffffa- i s d i s -tinguished from sanna- and vinnana- because (2) sanna- and vinnana- are not equated with the conditions which cause the occurrence of complete freedom, therefore, (3) panna- i s the highest means of knowledge because i t i s associated with the highest goal, nibbana-; and (4), there i s a c o r r e l a t i o n between knowledge and v i s i o n , e.g., one who knows sees r e a l i t y as i t r e a l l y i s . I w i l l have more to say about this point l a t t e r . Perception and consciousness are legitimate means of knowledge in regards to co n v e n t i o n a l - r e l a t i o n a l matters, but because they d i f f e r e n t i a t e the world into " I " and "non-I," " t h i s ' s " and "that's," they f a i l to free the person from the mistaken assumption of nicca-, at tan-, and sukha-57 (permanence, s u b s t a n t i a l i t y , and s a t i s f a c t i o n ) . What distinguishes panna-from sanna- and vinnana- i s that the person endowed with penetrative know-ledge i s completely free from ignorance and t h i r s t ; ignorance defined as "the nonpenetration of the Noble Truths," while parma- i s "the penetration of the Noble Truths." Paj&a- d i s p e l l s ignorance, t h i r s t , etc., and brings about the complete cessation of bondage and the occurrence of freedom. Penetrative knowledge is associated with nippapanca-, yet one step beyond, in that i t completely r e a l i z e s that d i s t i n c t i o n s constructed for conventional-relational purposes in the phenomenal world are never to be confused with absolute truth which knows these d i s t i n c t i o n s as empty. Panna-is the knowledge of "emptiness" (sunnata-), whereby one endowed with panna-r e a l i z e s that even the notion of "emptiness" i s not an expression of "some-thing," nor is i t a proposition about something. Penetrative knowledge, though i t i s a p e r f e c t i o n of man's i n t e l l e c t , i s not to be equated with conceptual knowledge. It functions by draining away a l l attachments to e n t i t i e s which are a c t u a l l y mental and emotional f a b r i c a t i o n s . This capacity (to d i f f e r e n t i a t e and to become attached to what one d i f f e r e n t i a t e s ) exists because the mind or consciousness does not exist independent of the "objects of knowledge" that appear external to the mind . . . . From early Buddhism onward, the conscious mind (vinnana, yijnana) was understood not as a f a c u l t y that existed i n -dependent of perceived objects, but as a r i s i n g from the i n t e r a c t i o n of "subjective" and "objective" elements. As every e x i s t i n g thing, the conscious mind i s something which has "become;" and the becoming is due to "food," i . e . , a stimulus. If the stimulus ceases, then "what becomes" ceases. Wisdom i s , in part, a concentrative exercise which dissolves the mental and emotional attachment of the apparent mind to "things" (including ideas or assertions), for i t is the awareness that a l l "things" are empty.42 The i n s i g h t f u l and se1f-controlJed man does not r e l y on anything, worldly or otherwise, but let s it a l l go "to give the r e s u l t i n g emptiness 58 a free run, unobstructed by anything whatever, or by the f i g h t against i t . To stop r e l y i n g on anything, to seek nowhere any refuge or support, that i s to be supported by the 'perfection of wisdom.'"43 p anna- i s the mental capacity or power which operates spontaneously, free from the habitual tendency to d i f f e r e n t i a t e and to become attached to what one d i f f e r e n t i a t e s ; and as the perfection of man's i n t e l l i g e n c e , i t transcends conventional-re-l a t i o n a l knowledge with the penetration of absolute truth ( = to r e a l i t y as i t r e a l l y i s ) . Mrs. Rhys Davids writes: Panna was not simply exercise of thought on matters of general know-ledge and pract i c e , nor was i t d i a l e c t i c , nor desultory r e v e r i e . It was i n t e l l i g e n c e diverted by--or rather as--concentrated v o l i t i o n , from lower p r a c t i c a l issues t i l l , as a fusion of sympathy, synthesis, synergy, i t "made to become" that s p i r i t u a l v i s i o n which had not been before.44 -In Buddhism, "becoming" and "knowledge" are coextensive. The character of the i n d i v i d u a l "becomes" or changes along the scale from ignorance to ins i g h t . The unenlightened man constructs his own world through his d i s -criminative knowledge (vinnana-) and produces.attachments i n the process. So long as he d i f f e r e n t i a t e s the world into so-called "things" and h i s energies (kamma-) continue this mental and emotional construction and the attachment which follows, the ignorant man w i l l remain continually i n bondage, constantly i n disharmony within and without. Mrs. Rhys Davids describes the dilemma: Thinking r e s u l t s i n desire, through desire objects are divided into what we l i k e and what we d i s l i k e , hence envy and sel f i s h n e s s , hence quarreling and fighting.45 The binding energies (kamma-) d i s s i p a t e when one achieves that penetration that a l l fabricated phenomena are empty of se l f - e x i s t e n c e . When one t r u l l y sees the world o b j e c t i v e l y , as i t r e a l l y i s , then his v i s i o n and ac t i o n w i l l no longer be in disharmony (dukkha-) to the way things are.46 59 The man of insight and knowledge (vipassana-nana- = panna-) no longer has h i s energies bound by his ignorance and t h i r s t , nor his v i s i o n of r e a l i t y impaired by subjective superimpositions. He i s completely free. Panna- should be understood not as a means to an end, but the end i n i t s e l f . The ignorant man i s bound, while the man of in s i g h t and knowledge i s free. Freedom or l i b e r a t i o n (vimokkha-) i s said to be three f o l d : They are these three, namely, the signless, the d e s i r e l e s s , and the void. For this i s said: "When one who has great r e s o l u t i o n brings (formations) to mind as impermanent, he acquires the signless l i b e r -a t i o n . When one who has great t r a n q u i l l i t y brings (them) to mind, as p a i n f u l , he acquires the des i r e l e s s l i b e r a t i o n . When one who has great wisdom brings (them) to mind as no t - s e l f , he acquires the void aspect of liberation."47 Shwe Aung remarks:. It i s termed the "Signless" (animitta) when the meditator contemplates things as impermanent by ri d d i n g his mind of the signs of the three delusions — namely, of the h a l l u c i n a t i o n of perception, thought, and views (sanna-vipallasa, c i t t a - v i p a l l a s a , and d i t t h i - v i p a l l l s a ) , which have led mankind to believe that impermanent things are permanent. It i s termed "the Undesired" (appanihita) when he contemplates things as e v i l by ri d d i n g his mind of the craving which lead mankind to covet things as i f they were good. It i s termed "the Void," or "Emptiness" (sunnata), when he contemplates things as unsubstantial by r i d d i n g his . mind of the idea of an ego, or soul.48 In this way, freedom or l i b e r a t i o n (vimokkha-) i s equal to panna- i n that .freedom is equate with the man endowed with penetrative knowledge who sees things as they r e a l l y as, impermanent, unsatisfactory, and unsubstantial, and who, because of such knowledge, is no longer attached. To conclude, according to Frederick Streng: MA/ • • • (Panna-) which permitted one "to see things as they r e a l l y are," was s i g n i f i c a n t from a r e l i g i o u s point of view since one "became" what one knew . . . . In summary we would say that the insight into the emptiness of a l l things destroyed i l l u s i o n ; for this i l l u s i o n was created by p o s i t i n g s e l f - e x i s t e n c e on "things" distinguished by perception or imagination. Wisdom was not i t s e l f an ultimate view, nor was i t an as s e r t i o n about an absolute being. Wisdom was the pr a c t i c e (carya) of d i s s o l v i n g the grasping-after-hoped-for-ultimates either i n the phenomenal world or 60 the realm of ideas. To know "emptiness" was to r e a l i z e emptiness. 4^ I.e., to r e a l i z e that a l l things are empty means to l i v e a l i f e empty or void of attachments to things which are in r e a l i t y empty. V Knowledge and V i s i o n (Nanadassana-) Throughout the Nikayas the emphasis was on personal and d i r e c t know-ledge as the c'ondition necessary for freedom. Knowledge was described as one seeing. The Buddha was said to be one who "knowing, knows and seeing, sees having become sight and knowledge."^^ This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n of the Buddha as "the knowing and seeing one" (janata passata^l) i s usually said of what he claims to know that he both "knows and sees" (tarn aham janami passami t i ^ 2 ) . The c e n t r a l doctrines or truths of Buddhism are "seen." One "comprehends the Noble Truths and sees t h e m . N i b b i n a - i s "seen" (nibbanam passeyyan _ti-* 4) analogously to the seeing of a man pre-v i o u s l y b l i n d having been cured by a physican. The Buddha i s one who "has knowledge and insi g h t into a l l things" (sabbesu dhammesu ca nana-dassl, Sutta Nipata 478) and "the r e l i -gious l i f e is lead under the Exalted One for the knowledge, insi g h t , attainment, r e a l i z a t i o n and comprehension of what i s not known, not seen, not attained, not r e a l i z e d and not comprehended" (A. IV.384). It i s said that the statement "I know, I see" i s d e s c r i p t i v e of one who claims to such knowledge is c l o s e l y associated with bhavana-vada or the claim to mental culture and development through meditation (A. 'IV.42,44)..55-When i t was said that this knowledge was to be had "personally" or " i n d i v i d u a l l y " (samam) i t i s necessary .to point out that what i s meant i s not that his knowledge was incommunicable or subjective. The primary reason for the frequent use of 'samam' to q u a l i f y the verb from<Jdxs in these contexts, seems to be to emphasize, the fact that his knowledge, i s to be had by d i r e c t l y seeing "oneself" and not i n d i r e c t l y by hearing i t from some source (as in the Vedic t r a d i t i o n ) . It i s said "a monk does not hear that i n such and such a v i l l a g e there was a b e a u t i f u l g i r l or woman but has himself seen her (samam p a s s a t i ) . " - ^ The d i s t i n c t i o n i s that he has himself seen her instead of assuming i t to 61 be the case having heard i t from some authority. In the same way, one having heard the teaching (dhamma-) c u l t i v a t e s (bhavana-) his mental ca-p a c i t i e s to perfection so that he may see the dhamma- himself. The Buddha emphasizes that "he has seen i t by himself . . . and he is not saying so af t e r having heard from another recluse or brahmin."-'8 "Would i t be proper," he remarked, " f o r him to say so . . . i f he had not known, seen, experienced, r e a l i z e d , and apprehended with his penetrative knowledge (parma-)?"59 ^ n e Buddha claims that what he preaches he himself has personally v e r i f i e d and ins t r u c t s his adherents to v e r i f y the dhamma- for themselves: "Let an i n -t e l l i g e n t person come to me, sincere, honest, and strightforward; I s h a l l i n s t r u c t him and teach the doctrines so that on my in s t r u c t i o n s he would conduct himself i n such a way that before long he would himself know and himself see . . . , " 6 0 The.dhamma-, which i s described as "bearing f r u i t i n this l i f e before long, an i n v i t a t i o n to 'come and see,' leading to the goal and v e r i f i a b l e by the w i s e , i s to be personally r e a l i z e d ; yet i t i s not a private or subjective experience which cannot be communciated or rel a t e d in some li m i t e d fasion (please turn back to the discussion on Conceptual Mapping, pp. 5-7). The point i s that although one's knowledge can be communicated i n some d i s -torted r e l a t i v e projection, that knowledge must be d i r e c t l y r e a l i z e d by one to whom the knowledge was rel a t e d ; i . e . , to r e a l i z e the Buddha's teaching, which r e l a t e s his knowledge and v i s i o n of r e a l i t y i n conventional modes of communication, one must transcend those modes of knowledge and gain that knowledge and v i s i o n of r e a l i t y which i s d i r e c t , i n t u i t i v e , and objective. This knowledge i s gained by one's own i n i t i a t i v e , as a product of the natural development of the mind due to the operation of causal processes and not derived from some supernatural source. 62 Buddhism stresses the importance of eliminating subjective bias and getting r i d of habits of mind which cause the person to f a l l into error. The f i r s t school of Sceptics said that truth cannot be ar r i v e d at and i t was always a subjective factor such as attachment (chando), passion (rago), hate (doso), or repulsion (patigho), which makes one accept a proposition as true . . . . We . . . see the influence (on Buddhism) of the above doctrine of the Sceptics where i t i s said that there are "four ways of f a l l i n g into i n j u s t i c e " or untruth (agati-gammanani, A. 11.18), namely out of attachment (chanda-), hatred (dosa-), ignorance (moha-), and fear (bhaya-); the arahant or the " i d e a l person" i n Buddhism i s not misled i n any of these four ways (D. I l l , 1 3 3 ) . 6 2 The important difference ( e s p e c i a l l y from a r e l i g i o u s point of view) be-tween Buddhism and skepticism i s that Buddhism i s not t o t a l l y s k e p t i c a l i n regards to the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e a l i z i n g the truth o b j e c t i v e l y . One's emotional d i s p o s i t i o n s , whether i t be one's l i k e or d i s l i k e s , can d i s t o r t the truth and the Buddha warns his d i s c i p l e s , " I f others were to speak i l l of me,' the dhamma -, and the samgha- (the "order" or "community" of monks), do not bear any hatred or i l l - w i l l towards them or be displeased at heart . . . for i f you were to be enraged and upset, w i l l you be able to know whether these statements ( c r i t i c i s m s ) of others were f a i r or not?" Or, " i f others were to speak i n praise of me, my dhamma-, or my samgha-, you should not be happy, delighted, and elated at heart . . . for i f you were to be happy, delighted, and elated at heart, i t w i l l only be a danger to you . . . ." For any statement to be true i t must be established on evidence that warrents i t s assertion and not on the grounds of one's personal prejudice. The terms used for "true" or " t r u t h " are bhuta- and taccha-.^ 4 The use of bhutam i n the sense of "true" i s s i g n i f i c a n t for i t l i t e r a l ly for i t l i t e r a l l y means " f a c t , i . e . , what has become, taken place or happened." Likewise yathabhutam, which means " i n accordance with fact is often used synonymously with truth. It is the object of knowledge-"one knows what i s in accordance with f a c t " (yathabhutam pajanati, D. 1.83,84) . . ." . F a l s i t y is here defined as the denial of fact or as 63 what does not accord with fact.^5 To ascertain the facts c l e a r l y , one's mind must be empty of subjective bias and habits of mind, else the facts w i l l become obscured. The penetration of truth ( = to the r e a l i t y of a given s i t u a t i o n r i g h t l y ascertained and understood) i s not established on one's subjective biases and prejudices, but rather on the d i r e c t , i n t u i t i v e , objective knowledge and v i s i o n of r e a l i t y as i t r e a l l y i s (yathabhuta). The impact of strong desire or t h i r s t (tanha-) i s also c l e a r l y recog-nized i n Buddhist doctrine. One causal statement made is that "because of t h i r s t c l i n g i n g (occurs) . . ." (tanhapaccaya upadanam^) . Clinging is described as fourfold: (1) c l i n g i n g to sensual desires (kamupadana-), (2) c l i n g i n g to r i t u a l s (silabbhatupadana-), (3) c l i n g i n g to dogmatic and/or metaphysical speculations (ditthupadana-), and (4) c l i n g i n g to theories of soul or s u b s t a n t i a l i t y (attavadupadana-). Our concern here i s with the l a t t e r two types of c l i n g i n g . One believes in c e r t a i n dogmatic views and theories of soul or s u b s t a n t i a l i t y because he i s compelled by his desires to believe in that way, whereby, i t may be said that one's desires and outlook or understanding are correlated. These desires (tanha-) are an-alyzed as threefold: (1) the t h i r s t for sensual pleasures or s e n s - g r a t i f i -cation (kamatanha-), (2) the t h i r s t for becoming or personal immortality (bhavatanha-), and (3) the t h i r s t for nonbecoming or a n n i h i l a t i o n (vibhava-tanha-).° 7 Although these strong desires were not correlated with any p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s i n the P a l i Canon, most probably i t would have been said that those who desired personal immortality would have believed in a theory C Q of personal immortality ( b h a v a d i t t h i - P O ) , while those who had a strong de-s i r e for a n n i h i l a t i o n or power^ 9 would have believed i n an a n n i h i l a t i o n i s t ( i . e . , M a t e r i a l i s t ) theory (vibhavaditthi-7^). .64 The b e l i e f s i n soul and substance thus not only have the i r o r i g i n s i n our l i n g u i s t i c habits 71 but also in a craving i n us to believe in them . . . . The stress l a i d on the importance of eliminating subjective bias is therefore probably due to the r e a l i z a t i o n of this impact of desire on b e l i e f . The o b j e c t i v i t y that should be achieved i n introspection a f t e r a t t a i n i n g the fourth jhana ( i . e . , stage or trance of meditation72) i s described as follows: "Just as one per-son should o b j e c t i v e l y observe another, a parson standing should observe a person seated or a person seated a person lyingdown, even so, should one's object of introspection be. well-apprehended, well r e f l e c t e d upon, well-contemplated and well-penetrated with one's knowledge" (A. 11.1,27). This emphasis on the importance of getting r i d of our prejudices and habits of mind, which make us f a l l into error reminds us of Bacon's " i d o l s , " which according to him' i n t e r -fere with the o b j e c t i v i t y of our thinking.73 In short, to gain that knowledge and v i s i o n of things as they r e a l l y are (yathibhilta), which consist of knowing and seeing "what exi s t s as 'e x i s t i n g ' and what does not e x i s t as 'not e x i s t i n g ' , " ^ 4 i s p a r t l y established by eliminating subjective biases, c e r t a i n habits of thinking, and desires considered to be nonconducive to the penetration of things. What, then, i s the means of knowledge which constitutes t h i s alleged objective "knowledge and v i s i o n " (nanadassana-) or "knowing and seeing" ( j a n a t i passati)? We may dismiss the sources of knowledge such as divine r e v e l a t i o n , testimony, and reasoning i n the sense of takka- ( i . e . , i n d i r e c t proof or a p r i o r i proof) as the means of knowing and seeing because these means are i n d i r e c t and not personally genuine. "Proper r e f l e c t i o n (yoniso manasikara) involves both experience and r e f l e c t i o n or reasoning. Thus the Buddha recognized experience both sensory and extrasensory, and reasoning or inference based on experience as sources of knowledge."^^ Direct perception, both sensory and extrasensory, provides man with the knowledge of phenomena (dhamrne 'nana), and on the basis of this d i r e c t knowledge, the Buddha made inductive inferences with regard to the u n i v e r s a l i t y of (1) c a u s a l i t y (paticcasamuppada), (2) imper-manence (aniccata), (3) unsati s f a c t o r i n e s s (dukkhata), and (4) non-s u b s t a n t i a l i t y (anattata). These inferences came to be known as i n -f e r e n t i a l knowledge (anvaye ~n>ana).76 Knowledge and v i s i o n (rfanadassana-) also denotes not only "knowledge 65 and insight of things as they r e a l l y are" (yathabhuta-nanadassana-), but distinguishes as well the "knowledge and in s i g h t of complete freedom" ( v i that my freedom i s unshakable, that this i s the l a s t b i r t h , and that there 7 7 i s no further r e b i r t h . " ' ' In t h i s sense, nanadassana- i s equivalent to arma- ( f i n a l knowledge), a term used e x c l u s i v e l y to denote this knowledge of f i n a l s a l v a t i o n . 7 8 The means of perception are both normal ( i . e . , sensory) and paranormal ( i . e . , extrasensory). For perception to be objective i t must be character-ized by nippapanca-. Both sensory and extrasensory perception have t h e i r corresponding objects, and the objects of extrasensory perception are those not perceived by the normal sense f a c u l t i e s . "The d i f f e r e n c e between the two forms of perception seems to be a d i f f e r e n c e i n the degree of penetra-t i o n " 7 9 ; whereas, i n the Niddesa 1:323 i t i s said, "He saw with his t e l e -pathic knowledge . . . r e t r o c o g n i t i v e knowledge . . . his human eye or divine eye." The difference between sensory and extrasensory perception i s that "the percipient seer using, as i t ware, another sense—panna-, or dibba-cakkhu--not the 'eye of f l e s h ' . " 8 ^ What i s meant by "seen" may denote either normal or paranormal perception, however, nanadassana- gen-e r a l l y is used to denote the knowledge and v i s i o n derived from extra-sensory perception. In this way, "knowledge and v i s i o n " or "knowing and seeing" are mainly, though not e x c l u s i v e l y , a byproduct of mental concen-t r a t i o n (samadhi-). When the Buddha says that "there arose i n him the knowledge and v i s i o n that Uddaka Ramaputta had died the previous night,"8''-i t must be presumed that his knowledge and v i s i o n was had by means of extra-sensory perception. MM "The extrasensory perceptions or powers (abhinna) recognized i n early e.g "there arose i n ma the knowledge and i n s i g h t 66 Buddhism are as follows: 1. Psychokinesis (iddhividha.), which i s not a form of knowledge but a power. It consist i n the various manifestations of the 'power of w i l l ' (adhitthana iddhi) i n the jhanas. 2. C.lairaudience (dibbasota), the fa c u l t y of perceiving sounds even at a distance, far beyond the range of ordinary auditory f a c u l t i e s . This extension of auditory perception both i n extent and i n depth enable the person to perceive d i r e c t l y c o r r e l a t e d phenomena which are otherwise only i n f e r r e d . 3 . Telepathy (cetopariyanana), which enable one to comprehend the gen-e r a l state as well as the functioning of anothers mind. 4. Retrocognition (pubbenivasanussatinana), the a b i l i t y to perceive one's own past h i s t o r y . I t i s dependent on memory ( s a t i ) , and this memory of past existence i s attained through acts of intensive concentration (samadhi), as i n the development of other f a c u l t i e s . 5. Clairvoyance (dibbacakkhu or cut'upapatanana), the knowledge of the decease and s u r v i v a l of other beings who wander i n the cycle of exis-tence i n accordance with t h e i r behavior (karma). This together with r e t r o c o g n i t i o n , enables one to v e r i f y the phenomenon of r e b i r t h . 6. Knowledge, of the destruction of d e f i l i n g impulses (asavakkhayarfana) which, together with the l a s t four mentioned above, provides an i n -sight into the four Noble T r u t h s . " 8 2 Inference (anumana-) or inductive knowledge (anayanana-) i s based on the knowledge of c a u a l i t y , established on the data of perception both normal and paranormal, whereby i n f e r e n t i a l knowledge i s the knowledge that a causal sequence or concomitant observed to hold good i n a number of present instances would as well have taken place i n the unobserved past and w i l l take place i n the unobserved future. For example, the statement that "because of b i r t h ageing and dying (occur)" (jatipaccaya jaramaranam 8 3) ± s a n empirical gen-e r a l i z a t i o n based on the observation that a l l those who are "known and seen" to be born eventually age and die. From observed cases, then, the induc-t i v e knowledge (anayanana-) is made that a l l those who are born are subject to ageing and dying, whether i n the past or i n the future. Knowledge of these causal c o r r e l a t i o n s or sequences i.s c a l l e d "the 67 knowledge of phenomena" (dhamrne nanam O H). If i s then stated that: This constitutes the knowledge of phenomena; by seeing, experiencing, acquiring knowledge before long and delving into these phenomena, he draws an inference (nayam neti) with regard to the past and the future (atltanagate) as follows: " A l l those recluses and brahmins who thoroughly understood the nature of decay and death, i t s cause, i t s cessation and the path leading to the cessation of decay and death did so in the same way as I do at present; a l l those recluses and brahmins who in the fu-ture w i l l thoroughly-understand the nature of decay and death . . . w i l l do so i n the same way as I do at present"--this constitutes his inductive knowledge (idam assa anvaye nanam)„85 Thus, perception (normal and paranormal) and inference are considered the means of knowledge and v i s i o n (nanadassana-). The emphasis that "knowing" (janam) must be based on "seeing" (passam) or d i r e c t perceptive experience, makes Buddhism a form of Empiricism. We have, however, to modify the use of the term somewhat to mean not only that a l l our knowledge i s derived from sense-experience but from extrasensory experience as well . . . . Early (as well as orthodox) Buddhism should therefore be regarded not as a system of metaphysics but as a v e r i f i a b l e hypothesis discovered by the Buddha i n the course of his " t r i a l and error" experimentation with the d i f f e r e n t ways of l i f e . We agree with Dr. Warder when he says that "the Buddha legend sythesizes the quest for truth on s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e s regardless of past t r a d i t i o n s : observation of l i f e , experiments i n asceticism (under various teachers and independently), the f i n a l deduction of a way to end s u f f e r i n g . " We also agree with him when, comparing Buddhism with Epicureanism, he says, "Both attacked old superstitions and sought know-ledge of nature, knowledge which we may characterize as s c i e n t i f i c on account of i t s basis of perception, inference, v e r i f i c a t i o n , etc. ( i t a l i c s mine )"86 In the Sabba-sutta, S.4:15: Here a contemporary of the Buddha, a philosopher named Janussoni questions him with regard to "everything" (sabba), that i s , the meta-physical questions as to what constitutes "everything" i n this u h i - -. verse. The Buddha's immediate response i s that "everything" means the eye, form, ear, sound, nose, odor, tongue, taste, body, tangible objects, mind, and mental objects or concepts. In short, "everything" consists of the six senses and t h e i r corresponding objects. The Buddha goes on to say that there may be others who would not agree with him and who would posit various other things as "everything." But such speculations lead only to vexation and worry, because any such thing would be beyond the sphere of experience (avisaya).87 F i n a l l y , i t should be noted here that panria- (penetrative' knowledge) V A/ is synonymous with nanadassana-; nanadassana are technical terms used to 68 describe panna-. "A person who knows arid sees things as they r e a l l y are need not make an e f f o r t of w i l l (saying), 'I s h a l l become d i s i n t e r e s t e d ; 1 i t i s the nature of things (dhammata-) that a person who knpws and sees becomes d i s i n t e r e s t e d , " 8 8 i . e . , the man of wisdom, who has personally ver-i f i e d the Noble Truths with his knowledge and v i s i o n , sees things objec-t i v e l y ; and because of his wisdom he is freed from attachments to things which are in r e a l i t y empty. Thus, "becoming i n d i f f e r e n t , he becomes free from attachment, from this freedom from attachment he i s l i b e r a t e d , when he i s released he has the knowledge, 'I am released,' then he has that penetrative knowledge (paT~ma-). Destroyed i s r e b i r t h , l i v e d i s the best l i f e , done is what must be done, there i s nothing more to t h i s . " 8 9 Two Truths in Buddhism The chapter on Conceptual Mapping discussed the inherent l i m i t a t i o n s of mapping r e a l i t y into r e l a t i v e conceptual schemes and th e i r pragmatic worth. The problem which arises i s that when one does not possess the awareness of these two facts — l i m i t a t i o n and n e c e s s i t y — h e w i l l c l i n g un-aware to his subjective view of r e a l i t y thinking i t t r u l l y r e f l e c t s the way things are o b j e c t i v e l y . As a r e s u l t , he becomes obsessed with the world he conceptually constructs. How, then, can the Buddhist r e l a t e t h e i r doctrines (dhamma) and yet avoid the problem of having their adherents become attached to those doc-tr i n e s , i . e . , holding on to what is r e l a t i v e as i f i t were absolute? How can they speak about the i n d i v i d u a l personality (pudgala-), about samsara-and nibbana-, etc., as i f they were r e a l e n t i t i e s , when i n r e a l i t y they e x i s t only as mental f a b r i c a t i o n s ? To avoid such confusion and problems the Buddhist introduce a system of two truths: conventional-relational 69 truth and absolute truth. In order to avoid a confusion i t should be mentioned here that there are two kinds of truths: conventional truth (sammuti-sacca, Skt. sam-v r t i - s a t y a ) and ultimate truth (paramattha-sacca, Skt. paramartha-sat-ya). When we use such expressions i n our d a i l y l i f e as "I,." "you," "being," " i n d i v i d u a l , " etc., we do not l i e because there i s no s e l f or being as such, but we speak a truth conforming to the convention of the world. But the ultimate truth i s that there i s no " I " of "being" in r e a l i t y . 9 0 There exists no i n t r i n s i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t objects of knowledge. The d i s -t i n c t i o n between " r e l a t i v e t r u t h " and "absolute truth" does not pertain to d i f f e r e n t objects of knowledge, rather, i t refe r s to the manner by which "things" are perceived, the means of knowledge by which "things" are known. Mundane truth i s based on the i n t e l l e c t u a l and emotional attachment to ideas or sense objects whereby such objects of knowledge were used as i f they had an existence independent of the perceiver. Such truth discriminates, i d e n t i f i e s , and categorizes segments of existence as "door," "room," "money," " I , " "you," or any mental or sensual object of cognition. A l l men use such truth to carry on the everyday a f f a i r s of l i k e . Likewise a l l r e l i g i o u s doctrines and theories about the nature of existence f a l l within the bounds of mundane truth, for they are fab-r i c a t i o n s . Ultimate truth, on the other hand, i s a q u a l i t y of l i f e expressed i n the complete i n d i f f e r e n c e to the construction or cessa-ti o n of "things." Ultimate Truth i s the r e a l i z a t i o n of dependent co-o r i g i n a t i o n whereby there i s no attachment to fabricated "things"--not even to the formulation of dependent co-origination.91 In this way, the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two kinds of truths i s a d i s t i n c -t i o n i n the l e v e l of understanding, i . e . , between higher and lower know-ledge. Conventional-relational truth is " j u s t an erroneous view," while absolute truth i s "established by the nature of things (sabhava-siddam), i t i s opposed to mere o p i n i o n . " 9 2 Conventional-relational truth i s estab-lished on a r e l a t i v e c r i t e r i o n of values, subject to subjective i n t e r p r e -tations and currents, while absolute truth i s objective, empty of any point of view at a l l . On a p r a c t i c a l l e v e l i t i s necessary and conventionally true to say that "a chair i s not a table," when when known and seen with one's penetrative knowledge, terms l i k e " c h a i r " and " t a b l e " are seen as 70 empty of self-existence (sabhava-) to which language implies s° misleadingly. According to Buddhism, i t i s ignorance (avij ja-) which causes one to think that verbal designations are ultimates, that r e l a t i v e truths are absolutely true. The Buddhist well recognize the pragmatic value of conventional-rela-t i o n a l truth not only i n d a i l y s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s , but as an aid to lead the person from bondage to freedom. For example, one i s to develop his i n t e l l e c t u a l capacities of understanding to apprehend the Noble Truths con-ceptually at f i r s t , then to transcend such conceptual knowledge with a perfect view (samma d i t t h i - ) of the Noble Truths. One begins the Ei g h t f o l d Noble Path Leading to the Cessation of Dukkha- 9 3.by adopting what the Buddhist conceive as conventionally true. With this r i g h t view (samma d i t t h i - ) the adherent progresses through the c u l t i v a t i o n of v i r u t e (sIla-) and mental concentration (samadhi-) and then eventually back to samma d i t t h i - , now the A/A/ the perfected v i s i o n of r e a l i t y equal to panna-. In short, he has moved AVA/- A/A/ from d i s c r i m i n a t i v e knowledge (vinnana-) to penetrative knowledge (panna-), samsara- to nibbana-, transcending the lower le v e l s of knowledge which know and see things as s t a t i c e n t i t i e s through c o n v e n t i o n a l - r e l a t i o n a l means o.f knowledge. The a b i l i t y to understand a conceptual scheme i s an a b i l i t y necessary to achieve the "goal," i n the same way as the a b i l i t y to accurately read a map and road signs enables one to reach his desired destination without getting l o s t or d i s t r a c t e d . In the "Parable of the R a f t , " 9 4 the dhamma-(doctrine or teaching) i s compared to a r a f t constructed to carry the per-son across a torrent r i v e r , i . e . , the purpose the dhamma- serves i s that i t gives the adherent an i n s t r u c t u r a l v e h i c l e to carry him from normality to n o b i l i t y . Yet in the end, when the destination i s reached, one does 71 not carry the r a f t with him afterwards, and i n the same way, one should not c l i n g onto the dhamma- having reached the other shore ( i . e . , nibbana-). The danger i s that: If one t r i e s to hold l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s as an absolute norm for truth of r e a l i t y , he i s doomed to f a i l u r e . L o g i c a l and d i s c u r s i v e thought as a process of meaning i s a s e l e c t i v e process, and this s e l e c t i v i t y prevents i t from being able to express the t o t a l i t y of existence, or the t o t a l human experience of existence. This p r i n -c i p l e of s e l e c t i v i t y i s both the strength and weakness of di s c u r s i v e thought. On the one hand, i t permits meaningful communication; on the other, i t l i m i t s the awareness according to habits of apprehen-sion. 95 What the system of two truths achieves i s that i t recognizes the d i f -ference in the lev e l s of understanding, as well as the pragmatic yet l i m i t e d value of conv e n t i o n a l - r e l a t i o n a l truths. It i s the awareness that verbal designations are i n d i r e c t expressions of truth which serve as symbols of absolute truth, which enable one to transcend c o n v e n t i o n a l - r e l a t i o n a l modes of understanding and r e a l i z e absolute truth. " I f thoughts of mundane ' r e a l i t i e s ' were not imbued with an awareness of emptiness, they perverted the truth and posited s e l f - e x i s t e n c e in the objects of sense or imagina-t i o n . It i s this attachment to 'things' towards which mundane truth was prone, that the truth of emptiness attempted to d i s p e l . " 9 ^ The system of two truths as well, then recognizes that higher knowledge, having known and seen things as empty, frees the person from previous attachments to things once conceived to be s u b s t a n t i a l . Thus, "the things of the apparent world are not destroyed, but they are reevaluated i n such a way that they no longer have the power emotionally and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y to control human l i f e . " 9 7 Most important, the system of two truths recognizes that those who view the world from the standpoint of mundane truth are bound i n sam-sara- and those who view the world from the standpoint df ultimate truth have achieved nibbana-. 72 Notes •'-Compendium0, p. 7. 2"'Consciousness 1 in an eschatological sense i s almost always associated with 'disp o s i t i o n s ' (samkhara). The nature of the samkharas is exemplified by a statement in the Anguttara Nikaya that one who has attained 'the state of concentration free from c o g i t a t i v e and r e f l e c t i v e thought can comprehend with his mind the mind of another, and by observing how the mental samkharas are disposed i n the mind of that p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l , (he can) also pre-d i c t that he would think such and such a thought at a l a t e r time.' (A.1.171) ". . . i t i s said that d i s p o s i t i o n s condition consciousness . . . . these d i s p o s i t i o n s are ultimately the r e s u l t s of perceptive a c t i v i t y . This is c l e a r l y implied in a passage in the Samyutta that discusses the difference between a dead man (mato kalakato) and a man who has entered the state of mental concentration characterized by the cessation of perception and sen-sation (sannavedayjtanirodham samapanno). 'In the case of a dead man, his d i s p o s i t i o n s , bodily, verbal and mental, cease to e x i s t and are p a c i f i e d ; l i f e has come to an end,breath i s calmed, and the senses are destroyed. But in the case of a man who has attained the state of cessation of percep-tion and sensation, even though his d i s p o s i t i o n s have ceased to e x i s t and are p a c i f i e d , his l i f e has not come to an end, breath i s not calmed, and the senses are not destoryed. 1 (S.4.294) "According to this account, although the senses of the man who has at-tained the state of cessation of perception and sensation are i n t a c t , because there i s a temporary cessation of perceptive a c t i v i t y he does not accumulate any d i s p o s i t i o n s . The obvious conclusion i s that d i s p o s i t i o n s are the re-sults of perceptive a c t i v i t y . Not only the tendencies in the conscious mind but even those i n the unconscious process are the r e s u l t s of perception." C a u s a l i t y 0 , pp. 120-21. •^According to M. 1:292, " I t discriminates ( v i j a n a t i ) , therefore i t i s c a l l e d d i s c r i m i n a t i v e knowledge (vinnana-). And what does i t discriminate? It d i s c r i m i n a t i e s pleasure, pain, and neither pleasure or pain." According to Atthas. 112: "Just as, 0 great king, a town guard s i t t i n g at the cross-roads i n the middle of the town could see a man coming from the east, could see a man coming from the west, south, north, so too, 0 great king, what-ever material shape he sees with (his) sight, he discriminates ( v i j a n a t i ) that by his d i s c r i m i n a t i v e knowledge, what sound he hears by his ear, what smell he smells with his nose, what taste he tastes by his tongue,, what tangible he touches with his body, what mental phenomena (dhamma: idea) he discriminates with the mind (manasa) he discriminates by d i s c r i m i n a t i v e knowledge" (these verses trans, by Santucci, BPT, p. 86). Vinnana- i s a pregnate term in Buddhism. It can mean mere sensual awareness. However, the d e f i n i t i o n used throughout this paper ref e r s to i n t e l l e c t u a l d i scrimin-ation, i . e . , awareness + judgment. For instance, the guard judges that the object (awareness)jmpving towards him i s a man. According to Kalupahana, ". . . the term vinnana . . . i s used i n the early Buddhist t e x t s ^ i n a wide va r i e t y of meanings . . . . At least three important uses of vinnana can be c l e a r l y distinguished. F i r s t , i t i s used to denote psychi phenomena i n general, synonymous with the terms c i t t a , 'mind,' and mano, 'thought.' Second, i t is used to describe a complete act of perception or cognition; and t h i r d , i t stands for the connecting l i n k between two- l i v e s , a form of 73 of consciousness^, that l a t e r came to be designated ' r e b i r t h consciousness' (patisandhi-vinnana)." C a u s a l i t y 0 , p. 119. For our purpose, we w i l l be concerned with vinnana- defined as "perception" or "cognition." ^The Nikayas (Collections) belong to the Sutta-Pitaka (Basket of Dis-courses) . There are f i v e , v i z . , Digha-Nikaya ( C o l l e c t i o n of Long Discourses), Ma j jhima-Nikaya ( C o l l e c t i o n of Medium Discourses), Samyu tta-Nikaya (Collec-t i o n of Connected Discourses), Anguttara-Nikaya ( C o l l e c t i o n of Item-more Discourses), and Khuddaka-Nikaya ( C o l l e c t i o n of L i t t l e Texts). P s y c h o l o g i c a l A t t i t u d e 0 , p. 129. frlbid., see pp. 129-32. ^Compendium0, pp. 11-12. 80p_. c i t . , p. 131. 9 I b i d . , pp. 54-55. 1 0 I b i d . , p. 80. •'•'•The preceeding analysis on disharmony, tension, and resistence f o l -lows c l o s e l y that of Govinda's, Ibid., pp. 79-82 and 129-142, and Aung's, Compendium0, pp. 2-11. 1 2IPTB, p. 5. 1 3 D i s c u s s e d in Concept and R e a l i t y 0 , pp. 2-9; IPTB, pp. 5-7; BP, pp. 2--21 and 77-78; C a u s a l i t y 0 , pp. 121-25; and by E.R. Saratchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Percept ion, Colombo, Ceylon, 1958. Much of the following discussion follows Nanananda's, C_oncep_t and R e a l i t y 0 , pp. 2-20. •^By sense-perception i s meant sensual awareness interpreted or judged subj e c t i v e l y through the i n d i v i d u a l ' s conscious processes, conditioned by samkharas ( d i s p o s i t i o n s ) . The six sense spheres are, v i z . , (1) cakkhu-"sig h t , eye" and i t s object, rupa- " v i s i b l e objects, color, material shapes," (2) sota- "hearing, ear" and i t s object, sadda- "sound," (3) ghana- "smell, nose" and i t s object, gandha- "smell, odor," (4) j i v h a - " t a s t i n g , tongue" and i t s object, rasa- "taste, f l a v o r , " and (5) mano- "thinking, organ of consciousness" and i t s objects, dhamma "mental phenomena, mental datta, men-t a l images," e.g., concepts, ideas, judgments, names or words. •^Kalupahana translates papanca- as "obsessed perceptions," see BP, p. 20, or C a u s a l i t y 0 , p. 122. 1 6Concept and R e a l i t y 0 , p. 5. 1 7 I bid., pp. 6-7. 1 8IPTB, pp. 5-6. . -74 2 0 I b i d . , pp. 10-11. 2 1 T h e r a g a t h a 980,990. 2 2I_PTB, p. 7. 2 ^ t r a n s . by Nanananda, Concept and R e a l i t y 0 , p. 31. 2 ^ E m p t i n e s s Q , pp. 17-18. 2 5 I b i d . , p. 59. 2 6 I b i d . , p. 69. 2 7 I b i d . , pp. 52-53. 2 8Presuppositions°, p. 141. 2 9 c i t e d i n Concept and R e a l i t y 0 , p.p. 22-24. -^According^to Nanananda, Ibid., p. 23: "The causal connection between vitakka and papanca-sanna-samkha might, at f i r s t sight, appear i n t r i g u i n g . Acquaintance with the Madhupindika formula of sense-perception ( S i c l . vitakka papanca) might make one wonder whether we have here a r e v e r s a l of the correct order (vitakka papanca-sanna-samkha). But the c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s more ap-parent than r e a l . The assertion of the Sakkapanha sutta that vi_takka o r i g i n -ates from papanca-sarina-samkha only means that i n the case of. the worlding the word or concept grasped as an object for r a t i o c i n a t i o n , i s i t s e l f a pro-duct of papanca. This in i t s turn breeds moire of i t s kind when one proceeds to indulge i n conceptual p r o l i f e r a t i o n (papanca). Concepts characterized by the p r o l i f e r a t i n g tendency (papanca-sanffa-samkha) constitute the raw-mater-i a l for the process and the end product i s much the same in kind though with this d i f f e r e n c e that i t has greater potency to obsess, bewilder, and over-whelm, the worlding. Thus there i s a curious r e c i p r o c i t y between vitakka and papanca-sanna-samkha--a kind of v i c i o u s c i r c l e , as i t were. Given papanca-san'na-samkha there comes to be vitakka and given vitakka there arises more pa pal?c a-san'na-samkha, r e s u l t i n g i n the subjection to the same." J trans, by Nanananda, Ibid., p. 24. Simile found in Vitakkasarithana-sutta, M.1:119. -^"Rapture" here refers to the term jhana-. "Jhana i s explained i n Vis.4:119 as .'meditating or r e f l e c t i n g upon (upanijjhanato) the object (arammana) or (va) ( i t i s so-called) due to i t s burning (jhapanato 'des-troying') of an adverse object (paccanika-).' According to the d e s c r i p t i o n of jhana, we fin d that the word never ref e r s to meditation in general, but to a state or states as described below. The o r i g i n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of these states of meditation was divided into four stages. The f i r s t stage is achieved when the meditator frees his mind from sensuous and worldly ideas, concentrates his mind upon a meditation subject. He concentrates by using vitakka ' i n i t i a l thought' and v i c a r a 'sustained thought; i n v e s t i -gation.' The r e s u l t of this i n v e s t i g a t i o n is the l i b e r a t i o n of the f i v e 75 nivarana's (kamacchanda 'excitement of or for sensual pleasure' or 'sensual pleasure and excitement'; vyapada ' i l l - w i l l ' ; thinamiddha 'sloth and torpor'; uddhaccakukkucca 'agi t a t i o n and worry'; and v i e i k i c c h a 'doubt, p e r p l e x i t y ' ) . Following upon t h i s , p l t i 'joy' and sukha 'happiness' a r i s e . Thus the f i r s t stage of jhana comprises the four elements of vitakka, v i c a r a , p i t i , and sukha. "With the second jhana, we'find that vitakka and v i c a r a are suppressed, and p i t i and sukha remain, being experienced by the meditator in his e n t i r e being. "The t h i r d jhana comes about when P_Iti i s suppressed and experiences only sukha. "The fourth jhana comes about when the meditator disposes of both 'dis-ease' (dukkha) and 'ease' or 'happiness' (sukha) and attains equanimity (u-pekka). "This l i s t i n g appears in D.1:73-77; M„l:276-78, 454f.; Vis.4:79-197; A.1:163, 3:394f.; etc."BPT,.p. 28. 3 4 t r a n s , by flfanananda, Concept and R e a l i t y 0 , p. 25. J Minor Anthologies of the P a l i Canon 10, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, II, c i t e d i n Ibid., p. 28. Ibid., p. 28. The proceeding analysis on nippapanca- follows c l o s e l y that of "R'anananda's, Ibid., pp. 22-34„ 3 7Emptiness°, p. 82. 3 8 V i s . l 4 : 2 : 3 9 V i s . l 4 : l 4^Because penetration i s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of panna-, I translate i t as "penetrative knowledge." 4 J - V i s . 14: 3, 5, 7, trans, by Nyanamoli 4 2Emptiness°, p. 91. 4 3Edward Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books, London, 1958, p. 94. Cited i n Emptiness 0, p. 85. 4 4C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychology, London, 1914, p. 133. Cited i n Emptiness 0, p. 91. 45 Ibid., pp. 87-88. Cited in Emptiness 0, p. 38. H D T h e analysis on knowledge and becoming as co-extensive was taken from Emptiness 0, pp. 38-39. q'Vis.21:70, trans, by Nyanamoli. 4 8Cotnpendium°, p. 67. 4 9Emptiness°, p. 98. 76 5 0M.1:111. 5 1M.2:111. 52 M.1:329. 5 3 S u t t a Nipata 229. 5 4M.1:511. -'-'Early Buddhist 0, p. 418. The proceeding and following analysis on nanadassana- follows J a y a t i l l e k e ' s , Early Buddhist 0, pp. 417-43 and 457-64. Most of the c i t a t i o n s were extracted from these pages, however, many of the translations are mine own (unless otherwise noted). 5 6 I b i d . , pp. 426-27. 5 7A.3:90. 5 8 I t i v u t t a k a 58. 5 9M.1:475. 60M.2:44, trans, by J a y a t i l l e k e , Early Buddhist 0, p. 427. 6 1M.1:37. 620p_. c i t . , p. 428. 6 3D.1:3. 6 4M.2:170. • 6 5 E a r l y Buddhist 0, p. 352. 6 6M.1:261. 67M.1:48, 299; 3:250. 6 8A.1:83. ^ 9Vibhava- may be translated as either " a n n i h i l a t i o n " or "power." 70M.1:65. 7 1 s e e Early_ Buddhist 0, pp. 102-3 and 319-20. 1? i . e . , the stage of equanimity (upekka-). 7 30p. c i t . , pp. 430-31. 7 4A.5:36. 77 7 5BP, p. 20 7 6 lb i d . , p. 22. '< 77M.1:67; 3:162. 7 8 s e e M.2:43; 3:29; S.l:24. 7 9BP, p. 22. 8 0Compendium° > p. 225. 8 1H.1:70. 8 2BP, pp. 21-22. For a more complete analysis see Early Buddhist 0, pp. 438-41, and the entire 12th chapter of the V i s . 8 3S.2:28. 8 4S.2:58. 8 5 E a r l y Buddhist 0, pp. 442-42. C i t a t i o n S.2:58„ 8 6 I b i d . , pp. 463-64. 8 7BP, pp. 23-24. 8 8A.5:313. 8 9Mahavagga 1:21. ^Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, p. 55. According to J a y a t i l l e k e , Early Buddhist°, pp. 361-68, there appears i n the P a l i Canon no cle a r - c u t d i s t i n c t i o n between these two kinds of truth. The doctrine of two truths i s a l a t e r emergence. Instead, i n the P a l i Canon sammuti-sacca- and para-mattha-sacca- refer to two types of suttas (discourses), those of d i r e c t meaning (nltattha-) and those of i n d i r e c t meaning (neyyattha-). An i n -d i r e c t sutta-would say, e.g., "there i s an i n d i v i d u a l personality (pud-ga l a - ) , " while a d i r e c t sutta- would say, e.g., "there i s no pudgala-." Because the Buddha, as with a l l r e l i g i o u s teachers, i s constrained by the use of language which has misleading implications, we have to at times i n f e r what he means. This means is i n d i r e c t . When he i s pointing out the misleading implications of language without use of these implications, his meaning i s p l a i n and d i r e c t , nothing i s to be in f e r r e d . 9 1Emptiness°, p. 39. 9 2 L e d i Sadaw, "Some Points on Buddhist Doctrine," Journal of the P a l i  Texts Society (1914), p. 129. 9 3The E i g h t f o l d Noble Path i s , v i z . , perfect (samma) view ( d i t t h i - ) , i ntention (samkappa-), speech (vaca-), acting (kammanta-), l i v i n g ( a j l v a - ) , effort, (vayama-), inspective r e c o l l e c t i o n or mindfulness (sati-.), and con-centration (samadhi-). 9 4 M . i : i 3 4 f . 9^Emptiness 0, p. 9 6 . 9 7 I b i d . t p > 9 6 79 CONCLUSION: NIBBANA- THE ANTITHESIS OF SAMSARA-The I t i v u t t a k a 38f. states that nibbana- i s of two kinds: (1) nibbana-with substrate l e f t (saupadisesa-, i . e . , nibbana- attained during one's lifespan!) and (2) nibbana- without substrate (ahupadisesa-, i . e . , the nibbana- of the dead arahant-, "noble one"). What i s the nature of nibbana- with substrate l e f t (saupadisesa-), i . e . riibbana- attained i n this l i f e here and now; or, what i s the nature of the l i v i n g arahant-? As stated previously, human experience and personality are causally conditioned. From the time the i n d i v i d u a l i s born his sense f a c u l t i e s (indriya-) s t a r t functioning and through these doors enter sense impressions. These impressions or sense data (phassa-, "contact") produce in him feelings or sensations (vedana-), pleasurable, p a i n f u l , or neither pleasure or pain. From here on, i t i s stated that because of sensation t h i r s t a r i s e s , and because of t h i r s t c l i n g i n g a r i s e s , and so on. A more det a i l e d analysis is found i n the Madhupindika-sutta. Here, i n an explan-ation of the causal process of sense-perception, we f i n d that immediately a f t e r vedana- the ego-consciousness intrudes and thereafter conditions the ent i r e process, culminating in the generation of obsessions, either t h i r s t , conceit, or dogmatic views. The i n d i v i d u a l then becomes the hapless object of these obsessions. This i s the normal order of things (dhammata-). At-tachment (raga-) and aversion or repulsion (patigha-) that one develops that one develops towards the things of the world are due to the presence of ignorance and habits of mind. One is ignorant, i n this case, that both subject and object and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between subject and object(s) which r e s u l t s i n the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of concepts (papanca-) are empty of s e l f - e x i s -tence. This i s the manner i n which "normal" human beings behave when they 80 come into contact with the external world. Such a person i s c a l l e d "one who follows the stream" (anusotagami-), i . e . , one who gives into his own i n c l i n a t i o n s , following his own w i l l . Thus i t i s declared: Those who give r e i n to passions, in this world Not passion-freed, in sense desires d e l i g h t i n g , These of t and o f t subject to b i r t h and eld; Bondsmen to craving, down the current go.l The Buddha recognized two causal processes, one "determined by d i s -p o s i t i o n s " (samkhata-) and the other "undetermined by d i s p o s i t i o n s " (asam-khata-). The causal process determined by d i s p o s i t i o n s (samkhara-), both good and bad, leads to bondage (bandha-) and disharmony or dis-ease (dukkha-while the causal process undetermined by d i s p o s i t i o n s leads to. freedom ( v i -mutti-) and harmony or ease (sukha-). The f i r s t four causal pattern pre-v i o u s l y mentioned — physical organic and inorganic order, psychological order and moral order—may be classed under the former process, samkhata-. The l a s t pattern mentioned, i d e a l s p i r i t u a l order, may be classed under the l a t t e r , asamkhata-. . Human beings whose behavior i s determined by d i s p o s i -tions are those described as "following the stream" (anusotagami-), xrtiile those whose behavior is not determined by d i s p o s i t i o n s , i . e . , those, who have attained the p a c i f i c a t i o n of a l l d i s p o s i t i o n s (sabbasamkharasamatha-), either go against the stream, remain steadfast, or have crossed over the flood of existence (samsar'ogha-). Going against the stream, remaining steadfast, or crossing over i s achieved as a r e s u l t of in s i g h t and s e l f -c o ntrol, i . e . , panna- and viraga- (nonattachment) or nekkhamma- (renuncia-t i o n ) . Because of insight and s e l f - c o n t r o l nibbana- i s attained, and the l i f e of one who has attained nibbana- i s one of transcendence (lokuttara-), l i k e the lotus (pundarika-) that remains unsmeared by the surrounding pol-luted water. In this way, "normal" human existence (samsara-) is contrasted 81 with the freedom of nibbana- attained by the "noble one" (arahant-). There i s . s a i d to be three types of persons contrasted to the "one who follows the. stream," The f i r s t type generally attempts to follow a good l i f e avoiding e v i l actions, he i s c a l l e d "one who goes against the stream" (patisotagami-). The second type i s one who has advanced further along the path to freedom and has reached the stage of "nonreturner" (anagaml-) to this world, because he has destroyed the f i v e kinds of f e t t e r s (samyojana- 2). The l a s t type of person i s the one who is f u l l y enlighted and i s completely freed, who remains unsmeared by the world l i k e one who has "crossed over" (parangata-) and remains i n safety when the world outside him i s i n t u r m o i l . 3 Such a person through mental c u l t i v a t i o n (bhavana-) has d i s c i p l i n e d his mind and i s able to control i t as he wishes. When an external sense object comes into contact with a sense f a c u l t y he can prevent the i n t r u s i o n of ego-con-sciousness, since he has insig h t into the nature of the process of sense-perception plus s e l f - c o n t r o l . Once this i n t r u s i o n i s prevented, i t i s possible to arrest the i n f l u x of unwholesome mental states (akusala dhamma) as coveting (abhijjha-) and dejection (domanassa-). When confronted with the outside world, instead of generating attachment (raga-) he generates nonattachment (viraga-). ' •' , • Perceiving the aggregates that constitute the psychophysical person-a l i t y as being nonsubstantial (anatta) and preventing the ego-consci-ousness from assailing- himself when the process 'of perception takes place, "a learned Aryan d i s c i p l e has re v u l s i o n for (nibbandati) the physical form (rupa ), f e e l i n g (vedana) .^perception ( s a n ^ ) , dispos-i t i o n s (samkhara), and consciousness (vinnana). Haying revulsion, he i s not attached; being nonattached he i s freed, and i n him who i s thus freed arises the knowledge of. freedom: Destroyed i s b i r t h , l i v e d i s the higher l i f e ; done i s what ought to be done; there i s no further existence." (S.3:83f.) 4 In this way, with the elimination of the f a l s e notion of the ego-con-sciousness and the development of panna-, the normal process of sense-per-82 ception i s changed With the attainment of mental concentration or r e s t r a i n (saravara), one i s able to prevent the i n f l u x of impurities (kilesa) such as attachment (raga) and aversion (patigha). According to the des-c r i p t i o n i n the text, this i s going against (patisota) the normal causal pattern. Yet i t represents a causal pattern with d i f f e r e n t causal f a c t o r s . This causal pattern may be stated as follows: The elimination of egb-consciousness produces re v u l s i o n (nibbida) with regard to tilings which e a r l i e r were grasped as being s u b s t a n t i a l . Revulsion produces detachment (viraga). Detachment produces free-dom (vimutti), and therefore one attains s t a b i l i t y ( t h i t a t a ) of mind so that one does not tremble or i s not agitated .as a r e s u l t of gain (labha) or loss (alabha), good repute (yasa) or disrepute (ayasa), praise (pasamsa) or blame (ninda), happiness (sukha) or s u f f e r i n g (dukkha). These are the eight worldly phenomena (attha-lokadhamma) by which one i s constantly a s s a i l e d i n this l i f e (D.3: 260). Hence, the highest point of "blessedness" (mangala) i s achieved, according to the Maha-mangala-sutta, by a person "whose mind i s not overwhelmed when i n contact with worldly phenomena (lokadhamma), i s freed from sorrow, t a i n t l e s s and secure (Sutta Nipata 268)." Such a person f e e l s secure and at peace in the midst of a l l the destruction and confusion p r e v a i l i n g in the world.5 The arahant-, then, experiences a l l sense impressions coming through his sense f a c u l t i e s , yet what distinguishes the "noble one" from "normal" human beings i s that he i s able to prevent the generation of attachment or aversion. For him, a l l sense impressions are properly understood through his penetrative knowledge or i n s i g h t (panna-) and because of the attainment of s e l f - c o n t r o l . Although these impressions produce t h e i r respective sensations — pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure or p a i n — t h e arahant- remains unmoved by them. He i s neither established on (appati-t t h i t a - ) or not leaning against ( a n i s s i t a - ) anything in this world, and, as such, nothing i n this world worries him or causes him pain, e.g., gain or loss, b i r t h , ageing, or dying, and so on. The attainment of i n s i g h t and s e l f - c o n t r o l causes the cessation of dukkha- and samsara-, and brings about the occurrence of nibbana-. In this way, insight and s e l f - c o n t r o l , the conditions necessary for complete freedom, are synonymous with nibbana-. What i s meant by "with the sub-83 st r a t e l e f t " i s that there remains a residue of kamma- l e f t to be burnt up. In the same way as when a potter discontinues spinning his potter's wheel, yet the wheel continues to spin on i t s own energy u n t i l that energy which caused i t to spin i n the f i r s t place burns i t s e l f out causing the wheel to come to rest ; so too w i l l the arahant- remain i n this l i f e u n t i l he burns up or exhausts the residue of kamma- which has b u i l t up due to past actions, then he comes to r e s t . The most misunderstood aspect of nibbana- i s that of nibbana- "with-out substrate l e f t , " or of the arahant- who passed away. The question which arises is what happens to the arahant- a f t e r death? Does he e x i s t s , i n what form, or i s he completely destroyed? If a f t e r denying that the tathagata survives death, the Buddha main-tained that he is annihilated he would have been g u i l t y of saying some-thing that i s not based or dependent on any source of knowledge. Hence, the most reasonable, way to in t e r p r e t the Buddha's statements on this problem and not misrepresent him would be to say that the state of the arahant af t e r death cannot be known by the ava i l a b l e means of knowing (pamana, Sk. pramana). This explains the Buddha's decision to leave this question undelcared (avyakata)."6 It is not the purpose of this report to either examine or resolve the speculations that have arisen i n the various schools of Buddhist thought, including Theravada Buddhism, concerning the question: "What happens to the arahant- a f t e r death?" Rather, since the purpose of this report i s to ex-amine the conditions which cause the human condition of samsara-, and the conditions which cause i t s cessation, such discussion i s not necessary to f u l f i l l our purpose. We need only concern ourselves with nibbana- achieved i n this l i f e , here and now. And as such, I s h a l l follow the Buddha by ex-ample and remain s i l e n t on this issue. Formally defined, nibbana- l i t e r a l l y means "blowing out" (from p r e f i x nis "out," and root va "to blow"). 84 Buddhaghosa (Vis.8:247) states that nibbana i s c a l l e d such "because i t has gone out (nikkhanto), escaped from (nissato), i s detached from (visamyutto) t h i r s t (tanhaya), so c a l l e d as 'vana' (fastening) because to ensure successive becoming, t h i r s t serves as a j o i n i n g together, a binding, a lacing together of the four kinds of generation, f i v e des-t i n i e s , seven stations of consciousness, and nine abodes' of being." Nyanamoli (p. 319, note 72) believes that the o r i g i n a l meaning of nibbana was probably an e x t i n c t i o n of a f i r e by ceasing to blow on i t with a bellows. Then i t was extended to the e x t i n c t i o n of f i r e by any means; and by analogy, nibbana was applied to the e x t i n c t i o n of greed, etc., i n the Arahant. In the older texts there are passages which r e l a t e to the going out of a f i r e through lack of f u e l . In M.1:487 the following dialogue occurs between Buddha and Vaccha: " I f , good Gotama, someone were to question me thus: This f i r e that is blazing i n front of you--what i s the reason that this f i r e i s blazing?--I, good Gotama, on being questioned thus reply thus: . . . this f i r e i s blazing because of a supply (upadana) of grass and s t i c k s . " I f that f i r e that was i n front of you, Vaccha, were to be quenched (nibbayeyya) would you know: This f i r e that was in front of me has been quenched (nibbuto)? " . . . For, good Gotama, that f i r e blazed because of a supply of grass and s t i c k s , yet having t o t a l l y consumed this and from the lack of other f u e l , being without f u e l i t i s reckoned to be quenched." (Horner, Middle Lenght Sayings, I I , pp. 165-66). In S.2:85 a s i m i l a r statement a r i s e s : "Verily, that great bonfire, when the f i r s t l a i d f u e l were come to an end, and i t were not fed by other f u e l , would without food become extinct (nibbayeyya)." (Woodward, Kindred Sayings, I I , pp. 59-60. • In M.3:245 we f i n d that the quenching of the " f i r e " i s applied to the enlightened.person: "He comprehends that on the breaking up of the body a f t e r the l i f e - p r i n c i p l e has come to an end a l l enjoyable experiences here w i l l become cool ( s i t i b h a v i s s a n t i ) . "Monk, an oil-lamp burns on account of the o i l and on account of the wick but goes out (nibbayati) from the lack of f u e l i f the o i l and the wick come to an end and no others are brought, even so, monk, experiencing a f e e l i n g that i s l i m i t e d by the body . . . li m i t e d by the l i f e - p r i n c i p l e , he comprehends that he i s experi-encing limited by the l i f e - p r i n c i p l e , he comprehends that he i s experiencing f e e l i n g limited by the body . . . l i m i t e d by the 85 l i f e - p r i n c i p l e . He comprehends that on the breaking up of the body af t e r the l i f e - p r i n c i p l e has come to an end a l l enjoyable experiences here w i l l come c o o l . " (Horner, Middle Length Sayings, III, pp. 291-92. What is extinguished i s the threefold f i r e of raga "passion," dosa "hatred," and mo ha "delusion" among other defilements. 7 Buddhaghosa t e l l s us that, " I t has peace as i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . Its function is not to die; or i t s function i s to comfort. It i s manifested as the signless; or i t is manifested as n o n - d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n (nippapa'nca) ." 8 Nibbana- is also equated with the t h i r d Noble Truth, the cessation ( n i r -odha- 9) of dukkha-, i . e . , i t is the remainderless fading away and cessation of dukkha-. 1 0 For our intent and purpose,' we may conclude that nibbana- ref e r s to the e x t i n c t i o n of t h i r s t (tanhakkhaya-), hence the state of nonattachment (viraga-). According to the doctrine of kamma-, one continues to wander in samsara-, 'from b i r t h to b i r t h , as a r e s u l t of ignorance ( a v i j j a - ) , t h i r s t (t^nha-), and the resultant c l i n g i n g or grasping (upadana-). Freedom ( v i -mutti-H) or the attainment of nibbana- consists i n the e x t i n c t i o n of these karmic forces through the c u l t i v a t i o n of insi g h t or knowledge ( v i j j a-) and the elimination of t h i r s t (tanhakkhaya-) and nonclinging (anupadana-) through s e l f - c o n t r o l or renunciation. As the complete cessation of the causal con-di t i o n s which generate and perpetuate dukkha-, nibbana- may be characterized as the end of dukkha- (dukkhass'anta-) and the state of perfect happiness (parama sukha, "ease or harmony"). Nibbana- is c a l l e d "unconditioned" (asamkhata-^) because those con-d i t i o n s which cause dukkha- and i t s continuence are completely destroyed. They no longer a f f e c t the wise s e l f - c o n t r o l l e d man. In this way, nibbana-may be regarded as the an t i t h e s i s of samsara- because the arahant- is no longer continually bound to his habitual behavior (kamma-) which r e s u l t s 86 i n f r u s t r a t i o n , t e n s i o n , and disharmony ( d u k k h a - ) . I t i s the " n o b l e " way of l i f e of one i n p e r f e c t harmony (parama s u k h a ) , compared t o the " n o r m a l " human c o n d i t i o n of disharmony (dukkha-) and bondage (bandha-). And as such , f o r Buddhism n i b b a n a - i s the h i g h e s t g o a l , the summon bonum, the s t a t e o f h a v i n g t r a n s c e n d e d the human dilemma of bondage ( i . e . , o f i g n o r a n c e and l a c k o f s e l f - c o n t r o l ) by one endowed w i t h i n s i g h t and s e l f - c o n t r o l . Notes ^A.2:5f., t r a n s , by Kalupahana, BP, p. 72. ^ A c c o r d i n g t o N y a n a t i l o k a , B u d d h i s t D i c t i o n a r y , p. 161, t h e r e a r e t e n f e t t e r s , but we a r e c o n c e r n e d here o n l y w i t h the l a s t f i v e , v i z . : (6) c r a v i n g f o r f i n e - m a t e r i a l e x i s t e n c e ( r u p a - r a g a - ) , (7) c r a v i n g f o r i m m a t e r i a l e x i s -t e n c e ( a r u p a - r a g a - ) , (8) c o n c e i t (mana-), (9) r e s t l e s s n e s s ( u d d h a c c a - ) , and (10) i g n o r a n c e ( a v i j j a - ) . 3 f r o m A.2:5f. 4 B P , pp. 72-73. 5 I b i d . , p. 73. ^ I _ b i d . , p. 80. The p r o c e e d i n g a n a l y s i s c l o s e l y f o l l o w s K a l u p a h a n a 1 s, BP, pp. 69-88. 7BPT, pp. 40-41. °Vis.16:66, t r a n s , by Nya n a m o l i . ^ A c c o r d i n g t o Buddhaghosa, Vis.16:18: " ( N i r o d h a ' c e s s a t i o n ' ) : t h e word n i denotes absence, and the word r a d h a , a p r i s o n . Now the t h i r d t r u t h i s v o i d o f a l l d e s t i n i e s (by r e b i r t h ) and so t h e r e i s no c o n s t r a i n t (rodha) o f s u f f e r i n g h e r e r e c k o n e d as the p r i s o n o f the round o f r e b i r t h s ; or when t h a t c e s s a t i o n has been a r r i v e d a t , t h e r e i s no more c o n s t r a i n t o f s u f f e r i n g r e c -koned as the p r i s o n o f the round o f r e b i r t h s . And b e i n g the o p p o s i t e o f t h a t p r i s o n , i t i s c a l l e d d u k k h a - n i r o d h a ( c e s s a t i o n o f s u f f e r i n g ) . Or a l t e r -n a t i v e l y , i t i s c a l l e d ' c e s s a t i o n of s u f f e r i n g ' because i t i s a c o n d i t i o n f o r the c e s s a t i o n of s u f f e r i n g c o n s i s t i n g i n n o n - a r i s i n g . " ( t r a n s , by Nyana-m o l i ) 1 0 f r o m Vis.16:64. H y i m u t t i - r e f e r s t o the freedom from s u c h ' e v i l s as the asavas (D.3:68), v i z . : the i n t o x i c a n t o f s e n s u a l d e s i r e s (kamasava-), the i n t o x i c a n t of be-87 coming (bhavlsava-), the intoxicant of ignorance (avij jisava-) of the four Noble Truths, and the intoxicant of views (ditthasava-), i . e . , speculations and wrong views). 1 2A.1:152; S.4:369f; Milp. 270. v. 1 88 BIBLIOGRAPHY Aung, Shwe Zan. Compendium of Philosophy. London, 1972. Conze, Edward. Buddhism: Its Essence and Development. New York, 1951. --Buddhis t Thought in India. London, 1962. --Buddhist Wisdom Books. London, 1958. Dasgupta, Surendranath. A History of Indian Philosophy. Cambridge, 1951. v o l . I, pp. 78-124. Davids, Rhys C.A.F. Buddhist Psychology. London, 1914. Davids, T.W. P a l i - E n g l i s h Dictionary. London, 1972. Eliade, Mircea. The Sacred and the Profane. New York, 1959. Govinda, Lama Anagarika. The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy. New York, 1971. Guenther, H.V. "The Levels of Understanding i n Buddhism," Journal of the  American O r i e n t i a l Society. 1958. pp. 19-28. --Philosophy and Psychology of Abhidharma. Lucknow, 1957. Hiriyanna, M. Outlines of Indian Philosophy. London, 1963. pp. 134-54. Horner, I.B. Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected. London, 1936. Humphreys, Christmas. The Wisdom of Buddhism. London, 1970. Jacobson, Nolan Pliny. Buddhism: The Religion of Analysis. London, 1966. Johansson, Rune E-.A. The Psychology of Nirvana. London, 1969. Kalupahana, David J. Buddhist Philosophy. Honolulu, 1976. --Causality: The Central Philosophy £f Buddhism. Honolulu, 1975. Kashyap, J. The Abhidhamma Philosophy. Ceylon, 1954. Malalasekera, G.P., ed. Encylopaedia of Buddhism, v o l . I. Ceylon, 1961. Murti, T.R.V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. London, 1970. A/ Nanananda. Concept and Reality i n Early Buddhist Thought. Kandy, 1971. Narada. A Manual of Abhidhamma. Kandy, 1968. 89 Nyanaponika. Abhi.dhamma S tudies. Kandy, 1965. --Anatti and Nibbana. Kandy, 1959. --,ed. The Basic Facts of Existence (#1, "Impermanence, Collected Essays"). . Kandy, 1973. Nyanatiloka. Buddhis t Dictionary. Colombo, 1972. --Guide Through the Abhidhamma-Pitaka. Colombo, 1957. Potter, Karl H. Presuppositions of India's Philosophies. Westport, 1975. Robinson, Richard H.' Early Madhyamika i n India and China. Madison, 1967. --The Buddhist Religion. Belmont, 1970. Sadaw, Ledi. "Some Points on Buddhist Doctrine," Journal of the P a l i Texts  Society (1914), pp. 115-63. Saddhatissa, H. Buddhist Ethics. New York, 1970. Santucci, James A. A. Dictionary of Buddhist P a l i Terms. Dept. of L i n g u i s t i c s Seminar Papers Series #13, C a l i f o r n i a State University at F u l l e r t o n , 1971. --The Importance of Psychology in Theravada Buddhism. Dept. of Religious Studies Seminar Papers Series #10, C a l i f o r n i a State U n i v e r s i t y at F u l l e r -ton, 1974. Sarathchandra, E.R. Buddhist Psychology of Perception. Columbo, 1958. Sprung, Mervyn, ed. The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta. Boston, 1973. Stcherbatsky, Theodor. The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning 2l t h l Word "Dharma." Calcutta, 1961. . • --The Conception of_ Buddhist Nirvana. London, 1965. Streng, Frederick J.. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. New York, 1967. --"The Problem of Symbolic Structures i n Religious Apprehension," History  of Religions (Summer 1964), pp. 126-53. Takakusu, J u n j i r o . The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy. Honolulu, 1956. Thomas, E.J. The History of Buddhist Thought. New York, 1933. Warder, A.K. Indian Buddhism. Delhi, 1970. Warren, Henry Clarke. Buddhism i_n Translations. New York, 1970. 90 Wayman, II. " B u d d h i s t Dependent O r i g i n a t i o n , " H i s t o r y of R e l i g i o n s (Feb. 1971), pp. 185-203. --"The Meaning o f Un-wisdom A v i d y a , " P h i l o s o p h y E a s t and West ( A p r i l , J u l y 1957), pp. 21-25. Welbon, Guy R i c h a r d . The B u d d h i s t N i r v a n a and i t s . W estern I n t e r p r e t e r s . C h i -cago, 1968. W i j e s e k e r a , O.H. deA. The Three S i g n a t a . Kandy, 1960. 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0094093/manifest

Comment

Related Items