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Process choice in the resolution of labour-management relations problems Coleman, Richard S. 1977

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PROCESS CHOICE IN THE RESOLUTION OF LABOUR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS PROBLEMS by. RICHARD S. COLEMAN B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1 9 7 4 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES in the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1 9 7 7 © Richard S. Coleman, 1977. In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree ly ava i l ab le for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thesis for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i cat ion of th is thesis for f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my writ ten permission. Department of Industr ial Relations The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 W e s b r o o k P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , C a n a d a V 6 T 1W5 Date Ap r i l 29. 1977 A B S T R A C T Two p r o c e s s f r a m e w o r k s a r e a v a i l a b l e t o s o l v e l a b o u r -m a n a g e m e n t p r o b l e m s . One i s b a s e d o n t h e c o n f l i c t a s p e c t o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , w h i l e t h e o t h e r e x p l o i t s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p ' s s y m b i o t i c n a t u r e . The s t u d y e x a m i n e d why s p e c i f i c p r o b l e m s a r e a s s i g n e d t o p a r t i c u l a r p r o c e s s e s w i t h t h e v i e w t h a t s u c h a n a n a l y s i s w o u l d i n d i c a t e t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r c o o p e r a t i o n . A d e c i s i o n m o d e l w a s p r o p o s e d w h i c h i s o l a t e s v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s a n d r e s u l t i n g b e h a v i o r s r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r o c e d u r e o f p r o b l e m r e s o l u t i o n . I n t h e a b s e n c e o f a m e t h o d f o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e u n i v e r s a l n a t u r e o f p r o b l e m s i t w a s s u g -g e s t e d t h a t i n d i v i d u a l p r o b l e m s a r e i n d e p e n d e n t l y c a t e -g o r i z e d b y e a c h p a r t y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r p o t e n t i a l f o r a w i n / w i n o r w i n / l o s e s o l u t i o n . O n c e e a c h p a r t y h a s i n d e p e n -d e n t l y a r r i v e d a t a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n f o r a s i n g l e p r o b l e m , a c h o i c e o f p r o c e s s i s e f f e c t e d b y t h e d o m i n e e r i n g n a t u r e o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s , t h e p r e s e n c e o f a u d i e n c e s , a n d t h e n e e d t o m a i n t a i n a n i m a g e o f p o w e r . I t w a s h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t a d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s w i l l b e c h o s e n w h e n e x p e c t a t i o n s o f r e s p o n s e a r e e i t h e r u n c l e a r o r d i s t r i -b u t i v e . I f m o r e t h a n o n e p r o b l e m e x i s t s , t h e same f a c t o r s w i l l r e s t r i c t t h e d e c i s i o n t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s u n l e s s b o t h s i d e s a g r e e t o a s e p a r a t e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s f o r p o t -e n t i a l l y w i n / w i n p r o b l e m s . I n a d d i t i o n t o a m u t u a l d e c i s i o n t o p u r s u e t h e i n t e g r a t i v e o p t i o n , a s u c c e s s f u l r e s o l u t i o n o f a p r o b l e m t h r o u g h a s e p a r a t e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s w i l l i i i only be successful i f a strategic structure i s implemented to minimize suspicion, tendencies towards revenge, and negative audience reactions. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION 1 I I . A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 5 Assumptions 5 Problem I d e n t i f i c a t i o n : A U t i l i t y -Based C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 5 Available Processes . . i 1 0 A Conceptual Summary 1 1 I I I . PROCESS OPTIONS 14 The Integrative Process. 14 A Model 1 5 Conditions 1 9 Tactics 2 1 Summary: The Integrative Process 2 5 The D i s t r i b u t i v e Process 2 5 A Model 26 Tactics 31 A T a c t i c a l Typology 33 Summary: The D i s t r i b u t i v e Process 40 IV. CHOICE OF PROCESS: HYPOTHESES 42 Underlying Contentions 43 I n i t i a l Choice of Process 46 Hypotheses 47 V. CHOICE OF PROCESS: DISCUSSION 50 T a c t i c a l Differences 50 Trust and Suspicion 5 2 V C H A P T E R P A G E Summary . 58 I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s C r i t e r i a 59 T h e P r e s e n c e o f A u d i e n c e s 59 B a r g a i n i n g P o w e r i n F u t u r e D i s t r i b u t i v e N e g o t i a t i o n s 6 2 P r e d i c t i o n s 64 Summary a n d C o n c l u s i o n s 66 V I . C H O I C E OF P R O C E S S : MORE THAN ONE P R O B L E M 70 The Q u e s t i o n o f P r o b l e m S e p a r a t i o n 71 D e c i s i o n P r o c e s s (Why) 73 P r e d i c t i o n s (When) 77 Summary (Why a n d When) 78 S e p a r a t i o n S t r a t e g i e s 78 S e p a r a t i o n C o n s t r a i n t s 78 Summary o f C o n s t r a i n t s 83 S e p a r a t i o n S t r a t e g i e s (How) 83 S t r u c t u r a l S t r a t e g y A 85 S t r u c t u r a l S t r a t e g y B 88 S t r u c t u r a l S t r a t e g y C 9 2 S t r u c t u r a l S t r a t e g y D 96 C o n c l u s i o n s (How) 100 Summary 101 V I I I . SUMMARY AND C O N C L U S I O N S 1 0 2 B I B L I O G R A P H Y 108 v i LIST OP TABLES TABLES PAGE 1. A l l Possible Conceptual/Perceptual Situations Leading to Process Decisions 48 2. Process Decisions 65 v i i L I S T OF F I G U R E S F I G U R E S P A G E 1 . F i x e d - s u m o r " W i n - L o s e " P a y o f f 8 2. V a r i a b l e - s u m o r " W i n - W i n " P a y o f f 8 3. A C o n c e p t u a l Summary 12 4. J o i n t P r o b l e m - S o l v i n g P r o c e s s 1 6 5. P a y o f f M a t r i x f o r I n t e g r a t i v e P r o c e s s 20 6 . One P a r t y ' s P e r c e p t i o n s o f B o t h P a r t i e s G r o s s a n d ; N e t U t i l i t y F u n c t i o n s 29 7. A c t u a l a n d P e r c e i v e d N e t E x p e c t e d U t i l i t y F u n c t i o n s F o r B o t h P a r t i e s 32 8. P o s s i b l e C o m b i n a t i o n s o f P r o b l e m C l a s s i f i c a t i o n s a n d P r o c e s s G i v e n Two P r o b l e m s 75 9. S t r u c t u r a l S e p a r a t i o n S t r a t e g i e s 84 10. A D e c i s i o n M o d e l 103 To Jane and Alexander whose l o v e and support made the past two years p o s s i b l e . 1. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Presumably, labour and management are involved i n a relationship from which each w i l l derive some s a t i s f a c t i o n . A quasi-equilibrium i s usually achieved whereby each i s content to remain i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p . However, the factors e f f e c t i n g each party's s a t i s f a c t i o n are continually subject to f l u c t u a -t i o n . Problems a r i s e r e l a t i n g to conditions of work and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the proceeds of production. Herein l i e s the value of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s research: the analysis, deter-mination and possible refinement of the process r e l i e d on by both par t i e s to cope with a dynamic s i t u a t i o n while s t i l l maintaining t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . The i n t e r e s t and value of the subject i s r e f l e c t e d i n the voluminous body of l i t e r a t u r e directed towards i t . Contributions have been made by many s o c i a l d i s c i p l i n e s . Economists have attempted to define economic boundaries and c r i t e r i a which l i m i t the extent to which the par t i e s can disagree on problem solutions (Hicks, 1948; Chamberlain, 1965). Sociologists and psychologists have scr u t i n i z e d behavioral determinants and reactions to p a r t i c u l a r negotiating mechanisms^ (Deutch, I960; Rubin-and Brown, 1975). Although the value of these contributions cannot be under-stated, most have shown a myopic concern with the process i t s e l f and indeed, a single aspect of the process. While many writers "Mechanisms" re f e r s to bargaining t a c t i c s . 2. seem to recognize the symbiotic nature of the labour-management relat i o n s h i p ( H i l l s , 1975; Stevens, 1963) they f a i l to delve into the contradictions involved and proceed to analyse the resolution of the c o n f l i c t f u l aspect of the rela t i o n s h i p . Refinement of the coping process, however, can come from two sources: either an optimization of the c o n f l i c t process or an exploitation of the cooperative p o t e n t i a l . Neglect of the l a t t e r leaves gaps i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s theory r e l a t i n g to the s p e c i f i c s of cooperative implementation and p o t e n t i a l . Estimates of cooperative pot e n t i a l which often appear i n the l a y press are therefore subjective guesses. It does not seem possible that either a cooperative or c o n f l i c t approach i s necessarily appropriate for every labour-management r e l a t i o n -ship, which suggests that a complete consideration of the entire process of problem resolution must contain an analysis of a primary step. This "step'? concerns the choice of a process for resolving a problem which i s made by the par t i e s when a problem f i r s t a r i s e s . C o n f l i c t bargaining i s only one of the process options av a i l a b l e . Other processes are available which may be more appropriate to d i f f e r e n t circumstances. More important, the nature of a p a r t i c u l a r process may have s p e c i f i c e f f e c ts on the nature of other processes going on i n the same rela t i o n s h i p , and therefore, the p o t e n t i a l f o r exploiting the symbiotic aspect of the r e l a t i o n s h i p (cooperation). In the search f o r a solution to any problem,.relating to 3 . i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s or otherwise, i t i s normally assumed that resolution processes l i e somewhere on a continuum, with genuine maximum cooperative problem solving at one end and "cut-throat" bargaining at the other (Stevens, 1 9 6 3 , p. 1 0 ) . On an i n t u i t i v e basis, i t would seem f a i r l y reasonable to con-clude that these processes employ t a c t i c s which are e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t . To i d e n t i f y the e f f e c t s and consequences of d i f f -erent processes more precisely, t h i s study examines the way i n which parties can reach apparently e f f e c t i v e problem solutions from the perspective of i n i t i a l choice of process. In p a r t i c u l a r , the strategies dictated by the chosen process are examined to determine t h e i r e f f e c t on the process decision. It i s hoped thereby some l i g h t may be thrown on the nature of the choice i t s e l f and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of options, p a r t i c u l a r l y the p o t e n t i a l f o r cooperation. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , discussion i s focused on two areas: 1 . Why problems are assigned to particular, processes, including how the nature of the process options effebts the assignment of problems to p a r t i c u l a r processes. 2. The p o t e n t i a l f o r e x p l o i t i n g the symbiotic nature of the labourfmanagement re l a t i o n s h i p within the present i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s structure. The study i s broken into f i v e parts. The i n i t i a l section presents a conceptual framework upon which the research i s based. As a further basis from which to proceed with the analysis, the second section examines the process options. Specific hypotheses are examined i n threes subsequent sections. The f i r s t of these parts develops^hypotheses concerning the process option which each party w i l l be expected to regard as 4 most appropriate f o r p a r t i c u l a r circumstances . The next section provides support f o r these hypotheses. The l a s t section describes the e f f e c t that a multitude of problems w i l l have on the process decision. This section also deals with possible strategies to achieve cooperation through independent processes. "Circumstances" ref e r s to the s p e c i f i c s oi the problem, the psychological environment, and tne hxstory o i the rel a t i o n s h i p 5 CHAPTER II A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK To c r i t i c a l l y evaluate any r e a l s i t u a t i o n , condition, or process, i t i s necessary to i s o l a t e various aspects so that each may by studied and evaluated i n d i v i d u a l l y . Otherwise c e r t a i n aspects may be overshadowed by the complexity of the whole. A conceptual framework i s therefore useful to proceed i n an orderly fashion. Following t h i s reasoning, the resolution of any problem may be broken down to three steps. These are the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and categorization of the problem, the choice of an appropriate process to solve the problem, and the f i n a l generation of a solution. The conceptual model used below has i s o l a t e d these three steps and i n addition, includes two general assumptions. F i r s t , i t i s assumed that problem types can be i d e n t i f i e d and put into two general c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . Second, i t i s assumed that the choice of a process i s l i m i t e d to two options. Assumptions PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION; A UTILITY BASED CLASSIFICATION The f i r s t assumption i s that the problems which a r i s e to threaten the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p may be categorized. D i s t i n c t i o n s can be made on two planes. The two most popular approaches found i n the l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t e f i r s t , to the method employed to solve the problem and second, the status of the outcome. The f i r s t approach can be dismissed immediately since i t i s the optimum process given the problem that i s being studied. 6. The nature of the outcome i s of f a r more use, but only as t h i s outcome i s seen as a pot e n t i a l p r i o r to processing. The nature of the problem must be considered at t h i s early stage i f a method fo r processing i s to be obtained before the chosen process i s implemented. The nature or status of an outcome can be conceptually rel a t e d to the theory of u t i l i t y because each party w i l l have some idea of the value of a pot e n t i a l reward. It i s i m p l i c i t i n u t i l i t y theory, however, that u t i l i t y i s an i n d i v i d u a l c a l c u l a t i o n . Each actor ( i n d i v i d u a l or organization) w i l l have a di f f e r e n t u t i l i t y function r e l a t i n g to the same rewards. Usually t h i s r e l a t e s to i n d i v i d u a l preferences, but i n the labour-management sphere, u t i l i t y i s p a r t i a l l y a function of a party's perceptions of h i s p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e to h i s opposite. The character of any labour-management re l a t i o n s h i p may be said to l i e on a continuum, one end of which s p e c i f i e s labour as an equal partner and the other as a purchased input rauch l i k e other raw materials. At one extreme employers who view labour as a dehumanized troublesome input w i l l tend to deal with a l l labour related matters asbargainable p o t e n t i a l , attempting to obtain the most "good" f o r the le a s t cost. Employers at the opposite end of the continuum w i l l tend to approach the same problems i n a d i f f e r e n t manner, viewing problem solutions as the c r i t i c a l concern rather than the cost. The f i r s t employer w i l l view the cost of a solution as a ce r t a i n punitive loss i n favour of the other side, whereas the second employer w i l l view the same outlay, not simplysas a cost, but 7. also as an input necessary f o r the firm's development. The difference comes from a conception of labour as "the other side" or as part of the organization (Harbison and Coleman, 1951, Ch. 1 ) . Most firms appear to l i e somewhere i n the middle. There i s a conception of management prerogative and cost, but also a r e a l i z a t i o n that solutions to ce r t a i n problems may be mutually rewarding. It i s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between outcomes which permits problem c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Depending on management's perspective, there i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between problems which o f f e r a p o s i t i v e solution to both p a r t i e s and problems which, when taken by themselves, represent a d i s t i n c t l o s s to one party and a gain to the other. More succinctly, the former o f f e r s a variable sum reward whereas the l a t t e r o f f e r s a po t e n t i a l f o r zero sum outcomes. These concepts are demonstrated i n Figures 1 and 2 below. Insert Figures 1 and 2 here In both cases the horizontal axis (Dg) represents one party's u t i l i t y and the v e r t i c a l axis (U^) the other party's u t i l i t y . Figure 1 shows a po t e n t i a l f o r fix e d sum rewards since any movement on the curve represents an increase i n u t i l i t y f o r one party but a decrease i n u t i l i t y f o r the other. The second figure shows the opposite s i t u a t i o n where increases i n one party's u t i l i t y automatically increase the other party's u t i l i t y as well. FIGURE 1 FIXED-SUM OB "WIN-LOSE" PAYOFF U t i l i t y 8. In essence total u t i l i t y derived from solutions i s being contemplated, as opposed to u t i l i t y measured in the same coin. It i s not necessary that the reward be of the same type. The only assertion made i s that the expected solution w i l l occur when u t i l i t y functions are perceived as rising in conjunction with one another or moving i n the opposite directions. Certainly some problems^ are more l i k e l y to be perceived in one way rather than the other, and this may be taken into account when approaching problems. Walton and McKersie (1965, p. 129) imply that economic problems w i l l most l i k e l y be among the fixed sum variety. However, no conclusive statement may be made without regard for each party's perspective. This i s a different.approach than that taken by other theorists. For example, Walton and McKersie (1965) do not separate a conception of the problem from that of the appro-priate process. Driscoll (1976) c l a r i f i e s this position by stating;that problem classification i s actually part of a process which i s already underway. The implication i s that classification requires input from both parties (Driscoll, p. 2 ) : This behavioral process involves both parties attempting to identify problems where their interests coincide... This conception of the classification of problems i s based on the f i r s t approach found in the literature—namely that of process classification—and as such i t i s rejected (see p. 5 above). ^ Throughout the thesis "problems" w i l l become "issues" i f there i s a perception of win/lose potential. 10. While t h i s thesis w i l l cover i n some depth the effect of multiple party input on the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of problems f o r the purpose of process choice, t h i s i n i t i a l discussion concerns the actual formation of each party's perceptions. The d i s t i n c t i o n used below i s made at the party l e v e l p r i o r to negotiations, and thus represents a party's independent perception. I m p l i c i t l y , there are therefore at l e a s t two perceptions of a problemfs status. AVAILABLE PROCESSES The second assumption concerns the a v a i l a b i l i t y of dif f e r e n t processes. There are four options open to a party when a problem a r i s e s . F i r s t , i t may r e l y on the other party to develop a solution and accept t h i s solution a r b i t r a r i l y . Second, i t may present i t s own solution as the only a l t e r n a t i v e choosing to terminate the rel a t i o n s h i p should the solution not be accepted by the other party. Third, i t may negotiate a solution, attempting to derive as much partisan s a t i s f a c t i o n as possible regardless of the l o s s to the other party as long as the relat i o n s h i p i s prolonged. Fourthly, i t may j o i n the other party i n attempting to resolve the problem with the major regard being for the solution rather than the comparative l e v e l of benefits. In an i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s perspective which assumes a continuing r e l a t i o n s h i p , the f i r s t two processes need not be considered. : The f i r s t option i s rejected because i t lacks _> c r e d i b i l i t y in an interest-laden i n d u s t r i a l society. The second i s dismissed because i t lacks the reasonability and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 1 1 assumed i m p l i c i t i n the two parties (a "mature" re l a t i o n s h i p i s assumed; Stevens, 1 9 6 3 , p. 4 ) . We are therefore l e f t with the t h i r d and fourth options, referred to i n the phrasology as " d i s t r i b u t i v e " and "i n t e g r a t i v e " respectively (Walton and McKersie, 1 9 6 5 ; D r i s c o l l , 1 9 7 6 ) . The nature of these processes provides the basis for the entire analysis. The central idea to be developed i n t h i s thesis i s that these frameworks represent situations conducive to two sets of t a c t i c s which are v i r t u a l l y the ant i t h e s i s of one another. A Conceptual Summary Given that there are two possible perceptions of a problem's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , there are three:different combinations possible between parties ( i n t e g r a t i v e / i n t e g r a t i v e , d i s t r i b u t i v e / d i s t r i b u t i v e , and d i s t r i b u t i v e / i n t e g r a t i v e ) . There are also two options f o r the process a c t u a l l y employedvto solve the problem, i n d i c a t i n g that there are four possible process decisions. A problem with variable sum pot e n t i a l (hereafter refered to as integrative) can be processed i n an integrative or d i s t r i b u t i v e manner, and s i m i l a r l y f o r a problem with zero sum pot e n t i a l (hereafter r e f e r r e d to as d i s t r i b u t i v e ) . A graphical demon-st r a t i o n of the conceptual framework i s given i n Figure 3 . Insert Figure 3 here This flow chart shows the possible situations faced by one party. The small l e t t e r s marking the flows represent F I G U R E 3 A C O N C E P T U A L FRAMEWORK: FOUR P O S S I B L E D E C I S I O N S 13 the possible decisions. Herein l i e s the basis of the analysis from which the more s p e c i f i c hypotheses are generated. Referring back to the opening pages, these decisions are of primary concern. As suggested, i t i s the nature of the d i f f e r e n t processes which i s c r i t i c a l to the process decision. The following chapter w i l l describe each process i n d e t a i l so that i t w i l l be possible to e x p l i c i t l y examine the effects and consequences of t h e i r c o n f l i c t i n g t a c t i c s . 14 CHAPTER III PROCESS OPTIONS The previous chapter suggested that there are two legitimate process options f o r two p a r t i e s to employ to solve a mutual problem. These two processes were l a b e l l e d " d i s t r i b u t i v e " and "integrative". This chapter w i l l present models f o r both of these processes. The Integrative Option The integrative process i s ultimately a problem solving exercise which concentrates on the best t o t a l solution to a problem instead of immediate i n d i v i d u a l party i n t e r e s t s . 1 The emphasis i s on employing a l l resources to defeat the problem rather than spending a substantial portion on defending a po s i t i o n . Many authors have dealt with the integrative process or versions of i t . The l i t e r a t u r e contains s p e c i f i c models f o r carrying out the process together with attempts to c l a r i f y p a r t i c u l a r aspects of the procedure. I m p l i c i t l y and e x p l i c i t l y t h i s l i t e r a t u r e suggests that there are three topic areas to be considered under the integrative heading: 1. The procedural steps of the process (a model). 2. The conditions or rules necessary f o r a successful process. 3. The t a c t i c s appropriate to f a c i l i t a t e these conditions and most e f f i c i e n t l y solve the problem. Party in t e r e s t s are assumed to be taken care of by increasing u t i l i t y functions f o r both p a r t i e s . 1 5 A MODEL The integrative process i s a problem solving exercise primarily concerned with sequencing the solution process through a number of steps (Filley, 1 9 7 5 , P» 26). The step process i s necessary for a number of reasons. Most obviously the participants should avoid settling on a solution u n t i l a l l aspects of the problem have been identified. In this manner there i s less chance that a potentially destructive aspect w i l l be overlooked. Similarly, the injection of certain information i s required before some tasks may be accomplished. There i s also a possibility that an integration of a l l the required tasks w i l l create tactical dilemmas. For example, there i s a need to separate the definition of the problem from the search for alternate solutions because i t i s thought to be more efficient to keep solution proposals out of the definition of the problem because they . elicit feelings of ownership (Filley, 1975). It w i l l be demonstrated below that this separation of steps i s necessary i f destructive inter-personal conflict i s to be minimized. The process i s dissected below according to taPks because of these considerations. Many authors are in agreement that there are in fact three separate tasks to be accomplished (Filley, 1 9 7 5 ; Walton and McKersie, 1 9 6 5 ; Hall, 1 9 7 2 ; Miner, 1 9 7 3 ; Taylor and McKrimmon, 1 9 7 6 ) . The process i s demonstrated by the flow chart given i n Figure 4. Insert Figure 4 here FIGURE 4 JOINT. PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS * -STEP RQflefine ONE" Problem recognition and d e f i n i t i o n Redefine Additional, search • STEP TWO V Search f o r alt e r n a t i v e s Additional search Search f o r consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e s V Change . c r i t e r i a > s STEP -frffiEE Evaluate a l t e r n a t i v e s against c r i t e r i a unsatisfactory unsatisfactory • v., Mutually s a t i s f a c t o r y solution V Accepted solution Change c r i t e r i i * Source: Walton and McKersie, 1965, p. 138. 17. Step I The opening task i s to s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f y the problem. This means establishing a mutually acceptable statement of the goals and obstacles to both p a r t i e s ' need requirements. The basic strategy i s to bring into the open any fa c t s , goals, and objectives thought to be relevant by any party present. There w i l l be no guarantee that the other party—even given honourable i n t e n t i o n s — w i l l be working towards an agreeable solut i o n unless both p a r t i e s c l e a r l y indicate t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r objectives. Both parties must therefore present t h e i r own interpretations of what they see the problem to be. This step may prove unduly d i f f i c u l t because each party w i l l enter with a separate and undoubtably unique set of goals and needs. Neophytes and veterans a l i k e w i l l i n i t i a l l y tend to define the problem as i t r e l a t e s to these i n d i v i d u a l needs. The i l l u m i n a t i o n of each party's views may make the problem much more complicated than i t would otherwise appear because the immediately v i s i b l e problem may carry severe i m p l i -cations f o r apparently unrelated areas. Consider, f o r example, the case of an i n e f f i c i e n t employee facing dismissal. On the surface there i s a simple case of proving incompetance, but hidden i n the shadows i s a fear by the union o f f i c e r s of constituency d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and/or a need on managementIs part to r e t a i n a psychological bargaining advantage gained i n previous contract negotiation sessions. Step II The second task i n the problem solving exercise i s the search f o r alternate solutions. As i s demonstrated i n 18. Figure 4 t h i s step i s broken into two parts: the creative search f o r alternate solutions and the examination of the consequences of each of these a l t e r n a t i v e s . The l a t t e r part should;not be confused with the evaluation of the alternate solutions against the s p e c i f i e d problem, but rather the systematic evaluation of each alt e r n a t i v e according to what consequences w i l l most l i k e l y follow i t s implementation, regardless of what may be thought to be appropriate consequences f o r solving the problem i t s e l f . The determination of c r i t e r i a f o r evaluating a *?,best" solution should not come u n t i l the t h i r d and f i n a l step. Any attempts to evaluate proposals prematurally w i l l e n t a i l i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a and a proposed solution, both of which w i l l be shown to be detrimental to the o v e r a l l process. The task i s therefore to generate as many solutions as possible without evaluation. While the f i r s t h a l f of t h i s step requires only the i n j e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l thoughts, the second h a l f requires the introduction of fa c t u a l data. It may be necessary to r e c r u i t external expertise. Step I I I In the f i n a l step a solution must be picked which w i l l maximize the t o t a l u t i l i t y . F i l l e y (1975, pp. 116-120) refers to t h i s step as "evaluation and concensus decision". Picking an appropriate solution e n t a i l s a r r i v i n g at a set of c r i t e r i a f o r evaluation which are acceptable to a l l p a r t i e s ; narrowing the range of solutions generated i n Step I I ; and 19 j o i n t l y deciding on the best al t e r n a t i v e through discussion. CONDITIONS The effectiveness of the above three-tiered exercise w i l l depend on the fulfi l m e n t of a number of conditions. Most of these are graphically demonstrated i n the simple payoff matrix shown i n Figure 5 . The horizontal and v e r t i c a l scales are Insert Figure 5 here measured i n degrees of "cooperation", t h i s being the ant i t h e s i s of defensiveness and h o s t i l i t y . "Cooperation" i s a subjective measure and may also be termed degrees of " t r u s t " of simply "input", meaning l e v e l s of p o s i t i v e commitment. The maximum t o t a l pay-off offered i n the matrix i s only available through maximum cooperation. It i s also i l l u s t r a t e d that each party i s dependent on the other f o r maximum i n d i v i d u a l pay-off. Non-cooperation by one party may achieve a more favourable reward r a t i o but not a maximum i n d i v i d u a l reward. Only i n the f i n a l move i s i t possible for one or the other party to obtain a maximum i n d i v i d u a l reward and a more favourable reward r a t i o (party A may choose 3 a f t e r party B has given 4 , but B must choose 4 regardless since to do otherwise would mean w i l l i n g l y accepting a lower reward). But both parties must match each other's cooperative input over the Jong run because the re l a t i o n s h i p i s assumed to be continuous and other problems w i l l a r i s e when dependencies are reversed. Any FIGURE 5 P g y o f f M a t r i x f o r I n t e g r a t i v e P r o c e ocess P a r t y B C o o p e r a t i o n P a r t y A 1 1 2 3 3 / l 4 5 2 3 3 6 6 7 4 3 6 c J 7 7 ' 8 10 A T 7 6 10 8 10 10 Cooperation 2 1 . d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f l e s s t h a n c o m p l e t e ^ c o o p e r a t i o n w i l l r e d u c e t h e e s s e n t i a l l e v e l o f t r u s t a n d t h e r e b y i n h i b i t f u t u r e e f f o r t s . A s i n t h e m a t r i x , t h e k e y r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s a r e t r u s t a n d o p e n n e s s . C l e a r l y maximum a c c u r a t e c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i l l n o t t r a n s p i r e i f o n e p a r t y f e a r s t h a t t h e o t h e r w i l l i n v o k e n e g a t i v e s a n c t i o n s o r m i s u s e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . E a c h p a r t y m u s t b e c o m p l e t e l y a s s u r e d t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n w i l l b e u s e d s o l e l y i n a p o s i t i v e m a n n e r f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m s o l v i n g e x e r c i s e . S i m i l a r l y , o n e p a r t y may t e n d t o d i s t o r t a n y i n f o r m a t i o n i t d o e s g i v e o r r e c e i v e i f i t f e a r s a p a r t i s a n r e c e p t i o n a n d / o r r e s p o n s e . P r o b l e m s o l v i n g i n t e n t m u s t b e c l e a r . M a n a g e m e n t , f o r e x a m p l e , w o u l d b e s o m e w h a t l e a r y o f p r e s e n t i n g o t h e r w i s e c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n i f t h e y t h o u g h t i t w o u l d b e i m p r o p e r l y u s e d . The a r g u m e n t w o r k s b o t h w a y s s i n c e l a b o u r may n o t b e l i e v e t h e d a t a p r o v i d e d g i v e n p a s t m a n a g e m e n t p e r f o r m a n c e . T A C T I C S I n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h t h e a b o v e c o n d i t i o n s o f t r u s t a n d c o o p e r a t i v e o p e n n e s s a n u m b e r o f t a c t i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s a r e e v i d e n t . T h e y r e l a t e t o r e d u c i n g t h e o t h e r p a r t y ' s f e a r o f e x p l o i t a t i o n a n d b u i l d i n g a s t r o n g a n d c o o p e r a t i v e a t m o s p h e r e d e v o i d o f w h a t c a n b e t e r m e d " i n t a n g i b l e i s s u e s " ( R u b i n a n d B r o w n , 1 9 7 5 ) . I n o r d e r t o s a t i s f y t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o c r e a t e a n o n - c o m p e t e t i v e s t r u c t u r e , s t r e s s i n g a n d g u a r a n t e e i n g m u t u a l a c c e p t a n c e o f a l l g r o u p d e c i s i o n s . O p t i m u m s t r a t e g i e s t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s g e n e r a l g o a l a r e d i s c u s s e d b e l o w a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t e p p r o g r e s s i o n o u t l i n e d a b o v e i n t h e 22. integrative model. The discussion w i l l take the form of d e l i n -eated s p e c i f i c behaviors most conducive to accomplishing the step^by-step tasks. Step I In the opening stages energy should be directed towards s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f y i n g the problem. During t h i s a c t i v i t y ( i ) each party should avoid taking a side or establishing a commitment (Walton and McKersie, 1965, p. 15l) ;. Prom the st a r t t h i s w i l l mean ( i i ) c a r e f u l avoidance of s t a t i n g goals as p r i o r i t i e s instead of simply as goals ( P i l l e y , 1975, p. 110). In t h i s manner each party w i l l r e t a i n equal importance without the need to do b a t t l e for i t . For s i m i l a r reasons, ( i i i ) the problem should be stated as a goal or obstacle rather than as a projected solution ( J l l l e y , 1 9 7 5 , p. 109). Otherwise i n d i v i d u a l commitment, voiced or not, may cause agreement with the proposal (or fact) to become the issue, rather than the problem i t s e l f (Rubin and Brown, 1975, pp. 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 ) . For the same reasons, (iv) i n d i v i d u a l perceptions should be stated i n s p e c i f i c s and not p r i n c i p l e s since p r i n c i p l e s are too f a r removed from o b j e c t i v i t y . S p e c i f i c s are r e a l actions that can be objec t i v e l y proved or disproved on a f a c t u a l basis. P r i n c i p l e s are matters of judgement and as such cannot necessarily be reduced to a mutually agreeable factual basis. For example, the hypothetical statement "we*believe that a hot lunch i s every working man's right? by a union o f f i c e r cannot be debated on a fa c t u a l basis because i t i s based on the union's subjective b e l i e f s . On the other hand, the statement "our men 23 are concerned that working at l o c a t i o n X i s depriving them of the hot ^.unch that others are getting elsewhere" can he discussed according to the men's wishes, the past a c c e s s i b i l i t y of hot lunches, or the present a c c e s s i b i l i t y of hot lunches at other locations. In addition, a party s t r i v i n g to prove or defend a p r i n c i p l e w i l l be much harder to pacify because the point has become an i n a l t e r a b l e "truth" rather than a problem and disagreement becomes unavoidable and superfluous to the solution of the main problem. In the hot lunch example, the universal r i g h t s of working men may become the center of discussion, thereby digressing from the main problem of employee unrest. With regard to general behavior (v) a l l parties must be careful not to appear accusatory or judgemental, j u s t &s (vi) i d e n t i f y i n g with a proposal or statement should be avoided (Miner, 1973, p i 194), ( v i i ) so should fo r c i n g a party into a defensive or committed stance be avoided. Strategies to optimize a cooperative structure could involve a non-aligned seating plan, or perhlps the use of an impersonal format such as a black-board etc. Tactics (v) through ( v i i ) above a l l of those presented thus f a r , are necessary during the entire pro-ceeding rather than being confined to t h i s s p e c i f i c step. Step I I Depersonalizing the s i t u a t i o n i s even more important i n ^ the second step ( P i l l e y , 1975.» P« H I ) . As with the i d e n t i f i -cation of the problem, search f o r solutions cannot be done cor r e c t l y unless both parties f e e l completely free to present 24. information, including the highly c o n f i d e n t i a l v a r i e t y . Probable examples could be the presentation of the company's cost and p r o f i t structure, or perhaps data on declining union membership and/or f i n a n c i a l i n s t a b i l i t y . This step i s exploratory and tentative. Not only must each party convince the other that no sanctions w i l l be l e v i e d , i t must also promise not to hold another party to an advanced idea. In addition, ( i ) e f f o r t must be directed towards the problem and not the other party ( P i l l e y , 1 9 7 5 , p. 9 0 ) . ( i i ) I d e n t i f i c a t i o n with p a r t i c u l a r solutions should be avoided. As i n the f i r s t step, ( i i i ) judgemental or accus-atory statements w i l l be detrimental to the process, ( i v) Even s l i g h t signs of approval of one proposal over another at t h i s stage may cause a ranking of proposals. This strategy i s not simply delaying disagreement u n t i l a future step because objective examination over time can d i s p e l l former doubts ( F i l l e y , 1 9 7 5 , p. 114). "Brainstorming" i s a very appropriate technique f o r t h i s step (Bouchard, 1969). This method embodies a l l of the c r i t e r i a set out thus f a r . The stress i s i n i t i a l l y on maximum i n f o r -mation flow; judgement and evaluation coming l a t e r . Step III The f i n a l step i s perhaps the most del i c a t e since the task requirement i s that a decision be made. Both parties are put i n highly vulnerable positions because the need f o r ove r a l l s a t i s f a c t i o n requires that u t i l i t y functions be com-2 5 . p l e t e l y exposed. To avoid defensive reactions which w i l l hinder acceptance and agreement, a number of possible t a c t i c s already suggested are applicable. In addition, the parties should avoid the use of agreement mechanisms which may prevent or cut short discussion of a l t e r n a t i v e s . Otherwise some individuals may depart discontented and uncommitted to the chosen solution. Again, anything that w i l l create a defensive reaction should be avoided. This w i l l mean concentrating on the good aspects of solutions rather than the negative. Agreement w i l l f a c i l i t a t e future cooperation on more d i f f i c u l t areas. S i m i l a r l y , the parties should f s t e e r c l e a r of discussions about feelings and preferences whenever possible. It i s v i r t u a l l y impossible to convince a party that he i s harbouring an incorrect f e e l i n g through r a t i o n a l objective discussion without e l i c i t i n g a defensive posture. SUMMARY: THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESS The integrative model given above represents a s p e c i f i c procedure designed to optimize the p r o b a b i l i t y of both p a r t i e s obtaining a good and perhaps "best" solution to a p a r t i c u l a r problem. Adherence to the t a c t i c a l imperatives suggested should depersonalize the bargaining atmosphere s u f f i c i e n t l y to erase the p a r t i c i p a n t s / i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with one or the other party, and es t a b l i s h an o v e r a l l , single team s p i r i t . As suggested, the key requirements are trust and openness. The D i s t r i b u t i v e Process As noted i n the introduction, the l i t e r a t u r e on labour-management r e l a t i o n s i s replete with items on c o n f l i c t barg-26. aining. Many authoEs have developed specific models to demonstrate structure and strategy; Walton and McKersie (1965) Pen (1952), Mabry (1965), Stevens (1963), Hicks (1948) and Chamberlain (1965) to mention but a few. Others have concentrated on empirical strategies outside of any specific model. Among the latter are Peters (1955), Douglas (1962), Atherton (1973), Bakke (1966), Schelling (I960), and Selekman, Selekman and Puller (1964). The construct of the distributive model used below i s derived from those created by Walton and McKersie,„ Stevens, and Mabry. Support for particular aspects of the model i s drawn from a l l of the authors l i s t e d . A MODEL The distributive bargaining process i s the antithesis of the integrative option. Essentially, the distributive model assumes that the primary concern for each party i s deriving a maximum share of a "solution" ("solution"in this context i s more appropriately labelled "settlement")) This results from an implicit assumption that u t i l i t y functions are of opposite rather than like slopes (win/lose). Since a further assumption i s that the high nature of the stakes involved w i l l positively effect each party's interest level (ie. indifference i s incon-sistent with the desire to further the relationship) i t i s presumed that each party w i l l go to considerable trouble to positively effect the balance in i t s favour. Not so far, however, as to overpower the common interest of the parties to reach an agreement that w i l l extend their relationship (Stevens, 1963, p. 4). 2 7 The f i r s t important*conception i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e model i s that each party has a perception of h i s own as well as h i s opponent's u t i l i t y function f o r p a r t i c u l a r issues (Walton and McKersie, 1965, pp. 19-45). The d i r e c t i o n , slope and p o s i t i o n of these preferences i s a function of the net value or u t i l i t y accruing to the p a r t i c u l a r party at that l e v e l of benefit d i v i -sion. "Net" of course, implies that there i s a gross l e v e l which would exist i f there were no accompanying costs. But one party i s not l i k e l y to r e l i n q u i s h a favourable p o s i t i o n w i l l i n g l y . Some resistance w i l l be exhibited i n the form of negative sanctions such as a work stoppage or a demand fo r a s i m i l a r l y valued concession. The u t i l i t i e s of both pa r t i e s therefore represent a c e r t a i n l e v e l of value net of attainment costs. It i s immediately obvious that both p a r t i e s ' perceptions are mutually dependent. Each party's expected u t i l i t y (N.E.U.) i s a l e v e l of u t i l i t y (T3L) m u l t i p l i e d by the p r o b a b i l i t y (P^) that t h i s u t i l i t y w i l l be attained cost free, minus the estimated costs (C^) m u l t i p l i e d by the p r o b a b i l i t y that some resistance w i l l be encountered (1 - P^) ( i . e . non-acceptance). In seeking a p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n , therefore, a party Equation 1; Expected U t i l i t y Calculation ^ i = benefit d i v i s i o n l e v e l j = party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n Walton and McKersie (1965, p. 137) use a s i m i l a r equation, but they use d i f f e r e n t notation and put the equation to a 28. must have a f a i r l y d i s t i n c t estimate of the degree of resistance that w i l l be encountered such that ?(U. .) may be calculated, t h i s being a function of the value given to the concession by the opponent and the l a t t e r * s a b i l i t y to i n s i s t on i t s most preferred benefit d i s t r i b u t i o n . This c a l c u l a t i o n i s d i s t i n c t from the cost function (C\ ) which measures the expected cost of that l e v e l of resistance to the f i r s t party. A graphical demonstration of these relationships i s given i n Figure 6. Insert Figure 6 here The horizontal axis represents d i f f e r e n t d i v i s i o n s of a f i n i t e benefit. Movement to the l e f t represents a greater proportionate share to party B and movement to the r i g h t a greater proportionate share to party A. The v e r t i c a l axes represent varying l e v e l s of p o s i t i v e and negative marginal u t i l i t y . P_ i s the gross l e v e l of u t i l i t y experienced by party A at p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l s of benefit [P(U.) U.], and P- i s the expected cost ( u t i l i t y loss) of achieving those benefit shares (G [1 - P(U i)] ). P^ and P^ are party A*s subjective estimates of party B's gross u t i l i t y and the cost l e v e l which B expects i t w i l l experience to withhold each share l e v e l . The varying ( continued from previous page) s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t use. For example, they do not divide u t i l i t i e s by benefit l e v e l s (a contribution made by Mabry, 1965) p r e f e r r i n g to use the value of "an alternate demand". Sim i l a r l y , costs (C.) are r e s t r i c t e d to s t r i k e costs. 1 FIGURE 6 ONE PARTY"S PERCEPTIONS OF BOTH PARTIES' C-GROSS AND NET UTILITY FUNCTIONS (A) Marginal U t i l i t y Benefit Shares a= p o s i t i v e gross u t i l i t y function for A P-= negative gross u t i l i t y function f o r A Pfe= p o s i t i v e gross u t i l i t y function for B P^= negative gross u t i l i t y function f o r B Marginal U t i l i t y Party B N.E.U.&= net expected u t i l i t y f o r A N.E.U.b= net expected u t i l i t y f o r B This model i s derived from those created by Mabry (1965), Walton and McKersie (1965) and ^raiJ9SLB^aSai^S8f0^,l ° b t a i n e d f r ° m °0nCept °f *™ VD 30. slope of the gross u t i l i t y functions i s explained by the concept of diminishing marginal u t i l i t y because each increment of benefit i s worth s l i g h t l y l e s s than the l a s t as benefit shares get greater. S i m i l a r l y , the cost functions demonstrate increasing marginal d i s u t i l i t y as each party w i l l tend to o f f e r more resistance as lower and lower benefit shares are contemf-plated. P &, P^, P-, and P^ are i n t e r - r e l a t e d since they are func-tions of some of the same variables. For example, i f P i s somehow exogenously increased f o r p a r t i c u l a r benefit share l e v e l s , the d i s u t i l i t y of P- w i l l decrease. Competetive market forces f o r example, could diminish the poten t i a l amoun-fc of cash available for increased wages, thereby increasing management's d i s u t i l i t y related to l o s t p r o f i t s or income, and increasing management's u t i l i t y f o r l e s s wages. This could r e s u l t i n a greater willingness f o r party A (management) to push f o r par-t i c u l a r share l e v e l s . P^ w i l l s h i f t downwards, e f f e c t i n g P(U^-g), bringing P^ down too. Once these gross functions are available, the net expected u t i l i t y functions can be plotted. As benefit share l e v e l s r i s e , the opponent's resistance increases, and as the l a t t e r causes a greater negative marginal u t i l i t y i n proportion to the p o s i t i v e marginal u t i l i t y , net marginal u t i l i t y declines eventually achieving negative status. In Figure 6^ these points are shown as A and B . Each party w i l l be expected to pursue an objective as long as t h i s l e v e l of pursuit o f f e r s a net gain. Pursuit w i l l cease when net gain becomes negative (crosses the " 0 " l i n e ) . The immediate implication i s that both 31. parties must experience zero marginal net gain at the same benefit d i s t r i b u t i o n point f o r consensus to be reached. Any movement i n either d i r e c t i o n from t h i s point would cause a negative u t i l i t y gain f o r both p a r t i e s . In other words, both part i e s perceive that further resistance to the other's p o s i t i o n (or insistance on t h e i r own position) would cost too much (e.g. r e a l or exaggerated fear of a str i k e ) i n r e l a t i o n to the value ( u t i l i t y ) placed on an added increment of gain. TACTICS Based on the model given above i t i s possible to examine the process through which agreement i s reached. Since there are two parties and each party has as independent conception of the respective net gain functions, the framework of bargaining revolves about four functions. A possible opening p o s i t i o n i s shown i n Figure 7. To avoid needless complexity, only the Insert Figure 7 here net expected u t i l i t y functions are shown. The dotted l i n e s represent partyBB's net expected u t i l i t y function (U^) and party B's perception of party A's expected u t i l i t y function ( U 2 ) . Party B ac t u a l l y wants benefit share l e v e l BB and i t perceives that party A wants benefit share l e v e l BA . Party A d e s i r e s benefit share l e v e l AAg but perceives that B wants benefit share l e v e l AB . Both parties have i n f l a t e d views of the other party's settlement l e v e l . It w i l l be i n the inte r e s t s of both pa r t i e s to effect agreement at some point near t h e i r own ends because the 3 2 . FIGURE 7 ACTUAL AND PERCEIVED NET EXPECTED UTILITY FUNCTIONS FOR BOTH PARTIES ! 1 U^= Net expected u t i l i t y of B j U 2= B's perception of A's net expected u t i l i t y U^= Net expected u t i l i t y of A U^= A's perception of B's net expected u t i l i t y i j = Benefit share goal of party j as perceived g by party i 33 necessary requirement f o r equilibrium to be reached i s that the net gain functions are equated on the horizontal a x i s . Party B w i l l d i r e c t t a c t i c a l energies at Ug, attempting to s h i f t t h i s function to the l e f t . In a c t u a l i t y party B w i l l be eff e c t i n g the r e a l net u t i l i t y function of party A; U y The interdependence of the P a, P^, P-, and P^ functions allows f o r a set of t a c t i c s which can be e f f e c t i v e l y used to manipulate the net gain equilibrium to p a r t i c u l a r advantage. A T a c t i c a l Typology In choosing a t a c t i c a l typology there i s a choice between l i s t i n g by intent or by e f f e c t . Walton and McKersie (1965), Selekman e t . a l . (1964), Douglas (1962 ) r and Mabry (1965) have taken the f i r s t route and produced a number of useful d i s t i n c -t ions. There i s another school, however, which ranks t a c t i c s by psychological e f f e c t . The game th e o r i s t s , f o r example, although interested i n the intent of actions, seem much more interested i n the response and the psychological determinants of that response. Such an analysis i s necessarily involved i n studying the whole psychological m i l i e u i n and above the t a c t i c a l maneuvers (for example: the growth and e f f e c t of fear, see Kee, 1969; the e f f e c t of dogmatism, see Druckman, 1967). Stevens (1963) has e f f e c t i v e l y managed both. He l i s t s t a c -t i c s by intent, but he ranks them according to e f f e c t . He employs an approabh-avoidance gradient analysis to demonstrate both what a t a c t i c can do i n terms of s p e c i f i c behavior (e.g* r a i s e a party's desire to avoid a s p e c i f i c action thereby bringing him closer to his opponent's goals) and what i t does 34 to the psychological dynamics of the s i t u a t i o n (e.g. r a i s e or lower the l e v e l of tension). Stevens ranks t a c t i c s which increase tension as Class I and t a c t i c s which reduce tension as Class I I . The former represent attempts of coersion and the l a t t e r , persuasion. This d i s t i n c t i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important because i t i s f a i r l y well documented that increased tension i s associated with a v a r i e t y of aberrant behaviors such as reduced learning capacity and i n a b i l i t y to pay, attention (Miner, 1973; Hinton, 1968; Shutz, 1958). Stevens suggests that h i s t a c t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n permits a normative grading of bargaining t a c t i c s . He indicates that tension i s an increasing function of the tendency to avoid. Because an increase i n "tendency to avoid" w i l l lead to the motivation to escape, the inevi t a b l e consequence i s a breakdown i n negotiations when one or the other parties leave the negotiations " . . . i n a p r e c i p i t a t e and non-deliberative fashion [p. 24]." Such action may lead to a s t r i k e or. a lockout. The following typology w i l l review t a c t i c s by intent as they f i t into the d i s t r i b u t i v e model. But by borrowing from the Class I/Class II concept, expected effect w i l l also be considered. L i s t i n g t a c t i c s by intent i s e s s e n t i a l l y l i s t i n g funcions. Tactics per se therefore become s p e c i f i c actions with a precise intent. The following analysis w i l l be based on t h i s concept. The d i s t r i b u t i v e model allocates three functions to each party. These are ( i ) information gathering, so that net gain functions may be calculated; ( i i ) information giving, so that 35 the opponent i s given an impression much i n the f i r s t party's favour; and ( i i i ) actual manipulation of the u t i l i t y and cost functions to e l i c i t a concensus near a party's own end.^ Function ( i ) : Information Gathering. It i s implict i n the model presented above that each party must continually t r y to ascertain the net gain of the other party. It i s c r i t i c a l that these estimates are accurate since i t i s on them that a party's own bargaining p o s i t i o n together with i t s strategies depend. Documented t a c t i c s used i n t h i s regard include i pressure t a c t i c s designed to scare the other party into revealing data by mistake. Douglas ( 1 9 6 2 , p. 2 6 ) has recorded a bargainer's use of "...a dir e c t personal attack" on an inexperienced member of the opponent's team to e l i c i t clues as to the r e a l , ' 3 posi t i o n of the l a t t e r . ...[company negotiator]...calculated e f f o r t s to make a personal target of certa i n persons on the union committee...if h i s — blows f a i l e d to e l i c i t personal ann&yance, he interpreted t h i s to say that the point was not s i g n i f i c a n t to the opponent;...when he drew blood with one of h i s attacks he took i t as a sign that he had h i t sens i t i v e ground 0P« 2 4 ] . ?In order to d i f f e r e n t i a t e r e a l emotions from the feigned H This approach i s seemingly s i m i l a r to one taken by Douglas ( 1 9 6 2 ) . This author also breaks the process into three areas, but her di s t i n c t i o n s r e f e r to phases i n a progression toward an eventual solution rather than a t a c t i c a l typology. Her phases are: ( i ) establishing a negotiating range, ( i i ) reconnoitering the range, ( i i i ) p r e c i p i t a t i n g the decision-reaching c r i s i s . The functional d i s t i n c t i o n s employed i n the present paper do not follow t h i s conceptual model because t a c t i c a l considerations are not s p e c i f i c to p a r t i c u l a r phases. I t i s cl e a r , however, that certain t a c t i c s are more predominant i n p a r t i c u l a r phases. 36 variety, the perceptive negotiator w i l l watch f o r immediate physical responses (Douglas, 1962): ...I [a management negotiator] notice flushing of the face and mainly I watch the neck muscles i n the other fellow [p. 25], S i m i l a r l y , Selekman et a l . (1964) have recorded the use of exaggerated impatience designed to create the i l l u s i o n of impending doom, thereby fo r c i n g the opponent's hand. (This t a c t i c could a l t e r the opponent's impression of the status quo, therefore i t can have another purpose besides information generation. It i s included under t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n because i t accomplishes the l a t t e r ta&k either as a primary or secondary goal). Both of these t a c t i c a l maneuvers are d e f i n i t e l y of the Class I type. They are s p e c i f i c a l l y designed to increase pressure (tension) thereby reducing the opponent's cognitive a b i l i t y and hopefully making him commit an e r r o r — i n t h i s case, revealing information regarding the l o c a t i o n of his u t i l i t y functions. Function ( i i ) : Information Giving. Information g i v i n g i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e bargaining context embodies two sub-functions. Both as defense and offense a party must decide whether i t w i l l be most useful to represent, mis-represent, or simply conceal partisan u t i l i t y and estimated cost functions* Any strategy chosen w i l l attempt to present a net gain function as close to the other party's own end of the benefit share continuum as possible. This function reaches a v i s i b l e pinacle during the i n i t i a l stages of the process (Douglas, 1962, pp. 1 3 - 3 2 ) . 3 7 As an offensive strategy, the i n i t i a l communication of points A and B (Figure 6 ) apparently transpires i n a set of g g pretentious monologues. The context of these statements i s governed by a phenomenon that Stevens ( 1 9 6 3 , pp. 3 2 - 3 4 ) r e f e r s to as the "demand r u l e " . The precepts of t h i s r u l e require that both parties prepare and/or present highly i n f l a t e d demands. The purpose i s to e s t a b l i s h a negotiating region ("room fo r bargaining*?, Stevens, 1 9 6 3 , p. 3 3 ) . presenting demands that are too close to one's " r e a l " acceptable l e v e l (AA g f o r A) w i l l c u r t a i l bargaining a b i l i t y by l i m i t i n g one's f l e x i b i l i t y . Opening demands can also be too high i f a responding party i s forced to a l e v e l of tension ( l e v e l of avoidance) where breakdown occurs prematurely (Stevens, 1 9 6 3 , p. 2 4 ) . Attempts to e s t a b l i s h projections of preferred si t u a t i o n s (BA for A) i s not r e s t r i c t e d to the opening stages of bargaining. Constant calculations are essential fo r e f f i c i e n t bargaining. The ultimate aim of most t a c t i c s i s to effect the other party's u t i l i t y functions such that concensus i s reached near the i n i t i a t i n g party's own end of the benefit share continuum. The positions shown i n Figures 6 and 7 w i l l be constantly changing. A party may attempt to a l t e r the opponent's impressions of the bargaining " r e a l i t y " by demonstrating an exaggerated value of a benefit share and establishing a commitment to that benefit l e v e l (B's perception of P i s increased, which should increase the p r o b a b i l i t y of r e j e c t i o n of B's aspirations, thereby s h i f t i n g P^ and P^ down. The l a t t e r i s a secondary 38. e f f e c t because the maneuver i s presented i n t h i s section as primarily a communication device). A commitment strategy i s an important aspect of information giv i n g because too l i t t l e commitment may lead one party to disbelieve the other party's assertions. A balance must be drawn because too much commitment may p r e c i p i t a t e too v i o l e n t a response (e.g. a premature s t r i k e ) . The degree of commitment may also effect future bargaining effectiveness i f the committed party i s unable to agree to an otherwise acceptable l e v e l of benefit share offered by the opposite party because of p o t e n t i a l l o s s of face and c r e d i b i l i t y . The degree to which a party bargains e f f e c t i v e l y depends on how much of what i t says i s believed. Party A may have to s t i c k to an otherwise unwise commitment simply to preserve r e l i a b i l i t y (Walton and McKersie, 1965, pp. 82-120; Peters, 1955; Stevens, 1963, p. 35). A loss of apparent power may also occur i f one party chooses to back down from a f a i r l y established commitment. This i s discernable i n the above model i n a more optimistic i n t e r -pretation of the u t i l i t y functions by the other party. Chamberlain (1965) and Levinson (1963) have i d e n t i f i e d the importance of t h i s concept even as a carryover between d i f f e r e n t contract negotiations. A party could also demonstrate to the opponent that the d i s u t i l i t y associated with an expected cost i s not very great. This could be manifest i n a show of market strength, a large s t r i k e fund, or some such meani to show that a s t r i k e would 39. be very damaging. Defensive attempts to minimize clues throughout the process can be recognized i n a generally low rate of a c t i v i t y , the use of a single spokesman, and neutral or controlled reactions. More complex t a c t i c s involve the curtailment of information and/or power from a l l but essential team members (Walton and McKersie, 1965, pp. 67-72). Most of the s p e c i f i c maneuvers which f a l l into the Function ( i i ) category are s t r i c t l y Class II persuasion. They represent attempts to convince the opponent simply through information transfer. I f accompanied by other actions they may become an in t e g r a l part of a Class I maneuver, but as such they f a l l under the t h i r d functional category. Function ( i i i ) : Manipulation of the Other Party's U t i l i t i e s . The t h i r d set of t a c t i c s represent the main function of the d i s t r i b u t i v e bargaining process. They represent attempts to a l t e r the opponent's preferences toward h i s own po s i t i o n once t h i s position i s subjectively estimated. The complexity of the s i t u a t i o n allows f o r two s u b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . (a) Attempts to a l t e r the opponent's perceptions of h i s  own u t i l i t i e s involve manipulations of P f e and P^ of Figure 6. In t h i s case one party i s attempting to a l t e r the opposite's perceptions of the consequences of a c t u a l l y achieving a p a r t i c u l a r benefit share d i v i s i o n . This could mean providing cues to show that the relat i o n s h i p would soon have to terminate (P^ s h i f t s down, as does P^; Pft may s h i f t up); that costs could 40 be very high i n the future; or i t could mean convincing the opponent that c e r t a i n l e v e l s of benefit d i v i s i o n are not as damaging to the l a t t e r as i t might i n i t i a l l y think (P f e s h i f t s down because increased units create l e s s marginal u t i l i t y ) . P^ and P^ may also be influenced through P & and P- even though the former remain the target. I f P_ s h i f t s up (e.g. l o s s on another issue) u t i l i t y to party A increases, thereby e f f e c t i n g P (U i B) of Equation 1 negatively and s h i f t i n g Pfe down. Sim i l a r l y , i f P- s h i f t s up, party B may f e e l a po t e n t i a l for more ferocious attacks (long s t r i k e s etc.) and P^ w i l l s h i f t down. A l l of these t a c t i c s are e s s e n t i a l l y of the Class II var i e t y . They represent information transfer and not threats. (b) Party A may also manipulate party B*s preferences  through coercion. This i s done through threats and b l u f f s concerning P^. Party A w i l l attempt to convince party B of the costs of i n s i s t i n g on a p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n by threatening a c e r t a i n response i f i t does (P^ s h i f t s down, as does P^ because P(U i B) i s reduced). This effect could be achieved through dire c t threat to P^ (e.g. a s t r i k e ) , or perhaps a threat together with a convincing demonstration of high P and P- functions, both of which show the desire and capacity to i n s i s t . The key to success with a coercion strategy i s dependent upon the degree to which party A i s believed. The correct degree of commitment i s c r i t i c a l (see discussion above, pi*38). SUMMARYt THE DISTRIBUTIVE PROCESS The d i s t r i b u t i v e process i s the a n t i t h e s i s of the 41. integrative method of problem resolution. Party l i n e s are f a i r l y c l e a r l y drawn and there i s a r e a l i z a t i o n that both parties are concerned with obtaining the largest benefit share. The emphasis i s on calculated maneuvers designed to a l t e r the opposite 1s viewpoint on what i s an acceptable share d i s t r i b u t i o n . Unlike the integrative process which seeks to determine the one best solution to a problem, the d i s t r i b u t i v e process represents a method by which each party attempts to obtain the solution that i t believes would be best for partisan i n t e r e s t s , f u l l y r e a l i z i n g that i t i s a win/lose s i t u a t i o n . Solutions are sought out and graded against partisan u t i l i t y functions on an independent basis. The emphasis i s on fo r c i n g a solution rather than discovering one. The d i s t r i b u t i v e and integrative process frameworks reveal the a n t i t h e t i c a l and incongruent nature of the d i f f e r e n t t a c t i c s appropriate f o r each process. It i s now possible to e x p l i c i t l y examine the effects and consequences of the d i f f e r e n t processes regarding the process delineated i n Figure 3s(p. 1 2 ) . 42 CHAPTER IV CHOICE OP PROCESS: HYPOTHESES The conception that there are two separate process options available by which to solve labour-management problems i s seemingly challenged by empirical diagnosis. For example, there are a number of well documented cases where cooperatively oriented negotiations within a d i s t r i b u t i v e framework have yielded integrative solutions (Blake, Shapard and Bfouton, 1968, pp. 122-245; Business Management, Mar., 1964, p. 43). Note, f o r example, "productivity" bargaining where both parties supposedly reach an integrative solution through a d i s t r i b u t i v e means. S i m i l a r l y , the s t e e l industry's continuous committee has handled a l l issues including wages, thereby representing an attempt to deal with a perceived d i s t r i b u t i v e issue through an integrative process (Orr, 1973). Even more p r o l i f i c are the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining ease studies which reveal apparently integrative problems being handled i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e manner (Douglas, 1962; Selekman et a l . , 1964; Walton and McKersie, 1965, pp. 167-168). A l l of these cases represent examples of a seemingly indiscriminant assignment of problems to processes, and at the extreme, a lack of d i s t i n c t i o n between processes. A general answer i s provided by Driscoll r(1976) i n h i s conceptualization of problem c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Recall that he suggests that solutions are regenerated from "...a behavioral process [involving] bothgparties attempting to i d e n t i f y problems where t h e i r i n t e r e s t s coincide [p. 2]/" Presumably, i f 43. i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s not reached, problems are handled i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e manner or dropped. The generalization i s only p a r t i a l l y correct. It draws attention to the necessary input of both parties, but as a generalization i t hides important aspects of the mental mechanism by which the process i s eventually chosen. Important questions remain unanswered: Are problems c l a s s i f i e d only during negotiations or are they considered p r i o r to any j o i n t meeting? What aspects o f problems cause them to be handled i n an integrative or d i s t r i b u t i v e way? Are there situations which are currently handled through a d i s t r i b u t i v e process which s t i l l have an integrative potential? The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to describe the c r i t e r i a upon which a process decision i s based and provide hypotheses directed at the predicted choice behaviors. These hypotheses together with answers to the above queries w i l l be discussed i n the next chapter. Underlying Contentions The f i r s t step i n predicting the d i r e c t i o n of a decision process i s a determination of the relevant c r i t e r i a upon which these decisions are based. As i n any thought transformation, r a t i o n a l decisions must u l t i m a t l y be based on some perception of the probable outcome. The relevance of t h i s step to a labour-management problem was examined i n some d e t a i l above. The determination of partisan u t i l i t y i s presented as a f a i r l y automatic response to a meaningful stimulus. But i t i s not 44 sufficient merely to choose a process based on one's own conception of a problem's status. The choice of process must be based on a perception of the other party's conceptions.^ The necessity of a party estimating i t s opposite's perceptions of the problem situation has been documented by a number of researchers, particularly those concerned with conflict bargaining. Stevens (1963), Peters (1965), Douglas (1962), and Walton and McKersie (1965) are five notable examples of authors who have stressed this interest. A l l were concerned with strategies of distributive bargaining. Their main thesis supporting the need to estimate perceptions revolves around bargaining advantage. Specifically, a l l indicated that effective bargaining necessitates an estimate of probable res-ponse. They outline circumstances where mistaken perceptions may prove damaging (Walton and McKersie, pp. 63-67; Stevens, Ch. 4 ) . For the most part, their analyses run quite close to that provided above. That i s , each party i s trying to obtain the best possible settlement for i t s e l f . Attempts to achieve this settlement involve manipulation of the other party's u t i l i t y functions. If a party i s to select an appropriate strategy with regard to the positive and negative u t i l i t y functions of the other party, accurate assessment of their position i s necessary. Otherwise a party's own position w i l l Throughout the thesis, "perceptions" refer to calculated estimates of the other party's position. "Conceptions" refer to calculations of a party's own u t i l i t y position. 4 5 . suffer on two counts. (a) F i r s t l y , incorrect assessment w i l l lead to inap-propriate offensive bargaining behavior. An underestimate of AB of Figure ?, (party A's estimate of the l e v e l of benefit share that party B i s s t r i v i n g for) for example, may lead party A to a commitment to a l e v e l which i s r e a l l y quite unacceptable to party B. This mistake could lead to a breakdown i n negotiations and a s t r i k e . S i m i l a r l y , concession or commitment t a c t i c s based on an overestimate of IB w i l l cause party B to reassess h i s own bargaining p o s i t i o n . An example of such a mistake i s provided by Douglas (1962). In t h i s case negotiations fo r an hourly wage increase had apparently reached a stage where party A (management) decided that they "knew" what party B (union) wanted. Consequently party A offered 2 cents more i n the vain hope of s o l i c i t i n g a prompt agreement: So he [management] came i n and...said to me [mediator] i n caucus..."I know what w i l l s e t t l e i t : 100. Now l e t s stop a l l the bickering. Lets get 'em i n here and give 'em a dime." ...So we went i n and he t o l d them..."Now I know there's going to be a l o t t a haggling and I have a good idea where i t s gonna end up, and I have an o f f e r to make. And here i t i s . I wanta end t h i s thing up...100 an hour." And i t was 20 above what the union, you see. Union sat there...and not a word...So Art Smith [union negotiator]...said"...we'd l i k e to consider your offer."...Don't you know we had a s t r i k e [pp. 286,2B1J. (b) Protection of one's own " r e a l " bargaining p o s i t i o n i s as c r i t i c a l as accurately assessing the other party's po s i t i o n . In t h i s context, inaccurate perceptions leading to inappropriate information dispersement w i l l cause the opposite party to act i n c o r r e c t l y . Douglas comments that "...any show of change from one p o s i t i o n to another w i l l be a source of cues 46 to the opposing party about what i t can r i g h t l y expect and push f o r [p. 36]." A party who reveals too much may a c t u a l l y a l t e r the whole bargaining s i t u a t i o n from one conducive to quick agreement to one which w i l l drag on f o r days, perhaps ending i n a s t r i k e . Such was the case given i n the example provided immediately above. Handled t a c t f u l l y , settlement may have been reached at 8 cents or 9 cents. However, t a c t l e s s open presentation of management's u t i l i t y functions(at l e a s t 10 cents) gave the union negotiators a perception of even greater p o t e n t i a l . Siegal and Pourak;er (I960) provide experimental support for the-argument that an incorrect defensive strategy can lead to increased offensive t a c t i c s by the other party. In early experiments of bargaining behavior they observed that an unexpectedly generous bid by one party l e d to an increased " l e v e l of a s p i r a t i o n " i n the opponent rather than a quick and speedly settlement. I n i t i a l Choice of Process The same arguments may be used to support the suggestion that the i n i t i a l choice of process must be a function of a party's own conceptions together with an estimate of the opponent's conceptions. A party w i l l not b l i n d l y enter a bargaining s i t u a t i o n hoping that the other party perceives s i m i l a r conceptual circumstances (a, b, c, d of Figure 3). Such an action on the part of a d i s t r i b u t i v e bargainer would be i r r a t i o n a l . A party facing a decision over two processes i s i n the same predicament. I f the process turns out to be 4 7 . d i s t r i b u t i v e i t w i l l want to be prepared. Consequently, i t w i l l t r y to estimate the opposite*s conception of the same problem before i n i t i a t i n g or p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a p a r t i c u l a r process option. Hypotheses A tabular presentation of a l l possible conceptual/ perceptual situations i s given i n Table 1. Given that there Insert Table 1 here are two possible problem categories and each party must calculate one f o r each other as well as themselves, there are ten d i f f e r e n t combinations possible. Each unique combin-ation i s presented with a small l e t t e r (a, b, c, or d) i d e n t i f y i n g the p a r t i c u l a r case with the decision l i n e s shown i n the conceptual framework diagram (Figure 3). Two process choice hypotheses w i l l be considered, both of which may be i d e n t i f i e d i n Figure 3 and Table 1. The hypotheses to be evaluated are: (I) I f a party A i d e n t i f i e s a problem as integrative but i s not sure of the response of the other party, decision "b" w i l l be pursued over decision "a". (II) Decision "d" i s never made. Theseipropositions are based on the behavior appropriate for p a r t i c u l a r perceptions. Hypothesis I suggests that mutual perceptions of integrative p o t e n t i a l and probable integrative response (Table 1, case 1) are the only circumstances where an integrative process i s predicted to be chosen. Hypothesis II TABLE 1 ALL POSSIBLE CONCEPTUAL/PERCEPTUAL SITUATIONS LEADING TO PROCESS DECISIONS PARTY A Decision path from Percep-t i o n of PARTY B Percep-t i o n of Decision path from # Framewor tc Actual '. Party B Party A Actual I 'ramework (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1) a I I I I a 2) a I I D I b 3) a I I I D c 4) a I I D D c 5) b I D D I b 6) b I D I D c 7) b I D D D c 8) c D I I D c 9 ) c D I D D c 10) c D D D D c I = Integrative Process D = D i s t r i b u t i v e Process a = Integrative Choice b = D i s t r i b u t i v e Choice c = D i s t r i b u t i v e Choice 49. indicates that an integrative choice i n the case when one perceives a d i s t r i b u t i v e p o t e n t i a l and expects a d i s t r i b u t i v e response (Table 1, case 10) would be i r r a t i o n a l . Both hypotheses suggest that one party's desire f o r an integrative option i s i n s u f f i c i e n t incentive f o r an integrative process to be pursued. 50. CHAPTER V CHOICE OP PROCESS: DISCUSSION This chapter represents an attempt to strengthen and support the hypotheses presented i n Chapter IV. The f i r s t hypothesis contends that a party w i l l choose the integrative option only i n ifche case where i t believes that both parties w i l l gain from the solution and that the other party has the same b e l i e f . Hypothesis II indicates the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of pursuing an integrative process when cues indicate that the problem has no integrative p o t e n t i a l and the other party has no intention of pursuing t h i s option. These predictions are based on the behavior deemed appropriate f o r p a r t i c u l a r perceptions. The discussion of t h e i r v a l i d i t y i s based on ( i ) the d i f f e r e n t i n i t i a l t a c t i c s optimumly employed f o r the two process options described above; ( i i ) game theory experiments concerning trust and suspicion; and ( i i i ) s p e c i f i c aspects of North American i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . The i r r a t i o n a l i t y of a M d H decision i s explained i n the f i r s t section below r e l a t i n g to the t a c t i c a l differences between the process options. However, because both hypotheses derive support from t h i s area, attempts at separate discussions fo r each would e n t a i l considerable r e p e t i t i o n . As a consequence both hypotheses are treated together. T a c t i c a l Differences The above description of the two process frameworks demonstrated that the t a c t i c a l maneuvers required f o r success 51 i n each process are e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t . The integrative process c a l l s f o r the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and candid consideration of a number of alternate solutions together with a search f o r new solutions through a combination of mutually a t t r a c t i v e features (Miner, 1973). The d i s t r i b u t i v e process on the otherrhand, works on a l i m i t e d number of solutions generated separately by each party as i t s optimum solution (Stevens, 1963). The integrative process i s exploratory and tentative, as opposed to the firm commitments of the d i s t r i b u t i v e process (Walton and McKersie, 1965). The commitments necessary for success i n the l a t t e r (Stevens, 1963) are disfunctional i n the former (Hinton, 1968). Overall, the open atmosphere of o b j e c t i v i t y , trusty and low pressure i m p l i c i t i n the integrative process i s inconsistent with the calculated high pressure, low trust t a c t i c s of the d i s t r i b u t i v e process. The f i r s t steps of each process are consistent with the general comparison. In the integrative process, the f i r s t step c a l l s f o r a maximum sharing of information i n the form of basic objective f a c t s . This i s necessary i f the solution i s to adequately deal with each parties* needs. I t i s described i n some d e t a i l above that the i n i t i a l stages of the d i s t r i b u t i v e process serve the same function of information flow, but the f i r s t step of the d i s t r i b u t i v e process c a l l s f o r a minimum sharing of correct information and the appropriate medium i s tentative solutions (the infamous "demand"). The d i s t r i b u t i v e strategy i s to force the opponent into revealing his r e a l p o s i t i o n (minimum acceptable l e v e l ) while presenting 52 a much i n f l a t e d version of one's own p o s i t i o n . Neither party w i l l be effected by the d i s t r i b u t i v e / integrative t a c t i c a l divergence i f both parties recognize an integrative p o t e n t i a l and perceive a forthcoming integrative response. But i f one party b l i n d l y pursues an integrative process and the other side i s intent on the d i s t r i b u t i v e process, the information sharing w i l l be one sided and the f i r s t party w i l l be at a d i s t i n c t disadvantage, having revealed i t s p o s i t i o n on the marginal u t i l i t y diagram. Each party should recognize t h i s s i t u a t i o n , or f a i l to only' once, and depending on t h e i r degree of r i s k avoidance, could either wait f o r the other party to show i t s hand or pursue the safer route regardless (Hypothesis I ) . A perception of d i s t r i b u t i v e p o t e n t i a l and d i s t r i b u t i v e response w i l l never be handled i n an integrative manner because t h i s would i n v i t e exploitation (Hypothesis I I ) . However, i n the "b" s i t u a t i o n (Hypothesis I) there i s an added vari a b l e . The degree of certainty that the other party w i l l respond i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e manner to an integrative i n i t i a t i v e i s a function of party A's trust i n party B. Trust and Suspicion The effect of t r u s t — a n d i t s counterpart, s u s p i c i o n — on c o l l e c t i v e bargaining has attracted a great deal of academic consideration. Among the more s p e c i f i c statements recorded by researchers i s t h i s one, made by a union negotiator (Douglas)• 53 . . . i f i t were the company doing the t a l k i n g you wouldn't trust him [p. 72], Anecdotal evidence, however, need not be r e l i e d upon because the topic has generated a great number of controlled laboratory experiments. More p a r t i c u l a r l y , a close scrutiny of the trust variable i s provided by game theory and i t s offshoots. Game theory i s an experimental branch of decision theory which establishes a controlled experimental frame-work within which the "players" are guided by strategic considerations. The l a t t e r are defined as "...the choices made by a r a t i o n a l player dealing with a r a t i o n a l opponent governed by hi s int e r e s t s and by his awareness of the o p p o n e n t ' s i n t e r e s t s [Rapoport, 1966, p. 188]." "Rationality" i s defined as the consistent p a i r i n g of strategy with goals. A number of game the o r i s t s have attempted to analyse c o l l e c t i v e bargaining through the creation of a r t i f i c i a l bargaining environments. Some of the more relevant studies are considered below. Deutch (I960) defined t r u s t as choosing to pursue a path that may lead to an event perceived to be harmful, even though occurance of t h i s event i s dependent on another person and there are d e f i n i t e indications that the poten t i a l lo s s may be greater than the pot e n t i a l gain. Trust therefore becomes synonomous with confidence. In terms of the p r o b a b i l i t y of cooperation between parties, given at le a s t one t r u s t i n g party, "...the choice 54 [between cooperating or not] i s determined by such variables as the r e l a t i v e attractiveness of the competing a l t e r n a t i v e s and the subjective p r o b a b i l i t i e s of r e a l i z i n g the alter n a t i v e s [p. 125].M Severe problems of trust therefore occur when one or both p a r t i e s are " i . . i n d i r e c t l y oriented to obtain maximum gain at minimum cost [to themselves] [p. 123]." Such i s the case i n d i s t r i b u t i v e bargaining. Deutch was primarilyrconcerned with the ef f e c t of i n d i v i d u a l l y perceived intentions on t r u s t i n g behavior. He used a two-person, p o t e n t i a l l y variable-sum game i n which i n d i v i d u a l rewards were dependent on choices made by both parties. The game was structured such that decisions based on i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y were impossible unless conditions of mutual t r u s t also existed. Subjects were programed to a cooperative, competitive,&crr i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c motivational orientation and experiments were conducted c o n t r o l l i n g f o r simultaneity of choice and pre-choice communication v a r i a b l e s . The cases of most in t e r e s t to the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining sphere are those i n which non-simultaneous choice was paired with an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c o rientation. The l a t t e r i s closest to the "integrative" orientation given above because only the competitive motivational orientation c a r r i e d the implication of win/lose c o n f l i c t . The cooperative orientation was much stronger than the integrative requirements given above. Qf 48 subjects who commenced the game with an i n d i -v i d u a l i s t i c o rientation, only 20.8$ behaved cooperatively. This figure was more than doubled (52$) with pre-choice 5 5 . communication. The cle a r i n d i c a t i o n i s that Deutch's subjects were r i s k averters when faced with an i n t e g r a t i v e / d i s t r i b u t i v e decision and uncertainty of an opposite's r e c i p r o c a l action. Unfortunately, Deutch's study lacks a c e r t a i n degree of relevance to i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s because he made no attempt to control f o r the negotiating h i s t o r y of relationships. However, there i s another study which did control f o r t h i s v a r i a b l e . Benton, Gelber, K e l l y , and Liebley ( I 9 6 9 ) conducted a card game type simulation where both parties were rewarded a c e r t a i n amount per t r i a l depending upon the succeeding state of a card v a r i a b l e . The c r i t i c a l aspect of the experimental design was that only one player had cost-free knowledge of the card variable, whereas the other party could only obtain d i r e c t knowledge at a penalty cost to both. As i n labour-management negotiations, both players were faced with dilemmas of honesty versus deceit and trust versus suspicion. The controlled variable was "trustworthiness" as measured by the f i r s t subject's (perfect information) h i s t o r y of deceit. The authors found that the rate of doubting—even i n the face of negative consequences-increased markedly according to the controlled subject's untrustworthy behavior (found to be l y i n g 25$, 50$, 75$, and 100$ of the occasions when checked). The implication f o r the present study i s that d i s t r u s t — and a "b" c h o i c e — i s a function of past bargaining behavior. By the very nature of the d i s t r i b u t i v e process (controlled information flow, misinformation etc.) Benton e>t als ' s 5 6 . findings suggest that any perceptions of as d i s t r i b u t i v e response based on past experience should be s u f f i c i e n t motivation to pursue an i n i t i a l d i s t r i b u t i v e strategy. Loomis (1959) was even more pessimistic regarding the pote n t i a l f o r an integrative process. In the t h e o r e t i c a l introduction to h i s paper, Loomis suggests that there are four conditions essential f o r the establishment of a r e l a -tionship based on tr u s t , a l l of which are only s a t i s f i e d i n case 1 of Table l j (1) Each i n d i v i d u a l must be committed to reaching some goal where commitment i s such that f a i l u r e to achieve the goal would cost more than he would be w i l l i n g to r i s k i n an uncertain venture. (2) Each i n d i v i d u a l must r e a l i z e that he cannot reach a s p e c i f i c goal without the help of other persons. (3) Each i n d i v i d u a l must recognize a s i m i l a r dependence of the other person(s) to him and that they are ready to help him. (4) Each i n d i v i d u a l must know that the other par t i e s are each aware that the members are a l l mutually i n t e r -dependent. By Loomis' estimation, the c r u c i a l factor i s a state of "perceived mutual t r u s t " . He discounts any p o s s i b i l i t y of anything but a case 1 (Table 1) si t u a t i o n leading to an integrative process: . . . i f the i n d i v i d u a l perceives mutual t r u s t , he w i l l cooperate, and i f the i n d i v i d u a l does not perceive mutual trust he w i l l not cooperate. In the second case the i n d i v i d u a l should see 9[Table 1, cases 5,6,7,10; for party A| cases 2,4,5,7,9,10 for party B] since he has ho reason to expect that the person w i l l cooperate, that an uncooperative choice i s h i s best defense against undue loss [p. 308]. 57 Loomis tested t h i s hypothesis i n a matrix game design with 119 subjects and found, among other things, that 80$ of a l l subjects made choices consistant with t h e i r perceptions of the relationship as having f u l f i l l e d a l l four requirements. A paper written by Shure, Meeker, and Hansford (1965) i s more s p e c i f i c a l l y focused on the f i r s t move of a t a c t i c a l interchange. These authors set up an experimental s i t u a t i o n whidh required two subjects to j o i n t l y accomplish a highly structured task (one "subject" was a computer). The task was such that cooperation was po s s i b l e — t h e r e b y maximizing t o t a l g ain—together with two other behavior combinations: dominance/ submission and mutual interference. I f both parties remained lea r y of each other's motives, mutual interference would i s o l a t e i n d i v i d u a l players thereby permitting l i t t l e or no reward, but also no direc t "punishment". I f one party decided to trust the other, however, severe v u l n e r a b i l i t y was experienced due to an aspect of the game design that gave the opposite party the power to dominate future behavior i f the f i r s t party choose to i n i t i a t e an interchange with an integrative move. Domination ranged from allowing the opposite party to maximize hi s t o t a l possible gain to actual i n f l i c t i o n of physical pain (an e l e c t r i c shock).., Results demonstrated that only 48$ began with intensions to cooperate, and only 39$ eventually ca r r i e d out t h i s decision. In t h i s experiment there was no bargaining hi s t o r y to bias the subjects' decisions. Actions were based s o l e l y on each subject's c u l t u r a l l y acquired feelings f o r a s i t u a t i o n where they could gain a reward, but only through extreme 58. v u l n e r a b i l i t y . S u c h a c o s t w a s t o o m u c h f o r o v e r o n e h a l f o f t h e s u b j e c t s t o e v e n c o n t e m p l a t e c o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e f o r m o f a n i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s . Some 1 0 $ m o r e c o n t e m p l a t e d c o o p e r -a t i o n b u t c o u l d n o t make t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n t o c a r r y o u t a c o o p e r a t i v e s t r a t e g y . The i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s s t u d y f o r t h e l a b o u r - m a n a g e m e n t a r e n a i s t h a t r e g a r d l e s s o f a r e l a t i o n s h i p ' s e x p e r i e n c e s , t h e p a r t o f w e s t e r n c u l t u r e d e v o t e d t o d e p e n d e n c y s i t u a t i o n s s i m i l a r t o l a b o u r - m a n a g e m e n t r e l a t i o n s ( a s i n t h e M e e k e r e t a l , e x p e r -i m e n t : h i g h - v u l n e r a b i l i t y ) p r o d u c e s a r i s k a v e r s i o n a t t i t u d e i n a g r e a t n u m b e r o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . F o r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , t h i s s u g g e s t s a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a " s a f e " d i s t r i b u t i v e o p t i o n w i l l b e p u r s u e d i n a l l c a s e s w h e r e r e s p o n s e i s u n s u r e , e v e n w h e n a p a r t y r e c o g n i z e s a p o t e n t i a l f o r c o o p e r a t i o n ( H y p o t h e s i s 1 ) . Summary The c o n t r o l l e d e x p e r i m e n t s o u t l i n e d i m m e d i a t e l y a b o v e r e l a t e t o c r i t e r i a t h a t c o u l d e f f e c t a n y p a i r o r g r o u p o f p a r t i e s i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s o u t s i d e o f t h e l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s f i e l d . T h e y i n d i c a t e t h a t a p a r t y f a c i n g a h i g h t h r e a t s i t u a t i o n w i l l t e n d t o r e a c t i n a s a f e m a n n e r . T h e r e a r e a n u m b e r o f f a c t o r s s p e c i f i c t o t h e l a b o u r - m a n a g e m e n t s p h e r e w h i c h g i v e t h i s c o n c l u s i o n e v e n g r e a t e r w e i g h t i n t h i s a r e a . T h e s e f a c t o r s r e l a t e t o t h e p r e s e n c e o f a n a u d i e n c e a n d t h e n e c e s s i t y o f r e t a i n i n g a p o w e r f u l i m a g e f o r f u t u r e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s e s w i t h t h e same p a r t y . 59 I n d u s t r i a l Relations C r i t e r i a THE PRESENCE OF AUDIENCES An audience i s defined as a physical or psychological presence for whom the negotiator must perform. The motivation to perform rests on the need for peer support fo r psychological well-being and career goals. In most cases, the audience i s somehow dependent upon the negotiator's performance f o r either tangible (as i n monetary value of a benefit share) or intangible outcomes (emotional feelings of v i c t o r y or defeat). Much concern i s therefore directed towards the negotiator's behavior, by himself, h i s fellow negotiator's, and h i s constituency. A pos i t i v e or negative audience response may be directed at any aspect of the negotiator's behavior or the consequences of t h i s b e h a v i o r -s p e c i f i c commitments, concessions, agreements, bargaining st y l e etc. Some l i t e r a t u r e i s devoted to analysing t h i s aspect of the labour-management interchange, p a r t i c u l a r l y the dominance of a constituency on the;labour side. Blunu(1961) writes that audiences are the sole reason for the present form of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. He suggests that the negotiators are aware of what the l e v e l of settlement w i l l be from the s t a r t , but appearances of hard fought b a t t l e s are necessary to sustain constituency support. A cursory treatment of the subject i s provided by Rubin and Brown (1975). These authors have stated a number of general propositions. The most relevant to present purposes 60 i s one which states: I f a "bargainer i s accountable to an audience for whatever i t i s that w i l l bring p o s i t i v e evaluation, then t h i s accountability i s the mechanism by which he may be controlled [p. 47]. Rubin and Brown suggest that constituencies have the power to apply sanctions to negotiators who are perceived to be behaving inappropriatly. Sanctions include removal of the negotiator from h i s r o l e , reduced support (wildcat s t r i k e s etc.) and damage to h i s bargaining reputation. Empirical support f o r t h i s proposition i s provided by McKersie, Perry, and Walton (1965). Observing the 1961 Auto Workers/ International Harvester contract negotiations, these authors "...found that a negotiator's f a i l u r e to bargain i n accord with his constituency's preferences had serious implications for h i s continuation as a member of the bargaining team [Rubin and Brown, 1975, p. 48]." Further, "...a good number of delegates perceived high costs i n f a i l i n g to advocate t h e i r constituents' demands. Many of the delegates faced serious challenges to t h e i r leadership from organized factions within the membership and could be said to have chosen th e i r orientation i n response to i m p l i c i t p o l i t i c a l sanctions [McKersie et a l . , 1965, p. 465]." On a s i m i l a r plane, Rubin and Brown pose a second proposition: Audiences, especially dependent ones, generate pressures toward l o y a l t y , commitment, and advocacy of t h e i r prefer-red positions [p. 50]. 61. As support the authors c i t e a number of experimental studies which demonstrate the conformity of negotiators to group norms. The relevance of the "audience e f f e c t " for present purposes relates to the p o t e n t i a l willingness of a negotiator to act cooperatively i n front of a d i s t r i b u t i v e l y oriented constituency. Constituents are often not aware of the i n t r i -cacies of negotiations (Blum, 1961). They see only the . broader picture which i n North America usually delineates an **us/themM r e l a t i o n s h i p . I f there i s some doubt of an expected integrative response i n the negotiator's mind, there may be a great deal of doubt i n the l e s s informed constituent. Labour r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e contains a number of outstanding examples of the audience phenomenon. In 1965, four and one h a l f years of peaceful (no s t r i k e s or breakdowns i n negotiations) negotiating i n the s t e e l industry was terminated with the unseating of the union leadership. Apparently, three decades of severe s t r i f e (etg. long s t r i k e s , v i c i o u s d i a t r i b e s ) and b i t t e r win/lose bargaining p r i o r to i960 had created militancy i n the rank and f i l e . The l a t t e r distrusted management's intent and believed that t h e i r leadership were being t r i c k e d into subser-vience to management/s desires ( F e l l e r , 1969). On the same plane a period of accrimonious and c o s t l y bargaining between the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and R e t a i l Food Store Employees Union and a supermarket employers' association was followed by a b r i e f period of more integrative 6 2 behavior. No emotional shouting matches were permitted and no accusations were allowed during a party's presentation. But because "...the new bargaining approach did not follow the t r a d i t i o n a l pattern, both sides [constituents] began to question not only the adequacy, but the i n t e g r i t y of t h e i r spokemen [Business Perspectives, 1968, pp. 4-10]." BARGAINING POWER IN FUTURE DISTRIBUTIVE NEGOTIATIONS In the opening pages of Industrial Peacemaking, Douglas (1962) notes that when "...the negotiators close the doors to the conference room, they turn t h e i r backs on r e a l i t y i n any of the senses i n which science and society use that term [p. 8]." The v a l i d i t y of t h i s statement i s demonstrated i n the d i s t r i b -utive model provided above. Except where extreme conditions of disproportionate power exist, the model implies that negotiation outcomes depend to a great extent on the s k i l l f u l use of the available t a c t i c s rather than on an environmental r e a l i t y . Part of negotiation s k i l l i s providing as favourable as image as possible of one's power pos i t i o n . The l a t t e r i s defined i n the context of i n a b i l i t y to r e s i s t / a b i l i t y to i n s i s t . The degree to which experienced negotiators r e a l i z e t h i s negatively ef f e c t s the relevance of a " r e a l " power structure. This conclu-t i o n i s i m p l i c i t i n the nature of the d i s t r i b u t i v e process. The presentation of a favourable net expected u t i l i t y function andvthe attempted manipulation of the other party's net expected u t i l i t y function, p a r t i c u l a r l y through a commitment strategy, indicate the prevalence of exaggerated projections. 63. For example, i f a party makes a threat to s t r i k e , t h i s threat w i l l have no coercive power unless i t i s believed by the other party. Each party must therefore be careful not to give i t s opposite any impression of weakness. In a continuing r e l a t i o n s h i p the necessity of demonstrating a favourable image carr i e s over between d i f f e r e n t contract negotiations. A sign of weakness given i n one set of negotiations may become relevant when the contract reopens through a deflated image of •power" and consequently, perceptions of minimum acceptable l e v e l s of benefit shares. A perception by party A of a low capacity to i n s i s t or r e s i s t on thejpart: of party B w i l l i n f l a t e party A's aspirations f o r a l a r g e r benefit share through a lower P^ ( d i s u t i l i t y of i n s i s t i n g on a p a r t i c u l a r benefit share l e v e l , see Figure 6, p. 29 above). This e f f e c t could lead to unnecessary sanctions or even deadlock i f the i n i t i a l perception of party B's a b i l i t y to r e s i s t / i n s i s t i s i ncorrect. In the present case these arguments suggest that a party which foresees any future d i s t r i b u t i v e bargaining with the same opposite party w i l l not jeopordize the p o t e n t i a l future value^of commitment t a c t i c s by demonstrating any dependence on the other party f o r future reward d i s t r i b u t i o n . The i n s t i g -ation by party A of an integrative process may be a signal to party B that A does not have the power to push fo r what i t wants i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e process, and must r e l y on party B's cooperation i n order to a t t a i n even the smallest benefit share. 64 Such i s the case i f a party perceives a probable d i s t r i b u t i v e response and pursues the integrative process i n the hope that the other party i s " r e a l l y " of an integrative pursuasion also. In a relationship based on c o l l e c t i v e bargaining such an action may be interpreted as an i n a b i l i t y to pursue the d i s t r i b u t i v e option at a l l — i . e . a lack of power. Predictions Predictions based on expected r a t i o n a l behavior for p a r t i c u l a r perceptions may now be given f o r a l l of the cases l i s t e d i n Table 1. Predictions f o r each perception/conception combination are given i n Table 2. Insert Table 2 here In the f i r s t four cases l i s t e d , party A i s expected to pursue an integrative process. It w i l l enter the "process" prepared f o r a maximum sharing of information. In case 1 t h i s plan w i l l be reciprocated, but i n cases 2t ^ a n d 4 party A w i l l soon discover that party B i s not prepared to share information so f r e e l y . A w i l l encounter reservation i n case 2, but d i s t r i -butive aggression i n cases,:. 3 and 4. In case 2, party A w i l l undoubtably encounter a f a i r l y quiet opposite who w i l l be prudently awaiting signs from party A that the problem i s as party B i t s e l f sees i t . Any other behavior w i l l destroy any likelynood of cooperation. In case 3, party B may decide to respond to Party A's integrative i n i t i a t i v e by creating the f a l s e impression that 65. TABLE 2 PROCESS DECISIONS PARTY A Case # 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8 ) 9 ) 10) Actual Perception of Party B I I I I I I I I I D I D I D D I D I D D PARTY B Perception of P a r t y A | A c t u a l I I D I I D D D D I I D D D I D D D D D PROCESS CHOICE** I I or D| D D I or D| D D D D D I = Integrative Process D = D i s t r i b u t i v e Process * = Conceptions of own u t i l i t y **= Expected r a t i o n a l behavior 66 i t i s an integrative problem, hoping thereby to t r i c k party A into revealing too much information. There i s some doubt that t h i s can continue for any length of time because party B w i l l not want to reveal any information regarding i t s own pos i t i o n . This w i l l a l e r t party A of i t s appropriate choice. In case 4, party B w i l l enter pre-disposed to pursue the d i s t r i b u t i v e process. The same arguments apply to party A's choice i n cases 5 through 10. Party A w i l l either t r y to fathom the s i t u a t i o n or pursue the d i s t r i b u t i v e process regardless because of a perception that B has an i n c l i n a t i o n towards the d i s t r i b u t i v e option. The roles are sometimes reversed, however, i t seems clea r that only i n the f i r s t case i s the integrative process l i k e l y to be chosen and completed. Even i n case 5 where both pa r t i e s are a c t u a l l y " I ' , the d i s t r i b u t i v e process w i l l ultimately p r e v a i l because the integrative option does not allow f o r the kind of information exchange whereby one party gives an increment of information and then waits f o r the other party to give a contribution. This i s not a tr u s t f i l l e d atmosphere and temptations and suspicions w i l l a r i s e concerning how much and what kinds of information should be traded. In a l l other cases a choice of the integrative option would be a t a c t i c a l error since i t would put a party at a severe bargaining disadvantage. Summary and Conclusions The purpose of t h i s chapter was to provide support from the l i t e r a t u r e f or two hypotheses concerning decision 67. behavior. The discussion provided insight into the c r i t e r i a which w i l l effect the choice of one process over another. It was suggested that fear of being exploited in a distributive process, together with a fear of audience reaction and possible power loss w i l l severely limit the choice of the integrative option. The analysis also provides some general answers to the questions posed at the beginning of the previous chapter (see page 43 above). Are problems classified only during negotiations or are they  considered prior to any .joint meetings? Problems receive a classification before negotiations begin. Otherwise neither party would know how to instigate bargaining. The kinds of situations referred to by Driscoll (1976"; see page 30 above), where both parties assign problems after negotiations have begun only apply to cases 5 to 9 when response i s not yet known. What aspects of problems cause them to be handled in an m integrative or distributive way? It was necessary to describe the entire decision making process in order to answer this question. Given the above description of the decision making mechanism, i t would appear that there i s nothing implicit in a particular problem that w i l l cause i t to be universally processed in an integrative or distributive manner. While some problems may tend to be processed in a distributive manner more often than others—particularly the economic v a r i e t y — , the aspects involved in individual assignments are individual opinion and perceived response. It i s the nature of the 68 process options rather than s p e c i f i c aspects of the i n d i v i d u a l problems that determines the choice of process. This conclusion i s c l a r i f i e d and v a l i d a t e d by the many documented examples of productivity bargaining. A comparison of these examples demonstrates how a s i m i l a r problem can be processed to resolutionsthrough either process option, thereby i n d i c a t i n g that a preference f o r a p a r t i c u l a r process must r e s u l t from c r i t e r i a other than the innate nature of the problem. Productivity bargaining may be defined as M...a method by which...improvements i n the terms of employment are financed...by agreed changes i n the work system which r e s u l t i n labour being used mote e f f e c t i v e l y [Fox, 1966, p.447]." For example, a higher wage or bonus may be obtained, together with a change i n work practices. Such an agreement can r e s u l t from a d i r e c t one-time trade within the d i s t r i b u t i v e framework where one party gains on one issue but the other party's loss 1 i s made up through a gain on the other issue ; or the agreement can evolve from a pure integrative process where the problem may be defined as decreased market shares or even firm closure. In the second case, worker s a t i s f a c t i o n or a s i m i l a r variable i s added to the basic d e f i n i t i o n of the problem i n Step I of the integrative process, thereby ensuring that the solution w i l l not adversely effect labour (see p. 17 above). 1 In 1961, American Motors traded a p r o f i t sharing plan for cert a i n operating concessions. 2 Although not a pure example of the integrative process, the i n i t i a l cooperation between labour and management i n the United States Steel industry demonstrates a s i t u a t i o n where the problem 6 9 . The same s o l u t i o n i s d e r i v e d f r o m b o t h p r o c e s s o p t i o n s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t a p r e f e r e n c e f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p r o c e s s m u s t r e s u l t f r o m c r i t e r i a o t h e r t h a n t h e i n n a t e n a t u r e o f t h e p r o b l e m . The d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e t w o h y p o t h e s e s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n i n g c r i t e r i o n i s t h e a n t i t h e t i c a l n a t u r e o f t h e two p r o c e s s o p t i o n s , c o m p o u n d e d b y a n a u d i e n c e e f f e c t a n d a f e a r o f p o w e r l o s s . The u n d e r l y i n g t h e m e o f H y p o t h e s i s I i s t h a t t h e s e f a c t o r s r e s t r i c t t h e c h o i c e o f t h e i n t e g r a t i v e o p t i o n . A r e t h e r e s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h a r e c u r r e n t l y h a n d l e d t h r o u g h a  d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s w h i c h s t i l l h a v e a n i n t e g r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l ? T h e r e i s d e f i n i t l y a p o t e n t i a l f o r i n t e g r a t i v e p r o b l e m s t o b e h a n d l e d i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e m a n n e r . R e f e r r i n g t o T a b l e 1 , c a s e s 1 , 2 , a n d 5 h a v e a n i n t e g r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l b u t o n l y i n c a s e 1 i s a n i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s l i k e l y . The d i s c u s s i o n o f H y p o t h e s i s I i n d i c a t e d t h a t p r o c e s s c h o i c e i n c a s e s 2 a n d 5 i s l i m i t e d b y s u s p i c i o n , a u d i e n c e e f f e c t a n d f e a r o f p o w e r l o s s . ( f o o t n o t e 2 c o n t i n u e d f r o m p r e v i o u s p a g e ) w a s d e c r e a s e d m a r k e t s h a r e s . The p a r t i e s a g r e e d t o c e r t a i n m e t h o d s t o c o r r e c t t h e d a m a g e d s t a t e o f t h e i r i n d u s t r y w h i l e s t i l l s a t i s f y i n g t h e n e e d s a n d d e s i r e s o f t h e l a b o u r f o r c e ( F e l l e r , 1 9 6 8 ) . 7 0 . CHAPTER V I C H O I C E OP P R O C E S S : MORE THAN ONE P R O B L E M The a b o v e d i s c u s s i o n r e l a t e s t o t h e s o l u t i o n o f o n l y o n e p r o b l e m a t a t i m e . A t r a d e - o f f o f c o n c e s s i o n s a s t h e y r e l a t e d t o d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g w a s a l l u d e d t o , b u t c o n c e r n w a s f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f o n l y o n e b e n e f i t t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f a n y o t h e r . I n o r d e r t o g i v e t h e d i s c u s s i o n m u c h m o r e r e l e v a n c e t o t h e l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s s p h e r e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s i d e r s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e s e v e r a l p r o b l e m s e x i s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . I n a n y l a b o u r - m a n a g e m e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p a n u m b e r o f d i f f e r -e n t p r o b l e m s may b e e v i d e n t o n a n y g i v e n d a y . I t i s u n r e a s o n -a b l e ; t o e x p e c t t h a t t w o o r m o r e p a r t i e s c a n o r w o u l d w a n t t o d e a l w i t h e v e r y p r o b l e m w i t h o u t some o v e r l a p . C o n s e q u e n t l y , p r o c e s s c h o i c e i n a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e t w o o r m o r e p r o b l e m s a r e a t s t a k e b e c o m e s a q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t o s e p a r a t e p r o b l e m s i n o r d e r t o p r o c e s s e a c h w i t h o u t a n y c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e o t h e r s , o r t o g r o u p t h e p r o b l e m s t o g e t h e r i n a s i n g l e p r o c e s s . A p e r u s a l o f t h e l i t e r a t u r e i n d i c a t e s t h a t a l a r g e maj<-o r i t y o f p r o b l e m s a r e p r o c e s s e d i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e m a n n e r ( R u b i n a n d B r o w n , 1975. p . 1). A s s u g g e s t e d i n C h a p t e r I V , a n u m b e r o f c a s e s a r e e v i d e n t w h e r e a p p a r e n t l y i n t e g r a t i v e p r o b l e m s h a v e r e c e i v e d d i s t r i b u t i v e t r e a t m e n t ( p r o d u c t i v i t y b a r g a i n i n g ; t h e s t e e l i n d u s t r i e s ' a t t e m p t s a t c o o p e r a t i o n , O r r , 1973) n o t o n l y a s s i n g l e i s s u e s b u t a s a p a r t o f a g r o u p o f i s s u e s . The p u r p o s e o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o d e s c r i b e why i n t e g r a t i v e p r o b l e m s may p r e s e n t l y b e p r o c e s s e d w i t h s e v e r a l i s s u e s a n d p r o b l e m s i n a s i n g l e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s . T h i s p r o j e c t e n t a i l s a n 71. analysis of why separation may be considered desirable or undesirable and which perceptive conditions are necessary for a separation motive to exi s t . Discussion i n the previous chapter indicated that b e l i e f i n the integrative p o t e n t i a l of a s p e c i f i c problem was not s u f f i c i e n t inducement to i n i t i a t e or p a r t i c i p a t e i n an integrative process. The same factors that r e s t r i c t the choice of process for a single problem may l i m i t the choice of the cooperatively oriented integrative process when many problems are i n question. Taking the decision model one more step, impediments may r e s t r i c t the manifestation of the integrative process even i f both parties indicate a desire to pursue t h i s process. The second part of Chapter VI w i l l therefore i s o l a t e the actual availability of the integrative option. Specific impediments w i l l be i d e n t i f i e d and examples w i l l be presented to demonstrate how process decisions and hence cooperative p o t e n t i a l , are tempered by strategic necessity. Discussion i s therefore centered on three areas: (1) Why a separation of problems and hence, processes i s desirable. (2) When such a separation i s l i k e l y to take place. (3) How such a separation may be successfully accomp-li s h e d . The Question of Problem Separation Some consideration of the t a c t i c a l complexities created by the existence of several problems i s given i n the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e . Walton and McKersie (1965), Douglas 0-962) Stevens (1963), and Selekman et a l . (1964) make reference to 72 and give examples of situations where the question of separation/inclusion i s paramount. Douglas (196?, p. 55) refers to the need f o r several issues i n the exploitation of the concession t a c t i c . Stevens (1963, p. 60) suggestsr ,that the same phenomenon i s a necessary and valuable t a c t i c to be used to create f a l s e perceptions of r e a l u t i l i t y curves (AA and BB of Figure 7). Walton and McKersie (1965) consider g g both points: . . . d i s t r i b u t i v e bargaining, which may c a l l f o r including items not genuinely of concern to him; including extra items can be a t a c t i c f o r concealing h i s true u t i l i t i e s or f o r creating some "trading horses" [p. 170], In the other d i r e c t i o n , Douglas (1962) points to a popular and e f f i c i e n t strategy of reaching a temporary agreement on those problems which o f f e r the highest p o t e n t i a l f o r quick agreement f i r s t , thereby creating an exploitable trend towards agreement on harder issues at a l a t t e r time (pp. 33-37). Walton and McKersie (1965) P. 145) r e f e r to t h i s strategy as an "agenda" technique. Clearly any two issues can be combined for concession purposes, p a r t i c u l a r l y when p o t e n t i a l l y integrative problems are considered much l e s s c r i t i c a l than the d i s t r i b u t i v e v a r i e t y . 1 For present purposes, however, in t e r e s t l i e s i n ' I f the resolution of a d i s t r i b u t i v e issue i s considered to be extremely important, a preferred p o s i t i o n on any l e s s important issues or problems may be traded to increase the benefit share i n the primary issue. I f the l e s s important problem i s recognized to have integrative p o t e n t i a l i t w i l l be s t r a t e g i c a l l y valuable to present a fabricated image of d i s t r i b u t i v e p o t e n t i a l to the other party. I f t h i s second *ssue can be traded f o r a better benefit share on the more 73. d e t e r m i n i n g t h o s e a s p e c t s o f t h e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s w h i c h a r e u n e f f e c t e d b y t h e c o n t e n t , n a t u r e , o r i m p o r t a n c e o f s p e c i f i c p r o b l e m s . N o n e o f t h e a b o v e t h e o r i s t s make a n y a t t e m p t t o c l a s s i f y v y p r o b l e m s o r d e t e r m i n e w h e n o r w h i c h i n c l u s i o n o r s e p a r a t i o n s t r a t e g y i s a p p r o p r i a t e . To a c c o m p l i s h t h e s e t a s k s i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o d i s s e c t t h e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s a n d a g a i n d e a l w i t h t h e p a r t i e s ' p e r s p e c t i v e s o f t h e p r o b l e m ' s i i p o t e n t i a l a n d e x p e c t e d t a c t i c a l r e s p o n s e . I t h a s a l r e a d y b e e n d e m o n s t r a t e d how s i n g u l a r c o n c e p t i o n s o f a p r o b l e m ' s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o g e t h e r w i t h p e r c e p t i o n s o f a n o p p o s i t e ' s c o n c e p t i o n s c a n e f f e c t t h e c h o i c e o f p r o c e s s . The a d d i t i o n o f o n e m o r e p r o b l e m s i m p l y a d d s o n e m o r e s t e p t o t h e p r o c e d u r e . T h e b a s i s f o r t h i s c o n t e n t i o n l i e s i n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e t w o p r o c e s s e s . D E C I S I O N P R O C E S S (WHY) F o r s i m p l i c i t y t h e a d v e n t o f o n l y t w o p r o b l e m s w i l l b e d e a l t w i t h . G i v e n t w o p r o b l e m s , t h e r e a r e s e v e n u n i q u e c o m b i n a t i o n s o f p r o c e s s c h o i c e s . T h e s e a r e g i v e n i n F i g u r e 8/ The l e t t e r s ' I ' a n d ' D ' r e p r e s e n t t h e p r o c e s s i n d e p e n d e n t l y d e c i d e d u p o n b y e a c h p a r t y t h r o u g h t h e p e r c e p t u a l p r o c e s s d e s c r i b e d i n C h a p t e r I V ( i . e . c o l u m n 3 o f T a b l e 1). The t h o u g h t p r o c e s s c a n b e d e s c r i b e d t h r o u g h t h e s e c a s e s . I n a l l c a s e s b o t h p a r t y A a n d p a r t y B a r e ( f o o t n o t e 1 c o n t i n u e d f r o m p r e v i o u s p a g e ) i m p o r t a n t i s s u e , t h e f i r s t p a r t y h a s g a i n e d o n t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e m a i n i s s u e a | n o c o s t t o i t s e l f b e c a u s e t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e s e c o n d i s s u e w a s n o t a d v e r s e t o i t s i n t e r e s t s i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . 7 4 I n s e r t F i g u r e 8 h e r e a w a r e o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f b o t h p r o b l e m s . B o t h p a r t i e s h a v e c o n s i d e r e d e a c h p r o b l e m s e p a r a t l y a n d a r e c o n g n i z a n t o f p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n s o f p o t e n t i a l ( ' I * o r ' D ' ) . B e c a u s e t h e r e i s m o r e t h a n o n e p r o b l e m , h o w e v e r , a c h o i c e m u s t b e made a s t o w h e t h e r t h e y b e c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e same t a l k s o r o t h e r w i s e . When p r o b l e m s a r e o f d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s — i . e . i n t e g r a t i v e o r d i s t r i b u t i v e p o t e n t i a l — t h e a n t i t h e t i c a l n a t u r e o f t h e p r o c e s s e s w i l l g u i d e t h e c h o i c e o f p r o c e s s . I f a n o v e r l a p o f t h e t w o d i f f e r e n t p r o c e s s e s w e r e t o o c c u r d i l e m m a s w o u l d a r i s e r e l a t i n g t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t a c t i c s — w h e r e a n i n t e g r a t i v e p r o b l e m c a l l s f o r c o o p e r a t i o n , a d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e c a l l s f o r c a l c u l a t e d s e c u r i t y . I f t h e t w o p r o c e s s e s a r e a t t e m p t e d a t t h e same t i m e o r e v e n i n t h e same r e l a t i o n s h i p , o n e o r t h e o t h e r p r o c e s s m u s t s u f f e r some a l t e r a t i o n . E i t h e r t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s m u s t b e c o m e u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y o p e n o r t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s w i l l b e d e b a s e d b y c a l c u l a t e d i n f o r m a t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n . D e g r e e s o f v a r i a t i o n i n i n f o r m a t i o n f l o w a n d c o o p e r a t i v e , n o n - p a r t i s a n d i s c u s s i o n s a r e a s c r i t i c a l t o t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s a s c a l c u l a t e d r e s t r i c t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n i s t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s . T h e l a t t e r c a n c o n t i n u e a s s u c h w i t h a v a r y i n g a m o u n t o f d i s c l o s u r e , b u t t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s c a n n o t c o n t i n u e t o o p e r a t e w i t h a n y p a r t i s a n r e s t r i c t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n f l o w . S u c h r e s t r i c t i o n 75. FIGURE 8 POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF PROBLEM CLASSIFICATIONS AND PROCESSES GIVEN TWO PROBLEMS PARTY A B 1 I I PROBLEM 2 I I (b) — D (c) L I D D I (d) I D D ( e ) D D (f) D I ' I D D I D ( g ) I D I D 7 6 w i l l f o s t e r d i s t r u s t and "degrees o f c o o p e r a t i o n " (see F i g u r e 5 , p. 2 0 ) w i l l decrease f o r both p a r t i e s . Therefore i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s e s need to be separated from the d i s t r i b u t i v e v a r i e t y . The nature o f problem p e r s p e c t i v e f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t s the d i v i s i o n - i n c l u s i o n d e c i s i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y between problems of l i k e p o t e n t i a l . By t h e i r nature i n t e g r a t i v e p rocesses should tend towards the i s o l a t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r problems. The i n t e g r a t i v e process i s designed f o r o n l y one problem at a time s i n c e d i f f e r e n t problems w i l l c a r r y d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a and a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a i s so c r i t i c a l to the step by step i n t e g r a t i v e procedure. Indeed, the nature o f the i n t e g r a t i v e model's f i r s t task o f problem d e f i n i t i o n i m p l i e s the necessary s i n g u l a r i t y o f problems. D i s t r i b u t i v e combinations are s l i g h t l y more complicated. T h e o r e t i c a l l y they c o u l d go e i t h e r way depending upon the p a r t y ' s p e r c e p t i o n o f which w i l l prove most advantageous. I t may be f e l t , f o r example, t h a t a b a r g a i n i n g advantage w i l l be enjoyed i f a problem i s c o n s i d e r e d by i t s e l f . Such would be the case i f a w e l l informed p a r t y thought t h a t i t c o u l d manipulate the o p p o s i t e ' s p e r c e p t i o n of a s i t u a t i o n ( t a c t i c s i n F u n c t i o n ( i i i ) ( a ) : Perhaps through the p r e s e n t a t i o n o f s p e c i f i c f a c t s ) more e a s i l y i f s o l u t i o n s to o t h e r i s s u e s were not a v a i l a b l e to c r e a t e a t o t a l b e n e f i t comparison. In g e n e r a l , however, there should be a tendency f o r d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e s to be t r e a t e d together. P r i m a r i l y because t h e r e i s not a g r e a t l i k e l i h o o d 77 that the opposite would or could commit i t s e l f to a singular solution to one issue before a l l issues are considered (Goldenberg, 1975) but also because two issues provide two sets of information and possible t a c t i c s plus c e r t a i n t a c t i c s which are generated from the combination. The l a t t e r refers to a concession process s i m i l a r to that mentioned above (pp. 72, 73) where each party attempts to manipulate the other's net u t i l i t y function for one issue through another. In the present case the issues may be of equal importance to the p a r t i e s . A concession strategy should allow for a quicker resolution of both problems because the fear of l o s s on one may be compensated f o r by a r e l a t i v e gain on another. Walton and McKersie (1965» p. 177) o f f e r two empirical instances of a trade-off of d i s t r i b u t i v e issues: (1) 1950, General Motors versus U.A.W.—a f i v e year agreement traded for a union shop clause. (2) 1961, American Motors versus U.A.W.—operating concessions traded for a p r o f i t sharing plan. PREDICTIONS (WHEN) Situations (a) through (d) of Figure 8 should therefore produce a concensus f o r separate processes. S i m i l a r l y , agreement on a single process for s i t u a t i o n (e) should be had. Where disagreement i s predicted to occur [ ( f ) and (g)] the party desiring the d i s t r i b u t i v e process w i l l carry the the decision. This i s because t o t a l cooperation i s necessary f o r the integrative process whereas the d i s t r i b u t i v e process requires only p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I f the problem i s to I 7 8 . be considered at a l l i t must be on the terms of the party desiring 'D'. The acquiescence of the • I ' party to the domination of the 'D' party i s guaranteed by the over-bearing nature of the d i s t r i b u t i v e process with regard to information. I f data i s not shared both parties can only act i n an i n d i f f e r e n t manner, whereas u n v e i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n may be used to hurt or help at the receiving party's di s c r e t i o n (Seigal and Fouraker, I960, p. 102). SUMMARY (WHY AND WHEN) The above discussion concluded that a desire f o r a separation of problems f o r the purpose of separating processes w i l l only exist i f both p a r t i e s wish to pursue an integrative process. In the preceeding chapter i t was indicated that t h i s condition was u n l i k e l y unless both parties perceived a pote n t i a l f o r an integrative solution and a forthcoming integrative response from the other party. Given a pa i r of problems and at le a s t one party who desires to pursue the d i s t r i b u t i v e process for both problems, t h i s process w i l l i n fact be followed regardless of the other party's wishes. Separation Strategies  SEPARATION CONSTRAINTS The above discussion determined when each of the processes w i l l be chosen and when separation w i l l be considered appropriate. Even a mutual desire to separate processes, however, does not indicate whether the separate processes 79. have any chance f o r successful completion. Given the cooper-ative nature of th® integrative process and the suspicious nature of the d i s t r i b u t i v e process, the p r o b a b i l i t y of successful separation rests with the a b i l i t y of the pa r t i e s to discount a number of constraints which complicate a complete and thorough separation. (a) Information (Confidential Necessity) The preceeding discussion has indicated that the integrative process requires the unveili n g of any and a l l facts which may be relevant to the problem at hand. In a relationship which r e l i e s on a d i s t r i b u t i v e process to deal with other issues, there i s a high p r o b a b i l i t y that some information considered applicable to the d i s t r i b u t i v e process ( c o s t / p r o f i t figures, union membership d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ) w i l l not be w i l l i n g l y shared i n an integrative process. This circumstance w i l l severely hinder the progress of the l a t t e r . For t h i s reason, relationships which practice both processes may r e s t r i c t subjects going through an integrative 2 process to f a i r l y inconsequential problems. The grounds f o r t h i s conclusion again l i e i n the domineering nature of the d i s t r i b u t i v e process with regard to information. I f the opposite perceives d i s t r i b u t i v e p o t e n t i a l , the party with an integrative orientation w i l l be s t r a t e g i c a l l y damaged. 2 Reference to t h i s phenomenon i s i m p l i c i t i n much of the l i t e r a t u r e dealing with labour-management cooperative r e l a -tionships. For example, see Weinburg, 1976 or The story of a pioneer i n c r i s i s - f r e e bargaining, 1964. 80 ( b ) S u s p i c i o n I f t h e p a r t i e s h a v e h a d e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s o p e n i n g m a n e u v e r s i n a n i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s w i l l u n d o u b t a b l y b e t e m p e r e d b y a f e a r o f e x p l o i t a t i o n . T h i s i s a n i n e v i t a b l e p r o b l e m b e c a u s e o f t h e s e c r e t i v e n a t u r e o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s . I f i n i t i a t i n g t a c t i c s o r s p e c i f i c s t r u c t u r a l s t r a t e g i e s ( s e e b e l o w ) c a n n o t c r e a t e a m u t u a l l y b e l i e v a b l e a t m o s p h e r e o f t r u s t , t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s w i l l e i t h e r b r e a k d o w n c o m p l e t e l y o r r e v e r t t o a game o f i n f o r m a t i o n t r a d i n g . The l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n w o u l d h i n d e r m o v e m e n t t h r o u g h t h e r e q u i r e d s t e p s b e c a u s e t h e r e w o u l d n e v e r b e a c o m p l e t e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e p r o b l e m . T h i s w o u l d b e t h e c a s e b e c a u s e t h e r e i s l i t t l e c h a n c e t h a t e a c h s i d e h o l d s t h e same a m o u n t ( a n d v a l u e ) o f i n f o r m a t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y a o n e f o r o n e t r a d e w i l l l e a v e o n e p a r t y w i t h a e x c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s c o n s t r a i n t w i l l b e v e r y s t r o n g i f a p a r t y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e p r o b l e m h a s i n t e g r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l b u t i s u n s u r e o f t h e o p p o s i t e p a r t y ' s c o n c e p t i o n s ( i . e . c a s e s 2 a n d 5 o f T a b l e 1 ) . ( c ) E e v e n g e ( P h y s i c a l ) P h y s i c a l r e v e n g e r e f e r s t o a n i n c l i n a t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f e i t h e r o r b o t h p a r t i e s t o s e e k r e d r e s s f o r p e r c e i v e d i m p r o p e r d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e i n p a s t w i n / l o s e o u t c o m e s - s — i . e . o n e p a r t y f e e l s t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t y w o n t o o m a n y ( o r m u c h ) c o n c e s s i o n s ( m o n e y e t c . ) i n p r e v i o u s n e g o t i a t i o n s . S u c h a m o t i v e w o u l d i n j e c t a d i s t r i b u t i v e m e n t a l i t y i n t o t h e a t t e m p t e d i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s . T h i s s i t u a t i o n w o u l d u n d e r m i n e 81 the integrative process by giving-weight to s p e c i f i c solutions. Discussions based on feelings and preferences are counter-productive i n a l l steps of the process because they force commitments and create defensive reactions. The existence of a revenge motive i s dependent upon the degree to which the pa r t i e s stressed the idea of winning i n past d i s t r i b u t i v e processes. A past record of s t r i k e s and/or hard bargaining, f o r example, may indicate that the party stressing the hard stance has set i t s e l f up to f e e l a l o s e r or winner/ Even the resolution of a grievance produces a l o s e r and winner syndrome, "...thereby increasing the l e v e l of labour-management f r i c t i o n [Davey, 1972, p. 148]." (d) Revenge (Psychological) The i n c l i n a t i o n to gain psychological revenge over the other party re l a t e s to personal feelings of h o s t i l i t y and d i s l i k e towards members of the other party's team. Schutz (1958) suggests that such h o s t i l e personal emotions are uncon-t r o l l a b l y transferred to every s i t u a t i o n i n which the o r i g i n a l target i s present. He c i t e s cases where t h i s transfer has created l i s t e n i n g d i s t o r t i o n s and pursuent unwarranted negative reactions. In an integrative process such behavior w i l l raise r e c i p r o c a l h o s t i l i t y and a defensive stance (Steiner, 1974) as well as l i m i t either party's a b i l i t y to c r e a t i v e l y seek a solution (Hinton, 1968, pp. 211-217). It w i l l also r e s t r i c t the aggressor's a b i l i t y to agree on an otherwise good solution ( i . e . unnecessary and s t r a t e g i c a l l y unsound commitments). 82. ( e ) A u d i e n c e s M o s t o f t h e s e p a r a t i o n c o n s t r a i n t s a l r e a d y o u t l i n e d a r e e x a c e r b a t e d b y t h e p r e s e n c e o f a n a u d i e n c e . P o o r l y i n f o r m e d c o n s t i t u e n c i e s may d e v e l o p a n y n u m b e r o f i r r a t i o n a l e m o t i o n s ( B l u m , 1 9 6 1 ) , t h e m o r e g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d o f w h i c h w i l l h a m p e r t h e a b i l i t y o f e v e n a p e r f e c t l y r a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t o r t o a c t a s h e b e l i e v e s i s o t h e r w i s e a p p r o p r i a t e . A n a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f t h i s c o n s t r a i n t b y n e g o t i a t o r s i s d e m o n s t r a t e d i n t h i s s t a t e m e n t b y a u n i o n p r e s i d e n t ( L a b o u r G a z e t t e , J a n . 1975 p.43): T o d a y s t r a d e u n i o n i s t s . . . h a v e a n i n n a t e s u s p i c i o n o f t h e " e s t a b l i s h m e n t " , a n d t h a t s o m e t i m e s ^ i n c l u d e s t h e i r o w n e l e c t e d l e a d e r s . T h e r a n k a n d f i l e a r e t h o r o u g h l y i m b u e d w i t h t h e a d v e r s a r y c o n c e p t . . . a n d u n i o n o f f i c e r s who p a r t i c i p a t e [ i n c o o p e r a t i v e d i s c u s s i o n s ] a r e o f t e n a c c u s e d o f " f r a t e r n i z i n g w i t h t h e e n e m y " . ( f ) B a r g a i n i n g P o w e r P o s i t i o n The i n s t i g a t i o n o r c o m p l e t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a n i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s may b e r e s t r i c t e d b y t h e p a r t i e s * h e s i t a t i o n t o w a r d a p p e a r i n g w e a k . E v e n a p a r t y who i s o b v i o u s l y v e r y s t r o n g may f e a r t h e o p p o s i t e * s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , ' a l t h o u g h s u b s t a n t i a l p o w e r d i s p a r i t i e s m a k e t h i s e v e n t l e s s l i k e l y . A s a r e s u l t , n e i t h e r p a r t y may c h o o s e t o a l t e r a d i s t r i b u t i v e l y b a s e d s y s t e m w h i c h i s a p p a r e n t l y o p e r a t i n g e f f e c t i v e l y . T h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t some c r i s i s may b e n e c e s -s a r y t o p r o v i d e s u f f i c i e n t m o t i v a t i o n . O n c e i n a n i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s , a c o n c e r n f o r p a r t i s a n p o w e r p o s i t i o n s may l i m i t t h e w i l l i n g n e s s t o p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y . 83. Summary o f C o n s t r a i n t s T h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s a r e e x p e c t e d t o i n f l u e n c e a n a c t u a l d e c i s i o n t o s e p a r a t e p r o b l e m s t h r o u g h a p a r t i s a n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h e y r e p r e s e n t . A g a i n , t h e d e c i s i o n i s f l a v o u r e d b y a d o m i n e e r i n g d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s a n d v a r y i n g d e g r e e s o f r i s k a v e r s i o n . P o r t h e f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s , h o w e v e r , i t i s a s s u m e d t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n t o s e p a r a t e p r o b l e m s h a s a l r e a d y b e e n made a n d t h e c h i e f c o n c e r n i s t o make s e p a r a t e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s w o r k . E v e n i f a m u t u a l s e p a r a t i o n m o t i v e e x i s t s , c o o p a r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l c a n n o t b e b r o u g h t t o f r u i t i o n u n l e s s t h e c o n s t r a i n t s a r e o v e r c o m e . S E P A R A T I O N S T R A T E G I E S (HOW) The p u r p o s e o f t h i s s e c t i o n i s t o o u t l i n e how t h e s e p a r -a t i o n d e c i s i o n i s t e m p e r e d b y s t r a t e g i c n e c e s s i t y ( i . e . f o r s u c c e s s , s t r a t e g i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s m u s t b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t ) . C o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e l i s t e d c o n s t r a i n t s , t h e p a r t i e s may c h o o s e f r o m a m u l t i t u d e o f s e p a r a t i o n s t r a t e g i e s . A n y n u m b e r o f s p e c i f i c s t r a t e g i e s a r e a v a i l a b l e , b u t o n l y f o u r s i m p l e s t r u c t u r e s e x i s t . T h e s e a r e d e m o n s t r a t e d i n F i g u r e 9. The I n s e r t F i g u r e 9 h e r e s u c c e s s o f a s e p a r a t i o n a t t e m p t w i l l d e p e n d o n t h e a b i l i t y o f e a c h o r a n y o f t h e s e s t r u c t u r e s t o d e a l w i t h t h e a b o v e i m p e d i m e n t s . A p e r u s a l o f b e h a v i o r a l s c i e n c e a n d b u s i n e s s i n d e x e s t o g e t h e r w i t h i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e r e v e a l e d a 84 F I G U R E 9 STRUCTURAL S E P A R A T I O N S T R A T E G I E S Same N e g o t i a t o r s f o r D i f f e r e n t N e g o t i a t o r s f o r • I ' a n d ' D ' p r o c e s s e s ' I ' a n d ' D ' p r o c e s s e s C o n c u r r e n t P r o c e s s e s N o n -c o n c u r r e n t P r o c e s s e s B D 85 n u m b e r o f e x a m p l e s o f s e p a r a t i o n a t t e m p t s . H o w e v e r , d i f f e r e n t r e p o r t i n g s t y l e s a n d r e s e a r c h m e t h o d s l i m i t t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h c o m p a r i s o n s c a n b e made a n d h y p o t h e s e s l e g i t i m a t e l y s u p p o r t e d . C l e a r l y a l l o f t h e c o n s t r a i n t s m e n t i o n e d may o p e r a t e t o v a r y i n g d e g r e e s i n d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r e s . S u c h v a r i a t i o n s a r e n o t a l t o g e t h e r u n p r e d i c t a b l e , c o n s e q u e n t l y , a l t h o u g h t h e d i s c u s s i o n i s o f a b r o a d s u g g e s t i v e n a t u r e , a g e n e r a l h y p o t h e s i s i s j u s t i f i e d . ( I l l ) W h e r e s u c c e s s i s d e f i n e d a s a c o m p l e t e d p r o c e s s ( w i t h s o l u t i o n ) , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a s u c c e s s f u l s e p a r a t i o n o f a n i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s f r o m a d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s i s e x p e c t e d t o i n c r e a s e w i t h t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h ; ! t h e p a r t i e s c a n a v o i d o r d e a l w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n s t r a i t s t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f n o n - d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i -c i p a n t s a n d a v a r i e d t i m e - s t r u c t u r e . A s i n d i c a t e d i n F i g u r e 9 , t i m i n g a n d t h e b a r g a i n i n g o r i e n t a t i o n o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e t h e v a r i a b l e s w h i c h m a k e t h e f o u r s t r u c t u r a l s t r a t e g i e s d i f f e r e n t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n i s o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d t h e p r e d i c t e d a n d e x p e r i e n c e d s u c c e s s o f e a c h s t r u c t u r e . ( a ) S t r u c t u r a l S t r a t e g y A The f i r s t s t r u c t u r e i s d e f i n e d a s o n e s e t o f n e g o t i a t o r s a t t e m p t i n g t o s w i t c h b a c k a n d f o r t h b e t w e e n p r o b l e m s , a c c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r t h e l a t t e r a r e o f i n t e g r a t i v e o r d i s t r i b u t i v e p o t e n t i a l . T h i s s t r u c t u r e i s p e r h a p s t h e l e a s t l i k e l y t o s u c c e e d b e c a u s e o f t h e e x t r e m e l y c l o s e p r o x i m i t y o f t h e p r o c e s s e s . B o t h p a r t i e s w i l l f i n d i t v e r y h a r d t o o f f e r s r j y i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h may b e u s e d t o e l i c i t a b e t t e r s h a r e 86 . i n t h e c o n c u r r e n t d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s . S u s p i c i o n s a r e l i k e l y t o b e h i g h b e c a u s e n e i t h e r p a r t y w i l l b e s u r e a s t o w h e t h e r a p p a r e n t i n t e g r a t i v e t a c t i c s a r e n o t r e a l l y a d i s g u i s e d d i s t r i b u t i v e v a r i e t y . V o l u n t a r y a d m i s s i o n s o f a n i n t e g r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e may b e a t t e m p t s t o d i s c e r n o r a l t e r t h e o p p o s i t e * s p e r c e p t i o n s o f h i s own u t i l i t i e s . P o r e x a m p l e , a n e x a g g e r a t e d c o n c e r n e x p r e s s e d b y m a n a g e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e e m p l o y e e s * r e a l w a g e s ( b u y i n g p o w e r ) c o u l d b e u s e d t o i n c r e a s e t h e s u r f a c e v a l i d i t y o f t h e f o r m e r p a r t y ' s e x p r e s s e d f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n s r e g a r d i n g " a b i l i t y t o p a y " . T h i s w i l l r e d u c e t h e u n i o n ' s a s p i r a t i o n s ( A A o f O F i g u r e 7) a n d i n c r e a s e p e r c e i v e d a s p i r a t i o n s o f m a n a g e m e n t ( A B ) . B y t h e same t o k e n , a r g u m e n t s s t r e s s i n g t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r m u t u a l g a i n o n o n e p r o b l e m c o u l d b e a n a t t e m p t t o g i v e t h e p r o b l e m a n a r t i f i c i a l l y l o w p r i o r i t y s o t h a t t r a d e s w i l l b e m o r e f a v o u r a b l e . P h y s i c a l r e v e n g e may n o t b e e v i d e n t i n a s t r i c t s e n s e b e c a u s e n o n e o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e i s s u e s b e i n g h a n d l e d i n t h e c o n c u r r e n t d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s w i l l h a v e b e e n f i n a l i z e d . H o w e v e r , t h e r e w i l l b e a n u r g e t o c o n s i d e r t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o b l e m s a s h a v i n g p o t e n t i a l f o r c o n c e s s i o n t a c t i c s , t h e r e b y l i m i t i n g t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h p e r c e i v e d i n t e g r a t i v e p r o b l e m s a r e a s s i g n e d t o a n i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s i n i t i a l l y ( s e e a b o v e , p p . 72,73). P s y c h o l o g i c a l r e v e n g e i s m u c h m o r e l i k e l y t o a r i s e . U n l e s s t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s h a v e b e e n u n u s u a l l y h a r m o n i o u s some i l l - w i l l w i l l p e r s i s t i n m e m b e r s o f o n e o r b o t h p a r t i e s , 87. p a r t i e u l a r l l y i f Glass I t a c t i c s have been employed—an almost inevitable s i t u a t i o n i n the d i s t r i b u t i v e process. Even the audience effect w i l l be exaggerated i n t h i s structure* Constituencies expect tough bargaining at any time (Labour Gazette, Jan. 1975) but almost c e r t a i n l y i n r e l a t i o n to the written contract. Since d i s t r i b u t i v e issues are usually r e l a t e d to t h i s contract, attempts at a concur-rent integrative process are much more l i k e l y to be perceived as " s e l l i n g out". The P a c i f i c Coast (U.S.A.) pulp and paper industry provides an example of a negative constituency reaction. In 1964 a period of comparatively c r i s i s free negotiations was shattered when the rank and f i l e became s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r negotiators* secret and apparently soft dealings with management to replace the former with more m i l i t a n t types (Levinson, 1966, pp. 91-94). The previous attempts at r a t i o n a l discussion within the general d i s t r i b u t i v e framework had i n i f a c t been producing f a i r l y good settlements (Northrup and Young, 1968). The Steel industry's (U.S.A.) f i r s t Human Relations Committee established i n I960 represents the only complete example found which f i t s into the Structure A framework. After many years of v i o l e n t and c o s t l y confrontation an attempt at cooperative interchange was proposed by the union i n the form of a j o i n t union-management committee with two neutral chairmen. This committee was to "...plan and oversee studies and recommend solutions to mutual problems [ F e l l e r , 1968, p. 153]." Proposed problems included long term income 88 d i s t r i b u t i o n , j o b c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , wage i n c e n t i v e s , s e n i o r i t y , m e d i c a l c a r e e t c . U n f o r t u n . a t e l f e r t h e u n i o n a n d m a n a g e m e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w e r e t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g c o m m i t t e e s a n d t h e c h o s e n " n e u t r a l " c h a i r m e n w e r e t h e t w o p a r t i e s ' c h i e f n e g o t i a t o r s . A s p r e d i c t e d ( I n d u s t r y W e e k , D e c . 6 , 1 9 7 1 ) : . . . s o m e u n i o n l e a d e r s c h a r g e d t h a t some s u p e r v i s o r s a t t e m p t e d t o r e d u c e m a n n i n g i n a m a n n e r c o n t r a r y t o t h e a g r e e m e n t , a n d m a n a g e m e n t a c c u s e d some u n i o n s o f t r y i n g t o u s e t h e c o m m i t t e e t o t a k e u p g r i e v a n c e s t h a t c o u l d n o t b e p r o c e s s e d t h r o u g h n o r m a l p r o c e d u r e s . U n a b l e t o o v e r c o m e s u s p i c i o n s o f i n f o r m a t i o n m i s s u s e e t c . t h i s c o m m i t t e e p r o d u c e d o n l y o n e s h e e t o f p a p e r l i s t i n g a l l o f t h e f a c t o r s w h i c h c o u l d b e a r g u e d t o b e r e l e v a n t t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p e r i o d i c wage a n d b e n e f i t a d j u s t m e n t s . ( F e l l e r , 1 9 6 8 , p . 1 5 4 ) . ( b ) S t r u c t u r a l S t r a t e g y B S t r u c t u r e B i s d e f i n e d a s n o n - d i s t r i b u t i v e n e g o t i a t o r s i n v o l v e d i n a n i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s a t t h e same t i m e t h a t o t h e r p a r t y n e g o t i a t o r s a r e i n v o l v e d i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s . T h i s s t r u c t u r e r u n s u p a g a i n s t m a n y o f t h e same p r o b l e m s e n c o u n t e r e d i n S t r u c t u r e A , b u t , . t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t . T h i s i s b e c a u s e t h e u s e o f n o n - d i s t r i b u t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s i s e x p e c t e d t o r e d u c e t h e n e c e s s i t y o f c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t r o l ; t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h o n e p a r t y f e a r s m i s s u s e o f t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i n a s u b s e q u e n t d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s ; a n d t h e l e v e l o f e m o t i o n a l s t a b i l i t y o f t h e b a r g a i n e r s . T h e n e e d f o r c o n t r o l o f c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s r e d u c e d b e c a u s e t h e n e g o t i a t o r s a r e c o n s i d e r i n g o n l y o n e 89 p r o b l e m , p r e s u m a b l y w h i l e o t h e r s p u r s u e o t h e r p r o b l e m s . I f d i s c u s s i o n a n d d a t a c o n s i d e r a t i o n c a n b e l i m i t e d t o t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s , c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n c e a s e s t o b e a p r o b l e m . T h i s s i t u a t i o n i s m u c h m o r e l i k e l y w h e n t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e n o t d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n e r s i n a n o t h e r a r e n a b e c a u s e t h e r e i s l e s s t e m p -t a t i o n t o t r a n s f e r i n f o r m a t i o n t o a d i s t r i b u t i v e f o r u m . I n a d d i t i o n , i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s n e g o t i a t o r s may n o t h a v e b e e n c o g n i z a n t o f t h e i r p a r t i e s ' s t r a t e g y i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e y may n o t - k n o w w h i c h i n f o r -m a t i o n t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i v e c o u n t e r p a r t s a r e s t r a t e g i c a l l y m a n i p u l a t i n g . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e y h a v e n o g r o u n d s o n w h i c h t o l i m i t i n f o r m a t i o n f l o w . S u s p i c i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n m i s s u s e i s r e d u c e d f o r a l l o f t h e same r e a s o n s . P s y c h o l o g i c a l r e v e n g e i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e d u c e d b e c a u s e t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s h a v e n o t t r a d e d C l a s s I t a c t i c s i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e a t m o s p h e r e . T h e r e h a s , b e e n n o o p p o r t u n i t y f o r i l l - w i l l t o d e v e l o p . The v a l i d i t y o f t h e s e p r e d i c t i o n s i s d e m o n s t r a t e d i n s e v e r a l e x a m p l e s . I n o n e c a s e ( B l a k e , S h e p a r d , a n d M o u t o n , 1968) w h e r e b o t h p a r t i e s h a d r e a c h e d a n a p p a r e n t l y u n s o l v a b l e i m p a s s e i n c o n v e n t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s , o n e p a r t y ( m a n a g e m e n t ) p r o p o s e d t h e n o v e l s u g g e s t i o n t h a t a l l i s s u e s i n d i s p u t e b e s e p a r a t e d a n d b i - p a r t i t e c o m m i t t e e s e s t a b l i s h e d t o " . . . g a t h e r f a c t s a n d t o p r o p o s e a s e r i e s o f p r e f e r r e d s o l u t i o n s t o b e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e ( m a i n ) b a r g a i n i n g c o m m i t t e e i n t h e f o r m o f 90 recommended solutions [Blake et a l . , p. 137]." Committees made up of non-bargaining s t a f f members from each side i approached d i f f e r e n t problems through a c l a s s i c integrative process as described above: " . . . j o i n t problem d e f i n i t i o n , focusing on a range of solutions, increasing the base of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and attempting to demonstrate willingness to cooperate [Blake et a l . , p. 137]." After some d i f f i c u l t i e s i n overpowering partisan orientations, adequate solutions were found. The tentative conclusion stemming from t h i s example i s that the use of new, non-distributive participants avoided the constraints which had been keeping t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i v e counterparts deadlocked. This program su b s t a n t i a l l y reduced the problem of c o n f i d e n t i a l information because the p a r t i -cipants were not hardened by experience i n d i s t r i b u t i v e processes and were not cognizant of previous d i s t r i b u t i v e bargaining strategies. Suspicions and revenge tendencies were s i m i l a r l y contained because of a lack of a h i s t o r y of confrontation, and the audience effect was s u r p r i s i n g l y reduced simply because of the professional, n o n - p o l i t i c a l status of committee members. The Steel industry also provides an example within the Structure B framework. At the same time that the Human Relations Committee was i n existence, various sub-committees made up of lawyers, economists, and research s p e c i a l i s t s (appointed and non-bargaining s t a f f ) were d i l i g e n t l y at work on problems which were mutually considered by members of the 91 m a i n c o m m i t t e e t o h a v e i n t e g r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l ( F e l l e r , 1968, p . 1 5 5 ; O r r , 1973 , p . 7 4 ) . S u c h p r o b l e m s i n c l u d e d r e s t r u c -t u r i n g o f S e n i o r i t y r u l e s g o v e r n i n g l a y o f f s , t h e c r e a t i o n o f a n i n t e r - p l a n t j o b o p p o r t u n i t i e s p r o g r a m , t h e r e v i s i o n o f t h e j o b c l a s s i f i c a t i o n m a n u a l , , a n d t h e s u g g e s t i o n f o r r e s t r u c t u r i n g t h e c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t . E c o n o m i c i s s u e s a n d r e l a t e d c r i t e r i a w e r e s p e c i f i c a l l y l e f t o u t o f d i s c u s -s i o n s a n d r u l e s w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d s u c h t h a t a l l d i s c u s s i o n s w e r e o f f t h e r e c o r d a n d c o u l d n o t b e r e p e a t e d i n a n y o t h e r p r o c e s s o r f o r u m . T h i s a r r a n g e m e n t w o r k e d w e l l i n d e r i v i n g s o l u t i o n s ( F e l l e r , 1968, p . 1 5 8 ) . A g a i n , t h e u s e o f n o n - d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n e r s o v e r c a m e t h e i m p e d i m e n t s a n d s o l u t i o n s w e r e d e v e l o p e d . E v e n t h o u g h m u t u a l s u s p i c i o n , i n f o r m a t i o n c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y a n d r e v e n g e w e r e c o n t a i n e d , h o w e v e r , t h e a u d i e n c e c o n s t r a i n t e v e n t u a l l y r u i n e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p . The u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p w h i c h h a d h e l p e d e s t a b l i s h t h e s u b - c o m m i t t e e a r r a n g e m e n t h a d made n o p r o v i s i o n s t o e x p l a i n o r j u s t i f y t h e s i t u a t i o n t o t h e r a n k a n d f i l e ( F e l l e r , p . 1 5 7 ) . A s a c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e y w e r e d e p o s e d f o u r y e a r s l a t e r b e c a u s e t h e m e m b e r s b e c a m e c o n c e r n e d t h a t t h e y w e r e b e i n g e x p l o i t e d b y t h e c o o p e r a t i v e a t m o s p h e r e . The u s e o f n o n - p o l i t i c a l c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s w a s a n i n s u f -f i c i e n t p r e c a u t i o n a g a i n s t n e g a t i v e a u d i e n c e r e s p o n s e . A s s u g g e s t e d i n t h e l a s t e x a m p l e , t h e a u d i e n c e c o n s t r a i n t r e p r e -s e n t s t h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t i m p e d i m e n t t o t h e s u c c e s s o f S t r u c t u r e B . A l t h o u g h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e n o n - p o l i t i c a l , m a k i n g t h e p r o c e s s i t s e l f l i k e l y t o s u c c e e d , t h e i r a c t i o n s 92 r e m a i n t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p . The l a t t e r * s f e a r o f a u d i e n c e r e s p o n s e may c a u s e i t t o l i m i t t h e f r e e d o m o f t h e p r o c e s s p a r t i c i p a n t s . A f a i l u r e t o t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h i s c o n s t r a i n t c o u l d u n s e a t t h e l e a d e r s h i p a n d t e r m i n a t e t h e c o m m i t t e e s . ( c ) -STRUCTURAL STRATEGY 0 S t r u c t u r e C i s d e f i n e d a s t h e u s e o f d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n e r s a t a t i m e w h e n n o d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s b e i n g c a r r i e d o n . T h i s s t r u c t u r e r e p r e s e n t s a n o t h e r s i t -u a t i o n w h e r e t h e n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s o f t h e c o n s t r a i n t s a r e e x p e c t e d t o b e r e d u c e d . I n t h i s i n s t a n c e t h e a l t e r e d v a r i a b l e i s t h e t i m e f a c t o r . A s i n d i c a t e d a b o v e , t h e p r e s s u r e s o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e n s e r e g a r d i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h may r e f l e c t a n i m a g e o f a p a r t y ' s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s . T h i s i s b e c a u s e t h e m a n a g e m e n t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s t h e k e y t o o b t a i n i n g a l a r g e b e n e f i t s h a r e . P r e s u m a b l y , i f a d i s t r i -b u t i v e p r o c e s s i s n o t g o i n g o n c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h a n i n t e g -r a t i v e p r o c e s s t h e f e a r o f i n f o r m a t i o n m i s s u s e w i l l b e r e d u c e d s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o i m m e d i a t e f o r u m i n w h i c h t o m i s s u s e i t . S i m i l a r l y , t h e a u d i e n c e e f f e c t w i l l d e c r e a s e i n i m p a c t b e c a u s e o f t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s a n d t h e s e p a r a t e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s . A p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p , h o w e v e r , m u s t s t i l l b e w a r y o f t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t ' s d i s t r u s t C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e a u d i e n c e e f f e c t w i l l r e m a i n t o some d e g r e e . I t i s h a r d t o p r e d i c t how m u c h o f t h e r e v e n g e c o n s t r a i n t s 93 w i l l p e r s i s t o v e r t i m e . A s s t a t e d , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a p h y s i c a l r e v e n g e m o t i v e i s d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h p a s t d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s e s w e r e v i e w e d i n a w i n / l o s e p e r s p e c t i v e . The d e g r e e t o w h i c h p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e v e n g e p e r s i s t s i s a f u n c t i o n o f t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s e m p l o y e d C l a s s I t a c t i c s i n p a s t d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s e s . I t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e i n t e n s i t y o f e m o t i o n a l e f f e c t i s r e d u c e d t o r a t i o n a l i t y ' o v e r t i m e , h o w e v e r , S h u t z ' (1958) c o n c l u s i o n s s u g g e s t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g f e e l i n g s r e q u i r e a v e r y l o n g p e r i o d t o d i s s i p a t e . P e r s o n a l d i s t r e s s o v e r a n o p p o s i t e a c t o r ' s u s e o f C l a s s I t a c t i c s c o u l d p e r s i s t a s a p e r s o n a l d i s l i k e f o r y e a r s . One a t t e m p t a t s e p a r a t i o n t h r o u g h S t r u c t u r e C w a s t a k e n i n t h e U . S . A . r a i l r o a d i n d u s t r y i n 1968 ( W e i n b u r g , 1976). F o l l o w i n g t h e m u t u a l c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c f u t u r e o f t h e r a i l r o a d i n d u s t r y w a s s o m e w h a t d i m , a c o m m i t t e e w a s j o i n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d t o d i s c u s s m a t t e r s o f m u t u a l l a b o u r -m a n a g e m e n t c o n c e r n r e l a t i n g t o s a f e t y , l e g i s l a t i o n , a n d e d u c a t i o n w i t h i n t h e i n d u s t r y . T h e R a i l r o a d L a b o r - M a n a g e m e n t C o m m i t t e e w a s c o m p o s e d o f t h e h e a d s o f a l l l a b o u r a n d m a n a g e -m e n t g r o u p s — e l e v e n c o m p a n i e s , s i x u n i o n s , o n e e m p l o y e r a s s o c i a t i o n . The e x p r e s s p u r p o s e w a s t o d i s c u s s t h e s e m a t t e r s i n a s e t t i n g r e m o v e d f r o m t h e p r e s s u r e s o f t h e b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e ( W e i n b u r g , 1976, p . 18). T h u s f a r t h i s c o m m i t t e e h a s f a i l e d t o r e s o l v e a s i n g l e p r o b l e m . The c h i e f a c c o m p l i s h m e n t h a s b e e n t o e s t a b l i s h a s u b - c o m m i t t e e t o s t u d y i n e f f i c i e n c y i n t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f 9 4 . r a i l r o a d t e r m i n a l s . No s p e c i f i c s c o u l d b e f o u n d r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r e c i s e r e a s o n s f o r t h e m a i n c o m m i t t e e ' s l a c k o f s u c c e s s , b u t some h i n t c a n b e d r a w n f r o m t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e s u b - c o m m i t t e e . The l a t t e r h a s s u r v i v e d a n d p r o v e d v e r y s u c c e s s f u l i n s t r e a m -l i n i n g t e r m i n a l o p e r a t i o n s ( s e e n e x t s e c t i o n ) , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e m a i n c o m m i t t e e c o u l d n o t r i d t h e m s e l v e s o f t h e c o n s t r a i n t s b u t t h e s u b - c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s c o u l d . The o n l y a l t e r e d f a c t o r i s t h e human v a r i a b l e , a n d b e c a u s e s u c h a n a l t e r a t i o n i s e x p e c t e d t o r e d u c e r e v e n g e a n d s u s p i c i o n i t m u s t b e i n c l u d e d t h a t t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s h i n d e r e d t h e r p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e m a i n c o m m i t t e e . The h i s t o r y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s u p p o r t s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . A p a r t i c u l a r l y h a r d a n d a c c r i m o n i o u s d i s t r i b u t i v e l y o r i e n t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p u n d o u -b t a b l y e m p l o y e d C l a s s I t a c t i c s a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y r a i s e d r e v e n g e i n c l i n a t i o n s . The b e s t e x a m p l e o f S t r u c t u r e C i s r e p o r t e d b y D r i s c o l l ( 1 9 7 6 ) . T h i s r e s e a r c h e r r e p o r t s t h a t a j o i n t c o m m i t t e e e x i s t e d f o r a s h o r t p e r i o d i n a l a r g e u r b a n h o s p i t a l i n t h e N o r t h e a s t U . S . A . T h i s c o m m i t t e e h a d t h e e x c l u s i v e t a s k o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a n e x p e r i m e n t a l p r o g r a m t o i m p r o v e t h e q u a l i t y o f w o r k i n g l i f e i n t h e h o s p i t a l . I t i n c l u d e d m e m b e r s o f t h e h o s p i t a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f r o m t h r e e l a b o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . One o f t h e l a t t e r w a s a f u l l - t i m e d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n e r o n a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l u n i o n s t a f f . T h i s man i n i t i a l l y s h o w e d a n o t a b l e a m o u n t o f s u s p i c i o u s b e h a v i o r — c o m p l a i n t s o f t h e n u m b e r o f h o s p i t a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s 95. o n t h e c o m m i t t e e e t c . — b u t r e s e a r c h e r s i n d i c a t e d t h a t a f t e r n i n e s e s s i o n s h e w a s a b l e t o s a y " . . . I t r u s t e v e r y o n e " a n d i n d e e d , b e g a n r e f e r r i n g t o t h e c o m m i t t e e a s "my b a b y " . T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s i n d i c a t e t h e a b i l i t y t o o v e r c o m e s u s p i c i o n a n d a n y r e v e n g e t e n d e n c i e s w h i c h may h a v e e x i s t e d . A f t e r f i v e m o n t h s o f m e e t i n g s a f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s t h r e a t e n e d t h e m u n i c i p a l g o v e r n m e n t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t f o r i n c r e a s e d w a g e s , e t c . , a n d a t t h e same t i m e a h e w * . ' h o s p i t a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r t o o k o f f i c e a n d i m m e d i a t e l y i n i t i a t e d a p l a n w h i c h c u t i n t o t h e c o m m i t t e e ' s s u b j e c t a r e a . T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s w o u l d b e e x p e c t e d t o r a i s e p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s f o r a u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a p p a r e n t l y c o n s o r t i n g w i t h m a n a g e m e n t t y p e s ( L a b o u r G a z e t t e , J a n . 1975), a n d p r e d i c t a b l y t h e u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e m i s s e d s e v e r a l m e e t i n g s . I n h i s own w o r d s h e o u t l i n e d h i s p o s i t i o n ( D r i s c o l l , 1976): . . . I c a n ' t h o b n o b f o r a n h o u r a w e e k a n d t h e n f a c e y o u a s t h e o p p o s i t i o n i f n e c e s s a r y , , [ p . 11]. He f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e d h i s p r e d i c a m e n t b y i n t r o d u c i n g t h e f o r m a l c o n c e p t i o n t h a t a n y t h i n g r e s o l v e d b y t h e c o m m i t t e e w a s s u b j e c t t o h i s u n i o n ' s a p p r o v a l , a b l a t a n t i n t r u s i o n o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e s i d e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p . E v e n t u a l l y t h i s man f o r m a l l y w i t h d r e w f r o m t h e c o m m i t t e e . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e s e a s o n e d d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n e r m a n a g e d t o o v e r c o m e h i s i n i t i a l s u s p i c i o n s a n d r e a c t i o n s r e l a t e d t o c o n s t r a i n t s ( a ) a n d ( b ) ( I n f o r m a t i o n a n d s u s p i c i o n ) . C o n s t r a i n t ( d ) ( p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e v e n g e ) w a s n e v e r a f a c t o r > b e c a u s e t h e s e p e o p l e h a d n o t b e e n i n v o l v e d b e f o r e . T h e s e f a c t s 96. i n d i c a t e t h a t s u c c e s s i n S t r u c t u r e C i s p o s s i b l e i f s t h e c h i e f i m p e d i m e n t i s m u t u a l s u s p i c i o n b e t w e e n d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h i s c a s e r e p r e s e n t s t h e d e b i l i t a t i n g e f f e c t o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n p o s s e s s e d b y t h e u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s s u p e r i o r s . T h e y w e r e n o t o n l y s u s p i c i o u s o f m a n a g e m e n t i n t e n t , b u t a l s o f e a r f u l f o r t h e i r p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e . B o t h f a c t o r s w e r e t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a s a u d i e n c e p r e s s u r e . B o t h e x a m p l e s w i t h i n t h e S t r u c t u r e C f r a m e w o r k d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t i m e d o e s s s n o t a d e q u a t e l y e r a s e i m p e d i m e n t s c a r r i e d o v e r f r o m t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s . S u s p i c i o n a n d r e v e n g e w e r e o v e r c o m e i n t h e h o s p i t a l e x a m p l e b e c a u s e o f t h e u n i q u e n e w -n e s s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p ( p a r t i c i p a n t s h a d n e v e r f a c e d e a c h o t h e r b e f o r e ) w h i c h a c t u a l l y p u t s t h i s c a s e h a l f w a y i n t o t h e l a s t ( D ) S t r a t e g i c S t r u c t u r e . The r a i l r o a d c o m m i t t e e w a s n e v e r a b l e t o o v e r c o m e t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s a n d e v e n t u a l l y b o t h p a r t i e s w e r e f o r c e d t o s w i t c h t o S t r u c t u r e D f o r s u c c e s s . I n b o t h c a s e s , t h e a u d i e n c e e f f e c t e m e r g e d a s t h e c r u c i a l c o n s t r a i n t t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c o u l d n o t a v o i d w h e n p l a y i n g t h e c o o p e r a t i v e h a l f o f a d u a l r o l e . ( d ) STRUCTURAL STRATEGY T) S t r a t e g y D i s d e f i n e d a s t h e u s e o f n o n - d i s t r i b u t i v e n e g o t i a t o r s a t a t i m e w h e n n o d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s b e i n g c a r r i e d o n . T h i s s t r u c t u r e i s e x p e c t e d t o g e n e r a t e t h e m o s t s u c c e s s . % The p o s i t i v e a s p e c t s o f S t r u c t u r e s B a n d C a r e u t i l i z e d . S u s p i c i o n a n d r e v e n g e t e n d e n c i e s a r e r e d u c e d t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f n o n - d i s t r i b u t i v e a c t o r s a n d t h e l a c k o f 97 a c o n c u r r e n t d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s t o w h i c h i n f o r m a t i o n may b e r e l e v a n t . The n o n - p o l i t i c a l n a t u r e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s a n d t h e a b s e n c e o f d i s t r i b u t i v e c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e e x p e c t e d t o r e d u c e t h e a u d i e n c e e f f e c t . E x a m p l e s p r e s e n t i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e a r e f a i r l y n u m e r o u s . A s i n d i c a t e d a b o v e , t h e r j o i n t c o m m i t t e e e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e r a i l r o a d i n d u s t r y i n 1968 d i d n o t o p e r a t e i n a p r o d u c t i v e m a n n e r , b u t a n a t t e m p t w a s made t o r e a c h m u t u a l l y r e w a r d i n g s o l u t i o n s t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f s u b - c o m m i t t e e s made u p o f n o n - d i s t r i b u t i v e a c t o r s . One o f t h e s e s u b - c o m m i t t e e s p r o v i d e s a n e x a m p l e o f a s u c c e s s f u l i n t e g r a t i v e a t t e m p t . T h i s s u b -c o m m i t t e e c o n s i s t s o f s i x u n i o n s t a f f m e m b e r s , s i x r a i l r o a d e m p l o y e e s a n d t w o g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s . The t a s k a s s i g n e d t o i t w i s t o o b s e r v e a n d a n a l y s e t h e o p e r a t i o n o f r a i l w a y t e r m i n a l s a n d make r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g m o r e e f f i c i e n t p r o c e d u r e s e t c . D i s c u s s i o n - i s r e s t r i c t e d t o p r o b l e m s o f m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d i n t e g r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l a n d i n f o r m a t i o n a n d c r i t e r i a r e l a t e d t o e c o n o m i c s h a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a r e p a s s e d o v e r ( W e i n b u r g , 1976, p . 18). I n a d d i t i o n t h i s s u b - c o m m i t t e e m a k e s h i g h l y v i s i b l e a t t e m p t s t o s o l i c i t e m p l o y e e p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h r o u g h s u g g e s t i o n s e m i n a r s e t c . T h i s m a n n e r o f o p e r a t i o n h a s e f f e c t i v e l y e l i m i n a t e d p r o b l e m s r e l a t e d t o i n f o r m a t i o n c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , s u s p i c i o n , a n d e m p l o y e e d i s t r u s t . R e v e n g e was n e v e r a f a c t o r b e c a u s e t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s h a d n o t b e e n i n v o l v e d p r e v i o u s l y . A n o t h e r e x a m p l e c a n b e t a k e n f r o m t h e a b u n d a n t l i t e r a t u r e c o n c e r n i n g t h e S c a n l o n P l a n . The o r i g i n a l S c a n l o n P l a n 98 d e v e l o p e d a t M I T c a l l s f o r t h e c r e a t i o n &f t w o k i n d s o f c o m m i t t e e s ( F r o s t , W a k e l y , a n d R u b , 1974, p . 4). The f i r s t k i n d a r e p r o d u c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s c o n s i s t i n g o f o n e m a n a g e m e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a n d o n e o r m o r e e l e c t e d e m p l o y e e s . The e l e c t i o n o f t h e l a t t e r i s o n a d e p a r t m e n t a l l l e v e l a n d i s t h e r e f o r e u n r e l a t e d t o a u n i o n s t r u c t u r e . T h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h i s p r i m a r y c o m m i t t e e i s t o s o l i c i t s u g g e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y i m p r o v e m e n t s a n d t a k e a c t i o n w h e n e v e r p o s s i b l e . D e c i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g g r e a t e r s c o p e a n d m o r e r e s o u r c e s a r e made b y a " s c r e e n i n g " c o m m i t t e e w h i c h a l s o d e c i d e s o n b o n u s p a y m e n t s f o r p r o d u c t i v i t y i m p r o v e m e n t s . T h i s s e c o n d c o m m i t t e e i s c o m p o s e d o f t h e h e a d s o f m a j o r f u n c t i o n a l a r e a s a n d a n e q u a l n u m b e r o f e l e c t e d n o n - m a n a g e r i a l , n o n - s u p e r v i s o r y e m p l o y e e s . S p e c i f i c c o m p a n y / u n i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e n o t n a m e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s p l a n , b u t t h e l i t e r a t u r e s u g g e s t s t h a t i t h a s h a d w i d e s p r e a d s u c c e s s i n m a n y i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s f o r o v e r t w o d e c a d e s . S u c c e s s i s u n d o u b t a b l y a r e s u l t o f t h e n o n - d i s t r i b u t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . N o t o n l y a r e d i s c u s s i o n s p u r s u e d b y p e o p l e q u i t e r e m o v e d f r o m d i s t r i -b u t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , b u t t o p i c s c o n s i d e r e d a r e i m m e d i a t e l y r e w a r d i n g t o t h e common e m p l o y e e who p a r t i c i p a t e s d i r e c t l y . B o t h o f t h e s e f a c t o r s h e l p t o e l i m i n a t e t h e a u d i e n c e e f f e c t . A p l a n a d o p t e d b y t h e B . a n d G . R a i l r o a d i n 1923 h a s many o f t h e same a s p e c t s a s t h e S c a n l o n P l a n ( W e i n b u r g , 1976). J o i n t c o m m i t t e e s made u p o f u n i o n a n d m a n a g e m e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s m e t r e g u l a r l y t o d e a l w i t h w o r k e r s u g g e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g a n u m b e r o f m a t t e r s m u t u a l l y p e r c e i v e d o t o h a v e i n t e g r a t i v e 99. p o t e n t i a l ( s a f e t y , e f f i c i e n c y e t c ; W e i n b u r g , 1976, p . 1 4 ) . T h i s o p e r a t i o n l a s t e d s u c c e s s f u l l y f o r o v e r f i f t e e n y e a r s . S u s p i c i o n a n d c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n s w e r e r e d u c e d t o a n e g l i g i b l e l e v e l b e c a u s e d i s c u s s i o n r e m a i n e d r e s t r i c t e d t o p r o b l e m s o u t s i d e o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e f r a m e w o r k , a n d t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s h a d n o t h i n g t o do w i t h c o n t r a c t b a r g a i n i n g . The a u d i e n c e i m p e d i m e n t was n o t c o m p l e t e l y r e m o v e d a s i n t h e S c a n l o n P l a n , b u t i t w a s s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e d u c e d b e c a u s e t h e n o n - b a r g a i n i n g c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s k e p t i n c l o s e t o u c h w i t h w o r k e r s . A m u c h m o r e r e c e n t e x a m p l e o f S t r u c t u r e D c o m e s f r o m t h e R e t a i l P o o d i n d u s t r y . I n 1974 a j o i n t l a b o u r - m a n a g e m e n t c o m m i t t e e w a s e s t a b l i s h e d t o p r o v i d e ' % ^ . a f o r u m f o r j o i n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d c o o p e r a t i o n o n l o n g t e r m i n d u s t r y p r o b l e m s s u c h a s m a n a g e m e n t a n d u n i o n w o r k p r a c t i c e s , t e c h n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e , a n d p r o d u c t i v i t y [ W e i n b u r g , 1975, p . 18•].?'"" A t t h e m i c r o l e v e l w h e r e c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s t a k e p l a c e t h e s e p r o b l e m s r e m a i n u n d e r t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , b u t a p p a r e n t l y b o t h p a r t i e s b e l i e v e d t h a t a m a c r o v i e w p o i n t a l l o w e d f o r i n t e g r a t i v e ' p o t e n t i a l . T h e c o m m i t t e e i s c o m p o s e d o f s e n i o r u n i o n o f f i c e r s , c o m p a n y o f f i c i a l s ( e i g h t f o o d c h a i n s a n d t h r e e u n i o n s ) ? a n d a n e u t r a l c h a i r m a n . B e c a u s e d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i n t h i s i n d u s t r y i s c o n d u c t e d o n a l o c a l b a s i s , o f t e n s t o r e b y s t o r e , t h i s c o m m i t t e e s t r u c t u r e i s a c t u a l l y q u i t e r e m o v e d f r o m a d i s t r i b u t i v e a t m o s p h e r e . T h u s f a r t h e c o m m i t t e e h a s r e s t r i c t e d i t s e l f t o m a k i n g j o i n t l y i s s u e d s u g g e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g i n d i v i d u a l 100 d i s t r i b u t i v e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . A l t h o u g h n o t a l w a y s a c c e p t e d o n t h e i n d u s t r y ' s m i c r o l e v e l , t h e s e s u g g e s t i o n s ( o f t e n g u i d e l i n e s ) r e p r e s e n t a g r e e m e n t o n i n t e g r a t i v e p r o b l e m s w i t h n o a p p a r e n t p r o c e s s c o m p l i c a t i o n s . C O N C L U S I O N S (HOW) The e x a m p l e s d e s c r i b e d a b o v e i n d i c a t e t h a t p r o c e s s s e p a r a t i o n f a c e s a n u m b e r o f s u r m o u n t a b l e h u r d l e s . S t r i c t l y w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s i t s e l f , t h e f o u r t h s t r u c t u r e ( D ) d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e b e s t a b i l i t y t o o v e r c o m e t h e c o n s t r a i n t s . The p r o b l e m s o f S t r u c t u r e A a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y e n c o m p a s s i n g t h a t t h e r e i s some d o u b t o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u c c e s s . O n l y o n e e x a m p l e ( S t e e l ) — a f a i l u r e — c o u l d b e f o u n d , p e r h a p s i n d i c a t i n g a l a c k o f a t t e m p t s . S t r u c t u r e s B a n d C h a v e b e e n s u c c e s s f u l t o v a r y i n g d e g r e e s d e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e p a r t i e s a b i l i t i e s t o b u i l d i n s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s t o s a t i s f y r e q u i r e m e n t s w h i c h a r e a u t o m a t i c a l l y p r o v i d e d i n S t r u c t u r e D . T h e l a t t e r u t i l i z e s n o n - d i s t r i b u t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s a n d a d i f f e r e n t t i m e s t r u c t u r e i n o r d e r t o m i n i m i z e o r e l i m i n a t e t h e n e e d t o r e s t r i c t i n f o r -m a t i o n , s u s p i c i o n , a n d a u d i e n c e c o n s t r a i n t s . E x a m p l e s i n S t r u c t u r e s B a n d C d e m o n s t r a t e d how r u l e s r e g a r d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y w i t h i n a s p e c i f i c p r o c e s s a t t e m p t , t o g e t h e r w i t h c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h a u d i e n c e s c a n o v e r c o m e p o t e n t i a l l i m i t a t i o n s . T h e s e e x a m p l e s a l s o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e u s e o f d i f f e r e n t n e g o t i a t o r s h a s a g r e a t e r e f f e c t o n a l i s t e d c o n s t r a i n t t h a n a d i f f e r e n t t i m e s t r u c t u r e , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t s u s p i c i o n a n d r e v e n g e t e n d e n c i e s a r e n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y 101. r e d u c e d o v e r t i m e . Summary The p u r p o s e o f t h e p r e c e e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n w a s t o d e m o n s t r a t e w h y , w h e n , a n d how p r o b l e n s w i l l b e s e p a r a t e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f f i n d i n g . s o l u t i o n s . S e p a r a t e p r o c e s s e s f o r i n t e g r a t i v e p r o b l e m s a r e n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e o f t h e t a c t i c a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e i n t e g r a t i v e a n d d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s e s . A s e p a r a t i o n o f p r o c e s s e s i s n o t p r o b a b l e , h o w e v e r , u n l e s s b o t h ; » p a r t i e s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p r o b l e m h a s a p o t e n t i a l f o r a w i n / w i n s o l u t i o n a n d t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t y h a s a s i m i l a r c o n c e p t i o n f o r t h e p r o b l e m . E v e n i f t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s a r e m e t , o n e p a r t y may w i s h t o i n c l u d e t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o b l e m i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s t o f a c i l -i t a t e a c o n c e s s i o n s t r a t e g y . I n s u c h a c a s e t h e p a r t y d e s i r i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s w i l l d e t e r m i n e t h e r e s u l t i n g p r o c e s s . Once t h e d e c i s i o n t o s e p a r a t e h a s b e e n m a d e , t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r c o o p e r a t i o n t h r o u g h a n i n d e p e n d e n t i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s w i l l n o t b e r e a l i z e d u n l e s s a s t r a t e g i c s t r u c t u r e i s c h o s e n t h a t w i l l e l i m i n a t e o r l i m i t s e v e r a l c o n s t r a i n t s . The h o s t i l i t i e s , a n t a g o n i s m s , a n d a g e n e r a l l e v e l o f s u s p i c i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s may b e t r a n s f e r r e d t o d i s r u p t t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s i f c o m p l e t e s e p a r a t i o n c a n n o t b e a t t a i n e d . 1 0 2 C H A P T E R V I I I SUMMARY AND C O N C L U S I O N S The p r i n c i p a l p u r p o s e o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o s u m m a r i z e t h e p r e c e e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n a n d s u g g e s t some o f t h e i m p l i c a -t i o n s o f t h e a n a l y s i s . The m a j o r o b j e c t i v e o f t h e t h e s i s w a s t o d e s c r i b e t h e n a t u r e o f t h e p r o c e s s d e c i s i o n a n d r e l a t e i t t o t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r c o o p e r a t i o n . I n t e r e s t mas s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d a t why p r o b l e m s a r e a s s i g n e d t o p a r t i c u l a r p r o c e s s e s — p a r t i c -u l a r l y how t h e c h o i c e p r o c e s s i s e f f e c t e d b y t h e a n t i t h e t -i c a l n a t u r e o f t h e p r o c e s s e s — a n d t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r a s u c c e s s f u l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f c o o p e r a t i o n . T h r o u g h o u t t h e d i s c u s s i o n a g e n e r a l m o d e l h a s b e e n d e v e l o p e d . A g r a p h i c a l s u m m a r y i s g i v e n i n F i g u r e 1 0 . I n s e r t F i g u r e 1 0 h e r e I n t h e a b s e n c e o f a m e t h o d f o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e u n i v e r s a l n a t u r e o f s p e c i f i c p r o b l e m c a t e g o r i e s , i t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s a r e i n d e p e n d e n t l y made a c c o r d i n g t o c o n c e p -t i o n s o f p a r t i s a n u t i l i t y . S u c h c o n c e p t i o n s r e l a t e t o w i n / w i n o r w i n / l o s e p o t e n t i a l s ( i n t e g r a t i v e a n d d i s t r i b u t i v e ) . Once a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n f o r a s i n g l e p r o b l e m i s a r r i v e d a t , a p r e f e r e n c e f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p r o c e s s i s made a c c o r d i n g t o t h e e x p e c t e d t a c t i c a l r e s p o n s e o f t h e o t h e r p a r t y , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a d i s t r u s t i n g a u d i e n c e , a n d t h e i n i t i a t i n g p a r t y ' s p o w e r p o s i t i o n . The s e c o n d a n d t h i r d f a c t o r s a r e s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y . The f i r s t f a c t o r r e l a t e s t o t h e i n i t i a t i n g p a r t y ' s p e r c e p t i o n s FIGURE 10 A DECISION MODEL Problem C l a s s i f i c a t i o n based on independent conceptions of u t i l i t y -Perceptions of other party's b e l i e f i n singl e problem's p o t e n t i a l audience reac t i o n OTHER PROBLEM(S) T a c t i c a l Dilemmas! =^fe*=4 power image' damage j Preferred process f o r single problem: •I' or »D' Confidential information revenge-p h y s i c a l &; psy. I tx audiencej reaction! SEPARATE 'I ' INCLUSIVE ' D' T a c t i c a l Dilemmas power j image I damage' - "A ! OTHER PROBLEM(S) o 104 o f t h e o p p o s i t e p a r t y ' s b e l i e f i n t h e p r o b l e m ^ s i n t e g r a t i v e o r d i s t r i b u t i v e p o t e n t i a l . A d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s w i l l b e c h o s e n w h e n e x p e c t a t i o n s o f r e s p o n s e a r e d i s t r i b u t i v e b e c a u s e -o f a f e a r o f e x p l o i t a t i o n t h r o u g h a d o m i n e e r i n g d i s t r i b u t i v e r e s p o n s e . T h i s r e a c t i o n i s t h e r e s u l t o f t h e s t r a t e g i c n e c -e s s i t y o f p r e s e n t i n g a n i n f l a t e d r a t h e r t h a n a r e a l i m a g e o f o n e ' s u t i l i t y p o s i t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s . E v e n i f t h e f i r s t p a r t y i s n o t s u r e o f a d i s t r i b u t i v e r e s p o n s e , i t may c h o o s e t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e o p t i o n a n y w a y b e c a u s e o f a p e r c e p t i o n t h a t t h e a u d i e n c e r e q u i r e s a n o n - c o o p e r a t i v e a p p r o a c h , a n d a b e l i e f t h a t a p o w e r i m a g e w i l l s u f f e r . The c o n c u r r e n t e x i s t e n c e o f a n o t h e r p r o b l e m w i l l f u r t h e r i n f l u e n c e t h e p r o c e s s d e c i s i o n o n c e a p r e f e r e n c e i s d e v e l o p e d f o r a s i n g l e p r o b l e m . The n a t u r e o f t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s a d e c i s i o n t o s e p a r a t e p r o b l e m s i f m o r e t h a n o n e p r o b l e m e x i s t s a n d b o t h p a r t i e s h a v e d e v e l o p e d a p r e f e r e n c e f o r t h e i n t e g r a t i v e o p t i o n f o r a t l e a s t o n e o f t h e s e p r o b l e m s . The i n t e g r a t i v e o p t i o n i s d e s i g n e d f o r o n l y o n e p r o b l e m a t a t i m e a n d a d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s w o u l d c a u s e t a c t i c a l d i l e m m a s . The d e c i s i o n t o s e p a r a t e p r o b l e m s i s t e m p e r e d b y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s i x c o n s t r a i n t s . The n e e d t o k e e p c e r t a i n d a t a c o n f i d e n t i a l f o r f u t u r e o r c o n c u r r e n t d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s e s , s u s p i c i o n o f t h e o t h e r p a r t y ' s m o t i v e s , t h e t e n d e n c y t o s e e k p h y s i c a l a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e v e n g e , a f e a r o f a u d i e n c e r e a c t i o n , and a f e a r o f a r e d u c e d i m a g e o f p o w e r , a l l i n f l u e n c e t h e t h e d e c i s i o n b y e a c h p a r t y t o i n i t i a t e o r e v e n p a r t i c i p a t e 1 0 5 i n a n y i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s e s . A l t h o u g h t h e o r e t i c a l i n n a t u r e , t h e a n a l y s i s h a s a v a l u e f o r e m p i r i c a l s i t u a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a t t e m p t s a t i n t e g r a t i v e p r o b l e m s o l v i n g a l o n g s i d e d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g -a i n i n g . The d e c i s i o n m o d e l p r o v i d e s a b a s i s f r o m w h i c h l i m i t s t o c o o p e r a t i o n c a n b e a n a l y s e d a n d u n d e r s t o o d . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , t h e a n t i t h e t i c a l n a t u r e o f t h e t w o p r o c e s s f r a m e w o r k s — i . e . t h e d o m i n e e r i n g t a c t i c s o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s — r e s t r i c t s c o o p e r a t i v e ! p o t e n t i a l t o t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e b o t h p a r t i e s h a v e i n d e p e n d e n t c o n -c e p t i o n s o f i n t e g r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l . A f e a r o f e x p l o i t a t i o n e t c . a r e h y p o t h e s i z e d t o l i m i t c o o p e r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l s t i l l f u r t h e r t o t h e c a s e o f m u t u a l p e r c e p t i o n s o f i n t e g r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l a n d i n t e g r a t i v e r e s p o n s e . T h u s , a l t h o u g h 7 o f 1 0 p o s s i b l e c o m b i n a t i o n s o f c o n c e p t i o n s a n d p e r c e p t i o n s d e m o n s t r a t e a t l e a s t some i n t e g r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l ( o n e p a r t y ' s c o n c e p t i o n ) , o n l y 1 h a s a g o o d c h a n c e o f m a n i f e s t a t i o n . A p l u r a l i t y o f p r o b l e m s a l s o r e s t r i c t s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f i n t e g r a t i v e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . N o t o n l y m u s t e a c h p a r t y h a v e d e c i d e d o n t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s i n a s i n g l e p r o b l e m s e n s e , b u t b o t h p a r t i e s m u s t a g r e e t o s e p a r a t e a p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m f o r i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s i n g . A p a r t y w a n t i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s w i l l d o m i n a t e a d e c i s i o n . I f a m u t u a l d e s i r e f o r a n i n d e p e n d e n t i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s e x i s t s i n a t e n t a t i v e s e n s e , t h e d e c i s i o n t o p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y i s e f f e c t e d b y t h e same c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t i n f l u e n c e t h e p r o c e s s p r e f e r e n c e f o r a s i n g l e p r o b l e m , p l u s a t e n d e n c y 1 0 6 . t o s e e k r e v e n g e . A l l c o m b i n e t o t h r e a t e n t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n , s u c c e s s , o r e v e n i n i t i a t i o n o f a s e p a r a t e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s . P o u r s t r u c t u r a l s t r a t e g i e s a r e a v a i l a b l e t o d e a l w i t h t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s . The v a r i a b l e f a c t o r s b e t w e e n s t r u c t u r e s a r e t h e t i m e t a b l e o f t h e s e p a r a t e i n t e g r a t i v e a n d d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s e s , a n d t h e d i s t r i b u t i v e o r i n t e g r a t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n o f t h e n p a r t i c i p a n t s . E x a m p l e s i n d i c a t e t h a t a s u c c e s s f u l s t r u c t u r e m u s t s a t i s f y f o u r r e q u i r e m e n t s . ( 1 ) The d a t a n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s i s n o t c o n s i d e r e d c o n f i d e n t i a l i n d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s e s ; o r t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s h a v e f a i t h t h a t n e i t h e r p a r t y w i l l u s e t h e u n v e i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n i n a n y o t h e r f o r m . (2) The p a r t i c i p a n t s h a v e n o n e g a t i v e p e r s o n a l g r u d g e s t o a c t o n . (3) A d e q u a t e m e a n s a r e f o u n d t o s a t i s f y a p o t e n t i a l l y s u s p i c i o u s a u d i e n c e . ( 4 ) The p o w e r s t r u c t u r e m u s t b e s u c h t h a t n e i t h e r p a r t y i s t h r e a t e n e d s i m p l y b y p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h i s a n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e t w o p r o c e s s o p t i o n s a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h e a c h o t h e r a t t h e same t i m e , a l t h o u g h n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n t h e same r e l a t i o n s h i p . On a n o r m a t i v e b a s i s , t h e a n a l y s i s s u g g e s t s t h a t s t r a t e g i c s t r u c t u r e s c a n o v e r c o m e some c o n s t r a i n t s . B u t a n u m b e r o f a r e a s f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h a r e i n d i c a t e d t o f a c i l i t a t e a m o r e c o m p l e t e u n d e r -s t a n d i n g o f t h e l i m i t s t o c o o p e r a t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f s i n g l e p r o b l e m s s h o w e d t h a t m u t u a l p e r c e p t i o n s o f i n t e g r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l a n d r e s p o n s e a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r a n i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s t o b e m a n i f e s t . B u t t w o o t h e r p o t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n s w e r e i l l u m i n a t e d w h o s e i n t e g r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l i s s t y m i e d b y f e a r s o f e x p l o i t a t i o n e t c . — t h o s e w h e r e b o t h 107 p a r t i e s " b e l i e v e i n t h e p r o b l e m ' s i n t e g r a t i v e p o t e n t i a l , b u t o n e o r b o t h p a r t i e s f e a r a d i s t r i b u t i v e r e s p o n s e . A n u m b e r o f r e l a t e d t e s t a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s e m e r g e . What v a r i a b l e s o f a l a b o u r - m a n a g e m e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l o v e r c o m e a s u s p i c i o n o f d i s t r i b u t i v e r e s p o n s e ? D o e s a n a c c r i m o n i o u s b a r g a i n i n g h i s t o r y d e s t r o y a l l l i k e l y h o o d o f e x p l o i t i n g t h e s y m b i o t i c n a t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p ? W h i c h r e l a t i v e p o w e r p o s i t i o n s a r e m o s t c o n d u c i v e t o a n i n t e g r a t i v e c h o i c e ? Do c r i s e s h a v e some f o r c e f u l e f f e c t o n t h e d e c i s i o n m o d e l b y i n c r e a s i n g t h e c o s t o f r i s k a v e r s i o n ? Do t h e c o n s t r a i n t s o f a d o m i n e e r i n g d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s l i m i t t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r r e l e g a t e d t o i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s e s t o i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l m a t t e r s ? The p r e e e e d i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n h a s d e v e l o p e d a m o d e l w h i c h i s o l a t e s s p e c i f i c a r e a s u p o n w h i c h v a r i o u s f o r c e s w i l l a c t . 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