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Social construction of authority case studies under conditions of military discipline Connally, Orabelle 1976

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S O C I A L  C O N S T R U C T I O N  of  A U T H O R I T Y  CASE STUDIES UNDER CONDITIONS o f MILITARY DISCIPLINE by ORABELLE CONNALLY B.A., U n i v e r s i t y M.A.,  University  o f Washington, 1948 o f M i c h i g a n , 1951  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF ' ~ - - . THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  i n the Department of Sociology  We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d  THE  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May, 1976  0  Orabelle Connally, 1976  In  presenting  this  an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e the I  Library  further  for  agree  in p a r t i a l  fulfilment  of  at  University  of  Columbia,  the  make  that  it  freely  permission  this  representatives. thesis  for  It  financial  for  of  Sociology  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, C a n a d a  for  extensive by  the  gain  ' Columbia  shall  not  the  requirements  reference copying of  Head o f  is understood that  written permission.  Department  British  available  s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d  by h i s of  shall  thesis  I  agree  and this  be a l l o w e d  that  study. thesis  my D e p a r t m e n t  copying or  for  or  publication  w i t h o u t my  ii ABSTRACT  Five cases of resistance to authority i n the United States Navy in 1971 and 1972 were studied i n t e n s i v e l y .  These included anti-war cam-  paigns to keep the USS Constellation and the USS K i t t y Hawk from s a i l i n g to Vietnam, a movement defense of a s a i l o r charged with sabotage on the USS Ranger, a r a c i a l f i g h t of over 200 crew members on the USS K i t t y Hawk off Vietnam and two strikes by 130 Black s a i l o r s aboard the USS C o n s t e l lation.  White Jacket, Herman M e l v i l l e • s documentary report of l i f e aboard  a navy Man O'War i n 1843 and 1844 was also studied. The s o c i a l construction of authority, that i s , the way that authority was produced , strengthened or weakened by p a r t i c i p a n t s , was taken 1  as a problematic.  Published l e t t e r s , reports, pamphlets and a r t i c l e s by  members and supporters of the groups involved were the primary sources of information. Officers were found to use either a m i l i t a r i s t ideology when they commented on authority.  or a managerial  Each ideology included assump-  t i o n s about the p r a c t i c a l actions necessary for the exercise of authority and j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of the r i g h t of the few i n leadership to demand compliance of the many.  The m i l i t a r i s t ideology assumed an opposition of i n -  terests between officers, and men and that authority was manifested by and depended on an i n f e r i o r ' s exact obedience to a superior's commands i n a f a c e to-face s i t u a t i o n such as the s o c i a l and technological setting of M e l v i l l e ' s s a i l i n g Man O'War.  The managerial ideology i d e n t i f i e d authority as the  manipulation of i n s t i t u t i o n a l paths to career opportunity so that a l l of personnel were channeled into compliant behavior.  levels  Anti-war r e s i s t e r s and  Black movement s a i l o r s were very c r i t i c a l of authority but at the same time held p a r a l l e l ideas with one of the two models of how authority was; constructed.  Anti-war s a i l o r s assumed authority depended on a f a c e - t o - f a c e  command s i t u a t i o n as i n the m i l i t a r i s t  ideology and Black movement s a i l o r s  based t h e i r analysis of racism on i n s t i t u t i o n a l channeling which was consistent with the managerial view. The actions of the Black movement s a i l o r s were the most effective challenge to authority because t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y obviated extensive planning: or organization and because t h e i r analysis of racism tended to delegitimize managerial authority.  The atomization of personnel by the requirements for  organizing the technologically complex work of the ship and the  militarist  maintenance of oppositions between o f f i c e r s , senior NCOs and enlisted men made cooperation i n resistance u n l i k e l y .  At the same time the  authoritar-  ian style of lower l e v e l leadership also produced an anti-NCO s o l i d a r i t y among enlisted people.  The anti-war  s a i l o r s had hoped to c a p i t a l i z e on  t h i s s o l i d a r i t y but t h e i r understanding of the base of authority was i n correct and the Navy was able to absorb t h e i r actions without d i r e c t impact; however, t h e i r l i b e r t a r i a n attack on authority along with the Black actions precipitated a c o n f l i c t between 'managerial' and ' m i l i t a r i s t ' throughout the Navy.  officers  iv  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Pag  Introduction PART ONE: 1.  AUTHORITY MODELS, IDEOLOGIES AND  Contemporary m i l i t a r i s t i d e o l o g y  3.  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the 1970s: managerial ideology  5.  6.  PART TWO: 7.  8.  9.  The  29 47  emergence of 64 The  critique 73  A u t h o r i t y as i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n : i d e o l o g y of B l a c k movement s a i l o r s  The 81  F a c e - t o - f a c e conduct and the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a u t h o r i t y i n the 1970s .  85  CASE STUDIES  98  USS C o n s t e l l a t i o n s t a y home v o t e : f o r Vietnam, September 1971  Nine r e f u s e to  USS K i t t y Hawk stop our s h i p campaign: l e a v e f o r Vietnam, February 1972  leave 105  Seven r e f u s e  to 122  USS Ranger i s d i s a b l e d by sabotage and an e n l i s t e d man charged, t r i e d and a c q u i t t e d , June 1972 to May 1973 fight  26  The in  and navy o r g a n i z a t i o n . . .  A 1970s l i b e r t a r i a n view of a u t h o r i t y : of a n t i - w a r s a i l o r s  10.  Over 200  11.  130 B l a c k s a i l o r s November 1972  12.  .  A u t h o r i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n on a US warship i n 1843: l i b e r t a r i a n view of Herman M e l v i l l e as presented White J a c k e t  2.  4.  TECHNOLOGY  aboard the USS  Admirals r e a c t i o n :  strike  K i t t y Hawk, October 1972  twice on the USS  137 . . .  Constellation, .  November 1972  145  154 164  V  PART THREE:  THE IMPACT OF RESISTANCE ON AUTHORITY. . . . .  13.  The anti-war movement and the effectiveness of the managerial methods of control ..  14.  Black resistance: A p r a c t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l threat to managerial authority  15.  The i n t e r p r e t a t i v e bases of s o l i d a r i t y : Consciousness and conscience  16.  Managerial c r i s i s : Resistance among enlisted men precipitates c o n f l i c t between 'managers' and 'militarists'  Conclusion  Literature cited  Appendixes:  i ii iii  Sources of documents:  Annotated l i s t  . . . 223  Documentation of White Jacket  229  Sources of background information from interviews and p a r t i c i p a t i o n  231  vi  ACKNOWLEDGMENT  I am g r a t e f u l to t h e p e o p l e who gave me t h e i r and  time, f i r s t  initial  cooperation  o f a l l to my a d v i s o r P r o f e s s o r Dorothy Smith f o r  encouragement o f an e x p l o r a t o r y r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t , c h a l l e n g i n g  c r i t i c i s m i n t h e development o f the a n a l y s i s and c o u n s e l ing  i t s presentation.  i n organiz-  I- am a l s o g r a t e f u l to t h e Harbor P r o j e c t  p e o p l e and' the s t a f f a t the Center f o r Servicemen's R i g h t s  i n San  Diego and t o t h e SOS o r g a n i z e r s i n San F r a n c i s c o f o r t h e i r  coopera-  t i o n i n searching  their files  f o r o l d pamphlets, news r e l e a s e s and  even bumper s t i c k e r s from t h e i r s h i p campaigns. e s p e c i a l l y f o r t u n a t e i n having check t h e d r a f t Langowski take draft.  I have been  Annette Dunseth, a navy  veteran,  f o r c o r r e c t use o f n a v a l terms and C a t h i e Wamsley the time and c a r e to p r o o f r e a d  and type t h e f i n a l  1  INTRODUCTION  T h i s i s a study of m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t y based on the r e p o r t s of p e o p l e who  had  i n c i d e n t s of r e s i s t a n c e . Navy a t t a c k a i r c r a f t The  The  indirectly  eases of r e s i s t a n c e  c a r r i e r s i n 1971  and  1972  involved  occurred  during  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and  s o c i a l l y constructed,  or d i s a p p e a r e d .  s t r u c t i o n I . r e f e r to the p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n s  of the  By  war. under  the  authority  social  t h a t have produced and  conmain-  T h i s d e f i n i t i o n assumes t h a t i t i s a c t i o n s  of people t h a t are r e s p o n s i b l e but T h i s i s . the q u e s t i o n  US  o f how  technological conditions,  reconstructed  t a i n e d the a u t h o r i t y s t r u c t u r e .  on  in five  the Vietnam  a n a l y s i s of the documents i s d i r e c t e d at the q u e s t i o n  actual p o l i t i c a l , was  been d i r e c t l y and  published  i t does not  e x p l a i n how  they do  this.  study.  SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION In s p i t e of c o n s i d e r a b l e dependence of p e o p l e and  s o c i o l o g i c a l a t t e n t i o n to the  t h e i r s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s the dynamics of t h i s p r o -  cess remain d i f f i c u l t t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e  i n terms t h a t can be  phenomenal l e v e l - as C. Wright M i l l s p o i n t e d I m a g i n a t i o n i n 1951.  Although there i s no  a s t a t i c i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , or of how the l a r g e r s o c i a l c o n t e x t ,  at  the l e v e l of the i n d i v i d u a l of. how  grounded at a  i n the S o c i o l o g i c a l  l a c k of s o c i o l o g i c a l accounts of be a f f e c t e d by  or of s o c i a l change i n g e n e r a l ,  not been developed.  s h i p here, f o r i n s t a n c e  out  i n d i v i d u a l s may  in  s o c i a l a c t i o n has  inter-  people may  an  analysis  change the s t r u c t u r e of  Marx assumed a d i a l e c t i c a l  i n the German Ideology he  changes  relation-  said:  The s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and the S t a t e are c o n t i n u a l l y e v o l v i n g out of the l i f e - p r o c e s s of d e t e r m i n a t e i n d i v i d u a l s . . . , . . . i t i s men, who, i n d e v e l o p i n g t h e i r m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n and t h e i r m a t e r i a l i n t e r c o u r s e , change, a l o n g w i t h t h i s t h e i r r e a l e x i s tence, t h e i r t h i n k i n g and the p r o d u c t s of t h e i r thinking.(1956:74)  2 T h i s i d e a has c o n t i n u e d to i n s p i r e r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s and s o c i a l p h i l o s o p h e r s but  the p r a c t i c a l d e t a i l s of how. i t works have not been f i l l e d o u t .  The  a c t u a l p r o c e s s e s among a c t u a l people which jLs the p r o c e s s of change escapes  us and we have not been a b l e to s p e c i f y the c r i t i c a l p o i n t s of  change or even as we watched or p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h i s p r o c e s s , i f t h e r e were c r i t i c a l p o i n t s . S o c i o l o g i e s which focus on s o c i e t y as s o c i a l l y a t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s f o r how 1975).  s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i s accomplished  Both Schutz and Mead have developed  l y i n g processes are  constructed o f f e r  (Schutz 1967;  (Morris  t h e o r i e s of what these under-  Mead 1934).  Ethnomethodologists  a l s o s t u d i e d the p r a c t i c a l ways m i c r o - s o c i a l c o n t e x t s a r e produced participants and  (Turner 1974;  C i c o u r e l 1974).  The symbolic  have by  interactionists  some s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s have used r o l e theory to e x p l a i n the  c o n n e c t i o n between s o c i e t y and b e h a v i o r . e x p l a i n s conforming  b e h a v i o r , not i n n o v a t i v e a c t i o n  Turner,. Converse 1965; an account  To a l a r g e e x t e n t however, t h i s  L i n d e s m i t h .and S t r a u s s 1968).  i n terms of p r o c e s s and  (Blumer 1966; Mead's own  i n c l u d e s a c o n c e p t i o n of how  Newcomb, work i s creative  a c t i o n a r o s e but l a t e r r o l e t h e o r i s t s d i d not a t t e n d to t h i s as they on h i s i d e a s .  The approach i d e n t i f i e d as the " s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of  r e a l i t y " uses i n s i g h t s from both Schutz and Mead to develop the interdependence in  They are concerned  of  The  (Berger and Luckmann 1966;  '  w i t h the q u e s t i o n of.how i t happens  t h a t s o c i e t y i s e x p e r i e n c e d as having.an ual's p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  an account  of s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , s o c i a l i z a t i o n and i d e o l o g i e s  terms of s o c i a l meaning and. i n t e r a c t i o n  H o l z n e r 1968).  built  q u e s t i o n of how  e x i s t e n c e o u t s i d e of the p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n s may  s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n or a p a t t e r n of a c t i o n i s not addressed.  individ-  change a  It i s this  3 neglected  a r e a i n which I am  interested.  As  I explore  t h i s question  take the a b i l i t y of p e o p l e to c r e a t e s o c i e t y f o r granted. what they b r i n g . i n t o b e i n g undo or change. w i t h how  I am  they.are  I assume that  i n a d a i l y r o u t i n e p r a c t i c e , they can  also  concerned,with a u t h o r i t y s t r u c t u r e s a t t h i s  accomplished, how: they may  I  be broken and  how  level,  they  are  reconstituted. This question  of how  p e o p l e can or may  t e x t i s of immediate p r a c t i c a l ; i n t e r e s t twentieth  century.  We  affect their social  i n t h i s l a s t quarter  of  the  c i t i z e n s of developed c o u n t r i e s o f t e n f i n d  r e l u c t a n t l y cooperating  ourselves  as members of l a r g e formal o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  p l a i n of d e p e r s o n a l i z a t i o n . a n d  we  con-  We  exchange accounts of i n j u s t i c e .  com-  We  c r i t i c i z e some of the p r o d u c t s and byproducts of these o r g a n i z a t i o n s  such  as p o l l u t i o n , t h e i r e x p l o i t a t i o n of people or t h e i r danger to o u r s e l v e s others  i n the p o l i c i e s  d u c t s or t h e i r work. continue  they pursue, or of the consequences of t h e i r I t i s common t h a t i n s p i t e of our  people, i n c l u d i n g ourselves, Natural resources  I t i s e v i d e n t l y p o s s i b l e to  to take a c t i o n s to which we  are p o l l u t e d . o r d e s t r o y e d ,  people k i l l  are s t a r v e d and. imprisoned, o f t e n by p e o p l e who  to have these t h i n g s happen. education  In more minor and  i n s t i t u t i o n s of which we  cooperating  i n aspects  are p a r t we  we  a l s o the ones who  s u f f e r from it..,  century a l i e n a t i o n .  T h i s has  organize  are opposed. and  are  killed,  are most r e l u c t a n t  o r d i n a r y ways i n the may  of t h e i r work to which we  I t i s not even unusual t h a t the persons doing  twentieth  pro-  to cooperate s u f f i c i e n t l y . s o t h a t the work of these o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  b e n i g n or d e s t r u c t i v e , c o n t i n u e s .  others  disapproval  or  f i n d we  are  actively  are i n . p r i n c i p l e opposed.  the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s work are  become a s p e c i a l k i n d  of  4 As  s o c i o l o g i s t s we  should  not have p r a c t i c a l , a d v i c e of how should  be a b l e to comment on t h i s .  we  and  others  at l e a s t know to. what extent  and  under what c o n d i t i o n s  to b u r e a u c r a c i e s Organization  i s p o s s i b l e and  theory  has  likely  i n our  E t z i o n i 1964).  Organizational  a n a l y s i s does not  t e c h n i c a l or c u l t u r a l . c o n t e x t s  Woodward and  (Woodward's and  to t h e ' l a t t e r [Woodward 1965;  the work of people may  and which may  Reeves  C r o z i e r ' s work  C r o z i e r 1964]).  The  who  be used i n ways we  u l t i m a t e l y be used a g a i n s t  l i k e others  c l a s s i c a l . t h e o r i s t s did consider  Weber a n a l y z e d  potential for control. t i o n s and  are the employees of  simply  theory century  not  them; f o r but  Marx developed e x p l a n a t i o n s  we  not  organizations.  method of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as w e l l as  adequately  time.  and i t s  recommenda-  p o l i c i e s of a c t i o n f o r the a l i e n a t e d i n d u s t r i a l worker.  problem of the i n d i v i d u a l i n b u r e a u c r a c y cannot be by  do  the p a r a l l e l problems of t h e i r  the emerging b u r e a u c r a t i c  We  a straight-  produce o r g a n i z a t i o n a l t h e o r i e s r e l e v a n t to a d m i n i s t r a t o r s theories for ourselves  1970;  u s u a l l y ' l o c a t e them i n  s o c i o l o g i s t s , working away at t h e o r i e s of c o n t r o l p r e s e n t  c o n t r o l or f o r e s e e  resistance  been developed around problems of c o n t r o l r a t h e r M o u z e l i s 1968;  forward example of how  we  contemporary w o r l d .  (Bernard 1938;  are welcome e x c e p t i o n s  do  can e x t r i c a t e o u r s e l v e s ,  than r e s i s t a n c e  historical,  I f we  Today's  explained  borrowing Weber's a n a l y s i s of German b u r e a u c r a c y or Marx's  of a l i e n a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l workers under c o n d i t i o n s of capitalism.  A new  nineteenth  broad a n a l y s i s i s needed as M o u z e l i s has  noted  (1968). In s p i t e of the g e n e r a l have been r e s i s t i n g b u r e a u c r a c i e s .  lack: of s o c i o l o g i c a l a t t e n t i o n , p e o p l e Workers have o r g a n i z e d  together  s t r u g g l e w i t h management, f o r improved wages and working c o n d i t i o n s .  to This  5 has not always been a peaceful.and orderly process.  There i s a history  of mutiny among navy.personnel i n a number of countries i n this (Anthony 1937;  Armstrong 1959;  Schubert and Gibson 1933; was  Chorley  Sheehan 1971;  1943;  F u l l e r 1953;  century.  Russell  Wintringham 1936)  1974;  The Vietnam  War  a recent occasion for' resistance among e n l i s t e d personnel.  THE CASE STUDIES From 1965  to early 1973  United States' m i l i t a r y forces were  involved i n large scale warfare against countries i n Indochina. the US Army had reported serious resistance i n the infantry.  By  1969  There were  desertions, combat r e f u s a l s , r a c i a l fights and assassinations of o f f i c e r s . Incapacitation from drugs was and Osnos 1971)  an additional problem.  cluding automated warfare.  l a r g e l y replaced by a i r attacks i n -  In automated warfare target sensors and  delayed bombs are dropped by a i r c r a f t . sensors for d i r e c t bombing.  (Indochina Resource Center 1972)  and 1972  there were intensive c i v i l i a n and GI anti-war K i t t y Hawk, the USS  Constellation from returning to Indochina.  offered sanctuary to those s a i l o r s who Two  As  on these c a r r i e r s and support ships.  campaigns i n C a l i f o r n i a to keep the USS  ships.  the  accelerated, the Navy began experiencing trouble from the  In 1971  the USS  Later planes are guided by  The planes are based on a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s  at sea and on remote land bases.  enlisted men  Jay  As the land war became d i f f i c u l t - i n part because of  these forms of resistance - i t was  the a i r war was  (Hauser 1973;  Coral Sea  and  Local churches  p u b l i c l y refused to return to the  other c a r r i e r s , the USS Ranger and the USS  delayed for several months because of sabotage.  F o r r e s t a l were  There were s i m i l a r but  less spectacular reports of peace actions and sabotage on other ships.  6 In l a t e 1972 a r a c i a l f i g h t broke out aboard t h e USS K i t t y Hawk while  f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t Vietnam were underway.  er f i g h t on t h e o i l tender, USS Hassayampa. B l a c k sitdown  There was a s m a l l -  Two weeks l a t e r t h e r e was a  s t r i k e on the USS C o n s t e l l a t i o n and then a d o c k s i d e  to r e t u r n to t h e s h i p .  The s h i p had been on a t r a i n i n g c r u i s e out o f  San Diego i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r another Admiral  refusal  deployment to Indochina.  Zumwalt, t h e new C h i e f o f Naval O p e r a t i o n s ,  had been  t r y i n g t o i n c r e a s e r e - e n l i s t m e n t s by a s e r i e s o f reforms p u b l i c i z e d as "Z-Grams."  Some Z-Grams were i n t e n d e d  toward e n l i s t e d people tion.  to l i m i t h u m i l i a t i n g p r a c t i c e s  and o t h e r s ' i n t e n d e d  t o reduce r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a -  The reforms were p r o t e s t e d by many c a r e e r o f f i c e r s .  A f t e r the  K i t t y Hawk and C o n s t e l l a t i o n i n c i d e n t s , Zumwalt p u b l i c l y blamed officers.  Zumwalt was i n t u r n a t t a c k e d by some o f h i s  themselves admirals,. who t r i e d  to have him removed.  these  subordinates,  A c o n g r e s s i o n a l sub-  committee i n v e s t i g a t e d . t h e K i t t y Hawk f i g h t and C o n s t e l l a t i o n s t r i k e and concluded  that the f a u l t  l a y w i t h Zumwalt's new " p e r m i s s i v e n e s s . "  Zumwalt  then m o d i f i e d . h i s program and i n t r o d u c e d new c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . The  case s t u d i e s used i n t h i s t h e s i s a r e o f f i v e o f these  instances of r e s i s t a n c e :  war r e s i s t a n c e on t h e USS C o n s t e l l a t i o n , war  r e s i s t a n c e on t h e USS K i t t y Hawk, the r a c i a l f i g h t on t h e USS K i t t y Hawk, the two r a c i a l s t r i k e s on the USS C o n s t e l l a t i o n , sabotage on t h e USS Ranger a n d . f i n a l l y the a d m i r a l s ' r e a c t i o n t o Zumwalt's  reforms.  SOURCES AND METHODS P u b l i s h e d r e p o r t s o f these events o r g a n i z a t i o n make up t h e sources  and p u b l i s h e d comments on navy  o f i n f o r m a t i o n f o r t h e case s t u d i e s .  v a r i e t y o f documents were searched  f o r r e p o r t s o f people w i t h  different  A  7 relationships to the authority organization of the Navy.  Professional  m i l i t a r y journals, o f f i c i a l navy publications, t r a i n i n g manuals, GI movement newspapers, underground newspapers, a congressional report, peace movement l i t e r a t u r e and daily c i t y newspapers were the p r i n c i p l e sources. (An annotated.list of the documentary sources i s given i n appendix i . ) Herman M e l v i l l e ' s White Jacket, an account of his voyage i n a US Navy warship i n 1843  and 1844 was  also used as an enlisted man's report from  an e a r l i e r technological and organizational setting.  M e l v i l l e expressed  much of the l i b e r t a r i a n perspective of today's movement e n l i s t e d people. (Studies of White Jacket and of M e l v i l l e ' s sources are l i s t e d i n appendix ii.) The method of documentary analysis was a v a i l a b i l i t y of the documents.  Resistance  chosen.in part because of  i s l i k e l y to include actions  that are c o n s i d e r e d . i l l e g a l by those i n a p o s i t i o n to punish.  I t would be  d i f f i c u l t to gather relevant information from participants for this reason. It would also be impossible  to guarantee anonymity to informants inasmuch  as s o c i o l o g i s t s have not been able to maintain c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y of their research over a government's i n t e r e s t .  Beyond those p r a c t i c a l reasons for  using already published material.,, documents produced as a part of s o c i a l events are p a r t i c u l a r l y useful i n an exploratory study.  Selection and  deletion i n reporting have already been done by the participants rather than by a p r i o r framework of the researcher.  Thus the s e l e c t i o n has been  i n terms of.what they held to be relevant at that time and i n that of action.  Also the interpretations are given i n the language the  participants chose with the emphasis they considered intended  context  audience.  appropriate for their  8 Molotch and L e s t e r r e c e n t l y p o i n t e d out t h a t news r e p o r t i n g i s always a p o l i t i c a l  t a s k and no l e s s so i f a s o c i o l o g i s t  does i t (1973).  Dorothy Smith has d i s c u s s e d how i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s made by the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r a c t i c e s o f c o n s t i t u t i n g f a c t s by documentary r e p o r t s are' p o l i t i c a l l y consequential  (1973).  Recognition  o f t h e p o l i t i c a l process  t i o n o f the r e p o r t s , however, i s n o t enough information. not  simply  selection  To do t h i s I must read  a responsive (Smith  1973).  them.  to make them i n t o s o c i o l o g i c a l The r e a d i n g o f a document i s  a c t but i n v o l v e s c o n t i n u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and What the p a r t i c i p a n t s want o t h e r s  these documents i s a v a i l a b l e from them t o the extent properly. . war  o f the produc-  Becoming an adequate reader  t o l e a r n from  t h a t ' I can read  them  i s a p r a c t i c a l problem.  My competence as a reader v a r i e s f o r documents produced by a n t i -  d i s s e n t e r s , c a r e e r o f f i c e r s , B l a c k movement p e o p l e and t h e l e a d i n g  admirals.  In order  to understand.the campaign m a t e r i a l of the anti-war  o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d p e o p l e I i n t e r v i e w e d  some o f them i n f o r m a l l y .  I  a l r e a d y had f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h s i m i l a r , a c t i v i s t s from s e v e r a l y e a r s o f work i n d r a f t and m i l i t a r y c o u n s e l i n g i n the peace movement d u r i n g the s i x t i e s (see appendix i i i ) .  As a teacher  of sociology at a United  S t a t e s West  Coast community.college I have many s t u d e n t s who have been i n the Navy and a few who were " l i f e r s " , longer periods.  t h a t i s , c a r e e r i s t s who had been i n the Navy f o r  Through i n f o r m a l c o n v e r s a t i o n ,  z a t i o n s i m u l a t i o n s and student t h e i r views and i n t e r e s t s .  class discussions, organi-  papers I have been a b l e to l e a r n some o f  As a n - a c t i v i s t o f t h e anti-war  a l r e a d y am a q u a l i f i e d reader  o f underground p a p e r s , t h a t i s , I am a  member of. the p u b l i c to which they were d i r e c t e d . s o c i e t y I am s i m i l a r l y a q u a l i f i e d reader news magazines.  movement I  As an a d u l t i n the  o f d a i l y newspapers and weekly  9 Reading m i l i t a r y p r o f e s s i o n a l j o u r n a l s has p r e s e n t e d difficulties.  I gained  special  some v i c a r i o u s f a m i l i a r i t y by s t u d y i n g navy-  manuals and by u s i n g d i c t i o n a r i e s of n a v a l terms.  I once worked f o r the  US Navy aboard navy s h i p s so t h a t the p h y s i c a l s e t t i n g i s f a m i l i a r (see appendix i i i ) .  A f t e r r e a d i n g a j o u r n a l a r t i c l e I would check f o r  l a t e r l e t t e r s of c r i t i c i s m and i  original writer.  then r e p l i e s by  the  T h i s gave a b a s i s f o r making i n f e r e n c e s about how  a r t i c l e s were to be taken. some of my  commendation and  F i n a l l y I have had  c o l l e a g u e s , f r i e n d s and  f a m i l y who  the  informal interviews with have been n a v a l  officers.  There are many a i d s f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g M e l v i l l e ' s White J a c k e t . He wrote the book to encourage n a v a l reform and i s now  a v a i l a b l e w i t h supplementary notes  h i s sources.  The  to earn money.  The  text  e x p l a i n i n g h i s i n t e n t i o n s and  c o n t r o v e r s i e s about i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are a l s o d i s c u s s e d  s e v e r a l of the r e c e n t a n n o t a t o r s mation on M e l v i l l e r e s e a r c h ) .  (see appendix i i f o r b i b l i o g r a p h i c i n f o r -  In o r d e r to f o l l o w M e l v i l l e ' s n a u t i c a l  d e s c r i p t i o n s I.used a r e f e r e n c e book w i t h e x p l a n a t i o n s , p l a n s  and  i l l u s t r a t i o n s of the technology  (Lausanne  1971).  I was  by  of n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y  sailing  a l s o a b l e to walk aboard s e v e r a l o l d museum s h i p s of t h a t  era. To  t h i s background as a reader of the documents I a l s o b r i n g  p e r s p e c t i v e as a s o c i o l o g i s t and my western i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . understanding each account.  has  As  p a r t i c u l a r experience  I have read and  as a woman i n a  r e r e a d the documents  my  deepened as I have become a b l e to a t t e n d to more of  T h i s study  i s then a r e p o r t of what I have been a b l e to  make out of these m a t e r i a l s f o r b e a r i n g on the q u e s t i o n of how a u t h o r i t y i s maintained US Navy of the 1970s.  and  r e s i s t e d on a t t a c k a i r c r a f t  my  military  c a r r i e r s i n the  10  IDEOLOGY AND In the c o n f l i c t  THE  PRACTICE OP  AUTHORITY  t h a t went on i n the n a v a l  was  fundamental to i t s maintenance i n p r a c t i c e , were a c e n t r a l t o p i c . 1  the i s s u e i t s e l f was  which should p r e v a i l i n the Navy. hierarchy  and  among r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o r g a n i z e d around and authority.  form of  The  conflict  respond to r e s i s t a n c e .  by  i n attempts to m a i n t a i n , r e f o r m or identified  i n the Navy, e i t h e r i n c r i t i c i z i n g  upholding.them and  recommending how  them  the Navy s h o u l d  T h i s s e c t i o n of t h i s c h a p t e r i s concerned w i t h  the s i g n i f i c a n c e of i d e o l o g i e s of a u t h o r i t y formal o r g a n i z a t i o n ;  t a c t i c s used  i d e o l o g i e s of the d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s  d i f f e r e n t p r a c t i c e s of a u t h o r i t y or i n d e f i n i n g and  the navy  B l a c k movements were  These c o n c e p t i o n s were c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the  authority.  In-  authority  different positions within  of the peace and  of what  based upon d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s of the n a t u r e of  the d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s to the resist  The  the  and  this  expressed i n the v a r i o u s  'admiral's r e v o l t  c o n c e p t i o n s of a u t h o r i t y  as  was  deed i n the  reports,  organization  and  i n the  w i t h an a n a l y s i s of the  context of c o n f l i c t  two  major 'models' of  p r a c t i c e of a u t h o r i t y embedded i n the i d e o l o g i e s of the  in the  conflicting  parties. By  an  'ideology  both p r e s c r i b e and  justify  of a u t h o r i t y ' I r e f e r to b e l i e f s and the n a t u r e of a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s .  f i c a t i o n or l e g i t i m a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y construction authority  (Weber 1946).  as "the  to the s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n  which  The  justi-  r e l a t i o n s i s e s s e n t i a l to i t s s o c i a l  I f o l l o w H o l z n e r i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of  institutionalized  power" (Holzner 1967:148).  ideas  He  r i g h t to the  considers  ideas  legitimate exercise  of a u t h o r i t y  of f o r m a l o r g a n i z a t i o n .  basic  Bendix adopts a  of  11 s i m i l a r approach i n h i s study of h i s t o r i c a l changes i n m a n a g e r i a l ideologies.  He  shows how  as economic, p o l i t i c a l and  upset e s t a b l i s h e d r e l a t i o n s between s u b o r d i n a t e s servants  and masters, workers and  workers and  managers - new  the many had  to be  the concept of i d e o l o g y  an a l r e a d y  -  production,  the few  should  These were an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of  a c t u a l mechanism of c o n t r o l (Bendix 1970). use  superordinates  owners of the means of  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of why  developed.  and  t e c h n o l o g i c a l changes  Both H o l z n e r and  control the  Bendix thus  not merely to d e s c r i b e b e l i e f s which j u s t i f y  e s t a b l i s h e d p r a c t i c e , but  as i n t e g r a l to the s o c i a l  construc-  t i o n of a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s i n a c t u a l p r a c t i c e . T h i s view of the  term ' i d e o l o g y '  as an e s s e n t i a l element i n the  p r a c t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l forms of a u t h o r i t y d i f f e r s somewhat from i t s g e n e r a l  uses i n s o c i o l o g y .  t h i n k e r s i n t h i s area i s Mannheim who ideology its  as a t o t a l , way  s o c i a l bases and  representing  which p r o j e c t e d he  calls  i n s o c i o l o g y and essay "The of i d e a s  End  influential  developed an i n c l u s i v e account of  of thought i n s o c i e t y understood i n r e l a t i o n  i n t e r e s t groups. a r i s i n g out  of the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l o r d e r  (Mannheim 1966).  The  beliefs  and  those  p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n which  l a t t e r term has  never taken r o o t  i n c u r r e n t uses of* T<le.o\.Og^(for example, B e l l ' s i n h i s >  of I d e o l o g y " :  B e l l 1960)  i t i d e n t i f i e s an i n t e g r a t e d  i n which the i n t e r e s t s of d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s of a s o c i e t y  g i v e n e x p l i c i t and  sanctioned  the term i n s o c i o l o g y has toward how  to  He made a d i s t i n c t i o n between  an i d e a l system of s o c i a l and  'Utopia'  of the most  i n c l u d i n g the p a r t i c u l a r s e t of p o l i t i c a l  distinct  b e l i e f s based on and  One  b e l i e f s and  form.  set  are  Very g e n e r a l l y , however, the use  of  f o l l o w e d Mannheim i n o r i e n t i n g the s o c i o l o g i s t  i d e a s are to be understood i n r e l a t i o n to a  base, whether s o c i a l c l a s s or some other  social  special interest i n society.  12 As rather  I make use  than Mannheim.  term d i r e c t i n g us  of the term here I f o l l o w Bendix and We  w i l l not be  concerned here w i t h  'ideology'  to i n v e s t i g a t e the ways i n which s e t s o f i d e a s  the i n t e r e s t s or p e r s p e c t i v e  of s e c t i o n s of s o c i e t y .  We  are  r a t h e r w i t h i d e o l o g i e s as systems of i d e a s which f o r m u l a t e , organize  a p r o c e s s of a c t i o n ; and  r e c i p e s and  Holzner  provide  p r e s c r i p t i o n s f o r how  people should  a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s . In t h i s study two m a n a g e r i a l system of c o n t r o l and  a source of  as a  represent  concerned sanction,  recommendations,  a c t and  respond i n d e f i n i t e  i d e o l o g i e s are d i s t i n g u i s h e d :  a m i l i t a r i s t view of a u t h o r i t y .  a Similar  i d e o l o g i e s were found by Janowitz i n h i s e a r l i e r study of top m i l i t a r y elites  (1960).  MILITARIST IDEOLOGY The  ideology  t e n t of what Vagts has of war  (Vagts 1937).  m i l i t a r y way. fight.  I have c a l l e d  'militarist'  i n c l u d e d much of the  i d e n t i f i e d as m i l i t a r i s m i n h i s h i s t o r i c a l He  i d e n t i f i e d m i l i t a r i s m as d i s t i n c t  M i l i t a r i s m i n v o l v e d more than was  I t emphasized customs, p r e s t i g e , formal  i n t e r e s t s t h a t went beyond t h e i r u s e f u l n e s s m i l i t a r i s m became most developed d u r i n g  from  of the term i s p e j o r a t i v e and  'Militarist' v i r t u e s and  peacetime.  The  He  The  t i o n of m i l i t a r y . w o r k very  ideology  name.  The  o f f i c e r s who  Militarist  used t h i s i d e o l o g y  to which  However, i n that.  exalts m i l i t a r y  included a  as v e r y d i f f e r e n t from c i v i l i a n work and  d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s of o r g a n i z a t i o n .  appropriate  thought  I don't wish to f o l l o w him  I named ' m i l i t a r i s t '  to  officers'  ideology  i n i t s o r d i n a r y usage r e f e r s to a person who ideals.  the  r e g u l a t i o n s and  I a p p l i e d t h i s d i d i n c l u d e much of Vagts' i d e a of m i l i t a r i s m . h i s use  study  a b s o l u t e l y necessary  i n a c t u a l war.  con-  defini-  as r e q u i r i n g  then seemed  an  d i d not have a name  13 for I t . shared  E v i d e n t l y they i n the Navy and  took f o r granted  t h a t t h e i r ideas were w i d e l y  d i d not need s p e c i a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  managerial ideology incorporated disapproving of m i l i t a r i s t The  o f f i c e r s such as "rocks  and  terms f o r l a b e l i n g  former r e f e r s to e x c e s s i v e use of the m i l i t a r y , law  i s u n n e c e s s a r i l y c r u e l and In.the m i l i t a r i s t  between o f f i c e r s and men a u t h o r i t y and  l e s s capable,  although  (rocks and  Sundowner i s an  officer  subordinates.  i s assumed.  The m i l i t a r i s t s e x p l a i n e d to t h e i r s u p e r i o r  ability  the  ability,  E n l i s t e d p e o p l e were thought  t r a i n a b l e (within l i m i t s ) .  Navy work was  sometimes d r e a d f u l i n i t s consequences.  e n l i s t e d p e o p l e were not  shoals  i d e o l o g y a d i f f e r e n c e of i n t e r e s t and  their class position.  extremely dangerous and  punishment.,  o f f i c i o u s to h i s  p r i v i l e g e s of o f f i c e r s as due  t h e i r d e d i c a t i o n and  types  s h o a l s o f f i c e r " or. "sundowner."  r e f e r s to the Uniform Code of M i l i t a r y J u s t i c e ) . who  The  considered Hence  expected to do such work except under t h r e a t of  C o n t i n u a l d r i l l s and  f o r m a l i n s p e c t i o n s are thought  necessary  to i n s u r e t h e i r automatic obedience i n a sea emergency or b a t t l e . e t i q u e t t e of c a s t e , p r a c t i c e of d e f e r e n c e explained  and  intricate  as important  i n i n s u r i n g obedience and  Face-to-face  commands and  used to e x p l a i n how  obedience i n a c h a i n of command  a u t h o r i t y works as a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy.  t h i n k everyone e l s e does and w i l l .  f a l l i b l e because one symbolic  behavior,  are  respect f o r authority.  i n g l y , s a i l o r s w i l l r e s p e c t the a u t h o r i t y f i g u r e and they  rituals  The  are Accord-  obey commands o n l y i f  I f the o f f i c e r i s shown to  person does not show r e s p e c t by,the  be  appropriate  or i f the o f f i c e r h i m s e l f uses p e r s o n a l i s t r a t h e r than  f o r m a l approaches to l e a d e r s h i p , .or i f a s u p e r i o r revokes an o r d e r of o f f i c e r and  the crew knows t h i s ,  i f any  of these,  then a u t h o r i t y may  the be  14 lost.  A u t h o r i t y then i s b e l i e v e d t o r e s t on a unanimous b e l i e f i n  l e g i t i m a c y and t h i s l e g i t i m a t i n g i s done by s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n c o n f i r m i n g authority.  I f an e n l i s t e d person d i s o b e y s i n e x e c u t i o n of work i t may not  be as s e r i o u s a c h a l l e n g e to a u t h o r i t y as i f he f a i l s Disobedience  to show d e f e r e n c e .  can be handled, by immediate punishment - which may even h e l p  establish authority.  Any d e p a r t u r e from the immediate e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f  f a c e - t o - f a c e a u t h o r i t y c r e a t e s a problem i n t h e a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n If  a number d i s o b e y t h e r e i s a d e l i c a t e s i t u a t i o n .  immediately .punished. suddenly  itself.  A l l s h o u l d be  However i n such a s i t u a t i o n the b a l a n c e can  turn against the o f f i c e r .  t h i s i d e o l o g i c a l context.  That i s the meaning o f "mutiny" i n  T h i s command model i s based  on a t h e o r y o f the  maintenance o f a u t h o r i t y v e r y l i k e t h a t o f Chester Barnard who i n h i s , The F u n c t i o n s o f t h e E x e c u t i v e (1938) s a y s : I f a d i r e c t i v e communication i s accepted by one t o whom . i t i s addressed, i t s a u t h o r i t y f o r him i s confirmed o r established. I t i s admitted as the b a s i s o f a c t i o n . Disobedience o f such a communication i s a d e n i a l o f i t s a u t h o r i t y f o r him. T h e r e f o r e , under t h i s d e f i n i t i o n t h e d e c i s i o n as to .whether an o r d e r has a u t h o r i t y o r n o t l i e s w i t h the persons t o whom i t i s addressed, and does n o t r e s i d e i n "persons o f a u t h o r i t y " o r those who i s s u e o r d e r s , (p. 163) The navy people u s i n g t h i s model went beyond Barnard mous acceptance  o f a u t h o r i t y by group members.  i n stressing  unani-  Compliance w i t h t h e o r d e r s  of  a s u p e r i o r by t h e s u b o r d i n a t e i s seen as e s s e n t i a l i n the maintenance  of  authority... T h i s i d e a o f a u t h o r i t y was q u i t e d i f f e r e n t  by the m a n a g e r i a l or  from t h a t used  o f f i c e r s as we s h a l l see.; however, they were both models  ' r e c i p e s ' f o r a c c o m p l i s h i n g a u t h o r i t y , t h a t i s , who must do what to  whom i n what c o n t e x t s , what s a n c t i o n s a r e a p p r o p r i a t e and what.methods o f enforcement should be used.  15 In a d d i t i o n t o f a c e - t o - f a c e m i l i t a r i s t s ' model was b e l i e v e d  obedience to commands t h e  t o depend on m a i n t a i n i n g  social  distance  between a u t h o r i t y l e v e l s , between o f f i c e r s and men, and between s e n i o r NCOs and lower r a t e d and unrated men. two  T h i s model i n c l u d e s elements o f  o f Weber's types of a u t h o r i t y , b u r e a u c r a t i c  and t r a d i t i o n a l .  the c h a i n of command, the impersonal r u l e s and s t r i c t a u t h o r i t y o f the b u r e a u c r a t i c  I t has  obedience o f l e g a l  type but a l s o the r i t u a l , emphasis on  t r a d i t i o n and maintenance o f c a s t e t h a t a r e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l type.  Weber i n c l u d e d r e s p e c t  f o r the person, i n h i s c r i t e r i a  f o r the o f f i c e , as opposed t o r e s p e c t f o r legal authority.  does have t h i s but i n a d d i t i o n t h e r e to be upheld by r e s p e c t i n g  i s respect  holy  f o r t h e ' " u n i f o r m " which i s  t h e p e r s o n who wears i t . Weber r e l a t e s such  symbolic a s p e c t s o f a u t h o r i t y to h i s c h a r i s m a t i c authority.  The command model  type o f l e g i t i m a t i o n o f  They a r e comparable t o the wearing o f a m a g i c a l sword o r a  crown,(Weber 1946).  i t s hierarchy  The u n i f o r m as a symbol o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n and.  i d e n t i f i e s the person who wears i t w i t h h i s p o s i t i o n .  Deference to t h e p e r s o n i n a u t h o r i t y i n f a c e - t o - f a c e  situations i s integral  to how the a u t h o r i t y s t r u c t u r e o f the n a v a l o r g a n i z a t i o n affirmed  i s r e c o g n i z e d and  i n everyday p r a c t i c e .  THE  LIBERTARIAN CRITIQUE OF AUTHORITY  Anti-war s a i l o r s a l s o used.a f a c e - t o - f a c e model o f a u t h o r i t y but  they e x p l a i n e d  i t very d i f f e r e n t l y  than the m i l i t a r i s t s .  They found  a u t h o r i t y p r a c t i c e h u m i l i a t i n g to themselves and they thought i t as a d e v i c e  to make them accept t h e i r own p o w e r l e s s n e s s .  the r e g u l a t i o n s  that l i m i t e d  their personal  dress,  They  leisure,  intended  resented  political  16 expression a n d . p o l i t i c a l military citizens. to  organization.  laws i n s t e a d of c i v i l i a n laws as l i m i t i n g t h e i r r i g h t s One sub-group of the l i b e r t a r i a n s were a l s o s t r o n g l y  the uses o f the Navy, p a r t i c u l a r l y I have c a l l e d  anti-authoritarian political  They o b j e c t e d to the use o f  this critique  emphasis  thought.  ' l i b e r t a r i a n , ' because i t shares the  t h a t has been a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l i b e r t a r i a n  The word l i b e r t a r i a n r a t h e r than l i b e r a l i s used by  classical liberalism.  'Liberalism'  to a b e l i e f . i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of an o r d e r l y c a p i t a l i s t  s t a t e based on r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s and p o l i t i c a l  ' l i b e r a l ' w i t h t h i s s p e c i f i c meaning  freedom.  i n h i s c r i t i q u e of  Wolfe uses liberalism  F l a c k s f o u n d . t h a t s t u d e n t p r o t e s t o r s i n the s i x t i e s were  much more a n t i - a u t h o r i t a r i a n Similarly  and  F o r i n s t a n c e Chomsky uses ' l i b e r t a r i a n ' i n an  a r t i c l e on the themes i n v o l v e d i n anarchism (Chomsky 1972).  (Wolfe 1973).  opposed  i n the Vietnam war.  a n a r c h i s t w r i t e r s to show a d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i r p o s i t i o n  i s used to r e f e r  as  than c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l s  ( F l a c k s 1973:104-119).  the.GI movement had more i n common w i t h t h i s s t u d e n t a n t i -  a u t h o r i t a r i a n view than w i t h c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m . l i b e r t a r i a n , then, to name the emphasis  I have used  on l i b e r t y f o r i t s e l f .  The movement p e o p l e used the same command model of a u t h o r i t y as found i n the m i l i t a r i s t i d e o l o g y but viewed through t h e i r perspective.  T h e i r i d e a s of how  o r g a n i z a t i o n and o f how  libertarian  to r e s i s t or p r o t e s t navy  to slow down or end the war,  authority  assumed a u t h o r i t y  as depending on obedience t o commands i n a f a c e - t o - f a c e s e t t i n g . dividual  chief  p e t t y o f f i c e r s and commissioned  o f f i c e r s were o f t e n  mentioned as r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s p e c i f i c a u t h o r i t y abuses. t h a t as some p e o p l e r e s i s t e d  In-  I t was  hoped  o t h e r s would see t h i s and be s t r e n g t h e n e d  17 i n t h e i r own  a n t i - a u t h o r i t y , t h i n k i n g and would f i n a l l y p r o t e s t or  The  i r r e v e r e n c e of not  s a l u t i n g and  of a v o i d i n g o t h e r  was  applauded as h e l p f u l to r e s i s t a n c e .  deference e t i q u e t t e  These t a c t i c s imply  of a u t h o r i t y as t a k i n g p l a c e i n the f a c e - t o - f a c e group. authorities,  the Navy i t s e l f ,  as r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the war but  j u s t how  p e o p l e was  and  an a n a l y s i s  Higher  c o r p o r a t i o n s were mentioned  sometimes f o r the demeaning r e g u l a t i o n s ,  {these were i n v o l v e d i n n a v a l a u t h o r i t y over the e n l i s t e d  nojt e x p l a i n e d .  over the EMs  government and  resist.  The mechanism of compliance and  | ( E n l i s t e d Men)  was  described  i n personal  coordination  face-to-face  terms.  i Explanations  of why  the l i f e r s  did included c i t i n g  ( c a r e e r NCOs or o f f i c e r s ) a c t e d  i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r d e f e c t s as w e l l as  as  they  situational  i  f a c t o r s such as how  the o f f i c e r s might b e n e f i t by speedup of work or  avoidance of needed r e p a i r s .  The  "navy way"  or the " m i l i t a r y way"  by  were  I blamed f o r i l l o g i c a l a c t i o n s or b u r e a u c r a t i c d e l a y s .  The  EMs  themselves e x p l o i t e d and blamed t h e i r immediate c h i e f s , and  considered  officers  as  w e l l as the Navy command. The consciousness  l i b e r t a r i a n a n a l y s i s had  u s u a l l y developed as p a r t of a  change t h a t happened a f t e r j o i n i n g the Navy.  j o i n i n g the Navy from 1967  on had  ment as h i g h s c h o o l s t u d e n t s contemporaries i n navy towns.  Young  c e r t a i n l y been aware of the youth move-  or l a t e r as they i n t e r a c t e d w i t h The  a n t i - a u t h o r i t a r i a n values  movement must have h e i g h t e n e d t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s of navy, l i f e They r e p o r t e d had  men  civilian of  the  (Goodman 1970).  a sense of b e t r a y a l from the d i f f e r e n c e between what they  thought they, had  been promised and what they found.  h e i g h t e n e d f o r some by a profound d i s g u s t w i t h the Vietnam War.  C i v i l i a n youth who  had  the U n i t e d  been most deeply  This  was  States r o l e i n i n v o l v e d i n the  18 a n t i - d r a f t movement were not. l i k e l y b e i n g d r a f t e d i n t o the m i l i t a r y  to be among those v o l u n t e e r i n g f o r o r  ( t h e r e were a l t e r n a t i v e s to the d r a f t ) .  The a n t i - w a r c o n s c i o u s n e s s of EMs  as r e p o r t e d i n the v a r i o u s documents  was  t r a c e d to i n s i g h t s from s p e c i f i c e x p e r i e n c e i n the Navy.  MANAGERIAL IDEOLOGY The m a n a g e r i a l view of how different  from the m i l i t a r i s t  c o n t r o l was  ideology.  d e s c r i b i n g navy working r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  e x e r c i s e d was  They used "teamwork" as a way  w i t h p u b l i c i t y about team s p i r i t into required cooperation.  of  They d i d not r e c o g n i z e a c o n f l i c t  of i n t e r e s t between o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d p e o p l e . good pay were used as inducements  quite  to a l l .  Career advancement and  P e r s o n n e l p o l i c y was  to m o t i v a t e s a i l o r s ,  used a l o n g  c h i e f s and  officers  P o s s i b i l i t i e s of u n f a v o r a b l e d i s c h a r g e s o r  r e d u c t i o n s i n rank and e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t s channeled p e o p l e away from a c t i o n s d i s a p p r o v e d by the Navy.  These p r a c t i c e s were a l l l e g i t i m i z e d  by  the " c i v i l i a n " i d e a t h a t work s h o u l d be rewarded by c a r e e r advancement and good pay.  People w r i t i n g from t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e r e f e r r e d to themselves  as managers and to t h e i r o r i e n t a t i o n as m a n a g e r i a l .  Janowitz i s p a r t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the p o p u l a r i z a t i o n o f the term i n m i l i t a r y study p u b l i s h e d i n 1960  circles.  His  i s o f t e n quoted by t h e s e o f f i c e r s i n a r t i c l e s  on  a u t h o r i t y and p e r s o n n e l p o l i c y . Bendix thought t h a t the change to such m a n a g e r i a l i d e o l o g y r e s u l t e d , from t r a n s i t i o n to i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y .  In the mature  industrial  s o c i e t y a work e t h i c has been accepted:by workers but t h e r e i s s t i l l problem of c o n t r o l l i n g the workers' d i s c r e t i o n as to how  much o r  little  they w i l l  cooperate w i t h i n the framework o f a c o n t r a c t u a l  ship.  T h i s c o u l d account f o r managers' a t t e n t i o n to workers'  a  how relation-  attitudes  19 and  to the development of p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s departments (Bendix 1970:  195:197).  S i m i l a r l y we f i n d that. navy managers used techniques to  encourage c o o p e r a t i v e by  a t t i t u d e s by. i n v o k i n g  the s p i r i t  o f teamwork and  recommending the use o f a f r i e n d l y manner i n f a c e - t o - f a c e  t i v e contacts.  Counseling  administra-  and group development programs were a l s o used  along w i t h p e r s o n n e l p o l i c y d i r e c t e d toward c o n t r o l of o f f i c e r s who d i d not  share the m a n a g e r i a l Top  outlook.  l e v e l o f f i c e r s representing  the m a n a g e r i a l p o s i t i o n seemed  to use t h i s c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p as the b a s i s o f t h e i r Contractual  r e l a t i o n s h i p s were m a i n t a i n e d from the c e n t e r by p e r s o n n e l  p o l i c y and paper a u t h o r i z a t i o n s .  The p o l i c y makers j u s t i f i e d  reforms.as n e c e s s a r y to m a i n t a i n . t h e i r exchange f o r work..  ability  as ways to get c o o p e r a t i o n .  their  to o f f e r a r e a s o n a b l e  The.reforms t h a t improved l i v i n g  d i s p l a y of. c a s t e and use o f f a c e - t o - f a c e explained  authority.  c o n d i t i o n s , minimized  d e f e r e n c e e t i q u e t t e were a l l  C o n v e r s e l y o f f i c e r s t a k i n g the  m a n a g e r i a l p o s i t i o n were concerned t h a t t h e i r a u t h o r i t y was endangered when they c o u l d n ' t opportunity  d e l i v e r on t h e i r promises of j o b t r a i n i n g , c a r e e r  and adequate pay.  E t z i o n i ' s model of compliance w i t h i t s  p r e d i c t e d outcomes f o r c o e r c i v e , remunerative and normative methods:of c o n t r o l was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h these e x p e c t a t i o n s .  H i s model p r e d i c t s  that  workers w i l l be most a l i e n a t e d when c o e r c i v e methods a r e used, l e s s w i t h remunerative methods and t h a t the m o s t . a c t i v e c o o p e r a t i o n a v a i l a b l e from normative . c o n t r o l s the "managerial." o f f i c e r s . .  T h i s was the view of  C o n t r o l i s b e l i e v e d e x e r c i s e d , by the c a r e f u l  management of career, o p p o r t u n i t y compliance.  ( E t z i o n i ,1961).  would be  so t h a t p e r s o n n e l a r e channeled  into  T h i s corresponds to what Yuchtman and Samuel i d e n t i f i e d as an  20 i n s t i t u t i o n a l model i n t h e i r study of the I s r a e l i system o f e d u c a t i o n (Yuchtman and Samuel 1975).  They c o n t r a s t e d t h i s model w i t h an i n t e r -  p e r s o n a l one i n w h i c h f a c e - t o - f a c e i n f l u e n c e s were more i m p o r t a n t .  In  t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l model: . . . I n d i v i d u a l g o a l s and p l a n s f o r f u t u r e c a r e e r s a r e s e v e r e l y c o n s t r a i n e d by f o r m a l mechanisms such as an e a r l y s e p a r a t i o n o f more p r o m i s i n g s t u d e n t s from l e s s a b l e ones, d i f f e r e n t i a l t r a i n i n g o f v a r i o u s c l a s s e s o f s t u d e n t s t h r o u g h d i s t i n c t i v e types o f h i g h s c h o o l s and the g r a n t i n g o f o f f i c i a l c r e d e n t i a l s i n t h e form o f v a r i o u s d i p l o m a s and l i c e n s e s . (Yuchtman and Samuel . 1975:521) W i t h i n t h e navy model o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r o l t h e p r i n c i p a l mechanisms were s e l e c t i o n , assignment t o work o r t r a i n i n g , p r o m o t i o n , and use o f p e r s o n n e l r e c o r d s i n awarding punishment, t r a n s f e r s and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e discharges.  As these p r o c e s s e s  a r e implemented they have c o n s i d e r a b l e  e f f e c t on t h e f u t u r e of t h e i n d i v i d u a l s a i l o r o r o f f i c e r i n r e g a r d t o their l i f e t i m e job opportunities.  They a r e implemented v i a w r i t t e n  r e g u l a t i o n s f o l l o w e d by a u t h o r i z a t i o n s from a c e n t r a l b u r e a u c r a c y . t o - f a c e i n t e r a c t i o n i s sometimes i n v o l v e d b u t o n l y as a s u b - p a r t process.  of t h i s  Even t h e n , t h e w r i t t e n r e c o r d o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n i s more  than t h e i n t e r a c t i o n i t s e l f .  Face-  important  I n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l model c o n t r o l i s on a  c o n t r a c t u a l b a s i s and i n c l u d e s a promise o f f u t u r e c a r e e r  opportunity.  A l a r g e b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n i s assumed as the c o n t e x t i n w h i c h t h i s happens.  L e v e l s f o r o r d e r l y h a n d l i n g of p r o c e d u r e s and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of  c e n t r a l o r d e r s by a h i e r a r c h y o f o f f i c i a l s a r e d i s c u s s e d more as a b u r e a u c r a t i c process  than as a c h a i n o f command.  D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between  o f f i c e r , NCO and e n l i s t e d l e v e l s . i s n o t emphasized.  T h i s model has  s i m i l a r i t i e s t o Weber's i d e a l t y p e , b u r e a u c r a c y , w h i c h r e s t s on l e g a l authority.  I t l a c k s h i s emphasis on e x a c t obedience o f f u n c t i o n a r i e s  21 from l e v e l - t o - l e v e l .  Coordination  i n the i n s t i t u t i o n a l model. ability  and.training  as w e l l as l i n e communication i s used  His . c r i t e r i o n of s e l e c t i o n by  impersonal  i s satisfied,, i n f a c t , i t i s featured  of the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  strength,  and  i t s legitimacy.  model, a u t h o r i t y i s p a r t l y l e g i t i m i z e d by of the v a l i d i t y o f the r e g u l a t i o n s and  legality,  as the  In the  institutional  t h a t is., by  t h e i r s o u r c e but  the c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , but  and  career  does not  acceptance  i t differs  Weber's l e g a l l e g i t i m a t i o n by b e i n g more s t r o n g l y backed by t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of work f o r pay  essence  opportunity.  the  from  contrac-  Weber mentions  i d e n t i f y i t as the b a s i s  of  authority. The  i n s t i t u t i o n a l model does not  i n c l u d e an assumption of  s p e c i f i c technology or t e c h n o l o g i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s o t h e r i s expected to i n v o l v e t e c h n i c a l p r o c e s s e s . i n t e r e s t i n g but  i s not  expected to be  r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the work group and  than t h a t the work  The work i t s e l f may  extremely u n p l e a s a n t .  supervisory  not  The  be  personal  people are expected to  be  f r i e n d l y or at l e a s t p o l i t e inasmuch as they a l l work on the same b a s i s of c a r e e r promise. superordinate,to model c o n s i d e r s  W h i l e the command model p e r m i t s rudeness from  subordinates  though not  rudeness i n a p p r o p r i a t e  Although the models of how between the m a n a g e r i a l and t h a t the Navy should  be  l o g i c a l , development and of  life.  should  the  institutional  i n either direction.  a u t h o r i t y was  militarist  strong,  the r e v e r s e ,  constituted differed  i d e o l o g i e s , both i n c l u d e d have more money spent on  the view techno-  on,personnel.as a p r o t e c t i o n of the American  way  22  THE  BLACK MOVEMENT. ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITY  B l a c k movement s a i l o r s based t h e i r a c t i o n s on an a n a l y s i s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r a c i s m that.was v e r y s i m i l a r The managerial identified tional  to t h a t of the m a n a g e r i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n a l model d i d i n c l u d e a r e c o g n i t i o n of r a c i s m but  i t more as the r e s u l t  channeling.  assignment, t r a i n i n g  of' m i l i t a r i s t p r a c t i c e than of  The B l a c k s a i l o r s  thought  and advancement p o l i c y  c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t them.  the p r o c e s s of  a l l operated  so as to  t i o n s on the r a c i s m of w h i t e o f f i c e r s  Navy was  differed  discharge  They blamed low p e r s o n n e l  and NCOs who  thought  to u n f a i r l y  add  the disadvantages  i n c i t y g h e t t o s or oppressed  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l a n a l y s i s .  i n t h a t i t gave paramount s i g n i f i c a n c e  for control;  of t h e i r  rural  The m a n a g e r i a l  evalua-  d i d the r a t i n g .  of u s i n g p r e - s e r v i c e r e c o r d s as w e l l as r e c o r d s earned  c i v i l i a n experience clearly  dis-  The use of p e r s o n n e l r e c o r d s as a b a s i c element  c i t e d as r e p r o d u c i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  navy p o l i c y  institu-  selection,  i n advancement, assignment or i n d e c i d i n g punishment or type of was  model.  The i n the  prior  life.  This  was  i n s t i t u t i o n a l model  to i n s t i t u t i o n a l mechanisms  however, i t d i d r e c o g n i z e some elements of  institutional  racism. The  B l a c k movement s a i l o r s  i d e n t i f i e d B l a c k s as b r o t h e r s , members  of a group of which they were proud and allegiance.  They shared  certain  t h a t they should have the r i g h t  to which they should show  of the l i b e r t a r i a n views of EMs to t h e i r own  f r i e n d s and of p o l i t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n .  hairstyle  as B l a c k s .  as  c h o i c e of  However these were not p a r t of a  g e n e r a l l i b e r t a r i a n view, they r a t h e r f o c u s e d on t h e i r identity  and  such  They emphasized the r i g h t s  advancement w i t h i n the Navy f o r B l a c k s .  distinctive  of e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y f o r  N e i t h e r the B l a c k movement  sailors  23 nor the l i b e r t a r i a n e n l i s t e d  people.expected  equal pay or s t a t u s w i t h  NCOs or o f f i c e r s . , They d i d not c h a l l e n g e the system of. ranks as however the l i b e r t a r i a n c r i t i q u e a c r o s s ranks.  resting  i n career opportunity.  sailors.  They viewed t h i s  seen  by t h e i r navy e x p e r i e n c e .  them e q u a l l y expecta-  Their  sense  a r e a d i n e s s to demand what  similar  to the c i v i l i a n B l a c k movement  a n a l y s i s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n c i v i l i a n However, the s a i l o r s ' a n a l y s i s had developed  e x p e r i e n c e on., the s h i p s and was  j o b s and  i n educa-  i n p a r t out of  their  s p e c i f i c t o c o n d i t i o n s they found i n the  The young s a i l o r s were, of c o u r s e , f a m i l i a r w i t h the B l a c k move-  ment p a r t i c u l a r l y  i t s symbols of s o l i d a r i t y .  ment may.not have had an impact  The  early c i v i l rights  d i r e c t l y on them as c h i l d r e n but  urban u p r i s i n g s of the l a t e r s i x t i e s must have ( O b e r s c h a l l 1973; 1968). expected  move-  the Kerner  Whatever t h e r pre-navy commitment to the B l a c k movement, they to f i n d e q u a l treatment  only a f t e r  and j o b o p p o r t u n i t y i n the Navy.  they were d i s a p p o i n t e d on t h i s  t h a t they developed  a n a l y s i s of navy r a c i s m . . Cross's phenomenological "Negro-to-Black" viewing  as  promised.  T h e i r a n a l y s i s was  Navy.  by  discrimination  They too had j o i n e d the Navy w i t h p o s i t i v e  of b e t r a y a l i n c l u d e d r i g h t e o u s i n d i g n a t i o n and  tion.  treatment  p a r t . o n the Navy's o b l i g a t i o n to t r e a t  t i o n s and had been d i s i l l u s i o n e d  they had been  to unequal  treatment  the l e g i t i m a c y of.,the Navy's a u t h o r i t y which was  in significant  w i t h white  on equal d i g n i t y , of  B l a c k s d i d . n o t speak to t h i s but  race p a r t i c u l a r l y as undermining  insisted  such;  c o n v e r s i o n e x p e r i e n c e , d e s c r i b e s B l a c k s . a s moving  transition.  of  the  from  i n t e r m e d i a t e changes  to B l a c k rage w i t h commitment to t h e i r whole group (Cross 1973). s a i l o r s reported this  was  their  interpretation  the w o r l d as non-Black or a n t i ^ B l a c k through  It  had  Black  24 The  two models of a u t h o r i t y , command and i n s t i t u t i o n a l , and the  i d e o l o g i e s that included  them must be understood i n the context  of the  a c t u a l work o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the Navy which today c o n s i s t s o f a h i g h l y complex t e c h n o l o g i c a l and b u r e a u c r a t i c  structure.  movement c r i t i q u e s were used i n the v a r i o u s  The " i d e o l o g i e s and  s t r u g g l e s concerned w i t h the  n a t u r e o f a u t h o r i t y , i t s mode o f e x e r c i s e , and i t s use i n the Vietnam war. However, the i d e o l o g i c a l s t r u g g l e s seem, as we s h a l l see i n P a r t to  have had r e l a t i v e l y  little  impact on the a c t u a l s h i p  a l t h o u g h they d i d a f f e c t o r g a n i z a t i o n on the s h i p s .  operations  C l e a r l y the s i g n i f i -  cance o f i d e o l o g i e s of a u t h o r i t y i s g i v e n by the o r g a n i z e d work r e l a t i o n s which they formulate t i o n o f the t h e s i s which f o l l o w s on board a n a v a l v e s s e l d u r i n g  allows  us to r e c o g n i z e  s e t t i n g s and  and to which they r e f e r .  I n the s e c -  ( P a r t One) M e l v i l l e ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f l i f e  the 19th century  i s presented.  the form o f n a v a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i n which the m i l i t a r i s t It  Three,  T h i s shows  ideology  i s central.  the k i n d s o f changes t h a t have taken p l a c e i n  n a v a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and technology and to p r e s e n t  a c o n t r a s t between a  technology and. d i v i s i o n o f . l a b o r which depend on f a c e - t o - f a c e command t i o n s f o r the day-to-day c o o r d i n a t i o n of s h i p o p e r a t i o n s , temporary t e c h n o l o g i e s  and the con-  both o f automated machinery and b u r e a u c r a t i c  p r a c t i c e s which have taken over the work o f c o o r d i n a t i n g r o u t i n e In the contemporary a i r c r a f t Captain's  carrier,  operation.  c o o r d i n a t i o n and the e x e c u t i o n  d i r e c t i o n depend to a minimal degree on a command p r o c e s s  m i t t e d by f a c e - t o - f a c e o r d e r s .  Face-to-face  v e r y d i f f e r e n t p l a c e i n the context had  rela-  o f the trans-  a u t h o r i t y i n t e r a c t i o n s have a  o f contemporary o r g a n i z a t i o n than they  i n M e l v i l l e ' s day. P a r t Two o f the t h e s i s b r i n g s  together  a study o f a c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the navy command.  the f i v e case s t u d i e s and These a r e :  .the USS  25 Constellation Stay Home Vote, the USS K i t t y Hawk Stop our Ship campaign, sabotage on the USS Ranger and the subsequent t r i a l , a . r a c i a l f i g h t between more than 200 s a i l o r s on the.USS K i t t y Hawk, a prolonged s t r i k e of 130 Black s a i l o r s on the USS Constellation and f i n a l l y a protest of admirals as they react to these events and to managerial p o l i c i e s .  The  case studies allow us to examine i n d e t a i l the course of the development of s p e c i f i c attempts at resistance, the kinds of responses made to them by naval a u t h o r i t i e s , and, i n the case of the admirals 'revolt', how these types of resistance within the navy by enlisted men gave r i s e to c o n f l i c t among factions within the naval hierarchy which was focused on the type of practice of. authority appropriate or essential to the Navy. The case studies are central to the thesis as an account of the development and process of each instance of resistance. The discussion of ideologies and.the models of authority embedded i n them, and of these i n the context of the actual shipboard operations, provide an account of the organizational context i n which resistance took place and of the terms i n which the issues of authority were formulated by those active i n the conflict.  The focus on authority i s a focus given o r i g i n a l l y by the aims  of the movements, and by the formal organizational contexts i n which they developed.  In Part Three I have attempted to draw together what we can  learn from the case studies with respect to how such movements can challenge e f f e c t i v e l y or otherwise the established authority structures of the large-scale organization of navy ships, to look at the differences between the Black and anti^war movements i n this respect, and to draw out more f u l l y how these movements'had repercussions within the naval hierarchy i t s e l f resulting i n the 'revolt of the admirals' described i n Part Two.  26 r  PART ONE  AUTHORITY MODELS, IDEOLOGIES AND TECHNOLOGY-  In 1850 t h e U. S. Congress outlawed f l o g g i n g i n the Navy. civilian  government continued  shipping,  t o r e l y on the Navy f o r p r o t e c t i o n o f  f o r a t t a c k s on enemies and f o r defense.  f u r t h e r reform  efforts  The  T h i s use l i m i t e d  o f c i v i l i a n s inasmuch as the navy m i l i t a r i s t  l e a d e r s h i p argued t h a t l i m i t s on d i s c i p l i n e would end t h e i r  authority.  From t i m e - t o - t i m e the s e v e r e l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s and A r t i c l e s o f War were modified, civilian  but these changes were l i m i t e d supporters  by the t e n s i o n between the  o f m i l i t a r i s t s and o f l i b e r t a r i a n s .  T h e i r b i t by b i t  reforms kept the d i f f e r e n c e between l i f e as a s a i l o r and l i f e c i v i l i a n worker a t a more o r l e s s both.  The formal  constant  as a  as c o n d i t i o n s improved f o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y on s h i p s remained almost  unchanged. The  uses o f navy s h i p s d i d change.  By the 1970s U.S. A t t a c k  A i r c r a f t C a r r i e r s were b e i n g used as bases f o r a i r c r a f t c a r r y i n g bombs. Aircraft carriers,  a new development i n the 1920s had a l r e a d y  be u s e f u l f o r major w a r f a r e because o f t h e i r v u l n e r a b i l i t y weapons.  to modern  In s m a l l wars, a g a i n s t n a t i o n s w i t h o u t r e t a l i a t o r y  as i n Vietnam, they c o u l d s e r v e  as movable a i r bases.  ceased t o  technology  An u n f r i e n d l y  n a t i o n c o u l d n o t i n s i s t on t h e i r removal from the s e a as i t might demand the removal o f a l a n d  a i r base.  The o n l y combat r i s k s were those t h a t  the a i r c r e w s might encounter away from the s h i p .  Accidents  aboard the  27 ship remained a danger but not at the l e v e l of the 1843 navy.  As U.S.  international p o l i c y required the use of c a r r i e r s around the world, the expense of maintaining  the Navy increased.  The adequate repair and  maintenance of ships became a problem as the Navy carried out heavy bombing i n Vietnam (Klare 1974). These p o l i c y and technological changes had profound e f f e c t s on the basis of authority. does not r e f l e c t t h i s .  The language describing ship organization  M i l i t a r i s t s had preserved  these forms, but the  actual situations to which the old forms were applied were quite d i f ferent.  Navigation developments, weather p r e d i c t i o n , propulsion, ship  materials and design had made l i f e at sea much safer and more p r e d i c t able.  This safety was dependent on experts' knowledge of machinery and  electronics and their interpretations of indicators of automatic i n struments - not seamanship.  Wood, ropes, canvas, t a r , were a l i replaced  by s t e e l , e l e c t r o n i c s , machinery and o i l and i n a few cases nuclear power. New combat technologies replaced hand-to-hand and close ship combat.  Fire-  power now could be used against distant targets and aimed and f i r e d by instrument.  I t so happened that many men were required to run the complex  machinery of combat and crowding on the new large ships  continued.  As ship movement changed from dependence on wind to coal, the engineer with h i s crew of firemen was added.  The captain no longer  understood a l l • t h e mechanisms, that he commanded.  He had more power i n  respect.to the sea and the weather, and less i n respect to the o f f i c e r s and crew, because of h i s dependence on.their technical knowledge and expertise.  As each of the technical advances came - i n navigation,  communications, a i r c r a f t , ordnance, f u e l , machinery and damage control,  28 his  a r e a of c o n t r o l d i m i n i s h e d .  had  i n c r e a s e d power.  they were sent and  Above the c a p t a i n s , the f l e e t  They c o u l d now  age  as d i r e c t e d .  r e f e r to b a t t l e s and heroes from the  o f s a i l to i l l u s t r a t e t h e i r i d e a s of how  e a r l y technology to  c o n f i d e n t l y expect s h i p s to go where  to p a r t i c i p a t e i n war  M i l i t a r i s t s nevertheless  and  Jacket O'War.  i s probably  a u t h o r i t y s h o u l d work.  o r g a n i z a t i o n of s a i l i n g warships must be  get meaning from much of the m i l i t a r i s t  many r e p o r t s of l i f e  on s a i l i n g  ships.  the most e x h a u s t i v e  T h i s w i l l be p r e s e n t e d  i d e a s o f . a u t h o r i t y and  argument.  The  understood  F o r t u n a t e l y we  have  Herman M e l v i l l e ' s book White study  of l i f e on a US Navy  Man  next to p r o v i d e a r e f e r e n t f o r t r a d i t i o n a l  a base from which to a s s e s s  r e l a t i o n s h i p of technology,  commanders  a u t h o r i t y models and  the  contemporary  ideology.  29  Chapter  One  AUTHORITY ORGANIZATION ON A US WARSHIP IN  1843:  The L i b e r t a r i a n View of Herman M e l v i l l e as p r e s e n t e d  In 1842  two e n l i s t e d men  and a midshipman were charged w i t h  p l o t t i n g a mutiny and were hanged aboard the USS n a t i o n a l uproar.  i n White J a c k e t  Somers.  There was  a  James Fenimore Cooper and R i c h a r d Henry Dana were  among the j o u r n a l i s t s who  w r o t e newspaper and j o u r n a l a r t i c l e s a g a i n s t  the C a p t a i n f o r i g n o r i n g the r i g h t s t o due p r o c e s s of the t h r e e a l l e g e d mutineers.  The C a p t a i n had charged t h a t t h e r e was  the s h i p of m o s t l y boy midshipman (the USS  a p l o t to t a k e  Somers was  and use i t f o r p i r a t i n g o f f the A f r i c a n c o a s t .  a training  over sloop)  Even though the supposed  p l o t t e r s were h e l d i n c h a i n s , the C a p t a i n f e a r e d the crew would r e v o l t . He went ahead w i t h an e x t r a - l e g a l c o u r t m a r t i a l , found them g u i l t y sentenced  them t o immediate hanging.  The E x e c u t i v e O f f i c e r on  s h i p , a key p e r s o n i n i n s t i t u t i n g the c o u r t m a r t i a l , was of Herman M e l v i l l e .  and  the  a first  cousin  ( M e l v i l l e ' s l a s t n o v e l B i l l y Budd r e c r e a t e s some  of these events and c h a r a c t e r s . )  The r o l e of the C a p t a i n was  officially  i n v e s t i g a t e d by a c o u r t m a r t i a l h e l d when the s h i p r e t u r n e d t o the United States.  The  t r i a l was w e l l p u b l i c i z e d as c i t i z e n s debated the  i s s u e s i n newspapers and j o u r n a l s . (Harrison  The  C a p t a i n was  finally vindicated.  1959) Herman M e l v i l l e l e a r n e d of the case when a t sea as an  enlisted  30 man.  The charges of mutiny, the summary punishment of death and the  s o l i d a r i t y of the o f f i c e r s including his admired cousin were very d i s turbing to him.  He did considerable thinking about the authority  structure of the Navy as he continued to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the daily aboard his ship, the USS United States.  life  Five years a f t e r his voyage  he wrote White Jacket, a documentary of an enlisted man's l i f e on a man  o'  war. M e l v i l l e was not a t y p i c a l s a i l o r , his education and family  connections were above those of the average seaman. not unusual for a man voyage or two.  of his background to e n l i s t i n the navy for a  He had f i r s t gone to sea on merchant ships and had  joined the USS United States as a way Islands. was  However, i t was  of returning home from the Hawaiian  He was able to make friends with members of the crew and he  respected by them as a fellow s a i l o r and a competent seaman.  observed  He  t h e i r actions and relationships and he listened to their com-  p l a i n t s , their plans and their stories of sea White Jacket was  adventures.  popular for several years after publication.  It received enthusiastic reviews and over 5,000 copies were sold i n England and the United States.  Readers were sympathetic  to the attacks  on navy r i g i d i t y , abuses of authority and his condemnation of flogging. At this same time the issue of flogging was being debated i n the Congress.  Flogging was  U.S.  abolished as a l e g a l punishment three months  after White Jacket was published i n the United States. published a few months e a r l i e r i n England.)  (It had been  There were other books  and tracts on flogging and naval abuses, but M e l v i l l e ' s i s thought to  31 have been e s p e c i a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l . sources and  l a t e r s t u d i e s of White J a c k e t and  White J a c k e t was on the s h i p USS known.  Not  observed  Neversink  presented  own  i t s reception)  as a s t o r y of a m y t h i c a l voyage  but the r e a l source f o r the s t o r y was  soon  a l l of the s i t u a t i o n s d e s c r i b e d i n the book were a c t u a l l y  by M e l v i l l e .  other s a i l o r s . stands  (see appendix i i f o r M e l v i l l e ' s  He used r e p o r t s , j o u r n a l s and b i o g r a p h i e s of  S c h o l a r s have now  i d e n t i f i e d most of t h e s e .  i n s p i t e of t h i s l i t e r a r y borrowing  a c a r e f u l l y documented I was  The  book  and p a r t l y because of i t as  study.  a d v i s e d to read White J a c k e t by a member of the Concerned  O f f i c e r s ' Movement i n San Diego, " I f you r e a l l y want to know what l i f e a modern a i r c r a f t  carrier i s like,  i m p o s s i b l e t h a t the e x p e r i e n c e s  read White J a c k e t . "  of a s a i l o r of 1843,  c o u l d be s i m i l a r to those of an e n l i s t e d man an u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t k i n d and cruel conditions. of a "Man day.  o' War"  I was of 1843  me  even a M e l v i l l e ,  i n the 1970s l i v i n g  s i z e of s h i p and  wrong.  I t seemed to  under l e s s  aboard  physically  M e l v i l l e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the w o r l d  i s v e r y c l o s e to r e p o r t s of e n l i s t e d men  T h i s s h o u l d not be taken to mean t h a t t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s  to-  that give  r i s e to the r e p o r t s were the same but the model of a u t h o r i t y they used was  from M e l v i l l e ' s time.  t h a t t h i s was  important  As  I examined t h i s p u z z l e i t became c l e a r  f o r understanding  resisters' difficulties in  c h a l l e n g i n g contemporary a u t h o r i t y . M e l v i l l e i n t e r p r e t e d h i s experiences ideology. and  He was  from a  libertarian  v e r y much aware of h i m s e l f as a person w i t h  a c i t i z e n of a democratic  republic.  He  felt  dignity  the demands of the  on  32 Navy as an attempt to deny him both this dignity and his citizenship rights.  He documented the way  that the bureaucracy of the Navy, the  caste system and the m i l i t a r y purposes of war worked together to attack the citizenship rights and s e l f respect of s a i l o r s .  He also reported  what the s a i l o r s did about this as he described the various regular occasions l i v e d through by the USS Neversink's In 1843 sails.  ships were powered by the force of wind acting on  The Navy had already commissioned the building of  ships but they were not yet completed. the USS United States, was and l i g h t e r carronades. men,  crew.  steam-and-sail  The f r i g a t e M e l v i l l e signed on,  old but seaworthy., I t carried heavy cannons  The 205 foot ship also carried f i v e hundred  gunpowder, iron shot, fresh water, provisions for a long voyage,  farm animals for the o f f i c e r s ' mess, extra canvas,rwood and iron for replacements at sea and miscellaneous  items necessary for l i f e away  from shore for months at a time. A ship's e f f i c i e n c y depended on i t s seaworthiness,  the good  judgment of i t s o f f i c e r s , especially of the captain, the a b i l i t y numbers of the crew. for each watch.  S a i l i n g was  and  directed by an o f f i c e r of the deck  He had lookouts fore and a f t and topside for i n f o r -  mation about the immediate area of the ship.  He also could get a rough  reading of the ship's p o s i t i o n by sextant, compass and the use of charts and by dead reckoning.  His own knowledge of weather i n that sea and  his interpretations of cloud formations, wind and wave action of the moment completed his guides.  Speed was  changed by the taking i n or  l e t t i n g out of s a i l , the set of the s a i l s and the ship's p o s i t i o n to  33 the wind.  Too much s a i l i n a g a l e would c a p s i z e the s h i p .  I n order  to move the acres o f canvas o r t h e y a r d arms, many men were needed. The winches t h a t l i f t e d men.  t h e anchor a l s o r e q u i r e d t h e s t r e n g t h o f many  A l l o f t h i s work had t o be done r a p i d l y i n c a r e f u l c o o r d i n a t i o n .  D i r e c t i o n was e x e r c i s e d by the o f f i c e r o f the deck who gave  orders  d i r e c t l y t o the Bo'sun o r a m p l i f i e d by trumpet to the men.  The deck  crew were i n s i g h t and u s u a l l y h e a r i n g A first all  d i s t a n c e o f each o t h e r .  l i e u t e n a n t a c t e d as s h i p e x e c u t i v e  charge o f t h e s h i p ' s work.  depended on h i s e x e c u t i v e for continual supervision.  The c a p t a i n had the f i n a l word but  o f f i c e r and t h e s t a n d i n g  o f f i c e r o f t h e deck  Commissioned o f f i c e r s v a r i e d i n judgment  and knowledge o f t h e sea and s a i l i n g .  They u s u a l l y had r e c e i v e d some  t r a i n i n g as midshipmen aboard a navy s h i p .  Even so, M e l v i l l e  that a g r e a t number o f o f f i c e r s were incompetent. i n which one o f t h e l i e u t e n a n t s countermanded orders  o f f i c e r i n over-  and so saved the s h i p .  He r e p o r t e d  the captain's  suspected a storm  inappropriate  T h i s p l o t has been used i n o t h e r s e a  s t o r i e s b o t h i n f i c t i o n and n o n - f i c t i o n .  The p r a c t i c e o f h a v i n g an  o f f i c e r i n charge by v i r t u e o f h i s rank r a t h e r than h i s a b i l i t y o r judgment has not always helped  keep s h i p s a f l o a t .  Warrant  officers  who had come up through t h e ranks t o the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n s o f bo'sun, gunner, c a r p e n t e r petty o f f i c e r s .  and s a i l m a k e r  were competent o f n e c e s s i t y , as were  Any l a c k of a b i l i t y would have made a d i f f e r e n c e t o  the s h i p ' s o p e r a t i o n s  and they would be l i k e l y t o be c i t e d by the  o f f i c e r o f the deck and demoted by the c a p t a i n . Organization  and c o o p e r a t i o n were a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y i n  34 order  to manage the a c r e s  of s a i l .  l a b o r by mast, s e c t i o n o f s a i l ,  There was  a specific division  time of watch and  s i g n i n g on the s h i p each s a i l o r was  q u a r t e r watch.  given a long s e r i e s  t o s l e e p and  emergency  stow h i s gear.  numbers were more important to o f f i c e r s than the man's name. c i t e d t h i s as a b e g i n n i n g  of d e p e r s o n a l i z a t i o n .  j a c k e t enabled o f f i c e r s to i d e n t i f y him to f o r an impromptu t a s k , "you  Melville's  as someone who  i n the w h i t e j a c k e t " .  The Each crew was  The  b a s i c o r g a n i z a t i o n of the s h i p ' s work was l e d by a p e t t y o f f i c e r who  with  perienced  crews and  the men  s e c t i o n s of s a i l . energy i n t o their was  was  sailors.  privilege.  and messed w i t h them.  The  p e t t y o f f i c e r s were a s s i g n e d Men  cooperated w i t h  dangerous and  competence and  difficult  tasks.  c a p t a i n c o u l d f o r m a l l y o r d e r punishment.  Petty  They wore no They were ex-  difficult incredible  Many enjoyed demonstrating Much of the work  I f an o c c a s i o n a l man  The  i n front  d i d not  struck with a c o l t  c o u l d be h e l d f o r c a p t a i n ' s mast.  the " c a t o'nine t a i l s "  for  by workcrews.  to the most  work f a s t enough f o r an o f f i c e r , he might order him  f l o g g i n g by  pointed  a way  most a b l e and  t a k i n g the r i s k s of sea l i f e .  rope) or a man  white  anonymity of  t h e i r o r d e r s by p u t t i n g  n e c e s s a r y f o r everyone's s u r v i v a l .  (a k n o t t e d  own  a c a p a b l e seaman.  than o t h e r  i n s i g n i a nor d i d they have s p e c i a l  quartered  Melville  e x t r a work.  o f f i c e r s r e c e i v e d a l i t t l e more pay special  These  c o u l d be  s t a n d i n g w i t h o t h e r s when not under s p e c i f i c assignment was o t h e r s a i l o r s to escape blame and  On  of numbers  which i n d i c a t e d h i s assignment i n work and watch groups and c o n d i t i o n s as w e l l as where he was  of  At mast  u s u a l punishment was  the  a  of assembled s h i p ' s company.  35 The s k i l l e d c r a f t s  o f c a r p e n t r y , t a i l o r i n g , canvas making,  i r o n work, cooking and bookkeeping were needed i n a d d i t i o n to s a i l i n g skills.  The c r a f t s m e n who d i d t h i s work were journeymen i n t h e i r r e -  s p e c t i v e t r a d e s and no problem was r e p o r t e d i n g e t t i n g t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n . They knew what was expected and e v i d e n t l y d i d i t . what b e t t e r than t h e p e t t y  They were p a i d some-  officers.  There were many g r a d a t i o n s of p r e s t i g e among the f i v e  hundred  people on the s m a l l s h i p as w e l l as the c a s t e d i f f e r e n c e between o f f i c e r s and men.  (Although the U.S.Navy had o n l y been o r g a n i z e d as such s i n c e  1794, i t s t r a d i t i o n a l the  s t r u c t u r e was much o l d e r h a v i n g been taken from  B r i t i s h R o y a l Navy i n which many American  served.)  Officers  were t o be shown d e f e r e n c e i n speech, p o s t u r e and  s p e c i f i c wording of q u e s t i o n s and r e p l i e s . an o f f i c e r . officers  Enlisted  lived.  o f f i c e r s and s a i l o r s had  I t was an o f f e n s e t o i n s u l t  persons were not t o go i n t o  T h i s was " o f f i c e r ' s  the a r e a where the  c o u n t r y " and guarded by marines.  In a d d i t i o n to t h i s s e g r e g a t i o n t h e r e were d i f f e r e n t  spaces f o r the mid-  shipmen, warrant o f f i c e r s , t h e marines t o g e t h e r w i t h the s h i p ' s and master-at-arms  and f i n a l l y  The men a t e i n s m a l l groups  s e p a r a t e spaces f o r the men's hammocks.  called  "messes".  the men's mess was s i m p l e and monotonous. a v a i l a b l e to be f r e s h l y  corporals  The s a l t pork and pudding o f  L i v e c h i c k e n s and p i g s were  b u t c h e r e d f o r the o f f i c e r s ' f o o d .  The seamen took r e g u l a r watches and a t o t h e r times had to c l e a n and scour the decks, p o l i s h  metal f i x t u r e s , wash t h e i r hammocks  and c l o t h e s , r e p a i r ropes and waterproof wood and canvas. d i r e c t e d t h i s work.  Officers  The e f f o r t a t c l e a n l i n e s s was much more than was  •  n e c e s s a r y to run a s h i p .  3  6  By 1834 the U.S.Navy had a l r e a d y  established  i t s r e p u t a t i o n f o r " s p i t and p o l i s h " .  C a p t a i n and o f f i c e r s  t h a t t h e men  difficult.  uphold t h i s no m a t t e r how  insisted  There were p a r t i c u l a r  days f o r washing c l o t h e s , a i r i n g hammocks and even h a i r c u t t i n g , and s p e c i f i c hours f o r l e t t i n g down and stowing hammocks, f o r opening p e r s o n a l l o c k e r s , f o r e a t i n g and many o t h e r d a i l y events.  These s c h e d u l e s were  kept i n s p i t e o f i n c o n v e n i e n c e or danger to the s h i p or crew.  As the  N e v e r s i n k was met by storms i n s a i l i n g around the horn the s a i l o r s worked a l o f t  i n snow, f r e e z i n g temperatures and h i g h winds.  Those whose  watch duty ended i n the morning found t h e hammocks stowed and no d r y p l a c e to s l e e p . to  One c o l d and wet day, the C a p t a i n a l l o w e d the s a i l o r s  l a y l i k e s a r d i n e s on the wet and c o l d gun deck f o r a b r i e f nap, but  he would n o t order t h e hammocks out because t h i s was a g a i n s t navy p r e c e d e n t . There was  r e g u l a r group p r a c t i s e i n obedience.  was o f t e n r e q u i r e d t o w i t n e s s punishment.  The whole  crew  Musters might be c a l l e d a t  any hour f o r p r a c t i s e i n an emergency c o n d i t i o n such as "man o v e r b o a r d " , " f i r e " or " g e n e r a l q u a r t e r s " f o r b a t t l e . times became an e x e r c i s e i n d i s c i p l i n e . every morning.  Scrubbing o f the decks someThe decks were to be washed  In c o l d weather t h i s was p a i n f u l as the men worked i n  bare f e e t i n f r e e z i n g water on the deck.  When they f i n i s h e d the o f f i c e r  sometimes would o r d e r them t o do i t over as a t h i n l y d i s g u i s e d ment.  O f f i c e r s were not o f f i c i a l l y  punish-  p e r m i t t e d t o o r d e r punishments but  o r d e r s o f e x t r a duty and even the summary whippings by t h e c o l t were ordinarily  overlooked. The a u t h o r i t y , c a s t e p r i v i l e g e s and d e f e r e n c e g i v e n t o o f f i c e r s  37 cannot be explained as simply necessary, for the s a i l i n g of the ship. Merchant ships had a much simpler organization with less men, differences i n p r i v i l e g e and less punishment.  less  The demands of b a t t l e  are commonly considered the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for m i l i t a r y caste. primary function of an armed f r i g a t e i n the U.S.Navy was  The  to sink or  capture other ships as protection of shipping or as an attack on foreign merchant ships or foreign warships. lines.  Occasionally ships shelled coast  Some ships were used to transport troops and others were used  as gunboats on r i v e r s .  The Neversink (the USS United States) had been  in a famous b a t t l e against HMS  Macedonia i n the war of 1812.  reported the b a t t l e as told to him by a Black crewmember who been on the Macedonia during t h i s battle. recent report of the same b a t t l e was  Melville had also  (Melville pp.310-316)  A  reprinted i n the United States  Naval Institutes journal Proceedings confirming M e l v i l l e ' s description (Neff 1973). When general quarters was b a t t l e stations.  sounded the men  F i r s t they prepared  reported to their  the ship by breaking down bulk-  heads, stowing loose gear and laying out cots for the wounded.  Gun  crews assembled and extended the guns out the ports and prepared station with powder, wadding material and containers of shot. watched over the guns and threatened to k i l l any man to cooperate.  When the b a t t l e was  their  Officers  that was unwilling  underway, shot and cannonballs would  whistle across the ship as well as blood, f l e s h and s p l i n t e r s of wood. The dead and badly wounded were thrown overboard during the f i g h t . "Powder monkeys" rushed up and down the ladders bringing ammunition  38 •from below covered i n their s h i r t s so that i t wouldn't explode from the sparks of the b a t t l e . Cooperation during b a t t l e came easily as the men had practised their p a r t i c u l a r tasks many times.  They knew what to do although they  might very well not know what was happening i n the o v e r a l l b a t t l e . was a high l e v e l of excitement f u l scene. sword.  For any who  There  that energized them i n spite of the dread-  might openly refuse to fight there was  the o f f i c e r ' s  Some did manage to avoid f i g h t i n g , but this was done secretly.  When:the ship was  inspected after the b a t t l e guns were often found spiked.  After the b a t t l e the sights and smells of f l e s h and blood were promptly removed from the ship by a thorough washing down by water and vinegar, repairs were made and the regular l i f e of the ship resumed. The captain made the commitment to b a t t l e and i t was his order that would l a t e r end i t .  According to M e l v i l l e , i t sometimes happened  that a captain would not give an order to stop u n t i l most of h i s men were k i l l e d and his ship disabled.  This might earn him glory i f he  k i l l e d and possible promotion and heroism i f he survived.  was  The enlisted  men  achieved nothing by their s a c r i f i c e .  When rumors of war came to the  men  on the Neversink the o f f i c e r s became excited and the men  worried.  War promised much to the o f f i c e r but nothing but hard work and r i s k of l i f e and health to the s a i l o r .  In spite of this difference i n interests  b a t t l e i t s e l f has not been the occasion for mutiny.  Sailors have re-  fused to s a i l out to meet the enemy at the end of long wars, but t h i s has involved much more than refusal to do b a t t l e i t s e l f pp.120-127).  (Chorley 1973,.  39 During a b a t t l e f i r e p o w e r was own  c o o r d i n a t e d by o f f i c e r s .  Their  shouts or shouts a m p l i f i e d by trumpets were the media of communica-  tion.  The  c o o r d i n a t i o n and the obedience  seems to warrant etiquette.  years of England's  l e s s d i f f e r e n c e between o f f i c e r s and men  a c t i v e E l i z a b e t h a n navy.  The d e f i n i t i o n of  and  i n the officers  t h e i r r e c r u i t m e n t from the upper c l a s s e s came under  C h a r l e s I i n the e a r l y seventeenth The  for b a t t l e hardly  the whole e l a b o r a t e c a s t e system w i t h i t s r i t u a l  There was  as gentlemen and  necessary  c a s t e system may  century  ( C h o r l e y , p.131).  have been u s e f u l a t times f o r i t s e f f e c t  on o f f i c e r s ' c o o p e r a t i o n but p r o b a b l y not f o r i t s encouragement of the men.  For an o f f i c e r to be ready  to k i l l  b a t t l e he h i m s e l f must be v e r y obedient knew the man  i n d i v i d u a l l y or thought  a s a i l o r f o r disobedience i n to the Navy.  o r d e r e d a s h i p i n t o b a t t l e and d e c i d e d how  men  a l s o r i s k i n g h i s men.  S i m i l a r l y when a c a p t a i n l o n g to c o n t i n u e the  M e l v i l l e thought  t h a t inasmuch as  fight the  were not known as i n d i v i d u a l s they would be e a s i e r to s a c r i f i c e .  The o f f i c e r s themselves acquaintance  were w i l l i n g and  eager  for battle,  personal  and i n d i v i d u a l r e s p e c t f o r them would not be as  to c o n f l i c t w i t h the c a p t a i n s d e c i s i o n to f i g h t . m i l i t a r y c a s t e systems i s w i d e l y r e c o g n i z e d . War,  officer  of him as a person to be t r e a t e d  w i t h r e s p e c t t h i s would be more d i f f i c u l t .  he was  I f the  Roger L i t t l e found t h a t t h e r e was  among combat o f f i c e r s who spend time w i t h t h e men o r d e r them i n t o a c t i o n .  likely  T h i s f u n c t i o n of  In the r e c e n t Korean  a l a c k of a g g r e s s i v e a c t i o n  i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e i r men.  i s o l a t e d i n the f i e l d  As they would  they were l e s s l i k e l y  The army t r a n s f e r r e d such u n i t s to the back  to  40 l i n e s , allegedly for t r a i n i n g , but actually to give the o f f i c e r more contact with other o f f i c e r s and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the m i l i t a r y authority structure.  (Little  1969)  In the 1840s i n the United States naval o f f i c e r s came from privileged families while most crew members were from poor families. Prominent merchants, professional people and government o f f i c i a l s were often able to get their sons a p r e s i d e n t i a l or s e n a t o r i a l appointment as a midshipman.  Once on the ship the young middies learned that they  were not simply of a higher s o c i a l class but a d i f f e r e n t caste than the s a i l o r s .  Even an old veteran seaman might be whipped for not pleas-  ing a f i f t e e n year old midshipman. iated by his own  The middie might himself be humil-  seagoing professor or other o f f i c e r s , but he could  endure this teasing knowing that someday he would hold the o f f i c e r ' s position himself.  By the time the midshipman had become an o f f i c e r  with a command p o s i t i o n i n b a t t l e he would have learned that there  was  no c o n f l i c t between giving l i f e threatening orders to crew members and being a moral person himself, an o f f i c e r and a gentleman. In addition to this use of caste for establishing b a t t l e authority over men  i t allowed other uses.  used by o f f i c e r s for their own careers depended on laurels won  The s a i l o r s were regularly  career advancement.  The  officers'  i n b a t t l e , commendations won  i n various  competitions, and peacetime maneuvers as well as p o l i t i c a l patronage from c i v i l i a n government.  The hope for commendations led to the  frequent cleaning and scrubbing of the ship even when p a i n f u l or deadly to the men.  In s a i l i n g competitions  the men were driven at f r a n t i c  41 speed  to g r e a t e x e r t i o n sometimes r e s u l t i n g i n a c c i d e n t a l deaths. The problem of m a i n t a i n i n g d i g n i t y as an inmate of a " t o t a l  i n s t i t u t i o n " were e v i d e n t on the N e v e r s i n k .  Goffman, i n h i s denota-  t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of t o t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s included ships. of l i f e itself  In h i s examples  i n a t o t a l i n s t i t u t i o n he used many scenes from White J a c k e t (Goffman 1961).  H a i r c u t s and s t y l e of beard were l i m i t e d by  navy r u l e s and o f f i c e r s ' o r d e r s .  The s a i l o r s '  l e i s u r e time, c a r d  games, use of l i q u o r , even p l a y i n g c h e c k e r s , were a l l c o n t r o l l e d .  The  C a p t a i n o r h i s E x e c u t i v e O f f i c e r were o f t e n p u n i t i v e i n a d m i n i s t e r i n g these r e g u l a t i o n s .  M e l v i l l e noted t h a t the i d e a l s a i l o r from an o f f i c e r s '  view was one who would not c o n s i d e r r e s i s t a n c e no matter what the humiliation. T h i s L a n d l e s s was a f a v o r i t e w i t h the o f f i c e r s , among whom he went by the name "Happy Jack". And i t i s j u s t such Happy Jacks as Landl e s s t h a t most s e a - o f f i c e r s p r o f e s s to admire; a f e l l o w w i t h o u t shame, without a s o u l , so dead to the l e a s t d i g n i t y of manhood t h a t he c o u l d h a r d l y be c a l l e d a man. Whereas, a seaman who e x h i b i t s t r a i t s of moral s e n s i t i v e n e s s , whose demeanor shows some d i g n i t y w i t h i n ; t h i s i s the man they, i n many c a s e s , i n s t i n c t i v e l y d i s l i k e . The reason i s , they f e e l such a man to be a c o n t i n u a l r e p r o a c h to them, as b e i n g m e n t a l l y s u p e r i o r to t h e i r power, He has no b u s i n e s s i n a man-of-war; they do not want such men. To them t h e r e i s an i n s o l e n c e i n h i s manly freedom, contempt i n h i s very c a r r i a g e . He i s unendurable, as an e r e c t , l o f t y - m i n d e d A f r i c a n would be to some s l a v e d r i v i n g p l a n t e r . ( M e l v i l l e , pp.384,385) M e l v i l l e thought t h a t the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a s a i l o r ' s  speaking  i n s e l f defense was a d i r e c t d e n i a l of h i s r i g h t s as a c i t i z e n .  He a l s o  thought  i t was u n f a i r t h a t the A r t i c l e s of War c o u l d name a c t i o n s  crimes  such as "cowardice i n the f a c e of the enemy", " d e s e r t i o n ' or " s l e e p i n g on duty", none of which were crimes f o r c i v i l i a n s .  In the Navy these  were not Only crimes but they were crimes p u n i s h a b l e by death.  As  M e l v i l l e remembered the p u b l i c r e a d i n g s of the A r t i c l e s of War he  42 commented: As, month a f t e r month, I would stand bareheaded among my s h i p mates, and hear t h i s document read, I have thought to myself, w e l l , w e l l , White J a c k e t , you a r e i n a sad box i n d e e d . . . I t admonishes you to take a l l bad usage i n good p a r t , and never to j o i n i n any p u b l i c meeting t h a t may be h e l d on the gundeck f o r a r e d r e s s of g r i e v a n c e s . Listen: Art.XIII. "J_f any person i n the navy s h a l l make, or attempt to make, any mutinous assembly, he s h a l l , on c o n v i c t i o n t h e r e of by a c o u r t m a r t i a l , s u f f e r death." B l e s s me, White J a c k e t , are you a g r e a t gun y o u r s e l f , t h a t you so r e c o i l , to the e x t r e m i t y of your b r e e c h i n g s , a t t h a t discharge? But g i v e ear a g a i n . Here goes another minute-gun. I t i n d i r e c t l y admonishes you to r e c e i v e the g r o s s e s t i n s u l t , and stand s t i l l under i t : Art.XIV. "No p r i v a t e i n the navy s h a l l d i s o b e y the l a w f u l o r d e r s of h i s s u p e r i o r o f f i c e r s , or s t r i k e him, or draw, or o f f e r to draw, or r a i s e any weapon a g a i n s t him, w h i l e i n the e x e c u t i o n of the d u t i e s of h i s o f f i c e , on p a i n of death." Do not hang back t h e r e by the bulwarks, White J a c k e t ; come up to the mark once more; f o r here goes s t i l l another minutegun, which admonishes you never to be caught napping: P a r t of Art.XX. " I f any person i n the navy s h a l l s l e e p upon h i s watch, he s h a l l s u f f e r death." Murderous! But then i n time of peace, they do not e n f o r c e these b l o o d t h i r s t y laws? Do they not indeed? What happened to those t h r e e men on board an American armed v e s s e l a few y e a r s ago, ... " S h a l l s u f f e r death!", those were the t h r e e words t h a t hung those t h r e e men. ... By the main-mast! then, i n a time of profound peace, I am s u b j e c t to the c u t - t h r o a t m a r t i a l law! And when my own b r o t h e r , who happens to be d w e l l i n g ashore, and does not s e r v e h i s country as I am now doing - when he i s a t l i b e r t y to c a l l p e r s o n a l l y upon the P r e s i d e n t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and express h i s d i s a p p r o b a t i o n of the whole n a t i o n a l administ r a t i o n , here am 1, l i a b l e a t any time to be run up a t the yardarm, w i t h a n e c k l a c e , made by no j e w e l e r , round my neck! ( M e l v i l l e , pp.294,295) E v i d e n t l y other Americans shared M e l v i l l e ' s r e c r u i t i n g was  a problem.  During  concern,  s e v e r a l p e r i o d s i n the n i n e t e e n t h  century l e s s than twenty p e r c e n t of the s a i l o r s i n the f l e e t were citizens. harbor  " S a i l o r s wanted f o r the Navy" was  towns.  a common s i g n i n n a v a l  N a t i o n a l s of o t h e r c o u n t r i e s were more e a s i l y  recruited.  43 The harsh regulations, l i v i n g privations and the caste system that made navy l i f e so d i f f i c u l t for s a i l o r s at the same time helped to keep the loyalty and cooperation of o f f i c e r s .  The rights of summary  punishment protected the captain from future review of h i s actions and assured him that he would have a l l authority necessary to rule h i s ship.  The p r i v i l e g e s of caste and rank and the r e l a t i v e l y  l i v i n g situations made l i f e as a navy o f f i c e r appealing.  comfortable The deference  ceremonies were not only f l a t t e r i n g to an o f f i c e r but they also reminded him of navy rule.  At the same time that he was placed i n a high  position r e l a t i v e to the s a i l o r s he was subordinate to navy rule and ritual.  The forms were above him.  According to Katharine Chorley the  loyalty of o f f i c e r s to their government i s always an important ation i n the use of the m i l i t a r y (Chorley p.244).  consider-  She noted that i t  was much easier to get the rank and f i l e to cooperate with a government even when cooperation was against their class interests. The men on the Neversink did sometimes r e s i s t orders. were attempts on the l i v e s of o f f i c e r s and the captain.  There  At night when  an o f f i c e r was walking by the foot of a ladder on a lower deck, heavy iron b a l l s or carronade  shot would sometimes be dropped.  In the dark-  ness i t was impossible to i d e n t i f y the g u i l t y person among the many scurrying men.  On an occasion near the end of the voyage the whole  crew ignored the captain's order to have their beards shaved. days went by as the orders were not followed and tension grew.  Several A  mutiny was averted by heroic action of the men's f a v o r i t e lieutenant, Mad Jack.  He bravely jumped i n among the very angry men and casually,  44  as i f the s i t u a t i o n were not  so s e r i o u s , a d v i s e d  t h o u g h t f u l about t h e i r a c t i o n s . b r i n g i n g any  f l o g g e d and  c a p t a i n and  put  Old Ushant, d i d h o l d out and  i n i r o n s , would not  though  g i v e over h i s beard to  p o s s i b i l i t y of r e s i s t a n c e was  often considered  h u m i l i a t i o n of powerlessness angered him  punishment. As  h e r o i c man,  appeared to have t h e i r  the  the Navy.  The The  One  to be more  c a p t a i n t a c t f u l l y r e f r a i n e d from  charges over the a f f a i r as the men  beards shaved. he was  The  the men  On  one  o c c a s i o n White J a c k e t  by  even more than p h y s i c a l  h i m s e l f was  to be  flogged.  the g r a t i n g s were b e i n g p r e p a r e d f o r the f l o g g i n g he d e c i d e d  rush the c a p t a i n and  plunge w i t h him  Melville.  over the s h i p ' s s i d e .  c o u l d happen an o f f i c e r pleaded on White J a c k e t ' s  b e h a l f and  he would  Before he  this  was  released. There was  sabotage as i n the s p i k i n g of guns d u r i n g b a t t l e .  Smuggling of l i q u o r and ed and resist.  n a r c o t i c s by s m a l l c o n s p i r a t o r i a l groups happen-  even l e g a l a c t i o n was M e l v i l l e himself  groups supported reforms.  used or a t l e a s t c o n s i d e r e d  p r o t e s t e d by  as a way  the w r i t i n g of h i s book.  to Civilian  A group r e s i s t a n c e , t h a t i s , a mutiny, would  have been very u n l i k e l y a c c o r d i n g  to M e l v i l l e , because of c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s  of the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the s h i p .  D i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the crew l i m i t e d  co-  1 M e l v i l l e r e s e a r c h e r s have concluded t h a t t h i s event d i d not happen to M e l v i l l e h i m s e l f . There was a r e p o r t from another s h i p i n which a s a i l o r a c t u a l l y d i d take the C a p t a i n w i t h him to t h e i r deaths. Researchers a l s o doubt t h a t the near mutiny-of-the-beards and Old Ushant's heroism o c c u r r e d on the USS U n i t e d S t a t e s . M e l v i l l e d i d hear of a s i m i l a r mutiny over another i s s u e . H a i r c u t and beard r e g u l a t i o n s were w i d e l y d i s l i k e d at t h a t time and sometimes p r o t e s t e d . M e l v i l l e had been i n v o l v e d i n mutiny h i m s e l f on an e a r l i e r merchant voyage, (see V i n c e n t 1970 i n appendix i i )  45  operation.  M e l v i l l e commented on the way  the marines were used:  But the mutual contempt, and even h a t r e d , s u b s i s t i n g between t h e s e two b o d i e s o f men - b o t h c l i n g i n g t o one k e e l , b o t h lodged i n one household - i s h e l d by most Navy o f f i c e r s as the h e i g h t of the p e r f e c t i o n of Navy d i s c i p l i n e . I t i s r e g a r d e d as the b u t t o n t h a t caps t h e u t t e r m o s t p o i n t on t h e i r main-mast. Thus they r e a s o n : Secure of t h i s antagonism between the marine and the s a i l o r , we can always r e l y upon i t , t h a t i f the s a i l o r m u t i n i e s , i t needs no g r e a t i n c i t e m e n t f o r the marine to t h r u s t h i s bayonet through h i s h e a r t ; i f the marine r e v o l t s , the p i k e of the s a i l o r i s i m p a t i e n t to charge. Checks and b a l a n c e s , b l o o d a g a i n s t b l o o d , t h a t i s the c r y and the argument. What a p p l i e s to the r e l a t i o n i n which the marine and s a i l o r s t a n d toward each o t h e r - the mutual r e p u l s i o n i m p l i e d by a system of checks - w i l l , i n degree, a p p l y to n e a r l y the e n t i r e i n t e r i o r of a man-of-war's d i s c i p l i n e . The whole body of t h i s d i s c i p l i n e i s e m p h a t i c a l l y a system of c r u e l cogs and wheels, s y s t e m a t i c a l l y g r i n d i n g up i n one common hopper a l l t h a t might m i n i s t e r to the moral w e l l - b e i n g of the crew. (pp.374-375) Navy power over the crew was  thus e x e r c i s e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways,  but a l l were used i n a f a c e to f a c e s e t t i n g .  P r i v i l e g e s of the c a s t e  system h e l p e d t o keep o f f i c e r s o b e d i e n t t o the government e n l i s t e d men.  The r e a d i n g of the A r t i c l e s of War  the power to p u n i s h t h a t they b e l i e v e d n e c e s s a r y .  but a l i e n a t e d  r e a s s u r e d o f f i c e r s of The same A r t i c l e s  a l l o w e d them to deny c i v i l i a n c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s to s a i l o r s . i n mutiny was  Solidarity  p r e v e n t e d by d i v i s i o n of the crew i n t o opposing groups  such as t h a t between marines and s a i l o r s . s a i l o r s i n the B r i t i s h  f l e e t m u t i n i e s of 1 7 9 7  b a t t l e as i n s a i l i n g i t was  s k i l l e d men,  of work t h a t produced c o o p e r a t i o n . of the o f f i c e r s may  [Marines had j o i n e d w i t h (Manwaring  1935)Jl  In  p r a c t i s e and e x a c t assignment  The t h r e a t of death from the swords  a l s o have been a c o n t r o l i n b a t t l e as the t h r e a t of  l e s s e r punishments were i n the o r d i n a r y r o u t i n e s of d a i l y work. thought t h i s r e s u l t i n g c o n t r o l was  a consequence of n a v a l  Melville  organization  not s i m p l y of p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s t y l e s of l e a d e r s h i p o r of e v i l i n tent:  46  ... The immutable ceremonies and i r o n e t i q u e t t e of a man-of-war; the s p i k e d b a r r i e r s s e p a r a t i n g the v a r i o u s grades of rank; the d e l e g a t e d a b s o l u t i s m of a u t h o r i t y on a l l hands; the i m p o s s i b i l i t y , on the p a r t of the common seaman, of appeal from i n c i d e n t a l abuses, ... a l l tend to beget i n most armed s h i p s a g e n e r a l s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n which i s the p r e c i s e r e v e r s e of what any C h r i s t i a n c o u l d d e s i r e . ... I t i s not t h a t the o f f i c e r s a r e so m a l e v o l e n t , nor a l t o g e t h e r , t h a t the man-o-war's man i s so v i c i o u s . Some of these e v i l s a r e unavoidably generated through the o p e r a t i o n of the Naval code; o t h e r s are a b s o l u t e l y o r g a n i c to a Navy e s t a b l i s h m e n t , and, l i k e o t h e r o r g a n i c e v i l s , are i n c u r a b l e , except when they d i s s o l v e w i t h the body they l i v e i n . (p.375) The  Navy was  not l i k e l y to d i s s o l v e .  The  i n t e r e s t of the grow-  i n g i n d u s t r i a l n a t i o n i n a navy t h a t would defend i t s s h i p p i n g was powerful members.  support The  f o r maintenance of the Navy and  i t s a u t h o r i t y over i t s  n a t i o n a l s o h e l d an i d e o l o g y t h a t s t r e s s e d  e q u a l i t y of i t s c i t i z e n s .  political  T h i s c r e a t e d a t e n s i o n l i m i t i n g the e x e r c i s e  of m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t y but i t d i d not become a t h r e a t to n a v a l ization  itself.  a  organ-  47  Chapter  Two  CONTEMPORARY MILITARIST IDEOLOGY AND NAVY ORGANIZATION  Over the past one hundred and twenty-five years since M e l v i l l e wrote White Jacket technological development led to profound changes i n the way  that people worked together to accomplish navy purposes.  formal organization of authority has remained comparatively  The  unchanged;  however, the navy administration changed from a simple chain of command between the ships and the Secretary of War  to a vast bureaucracy.  This  severely l i m i t e d the t r a d i t i o n a l practice of authority on the ships. The navy bureaucracy above the ships and f l e e t s i s immense. also shore establishments  There are  for ship repairs, personnel development,  training and education and materials as well as many administrative bureaus and s p e c i a l missions with foreign and domestic assignments.  Navy  regulations, operational orders and technical information come from this bureaucracy i n a continuing stream followed by changes, corrections and deletions.  Thomas i n a friendly s a t i r e of navy l i f e commented: ... There i s a constantly building pyramid of required operational and maintenance reports, personnel questionnaires, leadership program notes, safety presentations, physical f i t n e s s test cards, management d i r e c t i v e s , special inquiry forms, performance charts, inspection and pre-inspection records and t r a i n i n g , and medical and counseling lectures. For example, i f an operating a i r c r a f t squadron attempted to give every lecture on each subject that i s directed by higher authorities (who, i n c i d e n t a l l y , have never coordinated their requirements) there would seldom be time for either f l y i n g or maintenance. (Thomas 1972:21)  48 This bureaucracy i s headed by over three hundred admirals their staffs.  As a group the admirals have higher s o c i a l class origins  than other o f f i c e r s .  The contemporary admirals are almost a l l graduates  of the naval academy.  Of the ten f u l l admirals on duty i n January  three were sons of admirals, one of these was admirals and a past Secretary of the Navy! admiral.  . (Navy Times, A p r i l 24,  This p o s i t i o n was  period of this study. superior.  The CNO  1974,  also the nephew of two  His brother was  other  a vice-  1974)  The Chief of Naval Operations, CNO, the Navy.  and  i s the highest o f f i c e r of  held by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt during the  The c i v i l i a n Secretary of the Navy i s the CNOs  directs the Navy i n i t s various sea, material and  technical commands.  Other o f f i c e r s including admirals are assigned  out-  side the navy to the Department of Defense and the s t a f f of the Joint Chiefs.  The CNO  i s a member of the Joint Chiefs, the o f f i c i a l body that  advises the Security Council and through i t the Secretary of Defense and the President.  The J o i n t Chiefs are an advisory group and do not have  command authority.  Formal commands come down from the President,  Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Navy, Army, and A i r Force to the Chiefs of each m i l i t a r y department such as the CNO  for the Navy  Department. There are a v a r i e t y of channels for the development of policy. Their use has varied with the p r e s i d e n t i a l administration and the d i f f e r e n t Secretaries of Defense.  The Department of Defense has a c i v i l i a n  for policy recommendations and m i l i t a r y advisors for each of the offices.  staff civilian  The m i l i t a r y s t a f f have access to more technical expertise and  personnel than the c i v i l i a n heads.  This gives the m i l i t a r y advisors  49 s p e c i a l influence.  The Joint Chiefs also have a m i l i t a r y s t a f f as do  each of the separate m i l i t a r y departments. l i m i t s consideration of policy.  Superiors send subordinates problems to  research for l a t e r policy decisions. come back up a chain of command.  The chain of command system  The report of the research must  According to Donovan, innovative  suggestions are not made and questioning of the o r i g i n a l formulation i s rarely done because superiors are not to be contradicted (Donovan 1970: 74-77).  The Congress i s also involved i n policy making.  The CNO and other  m i l i t a r y chiefs and experts are occasionally asked to t e s t i f y on policy before a congressional committee.  The Congress i s responsible for fund-  ing, for..approval of naval law and whatever other aspects of naval policy interest them.  The welfare of enlisted people has been an ongoing con-  cern of many. As the chief o f f i c e r s give advice to congressional committees their personal power i s increased as they and their recommendations are heard and accepted and as they also get to know the Washington D.C. e l i t e , White House people and j o u r n a l i s t s , s o c i a l l y .  They are l i k e l y to be  already acquainted with m i l i t a r y i n d u s t r i a l i s t s from previous work i n materials procurement and i n the development of technology.  Their personal  power can also be expanded by writing i n m i l i t a r y journals which have a readership of r e t i r e d and active duty o f f i c e r s . advertise heavily i n these journals.  M i l i t a r y contractors  As o f f i c e r s r e t i r e many are offered  positions i n m i l i t a r y industry (Donovan 1970:54-61). The United States m i l i t a r y e l i t e are popularly considered a p o l i t i c a l , that i s , w i l l i n g to submit to any legitimate orders of the c i v i l i a n government.  There have been a few recent c o n f l i c t s between high  50 o f f i c e r s and government leaders, but these have not involved the o f f i c e r s ' use of command authority over m i l i t a r y units against the government. However, i n 1861,  i n the c i v i l war,  one t h i r d of the o f f i c e r s joined the  Confederacy, taking some ships and men  with them.  In the 1970s the  m i l i t a r y e l i t e has been p o l i t i c a l l y active through the f a c i l i t i e s of their respective m i l i t a r y services.  Each branch has a vast public r e l a t i o n s  program with films, p e r i o d i c a l s , speakers and news releases which use s t o r i e s exphasizing  the danger to U.S.  security from foreign powers and  the consequent need for the new weapons used i n their p a r t i c u l a r departments.  The p o s s i b i l i t y of losing control of the sea to the Soviet Union  i s a major theme used i n navy public r e l a t i o n s . the present  The navy e l i t e backs  administration p o l i c y of m i l i t a r y pressure on selected small  nations around the world i n favor of U.S. themselves with c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c i a n s who  economic i n t e r e s t s .  They a l i g n  back a strong and well funded  navy and for whom the protection of o i l by sea power i s a central problem. Within the close relationships of the navy e l i t e to government and industry there i s room for differences, for instance the managers and m i l i t a r i s t s d i f f e r e d on authority ideology. many c o n f l i c t s over the indoctrination of new  In the past there have been technology such as i n the  development and use of a i r c r a f t and of nuclear submarines.  The  policies  on use of equipment and weapons have changed with technological progress and i n t e r n a t i o n a l relationships; however, ship organization and deference requirements have not had a p a r a l l e l development. Authority i s s t i l l based on t r a d i t i o n and further legitimized i n law and other formal regulations.  Its practice i s described i n handbooks  that give detailed s p e c i f i c a t i o n for i t s application.  The handbooks give  51 m i l i t a r i s t reasons for the caste system and deference etiquette, and m i l i t a r i s t arguments for administration by the chain of command.  Authority  relationships are assumed to depend on face-to-face encounters. The captain i s the Commanding Officer or CO of a ship. delegates general administration to the Executive O f f i c e r , XO. work i s divided into departments.  He The  ship's  The department heads report to the XO  for administrative matters and d i r e c t l y to the CO for operation  readiness.  Departments are divided into d i v i s i o n s which are further divided into work s h i f t s called sections. an o f f i c e r who  may  On larger ships each d i v i s i o n i s headed by  oversee other o f f i c e r s and petty o f f i c e r s .  The chief  petty o f f i c e r s are responsible for the work of the e n l i s t e d men.  First  and Second class petty o f f i c e r s usually a s s i s t with this supervision. (USNI 1972:2-38)  (see appendix i .  for USNI and other documentary  references)  FACE-TO-FACE CONDUCT Orders are supposed to come down this l i n e of command and r e q u i s i t i o n s , appeals, requests for leave, and so on, go up the chain for approval at each l e v e l .  Details of orders involving technical procedures  usually originate below the l e v e l of the CO because of the expertise involved.  Cooperation  across levels or messages from lower l e v e l s to  higher levels are sometimes necessary for c e r t a i n technical operations. This i s done informally.  Lower o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d men  must use  considerable tact to not seem to i n s u l t those of higher rank when giving information or correcting information (USNI 1966:466-467).  People of  superior rank are to be obeyed i n d e t a i l and are not to be contradicted or questioned.  Superiors may  c r i t i c i z e people with lower rank.  Requests  52 or suggestions of superiors are to be taken as a command by the i n f e r i o r . The i n f e r i o r i s to answer with deference, as "aye, aye, s i r " , but superior shows agreement by "very w e l l " .  (USNI 1968:29-31)  tion of a correction within these l i m i t s i s thus d i f f i c u l t . ideology does not include provision for corrections.  the  CommunicaThe m i l i t a r i s t  The need to communi-  cate i s reduced by elaborate instructions i n technical manuals, manufacturers directions and navy regulations covering expected s i t u a t i o n s . (USNI 1966:293-294) Deference to superiors requires more than the use of the proper manner i n verbal communications.  In i t s simplest form i t involves a  salute from an e n l i s t e d person to an o f f i c e r .  It may  involve the whole  ship's company lined up at attention on the weather decks to pay to a person of high rank.  When the ship i s i n port eight men  available to be used as "sideboys" of s u f f i c i e n t rank.  respect  are usually  to give salutes to v i s i t i n g o f f i c e r s  At the bo'sun's whistle they come on the double, take  their places facing each other and salute as the personage comes aboard exactly as s a i l o r s did on M e l v i l l e ' s ship.  (USNI 1972:112-117)  P r i v i l e g e varies with authority p o s i t i o n .  The l i v i n g spaces of  the ship have separate berthing areas and messes for the Captain, for the senior o f f i c e r s , the junior o f f i c e r s , the chief petty o f f i c e r s and for the e n l i s t e d men.  Different food i s served to o f f i c e r s and they have  servants, called "stewards", who  clean their quarters.  The captain and  senior o f f i c e r s have separate cabins, junior o f f i c e r s share cabins, chief petty o f f i c e r s share quarters and lower rated men bunks.  (USNI 1972:25-26)  sleep i n t i e r s of  53  Uniforms and i n s i g n i a indicate difference i n status and work assignment.  Pay d i f f e r s by rank, grade, years of service and by certain  s p e c i a l assignments.  O f f i c e r s s a l a r i e s range from 3 1/2 to 21 times as  much as non-rated men and from 1/2 to 7 1/2 times as much as chief petty officers.  ( A l l Hands,  March 1971) Special allowances and p r i v i l e g e s  increase this difference.  The terms of work contracts are d i f f e r e n t f o r  o f f i c e r s and enlisted people.  Under certain conditions o f f i c e r s may resign  their commissions, but e n l i s t e d personnel may only be discharged by navy order or at the end of an enlistment period. Officers are encouraged to cooperate i n many ways.  They are  offered good pay, opportunity for advancement, use of servants, extra allowances for housing and families. and retirement i s early. fifties.  Retirement provisions are generous  Officers r e t i r e i n their late f o r t i e s or early  A few o f f i c e r s w i l l reach the e l i t e as admirals who command  f l e e t s or head Washington D.C. Navy bureaus.  Promotions depend on  personnel evaluations by superiors and successful completion of certain v a r i e t i e s of duty assignments. fere. For  Any blemishes on t h e i r record may i n t e r -  I f they f a i l to be promoted i n a certain period they must resign.  promotion to the higher levels they need the informal sponsorship of  elite officers.  A l l of this l i m i t s maverick behavior of o f f i c e r s  (Donovan 1970:77-80).  CASTE DIFFERENCES O f f i c e r s are treated with deference by e n l i s t e d people. The caste d i v i s i o n of the Navy exaggerates differences i n the c i v i l i a n society. Most o f f i c e r s are from the lower middle or upper middle families, a few are from the upper-classes.  E n l i s t e d men are from lower, working class or  54 lower middle class origins (Janowitz 1960:90).  Lang reported that i n 1960,  91% of navy o f f i c e r s had attended college and 70% had graduated  compared  to 5% of enlisted men who had attended and less than 1% who had graduated (Lang 1964:55).  O f f i c e r s are trained at the Naval Academy or by Naval  Reserve O f f i c e r Training programs at c i v i l i a n u n i v e r s i t i e s and colleges or at Naval Officers Candidate School.  Entrance into the academy at  Annapolis depends on being nominated and passing examinations. tions are made by senators and by p r e s i d e n t i a l appointment.  Nomina-  The presiden-  t i a l appointments include one hundred places held for the sons of m i l i t a r y professionals.  A very few s a i l o r s from the f l e e t may be nominated for  the academy and a few more for the o f f i c e r s ' candidate schools. Acceptance i s by competitive examination.  Entrance into the reserve  programs i s much easier than into the academy.  In a l l programs certain  grade and performance levels must be maintained i n order to continue. The graduates of the reserve programs have brought a l e v e l i n g into the navy o f f i c e r s ' corps; however, most reservists find the Navy unsatisfactory and don't continue after their i n i t i a l period of service (Zald 1964:273; Huntington  1965:137).  Those few enlisted men who can r i s e to e l i g i b i l i t y  for chief i n fourteen years arid are less than thirty-two years old at that time may apply for promotion to warrant o f f i c e r . Officers and senior NCOs are almost a l l of the white race. was a matter of policy u n t i l l a t e i n World War I I .  This  For the h a l f century  before, the Navy had e n l i s t e d Blacks and F i l i p i n o nationals as cooks and servants exclusively.  E a r l i e r , for instance when M e l v i l l e served i n the  Navy, many e n l i s t e d men were Black.  By 1940 there were almost no Blacks  and there i s now a strong e f f o r t to change t h i s .  New enlistments were  55 over 20% Black producing  a t o t a l of Black enlisted i n 1973 of 6 1/2%.  Three percent of midshipmen at Annapolis were Black but only 1% of commissioned o f f i c e r s . (Proceedings,  Blacks make up 12% of U.S. population.  A p r i l 1973:28-36; A l l Hands, August 1973:54-61)  On any  p a r t i c u l a r ship there are l i k e l y to be many Blacks i n the lowest e n l i s t e d ratings and very few i f any Black senior petty o f f i c e r s or commissioned officers. Officers are rotated every two to three years to d i f f e r e n t assignments to give them a variety of experience. part of most career l i n e s .  Sea duty i s a necessary  On a ship, o f f i c e r s either have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  over technical functions or over an administrative area as a l i n e o f f i c e r . On shore, o f f i c e r s have many required s o c i a l obligations as well as navy assignments.  Elaborate etiquette i s also expected of o f f i c e r s ' wives.  There i s a s p e c i a l USNI handbook for wives (USNI 1964).  E n l i s t e d wives  are also given some i n s t r u c t i o n but i t has less required etiquette.  They  are told how to use the services of the Navy such as i n shopping, housing and health care.  Invitations to family programs are sometimes issued to  " o f f i c e r s and their l a d i e s " , "chief petty o f f i c e r s and their wives", "enlisted men and their women" which makes the s o c i a l status of the respective wives quite clear.  Husbands of navy personnel are a new  phenomena and have not yet been o b j e c t i f i e d by etiquette.  Women i n the  Navy are assigned to shore duty except for nurses on h o s p i t a l ships and a very few women who were assigned ship duties for a short l i v e d experi~ ment on a h o s p i t a l ship. The p o s i t i o n of chief petty o f f i c e r i s a new development since 1843. crews.  Then there were petty o f f i c e r s who were s k i l l e d leaders of work The petty o f f i c e r  of the old navy was considered a regular  56 member of the crew and received only a l i t t l e more pay. with no other signs of rank. leadership.  The men  respected him for his competence and personal  If a petty o f f i c e r lacked these q u a l i t i e s he wouldn't have  been useful i n leading his crew, i n fact he would have been a danger and the captain would very l i k e l y have replaced him.  Effectiveness of  leadership i s no longer as observable as i t was on a s a i l i n g ship.  Petty  o f f i c e r s now win their rates by passing paper and p e n c i l tests over technical s p e c i a l t i e s , attending specialty schools and by receiving high marks from their superiors on leadership a b i l i t y , job performance, acceptance of authority, appearance and a b i l i t y to get along with others. Requirements for advancement are set by the Bureau of Naval Personnel and require the COs recommendation as well as s a t i s f a c t i o n of the requirements for the promotion.  (USNI 1972:62-67)  The senior petty o f f i c e r s direct the actual day-to-day work that runs the complicated systems on the ship.  They oversee assignment of  men  to s p e c i f i c jobs and know what i s to be done or where to go to get i n formation.  It i s commonly said that the chiefs run the Navy.  Young  junior commissioned o f f i c e r s are the immediate supervisors of the chiefs. They are more or less executive trainees themselves and not prepared to exercise much authority.  The chiefs know their own job and don't need  special d i r e c t i o n (USNI 1972:35-36). to  the new  ensigns.  This leaves administrative paper work  One newly commissioned o f f i c e r wrote back to his former  commander at a Naval Reserve O f f i c e r s ' Training Unit: Also please t e l l the guys not to worry because they f e e l they don't know anything when they get commissioned. Ensigns aren't supposed to know anything, seriously, so there's nothing to sweat. (I r e a l l y worried about this i n c i d e n t a l l y . ) (Proceedings, September 1973:83-84)  The  e n s i g n may  not be expected  be t r e a t e d as an o f f i c e r .  A c h i e f may  to know a n y t h i n g , but he i s to  be a g e n e r a t i o n o l d e r than the  o f f i c e r and have more p r a c t i c a l knowledge.  He must n e v e r t h e l e s s show the  young e n s i g n d e f e r e n c e by language and p o s t u r e . p o s i t i o n s i s now as a new of  ensign.  end of h i s t h a t may to  The pay  s i m i l a r , i n f a c t a master c h i e f may  of the  two  make twice as much  With promotions the o f f i c e r w i l l soon pass the  even a master c h i e f i n two  or three years.  The  i n s u l t the c h i e f s .  The  New  salary  c h i e f i s a t the dead  o c c u p a t i o n a l l a d d e r w h i l e the e n s i g n i s b e g i n n i n g  l e a d to an a d m i r a l s h i p .  new  an  ascent  ensigns are r e p o r t e d as c a r e f u l not  c h i e f s have become mid-management.  One  handbook s t a t e s : I t i s the Navy's i n t e n t i o n t h a t the c h i e f p e t t y o f f i c e r , pay grade E-7, be a "man a p a r t " , t h a t t h e r e be a d i s t i n c t i o n between the treatment accorded c h i e f p e t t y o f f i c e r s of a l l pay grades and the remainder of the s h i p s ' e n l i s t e d men. (USNI 1972:36)  THE Most non-rated o r firemen. old.  ACCOMPLISHMENT OF WORK e n l i s t e d people on s h i p s are a s s i g n e d as seamen  They are u s u a l l y v e r y young, from seventeen  A f t e r e n l i s t m e n t they go through  r e c e i v e b r i e f t r a i n i n g on a s h i p .  "boot  to twenty y e a r s  camp" f o r o r i e n t a t i o n and  Their f i r s t  then  assignments are r o u t i n e work  such as c h i p p i n g p a i n t , working i n the l a u n d r i e s o r k i t c h e n s o r t e n d i n g machines. and  L a t e r some a r e g i v e n s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g f o r the s e r v i c i n g ,  o p e r a t i o n of s p e c i f i c technology  or equipment.  This i s c a l l e d  work, but i t does not use  the same q u a l i t y of s k i l l  the 1843  s k i l l requires f a m i l i a r i t y with  sailor.  The new  equipment and knowledge of how it  and how  t h a t was  No  skilled  required for  particular  to take i t a p a r t or at l e a s t how  to r e c o g n i z e when i t i s i n working o r d e r .  repair  to s e r v i c e  special physical  58 a b i l i t y or s k i l l f u l movement of hands or body are needed i n most j o b s . Nevertheless  i t does take time and  l e a r n what to do.  t r a i n i n g f o r the e n l i s t e d people  Having l e a r n e d t h e i r s p e c i a l job they may  some i n s i g h t i n t o s e v e r a l other a l l i e d j o b s but p r o b a b l y much about the whole o p e r a t i o n of t h e i r d i v i s i o n or how d i f f e r e n t departments f i t s  to  have gained  do not know v e r y work i n the  t o g e t h e r so t h a t the v a r i o u s t e c h n o l o g i e s c a r r y  out the s h i p ' s m i s s i o n . The  crew of the o l d s a i l i n g s h i p s depended on each o t h e r  and  on the p e r s o n a l d i r e c t i o n of an o f f i c e r , but i n an emergency they c o u l d many of the o t h e r j o b s . technology necessary  Most of them had  of s a i l i n g and w a r f a r e . skills  i n t h e i r own  The  hands.  a broad u n d e r s t a n d i n g  s a i l o r s had  and  they o f t e n understood  a number of  A l l s a i l o r s had  be f a m i l i a r w i t h some of the c r a f t s from watching  In the contemporary navy t h e r e i s l i t t l e  the  the  the o p p o r t u n i t y to  the craftsmen  the mechanics o r p r o c e s s e s  of  at work  t h a t were i n v o l v e d . any  of  the systems work s i n c e t h i s work goes on by machines w i t h i n housings,  in  e l e c t r i c a l systems o r e l e c t r o n i c tubes. system and  i n f o r m a t i o n i n manuals.  do  o p p o r t u n i t y to watch how  There are s h i p ' s p l a n s of each  There are books about the b a s i c  t h e o r i e s i n v o l v e d - a l l on the s h i p but not i n everybody's  understanding.  A t o t a l i d e a of what i s going on as the s h i p steams and b a t t l e s i s not shared but i s a v a i l a b l e b i t by b i t from many e x p e r t s and  i n manuals.  An  emergency exchange of most s p e c i a l t i e s would not be p o s s i b l e except w i t h i n s m a l l t e c h n i c a l groups. Schedules  f o r the day's work are s e t navy wide.  a p p l i e d to the p a r t i c u l a r s h i p and  They are  i t s departments, d i v i s i o n s and s e c t i o n s  by the C a p t a i n ' s p l a n of the day p u b l i s h e d d a i l y and posted  i n each s e c t i o n .  59  B i l l s are set up for each condition of operation of the ship with related assignments of each man to a s p e c i f i c job.  Each person has d i f f e r e n t  assignments depending on whether the work i s for general maintenance or for  special conditions such as a "landing party", "rescue and assistance",  "man overboard" or " f i r e " . stations.  There are also s p e c i a l assignments for b a t t l e  (USNI 1972:15-20) When an e n l i s t e d man i s to perform a p a r t i c u l a r job he w i l l not  have to be told to do i t , i t w i l l already be down i n the b i l l for his section and he w i l l check his own card for the s p e c i f i c assignment.  There  w i l l be information already i n writing of what to do, how to do-it and how to put away the tools. .1843 s a i l o r s were given directions by voice.  The superior and  i n f e r i o r were face-to-face and summary punishment was immediately available from the c o l t coiled i n the bo'sun mate's cap. usually unnecessary.  Exact instructions were  Each s a i l o r would already have learned what to do  from watching others, figuring i t out for themselves or by direct i n s t r u c tions from the other s a i l o r s or their petty o f f i c e r .  Contemporary  i n s t r u c t i o n and authority i n t e r a c t i o n i s more often done v i a paper rather than personal contact.  A face-to-face command and obedience i n t e r a c t i o n  i s not usually necessary, d i r e c t i o n i s done by a t h i r d impersonal authority, paper. When a ship i s on active duty or training there are very long working hours.  A man may have regular daily work followed by four hours  of watch duty.  There are also regular daily inspections and musters are  c a l l e d around the clock.  When equipment or machinery breaks down at sea  the men i n that unit may work t h i r t y - s i x hours without interruption to  60 complete repair. hours.  Work days are more often between twelve and sixteen  Most of these jobs are not very i n t e r e s t i n g or d i f f i c u l t .  major exception to this i s work on the f l i g h t deck.  The  The a c t i v i t y of planes  landing and taking off i s very exciting and dangerous and requires s k i l l and judgment for the people on the deck as well as i n the plane. work i s done by the s p e c i a l a i r wing and was The work i n the engine room i s probably also dangerous.  This  not considered i n this study.  the most uncomfortable and i t i s  It often involves longer hours than other ratings.  CONTROL OF ENLISTED LIFE The chiefs are responsible for the appearance of the men,  of the  l i v i n g spaces and for the application of the many s p e c i f i c regulations on personal l i v i n g and deference behavior. by higher o f f i c e r s they may their crew.  On the occasions of inspection  be called to account for any deviations i n  There i s l i t t l e opportunity for the chiefs to demonstrate  a b i l i t y i n doing work and so they are not able to develop authority on the basis of respect for their s k i l l .  F i r s t and second class petty  o f f i c e r s make most of the face-to-face contact with e n l i s t e d people. There are not many opportunities for chiefs to use personal leadership or  persuasion. The huge c a r r i e r s are crowded with equipment, provisions, a i r -  c r a f t and 4500 men.  There i s much better food than M e l v i l l e ate on the  Neversink and i t i s available over a longer period of time.  There i s  provisions for protective clothing i n cold weather but o r d i n a r i l y not a i r conditioning i n the hot and steaming weather of the t r o p i c s . kinds of machinery do have the p r i v i l e g e s of a i r conditioning. of e n l i s t e d men  Certain The  are more r e s t r i c t e d i n some ways than they were i n  lives 1843.  61 Now  not only where they stow their gear but how  i s specified (USNI 1968:70-85).  they fold t h e i r clothes  The length of the s t r i n g of numbers they  are assigned for duty and berth stations has grown longer.  The numbers  s t i l l designate their work and bunk and emergency stations and jobs for which they are q u a l i f i e d (USNI 1972:18).  The d e t a i l s of their uniforms,  style of haircuts and beards and personal cleanliness are more controlled. Exact position of the s a i l o r and his belongings i s required during certain inspections, for instance the procedure for seabag inspection includes these d i r e c t i o n s : . .  The  Shoes placed i n pairs with the toes of the f i r s t pair of shoes two inches or three fingers from the bunk post, (b) The second pair of shoes i n l i n e , two inches or three fingers from toes to heel of f i r s t pair of shoes.... Lower personal drawer w i l l be removed from locker and placed athwartship on pillow with contents intact i n accordance with F i g . 18-6. Valuables w i l l be placed i n upper drawer i n locker. (USNI 1968:398)  personal l i f e of the men  i s further controlled by scheduling their  on-ship recreation and by location of l i v i n g space.  There continue to be  rules on gambling, swearing, use of alcohol, narcotics, cigarettes and for  s o c i a l and sexual behavior.  As men  leave the ship i n port they must  pass inspection by a senior petty o f f i c e r .  Their haircut, general  appearance, uniform and i n some cases l i b e r t y papers must be approved i n order to be allowed to leave. On the Neversink with i t s o f f i c e r s , middies and crew of f i v e hundred many of the crew were strangers to each other. be true of a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s of 4500.  This continues to  This i s not simply a consequence  of the large number of people but results from the many physical and s o c i a l d i v i s i o n s of the ship. tion.  It i s also part of the plan of administra-  Many areas of the ship are off l i m i t s to most of the crew.  62 O f f i c e r s ' country i s s t i l l marines.  u n a v a i l a b l e to e n l i s t e d men  and guarded  by  Even the o f f i c e r s a r e not f a m i l i a r w i t h many of the spaces  the s h i p .  on  Many people come t o g e t h e r d u r i n g the e n l i s t e d men's mess, but  they a r e moved a l o n g i n l i n e s and seated a t t a b l e s w i t h l i t t l e o p p o r t u n i t y to  t a l k to more than the f r i e n d s from t h e i r u n i t who  line.  are w i t h them i n the  These a r e the same people t h a t they w i l l p r o b a b l y accompany on  liberty.  They are more l i k e l y  to meet o t h e r crew members a t events on  shore than on the s h i p .  ENFORCEMENT The men  r e g u l a r l y push a g a i n s t those r e g u l a t i o n s which  their personal l i f e .  C h i e f s may  conduct, e x t r a work assignments, some cases e x t r a - l e g a l abuse.  counter by o f f i c i a l  limit  c i t a t i o n s o f mis-  c a l l i n g of e a r l y morning musters  The c h i e f may  and i n  also withhold certain  p r i v i l e g e s and mark the p e r s o n n e l r e c o r d so t h a t the e n l i s t e d man be c o n s i d e r e d f o r promotion and i f sent to mast would be l i k e l y r e c e i v e a more s e v e r e sentence. The e n l i s t e d man  who  cannot  to  (USNI 1966:430-433) does h i s work promptly and e f f i c i e n t l y  r e c e i v e good marks on h i s semi-annual  r a t e d and a r e important f o r promotion.  may  p e r s o n n e l e v a l u a t i o n and so have a  chance f o r promotion t o the next grade.  o n l y reward  liberty  H i s a t t i t u d e and manner a r e a l s o (USNI 1972:61-65)  they hope f o r c o n s i s t s o f not l o s i n g ground  For some the  such as not b e i n g  reduced i n grade or not g e t t i n g l e s s than an honorable d i s c h a r g e or i n a v o i d i n g harassment by the c h i e f . The b a s i c pay i t s e l f  i s now  ( P a c i f i c News S e r v i c e , October  almost comparable to c i v i l i a n j o b s .  i n c r e a s e s from s t e p - t o - s t e p are s u b s t a n t i a l .  1972) The  63 Men  who  are l a t e to work or muster or miss any o t h e r duty can be  e a s i l y i d e n t i f i e d by t h e i r immediate p e t t y o f f i c e r and s c o l d e d or "put report". they may alleged  on  T h i s means they can be c a l l e d to account a t C a p t a i n ' s Mast where be g i v e n b r i g time and/or  r e d u c t i o n i n pay or grade.  If their  t r a n s g r e s s i o n i s c o n s i d e r e d more s e r i o u s they can. be h e l d f o r a  c o u r t m a r t i a l which i s a f o r m a l  trial.  Courts and punishments now  f o l l o w the Uniform Code of M i l i t a r y  J u s t i c e which a l s o s p e c i f i e s what a c t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e crimes. a reformed v e r s i o n o f the o l d A r t i c l e s o f War.  The UCMJ i s  I t i s more s e v e r e than  c i v i l i a n law and does not a l l o w f o r the r i g h t s o f the accused to the same e x t e n t as c i v i l i a n c o u r t s .  N e g l e c t of duty, d e s e r t i o n , i n s u l t i n g  an  o f f i c e r and a number of o t h e r a c t s t h a t would not be c i v i l i a n crimes  con-  t i n u e to be i d e n t i f i e d as crimes by the UCMJ. Punishment can be by :  summary o r d e r of the c a p t a i n at Mast or by a Summary C o u r t , by the more f o r m a l S p e c i a l Court o r by a G e n e r a l Court. ranks of o f f i c e r s who  These c o u r t s v a r y i n the  can convene them and i n the f o r m a l i t y of p r o c e e d i n g s ,  the r i g h t s of the accused and the s e v e r i t y of sentences that can be g i v e n . For  i n s t a n c e , the G e n e r a l Court can o n l y be o r d e r e d by a F l e e t Commander.  C a p t a i n ' s Mast i s the most i n f o r m a l .  I t i s c a l l e d by the s h i p ' s c a p t a i n  and t h e r e i s no allowance f o r defense or a p p e a l . are  The p o s s i b l e  sentences  l i m i t e d to two months i n the b r i g , reduced pay and l i m i t e d p e r i o d s on 2  bread and water.  Punishment i s much more l i m i t e d f o r o f f i c e r s and f o r  many crimes the a u t h o r i t y o f the c o u r t must a l s o be h i g h e r than f o r an e n l i s t e d man's t r i a l .  (UCMJ Paragraph  815, A r t i c l e 15,  1968)  2 C i v i l i a n c o u r t d e c i s i o n s i n 1973 and 1974 have h e l d t h a t b o t h defense and a p p e a l must be a l l o w e d . The extent to which the Navy w i l l comply w i t h t h i s on s h i p s a t sea i s not c e r t a i n .  64  Chapter Three  ADMINISTRATION IN THE The  The m a n a g e r i a l ed by BUPERS.  The  1970s  Emergence of M a n a g e r i a l  i d e o l o g y was  expressed  Ideology  by  the CNO  and  implement-  CNO's Z-Grams ( p e r s o n a l o r d e r s to the f l e e t on  per-  s o n n e l i s s u e s ) and h i s speeches were r e p o r t e d i n A l l Hands as were BUPERS" p o l i c y changes and new a z i n e t h a t a t t h i s time was the Navy.  Navy l i f e  to l e a r n new  procedures.  p u b l i s h e d by BUPERS and  i s presented  s k i l l s w h i l e e n j o y i n g t r a v e l and  announcements of new  p e r s o n n e l procedures  CNO  throughout  for enlisted  recreation.  t h e i r work and  r e t i r e m e n t r i g h t s and o t h e r b e n e f i t s . a t i o n s are r e p o r t e d .  sent  as an o p p o r t u n i t y  human i n t e r e s t s t o r i e s about s a i l o r s ,  navies.)  A l l Hands i s a g l o s s y mag-  their  There are families,  f o r o b t a i n i n g promotions,  Winners of awards and  (Ships as w e l l as people  commend-  r e c e i v e awards i n  P u b l i c speeches to the f l e e t are o c c a s i o n a l l y made by  or other e l i t e members and  these may  be i n c l u d e d .  The  a r t i c l e s , p u b l i c speeches, l e t t e r s and announcements of new t i o n s when put  people  t o g e t h e r c o n s t i t u t e a r e p o r t of o f f i c i a l  the  feature regula-  ideology.  S a i l o r s are c h a r a c t e r i z e d as eager, hardworking but n o n - r e f l e c t i v e young people, As  r e m i n i s c e n t of M e l v i l l e ' s "Happy t h i s i d e o l o g y i s developed  Jack".  i n the magazine i t appears to  i n c l u d e elements from contemporary management t h e o r y . s u r p r i s i n g i n t h a t i t i s i n p a r t d e r i v e d from i t .  T h i s i s not  J a n o w i t z ' work i s  65  often mentioned as an argument f o r the managerial approach.  Social  s c i e n t i s t s are used by the Navy as researchers and advisors on personnel and administration and as instructors i n the special colleges.  Team  work and concern for people are watchwords, motivation i s considered the central problem.  I n t r i n s i c interest i n the job or i n navy purposes are  not mentioned as motivating.  Pay and l i v i n g conditions are given con-  siderable attention and career training for either a return to c i v i l i a n l i f e or f o r continued service i n the Navy i s promised.  Conflict i s  rarely i d e n t i f i e d but when i t i s i t i s treated as a problem to be eliminated.  I t i s analyzed as a r i s i n g from personality differences  or misunderstandings rather than as having any p o l i t i c a l or organi z a t i o n a l source.  The p o s s i b i l i t y of development of any adversary  organization for enlisted people such as the maritime unions i s not explored. Along with this friendly approach, there are also threats of punishment.  These are presented i n d i r e c t l y .  For instance, A l l  Hands featured an a r t i c l e about how the navy had begun to use dogs i n drug detection.  This was presented as a human interest story  about dog handlers and dogs rather than an a r t i c l e e x p l i c i t l y warning drug smugglers (Aug. 1973).  Drug smuggling i s very widespread i n the  Navy and some readers of A l l Hands would certainly have seen the a r t i c l e as a warning.  Secret agents on the ships are being increased.  A story about this told of the d i f f i c u l t and exciting detective work of these agents i n their fight against crime (Feb. 1974).  The most  d i r e c t threat was made by the publishing of the various administrative  66 and court discharges, cross c l a s s i f i e d by their benefits and d i s advantages for c i v i l i a n l i f e . the of  The accompanying a r t i c l e  emphasized  usefulness of an honorable discharge; however, the handicaps the other discharges were made clear. (August 1973). The CNO, Admiral Zumwalt has been the p r i n c i p l e speaker  for  managerial ideology. He has been backed by both recent Secre-  taries of the Navy, Chafee and Warner as well as managers of BUPERS. Zumwalt's personnel reforms, Z-Grams, were aimed at making l i f e  less  humiliating and uncomfortable for lower l e v e l enlisted people and younger o f f i c e r s .  He explained h i s approach i n an interview reported  in the professional m i l i t a r y journal Ordnance: In any large organization i t i s essential for i n d i v i d u a l members to believe with certainty that their contribution i s not only important, but also i s appreciated and rewarded. ... We are discarding the accumulated barnacles of customary procedures and p o l i c i e s which have become s a n c t i f i e d through past experience but now are found to have no meaningful place i n a modern m i l i t a r y organization, We see no reason why the new generation of Navy men must give up the grooming and personal-appearance practices which i d e n t i f y them as members of their generation. (Ordnance Jan.-Feb. 1972) The Admiral v i s i t e d throughout the f l e e t i n addition to sending out Z-grams.  On these v i s i t s he would shake hands with a few enlisted  people, talk about h i s "people programs" and answer questions, then move on quickly to another ship.  The v i s i t s were reported i n A l l  Hands with pictures of the smiling admiral.  One of these showed him  being lowered from a helicopter i n a harness to a r o l l i n g destroyer deck below i n the Southeast China Sea. 52-55)  ( A l l Hands, Dec. 1972,  pp.  67 Organization theory has i d e n t i f i e d feedback as a problem of authoritarian h i e r a r c h i c a l organizations. the Navy.  Zumwalt recognized this i n  Messages coming back up the chain of command were limited  by deference r i t u a l which s p e c i f i e s words and posture of the subordinate including the position of the hands, distance from superior, f a c i a l expression, volume and tone of voice.  Humans are s t i l l  capable  of expressing some information within this s t r i c t form but c e r t a i n l y much i s l o s t .  (Birdwhistell 1970, pp.79-80)  To get some of this l o s t  information on personnel matters, Zumwalt held invited round table discussions with Black o f f i c e r s , young commissioned and non-commissioned o f f i c e r s and s p e c i a l occupational groups.  For the lower l e v e l enlisted  people there were also suggestion boxes and open telephone l i n e s to their commanding o f f i c e r s .  (Armed Forces Journal Dec. 1970, p.30 and  p.42) Actual administration of personnel policy contrasts with this personal responsiveness  to suggestions.  motion are done impersonally.  Assignment, transfer and pro-  Promotion requires considerable paper  work and the passing of examinations.  Recommendations, evaluations,  c i t a t i o n s , job experience, test performance and specialty school attendance are combined by computer and matched to service needs.  The  chief petty o f f i c e r selection board members and detailers consider cases separately but operate anonymously themselves. personal, warmth, handshake or hopeful pat on the back.  There i s no Personnel  assignment and promotion seem to be based on a cost accounting system rather than the human relations approach of the people programs. ( A l l  68 Hands Oct.  1971) The CNO  and his supporters recognized that there were  problems i n the f l e e t .  These were conceptualized as retention,  turbulence and race r e l a t i o n s .  Retention was  the f i r s t  attacked.  The Navy sets certain quotas for reenlistment of personnel at a l l levels and for several years these goals were not met.  (In this  period there was a c i v i l i a n draft which assigned some men Navy. of  to the  M i l i t a r y service was very unpopular partly related to c r i t i c i s m  the Vietnam war.)  something about i t .  Zumwalt as the new This was  CNO  i n 1970 planned to do  the genesis of h i s people programs.  He thought that i f navy l i f e could allow personal appearance to be more l i k e c i v i l i a n youth styles more people would be s a t i s f i e d with a navy career.  The retention problem was diagnosed as a lack of  career opportunity and annoyance with demanding regulations. ( A l l Hands, Dec. 1970, p.17)  His Z-gram orders made changes i n the allow-  ed hair s t y l e s , rules on wearing uniforms, recreation and a v a i l a b i l i t y of beer i n quarters and for junior o f f i c e r s , a v a i l a b i l i t y of single women i n their clubs.  (USNI Proceedings, May  1971, pp.294-298)  The admiral stated that he did not intend to withdraw navy power over the men but only wished to make the regulations more reasonable.  ( A l l Hands Sept. 1971 pp.38-39)  He was  service people a substantial increase i n pay. pay scales for the U.S. m i l i t a r y . ) 10)  successful i n getting (The Congress l e g i s l a t e s  (Armed Forces Journal, Feb. 1972  p.  He also introduced foreign homeporting for selected ships and  explained this policy as l i m i t i n g separations of service people from their families who would now Hands, May  1973:52-53)  l i v e near the ship's new  foreign port. ( A l l  69 The  c h i e f s and o f f i c e r s who a r e o r who have r e c e n t l y been  s t a t i o n e d on s h i p s , had other views about r e t e n t i o n .  They complained  that  navy bureaucracy was n o t h e l p f u l f o r s o l v i n g the p r a c t i c a l problems on the ships. bureaus.  O f f i c e r s f e l t powerless i n t r y i n g to communicate w i t h  There were r e p o r t s of attempts to get a r e a s o n a b l e a c t i o n from  BUPERS such as the promotion o r t r a n s f e r o f a d e s e r v i n g officer.  skilled  One w r i t e r , a commander, complained t h a t t h i s b u n g l i n g o f  BUPERS f o r c e d competent p e o p l e t o l e a v e t h e Navy. b a s i s o f the r e t e n t i o n problem.  the BUPERS orders..  He f e l t no amount o f c o m f o r t a b l e  compensate f o r the f r u s t r a t i o n and i l l o g i c o f  (Proceedings,  A p r i l 1971:31-33)  same complaint was r e p e a t e d by another w r i t e r . suggesting  He thought t h i s was t h e  He complained t h a t the c a p t a i n o f a s h i p  power t o p u n i s h but not to reward.  l i v i n g arrangements c o u l d  by  and h i g h l y  T y p i c a l l y a t r a n s f e r t o the wrong j o b without a promotion would  come through.  had  various  A year l a t e r the  T h i s o f f i c e r went f u r t h e r  t h a t BUPERS q u i t the p e r s o n n e l f i e l d  entirely.  (Proceedings,  March 1972:110) The  BUPERS magazine A l l Hands i t s e l f  provided  evidence that  were problems and m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s w i t h p e r s o n n e l p r o c e d u r e s . z i n e has s e v e r a l departments devoted t o q u e s t i o n s get  there  The maga-  and answers on how t o  t r a n s f e r s , promotions and s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i n c l u d i n g r e t i r e m e n t  benefits.  In a r e g u l a r column, t h e Master C h i e f P e t t y O f f i c e r o f t h e Navy commented on t h e p r o c e s s o f promotion f o r s e n i o r and master c h i e f s . wanted promotion were a d v i s e d  to b u i l d t h e i r r e c o r d s  Those who  from t h e ground up  so t h a t t h e i r " s e r v i c e j a c k e t s " would r e f l e c t w e l l on t h e i r performance as t h e s e l e c t i o n boards s t u d i e d  every page.  70  The name of the game i s to be competitive. Long years of f a i t h f u l service and graying temples are not c r i t e r i a for promotion. Accept the challenge and s p i r i t of the competition. Prepare yourself. Push yourself, c u l t i v a t e your study habits. Be marketable. Get busy and create a demand for yourself. Perform! ( A l l Hands, October 1971: 45) For those who to know why,  had followed this advice but had not been chosen and wanted the chief said "the answer i s simply not available....  ever, secrecy i s not to s t i f l e you."  How-  This kind of advice continues i n  A l l Hands issue by issue. Retention problems are explained by some o f f i c e r s as a result of lack of promotion opportunities because of budget cuts which i n turn have resulted from the long unpopular Vietnam war.  Anti-war attitudes or  actions within the Navy are not considered.  Some of the young o f f i c e r s  were among those who  (Berkeley Barb, November 12-  opposed the Vietnam war  18, 1972:2). Turbulence was used to cover protest, conscientious objection, insubordination, disorder, r i o t , s t r i k e s , sabotage, desertion and challenges to m i l i t a r y law.  It also was used to mean turnover of personnel.  The term lends i t s e l f to metaphor i n that i t has two similar meanings.  One  i s agitation or tumult among many people and the other refers to agitation or disturbance i n a body of water as by winds or currents.  I thought the  context of i t s use reflected both of these meanings so that resistance became defined as a natural problem similar to a storm. eventually blow over. in the f l e e t " .  Storms of course  The references were t y p i c a l l y "the turbulence  now  The phenomena was not i t s e l f subjected to, inquiry or ques-  tions of what might be happening to produce turbulence.  (Armed Forces  71 Journal, December 7, 1971)  The use of turbulence avoids words l i k e s t r i k e  which i m p l i c i t l y l e g i t i m i z e mass action against management or "mutiny" which implies the confrontation setting of the m i l i t a r i s t The t h i r d problem was named race r e l a t i o n s .  ideology.  Zumwalt  recognized  that the history of discrimination i n the Navy had l e d to an almost 100% white o f f i c e r and NCO corps and that new r e c r u i t s included an overrepresentation of Blacks.  This led to r e i n f o r c i n g the b e l i e f of Blacks  that they were discriminated against i n admissions to specialty t r a i n i n g , o f f i c e r s ' programs and general promotions. this.  Zumwalt came to recognize  He became aware of some of the problems of Black people during the  roundtable discussions, for instance that many of the r e c r e a t i o n a l , housing and educational programs of the Navy were not open to them or related to their i n t e r e s t s . command chain.  Orders to end discrimination went down the  Zumwalt thought that recruitment  and promotion of some  Blacks to superior positions would show the Navy's new dedication to equality. recruitment  An Affirmative Action Program, that i s , s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g and e f f o r t s , was set up to do t h i s .  ( A l l Hands, A p r i l 1971)  The  program helped a select few but did not upgrade the large numbers of very poor r e l a t i v e l y unschooled Blacks that were coming i n as r e c r u i t s and being assigned  to c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s where there was l i t t l e or no p o s s i b i l i t y  of promotion.  The attention given to race r e l a t i o n s following the s t r i k e  and r i o t incidents (see the Case Studies i n Part Two) show that the p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l power of Blacks acting i n s o l i d a r i t y was already recognized  by the managerial o f f i c e r s .  The tinder box s i t u a t i o n of white  and Black r e l a t i o n s was also noticed and education,  counseling and  72 s e n s i t i v i t y programs were introduced.  Fitness reports for o f f i c e r s and  chiefs began to include ratings of their "equal opportunity ( A l l Hands, September 1971:38) o f f i c e r be assigned  leadership".  Z-gram 66 required that a minority group  to each command as an assistant f o r minority a f f a i r s  (USNI Proceedings, May 1971:298)  73 Chapter Four  A 1970s LIBERTARIAN VIEW OF AUTHORITY The Critique of Anti-war Sailors  By the early 1970s GI underground newspapers were being published at most major m i l i t a r y bases i n the United States and overseas.  The newspapers were usually one of several projects of the l o c a l  anti-war group of c i v i l i a n s and active duty people.  Other projects  were l i k e l y to be a bookstore or coffee house and a counseling center where l e g a l aid was available f o r c i v i l l i b e r t i e s problems with the military.  (The Door Nov. 11-25 1971, p.8)  The counseling and l e g a l  services projects came from two e a r l i e r pre-peace movement c i v i l i a n interests.  One branch had developed from a service to conscientious  objectors supported by p a c i f i s t s and the other branch developed as an extension of defense of p o l i t i c a l dissent by c i v i l - l i b e r t a r i a n groups. The l o c a l GI centers varied i n their emphasis on the Vietnam war, use of s o c i a l i s t analysis and support of non-violent action; however, the newspapers did not r e f l e c t these differences.  They a l l reported  national GI movement events, l o c a l c i v i l i a n movement news and reports of protest events on the ship or base.  Each paper usually included  l e t t e r s from enlisted people about a l i e n a t i n g experiences i n the m i l i t a r y and some humanistic discussion of the war mission of m i l i t a r y units at that base.  They a l l had a strong l i b e r t a r i a n message, asking  enlisted people to think for themselves and explaining the protections  74  of c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s as guaranteed by The  e n l i s t e d people who  l e t t e r s to them p r e s e n t  a very  the c o n s t i t u t i o n .  e d i t these papers and  d i f f e r e n t perspective  those who  write  on navy l i f e  than  o f f i c e r s w r i t i n g i n the p r o f e s s i o n a l j o u r n a l s or than the human i n t e r e s t and  teamwork s t o r i e s of p e r s o n n e l managers i n A l l Hands. Lower l e v e l e n l i s t e d p e o p l e d i v i d e the Navy i n t o l i f e r s  E.M.s.  L i f e r s , names those p e o p l e who  Navy and  are s e r v i n g  s e n i o r e n l i s t e d men, subject  to b e i n g  t h e i r second or more e n l i s t m e n t . but  o f f i c e r s who  called l i f e r s .  rated e n l i s t e d people.  humiliates  his  I t may  other p o l i t i c a l meaning. "lifer and by  o f f i c i o u s n e s s and The  who  had  this particular l i f e r  overuse of h u m i l i a t i n g  p.3)  The  or a  listed  regulations.  f i g h t e r s and  h i t them or a buddy w i t h h i s f i s t .  1972,  an  earned t h i s honor  statements by  that a l a t e r  T h i s commonly i n v o l v e d a l i f e r ,  to complain would get him  non-  i s rulebound i n  EMs  They t y p i c a l l y r e p o r t e d  w i t h i n the Navy, would not be punished and  Oct.  and  l o c a l assignment  GI papers c a r r i e d many p e r s o n a l  them around.  also  i t designates  GI underground papers o f t e n f e a t u r e d  the Navy as v e r y young "Gung Ho"  usually  not have pro-war, a n t i - B l a c k  become anti-war or a n t i - m i l i t a r y .  turned  title,  h i s subordinates  or may  They are  r e f e r s to lower r a t e d and  of the month" w i t h h i s name, rank and  a s h o r t a r t i c l e on how  had  E.M.s  i n t e r e s t i n the  are p e r s o n a l l y known are  L i f e r i s a negative  a u t h o r i t y p e r s o n who administration.  have a c a r e e r  and  i n t o more t r o u b l e .  joining  experience  usually a chief,  This act, although the new  who  illegal  EM would l e a r n t h a t  ( P a c i f i c News S e r v i c e  same s t o r y r e c u r s whether or not  the b a s i c i n c i d e n t  75 concerned or  racism, war  " s p i t and p o l i s h " .  brotherhood  objection, safety, c i v i l  A f t e r t h i s t r u l y consciousness  would be found w i t h other EMs  " b r a s s " behind the o f f i c e r s  them.  l i b e r t i e s , r o c k music raising  a g a i n s t the l i f e r s  and  (Brass r e f e r s to the h i g h e r a u t h o r i t i e s ,  the  usually  i n the h i e r a r c h y on and above the s h i p . )  The  r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t l i m i t beards  and h a i r c u t s were w i d e l y  r e s e n t e d and p r o v i d e d o c c a s i o n s f o r c l a s h e s w i t h l i f e r s . i n c i d e n t s o c c u r r e d when a s h i p was t h e i r way  experience,  on and o f f the s h i p .  i n p o r t and men  Daily  were i n s p e c t e d on  At other times, a b u s i v e  language,  p u n i t i v e o r d e r s , e x t r a musters and d r i l l  as w e l l as d i r e c t  a t t a c k were e x p e r i e n c e d as h u m i l i a t i n g .  The h u m i l i a t i o n seemed to  occur because no d i g n i f i e d response was of  the treatment  angered in  itself.  c h i e f was  accepted the harangue.  a f t e r the men bunk and  and  how  h i s c h i e f had  My  been  were l i s t e n i n g to i n a shore  tavern  v e r y a b u s i v e i n language and  gesture.  The  c h i e f r e t u r n e d to the s h i p sometime  v e r y drunk.  ordered an EM  He vomited  to c l e a n i t .  on an  Next he  s a i l o r ' s c l o t h e s and threw these over the s i d e .  a small ship.) h a v i o r of  and by then he was  then h i s own  on another  informant i n s i s t e d  t h i s was  EMs vomited  ( T h i s was  t y p i c a l arrogant  be-  lifers. The EMs  outlook  The  allowed r a t h e r than because  s a i l o r t o l d me  about the rock music EMs  an A s i a n p o r t .  The EMs  One  physical  who  w r i t e i n GI papers  w i t h more c o n s c i o u s n e s s  expressed  a strong  libertarian  of b e i n g c i t i z e n s than s a i l o r s .  demanded t h e i r r i g h t s as c i t i z e n s under the c o n s t i t u t i o n .  They  They were  aware of t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n as v o t e r s and campaigners f o r government  representatives. political an EMs  They a l s o r e l i e d on c e r t a i n congressmen and  f i g u r e s to h e l p  letter. The  them and  (The Door Nov.  17-Dec. 1,  navy drug program was  to the Navy f o r s u r v e i l l a n c e and people w i t h drug problems. on drugs are simply the day.  EMs  Men  claimed  t h e r e was  crannies  and  odd  spaces.  of m a r i j u a n a as a way any  effort.  considered  on  the s h i p who  no  l e t t e r Nov  the  trip"  f o r t h e i r heightened  ( P a c i f i c News S e r v i c e Jan  are  1972,  p.10)  The  GI papers f r e q u e n t l y p o i n t e d  They c o n s i d e r e d  t h e i r use  and  out  the  even the  They r e p o r t  The  are not  1971)  t h a t i t i s o n l y when the "dope" runs (The  Door Nov Men  17 - Dec  report  1,  b r i g i s i n an out of the way likely  to become g e n e r a l  R e s i s t e r s claimed  out 1972)  humiliating  area of the  knowledge.  Ho"  ship.  (SOS  News-  t h a t newer marines were put  on  guard duty because e x p e r i e n c e d marines i d e n t i f y themselves as EMs sympathize w i t h t h e i r s a i l o r EMs and  reported  t h a t o n l y a few  use  t h a t the Navy c o n t r o l s d i s s e n t w i t h o u t p u t t i n g  sometimes p h y s i c a l punishment from the more "Gung  marine guards. Events t h e r e  have a "bad  consideration  b r i g i s guarded by marines.  treatment and  more u s e f u l  punishment than as an a i d to  t h a t r e s i s t a n c e to a u t h o r i t y b e g i n s . The  a t r a p and  to h i d e drugs on the s h i p because of the many  harmfulness of hard drugs.  out  1972)  Drugs are used w i d e l y i n the Navy and  e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e i n Asian ports. difficult  i n response to  thrown i n the b r i g along w i t h the drunks f o r  c o n s c i o u s n e s s or p a n i c .  I t i s not  some d i d i n t e r v e n e  other  and  prisoners.  t h a t most s a i l o r s d i d not  t h i n k about the  of them were ever eager to p a r t i c i p a t e i n i t .  war A  77 few EMs became strongly anti-war instance on the Carrier USS  from their navy experiences.  Coral Sea a s a i l o r noted i n an SOS  For newsletter:  One time i n the Tonkin Gulf they had a show on closed c i r c u i t TV put on by the F l i g h t Ops. They explained everything they did over there - l i k e how many bombs they dropped and where they dropped them. This guy explained how they were bombing the Ho Chi Minh t r a i l and destroyed the trucks, people, and ammunition dumps. He r e a l l y seemed to get into that, r e a l l y enjoy t e l l i n g people they destroyed so many supply dumps, digging that there was a secondary explosion. The dude got up to show the point on the map and when he turned around, i n big block l e t t e r s on his back was written "Murder, Inc." When he did that, man, a l o t of people were r e a l l y up tight. He wasn't there t h i r t y seconds before the Captain came running i n and threw him out. He was a f r a i d that people would a l l of a sudden think about what was Duty on "the l i n e " was  going on. (SOS newsletter Nov.  d i s l i k e d partly because of the long  periods at sea and t o t a l months away from home, the discomfort on the s t e e l ships i n the hot damp climate, the cockroaches and the long working hours.  Sixteen hours was  24 hours or more. interesting.  EMs  usual but i t was not uncommon for some to work  reported their work as unchallenging and  un-  The a v a i l a b i l i t y of precise s p e c i f i c a t i o n s for doing each  job make general understanding  of the work unnecessary.  Certain jobs  are more d i s l i k e d than others, paint chipping was mentioned as an endless grueling task.  Work i n the engine room i s extremely hot and uncomfort-  able and i t i s also the most dangerous work on the ship. crews work longer hours and have less time off i n port. needed to do repairs while the b o i l e r s are down.  ation i s arranged.  the painter unless complicated ( P a c i f i c News Service, Oct.  They are usually  Other jobs require  confinement i n small spaces deep inside the ship. space can axphyxiate  Engineering  Painting i n such a artificial  ventil-  1971)  There were many reports of hazardous conditions on ships that  1971)  78  according  to the EMs had r e s u l t e d from inadequacy o f the NCO, d i v i s i o n  o f f i c e r or captain.  Sometimes these had r e s u l t e d from the  attempts t o win some c o m p e t i t i o n  i n the f l e e t .  officers'  One f r e q u e n t  complaint  was  t h a t on o l d s h i p s i n unseaworthy c o n d i t i o n the c a p t a i n would  ask  f o r r e p a i r s because he d i d n ' t want complaints on h i s r e c o r d  be  responsible  f o r a delay  i n s h i p movement.  c r e a s i n g number o f f i r e s and other to sabotage.  The a c c i d e n t s  sabotage has o n l y  accidents  damage.  on the s h i p s i n a d d i t i o n  Complaints about s a f e t y have l e d men t o r e f u s e  1973  Seven r e f u s e d  i n the f a l l o f 1971 (UFTB Oct.  and  executive  times p r a i s e d .  ships.  t o board the USS McCormick  i s n o t always n e g a t i v e .  Captains  o f f i c e r s are o f t e n c a l l e d l i f e r s b u t they are a l s o someThe d i f f e r e n c e depends on t h e i r a t t i t u d e toward the A young navy v e t e r a n  s t y l e s o f o f f i c e r under whom he had worked.  Commander and the c a p t a i n o f the s m a l l s h i p .  t o l d me o f two d i f f e r e n t  One was a mustang, t h a t  an o f f i c e r who had come up from the ranks.  livered  t o board s e v e r a l  1971).  a t t i t u d e toward o f f i c e r s  Navy and toward the EMs.  is,  i s correct.)  t o board the minesweeper USS Ogden i n March  (CAMP NEWS June 1973).  The  time  ( T h i s assumes t h a t t h e  o f f i c i a l naming o f an event as sabotage o r as an a c c i d e n t  Twenty three men r e f u s e d  or to  There have been an i n -  have i n v o l v e d deaths b u t up t o t h i s  involved property  not  He was a L i e u t e n a n t The s h i p was t o be de-  t o Greece and the c a p t a i n was t o r e t i r e a f t e r the t r i p .  s h i p was n o t kept o v e r l y c l e a n but was i n e x c e l l e n t working  The  condition.  The men were a l l o w e d as much freedom as p o s s i b l e w h i l e a l s o g e t t i n g the work done.  They used t h e i r own judgment i n grooming t h e i r h a i r and  79 beards.  On t h e i r way t o the M e d i t e r r a n e a n they stopped a t a U.S. East  Coast p o r t .  A rear admiral  passed by t h e i r dock and saw the untrimmed  h a i r and beards o f the crew. the men get r e g u l a t i o n  He c a l l e d  the c a p t a i n and demanded t h a t  h a i r c u t s immediately.  The c a p t a i n i n b e s t  American f o l k t r a d i t i o n , s a i d t h a t they were n o t s u b j e c t Admiral's j u r i s d i c t i o n .  to the Rear  T h e i r assignment a c t u a l l y was under a d i f f e r e n t  navy command and no h a i r was c u t . My informant d e s c r i b e d  another o f f i c e r who was v e r y d i f f e r e n t .  T h i s man was on " h i s way up" as the young e x e c u t i v e ship. and  He h e l d c o n t i n u a l i n s p e c t i o n s  "spit  o f f i c e r o f another  f o r both o p e r a t i o n a l  and p o l i s h " .  The men were sometimes r e q u i r e d  s i x hours t o get t h e i r  equipment i n p e r f e c t c o n d i t i o n .  hated by t h e men, t h i s o f f i c e r was awarded the h i g h e s t i n s e v e r a l f l e e t competitions.  effectiveness  t o work  thirty-  Although commendations  A t t h e end o f t h e t r i p t h e r e were  unusual numbers o f U n a u t h o r i z e d Absences, t r a n s f e r s , and d i s c h a r g e s f o r drug, a l c o h o l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l problems. officers' climb  My informant thought the  c a r e e r p a t t e r n was p r o b a b l y s i m i l a r to the c u r r e n t CNO's  to success.  ever a p p o i n t e d CNO. The  At f o r t y n i n e Zumwalt had been the youngest H i s promotion had bypassed t h i r t y s e n i o r  officer officers.  i d e a o f a u t h o r i t y t h a t was p r e s e n t e d by these e n l i s t e d  w r i t e r s and my i n f o r m a n t s was s i m i l a r t o the m i l i t a r i s t s ' i d e a o f a u t h o r i t y as a f a c e t o f a c e command and obedience i n t e r a c t i o n . p a r t i c u l a r o f f i c e r o r NCO who d e a l t w i t h the EMs was h e l d f o r the men's s i t u a t i o n s . to f a c e group i n mind.  The  responsible  A c t i o n s were taken w i t h e f f e c t on the f a c e  They thought an NCO's or o f f i c e r ' s  authority  80 would be weakened i f they a l l knew that no-one respected him. October 1971)  (UFTB  They also thought general navy authority would be weakened  as they gained rights of due process and personal and p o l i t i c a l freedom. ( S h e r i l l 1970)  (UFTB May 1972)  It i s true that the GI writers also  i d e n t i f i e d broad economic and p o l i t i c a l factors as responsible for their m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n but they didn't analyze the i n s t i t u t i o n a l connections to maintenance of authority. The GI writers reported much of the same l i b e r t a r i a n viewpoint as M e l v i l l e , yet the context of c i t i z e n s h i p and freedom must have been d i f f e r e n t i n 1843 from the managed society of the 1970s.  They did not  follow M e l v i l l e i n h i s insistence that the c i t i z e n ' i s sovereign, that he or she need not show deference to anyone.  Contemporary EMs negotiated for  better treatment but they didn't seem to expect equality with o f f i c e r s . Only when an o f f i c e r was thought to be acting e x p l o i t i v e l y or using his power to humiliate them did they complain.  The most alienating experience  reported was aboard the USS Coral Sea when a rear admiral's body was stored in the enlisted men's mess i n their milk r e f r i g e r a t o r . in a helicopter accident.)  (He had been k i l l e d  An EMs cynical comments were reported through-  out the GI underground press.  (UATB September 19, 1972)  They took the  issue as a measure of their lack of worth to the Navy but they were not outraged.  81 Chapter Five  AUTHORITY AS INSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION The Ideology of Black Movement Sailors  The GI press was sympathetic  to Blacks and other members of  minority groups and often featured a r t i c l e s on m i l i t a r y racism. should not be taken to mean that the white EMs who resistance were themselves p a r t i c u l a r l y sympathetic  This  participated i n to Blacks.  From  the instances of fights and r i o t s i t i s clear that there was considerable white/Black enmity at enlisted l e v e l s .  Some Blacks participated i n the  anti-war movement but groups of Black s a i l o r s were not involved.  However,  United States Congressman, Ron Dellums, an outspoken supporter of GI rights and of opposition to the war was also a Black and concerned about Blacks i n the Navy. The Black rights movement had a long history both i n the c i v i l i a n society and i n the m i l i t a r y (Moskos 1966). had been won  i n the midst of World War  Some measure of integration  II but there was  s t i l l de facto  discrimination, including segregation i n recreation and housing i n much of the Navy.  The Black c i v i l i a n movement had used non-violent  techniques of s i t - i n s , demonstrations  and non-cooperation i n a popular  movement i n the southern United States i n the l a t e f i f t i e s and s i x t i e s . The young Black s a i l o r s can be supposed to have heard many of the slogans of the movement.  They were aware of the Black power affirmation  of Blackness as positive and modified "natural" h a i r s t y l e s  82  were p o p u l a r . gestures. it  They p r a c t i s e d the in-group hand shakes and power  C o n s i d e r i n g t h e i r youth  i s unlikely  t h a t they had had  movement p a r t i c i p a n t s . as a r i g h t t h a t was not be  and  t h e i r c h o i c e of e n l i s t m e n t  c i v i l i a n e x p e r i e n c e as s e l f - c o n s c i o u s  They d i d expect  equal treatment  w e l l r e c o g n i z e d and  i n the Navy  f o r which n e g o t i a t i o n  should  necessary. B l a c k s a r e more f r e q u e n t l y a s s i g n e d the menial  j o b s of  c h i p p i n g p a i n t , p a i n t i n g , l a u n d r y work, c l e a n i n g , k i t c h e n d u t i e s 1  and  s e r v i c e work i n o f f i c e r s ' q u a r t e r s .  promotion p o s s i b i l i t i e s . to EMs  Ratings  These j o b s have l i m i t e d  of e f f i c i e n c y a r e r e g u l a r l y  by t h e i r s u p e r i o r p e t t y o f f i c e r .  These e v a l u a t i o n s are  c o n s i d e r e d i n d e c i s i o n s to promote, demote or d i s c h a r g e . b e l i e v e d they r e c e i v e d more low marks than w h i t e s work. (UFTB Feb.  15, 1973)  given later  Blacks  f o r the same q u a l i t y  They a l s o b e l i e v e d t h a t the NCO's c i t e d  them f o r p u n i s h a b l e o f f e n s e s more often than they d i d w h i t e s  for  similar actions.  At C a p t a i n ' s Mast they were g i v e n more severe  punishments.  COs  B l a c k s and  The  e x p l a i n e d t h a t the e n t e r i n g t e s t s c o r e s of  t h e i r c i v i l i a n a r r e s t r e c o r d s were used i n d e t e r m i n i n g  punishments a t Mast and  i n discharge decisions.  are reviewed  but  effect.  f o r whites  records r e f l e c t  this.  institutional  T h e i r s c h o o l r e c o r d s , t e s t s c o r e s and In the Navy they f e l t  get a f r e s h s t a r t when t h i s background was navy performance.  same s c o r e s  t h i s does not remedy the d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  B l a c k s have been s u b j e c t to d i r e c t and  in their c i v i l i a n l i f e .  The  racism police  they were not a b l e to  used i n a d d i t i o n to  their  T h e i r i n i t i a l assignments were l i m i t e d to u n s k i l l e d  '83 rates and then as they could not accumulate experience toward s k i l l e d rates i n these c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s promotion became impossible.  This lack  of promotion i s one indicator that i s used to increase punishments at Mast.  Blacks claimed that even when some of them did get special  training and advancement they would be reassigned downward to uns k i l l e d work. (Door Nov.  17-Dec. 1, 1972)  Ashore, c i v i l i a n bars,  restaurants and rental housing are usually u n o f f i c i a l l y  segregated.  Whites and Blacks sometimes clash i n fights i n these shore leave towns.  Again the Blacks found they were arrested more often and  given heavier punishments than whites.  (Camp News, May  15,  1973)  The Navy has issued haircut regulations that l i m i t hair that bushes which of course l i m i t s the Black movement "natural". Some CO's have also prohibited the Black handshake and the clenched f i s t salute.  Others prohibit Blacks from gathering or walking to-  gether i n groups of three or more.  (Camp News, May  15, 1973)  In  response to this the Black Servicemen's Caucus, a San Diego support group, issued a poster "You Can't Be Black and Navy Too". appeared  i n reduced size i n many GI papers.  This  (Camp News, Feb. 15,  1973)  Complaints were often taken to the race relations a s s i s t ants or race relations councils who  could do l i t t l e .  The race relations  people had d i f f i c u l t y explaining concerns to the higher o f f i c e r s  who  were not aware of the Blacks' s i t u a t i o n and often didn't believe there was  general discrimination.  Black senior e n l i s t e d men  There were very few Black o f f i c e r s or  to give them counter information. When  nothing was done within the Navy complaints would go to Black community  84  groups and n a t i o n a l s u p p o r t groups such as the NAACP and the B l a c k C o n g r e s s i o n a l Caucus.  The B l a c k Servicemen's  Caucus was  an a c t i v e  s u p p o r t group i n the San Diego a r e a . (LA F r e e P r e s s Dec. The Navy treatment of B l a c k EMs was  1972)  similar regardless  of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the i n d i v i d u a l B l a c k s a i l o r . them a shared u n d e r s t a n d i n g and b r o t h e r h o o d .  15,  T h i s gave  Their s o l i d a r i t y could  be e s t a b l i s h e d e a s i l y on the s h i p inasmuch as most had d a r k e r s k i n than w h i t e s and o f t e n a " h i p " s t y l e of t a l k and movement.  After  i n i t i a l r e c o g n i t i o n common u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o u l d be assumed w i t h r i s k of b e i n g m i s t a k e n .  little  The B l a c k a n a l y s i s t h a t developed condemned  b o t h t h e Navy and e s t a b l i s h m e n t w h i t e s o c i e t y as u p h o l d i n g the g e n e r a l advantage of w h i t e s by law and by r e g u l a t i o n s based on w h i t e i d e o l o g y . I n s t i t u t i o n a l r a c i s m was  i d e n t i f i e d as t h a t s i t u a t i o n where the  o r d i n a r y i n s t i t u t i o n a l procedures n e c e s s a r y f o r moving toward  political,  e d u c a t i o n a l , economic and p r o f e s s i o n a l s u c c e s s a l l l i m i t e d B l a c k progress.  The Navy p r a c t i s e of assignment,  and advancement a l l worked i n t h i s way.  experience.  training  T h i s r e c o g n i t i o n came about  from more t h a n an a b s t r a c t a n a l y s i s , i t was B l a c k EMs  discipline, special  grounded i n t h e young  They a l s o r e c o g n i z e d i n d i v i d u a l NCO's and  o f f i c e r s as r a c i s t but they put t h e i r p r o t e s t and r e s i s t a n c e i n t o changing the i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements not t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s . was  t h e i r encounter w i t h paper r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t they e x p e r i e n c e d  as most c o n t r o l l i n g , as h a v i n g a u t h o r i t y over them. Dec.  It  1,  1972)  (Door, Nov.  17-  85  Chapter Six  FACE-TO-FACE CONDUCT AND THE  CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORITY IN THE 1970s  Authority functions i n the accomplishment of navy work on a day-to-day basis.  The m i l i t a r i s t ideology i s v i s i b l e i n the forms of  dress, i n s i g n i a and deference etiquette, but this i s displayed apart from the doing of the work i t s e l f .  The work i s formally organized  i n an  elaborate d i v i s i o n of labor with s p e c i f i c assignment of tasks  administered  by an authority hierarchy but using rules established by a higher bureaucracy.  The skeleton of this d i v i s i o n of labor came from the s a i l i n g  ships but i t has been elaborated  to f i t technological change.  The  hierarchy has been extended, technical s p e c i a l i s t s have been added and crew chiefs have become mid-management.  The m i l i t a r i s t ideology emphasizes  face-to-face order giving but i n the 1970s information i s more often passed from one authority l e v e l to another i n printed words. involves use of information on how commands as to what to do.  The day-to-day work  to do p a r t i c u l a r jobs rather than  There i s l i t t l e personal supervision of work.  Ongoing records are kept of who be traced back to the worker.  does what and inadequate work can often There seems to be l i t t l e need for face-to-  face command authority i n order to get navy work actually accomplished. THE PLACE OF MILITARIST AUTHORITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY NAVY Ship crews not only work together but they must also l i v e together.  Face-to-face  authority i s used here i n enforcing dress  and  86 posture is  no  codes, c l e a n l i n e s s of person and  quarters  obvious t i e between these requirements and  laundry,  r e c r e a t i o n and  and  deference.  practical living.  s l e e p i n g f a c i l i t i e s are p r o v i d e d  made of them as the EMs  have a need and  But  f o r EMs  Food,  and  t h e i r s c h e d u l e s permit.  P o l i c i n g i s a l s o used.  guards posted  at the b r i g and  i n o f f i c e r s ' country,  There i s some p e r s o n a l  s u p e r v i s i o n by NCOs.  are a v a i l a b l e i f t r o u b l e d e v e l o p s . t i o n , gambling, e t c . may  be r e p o r t e d  to a f a c e - t o - f a c e h e a r i n g w i t h Mast.  EMs  may  be  s e r i o u s crimes.  The  dress  finally  These are s t r o n g l y  have produced s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s w i t h  o f f i c e r t r a i n i n g and ideology.  to  resented  the r e l a t e d requirements f o r  many more e l a b o r a t i o n s of e t i q u e t t e , o f f the s h i p .  or work and  Captain's  l e a v e the s h i p s i n p o r t  to the  accomplish-  In f a c t , the c a s t e s o c i a l d i v i s i o n i s more r i g i d  with ship l i f e  leading  are used as a back up  o f f the s h i p do not have an obvious c o n n e c t i o n  militarist  insubordina-  l i v i n g , not as o r d i n a r y c o n t r o l s .  However these i n s p e c t i o n s and  i d e o l o g y may  marines  h e l d f o r c o u r t m a r t i a l f o r more  i n s p e c t i o n s t h a t occur when the EMs  ment of work.  p o l i c e and  O f f i c e r and  confrontations  are f a c e - t o - f a c e a u t h o r i t y i n t e r a c t i o n s . by EMs.  are  i n s e c u r i t y areas.  on paper to the next l e v e l  the E x e c u t i v e  the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p l a n f o r work and  simply  There  Problems such as f i g h t s ,  immediately a r r e s t e d and These p e r s o n a l  Ship's  use  Most  d a i l y l i v i n g goes on w i t h o u t s p e c i a l enforcement or s u p e r v i s i o n by o r g a n i z a t i o n of the a c t i v i t i e s .  there  i t s purposes.  The  militarist  little  For many y e a r s  s h i p o r g a n i z a t i o n has been shaped by When the m a n a g e r i a l e l i t e c a l l s f o r  l e a d e r s h i p or the e a s i n g of e t i q u e t t e or dress  with  integration  recruitment, this persuasive  codes t h e r e i s a  87 militarist guy  outcry.  leader.  The  T h i s alarm c e n t e r s  tough guy  around the dangers of the good  the m i l i t a r i s t s p r e f e r may  have some  p r a c t i c a l uses. The o f f i c e r s who as s i g n s  NCO  may  very w e l l b e n e f i t m i l i t a r i s t  i n t e r p r e t cooperation  w i t h " s p i t and  that t h e i r a u t h o r i t y i s unchallenged.  d i s p l a y and used  tough guy  would have no  tough guy  s p e c i a l reason to be  methods of e n f o r c i n g  this.  T h i s may  officer.  The  the men  and  the h i g h e r  become a v e r y  etiquette  on  this  concerned i f the NCOs  t h e i r anger would be d i r e c t e d a t the NCO then may  p o l i s h " and  They i n s i s t  angry but  NCO  senior  make EMs  not  the  very  senior  convenient b u f f e r between  c h a i n of command.  The  men  may  focus a l l  t h e i r d i s c o n t e n t w i t h the Navy on the t a r g e t at hand. The  NCOs themselves may  and m i l i t a r i s t and  has  standards d i f f i c u l t .  militarist  The  s a i l o r s strongly  r e g u l a t i o n s on appearance and  object  behavior.  Per-  doesn't work w e l l because r a t i o n a l i z i n g the need f o r s p i t  p o l i s h and  d e f e r e n c e e t i q u e t t e i s not  acceptable  to EMs.  ability  orders  Much of the work i s monotonous  l i t t l e meaning to the s a i l o r s .  to the exact suasion  f i n d enforcement of navy work  The  easy, at l e a s t not  i n terms  NCOs have been s e l e c t e d i n p a r t by  their  to f o l l o w navy r e g u l a t i o n s , they are a l s o s e l f s e l e c t e d  those who  f a v o r a navy c a r e e r .  They a r e n ' t  likely  view of the r e g u l a t i o n s as simple harassment. e a s i e r f o r most NCOs to get tough guy.  Those few who  compliance by  are a b l e to use  t h r e a t to the l e g i t i m a c y of the  others.  and  as  to share the  EMS  In t h i s s i t u a t i o n i t i s  t h r e a t of punishment as n i c e guy  s t y l e s may  be  a a  88 The tough guy r o l e may a l s o be p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y c o m f o r t a b l e f o r the NCO who f e e l s powerless  i n r e s p e c t to the l a r g e r bureaucracy  o f f e n d e d by t h e young o f f i c e r w i t h h i s p r o m i s i n g c a r e e r .  and/or  Some sense o f  power may s t i l l be gained by o f f i c i o u s n e s s and a r b i t r a r y demands on subordinates.  Such a t r a n s f e r o f anger  from i t s o r i g i n to l e s s  t a r g e t s i s p r o t e c t e d i n an a u t h o r i t y system subordinates.  t h a t l i m i t s c r i t i c i s m by  Inasmuch as t h i s happens i t may s e r v e the Navy purpose o f  keeping t h e NCOs c o o p e r a t i v e w i t h t h e i r s u p e r i o r s and v i g i l a n t t h e i r work  powerful  over  groups. Militarist  a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p s may a l s o be r e l a t e d t o t h e  m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n o f the Navy.  The m i l i t a r i s t  ideology recognizes a  c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t between e n l i s t e d people and o f f i c e r s .  Enlisted  p e o p l e have t r a d i t i o n a l l y had t h e most d i f f i c u l t work, t h e most p e r s o n a l involvement  i n doing v i o l e n c e , the h a r d e s t l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n and t h e most  danger o f b e i n g k i l l e d .  O f f i c e r s had somewhat l e s s r i s k s o f death and  much more t o g a i n from t h e i r c a r e e r s and t h e d i s p l a y o f m i l i t a r y  status.  The n a t i o n a l and c l a s s i n t e r e s t s o f o f f i c e r s have more o f t e n been i n v o l v e d i n p a r t i c u l a r wars.  B a t t l e s a t s e a a r e r a r e l y e x p l a i n a b l e as simple  defense o f home and c o u n t r y .  The purposes  o f sea war must seem i r r e l e v a n t  to t h e l o n g term i n t e r e s t s o f most s a i l o r s and o f immediate danger to t h e i r persons.  Ships a t s e a have a l s o been i n genuine  danger from  storms.  As a r e s u l t r e c r u i t m e n t i n t o n a v i e s had t o be done by u s i n g p r i s o n e r s , impressment o r c i v i l i a n d r a f t . s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e "tough  Under these c o n d i t i o n s i t i s n o t  guy" way o f d e a l i n g w i t h s a i l o r s  developed.  In a d d i t i o n to t h e t h r e a t o f punishment, t h e tough guy h e l p e d c r e a t e a shared r e a l i t y o f t h e powerlessness  o f the men and r e s p e c t f o r the power,  89 i f not the person, o f the o f f i c e r , some d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h i s . o f f i c e r s or by mutiny.  e s p e c i a l l y the C a p t a i n .  There were  S a i l o r s sometimes r e a c t e d by murdering  These a c t i o n s were i n t u r n handled p u n i t i v e l y  u n l e s s a mutinous group was  s u c c e s s f u l , i n t h a t case t h e r e might be  c o n s i d e r a b l e n e g o t i a t i o n between the mutinous crew and navy (Dugan 1965;  Manwaring  and Dobree 1935;  Wintringham 1936)  leaders. M e l v i l l e thought  navy s h i p s were o r g a n i z e d so as to produce c o n f l i c t s and d i v i s i o n s of i n t e r e s t w i t h i n the crew as a p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t mutiny. been openly used i n t h i s way.  Marines have  T h e i r t r a i n i n g encourages development o f a  s e p a r a t e group i d e n t i t y from s a i l o r s and they a r e a s s i g n e d as p o l i c e on the s h i p s . Today's m i l i t a r i s t s assume t h a t t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t between EMs  and o f f i c e r s and t h i s i s i n p a r t why  a u t h o r i t y and p u n i t i v e d i s c i p l i n e .  they c a l l  f o r strong  However t h i s c o n f l i c t , whatever i t  may be, i s no l o n g e r o b v i o u s and the m i l i t a r i s t s do not s p e c i f y i t .  A  s a i l o r on an a i r c r a f t  and  limb. is  c a r r i e r of today i s not i n much danger of l i f e  The work i s h a r d w i t h l o n g hours and c l o s e q u a r t e r s b u t the pay  good.  The o f f i c e r s do have more inducements such as c a r e e r promise,  b e t t e r s a l a r y and p r e s t i g e . e n l i s t e d men,  T h e i r l i f e i s more c o m f o r t a b l e than t h a t of  but the l a t t e r ' s s i t u a t i o n i s c o m f o r t a b l e t o o , o n l y more  crowded w i t h l e s s p r i v a c y .  O f f i c e r s may have a c a r e e r i n t e r e s t  Navy which would l e a d them to work f o r a l a r g e r navy and be in  b e i n g a b l e to do war duty.  i n the  interested  Promotions i n c r e a s e d u r i n g wars and i n  growth p e r i o d s of the Navy, and war duty i s e s s e n t i a l f o r the h i g h e r promotions. the  The use of the Navy as n a t i o n a l defense which would be i n  i n t e r e s t s o f a l l p e r s o n n e l i s not u s u a l l y p r e s e n t e d as an argument  90 f o r cooperation.  There was an enormous e f f o r t  t o convince p e r s o n n e l o f  the need f o r defense a g a i n s t  communism but t h i s argument i s no l o n g e r  p o p u l a r and r a t h e r u n r e l a t e d  to c u r r e n t n a t i o n a l p o l i c y .  The Navy i s now  used f o r showing f o r c e i n disagreements w i t h s m a l l n a t i o n s , on them as i n Vietnam.  or i n attacks  Navy w r i t e r s a l s o argue t h a t the Navy has a r o l e  i n guarding commerce and shipment o f o i l .  They t h i n k the Navy should be  s u p e r i o r t o t h e USSR Navy i n command o f the seas.  None o f t h e s e navy uses  t i e s i n t e r e s t s of j u n i o r o f f i c e r s o r e n l i s t e d people t o the navy (Proceedings,  very  mission.  January 1973:15-64; October 1974:48-54; K l a r e 1972)  There  i s a c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , however, or a t l e a s t the i n t e r e s t s o f the e n l i s t e d men.  The l o n g deployments around t h e w o r l d make f o r  working hours and l o n g e r  time away from f a m i l i e s .  longer  There i s a l s o concern  f o r s e a w o r t h i n e s s o f s h i p s as r e g u l a r r e p a i r s c h e d u l e s a r e n o t f o l l o w e d i n the Navy's e f f o r t  to meet n a t i o n a l p o l i c y demands f o r a worldwide  navy p r e s e n c e . Several identified.  c o n f l i c t s between o f f i c e r s and EMs can s t i l l be  As o f f i c e r s t r y t o w i n f l e e t c o m p e t i t i o n s  commendations they a r e l i k e l y  or personal  t o r e q u i r e e x t r a work from s a i l o r s .  The  EMs t h i n k needed r e p a i r s a r e sometimes avoided because the r e p o r t o f a s h i p problem might harm the o f f i c e r ' s  career.  as m i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s attempt to e n f o r c e perceived  by EMs as h u m i l i a t i n g .  conflict  d e f e r e n c e e t i q u e t t e which i s  B l a c k EMs e v i d e n t l y f e e l the sharpest  c o n f l i c t s , r e p o r t i n g t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i r e c t l y opposed t o t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . d i r t i e s t work and then d i s c r i m i n a t e d b e t t e r jobs  There i s another  o f a u t h o r i t y on the s h i p s i s  They f e e l they a r e used t o do the against  can be kept open f o r w h i t e s .  i n evaluations  so t h a t the  When they complain they b e l i e v e  91 they get  more h u m i l i a t i n g treatment and  A n t i - w a r EMs related  and  to the  m i l i t a r i s t s recognize a p o l i t i c a l  r o l e of  resisters  and  resisters  p o i n t out  control end  the  The  t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s are  interests  as  They t h i n k EMs  see  t h i s as  must be  i n labor unions.  available  f o r any  and  p e o p l e i s not  expected.  as w e l l as m i l i t a r i s t s s u s p e c t the compliance w i t h Navy a u t h o r i t y .  and  the  Navy are  thought to be  interest  The  they do  use  of  of EMs  are  for  opposed  retired officers lobby f o r t h e i r  these i n d i c a t e s t h a t i n t e r e s t s  of  l i t e r a t u r e promises job  c a r e e r s w i t h i n the  to  are  interests. officers  CONTROL  I n d i v i d u a l c a r e e r achievement i s s t r e s s e d i n many ways.  w e l l as  of  congruent.  MANAGERIAL STYLES OF  recruiting  to  i n d i c a t e s t h a t managers  A c t i v e duty and and  the  This strong r e j e c t i o n  self-interests  organized i n p r o f e s s i o n a l s o c i e t i e s o f f i c i a l encouragement of  the  considered a p p l i c a b l e  (Richardson 1970)  to o r g a n i z e i n t h e i r own  The  the  i n d e c i s i o n making.  even though i t i s r e c o g n i z e d as workable  s h i p p i n g companies. EMs  All  a l l assignment without  m a r i t i m e unions to n e g o t i a t e w i t h s a i l o r s i s not  e f f o r t s of  b e g i n n i n g of  m i l i t a r i s t s , think this i s inappropriate.  V o l u n t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n of e n l i s t e d  civilian  to  1971)  p o s s i b i l i t y of s t r i k e or d e l a y s from p a r t i c i p a t i o n  situation  the  The  p e o p l e have attempted to o r g a n i z e i n  c i v i l i a n workers do  e l i t e , managers and  military  The  making i t more d i f f i c u l t  (Armed F o r c e s J o u r n a l , June 7,  From t i m e - t o - t i m e e n l i s t e d  the  interest  Navy i n support of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y .  m i l i t a r i s t s agree and  of a u t h o r i t y .  military  c o n f l i c t of  m i l i t a r i s t s quote each o t h e r ' s statements to show t h i s .  EMs.  t h e i r own  sometimes even e x t r a punishment.  Navy.  training In a l l the  for later c i v i l i a n recruiting  jobs  literature  Navy as career  92 t r a i n i n g i s used as a main a p p e a l .  There i s o r d i n a r i l y an  statement about the good people w i t h whom the new  additional  r e c r u i t w i l l be  and another statement about adventure and t r a v e l .  T h i s promise of  c a r e e r advancement appears  of l e g i t i m i z i n g  authority.  It f i t s  to be the managers' way  working  the m a n a g e r i a l i d e o l o g y of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n  their as  commodity exchange, and the appeal to s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d motives as a b a s i s f o r involvement and  compliance.  T h e i r a u t h o r i t y i s a l s o backed by g e n e r a l c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e i r "paper m a n i p u l a t i o n " .  T h i s c o o p e r a t i o n i s taken f o r g r a n t e d , at  l e a s t I found no r e f e r e n c e to i t o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of p e o p l e n o t cooperating.  I am u s i n g "paper m a n i p u l a t i o n " to r e f e r to c o n t r o l by  m a n i p u l a t i o n of c a r e e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s v i a a u t h o r i z a t i o n s , and payments by checque.  A l o c a l base CO or a s h i p ' s c a p t a i n  themselves a u t h o r i z e promotions,  These  are  P r o p e r l y c e r t i f i e d papers are accepted as an  u n c h a l l e n g e a b l e r e a l i t y by m i l i t a r y p e o p l e and c i v i l i a n s . mistakes are made, they may  When  be appealed through the b u r e a u c r a c y ,  but u n t i l another o r d e r or checque not remedy them.  comes through l o c a l a c t i o n  can  These paper a u t h o r i z a t i o n s were used by the  CNO  and BUPERS to channel e n l i s t e d p e o p l e ' s and o f f i c e r ' s a c t i o n s desired behavior.  into  When more a p p l i c a n t s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r r a t e were  needed s p e c i a l bonuses would become a v a i l a b l e and/or might be lowered.  cannot  t r a n s f e r s or r e t i r e m e n t s , p r e p a r e  examinations o r make out pay and a l l o t m e n t checques. centrally controlled.  examinations  If militarist  the requirements  o f f i c e r s became a problem  promotion p o l i c y would p e n a l i z e those w i t h a m i l i t a r i s t E a r l y r e t i r e m e n t s were f o r c e d on o f f i c e r s who  then  approach.  d i d not r e c e i v e promo-  t i o n s i n a c e r t a i n number of y e a r s , e l i m i n a t i n g those who  were  not  ambitious or s u c c e s s f u l a t g e t t i n g r e c o g n i t i o n from t h e i r  All  of t h i s was  done w i t h o u t the n e c e s s i t y of f a c e to f a c e  superiors.  confrontation  or r e s o r t to p h y s i c a l f o r c e . Paper m a n i p u l a t i o n i s much more d i f f i c u l t f a c e to f a c e a u t h o r i t y and u a t i o n of an o f f i c e r who his  retirement  EM who  can be much s t r o n g e r .  C o n s i d e r the  papers and  no  longer  who  high if  or  the  i s passed over i n  P e o p l e around them are powerless to h e l p .  s o n a l p h y s i c a l a t t a c k or a c t of sabotage might be likely  receives  r e c e i v e s a c t i v e duty pay,  or the NCO  sit-  Without the proper papers none of these people can  what they want.  not  than  wished to c o n t i n u e i n the Navy but  gets a p u n i t i v e d i s c h a r g e ,  promotions.  to f i g h t  A per-  expressive  to be h e l p f u l i n g e t t i n g a change i n the papers.  get  but  is  Very  l e v e l o f f i c e r s or congressmen sometimes are a b l e to i n t e r v e n e  the a p p l i c a n t can get t h e i r a t t e n t i o n and  a c t i o n has  been h e l p f u l i n a few  cases.  cooperation.  Of course t h i s  -  Legal involves  more paper work i n an attempt to get the s u p e r i o r paper a u t h o r i z a t i o n of the c o u r t s .  The  r e g u l a t i o n s under which the o r i g i n a l paper  i s s u e d might be  changed by p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n through the  but  t h i s i s a long way  round and  ful  comes too l a t e to remedy the i n i t i a l  Congress,  o r d i n a r i l y even i f u l t i m a t e l y  These paper a u t h o r i z a t i o n s  was  success-  problem.  are v e r y  effective in  channeling  a c t i o n s of navy r e s i s t e r s as w e l l as c o o p e r a t o r s .  B u i l d i n g a proper  record  Conscientious  i s as important f o r the EM  Objector who  discharge  wants to be  t r y i n g to get  as i t i s f o r an NCO  an a d m i r a l  a  b u c k i n g f o r c h i e f or a commander  or even the c a p t a i n who  may  want to get r i d  94 of h i s e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e r or any  other  ways to i n f l u e n c e t h i s paper work. r e q u i r e d by r e g u l a t i o n , these may  subordinate.  Navy people do  When t h e r e are s p e c i f i c be used a g a i n s t  learn  procedures  the bureaucracy to  l i m i t or d e l a y a c t i o n s or h o l d the bureaucracy to r u l e s t h a t are a burden. C r o z i e r has  discussed  how  r e g u l a t i o n s are o f t e n used by workers to  more c o n t r o l over t h e i r s i t u a t i o n ( C r o z i e r 1964). major s t r a t e g i e s of GI r e s i s t e r s and was It  o f t e n helped  or d i s c h a r g e s ,  aided by  T h i s was  one  of  the c o u n s e l i n g  i n d i v i d u a l s to have f a v o r a b l e outcomes to t h e i r t r a n s f e r s but  t h i s was  done o n l y one  case at a time.  Paper manipula-  d e c i s i o n s are made by unnamed committees w i t h i n BUPERS.  can e x e r c i s e d i s c r e t i o n w i t h o u t the n e c e s s i t y of e x p l a n a t i o n s appointed want by  applicants.  I n d i v i d u a l s t r y to get  available.  They  they  by a p p l y i n g  T h e i r a c t i o n s become the b e h a v i o r  Many  to d i s -  the a u t h o r i z a t i o n s  c a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n to b u i l d i n g t h e i r r e c o r d and  the c h o i c e s  the  centers.  t i o n i s not r u l e by r e g u l a t i o n i t i s r a t h e r r u l e by a u t h o r i z a t i o n . personnel  gain  for  wanted by  the  managers. According  to the m a n a g e r i a l i d e o l o g y ,  a u t h o r i t y s h o u l d be avoided recommends a v e r y  i n face-to-face r e l a t i o n s .  and  The  approach  d i f f e r e n t s t y l e f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s from s u p e r i o r  i n f eriori'n the f o l l o w i n g a d v i c e Organization  command types of  to o f f i c e r s from the handbook,  to  Ship  Personnel:  . . . assume the second d i v i s i o n o f f i c e r on the guided m i s s i l e d e s t r o y e r P r a t t has n o t i c e d t h a t the q u a r t e r d e c k f o r which he i s r e s p o n s i b l e c o u l d stand a l i t t l e Improvement. H i s Boatswain's Mate 2/C H a r r i s i s i n charge of the q u a r t e r deck. A good approach i s : " H a r r i s , t h i s area i s f a l l i n g o f f a b i t , l e t ' s b r i n g the deck out a l i t t l e b r i g h t e r " . • • •  95 I f he wishes to make i t a b i t s t r o n g e r , he can say: "Harris, the quarterdeck i s not up to P r a t t standards of appearance. I f you cannot keep i t up p r o p e r l y w i t h the men you have, l e t me know and w e ' l l look i n t o a s h i f t of work d e t a i l s h e r e . " I f t h i s does not get r e s u l t s he should e i t h e r c o n s i d e r r e p l a c i n g p e t t y o f f i c e r H a r r i s or a s s i g n i n g more men. (USNI 1972:32) (see appendix i f o r USNI r e f e r e n c e s ) Teamwork i s used as a metaphor f o r work r e l a t i o n s h i p s , emphasizes shared may  purposes and  a non-hierarchical organization.  t r a n s f e r some of the p o s i t i v e c u l t u r a l v a l u e s  m i l i t a r y work.  Face-to-face  a l c o h o l and  It also  of team s p o r t s to  r e l a t i o n s h i p s are o c c a s i o n s  i n many c o u n s e l i n g programs.  this  for  manipulation  There are s p e c i a l programs t h a t o f f e r  c a r e e r c o u n s e l i n g as w e l l as g e n e r a l p s y c h i a t r i c and  counseling.  drug,  religious  There are o t h e r programs t h a t b r i n g s m a l l groups t o g e t h e r  sensitivity  s e s s i o n s c a l l e d group development.  The programs attempt  d e f i n e problems as i n d i v i d u a l or i n t e r p e r s o n a l and  probably  d e p o l i t i c i z e d i s c o n t e n t as w e l l as to r e h a b i l i t a t e . s o c i o l o g i c a l name f o r t h i s i s p r o b a b l y  The  " c o o l i n g the mark"  in  to  are meant to  appropriate (Goffman 1952).  The  GI movement people thought c o u n s e l i n g , e s p e c i a l l y i n the drug programs,  was  used to get i n f o r m a t i o n about i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t c o u l d l a t e r be used i n  c r i m i n a l a c t i o n s or d i s c h a r g e procedures a g a i n s t them or t h e i r f r i e n d s . I n t e l l i g e n c e agents are i n c r e a s i n g l y used on the s h i p s , presence has  been announced i n A l l Hands.  face-to-face relationship. anyone may  be  suspected  expected to b u i l d who  may  T h i s i s a k i n d of s p e c t o r of a  S i n c e the i d e n t i t y of the agents i s not known  of b e i n g one.  team s p i r i t .  (Marx 1974)  I t probably  not know the i d e n t i t y of the agent.  r e p o r t e d and  their  T h i s can h a r d l y  does worry NCOs and Any  officers  of t h e i r a c t i o n s may  c r i t i c i z e d w i t h a r e s u l t i n g mark on t h e i r r e c o r d s .  agents are a t h r e a t to anyone c r i t i c a l of m a n a g e r i a l  ideology.  be  be  Secret  96 To summarize, the s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . o f a u t h o r i t y on the has  shifted  from f a c e - t o - f a c e command and  obedience among l e a d e r s  f o l l o w e r s to a much more complex s i t u a t i o n . i n d i r e c t and  done by  channeling  i n t h e i r consequences.  consequences, they may  simply  naval a d m i n i s t r a t i v e process  t h r e a t v i a paper.  one may  are  be needed to a d m i n i s t e r  which i s a l s o c o n s e q u e n t i a l  i n the l a r g e r s o c i e t y .  they no  l o n g e r r e c e i v e pay.  For  the  The  papers.  the  for similar  i n s t a n c e , i f a person i s  I f the d i s c h a r g e was  t h i s w i l l be marked on the d i s c h a r g e to see these p a p e r s .  largely  c o n s i s t of paper messages which No  and  f o l l o w from the r e g u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n of  process  ask  c o n t r o l i s now  of o p p o r t u n i t i e s and  Punishment as w e l l as rewards may palpable  The  ships  discharged  l e s s than h o n o r a b l e  C i v i l i a n employers u s u a l l y  f a i l u r e to be h i r e d by p o t e n t i a l employers  i s not e x a c t l y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the punishment but  i t i s nonetheless  punitive in effect. The work i t s e l f  i s so a s s i g n e d  s u p e r v i s i o n i s u s u a l l y unnecessary. i n t e r a c t i o n between EMs inspections.  The  organized  that  There are o c c a s i o n s  face-to-face  for  face-to-face  and NCOs i n the s h i p l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n and  r e l a t i o n s h i p i s often perceived  Formal judgment and group.  and  punishment may  as h u m i l i a t i n g by  occur but not  EMs.  i n the work  T h i s takes p l a c e sometime a f t e r the a l l e g e d t r a n s g r e s s i o n at  executive  o f f i c e r ' s hearing  s a i l o r w i l l again experience the guards.  and  at Captain's  Mast.  I f sent  to the b r i g  None of these i n t e r a c t i o n s are l i k e l y Counseling  and  to be r e l a t e d to  These may  a  the  group development programs  o f f e r an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d pseudo-personal c o n t a c t between the EMs.  the  a face-to-face authority r e l a t i o n s h i p with  d i r e c t accomplishment of work.  t i o n and  during  organiza-  have a c o o l i n g out or c o o l i n g down f u n c t i o n ,  but  i f so, t h i s happens v i a p e r s u a s i o n  commands.  o r s u b t l e t h r e a t , n o t through  The r a t i o n a l e f o r the maintenance of a formal  deference  e t i q u e t t e between the men and o f f i c e r s i s no l o n g e r p l a u s i b l e . r e l a t i o n s h i p can now be f r i e n d l y w i t h o u t d e s t r o y i n g obedience. and  The  the b a s i s o f  The o r d e r s most o f t e n come now from l e v e l s above t h e s a i l o r  h i s immediate s u p e r v i s o r , and they come as paper r a t h e r than as  v e r b a l orders order,  delivered face-to-face.  I f the s a i l o r o b j e c t s t o the  the " b r a s s " o r Navy can be blamed, but the immediate  i s n o t d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r work d e c i s i o n s .  supervisor  98  PART TWO  CASE STUDIES  The case studies were i n i t i a l l y planned around antiwar campaigns on three attack a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s , the USS Constellation, the USS Coral Sea and the USS K i t t y Hawk from f a l l 1971 through winter 1972.  I interviewed people involved i n these movements and  gathered their l i t e r a t u r e as well as news reports of the events from GI, underground, navy and regular press sources (see appendix i f o r a description of these sources).  More material was available for  events i n the San Diego area due partly to a more adequate public library collection.  In the San Diego l i b r a r y one of the daily news-  papers was even indexed by the name of p a r t i c u l a r ships. also kept copies of the l o c a l underground paper, The Door.  The l i b r a r y Little  was available from the San Francisco l i b r a r y where no d a i l y paper i s indexed. In addition there was not as much documentary material produced by the movement groups i n the Bay Area.  The Bay area people  used a more informal approach to organizing and they t r i e d to avoid p u b l i c i t y rather than use i t as a t a c t i c to get c i v i l i a n support. There were news reports after an event but l i t t l e during the campaigns. Consequently I found much more material about the Constellation and K i t t y Hawk campaigns than about the Coral Sea. As I was i n the process  99 of organizing this material i n the f a l l of 1972 two major resistance events happened.  These were r a c i a l resistance actions on the same two  ships I had already been following, the K i t t y Hawk and the Constellation. At about this same time the sabotage charges against Chenoweth of the Ranger became news and I was able to c o l l e c t considerable  material  on this since by then I was receiving s i x of the GI and underground papers.  The ephemeral nature of underground newspaper publishing  and the lack of complete l i b r a r y c o l l e c t i o n s make find back copies.  i t d i f f i c u l t to  The newspaper people themselves usually do not  have a l l or even many of their old editions on f i l e .  I t i s much  easier to gather this kind of document on current events than to find reports for actions that happened a few months or a year or two earlier. Following the r a c i a l incidents, national news services reported trouble within the naval command related to navy p o l i c y toward Blacks and dissenters.  I was already aware of a command c o n f l i c t  over management ideologies from my reading of the m i l i t a r y journals. I continued  to gather this material.  These journals are available  i n many l i b r a r i e s . I arranged the news reports, a r t i c l e s and pamphlets chronol o g i c a l l y within s p e c i f i c case h i s t o r i e s and then read and re-read them as I t r i e d out d i f f e r e n t interpretations of what was happening. The t o t a l 550 documents are too bulky to be reproduced here but i n t h i s section, part two, I have summarized the s i x major cases for which there was the most complete information.  These are the anti-war  100 campaigns on the K i t t y Hawk and the Constellation; the l a t e r r a c i a l incidents on these two ships; the charges, t r i a l and movement support of Chenoweth on the USS Ranger; and f i n a l l y , the admirals reaction against CNO Zumwalt and managerial p o l i c y . These events happened i n an h i s t o r i c a l context and i n p a r t i c u l a r were related to the war i n Vietnam, to actions on other ships, and to the peace movement.  During 1969 several infantry  units refused combat orders i n Vietnam.  Fragging of o f f i c e r s , f i g h t s ,  desertion and drug usage were also a problem f o r the U.S. m i l i t a r y command.  They decreased their use of ground troops and increased the  a i r war.  Many of the planes used i n the a i r war were based on car-  r i e r s o f f Vietnam.  Such c a r r i e r s had been used throughout  the V i e t -  nam war but now more of them were sent to the Western P a c i f i c area and held there f o r longer and longer periods.  There were fourteen  Attack Carriers i n the U.S. Navy and by f a l l of 1972 s i x of them were deployed o f f Vietnam. c a r r i e r s are undergoing  At any p a r t i c u l a r time, two or three  regular repairs so s i x c a r r i e r s represent-  half of the available Attack Carrier force. In the spring of 1970 the c i v i l i a n anti-war protest became a massive movement after four students were k i l l e d by national guardsmen on Kent State University campus i n Ohio and c i v i l i a n s demonstrated i n protest across the country. demonstrations  The following A p r i l and May mass  and disruptions were held at the nation's c a p i t o l and  i n c i t i e s across the country. followed these events.  The anti-war campaigns on the ships  The relationship of the s i x case h i s t o r i e s to  each other and to national events i s shown i n the following b r i e f chronology of the period:  101  CHRONOLOGY OF NAVY RESISTANCE 1971-73 *(Starred events are reported as part of the case h i s t o r i e s ) Month and Year  Ship Related Events  National Events  1971 April May to October  *San Diego Vote Campaign to keep the USS Constellation home. Nine crew members took sanctuary i n l o c a l churches.  October to November  -SOS campaign on the USS Coral Sea at Alameda. 300 s a i l o r s were rumored on Unauthorized Absence and three o f f i c e r s resigned as the ship l e f t .  December to February  *S0S campaign on the USS K i t t y Hawk at San Diego. Nine remained i n sanctuary when the ship l e f t (including two from a support ship).  -Massive disruptions and anti-war demonstrations occurred i n major c i t i e s .  1972 April  -USS Midway l e f t Alameda as one s a i l o r took sanctuary.  May June  -USS America s a i l e d from Norfolk as the Coast Guard cleared protestors from the harbor.  July  -A m i l l i o n d o l l a r f i r e occurred on the USS Forrestal at Norfolk and a s a i l o r was arrested for sabotage. *Sabotage to a reduction gear of the USS Ranger delayed i t s departure three months.  -Bombing of North Vietnam resumed from c a r r i e r based planes. -Mining of Haiphong harbor by Coral Sea planes.  102 August  *The Navy arrested Seaman Chenoweth f o r the Ranger sabotage. GI movement people organized support for h i s defense.  September  -USS Enterprise l e f t Alameda as anti-war c i v i l i a n s attempted to block Golden Gate with boats. The Navy discharged f i v e s a i l o r s as SOS organizers.  October  *0ver 200 were involved i n a r a c i a l fight on the USS K i t t y Hawk while the ship was i n action o f f Vietnam. Forty-six s a i l o r s were injured, twentyeight arrested. -Four were injured i n a r a c i a l fight on the o i l e r , Hassayampa while i n the P h i l l i p i n e s .  -The Democratic Party nominated anti-war candidate, McGovern.  -Bombing of North Vietnam was stopped.  *An admiral p u b l i c l y warned of sabotage by dissidents and blamed Zumwalt's reforms i n a retirement speech. November  *Sit-down strikes involving up to 300 s a i l o r s occurred on the USS Constellation on training out of San Diego and at the dock. *CN0 Zumwalt and the Secretary of the Navy attacked top o f f i c e r s f o r f a i l u r e to implement r a c i a l reforms.  -President Nixon defeated anti-war candidate McGovern f o r the U.S. Presidency.  *A group of admirals worked to have Zumwalt removed. -A r a c i a l uprising occurred at the navy b r i g i n Norfolk. -Over 200 s a i l o r s were i n a r a c i a l fight at Midway Island. December  -Bombing of North Vietnam resumed  103  *Congressional Investigation of r a c i a l i n c i d e n t s was completed. The Representat i v e s found t h a t the problem was the CNOs p o l i c y of "permissiveness".  - P a r i s Peace Agreements were s i g n e d ending Vietnam War d i r e c t involvement.  * T r i a l s of twenty-eight K i t t y Hawk s a i l o r s ended. Seven remained i n n a v a l p r i s o n s .  *Chenoweth a c q u i t t e d of Ranger sabotage. -Two days of r a c i a l f i g h t i n g o c c u r r e d on the USS R o o s e v e l t i n the Caribbean Sea.  -Watergate i n v e s t i g a t i o n s began under newly a p p o i n t e d Attorney General, E l l i o t Richardson.  104 The f i v e case h i s t o r i e s were summarized from the r e p o r t s of the v a r i o u s documents.  In doing t h i s I t r i e d  to s e l e c t so t h a t the v a r i e t y  of sources and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the whole corpus were r e p r e s e n t e d .  I  have noted the d i f f e r e n c e s i n i d e a s of what happened as I r e c o g n i z e d them. The case h i s t o r i e s p r e s e n t e d here a r e then not the o r i g i n a l m a t e r i a l  from  which I worked but summaries based on my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the documents.  105 Chapter Seven  USS CONSTELLATION STAY HOME VOTE  Nine Refuse to Leave for Vietnam, September 1971  In spring 1971 following the national peace movement demonstrations, the USS Constellation, an attack a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r , arrived i n San Diego to prepare f o r another tour to Vietnam.  The ship had been  under repair i n Bremerton, Washington, where a group of o f f i c e r s and enlisted men had organized a unit of the Concerned Officers Movement or COM.  They had already planned and participated i n a peace walk i n  Bremerton.  San Diego anti-war people had also organized as Non Violent  Action, NVA.  They planned to support protest among the s a i l o r s on  the c a r r i e r .  They sent 2500 l e t t e r s aboard t e l l i n g the s a i l o r s that  NVA hoped they would stay home rather than go on to the ship's s i x t h tour i n Vietnam. We are convinced that the coming WESTPAC deployment of the Connie w i l l be harmful to everyone - to you, to us and to the people of Southeast Asia. The war i n Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos i s f a r more devastating than most people r e a l i z e . (NVA A p r i l 1971,C-3 see appendix i f o r document'Preferences) This l e t t e r arrived on the ship before i t had docked i n San Diego.  (Later COM reported that the Captain had confiscated and  destroyed almost a l l of the l e t t e r s .  They then c a l l e d f o r a Navy  Court of Inquiry and a U.S. Postal Service investigation.)  The ship  was met by U.S. Representative Ron Dellums and NVA people.  Dellums  talked to Blacks and anti-war crew members about discrimination and  106 p o l i t i c a l harassment on the ship.  The Captain, according to The Door,  the l o c a l underground newspaper, nervously chewed Turns. (Door A p r i l 14-18, 1971) NVA and COM were soon cooperating. small newspaper, Liberty C a l l .  In May COM put out a  I t reported how eleven hundred of the  Connie crew had signed a p e t i t i o n to have the Jane Fonda anti-war 3 show perform on the ship.  The Captain refused permission to have  the show aboard (pro-military entertainers had been hosted on the ship e a r l i e r ) and he confiscated the p e t i t i o n s .  The Fonda show was  held i n San Diego on May 15th, Armed Forces Day or "Armed Farces Day" as the a n t i - m i l i t a r y people called i t . and c i v i l i a n s attended.  Twenty-five hundred s a i l o r s  The daily newspaper, the San Diego Union  reported the e f f o r t s to get the show on the ship.  They also explained  that COM was requesting a Naval Court of Inquiry into the e a r l i e r l e t t e r confiscation, they reported the Jane Fonda p e t i t i o n confiscation, protest of a new order of the captain banning non-approved l i t e r a t u r e and punishment on the ship of a COM member. e d i t o r i a l comment.  This was reported without  (San Diego Union June 7, 1971)  In June an informal meeting of about one hundred and f i f t y men was held on the ship to talk about racism, drugs and navy l i f e i n general.  Someone suggested that they a l l use the Action Line and ask  for peanut butter.  The Action Line became jammed and they got peanut  butter f o r supper.  The executive o f f i c e r then came on the ship's TV  3 Jane Fonda and other anti-war actors and entertainers had been traveling to m i l i t a r y bases with their show. I t was sponsored by the United States Servicemen's Fund, a nation-wide c i v i l i a n and GI support group.  107 and warned that this was an organized attempt to jam the l i n e and i f this worked the group might escalate i t s demands.  Several days  l a t e r the group held another meeting and went over a number of grievances.  The Captain called a meeting the following day, re-  sponded to the points, named four crewmen he claimed were responsible, and said they would be charged with sedition i f the group met again. This was a l l g l e e f u l l y reported i n The Door as "The Great Peanut Butter Conspiracy".  The Door noted that the Captain had since been called to  Washington and that both the postal service and Navy were now gating the Captain.  (Door July 7-20,  investi-  1971)  By July many of the COM members had been transferred o f f the ship.  The Door ran a long story "The Connie i s No Lady" that re-  viewed the campaign.  In the same issue The Door reported that peace  people i n San Diego were trying to stop funding for attack c a r r i e r s . A b i l l was being prepared for Congress.  Citizens were urged to r e a l i z e  that the Vietnam War was continuing by naval a i r c r a f t based on these carriers.  A campaign to stop the Connie was presented as a symbolic  way of gathering more c i v i l i a n as well as GI support for ending the war.  (Door July 21-Aug. 3, 1971) In August a banner saying "Connie Stay Home For Peace" was  flown over San Diego a number of times by a member of the Harbor Project, and ex-carrier p i l o t .  The Harbor Project was the name of  the combined e f f o r t of COM and NVA.  They now decided on a vote  campaign as their next e f f o r t to keep the Connie home. had encouragement  The  campaign  from Joan Baez and her Institute for the Study of  108 Nonviolence and the active support of David Harris.  Harris had been  a leader i n the draft resistance movement and was just out of j a i l for draft resistance at this time. (Door Aug. 18-Sept. 1, There was an intensive campaign for the next s i x weeks.  1971) There were  meetings, public picnics and rap sessions with Harris and m i l i t a r y counselors.  Bumper stickers and stick-on slogans were made available  a l l over town.  Some of these began showing up on the ship, even on  the captain's door. The Navy was also doing public r e l a t i o n s .  August  the ship hosted dependents for a day cruise and a i r show.  fifteenth Navy and  veterans groups spoke out against the vote project considering i t b i z a r r e to allow m i l i t a r y men to vote as to whether they would follow orders of the c i v i l i a n government. (San Diego Union Aug. 29,  1971)  NVA handed out more l e a f l e t s emphasizing the v a l i d i t y of s a i l o r s expressing their own ideas about their m i l i t a r y orders. Liberty Call, carried statements by David Harris and two ex-officers which were representative of this l i t e r a t u r e . The vote i s an exercise i n very simple and straightforward democracy. I t i s a common voice for people who have been denied a common voice i n the ongoing process of government decisions. If i t i s r e a l l y democracy the government i s p r a c t i c i n g and democracy the Navy i s defending, then we expect they w i l l recognize and be bound by the results of the vote the vote w i l l help us as a people begin to make decisions that have been out of our hands for much too long. Dave Harris ...As a Naval aviator, I have flown from the decks of our c a r r i e r s . Today, c a r r i e r s are used, not to protect other naval vessels, but to attack targets on land. The most sophisticated of technological weapons are targeted at people, the people of underdeveloped countries. Right  109  now attack c a r r i e r s are i n the Gulf of Tonkin. Their planes are bombing people i n our names. Do we want that bombing to continue?... Should the USS Constellation stay home? John Huyler (former Navy Lt.) We hold that the rights of free speech and dialogue i s a CRUCIAL right that must be established before any other reform can be made possible. Admiral Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations, has made i t his p o l i c y to create channels, such as the ACTION LINE, for in-service members to a i r their grievances. It i s the opinion of COM that although these channels are a step i n the right d i r e c t i o n , they should be expanded to include channels by which servicemen can form and express their views on community and national issues as well It i s not enough that men be given the right to a i r petty grievances, such as lack of t o i l e t paper i n the heads, and be silenced on issues that concern them as i n d i v i d u a l s . Paul Rogers (former Ensign on the Constellation) (Liberty C a l l , September 17-21, 1971) 0  The campaign gathered supporters with street dances and picnics.  A small booklet was  printed and c i r c u l a t e d with  statements by four e n l i s t e d men  and o f f i c e r s on how  personal  they had come to  r e a l i z e that they could no longer p a r t i c i p a t e i n the war.  Each of  the four reported s p e c i f i c events that had influenced them to change. These varied from anti-war films to face-to-face contact with V i e t namese victims and wounded s a i l o r s . r e a l i z e how (NVA  In each case they had come to  they themselves were involved i n the destruction of people.  1971) In September, a GI newspaper Up From The Bottom reported  the campaign and also featured a report by a Connie wife about the problems she had i n trying to v i s i t her husband who on r e s t r i c t i o n . than the NVA  was  on the Connie  The tone of the paper was more b i t t e r and  and COM materials.  The Connie wife s a i d :  A " L i f e r of the Month" was  informal featured.  110  Don't get r i l e d when you see a couple.of l i f e r s plus an o f f i c e r and the Master at Arms at the quarterdeck, i t takes their combined efforts for them to read an- I.D. card and hassle every man. I noticed that, even tho the l i f e r s t r i e d , they couldn't smile, they've growled and frowned too much! ....I wish more d i s s a t i s f i e d wives of the P.O.W.s of the Constellation would get their s h i t together. We sure could make some noise! (UFTB September 1971) The San Diego Union ran a long report of a crewman who  had been  confined to the b r i g for d i s t r i b u t i n g l e a f l e t s on the ship while i t was at sea on a training run.  He was now  not being allowed to appeal the sentence.  fasting i n protest over The Captain was reported  as having asked the Navy to discharge him for drug use. reported as picketing the ship. NVA  NVA  (San Diego Union Sept. 2,  was 1971)  l e a f l e t i n g and programs continued and the bi-weekly  Door and d a i l y newspaper San Diego Union continued coverage. vote was by NVA  to be taken September 17 to 21.  The  B a l l o t boxes were manned  volunteers (mostly young c i v i l i a n s ) throughout  the c i t y .  Three thousand b a l l o t s were mailed to s p e c i f i c s a i l o r s on the ship. The campaign was  topped off with two Baez f o l d concerts and a rap  session with Dave Harris.  This was well publicized i n movement and  regular press media and by l e a f l e t i n g .  GI newspapers around the  country carried stories about the "Connie Stay Home" campaign. The San Diego and Los Angeles newspapers interviewed the ship's captain, Gerhard, and he and the A i r Force Commander of the P a c i f i c Fleet issued statements on schedule.  that the Constellation would s a i l  Secretary of the Navy, Chafee, declared that the morale  on the ship was high and that i t was  inappropriate for m i l i t a r y  men  Ill to vote on their orders of a c i v i l i a n government.  (San Diego Union  September 2, 1971) During the days of the vote there were daily reports i n the  San Diego Union as well as continual broadsides, l e a f l e t i n g ,  folk concerts and street events by the project people. Diego Union was the f i r s t to announce the vote.  The San  Eighty-two per  cent of the t o t a l 55,000 votes were f o r the Connie to stay home. Six  hundred f o r t y - s i x of the crew had voted, f i f t y - f o u r per cent  for  staying home.  men aboard.)  (There were about 4500 o f f i c e r s and enlisted  (San Diego Union September 23, 1971) NVA l e a f l e t s  were soon out announcing and analyzing the vote. A small counter-campaign was started by four women: ...to l e t the crew know not a l l of San Diego i s apathetic, s i t t i n g back and doing nothing. We are extremely appalled at how much p u b l i c i t y and attention i s being given to the vote. (San Diego Union Sept. 21, 1971) NVA had planned a f u l l schedule of events as anti-climax for  the l a s t ten days between the vote and ship's s a i l i n g .  Legal  counseling was to be offered with trained m i l i t a r y counselors and lawyers available.  There were also to be pickets, v i g i l s at the  navy gates and a f i n a l candlelight v i g i l the night before the ship sailed. the  A peace f l e e t of small private boats were to gather i n  harbor as a f i n a l protest when the ship s a i l e d .  September  twenty-seventh the f i r s t counseling event was held.  September  twenty^eighth Captain Gerhard was hospitalized and a Captain Ward assumed command.  The project people thought the s t r a i n of their  campaign was responsible. (Harbor Project Sept. 1971, San Diego  112 Union Sept. 28,  1971)  September twenty-ninth four men p u b l i c l y refused to 4 return to their ship. They did this by taking sanctuary i n a l o c a l Catholic Church and by issuing public statements of their objections to further m i l i t a r y service (NVA 1971).  Charlie Andrews'  statement was similar to the others: The USS Constellation under orders, not from the American people but a few very powerful p o l i t i c i a n s and m i l i t a r y people, has taken the right over l i f e and death. I refuse to take part i n this murder. I am i n sanctuary. I w i l l not be forced to take part i n this murder. P.S. Thou must not k i l l .  (NVA,  1971)  The four p r i e s t s and a nun from the church also issued their statement of reasons for o f f e r i n g sanctuary.  (NVA, 1971)  own  In a  later.interview the men said that they had been to several other churches with their request for sanctuary before they were accepted. (Door, Oct. 13-27, 1971) The f i r s t day of sanctuary the ranking naval chaplain of the Naval D i s t r i c t paid a f r i e n d l y v i s i t and was challenged by the men for h i s role i n the m i l i t a r y .  (Door, Oct. 13-27, 1971)  The September t h i r t i e t h San Diego Union reported that there were now s i x men  i n sanctuary, two more had joined.  The a r t i c l e  quoted the men as aware that sanctuary was not l e g a l l y recognized 4 Sanctuary had been used by m i l i t a r y r e s i s t e r s since 1969. It was a symbolic r e v i v a l of the medieval practise of church protection. Although church authority i n the twentieth century does not protect against m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n police, i t was used as a t a c t i c f o r expressing conscientious objection and as a way of p u b l i c l y i l l u s t r a t ing a contradiction between m i l i t a r y and r e l i g i o u s values.  113 and that they expected to be arrested, t r i e d and convicted for r e f u s a l to return to their ship.  The same issue quoted the  new  commanding o f f i c e r , Captain Ward, as saying he didn't detect anything alarming i n the crew's behavior, but that there were many malcontents aboard. age for any ship.  He thought this was  about the usual  percent-  He said the Navy handles them by waiting u n t i l  they v i o l a t e a regulation and then they would "end up i n d i s c i p l i n ary status".  (San Diego Union Sept. 30,  1971)  The Coast Guard published a warning to any people that might try to obstruct the ship's s a i l i n g October f i r s t .  The  sailed without incident but without three more s a i l o r s who joined the other s i x i n sanctuary.  sailors.  1971)  Early the next morning at 4:40 arrested and flown to the ship.  prayer service that afternoon arrests became national news.  A.M.  the s a i l o r s were  The captain was  charges would be f i l e d against them.  the men's own  had  Some of them had been discussing  this step for several days with small groups of other (Door, Oct. 13-27,  ship  to decide what  The priests held a church  for the men.  The sanctuary and  Detailed reports of the events and  reports came later i n l o c a l and national anti-war  media. (These l a t t e r sources have delays between gathering news and publishing.  Most are published bi-weekly or monthly.)  Up  From The Bottom reported the sanctuary and subsequent arrests but with a s l i g h t c r i t i c i s m of the t a c t i c ! The Connie 9 were given a choice of either going to a  114 federal prison or to the f l o a t i n g prison they c a l l the USS Constellation. A l l 9 chose to go back to that h o r r i f y i n g h e l l hole and work among humanoids. Around 6:55 am the Connie 9 were on a plane headed back to the USS Constellation. Now that the Connie 9 are returned to a f l o a t i n g sexist, r a c i s t , dictatorship, they w i l l be rechanneled to be robots and wind-up t i n s o l d i e r s . This means that they w i l l have a hard time regaining their p o s i tions as free speaking i n d i v i d u a l s . Support i s needed for these 9 i n d i v i d u a l s and a l l others who speak up for what they believe i s r i g h t . The best thing you can do i s set an example by your personal actions, speaking up and voicing your opinions, get together with your friends and make the oppressors hear you out. Always remember, that they can't close your mouth, they can't control your actions, they can't control your thinking. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE (UFTB Oct. 1971) This statement also r e f l e c t e d a difference between the UFTB and the Harbor Project's rhetoric.  In September an a r t i c l e  about the Harbor Project i n the Door had said: The Desire of the project workers to r e l a t e to the various constituencies of the Vote on a "just f o l k s " l e v e l i s r e f l e c t e d by both the tone and content of the l e a f l e t s , radio, and TV spots. There i s no use of the words "militarism", "racism," "sexism," "imperialism". Instead a conscious e f f o r t i s being made to communicate with people i n a personal, non-rhetorical s t y l e . ...The underlying assumptions of the Project-that the proj e c t workers, many with white middle class backgrounds, can r e l a t e to the people of San Diego on both a non-ideological and revolutionary l e v e l basis are seemingly r a d i c a l assumptions within the r a d i c a l - l e f t movement. Revolutions have c l a s s i c a l l y been related to working vs. r u l i n g class struggle, or to the overthrow of c o l o n i a l regimes by subjugated people. This assumption i s a r t i c u l a t e d by David Harris when he says: "I think we are i n the struggle for our own existence." (Door Sept. 15-29, This difference was  partly one of t a c t i c s but also came  from d i f f e r e n t analyses of the s i t u a t i o n . emphasized that i t was  1971)  The project people  the use of violence as a means that  was  wrong while the UFTB group cited exploitation and capitalism as  115 the  basic problem.  This difference did not become a public topic  except for such s l i g h t references.  Neither group made an issue of  their differences and neither printed analyses of the war beyond the most simple broad statements. When the Constellation reached Honolulu i t was learned that the nine had been given one month b r i g sentences at Captain's Mast and were fasting i n protest.  (San Diego Union Oct. 12,  1971)  By the end of the month one of the men had decided to cooperate with the Navy and so the group was reduced to the "Connie 8".  The  Navy enlistments of two of the men were almost up and they were flown back to the naval station at Treasure Island i n San Francisco Bay where they were detained.  They were able to talk to other  movement EMs and help with the organizing of another campaign that had been inspired from the Connie vote. This new e f f o r t became the (SOS could mean Stop Our Ship or Save Our Ship) SOS movement on the USS Coral Sea, another attack carrier.  This ship was scheduled to leave the Bay Area i n November  for Vietnam.  The new campaign d i f f e r e d from the Connie Vote i n that  there were more enlisted men involved i n the early organizing and there was less i n i t i a l p u b l i c i t y and involvement of the l o c a l c i v i l i a n peace community.  There was more of an a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t ,  a n t i - l i f e r emphasis i n their l i t e r a t u r e and non-violence was not featured; however, there was a non-violent caucus within the organizing group. sanctuary again.  There was an attempt to use the method of public The City of Berkeley and a dozen churches agreed  116 to o f f e r sanctuary and counseling. and talked to supporters  Many s a i l o r s v i s i t e d the churches  there, but none took sanctuary.  partly due to differences within SOS a tactic.  This  was  on the question of sanctuary  The disagreement did not become an open s p l i t .  Publicly  and i n most of the reports a l l ship protest and resistance was ferred to as part of the same movement.  as  re-  Later SOS became the sym-  bol for many other anti-war events sponsored by various groups. There were f i n a l l y several SOS r a l l i e s with s a i l o r s and c i v i l i a n s attending.  At one,  commissions to loud acclaim.  three young o f f i c e r s resigned  their  After a t r i a l run the Coral Sea came  back into harbor through the Golden Gate bridge.  While  supporters  waved peace banners from the bridge, seventy s a i l o r s on the f l i g h t deck formed themselves into an SOS. was  A f i n a l huge demonstration  held November twelfth when the ship s a i l e d from Alameda.  National and i n t e r n a t i o n a l news services carried reports that up to two hundred f i f t y s a i l o r s had f a i l e d to return to the ship. (Berkeley Barb Nov.  12-18,  1971)  While t h i s campaign was  underway the f i v e additional  Constellation prisoners were flown into the Treasure Island Naval Base and held i n detention.  Their l e g a l counselors found i t  d i f f i c u l t to t a l k to them without Navy interference. Dellums appointed who men.  was  Congressman  one of the Harbor Project people as his aide  then allowed  to v i s i t and report on the treatment of the  Dellums continued  ment of the prisoners.  to push the Navy for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r e a t They were given General Discharges December  117 s i x t h and there were celebrations i n the Bay area and a l a t e r r e union i n San Diego.  The discharge was b i l l e d as a success by the  underground and GI papers.  The eight could have been t r i e d at a  court martial and i f found g u i l t y been given sentences of several years i n prison.  (Door Dec. 2-23, 1971)  UFTB reported the outcome with mild approval i n an a r t i c l e t i t l e d "Connie 8 Skate".  I t ended, " A l l power to the  man or woman who gets out of the service no matter what the reason i s " .  (UFTB Jan. 1972) The m i l i t a r y editor of the San  Diego Union complained about the general discharges under honorable conditions.  He f e l t the veterans benefits for which they were  now e l i g i b l e were not deserved.  He noted that the discharges were  decided by a BUPERS board and issued i n the Chief of Naval Personnel's name.  (San Diego Union Dec. 16, 1971)  Several of the eight r e s i s t e r s remained i n San Diego and worked with the Harbor Project which now was focusing on another c a r r i e r , the USS K i t t y Hawk and i t s planned departure i n March. There were also other e f f o r t s related to d i f f e r e n t ships.  In  January a s a i l o r from the USS Hancock took sanctuary. The eight did not go to Vietnam but the USS Constellation did with almost a l l of the crew aboard.  The planes immediately  entered a c t i v e l y into the bombing of Vietnam.  A San Diego o f f i c e r ' s  wife received a telegram from her husband, a f l y e r . down a MIG.  He had shot  "I'm t e r r i b l y proud of him," she told a reporter.  (San Diego Union Jan. 21, 1972) And so the eight month campaign -  118 although It had received the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of some of the s a i l o r s and o f f i c e r s , the attention of the whole crew, and national publ i c i t y , and also forced the Navy to recognize i t and react publ i c l y to i t - had not managed to stop or even delay the movement and use of the ship. In January The Door reported that there was the Connie.  trouble on  They had received l e t t e r s saying the ship would re-  turn early because of antiwar sentiment and poor morale. Jan. 13-27, 1972)  (Door  Months l a t e r after the ships return and  the  November s t r i k e , the Captain reported that there had been many instances of sabotage at sea and that three suspected saboteurs had been taken o f f the ship while i n Asia. uncovered a plot of enlisted men to prevent planes from leaving. time.  (Associated Press, Nov.  None of this was 15,  reported at the  1972) also attempted i n Jan-  Captain Ward's wife, at home i n San Diego, organized  tour for wives to meet the ship when i t was for  had  to l i e down on the f l i g h t deck  A plan to boost ship morale was uary.  He also said he  eight days of rest and recreation.  siderable p u b l i c i t y .  Two  a  to be i n Hong Kong  This plan received con-  hundred f i f t y wives with some other  r e l a t i v e s and children paid for their tickets and made the t r i p , a r r i v i n g February fourth.  Local papers i n the U.S.  featured  their respective hometown boys' reunion with their wives.  A  Seattle a r t i c l e pictured a Black petty o f f i c e r as he greeted his Seattle wife and baby.  The message seemed to be that a l l was  well  119 on the Connie, p a r t i c u l a r l y with Blacks.  The a r t i c l e implied that  the Navy had sponsored the whole t r i p , but the cost was actually paid by the wives themselves.  The paper did not follow the story  to i t s f r u s t r a t i n g end. The v i s i t was interrupted without notice after less than four days.  The ship had been ordered back to duty  i n Vietnam for a massive a i r s t r i k e .  When the unhappy wives r e -  turned to San Diego they were interviewed by the San Diego Union. Reactions ranged from anger expressed by several enlisted men's wives to d u t i f u l acceptance of the navy way by an o f f i c e r ' s wife. (San Diego Union Feb. 12, 1972, Seattle Times Feb. 4, 1972) Several months passed without reports and the ship was expected back i n A p r i l .  Out of town families had started to  arrange for housing i n San Diego.  The San Diego symphony con-  sidered playing a major concert on the f l i g h t deck as a welcome when the ship returned.  This was protested by the Harbor Project  and other peace groups and the plan was dropped.  (San Diego Union  A p r i l 1, 1972) On A p r i l t h i r d when the Connie was near Japan on i t s planned return home, the Navy suddenly announced that i t would instead return to "Yankee Station" f o r more bombing of Vietnam. (San Diego Union A p r i l 6, 1972) The Navy attempted to notify the many dependents who were on their way to San Diego.  I t was almost  three months l a t e r that the c a r r i e r f i n a l l y did return to San Diego on July f i r s t 1972.  I t had been gone a t o t a l of nine months.  The Harbor Project people greeted the returning s a i l o r s with l i t e r a t u r e that emphasized the destruction caused by their mission.  120 Should the USS Constellation have stayed home? Was i t worth the stereo you wanted to pick up clean? Was i t worth the 9 months of loneliness and cramped living?...was i t worth the incredible suffering rained upon Vietnamese children, women and men? (Harbor Project, July 1972) They also invited e n l i s t e d men to their storefront bookstore "Second Thoughts" where counseling as well as books were a v a i l able.  They referred to their group as "San Diego Concerned M i l i t a r y " .  Up From The Bottom also greeted  the returning s a i l o r s but with an  a r t i c l e that c a r e f u l l y r a t i o n a l i z e d their p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Vietnam war,  explaining that they had l i t t l e choice and were themselves  victimized by the Navy.  They were i n v i t e d to UFTB's counseling  center i n downtown San Diego and promised: f u l l support of resources and energy to any e f f o r t by Connie crewmen and wives to organize for l e g a l r i g h t s , against another WESPAC deployment or any other struggle against the brass i n which you can use our aid. We're here to help a l l people i n the m i l i t a r y gain a decent way of l i f e free from harassment, coercion and oppression. (UFTB July 1972) The Door reported the return of the ship emphasizing i t s destructive r o l e i n IndoChina but without c r i t i c i z i n g the crew.  (Door July 7-20,  1972) Immediate organizing was not possible as men were given the usual t h i r t y days leave followed by t h i r t y days l i g h t duty as the ship was under repairs.  At the same time about one t h i r d of  the crew were replaced as part of the ordinary rotations for some and end of enlistment  for others.  By October one f i f t h of the  crew were not new, not only to the ship but to the Navy.  The move-  ment papers did not report contact with the reconstituted crew.  }  121  The peace community and underground press were occupied this summer and f a l l 1972 with a campaign to get the question of the A i r War on the C a l i f o r n i a b a l l o t and with the p r e s i d e n t i a l campaign of Senator George McGovern who was running as an a n t i war candidate.  Up_ From The Bottom had continued to follow Navy  news but l i t t l e was reported from San Diego and nothing from the Constellation.  The Harbor Project was cooperating with EMs on  the USS K i t t y Hawk.  The K i t t y Hawk was then i n WESPAC and the  Harbor Project helped by p r i n t i n g a newspaper written by men on the ship. During this summer from one to eleven men took sanctuary from three c a r r i e r s i n the San Francisco Bay area and extensive sabotage was reported on the USS Ranger at Alameda and on the USS F o r r e s t a l on the East Coast. The account of the USS Constellation w i l l be interrupted here to follow the K i t t y Hawk story.  122  Chapter Eight  USS KITTY HAWK STOP OUR SHIP CAMPAIGN  Seven Refuse to Leave f o r Vietnam, February 1972  While the Constellation Vote was being taken the USS K i t t y Hawk, another attack c a r r i e r was beginning preparations for sea t r i a l s f o r a March 1972 deployment to Vietnam. in port since July.  The ship had been  The crew had been on the customary months  leave and were back by the time of the September Connie Vote campaign and October sanctuary events.  They also probably knew  something about the SOS movement on the Coral Sea i n the Bay Area. The Coral Sea had s a i l e d f o r Vietnam November twelfth amid protest and national p u b l i c i t y as discussed e a r l i e r . In December some K i t t y Hawk crewmen joined with the Harbor Project to publish a newsletter c a l l e d K i t t y L i t t e r .  Harbor  Project now had f i v e ex-Navy men including two of the "Connie 8" and a young woman on i t s volunteer s t a f f .  This newsletter d i f f e r e d  from their e a r l i e r Liberty C a l l by discussing more of the s p e c i f i c problems of enlisted men and using EM terms such as " l i f e r " .  There  was now more economic analysis of the war and less emphasis on suffering of the Vietnamese.  The f i r s t edition reviewed the Connie  and Coral Sea anti-war campaigns.  At least two hundred copies were  mailed to the ship and four thousand others distributed i n the San  123  Diego area. who  The copies sent aboard ship were addressed to individuals  had been asked i f they were w i l l i n g to be sent the paper.  The  s a i l o r organizers said that they went up and down the chow lines and noted those with s l i g h t l y longer hair and asked them f o r t h e i r names to receive the paper.  The paper s t a f f thought that more people  would read the paper i f there were limited copies available than i f they had sent many copies to the ship. In addition to reports of anti-war movements on other ships the f i r s t issue had news about racism at Camp Pendleton, counseling information about Captain's Mast hearings, comment on the d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n of enlisted men,  explanations of GI free  speech r i g h t s , and comment on automated warfare i n Indochina. One a r t i c l e that i n v i t e d crew members to write f o r the papers was assigned with the s a i l o r ' s name, Steve Harris, and he had added "During working hours you can find me cleaning the head at frame 03-100/104 6L".  (Kitty L i t t e r Nov.  1971)  Up From The Bottom also had a l e t t e r signed by K i t t y Hawk crew member, Jerry Cich, t i t l e d "Stop the Shitty K i t t y " .  He  said he had heard that there might be a campaign similar to the Connie vote or the campaign to stop the Coral Sea or the K i t t y Hawk. He hoped i t would be more l i k e the SOS campaign and that enlisted people would be the main ones to organize i t .  Enlisted men were  invited to come by the Center for Servicemen's Rights (sponsors of UFTB) to talk with him about i t , issue featured the XO  (UFTB Nov.-Dec. 1971)  The same  (Executive O f f i c e r ) of the K i t t y Hawk as the  124  " L i f e r of the Month" because of his harassments over haircuts. cut problems were reported again i n the following issue.  The  HairCO,  Captain Oberg, had l i b e r a l i z e d haircuts, but at the same time s p e c i f i c a l l y not allowed braiding of h a i r .  The paper charged  that since this only affected Blacks i t was  racism.  (UFTB, Jan.  1972)  By the second issues of both K i t t y L i t t e r and UFTB both s a i l o r s who  had signed their names to a r t i c l e s had been taken off  the ship. Objector ing  Harris was and Cich was  given an honorable discharge as a transferred.  Cich wrote an a r t i c l e protest-  the transfer and asked again for an SOS  K i t t y Hawk.  Conscientious  He also spoke against the war  type campaign on the and the Navy's methods  of job assignment and about the lack of f u l l information for enl i s t e d people when they are recruited.  (UFTB Jan. 1972)  Project people told me that such discharges  Harbor  and transfers were  commonly used at this time to remove organizers.  One  outspoken  person might not be removed but as others seemed to be influenced, action was  taken.  According  to them, from t h i r t y to f o r t y - f i v e  people were transferred or discharged  during each ship campaign.  This second issue of K i t t y L i t t e r had a picture of the triumphant Connie eight on the cover waving their discharges captioned  "WE  WON".  There was  and  a f u l l report inside and s t o r i e s  of protest continuing on the Coral Sea and the Enterprise, the Navy's only atomic powered attack c a r r i e r .  Five hundred s a i l o r s  on .the Enterprise had signed a p e t i t i o n against the war. McGovern was  Senator  quoted by K i t t y L i t t e r as saying America's bombing  125  of peasants was barbaric.  One a r t i c l e attacked the steward system  whereby o f f i c e r s have servants.  The a r t i c l e explained how  nationals were recruited for this job. " i n s t i t u t i o n a l racism". by l i f e r s was  Filipino  The a r t i c l e was headed  Haircuts were s t i l l a problem.  explained as the l i f e r ' s way  Harassment  of keeping the men  from  questioning any orders or from thinking about what they were doing. To prevent thinking, an environment of fear was necessary and so harassment on petty matters was  used.  i s Cancer to an A i r c r a f t Carrier". were analyses of the POW  One f i l l e r added "Thinking  (Kitty L i t t e r Jan. 1972)  issue and of the Navy's use of the  There USS  Enterprise i n the Indian Ocean to threaten India during the PakistanBangladesh war. for  The r o l e of attack c a r r i e r s was  explained as only  support to counter-revolutionary movements i n non-industrial  nations.  An airman at the Nevada base of the airwing wrote that  Captain Oberg had used the ship's intercom to denounce K i t t y L i t t e r people as irresponsible dupes.  Another a r t i c l e said that K i t t y  L i t t e r had been praised by many people while they were at the Nevada base.  In February the t h i r d issue of K i t t y L i t t e r had a  l e t t e r from a s a i l o r on the Coral Sea: Dear John, Well, I thought I would write to you and t e l l you what I am doing now. I am aboard the USS Coral Sea off the coast of you know where! It took more guts than I had to go to j a i l rather than go here. I think perhaps I wasn't as I thought I was. I think the ship i s the one responsible for the children being k i l l e d , The crazy mothers are bombing what they can't see, A l l they do i s f l y over land, go to where they think they are supposed to be and drop their bombs, There are so many clouds that they can't see what they're bombing, so  126  they don't know i f i t i s a f u e l depot or a school. The morale i s r e a l l y bad. I think hardly anybody wanted to come over here. Now they r e a l i z e i t and can't do anything about i t . The o f f i c e r s aboard that l e t anybody know that they were members of COM a l l got general discharges or transferred. Us enlisted men just get worse jobs. I had to go captain's mast cause I wouldn't go on a bomb working party. They about hung me but George got me out of i t so I don't have anymore of that s h i t . Well, I better go before you f a l l asleep reading t h i s . The next l e t t e r w i l l have combat pay so you can give i t to COM & NVA. Maybe they can use i t . See ya l a t e r . Love & Peace, Mark (Kitty L i t t e r , Feb. 1972) A veteran of a K i t t y Hawk WESPAC tour of 1966 had v i s i t e d San Diego and h i s story of how he had fasted for f i f t y - o n e days while trying to get a discharge was featured as an a n t i - m i l i t a r y action.  The  caste system was protested i n another a r t i c l e : ...Every time an enlisted man salutes only because i t i s required, he gives himself the finger; every time he says s i r to an o f f i c e r he does not respect, he c a l l s himself "scum"....It i s argued that o f f i c e r s have earned t h e i r p r i v i l e g e s . Can any man earn the right to degrade another as a s o c i a l inferior?...The ultimate damage of the needless m i l i t a r y class discrimination i s to us a l l as human beings. We are prevented from r e l a t i n g as a person, each of importance i n h i s own r i g h t . . . A similar theme was continued i n another a r t i c l e i n which i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was stressed i n order to remain a "brother" of others.  person and a  The a l t e r n a t i v e was mindless obedience or  playing i t cool i n the Navy and thus becoming a "non-person", that i s , simply subordinate or superior to others.  Another a r t i c l e  explained the enlisted men's right to write to congressmen and told them how to go about i t .  Senatorial opposition to North Vietnam  bombing was covered and d e t a i l s given of a medical aid program i n Vietnam that was helping war injured children.  There were i l l u s t r a -  127 tions and comics.  Chaplains were caricatured by a leering cartoon  of a chaplain with these comments: This i s Chaplain Luther. Chaplain Luther i s a clergyman i n uniform on your ship to help you. He w i l l help you with personal problems as well as s p i r i t u a l ones. Do you s p i r i t u a l l y or morally object to k i l l i n g ? Are you concerned with sayings from the Bible l i k e "thou shalt not k i l l " ? Well have no worries because Chaplain Luther w i l l show you a BUPERS i n s t r u c t i o n that says i t ' s O.K. (Kitty L i t t e r Feb. 1972) I t was rumored that the Hawk might leave a month early. Resistance people thought the Navy was trying to avoid their campaign.  When the Navy f i n a l l y announced the early departure they  said the K i t t y Hawk was needed to r e l i e v e other,carriers o f f Vietnam. A s p e c i a l e d i t i o n of K i t t y L i t t e r came out almost on the eve of departure with a story of two K i t t y Hawk crewmen who were a l ready taking sanctuary at the Church of the Brethren i n San Diego. The church issued a statement explaining their support as based on b e l i e f i n freedom of worship and freedom of conscience.  A Joan  Baez concert for K i t t y Hawk crewmen was announced to be held at a l o c a l park.  There would also be lawyers and counselors for advice.  A more i n s i s t e n t anti-war statement was included this time. Think About It.'! People Are Dying!! ... The K i t t y Hawk w i l l k i l l thousands of people on this deployment. . . We're a l l prisoners of war! I f you're not a prisoner of war why are you going to s a i l with the stupid ship i n a day or two? THINK ABOUT IT! (Kitty L i t t e r Feb. 15, 1972) There was also an a r t i c l e by a Connie wife who had flown to Hong Kong to meet her husband and been b i t t e r l y disappointed when the Navy had suddenly ordered the ship back to duty. If I could see a v a l i d purpose, maybe these separations would  128 be more bearable. But v i r t u a l l y no one believes i n this war any more, The ship's mission i s one of u n j u s t i f i a b l e k i l l i n g and destruction,., sometime, Navy wives w i l l have the courage and honesty to voice their r e a l feelings and opinions. The Navy has already punished me i n the worst possible way— they've taken my husband away. (Kitty L i t t e r , Feb. 15, 1972) As the ship sailed the seventeenth of February i t l e f t nine men behind, f i v e more had joined the f i r s t two. s a i l o r s from the o i l e r M i s p i l l i o n also joined. of the ships that accompanied the K i t t y Hawk.  Two other  The o i l e r was one These sanctuary  events were followed closely by d a i l y reports i n the San Diego Union and they were l a t e r reported i n the GI and underground press.  (San Diego Union Feb. 17, 1972) The s a i l o r s were arrested and a l l nine flown to the  K i t t y Hawk at sea for hearings at Captain's Mast.  The seven  K i t t y Hawk men were given t h i r t y days i n the b r i g and half pay for two months on a charge of Unauthorized Absence. men  The two crew-  from the M i s p i l l i o n were returned to their ship for mast.  (San Diego Union Feb. 1972) The March f i f t e e n t h issue of K i t t y L i t t e r went to the ship at sea.  I t featured the sanctuary story and emphasized that  the men were now aboard and were mistreated by the marines guarding the b r i g .  The story of the s p e c i f i c abuses to the s a i l o r s was  carried i n national peace journals and readers were asked to write protest l e t t e r s to the Captain.  The March K i t t y L i t t e r had other  a r t i c l e s which reported organizing aboard the Coral Sea, then on duty off Vietnam, and protests from the airwing of the c a r r i e r USS  129  Midway.  A s a i l o r from the Midway who had taken sanctuary was r e -  ported as honorably discharged.  The paper printed a telegram from  Senator McGovern to "concerned K i t t y Hawk crewmen".  He said he  shared their objection to the war and pledged to continue to work for U.S. withdrawal from Indochina.  A different a r t i c l e  complained  about the willingness of Congress to vote money for the war.  It  also l i s t e d names of senators that were interested i n the rights of servicemen and might take action i f complaints were sent to them. Counseling centers i n the P h i l l i p i n e s and Japan were l i s t e d .  There  were pictures of Vietnamese victims of the bombing and several cartoons with cynical remarks about corpsmen and r e c r u i t e r s .  (Kitty  L i t t e r March 1972) Back i n San Diego, The Door ran a long a r t i c l e on the s p e c i f i c K i t t y Hawk crewmen who took sanctuary and on sanctuary as a way of resistance.  Some of the ministers and p r i e s t s had  found that their superiors did not support them or their  congrega-  tions objected to the style of l i f e of the s a i l o r s and their friends. Commonly i n the sanctuary s i t u a t i o n supporters of the men would stay at the churches night and day since i t was never known when the arrests would occur.  A p r i e s t at the Catholic church that had kept  the Connie nine i n sanctuary said that there was somewhat of a problem because of FBI charges about the immorality of the group. The FBI had taken pictures of the emerging young men and women as they crawled out of t h e i r sleeping bags at 4:30 am.  (Door, Feb,  24-Mar, 9, 1972) Sanctuary brought c i v i l i a n peace people and re-  130  s i s t i n g s a i l o r s into very close contact,  Usually this became a  learning situation f o r the older peace people and the s a i l o r s and ; their friends were treated with respect.  Around the country i n  sanctuary events there were a few d i f f i c u l t days while those of the l o c a l peace community who personally held s t r i c t rules on liquor, dope, smoking, sex and language, adjusted. Sanctuary as a t a c t i c ran into another kind of trouble on the ship.  A special news release came from Harbor Project  countering charges of Captain Oberg that the project had planned to use the s a i l o r s for p o l i t i c a l gains at the Republican tion.  conven-  (The convention was then scheduled for San Diego, l a t e r i t  was changed to Miami.)  The a r t i c l e claimed that i t was Oberg who  was trying to deceive the men the country.  as the Navy was t r y i n g to deceive  (Kitty L i t t e r March 1972)  The May K i t t y L i t t e r re-  ported that one of the K i t t y Hawk seven had been given a second t h i r t y days f o r hiding aboard ship for over twenty-four hours and was given an administrative discharge. to the sanctuary group i n the paper.  This was  the l a s t reference  Harbor Project people  thought  that p u b l i c i t y would hinder the processing of discharges for the men.  They were p a r t i c u l a r l y mindful of avoiding use of the men's  s i t u a t i o n for anti-war p u b l i c i t y without their active cooperation. So this time there was no l a t e r report of "we've won". May  (Kitty L i t t e r  1972) There was an o f f i c i a l daily newsletter aboard the K i t t y  Hawk, an eight page mimeograph called the K i t t y Hawk Flyer.  Its  131  content was quite d i f f e r e n t from the GI papers.  A s a i l o r had sent  four copies from March to A p r i l to the Harbor Project.  The s a i l o r  had underlined c e r t a i n items and added a few of his own comments. There was news of d a i l y events such as movies to be shown and sea meetings with other ships for supply and refueling. reports of a i r accidents and recoveries of p i l o t s . b r i e f news reports from the United States.  There were There were  Several a r t i c l e s gave  warnings about drugs and alcohol i n a "buddy" tone.  There was  also information about applying for higher rates and human r e l a tions stories about several i n d i v i d u a l crewmen. One a r t i c l e explained why punishments at Mast might seem inconsistent.  I t told how past d i s c i p l i n a r y record, job performance  and o v e r a l l a t t i t u d e were considered with the "fact that good order and d i s c i p l i n e must be maintained function as an e f f e c t i v e team." the s a i l o r .  on board K i t t y Hawk i f we are to These words had been underlined by  In the margin he had written "right on cap".  (Kitty  Hawk Flyer, Mar. 16, 1972) In an adjacent column there was an a r t i c l e explaining that s e n s i t i v i t y was needed to end racism i n the Navy and that people should be treated as individuals.  The  c o n f l i c t between the way Mast punishments are decided and the goal of treating people as individuals was evidently not apparent to the editors or the captain.  It was a complaint of EMs especially  Black s a i l o r s . The s a i l o r had checked a half page a r t i c l e "chain of command: Necessary or Not".  I t explained "the chain of command  132 was  not designed as harassment, but as m i l i t a r y necessity and then  gave a few reasons why i t was necessary.  I t ended "Unfortunately  there w i l l always be the disgruntled and discouraged men who have had their chits recommended for disapproval somewhere along the l i n e , but remember: there i s always a reason."  (Kitty Hawk Flyer  A p r i l 4, 1972) In the A p r i l seventh e d i t i o n the s a i l o r wrote over an a r t i c l e "take a good h i t before reading".  It was t i t l e d "Commander  Task Force 77 Message on Vietnam" and had been sent throughout the task force.  I t explained that a c r u c i a l b a t t l e was shaping up and  that: We are assembling the largest c a r r i e r task force of this c o n f l i c t and have been given the necessary operational authorities to e f f e c t i v e l y use i t ; a l l we need i s a l i t t l e good weather and the best e f f o r t of every man jack i n the force and we can turn the tide of battle to ensure the South Vietnamese v i c t o r y , thus enabling them to exercise the right of self-determination. In short, the chips are down, the stakes are high, so l e t ' s play the game to the best of our a b i l i t y . (Kitty Hawk Flyer, A p r i l 7,1972) Adjacent  to this a r t i c l e was a picture of a Commander who had been shot  down and rescued.  The s a i l o r had commented "almost l o s t 2 i n one month!"  The A p r i l eighth issue featured details of an Alpha Strike (bombing of North Vietnam).  I t also noted that the Constellation had  just rejoined the K i t t y Hawk, Coral Sea and Hancock who were now a l l "on the l i n e " . (Kitty Hawk Flyer, A p r i l 8, 1972) There was an announcement of a r e c r u i t i n g program i n which selected re-enlistees and boot camp graduates would v i s i t their home town high schools. noted "more high school talks by us".  The s a i l o r  A poem "The Cocky Hawkers" by  a crewmember t o l d of how Vcharlie was fighting a fight that can't be  133  won,  f o r one  of the teams which are h i s s t a l k e r s , i s the crew of  the K i t t y Hawk, c a l l e d the Cocky Hawkers". written "ain't  t h i s cute?"  He had  By  t h i s the s a i l o r  had  u n d e r l i n e d phrases i n a column  "What's going on" as f o l l o w s : . . . i f you're i n t e r e s t e d i n whether t h e r e i s r e a l l y a war going on, s t r o l l up to the f l i g h t deck some n i g h t a f t e r f l i g h t ops s e c u r e s and watch—We are now c l o s e enough t h a t the f l a s h e s of the bombs and an o c c a s i o n a l sound can be heard; i f you're r e a l l y l u c k y , you may be a b l e to see a f l a r e o r two... ( K i t t y Hawk F l y e r A p r i l 9, 1972) The May  i s s u e of K i t t y L i t t e r  c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the  Flyer.  I t announced the opening of Harbor P r o j e c t ' s s t o r e f r o n t b o o k s t o r e , Second Thoughts. war,  and  There was  a l o n g a r t i c l e on P r e s i d e n t Nixon,  the e l e c t i o n campaign ending w i t h "Ask  t h i s k i l l i n g and v i o l e n c e worth i t ? Two  excerpts  Is t h i s man  the  yourselves, i s a l l worth a damn?"  from K i t t y Hawk crewmen's l e t t e r s showed t h a t some  men  were a s k i n g themselves v e r y s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s : ...my s o u l was g i v i n g me a headache y e s t e r d a y I s a t down and s t a r t e d to t h i n k about what I was doing. I f e e l now t h a t t h e r e i s no way out, except to r e v o l t a g a i n s t the system t o t a l l y . I b e l i e v e the Navy i s u s i n g t h e i r CO g i m i c to c o n t r a d i c t i t s own applicants. What I mean i s , While you w a i t f o r your C O . papers you are s t i l l very much s u p p o r t i n g the war. There are not exc e p t i o n s to the r u l e ; even the most t r i v i a l j o b s are e s s e n t i a l to the o p e r a t i o n of War Ships e t c . They wouldn't have s o - c a l l e d t r i v i a l j o b s i f they weren't needed. I t i s a l s o my b e l i e f t h a t the Navy i s u s i n g mind bending t a c t i c s to d e t e r the t h i n k i n g mans mind. As time drags on the edge on everyones s p i r i t seems to be only f a i r . There i s a d e f i n i t e drop i n morale. The r e a son b e i n g ; t h e r e i s not an h o r i z o n i n view. Dear Concerned M i l i t a r y , ...My case i s by f a r not unique among s a i l o r s s e r v i n g i n WesPac, but perhaps what I say w i l l h e l p o t h e r s . U n t i l about the f i r s t of March I.was a member of the s h i p s Master At Arms f o r c e , a j o b I was g i v e n w i t h o u t my c h o i c e o r consent. My s o l e purpose was p e t t y harassment ( h a i r c u t s , u n i f o r m  134 regs, keeping the enlisted rabble from o f f i c e r s country), a job I could not bring myself to do. For this reason many times I received threats, harassment, and l a t e r expulsion from the force (much to my pleasure). During my two month stay on the force I experienced, f i r s t hand, most of the wrong things that i n my three and one half years i n the Navy I tended to overlook; things that I now r e a l i z e are the basic problems with the m i l i t a r y . One instance that s t i c k s i n my mind (one that caused me much mental anguish) occured shortly before we reached the P.I., about the end of February. A man was brought up to the MAA o f f i c e . He was c i r c u l a t i n g an open l e t t e r to Senator McGovern protesting the K i t t y Hawk's involvement in the war i n Vietnam. The l i f e r s had a f i e l d day trying to verbally r i p him and his l e t t e r to pieces (harassment, threats, the whole b i t ) . I was told to escort him to the XO for an informal inquiry, which turned out to be another threat session, only at a higher l e v e l . I, being very much opposed to this war and i n support of the man's right to h i s l e t t e r , stated my feelings to the XO. The XO said he was not there to argue the morality of the war (he gave me the f e e l i n g he could r e a l l y care l e s s ) , that the issue was the l e t t e r and the damages i t could do to him and the captain. He said i f we continued to c i r c u l a t e the l e t t e r he would have to find a l e g a l way to stop us. At this time the l e t t e r i s no longer being c i r c u l a t e d . Along with 120 signatures of supporters, i t has been sent to Senator McGovern. The consequences of my involvement: I was i n danger of losing my security clearance. For now I have been allowed to keep i t , as long as I do nothing to "jeopredize (sic) the national s e c u r i t y . " I am f a i r l y certain however, that by writing l e t t e r s to Senator McGovern and you, I w i l l eventually lose i t , though I do not see how writing l e t t e r s protesting the war and m i l i t a r y i n j u s t i c e breaks security. My l e t t e r may not do me much good, but perhaps they w i l l help a fellow shipmate i n his personal fight against this war and m i l i t a r y i n j u s t i c e . (Kitty L i t t e r , May 1972) The same issue of K i t t y L i t t e r had an analysis of the U.S. r o l e i n IndoChina.  I t emphasized the popular basis of the revolt  against the US supported South Vietnamese government.  The seven  point peace plan proposed by the People's Republic of Vietnam was presented on a f u l l page.  The issue also told of how s a i l o r s i n  135 New  J e r s e y had  jumped overboard to j o i n a canoe f l o t i l l a p r o t e s t i n g  the s a i l i n g of t h e i r ammunition s h i p , the N i t r o . filled  out  Anti-war comics  the e d i t i o n . E l e c t i o n campaign m a t e r i a l i n the August i s s u e took up  more space than r e p o r t s from the s h i p ; s i x pages r e l a t e d to McGovern campaign and news, one  a n a l y s i s of the war,  as a g a i n s t one  of ship  on a v a i l a b i l i t y of l e g a l c o u n s e l i n g m a t e r i a l s , and  In the s h i p news C a p t a i n thought to be  Townsend had  r e p l a c e d Oberg.  a poem.  Townsend  l e s s a v a i l a b l e to the crew than the former CO.  punishments at Mast were  the  was  His  criticized:  C a p t a i n Townsend has shown h i m s e l f to be one of the o r i g i n a l "law 'n order k i d s " , b o t h at mast and on the IMC. He has imposed such arcane and r i d i c u l o u s punishments as 3 days' bread and water f o r such t i n y and meaningless " c r i m e s " as unauthori z e d absence. In two c o n s e c u t i v e masts, C a p t a i n Townsend has put s e v e r a l b l a c k men i n t o the b r i g f o r f i g h t i n g w i t h w h i t e men, w h i l e d i s m i s s i n g "with a warning" a w h i t e man who spoke i n a demeaning manner to a b l a c k man on board, as w e l l as many w h i t e men.... ...He has r e l a x e d the h a i r c u t r e g u l a t i o n s on the s h i p (much t o the c h a g r i n of K i t t y Hawk's number one j i n g o , M o r r i s P e e l l e ) and s a i d p e o p l e can have t h e i r h a i r as they want, w i t h i n r e a son, as l o n g as i t ' s n e a t l y combed and not " f u z z y " . A f t e r t h i s i n c i d e n t of b l a t a n t r a c i s m , he spent s e v e r a l hours t a l k i n g to b l a c k s a i l o r s on the f o r e c a s t l e , f i n a l l y a d o p t i n g a t l e a s t one of t h e i r s u g g e s t i o n s , the f o r m a t i o n of a Human Resources C o u n c i l to r e p l a c e the o l d token M i n o r i t y A f f a i r s Committee. ( K i t t y L i t t e r Aug. 1972) There a l s o was It  a b r i e f but eloquent  poem from a K i t t y Hawk crewmember.  read: A ghost s h i p D r i f t i n g i n the t i m e l e s s v o i d . . . . Cast o f f by phobias and f e a r s Of the s e l f , Not of o t h e r s ,  136 A grave disaster has taken place, We've cut our throat i t seems. Painting the sun black Is hardly a game. This was the l a s t issue of K i t t y L i t t e r .  Some of the  harbor project people became more involved i n McGovern's presidential campaign.  The correspondents on the ship may have been transferred.  The Captain l a t e r reported having transferred "dissidents". Up Against  September  The Bulkhead, a Bay Area GI protest paper (not to be con-  fused with Up_ From The Bottom from San Diego), printed a l e t t e r from a K i t t y Hawk crewman o f f e r i n g to do some a r t i c l e s against the war. (Up Against The Bulkhead Sept. 1972) There was also a l e t t e r printed in Camp News that had o r i g i n a l l y been sent to the Harbor Project. (Camp News i s a national GI protest paper)  I t told of extended time  "on the l i n e " because of a f i r e on another c a r r i e r which was rumored as sabotage.  F i n a l l y the K i t t y Hawk i t s e l f had to come i n to the  P h i l l i p i n e s for repair: We had f i v e main machinery room f i r e s i n seven days, o i l f i r e s that could have been very bad. Right now we have only one of four engines and three of eight e l e c t r i c a l generators— a l l of the rest of them are fucked up i n one way or another. Number 4 drive shaft coming out of #4 Main l o s t some bearings and developed a fore and a f t movement of about 2' above the waterline. We're not going anywhere for awhile. The Oriskany i s i n Yokuska, Japan, for extensive s t r u c t u r a l repair (Camp News Sept. 15, 1972) In the same issue of Camp News two o f f i c e r s from the K i t t y Hawk, one a p i l o t and one a bombadier were reported as having turned i n t h e i r wings as protest against the war. a GI paper from the P h i l l i p i n e s ,  Camp News had picked this up from Seasick.  137 Chapter Nine  USS  RANGER IS DISABLED BY SABOTAGE  And an Enlisted Man  Charged, Tried and  July 1972  to May  Acquitted  1973  In the summer of 1972 many instances of sabotage were reported on navy a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s . USS  On the USS  F o r r e s t a l and  the  Ranger sabotage resulted i n delays i n s a i l i n g and i n one half  to three m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n repairs.  August seventh the navy an-  nounced that they had arrested a fireman for allegedly throwing nuts and bolts into the huge reduction gears on the main shaft to the Ranger's b o i l e r the month before.  One  gear was  at a cost of hundreds of thousands of d o l l a r s .  man  was  ing he was  guilty.  (UFTB Aug.  Barb reported that the arrested  Patrick Chenoweth and that he was  at Treasure Island Naval Base.  replaced  The ship would be  delayed i n s a i l i n g to Vietnam by several months. September eighth the Berkeley  to be  Sept. 19 fire-  being held incommunicado  The a r t i c l e cheered Chenoweth assum-  The writer was  pleased with the sabotage because  of i t s expense to the navy and the delay i n the ships scheduled departure for Vietnam. Chenoweth was War was  They also noted that one of the charges against  an unusual one "sabotage i n time of war'.  (The Vietnam  never o f f i c i a l l y de'clared so wartime law did not come into  effect.) A New  York Times a r t i c l e November s i x t h noted that the sabo  138 had caused a three and one-half months delay i n the ships s a i l i n g and that a fireman had been charged with "sabotage i n time of war" as well as "destruction of government property". sabotage t r i a l i n the Vietnam war.  This was the f i r s t  The same a r t i c l e said that E r i c  Seitz, Chenoweth's attorney, said that f i f t e e n other sabotage acts had been found by the naval investigation service and that more acts had continued after Chenoweth's arrest.  The a r t i c l e described the  sabotage as the i n s e r t i o n of a paint scraper and two metal studs into one of the gears.  Other sabotage was also detailed, " d i s -  mantling of valves, plugging of f i r e hoses, destruction of o i l pressure gauges...fouling fresh water supply, f i r e s , a bomb threat, slashed wires, and o i l drainage". An SOS movement teas reported on the ship, SOS stickers were showing up throughout ment.  the ship and sometimes on damaged equip-  The a r t i c l e s also reviewed  the r a c i a l incidents on the K i t t y  Hawk and Hassayampa and f i r e s and explosions on other ships. (The Constellation s t r i k e had not been reported as i t was s t i l l i n progress at this:time.)• -The Chief of Naval Operations was reported as sending out "tough" new orders to commanders to improve conditions for  Blacks.  The Secretary of the Navy had asked a s t a f f meeting of  admirals for their advice on how to stop the sabotage.  October  t h i r t y - f i r s t a r e t i r i n g admiral had given a speech warning about the dangerous trends i n the Navy, especially sabotage.  The sabotage was  thought to be linked to the SOS movement and to drug usage but not to r a c i a l tension.  (New York Times, Nov. 6, 1972)  139  The Berkeley Barb of November tenth through sixteenth carried a long a r t i c l e i n which i t n o w emphasized the lack of evidence against Chenoweth. three witnesses who responsible.  The case consisted of the words of  had supposedly  heard Chenoweth say he  was  The continuing sabotage aboard the Ranger was  to strengthen Chenoweth's case.  His attorney E r i c Seitz,  cited was  described as being a s p e c i a l i s t i n m i l i t a r y law with the National Lawyers Guild.  He planned  to challenge the l e g a l i t y of the V i e t -  nam war on the basis of the Navy charge of "sabotage i n time of  war".  'Our theory,' Seitz told Barb, ' i s that there's so much of this going on now, and i t s a l l so serious, they're so deeply worried and frustrated, that they're going to fasten on anybody they can find. The fact that they've tacked on these charges (those making the alleged offenses "wartime" offenses) i s simply unbelievable, a pure case of overreaction; and the reason their over-reacting i s they're so frightened of what's happening. Ordinarily, nobody i n his right mind would take a case with this kind of evidence to t r i a l . ' (Berkeley Barb Nov. 10-16, 1972) The next week the Barb reported that the Navy might move the t r i a l to the P h i l l i p i n e s to be nearer the ship. (The Ranger had s a i l e d November twenty-second)  The Barb thought this was  to allow harassment of the  defense s t a f f by the P h i l l i p i n e government and also remove the t r i a l from the view of the American public.  (Berkeley Barb Nov.  C i v i l i a n courts became involved i n the t r i a l as Seitz was  17-23,  1972)  able to get  a hearing i n Federal Court on the question of p r e - t r i a l confinement. Judge Peckham, the Federal D i s t r i c t Court Judge, gave the Navy ten days to hold a hearing on relaxation of custody or said that he would hold i t himself. T h e  judge also ordered the Navy to stop censoring  140  Chenoweth's m a i l and t o p r o v i d e f o r c o n f i d e n t i a l c o n f e r e n c e s f o r Seitz with h i s c l i e n t .  ( B e r k e l e y Barb Nov.  24-30,  1972)  P r e t r i a l h e a r i n g s i n m i l i t a r y c o u r t c o n t i n u e d as argued v a r i o u s motions  i n c l u d i n g one  Seitz  to have the j u r y chosen a t  random as c i v i l i a n j u r i e s a r e , r a t h e r than handpicked by the base commander.  T h i s was  denied,  p r e - t r i a l confinement  The Navy d i d not h o l d h e a r i n g s on  and so Judge Peckham h e l d h i s own h e a r i n g .  He r u l e d a g a i n s t p r e - t r i a l r e l e a s e because the o f f e n s e " . to  ( B e r k e l e y Barb Dec.  1-7,  take t h i s to the US Court of Appeals. In  e a r l y January 1973  of the " s e r i o u s n e s s of  1972)  The defense  planned  ( B e r k e l e y Barb Dec.  9-14,  1972)  the Navy judge, C a p t a i n Keyes, o r d e r e d  the t r i a l moved to the Subic Bay Naval Base i n the P h i l l i p i n e s where t h r e e of the p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s were aboard B e r k e l e y Barb staff.  e x p l a i n e d i n d e t a i l how  the Ranger.  The  t h i s t h r e a t e n e d the defense  The P h i l l i p i n e s government had p r e v i o u s l y r a i d e d and  shut down the N a t i o n a l Lawyers G u i l d Center i n S u b i c Bay.  then  Legal  workers had been charged w i t h s u b v e r s i o n a g a i n s t the Marcos Government and one of the G u i l d a t t o r n e y s was  still  in j a i l  there.  been a r r e s t e d a f t e r b e i n g turned over to the P h i l l i p i n e by the U.S. Dellums  Navy.  ( B e r k e l e y Barb Jan. 12-18, 1973)  He  had  government  Congressman  immediately p r o t e s t e d to A d m i r a l Zumwalt on the b a s i s of  d e n i a l of the defendents r i g h t to c o u n s e l .  He a l s o noted t h a t  t r i a l would remove the Navy's a c t i o n s from the p u b l i c . another s e r i e s .of a p p e a l s .  the  S e i t z began  He s t a r t e d w i t h the M i l i t a r y Court of  Appeal and then went to the U.S.  C i r c u i t Court of Appeals.  The  141  m i l i t a r y judge, Keyes, had a l s o pronounced the  Vietnam war was war.  on the q u e s t i o n o f whether  He s a i d t h a t i t was.  T h i s confirmed the  p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e sentence f o r sabotage b e i n g as much as t h i r t y years.  T h i s a l s o l i m i t e d the defense p l a n s .  12-18, 1973) the  trial  ( B e r k e l e y Barb J a n .  February f i f t e e n t h Up From The Bottom i n t e r p r e t e d  action:  Pat i s b e i n g used as a scapegoat f o r a l l o f the sabotage t h a t i s happening on a l l U.S. s h i p s a c r o s s the w o r l d . The Navy i s choosing t o send one man to j a i l r a t h e r than take c a r e o f the sources o f the anger and f r u s t r a t i o n f e l t by everyone i n the Navy and a l l s e r v i c e s , r a c i a l o p p r e s s i o n , horrendous l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s , 12 hour working days, l a c k o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , m i l i t a r y involvement i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s and a multitude of others. Pat  needs our s u p p o r t . In  March the Los Angeles  (UFTB Feb. 15, 1973) F r e e P r e s s devoted f o u r  pages to a d e t a i l e d h i s t o r y o f the sabotage, the t r i a l , tance movement i n the Navy and Zumwalt's reforms.  full  the r e s i s -  The a r t i c l e  commented on the t a c t i c s o f the " a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t s " d e f e n d i n g Chenoweth: W i t h i n t h i s framework, i t would n o t be i n Chenoweth's b e s t i n t e r e s t s to say t h a t he d i d , i n f a c t , d i s a b l e the Ranger, but t h a t h i s a c t c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d i n terms o f Vietnamese l i v e s saved, o r i n the c o n t e x t o f the fundamental r i g h t s and wrongs o f the Indochina war. T h e r e f o r e the defense h o l d s t h a t Pat Chenoweth i s b e i n g framed. Which may be t r u e . From anyone's v i e w p o i n t , the d i s a b l i n g o f the Ranger was an a c t o f s i g n i f i c a n c e . . . I n t h r e e months, p l a n e s f l y i n g from the boat can d e l i v e r over 30 m i l l i o n rounds o f exp l o s i v e s t o neighborhoods where peasants and g u e r r i l l a fighters live. The U n i t e d S t a t e s owns o n l y 14 such a t t a c k c a r r i e r s . Because o f n e c e s s a r y r e p a i r s and commitments elsewhere, a maximum o f about e i g h t have been a v a i l a b l e t o p u l v e r i z e Vietnam a t any g i v e n moment. A d i f f e r e n c e o f t h r e e c a r r i e r months i s t h e r e f o r e a matter  142  of material interest to a l l parties. The a r t i c l e went on with a f r i e n d l y biography of Chenoweth noting among other comments that: . . . l i k e any enlisted Navy man, he has spent a l o t of time holding h i s round white s a i l o r hat i n h i s hand while indoors, which gives him a d e f e r e n t i a l appearance. But i f h i s uniform makes him look humble and m i l i t a r y , the impression i s offset by his haircut. He s l i c k s his hair straight back from his forehead i n the manner of b i g c i t y stone grease, son of rebel without a cause. It i s c l e a r l y not the style of a l i f e r , or an Ivy Leaguer either. The a r t i c l e reported that over one thousand people had attended a Free Chenoweth r a l l y led by Jane Fonda on January twenty-second sponsored by the Free Chenoweth committee.  (LAFreep March 9,  1973)  More d e t a i l s of the sabotage were given than I had found in any other source.  According to this report while the ship was  s t i l l i n Alameda an o f f i c e r had discovered a machinery room hatch open and followed this up to find a paint scraper i n the o i l sludge beneath the reduction gears. the ship engines were started.  This was taken out and the next day A loud noise came from the gears.  One engine was then shut down and the ship continued i t s training mission on three engines.  Several weeks l a t e r when the gears were  f i n a l l y examined, i t was found that several bolts had irreparably damaged the large reduction gear. It was during this training cruise that a naval i n t e l l i gence agent, a s a i l o r , heard Chenoweth say to a buddy "that was yeah, I r e a l l y messed those gears up.  me,  Sorry I fucked you guys up".  This report plus a similar one from another buddy, Bailey, were the  143  e n t i r e b a s i s of the Navy's case. The  (LAFreep March 9,  a p p e a l s a g a i n s t moving the t r i a l  f a i l e d even though they had J u s t i c e Douglas.  to the  Phillipines  been c a r r i e d as h i g h as Supreme Court  However, a F e d e r a l Judge h e l d t h a t the Navy must  guarantee the s a f e t y of the a t t o r n e y  and h i s s t a f f and  r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o s t s of the The  1973)  t r i a l was  also  defense.  s e t f o r m i d - A p r i l i n the P h i l l i p i n e s when  the m i l i t a r y judge, C a p t a i n Keyes, suddenly became i l l . was  postponed to e a r l y May  (Camp News May  15,  1973)  and By  a new  t h i s time the Ranger was  involvement i n the Vietnam war  earlier.)  The  new  judge decided  The  trial  judge flown i n from H a w a i i .  l e a v e i t s WESPAC duty to r e t u r n to Alameda. military  be  had  preparing  to  (Formal American ended t h r e e months  to h o l d the t r i a l i n San  Francisco,  after a l l . The B a i l e y , was  t r i a l began June f o u r t h .  to t e s t i f y  to the c o u r t s and  The  f o l l o w i n g day  given  panel  amendment r i g h t s not  did t e s t i f y .  a l s o p r e s s u r i n g him.  1973)  to i n c r i m i n a t e  (UPI  but  on  himself.  from the judge, he  was  inconsistencies  S e i t z t o l d the m i l i t a r y coached the w i t n e s s June 6, 1973,  A f t e r t h r e e hours d e l i b e r a t i o n the  j u r y found Chenoweth i n n o c e n t !  witness,  to t e s t i f y  Under c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  t h a t the Navy i n t e l l i g e n c e agents had  Barb June 8-14,  prosecution  refused  pressure  i n dates of c o n v e r s a t i o n s .  t h a t the Navy was  first  admitted the sabotage,  s u r p r i s e , he  under c o n s i d e r a b l e  immunity and  were brought out  t h a t Chenoweth had  prosecutions  the b a s i s of h i s f i f t h  The  and  Berkeley military  N a t i o n a l news s e r v i c e s c a r r i e d the  144  s t o r y complete w i t h a r e c a p i t u l a t i o n of e v e n t s , a reminder t h a t Chenoweth had been i n j a i l  ten months and a quote of p a r t of  Chenoweth's statement to the p r e s s . At a time i n h i s t o r y when the US m i l i t a r y i s the major g e n o c i d a l f o r c e around the g l o b e , i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y g r a t i f y i n g not o n l y to be f r e e but to have beaten the Navy i n i t s attempt to frame me. (UPI June 13, 1973) Chenoweth was  g i v e n duty a t a l o c a l base, then immediately o r d e r e d  to t h r e e weeks l e a v e f o l l o w e d by an h o n o r a b l e d i s c h a r g e one y e a r early.  ( B e r k e l e y Barb June 15-21, 1973, June 22-28,  1973)  Camp News r e p o r t e d t h a t sabotage c o n t i n u e d on many s h i p s . Another s a i l o r had been charged w i t h a f i r e on the C o r a l Sea and was  i n the T r e a s u r e I s l a n d b r i g .  The paper commented:  ...the growing a t t a c k from w i t h i n i s an unexpected c o m p l i c a t i o n t h a t w i l l have to be f a c e d . In the words o f a s a i l o r from the CORAL SEA 'sabotage w i l l become as American as a p p l e p i e ' . (Camp News J u l y 15, 1973, F-21)  145  Chapter Ten  OVER 200 FIGHT ABOARD THE USS KITTY HAWK OCTOBER 1972  On off  October t w e l f t h 1972 w h i l e the K i t t y Hawk was i n a c t i o n  Vietnam over two hundred B l a c k and w h i t e s a i l o r s  fought throughout the s h i p f o r f i v e hours. the s t o r y i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . been i n j u r e d and three ated  Oct. by  t h e s t o r y began to be f i l l e d  F i r s t reports c a l l e d i t a r a c i a l ( S e a t t l e P.I.  out.  out or r a t h e r t h e s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t  F o r events p r e c e d i n g  t h e u p r i s i n g and  the f i g h t i n g t h e r e a r e p i e c e m e a l accounts.  a number o f p l a c e s  throughout the s h i p .  few were c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  ground GI press ganization  There were a c t i o n s  Interpretations differed  L a t e r r e p o r t s came out i n the under-  and from t h e B l a c k Servicemen's Caucus, a new o r -  i n San Diego, and a l s o from the c o n g r e s s i o n a l By  for  t h a t they had to be evacu-  14, 1972; S e a t t l e Times, Dec. 27, 1972) As s e v e r a l weeks went  during  but  o f these so b a d l y  o r " f i g h t " l a t e r i t was r e f e r r e d to as a r i o t .  s t o r i e s were f i l l e d  at  Wire s e r v i c e s c a r r i e d  The r e p o r t s s a i d t h a t f o r t y - s i x had  from the s h i p by h e l i c o p t e r .  "tiff"  and marines  investigation.  the b e g i n n i n g o f October the K i t t y Hawk had been away  seven and one-half  months.  l i n e " w i t h twelve t o e i g h t e e n  Most o f t h a t time was spent "on the hours work d a i l y f or the crew.  The  s h i p had been expected t o r e t u r n home soon b u t i n s t e a d o r d e r s  were  to r e t u r n f o r more duty a t "Yankee S t a t i o n " .  were  R a c i a l tensions  146  high.  The s h i p was i n Subic Bay f o r a weeks r e s t and r e c r e a t i o n  when there was some d i s t u r b a n c e  ashore.  UFTB r e p o r t e d  that a Black  s a i l o r had been stabbed i n the EM c l u b and the marine r i o t called. The  They came and used t e a r gas and the f i g h t  Door was t o l d  squad  intensified.  t h a t a w h i t e s a i l o r p a i d F i l i p i n o n a t i o n a l s to  attack Blacks  i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y and t h a t f i v e B l a c k s were s l a s h e d  and  (UFTB Dec. 15, 1972; The Door Jan.  stabbed.  Congressional men's c l u b .  10-24, 1972)  The  r e p o r t says t h a t t h e r e was a f i g h t a t the e n l i s t e d They were not sure what happened but were w i l l i n g to  jump to c o n c l u s i o n s : On the t e n t h o f October, a f i g h t o c c u r r e d a t the e n l i s t e d men's c l u b a t Subic Bay. While i t cannot be u n e q u i v o c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t K i t t y Hawk p e r s o n n e l p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the f i g h t , c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence tends to support the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t some o f the s h i p ' s b l a c k s a i l o r s were i n v o l v e d s i n c e 15 young b l a c k s r e t u r n e d t o the s h i p on the r u n and i n a v e r y d i s h e v e l e d c o n d i t i o n a t about the time the f i g h t at the c l u b was brought under c o n t r o l . The f o l l o w i n g morning the s h i p r e t u r n e d t o combat, cond u c t i n g a i r o p e r a t i o n s from 1 t o 6 pm... At approximately 7 pm, on October 12th, 1972, the s h i p ' s i n v e s t i g a t o r c a l l e d a b l a c k s a i l o r t o h i s o f f i c e f o r q u e s t i o n i n g about h i s a c t i v i t i e s i n Subic Bay. He was accompanied by n i n e o t h e r b l a c k men. They were b e l l i g e r e n t , l o u d , and used abusive language. Those accompanying him were n o t a l l o w e d to s i t on the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The s a i l o r was a p p r i s e d of h i s r i g h t s , r e f u s e d to make a statement and was allowed t o l e a v e . . . (HASC Jan. 2, 1973, p.17674) In r e f e r r i n g to t h i s q u e s t i o n i n g on the s h i p , B l a c k s  report that i t  was i n i t i a t e d by them t o get a c t i o n a g a i n s t the p e r s o n who had h i r e d the a t t a c k e r s .  They s a i d t h a t o n l y B l a c k s a i l o r s were c a l l e d i n f o r  q u e s t i o n i n g and t h a t charges were n o t f i l e d a g a i n s t the w h i t e they had accused u n t i l a month l a t e r and l a t e r were d i s m i s s e d .  sailor That  ,  evening  147  about t w e n t y - f i v e B l a c k s gathered  the c a p t a i n .  He  l o n g as i t was  t o l d them they c o u l d meet and  a peaceful gathering.  About Face Dec.  thought  with  t a l k together  as  (The Door Jan. 10-24,  1973;  1972)  B l a c k s had incident.  to t a l k about t h i s  a number of complaints  before this  shore  They c o n s i d e r e d job assignments d i s c r i m i n a t o r y and  they r e c e i v e d s t i f f e r p e n a l t i e s a t Mast than  whites.  B l a c k s were not allowed to g i v e the power s a l u t e or t h e i r handshake, the dap.  No more than t h r e e B l a c k s were allowed  t o g e t h e r i n the mess h a l l or congregate was  done i n such a way  in  the same a r e a - and  o t h e r b e r t h i n g spaces friends.  t h a t no more than two i t was  Billeting  B l a c k s were bunked  a g a i n s t the s t a n d i n g r u l e s to e n t e r  so t h a t B l a c k s were not a b l e to v i s i t  (Door Jan. 10-24, 1973)  exists  their  The House Armed S e r v i c e s  Committee r e p o r t does not mention any denies t h a t any  anywhere e l s e .  to s i t  i n s t a n c e of r a c i s m and f u r t h e r  (HASC, p.17685).  As B l a c k s gathered  t h a t evening  were c a l l e d out by a mess cook who  on the mess deck, marines  s a i d he had been a t t a c k e d .  When  they a r r i v e d , one marine c o r p o r a l e i t h e r drew or attempted to draw his  gun.  self.  The XO  appeared, he was  Commander Cloud, a B l a c k man  He o r d e r e d the marines to withdraw.  c h i e f s t a y e d w i t h the s a i l o r s  (pp.17674-5).  He  and a w h i t e master  (Cloud had been  sometime a f t e r June f i f t h when Townsend had been appointed at  t h a t time the o l d XO,  him-  appointed  Captain,  P e e l l e , had been on duty.)  Cloud spoke to the s a i l o r s who  were v e r y angry.  Behind  him,  148 the  CO, Captain Townsend, had entered the space but Cloud did not  know t h i s .  After l i s t e n i n g and noting the angry f e e l i n g of the  Blacks, Captain Townsend l e f t without speaking to his executive o f f i c e r who had not seen him.  The captain then alerted the marines  and ordered them to put more guards on the hanger deck and to break up any group of three or more s a i l o r s on the deck.  The XO  did not know of this order and continued to talk with the men on the  messdeck for an hour.  By then he f e l t the incident was over.  The meeting broke up and most l e f t v i a the hanger decks.  They  were instantly confronted by an advancing l i n e of twenty-six marine guards (p.17675). The marines moved toward them to contain them i n the a f t e r end of the deck.  As the marines began to make arrests some of the  Blacks picked up available hardware and fought back.  The Captain  appeared on the scene and attempted to calm the s i t u a t i o n .  The XO  also arrived but then l e f t as he was informed of an injury below. Evidently the marine attack had been seen by other Black s a i l o r s from the meeting who now ran through the ship waking Blacks and y e l l i n g "they're k i l l i n g our brothers".  The Congressional report,  after reporting the command mix-up quoted Blacks as also y e l l i n g " k i l l the white trash, k i l l , k i l l " and " k i l l the son of a b i t c h " . Whites were not quoted.  From this time on for four or f i v e hours  there were a number of fights at various places on the ship (pp. 17675-6).  The ship's dispensary was soon f i l l e d with the wounded  and more confrontations occurred there as i t appeared that whites  149  were b e i n g  treated f i r s t .  GI r e p o r t s and  the c o n g r e s s i o n a l study  are c o n t r a d i c t o r y on what happened i n the d i s p e n s a r y . v a r y from o n l y w h i t e s treated f i r s t . Feb.  15,  g e t t i n g c a r e to B l a c k s demanding they  (HASC p.17676; B e r k e l e y Barb Jan. 4, 1973;  c o n f u s i o n i n command c o n t i n u e d as the XO was  t h a t the CO had been i n j u r e d or k i l l e d . announcement over  The  XO  a l i v e and w e l l , he was  the marines.  The  normal d u t i e s .  then made an  the F o ' c ' s l e .  The  c a p t a i n however,  countered  the XO's  o r d e r s and went to  t r o u b l e aboard.  XO  Cloud met  B l a c k s now  them and  t a l k e d w i t h them f o r s e v e r a l ending  (HASC p.17676). No  a r r e s t s were made a t f i r s t  forty-six injured.  although  S e n i o r p e t t y o f f i c e r s and  e x t r a n i g h t p a t r o l i n the b e r t h i n g a r e a s .  on i t s bombing m i s s i o n . Subi c Bay  the  began g a t h e r i n g  hours a f t e r which they r e t u r n e d to t h e i r compartments thus  did  the  them, o r d e r i n g everyone to r e t u r n  These c o n t r a d i c t o r y o r d e r s a l e r t e d more of  crew t h a t t h e r e was  the event  told  were p a r t of the o r i g i n a l group a t t a c k e d  c a p t a i n heard  c l o s e s t microphone and  at  UFTB  on the hanger deck t a l k i n g to a s m a l l  number of B l a c k s a i l o r s who  to  be  the s h i p ' s PA System o r d e r i n g the B l a c k s to the  A f t e r Messdeck and marines to the F o ' c ' s l e .  by  stories  1973) The  was  The  Two  i n the P h i l l i p i n e s ,  flown back to the U.S. t r i e d on the s h i p .  there were at  commissioned The  ship  least  officers  continued  weeks l a t e r when the s h i p p u l l e d  into  twenty-one B l a c k s were a r r e s t e d and  for t r i a l .  F i v e o t h e r B l a c k s were to be  L a t e r one w h i t e man  was  charged.  (HASC pp.17675-6,  150  UFTB Feb. 15, 1973) Congressman Dellums  t o g e t h e r w i t h t h r e e o t h e r s e n a t o r s and  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and the Mayor o f B e r k e l e y asked the Navy to i n v e s t i g a t e . (Berkeley Barb Dec. 1-7, 1972) did  The House Armed S e r v i c e s  Sub-committee  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n but Dellums was n o t a p p o i n t e d t o the sub-committee  even though he was the o n l y B l a c k member of the Armed S e r v i c e s The Navy t r i a l s  took over f i v e months.  supported by the San Diego B l a c k Servicemen's  Committee.  The defense was  Caucus,  the American  C i v i l L i b e r t i e s Union and the N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n f o r t h e Advancement o f C o l o r e d People. to  E a r l y i n the t r i a l s  show how a Navy w i t n e s s had l i e d  irregularities,  the defense was a b l e  and to c h a l l e n g e a number o f o t h e r  f o r i n s t a n c e the w h i t e e n l i s t e d p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s  had been a s s i g n e d t o duty s t a t i o n i n the l e g a l o f f i c e where the case was b e i n g p r e p a r e d .  The ACLU charged t h a t due p r o c e s s had been denied.  S e v e r a l of the h a r s h e r sentences were then withdrawn, b u t the t r i a l s continued.  The o n l y w h i t e defendant was a c q u i t t e d as were t h r e e B l a c k s .  Charges were dropped  f o r f i v e others.  a s s a u l t and f o u r o f r i o t i n g . f i v e months i n the b r i g . c o u l d n o t be f r e e d because  By t h i s time many had a l r e a d y s e r v e d  S e v e r a l o f those who had had charges  the f i r s t  i n the b r i g .  A l t h o u g h by the dropping  charges i t was admitted t h a t they s h o u l d n ' t have been  h e l d a t a l l , these secondary charges were honored The  dropped  they had been c i t e d w i t h new charges o f  contempt from a l l e g e d misconduct of  F o u r t e e n were found g u i l t y o f  and sentences g i v e n .  t r i a l s were a l l w e l l p u b l i c i z e d i n l o c a l and n a t i o n a l  newspapers and the GI and underground  p r e s s January through May 1973.  151  (Door Jan.  10-24, 1973; UFTB Feb.  15, 1973; LAFreep Mar. 9-13, 1973;  Camp News Mar. 13, 1973; About Face A p r i l 1973; UFTB A p r i l 1973) The  q u e s t i o n o f charges as w e l l as p r o s e c u t i o n o f the  case was e v i d e n t l y v e r y p o l i t i c a l ,  Camp News quoted New York Times  r e p o r t o f t h e view o f a Navy c a p t a i n : You c a l l i t a r i o t , you say t h a t the charges were too h a r s h . W e l l , you know what the people out here a r e s a y i n g , t h e r e t i r e d Navy men you meet on the g o l f course? They're n o t t a l k - i n g r i o t , they c a l l i t mutiny. They say they s h o u l d have been charged w i t h mutiny." Camp News commented t h a t even r i o t court.  charges had n o t h e l d up i n  (Camp News May 15, 1973)  The House Armed S e r v i c e s Sub-committee i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e K i t t y Hawk i n c i d e n t and the l a t e r C o n s t e l l a t i o n s t r i k e . testimony  They  gathered  from o f f i c e r s and a few e n l i s t e d men, but none o f t h e B l a c k s  who had been i n v o l v e d i n t h e f i g h t s .  The sub-committee r e p o r t e d  that  t h e r e was no r a c i s m aboard t h e K i t t y Hawk and t h a t t h e problem r e s u l t e d from r e c r u i t m e n t g i v e n adequate t r a i n i n g . had,  according  o f low i n t e l l i g e n c e B l a c k s who had not been Zumwalt's program o f " p e r m i s s i v e n e s s "  to the r e p o r t , robbed midmanagement o f t h e i r a u t h o r i t y .  They d i d admit t h a t some B l a c k s thought t h e Navy was d i s c r i m i n a t o r y but  they added t h a t t h i s was m i s p e r c e p t i o n .  p e r c e p t i o n o f r a c i s m was c o n s i d e r e d  I n any case, even  irrelevent since:  The subcommittee has been unable to determine any p r e c i p i t a t i n g cause f o r the rampage aboard the USS K i t t y Hawk. Not o n l y was t h e r e n o t one case wherein r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c o u l d be p i n p o i n t e d , b u t t h e r e i s no evidence which i n d i c a t e d t h a t the b l a c k s who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h a t i n c i d e n t p e r c e i v e d r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , e i t h e r i n g e n e r a l or i n any s p e c i f i c , o f such a nature as t o j u s t i f y b e l i e f t h a t v i o l e n t r e a c t i o n was r e quired. (HASC 17668)  152 The  Congressional  wash by  the underground and  press.  (The  r e p o r t was GI press  and  d e t a i l e d i n the c o n g r e s s i o n a l Neither  possibility The  the r e p o r t nor  captain's  considered  the  regular  i n more d e t a i l  s t o r y of the mixup of command a l s o been noted i n the  the GI a r t i c l e s p i c k e d  t h a t the c a p t a i n d i d not  committee e v i d e n t l y d i d not  important.  The  r e p o r t had  as an i n c r e d i b l e w h i t e -  to some extent  r e c e p t i o n of the r e p o r t w i l l be  i n the r e p o r t of the Connie S t r i k e . )  reports.  greeted  up  the  t r u s t h i s Black executive  even c o n s i d e r  T h i s i s p u z z l i n g because i n the HASC v e r s i o n . i t i s the i n c o n s i s t e n t commands t h a t p r e c i p i t a t e d the f i g h t i n g .  K i t t y Hawk l e f t a g a i n The  f o r Vietnam i n l a t e November 1973  Indochina war  had  In December when the s h i p was i n the engine room. Up  From The  Bottom p r i n t e d a l e t t e r from  .a  the s h i p .  The  reported  K i t t y Hawk s a i l o r  about  been r e c e i v e d p r i o r  In an accompanying a r t i c l e UFTB blamed the a c c i d e n t  of c o n d i t i o n s  thoughout the f l e e t .  September.when the s h i p was  one  new  thirty-eight injured.  l e t t e r had  the unsafe c o n d i t i o n s of the s h i p and  noted t h a t t h i s was  inspected  or non-rated firemen and  s a i l o r was  o n l y seventeen.  v e r y much t r a i n i n g . posthumously and  The  claimed  on  typical  They charged t h a t even i n i n Hawaii i t had  (UFTB, December 15-January 15,  apprentices  under a  i n the P h i l l i p i n e s f i r e was and  to the f i r e .  S i x men  the  been o f f i c i a l l y over s i n c e January.  were k i l l e d  unsafe c o n d i t i o n s on  unsafe.  officer.  the command mixup  A f t e r r e t u r n i n g home and undergoing drydock r e p a i r s  captain.  GI  1974)  The  been found  s i x men  a l l under twenty-one.  k i l l e d were At l e a s t  None of them c o u l d have r e c e i v e d  Navy awarded the men t h a t they had  bravery c i t a t i o n s  w i l l i n g l y stayed  in  the  153 compartment pointed  to f i g h t  the f i r e .  (Navy Times, A p r i l  out t h a t the r e g u l a r f i r e f i g h t i n g  h a t c h without w a i t i n g  to evacuate  firemen.  policy  10, 1974:23)  UFTB  i s always to l o c k the  They noted t h a t a l l o f the  b o d i e s were found by the hatch where they must have been w a i t i n g f o r it  tobe  opened - not f i g h t i n g  the f i r e .  (UFTB, May  15-June 15,  1974)  154  Chapter  Eleven  130 BLACK SAILORS STRIKE TWICE ON THE USS CONSTELLATION NOVEMBER 1972  The f i r s t news of the fight on the K i t t y Hawk had reached San Diego by October fourteenth 1972.  The crew of the Constellation  had many opportunities to hear about i t as they were i n and out of port on training cruises.  Associated Press and United Press Inter-  national carried news of the K i t t y Hawk throughout  the eighteenth.  Three weeks l a t e r , November f i f t h , the Connie made headlines when one hundred t h i r t y s a i l o r s were put o f f the ship because of an e a r l i e r s t r i k e at sea on November t h i r d and fourth (Seattle, Channel 7 TV Nov. 5, 1972, A.P. Nov. 5, 1972)  Information about this and  subsequent events came out over the the next three months from many sources.  Explanations varied but there was considerable agreement  about the sequence of events. The Connie started sea t r i a l s  on October fourth.  By October  seventeenth Blacks were meeting informally to talk about their grievances.  The usual place was the after mess decks called the "sidewalk  cafe".  The executive o f f i c e r attended the meeting on the eighteenth.  Other meetings followed, sanctioned as o f f i c i a l human relations d i s cussions.  The executive o f f i c e r or other o f f i c e r s were i n attendance.  The Black s a i l o r s decided to document their perceptions of prejudice. They appointed representatives to examine records of non-judicial  155  punishment to check f o r r a c i a l The s h i p had days l a t e r on October  bias.  r e t u r n e d to p o r t and then l e f t thirtieth.  At sea on October  again several  thirty-first,  d i v i s i o n o f f i c e r s were asked by C a p t a i n Ward to f i n d two f i f t y v o l u n t e e r s f o r shore duty.  A c c o r d i n g to the c a p t a i n t h i s  to make room f o r the a i r p e r s o n n e l coming aboard. of the crew i t was ship.  T h i s was  e a s i n e s s was duty and  throughout  the s h i p .  courts.  C o n s i d e r a b l e un-  then r e c e i v e l e s s than a f u l l honorable d i s c h a r g e .  Bad  the  among B l a c k s t h a t they would be t a r g e t e d f o r shore  i s t r a t i v e d i s c h a r g e s can be g i v e n as Honorable, able.  was  A c c o r d i n g to some  to get r i d of d i s s i d e n t s and p r o t e s t o r s on  t a l k e d about  felt  hundred  Admin-  G e n e r a l or U n d e s i r -  Conduct and D i s h o n o r a b l e d i s c h a r g e s are o n l y g i v e n by  Any  d i s c h a r g e o t h e r than honorable has g r e a t disadvantages  t h a t f o l l o w the s a i l o r back i n t o c i v i l i a n l i f e .  It i s d i f f i c u l t ,  sometimes i m p o s s i b l e to get c i v i l i a n j o b s w i t h one of these d i s charges i n your background.  The u n d e s i r a b l e , bad' conduct and  h o n o r a b l e d i s c h a r g e s mean the l o s s o f most v e t e r a n s b e n e f i t s . an h o n o r a b l e d i s c h a r g e may was  disEven  have a code number which shows t h a t i t  f o r "convenience of the government".  An employer  who  knows what  these numbers mean and many do, might not h i r e someone i n t h i s category.  (Door Nov.  17-Dec. 1,  1972)  B l a c k s had a l r e a d y noted t h a t they were more l i k e l y lower s c o r e s on e n t r a n c e t e s t s and more u n s k i l l e d duty T h e i r s u p e r i o r s e n i o r p e t t y o f f i c e r s were more l i k e l y lower marks on t h e i r performance  evaluations.  to get  assignments. to g i v e them  A l l these i n t u r n l e d  156  to more c i t a t i o n s  of misconduct, more C a p t a i n ' s  more severe sentences  than w h i t e s .  Mast h e a r i n g s  T h i s r e c o r d of Masts and  with punish-  ments along w i t h performance comments from the s u p e r v i s o r s and  entrance  examinations c o u l d a l l be used to j u s t i f y a p u n i t i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e discharge.  There were t h r e e hundred f i f t y B l a c k crewmen on the Connie  and v e r y few B l a c k p e t t y o f f i c e r s . number of people  aboard was  There were no B l a c k o f f i c e r s .  about f o r t y - f i v e hundred.  These g r i e v a n c e s were f o r m a l i z e d at a November f i r s t On November second i t was  l e a r n e d t h a t s i x men,  asked to s i g n f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s c h a r g e s . the good s e r v i c e r e c o r d of s e v e r a l . were based on t h e i r o r i g i n a l GCT service records.  The  The  scores  B l a c k s were outraged.  a l l B l a c k , had  T h i s was  meeting. been  i n spite  of  administrative discharges (military  IQ t e s t s ) and  I f the men  had  scored  high  enough to get i n the Navy, the same s c o r e s h o u l d h a r d l y be used f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n to throw them out, p a r t i c u l a r l y without discharge.  (Door Nov.  17-Dec. 1, 1972)  e x p l a i n e d d i f f e r e n t l y by  identified  By  f i f t e e n s a i l o r s as a g i t a t o r s  (HASC p.17677)  the morning of November t h i r d people were a l r e a d y  ing  on the forward  met  w i t h them and was  lated  They r e -  asked t h a t t h e i r r e c o r d s be reviewed to see i f ^ a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i s c h a r g e s would be p o s s i b l e .  agreed  honorable  T h i s same i n c i d e n t was  the c o n g r e s s i o n a l sub-committee.  p o r t e d that the C a p t a i n had and had  an  mess deck to t a l k about t h i s . asked to announce over  this.  executive  officer  the PA system t h a t he  to stop g i v i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s c h a r g e s . a f l y e r around the s h i p that s a i d  The  gather-  I n s t e a d he  circu-  I t a l s o announced  an  had  157  open meeting of the human r e s o u r c e s c o u n c i l f o r 9P.M.  (HASC p.17678)  The morning meeting c o n t i n u e d .  grown l a r g e  enough t h a t i t was men  was  called a s i t - i n  were o r d e r e d out and  were ordered  regrouped  to the a r e a , but  unnecessary  f i f t y men  had  and  gathered  convened a t 9pm  by the e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r . on the main mess deck.  and  a t t h i s time and  Marines  Fifty  to two  hundred  to meet w i t h them.  The  r e g u l a r meeting  the human r e l a t i o n s c o u n s e l o r s remained u n t i l  1  (HASC p.17678) asked  to have the  t a l k to them and sent a human r e l a t i o n s c o u n s e l o r to see C a p t a i n Ward r e f u s e d . go to him.  them out.  The  He was By  The  Captain  him.  group then e l e c t e d t h r e e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  c a p t a i n t a l k e d to them b r i e f l y  then  ordered  l a t e r asked by o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a t h i r d  and  refused.  and  the group i n the mess had  the time of the l a s t r e f u s a l i t was  past  grown to over t h r e e hundred.  Armed they  surrounded  not  the a r e a .  The  s a i l o r s were asked  f o r m a l l y o r d e r e d , and one hundred f i f t y were passed  out among the remainder.  t i o n as they r e a l i z e d they had 17-Dec. 1,  1972,  UFTB Dec.  to l e a v e , but  left.  There was  taken over  Food and  time  midnight  marines appeared a g a i n , t o g e t h e r w i t h s e n i o r p e r s o n n e l and  Nov.  this  the s h i p ' s human r e l a t i o n s  As the meeting went on the men  to  The  the C h i e f Master a t Arms d e c i d e d  they were p u l l e d back.  c o u n c i l members continued  midnight.  By noon the group had  blankets  a f e e l i n g of e x u l t a -  the main mess deck.  (Door  1972)  At t h i s same time t h e r e was  c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n s u l t a t i o n between  the C a p t a i n and h i s s u p e r i o r s i n the navy c h a i n of command.  The  Pacific  158  F l e e t Commander, V i c e A d m i r a l Walker had by h e l i c o p t e r . deck.  The  At  The  an A l l Hands muster was  I t was  r e t u r n i n g to San  announced  Diego.  The  s h i p docked t h e r e at 9  and A.M.  c a p t a i n then d i d meet b r i e f l y w i t h the s t r i k i n g s a i l o r s and  grievances. Later  ashore as a beach detachment to d i s c u s s  They went ashore, t h e r e were no  the c a p t a i n r e p o r t e d  refused  the r e q u e s t s  One  hundred t h i r t y - t w o s a i l o r s l e f t  the s h i p .  he had  aboard.  not  as a c o n s c i e n t i o u s  He  had  objector.  papers and  (UFTB A p r i l 1973)  the San The  men  detachment and  He  felt  not  a l s o the c l a i m of  he  a GI  were taken to N o r t h I s l a n d N a v a l S t a t i o n as a beach  spent the next s e v e r a l days d i s c u s s i n g t h e i r s i t u a t i o n was  the Naval A i r Force P a c i f i c F l e e t ' s P u b l i c  Affairs Officer.  T h i s time was  service records.  The  men  Their ship l e f t  A j e t p l a n e was  that  Diego support group, the B l a c k Servicemen's Caucus.  w i t h a LCDR C o l l i n s who  fourth.  T h i s was  although  previously  the other w h i t e s were used to make i t look as i f i t was  r a c i a l incident.  The  clear.  ashore w i t h the o t h e r s  not been p a r t of the mess deck s t r i k e .  applied f o r a discharge  he  (HASC p. 17679)  shore group i n c l u d e d e i g h t w h i t e s a i l o r s whose r o l e was put  their  committee t h a t  of h i s s u p e r i o r s t o keep the men  of them l a t e r s a i d t h a t he was  told  r e p o r t s of r e s i s t a n c e .  to the c o n g r e s s i o n a l  had  and  flight  developed problems w i t h t h e i r d r i n k i n g water  them they would be put  One  ship  c a l l e d on the  sit-down s a i l o r s stayed where they were.  t h a t the ship had would be  4 A.M.  p r o b a b l y v i s i t e d the  had  reported  been put  the f i f t h and  over the s i d e .  The  as r e g u l a r duty i n the  EMs  ashore on Saturday, November returned  Captain  unexpectedly the  s a i d t h i s was  the  seventh.  reason  159  f o r the r e t u r n , the s a i l o r s were s k e p t i c a l . had  ordered the C a p t a i n back to t a l k to them.  s h i p l e f t and a g a i n r e t u r n e d . s i o n a l committee i t was  eighth.  The men  asked  promise.  The  to a sentence  That same day  T h i s time, a c c o r d i n g t o the  the  congres-  He d i d meet w i t h them on Wednesday, the  that previous administrative discharges  C a p t a i n ' s Mast sentences for their strike.  the Navy  by o r d e r of the f l e e t commander t h a t the  c a p t a i n t a l k to the men.  The  They thought  be reviewed  The s a i l o r s  and  and  t h a t they be g i v e n amnesty  claimed t h a t they d i d not get a f i r m  sub-committee r e p o r t says t h a t the C a p t a i n had  agreed  review but had put some c o n d i t i o n s on amnesty (p.17679).  C a p t a i n o r d e r e d them to r e p o r t the f o l l o w i n g morning a t 8  a f t e r overnight  liberty.  A t 7:30 assembled and  A.M.  the n i g h t b e f o r e .  they would not board.  The  The  men  Captain d i d  w i t h a d i r e c t o r d e r beyond the one he had  At 8 A.M.  They s a i d t h i s was  the U.S.Navy and abuses.  November n i n t h , one hundred twenty-nine  told officers  not c o n f r o n t the men  the f l a g !  A.M.  they h e l d t h e i r own  given  muster and s a l u t e d  to show t h a t they were s t i l l p a r t of  t h a t t h e i r p r o t e s t was  only against s p e c i f i c  racial  c o n g r e s s i o n a l study says they were " a l l e g e d l y a c t i n g  on  a d v i c e from an u n i d e n t i f i e d h i g h l e v e l source i n the Pentagon" (p.17679). The  sailors  Mast and  c o n t i n u e d to ask f o r amnesty, i n v e s t i g a t i o n of  i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s c h a r g e s on the s h i p . At f i r s t ,  s e v e r a l o f f i c e r s mingled w i t h the group and  to t a l k w i t h them, but the s a i l o r s asked The men  Captain's  s a t down and w a i t e d .  them to l e a v e and  During t h i s time C a p t a i n Ward  tried  they d i d . talked  160  w i t h c i v i l i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the s a i l o r s and a l s o had c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h CNO the  Navy, Warner.  Zumwalt.  telephone  He a l s o c o n s u l t e d the S e c r e t a r y of  F i n a l l y a t 2 p.m.  after  s i x hours of the dock s i t -  i n the s a i l o r s were t o l d they would not be o r d e r e d to the s h i p and C a p t a i n Ward would arrange f o r t h e i r had won  t h i s round  (Door Nov.  transfers.  17-Dec. 1, 1972).  The men  felt  They j o y f u l l y  that  they boarded  buses back to N o r t h I s l a n d Naval S t a t i o n where they were expected to c o n t i n u e the d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s . arriving  t h a t one t h i r d had been bussed to M i r i m a r Naval S t a t i o n  another t h i r d to I m p e r i a l Naval A i r S t a t i o n 23,  and  ( B e r k e l e y Barb Nov.  17-  1972). That was  of  However they found on  the men  the end of the s t r i k e .  One hundred  were t r i e d f o r b e i n g on U n a u t h o r i z e d Absence f o r s i x h o u r s .  C a p t a i n ' s Mast h e a r i n g s were h e l d f o r a few men fined  twenty-five dollars  Twenty-nine  and some may  were d i s c h a r g e d .  a l t h o u g h t h i s i s not c l e a r . the  twenty-three  punishments  a t a time.  have been reduced i n grade.  They p r o b a b l y r e c e i v e d g e n e r a l d i s c h a r g e s There was  agreement i n most r e p o r t s  were m i l d and t h a t r a c i s m d i d e x i s t  ( B e r k e l e y Barb, UPI Nov.  They were  10, 1972,  i n the Navy.  Los Angeles Times Nov.  23,  November t e n t h A d m i r a l Zumwalt made n a t i o n a l news by a group of a d m i r a l s and marine  that  1972) telling  g e n e r a l s t h a t the i n c i d e n t s on the  K i t t y Hawk, the Hassayampa and the C o n s t e l l a t i o n were a l l due to f a i l u r e of commanders to implement h i s r a c i a l reforms Nov.  12, 1972).  (New  York Times  Many a d m i r a l s and commanders and even m i d d l e manage-  ment p e o p l e r e a c t e d to t h i s w i t h anger and a c t i o n .  The s t o r y of  this  161  r e s i s t a n c e w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d The  f o r i t s e l f as the s i x t h case h i s t o r y .  c o n g r e s s i o n a l study was done as p a r t o f t h i s top l e v e l r e s i s t a n c e  to Zumwalt and h i s m a n a g e r i a l program.  The chairman o f the House  Armed S e r v i c e s Committee, Rep. Hebert, suspected was  t h a t the problem  n o t r a c i s m b u t a breakdown i n d i s c i p l i n e and s e t up a committee  to i n v e s t i g a t e .  According  p o l i c y of p e r m i s s i v e n e s s ( S e a t t l e P.I. The before  to him i t was Zumwalt's f a u l t f o r h i s  r a t h e r than genuine B l a c k  Nov. 14, 1972) sub-committee announced most o f t h e i r  they had f i n i s h e d the i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  permissiveness  grievances.  conclusions  Zumwalt's  reforms,  and e s p e c i a l l y the i n i t i a t i o n o f Human R e l a t i o n s  C o u n c i l s were c i t e d as t h e u n d e r l y i n g causes.  The Human R e l a t i o n s  C o u n c i l s were a t t a c k e d because they were thought t o " s h o r t the c h a i n o f command.  They f e l t a l l of these  i n f l u e n c e s had l e d t o  a l a c k of d i s c i p l i n e r e s u l t i n g i n the disturbances. of t h e K i t t y Hawk, they The published  c o u l d f i n d no evidence  a c t u a l testimony  As i n t h e case  of r a c i s m .  was n o t made p u b l i c , b u t t h e committee  a summary o f events w i t h recommendations f o r the f u t u r e .  T h i s i s t h e r e p o r t c i t e d as HASC.  They s a i d t h a t t h e s i t downs had  been l e d by a s m a l l group of a g i t a t o r s . trated  circuit"  the whole a f f a i r "  (p.17685).  " F i f t e e n a g i t a t o r s orches-  On another page they  twenty t o t w e n t y - f i v e men were r e s p o n s i b l e (p.17668).  said  Neither  statement was f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t e d by s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s or i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a g i t a t o r s .  They p o i n t e d out that young B l a c k  recruits  were e a s i l y l e d and t h a t the g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e o f B l a c k s was p a r t l y to blame (p. 17685).  162 Time Magazine was  critical  of the sub-committee h e a r i n g s and  c a l l e d them an a t t a c k on A d m i r a l Zumwalt and h i s program (Nov.  27,  The o f f i c e r s ' j o u r n a l Proceedings r e p o r t e d the f i n d i n g s i n A p r i l  1972).  1973  under a h e a d l i n e " H i l l U n i t C i t e s P e r m i s s i v e n e s s i n I n c i d e n t s on Navy Carriers".  The a r t i c l e c o n s i s t e d of a quote o f a Washington Post  a r t i c l e of January f i n d i n g s , quoted  twenty-fourth.  The Post a r t i c l e summarized  some of the statements about  n e s s , but d i d not e d i t o r i a l i z e beyond t h i s  the  the problem of p e r m i s s i v e -  selection.  Movement coverage of the C o n s t e l l a t i o n events had seldom the word mutiny  to d e s c r i b e the s t r i k e .  The B e r k e l e y Barb d i d use  the term once and then i n quotes, a l t h o u g h i t was the a r t i c l e i t s e l f  s i t - i n was  i n San Diego were c a u t i o u s .  used.  used  a headline.  In  The Door and Up_ From The Bottom  They r e f e r r e d to the a c t i o n s as " r e f u s e d  to board," "mass d e m o n s t r a t i o n , " " s e i z e d the main mess,"  "sit-in,"  and " s t o o d up a g a i n s t the Navy".  "sit-down,"  " r e f u s e d to board" but mutiny  The r e g u l a r p r e s s used  o n l y i n the c o n t e x t o f q u o t i n g the  C a p t a i n when he s t a t e d t h a t he had not g i v e n the men to  a v o i d the p o s s i b i l i t y of mutiny  (UPI, AP,  The subcommittee's r e p o r t f r e e l y used mutiny, i n mutiny  or a 'sit-down' s t r i k e . "  and " r e f u s e d to b o a r d . " mutiny  a direct  November 24,  order  1972).  f o r i n s t a n c e , "engaged  They a l s o used " r e f u s e d to move"  A c c o r d i n g to the UCMJ a person i s g u i l t y of  i f he or she: . . . w i t h i n t e n t to usurp o r o v e r r i d e l a w f u l m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t y , r e f u s e s , i n c o n c e r t w i t h any o t h e r person, to obey o r d e r s or o t h e r w i s e to do h i s duty or c r e a t e s any v i o l e n c e o r d i s t u r b a n c e . ( S e c t i o n 894, A r t i c l e 94)  The punishment f o r mutiny martial shall  direct."  i s "death o r such o t h e r punishment as a c o u r t -  163 As i t happened these events mutinous or o t h e r w i s e , l o s t newsworthiness and the s h i p l e f t A s i a on January in  the war.  fifth  1973.  f o r a seventh deployment t o Southeast  I t was to j o i n i n the h e a v i e s t bombing  About one hundred p r o t e s t o r s , c i v i l i a n s and EMs, h e l d  a v i g i l as t h e s h i p l e f t .  The one hundred and twenty-nine  sit-downers o r mutineers whichever February  their  strikers,  they were, were not on board  (UFTB,  15, 1973). Ten months l a t e r t h e Connie was a g a i n i n p o r t i n San Diego w i t h  a new c a p t a i n .  Up_ From The Bottom r e p o r t e d more EM harassment and a  p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s e f f o r t on t h e s h i p : How h y p o c r i t i c a l i t was t o see the p u b l i c i t y t h e C o n s t e l l a t i o n made out o f g i v i n g b l o o d f o r a l i t t l e boy whose b l o o d won't c l o t . They made sure i t got on TV and i n the papers, showing what i t s men were d o i n g f o r t h i s boy. A s h o r t time l a t e r , they were t r e a t i n g these men l i k e school children. Remember the o l d h a l l passes? On the C o n s t e l l a t i o n , t h e y ' r e making the men get w a l k i n g c h i t s to get o f f the s h i p d u r i n g working hours. To get o f f i n c i v i e s d u r i n g those hours you need t o show a l i b e r t y c h i t a t the brow. . . . They show what dimwits the CO and XO o f the s h i p a r e . Perhaps they enjoy pushing people i n t o h a v i n g sitdowns o r riots. Keep i t up, and i t w i l l happen, C a p t a i n Speer. (UFTB, December 1973)  164  Chapter  Twelve  ADMIRALS REACTION NOVEMBER  1972  I n s u r r e c t i o n and sabotage at sea have touched o f f i n s u r r e c t i o n s and sabotage of a d i f f e r e n t k i n d ashore. . . . Armed w i t h the ammunition p r o v i d e d by the r a c e r i o t s and sabotage, many a d m i r a l s have shown t h e i r own l a c k of d i s c i p l i n e by campaigning f o r Zumwalt's o u s t e r . Some have made l a t e n i g h t phone c a l l s to Pentagon correspondents. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s and p o l i t i c i a n s have been cornered a t c o c k t a i l p a r t i e s . (Time Magazine, November 27, 1972:20) A y e a r and a h a l f l a t e r when Zumwalt was his  full  term, a New  g e t t i n g ready  to r e t i r e  York Times s t a f f w r i t e r commented:  "Zumwalt i s  p r o b a b l y the o n l y c h i e f of n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s i n h i s t o r y who of 19,  r e t i r e d a d m i r a l s t r y to unseat him i n midterm". 1974)  had  a group  ( S e a t t l e P.I.,  May  The a d m i r a l s r e v o l t had a h i s t o r y b e g i n n i n g w i t h Zumwalt's  appointment as CNO  i n 1970.  Navy, John Chafee,  and o f f i c i a l l y a p p o i n t e d by P r e s i d e n t Nixon.  He was  recommended by S e c r e t a r y of the  t h r e e s e n i o r a d m i r a l s were passed over to p i c k Zumwalt, the CNO  after  ever to h o l d t h a t o f f i c e .  He was  Thirty-  youngest  forty-nine.  Zumwalt began h i s term w i t h p l a n s to i n c r e a s e r e e n l i s t m e n t r a t e s or  " r e t e n t i o n " as t h i s i s r e f e r r e d  to by navy o f f i c e r s .  He a c c o r d i n g l y  i s s u e d o r d e r s which he thought would make navy l i f e more a t t r a c t i v e or  at l e a s t l e s s h u m i l i a t i n g to EMs.  He  called  program" and p e r s o n a l i z e d h i s o r d e r s as Z-grams. c a r r i e d s t o r i e s of how  Zumwalt was  this his  "people  Military journals  t r y i n g to b u i l d a "mod"  navy.  One  165  c h i e f thought t h a t a u t h o r i t y was being was f o r c i n g them t o be " n i c e guys". of commanding men  tried  to p l e a s e  w r i t e r s noted t h a t the l i v i n g be  A n i c e guy was one who  had p e r m i t t e d  c o n d i t i o n s on s h i p s were g e t t i n g t o too easy.  for  and  regulations".  T h i s was aimed a t  These were r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t were  t h e i r use by c h i e f s t o h a r a s s EMs.  pects  (Z-grams 35, Sept.  beer i n s e n i o r e n l i s t e d b a r r a c k s . )  Z-gram 57 was i s s u e d November t e n t h 1970. "chicken  instead  them ( A l l Hands Sept. 1970). Other  too s o f t and l i f e i n shore b a r r a c k s  1970,  taken away from NCOs and thus  notorious  The most c o n t r o v e r s i a l a s -  o f Z-gram 57 were i t s l i b e r a l i z a t i o n o f h a i r and b e a r d s t y l e s  i t s r e l a x a t i o n of the r u l e s f o r occasions  c o u l d be worn. later,  where working dungarees  By January t w e n t y - f i r s t 1971, l e s s than two months  Z-gram 57 had been d r a s t i c a l l y amended."'  I t s provisions for  freedom o f h a i r s t y l e and wearing o f working uniforms had been r e v i s e d . T h i s was r e p o r t e d  i n A l l Hands w i t h a s h o r t  explanation:  As a r e s u l t o f f i e l d t r i p s , p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t s and correspondence w i t h Navymen, the C h i e f o f Naval O p e r a t i o n s had i s s u e d f u r t h e r c l a r i f y i n g changes t o o f f i c i a l Navy p o l i c y i n two areas - h a i r grooming and u n i f o r m s . (March 1971, p.32) Explicit in  reasons f o r the change were guessed a t i n e d i t o r i a l comment  the Armed F o r c e s  Journal:  Navy S e c r e t a r y John Chafee and C h i e f o f Naval O p e r a t i o n s (CNO) A d m i r a l Elmo Zumwalt a r e f e e l i n g the k i c k o f an a d m i r a l s ' backl a s h t h a t has been g a t h e r i n g steam ever s i n c e November, when Zumwalt u n v e i l e d h i s concept o f an a l l - d u n g a r e e , m o d - h a i r - s t y l e new Navy where a n y t h i n g goes. 5 Two y e a r s l a t e r t h e order a l l o w i n g dungarees to be worn o f f duty was c a n c e l l e d e n t i r e l y . ( A l l Hands March 1973) H a i r and beard r u l e s were l i m i t e d a g a i n i n A p r i l (Navy Times A p r i l 25, 1973).  166  At the Commanders-in-Chief c o n f e r e n c e h e l d here i n mid-January, Zumwalt's assembled f o u r - s t a r a d m i r a l s - t h e top e i g h t o f f i c e r s under h i s command - t o l d him b l u n t l y t h a t t h e Navy had gone overboard on r e l a x a t i o n o f d i s c i p l i n e . The a d m i r a l s a l s o r e p o r t e d t h a t Zumwalt's free-and-easy conc e s s i o n o f p r i v i l e g e s t o young boot seamen had aroused b i t t e r complaint among the m i d - l e v e l p e t t y o f f i c e r s and c h i e f s ( i n essense, t h e hard-hats o f the Navy) who had worked l o n g y e a r s to earn j u s t such p r i v i l e g e s as a r e now b e i n g extended to a l l hands. "The whole middle l e v e l o f l e a d e r s h i p on whom we have t o depend-both o f f i c e r s and p e t t y o f f i c e r s " , s a i d one a d m i r a l , soon a f t e r the c o n f e r e n c e , " i s simply b e i n g bypassed, and they r e sent i t " . (AFJ March 15, 1971, p.17) The events l e a d i n g up to t h i s r e s i s t e n c e were d e s c r i b e d a l s o . ber f i f t h , A d m i r a l Hyland, r e t i r e d w i t h a warning  Decem-  t h e F l e e t Commander o f t h e P a c i f i c , had  speech:  How f a r can we permit a b s o l u t e freedom o f speech, deportment and d r e s s , and s t i l l hang onto t h a t i n d i s p e n s a b l e element o f discipline? Such freedoms, have always been s e t i n abeyance by men i n uniform. I t i s n e c e s s a r y that they f o r e g o some o f them t o p r o t e c t the freedom o f a l l . (AFJ, p.17) Zumwalt compromised by r e v i s i n g h i s o r d e r , but a c c o r d i n g to the Armed F o r c e s J o u r n a l , he a l s o took counter measures.  H i s "up o r o u t " p o l i c y ,  as i t a p p l i e d to a d m i r a l s , c o u l d remove some o f h i s c r i t i c s  from the  a c t i v e Navy. S e n i o r f l a g o f f i c e r s a r e a s k i n g i f y o u t h f u l ( f o r the p o s t ) CNO Zumwalt may n o t be f e e l i n g i l l a t ease i n the c o n t i n u e d presence on a c t i v e duty of so many o f f i c e r s h i s s e n i o r i n age and once h i s s e n i o r s i n rank. T h i s , they say, i s the upshot o f the r e cent memo to a l l f l a g o f f i c e r s on c o n t i n u a t i o n / r e t i r e m e n t p o l i c y . The e m b i t t e r e d a d m i r a l s say the Navy i s f o r c i n g f l a g o f f i c e r s i n t o e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t both by e s t a b l i s h i n g and a d h e r i n g to a r b i t r a r y p l u c k i n g board percentages and by p e r s o n a l l e t t e r s from CNO when they r e a c h around age 58... (AFJ Mar. 15, 1971)  167  A y e a r l a t e r o n l y f o u r of the seven f u l l a d m i r a l s remained on duty.  Zumwalt a l s o t r i e d  c o n c i l i a t i o n with a l e t t e r  active  to r e t i r e d  o f f i c e r s e x p l a i n i n g h i s program i n terms of need f o r r e t e n t i o n . (AFJ  Mar.  15,  1971)  In January  1972,  l i s h e d an i n t e r v i e w w i t h the A d m i r a l . the most d i f f i c u l t  Armed F o r c e s J o u r n a l pubTo the q u e s t i o n "what  was  a s p e c t of your j o b , " he answered:  . . . g e t t i n g a n y t h i n g done. There are so many checks and b a l a n c e s i n any b u r e a u c r a t i c government - and here t h i s i s not i d e o l o g i c a l but I t h i n k i t ' s even more t r u e of the communist or d i c t a t o r i a l government than w i t h a democratic government, but j u s t the sheer bureaucracy of modern government makes i t d i f f i c u l t to get b u s i n e s s done q u i c k l y . What s u r p r i s e d him most i n h i s new  job  was:  ...the d i s c o v e r y t h a t , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t a d e c i s i o n may have been made by me w i t h i n the Navy, we s t i l l f i n d o c c a s i o n a l l y t h a t we have to s e l l the i d e a to the a c t i o n o f f i c e r ! In s h o r t , the "system" i s sometimes such t h a t the word doesn't always get to the guy who has to implement the decision. (AFJ Jan. 1972) And limited.  so the A d m i r a l came to r e c o g n i z e t h a t h i s power  However he c o n t i n u e d to p r e s s f o r changes i n o t h e r areas,  e s p e c i a l l y r a c e r e l a t i o n s , u n t i l the f a l l of  was  of 1972  and  the o c c a s i o n s  the C o n s t e l l a t i o n s t r i k e and K i t t y Hawk f i g h t and a second much  more stubborn r e s i s t a n c e by h i s a d m i r a l s . As manning the Navy became a problem i n the 1970s and d r a f t was of  to end,  the Navy expected  to r e c r u i t a h i g h e r  the  percentage  B l a c k s as a consequence of the l i m i t e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f f e r e d to  B l a c k people  in civilian  life.  There was  also a special m i l i t a r y  civilian  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n program " p r o j e c t 100,000" aimed a t p o o r l y  educated  people which i n c l u d e d many B l a c k s .  The Navy had a r e p -  168  u t a t i o n as b e i n g r a c i s t but i n s p i t e o f t h i s Zumwalt hoped to somehow make B l a c k s f e e l welcome. all  Race R e l a t i o n s A s s i s t a n t s were a s s i g n e d to  commands as a f i r s t e f f o r t .  He a l s o asked  ners to use programming o f i n t e r e s t  the r e c r e a t i o n a l p l a n -  to B l a c k s and asked  the canteen  managers t o s t o c k items and magazines of use and i n t e r e s t  to Blacks.  Barbers were t o l e a r n how t o c u t the Navy v e r s i o n o f a " n a t u r a l " . An A f f i r m a t i v e A c t i o n p o l i c y was i n s t i t u t e d and i t was used t o p r o mote a few B l a c k s a l r e a d y i n h i g h p o s i t i o n s , t o h i g h e r s t a t u s . T h i s e v i d e n t l y had l i t t l e % f f e e t on. the s i t u a t i o n o f most B l a c k s . e  The K i t t y Hawk f i g h t i n October 1972 brought n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n t o the i s s u e and alarmed the Navy. third  the f i r s t  The evening  s i t - i n o f the Connie S t r i k e began.  f o u r t h an o r d e r went out t o f l e e t  o f November  On November  commanders t o take d e f i n i t e measures  to g e t r i d o f r a c i s m i n t h e i r commands. . . . c h i e f o f n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s approved an unprecedented o r d e r t e l l i n g a l l commands t h a t i n e f f e c t , t h e i r c a r e e r s may depend on how q u i c k l y they move to improve c o n d i t i o n s f o r the growing numbers o f b l a c k s i n the f l e e t . (NY Times Nov. 6, 1972) F o l l o w i n g the end of the C o n s t e l l a t i o n S t r i k e the next week on November t e n t h Zumwalt.called  e i g h t y o f h i s a d m i r a l s and marine  g e n e r a l s t o g e t h e r and a n g r i l y c r i t i c i z e d his orders.  According  them f o r not f o l l o w i n g  t o the news r e p o r t he t o l d  them t h a t the  i n c i d e n t s were: ' c l e a r l y due to f a i l u r e o f commands to implement' new r a c i a l programs 'with a whole h e a r t ' . He i n s t r u c t e d t h e Navy's h i g h command to 'seek out and take a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n , e i t h e r p u n i t i v e or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ' a g a i n s t those who engage i n o r condone d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i s e s o r who have ' v i o l a t e d e i t h e r the s p i r i t o r the l e t t e r o f our equal o p p o r t u n i t y program'.  169  ...Minority a f f a i r s assistants appointed to deal with r a c i a l problems a f l o a t and ashore, have been ' e f f e c t i v e l y hamstrung' in too many cases he said...'I am speaking to you and through you to the Navy's entire command structure to emphasize again that this issue of discrimination must be faced openly and fully'. (New York Times Nov. 12, 1972) It was after this lecture that the admirals mutiny began. Exactly what happened i n the inner c i r c l e s i s not available i n f o r mation, however one mode of action used by both sides was to give information to the media.  There were reports of an attempt to get  r i d of Zumwalt, his "permissiveness" and h i s race relations programs. The CNO's speech to the admirals had become immediate news. porters rushed to interview him.  Re-  They asked how he intended to  enforce his policy toward commanders who  f a i l e d to carry out his  programs "with a whole heart": We w i l l i n s i s t that the selection boards pay great attention to a man's performance i n this area, and those who are not r e a l l y f u l l y conscious of the need f o r absolute and t o t a l equality w i l l , over time, be weeded out i n the Navy's selection system. (A.P. Nov. 12, 1972) He also said that the Inspector General would have his o f f i c e make spot checks as well as other investigations to follow up on two hundred d i f f e r e n t equal-opportunity programs. Zumwalt evidently had the support of the two people most needed for these two enforcement procedures and by July had added a third.  One was the head of BUPERS, Vice-Admiral David Bagley and  the other was the Inspector General of the Navy, Vice-Admiral Means Johnston.  In July, a new Vice-CNO, Admiral Hollowell was to take  170 office.^  He had been appointed p r i o r to January  1973.  The next v i s i b l e s t e p i n Zumwalt's defense was r e l e a s e d from "Navy o f f i c i a l s "  t h a t showed how  proved d r a m a t i c a l l y s i n c e Zumwalt had 1972) He  The  f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n was  i s s u e d Z-gram 117  statement  d i s c i p l i n e had  im-  taken command. (UPI, November  19,  more of a compromise w i t h h i s c r i t i c s .  specifically  f o u r t e e n t h and demanded s t r i c t  a  to young e n l i s t e d men  obedience  on November  under t h r e a t of punishment:  T h i s s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e and s u b o r d i n a t i o n of s e l f f o r the good of a l l i s a b s o l u t e l y mandatory f o r any o r g a n i z a t i o n , c i v i l i a n or m i l i t a r y , to f u n c t i o n p r o p e r l y . I t cannot be any o t h e r way. . . . I am aware of the e x t r a hours worked and the o v e r l o n g deployments e x p e r i e n c e d by many; but the Navy i s no d i f f e r e n t than any o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n i n t h a t i t r e q u i r e s complete and t o t a l obedience. I t can be no o t h e r way. (All Hands, December 1972) R e p o r t e r s began a s k i n g o t h e r o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d men Drew M i d d l e t o n r e p o r t e d f o r the New  their opinions.  York Times:  The consensus i n more than a s c o r e o f i n t e r v i e w s was t h a t the a d m i r a l had gone too f a r , too f a s t i n a t t e m p t i n g to l e a d a t r a d i t i o n a l i s t , s e m i - i s o l a t e d o f f i c e r corps i n t o new r e l a t i o n s h i p s between commander and commanded. R e s i s t a n c e developed, a r e t i r e d a d m i r a l s a i d , because o f f i c e r s b e l i e v e d Zumwalt's d i r e c t i v e s l e d to breaks i n the c h a i n of command. . . . Many i n t e r v i e w e d i n Washington and a t Navy bases were outspokenly c r i t i c a l of Zumwalt's p o l i c i e s , but they r e f u s e d to  6 I i n f e r the support of these a d m i r a l s mainly from r e p o r t s of promot i o n s i n USNI P r o c e e d i n g s . D a v i d Bagley's younger b r o t h e r Ward Bagley a l o n g w i t h Johnston and H o l l o w e l l r e c e i v e d the 3 vacant f u l l a d m i r a l s h i p s the next y e a r , Ward Bagley becoming the next i n l i n e under Hollowell. There were over 300 v i c e and r e a r a d m i r a l s so these promot i o n s were undoubtedly v e r y s e l e c t i v e . Zumwalt l a t e r r e p o r t e d that H o l l o w e l l ' s promotion to v i c e - c h i e f and l a t e r to Zumwalt's p o s i t i o n had been h i s c h o i c e . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s e v i d e n c e , David Bagley h i m s e l f spoke out p u b l i c l y f o r "people programs".  171  a l l o w the use of t h e i r names. A l l f e l t that the r a c i a l i s s u e , dramatized by the r e f u s a l e a r l i e r t h i s month of 123 b l a c k s to r e p o r t f o r duty aboard the c a r r i e r USS C o n s t e l l a t i o n , was o n l y a symptom of a g e n e r a l m a l a i s e . . . . ' I don't say t h e y ' r e dumb', s a i d a commander, 'but they haven't got the e d u c a t i o n to handle most equipment. You can't t u r n over a machine worth a q u a r t e r - o f a m i l l i o n . b u c k s to some s a i l o r , w h i t e or b l a c k , who's l i a b l e to r u i n i t through i g n o r ance. ...'The t h i n g we have to a v o i d a t a l l c o s t s , 'one r e t i r e d a d m i r a l s a i d , ' i s promoting them j u s t because t h e y ' r e b l a c k . They have to be capable. Too many l i v e s depend on them i n peace as w e l l as war.' (New York Times Nov. 22, 1972) I n San Diego, the LA Times and Washington P r e s s s e r v i c e s i n t e r v i e w e d e n l i s t e d people. o l d e r c a r e e r men  The  EMs  claimed  the p e t t y o f f i c e r s , e x p e c i a l l y the  would o f t e n i g n o r e  problem on the s h i p s . Connie p r o t e s t , one  The  B l a c k e n l i s t e d men  estimated  experienced  Connie s t r i k e r s .  White EMs  g e n e r a l l y supported  the  from the a c t i o n s of p e t t y  counter  23,  racial  officers.  have j o i n e d them i f i t had  were not unanimous i n support  Some thought the t r o u b l e was  (Los Angeles Times Nov. The  the  the same problems t h a t were complained  of on the Connie and would probably ed on t h e i r s h i p s .  t h a t t h i s was  t h a t s e v e n t y - f i v e per cent of the  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s i n the Navy r e s u l t They s a i d they had  the Z-grams and  of  happenthe  the f a u l t of B l a c k s .  1972)  a t t a c k had  a l r e a d y begun.  November  fourteenth,  the Chairman of the House Armed S e r v i c e s Committee announced an i n vestigation. appointed  sub-committee chairman, and  a l r e a d y , Ron to j o i n .  F l o y d H i c k s , a c o n s e r v a t i v e from Washington s t a t e as was  noted i n t h i s paper  Dellums, the only B l a c k on the committee, was  Time Magazine r e p o r t e d  get Zumwalt removed:  was  not  allowed  t h a t some a d m i r a l s were t r y i n g  to  172  Some have made l a t e - n i g h t phone c a l l s to Pentagon c o r r e s p o n d e n t s . A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s and p o l i t i c i a n s have been c o r n e r e d a t cocktail parties. The message i s the same: Zumwalt has gone too f a r . One o f h i s c r i t i c s i s A d m i r a l Isaac K i d d , 53, thought to be the most l i k e l y man t o r e p l a c e Zumwalt. Even S e c r e t a r y of t h e Navy John Warner threw out h i n t s t h a t he was n o t a l t o gether p l e a s e d w i t h the d i r e c t i o n i n which Zumwalt was heading. ... Warner admitted t h a t he was 'under a g r e a t d e a l o f p r e s s u r e ' from Zumwalt's c r i t i c s . Time Magazine i t s e l f , backed Zumwalt s t r o n g l y : I f he i s r e p l a c e d or even hobbled i n h i s r e v o l u t i o n a r y shakeup of t h e Navy, i t c o u l d w e l l s i g n a l an end to the attempts to humanize a l l t h r e e s e r v i c e s . (Time Magazine Nov. 27, 1972) A d m i r a l K i d d , mentioned i n t h e above a r t i c l e , was the C h i e f of Naval Material. CNO.  T h i s p o s i t i o n i s c o n s i d e r e d second i n importance t o t h e  The C h i e f o f M a t e r i a l has d i r e c t access  t o t h e S e c r e t a r y of  the Navy i n an a d v i s o r y c a p a c i t y . The House sub-committee began h e a r i n g s i n Washington and Chairman H i c k s  t o l d r e p o r t e r s a f t e r the f i r s t  session:  We cannot o v e r l o o k the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e may e x i s t a t t h i s time an environment o f - f o r l a c k o f a b e t t e r word - p e r m i s s i v e ness - wherein a l l t h a t i s needed i s a c a t a l y s t . (A.P. Nov. 25, 1972) Zumwalt t e s t i f i e d ness i n the Navy.  to t h e committee and denied  t h a t t h e r e was p e r m i s s i v e -  The sub-committee was w i d e l y r e c o g n i z e d as out t o  stop Zumwalt and h i s programs r a t h e r than to i n v e s t i g a t e r a c i s m i n the Navy.  When t h e sub-committee h e a r i n g s moved t o San Diego, t h e  o f f i c e r s on t h e Connie and K i t t y Hawk were q u e s t i o n e d . men  A few e n l i s t e d  from t h e Connie t e s t i f i e d b u t none from the K i t t y Hawk. (Some  had been asked b u t because o f t h e i r impending c o u r t m a r t i a l s and t h e i r d i s t r u s t of t h e committee, they r e f u s e d . ) quoted one Connie EM who had t e s t i f i e d :  An A s s o c i a t e d P r e s s r e p o r t e r  173 They asked me q u e s t i o n s about why I disobeyed a b a s i c order and why I j o i n e d t h e p r o t e s t , but they d i d n ' t address thems e l v e s to t h e c e n t r a l problems o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and i n f e r i o r job assignments f o r b l a c k s aboard the s h i p . (AJ?, November 25, 1972) The  subcommittee r e p o r t was completed January second 1973.  I t s primary f i n d i n g s were t h a t t h e r e was indeed i n t h e Navy and t h a t there were no i n s t a n c e s They f e l t  the disturbances  a few " s k i l l e d  "permissiveness"  of r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  r e s u l t e d from misunderstandings o f B l a c k s ,  a g i t a t o r s " and the weakened mid-management. Mid-  management had been weakened by t h e use o f the race r e l a t i o n s c o u n c i l s and  by the r e l a x e d h a i r and u n i f o r m s t a n d a r d s .  They found B l a c k u n i t y  d i v i s i v e w i t h i n the Navy and recommended t h a t g e s t u r e s "passing  such as  t h e power" and t h e B l a c k hand shake be d i s c o u r a g e d .  The  sub-committee r e p o r t asked f o r more t r a i n i n g f o r both r e c r u i t s and mid-management and f o r an i n c r e a s e selectivity  i n recruitment  o f EMs.  i n p o l i c e on t h e s h i p s and more They d i s c u s s e d  of h i s s t a f f and s a i d " t h e subcommittee r e g r e t s not  that the t r a d i t i o n of  c r i t i c i z i n g seniors i n front of t h e i r subordinates  i n t h i s c a s e " (HASC, January 2, 1973:17668-70). its  t h e CNOs rebuke  was i g n o r e d  Camp News c a r r i e d  own s t o r y o f t h e r e p o r t under t h e heading " F l e e t Racism White-  wash" (February 15, 1973).  P r o c e e d i n g s r e p r i n t e d a r e p o r t by the  Washington Post which i n c l u d e d  a paragraph about Zumwalt's  claim  t h a t p e r m i s s i v e n e s s d i d n o t e x i s t and a l s o t h a t s a i l o r s had charged that "unwritten  orders" against  Zumwalt  Blacks  e x i s t e d on the K i t t y Hawk.  remained the occupant o f t h e C h i e f o f Naval  174  O p e r a t i o n s o f f i c e , but month by month announcements came of  new  r e g u l a t i o n s and programs t h a t were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the sub-committee recommendations.  December t w e n t y - s i x t h 1972,  Zumwalt asked h i s  commands to g i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s c h a r g e s to those who were p o t e n t i a l troublemakers. February n i n t h 1973.  they  thought  Three thousand were d i s c h a r g e d by  T h i r t e e n p e r c e n t of those d i s c h a r g e d were  B l a c k s compared to s i x p e r c e n t B l a c k s i n the Navy (Camp News Feb. 15, 1973).  On January  dungarees o f f duty was  fifteenth  1973,  the p e r m i s s i o n to wear  withdrawn ( A l l Hands March 1973).  In A p r i l  beard and h a i r r e g u l a t i o n s were a g a i n t i g h t e n e d (Navy Times A p r i l 25, 1973).  A new  o f f i c e r s was  form o f v e r b a l and w r i t t e n address f o r p e t t y  instituted  i n May.  I n s t e a d of c a l l i n g a second  p e t t y o f f i c e r , Brown, f o r i n s t a n c e , he was "Petty O f f i c e r  Brown".  addressed as C h i e f  C h i e f s a t the E-7  C h i e f Jones"  rating  of Master-at-Arms was  assist  i n law enforcement  "Senior  1973).  The MAA  was  A  and disadvantages of the f i v e  new  to  a t sea and on shore ( A l l Hands June  d i s c h a r g e s , honorable to d i s h o n o r a b l e was  benefits.  to be c a l l e d  ( A l l Hands May  announced i n June.  A c h a r t showing the advantages  i n August.  to be r e f e r r e d to as  l e v e l c o n t i n u e d to be  but E-8s and E-9s were now  C h i e f Brown" and "Master  of  now  class  1973). types  i n c l u d e d i n A l l ! Hands  There were many d i f f e r e n c e s p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n veterans  The same i s s u e announced t h a t twenty-eight teams of  h a n d l e r s and dogs had been added to the Navy as drug d e t e c t o r s and one hundred training  as A l c o h o l Abuse C o u n s e l o r s .  i n boot camp was  In September  initial  i n c r e a s e d from seven and a h a l f  to n i n e  175 weeks to a l l o w more time i n l e a r n i n g m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e and customs and  courtesy.  E f f o r t s a t improving charges  of d i s o b e d i e n c e and  In January  navy  1973  the opening  "management of p e o p l e " was  r a c e r e l a t i o n s continued but  without  l a c k of good w i l l of o f f i c e r s and NCOs. of f o u r Human Resource Centers announced i n A l l Hands.  f o r the  These o f f e r e d a  number of s e r v i c e s to commanding o f f i c e r s under the t o p i c s of r a c e relations,  command development, i n t e r c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s , drug  a l c o h o l e d u c a t i o n and a l c o h o l i c r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . November 1973,  the a i r c r a f t  an example of how  c a r r i e r USS  F o r r e s t a l was  a Human Resource C o u n c i l Center  command i n race r e l a t i o n s .  The  telephone  to the C a p t a i n " telephone. f o u r hour telephone the program.  fall,  p o i n t e d to as  could help a ship's  s h i p ' s TV and newspaper r e g u l a r l y  used m a t e r i a l about B l a c k s and o t h e r m i n o r i t i e s . p o r t u n i t y to t a l k by  The next  directly  There was  r e c o r d e r system.  There was  an  to the C a p t a i n on a  a " h o t l i n e " which was  op-  "Questions a twenty-  Seminars were the main p a r t of  "Awareness" s e s s i o n s of e i g h t e e n p a r t i c i p a n t s were used  to share i n f o r m a t i o n of backgrounds of d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l and personnel.  and  racial  "Upward" c l a s s e s were used to t a l k about the p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n of each.  These groups were l e d by f a c i l i t a t o r s and  to be s i m i l a r to the T groups, c o n f r o n t a t i o n , s e n s i t i v i t y and therapy groups t h a t were p o p u l a r among c i v i l i a n s .  seemed reality  In a d d i t i o n to  these programs t h e r e were s p e c i a l days when most of the crew were i n v o l v e d i n " r a p " s e s s i o n s ( A l l Hands November 1973). The a l c o h o l and drug c e n t e r s were r e p o r t e d as h e a v i l y used.  Command Development  176  was  defined  as s i m i l a r to o r g a n i z a t i o n a l development programs i n  c i v i l i a n industry. Educational  C i v i l i a n a d v i s o r s were used as p a r t of the  m a t e r i a l was  staff.  a l s o p r e s e n t e d d i r e c t l y i n A l l Hands by  f e a t u r e a r t i c l e s on B l a c k s who  had  done w e l l i n the U.S.  Navy and  on  Black h i s t o r y . The press.  success of these programs was  They noted t h a t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n continued  sometimes a l l of the men 1973).  The  The  new  GI  t h a t most  to be  C i v i l i a n pressure  who  were on t r i a l  hair regulations also  banned s e v e r a l s t y l e s of B l a c k h a i r c u t and f i g h t s continued  and  the  and  i n the b r i g s were B l a c k (Camp News May  treatment of K i t t y Hawk B l a c k s  seen as d i s c r i m i n a t o r y .  racial  q u e s t i o n e d by  grooming.  15,  was  specifically Incidents  of  reported.  through the Congress and  the  courts  l i b e r a l i z e d navy r e g u l a t i o n s s l i g h t l y .  Summary Court M a r t i a l s came  to i n c l u d e the r i g h t t o an a t t o r n e y  to a p p e a l s (Camp News  and  June 1973).  The  Navy, presumably w i t h the CNO's  fought these through c o u r t s and s p e c i a l court orders. for discharge  on  s i o n a l pressure. less punitive  and  Use  of code numbers showing n e g a t i v e finally  Navy then i n t r o d u c e d  (Navy Times A p r i l 10,  By June 1974  by  reasons  g i v e n up under Congres-  a new  system o n l y  slightly  1974).  when Zumwalt's term e x p i r e d  ( i t was  as non-renewable) he was  succeeded by h i s V i c e - C h i e f ,  Zumwalt s a i d t h a t he had  personally  command was  cooperation,  then d i d n ' t comply u n t i l f o r c e d  t e r m i n a l papers was The  May  chosen him.  Ward Bagley whose o l d e r b r o t h e r ,  The  reported  Hollowell. new  second i n  David, remained  the  . 177 c h i e f of BUPERS. insurgent  still  A d m i r a l Kidd who had been r e p o r t e d as a p r i n c i p a l remained as C h i e f o f M a t e r i a l .  a d m i r a l d u r i n g t h i s whole p e r i o d . named.  Warner had r e s i g n e d  A new  to accept  He had been a  S e c r e t a r y of the Navy  The new Navy  Middendorf, had been promoted from Under S e c r e t a r y .  Secretary,  No s h i f t o f f a c -  apparent. As Zumwalt  for  was  a p r e s t i g i o u s appointment to  head the American B i - C e n t e n n i a l Commission.  t i o n s was  full  r e t i r e d he was s t i l l making h e a d l i n e s .  h i s "hawkish v i e w s " on m i l i t a r y p o l i c y .  He advocated  This  time  increased  n a v a l s t r e n g t h and r a i s e d alarms about the a l l e g e d U.S. l o s s of c o n t r o l of the sea.  He wanted to i n c r e a s e use of s m a l l a t t a c k  ships  i n s t e a d of r e l y i n g h e a v i l y on a t t a c k c a r r i e r s as the Navy has i n the immediate p a s t .  H i s p o s i t i o n s on m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y and p a r t i c u l a r  combat systems may. v e r y w e l l have been applauded by d i f f e r e n t alignments personnel  of m i l i t a r y and governmental people than were h i s policies.  In any case h i s support  as CNO was r e l a t e d to  more than r e a c t i o n to h i s r a c e r e l a t i o n s p o l i c i e s and Z-gram o r d e r s . On r e t i r e m e n t he was i n t e r v i e w e d on a n a t i o n a l TV program, "Meet the P r e s s " , June 30, 1974.  Most q u e s t i o n s were on h i s outspoken  views on navy s t r e n g t h , but when asked about the K i t t y Hawk f i g h t , he s a i d , " i t a r r i v e d l a t e r than I had a n t i c i p a t e d " .  His astute public  r e l a t i o n s a b i l i t y have l e d s e v e r a l commentators to p r e d i c t t h a t he may  run  f o r p u b l i c o f f i c e as a c i v i l i a n . Zumwalt  survived h i s admirals  r e v o l t but a t the c o s t of  some of h i s program and by a v o i d i n g p u b l i c reprimands to h i s o f f i c e r s  178 f o r t h e i r disobedience.  The a d m i r a l s r e v o l t had  p o l i c y but d i d not completely upset the reforms admirals d i d not s u f f e r of  t h e i r c a r e e r s may  an impact  on navy  or the regime.  The  f o r m a l punishment or f o r m a l charges but some  have been a f f e c t e d .  motion to a f u l l a d m i r a l s h i p t h a t y e a r .  None were rewarded by  pro-  179  PART THREE  THE IMPACT OF RESISTANCE ON AUTHORITY  The o u t s t a n d i n g l e s s o n o f the case h i s t o r i e s i s t h a t a u t h o r i t y was c o n s t r u c t e d i n such a way t h a t the movements had l i t t l e effectiveness. The  impact  The case h i s t o r i e s make d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f t h i s  on i t s apparent.  anti-war movement i n v a r i o u s ways p r e s e n t e d a d i r e c t c h a l l e n g e to the  a u t h o r i t y o f the Navy, y e t , as we s h a l l s e e , t h e i r methods o f working w i t h i n l e g a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e s s e s and t h e i r l a c k o f success i n d e v e l o p i n g widespread  r e s i s t a n c e i n t h e Navy l i m i t e d  i n t e r f e r e w i t h m a n a g e r i a l methods o f c o n t r o l  t h e i r a b i l i t y to  (Chapter T h i r t e e n ) .  B l a c k movement on the other hand p r e s e n t e d a much more c r i t i c a l to m a n a g e r i a l  c o n t r o l both because i t developed  spread group a c t i o n and because i t d i r e c t l y managerial  a u t h o r i t y (Chapter F o u r t e e n ) .  The  challenge  as a p o t e n t i a l f o r wide-  c h a l l e n g e d the l e g i t i m a c y o f  In Chapter  F i f t e e n we w i l l  look  a t some o f the d i f f e r e n c e s between the anti-war movement and the B l a c k movement w i t h r e s p e c t to the bases o f the movements and the ways i n which r e s i s t a n c e was developed  d i f f e r e n t l y because o f d i f f e r e n c e s i n how  people  were i n v o l v e d and o f d i f f e r e n c e s i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e p r o c e s s e s which d e f i n e d the movements. The r e s i s t a n c e a c t i o n s d i d n o t n o t i c e a b l y i n t e r f e r e w i t h the war  b u t they d i d p r e c i p i t a t e an o r g a n i z a t i o n c r i s i s a t the top l e v e l s as  m i l i t a r i s t s and managers squared  off.  T h i s c o n f l i c t may have had more  180 p o t e n t i a l f o r i n t e r r u p t i o n o f the war work than the d i r e c t r e s i s t a n c e . The  top l e v e l f i g h t took up c o n s i d e r a b l e  tried  to stop  practices.  each other  energies  o f many p e o p l e as they  from undermining t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e  In the f i n a l chapter i n t h i s s e c t i o n we w i l l  about the ways i n which these movements had r e p e r c u s s i o n s organization,  authority  l e a r n something w i t h i n the  i n t h e responses t h a t were made, and how those responses  themselves were r e a c t e d  to by other  sections of the naval  organization.  181  Chapter  THE THE  Thirteen  ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT  EFFECTIVENESS OF THE  AND  MANAGERIAL METHODS OF CONTROL  Lack of success i n b r e a k i n g  down a u t h o r i t y s t r u c t u r e s was  n o t i c e a b l e i n the case of the anti-war movement. of d e d i c a t e d backed by and  e f f e c t s on navy p l a n s  not  p e o p l e put months  a p o p u l a r c i v i l i a n peace movement, prominent p o l i t i c a l  p r o b a b l y d i d add was  NVA  o r g a n i z a t i o n work i n t o t h e i r Connie Vote campaign and  even e n t e r t a i n m e n t s t a r s .  direct  The  or navy a u t h o r i t y .  to the s t r e n g t h  t h e i r primary purpose.  T h e i r purpose was  Indirectly their  a w e l l documented a n a l y s i s of how  organizers  sophisticated strategy. a c t i o n s of EMs  and  i n the Bay  follow  no  connection  Diego  and  but  they continued  to do navy work.  have seen ( P a r t One)  i t was  not.  of  to c o n t r o l i n T h i s would  have made sense as r e s i s t a n c e i f the command model of a u t h o r i t y had as we  and  the h u m i l i a t i o n s  exact  but  and  They supported the widespread a n t i - a u t h o r i t a r i a n  S a i l o r s d i d become more " u p p i t y , " more d i f f i c u l t  accurate,  the  Area used a s l i g h t l y more  l e d them i n denouncing l i f e r s and  posture,  own  fitted.  navy l i f e . dress  this  m i l i t a r y , government  however, t h e r e was  i n which the t a c t i c of w a r - r e f u s a l  SOS  actions  to p u b l i c i z e t h e i r  Other anti-war p e o p l e such as the UFTB s t a f f i n San the C o r a l Sea  no  enough manpower a v a i l a b l e to run  i n d u s t r i a l e l i t e s p r o f i t e d from the war; to a s t r a t e g y  figures  of the c i v i l i a n peace movement but  t h e i r example t h a t t h e r e would not be They had  were  In s p i t e of t h i s there were v i r t u a l l y  r e f u s a l to p a r t i c i p a t e , w i t h the hope t h a t enough o t h e r s would  ship.  most  been  182 The  l i b e r t a r i a n a n a l y s i s i d e n t i f i e d the " b a t t l e l i n e " as b e i n g  i n the f a c e - t o - f a c e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s v e r y much as M e l v i l l e had i n 1843. They p u b l i c i z e d i n s t a n c e s o f abuse o f a u t h o r i t y and o f the success - i n c h a l l e n g i n g i t as a way o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a g e n e r a l consciousness  among EMs.  t h i s would a f f e c t  o f EMs  anti-military  T h i s was not t i e d i n t o any a n a l y s i s as t o how  the complex o r g a n i z a t i o n o f s h i p s i n 1972.  There seemed  to be an unexamined assumption t h a t d i r e c t i n d i v i d u a l c h a l l e n g e s t o a u t h o r i t y i n f a c e - t o - f a c e s i t u a t i o n s would l e a d t o i m m o b i l i z a t i o n  of the  ships. The  non-violent  r e s i s t e r s went f u r t h e r i n t h e i r c h a l l e n g e t o  n a v a l a u t h o r i t y than d i s o b e d i e n c e situations. Navy.  or l a c k o f r e s p e c t  They r e f u s e d on grounds o f c o n s c i e n c e  By doing  t h i s with  get e x c e l l e n t p u b l i c i t y  i n face-to-face  to continue  the use o f church s a n c t u a r y  they a l s o managed to  f o r the c i v i l i a n peace movement.  peace movement became s u p p o r t i v e s a i l o r s who r e s i s t e d openly.  work i n the  C i v i l i a n s i n the  o f UAs and d e s e r t e r s as w e l l as the  The documentary m a t e r i a l does not p i c k up  the e m o t i o n a l f e e l i n g o f the c i v i l i a n s u p p o r t e r s  o r GI a c t i v i s t s .  One  organizer  o f the C o r a l Sea campaign t o l d me "those were v e r y u n u s u a l  civilians  took more chances, put more on the l i n e than they had ever even  considered  doing  before.  I t was extremely e x c i t i n g . "  times,  T h i s new  s o l i d a r i t y between c i v i l i a n s and peace movement p e o p l e (the s o l i d a r i t y r e s u l t e d from many other helped  GI a c t i o n s i n a d d i t i o n to the case h i s t o r i e s )  i n the growing movement to end the.Vietnam war. The  impact o f the peace campaign on the s h i p s was e n e r g i z i n g  f o r the c i v i l i a n peace movement but i t d i d not seem t o even slow down the use o f the c a r r i e r s and the p r o g r e s s  of the war.  Individuals did refuse  183 orders, others.  they d i d r e f u s e to r e t u r n to the s h i p and were f o l l o w e d  A few  were sympathetic.  The  few  manipulation,  who  reported  to the s h i p s a i d t h a t  a b l e to absorb both the NVA  a g i t a t o r s , s u r v e i l a n c e and  by  d i r e c t i o n of work.  t h e i r ordinary  appear  the more p o l i t i c a l  Both groups of war  r e s i s t e r s lacked to get  and  the navy way..  the symbolic r e j e c t i o n of a u t h o r i t y and the Navy as the m i l i t a r i s t s and  and  organizaan  to take  UFTBs a t t a c k s  and  M i l i t a r i s t s were alarmed  by  t h i s d i d cause some problems w i t h i n  the managers s p a r r e d ,  to impede the navy's p a r t i n the  of  cooperation  to b o t h . t h e NVAs anguished appeals to EMs  lifers  paper  procedures f o r the  f o r t h e i r c o m p l i c i t y i n the war  r i d i c u l e against  they  selected discharge  i t happened t h a t the Navy's a b i l i t y  remained s u p e r i o r responsibility  and  i t s a c t u a l methods of c o n t r o l which were by  c o n t r a c t u a l promises of good pay,  a n a l y s i s of how  by  f o r the s h i p ' s work.  Navy was  UFTB approach by  EMs  I f they l a t e r r e s i s t e d on the s h i p i t d i d not  consequential  t i o n and  a  In each case of s a n c t u a r y the o r i g i n a l r e f u s e r s were j o i n e d  s i x or seven more.  to be  by  but  i t d i d not  seem  war.  There i s a d i f f e r e n c e between.condemning the Navy as e x p l o i t i v e or immoral and  challenging  p e o p l e spoke out but  the l e g i t i m a c y of i t s a u t h o r i t y .  s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t what the Navy d i d and  t h e i r p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n s as they r e f u s e d  obedience to navy r e g u l a t i o n s and institutionalized  conscientious  of both NVA  and  T h i s served  to s t r e n g t h e n  withdrew one  UFTB groups was  to p r o v i d e  they d i d i t ,  c i v i l i a n law  ( S h e r i l l 1970).  that  A major  l e g a l counseling  has  tactic  s e r v i c e to  the l e g i t i m a c y of navy a u t h o r i t y even as i t  or another i n d i v i d u a l s a i l o r from the Navy.  p o s i t i v e connection  anti-war  o r d e r s were done w i t h c a r e f u l  the m i l i t a r y and  objection  how  The  between EMs  and  movement p e o p l e .  I t d i d keep a  EMs.  184 The managers d e a l t w i t h a n t i - w a r and a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t a c t i o n s on s e v e r a l l e v e l s .  They avoided any o v e r t acknowledgement o f r e s i s t a n c e  or of l i b e r t a r i a n c r i t i c i s m s .  The s i t u a t i o n was r e f e r r e d to as  " t u r b u l e n c e " i n the f l e e t .  The EM argument not h a v i n g been r e c o g n i z e d d i d  not have t o be d e a l t w i t h .  Paper m a n i p u l a t i o n was t h e i r major  As EMs o r young o f f i c e r s were thought any  tactic.  to be d o i n g o r g a n i z i n g and g a i n i n g  f o l l o w i n g they would be t r a n s f e r r e d o r d i s c h a r g e d q u i e t l y .  Counseling  programs, i n v e s t i g a t i o n and d i r e c t p o l i c e s u r v e i l a n c e were a l s o i n c r e a s e d . When t h e a n t i - w a r s a i l o r s a p p l i e d f o r c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b j e c t o r s t a t u s they f o l l o w e d the paper procedures  e s t a b l i s h e d by the m i l i t a r y .  As  more p e o p l e a p p l i e d f o r t h i s s t a t u s and as c o u r t cases developed, t h e procedures were i n c r e a s i n g l y f o r m a l i z e d and w i d e l y r e c o g n i z e d by navy officials.  The s t e p s f o r g e t t i n g c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b j e c t o r s t a t u s u s u a l l y  i n v o l v e d d i s o b e d i e n c e to o r d e r s f o l l o w e d by a sentence a t Mast o f one or more months i n t h e b r i g .  The paper h i s t o r y o f t h i s e n t i r e  application,  o r d e r r e f u s a l and acceptance o f punishment were a l l n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e f i n a l authorized discharge.  The c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b j e c t o r s were thus v e r y o b e d i e n t  as they f o l l o w e d t h e forms. managerial  T h i s l e g i t i m i z e d t h e navy p r o c e d u r e s .  The  top command d i d n o t o b j e c t to these people l e a v i n g t h e Navy.  I t a c t u a l l y saved  them the t r o u b l e o f i d e n t i f y i n g "troublemakers.  They  d i d n o t , however, want l e a v i n g t h e Navy w i t h an h o n o r a b l e d i s c h a r g e t o be so easy t h a t i t would become p o p u l a r . The anti-war campaigns o f the C o n s t e l l a t i o n and K i t t y Hawk were a concern to managers as poor p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s . c h a l l e n g e t o navy work.  They were not a s e r i o u s  The EMs who took s a n c t u a r y d i d t h i s as a way o f  p o i n t i n g out t h e i m m o r a l i t y o f the Vietnam war and as one way to b u i l d an  185 appropriate  record f o r a conscientious  to a c t u a l l y  challenge  navy a u t h o r i t y as the dockside  Connie s t r i k e r s l a t e r had. supporters  i t was  a rejection  sentences and  of m i l i t a r y  support  non-violent  went UA  or d e s e r t e d  problem and  The  a l t o g e t h e r may  a challenge  Movement EMs  F r a n c i s c o Bay  a r r e s t s and  church criticized the  a challenge  g r e a t e r number of p e o p l e who have been more d i f f i c u l t  and  given  to  that  was  frequently  as a p r a c t i c a l  to l e g i t i m a c y . debated these t a c t i c s .  sanctuary,was encouraged i n the SOS San  The  the church acknowledged  not  The  of d r a m a t i z i n g  resister.  T h i s i n i t s e l f was  the managers.  and  conscience,  They o n l y asked t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n be  the person's s i n c e r e b e l i e f s . l i k e l y to worry  a way  of  a u t h o r i t y , a l t h o u g h they  r e s i s t e r s and  a u t h o r i t y of the m i l i t a r y .  resisters  of the r i g h t s  a u t h o r i t y but  statements d i d not denounce m i l i t a r y The  used  Black  e v e n t u a l l y be d i s c h a r g e d .  demonstrating the s i n c e r i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l  the war.  not  t h a t the Navy would a r r e s t . t h e r e s i s t e r s ,  t a c t i c expressed r e l i g i o u s  not  I t was  muster of the  W i t h i n . t h e church s a n c t u a r y ,  shared the e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t they would s e r v e j a i l sanctuary  objector discharge.  Area.  Going UA  campaign on the USS  r a t h e r than t a k i n g C o r a l Sea  Sanctuary o f f e r e d good p u b l i c i t y but  f i n a l d i s p o s a l of the EMs  i n the  later  the  c o u l d be manipulated f o r the Navy's  benefit.  T h i s happened to the K i t t y Hawk r e s i s t e r s when Navy n e g o t i a t i o n s  convinced  the s a i l o r s and  numbers of UAs men  Harbor P r o j e c t people to drop p u b l i c i t y .  might i n t e r f e r e w i t h  are a s s i g n e d  to s h i p s and  brought from shore bases and  s h i p movement, but  most d i s s a t i s f i e d of the crew might be r e p o r t s about the number who  an excess number of  i n a d d i t i o n extra personnel o t h e r s h i p s i n the h a r b o r . a help  Large  can be The  to navy work.  quickly  l o s s of  the  Movement  do not r e t u r n to l e a v e w i t h a s h i p may  not  be  186 c r e d i t e d by the r e g u l a r newspapers. p e o p l e t o know t h e exact  I t was i m p o s s i b l e  t o t a l o f UAs i n the C o r a l Sea campaign.  people thought•two hundred f i f t y  had f a i l e d  t o r e t u r n , the Navy  what they s a i d were the u s u a l number, t h i r t y f i v e 1971).  f o r the movement The SOS reported  (UA Bulkhead, November  S a i l o r s on the s h i p would have c e r t a i n l y n o t i c e d i f any o f t h e i r  buddies were m i s s i n g ,  but they d i d n o t have communication networks  the s h i p to add t h i s up to a t o t a l The  across  trend.  i n c r e a s e i n sabotage was a s e r i o u s concern o f both m i l i t a r -  i s t s and managers as a c h a l l e n g e  to a u t h o r i t y .  The a c t u a l damage o f  sabotage i s not t h e e s s e n t i a l problem a l t h o u g h damage i s expensive f o r the Navy and the Ranger sabotage delayed  the s h i p f o r t h r e e months.  is  ideally  is  expected i n time of war and the Navy i s w e l l prepared t o handle i t . The  initial  s e t up f o r r e p a i r as p a r t o f i t s shore e s t a b l i s h m e n t .  The Navy Damage  charges a g a i n s t Chenoweth and the Navy p u b l i c i t y about the t r i a l  indicated  that they thought i t was p a r t o f an o r g a n i z e d  r e s i s t a n c e move-  ment; however, i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t the EMs who were openly speaking against the war and o r g a n i z i n g a g i n s t i t were i n v o l v e d i n sabotage. under c o n s i d e r a b l e  s u r v e i l a n c e and they knew i t (Marx 1974).  They were Nevertheless  the anti-war movement p e o p l e supported Chenoweth and p u b l i c i z e d the case in  the movement papers.  media.  The case was a l s o p i c k e d up i n the r e g u l a r news  P u b l i c i t y about the Navy's concern d i d p o l i t i c a l work f o r r e s i s t e r s ,  to some extent impression  i t actually substituted f o r solidarity,  o f many a c t i o n s i n s o l i d a r i t y .  c o n v i c t Chenoweth but gave the p r e s s  t h a t i s , i t gave the  The Navy not o n l y f a i l e d t o  this opportunity  t o d i s c u s s the  p o p u l a r i t y o f sabotage d u r i n g  the e l e v e n months Chenoweth was i n j a i l .  m a n a g e r i a l method o f h a n d l i n g  such s i t u a t i o n s i s now t o a v o i d  publicity  The  187 and  i n c r e a s e p r e v e n t i v e measures such as a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s c h a r g e s  o f the  d i s s a t i s f i e d and s u r v e i l a n c e . In s p i t e o f the s u c c e s s f u l defense o f Chenoweth and r e s u l t i n g p u b l i c i t y and the many i n d i v i d u a l i n s t a n c e s o f r e s i s t a n c e , the anti-war movement was n o t s u c c e s s f u l i n b r i n g i n g about a g e n e r a l w i t h d r a w a l o f cooperation  w i t h n a v a l a u t h o r i t y on the p a r t o f EMs.  The movement had  hoped f o r a widespread response to t h e i r campaigns, as a r e s u l t both o f t h e i r a p p e a l to c o n s c i e n c e and  through the p u b l i c i z e d a c t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l s  t h e i r a t t a c k on the command f a c e - t o - f a c e r e l a t i o n s o f a u t h o r i t y which  the l i b e r t a r i a n view i d e n t i f i e d  as an i n f r i n g e m e n t  on p e r s o n a l  liberties.  In the absence o f a g e n e r a l i z e d w i t h d r a w a l o f c o o p e r a t i o n  with  a u t h o r i t y , t h e i r methods of working w i t h i n l e g a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e channels made them more e a s i l y c o n t r o l l e d by the use o f m a n a g e r i a l o f methods. handling  kinds  The navy managers developed an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e procedure f o r  those who o b j e c t e d  on grounds of c o n s c i e n c e  which was e f f e c t i v e  i n a v o i d i n g adverse p u b l i c i t y and a t the same time was a means o f g e t t i n g r i d o f p o t e n t i a l sources o f t r o u b l e .  S i m i l a r l y the methods o f a c t i o n  chosen by the anti-war movement made i t g e n e r a l l y easy f o r the navy " a u t h o r i t i e s " t o i d e n t i f y " t r o u b l e - m a k e r s " and to s h i f t out r i s k i n g the r e a c t i o n o f a s o l i d a r y group.  them around  with-  Through t h e i r c o n t r o l o f  channels o f communication they c o u l d prevent any e f f e c t i v e feedback to t h e r e s i s t e r s and hence they c o u l d i s o l a t e p o t e n t i a l s o u r c e s o f t r o u b l e w i t h i n the  ships.  188  Chapter  Fourteen  BLACK RESISTANCE:  A PRACTICAL AND  IDEOLOGICAL THREAT TO MANAGERIAL AUTHORITY  The movement among B l a c k s p r e s e n t e d a much more s e r i o u s lenge to n a v a l a u t h o r i t y and p a r t i c u l a r l y  chal-  to m a n a g e r i a l forms o f c o n t r o l .  I t was much l e s s r e a d i l y handled by 'managerial' s t r a t e g i e s than t h e a n t i war movement.  I t took the form o f a d i r e c t w i t h d r a w a l o f c o o p e r a t i o n o f  a k i n d t h a t the a n t i - w a r movement would have l i k e d could. and  t o a c h i e v e but never  Black resistance d i d a c t u a l l y threaten naval authority  the Navy found i t n e c e s s a r y to modify  a result.  directly  i t s p l a n s f o r s h i p movement as  A group o f angry men occupying an a r e a o f the s h i p and r e f u s i n g  to move d i d i n t e r r u p t work and c o u l d n o t be d e a l t w i t h by paper t i o n or i n d i v i d u a l counseling.  manipula-  The f i g h t on the K i t t y Hawk was another  s i t u a t i o n beyond m a n a g e r i a l c o n t r o l .  The use o f a p a r a l l e l s t r u c t u r e o f  l e g i t i m a c y i n the d o c k s i d e s t r i k e o f the Connie s a i l o r s , when the B l a c k s h e l d t h e i r own muster and f l a g s a l u t e was even more c h a l l e n g i n g . Furthermore,  the charge o f r a c i s m i n c a r e e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was  a d i r e c t d e n i a l of managerial legitimacy.  The m a n a g e r i a l promise o f  c a r e e r o p p o r t u n i t y was n o t simply one among many rewards o f f e r e d by the m a n a g e r i a l system o f c o n t r o l .  I t was i t s b a s i s .  c a r e e r were what they manipulated.  The c o n t i n g e n c i e s o f  T h e i r a b i l i t y .to d e l i v e r j o b t r a i n i n g  or a c a r e e r i n the Navy i n r e l a t i o n to performance  i n the job i n a f a i r  and r a t i o n a l way was t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r l e g i t i m a c y .  As B l a c k s openly and  w i t h much p u b l i c i t y i n s i s t e d t h a t they had not shared t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y m a n a g e r i a l l e g i t i m a c y was brought  into question.  B l a c k s accounted f o r  189 over twelve p e r c e n t o f new r e c r u i t s .  The s i t u a t i o n was not l i k e l y  away.  t h a t t h i s problem was i m p o s s i b l e t o  The CNO and h i s managers found  s o l v e completely and almost  to go  i m p o s s i b l e to a m e l i o r a t e as the m i l i t a r i s t  o f f i c e r s c o n t i n u e d t o a c t so as to i n c r e a s e b l a c k e x p e r i e n c e o f r a c i s m . I t was n o t o n l y m i l i t a r i s t  racism that Blacks protested.  M a n a g e r i a l use of c e n t r a l i z e d bureaucracy, t i o n , c r e a t e d widespread Blacks.  The m a n a g e r i a l  complaint  ship.  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among navy p e r s o n n e l  manipula-  including  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s c h a r g e p o l i c y was the i n i t i a l  i n the Connie s t r i k e .  managerial  e s p e c i a l l y t h e i r paper  The C a p t a i n was c e r t a i n l y f o l l o w i n g  p o l i c y when he d e c i d e d t o d i s c h a r g e some o f the B l a c k s on the  H i s l a c k o f s e n s i t i v i t y t o B l a c k i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h i s might be  blamed on a m i l i t a r i s t  o u t l o o k but i t was h i g h e r m a n a g e r i a l  p o l i c y that  was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the Captain's d i s c h a r g i n g o f d i s s i d e n t s . The B l a c k a n a l y s i s of t h e i r s i t u a t i o n d i d n o t a t t e n d to f a c e t o - f a c e s i t u a t i o n s but i n d i c t e d the whole p r o c e s s of assignment, punishment and d i s c h a r g e .  The p r o c e s s was what they wanted reviewed as  they s a t i n on the C o n s t e l l a t i o n ' s main mess decks. of assignment, promotion to B l a c k s .  The m a n a g e r i a l  and d i s c h a r g e d i d r e s u l t i n a g e n e r a l  The B l a c k a n a l y s i s f i t t e d .  The charges  the e f f e c t o f c h a l l e n g i n g the Navy managers' a b i l i t y promises  promotion,  policy  disadvantage  of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n had to f u l f i l l  their  of equality. The B l a c k r e s i s t a n c e cases had each taken o n l y a b r i e f o r g a n i z i n g  e f f o r t but the s o l i d a r i t y o f the r e s i s t e r s as they a c t e d w i t h i n d i g n a t i o n and assurance  t h a t the Navy was wrong and they'were r i g h t was g e n u i n e l y  f r i g h t e n i n g to the navy managers. ability  I t c h a l l e n g e d a l e g i t i m a c y based on  to o f f e r j o b o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t o o f f e r them w i t h o u t  r e g a r d t o race.  190 B l a c k u p r i s i n g s were p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  throughout the Navy.  Of the two B l a c k  r e s i s t a n c e events the unorganized f i g h t on the K i t t y Hawk was l e s s problem f o r the managers. it  A r i o t o r f i g h t i s dangerous to the s h i p w h i l e  i s happening, but when i t . i s over i t can be used as e v i d e n c e of  i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and a g g r e s s i o n of r e s i s t e r s . can on  be j u s t i f i e d  the C o n s t e l l a t i o n  were q u i t e d i f f e r e n t  civilian  were c a l l e d  They  i n they would  T h i s was an immediate  challenge  the a u t h o r i t y of the C a p t a i n and the s h i p ' s o f f i c e r s . B l a c k s a i l o r s ' a n a l y s i s of t h e i r s i t u a t i o n was a c c u r a t e , the  Navy was g u i l t y  of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r a c i s m and t h e i r demands t h a t i t be  c o r r e c t e d were d i r e c t e d measures a v a i l a b l e  a t the a c t u a l l o c a t i o n  o f the problem.  The  w i t h i n the m a n a g e r i a l system of a u t h o r i t y when they  were used i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n  to attempt to r e s t o r e n a v a l c o n t r o l  likely  to c o n f i r m the B l a c k c r i t i q u e  them.  Direct  measures of c o n t r o l  would recommend tended to r e s u l t response to c o r r e c t i n g  were  of the navy as d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  o f the k i n d t h a t the m i l i t a r i s t i n e x a c e r b a t i n g the s i t u a t i o n .  the s i t u a t i o n  against ideology  The  d i r e c t l y by meeting B l a c k demands f o r  e l i m i n a t i o n o f r a c i s m i n the Navy was made d i f f i c u l t both because of  potential of  as on the K i t t y Hawk.  They m a i n t a i n e d o r d e r as they used the approved  t a c t i c of the sit-down s t r i k e .  The  the  strikes  The B l a c k s t r i k e r s were sure of what they were  t h a t as soon as p r o p e r h i g h e r a u t h o r i t i e s  be shown to be r i g h t .  The  even though the o r i g i n a l com-  d o i n g , they were not r e a c t i n g out o f t e r r o r felt  Punishment of the r i o t e r s  on the b a s i s of c u l t u r a l v a l u e s of o r d e r .  p l a i n t s were s i m i l a r .  to  of a  r e s i s t a n c e to such changes from w h i t e s a i l o r s but a l s o because  the p o s i t i o n  of the m i l i t a r i s t s on r a c i s m .  The m a n a g e r i a l method of  191 handling  the s i t u a t i o n a f t e r some of the e a r l i e r measures of d i r e c t  r e p r e s s i o n had  been shown to c r e a t e more t r o u b l e than they s o l v e d , was  handle the immediate s i t u a t i o n by promises, not  t h r e a t s , and  to  then to  d i v i d e the group up which weakened t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y and  broke down t h e i r  organization.  separate  and  T h e i r s o l i d a r i t y was  m i l d punishments.  The  Navy.  The  event was  trials  l a t t e r a l s o have l e s s grounds f o r r e a c t i o n s  from the B l a c k movement i n the The  f u r t h e r weakened by  community.  c o n t r o l l e d but  the example c o n t i n u e s  p o t e n t i a l i t y for a c t i v e Black resistance s t i l l  to worry  exists.  the  It i s  a v e r y d i f f i c u l t problem because i t s s o l u t i o n would r e q u i r e c o n t r o l over militarist  o f f i c e r s and  a t t e m p t i n g to get  t h i s c o n t r o l but  problem they a r e n ' t not  invent  likely  paper m a n i p u l a t i o n or by  system.  to be  successful.  cannot be  do  educational  d i s s i d e n t admirals  the House Armed S e r v i c e s  Managers  are  the dimensions of  the  The  militarist  programs or group s o c i a l c i v i l i a n economic and  Preventing  Blacks  psychological social support i n  from g e t t i n g  p o l i t i c a l power i s a matter of economic i n t e r e s t i n the home s t a t e s some of these p o l i t i c i a n s . middle-class Many n o r t h e r n  Blacks  w h i t e s ' anger and  of these are a l s o a n t i - B l a c k . Navy has likely  are a l s o used as scapegoats f o r  f e a r s about d e t e r i o r a t i n g urban  as w e l l as s o u t h e r n p o l i t i c i a n s h o l d  b a s i s of support from a n t i - p o o r  interests. (Lauter  and  Howe 1971)  of  the  areas.  t h e i r o f f i c e on  (Piven and  been somewhat more r a c i s t than the g e n e r a l  to be  did  o b l i t e r a t e d from the Navy by  found e n t h u s i a s t i c p o l i t i c a l  Committee.  officers  they produce i t i n d e p e n d e n t l y .  simply  I t i s i n t e g r a t e d i n the U.S. The  society.  considering  i n s t i t u t i o n a l r a c i s m nor Racism i t s e l f  therapy.  b a s i c changes i n U.S.  the  Cloward 1971) In the p a s t  Many the  s o c i e t y , i t i s not  allowed to become v e r y much l e s s , as the CNO  found  out.  192 Black consciousness situation.  T h e i r anger cannot  i n c l u d e s an a c c u r a t e a n a l y s i s of be d e f l e c t e d onto mid-management  The m a n a g e r i a l programs of paper m a n i p u l a t i o n of m i l i t a r i s t s , promotion  of B l a c k s and p s y c h o l o g i c a l p e r s u a s i o n may  t e n s i o n p o i n t s but r a c i s m a l s o o p e r a t e s Class d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s b u i l t  through  American, i d e o l o g y and  lifers.  selective  remove some of  class  the  discrimination.  i n t o US Navy o r g a n i z a t i o n as i t i s b u i l t  i n t o U n i t e d S t a t e s s o c i e t y and y e t t h i s i s not r e c o g n i z e d by or  their  managerial  so cannot be d e a l t w i t h f o r i t s e l f .  As more  B l a c k s are a t . t h e bottom as p o o r l y s c h o o l e d r e c r u i t s they w i l l the f e e l i n g s of e x p l o i t a t i o n and h u m i l i a t i o n t h a t poor white i s i n t e r p r e t e d as white o p p r e s s i o n of B l a c k s . to  receive administrative discharges.  to  be e x p l o i t e d and  experience  EMs  More B l a c k s w i l l  do.  continue  People a t the bottom w i l l  to f e e l t h a t they a r e .  continue  Inasmuch as t h i s i s seen  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , B l a c k s w i l l c o n t i n u e to j o i n  This  as  t o g e t h e r to a c t a g a i n s t i t .  They have the s o l i d a r i t y to do t h i s e f f e c t i v e l y , t h a t i s , to a c t u a l l y i n t e r f e r e w i t h navy work.  Michael K l a r e i s probably r i g h t i n h i s  p r e d i c t i o n t h a t as U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r e i g n p o l i c y c o n t i n u e s to r e q u i r e a l a r g e navy, r a c i a l s t r i k e s and  fights w i l l  continue  ( K l a r e 1974).  193  ./  Chapter  THE  Fifteen  INTERPRETATIVE BASES OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND  As we  SOLIDARITY:  CONSCIENCE  have seen, the B l a c k movement was  more e f f e c t i v e than the  anti-war movement i n d e v e l o p i n g r e s i s t a n c e to n a v a l a u t h o r i t y . Black s a i l o r s ,  the f o r m a t i o n of group s o l i d a r i t y appears  important a s p e c t of t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s . succeed  i n creating this.  and shared and  to have been an  The anti-war movement d i d not  In t h i s chapter we w i l l l o o k a t d i f f e r e n c e s  between the two movements w i t h r e s p e c t to how developed  Among  in-group i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s were  the r e l a t i o n of in-group i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to  how  c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n c o u l d be m o b i l i z e d . Both movements shared problems of o r g a n i z i n g p r e s e n t e d by way  i n which EMs  ships with l i t t l e  were d i s p e r s e d throughout opportunity f o r contact.  the s h i p as w e l l as on  different  As we have seen i n P a r t  communications were c o n t r o l l e d by the n a v a l a u t h o r i t i e s and continuous s u r v e i l a n c e and a c t i v e r e p r e s s i o n of p o t e n t i a l  the  there  One  was  trouble.  O b e r s c h a l l has noted t h a t masses o f people when r e a c t i n g to s i t u a t i o n s  so  o p p r e s s i v e t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n i s prevented, r e l y on t h e i r common c u l t u r e and on t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y because of t h e i r sense of a common f a t e ( O b e r s c h a l l 1973:317).  T h i s suggests a d i f f e r e n c e between the two move-  ments which goes beyond the f a c t t h a t i n B l a c k a c t i o n s t h e r e was a p p e a l to t h e i r own  a direct  i n t e r e s t s whereas the anti-war movement i n v o l v e d an  a p p e a l o f broad concerns  f o r other people.  I t suggests the importance  of  the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e base as c r u c i a l f o r i n t e r a c t i o n i n the c o n f r o n t a t i o n s themselves  and  f o r how  these c o n f r o n t a t i o n s were o r g a n i z e d and  developed.  194 Roberta Ash i n h e r model o f movement a c t i o n has s t r e s s e d t h e need to i n v e s t i g a t e t h e l i n k between shared c o n d i t i o n s , and the emergence of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f common i n t e r e s t s i s not enough  to account f o r t h e emergence o f group a c t i o n . connection  According  i n v o l v e s i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e formulated  to h e r t h i s  i n a shared  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a s i t u a t i o n common t o members o f the group.  The  e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e B l a c k movement i n m o b i l i z i n g i n a h i g h l y c o n t r o l l e d and  r e p r e s s i v e context  can be understood i n these terms.fAsh  1972)  In t h e B l a c k a c t i o n s , meetings preceded t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s by o n l y a few days i n one case and two weeks i n the o t h e r .  B l a c k EMs a l r e a d y  shared " B l a c k e x p e r i e n c e " as c i v i l i a n s and t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f h a v i n g b e l i e v e d r e c r u i t e r s when they promised e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s l a t e r disappointment.  When use o f B l a c k power g e s t u r e s  were outlawed t h e i r i n d i g n a t i o n was shared. to t a l k to each o t h e r  to f i n d  common s i t u a t i o n i n c l u d e d  t h i s out.  i n t h e Navy and  and B l a c k h a i r c u t s  I t was n o t n e c e s s a r y f o r them  Their recognition of their  r e c o g n i t i o n o f common u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  s t o r i e s o f the shore f i g h t o f the K i t t y Hawk and the p u n i t i v e of t h e C o n s t e l l a t i o n reached B l a c k s , Neither  to do.  argument were needed f o r a c t i o n .  charismatic  l e a d e r s h i p nor  The o n l y q u e s t i o n was what  On t h e K i t t y Hawk even t h i s was not a q u e s t i o n .  perceived  discharges  t h e r e was one response, anger.  long d i s c u s s i o n s , s o c i a l gatherings,  persuasive  As t h e  The s i t u a t i o n was  as a t t a c k , and s e l f - d e f e n s e was t h e common response. What t h e B l a c k s  d i d do i n both events was t o c r e a t e mutinous  s i t u a t i o n s unprecedented i n American n a v a l h i s t o r y .  The Navy was a b l e t o  g a i n c o n t r o l but n o t u n t i l some hours and days o f d e l i c a t e management. think t h i s a b i l i t y of Blacks  to a c t together  r e s t e d on t h e s o l i d a r i t y o f  I  195 common understanding  as w e l l as shared i d e n t i t y .  "Consciousness  o c c u r s d u r i n g r e c r u i t m e n t to i d e n t i t y movements and may time, but once the new the p i e c e s f a l l from the new  raising"  take c o n s i d e r a b l e  movement paradigm r e p l a c e s the e s t a b l i s h e d i d e o l o g y ,  into place.  view without  New  s i t u a t i o n s can be c o r r e c t l y  c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h other members.  interpreted Brother-  s i s t e r h o o d can be e s t a b l i s h e d by simply r e c o g n i z i n g each other as group members. In a d d i t i o n to s h a r i n g the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e base B l a c k s shared ease o f v i s u a l i d e n t i t y . s k i n , many do.  Although not a l l B l a c k s have t a n , brown o r b l a c k  R e c o g n i t i o n of each o t h e r by s k i n c o l o r , h a i r or s t y l e of  language and movement was shared o u t l o o k w i t h o u t I t was  often possible.  not as easy f o r . t h e a n t i - w a r EMs  and down the chow l i n e and  intended.  enough to i n d i c a t e a  t o i d e n t i f y each o t h e r .  C o r a l Sea and EMs  h a i r as a c l u e t o . l i b e r t a r i a n a t t i t u d e s .  The wearing  T h i s was  the n e c e s s i t y of knowing the i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l l y .  codes were r e l a x e d on the USS  hair.  The  hair  t h e r e were a b l e to use  The a c t i v i s t EMs  would walk up  g i v e out t h e i r l i t e r a t u r e to those w i t h l o n g e r  o f a u n i f o r m , i n a u n i f o r m way,  It identifies  works as i t was  probably  the wearers as each the same and masks any  d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the group.  sub-  The darker s k i n of most B l a c k s s u b v e r t s  German s a i l o r s i n the m u t i n i e s a t the end of the F i r s t World War s t r a n d s of red t h r e a d to i d e n t i f y those who c o u l d be removed q u i c k l y i f unsympathetic and Langhorne  an  were w i t h the mutiny.  people approached.  this.  wore These  (Schubert  1933)  B l a c k s saw  themselves  i n d i g n i t y with other Blacks.  as i n a common s i t u a t i o n of t h r e a t or  Ships r u l e s s i n g l e d them out and gave them  common cause as B l a c k s - as i n the r u l e a g a i n s t over t h r e e B l a c k s w a l k i n g  196 together.  T h i s common s i t u a t i o n was a l s o e v o c a t i v e o f c o n s i d e r a b l e emo-  t i o n , o f anger o r f e a r .  In t h e K i t t y Hawk events  shared  i n d i g n a t i o n was  i n c r e a s e d by t h e s t o r y about B l a c k s b e i n g a t t a c k e d on shore l e a v e i n t h e Phillipines left  f o l l o w e d by the u n s u c c e s s f u l meetings on t h e s h i p .  As they  the l a s t meeting they thought they were b e i n g a t t a c k e d by the marines.  T h e i r immediate common response was s e l f - d e f e n s e of themselves and o t h e r Blacks.  The shout o f " t h e y ' r e k i l l i n g our b r o t h e r s " and the a c t i o n s of  initiating  some o f t h e f i g h t i n g on lower The  Connie s t r i k e s developed  There was concern  over a s l i g h t l y  longer p e r i o d .  about the f u t u r e o f B l a c k s on t h e s h i p because o f t h e  rumor o f t h e d i s c h a r g e s o f B l a c k s . t a l k w i t h t h e group they f e l t  When t h e c a p t a i n r e f u s e d r e p e a t e d l y t o  t h e r e was n o t h i n g e l s e t o do but stand  or t h e i r s i t u a t i o n s would get worse. effort  decks i s not s u r p r i s i n g .  The d o c k s i d e sit-down was a f i n a l  t o s t a y t o g e t h e r u s i n g t h e i r combined power t o keep r e p r i s a l s  b e i n g g i v e n , as w e l l as to c o n t i n u e t h e attempt to r e d r e s s grievances. very high.  their  from original  Through t h e s e s t r i k e s t h e l e v e l o f anger and i n d i g n a t i o n was A w h i t e e x - s a i l o r t o l d me o f how he was a s s i g n e d t o a s s i s t i n  the navy i n v e s t i g a t i o n f o l l o w i n g t h e s t r i k e . Black s a i l o r s , by  firm  they were s t i l l  He t a l k e d w i t h some o f the  deeply angry and he h i m s e l f was v e r y  shaken  t h e i r emotion. T h i s form o f shared  sailors.  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was not a v a i l a b l e to anti-war  The anti-war p o s i t i o n had n o t developed  as p a r t o f a common  c i v i l i a n e x p e r i e n c e or even i d e n t i c a l m i l i t a r y e x p e r i e n c e . some shared  elements as a p o s i t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n o f l i f e  f o l l o w e d by disappointment encountered. varied.  There were  i n the Navy was  as m i l i t a r y purposes and' methods were  The content o f the e x p e c t a t i o n s and t h e l a t e r  re-orientation  There was a shared a n t i - m i l i t a r y view but t h i s was not i n t e r p r e t e d  197 as fundamental to t h e i r own l i f e centered  situations.  The a n t i - w a r  perspective  on a concern f o r the people who were s u f f e r i n g and d y i n g i n  Vietnam.  A c t i o n was based on a r e l u c t a n c e  i n harming them.  to j o i n i n f u r t h e r  To get to t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e  complicity  t h i n k i n g was  needed as w e l l as some i d e a of c o n n e c t i o n s from d a i l y navy assignments to the bombing o f p e o p l e . oppression.  I t involved imaginative  p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n others'  The f i n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s were t h e r e f o r e more v a r i e d  p o s i t i o n s based on a common and d i r e c t p e r s o n a l  than  experience.  In the peace a c t i o n s , a c t i v i s t s were a l s o aware of some oppress i o n of themselves, but t h i s was a consequence of t h e i r o r g a n i z i n g and they didn't and  f e e l t h a t i t was extremely u n f a i r .  They p r o t e s t e d  their  treatment  o f t e n took l e g a l a c t i o n on the b a s i s of t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s but  they were not i n d i g n a n t  n o r s u r p r i s e d when the Navy made counter-moves.  There was even a minor sense o f triumph because the Navy had n o t i c e d and been annoyed w i t h t h e i r a c t i o n s .  Those people who had developed  opposition  to t h e war and were t a k i n g s e r i o u s r e s i s t a n c e a c t i o n s had o f t e n gone through a p e r i o d o f e m o t i o n a l anguish as they reached t h e i r d e c i s i o n s to act. trol.  But by the time o f a c t u a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n  t h i s was u s u a l l y under con-  They were more l i k e l y to meet the events w i t h a sense of tragedy  than o f anger.  The a c t i v i s t s d i d not respond to attempts to c o n t r o l the  movement w i t h g r e a t e r  i n d i g n a t i o n and anger as d i d the B l a c k s .  Nor was  t h e r e a b a s i s f o r a widespread response of i n d i g n a t i o n among EMs. The organization,  K i t t y Hawk and C o n s t e l l a t i o n anti-war campaigns l i t e r a t u r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s , extensive  events and morale b u i l d i n g o c c a s i o n s .  press  involved  coverage,  social  The v o t e from the s a i l o r s on the  C o n s t e l l a t i o n was s l i g h t l y over h a l f f o r s t a y i n g home.  Only twenty-two  198 p e r c e n t of the s a i l o r s , had v o t e d .  The n i n e who took s a n c t u a r y from the  C o n s t e l l a t i o n were o n e - t h i r d of one p e r c e n t of the crew. percentage  Even a s m a l l e r  took s a n c t u a r y from the K i t t y Hawk, seven of a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t h r e e thousand Mispillion.)  e n l i s t e d men.  (The two o t h e r s w i t h them were from the USS  In s i m i l a r a c t i o n s on o t h e r c a r r i e r s from one to t e n  p u b l i c l y r e f u s e d to r e t u r n to t h e i r s h i p s .  The low numbers may  indicate  the l i m i t of anti-war commitment a v a i l a b l e among s a i l o r s a t t h a t  time.  However, to a c t i v a t e t h i s s m a l l r e s i s t a n c e i t had been n e c e s s a r y to do c o n t i n u a l o r g a n i z i n g , i n d i v i d u a l c o u n s e l i n g and b u i l d i n g of community support.  There were o c c a s i o n s when l a r g e numbers o f the anti-war  people  came t o g e t h e r but the s i t u a t i o n s d i d not develop i n t o r e s i s t a n c e . when a r r e s t s were made a t the s a n c t u a r y s i t e s t h e r e was no more symbolic r e s i s t a n c e .  Even  than  An a p p e a l to c o n s c i e n c e does not seem to be an  adequate base f o r the s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n needed i n mass  resistance  7 confrontations. The  l i n k between shared c o n d i t i o n s and the emergence of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s can now be f i l l e d  in.  A c t u a l shared c o n d i t i o n s become group e x p e r i -  ence when i n d i v i d u a l s use the same i n t e r p r e t a t i v e mode and a t the same time are c o n s c i o u s o f t h e i r i d e n t i t y w i t h each o t h e r .  I f they i n t e r p r e t  c o n d i t i o n s as o p p r e s s i o n t h i s base p r e p a r e s the members f o r j o i n t An opponent's moves p e r c e i v e d as t h r e a t e n i n g may then r e s u l t  action.  i n the v e r y  r a p i d and a p p a r e n t l y spontaneous development of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . a c t i o n s o f h i g h commitment and unanimity  their  Mass  c a n , a r i s e without extensive p r i o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n o r h i e r a r c h y of a u t h o r i t y , as i n the C o n s t e l l a t i o n  strikes  and the Kitty,Hawk f i g h t . 7 The c i v i l i a n s t r e e t c o n f r o n t a t i o n s of the d r a f t r e s i s t a n c e movement and youth peace movement i n v o l v e d an i n t e r p r e t i v e base of both c o n s c i e n c e and c o n s c i o u s n e s s and they a l s o were preceded by e x t e n s i v e p l a n n i n g and o r g a n i zation. I don't t h i n k they a r e a c l e a r case a g a i n s t t h i s statement.  199 Not a l l s o c i a l movements have t h i s b a s i s  for solidarity.  a n t i - w a r movement i s a type which emerges when i n d i v i d u a l s others' rather  than t h e i r own  T h i s base may  as i n d i v i d u a l s on the b a s i s  c o n s c i e n c e , but c o o p e r a t i v e a c t i o n continually  interpret  c o n d i t i o n s as o p p r e s s i v e and come t o d e f i n e  t h e i r own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h i s i n a shared a n a l y s i s . p r e p a r e the'members f o r a c t i o n  The  of i n d i v i d u a l  can o n l y be taken i f s o c i a l  interaction  v e r i f y i n g the mutuality of t h e i r understandings i s a v a i l a b l e .  T h i s was the case o f the anti-war movement based on c o n s c i e n c e .  It i s a  type of movement which i s much more dependent on openness and a c c e s s i bility  o f channels o f communication between members.  200  Chapter  MANAGERIAL CRISIS:  Sixteen  RESISTANCE AMONG ENLISTED  PRECIPITATES CONFLICT BETWEEN.'MANAGERS' AND  Neither t i v e i n breaking  MEN  'MILITARISTS'  the anti-war movement nor the B l a c k movement were e f f e c down o r changing the a u t h o r i t y s t r u c t u r e o f the Navy as a  d i r e c t consequence of t h e i r a c t i o n s .  They d i d , however, have an i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t on the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e of a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the n a v a l which brought about the c h a l l e n g e case s t u d i e s as the "Admirals  hierarchy  to Zumwalt's a u t h o r i t y d e s c r i b e d  Reaction".  i n the  T h i s e f f e c t of the movements  came about through the i n t e r a c t i o n of p u b l i c p r e s s u r e s  c r e a t e d by the  movement a c t i o n s ; the response of the 'managerial' p o l i c y makers to t h i s pressure;  i t s e f f e c t s on the bases o f a u t h o r i t y of those who a c t u a l l y  r e l i e d on t h e i r a u t h o r i t y f o r the day-to-day work of running the Navy, i n p a r t i c u l a r the NCOs; and the response of m i l i t a r i s t  o f f i c e r s and NCOs to  t h i s t h r e a t both to t h e i r a u t h o r i t y , and, as they saw i t , to the Navy. Both B l a c k and a n t i - w a r movement a c t i o n s drew p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n to a s p e c t s o f the workings of the Navy. the p r e s s ,  This r e s u l t e d i n p u b l i c pressures, i n  on the Congress and i n the c o u r t s which c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the Navy's j u d i c i a l system.  P u b l i c pressure  came a t a  time when the Navy was concerned.to change i t s bases of r e c r u i t m e n t  and to  emphasize working i n the Navy as fundamentally s i m i l a r to employment i n a c i v i l i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h the a d d i t i o n a l advantages of o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r t r a i n i n g and advancement. leaders  and by s u p p o r t e r s  The l i b e r t a r i a n c r i t i q u e made both by B l a c k of the a n t i - w a r movement c h a l l e n g e d  t h i s view of  201 the Navy and brought out the continued and  patterns  existence  of a r a c i a l caste  system  of a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s of. a t r a d i t i o n a l k i n d which were  repre-  sented as i n f r i n g i n g on the i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , t h a t i s , t h e i r guaranteed r i g h t s as c i t i z e n s  ( F i n n 1971).  Navy r e c r u i t m e n t  also  f e l l o f f and the percentage o f t r a i n e d p e r s o n n e l w i l l i n g to r e - e n l i s t decreased a l a r m i n g l y . but  Shortages of new r e c r u i t s were f i l l e d by the d r a f t  t h e r e was no s i m i l a r f o r c e f o r r e - e n l i s t m e n t s . Zumwalt's response was t o take s t e p s , among them h i s Z-Grams, t o  b r i n g n a v a l p r a c t i c e s more i n t o l i n e w i t h s t a n d a r d s i m p l i e d by these p u b l i c criticisms. expression hierarchy.  The Z-Gram reforms were not intended  to encourage p o l i t i c a l  among E n l i s t e d Men nor to make r e a l changes i n the n a v a l They d i d a l l o w more space f o r p e r s o n a l  a wider range o f p e r s o n a l  s t y l e s o f dress  action.  They  permitted  and they promoted the m a n a g e r i a l  modes of i n t e r p e r s o n a l e x e r c i s e of a u t h o r i t y s t r e s s i n g c o o p e r a t i o n teamwork r a t h e r  than command and obedience.  Zumwalt h i m s e l f  example through h i s p o l i c y of making p e r s o n a l were e x p l i c i t l y d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t strategy  f o r dealing with  appearances.  racist practices.  'turbulence'  and  s e t an S e v e r a l Z-Grams  The m a n a g e r i a l  i n the F l e e t d e a l t d i r e c t l y w i t h  movement a c t i o n s by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e methods and i n d i r e c t l y by a t t e m p t i n g to reduce r a c i s t p r a c t i c e s of the Navy and by l i m i t i n g the m i l i t a r i s t t i c e s o f a u t h o r i t y t h a t had been i d e n t i f i e d as most These p o l i c i e s c r e a t e d of a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the Navy. was the most p i n c h .  prac-  objectionable.  problems w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l p r a c t i c e s  The NCOs were i n the p o s i t i o n where  They were r e s p o n s i b l e  there  f o r seeing  t h a t t h e i r crews  were p r e p a r e d f o r i n s p e c t i o n s and t h a t the many exact  r e g u l a t i o n s were  conformed to as w e l l as f o r the r o u t i n e c o o r d i n a t i o n of day-to-day work  202 on board s h i p .  Under the Z-Gram program they were h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r  c a r r y i n g out these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and a t the same time a v o i d i n g i n f r i n g e m e n t of the c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s of e n l i s t e d men.  l i n k i n an a u t h o r i t a r i a n system.  They were the l a s t  They passed on unwelcome o r d e r s t h a t had  been d e c i d e d from above f o r reasons u n r e l a t e d to the immediate of the work crew.  interests  They were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s e e i n g t h a t the work and the  s a i l o r s ' p e r s o n a l l i v i n g arrangements were c a r r i e d out a c c o r d i n g to p r e c i s e navy r e g u l a t i o n s .  In doing so they depended upon t h e i r a u t h o r i t y i n  f a c e - t o - f a c e command r e l a t i o n s . militaristic  They depended upon a u t h o r i t y of the  type which meant t h a t whether they chose to use t h i s  or n o t , they c o u l d i s s u e commands and expect  style  them to be obeyed or take  p u n i t i v e a c t i o n i f they were n o t .  T h i s a u t h o r i t y depended on the support  of the n a v a l h i e r a r c h y .  p o l i c i e s t h r e a t e n e d to d e p r i v e them of  t h i s support.  Zumwalt's  They were s t i l l  expected  to see t h a t the work got done and  t h a t navy r o u t i n e s and r e g u l a t i o n s were conformed t o , but they were expected  to do so without  i n f r i n g i n g the r i g h t s of the EMs.  not count on the support o f t h e . n a v a l h i e r a r c h y i f they used p r a c t i c e s which were not i n agreement w i t h o f f i c i a l Militarist  policies.  Both were alarmed  a t the o c c a s i o n a l  g r u d g i n g c o o p e r a t i o n and f r e q u e n t i n f r a c t i o n o f minor r u l e s of  e t i q u e t t e as w e l l as at the d i r e c t anti-war a c t i o n s . to s a l u t e ,  authority  o f f i c e r s and NGOs came t o g e t h e r i n support of the  m i l i t a r i s t view of n a v a l a u t h o r i t y . rudeness,  They c o u l d  When a s a i l o r  they v i e w e d . t h e i r a u t h o r i t y as under a t t a c k .  d i s t i n g u i s h between a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t s , anti-war p e o p l e , .Black power a c t i v i s t s or f o r e i g n agents. ' s u b v e r s i v e agents' or e a s i l y l e d 'dupes'.  failed  They d i d not pro-communist,  These were a l l c o n s i d e r e d T h e i r i d e o l o g y of a u t h o r i t y  203 prescribed  immediate and f o r c e f u l a c t i o n i n response to these t h r e a t s .  When Zumwalt's p o l i c i e s prevented, these responses, he and.the m a n a g e r i a l p o s i t i o n he r e p r e s e n t e d  came to be seen as a s e r i o u s t h r e a t to n a v a l  a u t h o r i t y i n terms o f t h e m i l i t a r i s t  ideology.  B l a c k u p r i s i n g s o f themselves were n o t seen by m i l i t a r i s t s as a direct  challenge  does r e c o g n i z e to i t .  t o the bases o f n a v a l a u t h o r i t y .  The m i l i t a r i s t  t h i s k i n d o f t h r e a t , but t h e r e a r e p r e s c r i b e d  preserving  authority.  saw as e s s e n t i a l to  They thought t h a t the events were evidence f o r t h e i r  p r e d i c t i o n o f the danger, o f the " p e r m i s s i v e n e s s " They b e l i e v e d prevention  t h e i r own " g e t tough"  as w e l l as c o n t r o l . ,  they were saved a t e s t o f t h i s . on t h e i r hands b e i n g  of managerial  the m i l i t a r i s t  leadership.  s o l u t i o n s would have worked both as  Because they were n o t i n complete charge, F a i l u r e s a t s h i p l e v e l c o u l d be blamed  t i e d by h i g h e r  managerial a u t h o r i t y .  F o r example,  the C a p t a i n ' s commands t h a t p r e c i p i t a t e d the K i t t y Hawk f i g h t  by  responses  The r e a l l y s e r i o u s problem was the m a n a g e r i a l l e a d e r s h i p which  p r e v e n t e d the p u n i t i v e a c t i o n which m i l i t a r i s t s  of men.  ideology  conformed to  p r e s c r i p t i o n s f o r responses t o non-compliance o f a number  The a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  the m i l i t a r i s t s .  o f t h i s a c t i o n was not c a l l e d  The c o n g r e s s i o n a l  into  question  sub-committee r e p o r t which took a  g e n e r a l l y m i l i t a r i s t p o s i t i o n documents the d i s r u p t i v e e f f e c t s o f t h e Captain's orders question The  that contradicted  about the c o r r e c t n e s s  handling  the E x e c u t i v e  o f these o r d e r s  O f f i c e r but r a i s e s no  (HASC 1973:17674-17676).  o f the r a c i a l i n c i d e n t i n the P h i l i p p i n e s and the r e s t r i c t i o n  of B l a c k e x p r e s s i o n  o f s o l i d a r i t y on the s h i p were not q u e s t i o n e d .  militarist  d i d not recognize  ideology  a v a l i d basis f o r Black  The  solidarity  or a problem o f i n j u s t i c e s i n how.Blacks were t r e a t e d i n the Navy, o r how  204 m i l i t a r i s t s ' m e a s u r e s themselves,  such as the o r d e r f o r the marines to  advance, c o u l d d i r e c t l y add to the c r i s i s o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n such a context.  The C a p t a i n ' s a c t i o n would be seen i n the terms o f the m i l i t a r i s t  i d e o l o g y as e n t i r e l y i n keeping w i t h proper procedures control.  for maintaining  They would have no e x p l a n a t o r y v a l u e f o r the r e s u l t i n g The m i l i t a r i s t  ideology i d e n t i f i e d  fights.  the c r u c i a l t h r e a t to  a u t h o r i t y not i n the c o n f r o n t a t i o n s themselves,  nor i n the r o l e t h a t  m i l i t a r i s t measures p l a y e d i n them, but. i n Zumwalt's p o l i c y o f " p e r m i s s i v e n e s s " i n h a n d l i n g them.  T h i s was the b a s i s o f m i l i t a r i s t  r e s i s t a n c e t o the CNOs a u t h o r i t y .  The concerns  a c t i o n s and about how the reforms a u t h o r i t y and undercut  l i m i t e d t h e NCOs and s h i p s  officers'  t h e i r c h a i n o f command came t o g e t h e r i n g e n e r a l i z e d  r e s i s t a n c e among NCOs and . o f f i c e r s . orders.  about h a n d l i n g o f movement  They complained  and they o b s t r u c t e d  At the h i g h e r l e v e l s o f the h i e r a r c h y , m i l i t a r i s t  support w i t h i n Congress and elsewhere o u t s i d e the Navy.  admirals  sought  The CNO was  surprised. Zumwalt c o u l d understand  how e n l i s t e d people were r e l u c t a n t to  f o l l o w o r d e r s they c o n s i d e r e d h a r a s s i n g , b u t he was s u r p r i s e d when NCOs, s h i p s o f f i c e r s and f i n a l l y h i s top l e v e l a d m i r a l s r e s i s t e d . e v i d e n t l y thought  h i s a u t h o r i t y would be s u f f i c i e n t  as i t p r o b a b l y had been i n o t h e r a r e a s . assessed  the depth o f m i l i t a r i s t  or t h e i r p o l i t i c a l power o u t s i d e . reforms  as they l i m i t e d lower  their authority.  He had  t o get t h e i r  compliance  Zumwalt must n o t have c o r r e c t l y  o p p o s i t i o n , t h e i r support w i t h i n t h e Navy He must n o t have r e c o g n i z e d t h a t the  o f f i c e r s ' and NCOs d i s c r e t i o n a l s o l i m i t e d  He a c t e d as though t h e i r f a i l u r e to implement h i s  205 commands was managerial  simple i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n .  Obedience to o r d e r s i s expected  o f f i c e r s even though i t i s to be p r e s e n t e d by the  as i f i t was  v o l u n t a r y as i n team c o o p e r a t i o n .  h i s r a c e r e l a t i o n s reforms he became angry  subordinate  As Zumwalt proceeded  a t the l a c k of  of the n e c e s s i t y f o r change and both p u z z l e d and angry  by  with  understanding  at the  militarists'  insubordination. The K i t t y Hawk f i g h t and the CNO  and h i s m a n a g e r i a l  group.  the C o n s t e l l a t i o n s t r i k e s had These events  encouraged them i n t h e i r  view of the a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y of e l i m i n a t i n g r a c i s m .  Zumwalt took  s t e p o f a p u b l i c a t t a c k o n . h i s top m i l i t a r i s t o f f i c e r s . major p r i n c i p l e of m i l i t a r i s t  the  This violated  a  a u t h o r i t y which r e q u i r e s m a i n t a i n i n g a  common f r o n t o f support and agreement and the scenes.  alarmed  r e s e r v i n g c r i t i c i s m f o r behind  A u t h o r i t y i n terms of the m i l i t a r i s t  i d e o l o g y i s seen  to  depend upon t h i s and to be undermined when a s u p e r o r d i n a t e p u b l i c l y c r i t i c i z e s a s u b o r d i n a t e i n the l i n e of command.  The  l i n e of command  upon which Zumwalt depended f o r the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of h i s o r d e r s became i n this situation a basis for opposition.  Zumwalt was  attacked with  r i g h t e o u s i n d i g n a t i o n by the mutinous a d m i r a l s . The CNO  fought t h i s w i t h m a n a g e r i a l methods.  He  compromised  w i t h h i s d i s s i d e n t a d m i r a l s by a p u b l i c s e m i - r e t r a c t i o n but he a l s o h i s power to p u n i s h v i a paper m a n i p u l a t i o n . cooperated  c o u l d be promoted and  f o r promotion  and  Through BUPERS those t h a t  the r e s i s t i n g a d m i r a l s c o u l d be  i n some cases, r e t i r e d e a r l y .  He  and  c o v e r t l y by s e c r e t agents  S e r v i c e ( A l l Hands, February  1974).  of" the Naval  bypassed  increased surveilance  of management openly by d i r e c t s u p e r v i s i o n i n the I n s p e c t o r reviews  used  General  Intelligence  206 Controversy identified had  was o b s e r v a b l e  the CNO as the hero<  attempted h u m a n i s t i c  was o f another o p i n i o n .  in. n a t i o n a l media s t o r i e s  Even the GI p r e s s r e p o r t e d  that  t h a t the CNO  reforms. . The c o n g r e s s i o n a l sub-committee r e p o r t :  There was undoubtedly much o t h e r  submerged w e l l below the l e v e l o f media r e p o r t s .  infighting  As the months went  along  the m i l i t a r i s t recommendations o f the subcommittee were implemented. admirals  revolt  The  turned p o l i c y back to t h e "navy way" the managers had  t r i e d t o move beyond; however, the managers s t i l l h e l d the a u t h o r i z e d positions f o ri n i t i a t i n g action. The p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t s o f t h i s i n t e r n a l f i g h t i n terms o f navy wide i n s e c u r i t y o f NCOs and o f f i c e r s and the e f f e c t s o f t h i s on t h e i r work have not been assessed. continues.  T h i s must have been c o n s i d e r a b l e and t e n s i o n  The b a s i c cause o f these  t e n s i o n s was the r e s i s t a n c e a c t i o n s  of EMs even though they had produced t h i s e f f e c t q u i t e u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y . At.the  top, a d m i r a l s  l i m i t e d each,other's a u t h o r i t y by t h e i r d i r e c t  on o r even sabotage o f each o t h e r ' s not be assured  careers:  t h e i r o r d e r s would be backed.  on the s h i p s , o f f i c e r s  campaign t h a t r e s u l t e d i n having  could  The changes i n the C a p t a i n ' s  o r d e r s d u r i n g the C o n s t e l l a t i o n s t r i k e i s one example. Connie v o t e  attack  The e a r l i e r  the C a p t a i n r e p o r t to  Washington may a l s o have been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s t r a n s f e r on the eve o f the s h i p ' s d e p a r t u r e .  The v e r y m i l i t a r i s t judge i n the Ranger sabotage  t r i a l was f i n a l l y p u l l e d out on the excuse o f i l l n e s s and another m i l d e r person f i l l e d h i s p l a c e .  The a c t u a l , reasons f o r these  t r a n s f e r s are not  a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n , b u t t h e r e were many r e p o r t s o f the concern felt  f o r t h e i r navy c a r e e r s . i n t h e l i k e l i h o o d  deal with  resistance.  t h a t they  officers  too would have to  Whichever tack they might take they would be  s u b j e c t t o c r i t i c i s m by some s u p e r i o r .  207 This points be undermined which  t o another way i n which a u t h o r i t y c o n s t r u c t i o n  may  i s not by w i t h d r a w a l o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the s o c i a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y by s u b o r d i n a t e s , but b y u n c e r t a i n t y  about the  l e g i t i m a c y and bases o f a u t h o r i t y among those who a r e expected t o exercise i t .  T h i s was the i n d i r e c t  movements on the n a v a l h i e r a r c h y  impact o f t h e anti-war and B l a c k  through p u b l i c r e a c t i o n s and t h e responses  d i c t a t e d by the m a n a g e r i a l approach t o them.  208  CONCLUSION  T h i s study has i n v e s t i g a t e d the r e s i s t a n c e a c t i o n s and the p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t s on m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t y o f f i v e events o f group r e s i s t a n c e aboard U n i t e d  S t a t e s Navy s h i p s i n 1971 and 1972.  The events happened i n  the f i n a l y e a r s o f the Vietnam war and i n c l u d e d anti-war campaigns on the USS C o n s t e l l a t i o n and the USS K i t t y Hawk, sabotage on the USS Ranger, a f i g h t o f more than 200 B l a c k and w h i t e s a i l o r s on the USS K i t t y Hawk o f f Vietnam, and a s t r i k e o f 130 B l a c k s a i l o r s on the USS C o n s t e l l a t i o n . The  s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y , that i s , the way t h a t  a u t h o r i t y was produced, s t r e n g t h e n e d o r weakened by p a r t i c i p a n t s , was taken as a p r o b l e m a t i c .  Published  accounts by members o f the v a r i e d  i n v o l v e d were the primary sources o f i n f o r m a t i o n .  groups  These accounts appeared  i n o f f i c e r s ' p r o f e s s i o n a l j o u r n a l s , navy and c i v i l i a n news media, GI underground newspapers, campaign l i t e r a t u r e and i n the r e p o r t o f a  congressional  investigation. O f f i c e r s ' accounts used one o f two a v a i l a b l e i d e o l o g i e s . ideology  included  Each  assumptions about the p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r the  e x e r c i s e o f a u t h o r i t y and j u s t i f i c a t i o n s about the r i g h t t o demand compliance.  One was the c l a s s i c a l m i l i t a r i s t  the managerial, i d e o l o g y ideology  perspective  of c i v i l i a n c o r p o r a t e  society.  and the other was The m i l i t a r i s t  assumed t h a t a u t h o r i t y was m a n i f e s t e d by an i n f e r i o r ' s  obedience t o a s u p e r i o r ' s  commands i n a f o r m a l  face-to-face  as the s o c i a l and t e c h n o l o g i c a l s e t t i n g o f o l d navy s a i l i n g managerial ideology  exact  s e t t i n g such ships.  The  i d e n t i f i e d a u t h o r i t y as the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s e s so t h a t they r e s u l t e d i n compliance o f p e r s o n n e l .  209 The but  r e s i s t i n g s a i l o r s c r i t i c i z e d elements of both  h e l d p a r a l l e l i d e a s w i t h , t h e two  models of how  ideologies  a u t h o r i t y , works.  B l a c k movement a n a l y s i s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r a c i s m was  s i m i l a r to  the  m a n a g e r i a l model of a u t h o r i t y as, i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s w h i l e the s a i l o r s ' l i b e r t a r i a n c r i t i q u e of the m i l i t a r y assumed t h a t depended on obedience to f a c e - t o - f a c e  commands.  The  i n s t i t u t i o n a l or the command model l e d to d i f f e r e n t awareness of  century  provided  t e c h n o l o g y to which the m i l i t a r i s t temporary n a v a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and Ship o r g a n i z a t i o n  of  routine operations  to  varying  form of a u t h o r i t y was  technology was  i s embedded i n an e x t e n s i v e of a l a r g e a i r c r a f t  c e n t r a l processes involved  considerable  and  extent  i n operation  integral.  Con-  different.  bureaucratic  c a r r i e r are c a r r i e d on The  and  command-obedience  a u t h o r i t y are no of the s h i p .  apparatus.  The  longer  the  a u t h o r i t y of  the  on the i n s t i t u t i o n a l model of a u t h o r i t y which i s  major means of securing, course and  "Paper m a n i p u l a t i o n "  becomes  the  conformity. consequences of the cases of r e s i s t a n c e must  understood b o t h i n terms of the i d e o l o g i e s which guided them the key  and  the o v e r a l l c o o r d i n a t i o n of n a v a l work depends to a  i n the m a n a g e r i a l i d e o l o g y .  The  i n the Navy i n  shown to be v e r y  i n l a r g e p a r t by automatic p r o c e s s e s .  naval hierarchy  life  a d e s c r i p t i o n o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n  f a c e - t o - f a c e r e l a t i o n s h i p s of m i l i t a r i s t  identified  the  today i s based on a complex t e c h n o l o g y i n c l u d i n g  automated machinery and  represented  authority  t a c t i c s and  account by Herman M e l v i l l e of shipboard  the e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h  coordinated  anti-war  threat.  An  The  use  The  a s p e c t s of a u t h o r i t y i n the a c t i o n s  of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l context  of a u t h o r i t y  relations.  be  and  taken, and  i n terms  210 The  immediate r e s u l t of the r e s i s t a n c e events was a h i g h  c o n f l i c t between m a n a g e r i a l were alarmed  and m i l i t a r i s t  officers.  Militarist  a t the " p e r m i s s i v e n e s s " o f the managers and t r i e d  C h i e f o f N a v a l O p e r a t i o n s , A d m i r a l Zumwalt.  level  officers  to oust the  The s t r i k e o f t h e B l a c k move-  ment s a i l o r s was a more e f f e c t i v e c h a l l e n g e to a u t h o r i t y than the anti-war r e s i s t a n c e , p a r t l y because the i n s t i t u t i o n a l a n a l y s i s of the B l a c k c h a l l e n g e d the l e g i t i m a c y of navy a u t h o r i t y .  sailors  T h e i r p o s i t i o n c o u l d be  changed i n t o p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n q u i c k l y because B l a c k s a i l o r s shared a remarkable  s o l i d a r i t y i n commitment and u n d e r s t a n d i n g  s i v e p l a n n i n g o r f o r m a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of r e s i s t a n c e .  that obviated Further, their  e x p e r i e n c e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n continued i n s p i t e of c e r t a i n r e f o r m by m a n a g e r i a l  officers.  T h i s guaranteed  exten-  efforts  a readiness to r e s i s t .  The a t o m i z a t i o n of p e r s o n n e l by the t e c h n i c a l requirements f o r the d i v i s i o n of l a b o r and the m i l i t a r i s t maintenance of o p p o s i t i o n s between o f f i c e r s , NCOs and e n l i s t e d men made c o o p e r a t i o n i n r e s i s t a n c e d i f f i c u l t , but a t the same time produced people.  a n t i - m i l i t a r y s o l i d a r i t y among e n l i s t e d  Government use of the Navy added to t h i s by demands  f o r long  deployments a t s e a and by the u n p o p u l a r i t y of the Vietnam war. of the Navy to c o n t i n u e w i t h i t s work i n s p i t e of the s e r i o u s w i t h i n o f f i c e r s ' r a n k s , widespread  The a b i l i t y disagreements  d i s a f f e c t i o n o f e n l i s t e d p e o p l e and t h e  s p e c i f i c r e s i s t a n c e events was due c h i e f l y to i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n n e l i n g by m a n i p u l a t i o n of c a r e e r o p p o r t u n i t y .  T h i s was backed by US government  f u n d i n g o f r e l a t i v e l y h i g h pay l e v e l s f o r o f f i c e r s and e n l i s t e d p e o p l e . g e n e r a l we must conclude proved  extremely  In  t h a t the a u t h o r i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n of the US Navy  r e s i l i e n t and r e s i s t a n t  to e f f o r t s a t change.  Its organi-  z a t i o n had a d u r a b i l i t y and power t h a t seemed to outweigh c o m p l e t e l y the d i r e c t a c t i o n of resistance.  211 We  have noted the d i f f e r e n c e s i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s and  of the B l a c k and fifteen.  The  a n t i - w a r movements i n c h a p t e r s t h i r t e e n , f o u r t e e n ,  T h e i r t a c t i c s were worked out  tives.  The  and  impact of r e s i s t a n c e on a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s i n the Navy must  a l s o be understood i n terms of the t a c t i c s adopted by  construction  organization  of a u t h o r i t y  these movements.  i n terms of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e models of  i n the Navy and  i t s relevance  to t h e i r o b j e c -  B l a c k movement's methods of r e s i s t a n c e appeared to  r e l a t i v e l y a c c u r a t e i n t h e i r a p p r a i s a l of n a v a l  the  authority.  be  The  anti-war  s a i l o r s ' c o n c e p t i o n of a u t h o r i t y as obedience to commands i n  face-to-face  s e t t i n g was  the  not.  The  Navy anti-war p e o p l e d i d not  d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i r work s i t u a t i o n and old s a i l i n g ships  or even of t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e from s o l d i e r s i n  i n s t e a d on authority  the maintenance of a u t h o r i t y . the r e l e v a n c e  The  constructed.  The  anti-war people c a p i t a l i z e d on t r i e d to b u i l d on  c o n s c i o u s n e s s among EMs M i l i t a r i s t s and  i n "uppity"  o b s t r u c t i v e of navy a u t h o r i t y .  g a i n the support of the the Vietnam war.  the widespread EM  No  depends that  anti-lifer  the Case  an i n c r e a s e  a c t i o n s , but  Studies). in this anti-  t h i s d i d not become  . L i f e r s are used as b u f f e r s between h i g h e r  e f f o r t was  'lifers'  That may  little  these to develop a s t r o n g e r a n t i - m i l i t a r y  l i b e r t a r i a n s both reported  sailors.  command model had  e f f e c t s of a c t i o n s  (see Chapter Four and  m i l i t a r y , c o n s c i o u s n e s s and  management and  the  of t h e . s p e c i f i c t a c t i c to the a c t u a l way  is  sentiments and  the  In the contemporary Navy, as  have seen, t a c t i c s based on t h i s f a c e - t o - f a c e  impact on  to  t h a t of e n l i s t e d p e o p l e on  contemporary i n f a n t r y i n combat i n Vietnam. we  attend  made by  the anti-war movement to  for their opposition  to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n  not have been a r e a l i s t i c p o s s i b i l i t y  in  any  212 case,  but  i t was  never t r i e d .  Instead  the anti-war t a c t i c s h e l p e d  c r e a t e o p p o s i t i o n to the NCOs which appeared i n the i n c r e a s e d of EMs.  They c o n t r i b u t e d  to the support  to  "uppityness"  which NCOs gave to the m i l i t a r i s t  position. Furthermore, the anti-war movement i n many ways worked w i t h i n the m a n a g e r i a l framework and  d i r e c t l y recognized  methods of e x e r c i s i n g a u t h o r i t y . they used n o n - v i o l e n t GI c o u n s e l i n g of a t t o r n e y s updating  Every anti-war movement group whether  methods or a more p o l i t i c a l  as a major p a r t of t h e i r work. and was  the l e g i t i m a c y of i t s  cooperatively organized  of m a t e r i a l s , c o u n s e l o r  approach always  T h i s was  backed by  nation-wide with  t r a i n i n g workshops and  regular  bulletins  court  resulting  c o u r t cases d i d make f o r s p e c i f i c adjustments i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n c l u d i n g the Navy.  the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of "sea  l a w y e r s " but  to accomodate t h e i r r e g u l a t i o n s and  M i l i t a r i s t s were alarmed  the top l e v e l managers were a b l e  The  GI c o u n s e l o r s  upheld l e g i t i m a c y of the Navy as they e x p l a i n e d how use  r e g u l a t i o n s and  the  procedures to c o u r t d e c i s i o n s without  l o s s of a u t h o r i t y to d i r e c t navy work.  and  used and  on  (see Chapter F o u r ) .  by  s e r v i c e s were w i d e l y  services  decisions  procedures i n the m i l i t a r y  The  provided  advice  to c a r e f u l l y  c o u r t d e c i s i o n s f o r the s a i l o r ' s own  Anti-war p e o p l e hoped t h a t as i t became p o s s i b l e f o r EMs  the  -  an i n c r e a s e i n d i s c h a r g e s ;  Navy who  however, t h i s was  themselves used d i s c h a r g e  of " t u r b u l e n c e . "  The  follow  to get out of  not  the  this.  a problem f o r  of the d i s s a t i s f i e d as  prevention  Thus i n d i f f e r e n t ways the t a c t i c s of t h e . a n t i - w a r move-  ment tended to c o n s o l i d a t e n a v a l a u t h o r i t y r a t h e r than produce a disaffection.  EMs  benefit.  s e r v i c e s w i t h o u t heavy punishment more of them would choose to do There was  to  general  navy developed more adequate means of d e a l i n g w i t h  the  213 problem of " t u r b u l e n c e " At  almost i n c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h the a n t i - w a r movement.  the same time the movement's a t t a c k on the f a c e - t o - f a c e  the NCOs served  to b u i l d up  authority  support f o r the m i l i t a r i s t v e r s i o n  of  of  authority.  SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION RECONSIDERED In the I n t r o d u c t i o n  the q u e s t i o n  s h i p to contemporary l a r g e f o r m a l appropriate  organizations  was  raised.  problem.  of the US Navy c e r t a i n l y  proved r e s i s t a n t  The  pants i n : f o r m a l  authority  f o r lower l e v e l  The  connection  partici-  o r g a n i z a t i o n may  whose a c t i o n s support the ongoing s i t u a t i o n . The  authority  between p o t e n t i a l s o c i a l change and  i t w i t h i n a l a r g e formal  these a c t i o n s .  However,  o r g a n i z a t i o n s 'to i n i t i a t e change, i t c a l l s a t t e n t i o n to  the n e c e s s i t y of u n d e r s t a n d i n g the p r a c t i c a l dynamics of construction.  of  organization  to e f f o r t s a t change.  t h i s study shows more than t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t  and  now  S p e c i f i c p r a c t i c a l conclusions  t h i s worked i n the Navy have been g i v e n .  obstructs  It i s  to c o n s i d e r whether t h i s study of navy a u t h o r i t y h e l p e d  i l l u m i n a t e t h i s more g e n e r a l how  of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e l a t i o n -  what  i n v o l v e many people  I t i s not  i d e o l o g i e s w i t h which p e o p l e j u s t i f y  enough to their  identify  positions  frame t h e i r i d e a s of what i s going on are a l s o n e c e s s a r y f o r under-  standing  how  i t i s a l l held together.  Even t h i s i s not  a c t u a l t e c h n i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of the work and ground supports f o r compliance must a l s o be  enough,  the  the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of back- .  considered.  As  t h i s i s done  the r e l a t i v e l y powerless p o s i t i o n . o f the lower l e v e l p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l p r o b a b l y become apparent; however, to the extent understood by  t h a t the a n a l y s i s i s  them, they w i l l have more power than they had  without  knowledge because they w i l l know which of t h e i r p o s s i b l e a c t i o n s has l i k e l i h o o d , of p r a c t i c a l  effects.  this more  214 The  tremendous weight of governments and  t i o n s as a g a i n s t  i n d i v i d u a l s has  Rather what should  model f o r the way  be d i s m i s s e d  are however i s not  by  charged and  orders,  change produced.  In the case h i s t o r i e s , r e c o g n i z a b l e  f o r a crime, but  publicity  s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n approach at f i r s t  t h a t extended  ned  and  The  power bases of the  face-to-  documents a l s o  and  c l a s s phenomena i f i t i s f u l l y used a t t e n t i o n to f a c e - t o - f a c e When we  f o r each other we  ( M o r r i s 1975).  place.  institutional  I t i s o n l y when we  i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t the background f a c t o r s  become i n t e r e s t e d i n the accounts the p a r t i c i p a n t s make  b r i n g i n the a c t u a l on-going c o n s t r u c t i n g of a r e l a t i o n  to the w o r l d beyond the f a c e - t o - f a c e  s e t t i n g (Smith 1973).  s t r u c t i o n i s o n l y inadequate as an approach i f we i n c l u d e the t h i n g s  plan-  different  l o c a t e d the s i t u a t i o n i n an h i s t o r i c a l time and  s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n approach then can be used to study  escape us.  this.  about the i d e o l o g i e s through which a c t i o n was  The  l i m i t our  face-to-  the r e p o r t s of the w r i t t e n documents  i n t e r p r e t e d , about the p e r c e i v e d  p a r t i c i p a n t s and  actions  encounters.  seems bound w i t h i n a  the mechanisms of i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r o l became v i s i b l e . brought i n i n f o r m a t i o n  It is  t h e r e were a l s o w r i t t e n i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  a u t h o r i z a t i o n s , r e g u l a t i o n s and  f a c e model; however, i n f o l l o w i n g out  the  a s t r i k e or f i g h t or when a person  These paper n e g o t i a t i o n s were more d e c i s i v e than f a c e - t o - f a c e The  Grabiner  t h e i r a c t i o n s c r e a t e h i s t o r y , what these  obvious.  tried  Johnson and  the  i s f a c e - t o - f a c e n e g o t i a t i o n as  f a c e a c t i o n s happened as when there was was  (McNall,  t h a t s o c i e t y i s m a i n t a i n e d and  c e r t a i n l y p e o p l e who  organiza-  l e d some s o c i o l o g i s t s to d i s m i s s  s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n approach as inadequate 1975).  l a r g e formal  t h a t are c o n s t r u c t e d ,  fail  for instance,  S o c i a l con-  to extend i t to records,  authoriza-  t i o n s , p u b l i c i t y , formal o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  the p r o c e s s e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h e i r i n t e r s e c t i o n w i t h the s o c i e t y at  large.  and  215 There have been few  s o c i o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s which have examined  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r o c e s s e s from the, p e r s p e c t i v e i n i t i a t e d actions.  M o u z e l i s has  c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n to t h i s o m i s s i o n of  l a r g e areas of human a c t i o n (1968). t r a t e d i n s t e a d on problems d e f i n e d The is  of problems of worker  Organization  t h e o r i s t s have concen-  from the p e r s p e c t i v e  of management.  e f f e c t i v e n e s s of m a n a g e r i a l c o n t r o l i n i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i o n taken as the c e n t r a l problem.  L i t t l e a t t e n t i o n i f any  to i s s u e s a r i s i n g from the p o s i t i o n of workers. approach focuses  upon how  create organized  processes.  The  social  been  profit given  construction  i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r a c t i o n and i n t e r a c t i o n I t o f f e r s an approach which focuses  o r g a n i z a t i o n as something which i s brought i n t o b e i n g participants.  has  or  C r o z i e r has  by  a u s e f u l metaphor to show how  t h e o r i s t s have f a i l e d to r e c o g n i z e  on  the a c t i o n s  of  organization  the f u l l humanness of a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s :  The c l a s s i c r a t i o n a l i s t s d i d not c o n s i d e r the members of an o r g a n i z a t i o n as human b e i n g s , but j u s t as other cogs i n the machine. For them, workers were o n l y hands. The human r e l a t i o n s approach has shown how incomplete such a r a t i o n a l e was. I t has a l s o made i t p o s s i b l e to c o n s i d e r workers as c r e a t u r e s of f e e l i n g , who are moved by the impact of the s o c a l l e d r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s taken above them, and w i l l r e a c t to them. A human b e i n g , however, does not have o n l y a hand and a h e a r t . He a l s o has a head, which means t h a t he i s f r e e to d e c i d e and to p l a y h i s own game . . . ( C r o z i e r 1964: 149). In t h i s study, p o l i t i c a l beyond t h a t observed by members had metaphor.  brothers EMs  and  c o n s c i o u s n e s s and Crozier.  In a d d i t i o n to hands, h e a r t s  s i s t e r s and  as w e l l as admirals  a c t i o n of the members went and  heads,  f r i e n d s - to c o n t i n u e C r o z i e r ' s  depended on each other  and  on  outside  support f o r t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h i n the Navy. When s o c i o l o g i s t s have c o n s i d e r e d  human a c t i o n s as p r o d u c i n g  h i s t o r i c a l events they have used concepts such as s o c i a l f o r c e s and  social  216 s t r u c t u r e to e x p l a i n the s t r e n g t h and surrounding  any  particular participants.  l a t i o n s f o r many purposes, but how  p a r t l y intended  They m y s t i f y  stubbornness of the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n  they are not adequate f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g  s o c i a l change such as reform  r a t h e r than e l u c i d a t e .  are t h a t make up what i s meant by i n d i v i d u a l s as they a c t w i t h are l i m i t e d by p h y s i c a l and enormously d i f f i c u l t so many events and  I don't o b j e c t to these formu-  and  The  s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s , whatever they  s o c i a l f o r c e s , must go on a g a i n s t each o t h e r  and  through  as they l i m i t  t e c h n o l o g i c a l circumstances.  relationships.  The  real difficulty  c o n t r o l is m a i n t a i n e d , r e s i s t e d and  i s t h a t we  t h e r e f o r e of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  have  on.  i n a t t e n t i o n to how new  Workers i n I n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s are thought to be  incapable  In b u r e a u c r a t i c  o n l y t a k i n g o r d e r s " or " I j u s t work h e r e . "  The  of  independent  organizations  purposes of the  i n j u s t i c e s i n i t s methods are r u l e d out  e f f e c t i v e concern of workers; the same workers who  events  forms developed.  people from the bottom to the top l e v e l s e x p l a i n t h e i r a c t i o n s as  t i o n i n c l u d i n g any  and  This i s  the fundamentals of what i s going  There i s an i d e o l o g i c a l b a s i s f o r our  a c t i o n and  r e v o l u t i o n s happen.  to t h i n k about o n l y p a r t l y because i t i s a m i x t u r e of  never adequately a b s t r a c t e d  happen, how  and  "I  am  organiza-  as beyond  accomplish  the  the  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l purposes by u s i n g the p r e s c r i b e d methods. T h i s study has  used a d i f f e r e n t approach, i t has  t h a t workers are i n v o l v e d i n p r o d u c i n g part.  The  p r a c t i c a l way  anti-war EMs  and  the o r g a n i z a t i o n of which they  t h a t t h i s happens i n the Navy i s i n t r i c a t e .  B l a c k movement s a i l o r s d i d p a r t i c i p a t e i n the  t i o n of a u t h o r i t y , but  o f t e n i n unintended ways and  t e c h n o l o g i c a l c o n t r o l s , paper m a n i p u l a t i o n s , d i v i s i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l backed by States.  been assumed are The  construc-  under c o n s t r a i n t s of  opportunity  channeling  the economic r e s o u r c e s  of the  and United  217  LITERATURE CITED  Anthony, I r w i n 1937 R e v o l t a t Sea, G.P.. Putman's Sons, New York. Arendt, Hannah 1958 The Human C o n d i t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago P r e s s , Chicago. Armstrong, 1959 Ash,  Warren Mutiny A f l o a t , John Day Company, New York.  Roberta  1972 Barnard, 1938  S o c i a l Movements i n America, Markham,  Chicago.  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The Great Age of S a i l , t r a n s l a t e d by M i c h a e l K e l l y , e d i t e d by Joseph Jobe, The V i k i n g P r e s s , New York.  L a u t e r , P a u l and Howe, F l o r e n c e 1971 The C o n s p i r a c y of the Young, World P u b l i s h e r s , New  York.  L i n d e s m i t h , A l f r e d R. and S t r a u s s , Anselm L. 1968 S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 3rd E d i t i o n , H o l t , R i n e h a r t , Winston, York. Little, 1969  New  Roger W. "Buddy R e l a t i o n s and Combat Performance", The New M i l i t a r y , e d i t e d by M o r r i s J a n o w i t z , W. W. Norton, New York.  M c N a l l , S c o t t G. and Johnson, James C. M. 1975 "The New C o n s e r v a t i v e s : E t h n o - m e t h o d o l o g i s t s , Phenomenologists, and Symbolic I n t e r a c t i o n i s t s " , The I n s u r g e n t S o c i o l o g i s t s , 5:4:49-65. Mannheim, K a r l 1936 Ideology and U t o p i a , H a r c o u r t , Brace and World, New  York.  Manwaring, George E r n e s t and Dobree, Bonamy 1935 F l o a t i n g R e p u b l i c , Frank Cass and Company, London Marx, Gary T. 1974 "Thoughts on a N e g l e c t e d Category o f S o c i a l Movement P a r t i c i pant: The Agent P r o v o c a t e u r and the Informant", American J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , 80:402-442.  220 Marx, K a r l 1956 K a r l Marx, S e l e c t e d W r i t i n g s i n S o c i o l o g y and S o c i a l t r a n s l a t e d , b y T. B. Bottomore, McGraw H i l l , Toronto. ;  Mead, George H e r b e r t 1934 Mind, S e l f and  S o c i e t y , U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago,  Philosophy,  Chicago.  M e l v i l l e , Herman 1970 White J a c k e t , Northwestern Newberry E d i t i o n , Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , Evanston and Chicago ( f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1850). M i l l s , C. Wright 1951 The S o c i o l o g i c a l Imagination, Molotch, 1973  Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , London.  Harvey and L e s t e r , M a r i l y n " A c c i d e n t s , Scandals and R o u t i n e s : Resources f o r Insurgent Methodology", The Insurgent S o c i o l o g i s t , 3:4:1-11.  M o r r i s , Monica B. 1975 '"Creative Sociology', Conservative American S o c i o l o g i s t , 10:168-178.  or R e v o l u t i o n a r y ? " ,  The  Moskos, C h a r l e s C. 1966 " R a c i a l I n t e g r a t i o n i n the Armed F o r c e s " , American J o u r n a l of S o c i o l o g y , 72:2. M o u z e l i s , N i c o s P. 1968 O r g a n i z a t i o n and Bureaucracy, A l d i n e ,  Chicago.  N e f f , Jacob K. 1973 "We Must F i g h t Her", USNI P r o c e e d i n g s , March ( r e p r i n t e d from Army and Navy of America, John P e a r s o l , P e n n s y l v a n i a , 1856). N e i e r , Aryeh 1974 "FBI  Files:  Modus I n o p e r a n d i " ,  Civil  L i b e r t i e s Review 1:3:50-58.  Newcomb, Theodore; Turner, Ralph and Converse, P h i l i p 1965 S o c i a l Psychology, H o l t , R i n e h a r t , Winston, New O b e r s c h a l l , Anthony 1973 S o c i a l C o n f l i c t and  York.  S o c i a l Movements, P r e n t i c e - H a l l , New  P i v e n , Frances Fox and Cloward,. R i c h a r d A. 1971 R e g u l a t i n g the Poor, V i n t a g e Books, New  Jersey.  York.  R i c h a r d s o n , Stephen A. 1970 " O r g a n i z a t i o n a l C o n t r a s t s on B r i t i s h and American S h i p s " , The S o c i o l o g y of O r g a n i z a t i o n s by Oscar Grusky and George A. M i l l e r , The Free P r e s s , Toronto. R u s s e l l , D. E. H. 1974 R e b e l l i o n , R e v o l u t i o n and Armed F o r c e , Academic P r e s s , New  York.  221 Schubert, P a u l and Gibson, Langhorne 1933 Death of a Fleet,.Coward McCann, New  York.  Schutz, A l f r e d 1967 The Phenomenology of the S o c i a l World, t r a n s l a t e d by George Walsh and F r e d e r i c k L e h n e r t , Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , Illinois. Sheehan, N e i l 1971  The A r n h e i t e r A f f a i r , Random House, New  Sherill,  York.  Robert  1970  M i l i t a r y J u s t i c e i s to J u s t i c e as M i l i t a r y Music i s to Music, Harper and Row, New York.  Smith, Dorothy E. 1965 "The L o g i c of C u s t o d i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n " , P s y c h i a t r y : the Study o f I n t e r p e r s o n a l P r o c e s s e s , 26:311-323. 1973  Journal for  "The S o c i a l C o n s t r u c t i o n of Documentary R e a l i t y " paper p r e s e n t e d to Canadian S o c i o l o g y and Anthropology A s s o c i a t i o n Meeting a t Kingston, Ontario.  Thomas, W a l t e r "R" 1972 From a Small Naval O b s e r v a t o r y , USNI, A n n a p o l i s . T u r n e r , Roy (ed.) 1974 Ethnomethodology,  Penguin, M i d d l e s e x  Vagts, A l f r e d 1937 Weber, 1946  A H i s t o r y of. M i l i t a r i s m , Free P r e s s , New  York.  Max From Max Weber, t r a n s l a t e d by H. H. G e r t h and C. Wright M i l l s , Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , London.  Wolfe, A l a n 1973 The Seamy S i d e of Democracy, David McKay, New  York.  Wintringham, T. H. 1936 Mutiny, S t a n l e y Nott L i m i t e d , London. Woodward, Joan and Reeves, Tom Kynaston 1970 "The S t o r y of M a n a g e r i a l C o n t r o l " , I n d u s t r i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n B e h a v i o r and C o n t r o l , e d i t e d . b y Joan Woodward, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , London. Woodward, Joan 1965 I n d u s t r i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n Theory and P r a c t i c e , Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , London.  222 Yuchtman 1975  ( Y a a r ) , Ephraim and Samuel, Y i t z h a k "Determinants of Career P l a n s : I n s t i t u t i o n a l versus I n t e r p e r s o n a l E f f e c t s " , American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 40:521-531.  Z a l d , Mayer N. and Simon, W i l l i a m 1964 "Career O p p o r t u n i t i e s and Commitments Among O f f i c e r s " , The New M i l i t a r y , e d i t e d by M o r r i s Janowitz, W. W. Norton, New'York.  223  Appendix i  SOURCES OF DOCUMENTS  I n i t i a l s Used as Reference  Annotated  List  Source  NVA  THE  COM  ed O f f i c e r s Movement (COM) j o i n e d t o g e t h e r as t h e Harbor  Liberty Kitty  Call  Litter  HARBOR PROJECT  Project.  Non V i o l e n t A c t i o n (NVA) and Concern-  They maintained  a house i n San Diego where  meetings were h e l d , some o f t h e i r s u b s i s t e n c e workers lived  t h e r e and they p u b l i s h e d two undergroup GI news-  letters:  L i b e r t y C a l l was done w i t h t h e h e l p of a c t i v e  duty people  i n San Diego, e s p e c i a l l y  those on the USS  Constellation.  K i t t y L i t t e r was produced by men on the  K i t t y Hawk w i t h  t h e h e l p o f Harbor House p e o p l e .  When a t  sea, the s a i l o r s would send t h e i r copy to Harbor House where t h e paper was mimeod and sent back t o s u b s c r i b e r s on the s h i p . and  lick  L e a f l e t s , campaign pamphlets and " s t i c k 'em  'ems" were p u b l i s h e d under the names o f NVA, COM  and Harbor P r o j e c t .  K. H. F l y e r  KITTY HAWK FLYER  T h i s n e w s l e t t e r was p r i n t e d d a i l y  aboard t h e USS K i t t y Hawk as p a r t o f the o f f i c i a l c a t i o n plan of the s h i p . from March and A p r i l 1972.  communi-  The s i x c o p i e s t h a t I used were They were marked w i t h  comments  and u n d e r l i n e s by a s a i l o r on the Hawk who had sent them to t h e harbor p r o j e c t s .  224 UP FROM THE BOTTOM  The Center f o r Servicemen's R i g h t s i n  downtown San Diego p u b l i s h e d t h i s Navy underground Up From The Bottom or UFTB.  paper  A c t i v e duty p e o p l e , ex GIs  and c i v i l i a n s wrote the a r t i c l e s .  I t c a r r i e d news from  the s h i p s i n the San Diego a r e a and some r e p o r t s of c i v i l i a n movement programs.  The Center p r o v i d e d  c o u n s e l i n g and l e g a l a i d r e l a t e d to c i v i l d i s c h a r g e problems of  THE DOOR  military  liberty  and  EMs.  The Door i s a b i - w e e k l y underground paper i n  San Diego.  I t f e a t u r e s movement e v e n t s , o c c a s i o n a l  local  p o l i t i c a l exposes, GI news, reviews o f l o c a l r o c k c o n c e r t s and announcements of e n t e r t a i n m e n t and p o l i t i c a l e v e n t s . San Diego l i b r a r y  files  the Door i n i t s p e r i o d i c a l s  collection.  The San Diego Union i s one of the d a i l y papers i n San Diego.  The o t h e r paper i s owned by the same p u b l i s h e r  and p r i n t s s i m i l a r news.  The San Diego P u b l i c  Library  indexes the Union even by r e f e r e n c e s to i n d i v i d u a l  ships,  they c a r r y the c o p i e s i n m i c r o f i l m .  SOS NEWSLETTER, Stop Our Ship or SOS i z i n g name by s e v e r a l GI groups.  i s used as an organ-  I n i t i a l l y i t referred  to the p e o p l e working t o g e t h e r on the C o r a l Sea  campaign.  They p u b l i s h e d l e t t e r s from the s h i p at sea and g e n e r a l GI news as w e l l as produced l e a f l e t s ship  campaigns.  f o r San F r a n c i s c o a r e a  225 PNS  PACIFIC NEWS SERVICE  Their  r e l e a s e s are used by s u b s c r i b e r newspapers l o c a l l y  and  releases.  (Western  copy of news  correspondent  my main source  i n the  f o r events  BULKHEAD  i n WESPAC.  Up A g a i n s t the Bulkhead, UATB,  a r e a underground navy paper.  n a t i o n a l and  NOMLAC  their  Pacific)  UP AGAINST THE i s a bay  They gave me  News from t h e i r  P h i l l i p i n e s was  Bulkhead  provides  a p r o f e s s i o n a l news s e r v i c e f o r the P a c i f i c a r e a .  around the w o r l d .  UA  P a c i f i c News S e r v i c e , PNS,  It carries  GI  l o c a l news.  CCCO NEWSLETTER AND  NOMLAC  The West Coast o f f i c e of  the  C e n t r a l Committee f o r C o n s c i e n t i o u s O b j e c t o r s , CCCO, publishes a Newsletter  Law  and  Counseling,  NOMLAC.  The n a t i o n a l CCCO o f f i c e p u b l i s h e s another  letter.  These both summarize r e c e n t cases and  law and r e g u l a t i o n s . draft and  AFSC  on M i l i t a r y  CCCO has  changes i n  a center f o r m i l i t a r y  c o u n s e l i n g i n San F r a n c i s c o and p r o v i d e s  i n f o r m a t i o n to c o u n s e l o r s on the West  AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE  Coast.  The American F r i e n d s  w i t h GIs and h e l p s o r g a n i z e c i v i l i a n SOS t i o n to i t s o t h e r community programs. Bay  Area s u p p l i e d me  and  '72  pamphlets and  i n the C o r a l Sea,  campaigns.  and  training  S e r v i c e Committee, A Quaker O r g a n i z a t i o n , sponsors  .  news-  work  groups i n a d d i T h e i r o f f i c e i n the  l e a f l e t s used i n  the Midway and  1971  the E n t e r p r i s e  226 TURNING THE REGS AROUND l i s h e d by the T u r n i n g  T h i s i s a s m a l l b o o k l e t pub-  The Regs Around Committee.  It i s a  GI movement book o f a d v i c e o f how to use the Uniform Code of M i l i t a r y J u s t i c e i n defense and o r g a n i z i n g . l a r g e s e c t i o n s from the UCMJ.  THE  P u b l i s h e d i n the bay a r e a .  BERKELEY BARB & LOS ANGELES FREE PRESS a r e two  o r i g i n a l underground papers i n C a l i f o r n i a .  They  to p u b l i s h h i p a r t i c l e s and cover some movement e s p e c i a l l y GI r e s i s t a n c e . reviews  respective  continue events  They a l s o f e a t u r e e x t e n s i v e  of l o c a l entertainment  advertisements  CAMP  I t quotes  and c a r r y commercial  f o r the many sex s e r v i c e s i n t h e i r  areas.  NEWS i s a Chicago GI paper t h a t g i v e s  comprehensive  coverage o f the GI movement i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .  ABOUT FACE i s the n e w s l e t t e r o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s S e r v i c e men's Fund.  The USSF s o l i c i t s  wish to support  funds from c i v i l i a n s who  the GI movement and p a r t i a l l y supports GI  papers and c o f f e e houses and o t h e r s m a l l community resistance projects.  WIN i s a n e w s l e t t e r o f peace a c t i v i s t s and a l t e r n a t i v e life  s t y l e people.  I t i s p u b l i s h e d by i t s s t a f f  t i v e and t h e War R e s i s t e r s League. u n t i l 1973 when i t became weekly.  I t has been  collecbi-weekly  227 AMERICAN REPORT was the monthly j o u r n a l o f the Committee of C l e r g y has  and Laymen Concerned about the Vietnam War.  professional  It  coverage o f n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  events.  CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT  "Report by the S p e c i a l  Subcommittee on D i s c i p l i n a r y Problems i n the US Navy o f the  Committee on Armed S e r v i c e s ,  House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  N i n e t y Second Congress, Second S e s s i o n , This  i s the r e p o r t  Constellation  of the K i t t y Hawk r i o t and the  strike.  DAILY NEWSPAPERS AND WEEKLY JOURNALS San  Francisco  D a i l y papers i n the  and S e a t t l e area were o f t e n used.  n a t i o n a l weekly j o u r n a l s  The  TIME and NEWSWEEK were a l s o used  as was THE NATION a j o u r n a l o f l i b e r a l  PROCEEDINGS  January 2, 1973."  The U n i t e d S t a t e s  opinion.  Naval I n s t i t u t e i s the  p r o f e s s i o n a l s o c i e t y f o r Naval O f f i c e r s .  They p u b l i s h a  monthly magazine Proceedings which c a r r i e s a r t i c l e s on current  events, n a v a l h i s t o r y , t e c h n i c a l changes, and  comments on n a v a l and n a t i o n a l p o l i c y and s t r a t e g y .  They  p u b l i s h books and manuals as w e l l .  NAVY MANUALS  Many o f the r e g u l a r  books and i n s t r u c t i o n  manuals recommended and/or o f f i c i a l l y used by the Navy  228 are p u b l i s h e d by The  the U n i t e d S t a t e s Naval I n s t i t u t e , USNI.  f o l l o w i n g were used i n t h i s  study:  1964  Johnson, F l o r e n c e R.,  1966  Cope, H a r l e y F. and B u c k n e l l , Howard, Command at Sea  1968  USNI, Blue J a c k e t s Manual  1971  USNI, Watch O f f i c e r s Guide  1971  Noel J r . , John V. and Beach, Edward Naval Terms D i c t i o n a r y  1972  USNI, Ship O r g a n i z a t i o n and  ALL HANDS  Welcome Aboard  Personnel  T h i s i s the monthly g l o s s y magazine of  Naval Bureau of P e r s o n n e l ,  BUPERS.  I t contains  human i n t e r e s t s t o r i e s of n a v a l p e r s o n n e l f a m i l i e s and a l s o has  L.,  and  the  illustrated  their  announcements of changes i n r e g u l a t i o n s .  departments f o r answering q u e s t i o n s  on promo-  t i o n s , t r a n s f e r s , r e t i r e m e n t , r e e n l i s t m e n t and  NAVY TIMES  It  discharge.  T h i s i s a weekly o f f i c i a l Navy newspaper.  ARMED FORCES JOURNAL and  ORDNANCE  These are semi-  o f f i c i a l military professional journals for o f f i c e r s . T h e i r content  The  i s s i m i l a r to  Proceedings.  Uniform Code of M i l i t a r y J u s t i c e , the c u r r e n t m i l i t a r y  c r i m i n a l law and procedures  f i r s t approved by  i n 1950  and  and  amended i n 1956  1968.  Congress  229 Appendix i i  DOCUMENTATION OF WHITE JACKET  White J a c k e t was Newberry E d i t i o n as my  p u b l i s h e d i n 1850.  basic text.  I used the 1970  Northwestern  Other sources were as f o l l o w s :  Cohen, Hennig, Ed; White J a c k e t by Herman M e l v i l l e , H o l t , R i n e h a r t , Winston, New York, 1967. D a v i s , M e r r i l l R. and G i l l m a n , W i l l i a m H., Eds; The L e t t e r s of Herman M e l v i l l e , Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , New Haven, 1960. Humphries, A. R., Ed; White J a c k e t by Herman M e l v i l l e , U n i v e r s i t y , London, 1966. Mumford, Lewis;  Herman M e l v i l l e , H a r c o u r t  Brace, New  Oxford  York,  1920.  Thorp, W i l l a r d ; " H i s t o r i c a l Note", appendix of White J a c k e t by Herman M e l v i l l e , Northwestern Newberry E d i t i o n , Evanston, 1970. V i n c e n t , Howard P.; The T a i l o r i n g of M e l v i l l e ' s White J a c k e t , Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , Evanston, 1970.  MELVILLE'S SOURCES FOR In a d d i t i o n to h i s own 1843  and  1844,  WHITE JACKET  experiences  on the USS  M e l v i l l e drew on the works of o t h e r s .  United States i n  The  principal  sources a c c o r d i n g to r e s e a r c h of Howard V i n c e n t and W i l l a r d Thorp were: Ames, N a t h a n i e l ; A M a r i n e r ' s  Sketches,  Providence,  RI,  1831.  A B r i t i s h Seaman, L i f e on Board a. Man-of-War, B l a c k i e , F u l l e r t o n & Company, Glasgow, 1829. Leech, Samuel, T h i r t y Years From Home: A V o i c e From the Main Deck, b e i n g the E x p e r i e n c e of Samuel Leech, who was f o r s i x y e a r s i n the B r i t i s h and American N a v i e s , was captured i n the B r i t i s h F r i g a t e Macedonia: Afterwards entered the American Navy, and was taken i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s b r i g Syren, by the B r i t i s h s h i p Medway, C h a r l e s Tappon, Boston, 1843.  230 McNally, W i l l i a m , E v i l s and Abuses i n the Naval and Merchant S e r v i c e Exposed: w i t h P r o p o s a l f o r t h e i r Remedy and Redress, Boston, 1839. M a r t i n g a l e , Hawser (John Sherbourne Ocean, Boston, 1842. Nicol,  S l e e p e r ) , T a l e s of the  John, The L i f e and Adventures of John N i c o l , W. Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1822.  Mariner,  231  Appendix  iii  SOURCES OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION FROM INTERVIEWS AND PARTICIPATION  SAN DIEGO  I visited  interviewed  e x - s e r v i c e p e o p l e and c i v i l i a n s working w i t h Harbor P r o j e c t .  I attended  s e v e r a l o f t h e i r meetings i n c l u d i n g one a t t h e i r  Second Thoughts. talked with  the Harbor P r o j e c t i n ' A p r i l and May 1972 and  I also v i s i t e d  the Center f o r Servicemen's R i g h t s and  s e v e r a l of t h e i r counselors  SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA  and o r g a n i z e r s .  I n October 71 and May 72 I had l o n g d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h peace program s t a f f o f the AFSC. talked with  bookstore,  I v i s i t e d P a c i f i c News S e r v i c e and  t h e i r news s t a f f who p u b l i s h SOS.  I a l s o t a l k e d and  corresponded w i t h s e v e r a l o t h e r  SOS workers i n c l u d i n g a l e a d e r o f the  non-violent  I have a l s o spent many hours t a l k i n g  caucus w i t h i n SOS.  d r a f t and m i l i t a r y c o u n s e l o r s  from San F r a n c i s c o CCCO d u r i n g t h e i r  with  visits  to the Northwest.  EVERETT, WASHINGTON had  As a community c o l l e g e i n s t r u c t o r s i n c e 1963 I have  c l a s s d i s c u s s i o n s , r o l e p l a y i n g and p e r s o n a l c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h navy  veterans.  Many o f the v e t e r a n s  t h r e e o f the s h i p s c o n s i d e r e d  had been on c a r r i e r duty i n c l u d i n g duty on  i n t h i s study.  of duty i n the Navy, but o c c a s i o n a l students c o l l e g e students  Most had o n l y spent have been l i f e r s .  one t o u r  Community  a r e u s u a l l y from working o r lower middle c l a s s f a m i l i e s .  They a r e u s u a l l y n o t s o c i a l a c t i v i s t s although had v e r y s t r o n g a n t i - m i l i t a r y a t t i t u d e s .  veterans  s i n c e 1969 have  I c o n s i d e r t h i s student  to be more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f EM o p i n i o n than the peace a c t i v i s t s .  source  232 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON  I p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a GI peace march a t Whidbey I s l a n d  N a v a l A i r S t a t i o n i n J u l y 1972. marine and navy demonstrators. Secretary  I had been i n v i t e d as the a c t i n g Peace  f o r the Northwest R e g i o n a l  S e r v i c e Committee, AFSC. military  I was a b l e t o t a l k w i t h many o f the  counseling  o f f i c e o f the American  Friends  In e a r l i e r work I had c h a i r e d AFSCs d r a f t and  committee from 1967 to 1970.  This involved  attendance  at l e g a l and c o u n s e l i n g workshops, a t c o u r t m a r t i a l s and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n support  programs f o r p a r t i c u l a r s e r v i c e p e o p l e i n c l u d i n g two i n s t a n c e s of  sanctuary.  I n a l l o f these I spent c o n s i d e r a b l e  time t a l k i n g to t h e  s e r v i c e people involved.  PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD a t BREMERTON, WASHINGTON  I once worked f o r a  y e a r and a h a l f as a s u b - p r o f e s s i o n a l draftsman a t the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard  i n the Design D i v i s i o n f o r Damage C o n t r o l and Ordnance Design.  T h i s o c c a s i o n a l l y i n v o l v e d going come f a m i l i a r w i t h  aboard s h i p s t o check p l a n s .  I d i d be-  the p h y s i c a l f e e l i n g and a c t u a l appearance o f the  i n t e r i o r s o f many s h i p s i n c l u d i n g a i r c r a f t  carriers.  

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