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The subjection of women today Wendell, Susan Dorothy 1976

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THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN TODAY by SUSAN DOROTHY WENDELL B.A., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1967. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES The Department of Philosophy We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1976 (o) Susan Dorothy Wendell, 1976 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e fo r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t permiss ion fo r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l ga in s h a l l not be a l lowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department of The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date flpMk^ C,, /f 7£ . i i THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN TODAY ABSTRACT In The S u b j e c t i o n of Women, John S t u a r t M i l l proposed that ' a l l honourable employments' and the t r a i n i n g and education that q u a l i f i e s one f o r them be made as f r e e l y open to women as to men. Today f e m i n i s t s c a l l f o r e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y i n employment and e d u c a t i o n f o r many of the same reasons M i l l gave i n h i s essay. In my t h e s i s I examine the i m p l i c a t i o n s of both M i l l ' s proposals and the comparable modern g o a l , e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . I analyze the m e r i t a r i a n and the v a r i o u s u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t e r i a of e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to determine what s o r t s of measures they r e q u i r e us to take. I show that c e r t a i n common and good u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t e r i a of equal employment o p p o r t u n i t y r e q u i r e us to g i v e boys and g i r l s ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' and to e l i m i n a t e sex p r e j u d i c e from our s o c i e t y . Then I argue that the best i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of J . S . M i l l ' s p r o p o s a l s r e q u i r e s the same measures. G i v i n g boys and g i r l s ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n , ' as I def ine i t , i n c l u d e s t r e a t i n g them the same i n the matter of t h e i r p s y c h o l o g i c a l development, i . e . not i n f l u e n c i n g e i t h e r sex more than the other to develop or not to develop p a r t i c u l a r p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a i t s or d e s i r e s . E l i m i n a t i n g sex p r e j u d i c e , I contend, i s necessary to s o l v i n g the problem o f d e - f a c t o sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; i t demands, among other t h i n g s , that we come to v a l u e p e o p l e ' s a c t i v i t i e s , achievements, and t r a i t s '.according to t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s to human happiness and r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r sex. I f u r t h e r argue that i f we t r y to b r i n g about ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' before we have d e a l t w i t h our sex p r e j u d i c e , we w i l l endanger the female p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a i t s and many of the s p e c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s to human happiness h i t h e r t o made by women. I conclude that we should f i r s t cast o f f our sex p r e j u d i c e and then take whatever f u r t h e r steps are necessary to g ive women and men e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y to f i l l any u s e f u l r o l e i n s o c i e t y . i v CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 THE: SUBJECTION OF WOMEN ... • • • . •. ................ 1 CHAPTER 2 EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY . .. ...................... 18 CHAPTER 3 THE PROBLEM OF DE FACTO DISCRIMINATION ... 97 CHAPTER 4 DIFFICULTIES . •. - 128 CHAPTER 5 EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AGAIN ......... 156 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................ 160 APPENDIX 162 V ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank my a d v i s o r , Don Brown, f o r h i s e x c e l l e n t c r i t i c i s m and his. constant encouragement. Many of the ideas i n my t h e s i s arose from our d i s c u s s i o n s . I a l s o thank Jonathan Bennett, Ed Levy and Bob Hadley f o r t h e i r h e l p f u l suggestions i n the p r e p a r a t i o n of the f i n a l v e r s i o n . I am g r a t e f u l to the Canada C o u n c i l and the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia f o r f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e during my s t u d i e s . DEDICATION To my mother, the la t e Dorothy Powell Wendell and my grandmother, the la t e Jessie Warren Wendell v i i PREFACE Much of what John Stuart M i l l s a i d i n The Subjection of Women i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to current p o l i t i c a l debate about women's l i b e r a t i o n . Of a l l the proposals f o r change that M i l l put f o r t h i n h i s essay, the ones which remain most problematic have to do with women's education and t h e i r access to employment. He c a l l e d f o r opening ' a l l honourable employments' and the t r a i n i n g and education which q u a l i f i e s one for them as f r e e l y to women as to men. Today many of us are t r y i n g to create the conditions which w i l l give women equal opportunity with men i n employment and education.• In the pages that follow, I show that both M i l l ' s prpposed opening of education and occupations as f r e e l y to women as to men and good u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t e r i a of equ a l i t y of opportunity i n education and employment require us to give boys and g i r l s 'the same ea r l y education' and to eliminate sex prejudice from society. Although M i l l a n ticipated the need f o r the measures I c a l l 'the same early education,' he did not an t i c i p a t e the need f o r getting r i d of sex prejudice. Most feminists today recognize the importance of 'the same early education,' but much controversy among us surrounds the problem of sex prejudice. In feminist p o l i t i c s we see a clash between those who favour equality of opportunity f o r women to do what men now do and those who i n s i s t that greater changes should be made i n order to put the proper emphasis on the t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s and achievements of women v i i i and the female c h a r a c t e r t r a i t s . I take a p o s i t i o n oh the s i d e of those who urge g r e a t e r changes. I argue that we must r i d o u r s e l v e s of the sex p r e j u d i c e which c o n s i s t s i n undervaluing women's work and the female t r a i t s before we attempt to give boys and g i r l s ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n , ' or we w i l l endanger the s p e c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s women make to human happiness. I r o n i c a l l y , even g i v i n g women e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y with men to do what men do now r e q u i r e s the removal of sex p r e j u d i c e ; . f o r , as I demonstrate, de facto d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against women cannot be e l i m i n a t e d ( i n any way acceptable to u t i l i t a r i a n s ) without t a k i n g that step. But once sex p r e j u d i c e i s gone, the jobs and r o l e s that are accorded h i g h status and reward and that e q u a l i t y of opportunity makes a v a i l a b l e to both sexes w i l l not be r e s t r i c t e d to those that men now f i l l . 1 Chapter 1 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN In h i s essay, The S u b j e c t i o n of ^Women, J . S . M i l l attacked the l e g a l s u b o r d i n a t i o n of women to men. The s p e c i f i c m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of t h i s s u b o r d i n a t i o n which he was concerned to change were the terms of the l e g a l marriage c o n t r a c t and the b a r r i n g of women from c e r t a i n funct ions and occupations engaged i n by men. These he s a i d were both wrong i n themselves and important hindrances to human improvement. The essay c l e a r l y had a p o l i t i c a l purpose: to convince people (and e s p e c i a l l y men, s i n c e the necessary power r e s i d e d with them) to change t h e i r s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s to conform to " a p r i n c i p l e of p e r f e c t e q u a l i t y , admitt ing no power or p r i v i l e g e on one s i d e , nor d i s a b i l i t y on the other.""'" I s h a l l b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e the s i t u a t i o n s M i l l found o b j e c t i o n a b l e , h i s arguments against these s i t u a t i o n s and i n favour of change, and h i s s p e c i f i c proposals f o r change. Then I s h a l l begin examining one of h i s proposals which was not c a r r i e d out i n England or i n Canada but has gained i n c r e a s i n g support i n recent y e a r s . The V i c t o r i a n Marriage C o n t r a c t : . The l e g a l c o n d i t i o n s of E n g l i s h married women at the time M i l l wrote were abominable. He b e l i e v e d that t h e i r o v e r a l l l e g a l s tatus 2 was worse than that of s l a v e s , and he p r o t e s t e d these s p e c i f i c 2 aspects of the c o n t r a c t : 1) The wife vowed l i f e l o n g obedience to her husband, and was h e l d to i t by law. 2) She could do n o t h i n g whatever but by h i s p e r m i s s i o n , at l e a s t t a c i t . 3) She could acquire no property f o r h e r s e l f . Anything she gained, even an i n h e r i t a n c e , became i p s o f a c t o her husband's and h i s alone. 4) The sense i n which a husband and wife were "one person i n law" was that whatever was hers was h i s , but not v i c e - v e r s a , and that he was h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e to t h i r d p a r t i e s f o r her a c t i o n s . 5) A wife was a s l a v e to her husband at a l l hours and a l l minutes, having no time o f f and no f i x e d d u t i e s . 6) A wife was compelled to submit to sexual r e l a t i o n s w i t h her husband at h i s w i l l . 7) A woman had no l e g a l r i g h t s w i t h r e s p e c t to her c h i l d r e n . They were by law t h e i r f a t h e r ' s c h i l d r e n , and only h i s . 8) With respect to s e p a r a t i o n , a) I f a woman l e f t her husband, she could take n e i t h e r her c h i l d r e n nor any m a t e r i a l goods whatever. b) A man might compell h i s w i f e t o r e t u r n to h i m , e i t h e r by law or by p h y s i c a l f o r c e . c) A man might l e g a l l y s e i z e any earnings or other p rop erty acquired by h i s wife d u r i n g t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n . 3 8) d) Only a separation by court decree e n t i t l e d a woman to remain apart from her husband and to use her own earnings, and i t was given only at considerable expense and only i n cases of desertion ordextreme cruelty. 9) TA woman who brought charges of b r u t a l i t y against her husband was returned to his custody. Of course these conditions were not spelled out and.assented to (except for the f i r s t ) by those who entered into a marriage contract; they were the results of various kinds of court proceedings, the sorts of things well-known to lawyers but probably rarely thought of, except i n times of c r i s i s , by the people bound to them. And M i l l readily admitted that the actual treatment of most women by their husbands was far better than that which the law allowed. The Barring of Women from Public Functions and from Professional  Occupations: English women did not have the vote when M i l l wrote The Subjection  of Women, nor could they run for Parliament or hold public o f f i c e . The most lucrative and prestigious professions were closed to them by a number of factors: poor early education, lack of f i n a n c i a l backing, and lack of opportunity to .apprentice were prominent. But when two women went so far as to become doctors and demanded to be licensed, the societies and colleges which governed the professions made rules to exclude women from qualifying examinations and licen s i n g , and the 4 Universities decided to deny them professional training. The issues of women's admission to men's professions were very hot i n 1869. M i l l ' s Arguments For convenience i n summarizing them, I place M i l l ' s arguments i n four categories: F i r s t , M i l l presented a number of arguments that the restraints on women were not required by the general good, including: 3. 3„That there was no experience on which to base the b e l i e f that they were required by the general good. Since no other system of relations between the sexes but the subordination of women had been t r i e d , there was no available evidence that i t was the most conducive to the happiness of women and men.^ b. That women need not be prevented from doing what they - j cannot do, either for th e i r own good or for the good of others; and that open competition would protect society from women's incompetence i n the professions and in public office."' c. That women could be given the vote on the same conditions and with the same l i m i t s that applied to men, so that the i r possible incompetence to govern would not harm society.^ d. That women would s t i l l choose to perform the necessary function of caring for a family, even i f they had completely free choice of occupation, so their v i t a l contribution to human happiness would not be l o s t . However, i t might be necessary to make marriage more attractive to women by improving the i r status i n i t . 7 5 e. That there need not be an authority i n marriage.in order f o r the family to be a workable and happy association, j u s t as there need not be an authority i n a business partnership. Second, M i l l argued that the differences i n treatment of men and women were not j u s t i f i e d by the differences between them, because: a. No one knew what the natural differences between the sexes r e a l l y 9 were. b. There was good reason to beli e v e that people created many of the differences between men and women by t r e a t i n g the two sexes differently."*"^ Third, M i l l argued that the e x i s t i n g l e g a l i n e q u a l i t i e s between the sexes and r e s t r a i n t s on women had some very bad consequences, including: a. That they were a source of unhappiness to women. He believed that both the marriage contract X L and the barri n g of women from most 12 rewarding occupations besides marriage had consequences which made many women unhappy. He also believed that t h e i r lack of freedom and independence was i n i t s e l f (regardless of i t s consequences) an important source of unhappiness to women."'"3 b. That marriage was not as happy a s r e l a t i o n between the two partners as i t could be, because the i n e q u a l i t i e s between the sexes and the r e s t r a i n t s on women created vast d i f f e r e n c e s between most husbands and 1.4 wives that prevented l o n g - l a s t i n g intimate society. And that marriage often contributed to the de t e r i o r a t i o n of a man through association with the i n f e r i o r i n t e l l e c t and narrow i n t e r e s t s of his wife, rather than contributing to the development of both husband and wife? 6 c. That they had bad e f f e c t s on men's characters. M i l l believed that having almost t o t a l power over t h e i r wives tended to make men morose and even v i o l e n t to t h e i r equals and that the e x i s t i n g family was "a school of w i l f u l n e s s , overbearingness, unbounded self-indulgence, and a double-dyed and i d e a l i z e d s e l f i s h n e s s " f o r the f a t h e r , ^ and of self-worship f o r a l l the males."*"7 d. That they had bad e f f e c t s on women's characters. Women were ignorant because of t h e i r poor education and the early l i m i t a t i o n imposed on t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , which i n turn made them narrow-minded and 18 concerned almost e n t i r e l y with the welfare of t h e i r own f a m i l i e s . 19 They were unduly s e l f - s a c r i f i c i n g . Since they had no l e g a l r i g h t s , many women tended to seek whatever power they could get i n the form of 20 influence over men. Their upbringing created the problems M i l l 21 c a l l e d "nervous s u s c e p t i b i l i t y . " And they tended to be overly 22 conventional and conformist. e. That women's power and influence was often not to the general good, because of t h e i r ignorance, t h e i r narrow motivations, and t h e i r conventionality, and because i t did not carry r e s p o n s i b i l i t y with i t . They also engaged i n harmful acts of charity because they could not 23 appreciate the value of self-dependence. f . That society was l o s i n g the bene f i t s of the talents and energy of women, including the possible improvement i n the performance of men 24 which the greater competition might stimulate. F i n a l l y , M i l l argued that the changes he proposed would bring c e r t a i n p o s i t i v e benefits to men and women, including: 7 a. That the s u f f e r i n g s of many i n d i v i d u a l wives because t h e i r husbands 25 abuse t h e i r power over them would be reduced by reducing that power. b. That the bad moral a n d ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e on everyone, e s p e c i a l l y males, of the l e g a l i n e q u a l i t i e s between the sexes would be 26 removed (see c and d immediately above). c. That "the mass of f a c u l t i e s a v a i l a b l e f o r the h i g h e r s e r v i c e of humanity" would be doubled. d . That the b e t t e r education of women and t h e i r consciousness of t h e i r own independence and choice of a c t i v i t i e s would produce an immense expansion of women's f a c u l t i e s and of the range of t h e i r moral 28 concerns. e. That women's i n f l u e n c e i n s o c i e t y would be more to the g e n e r a l 29 good i f they were w e l l - e d u c a t e d . f . That marriage could be a s o l i d f r i e n d s h i p , which was not p o s s i b l e so long as men and women were so d i f f e r e n t i n i n t e r e s t s and so unequal i n r i g h t s . M i l l d e s c r i b e d h i s i d e a l of marriage on page 93. g. "The unspeakable gain i n p r i v a t e happiness to the l i b e r a t e d h a l f of the s p e c i e s ; the d i f f e r e n c e to them between a l i f e of s u b j e c t i o n to the 30 w i l l of o t h e r s , and a l i f e of r a t i o n a l freedom." The Proposals f o r Change J . S . M i l l made s p e c i f i c recommendations f o r change with regard to marriage, women's access to occupations, women's e d u c a t i o n , and t h e i r being allowed to h o l d p u b l i c o f f i c e and to vote. M i l l b e l i e v e d that marriage should be a p a r t n e r s h i p of equals. Of course i t i s one t h i n g to say that marriage 'should be a p a r t n e r s h i p 8 of equals, and another to say what that means i n terms of law. Scattered throughout Chapter I I of The Subjection of Women are M i l l ' s ideas of the l e g a l preconditions of equality i n marriage: 1. That physical compulsion be eliminated by making convictions 31 of personal violence grounds for l e g a l separation. 2. That the l e g a l compulsion on the wife to obey her husband be eliminated, and that no d i v i s i o n of powers between spouses 32 be predetermined by law. 3. That each be allowed to own whatever property would be his/hers 33 i f they were not married and to have complete control over i t . 4. That women be e n t i t l e d to pursue any honourable occupations open to men. The following passage shows that he considered condition #4 necessary to equality i n marriage: The power of earning i s essential to the dignity of a woman, i f she has not independent property. But i f marriage were an equal contract, not implying the obligation of obedience; i f the connexion were no longer enforced to the oppression of those to whom i t i s purely a mischief, but a separation on just terms (I do not now speak of a divorce), could be obtained by/any woman who was morally e n t i t l e d to i t ; and i f she would then fi n d a l l honourable employments as free l y open to her as to men; i t would not be necessary for her protection, that during marriage she should make th i s p a r t i c u l a r use of her faculties.34 I think the passage shows that M i l l was conscious of the p o s s i b i l i t y of f i n a n c i a l compulsion, i . e . that a woman might have to obey her husband because he was necessary to her economic sur v i v a l . To eliminate f i n a n c i a l compulsion, i t would be necessary for women to be able to support themselves, and so M i l l was concerned that women have 9 access to employment. He did not believe i t was necessary for women to exercise their employment opportunities in order for marriage to be an equal partnership. In fac t , he did not think i t desirable for married women to work for income. In an otherwise j u s t state of things, i t i s not ... I think, a desirable custom, that the wife should contribute by her labour to the income of the family.35 M i l l spoke of making a l l honourable employments as freely open to women as to men.} He also described his proposals with regard to employment and education as: "... the opening to them of a l l honourable employments, and of the tra i n i n g and education which 36 q u a l i f i e s for those employments ... " and "... giving to women the free use of their f a c u l t i e s , by leaving them the free choice of their employments, and opening to them the same f i e l d of occupation and the 37 same prizes and encouragements as to other human beings." In the following passage he appears to have been proposing r a d i c a l changes i n the education which comes before the time for choosing an occupation: Women i n general would be brought up equally capable of understanding business, public a f f a i r s , and the higher matters of speculation, with men i n the same class of society; and the select few of the one as we l l as of the other sex, who were qu a l i f i e d not only to comprehend what i s done or thought by others, but to think or do something considerable themselves, would meet with the same f a c i l i t i e s for improving and training t h e i r capacities i n the one sex as i n the other.38 As to women's being allowed to hold public o f f i c e , M i l l said: And i n the case of public o f f i c e s , i f the p o l i t i c a l system of the country i s such as to exclude u n f i t men, i t w i l l equally exclude u n f i t women: while i f i t i s not, there i s no additional e v i l i n the fact that the un f i t persons whom i t admits may be either women or men. As long therefore as i t i s 10 acknowledged that even a few women may be f i t for these duties, the laws which shut the door on those exceptions cannot be j u s t i f i e d by any opinion which can be held respecting the capacities of women i n g e n e r a l . ^ He recommended " t h e i r recognition as the equals of men i n a l l that belongs to c i t i z e n s h i p , " ^ and this of course included the rig h t to vote. For M i l l the enfranchisement of women was a very important part of the measures necessary to eliminate t h e i r suffering. He did not believe that his other suggested changes i n law were s u f f i c i e n t . He expressed this attitude i n a l e t t e r to Florence Nightingale i n 1867. She had asked him why women's suffrage was of higher p r i o r i t y than l e g i s l a t i o n to remove some of women's other d i s a b i l i t i e s . He replied: God knows I do not undervalue these miseries; for I think that r -?". man, and woman too, a heartless coward whose blood does not b o i l at the thought of what women suffer; but I am quite persuaded that i f we were to remove them a l l tomorrow, i n ten years new forms of suffering would have arisen; for no earthly power can ever prevent the constant unceasing unsleeping e l a s t i c pressure of human egotism from weighing down and thrusting aside those who have not the power to r e s i s t i t ... and ... new circumstances w i l l constantly be a r i s i n g , for which fresh l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l be needed. And how are you to ensure that such l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l be j u s t , unless you can either make men perfect, or give women an equal voice i n their own a f f a i r s ? I leave you to judge which i s the easier. 4 x Furthermore, M i l l believed that the enfranchisement of women was the quickest way to improving the i r education. In a l e t t e r to Florence May i n 1868, he expressed t h i s b e l i e f and argued for i t : How very quickly public attention to the education of a class follows upon opening the franchise to that class we have a l l of us seen within the la s t year i n the sudden and universal interest i n the education of the poortwhich has followed upon our new Reform B i l l . 4 2 11 In the same l e t t e r he pointed out to her that the lack of a vote was an important barrier to many careers. Appointments given out by p o l i t i c i a n s (e.g. postmaster or telegraph clerk) were naturally given to voters, who could repay the kindness at election time. Parliament decided the rules for entry into the professions, and M i l l believed that so long as Parliament consisted of men only, elected by men only, these rules would jealously guard the professions from women. Of a l l M i l l ' s proposed changes, the ones that remain most incomplete and controversial i n present-day North America (and England) are those having to do with employment and education. I s h a l l now turn my attention e n t i r e l y to these proposals. In the rest of this chapter I s h a l l show what M i l l hoped to accomplish by them. In the next chapter I s h a l l begin to examine thei r implications and their relationship to the modern demand for equality of opportunity. M i l l had several goals i n mind when he urged the adoption of his reforms i n women's position with regard to employment and education. F i r s t , as we already know, he wanted to give women the power of earning he believed was necessary to their dignity and equality i n marriage. Second, he wanted go give women their choice of work so that none would be forced to be miserable i n unsuitable work or to suffer the sense of a wasted l i f e . There i s nothing, after disease, indigence, and g u i l t , so f a t a l to the pleasurable enjoyment of l i f e as the want of a worthy outlet for the active f a c u l t i e s . ^ 3 12 M i l l believed that caring for a family i s generally s u f f i c i e n t occupation for a woman during that time when her children need her care; and this b e l i e f i s , I think, a measure of h i s respect for the importance of the services that wives and mothers perform and for the d i f f i c u l t y of their tasks. He drew the attention of his readers to those women who want to but never do marry, to those who have no children or whose children are grown-up and do not need to be cared for, and f i n a l l y to those who prefer to follow some other occupation than r a i s i n g a family. These women, need and want to do something useful and important and suitable to them, He described the needless i n j u s t i c e of their s i t u a t i o n : The injudiciousness of parents, a youth's own inexperience, or the absence of external opportunities for the congenial vocation, and th e i r presence for an uncongenial, condemn numbers of men to pass t h e i r l i v e s i n doing one thing reluctantly and i l l , when there are other things which they could have done w e l l and happily. But on women this sentence i s imposed by actual law, and by customs equivalent to law. What, i n unenlightened s o c i e t i e s , colour,rrace, r e l i g i o n , or i n the case of a conquered country, n a t i o n a l i t y , are to some men, sex i s to a l l women: a peremptory exclusion from almost a l l honourable occupations, but either such as cannot be f i l l e d by others, or such as those others do not think worthy of the i r acceptance.^ Third, he wanted to give everyone i n society the f u l l benefit of women's talents and energies. Mental superiority of any kind i s at present everywhere so much below the demand; there i s such a deficiency of persons competent to do excellently anything which i t requires any considerable amount of a b i l i t y to do; that the loss to the world, by refusing to make use of one-half of the whole, quantity of talent i t possesses, i s extremely serious. 13 This t h i r d goal was to be reached partly by improving women's education: This great accession to the i n t e l l e c t u a l power of the species, and to the amount of i n t e l l e c t available for the good management of i t s a f f a i r s , would be obtained, p a r t l y , through the better and more complete i n t e l l e c t u a l education ^ of women, which would then improve p a r i passu with that of men. And fourth, he wanted to maintain, for the benefit of society, a system of competition for jobs on the basis of qu a l i f i c a t i o n s alone. To ordain that any kind of persons s h a l l not be physicians, or s h a l l not be advocates, or s h a l l not be Members of Parliament, or sais to injure not them only, but a l l who employ physicians or advocates, or elect Members of Parliament, and who are deprived of the stimulating effect of greater competition on the exertions of the competitors, as wel l as r e s t r i c t e d to a narrower range of in d i v i d u a l choice.47 CHAPTER 1. 1 John Stuart M i l l , The Subjection of Women, Cambridge, Massachusetts, M.I.T., 1970, p.3. • A l l references are to this edition. 2 Ibi d . , pp. 31-33. 3 For a much f u l l e r explanation of th i s s i t u a t i o n , see Appendix: "Women and the Professions i n M i l l ' s England." 4 Ibid . , p. 6. 5 Ibid . , p. 27. 6 Ibid . , pp. 53 and 53. 7 i b i d . , pp. 28, 29 and 51. More on this l a t e r . 8 Ibi d . , pp. 39-42. 9 Ib i d . , p. 22. 10 Ibi d . , .pp. 22, 23 and 68-78. 11 Ibi d . , pp. 32-37 and 79. 12 Ib i d . , pp. 98-100. 13 Ibi d . , pp. 95 and 96. 14 Ibi d . , pp. 92 and 93. CHAPTER 15 Ibid., pp. 94 and 9 5 . 16 I b i d . , p. 37. 17 I b i d . , p. 81. 18 I b i d . , p. 39. 19 I b i d . , p. 42. 20 I b i d . , p. 43. 21 I b i d . , p. 60. 22 I b i d . , p. 89. 23 I b i d . , pp. 86-91. 24 Ibid., ,pp. 51, 52 and 82. 25 I b i d . , p. 79. 26 I b i d . , pp. 80-82. 27 I b i d . , p. 82. 28 I b i d . , pp. 83 and 84. 29 I b i d . , p. 84. CHAPTER 1 30 Ib i d . , p. 95. 31 Ibi d . , p. 36. 32 Ibi d . , pp. 39, 40 and 48. 33 Ib i d . , p. 47. 34 Ib i d . , p. 48. 35 Ib i d . , p. 48 36 Ibi d . , p. 80 37 Ibi d . , p. 82. 38 Ib i d . , p. 83. 39 Ib i d . , p. 53. 40 Ib i d . , p. 80. 41 The flater Letters of John Stuart M i l l 1848-1873, ed. F.E. Mineka and D.N. Lindley, Toronto, 1972, Letter 1169, December 31, 1867. 42 Ib i d . , Letter 1209, after March 22, 1868. 43 M i l l , The Subjection of Women, pp. ci't., p. 98. 44 Ib i d . , p. 100. 45 Ibid., p. 83. 46 lb i d . , p. 83. 47 Ibid., p. 52 CHAPTER 18 Chapter 2 EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY We have seen that J.S. M i l l strongly advocated certain p o l i c i e s with regard to women's access to occupations: that a woman should " f i n d a l l honourable employments as freely open to her as to men"; "the opening to them of a l l honourable employments, and of the traini n g and education which q u a l i f i e s for those employments"; and "opening to them the same f i e l d of occupation and the same prizes and encouragements as to other human beings". As feminist p o l i t i c a l debate since that time has shown, there i s a great deal of room for disagreement about the necessary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions for employments, education, etc., being "open" to women or "as freely open... as to men." But we know from the previous chapter that M i l l had certain goals i n advocating these p o l i c i e s which can help us interpret them. He wanted: A) to give women the power of earning necessary to their dignity and equality i n marriage, B^ to give women th e i r choice of work so that none would be forced to be miserable i n unsuitable work or to suffer the sense of a wasted l i f e , C) to give everyone i n society the f u l l benefit of women's talents and energies, D) to maintain, for the benefit of society, a system of competition for jobs on the basis of qu a l i f i c a t i o n s alone. 19 These goals might easily be those of anyone advocating equality of opportunity for women today. And M i l l was c a l l i n g for some kind of equality of opportunity. I say some kind of equality of opportunity because there i s so much disagreement about what counts as equal opportunity and also because the meaning of M i l l ' s p o l i c i e s has not yet been made clear. But making jobs "as freely open to women as to men" at least requires that women and men have the same lega l rights of access to them, which i s what John Rawls refers to as "formal equality of opportunity,""'" and what I consider the least stringent c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity. As we s h a l l see i n the pages that follow, "equality of opportunity" i s defined i n many different ways by those who advocate i t as a policy. Although some definitions are more plausible than others and at least one that i s common leads us into absurdities, I think that any e f f o r t to show that one and only one set of c r i t e r i a for equality of opportunity i s correct would be hopeless. I propose instead to examine a wide range of uses of the term i n order to see what steps the proponents of equal opportunity are committed to taking by the various uses. I w i l l show that certain common u t i l i t a r i a n understandings of equal opportunity require us to give g i r l s and boys the same early education ( i n the relevant ways to be described) i f we want to give them equal opportunity. Then I w i l l argue that<-the best interpretation of the p o l i c i e s M i l l advocated requires the same step. F i n a l l y , I w i l l show that to meet the common u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t e r i a orf equal opportunity or to carry out M i l l ' s p o l i c i e s we must eliminate sex prejudice from our society. 20 Let us begin the examination of equality of opportunity with a look at the least stringent c r i t e r i o n . I admit that this c r i t e r i o n would probably be unacceptable to most people who favour equal opportunity. Few people would say that English women were given equal opportunity with men to become doctors when the rules against thei r taking the examinations to obtain licenses to practice were abolished; but some people might say so. Moreover i t i s important to understand just what defects of the least stringent c r i t e r i o n lead most proponents of equal opportunity to adopt more stringent c r i t e r i a . Formulated generally, the least stringent c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity for women tio do x i s : that there be no rules or laws which exclude women from doing x or forbid them to do x on the grounds that they are women. This c r i t e r i o n has two serious inadequacies.. F i r s t , as 2 Bernard Williams points out with an example i n "The Idea of Equality" , the members of a class A can be excluded from doing x or forbidden to do x by rules against people who have t r a i t s which are correlated with membership i n class A or rules requiring t r a i t s which are inversely correlated with membership i n class A. I c a l l t h i s the problem of correlated t r a i t s . When we look at the various solutions to t h i s problem we s h a l l begin to see a great d i v e r s i t y of opinion about the necessary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions of equality of opportunity. The other inadequacy of the least stringent c r i t e r i o n i s t h i s : 21 Even i n the absence of rules or laws excluding members of class A, people can be excluded from doing x just because they are members of A by those who have the power to determine who gets to do x, unless there are rules against exclusion i n practice. I c a l l t h i s the problem of de facto discrimination. In the next chapter I w i l l show that i t should lead M i l l and other u t i l i t a r i a n s who want equality of opportunity to conclude that we must remove sex prejudice from our society. The problem of correlated t r a i t s . Let us look at some examples of the problem: (a) In 1865 the Society of Apothecaries had no rule against granting licenses to women. But after Elizabeth Garrett took the License i n that year, the Apothecaries changed their rules to exclude from licensing anyone who had received part of his/her medical education privately. Since women were not admitted to the medical schools, the new regulation excluded them from the profession u n t i l 3 the medical schools l e t them attend. (b) The Apothecaries might have used a different kind of rule to exclude women from their profession. They might have required that only people capable of l i f t i n g a 200-pound man be licensed by the Society. Although this would have excluded some men, i t would certainly have excluded most women. (c) The law requiring that doctors have formal medical education, which of course remained even after women were permitted to take licenses 22 and admitted to the medical schools, excluded most women from becoming doctors. It excluded a l l those who did not attend medical school, a t r a i t far more highly correlated with beingsa woman than with being a man; for i t was far more d i f f i c u l t for women than for men to get to medical school, because of'their poor early education, their lack of models and encouragement,.and their lack of financial backing. In a l l Canada, there were 550 female medical students enrolled for the 1967-68 term, only 12.5% of the total medical school enrollment. Everyone who desires equal opportunity for women, even an adherent to the least stringent criterion,,is l i k e l y to be dissatisfied with the state of affairs in example (a), and unlikely to claim that i t l e f t women an equal opportunity with men to become Apothecaries. Not only was the correlation between being a woman and having a private medical education complete (i.e. a l l women who got a medical education had to get i t privately), but i t was created by another set of rules -the rules of the medical schools. Thus the combination of the Apothecaries' rule and the set of medical school rules excluded women from becoming licensed Apothecaries on the grounds that they were women. Yet notice that a person who would have been unwilling to defend or accept a rule that women may not become licensedd apothecaries^ might very well have defended each of the two rules which together excluded women: the medical school prohibitions on grounds of modesty (the grounds on which they were most often defended in the Lancet - presumably 23 i t offended Victorian morality for women to learn the functions of the human body from male teachers i n the presence of their young male colleagues), and the Apothecaries' rule on the grounds that examinations alone were i n s u f f i c i e n t test of the quality of one's medical education. Therefore, i n order to rule out ways of excluding women l i k e that presented i n example (a), we must a l t e r the least stringent c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity, or else say that the next most stringent c r i t e r i o n ( i n case anyone would adhere to the f i r s t ) i s t h i s : that there be no rules or laws arid rib combination of rules or laws which exclude women from doing x or forbid them to do x on the grounds that they are women. Both examples (b) and (c) are more problematic and controversial than example (a). Those who advocate equal opportunity for women would not a l l have the same objections to the situations described i n these two examples;, some might not object at a l l to the sit u a t i o n described i n example (c). I s h a l l use these examples to i l l u s t r a t e various positions on the problem of correlated t r a i t s taken by those who have different definitions of equality of opportunity. I t i s h e l p f u l i n examining the uses of the term "equality of opportunity" to c l a s s i f y i t s exponents according to their reasons for desiring i t . This i s partly because people's reasons for wanting equality of opportunity affect t h e i r c r i t e r i a of i t . There are of course l i m i t s to what anyone can plausibly claim to mean by "equality 24 of opportunity;" and I have already maintained that the least stringent c r i t e r i o n i s one such l i m i t . But, as we s h a l l see, people who want equality of opportunity w i l l be s a t i s f i e d with different conditions depending on thei r reasons for wanting i t . Furthermore, I s h a l l argue that people with certain reasons for wanting i t should demanddcertain steps as necessary conditions of i t . Following T.D. Campbell , I consider two categories of exponents of equality of opportunity: the meritarians and the u t i l i t a r i a n s . Campbell characterises the meritarian as one "who sees equality of opportunity as part of j u s t i c e and j u s t i c e as being concerned with rewarding and punishing according to in d i v i d u a l deserts." 7 His/her version of equality of opportunity w i l l be determined by the fact that "the meritarian i s concerned to distinguish between persons on the basis of their praiseworthiness alone, a l l other cha r a c t e r i s t i c s , including a b i l i t y insofar as a person cannot take the credit for i t s development, being irrelevant." Isauh B e r l i n describes t h i s position i n "Equality." John Wilson actually holds a version of i t i n h i s book, Equality. "^ John Rawls"*""*" and T.D. Campbell both offer b r i e f c r i t i c i s m s of i t . We w i l l look more closely at the position and the cr i t i c i s m s when we see how the meritarian would deal with the problem of correlated t r a i t s and s p e c i f i c a l l y with examples (b) and (c). Campbell describes the u t i l i t a r i a n who favours equal opportunity as one who wants to fi n d the best person for each job for the good of society and who may also take the long-range view of wanting to 25 develop human c a p a c i t i e s and r a i s e the l e v e l of competit ion f o r 13 p o s i t i o n s of power and p r e s t i g e . I b e l i e v e t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i s too r e s t r i c t e d . There are other u t i l i t a r i a n reasons f o r wanting equal o p p o r t u n i t y ; f o r example, some of M i l l ' s reasons f o r wanting to open the p r o f e s s i o n s to women have to do with improving marriage and a l l the r e l a t i o n s between the sexes f o r everyone's greater happiness. Among those who have a u t i l i t a r i a n p o s i t i o n on e q u a l i t y of opportunity 14 15 are M i l l , Tawney , F r a n k e l , and Campbell h i m s e l f . We w i l l see f u r t h e r on how v a r i o u s u t i l i t a r i a n s would handle the problem of c o r r e l a t e d t r a i t s . The mefitariaris and the problem of c o r r e l a t e d t r a i t s : The m e r i t a r i a n p o s i t i o n on e q u a l i t y of opportunity described by Campbell can be formulated t h u s : Only people who deserve to do x should get to do i t , and no people who deserve to do x should be excluded from doing i t . From t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n we can see that the m e r i t a r i a n ' s p o s i t i o n on the r u l e s governing who gets to do x would be to accept only r u l e s r e q u i r i n g t r a i t s which make a person deserving o_r r u l e s e x c l u d i n g t r a i t s which make a person undeserving of doing x. Furthermore, according to Campbell, the m e r i t a r i a n would i n s i s t on a d i s t i n c t i o n between t r a i t s people can and those they cannot help having and w i l l not o r d i n a r i l y count t r a i t s people cannot h e l p having or not having as making them more or l e s s deserving of doing x. Thus the d o c t r i n e of equal opportunity that IsaUh B e r l i n d e s c r i b e s i s a m e r i t a r i a n p o s i t i o n : 26 "that the only i n e q u a l i t y which should be avoided i s an i n e q u a l i t y based on c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which the i n d i v i d u a l cannot a l t e r - unequal treatment based, f o r i n s t a n c e , on b i r t h , or c o l o u r , which human beings cannot a l t e r at w i l l . " John W i l s o n , who holds a modif ied m e r i t a r i a n p o s i t i o n , t e l l s us that the trend towards equal opportunity i s a trend away from r e q u i r i n g t r a i t s which are not i n everyone's power to a c q u i r e : Suppose, however, we adopt a d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i o n from wealth or i n t e l l i g e n c e , the c r i t e r i o n of e f f o r t ; and grant some p r i v i l e g e (such as u n i v e r s i t y education) p u r e l y on t h i s c r i t e r i o n . We should be i n c l i n e d to say, I t h i n k , that we had approached more n e a r l y to the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y . T h i s i s because making an e f f o r t (we suppose) i s something w i t h i n the capacity of everyone, whereas b e i n g born i n t o a r i c h family or being i n t e l l i g e n t i s n o t . By e x c l u d i n g wealth we have excluded a c c i d e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : and by excluding i n t e l l i g e n c e we d i s t i n g u i s h between one k i n d of n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , those we cannot help having or not h a v i n g , and another k i n d which we b e l i e v e ; to be u n i v e r s a l l y a v a i l a b l e - the c a p a c i t y to make an e f f o r t , or to be k i n d , or some other capacity which i s w i t h i n the c o n t r o l of our w i l l . We have to suppose t h i s i n order to make sense of the n o t i o n of an equal o p p o r t u n i t y , or of an e q u a l chance. I may have the r i g h t to do things which I have not the power to do . . . . But i f I have not the power, then s t r i c t l y speaking I do not have the opportunity or the c h a n c e . ^ C l e a r l y m e r i t a r i a n s , i n c l u d i n g W i l s o n , would be against excluding women from doing x on the grounds t h a t they are women, s i n c e b e i n g female i s u n a l t e r a b l e from before b i r t h and t h e r e f o r e cannot make one e i t h e r deserving or undeserving. The s i t u a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n example (b) a l s o seems to f a l l short of m e r i t a r i a n s ' c r i t e r i a of equal o p p o r t u n i t y , s i n c e the t r a i t r e q u i r e d (being able to l i f t a 200-lb man) i s not the s o r t of t h i n g everyone has the powerttoaacquire. But the s i t u a t i o n i n example (c) i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t , because the r e q u i r e d t r a i t (having a medical education);, i s much more the s o r t of t h i n g we t h i n k people have 27 the power to acquire than the a b i l i t y to l i f e a 200-lb man. Thus meritarians l i k e Wilson may be more inclined to say that there i s equality of opportunity i n the case of (c) than i n the case of example (b). Let us examine this d i s t i n c t i o n between t r a i t s people have the power to acquire and t r a i t s they do not. Wilson t e l l s us we must have some d i s t i n c t i o n between characteristics people cannot help having or not having, and those which we believe are universally available; e.g. we believe people cannot help being born into wealthy families or poor fami l i e s , being i n t e l l i g e n t or u n i n t e l l i g e n t , healthy or unhealthy, and we believe people can help being courageous or cowardly, determined or wishy-washy, hard-working or lazy. Presumably i f getting a medical education requires no characteristics which people cannot help having or not having, then i t i s very much within people's power to acquire, and equally within the power of women and men to acquire; the fewer of these characteristics i t requires, the more i t i s within everybody's power to acquire. Wilson notices the problem with using this d i s t i n c t i o n : Suppose courage, determination, and e f f o r t are not universally available ? Suppose they are determined by factors e n t i r e l y out of people's control ? This problem i s the basis of John Rawls' c r i t i c i s m of the meritarian position.' He says: I t seems to be one of the fixeddpoints of our considered judgments that no one deserves his place i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of native endowments, any more than one deserves one's i n i t i a l s t a rting place i n society. The assertion that a man deserves 28 the superior character that enables him to make the e f f o r t to cultivate his a b i l i t i e s i s equally problematic; for his character depends i n large part upon fortunate family and s o c i a l circumstances for which he can claim no credit. ^ The notion of desert seems not to apply to these cases. Now some meritarians might grant that the a b i l i t y to make an e f f o r t , for example, i s not something one can help having or not having, and therefore not a t r a i t which makes a person deserving, but go on to claim that the tendency to make an e f f o r t , given the a b i l i t y , i s such a t r a i t . But then how would these meritarians form their c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity to do x ? Would they not have to exclude people from doing x who, having the a b i l i t y to make an e f f o r t , do not exercise i t , and include those who lack the a b i l i t y and therefore cannot exercise i t ? And even supposing they wanted to carry out such a policy, how would they t e l l the members of the f i r s t group from those of the second ? Surely some people have the general a b i l i t y to make an e f f o r t but lack the a b i l i t y to make an e f f o r t i n p a r t i c u l a r matters because of fearss or desires that are beyond their control. The supposed d i s t i n c t i o n between t r a i t s people have the power to acquire and t r a i t s they do not i s at best unworkable and at worst an i l l u s i o n . Even wanting to do x i s often ( i f not always) causally traceable to circumstances and experiences that people cannot help having had." Wilson believes he has a solution to a l l t h i s . Characteristics l i k e courage, determination, and the a b i l i t y to make an e f f o r t are usually considered part of a human being's personality (whether or not they are causally determined by factors out of his/her- control), so we 29 could say that people have equal opportunity when t h e i r share of the good i n question or t h e i r doing something they want to do depends only on c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which are ' p a r t of t h e i r r e a l s e l v e s . ' T h i s circumvents the d i f f i c u l t y of t r y i n g to d i s t i n g u i s h between t r a i t s people can and those they cannot help having while p r e s e r v i n g the system of r e q u i r i n g those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which we f e e l (however i r r a t i o n a l l y ) make people d e s e r v i n g . Therefore I consider W i l s o n ' s proposed s o l u t i o n a modif ied m e r i t a r i a n p o s i t i o n . . . . e g a l i t a r i a n s p r e f e r to change e x i s t i n g games and systems i n a p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n : r o u g h l y , away from those that favour e x t e r n a l or ' a c c i d e n t a l ' a t t r i b u t e s , towards those that favour n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which are ' p a r t of the r e a l s e l f , as we might be tempted to say.20 . . . t h e quest ion of whether one game or system gives a person more e q u a l i t y of opportunity than another game or system depends u l t i m a t e l y on what we count as a p e r s o n . v The e g a l i t a r i a n adopts a narrow p i c t u r e , whereby a person _Ls determined and courageous, but only has i n t e l l i g e n c e , wealth, and a t i t l e . . . . So f a r as l o g i c and language go, i t seems a r b i t r a r y which p i c t u r e we choose to adopt. Although i t may seem a r b i t r a r y which of a p e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s we consider ' p a r t of the r e a l s e l f , Wilson suggests that the r i g h t ones 22 are those which the personsconsiders e s s e n t i a l to h i m s e l f / h e r s e l f . Presumably p e o p l e ' s d e s i r e s could a l s o be i n c l u d e d among t h e i r e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , as w e l l as t h e i r courage, a b i l i t y to make an e f f o r t , e t c . T h i s s o l u t i o n i s a p p e a l i n g , but i t i s not c o n v i n c i n g . I t i s appealing because r e s p e c t i n g p e o p l e ' s own views of themselves seems l i k e a way of t r e a t i n g them as equals . I t i s not convincing because we know that the ways 'tfKey see themselves are often taught to them i n chi ldhood by people who have f a l s e b e l i e f s about them or who do not have 30 their best interest at heart. When men believed that i t was not i n women's natures to want to be doctors, women.believed i t too. When their masters believed that slaves were by nature cowardly and lazy, slaves believed i t too. When we have some reason to believe that there are oppressed classes i n our society, how can we put special f a i t h i n a person's self-concept and expect i t to give us the answer to whether equal opportunity has been achieved or not ? Furthermore, i t i s plausible to suppose that, even i n the least oppressive society we can imagine, many women would consider their being female 'part of thei r r e a l selves' and many men would consider their being male 'part of thei r r e a l selves'. In this case, would Wilson have us believe that people who favour equal opportunity should approve of existing systems which favour femaleness or maleness ? We have seen that meritarian c r i t e r i a of equality of opportunity rely on a d i s t i n c t i o n between t r a i t s people have the power to acquire and t r a i t s they do not. This d i s t i n c t i o n has appeal as a description of common usage because of the language i n which some egal i t a r i a n sentiments are expressed. "He can't help being black" (an expression no longer acceptable because i t suggests i t would be nice i f he could) used to be offered as an explanation of people's d i s l i k e for r a c i a l discrimination, and i t certainly suggests that there are some things he can help being on the basis of which i t would be al r i g h t to exclude him from some of the goods of society. But we know too wel l that even the a b i l i t y to make an e f f o r t i s not universal and.can be exaggerated or destroyed i n children by those who shape thei r personalities. At 31 best this d i s t i n c t i o n has to be forced i n the way I suggested, and then i t leads the meritarians into trying to carry out absurd p o l i c i e s . Furthermore, we have seen that Wilson's proposal to circumvent the d i s t i n c t i o n does not work. F i n a l l y , l e t us even assume, for the sake of argument, that the meritarian can distinguish characteristics and accomplishments for which people can take credit. Then, as T.D. Campbell points out, the meritarian's view points to handicapping people i n competition for the goods of society so as to equalize those factors f o r which they cannot take credit. This system of providing equal opportunity i s very odd to apply to the competition for employment; for when the goods i n question are positions of power and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t clearly leads, as Campbell says, to "worthy dolts i n high positions, with disastrous 23 consequences." But we should not overlook a p o s s i b i l i t y that Campbell f a i l s to see: that the meritarian might work toward Equalizing the factors that are out of the individual's control, rather than handicapping the competitors after the fact of the i r unequal history. Unfortunately, there i s nothing i n the meritarian position that would commit him/her to preferring the former course of action, which course would be preferred by anyone with a reasonable desire for the common good. This remark conveniently brings us to the subject of the u t i l i t a r i a n s . 32 The u t i l i t a r i a n s arid the problem of c o r r e l a t e d t r a i t s : As f a r as I can see, there are four reasons f o r u t i l i t a r i a n s to want e q u a l i t y of employment o p p o r t u n i t y . I a r r i v e d at these reasons by g e n e r a l i z i n g M i l l ' s four goals i n wanting.to open a l l occupations to women, and l a t e r I w i l l d i s c u s s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the u t i l i t a r i a n reasons and M i l l ' s g o a l s . U t i l i t a r i a n s might have one or more of the f o l l o w i n g reasons f o r wanting e q u a l i t y of employment o p p o r t u n i t y : 1) They want to f i l l each job w i t h the best person or one of the best people to do i t . 2) They want to develop human c a p a c i t i e s and r a i s e the l e v e l of competit ion f o r j o b s . 3) They want the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e number of people to have jobs which they f r e e l y choose and which employ t h e i r a b i l i t i e s i n ways s a t i s f y i n g to themselves. 4) They want to improve the r e l a t i o n s among the people i n v a r i o u s s e c t i o n s of s o c i e t y which do not p r e s e n t l y have equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s , f o r everyone's b e n e f i t . In our case they want equal employment opportunity f o r men and women because they b e l i e v e t h i s w i l l improve r e l a t i o n s between the sexes by p u t t i n g them on a more equal f o o t i n g e c o n o m i c a l l y , s o c i a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y . U t i l i t a r i a n s ' p o s i t i o n s on the problem of c o r r e l a t e d t r a i t s and t h e i r c r i t e r i a of equal o p p o r t u n i t y w i l l d i f f e r according to how much importance they p l a c e on each of these reasons. That i s why we f i n d so 33 much di v e r s i t y of opinion on these matters among u t i l i t a r i a n s as w e l l as between them and the meritarians. 1) The Best Person for Each Job. '• Insofar as people stress the goal of f i l l i n g each job with the best person to do i t , they w i l l judge ahrule governing who gets to do x by how important the t r a i t i t requires i s to the actual performance of the job x. They w i l l reject any rule which requires a t r a i t irrelevant to doing the job because i t would get i n the way of finding the best person to do i t , and accept any rule which requires a t r a i t that i s necessary to performing the job. And those for whom i t i s the only goal of equality of opportunity w i l l tend to accept any rule which requires a t r a i t genuinely useful i n performing the job. U t i l i t a r i a n s who stress this f i r s t goal would probably not l i k e the s i t u a t i o n i n example (b), because being able to l i f t a 200 l b . man i s nearly irrelevant to being a good doctor (since l i f t i n g patients could be done with the help of other people), and so the requirement might interfere with the selection of the best people to be doctors; but they might tolerate the requirement as a f i n a l basis of selection among people who were equally w e l l - q u a l i f i e d i n a l l other respects. On the other hand, they would be pleased with the requirement i n example \c), since a medical education (though not necessarily the kind we now give) i s essential to a doctor. The correlation between the t r a i t required i n (c) and being male would not bother them unless th e i r goal i s finding the best person for the job i n the sense of the 34 best person by nature and not just by present 'performance. I f they want to f i n d the best person by nature, then the correlation might bother them by leading them to suspect that not everyone was getting maximum opportunities to prepare himself/herself to be a doctor, and that some who were best q u a l i f i e d by nature to be doctors might not be emerging as doctors. Those who emphasize finding the best person by present performance for each job as the main purpose of equal opportunity w i l l tend to be s a t i s f i e d that equal opportunity exists when jobs are given out on the basis of objective tests of people's performance of tasks closely related to the actual work, provided of course that there are no obstacles put i n the way of anyone's taking the tests who wants to and that every one i s given the same test for the same job, etc. They have what Charles Frankel c a l l s the"meritocratic" conception of equal opportunity. I t holds that the tests should be f a i r , that they should be open to everyone, that lack of money or other physical hindrances should not be a barrier to taking them, and that people should then be graded and rewarded i n terms of their performance. 2 4 Those who take this commonly-held position are s a t i s f i e d i f people are selected for jobs on the basis of their compared performances, actual or predicted, of tasks important to the work, and without regard to t h e i r other cha r a c t e r i s t i c s , such as race, colour, r e l i g i o n , sex. There are serious problems i n meeting even this c r i t e r i o n of equal 25 opportunity because of de facto discrimination, and because not every job can be eas i l y broken down into tasks for which we can devise 35 objective tests. And to most u t i l i t a r i a n s , as we s h a l l see, this c r i t e r i o n i s inadequate. 26 Those who emphasize finding the best person by nature for each job as the main purpose of equal opportunity w i l l be concerned with what 27 Campbell c a l l s "the preparation of candidates for selection" as w e l l as with the process of selection for the jobs. They w i l l want everyone to be given the best conditions for developing their natural endowments so that these endowments are eventually manifested i n the i r performance of tasks. Equal opportunity has to go back to the e a r l i e s t processes of education i f we are to successfully select those who are best-qualified by nature to do the various jobs of society. Thus those u t i l i t a r i a n s have c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity that are s i m i l a r to the c r i t e r i a of those who stress developing human potential and r a i s i n g the l e v e l of competition for jobs, which we w i l l examine more closely a l i t t l e l a t e r on. Although f i l l i n g each job with the best person to do i t i s not the only reason a u t i l i t a r i a n might desire equal opportunity, a l l u t i l i t a r i a n s w i l l consider i t important to maximize the a b i l i t y of each person to do his/her job, because the e f f i c i e n t performance of jobs that must be done i s a c r u c i a l source of well-being to everyone i n society. Some people, as we s h a l l see, have v a l i d u t i l i t a r i a n goals i n seeking equal opportunity that c o n f l i c t somewhat with the goal of f i l l i n g each job with the best person to do i t , but a l l u t i l i t a r i a n s w i l l at least approve of requiring employees to have those t r a i t s that are necessary to doing a job. Hence, unlike some merit- 1 36 arians, u t i l i t a r i a n s w i l l never come up with a c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity which overlooks the need to f i l l jobs with, people competent to perform them. 2) Developing Human Capacities. Insofar as people stress developing human capacities and ra i s i n g the l e v e l of competition for jobs as a goal of equal opportunity they w i l l be concerned about how much I t i s possible to a l t e r the fact that some group or i n d i v i d u a l lacks a t r a i t required or possesses a t r a i t excluded by a rule governing who gets to do x, because they want to maximize everyone's advantages i n the competition for jobs. Although, as I have said, no u t i l i t a r i a n would have developing human capacities as his/her only goal i n bringing about equal opportunity, there are some who stress i t s importance. They would not l i k e the situa t i o n described i n example (b). The required t r a i t i n (b) generally cannot be cultivated i n groups or individuals who do not have i t , and the rule which requires i t puts those people, many of whom otherwise have the capacity to be doctors, at a disadvantage that would deter them from developing that capacity. Weighing this very great drawback of the rule against the s l i g h t u t i l i t y given to i t by the relevance of being able to l i f t , a 200-lb. man to the work of a doctor, they would certainly reject the rule i n example (b). But, as u t i l i t a r i a n s , they would have to accept any rule which requires a t r a i t necessary to performing the work of a doctor, regardless of whether or not the t r a i t put groups or individuals at a disadvantage that could not be corrected. Thus they would not object to the rule given i n 37 example (c) , since i t makes such a necessary requirement. However, since having a medical education i s the sort of thing that can be cultivated i n groups or individuals who do not have i t , the correlation between having i t and being male might lead them to suspect that females were under a disadvantage that could be corrected, and they would have to be s a t i s f i e d that this was not the case before they would approve of the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n described i n the example. Those who emphasize developing human capacities have c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity that go back beyond the process of selecting people for jobs to the process of training and educating them. They are the u t i l i t a r i a n s who take the "long-term view" described by Campbell: But the u t i l i t a r i a n could also be concerned with equality of opportunity with respect to the preparation of candidates for selection as w e l l as i n the selection process i t s e l f , f o r , i f a u t i l i t a r i a n takes a long-term view, he w i l l be interested i n the general development of human capacities so that the l e v e l of competition and hence the a b i l i t i e s of those selected w i l l be higher. He w i l l therefore be prepared to take into account contingent curable incapacities i n determining equality of educational or preparatory opportunity, although i n the end his selection w i l l be based on acquired rather than potential a b i l i t i e s . 2 8 This i s e s s e n t i a l l y the view that Charles Frankel describes as the "educational" conception 6.£ equality of opportunity which holds "that we cannot have r e a l equality of opportunity unless we successfully modify those aspects of the individual's s i t u a t i o n which 2 prevent him from performing up to the l e v e l of his natural a b i l i t i e s . " And R.H. Tawney maintains that r e a l equality of opportunity exists " i n so far as, and only i n so far as, each member of a community, 38 whatever his b i r t h , or occupation, or s o c i a l position, possesses i n f a c t , and not merely i n form, equal chances of using to the f u l l h i s 30 natural endowments of physique, of character, and of i n t e l l i g e n c e . " I t i s possible' to want to give everyone the best conditions for developing his/her natural potential for n o n - u t i l i t a r i a n reasons. For example someone might believe that i t i s the right way of acting towards a l l human beings because they are a l l creatures sacred to God and endowed by Him with certain p o t e n t i a l i t i e s which should be f u l f i l l e d as f a r as possible, or because every human being deserves the best conditions for developing his/her potential just i n v i r t u e of being human. Since I do not think that those reasons for desiring equal opportunity have any special l i g h t to throw on the problem of defining i t , and since I do not want to defend them, I l i m i t my remarks on them to acknowledging that they e x i s t . Frankel and Tawney both offer us c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity which are derived from the concern for developing human capacities, but Tawney's c r i t e r i o n i s more demanding and more problematic than Frankel's. Tawney seems to want everyone to have an equal chance of developing his/her natural endowments, whatever those endowments may be, and as John Schear points out i n "Equality of Opportunity 31 and Beyond," not a l l talents and capacities can be developed f u l l y i n any given society.y The values embodied i n a society determine the kinds of jobs and roles which are available to i t s people, and these i n turn determine the extent to which a p a r t i c u l a r natural endowment 39 or combination of endowments can be used. I f people's n a t u r a l endowments d i f f e r a great deal i n kind, then Tawney's c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity may be impossible to meet. In any case i t demands that s o c i e t y be organized i n such a way as to maximize not only each person's chances to develop his/her c a p a c i t i e s , but also the correspondence between the jobs or roles a v a i l a b l e and the natural endowments people have. This sort of c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity o f f e r s a d i f f e r e n t answer to the question "opportunity to do what ?" than the answer we have been considering - to f i l l the e x i s t i n g jobs. The issue of whether the l a t t e r answer i s a good one.;- whether i t i s i n f a c t desirable to s e t t l e f o r having equal opportunity f o r everyone to f i l l the e x i s t i n g jobs - i s d i f f e r e n t from the issue of what constitutes having equal opportunity to f i l l the e x i s t i n g jobs, and I w i l l take i t up i n a l a t e r chapter. For the present we are dealing with the c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity to f i l l existing'jobs i n order to see what steps they require us to take, since t h i s i s a popular current p o l i t i c a l goal, and i t i s at least arguable that M i l l ' s 32 goal was to open the e x i s t i n g jobs to women. Frankel's "educational" conception provides a c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity to f i l l the e x i s t i n g jobs. I t says that we must remove the obstacles i n everyone's s i t u a t i o n that prevent him/her from performing up to the l e v e l of his/her n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s and then we have equal opportunity; thus i t seeks to equalize everyone's opportunities by minimizing- everyone's disadvantages. This c r i t e r i o n s u i t s not only 40 those u t i l i t a r i a n s who want to develop human capacities and raise the l e v e l of competition for jobs, but also those who want to f i n d the person best q u a l i f i e d by nature for each gob. But i n i t s present formulation, the c r i t e r i o n i s too vague to t e l l us much about what must be done to meet i t . We have to know what counts as an obstacle i n someone's s i t u a t i o n , and on that point there i s room for disagreement. Perhaps i t w i l l help i n considering what should count as an obstacle i n someone's situ a t i o n i f we f i r s t ask what i s necessary to being able to perform up to the l e v e l of one's natural a b i l i t i e s . Certainly one must not be prevented from t r a i n i n g for or getting a job by rules which exclude one for unnecessary or unimportant reasons (see previous pages). But there i s more to i t than that. ' I think we can assume that "natural a b i l i t i e s " includes a b i l i t i e s to do things 33 that people are born with and capacities to develop certain a b i l i t i e s to do things. Then people need some conditions for proper development of t h e i r a b i l i t i e s as w e l l as a clear f i e l d for using what they have developed. I see three major kinds of development which must take place i n individuals before they can perform at the l e v e l of t h e i r natural a b i l i t i e s : development of s k i l l s and knowledge, physical development, and emotional development. There are basic s k i l l s and knowledge necessary to anyone who wants to function i n our society. For example, we need language s k i l l s , mathematical s k i l l s , and manual coordination s k i l l s ; and we need information about how things work for day-to-day l i v i n g - about food, 41 c l o t h i n g , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , s h e l t e r and s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s . We t r y to g ive our c h i l d r e n these b a s i c s k i l l s and knowledge by the process of e a r l y e d u c a t i o n . But i n order to s u c c e s s f u l l y compete f o r jobs and to perform up to the l e v e l of t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s , some c h i l d r e n must develop some of the b a s i c s k i l l s ( e . g . language or mathematics) f a r beyond the degree that i s necessary f o r t h e i r s u r v i v a l , a n d . a l l c h i l d r e n must have adequate information about what r o l e s and jobs are a v a i l a b l e to them. In a d d i t i o n , most jobs r e q u i r e some s p e c i a l s k i l l s and the possession of p a r t i c u l a r information f o r t h e i r performance. People must develop t h e i r p h y s i c a l p o t e n t i a l as w e l l as t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l and s k i l l p o t e n t i a l i n order to perform at the l e v e l of t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s . Indeed we know that i n many ways poor p h y s i c a l development leads to poor development of s k i l l s and knowledge. For good p h y s i c a l development people need at l e a s t good n u t r i t i o n , proper medical c a r e , f r e s h a i r , r e s t and e x e r c i s e . There are many aspects of emotional development, or ' p e r s o n a l i t y development' as i t i s sometimes c a l l e d . Some p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s are of v i r t u a l l y u n i v e r s a l importance to f u n c t i o n i n g i n s o c i e t y at the l e v e l of one's n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s , f o r example: a sense of s e l f - w o r t h , a sense of the worth of o t h e r s , the a b i l i t y to make c h o i c e s , the a b i l i t y to take and s u s t a i n an i n t e r e s t , the d i s p o s i t i o n to make an e f f o r t to s a t i s f y one's 34 d e s i r e s , the a b i l i t y to c a r r y out a p l a n . Other t r a i t s are of wide g e n e r a l importance, f o r example: c r e a t i v i t y , i m a g i n a t i o n , a b i l i t y to concentrate, honesty. S t i l l other t r a i t s are of s p e c i a l importance i n many 42 kinds of j o b s , f o r example: ambit ion, aggressiveness, o b j e c t i v i t y , t a c t , p a t i e n c e , sympathy w i t h the s u f f e r i n g of other people. Then there are t r a i t s of very s p e c i a l i z e d importance, which have t o do w i t h being a t t r a c t e d and devoted to p a r t i c u l a r occupations, f o r example: love of horses or of books, the d e s i r e to care f o r c h i l d r e n , the l u s t f o r c l e a n l i n e s s . Now i t seems to me that anyone's not having access to the means of developing h i s / h e r b a s i c s k i l l s to whatever degree he/she was capable of would c o n s t i t u t e an o b s t a c l e to that p e r s o n ' s performing up to the l e v e l of h i s / h e r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s . Of course there can be and there i s disagreement about what counts as g i v i n g people access to education; f o r example, should we o f f e r d i f f e r e n t e d u c a t i o n a l programs to people who d i f f e r i n the way they l e a r n , the speed at which they l e a r n , and/or the c u l t u r a l background from which they come to s c h o o l ? Does anything s h o r t of p r o v i d i n g the best c o n d i t i o n s f o r everyone's l e a r n i n g the b a s i c s k i l l s and knowledge to whatever degree he/she i s capable of r e a l l y c o n s t i t u t e removing the e d u c a t i o n a l obstac les to h i s / h e r performing up to the l e v e l of h i s / h e r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s ? I t h i n k t h a t , given the reason behind t h i s u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity - to develop human c a p a c i t i e s - the answer must be " n o . " As to a c q u i r i n g the s p e c i a l s k i l l s and knowledge necessary f o r doing p a r t i c u l a r "jobs, we c e r t a i n l y would not want to t r y to have every person develop a l l of these to tt).e best of h i s / h e r a b i l i t y , f o r the process of t r a i n i n g most people would take more than a human l i f e t i m e . Supposing that we do not want to choose occupations 43 for people and then t r a i n them i n those occupations, J J we must give them the information they need on what roles and jobs:are available to them, so that they can choose an occupation and then acquire whatever special q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are necessary for i t to the highest 36 degree they are capable of. I w i l l consider the problem of presenting r e a l choices to people i n more d e t a i l l a t e r , but I do want to point out here that the process of choosing which roles and jobs to compete for also involves psychological factors that are the r e s u l t of what I have called emotional development. For example, we can easily see how important self-confidence i s i n choosing a highly competitive or d i f f i c u l t career. Moreover, a c h i l d who has developed l i t t l e patience and no love of accuracy and o b j e c t i v i t y would not choose to be a s c i e n t i s t ; someone who takes l i t t l e or no joy i n c r e a t i v i t y would not choose to be an a r t i s t . I think any u t i l i t a r i a n who stresses the goal of developing human capacities should consider the following steps necessary to removing the obstacles to a person's performing up to the l e v e l of his/her natural a b i l i t i e s : that we provide the best conditions for his/her learning the basic s k i l l s and knowledge to whatever extent he/she i s capable of, that we provide adequate information about what roles and jobs are available to him/her, and that we provide the means for him/her to acquire whatever spe c i a l s k i l l s and knowledge are necessary for doing any p a r t i c u l a r job he/she chooses to do. Furthermore, I think any such u t i l i t a r i a n should consider providing the conditions for physical development - good n u t r i t i o n , proper medical care, fresh 44 a i r , rest and exercise - necessary to 'removing the obstacles'. But the issue of what conditions for emotional development should be provided i s more problematic, because i t i s not so easy to decide what should count as an emotional or psychological obstacle to people's performing at the l e v e l of their natural a b i l i t i e s . I have said that some personality t r a i t s are of v i r t u a l l y universal importance to functioning i n society at the l e v e l of one's natural a b i l i t i e s . I have also mentioned that some results of emotional development w i l l play an important part i n people's choosing what jobs to t r a i n for and compete for. Few writers on equal opportunity even consider the psychological factors that go into successfully competing for jobs. Yet some of these factors are, I w i l l claim, so important that the lack of them can be an obstacle to people's performing at the l e v e l of their natural a b i l i t i e s as insurmountable as laws against th e i r working i n the professions for which they are most talented. T.D. Campbell, one of the few writers who consider the role of psychological factors i n creating equal opportunity, argues -against l e t t i n g two important psychological factors countaas obstacles to people's performance of a task - the disposition to make an ef f o r t and the desire to do i t . He claims that "to have an opportunity i s to be in a situ a t i o n where, by choice and e f f o r t , a desirable goal may be achieved," and i f we count such factors as unwillingness or i n a b i l i t y to make an e f f o r t and lack of desire to do the task as obstacles which reduce opportunities, "we w i l l leave no room for the d i s t i n c t i o n between 45 equality of opportunity and equality of chance". I disagree with his conclusions about both these psychological factors. Campbell draws his conclusions about e f f o r t and desire i n the context of considering what obstacles to thei r successful performance, including natural a b i l i t i e s , people should be handicapped for i n order to give them equal opportunity. He points out that, i f we include unwillingness or i n a b i l i t y to make an e f f o r t and lack of desire to do i t among these obstacles, we w i l l wind up handicapping people i n such a way that they simply have an equal chance of succeeding. But by employing the u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity which we are presently considering, we reject the practice of handicapping altogether, and we consider only what obstacles to people's performing according to th e i r natural a b i l i t i e s exist and must be removed. We are not trying to equalize people's chances of success, because we want to maximize the dependence of performance upon natural a b i l i t i e s (which we do not assume are the same i n everyone). Now we might want to say that although Campbell i s on the wrong track when he maintains that the d i s t i n c t i o n between opportunity and chance rests upon i t , he has discovered some truth about opportunity -that not a l l conditions i n the way of performance are privations of opportunity, and s p e c i f i c a l l y , that unwillingness or i n a b i l i t y to make an e f f o r t and lack of desire to do something are not privations of opportunity to do i t . This would mean that creating equality of opportunity by removing the obstacles to people's performing up to the 46 l e v e l of their natural a b i l i t i e s would d e f i n i t e l y not require bringing i t about that the i r performance does i n fact r e f l e c t t h e i r natural a b i l i t i e s . The following example makes Campbell's claim about the meaning of opportunity very plausible: Suppose my friend and I are both Invited to apply for a job i n the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s that would employ our a b i l i t i e s better than they are now employed. I weigh the advantages and disadvantages and decide that having the job i s not worth the ef f o r t i t would take to move there or not worth l i v i n g i n such a cold place, so I do not apply. I t would be very odd to say that I did not have the opportunity to have a better job. And i f my decision not to apply for the job i s the only thing i n the way of my getting i t that i s not i n the way of my fri e n d , i t would be very odd to say thattwe did not have equal opportunity to get the job. But i f we change the example a l i t t l e we begin to see some problems: Suppose when invi t e d to apply for the job I become extremely anxious at the prospect of having to make such an important choice, and f i n a l l y , unable to decide what to do, I l e t the deadline for applications pass. Suppose further that t h i s behaviour i s t y p i c a l of my responses to important decisions, and that i t s causes can be traced to certain childhood experiences. My friend has no such problem. Or suppose that my attitude toward being invited to apply i s resignation to f a i l u r e . I f e e l , i n spite of evidence to the contrary, that I could not get the job because any r e a l e f f o r t I make i s doomed to f a i l u r e , and so I do not apply. Suppose further that t h i s 47 response f i t s a p a t t e r n that can be t r a c e d back.to. childhood e x p e r i e n c e s . I n . b o t h these cases i t seems reasonable to say t h a t I do not have the opportunity, to take the b e t t e r job (because I was deprived of the opportunity at an e a r l y age), and that I c e r t a i n l y do not have an equal opportunity with my f r i e n d to get i t . Some people w i l l no doubt disagree with t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , but i t does not s t r e t c h the meaning of opportunity too f a r beyond i t s normal use. S u r e l y people cannot perform up to the l e v e l of t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s i f , due to some aspect of t h e i r emotional development, they l a c k the g e n e r a l a b i l i t y to make a choice or the d i s p o s i t i o n to act oh t h e i r c h o i c e s . In these cases i t does not exceed the l i m i t s of our concept of opportunity to conclude that p e o p l e ' s o p p o r t u n i t i e s are not as good as they could be. And i f we know that the a b i l i t y to make a choice and the d i s p o s i t i o n to make an e f f o r t can be nourished or thwarted by c e r t a i n p r a c t i c e s . ( e s p e c i a l l y d u r i n g c h i l d h o o d ) , then we can remove the emotional ob stacles to p e o p l e ' s performance by p r o v i d i n g the best c o n d i t i o n s f o r them to develop these t r a i t s . Therefore i t seems to me t h a t , s i n c e l a c k of any of the p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s which I mentioned on page +1 as being of u n i v e r s a l importance would be a major o b s t a c l e to anyone's performing up to the levjel of h i s / h e r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s , those who h o l d t h i s c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity should consider p r o v i d i n g the best c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i r development necessary to c r e a t i n g e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . Suppose that some people have a l l the p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s I have c a l l e d u n i v e r s a l l y important, i n c l u d i n g the general a b i l i t y to make 48 choices, but they do not choose to compete for or work i n the jobs f o r which they are most talented. S h a l l we say that the i r not wanting to do the work for which they are most talented i s an obstacle to thei r performing at the l e v e l of the i r natural a b i l i t i e s - an obstacle which, on our c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity, must be removed before they w i l l have equal opportunity i n our society ? Campbell says, "... i t i s misleading to say that a person has not got an opportunity to do something which he i s able to do and knows he can do, but has 38 no desire to do". This suggests that the meaning of 'opportunity' i s such that we could not take someone/s:.notwwanting*;c'oddoa something to be an obstacle to his/her doing i t and s t i l l claim to be applying a c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity. I think Campbell i s wrong about this too. There are some circumstances i n which we might say that people have not got an opportunity to do something which they are able to do and know they can do, but have no desire to do. I f , for example, they were conditioned at an early age to avoid the a c t i v i t y i n question, they might have a strong desire not to do i t , which i s a way of having no desire to do 39 i t . Take a rather extreme example: In Brave New World, Aldous Huxley introduces us to the practice of "Neo-Pavlovian Conditioning," by which eight-month-old babies are quickly made to fear and avoid roses and books by shocking them when they approach these objects. In Huxley's book these "Delta" children were destined for further conditioning and very lim i t e d t r a i n i n g f o r s p e c i f i c jobs; but suppose that these children 49 a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e d p r e c i s e l y the same t r a i n i n g as a l l other c h i l d r e n of t h e i r mental and p h y s i c a l c a p a c i t i e s , and, except f o r t h e i r c o n d i t i o n i n g to avoid roses and books, had no s p e c i a l treatment as a group. Would we say that they had equal opportunity with the other c h i l d r e n to become gardeners or l i b r a r i a n s ? Would we say t h a t , given they were able to do these jobs and knew they could do them, they s t i l l had the opportunity to become gardeners or l i b r a r i a n s ? I t h i n k n o t . - And I think we are f o r c e d to regard t h i s k i n d of p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n i n g as an o b s t a c l e to p e o p l e ' s performing up to the l e v e l of t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s - probably as great an o b s t a c l e as a law against t h e i r working as gardeners or l i b r a r i a n s . Admittedly the case i n which people have been d e l i b e r a t e l y and r a t h e r h a r s h l y c o n d i t i o n e d to avoid the work f o r which they are most t a l e n t e d seems l i k e a very s p e c i a l case of t h e i r not wanting to do that work. And i t would seem that we could remove t h i s o b s t a c l e to p e o p l e ' s performance by r e f r a i n i n g from c o n d i t i o n i n g people i n t h i s way, and by employing whatever methods are a v a i l a b l e to counter the c o n d i t i o n i n g i n anyone to whom i t has been done a l r e a d y . We could even take measures to counteract traumatic experiences which a c c i d e n t a l l y c o n d i t i o n people to avoid c e r t a i n kinds of work. But there aire l o t s of cases of people not wanting to do the work f o r which they are most t a l e n t e d i n which the l a c k of d e s i r e can be reasonable a t t r i b u t e d to i n f l u e n c e s that are n e i t h e r harsh nor traumatic . G i r l s whose parents and teachers l o v i n g l y and c o n s i s t e n t l y encourage 50 them i n playing at and exploring the role of homemaker and only tolerate, with some amusement, thei r trying on other roles, are very unlikely to become doctors. Indeed, they w i l l not want to become doctors, unless there i s some other strong influence i n thei r l i v e s , for example a much-loved role model. This process of influencing a c h i l d (or an adult) need not even be deliberate; i n fact i t i s often the result of parents' and teachers' own expectations. Certainly the presence of powerful role models with whom a c h i l d can id e n t i f y AO i s almost always accidental. Yet can we honestly say that, unlike those who have been subjected to harsh or traumatic conditioning, g i r l s who have been gently influenced i n t h i s way to want to become homemakers, a l l other things being equal, have an opportunity to become doctors ? D i f f i c u l t i e s arise when we t r y to say just what i s the obstacle to her performing up to the l e v e l of her natural a b i l i t i e s i n the case of the g i r l who i s talented enough to become a doctor and who wants only to become a homemaker because of a?history l i k e that described above. I f we say that the obstacle i s simply that she does not want to be a doctor, then do we not commit ourselves to a policy of doing whatever we can to make people's preferences match their natural a b i l i t i e s i n order to give them equal opportunity ? But surely some cases of not wanting to do what one i s most talented for are not cases of lacking the opportunity. For instance, one may not d i s l i k e the work one i s most talented to perform, but prefer a way of l i f e that i s 51 incompatible with i t - as when someone prefers spending more time with his/her family to having the most responsible position he/she i s qu a l i f i e d to hold. On the other hand, i f we say that the obstacle i n the case i s her having been influenced not to want to become a doctor, then do we not commit ourselves either to the policy of doing whatever we can to make people's preferences match their natural a b i l i t i e s or to a policy of refraining from influencing people's preferences altogether ? Yet surely some influences do not deprive people of th e i r opportunities or even reduce them. I f I had an a r t i s t i c uncle who imparted his love of painting to me, he did not thereby lessen my opportunity to become a doctor, even i f he increased my desire to become a painter. Or i f my father hated his work as a doctor and made no secret of i t , that i n i t s e l f did not reduce my opportunity to enter the same profession, even i f i t reduced my desire to do so. Some, but certainly not a l l , influences over people's wants deprive them of or lessen their opportunities. How s h a l l we distinguish those influences ? The influence that parents and teachers exert when they encourage a g i r l to become a homemaker i s sim i l a r i n two ways to the st r a i g h t -forward conditioning which i s applied to Delta children i n Huxley's 41 imaginary world. F i r s t , i t produces, by means of reward and/or punishment, an association i n the mind of the person influenced which does not r e f l e c t any regular causal relationship. When we slap the hand of a ch i l d who reaches out for f i r e , we create (with less i 52 la s t i n g damage than i f we allowed i t to occur naturally) an association between reaching for f i r e and pain which r e f l e c t s a true causal relationship. But this i s not so i f we shock the c h i l d who reaches for a book. Nor i s i t so i f we reward homemaker-role behaviour with love and/or approval. In the l a t t e r case i t has been claimed that by encouraging a g i r l to become a homemaker we prepare her for the world, which she w i l l f i n d does approve of her i n that rol e and i n few others. But the relationship between being a homemaker and gaining love and/or approval i s far less certain than that between touching f i r e and pain, and although I can never make i t the case that f i r e does not burn my c h i l d , I can be one of the few people who approve of her becoming a doctor. Secondly, i n both the Delta children and the girl-homemaker cases, the influence exerted makes the person influenced have the values and aims which the influencer wants him/her to have, rather than helping the person influenced to discover what he/she wants to do. Even i f the g i r l ' s parents and teachers are not deliberate about influencing her to become a homemaker, nevertheless she i s influenced to have the aims they want her to have when they reward her with the i r love and/or approval for exploring that role and no others. I f they wanted to influence her to discover what she wants to do, they could and would encourage her to explore any harmless roles that interest her. My hypothetical uncle-artist case d i f f e r s - f r o m the girl-homemaker case i n j u s t this way. When my uncle gives me an appreciation of painting, he increases my means of finding out what I want to do; and even i f 53 he rewards me with his approval for my interest i n painting, he does not influence me to have the values and aims he wants me to have rather than to f i n d out what I want so long as he does not withhold his approval from a l l my other interests. So i n the case of the girl-homemaker I think we should say that the obstacle to her performing up to the l e v e l of her natural a b i l i t i e s i s that, by rewarding her with love and/or approval only for playing at the role of homemaker, her parents and teachers created an association i n her mind between that role and love and/or approval which does not r e f l e c t any regular causal relationship, and that by this means they influenced her to have the aims and values they wanted her to have rather than to discover what she wanted to do and could do best. To remove this type of obstacle to people's performing up to the l e v e l of the i r natural a b i l i t i e s , we must r e f r a i n from exerting the kind of influence I have described. Since i t i s not always easy to be aware of our own preferences or to know what w i l l serve as a reward or punishment to a c h i l d , the safest course of prevention i s probably to do whatever we can to help children (and others) to find out for themselves what they want to do, as acting on this conscious intention would tend to counteract any unconscious manipulation we may be engaging i n . When I say that we might adopt a policy of doing everything we can to help people f i n d out what they want to do, I do not mean to suggest that people are born with hidden tastes and preferences that they must 54 then uncover to discover what they want to do. Probably people's preferences for various a c t i v i t i e s and experiences are determined by innumerable-factors of both the i r environment and their inheritance. But especially in.choosing an occupation or r o l e , we must know what a c t i v i t i e s and experiences i t involves before we can know i f we want i t , and this i s the process of discovery. Someone might object to the random way i n which people's preferences for a c t i v i t i e s and experiences are determined and maintain that, since influences of some kind are inevitable, they should be deliberate and directed towards making people's preferences match t h e i r a b i l i t i e s : . , This might be a useful p o l i c y , but, as I have claimed, i t cannot be necessary to creating equality of opportunity, since only some kinds of influences over people's preferences hinder opportunity and only some kinds of influences are obstacles to people's performing up to the l e v e l of their natural a b i l i t i e s . There are important psychological components to a g i r l ' s becoming a doctor besides her desire to do so and her possessing a l l of what I have called the universally important character t r a i t s . The train i n g of a physician i s a long and d i f f i c u l t process, for which one who i s to succeed needs a high degree of self-confidence, .patience and d i s c i p l i n e i n addition to a strong desire to do i t . Now confidence i n one's i n t e l l e c t u a l and physical powers, patience and d i s c i p l i n e are t r a i t s which adults can cultivate or quash i n children, i n ways simi l a r to those by which they influence some of their children's 55 desires. Therefore we must consider whether any of the means by which people can be influenced to develop or not.to develop personality t r a i t s that are necessary for s p e c i f i c jobs create obstacles to th e i r performing up to the l e v e l of th e i r natural a b i l i t i e s and also whether any of these means should be used to make sure that people have those t r a i t s which w i l l be most he l p f u l i n the work they are suited to do. Straightforward conditioning could be applied to developing or destroying s p e c i f i c personality t r a i t s by deliberately rewarding or punishing manifestations of them. A v i v i d picture of t h i s possib-i l i t y i s presented by Charles Dickens i n David Copperfield, where Mr. Murdstone and his s i s t e r systematically destroy the self-confidence of David's mother. Attempting to influence people to develop some personality t r a i t s and not others by means of rewards and punishments i s quite common; parents and teachers try to make children obedient, respectful, tidy and industrious and to prevent the i r being s e l f i s h , c r u e l , greedy and messy. Reward and punishment often f a i l to shape par t i c u l a r personalities the way they are intended to, but that does not show that the task of shaping personalities i s impossible; they may be the least effective means. Certainly other kinds of influence 42 have been known to work - advice, example, and even a t t r i b u t i o n . I t i s reasonable to suppose that with more knowledge we could do quite a l o t to determine the character t r a i t s children w i l l acquire. Now would any method by which we might influence a g i r l not to develop self-confidence, patience and d i s c i p l i n e put obstacles i n the way of her performing up to the l e v e l of her natural a b i l i t i e s and deprive 56 her of her opportunity to become a doctor, or would only some methods do that ? Does reward and/or punishment, for example giving love and approval to her when she shows 'feminine' t i m i d i t y or f l i g h t i n e s s , v i o l a t e her opportunities more than advice l i k e , "Men are attracted to g i r l s who make them f e e l needed, not g i r l s who act too self-confident"? And what about a t t r i b u t i o n : "She's so helpless, impatient, etc." ? I am in c l i n e d to say that any method of influence which i s s u f f i c i e n t to prevent her developing the t r a i t s she needs to become a doctor places obstacles i n her way and deprives her of her opportunities, and that, this i s true whether or not the method i s applied deliberately to produce the results i t produces. I t i s the lack of the necessary t r a i t s which i s the obstacle to her performance, so.that by creating, that lack we create the obstacle and diminish her opportunities. What i f we make no e f f o r t to quash the necessary t r a i t s and no e f f o r t to cultivate them either ? Self-confidence, patience and d i s c i p l i n e often (not always) bring the i r own rewards; so unless we punish instances of them or prevent the usual rewards from coming, children are l i k e l y to develop these t r a i t s on the i r own, provided they are given occasion to exercise them and discover the rewards for themselves. But then c u l t i v a t i n g these t r a i t s may consist primarily i n providing people with occasions to exercise them and reap the rewards. To do nothing toward providing or preventing such occasions leaves the development of those t r a i t s to chance - to the accidental circumstances of environment. And then i t i s reasonable to say that people have very unequal opportunities to become doctors even i f the only difference 57 among them i s that some of them by chance lacked the conditions for developing patience or d i s c i p l i n e and others had those conditions. The lack of patience or d i s c i p l i n e i s an obstacle to some people's performing up to the l e v e l of thei r natural a b i l i t i e s - an obstacle which we could take (or could once have taken) steps to remove. I t looks as though we should commit ourselves to c u l t i v a t i n g self-confidence, patience and d i s c i p l i n e i n everyone 1 as a means of removing the obstacles to people's performing up to the l e v e l of their natural a b i l i t i e s . I say 'c u l t i v a t i n g ' because some methods of influencing people to develop these t r a i t s might be unacceptable to us, not on the grounds that they diminish people's opportunities j but on other grounds - for example some methods might cause damage to other aspects of the personality; but c u l t i v a t i n g the t r a i t s , i.e. giving people occasions to exercise them and experience their rewards, i s not a method that i s l i k e l y to c o n f l i c t with other kinds of well-being. Furthermore, possessing self-confidence, patience and d i s c i p l i n e i s l i k e l y to be he l p f u l to nearly everyone, and acquiring them i s not l i k e l y to c o n f l i c t with acquiring other psychological t r a i t s which are necessary or useful i n various other employments. This brings us to some d i f f i c u l t i e s . What of the t r a i t s that are useful i n other kinds of employments ? Can we cultivate a l l the psychological t r a i t s that are necessary or he l p f u l i n a l l jobs i n everyone ? Three circumstances might make this impossible. 58 F i r s t , i t may be impossible to c u l t i v a t e some t r a i t s that would be necessary or h e l p f u l i n some occupations. The e x e r c i s e of some t r a i t s may o r d i n a r i l y b r i n g p a i n as often as of more often than pleasure - compassion, perhaps, i s an example. We would have to d e l i b e r a t e l y reward m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of such t r a i t s or employ other methods to i n f l u e n c e people to acquire them; i t would not be s u f f i c i e n t to p r o v i d e circumstances i n which, they could be e x e r c i s e d . The methods that would be needed to i n f l u e n c e people to develop such t r a i t s might be o b j e c t i o n a b l e to u t i l i t a r i a n s on the grounds that they cause some harm to the p e r s o n a l i t y or to the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e or b o t h . Second, t r a i t s that are necessary or u s e f u l i n some occupations might c o n f l i c t with t r a i t s that are necessary or u s e f u l i n o t h e r s . For example, contentment - a tendency to e a s i l y accept whatever comes one's way - would be a u s e f u l (perhaps even necessary) t r a i t i n many unpleasant or dead-end j o b s , but t h i s t r a i t would seem to be incompatible with a h i g h l y - d e v e l o p e d a m b i t i o n , which i s u s e f u l (perhaps even necessary) to o b t a i n i n g jobs by long and d i f f i c u l t s t r i v i n g and to keeping jobs that are h i g h l y c o m p e t i t i v e . I t i s at l e a s t quest ionable whether someone can have both these t r a i t s at the same p e r i o d i n h i s / h e r l i f e ; and i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to imagine how we would c u l t i v a t e them both i n a c h i l d . We can imagine i n f l u e n c i n g a c h i l d to be ambitious up to the p o i n t that e f f o r t can achieve no more, and at that p o i n t to be content; but such a c h i l d i s u n l i k e l y to s e t t l e i n t o an unpleasant or dead-end job u n t i l a long time has passed, i f at a l l . 59 T h i r d , there may be so many p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s that are necessary or u s e f u l i n some occupation t h a t , even i f they are not incompatible w i t h one another, i t would be impossible to c u l t i v a t e them a l l i n one person. I f t h i s were the case, or i f the second circumstance were the case and some t r a i t s are i n c o m p a t i b l e , we would be f o r c e d to decide which t r a i t s to c u l t i v a t e i n which people. We might c u l t i v a t e i n each person those t r a i t s which are most u s e f u l i n the work he/she i s best s u i t e d to perform. In f a c t the c r i t e r i o n of e q u a l i t y of opportunity we are examining seems to r e q u i r e such a p o l i c y i n those circumstances. Quite apart from the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of adopting t h i s p o l i c y , we must ask whether i t i s d e s i r a b l e to e x e r c i s e as much p u b l i c c o n t r o l over the growth of c h i l d r e n as i t i s l i k e l y to r e q u i r e . F r a n k e l a n t i c i p a t e s t h i s q u e s t i o n about a p p l y i n g h i s " e d u c a t i o n a l " c r i t e r i o n when he suggests that we use u t i l i t a r i a n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s to decide whether or not to make a p a r t i c u l a r m o d i f i c a t i o n i n p e o p l e ' s s i t u a t i o n s to remove the o b s t a c l e s to t h e i r performing at the l e v e l of t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s . He says we should weigh the b e n e f i t s of the m o d i f i c a t i o n against i t s ^ c o s t s i n human time, energy and s t r i v i n g , that we should consider the p r o b a b i l i t i e s that the m o d i f i c a t i o n w i l l succeed i n removing the o b s t a c l e , and that we should ask o u r s e l v e s what present i n s t i t u t i o n s , l i k e the f a m i l y , we are w i l l i n g to give up f o r equal o p p o r t u n i t y . I w i l l not attempt to answer these questions of cost and b e n e f i t h e r e . I am content to have shown how the 'removing the o b s t a c l e s ' c r i t e r i o n of e q u a l i t y of opportunity i s a very s t r i c t c r i t e r i o n indeed. 60 3) Free Choice and Satisfaction . U t i l i t a r i a n s who want equality of opportunity as a means of having most people i n jobs which they freely choose and which employ their a b i l i t i e s i n ways sat i s f y i n g to themselves w i l l not l i k e rules which unnecessarily exclude anyone from a p a r t i c u l a r job. Rules which require or exclude (non-universal) t r a i t s which are not important to the performance of a job needlessly reduce the number of people who can choose to do that job and possibly f i n d i t a source of s a t i s f a c t i o n to them. Thus these u t i l i t a r i a n s would certainly reject the rule given i n example (b). The exclusion of vast numbers of people from becoming doctors by a rule requiring that they be able to l i f t a 200-lb. man would far outweigh*., the small u t i l i t y of the requirement. On the other hand, as u t i l i t a r i a n s they would have to accept the rule given i n example ( c ) , which requires doctors to have a medical education, regardless of how many people i t excluded from becoming doctors. However, as we have seen, they could accept the rule given i n example (c) and s t i l l object to the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n described there. They might think that the correlation between having a medical education and being male suggests that either females or males are being deprived i n some way of the freedom to choose thei r professions. They would have to know that as many as possible females and males had a free choice about whether or not to become doctors before they would approve of the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n i n example (c). 61 The desire to increase the number of people who choose their own occupations and employ their a b i l i t i e s i n s a t i s f y i n g ways was one of M i l l ' s reasons f o r wanting to open a l l professions as fr e e l y to women as to men. I t i s also a good reason for u t i l i t a r i a n s to support equality of opportunity. The work that they do i s for many people the major source of happiness or misery i n the i r l i v e s ; and, as M i l l pointed out, the freedom to choose one's own occupation i s an important source of happiness i n i t s e l f . Of course u t i l i t a r i a n s might want to maximize the number of people who freely choose their occupations and engage i n s a t i s f y i n g work without wanting everyone to have an equal opportunity to f i l l the jobs that exist right nowyin our society. They might think i t necessary to deprive some people of any choice at a l l i n order to give most people free choice and job s a t i s f a c t i o n , i n which case they would not want everyone's opportunities to be equal. Or, they might think that the jobs that exist i n our society right now cannot possibly offer s a t i s f y i n g work to any but a small minority of people, so that a complete s o c i a l and economic reorganization i s necessary to r e a l i z e t h e i r goal. But here we are concerned with t h i s u t i l i t a r i a n goal only insofar as i t i s a reason for wanting equal opportunity for everyone to f i l l the existing jobs. We s h a l l look at how this reason for wanting i t would affect our c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity. One c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity which seems to suit these purposes i s that people have equal opportunity when each person's choice of employments i s maximized. The idea that, given free 62 choice of t h e i r occupations, most or even many people would wind up i n jobs which employ t h e i r a b i l i t i e s i n s a t i s f y i n g ways i s perhaps a l i t t l e o p t i m i s t i c . But we may be able to d i s c o v e r the best c o n d i t i o n s f o r making a good choice and p r o v i d e those c o n d i t i o n s . For example, we might f i n d out by experience at what age people are most l i k e l y to choose an occupation which w i l l continue to give them s a t i s f a c t i o n ; we already know that ten years i s c e r t a i n l y too young except f o r a few p r o d i g i e s and t h i r t y years i s too l a t e f o r some occupations, l i k e those i n v o l v i n g music and languages. F or many occupations i t i s not necessary that a person devote a l i f e t i m e to them; thus most people can choose t h e i r work more than once, and t h i s creates a b e t t e r chance that f r e e choice w i l l lead to job s a t i s f a c t i o n . How would we go about maximizing p e o p l e ' s choice of employments ? The obvious f i r s t step i s to permit them to do any jobs they want to do and are capable of doing (at l e a s t adequately) . Of course t h i s means that we must not exclude anyone from a job by r e q u i r i n g t r a i t s which are not important to i t s performance or by r u l i n g out t r a i t s which do not i n t e r f e r e with i t s performance. Then we would have to apply the same p o l i c y to t r a i n i n g f o r jobs - p e r m i t t i n g people to take whatever t r a i n i n g they want and are capable of taking - i f the f i r s t step i s to be meaningful at a l l . But are these two measures enough ? When people are allowed to do any work they want to do and can do, and to o b t a i n the t r a i n i n g necessary f o r i t , s h a l l we say that we have maximized t h e i r choices and now, as f a r as p o s s i b l e , they f r e e l y choose 63 their occupations and have equal opportunity ? I think, l i k e Sharon H i l l , that we must go back beyond the point when the decision i s made i f we want to maximize people's choices. H i l l says: We saw e a r l i e r that i n order to decide for oneself, one must decide without being coerced at the time of choice. There are other interferences which may occur much e a r l i e r and which can render a person incapable of making autonomous decisions on these important matters. For the time being, l e t us imagine a school system deliberately adopted the following p o l i c i e s . F i r s t , suppose that the system leads g i r l s to take up domestic a c t i v i t i e s and keeps them from others l i k e competitive games and mechanics. - Then, when they reach the age to choose how to spend their time, they have already developed the s k i l l s to enjoy cooking and sewing at a high l e v e l and discover, not surprisingly, that they l i k e domestic tasks and not car repair, carpentry or basketball. Surely the p o s s i b i l i t y that these l a t t e r might have been the objects of their choice i s v i r t u a l l y extinguished. You may say that at the age of reason they have a right to self-determination, but i t i s an empty right i n so far as the l i v e options for them have been severely r e s t r i c t e d . 4 4 H i l l l i s t s a t o t a l of f i v e ways i n which schools can (and do) interfe r e with people's choices~6f career long before the time for choosing arrives: 1. By r e s t r i c t i n g the s k i l l s that children develop to those needed i n only certain kinds of occupations and a c t i v i t i e s . 2. By depriving them of information about what careers they are capable of pursuing. 3. By r e s t r i c t i n g their imaginations to a c t i v i t i e s of certain sorts. She suggests they might do this by l i m i t i n g role models or by constantly warning some children about the unfortunate consequences of engaging i n certain occupations. 64 4. By encouraging the development of character t r a i t s which w i l l make i t v i r t u a l l y impossible f o r them to s u c c e s s f u l l y pursue c e r t a i n careers and d i s c o u r a g i n g the development of those which would be conducive to and h e l p f u l i n pursuing those c a r e e r s . 5. By i n s i s t i n g on standards of dress and e t i q u e t t e which a r e , i n our s o c i e t y , a s s o c i a t e d with c e r t a i n career r o l e s and l i f e s t y l e s . The a s s o c i a t i o n tends to f i x the c h i l d r e n ' s expectations about t h e i r f u t u r e l i v e s . Of course, as she p o i n t s out, these things can be done outside the schools - i n the home and i n v a r i o u s other s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s . And they can be done at any time Before the time f o r choosing a c a r e e r , not j u s t during the s c h o o l - y e a r s . H i l l ' s f i r s t three methods of i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h p e o p l e ' s a b i l i t i e s to make choices suggest that some of the c o n d i t i o n s I s a i d ( i n the previous s e c t i o n ) were necessary f o r removing the obstacles to p e o p l e ' s performing up to the l e v e l of t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s might a l s o be necessary c o n d i t i o n s f o r maximizing p e o p l e ' s choice of t h e i r occupations: that we p r o v i d e the best c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i r l e a r n i n g the b a s i c s k i l l s and knowledge to whatever degree they are capable of , that we p r o v i d e adequate i n f o r m a t i o n about what r o l e s and jobs are a v a i l a b l e to them, and that we provide the means f o r them to a c q u i r e whatever s p e c i a l s k i l l s and knowledge are necessary f o r doing any p a r t i c u l a r jobs they choose to do. I t h i n k these c o n d i t i o n s are necessary f o r maximizing p e o p l e ' s c h o i c e s . . P e o p l e ' s b a s i c s k i l l s and knowledge should be developed to the best of t h e i r c a p a c i t y so 65 that they have a c c u r a t e . i n f o r m a t i o n about what they are capable of and so that t h e i r a b i l i t i e s to compete f o r occupations they could succeed at have been maximized; f o r unless t h e i r a b i l i t i e s to compete are maximized, some careers are c losed to them u n n e c e s s a r i l y ( i . e . not because they were not capable of them) before the p o i n t of choice i s reached. F u r t h e r m o r e , . i f someone f a l s e l y b e l i e v e s he/she can e i t h e r be a j a n i t o r or a garbage c o l l e c t o r and nothing e l s e , and chooses to be a j a n i t o r , we can h a r d l y say that that person f r e e l y chose h i s / h e r occupation; therefore people must have adequate i n f o r m a t i o n about what occupations are a v a i l a b l e to them i f t h e i r choices are to be maximized. And unless everybody has the a c t u a l means of t r a i n i n g f o r any occupation they might choose, t h e i r choices are l i m i t e d to those f o r which they can o b t a i n t r a i n i n g and t h e i r choices are not as great as they could be. In a d d i t i o n , s i n c e poor or unbalanced p h y s i c a l development can o b v i o u s l y r e s t r i c t p e o p l e ' s choice of work a great d e a l , I t h i n k we must a l s o provide everyone with the c o n d i t i o n s f o r p h y s i c a l development - g o o d n u t r i t i o n , proper medical c a r e , f r e s h a i r , r e s t and e x e r c i s e -i f we are to maximize t h e i r choice of occupation. The f i f t h method of i n t e r f e r i n g seems r e l a t i v e l y easy to a v o i d . We can r e f r a i n from imposing standards of dress and e t i q u e t t e on people before they choose t h e i r occupations. And s i n c e we do want to al low people to change t h e i r occupations as w e l l as to choose t h e i r f i r s t ones, we should probably a b o l i s h enforced standards of dress and 66 e t i q u e t t e as f a r as p o s s i b l e , or make standards uniform f o r a l l occupations except where r e q u i r e d f o r h e a l t h or s a f e t y , i f we waft't to maximize p e o p l e ' s choices of work. Of course we know that innumerable p s y c h o l o g i c a l pressures can s u f f i c i e n t l y determine a p e r s o n ' s s t y l e s of dress and behaviour without the help of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e s . For that matter, innumerable p s y c h o l o g i c a l pressures can determine a p e r s o n ' s expectations about the future without the help of p a t t e r n s of dress and e t i q u e t t e . And that b r i n g s us to H i l l ' s f o u r t h and most problematic k i n d of i n t e r f e r e n c e . Sharon H i l l argues that i f g i r l s develop c e r t a i n p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s to a h i g h degree - p a s s i v i t y , understanding and s e n s i t i v i t y - and others very l i t t l e or not at a l l - aggressiveness, i m p a r t i a l i t y and d i s c i p l i n e - . t h e y w i l l tend to choose to become housewives and not d o c t o r s . C e r t a i n l y they w i l l be b e t t e r s u i t e d to become housewives. As I p o i n t e d out i n the previous s e c t i o n , people who l a c k s e l f -confidence, p a t i e n c e and d i s c i p l i n e w i l l probably not succeed i n becoming d o c t o r s , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l and p h y s i c a l powers. A g i r l who can see that these character t r a i t s are r e q u i r e d f o r success and knows that she lacks them w i l l c o r r e c t l y judge that she i s not s u i t e d to becoming a d o c t o r . Even i f ( and t h i s might be very unusual) she wants very much to become a d o c t o r , the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d w i l l probably look insurmountable to h e r . Because character t r a i t s she now lacks are important to success i n many kinds of occupations ( t r a d i t i o n a l l y and not a c c i d e n t a l l y 'male' o c c u p a t i o n s ) , 67 her choice of career has already been greatly reduced by the p a r t i c u l a r way that her character has developed. Here again we are confronted, as we were when we considered how to remove the obstacles to people's performing up to the l e v e l of thei r natural a b i l i t i e s , with the problem of what sortscof influence, i f any, we ought to exert on the development of character t r a i t s . And here again I am inclined to say that any method of influence which i s s u f f i c i e n t to prevent a g i r l from developing the t r a i t s 'she needs to become a doctor deprives her of her opportunities, this time by reducing her choice of occupation. Furthermore, i f we do not deliberately influence her i n any way, but leave i t to chance whether or not she develops these t r a i t s , we have not maximized her  choices, since she could by accident lack the conditions for c u l t i v a t i n g these t r a i t s when we could have provided them. So i t seems that we must cul t i v a t e self-confidence, patience and d i s c i p l i n e i n people i f we want to maximize thei r choices. But can we cu l t i v a t e a l l the psychological t r a i t s that are necessary i n a l l gobs i n everyone ? I f i t i s possible, this would seem to be required to maximize everyone's choices, for i t would mean that no one would lack the psychological equipment to enter and stay i n a n y occupation, and thus no one's choices would be limited by the, . development of his/her character. Of course i f i t i s not possible, as i t might not be f o r any of the reasons I suggested on pages 5"7 through St , then people's choices would necessarily be limited by the development 68 of t h e i r c h a r a c t e r s , although we may be able to reduce these l i m i t a t i o n s f a r below t h e i r present l e v e l by c u l t i v a t i n g those t r a i t s which are n e c e s s a r y . t o a l l or most occupations.and those that do not c o n f l i c t w i t h any other t r a i t s that are necessary to p a r t i c u l a r occupations. Beyond t h a t , as to the development of c o n f l i c t i n g t r a i t s , the s o l u t i o n proposed i n the previous s e c t i o n - that we c u l t i v a t e i n each person those t r a i t s which are most u s e f u l i n the work he/she i s best s u i t e d to perform - i s not a p p r o p r i a t e h e r e , s i n c e we are t r y i n g to maximize p e o p l e ' s choices and not the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s and t h e i r performance. Here i t seems more a p p r o p r i a t e to t r y to f i n d out p e o p l e ' s preferences f o r a c t i v i t i e s and experiences i n time to c u l t i v a t e _ t h e s p e c i a l t r a i t s that would enable them to pursue those i n t h e i r occupations. We could of course leave the development of c o n f l i c t i n g t r a i t s to chance. F i n a l l y , some t r a i t s that a person may not have already developed when he/she considers e n t e r i n g a p a r t i c u l a r occupation might be developed f o r the s p e c i f i c purpose of enabling him/her to pursue that o c c u p a t i o n . I t may be that i n many cases people who l a c k the necessary t r a i t s would not f i n d the occupation that r e q u i r e s them appeal ing; but where t h i s remedy i s p o s s i b l e , making the means of doing i t ( a k i n d of r e h a b i l i t a t i v e psychotherapy ?) a v a i l a b l e to everyone would be a necessary step i n maximizing everyone's c h o i c e s . Aho.ther.-problem v'which" came * up '^when* we- asked'-hT6wt to remove the 69 o b s t a c l e s to p e o p l e ' s performing up to the l e v e l of t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s a l s o a r i s e s when we consider how to maximize t h e i r c h o i c e s . P e o p l e ' s not wanting to take up c e r t a i n careers and wanting to take up others sometimes acts as an o b s t a c l e to t h e i r e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s , and i n some cases i t can be s a i d to l i m i t t h e i r choice of occupations. I t seems odd to say the l a t t e r , s i n c e we u s u a l l y consider having a choice j u s t being able to do what one wants to do. But i n some cases the source of p e o p l e ' s d e s i r e s can be s a i d to be an i n t e r f e r e n c e with the normal process of making a c h o i c e . Thus i t would not be outrageous to say that the D e l t a c h i l d r e n i n my example from H u x l e y ' s Brave New World (see pages 4-8 and 41 above) d i d not r e a l l y have a choice about whether or not to become gardeners or l i b r a r i a n s , or that the g i r l s d e s c r i b e d on pages 41^ w.<^ 50 whose parents and teachers i n f l u e n c e d them to want to become home-makers d i d not r e a l l y have the choice of becoming d o c t o r s . The same k i n d of i n f l u e n c e over p e o p l e ' s wants that creates an o b s t a c l e to t h e i r performing up to the l e v e l of t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s can be considered an i n t e r f e r e n c e with the normal process', of making a choice: i . e . the k i n d of i n f l u e n c e that c r e a t e s , by means of reward and/or punishment, an a s s o c i a t i o n i n the mind of the person i n f l u e n c e d that does not r e f l e c t any r e g u l a r c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and makes the person i n f l u e n c e d have the values and aims which the i n f l u e n c e r wants him/her to have r a t h e r than h e l p i n g the person i n f l u e n c e d to d i s c o v e r what he/she wants to do (see page 5"3 above) . 70 Thus people's not wanting to take up certain careers and wanting to take up others can be said to l i m i t t h e i r choice of occupations and thereby decrease their opportunities when the source of these wants i s the kind of influence (described above) that interferes with the normal process of making a choice. And unless one wants to claim that people exercise the same degree of choice whenever' they do what they want to do, regardless of the source of their wants, this kind of influence seems to be a good place to draw the l i n e for acceptable sources of wants. For, as we saw i n the l a s t section, most influences upon what we want to do cannot reasonably be said to deprive us of or diminish our opportunities, but those related to straightforward conditioning can. I do not want to discuss here the issue of whether the sources of people's desires ever affect t h e i r freedom of choice. I t i s at least a plausible claim that they sometimes do, and I have suggested a good c r i t e r i o n by which to recognize those times. People who think that they never do cannot object to conditioning and related influences on the grounds that they diminish t h e i r choices, although they might object to them on other grounds. But i f we grant that some kinds of influence over people's wants do diminish the i r choices of occupation, then we must avoid those kinds of influence i f we are to maximize people's choices. As I suggested i n the la s t section, a good way.to avoid them i s to adopt a policy of doing everything we can to help people find out, given their preferences for some a c t i v i t i e s and experiences, what occupations they want to pursue. 71 I think I have now presented most i f not a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n trying to maximize each person's:choice of occupation. I have also shown that employing this c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity requires us to take many of the same steps as we needed.for removing the obstacles to people's performing at the l e v e l of their natural a b i l i t i e s . 4) Improving the Relations between Groups •. People who want to improve the relations between, say, the races or the sexes by putting them on a more equal footing economically, s o c i a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y w i l l have different ideas about what improve-ment consists i n . However, those who stress t h i s 9s a goal of equal employment opportunity w i l l a l l bring a perspective to the problem of correlated t r a i t s and the d e f i n i t i o n of equal opportunity which we have not yet encountered. For they w i l l be primarily concerned to compare the situations of the members of one group with the situations of the members of another group. Thus anyone who hopes to improve the relations between the sexes by ensuring equal employment opportunity i n a society w i l l be concerned about the degree of correlation between sex and a t r a i t required or excluded by rules governing who gets to do a p a r t i c u l a r job. U t i l i t -arians with this goal have a prima facie reason for d i s l i k i n g any rule which requires or excludes a t r a i t correlated with sex, since the rule tends to work againstt'them by excluding women from jobs to which men have access and vice versa. Of course this i s only a prima facie 72 reason f o r them to d i s l i k e such a.-rule, and i t would be outweighed by some reasons f o r l i k i n g . i t , f o r example i f :the t r a i t r e q u i r e d were n e c e s s a r y . t o the performance of the j o b . Furthermore, they would be more i n c l i n e d to : accept such a r u l e i f the c o r r e l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n could be changed by measures w i t h i n our r e a c h , and l e s s i n c l i n e d to accept i t i f the c o r r e l a t i o n i s n a t u r a l or otherwise extremely d i f f i c u l t to change. U t i l i t a r i a n s who have t h i s f o u r t h g o a l would not l i k e the r u l e d e s c r i b e d i n example ( b ) . I t r e q u i r e s a t r a i t which i s h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h being male and i s n e i t h e r very important to the job nor the s o r t of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which most women could a c q u i r e ; the only t h i n g i t has i n i t s favour i s a very minimal degree of u s e f u l n e s s , w h i l e i t has two very s e r i o u s counts against i t . As f o r example ( c ) , I have already s a i d that the r u l e i n t h i s example must be acceptable to any u t i l i t a r i a n but the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n need not be acceptable. Since having a m e d i c a l education i s the s o r t of t r a i t which we have reason to b e l i e v e can be c u l t i v a t e d among groups which do not now have i t ( i n t h i s case women), we would expect those who s t r e s s t h i s f o u r t h g o a l of equal opportunity to want at l e a s t to take s t e p s , at most to do everything p o s s i b l e , to e l i m i n a t e the c o r r e l a t i o n between being male and having a m e d i c a l education. Those who s t r e s s improving the r e l a t i o n between the sexes by g i v i n g women and men equal opportunity w i l l tend toward c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity that compare t h e i r advantages i n competing f o r . j obs i For they are not so concerned to minimize everyone's disadvantages as to 73 equalize the advantages of males and females, since they care less about the relationship between success and natural a b i l i t y than about the relationship between success and sex. 46 47 John Schaar and Bernard Williams both have c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity which compare the advantages of people competing for some good, although neither of these writers c l e a r l y seeks the u t i l i t a r i a n goal we are discussing. Schaar says the equal opportunity p r i n c i p l e guarantees that a l l competitors have the same advantages and that those who do wel l are rewarded more generously than those who do poorly. ' A l l competitors have the same advantages' needs a l o t of s p e l l i n g out. If i t i s easier for us to handicap the well-educated than to give everyone a good education, would that count as bringing about equal opportunity ? Unfortunately Schaar does not elaborate, but I think we can safely assert that no u t i l i t a r i a n who cares at a l l for f i l l i n g jobs with the poeple most competent to perform them or for developing human capacities w i l l accept a c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity that requires very much handicapping and s t i l l want to bring i t about. But i f u t i l i t a r i a n s who are primarily interested i n equalizing the advantages of men and women are not w i l l i n g to handicap the members of one group i n order to do.it, won't their c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity comeuback to minimizing everyone's disadvantages or maximizing everyone's advantages ? Not necessarily.. They could adopt c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity l i k e those Bernard Williams comes up with In order to deal with the problem of correlated t r a i t s : 74 I t seems then that a system of alloc a t i o n w i l l f a l l short of equality of opportunity i f the alloc a t i o n of the good i n question i n fact works out unequally or disproportionately between dif f e r e n t sections of society, i f the unsuccessful sections are under a disadvantage which could be removed by further reform or s o c i a l action.48 These c r i t e r i a do not c a l l for minimizing everyone's disadvantages; they c a l l for removing the disadvantages of some groups. To c l a r i f y what Williams' c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity involve, let"us look at how we would apply them to example (c). Having seen that the system of alloc a t i o n of M.D.'s i n fact works out unequally between men and women, we would look for any disadvantages women might be under which could be removed by further reform or s o c i a l action. I f there were none, we would declare that women had equal opportunity with men to become doctors. There are two problems with applying Williams' c r i t e r i a to this example, and they are general problems for the use of his c r i t e r i a . The one he acknowledges i s the d i f f i c u l t y i n deciding what to count as a reformable disadvantage, and I w i l l take i t up shortly. The other i s t h i s : I f women were 51% of the doctors, as they are 52% of the population, i t i s possible that their natural talents would be underutilized, or that some women's natural attraction to a medical career would be frustrated, because they were under a disadvantage that men were not under. That i s , i t i s possible that i f there were no special disadvantages i n the way of either sex, women would be 75% of the doctors because of some natural difference between the sexes. For instance, women might 75 n a t u r a l l y f i n d science e a s i e r and be b e t t e r at i t , or they might be more a t t r a c t e d than men to a career that i n v o l v e s a l o t of contact w i t h b l o o d , or they might be i n s t i n c t i v e d i a g n o s t i c i a n s . The reverse i s p o s s i b l e too (and has f r e q u e n t l y been suggested): men might be 75% of the doctors i f n e i t h e r sex was under any disadvantages. Perhaps Bernard W i l l i a m s does not b e l i e v e that there are n a t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s between the sexes that would i n f l u e n c e the d i s t r i b u t i o n of M . D . s ; otherwise, why would he t h i n k that a 12%-88% d i s t r i b u t i o n should make us seek out disadvantages any more than a 51%-49% d i s t r i b u t i o n ? Or perhaps he t h i n k s that n a t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s can count as disadvantages and should be compensated f o r i n order to e q u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e the p r i v i l e g e of being a doctor between the sexes. I r o n i c a l l y , the g o a l of equal opportunity i s often- supposed to bypass the i s s u e of n a t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n a way that the g o a l of e q u a l i t y does not . We can look f o r disadvantages to e i t h e r sex r e g a r d l e s s of the percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n of M.D.s that we f i n d . But what counts as a reformable disadvantage ? Here i s an example W i l l i a m s g i v e s : I t i s a known f a c t that the system of s e l e c t i o n f o r grammar schools by the '11+' examination favours c h i l d r e n i n d i r e c t p r o p o r t i o n to t h e i r s o c i a l c l a s s , the c h i l d r e n of p r o f e s s i o n a l homes having p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y greater success than those from w o r k i n g - c l a s s homes. ye have every reason to suppose that these r e s u l t s are the p r o d u c t , i n good p a r t , of environmental f a c t o r s ; and we f u r t h e r know that imaginative s o c i a l reform, both of the primary e d u c a t i o n a l system and of l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s , would favourably a f f e c t those environmental f a c t o r s . In these circumstances, t h i s system of e d u c a t i o n a l s e l e c t i o n f a l l s short of e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . ^ U n f o r t u n a t e l y he i s not s p e c i f i c about what i n the primary e d u c a t i o n a l 76 system' and i n the home environment he would want to change. How much leveli n g of s o c i a l differences would he require ? At least, i t seems, he would want children.to get the same basic s k i l l s and the same c u l t u r a l exposure. He does not mention psychological factors as disadvantages; but surely i f the children of one class were brought up to be less competitive than those of another class, this would be as much a disadvantage i n the English educational system as lack of s k i l l s . And what about lack of encouragement for their interest i n i n t e l l e c t u a l subjects ? Not only how hard we w i l l compete for what we want, but what we want can be influenced by our environment, and i t can be a disadvantage. Think of the c h i l d who does not care about passing the '11+' examination. This i s a disadvantage, and i t can often be removed. Williams suggests that even genetic differences may count . as reformable disadvantages: Suppose i t were discovered that when a l l curable environmental disadvantages had been dealt with, there was a residual genetic difference i n brain constitution, for instance, which was correlated with differences i n desired types of a b i l i t y ; but that the brain constitution could i n fact be changed by an operation. Suppose further that the wealthier classes could afford such an operation for their children, so that they always came out on top of the educational system; would we then think that poorer children did not have equality of opportunity, because they had no opportunity to get r i d of thei r genetic disadvantages ? ^  Yet to run our world l i k e t h i s , he says, would be 1to carry our emphasis on equal opportunity to the point where children are "just being regarded as locations of abilities.""'"'' Thus, having reached a very s t r i c t c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity, he begins to point out that i n 77 p r a c t i c e we may p r e f e r a de-emphasis on competit ion and success to a thoroughgoing i n s i s t e n c e on e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . We can, I t h i n k , g l e a n from W i l l i a m s ' work on e q u a l i t y of opportunity a c r i t e r i o n which would be u s e f u l to those u t i l i t a r i a n s who s t r e s s the goal of improving the r e l a t i o n s between the sexes: the members of c l a s s A have equal opportunity with the r e s t of s o c i e t y to do x i f they are not under any disadvantages which could be removed by reform or s o c i a l a c t i o n . Thus, to determine i f females and males have equal opportunity to do x, we should look f o r any disadvantages e i t h e r sex may be under which could be removed by reform or s o c i a l a c t i o n . We must i n t e r p r e t t h i s c r i t e r i o n to r u l e out handicapping those who have advantages i f i t i s 52 to be acceptable to most u t i l i t a r i a n s ; but s t i l l i t does not c a l l f o r maximizing everyone's advantages, only f o r doing whatever we can to b r i n g a disadvantaged c l a s s up to.--the l e v e l of the r e s t .'of s o c i e t y . One d r a s t i c step toward removing the disadvantages of a c l a s s i s to remove any job requirements c a l l i n g f o r t r a i t s that are i n v e r s e l y c o r r e l a t e d with membership i n that c l a s s and are not necessary to job performance. I f we could define the necessary q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r each j o b , t a k i n g t h i s step would s i m p l i f y the s o c i a l reforms we would have to make i n c o n d i t i o n s p r i o r to the p o i n t of h i r i n g ; i t a l s o has p o s s i b i l i t i e s as a s o l u t i o n to the problem of de f a c t o d i s c r i m i n a t i o n (see Chapter 3 ) . The E q u a l Economic O p p o r t u n i t i e s Commission of the U n i t e d States and the U . S . Supreme: Court have '. a c t u a l l y come q u i t e c lose to i t . The Commission, whose job i t i s to enforce the p r o v i s i o n s 78 of the C i v i l Rights Act of 1964 p e r t a i n i n g to employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s , demands that an employer who r e q u i r e s a t r a i t w h i c h . i s unequally d i s t r i b u t e d among the c lasses of c i t i z e n s p r o t e c t e d by the Act ( r a c e s , c o l o u r s , r e l i g i o n s , sexes, n a t i o n a l o r i g i n s ) be able to show that the t r a i t i s u s e f u l as a measurement of the e s s e n t i a l knowledge, s k i l l s or behaviours composing the job or as a v a l i d p r e d i c t o r of "major or c r i t i c a l work behaviours as revealed by c a r e f u l job a n a l y s e s , " and that a l t e r n a t i v e methods of measurement or p r e d i c t i o n are not 53 a v a i l a b l e . For example, employers who r e q u i r e p r o s p e c t i v e employees to pass t e s t s which fewer b l a c k s than whites tend to pass must show that the t e s t scores meet these standards and that no other s u i t a b l e h i r i n g procedures are a v a i l a b l e . The U . S . Supreme Court upheld the Commission's demands i n Griggs v . Duke Power Company (401 U . S . 424 (1971)). Many u t i l i t a r i a n s would be too committed, f o r good reasons, to some degree of seeking the b e s t - q u a l i f i e d people to do the jobs of s o c i e t y to accept removing a l l but the necessary q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r j o b s . Furthermore, the necessary q u a l i f i c a t i o n s would s t i l l remain, and along w i t h them the problem of removing the disadvantages of the c l a s s i n quest ion with respect to a c q u i r i n g those necessary t r a i t s . As was suggested i n the d i s c u s s i o n o f W i l l i a m s , much the same f a c t o r s that can operate as o b s t a c l e s to p e o p l e ' s performing up to the l e v e l of t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s (see s e c t i o n 2 above) can be disadvantages of a c l a s s w i t h r e s p e c t to a c q u i r i n g job q u a l i f i c a t i o n s : 79 development of s k i l l s and knowledge, physical development and psychological development. For instance, i f a class of people has poorer conditions for developing t h e i r basic s k i l l s and knowledge than the rest of society, that i s a disadvantage to them with regard to their entering medical school. Or, i f a class of people i s influenced, i n a way that the rest of society i s not, to have psychological t r a i t s which are incompatible with successfully competing for entrance into medical school, or to lack t r a i t s which are necessary to successful competition, that i s a disadvantage with respect to their getting a medical education. Even i f a class of people Is influenced i n certain ways not to want to become doctors, that i s a disadvantage. By the c r i t e r i o n under consideration, i f women and men are to have equal opportunity to do certain jobs i n society, l e t us say professional jobs, we must do everything possible, with the exceptions of handicapping the advantaged or removing necessary q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , to ensure that neither sex i s under any disadvantage pertaining to their becoming professionals. Therefore I think the following steps are cl e a r l y necessary: a) Males and females must be given the same (or equally good) conditions for developing basic s k i l l s and knowledge. b) Males and females must be given the same information about what roles and jobs are available to them. c) Males and females must be given the same (or equally good) means of acquiring whatever special s k i l l s and knowledge are necessary to the professions. 80 d) Males and females must be given the same (or e q u a l l y good) c o n d i t i o n s f o r p h y s i c a l development. e) Males and females must be t r e a t e d the same i n the matter of t h e i r p s y c h o l o g i c a l development; i . e . n e i t h e r sex should be i n f l u e n c e d more than the other to develop or not to develop p a r t i c u l a r p s y c h o l -o g i c a l t r a i t s _or d e s i r e s . H e r e a f t e r I w i l l r e f e r to these f i v e steps as ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n . ' I t i s important to note that t h i s c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity does not r e q u i r e us to t r e a t everyone the same or even e q u a l l y with regard to t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l , p h y s i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l development. I t simply r e q u i r e s that there be no i n e q u a l i t i e s , and i n some matters 54 no d i f f e r e n c e s , based on sex. I t allows i n e q u a l i t i e s or d i f f e r e n c e s i n the treatment of people w i t h i n each sex based on, f o r example, n a t u r a l a b i l i t y . Thus, i n the matter of p s y c h o l o g i c a l development, i t does not say that we must c u l t i v a t e a l l character t r a i t s that are necessary or u s e f u l i n a l l jobs i n everyone ( i f i t i s p o s s i b l e to do s o ) . Nor does i t say that we must adopt a p o l i c y of doing everything we can to help people f i n d out what they want to do and avoid a p p l y i n g any influence'-over p e o p l e ' s d e s i r e s r e l a t e d to c o n d i t i o n i n g . I t says only that there must be no d i f f e r e n c e i n the t r a i t s and d e s i r e s people are i n f l u e n c e d to develop or i n the degree of i n f l u e n c e a p p l i e d which could be a t t r i b u t e d to t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e i n sex. T h i s f e a t u r e of the c r i t e r i o n suggests that i t would be e a s i e r to apply than e i t h e r of the l a s t two c r i t e r i a we have examined. 81 Of course doing everything possible to remove any disadvantages either sex may be under i n the matter of obtaining 1jobs may require a degree of s o c i a l control or, as Williams fears, an attitude toward people, which most u t i l i t a r i a n s would f i n d so offensive as to outweigh the benefits of equal opportunity.. However, I think the steps I put forth as necessary (steps a through e) are not so far beyond our present reach that they require much more s o c i a l control than we now l i v e with or a very new attitude toward human beings. In fact they are being strongly advocated at this time i n many p o l i t i c a l spheres. * * * We have seen how the four goals of equal employment opportunity would lead u t i l i t a r i a n s to different positions on the problem of correlated t r a i t s and to different c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity, depending on which one they stressed. People can hold more than one of these goals to be important, and there are many possible combinations of concern for the four of them; a variety of positions on correlated t r a i t s and c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity i s the r e s u l t . In the matter of rules requiring t r a i t s inversely correlated with being female, opinions w i l l d i f f e r about where on a continuum from barely useful to absolutely necessary a t r a i t has to be for the rule requiring i t to be acceptable. Those whose sole interest i s i n finding the best-qualified person by present performance for each job w i l l tend toward the 'barely useful' end, and those whose main goal i s to improve the relations between the sexes w i l l t t e n d toward the 82 'absolutely necessary' end, while those who hold both goals important w i l l probably l i k e some position i n the middle. With regard to c r i t e r i a of equal employment opportunity, we found that a l l the u t i l i t a r i a n reasons for wanting i t , with the exception of finding the best person by present performance for each job, lead to c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity that go back beyond the process of selecting people for jobs to the process of training and educating them. However, there are important differences here too. For example, those who stress developing human capacities, and therefore seek to remove the obstacles to everyone's performing up to the l e v e l of his/her natural a b i l i t i e s , may want to take steps to improve everyone's education before taking steps to improve the education of a disadvantaged group, l i k e women, up to the same l e v e l as the best-educated group i n society. But to the extent that they value improving the relations between the sexes, they w i l l give equalizing women's and men's advantages p r i o r i t y over making across-the-board improvements i n everyone's conditions. In the end, removing the obstacles to everyone's performing up to the l e v e l of his/her natural a b i l i t i e s may involve equalizing the present advantages of men and women and much more; but i n that case i t i s a question of p r i o r i t i e s along the way, since removing women's disadvantages (assuming that women are the disadvantaged sex with regard to most employments) i s a step i n removing the obstacles :to everyone's natural a b i l i t i e s . Removing any disadvantages women may be under, since we have interpreted.it to exclude handicapping men i n any way, does not c o n f l i c t with either removing the obstacles to everyone's performing up to the 83 l e v e l of his/her natural a b i l i t i e s or maximizing everyone's choice of occupation; i t i s a step on the way to r e a l i z i n g these other two; c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity. Nor does i t c o n f l i c t with giving out jobs on the basis of compared performances, actual or predicted, of tasks related to the work - the c r i t e r i o n which : suits those who want to f i l l each job with the best person by present performance to do i t ; i t i s merely superfluous to t h i s goal. Therefore I think anyone who has some int e r e s t , i n improving the relations between the sexes by equalizing their advantages on the job market can adopt the steps I said were necessary to i t ('the same early education') without jeopardizing his/her other goals. Those who also want to fi n d the best person by nature for each job, to develop human capacities, or to give most people free choice of the i r employments and job s a t i s f a c t i o n w i l l , of course, f i n d these steps inadequate and want to do more towards giving everyone the best conditions for development of s k i l l s and knowledge and physical development. In addition, they w i l l probably want to take steps to cultivate i n everyone those psychological t r a i t s that are important for success i n a l l or most occupations and to adopt a policy of helping^people to f i n d out what kinds of work they want to do. But at least they w i l l want to do what steps a through e above require. Hence I believe that the correct way to interpret the u t i l i t a r i a n i d e a l of equal employment opportunity, for anyone who hopes to improve the relations between the sexes by i t , requires us to give boys and g i r l s 'the same early education' as I have defined i t . 84 J . S . M i l l had a l l four of what I have c a l l e d the u t i l i t a r i a n reasons f o r d e s i r i n g equal employment opportunity f o r wanting a l l honourable employments to be as f r e e l y open to women as to men. On the f i r s t page of t h i s chapter I l i s t e d the goals he spoke of i n The Subject ion of Women f o r opening a l l occupations to women. I t r i e d to formulate T t h e four u t i l i t a r i a n reasons' more g e n e r a l l y than M i l l ' s g o a l s , but we can e a s i l y see that M i l l ' s goals f i t i n t o these four categories and i n c l u d e some aspects of each of them. M i l l wanted to m a i n t a i n . a system of competit ion f o r jobs on the b a s i s of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s alone ( g o a l D) because he b e l i e v e d i t to be the best way of f i n d i n g the best person f o r each j o b . I t i s not that a l l processes are supposed to be e q u a l l y good, or a l l persons to be e q u a l l y q u a l i f i e d f o r e v e r y t h i n g ; but that freedom of i n d i v i d u a l choice i s now known to be the only t h i n g which procures the adoption of the best p r o c e s s e s , and throws each o p e r a t i o n i n t o the hands of those who are best q u a l i f i e d f o r i t . 5 5 M i l l wanted to give everyone i n s o c i e t y the f u l l b e n e f i t of women's t a l e n t s and energies (goal C ) . To do that i t i s o b v i o u s l y necessary to develop those t a l e n t s - to develop women's c a p a c i t i e s . The second b e n e f i t to be expected from g i v i n g to women the free use of t h e i r f a c u l t i e s , by l e a v i n g them the f r e e choice of t h e i r employments, and opening to them the same f i e l d of occupation arid the same p r i z e s and encouragements as to other human b e i n g s , would be that of doubling the mass of mental f a c u l t i e s a v a i l a b l e f o r the higher s e r v i c e of humanity.56 He hoped that developing women's c a p a c i t i e s and p u t t i n g them to use would, as a consequence, f u r t h e r develop men's c a p a c i t i e s . T h i s was to happen by means of i n c r e a s e d competit ion and by the b e t t e r i n f l u e n c e on men's development of a s s o c i a t i n g i n marriage with 85 i n t e l l e c t s equal to theirs rather than (as before) i n f e r i o r (See my chapter 1). I conclude that developing human capacities was an important reason to M i l l for wanting to open a l l occupations to women. In the above quotation from The Subjection of Women, M i l l states that he wants to give women the free choice of their employments (goal B). That he wanted as many men and women as possible to freel y choose their work and f i n d s a t i s f y i n g jobs i s evident i n the following passage: I f there i s anything v i t a l l y important to the happiness of human beings, i t i s that they should r e l i s h their habitual pursuit. This requisite of an enjoyable l i f e i s very imperfectly granted, or altogether denied, to a large part of mankind; and by i t s absence many a l i f e i s a f a i l u r e , which i s provided, i n appearance, with every requisite of success. But i f circumstances which society i s not yet s k i l l f u l enough to overcome, render such f a i l u r e s often for the present inevitable, society need not i t s e l f i n f l i c t them. Making the marriage r e l a t i o n one of equality between the partners was the most important respect i n which M i l l hoped to improve the relations between the sexes. He believed, as we have seen i n my f i r s t chapter, that women must have the power of earning their l i v i n g s i n order to have dignity and equality i n marriage, and giving them this power was a major reason for his wanting to open a l l occupations to them as fr e e l y as to men (goal A). He thought that equality i n a marriage would have good consequences for more than the two people involved i n i t , since most children were raised i n families and the development of their characters was much affected by the relationship between thei r parents. The f i r s t part of Chapter 4 of The Subjection of Women i s devoted to describing the benefits of equality i n marriage. 86 Given that M i l l had the four u t i l i t a r i a n goals of equal employment o p p o r t u n i t y : i n wanting to open a l l occupations as f r e e l y to women as to m e n , . i t i s c l e a r that the l e a s t s t r i n g e n t c r i t e r i o n - that there be no r u l e s or laws which exclude women from doing x or f o r b i d them to do x on the grounds that they are women - or even the modified v e r s i o n of i t , which a l s o d i s a l l o w s combinations of r u l e s or laws which exclude women on the grounds that they are women, could not be acceptable to him as an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of making a l l occupations and t r a i n i n g 'as f r e e l y open to women as to men.' N e i t h e r would h i r i n g (and a d m i t t i n g to t r a i n i n g ) p p e o p l e s o l e l y on the b a s i s of t h e i r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to perform the work be an adequate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; f o r M i l l , l i k e a l l u t i l i t a r i a n s who have h i s aims, would have to go back beyond the process of s e l e c t i n g people for jobs to the process of t r a i n i n g and educating them i n order to f i n d out whether the occupations were as f r e e l y open to women as to men. M i l l ' s goals at l e a s t r e q u i r e that boys and g i r l s r e c e i v e ' the same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' and probably a d d i t i o n a l e f f o r t s ( l i k e those I d e s c r i b e d on pages 82. and $3) to develop human c a p a c i t i e s and give people t h e i r free choice of employments. My conclusion-about the c o r r e c t way to i n t e r p r e t M i l l ' s i n j u n c t i o n to open a l l honourable employments (and the t r a i n i n g and education necessary to them) as f r e e l y to women as to men does not have to r e s t s o l e l y on inference from what he s a i d . In s e v e r a l passages of The S u b j e c t i o n of Women he makes d i r e c t statements that support the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which r e q u i r e s us to give boys and g i r l s ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n . ' 87 T h i s great a c c e s s i o n to the i n t e l l e c t u a l power of the s p e c i e s , and to the amount of i n t e l l e c t a v a i l a b l e f o r the good management of i t s a f f a i r s , would be o b t a i n e d , p a r t l y , through the b e t t e r and more complete i n t e l l e c t u a l education of women, which would then improve p a r i passu w i t h that of men. Women i n general would be brought up e q u a l l y capable of understanding b u s i n e s s ; p u b l i c a f f a i r s , and the higher matters of s p e c u l a t i o n , with men i n the same c l a s s of s o c i e t y ; and the s e l e c t few of the one as w e l l as o f the other sex, who were q u a l i f i e d not only to comprehend what i s done or thought by o t h e r s , but to t h i n k or do something c o n s i d e r a b l e themselves, would meet with-" the same f a c i l i t i e s f o r improving and t r a i n i n g t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s i n the one sex as i n the other. In t h i s way, the widening of the sphere of a c t i o n f o r women would operate for good, by r a i s i n g t h e i r education to the l e v e l of that of men, and making the one p a r t i c i p a t e i n a l l improvements made i n the o t h e r . ^ 8 Here M i l l ' s plans correspond to c o n d i t i o n s a through c i n my 59 d e s c r i p t i o n of ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n . ' That he recognized the need f o r the same or e q u a l l y good c o n d i t i o n s f o r p h y s i c a l development (my c o n d i t i o n d) i s evident i n t h i s passage: . . .when people are brought up, l i k e many women of the h i g h e r c l a s s e s . . . a k i n d of hot-house p l a n t s , s h i e l d e d from the wholesome v i c i s s i t u d e s of a i r and temperature, and u n t r a i n e d i n any of the occupations and e x e r c i s e s which give stimulus and development to the c i r c u l a t o r y and muscular system, w h i l e t h e i r nervous system, e s p e c i a l l y i n i t s emotional department, i s kept i n u n n a t u r a l l y a c t i v e p l a y ; i t i s no wonder that those of them who do not dier.of consumption, grow up w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n s l i a b l e to derangement from s l i g h t causes, both i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l , and without stamina to support any task, p h y s i c a l or mental , r e q u i r i n g c o n t i n u i t y of e f f o r t . . . . Women who i n t h e i r e a r l y years have shared i n the h e a l t h f u l p h y s i c a l education and b o d i l y freedom of t h e i r b r o t h e r s , and who o b t a i n a s u f f i c i e n c y of pure a i r and e x e r c i s e i n a f t e r - l i f e , very r a r e l y have any excessive s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of nerves which can d i s q u a l i f y them f o r a c t i v e p u r s u i t s . F i n a l l y , I t h i n k the f o l l o w i n g passage shows that M i l l saw how the d i f f e r e n t i n f l u e n c e brought to bear on women's emotional development a f f e c t e d t h e i r achievements, and that he recognized the need to change i t i f women were hot to be under great disadvantages. 88 In the various arts and i n t e l l e c t u a l occupations, there i s a degree of proficiency s u f f i c i e n t for l i v i n g by i t , and there i s a higher degree on which depend the great productions which immortalize a name. To the attainment of the former, there are adequate motives': i n the case of a l l who follow the pursuit professionally: the other i s hardly ever attained where there i s not, or where there has not been at some period of l i f e , an ardent desire of celebrity. Nothing less i s commonly a su f f i c i e n t stimulus to undergo the long and patient drudgery, which, i n the case even of the greatest natural g i f t s , i s absolutely required for great eminence i n pursuits i n which we already possess so many splendid memorials of the highest genius. Now, whether the cause be natural or a r t i f i c i a l , women seldom have this eagerness for fame .... I do not at a l l . believe that i s inherent i n women. I t i s only the natural result of th e i r circumstances. The love of fame i n men i s encouraged by education and opinion: to "scorn delights and l i v e laborious days" for i t s sake, i s accounted the part of "noble minds," even i f spoken of as their " l a s t i n f i r m i t y , " and i t i s stimulated by the access which fame gives to a l l objects of ambition, including even the favour of women; while to women themselves a l l these objects are closed, and the desire of fame i t s e l f considered daring and unfeminine.61 Here I want to point out that giving boys and g i r l s 'the same early education' would not require measures that would be unacceptable to M i l l as a l i b e r t a r i a n . Certainly no problem arises as to r e s t r i c t i n g the l i b e r t i e s of children by any attempt to control their education, 62 since M i l l states quite c l e a r l y i n On Liberty that children and young persons who are s t i l l under their parents' l e g a l j u r i s d i c t i o n are exceptions to the p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y . Furthermore, i n the following remark he seems to p o s i t i v e l y approve of our exerting quite a l o t of control over the growth of young minds: The existing generation i s master both of the training and the entire circumstances of the generation to come; i t cannot indeed make them perfectly wise and good, because I t i s i t s e l f so lamentably deficient i n goodness and wisdom; and i t s best ef f o r t s are not always, i n indiv i d u a l cases, i t s most successful ones; but i t i s perfectly well able to make the r i s i n g 89 generation, as a whole, as good as, and a l i t t l e better than, i t s e l f . I f society l e t s any considerable number of i t s members grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by r a t i o n a l consideration of distant motives, society has i t s e l f to blame for the consequences.^3 The only problem that might arise as to l i b e r t i e s would have to do with the possible v i o l a t i o n of the l i b e r t i e s of parents and other adults which might be required to carry .-out the steps involved i n 'the same early education.' I w i l l not speculate here as to whether M i l l would have supported the claim that parents ought to be free to raise their children as they wish, short of cl e a r l y harming them or others, of course. Nor w i l l I defend the claim that not giving boys and g i r l s 'the same early education' i s a way of harming some of them., For i t would not be s t r i c t l y necessary to interfere with parents' actions towards t h e i r children. I believe a propaganda campaign or at least a campaign of rati o n a l persuasion could, eventually, get parents to give boys and g i r l s 'the same early education' at home. At school, teachers could be put under a leg a l obligation to carry out public policy (or,, i n the case of a private school, the parents' p o l i c i e s ) and would not be e n t i t l e d to the l i b e r t y of choosing whether or not to treat boys and g i r l s d i f f e r e n t l y . A d i f f i c u l t y i n opening a l l employments as freely to women as to men which M i l l did not foresee (at least not i n i t s f u l l strength) i s the presence of de facto discrimination. De facto discrimination gets i n the way of finding the best-qualified person for each job. I t i s an obstacle to people's performing up to the l e v e l of th e i r natural a b i l i t i e s , and i t unnecessarily l i m i t s people's choices of occupation. 90 Where de facto d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against women occurs i t i s a disadvantage to them that can be removed by s o c i a l a c t i o n . Thus i t v i o l a t e s a l l but the l e a s t s t r i n g e n t * c r i t e r i a of equal o p p o r t u n i t y that we have examined. I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that M i l l d i d not take t h i s problem i n t o account, s i n c e the opportunity to d i s c r i m i n a t e against women does not a r i s e u n t i l the... l e g a l b a r r i e r s and the most f o r b i d d i n g s o c i a l and economic b a r r i e r s to t h e i r seeking to enter an occupation begin to be l i f t e d . We know now that even i f boys and g i r l s were given the same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n , and i f there were no r u l e s or laws e x c l u d i n g women from any o c c u p a t i o n s , and even i f , i n every other r e s p e c t , a l l the most s t r i n g e n t c r i t e r i a of equal o p p o r t u n i t y we have considered were met, de facto d i s c r i m i n a t i o n would be a s e r i o u s disadvantage to women i n our s o c i e t y , i f not a l l over the w o r l d . 91 CHAPTER 2 1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, p. 72. 2 Bernard Williams , "The Idea of Equality," i n Problems of the Self, Cambridge, 1973, pp. 244 and 245. 3 See Appendix. 4 Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women i n Canada, Ottawa, 1970, p. 171, paragraph 35. 5 In fact, a need for women doctors to treat women patients may have been recognized. We have some reason to believe that the extreme modesty of Victorians interfered with good medical care for women. 6 T.D. Campbell, "Equality of Opportunity," Meeting of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, November 25, 1974. 7 Ibid., p. 66. 8 Ibid., p. 67. 9 R. Wollheim and I. B e r l i n , "Equality," Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n  Society, Vol. LVI, 1955-56, pp. 281-326. 10 John Wilson, Equality j London, 1966, especially pp. 59-65 and 160-161. 11 Rawls, op. c i t . . 12 Campbell, op. d i t . . 13 Ib i d ; , pp. 64 and 65. 92 CHAPTER 2 14 R.H. Tawney, Equality, New York, Capricorn, 1961, pp. 106-112. 15 Charles Frankel, "Equality of Opportunity," Ethics, Vol. 81, 1970-71, pp. 191-211. 16 Wollheim and B e r l i n , bp. c i t . , p. 316 17 Wilson, op. c i t . , pp. 59 and 60. 18 I b i d . , p. 62.. 19 Rawls, op. c i t . , p. 104. 20 Wilson, op. c i t . , p. 63. 21 Ibid., p. 64. 22 Ibid., p. 160. 23 Campbell, op. c i t . , p. 68. 24 Frankel, dp. c i t . , p. 203. Frankel probably took the term "meritocracy" from Michael Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy, London, 1958. 25 See Chapter 3 for more on de facto discrimination.' 26. I am not claiming that there are natural differences i n aptitude, only that people who think there are and who want to f i n d the best person by nature for each gob are committed to certain positions. 93 CHAPTER 2 27 Campbell, op; c i t . , p. 65. 28 Ibi d . , p. 65. 29 Frankel, op. c i t . , p. 204. 30 Tawney, op. c i t . , pp. 106 and 107. 31 John H. Schaar, "Equality of Opportunity and Beyond," Equality, ed. Pennock and Chapman, New York, 1967, pp. 228-249. 32 See Chapter 1 and l a t e r chapters. 33 The a b i l i t i e s ' to do things that we are born with are probably so few as to be neg l i g i b l e . That i s why the conditions for proper development:are so important to human beings. 34 I think these t r a i t s are a l l i n t e r r e l a t e d , and I do not mean to imply that they are i n fact separable. 35 I w i l l take up this p o s s i b i l i t y again l a t e r . 36 People's need for this information about roles and jobs was suggested to me by Sharon H i l l . More about her views l a t e r . 37 Campbell, op. c i t . , p. 62. 38 Ibi d . , p. 62. 39' . o  Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, New York, Bantam, p. 12. 94 CHAPTER 2 40 Lately some minority groups have made a deliberate e f f o r t to supply the young with role models. 41 Here I p r o f i t t e d from Jonathan Glover's account of manipulation. See Jonathan Glover, Responsibility, London, 1970, pp. 56-58. 42 See R.D. Laing, The P o l i t i c s of the Family, Massey Lectures, C.B.C. Publications, 1969. 43 Frankel, op. c i t . , pp. 204-207. 44 Sharon H i l l , "The Importance of Autonomy," Paper given at the P a c i f i c meetings of the American Philosophical Association, Spring, 1973, p. 12. 45 The t h i r d kind i s related to the fourth and to the f i r s t two, since i n order to imagine themselves i n a ro l e , people must have the information that the role i s available to them and probably certain personality t r a i t s which are appropriate to the role or which attract them to the role. 46 Schaar, op. c i t . , p. 243. 4'7 Williams, op. c i t . , p. 245. 48 Ibid., p. 245. 49 Ibid., p. 245. 50 Ibid., p. 246. 51 Ibid., p. 247. 95 CHAPTER 2 Handicapping one person can be considered a s p e c i a l way of removing a n o t h e r ' s . d i s a d v a n t a g e s , but Wil l iams seems to f o l l o w my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Indeed, unless we i n t e r p r e t i t my way, i t would seem that no disadvantage i s beyond the easy reach of reform or s o c i a l a c t i o n . 53 See T i t l e 29 - Labor, chapter XIV EEOC, p a r t 1607 - G u i d e l i n e s on Employee S e l e c t i o n Procedures, F e d e r a l R e g i s t e r , V o l . 35, No. 149, Aug. 1, 1970, pp. 12311-12379. 54 Of course i t can be a p p l i e d to other c a t e g o r i e s of people, e . g . r a c e , r e l i g i o n , language spoken. M i l l , The Subject ion of Women, bp. c i t . , p . 19. I b i d . , p . 82. 57 I b i d . , p. -100. 58 I b i d . , p. 83. 59 M i l l wanted women to be b e t t e r educated f o r other reasons besides e n a b l i n g them to engage i n a l l honourable employments. But the l a s t sentence of t h i s passage s t r o n g l y suggests that he considered i t to be a c o n d i t i o n of " l e a v i n g them the f r e e choice of t h e i r employments, and g i v i n g to them the same f i e l d of occupation and the same p r i z e s and encouragements as to other human b e i n g s . " (p. -32). 60 M i l l , The Subject ion of Women, bp. c i t . , p. 61. 61 I b i d . , pp. 75 and 76. 62 John S t u a r t M i l l , On L i b e r t y , New York, B o h b s - M e r r i l l , 1956, p. 13. CHAPTER 2 63 I b i d . , p. 100. 97 i Chapter 3 THE PROBLEM OF DE FACTO DISCRIMINATION The problem of de facto discrimination i s t h i s : even i n the absence of rules or laws excluding members of class A, people can be excluded from doing X just because they are members of A by those who have the power to determine who gets to do x, unless there are safeguards against exclusion i n practice. On page 3d of the previous chapter I pointed out that this i s another d i f f i c u l t y , besides the problem of correlated t r a i t s , with the least stringent c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity. We s h a l l see that the problem of de facto'discrimination, l i k e the problem of correlated t r a i t s , leads us to more stringent c r i t e r i a of equal opportunity for women than that there be no rules or laws which exclude them from doing X on the grounds that they are women. Furthermore, since de facto discrimination violates a l l but the least stringent c r i t e r i o n of equal opportunity, i f we are to meet any of the c r i t e r i a examined i n the previous chapter, we must see how de  facto discrimination could be removed where i t occurs. I w i l l not try here to show that discrimination against women does exist i n our and other societies. Even i f the problem of de facto discrimination i s only a p o s s i b i l i t y , we must know how to recognize i t and how to prevent i t . Preventing discrimination has been a concern of 98 legislatures i n Canada and the United States, and we North Americans are i n the habit of thinking that unless a class of people have recourse to law i n cases of discrimination against them, they do not have equal opportunities with the rest of society. Hence there are such laws as the Canadian B i l l of Rights (1960), the Human Rights Code of B r i t i s h Columbia Act (1973), and i n the U.S., the C i v i l Rights Act of 1964 T i t l e VII, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. 'Human right s ' and 'anti-discrimination' l e g i s l a t i o n i s notoriously d i f f i c u l t to enforce. This i s not only because alleged v i o l a t i o n s are so numerous, but also because vio l a t i o n s are so d i f f i c u l t to prove. Let us look at a basic form of such l e g i s l a t i o n : No person or organization s h a l l exclude or prevent another person from doing X on the grounds that he/she i s a member of class A (where class A i s a 'protected' class, e.g. a race, r e l i g i o n , colour, sex). For example, t h i s i s the form of section B of the Human Rights Code of B r i t i s h Columbia Act (1973): 8. (1) Every person has the right of equality of opportunity based upon bona fide q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i n respect of his occupation or employment, or i n respect of an intended occupation, employment, advancement, or promotion; and, without l i m i t i n g the generality of the foregoing, (a) no employer s h a l l refuse to employ, or to continue to employ, or to advance or promote that person, or discriminate against that person i n respect of employment or a condition of employment; and (b) no employment agency s h a l l refuse to refer him for employment, unless reasonable cause exists for such refusal or discrimination. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), (a) the race, r e l i g i o n , colour, age, marital status, ancestry, place of o r i g i n , or p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f of any person or class of persons s h a l l not constitute reasonable cause; 99 (b) the sex of any person s h a l l not c o n s t i t u t e reasonable cause unless i t r e l a t e s to the maintenace of p u b l i c decency; (c) a c o n v i c t i o n for a c r i m i n a l or summary c o n v i c t i o n charge s h a l l not c o n s t i t u t e reasonable cause unless such charge r e l a t e s to the occupation or employment, or to the intended o c c u p a t i o n , employment, advancement, or promotion, of a person. (3) No p r o v i s i o n : o f t h i s s e c t i o n r e l a t i n g to age s h a l l p r o h i b i t the o p e r a t i o n of any term of a bona f i d e r e t i r e m e n t , superannuation, or pension p l a n , or the terms or c o n d i t i o n s of any bona f i d e group or employee insurance p l a n , or of any bona f i d e scheme based upon s e n i o r i t y . Such l e g i s l a t i o n may at f i r s t seem l i k e a good s o l u t i o n to the problem of de facto d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , but when we-^look more c l o s e l y we see that i t w i l l often be d i f f i c u l t to determine that membership i n a p r o t e c t e d c l a s s has been the grounds of r e f u s a l to employ someone, or that reasonable cause does not e x i s t for such a r e f u s a l . T h i s i s a general problem with e n f o r c i n g a n t i - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n l e g i s l a t i o n - the d i f f i c u l t y of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g genuine demands for q u a l i f i c a t i o n s from d i s c r i m i n a t o r y behaviour. Furthermore, because of p r e j u d i c e s deeply embedded i n our c u l t u r e , we can deceive not only the law enforcers and the v i c t i m s , but ourselves too about these matters. How f a r can we t r u s t w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d people who say, "We d o n ' t d i s c r i m i n a t e against women. We are simply l o o k i n g for the best man f o r the j o b . " ? In order not to be deceived, l e t us look more c l o s e l y at the c l e a r and the n o t - s o - c l e a r areas of sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and at the p r e j u d i c e s which feed them both. We can continue to use the example of h i r i n g p r a c t i c e s to i l l u s t r a t e problems common to s i t u a t i o n s where there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y of genuine demands for q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ; moreover, i f we 100 r e s t r i c t the example to h i r i n g for government j o b s , i t w i l l be c l e a r that our c o n c l u s i o n s about sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n are not remarks about c a p i t a l i s m , but apply to any s o c i e t y i n which both government jobs and sex p r e j u d i c e s e x i s t . There are three kinds of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against women which can occur i n the h i r i n g p r o c e s s : 1) An employer ( i . e . the person or persons who do the h i r i n g for a job) refuses to consider h i r i n g any woman for the j o b , for example by r e f u s i n g to accept a p p l i c a t i o n s from women."*" 2) An employer c o n s i s t e n t l y favours men over women with equal q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . 3) An employer h i r e s a man who i s l e s s q u a l i f i e d f o r the job than a woman a p p l i c a n t . I t i s i n category #1 that the c l e a r e s t cases of sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o c c u r . Such an employer may a d v e r t i s e for a man and may greet a woman a p p l i c a n t by s t a t i n g that he/she wants a man for the j o b , that women should not be i n t h i s f i e l d of employment, e t c . These are h a r d l y cases i n which the onlooker can be deceived; the evidence i s overwhelming that the employer i s excluding women from the job on the grounds that they are women. The employer, i n honesty or i n s e l f - d e c e p t i o n , may b e l i e v e something l i k e t h i s : "I have nothing against women. I t ' s j u s t that t h e y ' r e such i n e f f i c i e n t w o r k e r s . " We would c a l l t h i s b e l i e f a p r e j u d i c e , because we know '. not' only that t i t i s f a l s e , but a l s o that there i s so much a v a i l a b l e evidence against i t that i f he/she had taken any i n t e r e s t 101 i n the evidence, he/she would not hold i t . Either the employer i s i n the habit of forming b e l i e f s on very l i t t l e evidence and stic k i n g to them, or he/she i s deceiving himself/herself and does have 'something against women' which predisposes him/her to believe that they are i n e f f i c i e n t . In any case, the employer has pre-judged a l l 2 (or nearly a l l ) women, including the applicant, and shows no interest i n the evidence of their a b i l i t i e s to do the job. On the other hand, the employer's refusal to consider women for the job may be based on a be l i e f that has some evidence i n i t s favour and no available evidence against i t . For example, suppose the employer were h i r i n g people for an engineering job which no women had successfully performed anywhere, and i n which he/she had already given several women an opportunity to work. He/she has concluded on the basis of th i s evidence that women cannot do the job, and we would not consider that b e l i e f a prejudice, because the employer has shown interest i n the evidence and the available evidence does not contradict the b e l i e f . To say that this employer's refusal to consider women for the job i s based on a be l i e f which i s not a prejudice i s not to say that his/her refusal i s not a case of sex discrimination, or that we would not disapprove of i t . I t i s a case of sex discrimination, because he/she i s excluding each woman on the grounds of her sex without considering her q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to do the job. Furthermore, there are several good reasons to disapprove of and guard against the employer's acting on his/her b e l i e f : 102 a) Evidence of the form "No women have suc c e s s f u l l y done X," for b e l i e f s of the form "No woman can do X" or even, "Most women cannot do X," i s very touchy evidence indeed. For when we ask i f women have had a decent opportunity to do X (decent enough to j u s t i f y the b e l i e f ) , we often f i n d that we cannot answer "yes," and that we become embroiled i n the very problems of understanding "opportunity" which we have been encounteringc.so f a r . We need some explanation to add to "No women have su c c e s s f u l l y done X" before i t becomes p l a u s i b l e to say, "No woman can do X," or even "Most women cannot do X." For example, a p h y s i o l o g i c a l explanation based on the differences between men and women w i l l do as evidence for "No woman can do X." A psychological or s o c i o l o g i c a l explanation may do as evidence f o r "Most women cannot do X." When he/she has noiexplanation to back i t up, an employer who acts on the b e l i e f "No woman can do X" by refusing to consider women's q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to do X i s simply turning his/her back on possible counterexamples. 3 b) As Plato pointed out , even i f there i s evidence and an explanation for "Most women cannot do X," as long as there i s a way, independent of sex, to determine or estimate a b i l i t y to do X, there i s notgood reason for using sex as a q u a l i f i c a t i o n . .-• Individuals, not classes, have the a b i l i t i e s the employer seeks. c) There i s far more at stake for the applicant than for the employer. The employer may lose a l i t t l e time by considering the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l female applicants. If he/she refuses to do so, the applicant 103 loses a chance of exercising her a b i l i t i e s i n productive work. d) There i s more at stake for the community than for the - 4 employer. As M i l l was fond of pointing out , the community stands to lose the work of the best person for the job. e) The prediction "Most women cannot do X," i f i t i s based on negative evidence and a strong psychological or soci o l o g i c a l explanation, can be a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy. Suppose (as seems l i k e l y ) that many people need models of success with whom they can id e n t i f y i n order to develop a b i l i t i e s . Then, for example, i f there are no women professors i n a f i e l d , few women students go on to graduate study, very few become qu a l i f i e d to be professors, and the b e l i e f that most women cannot do i t i s reinforced. Furthermore, i f women are not considered for a particular kind of job, no woman with her own interests i n mind w i l l t r a i n herself to do i t , few women w i l l succeed at i t , and the b e l i e f that most women cannot do i t w i l l p e r s i s t . Thus an employer's acting on the b e l i e f that most women cannot do a job puts women as a class at a disadvantage which seems eas i l y corrected.by adopting the practice of considering each applicant's q u a l i f i c a t i o n s regardless of sex. The form of anti-discrimination law which I took up outlaws type-1 discrimination of any kind, and I think I have shown that this i s desirable for creating equal opportunity for women. I have been talking about cases of type-1 discrimination which are obvious to an observer. There are other cases which are not so obvious and may be d i f f i c u l t to prove. An employer may not i n fact consider h i r i n g women for a job, 10 4 but i f he/she accepts a p p l i c a t i o n s from women, then i t may look to us l i k e type-2 or type-3 d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s going on, and we may be able to prove t h a t , but we w i l l not be able to prove that type-1 i s going on. Sometimes,an employer, d e c l a r e s that h i s / h e r p o l i c y i s to h i r e the man i f a man and a woman a p p l i c a n t are e q u a l l y q u a l i f i e d , often because he/she b e l i e v e s that men, as the heads of f a m i l i e s , need jobs more than women"*, or that the proper sphere of women does not i n c l u d e the type of work i n q u e s t i o n , or because he/she b e l i e v e s that a l l women have some u n d e s i r a b l e t r a i t or l a c k some d e s i r a b l e t r a i t , or because of a simple preference f o r working w i t h men. Such a p o l i c y i s a c l e a r case of type-2 d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . Given a group of a p p l i c a n t s with equal q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , we would expect thosel:hired to be a random sample, i n r e s p e c t of sex, of the group, i f the employer d i d the h i r i n g without regard to sex. But the employer may be h i r i n g with regard to some t r a i t which i s i n v e r s e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h being female and which i s admittedly not a q u a l i f i c a t i o n for the job i t s e l f , for example l i k e l i h o o d to b e n e f i t the department b a s k e t b a l l team. To prevent t h i s , we would have to r e q u i r e that employers h i r e on the b a s i s of job q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a l o n e , and use some random procedure for d e c i d i n g among e q u a l l y - q u a l i f i e d a p p l i c a n t s . I f an employer has no women on a p a r t i c u l a r j o b , and we can prove that a s u b s t a n t i a l number of women a p p l i e d with the same q u a l i f i c a t i o n s as the men who were h i r e d , we can show that the employer used some other c r i t e r i a besides q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , perhaps sex, perhaps some t r a i t i n v e r s e l y c o r r e l a t e d with being female, to s e l e c t h i s / h e r employees. Furthermore, 105 we assume that an employer should be looking for the best-qualified person for the job - a f a i r assumption i n the public service. So i f we f i n d that he/she.has hired a man who i s less q u a l i f i e d for -_ the job than a woman applicant, we know that the employer i s h i r i n g at least partly on the basis of sex or of some t r a i t inversely correlated with being female (type-3 discrimination). In both these types of case, the main d i f f i c u l t i e s of proof are defining q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and finding an adequate method of comparing them, solthat we can j u s t i f y a claim that the members of a particular group of applicants have equal q u a l i f i c a t i o n s or a claim that one applicant i s better q u a l i f i e d than another. When dealing with the problem of correlated t r a i t s , we found that one way of removing women's disadvantages i s to remove any requirements for doing X which are inversely correlated with being female and are not necessary for the performance of X. I t i s tempting to l i m i t the scope of 'qu a l i f i c a t i o n s ' for a job to just those t r a i t s which are necessary for i t s performance. I t seems easier to decide between necessary and unnecessary t r a i t s than between genuinely useful t r a i t s and those which merely r e f l e c t the preferences of the employer (and i t may be very useful to cater to the preferences of the employer, however i r r a t i o n a l they are). Furthermore, although' some useful t r a i t s would cl e a r l y be unfair requirements, i t cannot be unfair to require a t r a i t that i s necessary to performing the job. 106 So l e t us look f i r s t at how we could decide which t r a i t s are necessary and which are unnecessary. Ordinarily we make a common-sense evaluation of the requirements of the job; for example, a mail-sorter must be able to read and must have enough manual dexterity to make p i l e s of mail, and i f we want the job well done, he/she must be quick-thinking, honest and conscientious. Of course the job can be done by someone who i s slow, dishonest and/or. careless, but i t w i l l not be done the way we want i t done - quickly, r e l i a b l y and thoroughly. An employee who i s unusually cheerful may greatly improve the effic i e n c y of the mail-room, and o r d i n a r i l y we would regard this as a bonus and not a necessity; but we could describe the new mail-sorter's job to include r a i s i n g the morale of the other employees i n the mail-room and improving general e f f i c i e n c y , i n which case cheerfulness and perhaps leadership q u a l i t i e s become necessary to doing the job. So our ideas of which t r a i t s are necessary i n an employee depend on our description of an adequate performance of the job. We started by asking what sorts of t r a i t s w i l l count as qu a l i f i c a t i o n s for a job, and now we seem to be faced with a new question - what sorts of job descriptions w i l l we accept ? For even i f we l i m i t the scope of 'qua l i f i c a t i o n s ' to those t r a i t s which are necessary to perform the job, i t seems that an employer could c a l l any t r a i t s ' q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ' by describing the job i n such a way that i t requires them. There i s , of course, the l i m i t a t i o n imposed by the type of a n t i d i s c r i m i n a t i o n law we are considering, that certain t r a i t s are not allowed to count as qua l i f i c a t i o n s under any job description (with a few stipulated 107 exceptions'), e.g. race, sex, r e l i g i o n . But unless we also set l i m i t s on the sorts of job descriptions we w i l l accept, i t w i l l be so easy for an employer to j u s t i f y either not having hired a particular person or class of persons or requiring whatever characteristics he/she prefers i n an employee (including those closely related with sex, race, r e l i g i o n , e t c . ) , that i t w i l l be impossible to prove or prevent even the most blatant cases of discrimination. Surely some job descriptions are unacceptable to us, even to those of us who are not p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned about discrimination. For instance, although employees are often hired i n part to f l a t t e r the employer, or to display the employer's status (as i n the case of the att r a c t i v e receptionist who i s very car e f u l l y picked to perform almost no work at a l l ) , the jobs are hot announced or advertised' under these descriptions, and applicants are rarely told that obsequiousness or a certain taste i n clothes and make-up are requirements of the jobs. Perhaps i t i s because these job descriptions offend a widespread sense of what sorts of tasks are compatible with human dignity. For whatever reasons, we do now have some c u l t u r a l (and legal) l i m i t a t i o n s on what sorts of jobs people should be hir£d to perform. And there are also l i m i t s to what descriptions of a job are believable. I f an employer claims he hires only very strong men to work i n his factory because the job requires heavy physical labour, and anyone who v i s i t s the factory can see that a l l the heavy work i s done by machines, then his description of the job i s p l a i n l y false and therefore unacceptable. 108 C e r t a i n l y our descriptions of government jobs would and should depend on our ideas of what i s i n the public i n t e r e s t . In addition, for the purpose of making sex-discrimination detectable and reducing i t s occurrence, I suggest i t i s possible to make the following requirements of job descriptions: a) That they be true to the actual tasks to be performed. b) That they not be such as to require employees to have t r a i t s which are highly correlated with sex, unless i t can be shown that the task which necessitates such a t r a i t i s necessary for the public i n t e r e s t and cannot reasonably be accomplished i n another way (for example by automation or by teamwork). c) That they be made public and that they be used as the actual guidelines of h i r i n g p r a c t i c e s . Once we have an acceptable d e s c r i p t i o n of the adequate performance of a job, we may want to use more than our common-sense evaluation; of i t s requirements to a r r i v e at a l i s t of the t r a i t s necessary i n an employee. We may have s t a t i s t i c a l c o r r e l a t i o n s and predictions to inform us. When we use what I have c a l l e d the common-sense evaluation of a job we come up with requirements that may include a b i l i t i e s , s k i l l s , knowledge, character t r a i t s (such as honesty and conscientiousness), and experience, i . e previous successful performance of the tasks involved ( i n the case of jobs where the tasks are so complex as to require subtle combinations of a b i l i t i e s , s k i l l s , knowledge and character t r a i t s which would be too d i f f i c u l t to break down into t h e i r p a r t s ) . 109 Furthermore, we w i l l probably come up with various proofs of these on our l i s t of necessary t r a i t s ; for example testimonies of character and of previous successful performance, and perhaps certain t e s t - r e s u l t s , when we have tests that require the performance of tasks l i k e those required i n the job or ask questions which c a l l upon knowledge necessary i n the job.^ But i t i s possible that our knowledge of s t a t i s t i c a l correlations and predictions would lead us to add things to our l i s t of necessary t r a i t s that a common-sense evaluation of the job would never produce. For example, suppose we know that people with normal-range blood pressure make far fewer mistakes under stress than people with high blood pressure. Would we not want to make normal-range blood pressure a necessary t r a i t of surgeons, a i r - t r a f f i c - c o n t r o l l e r s , and others who work i n high-stress jobs which frequently involve life-and-death decisions ? I f the correlation were firmly established and very high, could any record of accuracy, no matter how long, overcome our qualms about an applicant with high blood pressure ? On the other hand, we would probably have reservations about acting on some information that s t a t i s t i c a l studies might y i e l d . Suppose we know that mail-rooms composed of a l l married employees are 30% more e f f i c i e n t than those with single employees ? Suppose factory workers between 16 and 35 years old have 20% higher productivity than a l l others ? Suppose, as i t i s often claimed, the turnover rate of women i n some jobs i s so high that the time they work i s not, on the average, worth the time put into training them ? Do we want to add to our l i s t of 110 necessary characteristics t r a i t s which are highly correlated either with requirements we arrived at by a common-sense evaluation of a job or with actual job performance ? I pointed out e a r l i e r i n t h i s section that the prediciton "Most women cannot do X" can be a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy, and that acting on i t can put women as a class at a disadvantage which could be avoided by considering each applicant's s u i t a b i l i t y regardless of sex. Acting on s t a t i s t i c a l information l i k e that suggested i n the preceding paragraph i s l i k e l y to rule out the p o s s i b i l i t y of s o c i a l changes that would change the s t a t i s t i c s . I t may be possible to find and reduce or eliminate the causal factors i n the i n e f f i c i e n c y of having unmarried people i n mail-rooms, the lower productivity of factory workers over 35, and the turnover rate of women i n some jobs, but i t w i l l not happen i f h i r i n g practices conform to these s t a t i s t i c s . Yet what of the blood pressure-mistakes correlation ? Do we mean to give .people with high blood pressure a chance to prove i t wrong, where accuracy i s a matter of l i f e and death ? Here we are brought back, as we were i n the problem of describing jobs, to balancing the public interest against;.the^desire,;toravoid .putting classes of applicants at a disadvantage. Where success i n the job i s extremely c r u c i a l to the consumers of the goods or services, our scruples about using any s t a t i s t i c a l methods of prediction should be lessened. Otherwise, we should be wary of correlations and predictions, and seek out the best ways of judging the s u i t a b i l i t y of each indi v i d u a l applicant by his/her provable a b i l i t i e s , s k i l l s , knowledge, character t r a i t s I l l and/or experience. Supposing s t i l l that we count only t r a i t s necessary to the performance of a job a s • ' q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ' for the j o b , and supposing that we have a complete l i s t of the necessary t r a i t s , how s h a l l we choose an employee from among the a p p l i c a n t s ? The only a p p l i c a n t s we w i l l consider q u a l i f i e d for the job are those who have a l l the necessary t r a i t s , s i n c e by our hypothesis no one e l s e can adequately perform the j o b . And how s h a l l we choose among the q u a l i f i e d a p p l i c a n t s ? Not by comparing t h e i r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , because among those who have the necessary t r a i t s , no one i s more q u a l i f i e d than another. I t might at f i r s t seem that someone who has more of a necessary t r a i t than the others w i l l be more q u a l i f i e d than them, but that i s not t r u e ; f o r example, i f conscientiousness i s a necessary t r a i t i n a m a i l - s o r t e r , i t i s not the case that the more conscientiousness the b e t t e r the m a i l - s o r t e r , s i n c e there i s a p o i n t at which i t i n t e r f e r e s too much with speed, so an approximate degree of c o n s c i e n t i o u s n e s s ^ w i l l be the necessary t r a i t which an a p p l i c a n t e i t h e r does or does not have. I f we cannot compare t h e i r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , we s h a l l have to choose among q u a l i f i e d a p p l i c a n t s by some random s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s , i n order to safeguard against d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and guarantee that q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are the only c r i t e r i a we use i n h i r i n g . Now i t i s time to consider whether we do want to l i m i t the scope of ' q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ' for a job to those t r a i t s which are necessary for i t s performance. We found that what we consider necessary depends on the job d e s c r i p t i o n we have, which should i n t u r n depend on our ideas about 112 what i s i n the public interest. But i s i t i n the public interest to content ourselves with asking for only the traits.necessary to performing ,j,oh. and,-, then choosing randomly from among the q u a l i f i e d applicants ? Surely some among the applicants.who meet our requirements could do the job far better than others. Should we not try to fi n d the best person for each job ? Certainly M i l l thought that the means of selection should aim at the goal of finding the best person for the job: I t i s not that a l l processes are supposed to be equally good, or a l l persons to be equally q u a l i f i e d for everything; but that freedom of ind i v i d u a l choice i s known to be the only thing which procures the adoption of the best processes, and throws each operation into the hands of those who are best q u a l i f i e d for i t . x ^ The excellence of the work done by people who are best suited to a job often raises our standards of an adequate performance of the job; and a job description changes with the innovations brought to i t by the people who do i t . Indeed this process an a large scale i s the means by which the standard of l i v i n g of a whole society i s raised. Should we leave i t to chance whether we hire those most capable of bringing excellence to their work, or should we make some effo r t to find them ? If we want to do the l a t t e r , we w i l l have to compare the qua l i f i c a t i o n s of those who•.meetstthe minimum requirements of the job, and to do that we w i l l have to extend the scope of 'qu a l i f i c a t i o n s ' to include not only those t r a i t s which are necessary to performing a job, but also those which are l i k e l y to .be he n e f i c i a l i n some way and lead to excellent work. 113 But i f we extend the scope of ' q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ' beyond necessary t r a i t s to b e n e f i c i a l . t r a i t s , w i l l i t not be more d i f f i c u l t for us to distinguish genuine q u a l i f i c a t i o n s from the preferences of the employer and therefore more d i f f i c u l t for. us to discover and prove i t i f an employer i s h i r i n g men.preferentially over women with equal or better q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ? Let us see what can be done. We can at least l i m i t the range of 'beneficial t r a i t s ' to those t r a i t s which can plausibly be associated with the job. If we describe our government jobs according to our ideas of what i s i n the public interest, and i f we employ the further requirements I suggested we make of acceptable job descriptions, then we w i l l rule out practices l i k e h i r i n g someone partly for his a b i l i t y to benefit the department basketball team (unless the job i s described that way, which would have to be j u s t i f i e d i n terms of the public interest, and r a i s i n g department morale would hot j u s t i f y that pa r t i c u l a r description, since i t might be done any number of ways). Of course there i s plenty of room for disagreement over what i s i n the public interest, but assuming we do have an acceptable job description, i t does l i m i t the range of t r a i t s which an employer can c a l l genuine q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . Furthermore, for the reasons already given, I suggest we continue to be wary of s t a t i s t i c a l correlations and predictions and not consider them relevant to genuine q u a l i f i c a t i o n s unless an extremely important matter of public interest i s involved; this l i m i t s our 'beneficial t r a i t s ' to the common-sense classes of a b i l i t i e s , s k i l l s , knowledge, character t r a i t s and experience. Unfortunately, we now have the problem of compar qu a l i f i c a t i o n s . 114 Comparing q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i s d i f f i c u l t under the best c o n d i t i o n s , i . e . i n the absence of p r e j u d i c e s about c l a s s , sex, r a c e , r e l i g i o n , e t c . A c t u a l l y there are two kinds of comparison to be made: f i r s t , weighing one k i n d of b e n e f i c i a l t r a i t against.: another, e . g . i f one a p p l i c a n t has a l o t of p r a c t i c a l experience and another has a l o t of formal t r a i n i n g ; and second, comparing the values of the same k i n d of t r a i t as had by more than one a p p l i c a n t , e . g . comparing the values of two a p p l i c a n t s ' experience. A l l comparisons of the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of a p p l i c a n t s are more or l e s s complicated combinations of these two kinds of comparison. The second k i n d can sometimes be made with r e l a t i v e ease and o b j e c t i v i t y , i f the tasks r e q u i r e d by the job are simple enough that r e l i a b l e t e s t s of the knowledge and a b i l i t i e s of a p p l i c a n t s can be devised and the comparisons can be made by means of t e s t s c o r e s . But both kinds are often d i f f i c u l t and, i n our w o r l d , fraught with the dangers of p r e j u d i c e . The k i n d of sex p r e j u d i c e which enters i n t o the process of comparing q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , u n l i k e the k i n d that c o n s i s t s i n b e l i e f s that a l l women have some u n d e s i r a b l e t r a i t or l a c k some d e s i r a b l e t r a i t , cannot be defeated by counterexamples. I t c o n s i s t s of the a t t i t u d e that the a c t i v i t i e s and achievements of women are l e s s v a l u a b l e than those of men, whatever those a c t i v i t i e s and achievements may be, and that i s an a t t i t u d e deeply embedded i n our s o c i e t y . I t i s well-known that the s t a t u s and remuneration of elementary e d u c a t i o n , s o c i a l work and home economics were g r e a t l y r a i s e d when men entered those f i e l d s . A boy who l i k e s to p l a y g i r l s ' games i s f a r more w o r r i e d - o v e r by a d u l t s and 115 despised by other children than a g i r l who l i k e s to play boys' games. And homemaking, although I t involves tasks that are absolutely necessary to the well-being of every human being, i s perhaps the lowest-status job of a l l , as i s shown by the r i d i c u l e and/or p i t y with which a male homemaker i s regarded, while a woman doctor partakes of some, but not usually a l l , the status of a male doctor. As further evidence of this prejudice, we see that the pay for jobs done mostly by women i s less;'than that for jobs done mostly by men, regardless of the skills,^knowledge, training and ef f o r t involved. For example, u n t i l recently at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia the jobs with the lowest average salaries were jobs f i l l e d almost exclusively by women - Clerks, Secretaries, Library Assistants and Food Service Workers;"'"''' i n the Library, the average Stack Attendant (only males were e l i g i b l e for this job) whose job was to sort and reshelve books made $131 more per month than the average female Library Assistant I (a 92% female c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ) whose job was to 12 type catalogue cards and f i l e them and to check books i n and out. Thia'.'is' what the market w i l l bear, but not because of supply-and-demand, since, for example, s k i l l e d t y p i sts are obviously i n shorter supply than men capable of sorting and reshelving numbered books, but because of the expectations of both women and men that women w i l l be paid less for the work they do. How might this kind of prejudice, this attitude that the a c t i v i t i e s and achievements of women are less valuable than those of men, enter 116 into the process of comparing q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ? When women and men applicants.are being compared, i t would cert a i n l y affect the weighing of different kinds of t r a i t s against each other; and i f the prejudice extends to the achievements of individual women i n normally male f i e l d s , i t would also affect the comparison of their t r a i t s of the same kind. That the prejudice does extend to the achievements of women i n normallh male f i e l d s i s perhaps the best explanation of the 13 results of one recent study of h i r i n g patterns i n academia: L.S. F i d e l l sent one of two forms, A and B, to the chairman of each of the 228 university and college psychology departments i n the U.S. which offer graduate degrees. Each form contained 10 paragraphs describing the professional background of hypothetical psychologists. The quality of background was varied among the paragraphs. Paragraphs headed by a male f i r s t name on one form had a female f i r s t name on the other and were otherwise i d e n t i c a l . The chairmen were asked, on the pretext of cooperating i n a long-range study of 10 young PhDs, to rate the d e s i r a b i l i t y for h i r i n g of each of the applicants and to indicate the l e v e l at which he/she would be offered a position. 147 chairmen responded (75 to form A, 72 to form B). Although the difference i n d e s i r a b i l i t y ratings for males and females was not s i g n i f i c a n t , a very s i g n i f i c a n t difference-in the l e v e l of position offered was found. Women received greater numbers^of offers at the assistant professor l e v e l or lower than did men. "Across a l l paragraphs the modal l e v e l of offer for women was assistant professor, while for men i t was associate 117 prof essor. "J"'+ There were no>responses suggesting the rank of f u l l professor when the paragraphs described women, although several such responses were made to a par t i c u l a r paragraph when i t was headed by a man's name. I t may be suggested that the charimen have other attitudes or b e l i e f s about women, besides a tendency to undervalue women's achievements, which affected their responses to the resumes. Perhaps they think that university teaching i s hot the proper sphere of women, or that a l l women have some undesirable t r a i t which does not show up on resumes but which would hinder their work i n the department, or perhaps they just do not l i k e having women around or prefer men. But i f any of these b e l i e f s and attitudes were at work, surely we would expect them to have some effect on the d e s i r a b i l i t y ratings, and not just on the rank suggested. I t cannot be a matter of reluctance to trust women with r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , because i n most departments the rank of assistant professor carries no less r e s p o n s i b i l i t y than the rank of associate professor, although i t does pay less and carry less status. Perhaps they offer women a lower position i n the hope that they w i l l not accept i t , but this would not be a well-founded hope given that s o . T m a n y women PhDs do accept positions.'.-i-nvthe very low ranks of universities.'*'^ The most plausible explanation of the phenomenon i s that the chairmen do undervalue the achievements of women i n this" normally male f i e l d . And i t would not be unduly pessimistic to suppose that, i f they are looking for someone to f i l l the position of associate professor i n the i r departments, they could 118 not be t r u s t e d to compare the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of men and women and to h i r e the best person for the j o b . We can see now how'employers who b e l i e v e they are h i r i n g s t r i c t l y on the b a s i s of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s may be a c t u a l l y h i r i n g on the b a s i s of sex p l u s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , i . e . the sex of the a p p l i c a n t s enters i n t o the h i r i n g d e c i s i o n when the employers' comparisons of a p p l i c a n t s ' q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i s t a i n t e d with a tendency to undervalue the achievements of women. Employers may have a very c l e a r i d e a of what s o r t s of t r a i t s count as q u a l i f i c a t i o n s for the job and even of what s o r t s of t r a i t s i n an employee lead to e x c e l l e n c e and i n n o v a t i o n , they may s t i c k very c l o s e l y to comparing a p p l i c a n t s only with regard to which of these t r a i t s they have,- and to what degree, and to s e l e c t i n g the best person for the job only on the b a s i s of the comparison, and then they may b r i n g i n sex as a c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the comparison, perhaps without even r e a l i s i n g i t . Thus, even with the f i r m i n t e n t i o n of being o b j e c t i v e , employers may d i s c r i m i n a t e against women by c o n s i s t e n t l y h i r i n g men over women with equal q u a l i f i c a t i o n s or h i r i n g men who are l e s s q u a l i f i e d than women a p p l i c a n t s . We w i l l want to prevent the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n that a r i s e s from g i v i n g lower value to the a c t i v i t i e s and achievements of women, both because i t puts women at a disadvantage i n the h i r i n g p r o c e s s , and because i t i s not i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , s i n c e i t gets i n the way of having the r e a l l y b e s t - q u a l i f i e d person for the j o b . I f we are to prevent i t by means of a n t i - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n laws we w i l l have to be able to detect and prove i t , and that b r i n g s us back to our o l d 119 problem that to detect and prove cases of types 2 and 3 discrimination we need a d e f i n i t i o n of ' q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ' and an unprejudiced method of comparing them. Let us assume we'. can get a good d e f i n i t i o n of ' q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ' -i n effect a l i s t of the necessary and b e n e f i c i a l t r a i t s for each job. We then need an unprejudiced procedure for weighing the different kinds of t r a i t s of applicants and an unprejudiced method of comparing the value of the same kinds of t r a i t s as had by different applicants. Only unprejudiced people with a thorough knowledge of the jobs to be done could give us either of these. Conceivably they could create an ordered l i s t for each job that would rank t r a i t s from 'barely he l p f u l ' to 'absolutely necessary' and also rank combinations of t r a i t s . For some jobs objective tests might be devised for comparing applicants' knowledge, s k i l l s and a b i l i t i e s ; but i n cases where we want to compare the quality of their experience no fixed procedure could be used, and each comparison would have to be validated by the judgment of some unprejudiced person experienced i n the f i e l d of work. Often, as i n most professional f i e l d s , the person doing a comparison of applicants' experience or potential must have the unprejudiced judgment of people i n the f.ield who have direct knowledge of the applicants' previous work. In short, we need the good judgment of large numbers of unprejudiced experts just to detect sex discrimin-ation. Preventing i t by means of detecting, proving and punishing cases i s , of course, an even'v greater task which would require even more unprejudiced people. And where are these unprejudiced people 120 to come from when the attitude of undervaluing the activities and achievements of women is deeply embedded in.a society ? The possibility of preventing de facto sex discrimination by means of anti-discrimination laws looks even more remote when we realize that so far we have only been considering the hiring process; yet i f prejudice is embedded in the society, discrimination against females is probably putting them at a disadvantage long before they reach the hiring process: in admission to training and education and advancement through those systems, and long after i t : in the pay and encouragements they receive at work and in promotion through the ranks of their occupations. The thought of the legions of unprejudiced people i t would require to prevent a l l this is staggering, for the same d i f f i c u l t i e s of defining and comparing 'qualifications' must be met in a l l these instances.. Before concluding that we must eliminate sex prejudice from our society in order to do away with sex discrimination, i t is only f a i r (and hopeful) to consider the other plausible methods of preventing discrimination besides anti-discrimination laws of the form we have examined; concealing the sex of applicants and using affirmative action programs. Obviously an employer, educator, etc. } who does not know the sex of an applicant cannot discriminate against him/her on the basis of sex. It is sometimes possible to conceal the identity of applicants in large communities and in occupational and educational fields large enough that applicants cannot be identified by their background 121 information. Of course this procedure precludes the interview process as a means of assessing applicants' character t r a i t s , and i t does not prevent recommendations and reports by teachers, former employers, etc., from being prejudiced by th e i r knowledge of the applicants' sex. Furthermore, i t i s useless against discrimination which may be encountered by workers and students every day i n th e i r attempts to gain recognition and advance themselves through the system. For these reasons i t i s not a major solution to the.problem of preventing sex discrimination, although i t i s useful as an occasional t o o l . Affirmative Action Experience i n administering equal opportunity laws over the past 30 years has shown that many discriminatory practices-of the past remain so deeply embedded i n basic i n s t i t u t i o n s of society that these practices continue to have extremely unequal effect on certain groups i n our population, even when the employer has no conscious intent to discriminate. The l e g a l necessity for p o s i t i v e , affirmative action to remove these discriminatory practices which s t i l l pervade every phase of employment has been firmly established by the courts. These sentences are taken from the "Foreward" to Affirmative Action and Equal Employment, A Guidebook for Employers, published by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission,. Affirmative action can be required by the U.S. courts of companies, agencies and i n s t i t u t i o n s found g u i l t y of discriminatory-practices; and i t i s required, by Presidential Executive Order 11246, of a l l Federal contractors and subcontractors with contracts over $50,000 and 50 or more employees. (Executive Order 11246 i n effect requires affirmative action programs 122 i n a l l colleges and u n i v e r s i t i e s which receive s u b s t a n t i a l Federal funds.) An o u t l i n e of an af f i r m a t i v e action program i s given on the page reprinted here from the Guidebook. An e s s e n t i a l concept i n the program i s " u n d e r u t i l i z a t i o n , " which i s defined by the E.E.O.C. as having fewer minorities or women i n a p a r t i c u l a r job category than would reasonably be expected by t h e i r presence i n the work force, or employing persons i n jobs that do not make adequate use of t h e i r s k i l l s and t r a i n i n g . The Guidebook has t h i s to say about eliminating " u n d e r u t i l i z a t i o n " : The ultimate long-range goal of your a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n program should be representation of each group i d e n t i f i e d as "un d e r u t i l i z e d " i n each major job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n reasonable r e l a t i o n to the o v e r a l l labor force p a r t i c i p a t i o n of such group. This goal may be modified to the extent that you can prove that v a l i d job-related s e l e c t i o n standards reduce the percentage of a p a r t i c u l a r group q u a l i f i e d for a p a r t i c u l a r job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Long-range goals should not be r i g i d and unchangeable. They cannot be based upon exact predictable s t a t i s t i c s . For example, studies i n d i c a t e that many q u a l i f i e d women not i n the present labor force could become " a v a i l a b l e " i f job opportunities were open to them. S i m i l a r l y , many members of minority groups now i n the workforce could become " q u a l i f i e d " i f better jobs and ^ opportunities for t r a i n i n g and promotion become open to them. Obviously a f f i r m a t i v e action programs are not designed p r i m a r i l y to f i n d the "best person for each job,' but to f i l l i n the "u n d e r u t i l -i z a t i o n " gaps i n the work force with mi n o r i t i e s and women who meet s e l e c t i o n standards which " r e f l e c t actual job needs." Nevertheless, there i s some allowance for s e l e c t i n g the best q u a l i f i e d person among the q u a l i f i e d minority and women applicants. 123 A f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n programs make armodif ied v e r s i o n of Bernard W i l l i a m s ' assumption that i f women and m i n o r i t i e s were not at a disadvantage, then the a l l o c a t i o n of goods to them would be p r o p o r t i o n a t e to t h e i r presence i n the p o p u l a t i o n . They assume that i f women and m i n o r i t i e s were hot being d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t , the p r o p o r t i o n of them employed i n any job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n would approx-imately equal the p r o p o r t i o n of them i n the o v e r a l l work f o r c e of the country. As I pointed out i n c r i t i c i z i n g W i l l i a m s , t h i s assumption may be f a l s e . A percentage of women i n a p a r t i c u l a r job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n which r e f l e c t s t h e i r percentage of the o v e r a l l work f o r c e may represent a gross u n d e r u t i l i z a t i o n of the s k i l l s and t r a i n i n g of women, or of the s k i l l s and t r a i n i n g of men. So a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n has s e r i o u s drawbacks. I t i s sometimes defended as a means of compensating the c l a s s e s of women and m i n o r i t i e s for t h e i r long h i s t o r i e s of i n f e r i o r o p p o r t u n i t i e s and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against them. I do not b e l i e v e that l i v i n g women can be compensated today f o r the i n j u s t i c e s or unhappiness suffered by t h e i r foremothers. And g i v i n g women who have been put under disadvantages by t h e i r education and u p b r i n g i n g e x c e l l e n t chances to improve t h e i r education now i s a b e t t e r compensation than g i v i n g them jobs that other people are more q u a l i f i e d to perform - b e t t e r f o r the i n d i v i d u a l women and b e t t e r f o r s o c i e t y as a whole. Probably the best compensation for having suffered disadvantages i s to see measures taken i n our own l i f e t i m e s to end p r e j u d i c e and improve the education of g i r l s . 124 Affirmative action is better defended as an interim measure un t i l prejudice is eliminated from society. . It seems better than the f u t i l i t y of trying to enforce anti-discrimination laws case-by-case, and not nearly so good as liv i n g without prejudice. Probably the fact of having minorities and women functioning in most jobs would contribute to ending prejudice against them, and these people would provide models for children who now labour under the disadvantage of low hopes and expectations. 125 From the Guidebook: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION = RESULTS The most important measure of an Affirmative Action Program i s i"ts RESULTS. Extensive e f f o r t s to develop procedures, analyses, data c o l l e c t i o n systems, report forms and fine written policy statements are mean-ingless unless the end product w i l l be measurable, yearly improvement  i n h i r i n g , t r a i n i n g and promotion of minorities and females i n a l l parts of your organization. Just as the success of a company program to increase sales i s evaluated i n terms of actual increases i n sales, the only r e a l i s t i c basis for evaluating a program to increase opportunity for minorities and females i s i t s actual impact upon these persons. The essence of your Affirmative Action Program should be: * Establish strong company policy and commitment. * Assign r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and authority for program to top company o f f i c i a l . * Analyze present work force to i d e n t i f y jobs, departments and units where minorities and females are underutilized. * Set s p e c i f i c , measurable, attainable h i r i n g and promotion goals, with target dates, i n each area of underutilization. * Make every manager and supervisor responsible and accountable for helping to meet these goals. * Re-evaluate job descriptions and h i r i n g c r i t e r i a to assure that they r e f l e c t actual job needs. * Find minorities and females who qualify or can become qu a l i f i e d to f i l l goals. * Review and revise a l l employment procedures to assure that they do not have discriminatory effect and that they help a t t a i n goals. * Focus on getting minorities and females into upward mobility and relevant training pipelines where they have not had previous access. * Develop systems to monitor and measure progress regularly. If results are not satisfactory to meet goals, find out why, and make necessary changes. 126 CHAPTER 3 1 In an analysis of the 1969-70 edition of Canada Careers Directory for  University Graduates, the Federal Women's Bureau found that, of the 3,268 vacancies l i s t e d by banks, insurance companies, pharmaceutical and chemical firms and manufacturers of soap and detergents, 2,024 positions were open only to men. From the Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women i n Canada, op. c i t . , p. 91, paragraph 304. 2 The employer may not have prejudged a l l women. He/she may base h i s / her prejudice on an experience of one or two i n e f f i c i e n t women. 3 I accept the interpretation of Christine Pierce i n her a r t i c l e "Equality: Republic V," The Monist, Vol. 57, 1973, pp. 1-11. 4 M i l l , The Subjection of Women, op. c i t . , pp. 51 and 52. 5 This i s a frequently-given j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t h i s type of sex d i s -crimination. Of course i f the employer were r e a l l y concerned about the neediness of the applicants he/she could inquire d i r e c t l y into i t and give the jobs to actual heads of families, heads of the largest families, etc. 6 Certainly i t would do no.-harm to impose th i s assumption on the private sector too, since i t i s to the employer's advantage. Thus a n t i -discrimination laws seem to enforce the i d e a l competitive selec-tion mechanisms of capitalism. 7 The Human Rights Code of B.C. allows for sex as a q u a l i f i c a t i o n when i t relates to "the maintenance of public decency." The E.E.O.C. of the U.S. has a small category of jobs i n which sex i s a " bona fide occupational q u a l i f i c a t i o n , "e.g. modelling and acting are included, and a l l other jobs must be open to both sexes. 8 These standards have long been lower for women than for men. "Wanted: Att r a c t i v e , pleasant young woman ... " was, u n t i l very recently, a common wording for newspaper advertisements. 127 CHAPTER 3 9' Recently the s p e c i f i c i t y of such tests has been i n s i s t e d upon by those who oppose the use of I.Q. or "general i n t e l l i g e n c e " tests for screening applicants, because these l a t t e r tests can be used to screen out people who are not f u l l participants i n the dominant culture but who would be capable of doing the job wel l . Hence the United States E.E.O.C. and Supreme Court guidelines referred to i n the section on correlated t r a i t s . 10 M i l l , The Subjection of Women, op. c i t . , p. 19. 11 In 1972-73, 922 women were i n these categories and 48 men. From A Report on the Status of Women at the University of B r i t i s h  Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., 1973, pp. 48 and 49. 12 I b i d . , p. 49. 13 F i d e l l , L.S., "Empirical V e r i f i c a t i o n of Sex Discrimination i n Hiring Practices i n Psychology," American Psychologist^ Vol. 25, 1970, pp. 1094-1098. 14 Ib i d . , p. 1096 15 Data on this and references are provided on page 1094 of F i d e l l ' s a r t i c l e . 16 Affirmative Action and Equal Employment, A Guidebook for Employers, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D.C, 1974, pp. 26 and 27. 128 Chapter 4 DIFFICULTIES In the preceding two chapters I showed that both the correct way to interpret the u t i l i t a r i a n i d e a l of equal employment opportunity, for anyone who hopes to improve the relat-tions between the sexes by i t , and the correct way to interpret J.S. M i l l ' s goal of opening a l l employ-ments equally to women and to men, require us to give boys and g i r l s 'the same early education' and to remove sex prejudice from our society. In this chapter I w i l l show that giving boys and g i r l s 'the same early education' before sex prejudice has been eradicated would jeopardize many of the special contributions to human l i f e hitherto made by women. This danger would, I think, be unacceptable to M i l l . Let us s t a r t by reviewing the steps that I have called giving boys and g i r l s 'the same early education': a) Males and females must be given the same (or equally good) conditions for developing basic s k i l l s and knowledge. b) Males and females must be given the same information about what roles and jobs are available to them. c) Males and females must be given the same (or equally good) means of acquiring whatever special s k i l l s and knowledge are necessary to the professions. d) vMales and females must be given the same (or equally good) conditions for physical development. 129 e) Males and f e m a l e s must be t r e a t e d the same i n t h e m a t t e r o f t h e i r p s y c h o l o g i c a l development; i . e . n e i t h e r s e x s h o u l d be i n f l u e n c e d more t h a n t h e o t h e r t o d e v e l o p o r n o t t o d e v e l o p p a r t i c u l a r p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a i t s o r d e s i r e s . S t e p s b and e w i l l be most i m p o r t a n t t o t h e arguments o f t h i s c h a p t e r . Our w a n t i n g t o g i v e boys and g i r l s 'the same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' w o u l d n o t i m p l y t h a t we had g i v e n up our s e x p r e j u d i c e s . I t i s easy t o im a g i n e a s o c i e t y o f p e o p l e who r e m a i n s k e p t i c a l about most f e m a l e s ' a b i l i t i e s t o compete w i t h males and who c o n t i n u e t o u n d e r v a l u e t h e a c t i v i t i e s and achiev e m e n t s o f women, b u t who have been convince4 t h a t g i r l s ought t o have e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s w i t h boys t o e n t e r male p r o f e s s i o n s and ought n o t t o be h a n d i c a p p e d i n the c o m p e t i t i o n f o r power and p r e s t i g e by t h e d i f f e r e n t u p b r i n g i n g t h e y g e t . I b e l i e v e C a n a d i a n s o c i e t y i s c l o s e t o b e i n g s u c h a s o c i e t y . There i s much more w i l l i n g n e s s h e r e t o e l i m i n a t e " s e x i s m " f r o m s c h o o l s t h a n t o acknowledge t h a t i t i s n o t s h a m e f u l f o r a man t o be a homemaker o r t h a t s e c r e t a r i e s a r e u n d e r p a i d f o r t h e i r con-t r i b u t i o n t o b u s i n e s s . F u r t h e r m o r e i t i s p o s s i b l e t o b r i n g about 'the same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' w i t h o u t e r a d i c a t i n g a l l s e x p r e j u d i c e . The "Why Not'??" a d v e r t i s i n g campaign d u r i n g I n t e r n a t i o n a l Women's Y e a r sought t o Uo t h a t b y c o n v i n c i n g p a r e n t s and t e a c h e r s t h a t boys and g i r l s s h o u l d be b r o u g h t up w i t h t h e same o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r " s u c c e s s . " That s o r t o f t h i n g on a l a r g e r s c a l e -the r e - e d u c a t i s p h o f p a r e n t s and t e a c h e r s t o t r e a t male and f e m a l e c h i l d r e n (as f a r as p o s s i b l e ) t h e same - p l u s r e f o r m o f s c h o o l t e x t b o o k s and c u r r i c u l u m and perhaps t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f some p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e c h n i q u e s 130 designed to counteract unintentional different treatment could, i n time, accomplish 'the same early education." Let us suppose that we can give boys and g i r l s 'the same early education' and that we want to. Ideally our further decisions about how to educate our children are motivated by one concern - their greatest future happiness - in d i v i d u a l l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y . The future needs of society for people trained and educated for the occupations we value or deem necessary should determine our general educational policy. Concern for t h e i r future happiness should guide our application of this policy to individuals. But we are not now looking at the id e a l s i t u a t i o n . Insofar as sex prejudice exists i n our society i t i s bound to affect our decisions about education. I refer here to the kind of sex prejudice that consists of the attitude that the a c t i v i t i e s and achievements of women are less valuable than those of men, whatever those a c t i v i t i e s and achievements may be (see Chapter 3, page 11$) . In the rest of this chapter I w i l l examine the probable consequences of trying to bring about 'the same early education' before sex prejudice i s eliminated from society. What are these a c t i v i t i e s and achievements of women that sex pre-judice causes us to undervalue ?, At present the a c t i v i t i e s and achieve-ments of most women have the theme of helping other people. Most women work either as assistants to men or i n one of the 'helping occupations.' Secretaries, t y p i s t s , stenographers and receptionists are primarily assistants to men. Domestic work, nursing (which i s mostly an assist i n g job too) and elementary teaching are the 'helping occupations' f i l l e d 131 almost exclusively by women; but of course many women work i n 'helping occupations! which also employ considerable numbers of men, e.g. i n restaurant service, r e t a i l sales, and s o c i a l work. According to Labour Canada",*^  i n 1974 the occupational categories which employed the most women who worked outside the i r homes were: C l e r i c a l at 35.4%; Service at 18.0%; Sales at 10.1%; Medicine and Health at 9.2% (an estimated 84.3% of whom were i n nursing, therapy and related as s i s t i n g occupations -based on 1971 Census of Canada figures); and Teaching at 7.0%. Women were 72.9% of the people employed i n C l e r i c a l occupations, 73.9% of those employed i n Medicine and Health, and 55.7% of those i n Teaching. Homemaking i s probably the paradigm helping occupation. Homemakers t y p i c a l l y keep the house clea.m, plan and prepare the family's meals, buy and maintain the family's clothing, and (most important) care f o r and to a great extent educate young children. They often manage the family's s o c i a l l i f e , provide transportation, tend a garden, look after the health of husband and children, and provide emotional support and encouragement to family members. Labour Canada reports that approx-imately 47.3% of Canadian women over 14 were f u l l - t i m e homemakers i n 2 1974. The Royal Commission Report on the Status of Women i n Canada 3 (1969) cites two studies that found a f u l l - t i m e homemaker works daily anywhere from s i x hours when there are no children up to eleven hours when there are two or more children. Women who work outside t h e i r homes often perform the tasks of homemaker for their families as w e l l ; both studies found that they work about four hours da i l y at home. These occupations which the most women engage i n tend (with the 1 3 2 possible exception of elementary teaching and s o c i a l work) to be low-prestige and low-paying. This i s especially remarkable when we conside how important the tasks they involve are to the functioning of business and to almost everyone's su r v i v a l and well-being. Let us consider the case of homemaking alone. Homemaking i s an especially low-status occupation. Most men would not consider making i t the f u l l - t i m e work of even a few years, much less of a li f e t i m e . I t rarely counts as work experience when women apply for jobs outside the home, even when those jobs involve s i m i l a r tasks. Yet the tasks of a homemaker are indispensable to most adults and v i t a l to a l l children. I think we can conclude from what M i l l said about homemaking i n The Subjection of Women that he thought i t was one of the 'honourable employments.' I f , i n addition to the physical suffering of bearing children, and the whole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of their care and education i n early years, the wife undertakes the careful and economic application of the husband's earnings to the general comfort of the family; she takes not only her f a i r share, but usually the larger share, of the bodily and mental exertion required by th e i r j o i n t existence. 4 But homemaking d i f f e r s from other 'honourable employments' i n a number of important ways. The person employed does not receive any payment fo her work that i s her own to spend, but remains f i n a n c i a l l y dependent on her husband, who i n a sense receives payment for both of them. Thus the homemaker's economic security and working conditions are determined partly by her husband's success i n working outside the home and par t l y by her relationship with her husband. I f she loses her husband, a woman often finds that she gets no f i n a n c i a l reward for performing the 133 same tasks f o r her c h i l d r e n as she d i d before and that she must l i v e on welfare or f i n d work o u t s i d e her home. Homemakers do not r e c e i v e f r i n g e b e n e f i t s as people do who work outside the home. I f there are c h i l d r e n , the homemaker works long hours and i s on c a l l 24 hours a day, a l l year round. And although M i l l thought that a woman could have the power of earning necessary f o r her d i g n i t y and e q u a l i t y i n marriage (see my Chapter 1) without a c t u a l l y e x e r c i s i n g i t , we know that to a great extent t h i s i s not true now. In our t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y advancing s o c i e t y few jobs are a v a i l a b l e f o r u n s k i l l e d workers, and s k i l l s and knowledge so r a p i d l y become outdated that even a h i g h l y - t r a i n e d woman can lose her a b i l i t y to f i n d work when she reamins at home f o r a few y e a r s . But perhaps the greatest d i f f e r e n c e between homemaking and other 'honourable employments' i s that the homemaker's emotional l i f e and her occupation are i n t e r t w i n e d i n a manner r a r e l y found i n other j o b s . Most of us must have some m i n i m a l l y f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h those we work f o r and w i t h , but few of u s , besides housewives, a l s o eat , play and sleep with them. For the homemaker, almost a l l the i n g r e d i e n t s of p e r s o n a l happiness depend on the w e l l - b e i n g of a few people and her i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h them. Of course homemaking has i t s advantages. A homemaker may u s u a l l y organize her own time and to some extent s e t her own standards of achievement. Many women r e c e i v e a great d e a l of pleasure from watching and h e l p i n g t h e i r c h i l d r e n grow (although most do appreciate a r e g u l a r opportunity to get away from the demands of c h i l d c a r e ) . S t i l l i t does seem remarkable that so many women choose t h i s o c c u p a t i o n , often without 134 r e a l l y t r y i n g to take up any o t h e r , i n the face of i t s ' d i s a d v a n t a g e s -no s e t wages, f i n a n c i a l i n s e c u r i t y , l a c k of r e c o g n i t i o n on the job market, low s t a t u s i n the community, 'absence of f r i n g e b e n e f i t s , i t s tendency to deprive them of t h e i r 'power of e a r n i n g , ' and i t s i n s e p a r -a b i l i t y from t h e i r strongest emotional attachments. Two kinds of e x p l a n a t i o n have been o f f e r e d f o r the phenomenon of the m a j o r i t y of women v o l u n t a r i l y becoming f u l l - t i m e or p a r t - t i m e homemakers. I t i s claimed that g i r l s are s y s t e m a t i c a l l y i n f l u e n c e d to expect to become homemakers, encouraged to do s o , and discouraged from t a k i n g up other occupations except f o r the t r a d i t i o n a l l y 'female occupations ' I have mentioned. I t has a l s o been claimed that women have a n a t u r a l p r e -ference f o r the a c t i v i t i e s and experiences that homemaking i n v o l v e s . Much evidence of the d i f f e r e n t treatment we give boys and g i r l s -the d i f f e r e n t expectations of them that we express, the d i f f e r e n t standards of b e h a v i o u r , encouragements, rewards and role-models we give them - has been brought f o r t h to support the hypothesis that g i r l s ' tendency to choose homemaking and other 'female o c c u p a t i o n s ' i s created r a t h e r than n a t u r a l . For example, the Royal Commission j l e p o r t t e l l s of elementary s c h o o l textbooks which p o r t r a y women only as homemakers or t y p i s t s , s e c r e t a r i e s , s c h o o l t e a c h e r s , waitresses and l i b r a r i a n s , and g i r l s as concerned only with the kinds of tasks these occupations r e q u i r e . G i v i n g boys and g i r l s ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' w i l l e l i m i n a t e any s p e c i a l i n f l u e n c e s which we may now be using on g i r l s to get them to take up 'female o c c u p a t i o n s . ' I f g i r l s do choose homemaking because they are s p e c i a l l y i n f l u e n c e d 1 3 5 to do so and not because of a natural preference for the a c t i v i t i e s and experiences i t involves, then g i r l s who get 'the same early education' as boys cannot be counted on to become homemakers. How w i l l those jobs be f i l l e d ? Given that sex prejudice leads many people to undervalue t h i s occupation,.the tasks i t involves and the t r a i t s i t requires, i t i s un l i k e l y that they w i l l want to influence a l l boys and g i r l s to aspire to homemaking and then open i t up to competition as a means of solving this problem. (This i s what happens for instance, with the professions. Most boys learn to respect and aspire to them and competition prevents a l l but a few from reaching the goal.) Of course 'the same early education' does not require that we treat everybody a l i k e . So we could influence some segment of the population ( g i r l s and boys) to pursue homemaking - presumably those who are not considered f i t for the more prestigious and high-paying work or those who have t r a i t s which make them spe c i a l l y suited to the job. I t would require nearly a quarter of the boys and g i r l s to f i l l t h i s f u l l - t i m e occupation, not to mention part-time homemaking and the other 'female occupations.' I t i s not l i k e l y that a sex-prejudiced society would w i l l i n g l y set aside nearly h a l f i t s l i t t l e boys to be brought up to become homemakers, nurses, secretaries, etc. Indeed the acknowledgement that these occupations are very important and the willingness to deliber-ately steer half the boys as w e l l as h a l f the g i r l s into them would be strong evidence that sex-prejudice was disappearing. I t i s more l i k e l y that everyone - boys and g i r l s - would get essen t i a l l y the same influences and encouragements that boys now get, and the losers of the competition 136 for prestigious and high-paying jobs would get 'female jobs' and the low-status jobs that some men now have. As for M i l l ' s position on this problem, there i s no evidence that he thought men should be encouraged or influenced to take up the work of homemakers. (The other 'female occupations,' except for domestic work, were either non-existent or quite new at that time.) On homemaking as an occupation, M i l l says: Like a man when he chooses a profession, so, when a woman marries, i t may i n general be understood that she makes a choice of the management of a household, and the bringing up of a family, as the f i r s t c a l l upon her exertions, during as many years of her l i f e as may be required for the purpose; and that she renounces, not a l l other objects and occupations, but a l l which are not consistent with the requirements of t h i s . ^ M i l l apparently did not anticipate the problem that concerns me here. He did remark i n the f i r s t chapter of The Subjection of Women that i f women were given a r e a l choice of occupations they could not be counted on to choose marriage i n the form of the despotism i t was at the time, and that i t would probably be necessary to make marriage ate t r a c t i v e to them by giving them equal rights with t h e i r husbands. 7 But there i s no hint that he had any other worries about the matter. For although he advocated subjecting a l l honourable occupations to open competition, and he said many things that indicate he would have wanted boys and g i r l s to have 'the same early education' (see my Chapter 2), and although he claimed that no one knew at that time what women's natures were, he said: For i f the performance of the function i s decided either by competition, or by any mode of choice which secures regard to the 137 public i n t e r e s t , there needs be no apprehension that any-important employments w i l l f a l l into the hands of women i n f e r i o r to average men, or to the average of their male competitors. The only result would be that there would be fewer women than men in such employments; a result certain to happen i n any case, i f only from the preference always l i k e l y to be f e l t by the majority of women for the one vocation i n which there i s nobody to compete with them.8 He certainly seems to have been confident that women would choose home-making even i f they were not influenced as g i r l s to do so. Perhaps this i s due to the special circumstances of the time he wrote: when known intimate relations with men outside of marriage were out of the question for any woman who wanted respect, when marriage almost certainly produced children quite soon, when most children were e n t i r e l y brought up at home, and when housework was for many women so arduous as to preclude any outside employment. In short, i n M i l l ' s time for a woman to love a man who loved her was for her to embark on many years of fu l l - t i m e homemaking. She need not have chosen i t as an occupation; i t followed naturally from other choices she made. And for a woman to choose not to be a homemaker was to choose the l i f e of a spinster - often lonely, unprotected, and probably celibate. The circumstances which v i r t u a l l y forced women into homemaking then do not exist now i n most of Canada and many other parts of the world. S t i l l women who want a long-lasting sexual relationship with a man and/or children but not a career of homemaking f i n d that t h e i r wishes are thwarted by conditions not i n their control - primarily the expectations of most men that the i r mates w i l l take the role of homemaker and the short supply of childcare f a c i l i t i e s . But these conditions are f a r more 138 e a s i l y changed than the conditions that limited Victorian women. I f boys and g i r l s were given 'the same early education,' men with the right expectations would not be hard to f i n d . I f more women demanded c h i l d -care f a c i l i t i e s rather than accepting the role of homemaker they would have to be supplied; we must remember that women have a power now to get what they want that they did not have i n M i l l ' s time - a vote. Therefore we have no reason to be confident that women who have received 'the same early education' as men w i l l choose to become homemakers unless they have a natural preference for the a c t i v i t i e s and experiences that occupation involves. Suppose women (and perhaps some men) do have natural preferences for the a c t i v i t i e s and experiences that homemaking involves. "Then talented women w i l l take up homemaking as their f i r s t choice, provided that they retain these preferences after having had 'the same early education' as men. But people are e a s i l y influenced to give up some natural preferences because of desires which c o n f l i c t with them. When g i r l s are not exposed to any special influences that might encourage these preferences for homemaking a c t i v i t i e s and experiences they are l i k e l y to be influenced to give them up by the obvious disadvantages of homemaking as a career, including the fact that most people hold i t i n low esteem compared to other occupations. Furthermore, i f 'the same early education' i s directed toward preparing boys and g i r l s for 'male occupations';' i t may repress g i r l s ' natural preferences for homemaking right from the st a r t by discouraging the development of those psycho-l o g i c a l t r a i t s which lead to the preferences. (See page 1+7 for more on 139 t h i s s u b j e c t . ) C e r t a i n l y i f the preferences f o r homemaking are n a t u r a l to women they have a r a t h e r weak h o l d on them, f o r there are many women who do not now choose homemaking i n s p i t e of a l l the encouragements to do so. M i l l could not r e l y on the hypothesis of n a t u r a l preferences to s o l v e the problem of f i l l i n g women's occupations, s i n c e he so vehemently assured us that no one could know*for c e r t a i n what women's n a t u r e s , untouched by the i n f l u e n c e s exerted on them at that t ime, r e a l l y were. I deny that anyone knows, or can know, the nature of the two sexes, as long as they have only been seen i n t h e i r present r e l a t i o n to one a n o t h e r : . . . . •- What i s now c a l l e d the nature of women i s an eminently a r t i f i c i a l t h i n g - the r e s u l t of forced r e p r e s s i o n i n some d i r e c t i o n s , u n n a t u r a l s t i m u l a t i o n i n o t h e r s . 9 Both i n the case that women p r e s e n t l y choose homemaking because we i n f l u e n c e them to do so and i n the case that they p r e s e n t l y make t h i s choice because they are motivated by n a t u r a l p r e f e r e n c e s , there i s a good chance that g i v i n g g i r l s and boys ' the same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' w i l l r e s u l t i n few t a l e n t e d and e n t h u s i a s t i c women choosing homemaking i n the f u t u r e . Sex p r e j u d i c e makes i t l i k e l y that t h i s and other 'female o c c u p a t i o n s ' w i l l be f i l l e d by the l o s e r s of the competit ion f o r p r e s t i g i o u s and h i g h -paying j o b s . M i l l would consider t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s very unfortunate. He valued the tasks performed by the homemaker very h i g h l y , and he b e l i e v e d that performing them w e l l r e q u i r e d s k i l l and d e v o t i o n . (See page 74 of The S u b j e c t i o n of Women.) C e r t a i n l y the task of p r o v i d i n g c h i l d r e n w i t h a h e a l t h y emotional and moral background upon which to b u i l d t h e i r l i v e s (as he d e s c r i b e d i t i n the 1832 essay"^) i s not one he would want to 140 a l l o c a t e to people who are stuck w i t h i t because they could not get the jobs they r e a l l y wanted. And on t h i s p o i n t I t h i n k we must s i d e w i t h M i l l , even i f we t h i n k he exaggerates the s k i l l and devotion needed f o r the other tasks of homemaking. I t i s one t h i n g to l e t d i t c h - d i g g i n g and garbage c o l l e c t i n g f a l l to those who would rather be doing something e l s e ; i t i s q u i t e another to l e t the development of young c h i l d r e n ' s characters f a l l to them. I have mostly been t a l k i n g about the f a t e of homemaking. But the same d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e f o r the other occupations which are f i l l e d p r e -dominantly by women. Unless t h e i r status and rewards are improved, or u n l e s s we are w i l l i n g to s t e e r t a l e n t e d boys as w e l l as g i r l s i n t o them, they, l i k e homemaking, w i l l be f i l l e d by the l o s e r s of competit ion f o r b e t t e r j o b s . At t h i s p o i n t l e t us consider a p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n to our d i f f i c u l t i e s so f a r . I t i s f r e q u e n t l y suggested that homemaking i n p a r t i c u l a r and some of the other 'female o c c u p a t i o n s ' should not be f u l l - t i m e jobs f o r anyone, but that the tasks they i n v o l v e should be shared by everyone. I f the more demanding of these tasks are to be e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y entered i n t o and w e l l - p e r f o r m e d , then everyone w i l l have to be encouraged to take them on and t r a i n e d f o r them. In other words, t h e i r value would have to be recognized by s o c i e t y as a whole and r e f l e c t e d i n ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' we are to give a l l c h i l d r e n . T h i s amounts to a major r e d u c -t i o n i n s e x - p r e j u d i c e , and we are back to the same o l d problem. Our d i f f i c u l t i e s are i n c r e a s e d i f the work that women t r a d i t i o n a l l y have done r e q u i r e s p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a i t s which w i l l tend to be l o s t i f we 141 give g i r l s and boys 'the same early education.' Let us turn now to the probable e f f e c t of 'the same ea r l y education,' combined with sex prejudice, on the development of psychological t r a i t s . There do seem to be psychological t r a i t s that women tend to have more often or to a greater degree than men. I s h a l l c a l l them the female psychological t r a i t s . Of those he noticed i n h i s time, M i l l mentioned 'nervous s u s c e p t i b i l i t y , ' which makes t h e i r minds mobile, changeable and susceptible to an unusually high degree of excitement; exaggerated s e l f - s a c r i f i c e ; conformism; l i t t l e ambition f o r fame; a narrow sphere of concern, l i m i t e d to the welfare of t h e i r f a m i l i e s ; and a capacity f o r rapid and correct i n s i g h t i n t o present f a c t which makes them good at p r a c t i c a l thinking. I think h i s observations apply to women today, but I would add to his l i s t : the 'maternal' t r a i t s -tenderness, supportiveness, a desire to nurture and help the weak and help l e s s ; sympathy with s u f f e r i n g ; gentleness; t i m i d i t y ; low expec-tations f o r success; fear of success; self-consciousness; a tendency to express sadness, tenderness and fear; and a tendency not to express anger and aggression. Some of the female t r a i t s are required by the work women usually do. Proper caring f or and teaching young chi l d r e n and good nursing require the 'maternal' t r a i t s , gentleness, sympathy and some s e l f - s a c r i f i c e . P r a c t i c a l rather than abstract thinking i s necessary to the homemaker, secretary and nurse when they are a c t u a l l y working, although i t need not exclude abstract thinking at other times. C l e a r l y i t i s desirable that some people have these t r a i t s . Perhaps i t i s even more desirable that 142 everyone have them to some degree or some of the time. Iri The Subject ion of Women, M i l l expressed admirat ion f o r women's s e l f l e s s n e s s ( i n moder-12 ation) and t h e i r p r a c t i c a l t h i n k i n g . Others of the female t r a i t s have some usefulness f o r the performance of women's work but are not necessary f o r i t . Conformism makes the homemaker a good s o c i a l i z e r of c h i l d r e n , but so would a l i v e l y concern f o r the good of s o c i e t y ; and the l a t t e r i s a more d e s i r a b l e t r a i t . S e l f - s a c r i f i c e , l a c k of ambition f o r fame, low expectations f o r success and fear of success a l l enable women to be content i n t h e i r jobs and render them l e s s c o m p e t i t i v e than men; t h i s makes women b e t t e r a s s i s t a n t s , . s i n c e they do not want to take command, and i t u s u a l l y h e l p s to make home a haven from the h a r s h , competit ive world of b u s i n e s s . I t i s d e s i r a b l e that some people have tendencies to s e l f - s a c r i f i c e and to contentment (as opposed to ambition) and w i l l i n g n e s s to f o l l o w r a t h e r than l e a d ; and perhaps i t i s d e s i r a b l e that we a l l have these t r a i t s i n some degree or some of the time. At l e a s t some people are going to have to be a s s i s t a n t s some of the t ime, and l i f e would be unbearable i f we had no r e s p i t e from competit ion. I t i s not d e s i r a b l e , I t h i n k , that anyone have lower than r e a l i s t i c expectations f o r success or f e a r of success, nor i s i t necessary. F i n a l l y , some of the female p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a i t s , although they may have s h o r t - t e r m b e n e f i t s ( e s p e c i a l l y f o r men); do not c o n t r i b u t e i n the long term to women's achievements. Among these I would p l a c e s e l f -consciousness, t i m i d i t y , t h e i r narrow sphere of concern, and the tendency 13 hot to express anger and aggression - none of which b e n e f i t humanity 1 4 3 enough that they ought to be preserved. Their tendency to express sadness and fear when they are f e l t does not, I think, contribute to women's achievements, but i t i s healthy and worthy of being encouraged i n everyone anyway. M i l l expressed admiration for some of the feats of 1 4 strength that nervous s u s c e p t i b i l i t y enabled women to perform, but i t is not clear that i t makes an important contribution to th e i r usual work, and on the whole I think i t i s neutral. How do women come to have these female t r a i t s ? There are three possible explanations of the fact that women have a certain psychological t r a i t more often or to a greater degree than men. F i r s t , the t r a i t could be natural to women and not natural or less natural to men. By th i s I mean that i n conditions that do not completely prevent i t s development and expression and do not encourage its-:;development and expression any more i n women than i n men, the t r a i t tends to occur more often and to a greater degree i n women than i n men. This might be the case i f , for example, the presence of a par t i c u l a r balance of hormones were a necessary condition for the occurrence of the t r a i t . Second, i t could be the case that the t r a i t i s natural to everybody ( i . e . occurs unless discouraged or prevented) and that boys' present education discourages or prevents i t s development while g i r l s ' present education allows or even encourages i t to be developed and expressed. Third, the t r a i t could be created i n g i r l s more than i n boys. That i s , although human beings (obviously) have the potential to develop this t r a i t , they would not do so except i n certain special conditions which we put g i r l s i n and not boys. I f i t i s a t r a i t that develops from behaviour that has i t s own rewards (e.g. 144 g e n t l e n e s s ) , then we may be c u l t i v a t i n g i t i n g i r l s and not i n boys (see page 5*6 , Chapter 2). I f i t i s a t r a i t that does not tend to b r i n g i t s own rewards, then we may be c r e a t i n g i t i n g i r l s by rewarding some behaviour and p u n i s h i n g other behaviour, by a t t r i b u t i o n , or by any of the complex and often s u b t l e processes by which we ( d e l i b e r a t e l y or a c c i d e n t a l l y ) shape p e r s o n a l i t i e s . What w i l l be the e f f e c t of g i v i n g boys and g i r l s ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' . o n the female p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a i t s that" should be preserved ? T h i s w i l l depend p a r t l y on the nature of ' the same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' and p a r t l y on the o r i g i n of the t r a i t s . I f a t r a i t i s n a t u r a l to women and not n a t u r a l or l e s s n a t u r a l to men, then ' the same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' may not a f f e c t the t r a i t ; i t may s t i l l occur i n women. 'The same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' c o u l d , however, prevent the development of n a t u r a l t r a i t s , i n c l u d i n g n a t u r a l female t r a i t s . I f a female t r a i t i s n a t u r a l to every-one, then boys ' present education i s r e p r e s s i n g i t , and g i v i n g g i r l s the same education that boys now have w i l l repress i t i n g i r l s too. I f a female t r a i t i s created i n g i r l s and not i n boys by s p e c i a l i n f l u e n c e s on g i r l s , then e i t h e r we must create i t i n both boys and g i r l s or give i t up a l t o g e t h e r . John S t u a r t M i l l was aware of the problem of p r e s e r v i n g women's v a l u a b l e p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a i t s while g i v i n g them the same education as men. George Croom Robertson wrote him a l e t t e r i n which he expressed h i s concern about i t . He s a i d : Upon the argument of Ch. 3, that women as they are best c o r r e c t what i s e x c e s s i v e , & best apply what i s good, i n the s p e c u l a t i o n of men, might not an opponent argue, that i t would be a p i t y thus to destroy 145 t h i s balance of the mutual forces ? I f women f u l f i l so important a function because, being not trained as men, they are what they are, would they not, i f trained as men (which i s the object of the argument), f a l l into the errors of men & a l l a l i k e , men and women, henceforth be uncontrolled ? ... I suspect that the only true way out of the d i f f i c u l t y i s to declare that i f men have needed help from women as women are, i t i s because they, the men, have not been properly trained; i s to attes t , that, by throwing down the barriers before women, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y the type of mental action to which the one sex would henceforth not be debarred from approaching more than the other, would be a better type than the favoured sex has hitherto sought or been able to attain to 15 M i l l does not seem to have solved i t in^h i s own mind. His reply to Robertson i s f a r from adequate: The most important of your points i s the suggestion of a possible turning of what i s said about the usefulness of the present feminine type as a corrective to the present masculine, into an argument for maintaining the two types d i s t i n c t by difference of tra i n i n g . You have yourself gone into considerations of great importance i n answer to t h i s argument, a l l of which I f u l l y accept. I should add some others to them, as, f i r s t , i t i s not certain that the differences spoken of are not partly at least natural ones, which would subsist i n spite of identity, of train i n g ; secondly the correction which the one type supplies to the excesses of the other i s very imperfectly obtained now owing to the very circumstance that women's sphere & men's are kept so much apart. At present, saving fortunate excep-tions, women have rather shown the good influence of this sort which they might exercise over men, than actually exercised it.16 He agrees with Robertson's dubious assumption that women trained as men would have the best of both the female and the male characteristics of mental a c t i v i t y rather than simply losing the female ones. Neither of them offers a reason for believing t h i s . As for M i l l ' s own suggestions: He i s not e n t i t l e d to be consoled by the p o s s i b i l i t y that the differences are natural; and the fact that women did not have much influence on men at the time surely does not counterbalance the p o s s i b i l i t y that they would cease to have any at a l l ! The same problem that concerned Robertson i s part of what troubled 146 Sigmund Freud about The Subjection of Women. In the now infamous l e t t e r to his fiancee about M i l l ' s book, Freud says: :. I t seems a completely u n r e a l i s t i c notion to send women into the struggle for existence i n the same way as men. Am I to think of my delicate, sweet g i r l as a competitor ? After a l l , the encounter could only end by my t e l l i n g her, as I did seventeen months ago, that I love her, and that I w i l l make every e f f o r t to get her out of the competitive role into the quiet, undisturbed a c t i v i t y of my home. I t i s possible that a different education could suppress' a l l women's delicate q u a l i t i e s - which are so much i n need of protection yet so powerful - with the result that they could earn their l i v i n g l i k e men. I t i s also possible that i n this case i t would not be j u s t i f i a b l e to deplore the disappearance of the most lovely thing the world has to offer us: our i d e a l of womanhood. But I believe that a l l reforming a c t i v i t y , l e g i s l a t i o n and education, w i l l founder on the fact that long before the age at which a pro-fession can be established i n our society, nature w i l l have appointed woman by her beauty, charm, and goodness, to do something else.17 Are a l l these worries j u s t i f i e d ? Aside from meeting the conditions by which i t i s defined, what w i l l 'the same early education' be l i k e ? W i l l g i r l s be educated the way boys are now ? W i l l boys be educated more the way g i r l s are now ? W i l l both be educated i n the best way to prepare them for a l l the jobs that need doing ? Freud, Robertson, and to some extent M i l l ( i n his reply to Robertson) assumed that g i r l s would be educated the way boys were being educated at the time. There i s good reason forrrmaking this assumption. Sex prejudice - the undervaluing of the a c t i v i t i e s and achievements of women - makes i t very l i k e l y that people w i l l not want to educate boys the way g i r l s are educated or prepare boys for 'female occupations,' and that 'the same early education' w i l l be ess e n t i a l l y boys' education applied to both sexes. This i s v i r -t u a l l y guaranteed i f people believe, as Freud did, that g i r l s ' upbringing and preparation for the usual occupations of women renders them incapable 147 of f u n c t i o n i n g i n the competit ive world o u t s i d e the home and of succeeding i n the 'male o c c u p a t i o n s . ' Given that ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' w i l l be l i k e boys' education -i . e . that i t w i l l be d i r e c t e d towards p r e p a r i n g boys and g i r l s f o r 'male o c c u p a t i o n s ' - how w i l l i t a f f e c t the female p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a i t s ? I f any of the t r a i t s are n a t u r a l to women and not n a t u r a l or l e s s n a t u r a l to men, as M i l l suggested i n h i s r e p l y to Robertson, then they could continue to occur i n women provided that t h e i r education d i d not repress them. There i s no p a r t i c u l a r reason why i t would repress them, unless they c o n f l i c t w i t h t r a i t s that we i n f l u e n c e boys to have i n order to make them more s u i t a b l e f o r 'male o c c u p a t i o n s . ' . Then i n f l u e n c i n g g i r l s to have these t r a i t s too might discourage or prevent the develop-ment of some female t r a i t s . Thus i f g i r l s , l i k e boys, were encouraged to be a g g r e s s i v e , ambit ious, competit ive and unemotional, they might be u n l i k e l y to develop s u f f i c i e n t l y strong tendencies toward s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , g e n t l e n e s s , and t a k i n g care of others to become homemakers or n u r s e s , even i f those tendencies are more n a t u r a l to them than to boys. That i s not to say that they would never have s e l f l e s s , g e n t l e , emotional or uncompetitive moments, but only that those t r a i t s would not p r e -dominate i n t h e i r p e r s o n a l i t i e s as they often do now and perhaps not be s u f f i c i e n t to cause them to be a t t r a c t e d to the h e l p i n g occupations or to be very good at the tasks they i n v o l v e . So even i f the female t r a i t s we want to preserve are n a t u r a l to women and not to men, there i s . s t i l l a r i s k of l o s i n g them or d i m i n i s h i n g them i f we give g i r l s and boys ' the same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n . ' In any case, 148 as we have seen, M i l l cannot use the c l a i m that the v a l u a b l e female psycho-l o g i c a l t r a i t s are n a t u r a l to women to get us out of t h i s or any other problem. I f any of the t r a i t s i n q u e s t i o n are n a t u r a l to everyone, then boys' p r e s e n t education i s r e p r e s s i n g them, and g i v i n g g i r l s the same education as boys now have w i l l repress them i n g i r l s too. For example, the t e n -dency to express sadness by c r y i n g i s something that l i t t l e boys seem to have as much as l i t t l e g i r l s u n t i l the boys are taught not to c r y . G i r l s could e a s i l y be taught not to cry too. T h i s i s not a p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r a b l e r e p r e s s i o n , but a good case could be made that i t i s p r e s e n t l y necessary f o r success i n most 'male o c c u p a t i o n s , ' and that we should t h e r e f o r e i n f l u e n c e boys and g i r l s not to cry by way of g i v i n g them ' the same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n . ' Suppose the ' m a t e r n a l ' t r a i t s are n a t u r a l to everyone ! I f any of the v a l u a b l e female p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a i t s are not n a t u r a l but c r e a t e d , then we w i l l l o s e them unless we are w i l l i n g to create them i n boys t o o . • The c o n d i t i o n s of ' t h e same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' do not allow us to apply any i n f l u e n c e to g i r l s that we do not apply to boys. I f v a l u a b l e female p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a i t s are e n t i r e l y created and we give g i r l s 'thessame e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' as we now give boys, we w i l l l o s e those t r a i t s . Perhaps we exaggerate the danger of l o s i n g v a l u a b l e female t r a i t s when we assume that ' the same e a r l y e d u c a t i o n ' would be l i k e boys' present e d u c a t i o n . Even sex p r e j u d i c e might allow m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n boys ' present education to e l i m i n a t e unnecessary r e p r e s s i v e measures or to make i t more 149 adequate to the task of preparing people for the 'male occupations.' For example, though boys are now taught not to cry, this p a r t i c u l a r repressive measure could be eliminated, since crying every once i n a while does not interfere with the performance of most jobs. This step would involve a big change i n people's attitudes, because a man who cries as often as women do, say, i s usually regarded as unstable; but i t would not require that people give up their sex prejudices. Giving up unnecessary repressive measures would allow the female t r a i t s which are natural (either to women only or to both sexes) to emerge, provided that they did not c o n f l i c t with t r a i t s which we consider necessary to the performance of 'male jobs' or to successful competition for them. This does not, of course, solve the problem of what happens to any of the female t r a i t s that are not natural, since wevwould influence people to acquire only those t r a i t s which prepare them for 'male occupations' unless we gave up our sex prejudices. Perhaps some female t r a i t s might be useful i n the male occupations - not as we conceive of these occupations now, but as they might be - but the recognition of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y and the change i n the nature of the work would represent a major reduction i n sex prejudice. As I have pointed out before, giving boys and g i r l s 'the same early education' does not require us to treat everyone a l i k e . For instance, we are not required to t r y to prepare everyone to be successful competitors for the most prestigious and high-paying jobs. So we could influence each person to have those psychological t r a i t s which are most useful i n the work he/she i s best suited, by his/her talents and preferences, to 150 perform. (I suggested this policy before on pagefT^, Chapter 2.) I f we were w i l l i n g to prepare boys as we l l as g i r l s for the 'female occu-pations,' we could preserve the female t r a i t s by influencing people who were well-suited to them to develop;those t r a i t s . However, a large part of what makes people suitable for the 'female occupations' i s their female psychological t r a i t s . I f these t r a i t s occur naturally i n some people, and i f we do not repress them but allow them to develop, then we can steer such people into female occupations and further influence them to acquire useful t r a i t s . I f female psychological traits'do not occur naturally i n people unless, say, they are cultivated, then we must be w i l l i n g to set aside some portion of our youngsters i n which to cultivate them. That step requires recognition of the importance of the female occupations or the tasks they involve and a willingness to give boys female t r a i t s as w e l l as acceptance of a r a d i c a l type of s o c i a l engineering. There i s more than one conclusion that can be drawn from these pessimistic considerations. We could conclude that giving women equality of opportunity with men to enter a l l honourable employments i s undesirable because i t i s l i k e l y to have two very unfortunate consequences: that the tasks women have t r a d i t i o n a l l y performed for humanity might then be l e f t to the losers of the competition for 'better' jobs and that the special psychological t r a i t s which have enabled women to perform those tasks so we l l and which we value i n themselves might, through repression or neglect or c u l t i v a t i o n , disappear from our society. This i s the conclusion Freud almost reached before he reassured himself that i t would be impossible to give women equal opportunity anyway. But since removing sex prejudice 151 from society i s necessary to bringing about complete equality of oppor-tunity, and since i t i s the combination of giving boys and g i r l s 'the same early education' with sex prejudice that threatens women's a c t i -v i t i e s and achievements and female psychological t r a i t s , i t i s more reasonable to conclude that removing sex prejudice should be higher p r i o r i t y than giving boys and g i r l s 'the same early education.' The removal of sex prejudice from society would mean that people's a c t i v i t i e s , achievements and t r a i t s would be valued according to their contribution to human happiness regardless of their sex. But that i s not enough. Some people think that i f women were revered as housewives and mothers and i n the i r other usual roles i t would solve the problem of equality of the sexes. They think that the source of the problem i s that the roles of women are not given enough respect, so they want to elevate the prestige of those roles without trying to li b e r a t e women from 18 the necessity of taking them on. But we have seem too many important reasons for giving women equal opportunity with men to play any useful role i n society for us to be s a t i s f i e d with removing sex prejudice alone. We must take whatever further steps are necessary to give women and men equality of opportunity. M i l l gave us another reason for removing sex prejudice besides the ones we have found so far. He thought that men and women should become more a l i k e i n order to improve marriage. He said: Intimate society between people r a d i c a l l y d i s s i m i l a r to one another, i s an i d l e dream. Unlikeness may at t r a c t , but i t i s likeness which retains; and i n proportion to the likeness i s the s u i t a b i l i t y of the individuals to give each other a happy l i f e . 1 9 152 Although. M i l l s t r e s s e d the prospect of women becoming more l i k e men, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e i r knowledge and i n t e r e s t s , there are i n d i c a t i o n s that he thought men would b e n e f i t from becoming more l i k e women i n some respects too. He s a i d that women should become l e s s s e l f - s a c r i f i c i n g 20 and men more s o . He recommended that men engaged i n t h e o r i z i n g or s p e c u l a t i n g consult the p r a c t i c a l mind of an i n t e l l i g e n t woman to avoid 21 the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f a u l t s of masculine thought. In order f o r e i t h e r of these things to happen, and before men w i l l become more l i k e women i n any way, men must come to value the t r a i t s that women have and they tend to l a c k . And women must come to value t h e i r own t r a i t s before they w i l l be w i l l i n g to pass them on to or allow them to develop i n t h e i r sons. I f these things happened, many of the t r a i t s that we now know as ' female ' or 'male ' would become simply human t r a i t s . But M i l l d i d not see that r e -moving sex p r e j u d i c e must be an e a r l y step i n the l i b e r a t i o n of women i f they are to have the opportunity to become f u l l y human and not j u s t the opportunity to become more l i k e men. 153 CHAPTER 4 1 Women i n the Labour Force,.facts arid figures, Labour Canada, Women's Bureau, 1975 E d i t i o n , p. 49. 2 Ibid. This figure i s derived from the p a r t i c i p a t i o n rate of women i n the labour force (p. 3) and the percentage of women not i n the labour force who reported being f u l l - t i m e homemakers (p. 51). 3 Royal Commission Report on the Status of Women i n Canada, op. c i t . , p. 33. See also "Time Spent i n Housework," by Joann Vanek, S c i e n t i f i c American, Vol. 231, November 1974, p. 116 f f . 4 M i l l , The Subjection of Women, op.•cit., p. 48. 5 Royal Commission Report, op. c i t . , pp. 174 and 175. 6 M i l l , The Subjection of Women, op. c i t . , p. 48. 7 Ibi d . , pp. 28 and 29. 8 Ibid . , p. 51. 9 Ibi d . , p. 22. 10 John Stuart M i l l and Harriet Taylor M i l l , Essays on Sex Equality, ed. A l i c e S. Rossi, Chicago, 1970, especially p. 76. 11 Here I have used my own observations, and I appeal to those of the reader. The problems I am about to present arise so long as there are some valuable psychological t r a i t s which females tend to have more often or to a greater extent than males. The psychological l i t e r a t u r e about sex - t r a i t correlations i s voluminous and diverse. Studies which support some of my generalizations include: 154 CHAPTER 4 Costrich, Norma et a l . , "When stereotypes hurt: Three studies of penalties f o r sex-role reversals," Journal of Experimental  Social Psychology 1975, Vol. 11, pp. 520-530. Halas, Celia M. "Sex-role stereotypes: Perceived childhood s o c i a l -i z a t i o n experiences and the attitudes and behavior of adult women," Journal of Psychology 1974, Vol. 88 (2), pp. 261-275. Horner, Matina, " F a i l : Bright Women," Psychology Today, 1969 (Nov.), Vol. 3 (6), pp. 36P38, 62. Rose, Clare, "Women's Sex-role attitudes: A h i s t o r i c a l perspective," New Directions for Higher Education, 1975, No. 11, pp. 1-31. Also see de Beauvoir, Chesler and Figes i n Bibliography. 12 M i l l , The Subjection of Women, op. c i t . , p. 42 and pp. 57 and 58. 13 I am not ref e r r i n g here to non-violence, which i s a b e n e f i c i a l and desirable practice but not the same as the tendency not to express anger and aggression. 14 M i l l , The Subjection of Women, op. c i t . , pp. 60-62. 15 The Later Letters of John Stuart M i l l 1848-1873, op. c i t . , p. 1635, footnote to Letter 1473. 16 I b i d . . Letter 1473. 17 The Letters of Sigmund Freud, Selected and edited by Ernst L. Freud, translated by Tanis and James Stern, New York, 1961, Letter 28, p. 76. Incidentally, the l e t t e r shows that Freud's memory of the book he translated was abominable. 18 An excellent example of this attitude can be found i n CS. Lewis, That Hideous Strength, London, 1955. 19 M i l l , The Subjection of Women, op. c i t . , p. 91. 20 Ibid., p. 42. 21 Ibid., p. 59. CHAPTER 156 Chapter ; 5 EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AGAIN The dangers of taking some steps toward creating equality of oppor-tunity i n employment before removing sex prejudice are related to a fam i l i a r complaint about equality of opportunity as a p o l i t i c a l goal. The complaint i s that i t i s not desirable to create equality of oppor-tunity for everyone to f i l l the jobs or roles that are currently highly valued and highly rewarded because the current values of our society are misguided. I have argued that they are misguided i n that we under-value women's a c t i v i t i e s and achievements and female psychological t r a i t s . Of course they may be misguided i n other ways too; the con-v i c t i o n that they are i s eloquently expressed by John Schaar i n "Equality of Opportunity and Beyond:" Before one subscribes to the equality-of-opportunity formula, then, he should be certain that the dominant values, i n s t i t u t i o n s , and goals of his society are the ones he r e a l l y wants. The tone and content of much of our recent serious l i t e r a t u r e and s o c i a l thought - thought that escapes the confines of the conservativef-r a d i c a l framework - warn that we are w e l l on the way toward b u i l d -ing a culture our best men w i l l not honor. The f a c i l e formula of equal opportunity quickens that trend. I t opens more and more opportunities for more and more people to contribute more and more energies toward the r e a l i z a t i o n of a mass, bureaucratic, techno-l o g i c a l , p rivatized, m a t e r i a l i s t i c , bored, and t h r i l l - s e e k i n g , consumption-oriented society - a society of well-fed, congenial, and s y b a r i t i c monkeys surrounded by gadgets and pleasure-toys. 1 Equality of opportunity can be defended from t h i s c r i t i c i s m by broadening i t s scope - i . e . , by giving a different answer to 'opportunity to do what ?' than 'to f i l l the highly valued jobs or roles.' For example, 157 R.H. Tawney offers an alternative formulation of equality of opportunity i n Equality: Rightly interpreted, i t means, not only that what are commonly regarded as the prizes of l i f e should be open to a l l , but that none should be subjected to arbitrary penalties; not only that exceptional men should be free to exercise their exceptional powers, but that common men should be free to make the most of their common humanity.2 Such a formulation escapes the other most frequent complaint about the p o l i t i c a l i d e a l of equality of opportunity - that i t i s a poor sub-s t i t u t e for a more equal d i s t r i b u t i o n of the goods of society. Tawney himself c r i t i c i z e s the narrow formulation of the i d e a l on these grounds: So the doctrine which throws a l l i t s emphasis on the importance of opening avenues to ind i v i d u a l advancement i s p a r t i a l and one-sided. I t i s right i n i n s i s t i n g on the necessity of opening a free career to aspiring talent; i t i s wrong i n suggesting that opportunities to r i s e , which can, of their very nature, be seized only by the few, are a substitute for a general d i f f u s i o n of the means of c i v i l i z a t i o n , which are needed by a l l men, whether they r i s e or not, and which those who cannot climb the economic ladder, and who sometimes, indeed, do not desire to climb i t , may turn to as good account as those who can.3 I agree with Tawney that equality of opportunity to obtain the best jobs or to become wealthy i s not an adequate substitute for a more equal d i s -t r i b u t i o n of the goods of society. However, I think that even i n a society where the goods were distributed as equally as possible, i t would be desirable, for a l l the u t i l i t a r i a n reasons that were brought out i n Chapter 2, to have equality of opportunity to f i l l any given job or rol e . The question then comes back to: What jobs and roles should there be ? There are problems with using Tawney's formulation of equality of opportunity as a p o l i t i c a l goal for today. The concept of making the most of our common humanity needs interpretation. Our common humanity 158 i n c l u d e s the capacity to be extremely c r u e l , and I doubt that Tawney or anyone e l s e would want us to make the most of t h a t . What he probably had i n mind i s making the most of the v a l u a b l e aspects of our common humanity. But then so long as the i n t e r p r e t e r s of the g o a l are burdened w i t h sex p r e j u d i c e , t h e i r ideas of the v a l u a b l e aspects of our humanity might t u r n out to be h e a v i l y weighted on the s i d e of masculine t r a i t s and a c t i v i t i e s . I f sex p r e j u d i c e were s u f f i c i e n t l y reduced that i t d i d not get i n the way of honest e v a l u a t i o n s , I would favour the f o l l o w i n g f o r m u l a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l i d e a l of e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y : People s h o u l d , as f a r as p o s s i b l e , have e q u a l i t y of opportunity to develop a l l the v i r t u e s and experience a l l the happiness of which human b e i n g are capable. Then the q u e s t i o n : What jobs and r o l e s should there be ? would be answered according to what a c t i v i t i e s and achievements c o n t r i b u t e to human v i r t u e and happiness. CHAPTER 1 Schaar, op. c i t . , p. 231. 2 Tawney, bp. ; c i t . , p . 112. 3 I b i d . , p. 113. 160 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Affirmative Action and Equal Employment. A Guidebook for Employers, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D.C., 1974. de Beauvoir, S., The Second Sex, New York, 1952. Campbell, T.D., "Equality of Opportunity", Meeting of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, November 25, 1974. Chesler, P., Women and Madness, New York, 1972. Day, S., A Report on the Status of Women at the University of B r i t i s h  Columbia, Vancouver, 1973. F i d e l l , L.S. "Empirical V e r i f i c a t i o n of Sex Discrimination i n Hiring Practices i n Psychology", American Psychologist,', Vol. 25, 1970. Figes, E., Patriarchal Attitudes, London, 1972. Frankel, C, "Equality of Opportunity", Ethics, Volume 81, 1970-71. Freud, E., The Letters of Sigmund Freud, New York, 1961. Glover, J . , Responsibility, London, 1970. Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, Federal Register, Volume 35, Washington, D.C., 1970. Heilbrun,.C., Toward a Recognition of Androgeny, New York, 1973. H i l l , S., "The Importance of Autonomy", Meeting of the American Philosoph-i c a l Association, Spring, 1973. Huxley, A., Brave New World, New York, 1939. Laing, R.D., The P o l i t i c s of the Family, Massey Lectures, C.B.C. Publication, 1969. Lewis, C.S., That Hideous Strength, London, 1955. Manton, J . , Elizabeth Garrett Anderson, London, 1965. M i l l , J.S., (1) The,Subjection of Women,.Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970. (2) On Liberty, New York, 1956. 161 M i l l , J.S. and M i l l , H.T., Essays on Sex Equality, Chicago, 1970. M i l l e t t , K., Sexual P o l i t i c s , New York, 1971. Mineka, F.E. -and Lindley, D.N., The Later L e t t e r s of John Stuart M i l l , Toronto, 1972. M i t c h e l l , J . , Woman's Estate, Manchester, 1971. The Monist, Volume 57, No. 1, 1973. Morgan, R., Sisterhood i s Powerful, New York, 1970. Pierce, C , "Equality: Republic V", The Monist, Volume 57, 1973. Rawls, J . , A Theory of J u s t i c e , Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971. Reader, W.J., Professional Men. The Rise of the Pr o f e s s i o n a l Classes i n  Nineteenth-Century England, London, 1966. Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women i n Canada, Ottawa, _____ Schaar, J . , "Equality of Opportunity and Beyond", Equality, New York, 1967. Tawney, R.H., Equ a l i t y , New York, 1961. Vanek, J . , "Time Spent i n Housework", S c i e n t i f i c American, Volume 231, No. 5, 1974. Williams, B., "The Idea of Equal i t y " , Problems of the S e l f , Cambridge, 1973. Wilson, J . , Equality, London, 1966. Wi t t i g , M. The Guerillefes,London, 1971. Wollheim, R., and B e r l i n , I., "Equality", Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, Volume LVI, 1955-56. Women i n the Labour Force, Labour Canada, Women's Bureau, Ottawa, 1975. Women Unite, Toronto, .1972. Woolf, V., A Room of One's Own, Middlesex, 1970. 162 APPENDIX WOMEN AND '''.THE PROFESSIONS IN MILL'S ENGLAND How f a r was the b a r r i n g of women from c e r t a i n occupations"*" a matter of law ? C e r t a i n l y they were d i s e n f r a n c h i z e d and prevented from h o l d i n g p u b l i c o f f i c e by law, but was i t law that b a r r e d them from e n t e r i n g the p r o f e s s i o n s that they d i d not undertake ? The c l o s i n g of the p r o f e s s i o n s to women was, and had j u s t become, a l e g a l matter at the time that J . S . M i l l wrote The Subject ion of Women. Before that t ime, other s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s had been s u f f i c i e n t to keep women from even t r y i n g to enter most p r o f e s s i o n s . Although they were grammar s c h o o l t e a c h e r s , a c t r e s s e s , and sometimes w r i t e r s , musicians ( u s u a l l y music t e a c h e r s ) , p a i n t e r s or s c u l p t o r s , they were not p h y s i c i a n s , c l e r g y , b a r r i s t e r s , a t t o r n e y s , surgeons, a p o t h e c a r i e s , a r c h i t e c t s , engineers, d e n t i s t s , accountants, or c i v i l s e r v a n t s . Nor, of course, d i d they make careers i n the Army or Navy as men d i d . Perhaps the strongest s o c i a l f a c t o r which kept women from e n t e r i n g the p r o f e s s i o n s was the almost u n i v e r s a l assumption that women would not support themselves (except t e m p o r a r i l y ) , that they would marry and be supported by men. Fathers expected to make marriages f o r t h e i r daughters, not to p r o v i d e them w i t h p r o f e s s i o n a l education and set them up 2 i n b u s i n e s s . As a r e s u l t , women lacked the p r e p a r a t o r y e d u c a t i o n , the opportunity to a p p r e n t i c e , and the ' c o n n e c t i o n s ' and f i n a n c i a l backing necessary to make a c a r e e r . 163 We have the testimony of the Schools Enquiry Commission of lS^S"" to the fact that g i r l s ' education was poor. W.J. Reader t e l l s us they found that " g i r l s ' education, insofar as i t was anything more than a tra i n i n g i n deportment and agreeable manners, was sloppy and unsystematic."^ Their schools taught L a t i n badly and hardly any Greek, arithmetic and grammar just by rote, and music primarily as a manual s k i l l ; the natural science that they offered (e.g. astronomy) lacked a foundation of basic p r i n c i p l e s . Of course many g i r l s , especially those of wealthy families, were never sent to school at a l l , but were taught 'accomplishments' (a combination of sewing c r a f t s , a l i t t l e music, and s o c i a l s k i l l s ) at home. By contrast, a l i b e r a l education for a boy, such as could be obtained i n the public schools and then at Oxford, Cambridge and other Un i v e r s i t i e s , was based on a thorough knowledge of the classics - Lat i n and Greek l i t e r a t u r e and mathematics. Poor education has two kinds of effects with respect to the career ambitions of g i r l s : I t makes them unlikely to occur and nearly Impossible to r e a l i z e i f they do occur. Without i n t e l l e c t u a l stimulation one cannot develop an interest i n i n t e l l e c t u a l pursuits, and without some i n k l i n g that what a doctor or a lawyer does i s within the scope bf one's talents, one does not aspire to enter medicine or law. Furthermore, a l l the professions which women did not enter required some kind of education which was not available to them u n t i l at least the middle of the nineteenth century. fhe ' l i b e r a l professions,' d i v i n i t y , physic and the law, required a l i b e r a l , i . e . c l a s s i c a l , 164 education. To enter the 'lower branches' ( i . e . lower i n prestige) of the professions and become, f o r example, an apothecary, a surgeon or an attorney, one needed s p e c i a l i z e d education and apprenticeship . , . . 6 with, a p r a c t i t i o n e r . Often i t i s possible, when there are clear-cut q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r an occupation, enshrined i n law by the l i c e n s e to p r a c t i c e , or i n the rules' of p r o f e s s i o n a l s o c i e t i e s by some formal recognition of members, for a member of a group which would normally be excluded from that occupation to break into i t by f u l f i l l i n g the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , e.g. by passing examinations. Perhaps a woman could obtain the necessary l i b e r a l and s p e c i a l i z e d education from good tutors, and the necessary apprenticeship with some r e l a t i v e or f r i e n d of the family, to break into a f i e l d by meeting the formal requirements of the profession. But i t was not u n t i l w e ll into the nineteenth century that d e f i n i t e c r i t e r i a f o r entry were established for the professions that were the province of men. Standards of admission to p r a c t i c e we^e f i r s t established i n the 'lower branches' of the professions, probably because there were more people engaged i n them than i n the ' l i b e r a l professions,' so that there was more need f o r t h e i r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to be formally recognized, and because these people wanted t h e i r s o c i a l status raised above that of common tradesmen. The Apothecaries Act of 1815 gave the Society of Apothecaries the power to determine who could c a l l themselves apothecaries, and the 165 S o c i e t y set up r e g u l a t i o n s by which to decide t h i s . P r o s p e c t i v e customers knew that anyone who c a l l e d h i m s e l f an apothecary had c e r t a i n kinds of education and experience, and p r o s p e c t i v e apothecaries had a . s t r a i g h t p a t h to f o l l o w to t h e i r g o a l , i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r s o c i a l o r i g i n and connections. P r i o r to the p a s s i n g of the A c t , the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of both apothecaries and surgeons c o n s i s t e d of a p e r i o d of a p p r e n t i c e s h i p (the q u a l i t y of which was, of course, not c o n t r o l l a b l e ) and attendance of some l e c t u r e s on medicine, anatomy and p h y s i o l o g y . L i c e n s e s to p r a c t i c e had been unknown.. A f t e r 1815, i t became customary f o r anyone who wanted to go i n t o general p r a c t i c e to take the Apothecaries l i c e n s e and a diploma of membership i n the Royal C o l l e g e of Surgeons, which, between 1823 and 1833, t ightened up i t s examinations so that they were notlonger merely formal i n t e r v i e w s . Then the Law S o c i e t y was formed i n 1831 by attorneys to promote the improvement of t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n ^ and by 1836 i t was o f f e r i n g l e c t u r e s and, under the judges' a u t h o r i t y , a d m i n i s t e r i n g examinations to p r o s p e c t i v e a t t o r n e y s . Two of the ' l i b e r a l p r o f e s s i o n s , ' the B a r r i s t e r s and the P h y s i c i a n s , moved toward o b j e c t i v e standards of q u a l i f i c a t i o n i n the mid-nineteenth century; Admission to the Common-Law Bar had always been c o n t r o l l ed by the Inns of Court (four ancient p r i v a t e c l u b s ) . Reader d e s c r i b e s the procedure: The u s u a l method of l e a r n i n g to be a b a r r i s t e r was a mixture of a p p r e n t i c e s h i p and p r i v a t e reading . . , -and v i r t u a l l y the only formal requirement, apart from the payment of f e e s , was to appear at one's. Inn often enough to eat a s t i p u l a t e d number of d i n n e r s , which was not so e c c e n t r i c as i t sounds s i n c e , i n theory at l e a s t , 166 i t w a s a method by which a l l the members o f the profession, senior and junior, could get to know each other." I n 1847, lectureships were set up at t h r e e o f the Inns, and i n 1851, with the creation o f the Council o f Legal Education which represented a l l four Inns, attendance at .lectures became compulsory for aspiring b a r r i s t e r s . ThecSbuncil also set up a system o f voluntary qualifying examinations at t h i s time, but did not make them compulsory u n t i l 1872. The Royal College o f Physicians o f London and s i m i l a r colleges i n Dublin and Edinburgh had granted licenses to physicians since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries respectively. I n the nineteenth century^ the Royal College took f a n y m o r e interest i n the l i b e r a l education than i n the medical trai n i n g o f aspiring physicians. For example, the Fellows o f the College, i n admitting others to their number, in s i s t e d o n degrees from either Oxford o r Cambridge (which o f course automatically excluded women); yet neither University offered medical education, and those who obtained the i r medical degrees there took a degree i n Arts, went away to study medicine however they chose, and returned to get a n M.D. o n the recommendation o f t h e i r professors. The physicians considered their most important q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to be the gentlemanly bearing and c l a s s i c a l training which was obtained at public schools and u n i v e r s i t i e s . The Medical Act o f 1858 consolidated the practice o f medicine and recognized the necessity o f professional training tested by formal examination. Reader describes i t : 167 The Act created the ' r e g i s t e r e d medical p r a c t i t i o n e r , ' a r e c o g n i z a b l e descendant o f the q u a l i f i e d apothecary created by the Apothecaries Act of 1815. He was a man (women had s c a r c e l y yet begun to d i s t u r b the p r o f e s s i o n ' s peace of mind, though they were soon to do so) who had s a t i s f i e d one or more of twenty-one e x i s t i n g l i c e n s i n g b o d i e s , a f t e r examination, that he was f i t to p r a c t i c e . No l i c e n s i n g bodies were a b o l i s h e d ; -no new ones were set up - that was beyond the range of p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s - b u t at l e a s t the powers of a l l the r e c o g n i z a b l e bodies were made to cover the U n i t e d Kingdom i n s t e a d of b e i n g c o n f i n e d , as many of them had been i n the p a s t , to c e r t a i n p a r t s of i t . A l i c e n s e granted by one of these bodies gave the h o l d e r of i t an absolute r i g h t to have h i s name p l a c e d on the r e g i s t e r kept by an a u t h o r i t y (the General C o u n c i l of M e d i c a l Education and R e g i s t r a t i o n of the U n i t e d Kingdom) created f o r the purpose. Once r e g i s t e r e d , the doctor had a r i g h t to p r a c t i c e anywhere i n the U n i t e d Kingdom. He a l s o had a r i g h t to p r a c t i c e any branch of medicine, even though he might only be q u a l i f i e d i n one of the recognized three -medicine, surgery, and midwifery.9 The Act a l s o p r o v i d e d for the r e g i s t r a t i o n of any p r a c t i t i o n e r who had been a c t i v e before 1858. The change to formal q u a l i f i c a t i o n s began, though i t was not i n t e n d e d , to open the p r o f e s s i o n s to women. We know of two women who made use of the new r e g u l a t i o n s . E l i z a b e t h B l a c k w e l l , who had obtained an M.D. degree from a school i n Geneva, New York i n 1849, claimed her r i g h t to be r e g i s t e r e d under the M e d i c a l Act of 1858. And i n 1865 E l i z a b e t h G a r r e t t took the L i c e n s e of The S o c i e t y of A p o t h e c a r i e s ; she simply met the requirements, and they r e l u c t a n t l y gave her one. But then, i n a move to exclude women from t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n , the Apothecaries changed t h e i r r e g u l a t i o n s to f o r b i d the granting of a l i c e n s e to anyone who had obtained p a r t of h i s / h e r medical education p r i v a t e l y . Since women were not admitted to the medical schools i n England ( G a r r e t t had had to study p r i v a t e l y under recognized teachers 168 because she had been, shut out of the m e d i c a l s c h o o l of Middlesex H o s p i t a l i n s p i t e of her e x c e l l e n t performance t h e r e ) , they were 11 v i r t u a l l y excluded from the p r o f e s s i o n . S h o r t l y a f t e r the Apothecaries changed t h e i r r u l e s , other examining bodies i n London simply refused to admitewomen to t h e i r examinations; Around the same time that some p r o f e s s i o n s were f o r m a l i z i n g t h e i r requirements, s e v e r a l establishments were set up f o r the s e r i o u s education of women: Queen's C o l l e g e , H a r l e y Street (1848), Bedford C o l l e g e , London (1849), The North London C o l l e g i a t e School (1850), The Ladies C o l l e g e , Cheltenham (1853). Some of the newly-educated women had p r o f e s s i o n a l ambitions, and i n 1869 women entered Edinburgh U n i v e r s i t y as medical students, on c o n d i t i o n that they attend separate c l a s s e s from the men. However, these s p e c i a l arrangements broke down, and i n 1870 the General C o u n c i l of the U n i v e r s i t y refused to al low them to attend c l a s s e s with the men. F i n a l l y the U n i v e r s i t y refused to l e t them graduate, having decided that i t had been a mistake to admit them. There was l i t i g a t i o n i n 1872 and i n 1873 to get the women r e - a d m i t t e d , but to no a v a i l . Thus women's r i g h t to enter the p r o f e s s i o n s became a l e g a l matter when two women became r e g i s t e r e d m e d i c a l p r a c t i t i o n e r s and men h u r r i e d to c l o s e the doors on the r e s t . By 1869, when M i l l wrote The Subject ion of Women, the women's s t r u g g l e s against the examining 12 bodies and medical schools were w e l l under way; they d i d not meet w i t h success u n t i l 1876, when the r i g h t of q u a l i f i e d women to be p l a c e d 169 on the R e g i s t e r was made law by, R u s s e l l Gurney's ' A c t to remove the 13 R e s t r i c t i o n s on the Granting of Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s on the Ground of Sex. ' Then one by one v a r i o u s examining and teaching bodies admitted women, and i n 1882 the members of the Royal Commission on the M e d i c a l Acts s t a t e d that i t was " o n l y f a i r and reasonable that women should be admitted to the examinations on the same terms as men.""*"^ Medicine was, of a l l the p r o f e s s i o n s which were e x c l u s i v e l y male i n 1800, the one most a c c e s s i b l e to women i n 1900. S e v e r a l b a r r i e r s had been lowered: l i b e r a l and p r o f e s s i o n a l s c h o o l i n g was a v a i l a b l e to those who could pay f o r i t ; the necessary q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of a doctor were c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d and i t was recognized ( l e g a l l y at l e a s t ) that women could o b t a i n them; a p p r e n t i c e s h i p had been v i r t u a l l y a b o l i s h e d . However, s i n c e a t t i t u d e s towards women s u p p o r t i n g themselves had not s u b s t a n t i a l l y changed, the problem of f i n a n c i a l backing s t i l l loomed l a r g e f o r them. Education was expensive, and even a f t e r one was r e g i s t e r e d , i t took at l e a s t a year to set up a p r a c t i c e l u c r a t i v e enough to support o n e s e l f . A woman d o c t o r , who had to cope with p r e j u d i c e s against her a b i l i t i e s , might never succeed i n becoming f i n a n c i a l l y independent. There were 477 women doctors recorded i n the 1911 census. The p r o f e s s i o n s which r e q u i r e d a p e r i o d of a p p r e n t i c e s h i p were, of course, much l e s s a c c e s s i b l e to women than those which r e q u i r e d only s c h o o l i n g . Popular a t t i t u d e s about t h e i r a b i l i t i e s and proper occupations- would make i t d i f f i c u l t f o r them to get a p p r e n t i c e d , and a p p r e n t i c e s h i p was very expensive. A p e r i o d of a p p r e n t i c e s h i p f o r 170 a b a r r i s t e r , a t t o r n e y , engineer or a r c h i t e c t was l i k e l y to cost at l e a s t J _ T 0 Q 0 . ( O n e could get an undergraduate education at Oxford or Cambridge f o r between _:300 and ^ 4 0 0 . ' . T h i s might very w e l l e x p l a i n the f a c t that censuses up to 1911 recorded no women lawyers or engineers, and only h a l f a dozen a r c h i t e c t s i n 1901. 171 APPENDIX 1 M i l l spoke s p e c i f i c a l l y of medicine and advocacy. He was defending the rights ; of middle-class women to:enter the professions. No one denied the rights of poor women to work In facto r i e s , i n the f i e l d s , or as domestic servants i n other people's homes. See M i l l , The Subjection of Women, op. c i t . , p. 52. 2 This i s not the place to prove t h i s , or tlo discuss i t s origins. I do not mean to imply that these attitudes occurred i n a vacuum and were the sole cause of the limi t a t i o n s of which I write. 3 (The Taunton Commission) Report of the Schools Enquiry Commission, 1868. 4 W.J. Reader, Professional Men. The Rise of the Professional Classes •in Nineteenth-Century England, London, 1966, p. 169. 5 I am leaving out of consideration the negative reinforcements which the expression of such interests would bring on a g i r l i n Victorian England. 6 As of 1815, an apothecary had to have competence i n L a t i n , c e r t i f i c a t i o n of attendance at lectures on anatomy and physiology, medicine, chemistry and materia media, s i x months hospital attendance and f i v e years'apprenticeship. See Reader, bp. c i t . , p. 52. 7 For a l i s t of the regulations, see footnote 6. 8 Reader, op. c i t ; , p. 22. 9 Ibid., p. 66. 10 Jo Manton, Elizabeth.. Garrett Anderson, London, 1965, Chapter 10. 11 -Reader, op. c i t . , p. 176. 172 12 The i s s u e s were probably widely d i s c u s s e d , because the L a n c e t , the p e r i o d i c a l of the medical p r o f e s s i o n , reported the disputes i n some d e t a i l and h o t l y opposed the women's e f f o r t s . 13 Reader, op. c i t . , p . 179. 14 Royal Commission on the M e d i c a l Acts 1882, paragraph. 67.-15 Reader, op. c i t . , Chapter 8. 16 I b i d . , Chapter 9. 

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