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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Social construction of authority case studies under conditions of military discipline Connally, Orabelle 1976

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S O C I A L C O N S T R U C T I O N of A U T H O R I T Y CASE STUDIES UNDER CONDITIONS of MILITARY DISCIPLINE by ORABELLE CONNALLY B.A., University of Washington, 1948 M.A., University of Michigan, 1951 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF ' ~ - - . THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n the Department of Sociology We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May, 1976 0 Orabelle Connally, 1976 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d tha t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f Sociology ' The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada i i ABSTRACT Five cases of resistance to authority in the United States Navy in 1971 and 1972 were studied intensively. These included anti-war cam-paigns to keep the USS Constellation and the USS Ki t ty Hawk from sa i l ing to Vietnam, a movement defense of a sai lor charged with sabotage on the USS Ranger, a rac ia l f ight of over 200 crew members on the USS Ki t ty Hawk off Vietnam and two strikes by 130 Black sai lors aboard the USS Constel- l a t ion . White Jacket, Herman Melv i l le •s documentary report of l i f e aboard a navy Man O'War in 1843 and 1844 was also studied. The social construction of authority, that i s , the way that authority was produced1, strengthened or weakened by participants, was taken as a problematic. Published le t ters , reports, pamphlets and ar t ic les by members and supporters of the groups involved were the primary sources of information. Officers were found to use either a mi l i t a r is t or a managerial ideology when they commented on authority. Each ideology included assump-tions about the pract ical actions necessary for the exercise of authority and just i f icat ions of the right of the few in leadership to demand compli-ance of the many. The mi l i t a r is t ideology assumed an opposition of i n -terests between officers, and men and that authority was manifested by and depended on an in fe r io r 's exact obedience to a superior's commands in a face-to-face situation such as the social and technological setting of M e l v i l l e ' s sa i l ing Man O'War. The managerial ideology ident i f ied authority as the manipulation of inst i tut ional paths to career opportunity so that a l l levels of personnel were channeled into compliant behavior. Anti-war resisters and Black movement sai lors were very c r i t i c a l of authority but at the same time held paral le l ideas with one of the two models of how authority was; con-structed. Anti-war sai lors assumed authority depended on a face-to-face command situation as in the mi l i t a r is t ideology and Black movement sa i lors based their analysis of racism on inst i tut ional channeling which was con-sistent with the managerial view. The actions of the Black movement sai lors were the most effective challenge to authority because their sol idar i ty obviated extensive planning: or organization and because their analysis of racism tended to delegitimize managerial authority. The atomization of personnel by the requirements for organizing the technologically complex work of the ship and the mi l i t a r i s t maintenance of oppositions between of f icers , senior NCOs and enlisted men made cooperation in resistance unl ikely. At the same time the authoritar-ian style of lower level leadership also produced an anti-NCO so l idar i ty among enlisted people. The anti-war sai lors had hoped to capital ize on th is sol idar i ty but their understanding of the base of authority was i n -correct and the Navy was able to absorb their actions without direct impact; however, their l ibertar ian attack on authority along with the Black actions precipitated a conf l ic t between 'managerial' and 'm i l i t a r i s t ' o f f icers throughout the Navy. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS Pag Introduction PART ONE: AUTHORITY MODELS, IDEOLOGIES AND TECHNOLOGY . 26 1. Authority organization on a US warship i n 1843: The l i b e r t a r i a n view of Herman M e l v i l l e as presented i n White Jacket 29 2. Contemporary m i l i t a r i s t ideology and navy organization . . . 47 3. Administration i n the 1970s: The emergence of managerial ideology 64 4. A 1970s l i b e r t a r i a n view of authority: The c r i t i q u e of anti-war s a i l o r s 73 5. Authority as i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n : The ideology of Black movement s a i l o r s 81 6. Face-to-face conduct and the construction of authority i n the 1970s . 85 PART TWO: CASE STUDIES 98 7. USS C o n s t e l l a t i o n stay home vote: Nine refuse to leave f o r Vietnam, September 1971 105 8. USS K i t t y Hawk stop our ship campaign: Seven refuse to leave for Vietnam, February 1972 122 9. USS Ranger i s disabled by sabotage and an e n l i s t e d man charged, t r i e d and acquitted, June 1972 to May 1973 137 10. Over 200 f i g h t aboard the USS K i t t y Hawk, October 1972 . . . 145 11. 130 Black s a i l o r s s t r i k e twice on the USS C o n s t e l l a t i o n , November 1972 . 154 12. Admirals r e a c t i o n : November 1972 164 V PART THREE: THE IMPACT OF RESISTANCE ON AUTHORITY. . . . . 13. The anti-war movement and the effectiveness of the managerial methods of control . . 14. Black resistance: A practical and ideological threat to managerial authority 15. The interpretative bases of solidarity: Consciousness and conscience 16. Managerial c r i s i s : Resistance among enlisted men precipitates conflict between 'managers' and 'militarists' Conclusion Literature cited Appendixes: i Sources of documents: Annotated l i s t . . . 223 i i Documentation of White Jacket 229 i i i Sources of background information from interviews and participation 231 v i ACKNOWLEDGMENT I am g r a t e f u l to the people who gave me th e i r cooperation and time, f i r s t of a l l to my advisor Professor Dorothy Smith f o r i n i t i a l encouragement of an exploratory research project, challenging c r i t i c i s m i n the development of the analysis and counsel i n organiz-ing i t s presentation. I- am also g r a t e f u l to the Harbor Project people and' the s t a f f at the Center for Servicemen's Rights i n San Diego and to the SOS organizers i n San Francisco for t h e i r coopera-t i o n i n searching t h e i r f i l e s f o r old pamphlets, news releases and even bumper s t i c k e r s from t h e i r ship campaigns. I have been e s p e c i a l l y fortunate i n having Annette Dunseth, a navy veteran, check the dr a f t for correct use of naval terms and Cathie Wamsley Langowski take the time and care to proofread and type the f i n a l d r a f t . 1 INTRODUCTION This i s a study of m i l i t a r y authority based on the published reports of people who had been d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y involved i n f i v e incidents of resistance. The eases of resistance occurred on US Navy attack a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s i n 1971 and 1972 during the Vietnam war. The analysis of the documents i s directed at the question of how under the actual p o l i t i c a l , o rganizational and technological conditions, authority was s o c i a l l y constructed, reconstructed or disappeared. By s o c i a l con-s t r u c t i o n I.refer to the p r a c t i c a l actions that have produced and main-tained the authority structure. This d e f i n i t i o n assumes that i t i s actions of people that are responsible but i t does not explain how they do t h i s . This i s . the question of the study. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION In s p i t e of considerable s o c i o l o g i c a l attention to the i n t e r -dependence of people and t h e i r s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s the dynamics of t h i s pro-cess remain d i f f i c u l t to conceptualize i n terms that can be grounded at a phenomenal l e v e l - as C. Wright M i l l s pointed out i n the S o c i o l o g i c a l  Imagination i n 1951. Although there i s no lack of s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts of a s t a t i c interdependence, or of how i n d i v i d u a l s may be affected by changes i n the larger s o c i a l context, or of s o c i a l change i n general, an analysis at the l e v e l of the i n d i v i d u a l of. how people may change the structure of s o c i a l action has not been developed. Marx assumed a d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n -ship here, for instance i n the German Ideology he s a i d : The s o c i a l structure and the State are continually evolving out of the l i f e - p r o c e s s of determinate i n d i v i d u a l s . . . , . . . i t i s men, who, i n developing t h e i r material production and t h e i r material intercourse, change, along with t h i s t h e i r r e a l e x i s -tence, t h e i r thinking and the products of t h e i r thinking.(1956:74) 2 This idea has continued to i n s p i r e revolutionaries and s o c i a l philosophers but the p r a c t i c a l d e t a i l s of how. i t works have not been f i l l e d out. The ac t u a l processes among actual people which jLs the process of change escapes us and we have not been able to specify the c r i t i c a l points of change or even as we watched or p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h i s process, i f there were c r i t i c a l points. Sociologies which focus on society as s o c i a l l y constructed o f f e r a t h e o r e t i c a l basis for how s o c i a l organization i s accomplished (Morris 1975). Both Schutz and Mead have developed theories of what these under-l y i n g processes are (Schutz 1967; Mead 1934). Ethnomethodologists have also studied the p r a c t i c a l ways micro-social contexts are produced by p a r t i c i p a n t s (Turner 1974; Cicourel 1974). The symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n i s t s and some s o c i a l psychologists have used r o l e theory to explain the connection between society and behavior. To a large extent however, t h i s explains conforming behavior, not innovative action (Blumer 1966; Newcomb, Turner,. Converse 1965; Lindesmith .and Strauss 1968). Mead's own work i s an account i n terms of process and includes a conception of how creative action arose but l a t e r r o l e t h e o r i s t s did not attend to t h i s as they b u i l t on h i s ideas. The approach i d e n t i f i e d as the " s o c i a l construction of r e a l i t y " uses i n s i g h t s from both Schutz and Mead to develop an account of the interdependence of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , s o c i a l i z a t i o n and ideologies i n terms of s o c i a l meaning and. i n t e r a c t i o n (Berger and Luckmann 1966; ' Holzner 1968). They are concerned with the question of.how i t happens that society i s experienced as having.an existence outside of the i n d i v i d -ual's p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The question of how p r a c t i c a l actions may change a s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n or a pattern of action i s not addressed. I t i s t h i s 3 neglected area i n which I am interested. As I explore t h i s question I take the a b i l i t y of people to create society for granted. I assume that what they bring.into being i n a d a i l y routine p r a c t i c e , they can also undo or change. I am concerned,with authority structures at t h i s l e v e l , with how they.are accomplished, how: they may be broken and how they are reconstituted. This question of how people can or may a f f e c t t h e i r s o c i a l con-text i s of immediate p r a c t i c a l ; i n t e r e s t i n t h i s l a s t quarter of the twentieth century. We c i t i z e n s of developed countries often f i n d ourselves r e l u c t a n t l y cooperating as members of large formal organizations. We com-p l a i n of depersonalization.and we exchange accounts of i n j u s t i c e . We c r i t i c i z e some of the products and byproducts of these organizations such as p o l l u t i o n , t h e i r e x p l o i t a t i o n of people or t h e i r danger to ourselves or others i n the p o l i c i e s they pursue, or of the consequences of t h e i r pro-ducts or t h e i r work. I t i s common that i n s p i t e of our disapproval we continue to cooperate s u f f i c i e n t l y . s o that the work of these organizations, benign or destructive, continues. I t i s evidently possible to organize people, including ourselves, to take actions to which we are opposed. Natural resources are polluted.or destroyed, people k i l l and are k i l l e d , others are starved and. imprisoned, often by people who are most reluctant to have these things happen. In more minor and ordinary ways i n the education i n s t i t u t i o n s of which we are part we may f i n d we are a c t i v e l y cooperating i n aspects of t h e i r work to which we are in. p r i n c i p l e opposed. It i s not even unusual that the persons doing the organization's work are also the ones who s u f f e r from it.., This has become a s p e c i a l kind of twentieth century a l i e n a t i o n . 4 As s o c i o l o g i s t s we should be able to comment on t h i s . I f we do not have p r a c t i c a l , a d v i c e of how we and others can e x t r i c a t e ourselves, we should at l e a s t know to. what extent and under what conditions resistance to bureaucracies i s possible and l i k e l y i n our contemporary world. Organization theory has been developed around problems of control rather than resistance (Bernard 1938; Mouzelis 1968; Woodward and Reeves 1970; E t z i o n i 1964). Organizational analysis does not u s u a l l y ' l o c a t e them i n h i s t o r i c a l , t e c h n i c a l or cultural.contexts (Woodward's and Crozier's work are welcome exceptions to t h e ' l a t t e r [Woodward 1965; Crozier 1964]). We s o c i o l o g i s t s , working away at theories of control present a s t r a i g h t -forward example of how the work of people may be used i n ways we do not control or foresee and which may ultimately be used against them; for we produce organizational theories relevant to administrators but not theories for ourselves who l i k e others are the employees of organizations. The c l a s s i c a l . t h e o r i s t s did consider the p a r a l l e l problems of t h e i r time. Weber analyzed the emerging bureaucratic method of administration and i t s p o t e n t i a l for c o n t r o l . Marx developed explanations as well as recommenda-tions and p o l i c i e s of action for the alienated i n d u s t r i a l worker. Today's problem of the i n d i v i d u a l i n bureaucracy cannot be adequately explained by simply borrowing Weber's analysis of German bureaucracy or Marx's theory of a l i e n a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l workers under conditions of nineteenth century capitalism. A new broad analysis i s needed as Mouzelis has noted (1968). In s p i t e of the general lack: of s o c i o l o g i c a l attention, people have been r e s i s t i n g bureaucracies. Workers have organized together to struggle with management, for improved wages and working conditions. This 5 has not always been a peaceful.and orderly process. There is a history of mutiny among navy.personnel in a number of countries in this century. (Anthony 1937; Armstrong 1959; Chorley 1943; Fuller 1953; Russell 1974; Schubert and Gibson 1933; Sheehan 1971; Wintringham 1936) The Vietnam War was a recent occasion for' resistance among enlisted personnel. THE CASE STUDIES From 1965 to early 1973 United States' military forces were involved in large scale warfare against countries in Indochina. By 1969 the US Army had reported serious resistance in the infantry. There were desertions, combat refusals, racial fights and assassinations of officers. Incapacitation from drugs was an additional problem. (Hauser 1973; Jay and Osnos 1971) As the land war became d i f f i c u l t - in part because of these forms of resistance - i t was largely replaced by air attacks i n -cluding automated warfare. In automated warfare target sensors and delayed bombs are dropped by aircraft. Later planes are guided by the sensors for direct bombing. The planes are based on aircraft carriers at sea and on remote land bases. (Indochina Resource Center 1972) As the air war was accelerated, the Navy began experiencing trouble from the enlisted men on these carriers and support ships. In 1971 and 1972 there were intensive c i v i l i a n and GI anti-war campaigns in California to keep the USS Kitty Hawk, the USS Coral Sea and the USS Constellation from returning to Indochina. Local churches offered sanctuary to those sailors who publicly refused to return to the ships. Two other carriers, the USS Ranger and the USS Forrestal were delayed for several months because of sabotage. There were similar but less spectacular reports of peace actions and sabotage on other ships. 6 In l a t e 1972 a r a c i a l f i g h t broke out aboard the USS K i t t y Hawk while f l i g h t operations against Vietnam were underway. There was a small-er f i g h t on the o i l tender, USS Hassayampa. Two weeks l a t e r there was a Black sitdown s t r i k e on the USS Co n s t e l l a t i o n and then a dockside r e f u s a l to return to the ship. The ship had been on a t r a i n i n g c ruise out of San Diego i n preparation for another deployment to Indochina. Admiral Zumwalt, the new Chief of Naval Operations, had been tr y i n g to increase re-enlistments by a series of reforms p u b l i c i z e d as "Z-Grams." Some Z-Grams were intended to l i m i t humiliating practices toward e n l i s t e d people and others'intended to reduce r a c i a l d iscrimina-t i o n . The reforms were protested by many career o f f i c e r s . A f t e r the K i t t y Hawk and Co n s t e l l a t i o n incidents, Zumwalt p u b l i c l y blamed these o f f i c e r s . Zumwalt was i n turn attacked by some of h i s subordinates, themselves admirals,. who t r i e d to have him removed. A congressional sub-committee investigated.the K i t t y Hawk f i g h t and Co n s t e l l a t i o n s t r i k e and concluded that the f a u l t lay with Zumwalt's new "permissiveness." Zumwalt then modified.his program and introduced new control s t r a t e g i e s . The case studies used i n th i s thesis are of f i v e of these instances of resistance: war resistance on the USS Co n s t e l l a t i o n , war resistance on the USS K i t t y Hawk, the r a c i a l f i g h t on the USS K i t t y Hawk, the two r a c i a l s t r i k e s on the USS Co n s t e l l a t i o n , sabotage on the USS Ranger a n d . f i n a l l y the admirals' reaction to Zumwalt's reforms. SOURCES AND METHODS Published reports of these events and published comments on navy organization make up the sources of information for the case studies. A va r i e t y of documents were searched for reports of people with d i f f e r e n t 7 relationships to the authority organization of the Navy. Professional military journals, o f f i c i a l navy publications, training manuals, GI move-ment newspapers, underground newspapers, a congressional report, peace movement literature and daily city newspapers were the principle sources. (An annotated.list of the documentary sources is given in appendix i.) Herman Melville's White Jacket, an account of his voyage in a US Navy warship in 1843 and 1844 was also used as an enlisted man's report from an earlier technological and organizational setting. Melville expressed much of the libertarian perspective of today's movement enlisted people. (Studies of White Jacket and of Melville's sources are lis t e d in appendix i i . ) The method of documentary analysis was chosen.in part because of availability of the documents. Resistance is likely to include actions that are considered.illegal by those in a position to punish. It would be d i f f i c u l t to gather relevant information from participants for this reason. It would also be impossible to guarantee anonymity to informants inasmuch as sociologists have not been able to maintain confidentiality of their research over a government's interest. Beyond those practical reasons for using already published material.,, documents produced as a part of social events are particularly useful in an exploratory study. Selection and deletion in reporting have already been done by the participants rather than by a prior framework of the researcher. Thus the selection has been in terms of.what they held to be relevant at that time and in that context of action. Also the interpretations are given in the language the participants chose with the emphasis they considered appropriate for their intended audience. 8 Molotch and Lester recently pointed out that news reporting i s always a p o l i t i c a l task and no less so i f a s o c i o l o g i s t does i t (1973). Dorothy Smith has discussed how int e r p r e t a t i o n s made by the organizational practices of c o n s t i t u t i n g facts by documentary reports are' p o l i t i c a l l y consequential (1973). Recognition of the p o l i t i c a l process of the produc-t i o n of the reports, however, i s not enough to make them into s o c i o l o g i c a l information. To do t h i s I must read them. The reading of a document i s not simply a responsive act but involves continual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and s e l e c t i o n (Smith 1973). What the p a r t i c i p a n t s want others to learn from these documents i s a v a i l a b l e from them to the extent that'I can read them properly. Becoming an adequate reader i s a p r a c t i c a l problem. . My competence as a reader varies f o r documents produced by a n t i -war dissenters, career o f f i c e r s , Black movement people and the leading admirals. In order to understand.the campaign material of the anti-war o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d people I interviewed some of them informally. I already had f a m i l i a r i t y with similar, a c t i v i s t s from several years of work i n d r a f t and m i l i t a r y counseling i n the peace movement during the s i x t i e s (see appendix i i i ) . As a teacher of sociology at a United States West Coast community.college I have many students who have been i n the Navy and a few who were " l i f e r s " , that i s , c a r e e r i s t s who had been i n the Navy f or longer periods. Through informal conversation, class discussions, organi-zation simulations and student papers I have been able to learn some of t h e i r views and i n t e r e s t s . As a n - a c t i v i s t of the anti-war movement I already am a q u a l i f i e d reader of underground papers, that i s , I am a member of. the pu b l i c to which they were dir e c t e d . As an adult i n the society I am s i m i l a r l y a q u a l i f i e d reader of d a i l y newspapers and weekly news magazines. 9 Reading m i l i t a r y professional journals has presented s p e c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . I gained some vi c a r i o u s f a m i l i a r i t y by studying navy-manuals and by using d i c t i o n a r i e s of naval terms. I once worked for the US Navy aboard navy ships so that the p h y s i c a l s e t t i n g i s f a m i l i a r (see appendix i i i ) . A f t e r reading a journal a r t i c l e I would check for l a t e r l e t t e r s of c r i t i c i s m and commendation and then r e p l i e s by the i o r i g i n a l w r i t e r . This gave a basis for making inferences about how the a r t i c l e s were to be taken. F i n a l l y I have had informal interviews with some of my colleagues, friends and family who have been naval o f f i c e r s . There are many aids for i n t e r p r e t i n g M e l v i l l e ' s White Jacket. He wrote the book to encourage naval reform and to earn money. The text i s now a v a i l a b l e with supplementary notes explaining h i s intentions and his sources. The controversies about i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are also discussed by several of the recent annotators (see appendix i i for b i b l i o g r a p h i c i n f o r -mation on M e l v i l l e research). In order to follow M e l v i l l e ' s n a u t i c a l descriptions I.used a reference book with explanations, plans and i l l u s t r a t i o n s of the technology of nineteenth century s a i l i n g (Lausanne 1971). I was also able to walk aboard several old museum ships of that era. To t h i s background as a reader of the documents I also bring my perspective as a s o c i o l o g i s t and my p a r t i c u l a r experience as a woman i n a western i n d u s t r i a l society. As I have read and reread the documents my understanding has deepened as I have become able to attend to more of each account. This study i s then a report of what I have been able to make out of these materials for bearing on the question of how m i l i t a r y authority i s maintained and r e s i s t e d on attack a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s i n the US Navy of the 1970s. 10 IDEOLOGY AND THE PRACTICE OP AUTHORITY In the c o n f l i c t that went on i n the naval organization as t h i s was expressed i n the various reports, conceptions of authority and of what was fundamental to i t s maintenance i n practice, were a c e n t r a l t o p i c . In-deed i n the 'admiral's r e v o l t 1 the issue i t s e l f was the form of authority which should p r e v a i l i n the Navy. The d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s within the navy hierarchy and among representatives of the peace and Black movements were organized around and based upon d i f f e r e n t conceptions of the nature of authority. These conceptions were c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the t a c t i c s used by the d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s to the c o n f l i c t i n attempts to maintain, reform or r e s i s t authority. The ideologies of the d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s i d e n t i f i e d d i f f e r e n t p r a c t i c e s of authority i n the Navy, either i n c r i t i c i z i n g them or i n d e f i n i n g and upholding.them and recommending how the Navy should respond to resistance. This section of t h i s chapter i s concerned with the s i g n i f i c a n c e of ideologies of authority i n the context of c o n f l i c t i n formal organization; and with an analysis of the two major 'models' of the p r a c t i c e of authority embedded i n the ideologies of the c o n f l i c t i n g p a r t i e s . By an 'ideology of authority' I r e f e r to b e l i e f s and ideas which both prescribe and j u s t i f y the nature of authority r e l a t i o n s . The j u s t i -f i c a t i o n or l e g i t i m a t i o n of authority r e l a t i o n s i s e s s e n t i a l to i t s s o c i a l construction (Weber 1946). I follow Holzner i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of authority as "the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r i g h t to the legitimate exercise of power" (Holzner 1967:148). He considers ideas of authority basic to the s o c i a l construction of formal organization. Bendix adopts a 11 s i m i l a r approach i n h i s study of h i s t o r i c a l changes i n managerial ide o l o g i e s . He shows how as economic, p o l i t i c a l and technological changes upset established r e l a t i o n s between subordinates and superordinates -servants and masters, workers and owners of the means of production, workers and managers - new j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of why the few should c o n t r o l the many had to be developed. These were an e s s e n t i a l part of the actual mechanism of control (Bendix 1970). Both Holzner and Bendix thus use the concept of ideology not merely to describe b e l i e f s which j u s t i f y an already established p r a c t i c e , but as i n t e g r a l to the s o c i a l construc-t i o n of authority r e l a t i o n s i n actual p r a c t i c e . This view of the term 'ideology' as an e s s e n t i a l element i n the p r a c t i c a l construction of organizational forms of authority d i f f e r s some-what from i t s general uses i n sociology. One of the most i n f l u e n t i a l thinkers i n t h i s area i s Mannheim who developed an i n c l u s i v e account of ideology as a t o t a l , way of thought i n society understood i n r e l a t i o n to i t s s o c i a l bases and including the p a r t i c u l a r set of p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s representing d i s t i n c t i n t e r e s t groups. He made a d i s t i n c t i o n between b e l i e f s based on and a r i s i n g out of the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l order and those which projected an i d e a l system of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l organization which he c a l l s 'Utopia' (Mannheim 1966). The l a t t e r term has never taken root i n sociology and i n current uses of*>T<le.o\.Og^(for example, B e l l ' s i n h i s essay "The End of Ideology": B e l l 1960) i t i d e n t i f i e s an integrated set of ideas i n which the i n t e r e s t s of d i f f e r e n t sections of a society are given e x p l i c i t and sanctioned form. Very generally, however, the use of the term i n sociology has followed Mannheim i n o r i e n t i n g the s o c i o l o g i s t toward how b e l i e f s and ideas are to be understood i n r e l a t i o n to a s o c i a l base, whether s o c i a l class or some other s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t i n society. 12 As I make use of the term here I follow Bendix and Holzner rather than Mannheim. We w i l l not be concerned here with 'ideology' as a term d i r e c t i n g us to investigate the ways i n which sets of ideas represent the i n t e r e s t s or perspective of sections of society. We are concerned rather with ideologies as systems of ideas which formulate, sanction, organize a process of action; and provide a source of recommendations, recipes and p r e s c r i p t i o n s for how people should act and respond i n d e f i n i t e actual s i t u a t i o n s . In t h i s study two ideologies are distinguished: a managerial system of control and a m i l i t a r i s t view of authority. Similar ideologies were found by Janowitz i n h i s e a r l i e r study of top m i l i t a r y e l i t e s (1960). MILITARIST IDEOLOGY The ideology I have c a l l e d ' m i l i t a r i s t ' included much of the con-tent of what Vagts has i d e n t i f i e d as m i l i t a r i s m i n h i s h i s t o r i c a l study of war (Vagts 1937). He i d e n t i f i e d m i l i t a r i s m as d i s t i n c t from the m i l i t a r y way. M i l i t a r i s m involved more than was absolutely necessary to f i g h t . It emphasized customs, prestige, formal regulations and o f f i c e r s ' i n t e r e s t s that went beyond t h e i r usefulness i n actual war. He thought m i l i t a r i s m became most developed during peacetime. The ideology to which I applied t h i s did include much of Vagts' idea of m i l i t a r i s m . However, his use of the term i s pejorative and I don't wish to follow him i n that. ' M i l i t a r i s t ' i n i t s ordinary usage r e f e r s to a person who exalts m i l i t a r y v i r t u e s and i d e a l s . The ideology I named ' m i l i t a r i s t ' included a d e f i n i -t i o n of military.work as very d i f f e r e n t from c i v i l i a n work and as r e q u i r i n g very d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s of organization. M i l i t a r i s t then seemed an appropriate name. The o f f i c e r s who used t h i s ideology did not have a name 13 for I t . Evidently they took for granted that t h e i r ideas were widely shared i n the Navy and did not need s p e c i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . The managerial ideology incorporated disapproving terms for l a b e l i n g types of m i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s such as "rocks and shoals o f f i c e r " or. "sundowner." The former refers to excessive use of the military, law (rocks and shoals ref e r s to the Uniform Code of M i l i t a r y J u s t i c e ) . Sundowner i s an o f f i c e r who i s unnecessarily cruel and o f f i c i o u s to h i s subordinates. In.the m i l i t a r i s t ideology a difference of i n t e r e s t and a b i l i t y between o f f i c e r s and men i s assumed. The m i l i t a r i s t s explained the authority and p r i v i l e g e s of o f f i c e r s as due to t h e i r superior a b i l i t y , t h e i r dedication and t h e i r class p o s i t i o n . E n l i s t e d people were thought les s capable, although t r a i n a b l e (within l i m i t s ) . Navy work was considered extremely dangerous and sometimes dreadful i n i t s consequences. Hence e n l i s t e d people were not expected to do such work except under threat of punishment., Continual d r i l l s and formal inspections are thought necessary to insure t h e i r automatic obedience i n a sea emergency or b a t t l e . The etiquette of caste, p r a c t i c e of deference and i n t r i c a t e r i t u a l s are explained as important i n insuring obedience and respect f o r authority. Face-to-face commands and obedience i n a chain of command are used to explain how authority works as a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy. Accord-i n g l y , s a i l o r s w i l l respect the authority f i g u r e and obey commands only i f they think everyone else does and w i l l . I f the o f f i c e r i s shown to be f a l l i b l e because one person does not show respect by,the appropriate symbolic behavior, or i f the o f f i c e r himself uses p e r s o n a l i s t rather than formal approaches to leadership, .or i f a superior revokes an order of the o f f i c e r and the crew knows t h i s , i f any of these, then authority may be 14 l o s t . Authority then i s believed to rest on a unanimous b e l i e f i n legitimacy and t h i s l e g i t i m a t i n g i s done by s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n confirming authority. I f an e n l i s t e d person disobeys i n execution of work i t may not be as serious a challenge to authority as i f he f a i l s to show deference. Disobedience can be handled, by immediate punishment - which may even help e s t a b l i s h authority. Any departure from the immediate effectiveness of face-to-face authority creates a problem i n the authority r e l a t i o n i t s e l f . If a number disobey there i s a d e l i c a t e s i t u a t i o n . A l l should be immediately .punished. However i n such a s i t u a t i o n the balance can suddenly turn against the o f f i c e r . That i s the meaning of "mutiny" i n th i s i d e o l o g i c a l context. This command model i s based on a theory of the maintenance of authority very l i k e that of Chester Barnard who i n h i s , The Functions of the Executive (1938) says: If a d i r e c t i v e communication i s accepted by one to whom . i t i s addressed, i t s authority for him i s confirmed or established. It i s admitted as the basis of action. Dis-obedience of such a communication i s a denial of i t s authority f or him. Therefore, under t h i s d e f i n i t i o n the deci s i o n as to .whether an order has authority or not l i e s with the persons to whom i t i s addressed, and does not re-side i n "persons of authority" or those who issue orders, (p. 163) The navy people using t h i s model went beyond Barnard i n st r e s s i n g unani-mous acceptance of authority by group members. Compliance with the orders of a superior by the subordinate i s seen as e s s e n t i a l i n the maintenance of authority... This idea of authority was quite d i f f e r e n t from that used by the managerial o f f i c e r s as we s h a l l see.; however, they were both models or 'recipes' f or accomplishing authority, that i s , who must do what to whom i n what contexts, what sanctions are appropriate and what.methods of enforcement should be used. 15 In addition to face-to-face obedience to commands the m i l i t a r i s t s ' model was believed to depend on maintaining s o c i a l distance between authority l e v e l s , between o f f i c e r s and men, and between senior NCOs and lower rated and unrated men. This model includes elements of two of Weber's types of authority, bureaucratic and t r a d i t i o n a l . It has the chain of command, the impersonal rules and s t r i c t obedience of l e g a l authority of the bureaucratic type but also the r i t u a l , emphasis on t r a d i t i o n and maintenance of caste that are i d e n t i f i e d with the t r a d i t i o n -a l type. Weber included respect f o r the o f f i c e , as opposed to respect for the person, i n h i s c r i t e r i a for l e g a l authority. The command model does have t h i s but i n addition there i s respect for the'"uniform" which i s to be upheld by respecting the person who wears i t . Weber r e l a t e s such symbolic aspects of authority to h i s charismatic type of l e g i t i m a t i o n of authority. They are comparable to the wearing of a magical sword or a holy crown,(Weber 1946). The uniform as a symbol of the organization and. i t s hierarchy i d e n t i f i e s the person who wears i t with hi s p o s i t i o n . Deference to the person i n authority i n face-to-face s i t u a t i o n s i s in t e g r a l to how the authority structure of the naval organization i s recognized and affirmed i n everyday p r a c t i c e . THE LIBERTARIAN CRITIQUE OF AUTHORITY Anti-war s a i l o r s also used.a face-to-face model of authority but they explained i t very d i f f e r e n t l y than the m i l i t a r i s t s . They found authority p r a c t i c e humiliating to themselves and they thought i t intended as a device to make them accept t h e i r own powerlessness. They resented the regulations that l i m i t e d t h e i r personal dress, l e i s u r e , p o l i t i c a l 16 expression a n d . p o l i t i c a l organization. They objected to the use of m i l i t a r y laws instead of c i v i l i a n laws as l i m i t i n g t h e i r r i g h t s as c i t i z e n s . One sub-group of the l i b e r t a r i a n s were also strongly opposed to the uses of the Navy, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Vietnam war. I have c a l l e d t h i s c r i t i q u e ' l i b e r t a r i a n , ' because i t shares the a n t i - a u t h o r i t a r i a n emphasis that has been associated with l i b e r t a r i a n p o l i t i c a l thought. The word l i b e r t a r i a n rather than l i b e r a l i s used by anarchist writers to show a di f f e r e n c e between t h e i r p o s i t i o n and c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m . For instance Chomsky uses ' l i b e r t a r i a n ' i n an a r t i c l e on the themes involved i n anarchism (Chomsky 1972). 'Liberalism' i s used to r e f e r to a b e l i e f . i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of an orderly c a p i t a l i s t state based on r a t i o n a l decisions and p o l i t i c a l freedom. Wolfe uses ' l i b e r a l ' with t h i s s p e c i f i c meaning i n h i s c r i t i q u e of l i b e r a l i s m (Wolfe 1973). Flacks found.that student protestors i n the s i x t i e s were much more a n t i - a u t h o r i t a r i a n than c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l s (Flacks 1973:104-119). S i m i l a r l y the.GI movement had more i n common with t h i s student a n t i -a u t h o r i t a r i a n view than with c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m . I have used l i b e r t a r i a n , then, to name the emphasis on l i b e r t y f o r i t s e l f . The movement people used the same command model of authority as found i n the m i l i t a r i s t ideology but viewed through t h e i r l i b e r t a r i a n perspective. Their ideas of how to r e s i s t or protest navy authority organization and of how to slow down or end the war, assumed authority as depending on obedience to commands i n a face-to-face s e t t i n g . In-d i v i d u a l chief petty o f f i c e r s and commissioned o f f i c e r s were often mentioned as responsible for s p e c i f i c authority abuses. It was hoped that as some people r e s i s t e d others would see t h i s and be strengthened 17 i n t h e i r own anti-authority, thinking and would f i n a l l y protest or r e s i s t . The irreverence of not s a l u t i n g and of avoiding other deference etiquette was applauded as h e l p f u l to resistance. These t a c t i c s imply an analysis of authority as taking place i n the face-to-face group. Higher a u t h o r i t i e s , the Navy i t s e l f , government and corporations were mentioned as responsible for the war and sometimes for the demeaning regulations, but j u s t how {these were involved i n naval authority over the e n l i s t e d people was nojt explained. The mechanism of compliance and coordination over the EMs |(Enlisted Men) was described i n personal face-to-face terms. i Explanations of why the l i f e r s (career NCOs or o f f i c e r s ) acted as they did included c i t i n g i n d i v i d u a l character defects as well as s i t u a t i o n a l i factors such as how the o f f i c e r s might benefit by speedup of work or by avoidance of needed r e p a i r s . The "navy way" or the " m i l i t a r y way" were I blamed for i l l o g i c a l actions or bureaucratic delays. The EMs considered themselves exploited and blamed t h e i r immediate c h i e f s , and o f f i c e r s as w e l l as the Navy command. The l i b e r t a r i a n analysis had usually developed as part of a consciousness change that happened a f t e r j o i n i n g the Navy. Young men j o i n i n g the Navy from 1967 on had c e r t a i n l y been aware of the youth move-ment as high school students or l a t e r as they interacted with c i v i l i a n contemporaries i n navy towns. The a n t i - a u t h o r i t a r i a n values of the movement must have heightened t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s of navy, l i f e (Goodman 1970). They reported a sense of betrayal from the difference between what they had thought they, had been promised and what they found. This was heightened for some by a profound disgust with the United States r o l e i n the Vietnam War. C i v i l i a n youth who had been most deeply involved i n the 18 a n t i - d r a f t movement were not. l i k e l y to be among those volunteering for or being drafted into the m i l i t a r y (there were al t e r n a t i v e s to the d r a f t ) . The anti-war consciousness of EMs as reported i n the various documents was traced to insi g h t s from s p e c i f i c experience i n the Navy. MANAGERIAL IDEOLOGY The managerial view of how control was exercised was quite d i f f e r e n t from the m i l i t a r i s t ideology. They used "teamwork" as a way of describing navy working r e l a t i o n s h i p s . They did not recognize a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t between o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d people. Career advancement and good pay were used as inducements to a l l . Personnel p o l i c y was used along with p u b l i c i t y about team s p i r i t to motivate s a i l o r s , c hiefs and o f f i c e r s into required cooperation. P o s s i b i l i t i e s of unfavorable discharges or reductions i n rank and early retirements channeled people away from actions disapproved by the Navy. These practices were a l l l e g i t i m i z e d by the " c i v i l i a n " idea that work should be rewarded by career advancement and good pay. People w r i t i n g from t h i s perspective referred to themselves as managers and to t h e i r o r i e n t a t i o n as managerial. Janowitz i s p a r t l y responsible for the popularization of the term i n m i l i t a r y c i r c l e s . His study published i n 1960 i s often quoted by these o f f i c e r s i n a r t i c l e s on authority and personnel p o l i c y . Bendix thought that the change to such managerial ideology resulted, from t r a n s i t i o n to i n d u s t r i a l society. In the mature i n d u s t r i a l society a work et h i c has been accepted:by workers but there i s s t i l l a problem of c o n t r o l l i n g the workers' d i s c r e t i o n as to how much or how l i t t l e they w i l l cooperate within the framework of a contractual r e l a t i o n -ship. This could account for managers' attention to workers' at t i t u d e s 19 and to the development of public r e l a t i o n s departments (Bendix 1970: 195:197). S i m i l a r l y we f i n d that. navy managers used techniques to encourage cooperative attitudes by. invoking the s p i r i t of teamwork and by recommending the use of a f r i e n d l y manner i n face-to-face administra-t i v e contacts. Counseling and group development programs were also used along with personnel p o l i c y directed toward control of o f f i c e r s who did not share the managerial outlook. Top l e v e l o f f i c e r s representing the managerial p o s i t i o n seemed to use t h i s contractual r e l a t i o n s h i p as the basis of t h e i r authority. Contractual r e l a t i o n s h i p s were maintained from the center by personnel p o l i c y and paper authorizations. The p o l i c y makers j u s t i f i e d t h e i r reforms.as necessary to maintain.their a b i l i t y to o f f e r a reasonable exchange f o r work.. The.reforms that improved l i v i n g conditions, minimized display of. caste and use of face-to-face deference etiquette were a l l explained as ways to get cooperation. Conversely o f f i c e r s taking the managerial p o s i t i o n were concerned that t h e i r a u t h o r i t y was endangered when they couldn't d e l i v e r on t h e i r promises of job t r a i n i n g , career opportunity and adequate pay. E t z i o n i ' s model of compliance with i t s predicted outcomes for coercive, remunerative and normative methods:of control was consistent with these expectations. His model predicts that workers w i l l be most alienated when coercive methods are used, le s s with remunerative methods and that the most.active cooperation would be av a i l a b l e from normative . controls ( E t z i o n i ,1961). This was the view of the "managerial." officers.. Control i s believed exercised, by the c a r e f u l management of career, opportunity so that personnel are channeled into compliance. This corresponds to what Yuchtman and Samuel i d e n t i f i e d as an 20 i n s t i t u t i o n a l model i n t h e i r study of the I s r a e l i system of education (Yuchtman and Samuel 1975). They contrasted t h i s model w i t h an i n t e r -personal one i n which f a c e - t o - f a c e i n f l u e n c e s were more important. In t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l model: . . . I n d i v i d u a l goals and plans f o r f u t u r e careers are seve r e l y constrained by formal mechanisms such as an e a r l y s e p a r a t i o n of more promising students from l e s s able ones, d i f f e r e n t i a l t r a i n i n g of va r i o u s c l a s s e s of students through d i s t i n c t i v e types of high schools and the g r a n t i n g of o f f i c i a l c r e d e n t i a l s i n the form of var i o u s diplomas and l i c e n s e s . (Yuchtman and Samuel . 1975:521) Wit h i n the navy model of i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r o l the p r i n c i p a l mechanisms were s e l e c t i o n , assignment to work or t r a i n i n g , promotion, and use of personnel records i n awarding punishment, t r a n s f e r s and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e discharges. As these processes are implemented they have considerable e f f e c t on the f u t u r e of the i n d i v i d u a l s a i l o r or o f f i c e r i n regard to t h e i r l i f e t i m e job o p p o r t u n i t i e s . They are implemented v i a w r i t t e n r e g u l a t i o n s f ollowed by a u t h o r i z a t i o n s from a c e n t r a l bureaucracy. Face-to- f a c e i n t e r a c t i o n i s sometimes i n v o l v e d but only as a sub-part of t h i s process. Even then,the w r i t t e n record of the i n t e r a c t i o n i s more important than the i n t e r a c t i o n i t s e l f . In the i n s t i t u t i o n a l model c o n t r o l i s on a c o n t r a c t u a l b a s i s and in c l u d e s a promise of f u t u r e career opportunity. A l a r g e b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n i s assumed as the context i n which t h i s happens. Levels f o r o r d e r l y handling of procedures and implementation of c e n t r a l orders by a h i e r a r c h y of o f f i c i a l s are discussed more as a b u r e a u c r a t i c process than as a chain of command. D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between o f f i c e r , NCO and e n l i s t e d l e v e l s . i s not emphasized. This model has s i m i l a r i t i e s to Weber's i d e a l type, bureaucracy, which r e s t s on l e g a l a u t h o r i t y . I t l a c k s h i s emphasis on exact obedience of f u n c t i o n a r i e s 21 from l e v e l - t o - l e v e l . Coordination as w e l l as l i n e communication i s used i n the i n s t i t u t i o n a l model. His . c r i t e r i o n of s e l e c t i o n by impersonal a b i l i t y and.training i s s a t i s f i e d , , i n f a c t , i t i s featured as the essence of the organization's strength, and i t s legitimacy. In the i n s t i t u t i o n a l model, authority i s p a r t l y l e g i t i m i z e d by l e g a l i t y , that is., by acceptance of the v a l i d i t y of the regulations and t h e i r source but i t d i f f e r s from Weber's l e g a l l e g i t i m a t i o n by being more strongly backed by the contrac-tu a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of work for pay and career opportunity. Weber mentions the contractual relationship, but does not i d e n t i f y i t as the basis of authority. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l model does not include an assumption of s p e c i f i c technology or technological l i m i t a t i o n s other than that the work i s expected to involve t e c h n i c a l processes. The work i t s e l f may not be i n t e r e s t i n g but i s not expected to be extremely unpleasant. The personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the work group and supervisory people are expected to be f r i e n d l y or at l e a s t p o l i t e inasmuch as they a l l work on the same basis of career promise. While the command model permits rudeness from superordinate,to subordinates though not the reverse, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l model considers rudeness inappropriate i n either d i r e c t i o n . Although the models of how authority was constituted d i f f e r e d between the managerial and m i l i t a r i s t i deologies, both included the view that the Navy should be strong, should have more money spent on techno-l o g i c a l , development and on,personnel.as a protection of the American way of l i f e . 22 THE BLACK MOVEMENT. ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITY Black movement s a i l o r s based t h e i r actions on an analysis of i n s t i t u t i o n a l racism that.was very s i m i l a r to that of the managerial model. The managerial i n s t i t u t i o n a l model did include a recognition of racism but i d e n t i f i e d i t more as the r e s u l t of' m i l i t a r i s t p r a c t i c e than of i n s t i t u -t i o n a l channeling. The Black s a i l o r s thought the process of s e l e c t i o n , assignment, t r a i n i n g and advancement p o l i c y a l l operated so as to d i s -criminate against them. The use of personnel records as a basic element i n advancement, assignment or i n deciding punishment or type of discharge was c i t e d as reproducing d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . They blamed low personnel evalua-tions on the racism of white o f f i c e r s and NCOs who did the r a t i n g . The navy p o l i c y of using pre-service records as w e l l as records earned i n the Navy was thought to u n f a i r l y add the disadvantages of t h e i r p r i o r c i v i l i a n experience i n c i t y ghettos or oppressed r u r a l l i f e . This was c l e a r l y an i n s t i t u t i o n a l analysis. The managerial i n s t i t u t i o n a l model d i f f e r e d i n that i t gave paramount s i g n i f i c a n c e to i n s t i t u t i o n a l mechanisms for c o n t r o l ; however, i t did recognize some elements of i n s t i t u t i o n a l racism. The Black movement s a i l o r s i d e n t i f i e d Blacks as brothers, members of a group of which they were proud and to which they should show alleg i a n c e . They shared c e r t a i n of the l i b e r t a r i a n views of EMs such as that they should have the r i g h t to t h e i r own h a i r s t y l e and choice of friends and of p o l i t i c a l expression. However these were not part of a general l i b e r t a r i a n view, they rather focused on t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e i d e n t i t y as Blacks. They emphasized the r i g h t s of equal opportunity for advancement within the Navy for Blacks. Neither the Black movement s a i l o r s 23 nor the l i b e r t a r i a n e n l i s t e d people.expected equal pay or status with NCOs or o f f i c e r s . , They did not challenge the system of. ranks as such; however the l i b e r t a r i a n c r i t i q u e i n s i s t e d on equal dignity, of treatment across ranks. Blacks did.not speak to t h i s but to unequal treatment by race p a r t i c u l a r l y i n career opportunity. They viewed t h i s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as undermining the legitimacy of.,the Navy's authority which was seen as r e s t i n g i n s i g n i f i c a n t part.on the Navy's o b l i g a t i o n to treat them equally with white s a i l o r s . They too had joined the Navy with p o s i t i v e expecta-tions and had been d i s i l l u s i o n e d by t h e i r navy experience. Their sense of betrayal included righteous indignation and a readiness to demand what they had been promised. Their analysis was s i m i l a r to the c i v i l i a n Black movement analysis of i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n c i v i l i a n jobs and i n educa-t i o n . However, the s a i l o r s ' analysis had developed i n part out of t h e i r experience on., the ships and was s p e c i f i c to conditions they found i n the Navy. The young s a i l o r s were, of course, f a m i l i a r with the Black move-ment p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s symbols of s o l i d a r i t y . The early c i v i l r i g h t s move-ment may.not have had an impact d i r e c t l y on them as c h i l d r e n but the urban uprisings of the l a t e r s i x t i e s must have (Oberschall 1973; Kerner 1968). Whatever ther pre-navy commitment to the Black movement, they had expected to f i n d equal treatment and job opportunity i n the Navy. I t was only a f t e r they were disappointed on t h i s that they developed t h e i r analysis of navy racism. . Cross's phenomenological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the "Negro-to-Black" conversion experience, describes Blacks.as moving from viewing the world as non-Black or anti^Black through intermediate changes to Black rage with commitment to t h e i r whole group (Cross 1973). Black s a i l o r s reported t h i s t r a n s i t i o n . 24 The two models of authority, command and i n s t i t u t i o n a l , and the ideologies that included them must be understood i n the context of the actual work organization of the Navy which today consists of a highly complex technological and bureaucratic structure. The "ideologies and movement c r i t i q u e s were used i n the various struggles concerned with the nature of authority, i t s mode of exercise, and i t s use i n the Vietnam war. However, the i d e o l o g i c a l struggles seem, as we s h a l l see i n Part Three, to have had r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e impact on the actual ship operations although they did a f f e c t organization on the ships. C l e a r l y the s i g n i f i -cance of ideologies of authority i s given by the organized settings and work r e l a t i o n s which they formulate and to which they r e f e r . In the sec-t i o n of the thesis which follows (Part One) M e l v i l l e ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of l i f e on board a naval vessel during the 19th century i s presented. This shows the form of naval organization i n which the m i l i t a r i s t ideology i s c e n t r a l . It allows us to recognize the kinds of changes that have taken place i n naval organization and technology and to present a contrast between a technology and. d i v i s i o n of.labor which depend on face-to-face command r e l a -tions for the day-to-day coordination of ship operations, and the con-temporary technologies both of automated machinery and bureaucratic practices which have taken over the work of coordinating routine operation. In the contemporary a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r , coordination and the execution of the Captain's d i r e c t i o n depend to a minimal degree on a command process trans-mitted by face-to-face orders. Face-to-face authority i n t e r a c t i o n s have a very d i f f e r e n t place i n the context of contemporary organization than they had i n M e l v i l l e ' s day. Part Two of the thesis brings together the f i v e case studies and a study of a c o n f l i c t within the navy command. These are: .the USS 25 Constellation Stay Home Vote, the USS Kitty Hawk Stop our Ship campaign, sabotage on the USS Ranger and the subsequent t r i a l , a.racial fight be-tween more than 200 sailors on the.USS Kitty Hawk, a prolonged strike of 130 Black sailors on the USS Constellation and fi n a l l y a protest of admirals as they react to these events and to managerial policies. The case studies allow us to examine in detail the course of the development of specific attempts at resistance, the kinds of responses made to them by naval authorities, and, in the case of the admirals 'revolt', how these types of resistance within the navy by enlisted men gave rise to conflict among factions within the naval hierarchy which was focused on the type of practice of. authority appropriate or essential to the Navy. The case studies are central to the thesis as an account of the development and process of each instance of resistance. The discussion of ideologies and.the models of authority embedded in them, and of these in the context of the actual shipboard operations, provide an account of the organizational context in which resistance took place and of the terms in which the issues of authority were formulated by those active in the conflict. The focus on authority is a focus given originally by the aims of the movements, and by the formal organizational contexts in which they developed. In Part Three I have attempted to draw together what we can learn from the case studies with respect to how such movements can challenge effectively or otherwise the established authority structures of the large-scale organization of navy ships, to look at the differences between the Black and anti^war movements in this respect, and to draw out more fully how these movements'had repercussions within the naval hierarchy i t s e l f resulting in the 'revolt of the admirals' described in Part Two. 26 r PART ONE AUTHORITY MODELS, IDEOLOGIES AND TECHNOLOGY-In 1850 the U. S. Congress outlawed flogging i n the Navy. The c i v i l i a n government continued to r e l y on the Navy for protection of shipping, for attacks on enemies and for defense. This use l i m i t e d further reform e f f o r t s of c i v i l i a n s inasmuch as the navy m i l i t a r i s t leadership argued that l i m i t s on d i s c i p l i n e would end t h e i r authority. From time-to-time the severe l i v i n g conditions and A r t i c l e s of War were modified, but these changes were l i m i t e d by the tension between the c i v i l i a n supporters of m i l i t a r i s t s and of l i b e r t a r i a n s . Their b i t by b i t reforms kept the difference between l i f e as a s a i l o r and l i f e as a c i v i l i a n worker at a more or less constant as conditions improved f o r both. The formal organization of authority on ships remained almost unchanged. The uses of navy ships did change. By the 1970s U.S. Attack A i r c r a f t C a r r i e r s were being used as bases for a i r c r a f t carrying bombs. A i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s , a new development i n the 1920s had already ceased to be u s e f u l for major warfare because of t h e i r v u l n e r a b i l i t y to modern weapons. In small wars, against nations without r e t a l i a t o r y technology as i n Vietnam, they could serve as movable a i r bases. An unfriendly nation could not i n s i s t on t h e i r removal from the sea as i t might demand the removal of a land a i r base. The only combat r i s k s were those that the aircrews might encounter away from the ship. Accidents aboard the 27 ship remained a danger but not at the level of the 1843 navy. As U.S. international policy required the use of carriers around the world, the expense of maintaining the Navy increased. The adequate repair and maintenance of ships became a problem as the Navy carried out heavy bombing in Vietnam (Klare 1974). These policy and technological changes had profound effects on the basis of authority. The language describing ship organization does not reflect this. M i l i t a r i s t s had preserved these forms, but the actual situations to which the old forms were applied were quite d i f -ferent. Navigation developments, weather prediction, propulsion, ship materials and design had made l i f e at sea much safer and more predict-able. This safety was dependent on experts' knowledge of machinery and electronics and their interpretations of indicators of automatic i n -struments - not seamanship. Wood, ropes, canvas, tar, were a l i replaced by steel, electronics, machinery and o i l and in a few cases nuclear power. New combat technologies replaced hand-to-hand and close ship combat. Fire-power now could be used against distant targets and aimed and fired by instrument. It so happened that many men were required to run the complex machinery of combat and crowding on the new large ships continued. As ship movement changed from dependence on wind to coal, the engineer with his crew of firemen was added. The captain no longer understood all•the mechanisms, that he commanded. He had more power in respect.to the sea and the weather, and less in respect to the officers and crew, because of his dependence on.their technical knowledge and expertise. As each of the technical advances came - in navigation, communications, aircraft, ordnance, fuel, machinery and damage control, 28 his area of control diminished. Above the captains, the f l e e t commanders had increased power. They could now confidently expect ships to go where they were sent and to p a r t i c i p a t e i n war as directed. M i l i t a r i s t s nevertheless r e f e r to b a t t l e s and heroes from the age of s a i l to i l l u s t r a t e t h e i r ideas of how authority should work. The early technology and organization of s a i l i n g warships must be understood to get meaning from much of the m i l i t a r i s t argument. Fortunately we have many reports of l i f e on s a i l i n g ships. Herman M e l v i l l e ' s book White  Jacket i s probably the most exhaustive study of l i f e on a US Navy Man O'War. This w i l l be presented next to provide a referent for t r a d i t i o n a l ideas of.authority and a base from which to assess the contemporary r e l a t i o n s h i p of technology, authority models and ideology. 29 Chapter One AUTHORITY ORGANIZATION ON A US WARSHIP IN 1843: The L i b e r t a r i a n View of Herman M e l v i l l e as presented i n White Jacket In 1842 two e n l i s t e d men and a midshipman were charged w i t h p l o t t i n g a mutiny and were hanged aboard the USS Somers. There was a n a t i o n a l uproar. James Fenimore Cooper and Richard Henry Dana were among the j o u r n a l i s t s who wrote newspaper and j o u r n a l a r t i c l e s against the Captain f o r i g n o r i n g the r i g h t s to due process of the three a l l e g e d mutineers. The Captain had charged that there was a p l o t to take over the ship of mostly boy midshipman (the USS Somers was a t r a i n i n g sloop) and use i t f o r p i r a t i n g o f f the A f r i c a n coast. Even though the supposed p l o t t e r s were he l d i n chains, the Captain feared the crew would r e v o l t . He went ahead w i t h an e x t r a - l e g a l court m a r t i a l , found them g u i l t y and sentenced them to immediate hanging. The Executive O f f i c e r on the s h i p , a key person i n i n s t i t u t i n g the court m a r t i a l , was a f i r s t cousin of Herman M e l v i l l e . ( M e l v i l l e ' s l a s t novel B i l l y Budd recreates some of these events and characters.) The r o l e of the Captain was o f f i c i a l l y i n v e s t i g a t e d by a court m a r t i a l h e l d when the ship returned to the United States. The t r i a l was w e l l p u b l i c i z e d as c i t i z e n s debated the issues i n newspapers and j o u r n a l s . The Captain was f i n a l l y v i n d i c a t e d . (Harrison 1959) Herman M e l v i l l e learned of the case when at sea as an e n l i s t e d 30 man. The charges of mutiny, the summary punishment of death and the solidarity of the officers including his admired cousin were very dis-turbing to him. He did considerable thinking about the authority structure of the Navy as he continued to participate in the daily l i f e aboard his ship, the USS United States. Five years after his voyage he wrote White Jacket, a documentary of an enlisted man's l i f e on a man o' war. Melville was not a typical sailor, his education and family connections were above those of the average seaman. However, i t was not unusual for a man of his background to enlist in the navy for a voyage or two. He had f i r s t gone to sea on merchant ships and had joined the USS United States as a way of returning home from the Hawaiian Islands. He was able to make friends with members of the crew and he was respected by them as a fellow sailor and a competent seaman. He observed their actions and relationships and he listened to their com-plaints, their plans and their stories of sea adventures. White Jacket was popular for several years after publication. It received enthusiastic reviews and over 5,000 copies were sold in England and the United States. Readers were sympathetic to the attacks on navy ri g i d i t y , abuses of authority and his condemnation of flogging. At this same time the issue of flogging was being debated in the U.S. Congress. Flogging was abolished as a legal punishment three months after White Jacket was published in the United States. (It had been published a few months earlier in England.) There were other books and tracts on flogging and naval abuses, but Melville's is thought to 31 have been e s p e c i a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l . (see appendix i i for M e l v i l l e ' s own sources and l a t e r studies of White Jacket and i t s reception) White Jacket was presented as a story of a mythical voyage on the ship USS Neversink but the r e a l source for the story was soon known. Not a l l of the s i t u a t i o n s described i n the book were a c t u a l l y observed by M e l v i l l e . He used reports, journals and biographies of other s a i l o r s . Scholars have now i d e n t i f i e d most of these. The book stands i n s p i t e of t h i s l i t e r a r y borrowing and p a r t l y because of i t as a c a r e f u l l y documented study. I was advised to read White Jacket by a member of the Concerned O f f i c e r s ' Movement i n San Diego, " I f you r e a l l y want to know what l i f e on a modern a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r i s l i k e , read White Jacket." It seemed to me impossible that the experiences of a s a i l o r of 1843, even a M e l v i l l e , could be s i m i l a r to those of an e n l i s t e d man i n the 1970s l i v i n g aboard an u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t kind and s i z e of ship and under les s p h y s i c a l l y c r u e l conditions. I was wrong. M e l v i l l e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the world of a "Man o' War" of 1843 i s very close to reports of e n l i s t e d men to-day. This should not be taken to mean that t h e i r experiences that give r i s e to the reports were the same but the model of authority they used was from M e l v i l l e ' s time. As I examined t h i s puzzle i t became clear that t h i s was important f o r understanding r e s i s t e r s ' d i f f i c u l t i e s i n challenging contemporary authority. M e l v i l l e interpreted h i s experiences from a l i b e r t a r i a n ideology. He was very much aware of himself as a person with d i g n i t y and a c i t i z e n of a democratic republic. He f e l t the demands of the 32 Navy as an attempt to deny him both this dignity and his citizenship rights. He documented the way that the bureaucracy of the Navy, the caste system and the military purposes of war worked together to attack the citizenship rights and self respect of sailors. He also reported what the sailors did about this as he described the various regular occasions lived through by the USS Neversink's crew. In 1843 ships were powered by the force of wind acting on sa i l s . The Navy had already commissioned the building of steam-and-sail ships but they were not yet completed. The frigate Melville signed on, the USS United States, was old but seaworthy., It carried heavy cannons and lighter carronades. The 205 foot ship also carried five hundred men, gunpowder, iron shot, fresh water, provisions for a long voyage, farm animals for the officers' mess, extra canvas,rwood and iron for replacements at sea and miscellaneous items necessary for l i f e away from shore for months at a time. A ship's efficiency depended on i t s seaworthiness, the good judgment of i t s officers, especially of the captain, the a b i l i t y and numbers of the crew. Sailing was directed by an officer of the deck for each watch. He had lookouts fore and aft and topside for infor-mation about the immediate area of the ship. He also could get a rough reading of the ship's position by sextant, compass and the use of charts and by dead reckoning. His own knowledge of weather in that sea and his interpretations of cloud formations, wind and wave action of the moment completed his guides. Speed was changed by the taking in or letting out of s a i l , the set of the sails and the ship's position to 33 the wind. Too much s a i l i n a gale would capsize the ship. In order to move the acres of canvas or the yard arms, many men were needed. The winches that l i f t e d the anchor also required the strength of many men. A l l of t h i s work had to be done r a p i d l y i n c a r e f u l coordination. D i r e c t i o n was exercised by the o f f i c e r of the deck who gave orders d i r e c t l y to the Bo'sun or amplified by trumpet to the men. The deck crew were i n sight and usually hearing distance of each other. A f i r s t lieutenant acted as ship executive o f f i c e r i n over-a l l charge of the ship's work. The captain had the f i n a l word but depended on h i s executive o f f i c e r and the standing o f f i c e r of the deck fo r continual supervision. Commissioned o f f i c e r s varied i n judgment and knowledge of the sea and s a i l i n g . They usually had received some t r a i n i n g as midshipmen aboard a navy ship. Even so, M e l v i l l e suspected that a great number of o f f i c e r s were incompetent. He reported a storm i n which one of the lieutenants countermanded the captain's inappropriate orders and so saved the ship. This p l o t has been used i n other sea s t o r i e s both i n f i c t i o n and n o n - f i c t i o n . The p r a c t i c e of having an o f f i c e r i n charge by v i r t u e of h i s rank rather than h i s a b i l i t y or judgment has not always helped keep ships a f l o a t . Warrant o f f i c e r s who had come up through the ranks to the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n s of bo'sun, gunner, carpenter and sailmaker were competent of necessity, as were petty o f f i c e r s . Any lack of a b i l i t y would have made a differ e n c e to the ship's operations and they would be l i k e l y to be c i t e d by the o f f i c e r of the deck and demoted by the captain. Organization and cooperation were absolutely necessary i n 34 order to manage the acres of s a i l . There was a s p e c i f i c d i v i s i o n of labor by mast, se c t i o n of s a i l , time of watch and quarter watch. On signing on the ship each s a i l o r was given a long seri e s of numbers which indicated h i s assignment i n work and watch groups and emergency conditions as well as where he was to sleep and stow h i s gear. These numbers were more important to o f f i c e r s than the man's name. M e l v i l l e c i t e d t h i s as a beginning of depersonalization. M e l v i l l e ' s own white jacket enabled o f f i c e r s to i d e n t i f y him as someone who could be pointed to for an impromptu task, "you i n the white jacket". The anonymity of standing with others when not under s p e c i f i c assignment was a way for other s a i l o r s to escape blame and extra work. The basic organization of the ship's work was by workcrews. Each crew was led by a petty o f f i c e r who was a capable seaman. Petty o f f i c e r s received a l i t t l e more pay than other s a i l o r s . They wore no s p e c i a l i n s i g n i a nor did they have s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e . They were quartered with the men and messed with them. The most able and ex-perienced crews and petty o f f i c e r s were assigned to the most d i f f i c u l t sections of s a i l . Men cooperated with t h e i r orders by putting i n c r e d i b l e energy into dangerous and d i f f i c u l t tasks. Many enjoyed demonstrating t h e i r competence and taking the r i s k s of sea l i f e . Much of the work was necessary f o r everyone's s u r v i v a l . I f an occasional man did not work fa s t enough for an o f f i c e r , he might order him struck with a c o l t (a knotted rope) or a man could be held for captain's mast. At mast the captain could formally order punishment. The usual punishment was a flogging by the "cat o'nine t a i l s " i n front of assembled ship's company. 35 The s k i l l e d c r a f t s of carpentry, t a i l o r i n g , canvas making, i r o n work, cooking and bookkeeping were needed i n addition to s a i l i n g s k i l l s . The craftsmen who d i d t h i s work were journeymen i n t h e i r r e -spective trades and no problem was reported i n getting t h e i r cooperation. They knew what was expected and evidently did i t . They were paid some-what better than the petty o f f i c e r s . There were many gradations of prestige among the f i v e hundred people on the small ship as well as the caste diffe r e n c e between o f f i c e r s and men. (Although the U.S.Navy had only been organized as such since 1794, i t s t r a d i t i o n a l structure was much older having been taken from the B r i t i s h Royal Navy i n which many American o f f i c e r s and s a i l o r s had served.) O f f i c e r s were to be shown deference i n speech, posture and s p e c i f i c wording of questions and r e p l i e s . It was an offense to i n s u l t an o f f i c e r . E n l i s t e d persons were not to go into the area where the o f f i c e r s l i v e d . This was " o f f i c e r ' s country" and guarded by marines. In addition to t h i s segregation there were d i f f e r e n t spaces f or the mid-shipmen, warrant o f f i c e r s , the marines together with the ship's corporals and master-at-arms and f i n a l l y separate spaces f or the men's hammocks. The men ate i n small groups c a l l e d "messes". The s a l t pork and pudding of the men's mess was simple and monotonous. L i v e chickens and pigs were av a i l a b l e to be f r e s h l y butchered f or the o f f i c e r s ' food. The seamen took regular watches and at other times had to clean and scour the decks, p o l i s h metal f i x t u r e s , wash t h e i r hammocks and clothes, repair ropes and waterproof wood and canvas. O f f i c e r s directed t h i s work. The e f f o r t at cleanliness was much more than was • 3 6 necessary to run a ship. By 1834 the U.S.Navy had already established i t s reputation f o r " s p i t and p o l i s h " . Captain and o f f i c e r s i n s i s t e d that the men uphold t h i s no matter how d i f f i c u l t . There were p a r t i c u l a r days for washing clothes, a i r i n g hammocks and even h a i r c u t t i n g , and s p e c i f i c hours f o r l e t t i n g down and stowing hammocks, for opening personal lockers, f o r eating and many other d a i l y events. These schedules were kept i n s p i t e of inconvenience or danger to the ship or crew. As the Neversink was met by storms i n s a i l i n g around the horn the s a i l o r s worked a l o f t i n snow, freez i n g temperatures and high winds. Those whose watch duty ended i n the morning found the hammocks stowed and no dry place to sleep. One cold and wet day, the Captain allowed the s a i l o r s to l a y l i k e sardines on the wet and cold gun deck for a b r i e f nap, but he would not order the hammocks out because t h i s was against navy precedent. There was regular group p r a c t i s e i n obedience. The whole crew was often required to witness punishment. Musters might be c a l l e d at any hour f o r p r a c t i s e i n an emergency condition such as "man overboard", " f i r e " or "general quarters" f or b a t t l e . Scrubbing of the decks some-times became an exercise i n d i s c i p l i n e . The decks were to be washed every morning. In cold weather t h i s was p a i n f u l as the men worked i n bare feet i n freezing water on the deck. When they f i n i s h e d the o f f i c e r sometimes would order them to do i t over as a t h i n l y disguised punish-ment. O f f i c e r s were not o f f i c i a l l y permitted to order punishments but orders of extra duty and even the summary whippings by the c o l t were o r d i n a r i l y overlooked. The authority, caste p r i v i l e g e s and deference given to o f f i c e r s 37 cannot be explained as simply necessary, for the sailing of the ship. Merchant ships had a much simpler organization with less men, less differences in privilege and less punishment. The demands of battle are commonly considered the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for military caste. The primary function of an armed frigate in the U.S.Navy was to sink or capture other ships as protection of shipping or as an attack on foreign merchant ships or foreign warships. Occasionally ships shelled coast lines. Some ships were used to transport troops and others were used as gunboats on rivers. The Neversink (the USS United States) had been in a famous battle against HMS Macedonia in the war of 1812. Melville reported the battle as told to him by a Black crewmember who had also been on the Macedonia during this battle. (Melville pp.310-316) A recent report of the same battle was reprinted in the United States Naval Institutes journal Proceedings confirming Melville's description (Neff 1973). When general quarters was sounded the men reported to their battle stations. First they prepared the ship by breaking down bulk-heads, stowing loose gear and laying out cots for the wounded. Gun crews assembled and extended the guns out the ports and prepared their station with powder, wadding material and containers of shot. Officers watched over the guns and threatened to k i l l any man that was unwilling to cooperate. When the battle was underway, shot and cannonballs would whistle across the ship as well as blood, flesh and splinters of wood. The dead and badly wounded were thrown overboard during the fight. "Powder monkeys" rushed up and down the ladders bringing ammunition 38 •from below covered in their shirts so that i t wouldn't explode from the sparks of the battle. Cooperation during battle came easily as the men had practised their particular tasks many times. They knew what to do although they might very well not know what was happening in the overall battle. There was a high level of excitement that energized them in spite of the dread-f u l scene. For any who might openly refuse to fight there was the officer's sword. Some did manage to avoid fighting, but this was done secretly. When:the ship was inspected after the battle guns were often found spiked. After the battle the sights and smells of flesh and blood were promptly removed from the ship by a thorough washing down by water and vinegar, repairs were made and the regular l i f e of the ship resumed. The captain made the commitment to battle and i t was his order that would later end i t . According to Melville, i t sometimes happened that a captain would not give an order to stop until most of his men were k i l l e d and his ship disabled. This might earn him glory i f he was k i l l e d and possible promotion and heroism i f he survived. The enlisted men achieved nothing by their sacrifice. When rumors of war came to the men on the Neversink the officers became excited and the men worried. War promised much to the officer but nothing but hard work and risk of l i f e and health to the sailor. In spite of this difference in interests battle i t s e l f has not been the occasion for mutiny. Sailors have re-fused to s a i l out to meet the enemy at the end of long wars, but this has involved much more than refusal to do battle i t s e l f (Chorley 1973,. pp.120-127). 39 During a b a t t l e firepower was coordinated by o f f i c e r s . Their own shouts or shouts amplified by trumpets were the media of communica-t i o n . The coordination and the obedience necessary for b a t t l e hardly seems to warrant the whole elaborate caste system with i t s r i t u a l and etiquette. There was le s s d i f f e r e n c e between o f f i c e r s and men i n the years of England's active Elizabethan navy. The d e f i n i t i o n of o f f i c e r s as gentlemen and t h e i r recruitment from the upper classes came under Charles I i n the early seventeenth century (Chorley, p.131). The caste system may have been useful at times for i t s e f f e c t on o f f i c e r s ' cooperation but probably not for i t s encouragement of the men. For an o f f i c e r to be ready to k i l l a s a i l o r f o r disobedience i n b a t t l e he himself must be very obedient to the Navy. If the o f f i c e r knew the man i n d i v i d u a l l y or thought of him as a person to be treated with respect t h i s would be more d i f f i c u l t . S i m i l a r l y when a captain ordered a ship into b a t t l e and decided how long to continue the f i g h t he was also r i s k i n g h i s men. M e l v i l l e thought that inasmuch as the men were not known as i n d i v i d u a l s they would be easier to s a c r i f i c e . The o f f i c e r s themselves were w i l l i n g and eager for b a t t l e , personal acquaintance and i n d i v i d u a l respect for them would not be as l i k e l y to c o n f l i c t with the captains decision to f i g h t . This function of m i l i t a r y caste systems i s widely recognized. In the recent Korean War, Roger L i t t l e found that there was a lack of aggressive action among combat o f f i c e r s who i d e n t i f i e d with t h e i r men. As they would spend time with the men i s o l a t e d i n the f i e l d they were les s l i k e l y to order them into action. The army transferred such units to the back 40 lines, allegedly for training, but actually to give the officer more contact with other officers and identification with the military authority structure. ( L i t t l e 1969) In the 1840s in the United States naval officers came from privileged families while most crew members were from poor families. Prominent merchants, professional people and government o f f i c i a l s were often able to get their sons a presidential or senatorial appointment as a midshipman. Once on the ship the young middies learned that they were not simply of a higher social class but a different caste than the sailors. Even an old veteran seaman might be whipped for not pleas-ing a fifteen year old midshipman. The middie might himself be humil-iated by his own seagoing professor or other officers, but he could endure this teasing knowing that someday he would hold the officer's position himself. By the time the midshipman had become an officer with a command position in battle he would have learned that there was no conflict between giving l i f e threatening orders to crew members and being a moral person himself, an officer and a gentleman. In addition to this use of caste for establishing battle authority over men i t allowed other uses. The sailors were regularly used by officers for their own career advancement. The officers' careers depended on laurels won in battle, commendations won in various competitions, and peacetime maneuvers as well as p o l i t i c a l patronage from c i v i l i a n government. The hope for commendations led to the frequent cleaning and scrubbing of the ship even when painful or deadly to the men. In sailing competitions the men were driven at frantic 41 speed to great exertion sometimes r e s u l t i n g i n accidental deaths. The problem of maintaining dignity as an inmate of a " t o t a l i n s t i t u t i o n " were evident on the Neversink. Goffman, i n h i s denota-t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of t o t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s included ships. In h i s examples of l i f e i n a t o t a l i n s t i t u t i o n he used many scenes from White Jacket i t s e l f (Goffman 1961). Haircuts and s t y l e of beard were l i m i t e d by navy rules and o f f i c e r s ' orders. The s a i l o r s ' l e i s u r e time, card games, use of l i q u o r , even playing checkers, were a l l c o n t r o l l e d . The Captain or h i s Executive O f f i c e r were often punitive i n administering these regulations. M e l v i l l e noted that the i d e a l s a i l o r from an o f f i c e r s ' view was one who would not consider resistance no matter what the humiliation. This Landless was a f a v o r i t e with the o f f i c e r s , among whom he went by the name "Happy Jack". And i t i s j u s t such Happy Jacks as Land-less that most s e a - o f f i c e r s profess to admire; a fellow without shame, without a soul, so dead to the le a s t d i g n i t y of manhood that he could hardly be c a l l e d a man. Whereas, a seaman who exhibits t r a i t s of moral sensitiveness, whose demeanor shows some dig n i t y within; t h i s i s the man they, i n many cases, i n s t i n c t i v e l y d i s l i k e . The reason i s , they f e e l such a man to be a continual reproach to them, as being mentally superior to t h e i r power, He has no business i n a man-of-war; they do not want such men. To them there i s an insolence i n h i s manly freedom, contempt i n h i s very carriage. He i s unendurable, as an erect, lofty-minded A f r i c a n would be to some slave d r i v i n g planter. ( M e l v i l l e , pp.384,385) M e l v i l l e thought that the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a s a i l o r ' s speaking i n s e l f defense was a d i r e c t denial of h i s ri g h t s as a c i t i z e n . He also thought i t was un f a i r that the A r t i c l e s of War could name actions crimes such as "cowardice i n the face of the enemy", "desertion' or "sleeping on duty", none of which were crimes for c i v i l i a n s . In the Navy these were not Only crimes but they were crimes punishable by death. As M e l v i l l e remembered the public readings of the A r t i c l e s of War he 42 commented: As, month a f t e r month, I would stand bareheaded among my ship-mates, and hear t h i s document read, I have thought to myself, w e l l , well, White Jacket, you are i n a sad box indeed...It ad-monishes you to take a l l bad usage i n good part, and never to j o i n i n any public meeting that may be held on the gundeck for a redress of grievances. L i s t e n : Art.XIII. "J_f any person i n the navy s h a l l make, or attempt  to make, any mutinous assembly, he s h a l l , on conviction there-of by a court m a r t i a l , su f f e r death." Bless me, White Jacket, are you a great gun yourself, that you so r e c o i l , to the extremity of your breechings, at that discharge? But give ear again. Here goes another minute-gun. It i n -d i r e c t l y admonishes you to receive the grossest i n s u l t , and stand s t i l l under i t : Art.XIV. "No p r i v a t e i n the navy s h a l l disobey the lawful  orders of h i s superior o f f i c e r s , or s t r i k e him, or draw, or  o f f e r to draw, or r a i s e any weapon against him, while i n the  execution of the duties of h i s o f f i c e , on pain of death." Do not hang back there by the bulwarks, White Jacket; come up to the mark once more; for here goes s t i l l another minute-gun, which admonishes you never to be caught napping: Part of Art.XX. " I f any person i n the navy s h a l l sleep upon  his watch, he s h a l l s u f f e r death." Murderous! But then i n time of peace, they do not enforce these b l o o d t h i r s t y laws? Do they not indeed? What happened to those three men on board an American armed vessel a few years ago, ... " S h a l l s u f f e r death!", those were the three words that hung those three men. ... By the main-mast! then, i n a time of profound peace, I am subject to the cut-throat m a r t i a l law! And when my own brother, who happens to be dwelling ashore, and does not serve h i s country as I am now doing - when he i s at l i b e r t y to c a l l personally upon the President of the United States, and express h i s disapprobation of the whole national adminis-t r a t i o n , here am 1, l i a b l e at any time to be run up at the yardarm, with a necklace, made by no jeweler, round my neck! ( M e l v i l l e , pp.294,295) Evidently other Americans shared M e l v i l l e ' s concern, r e c r u i t i n g was a problem. During several periods i n the nineteenth century less than twenty percent of the s a i l o r s i n the f l e e t were c i t i z e n s . " S a i l o r s wanted for the Navy" was a common sign i n naval harbor towns. Nationals of other countries were more e a s i l y r e c r u i t e d . 43 The harsh regulations, living privations and the caste system that made navy l i f e so d i f f i c u l t for sailors at the same time helped to keep the loyalty and cooperation of officers. The rights of summary punishment protected the captain from future review of his actions and assured him that he would have a l l authority necessary to rule his ship. The privileges of caste and rank and the relatively comfortable living situations made l i f e as a navy officer appealing. The deference ceremonies were not only flattering to an officer but they also remind-ed him of navy rule. At the same time that he was placed in a high position relative to the sailors he was subordinate to navy rule and ri t u a l . The forms were above him. According to Katharine Chorley the loyalty of officers to their government i s always an important consider-ation in the use of the military (Chorley p.244). She noted that i t was much easier to get the rank and f i l e to cooperate with a govern-ment even when cooperation was against their class interests. The men on the Neversink did sometimes resist orders. There were attempts on the lives of officers and the captain. At night when an officer was walking by the foot of a ladder on a lower deck, heavy iron balls or carronade shot would sometimes be dropped. In the dark-ness i t was impossible to identify the guilty person among the many scurrying men. On an occasion near the end of the voyage the whole crew ignored the captain's order to have their beards shaved. Several days went by as the orders were not followed and tension grew. A mutiny was averted by heroic action of the men's favorite lieutenant, Mad Jack. He bravely jumped in among the very angry men and casually, 44 as i f the s i t u a t i o n were not so serious, advised the men to be more thoughtful about t h e i r actions. The captain t a c t f u l l y refrained from bringing any charges over the a f f a i r as the men appeared to have t h e i r beards shaved. One heroic man, Old Ushant, did hold out and though he was flogged and put i n irons, would not give over hi s beard to the captain and the Navy. The p o s s i b i l i t y of resistance was often considered by M e l v i l l e . The humiliation of powerlessness angered him even more than phy s i c a l punishment. On one occasion White Jacket himself was to be flogged. As the gratings were being prepared for the flogging he decided he would rush the captain and plunge with him over the ship's side. Before t h i s could happen an o f f i c e r pleaded on White Jacket's behalf and he was released. There was sabotage as i n the spiking of guns during b a t t l e . Smuggling of l i q u o r and narcotics by small c o n s p i r a t o r i a l groups happen-ed and even l e g a l action was used or at l e a s t considered as a way to r e s i s t . M e l v i l l e himself protested by the w r i t i n g of h i s book. C i v i l i a n groups supported reforms. A group resistance, that i s , a mutiny, would have been very u n l i k e l y according to M e l v i l l e , because of c e r t a i n features of the organization of the ship. Divisions within the crew l i m i t e d co-1 M e l v i l l e researchers have concluded that t h i s event did not happen to M e l v i l l e himself. There was a report from another ship i n which a s a i l o r a c t u a l l y did take the Captain with him to t h e i r deaths. Researchers also doubt that the near mutiny-of-the-beards and Old Ushant's heroism occurred on the USS United States. M e l v i l l e did hear of a s i m i l a r mutiny over another issue. Haircut and beard regulations were widely d i s l i k e d at that time and sometimes protested. M e l v i l l e had been involved i n mutiny himself on an e a r l i e r merchant voyage, (see Vincent 1970 i n appendix i i ) 4 5 operation. M e l v i l l e commented on the way the marines were used: But the mutual contempt, and even hatred, sub s i s t i n g between these two bodies of men - both c l i n g i n g to one ke e l , both lodged i n one household - i s held by most Navy o f f i c e r s as the height of the pe r f e c t i o n of Navy d i s c i p l i n e . I t i s regarded as the button that caps the uttermost point on t h e i r main-mast. Thus they reason: Secure of t h i s antagonism between the marine and the s a i l o r , we can always r e l y upon i t , that i f the s a i l o r mutinies, i t needs no great incitement for the marine to thrust his bayonet through h i s heart; i f the marine r e v o l t s , the pike of the s a i l o r i s impatient to charge. Checks and balances, blood against blood, that i s the cry and the argument. What applies to the r e l a t i o n i n which the marine and s a i l o r stand toward each other - the mutual repulsion implied by a system of checks - w i l l , i n degree, apply to nearly the e n t i r e i n t e r i o r of a man-of-war's d i s c i p l i n e . The whole body of t h i s d i s c i p l i n e i s emphatically a system of c r u e l cogs and wheels, systematically grinding up i n one common hopper a l l that might minister to the moral well-being of the crew. (pp.3 7 4 - 3 7 5 ) Navy power over the crew was thus exercised i n d i f f e r e n t ways, but a l l were used i n a face to face s e t t i n g . P r i v i l e g e s of the caste system helped to keep o f f i c e r s obedient to the government but alienated e n l i s t e d men. The reading of the A r t i c l e s of War reassured o f f i c e r s of the power to punish that they believed necessary. The same A r t i c l e s allowed them to deny c i v i l i a n c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s to s a i l o r s . S o l i d a r i t y i n mutiny was prevented by d i v i s i o n of the crew into opposing groups such as that between marines and s a i l o r s . [Marines had joined with s a i l o r s i n the B r i t i s h f l e e t mutinies of 1 7 9 7 (Manwaring 1 9 3 5 ) J l In b a t t l e as i n s a i l i n g i t was s k i l l e d men, p r a c t i s e and exact assignment of work that produced cooperation. The threat of death from the swords of the o f f i c e r s may also have been a control i n b a t t l e as the threat of le s s e r punishments were i n the ordinary routines of d a i l y work. M e l v i l l e thought t h i s r e s u l t i n g control was a consequence of naval organization not simply of p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s t y l e s of leadership or of e v i l i n -tent: 46 ... The immutable ceremonies and i r o n etiquette of a man-of-war; the spiked b a r r i e r s separating the various grades of rank; the delegated absolutism of authority on a l l hands; the i m p o s s i b i l i t y , on the part of the common seaman, of appeal from i n c i d e n t a l abuses, ... a l l tend to beget i n most armed ships a general s o c i a l condition which i s the precise reverse of what any C h r i s t i a n could desire. ... I t i s not that the o f f i c e r s are so malevolent, nor altogether, that the man-o-war's man i s so v i c i o u s . Some of these e v i l s are unavoidably generated through the operation of the Naval code; others are absolutely organic to a Navy establishment, and, l i k e other organic e v i l s , are incurable, except when they di s s o l v e with the body they l i v e i n . (p.375) The Navy was not l i k e l y to d i s s o l v e . The i n t e r e s t of the grow-ing i n d u s t r i a l nation i n a navy that would defend i t s shipping was a powerful support for maintenance of the Navy and i t s authority over i t s members. The nation also held an ideology that stressed p o l i t i c a l equality of i t s c i t i z e n s . This created a tension l i m i t i n g the exercise of m i l i t a r y authority but i t did not become a threat to naval organ-i z a t i o n i t s e l f . 47 Chapter Two CONTEMPORARY MILITARIST IDEOLOGY AND NAVY ORGANIZATION Over the past one hundred and twenty-five years since Melville wrote White Jacket technological development led to profound changes in the way that people worked together to accomplish navy purposes. The formal organization of authority has remained comparatively unchanged; however, the navy administration changed from a simple chain of command between the ships and the Secretary of War to a vast bureaucracy. This severely limited the traditional practice of authority on the ships. The navy bureaucracy above the ships and fleets is immense. There are also shore establishments for ship repairs, personnel development, training and education and materials as well as many administrative bureaus and special missions with foreign and domestic assignments. Navy regulations, operational orders and technical information come from this bureaucracy in a continuing stream followed by changes, corrections and deletions. Thomas in a friendly satire of navy l i f e commented: ... There is a constantly building pyramid of required operational and maintenance reports, personnel question-naires, leadership program notes, safety presentations, physical fitness test cards, management directives, special inquiry forms, performance charts, inspection and pre-inspection records and training, and medical and counseling lectures. For example, i f an operating aircraft squadron attempted to give every lecture on each subject that is directed by higher authorities (who, i n -cidentally, have never coordinated their requirements) there would seldom be time for either flying or main-tenance. (Thomas 1972:21) 48 This bureaucracy is headed by over three hundred admirals and their staffs. As a group the admirals have higher social class origins than other officers. The contemporary admirals are almost a l l graduates of the naval academy. Of the ten f u l l admirals on duty in January 1974, three were sons of admirals, one of these was also the nephew of two other admirals and a past Secretary of the Navy! His brother was a vice-admiral. . (Navy Times, April 24, 1974) The Chief of Naval Operations, CNO, is the highest officer of the Navy. This position was held by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt during the period of this study. The c i v i l i a n Secretary of the Navy is the CNOs superior. The CNO directs the Navy in i t s various sea, material and technical commands. Other officers including admirals are assigned out-side the navy to the Department of Defense and the staff of the Joint Chiefs. The CNO is a member of the Joint Chiefs, the o f f i c i a l body that advises the Security Council and through i t the Secretary of Defense and the President. The Joint Chiefs are an advisory group and do not have command authority. Formal commands come down from the President, Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Navy, Army, and Air Force to the Chiefs of each military department such as the CNO for the Navy Department. There are a variety of channels for the development of policy. Their use has varied with the presidential administration and the different Secretaries of Defense. The Department of Defense has a c i v i l i a n staff for policy recommendations and military advisors for each of the c i v i l i a n offices. The military staff have access to more technical expertise and personnel than the c i v i l i a n heads. This gives the military advisors 49 special influence. The Joint Chiefs also have a military staff as do each of the separate military departments. The chain of command system limits consideration of policy. Superiors send subordinates problems to research for later policy decisions. The report of the research must come back up a chain of command. According to Donovan, innovative suggestions are not made and questioning of the original formulation is rarely done because superiors are not to be contradicted (Donovan 1970: 74-77). The Congress is also involved in policy making. The CNO and other military chiefs and experts are occasionally asked to testify on policy before a congressional committee. The Congress is responsible for fund-ing, for..approval of naval law and whatever other aspects of naval policy interest them. The welfare of enlisted people has been an ongoing con-cern of many. As the chief officers give advice to congressional committees their personal power is increased as they and their recommendations are heard and accepted and as they also get to know the Washington D.C. e l i t e , White House people and journalists, socially. They are likely to be already acquainted with military industrialists from previous work in materials procurement and in the development of technology. Their personal power can also be expanded by writing in military journals which have a readership of retired and active duty officers. Military contractors advertise heavily in these journals. As officers retire many are offered positions in military industry (Donovan 1970:54-61). The United States military e l i t e are popularly considered apo l i t i c a l , that i s , willing to submit to any legitimate orders of the c i v i l i a n government. There have been a few recent conflicts between high 50 officers and government leaders, but these have not involved the officers' use of command authority over military units against the government. However, in 1861, in the c i v i l war, one third of the officers joined the Confederacy, taking some ships and men with them. In the 1970s the military e l i t e has been p o l i t i c a l l y active through the f a c i l i t i e s of their respective military services. Each branch has a vast public relations program with films, periodicals, speakers and news releases which use stories exphasizing the danger to U.S. security from foreign powers and the consequent need for the new weapons used in their particular depart-ments. The possibility of losing control of the sea to the Soviet Union is a major theme used in navy public relations. The navy e l i t e backs the present administration policy of military pressure on selected small nations around the world in favor of U.S. economic interests. They align themselves with c i v i l i a n politicians who back a strong and well funded navy and for whom the protection of o i l by sea power is a central problem. Within the close relationships of the navy e l i t e to government and industry there is room for differences, for instance the managers and mi l i t a r i s t s differed on authority ideology. In the past there have been many conflicts over the indoctrination of new technology such as in the development and use of aircraft and of nuclear submarines. The policies on use of equipment and weapons have changed with technological progress and international relationships; however, ship organization and deference requirements have not had a parallel development. Authority is s t i l l based on tradition and further legitimized in law and other formal regulations. Its practice is described in handbooks that give detailed specification for i t s application. The handbooks give 51 m i l i t a r i s t reasons for the caste system and deference etiquette, and m i l i t a r i s t arguments for administration by the chain of command. Authority relationships are assumed to depend on face-to-face encounters. The captain is the Commanding Officer or CO of a ship. He delegates general administration to the Executive Officer, XO. The ship's work is divided into departments. The department heads report to the XO for administrative matters and directly to the CO for operation readiness. Departments are divided into divisions which are further divided into work shifts called sections. On larger ships each division is headed by an officer who may oversee other officers and petty officers. The chief petty officers are responsible for the work of the enlisted men. First and Second class petty officers usually assist with this supervision. (USNI 1972:2-38) (see appendix i . for USNI and other documentary references) FACE-TO-FACE CONDUCT Orders are supposed to come down this line of command and requisitions, appeals, requests for leave, and so on, go up the chain for approval at each level. Details of orders involving technical procedures usually originate below the level of the CO because of the expertise involved. Cooperation across levels or messages from lower levels to higher levels are sometimes necessary for certain technical operations. This is done informally. Lower officers and enlisted men must use considerable tact to not seem to insult those of higher rank when giving information or correcting information (USNI 1966:466-467). People of superior rank are to be obeyed in detail and are not to be contradicted or questioned. Superiors may c r i t i c i z e people with lower rank. Requests 52 or suggestions of superiors are to be taken as a command by the inferior. The inferior is to answer with deference, as "aye, aye, s i r " , but the superior shows agreement by "very well". (USNI 1968:29-31) Communica-tion of a correction within these limits i s thus d i f f i c u l t . The m i l i t a r i s t ideology does not include provision for corrections. The need to communi-cate is reduced by elaborate instructions in technical manuals, manu-facturers directions and navy regulations covering expected situations. (USNI 1966:293-294) Deference to superiors requires more than the use of the proper manner in verbal communications. In i t s simplest form i t involves a salute from an enlisted person to an officer. It may involve the whole ship's company lined up at attention on the weather decks to pay respect to a person of high rank. When the ship is in port eight men are usually available to be used as "sideboys" to give salutes to v i s i t i n g officers of sufficient rank. At the bo'sun's whistle they come on the double, take their places facing each other and salute as the personage comes aboard -exactly as sailors did on Melville's ship. (USNI 1972:112-117) Privilege varies with authority position. The liv i n g spaces of the ship have separate berthing areas and messes for the Captain, for the senior officers, the junior officers, the chief petty officers and for the enlisted men. Different food is served to officers and they have servants, called "stewards", who clean their quarters. The captain and senior officers have separate cabins, junior officers share cabins, chief petty officers share quarters and lower rated men sleep in tiers of bunks. (USNI 1972:25-26) 53 Uniforms and insignia indicate difference in status and work assignment. Pay differs by rank, grade, years of service and by certain special assignments. Officers salaries range from 3 1/2 to 21 times as much as non-rated men and from 1/2 to 7 1/2 times as much as chief petty officers. (All Hands, March 1971) Special allowances and privileges increase this difference. The terms of work contracts are different for officers and enlisted people. Under certain conditions officers may resign their commissions, but enlisted personnel may only be discharged by navy order or at the end of an enlistment period. Officers are encouraged to cooperate in many ways. They are offered good pay, opportunity for advancement, use of servants, extra allowances for housing and families. Retirement provisions are generous and retirement is early. Officers retire in their late forties or early f i f t i e s . A few officers w i l l reach the el i t e as admirals who command fleets or head Washington D.C. Navy bureaus. Promotions depend on personnel evaluations by superiors and successful completion of certain varieties of duty assignments. Any blemishes on their record may inter-fere. If they f a i l to be promoted in a certain period they must resign. For promotion to the higher levels they need the informal sponsorship of el i t e officers. A l l of this limits maverick behavior of officers (Donovan 1970:77-80). CASTE DIFFERENCES Officers are treated with deference by enlisted people. The caste division of the Navy exaggerates differences in the c i v i l i a n society. Most officers are from the lower middle or upper middle families, a few are from the upper-classes. Enlisted men are from lower, working class or 54 lower middle class origins (Janowitz 1960:90). Lang reported that in 1960, 91% of navy officers had attended college and 70% had graduated compared to 5% of enlisted men who had attended and less than 1% who had graduated (Lang 1964:55). Officers are trained at the Naval Academy or by Naval Reserve Officer Training programs at c i v i l i a n universities and colleges or at Naval Officers Candidate School. Entrance into the academy at Annapolis depends on being nominated and passing examinations. Nomina-tions are made by senators and by presidential appointment. The presiden-t i a l appointments include one hundred places held for the sons of military professionals. A very few sailors from the fleet may be nominated for the academy and a few more for the officers' candidate schools. Acceptance is by competitive examination. Entrance into the reserve programs is much easier than into the academy. In a l l programs certain grade and performance levels must be maintained in order to continue. The graduates of the reserve programs have brought a leveling into the navy officers' corps; however, most reservists find the Navy unsatisfactory and don't continue after their i n i t i a l period of service (Zald 1964:273; Huntington 1965:137). Those few enlisted men who can rise to e l i g i b i l i t y for chief in fourteen years arid are less than thirty-two years old at that time may apply for promotion to warrant officer. Officers and senior NCOs are almost a l l of the white race. This was a matter of policy u n t i l late in World War II. For the half century before, the Navy had enlisted Blacks and Filipino nationals as cooks and servants exclusively. Earlier, for instance when Melville served in the Navy, many enlisted men were Black. By 1940 there were almost no Blacks and there i s now a strong effort to change this. New enlistments were 55 over 20% Black producing a total of Black enlisted in 1973 of 6 1/2%. Three percent of midshipmen at Annapolis were Black but only 1% of commissioned officers. Blacks make up 12% of U.S. population. (Proceedings, April 1973:28-36; A l l Hands, August 1973:54-61) On any particular ship there are likely to be many Blacks in the lowest enlisted ratings and very few i f any Black senior petty officers or commissioned officers. Officers are rotated every two to three years to different assignments to give them a variety of experience. Sea duty is a necessary part of most career lines. On a ship, officers either have responsibility over technical functions or over an administrative area as a line officer. On shore, officers have many required social obligations as well as navy assignments. Elaborate etiquette is also expected of officers' wives. There is a special USNI handbook for wives (USNI 1964). Enlisted wives are also given some instruction but i t has less required etiquette. They are told how to use the services of the Navy such as in shopping, housing and health care. Invitations to family programs are sometimes issued to "officers and their ladies", "chief petty officers and their wives", "enlisted men and their women" which makes the social status of the respective wives quite clear. Husbands of navy personnel are a new phenomena and have not yet been objectified by etiquette. Women in the Navy are assigned to shore duty except for nurses on hospital ships and a very few women who were assigned ship duties for a short lived experi-~ ment on a hospital ship. The position of chief petty officer i s a new development since 1843. Then there were petty officers who were skilled leaders of work crews. The petty officer of the old navy was considered a regular 56 member of the crew and received only a l i t t l e more pay. with no other signs of rank. The men respected him for his competence and personal leadership. If a petty officer lacked these qualities he wouldn't have been useful in leading his crew, in fact he would have been a danger and the captain would very likely have replaced him. Effectiveness of leadership is no longer as observable as i t was on a sailing ship. Petty officers now win their rates by passing paper and pencil tests over technical specialties, attending specialty schools and by receiving high marks from their superiors on leadership a b i l i t y , job performance, accep-tance of authority, appearance and a b i l i t y to get along with others. Requirements for advancement are set by the Bureau of Naval Personnel and require the COs recommendation as well as satisfaction of the require-ments for the promotion. (USNI 1972:62-67) The senior petty officers direct the actual day-to-day work that runs the complicated systems on the ship. They oversee assignment of men to specific jobs and know what is to be done or where to go to get in-formation. It is commonly said that the chiefs run the Navy. Young junior commissioned officers are the immediate supervisors of the chiefs. They are more or less executive trainees themselves and not prepared to exercise much authority. The chiefs know their own job and don't need special direction (USNI 1972:35-36). This leaves administrative paper work to the new ensigns. One newly commissioned officer wrote back to his former commander at a Naval Reserve Officers' Training Unit: Also please t e l l the guys not to worry because they feel they don't know anything when they get commissioned. Ensigns aren't supposed to know anything, seriously, so there's nothing to sweat. (I really worried about this incidentally.) (Proceedings, September 1973:83-84) The ensign may not be expected to know anything, but he i s to be treated as an o f f i c e r . A chief may be a generation older than the new o f f i c e r and have more p r a c t i c a l knowledge. He must nevertheless show the young ensign deference by language and posture. The pay of the two positions i s now s i m i l a r , i n fact a master chief may make twice as much as a new ensign. With promotions the o f f i c e r w i l l soon pass the salary of even a master chief i n two or three years. The chief i s at the dead end of his occupational ladder while the ensign i s beginning an ascent that may lead to an admiralship. New ensigns are reported as c a r e f u l not to i n s u l t the c h i e f s . The chiefs have become mid-management. One handbook states: It i s the Navy's in t e n t i o n that the chief petty o f f i c e r , pay grade E-7, be a "man apart", that there be a d i s t i n c t i o n between the treatment accorded chief petty o f f i c e r s of a l l pay grades and the remainder of the ships' e n l i s t e d men. (USNI 1972:36) THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF WORK Most non-rated e n l i s t e d people on ships are assigned as seamen or firemen. They are usually very young, from seventeen to twenty years old. A f t e r enlistment they go through "boot camp" for o r i e n t a t i o n and then receive b r i e f t r a i n i n g on a ship. Their f i r s t assignments are routine work such as chipping paint, working i n the laundries or kitchens or tending machines. Later some are given s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g f or the s e r v i c i n g , r e p a i r and operation of s p e c i f i c technology or equipment. This i s c a l l e d s k i l l e d work, but i t does not use the same q u a l i t y of s k i l l that was required for the 1843 s a i l o r . The new s k i l l requires f a m i l i a r i t y with p a r t i c u l a r equipment and knowledge of how to take i t apart or at l e a s t how to service i t and how to recognize when i t i s i n working order. No s p e c i a l p h y s i c a l 58 a b i l i t y or s k i l l f u l movement of hands or body are needed i n most jobs. Nevertheless i t does take time and t r a i n i n g for the e n l i s t e d people to learn what to do. Having learned t h e i r s p e c i a l job they may have gained some insight into several other a l l i e d jobs but probably do not know very much about the whole operation of t h e i r d i v i s i o n or how work i n the d i f f e r e n t departments f i t s together so that the various technologies carry out the ship's mission. The crew of the old s a i l i n g ships depended on each other and on the personal d i r e c t i o n of an o f f i c e r , but i n an emergency they could do many of the other jobs. Most of them had a broad understanding of the technology of s a i l i n g and warfare. The s a i l o r s had a number of the necessary s k i l l s i n t h e i r own hands. A l l s a i l o r s had the opportunity to be f a m i l i a r with some of the c r a f t s from watching the craftsmen at work and they often understood the mechanics or processes that were involved. In the contemporary navy there i s l i t t l e opportunity to watch how any of the systems work since t h i s work goes on by machines within housings, i n e l e c t r i c a l systems or e l e c t r o n i c tubes. There are ship's plans of each system and information i n manuals. There are books about the basic theories involved - a l l on the ship but not i n everybody's understanding. A t o t a l idea of what i s going on as the ship steams and b a t t l e s i s not shared but i s a v a i l a b l e b i t by b i t from many experts and i n manuals. An emergency exchange of most s p e c i a l t i e s would not be possible except within small t e c h n i c a l groups. Schedules for the day's work are set navy wide. They are applied to the p a r t i c u l a r ship and i t s departments, d i v i s i o n s and sections by the Captain's plan of the day published d a i l y and posted i n each section. 59 B i l l s are set up for each condition of operation of the ship with related assignments of each man to a specific job. Each person has different assignments depending on whether the work is for general maintenance or for special conditions such as a "landing party", "rescue and assistance", "man overboard" or " f i r e " . There are also special assignments for battle stations. (USNI 1972:15-20) When an enlisted man is to perform a particular job he w i l l not have to be told to do i t , i t w i l l already be down in the b i l l for his section and he w i l l check his own card for the specific assignment. There w i l l be information already in writing of what to do, how to do-it and how to put away the tools. .1843 sailors were given directions by voice. The superior and inferior were face-to-face and summary punishment was immediately available from the colt coiled in the bo'sun mate's cap. Exact instructions were usually unnecessary. Each sailor would already have learned what to do from watching others, figuring i t out for themselves or by direct instruc-tions from the other sailors or their petty officer. Contemporary instruction and authority interaction is more often done via paper rather than personal contact. A face-to-face command and obedience interaction i s not usually necessary, direction i s done by a third impersonal authority, paper. When a ship is on active duty or training there are very long working hours. A man may have regular daily work followed by four hours of watch duty. There are also regular daily inspections and musters are called around the clock. When equipment or machinery breaks down at sea the men in that unit may work thirty-six hours without interruption to 60 complete repair. Work days are more often between twelve and sixteen hours. Most of these jobs are not very interesting or d i f f i c u l t . The major exception to this is work on the flight deck. The activity of planes landing and taking off is very exciting and dangerous and requires s k i l l and judgment for the people on the deck as well as in the plane. This work is done by the special air wing and was not considered in this study. The work in the engine room is probably the most uncomfortable and i t is also dangerous. It often involves longer hours than other ratings. CONTROL OF ENLISTED LIFE The chiefs are responsible for the appearance of the men, of the living spaces and for the application of the many specific regulations on personal living and deference behavior. On the occasions of inspection by higher officers they may be called to account for any deviations in their crew. There is l i t t l e opportunity for the chiefs to demonstrate ab i l i t y in doing work and so they are not able to develop authority on the basis of respect for their s k i l l . First and second class petty officers make most of the face-to-face contact with enlisted people. There are not many opportunities for chiefs to use personal leadership or persuasion. The huge carriers are crowded with equipment, provisions, a i r -craft and 4500 men. There is much better food than Melville ate on the Neversink and i t is available over a longer period of time. There is provisions for protective clothing in cold weather but ordinarily not air conditioning in the hot and steaming weather of the tropics. Certain kinds of machinery do have the privileges of air conditioning. The lives of enlisted men are more restricted in some ways than they were in 1843. 61 Now not only where they stow their gear but how they fold their clothes is specified (USNI 1968:70-85). The length of the string of numbers they are assigned for duty and berth stations has grown longer. The numbers s t i l l designate their work and bunk and emergency stations and jobs for which they are qualified (USNI 1972:18). The details of their uniforms, style of haircuts and beards and personal cleanliness are more controlled. Exact position of the sailor and his belongings is required during certain inspections, for instance the procedure for seabag inspection includes these directions: Shoes placed in pairs with the toes of the f i r s t pair . . of shoes two inches or three fingers from the bunk post, (b) The second pair of shoes in line, two inches or three fingers from toes to heel of f i r s t pair of shoes.... Lower personal drawer w i l l be removed from locker and placed athwartship on pillow with contents intact in accordance with Fig. 18-6. Valuables w i l l be placed in upper drawer in locker. (USNI 1968:398) The personal l i f e of the men is further controlled by scheduling their on-ship recreation and by location of living space. There continue to be rules on gambling, swearing, use of alcohol, narcotics, cigarettes and for social and sexual behavior. As men leave the ship in port they must pass inspection by a senior petty officer. Their haircut, general appearance, uniform and in some cases liberty papers must be approved in order to be allowed to leave. On the Neversink with i t s officers, middies and crew of five hundred many of the crew were strangers to each other. This continues to be true of aircraft carriers of 4500. This is not simply a consequence of the large number of people but results from the many physical and social divisions of the ship. It is also part of the plan of administra-tion. Many areas of the ship are off limits to most of the crew. 62 O f f i c e r s ' country i s s t i l l unavailable to e n l i s t e d men and guarded by marines. Even the o f f i c e r s are not f a m i l i a r with many of the spaces on the ship. Many people come together during the e n l i s t e d men's mess, but they are moved along i n l i n e s and seated at tables with l i t t l e opportunity to t a l k to more than the friends from t h e i r unit who are with them i n the l i n e . These are the same people that they w i l l probably accompany on l i b e r t y . They are more l i k e l y to meet other crew members at events on shore than on the ship. ENFORCEMENT The men r e g u l a r l y push against those regulations which l i m i t t h e i r personal l i f e . Chiefs may counter by o f f i c i a l c i t a t i o n s of mis-conduct, extra work assignments, c a l l i n g of early morning musters and i n some cases ex t r a - l e g a l abuse. The chief may also withhold c e r t a i n l i b e r t y p r i v i l e g e s and mark the personnel record so that the e n l i s t e d man cannot be considered for promotion and i f sent to mast would be l i k e l y to receive a more severe sentence. (USNI 1966:430-433) The e n l i s t e d man who does hi s work promptly and e f f i c i e n t l y may receive good marks on h i s semi-annual personnel evaluation and so have a chance for promotion to the next grade. His a t t i t u d e and manner are also rated and are important for promotion. (USNI 1972:61-65) For some the only reward they hope for consists of not l o s i n g ground such as not being reduced i n grade or not getting less than an honorable discharge or i n avoiding harassment by the chief. ( P a c i f i c News Service, October 1972) The basic pay i t s e l f i s now almost comparable to c i v i l i a n jobs. The increases from step-to-step are s u b s t a n t i a l . 63 Men who are l a t e to work or muster or miss any other duty can be e a s i l y i d e n t i f i e d by t h e i r immediate petty o f f i c e r and scolded or "put on report". This means they can be c a l l e d to account at Captain's Mast where they may be given b r i g time and/or reduction i n pay or grade. If t h e i r alleged transgression i s considered more serious they can. be held for a court m a r t i a l which i s a formal t r i a l . Courts and punishments now follow the Uniform Code of M i l i t a r y J u s t i c e which also s p e c i f i e s what actions constitute crimes. The UCMJ i s a reformed version of the old A r t i c l e s of War. It i s more severe than c i v i l i a n law and does not allow for the rights of the accused to the same extent as c i v i l i a n courts. Neglect of duty, desertion, i n s u l t i n g an o f f i c e r and a number of other acts that would not be c i v i l i a n crimes con-tinue to be i d e n t i f i e d as crimes by the UCMJ. : Punishment can be by summary order of the captain at Mast or by a Summary Court, by the more formal Special Court or by a General Court. These courts vary i n the ranks of o f f i c e r s who can convene them and i n the formality of proceedings, the r i g h t s of the accused and the severity of sentences that can be given. For instance, the General Court can only be ordered by a Fleet Commander. Captain's Mast i s the most informal. I t i s c a l l e d by the ship's captain and there i s no allowance for defense or appeal. The possible sentences are l i m i t e d to two months i n the b r i g , reduced pay and l i m i t e d periods on 2 bread and water. Punishment i s much more l i m i t e d for o f f i c e r s and for many crimes the authority of the court must also be higher than for an e n l i s t e d man's t r i a l . (UCMJ Paragraph 815, A r t i c l e 15, 1968) 2 C i v i l i a n court decisions i n 1973 and 1974 have held that both defense and appeal must be allowed. The extent to which the Navy w i l l comply with t h i s on ships at sea i s not c e r t a i n . 6 4 Chapter Three ADMINISTRATION IN THE 1970s The Emergence of Managerial Ideology The managerial ideology was expressed by the CNO and implement-ed by BUPERS. The CNO's Z-Grams (personal orders to the f l e e t on per-sonnel issues) and his speeches were reported i n A l l Hands as were BUPERS" p o l i c y changes and new procedures. A l l Hands i s a glossy mag-azine that at t h i s time was published by BUPERS and sent throughout the Navy. Navy l i f e i s presented as an opportunity for e n l i s t e d people to l e a r n new s k i l l s while enjoying t r a v e l and recreation. There are human i n t e r e s t s t o r i e s about s a i l o r s , t h e i r work and t h e i r f a m i l i e s , announcements of new personnel procedures for obtaining promotions, retirement r i g h t s and other b e n e f i t s . Winners of awards and commend-ations are reported. (Ships as w e l l as people receive awards i n navies.) Public speeches to the f l e e t are occasionally made by the CNO or other e l i t e members and these may be included. The feature a r t i c l e s , p u b l i c speeches, l e t t e r s and announcements of new regula-tions when put together constitute a report of o f f i c i a l ideology. S a i l o r s are characterized as eager, hardworking but n o n - r e f l e c t i v e young people, reminiscent of M e l v i l l e ' s "Happy Jack". As t h i s ideology i s developed i n the magazine i t appears to include elements from contemporary management theory. This i s not s u r p r i s i n g i n that i t i s i n part derived from i t . Janowitz' work i s 65 often mentioned as an argument for the managerial approach. Social scientists are used by the Navy as researchers and advisors on personnel and administration and as instructors in the special colleges. Team work and concern for people are watchwords, motivation is considered the central problem. Intrinsic interest in the job or in navy purposes are not mentioned as motivating. Pay and living conditions are given con-siderable attention and career training for either a return to c i v i l i a n l i f e or for continued service in the Navy is promised. Conflict is rarely identified but when i t is i t is treated as a problem to be eliminated. It is analyzed as arising from personality differences or misunderstandings rather than as having any p o l i t i c a l or organ-izational source. The possibility of development of any adversary organization for enlisted people such as the maritime unions is not explored. Along with this friendly approach, there are also threats of punishment. These are presented indirectly. For instance, A l l Hands featured an article about how the navy had begun to use dogs in drug detection. This was presented as a human interest story about dog handlers and dogs rather than an article explicitly warning drug smugglers (Aug. 1973). Drug smuggling i s very widespread in the Navy and some readers of A l l Hands would certainly have seen the article as a warning. Secret agents on the ships are being increased. A story about this told of the d i f f i c u l t and exciting detective work of these agents in their fight against crime (Feb. 1974). The most direct threat was made by the publishing of the various administrative 66 and court discharges, cross classified by their benefits and dis-advantages for c i v i l i a n l i f e . The accompanying ar t i c l e emphasized the usefulness of an honorable discharge; however, the handicaps of the other discharges were made clear. (August 1973). The CNO, Admiral Zumwalt has been the principle speaker for managerial ideology. He has been backed by both recent Secre-taries of the Navy, Chafee and Warner as well as managers of BUPERS. Zumwalt's personnel reforms, Z-Grams, were aimed at making l i f e less humiliating and uncomfortable for lower level enlisted people and younger officers. He explained his approach in an interview reported in the professional military journal Ordnance: In any large organization i t is essential for individual members to believe with certainty that their contribution is not only important, but also i s appreciated and rewarded. ... We are discarding the accumulated barnacles of customary procedures and policies which have become sanctified through past experience but now are found to have no meaningful place in a modern military organization, We see no reason why the new generation of Navy men must give up the grooming and personal-appearance practices which identify them as members of their generation. (Ordnance Jan.-Feb. 1972) The Admiral visited throughout the fleet in addition to sending out Z-grams. On these v i s i t s he would shake hands with a few enlisted people, talk about his "people programs" and answer questions, then move on quickly to another ship. The v i s i t s were reported in A l l  Hands with pictures of the smiling admiral. One of these showed him being lowered from a helicopter in a harness to a rolling destroyer deck below in the Southeast China Sea. (All Hands, Dec. 1972, pp. 52-55) 67 Organization theory has identified feedback as a problem of authoritarian hierarchical organizations. Zumwalt recognized this in the Navy. Messages coming back up the chain of command were limited by deference r i t u a l which specifies words and posture of the sub-ordinate including the position of the hands, distance from superior, facia l expression, volume and tone of voice. Humans are s t i l l capable of expressing some information within this s t r i c t form but certainly much i s lost. (Birdwhistell 1970, pp.79-80) To get some of this lost information on personnel matters, Zumwalt held invited round table discussions with Black officers, young commissioned and non-commissioned officers and special occupational groups. For the lower level enlisted people there were also suggestion boxes and open telephone lines to their commanding officers. (Armed Forces Journal Dec. 1970, p.30 and p.42) Actual administration of personnel policy contrasts with this personal responsiveness to suggestions. Assignment, transfer and pro-motion are done impersonally. Promotion requires considerable paper work and the passing of examinations. Recommendations, evaluations, citations, job experience, test performance and specialty school attendance are combined by computer and matched to service needs. The chief petty officer selection board members and detailers consider cases separately but operate anonymously themselves. There is no personal, warmth, handshake or hopeful pat on the back. Personnel assignment and promotion seem to be based on a cost accounting system rather than the human relations approach of the people programs. (All 68 Hands Oct. 1971) The CNO and his supporters recognized that there were problems in the fleet. These were conceptualized as retention, turbulence and race relations. Retention was the f i r s t attacked. The Navy sets certain quotas for reenlistment of personnel at a l l levels and for several years these goals were not met. (In this period there was a c i v i l i a n draft which assigned some men to the Navy. Military service was very unpopular partly related to criticism of the Vietnam war.) Zumwalt as the new CNO in 1970 planned to do something about i t . This was the genesis of his people programs. He thought that i f navy l i f e could allow personal appearance to be more like c i v i l i a n youth styles more people would be satisfied with a navy career. The retention problem was diagnosed as a lack of career opportunity and annoyance with demanding regulations. (All  Hands, Dec. 1970, p.17) His Z-gram orders made changes in the allow-ed hair styles, rules on wearing uniforms, recreation and availability of beer in quarters and for junior officers, availability of single women in their clubs. (USNI Proceedings, May 1971, pp.294-298) The admiral stated that he did not intend to withdraw navy power over the men but only wished to make the regulations more reason-able. (All Hands Sept. 1971 pp.38-39) He was successful in getting service people a substantial increase in pay. (The Congress legislates pay scales for the U.S. military.) (Armed Forces Journal, Feb. 1972 p. 10) He also introduced foreign homeporting for selected ships and explained this policy as limiting separations of service people from their families who would now li v e near the ship's new foreign port. (All  Hands, May 1973:52-53) 69 The chiefs and o f f i c e r s who are or who have recently been stationed on ships, had other views about retention. They complained that navy bureaucracy was not h e l p f u l for solving the p r a c t i c a l problems on the ships. O f f i c e r s f e l t powerless i n t r y i n g to communicate with various bureaus. There were reports of attempts to get a reasonable action from BUPERS such as the promotion or transfer of a deserving and highly s k i l l e d o f f i c e r . T y p i c a l l y a transfer to the wrong job without a promotion would come through. One wr i t e r , a commander, complained that t h i s bungling of BUPERS forced competent people to leave the Navy. He thought t h i s was the basis of the retention problem. He complained that the captain of a ship had power to punish but not to reward. He f e l t no amount of comfortable l i v i n g arrangements could compensate for the f r u s t r a t i o n and i l l o g i c of the BUPERS orders.. (Proceedings, A p r i l 1971:31-33) A year l a t e r the same complaint was repeated by another w r i t e r . This o f f i c e r went further by suggesting that BUPERS quit the personnel f i e l d e n t i r e l y . (Proceedings, March 1972:110) The BUPERS magazine A l l Hands i t s e l f provided evidence that there were problems and misunderstandings with personnel procedures. The maga-zine has several departments devoted to questions and answers on how to get t r a n s f e r s , promotions and s o c i a l services including retirement benefits. In a regular column, the Master Chief Petty O f f i c e r of the Navy commented on the process of promotion f o r senior and master c h i e f s . Those who wanted promotion were advised to b u i l d t h e i r records from the ground up so that t h e i r "service jackets" would r e f l e c t w e l l on t h e i r performance as the s e l e c t i o n boards studied every page. 70 The name of the game is to be competitive. Long years of faithful service and graying temples are not c r i t e r i a for promotion. Accept the challenge and s p i r i t of the competition. Prepare yourself. Push yourself, cultivate your study habits. Be marketable. Get busy and create a demand for yourself. Perform! (All Hands, October 1971: 45) For those who had followed this advice but had not been chosen and wanted to know why, the chief said "the answer is simply not available.... How-ever, secrecy is not to s t i f l e you." This kind of advice continues in A l l Hands issue by issue. Retention problems are explained by some officers as a result of lack of promotion opportunities because of budget cuts which in turn have resulted from the long unpopular Vietnam war. Anti-war attitudes or actions within the Navy are not considered. Some of the young officers were among those who opposed the Vietnam war (Berkeley Barb, November 12-18, 1972:2). Turbulence was used to cover protest, conscientious objection, insubordination, disorder, r i o t , strikes, sabotage, desertion and chal-lenges to military law. It also was used to mean turnover of personnel. The term lends i t s e l f to metaphor in that i t has two similar meanings. One is agitation or tumult among many people and the other refers to agitation or disturbance in a body of water as by winds or currents. I thought the context of i t s use reflected both of these meanings so that resistance be-came defined as a natural problem similar to a storm. Storms of course eventually blow over. The references were typically "the turbulence now in the fleet". The phenomena was not i t s e l f subjected to, inquiry or ques-tions of what might be happening to produce turbulence. (Armed Forces 71 Journal, December 7, 1971) The use of turbulence avoids words like strike which implicitly legitimize mass action against management or "mutiny" which implies the confrontation setting of the mi l i t a r i s t ideology. The third problem was named race relations. Zumwalt recognized that the history of discrimination i n the Navy had led to an almost 100% white officer and NCO corps and that new recruits included an over-representation of Blacks. This led to reinforcing the belief of Blacks that they were discriminated against in admissions to specialty training, officers' programs and general promotions. Zumwalt came to recognize this. He became aware of some of the problems of Black people during the roundtable discussions, for instance that many of the recreational, housing and educational programs of the Navy were not open to them or related to their interests. Orders to end discrimination went down the command chain. Zumwalt thought that recruitment and promotion of some Blacks to superior positions would show the Navy's new dedication to equality. An Affirmative Action Program, that i s , special training and recruitment efforts, was set up to do this. (All Hands, April 1971) The program helped a select few but did not upgrade the large numbers of very poor relatively unschooled Blacks that were coming in as recruits and being assigned to classifications where there was l i t t l e or no possibility of promotion. The attention given to race relations following the strike and ri o t incidents (see the Case Studies i n Part Two) show that the potential p o l i t i c a l power of Blacks acting in solidarity was already recognized by the managerial officers. The tinder box situation of white and Black relations was also noticed and education, counseling and 72 sensitivity programs were introduced. Fitness reports for officers and chiefs began to include ratings of their "equal opportunity leadership". (All Hands, September 1971:38) Z-gram 66 required that a minority group officer be assigned to each command as an assistant for minority affairs (USNI Proceedings, May 1971:298) 73 Chapter Four A 1970s LIBERTARIAN VIEW OF AUTHORITY The Critique of Anti-war Sailors By the early 1970s GI underground newspapers were being published at most major military bases in the United States and over-seas. The newspapers were usually one of several projects of the local anti-war group of civilians and active duty people. Other projects were likely to be a bookstore or coffee house and a counseling center where legal aid was available for c i v i l liberties problems with the military. (The Door Nov. 11-25 1971, p.8) The counseling and legal services projects came from two earlier pre-peace movement c i v i l i a n interests. One branch had developed from a service to conscientious objectors supported by pacifists and the other branch developed as an extension of defense of p o l i t i c a l dissent by c i v i l - l i b e r t a r i a n groups. The local GI centers varied in their emphasis on the Vietnam war, use of socialist analysis and support of non-violent action; however, the newspapers did not reflect these differences. They a l l reported national GI movement events, local c i v i l i a n movement news and reports of protest events on the ship or base. Each paper usually included letters from enlisted people about alienating experiences in the military and some humanistic discussion of the war mission of military units at that base. They a l l had a strong libertarian message, asking enlisted people to think for themselves and explaining the protections 74 of c i v i l l i b e r t i e s as guaranteed by the c o n s t i t u t i o n . The e n l i s t e d people who edit these papers and those who write l e t t e r s to them present a very d i f f e r e n t perspective on navy l i f e than o f f i c e r s w r i t i n g i n the professional journals or than the human i n t e r e s t and teamwork s t o r i e s of personnel managers i n A l l Hands. Lower l e v e l e n l i s t e d people divide the Navy into l i f e r s and E.M.s. L i f e r s , names those people who have a career i n t e r e s t i n the Navy and are serving t h e i r second or more enlistment. They are usually senior e n l i s t e d men, but o f f i c e r s who are personally known are also subject to being c a l l e d l i f e r s . E.M.s r e f e r s to lower rated and non-rated e n l i s t e d people. L i f e r i s a negative t i t l e , i t designates an authority person who humiliates his subordinates and i s rulebound i n his administration. I t may or may not have pro-war, anti-Black or other p o l i t i c a l meaning. GI underground papers often featured a " l i f e r of the month" with hi s name, rank and l o c a l assignment l i s t e d and a short a r t i c l e on how t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l i f e r earned t h i s honor by o f f i c i o u s n e s s and overuse of humiliating regulations. The GI papers c a r r i e d many personal statements by EMs who had become anti-war or a n t i - m i l i t a r y . They t y p i c a l l y reported j o i n i n g the Navy as very young "Gung Ho" f i g h t e r s and that a l a t e r experience turned them around. This commonly involved a l i f e r , usually a c h i e f , who had h i t them or a buddy with hi s f i s t . This act, although i l l e g a l within the Navy, would not be punished and the new EM would learn that to complain would get him into more trouble. ( P a c i f i c News Service Oct. 1972, p.3) The same story recurs whether or not the basic incident 75 concerned racism, war objection, safety, c i v i l l i b e r t i e s , rock music or " s p i t and p o l i s h " . A f t e r t h i s t r u l y consciousness r a i s i n g experience, brotherhood would be found with other EMs against the l i f e r s and the "brass" behind them. (Brass ref e r s to the higher a u t h o r i t i e s , usually the o f f i c e r s i n the hierarchy on and above the ship.) The regulations that l i m i t beards and haircuts were widely resented and provided occasions for clashes with l i f e r s . Daily incidents occurred when a ship was i n port and men were inspected on t h e i r way on and o f f the ship. At other times, abusive language, punitive orders, extra musters and d r i l l as w e l l as d i r e c t p h y s i c a l attack were experienced as humiliating. The humiliation seemed to occur because no d i g n i f i e d response was allowed rather than because of the treatment i t s e l f . One s a i l o r t o l d me how h i s chief had been angered about the rock music EMs were l i s t e n i n g to i n a shore tavern i n an Asian port. The chief was very abusive i n language and gesture. The EMs accepted the harangue. The chief returned to the ship sometime a f t e r the men and by then he was very drunk. He vomited on an EMs bunk and then h i s own and ordered an EM to clean i t . Next he vomited on another s a i l o r ' s clothes and threw these over the side. (This was a small ship.) My informant i n s i s t e d t h i s was t y p i c a l arrogant be-havior of l i f e r s . The EMs who write i n GI papers expressed a strong l i b e r t a r i a n outlook with more consciousness of being c i t i z e n s than s a i l o r s . They demanded t h e i r r i g h t s as c i t i z e n s under the c o n s t i t u t i o n . They were aware of t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n as voters and campaigners for government representatives. They also r e l i e d on c e r t a i n congressmen and other p o l i t i c a l figures to help them and some did intervene i n response to an EMs l e t t e r . (The Door Nov. 17-Dec. 1, 1972) The navy drug program was considered a trap and more useful to the Navy for s u r v e i l l a n c e and punishment than as an a i d to the people with drug problems. Men on the ship who have a "bad t r i p " on drugs are simply thrown i n the b r i g along with the drunks for the day. EMs claimed there was no consideration for t h e i r heightened consciousness or panic. Drugs are used widely i n the Navy and are e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e i n Asian ports. ( P a c i f i c News Service Jan 1972, p.10) It i s not d i f f i c u l t to hide drugs on the ship because of the many crannies and odd spaces. The GI papers frequently pointed out the harmfulness of hard drugs. They considered t h e i r use and even the use of marijuana as a way that the Navy controls dissent without putting out any e f f o r t . They report that i t i s only when the "dope" runs out that resistance to authority begins. (The Door Nov 17 - Dec 1, 1972) The b r i g i s guarded by marines. Men report humiliating treatment and sometimes p h y s i c a l punishment from the more "Gung Ho" marine guards. The b r i g i s i n an out of the way area of the ship. Events there are not l i k e l y to become general knowledge. (SOS News- l e t t e r Nov 1971) Resisters claimed that newer marines were put on guard duty because experienced marines i d e n t i f y themselves as EMs and sympathize with t h e i r s a i l o r prisoners. EMs reported that most s a i l o r s did not think about the war and that only a few of them were ever eager to p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t . A 77 few EMs became strongly anti-war from their navy experiences. For instance on the Carrier USS Coral Sea a sailor noted in an SOS newsletter: One time in the Tonkin Gulf they had a show on closed circuit TV put on by the Flight Ops. They explained everything they did over there - like how many bombs they dropped and where they dropped them. This guy explained how they were bombing the Ho Chi Minh t r a i l and destroyed the trucks, people, and ammunition dumps. He really seemed to get into that, really enjoy telling people they destroyed so many supply dumps, digging that there was a secondary explosion. The dude got up to show the point on the map and when he turned around, in big block letters on his back was written "Murder, Inc." When he did that, man, a lot of people were really up tight. He wasn't there thirty seconds before the Captain came running in and threw him out. He was afraid that people would a l l of a sudden think about what was going on. (SOS newsletter Nov. 1971) Duty on "the lin e " was disliked partly because of the long periods at sea and total months away from home, the discomfort on the steel ships in the hot damp climate, the cockroaches and the long working hours. Sixteen hours was usual but i t was not uncommon for some to work 24 hours or more. EMs reported their work as unchallenging and un-interesting. The availability of precise specifications for doing each job make general understanding of the work unnecessary. Certain jobs are more disliked than others, paint chipping was mentioned as an endless grueling task. Work in the engine room is extremely hot and uncomfort-able and i t is also the most dangerous work on the ship. Engineering crews work longer hours and have less time off i n port. They are usually needed to do repairs while the boilers are down. Other jobs require confinement in small spaces deep inside the ship. Painting in such a space can axphyxiate the painter unless complicated a r t i f i c i a l v e n t i l -ation is arranged. (Pacific News Service, Oct. 1971) There were many reports of hazardous conditions on ships that 78 according to the EMs had resulted from inadequacy of the NCO, d i v i s i o n o f f i c e r or captain. Sometimes these had resulted from the o f f i c e r s ' attempts to win some competition i n the f l e e t . One frequent complaint was that on old ships i n unseaworthy condition the captain would not ask for repairs because he didn't want complaints on h i s record or to be responsible for a delay i n ship movement. There have been an i n -creasing number of f i r e s and other accidents on the ships i n addition to sabotage. The accidents have involved deaths but up to t h i s time sabotage has only involved property damage. (This assumes that the o f f i c i a l naming of an event as sabotage or as an accident i s correct.) Complaints about safety have led men to refuse to board several ships. Twenty three men refused to board the minesweeper USS Ogden i n March 1973 (CAMP NEWS June 1973). Seven refused to board the USS McCormick i n the f a l l of 1971 (UFTB Oct. 1971). The a t t i t u d e toward o f f i c e r s i s not always negative. Captains and executive o f f i c e r s are often c a l l e d l i f e r s but they are also some-times praised. The differe n c e depends on t h e i r a t t i t u d e toward the Navy and toward the EMs. A young navy veteran t o l d me of two d i f f e r e n t s t y l e s of o f f i c e r under whom he had worked. One was a mustang, that i s , an o f f i c e r who had come up from the ranks. He was a Lieutenant Commander and the captain of the small ship. The ship was to be de-l i v e r e d to Greece and the captain was to r e t i r e a f t e r the t r i p . The ship was not kept overly clean but was i n excellent working condition. The men were allowed as much freedom as possible while also getting the work done. They used t h e i r own judgment i n grooming t h e i r h a i r and 79 beards. On the i r way to the Mediterranean they stopped at a U.S. East Coast port. A rear admiral passed by t h e i r dock and saw the untrimmed h a i r and beards of the crew. He c a l l e d the captain and demanded that the men get regulation haircuts immediately. The captain i n best American f o l k t r a d i t i o n , said that they were not subject to the Rear Admiral's j u r i s d i c t i o n . Their assignment a c t u a l l y was under a d i f f e r e n t navy command and no hai r was cut. My informant described another o f f i c e r who was very d i f f e r e n t . This man was on "his way up" as the young executive o f f i c e r of another ship. He held continual inspections for both operational effectiveness and " s p i t and p o l i s h " . The men were sometimes required to work t h i r t y -s i x hours to get t h e i r equipment i n perfect condition. Although hated by the men, th i s o f f i c e r was awarded the highest commendations i n several f l e e t competitions. At the end of the t r i p there were unusual numbers of Unauthorized Absences, tra n s f e r s , and discharges for drug, alcohol and psychological problems. My informant thought the o f f i c e r s ' career pattern was probably s i m i l a r to the current CNO's climb to success. At f o r t y nine Zumwalt had been the youngest o f f i c e r ever appointed CNO. His promotion had bypassed t h i r t y senior o f f i c e r s . The idea of authority that was presented by these e n l i s t e d writers and my informants was s i m i l a r to the m i l i t a r i s t s ' idea of authority as a face to face command and obedience i n t e r a c t i o n . The p a r t i c u l a r o f f i c e r or NCO who dealt with the EMs was held responsible for the men's s i t u a t i o n s . Actions were taken with e f f e c t on the face to face group i n mind. They thought an NCO's or o f f i c e r ' s authority 80 would be weakened i f they a l l knew that no-one respected him. (UFTB October 1971) They also thought general navy authority would be weakened as they gained rights of due process and personal and p o l i t i c a l freedom. (Sherill 1970) (UFTB May 1972) It is true that the GI writers also identified broad economic and p o l i t i c a l factors as responsible for their military situation but they didn't analyze the institutional connections to maintenance of authority. The GI writers reported much of the same libertarian viewpoint as Melville, yet the context of citizenship and freedom must have been different in 1843 from the managed society of the 1970s. They did not follow Melville in his insistence that the citizen'is sovereign, that he or she need not show deference to anyone. Contemporary EMs negotiated for better treatment but they didn't seem to expect equality with officers. Only when an officer was thought to be acting exploitively or using his power to humiliate them did they complain. The most alienating experience reported was aboard the USS Coral Sea when a rear admiral's body was stored in the enlisted men's mess in their milk refrigerator. (He had been k i l l e d in a helicopter accident.) An EMs cynical comments were reported through-out the GI underground press. (UATB September 19, 1972) They took the issue as a measure of their lack of worth to the Navy but they were not outraged. 81 Chapter Five AUTHORITY AS INSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION The Ideology of Black Movement Sailors The GI press was sympathetic to Blacks and other members of minority groups and often featured articles on military racism. This should not be taken to mean that the white EMs who participated in resistance were themselves particularly sympathetic to Blacks. From the instances of fights and riots i t i s clear that there was considerable white/Black enmity at enlisted levels. Some Blacks participated in the anti-war movement but groups of Black sailors were not involved. However, United States Congressman, Ron Dellums, an outspoken supporter of GI rights and of opposition to the war was also a Black and concerned about Blacks in the Navy. The Black rights movement had a long history both in the c i v i l i a n society and in the military (Moskos 1966). Some measure of integration had been won in the midst of World War II but there was s t i l l de facto discrimination, including segregation in recreation and housing in much of the Navy. The Black c i v i l i a n movement had used non-violent techniques of s i t - i n s , demonstrations and non-cooperation in a popular movement in the southern United States in the late f i f t i e s and sixties. The young Black sailors can be supposed to have heard many of the slogans of the movement. They were aware of the Black power affirmation of Blackness as positive and modified "natural" hairstyles 82 were popular. They practised the in-group hand shakes and power gestures. Considering t h e i r youth and t h e i r choice of enlistment i t i s u n l i k e l y that they had had c i v i l i a n experience as self-conscious movement p a r t i c i p a n t s . They did expect equal treatment i n the Navy as a r i g h t that was w e l l recognized and for which negotiation should not be necessary. Blacks are more frequently assigned the menial jobs of chipping paint, painting, laundry work,1 cleaning, kitchen duties and service work i n o f f i c e r s ' quarters. These jobs have l i m i t e d promotion p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Ratings of e f f i c i e n c y are r e g u l a r l y given to EMs by t h e i r superior petty o f f i c e r . These evaluations are l a t e r considered i n decisions to promote, demote or discharge. Blacks believed they received more low marks than whites for the same q u a l i t y work. (UFTB Feb. 15, 1973) They also believed that the NCO's c i t e d them for punishable offenses more often than they did whites for s i m i l a r actions. At Captain's Mast they were given more severe punishments. The COs explained that the entering test scores of Blacks and t h e i r c i v i l i a n arrest records were used i n determining punishments at Mast and i n discharge decisions. The same scores are reviewed for whites but t h i s does not remedy the discriminatory e f f e c t . Blacks have been subject to d i r e c t and i n s t i t u t i o n a l racism i n t h e i r c i v i l i a n l i f e . Their school records, test scores and p o l i c e records r e f l e c t t h i s . In the Navy they f e l t they were not able to get a fresh s t a r t when th i s background was used i n addition to t h e i r navy performance. Their i n i t i a l assignments were l i m i t e d to u n s k i l l e d '83 rates and then as they could not accumulate experience toward skilled rates in these classifications promotion became impossible. This lack of promotion is one indicator that is used to increase punishments at Mast. Blacks claimed that even when some of them did get special training and advancement they would be reassigned downward to un-skilled work. (Door Nov. 17-Dec. 1, 1972) Ashore, c i v i l i a n bars, restaurants and rental housing are usually unofficially segregated. Whites and Blacks sometimes clash in fights in these shore leave towns. Again the Blacks found they were arrested more often and given heavier punishments than whites. (Camp News, May 15, 1973) The Navy has issued haircut regulations that limit hair that bushes which of course limits the Black movement "natural". Some CO's have also prohibited the Black handshake and the clenched f i s t salute. Others prohibit Blacks from gathering or walking to-gether in groups of three or more. (Camp News, May 15, 1973) In response to this the Black Servicemen's Caucus, a San Diego support group, issued a poster "You Can't Be Black and Navy Too". This appeared in reduced size in many GI papers. (Camp News, Feb. 15, 1973) Complaints were often taken to the race relations assist-ants or race relations councils who could do l i t t l e . The race relations people had d i f f i c u l t y explaining concerns to the higher officers who were not aware of the Blacks' situation and often didn't believe there was general discrimination. There were very few Black officers or Black senior enlisted men to give them counter information. When nothing was done within the Navy complaints would go to Black community 84 groups and n a t i o n a l support groups such as the NAACP and the Black Congressional Caucus. The Black Servicemen's Caucus was an a c t i v e support group i n the San Diego area. (LA Free Press Dec. 15, 1972) The Navy treatment of Black EMs was s i m i l a r r e g a r d l e s s of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the i n d i v i d u a l Black s a i l o r . This gave them a shared understanding and brotherhood. Their s o l i d a r i t y could be e s t a b l i s h e d e a s i l y on the ship inasmuch as most had darker s k i n than whites and o f t e n a " h i p " s t y l e of t a l k and movement. A f t e r i n i t i a l r e c o g n i t i o n common understanding could be assumed w i t h l i t t l e r i s k of being mistaken. The Black a n a l y s i s that developed condemned both the Navy and establishment white s o c i e t y as upholding the general advantage of whites by law and by r e g u l a t i o n s based on white ideology. I n s t i t u t i o n a l racism was i d e n t i f i e d as that s i t u a t i o n where the ordinary i n s t i t u t i o n a l procedures necessary f o r moving toward p o l i t i c a l , e d u c a t i o n a l , economic and p r o f e s s i o n a l success a l l l i m i t e d Black progress. The Navy p r a c t i s e of assignment, d i s c i p l i n e , s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g and advancement a l l worked i n t h i s way. This r e c o g n i t i o n came about from more than an a b s t r a c t a n a l y s i s , i t was grounded i n the young Black EMs experience. They a l s o recognized i n d i v i d u a l NCO's and o f f i c e r s as r a c i s t but they put t h e i r p r o t e s t and r e s i s t a n c e i n t o changing the i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements not these i n d i v i d u a l s . I t was t h e i r encounter w i t h paper r e g u l a t i o n s that they experienced as most c o n t r o l l i n g , as having a u t h o r i t y over them. (Door, Nov. 17-Dec. 1, 1972) 85 Chapter Six FACE-TO-FACE CONDUCT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORITY IN THE 1970s Authority functions in the accomplishment of navy work on a day-to-day basis. The m i l i t a r i s t ideology is visible in the forms of dress, insignia and deference etiquette, but this i s displayed apart from the doing of the work i t s e l f . The work is formally organized in an elaborate division of labor with specific assignment of tasks administered by an authority hierarchy but using rules established by a higher bureaucracy. The skeleton of this division of labor came from the sailing ships but i t has been elaborated to f i t technological change. The hierarchy has been extended, technical specialists have been added and crew chiefs have become mid-management. The m i l i t a r i s t ideology emphasizes face-to-face order giving but in the 1970s information is more often passed from one authority level to another in printed words. The day-to-day work involves use of information on how to do particular jobs rather than commands as to what to do. There is l i t t l e personal supervision of work. Ongoing records are kept of who does what and inadequate work can often be traced back to the worker. There seems to be l i t t l e need for face-to-face command authority in order to get navy work actually accomplished. THE PLACE OF MILITARIST AUTHORITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY NAVY Ship crews not only work together but they must also live to-gether. Face-to-face authority is used here in enforcing dress and 86 posture codes, cleanliness of person and quarters and deference. But there i s no obvious t i e between these requirements and p r a c t i c a l l i v i n g . Food, laundry, recreation and sleeping f a c i l i t i e s are provided for EMs and use made of them as the EMs have a need and t h e i r schedules permit. Most d a i l y l i v i n g goes on without s p e c i a l enforcement or supervision simply by organization of the a c t i v i t i e s . P o l i c i n g i s also used. There are guards posted i n o f f i c e r s ' country, at the b r i g and i n s e c u r i t y areas. There i s some personal supervision by NCOs. Ship's p o l i c e and marines are a v a i l a b l e i f trouble develops. Problems such as f i g h t s , insubordina-t i o n , gambling, etc. may be reported on paper to the next l e v e l leading to a face-to-face hearing with the Executive O f f i c e r and f i n a l l y Captain's Mast. EMs may be immediately arrested and held for court martial for more serious crimes. These personal confrontations are used as a back up to the organizational plan for work and l i v i n g , not as ordinary controls. The inspections that occur when the EMs leave the ships i n port are face-to-face authority i n t e r a c t i o n s . These are strongly resented by EMs. However these inspections and the related requirements for dress o f f the ship do not have an obvious connection to the accomplish-ment of work. In f a c t , the caste s o c i a l d i v i s i o n i s more r i g i d with many more elaborations of etiquette, o f f the ship. The m i l i t a r i s t ideology may have produced s o c i a l constructions with l i t t l e i n t e g r a t i o n with ship l i f e or work and i t s purposes. For many years recruitment, o f f i c e r t r a i n i n g and ship organization has been shaped by t h i s m i l i t a r i s t ideology. When the managerial e l i t e c a l l s for persuasive leadership or the easing of etiquette or dress codes there i s a 87 m i l i t a r i s t outcry. This alarm centers around the dangers of the good guy leader. The tough guy the m i l i t a r i s t s prefer may have some p r a c t i c a l uses. The tough guy NCO may very well benefit m i l i t a r i s t senior o f f i c e r s who i n t e r p r e t cooperation with " s p i t and p o l i s h " and etiquette as signs that t h e i r authority i s unchallenged. They i n s i s t on t h i s display and would have no s p e c i a l reason to be concerned i f the NCOs used tough guy methods of enforcing t h i s . This may make EMs very angry but t h e i r anger would be directed at the NCO not the senior o f f i c e r . The NCO then may become a very convenient buffer between the men and the higher chain of command. The men may focus a l l t h e i r discontent with the Navy on the target at hand. The NCOs themselves may f i n d enforcement of navy work orders and m i l i t a r i s t standards d i f f i c u l t . Much of the work i s monotonous and has l i t t l e meaning to the s a i l o r s . The s a i l o r s strongly object to the exact m i l i t a r i s t regulations on appearance and behavior. Per-suasion doesn't work w e l l because r a t i o n a l i z i n g the need for s p i t and p o l i s h and deference etiquette i s not easy, at l e a s t not i n terms acceptable to EMs. The NCOs have been selected i n part by t h e i r a b i l i t y to follow navy regulations, they are also s e l f selected as those who favor a navy career. They aren't l i k e l y to share the EMS view of the regulations as simple harassment. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n i t i s easier for most NCOs to get compliance by threat of punishment as a tough guy. Those few who are able to use nice guy s t y l e s may be a threat to the legitimacy of the others. 88 The tough guy r o l e may also be psychologically comfortable for the NCO who fee l s powerless i n respect to the larger bureaucracy and/or offended by the young o f f i c e r with h i s promising career. Some sense of power may s t i l l be gained by off i c i o u s n e s s and a r b i t r a r y demands on subordinates. Such a transfer of anger from i t s o r i g i n to l e s s powerful targets i s protected i n an authority system that l i m i t s c r i t i c i s m by subordinates. Inasmuch as t h i s happens i t may serve the Navy purpose of keeping the NCOs cooperative with t h e i r superiors and v i g i l a n t over t h e i r work groups. M i l i t a r i s t authority r e l a t i o n s h i p s may also be r e l a t e d to the m i l i t a r y mission of the Navy. The m i l i t a r i s t ideology recognizes a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t between e n l i s t e d people and o f f i c e r s . E n l i s t e d people have t r a d i t i o n a l l y had the most d i f f i c u l t work, the most personal involvement i n doing violence, the hardest l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n and the most danger of being k i l l e d . O f f i c e r s had somewhat less r i s k s of death and much more to gain from t h e i r careers and the display of m i l i t a r y status. The natio n a l and class i n t e r e s t s of o f f i c e r s have more often been involved i n p a r t i c u l a r wars. Battles at sea are r a r e l y explainable as simple defense of home and country. The purposes of sea war must seem i r r e l e v a n t to the long term i n t e r e s t s of most s a i l o r s and of immediate danger to t h e i r persons. Ships at sea have also been i n genuine danger from storms. As a r e s u l t recruitment into navies had to be done by using prisoners, impressment or c i v i l i a n d r a f t . Under these conditions i t i s not sur p r i s i n g that the "tough guy" way of dealing with s a i l o r s developed. In addition to the threat of punishment, the tough guy helped create a shared r e a l i t y of the powerlessness of the men and respect f o r the power, 89 i f not the person, of the o f f i c e r , e s p e c i a l l y the Captain. There were some d i f f i c u l t i e s with t h i s . S a i l o r s sometimes reacted by murdering o f f i c e r s or by mutiny. These actions were i n turn handled p u n i t i v e l y unless a mutinous group was successful, i n that case there might be considerable negotiation between the mutinous crew and navy leaders. (Dugan 1965; Manwaring and Dobree 1935; Wintringham 1936) M e l v i l l e thought navy ships were organized so as to produce c o n f l i c t s and d i v i s i o n s of i n t e r e s t within the crew as a protection against mutiny. Marines have been openly used i n t h i s way. Their t r a i n i n g encourages development of a separate group i d e n t i t y from s a i l o r s and they are assigned as p o l i c e on the ships. Today's m i l i t a r i s t s assume that there i s a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t between EMs and o f f i c e r s and t h i s i s i n part why they c a l l for strong authority and punitive d i s c i p l i n e . However t h i s c o n f l i c t , whatever i t may be, i s no longer obvious and the m i l i t a r i s t s do not specify i t . A s a i l o r on an a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r of today i s not i n much danger of l i f e and limb. The work i s hard with long hours and close quarters but the pay i s good. The o f f i c e r s do have more inducements such as career promise, better salary and prestige. Their l i f e i s more comfortable than that of e n l i s t e d men, but the l a t t e r ' s s i t u a t i o n i s comfortable too, only more crowded with le s s privacy. O f f i c e r s may have a career i n t e r e s t i n the Navy which would lead them to work for a larger navy and be interested i n being able to do war duty. Promotions increase during wars and i n growth periods of the Navy, and war duty i s e s s e n t i a l for the higher promotions. The use of the Navy as national defense which would be i n the i n t e r e s t s of a l l personnel i s not usually presented as an argument 90 f o r cooperation. There was an enormous e f f o r t to convince personnel of the need for defense against communism but th i s argument i s no longer very popular and rather unrelated to current n a t i o n a l p o l i c y . The Navy i s now used for showing force i n disagreements with small nations, or i n attacks on them as i n Vietnam. Navy writers also argue that the Navy has a r o l e i n guarding commerce and shipment of o i l . They think the Navy should be superior to the USSR Navy i n command of the seas. None of these navy uses t i e s i n t e r e s t s of junior o f f i c e r s or e n l i s t e d people to the navy mission. (Proceedings, January 1973:15-64; October 1974:48-54; Klare 1972) There i s a c o n f l i c t with t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , however, or at le a s t the i n t e r e s t s of the e n l i s t e d men. The long deployments around the world make for longer working hours and longer time away from f a m i l i e s . There i s also concern for seaworthiness of ships as regular repair schedules are not followed i n the Navy's e f f o r t to meet nationa l p o l i c y demands for a worldwide navy presence. Several c o n f l i c t s between o f f i c e r s and EMs can s t i l l be i d e n t i f i e d . As o f f i c e r s t r y to win f l e e t competitions or personal commendations they are l i k e l y to require extra work from s a i l o r s . The EMs think needed repairs are sometimes avoided because the report of a ship problem might harm the o f f i c e r ' s career. There i s another c o n f l i c t as m i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s attempt to enforce deference etiquette which i s perceived by EMs as humiliating. Black EMs evidently f e e l the sharpest c o n f l i c t s , reporting that the administration of authority on the ships i s d i r e c t l y opposed to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . They f e e l they are used to do the d i r t i e s t work and then discriminated against i n evaluations so that the better jobs can be kept open for whites. When they complain they believe 91 they get more humiliating treatment and sometimes even extra punishment. Anti-war EMs and m i l i t a r i s t s recognize a p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t r e l a t e d to the r o l e of the Navy i n support of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y . The r e s i s t e r s and m i l i t a r i s t s quote each other's statements to show t h i s . The r e s i s t e r s point out that t h e i r actions are making i t more d i f f i c u l t to control EMs. The m i l i t a r i s t s agree and see t h i s as the beginning of the end of authority. (Armed Forces Journal, June 7, 1971) From time-to-time e n l i s t e d people have attempted to organize i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s as c i v i l i a n workers do i n labor unions. A l l the m i l i t a r y e l i t e , managers and m i l i t a r i s t s , think t h i s i s inappropriate. They think EMs must be a v a i l a b l e for any and a l l assignment without the p o s s i b i l i t y of s t r i k e or delays from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n decision making. Voluntary cooperation of e n l i s t e d people i s not expected. The use of maritime unions to negotiate with s a i l o r s i s not considered applicable to the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n even though i t i s recognized as workable for c i v i l i a n shipping companies. (Richardson 1970) This strong r e j e c t i o n of e f f o r t s of EMs to organize i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t indicates that managers as w e l l as m i l i t a r i s t s suspect the s e l f - i n t e r e s t s of EMs are opposed to compliance with Navy authority. Active duty and r e t i r e d o f f i c e r s are organized i n p r o f e s s i o n al s o c i e t i e s and they do lobby for t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . The o f f i c i a l encouragement of these indicates that i n t e r e s t s of o f f i c e r s and the Navy are thought to be congruent. MANAGERIAL STYLES OF CONTROL Individual career achievement i s stressed i n many ways. Navy r e c r u i t i n g l i t e r a t u r e promises job t r a i n i n g for l a t e r c i v i l i a n jobs as w e l l as careers within the Navy. In a l l the r e c r u i t i n g l i t e r a t u r e career 92 t r a i n i n g i s used as a main appeal. There i s o r d i n a r i l y an a d d i t i o n a l statement about the good people with whom the new r e c r u i t w i l l be working and another statement about adventure and t r a v e l . This promise of career advancement appears to be the managers' way of l e g i t i m i z i n g t h e i r authority. It f i t s the managerial ideology of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n as commodity exchange, and the appeal to s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d motives as a basis for involvement and compliance. Their authority i s also backed by general cooperation with t h e i r "paper manipulation". This cooperation i s taken for granted, at l e a s t I found no reference to i t or the p o s s i b i l i t y of people not cooperating. I am using "paper manipulation" to r e f e r to control by manipulation of career p o s s i b i l i t i e s v i a authorizations, examinations and payments by checque. A l o c a l base CO or a ship's captain cannot themselves authorize promotions, transfers or retirements, prepare examinations or make out pay and allotment checques. These are c e n t r a l l y c o n t r o l l e d . Properly c e r t i f i e d papers are accepted as an unchallengeable r e a l i t y by m i l i t a r y people and c i v i l i a n s . When mistakes are made, they may be appealed through the bureaucracy, but u n t i l another order or checque comes through l o c a l action can not remedy them. These paper authorizations were used by the CNO and BUPERS to channel e n l i s t e d people's and o f f i c e r ' s actions into desired behavior. When more applicants for a p a r t i c u l a r rate were needed s p e c i a l bonuses would become a v a i l a b l e and/or the requirements might be lowered. If m i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s became a problem then promotion p o l i c y would penalize those with a m i l i t a r i s t approach. Early retirements were forced on o f f i c e r s who did not receive promo-tions i n a c e r t a i n number of years, eliminating those who were not ambitious or successful at getting recognition from t h e i r superiors. A l l of t h i s was done without the necessity of face to face confrontation or resort to p h y s i c a l force. Paper manipulation i s much more d i f f i c u l t to f i g h t than face to face authority and can be much stronger. Consider the s i t -uation of an o f f i c e r who wished to continue i n the Navy but receives his retirement papers and no longer receives a c t i v e duty pay, or the EM who gets a punitive discharge, or the NCO who i s passed over i n promotions. Without the proper papers none of these people can get what they want. People around them are powerless to help. A per-sonal p h y s i c a l attack or act of sabotage might be expressive but i s not l i k e l y to be h e l p f u l i n getting a change i n the papers. Very high l e v e l o f f i c e r s or congressmen sometimes are able to intervene -i f the applicant can get t h e i r a ttention and cooperation. Legal action has been h e l p f u l i n a few cases. Of course t h i s involves more paper work i n an attempt to get the superior paper authorization of the courts. The regulations under which the o r i g i n a l paper was issued might be changed by p o l i t i c a l action through the Congress, but t h i s i s a long way round and o r d i n a r i l y even i f ultimately success-f u l comes too l a t e to remedy the i n i t i a l problem. These paper authorizations are very e f f e c t i v e i n channeling actions of navy r e s i s t e r s as w e l l as cooperators. Building a proper record i s as important for the EM t r y i n g to get a Conscientious Objector discharge as i t i s for an NCO bucking for chief or a commander who wants to be an admiral or even the captain who may want to get r i d 94 of h i s executive o f f i c e r or any other subordinate. Navy people do learn ways to influence t h i s paper work. When there are s p e c i f i c procedures required by regulation, these may be used against the bureaucracy to l i m i t or delay actions or hold the bureaucracy to rules that are a burden. Crozier has discussed how regulations are often used by workers to gain more control over t h e i r s i t u a t i o n (Crozier 1964). This was one of the major strategies of GI r e s i s t e r s and was aided by the counseling centers. It often helped i n d i v i d u a l s to have favorable outcomes to t h e i r transfers or discharges, but t h i s was done only one case at a time. Paper manipula-t i o n i s not r u l e by regulation i t i s rather r u l e by authorization. Many personnel decisions are made by unnamed committees within BUPERS. They can exercise d i s c r e t i o n without the necessity of explanations to d i s -appointed applicants. Individuals t r y to get the authorizations they want by c a r e f u l attention to b u i l d i n g t h e i r record and by applying for the choices a v a i l a b l e . Their actions become the behavior wanted by the managers. According to the managerial ideology, command types of authority should be avoided i n face-to-face r e l a t i o n s . The approach recommends a very d i f f e r e n t s t y l e f or i n s t r u c t i o n s from superior to i n f eriori'n the following advice to o f f i c e r s from the handbook, Ship Organization and Personnel: . . . assume the second d i v i s i o n o f f i c e r on the guided m i s s i l e destroyer Pratt has noticed that the quarterdeck for which he i s responsible could stand a l i t t l e Improvement. His Boatswain's Mate 2/C Harris i s i n charge of the quarter-deck. A good approach i s : "Harris, t h i s area i s f a l l i n g off a b i t , l e t ' s bring the deck out a l i t t l e b r ighter". • • • 95 If he wishes to make i t a b i t stronger, he can say: "Harris, the quarterdeck i s not up to Pratt standards of appearance. If you cannot keep i t up properly with the men you have, l e t me know and w e ' l l look into a s h i f t of work d e t a i l s here." If t h i s does not get r e s u l t s he should e i t h e r consider re-placing petty o f f i c e r Harris or assigning more men. (USNI 1972:32) (see appendix i for USNI references) Teamwork i s used as a metaphor for work r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h i s emphasizes shared purposes and a non-hierarchical organization. I t also may transfer some of the p o s i t i v e c u l t u r a l values of team sports to m i l i t a r y work. Face-to-face r e l a t i o n s h i p s are occasions for manipulation i n many counseling programs. There are s p e c i a l programs that o f f e r drug, alcohol and career counseling as w e l l as general p s y c h i a t r i c and r e l i g i o u s counseling. There are other programs that bring small groups together i n s e n s i t i v i t y sessions c a l l e d group development. The programs attempt to define problems as i n d i v i d u a l or interpersonal and probably are meant to d e p o l i t i c i z e discontent as well as to r e h a b i l i t a t e . The appropriate s o c i o l o g i c a l name for t h i s i s probably "cooling the mark" (Goffman 1952). The GI movement people thought counseling, e s p e c i a l l y i n the drug programs, was used to get information about i n d i v i d u a l s that could l a t e r be used i n criminal actions or discharge procedures against them or t h e i r f r i e n d s . I n t e l l i g e n c e agents are increasingly used on the ships, t h e i r presence has been announced i n A l l Hands. This i s a kind of spector of a face-to-face r e l a t i o n s h i p . Since the i d e n t i t y of the agents i s not known anyone may be suspected of being one. (Marx 1974) This can hardly be expected to b u i l d team s p i r i t . I t probably does worry NCOs and o f f i c e r s who may not know the i d e n t i t y of the agent. Any of t h e i r actions may be reported and c r i t i c i z e d with a r e s u l t i n g mark on t h e i r records. Secret agents are a threat to anyone c r i t i c a l of managerial ideology. 96 To summarize, the s o c i a l construction.of authority on the ships has s h i f t e d from face-to-face command and obedience among leaders and followers to a much more complex s i t u a t i o n . The control i s now l a r g e l y i n d i r e c t and done by channeling of opportunities and threat v i a paper. Punishment as well as rewards may consist of paper messages which are palpable i n t h e i r consequences. No one may be needed to administer the consequences, they may simply follow from the regular organization of the naval administrative process which i s also consequential for s i m i l a r process i n the larger society. For instance, i f a person i s discharged they no longer receive pay. If the discharge was less than honorable t h i s w i l l be marked on the discharge papers. C i v i l i a n employers usually ask to see these papers. The f a i l u r e to be hired by p o t e n t i a l employers i s not exactly administration of the punishment but i t i s nonetheless punitive i n e f f e c t . The work i t s e l f i s so assigned and organized that face-to-face supervision i s usually unnecessary. There are occasions for face-to-face i n t e r a c t i o n between EMs and NCOs i n the ship l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n and during inspections. The r e l a t i o n s h i p i s often perceived as humiliating by EMs. Formal judgment and punishment may occur but not i n the work group. This takes place sometime a f t e r the alleged transgression at the executive o f f i c e r ' s hearing and at Captain's Mast. If sent to the b r i g a s a i l o r w i l l again experience a face-to-face authority r e l a t i o n s h i p with the guards. None of these i n t e r a c t i o n s are l i k e l y to be r e l a t e d to the d i r e c t accomplishment of work. Counseling and group development programs o f f e r an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d pseudo-personal contact between the organiza-t i o n and EMs. These may have a cooling out or cooling down function, but i f so, t h i s happens v i a persuasion or subtle threat, not through commands. The ra t i o n a l e for the maintenance of a formal deference etiquette between the men and o f f i c e r s i s no longer p l a u s i b l e . The r e l a t i o n s h i p can now be f r i e n d l y without destroying the basis of obedience. The orders most often come now from l e v e l s above the s a i l o r and h i s immediate supervisor, and they come as paper rather than as verbal orders delivered face-to-face. If the s a i l o r objects to the order, the "brass" or Navy can be blamed, but the immediate supervisor i s not d i r e c t l y responsible for work decisions. 98 PART TWO CASE STUDIES The case studies were i n i t i a l l y planned around antiwar campaigns on three attack aircraft carriers, the USS Constellation, the USS Coral Sea and the USS Kitty Hawk from f a l l 1971 through winter 1972. I interviewed people involved in these movements and gathered their literature as well as news reports of the events from GI, underground, navy and regular press sources (see appendix i for a description of these sources). More material was available for events in the San Diego area due partly to a more adequate public library collection. In the San Diego library one of the daily news-papers was even indexed by the name of particular ships. The library also kept copies of the local underground paper, The Door. L i t t l e was available from the San Francisco library where no daily paper is indexed. In addition there was not as much documentary material produced by the movement groups in the Bay Area. The Bay area people used a more informal approach to organizing and they tried to avoid publicity rather than use i t as a tactic to get c i v i l i a n support. There were news reports after an event but l i t t l e during the campaigns. Consequently I found much more material about the Constellation and Kitty Hawk campaigns than about the Coral Sea. As I was in the process 99 of organizing this material in the f a l l of 1972 two major resistance events happened. These were racial resistance actions on the same two ships I had already been following, the Kitty Hawk and the Constellation. At about this same time the sabotage charges against Chenoweth of the Ranger became news and I was able to collect considerable material on this since by then I was receiving six of the GI and underground papers. The ephemeral nature of underground newspaper publishing and the lack of complete library collections make i t d i f f i c u l t to find back copies. The newspaper people themselves usually do not have a l l or even many of their old editions on f i l e . It is much easier to gather this kind of document on current events than to find reports for actions that happened a few months or a year or two earlier. Following the racial incidents, national news services re-ported trouble within the naval command related to navy policy to-ward Blacks and dissenters. I was already aware of a command conflict over management ideologies from my reading of the military journals. I continued to gather this material. These journals are available in many libraries. I arranged the news reports, articles and pamphlets chrono-logically within specific case histories and then read and re-read them as I tried out different interpretations of what was happening. The total 550 documents are too bulky to be reproduced here but in this section, part two, I have summarized the six major cases for which there was the most complete information. These are the anti-war 100 campaigns on the Kitty Hawk and the Constellation; the later r a c i a l incidents on these two ships; the charges, t r i a l and movement support of Chenoweth on the USS Ranger; and f i n a l l y , the admirals reaction against CNO Zumwalt and managerial policy. These events happened in an historical context and in particular were related to the war in Vietnam, to actions on other ships, and to the peace movement. During 1969 several infantry units refused combat orders in Vietnam. Fragging of officers, fights, desertion and drug usage were also a problem for the U.S. military command. They decreased their use of ground troops and increased the air war. Many of the planes used in the air war were based on car-riers off Vietnam. Such carriers had been used throughout the Viet-nam war but now more of them were sent to the Western Pacific area and held there for longer and longer periods. There were fourteen Attack Carriers i n the U.S. Navy and by f a l l of 1972 six of them were deployed off Vietnam. At any particular time, two or three carriers are undergoing regular repairs so six carriers represent-half of the available Attack Carrier force. In the spring of 1970 the c i v i l i a n anti-war protest became a massive movement after four students were k i l l e d by national guards-men on Kent State University campus in Ohio and civilians demonstrated in protest across the country. The following April and May mass demonstrations and disruptions were held at the nation's capitol and in cities across the country. The anti-war campaigns on the ships followed these events. The relationship of the six case histories to each other and to national events i s shown in the following brief chronology of the period: 101 CHRONOLOGY OF NAVY RESISTANCE 1971-73 *(Starred events are reported as part of the case histories) Month and Year 1971 Ship Related Events National Events April May to October *San Diego Vote Campaign to keep the USS Constellation home. Nine crew members took sanctuary in local churches. -Massive disruptions and anti-war demon-strations occurred in major c i t i e s . October to November December to February -SOS campaign on the USS Coral  Sea at Alameda. 300 sailors were rumored on Unauthorized Absence and three officers resigned as the ship l e f t . *S0S campaign on the USS Kitty  Hawk at San Diego. Nine re-mained in sanctuary when the ship l e f t (including two from a support ship). 1972 April May June -USS Midway l e f t Alameda as one sailor took sanctuary. -USS America sailed from Norfolk as the Coast Guard cleared protestors from the harbor. -Bombing of North Vietnam resumed from carrier based planes. -Mining of Haiphong harbor by Coral Sea planes. July -A million dollar f i r e occur-red on the USS Forrestal at Norfolk and a sailor was arrested for sabotage. *Sabotage to a reduction gear of the USS Ranger delayed i t s departure three months. 102 August *The Navy arrested Seaman Chenoweth for the Ranger sabotage. GI movement people organized support for his defense. September -USS Enterprise l e f t Alameda as anti-war civilians attempted to block Golden Gate with boats. The Navy discharged five sailors as SOS organizers. October *0ver 200 were involved in a racial fight on the USS Kitty  Hawk while the ship was in action off Vietnam. Forty-six sailors were injured, twenty-eight arrested. -The Democratic Party nominated anti-war candidate, McGovern. -Four were injured in a racial fight on the oil e r , Hassayampa while in the Phillipines. *An admiral publicly warned of sabotage by dissidents and blamed Zumwalt's reforms in a retirement speech. -Bombing of North Vietnam was stopped. November *Sit-down strikes involving up to 300 sailors occurred on the USS Constellation on training out of San Diego and at the dock. *CN0 Zumwalt and the Secretary of the Navy attacked top officers for failure to imple-ment racial reforms. -President Nixon de-feated anti-war candidate McGovern for the U.S. Presidency. *A group of admirals worked to have Zumwalt removed. -A racial uprising occurred at the navy brig in Norfolk. -Over 200 sailors were in a racial fight at Midway Island. December -Bombing of North Vietnam resumed 103 *Congressional Investigation of r a c i a l incidents was completed. The Representa-ti v e s found that the problem was the CNOs p o l i c y of "permissiveness". * T r i a l s of twenty-eight K i t t y  Hawk s a i l o r s ended. Seven remained i n naval prisons. -Paris Peace Agreements were signed ending Vietnam War d i r e c t involvement. *Chenoweth acquitted of Ranger sabotage. -Two days of r a c i a l f i g h t -ing occurred on the USS Roosevelt i n the Caribbean Sea. -Watergate in v e s t i g a -tions began under newly appointed Attorney General, E l l i o t Richardson. 104 The f i v e case h i s t o r i e s were summarized from the reports of the various documents. In doing t h i s I t r i e d to sel e c t so that the v a r i e t y of sources and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the whole corpus were represented. I have noted the differences i n ideas of what happened as I recognized them. The case h i s t o r i e s presented here are then not the o r i g i n a l material from which I worked but summaries based on my in t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the documents. 105 Chapter Seven USS CONSTELLATION STAY HOME VOTE Nine Refuse to Leave for Vietnam, September 1971 In spring 1971 following the national peace movement demon-strations, the USS Constellation, an attack aircraft carrier, arrived in San Diego to prepare for another tour to Vietnam. The ship had been under repair in Bremerton, Washington, where a group of officers and enlisted men had organized a unit of the Concerned Officers Movement or COM. They had already planned and participated in a peace walk in Bremerton. San Diego anti-war people had also organized as Non Violent Action, NVA. They planned to support protest among the sailors on the carrier. They sent 2500 letters aboard te l l i n g the sailors that NVA hoped they would stay home rather than go on to the ship's sixth tour in Vietnam. We are convinced that the coming WESTPAC deployment of the Connie w i l l be harmful to everyone - to you, to us and to the people of Southeast Asia. The war in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos is far more devastating than most people realize. (NVA April 1971,C-3 see appendix i for document'Preferences) This letter arrived on the ship before i t had docked in San Diego. (Later COM reported that the Captain had confiscated and destroyed almost a l l of the letters. They then called for a Navy Court of Inquiry and a U.S. Postal Service investigation.) The ship was met by U.S. Representative Ron Dellums and NVA people. Dellums talked to Blacks and anti-war crew members about discrimination and 106 p o l i t i c a l harassment on the ship. The Captain, according to The Door, the local underground newspaper, nervously chewed Turns. (Door April 14-18, 1971) NVA and COM were soon cooperating. In May COM put out a small newspaper, Liberty Call. It reported how eleven hundred of the Connie crew had signed a petition to have the Jane Fonda anti-war 3 show perform on the ship. The Captain refused permission to have the show aboard (pro-military entertainers had been hosted on the ship earlier) and he confiscated the petitions. The Fonda show was held in San Diego on May 15th, Armed Forces Day or "Armed Farces Day" as the anti-military people called i t . Twenty-five hundred sailors and civilians attended. The daily newspaper, the San Diego Union reported the efforts to get the show on the ship. They also explained that COM was requesting a Naval Court of Inquiry into the earlier letter confiscation, they reported the Jane Fonda petition confiscation, protest of a new order of the captain banning non-approved literature and punishment on the ship of a COM member. This was reported without editorial comment. (San Diego Union June 7, 1971) In June an informal meeting of about one hundred and f i f t y men was held on the ship to talk about racism, drugs and navy l i f e in general. Someone suggested that they a l l use the Action Line and ask for peanut butter. The Action Line became jammed and they got peanut butter for supper. The executive officer then came on the ship's TV 3 Jane Fonda and other anti-war actors and entertainers had been traveling to military bases with their show. It was sponsored by the United States Servicemen's Fund, a nation-wide c i v i l i a n and GI support group. 107 and warned that this was an organized attempt to jam the line and i f this worked the group might escalate i t s demands. Several days later the group held another meeting and went over a number of grievances. The Captain called a meeting the following day, re-sponded to the points, named four crewmen he claimed were responsible, and said they would be charged with sedition i f the group met again. This was a l l gleefully reported in The Door as "The Great Peanut Butter Conspiracy". The Door noted that the Captain had since been called to Washington and that both the postal service and Navy were now investi-gating the Captain. (Door July 7-20, 1971) By July many of the COM members had been transferred off the ship. The Door ran a long story "The Connie is No Lady" that re-viewed the campaign. In the same issue The Door reported that peace people in San Diego were trying to stop funding for attack carriers. A b i l l was being prepared for Congress. Citizens were urged to realize that the Vietnam War was continuing by naval aircraft based on these carriers. A campaign to stop the Connie was presented as a symbolic way of gathering more c i v i l i a n as well as GI support for ending the war. (Door July 21-Aug. 3, 1971) In August a banner saying "Connie Stay Home For Peace" was flown over San Diego a number of times by a member of the Harbor Project, and ex-carrier p i l o t . The Harbor Project was the name of the combined effort of COM and NVA. They now decided on a vote campaign as their next effort to keep the Connie home. The campaign had encouragement from Joan Baez and her Institute for the Study of 108 Nonviolence and the active support of David Harris. Harris had been a leader in the draft resistance movement and was just out of j a i l for draft resistance at this time. (Door Aug. 18-Sept. 1, 1971) There was an intensive campaign for the next six weeks. There were meetings, public picnics and rap sessions with Harris and military counselors. Bumper stickers and stick-on slogans were made available a l l over town. Some of these began showing up on the ship, even on the captain's door. The Navy was also doing public relations. August fifteenth the ship hosted dependents for a day cruise and air show. Navy and veterans groups spoke out against the vote project considering i t bizarre to allow military men to vote as to whether they would follow orders of the c i v i l i a n government. (San Diego Union Aug. 29, 1971) NVA handed out more leaflets emphasizing the validity of sailors expressing their own ideas about their military orders. Liberty Call, carried statements by David Harris and two ex-officers which were representative of this literature. The vote is an exercise in very simple and straightforward democracy. It is a common voice for people who have been denied a common voice in the ongoing process of government decisions. If i t is really democracy the government is practicing and democracy the Navy i s defending, then we expect they w i l l recognize and be bound by the results of the vote the vote w i l l help us as a people begin to make decisions that have been out of our hands for much too long. Dave Harris ...As a Naval aviator, I have flown from the decks of our carriers. Today, carriers are used, not to protect other naval vessels, but to attack targets on land. The most sophisticated of technological weapons are targeted at people, the people of underdeveloped countries. Right 109 now attack carriers are in the Gulf of Tonkin. Their planes are bombing people in our names. Do we want that bombing to continue?... Should the USS Constellation stay home? John Huyler (former Navy Lt.) We hold that the rights of free speech and dialogue is a CRUCIAL right that must be established before any other re-form can be made possible. Admiral Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations, has made i t his policy to create channels, such as the ACTION LINE, for in-service members to air their grievances. It i s the opinion of COM that although these channels are a step in the right direction, they should be expanded to include channels by which servicemen can form and express their views on community and national issues as well It is not enough that men be given the right to air petty grievances, such as lack of t o i l e t paper in the heads, and be silenced on issues that concern them as individuals. Paul Rogers (former Ensign on the Constellation) (Liberty Call, September 17-21, 1971) 0 The campaign gathered supporters with street dances and picnics. A small booklet was printed and circulated with personal statements by four enlisted men and officers on how they had come to realize that they could no longer participate in the war. Each of the four reported specific events that had influenced them to change. These varied from anti-war films to face-to-face contact with Viet-namese victims and wounded sailors. In each case they had come to realize how they themselves were involved in the destruction of people. (NVA 1971) In September, a GI newspaper Up From The Bottom reported the campaign and also featured a report by a Connie wife about the problems she had in trying to v i s i t her husband who was on the Connie on restriction. The tone of the paper was more bitter and informal than the NVA and COM materials. A "Lifer of the Month" was featured. The Connie wife said: 110 Don't get rile d when you see a couple.of l i f e r s plus an officer and the Master at Arms at the quarterdeck, i t takes their com-bined efforts for them to read an- I.D. card and hassle every man. I noticed that, even tho the l i f e r s tried, they couldn't smile, they've growled and frowned too much! ....I wish more dissatisfied wives of the P.O.W.s of the Constellation would get their shit together. We sure could make some noise! (UFTB September 1971) The San Diego Union ran a long report of a crewman who had been confined to the brig for distributing leaflets on the ship while i t was at sea on a training run. He was now fasting in protest over not being allowed to appeal the sentence. The Captain was reported as having asked the Navy to discharge him for drug use. NVA was reported as picketing the ship. (San Diego Union Sept. 2, 1971) NVA leafleting and programs continued and the bi-weekly Door and daily newspaper San Diego Union continued coverage. The vote was to be taken September 17 to 21. Ballot boxes were manned by NVA volunteers (mostly young civilians) throughout the city. Three thousand ballots were mailed to specific sailors on the ship. The campaign was topped off with two Baez fold concerts and a rap session with Dave Harris. This was well publicized in movement and regular press media and by leafleting. GI newspapers around the country carried stories about the "Connie Stay Home" campaign. The San Diego and Los Angeles newspapers interviewed the ship's captain, Gerhard, and he and the Air Force Commander of the Pacific Fleet issued statements that the Constellation would s a i l on schedule. Secretary of the Navy, Chafee, declared that the morale on the ship was high and that i t was inappropriate for military men I l l to vote on their orders of a c i v i l i a n government. (San Diego Union September 2, 1971) During the days of the vote there were daily reports in the San Diego Union as well as continual broadsides, leafleting, folk concerts and street events by the project people. The San  Diego Union was the f i r s t to announce the vote. Eighty-two per cent of the total 55,000 votes were for the Connie to stay home. Six hundred forty-six of the crew had voted, fifty-four per cent for staying home. (There were about 4500 officers and enlisted men aboard.) (San Diego Union September 23, 1971) NVA leaflets were soon out announcing and analyzing the vote. A small counter-campaign was started by four women: ...to let the crew know not a l l of San Diego is apathetic, sitting back and doing nothing. We are extremely appalled at how much publicity and attention is being given to the vote. (San Diego Union Sept. 21, 1971) NVA had planned a f u l l schedule of events as anti-climax for the last ten days between the vote and ship's sailing. Legal counseling was to be offered with trained military counselors and lawyers available. There were also to be pickets, v i g i l s at the navy gates and a f i n a l candlelight v i g i l the night before the ship sailed. A peace fleet of small private boats were to gather in the harbor as a f i n a l protest when the ship sailed. September twenty-seventh the f i r s t counseling event was held. September twenty^eighth Captain Gerhard was hospitalized and a Captain Ward assumed command. The project people thought the strain of their campaign was responsible. (Harbor Project Sept. 1971, San Diego 112 Union Sept. 28, 1971) September twenty-ninth four men publicly refused to 4 return to their ship. They did this by taking sanctuary in a local Catholic Church and by issuing public statements of their objections to further military service (NVA 1971). Charlie Andrews' statement was similar to the others: The USS Constellation under orders, not from the American people but a few very powerful politicians and military people, has taken the right over l i f e and death. I refuse to take part in this murder. I am in sanctuary. I w i l l not be forced to take part in this murder. P.S. Thou must not k i l l . (NVA, 1971) The four priests and a nun from the church also issued their own statement of reasons for offering sanctuary. (NVA, 1971) In a later.interview the men said that they had been to several other churches with their request for sanctuary before they were accepted. (Door, Oct. 13-27, 1971) The f i r s t day of sanctuary the ranking naval chaplain of the Naval District paid a friendly v i s i t and was challenged by the men for his role in the military. (Door, Oct. 13-27, 1971) The September thirtieth San Diego Union reported that there were now six men in sanctuary, two more had joined. The a r t i c l e quoted the men as aware that sanctuary was not legally recognized 4 Sanctuary had been used by military resisters since 1969. It was a symbolic revival of the medieval practise of church protection. Although church authority in the twentieth century does not protect against military and c i v i l i a n police, i t was used as a tactic for ex-pressing conscientious objection and as a way of publicly i l l u s t r a t -ing a contradiction between military and religious values. 113 and that they expected to be arrested, tried and convicted for refusal to return to their ship. The same issue quoted the new commanding officer, Captain Ward, as saying he didn't detect any-thing alarming in the crew's behavior, but that there were many malcontents aboard. He thought this was about the usual percent-age for any ship. He said the Navy handles them by waiting un t i l they violate a regulation and then they would "end up in d i s c i p l i n -ary status". (San Diego Union Sept. 30, 1971) The Coast Guard published a warning to any people that might try to obstruct the ship's sailing October f i r s t . The ship sailed without incident but without three more sailors who had joined the other six in sanctuary. Some of them had been discussing this step for several days with small groups of other sailors. (Door, Oct. 13-27, 1971) Early the next morning at 4:40 A.M. the sailors were arrested and flown to the ship. The captain was to decide what charges would be f i l e d against them. The priests held a church prayer service that afternoon for the men. The sanctuary and arrests became national news. Detailed reports of the events and the men's own reports came later in local and national anti-war media. (These latter sources have delays between gathering news and publishing. Most are published bi-weekly or monthly.) Up  From The Bottom reported the sanctuary and subsequent arrests but with a slight criticism of the tactic! The Connie 9 were given a choice of either going to a 114 federal prison or to the floating prison they c a l l the USS Constellation. A l l 9 chose to go back to that horrifying h e l l hole and work among humanoids. Around 6:55 am the Connie 9 were on a plane headed back to the USS Constellation. Now that the Connie 9 are re-turned to a floating sexist, racist, dictatorship, they w i l l be rechanneled to be robots and wind-up t i n soldiers. This means that they w i l l have a hard time regaining their posi-tions as free speaking individuals. Support i s needed for these 9 individuals and a l l others who speak up for what they believe is right. The best thing you can do is set an example by your personal actions, speak-ing up and voicing your opinions, get together with your friends and make the oppressors hear you out. Always remember, that they can't close your mouth, they can't control your actions, they can't control your think-ing. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE (UFTB Oct. 1971) This statement also reflected a difference between the UFTB and the Harbor Project's rhetoric. In September an a r t i c l e about the Harbor Project in the Door had said: The Desire of the project workers to relate to the various constituencies of the Vote on a "just folks" level i s re-flected by both the tone and content of the leaflets, radio, and TV spots. There is no use of the words "militarism", "racism," "sexism," "imperialism". Instead a conscious effort is being made to communicate with people in a per-sonal, non-rhetorical style. ...The underlying assumptions of the Project-that the pro-ject workers, many with white middle class backgrounds, can relate to the people of San Diego on both a non-ideological and revolutionary level basis are seemingly radical assump-tions within the radical-left movement. Revolutions have classically been related to working vs. ruling class struggle, or to the overthrow of colonial regimes by subjugated people. This assumption is articulated by David Harris when he says: "I think we are in the struggle for our own existence." (Door Sept. 15-29, 1971) This difference was partly one of tactics but also came from different analyses of the situation. The project people emphasized that i t was the use of violence as a means that was wrong while the UFTB group cited exploitation and capitalism as 115 the basic problem. This difference did not become a public topic except for such slight references. Neither group made an issue of their differences and neither printed analyses of the war beyond the most simple broad statements. When the Constellation reached Honolulu i t was learned that the nine had been given one month brig sentences at Captain's Mast and were fasting in protest. (San Diego Union Oct. 12, 1971) By the end of the month one of the men had decided to cooperate with the Navy and so the group was reduced to the "Connie 8". The Navy enlistments of two of the men were almost up and they were flown back to the naval station at Treasure Island in San Francisco Bay where they were detained. They were able to talk to other movement EMs and help with the organizing of another campaign that had been inspired from the Connie vote. This new effort became the (SOS could mean Stop Our Ship or Save Our Ship) SOS movement on the USS Coral Sea, another attack carrier. This ship was scheduled to leave the Bay Area in November for Vietnam. The new campaign differed from the Connie Vote in that there were more enlisted men involved in the early organizing and there was less i n i t i a l publicity and involvement of the local c i v i l i a n peace community. There was more of an anti-capitalist, a n t i - l i f e r emphasis in their literature and non-violence was not featured; however, there was a non-violent caucus within the or-ganizing group. There was an attempt to use the method of public sanctuary again. The City of Berkeley and a dozen churches agreed 116 to offer sanctuary and counseling. Many sailors visited the churches and talked to supporters there, but none took sanctuary. This was partly due to differences within SOS on the question of sanctuary as a tactic. The disagreement did not become an open s p l i t . Publicly and in most of the reports a l l ship protest and resistance was re-ferred to as part of the same movement. Later SOS became the sym-bol for many other anti-war events sponsored by various groups. There were f i n a l l y several SOS r a l l i e s with sailors and civilians attending. At one, three young officers resigned their commissions to loud acclaim. After a t r i a l run the Coral Sea came back into harbor through the Golden Gate bridge. While supporters waved peace banners from the bridge, seventy sailors on the fl i g h t deck formed themselves into an SOS. A f i n a l huge demonstration was held November twelfth when the ship sailed from Alameda. National and international news services carried reports that up to two hundred f i f t y sailors had failed to return to the ship. (Berkeley Barb Nov. 12-18, 1971) While this campaign was underway the five additional Constellation prisoners were flown into the Treasure Island Naval Base and held in detention. Their legal counselors found i t d i f f i c u l t to talk to them without Navy interference. Congressman Dellums appointed one of the Harbor Project people as his aide who was then allowed to v i s i t and report on the treatment of the men. Dellums continued to push the Navy for constitutional treat-ment of the prisoners. They were given General Discharges December 117 sixth and there were celebrations in the Bay area and a later re-union in San Diego. The discharge was bil l e d as a success by the underground and GI papers. The eight could have been tried at a court martial and i f found guilty been given sentences of several years in prison. (Door Dec. 2-23, 1971) UFTB reported the outcome with mild approval in an arti c l e t i t l e d "Connie 8 Skate". It ended, " A l l power to the man or woman who gets out of the service no matter what the reason i s " . (UFTB Jan. 1972) The military editor of the San  Diego Union complained about the general discharges under honorable conditions. He f e l t the veterans benefits for which they were now eligible were not deserved. He noted that the discharges were decided by a BUPERS board and issued in the Chief of Naval Personnel's name. (San Diego Union Dec. 16, 1971) Several of the eight resisters remained in San Diego and worked with the Harbor Project which now was focusing on another carrier, the USS Kitty Hawk and i t s planned departure in March. There were also other efforts related to different ships. In January a sailor from the USS Hancock took sanctuary. The eight did not go to Vietnam but the USS Constellation did with almost a l l of the crew aboard. The planes immediately entered actively into the bombing of Vietnam. A San Diego officer's wife received a telegram from her husband, a flyer. He had shot down a MIG. "I'm terribly proud of him," she told a reporter. (San Diego Union Jan. 21, 1972) And so the eight month campaign -118 although It had received the participation of some of the sailors and officers, the attention of the whole crew, and national pub-l i c i t y , and also forced the Navy to recognize i t and react pub-l i c l y to i t - had not managed to stop or even delay the movement and use of the ship. In January The Door reported that there was trouble on the Connie. They had received letters saying the ship would re-turn early because of antiwar sentiment and poor morale. (Door Jan. 13-27, 1972) Months later after the ships return and the November strike, the Captain reported that there had been many instances of sabotage at sea and that three suspected saboteurs had been taken off the ship while in Asia. He also said he had uncovered a plot of enlisted men to l i e down on the flight deck to prevent planes from leaving. None of this was reported at the time. (Associated Press, Nov. 15, 1972) A plan to boost ship morale was also attempted in Jan-uary. Captain Ward's wife, at home in San Diego, organized a tour for wives to meet the ship when i t was to be in Hong Kong for eight days of rest and recreation. This plan received con-siderable publicity. Two hundred f i f t y wives with some other relatives and children paid for their tickets and made the t r i p , arriving February fourth. Local papers in the U.S. featured their respective hometown boys' reunion with their wives. A Seattle a r t i c l e pictured a Black petty officer as he greeted his Seattle wife and baby. The message seemed to be that a l l was well 119 on the Connie, particularly with Blacks. The article implied that the Navy had sponsored the whole tr i p , but the cost was actually paid by the wives themselves. The paper did not follow the story to i t s frustrating end. The v i s i t was interrupted without notice after less than four days. The ship had been ordered back to duty in Vietnam for a massive air strike. When the unhappy wives re-turned to San Diego they were interviewed by the San Diego Union. Reactions ranged from anger expressed by several enlisted men's wives to dutiful acceptance of the navy way by an officer's wife. (San Diego Union Feb. 12, 1972, Seattle Times Feb. 4, 1972) Several months passed without reports and the ship was expected back in April. Out of town families had started to arrange for housing in San Diego. The San Diego symphony con-sidered playing a major concert on the flig h t deck as a welcome when the ship returned. This was protested by the Harbor Project and other peace groups and the plan was dropped. (San Diego Union April 1, 1972) On April third when the Connie was near Japan on i t s planned return home, the Navy suddenly announced that i t would instead return to "Yankee Station" for more bombing of Vietnam. (San Diego Union April 6, 1972) The Navy attempted to notify the many dependents who were on their way to San Diego. It was almost three months later that the carrier f i n a l l y did return to San Diego on July f i r s t 1972. It had been gone a total of nine months. The Harbor Project people greeted the returning sailors with literature that emphasized the destruction caused by their mission. 120 Should the USS Constellation have stayed home? Was i t worth the stereo you wanted to pick up clean? Was i t worth the 9 months of loneliness and cramped living?...was i t worth the incredible suffering rained upon Vietnamese children, women and men? (Harbor Project, July 1972) They also invited enlisted men to their storefront bookstore "Second Thoughts" where counseling as well as books were avail-able. They referred to their group as "San Diego Concerned Military". Up From The Bottom also greeted the returning sailors but with an art i c l e that carefully rationalized their participation in the Vietnam war, explaining that they had l i t t l e choice and were themselves victimized by the Navy. They were invited to UFTB's counseling center in downtown San Diego and promised: f u l l support of resources and energy to any effort by Connie crewmen and wives to organize for legal rights, against another WESPAC deployment or any other struggle against the brass in which you can use our aid. We're here to help a l l people in the military gain a decent way of l i f e free from harassment, coercion and oppression. (UFTB July 1972) The Door reported the return of the ship emphasizing i t s destructive role in IndoChina but without c r i t i c i z i n g the crew. (Door July 7-20, 1972) Immediate organizing was not possible as men were given the usual thirty days leave followed by thirty days light duty as the ship was under repairs. At the same time about one third of the crew were replaced as part of the ordinary rotations for some and end of enlistment for others. By October one f i f t h of the crew were not new, not only to the ship but to the Navy. The move-ment papers did not report contact with the reconstituted crew. } 121 The peace community and underground press were occupied this summer and f a l l 1972 with a campaign to get the question of the Air War on the California ballot and with the presidential campaign of Senator George McGovern who was running as an anti-war candidate. Up_ From The Bottom had continued to follow Navy news but l i t t l e was reported from San Diego and nothing from the Constellation. The Harbor Project was cooperating with EMs on the USS Kitty Hawk. The Kitty Hawk was then in WESPAC and the Harbor Project helped by printing a newspaper written by men on the ship. During this summer from one to eleven men took sanctuary from three carriers in the San Francisco Bay area and extensive sabotage was reported on the USS Ranger at Alameda and on the USS Forrestal on the East Coast. The account of the USS Constellation w i l l be interrupted here to follow the Kitty Hawk story. 122 Chapter Eight USS KITTY HAWK STOP OUR SHIP CAMPAIGN Seven Refuse to Leave for Vietnam, February 1972 While the Constellation Vote was being taken the USS Kitty  Hawk, another attack carrier was beginning preparations for sea t r i a l s for a March 1972 deployment to Vietnam. The ship had been in port since July. The crew had been on the customary months leave and were back by the time of the September Connie Vote campaign and October sanctuary events. They also probably knew something about the SOS movement on the Coral Sea in the Bay Area. The Coral Sea had sailed for Vietnam November twelfth amid protest and national publicity as discussed earlier. In December some Kitty Hawk crewmen joined with the Harbor Project to publish a newsletter called Kitty L i t t e r . Harbor Project now had five ex-Navy men including two of the "Connie 8" and a young woman on i t s volunteer staff. This newsletter differed from their earlier Liberty Call by discussing more of the specific problems of enlisted men and using EM terms such as " l i f e r " . There was now more economic analysis of the war and less emphasis on suffering of the Vietnamese. The f i r s t edition reviewed the Connie and Coral Sea anti-war campaigns. At least two hundred copies were mailed to the ship and four thousand others distributed in the San 123 Diego area. The copies sent aboard ship were addressed to individuals who had been asked i f they were willing to be sent the paper. The sailor organizers said that they went up and down the chow lines and noted those with slightly longer hair and asked them for their names to receive the paper. The paper staff thought that more people would read the paper i f there were limited copies available than i f they had sent many copies to the ship. In addition to reports of anti-war movements on other ships the f i r s t issue had news about racism at Camp Pendleton, counseling information about Captain's Mast hearings, comment on the d i f f i c u l t situation of enlisted men, explanations of GI free speech rights, and comment on automated warfare in Indochina. One a r t i c l e that invited crew members to write for the papers was assigned with the sailor's name, Steve Harris, and he had added "During working hours you can find me cleaning the head at frame 03-100/104 6L". (Kitty Litter Nov. 1971) Up From The Bottom also had a letter signed by Kitty  Hawk crew member, Jerry Cich, t i t l e d "Stop the Shitty Kitty". He said he had heard that there might be a campaign similar to the Connie vote or the campaign to stop the Coral Sea or the Kitty Hawk. He hoped i t would be more like the SOS campaign and that enlisted people would be the main ones to organize i t . Enlisted men were invited to come by the Center for Servicemen's Rights (sponsors of UFTB) to talk with him about i t , (UFTB Nov.-Dec. 1971) The same issue featured the XO (Executive Officer) of the Kitty Hawk as the 124 "Lifer of the Month" because of his harassments over haircuts. Hair-cut problems were reported again in the following issue. The CO, Captain Oberg, had liberalized haircuts, but at the same time specifically not allowed braiding of hair. The paper charged that since this only affected Blacks i t was racism. (UFTB, Jan. 1972) By the second issues of both Kitty Litter and UFTB both sailors who had signed their names to articles had been taken off the ship. Harris was given an honorable discharge as a Conscientious Objector and Cich was transferred. Cich wrote an article protest-ing the transfer and asked again for an SOS type campaign on the Kitty Hawk. He also spoke against the war and the Navy's methods of job assignment and about the lack of f u l l information for en-listed people when they are recruited. (UFTB Jan. 1972) Harbor Project people told me that such discharges and transfers were commonly used at this time to remove organizers. One outspoken person might not be removed but as others seemed to be influenced, action was taken. According to them, from thirty to forty-five people were transferred or discharged during each ship campaign. This second issue of Kitty Litter had a picture of the triumphant Connie eight on the cover waving their discharges and captioned "WE WON". There was a f u l l report inside and stories of protest continuing on the Coral Sea and the Enterprise, the Navy's only atomic powered attack carrier. Five hundred sailors on .the Enterprise had signed a petition against the war. Senator McGovern was quoted by Kitty L i t t e r as saying America's bombing 125 of peasants was barbaric. One article attacked the steward system whereby officers have servants. The a r t i c l e explained how Filipino nationals were recruited for this job. The article was headed "institutional racism". Haircuts were s t i l l a problem. Harassment by l i f e r s was explained as the l i f e r ' s way of keeping the men from questioning any orders or from thinking about what they were doing. To prevent thinking, an environment of fear was necessary and so harassment on petty matters was used. One f i l l e r added "Thinking is Cancer to an Aircraft Carrier". (Kitty Litter Jan. 1972) There were analyses of the POW issue and of the Navy's use of the USS Enterprise in the Indian Ocean to threaten India during the Pakistan-Bangladesh war. The role of attack carriers was explained as only for support to counter-revolutionary movements in non-industrial nations. An airman at the Nevada base of the airwing wrote that Captain Oberg had used the ship's intercom to denounce Kitty Litter people as irresponsible dupes. Another a r t i c l e said that Kitty  Litter had been praised by many people while they were at the Nevada base. In February the third issue of Kitty Litter had a letter from a sailor on the Coral Sea: Dear John, Well, I thought I would write to you and t e l l you what I am doing now. I am aboard the USS Coral Sea off the coast of you know where! It took more guts than I had to go to j a i l rather than go here. I think perhaps I wasn't as I thought I was. I think the ship is the one responsible for the children being k i l l e d , The crazy mothers are bombing what they can't see, A l l they do is f l y over land, go to where they think they are supposed to be and drop their bombs, There are so many clouds that they can't see what they're bombing, so 126 they don't know i f i t i s a fuel depot or a school. The morale i s really bad. I think hardly anybody wanted to come over here. Now they realize i t and can't do anything about i t . The officers aboard that let anybody know that they were members of COM a l l got general discharges or transferred. Us enlisted men just get worse jobs. I had to go captain's mast cause I wouldn't go on a bomb working party. They about hung me but George got me out of i t so I don't have anymore of that shit. Well, I better go before you f a l l asleep reading this. The next letter w i l l have combat pay so you can give i t to COM & NVA. Maybe they can use i t . See ya later. Love & Peace, Mark (Kitty Li t t e r , Feb. 1972) A veteran of a Kitty Hawk WESPAC tour of 1966 had visited San Diego and his story of how he had fasted for fifty-one days while trying to get a discharge was featured as an anti-military action. The caste system was protested in another a r t i c l e : ...Every time an enlisted man salutes only because i t is required, he gives himself the finger; every time he says si r to an officer he does not respect, he calls himself "scum"....It is argued that officers have earned their privileges. Can any man earn the right to degrade another as a social inferior?...The ultimate damage of the need-less military class discrimination i s to us a l l as human beings. We are prevented from relating as a person, each of importance in his own right... A similar theme was continued in another a r t i c l e in which individual responsibility was stressed in order to remain a person and a "brother" of others. The alternative was mindless obedience or playing i t cool in the Navy and thus becoming a "non-person", that i s , simply subordinate or superior to others. Another a r t i c l e explained the enlisted men's right to write to congressmen and told them how to go about i t . Senatorial opposition to North Vietnam bombing was covered and details given of a medical aid program in Vietnam that was helping war injured children. There were i l l u s t r a -127 tions and comics. Chaplains were caricatured by a leering cartoon of a chaplain with these comments: This i s Chaplain Luther. Chaplain Luther is a clergyman in uniform on your ship to help you. He w i l l help you with personal problems as well as spiritual ones. Do you s p i r i t -ually or morally object to killing? Are you concerned with sayings from the Bible li k e "thou shalt not k i l l " ? Well have no worries because Chaplain Luther w i l l show you a BUPERS instruction that says i t ' s O.K. (Kitty Litter Feb. 1972) It was rumored that the Hawk might leave a month early. Resistance people thought the Navy was trying to avoid their cam-paign. When the Navy f i n a l l y announced the early departure they said the Kitty Hawk was needed to relieve other,carriers off Vietnam. A special edition of Kitty L i t t e r came out almost on the eve of departure with a story of two Kitty Hawk crewmen who were a l -ready taking sanctuary at the Church of the Brethren in San Diego. The church issued a statement explaining their support as based on belief in freedom of worship and freedom of conscience. A Joan Baez concert for Kitty Hawk crewmen was announced to be held at a local park. There would also be lawyers and counselors for advice. A more insistent anti-war statement was included this time. Think About It.'! People Are Dying!! ... The Kitty Hawk w i l l k i l l thousands of people on this deployment. . . We're a l l  prisoners of war! If you're not a prisoner of war why are you going to s a i l with the stupid ship in a day or two? THINK ABOUT IT! (Kitty Litter Feb. 15, 1972) There was also an art i c l e by a Connie wife who had flown to Hong Kong to meet her husband and been bitterly disappointed when the Navy had suddenly ordered the ship back to duty. If I could see a valid purpose, maybe these separations would 128 be more bearable. But virtua l l y no one believes in this war any more, The ship's mission is one of unjustifiable k i l l i n g and destruction,., sometime, Navy wives w i l l have the courage and honesty to voice their real feelings and opinions. The Navy has already punished me in the worst possible way— they've taken my husband away. (Kitty L i t t e r , Feb. 15, 1972) As the ship sailed the seventeenth of February i t l e f t nine men behind, five more had joined the f i r s t two. Two other sailors from the oiler Mispillion also joined. The oiler was one of the ships that accompanied the Kitty Hawk. These sanctuary events were followed closely by daily reports in the San Diego  Union and they were later reported in the GI and underground press. (San Diego Union Feb. 17, 1972) The sailors were arrested and a l l nine flown to the Kitty Hawk at sea for hearings at Captain's Mast. The seven Kitty Hawk men were given thirty days in the brig and half pay for two months on a charge of Unauthorized Absence. The two crew-men from the Mispillion were returned to their ship for mast. (San Diego Union Feb. 1972) The March fifteenth issue of Kitty L i t t e r went to the ship at sea. It featured the sanctuary story and emphasized that the men were now aboard and were mistreated by the marines guarding the brig. The story of the specific abuses to the sailors was carried in national peace journals and readers were asked to write protest letters to the Captain. The March Kitty Litter had other articles which reported organizing aboard the Coral Sea, then on duty off Vietnam, and protests from the airwing of the carrier USS 129 Midway. A sailor from the Midway who had taken sanctuary was re-ported as honorably discharged. The paper printed a telegram from Senator McGovern to "concerned Kitty Hawk crewmen". He said he shared their objection to the war and pledged to continue to work for U.S. withdrawal from Indochina. A different article complained about the willingness of Congress to vote money for the war. It also listed names of senators that were interested in the rights of servicemen and might take action i f complaints were sent to them. Counseling centers in the Phillipines and Japan were listed. There were pictures of Vietnamese victims of the bombing and several car-toons with cynical remarks about corpsmen and recruiters. (Kitty  Litter March 1972) Back in San Diego, The Door ran a long ar t i c l e on the specific Kitty Hawk crewmen who took sanctuary and on sanctuary as a way of resistance. Some of the ministers and priests had found that their superiors did not support them or their congrega-tions objected to the style of l i f e of the sailors and their friends. Commonly in the sanctuary situation supporters of the men would stay at the churches night and day since i t was never known when the arrests would occur. A priest at the Catholic church that had kept the Connie nine in sanctuary said that there was somewhat of a problem because of FBI charges about the immorality of the group. The FBI had taken pictures of the emerging young men and women as they crawled out of their sleeping bags at 4:30 am. (Door, Feb, 24-Mar, 9, 1972) Sanctuary brought c i v i l i a n peace people and re-130 sisting sailors into very close contact, Usually this became a learning situation for the older peace people and the sailors and ; their friends were treated with respect. Around the country in sanctuary events there were a few d i f f i c u l t days while those of the local peace community who personally held s t r i c t rules on liquor, dope, smoking, sex and language, adjusted. Sanctuary as a tactic ran into another kind of trouble on the ship. A special news release came from Harbor Project countering charges of Captain Oberg that the project had planned to use the sailors for p o l i t i c a l gains at the Republican conven-tion. (The convention was then scheduled for San Diego, later i t was changed to Miami.) The a r t i c l e claimed that i t was Oberg who was trying to deceive the men as the Navy was trying to deceive the country. (Kitty L i t t e r March 1972) The May Kitty Litter re-ported that one of the Kitty Hawk seven had been given a second thirty days for hiding aboard ship for over twenty-four hours and was given an administrative discharge. This was the last reference to the sanctuary group in the paper. Harbor Project people thought that publicity would hinder the processing of discharges for the men. They were particularly mindful of avoiding use of the men's situation for anti-war publicity without their active cooperation. So this time there was no later report of "we've won". (Kitty Litter May 1972) There was an o f f i c i a l daily newsletter aboard the Kitty  Hawk, an eight page mimeograph called the Kitty Hawk Flyer. Its 131 content was quite different from the GI papers. A sailor had sent four copies from March to April to the Harbor Project. The sailor had underlined certain items and added a few of his own comments. There was news of daily events such as movies to be shown and sea meetings with other ships for supply and refueling. There were reports of air accidents and recoveries of pilots. There were brief news reports from the United States. Several articles gave warnings about drugs and alcohol in a "buddy" tone. There was also information about applying for higher rates and human rela-tions stories about several individual crewmen. One a r t i c l e explained why punishments at Mast might seem inconsistent. It told how past disciplinary record, job performance and overall attitude were considered with the "fact that good order and discipline must be maintained on board Kitty Hawk i f we are to function as an effective team." These words had been underlined by the sailor. In the margin he had written "right on cap". (Kitty  Hawk Flyer, Mar. 16, 1972) In an adjacent column there was an arti c l e explaining that sensitivity was needed to end racism in the Navy and that people should be treated as individuals. The conflict between the way Mast punishments are decided and the goal of treating people as individuals was evidently not apparent to the editors or the captain. It was a complaint of EMs especially Black sailors. The sailor had checked a half page art i c l e "chain of command: Necessary or Not". It explained "the chain of command 132 was not designed as harassment, but as military necessity and then gave a few reasons why i t was necessary. It ended "Unfortunately there w i l l always be the disgruntled and discouraged men who have had their chits recommended for disapproval somewhere along the line, but remember: there is always a reason." (Kitty Hawk Flyer April 4, 1972) In the April seventh edition the sailor wrote over an article "take a good hit before reading". It was t i t l e d "Commander Task Force 77 Message on Vietnam" and had been sent throughout the task force. It explained that a crucial battle was shaping up and that: We are assembling the largest carrier task force of this conflict and have been given the necessary operational authorities to effectively use i t ; a l l we need i s a l i t t l e good weather and the best effort of every man jack in the force and we can turn the tide of battle to ensure the South Vietnamese victory, thus enabling them to exercise the right of self-determination. In short, the chips are down, the stakes are high, so let's play the game to the best of our abi l i t y . (Kitty Hawk Flyer, April 7,1972) Adjacent to this article was a picture of a Commander who had been shot down and rescued. The sailor had commented "almost lost 2 in one month!" The April eighth issue featured details of an Alpha Strike (bombing of North Vietnam). It also noted that the Constellation had just rejoined the Kitty Hawk, Coral Sea and Hancock who were now a l l "on the line". (Kitty Hawk Flyer, April 8, 1972) There was an announce-ment of a recruiting program in which selected re-enlistees and boot camp graduates would v i s i t their home town high schools. The sailor noted "more high school talks by us". A poem "The Cocky Hawkers" by a crewmember told of how Vcharlie was fighting a fight that can't be 133 won, for one of the teams which are h i s s t a l k e r s , i s the crew of the K i t t y Hawk, c a l l e d the Cocky Hawkers". By t h i s the s a i l o r had written " a i n ' t t h i s cute?" He had underlined phrases i n a column "What's going on" as follows: . . . i f you're interested i n whether there i s r e a l l y a war going on, s t r o l l up to the f l i g h t deck some night a f t e r f l i g h t ops secures and watch—We are now close enough that  the flashes of the bombs and an occasional sound can be  heard; i f you're r e a l l y lucky, you may be able to see a f l a r e or two... ( K i t t y Hawk Flyer A p r i l 9, 1972) The May issue of K i t t y L i t t e r contrasted with the F l y e r . I t announced the opening of Harbor Project's storefront bookstore, Second Thoughts. There was a long a r t i c l e on President Nixon, the war, and the e l e c t i o n campaign ending with "Ask yourselves, i s a l l t h i s k i l l i n g and violence worth i t ? Is t h i s man worth a damn?" Two excerpts from K i t t y Hawk crewmen's l e t t e r s showed that some men were asking themselves very serious questions: ...my soul was giving me a headache yesterday I sat down and started to think about what I was doing. I f e e l now that there i s no way out, except to r e v o l t against the system t o t a l l y . I believe the Navy i s using t h e i r CO gimic to contradict i t s own applicants. What I mean i s , While you wait for your CO. papers you are s t i l l very much supporting the war. There are not ex-ceptions to the r u l e ; even the most t r i v i a l jobs are e s s e n t i a l to the operation of War Ships etc. They wouldn't have s o - c a l l e d t r i v i a l jobs i f they weren't needed. I t i s also my b e l i e f that the Navy i s using mind bending t a c t i c s to deter the thinking mans mind. As time drags on the edge on everyones s p i r i t seems to be only f a i r . There i s a d e f i n i t e drop i n morale. The rea-son being; there i s not an horizon i n view. Dear Concerned M i l i t a r y , ...My case i s by far not unique among s a i l o r s serving i n WesPac, but perhaps what I say w i l l help others. U n t i l about the f i r s t of March I.was a member of the ships Master At Arms force, a job I was given without my choice or consent. My sole purpose was petty harassment (haircuts, uniform 134 regs, keeping the enlisted rabble from officers country), a job I could not bring myself to do. For this reason many times I received threats, harassment, and later expulsion from the force (much to my pleasure). During my two month stay on the force I experienced, f i r s t hand, most of the wrong things that in my three and one half years in the Navy I tended to overlook; things that I now realize are the basic problems with the military. One instance that sticks in my mind (one that caused me much mental anguish) occured shortly before we reached the P.I., about the end of February. A man was brought up to the MAA office. He was circulating an open letter to Senator McGovern protesting the Kitty Hawk's involvement in the war in Vietnam. The l i f e r s had a f i e l d day trying to verbally rip him and his letter to pieces (harassment, threats, the whole b i t ) . I was told to escort him to the XO for an informal inquiry, which turned out to be another threat session, only at a higher level. I, being very much opposed to this war and in support of the man's right to his letter, stated my feelings to the XO. The XO said he was not there to argue the morality of the war (he gave me the feeling he could really care less), that the issue was the letter and the damages i t could do to him and the captain. He said i f we continued to circulate the letter he would have to find a legal way to stop us. At this time the letter is no longer being circulated. Along with 120 signatures of supporters, i t has been sent to Senator McGovern. The consequences of my involvement: I was in danger of losing my security clearance. For now I have been allowed to keep i t , as long as I do nothing to "jeopredize (sic) the national security." I am f a i r l y certain however, that by writing letters to Senator McGovern and you, I w i l l eventually lose i t , though I do not see how writing letters protesting the war and military injustice breaks security. My letter may not do me much good, but perhaps they w i l l help a fellow shipmate in his personal fight against this war and military injustice. (Kitty Litter, May 1972) The same issue of Kitty Litter had an analysis of the U.S. role i n IndoChina. It emphasized the popular basis of the revolt against the US supported South Vietnamese government. The seven point peace plan proposed by the People's Republic of Vietnam was presented on a f u l l page. The issue also told of how sailors in 135 New Jersey had jumped overboard to j o i n a canoe f l o t i l l a p r o t e s t i n g the s a i l i n g of t h e i r ammunition ship, the N i t r o . Anti-war comics f i l l e d out the e d i t i o n . E l e c t i o n campaign material i n the August issue took up more space than reports from the ship; s i x pages rel a t e d to the McGovern campaign and analysis of the war, as against one of ship news, one on a v a i l a b i l i t y of l e g a l counseling materials, and a poem. In the ship news Captain Townsend had replaced Oberg. Townsend was thought to be less a v a i l a b l e to the crew than the former CO. His punishments at Mast were c r i t i c i z e d : Captain Townsend has shown himself to be one of the o r i g i n a l "law 'n order kids", both at mast and on the IMC. He has im-posed such arcane and r i d i c u l o u s punishments as 3 days' bread and water for such tiny and meaningless "crimes" as unauthor-ized absence. In two consecutive masts, Captain Townsend has put several black men i n t o the b r i g f or f i g h t i n g with white men, while dismissing "with a warning" a white man who spoke i n a demeaning manner to a black man on board, as well as many white men.... ...He has relaxed the h a i r c u t regulations on the ship (much to the chagrin of K i t t y Hawk's number one jingo, Morris Peelle) and said people can have t h e i r h a i r as they want, within rea-son, as long as i t ' s neatly combed and not "fuzzy". A f t e r t h i s incident of blatant racism, he spent several hours t a l k i n g to black s a i l o r s on the f o r e c a s t l e , f i n a l l y adopting at l e a s t one of t h e i r suggestions, the formation of a Human Resources Council to replace the old token Minority A f f a i r s Committee. (K i t t y L i t t e r Aug. 1972) There also was a b r i e f but eloquent poem from a K i t t y Hawk crewmember. It read: A ghost ship D r i f t i n g i n the timeless void.... Cast off by phobias and fears Of the s e l f , Not of others, 136 A grave disaster has taken place, We've cut our throat i t seems. Painting the sun black Is hardly a game. This was the last issue of Kitty Litter . Some of the harbor project people became more involved in McGovern's presidential campaign. The correspondents on the ship may have been transferred. The Captain later reported having transferred "dissidents". September Up Against The Bulkhead, a Bay Area GI protest paper (not to be con-fused with Up_ From The Bottom from San Diego), printed a letter from a Kitty Hawk crewman offering to do some articles against the war. (Up Against The Bulkhead Sept. 1972) There was also a letter printed in Camp News that had originally been sent to the Harbor Project. (Camp News is a national GI protest paper) It told of extended time "on the line" because of a f i r e on another carrier which was rumored as sabotage. Finally the Kitty Hawk i t s e l f had to come in to the Phillipines for repair: We had five main machinery room fires in seven days, o i l fires that could have been very bad. Right now we have only one of four engines and three of eight e l e c t r i c a l generators— a l l of the rest of them are fucked up in one way or another. Number 4 drive shaft coming out of #4 Main lost some bearings and developed a fore and aft movement of about 2' above the waterline. We're not going anywhere for awhile. The Oriskany is in Yokuska, Japan, for extensive structural repair (Camp News Sept. 15, 1972) In the same issue of Camp News two officers from the Kitty Hawk, one a p i l o t and one a bombadier were reported as having turned in their wings as protest against the war. Camp News had picked this up from a GI paper from the Phillipines, Seasick. 137 Chapter Nine USS RANGER IS DISABLED BY SABOTAGE And an Enlisted Man Charged, Tried and Acquitted July 1972 to May 1973 In the summer of 1972 many instances of sabotage were reported on navy aircraft carriers. On the USS Forrestal and the USS Ranger sabotage resulted in delays in sailing and in one half to three million dollars in repairs. August seventh the navy an-nounced that they had arrested a fireman for allegedly throwing nuts and bolts into the huge reduction gears on the main shaft to the Ranger's boiler the month before. One gear was to be replaced at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. The ship would be delayed in sailing to Vietnam by several months. (UFTB Aug. Sept. 19 September eighth the Berkeley Barb reported that the arrested f i r e -man was Patrick Chenoweth and that he was being held incommunicado at Treasure Island Naval Base. The article cheered Chenoweth assum-ing he was guilty. The writer was pleased with the sabotage because of i t s expense to the navy and the delay in the ships scheduled de-parture for Vietnam. They also noted that one of the charges against Chenoweth was an unusual one "sabotage in time of war'. (The Vietnam War was never o f f i c i a l l y de'clared so wartime law did not come into effect.) A New York Times article November sixth noted that the sabo 138 had caused a three and one-half months delay i n the ships sailing and that a fireman had been charged with "sabotage in time of war" as well as "destruction of government property". This was the f i r s t sabotage t r i a l in the Vietnam war. The same article said that Eric Seitz, Chenoweth's attorney, said that fifteen other sabotage acts had been found by the naval investigation service and that more acts had continued after Chenoweth's arrest. The art i c l e described the sabotage as the insertion of a paint scraper and two metal studs into one of the gears. Other sabotage was also detailed, "dis-mantling of valves, plugging of f i r e hoses, destruction of o i l pressure gauges...fouling fresh water supply, f i r e s , a bomb threat, slashed wires, and o i l drainage". An SOS movement teas reported on the ship, SOS stickers were showing up throughout the ship and sometimes on damaged equip-ment. The articles also reviewed the racial incidents on the Kitty  Hawk and Hassayampa and fires and explosions on other ships. (The Constellation strike had not been reported as i t was s t i l l in progress at this:time.)• -The Chief of Naval Operations was reported as sending out "tough" new orders to commanders to improve conditions for Blacks. The Secretary of the Navy had asked a staff meeting of admirals for their advice on how to stop the sabotage. October t h i r t y - f i r s t a retiring admiral had given a speech warning about the dangerous trends in the Navy, especially sabotage. The sabotage was thought to be linked to the SOS movement and to drug usage but not to racial tension. (New York Times, Nov. 6, 1972) 139 The Berkeley Barb of November tenth through sixteenth carried a long ar t i c l e in which itnow emphasized the lack of evidence against Chenoweth. The case consisted of the words of three witnesses who had supposedly heard Chenoweth say he was responsible. The continuing sabotage aboard the Ranger was cited to strengthen Chenoweth's case. His attorney Eric Seitz, was described as being a specialist in military law with the National Lawyers Guild. He planned to challenge the legality of the Viet-nam war on the basis of the Navy charge of "sabotage in time of war". 'Our theory,' Seitz told Barb, 'is that there's so much of this going on now, and i t s a l l so serious, they're so deeply worried and frustrated, that they're going to fasten on anybody they can find. The fact that they've tacked on these charges (those making the alleged offenses "wartime" offenses) is simply unbelievable, a pure case of overreaction; and the reason their over-reacting i s they're so frightened of what's happening. Ordinarily, nobody in his right mind would take a case with this kind of evidence to t r i a l . ' (Berkeley Barb Nov. 10-16, 1972) The next week the Barb reported that the Navy might move the t r i a l to the Phillipines to be nearer the ship. (The Ranger had sailed November twenty-second) The Barb thought this was to allow harassment of the defense staff by the Phillipine government and also remove the t r i a l from the view of the American public. (Berkeley Barb Nov. 17-23, 1972) C i v i l i a n courts became involved in the t r i a l as Seitz was able to get a hearing in Federal Court on the question of pre-tri a l confinement. Judge Peckham, the Federal District Court Judge, gave the Navy ten days to hold a hearing on relaxation of custody or said that he would hold i t himself. The judge also ordered the Navy to stop censoring 140 Chenoweth's mail and to provide for c o n f i d e n t i a l conferences f o r S e i t z with h i s c l i e n t . (Berkeley Barb Nov. 24-30, 1972) P r e t r i a l hearings i n m i l i t a r y court continued as Seitz argued various motions including one to have the jury chosen at random as c i v i l i a n j u r i e s are, rather than handpicked by the base commander. This was denied, The Navy did not hold hearings on p r e - t r i a l confinement and so Judge Peckham held h i s own hearing. He ruled against p r e - t r i a l release because of the "seriousness of the offense". (Berkeley Barb Dec. 1-7, 1972) The defense planned to take t h i s to the US Court of Appeals. (Berkeley Barb Dec. 9-14, 1972) In early January 1973 the Navy judge, Captain Keyes, ordered the t r i a l moved to the Subic Bay Naval Base i n the P h i l l i p i n e s where three of the prosecution witnesses were aboard the Ranger. The Berkeley Barb explained i n d e t a i l how t h i s threatened the defense s t a f f . The P h i l l i p i n e s government had previously raided and then shut down the National Lawyers Guild Center i n Subic Bay. Legal workers had been charged with subversion against the Marcos Govern-ment and one of the Guild attorneys was s t i l l i n j a i l there. He had been arrested a f t e r being turned over to the P h i l l i p i n e government by the U.S. Navy. (Berkeley Barb Jan. 12-18, 1973) Congressman Dellums immediately protested to Admiral Zumwalt on the basis of deni a l of the defendents r i g h t to counsel. He also noted that the t r i a l would remove the Navy's actions from the pu b l i c . Seitz began another s e r i e s .of appeals. He started with the M i l i t a r y Court of Appeal and then went to the U.S. C i r c u i t Court of Appeals. The 141 m i l i t a r y judge, Keyes, had also pronounced on the question of whether the Vietnam war was war. He s a i d that i t was. This confirmed the p o s s i b i l i t y of the sentence for sabotage being as much as t h i r t y years. This also l i m i t e d the defense plans. (Berkeley Barb Jan. 12-18, 1973) February f i f t e e n t h Up From The Bottom interpreted the t r i a l a ction: Pat i s being used as a scapegoat for a l l of the sabotage that i s happening on a l l U.S. ships across the world. The Navy i s choosing to send one man to j a i l rather than take care of the sources of the anger and f r u s t r a t i o n f e l t by everyone i n the Navy and a l l serv i c e s , r a c i a l oppression, horrendous l i v i n g conditions, 12 hour working days, lack of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , m i l i t a r y involvement i n other countries and a multitude of others. Pat needs our support. (UFTB Feb. 15, 1973) In March the Los Angeles Free Press devoted four f u l l pages to a d e t a i l e d h i s t o r y of the sabotage, the t r i a l , the r e s i s -tance movement i n the Navy and Zumwalt's reforms. The a r t i c l e commented on the t a c t i c s of the " a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t s " defending Chenoweth: Within t h i s framework, i t would not be i n Chenoweth's best i n t e r e s t s to say that he did, i n f a c t , disable the Ranger, but that h i s act could be j u s t i f i e d i n terms of Vietnamese l i v e s saved, or i n the context of the fundamental r i g h t s and wrongs of the Indochina war. Therefore the defense holds that Pat Chenoweth i s being framed. Which may be true. From anyone's viewpoint, the d i s a b l i n g of the Ranger was an act of s i g n i f i c a n c e . . . In three months, planes f l y i n g from the boat can d e l i v e r over 30 m i l l i o n rounds of ex-plosives to neighborhoods where peasants and g u e r r i l l a f i g h t e r s l i v e . The United States owns only 14 such attack c a r r i e r s . Because of necessary repairs and commitments elsewhere, a maximum of about eight have been a v a i l a b l e to pu l v e r i z e Vietnam at any given moment. A difference of three c a r r i e r months i s therefore a matter 142 of material interest to a l l parties. The article went on with a friendly biography of Chenoweth noting among other comments that: ...like any enlisted Navy man, he has spent a lot of time holding his round white sailor hat in his hand while indoors, which gives him a deferential appearance. But i f his uniform makes him look humble and military, the impression is offset by his haircut. He slicks his hair straight back from his forehead in the manner of big city stone grease, son of rebel without a cause. It is clearly not the style of a l i f e r , or an Ivy Leaguer either. The article reported that over one thousand people had attended a Free Chenoweth ra l l y led by Jane Fonda on January twenty-second -sponsored by the Free Chenoweth committee. (LAFreep March 9, 1973) More details of the sabotage were given than I had found in any other source. According to this report while the ship was s t i l l in Alameda an officer had discovered a machinery room hatch open and followed this up to find a paint scraper in the o i l sludge beneath the reduction gears. This was taken out and the next day the ship engines were started. A loud noise came from the gears. One engine was then shut down and the ship continued i t s training mission on three engines. Several weeks later when the gears were fina l l y examined, i t was found that several bolts had irreparably damaged the large reduction gear. It was during this training cruise that a naval i n t e l l i -gence agent, a sailor, heard Chenoweth say to a buddy "that was me, yeah, I really messed those gears up. Sorry I fucked you guys up". This report plus a similar one from another buddy, Bailey, were the 143 e n t i r e basis of the Navy's case. (LAFreep March 9, 1973) The appeals against moving the t r i a l to the P h i l l i p i n e s f a i l e d even though they had been c a r r i e d as high as Supreme Court J u s t i c e Douglas. However, a Federal Judge held that the Navy must guarantee the safety of the attorney and h i s s t a f f and also be responsible f o r transportation costs of the defense. The t r i a l was set for mid-April i n the P h i l l i p i n e s when the m i l i t a r y judge, Captain Keyes, suddenly became i l l . The t r i a l was postponed to early May and a new judge flown i n from Hawaii. (Camp News May 15, 1973) By t h i s time the Ranger was preparing to leave i t s WESPAC duty to return to Alameda. (Formal American m i l i t a r y involvement i n the Vietnam war had ended three months e a r l i e r . ) The new judge decided to hold the t r i a l i n San Francisco, a f t e r a l l . The t r i a l began June fourth. The f i r s t prosecution witness, Bailey, was to t e s t i f y that Chenoweth had admitted the sabotage, but to the courts and prosecutions surprise, he refused to t e s t i f y on the basis of h i s f i f t h amendment ri g h t s not to incriminate himself. The following day under considerable pressure from the judge, he was given immunity and did t e s t i f y . Under cross-examination inconsistencies were brought out i n dates of conversations. Seitz t o l d the m i l i t a r y panel that the Navy i n t e l l i g e n c e agents had coached the witness and that the Navy was also pressuring him. (UPI June 6, 1973, Berkeley  Barb June 8-14, 1973) After three hours d e l i b e r a t i o n the m i l i t a r y jury found Chenoweth innocent! National news services c a r r i e d the 144 story complete with a r e c a p i t u l a t i o n of events, a reminder that Chenoweth had been i n j a i l ten months and a quote of part of Chenoweth's statement to the press. At a time i n h i s t o r y when the US m i l i t a r y i s the major genocidal force around the globe, i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y g r a t i f y i n g not only to be free but to have beaten the Navy i n i t s attempt to frame me. (UPI June 13, 1973) Chenoweth was given duty at a l o c a l base, then immediately ordered to three weeks leave followed by an honorable discharge one year early. (Berkeley Barb June 15-21, 1973, June 22-28, 1973) Camp News reported that sabotage continued on many ships. Another s a i l o r had been charged with a f i r e on the Coral Sea and was i n the Treasure Island b r i g . The paper commented: ...the growing attack from within i s an unexpected complication that w i l l have to be faced. In the words of a s a i l o r from the CORAL SEA 'sabotage w i l l become as American as apple pie'. (Camp News July 15, 1973, F-21) 145 Chapter Ten OVER 200 FIGHT ABOARD THE USS KITTY HAWK OCTOBER 1972 On October twelfth 1972 while the K i t t y Hawk was i n action off Vietnam over two hundred Black and white s a i l o r s and marines fought throughout the ship for f i v e hours. Wire services c a r r i e d the story i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . The reports said that f o r t y - s i x had been injured and three of these so badly that they had to be evacu-ated from the ship by he l i c o p t e r . F i r s t reports c a l l e d i t a r a c i a l " t i f f " or " f i g h t " l a t e r i t was referred to as a r i o t . (Seattle P.I. Oct. 14, 1972; Se a t t l e Times, Dec. 27, 1972) As several weeks went by the story began to be f i l l e d out or rather the several d i f f e r e n t s t o r i e s were f i l l e d out. For events preceding the upr i s i n g and during the f i g h t i n g there are piecemeal accounts. There were actions at a number of places throughout the ship. Interpretations d i f f e r e d but few were contradictory. Later reports came out i n the under-ground GI press and from the Black Servicemen's Caucus, a new or-ganization i n San Diego, and also from the congressional i n v e s t i g a t i o n . By the beginning of October the K i t t y Hawk had been away for seven and one-half months. Most of that time was spent "on the l i n e " with twelve to eighteen hours work d a i l y f or the crew. The ship had been expected to return home soon but instead orders were to return for more duty at "Yankee Station". R a c i a l tensions were 146 high. The ship was i n Subic Bay for a weeks rest and recreation when there was some disturbance ashore. UFTB reported that a Black s a i l o r had been stabbed i n the EM club and the marine r i o t squad c a l l e d . They came and used tear gas and the f i g h t i n t e n s i f i e d . The Door was t o l d that a white s a i l o r paid F i l i p i n o nationals to attack Blacks i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y and that f i v e Blacks were slashed and stabbed. (UFTB Dec. 15, 1972; The Door Jan. 10-24, 1972) The Congressional report says that there was a f i g h t at the e n l i s t e d men's club. They were not sure what happened but were w i l l i n g to jump to conclusions: On the tenth of October, a f i g h t occurred at the e n l i s t e d men's club at Subic Bay. While i t cannot be unequivocally established that K i t t y Hawk personnel p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the f i g h t , circumstantial evidence tends to support the conclu-sion that some of the ship's black s a i l o r s were involved since 15 young blacks returned to the ship on the run and i n a very disheveled condition at about the time the f i g h t at the club was brought under c o n t r o l . The following morning the ship returned to combat, con-ducting a i r operations from 1 to 6 pm... At approximately 7 pm, on October 12th, 1972, the ship's i n v e s t i g a t o r c a l l e d a black s a i l o r to h i s o f f i c e f o r questioning about h i s a c t i v i t i e s i n Subic Bay. He was accompanied by nine other black men. They were b e l l i g e r e n t , loud, and used abusive language. Those accompanying him were not allowed to s i t on the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The s a i l o r was apprised of h i s r i g h t s , refused to make a statement and was allowed to leave... (HASC Jan. 2, 1973, p.17674) In r e f e r r i n g to t h i s questioning on the ship, Blacks report that i t was i n i t i a t e d by them to get action against the person who had hired the attackers. They said that only Black s a i l o r s were c a l l e d i n for questioning and that charges were not f i l e d against the white s a i l o r they had accused u n t i l a month l a t e r and l a t e r were dismissed. That , 147 evening about twenty-five Blacks gathered to t a l k about this with the captain. He t o l d them they could meet and t a l k together as long as i t was a peaceful gathering. (The Door Jan. 10-24, 1973; About Face Dec. 1972) Blacks had a number of complaints before t h i s shore incident. They considered job assignments discriminatory and thought they received s t i f f e r penalties at Mast than whites. Blacks were not allowed to give the power salute or t h e i r hand-shake, the dap. No more than three Blacks were allowed to s i t together i n the mess h a l l or congregate anywhere else . B i l l e t i n g was done i n such a way that no more than two Blacks were bunked i n the same area - and i t was against the standing rules to enter other berthing spaces so that Blacks were not able to v i s i t t h e i r f r i e n d s . (Door Jan. 10-24, 1973) The House Armed Services Committee report does not mention any instance of racism and further denies that any e x i s t s (HASC, p.17685). As Blacks gathered that evening on the mess deck, marines were c a l l e d out by a mess cook who said he had been attacked. When they a r r i v e d , one marine corporal e i t h e r drew or attempted to draw his gun. The XO appeared, he was Commander Cloud, a Black man him-s e l f . He ordered the marines to withdraw. He and a white master chief stayed with the s a i l o r s (pp.17674-5). (Cloud had been appointed sometime a f t e r June f i f t h when Townsend had been appointed Captain, at that time the old XO, Pee l l e , had been on duty.) Cloud spoke to the s a i l o r s who were very angry. Behind him, 148 the CO, Captain Townsend, had entered the space but Cloud did not know this. After listening and noting the angry feeling of the Blacks, Captain Townsend l e f t without speaking to his executive officer who had not seen him. The captain then alerted the marines and ordered them to put more guards on the hanger deck and to break up any group of three or more sailors on the deck. The XO did not know of this order and continued to talk with the men on the messdeck for an hour. By then he f e l t the incident was over. The meeting broke up and most l e f t via the hanger decks. They were instantly confronted by an advancing line of twenty-six marine guards (p.17675). The marines moved toward them to contain them in the after end of the deck. As the marines began to make arrests some of the Blacks picked up available hardware and fought back. The Captain appeared on the scene and attempted to calm the situation. The XO also arrived but then l e f t as he was informed of an injury below. Evidently the marine attack had been seen by other Black sailors from the meeting who now ran through the ship waking Blacks and yelling "they're k i l l i n g our brothers". The Congressional report, after reporting the command mix-up quoted Blacks as also yelling " k i l l the white trash, k i l l , k i l l " and " k i l l the son of a bitch". Whites were not quoted. From this time on for four or five hours there were a number of fights at various places on the ship (pp. 17675-6). The ship's dispensary was soon f i l l e d with the wounded and more confrontations occurred there as i t appeared that whites 149 were being treated f i r s t . GI reports and the congressional study are contradictory on what happened i n the dispensary. The s t o r i e s vary from only whites getting care to Blacks demanding they be treated f i r s t . (HASC p.17676; Berkeley Barb Jan. 4, 1973; UFTB Feb. 15, 1973) The confusion i n command continued as the XO was t o l d that the CO had been injured or k i l l e d . The XO then made an announcement over the ship's PA System ordering the Blacks to the Af t e r Messdeck and marines to the Fo'c'sle. The captain however, was a l i v e and w e l l , he was on the hanger deck t a l k i n g to a small number of Black s a i l o r s who were part of the o r i g i n a l group attacked by the marines. The captain heard the XO's orders and went to the clos e s t microphone and countered them, ordering everyone to return to normal duties. These contradictory orders al e r t e d more of the crew that there was trouble aboard. Blacks now began gathering at the Fo'c'sle. XO Cloud met them and talked with them for several hours a f t e r which they returned to t h e i r compartments thus ending the event (HASC p.17676). No arrests were made at f i r s t although there were at l e a s t f o r t y - s i x injured. Senior petty o f f i c e r s and commissioned o f f i c e r s did extra night p a t r o l i n the berthing areas. The ship continued on i t s bombing mission. Two weeks l a t e r when the ship pulled into Subic Bay i n the P h i l l i p i n e s , twenty-one Blacks were arrested and flown back to the U.S. f o r t r i a l . F ive other Blacks were to be t r i e d on the ship. Later one white man was charged. (HASC pp.17675-6, 150 UFTB Feb. 15, 1973) Congressman Dellums together with three other senators and representatives and the Mayor of Berkeley asked the Navy to inves t i g a t e . (Berkeley Barb Dec. 1-7, 1972) The House Armed Services Sub-committee did an i n v e s t i g a t i o n but Dellums was not appointed to the sub-committee even though he was the only Black member of the Armed Services Committee. The Navy t r i a l s took over f i v e months. The defense was supported by the San Diego Black Servicemen's Caucus, the American C i v i l L i b e r t i e s Union and the National Association f o r the Advance-ment of Colored People. Early i n the t r i a l s the defense was able to show how a Navy witness had l i e d and to challenge a number of other i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , for instance the white e n l i s t e d prosecution witnesses had been assigned to duty s t a t i o n i n the l e g a l o f f i c e where the case was being prepared. The ACLU charged that due process had been denied. Several of the harsher sentences were then withdrawn, but the t r i a l s continued. The only white defendant was acquitted as were three Blacks. Charges were dropped for f i v e others. Fourteen were found g u i l t y of assault and four of r i o t i n g . By t h i s time many had already served f i v e months i n the b r i g . Several of those who had had charges dropped could not be freed because they had been c i t e d with new charges of contempt from alleged misconduct i n the b r i g . Although by the dropping of the f i r s t charges i t was admitted that they shouldn't have been held at a l l , these secondary charges were honored and sentences given. The t r i a l s were a l l well p u b l i c i z e d i n l o c a l and national newspapers and the GI and underground press January through May 1973. 151 (Door Jan. 10-24, 1973; UFTB Feb. 15, 1973; LAFreep Mar. 9-13, 1973; Camp News Mar. 13, 1973; About Face A p r i l 1973; UFTB A p r i l 1973) The question of charges as we l l as prosecution of the case was evidently very p o l i t i c a l , Camp News quoted New York Times report of the view of a Navy captain: You c a l l i t a r i o t , you say that the charges were too harsh. Well, you know what the people out here are saying, the re-t i r e d Navy men you meet on the golf course? They're not t a l k -- ing r i o t , they c a l l i t mutiny. They say they should have been charged with mutiny." Camp News commented that even r i o t charges had not held up i n court. (Camp News May 15, 1973) The House Armed Services Sub-committee investigated the K i t t y  Hawk incident and the l a t e r C o n s t e l l a t i o n s t r i k e . They gathered testimony from o f f i c e r s and a few e n l i s t e d men, but none of the Blacks who had been involved i n the f i g h t s . The sub-committee reported that there was no racism aboard the K i t t y Hawk and that the problem re-sulted from recruitment of low i n t e l l i g e n c e Blacks who had not been given adequate t r a i n i n g . Zumwalt's program of "permissiveness" had, according to the report, robbed midmanagement of t h e i r authority. They did admit that some Blacks thought the Navy was discriminatory but they added that t h i s was misperception. In any case, even perception of racism was considered i r r e l e v e n t since: The subcommittee has been unable to determine any p r e c i p i t a t i n g cause for the rampage aboard the USS K i t t y Hawk. Not only was there not one case wherein r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n could be pi n -pointed, but there i s no evidence which indicated that the blacks who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n that incident perceived r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , e i t h e r i n general or i n any s p e c i f i c , of such a nature as to j u s t i f y b e l i e f that v i o l e n t reaction was re-quired. (HASC 17668) 152 The Congressional report was greeted as an i n c r e d i b l e white-wash by the underground and GI press and to some extent the regular press. (The reception of the report w i l l be considered i n more d e t a i l i n the report of the Connie Strike.) The story of the mixup of command det a i l e d i n the congressional report had also been noted i n the GI reports. Neither the report nor the GI a r t i c l e s picked up the p o s s i b i l i t y that the captain did not t r u s t h i s Black executive o f f i c e r . The committee evidently did not even consider the command mixup important. This i s puzzling because i n the HASC v e r s i o n . i t i s the captain's inconsistent commands that p r e c i p i t a t e d the f i g h t i n g . A f t e r returning home and undergoing drydock repairs the K i t t y Hawk l e f t again for Vietnam i n l a t e November 1973 under a new captain. The Indochina war had been o f f i c i a l l y over since January. In December when the ship was i n the P h i l l i p i n e s f i r e was reported i n the engine room. Six men were k i l l e d and t h i r t y - e i g h t injured. Up From The Bottom printed a l e t t e r from .a K i t t y Hawk s a i l o r about unsafe conditions on the ship. The l e t t e r had been received p r i o r to the f i r e . In an accompanying a r t i c l e UFTB blamed the accident on the unsafe conditions of the ship and noted that t h i s was t y p i c a l of conditions thoughout the f l e e t . They charged that even i n September.when the ship was inspected i n Hawaii i t had been found unsafe. (UFTB, December 15-January 15, 1974) The s i x men k i l l e d were apprentices or non-rated firemen and a l l under twenty-one. At l e a s t one s a i l o r was only seventeen. None of them could have received very much t r a i n i n g . The Navy awarded the men bravery c i t a t i o n s posthumously and claimed that they had w i l l i n g l y stayed i n the 153 compartment to f i g h t the f i r e . (Navy Times, A p r i l 10, 1974:23) UFTB pointed out that the regular f i r e f i g h t i n g p o l i c y i s always to lock the hatch without waiting to evacuate firemen. They noted that a l l of the bodies were found by the hatch where they must have been waiting f o r i t t o b e opened - not f i g h t i n g the f i r e . (UFTB, May 15-June 15, 1974) 154 Chapter Eleven 130 BLACK SAILORS STRIKE TWICE ON THE USS CONSTELLATION NOVEMBER 1972 The f i r s t news of the fight on the Kitty Hawk had reached San Diego by October fourteenth 1972. The crew of the Constellation had many opportunities to hear about i t as they were in and out of port on training cruises. Associated Press and United Press Inter-national carried news of the Kitty Hawk throughout the eighteenth. Three weeks later, November f i f t h , the Connie made headlines when one hundred thirty sailors were put off the ship because of an earlier strike at sea on November third and fourth (Seattle, Channel 7 TV Nov. 5, 1972, A.P. Nov. 5, 1972) Information about this and subsequent events came out over the the next three months from many sources. Explanations varied but there was considerable agreement about the sequence of events. The Connie started sea t r i a l s on October fourth. By October seventeenth Blacks were meeting informally to talk about their griev-ances. The usual place was the after mess decks called the "sidewalk cafe". The executive officer attended the meeting on the eighteenth. Other meetings followed, sanctioned as o f f i c i a l human relations dis-cussions. The executive officer or other officers were in attendance. The Black sailors decided to document their perceptions of prejudice. They appointed representatives to examine records of non-judicial 155 punishment to check for r a c i a l bias. The ship had returned to port and then l e f t again several days l a t e r on October t h i r t i e t h . At sea on October t h i r t y - f i r s t , d i v i s i o n o f f i c e r s were asked by Captain Ward to f i n d two hundred f i f t y volunteers for shore duty. According to the captain t h i s was to make room for the a i r personnel coming aboard. According to some of the crew i t was to get r i d of dissidents and protestors on the ship. This was talked about throughout the ship. Considerable un-easiness was f e l t among Blacks that they would be targeted for shore duty and then receive less than a f u l l honorable discharge. Admin-i s t r a t i v e discharges can be given as Honorable, General or Undesir-able. Bad Conduct and Dishonorable discharges are only given by courts. Any discharge other than honorable has great disadvantages that follow the s a i l o r back into c i v i l i a n l i f e . I t i s d i f f i c u l t , sometimes impossible to get c i v i l i a n jobs with one of these d i s -charges i n your background. The undesirable, bad' conduct and d i s -honorable discharges mean the loss of most veterans b e n e f i t s . Even an honorable discharge may have a code number which shows that i t was for "convenience of the government". An employer who knows what these numbers mean and many do, might not h i r e someone i n t h i s category. (Door Nov. 17-Dec. 1, 1972) Blacks had already noted that they were more l i k e l y to get lower scores on entrance tests and more u n s k i l l e d duty assignments. Their superior senior petty o f f i c e r s were more l i k e l y to give them lower marks on t h e i r performance evaluations. A l l these i n turn l e d 156 to more c i t a t i o n s of misconduct, more Captain's Mast hearings with more severe sentences than whites. This record of Masts and punish-ments along with performance comments from the supervisors and entrance examinations could a l l be used to j u s t i f y a punitive administrative discharge. There were three hundred f i f t y Black crewmen on the Connie and very few Black petty o f f i c e r s . There were no Black o f f i c e r s . The number of people aboard was about f o r t y - f i v e hundred. These grievances were formalized at a November f i r s t meeting. On November second i t was learned that s i x men, a l l Black, had been asked to sign for administrative discharges. This was i n s p i t e of the good service record of several. The administrative discharges were based on t h e i r o r i g i n a l GCT scores ( m i l i t a r y IQ tests) and service records. Blacks were outraged. If the men had scored high enough to get i n the Navy, the same score should hardly be used for j u s t i f i c a t i o n to throw them out, p a r t i c u l a r l y without an honorable discharge. (Door Nov. 17-Dec. 1, 1972) This same incident was explained d i f f e r e n t l y by the congressional sub-committee. They re-ported that the Captain had i d e n t i f i e d f i f t e e n s a i l o r s as agitators and had asked that t h e i r records be reviewed to see i f ^ administrative discharges would be possible. (HASC p.17677) By the morning of November t h i r d people were already gather-ing on the forward mess deck to t a l k about t h i s . The executive o f f i c e r met with them and was asked to announce over the PA system that he had agreed to stop giving administrative discharges. Instead he c i r c u -lated a f l y e r around the ship that said t h i s . It also announced an 157 open meeting of the human resources council for 9P.M. (HASC p.17678) The morning meeting continued. By noon the group had grown large enough that i t was c a l l e d a s i t - i n by the executive o f f i c e r . The men were ordered out and regrouped on the main mess deck. Marines were ordered to the area, but the Chief Master at Arms decided t h i s was unnecessary and they were p u l l e d back. F i f t y to two hundred f i f t y men had gathered at t h i s time and the ship's human r e l a t i o n s c o u n c i l members continued to meet with them. The regular meeting convened at 9pm and the human r e l a t i o n s counselors remained u n t i l 1 midnight. (HASC p.17678) As the meeting went on the men asked to have the Captain t a l k to them and sent a human r e l a t i o n s counselor to see him. Captain Ward refused. The group then elected three representatives to go to him. The captain talked to them b r i e f l y then ordered them out. He was l a t e r asked by other representatives a t h i r d time and refused. By the time of the l a s t r e f u s a l i t was past midnight and the group i n the mess had grown to over three hundred. Armed marines appeared again, together with senior personnel and they surrounded the area. The s a i l o r s were asked to leave, but not formally ordered, and one hundred f i f t y l e f t . Food and blankets were passed out among the remainder. There was a f e e l i n g of exulta-t i o n as they r e a l i z e d they had taken over the main mess deck. (Door Nov. 17-Dec. 1, 1972, UFTB Dec. 1972) At t h i s same time there was considerable consultation between the Captain and h i s superiors i n the navy chain of command. The P a c i f i c 158 F l e e t Commander, Vice Admiral Walker had probably v i s i t e d the ship by h e l i c o p t e r . At 4 A.M. an A l l Hands muster was c a l l e d on the f l i g h t deck. The sit-down s a i l o r s stayed where they were. I t was announced that the ship had developed problems with t h e i r drinking water and would be returning to San Diego. The ship docked there at 9 A.M. The captain then did meet b r i e f l y with the s t r i k i n g s a i l o r s and t o l d them they would be put ashore as a beach detachment to discuss t h e i r grievances. They went ashore, there were no reports of resistance. Later the captain reported to the congressional committee that he had refused the requests of h i s superiors to keep the men aboard. One hundred thirty-two s a i l o r s l e f t the ship. (HASC p. 17679) The shore group included eight white s a i l o r s whose r o l e was not c l e a r . One of them l a t e r said that he was put ashore with the others although he had not been part of the mess deck s t r i k e . He had previously applied for a discharge as a conscientious objector. He f e l t that he and the other whites were used to make i t look as i f i t was not a r a c i a l incident. (UFTB A p r i l 1973) This was also the claim of GI papers and the San Diego support group, the Black Servicemen's Caucus. The men were taken to North Island Naval Sta t i o n as a beach detachment and spent the next several days discussing t h e i r s i t u a t i o n with a LCDR C o l l i n s who was the Naval A i r Force P a c i f i c Fleet's Public A f f a i r s O f f i c e r . This time was reported as regular duty i n the EMs service records. The men had been put ashore on Saturday, November fourth. Their ship l e f t the f i f t h and returned unexpectedly the seventh. A j e t plane was over the side. The Captain said t h i s was the reason 159 for the return, the s a i l o r s were s k e p t i c a l . They thought the Navy had ordered the Captain back to t a l k to them. That same day the ship l e f t and again returned. This time, according to the congres-s i o n a l committee i t was by order of the f l e e t commander that the captain t a l k to the men. He did meet with them on Wednesday, the eighth. The men asked that previous administrative discharges and Captain's Mast sentences be reviewed and that they be given amnesty for t h e i r s t r i k e . The s a i l o r s claimed that they did not get a firm promise. The sub-committee report says that the Captain had agreed to a sentence review but had put some conditions on amnesty (p.17679). The Captain ordered them to report the following morning at 8 A.M. a f t e r overnight l i b e r t y . At 7:30 A.M. November ninth, one hundred twenty-nine men assembled and t o l d o f f i c e r s they would not board. The Captain did not confront the men with a d i r e c t order beyond the one he had given the night before. At 8 A.M. they held t h e i r own muster and saluted the f l a g ! They said t h i s was to show that they were s t i l l part of the U.S.Navy and that t h e i r protest was only against s p e c i f i c r a c i a l abuses. The congressional study says they were "allegedly acting on advice from an u n i d e n t i f i e d high l e v e l source i n the Pentagon" (p.17679). The s a i l o r s continued to ask for amnesty, i n v e s t i g a t i o n of Captain's Mast and i n v e s t i g a t i o n of administrative discharges on the ship. At f i r s t , several o f f i c e r s mingled with the group and t r i e d to t a l k with them, but the s a i l o r s asked them to leave and they did. The men sat down and waited. During t h i s time Captain Ward talked 160 with c i v i l i a n representatives of the s a i l o r s and also had telephone consultations with CNO Zumwalt. He also consulted the Secretary of the Navy, Warner. F i n a l l y at 2 p.m. a f t e r s i x hours of the dock s i t -i n the s a i l o r s were t o l d they would not be ordered to the ship and that Captain Ward would arrange for t h e i r transfers. The men f e l t they had won t h i s round (Door Nov. 17-Dec. 1, 1972). They j o y f u l l y boarded buses back to North Island Naval Station where they were expected to continue the discussion of t h e i r grievances. However they found on a r r i v i n g that one t h i r d had been bussed to Mirimar Naval Station and another t h i r d to Imperial Naval A i r Station (Berkeley Barb Nov. 17-23, 1972). That was the end of the s t r i k e . One hundred twenty-three of the men were t r i e d f o r being on Unauthorized Absence for s i x hours. Captain's Mast hearings were held for a few men at a time. They were fined twenty-five d o l l a r s and some may have been reduced i n grade. Twenty-nine were discharged. They probably received general discharges although t h i s i s not c l e a r . There was agreement i n most reports that the punishments were mild and that racism did e x i s t i n the Navy. (Berkeley Barb, UPI Nov. 10, 1972, Los Angeles Times Nov. 23, 1972) November tenth Admiral Zumwalt made national news by t e l l i n g a group of admirals and marine generals that the incidents on the K i t t y Hawk, the Hassayampa and the C o n s t e l l a t i o n were a l l due to f a i l u r e of commanders to implement hi s r a c i a l reforms (New York Times Nov. 12, 1972). Many admirals and commanders and even middle manage-ment people reacted to t h i s with anger and action. The story of t h i s 161 resistance w i l l be considered for i t s e l f as the s i x t h case h i s t o r y . The congressional study was done as part of t h i s top l e v e l resistance to Zumwalt and his managerial program. The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Hebert, suspected that the problem was not racism but a breakdown i n d i s c i p l i n e and set up a committee to investigate. According to him i t was Zumwalt's f a u l t f or h i s p o l i c y of permissiveness rather than genuine Black grievances. (Seattle P.I. Nov. 14, 1972) The sub-committee announced most of t h e i r conclusions before they had f i n i s h e d the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Zumwalt's reforms, permissiveness and e s p e c i a l l y the i n i t i a t i o n of Human Relations Councils were c i t e d as the underlying causes. The Human Relations Councils were attacked because they were thought to "short c i r c u i t " the chain of command. They f e l t a l l of these influences had led to a lack of d i s c i p l i n e r e s u l t i n g i n the disturbances. As i n the case of the K i t t y Hawk, they could f i n d no evidence of racism. The actual testimony was not made p u b l i c , but the committee published a summary of events with recommendations for the future. This i s the report c i t e d as HASC. They said that the s i t downs had been led by a small group of agi t a t o r s . " F i f t e e n agitators orches-trated the whole a f f a i r " (p.17685). On another page they said twenty to twenty-five men were responsible (p.17668). Neither statement was further elaborated by s p e c i f i c findings or i d e n t i -f i c a t i o n of agi t a t o r s . They pointed out that young Black r e c r u i t s were e a s i l y led and that the general a t t i t u d e of Blacks was p a r t l y to blame (p. 17685). 162 Time Magazine was c r i t i c a l of the sub-committee hearings and c a l l e d them an attack on Admiral Zumwalt and h i s program (Nov. 27, 1972). The o f f i c e r s ' j o u r n a l Proceedings reported the findings i n A p r i l 1973 under a headline " H i l l Unit Cites Permissiveness i n Incidents on Navy Ca r r i e r s " . The a r t i c l e consisted of a quote of a Washington Post a r t i c l e of January twenty-fourth. The Post a r t i c l e summarized the findings, quoted some of the statements about the problem of permissive-ness, but did not e d i t o r i a l i z e beyond t h i s s e l e c t i o n . Movement coverage of the Co n s t e l l a t i o n events had seldom used the word mutiny to describe the s t r i k e . The Berkeley Barb did use the term once and then i n quotes, although i t was a headline. In the a r t i c l e i t s e l f s i t - i n was used. The Door and Up_ From The Bottom i n San Diego were cautious. They referred to the actions as "refused to board," "mass demonstration," "seized the main mess," " s i t - i n , " and "stood up against the Navy". The regular press used "sit-down," "refused to board" but mutiny only i n the context of quoting the Captain when he stated that he had not given the men a d i r e c t order to avoid the p o s s i b i l i t y of mutiny (UPI, AP, November 24, 1972). The subcommittee's report f r e e l y used mutiny, for instance, "engaged i n mutiny or a 'sit-down' s t r i k e . " They also used "refused to move" and "refused to board." According to the UCMJ a person i s g u i l t y of mutiny i f he or she: . . . with intent to usurp or override lawful m i l i t a r y authority, refuses, i n concert with any other person, to obey orders or otherwise to do h i s duty or creates any violence or disturbance. (Section 894, A r t i c l e 94) The punishment for mutiny i s "death or such other punishment as a court-ma r t i a l s h a l l d i r e c t . " 163 As i t happened these events mutinous or otherwise, l o s t t h e i r newsworthiness and the ship l e f t f o r a seventh deployment to Southeast As i a on January f i f t h 1973. It was to j o i n i n the heaviest bombing i n the war. About one hundred protestors, c i v i l i a n s and EMs, held a v i g i l as the ship l e f t . The one hundred and twenty-nine s t r i k e r s , sit-downers or mutineers whichever they were, were not on board (UFTB, February 15, 1973). Ten months l a t e r the Connie was again i n port i n San Diego with a new captain. Up_ From The Bottom reported more EM harassment and a publ i c r e l a t i o n s e f f o r t on the ship: How h y p o c r i t i c a l i t was to see the p u b l i c i t y the Con s t e l l a t i o n made out of giving blood f o r a l i t t l e boy whose blood won't c l o t . They made sure i t got on TV and i n the papers, showing what i t s men were doing for t h i s boy. A short time l a t e r , they were t r e a t i n g these men l i k e school children. Remember the o l d h a l l passes? On the Con s t e l l a t i o n , they're making the men get walking c h i t s to get o f f the ship during working hours. To get o f f i n c i v i e s during those hours you need to show a l i b e r t y c h i t at the brow. . . . They show what dimwits the CO and XO of the ship are. Perhaps they enjoy pushing people into having sitdowns or r i o t s . Keep i t up, and i t w i l l happen, Captain Speer. (UFTB, December 1973) 164 Chapter Twelve ADMIRALS REACTION NOVEMBER 1972 Insurrection and sabotage at sea have touched off insurrections and sabotage of a d i f f e r e n t kind ashore. . . . Armed with the ammunition provided by the race r i o t s and sabotage, many admirals have shown t h e i r own lack of d i s c i p l i n e by campaigning for Zumwalt's ouster. Some have made l a t e night phone c a l l s to Pentagon correspondents. Administration o f f i c i a l s and p o l i t i c i a n s have been cornered at c o c k t a i l p a r t i e s . (Time Magazine, November 27, 1972:20) A year and a h a l f l a t e r when Zumwalt was getting ready to r e t i r e a f t e r his f u l l term, a New York Times s t a f f w r i t e r commented: "Zumwalt i s probably the only chief of naval operations i n h i s t o r y who had a group of r e t i r e d admirals t r y to unseat him i n midterm". (Seattle P.I., May 19, 1974) The admirals r e v o l t had a h i s t o r y beginning with Zumwalt's appointment as CNO i n 1970. He was recommended by Secretary of the Navy, John Chafee, and o f f i c i a l l y appointed by President Nixon. T h i r t y -three senior admirals were passed over to pick Zumwalt, the youngest CNO ever to hold that o f f i c e . He was forty-nine. Zumwalt began his term with plans to increase reenlistment rates or " r etention" as t h i s i s referred to by navy o f f i c e r s . He accordingly issued orders which he thought would make navy l i f e more a t t r a c t i v e or at l e a s t l e s s humiliating to EMs. He c a l l e d t h i s his "people program" and personalized h i s orders as Z-grams. M i l i t a r y journals c a r r i e d s t o r i e s of how Zumwalt was t r y i n g to b u i l d a "mod" navy. One 165 chief thought that authority was being taken away from NCOs and thus was forcing them to be "nice guys". A nice guy was one who instead of commanding men t r i e d to please them ( A l l Hands Sept. 1970). Other writers noted that the l i v i n g conditions on ships were getting to be too s o f t and l i f e i n shore barracks too easy. (Z-grams 35, Sept. 1970, had permitted beer i n senior e n l i s t e d barracks.) Z-gram 57 was issued November tenth 1970. This was aimed at "chicken regulations". These were regulations that were notorious for t h e i r use by chiefs to harass EMs. The most co n t r o v e r s i a l as-pects of Z-gram 57 were i t s l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of h a i r and beard s t y l e s and i t s r e l a x a t i o n of the rules for occasions where working dungarees could be worn. By January twenty-first 1971, less than two months l a t e r , Z-gram 57 had been d r a s t i c a l l y amended."' I t s provisions for freedom of h a i r s t y l e and wearing of working uniforms had been revised. This was reported i n A l l Hands with a short explanation: As a r e s u l t of f i e l d t r i p s , personal contacts and correspondence with Navymen, the Chief of Naval Operations had issued further c l a r i f y i n g changes to o f f i c i a l Navy p o l i c y i n two areas - -hai r grooming and uniforms. (March 1971, p.32) E x p l i c i t reasons f o r the change were guessed at i n e d i t o r i a l comment i n the Armed Forces Journal: Navy Secretary John Chafee and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Elmo Zumwalt are f e e l i n g the kick of an admirals' back-lash that has been gathering steam ever since November, when Zumwalt unveiled h i s concept of an all-dungaree, mod-hair-style new Navy where anything goes. 5 Two years l a t e r the order allowing dungarees to be worn o f f duty was cancelled e n t i r e l y . ( A l l Hands March 1973) Hair and beard rules were l i m i t e d again i n A p r i l (Navy Times A p r i l 25, 1973). 166 At the Commanders-in-Chief conference held here i n mid-January, Zumwalt's assembled four-star admirals - the top eight o f f i c e r s under h i s command - t o l d him b l u n t l y that the Navy had gone overboard on rel a x a t i o n of d i s c i p l i n e . The admirals also reported that Zumwalt's free-and-easy con-cession of p r i v i l e g e s to young boot seamen had aroused b i t t e r complaint among the mid-level petty o f f i c e r s and chiefs ( i n essense, the hard-hats of the Navy) who had worked long years to earn j u s t such p r i v i l e g e s as are now being extended to a l l hands. "The whole middle l e v e l of leadership on whom we have to de-pend-both o f f i c e r s and petty o f f i c e r s " , said one admiral, soon a f t e r the conference, " i s simply being bypassed, and they re-sent i t " . (AFJ March 15, 1971, p.17) The events leading up to t h i s resistence were described also. Decem-ber f i f t h , Admiral Hyland, the Fl e e t Commander of the P a c i f i c , had r e t i r e d with a warning speech: How f a r can we permit absolute freedom of speech, deportment and dress, and s t i l l hang onto that indispensable element of d i s c i p l i n e ? Such freedoms, have always been set i n abeyance by men i n uniform. I t i s necessary that they forego some of them to protect the freedom of a l l . (AFJ, p.17) Zumwalt compromised by r e v i s i n g his order, but according to the Armed  Forces Journal, he also took counter measures. His "up or out" p o l i c y , as i t applied to admirals, could remove some of h i s c r i t i c s from the active Navy. Senior f l a g o f f i c e r s are asking i f youthful (for the post) CNO Zumwalt may not be f e e l i n g i l l at ease i n the continued presence on a c t i v e duty of so many o f f i c e r s h i s senior i n age and once his seniors i n rank. This, they say, i s the upshot of the re-cent memo to a l l f l a g o f f i c e r s on continuation/retirement p o l i c y . The embittered admirals say the Navy i s fo r c i n g f l a g o f f i c e r s into early retirement both by es t a b l i s h i n g and adhering to a r b i t r a r y plucking board percentages and by personal l e t t e r s from CNO when they reach around age 58... (AFJ Mar. 15, 1971) 167 A year l a t e r only four of the seven f u l l admirals remained on a c t i v e duty. Zumwalt also t r i e d c o n c i l i a t i o n with a l e t t e r to r e t i r e d o f f i c e r s explaining his program i n terms of need for retention. (AFJ Mar. 15, 1971) In January 1972, Armed Forces Journal pub-lis h e d an interview with the Admiral. To the question "what was the most d i f f i c u l t aspect of your job," he answered: ...getting anything done. There are so many checks and balances i n any bureaucratic government - and here t h i s i s not i d e o l o g i c a l but I think i t ' s even more true of the communist or d i c t a t o r i a l government than with a democratic government, but j u s t the sheer bureaucracy of modern government makes i t d i f f i c u l t to get business done quickly. What surprised him most i n h i s new job was: ...the discovery that, despite the fact that a decision may have been made by me within the Navy, we s t i l l f i n d occasion-a l l y that we have to s e l l the idea to the action o f f i c e r ! In short, the "system" i s sometimes such that the word doesn't always get to the guy who has to implement the decision. (AFJ Jan. 1972) And so the Admiral came to recognize that h i s power was l i m i t e d . However he continued to press for changes i n other areas, e s p e c i a l l y race r e l a t i o n s , u n t i l the f a l l of 1972 and the occasions of the C o n s t e l l a t i o n s t r i k e and K i t t y Hawk f i g h t and a second much more stubborn resistance by h i s admirals. As manning the Navy became a problem i n the 1970s and the d r a f t was to end, the Navy expected to r e c r u i t a higher percentage of Blacks as a consequence of the l i m i t e d opportunities offered to Black people i n c i v i l i a n l i f e . There was also a s p e c i a l m i l i t a r y c i v i l i a n r e h a b i l i t a t i o n program "project 100,000" aimed at poorly educated people which included many Blacks. The Navy had a rep-168 u t a t i o n as being r a c i s t but i n s p i t e of th i s Zumwalt hoped to somehow make Blacks f e e l welcome. Race Relations Assistants were assigned to a l l commands as a f i r s t e f f o r t . He also asked the r e c r e a t i o n a l plan-ners to use programming of i n t e r e s t to Blacks and asked the canteen managers to stock items and magazines of use and i n t e r e s t to Blacks. Barbers were to learn how to cut the Navy version of a "natural". An A f f i r m a t i v e Action p o l i c y was i n s t i t u t e d and i t was used to pro-mote a few Blacks already i n high p o s i t i o n s , to higher status. This evidently had l i t t l e % e f f e e t on. the s i t u a t i o n of most Blacks. The K i t t y Hawk f i g h t i n October 1972 brought national attention to the issue and alarmed the Navy. The evening of November t h i r d the f i r s t s i t - i n of the Connie S t r i k e began. On November fourth an order went out to f l e e t commanders to take d e f i n i t e measures to get r i d of racism i n t h e i r commands. ...chief of naval operations approved an unprecedented order t e l l i n g a l l commands that i n e f f e c t , t h e i r careers may depend on how quickly they move to improve conditions for the growing numbers of blacks i n the f l e e t . (NY Times Nov. 6, 1972) Following the end of the Co n s t e l l a t i o n S t r i k e the next week on November tenth Zumwalt.called eighty of h i s admirals and marine generals together and an g r i l y c r i t i c i z e d them for not following his orders. According to the news report he t o l d them that the incidents were: ' c l e a r l y due to f a i l u r e of commands to implement' new r a c i a l programs 'with a whole heart'. He ins t r u c t e d the Navy's high command to 'seek out and take appropriate action, either punitive or administrative' against those who engage i n or condone discriminatory p r a c t i s e s or who have 'violated e i t h e r the s p i r i t or the l e t t e r of our equal opportunity program'. 1 6 9 ...Minority affairs assistants appointed to deal with rac i a l problems afloat and ashore, have been 'effectively hamstrung' in too many cases he said...'I am speaking to you and through you to the Navy's entire command structure to emphasize again that this issue of discrimination must be faced openly and ful l y ' . (New York Times Nov. 12, 1972) It was after this lecture that the admirals mutiny began. Exactly what happened in the inner circles is not available infor-mation, however one mode of action used by both sides was to give information to the media. There were reports of an attempt to get ri d of Zumwalt, his "permissiveness" and his race relations programs. The CNO's speech to the admirals had become immediate news. Re-porters rushed to interview him. They asked how he intended to enforce his policy toward commanders who failed to carry out his programs "with a whole heart": We w i l l insist that the selection boards pay great attention to a man's performance in this area, and those who are not really fully conscious of the need for absolute and total equality w i l l , over time, be weeded out in the Navy's selection system. (A.P. Nov. 12, 1972) He also said that the Inspector General would have his office make spot checks as well as other investigations to follow up on two hundred different equal-opportunity programs. Zumwalt evidently had the support of the two people most needed for these two enforcement procedures and by July had added a third. One was the head of BUPERS, Vice-Admiral David Bagley and the other was the Inspector General of the Navy, Vice-Admiral Means Johnston. In July, a new Vice-CNO, Admiral Hollowell was to take 170 o f f i c e . ^ He had been appointed p r i o r to January 1973. The next v i s i b l e step i n Zumwalt's defense was a statement released from "Navy o f f i c i a l s " that showed how d i s c i p l i n e had im-proved dramatically since Zumwalt had taken command. (UPI, November 19, 1972) The following action was more of a compromise with h i s c r i t i c s . He issued Z-gram 117 s p e c i f i c a l l y to young e n l i s t e d men on November fourteenth and demanded s t r i c t obedience under threat of punishment: This s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e and subordination of s e l f f o r the good of a l l i s absolutely mandatory for any organization, c i v i l i a n or m i l i t a r y , to function properly. I t cannot be any other way. . . . I am aware of the extra hours worked and the overlong deployments experienced by many; but the Navy i s no d i f f e r e n t than any other i n s t i t u t i o n i n that i t requires complete and t o t a l obedience. I t can be no other way. ( A l l  Hands, December 1972) Reporters began asking other o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d men t h e i r opinions. Drew Middleton reported for the New York Times: The consensus i n more than a score of interviews was that the admiral had gone too f a r , too fast i n attempting to lead a t r a d i t i o n a l i s t , semi-isolated o f f i c e r corps into new r e l a t i o n s h i p s between commander and commanded. Resis-tance developed, a r e t i r e d admiral sai d , because o f f i c e r s believed Zumwalt's d i r e c t i v e s l e d to breaks i n the chain of command. . . . Many interviewed i n Washington and at Navy bases were outspokenly c r i t i c a l of Zumwalt's p o l i c i e s , but they refused to 6 I i n f e r the support of these admirals mainly from reports of promo-tions i n USNI Proceedings. David Bagley's younger brother Ward Bagley along with Johnston and Hollowell received the 3 vacant f u l l admiral-ships the next year, Ward Bagley becoming the next i n l i n e under Hollowell. There were over 300 v i c e and rear admirals so these promo-tions were undoubtedly very s e l e c t i v e . Zumwalt l a t e r reported that Hollowell's promotion to v i c e - c h i e f and l a t e r to Zumwalt's p o s i t i o n had been h i s choice. In ad d i t i o n to t h i s evidence, David Bagley himself spoke out p u b l i c l y f o r "people programs". 171 allow the use of t h e i r names. A l l f e l t that the r a c i a l issue, dramatized by the r e f u s a l e a r l i e r t h i s month of 123 blacks to report for duty aboard the c a r r i e r USS C o n s t e l l a t i o n , was only a symptom of a general malaise. ...'I don't say they're dumb', said a commander, 'but they haven't got the education to handle most equipment. You can't turn over a machine worth a quarter-of a million.bucks to some s a i l o r , white or black, who's l i a b l e to r u i n i t through ignor-ance. ...'The thing we have to avoid at a l l costs, 'one r e t i r e d admiral s a i d , ' i s promoting them j u s t because they're black. They have to be capable. Too many l i v e s depend on them i n peace as w e l l as war.' (New York Times Nov. 22, 1972) In San Diego, the LA Times and Washington Press services interviewed e n l i s t e d people. The EMs claimed the petty o f f i c e r s , e x p e c i a l l y the older career men would often ignore the Z-grams and that t h i s was the problem on the ships. The Black e n l i s t e d men generally supported the Connie protest, one estimated that seventy-five per cent of the r a c i a l discriminations i n the Navy r e s u l t from the actions of petty o f f i c e r s . They said they had experienced the same problems that were complained of on the Connie and would probably have joined them i f i t had happen-ed on t h e i r ships. White EMs were not unanimous i n support of the Connie s t r i k e r s . Some thought the trouble was the f a u l t of Blacks. (Los Angeles Times Nov. 23, 1972) The counter attack had already begun. November fourteenth, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee announced an i n -v e s t i g a t i o n . Floyd Hicks, a conservative from Washington state was appointed sub-committee chairman, and as was noted i n t h i s paper already, Ron Dellums, the only Black on the committee, was not allowed to j o i n . Time Magazine reported that some admirals were t r y i n g to get Zumwalt removed: 172 Some have made late-night phone c a l l s to Pentagon correspondents. Administration o f f i c i a l s and p o l i t i c i a n s have been cornered at c o c k t a i l p a r t i e s . The message i s the same: Zumwalt has gone too f a r . One of his c r i t i c s i s Admiral Isaac Kidd, 53, thought to be the most l i k e l y man to replace Zumwalt. Even Secretary of the Navy John Warner threw out hints that he was not a l t o -gether pleased with the d i r e c t i o n i n which Zumwalt was heading. ... Warner admitted that he was 'under a great deal of pressure' from Zumwalt's c r i t i c s . Time Magazine i t s e l f , backed Zumwalt strongly: If he i s replaced or even hobbled i n his revolutionary shakeup of the Navy, i t could well s i g n a l an end to the attempts to humanize a l l three services. (Time Magazine Nov. 27, 1972) Admiral Kidd, mentioned i n the above a r t i c l e , was the Chief of Naval M a t e r i a l . This p o s i t i o n i s considered second i n importance to the CNO. The Chief of Material has d i r e c t access to the Secretary of the Navy i n an advisory capacity. The House sub-committee began hearings i n Washington and Chairman Hicks t o l d reporters a f t e r the f i r s t session: We cannot overlook the p o s s i b i l i t y that there may e x i s t at t h i s time an environment of - for lack of a better word - permissive-ness - wherein a l l that i s needed i s a c a t a l y s t . (A.P. Nov. 25, 1972) Zumwalt t e s t i f i e d to the committee and denied that there was permissive-ness i n the Navy. The sub-committee was widely recognized as out to stop Zumwalt and his programs rather than to investigate racism i n the Navy. When the sub-committee hearings moved to San Diego, the o f f i c e r s on the Connie and K i t t y Hawk were questioned. A few e n l i s t e d men from the Connie t e s t i f i e d but none from the K i t t y Hawk. (Some had been asked but because of t h e i r impending court martials and t h e i r d i s t r u s t of the committee, they refused.) An Associated Press reporter quoted one Connie EM who had t e s t i f i e d : 173 They asked me questions about why I disobeyed a basic order and why I joined the protest, but they didn't address them-selves to the central problems of discrimination and i n f e r i o r job assignments for blacks aboard the ship. (AJ?, November 25, 1972) The subcommittee report was completed January second 1973. Its primary findings were that there was indeed "permissiveness" i n the Navy and that there were no instances of r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . They f e l t the disturbances resulted from misunderstandings of Blacks, a few " s k i l l e d a g i t a t o r s " and the weakened mid-management. Mid-management had been weakened by the use of the race r e l a t i o n s councils and by the relaxed h a i r and uniform standards. They found Black unity d i v i s i v e within the Navy and recommended that gestures such as "passing the power" and the Black hand shake be discouraged. The sub-committee report asked for more t r a i n i n g f o r both r e c r u i t s and mid-management and for an increase i n p o l i c e on the ships and more s e l e c t i v i t y i n recruitment of EMs. They discussed the CNOs rebuke of h i s s t a f f and said "the subcommittee regrets that the t r a d i t i o n of not c r i t i c i z i n g seniors i n front of t h e i r subordinates was ignored i n t h i s case" (HASC, January 2, 1973:17668-70). Camp News car r i e d i t s own story of the report under the heading "Fleet Racism White-wash" (February 15, 1973). Proceedings reprinted a report by the Washington Post which included a paragraph about Zumwalt's claim that permissiveness did not e x i s t and also that s a i l o r s had charged that "unwritten orders" against Blacks existed on the K i t t y Hawk. Zumwalt remained the occupant of the Chief of Naval 174 Operations o f f i c e , but month by month announcements came of new regulations and programs that were consistent with the sub-committee recommendations. December twenty-sixth 1972, Zumwalt asked his commands to give administrative discharges to those who they thought were p o t e n t i a l troublemakers. Three thousand were discharged by February ninth 1973. Thirteen percent of those discharged were Blacks compared to s i x percent Blacks i n the Navy (Camp News Feb. 15, 1973). On January f i f t e e n t h 1973, the permission to wear dungarees off duty was withdrawn ( A l l Hands March 1973). In A p r i l beard and h a i r regulations were again tightened (Navy Times A p r i l 25, 1973). A new form of verbal and written address for petty o f f i c e r s was i n s t i t u t e d i n May. Instead of c a l l i n g a second cl a s s petty o f f i c e r , Brown, for instance, he was now to be referred to as "Petty O f f i c e r Brown". Chiefs at the E-7 l e v e l continued to be addressed as Chief but E-8s and E-9s were now to be c a l l e d "Senior Chief Brown" and "Master Chief Jones" ( A l l Hands May 1973). A new r a t i n g of Master-at-Arms was announced i n June. The MAA was to a s s i s t i n law enforcement at sea and on shore ( A l l Hands June 1973). A chart showing the advantages and disadvantages of the f i v e types of discharges, honorable to dishonorable was included i n A l l ! Hands i n August. There were many differences p a r t i c u l a r l y i n veterans ben e f i t s . The same issue announced that twenty-eight teams of handlers and dogs had been added to the Navy as drug detectors and one hundred as Alcohol Abuse Counselors. In September i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g i n boot camp was increased from seven and a ha l f to nine 175 weeks to allow more time i n learning m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e and navy customs and courtesy. E f f o r t s at improving race r e l a t i o n s continued but without charges of disobedience and lack of good w i l l of o f f i c e r s and NCOs. In January 1973 the opening of four Human Resource Centers for the "management of people" was announced i n A l l Hands. These offered a number of services to commanding o f f i c e r s under the topics of race r e l a t i o n s , command development, i n t e r c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s , drug and alcohol education and a l c o h o l i c r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . The next f a l l , November 1973, the a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r USS F o r r e s t a l was pointed to as an example of how a Human Resource Council Center could help a ship's command i n race r e l a t i o n s . The ship's TV and newspaper re g u l a r l y used material about Blacks and other m i n o r i t i e s . There was an op-portunity to t a l k by telephone d i r e c t l y to the Captain on a "Questions to the Captain" telephone. There was a " h o t l i n e " which was a twenty-four hour telephone recorder system. Seminars were the main part of the program. "Awareness" sessions of eighteen p a r t i c i p a n t s were used to share information of backgrounds of d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l and r a c i a l personnel. "Upward" classes were used to t a l k about the present s i t u a t i o n of each. These groups were led by f a c i l i t a t o r s and seemed to be s i m i l a r to the T groups, confrontation, s e n s i t i v i t y and r e a l i t y therapy groups that were popular among c i v i l i a n s . In addition to these programs there were s p e c i a l days when most of the crew were involved i n "rap" sessions ( A l l Hands November 1973). The alcohol and drug centers were reported as heavily used. Command Development 176 was defined as s i m i l a r to organizational development programs i n c i v i l i a n industry. C i v i l i a n advisors were used as part of the s t a f f . Educational material was also presented d i r e c t l y i n A l l Hands by feature a r t i c l e s on Blacks who had done w e l l i n the U.S. Navy and on Black h i s t o r y . The success of these programs was questioned by the GI press. They noted that d i s c r i m i n a t i o n continued and that most and sometimes a l l of the men i n the brigs were Black (Camp News May 15, 1973). The treatment of K i t t y Hawk Blacks who were on t r i a l was seen as discriminatory. The new h a i r regulations also s p e c i f i c a l l y banned several s t y l e s of Black haircut and grooming. Incidents of r a c i a l f i g h t s continued to be reported. C i v i l i a n pressure through the Congress and the courts l i b e r a l i z e d navy regulations s l i g h t l y . Summary Court Martials came to include the r i g h t to an attorney and to appeals (Camp News May and June 1973). The Navy, presumably with the CNO's cooperation, fought these through courts and then didn't comply u n t i l forced by s p e c i a l court orders. Use of code numbers showing negative reasons for discharge on terminal papers was f i n a l l y given up under Congres-s i o n a l pressure. The Navy then introduced a new system only s l i g h t l y less punitive (Navy Times A p r i l 10, 1974). By June 1974 when Zumwalt's term expired ( i t was reported as non-renewable) he was succeeded by his Vice-Chief, Hollowell. Zumwalt said that he had personally chosen him. The new second i n command was Ward Bagley whose older brother, David, remained the . 177 chief of BUPERS. Admiral Kidd who had been reported as a p r i n c i p a l insurgent s t i l l remained as Chief of Material. He had been a f u l l admiral during t h i s whole period. A new Secretary of the Navy was named. Warner had resigned to accept a prestigious appointment to head the American Bi-Centennial Commission. The new Navy Secretary, Middendorf, had been promoted from Under Secretary. No s h i f t of fac-tions was apparent. As Zumwalt r e t i r e d he was s t i l l making headlines. This time for h i s "hawkish views" on m i l i t a r y p o l i c y . He advocated increased naval strength and raised alarms about the alleged U.S. loss of control of the sea. He wanted to increase use of small attack ships instead of r e l y i n g heavily on attack c a r r i e r s as the Navy has i n the immediate past. His positions on m i l i t a r y strategy and p a r t i c u l a r combat systems may. very well have been applauded by d i f f e r e n t alignments of m i l i t a r y and governmental people than were h i s personnel p o l i c i e s . In any case h i s support as CNO was re l a t e d to more than reaction to h i s race r e l a t i o n s p o l i c i e s and Z-gram orders. On retirement he was interviewed on a national TV program, "Meet the Press", June 30, 1974. Most questions were on h i s outspoken views on navy strength, but when asked about the K i t t y Hawk f i g h t , he sa i d , " i t a r r i v e d l a t e r than I had anti c i p a t e d " . His astute public r e l a t i o n s a b i l i t y have led several commentators to predict that he may run for p u b l i c o f f i c e as a c i v i l i a n . Zumwalt survived his admirals r e v o l t but at the cost of some of h i s program and by avoiding p u b l i c reprimands to h i s o f f i c e r s 178 f o r t h e i r disobedience. The admirals r e v o l t had an impact on navy p o l i c y but did not completely upset the reforms or the regime. The admirals did not s u f f e r formal punishment or formal charges but some of t h e i r careers may have been affected. None were rewarded by pro-motion to a f u l l admiralship that year. 179 PART THREE THE IMPACT OF RESISTANCE ON AUTHORITY The outstanding lesson of the case h i s t o r i e s i s that authority was constructed i n such a way that the movements had l i t t l e impact on i t s effectiveness. The case h i s t o r i e s make d i f f e r e n t aspects of t h i s apparent. The anti-war movement i n various ways presented a d i r e c t challenge to the authority of the Navy, yet, as we s h a l l see, t h e i r methods of working within l e g a l and administrative processes and t h e i r lack of success i n developing widespread resistance i n the Navy l i m i t e d t h e i r a b i l i t y to i n t e r f e r e with managerial methods of control (Chapter Thirteen). The Black movement on the other hand presented a much more c r i t i c a l challenge to managerial control both because i t developed as a p o t e n t i a l for wide-spread group ac t i o n and because i t d i r e c t l y challenged the legitimacy of managerial authority (Chapter Fourteen). In Chapter F i f t e e n we w i l l look at some of the differences between the anti-war movement and the Black movement with respect to the bases of the movements and the ways i n which resistance was developed d i f f e r e n t l y because of differences i n how people were involved and of differences i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e processes which defined the movements. The resistance actions did not noticeably i n t e r f e r e with the war but they did p r e c i p i t a t e an organization c r i s i s at the top l e v e l s as m i l i t a r i s t s and managers squared o f f . This c o n f l i c t may have had more 180 p o t e n t i a l f o r i n t e r r u p t i o n of the war work than the d i r e c t resistance. The top l e v e l f i g h t took up considerable energies of many people as they t r i e d to stop each other from undermining t h e i r respective authority practices. In the f i n a l chapter i n t h i s section we w i l l learn something about the ways i n which these movements had repercussions w i t h i n the organization, i n the responses that were made, and how those responses themselves were reacted to by other sections of the naval organization. 181 Chapter Thirteen THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MANAGERIAL METHODS OF CONTROL Lack of success i n breaking down authority structures was most noticeable i n the case of the anti-war movement. The NVA people put months of dedicated organization work into t h e i r Connie Vote campaign and were backed by a popular c i v i l i a n peace movement, prominent p o l i t i c a l figures and even entertainment s t a r s . In s p i t e of t h i s there were v i r t u a l l y no d i r e c t e f f e c t s on navy plans or navy authority. I n d i r e c t l y t h e i r actions probably did add to the strength of the c i v i l i a n peace movement but t h i s was not t h e i r primary purpose. Their purpose was to p u b l i c i z e t h e i r own r e f u s a l to p a r t i c i p a t e , with the hope that enough others would follow t h e i r example that there would not be enough manpower av a i l a b l e to run the ship. They had a well documented analysis of how m i l i t a r y , government and i n d u s t r i a l e l i t e s p r o f i t e d from the war; however, there was no connection to a strategy i n which the t a c t i c of war-refusal f i t t e d . Other anti-war people such as the UFTB s t a f f i n San Diego and the Coral Sea SOS organizers i n the Bay Area used a s l i g h t l y more sophisticated strategy. They supported the widespread a n t i - a u t h o r i t a r i a n actions of EMs and led them i n denouncing l i f e r s and the humiliations of navy l i f e . S a i l o r s did become more "uppity," more d i f f i c u l t to control i n exact dress and posture, but they continued to do navy work. This would have made sense as resistance i f the command model of authority had been accurate, but as we have seen (Part One) i t was not. 182 The l i b e r t a r i a n analysis i d e n t i f i e d the " b a t t l e l i n e " as being i n the face-to-face confrontations very much as M e l v i l l e had i n 1843. They p u b l i c i z e d instances of abuse of authority and of the success of EMs - i n challenging i t as a way of e s t a b l i s h i n g a general a n t i - m i l i t a r y consciousness among EMs. This was not t i e d into any analysis as to how th i s would a f f e c t the complex organization of ships i n 1972. There seemed to be an unexamined assumption that d i r e c t i n d i v i d u a l challenges to authority i n face-to-face s i t u a t i o n s would lead to immobilization of the ships. The non-violent r e s i s t e r s went further i n t h e i r challenge to naval authority than disobedience or lack of respect i n face-to-face s i t u a t i o n s . They refused on grounds of conscience to continue work i n the Navy. By doing t h i s with the use of church sanctuary they also managed to get excellent p u b l i c i t y for the c i v i l i a n peace movement. C i v i l i a n s i n the peace movement became supportive of UAs and deserters as w e l l as the s a i l o r s who r e s i s t e d openly. The documentary material does not pick up the emotional f e e l i n g of the c i v i l i a n supporters or GI a c t i v i s t s . One organizer of the Coral Sea campaign to l d me "those were very unusual times, c i v i l i a n s took more chances, put more on the l i n e than they had ever even considered doing before. It was extremely e x c i t i n g . " This new s o l i d a r i t y between c i v i l i a n s and peace movement people (the s o l i d a r i t y r esulted from many other GI actions i n addition to the case h i s t o r i e s ) helped i n the growing movement to end the.Vietnam war. The impact of the peace campaign on the ships was energizing for the c i v i l i a n peace movement but i t did not seem to even slow down the use of the c a r r i e r s and the progress of the war. Individuals did refuse 183 orders, they did refuse to return to the ship and were followed by a few others. In each case of sanctuary the o r i g i n a l refusers were joined by s i x or seven more. A few EMs who reported to the ship said that they were sympathetic. If they l a t e r r e s i s t e d on the ship i t did not appear to be consequential for the ship's work. The Navy was able to absorb both the NVA and the more p o l i t i c a l UFTB approach by i t s actual methods of control which were by paper manipulation, contractual promises of good pay, selected discharge of a g i t a t o r s , surveilance and by t h e i r ordinary procedures for the organiza-t i o n and d i r e c t i o n of work. Both groups of war r e s i s t e r s lacked an analysis of how i t happened that the Navy's a b i l i t y to get cooperation remained superior to both.the NVAs anguished appeals to EMs to take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e i r complicity i n the war and UFTBs attacks and r i d i c u l e against l i f e r s and the navy way.. M i l i t a r i s t s were alarmed by the symbolic r e j e c t i o n of authority and t h i s did cause some problems within the Navy as the m i l i t a r i s t s and the managers sparred, but i t did not seem to impede the navy's part i n the war. There i s a d i f f e r e n c e between.condemning the Navy as e x p l o i t i v e or immoral and challenging the legitimacy of i t s authority. The anti-war people spoke out strongly against what the Navy did and how they did i t , but t h e i r p r a c t i c a l actions as they refused orders were done with c a r e f u l obedience to navy regulations and the m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n law that has i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d conscientious objection ( S h e r i l l 1970). A major t a c t i c of both NVA and UFTB groups was to provide l e g a l counseling service to EMs. This served to strengthen the legitimacy of navy authority even as i t withdrew one or another i n d i v i d u a l s a i l o r from the Navy. I t did keep a p o s i t i v e connection between EMs and movement people. 184 The managers dealt with anti-war and a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t actions on several l e v e l s . They avoided any overt acknowledgement of resistance or of l i b e r t a r i a n c r i t i c i s m s . The s i t u a t i o n was referred to as "turbulence" i n the f l e e t . The EM argument not having been recognized did not have to be dealt with. Paper manipulation was t h e i r major t a c t i c . As EMs or young o f f i c e r s were thought to be doing organizing and gaining any following they would be transferred or discharged q u i e t l y . Counseling programs, i n v e s t i g a t i o n and d i r e c t p o l i c e surveilance were also increased. When the anti-war s a i l o r s applied f o r conscientious objector status they followed the paper procedures established by the m i l i t a r y . As more people applied for t h i s status and as court cases developed, the procedures were incr e a s i n g l y formalized and widely recognized by navy o f f i c i a l s . The steps f o r getting conscientious objector status usually involved disobedience to orders followed by a sentence at Mast of one or more months i n the b r i g . The paper h i s t o r y of t h i s e n t i r e a p p l i c a t i o n , order r e f u s a l and acceptance of punishment were a l l necessary for the f i n a l authorized discharge. The conscientious objectors were thus very obedient as they followed the forms. This l e g i t i m i z e d the navy procedures. The managerial top command did not object to these people leaving the Navy. I t a c t u a l l y saved them the trouble of i d e n t i f y i n g "troublemakers. They did not, however, want leaving the Navy with an honorable discharge to be so easy that i t would become popular. The anti-war campaigns of the Co n s t e l l a t i o n and K i t t y Hawk were a concern to managers as poor public r e l a t i o n s . They were not a serious challenge to navy work. The EMs who took sanctuary did th i s as a way of pointing out the immorality of the Vietnam war and as one way to b u i l d an 185 appropriate record for a conscientious objector discharge. I t was not used to a c t u a l l y challenge navy authority as the dockside muster of the Black Connie s t r i k e r s l a t e r had. Within.the church sanctuary, r e s i s t e r s and supporters shared the expectation that the Navy would arrest.the r e s i s t e r s , that they would serve j a i l sentences and eventually be discharged. The sanctuary t a c t i c expressed r e l i g i o u s support of the r i g h t s of conscience, i t was not a r e j e c t i o n of m i l i t a r y authority but a way of dramatizing and demonstrating the s i n c e r i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l r e s i s t e r . The church statements did not denounce m i l i t a r y authority, although they c r i t i c i z e d the war. The non-violent r e s i s t e r s and the church acknowledged the authority of the m i l i t a r y . They only asked that consideration be given to the person's sincere b e l i e f s . This i n i t s e l f was not a challenge that was l i k e l y to worry the managers. The greater number of people who frequently went UA or deserted altogether may have been more d i f f i c u l t as a p r a c t i c a l problem and a challenge to legitimacy. Movement EMs debated these t a c t i c s . Going UA rather than taking sanctuary,was encouraged i n the SOS campaign on the USS Coral Sea i n the San Francisco Bay Area. Sanctuary offered good p u b l i c i t y but l a t e r the arrests and f i n a l disposal of the EMs could be manipulated for the Navy's benefit. This happened to the K i t t y Hawk r e s i s t e r s when Navy negotiations convinced the s a i l o r s and Harbor Project people to drop p u b l i c i t y . Large numbers of UAs might i n t e r f e r e with ship movement, but an excess number of men are assigned to ships and i n addition extra personnel can be quickly brought from shore bases and other ships i n the harbor. The loss of the most d i s s a t i s f i e d of the crew might be a help to navy work. Movement reports about the number who do not return to leave with a ship may not be 186 credited by the regular newspapers. It was impossible for the movement people to know the exact t o t a l of UAs i n the Coral Sea campaign. The SOS people thought•two hundred f i f t y had f a i l e d to return, the Navy reported what they said were the usual number, t h i r t y f i v e (UA Bulkhead, November 1971). S a i l o r s on the ship would have c e r t a i n l y noticed i f any of t h e i r buddies were missing, but they did not have communication networks across the ship to add th i s up to a t o t a l trend. The increase i n sabotage was a serious concern of both m i l i t a r -i s t s and managers as a challenge to authority. The actual damage of sabotage i s not the e s s e n t i a l problem although damage i s expensive f o r the Navy and the Ranger sabotage delayed the ship f o r three months. The Navy i s i d e a l l y set up for repair as part of i t s shore establishment. Damage i s expected i n time of war and the Navy i s well prepared to handle i t . The i n i t i a l charges against Chenoweth and the Navy p u b l i c i t y about the t r i a l indicated that they thought i t was part of an organized resistance move-ment; however, i t i s u n l i k e l y that the EMs who were openly speaking against the war and organizing aginst i t were involved i n sabotage. They were under considerable surveilance and they knew i t (Marx 1974). Nevertheless the anti-war movement people supported Chenoweth and p u b l i c i z e d the case i n the movement papers. The case was also picked up i n the regular news media. P u b l i c i t y about the Navy's concern did p o l i t i c a l work for resisters, to some extent i t a c t u a l l y substituted f o r s o l i d a r i t y , that i s , i t gave the impression of many actions i n s o l i d a r i t y . The Navy not only f a i l e d to convict Chenoweth but gave the press t h i s opportunity to discuss the popularity of sabotage during the eleven months Chenoweth was i n j a i l . The managerial method of handling such s i t u a t i o n s i s now to avoid p u b l i c i t y 187 and increase preventive measures such as administrative discharges of the d i s s a t i s f i e d and surveilance. In s p i t e of the successful defense of Chenoweth and r e s u l t i n g p u b l i c i t y and the many i n d i v i d u a l instances of resistance, the anti-war movement was not successful i n bringing about a general withdrawal of cooperation with naval authority on the part of EMs. The movement had hoped for a widespread response to t h e i r campaigns, as a r e s u l t both of t h e i r appeal to conscience through the p u b l i c i z e d actions of i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e i r attack on the command face-to-face r e l a t i o n s of authority which the l i b e r t a r i a n view i d e n t i f i e d as an infringement on personal l i b e r t i e s . In the absence of a generalized withdrawal of cooperation with authority, t h e i r methods of working within l e g a l and administrative channels made them more e a s i l y c o n t r o l l e d by the use of managerial kinds of methods. The navy managers developed an administrative procedure f o r handling those who objected on grounds of conscience which was e f f e c t i v e i n avoiding adverse p u b l i c i t y and at the same time was a means of getting r i d of p o t e n t i a l sources of trouble. S i m i l a r l y the methods of action chosen by the anti-war movement made i t generally easy for the navy " a u t h o r i t i e s " to i d e n t i f y "trouble-makers" and to s h i f t them around with-out r i s k i n g the reaction of a s o l i d a r y group. Through t h e i r c o n t r o l of channels of communication they could prevent any e f f e c t i v e feedback to the r e s i s t e r s and hence they could i s o l a t e p o t e n t i a l sources of trouble within the ships. 188 Chapter Fourteen BLACK RESISTANCE: A PRACTICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL THREAT TO MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY The movement among Blacks presented a much more serious c h a l -lenge to naval authority and p a r t i c u l a r l y to managerial forms of control. It was much less r e a d i l y handled by 'managerial' strategies than the a n t i -war movement. It took the form of a d i r e c t withdrawal of cooperation of a kind that the anti-war movement would have l i k e d to achieve but never could. Black resistance did a c t u a l l y threaten naval authority d i r e c t l y and the Navy found i t necessary to modify i t s plans f o r ship movement as a r e s u l t . A group of angry men occupying an area of the ship and refusing to move did interrupt work and could not be dealt with by paper manipula-t i o n or i n d i v i d u a l counseling. The f i g h t on the K i t t y Hawk was another s i t u a t i o n beyond managerial c o n t r o l . The use of a p a r a l l e l structure of legitimacy i n the dockside s t r i k e of the Connie s a i l o r s , when the Blacks held t h e i r own muster and f l a g salute was even more challenging. Furthermore, the charge of racism i n career administration was a d i r e c t denial of managerial legitimacy. The managerial promise of career opportunity was not simply one among many rewards offered by the managerial system of control. I t was i t s basis. The contingencies of career were what they manipulated. Their a b i l i t y .to d e l i v e r job t r a i n i n g or a career i n the Navy i n r e l a t i o n to performance i n the job i n a f a i r and r a t i o n a l way was the basis of t h e i r legitimacy. As Blacks openly and with much p u b l i c i t y i n s i s t e d that they had not shared t h i s opportunity managerial legitimacy was brought into question. Blacks accounted f o r 189 over twelve percent of new r e c r u i t s . The s i t u a t i o n was not l i k e l y to go away. The CNO and h i s managers found that t h i s problem was impossible to solve completely and almost impossible to ameliorate as the m i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s continued to act so as to increase black experience of racism. It was not only m i l i t a r i s t racism that Blacks protested. Managerial use of cen t r a l i z e d bureaucracy, e s p e c i a l l y t h e i r paper manipula-t i o n , created widespread d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among navy personnel including Blacks. The managerial administrative discharge p o l i c y was the i n i t i a l complaint i n the Connie s t r i k e . The Captain was c e r t a i n l y following managerial p o l i c y when he decided to discharge some of the Blacks on the ship. His lack of s e n s i t i v i t y to Black i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h i s might be blamed on a m i l i t a r i s t outlook but i t was higher managerial p o l i c y that was responsible f o r the Captain's discharging of di s s i d e n t s . The Black analysis of t h e i r s i t u a t i o n did not attend to face-to-face s i t u a t i o n s but in d i c t e d the whole process of assignment, promotion, punishment and discharge. The process was what they wanted reviewed as they sat i n on the Constellation's main mess decks. The managerial p o l i c y of assignment, promotion and discharge did r e s u l t i n a general disadvantage to Blacks. The Black analysis f i t t e d . The charges of dis c r i m i n a t i o n had the e f f e c t of challenging the Navy managers' a b i l i t y to f u l f i l l t h e i r promises of equality. The Black resistance cases had each taken only a b r i e f organizing e f f o r t but the s o l i d a r i t y of the r e s i s t e r s as they acted with indignation and assurance that the Navy was wrong and they'were r i g h t was genuinely fr i g h t e n i n g to the navy managers. It challenged a legitimacy based on a b i l i t y to o f f e r job opportunities and to o f f e r them without regard to race. 190 Black uprisings were p o t e n t i a l i t i e s throughout the Navy. Of the two Black resistance events the unorganized f i g h t on the K i t t y Hawk was less of a problem f or the managers. A r i o t or f i g h t i s dangerous to the ship while i t i s happening, but when i t .is over i t can be used as evidence of i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and aggression of r e s i s t e r s . Punishment of the r i o t e r s can be j u s t i f i e d on the basis of c u l t u r a l values of order. The s t r i k e s on the Co n s t e l l a t i o n were quite d i f f e r e n t even though the o r i g i n a l com-p l a i n t s were s i m i l a r . The Black s t r i k e r s were sure of what they were doing, they were not reacting out of t e r r o r as on the K i t t y Hawk. They f e l t that as soon as proper higher a u t h o r i t i e s were c a l l e d i n they would be shown to be r i g h t . They maintained order as they used the approved c i v i l i a n t a c t i c of the sit-down s t r i k e . This was an immediate challenge to the authority of the Captain and the ship's o f f i c e r s . The Black s a i l o r s ' analysis of t h e i r s i t u a t i o n was accurate, the Navy was g u i l t y of i n s t i t u t i o n a l racism and t h e i r demands that i t be corrected were directed at the actual l o c a t i o n of the problem. The measures av a i l a b l e within the managerial system of authority when they were used i n th i s s i t u a t i o n to attempt to restore naval co n t r o l were l i k e l y to confirm the Black c r i t i q u e of the navy as disc r i m i n a t i n g against them. Direct measures of control of the kind that the m i l i t a r i s t ideology would recommend tended to r e s u l t i n exacerbating the s i t u a t i o n . The response to correcting the s i t u a t i o n d i r e c t l y by meeting Black demands for the e l i m i n a t i o n of racism i n the Navy was made d i f f i c u l t both because of p o t e n t i a l resistance to such changes from white s a i l o r s but also because of the p o s i t i o n of the m i l i t a r i s t s on racism. The managerial method of 191 handling the s i t u a t i o n a f t e r some of the e a r l i e r measures of d i r e c t repression had been shown to create more trouble than they solved, was to handle the immediate s i t u a t i o n by promises, not threats, and then to divide the group up which weakened t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y and broke down t h e i r organization. Their s o l i d a r i t y was further weakened by separate t r i a l s and mild punishments. The l a t t e r also have les s grounds for reactions from the Black movement i n the community. The event was controlled but the example continues to worry the Navy. The p o t e n t i a l i t y for active Black resistance s t i l l e x i s t s . I t i s a very d i f f i c u l t problem because i t s s o l u t i o n would require control over m i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s and basic changes i n U.S. society. Managers are attempting to get t h i s c o n t r o l but considering the dimensions of the problem they aren't l i k e l y to be successful. The m i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s did not invent i n s t i t u t i o n a l racism nor do they produce i t independently. Racism i t s e l f cannot be simply o b l i t e r a t e d from the Navy by paper manipulation or by educational programs or group s o c i a l psychological therapy. It i s integrated i n the U.S. c i v i l i a n economic and s o c i a l system. The dissident admirals found enthusiastic p o l i t i c a l support i n the House Armed Services Committee. Preventing Blacks from getting p o l i t i c a l power i s a matter of economic i n t e r e s t i n the home states of some of these p o l i t i c i a n s . Blacks are also used as scapegoats for the middle-class whites' anger and fears about d e t e r i o r a t i n g urban areas. Many northern as w e l l as southern p o l i t i c i a n s hold t h e i r o f f i c e on the basis of support from anti-poor i n t e r e s t s . (Piven and Cloward 1971) Many of these are also anti-Black. (Lauter and Howe 1971) In the past the Navy has been somewhat more r a c i s t than the general society, i t i s not l i k e l y to be allowed to become very much l e s s , as the CNO found out. 192 Black consciousness includes an accurate analysis of t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . Their anger cannot be deflected onto mid-management l i f e r s . The managerial programs of paper manipulation of m i l i t a r i s t s , s e l e c t i v e promotion of Blacks and psychological persuasion may remove some of the tension points but racism also operates through class d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . Class d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s b u i l t into US Navy organization as i t i s b u i l t into United States society and yet t h i s i s not recognized by managerial or American, ideology and so cannot be dealt with for i t s e l f . As more Blacks are at.the bottom as poorly schooled r e c r u i t s they w i l l experience the f e e l i n g s of e x p l o i t a t i o n and humiliation that poor white EMs do. This i s interpreted as white oppression of Blacks. More Blacks w i l l continue to receive administrative discharges. People at the bottom w i l l continue to be exploited and to f e e l that they are. Inasmuch as t h i s i s seen as di s c r i m i n a t i o n , Blacks w i l l continue to j o i n together to act against i t . They have the s o l i d a r i t y to do t h i s e f f e c t i v e l y , that i s , to a c t u a l l y i n t e r f e r e with navy work. Michael Klare i s probably r i g h t i n h i s p r e d i c t i o n that as United States foreign p o l i c y continues to require a large navy, r a c i a l s t r i k e s and f i g h t s w i l l continue (Klare 1974). 193 ./ Chapter F i f t e e n THE INTERPRETATIVE BASES OF SOLIDARITY: CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONSCIENCE As we have seen, the Black movement was more e f f e c t i v e than the anti-war movement i n developing resistance to naval authority. Among Black s a i l o r s , the formation of group s o l i d a r i t y appears to have been an important aspect of t h e i r effectiveness. The anti-war movement did not succeed i n creating t h i s . In t h i s chapter we w i l l look at differences between the two movements with respect to how in-group i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s were developed and shared and the r e l a t i o n of in-group i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to how c o l l e c t i v e action could be mobilized. Both movements shared problems of organizing presented by the way i n which EMs were dispersed throughout the ship as well as on d i f f e r e n t ships with l i t t l e opportunity for contact. As we have seen i n Part One communications were con t r o l l e d by the naval a u t h o r i t i e s and there was continuous surveilance and a c t i v e repression of p o t e n t i a l trouble. Oberschall has noted that masses of people when reacting to s i t u a t i o n s so oppressive that organization i s prevented, r e l y on t h e i r common culture and on t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y because of t h e i r sense of a common fate (Oberschall 1973:317). This suggests a diffe r e n c e between the two move-ments which goes beyond the fa c t that i n Black actions there was a d i r e c t appeal to t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s whereas the anti-war movement involved an appeal of broad concerns for other people. I t suggests the importance of the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e base as c r u c i a l f o r i n t e r a c t i o n i n the confrontations themselves and for how these confrontations were organized and developed. 194 Roberta Ash i n her model of movement action has stressed the need to inves t i g a t e the l i n k between shared conditions, and the emergence of c o l l e c t i v e actions. The existence of common i n t e r e s t s i s not enough to account for the emergence of group action. According to her th i s connection involves i n d i v i d u a l experience formulated i n a shared i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a s i t u a t i o n common to members of the group. The effectiveness of the Black movement i n mobilizing i n a highly c o n t r o l l e d and repressive context can be understood i n these terms.fAsh 1972) In the Black actions, meetings preceded the confrontations by only a few days i n one case and two weeks i n the other. Black EMs already shared "Black experience" as c i v i l i a n s and the experience of having believed r e c r u i t e r s when they promised equal opportunities i n the Navy and l a t e r disappointment. When use of Black power gestures and Black haircuts were outlawed t h e i r indignation was shared. I t was not necessary for them to t a l k to each other to fi n d t h i s out. Their recognition of t h e i r common s i t u a t i o n included recognition of common understanding. As the st o r i e s of the shore f i g h t of the K i t t y Hawk and the punitive discharges of the Co n s t e l l a t i o n reached Blacks, there was one response, anger. Neither long discussions, s o c i a l gatherings, charismatic leadership nor persuasive argument were needed for action. The only question was what to do. On the K i t t y Hawk even t h i s was not a question. The s i t u a t i o n was perceived as attack, and self-defense was the common response. What the Blacks did do i n both events was to create mutinous si t u a t i o n s unprecedented i n American naval h i s t o r y . The Navy was able to gain control but not u n t i l some hours and days of d e l i c a t e management. I think t h i s a b i l i t y of Blacks to act together rested on the s o l i d a r i t y of 195 common understanding as well as shared i d e n t i t y . "Consciousness r a i s i n g " occurs during recruitment to i d e n t i t y movements and may take considerable time, but once the new movement paradigm replaces the established ideology, the pieces f a l l into place. New s i t u a t i o n s can be c o r r e c t l y interpreted from the new view without consultation with other members. Brother-sisterhood can be established by simply recognizing each other as group members. In addition to sharing the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e base Blacks shared an ease of v i s u a l i d e n t i t y . Although not a l l Blacks have tan, brown or black skin , many do. Recognition of each other by skin color, h a i r or s t y l e of language and movement was often possible. This was enough to indicate a shared outlook without the necessity of knowing the i n d i v i d u a l personally. It was not as easy for.the anti-war EMs to i d e n t i f y each other. The h a i r codes were relaxed on the USS Coral Sea and EMs there were able to use ha i r as a clue t o . l i b e r t a r i a n a t t i t u d e s . The a c t i v i s t EMs would walk up and down the chow l i n e and give out t h e i r l i t e r a t u r e to those with longer h a i r . The wearing of a uniform, i n a uniform way, works as i t was probably intended. I t i d e n t i f i e s the wearers as each the same and masks any sub-d i v i s i o n s within the group. The darker skin of most Blacks subverts t h i s . German s a i l o r s i n the mutinies at the end of the F i r s t World War wore strands of red thread to i d e n t i f y those who were with the mutiny. These could be removed quickly i f unsympathetic people approached. (Schubert and Langhorne 1933) Blacks saw themselves as i n a common s i t u a t i o n of threat or i n d i g n i t y with other Blacks. Ships rules singled them out and gave them common cause as Blacks - as i n the rule against over three Blacks walking 196 together. This common s i t u a t i o n was also evocative of considerable emo-t i o n , of anger or fear. In the K i t t y Hawk events shared indignation was increased by the story about Blacks being attacked on shore leave i n the P h i l l i p i n e s followed by the unsuccessful meetings on the ship. As they l e f t the l a s t meeting they thought they were being attacked by the marines. Their immediate common response was self-defense of themselves and other Blacks. The shout of "they're k i l l i n g our brothers" and the actions of i n i t i a t i n g some of the f i g h t i n g on lower decks i s not s u r p r i s i n g . The Connie s t r i k e s developed over a s l i g h t l y longer period. There was concern about the future of Blacks on the ship because of the rumor of the discharges of Blacks. When the captain refused repeatedly to ta l k with the group they f e l t there was nothing else to do but stand firm or t h e i r s i t u a t i o n s would get worse. The dockside sit-down was a f i n a l e f f o r t to stay together using t h e i r combined power to keep r e p r i s a l s from being given, as w e l l as to continue the attempt to redress t h e i r o r i g i n a l grievances. Through these s t r i k e s the l e v e l of anger and indignation was very high. A white e x - s a i l o r t o l d me of how he was assigned to a s s i s t i n the navy i n v e s t i g a t i o n following the s t r i k e . He talked with some of the Black s a i l o r s , they were s t i l l deeply angry and he himself was very shaken by t h e i r emotion. This form of shared i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was not a v a i l a b l e to anti-war s a i l o r s . The anti-war p o s i t i o n had not developed as part of a common c i v i l i a n experience or even i d e n t i c a l m i l i t a r y experience. There were some shared elements as a p o s i t i v e expectation of l i f e i n the Navy was followed by disappointment as m i l i t a r y purposes and' methods were encountered. The content of the expectations and the l a t e r r e - o r i e n t a t i o n varied. There was a shared a n t i - m i l i t a r y view but t h i s was not interpreted 197 as fundamental to t h e i r own l i f e s i t u a t i o n s . The anti-war perspective centered on a concern f or the people who were s u f f e r i n g and dying i n Vietnam. Action was based on a reluctance to j o i n i n further complicity i n harming them. To get to t h i s understanding considerable thinking was needed as well as some idea of connections from d a i l y navy assignments to the bombing of people. I t involved imaginative p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n others' oppression. The f i n a l understandings were therefore more varied than positions based on a common and d i r e c t personal experience. In the peace actions, a c t i v i s t s were also aware of some oppres-sion of themselves, but t h i s was a consequence of t h e i r organizing and they didn't f e e l that i t was extremely u n f a i r . They protested t h e i r treatment and often took l e g a l action on the basis of t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s but they were not indignant nor surprised when the Navy made counter-moves. There was even a minor sense of triumph because the Navy had noticed and been annoyed with t h e i r actions. Those people who had developed opposition to the war and were taking serious resistance actions had often gone through a period of emotional anguish as they reached t h e i r decisions to act. But by the time of actual confrontation t h i s was usually under con-t r o l . They were more l i k e l y to meet the events with a sense of tragedy than of anger. The a c t i v i s t s did not respond to attempts to control the movement with greater indignation and anger as did the Blacks. Nor was there a basis f o r a widespread response of indignation among EMs. The K i t t y Hawk and Co n s t e l l a t i o n anti-war campaigns involved organization, l i t e r a t u r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s , extensive press coverage, s o c i a l events and morale b u i l d i n g occasions. The vote from the s a i l o r s on the Co n s t e l l a t i o n was s l i g h t l y over h a l f for staying home. Only twenty-two 198 percent of the sailors, had voted. The nine who took sanctuary from the Co n s t e l l a t i o n were one-third of one percent of the crew. Even a smaller percentage took sanctuary from the K i t t y Hawk, seven of approximately three thousand e n l i s t e d men. (The two others with them were from the USS M i s p i l l i o n . ) In s i m i l a r actions on other c a r r i e r s from one to ten p u b l i c l y refused to return to t h e i r ships. The low numbers may indicate the l i m i t of anti-war commitment a v a i l a b l e among s a i l o r s at that time. However, to ac t i v a t e t h i s small resistance i t had been necessary to do continual organizing, i n d i v i d u a l counseling and b u i l d i n g of community support. There were occasions when large numbers of the anti-war people came together but the s i t u a t i o n s did not develop into resistance. Even when arres t s were made at the sanctuary s i t e s there was no more than symbolic resistance. An appeal to conscience does not seem to be an adequate base f or the s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n needed i n mass resistance 7 confrontations. The l i n k between shared conditions and the emergence of c o l l e c t i v e actions can now be f i l l e d i n . Actual shared conditions become group experi-ence when i n d i v i d u a l s use the same i n t e r p r e t a t i v e mode and at the same time are conscious of t h e i r i d e n t i t y with each other. If they i n t e r p r e t t h e i r conditions as oppression t h i s base prepares the members for j o i n t action. An opponent's moves perceived as threatening may then r e s u l t i n the very rapid and apparently spontaneous development of c o l l e c t i v e action. Mass actions of high commitment and unanimity can,arise without extensive p r i o r organization or hierarchy of authority, as i n the Co n s t e l l a t i o n s t r i k e s and the Kitty,Hawk f i g h t . 7 The c i v i l i a n street confrontations of the d r a f t resistance movement and youth peace movement involved an i n t e r p r e t i v e base of both conscience and consciousness and they also were preceded by extensive planning and organi-zation. I don't think they are a clear case against t h i s statement. 199 Not a l l s o c i a l movements have t h i s basis for s o l i d a r i t y . The anti-war movement i s a type which emerges when i n d i v i d u a l s i n t e r p r e t others' rather than t h e i r own conditions as oppressive and come to define t h e i r own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r th i s i n a shared a n a l y s i s . This base may prepare the'members for action as i n d i v i d u a l s on the basis of i n d i v i d u a l conscience, but cooperative action can only be taken i f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n continually v e r i f y i n g the mutuality of t h e i r understandings i s a v a i l a b l e . This was the case of the anti-war movement based on conscience. I t i s a type of movement which i s much more dependent on openness and a c c e s s i -b i l i t y of channels of communication between members. 200 Chapter Sixteen MANAGERIAL CRISIS: RESISTANCE AMONG ENLISTED MEN PRECIPITATES CONFLICT BETWEEN.'MANAGERS' AND 'MILITARISTS' Neither the anti-war movement nor the Black movement were e f f e c -t i v e i n breaking down or changing the authority structure of the Navy as a d i r e c t consequence of t h e i r actions. They did, however, have an i n d i r e c t e f f e c t on the i n t e r n a l structure of authority within the naval hierarchy which brought about the challenge to Zumwalt's authority described i n the case studies as the "Admirals Reaction". This e f f e c t of the movements came about through the i n t e r a c t i o n of public pressures created by the movement actions; the response of the 'managerial' p o l i c y makers to t h i s pressure; i t s e f f e c t s on the bases of authority of those who a c t u a l l y r e l i e d on t h e i r authority for the day-to-day work of running the Navy, i n p a r t i c u l a r the NCOs; and the response of m i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s and NCOs to t h i s threat both to t h e i r authority, and, as they saw i t , to the Navy. Both Black and anti-war movement actions drew public attention to aspects of the workings of the Navy. This resulted i n public pressures, i n the press, on the Congress and i n the courts which c a l l e d into question the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the Navy's j u d i c i a l system. Public pressure came at a time when the Navy was concerned.to change i t s bases of recruitment and to emphasize working i n the Navy as fundamentally s i m i l a r to employment i n a c i v i l i a n organization with the a d d i t i o n a l advantages of opportunities for t r a i n i n g and advancement. The l i b e r t a r i a n c r i t i q u e made both by Black leaders and by supporters of the anti-war movement challenged t h i s view of 201 the Navy and brought out the continued existence of a r a c i a l caste system and patterns of authority r e l a t i o n s of. a t r a d i t i o n a l kind which were repre-sented as i n f r i n g i n g on the i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , that i s , t h e i r guaranteed r i g h t s as c i t i z e n s (Finn 1971). Navy recruitment also f e l l o f f and the percentage of trained personnel w i l l i n g to r e - e n l i s t decreased alarmingly. Shortages of new r e c r u i t s were f i l l e d by the d r a f t but there was no s i m i l a r force for re-enlistments. Zumwalt's response was to take steps, among them h i s Z-Grams, to bring naval practices more into l i n e with standards implied by these public c r i t i c i s m s . The Z-Gram reforms were not intended to encourage p o l i t i c a l expression among E n l i s t e d Men nor to make r e a l changes i n the naval hierarchy. They did allow more space f or personal action. They permitted a wider range of personal s t y l e s of dress and they promoted the managerial modes of interpersonal exercise of authority s t r e s s i n g cooperation and teamwork rather than command and obedience. Zumwalt himself set an example through h i s p o l i c y of making personal appearances. Several Z-Grams were e x p l i c i t l y d i r e c t e d against r a c i s t p r a c t i c e s . The managerial strategy f o r dealing with 'turbulence' i n the Fleet dealt d i r e c t l y with movement actions by administrative methods and i n d i r e c t l y by attempting to reduce r a c i s t p ractices of the Navy and by l i m i t i n g the m i l i t a r i s t prac-t i c e s of authority that had been i d e n t i f i e d as most objectionable. These p o l i c i e s created problems with the t r a d i t i o n a l practices of authority within the Navy. The NCOs were i n the p o s i t i o n where there was the most pinch. They were responsible for seeing that t h e i r crews were prepared f o r inspections and that the many exact regulations were conformed to as well as for the routine coordination of day-to-day work 202 on board ship. Under the Z-Gram program they were held responsible for carrying out these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and at the same time avoiding infringement of the c i v i l l i b e r t i e s of e n l i s t e d men. They were the l a s t l i n k i n an a u t h o r i t a r i a n system. They passed on unwelcome orders that had been decided from above for reasons unrelated to the immediate i n t e r e s t s of the work crew. They were responsible for seeing that the work and the s a i l o r s ' personal l i v i n g arrangements were ca r r i e d out according to pre-c i s e navy regulations. In doing so they depended upon t h e i r authority i n face-to-face command r e l a t i o n s . They depended upon authority of the m i l i t a r i s t i c type which meant that whether they chose to use t h i s s t y l e or not, they could issue commands and expect them to be obeyed or take punitive action i f they were not. This authority depended on the support of the naval hierarchy. Zumwalt's p o l i c i e s threatened to deprive them of t h i s support. They were s t i l l expected to see that the work got done and that navy routines and regulations were conformed to, but they were expected to do so without i n f r i n g i n g the r i g h t s of the EMs. They could not count on the support of the.naval hierarchy i f they used authority practices which were not i n agreement with o f f i c i a l p o l i c i e s . M i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s and NGOs came together i n support of the m i l i t a r i s t view of naval authority. Both were alarmed at the occasional rudeness, grudging cooperation and frequent i n f r a c t i o n of minor rules of etiquette as well as at the d i r e c t anti-war actions. When a s a i l o r f a i l e d to salute, they viewed.their authority as under attack. They did not d i s t i n g u i s h between a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t s , anti-war people, pro-communist, .Black power a c t i v i s t s or foreign agents. These were a l l considered 'subversive agents' or e a s i l y led 'dupes'. Their ideology of authority 203 prescribed immediate and f o r c e f u l action i n response to these threats. When Zumwalt's p o l i c i e s prevented, these responses, he and.the managerial p o s i t i o n he represented came to be seen as a serious threat to naval authority i n terms of the m i l i t a r i s t ideology. Black uprisings of themselves were not seen by m i l i t a r i s t s as a d i r e c t challenge to the bases of naval authority. The m i l i t a r i s t ideology does recognize t h i s kind of threat, but there are prescribed responses to i t . The r e a l l y serious problem was the managerial leadership which prevented the punitive action which m i l i t a r i s t s saw as e s s e n t i a l to preserving authority. They thought that the events were evidence for their p r e d i c t i o n of the danger, of the "permissiveness" of managerial leadership. They believed t h e i r own "get tough" solutions would have worked both as prevention as well as control., Because they were not i n complete charge, they were saved a test of t h i s . F a i l u r e s at ship l e v e l could be blamed on t h e i r hands being t i e d by higher managerial authority. For example, the Captain's commands that p r e c i p i t a t e d the K i t t y Hawk f i g h t conformed to the m i l i t a r i s t p r e s c r i p t i o n s f o r responses to non-compliance of a number of men. The appropriateness of th i s action was not c a l l e d into question by the m i l i t a r i s t s . The congressional sub-committee report which took a generally m i l i t a r i s t p o s i t i o n documents the di s r u p t i v e e f f e c t s of the Captain's orders that contradicted the Executive O f f i c e r but ra i s e s no question about the correctness of these orders (HASC 1973:17674-17676). The handling of the r a c i a l incident i n the Ph i l i p p i n e s and the r e s t r i c t i o n of Black expression of s o l i d a r i t y on the ship were not questioned. The m i l i t a r i s t ideology did not recognize a v a l i d basis for Black s o l i d a r i t y or a problem of i n j u s t i c e s i n how.Blacks were treated i n the Navy, or how 204 militarists'measures themselves, such as the order for the marines to advance, could d i r e c t l y add to the c r i s i s of confrontation i n such a con-text. The Captain's action would be seen i n the terms of the m i l i t a r i s t ideology as e n t i r e l y i n keeping with proper procedures for maintaining control. They would have no explanatory value for the r e s u l t i n g f i g h t s . The m i l i t a r i s t ideology i d e n t i f i e d the c r u c i a l threat to authority not i n the confrontations themselves, nor i n the r o l e that m i l i t a r i s t measures played i n them, but. i n Zumwalt's p o l i c y of "permissiveness" i n handling them. This was the basis of m i l i t a r i s t resistance to the CNOs authority. The concerns about handling of movement actions and about how the reforms l i m i t e d the NCOs and ships o f f i c e r s ' authority and undercut t h e i r chain of command came together i n generalized resistance among NCOs and . o f f i c e r s . They complained and they obstructed orders. At the higher l e v e l s of the hierarchy, m i l i t a r i s t admirals sought support within Congress and elsewhere outside the Navy. The CNO was surprised. Zumwalt could understand how e n l i s t e d people were reluctant to follow orders they considered harassing, but he was surprised when NCOs, ships o f f i c e r s and f i n a l l y h i s top l e v e l admirals r e s i s t e d . He had evidently thought his authority would be s u f f i c i e n t to get t h e i r compliance as i t probably had been i n other areas. Zumwalt must not have c o r r e c t l y assessed the depth of m i l i t a r i s t opposition, t h e i r support within the Navy or t h e i r p o l i t i c a l power outside. He must not have recognized that the reforms as they l i m i t e d lower o f f i c e r s ' and NCOs d i s c r e t i o n also l i m i t e d t h e i r authority. He acted as though t h e i r f a i l u r e to implement h i s 205 commands was simple insubordination. Obedience to orders i s expected by managerial o f f i c e r s even though i t i s to be presented by the subordinate as i f i t was voluntary as i n team cooperation. As Zumwalt proceeded with h i s race r e l a t i o n s reforms he became angry at the lack of understanding of the necessity for change and both puzzled and angry at the m i l i t a r i s t s ' insubordination. The K i t t y Hawk f i g h t and the C o n s t e l l a t i o n s t r i k e s had alarmed the CNO and h i s managerial group. These events encouraged them i n t h e i r view of the absolute necessity of eliminating racism. Zumwalt took the step of a p u b l i c attack on.his top m i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s . This v i o l a t e d a major p r i n c i p l e of m i l i t a r i s t authority which requires maintaining a common front of support and agreement and reserving c r i t i c i s m f o r behind the scenes. Authority i n terms of the m i l i t a r i s t ideology i s seen to depend upon t h i s and to be undermined when a superordinate p u b l i c l y c r i t i c i z e s a subordinate i n the l i n e of command. The l i n e of command upon which Zumwalt depended for the effectiveness of h i s orders became i n th i s s i t u a t i o n a basis for opposition. Zumwalt was attacked with righteous indignation by the mutinous admirals. The CNO fought t h i s with managerial methods. He compromised with h i s dissident admirals by a public semi-retraction but he also used h i s power to punish v i a paper manipulation. Through BUPERS those that cooperated could be promoted and the r e s i s t i n g admirals could be bypassed for promotion and i n some cases, r e t i r e d early. He increased surveilance of management openly by d i r e c t supervision i n the Inspector General reviews and covertly by secret agents of" the Naval I n t e l l i g e n c e Service ( A l l Hands, February 1974). 206 Controversy was observable in. n ational media s t o r i e s that i d e n t i f i e d the CNO as the hero< Even the GI press reported that the CNO had attempted humanistic reforms. :. The congressional sub-committee report was of another opinion. There was undoubtedly much other i n f i g h t i n g submerged well below the l e v e l of media reports. As the months went along the m i l i t a r i s t recommendations of the subcommittee were implemented. The admirals r e v o l t turned p o l i c y back to the "navy way" the managers had t r i e d to move beyond; however, the managers s t i l l held the authorized positions f o r i n i t i a t i n g action. The p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t s of t h i s i n t e r n a l f i g h t i n terms of navy wide i n s e c u r i t y of NCOs and o f f i c e r s and the e f f e c t s of t h i s on t h e i r work have not been assessed. This must have been considerable and tension continues. The basic cause of these tensions was the resistance actions of EMs even though they had produced t h i s e f f e c t quite u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y . At.the top, admirals l i m i t e d each,other's authority by t h e i r d i r e c t attack on or even sabotage of each other's careers: on the ships, o f f i c e r s could not be assured t h e i r orders would be backed. The changes i n the Captain's orders during the Con s t e l l a t i o n s t r i k e i s one example. The e a r l i e r Connie vote campaign that resulted i n having the Captain report to Washington may also have been responsible f o r h i s transfer on the eve of the ship's departure. The very m i l i t a r i s t judge i n the Ranger sabotage t r i a l was f i n a l l y p u l l e d out on the excuse of i l l n e s s and another milder person f i l l e d h i s place. The actual, reasons for these transfers are not av a i l a b l e information, but there were many reports of the concern o f f i c e r s f e l t f o r t h e i r navy careers.in the l i k e l i h o o d that they too would have to deal with resistance. Whichever tack they might take they would be subject to c r i t i c i s m by some superior. 207 This points to another way i n which authority construction may be undermined which i s not by withdrawal of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the s o c i a l construction of authority by subordinates, but by uncertainty about the legitimacy and bases of authority among those who are expected to exercise i t . This was the i n d i r e c t impact of the anti-war and Black movements on the naval hierarchy through public reactions and the responses dictated by the managerial approach to them. 208 CONCLUSION This study has investigated the resistance actions and the p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t s on m i l i t a r y authority of f i v e events of group resistance aboard United States Navy ships i n 1971 and 1972. The events happened i n the f i n a l years of the Vietnam war and included anti-war campaigns on the USS Co n s t e l l a t i o n and the USS K i t t y Hawk, sabotage on the USS Ranger, a f i g h t of more than 200 Black and white s a i l o r s on the USS K i t t y Hawk o f f Vietnam, and a s t r i k e of 130 Black s a i l o r s on the USS Con s t e l l a t i o n . The s o c i a l construction of authority, that i s , the way that authority was produced, strengthened or weakened by p a r t i c i p a n t s , was taken as a problematic. Published accounts by members of the varied groups involved were the primary sources of information. These accounts appeared i n o f f i c e r s ' p r o f e s s i o n a l journals, navy and c i v i l i a n news media, GI under-ground newspapers, campaign l i t e r a t u r e and i n the report of a congressional i n v e s t i g a t i o n . O f f i c e r s ' accounts used one of two av a i l a b l e ideologies. Each ideology included assumptions about the p r a c t i c a l actions necessary for the exercise of authority and j u s t i f i c a t i o n s about the right to demand com-pliance. One was the c l a s s i c a l m i l i t a r i s t perspective and the other was the managerial, ideology of c i v i l i a n corporate society. The m i l i t a r i s t ideology assumed that authority was manifested by an i n f e r i o r ' s exact obedience to a superior's commands i n a formal face-to-face s e t t i n g such as the s o c i a l and technological s e t t i n g of old navy s a i l i n g ships. The managerial ideology i d e n t i f i e d authority as the administration of i n s t i t u t i o n a l processes so that they resulted i n compliance of personnel. 209 The r e s i s t i n g s a i l o r s c r i t i c i z e d elements of both ideologies but held p a r a l l e l ideas with,the two models of how authority, works. The Black movement analysis of i n s t i t u t i o n a l racism was s i m i l a r to the managerial model of authority as, i n s t i t u t i o n a l process while the anti-war s a i l o r s ' l i b e r t a r i a n c r i t i q u e of the m i l i t a r y assumed that authority depended on obedience to face-to-face commands. The use of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l or the command model led to d i f f e r e n t t a c t i c s and to varying awareness of threat. An account by Herman M e l v i l l e of shipboard l i f e i n the Navy i n the early nineteenth century provided a d e s c r i p t i o n of an organization and technology to which the m i l i t a r i s t form of authority was i n t e g r a l . Con-temporary naval organization and technology was shown to be very d i f f e r e n t . Ship organization today i s based on a complex technology including automated machinery and i s embedded i n an extensive bureaucratic apparatus. The routine operations of a large a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r are c a r r i e d on and coordinated i n large part by automatic processes. The command-obedience face-to-face r e l a t i o n s h i p s of m i l i t a r i s t authority are no longer the c e n t r a l processes involved i n operation of the ship. The authority of the naval hierarchy and the o v e r a l l coordination of naval work depends to a considerable extent on the i n s t i t u t i o n a l model of authority which i s represented i n the managerial ideology. "Paper manipulation" becomes the major means of securing, conformity. The course and consequences of the cases of resistance must be understood both i n terms of the ideologies which guided them and i d e n t i f i e d the key aspects of authority i n the actions taken, and i n terms of the organizational context of authority r e l a t i o n s . 210 The immediate r e s u l t of the resistance events was a high l e v e l c o n f l i c t between managerial and m i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s . M i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s were alarmed at the "permissiveness" of the managers and t r i e d to oust the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt. The s t r i k e of the Black move-ment s a i l o r s was a more e f f e c t i v e challenge to authority than the anti-war resistance, p a r t l y because the i n s t i t u t i o n a l analysis of the Black s a i l o r s challenged the legitimacy of navy authority. Their p o s i t i o n could be changed into p r a c t i c a l action quickly because Black s a i l o r s shared a remarkable s o l i d a r i t y i n commitment and understanding that obviated exten-sive planning or formal organization of resistance. Further, t h e i r experience of dis c r i m i n a t i o n continued i n s p i t e of c e r t a i n reform e f f o r t s by managerial o f f i c e r s . This guaranteed a readiness to r e s i s t . The atomization of personnel by the te c h n i c a l requirements for the d i v i s i o n of labor and the m i l i t a r i s t maintenance of oppositions between o f f i c e r s , NCOs and e n l i s t e d men made cooperation i n resistance d i f f i c u l t , but at the same time produced a n t i - m i l i t a r y s o l i d a r i t y among e n l i s t e d people. Government use of the Navy added to t h i s by demands for long deployments at sea and by the unpopularity of the Vietnam war. The a b i l i t y of the Navy to continue with i t s work i n s p i t e of the serious disagreements wi t h i n o f f i c e r s ' ranks, widespread d i s a f f e c t i o n of e n l i s t e d people and the s p e c i f i c resistance events was due c h i e f l y to i n s t i t u t i o n a l channeling by manipulation of career opportunity. This was backed by US government funding of r e l a t i v e l y high pay l e v e l s f o r o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d people. In general we must conclude that the authority organization of the US Navy proved extremely r e s i l i e n t and r e s i s t a n t to e f f o r t s at change. Its organi-zation had a d u r a b i l i t y and power that seemed to outweigh completely the d i r e c t a c t i o n of resistance. 211 We have noted the differences i n effectiveness and organization of the Black and anti-war movements i n chapters t h i r t e e n , fourteen, and f i f t e e n . The impact of resistance on authority r e l a t i o n s i n the Navy must also be understood i n terms of the t a c t i c s adopted by these movements. Their t a c t i c s were worked out i n terms of t h e i r respective models of the construction of authority i n the Navy and i t s relevance to t h e i r objec-t i v e s . The Black movement's methods of resistance appeared to be r e l a t i v e l y accurate i n t h e i r appraisal of naval authority. The anti-war s a i l o r s ' conception of authority as obedience to commands i n face-to-face s e t t i n g was not. The Navy anti-war people did not attend to the d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i r work s i t u a t i o n and that of e n l i s t e d people on the old s a i l i n g ships or even of t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e from s o l d i e r s i n the contemporary i n f a n t r y i n combat i n Vietnam. In the contemporary Navy, as we have seen, t a c t i c s based on t h i s face-to-face command model had l i t t l e impact on the maintenance of authority. The e f f e c t s of actions depends instead on the relevance of t h e . s p e c i f i c t a c t i c to the actual way that authority i s constructed. The anti-war people c a p i t a l i z e d on the widespread EM a n t i - l i f e r sentiments and t r i e d to b u i l d on these to develop a stronger a n t i - m i l i t a r y consciousness among EMs (see Chapter Four and the Case Studies). M i l i t a r i s t s and l i b e r t a r i a n s both reported an increase i n t h i s a n t i -military, consciousness and i n "uppity" actions, but t h i s did not become obstructive of navy authority. . L i f e r s are used as buffers between higher management and s a i l o r s . No e f f o r t was made by the anti-war movement to gain the support of the ' l i f e r s ' f o r t h e i r opposition to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Vietnam war. That may not have been a r e a l i s t i c p o s s i b i l i t y i n any 212 case, but i t was never t r i e d . Instead the anti-war t a c t i c s helped to create opposition to the NCOs which appeared i n the increased "uppityness" of EMs. They contributed to the support which NCOs gave to the m i l i t a r i s t p o s i t i o n . Furthermore, the anti-war movement i n many ways worked within the managerial framework and d i r e c t l y recognized the legitimacy of i t s methods of exercising authority. Every anti-war movement group whether they used non-violent methods or a more p o l i t i c a l approach always provided GI counseling as a major part of t h e i r work. This was backed by services of attorneys and was cooperatively organized nation-wide with regular updating of materials, counselor t r a i n i n g workshops and b u l l e t i n s on court decisions (see Chapter Four). The services were widely used and the r e s u l t i n g court cases did make f o r s p e c i f i c adjustments i n administrative procedures i n the m i l i t a r y including the Navy. M i l i t a r i s t s were alarmed by the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of "sea lawyers" but the top l e v e l managers were able to accomodate t h e i r regulations and procedures to court decisions without loss of authority to d i r e c t navy work. The GI counselors advice to EMs upheld legitimacy of the Navy as they explained how to c a r e f u l l y follow and use regulations and court decisions for the s a i l o r ' s own b e n e f i t . Anti-war people hoped that as i t became possible for EMs to get out of the services without heavy punishment more of them would choose to do t h i s . There was an increase i n discharges; however, t h i s was not a problem for t h e - Navy who themselves used discharge of the d i s s a t i s f i e d as prevention of "turbulence." Thus i n d i f f e r e n t ways the t a c t i c s of the.anti-war move-ment tended to consolidate naval authority rather than produce a general d i s a f f e c t i o n . The navy developed more adequate means of dealing with the 213 problem of "turbulence" almost i n cooperation with the anti-war movement. At the same time the movement's attack on the face-to-face authority of the NCOs served to b u i l d up support for the m i l i t a r i s t version of authority. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION RECONSIDERED In the Introduction the question of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e l a t i o n -ship to contemporary large formal organizations was r a i s e d . I t i s now appropriate to consider whether t h i s study of navy authority helped illu m i n a t e t h i s more general problem. S p e c i f i c p r a c t i c a l conclusions of how t h i s worked i n the Navy have been given. The authority organization of the US Navy c e r t a i n l y proved r e s i s t a n t to e f f o r t s at change. However, t h i s study shows more than that i t i s d i f f i c u l t for lower l e v e l p a r t i c i -pants in:formal organizations 'to i n i t i a t e change, i t c a l l s a ttention to the necessity of understanding the p r a c t i c a l dynamics of authority construction. The connection between p o t e n t i a l s o c i a l change and what obstructs i t within a large formal organization may involve many people whose actions support the ongoing s i t u a t i o n . I t i s not enough to i d e n t i f y these actions. The ideologies with which people j u s t i f y t h e i r positions and frame t h e i r ideas of what i s going on are also necessary for under-standing how i t i s a l l held together. Even t h i s i s not enough, the actual t e c h n i c a l organization of the work and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of back- . ground supports f o r compliance must also be considered. As t h i s i s done the r e l a t i v e l y powerless position.of the lower l e v e l p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l probably become apparent; however, to the extent that the analysis i s understood by them, they w i l l have more power than they had without t h i s knowledge because they w i l l know which of t h e i r possible actions has more likelihood, of p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t s . 214 The tremendous weight of governments and large formal organiza-tions as against i n d i v i d u a l s has led some s o c i o l o g i s t s to dismiss the s o c i a l construction approach as inadequate (McNall, Johnson and Grabiner 1975). Rather what should be dismissed i s face-to-face negotiation as the model for the way that society i s maintained and change produced. I t i s c e r t a i n l y people who by t h e i r actions create h i s t o r y , what these actions are however i s not obvious. In the case h i s t o r i e s , recognizable face-to-face actions happened as when there was a s t r i k e or f i g h t or when a person was charged and t r i e d for a crime, but there were also written instructions, orders, authorizations, regulations and p u b l i c i t y that extended t h i s . These paper negotiations were more decisive than face-to-face encounters. The s o c i a l construction approach at f i r s t seems bound w i t h i n a face-to-face model; however, i n following out the reports of the written documents the mechanisms of i n s t i t u t i o n a l control became v i s i b l e . The documents also brought i n information about the ideologies through which action was plan-ned and interpreted, about the perceived power bases of the d i f f e r e n t p a r t i c i p a n t s and located the s i t u a t i o n i n an h i s t o r i c a l time and place. The s o c i a l construction approach then can be used to study i n s t i t u t i o n a l and class phenomena i f i t i s f u l l y used (Morris 1975). I t i s only when we l i m i t our attention to face-to-face i n t e r a c t i o n that the background factors escape us. When we become interested i n the accounts the p a r t i c i p a n t s make for each other we bring i n the actual on-going constructing of a r e l a t i o n to the world beyond the face-to-face s e t t i n g (Smith 1973). S o c i a l con-s t r u c t i o n i s only inadequate as an approach i f we f a i l to extend i t to include the things that are constructed, for instance, records, authoriza-t i o n s , p u b l i c i t y , formal organization, the processes of organization and t h e i r i n t e r s e c t i o n with the society at large. 215 There have been few s o c i o l o g i c a l studies which have examined organizational processes from the, perspective of problems of worker i n i t i a t e d actions. Mouzelis has c a l l e d attention to t h i s omission of large areas of human action (1968). Organization t h e o r i s t s have concen-trated instead on problems defined from the perspective of management. The effectiveness of managerial control i n increasing production or p r o f i t i s taken as the c e n t r a l problem. L i t t l e a t tention i f any has been given to issues a r i s i n g from the p o s i t i o n of workers. The s o c i a l construction approach focuses upon how i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r action and i n t e r a c t i o n create organized processes. I t o f f e r s an approach which focuses on organization as something which i s brought into being by the actions of p a r t i c i p a n t s . Crozier has a useful metaphor to show how organization t h e o r i s t s have f a i l e d to recognize the f u l l humanness of a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s : The c l a s s i c r a t i o n a l i s t s did not consider the members of an organization as human beings, but j u s t as other cogs i n the machine. For them, workers were only hands. The human r e l a t i o n s approach has shown how incomplete such a r a t i o n a l e was. It has also made i t possible to consider workers as creatures of f e e l i n g , who are moved by the impact of the soc a l l e d r a t i o n a l decisions taken above them, and w i l l react to them. A human being, however, does not have only a hand and a heart. He also has a head, which means that he i s free to decide and to play h i s own game . . . (Crozier 1964: 149). In t h i s study, p o l i t i c a l consciousness and action of the members went beyond that observed by Crozier. In addition to hands, hearts and heads, members had brothers and s i s t e r s and friends - to continue Crozier's metaphor. EMs as w e l l as admirals depended on each other and on outside support for t h e i r negotiation within the Navy. When s o c i o l o g i s t s have considered human actions as producing h i s t o r i c a l events they have used concepts such as s o c i a l forces and s o c i a l 216 structure to explain the strength and stubbornness of the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n surrounding any p a r t i c u l a r p a r t i c i p a n t s . I don't object to these formu-l a t i o n s for many purposes, but they are not adequate for understanding how p a r t l y intended s o c i a l change such as reform and revolutions happen. They mystify rather than elucidate. The s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s , whatever they are that make up what i s meant by s o c i a l forces, must go on through i n d i v i d u a l s as they act with and against each other and as they l i m i t and are l i m i t e d by p h y s i c a l and technological circumstances. This i s enormously d i f f i c u l t to think about only p a r t l y because i t i s a mixture of so many events and r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The r e a l d i f f i c u l t y i s that we have never adequately abstracted the fundamentals of what i s going on. There i s an i d e o l o g i c a l basis for our i n a t t e n t i o n to how events happen, how control is maintained, r e s i s t e d and new forms developed. Workers i n I n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s are thought to be incapable of independent action and therefore of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In bureaucratic organizations people from the bottom to the top l e v e l s explain t h e i r actions as "I am only taking orders" or "I j u s t work here." The purposes of the organiza-t i o n including any i n j u s t i c e s i n i t s methods are ruled out as beyond the e f f e c t i v e concern of workers; the same workers who accomplish the organizational purposes by using the prescribed methods. This study has used a d i f f e r e n t approach, i t has been assumed that workers are involved i n producing the organization of which they are part. The p r a c t i c a l way that t h i s happens i n the Navy i s i n t r i c a t e . 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They maintained a house i n San Diego where meetings were held, some of t h e i r subsistence workers l i v e d there and they published two undergroup GI news-l e t t e r s : L i b e r t y C a l l was done with the help of active duty people i n San Diego, e s p e c i a l l y those on the USS Cons t e l l a t i o n . K i t t y L i t t e r was produced by men on the K i t t y Hawk with the help of Harbor House people. When at sea, the s a i l o r s would send t h e i r copy to Harbor House where the paper was mimeod and sent back to subscribers on the ship. L e a f l e t s , campaign pamphlets and " s t i c k 'em and l i c k 'ems" were published under the names of NVA, COM and Harbor Project. K. H. Fly e r KITTY HAWK FLYER This newsletter was printed d a i l y aboard the USS K i t t y Hawk as part of the o f f i c i a l communi-cation plan of the ship. The s i x copies that I used were from March and A p r i l 1972. They were marked with comments and underlines by a s a i l o r on the Hawk who had sent them to the harbor projects. 224 UP FROM THE BOTTOM The Center for Servicemen's Rights i n downtown San Diego published t h i s Navy underground paper Up From The Bottom or UFTB. Active duty people, ex GIs and c i v i l i a n s wrote the a r t i c l e s . I t c a r r i e d news from the ships i n the San Diego area and some reports of c i v i l i a n movement programs. The Center provided m i l i t a r y counseling and l e g a l a id related to c i v i l l i b e r t y and discharge problems of EMs. THE DOOR The Door i s a bi-weekly underground paper i n San Diego. I t features movement events, occasional l o c a l p o l i t i c a l exposes, GI news, reviews of l o c a l rock concerts and announcements of entertainment and p o l i t i c a l events. San Diego l i b r a r y f i l e s the Door i n i t s p e r i o d i c a l s c o l l e c t i o n . The San Diego Union i s one of the d a i l y papers i n San Diego. The other paper i s owned by the same publisher and p r i n t s s i m i l a r news. The San Diego Public Library indexes the Union even by references to i n d i v i d u a l ships, they carry the copies i n microfilm. SOS NEWSLETTER, Stop Our Ship or SOS i s used as an organ-i z i n g name by several GI groups. I n i t i a l l y i t referred to the people working together on the Coral Sea campaign. They published l e t t e r s from the ship at sea and general GI news as w e l l as produced l e a f l e t s for San Francisco area ship campaigns. 225 PNS PACIFIC NEWS SERVICE P a c i f i c News Service, PNS, provides a p r o f e s s i o n a l news service for the P a c i f i c area. Their releases are used by subscriber newspapers l o c a l l y and around the world. They gave me t h e i r copy of news releases. News from t h e i r correspondent i n the P h i l l i p i n e s was my main source for events i n WESPAC. (Western P a c i f i c ) UA Bulkhead UP AGAINST THE BULKHEAD Up Against the Bulkhead, UATB, i s a bay area underground navy paper. I t c a r r i e s GI national and l o c a l news. NOMLAC CCCO NEWSLETTER AND NOMLAC The West Coast o f f i c e of the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, CCCO, publishes a Newsletter on M i l i t a r y Law and Counseling, NOMLAC. The nati o n a l CCCO o f f i c e publishes another news-l e t t e r . These both summarize recent cases and changes i n law and regulations. CCCO has a center for m i l i t a r y and draf t counseling i n San Francisco and provides t r a i n i n g and information to counselors on the West Coast. AFSC AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE The American Friends Service Committee, A Quaker Organization, sponsors work with GIs and helps organize c i v i l i a n SOS groups i n addi-. t i o n to i t s other community programs. Their o f f i c e i n the Bay Area supplied me pamphlets and l e a f l e t s used i n 1971 and '72 i n the Coral Sea, the Midway and the Enterprise campaigns. 226 TURNING THE REGS AROUND This i s a small booklet pub-l i s h e d by the Turning The Regs Around Committee. I t i s a GI movement book of advice of how to use the Uniform Code of M i l i t a r y J u s t i c e i n defense and organizing. I t quotes large sections from the UCMJ. Published i n the bay area. THE BERKELEY BARB & LOS ANGELES FREE PRESS are two o r i g i n a l underground papers i n C a l i f o r n i a . They continue to publish hip a r t i c l e s and cover some movement events e s p e c i a l l y GI resistance. They also feature extensive reviews of l o c a l entertainment and carry commercial advertisements f o r the many sex services i n t h e i r respective areas. CAMP NEWS i s a Chicago GI paper that gives comprehensive coverage of the GI movement i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . ABOUT FACE i s the newsletter of the United States Service-men's Fund. The USSF s o l i c i t s funds from c i v i l i a n s who wish to support the GI movement and p a r t i a l l y supports GI papers and coffee houses and other small community resistance projects. WIN i s a newsletter of peace a c t i v i s t s and a l t e r n a t i v e l i f e s t y l e people. I t i s published by i t s s t a f f c o l l e c -t i v e and the War Resisters League. I t has been bi-weekly u n t i l 1973 when i t became weekly. 227 AMERICAN REPORT was the monthly journal of the Committee of Clergy and Laymen Concerned about the Vietnam War. It has professional coverage of national and i n t e r n a t i o n a l events. CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT "Report by the Special Subcommittee on D i s c i p l i n a r y Problems i n the US Navy of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety Second Congress, Second Session, January 2, 1973." This i s the report of the K i t t y Hawk r i o t and the Const e l l a t i o n s t r i k e . DAILY NEWSPAPERS AND WEEKLY JOURNALS Daily papers i n the San Francisco and Seattle area were often used. The national weekly journals TIME and NEWSWEEK were also used as was THE NATION a journal of l i b e r a l opinion. PROCEEDINGS The United States Naval I n s t i t u t e i s the professional society for Naval O f f i c e r s . They publish a monthly magazine Proceedings which c a r r i e s a r t i c l e s on current events, naval h i s t o r y , t e c h n i c a l changes, and comments on naval and national p o l i c y and strategy. They publish books and manuals as w e l l . NAVY MANUALS Many of the regular books and i n s t r u c t i o n manuals recommended and/or o f f i c i a l l y used by the Navy 228 are published by the United States Naval I n s t i t u t e , USNI. The following were used i n t h i s study: 1964 Johnson, Florence R., Welcome Aboard 1966 Cope, Harley F. and Bucknell, Howard, Command at Sea 1968 USNI, Blue Jackets Manual 1971 USNI, Watch O f f i c e r s Guide 1971 Noel J r . , John V. and Beach, Edward L., Naval Terms Dictionary 1972 USNI, Ship Organization and Personnel ALL HANDS This i s the monthly glossy magazine of the Naval Bureau of Personnel, BUPERS. It contains i l l u s t r a t e d human i n t e r e s t s t o r i e s of naval personnel and t h e i r f a m i l i e s and announcements of changes i n regulations. I t also has departments for answering questions on promo-tio n s , t r a n s f e r s , retirement, reenlistment and discharge. NAVY TIMES This i s a weekly o f f i c i a l Navy newspaper. ARMED FORCES JOURNAL and ORDNANCE These are semi-o f f i c i a l m i l i t a r y p r o f e s s i o n a l journals for o f f i c e r s . Their content i s s i m i l a r to Proceedings. The Uniform Code of M i l i t a r y J u s t i c e , the current m i l i t a r y c r i m i n a l law and procedures f i r s t approved by Congress i n 1950 and amended i n 1956 and 1968. 229 Appendix i i DOCUMENTATION OF WHITE JACKET White Jacket was published i n 1850. I used the 1970 Northwestern Newberry E d i t i o n as my basic text. Other sources were as follows: Cohen, Hennig, Ed; White Jacket by Herman M e l v i l l e , Holt, Rinehart, Winston, New York, 1967. Davis, M e r r i l l R. and Gillman, William H., Eds; The Letters  of Herman M e l v i l l e , Yale University Press, New Haven, 1960. Humphries, A. R., Ed; White Jacket by Herman M e l v i l l e , Oxford University, London, 1966. Mumford, Lewis; Herman M e l v i l l e , Harcourt Brace, New York, 1920. Thorp, W i l l a r d ; " H i s t o r i c a l Note", appendix of White Jacket by Herman M e l v i l l e , Northwestern Newberry E d i t i o n , Evanston, 1970. Vincent, Howard P.; The T a i l o r i n g of M e l v i l l e ' s White Jacket, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1970. MELVILLE'S SOURCES FOR WHITE JACKET In addition to h i s own experiences on the USS United States i n 1843 and 1844, M e l v i l l e drew on the works of others. The p r i n c i p a l sources according to research of Howard Vincent and W i l l a r d Thorp were: Ames, Nathaniel; A Mariner's Sketches, Providence, RI, 1831. A B r i t i s h Seaman, L i f e on Board a. Man-of-War, Blackie, F u l l e r t o n & Company, Glasgow, 1829. Leech, Samuel, T h i r t y Years From Home: A Voice From the Main Deck, being the Experience of Samuel Leech, who was  for s i x years i n the B r i t i s h and American Navies, was captured i n the B r i t i s h F rigate Macedonia: Afterwards entered the American Navy, and was taken i n the United States b r i g Syren, by the B r i t i s h ship  Medway, Charles Tappon, Boston, 1843. 230 McNally, William, E v i l s and Abuses i n the Naval and Merchant  Service Exposed: with Proposal for t h e i r Remedy  and Redress, Boston, 1839. Martingale, Hawser (John Sherbourne Sleeper), Tales of the  Ocean, Boston, 1842. N i c o l , John, The L i f e and Adventures of John N i c o l , Mariner, W. Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1822. 231 Appendix i i i SOURCES OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION FROM INTERVIEWS AND PARTICIPATION SAN DIEGO I v i s i t e d the Harbor Project i n ' A p r i l and May 1972 and interviewed ex-service people and c i v i l i a n s working with Harbor Project. I attended several of t h e i r meetings including one at t h e i r bookstore, Second Thoughts. I also v i s i t e d the Center for Servicemen's Rights and talked with several of t h e i r counselors and organizers. SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA In October 71 and May 72 I had long discussions with peace program s t a f f of the AFSC. I v i s i t e d P a c i f i c News Service and talked with t h e i r news s t a f f who publish SOS. I also talked and corresponded with several other SOS workers including a leader of the non-violent caucus within SOS. I have also spent many hours t a l k i n g with d r a f t and m i l i t a r y counselors from San Francisco CCCO during t h e i r v i s i t s to the Northwest. EVERETT, WASHINGTON As a community college i n s t r u c t o r since 1963 I have had class discussions, r o l e playing and personal conversation with navy veterans. Many of the veterans had been on c a r r i e r duty including duty on three of the ships considered i n t h i s study. Most had only spent one tour of duty i n the Navy, but occasional students have been l i f e r s . Community college students are usually from working or lower middle class f a m i l i e s . They are usually not s o c i a l a c t i v i s t s although veterans since 1969 have had very strong a n t i - m i l i t a r y a t t i t u d e s . I consider t h i s student source to be more representative of EM opinion than the peace a c t i v i s t s . 232 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON I p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a GI peace march at Whidbey Island Naval A i r Station i n July 1972. I was able to t a l k with many of the marine and navy demonstrators. I had been i n v i t e d as the acting Peace Secretary for the Northwest Regional o f f i c e of the American Friends Service Committee, AFSC. In e a r l i e r work I had chaired AFSCs dra f t and m i l i t a r y counseling committee from 1967 to 1970. This involved attendance at l e g a l and counseling workshops, at court martials and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n support programs for p a r t i c u l a r service people including two instances of sanctuary. In a l l of these I spent considerable time t a l k i n g to the service people involved. PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD at BREMERTON, WASHINGTON I once worked for a year and a h a l f as a sub-professional draftsman at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard i n the Design D i v i s i o n for Damage Control and Ordnance Design. This occasionally involved going aboard ships to check plans. I did be-come f a m i l i a r with the ph y s i c a l f e e l i n g and actual appearance of the i n t e r i o r s of many ships including a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s . 

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