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Creation and design in the thought of Sir William Dawson Ballantyne, Edmund Chattan 1977

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CREATION AND DESIGN IN THE THOUGHT OF SIR WILLIAM DAWSON by EDMUND CHATTAN BALLANTYNE B.A., McGill University, 1972 A Thesis Submitted i n P a r t i a l Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES i n RELIGIOUS STUDIES We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA July, 1977 Edmund Chattan Ballantyne, 1977 In p resent ing t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e fo r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t permiss ion fo r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l ga in s h a l l not be a l lowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Depa rtment The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 i i ABSTRACT In 1859 Darwin's On the Origin of Species presented a compelling argument for evolution that was to challenge the funda-mental b e l i e f s of C h r i s t i a n i t y . I t was incompatible with the idea of a supernatural, designing, and providential God; and i t raised doubts about the Bible's i n s p i r a t i o n by contradicting the Genesis account of creation. Some Christians reconciled t h e i r f a i t h to the theory of evolution, while others rejected i t as a t h e i s t i c . This thesis examines the reaction of S i r William Dawson (1820-1899), the Canadian natural h i s t o r i a n and Christian apologist, who rejected evolution as a t h e i s t i c and spent the l a t t e r part of the 19th century campaigning against i t . Dawson was a Paleyite who believed i n the designing God and the l i t e r a l word of Genesis. He found evolution incompatible with th i s b e l i e f and countered i t by constructing a s c i e n t i f i c theory of creation. This study explores the nature of his Paleyism and how i t led him to defend the doctrine of creation as a theory which preserved b e l i e f i n the designing God and corroborated the Genesis cosmogony. I t also places his reaction to evolution i n the context of Canadian thought on th i s issue. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 I. DAWSON'S PALEYITE FAITH 5 Background 5 Dawson's Paleyite Heritage 9 Dawson's B i b l i c a l Faith and Its Geological Confirmation 13 Natural Theology and Prcgressionism . 19 Footnotes to Chapter I 25 I I . THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION 27 Darwin 28 Huxley 34 Spencer 36 Haeckel 38 The Theistic Evolutionists 41 The Agnostic and A t h e i s t i c Evolutionists on Science and Religion 45 Footnotes to Chapter II 50 I I I . THE MAJOR PROBLEMS DAWSON SAW IN THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION . 53 Natural Selection and Design 54 Naturalism and Natural Theology 60 Evolution and Genesis 71 Footnotes to Chapter I I I 79 i v IV. DAWSON'S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF EVOLUTION 81 A Sample of Canadian Solutions to the Problem of Evolution 81 Dawson's Solution to the Problem of Evolution 87 Footnotes to Chapter IV 94 BIBLIOGRAPHY 96 V ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I thank Professor N. K. C l i f f o r d for his support, suggestions, and advice, without which t h i s thesis would not be. I also thank Mr. John Andreassen and Mrs. Faith Wallis, of the McGill Archives, for their generous help. I am also indebted to the In t e r l i b r a r y Loan Division of the University of B r i t i s h Columbia who were always considerate and help f u l . Nancy Smith, who typed t h i s thesis, has also earned my gratitude. v i "Why, do you not say yourself that the sky and the birds prove God?" --"No." --"Does your r e l i g i o n not say so?" --"No. For though i t i s true i n a sense for some souls whom God has enlightened i n t h i s way, yet i t i s untrue for the majority." Pascal 1 INTRODUCTION In 1859 Darwin's Origin of Species presented a compelling argument for evolution that was to challenge the fundamental b e l i e f s of C h r i s t i a n i t y . The naturalism and randomness inherent i n the proposed evolutionary process was incompatible with the idea of a supernatural, designing, and providential God. Moreover, the idea of derivation raised doubts about the Bible's i n s p i r a t i o n by con-tr a d i c t i n g the Genesis account of a creation which had culminated i n Adam, who had been made i n the image of God. Although many Christians reconciled t h e i r f a i t h to evolutionary thought, others refused either to surrender th e i r trust i n the l i t e r a l word of Genesis or to accept a seemingly absurd and purposeless universe. From t h i s camp came several apologists who defended orthodoxy against evolution because they saw i t as a revolutionary view of l i f e t o t a l l y at odds with C h r i s t i a n i t y . Among the prominent defenders of the f a i t h was S i r William Dawson (1820-1899). One of Canada's leading i n t e l l e c t u a l s , Dawson was an active Presbyterian apologist and a highly q u a l i f i e d natural historian. A dynamic man, he b u i l t his reputation by writing prodigiously, by involving himself i n many s c i e n t i f i c and r e l i g i o u s associations, and by building McGill University into a distinguished i n s t i t u t i o n during his principalship from 1855 to 1893. His country recognized his a b i l i t i e s when, i n 1882, the Marquis of Lome appointed 2 Him the f i r s t president of the Royal Society of Canada. Dawson was also well-known interna t i o n a l l y . Among his friends were such men as Charles Lye11, Louis Agassiz, and Asa Gray, a l l of whom were out-standing s c i e n t i s t s and p r i n c i p a l figures i n the evolution contro-versy. Leading s c i e n t i f i c societies around the world often honoured his contributions. Dawson, for example, on separate occasions held the prestigious presidencies of both the B r i t i s h Association for the Advancement of Science (1886-1887) and i t s American counterpart (1882-1883). In addition to being a respected s c i e n t i s t Dawson was also an acknowledged apologist for creation. For example, the Evangelical Alliance and the V i c t o r i a Institute (a society of apologetic Christian s c i e n t i s t s ) often requested papers and lectures from him. Even Pri n c i p a l McCosh of Princeton College begged Dawson to accept the geology chair at that i n s t i t u t i o n i n his capacity as a s c i e n t i s t who could defend the f a i t h . McCosh admitted to Dawson i n a l e t t e r that "We f e e l i t to be of vast importance not only for ourselves but for the country to have you i n the United States to guide opinion at t h i s c r i t i c a l time.""'-Despite Dawson's importance as a Christian s c i e n t i s t i n the evolution controversy, there has been l i t t l e f i r s t - r a t e scholarly work done on him. The only recent work worth noting i s C. O'Brien's Si r William Dawson: a L i f e i n Science and Religion (1971), which competently describes Dawson's s c i e n t i f i c controversies. O'Brien recognized that Dawson f e l t t e r r i b l y threatened by evolution, but """Letter, J. McCosh to J. W. Dawson, Apr. 4, 1875, McGill University, Archives, Dawson papers. 3 he did not explore his subject's r e l i g i o u s make-up s u f f i c i e n t l y to explain why evolution was t o t a l l y unacceptable to him and why he so act i v e l y defended creation. Dawson was a Paleyite who reconciled his science and r e l i g i o n i n a f a i t h founded on God's two revelations: the Bible and nature. He assumed that the Bible was l i t e r a l l y true and that science could v e r i f y i t when i t touched on natural subjects. He also assumed that God's creation was imbued with purpose and design which science could examine i n order to prove the existence of a divine designer. He found the major evidences of t h i s i n biology. Zoological and botani-cal systems of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n revealed a whole natural order of hierarchical arrangements and repeated patterns and functions. The history of animal l i f e showed the planned progressive introduction of species. Every animal and plant exhibited complex adaptations to i t s environment. Dawson believed that a l l t h i s evidence of design and contrivance proved the divine designer. Darwinism threatened t h i s b e l i e f by reducing purpose and design to the results of random and l i m i t l e s s v a r i a t i o n as controlled by the law of natural selection. Adaptations resulted from the clash of v a r i a t i o n and environment. The natural order which systems of b i o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n revealed was explained by the v a r i a t i o n of groups of species away from l i k e progenitors. S i m i l a r i t y of type was due to continuity of inheritance. Furthermore, the progressive introduction of l i f e was quite simply proposed as evidence for evolution. Darwin offered a s u f f i c i e n t natural explanation for Dawson's evidences of God and then challenged the very idea of an i n t e l l i g e n t designer by introducing randomness as a r e a l factor i n 4 nature. Dawson opposed evolution primarily because i t was a n t i t h e t i -cal to the foundations of his f a i t h : nature and the Bible. Mere chance was incompatible with Dawson's b e l i e f i n a designing and i n t e l -ligent God. Naturalism, though less s i g n i f i c a n t , entailed the elimina-tion of the b i o l o g i c a l evidences of f a i t h and removed God as an ordering p r i n c i p l e i n nature. Because Dawson interpreted the Genesis creation narrative as a type of natural theology which spoke of the designing creator God, he also found evolution to be incompatible with i t . This thesis explains why Dawson was an ardent opponent of evolution. Chapter I describes and analyses his r e l i g i o u s viewpoint as i t stood before the publication of the Origin. Chapter II describes those aspects of evolutionary speculation which were to prove a n t i t h e t i c a l to the foundations of this viewpoint. Chapter I I I presents Dawson's perception of these problems. I t establishes that randomness and naturalism were the elements he found unacceptable i n evolution; and i t places Dawson i n the context of other Canadian thought on the same issues. Chapter IV presents Dawson's response to the challenge of evolution, namely his attempt to form a s c i e n t i f i c theory of creation. It also places t h i s response i n the context of other Canadian solutions to the same problem. 5 CHAPTER I DAWSON'S PALEYITE FAITH As Dawson battled the theory of evolution because i t was incompatible with his f a i t h , i t i s necessary f i r s t to examine the kind of f a i t h he had before broaching his reaction to evolutionary specula-ti o n . Dawson was a Paleyite who reconciled science and r e l i g i o n i n a highly r a t i o n a l i z e d f a i t h which was based on the Bible and natural theology. As this Paleyism was f u l l y developed before the publication of the Origin of Species, i n 1859, i t w i l l be best to examine i t as then fashioned. Before the Origin Dawson had reconciled scripture and science i n a harmonization of the Genesis cosmogony with geology, and he had constructed a natural theology on the evidences of design provided by biology and palaeontology. After presenting the background of Dawson's career, t h i s chapter describes Dawson's Paleyite heritage and his continuation of this t r a d i t i o n as i t stood before the Origin. I. Background Dawson was born on October 13, 1820, i n Pictou, Nova Scotia, to staunch Presbyterian parents. After passing much of his younger years scurrying around the l o c a l c o a l f i e l d s searching out geological specimens, he was enrolled i n the l o c a l Pictou Academy for his 6 secondary education. The Academy had been founded by T. McCulloch with the intention of t r a i n i n g Presbyterian ministers and providing a higher education for the l o c a l dissenters. Although i t was small and impoverished i t managed to send forth hundreds of clergymen, doctors, and scholars into the community. Dawson attended the Academy for four years and received a l i b e r a l education which included his favorite subject of natural history. As a student he must also have experienced strong re l i g i o u s influences, for when he graduated he set himself to studying "Hebrew and a l l i e d subjects" and gave serious thought to entering the ministry.* The p u l l of science, however, was greater on Dawson than that of the church. In 1840 he set o f f for Edinburgh i n order to study natural history with Robert Jameson (1774-1854), who was a leading geologist and a conservative Presbyterian under whom Charles Darwin had also studied. In 1841 Dawson returned to Pictou because his father had run into f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . As chance would have i t , however, Charles L y e l l , England's most important geologist, v i s i t e d Nova Scotia i n the same year and became acquainted with Dawson. They quickly became friends, and L y e l l engaged his junior as a guide i n an exploration of the Nova Scotia c o a l - f i e l d s . Dawson remained i n Nova Scotia u n t i l 1846, when he returned for a f i n a l year of studies with Jameson i n Edinburgh. His student days behind him, Dawson set to work building a career. In 1850 he was appointed superintendent of education for Nova Scotia and spent three years touring and organizing that colony's schools. His next appointment was to a commission regulating the a f f a i r s of the University of New Brunswick, and i n 1855 he was 7 appointed p r i n c i p a l of McGill, a position he held u n t i l 1893. McGill was an impoverished and poorly managed i n s t i t u t i o n when Dawson arrived. The grounds were dilapidated, and even the Arts building i t s e l f had been abandoned. He was, however, undeterred and immediately set to the task of building McGill into a university which, by the time of his retirement, had gained international standing. Dawson involved himself i n every aspect of his i n s t i t u t i o n ' s growth. He taught natural history, helped with financing, and i n 1857 founded the McGill Normal School which was to supply the teachers to t r a i n the students who would attend the university. In spite of his deep involvement with McGill, Dawson main-tained a severe regimen of research, writing, and lecturing on geo-l o g i c a l , b i o l o g i c a l , anthropological, and rel i g i o u s subjects. Because he was capable and p r o l i f i c i n each of these areas, his name became increasingly recognized. In 1881 he both received the L y e l l award from the Geological Society of London and also was made a companion of St. Michael and St. George. In 1883 he was knighted, and the next year his alma mater of Edinburgh conferred upon him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws. While these commendations brought public honour, Dawson's a b i l i t i e s had also provided him with the less tangible but more important respect and friendship of many major s c i e n t i f i c opinion makers such as Louis Agassiz and Asa Gray. Dawson's s c i e n t i f i c successes had not arisen out of a vacuum. Much 19th century s c i e n t i f i c work was done by the members of the many s c i e n t i f i c societies and promulgated i n their journals. Dawson was a member of the leading societies i n Canada and the major figure i n his own ci t y ' s Natural History Society. Moreover, he was one of the 8 prime movers behind the formation of the Royal Society of Canada, which was established i n 1882. But Canadian science was s t i l l young, and the most s i g n i f i c a n t studies were carried out by the English s c i e n t i s t s . Accordingly, Dawson frequently v i s i t e d England where he was a member of the major societies and a contributor to t h e i r journals. Among others, he was a fellow of both the Geological Society of London and the Royal Society of England. Dawson's pursuit of science was perhaps equalled by his defense of C h r i s t i a n i t y , where again he had an international reputa-ti o n . In Canada he was involved i n such organizations as the YMCA, the Montreal A u x i l i a r y Bible Society, the Quebec Women's Christian Temperance Union, and the Canada Sunday School Union. He was f r e -quently called on to lecture on re l i g i o u s topics, and at McGill he often made i t a habit to i n v i t e students home for discussions on B i b l i c a l subjects. His international a c t i v i t i e s included member-ships i n both the Evangelical Alliance and the V i c t o r i a I n s t i t u t e . He was Canadian vice-president of the Alliance and contributed papers to i t s 1873 meeting i n New York as well as the Jubilee Con-ference of 1896. The V i c t o r i a I n s t i t u t e , which was a B r i t i s h association of s c i e n t i s t s dedicated to "reconciling any apparent discrepancies between C h r i s t i a n i t y and Science," considered Dawson 2 to be one of t h e i r more important members. Requests for Dawson's aid i n defending the f a i t h came from near and far. In 1894 he was invited to the s i x t h Council of the Presbyterian Alliance i n Scotland i n order to speak on either "Modern 3 Apologetics and C r i t i c i s m " or "Biology and Natural Science." Moody's Northfield Seminary asked him to contribute i n t h e i r work. When Princeton College offered Dawson the geology chair, Charles 9 Hodge induced Princeton Seminary to establish a lectureship on "the r e l a t i o n of Science and Religion," with the hope that Dawson would accept i t as well. I I . Dawson's Paleyite Heritage The 19th century was a time of growing doubt. Franklin Baumer views i t as an age of sceptical revolution which c r y s t a l l i z e d i n s i x schools of thought. Psychology, beginning with Feuerbach, was coming to regard the s p i r i t u a l as a mental projection. U t i l i t a r -ianism frequently argued that r e l i g i o n was injurious to society. The sciences, and especially evolutionary biology, were increasingly describing a natural universe that bore l i t t l e r e l a t i o n to Christian b e l i e f s and hopes. The anthropology pursued by such men as Tylor and Frazer was reducing r e l i g i o n to a n a t u r a l i s t i c outgrowth of primitive superstition. Marxist economics was promulgating the idea that r e l i g i o n was nothing but a so c i a l by-product. The Higher C r i t i c i s m was subjecting the Bible to h i s t o r i c a l analyses which resulted i n such contentions as Strauss' that the New Testament was e s s e n t i a l l y 4 myth. A l l i n a l l , i t can be seen that the very essence of b e l i e f had come under question. Dawson was keenly aware of the atheism and agnosticism which surrounded him, and his own f a i t h was always coloured by a conserva-t i v e reaction to i t . This conservatism was rooted i n the C a l v i n i s t i c b e l i e f i n the f a l l e n condition of man which seemed to explain the i r r e l i g i o n and madness of the " m a t e r i a l i s t s , " " p o s i t i v i s t s , " and "agnostics." His f a i t h was that of an embattled man f i g h t i n g for the true and the good i n a h o s t i l e world. In 1864 he declared that 10 he could hear "the thunders of A n t i c h r i s t " which were possibly-soon to be p i t t e d i n the f i n a l "great struggle against the Gospel.""' By 1898, one year before his death, t h i s attitude had strengthened. In an exegesis of the Book of Revelation he applied some Johannine symbolism to his own era and arrived at the conclusion that "we may take the dragon to represent Heathenism and Agnosticism; the Beast, the Papacy and Ritualism; and the False Prophet, apostate Protes-„6 tantism." What Dawson was conserving against the ravages of i n f i d e l i t y was his highly rationalized f a i t h which was formed i n a combination of r e l i g i o n and science and based on God's twin revelations: nature and the Bible. He assumed that God's creation was imbued with purpose and design which science could demonstrate i n order to prove the divine designer. He also assumed that the Bible was l i t e r a l l y true and that science could v e r i f y i t when i t touched on natural subjects. In sum, he represented a continuity of that l i n e of b e l i e f which was epitomized i n Paley and argued for the inherent reasonableness of r e l i g i o n and i t s s c i e n t i f i c v e r i f i c a t i o n . At the turn of the 19th century Paley published h is Natural  Theology which argued for an i n t e l l i g e n t and benevolent God from the evidences of his design i n nature. Using the now famous analogy with the watch, Paley reasoned that i t was only by postulating the exist-ence of a divine designer that we could explain the numerous manifes-tations of order and contrivance i n nature. His argument rested p r i -marily on the myriad examples of contrivance i n anatomy which provided his reasoning with a s c i e n t i f i c and empirical foundation. He assumed that science and r e l i g i o n could be reconciled i n a universe pervaded 11 by purposefulness. The s c i e n t i f i c study of nature led to knowledge of God because i t discovered a designed creation which could not be explained through the action of random natural forces. Paley believed that everything was imbued with some divine purpose. Even purpose had a purpose, for i t existed to make possible natural theo-logy. Whatever God wished for his creatures he could have accom-plished "without the intervention of instruments or means," but " i t i s only by the display of contrivance, that the existence, the agency, the wisdom of the Deity, 'could' be t e s t i f i e d to his r a t i o n a l 7 creatures." While natural theology demonstrated the existence of the divine a r t i f i c e r , i t also served as a prelude to the New Testament which could i n turn stand the test of reason. The Evidences for  C h r i s t i a n i t y t r i e d to show that the New Testament was h i s t o r i c a l l y accurate and could be validated by secular h i s t o r i c a l methods. Paley's central argument was that because the o r i g i n a l Christian witnesses had defended t h e i r b e l i e f at the r i s k s of torture and death, and because they could not have done so without that f e e l i n g of cer-tainty which only miracles could have provided, the miracle stories must be true. Consequently the o r i g i n a l witnesses must have been correct i n t h e i r testimony and the New Testament must be true. Paleyism l i v e d on i n the 19th century u n t i l Darwinism preci-pitated i t s decline. Its most notable expression was i n the eight Bridgewater Treatises which were published between 1833 and 1840 from a bequest of the eccentric Earl of Bridgewater. These treatises continued the natural theological side of Paley's thought and attempted to i l l u s t r a t e "the power, wisdom and goodness of God" as 12 exhibited i n h i s creation. The writers were a l l eminent men such as W. Whewell, the philosopher of science, and P. M. Roget, who i s now more famous for h i s thesaurus. Thomas Chalmers, some of whose works were f a m i l i a r to Dawson, not only contributed one t r e a t i s e but also elsewhere embraced Paley's other side by o f f e r i n g r a t i o n a l defenses f o r s c r i p t u r e . His On the Power Wisdom and Goodness of God (1839) presented evidence f o r the deity i n man's moral and i n t e l l e c t u a l adaptation to the external world. The Evidence and Authority of the  C h r i s t i a n Revelation (1818) had aimed to v e r i f y the h i s t o r i c a l accuracy of the New Testament. As an adolescent Dawson wrote more than one paper o f f e r i n g r a t i o n a l and t e l e o l o g i c a l proofs for the existence of God which revealed the influence of Paley. His adult f a i t h was also i r r e v o -cably intertwined with the r a t i o n a l demonstrations that he could o f f e r for the existence of God and the v a l i d i t y of the Bible. F a i t h , he assumed, was a matter of i n t e l l e c t u a l assent to the evidences and arguments by which reason supported b e l i e f . His natural theology rested on the evidences of God's design i n nature, and his B i b l i c a l f a i t h rested on the s c i e n t i f i c support which could be brought to v e r i f y s cripture i n i t s h i s t o r i c a l narratives and descriptions of nature. Because Dawson believed that the study of nature led to God, he assumed that science could be r e c o n c i l e d with r e l i g i o n . Indeed, science was i t s e l f the r e l i g i o u s exercise of exploring God's creation. Science i n e l u c t a b l y led to r e l i g i o n , and Dawson maintained that to depart from the path of either was to enter "into the mists and darkness which shroud from our gaze the precious junction of the g s p i r i t u a l and the material." Science and r e l i g i o n described 13 d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f t h e u n i t a r y r a t i o n a l u n i v e r s e . The same o r d e r p e r v a d e d God, man, and t h e w o r l d ; and so s c i e n c e , w h i c h was l i m i t e d t o t h e i n d u c t i v e e x a m i n a t i o n o f ene r gy and m a t t e r , complemented r e l i g i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n s o f t h e s p i r i t u a l . A t no p o i n t i n h i s l i f e d i d Dawson d e p a r t f r o m t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t God had c r e a t e d a r a t i o n a l p u r p o s e f u l w o r l d and t h a t t h e r e was a " f u n d a m e n t a l u n i t y and harmony o f a l l t r u t h w h e t h e r n a t u r a l o r s p i r i t u a l , w h e t h e r 9 d i s c o v e r e d by man o r r e v e a l e d by G o d . " The t r a g e d y o f Dawson ' s f a i t h l a y i n t h e f a c t t h a t i t was b a s e d upon p r e c i s e l y t h o s e s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s and d e s c r i p t i o n s o f l i f e w h i c h Da rw i n was t o o v e r t u r n . Dawson ' s B i b l i c a l f a i t h was s u p p o r t e d b y t h e a c c o r d a n c e o f a s e e m i n g l y s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y o f c r e a t i o n w i t h G e n e s i s ; m i n d l e s s e v o l u t i o n was i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h b e l i e f i n a c r e a t o r . Dawson ' s n a t u r a l t h e o l o g y was b a s e d p r i m a r i l y on t h e e v i d e n c e s o f d e s i g n i n t h e o r g a n i c w o r l d ; D a r w i n ' s e v o l u t i o n a r y b i o l o g y was t o e x p l a i n t h e s e by t h e a c t i o n o f n a t u r a l and m i n d l e s s c a u s e s . Dawson was t o oppose Da rw i n becau se h i s w h o l e v i e w o f t h e w o r l d was f u n d a m e n t a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e v o l u t i o n a r y t h o u g h t . I I I . Dawson ' s B i b l i c a l F a i t h and I t s G e o l o g i c a l C o n f i r m a t i o n Th roughou t h i s l i f e Dawson n e v e r w a i v e r e d f rom t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e B i b l e was e s s e n t i a l t o h i s own f a i t h , t o C h r i s t i a n i t y , and t o t h e g e n e r a l h e a l t h and p r o g r e s s o f s o c i e t y . He saw i t as b e i n g e v e r y t h i n g f r o m a c h a r t e r f o r c i v i l l i b e r t i e s t o a c u r e f o r m a t e r i a l -i s m . He was most c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e book o f G e n e s i s b e c a u s e t h i s was t h e book most f r e q u e n t l y a n a l y s e d by t h e H i g h e r C r i t i c s and a l s o t h e 14 book most s u s c e p t i b l e , due to i t s cosmogony, to s c i e n t i f i c a t t a ck or defense. As Dawson i nves t ed much e f f o r t i n e x p l a i n i n g and defending Genes i s , we w i l l be able to ga in an i n s i g h t i n t o h i s a t t i t u d e toward the B i b l e and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to s c i ence by exam-i n i n g h i s thought on t h i s s u b j e c t . Dawson saw Genesis as a type o f n a t u r a l t heo logy . He thought tha t t h i s was ep i tomized i n i t s opening statement which con ta ins tha t "great fundamental t r u t h , which must ever form the b a s i s o f t rue r e l i g i o n and sound p h i l o s o p h y - - t h e p roduc t ion from non-ex i s t ence o f the m a t e r i a l un ive r se by the e t e r n a l s e l f - e x i s t e n t G o d . " ^ He always mainta ined tha t Genesis had served to p rov ide the Hebrews, and now modern man as w e l l , w i t h the b e l i e f i n a t ranscendent d e s i g n i n g God who had c rea ted an ordered and purposefu l w o r l d . I t was as though the cosmogony had been w r i t t e n to answer to the modern d iseases o f mater-i a l i s m , p o s i t i v i s m , pantheism, and the b e l i e f i n f o r t u i t o u s occur rence . Genesis exp la ined the u n i t y o f the u n i v e r s e , cosmic d e s i g n , and mono-the i sm, and i n c u l c a t e d a n a t u r a l and r a t i o n a l the i sm. Dawson b e l i e v e d i n the l i t e r a l word o f the B i b l e and i t s p l e n a r y i n s p i r a t i o n . He f r equen t ly complained about the exegetes who would reduce i t to myth, f o r i t was h i s constant p o s i t i o n tha t S c r i p t -ure was an accura te h i s t o r i c a l and r evea l ed n a r r a t i v e which r e f e r r e d to r e a l events . He was, n e v e r t h e l e s s , s u f f i c i e n t l y a s c i e n t i s t t ha t he o f ten was fo rced e i t h e r to r a t i o n a l i z e away the u n s c i e n t i f i c p o r t i o n s o f h i s m a t e r i a l or to push the Hebrew language i n t o meanings consonant w i t h h i s needs. For example, he would grant t ha t there were p o e t i c s ec t i ons i n Genes is , such as the re fe rence to the "windows o f the heavens," which should not be taken l i t e r a l l y . 15 Beyond his own believer's c r i t i c i s m , however, Dawson did not venture very far. He was s u f f i c i e n t l y enraged by the Higher C r i t i c s that, la t e r i n l i f e , he came to see them as the arch-enemy along with the evolutionists. He bemoaned how these two groups "have long since united forces, and true C h r i s t i a n i t y and true science are now face to face with both.""^ Between protests, however, he did surrender to them a l i t t l e ground. In 1860 Dawson had maintained 12 "the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, as an undeniable f a c t . " By 1877, Moses had been reduced to the status of editor of Genesis, although he s t i l l retained the authorship of the remainder of the 13 Pentateuch. By the 1880's, Dawson was well f a m i l i a r with B i b l i c a l c r i t i c i s m , and i n the 1890's the l a s t four books of the Pentateuch had become a record kept by camp scribes, which accounted for s t y l i s t i c variations; and the authorship of various parts of Genesis was attributed to such unknown authors as "the writer of 14 Genesis i i . " Despite these concessions, Dawson had a special d i s l i k e for c r i t i c s such as Graf, Kuenen, and Wellhausen; and he continued to believe i n the l i t e r a l word of Genesis. Genesis commits i t s e l f to a number of geological views. The most pertinent are that the earth was created, formed, and populated i n a set order over a period of s i x days, and that there once was a universal deluge. From the late 18th century u n t i l the early 1830's English geological opinion was frequently i n turmoil over the issue of whether or not i t s findings could be reconciled with Genesis. The geologists debated the compatibility of t h e i r data and theories with both the Genesis time scale and also the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a cataclysmic event as the Noachic deluge. 16 These controversies received a ra d i c a l twist when L y e l l began pub-l i s h i n g the three volumes of his Principles of Geology i n the early 1830's. L y e l l seemed to have severed geology from Genesis with his "uniformitarian" method, which maintained that a l l geological change had taken place gradually over immense stretches of time through the action of those kinds of causes which are presently observable. As Wilson, Lyell's biographer, explains i t : I f strata were to be deposited and upheaved quickly, i f valleys were to be excavated overnight, these events would indeed assume the dimensions of catastrophes; but i f very long periods of time were allowed, they might be accomplished gradually by the ordinary action of r a i n , wind, and waves to wear down the land and earth-quakes to b u i l d i t up again.15 L y e l l had seemingly invalidated the Genesis chronology and removed the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a cataclysmic event as the deluge. He had also rendered geology a n a t u r a l i s t i c science which could explain the earth by the action of e f f i c i e n t causality, without making reference to God. A number of authors responded to L y e l l i n an attempt to reconcile his uniformitarianism with Genesis, and Dawson was f a m i l i a r with the major works of this genre. Pye Smith, a Congregationalist divine, wrote The Relation Between the Holy Scriptures and Some Parts  of Geological Science (1852) which maintained that the flood had been of only limited extent and that the s i x creation days referred to but a small area of the globe where God had perfected the Garden of Eden. Hitchcock's Religion of Geology (1851), which Dawson considered to be "valuable and popular,"^ also limited the flood and then posited an in d e f i n i t e time gap between the f i r s t and subsequent creation days. The writer who most influenced Dawson, however, was Hugh M i l l e r whose 17 The Testimony of the Rocks (1857) resurrected the idea that the creation days referred to extensive eras rather than twenty-four hour periods. Dawson was a quasi-uniformitarian, which i s to say that he was primarily a L y e l l i a n gradualist, although he allowed for the occasional catastrophe whenever he needed to shorten his time span or allow for Noah's deluge. Nevertheless, he was enough of a uni-formitarian that he f e l t compelled to reconcile Genesis to t h i s method rather than to reject either. In 1860 he published Archaia which had the aims of harmonizing Genesis and geology as well as 17 disposing of polygenism. This work t y p i f i e d his r a t i o n a l scien-t i f i c view of r e l i g i o n . The reader i s immediately introduced to Dawson's Paleyite position when i n the preface he denounces those who try to "raise an insurmountable bar r i e r between the domains of 18 f a i t h and reason." He then goes on to explain that Genesis i s no mere myth or primitive attempt at science, but rather a purposeful revelation from God about the order of the world. The Bible i s 19 " f u l l of natural theology" and Genesis served to nurture "a high 20 and just appreciation of nature among the Hebrew people." Dawson followed a path popularized by M i l l e r i n suggesting that the revelation of the cosmogony to Moses occurred i n s i x visions over s i x days. I t was not to be interpreted as a s c i e n t i f i c account of nature, but rather as Moses' description of that which he had seen. He then interpreted, with great exegetical finesse, how the s i x days actually meant eras and how they nicely corresponded with the extensive geological periods provided by uniformitarianism. Assuming that the geological record did not reach as far back as the 18 fourth day, he correlated the remaining three days and t h e i r parts with the Palaeozoic, Mesozoic, Neozoic, and Modern periods. His method was to show how the animals which he considered characteris-t i c of each geological period corresponded seriatim with the animals which Genesis recorded as successively introduced on each day. The Modern period and the seventh day were i n agreement because neither of them had witnessed the introduction of any new forms of l i f e nor experienced any permanent and major geological change. A l l i n a l l , Genesis and geology were reconciled because they described the same world. Although Dawson had not bothered with any defense of the flood i n Archaia, l a t e r works show that he considered i t also to be capable of geological r a t i f i c a t i o n . He believed that i t had been of limited extent and that i t was corroborated by post-glacial submergence. But Dawson was not s a t i s f i e d with his uniformitarian vindica-tion of Genesis; i f both science and Genesis described the same world there had to be greater r e c o n c i l i a t i o n possible. Perhaps Genesis could guide s c i e n t i f i c speculation beyond i t s empirical lim i t a t i o n s to a tentative explanation of the f i r s t four creation days, and perhaps i n turn t h i s explanation might render more reasonable the Genesis cosmogony. Dawson took the then popular nebular hypothesis and showed how i t s theory of cosmic evolution accorded with the Genesis account of the creation of the heavenly bodies and more. For example, he urged how i t was quite s c i e n t i f i c that Genesis describes the existence of l i g h t (1:3) before the existence of the luminaries (1:14). After a l l , according to the nebular hypothesis as Dawson saw i t , the whirling mass of nebulous matter would be luminescent before i t actually formed into bodies such as the sun. He was l a t e r to remark on how this was "another point on which Moses anticipates 19 science." IV. Natural Theology and Progressionism Dawson believed that nature bore the impress of the divine mind: that nature was pervaded by a design which could not be explained through the action of natural causes. Ultimates, such as natural laws and the introduction of species, manifested God's hand rather than the operation of natural forces. Order, t e s t i f i e d a cosmic orderer. Adaptations, or any natural arrangement wherein some means serves an end, demonstrated the foresight and plan of a benevo-lent, purposive God. Dawson u n f a i l i n g l y and axiomatically drew the conclusion of design from the natural evidences of ultimacy, order, and adaptation. So strong was Dawson's t e l i c v i s i o n that whenever he attempted to demonstrate the existence of God from the mani-festations of ultimacy, order, and adaptation, he rarely i f ever bothered to construct an argument to prove his case. I t was as though these evidences were obviously evidences of design and thus equally obviously evidences of the divine designer. Furthermore, t h i s t e l i c reasoning so pervaded Dawson's thought that he came to see God as es s e n t i a l l y a purposive designer. Dawson occasionally spoke of how natural law s i g n i f i e d the divine law-maker, but his b e l i e f that ultimacy exhibits the action of God's mind depended mainly on the palaeontological evidences for the abrupt introduction of species. I f the species could not be explained as derived from either organic matter or other species, then th i s provided incontrovertible proof of God's creative action. The existence of law-like patterns, such as the c r y s t a l l i n e formations, 20 and r e g u l a r i t i e s , such as the s t r u c t u r a l types which run through the animal provinces, spoke to Dawson of designed order. Order attested to the existence of a u n i f i e d plan which extended throughout the whol of nature and thereby also to God the planner and orderer. Adaptations were the fundamentals i n Dawson's v i s i o n of desi because they so obviously indicated f i n a l c a u s a l i t y and the a c t u a l i -zation of div i n e purposiveness. Adaptations witnessed a side of God which ultimacy and order did not. They s i g n i f i e d a benevolent God who was s u f f i c i e n t l y involved i n his creation to so arrange each part of i t to serve some good and f u l f i l some end. Although u l t i -macy and order attested to the div i n e designer as well, t h i s God might conceivably be one who had l e f t h i s creation to the workings of b l i n d f a t a l i s t i c laws. But nature was f u l l of purpose f o r Dawson: nothing existed without serving some end, and everything had i t s legitimate place i n the scheme o f things. Dawson's t e l i c v i s i o n , however, was not so complete as to render him an incompetent s c i e n t i s t . Dawson was an em p i r i c i s t who believed i n induction and i n giving natural explanations and des-c r i p t i o n s to natural events and objects. On the other hand, his r e l i g i o n directed him to study matters which would ostensively support the f a i t h , and his r e l i g i o n prohibited him from the thought that ultimacy, order, and adaptation could be given s u f f i c i e n t natural explanations. Dawson was no less a s c i e n t i s t than h i s p o s i t i v i s t i c colleagues, and h i s purely professional work di d not r e l y on r e l i g i o u s reasoning. Design constituted a border between science and r e l i g i o n where the former ceased i t s explanatory a c t i v i t y and yielded to the l a t t e r . 21 Dawson's s c i e n t i f i c a l l y based natural theology was well developed before the publication of the Origin. Palaeontology and biology had provided the substance of his thought with t h e i r por-trayal of an organic world abounding with design. He believed that the millions of organisms and f o s s i l s provided overwhelmingly con-vincing examples of God's design. Dawson claimed that palaeontology presented a record of the progressive introduction of immutable species i n prehistoric time. The chronological succession of strata contained a succession of f o s s i l s from the very simple to the most complex. The strata also appeared to t e l l of the abrupt introduction and extinction of species. Species seemed to have made t h e i r f i r s t appearances f u l l y formed, and they never disappeared by gradually transmuting into the formation of new and derivative species. What interpretation could be given to th i s evidence but that species were immutable and created? Dawson certa i n l y believed that t h i s was the only j u s t i f i a b l e conclusion and that the f o s s i l s were empirical proof of God's many creations. Additionally, the fact that the succession of f o s s i l s i s progressive impressed him with the b e l i e f that God had had a s i m i l a r l y progressive creation plan. Dawson was a "pro-gressionist" who read the palaeontological record as the s c i e n t i f i c narrative of those ultimate beginnings where God had carried out his providential design. The idea of creation became a v a l i d s c i e n t i f i c theory which coordinated with and r a t i f i e d his r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s . Progressionism had much i n common with evolutionary thought: both saw development i n the f o s s i l record. L y e l l mentioned t h i s to Dawson, about one year after the publication of the Origin, when he wrote that: 22 I f Darwin (sic) theory i s ever established i t w i l l be by the facts and arguments of progressivists such as Agassiz whose development doctrine go (sic) three parts of the way tho they don't seem to see it.22 But Dawson needed no warning. Even before the Origin, he had elaborated his progressionism i n a way which made i t incompatible with the theories of the pre-Darwinian evolutionists. He was proba-bly provoked into doing t h i s by Robert Chambers' extremely popular Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844) which combined pantheism and evolution i n tracing a l l l i f e back to a primordial chemico-electric operation. Dawson took a lead from Hugh M i l l e r ' s Footprints of the Creator, which was a refutation of Chambers, and contended that although species had been introduced progressively, each one had degenerated after i t s creation. There was no progres-sive transmutation of species. The only progress was i n the i n t r o -duction of "new objects and powers not accounted for by previous objects or powers," the contemplation of which brings man "very near 23 to the presence of the S p i r i t u a l Creator." Dawson also saw design i n the order which prevails i n the structures of organisms and f o s s i l s : the order which botanical and zoological systems of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n disclose. For Dawson the science of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n was no mere tool of biology, for i t l i t e r a l l y caught hold of God's natural plan. Dawson believed that there was a natural b i o l o g i c a l order which was apparent i n the creation of l i f e around certain fundamental types. Following Cuvier, he affirmed that a l l animals were designed around one of four essential types: the 24 vertebrate; the radiate; the a r t i c u l a t e ; and the mollusc. Further-more, he contended that there i s a natural hierarchy of types as can be seen, for example, i n the manner i n which the vertebrate branch 23 breaks down into the mammal, b i r d , r e p t i l e , and f i s h types. As i f this were not enough, Dawson also maintained that order was manifest i n homologies, or the s i m i l a r types of construction found i n the 25 organs of various animals. The inevitable explanation for this per-vasive and fundamental order was that a l l animals had been designed around God's single u n i f i e d plan; and, accordingly, c l a s s i f i c a t i o n was no "mere matter of arbitrary naming or even a convenient arrangement 26 of structures" but rather the unravelling of God's plan. The most important type was the species, which Dawson believed to be a real entity. He put his emphasis here rather than on the individual which, as he knew, rarely represents i t with great accuracy. The genus, the order, or the class, were also of consider-ably less importance as they referred to the relations of organisms once created, while the species referred "to certain o r i g i n a l i n d i -viduals, protoplasts" which determined the structure of t h e i r con-27 stituent individuals. Although variable within l i m i t s , species were the immutable representatives of God's ordered plan; they were "that which the Creator has made, his unit i n the work, as well as 28 ours i n the study." Although the ultimacy of creative beginnings and the order exhibited i n b i o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n furnished much evidence for design, Dawson found the most compelling testimony i n the adaptations which species display. Not only i s each species i n t r i c a t e l y adapted to i t s environment, but also each organism i s i t s e l f a complex arrangement of ends and means. The vegetable c e l l i s adapted to the s o i l , to the atmosphere, and even to the distant sun. The coiled s h e l l of the pearly nautilus i s divided into a i r chambers which 24 e n a b l e i t t o m o d i f y i t s i n t e r n a l a i r d e n s i t y i n o r d e r t o f l o a t , r i s e , o r s i n k . V i s i o n i s t h e r e s u l t o f a comp lex o f a d a p t a t i o n s b e t w e e n , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e b r a i n , t h e c o r n e a , t h e l e n s , and t h e l i g h t . I n sum, l i f e i s r e p l e t e w i t h a d a p t a t i o n s e x p l i c a b l e o n l y t h r o u g h t h e a c t i o n and f o r e s i g h t o f a b e n e v o l e n t , d e s i g n i n g , p u r p o s i v e God. How c o u l d b l i n d n a t u r e c r e a t e an eye? How c o u l d i t be t h a t l i f e i s so i n t i m a t e l y s u i t e d t o i t s e n v i r onmen t were t h e r e no d i v i n e d e s i g n e r ? A d a p t a t i o n s e x i s t t h r o u g h o u t n a t u r e and c o n s t i t u t e d what Dawson c o n -s i d e r e d t o be e m p i r i c a l p r o o f o f G o d ' s e x i s t e n c e . F o r some p e o p l e t h e w o r l d makes c o m p l e t e s e n s e ; S i r W i l l i a m Dawson was one. He was an e s s e n t i a l l y r a t i o n a l man who b e l i e v e d i n a r a t i o n a l , p u r p o s i v e God who had d e s i g n e d a r a t i o n a l , p u r p o s e f u l w o r l d . He m a r v e l l e d a t t h e i m p r e s s o f d e s i g n w h i c h p e r m e a t e d G o d ' s c r e a t i o n , and he was overwhe lmed by t h e r a t i o n a l c o r r o b o r a t i o n w h i c h s c i e n c e p r o v i d e d s c r i p t u r e . Rea son , s c i e n c e , and r e l i g i o n a l l c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e comp lementa r y n a t u r a l and s p i r i t u a l r e a l m s w h i c h were u n i f i e d by t h e same r a t i o n a l d e s i g n . Reason l e d t o r e l i g i o n ; r e l i g i o n g u i d e d r e a s o n ; and n e i t h e r one c o u l d c o n t r a d i c t t h e o t h e r . Dawson ' s f a i t h was a r a t i o n a l i z e d f a i t h w h i c h e x i s t e d i n two modes, b o t h o f w h i c h were f ounded on s c i e n t i f i c e v i d e n c e . The t e l i c q u a l i t y o f h i s t h o u g h t saw mind i n n a t u r e w h i c h , when e m p i r i c a l l y d e m o n s t r a t e d , t o o k h im f r om t h e w o r l d t o God. S c r i p t u r e , w h i c h c o u l d be s c i e n t i f i c a l l y v a l i d a t e d when i t t o u c h e d on n a t u r a l s u b j e c t s , was t h e l i t e r a l r e v e l a t i o n o f G o d ' s w o r d . 25 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I " J . W. Dawson, F i f t y Years of Work i n Canada (London: Ballantyne, Hanson § Co., 1901), p. 2. 2 The V i c t o r i a Institute or Philosophical Society of Great  B r i t a i n (n. p., n. d.), p. 1. 3 Letter, G. Mathews to J. W. Dawson, March 4, 1894, McGill University, Archives, Dawson papers. 4 F. Baumer, Religion and the Rise of Scepticism (New Haven: Harcourt, Brace i> World, 1960), pp. 140ff. ^ J . W. Dawson and D. H. M'Vicar, Addresses of Pr i n c i p a l  Dawson and Rev. D. H. M'Vicar (Montreal: John L o v e l l , 1864), p. 5. ^ J . W. Dawson, The Seer of Patmos and the Twentieth Century (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1898), p. 3. 7 William Paley, Natural Theology (London: J. Faulder, 1810), p. 40. g J. W. Dawson, "Natural History i n i t s Educational Aspect," American Journal of Education, I I I (1857), p. 428. 9 J. W. Dawson, "Points of Contact Between Science and Reve-l a t i o n , " Pj^ lii£ejtoji_^ ev^ w, ser. 4, IV(1879), p. 606. 1 0 J . W. Dawson, Archaia (Montreal: B. Dawson, 1860), p. 61. " ^ J . W. Dawson, Eden Lost and Won (London: Hodder § Stoughton, 1895), p. 6. 12 J. W. Dawson, Archaia, p. 361. 13 J. W. Dawson, Origin of the World (Montreal: Dawson Bros., 1877), p. 26. 14 J. W. Dawson, Modern Science i n Bible Lands (rev. ed.; London: Hodder § Stoughton, 1892), p. 110. ^ L . Wilson, Charles L y e l l (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 282. ^ J . W. Dawson, Archaia, p. 114. 26 17 Polygenism was the theory that maintained that mankind had descended from several pairs of ancestors rather than from Adam and Eve alone. 18 J. W. Dawson, Archaia, preface, n. p. 19 Ibid., p. 54. 20 Ibid., p. 48. 21 J. W. Dawson, Nature and the Bible (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1882), p. 64. 22 Letter, L y e l l to Dawson, Oct. 27, 1860, McGill University Archives, Dawson papers. 23 J. W. Dawson, Archaia, p. 53. 24 By some point before 1886 th i s scheme had become amended and enlarged into s i x types. 25 An example of this i s the si m i l a r skeletal construction shared by the wing of a bat and the arm of a man. 26 J. W. Dawson, "Agassiz's Contributions to the Natural History of the United States," Canadian Naturalist, 111(1858), p. 211. 27 Ibid., p. 253. 28 T,., Ibid. 27 CHAPTER II THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION Evolution was a direct challenge to the heart of Dawson's f a i t h . The evolutionary speculations of Darwin and his d i s c i p l e s , for example, Huxley and Haeckel, assumed nature to be random. Spencer, the Lamarckian, argued that natural e v i l made b e l i e f i n a designing God impossible. The inherent naturalism of evolution removed God as an ordering and explanatory p r i n c i p l e i n biology. Dawson's rati o n a l i z e d f a i t h was based on science, and so evolution threatened the foundations of his b e l i e f . Randomness i n nature was incompatible with b e l i e f i n a designing God, and naturalism meant that God was not needed to explain the development of l i f e . Evolution clashed d i r e c t l y with Dawson's natural theology and challenged his f a i t h i n the Bible because he saw Genesis as a type of natural theology. Dawson battled evolution for the l a s t h a l f of his l i f e and focused on the ideas of four major evolutionists, who were either agnostics or atheists. Darwin, from the publication of the Origin i n 1859, was continually on Dawson's mind as the one who had grounded the development of evolutionary thought. Huxley was the object of Dawson's disdain from the early 1860's when he adopted the role of Darwin's popularizer. Spencer became an important figure for Dawson by the early 1870's, after the publication of his i n f l u e n t i a l The  Principles of Biology. Haeckel completed the l i s t of Dawson's 28 p r i n c i p a l foes when his works were f i r s t translated into English i n the mid 1870's. Dawson also followed and c r i t i c i z e d the theories of the major t h e i s t i c evolutionists such as Wallace, Mivart, and Le Conte. But these men were of less significance to him because they did l i t t l e to strengthen the argument for evolution. This chapter explores the concepts of naturalism and random-ness held by the agnostic and a t h e i s t i c evolutionists i n the order i n which they came into Dawson's view. I t then describes the attempts of some theists to reconcile r e l i g i o n and evolution. I t concludes with a discussion of the attitudes of the agnostics and atheists toward r e l i g i o n . I. Darwin Although there had been some notable exceptions, such as Lamarck, most men before Darwin believed that species were divine and immutable creations. The Origin (1859) contended that a l l species were transmutable, and that they had a l l evolved from a few aborig-i n a l progenitors. I t was common s c i e n t i f i c knowledge that species vary; Darwin argued that they were p l a s t i c . He argued that they were so p l a s t i c that any species could vary into becoming a new one: that any species could evolve. His rea l significance, however, lay not so much on this point as i t did on his provision of a natural mechanism to explain how i t happened. Evolution became the received s c i e n t i f i c view because Darwin provided the mechanism of "natural selection" to explain i t . Darwin took as his s t a r t i n g point the Malthusian tenet that nature i s a struggle for existence due to the competition of 29 geometrically increasing populations-for only a r i t h m e t i c a l l y increas-ing food supplies. Nature i s a scene of b a t t l e with the less f i t always giving way to the f i t t e s t . Now, given that species vary i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y , i t i s bound to happen occasionally that a v a r i a t i o n arises which chances to benefit s u r v i v a l . Because such adaptive v a r i a t i o n s promote l i f e , the species or i n d i v i d u a l s bearing them have a greater chance of surviving, and so the v a r i a t i o n s become selected. Species chancing to vary adaptively w i l l , over the course of time, survive. Species varying non-adaptively, die out. Over m i l l i o n s of years, and i n the face of a c o n t i n u a l l y changing environment, those species which continue to vary adaptively eventually become new species. Much of both the appeal and the threat of the O r i g i n was i t s naturalism. It allowed s c i e n t i s t s to remove God from biology. Darwin worked i n the realm of secondary causes and refused to use the divine mind as an explanatory idea. He argued that "such expressions as the 'plan of creation,' 'unity of design,' etc." were not explanations of nature but only v e i l s to ignorance.''' This was, of course, repugnant to Dawson who saw mind i n nature. In h i s review of the O r i g i n he c r i t i c i z e d Darwin's naturalism as "a rush and a leap into an 2 unknown and fathomless abyss." Evolution did not explain anything that designed creation could not. It was an ambitious attempt to understand nature while simultaneously ignoring God. Darwinism offered an alternate n a t u r a l i s t i c explanation of every kind of design which Dawson saw i n l i f e . Dawson saw the f i n e i n t e r n a l and external adaptations of animals and plants as the r e s u l t of God's beneficent- planning. Darwin explained them by the natural s e l e c t i o n of chance adaptive v a r i a t i o n s . Where the progressive 30 nature of the palaeontological record was seen by Dawson as evidence of God's progressive plan. Darwin took i t as direct evidence of evolution. I f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n were seen as a science which discerned God's order i n nature, Darwin explained t h i s order by genealogy: "the community of descent," he said, " i s the hidden bond which n a t u r a l i s t s have been unconsciously seeking, and not some unknown plan of crea-3 t i o n . " The s i m i l a r i t i e s of type, which Dawson took as an expression of God's mind, were.regarded by Darwin as the inheritance shared by many species i n t h e i r derivation from the same progenitors. The vertebrates had si m i l a r skeletons not because they were expressions of God's vertebrate type, but because they were a l l descended from the same vertebrate source. Darwin would have threatened the natural theologians had he only suggested that t h e i r evidences for design could be explained away, but the implications of his theory went even further. Natural selection implied that nature was random: that i t was without plan. The characteristics of a species were not selected by God's benefi-cent forethought but were the chance adaptive variations that natural selection had accumulated. In the f i r s t edition of the Origin Darwin protested that he had not introduced chance into nature, and that to label variations as chance-like was "a wholly 4 incorrect expression." He thought that variations might be referred to as chance-like only because t h e i r causes were unknown, but that discovery of the causes would show them to be under the rule of law. But i t would appear that Darwin had missed the main'implication of his own argument. Natural selection did not imply randomness or chance because the causes of variation were unknown, but because 31 there was no coordination between v a r i a t i o n and the needs of the i n d i v i d u a l . In f a c t , most va r i a t i o n s were useless, and some were harmful. Species became what they were by pot-luck. But t h i s Dawson could never accept, because v a r i a t i o n was never random f o r him, but always an i n d i c a t i o n of "the wisdom of the creator."*' In The V a r i a t i o n of Animals and Plants Under Domestication (1868), Darwin was more aware of the implications h i s theory held for the t h e i s t . He had decided that, for the most part, v a r i a t i o n was the " i n d e f i n i t e and f l u c t u a t i n g " r e s u l t of environmental i n f l u -ences.^ Evolution stood mostly on the natural s e l e c t i o n of t h i s v a r i a t i o n , and Darwin could conclude hi s book with the melancholy words that: I f we assume that each p a r t i c u l a r v a r i a t i o n was from the beginning of a l l time preordained, then that p l a s t i c i t y of organization, which leads to many injuriou s deviations of structure, as well as the redundant power of reproduction which i n i t i a l l y leads to a struggle f o r existence, and, as a consequence, to the natural s e l e c t i o n or s u r v i v a l of the f i t -t e s t , must appear to us superfluous laws of nature. On the other hand, an omnipotent and omniscient Creator ordains everything and foresees everything. Thus we are brought face to face with a d i f f i c u l t y as i n s o l u b l e as that of free w i l l and predestination.7 I f the f o r t u i t o u s v a r i a b i l i t y of nature gave Darwin an occa-s i o n a l touch of mild anxiety, h i s The Descent of Man (1871) exacerbated the troubles of many others. In t h i s rather clumsy book Darwin argued that man had descended, both p h y s i c a l l y and mentally, "from a hairy, g t a i l e d quadruped." Man was presented as the same kind of fo r t u i t o u s product as was the r e s t of l i f e , and by no means the acme of God's plan. This annoyed Dawson who viewed man as d i s t i n c t from the r e s t of creation, and as made i n the image of God. His The  Story of Earth and Man, which was published two years a f t e r The 32 Descent, repeatedly attacked Darwin's contention: Shave and paint your ape as you may, clothe him and set him up upon his feet, s t i l l he f a i l s greatly of the "human form divine;" and so i t i s with him morally and s p i r i t u a l l y as well. We have seen that he wants the i n s t i n c t of immortality, the love of God, the mental and s p i r i t u a l power of exercising dominion over the earth. The very agency by which he i s evolved i s of i t s e l f subversive of a l l these higher properties.^ The Descent may have denied man "the 'human form divine,'" but Darwin had a strong argument to back up his case. He used the essential s i m i l a r i t y of human anatomy with that of a l l other verte-brates as evidence for derivation. The parall e l i s m between the human skeleton and that of the monkey, seal, or bat was due to community of descent rather than God's plan. The seeming recapitulation of the major divisions of the vertebrate province by the developing human embryo led Darwin to conclude that the human fetus was the l i v i n g history of man's evolutionary past. Man also, evidently, possesses rudimentary souvenirs of his ancestry. He has, for example, a caecum, which i s a branch of the intestine serving no purpose and ending " i n a cul-de-sac."*^ Darwin also contended that there was no qua l i t a t i v e mental gulf between man and the other animals. Why, even dogs could form mental concepts, which Darwin had deduced from his observation that "when I say to my t e r r i e r , i n an eager voice . . . 'Hi, h i , where i s i t ? ' she at once takes i t as a sign that something i s to be hunted."*''' Even morality could be traced back to the " s o c i a l 12 i n s t i n c t s " found i n lower mammals. Although The Descent embroiled man i n evolutionary specula-t i o n , i t retreated somewhat from the emphasis on natural selection found i n the f i r s t edition of the Origin. The mechanism of natural selection had come under some serious objections. For example: how 33 could i t select the incipient stages of variations before they became useful? Why should minor variations not be swamped out of existence when the individuals bearing them mated? How could i t select those numerous characteristics of any species which provide no benefit i n the struggle for existence? The Descent answered these questions by stressing other mechanisms, along with natural selection, which had been b r i e f l y passed over i n Darwin's previous works. The most impor-tant of these was sexual selection, which meant that: (1) i n the struggle between males for females, the healthiest and strongest males win out, and accordingly have t h e i r characteristics selected into the evolutionary process; (2) the healthiest females produce the most offspring, and thus also t i l t evolution; (3) those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , such as sweet voices and skin colour, whereby animals sexually excite t h e i r mates, are also selected because the sexually a t t r a c t i v e mate more frequently and with the healthier companions. Darwin also explained some other mechanisms, but he seemed vague as to t h e i r r e l a t i v e merits. He stated "that the inherited effects of the long-continued use or disuse of parts w i l l have done 13 much," but he did not say how much. He talked of certain "unknown 14 causes," but he had no clue as to what they were. I t was apparent, however, that natural selection remained paramount for evolution and that sexual selection was the most important determinator of char-a c t e r i s t i c s unnecessary for s u r v i v a l . The s i x t h and f i n a l edition of the Origin (1872) also contained these revisions. In any event, evolution s t i l l proceeded n a t u r a l i s t i c a l l y and, for the most part, through the selection of fortuitous variations. This, Dawson never lost sight of. Despite the revisions he always associated Darwinism 34 with natural selection, and natural selection with naturalism and randomness. I I . Huxley Although i t was Darwin who had set the evolutionary b a l l r o l l i n g , i t was his junior, T. H. Huxley, who took natural selection to the people. Huxley was a controversialist who spent the l a t t e r part of the 19th century missionizing the doctrine of evolution. Although he was a zoologist of no mean standing, he s a c r i f i c e d much of his own work to become the major propagandist for natural selection. He also outdid Darwin i n his frank recognition of the implications that natural selection held for r e l i g i o n , and i n his willingness to pro-claim them loud and wide. Naturally, Dawson kept i n touch with Huxley's work from the 1860's on. Huxley welcomed the naturalism which Darwin had brought to biology and which he maintained would "lead us to a region free from the snares of those fascinating but barren v i r g i n s , the f i n a l causes."* He made out Darwinism to be the culmination of the history of science, a history which was no other than the decline of r e l i g i o u s ignorance and the r i s e of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. By the 1880's Darwinism had so liberated him from teleology that he came activ e l y to advocate agnosticism as the inevitable concomitant of science. At t h i s point Dawson singled out Huxley for special treatment and attacked t h i s combination of naturalism and agnosticism, saying: "there must be some points of a l l i a n c e between the Christian r e l i g i o n and the whole cosmos or arranged system of things, which must . . . be the product of the same Divine Mind with C h r i s t i a n i t y i t s e l f . " * ^ 35 While eagerly embracing Darwinian naturalism, Huxley also sought to strengthen i t . In 1863 his "Man's Place i n Nature" com-pared man with the anthropoid apes and concluded that they were not far removed from each other. Certainly there were many large d i f f e r -ences between man and the higher apes, but these were less than those between the higher and lower apes. There was apparently no inherent reason why man should be deemed d i s t i n c t from the rest of the animal kingdom. Later Huxley extended his n a t u r a l i s t i c bent toward mater-ialism. In "On the Physical Basis of L i f e " (1898) he denied the existence of any v i t a l l i f e force. Although he never committed himself to philosophical materialism, he favored m a t e r i a l i s t i c language and was prepared to consider man as a machine. Dawson viewed Huxley as more extreme than Darwin who "does not seem to have gone as far as abso-l u t e l y to i d e n t i f y the physical and the v i t a l i n the way that Huxley, 17 Tyndall, and others have done." Huxley accepted the randomness of evolution as quickly and f u l l y as he did the naturalism. He explained Darwinism as a natural method of t r i a l and error: "According to Teleology, each organism i s l i k e a r i f l e b u l l e t f i r e d straight at a mark; according to Darwin, organisms are l i k e grapeshot of which one h i t s something and the rest 18 f a l l wide." Cats abounded because they were good at catching mice, not because they had been designed to catch mice. And Huxley lectured a l l over England because he never t i r e d of t e l l i n g people that there was no teleology i n biology. 36 I I I . Spencer Herbert Spencer had come to the theory of evolution before Darwin, though he was, of course, l a t e r aided by Darwin's work. Spencer was a philosopher who wanted to create a complete and natural i s t i c picture of the universe. Evolution was to be at the centre of th i s v i s i o n because i t permitted him to do without God. He adopted evolution because evolution eliminated miracle. Because Spencer had expanded evolution into a philosophy, at the st a r t of his popular cam paign against evolution, i n 1873, Dawson viewed him as "the greatest 19 English authority on evolution." Spencer's F i r s t Principles (1861) outlined his assault on a l l knowledge. The knowable universe was to be examined as variations upon an evolutionary theme. Evolution, or the passage of matter and motion "from an i n d e f i n i t e , incoherent homogeneity to a d e f i n i t e and 20 coherent heterogeneity," founded everything. The solar system had evolved from a homogeneous nebular mass into a di f f e r e n t i a t e d system of stars and planets. Society had evolved from small groups of i n d i -viduals into complex nation states. Even languages, the a r t s , and science had emerged from humble beginnings into complexity. Spencer's The Principles of Biology (vol. I, 1865; v o l . I I , 1867) launched an a l l out attack on the doctrine of creation. I t was "a primitive hypothesis" which educated men had discarded along with 21 other superstitions. Deductively and speculatively Spencer fashion an evolutionary process to replace i t . Evolution was, after a l l , a more credible theory; i t was a single p r i n c i p l e which coherently explained: the natural relations of animals and plants; embryonic recapitulation; s i m i l a r i t y of type; and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of species 37 i n space and time. Spencer's theory of evolution was primarily Lamarckian. He contended that environmental change causes organisms to vary i n a direc t i o n of greater complexity and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . When change destabilizes the balance between an organism and i t s surroundings, i t triggers a chain of reactions i n the organism which are completed only upon the achievement of a new balance. Over the course of time and continuing environmental change, such v a r i a t i o n becomes speciation and thus also evolution. Additionally, t h i s process i s aided by the "survival of the f i t t e s t : " individuals who f a i l to adapt to change die out and are removed from the genetic pool. Spencer's system was consciously n a t u r a l i s t i c . Adaptations were not referred to God for explanation as the adaptive response of organisms to environmental change seemed to solve the problem. But Spencer's argument was weak. He had f a i l e d to show why an organism should vary adaptively- to environmental change. His argument i s l i t t l e more than a rationalized statement of b e l i e f i n the sufficiency of natural causes. Dawson noted t h i s , and observed that Spencer, as opposed to Darwin, "often exaggerates or extenuates with reference to his f acts, and uses the arts of the d i a l e c t i c i a n where argument f a i l s . " Spencer was ferociously antagonistic to the idea that some divine plan might underlie nature. He thought i t bizarre, for example, that anyone should see design i n the typological s i m i l a r i t i e s of species. Why should God have designed a mammalian type i n which each species has seven c e r v i c a l vertebrae, when the g i r a f f e could do with many more and the whale with less? 38 Shall we say that though, for the whale's neck, one vertebra would have been equally good, and though, for the giraffe's neck, a dozen would probably have been better than seven, yet seven was fixed upon for the mammalian type?23 Evolution could explain t h i s on the assumption of community of descent. That there might be some creative plan to explain i t Spencer dismisses as absurd. C l a s s i f i c a t i o n was obviously not to be construed as a re l i g i o u s exercise; i n fact, i t was merely a method 24 of arranging species i n order to " f a c i l i t a t e our thinking." But what Dawson could never understand was how Spencer's evolution could proceed so harmoniously without design. Spencer assumed there to be a p r i n c i p l e of progressive development i n nature, but Dawson contended 25 that without design nature could only be a sport of chance. Although Spencer's theory was as n a t u r a l i s t i c as that of Darwin and Huxley, i t lacked the element of randomness found i n t h e i r thought. Spencer's environmentalism provided for organisms to vary adaptively to change; evolution did not depend on the selection of chance variations. On the other hand, Spencer considered nature to be incompatible with b e l i e f i n a designing creator. He maintained that natural e v i l , so widespread i n nature, was i r r e c o n c i l a b l e with b e l i e f . How could a designing God have created an earth which i s "a scene of 26 warfare between a l l sentient creatures?" Why should he have created the myriad parasites which invade and derange the body? IV. Haeckel Ernst Haeckel, the zoologist, was "the recognized spokesman of Darwinism i n Germany" and also a s c i e n t i s t of international stature. 39 He had embraced Darwinism as the l i b e r a t o r of science from theology, as the st a r t of a new age i n a n a t u r a l i s t i c universe. P r o l i f i c i n writing and lecturing, Haeckel worked for the promulgation of evo-lutionary naturalism and the demise of C h r i s t i a n i t y . A l l that existed was a monistic universe i n which matter and force were the products of some primordial natural r e a l i t y . Natural selection had disproved teleology, and mechanical causes reigned supreme. Dawson was f a m i l i a r with at least two of Haeckel's books: The History of Creation ( f i r s t English edition, 1876) and the Evolution  of Man ( f i r s t English edition, 1879). In these books Haeckel t r i e d to prove evolution and to destroy b e l i e f i n design. His works assumed the primary agency of natural selection and focused on supplying evidence for evolution. While Haeckel presented the usual arguments for evolution, what i s peculiar to him i s the emphasis he placed on the evidence of rudimentary organs and ontogenetic recapitulation. Haeckel created the name "dysteleology," or the "science of purposelessness" for the study of rudimentary organs. He believed that evolution alone could explain these organs, and that they were conclusive proof of the absence of design. Why would a divine designer provide his creatures with useless organs? It was blatantly impossible, a contradiction i n terms. Yet rudimentary organs ex i s t . Man, for example, has a rudimentary and useless covering of hair. This at once shows his ape inheritance and disproves the b e l i e f i n a designing creator. Haeckel's " f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of Biogeny" states that "the evolution of the germ (Ontogeny) i s a compressed and shortened repro-28 duction of the evolution of the t r i b e (Phylogeny)." While other 40 evolutionists, i t i s true, used the argument from recapitulation, i t was Haeckel who r e l i e d on i t most of a l l . He reconstructed man's history by extrapolating from ontogeny to phylogeny and back again. Because of the ontogenetic s i m i l a r i t y of human egg c e l l s with a l l other animals, he concluded that man had descended "from a one-celled 29 organism." Because the developing human embryo seems to p a r a l l e l the embryonic forms of other vertebrates, and even the Ascidians, Haeckel traced man's derivation through the vertebrate phylogeny down to the worm. This Dawson considered to be an untenable conclusion. He countered Haeckel by saying that the facts of embryonic development have "long been known, arid . . . regarded as a wonderful evidence of the homology or unity of plan which pervades nature," rather than as evidence of evolution. Haeckel had a n a t u r a l i s t i c view of l i f e . He had removed miracle from nature by placing the s t a r t of evolution i n a primordial spontaneous generation. He was so convinced that natural selection could explain evolution that he ignored trying to prove i t and spent his time tracing the evolutionary paths of various organs and species. Final causes had been eliminated; nature was a l l ; and there was no more room for a mind and matter dualism. Haeckel believed that: everywhere the phenomena of human l i f e , as well as those of external nature are under the control of fixed and unalterable laws, that there i s everywhere a necessary causal connection between phenomena, and that, accordingly, the whole knowable universe i s one undivided whole, a "monon."31 Dawson had no respect for Haeckel's views. He accused Haeckel of assuming most everything he claimed to have proved. Haeckel's spontaneous generation was not based on facts, and only occurred when 41 he "waves his magic wand and simple masses of sarcode spring from 32 inorganic matter." Haeckel assumed that man's moral and ra t i o n a l nature lay po t e n t i a l l y i n the lower animals, and also that there was no mind apart from the brain. Indeed: We must grant the monist a l l these postulates as pure matters of f a i t h before he can begin h i s demonstration; and as none of them are axiomatic truths, i t i s evident that so far he i s simply a believer i n the dogmas of a philosophic creed.33 V. The Theistic Evolutionists A number of s c i e n t i s t s t r i e d to reconcile evolution and r e l i -gion i n a compromise which was usually made at the l a t t e r ' s expense. A sampling of three such men who were fam i l i a r to Dawson w i l l provide the essentials of this position. One of the more famous of these s c i e n t i s t s was A. R. Wallace, the co-discoverer with Darwin of natural selection, and a b i o l o g i s t whom Dawson considered to be "next to Darwin, . . . a leader among 34 English d e r i v a t i o n i s t s . " Wallace was a Darwinian u n t i l i t came to the question of man. Certainly man was a result of natural selection physically, but his moral and i n t e l l e c t u a l f a c u l t i e s were exempt from this agency. As early as 1864 Wallace was wri t i n g that man's more noble fa c u l t i e s led him to be s o c i a l and charitable rather than 35 to be a f i e r c e competitor i n the struggle for existence. The i n t e l -l e c t u a l and moral f a c u l t i e s were obviously a product of s p i r i t u a l forces and not of brute natural selection. In fa c t , the universe could be seen as no other than the w i l l of one or more s p i r i t u a l beings. 4 2 Wallace l i v e d i n a s p i r i t u a l cosmos. His "Creation by Law" (1867) maintained that evolution had been a process governed by laws such as those of the struggle for s u r v i v a l , heredity, and v a r i a t i o n . Surely this was compatible with the b e l i e f i n a law-abiding s p i r i t u a l creator who had so ordered his creation as to leave i t equipped with the power of adjusting to change, and of evolving? By 1889 Wallace had set forth his thesis that evolution had occurred i n three stages, the beginnings of which natural selection could not explain: the introduction of v i t a l i t y into the inorganic world; the introduction of consciousness; and the introduction of s p i r i t . Evidently such con-siderations led to the b e l i e f i n an unseen s p i r i t u a l realm "to which 37 the world of matter i s altogether subordinate." It was a l l very well for Wallace to point out some limitations to the agency of natural selection, and to bring s p i r i t back into the world. I t i s also understandable that he considered a law-like evolu-tion to be compatible with a law-abiding creator. But Wallace had not solved the problem of randomness. Perhaps n a t u r a l i s t i c evolution could not f u l l y explain l i f e , but Wallace had to do more than provide gaps for God. Wallace never explained why i t i s that v a r i a t i o n i s random, and how t h i s might be compatible with a supposedly law-abiding creator. Another t h e i s t i c evolutionist, the geologist Joseph Le Conte, saw evolution as a universal cosmic law. Unlike Wallace he had f u l l y accepted the n a t u r a l i s t i c universe and managed to reconcile i t with b e l i e f by opting for pantheism. Certainly the world i s ruled exclu-s i v e l y by natural law, but this world and i t s laws are none other than "the o b j e c t i f i e d modes . . . of the mind of God," and "science 43 i s the systematic knowledge of these divine thoughts and ways--a 38 r a t i o n a l system of natural theology." While t h i s may have been a l l very well i n rendering science and r e l i g i o n t h e o r e t i c a l l y compatible, i t would have made for a weak natural theology. Le Conte lacked any firm empirical ground on which to base his f a i t h . There was no inher-ent reason why his n a t u r a l i s t i c universe should be pantheistic rather than m a t e r i a l i s t i c . Le Conte also accepted natural selection and yet found i t impossible to conceive of b i o l o g i c a l adaptations and order except "as 39 the result of thought." As with Wallace he had missed the sobering assumption of randomness which natural selection had introduced into the world. Le Conte explained how we only speak of v a r i a t i o n as random due to our ignorance of i t s causes, that "of course, i t i s well under-40 stood that nothing i n Nature i s r e a l l y fortuitous." This completely missed the point. Natural selection implied randomness, regardless of the causes of v a r i a t i o n , because i t assumed that most v a r i a t i o n was not adaptive and sometimes even harmful. I f va r i a t i o n were not random there would have been no need for a selecting mechanism. Dawson gave Le Conte's views a thorough analysis and found them wanting. Le Conte's thesis that evolution i s caused by some force which God planted i n nature approached Spencer's hypothesis that things are s e l f created. Le Conte had placed "himself at the mercy of the agnostics who may say that the continuous evolution of things from one another by 'resident force' requires no intervention of a creative power." One of the more s i g n i f i c a n t t h e i s t i c evolutionists was also a major opponent of Darwin. St. George Mivart, who was at f i r s t a 44 Darwinian, l a t e r rebelled against natural selection and randomness i n an attempt to make evolution and design compatible. Mivart was a devout Catholic whose s c i e n t i f i c work earned him a doctorate of philosophy from Pius IX i n 1870, and whose modernism and t h e i s t i c theory of evolution earned him an excommunication toward the end of his l i f e . Dawson was fa m i l i a r with Mivart, although he never attacked his theory of evolution d i r e c t l y . Indeed, the only direct attack Mivart received from Dawson was a censure of his moral b e l i e f s , which Dawson considered to be those "of a Romish theologian" rather "than of 42 a B i b l i c a l student or philosopher." Mivart's book On the Genesis of Species (1871) provided for an evolution i n which the agency of natural selection was minimal. Natural selection helped to remove monstrosities from nature, and i t hastened the elimination of species superseded by evolution; but evolution proper proceeded i n a law-like manner by the action of some 43 "internal power." Mivart reconciled r e l i g i o n and science by sug-gesting that evolution was r e a l l y only "derivative creation," or "the 44 Divine action by and through natural laws." Mivart's theory was l i t t l e more than a statement of b e l i e f that God was s t i l l i n control of l i f e . He had raised some serious objections against natural selection, such as the question of how i t could select the beginning stages of variations not yet useful. But i t was not s c i e n t i f i c a l l y convincing to offer some unknown "internal power" i n i t s place. Additionally, although Mivart's scheme was compatible with b e l i e f i n design, i t lacked, as he admitted, any empirical proof for God. 45 VI. The Agnostic and At h e i s t i c Evolutionists on Science and Religion The theory of evolution by natural selection naturalized biology by allowing i t to proceed without God as an ordering p r i n c i p l e . Its acceptance showed a desire to remove providence from the world. Weismann, the German Darwinian zoologist, announced that evolution "influences our whole realm of thought," that i t means "nothing less 45 than the elimination of the miraculous from our knowledge of nature." It i s true that some evolutionists, Darwin, for example, l e f t room for an o r i g i n a l creation, but many would have even removed God from t h i s , his l a s t refuge. Spencer and Haeckel crossed the border between the organic and inorganic by reducing biology to chemistry. Tyndall, who based his case on the theory of the conservation of energy as well as on evolution, saw i n matter "the promise and potency of a l l terres-t r i a l l i f e . " 4 6 As God was removed from nature so also did nature adopt a seemingly godless appearance. Warfare, struggle, and famine became the determining forces behind l i f e . Man became a lonely figure i n a cold universe, the chance product of a random process. He had lost his immortality and, for some, his n o b i l i t y . Haeckel would even have traced love "to i t s primitive source, to the power of at t r a c t i o n 47 between two d i f f e r i n g c e l l s . " I t appeared as though the court of science had discovered that God was dead. The melancholy words of George Romanes, written at a time when he had l o s t his f a i t h as a resu l t of evolution, describe the impact of such thinking: 46 As I am f a r from able to agree with those who affirm that the t w i l i g h t doctrine of the "new f a i t h " i s a desirable substitute for the waning splendour of "the old," I am not ashamed to confess that with this v i r t u a l negation of God the universe to me has lost i t s soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to "work while i t i s day" w i l l doubtless but gain an i n t e n s i f i e d force from the t e r r i b l y i n t e n s i f i e d meaning of the words that "the night cometh when no man can work,"yet when at times I think, as at times I must, of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as I now f i n d i t , --at such times I s h a l l ever f e e l i t impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature i s susceptible. And: There i s a dreadful truth i n those words of Hamilton, --Philosophy having become a meditation, not merely of death, but of annihilation, the precept "know thyself" has become transformed into the t e r r i f i c oracle to Oedipus--"Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art."48 Although evolution was heavy a r t i l l e r y i n the war on r e l i g i o n , Darwin himself was not a combatant. I t i s clear, however, that he had a low regard for r e l i g i o n . In The Descent devotion i s explained as something di s t a n t l y approached i n "the deep love of a dog for his master, associated with complete submission, some fear, and perhaps 49 other feelings." I t i s perhaps not without a measure of truth that Dawson claimed Darwin's autobiography revealed a man "paralysed by a s p i r i t u a l atrophy, blinded and shut up i n prison and chained to the m i l l of a m a t e r i a l i s t i c philosophy. Huxley, on the other hand, was a very vocal agnostic. His only f a i t h was i n the s c i e n t i f i c method which, he concluded, had rendered the b e l i e f s of C h r i s t i a n i t y highly improbable. The history of science was, after a l l , the history of i t s victorious battles over C h r i s t i a n i t y . Nature shows no trace of God, and "extinguished theolo-gians l i e about the cradle of every science as the strangled snakes beside that of Hercules.""'* And yet Huxley did not appear overly 47 eager to embrace the surrogate r e l i g i o n of evolutionary science, for he had rebelled against the b e l i e f that evolutionary thought might t e l l us how to l i v e our l i v e s . In his Romanes lectures of 1893 he talked of how " s o c i a l progress means a checking of the cosmic 52 process at every step." Evolution did not legitimate s o c i a l Dar-winism. We have seen that Huxley regarded Darwinism as the death of natural theology. He also propagated the view that science had dis-proved, or rendered improbable, much of the Bible. Evolution and palaeontology had confuted the Genesis cosmogony, or as Huxley once 53 cal l e d i t , "the Miltonic hypothesis." Uniformitarian geology had shown the Noachic deluge to be f a n c i f u l . The c r e d i b i l i t y of the New Testament was severely strained due to i t s u n s c i e n t i f i c demonology and miracles. Obviously science would be wise to pursue i t s work without the counsel of revelation: Wherever b i b l i o l a t r y has prevailed, bigotry and cruelty have accompanied i t . I t l i e s at the root of the deep-seated, sometimes disguised, but never absent, antagonism of a l l the v a r i e t i e s of ecclesiasticism to the freedom of thought and to the s p i r i t of s c i e n t i f i c investigation.^4 Spencer was also an agnostic, but of a more elaborate sort, for Spencer was an agnostic who wanted to reconcile r e l i g i o n and science. He maintained that there was a re l i g i o u s sentiment i n man, an "undifferentiated substance of consciousness," or "a sense of that which exists persistently and independent of c o n d i t i o n s . " ^ Beneath the dogma and theology of every r e l i g i o n l i e s t h i s common appreciation that there i s an " u t t e r l y inscrutable" power behind the universe."' 6 This i s the essence of r e l i g i o n , a fee l i n g for the "unknowable;" r e l i g i o n deals with that which i s beyond thought and experience. 48 Science, on the other hand, " i s simply a higher development 57 of common knowledge." I t has the whole realm of the "knowable" to i t s e l f , and a monopoly on thought and experience. Man i s a f i n i t e creature trapped i n a conceptually f i n i t e world i n r e l a t i o n to which the unknowable i n f i n i t e can not be conceived. His universe i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , s c i e n t i f i c . The battles between science and r e l i g i o n are due to the infringement which either party occasionally makes on the other's domain. Sometimes science attempts to understand the absolute and moves i n on r e l i g i o n i n a f u t i l e attempt to know the unknowable. For the most part, however, r e l i g i o n i s the g u i l t y party i n i t s equally f u t i l e attempt to talk of the i n f i n i t e i n terms of the f i n i t e . The solution i s a more humble science and a r e l i g i o n which either i s s i l e n t or admits that i t s b e l i e f s and d i c t a are meaningless. Religion and science are reconciled because they are separate. This, Dawson found unacceptable. He accused Spencerianism of doing "more to degrade the human reason and cut i t o f f from a l l communion with anything beyond mere matter and force, than does any other form of philosophy."^ Haeckel also wanted to separate r e l i g i o n and science, but for the reason that he believed r e l i g i o n to be superstitious nonsense. He was a combatant for the a t h e i s t i c r e l i g i o n of science. Haeckel saw a universe devoid of design and purpose, a universe completely ruled by the juggernaut of mechanical causes and natural law. The advent of Darwinism was the death of God. Natural theology had been f e l l e d by the forces of naturalism and dysteleology. Genesis, already wounded by Copernicus, was d i r e c t l y refuted by evolution. Man was f i n a l l y free from the "anthropocenrtic error," or the b e l i e f that he 49 59 " i s the premeditated aim of the creation of the earth." To replace C h r i s t i a n i t y came the monistic r e l i g i o n of science: "the sublime, pantheistic idea of the Unity of God and Nature." 6^ A church i n i t s e l f , monism came complete with a pantheon containing such notables as Democritus, "the immortal founder of the Atomic theory," and Bruno, "the great martyr of the monistic theory."6''' Science would now lead man into a bright future of freedom, morality, culture, and progress. Darwin had removed mind from nature, and man was f i n a l l y able eagerly to embrace the new truth: the universe i s i n f i n i t e i n space and time; God i s dead; man i s mortal; morality i s enlightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t ; n a t u r a l i s t i c realism replaces Christian idealism. Dawson was h o r r i f i e d by such ideas, and concluded that i f l i f e were worth l i v i n g i n the universe Haeckel described: then i t must be for the immediate and s e l f i s h g r a t i f i c a t i o n of our desires and passions; and since we are deprived of God and conscience, and right and wrong, and future reward or punishment, there can be nothing l e f t for us but to rend and fight with our fellows . . . that we may reach such happiness as may be possible for us i n such an existence, ere we d r i f t into nonentity.62 50 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II *C. Darwin, On the Origin of Species (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1859), p. 482. 2 J. W. Dawson, "Review of 'Darwin On the Origin of Species  by Means of Natural Selection,'" Canadian Natu r a l i s t , V ( A p r i l , 1860), p. 100. 3 C. Darwin, Origin, p. 420. 4 I b i d . , p. 131. ^ J . W. Dawson, "Review of Darwin," p. 115. C. Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants Under  Domestication (2nd ed.; New York: D. Appleton § Co., 1896), v o l . I I , p. 345. 7 I b i d . , v o l . I I , p. 428. \ 8 C. Darwin, The Descent of Man (2nd ed. rev.; New York: J. A. H i l l $ Co., 1904), v o l . I I , p. 315. 9 J. W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man (London: Hodder § Stoughton, 1873), p. 395^ *^C. Darwin, The Descent of Man, v o l . I, p. 20. 1 ] T b i d . , v o l . I, p. 83. 1 2 I b i d . , v o l . I, p. 120. 1 3 I b i d . , v o l . I I , p. 314. Ibid. *^T. H. Huxley, "The Darwinian Hypothesis," Darwiniana (New York: D. Appleton § Co., 1897), p. 21. 16 J. W. Dawson, The Natural and the S p i r i t u a l (n. p., 1895), pp. 2f. 17 J. W. Dawson, Nature and the Bible (New York: Robert Carter £ Bros., 1882), p. 133. 51 18 T. H. Huxley, "Criticisms on The Origin of Species,"' Darwiniana, p. 84. 19 J. W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man, p. 321. 20 H. Spencer, F i r s t Principles (3rd ed.; London: Williams and Norgate, 1875), p. 396. 21 H. Spencer, The Principles of Biology (London: Williams and Norgate, 1865), v o l . I, p. 334. 22 J. W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man, p. 330. 23 H. Spencer, The Principles of Biology, v o l . I, p. 309. 24 Ibid., p. 59. 25 See J. W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man, p. 325; and J. W. Dawson, Facts and Fancies i n Modern Science (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1882), pp. 89f. 26 H. Spencer, The Principles of Biology, p. 340. 27 D. Gasman, The S c i e n t i f i c Origins of National Socialism (London: Macdonald, 1971), p. x x i i . 28 E. Haeckel, The Evolution of Man (3rd ed.; New York: D. Appleton § Co., 1886), v o l . I, p. 12. 2 9 I b i d . , p. 140. 30 J. W. Dawson, Facts and Fancies, p. 70. 31 E. Haeckel, Evolution of Man, v o l . I I , p. 455. 32 J. W. Dawson, The Dawn of L i f e (Montreal: Dawson Bros., 1875), p. 218. 33 J. W. Dawson, "Haeckel on the Evolution of Man," Princeton  Review, V (1880), pp. 446f. 3 4 J . W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man, p. 368. 35 A. R. Wallace, "The Development of Human Races Under the Law of Natural Selection," Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selec-t i o n (London: Macmillan § Co., 1870), passim. 36 A. R. Wallace, Darwinism (2nd ed.; London: Macmillan & Co., 1889), pp. 474f. 3 7 I b i d . , p. 476. 38 J. Le Conte, Evolution and i t s Relation to Religious Thought (New York: D. Appleton £ Co., 1888), p. 284; p. 283. 52 39 Ibid., p. 323. 4°Ibid., p. 79. 41 J. W. Dawson, Modern Ideas of Evolution (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1890), p. 166. 42 J. W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man, p. 387. 43 St. George Mivart, On the Genesis of Species (New York: D. Appleton § Co., 1871), p. 243. 44 Ibid., p. 278. 45 A. Weismann, The Evolutionary Theory (trans, from 2nd Ger-man ed. by J. A. Thomson; London: Edward Arnold, 1904), v o l . I, p. 6. 46 J. Tyndall, "Address of John Tyndall," Report of the B r i t i s h  Association for the Advancement of Science (1874), p. x c i i . 47 E. Haeckel, The Evolution of Man, v o l . I I , p. 393. 48 G. Romanes, Thoughts on Religion (4th ed., ed. by C. Gore; Chicago: Open Court, 1898), p. 29. 49 C. Darwin, The Descent of Man, v o l . I, p. 96. ^ J . W. Dawson, Modern Ideas of Evolution, p. 12. ^T. H. Huxley, "The Origin of Species," Darwiniana, p. 52. 52 T. H. Huxley, "Evolution and Ethics," Evolution and Ethics  and Other Essays (London: Macmillan § Co., 1895), p. 81. 53 T. H. Huxley, "Lectures on Evolution," Science and Hebrew  Tradition (London: Macmillan § Co., 1893), p. 66. 54 T. H. Huxley, Science and Hebrew Tradition, pp. i x f . ^H. Spencer, F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s , p. 96. 5 6 I b i d . , p. 46. 5 7 I b i d . , p. 18. 58 J. W. Dawson, Facts and Fancies, p. 20. 59 E. Haeckel, History of Creation (trans, from 8th German ed. by Schmitz § Lankester; New York: D. Appleton § Co., 1903), v o l . I, p. 40. 6 (^Ibid. , v o l . I, p. 72. 6 * J . W. Dawson, Facts and Fancies, p. 100. 53 CHAPTER I I I THE MAJOR PROBLEMS DAWSON SAW IN THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION Although Dawson subjected the Origin to a lengthy review when i t f i r s t came out, i n i t i a l l y he was not very agitated by i t . During the 1860's he wrote l i t t l e on evolution and appears to have become seriously aroused by the spread of evolutionary thought only toward the end of the decade. In 1869 he wrote a s c i e n t i f i c appraisal of "Modern Ideas of Derivation," and i n 1873 he launched his popular campaign against evolution with The Story of Earth and Man. The next 26 years brought a flood of books, a r t i c l e s , and lectures. Evolution by natural selection challenged the foundations of Dawson's f a i t h . The randomness inherent i n Darwinism was the major threat, because i t was completely antagonistic to b e l i e f i n the designing God. The naturalism inherent i n evolution was the second threat, because i t removed the natural evidences of design and made nature capable of producing l i f e without divine help. Randomness and naturalism were incompatible with Dawson's natural theology. They were also incompatible with his interpretation of the Genesis creation narrative because he read i t as a type of natural theology. This chapter explores the problems of randomness and naturalism which evolution presented to Dawson's f a i t h . It also places his perception of these problems into the Canadian context of thought on the same issues. 54 I. Natural Selection and Design The natural evidence of ultimacy, adaptation, and order led Dawson from nature to God. He saw design i n nature with such immediacy that i t was impossible for him to accept any theory which made out nature to be random. From the l a s t half of the 1860's when he began to r e a l i z e that the idea of natural selection implied precisely t h i s , he also decided i t was a t h e i s t i c . Because Dawson believed there could be no cosmos without God, and not even a hint of chaos with him, he could not have accepted Darwinism and maintained his f a i t h . With the opening of his popular campaign against evolution i n 1873, Dawson presented the controversy as at root a debate over whether or not there was design i n nature: over whether or not there was a God. Was one to hold, with Democritus, that a chaos of atoms could produce a- cosmos; or to hold that a cosmos must be designed? Darwinism led ineluctably to the former position. But because Dawson saw the controversy as centering on the question of design, he had u n f a i r l y reduced the Darwinian position to one which maintained the development of l i f e to be a t o t a l l y random a f f a i r . For example, i n his popular book Origin of the World, he admonished that: when evolutionists, i n t h e i r zeal to get r i d of creative intervention, trace a l l things to the interaction of insensate causes, they f a l l into the absurdity of believing i n absolute unmitigated chance as the cause of perfect order.^ This was inaccurate, however, for Darwinian randomness was always mitigated by law. This dichotomy between chance evolution and designed creation became somewhat ambiguous when Dawson considered the t h e i s t i c 55 evolutionists. In 1873 he maintained that evolution was incompatible with theism because evolution excludes "the idea of plan and design" 2 and resolves " a l l things into the action of unintelligent forces." Later he occasionally was w i l l i n g to admit t h e i s t i c evolution as "ess e n t i a l l y d i s t i n c t from Darwinism or Neo-Lamarkianism," because 3 " i t necessarily admits design and f i n a l causes." Yet he could never forget for long that i t was precisely Darwinism which had made evolutionary thought credible and that there was an "incongruity between the methods supposed by evolution and the princ i p l e s of design, f i n a l i t y , and eth i c a l purity inseparable from a true and 4 elevating r e l i g i o n . " Aside from t h i s confusion on t h e i s t i c evolution, Dawson's position on natural selection and design was unchanging. There were two options. Either one could accept Darwinism, and believe i n the completely absurd universe; or one could reject Darwinism, and believe i n the completely designed universe. Natural selection was incompatible with b e l i e f i n God, and t h i s was the major reason why Dawson rejected evolution. In his b e l i e f i n design, Dawson came at the end of the natural theology t r a d i t i o n i n Canada. .Paleyism was moderately represented among Canadian i n t e l l e c t u a l s before Darwin, and inevitably led to a rejection of Darwin, but i t did not survive him. Dawson was correct in arguing that i t would be impossible to accept natural selection, and yet believe i n the divine designer. There were f i v e s i g n i f i c a n t Canadian proselytizers of the 56 b e l i e f i n design who preceded the impact of Darwinism. Henry Taylor ( f l . 1770-1860), the Quebec author, was the f i r s t with his An Attempt  to Form a System of the Creation (1836) which aimed both to prove design as well as to reconcile Genesis and uniformitarianism. He saw design i n the order and adaptations i n nature, and one of his major examples of t h i s , i r o n i c a l l y , was the v a r i a t i o n i n species which guaranteed that no two individuals would be a l i k e , and showed "a master and designing hand to have directed t h e i r formation."^ Doubtless, had he l i v e d long enough, Taylor would have found Darwin's ideas on variation a special challenge. Thomas Trotter (17817-1855), the Presbyterian pastor of Antigonish, also wanted to reconcile Genesis and geology as well as to show the mind behind nature. His popular styled A Treatise on  Geology (1845) found God's i n t e l l i g e n t providence i n the history of the earth. He argued that the succession of geological periods was the unfolding of God's benevolent plan. For example, he saw divine purpose i n the carboniferous period which had lasted just long enough to provide man with the right amounts of coal, i r o n , and lime for his industries. But natural theology only came into i t s own i n Canada with the Elements of Natural Theology (1850), by James Beaven (1801-1875), which was concerned only with the question of design, and passed by the problem of reconciling God's word with his work. Beaven, an Anglican clergyman and scholar, was professor of d i v i n i t y at King's College, Toronto, from 1843 u n t i l 1849 when he accepted the chair of metaphysics at the University of Toronto. He wrote the Elements as a didactic book which aimed to relieve the believer of his 57 occasional doubts, and to convert the atheist i f his mind were not t o t a l l y warped. Beaven was very much l i k e Dawson. They both assumed, as Beaven stated i t , that "contrivance must have a contriver; design must have a designer." 6 And they both thought that t h i s contrivance and design was readily apparent i n nature. Beaven found his p r i n c i p a l evidence i n the order and adaptations of biology and astronomy. For example, he saw God's purposive mind i n such structures as "the teeth and s a l i v a , admirably adapted for preparing the food before i t 7 enters the stomach." He also, as with Dawson, believed there was a u n i f i e d plan i n nature, which he could t e l l from the fact that everything was adapted to some end. Outlines of Natural Theology (1859) by James Bovell (1817-1880) was similar i n i t s views but different i n approach. Bovell, who taught natural theology at T r i n i t y College, Toronto, shared Dawson's interpretation of the f o s s i l record as progressive; and so he argued for design from the coordinated progression of l i f e and i t s environment during the history of the earth. William Leitch (1814-1864), who was p r i n c i p a l of Queen's University, took the argument for design to astronomy. His God's  Glory i n the Heavens (1862) was a didactic exposition of the 'design which he discovered i n the arrangement and structures of the planets and stars. For example, he found a pattern on the moon i n the "endless repetitions of the t y p i c a l crater.with the central cone." He also found purpose i n the universe, which could be evinced i n such as the moon's effect of r a i s i n g and lowering the tides of the earth. Although his book came out shortly after the Origin, Leitch 58 had avoided i t s impact. After Darwin the major problem for the natural theologians shifted from that of demonstrating the plan of creation, to that of answering the challenge of randomness. Before Darwin i t was r e l a t i v e l y easy to assume that the universe had to have been designed, precisely because the only alternate explanation for i t was chance, which could be immediately dismissed as ridic u l o u s . With Darwin the idea of randomness received s c i e n t i f i c c r e d i b i l i t y . A sample of 19th century Canadian reactions to the problem of randomness w i l l show t h i s issue to be a s i g n i f i c a n t one which Dawson was not alone i n facing. There were those who, l i k e Dawson, found Darwinism to be t o t a l l y antagonistic to b e l i e f i n the divine designer. William Hincks (1794-1871), the brother of S i r Francis Hincks and professor of natural history at University College, Toronto, elaborated on th i s issue i n his presidential address to the Canadian I n s t i t u t e , i n 1870. And he confessed that: i f my reason compelled me to adopt the Darwinian hypothesis, i t s opposition, as I understand i t , to cherished and valued sentiments respecting creative wisdom and goodness, and a perfect divine plan i n nature, would cause me great pain.9 A frie n d of Dawson, James Carmichael, who was dean of Montreal and a colleague of Dawson i n the Natural History Society, shared Hinck's horror of Darwinism. Carmichael, who seems to have gained most of his views on Darwinism from Dawson, wrote two pamphlets i n defense of design: Design and Darwinism (1880), and Why Some F a i r l y I n t e l l i g e n t Persons Do Not Endorse the Hypothesis of Evolution (1898) . He aimed to make evident to the naive that Darwinism was incompatible with design and thus untenable. He argued that i t was: 59 a series of hypothetical assumptions, which, sometimes speaking i n the dogmatic language of ascertained fact, has boldly endeavoured to elevate the working of Disguised Accident into the position so long held by Divine Design.10 There were some thinkers, however, who did not share t h i s Dawsonian dichotomy of having to picture the universe either as a godless chaos or as a designed cosmos. For example, Goldwin Smith (1823-1910), the Toronto j o u r n a l i s t and hi s t o r i a n who was also an acquaintance of Dawson, accepted Darwinism and hoped for i t to be reconciled with r e l i g i o n . He realized the a t h e i s t i c implications of "the apparent evidences of the absence of design, waste and miscarriage i n the heavens and the earth, purposeless havoc and the extinction of races," but warned against leaping into materialism."^ Smith hoped that somehow randomness would be found to be incompatible only with the t r a d i t i o n a l dogma and superstitions, and not with the essence of f a i t h which underlay them. He was unable, however, convincingly to show how t h i s might be the case. Where Smith only hoped for a solution to the problem of randomness, John Watson (1847-1939), the idealist philosopher at Queen's University, managed to carry i t out. Instead of regarding variation as an accidental process which produced some good and some bad, Watson presented i t as a process which produced only d i f f e r i n g degrees of good. Because va r i a t i o n was always good, Watson could conclude that l i f e was i n fact coordinated with i t s environment by mind rather than by chance. Watson's only d i f f i c u l t y was that he lacked any s c i e n t i f i c evidence to substantiate his claim. In sum, b e l i e f i n the divine designer had a history i n Canada before Darwin, and was severely challenged by him. Dawson, as a 60 participant i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n , shared with many others the perception of Darwinian randomness as a s i g n i f i c a n t threat to t h i s b e l i e f . How widespread t h i s perception was, however, i s d i f f i c u l t to say; but the four thinkers sampled here echo a common sentiment found i n the colleges, s c i e n t i f i c s o c i e t i e s , and journals. I I . Naturalism and Natural Theology Evolutionary naturalism would have doomed Dawson's natural theology by removing the empirical evidence for. design. This was unacceptable to him because his f a i t h was based as much on nature as i t was on the Bible. Dawson held that science and r e l i g i o n could be reconciled; Spencer and the Darwinians claimed that nature showed no trace of God. Consequently, Dawson perceived t h e i r theories as mad attempts to go beyond sound induction and to eliminate God from science. From 1873 u n t i l his death Dawson repeatedly expounded on how there were l i m i t s to science and how i t was that man could know God. He wanted to establish C h r i s t i a n i t y as the metaphysics of modern science. He saw the main opposition to t h i s goal coming from Spencer, Haeckel, and Huxley. It was Darwin who had natural-ized biology, but i t was these men who extended Darwinism to agnosticism or atheism. Dawson's position on the r e l a t i o n of science and r e l i g i o n was constant throughout his career. Science was s t r i c t l y inductive. It could discover laws and explain the action of e f f i c i e n t causality, but the f i n a l explanation of the ultimacy, order, and adaptations which i t discovered,was r e l i g i o u s . Whether addressing a s c i e n t i f i c 61 or a popular audience, Dawson was adamant on th i s point. As p r e s i -dent of the B r i t i s h Association for the Advancement of Science he warned his peers that evolutionary speculation was bringing science into contact "with those great and awful questions of the ultimate destiny of humanity, and of i t s relations to i t s Creator," and that: In entering on such questions, we should proceed with caution and reverence, feeling that we are on holy ground; and that though, l i k e Moses of old, we may be armed with a l l the learning of our time, we are i n the presence of that which, while i t burns, i s not consumed; a mystery which neither observation, experiment, nor induction can ever f u l l y solve.12 Si m i l a r l y , i n 1881, while lecturing the students of Crozer Theo-l o g i c a l Seminary on the views of Spencer and Haeckel, Dawson admon-ished that: t h i s borderland between science and r e l i g i o n i s one which men cannot be prevented from entering; but what they may fin d therein depends very much on themselves. Under wise guidance i t may prove to us an Eden, the very gate of Heaven, . . . But on the other hand, i t may be found to be a b a t t l e f i e l d or a bedlam, a place of confused cries and incoherent ravings, and strewn with the wrecks of human hopes and aspirations.13 -At the start of his popular campaign against evolution, i n 1873, Dawson considered Spencer to be his prime enemy. He was reacting to The Principles of Biology which had replaced C h r i s t i a n i t y with an evolutionary metaphysics and had relegated r e l i g i o n to the realm of the unknowable. I f we followed Spencer, he contended, we would have to "hold that God i s 'unknowable,1 and creation 'unthink-able,'" with the result that "we are l e f t suspended on nothing over a bottomless v o i d . " 1 4 Huxley's Lay Sermons (1870) also came i n for some abuse when they argued that r e l i g i o n was beyond the realm of nature and knowledge, and that science proceeded best by l i m i t i n g 62 i t s e l f to m a t e r i a l i s t i c terminology. By 1880 Haeckel had become as dreaded an opponent as Spencer. The Evolution of Man had been translated into English i n 1879, and Dawson subjected i t to a lengthy c r i t i c i s m the following year. He described Haeckel's monism as "a sort of a t h e i s t i c monotheism," which led "to a cold, mechanical, and unsympathetic view of man and nature." 1*' Dawson countered Haeckel with both a c r i t i c a l s c i e n t i f i c attack and also an attempt to show the f u t i l i t y of his a t h e i s t i c mechanical view of nature. He argued that even i f l i f e were but a machine, such a machine could not exist without design: "The homely argument which Paley derived from the structure of a watch" would s t i l l "be f a t a l . " 1 6 Spencer and Haeckel remained Dawson's two p r i n c i p l e targets throughout the 1880's. These two men had elaborated evolution into n a t u r a l i s t i c philosophies which Dawson found h o r r i f i c . He c l e a r l y regarded the r e l i g i o n of science as more trying than the science which ignored r e l i g i o n . The publication of Spencer's The Data of Ethics, i n 1879, exacerbated his d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . This work based ethics on evolution, and Dawson remarked that: i t has contributed very much to open the eyes of thoughtful men to the depth of s p i r i t u a l , moral, and even soci a l and p o l i t i c a l , r uin into which we s h a l l d r i f t under the guidance of th i s philosophy.17 Dawson agreed with Spencer's naturalism i n so far as i t maintained that God was es s e n t i a l l y unknowable. He agreed that every-thing was unknowable i n essence. We can, however, know things i n their properties, r e l a t i o n s , and effects. I t was i l l i g i t i m a t e to replace the s p i r i t u a l explanation of l i f e with evolutionary naturalism, because God i s knowable through his effects on, and relations to, the 63 world. These relations and effects are apparent i n creation and design. In his elaborate denial of t h i s , Spencer had become for Dawson a kind of archetypical modern agnostic. Dawson occasionally stated that Spencer's n a t u r a l i s t i c agnosticism was worse than atheism. I t was not an expression of doubt or d i s b e l i e f but a reasoned conviction that God was unknow-able and that nature lacked his impress. I t i s clear, however, that Dawson was more disturbed by Haeckel's atheism. When discussing Haeckel, Dawson's rhetoric often revealed a profound discontent. He never retreated from the view that i f Haeckel were right then we would be "face to face with the darkest and most dangerous moral 18 problem that has ever beset humanity." Dawson claimed that Haeckel's naturalism was not supported by science but that i t was rather the perspective through which he pursued his science. In any event, Haeckel had f a i l e d because any science which indulges i n a t h e i s t i c theorizing w i l l f a i l . I f a l l i s mechanical then there i s no explanation for order, adaptations, and the progressive development of l i f e . For example: "Ordinary people f a i l to understand why a world of mere dead matter should not go on to a l l eternity obeying physical and chemical laws without 19 developing l i f e . " A dditionally, Haeckel's philosophy offered an unacceptable view of r e a l i t y . Without the p o s s i b i l i t y of discovering eternal truths, science became pointless, and without God there arose 20 the serious "question whether l i f e i s worth l i v i n g . " Although Dawson had frequently c r i t i c i z e d Huxley since 1869, i t was not u n t i l the 1890's that t h i s s c i e n t i s t ' s naturalism came in for the kind of treatment Dawson had previously reserved for 64 Haeckel and Spencer. Dawson was reacting to the a r t i c l e s which Huxley 21 began writing i n the late 1880*s on agnosticism. Huxley had come to the conclusion that although "the s c i e n t i f i c naturalism of the l a t t e r part of the nineteenth century" did not deny the supernatural, 22 i t did deny that there was any evidence for i t . He agreed with Dawson that b e l i e f was an i n t e l l e c t u a l matter founded on evidence, but he was an agnostic because science provided him no evidence. Dawson considered Huxley's agnostic naturalism to be a "dread alternative" which leaves man "with no Heavenly Father, no divine 23 solace i n our present l i f e , and no immortal destiny." He countered with a demonstration of design i n nature and an argument for the p o s s i b i l i t y of knowing God i n his effects. He also attempted to fi n d analogies between nature and the Gospel, such as between "the s a c r i f i c e s made by animals i n the interest of thei r progeny," and "the Christian 24 doctrine of vicarious suffering." He judged Huxley to have the bias of denying anything not demonstrable by sense data and thereby u n c r i t i c a l l y dismissing God. In 1896 Dawson probably had Huxley i n mind when he addressed the Jubilee Conference of the Evangelical Alliance on "Science the A l l y of Religion." Among others, Huxley had argued that each discovery of a secondary cause led that much further to naturalism by reducing the supernatural God's area of operations. Dawson's address argued that we replace the word "supernatural" with the word " s p i r i t u a l " so as to avoid the problem. Supernaturalism implies a d i s t i n c t i o n between secondary causality and God's immediate causality. The word " s p i r i t u a l " refers to the i n t e l l i g e n t design behind the whole natural world and i t s laws. 65 As Dawson saw the randomness i n evolution as inherently a t h e i s t i c , so also he saw i t s naturalism as inherently agnostic. I t not only eliminated the traces of God from nature and the f o s s i l record, but also eliminated him as a f i r s t cause. The naturalism of evolution tended toward materialism. Dawson knew that Darwin was prepared to allow God the role of f i r s t cause, but he also believed that the logic of the theory precluded t h i s . I f there were an o r i g i n a l creation then there was no reason why there could not be an i n d e f i n i t e number of further ones. Additionally, i t was r i d i c u -lous to suppose that God would leave an o r i g i n a l creation to be evolved i n a random fashion. As the matter stood, Spencer, Huxley, and Haeckel had i n fact reduced l i f e to matter. With t h i s appraisal of the s i t u a t i o n , Dawson saw t h e i s t i c theories of evolution as s u i c i d a l compromises. Even i f they were successfully to eliminate randomness from t h e i r theories, the t h e i s t i c evolutionists remained trapped within a naturalism that l e f t no proof for God. He became, at best, a theoretical p o s s i b i l i t y . The  Story of Earth and Man warned that "the bare hard logic of Spencer, . . . shows that the theory, carried out to i t s legitimate conse-quences, excludes the knowledge of a Creator and the p o s s i b i l i t y of 25 His Work." Aside from which, Dawson did not want: th i s God "afar o f f , " who has set the stone of nature r o l l i n g and then turned his back upon i t , but a present God, whose w i l l i s the law of nature, now as i n times p a s t . 2 6 By 1890, when he was f a m i l i a r with a l l the major t h e i s t i c evolutionists, Dawson asserted that "despite the efforts of the so called t h e i s t i c and Christian evolutionists," the theory of evolu-tion "may be, held to have tended constantly to a lower and lower 66 27 depth of m a t e r i a l i s t i c agnosticism." Le Conte, Mivart, Wallace, and others had t r i e d to avoid t h i s either by regarding the laws which guided evolution as divine, or by regarding the cause of the process as some divine power inherent i n l i f e . However, Dawson did not think that they had offered any compelling reasons why such forces or laws might not be purely natural. Dawson believed that there was a rati o n a l p r i n c i p l e behind nature which man's reason could discover: that there was a design i n nature. The naturalism of evolution forbade him t h i s empirical evidence for f a i t h . This he could not accept. Dawson did not naively believe that man could f u l l y understand God, but he did believe that man could understand the f i n i t e design to which God had fashioned nature. He also believed science to be out on a mad fantasy when i t sought to give a rati o n a l explanation of nature while simultane-ously ignoring or seeking to replace the God who had made i t r a t i o n a l : The f i n i t e cannot comprehend the i n f i n i t e , the temporal the eternal. We need not, however, on that account be agnostics, for i t i s s t i l l true that, within the scope of our narrow powers and opportunities, the Supreme Intelligence reveals to us i n nature His power and dignity; and i t i s t h i s , and t h i s alone, that gives attraction and dignity to natural science.28 Naturalism came after randomness as the second reason for rejecting evolution. In denying that there was any evidence of God i n nature, naturalism would eliminate natural theology and lead to agnosticism and materialism. 67 As with the issue of design and randomness, Dawson was not alone i n finding evolutionary naturalism to be a s i g n i f i c a n t challenge. Canadian natural theologians had faced the problem of naturalism, i n a minor way, before Darwin; i t was a major problem after him. I t was also a problem which did not confront the natural theologians alone, for Darwinian naturalism assaulted the heart of C h r i s t i a n i t y by implying that God was not responsible for the development of l i f e and man. Some considered that this meant the end of b e l i e f . Others hoped that at most i t would necessitate a reformulation of b e l i e f . Before Darwin, some Canadian natural theologians saw a n a t u r a l i s t i c threat i n the theories of Lamarck and Chambers. Both of these evolutionists believed that l i f e had originated i n a spontaneous generation and evolved by the agency of a perfecting power within i t . And while they both considered t h i s power to be natural, Chambers' position was modified, i n theory at least, by his pantheism. Taylor and Beaven realized that Lamarckism entailed a s u f f i c i e n t natural explanation for design, and so attacked i t as being s c i e n t i f i c a l l y unsubstantial. Moses Harvey (1820-1901), an hi s t o r i a n of Newfoundland and a Presbyterian pastor i n St. John's, responded to Chambers i n Lectures on the Harmony of Science and Revelation (1856). Although this work was concerned mainly with reconciling Genesis and geology, i t contained a rebuttal of Chambers' thought because Harvey had concluded that i t would lead to "gross 29 materialism." Another source of the n a t u r a l i s t i c threat lay i n philosophy. Bovell saw i n the epistemological r e l a t i v i s m of Hamilton and i n the Spinozism of German idealism, the death of natural theology. Hamilton 68 would have limited knowledge to the phenomenal and the r e l a t i v e ; idealism eliminated the d i s t i n c t i o n between nature and supernature. Although Bovell did not counter these threats i n philosophical argument, he wrote the Outlines of Natural Theology with the express intent of providing an alternative to such views. But the debate over naturalism only became widespread and s i g n i f i c a n t after the publication of the Origin. The theories of Lamarck and Chambers never gained s c i e n t i f i c r e s p e c t a b i l i t y . And Bovell had no need to be concerned, with either Hamilton or German idealism, because Hamilton had l i t t l e impact on philosophy, and German idealism was i n serious decline by the mid 19th century. Darwinian naturalism, on the other hand, did gain s c i e n t i f i c r e s p e c t a b i l i t y ; and Darwinism was so ably and widely defended that i t could not be ignored. One of the f i r s t Canadian responses to Darwin was a review of the Origin by E. J. Chapman (1821-1904) i n 1860. Chapman, who was professor of mineralogy and geology at University College, considered the major problem with Darwin's theory to be i t s natural-ism. He praised the book as a storehouse of knowledge, but maintained that Darwin was trying to answer questions which were beyond the range' of science. In a manner similar to that of Dawson, Chapman explained that the nature of species was part of a divine plan which i s "unfathomable to us at present, and perhaps ever to remain 30 unfathomed by our r e s t r i c t e d powers of inquiry." It was not s u f f i c i e n t , however, to reject evolution as a n a t u r a l i s t i c explanation of species without offering any s c i e n t i f i c argument. S i r Daniel Wilson (1816-1892), who was a natural h i s t o r i a n of international reputation and president of the University of 69 Toronto, understood t h i s . A good friend of Dawson, he thought the major challenge of Darwinism lay i n i t s n a t u r a l i s t i c explanation of the o r i g i n of man. I f man were a product of the apes, t h i s seemed to deny his unique s p i r i t u a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l constitution, and thus by implication his immortality. Wilson's Caliban: The Missing Link (1873), which was written "in response to the Descent of Man, aimed to show that the idea of a t r a n s i t i o n a l mind between ape and man was absurd. Among other things, Wilson argued that reason could not have evolved from a savage because i t would have been disadvantageous to his sur v i v a l . How could a being who depended on i n s t i n c t to l i v e , get by i n a "hybrid condition, with passions emancipated from the r e s t r a i n t of hal f - o b l i t e r a t e d i n s t i n c t s , and uncontrolled by 31 the glimmering reason?" Another kind of response to Darwinian naturalism was to accept i t , and then also to separate r e l i g i o n from science. For example, John Buchan (1841-1885), the p r i n c i p a l of Upper Canada College, proposed that r e l i g i o n and science were two separate realms. Thus although Buchan could admit that Darwinism "seems to s t r i k e at the b e l i e f i n personal immortality and the other foundations of morals and r e l i g i o n , " he could also maintain that "the presence of the re l i g i o u s and moral elements i n man i s at least as much a fact as the li n k s of resemblance that establish a l i n k between us and the 32 anthropoid apes." Buchan's solution was to place r e l i g i o n and science into separate compartments rather than to reconcile them. This would have h o r r i f i e d Dawson, both because i t removed the s c i e n t i f i c foundation of f a i t h , and also because i t produced a dichotomized and inconsistent view of r e a l i t y . 70 I t was also possible to accept Darwinian naturalism and to reconcile i t with b e l i e f . Watson was prepared to accept that evolution could explain the development of l i f e without reference to r e l i g i o n . But as an i d e a l i s t he concluded that the very process of evolution could be seen as "a phase, though not the highest phase, of the single self-conscious i n t e l l i g e n c e i n whom and through whom and by whom are 33 a l l things." I f naturalism implied that-God bore no r e l a t i o n to nature, Watson's idealism solved the problem by making God immanent with-i n nature. However, for many supernaturalists, such as Dawson, thi s solution to the problem of naturalism involved too rad i c a l a restatement of C h r i s t i a n i t y . Goldwin Smith took a more aggressive approach to the problem of naturalism. While he accepted the idea of evolution, he questioned the p o s i t i v i s t i c presuppositions of any science which divorced i t s e l f completely from r e l i g i o n . He argued that those who assumed metaphysics or r e l i g i o n had nothing to do with science, were i n fact taking a metaphysical position themselves. The Darwinian, he claimed, had no more right to assume that there was no intelligence behind evolution than did the believer have a right to assume that there was. In sum, there were many Canadian i n t e l l e c t u a l s , mostly s c i e n t i s t s , who believed that there were re l i g i o u s l i m i t s to science, and also that the study of nature should harmonize with b e l i e f . While they reacted to Darwinian naturalism i n various ways, they shared i n the view of i t as a threat. Dawson stood out among these thinkers, however, i n his capable theorizing on the r e l a t i o n of science and r e l i g i o n , and i n his aggressive defense of the evidence for God i n nature. 71 III. Evolution and Genesis Dawson considered the theory of evolution to be completely incompatible with the Genesis creation narrative, and thus also that i t struck at the very roots of faith. And because the Bible was as fundamental to his faith as was natural theology, this by itself would have been sufficient reason for him to reject evolution. However, because Dawson interpreted the Genesis creation narrative as a type of natural theology, the disagreement which he saw between evolution and Genesis was essentially a problem between evolution and natural theology. Genesis proclaimed the divine designer who had fashioned the world according to plan, but evolution assumed both that nature was random and also that natural causes could sufficiently explain l i f e . Had i t not been for this, Dawson could have reconciled evolution with his reading of the text of Genesis. There.was no significant difficulty between Genesis and evolution aside from the difficulties of randomness and naturalism. Dawson never saw the creation narrative as a primitive attempt at science, but always as a revelation that the universe is a designed cosmos. Genesis established the belief in a designing creator and a designed creation. It warned against belief in materialism, atheism, polytheism, and pantheism. Genesis: has no theories to support, except the general doctrine of an almighty Creator. Its notions are not warped by any superstition born of myth or idolatry. Nature is to i t neither a goddess nor a sport of chance,. . . but an ordered cosmos working out the designs of its Maker.34 In 1873 Dawson asserted that the Genesis idea of creation was: "Simply this; that all things have been produced by the Supreme 72 Creative W i l l , acting either d i r e c t l y or through the agency of 35 the forces and materials of His own production." And again, this rather vague conviction i s one which he never l e f t . Genesis does not state the precise methods of how l i f e developed. I t does describe the appearance of l i f e . I t notes that the waters, the land, and the atmosphere participate i n the production of l i f e . But i t does not give the sequence of secondary causes which were involved i n producing l i f e . The creation story t e l l s that God created the world according to a plan; i t does not t e l l how this plan was carried out. Dawson had no desire to be more s p e c i f i c about Genesis than he had to. Yet Genesis did impinge on Dawson's science i n a minor way, aside from committing him to a designing creator. Creation had proceeded i n a certain order: the fishes, for example, came before man. The creation of man was approximately 6,000 to 7,000 years ago. And the animals of the earth were said to have come forth "according to t h e i r kinds," which seemed to imply that they were immutable species. The B i b l i c a l order of creation should have presented no obstacle to Dawson's accepting evolution. He had reconciled t h i s order to the palaeontological record which was i n turn one of the major supports of the evolutionists. That evolution required millions of years was also no problem. Dawson had already turned 73 the days of creation into periods of in d e f i n i t e extent. Even the limited chronology which Genesis allows man should have been no problem; i t would merely have fixed the time at which the ape became human. Not even the apparent l i m i t a t i o n to variation imposed by the words "according to th e i r kinds" should have been an obstacle to Dawson's accepting evolution. He could hardly maintain that variation was t i g h t l y limited. Because he treated the a l l i e d species, which evolutionists offered as proof for transmutation, as being only v a r i e t i e s , his species had very wide l i m i t s . In Modern Ideas of Evolution he held that the "kinds" referred only to certain fundamental types, which were, nonetheless, highly variable within t h e i r kind. I t was apparent that Genesis "does not commit i t s e l f as to the l i m i t s of species or as to any special doctrine with respect to the precise 36 way i n which i t pleased God to make them." While addressing an audience at Union Theological Seminary, i n 1874, Dawson announced that the question of derivation was of "comparatively secondary importance" to that of materialism, and that the Genesis doctrine of creation 37 precluded only the l a t t e r . I t i s clear, then, that the "kinds" i n Genesis were no obstacle between Dawson and evolution. The text of Genesis could not have prevented Dawson from accepting evolution, and yet he was convinced that Darwinism was completely incompatible with i t . His problems accordingly could not have been i n exegesis. They lay i n the antagonism between the natural theology he had imported into Genesis and the randomness and naturalism of evolution. Dawson accepted that the mode of creation was unknown and that the creation took place over millions 74 of years. He could have had no reason to deny evolution as the mode of creation, were i t not that evolutionary randomness would have eliminated the creator altogether, and evolutionary naturalism would have denied him any r o l e . Dawson could not be an evolutionist and maintain his f a i t h i n the Bible, but the opposition between evolution and Genesis introduced no i r r e c o n c i l a b l e problems other than those of his natural theology. Among those 19th century Canadians who published r e c o n c i l i a -tions between Genesis and science, Dawson stands with only one other i n being concerned with the challenge which evolution presented to Genesis. Before Darwin, the threat to which the reconcilers were responding was the apparent antagonism between uniformitarianism and Genesis. After Darwin, the major threats were uniformitarianism and the doubt which the Higher C r i t i c i s m had raised about the i n s p i r a t i o n of Genesis. Uniformitarianism, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , was the theory which maintained that the history of the earth was one of gradual change over millions of years. The p r i n c i p a l problem t h i s posed Genesis was i t s antagonism to the short time span of s i x days which Genesis allows f o r the formation of the world. Henry Taylor's An Attempt to  Form a System of the Creation of Our Globe (1836) solved the problem by arguing that Genesis allowed for an i n d e f i n i t e period of time between God's creation of the earth and the f i r s t day mentioned i n Genesis 1:5. He placed the ages of uniformitarian geology into t h i s gap. Thomas Trotter's A Treatise on Geology (1845) argued that 75 while uniformitarianism explains the recent history of the earth, i t could not explain the early history which was subject to quick and catastrophic forces. The Mosaic Account of Creation (1856), by T. W. Goldie, followed Taylor i n placing an i n d e f i n i t e period between the creation and the f i r s t day, and also argued that the s i x days of the creation narrative actually refer to vast eras. But only one response to uniformitarianism dealt as seriously with the history of l i f e as i t did with the history of the earth. Moses Harvey, who was a progressionist l i k e Dawson, interpreted the days of Genesis as vast geological periods. His Lectures on the Harmony of Science and Revelation (1856) also contended that Genesis and science agreed " i n the great general outlines" of how "the earth has slowly and gradually advanced from a condition unfitted for 38 any animal existence to one i n which man i s denizen." There were two re c o n c i l i a t i o n s of Genesis and geology written in response to the Higher C r i t i c i s m . Ezekial Wiggins (1839-1910), an Ottawa c i v i l servant, wrote The Architecture of the Heavens (1864) i n reaction to Colenso's di s c r e d i t i n g of the authorship and accuracy of Genesis, i n the f i r s t part of his The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua C r i t i c a l l y Examined. Wiggins sought to refute Colenso by showing Genesis to be s c i e n t i f i c a l l y accurate. His main concern was the deluge, which Colenso had declared to be unbelievable. Wiggins attempted to vindicate i t geologically by l i m i t i n g i t to Europe, Asia, and A f r i c a , and by explaining how i t resulted from the earth t i l t i n g on i t s axis. Jacob Hirschfelder (1819-1902), who lectured i n ori e n t a l languages at University College, was also provoked by Colenso and, i n addition, Essays and Reviews and Kalischis Commentary on Genesis. 76 These l a s t two works raised serious questions about the i n s p i r a t i o n of Genesis and i t s geological claims. Hirschfelder countered these c r i t i c s with The Creation (1874), an elaborate p h i l o l o g i c a l argument intending to show that the Hebrew of Genesis allowed for the ages of geology to have occurred before the f i r s t day i n Genesis 1:5. This, he maintained, made Genesis geologically credible, and thus saved i t as God's revelation. The one writer, aside from Dawson, who was both engaged i n the Genesis and geology issue and also responding to the threat of evolution, was William Cassidy. His Age of Creation (1887) was mostly concerned with vindicating catastrophism as a geological theory so that he could, among other things, argue that the s i x creation days were a suitable length of time for the formation of the earth. But Cassidy also took the attack against Darwinism i n defense of the Mosaic account of the creation of l i f e . Although t h i s was a minor part of his book, he raised several s c i e n t i f i c objections to Darwin, such as that evolution demanded more time than the history of the earth allowed. But Cassidy did not consider evolution to be as serious a threat to the Bible, as did Dawson. For that matter, Dawson emerges as the only Canadian reconciler of Genesis and science who was concerned with a l l three major problems which Genesis faced: uni-formitarianism, the Higher C r i t i c i s m , and evolution. His r e c o n c i l i a -tion of Genesis amd uniformitarianism had been done partly i n reaction to the Higher C r i t i c i s m as well as to L y e l l . And, as we s h a l l see i n Chapter Four, he defended the doctrine of creation against the theory of evolution not only because i t was a base for his natural theology, but also because i t harmonized with Genesis. In addition, Dawson wrote Modern Science i n Bible Lands (1888) which had the sole intention of proving • the Higher C r i t i c s wrong by attempting to corroborate various topographical, geological, and h i s t o r i c a l references i n Genesis. 78 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I I I '''J. W. Dawson, Origin of the World (Montreal: Dawson Bros., 1877), p. 373. 2 J. W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man (London: Hodder ct Stoughton, 1873), p. 318. 3 J. W. Dawson, Modern Ideas~of Evolution (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1890), p. 227. 4Ibid... . **H. Taylor, Ah Attempt to Form a System of the Creation (Toronto: W. J. Coates, 1836), p. 15. 6 J . Beaven, Elements of Natural Theology (London: Francis § John Rivington, 1850), p. 58. 7 I b i d . , p. 96. g W. Leitch, God's Glory i n the Heavens (3rd ed.; London: Alexander Strahan, 1866), p. 60. 9 W. Hincks, "The President's Address," Canadian Journal, 2nd ser., XII(1870), p. 357. " ^ J . Carmichael, Design and Darwinism (Toronto: Hunter, Rose S, Co., 1880), p. 16. ^G. Smith, "The Prospect of a Moral Interregnum," Rose  Belford's Canadian Monthly, 111(1879), p. 656. 12 J. W. Dawson, "Presidential Address Before the B r i t i s h Association for the Advancement of Science, Sept., 1886," Canadian  Record of Science II(0ct., 1886), p. 204. 13 J. W. Dawson, Facts and Fancies i n Modern Science (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1882), p. 15. 14 J. W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man, p. 323. ^ J . W. Dawson, "Haeckel on the Evolution of Man," Princeton  Review V(1880), pp. 445 and 464. 1 6 I b i d . , p. 458. 79 17 J. W. Dawson, Facts and Fancies i n Modern Science, p. 101. 18 J. W. Dawson, "Haeckel on the Evolution of Man," p. 464. 19 J. W. Dawson, Facts and Fancies i n Modern Science, p. 82. 20 Ibid., p. 100. 21 See the compilation of a r t i c l e s i n : T. H. Huxley, Science  and the Christian Tradition (London: Macmillan, 1894). 22 T. H. Huxley, "Prologue," Science and the Christian Tradi- t i o n , pp. 38f. ' 23 J. W. Dawson, The Natural and the S p i r i t u a l (n. p., 1895), p. 2. 24 Ibid., p. 10. 25 J. W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man, p. 321. 2 6 I b i d . , p. 349. 27 J. W. Dawson, Modern Ideas of Evolution, p. .13. 28 J. W. Dawson, Salient Points i n the Science of the Earth (Montreal: W. Drysdale & Co., 1893), p. 6. 29 M. Harvey, Lectures on the Harmony of Science and Revela- tion' (Halifax: James Barnes, 1856), p. 40. 30 E. J. Chapman, "On the Origin of Species," Review-of On  the Origin of Species by C. Darwin, Canadian Journal, 2nd ser., V(1860), p. 386. 31 D. Wilson, Caliban: The Missing Link (London: Macmillan, 1873), p. 31. 32 J. M. Buchan, "The President's Address," Canadian Journal, 3rd ser., 1(1879-83), p. 379; pp. 379f. 33 J. Watson, An Outline of Philosophy (2nd ed.; Glasgow: James Maclehose § Sons, 1898), p. 183. 34 J. W. Dawson, Modern Science i n Bible Lands (pop. ed. rev.; London: Hodder t> Stoughton, 1892), p. 3. 35 J. W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man, p. 340. 36 J. W. Dawson, Modern Ideas of Evolution, p. 20; p. 17. 80 J. W. Dawson, Nature and the Bible (New York: Robert Carter § Brothers, 1882), p. 201. M. Harvey, Lectures on the Harmony: of Science and Revela- ti o n (Halifax::. James Barnes, 1856), p. 48; p. 30. 81 CHAPTER IV DAWSON'S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF EVOLUTION Because Dawson found the randomness and naturalism of evolution incompatible with his f a i t h , he rejected i t . But because he was a Paleyite and a dynamic apologist, he responded to i t by formulating a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y competitive theory of creation which preserved the design i n l i f e and could be reconciled with Genesis. This theory stands out i n 19th century Canada as an aggressive and highly competent solution to the problem of evolution, which kept science and r e l i g i o n reconciled without surrendering t r a d i t i o n a l supernaturalism. This chapter commences by examining a sample of Canadian solutions to the problem of evolution, and concludes with an examination of Dawson's solution. I. A Sample of Canadian Solutions to the Problem of Evolution Of a l l those who concluded that evolution presented serious, i f not f a t a l , problems for C h r i s t i a n i t y , there were very few who had constructive solutions to offer. Some sought to separate r e l i g i o n into a realm separate from the science which threatened i t . Others only reaffirmed t h e i r old r e l i g i o u s views without any great attempt to reinforce them before the challenge of evolution. And there were those who accepted that evolution had damaged their b e l i e f , but clung on i n the hope of some eventual resolution. On the other hand, 82 there were the p o s i t i v i s t s who embraced evolution as a welcome antidote to r e l i g i o n . There were also the German and B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s , and the s p i r i t u a l i s t s who f e l t capable of absorbing evolution into developmental views of l i f e , with God or s p i r i t somehow immanent i n the process of evolution i t s e l f . We have already touched upon some of the many responses to evolution, i n Chapter Three. There was John Buchan who separated his science from his r e l i g i o n . But this option cannot have been but a counsel of despair. I t produced inconsistent combinations of b e l i e f such as that of J. Moffat, a member of the Hamilton Associa-t i o n , who both accepted Darwinism and i t s implication that nature was mindless, while also holding that nature had to be designed. Writing i n the 1890's, he contended that r e l i g i o u s knowledge was different from s c i e n t i f i c knowledge, and that despite Darwin man could, and must,- continue to regard the universe as designed because: "nothing else that has ever been proposed can f u l l y meet the desperate needs, s a t i s f y the aspirations and reconcile the contra-dictions of his nature at a l l comparably with i t . " ^ But t h i s was to surrender the i n t e l l e c t u a l side of f a i t h , and with i t any coherent view of r e a l i t y . Those who rejected evolution while keeping r e l i g i o n and science reconciled, however, were not always i n a much stronger position. Very few were capable of making the doctrine of creation s c i e n t i f i c a l l y competitive with the theory of evolution. They were able to s a t i s f y themselves of the v a l i d i t y of t h e i r position, but they were unable s c i e n t i f i c a l l y to show i t as superior to evolution. For example, Carmichael, a Paleyite and c r e a t i o n i s t , took as his 83 major argument against evolution the fact that natural selection was incompatible with design. He assumed i t : t o be false because the randomness i t posited i n nature, he argued, precluded the p o s s i b i l i t y of l i f e . e x h i b i t i n g the order and seemingly designed adaptations which i t does. But th i s was to do no more than to challenge Darwinism on the basis of an assumption which i t was precisely Darwin's break-through to have removed from science. The significance of evolution was that i t could explain by means of natural law and a random process that which the creationists had taken to be designed. Another response to the problem of evolution was b r i e f l y mentioned i n Chapter Three, namely that of Goldwin Smith. He accepted that evolution, along with B i b l i c a l .criticism,.had destroyed much of the t r a d i t i o n a l dogma, superstitions, and anthropomorphic outlook of C h r i s t i a n i t y , but he did not conclude that t h i s meant the end of b e l i e f . The essence of r e l i g i o n was separable from revelation and theology, and could well survive the overthrow of i t s dogmatic formulations. This essence was the b e l i e f : that we have our being i n a Power whose character and purposes are indicated to us by our moral nature, i n whom we are united, and by the union made sacred to each other.^ Smith hoped that somehow a ra t i o n a l r e l i g i o n could be constructed on this foundation which would prove compatible.with science. He did not know how to do th i s himself, but urged s c i e n t i s t s and believers to engage i n open discussion i n the attempt to reunite science and r e l i g i o n on some ground between the extremes of untenable orthodoxy and fan a t i c a l positivism. And he admonished that should evolution completely discredit C h r i s t i a n i t y , the world would face the "consid-erable danger of a desperate c o n f l i c t between different classes of 84 society for the good things of that which people are coming to 3 believe i s the only world." But there were options which reconciled evolution and r e l i g i o n . The most noteworthy of these was John Watson's i d e a l i s t synthesis. Watson was one of the leading philosophers of his time. He had studied under Edward Caird at Glasgow, and p a r t l y inherited from him a revulsion for positivism and materialism, and a desire for a rat i o n a l i d e a l i s t i c f a i t h . He entered the evolution controversy i n the 1870's with a number of a r t i c l e s on such topics as evolution and morality, and science and materialism. Beginning with Comte, Mill,, and Spencer, i n 1888, he issued a number of books which examined evolutionary speculation and C h r i s t i a n i t y , and attempted a r e c o n c i l i a -t i o n of the two. While refusing to commit himself to the theory of evolution, Watson t r i e d to show how i t could be reconciled with both teleology and also idealism. He r e a l i z e d that Darwinism had rendered teleology unnecessary i n the study of individual species, and so he attempted to reintroduce i t on a higher l e v e l . Watson wanted to demonstrate that an i n t e l l i g e n t teleology was immanent within the organic realm as a whole, that evolution, i f true, was i t s e l f a t e l e o l o g i c a l process. But before doing t h i s he had to account for the chance i m p l i c i t i n Darwinism. As was mentioned i n Chapter Three, he accomplished t h i s by regarding variation as a process which produced only varying degrees of good, and not as one which produced both good and bad. He could consequently interpret variation as t e l i c rather than random. Teleology could now be safely reintroduced into evolution. 85 Watson took the fact of the harmony between l i f e and i t s environment as h i s f i r s t example of purpose. Because a l l v a r i a t i o n adapts organisms to t h e i r environments, and because a l l organisms are i n harmony with t h e i r environments, there must be a f i n a l cause behind t h i s coordination. Purpose can also be discovered i n the impulse f o r s u r v i v a l , which Darwinism assumes to e x i s t i n each organism. And l a s t l y , purpose can be seen i n the fact that lower forms of l i f e are not as well adapted as higher forms. Were t h i s not the case there would be no evolution from lower to higher forms. There i s , accordingly, teleology i n the progressive d i r e c -t i o n of evolution i t s e l f . Watson next wanted to show that t h i s t e l i c process was a manifestation of mind. He assumed that matter could not produce mind, and then argued that because existence contained the same p r i n c i p l e of r a t i o n a l i t y as did the mind, that a l l existence must be a product of i t . Evolution, i f true, would thus also be a product of mind. And so Watson could r e c o n c i l e i t with h i s i d e a l i s t i c panentheism. Evolution would be a phase of that i n t e l l i g e n c e which i s God. Simi l a r i n approach to Watson, although not i n a b i l i t y , was Stinson J a r v i s (1854-1926), a Toronto lawyer and n o v e l i s t who moved to the U. S. A. i n 1891. J a r v i s was a s p i r i t u a l i s t who believed that r e l i g i o n and science were both well served by the theory of evolution. His The Ascent of L i f e (1894) opined that Darwin could not success-f u l l y explain why animals should vary i n a progressive way. L i f e , he offered, evolves because the soul of each organism c o n t i n u a l l y s t r i v e s to discover and then achieve i d e a l s which are i n greater harmony with s p i r i t . Evolution i s fundamentally a r e l i g i o u s 86 process. Both Watson, i n his b r i l l i a n c e , and Stinson, i n his naivety, however, made two mistakes. F i r s t , they both assumed that evolution was progressive. But this was not a necessary part of Darwin's theory, which could just as eas i l y account for a regressive direc-tion i n l i f e , and did not state that a l l forms of l i f e were always improving. Watson appears to have been less influenced by Darwin than he was by- the none too s c i e n t i f i c evolutionary optimism of Spencer. Second, Stinson and Watson had not solved the problem of randomness. Stinson merely ignored i t . And Watson maintained the contradictory position that l i f e was a manifestation of int e l l i g e n c e and yet had evolved by natural selection. I f there were mind behind nature, i f i t were i n fact not random, then there was no need for any natural mechanism of selection. Diametrically opposed to Watson, was the solution offered by William Le Sueur (1840-1917). He embraced evolution as a theory which' strengthened his p o s i t i v i s t i c view of l i f e . Le Sueur was an author and a c i v i l servant who was one of the most vocal evolutionists i n Canada. A follower of Comte, he had an optimistic view of man and "the great church of science" which was to provide "the common home 4 and shelter of humanity." He ignored r e l i g i o n as something beyond the realm of science and knowledge, and saw i n evolution the proof of his conviction that God was not needed to explain man. Le Sueur revelled i n controversy. From the late 1870's u n t i l 1880, he used Rose Belford's Canadian Monthly and the Canadian  Journal as a medium to debate such questions as the r e l a t i o n of 87 morality to r e l i g i o n and the efficacy of prayer i n a world governed by natural law. His views that morality was unrelated to r e l i g i o n , which has a history of much e v i l i n any event, and that prayer could accomplish no changes i n the physical world, provoked many responses. In 1884 he made his general views on science and r e l i g i o n e x p l i c i t i n an argumentative pamphlet written i n response to an attack on agnosticism by the bishop of Ontario. He maintained that the world was witnessing a change toward rationalism and the rejection of miracle. Evolution was a result of t h i s process. Also, while the burgeoning r a t i o n a l s c i e n t i f i c point of view did not disprove b e l i e f i n God and immortality, i t did render them incredible "as part and parcel of a supernatural system miraculously revealed to mankind."^ Later the same year he issued another pamphlet which defended the views of his f i r s t from a rebuttal by the bishop. Concentrating more on the issue of evolution, he argued for i t as the most probable explanation of l i f e i n a universe run by natural law. He allowed as how evolution l e f t room for a hypothetical God at the beginning of l i f e , but continued by emphasizing how evolution had no need for the ideas of design and providence. He concluded by declaring himself a believer i n science, and i n v i t e d others "to taste and see whether the laws of the f i n i t e are not s u f f i c i e n t for f i n i t e man."6 I I . Dawson's Solution to the Problem of Evolution There were no t r a d i t i o n a l supernaturalists i n Canada, aside from Dawson, who were capable of grounding t h e i r f a i t h i n science s u f f i c i e n t l y well to challenge the evolutionists. For that matter 88 there were few anywhere. And those who accepted evolution and s t i l l believed usually did so at the expense of any i n t e l l e c t u a l l y complete and coherent view of r e a l i t y . The options of idealism and sp i r i t u a l i s m were not without problems, and such a ra d i c a l and complex reformulation of the f a i t h as Watson's was either beyond, or repugnant to, most. But without such a coherent view of r e a l i t y , the p o s i t i v i s t i c alternative gained increasing c r e d i b i l i t y . Dawson's significance l i e s i n the fact that he produced one of the most reasonable and compelling defenses of t r a d i t i o n a l supernatu-r a l ism. He very capably defended the concept of designed creation as an alternative explanation of l i f e to that of evolution. And he formulated t h i s into a coherent view of r e a l i t y i n which science and r e l i g i o n were reconciled. E s s e n t i a l l y creation meant there was a supernatural author for the designed development of l i f e . Dawson set t h i s forth i n a s c i e n t i f i c theory of "creation by law" which was antagonistic to evolution, preserved design, and could be reconciled with Genesis. The question of the o r i g i n of the universe and i t s inhabi-tants was always important to Dawson. He not only believed that the universe would be chaotic without design, but also as a super-nat u r a l i s t he placed the source of design outside of nature. He found i t inconceivable that nature might have i t s own p r i n c i p l e of order, or that order might be the chance result of a conflux of atoms dancing through i n f i n i t e time. Without b e l i e f i n a creator there arose the absurd alternatives of pantheism, idealism, and materialism. With a creator man gained a heavenly Father, d i s -covered the source of design, and became part of a r a t i o n a l , 89 purposeful world. Or, as Dawson to l d his audience at Crozer Theo-l o g i c a l Seminary, i n 1882: I f the universe has been created, then, just as i t s laws must be i n harmony with the w i l l of the Creator, so must our mental constitution; and man, as a reason-ing and conscious being, must be made i n the image of his Maker.7 As with design, so also creation constituted a border between science and r e l i g i o n . It was at once a s c i e n t i f i c and a r e l i g i o u s idea. Science discovered beginnings which i t could not explain, and which manifested the workings of God. The palaeontological record disclosed the introduction of species. Thermodynamics t e l l s us the universe i s dissipating energy, and so we must assume i t to have had a beginning. The speed of the earth's rotation i s diminish-ing, which implies that the world i s f i n i t e . And geology, which prior to the Origin Dawson believed to be a science which had discovered no indication of a beginning, came to be one which: by tracing back a l l present things to t h e i r o r i g i n , was the f i r s t science to establish on a basis of observed facts the necessity of a beginning and end of the world.^ Dawson was also forced to make creation a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y respectable theory i n biology, i n order to confront his foes' dismissal of the supernatural. Haeckel's a t h e i s t i c monism passed i t over as primitive superstition. Huxley considered i t beyond the realm of a necessarily n a t u r a l i s t i c science. Darwin admitted the p o s s i b i l i t y of an o r i g i n a l creation but found i t u n l i k e l y that "at innumerable periods i n the earth's history certain elemental atoms have been 9 commanded suddenly to flash into l i v i n g tissues." And Spencer, whom Dawson considered the most outrageous, not only made e x p l i c i t Darwin's b e l i e f that creation meant some incredible and miraculous departure 90 from natural law, but also considered i t an unthinkable r e l i g i o u s idea. Dawson's major arguments for creation were from the gaps i n the palaeontological record and the apparently q u a l i t a t i v e differences between man and the other animals. The f o s s i l record did not reveal a series of species slowly gradating into each other through time. It revealed d i s t i n c t species which arrived f u l l y formed i n one era and disappeared i n the next. While the evolutionists could argue the record was incomplete, Dawson argued i t supported his contention of creative intervention. There were gaps between species, a gap between vegetable and animal l i f e , and a gap between dead and l i v i n g matter. Surely t h i s was evidence of God's discrete species rather than an evolutionary continuum. As Spencer and the Darwinians included man i n evolution, Dawson was also at pains to show him as r a d i c a l l y d i s t i n c t from the other animals. The Story of Earth and Man, published two years after The Descent of Man, argued man was "a 'new departure' i n c r e a t i o n . " 1 ^ There was a huge gulf between "the mechanical, unconscious, r e p e t i t i v e nature of the animal" and a human who could think, t a l k , make moral decisions, and have reli g i o u s f e e l i n g s . 1 1 The Story of Earth and Man also contained the i n i t i a l elabora-tion of Dawson's proposal of creation by law. With an eye especially on Spencer's Principles of Biology, which had dismissed creation as ludicrous and unthinkable, Dawson t r i e d to re-establish "the old idea 12 of creative design, which undoubtedly rests on an inductive basis." It was not, however, u n t i l 1875 that his thoughts were polished and he was able to present them i n an impassioned address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Dawson defined the creation 91 of species as "the continuous introduction of new forms of l i f e under def i n i t e laws, but by a power not emanating from within themselves, 13 nor from the inanimate nature surrounding them." He wanted to show that creation was not some miracle repugnant to science. Certainly "the seen can be explained only by reference to the unseen," but t h i s did not mean that God encroached on natural law i n a sporadic and arbitrary manner. Creation by law was an elaboration of the progressionism Dawson had adopted before the Origin. The process was now presented as one regulated and s t a b i l i z e d by a number of laws which Dawson had general-ized from the f o s s i l record. A l l of these laws were incompatible with evolution. The development of l i f e was not a continuous a f f a i r but rather marked by the alternation of periods of rapid production of species with periods of extinction. Species were usually introduced i n intermediate types, from which they quickly varied, within l i m i t s , either toward degradation or elevation. A l l i e d species were introduced simultaneously i n different a r e a s . ^ And so i t went, with God's a c t i v i t i e s being discovered as s c i e n t i f i c , and evolution discredited as wrong. There was i n a l l of t h i s , however, one area Dawson studiously avoided. He never described the mode of creation nor even guessed at i t . But this was i n keeping with the mysterious realm between science and r e l i g i o n which creation occupied. Science could examine the re-sults of creation but not the process. Dawson maintained the position he had f i r s t announced i n 1863 i n response to Darwin's Origin: 92 It may be found, after a l l , that the question whether the creative force manifested i t s e l f i n c a l l i n g certain species into existence from nothing, from dead matter, whether by an instant and miraculous act, by more sudden natural change, or by slow and gradual processes, i s insoluble by us; or that a l l or many of these modes may have been concerned i n making l i v i n g beings, what they are.16 Creation by law provided Dawson with a supernatural explanation of the o r i g i n of l i f e which was s c i e n t i f i c a l l y credible. I t was a more coherent theory than evolution because i t not only explained the o r i g i n of species but also the o r i g i n of l i f e . Evolution had either to assume an o r i g i n a l creation or to argue for spontaneous generation. The former option Dawson considered to be incompatible with evolution, and the l a t t e r he considered absurd. Huxley might "make the grandeur of the material universe his highest object of adoration," and Haeckel might adopt the "alternative of self-existence or causelessness for the universe and a l l i t s phenomena," but t h i s was ridiculous presump-17 t i o n which explained nothing. Creation "provides i n ' w i l l , ' the only source of power actually known to us by ordinary experience, an i n t e l l i g i b l e o r i g i n 18 of nature." It does not leave man's ultimate questions unsatisfied or unanswered, but i s rather an elevating r a t i o n a l view of species which prevents "the deceptions of pseudo-scientists from doing t h e i r 19 e v i l work." Creation brings God into history rather than leaving him an otiose f i r s t cause or omitting him altogether. The o r i g i n of species shows that: the w i l l of God has been active and operative as the sole cause throughout a l l ages of the world's creation and history, and that the v i s i b l e universe i s not a mere product of i t s own phenomena.20 The design i n nature now gained a firm s c i e n t i f i c foundation. 93 The evidences for order and adaptation were vindicated, and the o r i g i n of species seen as part of a plan: The plans of the creative mind constitute the true l i n k of connection between the different states and developments of inorganic and organic objects. This i s the real meaning of creation by law, as distinguished from mere chance on the one hand, and arbitrary and capricious intervention on the other.21 Creation by law could also be reconciled with the Genesis cosmogony which Dawson had come to see as "not reconcilable with the supposition 22 of a series of arbitrary acts any more than the s c i e n t i f i c idea." In underpinning natural theology and the Bible, creation by law, as Dawson pleaded for i t to the American Association, i s the nexus where: natural science meets with theology, not as an antagonist, but as a friend and a l l y i n i t s greatest time of need, . . . neither men of science nor theologians have a right to separate what God i n Holy Scripture has joined together, or to b u i l d up a wall between nature and r e l i g i o n , and write upon i t "no thoroughfare." The science that does t h i s must be impotent to explain nature and without hold on the higher sentiments of man. The theology that does this must sink into mere superstition.23 But by the time of S i r William Dawson's death, i n 1899, the era of Paleyism was drawing to a close. Although his theory was as s c i e n t i f i c a l l y sound as that of evolution, i t belonged to t h i s dying perspective. Science was becoming increasingly n a t u r a l i s t i c and unwilling to tolerate r e l i g i o u s interferences with i t s expanding domain. And naturalism demanded evolution as much as evolution made naturalism feasible. Science and r e l i g i o n were separating into independent, and sometimes inconsistent, views of r e a l i t y . The harmony of science and r e l i g i o n which Dawson had fought for, was defeated. 94 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV """J. Moffat, "Man S c i e n t i f i c a l l y Considered," Journal and  Proceedings of the Hamilton Association, VIII(1891-2), p. 51. 2 G. Smith, Lectures and Essays (Toronto: Hunter, Rose § Co., 1881), p. 106. 3 G. Smith, "The Prospect of a Moral Interregnum," Rose  Belford's Canadian Monthly, 111(1879), p. 656. 4 W. Le Sueur, "The S c i e n t i f i c S p i r i t , " Rose Belford's  Canadian Monthly, 111(1879), p. 438; p. 441. 5W. Le Sueur, A Defense of Modern Thought (Toronto: Hunter, Rose § Co., 1884), p. 7. 6W. Le Sueur, Evolution and the Positive Aspects of Modern  Thought (Ottawa: A. S. Woodburn, 1884), p. 36. 7 J. W. Dawson, Facts and Fancies i n Modern Science (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1882), p. 15. g J. W. Dawson, "Address of J. W. Dawson, Vice-President," Proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of  Science, XXIV]' • pt. 2(1875), p. 23. 9 C. Darwin, On the Origin of Species (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1859), p. 483. 1 0 J . W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man (London: Hodder § Stoughton, 1873), p. 366. 1 1 I b i d . , p. 370. 1 2 I b i d . , p. 145. 13 J. W. Dawson, "Address of J. W. Dawson, Vice-President," p. 4. 14 Ibid., p. 22. "^Ibid . , p. 25. 1 6 J . W. Dawson, Air-Breathers of the Coal Period (Montreal: Dawson Bros., 1863), p. 76. 95 J. W. Dawson, Modern Ideas of Evolution (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1890), p. 161; p. 120. 1 8 J . W. Dawson, The Story of Earth and Man, p. 342. 19 J. W. 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