UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Decertification : the British Columbia experience Chafetz, Israel 1977

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Notice for Google Chrome users:
If you are having trouble viewing or searching the PDF with Google Chrome, please download it here instead.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1977_A4_6 C33.pdf [ 5.8MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0093950.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0093950-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0093950-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0093950-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0093950-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0093950-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0093950-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0093950-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0093950.ris

Full Text

DECERTIFICATION: THE BRITISH COLUMBIA EXPERIENCE by I s r a e l Chafetz B. Comm. Hrs., U n i v e r s i t y o f Manitoba 1975 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE i n THE FACULTY OF COMMERCE AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard A p r i l 1977 *c) I s r a e l Chafetz, 1977 In presenting thi's thes i s in p a r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ib ra ry sha l l make i t f r e e l y ava i l ab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th i s thes is for s cho la r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives . It i s understood that copying or pub l i ca t i on of th i s thes i s f o r f i nanc i a l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permiss ion. v a c u i t y O L • •» j • • • i . . u • j8£RstK&£Rfcj©f Commerce and Business A d m i n i s t r a t i o n The Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 W e s b r o o k P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , C a n a d a V 6 T 1W5 Date A p r i l 2 9 , 1 9 7 7 ABSTRACT D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s a l e g a l term i m p l y i n g the d i s s o l u t i o n o f a u n i t o f u n i o n i z e d employees. J u s t as a c e r t i f i c a t i o n l e g a l l y e s t a b l i s h e s a u n i o n i z e d u n i t of employees, a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n e r a d i c a t e s the l e g a l c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s of the u n i t . T h i s t h e s i s examines the i s s u e of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n and why d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o c c u r s . The data i s based on 4 3 cases of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n the P r o v i n c e o f B r i t i s h Columbia, Canada. A l l the r e s e a r c h was done by p e r s o n a l i n t e r v i e w s . For each case of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , employers, union o f f i c i a l s and n e u t r a l p a r t i e s were asked to comment. . The data was used t o r e c o n s t r u c t the events w i t h i n each case and i s o l a t e the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of those i n v o l v e d . Most d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s i n v o l v e d u n s k i l l e d workers employed by s m a l l companies. The companies experience average t u r n o v e r and are mostly i n the manufacturing and s e r v i c e i n d u s t r i e s of the B.C. economy. The unions which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n are very l a r g e f o r B.C. and r e p r e s e n t many sm a l l u n i t s . The unions are mostly i n d u s t r i a l or m i s c e l l a n e o u s l o c a l s . The employers' d e s i r e t o break the c e r t i f i c a t i o n and the unions' response t o the employers' i n f l u e n c e are the key f e a t u r e s o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The employers used a l a r g e a r r a y of t a c t i c s to break the union. At times the t a c t i c s were very s u b t l e , such as employer comments and i n other cases, the employer d i s m i s s e d employees f o r t h e i r union a c t i v i t y . Because the u n i t s were very s m a l l , the union l o c a l a s s i g n e d them a low p r i o r i t y t o union r e s o u r c e s . In many cases the union d i d not r e s i s t the employers' i n f l u e n c e and a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n r e s u l t e d . In some cases, the union spent a g r e a t d e a l of re s o u r c e s t o pr e s e r v e the u n i t but employer i n f l u e n c e i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h turnover of s t a f f r e s u l t e d i n the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . i i i . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page A b s t r a c t T a b l e o f Contents i i i . L i s t . o f T a bles v_ L i s t o f F i g u r e s vi. Acknowledgements _ Chapter I I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 Chapter I I D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n : A Process Model 3 - D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n Model 3 - L e g a l T r a n s f o r m a t i o n 7 - Board D e c i s i o n s 11 Chapter I I I Ar r a y o f P o s s i b l e Reasons f o r D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 18 - General Comments . 1 8 - S p e c i f i c Reasons f o r D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 21 Chapter IV Methodology 38 - P o p u l a t i o n 38 - Data Measures 39 - Data C o l l e c t i o n 45 Chapter V A c t o r s i n D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 52 - Companies 52 - Unions 59 - U n i t s 65 i v . Page Chapter VI Reasons f o r D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - S p e c i f i c Reasons - M u l t i p l e Reasons - M i s c e l l a n e o u s Reasons 74 75 89 92 Chapter VII C o n c l u s i o n 98 B i b l i o g r a p h y 102 Appendices 1 - Timing o f D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 2 - C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Manufacturing Companies which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 3 - C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Trade Companies which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 4 - C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f S e r v i c e Companies which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 5 - C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Other Companies which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 6 - C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f C r a f t Unions which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 7 - C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f I n d u s t r i a l Unions which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 104 105 113 120 128 136 144 8 - C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f M i s c e l l a n e o u s Unions which Experienced D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 153 V . LIST OF TABLES Page Table I C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Companies which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 56 (a) Grouped by i n d u s t r y 56 (b) Grouped by number o f employees 56 (c) Grouped by turnover 57 (d) Grouped by s k i l l l e v e l 57 (e) Grouped by experience with unions 58 (f) Grouped by experience w i t h d e c e r t i -f i c a t i o n 58 Table I I • C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f L o c a l s which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 61 (a) Grouped by type of union 61 (b) Grouped by m u l t i p l e d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 62 (c) Grouped by s i z e o f l o c a l 62 (d) Grouped by average s i z e c e r t i f i c a t i o n / l o c a l 63 (e) Grouped by type o f c o l l e c t i v e agreement n e g o t i a t e d 64 Table I I I C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f U n i t s which D e c e r t i f i e d 69 (a) Grouped by s i z e o f u n i t 69 (b) Grouped by l o n g e v i t y o f c e r t i f i c a t i o n 70 (c) Grouped by experience w i t h c o l l e c t i v e agreements 70 (d) Grouped by reason f o r o r i g i n a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n 71 (e) Grouped by reason f o r choosing union 71 Table IV C o n t r i b u t i n g Reasons f o r D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 94 Table V Reasons f o r D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 95 v x . LIST OF FIGURES F i g u r e 1 Dynamic Model of D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n F i g u r e 2 A r r a y o f Reasons f o r D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n v i i . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i k e to thank a l l the people who consented to interviews, for without t h e i r input there would not be a thesi s . I cannot name you a l l but I assure you that your honesty and h o s p i t a l i t y w i l l not be forgotten. In p a r t i -cular, I thank Mr. Paul Weiler and Ms. Jackie Johnson from the Labour Relations Board of B r i t i s h Columbia who assisted i n compiling a l i s t of cases. I owe a great deal to my thesis committee. Dr. Herbert D. Dreschler not only provided many thoughtful hours of conversation but also gave me a job which allowed the time ' to pursue my research. Dr. Chris Fraser meticulously read my thesis and his thorough c r i t i c i s m s and suggestions were very h e l p f u l . Two months ago, I would have described his suggestions much d i f f e r e n t l y , but I must admit that his c r i t i c i s m s were accurate and my thesis i s better for i t . I am e s p e c i a l l y g r a t e f u l to my advisor, Dr. Mark Thompson, who was always sensitive to my problems and always there to reassure me. He not only advised me throughout t h i s thesis, but his input throughout my entire program at U.B.C. improved the qu a l i t y of my education experience. I would also l i k e to extend my appreciation to Helen Roozendaal for her meticulous care i n typing t h i s manuscript. The work on thi s thesis touched my private l i f e . I thank Elizabeth Rodger for putting up with my mumbling and complaining i n 4 0 8 A and I thank Gary Waldman who was always v i i i . w i l l i n g t o l i s t e n . A s p e c i a l thanks to Judy f o r her unwavering l o v e , p a t i e n c e and understanding. The most i n s p i r i n g support o f a l l has come from my pa r e n t s , P h i l and Ruby C h a f e t z . I do not have the words t o d e s c r i b e t h e i r l o y a l t y and a s s i s t a n c e but I t h i n k they know what I mean. Thank you. U l t i m a t e l y , I am r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s t h e s i s . I take the agony al o n g w i t h the e c s t a s y . Any. omissions or e r r o r s are mine and mine alone. I have c h e r i s h e d the experi e n c e and am g r a t e f u l t o the U n i v e r s i t y . - 1 -CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION Our s o c i e t y has a success o r i e n t a t i o n . T h i s p h i l o s o p h y has permeated a l l walks o f l i f e . a n d has been communicated through a l l the media. Bookstores c a r r y hundreds of t i t l e s which p r e s c r i b e formulas f o r success i n b u s i n e s s , p o l i t i c s , gamesmanship and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The academic community a l s o has a body o f r e s e a r c h i n success r e l a t e d t o p i c s . O r g a n i z a t i o n r e s e a r c h has focu s e d on the i s s u e s o f how to measure o r g a n i z a t i o n success and which v a r i a b l e s are most important t o the success o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n . No concensus has been reached on e i t h e r i s s u e . From a l e a r n i n g s t a n d p o i n t , the study o f f a i l u r e may be j u s t as v a l u a b l e as the study o f success. I f we understand the causes o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f a i l u r e , then we may be c l o s e t o understanding the cause of o r g a n i z a t i o n s u c c e s s . T h i s t h e s i s examines the i s s u e of o r g a n i z a t i o n f a i l u r e w i t h i n the con t e x t of the union movement. One f a i l u r e w i t h i n the union movement i s when union mem-bers c o l l e c t i v e l y decide t o r e j e c t unionism as a v e h i c l e f o r r e p r e s e n t i n g worker concerns. In the vocabulary o f i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , t h i s i s known as d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s t h e s i s examines the t o p i c o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . - 2.-The t h e s i s c o n c e n t r a t e s on two areas of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n : c o n c e p t u a l a n a l y s i s and p r a c t i s e . A process model f o r decer-t i f i c a t i o n and an a r r a y of p o s s i b l e reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n w i l l be i n t r o d u c e d and compared to a c t u a l cases of decer-t i f i c a t i o n . The o b j e c t i v e i s to i d e n t i f y who i s i n v o l v e d and t o e x p l a i n why d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n takes p l a c e . The next two chapters o u t l i n e a process model f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n and p r e s e n t s an a r r a y of p o s s i b l e reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Chapter IV d i s c u s s e s the methodology used i n c o l l e c t i n g the data on a c t u a l cases of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n and Chapters V and VI analyze the data i n a framework of who i s i n v o l v e d i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n and why d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n takes p l a c e . The c o n c l u d i n g chapter summarizes the f i n d i n g s and suggests i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the r e s u l t s . - 3 -CHAPTER I I  DECERTIFICATION: A PROCESS MODEL INTRODUCTION Any d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n c a n be c l a s s i f i e d i n one o f two c a t e g o r i e s . I n t h e f i r s t c a t e g o r y , a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n r e s u l t s b e c a u s e t h e membership wants a d i f f e r e n t t r a d e u n i o n t o r e p r e s e n t them. I n t h e s e c o n d c a t e g o r y , t h e t r a d e u n i o n i s d e c e r t i f i e d b u t t h e membership d o e s n o t want any o t h e r u n i o n t o r e p r e s e n t them. T h i s t h e s i s c o v e r s t h e l a t t e r c a t e -g o r y . I t i s f u r t h e r c o n f i n e d t o t h o s e d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s w h i c h o c c u r r e d w i t h i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a and a d m i n i s t e r e d b y t h e B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s Board."*" T h i s c h a p t e r o u t l i n e s a p r o c e s s model o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n a nd t h e l e g a l framework i n w h i c h t h e p r o c e s s o p e r a t e s . DECERTIFICATION MODEL ( F i g u r e 1 i n t h e T e x t ) The i n i t i a l i n p u t s o f t h e model a r e e m p l o y e r s , e m p l o y e e s s h a r i n g a community o f i n t e r e s t a nd a g r o u p o f i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h t h e common d e s i r e o f u n i o n i z i n g t h e e m p l o y e e s . A t t h i s i n i t i a l s t a g e t h e e m p l o y e r h a s an o n g o i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e e m p l o y e e s i n a work e n v i r o n m e n t . The e m p l o y e e s ' _ 4 -community o f i n t e r e s t may be based on o c c u p a t i o n , o r g a n i z a t i o n or i n d u s t r y . H i s t o r i c a l l y , the community o f i n t e r e s t has been based on c r a f t or i n d u s t r i a l l i n e s . The i n t e r e s t group i s composed o f i n d i v i d u a l s p o s s e s s i n g a competence and/or i n t e r e s t i n o r g a n i z i n g the employees i n t o a t r a d e union l o c a l . The i n t e r e s t group may c o n s i s t o f o f f i c i a l s from a union f e d e r a t i o n i n t e r e s t e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g an a f f i l i a t e l o c a l or employees who are i n t e r e s t e d i n u n i o n i z i n g . T h e r e f o r e , the employees and the i n t e r e s t group are not n e c e s s a r i l y i d e n t i c a l . The employer, employees and i n t e r e s t group meet i n the process of a l e g a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n (throughput 1, F i g u r e 1). T h i s i s done through an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n to the Board. The Board determines i f there i s a s u f f i c i e n t community o f i n t e r e s t among the employees f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g purposes. The Board may amend the composition of the u n i t t o s a t i s f y t h e i r c r i t e r i a f o r a u n i t ' s community o f i n t e r e s t . The employees are then canvassed to a s c e r t a i n i f they want r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by the p a r t i c u l a r trade union. I f the m a j o r i t y o f employees do not want the t r a d e union t o r e p r e s e n t them the two i n p u t s r e v e r t back to t h e i r o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n s (as denoted by the d o t t e d l i n e ) . C e r t i f i c a t i o n w i l l be granted i f the m a j o r i t y o f the employees want union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . The employer emerges from the l e g a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n w i t h new and a d d i t i o n a l l e g a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s , the i n t e r e s t group gains the l e g a l s t a t u s of a trade union and the o r g a n i z e d employees become the membership of t h a t union (output 1). - 5 -Upon c e r t i f i c a t i o n , the trade union, membership and the employer i n c u r l e g a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s v i s - a - v i s each o t h e r . The trade union i s o b l i g a t e d to b a r g a i n and a d m i n i s t e r c o l l e c t i v e agreements on b e h a l f o f the membership. I t a l s o must p r o v i d e equal r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to a l l the employees which the t r a d e union r e p r e s e n t s . The trade union i s o b l i g a t e d t o b a r g a i n i n good f a i t h w i t h the employer and adhere t o the c o n d i t i o n s o f a r e s u l t i n g c o l l e c t i v e agreement. The membership i s o b l i g e d t o work w i t h i n the terms o f the c o l l e c t i v e agreement. The employer must n e g o t i a t e i n good f a i t h w i t h the t r a d e union and cannot d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t the employees because o f t h e i r union a f f i l i a t i o n . The employer i s a l s o bound by the terms of the n e g o t i a t e d agreement. I t i s noteworthy t h a t even a f t e r a c e r t i f i c a t i o n , the employer s t i l l i n t e r a c t s w i t h the employees. The employer/ employee i n t e r a c t i o n i s important because the employer's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s employees a f t e r c e r t i f i c a t i o n can i n f l u e n c e the employees' a t t i t u d e toward t h e i r union. T h i s p o i n t i s e s p e c i a l l y important i n a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n where employer i n f l u e n c e i s a l l e g e d . The trade union and the membership do not n e c e s s a r i l y have c o i n c i d i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s . Each group might expect more or l e s s than the o t h e r i s prepared to commit. The s t r e n g t h of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p i s determined by the degree o f success i n r e c o n c i l i n g t h e i r separate e x p e c t a t i o n s . For the purpose - 6 -of t h i s t h e s i s , the process o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s known as i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b a r g a i n i n g (throughput 2A). I t i s a continuous p r o c e s s throughout the l i f e o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p . The degree o f success i n t h e i r i n t e r n a l b a r g a i n i n g w i l l determine the e x t e n t t o which the union w i l l r e p r e s e n t the views of i t s members. The d e c i s i o n s reached between the union and i t s members are then taken t o the employer (throughput 2B) which r e s u l t s i n b a r g a i n i n g . In t h i s t h e s i s , b a r g a i n i n g i n c l u d e s the n e g o t i a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the c o l l e c t i v e agreement. I t i s a continuous output i n which the i s s u e s may change wit h the changes i n p e r c e p t i o n s o f those i n v o l v e d . The model can be d i v i d e d i n t o two s e c t i o n s . The top h a l f ( i n p u t 1 - output 1) e s t a b l i s h e s the l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i l e the bottom h a l f ( i n p u t 2 - output 2) i l l u s t r a t e s the proc e s s o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p once i t has been l e g a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d . In a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , some v a r i a b l e ( s ) a c t i v a t e the system t o r e v e r s e and consequently the th r e e e n t i t i e s r e v e r t back t o t h e i r o r i g i n a l s t a t e s (input 1 ) . T h i s i s denoted by the d o t t e d l i n e s i n F i g u r e 1. The process does not i n f e r t h a t the reason f o r a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s the r e v e r s e o f a c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The flow o f the model i n a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s the o p p o s i t e o f a c e r t i f i c a t i o n but the reasons u n d e r l y i n g the flow may not be. The model i l l u s t r a t e s a continuous a c t i v e / r e a c t i v e p rocess between the trade union, i t s members and the employer. - 7 -I t i s a system which operates i n a continuous flow and t o i n i t i a t e a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , a stimulus must be f e l t i n order t o reverse the flow. The stronger the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the trade union and i t s members, the stronger the stimulus must be t o break the flow. The source of the stimulus can o r i g i n a t e from any p o i n t i n the system but i t s s t r e n g t h i s t e s t e d a t the p o i n t where the union i n t e r a c t s w i t h i t s members (throughput 2A). This assumes t h a t any change i n the law w i l l not be of such a magnitude to e f f e c t the l e g a l s t a t u s of the three p a r t i e s . LEGAL TRANSFORMATION The l e g a l t ransformation process of the model i n c l u d e s both the c e r t i f i c a t i o n and d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n processes. This s e c t i o n discusses only the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n process. The law w i l l be h e l d constant f o r the purposes of t h i s study, because only d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s which occurred between January 1, 1974 and May 31, 19 76 w i l l be i n c l u d e d i n the sample. These dates are used because previous to January 1, 1974 there was a d i f f e r e n t code i n force i n B r i t i s h Columbia and the composition of Board members was a l s o d i f f e r e n t . May 31, 1976 was used as a c u t - o f f date f o r t h e study. The purpose of t h i s s e c t i o n of the a n a l y s i s i s to set out the l e g a l framework of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s . I t i s v i t a l t o " the i s s u e because i f an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s not - 8 -approved by the Board, the p a r t i e s cannot r e v e r t to t h e i r o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n s (input 1) d e s p i t e the s t r e n g t h of the s t i m u l u s . The r e g u l a t i o n s governing c e r t i f i c a t i o n are found i n S e c t i o n 52 o f the Labour Code o f B r i t i s h Columbia (R.S.B.C. Chap. 122-1975): 52(1) Where, a t any time a f t e r a trade union has been c e r t i f i e d f o r a u n i t of employees, the Board i s s a t i s f i e d , a f t e r such i n v e s t i g a t i o n as i t c o n s i d e r s necessary or a d v i s a b l e , t h a t the employer has ceased to be the employer o f the employees i n the u n i t , i t may c a n c e l the c e r t i f i c a t i o n . (2) Where ten months have e l a p s e d a f t e r the c e r -t i f i c a t i o n of a trade union, and a f t e r such i n v e s t i g a t i o n as the Board c o n s i d e r s necessary or a d v i s a b l e , which may i n c l u d e the t a k i n g of a vote o f the employees i n the a p p r o p r i a t e b a r g a i n i n g u n i t , the board i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t the t r a d e union has ceased t o r e p r e s e n t a m a j o r i t y of the employees i n the u n i t , i t may c a n c e l the c e r t i f i c a t i o n . (3) Where the c e r t i f i c a t i o n of a trade union as b a r g a i n i n g agent i s c a n c e l l e d under S e c t i o n 3 6 of t h i s s e c t i o n , any c o l l e c t i v e agreement between the t r a d e union and the employer of the employees i n the u n i t i n r e s p e c t o f which the c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s c a n c e l l e d and v o i d . The most s t r i k i n g aspect o f S e c t i o n 52 i s the absence of the l e g a l compulsion upon the Board to grant a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . In an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n , i f the m a j o r i t y of the v o t i n g employees i n a u n i t want trade union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 2 "the Board s h a l l c e r t i f y " the t r a d e union; however, i n a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n the Board has wider d i s c r e t i o n a r y power, f o r - 9 -3 i t "may c a n c e l the c e r t i f i c a t i o n . " The d i f f e r e n c e between " s h a l l " and "may" i s q u i t e s i g n i f i c a n t . The Board i s under no compulsion t o d e c e r t i f y even i f the m a j o r i t y of the employees i n the u n i t want t o . The l e g i s l a t u r e d i d not a r t i c u l a t e the p r e c i s e r u l e s of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , a g r e a t d e a l of l a t i t u d e was given the Board i n d e c i d i n g on d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The law speaks o n l y t o broad i s s u e s and few p o l i c y g u i d e l i n e s can be concluded from i t . However, the Board's power may not be omnipotent. "Power o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s d i s c r e t i o n a r y , but the Board must pay due r e g a r d t o o b j e c t s o f the s t a t u t e and the c l a s s of person f o r whose b e n e f i t the power was i n t e n d e d t o be conferred."4 S e c t i o n s 39 and 52 both d e a l w i t h the i s s u e of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . As i n t e r p r e t e d by the Board, S e c t i o n 52 i s a p p l i c a b l e o n l y i f the membership r e j e c t s unionism as a means of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h the consequence of v o i d i n g an e x i s t i n g c o l l e c t i v e agreement. S e c t i o n 52 cannot be used by the membership merely t o d i s e n f r a n c h i s e one p a r t i c u l a r union or to n u l l i f y any e x i s t i n g agreement. Thus, S e c t i o n 52 i s f o r the r e j e c t i o n of unionism per se w h i l e 39 i s i n t e n d e d f o r the r e j e c t i o n of one p a r t i c u l a r union. In S e c t i o n 39, the law d e a l s w i t h a union b e i n g decer-t i f i e d so the membership c o u l d choose a d i f f e r e n t union. The - 10 -a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n can onl y be submitted i n the 7th and 8th month i n each year of a c o l l e c t i v e agreement, and the e x i s t i n g agreement remains i n f o r c e d e s p i t e the change i n unions. In S e c t i o n 52, an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n can be made any time a f t e r the t e n t h month of a c e r t i f i c a t i o n and, i f approved by the Board, the e x i s t i n g c o l l e c t i v e agreement becomes n u l l and v o i d . Because o f the d i f f e r e n c e s between the s e c t i o n s , the Board was f o r c e d t o be e x p l i c i t as to the a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f each of the s e c t i o n s . I t would have been p o s s i b l e f o r the member-s h i p t o d e c e r t i f y under S e c t i o n 52 to r i d themselves of a c o l l e c t i v e agreement and then r e c e r t i f y under S e c t i o n 39(1). T h i s would f o r c e the employer t o b a r g a i n a new agreement. T h i s would subvert the law r e g a r d i n g a r a i d i n g s i t u a t i o n and i s i n e q u i t a b l e f o r the employer. The t i m i n g requirement i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t between the two s e c t i o n s . In the " r a i d i n g " s i t u a t i o n ( S e c t i o n 39), an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d t o two months o f the year because the l e g i s l a t u r e sought t o e s t a b l i s h some degree o f o r d e r i n union/management r e l a t i o n s and i n t e r -union r i v a l r i e s . T h i s r e s t r i c t i o n i s not found i n S e c t i o n 52 because i t i s presumed t h a t no union s h a l l r e p l a c e the d e c e r t i f i e d one. The p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t a p p l y i n g f o r a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n the f i r s t ten months ( S e c t i o n 52) i s t o giv e the new trade union an o p p o r t u n i t y of demonstrating t o i t s membership the b e n e f i t s o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . I t al l o w s - l i -the union time t o conc e n t r a t e on the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f u n c t i o n 5 without any f e a r t o i t s e x i s t e n c e . BOARD DECISIONS •The a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f S e c t i o n 52 i s c l e a r but there are o f t e n many events surrounding a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n which the Board must i n t e r p r e t i n terms of t h e i r p r o p r i e t y . The Board's most common i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s d e a l w i t h the ex t e n t o f o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e on the d e c i s i o n o f the members to d e c e r t i f y . The o t h e r s i t u a t i o n the Board g e n e r a l l y r u l e s on i s the ex t e n t the trade union has f u l f i l l e d i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f u n c t i o n . These r u l i n g s are c o n f i n e d t o the co n t e x t o f an absence o r presence o f union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and does not d e a l w i t h the i s s u e o f the q u a l i t y o f the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . (1) Employer I n f l u e n c e A b a s i c p o l i c y o f the Board i s t h a t employees have the r i g h t t o make d e c i s i o n s about the k i n d o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n they want without any undue i n f l u e n c e o r t h r e a t s . I f any employer i n f l u e n c e s the d e c i s i o n o f the union members i n a d e c e r t i -f i c a t i o n , then the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n w i l l be denied. The Board d e f i n e s employer i n f l u e n c e i n r e f e r e n c e t o s p e c i f i c cases. Every case i n v o l v i n g employer i n t e r f e r e n c e has i t s . own unique f e a t u r e s and i s q u i t e complex. The h i s t o r y o f the union/management r e l a t i o n s h i p i s an important c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f employer i n t e r f e r e n c e . I f the - 12 -employees have a h i s t o r y o f s e e k i n g t h e i r employer's c o u n s e l , then i t i s arguable t h a t employee c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the employer r e g a r d i n g a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s not i n a p p r o p r i a t e i n f l u e n c e . ^ An i n d i c a t i o n of the employer's i n t e n t i o n i s h i s i n i t i a l w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept the trade union and the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s . I f the employer r e c o g n i z e d the l e g i t i m a c y of the t r a d e union from the s t a r t , the Board w i l l take t h i s as evidence o f no undue i n f l u e n c e . C o n v e r s e l y , i f the union/management r e l a t i o n s h i p i s dominated by u n f a i r l a b o u r p r a c t i c e s or a r e l u c t a n c e to b a r g a i n on the p a r t of the employer, the Board w i l l take t h i s evidence as an i n d i c a t i o n 7 of undue i n f l u e n c e . Both the i n t e n t i o n and a c t i o n of the employer are c o n s i d e r e d . The Board e v a l u a t e s the m e r i t s of an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n on two bases. I t examines the wishes of the employees and the nature of the employer's i n t e r f e r e n c e . The Board w i l l not punish the employees s o l e l y because of the 8 employer's a c t i v i t i e s . I f the Board i s i n doubt, they can o r d e r a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n vote and i t s r e s u l t i s taken as evidence i n t h e i r d e c i s i o n . The Board i s not r e q u i r e d to 9 adhere to the r e s u l t s of the vote. An o v e r - r i d i n g i n f l u e n c e i n the Board's d e c i s i o n on d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s the p r i n c i p l e of encouraging c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n through u n i o n i z a t i o n . I f an employer has f r u s t r a t e d the employees' c a p a c i t y t o experience the b e n e f i t s o f unionism, the.Board w i l l not d e c e r t i f y . The Board w i l l h o l d the a p p l i c a t i o n i n abeyance x u u n t i l the union has been given the o p p o r t u n i t y t o demonstrate i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s . U n t i l then, the Board f e e l s the membership cannot make an o b j e c t i v e d e c i s i o n . There i s a t l e a s t one circumstance where the Board w i l l not approve an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . I f the employer's i n f l u e n c e r e q u i r e d the Board to impose a f i r s t c o l l e c t i v e agreement ( S e c t i o n 70), the union w i l l not be d e c e r t i f i e d d u r i n g the term o f t h a t agreement. S e c t i o n 70 i s o n l y used when the employer i s t r y i n g to sabotage the union's e x i s t e n c e and i n t h i s circumstance the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s p e r c e i v e d by the Board as the r e s u l t . of another employer t a c t i c . x x •(2) Member I n f l u e n c e Since the i n c e p t i o n o f the new Labour Code (19 74) t h e r e have not been any cases r e p o r t e d r e g a r d i n g undue i n f l u e n c e by union members upon t h e i r p e e rs. However, the Board's p o l i c y s hould not d i f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y from cases o f employer i n t e r f e r e n c e . I f the i n f l u e n c e of some members unduly subverts the wishes o f o t h e r members and consequently the members* a t t i t u d e toward the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n cannot be a s c e r t a i n e d , then i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d the a p p l i c a t i o n w i l l be denied. T h i s may be due from t h r e a t s of i n j u r y or i n t i m i -d a t i o n t o sway members' d e c i s i o n . (3) Union I n f l u e n c e When a trade union has ceased to be a trade union, the Board may d e c e r t i f y under S e c t i o n (52). By d e f i n i t i o n , a - 14 -t r a d e union cannot be "dominated or i n f l u e n c e d by an employer" and must have as one o f i t s primary purposes "the r e g u l a t i o n i n the p r o v i n c e of r e l a t i o n s between 12 employers and employees through c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . " When a t r a d e union i s a c t i n g i n c o n c e r t w i t h an employer, the Board i s l e f t w ith no c h o i c e but t o d e c e r t i f y . No case of t h i s nature has a r i s e n . There are grounds f o r a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i f the union does not f u l f i l l i t s b a r g a i n i n g o b l i g a t i o n s . In Western . Steak Restaurants (B.C.L.R.B. Case #124/74) the union d i d not n e g o t i a t e a c o l l e c t i v e agreement and t h e r e f o r e f a i l e d t o meet one o f i t s primary t a s k s . The Board approved the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n on t h a t b a s i s . CONCLUSION The major p o i n t of the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n model i s t h a t a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n upsets a dynamic p r o c e s s . The s t i m u l u s f o r a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n may come from many sources but they are i n j e c t e d through the model i n one or more o f the i n t e r a c t i o n p o i n t s (input 2, throughputs 2(A), 2 ( B ) ) . The l e g a l a n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e s which s t i m u l i are a s u b v e r s i o n of the membership's freedom o f c h o i c e . I f the employees f r e e l y decide they no longer want union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , then a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n w i l l be granted by the Board. A d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n w i l l a l s o be granted i f the trade union does not l i v e up t o i t s l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n s . The r u l i n g s of the Board d e a l with the d e t e r m i n a t i o n i f the employees had the - 15 -freedom to decide the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s s u e . I f the Board cannot reach a c o n c l u s i o n , the L o c a l w i l l not be d e c e r t i f i e d . T h i s i s i n alignment w i t h t h e i r p o l i c y o f encouraging c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . - 16 -FIGURE 1 Dynamic Model of D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n Input (1) I n t e r a c t i o n i n the Workplace Employees wit h a R j Community •^ 1 I n t e r e s t ^7 Throughput (1) Output (1) Input (2) L e g a l T r a n s f o r m a t i o n Employer f I n t e r a c t i o n ^ Membership — ^ J i n the < A, Workplace ^Legal Rights and ) b l i g a t i o n s L e g a l Rights/ and O b l i g a t i o n s L e g a l Rights and Obligatiions Throughput 2(A) Throughput 2(B) Output (2) I n t r a - O r g B a r g a i n i n g B a r g a i n i n g - 17 -FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I I 1. Subsequently t o be known as the Board. 2. S e c t i o n 39(1), Labour Code of B r i t i s h Columbia (1975). " S h a l l " i s u n d e r l i n e d f o r added emphasis. 3. S e c t i o n 52(2), Labour Code of B r i t i s h Columbia (1975). "May" i s u n d e r l i n e d f o r added emphasis. 4. F.W. Woolworth (1956), Supreme Court of Saskatchewan. The Saskatchewan Law o f D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s very s i m i l a r t o B r i t i s h Columbia and i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d t h i s d e c i s i o n would apply. 5. P a r t a I n d u s t r i e s , L.R.B.B.C. D e c i s i o n #19/1974. 6 . Dato Markets, L.R.B.B.C. D e c i s i o n #14/1974. 7 . London Drugs, L.R.B.B.C. D e c i s i o n #4 9/1974. Medieval Inn, L.R.B.B.C. D e c i s i o n #122/1974. Century P l a z a H o t e l , L.R.B.B.C. D e c i s i o n #68/1975 8. London Drugs, L.R.B.B.C. D e c i s i o n #49/19 74. 9. Rotary P i e , L.R.B.B.C. D e c i s i o n #143/1974. 10. Medieval Inn, L.R.B.B.C. D e c i s i o n #122/1974. 11. London Drugs, L.R.B.B.C. D e c i s i o n #49/1974. 12. S e c t i o n 1(1), Labour Code of B r i t i s h Columbia (1975). - 18 -CHAPTER I I I ARRAY OF POSSIBLE REASONS FOR DECERTIFICATION  INTRODUCTION An a r r a y o f p o s s i b l e reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n w i l l be p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s chapter.. The reasons w i l l be d i s c u s s e d w i t h the h e l p of examples and whenever p o s s i b l e , the reasons w i l l be supplemented by t e s t a b l e hypotheses. • GENERAL COMMENTS In the b e h a v i o u r a l sense, d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s an i n t e r a c t i o n between o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , the reasons f o r a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n must have an o r g a n i z a t i o n behaviour component. In order t o f u l l y understand the proximate reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n some gen e r a l comments of o r g a n i z a t i o n behaviour a p p l i c a b l e to d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n are a p p r o p r i a t e . In any o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e r e i s some degree of attachment between the membership and the o r g a n i z a t i o n h i e r a r c h y . A process of exchange between the membership and o r g a n i z a t i o n occurs where each p a r t y makes demands upon the oth e r i n terms of f i n a n c i a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l support. These demands - 19 -are r e c o n c i l e d and compromised u n t i l both the membership and the h i e r a r c h y are s a t i s f i e d w i t h the r e l a t i v e t r a d e - o f f s . The process i s known as,the " l i n k a g e mechanism" x and i s the major determinant of the degree of commitment between the members and the o r g a n i z a t i o n . In the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s context, the h i e r a r c h y i s r e p r e s e n t e d by the union o f f i c i a l s and the rank and f i l e r e p r e s e n t the membership. The demands of the union o f f i c i a l s and the rank and f i l e are r e p r e s e n t e d as the r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s which each group imposes upon the o t h e r (output 1 of F i g u r e 1). T h e r e f o r e , the a b i l i t y of the union and the rank and f i l e t o a c q u i r e i t s m a t e r i a l and p s y c h i c rewards i s the key to the union's s u r v i v a l . Rewards p r o v i d e the i n c e n t i v e t o remain i n the e x i s t i n g system and are i n s t r u m e n t a l to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of needs f o r both the union and i t s rank and f i l e . In the context of a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , the o r g a n i z a t i o n behaviour l i t e r a t u r e suggests t h a t the needs of e i t h e r the union or the rank and f i l e are not b e i n g met. The p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d (union and rank and f i l e ) are e i t h e r i n s e n s i t i v e t o or i n c a p a b l e of f u l f i l l i n g each o t h e r ' s needs. A l l of the forthcoming reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n are developed i n t h i s c o n t e x t . 2 . . . The concept of cues, which i s found i n o r g a n i z a t i o n behaviour l i t e r a t u r e , i s a p p l i c a b l e t o the i s s u e of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Environment, d e f i n e d as anything o u t s i d e a p a r t i c u l a r domain o f i n t e r e s t , c o n s t a n t l y emits cues of v a r y i n g s u b t l e t y and importance. The a b i l i t y of the - 20 -o r g a n i z a t i o n and/or i t s members to choose an a p p r o p r i a t e s t r a t e g y i s p a r t y a f u n c t i o n of the a b i l i t y t o r e c e i v e and i n t e r p r e t cues from the environment. For example, the union may i n t e r p r e t from an employer's environment t h a t the employer c o u l d not w i t h s t a n d a long s t r i k e and base t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y a p p r o p r i a t e l y . I f the union i n t e r p r e t e d the environmental cues c o r r e c t l y , t h e i r s t r a t e g y c o u l d prove s u c c e s s f u l . However, i f the union's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the cues i s wrong, then t h e i r s t r a t e g y i s u n l i k e l y t o succeed. The a c t u a l cue may be the employer's f i n a n c i a l s t r e n g t h or the employer's market p o s i t i o n . For the purposes of t h i s c h apter, the environment r e f e r s t o e v e r y t h i n g o u t s i d e of the t r a d e union. I t may range from the employer w i t h which the union b a r g a i n s t o the economy i n the macro sense. The m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of cues from the environment can e f f e c t the process of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . I f a union m i s i n t e r p r e t s cues from the environment and undertakes a s t r a t e g y which does not achieve the goals o f i t s members, the commitment o f the membership to the union may l e s s e n , which c o u l d r e s u l t i n d e c e r t i f i -c a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , both p r e s e n t and p o t e n t i a l f u t u r e rewards a f f e c t o r g a n i z a t i o n attachment. - 21 -S P E C I F I C REASONS FOR DECERTIFICATION (1) E x p e c t a t i o n s o f membership r e g a r d i n g c o s t / b e n e f i t o f 3 c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a r e n o t r e a l i z e d . The p r e m i s e o f t h e e x p e c t a t i o n r e a s o n f o r d e c e r -t i f i c a t i o n i s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s b r i n g t o an o r g a n i z a t i o n a u n i q u e s e t o f e x p e c t a t i o n s . I n t h e union/member c o n t e x t , i t i s l i k e l y b a s e d on a h i g h v a l u e i n t h e a r e a s o f m a t e r i a l r e w a r d and g r o u p i n t e r a c t i o n . The members a l s o p l a c e a h i g h v a l u e on a number o f f u t u r e p o t e n t i a l r e t u r n s due t o t h e u n i o n membership. P r e s e n t a n d f u t u r e e x p e c t a t i o n s i n t h e a g g r e g a t e must b o t h be met i f t h e membership i s t o f e e l , i t i s w o r t h w h i l e t o r e m a i n i n t h e u n i o n . T h e r e f o r e , i n one s e n s e , a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n may be r e g a r d e d as an i m b a l a n c e o f e x p e c t a t i o n s b e i n g g r e a t e r t h a n t h e a'ctual r e w a r d s . The w i d e r t h e d i s c r e p a n c y o f t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s t o r e w a r d s , t h e g r e a t e r i s t h e l i k e l i h o o d f o r a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . E x p e c t a t i o n s and r e w a r d s c a n be e x a m i n e d i n t e r m s o f c o s t / b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s . Members may have had h i g h e r e x p e c t a t i o n s o f b e n e f i t s t h a n t h e a c t u a l r e w a r d s r e c e i v e d o r t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s o f c o s t s i n v o l v e d i n g a i n i n g t h e r e w a r d s were l e s s t h a n t h e y h a d t o c o n t r i b u t e . 4 ( l a ) O v e r e s t i m a t i o n o f b e n e f i t s . I n s t i t u t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s w i t h i n u n i o n s may c a u s e t h e membership t o o v e r e s t i m a t e t h e b e n e f i t s o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . I n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f e r s t o t h e f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e and mechanisms o f u n i o n s i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s e t t i n g . An - 22 -o v e r e s t i m a t i o n o f b e n e f i t s i n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s e n s e o c c u r s when t h e u n i o n o v e r s t a t e s i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s t o t h e m e m b e r s h i p . W h i l e t h i s i s t h e u n d e r l y i n g c a u s e f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l ways t h i s may o c c u r . The u n i o n may h a v e b e e n f o r c e d t o o v e r s t a t e i t s c a p a c i t y a s a r e a c t i o n t o a h o s t i l e e m p l o y e r . T h i s c o u l d a r i s e a t t h e t i m e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s e s t a b l i s h e d o r a f t e r t h e union/member r e l a t i o n s h i p h a s b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d . I f i t a r o s e a t t h e t i m e t h e u n i t was b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e n t h e l e n g t h o f t i m e b e t w e e n c e r t i f i c a t i o n a n d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n w o u l d p r o b a b l y be q u i t e s h o r t . When a u n i t i s b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e e m p l o y e r h a s many o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e w o r k e r s s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e e m p l o y e r c a n s p e n d more t i m e w i t h t h e w o r k e r s t h a n t h e u n i o n a n d t h e . w o r k e r s d e p e n d on t h e e m p l o y e r a s a s o u r c e o f e m p l o y m e n t . T h e r e f o r e , t h e u n i o n may be p l a c e d i n s u c h a p o s i t i o n t h a t i t i s f o r c e d t o e x a g g e r a t e t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s i n o r d e r t o o v e r c o m e t h e power o f t h e e m p l o y e r . The d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n w o u l d a r i s e o n c e t h e members s e e t h a t t h e u n i o n c a n n o t a c c o m p l i s h w h a t i t p r o m i s e d . D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n c o u l d be due t o t h e n a t u r a l m a r k e t f o r c e s o f s u p p l y a n d demand, an e m p l o y e r u n w i l l i n g t o c o m p r o m i s e w i t h t h e u n i o n , o r i n e p t u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p . I t i s a p a r a d o x , t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e u n i t ' s e s t a b l i s h -ment may a l s o be t h e c a u s e o f i t s d e m i s e . I n a n y o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h a f o r m a l h i e r a r c h y o f e l e c t e d a n d a p p o i n t e d o f f i c i a l s , t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e s e o f f i c i a l s t o - 23 - . r e t a i n t h e i r s t a t u s i s p a r t l y a f u n c t i o n o f t h e i r a b i l i t y t o cope w i t h f a c t i o n a l i s m w i t h i n the membership. A trade union i s no e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s r u l e . A t y p i c a l s t r a t e g y o f both e s t a b l i s h e d and f a c t i o n a l l e a d e r s i s t o promise f u t u r e b e n e f i t s i n r e t u r n f o r member a l l e g i a n c e . These promises may be an overstatement o f r e a l i t y which r a i s e s the e x p e c t a t i o n s o f the members beyond what can a c t u a l l y be gained. Once the members r e a l i z e t h a t t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s w i l l not be s a t i s f i e d , a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n may be i n i t i a t e d . Again, the statements which can r e i n f o r c e the l e a d e r s h i p ' s a u t h o r i t y may u l t i m a t e l y be the cause of the union's demise. Inept l e a d e r s h i p may a l s o r a i s e member e x p e c t a t i o n s beyond r e a l i s t i c l i m i t s and hence cause a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The l e a d e r s h i p , through t h e i r l a c k o f knowledge and/or e x p e r i e n c e , may promise the members rewards which are u n a t t a i n a b l e . The promises are not intended as an o v e r t d e c e p t i o n but are based on a l a c k o f s e n s i t i v i t y to the s i t u a t i o n . I t most l i k e l y w i l l occur i n newly formed u n i t s where the l e a d e r s h i p have l i t t l e e x p e r i e n c e i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . B esides i n s t i t u t i o n a l reasons, there are member reasons why members might overestimate b e n e f i t s . Member reasons f o r o v e r e s t i m a t i n g b e n e f i t s occur because of i n a c c u r a t e member p e r c e p t i o n s . In the member reason f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , p e r c e p t i o n s are not provoked by f a l s e promises o r i n e p t l e a d e r s h i p but a r e . s t r i c t l y based on the - 24 -members* m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and/or ignorance of the a p p r o p r i a t e environmental cues. Again, the o v e r e s t i m a t i o n o f b e n e f i t s based on member reasons i s an u n d e r l y i n g reason and there are many p o s s i b l e events which can account f o r t h i s reason. Two major c a t e g o r i e s o f a p p l i c a b l e cues have been determined f o r the purposes df s t u d y i n g d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The members may have m i s i n t e r p r e t e d the cues from the employer r e g a r d i n g h i s a b i l i t y t o meet the demands f o r h i g h e r m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t s . I t may be due t o a misconception o f the f i n a n c i a l wealth o f the company, the employer's a b i l i t y to pass on c o s t i n c r e a s e s t o i t s customers or the employer's w i l l i n g n e s s t o submit to union demands. G e n e r a l l y , the employer p l a y s an important r o l e i n decer-t i f i c a t i o n because the union's a b i l i t y t o meet i t s members' needs and j u s t i f y i t s e x i s t e n c e i s e f f e c t e d by the r e a c t i o n o f the employer t o the union. T h e r e f o r e , the employer's r e s i s t a n c e may r e f l e c t upon the e f f e c t i v e n e s s and n e c e s s i t y o f the union. Once the membership r e a l i z e t h e i r misconceptions o f the employer's s t a t u s , they may become disenchanted w i t h the b e n e f i t s of u n i o n i z a t i o n and may d e c e r t i f y . A second member reason f o r an o v e r e s t i m a t i o n o f b e n e f i t s i s the "demonstration e f f e c t " . In t h i s case, members are i n t e r p r e t i n g cues which are not a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . A h y p o t h e t i c a l example be s t i l l u s t r a t e s the p o i n t . Members o f a union may read of l a r g e s e t t l e m e n t s - 25 -made by oth e r unions and hence demand a s i m i l a r s e t t l e m e n t without comparing i f the circumstances are a p p l i c a b l e to themselves. These s e t t l e m e n t s may not be a p p l i c a b l e to t h e i r s i t u a t i o n , thus t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s c o u l d not be r e a l i z e d . The d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n may be the behaviour they undertake to r e a d j u s t when the r e a l i t y of the circumstance emerge. 5 (lb) U n derestimation o f c o s t s . The c o s t s o f u n i o n i z a t i o n are underestimated when the membership underestimates the s a c r i f i c e s r e q u i r e d t o i n c u r the b e n e f i t s o f u n i o n i z a t i o n . S a c r i f i c e s may range from v o l u n t e e r work f o r the union t o l o s s o f income due t o a s t r i k e . S i m i l a r t o the o v e r e s t i m a t i o n o f b e n e f i t s , the un d e r e s t i m a t i o n o f c o s t s can a l s o be analyzed i n terms of the m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and/or m i s a p p l i c a t i o n o f environmental cues. For the purpose o f t h i s chapter, the u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n o f c o s t s s h a l l be r e f e r r e d t o as i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n reasons. E r r o r s of judgment on the p a r t o f union l e a d e r s and/or members i n the i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n c ontext may r e s u l t i n a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Even the most a s t u t e o f l e a d e r s and/or members can make mistakes which are not due t o i n e p t i t u d e on e i t h e r of t h e i r p a r t s . One of the most common e r r o r s i s a m i s c a l c u l a t i o n of a c t u a l employer r e s i s t a n c e to the e x i s -tence and demands of the union. I f the employer's r e s i s t a n c e i s underestimated, the necessary s a c r i f i c e s r e q u i r e d o f the membership w i l l a l s o be underestimated. The incongruency between e x p e c t a t i o n s t o r e a l i t y may provoke d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . An employer can r a i s e the employees' c o s t of union a f f i l i a t i o n by p r o l o n g i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s and w i t h s t a n d i n g a l o n g s t r i k e . These t a c t i c s , i f used, are p r e v a l e n t d u r i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n o f f i r s t c o l l e c t i v e agreements because employer r e s i s t a n c e from the i n c e p t i o n o f the c e r t i f i c a t i o n can r e t a r d the union from ever e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s e l f w i t h the new members. F i r s t c o n t r a c t s are important to the union 6 because the c o n t r a c t e s t a b l i s h e s a grie v a n c e procedure and 7 p r o v i s i o n s f o r t e c h n o l o g i c a l change. Even with the worst c o n t r a c t , the union can demonstrate t o i t s new members the advantages of unionism through the e x e r c i s e of the grievance procedure and t e c h n o l o g i c a l change c l a u s e s o f the c o n t r a c t . The Labour Code of B r i t i s h Columbia r e a f f i r m s the l i k e l i h o o d of employer r e s i s t a n c e a t the f i r s t c o n t r a c t by p r o v i d i n g g f o r a compulsory f i r s t agreement when undue r e s i s t a n c e t o c o n c l u d i n g a c o l l e c t i v e agreement i s proved and when requested by e i t h e r o f the p a r t i e s . To date, t h i s p r o v i s i o n has o n l y been requested by unions. There i s no s i m i l a r compulsory c o n t r a c t p r o v i s i o n w i t h i n the Labour Code f o r subsequent agreements. A t e s t a b l e h y p o t h e s i s emerges from t h i s . The i n a b i l i t y t o conclude a f i r s t c o l l e c t i v e agreement l i k e l y r e s u l t s i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n and i n e v i t a b l y i n d i c a t e s the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n reason o f c o s t u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n . In the i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n context, the union l e a d e r s h i p may l a c k the r e q u i s i t e knowledge and experience i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . The i n e p t i t u d e of the union l e a d e r s may i n i t i a t e the members' un d e r e s t i m a t i o n o f s a c r i f i c e s r e q u i r e d to g a i n the members' demands. In t u r n , the incongruence of o f member e x p e c t a t i o n s to r e a l i t y may be s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e t h a t the members may become disenchanted w i t h the union and may d e c e r t i f y . The s i t u a t i o n i s s i m i l a r to i n e p t l e a d e r s h i p due to i n s t i t u t i o n a l reasons (#1, F i g u r e 2) except the former r e s u l t s i n an u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n of c o s t s w h i l e the l a t t e r o v e r e s t i m a t e s b e n e f i t s . However, i n both cases the incongruence of e x p e c t a t i o n s t o rewards leads t o the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Membership apathy i s an i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n f a c t o r which may l e a d t o a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Apathy o f the membership i s d e f i n e d as an i n d i f f e r e n c e toward the union, c h a r a c t e r i z e d by minimum compliance to union r u l e s . T y p i c a l l y , i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h an a p a t h e t i c membership, the membership i s w i l l i n g t o j o i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n to share i n the b e n e f i t s but are not w i l l i n g t o undertake the necessary s a c r i f i c e s . In the union c o n t e x t , the members are w i l l i n g t o j o i n the union to g a i n the b e n e f i t s of the c o l l e c t i v e agreement but are not w i l l i n g t o make s a c r i f i c e s such as a s t r i k e . Hence, the c o s t s o f u n i o n i z a t i o n are underestimated and once the members r e c o g n i z e t h i s , they may move to d e c e r t i f y . 9 (2) Cohesive element of the o r g a n i z a t i o n i f m i s s i n g . The c o h e s i v e element i n any o r g a n i z a t i o n i s t h a t element which b r i n g s and keeps to g e t h e r the i n d i v i d u a l p a r t s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e i s v i t a l t o the e x i s t e n c e - 28 -o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n . In the union c o n t e x t , t h i s element i s e i t h e r the l e a d e r s h i p (formal or i n f o r m a l ) or the common goals of the membership. A p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s an absence of a c o h e s i v e element w i t h i n the u n i t . (2a) Dominant members of the u n i t are no l o n g e r p r e s e n t . ^ In any o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e r e u s u a l l y e x i s t s a group of people who are i n f l u e n t i a l upon the a t t i t u d e s of the m a j o r i t y of members w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . For the purpose o f t h i s t h e s i s , the group o f i n f l u e n t i a l members w i l l be d e f i n e d as the dominant group. The power o f the dominant group i s based on knowledge, wealth, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n or r e s p e c t from t h e i r p e ers. These i n d i v i d u a l s are o f t e n found i n the vanguard of the o r g a n i z a t i o n and are i n f l u e n t i a l on member p e r c e p t i o n s . I f the dominant group le a v e s the o r g a n i z a t i o n and i s not adequately r e p l a c e d , the cohesion of the o r g a n i z a t i o n may break and r e s u l t i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s demise. In the union context, the absence of cohesion' may r e s u l t i n a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s i s an u n d e r l y i n g reason and t h e r e are s e v e r a l ways t h i s may o c c u r . Some of the more probable ways are d i s c u s s e d below. The employer may r e c o g n i z e the dominant employees o f the u n i t and use t h i s t o promote a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The employer may f i r e them or make the work environment so unpleasant t h a t these people w i l l " v o l u n t a r i l y " q u i t . - 29 -The employer can be very s u b t l e about these a c t i v i t i e s . The normal turnover of employees may be the cause o f these l e a d e r s l e a v i n g the u n i t . Normal turnover i s a f u n c t i o n of many v a r i a b l e s . I t may be due to p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , o c c u p a t i o n , i n d u s t r y or geographic l o c a t i o n . D e s p i t e which reason i t might be, the p o i n t i s t h a t normal, turnover may cause the demise o f the c e r t i f i -c a t i o n i f the. people r e p l a c i n g those who q u i t do not give the union t h e i r support. The l e a d e r s i n the u n i t are o f t e n promoted. The employer or the union f e d e r a t i o n may r e c o g n i z e t h e i r o r g a n i z i n g t a l e n t s , r e s p e c t of t h e i r peers and give them h i g h e r order r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s which c o u l d d i s q u a l i f y them from the u n i t . I f no o t h e r l e a d e r of the u n i t emerges the ; cohesion of the union may break and a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n would r e s u l t . D e s p i t e the d i f f e r e n t ways t u r n o v e r can occur, i t i s the end r e s u l t of t u r n o v e r which can r e s u l t i n d e c e r t i f i -c a t i o n . The e s s e n t i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s t h a t turnover not o n l y changes the p e r s o n n e l w i t h i n . a c e r t i f i e d group of employees but t u r n o v e r can e f f e c t the a t t i t u d e s w i t h i n a group of c e r t i f i e d employees. As the committed u n i o n i s t s leave the c e r t i f i e d group, p a r t of the union's s t r e n g t h w i t h i n that.group a l s o l e a v e s . The h i g h e r the turnover w i t h i n a c e r t i f i e d group the g r e a t e r i s the danger t h a t the union's s t r e n g t h w i t h i n the group w i l l completely - 30 -erode. T h e r e f o r e , t u r n o v e r i s the b a s i s of a t e s t a b l e h y p o t h e s i s because we would expect h i g h turnover i s most l i k e l y i n u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d . Turnover can be used as a parameter t o measure the work .related s t a b i l i t y of l a b o u r . G e n e r a l l y , u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r has a h i g h p r o p e n s i t y to t u r n o v e r . U n s k i l l e d l a b o u r c i r c u l a t e s w i t h i n the secondary labour market and t h i s l a b o u r market i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a l a r g e t r a n s i e n t l a b o u r f o r c e c o n c e n t r a t e d i n low wage i n d u s t r i e s . U n i o n i z a t i o n w i t h i n these low wage i n d u s t r i e s i s g e n e r a l l y handled by i n d u s t r i a l and m i s c e l l a n e o u s unions. T h e r e f o r e , from the b a s i c reason of turnover as a p o s s i b l e cause o f d e c e r t i f i -c a t i o n two more hypotheses can be generated. We would expect the u n s k i l l e d o r g a n i z e d workers t o be most l i k e l y t o d e c e r t i f y and we would a l s o expect t h a t i n d u s t r i a l and m i s c e l l a n e o u s unions e x p e r i e n c e the m a j o r i t y o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s . (2b) Reason f o r the u n i t ' s e x i s t e n c e i s no longer p r e s e n t . ^ A union i s c r e a t e d to meet the needs of i t s members and to perform a s e r v i c e f u n c t i o n . A t y p i c a l reason f o r a union's c r e a t i o n i s t o r a i s e or preserve the s o c i o -economic s t a t u s of i t s members. I f the membership no l o n g e r p e r c e i v e s a purpose f o r union a f f i l i a t i o n then a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n may be p o s s i b l e . T h e r e f o r e , the absence of goals can d e s t r o y the c o h e s i o n of the union. I f a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e prompted the union's formation and the union s e t t l e d t h a t i s s u e t o i t s members' s a t i s f a c t i o n , the members may not p e r c e i v e any f u r t h e r use t o union a f f i l i a t i o n and d e c e r t i f y . T h e r e f o r e , the union c o u l d perform s u f f i c i e n t l y w e l l such t h a t i t would work i t s e l f out of e x i s t e n c e . T h i s i s not h i g h l y l i k e l y because the union i s c o n s t r a i n e d by the employer's goals and the dynamics of the socio-economic environment c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o p r o v i d e other reasons f o r the union's e x i s t e n c e . The environment o f the union may a l s o c o n t r i b u t e t o d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . For example, i f the employees u n i o n i z e d t o p r o t e c t themselves i n an i n f l a t i o n a r y economy and the i n f l a t i o n s u b s i d e s , then the need f o r the union may a l s o s u b s i d e . The c o n c l u s i o n t o be drawn i s t h a t the members' environment i n f l u e n c e s t h e i r a t t i t u d e s towards unions and c o u l d provoke the union's demise. The environment o f the members would a l s o i n c l u d e (by d e f i n i t i o n ) the employer. O r i g i n a l l y , the union may have been c r e a t e d as a r e a c t i o n to an i n s e n s i t i v e employer. The employer's s e n s i t i v i t y may i n c r e a s e once he r e a l i z e s the c o s t o f working under the c o n s t r a i n t s of a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. I f the a t t i t u d e of the employer changes the reason f o r u n i o n i z i n g may be removed. T h i s s i t u a t i o n would a l s o be a p p l i c a b l e with a change of employer w i t h i n a company. A change of employer a t t i t u d e or change o f employer i l l u s t r a t e s the important r o l e an employer c o u l d p l a y i n the d e c i s i o n t o d e c e r t i f y . - 32 -(3) Union i s no longer i n t e r e s t e d i n r e p r e s e n t i n g the •4.12 u n i t . The u n d e r l y i n g assumption i n a l l the p r e v i o u s reasons i s t h a t the union wanted t o keep the c e r t i f i c a t i o n . In t h i s category o f reasons, i t i s t h e union which promotes the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . There are v a r i o u s f a c t o r s which c o n t r i b u t e t o t h i s category of reasons. 13 (3a) Economic c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s . A union has l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s . I m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y , an a l l o c a t i o n o f those r e s o u r c e s i s made based on the union's c u r r e n t p r i o r i t i e s and f u t u r e o b j e c t i v e s . I f a c e r t i f i c a t i o n becomes too c o s t l y r e l a t i v e t o the revenues d e r i v e d from the c e r t i f i c a t i o n , the union may decide t o terminate the s e r v i c i n g f o r trie c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The p o i n t a t which a c e r t i f i c a t i o n becomes too c o s t l y d i f f e r s w i t h every c e r t i f i c a t i o n . There are a number of p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s how s i t u a t i o n s might a r i s e where c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s . The employer c o u l d attempt t o break the c e r t i f i c a t i o n f i n a n c i a l l y . I f the employer c o n t i n u a l l y submits g r i e v a n c e s , o f t e n goes t o c o s t l y a r b i t r a t i o n and drags out n e g o t i a t i o n s , then the c o s t to the union f o r s e r v i c i n g the u n i t r i s e s d r a m a t i c a l l y . T h i s would be more p r e v a l e n t i n the s m a l l e r u n i t s . I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t h a t the union never intended to s e r v i c e the l o c a l . T h i s circumstance may a r i s e i n u n i t s which approach the union t o o r g a n i z e them. In these s i t u a t i o n s , the union may o r g a n i z e the u n i t , c o l l e c t dues but never i n t e n d on s e r v i c i n g the l o c a l . When s e r v i c i n g i s r e q u i r e d the union simply p u l l s out. T h e r e f o r e , the union's c o s t e x p e c t a t i o n s of the u n i t was understated. Union withdrawal o f s e r v i c i n g , as a reason f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , focuses on the i s s u e o f how unions s e t p r i o r i t i e s . The primary f u n c t i o n o f a union i s t o r e p r e s e n t employees i n n e g o t i a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f c o l l e c t i v e agreements. The union must perform t h i s primary f u n c t i o n f o r every u n i t i t r e p r e s e n t s , r e g a r d l e s s of the u n i t ' s s i z e . I t can be d i f f i c u l t f o r the union to j u s t i f y adequate s e r v i c i n g of s m a l l u n i t s . A u n i t o f three members can r e q u i r e as much or more a t t e n t i o n than a u n i t o f t h i r t y members, y e t the t h i r t y member u n i t p r o v i d e s ten f o l d more revenue than the three member u n i t . Given t h a t unions can take advantage of economies of s c a l e from l a r g e u n i t s , i t i s expected t h a t the s m a l l e r u n i t s w i l l be a s s i g n e d by the union t o lower p r i o r i t y on union r e s o u r c e s . A t e s t a b l e h y p othesis can be c o n s t r u c t e d from the above d i s c u s s i o n . Small u n i t s are the most l i k e l y t o d e c e r t i f y . The problem i s how to d e f i n e s m a l l so the hypothesis can be t e s t e d . Small u n i t s r e l a t e t o the average s i z e u n i t w i t h i n a c o r r e s p o n d i n g union and a l s o r e l a t e s t o the u n i t s i z e v i s - a - v i s the a b s o l u t e s i z e o f the l o c a l . T h e r e f o r e , the amended t e s t a b l e h y p o t h e s i s i s r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l u n i t s are the most l i k e l y t o d e c e r t i f y . - 34 -(3b) P o l i t i c a l Problems."'"'1 A union may provoke a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n because o f i n t e r -union p o l i t i c s . A l l unions w i t h i n the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) are bound by an a n t i - r a i d i n g agreement. T h e r e f o r e , i f a union wanted t o r a i d another c e r t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n the CLC, i t would have t o promote a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n and then go i n and o r g a n i z e the u n i t . The b e n e f i t of t h i s t a c t i c i s p o l i t i c a l peace w h i l e the c o s t i s the new union must n e g o t i a t e a c o l l e c t i v e agreement because any a c t i v e agreements are v o i d e d by a S e c t i o n 52 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 15 (3c) Punish Employer. I t i s common f o r a c e r t i f i c a t i o n t o be a r e q u i s i t e f o r a company t o get work. C o n s t r u c t i o n i s a prime example where non-union s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s are not allowed on the s i t e o f a union c o n t r a c t o r . The B r i t i s h Columbia P u b l i c 16 Works F a i r Employment A c t encouraged u n i o n i z a t i o n because the a c t s t a t e s t h a t o n l y u n i o n i z e d companies would be e l i g i b l e f o r p u b l i c works c o n t r a c t s . In these s i t u a t i o n s , the employer would promote u n i o n i z a t i o n i n o r d e r t o get jobs but would not b a r g a i n a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. The employer gets the b e n e f i t o f c e r t i f i c a t i o n without any c o s t . As a r e a c t i o n t o t h i s , the union moves t o d e c e r t i f y t o punish the employer through l o s t s a l e s . - 35 -. C O N C L U S I O N T h i s chapter s e t out an a r r a y of p o s s i b l e reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Although each reason was analyzed s e p a r a t e l y , the presence of any one reason f o r d e c e r t i -f i c a t i o n does not assume the absence o f any o t h e r reason. Reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n can work i n combination but t h i s chapter was designed to o u t l i n e the component p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The chapter a l s o developed hypotheses based on p a r t i c u l a r reasons. The p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e s f l a g e d by the hypotheses as w e l l as the o t h e r p o s s i b l e reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n w i l l be t e s t e d a g a i n s t the a c t u a l cases of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . . The next chapter o u t l i n e s the method of g a t h e r i n g data about the a c t u a l cases. - 36 -FIGURE 2 A r r a y o f Reasons f o r D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (1) E x p e c t a t i o n s o f Membership Re: C o s t s / B e n e f i t s o f U n i o n i z i n g were not R e a l i z e d A B A n t i c i p a t e d B e n e f i t s o f U n i o n i z a t i o n were Over-es t i m a t e d beyond R e a l i s t i c L i m i t s I n s t i t u t i o n a l Reasons Union O v e r s t a t e d i t s C a p a b i l i t i e s t o the Member Reasons ^ A n t i c i p a t e d c o s t s o f U n i o n i z a t i o n were under-est i m a t e d below R e a l i s t i c L i m i t s T I n t r a - O r g a n i z a t i o n Reasons R & F Overestimated B e n e f i t s due t o a M i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the Environment ( 2 ) Cohesive Element of the O r g a n i z a t i o n i s No Longer Pr e s e n t Dominant Member o f the U n i t are No Longer Present B The Reason i o r the U n i t ' s Presence i s No Longer P r e s e n t (3) Union i s No Longer I n t e r e s t e d i n Representing the U n i t A £ 7 Economic Costs Exceed B e n e f i t s B P o l i t i c a l Problems Punish Employer - 37 -FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I I I 1. S t e e r s , R.M. and P o r t e r , L.W., M o t i v a t i o n and Work  Behaviour (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19 75) p. 256. 2. Luthens, F. and K r e i t n e r , R., O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  Behaviour M o d i f i c a t i o n ( S c o t t , Foresman and Company 1975) pg. 14. 3. Refer t o Reason #1 o f F i g u r e 2. 4. Refer t o Reason #1(A) of F i g u r e 2. 5. Refer t o Reason #1 (B) of F i g u r e 2. 6. S e c t i o n 93(3), Labour Code of B r i t i s h Columbia (1975). 7. S e c t i o n (74), Labour Code o f B r i t i s h Columbia (1975). 8. S e c t i o n (70), Labour Code o f B r i t i s h Columbia (1975). 9. Refer t o Reason #2 o f F i g u r e 2. 10. Refer t o Reason #2(A) of F i g u r e 2. 11. Refer t o Reason #2(B) o f F i g u r e 2. 12. Refer t o Reason #3 o f F i g u r e 2. 13. Refer t o Reason #3(A) o f F i g u r e 2. 14. Refer t o Reason #3(B) o f F i g u r e 2. 15. Refer t o Reason #3(C) of F i g u r e 2. 16. R.S.B.C. 1960 Chapter 75. T h i s A c t was r e p e a l e d June 30, 19 76 and r e p l a c e d by the P u b l i c C o n s t r u c t i o n F a i r Wages A c t , R.S.B.C. 1976 Chapter 34. The new Act no lon g e r has u n i o n i z a t i o n as a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r b i d d i n g on P u b l i c Works c o n t r a c t s - 3 8 -CHAPTER IV - METHODOLOGY INTRODUCTION Research design i s a major determinent of the q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y o f data c o l l e c t e d . T h i s c h a p t e r o u t l i n e s the r a t i o n a l and l o g i s t i c s o f the r e s e a r c h design used i n c o l l e c t i n g data on d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s . The methodology i n c l u d e s how the p o p u l a t i o n was determined, the type o f data gathered, and how the data was gathered. POPULATION The Labour R e l a t i o n s Board of B r i t i s h Columbia"*" p u b l i s h e s a l i s t o f a l l d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s which occur w i t h i n t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n . The l i s t i n c l u d e s S e c t i o n s 39 and 52 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . As p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter I I , S e c t i o n 39 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s occur when the members o f a u n i t want a d i f f e r e n t trade union to r e p r e s e n t them. S e c t i o n 52 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s occur because the members of a u n i t no lon g e r want any union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . With the a s s i s t a n c e o f the Board, a l l S e c t i o n 39 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s were i d e n t i f i e d and e l i m i n a t e d from the l i s t . The l i s t o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s was f u r t h e r condensed by e l i m i n a t i n g a l l - 39 -cases which occured because the companies had gone i n t o r e c e i v e r s h i p f o r reasons u n r e l a t e d t o the employees' u n i o n i z a t i o n . T h i s was confirmed through i n t e r v i e w s . The process r e s u l t e d i n a p o p u l a t i o n o f 4 3 cases, o c c u r i n g between January 1, 1974 and May 31, 19 76. DATA MEASURES As the i n t r o d u c t o r y chapter e x p l a i n s , the primary o b j e c t i v e o f the t h e s i s i s to i d e n t i f y who i s i n v o l v e d i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n and t o i s o l a t e the reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i -c a t i o n . A l l data c o l l e c t i o n was focused on the primary o b j e c t i v e . The type of da t a can be segmented i n t o two groups. One group r e l a t e s t o the hypotheses developed i n • the- p r e v i o u s chapter and the o t h e r group of data was c o l l e c t e d f o r i t s d e s c r i p t i v e m e r i t . The two groups are not mutually e x c l u s i v e . Data r e l a t i n g t o the hypotheses a l s o has an important d e s c r i p t i v e m e r i t . In summary o f the l a s t chapter, data r e l a t i n g t o hypotheses i n c l u d e the e x i s t a n c e of a f i r s t c o l l e c t i v e agreement, employee turnover, employee s k i l l l e v e l , type o f union, s i z e of the u n i t , s i z e o f the union and average s i z e u n i t w i t h i n the union. The data r e l a t i n g t o the e x i s t a n c e of. a f i r s t c o l l e c t i v e agreement was grouped on a yes/no b a s i s ; yes - a f i r s t agreement was concluded, no - a f i r s t agreement was not concluded. - 40 -Employee turnover i s d e f i n e d r e l a t i v e t o the i n d u s t r y . In t h i s r e s e a r c h i f t u r n o v e r i n a company i s c o n s i d e r e d low then i t i s low r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r companies i n the same economic p u r s u i t . Turnover i s d e f i n e d i n t h i s way f o r two reasons. F i r s t l y , t urnover d e f i n e d on an a b s o l u t e b a s i s i s too a r b i t r a r y because i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o defend any c a t e g o r i z a t i o n . How low i s low and where does one draw the l i n e ? By u s i n g a s c a l e of i n d u s t r i a l averages, a company can be compared to i t s peers. Secondly, r e l a t i v e t u r n o v e r i s more meaningful to the a c t o r s i n v o l v e d . For example, a union of h o t e l employees expects s t a f f t u r n o v e r w i t h i n a h o t e l to approximate 100% per annum. The union gears i t s o r g a n i z i n g campaign and g e n e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to t h i s t u rnover. To show turnover as h i g h d i s t o r t s t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s w i t h i n the market. The same argument i s a p p l i c a b l e to an employer. I t i s not f a i r t o say t h a t a h o t e l with 100% t u r n -over of s t a f f has a h i g h t u r n o v e r when the h o t e l ' s turnover i s average f o r i t s i n d u s t r y . S k i l l l e v e l i s determined by c r i t e r i a s i m i l a r to the B r i t i s h Columbia Department o f Labour - T r a i n i n g Branch. B a s i c a l l y , a t r a d i t i o n a l c r a f t s k i l l such as c a r p e n t r y i s c o n s i d e r e d a h i g h l y s k i l l e d job and a l l o t h e r s k i l l s are p r o r a t e d a c c o r d i n g l y . A l l work w i t h i n the. companies are measured and averaged on t h i s b a s i s . The computation produces a measure of the average s k i l l l e v e l w i t h i n the companies. - 41 -The types o f unions i n v o l v e d i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n are grouped by the t r a d i t i o n a l c r a f t , i n d u s t r i a l and m i s c e l l a n e o d e f i n i t i o n s . A c r a f t l o c a l i s one which c o n f i n e s i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n to a p a r t i c u l a r s k i l l , such as e l e c t r i c i a n s . An i n d u s t r i a l l o c a l o r g a n i z e s o n l y w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r y but i t w i l l o r g a n i z e a wide v a r i e t y of s k i l l s w i t h i n t h a t i n d u s t r y . An example i s a union o f h o s p i t a l employees. A m i s c e l l a n e o u s l o c a l o r g a n i z e s any s k i l l i n any i n d u s t r y . I t does not c o n f i n e i t s e l f t o any p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r y o r type o f worker. An example i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s l o c a l 351 o f the Teamsters Union. U n i t s i z e , union s i z e and average s i z e u n i t w i t h i n the union l o c a l are a l l measured by number of members. Membership i s an a p p r o p r i a t e measurement because the data can be v e r i f i e d by membership r e c o r d s w i t h i n the union. The o t h e r way o f measuring the s i z e o f the t h r e e groups i s by membership dues. Dues i s a proxy f o r membership s i z e and i s d i f f i c u l t t o v e r i f y . T h e r e f o r e , f o r the purpose o f data c o l l e c t i o n , membership i s the b e s t measure a v a i l a b l e . The o t h e r group of data i s l a b e l e d d e s c r i p t i v e . T h i s group i n c l u d e s type of company i n v o l v e d i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , type of c o l l e c t i v e agreement the union n e g o t i a t e s , company s i z e , reason(s) f o r the o r i g i n a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n , reason(s) f o r s e l e c t i n g the union as b a r g a i n i n g agent and reason(s) f o r the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Each d e s c r i p t i v e parameter c o n t r i b u t e s to the o b j e c t i v e o f the t h e s i s . - 42 -The d e f i n i t i o n s f o r the types of companies i n v o l v e d i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h those o f the B r i t i s h Columbia Department o f Labour. The o n l y m o d i f i c a t i o n i s the t r a d e and s e r v i c e i n d u s t r i e s are t r e a t e d s e p a r a t e l y i n t h i s r e s e a r c h w h i l e the Department of Labour groups the two t o g e t h e r . The f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n s w i l l be used throughout the t e x t . 2 Manufacturing - the term used t o d e s c r i b e i n d u s t r i e s which pr o c e s s r e s o u r c e s i n o r d e r to produce f i n i s h e d goods. Food and Beverage I n d u s t r y - a manufacturing i n d u s t r y p r o d u c i n g food and/or beverage goods through some p r o c e s s . T h i s i n d u s t r y i s d i s t i n c t from the a g r i c u l t u r e i n d u s t r y and/or t r a d e i n d u s t r y because o f i t s p r o c e s s i n g f u n c t i o n . F o r e s t Products - the i n d u s t r y producing lumber, plywood, wooden boxes and c o f f i n s as w e l l as pulp, paper and paper p r o d u c t s . P r i n t i n g , P u b l i s h i n g and A l l i e d I n d u s t r i e s - commercial p r i n t i n g , s t e r e o t y p i n g , p u b l i s h i n g and a s s o c i a t e d a c t i v i t i e s b e l ong to t h i s i n d u s t r i a l group. Primary Metal and Metal F a b r i c a t i n g I n d u s t r y - the i n d u s t r y p r o c e s s i n g metal o r e s , through s m e l t i n g , r e f i n e r y , c a s t i n g and r o l l i n g i n o r d e r t o produce metals i n b u l k form o r i n the form o f a simple f a b r i c a t e d product such as b o i l e r s , ornamental metal, stamped metal, wire, c a s t i n g s , f o r g i n g s , e t c . - 43 -Machinery, T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and E l e c t r i c a l Equipment I n d u s t r y -t h i s i n d u s t r y i s p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the p r o d u c t i o n or machinery, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n equipment and e l e c t r i c a l products but a l s o i n v o l v e s equipment r e p a i r and p a r t s p r o d u c t i o n . M i s c e l l a n e o u s Manufacturing - f o r the purposes of t h i s p u b l i c a t i o n , i n d u s t r i e s o f minor importance, i n terms of union membership c o n c e n t r a t i o n s , have been grouped under M i s c e l l a n e o u s Manufacturing. Some of the i n d u s t r i e s i n t h i s group are the tobacco i n d u s t r y , the rubber i n d u s t r y , the f u r n i t u r e i n d u s t r y and the chemical i n d u s t r i e s . C o n s t r u c t i o n Industry - The c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y i n c l u d e s b u i l d i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n , highway c o n s t r u c t i o n , b r i d g e c o n s t r u c t i o n and s p e c i a l i z e d c o n s t r u c t i o n such as dam c o n s t r u c t i o n . O p e r a t i n g w i t h i n t h i s i n d u s t r y are g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r s and s p e c i a l - t r a d e c o n t r a c t o r s . Trade - The wholesale, r e t a i l and market f u n c t i o n s are the a c t i v i t i e s of the trade i n d u s t r y . S e r v i c e I n d u s t r y - T h i s i n d u s t r y i s composed o f f i v e sub-i n d u s t r i e s . E d u c a t i o n a l S e r v i c e s - t h i s s u b - i n d u s t r y covers the elementary through secondary e d u c a t i o n a l s e r v i c e s , and u n i v e r s i t i e s but not l i b r a r i e s . H e a l t h and Welfare - t h i s s u b - i n d u s t r y covers a l l p r i v a t e and p u b l i c h e a l t h and w e l f a r e s e r v i c e s . - 44 -Other S e r v i c e s - a l l other community, b u s i n e s s and p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e s not covered by the s c h o o l and h e a l t h and w e l f a r e sub-groups. M u n i c i p a l S e r v i c e s - t h i s sub-group covers a l l m u n i c i p a l government employees from policemen through urban p l a n n e r s . P r o v i n c i a l and F e d e r a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n - t h i s s u b - i n d u s t r y covers the employees of the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments. Other I n d u s t r i e s Mining, M i l l i n g and O i l I n d u s t r y - t h i s primary i n d u s t r i a l group i n c l u d e s the components o f metal mining, m i n e r a l mining, q u a r r y i n g and i n c i d e n t a l a c t i v i t i e s (e.g. p r o s p e c t i n g ) . T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , Communication, and Other U t i l i t i e s - a i r , l a n d and sea t r a n s p o r t , s t o r a g e , communication and the p r o v i s i o n o f u t i l i t i e s such as e l e c t r i c a l power and sewers and the a c t i v i t i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h i s i n d u s t r y . J u s t as t u r n o v e r and s k i l l l e v e l d e s c r i b e the companies, the c o l l e c t i v e agreement d e s c r i b e s the union.. C o l l e c t i v e agreements are of three g e n e r a l types: standard, sem-s t a n d a r d and non-standard. When a L o c a l has a standard c o n t r a c t p o l i c y , every c e r t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n the L o c a l i s bound by the i d e n t i c a l c o l l e c t i v e agreement. In a semi-standard p o l i c y a l l the L o c a l ' s c e r t i f i c a t i o n s have i d e n t i c a l c o n t r a c t language but the r a t e s o f pay between c e r t i f i -c a t i o n s may d i f f e r . A non-standard c o n t r a c t i s when a L o c a l n e g o t i a t e s a unique agreement f o r every c e r t i f i c a t i o n i t r e p r e s e n t s . Data p e r t a i n i n g to the reasons f o r the o r i g i n a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n was gathered f o r two purposes. F i r s t l y , the i n f o r m a t i o n a i d s the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a h i s t o r y f o r each case. The reasons f o r o r g a n i z i n g i n d i c a t e the members' e x p e c t a t i o n s from u n i o n i z a t i o n . Secondly, a p o s s i b l e reason f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s the membership achieved t h e i r o b j e c -t i v e from u n i o n i z i n g (2B - F i g u r e 2 ) . The data c o u l d a i d i n c o n f i r m i n g or denying the c r e d i b i l i t y of the reason. Data r e l a t i n g t o how the union was chosen as b a r g a i n i n g agent was used as one component of the u n i t ' s h i s t o r y . The r e s e a r c h was a l s o i n t e r e s t e d i f a predominent p a t t e r n o f o r g a n i z i n g emerges i n u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d . Broad c a t e g o r i e s were c o n s t r u c t e d f o r the d i f f e r e n t o r g a n i z i n g methods. The c a t e g o r i e s i n c l u d e : union approached the employees, employees sought c e r t i f i c a t i o n and o r g a n i z e d w i t h the f i r s t union c o n t a c t e d and employees sought c e r t i f i c a t i o n and o r g a n i z e d a f t e r an e x t e n s i v e market searc h . The data on reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n was gathered t o meet the o b j e c t i v e o f the t h e s i s and t o t e s t the a c t u a l cases a g a i n s t the a r r a y o f p o s s i b l e reasons developed i n the p r e v i o u s chapter. DATA COLLECTION I t i s e v i d e n t from examining the r e p o r t e d d e c i s i o n s of the"Board t h a t d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s a v o l a t i l e i s s u e . - 46 -Management, employees and the union o f t e n have c o n f l i c t i n g opinions about the d e c i s i o n t o d e c e r t i f y . Because of the s e n s i t i v e environment of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , one must be c a r e f u l i n choosing the mechanism f o r data c o l l e c t i o n . P ersonal i n t e r v i e w was chosen as the research technique f o r two reasons. F i r s t l y , the data d i d not lend i t s e l f to a q u e s t i o n n a i r e format. I n t e r v i e w i n g provided the f l e x i b i l i t y to explore a wide l a t t i t u d e of i s s u e s . I n t e r v i e w i n g gives the researcher the b e n e f i t of v i s u a l l y observing the respondent. How a response i s given can be as meaningful as what i s s a i d . Secondly, d e c e r t i f i -c a t i o n i s a s e n s i t i v e i s s u e and i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t respondents would comment about a case i n w r i t i n g . As a research technique, i n t e r v i e w i n g has some v a l i d i t y problems. The respondents may change t h e i r answers i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r perceived r o l e e x p e c tation of the i n t e r -3 •view. This i s known as a " r e a c t i v e e f f e c t " and i n c l u d e s the e f f e c t a researcher, p h y s i c a l surrounding and the p e r c e i v e d r o l e e x p e c tation of respondent can have on the frequency and substance of responses to questions. As p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , the opinions of p a r t i c i p a n t s i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n are o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g . Therefore, there i s no s i n g l e group of i n d i v i d u a l s who can.be r e l i e d upon f o r accurate and o b j e c t i v e data. Because of the divergence of o p i n i o n s , data from employers, union o f f i c i a l s and n e u t r a l t h i r d p a r t i e s was sought. N e u t r a l t h i r d p a r t i e s are - 47 -i n d i v i d u a l s who deal with the cases of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n the course, of t h e i r work. Because of the sensi t i v e nature of t h e i r jobs, neither t h e i r names nor job t i t l e s can be exposed. The major shortcoming of the methodology i s employees involved i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n were not interviewed. A l i s t of employees was unavailable and due to turnover, very few employees were s t i l l working for the companies. Also, employers e x p l i c i t l y indicated that i f any interviews were sought with employees they would not consent to an interview. The p r i o r i t i e s of the research indicated that information from employers was more valuable than the opinion of any single employee. However, i n three i s o l a t e d cases, interviews were conducted with employees. A l l interviews were arranged by telephone. Once the appointment was made, a number of preparatory steps were taken. Inquiries were made about the type of organization the respondent worked for.. Previous to the appointment, the s i t e of the interview was v i s i t e d to insure f a m i l i a r i t y with the location. A l l the questions asked were pretested, reviewed and any information gathered i n other interviews about the case was reread. This preparation resulted i n a decrease of interview time and raised the qual i t y l e v e l of responses. The f i r s t issue discussed i n the interview was why the research was undertaken and how t h e i r names were gotten. C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of responses was assured and the o u t l i n e o f the i n t e r v i e w e x p l a i n e d . At t h a t p o i n t the q u e s t i o n s would commence. A l l answers were recorded i n longhand. A t the c o n c l u s i o n of the q u e s t i o n p e r i o d , the respondent was t o l d t h a t a copy o f the t h e s i s would be made a v a i l a b l e i n order t h a t he/she c o u l d be assured t h a t c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y was not broken. A note on c a l c u l a t i o n methodology - i s i n o r d e r . The data shows a p o p u l a t i o n o f 4 3 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s but o n l y 40 companies. Three companies had two d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s . The company data i s based on n=40 because u s i n g n=43 would r e s u l t i n double c o u n t i n g . A l l c a l c u l a t i o n s are based on ungrouped data w h i l e the data i s p r e s e n t e d i n grouped form. Grouping of data i s i n t e n d e d to p r e s e r v e . t h e anonymity of those i n v o l v e d w h i l e c a l c u l a t i n g the data on an ungrouped b a s i s g i v e s a h i g h e r degree o f s t a t i s t i c a l a ccuracy. CONCLUSION By u s i n g the methodology, as d e s c r i b e d i n t h i s chapter the f o l l o w i n g response r a t e s were o b t a i n e d . (a) Employer response r a t e Interviewed 30 cases No l o n g e r o p e r a t i n g i n B.C. 3 Appointment c o u l d not be arranged 2 Would not consent to an i n t e r v i e w 8 43 cases - 49 -(b) Union response r a t e I nterviewed 39 Appointment c o u l d not be arranged 3 Would not consent t o an i n t e r v i e w 1 43 (c) N e u t r a l t h i r d p a r t y Interviewed 40 Appointment c o u l d not be arranged 3 43 (d) M i s c e l l a n e o u s i n t e r v i e w s Employees of companies i n v o l v e d i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 3 Labour lawyers 1 4 cases cases cases cases cases cases (e) Number o f i n t e r v i e w s / c a s e # employer # union # N.T.P. o t h e r # cases i n t e r v i e w s i n t e r v i e w s i n t e r v i e w s i n t e r v i e w s Cases where 0 i n t e r -views conducted 0 0 0 0 0 0 Cases where 1 i n t e r -view conducted 1 0 0 1 0 1 Cases where 2 i n t e r -views conducted 18 6 15 15 0 36 Cases where 3 i n t e r -views conducted 21 21 21 21 0 63 Cases where 4 i n t e r - 1 views conducted 2 2 2 1 3 8 0 1 Cases where 5 i n t e r -views conducted 1 1 1 2 1 5 TOTAL 43 30 39 40 4 113 o - 51 -FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV 1. Subsequently t o be known as the Board. 2. Department of Labour - B r i t i s h Columbia, B.C. Labour  D i r e c t o r y 1975 (Planning and Research Branch, Depart-ment of Labour - B r i t i s h Columbia, 1975) pg. 11. 3. Runkel, P h i l i p J . and McGrath, Joseph E., Research on  Human Behaviour - a Systematic Guide t o Method (Holt R i n e h a r t and Winston, 1972), p. 176. - 52 -CHAPTER V  ACTORS IN DECERTIFICATION INTRODUCTION T h i s chapter w i l l o u t l i n e some b a s i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the a c t o r s i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The data i s c r u c i a l to the t h e s i s f o r two reasons. F i r s t l y , one cannot grasp the essence o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n u n l e s s there i s a b a s i c f a m i l i a r i t y of the types o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s and people i n v o l v e d i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Secondly, the data on a c t o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s necessary f o r t e s t i n g the hypotheses developed i n the p r e v i o u s chapter. The chapter focuses on company, union and u n i t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The companies are grouped by i n d u s t r y , s i z e and employee r e l a t e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The unions are grouped by type, s i z e and n e g o t i a t i o n p o l i c y . The u n i t s are grouped by s i z e , l o n g e v i t y o f the c e r t i f i c a t i o n and e x p e r i e n c e w i t h c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . (1) Companies ( r e f e r t o Table I) There were no d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s i n c o n s t r u c t i o n (Table 1(A), even though 49,000 1 o r g a n i z e d workers, r e p r e s e n t i n g 12.2% 2 o f the o r g a n i z e d labour f o r c e of B r i t i s h Columbia - 53 -are employed i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y . A t the very 3 l e a s t , the c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y a d m i n i s t e r s 800 c e r t i f i c a t i o n s . The absence o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n can be e x p l a i n e d by the l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f c o n s t r u c t i o n work which employs union labour and the s t r i c t s u r v e i l l a n c e kept on these s i t e s a g a i n s t non-union c o n t r a c t o r s . T h e r e f o r e , c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s o f t e n a r e q u i s i t e f o r a company t o b i d on c o n s t r u c t i o n jobs and r e q u i r e d by labour t o work on the s i t e . There was a h i g h frequency of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n the t r a d e i n d u s t r y (Table 1 ( A ) ) . Trade accounted f o r 19% o f a l l d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s , y e t i t employs o n l y 3.4%^of the o r g a n i z e d labour f o r c e . The reasons f o r t h i s d i s p r o -p o r t i o n a t e number of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n the next chapter. The frequency o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n the o t h e r three i n d u s t r i e s i s c o n s i s t e n t t o t h e i r p r o p o r t i o n o f o r g a n i z e d 5 l a b o u r . Manufacturing and s e r v i c e i n d u s t r i e s employ 64.4% o f a l l o r g a n i z e d l a b o u r i n B r i t i s h Columbia and account f o r 60% o f the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s . The oth e r i n d u s t r y employs 20%^ o f o r g a n i z e d labour and exp e r i e n c e s 14% o f a l l decer-t i f i c a t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , the frequency o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s r e a s o n a b l y c o n s i s t e n t t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f o r g a n i z e d l a b o u r w i t h the c o n s t r u c t i o n and trade e x c e p t i o n s . The number o f employees was used as a measure o f company s i z e . The m a j o r i t y o f companies each employed l e s s than 70 - 54 -employees (Table 1 ( b ) ) . However, the o t h e r companies which are c o n c e n t r a t e d i n the trade i n d u s t r y are q u i t e l a r g e . The s i x l a r g e s t companies r a i s e d the mean t o 193 employees per company. In f a c t , i f the s i x l a r g e s t companies are s e p a r a t e d from the p o p u l a t i o n , the remaining 34 companies have an average s i z e o f 16 employees with a standard d e v i a t i o n o f 14. R e l a t i v e t urnover w i t h i n the companies was average (Table 1 ( c ) ) . The turnover data r e f u t e s the h y p o t h e s i s which p r e d i c t e d the h i g h t u r n o v e r companies would be most l i k e l y t o d e c e r t i f y . However, the importance of t u r n o v e r i s not r e s t r i c t e d t o the number of employees t u r n i n g over but a l s o i n c l u d e s which employees are t u r n i n g over. In oth e r words, q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y are both important. Chapter I I I a l l u d e d t o the importance t u r n o v e r can have i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (2A - F i g u r e 2) and.the f o l l o w i n g chapter w i l l d i s c u s s the importance i t d i d have. In g e n e r a l , the s k i l l l e v e l o f employees w i t h i n companies e x p e r i e n c i n g d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s low (Table 1 ( d ) ) . Only t h r e e companies employed a h i g h s k i l l e d l a b o u r f o r c e . I t was h y p o t h e s i z e d i n Chapter I I I t h a t u n s k i l l e d employees are the most prone to d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n and t h i s data overwhelmingly supports the h y p o t h e s i s . Company experience i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s matters was a l s o very l i m i t e d . Only f i v e companies had any p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h unions (Table I (e)) and only two had a c t u a l l y a s s i g n e d a p a r t i c u l a r employee the task o f managing - 55 -a p e r s o n n e l f u n c t i o n . T h i s i s t o be expected i n s m a l l companies. Personnel d e c i s i o n s were made as the need arose and not handled as an ongoing f u n c t i o n . When company c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s were broken down by i n d u s t r y , no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s appeared (Appendix 2, 3, 4, 5). A l l the i n d u s t r i e s sampled had a l a r g e frequency o f sm a l l companies, u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r , average tu r n o v e r and l i t t l e e xperience i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . The o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e was the r e l a t i v e p r o p o r t i o n o f l a r g e companies i n the tr a d e s e c t o r . T h i s accounts f o r a mean employee s i z e w i t h i n t h i s s e c t o r o f 848 employees/company compared t o the p o p u l a t i o n mean o f 193.. TABLE I CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPANIES WHICH EXPERIENCED DECERTIFICATION (a) Frequency o f companies which experiened d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by i n d u s t r y . Type o f Industry Mfg. Const. Trade S e r v i c e Other # companies 12(30%) 0(0%) 8(20%) :. 14(35%) 6(15%) 40(100%) (b) Frequency o f companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by number o f employees # o f employees # of companies 0 - 9 10 - 19 20 - 29 30 - 39 40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - . 79 80 - 89 90 - 99 100 > T o t a l 14 (35 %) 11 (27.5%) 3 ( 7.5%) 3 ( 7.5%) 2 ( 5 %) 0 (.0 %) 1 ( 2.5%) 0 ( 0 %) 0 ( 0 %) 0 ( 0 %) 6 (15 %) 40 100 %) X= 192.9 (7"= 946.7 (c) Frequency o f companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n grouped by t u r n o v e r . Turnover Low (1) Average (2) High (3) T o t a l # companies 14 (35%) 17 (42.5%) 9 (22.5%) 40 (100%) X = 1.875 rT= .76 (d) Frequency o f companies which experi e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n grouped by s k i l l l e v e l . SKILL LEVEL , Low/ Moderate m Low(l) Moderated.5) Moderate (2.0) High(2.5) High(3) T o t a l "° i # o f companies 26(65%) 1(2.5%) 9(22.5%) 1(2.5%) 3(7.5%) 40(100%) X = 1.425 <7"= .65 - 58 -(e) Company experience with unions. No previous experience Previous experience 35 5 40 (87.5%) (12.5%) companies (f) Company experience with d e c e r t i f i c a i t o n s . No previous experience Previous experience 37 3 40 (92.5%) ( 7.5%) companies - 59 -(2) Unions (Refer t o Table II) The m a j o r i t y o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n d u s t r i a l and m i s c e l l a n e o u s l o c a l s (Table I I ( a ) ) . T h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g when one c o n s i d e r s t h a t the m a j o r i t y o f companies i n the sample employ u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r , which t r a d i t i o n a l l y are o r g a n i z e d by i n d u s t r i a l and m i s c e l l a n e o u s unions. I t was h y p o t h e s i z e d i n Chapter I I I t h a t d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s would most l i k e l y i n v o l v e i n d u s t r i a l and mi s c e l l a n e o u s unions and the data supports the v a l i d i t y o f the h y p o t h e s i s . A s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e o f the data r e l a t i n g t o union type i s the h i g h i n c i d e n c e o f m u l t i p l e d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s w i t h i n the unions. E i g h t l o c a l s , o f which seven were i n d u s t r i a l and m i s c e l l a n e o u s , account f o r 26 cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (Table I I ( b ) ) . The o t h e r l o c a l s each had one d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . On the average, the l o c a l s which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i -c a t i o n are much l a r g e r than average. An average s i z e l o c a l 7 i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s approximately 425 members while the average i n t h i s p o p u l a t i o n i s 4,141 members (Table 1 1 ( c ) ) . Even when the data was broken down by union type, a l l three major union types were l a r g e r than the p r o v i n c i a l average. A d i s c u s s i o n of l o c a l s i z e i s incomplete without mentioning c e r t i f i c a t i o n s i z e . The average s i z e c e r t i f i -c a t i o n w i t h i n the sample of l o c a l s i s 45.6 members (Table 1 1 ( d ) ) . Most l o c a l s have an average c e r t i f i c a t i o n s i z e o f l e s s than 50 members. A l s o , there were no d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s i n a one c e r t i f i c a t i o n l o c a l . When a l o c a l l o s t a u n i t - 60 -through d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , the l o c a l s t i l l s u r v i v e d . In f a c t , the union o f f i c i a l s i n t e r v i e w e d d i d not t h i n k the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s they e x p e r i e n c e d a f f e c t e d the union's f i n a n c i a l s t a t u s . However, the union o f f i c i a l s d i d t h i n k d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d t h e i r p u b l i c image. The c r u c i a l p o i n t i s the l o c a l s which experience d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n are q u i t e l a r g e and a d m i n i s t e r many s m a l l agreements. The union L o c a l s were grouped i n terms of t h e i r p o l i c y toward c o l l e c t i v e agreements. Only s i x L o c a l s chose t o n e g o t i a t e non-standard agreements and three o f these L o c a l s were c r a f t (Table 1 1 ( e ) ) . Most L o c a l s sought some degree o f s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n . S t a n d a r d i z a t i o n y i e l d s s i g n i f i c a n t savings f o r L o c a l s when c o n s i d e r i n g the l a r g e number o f c o n t r a c t s a L o c a l a d m i n i s t e r s . S t a n d a r d i z a t i o n minimizes the time of g e n e r a t i n g c o n t r a c t p r o p o s a l s , cuts l e g a l c o s t s and r a i s e s the e x p e r t i s e o f union o f f i c i a l s because they must onl y be f a m i l i a r with one c o n t r a c t i n s t e a d o f many c o n t r a c t s . However, with every b e n e f i t t h e r e i s u s u a l l y a c o s t . The unique circumstances o f a u n i t may not be r e f l e c t e d i n a c o n t r a c t i n or d e r t o accommodate the common sta n d a r d . TABLE I I  CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCALS  WHICH EXPERIENCED DECERTIFICATION (a) Frequency o f l o c a l s which experi e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by type o f union. - Based on number o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s . Type of L o c a l C r a f t I n d u s t r i a l M i s c e l l a n e o u s T o t a l # d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 7 (16.3%) 22 (51.2%) 14 (32.5%) 43 (100%) - Based on number o f d i f f e r e n t l o c a l s . 1 Type o f L o c a l 1 - 1 C r a f t ' I n d u s t r i a l M i s c e l l a n e o u s T o t a l # unions 6 (24%) 15 (60%) 4 (16%) 25 (100%) - 62 -(b) Number o f l o c a l s w i t h m u l t i p l e d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s T o t a l # L o c a l s T o t a l # Decer-t i f i c a t i o n s L o c a l s h a v i n g 1 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 17 (68%) 17 (40%) L o c a l s having 2 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 3 (12%) 6 (14%) L o c a l s h a ving 3 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 2 ( 8%) 6 (14%) L o c a l s h a v i n g 4 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 1 ( 4%) 4 ( 9%) L o c a l s h a ving 5 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 2 ( 8%) 10 (23%) 25(100%) 43(100%) . (c) Frequency o f l o c a l s which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n grouped by s i z e . # o f members # of L o c a l s 0 - 999 5 (22.7%) 1,000 - 1,999 2 ( 9.1%) 2,000 - 2,999 6 (27.4%) 3,000 - 3,999 2 ( 9.1%) 4,000 - 4,999 2 ( 9.1%) 5,000 - 5,999 0 ( 0 %) 6,000 - 6,999 0 ( 0 %) 7,000 - 7,999 1 ( 4.5%) 8,000 - 8,999 1 ( 4.5%) 9,000 - 9,999 1 ( 4.5%) 10,000 > 2 ( 9.1%) TOTAL 22 (100 %) X = 4141 - 63 -(d) Frequency o f l o c a l s which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by average s i z e c e r t i f i c a t i o n / l o c a l . Average s i z e C e r t i f i c a t i o n / L o c a l # o f l o c a l s 0 - 9 0 10 - 19 2 ( 9.1%) 20 - 29 9 (40.9%) 30 - 39 3 (13.7%) 40 - 49 2 ( 9.1%) 50 - 59 2 ( 9.1%) 60 - 69 1 ( 4.5%) 70 - 79 1 ( 4.5%) 80 - 89 0 ( o % J 90 - 99 0 ( 0 %) 100 > 2 ( 9.1%) TOTAL 22 (100 %) X = 45.6 0^= 45.22 (e) Frequency of l o c a l s which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by type o f ' c o l l e c t i v e agreement n e g o t i a t e d . Type o f C o l l e c t i v e Agreement Standard (1) Semi-standard (2) Non-standard (3) T o t a l # o f l o c a l s 12 (48%) 7 (28%) 6 (24%) 25 (100%) X = 1.76 <^= .83 i - 65 -(3) U n i t s (Refer t o Table I I I ) Each d e c e r t i f i e d u n i t averaged only e l e v e n employees (Table 1 1 1 ( e ) ) . T h i s i s expected because most the companies from which these u n i t s were o r g a n i z e d are a l s o q u i t e s m a l l . The smallness of the u n i t s was found throughout a l l i n d u s t r i e s and unions. The l a r g e companies d i d not have c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y l a r g e u n i t s . I t should be noted t h a t on the average and i n every case, the d e c e r t i f i e d u n i t was s m a l l e r than the average s i z e u n i t o f i t s c o r r e s p o n d i n g ' L o c a l . Union withdrawal o f s e r v i c i n g was c o n s i d e r e d as a p o s s i b l e reason f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (3(a) - F i g u r e 2). The h y p o t h e s i s which o r i g i n a t e d from:.the withdrawal o f s e r v i c e reason i n d i c a t e d t h a t s m a l l u n i t s were the most l i k e l y t o d e c e r t i f y . The data supports the h y p o t h e s i s . In every case o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n the u n i t was s m a l l i n both a b s o l u t e and r e l a t i v e terms. Union and company o f f i c i a l s , throughout a l l the i n t e r v i e w s , r e l a t e d t h a t d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r i m a r i l y occurs i n new units'. Union o f f i c i a l s e x p l a i n t h a t new u n i t s have the h i g h e s t frequency o f employer i n t e r f e r e n c e and i f the u n i t can r e s i s t employer p r e s s u r e , the p o s s i b i l i t y of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s remote. The company o f f i c i a l s e x p l a i n t h a t once the new members see t h a t the union cannot change working c o n d i t i o n s s i g n i f i c a n t l y , they become disenchanted w i t h the union and q u i t . Both e x p l a n a t i o n s have merit but - 6 6 -account f o r o n l y 50% o f the cases. Twenty-two o f 43 cases had a c e r t i f i c a t i o n which l a s t e d l o n g e r than 2 years (Figure V ( b ) ) . T h i s does not mean t h a t i n a l l o l d e r c e r t i f i c a t i o n s t here was no employer i n t e r f e r e n c e and the union l i v e d up t o i t s e x p e c t a t i o n s . However, i t does say t h a t those i n v o l v e d i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n are u n f a m i l i a r with circumstances i n v o l v i n g a t l e a s t 50% o f the cases. As d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter I I I , one i n d i c a t o r o f c o s t u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n (1(b) - F i g u r e 2) i s the i n a b i l i t y t o conclude a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. I t was hy p o t h e s i z e d t h a t u n i t s which d i d nc-t conclude a f i r s t c o l l e c t i v e agreement were l i k e l y t o d e c e r t i f y . In 19 cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (Table I I I ( c ) ) , a f i r s t agreement was not concluded. T h i s r e s u l t g i v e s some support t o the hyp o t h e s i s and i n d i c a t e s the reason o f c o s t underestimation may be a f a c t o r i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The reason o f c o s t underestimation w i l l be examined i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter. J u s t as the s i z e d e s c r i b e s the u n i t , the reason f o r the o r i g i n a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n a l s o d e s c r i b e s the u n i t . The impetus f o r most c e r t i f i c a t i o n s arose w i t h i n the company (Table 1 1 1 ( c ) ) . T h i s theme was found throughout a l l union and i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s . The t r a d i t i o n a l reason o f inadequate working c o n d i t i o n s was the most fr e q u e n t stimulus f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n . However, there were o t h e r i n t e r n a l reasons. In seven cases, the c e r t i f i c a t i o n was prompted by an employee who f e l t u n f a i r l y t r e a t e d . I t was t y p i c a l l y prompted by a pay r a i s e not granted or a promotion not r e c e i v e d . - 67 -The employee sought out the union to o r g a n i z e the company employees as a means o f paying back the employer f o r the p e r c e i v e d i n j u s t i c e . There were s i x cases where the employer prompted the c e r t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s was done f o r two reasons. F i r s t l y , employers sought out p a r t i c u l a r unions to o r g a n i z e h i s employees out of f e a r t h a t the employees would or g a n i z e under a more m i l i t a n t union. Secondly, employers sought a c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n o r d e r t o secure government c o n t r a c t s or t o be admitted on union work s i t e s . These two s i t u a t i o n s p r i m a r i l y o c c u r r e d i n i n d u s t r i a l unions. The unions a l s o promote c e r t i f i c a t i o n s j u s t as companies promote t h e i r products. The unions e n t e r the l a b o u r market and seek out u n i t s to o r g a n i z e . In an e x t e n s i v e i n t e r v i e w , one union o f f i c i a l r e l a t e d t h a t unions seek out u n i t s of employees which strengthen c u r r e n t b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s . T h i s union based i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n on v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l i n t e g r a t i o n . There were seven cases of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n which the unions promoted the o r i g i n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . These cases i n v o l v e d i n d u s t r i a l and m i s c e l l a n e o u s L o c a l s . A c e r t i f i c a t i o n can: a l s o be imposed by an o u t s i d e , namely the law. The Successor Rights and O b l i g a t i o n s c l a u s e found i n S e c t i o n 53(1) of the Labour Code o f B r i t i s h Columbia covers these circumstances. 53(1) Where a bu s i n e s s o r p a r t t h e r e o f , or a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t o f the e n t i r e a s s e t s t h e r e o f , - 68 -are s o l d , l e a s e d , t r a n s f e r r e d , or otherwise d i s p o s e d o f , the purchaser, l e s s e e , o r t r a n s f e r e e i s bound by a l l the proceedings under t h i s A c t b e f o r e the date o f the s a l e , l e a s e , t r a n s f e r o r o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n , . and the proceedings s h a l l c o n tinue as i f no change had o c c u r r e d ; and, where a c o l l e c t i v e agreement i s i n f o r c e , t h a t agreement continues to b i n d the purchaser, l e s s e e , or t r a n s f e r e e t o the same e x t e n t as i f i t had been s i g n e d by him. There were s i x cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n where S e c t i o n 53(1) was o r i g i n a l l y imposed. Another parameter f o r d e s c r i b i n g the u n i t i s the method the employees used i n choosing the union which r e p r e s e n t e d them (Table I I I ( e ) ) . The employees d i d not perform a market search o f unions. The u n i t s j o i n e d the f i r s t union t h a t would take them. In 24 cases of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n the employees based t h e i r c h o i c e o f unions on the f a c t t h a t a f r i e n d or r e l a t i v e was f a m i l i a r w i t h the union. There were ot h e r m i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons f o r j o i n i n g but the important p o i n t i s t h a t a l l u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d d i d not survey the labou r market f o r a union. - 69 -TABLE I I I CHARACTERISTICS OF UNITS WHICH DECERTIFIED (a) Frequency of u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d - grouped by number o f members of members # o f u n i t s 0 - 4 19 (44.2%) X= 10.5 5 - 9 10 (23.3%) <T<= 9.91 9 - 1 4 7 (16.3%) 1 5 - 1 9 1 ( 2.3%) 2 0 - 2 4 1 ( 2.3%) 2 5 - 2 9 3 ( 7.0%) 3 0 - 3 4 1 ( 2 . 3 % ) 3 5 - 3 9 0 ( 0%) 4 0 - 4 4 1 ( 2.3%) 4 5 - 4 9 0 ( 0 % ) 50 > 0 ( 0 %) TOTAL 43 (100 %) - 70 -(b) Frequency o f u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d - grouped by l o n g e v i t y of c e r t i f i c a t i o n # o f months # o f u n i t s 0 - 23 21 (48.8%) X = 72.6 24 - 47 6 (14.0%) o^= 91.49 4 8 - 7 1 3 ( 7.0%) 72 - 95 3 ( 7.0%) 9 6 - 1 1 9 1 ( 2.3%) 120 - 143 0 ( 0 % ) 144 - 167 3 ( 7.0%) 168 - 191 1 ( 2.3%) 192 - 215 0 ( 0 % ) 216 - 239 0 ( 0 % ) 240 > 5 (11.6%) 43 (100 %) (c) U n i t e x p e r i e n c e w i t h a c o l l e c t i v e agreement U n i t worked under a c o l l e c t i v e agreement 24 (56%) Never concluded a f i r s t agreement 19 (44%) T o t a l 43 (100%) - 71 -(d) Reasons f o r the o r i g i n a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d . Arose w i t h i n the company General working c o n d i t i o n s Disenchanted employee Employer i n s t i g a t e d Union o r g a n i z a t i o n d r i v e Imposed by law M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons No data T o t a l 10 7 6  23 7 6 2 5 23 7 6 2 5 43 (e) Reason f o r choosing a p a r t i c u l a r union - union approached the employees - employees o r g a n i z e d w i t h f i r s t union c o n t a c t e d - employees o r g a n i z e d a f t e r market search - o t h e r 13 24 (30%) (56%) (14%) 43 (100%) - 72 -CONCLUSION The data p r o v i d e s an i l l u s t r a t i v e s e t t i n g f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . G e n e r a l l y , the companies are s m a l l and p r i m a r i l y employ u n s k i l l e d l abour. Even the component o f the l a r g e f i r m s which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n meet the above c r i t e r i a . The owners/managers of the companies handle l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s and t h e i r e x p e r t i s e i n the f i e l d i s very l i m i t e d . The union L o c a l s are q u i t e l a r g e and r e p r e s e n t many s m a l l u n i t s . In the m a j o r i t y o f cases, the L o c a l d i d not promote the c e r t i f i c a t i o n s but r a t h e r were approached t o o r g a n i z e the employees. The i n d i v i d u a l u n i t s were q u i t e s m a l l even f o r L o c a l s which tended to o r g a n i z e s m a l l groups. The u n i t s c o n t r i b u t e d o n l y m a r g i n a l l y t o gross revenues of the L o c a l s . T h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply t h a t l a r g e L o c a l s n e g l e c t s m a l l u n i t s but.does imply t h a t the u n i t s were not c o n s i d e r e d by the L o c a l s as a c h e r i s h e d p r i z e . None of the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s threatened the economic v i a b i l i t y o f i t s co r r e s p o n d i n g L o c a l . - 73 -FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V 1. Department o f Labour - B r i t i s h Columbia, B.C. Labour D i r e c t o r y 19 75 (Planning and Research Branch, Depart-ment o f Labour - B r i t i s h Columbia, 19 75) pg. 14. 2. I b i d . 3. Department o f Research, C o n s t r u c t i o n Labour R e l a t i o n s  A s s o c i a t i o n ( C o n s t r u c t i o n Labour R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a t i o n , January 13, 1977). 4. Department o f Labour - B r i t i s h Columbia, B.C. Labour  D i r e c t o r y 19 75 (Planning and Research Branch, Depart-ment o f Labour - B r i t i s h Columbia, 1975) pg. 14. 5. I b i d . 6. I b i d . 7. Department o f Labour - B r i t i s h Columbia, B.C. Labour  D i r e c t o r y 19 75 (Planning and Research Branch, Depart-ment o f Labour - B r i t i s h Columbia, 1975) pg. 49 - 131. - 74 -CHAPTER VI  REASONS FOR DECERTIFICATION INTRODUCTION Thus f a r the t h e s i s has c o n c e n t r a t e d on an a n a l y s i s o f the p o s s i b l e reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n and the b a s i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the a c t o r s i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s c h a p t e r r e l a t e s the reasons developed i n the a n a l y s i s o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n t o the reasons found i n the f i e l d o f r e s e a r c h . I t was d i f f i c u l t to conclude the s p e c i f i c reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n each f i e l d case. ' As expected, the o p i n i o n s o f union o f f i c i a l s , company o f f i c i a l s and n e u t r a l t h i r d p a r t i e s were o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g . The c o n c l u s i o n s o f each case are based on a combination o f documented evidence, i n t e r v i e w c o n t e n t and i n t u i t i v e r e asoning. The mix o f evidence used i n the r e s e a r c h d i f f e r e d from case t o case depending on the w i l l i n g n e s s o f those i n t e r v i e w e d t o co-operate. RESULTS The reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (Figure 2) accounted f o r 41 o f 43 cases. The reasons d i d not f i t two o f the - 75 -cases. Of the 41 cases which d i d f i t the reasons, no one major catego r y o f reasons dominated (Table I V ) . A l l the major c a t e g o r i e s o f reasons o c c u r r e d w i t h i n a f a i r l y even frequency. T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e i s no one reason f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . A v a r i e t y o f reasons were found across i n d u s t r i e s (Appendix 2, 3, 4, 5) and unions (Appendix 6, 7, 8). T h e r e f o r e the data i n d i c a t e s t h a t the reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n do not c l u s t e r by i n d u s t r y o r union. (A) S p e c i f i c Reasons^" T h i s s u b - s e c t i o n r e l a t e s the i n d i v i d u a l reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , as found i n the f i e l d r e s e a r c h , t o the t h e o r e t i c a l reasons. Reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n a l s o o c c u r i n combination but t h i s s u b - s e c t i o n i s c o n f i n e d t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f each reason" s e p a r a t e l y . A l a t e r s e c t i o n w i l l d i s c u s s the combination o f reasons which r e s u l t i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . 1(a) O v e r e s t i m a t i o n o f B e n e f i t s : I n s t i t u t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n a l o v e r e s t i m a t i o n , as a cause of d e c e r t i f i -c a t i o n , r e l a t e s t o the union o v e r s t a t i n g i t s c a p a c i t y to the members. The incongruence between the members* e x p e c t a t i o n s and r e a l i t y provokes a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . There were s i x cases i n which i n s t i t u t i o n a l o v e r e s t i m a t i o n was a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The s i x cases of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n can be segregated i n t o two groups. In one group, i n v o l v i n g three of the s i x cases, the union exaggerated i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s because of - 76 -f a c t i o n a l i s m w i t h i n the u n i t . Although a u n i t may be approached by the employees to o r g a n i z e a c e r t i f i c a t i o n , i t i s not l i k e l y t h a t everyone w i l l be i n favour o f u n i o n i z a t i o n . The employees' s k e p t i c i s m w i t h unionism was g e n e r a l l y based on a f e a r o f l o s i n g wages due t o a s t r i k e . The unions o v e r s t a t e d t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o d e l i v e r i n o r d e r t o overcome the r e p u l s i o n o f some employees toward unionism. Union promises o f f u t u r e r e t u r n s were made i n exchange f o r p r e s e n t membership support. Once the employees r e a l i z e d the union promises c o u l d not be kept, they became disenchanted w i t h the union and d e c e r t i f i e d . In the o t h e r three cases o f i n s t i t u t i o n o v e r e s t i -mation, the union o r i g i n a l l y sought out the group o f employees. The union wanted these c e r t i f i c a t i o n s t o supplement t h e i r c u r r e n t o r g a n i z i n g s t r u c t u r e . Union o f f i c i a l s promised wage i n c r e a s e s comparable t o o t h e r u n i t s the union r e p r e s e n t e d . Union o f f i c i a l s t o l d the employees i f they d i d not j o i n now, membership fees would be c o n s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r once the c e r t i f i c a t i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d . Once the employees r e a l i z e d t h a t the union c o u l d not get the promised wage i n c r e a s e s , they d e c e r t i f i e d . I n s t i t u t i o n a l o v e r e s t i m a t i o n i s two-pronged. In one case, the union over s t a t e s i t s c a p a c i t i e s t o overcome d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h i n the u n i t . T h i s f a c t i o n a l i s m i s r o o t e d i n f e a r of l o s t wages and employer i n f l u e n c e . In the o t h e r case, the union o v e r s t a t e s i t s c a p a c i t y through - 77 -t h e i r o r g a n i z i n g t a c t i c s . Both cases i l l u s t r a t e the problems a u n i t can experience from i n a p p r o p r i a t e r e p r e -s e n t a t i o n . A t the time o f c e r t i f i c a t i o n , the employees never checked t h e p a s t performance o r promises of the union. The employees assumed a l l unions were a l i k e and based the d e c i s i o n to c e r t i f y and d e c e r t i f y on t h a t assump-t i o n . Perhaps the e x p e c t a t i o n s o f employees would have changed i f the employees o r i g i n a l l y i n v e s t i g a t e d the a l t e r n a t i v e s . O v e r e s t i m a t i o n o f B e n e f i t s : Members Member o v e r e s t i m a t i o n r e l a t e s to the members' b e l i e f t h a t u n i o n i z a t i o n w i l l s o l v e t h e i r w o r k - r e l a t e d problems. When u n i o n i z a t i o n d i d not meet t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s , the members d e c e r t i f i e d . T h i s source o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n appeared s i g n i f i c a n t i n o n l y one case. In t h a t case, a group o f employees was e a r n i n g lower wages than u n i o n i z e d employees w i t h i n the same i n d u s t r y . The unorganized employees f e l t the d i f f e r e n c e i n wages was accounted by not b e i n g u n i o n i z e d . The employees o r g a n i z e d e x p e c t i n g to get h i g h e r wages but soon found out t h a t the wage d i f f e r e n t i a l was due t o t h e i r employer's i n a b i l i t y t o pay h i g h e r wages. A d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n f o l l o w e d s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t the employees u n i l a t e r a l l y s e l e c t e d the union as the answer to t h e i r wage problems and n e g l e c t e d t o examine the f i n a n c i a l s t a t u s of t h e i r employer. - 78 -1(b) A n t i c i p a t e d Costs Underestimated Cost underestimation r e l a t e s to the membership under-e s t i m a t i n g the r e q u i r e d s a c r i f i c e s o f union membership. The employer can u n i l a t e r a l l y r a i s e the c o s t . o f union membership or union o f f i c i a l s may understate the s a c r i f i c e s r e q u i r e d f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . There were ni n e t e e n cases where c o s t u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the d e c i s i o n to d e c e r t i f y . In twelve o f the n i n e t e e n cases where c o s t under-e s t i m a t i o n was an important cause o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , the employers* a c t i o n s d i r e c t l y r a i s e d the c o s t o f union a f f i l i a t i o n t o the membership. In f i v e such cases, the employer w i t h s t o o d a long s t r i k e which became too c o s t l y f o r the employees. The c o s t o f s t r i k i n g was much h i g h e r than the expected b e n e f i t s and consequently the employees r e t u r n e d t o work without a c o n t r a c t and d e c e r t i f i e d . T y p i c a l l y , i t o c c u r r e d i n u n i t s n e g o t i a t i n g a f i r s t c o l l e c -t i v e agreement i n which the employer fought the c e r t i f i c a t i o n from i t s i n c e p t i o n . Employer i n f l u e n c e by p r o l o n g i n g a s t r i k e i s very v i s i b l e . In f o u r cases o f employer i n f l u e n c e , the employer was much more s u b t l e . In these f o u r cases, the employers changed work assignments and procedures i n order t o make the work environment much l e s s h o s p i t a b l e . For example, one employer s h i f t e d the union l e a d e r s i n t o l e s s a t t r a c t i v e jobs as a means o f punishment. In another case, the - 79 -employer walked among the employees and c a s u a l l y commented about b e n e f i t s he c o u l d not g i v e them because o f the union. The employers' comments r a i s e d the p e r c e i v e d cost o f the employees f o r j o i n i n g the union and d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n soon f o l l o w e d . Each working environment has unique f e a t u r e s which the employer can use t o h i s advantage i n r a i s i n g the c o s t of unionism. In.:-.three cases, the employer used a unique component o f the work environment t o r a i s e the c o s t of union a f f i l i a t i o n . An example w i l l b e s t i l l u s t r a t e the p o i n t . One employer was p a y i n g h i s s t a f f on a cash b a s i s and the employees never r e p o r t e d t h i s income f o r tax purposes. The wages were low and the employees u n i o n i z e d . The employer t h r e a t e n e d t h a t i f the employees d i d n ' t d e c e r t i f y , he would deduct income tax from t h e i r wages and r e p o r t them to the tax department. The c o s t o f u n i o n i z a t i o n grew too h i g h f o r these employees and they d e c e r t i f i e d . The p o i n t of t h i s example i s t o i l l u s t r a t e the wide range of t a c t i c s an employer can use t o r a i s e union membership co s t s o f h i s employees. Not a l l t a c t i c s are as v i s i b l e as t a k i n g a s t r i k e , b ut can be used w i t h equal e f f e c t i v e n e s s . The c o s t t o the membership of u n i o n i z i n g can be r a i s e d by the performance of union o f f i c i a l s i n the course of t h e i r d u t i e s . There were seven cases of c o s t underestimation where the a c t i o n s o f union o f f i c i a l s s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . F i v e of these s i x cases i n v o l v e d the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. - 80 -In the f i v e cases i n v o l v i n g c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n , the union i n s i s t e d on the standard c o n t r a c t , d e s p i t e warnings from the employers t h a t the c o n d i t i o n s o f the c o n t r a c t c o u l d not be met. These employers claimed they would be f o r c e d t o l a y o f f the m a j o r i t y o f t h e i r employees because they c o u l d not meet the c o n t r a c t e d wages. The c o n t r a c t s were sig n e d and the l a y - o f f s o c c u r r e d . The remaining employees f e l t the union was t h r e a t e n i n g t h e i r j o b . s e c u r i t y and d e c e r t i f i e d . The c o s t o f u n i o n i z a t i o n was very h i g h t o these employees. I t i s arguable t h a t the companies were marginal and would have c u r t a i l e d o p e r a t i o n s i n any case. In three o f the f i v e c a s e s , the company s t i l l s e r v i c e d the B r i t i s h Columbia market but based t h e i r o p e r a t i o n i n another p r o v i n c e . The union i n s i s t e n c e f o r the standard c o n t r a c t d e f i n i t e l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o the move. There was one case i n which, c o n t r a c t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n by the union p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t i n r a i s i n g the member c o s t o f u n i o n i z a t i o n . The members r a t i f i e d the standard agreement w i t h the understanding t h a t the union would not en f o r c e the s h i f t p r o v i s i o n s . The employer and employees had worked out the s h i f t p r o v i s i o n s amongst themselves. In the i n t e r i m the union h i r e d a new c o n t r a c t a d m i n i s t r a t o r who e n f o r c e d the s h i f t p r o v i s i o n s , as s e t out i n the standard c o l l e c t i v e agreement. T h i s proved t o be very i n c o n v e n i e n t t o the employees. The c o s t of u n i o n i z a t i o n i n c r e a s e d f o r the employees beyond a t o l e r a b l e l e v e l and r e s u l t e d i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . - 81 -The s i x cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n v o l v i n g c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i l l u s t r a t e s the importance a c o l l e c t i v e agreement can have t o the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n d e c i s i o n . A l a r g e l o c a l a d m i n i s t e r i n g many sm a l l u n i t s can b e n e f i t from economies of s c a l e through c o n t r a c t s t a n d a r d i -z a t i o n . The c o s t o f s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n i s t h a t the standard may not always c o i n c i d e w i t h the unique needs o f a u n i t . The problem o f f i t t i n g the standard to the i n d i v i d u a l u n i t s i s the i s s u e i n these s i x cases. The u n i t s were s m a l l r e l a t i v e t o t h e i r c o r r e s p o n d i n g l o c a l . The l o c a l s tended t o s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n and were not about t o s a c r i f i c e the standard f o r the sake of a few members. The p r i c e o f s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n to the l o c a l was d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f a s m a l l u n i t . The cases not only i n d i c a t e the p r i o r i t y the l o c a l s gave t o the s m a l l u n i t s but a l s o i l l u s t r a t e s what can happen when a u n i t does not o r i g i n a l l y seek a union which i s s e n s i -t i v e t o i t s needs. The p o i n t o f the s i x cases i s t h a t many unique circum-stances can r a i s e the c o s t o f u n i o n i z a t i o n . However, d e s p i t e the unique f e a t u r e s o f the cases, the union's w i l l i n g n e s s to compromise the standard and the employer's response are the important v a r i a b l e s i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The union can r a i s e the c o s t o f membership by not compromising the st a n d a r d c o l l e c t i v e agreement. The employer can r a i s e the c o s t o f union membership by w i t h s t a n d i n g a s t r i k e o r c l o s i n g down the b u s i n e s s . - 82 -2(a) Dominant Members o f the U n i t are No Longer P r e s e n t One o f the company c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s examined i n Chapter V was t u r n o v e r . The r e l a t i v e q u a n t i t y o f t u r n o v e r i n the companies was average. However, the t u r n o v e r i s two-d i m e n s i o n a l and the q u a l i t y o f those employees t u r n i n g over i s a l s o important. The absence of dominant members i n the u n i t , as a reason f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , r e l a t e s t o the q u a l i t y r a t h e r than the q u a n t i t y o f those t u r n i n g over. Every member o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n does not have the same l e v e l of commitment t o the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Only a s m a l l group w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s very committed and t h i s group g i v e s the o r g a n i z a t i o n i t s cohesion. A union i s no d i f f e r e n t . The v i t a l i t y o f a union depends on a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l group o f L o c a l members who are a c t i v e i n 2 L o c a l a f f a i r s , not upon the membership as a whole. There were t h i r t e e n cases of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n which t u r n o v e r made a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to the d e c e r t i f i -c a t i o n . W i t h i n these cases t h e r e were two types o f t u r n o v e r . In e i g h t cases, the t u r n o v e r was i n s t i g a t e d by the employer i n o r d e r t o subvert the u n i t ' s s t r e n g t h . In f i v e cases, the t u r n o v e r was based on normal a t t r i t i o n . In a s m a l l company, the employer u s u a l l y knows a l l the employees and can i d e n t i f y the l e a d e r s of the u n i t . In the e i g h t cases o f employer i n s t i g a t e d t u r nover, the employer - 8 3 -put v a r y i n g degrees o f pr e s s u r e on the union l e a d e r s i n o r d e r t o f i r e them o r have the l e a d e r s q u i t e t h e i r job. T y p i c a l l y , the employer waited f o r the r i g h t o p p o r t u n i t y to f i r e the person so i t would appear as a f a i r d i s m i s s a l . Another employer t a c t i c t o induce t u r n o v e r i s to wi t h s t a n d a s t r i k e u n t i l the union l e a d e r s become disenchanted and seek o t h e r work. A t t h a t p o i n t the u n i t has no l e a d e r s and those remaining go back t o work and d e c e r t i f y . The s t r i k e method t o induce t u r n o v e r o c c u r r e d i n f o u r cases. Normal turnover made a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n i n f o u r cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The l e a d e r s o f these u n i t s l e f t because o f a l t e r n a t i v e job o p p o r t u n i t i e s . These l e a d e r s are o f t e n r e c o g n i z e d f o r t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s and are o f f e r e d p o s i t i o n s o f h i g h e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The absence o f the u n i t s ' l e a d e r s c r e a t e s a vacuum i n the u n i t . I f the vacuum i s not f i l l e d the u n i t may l o s e c o n t i n u i t y and d e c e r t i f y . An a s t u t e employer can c r e a t e the pr o c e s s . 2(b) Reason f o r the U n i t ' s E x i s t e n c e i s No Longer Present Every o r g a n i z a t i o n has a purpose, be i t s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l o r economic. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s reason f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s the membership no l o n g e r f e e l s a need f o r a union and d e c e r t i f i e s . T h e r e f o r e , to these members the union has l o s t i t s purpose. T h i s reason made a s i g n i f i -c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n i n f i v e cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . There was no t y p i c a l case f o r t h i s reason but two examples from the r e s e a r c h w i l l i l l u s t r a t e the p o i n t . In - 84 -one case, a company's r a t e s t r u c t u r e was r e g u l a t e d by a p u b l i c agency. The employees agreed t o support a c e r t i f i -c a t i o n w i t h the p r o v i s i o n t h a t the union would support a h i g h e r r a t e s t r u c t u r e f o r the company. The h i g h e r r a t e s would be passed on i n h i g h e r wages to the employees. The union s u c c e s s f u l l y made a p r e s e n t a t i o n t o the r e g u l a t o r y agency and wages were r a i s e d . The employees no longer saw a need f o r the union and d e c e r t i f i e d . The reason f o r the u n i o n i z i n g had been s a t i s f i e d . As a p o s t - s c r i p t , the i d e n t i c a l s i t u a t i o n has a r i s e n i n the company and the employees are again c o n s i d e r i n g c e r t i f i c a t i o n . In the o t h e r example, a major change o c c u r r e d w i t h i n the company such t h a t the employees no lo n g e r f e l t a need f o r the union. A company d i d a major r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f i t s work and employed o n l y p r o f e s s i o n a l people. The p r o f e s s i o n a l s f e l t unionism was not becoming to a p r o f e s s i o n and d e c e r t i -f i e d . A l t hough o n l y f i v e cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n r e s u l t e d from an absence o f a reason f o r the u n i t ' s e x i s t e n c e , t h i s reason i s one o f the most important of a l l reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . As o r g a n i z a t i o n s change, the union must be s e n s i t i v e t o the changing needs o f i t s members. In the long run, the s e n s i t i v i t y o f unions to i t s members may determine the v i a b i l i t y o f unionism i n a changing work s o c i e t y . - 85 -3(a) Economic Costs Exceed B e n e f i t s T r a d i t i o n a l l y , when one t h i n k s of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , one imagines the employees f o r e s a k i n g the union or employer i n t e r f e r e n c e as the cause o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . However, the union may a l s o i n s t i g a t e a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n by abandoning the u n i t . The t h e o r e t i c a l reason f o r the union abandoning the u n i t i s t h a t the c o s t of s e r v i c i n g the u n i t becomes e x c e s s i v e r e l a t i v e t o the b e n e f i t s . There were e i g h t e e n cases o f the 43 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s s t u d i e d where withdrawal o f s e r v i c e by the union c o n t r i b u t e d t o a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The frequency o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s f o r t h i s reason i s h i g h but i t f i t s i n t o the circumstances o f the cases. The union L o c a l s which experi e n c e d d e c e r t i -f i c a t i o n s are v e r y l a r g e and t h e i r u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d were r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l . S e r v i c i n g these s m a l l u n i t s i s expensive and coupled w i t h employer i n t e r f e r e n c e , the c o s t s may r i s e even h i g h e r . In the course of i n t e r v i e w i n g union o f f i c i a l s , the i s s u e o f s e r v i c i n g was g e n e r a l l y d i s c u s s e d . Most union o f f i c i a l s e m p h a t i c a l l y denied abandoning a u n i t on a c o s t / b e n e f i t b a s i s . Yet, when a p a r t i c u l a r case was d i s c u s s e d , comments were made such as "The u n i t was more t r o u b l e than 3 i t was worth," "there were more p r e s s i n g - i s s u e s to d e a l 4 5 w i t h " and " i t was j u s t too damned expensive." A s m a l l m i n o r i t y o f union o f f i c i a l s d i d concede t h a t the revenues from the u n i t d i d not j u s t i f y the s e r v i c i n g . These quotes - 8 6 -are taken from cases i n which the unions d i d not seek out the c e r t i f i c a t i o n s and the unions never c o n s i d e r e d the u n i t s as a g r e a t o r g a n i z i n g p r i z e . T h e r e f o r e , the unions were making c o s t / b e n e f i t d e c i s i o n s and s m a l l u n i t s had a low p r i o r i t y on union r e s o u r c e s . There are two groups of cases i n which the union's absence o f s e r v i c i n g s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . In one group, the employer was the cause o f the h i g h s e r v i c i n g c o s t s and i n the o t h e r group, the employees f e l t the union was not s e r v i c i n g t h e i r needs. Cases o f the l a t t e r group were e s p e c i a l l y p r e v a l e n t i n new u n i t s i n which the members had l i t t l e e xperience w i t h the r e a l i t i e s o f c o n t r a c t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . There were seven cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n which the union withdrew s e r v i c i n g because the employer f o r c e d the s e r v i c i n g c o s t s upward. In s i x of the seven cases, the employer prolonged the n e g o t i a t i o n o f a c o l l e c t i v e agreement and w i t h s t o o d a long s t r i k e . In one o f the seven cases, the employer r a i s e d s e r v i c i n g c o s t s by o v e r l o a d i n g the g r i e v a n c e machinery. T y p i c a l l y , the employer prolonged the n e g o t i a t i o n which r e q u i r e d more a t t e n t i o n from the union o f f i c i a l s . The union o f f i c i a l s grew i m p a t i e n t w i t h t h e . o r d e a l o f b a r g a i n i n g and sought s t r i k e a c t i o n . As the c o s t s o f s u s t a i n i n g the s t r i k e i n c r e a s e d , the union c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y l o s t i n c e n t i v e t o support the s t r i k e . Once the employees r e a l i z e d the union was abandoning t h e i r cause, they went back t o work and d e c e r t i f i e d . - 87 -In e l e v e n o f the e i g h t e e n cases, the members o f the u n i t f e l t the union d i d not adequately s e r v i c e t h e i r needs and d e c e r t i f i e d . T y p i c a l l y , the union would n e g o t i a t e a c o l l e c t i v e agreement and would not be heard from u n t i l a new agreement was to be n e g o t i a t e d . The members expected t o see the union o f f i c i a l s on a p e r i o d i c b a s i s and when t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s were not s a t i s f i e d , the members f e l t abandoned by the union and d e c e r t i f i e d . There was some j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the f e e l i n g o f n e g l e c t by the union toward the u n i t . In one union s t u d i e d , the o f f i c i a l s not o n l y knew n o t h i n g about the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n but d i d not even r e c a l l they had ever been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the c e r t i f i c a t i o n ! The employer can a l s o c o n t r i b u t e t o the employees * f e e l i n g o f union n e g l e c t . In one case, an employer c a s u a l l y mentioned t h a t he had riot seen the union r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r q u i t e a l o n g time and t o l d h i s employees t h a t t h i s i s t y p i c a l o f a l l unions. An a s t u t e employer with the goal o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n can take advantage o f these s i t u a t i o n s but the employer would not have the o p p o r t u n i t y i f the union o f f i c i a l s had v i s i t e d the u n i t . Two p o i n t s emerge from the cases where union s e r v i c i n g p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The a t t i t u d e and t a c t i c s o f the employer can s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e the c o s t t o the union f o r s e r v i c i n g the u n i t . An employer determined t o break the c e r t i f i c a t i o n can r a i s e the c o s t o f s e r v i c i n g to such a l e v e l t h a t the union cannot a f f o r d to - 88 -a l l o c a t e the r e q u i r e d r e s o u r c e s to s e r v i c e the u n i t . The s e r v i c i n g reason f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n a l s o b r i n g s out the area o f how unions make d e c i s i o n s . I t appears from these cases t h a t the unions are making c o s t / b e n e f i t s about the u n i t s they r e p r e s e n t . However, t h i s i s not c o n c l u s i v e as there i s no data on the l e v e l o f s e r v i c i n g f o r sm a l l u n i t s which d i d not d e c e r t i f y . 3(b) P o l i t i c a l Problems As F i g u r e 2 i n d i c a t e s , i n t e r - u n i o n p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n -s h i p s can promote a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . P o l i t i c a l problems were a s i g n i f i c a n t cause o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n one case. A company had two s u b s i d i a r i e s which.were both i n the same i n d u s t r y . Each s u b s i d i a r y was o r g a n i z e d by a d i f f e r e n t union. The wage r a t e s , as s e t out i n the c o l l e c t i v e agreements, were s u b s t a n t i a l l y h i g h e r i n s u b s i d i a r y A than i n s u b s i d i a r y B. The employees o f s u b s i d i a r y B r e a l i z e d the wage d i f f e r e n t i a l and wanted t o change unions. However, both unions were members o f the Canadian Labour Congress which p r o h i b i t s r a i d i n g between member unions. The union f o r s u b s i d i a r y A ' a d v i s e d the employees o f s u b s i d i a r y B to d e c e r t i f y u s i n g S e c t i o n 52 and then seek a new c e r t i f i c a t i o n under the union r e p r e s e n t i n g the employees o f s u b s i d i a r y A. T h i s t a c t i c was s u c c e s s f u l . The case i l l u s t r a t e s how i n t e r - u n i o n p o l i t i c s e f f e c t a u n i t ' s b e haviour. P o l i t i c s s u b v e r t e d the i n t e n t o f - 89 -S e c t i o n 52 so the employees c o u l d get the type of union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n they wanted. T h i s s i t u a t i o n s h o u l d be c l o s e l y s c r u t i n i z e d by the Labour Board because one s e c t i o n o f the Labour Code was used t o s h o r t c i r c u i t the r a i d i n g requirements i n the Labour Code. 3(c) Punish Employer In the l a s t c h apter, one o f the.reasons f o r the o r i g i n a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n was t h a t an employer may r e q u i r e i t t o get work from p a r t i c u l a r customers. In these s i t u a t i o n s , the union has e x t r a b a r g a i n i n g leverage because i f t h e r e was a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , the employer would ' s u f f e r l o s t revenues. T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what happened i n one case o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The employer sought a c e r t i -f i c a t i o n i n o r d e r t o get work on a union s i t e but the employer r e f u s e d t o n e g o t i a t e a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. The union promoted the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n t o punish the employer f o r not n e g o t i a t i n g . In one sense t h i s case i s the most unfortunate of a l l the cases. The w i l l o f the employees was never a s s e r t e d . The employees complied w i t h the employer's wishes to c e r t i f y and then the employees complied w i t h the union to d e c e r t i f y . (B) M u l t i p l e Reasons In some cases, one reason p r o v i d e d the necessary s t i m u l u s f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n w h i l e i n other cases, a combination o f reasons was r e q u i r e d t o s t i m u l a t e a - 90 -d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The degree t o which one reason may s t i m u l a t e a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n versus a combination o f reasons i s not based on any i n n a t e potency o f a p a r t i c u l a r reason. In some cases, one p a r t i c u l a r reason was s u f f i c i e n t t o s t i m u l a t e a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n ; y e t i n o t h e r cases, t h a t same reason combined w i t h another to s t i m u l a t e a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The s u f f i c i e n t cause f o r a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n seems to be based on the s t r e n g t h o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the a c t o r s i n v o l v e d . As the dynamic model o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i l l u s t r a t e s ( F i g u r e 1), once the u n i t has been e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e r e are t h r e e major i n t e r a c t i o n p o i n t s . The i n t e r a c t i o n p o i n t s i n c l u d e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between employer/employee,^ member/ 7 8 union, and union/employer. The s t r e n g t h or weakness o f these r e l a t i o n s h i p s seems to determine the s t r e n g t h o f s t i m u l u s r e q u i r e d to promote a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , no p a r t i c u l a r reason has an i n n a t e potency but always depends on the circumstances. The circumstances of the cases were such t h a t three d i s t i n c t combinations o f reasons emerged i n f o u r t e e n cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The three combinations i n c l u d e : (1) a n t i c i p a t e d c o s t s underestimated/dominant member of the u n i t are no l o n g e r p r e s e n t , (2) a n t i c i p a t e d c o s t s under-estimated/economic c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s , and (3) idominant members o f the u n i t are no l o n g e r present/economic c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s . Each o f the combinations o c c u r r e d w i t h r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l frequency. - 91 -The combination o f " a n t i c i p a t e d c o s t s underestimated/ dominant members o f the u n i t are no lon g e r present" s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r s t o employer i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the u n i t and the s t a f f t u r n o v e r . The s t a f f t u r n o v e r was both v o l u n -t a r y and employer i n s t i g a t e d . T h i s combination was s i g n i f i c a n t i n f o u r cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The l o g i c o f t h i s combination i s t h a t employer p r e s s u r e on the employee to d e c e r t i f y i n c o n c e r t w i t h an absence o f l e a d e r s h i p i n the u n i t r e s u l t s i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The absence o f the u n i t s ' l e a d e r s i s e i t h e r by v o l u n t a r y t u r n o v e r o r employer induced t u r n o v e r . There was no c o n c l u s i v e f i n d i n g f o r the type o f tu r n o v e r which r e s u l t e d i n the a t t r i t i o n o f a u n i t ' s l e a d e r s . The combination o f " a n t i c i p a t e d c o s t s underestimated/ economic c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s " r e f e r s t o employer p r e s s u r e and union withdrawal o f s e r v i c i n g . There were s i x cases i n which t h i s combination o f reasons r e s u l t e d i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n T h i s combination i s almost expected because employer r e s i s t a n c e to u n i o n i z a t i o n can r a i s e the s e r v i c i n g c o s t s t o the union. A t some p o i n t the c o s t s o f s e r v i c i n g are e x c e s s i v e and the union withdraws from a c t i v e l y s u p p o r t i n g the u n i t . The combination o f these two reasons may be r e v e r s e d . A l a c k o f union s e r v i c i n g may be the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r an employer t o pr e s s u r e the employees .to d e c e r t i f y . The important p o i n t i s t h a t these two reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n a c t i n c o n c e r t . - 92 -The t h i r d combination o f reasons, "dominant members o f the u n i t are no l o n g e r present/economic c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s " r e l a t e s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o s t a f f t u r n o v e r combining w i t h the union withdrawal o f s e r v i c e , r e s u l t i n g i n a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . There were f o u r cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n which d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h i s combination. In these cases, the u n i t s were unable t o a s s e r t t h e i r demands on the union once t h e r e was no l e a d e r s h i p i n the u n i t s . The employer c o n t r i b u t e d by r a i s i n g the c o s t of s e r v i c i n g and c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the t u r n o v e r o f the u n i t ' s l e a d e r s . M u l t i p l e reasons f o r d e c e r t i f y i n g not o n l y i l l u s t r a t e which reasons a c t i n c o n c e r t but a l s o h i g h l i g h t the c r u c i a l r o l e s o f the a c t o r s i n the work s e t t i n g . The i n f l u e n c e of the employer c o n t i n u a l l y emerges as a v a r i a b l e t o c o n s i d e r . The union's response to employer p r e s s u r e and t o the u n i t are a key determinent i n the d e c i s i o n t o d e c e r t i f y . In these cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , the employer t r i e d t o break the c e r t i f i c a t i o n and the union response was withdrawal a f t e r l i m i t e d support o f the u n i t . (C) M i s c e l l a n e o u s Reasons The r e s e a r c h p r o v i d e d evidence f o r a l l o f the p o s s i b l e reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n but the reasons d i d not accommodate two o f the a c t u a l cases. For the purpose o f t h i s t h e s i s , the two cases are l a b e l e d as m i s c e l l a n e o u s . In one o f the m i s c e l l a n e o u s cases o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , the union a c t i v e l y turned a g a i n s t a u n i t because i t s members c r o s s e d a p i c k e t l i n e . The union f i n e d these members but the - 93 -c o u r t s l a t e r o v e r - r u l e d the f i n e s and f o r c e d the union to pay damages. At t h a t p o i n t , the u n i t f e l t i n compatible w i t h i n the union and d e c e r t i f i e d . The o t h e r m i s c e l l a n e o u s case of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n v o l v e d a L o c a l w i t h c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n competing companies. The union urged the customers of one company to switch t h e i r b u s i n e s s t o the o t h e r company. The union's a c t i o n r e s u l t e d i n a l a r g e l o s s o f revenue t o the former company. In response t o the union's a c t i o n s , the employer requested d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n t o pay back the union. A t t h a t p o i n t , there were only two people remaining i n the u n i t and the union d i d not care about the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The two m i s c e l l a n e o u s cases are q u i t e unique. These cases do not have r e p e t i t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s but they i l l u s t r a t e how important the work environment i s i n d e t e r -mining the reason f o r a d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . - 94 -TABLE IV - CONTRIBUTING REASONS FOR DECERTIFICATION* Reason 1 - E x p e c t a t i o n s o f membership re c o s t s / b e n e f i t s o f u n i o n i z a t i o n were not r e a l i z e d . (a) I n s t i t u t i o n a l reasons 6 Member reasons 1 (b) I n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n reasons 19 26 Reason 2 - Cohesive element o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s no lo n g e r p r e s e n t . (a) Dominant members o f the u n i t are no l o n g e r p r e s e n t 13, (b) The reason f o r the u n i t ' s presence i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t 5 18 Reason 3- Union i s no l o n g e r i n t e r e s t e d i n r e p r e s e n t i n g the u n i t . (a) Economic c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s 18 (b) P o l i t i c a l problems 1 (c) Punish employer 1 20 M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons 2 *The reasons f o l l o w the o u t l i n e o f F i g u r e I I - 9 5 -* Reasons 1, 2, 3 c o i n c i d e w i t h the reasons as shown i n F i g u r e 2 o f t e x t . - 96 -CONCLUSION From a l l the reasons p r e s e n t e d about the cases of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n , two i s s u e s s t a n d out above a l l the o t h e r s . The employers' response to-.the u n i o n i z a t i o n o f h i s employees and the unions' response t o the employers' a c t i o n s are the key behaviours u n d e r l y i n g d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n the m a j o r i t y o f cases. The employer i n t e r a c t s w i t h the employees on a d a i l y b a s i s and can modify the a t t i t u d e s o f h i s employees through the reward system under h i s c o n t r o l i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . The employers'' a b i l i t y t o promote a d e c e r t i -f i c a t i o n i s a l s o i n f l u e n c e d by the unions' st r e n g h t h i n the u n i t s . T h i s i s why s e r v i c i n g i s very important t o the unions' a b i l i t y t o h o l d a c e r t i f i c a t i o n . A c l o s e r e l a t i o n -s h i p between the unions and t h e i r u n i t s would appear t o minimize the employers' a n t i - u n i o n a c t i o n s . The c o n c l u d i n g c hapter of t h i s t h e s i s w i l l s y n t h e s i z e the theory, a c t o r s and reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n order t o c o n s t r u c t a g e n e r a l s c e n a r i o f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia. - 97 -FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI 1. T h i s s e c t i o n r e l a t e s t o Table IV and f o l l o w s the o u t l i n e d theory o f F i g u r e 2. 2. Brooks, George W., The Sources o f V i t a l i t y i n the American Labor Movement (New York S t a t e School o f I n d u s t r i a l and Labour R e l a t i o n s , J u l y 1960), p. 7. 3. I n t e r v i e w October 8, 19 76. 4. I n t e r v i e w September 29, 19 76. 5. I n t e r v i e w September 24, 19 76. - 9 8 -CHAPTER VII - CONCLUSION The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to summarize the major f i n d i n g s o f the r e s e a r c h and t o suggest i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h and p u b l i c p o l i c y . Most d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s i n v o l v e s m a l l u n i t s of u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r . G e n e r a l l y , the companies employ a s m a l l s t a f f and are owner operated. Union l o c a l s which experienced decer-t i f i c a t i o n are t y p i c a l l y o f the i n d u s t r i a l or m i s c e l l a n e o u s v a r i e t y and have a l a r g e membership. Employees w i t h i n d e c e r t i f i e d u n i t s have l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e with t h e i r employer o f t h e i r union. The employer can e a s i l y r e p l a c e the employees because the s k i l l s r e q u i r e d t o perform the work can be found i n the l a r g e secondary labou r market. Small u n i t s have a low p r i o r i t y w i t h the corresponding l o c a l s because the u n i t s c o n t r i b u t e very few members to the l o c a l and the revenues generated from the u n i t i s marginal. T h e r e f o r e , s m a l l u n i t s of u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r are most s u s c e p t i b l e t o employer i n f l u e n c e and have l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e on the p r i o r i t i e s and p o l i c i e s o f the union. Employer r e a c t i o n to u n i o n i z a t i o n and union response t o employer r e a c t i o n are the important dynamic f e a t u r e s o f - 99 -d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Employer response can occur immediately f o l l o w i n g the c e r t i f i c a t i o n o r may s u r f a c e a f t e r a number of y e a r s . In any case, the employer response depends on the unique f e a t u r e s o f the company and employer's a t t i t u d e s . The response can range from r e a s s i g n i n g work r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to c l o s i n g down the b u s i n e s s . The e x p e r t i s e , s t r e n g t h and w i l l i n g n e s s o f the union to combat employer i n f l u e n c e determines the employer's success o f b r e a k i n g the c e r t i f i c a t i o n . There came a p o i n t i n each case where the union e x p l i c i t y or i m p l i c i t l y d e c i d e d t h a t the c o s t of p r e s e r v i n g the u n i t d i d not j u s t i f y the b e n e f i t s . In some cases the union spent a great d e a l o f time and money t o p r e s e r v e the c e r t i f i c a t i o n . However, i n the m a j o r i t y of cases, the p o i n t at which c o s t s exceeded b e n e f i t s was very low and hence, union support of the u n i t was m a r g i n a l a t b e s t . In c o n c l u s i o n , and w i t h some e x c e p t i o n s , s m a l l u n i t s o f u n s k i l l e d l a b o u r o r g a n i z e d i n l a r g e l o c a l s , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h employer i n f l u e n c e and l i m i t e d union support r e s u l t e d i n d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n h i g h l i g h t s the v u l n e r a b l e s t a t u s o f the u n s k i l l e d workers w i t h i n s m a l l companies. The people who c o u l d most b e n e f i t from c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n are the people e x p e r i e n c i n g d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The c o n c l u s i o n s of the r e s e a r c h have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r p u b l i c p o l i c y . When a u n i t i s i n the o r g a n i z i n g stage a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from the Labour Board should meet with the - 100 -employees and e x p l a i n to the employees the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a c e r t i f i c a t i o n . Pamphlets should be d i s t r i b u t e d which summarizes the i s s u e s and t h e r e should be a check l i s t o f items so the u n i t can compare the b e n e f i t s o f f e r e d by d i f f e r e n t unions. Once the employees are more f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e i r r i g h t s and o p t i o n s , they w i l l be i n a s t r o n g e r p o s i t i o n t o decide i f they want a union and i f so which union. P r e s e n t l y , there i s a d i s c u s s i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia about amending the Labour Code i n order t h a t employers may o u t l i n e t h e i r a t t i t u d e s about unionism a t the time o f c e r t i f i c a t i o n . C u r r e n t l y , employer r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at the time o f c e r t i f i c a t i o n i s n o t a l l o w e d . The data o f t h i s t h e s i s i l l u s t r a t e s the s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e an employer can have on the a t t i t u d e s and d e c i s i o n s o f employees. I f the i n t e n t o f the Labour Code i s to give workers the o p p o r t u n i t y t o f r e e l y decide i f they want c o l l e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , then i t i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the proposed amendment. Employers have enough o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n f l u e n c e worker a t t i t u d e s without the r i g h t . There are many d i r e c t i o n s f o r r e s e a r c h i n the area o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . The f i r s t p r i o r i t y i s to repeat the r e s e a r c h i n a d i f f e r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n and compare the r e s u l t s with t h i s t h e s i s . The comparison would i n d i c a t e i f the a c t o r s and reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n are unique to B r i t i s h Columbia o r can a g e n e r a l s c e n a r i o be c o n s t r u c t e d f o r a l l - 101 -d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s . A second d i r e c t i o n o f r e s e a r c h i s the examination o f a l l attempted d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s which d i d not succeed. The data from the aborted d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s compared t o the d a t a i n t h i s r e s e a r c h may i n d i c a t e the d i f f e r e n c e s o f behaviour between s u c c e s s f u l and unsuccess-f u l d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s . - 102 -BIBLIOGRAPHY Books 1. Babbie, E a r l R. , Survey Research Methods (Wadsworth P u b l i s h i n g Company, 19 73). 2. Brooks, George W., Sources of V i t a l i t y i n the American  Labor Movement (New York S t a t e School of I n d u s t r i a l and .Labor R e l a t i o n s at C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y , J u l y 1960). 3. C a r r o t h e r s , A.W., C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g i n Canada (Toronto-Butterworths, 1965). 4. Dubin, Robert, Theory B u i l d i n g ( C o l l i e r - M a c M i l l a n L i m i t e d , 1969) . 5. Fox, A l l a n , A S o c i o l o g y o f Work i n I n d u s t r y (London: C o l l i e r - M a c M i l l a n L i m i t e d , 1971). 6. Hirschman, A l b e r t 0., E x i t , Voice and L o y a l t y (Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970). 7. Jamieson, S t u a r t M., I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s i n Canada ( C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1957). 8. L e s t e r , R i c h a r d A., As Unions Mature (Princ e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1958). 9. Olson, Mancur, L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n (Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965). 10. Runciman, Walter, R e l a t i v e D e p r i v a t i o n and S o c i a l  J u s t i c e (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1966). 11. Runkel, P h i l i p J . and McGrath, Joseph E., Research  on Human Behaviour - A Systematic Guide to Method (H o l t , R i n e h a r t and Winston Inc., 1972). 12. S t e e r s , R. and P o r t e r , L. M o t i v a t i o n and Work  Behaviour (McGraw H i l l Book Company, 19 75). 13. Whitney, N a t h a n i e l R., J u r i s d i c t i o n and American  B u i l d i n g Trade Unions (Harper and Row, 196 7). -10 3 -Law Cases 1. Labour R e l a t i o n s Board of B r i t i s h Columbia, Reported  Cases: D e c i s i o n s # 11/1974, 19/1974, 121/1974, 122/1974, 124/1974, 143/1974, 144/1974, 149/1974, 65/1975, 68/1975, 72/1975. - 104 -APPENDIX 1 Timing of D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n * 1974 1975 1976 January y~~ February ]_ 4 March December T o t a l (n) = 43 4 A p r i l 1 1 1 May 1 June 2 3 J u l y 2 2 August 3 September 4 2 October 2 November 13 13 17 * The t i m i n g of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s r e f e r s to the date the Board r u l e s on the cases. T h e r e f o r e , the i n c i d e n c e of the cases are not n e c e s s a r i l y i n the same month as the date the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n was processed through the Board. - 105 -APPENDIX 2 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Manufacturing Companies  Which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (a) Frequency o f manufacturing companies which experi e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by number of employees. # of Employees # o f Companies 37 0^ = 66.67 0 - 9 4 (33.4%) 10 - 19 4 (33.4%) 20 - 29 1 ( 8.3%) 30 - 39 0 40 - 49 1 ( 8.3%) 50 - 59 0 60 - 69 1 ( 8.3%) 70 - 79 0 80 - 89 0 90 - 99 0 100 > 1 ( 8.3%) TOTAL 12 (100 %) (b) Frequency o f manufacturing companies which experi e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n -grouped by t u r n o v e r . Turnover Low (1) Average (2) High (3) T o t a l # companies 5 (41.7%) 6 (50%) 1 (8.3%) 12 (100%) 1.67 «T= .65 (c) Frequency o f manufacturing companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n -grouped by s k i l l l e v e l . Low/ Moderate/ Low(l) Moderated.5) Moderated) High(2.5) High(3) T o t a l # companies 5 (41.7%) 0 4 (33.3%) 1 (8.3%) 2 (16.7%) 12 (100%) X = 1.8 CT^= .78 - 107 -(d) Frequency o f manufacturing companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by experience w i t h unions. No p r e v i o u s experience 11 (92%) P r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 1 ( 8%) 12 (e) Frequency o f manufacturing companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by p r e v i o u s experience w i t h d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . No p r e v i o u s experience P r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 11 (92%) _1 ( 8%) 12 - 108 -S i z e o f u n i t s w h i c h d e c e r t i f i e d w i t h i n t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y . # M e m b e r s # U n i t s o - 4 5 (41.7%) 5 - 9 3 (25 %) 10 - 14 3 (25 %) 15 - 19 1 ( 8.3%) 20 - 24 25 - 29 30 - 34 35 - 39 40 - 44 45 - 49 50 > X= 11.5 0"= 10.86 TOTAL 12 (100 %) - 109 -L o n g e v i t y o f c e r t i f i c a t i o n s w i t h i n the manufacturing i n d u s t r y . # Members # Un i t s 0 - 23 6 (46.2%) 24 - 47 1 ( 7.7%) 48 - 71 0 72 - 95 1 ( 7.7%) 96 - 119 0 120 - 143 0 144 - 167 1 ( 7.7%) 168 - 191 1 ( 7.7%) 192 - 215 0 216 - 240 0 241 > 3 (23 %) TOTAL 13 (100 %) X= 107 118.03 Exp e r i e n c e o f u n i t s i n the manufacturing i n d u s t r y w i t h c o l l e c t i v e agreements. U n i t worked under a c o l l e c t i v e agreement 6 (46%) Never concluded a f i r s t agreement _7 (54%) 13 (100%) - 110 -(i) Reason f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h i n the manufacturing i n d u s t r y . Arose w i t h i n the company General working c o n d i t i o n s 3 Disenchanted employee 3 Employer i n s t i g a t e d _1 Union o r g a n i z a t i o n d r i v e Imposed by law M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons No data 7 7 13 - I l l -(j) C o n t r i b u t i n g reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n of u n i t s w i t h i n the manufacturing i n d u s t r y . Reason 1 - Expectations of membership re c o s t / b e n e f i t of u n i o n i z a t i o n were not r e a l i z e d . (A) I n s t i t u t i o n a l reasons 2 Member reasons _0 2 (B) I n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n reasons _6_ ^ 8 Reason 2 - Cohesive element of the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s no longer present (A) Dominant members o f the u n i t are no longer present 3 (B) The reason f o r the u n i t ' s presence i s no longer present 0 _3 Reason 3 - Union i s no longer i n t e r e s t e d i n re p r e s e n t i n g the u n i t (A) Economic costs exceed b e n e f i t s 7 (B) P o l i t i c a l problems 0 (C) Punish employer _0 _7 Miscellaneous reasons 1 - 112 -(k) Reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h i n the manufacturing i n d u s t r y * Reason 1 Reason 3 Miscellaneous Reasons * Reasons 1 , 2 , 3 c o i n c i d e w i t h o u t l i n e o f F i g u r e 2 - 113 -APPENDIX 3 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Trade Companies Which  Exp e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (a) Frequency o f t r a d e companies which experi e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by number of employees # o f Companies 0 - 9 1 (12.5%) 10 - 19 3 (37.5%) 20 - 29 0 30 - 39 0 40 - 49 1 (12.5%) 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79 80 - 89 90 - 99 100 > _3 (37.5%) TOTAL 8 (100 %) X = 848 <J~'= 2090. 35 (b) Frequency o f t r a d e companies which experi e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by t u r n o v e r . Turnover Low (1) Average (2) High (3) T o t a l # companies 3 (37.5) 4 (50%) 1 (12.5%) 8 (100%) (c) Frequency o f t r a d e companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by s k i l l l e v e l . S k i l l L e v e l Low/ Moderate/ Low(l) Moderate (1.5) Moderate (2) High(2.5) H i g h ( l ) T o t a l # companies 7(87.5%) 1 (12.5%) 8 (100%) - 115 -(d) Frequency o f t r a d e companies which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n grouped by experience w i t h unions. No p r e v i o u s experience 7 (87.5%) P r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 1 (12.5%) 8 (100 %) (e) Frequency o f t r a d e companies which experi e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n grouped by experience w i t h d e c e r t i f i -c a t i o n . No p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 7 (87.5%) P r e v i o u s experience 1 (12.5%) ' 8 (100 %) - 116 -(f) S i z e o f u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d w i t h i n the trade i n d u s t r y . # Un i t s 0 - 4 3 (33.3%) 5 - 9 4 (44.5%) 10 - 14 1 (11.1%) 15 - 19 0 20 - 24 0 25 - 29 1 (11.1%) 30 - 34 0 35 - 39 0 40 - 44 0 45 - 49 0 50 > 0 TOTAL 9 (100 %) X = 9.8 = 8.68 (g) E x p e r i e n c e o f .units i n the trade i n d u s t r y with c o l l e c t i v e agreements. U n i t worked under a c o l l e c t i v e agreement 6 (67%) Never concluded a f i r s t agreement • _3 (33%) 9 (100%) - 117 -(h) Reasons f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h i n the trade i n d u s t r y . Arose w i t h i n the company General working c o n d i t i o n s 2 Disenchanted employee 2 Employer i n s t i g a t e d _0_ _4 4 Union o r g a n i z a t i o n d r i v e _2_ 2 Imposed by law __2 2 M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons No data _JL J L ( i ) C o n t r i b u t i n g reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h i n the t r a d e i n d u s t r y . Reason 1 - E x p e c t a t i o n o f membership re c o s t / b e n e f i t s o f u n i o n i z a t i o n were not r e a l i z e d . (A) I n s t i t u t i o n a l reasons 3 Member reasons _0_ 3 (B) I n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l reasons _4_ 7 - 118 -Reason 2 - Cohesive element o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t . (A) Dominant members o f the u n i t are no l o n g e r p r e s e n t 5 (B) The reason f o r the u n i t ' s presence i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t _ 0 5 Reason 3 - Union i s no l o n g e r i n t e r e s t e d i n r e p r e s e n t i n g the u n i t . (A) Economic c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s 3 (B) P o l i t i c a l problems 0 (C) Punish employer 0 - 119 -(j) Reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h i n the trade i n d u s t r y * Reason 1 Reason 2 \ / ! Reason 3 •Reasons 1, 2, 3 c o i n c i d e w i t h o u t l i n e o f F i g u r e 2. - 120 -APPENDIX 4  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f S e r v i c e Companies  Which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (a) Frequency o f s e r v i c e companies which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by number o f employees. # o f employees # o f companies 0 - 9 5 (35.7%) 10 - 19 3 (21.4%) 20 - 29 2 (14.3%) 30 - 39 3 (21.4%) 4 0 - 4 9 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79 8 0 - 8 9 90 - 99 100 > 1 ( 7.2%) X = 23 er^ = 24.29 14 (100 %) (b) Frequency o f s e r v i c e companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by t u r n o v e r . Turnover Low (1) # companies 5 (35.7%) Average (2) 4 (28.6%) High (3) 5 (35.7%) T o t a l 14 (100%) %= 2 (K= .88 (c) Frequency o f s e r v i c e companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by s k i l l l e v e l . S k i l l L e v e l Low/ Moderate/ Low(l) . Moderate (1.5) Moderated) High(2.5) # companies 9(64.3%) 0 4 (28.6%) 0 High(3) T o t a l 1 (7.1%) 14 (100%) - 122 -(d) Frequency o f s e r v i c e companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by experience w i t h unions. No p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 12 (85.7%) P r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 2 (14.3%) 14 (e) Frequency o f s e r v i c e companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by p r e v i o u s experience w i t h unions No p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 13 (82.8%) P r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 1 ( 7.2%) 14 - 123 -(f) S i z e o f u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d w i t h i n the s e r v i c e i n d u s t r y # members # u n i t s 0 - 4 6 (40 %) 5 - 9 3 (20 %) X= 12.4 1 0 - 1 4 2 (13.3%) <7^= 11.05 15 - 19 0 20 - 24 1 ( 6.7%) 2 5 - 2 9 2 (13.3%) 3 0 - 3 4 1 ( 6.7%) 3 5 - 3 9 0 4 0 - 4 4 0 4 5 - 4 9 0 50 > 0 TOTAL 15 (100 %) - 124 -(g) L o n g e v i t y o f c e r t i f i c a t i o n s w i t h i n the s e r v i c e i n d u s t r y . # months # u n i t s 0 - 2 3 8 (53. 3%) 24 - 47 0 48 - 71 3 (20 • %) 72 - 95 1 ( 6. 7%) 96 - 119 0 120 - 143 0 144 - 167 2 (13. 3%) 168 - 191 0 191 - 215 0 216 - 240 0 240 > 1 ( 6. 7%) TOTAL 15 (100 %) X= 65.5 0" = 79.84 (h) E x p e r i e n c e o f u n i t s i n the s e r v i c e i n d u s t r y with c o l l e c t i v e agreements. U n i t worked under a c o l l e c t i v e agreement 10 (67%) Never concluded a f i r s t agreement 5 (33%) 15 - 1 2 5 -Reasons f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h i n the s e r v i c e i n d u s t r y . Arose w i t h i n the company General working c o n d i t i o n s 2 Disenchanted employee 2 Employer i n s t i g a t e d 3 7 7 Union o r g a n i z a t i o n d r i v e _4 4 Imposed by law 3 3 M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons No data 1 1 1 5 C o n t r i b u t i n g reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h i n the s e r v i c e i n d u s t r y . Reason 1 - E x p e c t a t i o n o f membership re c o s t / b e n e f i t s o f u n i o n i z a t i o n were not r e a l i z e d . (A) I n s t i t u t i o n a l reasons . 1 Member reasons _ 0 1 (B) I n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n reasons _7 8 - 126 -Reason 2 - Cohesive element of the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t (A) Dominant members o f the u n i t are no l o n g e r p r e s e n t 3 (B) The reason f o r the u n i t ' s presence i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t _3 _6 Reason 3 - Union i s no l o n g e r i n t e r e s t e d i n r e p r e s e n t i n g the u n i t . (A) Economic c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s 5 (B) P o l i t i c a l problems 1 (C) Punish employer _0_ M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons 1 - 127 -(k) Reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h i n the s e r v i c e i n d u s t r y . * Reason 1 Reason 2 \ n / % Reason 3 A" Miscellaneous Reasons * Reasons 1, 2, 3 c o i n c i d e w i t h o u t l i n e o f "Figure 2. - 128 -APPENDIX 5  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Other Companies  Which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (a) Frequency o f o t h e r companies which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by number o f employees # employees # companies 4 (66.7%) R= 26.8 1 (16.65%) 0^= 50.67 0 - 9 10 - 19 20 - 29 30 - 39. 40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79 80 - 89 90 - 99 100 > TOTAL _1 (16.65%) 6 (100 %) (b) Frequency o f o t h e r companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by tu r n o v e r . Turnover Low (1) Average (2) High (3) T o t a l # companies 1 (16.65%) 3 (50%) 2 (33.35%) 6 (100%) X= 2.17 <r= .75 (c) Frequency o f o t h e r companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by s k i l l l e v e l . S k i l l L e v e l Low/ Moderate/ Low(l) Moderate(1.5) Moderate(2) High(2.5) High(3) T o t a l # companies 5 (83.3%) 0 1 (16.7%) 0 6 (100%) to VO X= 1.16 *~ = .41 - 130 -(d) Frequency o f o t h e r companies which experi e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by experience w i t h unions. No p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 5 (83.3%) P r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e _1 (16.7%) J 5 (e) Frequency o f o t h e r companies which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by p r e v i o u s experience w i t h d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s No p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e 6 (100 %) P r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e _0_ ( 0 %) 6 - 131 -(f) S i z e o f u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d w i t h i n the o t h e r i n d u s t r y . # members # u n i t s 0 - 4 5 5 - 9 0 10 - 14 1 15 - 19 20 - 24 25 - 29 30 - 34 35 - 39 40 - 44 45 - 49 50 > X = 4.8 <K= 5.2 TOTAL 6 (100 %) - 132 -(g) L o n g e v i t y o f u n i t s w i t h i n the other i n d u s t r y # u n i t s (50 %) X = 36.8 # months 0 - 23 3 24 - 47 2 48 - 71 0 72 - 95 0 96 - 119 1 120 - 143 144 - 167 168 - 191 192 - 215 216 - 240 240 > TOTAL 6 (33.3%) 0J= 38.22 (16.7%) (100 %) '(h) E x p e r i e n c e o f u n i t s i n the oth e r i n d u s t r y w i t h c o l l e c t i v e agreements U n i t worked under a c o l l e c t i v e agreement 2 (33%) Never concluded a f i r s t agreement _4_ (67%) 6 - 133 -(i) Reason f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h i n the other i n d u s t r y Arose w i t h i n the company General working c o n d i t i o n s Disenchanted employee Employer i n s t i g a t e d Union o r g a n i z a t i o n d r i v e Imposed by law M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons No data (j) C o n t r i b u t i n g reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h i n the o t h e r i n d u s t r y . Reason 1 - E x p e c t a t i o n s o f membership re c o s t / b e n e f i t s o f u n i o n i z a t i o n were not r e a l i z e d . (A) I n s t i t u t i o n a l reasons 0 Member reasons _1 1 (B) I n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n reasons _2_ 3 R e a s o n 2 - C o h e s i v e e l e m e n t o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t . (A) Dominant members o f t h e u n i t a r e no l o n g e r p r e s e n t 0 (B) The r e a s o n f o r t h e u n i t ' s p r e s e n c e i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t _1 _1 R e a son 3 - U n i o n i s no l o n g e r i n t e r e s t e d i n r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e u n i t . (A) E c o n o m i c c o s t s e x c e e d b e n e f i t s 3 (B) P o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s 0 (C) P u n i s h e m p l o y e r 1 - 135 -(k) Reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f u n i t s w i t h i n the o t h e r i n d u s t r y * . Reasons 1, 2, 3 c o i n c i d e w i t h o u t l i n e o f F i g u r e 2. - 136 -APPENDIX 6  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f C r a f t Unions Which  E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (a) Number o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s / C r a f t L o c a l T o t a l # L o c a l s D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s # L o c a l s w i t h 1 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 5 5 # L o c a l s w i t h 2 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s _1 _2 6 7 (b) Frequency o f C r a f t L o c a l s which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i -c a t i o n s - grouped by l o c a l membership. # members # l o c a l s 0 - 999 3 (50 %') 1,000 - 1,999 1 (16.6%) 2,000 - 2,999 1 (16.7%) 3,000 - 3,999 1 (16.7%) 4,000 - 4,999 5,000 - 5,999 6,000 - 6,999 7,000 - 7,999 8,000 - 8,999 9,000 - 9,999 10,000 > TOTAL 6 (100 %) X = 1328 \Y= 1013 - 137 -(c) Frequency o f C r a f t L o c a l s which exper i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by average s i z e c e r t i f i c a t i o n / l o c a l Average S i z e C e r t i f i c a t i o n / L o c a l # L o c a l s 0 - 9 10 - 19 20 - 29 4 (66.7%) 30 - 39 1 (16.7%) 40 - 49 50 - 59 1 (16.6%) 60 - 69 70 - 79 80 - 89 90 - 99 100 > TOTAL 6 (100 %) X= 29 (7^ = 11.58 (d) Frequency o f C r a f t L o c a l s which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by c o n t r a c t p o l i c y . Standard (1) # L o c a l s 1 (16.7%) Semi-Standard (2) Non Standard (3) T o t a l 2 (33.3%) 3 (50%) 6 (100%) X = 2.33 6^= .82 i r-1 O J 00 I - 139 -(e) Frequency o f u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d - grouped by membership s i z e . # members # u n i t s 0 - 4 3 (42.8%) 5 - 9 1 (14.3%) 10 - 14 2 (28.6%) 15 - 19 " 20 - 24 25 - 29 1 (14.3%) 30 - 34 35 - 39 40 - 44 45 - 49 50 > • TOTAL 7 (100 %) X= 10.9 C= 9.97 - 140 -(f) L o n g e v i t y o f c r a f t u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d . # months # u n i t s 0 - 23 3 (42.8%) 24 - 47 48 - 71 72 - 95 96 - 119 120 - 143 144 - 167 1 (14.4%) 168 - 191 192 - 215 216 - 240 240 > _3 (42.8%) TOTAL 7 (100 %) X= 152 lV= 139.7 (g) E x p e r i e n c e o f c r a f t u n i t s w i t h a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. U n i t worked under a c o l l e c t i v e agreement 4 (57%) Never concluded a f i r s t agreement _3 (43%) 7 - 141 -(h) Reason f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f c r a f t u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d . Arose w i t h i n the company General working c o n d i t i o n s Disenchanted employee 1 Employer i n s t i g a t e d _1 =1= 2 Union o r g a n i z a t i o n d r i v e Imposed by law _1_ 1 M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons _1 1 No data _3 _3 (i) C o n t r i b u t i n g reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n of c r a f t u n i t s Reason 1 - E x p e c t a t i o n o f membership re c o s t / b e n e f i t s o f u n i o n i z a t i o n were not r e a l i z e d . (A) I n s t i t u t i o n a l reasons 0 Member reasons __0 0 (B) I n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n reasons _4_ 4 - 142 -Reason 2 - Cohesive element of the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t . (A) Dominant members o f the u n i t are no l o n g e r p r e s e n t 2 (B) The reason f o r the u n i t ' s presence i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t _2 _4 Reason 3 - Union i s no l o n g e r i n t e r e s t e d i n r e p r e s e n t i n g the u n i t . (A) Economic c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s 3 (B) P o l i t i c a l problems 0 (C) Punish employer _0 _ 3 M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons 1 - 143 -( j ) Reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f c r a f t u n i t s * Reason 1 Reason 2 ^ Reason 3 1 Miscellaneous 1 ] Reasons ' / •Reasons 1, 2, 3 c o i n c i d e w i t h o u t l i n e o f F i g u r e 2 - 144 -APPENDIX 7  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f I n d u s t r i a l Unions  Which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s (a) Number o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s / I n d u s t r i a l L o c a l T o t a l # # L o c a l s D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s # L o c a l s w i t h 1 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 11 11 # L o c a l s w i t h 2 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 2 4 # L o c a l s w i t h 3 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 1 3 # L o c a l s w i t h 4 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 1 4 15 22 - 145 -(b) F r e q u e n c y o f i n d u s t r i a l l o c a l s w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - g r o u p e d by l o c a l membership. # members # l o c a l s 0 - 999 2 (16.7%) 1,000 - 1,999 2,000 - 2,999 4 (33.4%) 3,000 - 3,999 1 ( 8.3%) 4,000 - 4,999 5,000 - 5,999 6,000 - 6,999 7,000 - 7,999 1 ( 8.3%) 8,000 - 8,999 1 ( 8.3%) 9,000 - 9,999 1 ( 8.3%) 10,000 > 2 (16.7%) TOTAL 12 (100 %) X = 5417 = 4446 - 146 -(c) Frequency o f i n d u s t r i a l l o c a l s which e x p e r i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by average s i z e c e r t i f i c a t i o n / l o c a l Average S i z e . C e r t i f i c a t i o n / L o c a l # L o c a l s 0 - 9 10 - 19 20 - 29 4 (33.3%) 30 - 39 2 (16.9%) 40 - 49 1 ( 8.3%) 50 - 59 1 ( 8.3%) 60 - 69 1 ( 8.3%) 70 - 79 1 ( 8.3%) 80 - 89 1 ( 8.3%) 90 - 99 100 > 1 ( 8.3%) TOTAL 12 (100 %) X = 60.7 (7^ = 57.09 (d) Frequency o f i n d u s t r i a l l o c a l s which experi e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n c o n t r a c t p o l i c y . - grouped by Standard (1) Semi-standard (2) Non Standard (3) T o t a l # L o c a l s • 8 (53.4%) 5 (33.3%) 2 (13.3%) 15 (100%) X= 1.5 c^= .8 - 148 -(e) Frequency o f u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d - grouped by membership s i z e . \ members # u n i t s 0 - 4 8 (36.4%) 5 - 9 5 (22.7%) 10 - 14 4 (18.3%) 15 - 19 1 ( 4.5%) 20 - 24 1 ( 4.5%) 25 - 29 2 ( 9.1%) 30 - 34 1 ( 4.5%) 35 - 39 40 - 44 45 - 49 • 50 > — — TOTAL 22 (100 %) X= 11.8 0^= 9.65 - 149 -(f) L o n g e v i t y o f i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d # months # u n i t s 0 - 23 13 (59.2%) 24 - 47 2 ( 9.1%) 48 - 71 2 ( 9.1%) 72 - 95 1 ( 4.5%) 96 - 119 1 ( 4.5%) 120 - 143 144 - 167 1 ( 4.5%) 168 - 191 192 - 215 216 - 240 240 > 2 ( 9.1%) TOTAL 22 (100 %) X = 59.4 <T'= 84.35 (g) E x p e r i e n c e o f i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s with a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. U n i t worked under a c o l l e c t i v e agreement 13 (59%) Never concluded a f i r s t agreement 9 (41%) 22 - 150 -Reason f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d . Arose w i t h i n the company General working c o n d i t i o n s 2 Disenchanted employee 4 Employer i n s t i g a t e d _5^ 11 11 Union o r g a n i z a t i o n d r i v e _4 4 Imposed by law _5 5 M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons _1 1 No data _1 _1 22 C o n t r i b u t i n g reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s Reason 1 - E x p e c t a t i o n o f membership re c o s t / b e n e f i t s o f u n i o n i z a t i o n were no t r e a l i z e d . (A) I n s t i t u t i o n a l reasons- 3 Member reasons 1 (B) I n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n reasons _ 7 11 - 151 -Reason 2 - Cohesive element o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t . (A) Dominant members o f the u n i t are no l o n g e r p r e s e n t 6 (B) The reason f o r the u n i t ' s presence i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t 2 _ 8 Reason 3 - U n i t i s no l o n g e r i n t e r e s t e d i n r e p r e s e n t i n g the u n i t . (A) Economic c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s 9 (B) P o l i t i c a l problems 1 (C) Punish employer _1 11 M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons 1 - 152 -( j ) Reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s * . Reason 1 Reason 2 Reason 3 •;'-•."^ .^c.•.~-.'^ •:v.v«:*',*' Miscellaneous Reasons J * Reasons 1, 2, 3 c o i n c i d e w i t h o u t l i n e o f F i g u r e 2. -• 153 -APPENDIX 8  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f M i s c e l l a n e o u s Unions  Which E x p e r i e n c e d D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n (a) Number o f d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s / M i s c e l l a n e o u s L o c a l T o t a l # # L o c a l s D e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s # L o c a l s w i t h 1 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n 1 1 # L o c a l s w i t h 2 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 0 0 # L o c a l s w i t h 3 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 1 3 # L o c a l s w i t h 4 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 0 0 # L o c a l s w i t h 5 d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s 2 10 4 14 - 154 -(b) Frequency o f m i s c e l l a n e o u s l o c a l s which exper i e n c e d d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s - grouped by l o c a l s i z e . # members # l o c a l s 0 - 999 1,000 - 1,999 1 (25 %) 2,000 - 2,999 1 (25 %) 3,000 - 3,999 4,000 - 4,999 2 (50 %) 5,000 - 5,999 6,000 - 6,999 7,000 - 7,999 8,000 - 8,999 9,000 - 9,999 10,000 > TOTAL 4 (100 %) X= 3250 <7~= 1502 Frequency o f m i s c e l l a n e o u s l o c a l s which experience d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n - grouped by average s i z e c e r t i f i c a t i o n / l o c a l Average S i z e C e r t i f i c a t i o n / L o c a l # L o c a l s 0 - 9 10 - 19 2 (50%) 20 - 29 1 (25%) 30 - 39 40 - 49 1 (25%) 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79 80 - 89 90 - 99 100 > TOTAL 4 (100%) (d) Frequency o f m i s c e l l a n e o u s l o c a l s which experienced d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n s - grouped by c o n t r a c t p o l i c y . Standard (1) Semi-standard (2) Non standard (3) T o t a l # l o c a l s 3 (75%) 0 1 (25%) 4 (100%) 5c= 1.5 0-"= 1.0 CA - 157 -Frequency o f u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d - grouped by membership s i z e . # members # u n i t s .2%) X = 8. <T= 10 0 — 4 8 (57.5 - 9 4 (28.6%) 10 - 14 1 ( 7.1%) 15 - 19 20 - 24 25 - 29 30 - 34 35 - 39 1 ( 7.1%) 40 - 44 45 49 * 50 > TOTAL 14 (100 %) - 158 -L o n g e v i t y o f m i s c e l l a n e o u s u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d # months 0 - 23 24 - 47 48 - 95 96 - 119 120 - 14 3 144 - 167 168 - 191 192 - 215 216 - 240 240 > TOTAL # u n i t s 5 (35.7%) 4 (28.7%) 1 ( 7.1%) %= 53.6 2 (14.3%) tV= 49.65 1 ( 7.1%) 1 ( 7.1%) 14 (100 %) Ex p e r i e n c e o f m i s c e l l a n e o u s u n i t s w i t h a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. U n i t worked under a c o l l e c t i v e agreement Never concluded a f i r s t agreement 7 _J_ 14 (50%) (50%) - 159 -(h) Reason f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f m i s c e l l a n e o u s u n i t s which d e c e r t i f i e d . Arose w i t h i n the company General working c o n d i t i o n s 8 Disenchanted employee 2 Employer i n s t i g a t e d 10 10 3 3 0^  1 1 14 ( i ) C o n t r i b u t i n g reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n of m i s c e l l a n e o u s u n i t s . Reason 1 - E x p e c t a t i o n o f membership re c o s t / b e n e f i t o f u n i o n i z a t i o n were not r e a l i z e d . (A) I n s t i t u t i o n a l reasons 2 Member reasons 0 (B) I n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n reasons 9 11 Union o r g a n i z a t i o n d r i v e Imposed by law M i s c e l l a n e o u s reasons No d a t a - 160 -Reason 2 - Cohesive element o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n no l o n g e r p r e s e n t . (A) Dominant members o f the u n i t are no l o n g e r p r e s e n t 5 (B) The reason f o r the u n i t ' s presence i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t 1 Reason 3 - Union i s no l o n g e r i n t e r e s t e d i n r e p r e s e n t i n g the u n i t . 6 (A) Economic c o s t s exceed b e n e f i t s 6 (B) P o l i t i c a l problems 0 (C) Punish employer 0 - 161 -(j) Reasons f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f miscellaneous u n i t s * . Reason 2 Reason 1 2 \ :lf'' X " S-x Reason 3 * Reasons 1, 2, 3 c o i n c i d e w i t h o u t l i n e o f F i g u r e 2, 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            data-media="{[{embed.selectedMedia}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0093950/manifest

Comment

Related Items