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The Li Hsün faction and the Sweet Dew Incident in 835 : a study of a climactic episode in late T’ang… Preston, Jennifer Wei-Yen Jay 1976

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THE LI HSUN FACTION AND THE SWEET DEW INCIDENT IN 835: A STUDY OF A CLIMACTIC EPISODE IN IATE T'ANG POLITICS by JENNIFER WEI-YEN JAY PRESTON B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1973 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Asian Studies) We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA . September, 1976 (c) Jennifer Wei-Yen Jay Preston, 1976 In presenting th i s thesis in par t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree ly ava i lab le for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th i s thes is for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It i s understood that copying or pub l i ca t i on of this thes is fo r f inanc ia l gain shal l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Asian Studies The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date October. 1976 i i Abstract After the c r i p p l i n g An-Shih chaos of 755-?62,the attempts of post-rebellion T'ang to r e v i t a l i z e . the dynasty were continuously hindered by four in t e r - r e l a t e d factors! foreign incursions, fan-chen provincialism, bureaucratic factionalism, and eunuch domination of the court. The Sweet Dew Incident of 835 was a palace coup i n Ch'ang-an launched against the power-entrenched court eunuchs by the L i Hsun fac t i o n i n the central bureaucracy. L i Hsun's supporters included the emperor Wen-tsung, who played an active role i n the i n i t i a l planning and f i n a l launching of the coup. The coup f a i l e d , and the L i Hsiin men suffered a t r a g i c end, with the c i t y of Ch'ang-an being thrown into chaos and terror. The historiography of the incident i n the standard h i s t o r i e s of the period i s marked throughout with the moralizing bias of the Sung historiogmphers and does not provide an . adequate i n t e r -pretation of the L i Hsun fa c t i o n . Through a c r i t i c a l study of the standard h i s t o r i e s of the period and using supplementary sources, t h i s thesis i s an attempt to review the events of the Sweet Dew Incident and the L i Hsun fact i o n i n the context of the h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t i e s of post-r e b e l l i o n T'ang and t h e i r developments during the reign of Wen-tsung. Chapter One i s an introduction to the problem under study. The events and participants of the Sweet Dew Incident as recorded by the standard h i s t o r i e s are b r i e f l y described. In t h i s chapter the sources of these standard h i s t o r i e s are examined f o r the period under study, and the discrepancies and consistencies within these standard h i s t o r i e s are explained. The next chapter deals with the four h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t i e s of post-rebellion T'ang and t h e i r respective developments during the i i i r eign of Wen-tsung. The incursions of the Uighur, T'u-fan, and Nan-chao t r i b e s are f i r s t examined, then the recalcitrancy of the north-east provinces.. Next, the several domains of eunuch interference i n the court of Ch'ang-an, including imperial succession and m i l i t a r y control, are discussed. Las t l y , t h i s chapter describes the controver-s i a l issues surrounding the Niu and L i f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e , the infamous f a c t i o n a l feud which penetrated the central bureaucracy f o r over fo r t y years. In t h i s chapter an attempt i s also made to see whether the proposed strategy of the L i Hsun fa c t i o n was appropriate f o r dealing with these four problems of the central government. Chapter Three i s e s s e n t i a l l y a reconstruction of the L i Hsun fa c t i o n . The seventeen members of the f a c t i o n are traced and studied i n a composite biography based on t h e i r family backgrounds and p o l i t i c a l careers. This chapter also probes the circumstances under which the key personalities of the f a c t i o n , L i Hsun, Shu Yuan-yu, Wang Yai and Chia Su, made each other's acquaintance and formed a secret alignment i n Lo-yang. Chapter Four deals with the r i s e to power of L i Hsiin. L i Hsun's p o l i t i c a l methods, p a r t i c u l a r l y the divide and rule t a c t i c applied to the resolution of the eunuch problem and factionalism, are examined. In t h i s chapter L i Hsun's manipulations from within the Han-lin Academy and the transformation of his secret alignment i n Lo-yang to a; dominant fa c t i o n i n Ch'ang-an are also observed. The f i n a l chapter provides a narration of the events of the Sweet Dew Incident of 835. I t concludes/the study with an examination of the aftermath and repercussions of the coup on the emperor Wen-tsung and on the T'ang central government. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION AND THE SOURCES OF THE STANDARD WORKS 1 CHAPTER TWO. THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF WEN-TSUNG'S REIGN 16 CHAPTER THREE. THE LI HSUN FACTION - COMPOSITION AND FORMATION 39 CHAPTER FOUR. LI HSUN'S RISE TO POWER AND HIS ADMINISTRATION IN 835 58 CHAPTER FIVE. THE SWEET DEW INCIDENT AND CONCLUSION ?k-NOTES TO THE TEXT 95 BIBLIOGRAPHY 127 APPENDIX I. ADDITIONAL NON-OFFICIAL SOURCES OF THE STANDARD WORKS 134-CHARACTER INDEX 138 1 CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION AND THE SOURCES OF THE STANDARD WORKS Introduction The vast T'ang empire that emerged from the An-Shih rebellions (755-762)* was shaken i n institutional foundations and diminished i n geographical extent. Externally, i t was incessantly plagued by semi-autonomous military provinces and encroaching foreign tribes. The Yuan-ho Restoration under the emperor Hsien-tsung (805-820) stabilized to some extent central-provincial relations, but the pressures from border tribes did not cease u n t i l their f i n a l collapse as a result of internal disintegration. Internally, the usurpation of imperial prerogatives by the eunuchs and the factional s t r i f e amongst the central bureaucrats together rendered decision-making d i f f i c u l t and ineffective, thereby adversely affecting the cr e d i b i l i t y of the central authority i n Ch'ang-an. During the five month administration of Wang Shu-wen and his faction i n the reign of Shun-tsung (805), certain p o l i t i c a l reforms aimed against the eunuchs? abuses of power were 4 implemented. However, hostile reaction i n the eunuch ci r c l e s and the upper class bureaucrats succeeded i n expelling the Wang Shu-wen faction from court, and even forced the abdication of Shun-tsung i n favour of his son Hsien-tsung. In the reign of Wen-tsung (827-840), anxious attempts by the emperor to settle various immediate problems helped bring the L i Hsiin faction to power, and precipitated the Sweet Dew Incident of December 14, 835* From 833 to 835 a group of individuals under L i Hsiin, a Confucian scholar of eminent lineage but i n p o l i t i c a l disgrace at the time, formed a p o l i t i c a l alignment. Through both orthodox and unorthodox methods, the alignment emerged as the dominant faction i n the court 2 of Ch'ang-an. Varied i n social and p o l i t i c a l backgrounds, the key personalities Included the chief ministers, Wang Yai, Chia Su and Shu Yuan-yii. The faction also had an untrustworthy o f f i c i a l , Wang Fan, who oould not keep secrets, and a notorious physician, Cheng Chu. Apparently they had previously and secretly enlisted the support of the emperor Wen-tsung i n their p o l i t i c a l maneuvers and ventures. In less than a year, this faction was able to gain control of the adminis-tration, demote and exile the leading factionalist politicians at court, and murder at least six leading eunuchs, including Wang Shou-ch'eng, the eunuch who had originally been responsible f o r the r i s e to power of the L i Hsun faction. When L i Hsun and his faction launched the f i n a l plot to eliminate the remaining court eunuchs, they came to a tragic end. On that fateful day (the, jen-hsu day of the eleventh month of T'ai-ho 9» 835) the presence of 1 sweet dew , an auspicious omen 5 believed to forecast peace and harmony in the empire , was reported a t the morning audience by Han Yiieh, a member of the L i Hsun faction and grand general of the Chin-wu Guards of the Left. The emperor Wen-tsung, himself a participant In this anti-eunuch coup, summoned together a l l the court eunuchs, including the generals of the eunuch controlled Shen-ts'e Armies, Ch'iu Shih-liang and Yii Hung-chlh, to confirm the truth of Han Yiieh's announcement. At the site where the ' sweet dew was supposed to have descended, the eunuchs discovered, instead, an am-bush of armed soldiers. In contrast to the incompetent performance of L i Hsun's men (Han Yiieh was perspiring heavily before any action took place, and Wang Fan was trembling so hard that he could not command his army), the response of the eunuchs was amazingly quick and well co-3 ordinated. After successfully abducting the emperor, who symbolized ultimate and absolute authority i n the T'ang dynasty, the eunuchs immediately launched a counter-attack. Shortly afterwards, the entire L i Hsun faction was arrested, and without any t r i a l administered a bizarre execution. They were chopped i n half and their heads were hung above the ci t y gates. Clan exterminations of the L i Hsiin faction members were ruthlessly carried out. Women and slaves found i n their residences were enslaved by the state. While a dozen to f i f t y eunuchs died i n the event, altogether three thousand men were slaughtered by the eunuchs' orders. These massacres occurred i n the palaces, the Ch'ang-an ci t y quarters, and also i n Feng-hsiang (a short distance north-west of Ch'ang-an). Cheng Chu and several faction members had previously been despatched to Feng-hsiang in anticipation of a second attack i n the event that the coup f a i l e d i n Ch'ang-an. Some of these three thousand men, mostly c i v i l o f f i c i a l s , died through "guilt by association", but the majority was just a r b i t r a r i l y k i l l e d when the eunuchs sought revenge from the entire officialdom, of which the L i Hsiin faction was only a part. For the rest of the month, soldiers and gangsters took advantage of the general chaos to plunder i n the city. Order was restored only through the conscientious efforts of Ling-hu Ch'u, Cheng T'an, and LI Shih. The powers of deliberation, however, had openly and sharply shifted to the court eunuchs, who had triumphantly engineered the counter-attack. The central bureaucracy, already riven by factional s t r i f e , further diminished i n effective administration and control. As punishment for his involvement i n the coup, the emperor Wen-tsung, precariously holding his throne, was subjected to s t r i c t surveillance. Because this anti-eunuch coup was launched with the use of "sweet dew" as the decoy, i t has been referred to as the Sweet Dew Incident (Kan-lu chih-plen) or the Sweet Dew Tragedy (Kan-lu chih-huo) by the traditional historiographers. The traditional interpretation of this climactic episode i n late T'ang p o l i t i c s has been based on the standard histories for the periods the Chlu T'ang-shu. Hsln T'ang-shu and the Tzu-chlh t'ung-chlen (here-after referred to as GTS, HTS and TGTG. or collectively as the standard w o r k s T h e CTS was compiled i n 940-945 (Five Dynasties), the HTS In 1043-1060 (Sung), and the TGTG i n 1066-1085 (Sung). However, for the sake of convenience we shal l be referring to their compilers as Sung historiographers. These standard works cast the L i Hsiin faction as a group of e v i l , self-enhancing upstarts, divided amongst themselves by internal jealousies, and united only by a common greed for power, wealth and revenge. They are further condemned for openly associating with the generally despised eunuch, Wang Shou-ch'eng, who had f i r s t brought the group to p o l i t i c a l predominance. The unorthodox r i s e to power and daring p o l i t i c a l methods of L i Hsun are particularly denounced. The Sung historiographers found the incident i n which the 11 Hsiin faction poisoned Wang Shou-ch'eng to be morally shocking. This incident provided the ultimate proof for the Sung historiographers that the faction stopped at nothing to achieve their ambitions, including devising unscrupulous anti-eunuch and antl-factionalist policies solely for the purpose of currying imperial favour. The Sung historiographers interpret the Sweet Dew Incident of 835 as the inevitable outcome of internal s t r i f e i n the L i Hsiin faction. According to them, the coup was launched a few days ahead of schedule because Id Hsun wished to claim f u l l credit for eliminating a l l the court eunuchs. Towards this objective, he and his personal adherents had also plotted for the murder of Gheng Chu, 5 the physician who had f i r s t introduced the group to Wang Shou-ch'eng for p o l i t i c a l advancement. This negative appraisal of the II Hsun faction not only explained for the Sung historiographers the incompetent performance of the Id Hsun faction i n the sweet dew coup, a t the same time i t confirmed the loosely bound nature of their alignment. Thus, i n these respects, the standard works conclude that the faction members deserved the bizarre executions and clan exterminations. We observe also that the attempts and relative success of the brief L i Hsun administration i n p o l i t i c a l reforms, such as the ousting of factionalist leaders and the murder of six leading eunuchs, are not recognized by the Sung historiographers. Instead, the group received the entire blame for creating the havoc and massacres In Ch'ang-an, the sh i f t of the powers of deliberation to the eunuchs, and the worsened vulnerability of central authority i n the face of recalcitrant military governors. Despite the faulty nature of this traditional interpretation, a number of modern 7 scholars s t i l l subscribe to i t . Alternate views, however, have not been absent. The Ch'ing scholar, Wang Ming-sheng, challenges the traditional portrayal of L i Hsun and 8 Cheng Chu as immoral scoundrels. He points out the relative success of the L i Hsun administration and describes the p o l i t i c a l talents of L i Hsun. However, Wang Ming-sheng's contribution to the study of the L i Hsun faction l i e s i n probing the doubtful aspects of the traditional o interpretation t i t was not his intention to interpret the entire event. Several modern Chinese historians have similarly offered alternative views about the incident. Ts'en Chung-raien follows the tradition of Wang Ming-sheng i n noting the doubtful and suspicious items related i n the standard works.*° Ch'en Yin-k'o and LU Ssu-mien proceed further i n 6 venturing explanations for the L i Hsun faction and the Sweet Dew Incident i n the context of eunuch p o l i t i c s i n late T'ang, According to Ch'en Yin-k'o, the members of the L i Hsun faction, l i k e those of the Wang Shu-wen faction and a l l other alignments i n the central bureaucracy i n late T'ang, were no more than "hangers-on" and "echoing voices" of contending eunuch c l i q u e s . A c c o r d i n g to Lu Ssu-mien, the struggle for supremacy between the eunuch controlled Shen-ts'e Armies of the Left and of the Right played a direct role i n the i n i t i a l 12 formation of the L i Hsun faction and in their f i n a l debacle. Neither Ch'en Yin-k'o nor Lu Ssu-mien conceived the L i Hsun alignment as an independent faction functioning with the sanction of the emperor Wen-tsung. In Western languages, Arthur Waley's account of the incident in the Life and Times of Po Chu-1 constitutes perhaps the only, and by 13 far the most favourable re-appraisal of the L i Hsun faction. J Waley sees i n the Sweet Dew Incident a sincere and bold attempt by the faction members (some of whom were Po Chii-l's friends) to oust the eunuchs for the benefit of the T'ang p o l i t i c a l system, rather than for personal aggrandizement alone. t He considers the extremities of policy associated with the faction to be necessary i n the plot to eliminate the power-entrenched court eunuchs. Both the traditional and alternative interpretations above have viewed the SweetDew Incident only i n the context of the eunuch problem. To date, no separate study of the L i Hsun faction has appeared i n any language. There has been no attempt to connect this incident with other thematic problems of the time, such as factionalism i n the central bureaucracy and the central-provincial relationships outside of Ch'ang-an. I f e e l that a detailed study of the L i Hsun faction and the 7 Sweet Dew Incident, which together constituted a climactic episode i n late T'ang p o l i t i c s , w i l l enable us to gain certain insights into the intricacies underlying p o l i t i c s i n late ninth century China, In this thesis, my major concern Is to reconstruct the formation, composition and administration of the L i Hsiin alignment, and to trace the stages and impact of i t s presence i n the court of Wen-tsung. Through the experiences of L i Hsiin and his faction, we may be able to observe the operation and manipulation of certain informal institutional structures such as the Han-lin Academy of the scholars, and the Shen-ts'e Armies and the Shu-mi Council of the court eunuchs. Furthermore, through Wen-tsung's own experience with L i Hsun and the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of his reign, we may see and f e e l some repercussions of the An-Shih rebellions which had caused the T'ang dynasty to totter slowly to i t s end. With this inquiry i n mind, the rest of this chapter w i l l explore the sources upon which the standard works drew for the period under study. Chapter Two w i l l discuss the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of Wen-tsung 's reign, and the extent to which the L i Hsiin faction's objectives corresponded to them. The next chapter w i l l reconstruct the composition of the L i Hsiin faction, and the time and place of the formation of this p o l i t i c a l alignment. Turning to Chapter Four, we sha l l examine the r i s e to power and p o l i t i c a l methods of L i Hsun, and the accomp-lishments of his administration. Next, the preparation, execution and repercussions of the Sweet Dew Incident w i l l be discussed i n detail. This f i n a l chapter w i l l also surammarize the essential points made i n the study. 8 The Sources of the Standard Works on the Li Hsun Faction and the  Sweet Dew Incident The bulk of our information regarding the Li Hsiin faction and the Sweet Dew Incident is contained in the standard works on T'ang history: the GTS, HTS, and the TGTG. The biography (lleh-chuan) section of both the GTS (169) and the HTS (179) devotes an entire chapter of roughly the same length to the Li Hsiin faction members. The most detailed coverage of the event is located In the biography of Li Hsiin (CTS 169.11 HTS 179.1). Additional information is scattered in the biographies of the eunuchs, Wang Shou-ch'eng and Gh'iu Shih-liang, also located in the two T'ang-shu (CTS 184.10} HTS 208.2, HTS 207.7). The Wen-tsung annals (pen-chl) in the CTS (I7a-b) also contains 14 relevant details. In the TCTC an account of the entire event with about the same degree of comprehensiveness as the two T'ang-shu runs sporadically from the years T'ai-ho 1 to K'ai-ch'eng 5 (827-840). These records, which constitute the sources extant on the Sweet Dew Incident, actually underwent several stages of edition and revision, from the most primary accounts to the present "standard history" (cheng-shih) form.^ Since the most primary accounts are no longer extant, i t would be in our interest to investigate; 1) the quantity and nature of these non-extant sources, 2) the political atmosphere under which they were originally written, 3) the extent to which these sources were available to the Sung historiographers, and 4) the guidelines and principles by which these sources were selected, processed and utilized for the compilation of the accounts In the CTS, HTS, and the TCTC. To undertake this inquiry, we make use of the TCTC K'ao-i (Examination of Discrepancies of Sources in the TCTC)^ and the bibliographies of 9 contemporary works compiled close to or i n the Sung dynasty (hereafter referred to as Sung bibliographies)?^ The chief sources available to and u t i l i z e d by a l l three stand-ard works on our topic were of an o f f i c i a l nature. These were the "veritable records" (shih-lu) drafted at the end of an emperor's reign and the imperial decrees and statutes issued during the period of the reign. Our concern here i s to identify the exact "veritable record" used by the standard works i n the narration of the Sweet Dew Incident and the sources of this "veritable record" i t s e l f . We note that i n the two T'ang-shu (which were both used by the TCTC) the biographies of the L i Hsun faction members, rather than the Wen-tsung annals, provide the most comprehensive account of the entire event. From the only extant T'ang "veritable record", the Shun-tsung shih-lu. we know that the "veritable records" were most l i k e l y written i n chronicle form and contained biographies of persons inserted at the 19 time of their death. Since the L i Hsiin faction was involved with a dramatic event such as the Sweet Dew Incident, there i s l i t t l e doubt that the biographies of i t s members would have been included in a "veritable record". Since the entire faction was executed immediately after the fiasco i n late 835, when Wen-tsung was s t i l l the reigning emperor, we may conclude that the Wen-tsung shih-lu. and not any other, contained the biographies of L i Hsun and his associates. These same biographies i n the Wen-tsung phlh-lu were thus the chief sources of the standard works on the Sweet Dew Incident. Although the Wen-tsung shih-lu has not been extant since Sung times, from the Sung bibliographies we know that the work was pre-20 sented to Hstian-tsung (846-859) i n forty chapters, i n the year 854. 10 The supervisor of the work was Wei Mo, who shortly afterwards became chief minister. His. staff in the project included Chiang Chieh, a 21 descendant from a family of historiographers. In general, biographical materials for the "veritable records" were incorporated in their entire-ty from "accounts of conduct" (hslng-chuang) and tomb inscriptions. These works were often written at the request of family relatives by 22 friends or colleagues of the subject of the biography. However, in the case of notorious men, such as the Li Hsun faction members were conceived to be, no one would have dared to write and present favourable 23 "accounts of conduct" on their behalf. The negative portrayal of the Li Hsun faction most likely began with the extreme sensitivity and concern of the eunuchs about their role in history. For the "crime" of engineering the anti-eunuch coup, the en-tire faction was executed under the commands of the triumphant eunuchs, while the officialdom was terrorized and left with no alternative but to obey the orders of the eunuchs. One of these orders, issued and car-ried out on the day after the sweet dew coup was launched, was for Ling-hu Ch'u, then the vice-president of the Left of the State Affairs Department. (shang-shu sheng). to draft an imperial decree to proclaim throughout the 24 empire the guilty acts of Li Hsun, Wang Yai and their faction. This de-cree is no longer extant, but the standard works Indicate i t to be hostile towards the Li Hsun group. Since i t was written almost immediately after the fiasco of 835$ It must have constituted the f i r s t written work to portray the Li Hsun men with a negative bias. Several other imperial decrees s t i l l extant were also drafted in the days immediately follow-ing the crisis, in the form of prosecution orders for the Li Hsiin sup-porters, appointment notices of new chief ministers , and an "act of 11 grace** accompanying a change of reign t i t l e i n 8 3 6 . ^ In a l l these decrees, the conspicuous apologetic tone of the emperor Wen-tsung, in whose name they were drafted, suggests strongly that they might have been dictated to Ling-hu Ch'u by the vengeful eunuchs. If Ling-hu Ch*u, a respectable and high ranking veteran o f f i c i a l , could be forced to y i e l d to the commands of the eunuchs, we can imagine the greater pressures exerted on the minor history o f f i c i a l s , who wrote the "diaries of ac t i v i t y and repose" (ch*l-chu chu). We have evidence that the interference of the eunuchs i n history writing included removing the names of the L i Hsiin men from various f i l e s , such as those in the Han-26 l i n Academy, and the ministry of C i v i l Office. Such was the immediate p o l i t i c a l situation under which the i n i t i a l unfavourable conception of the L i Hsiin faction found i t s way into h i s t o r i c a l records. In 854, when Wei Mo and his staff were faced with the task of drafting the biographies of the L i Hsiin faction members in the Wen- tsung shih-lu. friendly "accounts of conduct" submitted on the behalf of the faction members were absent. Wei Mo and his staff thus had available only the documents mentioned abovet the Imperial decrees and edicts denouncing the alleged revolt of the L i Hsiin faction, the revised f i l e s i n various administrative offices, and the "diaries of a c t i v i t y and repose", a l l of which were marked with the eunuch imprint. We note that i n 854, the L i Hsun faction was s t i l l i n p o l i t i c a l disgrace, and the eunuchs had not to any degree relinquished their arbitrary 27 powers. ' Wei Mo and his staff, under the continued eunuch "supervision" i n history writing, and faced with the absence of alternative and independent sources, could not but produce a Wen-tsung shih-lu coloured with the same harsh negative bias against the L i Hsiin faction that i s 12 evident i n the extant imperial decrees drafted i n late 835. Apart from the Wen-tsung shih-lu. the preceding Mu-tsung and 28 Ghlng-tsung shih-lu and the restored Wu-tsung and Hsuan-tsung 29 shih-lu were available to the standard works. These, however, do not seem to have much relevance to our search for biographical sources 30 of the L i Hsun faction members. The fact that the entire faction died together indicates that their biographies would not have been scattered i n various "veritable records", but they would have been drawn up by the same history o f f i c i a l s and inserted i n the same place i n the Wen-tsung shih-lu. This fact further accounts for the general consistency i n the narration of the event i n the standard works, which were based on the Wen-tsung shih-lu. Nevertheless, we can s t i l l discern certain minor discrepancies. One category of discrepancy l i e s i n the GTS lacking certain records of incidents related i n both the HTS and the TCTC.3* The other group of discrepancies results from the TGTG's rejection of certain additional information i n preference for the GTS account, while the HTS accepts the information uncritically. These discrepancies may be partly attributed to the relative a v a i l a b i l i t y of additional non-official sources to each standard work. Of the three, the GTS seems to have adhered most f a i t h f u l l y to the material of the 32 o f f i c i a l "veritable records". Non-official sources, i n the category of "miscellaneous histories" (tsa-shih) and anecdotes (hslao-shuoP^ had been destroyed i n the Huang Ch'ao rebellions (874-884)-^'' and had not yet been replaced when the CTS was compiled. On the other hand, the compilers of the HTS and the TCTC. l i v i n g i n an age of relative s t a b i l i t y , had available many restored sources, a great amount of them non-official i n nature. Using the TCTC K'ao-l and the Sung bibliographies, 13 we are able to obtain crucial information about the nature and content of these non-official sources, most of which are not extant (see Appendix I). While dealing with the sources of the Wen-tsung shih-lu. we earlier described the i n i t i a l unfavourable portrayal of the Li Hsun faction that resulted from the pressures of the eunuchs on history writing. The compilers of the standard works were in particular conscious of the didactic import of historiography. Feeling no sympathy for the Li Hsiin faction's unorthodox and bold political methods, they not only took over from the Wen-tsung shih-lu the in-i t i a l portrayal of the faction as unscrupulous scoundrels, but they even stereotyped and standardized the Li Hsiin faction as the prime negative example of moral and political behaviour. Because Li Hsiin and Cheng Chu had the most unorthodox political careers, they are singled out by a l l three standard works to be the key figures of the faction. Accordingly they are given the bulk of the blame for the faction's bold political maneuvers. On the other hand, the role of respectable officials such as Wang Yai and Chia Su has been downplayed, to the extent that their participation in the faction is not easily recognized. However, that these men received some amount of blame from the Sung historiographers, along with Li Hsun and Cheng Chu, is evident in the fact that the bio-graphies of the faction members, including those of Wang Yai and Chia Su, are grouped into one biography chapter in the two T'ang-shu. In a l l three standard works, the negative appraisals of the Li Hsun faction members are generally consistent, despite the availability of supplementary non-official sources to the HTS and the TCTC. We can ascribe this consistency partly to the absence of favourable material Ik 35 i n the supplementary sources , and partly to the historiographers* reluctance to use any favourable material to upset or contradict their stereotyped negative appraisal. Indeed, we have an example of the latter. The s t i l l extant document, "an act of grace" promulgated i n 901» absolves i n ex p l i c i t terms the g u i l t of the L i Hsun faction members . 36 and their families. I t also declares that the L i Hsun faction was merely executing imperial orders i n the Sweet Dew Incident. This decree, however, has not been taken into account by the Sung historiographers i n their censure of the L i Hsun faction. Within the standard works themselves, we find material which conflicts with the negative appraisal. For example, L i Hsiin i s denounced as traitorous at the end of the account, but elsewhere i n the standard account i t i s admitted that he was only co-operating with the emperor Wen-tsung at a time that everyone i n the empire, including respectable bureaucrats, was confident that L i Hsiin 37 could bring peace to the world. We can understand this conflicting evidence once we realize that the accounts themselves were usually written by two categories of history o f f i c i a l s with different functions. The minor history o f f i c i a l s wrote the narrative of the event from the primary records, while the chief compiler, or supervisor of the standard works, being especially concerned about the didactic import of historio-graphy, wrote the appraisal section (tsan;) appended at the end of the narrative. In the appraisals themselves, there i s a slight variance In the degree of denunciation of the L i Hsun faction. The CTS seems to exercise the mildest degree, while the HTS indicates the harshest blame. We stated earlier that the HTS sometimes accepts non-official material uncritically, while the TGTG indicates more c r i t i c a l judgment. 15 It would seem that the HTS drew upon unfavourable additional sources with the effect of strengthening the negative image of the Li Hsun faction members. From what l i t t l e we know from the TCTC K'ao-i about the additional sources listed in Appendix I, i t would seem that they do not necessarily contain material favourable to the Li Hsiin faction members. Even i f these works were s t i l l extant, i t would not necessarily mean that we would have sources to support a favourable re-appraisal of the event. A favourable re-appraisal, however, is not the purpose of this study, although i t may be the outcome. The purpose of inquiring into the sources of the standard works on the Li Hsun faction and accounting for consistencies and discrepancies amongst these works is only to equip ourselves with a more criti c a l approach to their accounts and appraisals. 16 CHAPTER TWO. THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF WEN-TSUNG'S REIGN During L i Hsun's ri s e to power, he announced to the emperor Wen-tsung his faction's secret "strategy of peace" (T'ai-p'ing chih- ts'e). They wished to " f i r s t slaughter the eunuchs, recover the Ho-huang region, drive back the barbarians, and to reassert central control over the various military provinces i n Ho-pei."* We observe i n this strategy three targetsi 1) encroachments by the border tribes, 2) recalcitrancy in the Northeast, and 3)eunuch menace in the p o l i t i c a l arena, A fourth objective, not expressed above but which constituted one of the L i Hsun faction's main concerns when they came to power, was factionalism in the central bureaucracy i n Ch'ang-an, In this chapter we shal l discuss these four p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s with respect to their development i n the early part of Wen-tsung*s reign, prior to the a r r i v a l of the L i Hsun faction at the court of Ch'ang-an, Let us f i r s t look b r i e f l y at the situation of post-rebellion T'ang vis-a-vis i t s border tribes 1 the Uighur i n the north, the T'u-fan (Tibetans) i n the west, and the Nan-chao in the southwest. Of these three, the Uighur tribes had been the frie n d l i e s t neighbours to the T'ang dynasty. During the An-Shih rebellions, they had assisted the central government i n the recovery of the T'ang capitals. This service, however, bound post-rebellion T'ang to an unequal treaty of "peace through marriage terms" (ho-oh'in) and "peace through trade terms" (ho-shih). Under the terms of the f i r s t part of the agreement, 3 T'ang married princesses to Uighur dignitaries. To the advantage of the T'ang dynasty, the marriage bond established a general peace and an alliance with the Uighur which acted as a deterrent to encroachments from other border tribes, particularly the T'u-fan, The second part 1? of the agreement, however, caused tremendous strains to the state treasury, then already drained by the expensive punitive campaigns against the An-Shih forces. The arrangement made I t mandatory for the central government to buy, at exorbitant prices i n s i l k , a l l the horses the Uighur sent every year, even though most of these horses arrived in a sickly and unusable state. Throughout the post-rebellion period, as long as the marriage and "horse-trade" transactions were maintained, Ghinese-Uighur relations remained generally stable. Toward the end of Wen-tsung*s reign, a culmination of natural disasters, Internal chaos and external invasions by the Kirghiz began to weaken the Uighur tribes, u n t i l they were f i n a l l y driven northward in Wu-tsung's reign (840-846),-' In general, the foreign policy of post-rebellion T'ang was orientated towards alliance with the Uighur. to re s i s t the T'u-fan on the western borders.^ While the Uighur proved to be the frien d l i e s t border tribe, the T'u-fan showed themselves to be the most troublesome external enemy to the T'ang dynasty. The Uighur, a nomadic tribe, were interested only i n T'ang material wealth, but the T'u-fan coveted both T'ang territory and i t s material goods. During the An-Shih rebellions, when a l l the T'ang garrisons had been recalled to the capitals for their defence, the T'u-fan took the opportunity to occupy the entire region of Ho-huang (modern day Kansu, northern Ch'ing-hai and eastern Sinkiang). Apart from creating profound embarrassment to the T'ang empire, the T'u-fan occupation of this strategic region exposed the capital of Ch'ang-an. Furthermore, annual attacks of the northwest frontiers by the T'u-fan made f u t i l e any attempts to re-assert control over the region. By the f i r s t part of Wen-tsung's reign, the recovery of Ho-huang was s t i l l a topic of heated debate in the court, and 18 frequently aggravated factional strife in the central bureaucracy. In one instance, the T'u-fan commander of Wel-chou, a city of strategic Importance, surrendered to T'ang authorities in 83I. By the terms of a peace treaty previously signed with the T'u-fan, the surrender could not be accepted. Despite the counsel of Li Te-yii (Id faction) to take over Wel-chou immediately and from there launch an attack against the T'u-fan, the policy of "indulgence" (ku-hsl) advocated by his political rival, Niu Seng-ju (Niu faction), was adopted. Niu Seng-ju's counsel proved fallible and the T'ang government lost a crucial opportunity to regain lost territory. A few years later, when Li Hsun came to power, he expressed as his priority in foreign policy the recovery of Ho-huang. However, plans were not even drafted towards this objective when his faction suffered total annihilation in late 835. To the advantage of the T'ang dynasty, however, the T'u-fan themsaves had been disintegrating since the second reign period of Wen-tsung (K'al-ch'eng. 836-840). In 848, during Hsuan-tsung's reign, a combination of natural disasters and internal chaos brought the T'u-fan tribes to a fate similar to that 9 of the Uighur. Just when the Uighur and the T'u-fan were suffering internal disintegration, another neighbour on the southwestern borders was on the rise to power. This was the Nan-chao, who began attacking T'ang 10 territory during the f i r s t part of Wen-tsung * s reign. Nan-chao aggression became a real menace to the T'ang government after 859 and, for this reason, i t was partly responsible for the final eclipse of the T'ang dynasty. Next, let us deal with the problem of provincial militarism in post-rebellion T'ang. Although the An-Shih forces in Ho-pel were 19 finally quelled, the whole northeast region could not again be brought 12 under central control in the T'ang dynasty. The semi-autonomy of these provinces (fan-chen). Wei-po, Yu-chou and Gh'eng-te, meant that the T'ang central government had no effective say in local succession and received no provincial taxes from them. Obviously, the situation undermined the credibility of central authority In Ch'ang-an. Moreover, these semi-autonomous provinces served as moral and physical support for rebellious military governors elsewhere in the empire. Through costly campaigns, the Yuan-ho Restoration under Hsien-'tsung (805-820) achieved a consider-able degree of stability with the provinces. Even so, in 815, two daring military governors s t i l l successfully engineered the assass-1' ination of Wu Yuan-heng, then a chief minister in the court of Ch*ang--an. " When Wen-tsung ascended to the throne in 827, a succession dispute in-volving the military governor of Heng-hai (Honan), Li T'ung-chieh, 14 culminated in a direct confrontation with central forces. The rebel-lion of Li T'ung-chieh took three years to crush. In this disruption, i t was evident even at the time that the support of the Ho-pei military governors enabled Li T'ung-chieh to hold on for a longer period than otherwise would have been possible. About the same time, another in-s J • i 1 cident of provincial recalcitrancy manifested itself in An-nan,(Vietnam)." There, the protector-general, Han Yueh (a participant in the Sweet Dew Incident), was evicted by the local forces. Two years later, Li Chiang, a respectable central government official, was murdered in a local mutiny 16 in Shan-nan (Szuchuan), These events were indicative of the urgency to resolve the precarious balance of central and provincial powers, specifically that which existed in the northeastern Ho-pei provinces. Such a resolution was one of Li Hsun's objectives, but again, the faction 20 collapsed "before i t had the opportunity to deal with this issue. In the face of an external threat posed by the bordering tribes on the one hand, and an internal one manifested by rebellious military governors on the other, a strong unanimous court i n Ch'ang-an was necessary i f these problems were to be dealt with. In Wen-tsung's reign, however, the deliberation process and regular functions of the court were made incompetent and confused by the conspicuous presence of eunuch interference i n the Inner Court and factional s t r i f e i n the Outer. These two p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s w i l l be examined i n detail, since they together constituted the basic p o l i t i c a l setting for the a c t i v i t i e s of the L i Hsun faction. In pre-modern Chinese history, no dynasty appears to have been free of the disruptive impact of eunuchs i n po l i t i c s . T'ang eunuchs are generally recognized to have been the most threatening to the survival 17 of the p o l i t i c a l system and, i n effect, the dynasty It s e l f . ' Despite the paucity of primary sources on eunuch a f f a i r s , recent scholarship has nevertheless succeeded i n unravelling certain problems of the hi s t o r i c a l development and institutional foundations of eunuch power 18 in the T'ang dynasty. We sh a l l f i r s t examine the several areas of eunuch involvement up to the reign of Wen-tsung, and then trace Wen-tsung *s experience with his court eunuchs prior to the a r r i v a l of the L i Hsun faction to the p o l i t i c a l arena. The T'ang eunuchs were chiefly recruited from southern China, and originally served only as domestic servants i n the inner quarters 19 of the court. The foundations for eunuch power were gradually l a i d from the f i r s t century of T'ang rule (618-705), but the a c t i v i t i e s of the eunuchs up to the reign of Hsuan-tsung (712-756) were largely 21 restricted to personal attendance and companionship to princes and emperors and to routine management of inner palace affairs and the 20 imperial harem. In Hsuan-tsung's reign, opportunities for intense political participation were f i r s t available to and utilized by the legendized eunuch personality, Kao Li-shih, Later, the disintegrative forces of the An-Shih rebellions created further institutional gains 21 for the court eunuchs. By the year 820, of the court eunuchs^serv-ing in the department of Inner Attendance (nei-shih sheng) , 4,618 were holding official ranks. Out of this number, 1,698 were conferred 22 with ranks of third degree and above. By the time Wen-tsung ascended to the throne, eunuch power and Influence were strongly f e l t in milita-ry, economic, religious and political affairs, including the imperial succession issue. In the T'ang imperial city of Ch'ang-an, there existed two sep-arate military forces: the Guards (wei) or the Southern Armies, and the Palace Armies (chln-chun) or the Northern Armies.^ The Guards Included the left and right wings of the Tso-yu, Hsiao. Wu, Wei, Llng- ch'un. and later, the Chln-wu (which the Li Hsun faction used in the coup), the Chien-men. and the Ch'len-nlu. The Palace Armies were composed of the left and right wings of the Yu-lin. Lung-wu. Shen-wu. and later, the Shen-ts'e. Originally, the roles of the Northern and Southern Armies did not differ in providing defense for the emperor. After the disappearance of the militia (fu-ping) system In the eighth century, both military forces were recruited from mercenaries. However, while the Guards gradually diminished in military effectiveness, with some armies retaining only ceremonial roles during court audiences with the emperor, the Palace Armies expanded in military strength and signl-22 ficance. By the end of Hsuan-tsung's reign (712-756) the eunuchs had managed to obtain control of this superior military force. The Shen-ts'e had originally been a northwest frontier garrison force, which in 763 transferred operations to Ch'ang-an under the man-24 agement of eunuchs. In 786 i t was transformed into a regular palace army charged with the defence of the emperor. In the tradition of the other armies at the capital, i t was also divided into the left and right wings. Except for the period 770-783, the Shen ts'e Armies were controlled by two commanding eunuch generals (chung-wei). one of the Left and one of the Right. This control of the Shen-ts'e Armies proved to be the most solid bulwark of eunuch power in post-rebellion T'ang. Until 810, the Shen-ts'e Armies eclipsed the other palace armies on the basis of professionalism in leadership, discipline, combat strenth and organization. In recruitment, training and ex-pansion, the Shen-ts'e Armies received enormous imperial patronage. It was thus no wonder that these armies represented the most important support for the throne in quelling internal and external disruptions 25 between 786-810. J However, after 810, the corruption and arrogance of the Shen-ts'e Armies rendered them incompetent in terms of meeting external and even internal challenges. Nevertheless, in court politics and intrigues, the Shen-ts'e Armies continued to exert their influence until the end of the dynasty. From the rise to predominance until the final destruction of the powers of the eunuchs, several attempts to curb the power of the eunuchs failed due to the unsuccessful uprooting 26 of the control of the eunuchs over the Shen-ts'e Armies. Apart from actually commanding the Palace Armies, the eunuchs in post-rebellion T'ang were also put in charge of the storage of military 23 27 supplies. ' The eunuchs could thereby acquire detailed knowledge of any military campaign and at the same time put away weapons for their own palace intrigues. Another aspect of the military power of the eunuchs was its control of transportation facilities1 the super-vision of the rearing of horses and the administration of postal 29 routes. These were two indirect methods which could facilitate considerably the eunuchs' observation and influence of military activities. The third military base of eunuch strength was the practice of appointing eunuchs out of the capital as army supervisors (chien-chun). Under this system, eunuchs responsible to the emperor alone were attached to military governors throughout the empire. Through such direct contact with military governors, the eunuchs had the opportunity to enrich themselves by receiving bribes from the provincial authorities. They could also acquire practical military experience and enlist the support of the military governors for their own intrigues in Ch'ang-an. In summary, by means of control in the military sphere, the eunuchs were in a position to diminish drastically the military responsibilities and authority of the Ministry of War (plng-pu). which was under the control of the central bureaucracy. Next, let us look briefly at the eunuchs * economic base of power. In the T'ang central administration, the emperor's funds were separate from state revenues. It was in Hsuan-tsung's reign (712-756) that the emperor's own treasury became enriched at the ex-pense of the state treasury. From Su-tsung's reign (756-762) on, i t was evident that the eunuchs had gained complete control of the emperor's private treasury. It was from this base of control that 2k the eunuchs were able to directly influence the emperor to their own advantage. Another aspect of the economic power of the eunuchs lay in the system of palace marketing (kung-shih). by which the eunuchs were responsible for selecting foods for the palaces at low prices from local markets, cheating the merchants and farmers while enriching themselves. In fact, the eunuchs accumulated so much capital that many bought villas and patronized their own favourites, as in the case of the eunuch Wang Shou-ch'eng, who patronized Cheng Chu. The eunuchs were also put in charge of the construction of palace works, through which they received handsome sums of money from the emperor. From this economic basis of control, then, the eunuchs were able to exert their influence on a great number of people, both inside and outside the court of Ch'ang-an, In religious matters, the eunuchs also proved to be influential. Serving as commissioners of Good Works (kung-te shih) in the two capitals, the eunuchs were charged with the supervision of the Buddhist and Taoist faiths, as well as the management of foreign monks in the 30 empire. Most eunuchs were of the Buddhist religion, a consoling faith they adopted to ease the emotional pain over their physical mutilation. Through their generous donations to the Buddhist clergy and their own control of religion in the capitals, the eunuchs again undermined the central bureaucracy, which administered an equivalent bureau for religious matters, the Ministry of Rites (li-pu). At this point, we arrive at a discussion of eunuch power in the political domain. In the f i r s t part of the T'ang dynasty, the practice of sending out eunuchs envoys for political missions f i r s t set the stage for eunuch participation in the political system. The political 25 influence of the eunuchs was institutionalized by Tai-tsung's reign (763-779) with the establishment of the Shu-mi Council, a non-official 31 organ of advisers completely staffed by eunuchs in the court.^ The functions of the Shu-mi Council included acting as the emperor's personal secretariat, circulating and transmitting memorials from the central bureaucracy and imperial edicts from the emperor to his subjects. At the head of the Shu-mi Council, which had no offices for administration, were two councillors (shu-ml shih) who were in a position to forge imperial edicts and falsify memorials to their own advantage. By the reign of Wen-tsung, the Shu-mi councillors even participated in political deliberations at an equal footing with the chief ministers from the • central bureaucracy and the scholars from the Han-lin Academy. The two Shu-mi councillors and the two Shen-ts'e generals were the most powerful court eunuchs in late T'ang. With a firm hold secured in the military, economic and political domains of the Ch'ang-an court, the extent of eunuch power was manifested 32 most apparently in Imperial succession. Even before the eunuchs had begun to usurp the imperial prerogatives, the T'ang throne had never been secure. As early as Hsuan-tsung's reign (712-756), eunuch inter-ference in imperial succession was already evident in the unique relationship between the eunuch Kao Li-shih and the emperor Hsuan-tsung. In 805, eunuch activities began to thrust forward in an open manner, forcing the emperor Shun-tsung to abdicate, while enthroning his son, Hsien-tsung. From Hsien-tsung on, a l l other T'ang emperors except Ching-tsung were set" on the throne by the eunuchs. To complicate the situation, the Shen-ts'e generals and the Shu-mi councillors often supported different candidates for the throne. The decisions of the 26 33 Shen-ts'e generals, however, always prevailed in the end. This outcome of succession struggles without doubt indicates the greater strength of the Shen-ts'e generals in comparison to that of the Shu-mi councillors. In 820, Hsien-tsung was assassinated by the eunuchs even though they had f i r s t enthroned him. In this incident the powerful eunuchs, Gh'en Hung-chih and Wang Shou-ch'eng, who had actually engineered the assassination, merely killed some minor eunuchs in order to hide their guilt. These two eunuchs then set up Mu-tsung (821-825). The successor to Mu-tsung, Ghing-tsung (825-827), also met with sudden death. Even at the time, i t was believed without a doubt that Hsien-tsung's assassins were again behind this incident. These two assassinations had occurred only within six years of each other, but the assassins, referred to as the "Ytian-ho rebel clique" (Yuan-ho nl-tang) could not bef openly accused of their crime. In the situation where the "eunuchs became increasingly arbitrary, securing in their palms the power of setting up emperors, and issuing forth power from the emperor's right,""^ Wen-tsung's apprehensive feelings and his personality combined to aggravate the tensions of his reign. The standard histories credit Wen-tsung with l i t t l e will-power, character and decisiveness. However, i f we examine Wen-tsung*s involvement in an anti-eunuch strategy (manifested in the Special Examination Event of 828, the Sung Shen-hsi Affair of 831 and the Sweet Dew Incident of 835) i t becomes apparent that, contrary to the traditional viewpoint that the essence of his politics was recklessness, Wen-tsung's political moves were experimental but calculated. When Wen-tsung f i r s t came to the throne, he assumed the image of 27 a "virtuous ruler" "by abolishing the excesses which had accompanied the reigns of his predecessors, Mu-tsung and Ching-tsung. These measures included the removal from his palaces of hunting dogs, popular artists, musicians and some three thousand palace women. By 828, the second year of his reign, he was already involved with a confrontation between the court eunuchs and the bureaucrats. This was the special examination incident in which over one hundred candidates responded to Wen-tsung*s request for specific directives and guidelines to his reign. Liu Fen, a recent graduate of the literary (chin-shih) degree, submitted an eloquent paper which fiercely attacked the court eunuchs in the following manners CI feel that] what your majesty should worry about is that» the palaces are about to overturn, the state is about to enter a precarious phase, the empire Is about to topple, and that the country is about to f a l l into chaos...why must you allow the five or six favourite t eunuchs} to control the great administration of the empire, such that on the outside they monopolize your mandate and that on the inside they usurp your prerogatives... Of your various subjects none dares to point out the court eunuchs' crimes, and the Son of Heaven himself could not control their minds...The court eunuchs usurp the authority of the imperial succession. They entrapped the former emperor tChing-tsungl such that the end of his reign could not be set straight} thus, [when the throne came to youj the beginning of your reign could not be properly established,,.If your majesty could actually take away the state authority [from the eunuchs] and return i t to the chief ministers, and bring back military power to the generals, then there is nowhere that your mind does not reach, and nowhere that your conduct does not bring trust in..,3o Both the court officials and the candidates themselves considered Liu Fen's reply to be the most brilliant, yet i t did not pass. It was believed that because the paper launched a bold attack upon the eunuchs, the examination officials, Feng Su and Chia Su (a participant in the Sweet Dew Incident), dared not risk eunuch retaliation.^ Consequently Liu Fen's political career suffered a setback, and he 28 died later in obscure employment. Wen-tsung's involvement in this event has been ignored in the standard histories. We know that i t was Wen-tsung himself who designated and personally supervised the special examination. The timing of the examination in the second year of his reign suggests that Wen-tsung's motive may well have been to test the atmosphere of his central bureaucracy as well as the response of his court eunuchs, and on that basis to orientate his reign. The fact that Liu Fen's reply did not pass, and that there were no strong protests from the central bureaucracy on that decision, doubtlessly Indicated to Wen-tsung that he could not depend upon his ministers to inititate an anti-eunuch stand. That he did not interfere and reverse the decision of the examiners suggests further that he was not totally rash in his politics, but knew when to stop, Liu Fen's paper did not bring him honour at the time, but i t 3fi was widely circulated within the central bureaucracy. The audacious spirit with which he attacked the eunuchs did Indeed Influence both Wen-tsung and the 'sweet dew' plotters seven years later. Examining the Liu Fen paper, we find that at least Wen-tsung and Li Hsun were familiar with its allusions. During Li Hsun's rise to power the emperor had deliberately brought up an anti-eunuch allusion in the Spring and Autumn Annals (Ch'un-chlu) at which Li Hsiin quickly offered the 39 * appropriate explanation drawn from Liu Fen's paper. Shu Yiian-yu also appeared to have been affected by the examination reply. When he was about to be executed for his Involvement in the sweet dew coup of late 835, he proudly compared himself to the fate of Gh'ao Gh'uo and 40 Chang Hua, respected ministers who had wrongfully been treated. Liu F,en had also compared himself to these individuals in his examination 29 paper. As for Chia Su, i t could well have been that, as an examiner at the time, under the fear of eunuch retaliation, he did not dare take a radical stand and pass Liu Fen. Later, however, urged on by his guilt in Liu Fen's disgrace and the worsening eunuch menace in the court, he seemed to have decided to join Li Hsun and Shu Yuan-yu in their anti-eunuch stands. The Liu Fen incident indicates Wen-tsung's f i r s t and indirect Involvement In anti-eunuch activities. Two years later, the emperor actually attempted a more direct confrontation with his court eunuchs. 41 This experiment precipitated the tragic Sung Shen-hsi Affair. Sung Shen-hsi had been a Han-lin scholar whom Wen-tsung promoted to chief minister on the basis of his proven loyalty and reliability, for the purpose of devising an anti-eunuch strategy. Half a year after he became chief minister, the incident passed through a strange phase. The standard works t e l l us that soon Sung Shen-hsi related his anti-eunuch plans to Wang Fan, who leaked thejii- out to Chens Chu a n d the eunuch 42 Wang Shou-ch'eng, The latter two then prepared for a counter-attack, and concocted the story that Sung Shen-hsi had attempted to betray the present emperor and to set up Wen-tsung*s brother as emperor. The standard works further state that Wen-tsung's innate gullibility led him to believe in the accusation against Sung Shen-hsi, and accordingly allowed Wang Shou-ch'eng to exterminate the clan relations of Sung Shen-hsi. It was due to the protests of an upright eunuch Ma Ts'un-liang and concerted appeals from the central bureaucracy that Sung Shen-hsi's own l i f e was spared. However, he soon died in his place of exile. For several years afterwards, the punishment of Sung Shen-hsi was considered grossly unjust. After his death, there were continuous years of drought 30 and locust epidemics, thought to be an expression of heaven's dis-43 pleasure at the injustices of men. The narration of this incident in the standard works again leaves the role played by Wen-tsung unclear. The gullibility of the emperor does not adequately explain why he believed without a doubt, the alleged treachery of Sung Shen-hsi (whom he trusted) which was concocted by the eunuch Wang Shou-ch'eng (whom he distrusted and feared). In the Liu Fen incident we saw that Wen-tsung hid himself in the background as soon as i t was evident that there did not exist daring initiatives for an anti-eunuch confrontation in his bureaucracy. It seems that Wen-tsung again knew when to stop as soon as his plans with Sung Shen-hsi were foiled. His maneuver here was a quick cover-up of his part in the entire affair. Accordingly, he acted startled and enraged at the alleged conspiracy of Sung Shen-hsi. Thus, unexpectedly and abruptly, the experiment with Sung Shen-hsi was aborted. From this incident, however, Wen-tsung learned a lesson in future tactics. The key to success in anti-eunuch plans must l i e in dispelling the suspicions of the eunuchs. We can now see why Wang Fan and Cheng Chu, who had proved their loyalty to the eunuchs and thereby would not arouse their sus-picions, were appropriate choices of men for Wen-tsung and Li Hsun to include and manipulate for the execution of anti-eunuch plans, Li Hsun, recommended by the eunuch Wang Shou-ch'eng himself, on that basis alone could win special favour from the emperor without unusual suspicion from the eunuchs. On the other hand, the emperor most likely had in mind to employ or promote through these men other individuals of erudite learning (Shu Yuan-yu) and of political skills and experience (Wang Yai and Chla Su). As with the Liu Fen Incident, the Sung Shen-hsi 3 1 experiment did not result in curbing the power of the eunuchs. How-ever, the two incidents prepared Wen-tsung for a future event of an even more drastic nature, the Sweet Dew Incident of 835, which we shall deal with in Chapter Five. The fourth political reality of Wen-tsung's reign was factionalism in the central bureaucracy. Let us f i r s t distinguish our use of the term "faction" from its related forms "party" and "clique", to refer to alignments in the court of Ch'ang-an in late T'ang. The Chinese equivalent for a l l these terms is tang or tang-p'ai and the act of forming a political alignment is pejoratively called p'eng-tang. The political scientists, Lasswell and Kaplan, are more specific in their use of the term: A faction may be described as a continuing alignment within a decision-making group: a sub-group concurring in a l l decisions relating to a specified interest. The interest may concern expediency only...^ A "faction" is similar to a "party" in that i t operates through formal mechanism, but i t is less permanant an organization. A "clique" is differentiated from a "faction" in being less organized and more personalized, exerting influences through informal mechanisms only. Lasswell and Kaplan identify the "decision-making group" as the "party" in the Western sense. In this respect, their definition of "faction" seems inapplicable to alignments in the T'ang court, as the factions discussed in this study were independent of a larger organization. The political l i f e of the Ch'ang-an court was generally polarized between the Inner and the Outer courts, that is, the "within" and the "without". The former was manifested by eunuch circles, the imperial harem, imperial relatives and other informal channels such as the Han-lin Academy, a l l of which had direct access to the emperor. 32 The latter was represented by the central bureaucracy, which functioned through established governmental procedures. Now, i f we take the liberty to substitute the late T'ang central bureaucracy for the "decision-making group", then the Lasswell/Kaplan definition may be adopted for our purpose. The Li Hsun, Wang. Shu-wen, Nlu and Li groups were a l l alignments in the central bureaucracy during their respective periods of administration, and thus will be referred to as "factions". The eunuchs also aligned themselves, but since they did not assume regular bureaucratic posts, but operated conspiratorially behind the scenes, the term "cliques" then applies to their alignments. A faction could have been formed on the basis of expediency, with or without long-term policies and interest, and i t becomes the "dominant faction" when its authorized executive powers overshadow by far those of opposition factions in the central bureaucracy. In Shun-tsung's reign ( 805 ) the dominant faction was represented by Wang Shu-wen and his supporters. With authority sanctioned by the emperor, the Wang administration was able to bring about some sound political reforms. United h o s t i l i t y from both the opposition officials and the eunuchs, however, soon forced i t to resign. Three years later, factionalism in the central bureaucracy began to be characterized by the infamous Niu 45 and Li factional strife. -' The traditional and s t i l l most commonly accepted view of the development of the Niu and LI factional feud recognized two parties in the strife! the Niu faction headed by Niu Seng-ju and Li Tsung-46 min, and the Li faction, led by Li Te-ytt and his father Li Chi-fk. The feud began in 808 , during the examination scandal involving Li Ghi-fu, chief minister at the time, and the candidates Niu Seng-ju, 33 47 Li Tsung-min and Huang-fu Shin. It seems that in their examination replies the three candidates severely criticized the administration, which was taken as a personal insult by Li Chi-fu, who then held a key position in the government. The enraged Li Chi-fu was believed to have influenced the emperor to demote the candidates as well as their mentors and examiners. Some time later Li Chi-fu was also phased out of the political arena. However, the scandal that developed from a mere examination incident was enough to polarize the political.and social stands of supporters on both sides of the dispute in the central bureaucracy. In 821, another examination scandal deepened the factional strife. Ch'ien Hui, the examiner, was requested by some Li faction members to favour those candidates they recommended. It turned out that the successful candidates were related in one way or another to the Niu faction. An investigation into the case again concluded with the 48 purge of many innocent men. Later, the feud was continued and inten-sified by Li Te-yu, who was determined to redeem the honour that his father had lost in the f i r s t examination scandal. Thus, i t was in the form of examination scandals and other minor events that the factional feud between the Niu and Li leaders and partisans unfolded over forty 49 years, during which time each faction experienced high and low points. ' The Niu faction was at its height of influence during Hsuan-tsung's reign (846-859)i and the Li faction was predominant during Wu-tsung's reign (840-846). It was during Wen-tsung * s time that the struggle was most acute. There exists in modern scholarship another point of view with regards to the development of the Niu and Li factional feud."^ Ts'en Chung-mien's analysis accepts only one dissenting party in the factional 34 feud, the Niu/Li faction led by Niu Seng-ju and Li Tsung-min. In this view, Li Chi-fu and Li Te-yu and their followers were upright men and not likely to form factions. There did not exist a " L i " faction as led by Li Te-yU and his father. The animosities in the central bureaucracy were created and perpetuated by the Niu/Li faction alone. The Sung historiographers, especially Ssu-ma Kuang, were for some reason partial towards the Niu/Li faction members, but hostile against Li Te-yu and Li Chi-fu. This attitude was responsible for a biased narration of events such as the examinations scandals. It was inparticular responsible for the faulty conception of two polarized factions (i.e., the Niu and the Li) in the central bureaucracy. At close scrutiny, the analysis Is fundamentally influenced by the application of traditional pejorative connotations to the term "faction", to the extent of subscribing to the classical Confucian cliche that the superior m a n (ohun-tzu) did not form factions,-** The fact that, regardless of their "integrity" and other laudable points, Li Te-yu, Li Chi-fu and their followers did form and act as a political body against the Niu faction In the central bureaucracy is ignored. If we strip the negative and immoralistic overtone of the term "faction" and use i t in the neutral sense, then Ts'en Chung-mien's argument for a "one faction only" feud loses credibility. For our purposes in this study, we shall instead accept the traditional view that Li Te-yU, Li Chi-fu and their partisans formed the Li faction by virtue of the fact that they constituted a political sub-group In the central bureaucracy, in-' the same way that Niu Seng-ju, Li Tsung-min and their supporters are identified with the Niu faction. Next, dealing with the alignment factors of the Niu and Li factions, 35 we are presented with a more controversial issue than the i n i t i a l development of the factional feud itself. According to the traditional and s t i l l most widely accepted view, the Niu and Li factions were aligned according to social status, geographical origins and the examination category through which the faction members emerged (the Niu through the literary (chln-shlh) examinations, and the Li through the classical (ming-chlng) examinations). This analysis is tremendously weakened by numerous cases of exceptions to the rule, as pointed out by scholars opposed to i t . The same view maintains that the factional feud was a policy struggle, that the Niu faction supported a policy of "peaceful indulgence" (ku-hsi) whereas the Li faction recommended a policy of "using arms" (yung-plng). J With reference to the Yuan-ho period and even extending to the early part of Wen-tsung's reign, this view seems applicable. During the last decade of the factional feud, however, this policy difference no longer appeared responsible for the cleavage of the two factions. From another point of view, Mamoru Tonami asserts that, regardless of a l l the above issues, i t was political power alone eh, that aligned factions.^ According to him, i t was not the difference in policies between the two key political groups (aristocrats and examination bureaucrats), but the unique teacher-disciple relationship in the institution of provincial selection and employment (pl-chao) that exacerbated the course of the factional struggle. There yet remains Ts'en Chung-mien's argument that the feud was one-sided, characterized by a few upright "non-factionalists" involved in a struggle with the self-seeking individuals who belonged to the Niu/Li faction.^ The cause for a l l these varying points of view regarding the political affinities of the two factions is not difficult to find. 36 In fact, i t points to the most serious problem in the study of the Niu and Li factional dispute, the fact that faction members are not clearly identified or labelled with their own faction. The difficulty of identifying faction members may be properly appreciated once we recall that to be labelled "factionalist" was drastically detrimental to one's social and political l i f e during the T'ang dynasty,When one was in fact a supporter and member of the Niu or Li faction, one wouid not admit i t to the slightest degree. One's friends, staff and even a friendly historiographer would also deny any factionalist affiliations. Thus, in trying to assess the political affinities of a faction when even the faction members cannot be clearly identified presents an. extremely frustrating task for the modern scholar. A l l the views presented earlier, which try to focus on the factors of alignment in each of the two factions, are credible to certain extents. For our purpose in this study, let us consider each view to be inclu-sively contributory to the understanding of the problem, rather than pick one exclusively over the others. For forty years in the court of Ch'ang-an, the Niu and Li factional feud unfolded in the form of examination scandals, constant bickering, personality clashes and sometimes policy struggles. Mutual slandering eventually led to changes of government between the Niu and Li factions, and promotions or demotions of c i v i l officials corres-ponding to the fates of their political leaders. The intensity of the struggle was even reflected in the history writing and popular literat-57 ure of the time. The most intense phases of the strife occurred during Wen-tsung*s reign, which witnessed frequent turnovers of administration, CO as can be seen from the following table:-5 37 Year of Reign Faction in Power 827 828 829 830 -832 833 -834 835 836-838 838 -840 non-aligned bureaucrats Li Hsun faction both Li and Niu Li Niu Li Niu Li Indeed, to Wen-tsung, factionalism in his court was a real and pressing priority. Dealing with Ho-pei recalcitrancy would seem to him even 59 easier than eliminating the Niu and Li factional struggle. Factionalist leaders seemed too concerned with their own fate In the struggle to be interested in the problems of the empire. The other officials of the central bureaucracy were merely preoccupied about aligning themselves to the right faction. The polarization of the bureaucracy appeared almost total, and only a few of those who chose non-alignment with the Niu or'Li survived in their political l i f e . ^ To whatever issue that the faction in power said yes, the opposition would advocate no, regardless of the soundness of the decision. One example of the deadlocks of crucial policies that resulted from the polarized bureaucracy is the Wei-chou Affair of 8 3 I with the T'u-fan, as related earlier in this chapter. In order to recruit further support, both factions' members resorted to outside help. Because the eunuchs were in a unique position of power, both the Niu and Li faction leaders befriended the few powerful ones which helped them gain political power.The court eunuchs were already divided amongst themselves by certain differences. The situation in which members of the c i v i l bureaucracy individually sought them out further exacerbated the strained tension of Wen-tsung's reign. Indeed, 38 when Wen-tsung looked around him to solve the crucial problems of the empire, "he saw that his officials were using their emoluments to seek accommodation with the eunuchs, and of these there were none who upheld 62 principles and risked their l i f e . " It was this polarization that caused Wen-tsung to lose confidence In his central bureaucracy, and turn instead to those who dared to be non-partisan in the strife. In 827, he managed to use these officials, but they soon either passed away or disappeared from the political scene. We observed that in 83I he put his hopes in Sung Shen-hsi, a non-aligned scholar in the Han-lin Academy. The incident ended in tragedy when the eunuchs were alerted by Wang Fan, a member of the central bureaucracy who was eager to win special favours from the eunuchs. In 834, Wen-tsung again preferred to turn to the non-aligned men in the Niu and Li factional strife. By putting his faith in Li Hsiin and his men, Wen-tsung sought to solve not only eunuch problems, but also to eliminate the factionalism that had caused his court to lose credibility in the face of provincial aggression and foreign incursions. In the next chapter, we shall have occasion to look at the composition of the Li Hsun faction and also examine the circumstances under which the individuals came to form a political alignment. 39 CHAPTER THREE. THE LI HSUN FACTION - COMPOSITION AND FORMATION Composition of the Li Hsun Faction Because of eunuch interference in history writing and the moralizing tendencies of the Sung historiographers, many facts of the Li Hsiin faction and the Sweet Dew Incident remain unclear. One of these is the exact composition and actual formation of the Li Hsiin alignment, and the degree of its predominace in the court of Ch'ang-an on the eve of its downfall in late 835. We are concerned with who the members of the faction were, and the factors and circumstances which brought them together as a political alignment. In the following pages, we shall reconstruct a composite biography of the faction and trace the formation or alignment process of the faction itself. The Sung historiographers tend to allot f u l l blame for the Sweet Dew Incident to certain individuals, particularly Li Hsiin and Cheng Chu. The other members of the faction appear only vaguely, abruptly and in • scattered spots in the standard accounts. As a result, some are not easily recognized as participants in the incident. Combining-what we know about the non-extant source T'al-ho yeh-shih. the "act of grace" promulgated in 901» and the three standard works, we find that the Li Hsiin faction had a membership of at least seventeen active particpants in the court of Ch'ang-an on the eve of the coup.''" These seventeen men are listed below with some pertinent biographical entries. The resulting table will constitute the basis for the examination of the entire faction, which focuses on the:! social backgrounds and political careers of the faction members. TABLE I Name Place of Origin Family Background Entrance to P o l i t i c s Positions Before Joining L i Hsun Positions a t Eve of Sweet Dew Incident L i Hsun* Lung-hsl Kan-su Shu Tuan-yiP Chiang-chou Huai-nan Wang Yai T'ai-yuan, Ho-tung Chia Su- Ho-nan Cheng Chu Chiang-chou Ho-chung clan grandson of L i Kuei, nephew of L i Feng-ehi, hoth chief ministers In T'ang, from eminent L i lineage of Lung-hsi, which produced 11 chief ministers humble origins chin-shih (823) chin-shih (813) eminent Wang lineage i n T'ai-yuan which pro-duced 13 chief ministers humble or i g i n s , but p o l i t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n , h i s clan also pro-duced one other chief minister humble origins chin-shih (792) p o l i t i c a l e x i l e redactor i n Loyang commissioner of s a l t / i r o n , i n charge of revenues, Hung-wen scholar, vice-pres-ident of Chancellery, chief minister chin-shih (803) medical s k i l l s (816) vice-president of Ministry of Rites, chief minister, Han-l i n scholar vice-president of Censorate, acting v i c e -president of Ministry of Punishment, chief minister •p commissioner of c s a l t , iron/tea monopoly, honor-i f i c ssu-k'ung k ' a i - f u - i , chief minister Chi-hsien scholar mayor of Ch'ang-an, president of Censorate, chief minister vice-president of Ministry of War vic e - m i l i t a r y governor of Chao-i president of Min-i s t r y of Works, president of Cen-sorate, president of Court of Imperial Cheng Chu (continued) Wang Fan' Ch'ang-an humble origins, father Kuan-chung was an official g Kuo Hsing-yu unknown humble origins Lo Li-yen' HsUan-chou, Huai-nan 10 Li Hsiao-pen Lung-hsi, Kan-su Han Yiieh 11 Lang-chou, Shan-nan humble origins, father was an official imperial family humble origins Ku Shih-i 12 Su-chou, humble origins, father Chiang-nan was Han-lin scholar and high official Ch'ien K'o-fu 1 3 Wu-chun, Chiang-nan father and grandfather distinguished officials chin-shih acting president of (810) Ministry of Rites, prefect of Jun-chou, inspecting commis-sioner of Che-hsi chin-shih prefect of Ju-chou (d. unknown) vice-president of Censorate chin-shih (805) chin-shih (c. 810) learning skills (d. unknown) chin-shih (823) vice-president of Court of Agriculture secretary of Ministry of Punishment president of Imperial Treasury inspecting censor chin-shih secretary of Ministry (d, unknown) of Rites Equipage, military governor of Feng-hsiang, Han-lin expositor/ scholar president of Min-istry of Finance, in charge of rev-enues, military governor of T'ai-yuan president of Court of Justice, mil-itary governor of Pin-ning deputy mayor of Ch'ang-an _^ vice-president of Censorate grand general of Chin-wu Guards (Left) auxiliary secre-tary of Water Works, Han-lin scholar acting secretary of Ministry of War, vice military governor of Feng-hsiang Lu Chien-neng Fan-yang, eminent lineage in Ho-pei Fan-yang which produced 116 chin-shih graduates (798-875), father, brothers distinguished Hsiao Ghieh1^ Shan-nan direct descendants of imperial family of Liang dynasty (North and South Dynasty), brother was chief minister 16 Li Ghen-su Lung-hsi, Kan-su 17 Lu Hung-mao ' unknown imperial family humble origins, married sister of Empress dowager Wei Feng unknown humble origins, brother-in-law of Gheng Ghu chin-shih (d. unknown) inspecting censor chin-shih (817) unknown unknown secretary of Honorific Pro-motions, officer in charge of cur-rent affairs at-tached to Gheng Ghu in Feng-hsiang §cting secre-tary of Public Works, inspecting official attached to Gheng Ghu in Feng-hsiang director of Construction general of Chin-Works wu (Left) palace censor ommissioner of the Right general secre-tary to Cheng Chu in Feng-hsiang unknown unknown deputy prefect of Feng-hsiang 43 During the T'ang dynasty, the social status (men-ti) of a bureaucrat was often far more prestigious and significant than his 19 political accomplishments. 7 The social background of a T'ang politic-a l figure had two inter-related components, lineage distinction and the place of origin. When referring to the place of origin, we are not necessarily dealing with the place of birth of the individual, 20 but the /geographical location of the original lineage. Glancing down Column Two of Table I, i t seems clear that the place of origin did not form a basis of alignment in the Li Hsun faction. From the Northwest, we locate Li Hsun, Wang Fan, Li Chen-su and Li Hsiao-pen. From the Northeast we find Wang Yai, Chia Su, Cheng Chu and Lu Chien-neng. Finally, from the South, we identify Shu Yuan-yu, Lo Li-yen, Ku Shih-i, Han Yueh and Hsiao Chieh. The origins of Kuo Hsing-yu, Lu Hung-mao and Wei Feng cannot be traced. Turning to the issue of family background, let us refer to the three general categories of T'ang bureaucrats« the eminent lineages (mlng-tsu). the middle class scholar-official clans (shih-tsu). and the genuinely humble families (han-tsu). The eminent lineages had roots in the ruling class for at least a:.century, and from this category we Isolate LI Hsun, Li Hsiao-pen, Li Chen-su (Lung-hsi Lis), Wang Yai (T'ai-yuan Wangs) and Hsiao Chieh (Liang imperial family of the Northern/ 21 Douthern Dynasties). From the middle class scholar-official clans, which distinguished themselves by producing generations of scholars and of-fici a l s , we find Chia Su, Wang %n, Lo Li-yen, Ku Shih-i, Ch'ien K'o-fu 22 and Lu Chien-neng. Finally, from the genuinely humble stratum, we have those faction members who advanced to political prominence during their own generation through learning or other means. Shu Yuan-yu 44 and Kuo Hsing-yu emerged through literary degrees, Han Yiieh through administrative skills, Cheng Chu through medical skills and Wei Feng 23 and Lu Hung-mao through marriage relations. In social background, the Li Hsiin faction members ranged from eminent lineages to the socially maligned stratum, represented by Cheng Chu, who merely relied on his skills in medicine to gain a position in society and in politics. Social background then did not constitute a common integrating factor in the Li Hsun alignment. Next, dealing with the political careers of the faction members, Column Four of Table I indicates that, despite various social backgrounds and places of origin, a l l except four members were initiated into political l i f e through the most orthodox method of the time, the metro-politan literary (chin-shih) examinations.^ Obtaining the literary degree did not lead to immediate employment In the central bureaucracy in Ch'ang-an;. Rather than remain at the capital waiting indefinitely for an appropriate post, the majority of the Li Hsun faction at f i r s t obtained employment with the provincial authorities, which sought talent andreputation in an official rather than family influence and other 25 factors, J It is interesting to note that Li Hsiin himself, who was quickly employed through the central bureaucracy as assistant instructor in the T'al-hsueh Academy, later preferred to seek employment on the staff of the military governor of Ho-yang, It would seem that occasion-ally patronage through the provincial authorities offered good prospects for subsequent advancement in one's political l i f e . The Sung historiographers denounce the Li Hsun faction particularly for their interest in personal political advancement. To explore this issue, i t would be somewhat impractical to discuss the political careers ^5 of each faction member. We shall instead look at the political posts of the faction members before they joined the alignment with Li Hsun and on the eve of the Sweet Dew Incident. Column Five of Table I records the positions occupied before the individual became involved with the faction, and Column Six indicates the additional posts, transfers, and promotions gained by the eve of the Sweet Dew Incident. The following table is a simplification of the two columns to make the promotions more 26 meaningful and readable. TABLE II Name Before Joining Li Hs'un Rank At Eve of Incident Rank Li Hsiin political exile • none chief minister 3° Shu Yuan-yti redactor 5° chief minister 3° Wang Yai chief minister 3° chief minister ssu-k'ung k;!ai-fu-i 1° Chia Su president of Censorate 3° chief minister 3° Cheng Chu vice military governor of Chao-i 6°? president of a ministry 3° Wang Fan acting president of a ministry 3° president of a ministry 3° Kuo Hsing-yu vice president of Censorate 5° president of a court 3° Lo Ll-yen vice-president of a court 4° deputy mayor of Ch'ang-an 4° Li Hsiao-pen secretary of a ministry 5° vice-president of Censorate 4° Han YUeh president of Imperial Treasury 3° grand-general of Chin-wu Guards 3° Ku Shih-i inspecting censor 8° auxiliary secretary of a ministry 6° Ch'ien K'o-fu secretary of a ministry 5° acting secretary of a ministry 5° Lu Chien-neng inspecting censor 8° secretary of a ministry 5° Hsiao Chieh palace censor 7° acting secretary of a ministry 5° 46 L i Chen-su direct o r of a directorate general of Chin-wu 3° Guards Lu Hung-mao Wei Feng ommissioner 8' ,o general secretary 8°? deputy prefect 4° unknown In t h i s table we observe that, f o r less than ha l f of the f a c t i o n (LI Hsun, Shu Yuan-yu, Cheng Chu, Kuo Hsing-yu, Ku S h i h - i , Lu Chien-neng, Hsiao Chieh and Wei Feng), the promotions a f t e r joining the alignment were s t a r t l i n g , as noted i n a jump of a t l e a s t two degrees. To appreciate more f u l l y these quick promotions, i t should be r e a l i z e d that they were effected i n less than a year. However, the other faction members seem,', to have experienced a more regular rate of promotion. Wang Yai, Chia Su and Wang Fan had the most extensive p o l i t i c a l careers even before they joined the alignment. Wang Yai had nothing much to gain from working with L i Hsun, except f o r an h o n o r i f i c rank to bring him to a f i r s t degree bureaucrat, Chia Su was already a t h i r d degree o f f i c i a l p r i o r to h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the L i Hsun faction. The only additional post he gained was that of a chief ministership, a rather regular promotion i n view of h i s former p o l i t i c a l experience. Wang Fan experienced the most changes i n h i s p o l i t i c a l career,. A f t e r joining the L i Hsiin alignment, he advanced to the pres-idency of the Ministry of Finance from his former position of acting president of the Ministry of Rites. This promotion also does not seem r a d i c a l . These promotions of the L i Hsiin faction members may be viewed through a comparative perspective. In a recent study of the p o l i t i c a l careers of two hundred Important T'ang central bureaucrats, Sun Kuo-tung works out the average lengths of promotional stages i n public ^7 27 office in the central bureaucracy. For example, i t would ordinarily take a political figure 23.6 years from his f i r s t post to arrive at a chief ministership in the period 827-905. Applying the results of Sun Kuo-tung's study to the promotions of the Li Hsun faction members, we obtain the following figures: TABLE III Name From First Post To- Actual Time Sun's Estimates Li Hsiin chief minister 10 years 23.6 years Shu Yuan-yti chief minister 20 years 23.6 years Wang Yai chief minister 22 years (first in 816] 23/6 years ) Ghia Su chief minister 30 years 23.6 years Cheng Chu president of a ministry 17 years 22 years Wang Fan president of a ministry 23 years 22 years Kuo Hsing-yii president of a court 19 years 22 years Lo Li-yen president of a court 28 years 22 years Li Hsiao-pen vice-president of Censorate 23 years 22 years Ku Shih-i auxiliary secretary 10 years 10 years Hsiao Chieh acting secretary 16 years 14.2 years The f i r s t posting date cannot be obtained for some faction members, therefore the above table is somewhat incomplete. However, since we have the dates for the important members of the faction, the general conclusions would not be much affected. Looking at the last two columns of Table III we observe that in most cases, the career periods do correspond quite closely to Sun Kuo-tung's estimated averages, Only in two cases do we note the startingly quick and unorthodox rise to power, Li Hsun rose to chief minister in a mere decade, despite a disastrous setback when he was exiled and stripped of his official privileges, Cheng Chu, who did not even go through the regular examination channels 48 and had no Influential family backing, obtained charge of a ministry in only seventeen years, when the average length of time was twenty-two years for most other bureaucrats. With the cases of Chia Su, Lo Li-yen and Hsiao Chieh, i t even took them unusually longer than normal to obtain their final positions. These results show that the entire Li Hsiin faction did not advance politically as suddenly as insisted upon by the Sung historiographers. In fact, for some members not much profit could be gained from a risky alliance with Li Hsiin, a political exile. The thirst for power and influence could not fully account for the participation of a l l the faction members in the dangerous attempt to crush the powerful court eunuchs. The standard works also accuse, the Li Hsun faction of corruption. We can only find evidence of two members who had unusual wealth accumulations at the time of their death in 835. One was Cheng'Chu, who took bribes from both the Inner and Outer courts. It is no wonder, indeed, that when his residence 29 was raided, an extraordinary amount of wealth was recovered. Cheng Chu had also encouraged the emperor to undertake palace constructions and other projects. Being put in charge of these works, i t is most likely that Cheng Chu also cheated in the expense accounts, thereby further enriching himself. Wang Yai's residence also stored great 30 wealth^ , but, that'does not necessarily mean that i t was acquired through corruption. We note that Wang Yai had a rather successful political career, and came from an eminent lineage. Wang Yai could well have obtained his wealth from honest acquisitions during his political l i f e . The standard works are thus unjustified in accusing the entire Li Hsun faction of corrupt practices on the basis of evidence obtained for the corruption of Cheng Chu alone. 49 Looking a t Column Four of Table I again, we note that most members of the L i Hsun fa c t i o n were conforming p o l i t i c i a n s i n the T'ang dynasty i n the respect that they received a Confucian education and entered p o l i t i c a l l i f e through the l i t e r a r y examinations. When the f a c t i o n members were executed a f t e r t h e i r f i a s c o i n l a t e 835. the m i l i t a r y governor of Chao-i, L i u Ts'ung-chien, provided the sole defence of t h e i r innocence. L iu Ts'ung-chien argued that the L i Hsun facti o n members had been Confucian statesmen and acted only i n the 31 interests of the state. The extant writings of the fa c t i o n members are scanty and therefore not h e l p f u l i n determining the Confucian 32 orientation of the L i Hsun faction. We can f i n d only a small prose work by Lo Li-yen which indicates h i s Confucian attitudes i n government.^ In t h i s work he elaborates on the Confucian theory of government by moral suasion. Let us a t t h i s point, look a t the layout of the L i Hsun fact i o n i n the court of Ch'ang-an ju s t before the Sweet Dew Incident occurred. The f i r s t conspicuous f a c t to note i s that more than ha l f the fact i o n ( L i Hsiin, Shu Yuan-yti, Wang Yai, Chia Su, Cheng Chu, Kuo Hslng-yu, Han Yiieh and LI Chen-su), .either already ranked as t h i r d degree o f f i c i a l s or had just been promoted to that position (see Table I I I ) . This i s of great significance since, i n the T'ang central bureaucracy, t h i r d degree o f f i c i a l s were the act u a l decision-makers, i n charge of 34 chief minister's work, and r u l i n g over various minis t r i e s and courts. Positions above the t h i r d degree were honorific In nature and carried no deliberation powers measurable to those of the t h i r d degree o f f i c i a l s . Although Wang Yai's honorific ranks would bring him up to a f i r s t degree bureaucrat, since he concurrently occupied the position of chief minister, 50 he would s t i l l be functioning as a t h i r d degree o f f i c i a l . In view of the f a c t that on the eve of the Sweet Dew Incident, a l l other 35 important decision-makers had been dismissed from o f f i c e , the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n represented the dominant faction a t the Ch?ang-an court. The sweet dew coup was thus launched when the fa c t i o n exercised l e g a l authority i n the central bureaucracy. This important d e t a i l has not been noted by the standard works when they denounced the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n f o r traitorous behaviour and usurpation of the powers of deliberation. Formation i n Lo-yang Up to t h i s point, we have been analyzing the composition of the seventeen L i Hsiin f a c t i o n members i n the court of Ch'ang-an. We s h a l l next look a t the actual formation of the fact i o n . According to the standard works, L i Hsiin and Cheng Chu were the key figures of the facti o n who, upon meeting with the emperor Wen-tsung through the auspices of the eunuch Wang Shou-ch'eng, immediately recruited o f f i c i a l s to em-bark on t h e i r anti-eunuch course f o r the sole purpose of currying im-p e r i a l favour. In t h i s interpretation, the alignment i s seen to have been formed i n an ad hoc and hasty process i n Ch'ang-an f o r one s p e c i f i c purpose only, to gain imperial favour. However, i f we examine the key personalities of the f a c t i o n c l o s e l y , and trace the circumstances under which they made each other's acquaintance, we f i n d that Cheng Chu was not one of the o r i g i n a l founders and that the o r i g i n a l alignment was formed i n Lo-yang, early i n 833» even before L i Hsiin met with Cheng Chu, Wang Shou-ch'eng and the emperor Wen-tsung. In the reconstruction below, we s h a l l focus our attention on the a c t i v i t i e s of L i Hsun, the leader of the fac t i o n , and the c r u c i a l meetings amongst the four key figures of the faction , L i Hsiin, Shu Yuan-yu, Wang Yai and Chia Su. 51 L i Hsun, who was o r i g i n a l l y named L i Chung-yen, was the youngest member of the f a c t i o n , while Wang Yai was already past seventy when he was executed i n 835. The standard works a l l remark upon L i Hsun's Impressive looks and w e l l - b u i l t physique, and above a l l h i s resource-fulness i n devious a c t i v i t i e s , and h i s a b i l i t y to guess other people's 36 mind and intent. A f t e r he obtained h i s l i t e r a r y degree, he served b r i e f l y i n the T'ai-hsueh Academy and on the s t a f f of the m i l i t a r y governor of Ho-yang. Soon afterwards, his conniving nature was supposed 37 to have manifested i t s e l f i n the Wu Chao A f f a i r . This was a development of the growing animosities between L i Ch'eng and the uncle of L i Hsiin, L i Feng-chi, who had been a chief minister. In 825, Wu Chao, a L i f a c t i o n partisan, was informed that L i Feng-chi, of the Niu f a c t i o n , had antagonistically Interfered with L i Ch'eng's attempts to re-employ him. In a fury, Wu Chao threatened to assassinate L i Feng-chi. When the case was brought to t r i a l , L i Hsiin secretly ordered a witness to f a l s e l y implicate L i Ch'eng i n the murder attempt. The witness refused to l i e , and f o r h i s criminal behaviour, L i Hsiin was stripped of h i s o f f i c i a l p r i v i leges (ch'u-ming) and ex i l e d to Hsiang-ohou, a desolate place i n present day Kwangsi. This was the incident which served to tarnish L i Hsun's public image f o r l i f e . I t also provided ready evidence for the basic "unscrupulous nature" that both h i s contemporaries i n the court of Ch'ang-an and the Sung historiographers tagged onto h i s name. LI Hsiin was apparently pardoned i n 827, following the inauguration 39 of Wen-tsung's reign. ' From the standard works, we know about his mourning f o r his mother i n 833 i n Lo-yang. I t i s , however, important to account f o r h i s a c t i v i t i e s between 828-832, allowing him one year to get back to Ch'ang-an or Lo-yang a f t e r h i s amnesty. In the absence of 52 alternative sources which c©uld shed light on the issue, i t seems justifiable to accept the non-extant work, K'ai-ch'eng chi-shih's Re-statement, as quoted by the TCTG K'ao-i. It states that when Li Hsun returned from his exile, because of his political disgrace, he could not find employment even on the staff of his uncle Li Feng-chi, who had been responsible for his exile. The standard works a l l men-tion Li Hsun's expertise in expounding the commentaries of the Confu-cian classics, particularly the Book of Change (i-ching). It was Li Hsun's knowledge of these works that later so immensely impressed the emperor Wen-tsung. It may not be too tenuous for us to suppose that during these listless years of unemployment and political disgrace, Li Hsun might have devoted himself to a serious study of the classics. We are further tempted to speculate whether in fact any Confucian classic, or specifically the Book of Change , had provided Li Hsun with the ideological conception of the role of himself and the faction he was to form and the motivation for the political course the faction later embarked upon. We can find only one reference to the Spring and Au-41 tumn Annals which appeared to have inspired both Li Hsiin and the emperor. This small piece of evidence is unfortunately inadequate for us to draw a conclusive answer to the question posed above. From 832-834 Li Hsiin apparently settled in Lo-yang to observe the mourning period for his mother. It seems likely that i t was during this period that he met the other key personalities of the faction that he was to form and lead. In 832, Shu Yuan-yii was demoted from the Minis-try of Punishment in Ch'ang-an to assume the post of redactor "with special duty.in Lo-yang" (fen-ssu Tung-tu). The demotion came as a result of his repeated efforts to seek fuller responsibilities and recognition of 53 h i s talents and s k i l l s . Because of h i s humble background and the lack of an i n f l u e n t i a l patron i n Ch'ang-an, despite h i s spectacular success i n l o c a l and metropolitan examinations, I t took him eighteen years to ' acquire the post of a u x i l i a r y secretary (s i x t h degree)**2 while i t took others only ten years. From his writings one can indeed observe an extremely self-confident, self-righteous and proud personality, who compared himself to the celebrated commoners elevated to prestigious 43 positions on the basis of special talents alone, ^ From a memorial to the emperor, we note that early i n his p o l i t i c a l l i f e , he was concerned about corrupt practices i n the provinces, and considered i t his duty 44 to advise and counsel the top whenever he saw f i t . I t i s l i k e l y that with t h i s kind of personality, Shu Yuan-yii did not a t t r a c t many friends at the c a p i t a l , and thus did not receive much help with h i s p o l i t i c a l career. When he met L i Hsiin i n Lo-yang a t h i s demoted post, t h e i r common miserable experience i n the Ch'ang-an p o l i t i c a l arena must have 45 drawn them close to each other. While they were together, they may well have spent much time discussing current p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s i n the context of h i s t o r i c a l p a r a l l e l s extracted from the Confucian c l a s s i c s 46 which were f a m i l i a r to both. While L i Hsiin and Shu Yuan-yii were commiserating with each other over t h e i r b i t t e r p o l i t i c a l experience, the other two key figures of the fac t i o n , Wang Yai and Chia Su, were serving i n Ch'ang-an, The question arises as to when and where the meeting amongst the four would have taken place. I t i s u n l i k e l y that i t occurred i n Ch'ang-an as implied i n the standard works. Gatherings of any s o c i a l groups i n the c a p i t a l were regarded with intense suspicion by both the emperor and the court eunuchs, not to mention a meeting between respectable o f f i c i a l s and a p o l i t i c a l 54 e x i l e such as L i Hsun. Evidence points to the meeting as having taken place near Lo-yang'in the early part of 833• For Wang Yai and Chia Su to come down to Lo-yang during t h e i r vacations or on o f f i c i a l duties could not have been a problem, since even f o r l e i s u r e l y t r a v e l l e r s , 4? the journey from Ch'ang-an to Lo-yang took only ten days. We also know that Wang Yai went to L©-yang often, since he had a v i l l a there, with 48 forest groves and running streams surrounding i t . To write about about the L i Hsun f a c t i o n immediately a f t e r the disaster was a great r i s k , due to the thorough scrutiny of the triumphant eunuchs. However, a "strangeand marvellous" t a l e (chuan-ch"l hslao-shuo). written by L i Mei soon a f t e r the disaster, provides evidence that the meeting amongst the four key L i Hsun fa c t i o n members occurred near Lo-yang, i n Shou-an county. L i Mei appears to have been a d i s c i p l e of Shu Yiian-yu while he was i n Lo-yang. In guarded language, L i Mei writes about the ghosts of L i Hsun, Shu Yuan-yii, Wang Yai and Chia Su renewing t h e i r l e i s u r e l y travels near Lo-yang, not f a r from the v i l l a of Wang Yai. In the story, each ghost i n turn composes poems to express t h e i r d i s t r e s s and sorrow f o r being wrongfully and c r u e l l y butchered upon t h e i r defeat i n the sweet dew coup.-"^ I t would seem very l i k e l y that i n order to disarm p o l i t i c a l suspicion, under the pretext of l e i s u r e l y t r a v e l s , these four men had been planning t h e i r p o l i t i c a l strategy and were already r e c r u i t i n g i n Lo-yang. One such r e c r u i t was Kuo Hsing-yu, whom we have discussed •51 e a r l i e r with the other f a c t i o n members. Another was Lu Chien-neng, who may have stayed i n his family's v i l l a which was close to that 52 of Wang Yai near the Yin River, Lu T'ung, the poet, was another recruit and his ghost also appears i n L i Mei's story. Lu T'ung had been a longtime recluse i n Lo-yang, and did not even leave h i s house f o r food. 55 A monk from a nearby monastery brought him r i c e every day. The fa c t that on the night before the Sweet Dew Incident, Lu T'ung was staying i n Wang Yai's residence i n Ch'ang-an can only be accounted f o r by his active and secret p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the a f f a i r from the very beginning. Tsung-mi, the Buddhist monk and f i f t h patriarch of the Hua-yen school. , also seems to have made h i s acquaintance with LI Hsun and the other figures a t t h i s time, when he paid a v i s i t to Lo-yang i n 55 832 -833 . Tsung-mi attempted to hide L i Hsiin i n his monastery a f t e r the sweet dew coup f a i l e d . When arrested by the eunuchs f o r t h i s act, Tsung-mi admitted to having been L i Hsun's t r a v e l l i n g companion f o r a long while, and also knowing about h i s plans beforehand.^ Surely then, Tsung-mi must have been a t r a v e l l i n g companion with the others i n Lo-yang when they talked about p o l i t i c a l issues. In a b r i l l i a n t recon-struction of the l i f e and times of Po £h'u-i, Arthur Waley shows that Po Ghu-i was also a f f i l i a t e d with L i Hsun, Chia Su, and p a r t i c u l a r l y 57 Shu Yuan-yu, a t about the same time i n Lo-yang. Po Ch'u-1 was then the mayor of Lo-yang, Waley states that i t i s un l i k e l y that Po Chii-i knew anything about the r e a l nature of the meetings of L i Hsiin and the others i n Lo-yang. I t seems apparent, however, Po Chii-i's close f r i e n d Shu Yuan-yu would have t r i e d to r e c r u i t h i s support. Po Chii-i, i n d i f f e r e n t to p o l i t i c s i n general towards the l a t e r part of h i s l i f e , c l e a r l y did not wish to get involved. The sudden resignation of the mayorship i n Lo-yang may well be accounted f o r by the reason that he was reluctant to get involved i n the consequences of h i s friends' p o l i t i c a l course.-"^ Lu T'ung, Tsung-mi and Po Chii-i have not been included i n our e a r l i e r discussions of the L i Hsun faction because they were not a t the time p o l i t i c a l l y active i n the court of Ch'ang-an, 56 although they had been connected with the o r i g i n a l alignment i n one way or another i n Lo-yang, While Lu T'ung seems to have been success-f u l l y recruited by L i Hsiin and the others, and was executed along with the L i Hsun fact i o n i n la t e 835. Tsung-mi and Po,.Ghu-i apparently chose non-involvement and survived the tragedy. The formation of the alignment i n Lo-yang may have been so secretive that the facts eluded not only the eunuchs i n Ch'ang-an (they did not search Lo-yang f o r supporters of the L i Hsiin faction) but the historiographers as w e l l . For those who knew the facts of the alignment, such as L i Mei and Po Chl i - i , i t was of extreme Importance to refer to them only In guarded language and vague a l l u s i o n s , as shown i n L i Mei's "strange and marvellous" t a l e , and 59 Po Ch'u-i and L i Shang-yin's few poems on the event. When we consider these i n i t i a l meetings amongst the four key figures and t h e i r s o c i a l a f f i l i a t i o n s with those as Lu T'ung, Tsung-mi- and Po Ch'u-i i n Lo-yang during the early part of 833, the question arises as to whether any set of commonly held b e l i e f s drew them together, and the nature of the discussions and plans which could have taken place under the guise of l e i s u r e l y t r a v e l s . We can f i n d two common charac-t e r i s t i c s of t h i s group of mem t h e i r anti-eunuch attitudes and t h e i r non-alignment i n the Niu and L i f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e . L i Hsiin, Shu Yuan-yii, Wang Yai and Chia Su, p r i o r to the meetings i n Lo-yang di d not have any i l l i c i t dealings with eunuchs, even though i t was a normal practice f o r T'ang bureaucrats a t the time to gain spe c i a l f a v o u r s . ^ Lu T'ung's anti-eunuch attitudes have been v i v i d l y expressed i n h i s poem Eclipse 6 i of the Moon (Yiieh-shlh). Also, Po Cbiu-i's own strong feelings against 62 eunuchs had been voiced since early i n h i s p o l i t i c a l career. In the infamous Niu and L i f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e , the L i Hsiin alignment i n Lo-yang 57 and t h e i r s o c i a l a f f i l i a t i o n s were non-partisan. Although L i Hsun's uncle L i Feng-chi was a member of the Niu fac t i o n , i t i s u n l i k e l y that L i Hsiin necessarily followed h i s p o l i t i c a l i n c l i n a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r h i s unhappy experience i n the Wu Chao A f f a i r . Wang Yai also d i d not d i r e c t l y participate i n the Niu and L i f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e , even though he was one of the victims of the special examination purge of 808. As fo r Shu Yuan-yu and Chia Su, they were s p e c i f i c a l l y promoted to chief ministers by the emperor Wen-tsung on the basis of t h e i r non-involvement with either f a c t i o n . F i n a l l y , Po Chii-i's non-alignment i n the Niu and L i f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e was deliberately adhered to throughout his p o l i t i c a l l i f e . J Indeed, the p o l i t i c a l course that the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n l a t e r embarked on i n the court of Wen-tsung was oriented towards abolishing the power of the court eunuchs and the f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e of the cen t r a l bureaucracy. Up to t h i s point, we have reconstructed the i n i t i a l meeting of the 64 four key figures of the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n i n Lo-yang. The r e s t of the fa c t i o n and other partisans were most l i k e l y recruited l a t e r In Ch'ang-an, during L i Hsun's r i s e to power. In Chapter Two we observed some reasons why Wen-tsung was f r i e n d l y to the L i Hsiin men. He could w e l l have helped with the recruitment of the other fac t i o n members such as L i Hsiao-pen, L i Chen-su and Lu Hung-mao, to whom he was related by blood or by marriage. In the next chapter we s h a l l deal with the phenomenal r i s e to power of L i Hsun, his transformation of the alignment i n Lo-yang to a dominant fa c t i o n i n the cen t r a l bureaucracy i n Ch'ang-an, and the extent of success h i s administmtion had with confronting the eunuch problem i n the Inner court, and the f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e i n the Outer. 58 CHAPTER FOUR. LI HSUN'S RISE TO POWER AND HIS ADMINISTRATION IN 835 When the L i Hsttn alignment met secretly i n Lo-yang i n 833-834, a dual strategy seems to have been formulated. Wang Yai and Chia Su, both respectable bureaucrats i n Ch'ang-an a t the time, would work q u i e t l y i n the central bureaucracy and provide secret support f o r L i Hsun. They also soon helped to r e c a l l Shu Yuan-yii from his demoted post i n Lo-yang to Ch'ang-an. L i Hsiin, on the other hand, would seek re-entry into Ch'ang-an p o l i t i c s through alternative means. The p o l i t i c a l maneuvers L i Hsun took were unorthodox, going through the eunuchs and the Han-lin Academy, before establishing himself as chief minister i n the central bureaucracy. Through these steps, L i Hsun transformed the o r i g i n a l alignment i n Lo-yang to a dominant fa c t i o n i n Wen-tsung*s court, gained control of the admin-i s t r a t i o n , and dealt with two immediate problems that had been perplexing the emperor Wen-tsung: the eunuch menace and f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e . In 834, f o r L i Hsiin to enter the p o l i t i c a l arena of Ch'ang-an through the regular bureaucracy was d i f f i c u l t . Although a Confucian scholar and of an eminent clan, L i Hsun's proscription and subsequent e x i l e f o r his implication i n the Wu Chao:[Affair i n 825 stood i n the way. L i Hsun's alterna t i v e was to go through informal channels to gain p o l i t i c a l power. His f i r s t p o l i t i c a l move involved open associations with the notorious physician Cheng Chu and his intimate f r i e n d , the court eunuch Wang Shou-ch'eng. I t was with the objective of meeting Wang Shou-ch'eng that L i Hsiin f i r s t sought out Cheng Chu,. and recruited him in t o the alignment that was o r i g i n a l l y formed i n Lo-yang. In sharp contrast to L i Hsun's impressive good looks, Cheng Chu i s shown by the standard works to be physically repulsive: short, ugly and nearsighted, corresponding to h i s 1 innate e v i l nature. His only talents were i n the a r t of medicine, and 59 i n his "magnetic personality". It was by means of these.two particular talents that he made his f i r s t p o l i t i c a l appearance i n 818, on the staff of the military governor of Hsiang-yang. Immensely despised by both the Inner and Outer courts, Cheng Chu s t i l l managed to instantly cap-tivate the interest of one of the most powerful court eunuchs of the time,Wang Shou-ch'eng. He later attracted Wei Yuan-su, another leading eunuch. I t was through the relationship with Wang Shou-ch'eng that as early as Mu-tsung's reign (820-824) when he cured the emperor of a disease, Cheng Chu already enjoyed considerable prestige and amassed great wealth from bribery. Although the emperor Wen-tsung f i r s t resented Cheng Chu for his i l l i c i t contacts with the eunuchs and the o f f i c i a l s i n his court, he quickly changed his mind when he found Cheng Chu's medical prescriptions to be effective. This happened around 833. The standard works relate of at least three unsuccessful murder attempts on Cheng Chu. The f i r s t one was allegedly conceived by the emperor Wen-tsung and Sung Shen-hsi in 831, but i t was foiled by Wang Fan, who secretly warned Cheng Chu about 2 i t . The second attempt was plotted by the eunuch enemies of Wang Shou-ch'eng, The Shen-ts'e general of the Left , Wei Yuan-su, and the Shu-mi councillors Wang Chien-yen and Yang Ch*eng-ho. I t turned out that Wei Yuan-su was so impressed with Cheng Chu that he himself cancelled the murder plans. The third murder attempt was planned by the L i Hsun faction, which had put Cheng Chu on the blacklist as soon as the court 4 eunuchs were slaughtered. This murder plan shows that Cheng Chu was merely used by the L i Hsun faction i n the same way that Wang Shou-ch'eng was. Cheng Chu i s included i n our reconstruction of the L i Hsiin faction because he did operate i n the central bureaucracy as part of the faction. Cheng Chu was not the original founder, nor a leader of the faction, and 60 his meeting with Li Hsun took place after the original alignment had convened in Lo-yang. It was probably early in 834 when Li Hsun went to see Gheng Ghu. Cheng Chu was then passing through Lo-yang on his return to Chiang-an from Chao-i, where he had been serving as vice military governor. Li Hsun was s t i l l in mourning. The standard works record an instant dynamic relationship to have sprung between the two, as i f the two were of kindred spirit.-' Considering Cheng Chu"s innate capacity for bribery and unscrupulousness, the situation must have been more business-like and complicated. An arrangement was most likely made at the time, where-by Li Hstln would get an audience with the eunuch Wang Shou-ch*eng, while Cheng Chu would collect a generous sum as well as gain some degree of social respectability and possibly higher'political status by association with a notable scholar of eminent lineage, such as Li Hsun. Due to the risky nature of the political course decided in the meetings in Lo-yang, i t is unlikely that Cheng Chu at this point knew about the entire strategy and objectives of the Li Hsun alignment. After having met with Cheng Chu, Li Hsiin did indeed get an intro-duction to Wang Shou-ch'eng. Wang Shou-ch'eng had been a powerful veteran court eunuch throughout the reigns of Hsien-tsung, Mu-tsung and Ching-tsung, Although he had taken part in the assassination of Hsien-tsung, an act whiqh^included him in the "Yuan-ho rebel clique", no one had dared charge him.^ In 827, as the Shu-mi councillor, he had re-asserted his political influence by directly taking part in Wen-tsung*s enthronement. Later, relinquishing his Shu-mi post, he established his military base of power by seizing control of the Shen-ts'e Armies, Wen-tsung could not bear the arbitrary manners of Wang Shou-ch'eng in his court, but 61 openly he had to appear accommodating towards t h i s veteran of the state (tlng-kuo-ts'e lap). L i Hsun, with a capacity f o r shrewdness, predicted correctly that through Wang Shou-ch'eng, the least he could obtain was an audience with the emperor. During the i n i t i a l meeting with Wen-tsung, L i Hsiin struck up one of his perfect f i r s t Impressions that he had successfully t r i e d on Cheng 7 Chu and Wang Shou-ch'eng. Wen-tsung, an ardent admirer of learning and poetry, was p a r t i c u l a r l y impressed with L i Hsun's thorough knowledge of the Confucian c l a s s i c s . At the time L i Hsun was s t i l l i n mourning, but i n the next few months, he and Cheng Chu were allowed free admission i n t o the emperor's inner quarters. Most l i k e l y , i t was during t h i s time that L i Hsttn, i n guarded language and drawing a l l u s i o n s from L i u Fen's exam-g ination paper, informed the emperor about the objectives of hi s group. These were the removal of powerful court eunuchs, the a b o l i t i o n of f a c t -ionalism, and the r e v i t a l i z a t i o n of central authority i n face of provin-cia l i s m and foreign incursions. These were the same issues which had been Wen-tsung*s concerns since he came to the throne. . I t was possibly about t h i s time that Cheng Chu was informed about the aims of the L i Hsun's alignment, and was recruited into i t with promises: of s o c i a l prestige and higher p o l i t i c a l status, Cheng Chu i n turn most l i k e l y recruited Wang Fan, who had e a r l i e r alerted him about the emperor's murder plans against him. Cheng Chu's role at his time seemed to d i s p e l the suspicion of the court eunuchs while L i Hsiin was conversing with the emperor. Later, i t appears that L i Hsttn encouraged Cheng Chu i n construction 9 projects i n the palaces to keep him occupied. As soon as L i Hsiin terminated his mourning i n the seventh month of Tai-ho 8 (834), Wen-tsung, tremendously inspired by his bold speeches, 62 wished to place him immediately i n the Han-lin Academy as a remonstrator o f f i c i a l . The chief minister, L i Te-yii, and others protested indignantly over t h i s appointment, on the grounds of L i Hsun's e a r l i e r conduct i n the 10 Wu Chao A f f a i r . As a r e s u l t , L i Hsiin assumed instead the post of 11 assistant instructor i n the Ssu-men In s t i t u t e . Two months l a t e r , nevertheless, L i Hsun succeeded i n entering the Han-lin Academy as an expositor/scholar (shih -Chiang hsiieh-shih), a junior post i n contrast to the more senior appointments, the scholars (hs'ueh-shlh). Thus, a f t e r making contact with the eunuchs, L i Hsun's next t a c t i c was directed t o -wards the Han-lin Academy. The Han-lin Academy, located close to the emperor's Inner palaces, was o r i g i n a l l y an i n s t i t u t e f o r various d i s c i p l i n e s , such as c l a s s i c s , 12 l i t e r a t u r e , medicine and calligraphy. I t turned out to be a s t a f f of scholars well-versed i n the c l a s s i c s and well-endowed i n l i t e r a r y t a l e n t that took charge of the drafting of imperial decrees; and edicts. The Han-lin scholars were d i r e c t l y appointed by the emperor, responsible to him alone, and independent of the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the central bureaucracy. The Han-lin scholars and t h e i r d i r e c t o r (ch'eng-chih) were of any age, from any s o c i a l or p o l i t i c a l background and of a p o l i t i c a l status ranging 14 from a no degree rank to the f i r s t degree rank. At any one time, the number of Han-lin scholars serving the emperor varied from two to s i x . In the Han-lin Academy the scholars held no degrees of rank, but often they carried concurrent posts with degreed status i n the central bureau-cracy. In post-rebellion T'ang, the Han-lin Academy, along with the Shu-mi Council controlled by the eunuchs, and other ad hoc organs of power, grew i n p o l i t i c a l significance a t the expense of the authority of the 63 central bureaucracy. The functions of the Han-lin Academy came to include acting as personal counsel to the emperor as w e l l as d r a f t i n g imperial documents. Frequently while accompanying the emperor as h i s private secretaries, they were i n a position to participate i n the deliberation of state a f f a i r s . By virtue of t h i s newly acquired status, the Han-lin scholars were considered chief ministers of the Inner court (nei-hsiang).*5 This p a r t i c u l a r development of the Han-lin Academy d r a s t i c a l l y reduced the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the Secretariat (chung-shu sheng). More seriously, i t presented a challenge to the deliberation 16 powers of the regular chief ministers. However, except f o r a few occasions, the authority of the Han-lin scholars did not surpass that of the chief ministers. The Han-lin Academy instead served as the preparatory ground f o r the scholars to become chief ministers themselves. The emperor, who had come to regard these scholars as his confidants, usually promoted them d i r e c t l y to chief ministers to execute his orders through the central bureaucracy. We have seen how Sung Shen-hsi was elevated to chief minister by Wen-tsung i n 83I to plan f o r an anti-eunuch strategy. The close con-nection between the Han-lin Academy and the l a t e T'ang chief ministers i s shown by Ts'en Chung-mien's study, which concludes that forty-two per-cent of the chief ministers serving from 78O-888 had been Han-lin scholars, and thirty-two per-cent of the Han-lin scholars of the same period became chief ministers. I t was t h i s p o l i t i c a l potential of the Han-lin Academy that caused i t to be used:as a base f o r L i Hsun's p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . In the tenth month of T'ai-ho 8, L i Hsun was appointed as Han-lin expositor/scholar. He did not become a scholar, a more senior post, u n t i l 18 the seventh month of the next year, L i Hsun's o f f i c i a l duties i n the Han-lin Academy were to expound the commentaries of the Book of Change. 6k In which he was an authority. In order to dispel the suspicion of the eunuchs and the o f f i c i a l s i n his court with regards to the actual role of L i Hsun i n the Han-lin Academy, the emperor Wen-tsung frequently made i t seem that L i Hsiin was employed in only this capacity. L i HsKin's actual intent, however, was to operate from the Han-lin Academy. One of the f i r s t things he did i n the Han-lin Academy was to change his name 19 from L i Chung-yen to L i HsMn. ' His motive was thereby to erase the black mark of the Wu Chao A f f a i r that was associated with the name Chung-yen. The next thing he probably did was learn as much as possible about the Han-lin institutions from Wang Yai, a veteran of the Han-lin Academy 20 who had also served as i t s director. In order to continue to receive support from Cheng Chu and his eunuch connections, L i Hsun also tried to have him admitted to the Han-lin Academy. However, perhaps due to his mediocre background, Cheng Chu did not succeed in obtaining a Han-lin post u n t i l the eighth month of the next year (835)» barely three months 21 before the launching of the sweet dew plot. It was L i Hsun then who operated alone i n the Han-lin Academy for most of the time, backed with the support from the eunuch Wang Shou-ch'eng and the emperor Wen-tsung. Very soon after he entered the Han-lin Academy, L i Hsiin was able to re-22 cr u i t Ku Shih-i, one of the Han-lin scholars at the time. L i Hsun most li k e l y knew him well from 823, the year i n which both obtained their chin-shih degrees. Next, one after the other, two respective directors 23 were forced out, along with two other Han-lin scholars. -* Even though four Han-lin scholars remained during the period that L i Hsiin was i n the Academy, they did not seem to have objected to L i Hsun's p o l i t i c a l man-euvers there. From the time that he f i r s t entered the Han-lin Academy to the time 65 he became chief minister, the essence of L i Hsun's p o l i t i c s was a 24 simple divide and rule policy. Although he was o r i g i n a l l y recommended f o r p o l i t i c a l advancement by the eunuch Wang Shou-ch'eng, L i Hsun f i r s t applied t h i s strategy to the eunuch problem i n the court of Wen-tsung. U n t i l Hsuan-tsung's reign (846-859) when the emperor complained that his eunuchs had "come together i n one piece" (ho-wei i-p ' i e n ) . the court 25 eunuchs had been divided i n t o several cliques. P o l i c y differences seem . to have a t one time affected the formation of these eunuch cliques, as i n the case of the assassination of Hsien-tsung, when one eunuch clique opposed to the "using arms" poli c y emerged triumphant over the 26 clique that supported the same. At times there also seems to have existed a polarization between the Shen-ts'e Armies and the Shu-mi Council. In the succession dispute of Wu-tsung i n 840, the Shen-ts'e generals who were supporting Wu-tsung triumphed over the Shu-mi councillors who 27 had another candidate, i n mind. However, a t other times, these two eunuch i n s t i t u t i o n s supported each other, as i n the enthronement of Wen-tsung i n 827. Cliques within the two eunuch i n s t i t u t i o n s could also have possibly occurred. As f a r as the two Shu-mi councillors are concerned, however, there did not seem to e x i s t animosities between them. P a r t i c u l a r l y i n imperial succession, they seem to have agreed throughout the reigns 28 of the la t e T'ang emperors. As f o r the Shen-ts'e generals, there does e x i s t evidence of a struggle between the Left and Right wings. Lu Ssu-mien even suggests that the L i Hsun f a c t i o n owed i t s r i s e to power to the struggle between the two Shen-ts'e Armies, with Wei YGan-su as the 29 general of the Left, and Wang Shou-ch'eng as that of the Right. Again i n 845» the Shen-ts'e generals were divided. Y\i Hung-chih, the general of the Left triumphed over Yang Ch'in-i, the general of the Right, i n 66 the incident in which Wu-tsung sought to recover the seals of the 30 Shen-ts'e Armies. However, as far as their behaviour in imperial succession is concerned, the two Shen-ts'e generals were in accord throughout the reigns of the late T'ang emperors, except in the case of 31 Mu-tsung's succession. But more obvious and perhaps even more pre-valent than the above discussions were eunuch alignments based on per-sonal rivalries for power. In confronting the eunuch problem, Li Hsun f i r s t worked around the personal rivalry of Wang Shou-ch'eng, to whom he owed his i n i t i a l rise to power. Wang Shou-ch'eng was then the Shen-ts'e general of the Right, director of the Department of Inner Attendance and grand general of the Mobile Guards of the Right. His contenders for power were the Shen-ts'e general of the Left, Wei Yuan-su, the Shu-mi councillors, Wang Ghien-yen and Yang Gh'eng-ho, and the general of the Ling Guards of the Right, Gh'iu Shih-liang. Along with Wang Shou-ch*eng, these eunuchs had a l l taken part in the enthronement of Wen-tsung in 827. Li Hsun's tactic was to f i r s t alienate these enemies of Wang Shou-ch'eng, using the strong backing of this same eunuch. Thus Wei Yuan-su, Yang Gh'eng-ho-and Wang Ghien-yen were sent out of the capital of Ch'ang-an to assume posts of army supervisors. This occurred in the sixth month of T'ai-ho 9 32 0835). Two months later, the death sentence was imposed on a l l three eunuchs, on the grounds of i l l i c i t dealings with the Niu and Lif^faction members. Ch'lu Shih-liang was, instead, spared the fate of these eunuchs, and even given Wei Yuan-su's post, the Shen-ts'e general of the Left. To appease Wang Shou-ch'eng over Ch'iu Shih-liang*s appointment, Li Hsun influenced the emperor to further confer on Wang Shou-ch'eng high honorific titles such as the grand inspector general of the Shen-ts'e Armies of 67 the Left and of the Right, and grand commander of the Twelve Guards, At t h i s time, Wang Shou-ch'eng was so confident of his control over L i Hsiin that he was not aware that actual power was being transferred gradually to Ch'iu Shih-liang, i n preparation f o r the f i n a l step to eliminate Wang Shou-ch'eng himself. The next eunuch to suffer the death blow of L i Hsttn was Gh'en Hung-chih, on the grounds that he had personally assassinated Hsien-tsung. Another powerful eunuch, formerly a Shu-mi cou n c i l l o r , although dead, had hi s c o f f i n exposed and the corpse desecrated as a warning to h i s clique. For s i x other powerful eunuchs who had been e a r l i e r banished from the c a p i t a l , the death sentence was also imposed. The death orders, however, did not reach them u n t i l the L i Hsun fa c t i o n had been defeated, Consequently these eunuchs were spared 33 the fate of Wei Ytfan~su and the others. J While i n the the Han-lin Academy, a t the same time that he was dividing and eliminating the powerful court eunuchs, L i Hsun also attempted to abolish factionalism i n the central bureaucracy by means of the divide and rule p o l i c y . Just as he accused the court eunuchs of i l l i c i t contacts with the o f f i c i a l s of the Outer Court, L i Hsun now attacked the Niu and L i f a c t i o n leaders f o r t h e i r own bribery with the court eunuchs. In T'ai-ho 8 (834) the L i fa c t i o n was i n control of the administration, while the Niu leaders had at the time been sent out of Ch'ang-an. L i Terytt and Lu Sui, then chief ministers, were f i r s t dealt with by L i Hsun. L i Tsung-min, of the Niu f a c t i o n , was r e c a l l e d to the c a p i t a l and made a chief minister to help Wang Yai, then also chief 34 minister, and L i Hsun to attack the L i faction. During the next h a l f year L i Te-ytt was gradually i n f l i c t e d with a series of disgraces and demotions, u n t i l he was f i n a l l y sent out of the c a p i t a l on charges of 68 mismanagement of finance, traitorous behaviour and f a c t i o n a l l s t ac-t i v i t i e s . ^ Lu Sui i n s i s t e d on defending L i Te-yu and within one 36 month, was also sent out of Ch'ang-an to a p r o v i n c i a l post. As soon as the two chief ministers of the L i f a c t i o n were out of the c a p i t a l , the Niu faction came under attack. L i Tsung-min, on charges of i l l i c i t connections with court favourites and eunuchs, i n addition to f a c t i o n a l l s t 37 a c t i v i t i e s , ended up with a minor post quite: remote from Ch'ang-an. Thus, by the seventh month of T'ao-ho 9 (835) three chief ministers had been removed from the central bureaucracy by L i Hsun, operating from the Han-lin Academy. Countless partisans and d i s c i p l e s of the f a c t i o n leaders also suffered demotions and banishment, charged with associations with the Niu and LI factions. By the ninth month of T'al-ho 9 the atmosphere i n the central bureaucracy was so strained and i n s t i l l e d with fear that L i Hsun had to advise the emperor Wen-tsung to issue an edict of reas-surance. The edict proclaimed that from the date of issuance, a l l those partisans and d i s c i p l e s of either f a c t i o n would no longer be p e n a l i z e d . ^ While i n the Han-lin Academy, L i Hsun even made e f f o r t s to deal with economic problems. In the seventh month of T'ai-ho 9 L i Hsiin a t -tempted to deal with the abuses of Buddhist monasteries. Since a l l those who entered the clergy could evade corvee and taxation, when monasteries mul t i p l i e d , the state finances would suffer, L i Hsun drafted an. edict that forbade ordinations of monks and construction of Buddhist monas-39 t e r i e s . Further, he ordered an examination based on r e c i t a t i o n s to separate the true Buddhist monks from insincere ones. The monks were allowed three months to prepare f o r the examination. A l l those who , f a i l e d the examination had to be l a i c i z e d and returned to productive work. A l l those, however, who were over f i f t y years old, the crippled 69 and those with excellent reputations, would he excused from taking the examination. Although this project was put in edict form i t was abandoned shortly after Li Hsiin became chief minister. It seems likely that at the last minute Li Hsun decided not to intimidate so large an interest as the Buddhist clergy and their supporters* including his Buddhist friend, Tsung-mi, Many eunuchs, especially Ch'iu Shih-liang, were also Buddhists, ready to defend Buddhist interests. It would seem that Li Hsiin, not yet ready for a direct confrontation with the 40 eunuchs, did not wish to appear to be launching an all-out attack. Up to this time, Li Hsiin had been operating from the Han-lin Academy, with only secret support and advice from Wang Yai, Chia Su, and Shu Yuan-yu working in the central bureaucracy. Li Hsiin understood from the Wang Shu-wen incident of 805 that he must be able to step beyond the limits of the Han-lin Academy, Wang Shu-wen and his colleague Wang P'ei had also operated from the Han-lin Academy, after obtaining sup-port from a eunuch and an imperial concubine. They did not, however, themselves become part of the central bureaucracy, even though their partisans such as Liu Ytt-hsl, Liu Tsung-yuan and Wei Chih-i had posts in the central bureaucracy. When the eunuchs and the upper class bureaucrats united against their administration and stripped their power base in the Han-lin Academy, both Wang Shu-wen and Wang P'ei immediately 41 lost power. Li Hs'un realized that while the Han-lin Academy was an ef-fective institution of power, i t had to be "guaranteed" by the eunuch Wang Shou-ch'eng. As an informal and personal organ of the emperor, the Han-lin Academy in late T'ang was s t i l l part of the Inner Court, In the same way that the eunuch controlled Shu-mi Council was. The only difference was that, whereas the Han-lin had its own administrative offices, the Shu-mi ?o d i d not. L i Hsun's intent was to unite with h i s supporters i n the central bureaucracy, and a t the same time r e c r u i t further support. His f i n a l objective was to r a i s e the status of his group from an i l l e g a l alignment i n Lo-yang to a respectable p o l i t i c a l body and administration i n the central bureaucracy. Only then could he operate without the continued support of Wang Shou-ch'eng. L i Hsun had prepared f o r the transformation while he was i n the Han-lin Academy, By removing the Niu and L i f a c t i o n a l i s t leaders from the court of Ch'ang-an, the vacuum i n the central bureaucracy was waiting to be f i l l e d with members of his own alignment. In the ninth month of T'ai-ho 9 (835)i two months a f t e r the three chief ministers had been expelled from Ch'ang-an, he obtained chief ministership along with Shu Yuan-yii, whom he had f i r s t met i n Lo-yang, L i Hs'un also remained i n the Han-lin and held a concurrent post of vice-president of the Ministry of Rites, Shu Yuan-yii also became vice-president of the Censorate and vi c e -42 president of the Ministry of Punishment. Chia Su had become chief minister i n the fourth month of T'ai-ho 9» as soon as the L i f a c t i o n 43 chief ministers, L i Te-yti and Lu Sui, had been demoted. Wang Yai had 44 been chief minister since the seventh month of T'ai-ho 7 (833). The other members of L i HsUn's group,also gained promotions during the next two months. By the eve of the Sweet Dew Incident, of L i Hsun's men, four, including himself, were chief ministers, and eight out of the seventeen i n h i s f a c t i o n were t h i r d degree o f f i c i a l s , the decision-making rank i n he. the T'ang dynasty. J This f a c t i s s i g n i f i c a n t , considering that most other decision-makers had been forced out of Ch'ang-an by L i Hsun's divide and r u l e t a c t i c s . The departments which came under the control of the 46 L i Hsun group included the following: 71 Departments Faction Members i n Control Chief Minister's Cabinet L i Hsun, Shu Yuan-yu, Wang Yai, Chia Su M i n i s t r i e s i n the State A f f a i r s L i Hsun, Shu Yuan-yu, Cheng Chu Department Wang Fan Finance Wang Fan, Wang Yai Censorate Shu Yuan-yu, Cheng Chu, L i Hsiao-pen Han-lin Academy L i Hsun, Cheng Chu, Ku Shih-I With the key positions i n these departments i n the government controlled by L i Hsun's men, we may conclude that the L i Hsun alignment i n Lo-yang had, by the eve of the sweet dew coup, been transformed into the dominant fa c t i o n i n the c e n t r a l bureaucracy. At the same time, L i Hsun promoted talented and virtuous men outside of h i s faction. These included the respectable veteran bureaucrats P'ei Tu, Cheng T'an, and Ling-hu Ch'u, ' who had previously been placed i n honorific positions, P'ei Tu thus became president of the Secretariat, and the other two became vice-pres-idents of the State A f f a i r s Department, By means of acts l i k e t h i s , the officialdom, i n addition to the emperor Wen-tsung, t r u l y believed that L i Hsun would be capable of restoring peace to the empire. With the administration secured In the hands of h i s f a c t i o n , L i Hsttn again t r i e d to solve the f i n a n c i a l problems of Wen-tsung's reign. This i s evident i n the proposal to establish a tea monopoly i n the Chiang-Huai regions. The suggestion o r i g i n a l l y came from Cheng Chu, but WangYai,, as the commissioner of s a l t and i r o n , was appointed to implement 4-8 t h i s state monopoly i n tea production. Up to that time, there had been a tax of from ten to f i f t e e n per-cent on tea, which was a f l o u r i s h i n g trade ; i n the Chiang-Huai areas. To impose a state monopoly on tea would mean that a l l production of tea must be confined to plantations 72 under state control, and that the common people must transplant t h e i r tea shrubs to d i s t r i c t s designated as under state supervision. Whether t h i s was a feasible scheme or not i s d i f f i c u l t to assess, as i t appears that the L i Hsun fa c t i o n f e l l from power before the new po-l i c y of tea production was f u l l y implemented. Ling-hu Ch'u, who suc-ceeded Wang Yai as commissioner of s a l t and i r o n , spoke c r i t i c a l l y about the proposed scheme. In a memorial, he advocated a return to l o c a l control of tea production, and recommended, instead, an increased tax 49 on tea. Although both the state monopoly of tea and the attack against the monasteries were not implemented i n the end, these two proposals are Indicative of the attempts by the L i Hsun fac t i o n to deal with the wor-sening economic conditions of Wen-tsung*s reign. While he was operating through the Han-lin Academy alone, L i Hsiin did not not dare confront the powers of Wang Shou-ch'eng d i r e c t l y . Only a f t e r he had secured himself and his fa c t i o n i n the central bureaucracy did he f e e l ready f o r the f i n a l ousting of the eunuch o r i g i n a l l y r e -sponsible f o r h i s r i s e to power. Just twelve days a f t e r he became chief minister, with the consent of the emperor Wen-tsung, he succeeded i n 50 murdering Wang Shou-ch'eng by poisoned wine. Wang Shou-cheng's brother, the eunuch Wang Shou-chiian, was also k i l l e d soon aftowards. Most l i k e l y i t was a t t h i s time that Wang Shou-ch'eng's position as the Shen-ts'e general of the Right was given to the eunuch Yu Hung-chih, to balance the power of Gh'iu Shih-liang, who had e a r l i e r been elevated to Shen-ts'e general of the Left upon the murder of WeiYuan-su. As a r e s u l t of L i Hsun's divide and rule t a c t i c s , a t l e a s t s i x leading eunuchs were k i l l e d . With the death of Wang Shou-ch'eng also ended the l a s t of the "Yuan-ho rebel c l i q u e " that had assassinated Hsien-tsung, and that which 73 Wen-tsung had wanted to eliminate since the beginning of h i s reign. We r e c a l l that i n 83I Sung Shen-hsi was promoted to chief minister f o r the sole purpose of devising anti-eunuch p l o t s , but f o r the s i x months that he was chief minister, not only d i d he not eliminate one single eunuch, he himself suffered a t r a g i c end. In view of the f a c t that a year previous L i Hsiin had been a p o l i t i c a l e x i l e , the removal of s i x leading eunuchs a t court, must be considered a daring accomplishment. The standard works, i n t h e i r moralizing tones, overlook the f a c t that s i x leading eunuchs had been k i l l e d , and lament instead the betrayal of tr u s t that L i Hsiin had committed to the one who had been responsible f o r his p o l i t i c a l success. I r o n i c a l l y then, the Sung historiographers, who normally held only disdain f o r the T'ang eunuchs, denounced the L i Hsun faction f o r t h e i r anti-eunuch a c t i v i t i e s . Although Wang Shou-ch'eng himself f i n a l l y perished from the schemings of L i Hsun, two other eunuchs remained to be reckoned with. These were Ch'iu Shih-liang and Yu Hung-ch3h, who had taken over the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and powers of Wei Yuan-su and Wang Shou-ch'eng. L i Hs'un knew that the Shen-ts'e Armies constituted the bulwark of eunuch strength. When he stripped Wang Shou-ch*eng and Wei Yuan-su of the Shen-ts'e Armies'com-mand, he could only transfer i t to other eunuchs. To deal with these two eunuchs who now had control of the Shen-ts'e Armies, LI Hsiin r e a l i z e d that the f i n a l confrontation had to be a m i l i t a r y b a t t l e , not a p o l i t i c a l one. In the next chapter we s h a l l look a t the L i Hsiin faction's pre-parations f o r the sweet dew coup which was launched to deal with the remaining eunuchs i n the court of Wen-tsung, 74 CHAPTER FIVE. THE SWEET DEW INCIDENT IN 835 AND CONCLUSION The Sweet Dew Incident - Preparation, Execution and Repercussions I t was with the intent of abolishing the f i n a l base of eunuch power that the sweet dew coup was conceived and launched by the L i Hsun fa c t i o n with the active p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the emperor Wen-tsung. The L i Hsun fact i o n was shrewd enough to r e a l i z e that m i l i t a r y force must be used i n the f i n a l a b o l i t i o n of eunuch influence i n court p o l i t i c s . In a n t i c i p a t i o n of the event, preparations were made a t three l e v e l s . In the f i r s t place, Lo Li-yen and L i Hsiao-pen, as the deputy mayor of Ch'ang-an and vice-president of the Censorate, were given permission to start, mobilizing t h e i r reserve forces.* Han Y'ueh and L i Chen-su were next appointed respectively grand general and general of the Chin-wu Guards of the Left. The Chin-wu Guards were one of the r e l a t i v e l y more powerful Southern Armies of the Imperial c i t y of Ch'ang-an, i n contrast to the Shen-ts'e Armies which were the strongest Northern Armies con-t r o l l e d by the eunuchs. Apart from m i l i t a r y preparation i n the court of Ch'ang-an, m i l i t a r y appointments were set f o r the nearby provinces. Thus, Wang Fan became the m i l i t a r y governor of T'ai-yuan (Ho-tung) and Kuo Hsing-yu became that of PIn-ning (north of the Ch'ang-an area). These two men, on the pretext of getting ready f o r t h e i r departures to the provinces, were urged to r e c r u i t on a large scale. Cheng Chu was appointed m i l i t a r y governor of Feng-hsiang (northwest of the Ch'ang-an . 4 area), i n addition t o h i s many other posts. With him, he took f i v e other members of the L i Hsun fa c t i o n : Ch'ien K'o-fu, Lu Chien-neng, Hsiao Chieh, Lu Hung-mao and Wei Feng, along with f i v e hundred personal troops he had e a r l i e r selected. I t seems that Cheng Chu was despatched to a province close to Ch'ang-an i n order that a base would be retained f o r 75 the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n , should the coup i n Ch'ang-an f a i l . In the t h i r d l e v e l of m i l i t a r y preparation, l i n k s were made with a t l e a s t one semi-autonomous province, Chao-I (northeast of the Lo-yang area), with L i u Ts'ung-chien as the m i l i t a r y governor. The l i n k with Chao-i was most l i k e l y f a c i l i t a t e d by Cheng Chu's acquaintance with L iu Ts'ung-chien, under whom he had served two years previously,-' Apart from m i l i t a r y preparations, the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n wished to gain additional advantage by catching the eunuchs unaware i n a coup. The p l o t was to ambush the eunuchs a f t e r ushering them a l l " t o a single spot, with the f a l s e announce-ment of "sweet dew" used as a decoy. The coup was launched on the .ien-hs'u day of the eleventh month of T'ai-ho 9 (December 14, 835) i n the imperial palaces of Ch'ang-an (Ta-ming kung).^ Early that morning, the officialdom and court eunuchs were-gathered before the emperor Wen-tsung a t the Tzu-ch'en H a l l . Han Yiieh, the grand general of the Chin-wu Guards of the Left, whose duty i t was to report, about the events of the night before, announced that sweet dew had f a l l e n i n the trees of the Chin-wu barracks of the Left. LI Hsiin and Shu Yuan-yu, as chief ministers, advised the emperor to go there personally and inspect i t , as sweet dew was an auspicious omen believed 7 . . . to forecast peace In the empire. The emperor, L i Hsun, Shu Yuan-yu and the court eunuchs then headed towards the Han-yuan H a l l , near the Chin-wu quarters, while Wang Yai, Chia Su and the r e s t of the officialdom went about t h e i r regular duties. At the Han-yuan H a l l , the emperor ordered L i Hsun and Shu Yuan-yu to inspect the sweet dew f i r s t . They returned soon, and announced that they could not f i n d any trace of i t . Wen-tsung then turned towards Ch'iu Shih-liang, YU Hung-chih and the other eunuchs, demanding that they examine the trees of the Chin-wu quarters. 76 Wang Fan and Kuo Hsing-yu, on the pretext of departure f o r t h e i r garrisons i n T'ai-yuan and Pin-ning, had p r i o r to t h i s time l i n e d t h e i r troops at the Tanrfeng gates. After a l l the eunuchs had gone to inspect the sweet dew, L i Hsiin, with the emperor Wen-tsung next to him, c a l l e d upon Wang Fan and Kuo Hsing-yii to prepare t h e i r attack on the eunuchs. However, only Kuo Hsing-yU and the T'ai-yuan troops went forward to receive the Imperial orders. Wang Fan was trembling i n fear, and the Pin-ning troops d i d not a r r i v e on time. At the Ghin-wu quarters, Han Yiieh, who had taken the eunuchs there, was perspiring heavily. The eunuchs then became suspicious and slowed down t h e i r steps. A breeze happened to set i n , and revealed behind the curtains of the Ghin-wu quarters an ambush of sol d i e r s . They had appa-re n t l y been placed there previously by the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n to attack the eunuchs. The eunuchs reacted immediately, and raced out of the Ghin-wu grounds to where the emperor Wen-tsung was. Their intent was to abduct the emperor to t h e i r side as quickly as possible, such that they could issue orders through him on t h e i r own behalf. This was a b r i l l i a n t t a c t i c on t h e i r part, since taking the emperor away would also prevent him from providing further support f o r L i Hsiin. At the time L i Hsiin also had word that the ambush a t the Chin-wu quarters had been aborted, and immediately gave s i g n a l to the so l d i e r s to defend the emperor from the eunuchs, making sure that he was not abducted by them. The eunuchs, however, managed to seize the imperial chariot and guide i t to the HsUan-cheng H a l l , where they declared that L i Hsun and h i s men had rebelled. I n i t i a l l y the emperor denied to the eunuchs that L i HaJnhad rebelled, but a f t e r the eunuchs had taken him hostage, he seemed to r e a l i z e that h i s role was f i n a l l y f i n i s h e d and said not a 77 word. Meanwhile L i Hsun's men, Lo Li-yen and L i Hsiao-pen, from the Ch'ang-an c i t y reserves and the Censorate, arrived from the east and the west to j o i n the Chin-wu Guards i n the slaughter of the eunuchs. 9 They managed to k i l l only about f i f t y eunuchs. In the meantime, the Shen-ts'e Armies, under Ch'iu Shih-liang and Yu Hung-chih, had been de-spatched i n f u l l force to launch a counter-attack against the L i HsUn forces. They had orders to slaughter anyone i n s i g h t , and to r a i d a l l the administrative o f f i c e s of the central bureaucracy. Altogether, over 1,600 men were k i l l e d i n Ch'ang-an alone.*° One by one, the L i Hsun fac t i o n members were caught through various means. Shu Yuan-yii, Wang Yai, Chia Su and others were i n disguise, but they were seized by the Shen-ts'e soldiers shortly afterwards. As f o r Wang Fan, he had managed to escape from the imperial c i t y to h i s heavily barricaded residence. The eunuchs had to t r i c k him into opening his gates, "informing" him about hi s appointment as chief minister. L i Hsiin also escaped from the imperial c i t y , and f l e d to Chung-nan Mountain ( f o r t y miles from Ch'ang-an) where hi s f r i e n d the Buddhist monk Tsung-mi administered a monastery. Tsung-mi wanted to shelter him, but h i s d i s c i p l e s feared the anger of the eunuchs. As a r e s u l t , L i Hsiin had to leave and was soon caught on his way to Feng-hsiang. Knowing that he would be c r u e l l y tortured and mutilated by the eunuchs, L i Hsun quickly t r i c k e d a s o l d i e r into cutting off h i s head,;;; In the outer c i t y of Ch'ang-an, the search f o r L i Hsun's supporters continued ruthlessly. There, a large number of people died at. the hands of the Shen-ts'e soldiers. The eunuchs knew that Cheng Chu was In Feng-hsiang, where a number of L i Hsun's men were fl e e i n g to, Prosecution orders were immediately dictated by the eunuchs to the emperor and to the 78 remaining officials to capture these men.^ Thus, on the way to Feng-hsiang and in Feng-hsiang itself, another thousand men perished, in-cluding Gheng Ghu, Ch'ien K'o-fu, Lu Ghien-neng, Hsiao Chieh, Lu Hung-mao and Wei Feng. The next day at court audience, with the Li Hsiin faction?members and thousands of alleged supporters killed or arrested, only a meagre 12 number of officials appeared. The gates of the Imperial palaces were heavily barricaded and patrolled by armed soldiers under the command of the triumphant eunuchs. When the gates finally opened, new ministers were appointed to take over the administration of the Li Hsun faction members, but vacancies in the central bureaucracy remained numerous. Ling-hu Gh'u, then the vice-president of the State Affairs Department, had been ordered to draft the confessions of Wang Yai and the other faction members. With these confessions placed in front of him, and with the angry eunuchs hovering around him, the emperor Wen-tsung could only bow his head and consent to everything the eunuchs dictated. On the same day, the Shen-ts'e Armies under Ch'iu Shih-liang and Yu Hung-chih led the fettered Li Hsiin faction members down to the city markets where they were slaughtered at the waist. Their heads were hung high above the city gates 13 to serve as a warning to future plotters against the eunuchs. J The Ch'ang an populace, not knowing the f u l l story of the coup inside the palaces, watched in curiosity. A l l those officials who emerged unscathed from the massacres were forced to watch the ruthless executions and mutilations of the Li Hsun men, whose corpses were later arbitrarily strewn around. Clan exterminations of the Li Hsiin faction members were carried out on 14 the same day. Only very few men associated with the Li Hsun faction, no matter how remotely, escaped death. Included in the executions was 79 Lu T'ung the recluse, who had spent the night with Wang Yai j u s t before the launching of the sweet dew coup.^ Women and slaves found i n the residences of the L i Hsun fact i o n members were enslaved by the state. In the narration of t h i s incident i n the standard works, the most s t r i k i n g feature i s the incompetent performance of the L i Hsun fac t i o n , i n contrast to the amazingly quick recovery and co-ordinated counter-attack of the court eunuchs under Gh'iu Shih-liang and YU Hung-chih. The standard works explain t h i s point by stating that the conception and launching of the sweet dew plo t was hasty i n nature. According to them, there had been an o r i g i n a l plot "that had been con-ceived by Cheng Chu,.; .It.was to have a l l the court eunuchs and the Shen-ts'e Armies attend the funeral of Wang Shou-ch'eng, near Lan-t'ien (a short distance southeast of Ch'ang-^an), and from there launch a f u l l scale attack using Cheng Chu's personal troops."1"^ The standard works further indicate that i n t e r n a l s t r i f e between L i Hsiin and Cheng Chu was responsible f o r the cancellation of Cheng Chu's plot and i t s replacement hy'the sweet dew p l o t conceived by L i Hsiin a t the l a s t minute. The coup was then launched f i v e days ahead of the scheduled plot of Cheng Chu. The standard works' account about the struggle between L i Hsiin and Cheng Chu f o r leadership i n the f a c t i o n i s , however, f u l l of c o n f l i c t i n g evidence. As an example, one notices an a r b i t r a r y "assigning" of partisans to either L i Hsun or Cheng Chu, with no explan-ations or c l a r i f i c a t i o n s . One i s i n p a r t i c u l a r confused about why Wang Fan, who was recruited and well-treated by ChBng Chu f o r saving his l i f e , i s suddenly put into the L i Hsun l i n e of the struggle, instead of that of Cheng Chu. The rela t i o n s between L i Hsiin and Cheng Chu may be better understood i n the context of our e a r l i e r reconstruction 80 of the o r i g i n a l formation of the L i Hsun alignment. We r e c a l l that Gheng Chu had been recruited i n t o the alignment only a f t e r the meetings amongst L i Hsun, Wang Yai, Chia Su and Shu Yuan-yu i n Lo-yang. His role i n the faction was only to establish support with the eunuch Wang Shou-ch'eng and to di s p e l the suspicions of the other eunuchs. That L i Hsun and Cheng Chu had disagreements i s a p o s s i b i l i t y ; , i n view of the f a c t that L i Hsiin and the others were interested i n solving some problems of Wen-tsung's court, while Cheng Chu only wished to amass wealth and p o l i t i c a l power. We cannot determine whether i n -t ernal s t r i f e i n the faction did occur amongst L i Hsiin, Shu Yuan-yii , Wang Yai and Chia Su. However, we can safely say that i f i n t e r n a l s t r i f e did e x i s t , i t was not between L i Hsiin and Cheng Chu. While Cheng Chu may . indeed have proposed the p l o t to ambush the eunuchs a t Wang Shou-ch*eng*s funeral, i t Is unl i k e l y that i t had been the o r i g i n a l p l o t that was replaced a t the l a s t minute. In the f i r s t place, the timing of t h i s p l o t leaves questions unanswered. I f I t was supposed to have been launched f i v e days l a t e r by Cheng Chu, we cannot explain the presence of Cheng Chu i n Feng-hsiang a t the time of the sweet dew coup. Logically, he should have s t i l l been i n Ch*ang-an, preparing f o r the attack a t Wang Shou-ch*eng's funeral. Also, the date of the funeral would have been set forty-seven days a f t e r Wang Shou-ch* eng*s death, an unusual length of time to wait i n view of the rapid deterioration of the corpse. Secondly, the pl o t by Cheng Chu does not seem sound enough to have been considered by the shrewd L i Hsiin f a c t i o n , Wang Shou-ch*eng*s death by L i Hsun's order was not concealed a t the time. To have a grand funeral f o r him with a l l the eunuchs attending would indeed arouse the suspicions of the eunuchs. Furthermore, whether 81 one could make a l l the eunuchs and the Shen-ts'e Armies they commanded attend the funeral of Wang Shou-ch'eng, generally despised within eunuch c i r c l e s , i s a doubtful point. Moreover, even i f a l l the eunuchs did show up a t the funeral, m i l i t a r i l y , i t would have been a f o o l i s h scheme f o r the L i Hsun fac t i o n to have opened attack against the eunuchs who would have been surrounded by the entire force of the Shen-ts'e Armies, On the basis of these reasons, the o r i g i n a l p l o t by Cheng Chu was most l i k e l y overstressed by the Sung historiographers, who wished to explain the f a i l u r e of the coup by the hasty nature of a replacement plot. Actually, i f we examine the sweet dew coup, we f i n d that i t was not a hasty plot. We have already mentioned the three l e v e l s of m i l i t a r y preparations that were l a i d before the launching of the coup. In essence the strategy was to combat the m i l i t a r y force of the eunuchs by means of alterna t i v e m i l i t a r y forces, using the Chin-wu Guards, the reserve forces of the Censorate and Ch'ang-an, and the garrison forces of T'ai-yuan and Pin-ning. L i Te-yu, l a t e r c r i t i c i z i n g L i Hsun's p l o t as s u p e r f i c i a l and mediocre, states that he should have attempted to seize'' control of the Shen-ts'e Armies from within rather than confront them by means of another 17 m i l i t a r y force, ' In 845i i n Wu-tsung's reign, L i Te-yii did indeed a t -tempt to curb eunuch powers by ordering that the Shen-ts'e seals, symbol 18 of t h e i r authority and power, be returned. The incident was, however, quickly aborted when the Shen-ts'e general Yu Hung-chih threatened the emperor with a general r e b e l l i o n . Even i n 805, Wang Shu-wen knew that i n order to uproot the eunuchs* power, t h e i r base i n the Shen-ts'e Armies must be taken away. When he attempted to do t h i s by putting one of h i s men, Fan Hsi-ch'ao, i n control of them, i t turned out to be a dismal f a i l u r e , with the Shen-ts'e Armies refusing to heed Fan Hsi-ch'ao's 82 orders. From the experience of Wang Shu-wen, L i Hsun learned that i n order to uproot the eunuch base i n the Shen-ts'e Armies, i t must be taken from without, not from within. Thus, i t was not L i Hsun's pl o t which lacked sophistication, rather^Lt was that-.; L i Te-yu did not seriously analyze, the problem. Also, the use of sweet dew as the decoy i n the coup i s not as f a r c i c a l as I t may seem. Sweet dew had act u a l l y f a l l e n on the peach trees of the Tzu-ch'en palace i n the eighth month of T'ai-ho 9> three months before the launching of 19 the sweet dew coup. During that occasion the emperor Wen-tsung had personally examined and tasted the sweet dew on the advice of h i s ministers. Now, i f sweet dew were to be announced again, i t would not seem to be an unusual event and therefore would not i n s t a n t l y arouse the suspicions of the eunuchs. The incident was obviously i n the minds of the L i Hsun facti o n members when they conceived the sweet dew plot. Despite the preparations that went into the sweet dew coup, i t back-f i r e d almost in s t a n t l y . We can a t t h i s point examine the causes of the coup's f a i l u r e . Looking a t a l l seventeen members of the L i Hsun fact i o n again, one notices that despite the many m i l i t a r y appointments held by 20 them, none were professional m i l i t a r y personnel. The lack of pro-fes s i o n a l m i l i t a r y leadership i s indeed r e f l e c t e d i n the performance of the L i Hs\in| fa c t i o n during the coup, i n which Han Yueh and Wang Fan were perspiring and trembling even before any r e a l action took place. A s p e c i f i c incident could also account f o r the immediate f a i l u r e of the coup. Wang Fan, who had proved himself untrustworthy on two other occasions (warning Gheng Ghu about the emperor's murder plans against him, and not i f y i n g Wang Shou-ch*eng about the anti-eunuch plans of Sung Shen-hsi;, could i very w e l l have again leaked information to the other side, to Gh'iu 83 Shih-liang and Yu Hung-chih. He was apparently promised a chief ministership by those eunuchs, who nevertheless i n the end executed 21 him along with the other L i Hsiin faction members. From Wang Fan, the eunuchs most l i k e l y heard about, the c r i s i s that was to descend upon them, and must have according prepared f o r i t . Moreover, they may have a t the time perceived and prepared f o r the opportunity to wipe out, instead, the L i Hs*un fact i o n . This then explains the quick recovery and co-ord-ination of the eunuchs i n the events of the sweet dew coup. However, the disastrous outcome of the sweet dew coup cannot be en t i r e l y attributed to the lack of professional m i l i t a r y personnel, nor to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a fa c t i o n member leaking information, We mentioned that L i Hsiin learned many lessons from the experience of Wang Shu-wen i n 805. He probably r e a l i z e d that Gh'iu Shih-liang and the other eunuchs also learned t h e i r lessons, not only from Wang Shu-wen's incident, but also from L i Hsun's own experience i n dealing with the qther eunuchs. In the process of eliminating Wang Shou-ch'eng and the other eunuchs, the r i s e to power of Gh'iu Shih-liang and Yii Hung-chih was an Inevitable consequence. The next step planned i n L i Hsun's divide and rule strategy, which had hitherto been so e f f e c t i v e , was to wait f o r these remaining two powerful eunuchs to divide into a r i v a l r y of the Shen-ts'e Armies of the Left and of the Right. I t seems, however, that L i Hsun sensed instead the two eunuchs forming an a l l i a n c e with each other, a f t e r witnessing the fate of the other court eunuchs. Under these circumstances, there remained no alternative f o r L i Hsun but to launch the coup as quickly as possible, before Gh'iu Shih-liang and YU Hung-chih had time to plan t h e i r own intrigues. In t h i s respect, the L i Hsiin faction was rushed f o r time i n the f i n a l launching of t h e i r coup against the remaining court eunuchs. m The sweet dew coup had been an act of the dominant faction in the central bureaucracy against a l l the eunuchs in the T'ang court. With the eunuchs themselves emerging the victors, the revenge they sought did not. end with the clan exterminations of the Li Hsun faction members 22 and the massacre of three thousand men allegedly implicated in the coup. The entire officialdom was under attack; their offices were raided and 23 their files thrown everywhere. J Although other officials were appointed to take over the administration, real power had shifted radically from the central bureaucracy to the eunuchs. The officialdom, fearing for their own lives, could only bow meekly to the commands of the eunuchs.^ The chief ministers almost became in effect their secretaries in the 24 days immediately after the coup. In Ch'ang-an itself, the city was in tremendous disorder. Soldiers plundered rampantly, and imperial edicts had to be issued to stop the 2<5 terrorizing acts. ^ The populace of Ch'ang-an, not quite knowing the details of the chaos in the imperial cityy took advantage of the general unrest to seek private revenge and to intensify their own vendettas. It was due to the dedicated efforts of Ling-hu Ch'u, Cheng T'an-; and Li Shih that order was gradually restored. Both Cheng T'an and Li Shih were pro-moted to chief ministers immediately after the disastrous . coup, but Ling-hu Ch'u, who did not satisfy the eunuchs with his reports on the sins of 26 Wang Yai and the other plotters, was never appointed chief minister. The immediate function of these three officials was to restore the functioning order of the offices of the Chancellery (men-hsia sheng) and the Secretariat, which had been destroyed by the eunuchs' senseless campaign for revenge. Next, they advised the drafting of an edict which proclaimed the end of prosecutions of people connected with the Li Hsun 85 27 f a c t i o n . ' To calm the t e r r o r i z e d populace, Ling-hu Ch'u also mem-o r i a l i z e d to have the r o t t i n g and pungent~smelling bodies of the L i Hsun 28 f a c t i o n members buried. Although t h i s was four months a f t e r the launching of the sweet dew coup, the eunuch Ch'iu Shih-liang s t i l l ordered the corpses to be dug up again, and the bones to be thrown i n the r i v e r . The three o f f i c i a l s a l s o had to revoke everything that the L i HsUn fa c t i o n had done or were attempting to do. Included i n t h i s 29 project was the revocation of the state monopoly on tea i n Chiang-Huai, 30 and the cancellation of the palace construction projects of Cheng Chu. Despite the s i t u a t i o n where chaos and a r b i t r a r y acts ruled, Ling-hu Ch'u, Cheng T'an and L i Shih were able to carry out t h e i r restoration work and regain some authority as a r e s u l t of two l a t e r developments i n the court of Ch'ang-an. The f i r s t one was the subsequent d i v i s i o n of eunuch power between the Shen-ts'e generals and the Shu-mi counc i l l o r s . A f t e r the immediate te r r o r of the coup was over, the Shu-mi councillors L i u Hung-i and Hslieh C h i - l i n g seemed to sympathize i f i t h the emperor Wen-tsung and proved f r i e n d l y to the central bureaucracy, while Ch'iu Shih-l i a n g and Tu Hung-chih, the Shen-ts'e generals, continued to show animosity 3 i towards both. The second development was the r o l e L i u Ts'ung-chien, the m i l i t a r y governor of Chao-i, played i n the immediate months a f t e r the defeat of the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n . We r e c a l l that the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n , i n preparation f o r the m i l i t a r y coup against the eunuchs, had established ce r t a i n l i n k s with Liu Ts'ung-chien. In the f i n a l event, however, none of the L i Hsun fa c t i o n members managed to reach Chao-i, although a few family members succeeded i n doing so. Because of the strength of t h i s semi-autonomous province, the eunuchs di d not dare march into Chao-i to eradicate the remnants of the L i Hsiin faction. L i u Ts'ung-chien openly I 86 defied the power of the court eunuchs i n Ch'ang-an, and challenged the a r b i t r a r y manners with .which they dealt with the L i Hsun faction members. In three memorials to the central government he claimed that L i Hsun and the other f a c t i o n members were merely attempting to k i l l the menacing eunuchs and did not deserve the cruel executions they were ad-32 ministered a f t e r t h e i r f a i l u r e . In one memorial he even threatened that i f the eunuchs were more a r b i t r a r y i n t h e i r exercise of power, he would not hesitate to march into Ch'ang-an with his army* \_Wang] Yai and the others were Confucians, administrating the state with merit and imperial favour. They a l l wished to protect themselves and keep together t h e i r clans. How could they have wished to commit treason? [Li] Hsiin and the others a c t u a l l y wished to eliminate the court eunuchs and the two LShen-ts'e] generals, and accordingly set up the r i s k y p l o t to k i l l them a l l . Thus i t came about that [ L i Hsun's men and the eunuchs] were slaughtering each other, and [ L i Hsun's men turned out] to be accused of rebelliousness. , I t r u l y fear that [ L i Hsiin and the others] were not g u i l t y [of treason]. Even i f these chief ministers [ L i Hsiin, Shu Yuan-yii, Wang Yai and Chia Su] had actual u l t e r i o r motives, then they should be given proper t r i a l s , and accordingly meted out punishment. How could there be [ a s i t u a t i o n i n which] the eunuchs took control of arms and troops to a r b i t r a r i l y k i l l and plunder, implicating the entire officialdom, massacring and i n j u r i n g a r b i t r a r i l y , [causing] blood to flow through a thousand gates, and corpses to be counted i n tens of thousands, searching and prying through every branch and vine, and t e r r o r i z i n g and suspecting both the Inner and Outer courts? I would l i k e to go to the court of Ch'ang-an, and personally set apart, the innocent and the g u i l t y . I fear, howeiyer, that there would only be more massacres and the matter would not be resolved. I s h a l l [instead] be sure to d i l i g e n t l y govern and r u l e over your tributary states, and t r a i n my troops, such that on the inside I am your trusted confidant, and on the outside I am your state representative. I f the eunuchs are s t i l l d i f f i c u l t to control, I swear that I s h a l l to my death eliminate those [eunuchs] who hover around youI33 L i u Ts'ung-chien was the only person who dared appeal openly on behalf of the L i Hs'un fact i o n . By doing so, he acted as a deterrent to the a r b i t r a r y manners of the eunuchs, and functioned as an i n d i r e c t support to the administration of the reconstruction ministers and the 8? emperor Wen-tsung. I t was h i s presence i n Ch'ang-an p o l i t i c s and the support of the two eunuch Shu-mi cou n c i l l o r s , L i u Hung-i and Hsueh C h i - l i n g , which together helped Wen-tsung r e t a i n h i s throne, despite h i s active r o l e i n the sweet dew coup. However, seen from another perspective, L i u Ts'ung-chien's defiance and challenge i n the court of Ch'ang-an s i g n i f i e d the worsening central and p r o v i n c i a l balance of power i n the T'ang government. The coup i n Ch'ang-an court had served to weaken the central bureaucracy, s h i f t i n g i t s powers to the court eunuchs. But in ef f e c t , the coup had caused the court of Ch'ang-an to further lose c r e d i b i l i t y i n the eyes of the provinces, especially the semi-autonomous ones such as Chao-i and the Ho-pei provinces. Thus, i r o n i c a l l y , L i u Ts'ung-chien's behaviour indicates an open challenge by a province of the authority of the court of Ch'ang-an, even though i t was due to him that the chief ministers managed to regain some of t h e i r deliberation; powers from the court eunuchs. The province of Chao-i d i d not meet i t s fate u n t i l the reign of Wu-tsung i n 844, under the ad-34 ministration of L i Te-yu. Combined central and pr o v i n c i a l forces were sent i n t o Chao-i a f t e r the death of L i u Ts'ung-chien to re-assert central authority. The campaign concluded with the ruthless and thorough slaughter of the L i u family members, L i Te-yu, who suffered demotions and exiles during L i Hsun's r i s e to power, sought revenge against the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n members who had sought refuge i n Chao-i i n l a t e 835. Thus, included i n the slaughters were L i Hsun's brother, Wang Yai's grandson, and the sons of Chia Su, Wang Fan, Kuo Hsing-yU and Han Yiieh. The aftermath of the sweet dew coup on the emperor Wen-tsung was dramatic. The eunuchs knew from h i s performance i n the incident (by d i r e c t l y sending the eunuchs to L i Hsun's ambush, and afterwards denying 88 t h a t L i Hsun r e b e l l e d ) t h a t he had played a "substantial r o l e i n the i n i t i a l p l anning and launching of the coup a g a i n s t them. Having been abducted by the eunuchs i n the coup, Wen-tsung co u l d not but assume a submissive posture from then on. A source i n d i c a t e s t h a t he was n e a r l y 35 dethroned by the eunuchs.-^ Under the orders of the triumphant eunuchs, Wen-tsung d i c t a t e d the death sentences f o r the e n t i r e L i Hsiin f a c t i o n 36 and a l s o the prosectuion n o t i c e s f o r those who had f l e d t o Feng-hsiang. The a p o l o g e t i c and submissive tone of Wen-tsung i s evident throughout these e d i c t s i n which he denounced the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n of c o n s p i r i n g a g a i n s t the throne, and admitted t h a t he indeed had w r o n g f u l l y t r u s t e d these men. A month a f t e r the sweet dew coup, Wen-tsung changed h i s r e i g n t i t l e t o K'ai-ch'eng, t o s i g n i f y t h a t there had indeed been a change i n 37 h i s r e i g n . The tone of the i m p e r i a l n o t i c e regarding t h i s matter i s j u s t . a s a p o l o g e t i c as the above e d i c t s . The p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i t h the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d Wen-tsung's t h i r d attempt t o curb eunuch power, a f t e r the cautious and e x p l o r a t o r y move i n the L i u Fen Examination Event i n 828, and a f t e r the r a t h e r b o l d and r e c k l e s s Sung Shen-hsi A f f a i r i n 831. A f t e r the f a i l u r e of the sweet dew coup, Wen-tsung r e t r e a t e d per-manently from a c t i v e p o l i t i c s . Although he s t i l l complained about being c o n t r o l l e d by the eunuchs, he no longer demonstrated any v i g o u r t o pro-t e s t . He even knew t h a t h i s son had d i e d an u n n a t u r a l death, presumably 38 a t the hands of the eunuchs, but dared not q u e s t i o n them about i t . He became depressed and o f t e n absent-minded. Frequently he thought of 39 and p r a i s e d L i Hsun and h i s remarkable t a l e n t s t o h i s c h i e f m i n i s t e r s , ' In a poem he expressed h i s g r i e f a t not being a b l e t o convey h i s f e e l i n g s and emotions t o h i s s u b j e c t s , i n the same way t h a t he used t o when L i 40 Hsun was closeby. In c o n t r a s t t o the t h r i f t i n e s s w i t h which he f i r s t 89 opened h i s reign i n 827, a f t e r the sweet dew fi a s c o he indulged him-s e l f i n the usual extravagances of the imperial palaces: concubines, musicians, exotic goods, expensive games and drunken feasts. He even took as concubines the daughters of L i Hsiao-pen, an imperial r e l a t i v e 41 and a L i Hsiin faction member who also suffered a cruel death. Towards the end of h i s reign he was especially concerned about h i s record i n 42 h i s t o r y , and persisted i n prying into them. In general, the l a s t f i v e years of h i s reign a f t e r the sweet dew coup were spent q u i e t l y . He was succeeded by h i s brother Wu-tsung, the chosen candidate of the Shen-ts'e 43 generals, Gh'iu Shih-liang and Yti Hung-chih. When the sweet dew coup was aborted i n the midst of chaos and te r r o r , the d e t a i l s of the incident were most l i k e l y unknown even i n the c i t y of Ch'ang-an. A l l over the empire, however, people knew that there had been a bloody coup i n the c a p i t a l , i n which chief ministers and thousands of men were massacred. In 838, the Japanese monk Ennin / \ " 44 was i n Yang-chou (Huai-nan; where even he heard about the bloody coup. Of course, he made gross mistakes on the date and numbers i n the distorted account i n h i s diary. As f o r the few survivors of the incident, none dared r e f e r to i t even though they may well have known the facts and de t a i l s of the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n and the coup. The Buddhist monk Tsung-mi was spared from the a r b i t r a r y massacres most l i k e l y because of his Buddhist f a i t h , to which most eunuchs attached themselves. However, afterwards he kept himself distant, from any sort of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s 45 and died q u i e t l y a few years l a t e r . Po Chu-i had also been i n Lo-yang when the L i Hsiin alignment was formed, and surely knew about, the d e t a i l s of the incident even though he had chosen non-involvement. In two poems, however, he expressed g r i e f f o r the sweet dew victims, especially f o r 90 46 h i s dear f r i e n d Shu YUan-yii. Under the a r b i t r a r y power of the eunuchs, he dared to write only i n guarded language with vague a l l u s i o n s . Another poet who expressed sorrow and lament f o r L i Hsiin and the others was L i Shang-yin, stressing a t the same time h i s r e l i e f that Wen-tsung had not 47 been dethroned. How much L i Shang-yin was involved with the members of the L i HsUn fact i o n we do not know. A source indicates that i n a report to a p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l l a t e r that year L i Sheng-yin states that the accusations against L i Hsun, Wang Yai and the others were not sub-4 8 stantiated by evidence. This was a daring statement to make, considering the f a c t that the eunuchs were s t i l l sensitive about the incident.. In Chapter Three we mentioned L i Mei's "strange and marvellous" t a l e of the reunion of the ghosts of L i Hsiin and the others i n Lo-yang. From the story, i t seems clear that L i Mei, a d i s c i p l e of Shu Yuan-yii, knew about the d e t a i l s of the coup but only dared to r e f e r to i t through guarded language, using supernatural elements. The contents of the t a l e reveals poignantly h i s deep sense of loss when the victims died so unjustly. Po ChU-i, L i Shang-yin and L i Mei, i n expressing deep sympathy and g r i e f f o r the victims i n written works, represented only a t i n y minority i n the empire a t that time. Public sympathy f o r the L i Hsun f a c t i o n members was not evident u n t i l 901» i n the "act of grace" accompanying the change of reign t i t l e of Chao-tsung (888-903). In t h i s document, which ab-solved completely the g u i l t and blame of the seventeen L i Hsiin f a c t i o n members, i t i s stated that they had operated under imperial command and 49 did not commit treason. These sympathetic feelings have not been shared by the historiographers of the standard works, despite the presence of the 901 "act of grace" document. Rather, the Sung historiographers preferred to consider the 91 L i Hsun f a c t i o n members to be unscrupulous men a f t e r p r o f i t and wealth only. They continued to assess the L i Hsun men from the viewpoint of t h e i r f i n a l defeat i n the sweet dew plot. Ignoring the considerable success that the L i Hsun fac t i o n had with i t s administration p r i o r to the f i n a l f i a s c o , the Sung historiographers, instead, concentrated on the chaos that was l e f t i n the c i t y of Ch'ang-an. The emperor Wen-tsung was also c r i t i c i z e d f o r h i s mediocrity i n selecting men, even though hi s natural tendency to s t r i v e f o r the good of h i s empire was acknowledged. In spite of these feelings of h o s t i l i t y against the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n members, we note that, l i k e Wang Shu-wen and h i s f a c t i o n , the L i Hsiin men are not portrayed as t r a i t o r s to the state and included i n the section of traitorous o f f i c i a l s (chien-ch'en) as Ts'ui Yin Is. Ts'ui Yin, exasperated with the eunuch menace, had towards the end of the T'ang in v i t e d the m i l i t a r y governor, Chu Wen, to come into.the c a p i t a l to execute a mass slaughter of the court eunuchs.^ With the f i n a l ab-o l i t i o n of the eunuchs, also ended the T'ang dynasty that had been to t t e r i n g since the An-Shih rebe l l i o n s . 92 Gonclusion In post-rebellion T'ang, the repercussions of the An-Shih chaos reverberated f o r one and a half centuries before ushering i n a new order, or rather disorder, with the Five Dynasties Period. The L i Hsun fac t i o n and the Sweet Dew Incident i n 835 constituted a b r i e f but climactic episode i n the p o l i t i c s of the l a t e T'ang government that was continuously but helplessly searching f o r a r e v i t a l i z a t i o n of the dynasty. In t h i s study we have shown how the anxiety of the emperor Wen-tsung f o r a solution to the problems of his empire led him to co-operate;' with L i Hsun and his alignment, i n order to bring about a de-c i s i v e change i n the structure of the central government. Through a study of the composition and formation of the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n , we f i n d that, rather than a handful of opportunistic upstarts, as the standard works would have us believe, the L i Hsttn men were mostly orthodox o f f i -c i a l s concerned about the a f f a i r s of the empire. That LI Hsiin, a p o l i t i c a l e x i l e , could within one year manipulate such informal i n s t i t u t i o n s as the Han-lin Academy and transform his secret alignment i n Loyang i n t o the dominant f a c t i o n i n the central bureaucracy i n Ch'ang-an i s s i g n i -f i c a n t . I t shows the d r a s t i c degree of the disintegration following the An-Shih rebellions of the three-departmental (san-sheng chih-tu) system of the early T'ang government. I t i s even more s i g n i f i c a n t that i n s pite of the support of the emperor Wen-tsung i n i t s p o l i t i c a l ven-tures, the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n s t i l l collapsed i n the f i n a l coup. This outcome convincingly demonstrates that the T'ang emperor, although sym-b o l i c a l l y s t i l l the ultimate authority, carried l i t t l e actual power but remained a puppet controlled by the court eunuchs i n l a t e T'ang. In the short period of i t s r i s e to power and subsequent administra-9 3 t i o n i n the central bureaucracy, the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n murdered s i x chief court eunuchs and expelled the Niu and L i f a c t i o n a l i s t leaders and par-tisans from Ch'ang-an. This was an amazing fea t , i n consideration of the f a c t that the Niu and LI p o l i t i c i a n s did not even succeed i n eliminating one powerful court eunuch during t h e i r many respective periods of administration. That the L i Hsun faction had acted i n a h o s t i l e manner towards the eunuchs, to whom i t owed i t s i n i t i a l . r i s e to power, warrants addit i o n a l comment. Modern scholars generally do not see the L i Hsun fac t i o n as being independent of outside control. According to Ch'en Yin-k'o, the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n members, si m i l a r to a l l other l a t e T'ang o f f i c i a l s , were merely "hangers-on" and "echoing voices" of dissident 52 eunuchs. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , LU Ssu-mien interprets the L i Hsun f a c t i o n to be a mere puppet of the intrigues of the Shen-ts'e Armies of the Left 53 and of the Right, both under eunuch control. Likewise, Bischoff con-siders the Han-lin Academy, through which L i Hsun operated, to be an 54-i n s t i t u t i o n s o l e l y controlled by the court eunuchs. In h i s view then, L i Hsiin was also d i r e c t l y under the power of the eunuchs. In our study, however, the fact that the L i Hsiin faction was able to deal e f f e c t i v e l y with those eunuchs to whom i t owed i t s advancement shows that the f a c t i o n was d e f i n i t e l y not manipulated by the eunuchs. On the other hand, contrary to the viewpoints of the above three scholars, i t indicates that during L i Hsun's r i s e to power, the same eunuchs were themselves maneuvered. The manipulation of the eunuchs by the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n was, however, a short-lived a f f a i r . The f i n a l confrontation with the court eunuchs brought about an abrupt end fo r the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n members and th e i r supporters. This disastrous . outcome of the coup r e f l e c t s the 94 d i v i s i o n of power between the court eunuchs and the central bureaucracy that was b r i e f l y controlled by the L i Hsun fact i o n . I t shows that while a few i n d i v i d u a l eunuchs might be manipulated, when i t came to challenging the eunuch m i l i t a r y base i n the Shen-ts'e Armies, the court eunuchs stood together as one i n v i n c i b l e body. In f a c t , the established power of the eunuchs had already been demonstrated i n 805 i n the Wang Shu-wen A f f a i r . In anti-eunuch objectives, p o l i t i c a l methods and unorthodox r i s e to power, the Wang Shu-wen and the L i Hsiin factions did not d i f f e r from each other. While the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n was i n i t i a l l y much more powerful i n t h e i r administration, i t s fiasco was also f a r more dramatic and disastrous than the Wang Shu-wen faction. In spite of the support of the emperors both factions obtained, they f a i l e d to curb the power of the eunuchs i n the end. In the f i n a l analysis, the eunuchs of the T'ang dynasty had by the ninth century, r i s e n to a position that could not be challenged even by emperors. After the coup of 835i the only defence f o r the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n members came from L i u Ts'ung-chien, the m i l i t a r y governor of Ghao-i, with whom the L i Hsun fact i o n had made previous connections. I r o n i c a l l y , while L i u Ts'ung-chien's defiance of the p o l i t i c a l dominance of the eunuchs restored some powers to the central bureaucracy, i t also foreshadowed the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l m i l i t a r y governors i n the central government. For, the only successful movement to abolish the powers of the court eunuchs was eventually under-taken by Ghu Wen, the m i l i t a r y governor of Ho-nan. Unfortunately f o r the imperial household, a f t e r slaughtering a l l the court eunuchs i n Ch'ang-an i n 903» Ghu Wen subsequently usurped the T'ang throne i n 907. 95 NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE '''The rebellions of the An Lu-shan and Shih Ssu-ming families i n 755-762 constituted a drastic turning point i n T'ang history. For the p o l i t i c a l , economic and military factors behind the rebellions see E. G. Pulleyblank, The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan. Oxford, 1955. 2 In Chinese history, the concept of a restoration essentially refers to a period of revitalization i n a dynasty after i t had been i n f l i c t e d with a tremendous c r i s i s that threatened a collapse of the imperial household. In the T'ang dynasty, the Yuan-ho Rest-oration i n 805-820 was perhaps the only effective restoration move-ment. By means of expensive campaigns, the T'ang central government managed to restore control over most provinces. After a b r i l l i a n t reign i n the beginning, the last days of the emperor Hsien-tsung were somewhat chaotic. In fact, the emperor was assassinated by a eunuch clique mllitantly opposed to the policy of "using arms" In his reign. For details of the Yuan-ho Restoration, see amongst other works Lu Ssu-mien, Sui-T'ang Wu-tai shih. 'Peking, , 1959, 1 P.350-360$ C. A. Peterson, "The Restoration Completed! Emperor Hsien-tsung and the Provinces", i n A. F. Wright & D. C. Twitchett (ed.), Perspectives on the T'ang. New Haven, 1973. P. 151-192. That there had been another T'ang restoration movement in the Hui-ch'ang period (840-846) has been polemically argued by Tr^ang Chf'eng-yeh i n Taiwan. Despite voluminous publications, his arguments are not convincing, as his perspectives are impaired by a conscious p o l i t i c a l motive. See, for example, T'ang Ch'eng-yeh, T'ang-tai  hsiang-chlh yu Hul-ch'ang cheng-feng. Taipei; L i Te-yu yen-chiu. Taipei, 1970. In -the la t t e r work he discusses the L i Hsiin faction and the Sweet Dew Incident. Without any evidence he concludes that L i Te-yii was basically friendly towards the L i Hsiin faction, and expresses surprise that the two did not co-operateI We shall later see how L i Te-yu even slaughtered the l a s t remnants of the L i Hsiin family members when he was i n power. T'ang Ch'eng-yeh's p o l i t i c a l stand on behalf of the Taiwan government i s evident i n his work. He offers a rather favourable re-appraisal of the L i Hsun faction. It would indeed be interesting to see a recent Mainland Chinese view expressed on this issue, which one would expect to Interpret the Sweet Dew Incident to be f u l l of revolutionary potential. ^Ch'en Yin-k'o, i n his hypothesis about the intimate inter-relationships of the border tribes and the history of T'ang China, shows convincingly that had the foreign tribes themselves not been disintegrating gradually, the post-rebellion T'ang that was suffering from the devastation of the An-Shih chaos would not have been able to recover some lost territories. See Ch'en Yin-k'o, "T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao" ( f i r s t published i n Chungking 1944), in Ch'en Yin-k'o hslen-sheng lun-chi. Chung-yang yen-chiu-yuan l i - s h l h yii-yen yen-chiu-suo, Taipei, 1971| P. 192-209. In 805, Wang Shu-wen and his faction, which included talented 96 men such as Tu Tu, Liu Yu-hsi, Liu Tsung-yiian, Wei Chih-i, and Wang P'ei, had come to power through the help of a eunuch and an imperial con-cubine, with the f u l l support of the emperor Shun-tsung. Wang Shu-wen had served the emperor Shun-tsung since the latter was the heir apparent. Operating from the Han-lin Academy, Wang Shu-wen and Wang P'ei were able to implement certain reforms aimed against the abuses of power by the court eunuchs. After only five months of adminis-tration, the Wang faction was expelled from Ch'ang-an through the united efforts of the upper class bureaucrats and the eunuchs. The extant Shun-tsung shih-lu which i s attributed to Han YU and collected in the Han Ch'ang-li chi (wai-chl 6-8) casts the Wang faction as self-enhancing upstarts. This is the traditional interpretation of the Wang Shu-wen movement. The Shun-tsung shih-lu itself has been a controversial topic in recent scholarship. See the debate on its authorship between Pulley-blank and Dulls E. G. Pulleyblank, "The Shun-tsung shih-lu". Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies 19-(1957). P.336-344; J. L. Dull, "Han Ylis A Problem in T'ang Dynasty Historiography", Internation- a l Associations of Historians of Asia. Second Biennial Conference Pro- ceedings . Taipei, 1962, p. 71-99. For the translation of the Shun-tsung  shih-lu f see B.S. Solomon, The Veritable Record of the T'ang Emperor  Shun-tsung. Cambridge, 1955. Modern appraisals of the Wang faction, in the above sources and elsewhere, generally portray the members as true reformers, with ideals and political objectives. The Chinese Communists are in particular interested in emphasizing the revolutionary potential of the faction. See for instance Wang I-sheng, "Lun erh-Wang pa-ssu-ma cheng-chih ko-hsin t i li-shih i - i " , Li-shih yen-chiu 3 (1963;, p. 105 -130. For our purpose in this study, the Li Hsiin faction was similar to the Wang group in several respects, including political objectives and the rise to power. We shall be making frequent references to the Wang faction, ^In the T'ang dynasty, in the reigns of Kao-tsu (618-626) and of Te-tsung (78O-8OO), there has been two recorded cases 0 f the presence of sweet dew.See Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao 303, p. 2391; Ou-yang Chan's Kan-lu shu essay on the occasion of sweet dew descending during Te-tsung* s reign. In traditional China, sweet dew was an auspicious omen, believed to f a l l upon the earth only when the empire was at peace. See T. Mottchashi, Dal Kan-wa jiten. Tokyo, i960. ^For details on the compilation of these three standard works on T'ang history, see Robert des Rotours (trans.), Le Tralte des Examens. Paris, 1932, p. 56-85. ?See for example Chang Ch'iin, T'ang-shih. Taipei, 1958, p. 208-209; Fu Lo-ch'eng, Sui-T'ang Wu-tai shih. Taipei, 1957. p.,154-156; Liu Yat-wing, "The Shen-ts'e Armies and Palace Commissions.;in China, 755-^75 A.D., London (unpublished Ph. D. thesis 1970), p. 287-293. See Shih-ch'l-shih shang-ch'ueh 91. According to an article by Lo Hsiang-lin in 1934, a local hist-97 torlan Hu Hsi (Hsiao-ts'en) of Hsing-ning in Kwangtung had the inten-tion to collect material on the Sweet Dew Incident, in order to reach alternative views of the Li Hsun faction. Unfortunately his work is left only in note form, but Lo Hsiang-lin indicates in the article that he would continue the project. I have not been able to trace any subse-quent publications by Lo Hsiang-lin which relate to the event, and, of course, i t is impossible to obtain the notes by Hu Hsi. From the article itself, one observes that the notes are important in that Hu Hsi draws from works of literary men such as Li Shang-yin, a contemporary of the sweet dew victims. It seems that Hu Hsi, also author of the Hsing-ning tu-chih  k'ao. was a late Ch'lng/early Republican scholar interested in the Sweet Dew Incident because the eunuch Gh'iu Shih-liang, who played such an im? portant role in the event, had come from the Hsing-ning region, the native place of Hu Hsi. See Lo Hsiang-lin, "Hu chi Kan-lu shih-lel ts'ao-kao p'o-wei", Wen-shih hsiieh yen-chiu-suo chi-k'an 3 i l (1934). p. 1233-1236. ^See Ts'en Chung-mien, "Han-lin hsiieh-shih pi-chi chu-pu", Chung- yang yen-chiu-yuan 11-shih yU-yen yen-chiu-suo chi-k'an 15 (1948), p. 51-52; Ts'en Chung-mien, T'ung-chien Sui-T'ang chi pi-shih chlh-i. Peking. 1963, P. 278-282. ^See Ch'en Yin-k'o,"T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao", p. 179-180. •^See Lu Ssu-mien, Sui-T'ang Wu-tai shih. p. 393. ^See A. Waley, The Life and Times of Po ChU-i. London, 1949, p. 178-;81; 187-190. 14 / \ The Wen-tsung pen-chi in the HTS (8.3) is only one eighth the length of that of the CTS. and is practically useless in locating sources on the Li Hsun faction and the Sweet Dew Incident. ^The following chart reflects the typical stages of revision from the most primary accounts to the "standard history" form in the History offices standard history (cheng-shih) dealing with a defunct [ dynasty national history (kuo-shih) dealing with the reigning J dynasty veritable records (shih-lu) dealing with the reign J of an emperor daily-records (jih-li) records of current government (shih-cheng chi) drafted by chief ministers in office diaries of activity and repose (ch'i-chu chu)drafted by minor history officials 98 For a description of the process of h i s t o r y compilation, see D.C. Twitchett, "Chinese Biographical Writing"} Yang Lien-sheng, "The Organization of Chinese O f f i c i a l Historiography", both works i n W.G. Beasley & E.G. Pulleyblank (ed.), Historians of China and Japan, Oxford, 1961, p. 100-101* p.45-46. "^For the value of the TCTC K'ao-i i n ind i c a t i n g alternative sources and the origins of these sources see E. G. Pulleyblank, "The Tzyjih Tongjiann Kaoyih and the Sources f o r the History of the Period 730-763", B u l l e t i n of the School of Oriental and African Studies 13,(1950), p.448-473. 17 These include the bibliography monograph i n the two T'ang-shu (CTS 47-48} HTS'57-60). the Chih-chai shu-lu chieh-t'l.Chun-chai tu-shu chih. Cfo'uhg^wen tsung-mu chi-shih. and the Wen-hsien t'ung- k^ao (hereafter abbreviated as CCSLCT. CCTSC. CWTMCS. WHTK). 18 See note 4, t h i s chapter, about the Shun-tsung shih-lu. 19 7See E.G. Pulleyblank, "The Tzyjih Tongjiann Kaoyih and the Sources f o r the History of the Period 730-763", p.458-459. PO c See CCSLCT 4} CCTSC 6{ CWTMCS 2} HTS 58} WHTK 194. 2"Hfei Mo, descendant of the celebrated p o l i t i c a l f igure Wei Cheng, served both Wen-tsung and Hsuan-tsung, He has biographies i n both T'ang- shu (CTS 176} HTS 97). The drafters of the Wen-tsung sh i h - l u . under the supervision of Wei Mo, were Chiang Chieh (HTS 132). Niu Ts'ung, Wang Feng, Lu Kao, and Lu Tan, who respectively held the posts of vice-president of Imperial S a c r i f i c e s , a u x i l i a r y secretary of the Bureau of Meals, a u x i l i a r y secretary of the Bureau of Honorific T i t l e s , omissioner of the r i g h t , and executive secretary of the Chancellery. Niu Ts'ung was the, son of the Niu faction leader,Niu Seng-ju, Chiang Chieh i s also noted f o r compiling the works of L i Chiang, a respectable chjrf minister; the L i Hsiang-kuo lun-chi i n seven chapters. See D.C. Twitchett, "Problems of Chinese Biography", i n A. F. Wright & D.C. Twitchett (ed.), Confucian Personalities. Stanford, 1962, p.27. 2 ? I b i d . 2^See TCTC T'ai-ho 9 / l l / a f t e r kuei-hai. 25 There i s an abundance of references to the L i Hsun faction i n extant imperial edicts and decrees. These documents exist i n the form of appointment notices of the f a c t i o n members, prosecution orders, and "acts of grace". The documents are most f u l l y collected i n Sung Min-ch'iu's T:'ang t a chao-llng c h l , a work completed i n 1070. The documents are also e a s i l y found i n the Ch'uan T'ang-wen (CTW). included i n the 99 writings of Wen-tsung, i n chapters 72-75. Although Wang Yai, L i Hsiin, Cheng Chu and Ku Shih-i had been i n the Han-lin Academy, t h e i r names were removed from the Han-lin f i l e s and texts. See Ts'en Chung-mien, "Han-lin hsiieh-shih p i - c h i chu-pu", p.51-52. 2?The TCTC (Ta-chung 8/lO/day unspecified) makes a b r i e f a l l u s i o n to the absolution of g u i l t of the f a c t i o n members except L i Hsiin and Cheng Chu i n 854. The r e l i a b i l i t y of the TCTC i n t h i s instance i s i n doubt, as pointed out by Ts'en Chung-mien, i n h i s book T'ung-chlen  Sui-T'ang c h i pl-shih c h i h - i . p. 307. The two T'ang-shu do not have record of the incident. Furthermore, itrseems u n l i k e l y that Hsuan-tsung, who freq.ueni.ly complained about the eunuchs having "come together i n one piece", would have dared to take such an anti-eunuch stand i n his reign. See T'ang y u - l i n 2,p.' 38-39. When the L i Hsun f a c t i o n became absolved i n the "act of grace" i n 901, a statement shows that f o r over 60 years; no one had yet removed the g u i l t of the L i Hs'un fact i o n members. The year of the sweet dew coup was 8351 and i t i s indeed over 60 years when subtracted from.901,the year of the "act of grace". See T'ang ta chao-ling c h i 5» P.31-33. I t thus seems j u s t i f i e d t o accept the version that the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n members had not been absolved of g u i l t u n t i l 901. 2 8Mu-tsung shih-lu .(for 820-824) dated 831 * 20 chapters chief compilers Lu Sui The TCTC K l a o - l quotes t h i s work i n an instance which has no d i r e c t relevance to the L i Hsiin faction(TCTC T'ai-ho 5/9/keng-shen). Ching-tsung shih-lu (for 824-827) dated 843 10 chapters chief compilers Chfen. ;Jang-i This work i s not quoted by the TCTC K'ao-i .during the period 827-840. For sources to the above information, see CCSLCT 4; CCTSC 6; CWTMCS 2} HTS 58: WHTK 194. 2 9Wu-tsung shih-lu (for 8 40 -846 ) 30 chapters chief compilers Wei Pao-heng This work seems to have been the l a s t "veritable record" drafted i n the T'ang dynasty. By the end of the Five Dynasties Period, we know that only one chapter of t h i s work remained extant. The TCTC K'ao-i quotes from t h i s work often (for example, TCTC K'ai-ch'eng 5/l/i-mao, TCTC K'ai-ch'eng 5/l/kuei-wei, TCTC K'ai-ch'eng 5/l/kuei-yu). The version that was available to the TCTC must have been Sung Min-ch'iu's restored Wu-tsung shih-lu. Sung Min-ch'iu also undertook a project to restore the "veritable records" f o r the subsequent emperors: Hsiian-tsung, I-tsung, Hsi-tsung, Chao-tsung, and Chao Hsuan-tl. The project was undertaken c. 1070. 100 Hs'uan-tsung shih-lu (for 846-859) dated c. 10?0 30 chapters chief compilers Sung Min-ch'iu As stated above, t h i s work was undertaken i n the Sung dynasty. The TCTC also alludes to i t i n our period, but does not treat the material i n i t as r e l i a b l e (TCTC T'ai-ho 9/9/ting-maq). For sources to the above information, see CCSLCT 4; CCTSC 6; CWTMCS 2; HTS 58; WHTK 194. 30 J From what we know about these four "veritable records", they do _ not seem to be of prime importance to our study. The biographies appended to the Mu-tsung and Ching-tsung shih-lu would not Interest us, since the subjects of these biographies did not l i v e t o see the Sweet Dew Incident, of 835. In the Wen-tsung. Wu-tsung. and Hsuan- tsung shih-lu. we may f i n d the biographies of the contemporaries of L i Hsiin who survived the c r i s i s of 835» such as P'ei Tu, Po Ch'u-i, Ling-hu Ch'u, L i Te-yil, and Ch'iu Shih-liang. But, i n t h e i r biographies i n the two T'ang-shu and i n scattered b i t s of information throughout the relevant periods i n the TCTC, we do not f i n d c o n f l i c t i n g evidence to the standard accounts of the L i Hsun faction. We can account f o r t h i s consistencys 1) P'ei Tu and Ling-hu Ch'u both died l a t e i n Wen-tsung's reign, thus t h e i r biographies would have been included In the Wen-tsung shih-lu , and worked on by the same hi s t o r y o f f i c i a l s who composed the biographies of the L i Hsiin men. 2) Ch*iu Shih-liang, who died i n Wu-tsung's reign, should accord-i n g l y have been i n the Wu-tsung shih-lu. Po Chu-i and L i Te-yu's biographies ought to be i n the Hs'uan-tsung shih-lu. since they died during Hsuan-tsung's reign. The shih-lu a f t e r the Wen-tsung one were however reconstructed by Sung Min-ch'iu, a contemporary of the compilers of the CTS, HTS, and the TCTC. The sources available to Sung Min-ch'iu would l i k e l y have been accessible to the compilers of the Standard works. The s i m i l a r i t y of sources thus accounts f o r the general consistency of the records i n the standard works on the L i Hsiin faction. 31 The following are examples of additional d e t a i l s i n the HTS and TCTC which are not i n the CTS: 1) the incident i n which Wen-tsung's i l l n e s s was cured by Cheng Chu (HTS 179.2; TCTC T'ai-ho 7/12/keng-tau) 2) the incident i n which Wang Yai's appointment to chief minister Is stated to stem from Cheng Chu's help (HTS 179.2; TCTC T'ai-ho 7/9/ ping-yin) 3) The CTS does not record the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of f i v e a d d i t i o n a l figures i n the Sweet Dew Incident, to make up the number of seventeen i n the L i Hsiin faction. This number i s confirmed by the "act of grace" i n 901. and used by both the HTS and the TCTC. 4) The CTS records 1600 victims of the sweet dew coup, while both the HTS and the TCTC bring the t o t a l to 3000. 5) The depression of Wen-tsung a f t e r the sweet dew coup i s not mentioned i n the CTS, while both the HTS and the TCTC describe i t . 101 6)The information about the r e l a t i v e s of Wang Yai and Shu Yuan-yu i s not found i s the GTS, but can be located i n both the HTS and the TCTC. The following are examples of the TCTC's rej e c t i o n of additional. information i n preference f o r the CIS versions, while the HTS accepts u n c r i t i c a l l y the same material: 1) The chronology of the HTS i s unreliable. For example, L i Hsun would not have dared poison:, .the eunuch Wang Shou-ch'eng u n t i l he became chief minister. This i s the version accepted by both the GTS and the TCTC. 2) The incident of Ts'ui Chen-yu being ordered to dethrone the emperor Wen-tsung by Ch'iu Shih-liang i s not recorded i n the GTS. The TCTC l i s t s the information as unreliable, while the HTS accepts t h i s information u n c r i t i c a l l y . ^ 2 I t has been elsewhere indicated by means of the TCTC K'ao-i that, f o r T'ang hi s t o r y up to the end of Wen-tsung's reign;(the Wen-tsung  shih-lu being the l a s t f u l l y extant T'ang "veritable record" i n the Sung dynasty;, the GTS i s the most f a i t h f u l i n reproducing shih-lu mat-e r i a l , as opposed to the HTS and the TCTC. For case studies of certain periods i n which the GTS i s shown almost copying word by word from the "veritable records" , see E.G. Pulleyblank, The Background of the  Rebellion, of An Lu-shan. 167-171: Liu Yat-wing, "The Shen-ts'e Armies and Palace Commissions i n China", p. 437-W+. Unfortunately we cannot f i n d a TCTC K'&o-i quote of the Wen-tsung shih-lu with d i r e c t reference to the L i Hsun f a c t i o n , with which we can compare the corresponding version i n the CTS. are applying a simple c l a s s i f i c a t i o n f o r these n o n - o f f i c i a l sources, : the "miscellaneous h i s t o r i e s " (tsa-shlh) and the "anecdotal material" (hsiao-shuo). The f i r s t category includes the works c a l l e d "separate history'* (pieh-shih) and "unconventional h i s t o r i e s " (yeh-shlh). which were works of h i s t o r i c a l nature but not drafted under imperial decrees. The second category includes anthologies of anecdotes and tales which frequently dwelled on h i s t o r i c a l topics. -^For the course and devastating effects of the Huang Ch'ao Rebellion, see Ts'en Chung-mien, Sul-T'ang shih. Peking, 1957, P. 466-521. From the TCTC K'ao-i quotes on the non-extant sources discussed i n the Appendix I at the back, we cannot f i n d any favourable comments on the L i Hsiin faction. These quotes show that the non-extant sources could have possibly referred to the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n members i n the same negative tone as the standard works. Of course there could have existed favourable comments i n these non-extant works that were not quoted by the TCTC K'ao-i. which i s known not to indicate or quote a l l i t s sources. 3 6See T'ang ta chao-ling ehi 5. p. 31-33. 3?See CTS l69.ll HTS 179.1 102 NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO hlTS 1 7 9 . 1 ; see also similar version in TCTC T'ai-ho 9/7/after hsin-hai. 2Both T'ang-shu devote sections to the Uighur (CTS 1 9 5 ; HTS 2 1 7 a-b). Among the various works on T'ang Uighur history, see relevant articles in Lu Ssu-mien, Sui-T'ang Wu-tai shih. and Ts'en Chung-mien, Sui-T'ang  shih; also see Colin Mackerras, The Uighur Empire (744-840) According  to the T'ang Dynastic Histories. Canberra, 1 9 6 8 , ^See Kuang P'ing-chang, "T'ang-tai kung-chu ho-ch'in k'ao", Shih- hsueh nlen-pao 2 : 2 , p. 4 9 - 5 9 . 4 "From 7 5 8 on, every year the Uighur sent in 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 horses, and exacted from the state treasury over one million bolts of silk. The exchange was about one horse to forty bolts of silk." HTS 5 1 « See slso Ch'en Yin-k'o, "T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao", p. 2 0 5 -2 0 9 . 5See CTS 1 9 5 ; HTS 2 1 7 b. ^The T'u-fan also have monographs in the two T'ang-shu (CTS 1 9 6 ; HTS 2 1 6 a-b). Among the various works on the T'u-fan tribes, see relevant articles in Lu Ssu-mien, Sui-T'ang Wu-tai shih. and Ts'en Chung-mien, Sui-T'ang shih. ?See Ts'en Chung-mien, Sui-T'ang shih. p. 275-282. 8See TCTC T'ai-ho 5/9/keng-shen. ^See CTS 1 9 6 ; HTS 2 1 6 bjalso Su Ying-hui, "T'ang-Hsuan-tsung shou-fu Ho-huang ti-chu yti san-chou ch'i-kuan t i nien-tal lueh-lun", Chung- yang yen-chiu-yuan min-tsu hsueh yen-chiu-suo chi-k'an 2 9 ( 1 9 7 0 ) , P. 219-242. 1 0The Nan-chao also have monographs in the two T'ang-shu (CTS 1 9 7j HTS 2 2 2 a-c). Nan-chao raids f i r s t occurred .in the third year of* Wen-tsung's reign. See TCTC T'ai-ho 3/ll/ping-shen, For modern works on the Nan-chao, see HsiangTa, "Nan-chao shih lueh-lun", in T'ang-tai gh'ang-^ an YU Hsi-yU wen-ming. Peking, 1 9 5 7 i P. 1 5 5 - 1 9 4 ; also see Wilfred Stott, "The Expansion of the Nan-chao Kingdom", Toung-pao 5 0 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 1 9 0 - 2 2 0 . i:LSee Ch'en Yin-k'o, "T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao", p. 2 0 9 . One of the most intense contemporary critics of the Ho-pei situation 103 was Tu Mu, who memorialized the throne frequently about t h i s issue. See TCTC T'ai-ho 7/8/ping-yin. The Ho-pei region of T'ang China was of c r u c i a l significance to the central government. I t had a strategic location, and a good climate f o r agriculture and i d e a l breeding grounds for horses. Ch'en Yin-k'o and Wang Shou-nan propose that the independent orientation of the Ho-pei provinces i n l a t e T'ang was a consequence of the differences i n culture between the Northeast and the Ch'ang-an area. See Ch'en Yin-k'o, "T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao", p. 124-12?; V/ang Shou-nan, "Lun T'ang-t a i Ho-pei san-chen chih t u - l i t s a i wen-hua shang t i yuan-yin", Chung- shan hslieh-shu wen-hua chi-k'an 1 (1968), p. 569-62O. For a detailed study on the T'ang c e n t r a l government and i t s relationships with the various fan-chen provinces i n l a t e T'ang, see Wang Shou-nan, T'ang-tai  fan-chen y'u chung-yang kuan-hsi ch3h yen-chiu. Taipei, 1969. "^See TCTC YUan-ho 10/6/kuei-mao. 14 See TCTC T'ai-ho 1 to T'ai-ho 3 passim. To r e c r u i t support, L i T?.ung-chieh used women and wealth to bribe the Ho-pei governors. See TCTC T'ai-ho 1/8/keng-tzu. ^See TCTC T'ai-ho 2/9/keng-hsu. l 6See TCTC T'ai-ho 4/2/i-mao. 17 Among others, t h i s was the opinion expressed by the Ch'ing scholar Chao I. See Nien-erh-shih cha-chi 20, p. 262. For a b r i e f survey of the i n f l u e n t i a l eunuchs throughout Chinese history, see C. G. Stent, "Chinese Eunuchs", Journal of the North China Branch 2£ ihe Royal A s i a t i c Society 11 (new series, 18?6), p. 143-184. 18" The T'ang eunuchs, most of them being i l l i t e r a t e , neither wrote much nor l i k e d to leave t h e i r record i n history. What we know about them are from pieces of information f i l t e r e d through the c r i t i c a l eyes of the moralistic historiographers, who saw them as e v i l and depraved characters. Primary sources on the T'ang eunuchs consist of biographies i n the two T'ang-shu (CTS 184, biographies of 15 eunuchs; HTS 207-208, biographies of 21 eunuchs), biographies i n l o c a l gazeteers (e.g. bio-graphy Df Ch'iu Shih-liang i n the Hsing-ning hsien-chih). and eunuch epitaphs (e.g. the epitaph of Ch'iu Shih-liang written by Cheng Hsun, i n CTW 690. In recent works, Yano Chigara's studies of T'ang eunuchs and t h e i r customs such as the adoption of sons are highly informative. See for example his"Tbdai kangan kensel kakutoku i n yuko", Shigaku zasshl 63:10 (1954), P. 34-48; "Todai n i okeru kashi-sei n i t s u i t e " , Shigaku  kenkyu klnen rons6 (1950), p. 231-257. In the West, J.K. Rideout's work on the eunuchs i n the early part of the T'ang dynasty remains the most valuable source. See J. K. Rideout, "The Rise of the Eunuchs i n the T'ang'Dynasty 618-705", Asia Major 1 (new series, 1949-50), p. 53-72; Asia Ma.jor 3 (new series, 1952), p. 42-58. Rideout's work has been u t i l i z e d i n dissertations such as that by M.L. Carlson, "The Rationale of m Eunuch Power i n the Government of T'ang China 618-805", Chicago (unpublished Ph. D. thesis-19?l)5 and L i u Yat-wing, "The Shen-ts'e Armies and Palace Commissions i n China". 19 "T'ang eunuchs were supplied from amongst war prisoners, castrated criminals, captured slaves and from p r o v i n c i a l t r i b u t e s . See J.K. Rldeout, "Rise of the T'ang Eunuchs", Part I, p. 5^-55. 20 See Rldeout's analysis of eunuch foundations of p o l i t i c a l power i n the f i r s t century of the T'ang government. See J.K. Rideout, "Rise of the Eunuchs i n the T'ang Dynasty", Parts I and I I passim. 21 See M.L. Carlson, "The Rationale of Eunuch Power i n the Govern-ment of T'ang China',' p. 60-124, f o r the c r u c i a l r o l e Kao Li - s h i h played i n setting the stage f o r eunuch involvement i n the T'ang p o l i t i c a l system. Many ad-hoc organs of power, responsible to the emperor alone, were created a f t e r the An-Shih rebellions to meet the immediate needs of the situation. Among these were the Shen-ts'e Armies and the Shu-mi Council, both under the control of Ithe T'ang eunuchs. See J.K. Rideout,"Rise of the Eunuchs i n the T'ang Dynasty", Part I, P. 57, quoting from the Ts'e-fu yuan-kuei 665, P. 5-6. 2-^See Robert des Rotours, Le Traite des Examens. p. 17-195 E.G. Pulleyblank, The Background of the the Rebellion of An Lu-shan. p. 62-66. 24 See L i u Yat-wing, "The Shen-ts'e Armies and Palace Commissions i n China", p. 376-393. 2 % b i d . 26 In 805 Wang Shy-wen unsuccessfully t r i e d to wrest eunuch control from the Shen-ts'e Armies by putting one of h i s men, Fan Hsi-ch'ao i n control. L i Hsun's attempt precipitated the Sweet Dew Incident. Lastly, L i Te-yti's attempt a t d i r e c t l y ordering the return of the Shen-ts'e seals also f a i l e d . 27 'Eunuchs were put i n charge of m i l i t a r y storages, such as the ch'un-ch'i k'u. kung-chien k'u. and the wu-k'u. See L i u Yat-wing, The Shen-ts'e Armies and Palace Commissions i n China", p. I63-I66. p Q For example, when the residence of the eunuch Ch'iu Shih-liang was raided i n 843 upon h i s death, a large accumulation of wealth and m i l i t a r y weapons were discovered. See HTS 207.8 ;TCTC Hui-ch'ang 4/6/d.u. 2^See L i u Yat-wing, "The Shen-ts'e Armies and Palace Commissions i n China", p. 175. 105 30 J The extent to which commissions of Good Works were able to influence foreign monks I s most v i v i d l y described i n the case of the eunuch Gh'iu Shih-liang and the Japanese monk Ennin, See E.O. Reischauer (trans.), Ennin's Diaryt Record of a Pilgrimage to China i n Search of the law. Harvard, 1955. "~ •^Shu-mi.a technical term l i k e Han-lin and Shen-ts'e. w i l l not be translated i n t h i s study. Instead, we s h a l l r e f e r to i t as the Shu-mi Council, and to the heads of t h i s organ of power the Shu-mi councillors. TteiFive Dynasties Period retained t h i s organ, but i t was by then no longer staffed by eunuchs. 32 In t h i s section on the several areas of eunuch power, we should also take into consideration various practices of "self-perpetuation" of these powers. One of these was the practice of adopting sons, which allowed f o r certain ranks and authorities to be Inherited by an adopted son from h i s adopted father. See Yano Chirgara, "Todai n i okeru kashi-s e i n i t s u i t e " , p. 231-257. Another practice was the c u l t i v a t i o n of d i s c i p l e s by d i r e c t i n s t r u c t i o n . For example, i n Ch'iu Shih-liang*s lecture to h i s clique on the s k i l l s of strengthening favour with the emperor, he stressed the'Importance of not allowing the emperor to have free time to indulge himself with Confucian scholars and books. See HTS 217.8j TCTC Hui-ch'ang 3/6/kuei-yu. -^See L i u Yat-wing,"The Shen-ts'e Armies and Palace Commissions i n China",p. 274-275. ^TCTC T'ai-ho 2/3/l-mao -^Both the o r i g i n a l question and reply are preserved i n f u l l i n CTW 746, p. 9765-9772. Excerpts are found i n Liu Fen's biographies i n the two T'ang-shu (CTS 190 b. 15} HTS 178) and i n TCTC T'ai-ho 2/3/ i-mao. 36CTW 746, p. 9765-9772 3 7See TCTC T'ai-ho 2/3/chia-wu. -^Since we are t o l d that even the other examination candidates admired L i u Fen's paper and considered i t the best among t h e i r own, we have reason to believe that the paper must have been ci r c u l a t e d widely i n the c a p i t a l . Thus not only Wen-tsung, but most of those involved with Ch'ang-an p o l i t i c s must have had access to the examina-t i o n reply. While not passing L i u Fen, the examiners seemed to have purposely c i r c u l a t e d h i s paper, 39 - " L i Hsiin was considered to be an expert i n the c l a s s i c s . When Wen-tsung alluded to a certain incident which Liu Fen dealt with i n his 106 examination r e p l y , L i Hsun was quick w i t h an ardent response drawn from the paper. See TCTC T'ai-ho 9 / 4 / a f t e r keng-tzu; T'ang y u - l l n 6, p. 226. **°See CTW 746 , p. 9765-9772; a l s o see HTS 179.4,; Ch'ao Ch'uo was a famed m i n i s t e r i n Han times. For an e r r o r i n q u e l l i n g a r e b e l -l i o n i n 155 B.C., he was c r u e l l y s a c r i f i c e d by h i s mentor/emperor. Chang Hua, of the Chin dynasty, rose t o p o l i t i c i a l prominence d e s p i t e h i s humble background. As c h a n c e l l o r , he was in s t r u m e n t a l i n form-u l a t i n g a b r i l l i a n t s t r a t e g y t o a t t a c k the Wu. He was t a l e n t e d i n l e a r n i n g and outspoken i n defence o f h i s p r i n c i p l e s . Despite h i s m e r i t s , he was a l s o put t o death by h i s emperor. See A. St r a u g h a i r , Chang Hua—A Statesman-poet of the Western Chin Dynasty. Canberra, 1973, P. 5-6. ^ S e e TCTC T'ai-ho 4/6/after t i n g - w e i t o T'ai-ho 5/3/jen-yin passim; a l s o CTS 167.5; HTS 152.5; T'ang t a c h a o - l i n g c h i 49, p.248. ^ S e e TCTC T'ai-ho 5/2/jen-ch'en. 43 ^The t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese b e l i e f t h a t Heaven was the u l t i m a t e judge of human j u s t i c e i s pregnant i n the n a r r a t i o n of the Sung Shen-hsi A f f a i r . The l o c u s t s and epidemics are f r e q u e n t l y r e p o r t e d i n Sung-Shen-h s i biographies and i n the Wen-tsung pen-chi (CTS 167.5; HTS 152.5; CTS 17 b. H.D. L a s s w e l l & H. Kaplan, Power and S o c i e t y — A Framework f o r P o l i t i c a l I n q u i r y . New Haven, 1950, p. 169-173. J.H. Wechsler, i n h i s " F a c t i o n a l i s m i n E a r l y T'ang Government", i n A.F. Wright & D.C. Twit-c h e t t , P e r s p e c t i v e s on the T'ang. p. 89, subscribes t o the L a s s w e l l / Kaplan d e f i n i t i o n of 'Ta c t i o n " and does not d e f i n e the " d e c i s i o n -making group" i n the context of the T'ang p o l i t i c a l system. •'The Niu and L I f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e has been a most c o n t r o v e r s i a l t o p i c i n both contemporary and modem s c h o l a r s h i p . One would expect a.summary a n a l y s i s of d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of view i n a r e c e n t d i s s e r t a t i o n by Kwan Lai-hung, "The F a c t i o n a l Struggle of China, 820-850", London, (unpublished Ph. D. t h e s i s 1973). Unfortunately I have not been ab l e t o c o n s u l t t h i s work y e t , 46 This view i s h e l d by Ch'en Yin-k'o and most other s c h o l a r s o f T'ang h i s t o r y . See Ch'en Yin-k'o,''T.'ang-tajL, cheng.7ch.lh s h i h shu-lun kao", p. 153-175. This i s the p o i n t of departure t h a t Ch'en Yin-k'o took i n h i s a n a l y s i s of t h e Niu and L i f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e , which i s i n essence a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f h i s well-known hypothesis about the p o l a r i z a t i o n of the T'ang r u l i n g c l a s s a c c o r d i n g t o geographical and s o c i a l o r i g i n s of the two b l o c s : the o l d entrenched a r i s t o c r a c y and the newly a r i s e n bureaucracy. He a c c o r d i n g l y b e l i e v e s t h a t the Niu and L i f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e was l i n k e d w i t h the s t r u g g l e of the entrenched a r i s t o c r a c y and the new bureaucrats who emerged through the l i t e r a r y c h i n - s h i h examinations. 107 47 According to another version of t h i s incident, there was commotion i n the Ch'ang-an court due to the scheming a c t i v i t i e s of an infamous o f f i c i a l , P'ei Chun. Wang Yai, one of the c r u c i a l members of the L i Hsiin fac t i o n , was also involved i n t h i s incident, as he was the uncle of Huang-fu Shih, one of the candidates who c r i t i c i z e d the government. Along with Niu Seng-ju and the other candidates and the examiners, Wang Yai suffered a demotion. Among other o f f i c i a l s who f e l t the pen-a l t i e s to be u n j u s t i f i e d , Po ChU-i memorialized the throne and request-ed the'.,emperor to reverse the decisions. However, the victims of t h i s examination scandal did not get reinstated u n t i l 810. See E. F e i f e l , Po Chui-i as a CensorsHis Memorials Presented to Emperor Hsien-tsung  durine: the Years 808-810."Tokyo. 1961, p. 43-55. 4R See CTS 168.3; HTS 177.1; also A. Waley, The L i f e and Times of Po Chu-i. p. 134-135. Ch'ien Hul was one of the victims of this exam-ination scandal since, as examiner, his decisions were reversed upon an investigation. In his defence, however,he refused to show the l e t -t e r s of recommendation which members of the L i f a c t i o n wrote to him, requesting special treatment to those candidates whom they favoured. La 'The following table indicates the f a c t i o n i n power during the forty years of the f a c t i o n a l feuds Reigns Fatetion i n Power Hsien-tsung (805-820) L i Mu-tsung (820-824) L i , Niu Ching-tsung (824-827) Niu, L i Wen-tsung (827-840) Niu, L i Wu-tsung (840-846) L i Hsuan-tsung (846-859) Niu 5® This i s the view held by Ts'en Chung-mien, and Taiwan scholars such as T'ang Ch'eng-yeh. See Ts'en Chung-mien, Sui-T'ang shih. P. 397-422; also T'ang Ch'eng-yeh, L i Te-yU yen-chiu. Taipei, 1970. -?J'T'ang and Sung opinions on factionalism are based on t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l conceptj that only mediocre men (hsiao-jen) were cap-able of f a c t i o n a l i s t a c t i v i t i e s , and that the superior men (chun-tzu) did not form factions. I t was also emphasized that the en-lightened emperor should be able to prevent f a c t i o n a l i s t a c t i v i t i e s i n h i s reign. In reply to the emperor's question about the presence of factionalism i n the court, the o f f i c i a l s d i d not d i f f e r i n t h e i r reply, regardless of the f a c t i o n that they represented. The reply was, of course, i n l i n e with the t r a d i t i o n a l pejorative concept of f a c t i o n -alism. See, f o r example, L i Te-yii's essay "P'eng-tang l u " i n CTW 709, P. 9223. The h i s t o r i a n Ouyang Hslu, i n the midst of intense factional:struggles i n the Sung government, develops an interesting and r a d i c i a l idea based on the claim that mediocre men were not even capable of forming factions, that i s , act consistently as a p o l i t i c a l group. He considers that supperlor men alone were capable of behaving as one p o l i t i c a l body. In t h i s hypothesis, he departs from the t r a d -108 i t i o n a l pejorative overtones of the term "faction", and puts into i t positive connotations. See his essay "P'eng-tang lun" i n the anthology Ku-wen kuan-chih. p. 4-31-433. ^ 2 T h i s view i s represented by Ch'en Yin-k'o and other scholars, See his "T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao", p. 153-175. Ch'en Yin-k'o maintains that members of the Niu f a c t i o n represented the newly arisen bureaucrats who emerged from the 'li;terary chin-shih examinations, but that members of the L i fac t i o n constituted the remaining elements of the old aristocracy, which harboured within i t s e l f unequalled s o c i a l prestige. As pointed out by Ts'en Chung-mien i n h i s Sui-T'angrshlh.p. 397-422;, i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to draw out the many exceptions which weaken tremendously the hypothesis. J-"Actually Ch'en Yin-k'o suggests that those who supported the policy of "using arms" became partisan to the L i f a c t i o n , while those who opposed i t formed the Niu fac t i o n l a t e r on. I t seems v a l i d to state that during the Yuan-ho period, the members of the Niu faction... did advocate a p o l i c y of indulgence, while the L i faction pursued a polic y of "using arms". Later i n 831, i n the Wei-chou A f f a i r with the T'u-fan, Niu Seng-ju again advocated 'indulgence while L i Te-yu was i n favour of taking up arms against the T'u-fan. However, i n Hsuan-tsung's reign, Po Hin-chung, of the Niu f a c t i o n , pursued a policy of "using arms" against the border t r i b e s . See Ts'en Chung--mien, Sui-T'ang shih. p. 408. '54 -^See Chisaburo Tsukiyama, Todai s e l j i seido no kenkyu. Osaka, 1967, p. 248s also see Mamoru Tanami, "Chusei keizoku-sei no hokai to j i s h o - s e i " , Toyoshi kenkyu 21s3.(1963). p. 245-269. ^See Ts'en Chung-mien, Sui-T'ang shih. p. 397-422. D To be accused of being f a c t i o n a l i s t was a serious problem and often warranted prompt dismissals from o f f i c e or embarrassing demo-tions. In Wen-tsung's re i g n we f i n d frequent, changeovers of s t a f f caused by punishment, meted out to f a c t i o n a l i s t o f f i c i a l s . 57 One example of the intense feelings of a f a c t i o n member i n -fluencing history-writing may be seen.-in L i u K*o's"Niu-Yang j i h - l i " . A small part of t h i s work i s s t i l l extant, See E. G. Pulleyblank, "Liu K'o, A Forgotten R i v a l of Han Yii " , Asia Major 17 (new series 1959') 1 P« 156-157. L i u K'o was a partisan of the L i f a c t i o n , which explains the deliberate slanderous language i n the work. In l i t e r a t u r e , there e x i s t s some short s t o r i e s which aimed at slandering also the leaders of the Niu fac t i o n . One example i s the "Chou-ch'in hsing-chi" by Wei Ch'tian, i n which Niu Seng-ju i s accused of disrespect to the emperor and to the empress dowager. See T'ang-jen hslao-shuo. Hong Kong, 1966, p. 151-156. 5 8See TCTC T'ai-ho 1 to K'ai-ch'eng 5 passim. 109 ^See TGTG T'ai-ho 8 / l l / i - h a i , ^°Ch'en Yin-k'o, i n his "T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao", p. 168 , states that the entire T'ang bureaucracy was polarized, leav-ing no room a t a l l for the non-aligned i n the Niu and L i f a c t i o n a l struggle. This theory seems much too r i g i d , and does not account f o r a considerable number of non-aligned o f f i c i a l s , f o r example, Sung Shen-hsi, Po ChU-i, Lu Sui, P'ei Tu, and the L i Hsun fact i o n . 6 l ~~ For example, L i Te-yu had made contact with the eunuch Yang Ch'in-i. His father L i Chi-fu had e a r l i e r supported the "using arms" policy of the eunuch T'u-tu Ch'eng-ts'ui i n the Yuan-ho period. As fo r L i Tsung-min, he had also made contact with the eunuch Yang Ch'eng-ho. 6 2HTS 179.1 110 NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE "^Appendix I at the back shows that the non-extant source T'ai-ho  yeh-shih dealt with seventeen participants i n the sweet dew p l o t . This number i s confirmed by the "act of grace" of 9 0 1 . See T'ang ta chap-l i n g c h i 5 i P. 31 - 3 3 . The CTS 1 6 9 contains only nine separate biographies of the participants. The HTS adds three more to the l i s t , one of which i s not mentioned by the TCTC. The remaining f i v e participants, which would make up the number seventeen, are located i n the biography of Cheng Chu (HTS 1 7 9 . 2 ) . 2 L i Hsttn has no extant works. See CTS 169.1; HTS 179.1} TKCK 19, p.1258. ^Shu Yuan-yu has l e f t sixteen prose works and s i x poems. See CTS I69.6; HTS 75b/ l7a; HTS 179.5} TKCK 18, p.1152} CTShih 8:2$ CTW 727, P. 9479-9493. 4 Wang Yai has l e f t thirteen prose works and twenty-four poems. See CTS 169.3; HTS ?2b/ l9b; HTS 179.3; TKCK 1 3 , p .819; CTShih 6:1$ CTW 448. P.5789-5799. •^Chia Su has l e f t sixteen prose works and one poem. See CTS 1 6 9 . 5 $ HTS ?5b/7b$ HTS 179 . 4 $ TKCK 1 3 , p. 988$ CTShih l l s 9 ; CTW 7 3 1 , p.9541-9553. ^Cheng Chu has no extant works. See CTS 169.2; HTS 179.2. 7Wang Fan has no extant works. See CTS 169.4$ HTS 179 . 6$ TKCK 18, p.1142-1143. Kuo Hsing-yu has l e f t only one prose work. See CTS 169.7$ HTS 179.6$ TKCK 2 7 , P. 1758; CTW 729, P. 9521. ^Lo Li-yen has l e f t two prose works and one poem. See CTS I69.8; HTS 1?9.9; TKCK 1 5 , p. 1013; CTShih 7"9J CTW 692, p. 8998-8999. 1 0 L i Hsiao-pen has no extant works. See CTS 169.9; HTS 179.10; TKCK 27, P. 1758; i : LHan Yueh has no extant works. See HTS 179.8. 12 Ku Shih-i has no extant works. See HTS 162.3, i n the biography of his father Ku 3hao-lien$ TKCK 1 9 , p. 1257. ^Ch'ien K'o-fu has l e f t one poem. See CTS 168.8, i n the biography of h is father Ch'ien Huij TKCK 2 7 , p. 1759; CTShih.8s10. I l l 14 Lu Chien-neng has no extant works. See GTS 163.8, i n the bio-graphy his brother Lu Chien-tz'u; TKGK 27, p. 1759. "^Hsiao Chieh has no extant works. See CTS 172.3, i n the b i o -graphy of hi s brother Hsiao Mien; TRCK 18, p. 1179. " ^ L i Chen-su has no extant works. See HTS 179.12. 17 Lu Hung-mao has no extant works. See HTS 179.2, i n the biography of Cheng Chu. 18 Wei Feng has no extant works. See HTS 179.2, i n the biography of Cheng Chu. 19 .See Ch'en Yin-k'o's discussion about the p o l i t i c a l significance of s o c i a l prestige i n T'ang s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l history, i n his "T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao", p. 153-159. Ch'en Yin-k'o quotes an example i n which consideration f o r s o c i a l prestige affected marriages into the imperial family. The chief minister Cheng T'an, i n the l a t t e r part of Wen-tsung's reign, would rather marry his dauthter to the prestigeous Ts'ui clansman, a ninth degree o f f i c i a l , than to the heir apparent. 20 Although the eighth.. century historiographer L i u Chih-chi had argued that geography, rather than the place of o r i g i n of oneis lineage, played a more important r o l e i n the moulding of men, the History o f f i c e i n the T'ang continued to i d e n t i f y h i s t o r i c a l figures by t h e i r lineage origins i n h i s t o r i c a l records. See E. G. Pulleyblank, "Chinese H i s t o r i c a l C r i t i c i s m : L i u Chih-chi and Ssu-ma Kuang", i n W, G. Beasley & E. G. Pulleyblank, Historians of China and Japan, p. 147. 21 L i Hsiin descended from the Ku-chuang branch of the Lung-hsi L i s . L i Hsun's name has not been included i n the geneological t r e a t i s e of the T'ang chief ministers i n the HTS. According to the standard works and the T'ang t a chao-ling c h i 49, p. 248, L i Hsun did i n f a c t become chief minister. The omission must be another of Ou-yang Hsiu's errors i n the geneology project. The T'ang imperial family also claimed descent from the Lung-hsi L i s , although t h i s has been indicated to be erroneous by Ch!en Yin-k'o. See Ch'en Yin-k'o's several a r t i c l e s about t h i s issue i n Ch'en Yin-k'o hsien-sheng lun-chi. p. 249-258} 299-304; 342-345. For our purpose i n t h i s study, l e t us just include L i Hsiao-pen and L i Chen-su, related to the imperial family by blood, i n the Lung-hsi L i s . Wang Yai came from the T'ai-yuan Wangs, which altogether produced thirteen T'ang chief ministers. (HTS 72b/l9b). Hsiao Chieh, brother of Hsiao Mien, a chief minister, could trace descent from Hsiao YU, son of the l a s t emperor of the Latter Liang, i n the Nor-thern/Southern Dynasties. From t h i s southern a r i s t o c r a t i c clan emerged f i v e chief ministers i n the T'ang dynasty (HTS 71b/4b). 112 op According to the HTS 75b/7b, Chia Su and Chia STan (chief minister i n Te-tsung's court) were the only chief ministers from the Chia clan of Ho-nan. The exact, relationship between the two i s not known, since n e i -ther biography mentions the other. The HTS 179. indicates that a f t e r the sweet dew f i a s c o , the .ancestral temple of Chia Tan was completely des-troyed. One would assume that t h i s act was part of the clan extermin-a t i o n program administered to Chia Su. Wang Fan's father had also passed the l i t e r a r y examination and appeared to have served i n public o f f i c e . See GTSGKC 56, p. 1010. Lo Li-yen's family did not seem well-known, although h i s father may have held a public post. See GTSGKG 56, p. 1011. Ku Shih-i's father Ku Shao-lien was a Han-lin scholar and served as president of the Ministry of C i v i l Office and that of War. See HTS 162.3. Ch'ien K'o-fu's father Ch'ien Hui was vice-president of the Ministry of Rites and was a Han-lin scholar. He was involved'iin the examination scandal of 821, i n which h i s i n t e g r i t y showed i t s e l f when he refused to make public the "recommendation l e t t e r s " of L i Shen and the other L i f a c t i o n members. See CTS 168.3. Lu Chien-neng came from the famous Fan-yang clan i n Ho-pei, which a l -together produced 116 chin-shih graduates from 784-875. His father Lu Lun was a notable poet i n 766-779. Perhaps because of the small part that he played i n the sweet dew coup, h i s brother Lu Chien-tz'u seemed to have survived the c r i s i s . See CTS I63.8. 23 ^Nothing i s known about Shu YUan-yti's family origins. Even the place of b i r t h i s not agreed upon by the standard works (CTS, TCTGs Chiang-chou: HTS 179sWu-chou; HTS 75b/l7at Lu-chiang). I t seemed that both he and his brother Shu Yiian-pao excelled i n t h e i r l i t e r a r y t a l e n t and thus emerged into p o l i t i c s i n Ch'ang-an. Kuo Hsing-yii's family and place of o r i g i n are not known. Han YUeh's biography indicates that he was well-learned and had admin-i s t r a t i v e s k i l l s . There i s no record of h i s passing the l i t e r a r y examinations. Cheng Chu, Lu Hung-mao, and Wei Feng's family origins were extremely obscure. Wei Feng was a brother-in-law to Cheng Chu, and Lu Hung-mao' s wife was the s i s t e r of the empress dowager Hsiao. 24 For a description of the d i f f e r e n t kinds of examinations i n the T'ang dynasty, see Robert des; Botours, Le Traite des Examens. p. 26-55. In general there were two popular types of examinations which candidates may choose fromt the chin-shih. which involved l i t e r a r y talents and thorough knowledge of a t l e a s t one c l a s s i c ; and the ming- ching. which involved comprehensive knowledge of a l l the c l a s s i c s . The l i t e r a r y (chin-shih) degree, from mid-T'ang on, was the ^most pop-ular and orthodox i n i t i a t i o n t o p o l i t i c a l careers. The sons and grand-sons of important o f f i c i a l s could however bypass the^examinations and get i n t o p o l i t i c s by means of the y i n p r i v i l e g e (hereditary patronage). Apart from passing the l i t e r a r y examinations, a number of the L i Hsun fa c t i o n , such as Wang Yai and Shu Yuan-yti, also received honours i n spec i a l examinations designated by the emperor. 113 ^Shu Yuan-yU f i r s t relied upon the military governor of O-yueh to obtain political advancement (HTS 1?9.5)> Cheng Chu f i r s t impressed the military governor of Hsiang-yang, Li Shuo, with his medical skills (HTS 179.2). Kuo Hsing-yu was hired by the military governor of Ho-yang, Wu Chung-yin (HTS 179.7). Lo Li-yen originally assisted on the staff of the military governor T'ien Hung-chen (HTS 179.9).Lu Hung-mao, serving in the military governorship of Fu-fang, was in turn patronized by Cheng Chu when the latter became influential (HTS 179.2). The ranks placed after the various positions are listed accord-ing to Robert des Rotours (trans.), Traite des Fonctionnaires et le  Traite de l'Armee. Leiden, 1947. 27 'See Sun Kuo-tung, "T'ang-tai chung-yang chung-yao wen-kuan ch'ien-chuan shih-chien yii jen-ch'i t i t'an-t'ao", Hsln-ya shu-yuan hs"ueh-shu pien-k'an 16 (1974), P. 329-352. The following table, taken from p. 334 of the above work, indicates the lengths of time i t took a regular bureaucrat to advance to various posi-tions in the central bureaucracy. From f i r s t post t o — T'ang (in general) 827-906 auxiliary secretary 14.8 years 10 years (State Affairs Department) secretary 15 14.2 (State Affairs Department) secretary 18.4 17.9 (Chancellery/Secretariat) vice-president 23.9 22 (al l ministries but Civil Office) vice-president" 24 23 (Ministry of Civil Office) president of a ministry 25.4 22 chief minister 25.8 23.6 The': f i r s t posting dates for our faction members are obtained by noting the year in which each member passed his literary examinations. We then allow two,-years for the members to find employment in the cen-tral bureaucracy or in the provinces. The f i r s t posting date would thus be two years after obtaining the literary degree, and thenumber of years i t took to obtain the final position in theccentral bureaucracy is calculated by subtracting the f i r s t posting year from 835» the year a l l the faction members were killed. 2 9See CTS 169.2; HTS 179.2 114 3°See GTS 169.3! HTS 179.3. 3 1See Chapter .Five, p. 86. 32 The standard works show that shortly a f t e r the sweet dew fi a s c o the residences of the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n members were ransacked by both the eunuchs and the Ch'ang-an populace. I t i s l i k e l y that the written works of the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n would be destroyed i n t h i s chaos. L i Hsun, known to the standard works as an expert In the Confucian c l a s s i c s , could have written some work, but the Sung bibliographies do not l i s t anything. 3 3The t i t l e of t h i s work i s "Feng-yen ts'ao f u " (Fu on the breeze bending the grass), with a theme that went back to the Lun-yii of Con-fucius (12:19). See CTW 692, p. 8998-8999. 34 ^ s e e Sun Kuo-tung, "T'ang-tai chung-yang chung-yao wen-kuan ch'ien-chuan shih-chien yii jen-ch'i t i t'ao-t'ao", p. 338. ^See Chapter Four, p. 67-68. 3 6See CTS I69.I: HTS 179.1. 37 ^'This incident i s most detailed i n the biography of L i Feng-chi, i n GTS 167.3. 3 8Hsiang-chou was 4989 l i . f r o m Ch'ang-an. See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/8/ ping-shen, Hu San-sheng commentary. 3 9See CTS 169.1? HTS 179.1. ^See TCTC T'ai-ho 8/6/after ping-hsu. In the section TCTC T'ai-ho 9/3/keng-tzu, the K'ao-i quotes from the Pu kuo-shih f which indicates that Wen-tsung f i r s t noticed the audacity of L i Hsiin when the l a t t e r boldly expounded the Ch'un-ch'iu i n subtle reference to the eunuch menaae^ln court p o l i t i c s . The TCTC K'ao-i does not accept t h i s version, but states that long before t h i s time, L i Hsun had already convinced the emperor regarding h i s objectives. The quote i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n showing that L i Hsiin, an expert i n the c l a s s i c s , may w e l l have drawn upon them f o r i n s p i r a t i o n and motivation. The quote from the Pu kuo-shih reads:"Hsu K'ang-tso presented the newly annotated Oh'to-ch'iu ljeh-kuo~ ching-chuan i n 60 chapters. The emperor asked about tne" assassinations of Wu-tzu and Y'u-chi by the court eunuchs, HsuvK'ang-tso r e p l i e d that the .Ch'un-ch'iu was too abstruse, and he had not yet studied i t exhaustively and dared not expound on i t s meanings. When the emperor confronted L i Hsiin with the same issue, the l a t t e r disc-115 ussed i t most, eloquently". A f u l l e r version of t h i s incident i s extant i n the T'ang y u - l i n 6, p.226. 4-2 Sun Kuo-tung, "T'ang-tai chung-yang chung-yao wen-kuan ch'ien-chuan shih-chien yu jen-ch'i t i t'an-t'ao", p. 334. 43 -'The references are to Ma Chou and Chang Chia-chen, both of whom were commoners raised to eminent echelons of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y on the basis of talent and reputation alone. See Shu Yuan-yu's "Hsien-wen ch'ueh-hsia" (Presenting ah essay to the throne), i n CTW 727, p. 9480. 44 SeelCTW 727, P..9480-9482. 45 ^The standard works, without giving any d e t a i l s , t e l l us that L i Hsun, Shu Yuan-yu, Kuo Hsing-yu and the others knew each other i n Loyang. 46 Shu Yuan-yu and L i Hsun's biographies indicate t h e i r thorough knowledge of the c l a s s i c s and t h e i r erudite backgrounds, See CTS 179.1} HTS 179.1. 4? 'See Yen Keng-wang, "T'ang-tai Ch'ang-an Loyang tao-i-ch'eng k'ao", Hsiang-kang Chung-wen ta-hstteh, Chung-kuo wen-hua yen-chiu-suo hsueh-pao 3:1 (1970), P. 134. ^ 8See HTS 1?9.3. ^ T h i s t a l e i s i n the c o l l e c t i o n Tsuan-i c h i . by L i Mel. The t i t l e of the t a l e i s HsU-sheng. i t has been commented upon by the Sung c r i t i c L i u K*o-chuang,in Hou-ts'un hsien-sheng ta-ch'uan-chi 173» Ssu-pu ts'ung- k'an. This story i s also collected i n the modem work: Wang Meng-chli, T'ang-.jen hslao-shuo yen-chiu. Vol. 1, Taipei, 1971» P. 67, Wang Meng-chu discusses the obscure origins of the author L i Mei, i n addition to some remarks about the Sweet Dew Incident, i n p; 8-14. ^ In the "strange and marvellous t a l e s " (chuan-ch'i) of the T'ang dynasty, the supernatural i s often used to record strange incidents, fantasy stories and a l l e g o r i e s . Hs'u-sheng 's contents, when stripped of the supernatural, i s a l l e g o r i c a l and autobiographical i n nature, r e -cording the author's reminiscences of past travels with h i s mentor, Shu Yuan-yu* and the other acquaintances i n Lo-yang. 51 J The standard works indicate Kuo Hsing-yu to have been a close acquaintance to L i Hsun i n Lo-yang. See CTS 169.7} HIS 179.6. ^ 2See T'ang y u - l i n 4, p. 146. "^See T'ang t s ' a l - t z u chuan 5, P. 74; Lu T'ung's three chapters 116 of poems are extant in the CTShih 6s?. y Tsung-mi was working in a monastery at Chung-nan Mountain, forty miles from Ch'ang-an, For a biographical study of Tsung-mi, see Jan Yun-hua, "Tsung-mi, His Analyst of Ch'an Buddhism", Toung-pao 58 (1972), p. 1-55. ^See A. Waley, The Life and Times of Po Chu-i. p. 178. 5 6See CTS 169.1? HTS 179.1. 5 7See A. Waley, The Life and Times of Po Chii-i. p. 178-181. -^Po Chu-i's resignation as the mayor of Lo-yang is noted in the Wen-tsung nen-chi in the CTS 17 b, on T'ai-ho 7A/Jen-tzu. -^Po Chu-i's poems on the incident are discussed by A, Waley, The Life and Times of Po Ch'u-i. p. 181. Li Shang-yin's poems on the same event are discussed in J.J. Y. Liu, The Poetry of Li Shang-yin. Chicago, 1969, p. 168-172, and Chang .ts'ai-t'ien, Ytt-hsi-sheng nien-p'u  hui-chien,(first published Peking 1917), Peking, 1963, p. 38-£u ^See Chapter Two, note 61. Chia Su's anti-eunuch sentiment was expressed in the incident in which he dared to yell at a court eunuch. He was punished with a reduction in his salary. See TCTC 9/4/after ping-shen. 6 l3ee CTW 6:7. E, Feifel discusses Po ChU-i's anti-eunuch's memorials in his career as censor during the Yuan-ho period. See E. Feifel, Po ChU-i  as a Censor, p. 114-151. ^3See A. Vlaley, The Life and Times of Po Chu-i. passim. 64 See Chapter Five, note 51. 117 NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 1 See CTS 169.2, HTS 179.2 for the following biographical informatiom on Cheng Chu. 2See TCTC T'ai-ho 8/l2/after kuei-wei. ^See TCTC T'ai-ho 7/9/ping-yin. ^See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll/mou-ch'en. 5See CTS l69.ll HTS 179.1. 6 s e e GTS 184.10; HTS 208b.2. The HTS shows that Wang Shou-ch'eng, along with Ch'en Hung-chih (alias Ch'en Hung-ch'in^ took part in the as-sassination behind the scenes, but the CTS does not indicate one way or another, It seems justified to agree with Wang Ming-sheng, that the CTS has made another mistake, several of which are apparent in the Wang Shou-ch'eng biography itself. See Shih-ch'i shih shang-ch'ueh 91. 7See CTS 169.1| HTS 179.1. We have an example in which the emperor asked Li. Hsun about an allusion from the Ch'uh-ch'iu that was quoted by Liu Fen's ;examination reply. See Chapter Three, note 41. ^Cheng Chu, for the greater part of 834 to 835» seemed to be very much involved with construction projects, which included the digging of ponds in the Chu.-cb.iang, and the construction of palace pavilions. See CTS 169.2} HTS 179.2. 1 0See TCTC T'ai-ho 8/8/hsin-mao. 11 This was an institute designed to instruct the sons of officials of the seventh degree and above. The appointment was a low one, at the eighth degree third class. 12 The name Han-lin was not applied until Hsuan-tsung's reign (712-756) although since early T'ang, scholars had been placed in such cap-acities. The forerunners of the Han-lin Academy were the"eighteen scholars" ofZT'ai-tsung (626-649) and the Pei-men hs'ueh-shih of Kao-tsung (649-683). For the historical development of the Han-lin Academy, see. Tsukiyama Chisaburo, Todai sei-.ii sei-do no kenkyu, p. 87-Hl; Chou Tao-chi, Han-T'ang tsai-hsiang chih-tur Taipei, 1964, p. 506-518} F.A. Bischoff, La fforet des Pinceaux. Paris, 1963. Ts'en Chung-mien has researched the Han-lin texts more than anyone else. In his work, he has attempted to rectify many errors, including the omissions of certain 118 names in the Han-lin texts. See amongst other works, Ts'en Chung-mien, "Han-lin hsueh-shih pi-chi chu-pu", p. 49-223. 13 The central bureaucracy had its own scholars and their institutes. The Chancellery controlled the Hung-wen scholars, and the Secretariat controlled the Chi-hsien scholars. The Hung-wen scholars were responsible for consultations about institutions and rites, arid the Chi-hsien scholars were in charge of storage of archives and documents. 14 There seemed to exist various ranks of the Han-lin scholars: the hsueh-shih. shih-chiang hsueh-shih. shih-shu hsueh-shih. shih-tu  hsiieh-shih. We are not sure about the relative seniority of these posi-tions in the Han-lin Academy. We do know however that the hsiieh-shih were more senior appointments, while the other titles were junior posts. The ch'eng-chih. director of the Academy, was chosen amongst the hsueh-shih. In this study, we shall use the term "scholar" to refer to a l l of the above positions in the Han-lin Academy. "^The HTS discusses the., Han-lin scholars immediately after the section of chief ministers in the monograph - of officials (HTS 46). "^Examples are Lu Chih, Wang Shu-wen, and Li Hsun. Lu Chih, in Te-tsung's reign (78O-8O5), functioned as a chief minister although he was only a Han-lin scholar. Later he protested the current, situation and recom-mended a return of the powers of deliberation to the regular chief ministers. Te-tsung,however, did not listen. See F.A. Bischoff, La  Foret des Finceaux. p. 10j D.C. Twitchett, "Lu Chih(754-805): Imperial Adviser and Court Official", in A.F. Wright & D.C. Twitchett, Confucian  Personalities, p. 84-122. 17 'See Ts'en Chung-mien, "Han-lin hsueh-shih pi-chi chu-pu", p. 211-212. 18 The two T'ang-shu indicate that Li Hsiin did in fact become a regular hsiieh-shih scholar, but the TCTC says that Li Hsun remained a Han-lin shih-chiang hsiieh-shih. It seems reasonable to take the T'ang- shu versions, in view of the fact that Li Hsiin would not have been so influential had he not become a regular scholar. 1 9See CTS 169.1? HTS 179.1. Li Hsun's excuse at the time was that his name was taboo in respect to his uncle's. It would seem, however, that Li Hsiin wished to change the name also to indicate to himself and to the others that an important turn in his l i f e had occurred. Trad-itionally, one changed one's name to signify a new page in one's l i f e . 20 See Ts'en Chung-mien, "Han-lin hsiieh-shih pi-chi chu-pu", p.82, 99-101. 2 1See CTS 169.2; HTS. 179.2. Cheng Chu was appointed only to the position of Han-lin shih-chiang hsiieh-shih, the same post that Li Hsiin 119 had f i r s t obtained in the Han-lin Academy. 22 It seemed most likely that Ku Shih-i was recruited at this time into Li Hsun's alignment. Ku Shih-i was responsible for drafting some imperial/orders, including the death sentences of six eunuchs. For-tunately for these eunuchs, the death orders did not reach them until the Li Hsiin faction had been defeated. See TGTG T'ai-ho 9/ll/after i-ch'ou, Ku Shih-i himself was later arrested, exiled and executed subsequently. See TGTG T'ai-ho 9/l2/jen-shen. 23 ~Hsu K'ang-tso, the ch'eng-chih. was forced out of the Han-lin on T'ai-ho 9/5/5. His position was then assumed by Li Yii, who also found his way out of the Academy by T'ai-ho 9/8/5, Two other Han-lin scholars were sent out during Li HsUn's residence there. They were Kao Chung (in on T'ai-ho 7/10/12, and out by T'ai-ho 9/8/18) and YUan Hui (in on T'ai-ho 8/8/9, and out by T'ai-ho 9/9/11. The remaining Han-lin scholars are listed below: Name Date .of Appointment Date of Dismissal Kuei Jung T'ai-ho 9/8/l K'ai-ch'eng 1/5/15 Ch'en I-hsing T'ai-ho 7 K'ai-ch'eng 1/5/23 Liu Kung-ch'uan T'ai-ho 8/l0/l5 K'ai-ch'eng 5/3/9 Ting Chu-hui T'ai-ho 9/5/3 K'ai-ch'eng 3/ll/l6 Li Ch'ih T'ai-ho 9/10/12 K'ai-ch'eng 5/3/16 See Ts'en Chung-mien, "Han-lin hs'ueh-shih pi-chi chu-pu", p. 125-14-3. ?4 • Wang Ming-sheng called i t "Han-lin politics" while Ch'en, Yin-k'o prefers i t to be called "eunuch politics", even though in essence i t was a divide and rule strategy. See Ch'en Yin-k'o, "T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao", p. 181 j Shih-ch'i shih shang-ch'vleh 91. 25 •^Hsuan-tsung frequently complained to his subjects that the eunuchs in his court had become united in a mass. See T'ang yu-lin 2. p.38-39. See Ch'en Yin-k'o, "T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih shu-lun kao", p. 176. ^The Shen-ts'e generals of the time, Ch'iu Shih-liang and Yii Hung-chih, who eventually emerged triumphant over the Li Hsun faction, supported the enthronement of Wu-tsung and. . were successful. The Shu-mi councillors of the time, Liu Hung-i and Hsueh' Chi-ling supported another candidate, and when unsuccessful, met death shortly afterwards. See TCTC Hui-ch'ang l/3/after chia-hsii. In the enthronement of Wen-tsung, however, both the Shen-ts'e generals and the Shu-mi councillors agreed on the candidate. 2 See Liu Yat-wing, "The Shen-ts'e Armies and Palace Commissions in China", p. 274-275. 120 Z y S e e Lu Ssu-mien, Sui-T'ang Wu-tai s h i h . p. 393. 3°This i n c i d e n t i s not r e l a t e d i n the standard works, hut only-found i n Ennin's D i a r y , which the author kept w h i l e he was t r a v e l -l i n g i n China as p a r t of t h e Japanese embassy i n the l a t e 830's and 840's. T h i s i n c i d e n t i s perhaps one example o f the:eunuchs' s u c c e s s f u l attempts t o erase t h e i r r e c o r d i n h i s t o r i c a l works. Ennin's accounts, i n s p i t e of c e r t a i n e r r o r s here and here, seem to be q u i t e r e l i a b l e i n the n a r r a t i o n of t h i s event i n which the Shen-ts'e generals were approached t o r e t u r n t h e i r s e a l s , the symbol o f t h e i r m i l i t a r y power. I t seems t h a t , according t o E.O. Reischauer, quoting from Okada, the eunuchs had l o s t c e r t a i n powers s i n c e the death of the eunuch Ch'iu S h i h - l i a n g . The c e n t r a l government, then c o n t r o l l e d by L i Te-yu, most l i k e l y decided t o s t r i p the eunuch base of power and managed t o seek a d e a l w i t h Yang C h ' i n - i , the Shen-ts'e g e n e r a l of the L e f t , who succeeded Ch'iu S h i h - l i a n g . I t turned out t h a t although Yang Ch'in-i proved accommodating, the Shen-ts'e g e n e r a l of the Right, Yu Hung-c h i h would not submit h i s s e a l s . See E. 0. Reischauer, Ennin's D i a r y t  Record o f a Pilg r i m a g e t o China i n Search of the Law, p. 36O-36I. 31 J L i u Yat-wing, "The Shen-ts'e Armies and Palace Commissions i n China", p. 274-275. -^See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/6/after j e n - y i n . 3 3 S e e TCTC T'ai-ho 9 / l l / a f t e r i-ch'ou. ^ S e e CTS 169.1? HTS 179.1? TCTC T'ai-ho 8/9/jen-hsu. -^See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/4/day,'unspecified. 3 6 S e e TCTC T'ai-ho 9/4/ping-shen. 3 7 S e e TCTC T'ai-ho 9/7/jen-tzu. 3 8See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/9/kuei-mao. 3 9 S e e TCTC T'ai-ho 9/7/ting-ssu. The e d i c t i s preserved i n f u l l i n the T'ang t a c h a p - l i n g c h i 113, P. 591. 40 I n a rec e n t a r t i c l e , A.F. Wright suggests t h a t r e l i g i o n played a c r u c i a l r o l e i n the p o l i t i c s ; of the HsUan-wu Gate I n c i d e n t i n 626, i n which L i Shih-min (T'ai-tsung, 626-649) usurped the throne from h i s b r o t h e r , the h e i r apparent. See A.F. Wright, "T'ang T'ai-tsung and Buddhism", i n A.F. Wright & D.C. Tw i t c h e t t , P e r s p e c t i v e s on the  T'ang. p. 242-247. I n the Sweet Dew I n c i d e n t , t h ere a r e s c a t t e r e d pieces of in f o r m a t i o n which have r e l i g i o u s overtones. In view of the f a c t the most eunuchs were Buddhists, the L i Hsun proposals a g a i n s t 121 the Buddhist f a i t h may outwardly be interpreted as being motivated by anti-eunuch sentiments. However, whether the L i Hsiin f a c t i o n was anti-Buddhist i s d i f f i c u l t to determine, due to the lack of sources i n t h i s regard. We do know that the Buddhist monk,Tsung-mi, was one of the s o c i a l a f f i l i a t i o n s i n Loyang when the L i Hsiin a l i g n -ment was formed. From Ennin's Diary, we know that a f t e r the defeat of the L i Hsun fact i o n i n 835 > Taoist lectures f o r laymen were sus-pended and were not reinstated u n t i l 840, when Wu-tsung succeeded to the throne. See E.O. Reischauer, Ennin's Diarys Record of a Pilgrimage  to China i n Search of the Law, p. 299. I t i s conceivable that the triumphant and vengeful eunuchs i n 835 may w e l l have ordered the sus-pension of Taoist lectures, i n order to get even with the a n t i - Buddhist proposals of the L i Hsiin faction. However, as f a r as the role that r e l i g i o n might have played i n the entire Sweet Dew Incident, i t remains obscure and undefined. nSee TCTC Yung-chen 1/5/i-ch'ou. ^ 2See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/9/i-ssu} T'ang t a chao-ling c h i 49, p. 248. ^See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/4/mou-hsu; T'ang ta chao-ling c h i 48, p. 245. ^See T'ang-ta chao-ling c h i 48, p. 245. The TCTC states that Wang Yai owed his chief ministership to;.Cheng Chu. This i s , however, un l i k e l y , since Wang Yai was already vice-president of the State A f f a i r s Department. His promotion to chief minister may be considered a regular and normal step, without, the help of Cheng Chu. See TCTC T'ai-ho 7/ 7/after jen-yin. ^See Chapter Three, Table I I , p. 45-46. ^See Chapter Three, Table I, Column 6, p. 40-42. ^See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/l0/keng-tzu; CTS 169. If HTS 179.1. ^ 8See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/l0/aftar i - h a i . ^See D.C. Twitchett, The Financial Administration of the T'ang. Cambridge, 1963» p. 62-65. Ling-hu Ch'u's memorial i s s t i l l preserved i n the CTW 541, p. 696I. -^See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/l0/hsin-ssu; CTS l69.ll HTS 179.1. 122 NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE """See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll/ping-wuj CTS l69.1j HTS 179.1. 2 I b i d . Ibid. 4See TCTC T'ai-ho 9 / l l / a f t e r i-ch'ou; CTS 169.2; HTS 179.2. ^The f a c t that l i n k s were made with L i u Ts'ung-chien i s proved by two incidents: the refuge that some L i Hsiin family members received i n Chao-i a f t e r they had managed to f l e e there, and the three memorials which L i u Ts'ung-chien sent to Ch'ang-an demanding a repeal of the g u i l t on the L i Hsiin factioxunembers, ^The following narration of the events of the coup i s b a s i c a l l y a paraphrase of the accounts i n the three standard works. See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll/jen-hs'u to TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll/i-ch'ou; CTS 17 b; CTS l 6 9.il  HTS 179-1. For the exact location of the coup i n the Ch'ang-an palaces, see Hiraoka Takeo (ed.), Chban to Rakuyo. Jimbun kagaku kenkyusho Index 8, Kyoto, 1956, Vol. 3, maps 3 and 17. 'See Chapter One, note 5« ^Wen-tsung's denial of the accusation that L i Hsiin had rebelled i s strong i n the HTS,. The TCTC also has a version of Wen-tsung's i n i t i a l defense of L i Hsiin, but the CTS does not. 9 The HTS indicates that "several tens" of eunuchs died, but the TCTC states that only over ten eunuchs perished. Considering that there were so many of L i Hsun's men preparing f o r the attack, a t l e a s t f i f t y eunuchs must have .been k i l l e d . ^ A t f i r s t s i x to seven hundred men were k i l l e d i n the various administrative o f f i c e s i n the imperial c i t y , then another thousand perished i n Ch'ang-an, outside the imperial palaces, n S e e CTW 72, p. 944; CTW 74, p. 964; CTW 75, P. 976-978; T'ang ta chao-ling c h i 123. p. 636} 125, p.671-672; 127, P. 684. 12 In the T'ang dynasty, court audience with the emperor was pre-ceded by the officialdom coming i n f u l l ceremonial etiquette. The president and vice-presidents of the Oensorate usually led the pro-cession of the officialdom towards.! thepalaces of the emperor. With the o f f i c i a l s of the Censorate arrested or k i l l e d (Cheng Chu, Shu Yuan-yii, L i Hsiao-pen) and the chief ministers ( L i Hsiin, Shu Yiian-yU, Wang Yai, Chia Su) imprisoned or murdered, the ceremonial procession could not take place. See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll/kuei-hai, Hu San-sheng 123 commentary section. 1 3See TGTG T'ai-ho 9 / l l / a f t e r i-ch'ou. 14 Those who perished i n the clan exterminations included the brothers of L i Hsiin and even the married daughters of Wang Yai, Wang Yai's cousin had come to him for help, gained l i t t l e i n the way of fortune but died along with the Wang Yai family members. Shu Yuan-yii ' s clan son had obtained immense help from Shu Yuan-yii i n the begin-ning. Before the fiasco of 8351 however, he had argued with Shu Yuan-yii and left.. Being f a r away from the c a p i t a l a t the time of the sweet dew coup, Shu Yuan-yil's clan son was spared the fate of the sweet dew victims. These two incidents are related i n the standard works and i n anecdotes with the element of the unpredictability of fortune and misfortune. See TGTG T'ai-ho 9 / l l / a f t e r i-ch'ou; HTS 179.3; T'ang y i i -l i n 6, p. 225-226. "^See Chapter Three, p. 54-55. l 6See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll/mou-ch'en; CTS 169.1; HTS 179.1. 1 7See CTW 707, p. 9224. l 8See Chapter Four, note 30. 1 9See TCTC K'ai-ch'eng 3/3/day unspecified. 20 A l l of L i Hsiin 's fa c t i o n members were c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s , f a m i l i a r with p o l i t i c s but not. with m i l i t a r y t a c t i c s . Wang Yai, the most veteran o f f i c i a l i n the f a c t i o n , had come up with a plan t o deal with the T'u-fan i n 823, but that had not been adopted. Although Han Yiieh had been the protector-general of An^nan, he seemed to have worked only with c i v i l i a n matters. See HTS 179.8. 21See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll-jen-hsu. 22 According to the HTS and the TCTC. s i x to seven hundred men were f i r s t k i l l e d i n the various administrative buildings i n the imperial c i t y , then another thousand i n Ch'ang-an quarters, and another thousand on the way to Feng-hsiang. That then brings the t o t a l number of victims to about three thousand. The CTS figures add up to about 1600. We s h a l l use the HTS and the TCTC figures here i n t h i s study. 2 3See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll/jen-hsu, 2^See TCTC T'ai-ho 9 / l l / a f t e r i-ch'ou. 25Ibi&. 124 ?6 *°See TGTG T'ai-ho 9 / l l / a f t e r k u e i - h a i . 2 7 S e e TCTC T'ai-ho 9/l2/ting-hai. 2 8 S e e TGTG K'ai-ch'eng l / 3 / a f t e r j e n - y i n . 2^See Chapter Four, p. 71-72. 3°See TCTC T'ai-ho 9/l2/chia-shen. 3^When the emperor Wen-tsung was lamenting the f a c t t h a t ' he was enslaved by the c o u r t eunuchs a f t e r the sweet dew coup, the c h i e f m i n i s t e r L i Shih s a i d t h a t the^emperor ought t o be r e l i e v e d nevertheless t h a t even amongst the eunuchs there are those l i k e L i u Hung-i and HsUeh C h i -l i n g , who were f r i e n d l y t o Wen-tsung. See TCTC K'ai-ch'eng. l / l l / j e n - w u . L i u Hung-i and Hsueh C h i - l i n g , the Shu-mi c o u n c i l l o r s a f t e r the sweet dew coup, apparently formed a c l i q u e "between themselves and seemed t o support Wen-tsung and the c h i e f m i n i s t e r s , w h i l e Yu Hung-chih and Ch'iu S h i h - l i a n g , the Shen-ts'e generals continued t o show animosity towards both. I n the suc c e s s i o n of Wu-tsung a f t e r Wen-tsung, L i u Hung-i and Hsueh C h i - l i n g , who supported a candidate favoured by both the c h i e f m i n i s t e r s and Wen-tsung, met t h e i r f a t e . S h o r t l y a f t e r the succession of Wu-tsung, both were executed' by the two Shen-ts'e generals. See TCTC Hui-ch'ang l / 3 / a f t e r chia-hsu. 3 2 S e e CTW 733, p. 9579; a l s o TCTC K'ai-ch'eng 1/2/after kuei-wei. 33CTW 733, P. 9579. "^See TCTC Hui-ch'ang 4/8/after hsin-mao. -^This i s the i n c i d e n t about Ch'iu S h i h - l i a n g f o r c i n g the H a n - l i n s c h o l a r , T s ' u i Chen-yu, t o d r a f t an i m p e r i a l decree on beh a l f o f the empress dowager Hsiao t o dethrone Wen-tsung. The i n c i d e n t i s r e l a t e d i n the non-extant source, P ' i - s h i h chien-wen l u . as quoted by the TCTC  K'ao-i. The TCTC. u n l i k e the HTS. does not accept the source as r e l i a -b l e , s i n c e T s ' u i Chen-yu a t the time was not y e t a H a n - l i n s c h o l a r . Although t h i s source i s g e n e r a l l y dismissed as u n r e l i a b l e , t h a t Wen-tsung was insec u r e i n h i s throne a f t e r h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the sweet dew coup must have been q u i t e c l o s e t o the t r u t h . •^See t h i s chapter, note 11. 3 7 S e e T'ang t a c h a o - l i n g c h i 5, p. 30. 3 8 S e e TCTC K'ai-ch'eng 3/lo/keng-tzu. 125 3 9See CTS l69.ll HTS 179.1 tto See CTS 169.1} CTShlh 1:15. Wen-tsung was always Interested in learning and poetry. He left seven poems after his death. Mo counselled the emperor Wen-tsung against taking into the palaces the daughters of Li Hsiao-pen, since that would constitute an incestuous*;, relationship. Wen-tsung, however, took note of the counsel and released them. See TCTC K'ai-ch'eng l/y/day unspecified. 42 Wei Mo was the diarist at the time and did not allow Wen-tsung to pry into his records. See TCTC K'ai-ch'eng 4/lO/i-mao. After Wu-tsung came to the throne, he administered an extensive purge of the supporters of Wen-tsung, since he was not Wen-tsung's choice of candidate for the throne. The Japanese monk, Ennin, was in Ch'ang-an at the time and heard rumours that Wu-tsung purged four thousand people. As Reischauer says, this was most definitely a gross error in the number of victims. However, that there was terror in the capital at the time was most likely quite true. See E.O. Reischauer, Ennin's Diary: The  Record of a Pilgrimage to China in Search of the Law, p. 172-173. hh In 838, Ennin was in Yang-chou, and noticed a comet. In tradit-ional China-, comets were inauspicious phenomena, which signified disast-er. The standard works relate of a comet three feet long penetrating from the east at the time that Cheng Chu assumed power. On the subject of comets, Ennin writes about the incident thet he had earlier heard about. This was the bloody coup in the capital in which chief ministers and ten thousand people were killed. Ennin's date i s wrong by about twenty years, and the number of people who died is also grossly exaggerated. Ennin however admits in the diary that the matter was not clear to him. See E.O. Reischauer, Ennin's DiaryVThe Record of a Pilgrimage to China in Search of the Law, p. 46. he vSee Jan Ytin-hua, "Tsung-mi, His Analysis of Ch'an Buddhism", p. 20. TOSee A. Waley, The Life and Times of Po ChU-i. p. I88-I89. ^See J.J.Y. Liu, The Poetry of Li Shang-yin. p. 168-172. ho See Chang Ts'ai-t'ien, Yu-hsi-sheng nien-p'u hui-chien, p.41. ^See T'ang ta chap-ling chi 5, p. 31-33. 5°Ts'ui Yin's biographies are in CTS 177.lj HTS 223 b.2. For Chu Wen's career and the ensuing chaos io the Five Dynasties Period, see Wang Gungwu, The Structure of Power in North China during the Five 126 Dynasties. Stanford, 1963, p. 47-84-. -^One of the most inter e s t i n g points that has arisen i n t h i s study l i e s i n the observation of the o r i g i n a l formation of the L i Hsun alignment i n I&yang and i t s subsequent transformation into the dominant fac t i o n i n the.central bureaucracy i n Ch'ang-an. In the T'ang dynasty, s i m i l a r to the Han, there were two capitals:Ch'ang-an and Lo-yang. In view of the economically strategic location of Lo-yang, i t would have been the l o g i c a l choice f o r the p o l i t i c a l c a p i t a l of the T'ang. However, since the important clans which supported the throne resided i n Kuan-chung (northwest region), Ch'ang-an instead was the location of the imperial court and the seat of the government. In the f i r s t , part of the dynasty, nevertheless, Lo-yang, which also had imperial palaces modelled a f t e r those i n Ch'ang-an, was the "occasional" p o l i t i c a l c a p i t a l . P r i o r to the construction of the canal transport system l i n k i n g the two ca p i t a l s i n the l a t t e r part of Hs.uan-tsung' s reign (712-756), i t had been necessary f o r the entire T'ang imperial household and government to move to Lo;-yang whenever there was drought and crop f a i l u r e s i n Kuan-chung. The transfers t o Lo-yang were however a t times motivated by p o l i t i c a l concerns rather than economic necessities. The empress Wu (69O-705) f o r most of her reign stayed i n Lo-yang, where her support was situated. When Chung-tsung (705-710) moved back to Ch'ang-an, p o l i t i c a l motives were again apparent, as the support of his empress Wei resided i n Kuan-chung. After Hsuan-tsung's reign, Lo-yang never again was the seat of the T'ang government. (See D.C. Twitchett, The Fina n c i a l Administration Under..the.T'ang Dynasty, p. 86-87) Lo-yang's p o l i t i c a l significance was a f t e r then diminished to merely being the place of demotions from Ch'ang-an and the place of retirement f o r former Ch'ang-an bureaucrats. In the Sweet Dew Incident, the only p o l i t i c a l significance of Lo-yang that we can interp r e t from our study l i e s ' fin;.; .serving as the place f o r i l l e g a l and dangerous p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , including the formation.' of secret alignments. To gain insights into the exact p o l i t i c a l r o l e of Lo-yang i n the dual c a p i t a l T'ang p o l i t i c a l system, i t would be necessary to undertake a comprehensive study and review of the court intrigues and coups that occurred so frequently throughout the T'ang dynasty. -^See Chapter One, p. 5-6. j 3 I b i d . 5^F.A. 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So l omon , B.S. The V e r i t a b l e R e c o r d o f t h e T ' a n g Empero r Shun-tsung.805. C a m b r i d g e , 1955. S o u t h , M a r g a r e t . L I Hoj. A S c h o l a r O f f i c i a l o f t h e Yuan -ho P e r i o d 806- 821 . A d e l a i d e , 196?. S t e n t , C .G. " C h i n e s e E u n u c h s " , J o u r n a l o f t h e N o r t h C h i n a B r a n c h o f t h e R o y a l A s i a t i c S o c i e t y 11 (new s e r i e s , I876), p. 143-184. S t o t t , W i l f r e d , "The E x p a n s i o n o f t h e Nan -chao K i n g d o m " , T ' o u n g - p a o 50 (1963), P. 190-220. S t r a u g h a i r , Anna , Chang Huas A S t a t e s m a n - P o e t o f t h e W e s t e r n C h i n  D y n a s t y . C a n b e r r a , 1973. T w i t c h e t t , D.C. " C h i n e s e B i o g r a p h i c a l W r i t i n g " , i n B e a s l e y , W.G. & P u l l e y b l a n k , E .G. ( e d . ) , H i s t o r i a n s o f C h i n a a n d J a p a n . L ondon , 1961, p. 95-114. F i n a n c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n u n d e r t h e T ' a n g D y n a s t y . Cambr i d ge , 1963. . " L u C h i h (754-8®5): I m p e r i a l A d v i s o r a n d C o u r t O f -f i c i a l " , I n W r i g h t , A . F . & T w i t c h e t t , D.C. ( e d . ) , C o n f u c i a n P e r s o n a l i t i e s . S t a n f o r d , 1962, p. 84-122. . " P r o b l e m s o f C h i n e s e B i o g r a p h y " , i n W r i g h t , A . F . & T w i t c h e t t , D.C. ( e d . ) , C o n f u c i a n P e r s o n a l i t i e s . S t a n f o r d , 1962, P. 24-39. Wa ley , A r t h u r . The L i f e a n d T imes o f Po C h u - i . 772-846 A . D . London , 1949. Wang Gungwu. S t r u c t u r e o f Power i n N o r t h C h i n a d u r i n g t he F i v e  D y n a s t i e s . S t a n f o r d , 1963. 134 APPENDIX I. ADDITIONAL NON-OFFICIAL SOURCES OF THE STANDARD WORKS ON THE SWEET DEW INCIDENT The sources f o r the information on the following supplementary non-o f f i c i a l sources of the standard works are provided by the TCTC  K'ao-i and the Sung bibliographies: the bibliography monographs i n the two T'ang-shu (CTS 47-48: HTS 57-60), the Chih-chai shu-lu  c h i e h - t ' i , the Chun-chai tu-shu chih. the Ch'ung-wen tsung-mu c h i - shih. and the Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao. An asterisk indicates extant works. A ; Miscellaneous Histories (tsa-shlh) 1 a- T'ai-ho yeh-shih 7 ^ ^ ° (Unconventional History of the T'ai-ho, 827-835) dated l a t e T'ang 3 chapters author unknown preface by Yuan T'ao of Ch'en-chun &-Zs> Wi>), dated 847 We are Informed that t h i s work deals with the seventeen participants of the Sweet Dew Incident. Although both the author and the preface writer are unknown, the early date of the preface suggests the text to have been written shortly a f t e r the incident i n 835. The TCTC. K'ao-i does not quote t h i s work, but the HTS. seems to have used i t . Of the three standard works, the HTS i s the only one that i d e n t i f i e s a l l seventeen members of the fa c t i o n that launched the coup (HTS 179), The HTS (59) also records a work c a l l e d T'ai-ho yeh-shih,in 10 chapters, and t h i s information seems to have been drawn upon by t n e Yu-hai (47)^ "^  . In the Yu-hai, the authorship i s attributed to a recluse i n 889, and the work i s said to cover the period 827-890. This information i s not confirmed i n the other bibliographies. This l i s t i n g i n 10 chapters might w e l l have been a mistaken sub-s t i t u t i o n of the work i n 3 chapters, or a l a t e r expansion of the work to 10 chapters. 1 b. T'ai-ho ts'ui-hsiung c h i jkfy ?ui& (Record of the Destruction of E v i l Men i n the T'ai-ho) dated l a t e T'ang 1 chapter author unknown The Sung bibliographies agree on the text being i d e n t i c a l i n many respects to the above work, and conclude that i t must have been a draft , or an e a r l i e r edition. I t must have s t i l l existed as a separate work i n Sung times, since the TCTC K'ao-i makes reference to i t (TCTC T'ai-ho 8/6/after ping-hsU). 2. Kan-lu c h i (Record of the Sweet Dew Incident) dated l a t e T'ang 2 chapters author unknown We are t o l d that the f i r s t chapter deals with the tragedy of the Sweet Dew Incident, while the second concludes with the backgrounds 135 of the coup participants. I t Is s i g n i f i c a n t to note that both t h i s work and the previously mentioned T'ai-ho yeh-shih seemed to contain biographies. This biographical material may w e l l have been drawn upon by the HTS and the TGTG. which had access to these works. On one occasion the HTS incorporates almost the same words i n describing the c r u c i a l meeting between L i Hs'un and Cheng Chu. Compare these two passages: TCTC T'ai-ho 8 / 6/after ping-hs'u. quoting from the Kan-lu c h i : HTS 179.1 The TCTC quotes from t h i s work twice (TCTC T'ai-ho 8 / 6/after ping-hsu, TCTC T'ai-ho 9/4/kuei-ssu). The t i t l e of t h i s work varies s l i g h t l y among the bibliographies, and we can perhaps ascribe t h i s to the c i r c u l a t i o n of the work i n several copies or editions. 3. I-mao c h i I j ^ f i b (Record'of the Year I-mao, 835) dated l a t e T'ang 1 chapter author: L i Ch'ien-yung commentary by L i Shih-che of Wu-chun -t %v$\%), undated The bibliographies indicate the author, L i Ch'ien-yung, to have been a commoner, who recorded the basic plots of L i Hsun and Cheng Chu. Apart from t h i s , we cannot obtain further information about either the author or the commentator. The TCTC K'ao-i also quotes from t h i s work (TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll/mou-ch'en). ^' K'ai-ch'eng chi-shih flflfo.feMfr (Record of the Events of the K'ai-o ch'eng, 8 35 -840 ) dated l a t e T'ang 3 chapters . author: Yang S h i h ? $ p % The TCTC K'ao-i quotes from t h i s work frequently (TCTC T'ai-ho 7/9/ ping-yin, TCTC T'ai-ho 9/9/ting-mao; TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll/mou-ch'en, TCTC K'ai-ch'eng l/3/jen-yinj TCTC T'ai-ho 9 / l 2 / t i n g - h a i ) , but does not show any consistency i n accepting i t s versions of events. In the incident quoted i n T'ai-ho 9/9/ting-mao, the TCTC K'ao-i accepts the K'ai-ch'eng chi-shih version that L i Ku-yen was not i n the fa c t i o n of L i Tsung-min, but further down i n the same passage, i t disagrees with the work on a date. Although the period t h i s work deals with was supposedly 8 36 - 840 , the TCTC K'ao-i references show that i t covers also the events of the Sweet Dew Incident i n 835. *5 wen-wu liang-ch'ao h s i e n - t ' i c h i ^ % #9 ^6 jfe ^ (Deliberation Records of the Reigns of Wen-tsung and Wu-tsung, 8 27 -846 ) dated 846 -848 3 chapters , author: L i Te-yu ( 787 -849 ) This work records the deliberations of the cen t r a l government during 136 L i Te-yu's terras as chief minster to Wen-tsung and Wu-tsung. L i Te-yu was the leader of the L i fac t i o n a t court, and i t was because of h i s involvement i n partisan p o l i t i c s that he went through numerous changes i n h i s p o l i t i c a l career. L i Te-ytt may have written t h i s work during h i s e x i l e from Ch'ang-an, following the succession;.of HsUan-tsung i n 846 . Hsuan-tsung was f r i e n d l y to the p o l i t i c a l r i v a l s of L i Te-yu, Niu Seng-ju and his f a c t i o n . The TCTC K'ao-i quotes from t h i s work on many occasions, and f r e -quently accepts i t s version i n the elucidation of certain points ... (TCTC T'ai-ho 7/9/ping-yin, TCTC T'ai-ho 8 / 6/after ping-hsu). An extract of t h i s work i s extant under the same t i t l e , i n the c o l l e c t i o n HsU t'an-chu. i n the Shih-wan ch'uan lou-shu ts'ung-shu 11:1. Four incidents are related i n t h i s extract, including the two which deal with the appointment to chief minister of L i Te-yu and Wang Yai. None of the £our incidents i n the extract r e l a t e d i r e c t l y to the Sweet Dew Incident. Anecdotes (hsiao-shuo) Pu kuo-shih /j^ )fl$~ (Supplement to the National History) dated 8 ? 4 -888 6 chapters ^ author: Lin En w »o-The bibliographies do not have much information abdttt t h i s work. The TCTC K'ao-i quotes from i t often, but i s not consistent i n accepting i t s accounts. Whenever there are alternative versions of an incident, i t dismisses the work as mere anecdotal material. However, i n an incident where there are no other sources, i t accepts the Pu kuo-shih version,(TCTC T'ai-ho 7/l chia-wu^" T'ai-ho 9/4/keng-tzu, TCTC K'ai-ch'eng 3/5/i-hali TCTC K'ai-ch'eng 3 / n/ting-mao). Although t h i s work i s no longer extant as an independent work, some sections have been incorporated i n the s t i l l - e x t a n t anecdotal c o l l e c t i o n : T'ang y u - l i n . The T'ang y u - l i n i s a Sung anecdotal c o l l e c t i o n of over f i f t y works. Selections are not l i s t e d with t h e i r sources, and one must examine the TCTC K'ao-1 quotes along with the selections i n order to f i n d the o r i g i n a l sources. The section of Su kuo-shih which found i t s way into the T'ang y u - l i n relates to the incident i n which L i Hsun expounded the c l a s s i c s to the emperor (T'ang y u - l i n 6 , p.226} 3, P» ? 6 ) . T'ang ch'ueh-shih $JI£. (Gaps i n T'ang History) dated l a t e T'ang, or Five Dynasties 3 chapters , . . author: Kao Yen-hsiu is)/$T5' The author i s an obscure f i g u r e , who c a l l e d himself Ts'an l i a o - t z u -5$^ 3" . The TCTC K'ao-1 quotes t h i s work twice, i n one instance accepting i t s version, and i n another case rej e c t i n g i t on the basis of i t s anecdotal nature,(JJW K'ai-ch'eng Vll/i-hai, jm.K'a 1-ch' eng 5/l/i-mao), An extant extract of the work exists under the t i t l e Yti-lan ch'ueh-shih^jfffi , collected i n the Chih-pu-chu chai ts'ung-shu 1. For furthur information on the work see Ssu-k'u  ch'uan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao 2?, p.82. The extant extract does not 13? contain any direct reference to the Sweet Dew Incident. 8 P'i-shih chien-wen lu (Mr. P'i's Records of Things Seen and Heard) dated Five Dynasties or early Sung 5 chapters ifc # # author: P*i Kuang-yeh ' A To j|v We are told that this work covers the period 877-937» and was written "by a minor official in Hang-chou who called himself Lu men-tzujlj^ 3" . The TGTG K'ao-i quotes i t in an incident about the dethronement of Wen-tsung by Gh'iu Shih-liang that involved the Han-lin scholar Ts'ui Chen-yu (TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll/i-ch'ou). This incident is however rejected by the TCTC as unreliable material, since Ts'ui Chen-yu was at that time not yet the Han-lin scholar. The HTS however utilized the same material as fact. This is an incident in which the compiler of the TCTC shows more critical use of available non-official sources. The TCTC K'ao-i quote of the incident is also incorporated in the T'ang yii-lin (T'ang yu-lin 3, P. 76). *9 Tu-yang tsa-pien jfc W (Miscellaneous Compilations of Tu-yang) dated shortly after 873 3 chapters ^ . author: Su 0 Su 0, a native of Tu-yang, obtained his literary (chin-shih) degree in 886, and became a minor official. This anecdotal anthology, s t i l l extant as an independent work, deals with the period 763-873. This work is not quoted by the TCTC K'ao-i but i t seems clear that in at least three incidents, the HTS and the TCTC used i t to the extent of almost word by word copying. These three incidents are: l)the depression of Wen-tsung after the Sweet Dew Incident, 2)additional information about Wang Yai's cousin, Wang Mo, who suffered execution along with the Li Hslln faction members, and 3) additional information about Shu Yttan-yU's clan son, Shu Shou-ch* ien, who remained unscathed in the incident. Compare the versions in the HTS 179, TCTC T'ai-ho 9/ll/i-ch'ou, K'ai-ch'eng l/ll/ting-ssu, and in "the Tu-yang tsa-pien 2, p. 42-44. 138 CHARACTER INDEX An-nan $ ^ An-Shih rebellions (An Lu-shan, Shih Ssu-roing) # t-t,\\s % £l 9f} Chang Chia-chen tytjh ^  Chang Hua tfcj^ Ch'ang-an ^ fc£ Ch'ao Ch'uo ^ ^ Chao-i g$Jk Chao-tsung Ch'en Hung-chih (Ch'en Hung-ch'ing) ^& . $V5^IL Ch'en Jang-i Cheng Chu jfcf Cheng T'an ^(t ^ ch'eng-chih ^1 cheng-shih ]£. Ch•eng-te ch'i-chu chu ?£. Chl-hsien H a l l Chia Su Chia Tan^-5[«^j Chiang Chieh Chiang-chou •H^  Chiang-Huai US- 7f§_ Ch'ien Hui 1%%®^ Ch'ien K'o-fu ^  Jj ^ chien-ch'en ^ ^ chien-chiin ^ Chien-men Guards fgLf^yJ^ Ch'ien-niu Guards JL. chin-shih ^ - i : Chin-wu Guards ^ ^ <fj£j Ching-tsung Ch'iu Shih-liang ^ / b ^ i^L Chu Wen (Chu Ch'uan-chung) ^ Chu-chiang $b 139 criu-ming f^k^ Ch'uan T'ang-shih ^./ti^f Ch'uan T'ang-wen ^ 5L_ Ch'tin-ch'iu 5^^^. chiin-tzu ^ ^— Chung-nan Mountain ^£-^9 \ll chung-shu sheng >^ ^  ^ chung-wei -tj* Fan Hsi-oh-ao £ ^ fan-chen 3 ^ Fan-yang Feng S u - ^ ^ Feng-hsiang fu-ping Han r u e h ^ ^ j Han-lin Academy Ifajfoffj han-tsu WT$1 Heng-hai ^ ho-ch'in (ho-shih) ^ 9 ^ Ho-huang ;*} ->^ _ Ho-pei >*j Hsiang-chou w_ ^ Hsiao Chieh | | Hsiao Mien ||f^ C Hsiao Guards JjjfJ^J hsiao-jen hsiao-shuo (chuan-ch'i hsiao-shuo) /}^%ju ^  ^ Hsien-tsung Hsin T'ang-shu (tsai-hsiang shih-hsi p i a o ) ^ f f % X^%Q)b%3%L_ hslng-chuang ^ Hsu K'ang-tso %^ pjft Hsii-sheng Hsiian-tsung (712-756) ^ J N Hsuan-tsung (846-859) § ? v ^ Hsiieh C h i - l i n g & -fe B£ hsiieh-shih (shih-chiang, shih-shu, shih-tu h s u e h - s h i h ) ^ - K]&j§) >T £> 140 Huang Ch'ao ^ Huang-fu Shih Hui-ch'ang ^| % Hung-wen In s t i t u t e 2 ^ I-ching % - s -4 K'ai-ch'eng (K'ai-ch'eng chi-shih) ?8 i ^ f kan-lu % " f ^ Kan-lu chih-pien (Kan-lu chih-huo) JS-lL^ Kao Chung "^)%. Kao Li- s h i h ^ ^ Ku S h a o - l i e n ^ * , ^ Ku Shih-i ^ 1 ^ ^ k u - h s i ^ ^ , Kuei Jung ^ j j j ^ , kung-shih kung-te shih ^ Kuo Hsing-ytl ^f^^ kuo-shlh ^ ^ Lan-tien #2 Latter Liang ^ 2 $ t L i Chen-su ^ L i Ch'eng | 4 L i Chi-fu % $ ) L i Ch'ih - ^ J . L i Feng-chi ^ ^ £ L i Hsiao-pen ^ ^ ^ L i Hsun ( L i Chung-yen) ^ % \ * { \ L i Kuei L i Mel 4- ^ L i Shang-yin L i Shih % Z3 L i Shuo L i Te-yU tfeik L i Tsung-min L i T'ung-chieh ^ ^ ^ L i Yfi ^ li-pu ^ lieh-chuan ^ ^ Ling Guards Liu Ghih-chi ^ \ Liu Fen ^ j % Liu Hsu "^0 $>) Liu Hung-i ^ ) ^ ^ Li u K'o-chuang ^ . j Liu Kung-ch'uan ^ £ ^ Liu Ts'ung-chien <^ <$J^ L i u Tsung-yuan $>^^yj L i u YQ-hsi Lo Li-yen j£ £ ^ Lo-yang ^ ^ Lu Chien-neng ^ ^ Lu Chih Lu H u n g - m a o ^ ^ Lu Lun % \ % ? Lu Sui 3k % Lu T'ung & h Lu-chiang Js> . ^  Lung-hsi Lung-wu Armies Ma C h o u i l ) ^ Ma Ts.'un-liang v ^ ;fj Jfcj men-hsia sheng men-ti P?,f ming-ching ming-tsu Mu-tsung 4^ Nan-chao $o nei-hsiang #g nel-shih sheng $| ^  /|j Niu Seng-ju Ou-yang Hsiu ft£ ^ ^ P'ei Chun 14-2 P'ei Tu ^felL pen-chi pi-chao pieh-shih ping-pu ^ Pin-ning ft ^ Po Chu-i £jgj> san-sheng chih-tu Shan-nan & shang-shu sheng J$)^A^ Shen-ts'e Armies (Shen-ts'e generals) ^ Shen-wu Armies ^ ^ shih-cheng c h i $r^j$(_j, shih-lu shih-tsu -J? ftjfc Shou-an County Shu Tuan-pao y\j%_ Shu luan-yu ^ Shu-mi Council (Shu-ml councillors) % fjb Shun-tsung Ssu-ma Kuang f| a, Ssu-men In s t i t u t e P9 P^ l Sung Min-ch'iu % ^Jgs Sung Shen-hsi % ^ ^ Ta-ming kung ^ ^ ^ T'ai-ho (T'ai-ho yeh-shih) X M f^- £ T'al-hsueh t'ai-p* ing chih-ts'e ^ L T'ai-yuan T'ang dynasty $ jj^ tang (tang-p'ai, p'eng-tang) ^ . ^ >)1c Teng-k'o chi-k'ao % \%M Ting Chu-hui -X % ting-kuo-ts'e lao % $ \ tsa-shih jfcfe. $^ tsan ^ 143 Tso-yu Guards Tsuan-i c h i ^ Ts'ui Ghen-yu Ts'ui Yin %1t(Li T'u-t'u Ch'eng-ts'ui T'u-fan Tzu-ch'en Palace Tzu-chih t'ung-chien (K'ao-i) %J$k~ Uighur $ ^ Wang Ghien-yen ^ ^ "I Wang Fan £ Wang Ming-sheng ^ . Wang P'ei Wang Shou-ch'eng J. <f Wang Shou-chuan 5- *f ;l] Wang Shu-wen £ ^ Wang Yai % Wei Cheng <|£ ^ Wei Chih-i ^ Wei Feng 4fe Wei Mo $ k j £ Wei Pao-heng ^ Wei Yuan-su j f c j ^ Wei Guards ^ Wei-chou +*t Wei-pov,^-J-| Wen-tsung jjjl^, Wu Chao $g Wu Chung-yin ^ Wu Yuan-heng ^ f $ j Wu Guards ^ Wu-tai Wu-tsung -^Vj Yang C h ' e n g - h o / ^ j ^ ^ Yang Ch'in-i ^ ifcjfe y i n privileges \% Yin River \f YiiLHung-chih ?| *i & . Yu-chou \j[JQ -wj Yu-lin Armies ffl ffi^ Yuan Hui y^j ffl Yuan-ho Restoration (Yuan-ho ni-tang) *f *H T^fy Yung-chen | j \ £ yung-ping j | jjr. 

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