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A test of the just world hypothesis : sympathy for victims, blame for victimizers Boutilier, Robert Gordon 1975

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A TEST OF THE JUST WORLD HYPOTHESIS: SYMPATHY FOR VICTIMS, BLAME FOR VICTIMIZERS by ROBERT GORDON BOUTILIER B.A., University of Western Ontario, 1973 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Psychology We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA November, 1975 In presenting th i s thesis in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary shal l make it f ree ly ava i l ab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thes is for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t i on of th is thesis fo r f i nanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permission. Department of The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date kJ<nS >Z~Y ABSTRACT The performance before personality subhypothesis speci-f i e s that v i c t i m devaluation only occurs when witnesses cannot f i n d the victim responsible for the suffering on the basis of any performed act. Devaluation consists of a t t r i b u t -ing negative personality t r a i t s to a victim and claiming that he deserved to suffer. The Just World Hypothesis attempts to provide a motivational explanation for the phenomenon. In so doing, i t attributes two needs to the observer. F i r s t , the v i c t i m i z a t i o n evokes inequity anxiety which must be reduced. It can be reduced by construing the v i c t i m i z a t i o n as j u s t i -f i e d . Second, observers are therefore hypothesized to have a need to believe that the world i s just. Consequently, observers devalue victims thereby denying the occurrence of i n j u s t i c e . Since t h i s preserves the j u s t world b e l i e f , i t also helps reduce inequity anxiety. In the only published experiment c o r r e l a t i n g Just World B e l i e f (JWB) scores with victim devaluation (Rubin and Peplau, 1973), uncontrollable confounds and equivocal results pre-vented any conclusive data int e r p r e t a t i o n . The present research used items for two independent sources to assess subjects 1 JWB. The scores were combined to produce a t h i r d , highly homogenious index of JWB. After a c r i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e review, two addenda, and one al t e r n a t i v e , to the performance before personality subhypothesis i i i were presented. The alternative was the blame-sympathy-hypothesis. The predictions of both hypotheses were compared. Several possible meanings of the term " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " and the dependent variables designed to assess them were d i s -cussed. Sixty-three subjects completed two JWB scales three to four weeks before p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the experimental sessions along with 31 unpretested volunteers. Among the 12 to 19 subjects assembled for each session was a female confederate. The experimenter stated that i n order to study people's per-ceptions of other people i n stress i t would be necessary to select one person to receive shocks i n a verbal learning task which would be broadcast over closed c i r c u i t T.V. By a con-trivance, the confederate-victim appeared to be randomly chosen to be the "learner". She l e f t the room before the experimenter began playing one of two versions of a videotape on which the victimizer-experimenter (another confederate) shocked the victim e i t h e r contingently upon wrong responses (CS condition) or non-contingently (NCS) at random i n t e r v a l s throughout the task. At the end of the videotape subjects completed a questionnaire which measured personality evaluations and attributions of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the vic t i m and the v i c t i m i z e r . The Just World Hypothesis was not supported. JWB predicted nothing. No vic t i m devaluation occurred. JWB may be related to v i c t i m devaluation but the Just World Hypothesis i s not detailed enough to predict when i t w i l l occur. The absence of v i c t i m devaluation may be a resu l t of an int e r a c t i o n between iv information provided by post-test items and the perceived unfairness of the shock contingency conditions. The fact that, i n the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y items, an experimenter was asking subjects to comment on his own research ethics may have created demand c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e s p e c i a l l y i n the condition where the vic t i m suffered greater inequity (NCS). Inequity anxiety does, at l e a s t , influence the i n t e n s i t y of reactions to both victims and v i c t i m i z e r s . There are many alternate pathways along which the inequity anxiety might be manifested. It was suggested that a move towards more mundane realism i n t h i s l i n e of research might eliminate some of the pathways which aris e primarily from a r t i f a c t t i a l sources of information embedded i n the context of the psychology experiment i t s e l f . The performance before personality subhypothesis received no support. The alternative blaming hypothesis was strongly supported. There was a s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t for shock contingency. In the NCS condition the v i c t i m i z e r was blamed while the victim received sympathy. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. Introduction . x 2. CHAPTER ONE: AN EXPLICATION OF THE JUST WORLD HYPOTHESIS 3 A. The Victim Devaluation Phenomenon 3 B. Informational vs. Motivational Explanations. . 4 C. Just World B e l i e f and Inequity Anxiety . . . . 7 D. Important Moderating Variables 9 E. Performance Before Personality Subhypothesis . 10 F. Summary. 12 3. CHAPTER TWO: TESTING THE JUST WORLD HYPOTHESIS . . . 14 A. Research Extrapolating from S i t u a t i o n a l l y Aroused Inequity Anxiety to Just World B e l i e f 14 B. Research Measuring Just World B e l i e f 18 C. Evidence Bearing on the Performance Before Personality Subhypothesis 21 Lerner and Matthews 22 The Blaming Hypothesis 25 D. Assessment Strategies for the Performance Before Personality Subhypothesis and Alternative Hypotheses 26 The Responsibility Items 26 Hypothesized Inter-item Relationships. . . 34 E. Internal V a l i d i t y : Control Factors and Manipulation Checks 37 vi Page F. Summary and Formal Hypotheses 39 4. CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 41 A. Subjects 41 B. Materials 4 3 Pretest Questionnaires. . . 43 Videotape 4 3 Post-Experimental Questionnaire 44 C. Procedure 46 5. CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 50 A. F a i l u r e to Confirm the Just World Hypothesis. 5 0 B. Main E f f e c t for Shock Contingency 5 3 C. F a i l u r e to Confirm the Performance Before Personality Subhypothesis 5 7 D. Victimzer Blame and Victim Sympathy 59 E. Internal V a l i d i t y : Marginal Order E f f e c t . . . 6 2 F. Summary 64 6. CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 66 A. Inequity Anxiety as an Intensity Parameter and the Inefficacy of Just World B e l i e f . . 66 B. Responsibility Attributions and Personality Evaluations 6 8 Fail u r e of the Performance Before Personality Predictions 68 Unpredicted Blame and Sympathy 69 C. Explanations for the Absence of Victim Devaluation . . . . . 70 v i i Page Adequacy of the Deception 70 Interaction Between Victimizer Evaluations and Perceived Unfaireness 71 D. A r t i f a c t u a l Information Variables as Direction Parameters 72 E. A t t r i b u t i o n a l Set: An Information Prerequisite for Blame and Sympathy? 74 F. Suggestions for Future Research Using an Informational Orientation 77 Problems to be Considered 77 Advantages of Greater Mundane Realism . . . 78 G. Summary 81 7. BIBLIOGRAPHY 83 8. APPENDICIES 86 Appendix A: Pretest Questionnaires 86 Appendix B: Post-Experimental Questionnaire. . . . 100 v i i i LIST OF TABLES Page 1. Dependent variables: Code numbers, item labels and ordinal positions on post-experimental questionnaires . . 2 7 2. Account of subject p a r t i c i p a t i o n 42 3. Frequencies produced by median and t e r t i l e s p l i t s on two measures of Just World B e l i e f factor 52 4. MANOVA summary of shock main e f f e c t 54 5. Correlation matrix for blame c l u s t e r of variables. . 61 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e to express my gratitude to Dr. Thomas Storm and Dr. William Turnbull for t h e i r h e l p f u l , thought provoking suggestions and c r i t i c i s m s at every stage of t h i s study. I would also l i k e to thank N e i l Kyle and Katherine Doran for t h e i r convincing portrayals of the vi c t i m i z e r and the victim respectively. 1 A TEST OF THE JUST WORLD HYPOTHESIS: SYMPATHY FOR VICTIMS, BLAME FOR VICTIMIZERS The study of observers' reactions to innocently suffering victims has bearing upon a number of current topics of i n v e s t i -gation i n s o c i a l psychology. A t t r i b u t i o n theory i n general, and more d i r e c t l y , attributions of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y may help explain observers' reactions to victims. Moreover, the study of these reactions themselves can provide new perspectives on the a t t r i b u t i o n a l process. The observer's reaction to an incident of v i c t i m i z a t i o n i s also i n e x t r i c a b l y bound up i n the phenomenon of bystander non-intervention. The type of victim-i z a t i o n emphasized i n the bystander research usually involves some type of c r i s i s or emergency event. There are, however, other kinds of v i c t i m i z a t i o n which do not transpire i n emergency situations. These are of a more general nature and probably constitute the bulk of v i c t i m i z a t i o n incidents a person i s l i k e l y to encounter i n his da i l y l i f e . In t h i s category we f i n d such phenomena as unfair laws and i n s t i t u t i o n a l regula-tions as well as the abuse of authority by various o f f i c i a l s and bureaucrats. The poverty i n Black ghettos and Indian reserves i n North America r e f l e c t an extremely complicated process of e x p l o i t a t i o n representing a form of v i c t i m i z a t i o n which does not occur i n emergency situ a t i o n s . I t was the indifference of New York medical students to the tremendous problems facing ghetto dwellers attempting to obtain adequate 2 medical services which led Melvin J . Lerner to stop teaching community medicine and begin doing research on the phenomenon of victim devaluation. 3 CHAPTER ONE: AN EXPLICATION OF THE JUST WORLD HYPOTHESIS Under the general rubric of the "Just World Hypothesis" Lerner (1970) presents experimental results and hypothesized explanations which are fundamental enough to apply to a l l types of v i c t i m i z a t i o n . Without r e f e r r i n g to any s p e c i f i c experimental r e s u l t s , t h i s chapter provides a b r i e f summary of the concepts involved i n the Just World Hypothesis and how they are i n t e r r e l a t e d . The empirical v a l i d i t y of the hypothesis i s dealt with i n Chapter 2. In the present chapter the description of the phenomenon to be explained i s followed by i t s hypothesized explanation. Then, some of the important moderating variables are discussed. F i n a l l y , an important q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the hypothesized explan-ation i s examined. A. The Victim Devaluation Phenomenon The Just World Hypothesis purports to explain the phenomenon of v i c t i m devaluation. Victim devaluation i s a set of attributions made by an observer about a victim. These attributions f a l l into two main classes. F i r s t , the observer often derogates the personal worth of the victim. That i s , he attributes to the v i c t i m any variety of negative personality t r a i t s such as s t u p i d i t y , immaturity, selfishness, and so on. Second, the observer i s simultaneously prone to making judge-ments about the justness of the victim's predicament. More e x p l i c i t l y , he tends to say that the victim deserved his fate. 4 There are two hypothetical preconditions for victim devaluation. I t only occurs when the victim i s innocent and the observer needs to believe that the world i s just. These conditions, however, are not s u f f i c i e n t . Several empirically discovered factors are also necessary. The observer, for example, must be unable to help the victim. Further, the observer must perceive no alternative targets for blame besides the victim. A number of other variables have also been found to determine the occurrence of v i c t i m devaluation. Generally, i t could be said that the phenomenon occurs only under f a i r l y unusual circumstances. Nevertheless, Lerner and his colleagues have succeeded i n reproducing these circumstances many times i n the laboratory. Before a r t i c u l a t i n g the d e t a i l s of the Just World Hypothesis, an attempt i s made to h i g h l i g h t i t s underlying assumptions by contrasting i t with another possible approach to explaining the v i c t i m devaluation phenomenon. B. Information vs. Motivational Explanations There are two basic approaches that one may take. The informational approach t r i e s to specify what information led to the observer's reaction. I t assumes that the observer makes attributions towards persons being victimized according to the same processes through which he makes att r i b u t i o n s to anyone else i n any other s i t u a t i o n . Once normal a t t r i b u t i o n processes are understood, the problem of explaining victim derogation reduces to one of i s o l a t i n g the items of information 5 that produced these p a r t i c u l a r attributions about the victim and about the circumstances. The motivational approach, on the other hand, seeks to account for the phenomenon by i d e n t i f y i n g exceptions to the normal a t t r i b u t i o n a l process when i t i s applied to observers' reactions to victims. These exceptions derive from cert a i n needs or motives which are aroused i n people when they observe incidents of v i c t i m i z a t i o n . This approach assumes that the information available and assimilated for processing i s uni-form for a l l observers. The Just World Hypothesis f a l l s into t h i s class of explanation. The Just World Hypothesis i s recursive insofar as i t turns the a t t r i b u t i o n a l process back onto the observer of the victim. I t proposes that a l l observers perceive the victim as innocent but then deny that perception. From a psychoanalytic viewpoint, denial i s always explained i n terms of a subconscious need or desire. The Just World Hypothesis suggests that t h i s need i s the need to believe that the world i s just. This motive i s attributed to the observer on the basis of inferences made from his behavior. The reasoning may be characterized as follows: (a) I t i s obvious to everyone that the victim i s innocent. (b) This inequity creates inequity anxiety i n everyone who observes the v i c t i m i z a t i o n . (c) Overtly, the observer denies the inequity by saying that the victim deserved his fate. 6 (d) Since the observer's a t t r i b u t i o n s contradict the facts presented to him, he must be engaging i n some form of cognitive d i s t o r t i o n . (e) I t i s hypothesized that the cognitive d i s t o r t i o n arises from a c o n f l i c t between what the observer wants to perceive and what he actually does perceive. (f) The observer asserts that what he wants to be true, i s true. (g) The observer then (apparently unconsciously) reformulates his perception of the s i t u a t i o n to make i t consistent with how he wants the s i t u a t i o n to be. A l l that remains i s to specify i n statement (e) what i t i s that the observer wants to perceive. Since t h i s i s appar-ently an unconscious desire i t cannot be observed d i r e c t l y . We can, however, observe the observer's reformulated perception of the s i t u a t i o n and then extrapolate backwards. Since the observer has reformulated his perception of the s i t u a t i o n to be consistent with a b e l i e f that the world i s just , he must want to believe that the world i s just. That i s , he wants to believe that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get. This i s a concept of j u s t i c e based on the p r i n c i p l e of equity. A person's "equity r a t i o " i s a measure of the pro-p o r t i o n a l i t y of his inputs into a s i t u a t i o n to his outcomes from the s i t u a t i o n . The Just World Hypothesis proposes that the observer needs to believe that everyone's, p a r t i c u l a r l y the victim's outcomes appropriately r e f l e c t his inputs. This b e l i e f i s valued and guarded because i t has the power to reduce 7 inequity anxiety. A l l observers are attributed with an even more fundamental need than Just World B e l i e f . S p e c i f i c a l l y , everyone needs to reduce inequity when i t has been aroused. C. Just World B e l i e f and Inequity Anxiety According to Lerner, what motivates a person to protect his b e l i e f i n a just world i s the need to avoid the anxiety that would accompany the alternative b e l i e f . Novak and Lerner (1968, p. 147) explain t h i s need as follows: " I f people were not able to believe they could get what they wanted and avoid what they d i s l i k e by performing cert a i n appropriate acts, they would be anxious and, i n the extreme, incapacitated." Thus, people t r y to protect the b e l i e f that they have control over t h e i r own fates and are responsible for what happens to them. The suffering of an innocent victim i s an example of someone receiving an undeserved negative fate and as such i s a threat to the Just World B e l i e f . In order to restore the perception of j u s t i c e , people devalue the victim's personality, thereby making i t possible to claim that no i n j u s t i c e has transpired because the vi c t i m was a bad person and therefore "deserved" to suffer. The observer, therefore, can a l l a y his anxiety about receiving undeserved punishment (i . e . inequity anxiety) by reminding himself that since bad things only happen to bad people, he (being a good person) has nothing to fear. The victim devaluation phenomenon i s hypothesized to occur among those individuals who deal with the arousal of 8 inequity anxiety by denying the existence of the inequity. According to Lerner, these Just World Believers are more pre-disposed to reinterpret inequitable suffering as deserved su f f e r i n g . A l l that i s hypothesized with respect to people who do not need to believe that the world i s just i s that they engage i n less v i c t i m derogation. No account i s offered regard-ing how they deal with t h e i r inequity anxiety. Nonetheless, the response to inequity anxiety d i f f e r s among individuals on at least one dimension, that of Just World B e l i e f . Inequity anxiety, however, i s manifested not only as a t r a i t but also as a state. Some situations are so inequitable that everyone, no matter how just or unjust he believes the world to be, i s troubled by the i n j u s t i c e he observes. Thus, situations can be contrived which w i l l arouse varying degrees of inequity anxiety. The e f f e c t s of inequity anxiety on v i c t i m evaluations can be studied by arousing i t d i r e c t l y . When t h i s i s the aim of the research, there i s no need to take any account of i n d i v i d u a l differences i n Just World B e l i e f since the manipulation of the victim's equity r a t i o i n a s i t u a t i o n w i l l arouse varying l e v e l s of inequity anxiety i n everyone. Once the relationship between high state inequity anxiety and high v i c t i m devaluation has been established, however, the mediating function of Just World B e l i e f becomes important. Just World B e l i e f i s a hypothetical mechanism explaining the relationship. When the purpose of the research i s to e s t a b l i s h the adequacy of Just World B e l i e f as a mediating variable, a 9 change i n strategy i s required. Since Just World B e l i e f i s a t r a i t - l i k e construct i t cannot be d i r e c t l y manipulated as can inequity anxiety. We can only measure i t s v a r i a t i o n from person to person. I f Just World B e l i e f does i n fact translate anxiety into victim devaluation then Just World B e l i e f should be highly correlated with victim devaluation. Before Just World B e l i e f can even be correlated with victim devaluation, they must both be measured. D. Important Moderating Variables The variables which have most often been shown to moder-ate victim devaluation deal with the i n t e n s i t y and duration of the victim's s u f f e r i n g . E s s e n t i a l l y , these variables r e f l e c t degrees of inequity or i n j u s t i c e . Thus, those variables are quantifications of a central concept i n the Just World Hypothesis, the concept of inequity. The e f f e c t s of one other variable, however, have necessitated the formulation of a subhypothesis to account f o r them. This i s the "performance before person-a l i t y " subhypothesis. I t i s concerned with the e f f e c t s of victim r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and i s dealt with l a t e r . F i r s t l e t us consider the variables which influence the i n t e n s i t y of the v i c t i m devaluation. Since the observer needs to believe that the victim's outcomes from the s i t u a t i o n appropriately match his inputs, any evidence to the contrary would threaten the observer's Just World B e l i e f by evoking inequity anxiety i n him. The amount of the inequity anxiety aroused should be a function of the amount of inequity suffered 10 by the victim. Given two victims who made equal inputs into the same si t u a t i o n , the v i c t i m with the more negative outcome would arouse more inequity anxiety i n observers. Hence, the observers would devalue that victim more vehemently. Victim outcomes are evaluated along dimensions such as the duration and the i n t e n s i t y of the s u f f e r i n g . Longer and more intense su f f e r i n g leads to greater devaluation (Lerner, 1971b; Hardy, 1972). Likewise, a v i c t i m who received monetary compensation for his suffering would be devalued less than one who received no compensation (Lerner, 1971b; Lerner and Simmons, 1966). E. Performance Before Personality Subhypothesis The degree of victim devaluation can also be influenced by the extent of the victim's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for his own suffering. This seemingly s t r a i g h t forward observation has led to complications for the Just World Hypothesis. Ultimately, the problems arise from the d i f f i c u l t i e s associated with objectively determining a person's g u i l t or innocence without f i r s t making some value laden assumptions about when i t i s appropriate and just to hold someone responsible for the out-comes of his actions. The performance before personality sub-hypothesis i s a step i n the d i r e c t i o n of a value free, objective decision r u l e . I t i s a preliminary step towards operationally defining what types of inputs, given equal outcomes, di s t i n g u i s h "innocent victims" from people who do i n fact bring t h e i r s u f f e r -ing upon themselves. I t i s , therefore, a move towards defining the l i m i t s of a p p l i c a b i l i t y for the Just World Hypothesis. 11 That i s because the Just World Hypothesis only seeks to explain reactions to innocent victims. People who are responsible for t h e i r own suff e r i n g have made negative inputs into a s i t u a t i o n . Since these inputs are appropriately matched with negative outcomes, no inequity anxiety i s aroused and therefore no vic t i m devaluation occurs. The observer's Just World B e l i e f i s only threatened by innocent victims, victims who are not responsible for t h e i r own suf f e r -ing. The observer copes with t h i s threat by claiming that the innocent v i c t i m i s not innocent. In order to substantiate t h i s claim the observer must discover some hitherto unnoticed nega-t i v e input that the vic t i m makes i n the s i t u a t i o n . Furthermore, t h i s negative input must be of the type that w i l l most e f f e c t i v e -l y reduce the observers inequity anxiety. The performance before personality hypothesis divides inputs into two types. A vic t i m can be construed as deserving his fate on the basis of eithe r what he did or what he i s l i k e . Responsibility for the suff e r i n g can be seen as a function of either type of negative input; a performed act which p r e c i p i -tates the suffering, or an undesirable personal t r a i t which i n v i t e s r e t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . Succinctly, the performance before personality subhypothesis i s that observers w i l l only attribute r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the basis of personality when they cannot f i n d any performed act that made the victim responsible. What follows i s a personal int e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s subhypothesis. The subhypothesis can be thought of as an extension and a refinement of the inequity anxiety concept. Inequity anxiety 11 i s a reaction to the b e l i e f that one cannot get what one wants or avoid what one d i s l i k e s by performing appropriate acts. I t i s not a reaction to the b e l i e f that one cannot get goodies or avoid nasties simply by virtue of personal worth independent of acts. Personal worth i s only tangentially relevant. The performance before personality hypothesis implies that to the observer, personality based responsiblity for goal attainment i s a more abstract and tenuous causal factor. I t i s a h a s t i l y ascribed attribute which summarizes any type of performance based e f f i c a c y habitually displayed by a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l . Therefore, inequity anxiety i s more e f f e c t i v e l y reduced by matching negative outcomes with negative acts rather than with negative personality t r a i t s . Generalizing t h i s to the victim, the observer w i l l there-fore try to preserve his perception of a just world by f i r s t looking for an act which made the s u f f e r i n g equitable. Only when t h i s i s impossible w i l l the observer devalue the victim's personal worth. Hence, the performance before personality subhypothesis i m p l i c i t l y defines an "innocent" v i c t i m as one who has not performed any observable act to bring the suffering upon himself. I t should be noted i n passing that what t h i s subhypothesis f a i l s to make clea r i s how the observer arr i v e s at his a t t r i b u -tions of s p e c i f i c personality defects i n the victim. I f negative attributions are l i k e most other a t t r i b u t i o n s , they are i n f e r r e d from observable performed acts. I f inferences from performed acts form the content of v i c t i m devaluation, one 12 wonders why the observer would bother to i n f e r personality defects when he could more e f f e c t i v e l y reduce his inequity anxiety by r e l a t i n g the victim's behavior d i r e c t l y to the suffering. What the performance before personality subhypo-thesis seems to imply i s that the negative c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s attributed to the victim when devaluation occurs are in f e r r e d from observable behaviors which constitute neither necessary nor s u f f i c i e n t conditions for subsequent suf f e r i n g . For example, they may be behaviors i n the realms of body language or speaking s t y l e . These w i l l be referred to as "personality revealing behaviors". F. Summary The performance before personality subhypothesis speci-f i e s that victim devaluation w i l l only occur when observers cannot f i n d the victim responsible f o r his suffering on the basis of any performed act. The devaluation consists of at t r i b u t i n g negative personality t r a i t s to the victim. The Just World Hypothesis attempts to provide a motivational • explanation for vic t i m devaluation. In so doing i t attributes two needs to the observer. F i r s t , the incident of v i c t i m i z a -t i o n evokes inequity anxiety and the need to reduce i t . The inequity anxiety can be reduced by construing the world, and the v i c t i m i z a t i o n , as just. Therefore, observers are hypo-thesized to have a second need, the need to believe i n a just world. In order to meet that need observers devalue victims thereby denying the occurrence of i n j u s t i c e . Since t h i s 13 preserves the b e l i e f i n the just world, i t also maintains an avenue for inequity anxiety reduction. Other possible avenues are not dealt with by the hypothesis. Any attempt to t e s t the Just World Hypothesis must meet two requirements. F i r s t , i t must present observers with a victim who performed no act to bring about his fate. When contrasted with a less innocent victim t h i s would constitute a manipulation of inequity anxiety. Second, i t must measure the observer's Just World B e l i e f . Just World B e l i e f should predict v i c t i m devaluation under conditions of inequity anxiety arousal. 14 CHAPTER TWO: TESTING THE JUST WORLD HYPOTHESIS This chapter i s a c r i t i c a l review of the major studies on the Just World Hypothesis to date. The c r i t i c i s m s proposed provide the rationale for the design of the present experiment. None of the e a r l i e r experiments i n the Just World l i t e r a t u r e actually measured Just World B e l i e f . The i n i t i a l attempt to measure Just World B e l i e f was made by Rubin and Peplau (1973) . This study yielded equivocal r e s u l t s . The present research attempted to circumvent some of the methodological problems that might have hampered Rubin and Peplau. The performance before personality subhypothesis never adequately defines i t s key concept, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Moreover, the findings which supposedly support the subhypothesis are open to numerous alternative interpretations. One alternative, the blaming hypothesis, i s examined. This i s followed by a discussion of dependent and independent variables intended to assess the i n t e r n a l v a l i d i t y of the present experiment. F i n a l l y , the formal hypotheses of th i s experiment are pre-sented . A. Research Extrapolating From S i t u a t i o n a l l y Aroused Inequity  Anxiety to Just World B e l i e f Most of the evidence supporting the Just World Hypo-thesis comes from studies i n which the victim's equity r a t i o was manipulated by changing the severity of his outcomes i n a s i t u a t i o n . Note that t h i s approach does not permit any 15 conclusive inferences about Just World B e l i e f as a mediating mechanism between inequity and victim devaluation. In the t y p i c a l paradigm the punishment takes the form of feigned e l e c t r i c shock delivered to a videotaped female confederate-victim who i s presented as a participant i n a paired associate verbal learning experiment being broadcast over closed c i r c u i t T.V. I f the observers believe that they are only watching a videotape, or i f they believe that the v i c t i m i s only acting as i f she were being shocked (which i s , i n fact, the case), then they devalue her l e s s , i f at a l l (Lerner, 1971b). Lerner explains t h i s by noting that feigned shocks are less "unjust" than r e a l shocks and therefore present less of a threat to the observer's need to believe that the world i s just. Since there i s l i t t l e threat to t h i s b e l i e f , there i s l i t t l e need for v i ctim devaluation. In the same experiment the amount of victim devaluation was p o s i t i v e l y related to the expected duration of the victim's s u f f e r i n g . Lerner noted that longer durations of suffering are more unjust than shorter durations, given equal inputs by the victim. This greater i n j u s t i c e produced a greater threat to the observer's Just World B e l i e f and therefore required more adamant victim devaluation i n order to restore the perception of j u s t i c e . In another experi-ment (Lerner and Simmons, 1966) victim devaluation was inversely related to the amount of monetary compensation she received. Since more compensation seemed to the experimenters to be less unjust and since i t produced fewer at t r i b u t i o n s of victim deservingness from observers, the investigators i n f e r r e d that 16 i t had presented a lesser threat to the observer's Just World B e l i e f . Again, neither these experiments nor any other early "Just World" study was designed to test the actual e f f i c a c y of Just World B e l i e f i t s e l f . Its importance was based on nothing but conjecture. A l l of the above experiments had two things i n common; (a) the manipulation of outcomes to create inequity, and, (b) the use of Just World B e l i e f as an explanatory concept. With regard to the former commonality i t may be seen that i n the interpretations of the re s u l t s , the concept of i n j u s t i c e was used instead of "inequity". This might have obscured the fact that, i n a l l those studies, only one method of producing inequity was used. Inequitable i n j u s t i c e , however, can be created i n three ways. F i r s t , inputs can be held constant while outcomes are made more or less negative. This i s what was done i n a l l of the above studies. Second, outcomes can be held constant while the value of the inputs vary. This was attempted i n a number of l a t e r studies pertinent to the performance before personality sub-hypothesis. They are c r i t i c a l l y discussed l a t e r . Third, both inputs and outcomes can be held constant while only the connection between them i s varied. Outcomes can be made more or less contingent upon inputs. The present study employed t h i s method i n contrasting a condition where suffering was contingent upon performance with a condition where i t was not at a l l related to the same performance. 17 Inputs and outcomes were i d e n t i c a l i n both conditions. In the high inequity condition, however, the suffering ( e l e c t r i c shocks) occurred randomly no matter what acts the vic t i m performed. This captures the essence of inequity anxiety because i t i s not simply that inputs and outcomes are d i s -proportionally matched, i t i s that they are not matched at a l l . Most of the early experiments dealing d i r e c t l y with the Just World Hypothesis had a second thing i n common. Although the experimental manipulations were designed to create a state of s i t u a t i o n a l l y induced inequity anxiety, the results were interpreted i n terms of a d i s p o s i t i o n a l motivational concept. The t r a i t concept of Just World B e l i e f was substituted for the state concept of inequity anxiety. Furthermore, there was no attempt i n any of these studies to measure the observer's need to believe i n a just world. These studies were a l l published at least three years before the publication of the f i r s t scale to assess Just World B e l i e f (Rubin and Peplau, 1973) . As mentioned above, the strategy of inducing state inequity anxiety does not provide the evidence needed to con-clude anything about a need to believe that the world i s jus t . There are simply too many other ways that observers could deal with t h e i r s i t u a t i o n a l l y aroused inequity anxiety than to devalue victims. Therefore, Lerner 1s hypothesis about vi c t i m devaluation being a r e s u l t of attempts to protect the just 18 world b e l i e f have about the same epistemological force as the at t r i b u t i o n s which observers make about victims. Observers see a victim suffer and subsequently state that he deserved to suffer. Psychologists see an observer construe the incident as just and subsequently state that he had a need to see i t as ju s t . One r e l i a b l e conclusion that these studies to j u s t i f y , however, i s that more inequitable suffering produces more victim devaluation. The intermediary process remains unknown. The e f f e c t s of other methods of inducing state inequity anxiety remain unknown. B. Research Measuring Just World B e l i e f The speculative interpretations which Lerner placed on his results would carry more weight i f Just World Believers devalued victims more than Unjust World Believers. This i s the c r u c i a l piece of evidence needed to adequately test the Just World Hypothesis. Apart from the present experiment, only one other study has attempted to provide t h i s type of evidence. This attempt (Rubin and Peplau, 1973), however, met with a number of d i f f i c u l t i e s which the present study t r i e s to overcome. Rubin and Peplau's Just World B e l i e f Scale has 16 items and a C o e f f i c i e n t Alpha of .79. Its v a l i d i t y was tested within the context of a naturally occuring type of v i c t i m i z a -t i o n . Subjects were participants i n the 1971 U.S. national draft l o t t e r y . The r e s u l t s , however, lent only equivocal v a l i d a t i o n to the scale. Only four of the seven dependent 19 measures produced victim devaluation among high Just World Believers. Those who were unlucky i n the l o t t e r y probably received sympathy because the current c u l t u r a l sentiments among college students were opposed to the war i n Viet Nam. Rubin and Peplau commented, "This may have increased the p o s s i b i l i t y that subjects would r e j e c t the l o t t e r y i t s e l f rather than i t s victims" (p. 87). Also, by absolute standards of l o t t e r y p r o b a b i l i t i e s , the sample of lucky "observers" was small. F i f t y - e i g h t percent of the subjects received numbers that were i n the f i r s t t h i r d of the p r i o r i t y l i s t for being drafted. Because of t h i s skewedness, the o v e r a l l d i s t r i b u t i o n of l o t s d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the chance expectation 2 of equal numbers i n each t h i r d "X_ = 13.50, p < .01 . Since t h i s may have led to a high number of observers who anticipated a fate s i m i l a r to t h e i r less fortunate counterparts, the sympathy e f f e c t may have been compounded. Sorrentino and B o u t i l i e r (1974) have shown that the a n t i c i p a t i o n of a fate s i m i l a r to the victim's leads observers to evaluate the victim very p o s i t i v e l y . Results more consistent with Just World predictions might be obtained i f (a) the sample contained more unvictimized observers and (b) the nature of the victim-i z a t i o n were less generally viewed with contempt. The present study was an attempt to t e s t the predictions for this scale i n a s i t u a t i o n which met these desiderata. There are two additional possible reasons for Rubin and Peplau's f a i l u r e to confirm the Just World Hypothesis. F i r s t , the hypothesis might be wrong. Second, t h e i r Just World B e l i e f 20 Scale might lack adequate v a l i d i t y to i d e n t i f y true Just World Believers. The present study employed two measures of Just World B e l i e f . Moreover, a t h i r d set of Just World B e l i e f scores was generated by mathematically combining the two o r i g i n a l sets of scores. C o l l i n s (1974) factor analysed the Locus of Control Scale and found that the second factor seemed to measure Just World B e l i e f . There were eight items which loaded on t h i s factor. The analysis was performed on L i k e r t agreement ratings given to the 46 alternatives from Rotter's (1966) forced choice scale format. These items have never before been used to pre-d i c t victim devaluation. Rather than choosing between two measures of Just World B e l i e f , i t was possible to combine the scores on both scales i n such a way as to i s o l a t e and quantify the commonality of response variance between them. To do t h i s p r i n c i p l e component scores were calculated for each subject based on a weighted l i n e a r combination of t h e i r scores on the two Just World B e l i e f scales. Since the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e component represents the most i n t e r n a l l y consistent dimension underlying the input variables, the component scores generated i n t h i s analysis yielded a Just World B e l i e f score which incorporated the commonality between the scales by C o l l i n s and by Rubin and Peplau. This new measure of Just World B e l i e f w i l l be referred to as the COMJWB score. In the present study the predictions made by the Just World Hypothesis were tested i n such a way as to avoid the 21 c r i t i c i s m s of previous studies mentioned above. Inequity anxiety was s i t u a t i o n a l l y aroused by the method of making outcomes non-contingent upon performance inputs. Just World B e l i e f was measured. Subjects were divided into Just World Believers vs. Unjust World Believers according to t h e i r scores on two scales. These were Rubin and Peplau 1s scale and the COMJWB measure. Thus, the r e l a t i v e predictive v a l i d i t y of both measures could be compared. With th i s design i t was hoped that the connection between Just World B e l i e f and victim devaluation could be tested. I t was predicted that, i n the high inequity anxiety condition, Just World Believers would devalue the victim more than Unjust World Believers. Presumably the l a t t e r group would f i n d other ways to deal with t h e i r inequity anxiety. This was the major hypothesis of the study. It was, i n e f f e c t , the Just World Hypothesis. C. Evidence Bearing on the Performance Before Personality  Hypothesis One important q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the Just World Hypothesis, however, i s the performance before personality subhypothesis. It gives the whole notion that counter-intuitive twist. Without t h i s subhypothesis, the Just World Hypothesis might be assumed to apply to g u i l t y victims only. One could state, for example, that people devalue g u i l t y victims because they need to see the world as j u s t . Such a common sensical statement, however, leaves one with the f e e l i n g that nothing new has been discovered. On the other hand, when i t i s claimed that people devalue 22 innocent victims because they want to see the world as jus t , considerably more in t e r e s t i s aroused. This makes the lack of empirical support for the performance before personality subhypothesis a l l the more c r i t i c a l . The present study did not include any independent variables aimed at te s t i n g t h i s subhypothesis. Rather, i n the form of dependent variables, i t attempted to ask the questions whose answers might elimin-ate some of the uncertainties surrounding the interpretations of previous studies which did attempt to t e s t the subhypothesis. Even i f the subhypothesis were accepted, i t s meaning would be ambiguous at present. The following discussion examines the evidence for the subhypothesis and explores the many possible alternative interpretations of i t s meaning. Lerner and Matthews; Lerner and Simmons point out that they did not test t h e i r "performance before personality" hypothesis d i r e c t l y . There was no condition where the victim's performance was intended to be seen as deserving of punish-ment. In a l a t e r a r t i c l e , however, Lerner (1970) writes as i f the issue had been s e t t l e d by the results of the subsequent experiment (Lerner and Matthew, 1967) i n the series. When the person becomes aware of a victim who i s c l e a r l y innocent of any act which might have brought about the suffering, he i s confronted with a c o n f l i c t . He can decide he l i v e s i n a c r u e l , unjust world where innocent people can suffer or that the only people who suff e r i n t h i s world are those who deserve such a fate. The evidence supported the hypothesis that most people w i l l persuade themselves that "innocent" victims are s u f f i c i e n t l y undesirable p e o p l e — t h a t t h e i r suffering may be an appropriate fate. Even the apparently a l t r u i s t i c a l l y motivated victim tends to be seen as possessing undesirable a t t r i b u t e s . (Lerner, 1970, p. 227). 23 T h i s s ta tement presumably r e c e i v e s i t s s t r o n g e s t suppor t from the L e r n e r and Matthews (1967) exper iment where in s u b j e c t s who r a t e d the v i c t i m as more r e s p o n s i b l e f o r her s u f f e r i n g deva lued her l e s s than s u b j e c t s who r a t e d her as l e s s r e s p o n -s i b l e . The g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y o f t h i s a p p a r e n t l y c o n f i r m a t o r y r e s u l t i s l i m i t e d by the e x c l u s i v e use o f female s u b j e c t s i n t h a t exper iment . A more s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m , however, i s t h a t the exac t p s y c h o l o g i c a l meaning o f the o b t a i n e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r a t i n g s i s ex t remely ambiguous. L e r n e r and Matthews had p a i r s o f female s tudent s draw s l i p s o f paper to see who would be i n the n e g a t i v e r e i n f o r c e -ment (shock) c o n d i t i o n and who would be i n the c o n t r o l c o n d i t i o n . When the v i c t i m p i c k e d f i r s t , she was r a t e d as r e s p o n s i b l e f o r her own f a t e . S u b j e c t s who p i c k e d f i r s t deva lued the v i c t i m more than those who were r a t i n g a v i c t i m who had p i c k e d f i r s t . These r e s u l t s were taken as suppor t f o r the performance be fore p e r s o n a l i t y h y p o t h e s i s because the v i c t i m who per formed an a c t l e a d i n g t o her own s u f f e r i n g was not d e v a l u e d . Supposedly the " i n n o c e n t " v i c t i m ( s u b j e c t p i c k s f i r s t c o n d i t i o n ) posed a t h r e a t t o the s u b j e c t ' s b e l i e f i n a j u s t w o r l d and was t h e r e -fo re d e v a l u e d . The L e r n e r and Matthews ex p er iment , however, does not c o n s t i t u t e c o n c l u s i v e suppor t f o r the performance be fore p e r s o n a l i t y h y p o t h e s i s because the f a c t t h a t s u b j e c t s made r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r a t i n g s , d i f f e r i n g on the b a s i s o f who p i c k e d f i r s t does no t n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l y t h a t they h e l d the s u b j e c t r e s p o n s i b l e i n any o r d i n a r y sense o f the word . The demand 24 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the scales themselves may have been enough to lead subjects into a t t r i b u t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to someone on the basis of an act which would not o r d i n a r i l y e l i c i t such an a t t r i b u t i o n . A person who suffers as a r e s u l t of b l i n d l y drawing a s l i p of paper from a drum cannot be construed as being responsible for his fate i n the sense of having known the outcome of her act and having intended to produce that out-come. Nevertheless, Lerner and Matthews seem to be implying that a victim becomes less innocent ( i . e . more deserving of suffering) even i f he neither foresees nor intends the con-sequences of the act which i s the p r e c i p i t a t i n g cause of the suffering. This seems a very odd c r i t e r i o n for observers to use i n distinguishing between innocence and deservingness. In one sense, then, the Lerner and Matthews results--rather than support the performance before personality subhypothesis— actually weaken i t by over-extending the range of behavioral referents subsumed by the term "performance". The subhypothesis i s cast even further into doubt by the re s u l t s of an experiment by Chaikin and Darley (1973). They found that, at l e a s t i n cer t a i n circumstances, victims who are derogated are also seen as more responsible for t h e i r s u f f e r i n g . To complicate the picture further, Lerner and Agar (1972) found that varying levels of v i c t i m r e s p o n s i b i l i t y had no e f f e c t on victim evaluations. Therefore, there are c o n f l i c t i n g results to suggest that high v i c t i m r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the suffering (a) means less victim devaluation (Lerner and Matthews, 1967), (b) means more vic t i m devaluation (Chaikin 25 and Darley, 1973), or (c) has no e f f e c t on victim evaluations (Lerner and Agar, 1972). Alternative (c) i s the n u l l hypothesis. Alternative (b) can be expanded into what w i l l be c a l l e d the "blaming" hypothesis. The Blaming Hypothesis: Standing i n opposition to the performance before personality subhypothesis i s the common sense view that observers eit h e r blame or sympathize with victims. Webster's Third International (1964) defines the verb "to blame" as meaning, "1: to express disapproval of; f i n d f a u l t with: Reproach. 2a: to attribute r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to: make answerable to. b: to ascribed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for: account for by placing c u l p a b i l i t y . " The very fact that the acts of ascribing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and disapproving are both u n i f i e d under a single l i n g u i s t i c l a b e l suggests that the users of the language have some reason to conceptualize them as highly correlated a c t i v i t i e s . Perhaps t h i s i s because many acts can be used as the basis for both personality and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u t i o n s . E s p e c i a l l y when we are concerned with negative personality attributions ( i . e . devaluation), a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y laden act usually also reveals something of the actor's personality. The p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p hypothesized between responsi-b i l i t y a t t r ibutions and devaluation can actually be described i n two ways. When the target person i s both held responsible and devalued, he i s being blamed. When the target i s both exonerated of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and evaluated p o s i t i v e l y , he i s receiving sympathy. Sympathy and blame stand at opposite ends of the same continuum. 26 While the blaming hypothesis maintains the d i s t i n c t i o n between r e s p o n s i b i l i t y attributions and personality evaluations i t does not make any d i s t i n c t i o n among types of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The a s c r i p t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n blaming may be based on performed acts, personality revealing behaviors, some combina-t i o n of those two or some other c r i t e r i a . The blaming hypo-thesis, then, does not attempt to use v i c t i m r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to define a p r i o r i either v i c t i m innocence or victim g u i l t . I t therefore predicts somewhat less than the performance before personality subhypothesis because i t does not specify which conditions w i l l e l i c i t v i ctim blaming vs. victim sympathizing. Under the blaming hypothesis, t h i s prediction about the d i r e c -t i o n of observers' responses i s l e f t as an empirical question. D. Assessment Strategies for the Performance Before Personality  Subhypothesis and Alternative Hypotheses In the research reported here, an attempt was made to t e s t predictions made by the performance before personality hypothesis. This necessitated operationalizing the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for suffering i n several ways. From trends and findings obtained i n previous experiments using this paradigm a number of interpretations and operationalizations were made. The rationale for each meaning ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' w i l l be given as the item i s discussed. The items are l i s t e d i n Table I. The Responsibility Items: The f i r s t item (VRl - victim's undifferentiated r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ) asked the observer to rate the extent to which he thought the victim was responsible for her Table I Victim Position on Item (V) Items Questionnaire Type of Code (Appendix B) Item No. Item Label Form: A B Responsibility Global VR1 Performance: Unspecified VR2 S p e c i f i c VR3 VR4 VR5 Personality VR6 Addendum Sit u a t i o n a l VS7 Blame VB8 Evaluations Raw Score VE9 Difference VE10 victim's (V's) 5 1 undifferentiated r e s p o n s i b i l i t y V's unspecified 7 3 act r e s p o n s i b i l -i t y V's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 9 5 for memorization rate V 1s alternatives 11 7 V's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 13 9 for continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n V's d i s p o s i t i o n a l 17 13 (personality) r e s p o n s i b i l i t y control of V by 15 11 s i t u a t i o n V's blameworthiness 19 15 V's raw score person- 1 22 a l i t y evaluation V's difference score personality evalua- calcu-t i o n lated Experimenter Posi t i o n on Item (E) Items Questionnaire Code (Appendix B) No. Item Label Form: A B ERl experimenter's (E's) 6 2 undifferentiated r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ER2 E's unspecified act 8 4 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ER3 E's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 10 6 for l i s t d i f f i c u l t y ER4 E's alternatives 12 8 ER5 E's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 14 10 for V's continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n ER6 E's d i s p o s i t i o n a l 18 14 (personality) r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ES7 control of E by 16 12 si t u a t i o n EB8 E's blameworthiness 20 16 EE9 E's raw score person- 2 23 a l i t y evaluation EE10 E's difference score calcu-personality evaluation lated 28 suffering. This item was analogous to the ones which produced the contradictory findings i n other studies. By looking at correlations between t h i s item and others, i t was possible to get an idea what observers are thinking about when they make th i s undifferentiated type of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u t i o n . On the other hand, observers' reactions might not be any more d i f f e r e n t i a t e d than t h i s item. I f that were the case then this item would be commensurably global. The second item was also f a i r l y global i n nature. The "victim's unspecified act" r e s p o n s i b i l i t y item (VR2) dealt with performance-based deservingness on the most general l e v e l . I t asked observers to what extent they thought the victim did some-thing to bring the suffering upon herself. It did not ask what she did or why, i f she did nothing, she was responsible for her fate. I t i s possible that most subjects are not s u f f i c i e n t l y introspective or r e f l e c t i v e to be able to answer those more s p e c i f i c questions. I f that were the case, t h i s item would s t i l l have provided a rough test of the performance before personality subhypothesis. I f that subhypothesis were correct, observers who say that the victim did perform an act which caused her suffering would also r e f r a i n from devaluing her. Items VR3, VR4, and VR5 on Table I were a l l concerned with discovering what i t was, i f anything, that the victim actually did to deserve her fate, Items VR3 and VR5 represented two s p e c i f i c acts which many subjects have mentioned i n previous research. I f the observer focused on some act other than these two, he was asked to describe i t i n his own words i n item VR4 29 (victim's a l t e r n a t i v e s ) . I f , however, the observer thought the victim deserved to suffer because she performed poorly on the learning task, he would indicate t h i s on item VR3. "In t h i s experiment the amount of suffering ( i . e . number of e l e c t r i c shocks) the victim had to bear was d i r e c t l y related to how long i t took her to learn a s e r i a l l i s t of nonsense s y l l a b l e s . I f i t were found that t h i s i s the type of performance that most subjects r e f e r to when they claim that the victim i s responsible then we would have l i t t l e problem i n designing manipulations of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for independent variables i n future research. Unfortunately, there i s already evidence i n d i c a t i n g that observers are neither quite so co-operative nor cognitively simple as to confine t h e i r deliberations to such a narrow range of the victim's behavior. This i s where item VR5 (victim's continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n experiment) becomes relevant. Some observers may choose to make th e i r a t t r i b u t i o n s on the basis of larger units of analysis. The act of refusing or t a c i t l y consenting to p a r t i c i p a t e further i n the experiment may be the c r u c i a l "performance" influencing observer' reactions. This may be the explanation for the extremely nega-t i v e reactions to martyr victims. In the Lerner and Simmons experiment, there was a "martyr" condition wherein the confederate-victim was overheard convers-ing with the experimenter. She expressed a fear of being shocked and "protested that she would not take part i n an experiment i n which she would be shocked (Lerner and Simmons, 1966, p. 207)." The experimenter then pointed out that (a) the 30 observers would not receive a lab c r e d i t unless she consented to p a r t i c i p a t e (b) her r e f u s a l would cause the observers a great deal of trouble and inconvenience and, perhaps most importantly (c) the decision to p a r t i c i p a t e or not was, of course, up to her. Although t h i s scenario was calculated to give the impression that the victim was motivated by purely a l t r u i s t i c considerations i t probably also had the unfortunate side e f f e c t of drawing the observers' attention to the avenues of possible escape open to the victim. When her alternatives were made s a l i e n t , the observers might have decided the entire deservingness issue on the victim's choice or "performance" at that c r i t i c a l point. If t h i s i s what the observers did, then the resultant devaluation of the martyr contradicts the "per-formance before personality" subhypothesis. In fact, i t would support the common sense notion that observers devalue victims only when the victim's performance makes him deserving of suffering. The i n c l u s i o n of performance r e s p o n s i b i l i t y items aimed at the issue of the victim's continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the experiment made i t possible to further explore t h i s alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 'martyr' r e s u l t s . Proceeding from s i m i l a r c r i t i c i m s of Lerner and Simmons' operationalization of an "innocent" victim, Godfrey and Lowe (1973) contrasted i n t r i n s i c a l l y motivated martyrs with e x t r i n -s i c a l l y motivated martyrs. Martyrs who proceeded with the experiment because of a professed b e l i e f i n the importance and worth of the research were rated more favorably than martyrs who apparently had to be convinced to continue. Godfrey and 31 Lowe applied an a t t r i b u t i o n a l analysis to these r e s u l t s claim-ing that although both martyrs suffered innocently, only the e x t r i n s i c a l l y motivated martyr was devalued because he actually did something i n d i c a t i n g a personality weakness (e.g. he was a "sucker"; e a s i l y persuaded). Item V R 5 allowed observers to indicate to what extent they thought the v i c t i m acted autono-mously i n continuing to p a r t i c i p a t e . This i l l u s t r a t e s a more general point which i s the basis for the view that a v i c t i m i s derogated only when he i s held responsible. Many acts performed by the v i c t i m can be used as the basis for both r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and personality a t t r i b u -tions. This could explain the dynamics of the blaming and sympathizing reactions because the acts mentioned i n items V R 3 , V R 4 and V R 5 would not only inform the observer that the victim brought her s u f f e r i n g upon herself but they would also indicate that she was u n i n t e l l i g e n t (e.g. slow rate of learn-ing nonsense syllables) and spineless (e.g. f a i l u r e to discontinue p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the experiment). Thus, blaming i s global unfavorable reaction to the person. I t i s l i k e a negative halo e f f e c t . The phenomenological reactions of observers may be more global than was i n i t i a l l y apparent i n the early studies focusing only on personal evaluations of the victim. The extent to which the more global response of "blaming" characterizes observers' reactions to suffering victims i s largely unknown because none of the previous research has 32 attempted to d i r e c t l y assess the observers 1 a t t r i b u t i o n s of blame per se. Item VB8 (victim blame) was designed to do just that. On the personality side of the performance before personality subhypothesis, items VR6, VE9 and VE10 measured two aspects of the same reaction. I f , for example, an observer did not think that any of the performed acts s p e c i f i e d i n items VR3, VR4 or VR5 made the victim responsible, he could s t i l l claim that she brought her fate upon herself by turning to item VR6 (victim's personality r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ) . This item asked to what extent the victim's behavior was a r e s u l t of her personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and dispositions. Such ratings are presumably made on the basis of inferences from personality revealing behaviors. For instance, the observer might a t t r i -bute undifferentiated r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the victim on the basis of some set of expressive gestures which have no l i n g u i s -t i c l a b e l but which nevertheless betray an attitude which i n v i t e s v i c t i m i z a t i o n . In such a case the observer might express t h i s perception as a form of deservingness a r i s i n g from personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the victim. Therefore, i n holding the victim responsible on t h i s item the observer i s e s s e n t i a l l y devaluing the victim. Devaluation i s what per-sonality r e s p o n s i b i l i t y means within the context of the sub-hypothesis. Nonetheless, devaluation could occur independently of the as c r i p t i o n of any type of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , whether i t be performance or personality based. Therefore separate scales were included to tap personality a t t r i b u t i o n s per se. Either 33 VE9 or VE10 (or both) were used by Lerner and his colleagues as indecies of devaluation i n almost every previous study. The Just World Hypothesis has undergone some modification i n the l i g h t of empirical findings. These modifications w i l l be c a l l e d "addenda". Victim devaluation has been unexpectedly absent among some observers. These observers, however, have usually found other targets for t h e i r negative reaction. Observers who devalue or condemn either the v i c t i m i z e r or the v i c t i m i z i n g s i t u a t i o n (or both) do not devalue the victim. On the basis of spontaneous comments from subjects i n an experi-ment (Lerner and Simmons, 1966) using the same paradigm as that used i n t h i s study, Lerner suggested, "Apparently i f the subjects were w i l l i n g to condemn the s i t u a t i o n they had no need to devalue the victim" (Lerner, 1970, p. 211). Lerner does not specify why anyone who needed to believe that the world i s just would be w i l l i n g to condemn the s i t u a t i o n . Presumably he would say that such an observer would believe that the world i s actually unjust. I f , however, a l l observers sampled condemned the s i t u a t i o n the Just World Hypothesis i t s e l f would come into question. In the present study i t was possible to examine the exact degree of relationship between Just World B e l i e f and condemnation of the s i t u a t i o n . Item VS7 afforded observers the opportunity to condemn the s i t u a t i o n . Likewise, i n a previous unpublished study, subjects who devalued the v i c t i m i z e r tended not to devalue the victim. Items ERl to ER6 represent t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e . In t h i s paradigm 3 4 the v i c t i m i z e r i s the videotaped experimenter who administers the shocks to the victim. I f observers hold the experimenter responsible for the victim's suffering i t i s s t i l l h e l p f u l to know exactly what the basis i s for that a t t r i b u t i o n . The same rationale for item i n c l u s i o n apply to att r i b u t i o n s of respon-s i b i l i t y to the experimenter as apply to the victim. Therefore the experimenter items ERl to ER6 correspond to the victim items i n boxes VR1 to VR6. Personality and blame attributions for the experimenter were also measured. Hypothesized Inter-Item Relationships; The following i s an attempt to rel a t e the predictions of both the performance before personality subhypothesis and the blaming hypothesis to the operationalizations of the variables i n t h i s experiment. The predictions consist of clusters of correlations r e f l e c t i n g patterns of a t t r i b u t i o n s . They are presented symbolically as follows: Let: c = "co-occurs with" VRpers = VR6 = victim's d i s p o s i t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y VRperf = VR2 to VR5 = victim's performance r e s p o n s i b i l i t y VS = VS7 = control of victim by s i t u a t i o n VE = VE9, VE10 =. victim's personality evaluations ER = ERl to ER6 = vi c t i m i z e r ' s (experimenter's) r e s p o n s i b i l i Performance Before Personality Predictions: high VRperf 1. performance: (not low VE) c (high VRperf) c (low VRpers) c (low VS) c (low ER) 35 low VRperf 2 . personality:* (low VE) c (low VRperf) c (high VRpers) c (low VS) c (low ER) 3 . addenda: (not low VE) c (low VRperf) c (low VRpers) c [(high VS) and/or (high ER)] Blaming/Sympathizing Predictions: high VRperf 4 . blaming:* (low VE) c (high VRperf) c (high VRpers) c (low VS) c (low ER) low VRperf 5 . sympathizing: (high VE) c (low VRperf) c (low VRpers) c [(high VS) and/or (high ER)] *victim devaluation Notice that the performance before personality subhypothe-s i s requires three l i n e s while the blaming hypothesis requires only two. This i s because the performance before personality subhypothesis i s indeterminate i n the case of low victim per-formance r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Another way of expressing t h i s i s by pointing out that under the performance before personality sub-hypothesis there are two d i s t i n c t patterns of correlations (performance and addenda) associated with no devaluation. The performance before personality subhypothesis seeks to predict e i t h e r devaluation or no devaluation. The blaming 36 hypothesis predicts either devaluation or p o s i t i v e evaluation ( l i k i n g ) . This difference, however, i s not actually as important as i t might seem. In practice, devaluation i s always defined r e l a t i v e to more po s i t i v e victim evaluations i n other experi-mental conditions. The scales that Lerner and his colleagues have used to measure devaluation (VE9) have a midpoint of 75 and range from 15 (extremely negative) to 135 (extremely p o s i -tive) . In no reported study has a victim ever received a mean evaluation of less than 75, the midpoint. Thus the l a b e l l i n g of a p a r t i c u l a r mean score as either p o s i t i v e evaluation or non-devaluation i s determined as much by the investigator's t h e o r e t i c a l orientation as i t i s by the value of the score i n r e l a t i o n to scores i n other experimental conditions. The absolute value of the score seems to be r e l a t i v e l y unimportant i n l a b e l l i n g the score. The performance before personality subhypothesis attempts to order the alternative a t t r i b u t i o n patterns i n terms of the observer's preference. The observer w i l l prefer to see the victim's performance r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as high (line 1). His second choice i s to ascribe the patterns of either personality r e s p o n s i b i l i t y (line 2) or the addenda (line 3). The sub-hypothesis, however, does not state an order to preference between personality r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the addenda. The blaming hypothesis, on the other hand, does not assert that the observer has a preference. The observer blames or sympathizes as a function of the information he receives about the incident and the people involved. He i s not motivated to 3 7 re-interpret or d i s t o r t the information as i s the performance before personality observer. I t i s the motivational basis of the performance before personality subhypothesis ( i . e . need for inequity anxiety reduction) which hypothetically predisposes observers to have preferences among patterns of a t t r i b u t i o n s . E. Internal V a l i d i t y : Control Factors and Manipulation Checks Two items were included on the post-experimental question-naire to check the e f f i c a c y of the procedures. One dealt with the main manipulation of shock contingency. The item asked observers to rate how f a i r l y they thought the victim had been treated i n the experiment. This was a s y l l o g i s t i c operational-i z a t i o n of inequity. I f inequity i s perceived as unjust and i f i n j u s t i c e i s perceived as unfair then observers i n the non-contingency shock condition should have rated the victim's treatment as more unfair than observers i n the more equitable contingent shock condition. Another item dealt with the observers perception of the amount of suffering the victim experienced. Since she received the same number of shocks i n each condition, the severity of her suffering should have been rated the same across conditions. If t h i s were the case, i t would j u s t i f y concluding that the perceived inequity derived from the contingency/non-contingency manipulation and not form some d i s t o r t i o n of the severity of the victim's outcome. Two control factors were included as independent v a r i -ables i n the design. One dealt with pretest s e n s i t i z a t i o n and 38 the other dealt with order effects on the post-experimental questionnaire. To assess the extent of any pretest s e n s i t i z a -t i o n that might have occurred, a Solomon four group design was used (cf. Campbell and Stanley, 1963, p. 24). The pretesting occurred 3 to 4 weeks before the experimental session and con-s i s t e d of several personality tests and attitude measures including the two Just World Scales. In both shock contingency conditions there were some subjects who had been pretested and others who had not. Since the post-experimental questionnaire was rather lengthy, a factor was included to test for possible order e f f e c t s . The dependent variables f a l l into two main categories; the personality evaluations and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u t i o n s . Two orders of presentation were used. On one form of the questionnaire the personality evaluations were presented f i r s t (form A) and on the other (form B) the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y attributions were presented f i r s t . There are two reasons for including t h i s control factor. F i r s t of a l l , none of these variables have ever been examined for t h e i r s e n s i t i v i t y across time. I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g to know whether the victim de-valuation phenomenon i s merely a transi t o r y e f f e c t which l a s t s only a few minutes following the witnessing of an incident of v i c t i m i z a t i o n , or whether derogation can be observed on these scales for an i n d e f i n i t e period after the termination of the shocks. I f either type of dependent variable produces only transit o r y e f f e c t s , then the results of any p a r t i c u l a r experi-ment may rest on the timing of the ratings. Secondly, answering one type of item f i r s t might create an a t t r i b u t i o n a l set for the second type of item. This a t t r i b u t i o n a l set might be d i f f e r e n t from that which would be created i f the order were reversed. Yandell (1973) found just such an e f f e c t i n an a t t r i b u t i o n study. Thus, there i s reason to believe that the information obtained from t h i s factor may prove valuable for the interpretation of the r e s u l t s . F. Summary and Formal Hypotheses Lerner never measured Just World B e l i e f i n his subjects and was therefore l o g i c a l l y unable, s t r i c t l y speaking, to either confirm or disconfirm his hypothesis. Rubin and Peplau' ambiguous results might have been caused by sampling error which alotted a high p r o b a b i l i t y of v i c t i m i z a t i o n to many observers. The ambiguity might also have been caused by h i s t o r i c a l - p o l i t i c a l factors i n subjects' perceptions of the v i c t i m i z a t i o n or by inaccurate measurement of Just World B e l i e f The present research used items from two independent sources to assess subjects' Just World B e l i e f . A measure of Just World B e l i e f was constructed which met a c r i t e r i o n of high i n t e r n a l consistency. Furthermore, the simulated incident of v i c t i m i z a t i o n used i n t h i s study was more removed from h i s t o r i c a l - p o l i t i c a l issues. I t also minimized observers' an t i c i p a t i o n of a fate s i m i l a r to the victim's. The l i t e r a t u r e on the performance before personality and hypothesis was shown to be inconclusive. Several possible meanings of the term " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " were outlined. The 40 dependent variables designed to assess these various nuances were described. Two addenda, and one alternative, to the performance before personality subhypothesis were presented. The addenda are included i n the second hypothesis below. The alternative was the blame-sympathy hypothesis. Predictions of t h i s hypothesis and the performance before personality hypothesis were compared. The formal hypotheses of the present study are the Just World Hypothesis and derivations of the performance before personality subhypothesis. In the context of the operation-a l i z a t i o n s used i n th i s experiment they can be stated as follows: 1) In the high inequity anxiety condition, Just World Believers w i l l devalue the victim more than Unjust World Believers. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i n the non-contingent shock condition, subjects who scored high on COMJWB w i l l rate the victim's personality more negatively than low scorers on COMJWB. 2) Subjects who perceive the victim as responsible on account of some s p e c i f i e d act w i l l not devalue her while those who do not attribute to her any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for her own fate by her performed acts w i l l either devalue her or w i l l place the re s p o n s i b i l i t y for her suff e r i n g on the si t u a t i o n , the experi-menter or both. 41 CHAPTER THREE: METHOD A. Subjects One hundred fif t y - o n e volunteers were recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia. As Shown on Table I I , there were 30 unpre-tested subjects i n the two control conditions. The other 121 subjects were requested by telephone to p a r t i c i p a t e i n two sessions each l a s t i n g one hour. The random assignment of subjects to treatment conditions was r e s t r i c t e d only by time-table c o n f l i c t s and the u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of subjects at scheduled p a r t i c i p a t i o n times. F i f t y - e i g h t (48%) of the 121 subjects who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the pretest did not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the experi-mental treatment. Of those who, at the time of the second telephone contact, said they would p a r t i c i p a t e i n the second session at a p a r t i c u l a r time, 37 (31% of the t o t a l number pre-tested) f a i l e d to appear. Sixty-three (52%) of the 121 pre-tested did p a r t i c i p a t e . The remaining 21 of the 58 pretested dropouts either could not be contacted a second time or refused to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the second session for a variety of personal reasons. 2 A Hotellmgs T performed on the pretest scores of dropouts vs experimental participants f a i l e d to reveal any differences between the two groups on any of the personality 2 tests administered (T = 16.16; df = 118; p = .28). The drop-outs did not d i f f e r - s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the participants even on two scales which have previously been shown to be predictive 42 Table II Account of Subject P a r t i c i p a t i o n Male Female PRETESTED Dropouts: No Shows 21 16 37 Misc. 13 8 21 34 24 58 58 Experimental CS 18 13 31 Participants: NCS 17 15 32 35 28 63 63 Total Pretested 69 52 121 121 UNPRETESTED Controls: CS 12 5 17 NCS 5 8 13 Total Pretested 17 13 30 30 30 Total Contacted 86 65 151 of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n psychological research. These were Rubin and Peplau's (1973) Just World B e l i e f Scale and Adair's (1970) Psychological Research Survey. Zuckerman (1975) found Just World Believers more w i l l i n g to volunteer for psychological experiments and Adair and Fenton (1971) found the "good subject" syndrome among people with more favorable attitudes towards psychological research. B. Materials Pretest Questionnaires: Three to four weeks before the experimental session subjects assembled i n groups of 12 to 28. They were requested to complete the items from the Just World factor of the Locus of Control Scale ( C o l l i n s , 1974) and Rubin and Peplau's Just World B e l i e f Scale. A number of other person-a l i t y tests were also administered for exploratory purposes (see Appendix A for a l i s t of the tests and a sample question-naire) . Subjects marked t h e i r answers to a l l items on o p t i c a l sense computer cards. Videotape: There were two versions of black and white videotape corresponding to the two treatment conditions. Each videotape was to learn a s e r i a l l i s t of nonsense s y l l a b l e s . Depending on the condition, she received shocks either at random int e r v a l s throughout the learning task or upon wrong responses. Both conditions contained an equal number of shocks. The videotape was presented to subjects as a l i v e , c l o s e d - c i r c u i t TV broadcast. Therefore, the victim wore the same clothes i n both versions of the tape and to a l l experimental sessions since 44 she sat among the observer-subjects just p r i o r to the s t a r t of the "broadcast". Post-Experimental Questionnaire; The post-experimental questionnaire (see Appendix B) included Lerner's (1971b) vic t i m evaluation items along with a modified version for evaluations of the v i c t i m i z e r . A f t e r Lerner, difference scores were obtained by subtracting ratings of eit h e r the average college student or the average psychology experimenter from the raw score ratings of e i t h e r the victim or the experimenter, respectively. The ratings of the average student and the average experimenter w i l l be c a l l e d "average target" ratings. There were two forms of the post-experimental questionnaire. They varied only with respect to the order i n which the items appeared. In form A, the f i r s t s i x items consisted of raw score evaluations and average target ratings. These were followed by nine pairs of items related to the a t t r i b u t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and blame. The f i r s t item of each pair dealt with at t r i b u t i o n s towards the victim. The second item dealt with a t t r i b u t i o n s towards the v i c t i m i z e r . In the style of e a r l i e r studies, the f i r s t two items attempted to assess the observer's global a t t r i -bution of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . This was followed by two items measuring the observer's perception of both targets' respon-s i b i l i t y by virtue of unspecified acts. The t h i r d p a i r of items dealt with the question of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y through memorization rate i n the learning task. The fourth pair probed perceptions of alternatives open to both the v i c t i m and the v i c t i m i z e r . This allowed those observers who focused on the issue of the 45 v i c t i m ' s c o n t i n u e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e e x p e r i m e n t t o i d e n t i f y t h e m s e l v e s . P e r c e p t i o n s o f v i c t i m r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h r o u g h t h e p e r f o r m e d a c t o f p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e e x p e r i m e n t w e r e a s s e s s e d by t h e n i n e t h a n d t e n t h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i t e m s ( f i f t h p a i r ) . The n e x t f o u r i t e m s t a p p e d t h e l o c u s o f o b s e r v e r s ' a t t r i b u t i o n s o f c a u s a l i t y ( d i s p o s i t i o n a l v s . s i t u a t i o n a l ) f o r t h e t a r g e t s ' b e h a v i o r . A t t r i b u t i o n s o f b l a m e p e r s e f o l l o w e d . T h e r e w e r e two m a n i p u l a t i o n c h e c k s a n d two e x p l o r a t o r y p i l o t i t e m s a t t h e e n d . I n f o r m B o f t h i s q u e s t i o n n a i r e , t h e a t t r i b u t i o n s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n c h e c k s a n d t h e e x p l o r a t o r y i t e m s a l l a p p e a r e d f i r s t . The e v a l u a t i o n s o f t h e v i c t i m a n d t h e v i c t i m i z e r a p p e a r e d s e c o n d . One h a l f o f t h e s u b j e c t s i n e a c h s e s s i o n r e c e i v e d f o r m A a n d t h e r e m a i n i n g h a l f r e c e i v e d f o r m B . S u b j e c t s w e r e a s s i g n e d t o t h e s e two c o n d i t i o n s a t r a n d o m a n d , t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r d i d n o t know w h a t i t e m - o r d e r c o n d i t i o n t h e s u b j e c t was i n . S u b j e c t s w e r e , h o w e v e r , t o l d t h a t t h e r e w e r e two f o r m s . S i n c e t h e y w e r e t e s t e d i n g r o u p s a n d s a t c l o s e t o e a c h o t h e r w i t h 3 t o 4 s h a r i n g t h e same t a b l e i t was a s s u m e d t h a t a t l e a s t some w o u l d n o t i c e t h e d i f f e r e n t f o r m s . I n o r d e r t o s a t i s f y t h e i r c u r i o s i t y , t h e r e b y p r e v e n t i n g t h e m f r o m p e r u s i n g t h e i r n e i g h b o r s ' q u e s t i o n -n a i r e s , t h e y w e r e t o l d t h a t t h e two f o r m s c o n t a i n e d a l l t h e same q u e s t i o n s b u t i n d i f f e r e n t o r d e r s . They w e r e a l s o s i m p l y t o l d t h a t t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s was t o c o n t r o l f o r o r d e r e f f e c t s . A f t e r v e r b a l d e b r i e f i n g , e a c h s u b j e c t r e c e i v e d a d i t t o e d s h e e t e x p l a i n i n g t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e e x p e r i m e n t . 46 C. Procedure Subjects were tested i n groups of 12 to 19. Some control subjects were tested i n the same session with pretested subjects and vice versa. There were seven t e s t i n g sessions, three for the contingent shock (CS) condition and four for the non-contingent shock (NCS) condition. The confederate was always b l i n d to the condition being run up u n t i l the procedure of the learning task was explained to subjects. The confederate entered the room with the other subjects and sat with them. When a l l subjects had arrived, the experimenter introduced himself and gave the following rationale (cf. Godfrey and Lowe, 1973) for the procedure: This i s an experiment involving the perception of persons i n stress. The information we hope to obtain could be used to a s s i s t those who have to deal with people undergoing stress, such as accident, or d i s -aster or crime victims. I t i s also important for these people to be able to quickly assess what i s happening i n s t r e s s f u l emergency situ a t i o n s . Later, i t i s often also necessary for jurors i n a court t r i a l to be able to assess what happened. There w i l l be a questionnaire at the end of the experiment to tap your perceptions. We are also interested i n the differences that e x i s t between in d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r reactions to persons i n stress. We hypothesize that some of these differences may be related to the personality dimensions on which I tested you a few weeks ago. In a few minutes you w i l l be watching a person i n a s t r e s s f u l s i t u a t i o n . He w i l l be assigned the task of tryi n g to learn a l i s t of nonsense s y l l a b l e s . Nonsense s y l l a b l e s share, many at t r i b u t i o n s i n common with words but are much less l i k e l y to hold d i f f e r -ent connotations or emotional impacts from person to person. At t h i s point the instructions varied according to what condition was being run. 47 ^Contingent Shock") The learner w i l l receive an e l e c t r i c shock whenever he makes a wrong response. [Non-Contingent Shock] The learner w i l l receive e l e c t r i c shocks at random in t e r v a l s throughout the learning session. (Both Conditions] He w i l l perform the learn-ing task i n the room where the shock apparatus i s located. While we're watching t h i s experiment we're not going to be r i g h t i n the room with the learner because the room i s rather small and our presence might d i s t r a c t him and impair his per-formance. Instead, we are going to be watching them over a closed c i r c u i t T.V. system. The person you w i l l see administering the learning task and the shocks i s N e i l Kyle, the main experi-menter. Now I ' l l draw the student number to see who the learner w i l l be. The experimenter drew a s l i p of paper from a bowl and read a student number aloud. When he asked whose i t was, the confederate raised her hand. The experimenter t o l d the con-federate how to f i n d the testing room and she l e f t the room. Approximately 20 to 30 seconds l a t e r the experimenter turned on the videotape while explaining to subjects that he was about to turn on the closed c i r c u i t T.V. camera. The videotape depicted a male experimenter (the victim-izer) s i t t i n g at a table i n front of some impressive looking el e c t r o n i c equipment. After a few seconds the victim (a confederate) entered and introduced herself to the experimenter as the subject who was randomly selected to be the learner. The experimenter explained to the victim that her task was to memorize a l i s t of 12 nonsense s y l l a b l e s i n t h e i r proper order. The l i s t of s y l l a b l e s was written on a deck of f i l e cards, one s y l l a b l e to a card. The experimenter said that he would f i r s t show her the cards one at a time. She was to read the s y l l a b l e s aloud and try to memorize t h e i r order. Then the te s t i n g t r i a l s 48 would begin. There were to be as many t r i a l s as i t took for her to learn the l i s t i n the proper order without an error. In both conditions there were several t r i a l s and the learner made the same errors i n the same order. In other words, her task performance was the same i n both conditions. As he attached electrodes to the victim's wrist, the experimenter explained the shock contingencies depending on the condition being portrayed. He assured her that no perman-ent tissue damage would r e s u l t from the shocks. After the learner had had a chance to read the l i s t through once, the seven testing t r i a l s .began. In the contingent shock condition the learner appeared to receive an e l e c t r i c shock every time she made an error. In the non-contingent shock condition shocks were delivered at random in t e r v a l s throughout the t e s t -ing t r i a l s . The vi c t i m i z e r was c l e a r l y shown depressing a key on a box each time he administered a shock. During the learning task, the victim acted as i f she were being shocked each time the vi c t i m i z e r depressed the key. The key simul-taneously illuminated a c l e a r l y v i s i b l e lamp and sounded a buzzer. On the seventh t r i a l the learner gave the l i s t of sy l l a b l e s i n the correct order and.the experimenter then informed her that the task was over. The tape ended immedi-ately a f t e r he detached the electrodes from her wrist. When the videotape was fini s h e d the experimenter gave the following instructions to the observers who had just watched i t : Now I'd l i k e you to f i l l out t h i s questionnaire. Don't spend too much time pondering each item. Just give your f i r s t impressions but be careful not to omit any questions. There are two forms 49 of the questionnaire. Both forms ask a l l the same questions but the pages have simply been arranged i n d i f f e r e n t orders. This i s so that we can control for any eff e c t s that might r e s u l t from answering the questions i n a d i f f e r -ent order. So don't worry i f you see that your neighbor i s working on a d i f f e r e n t question. That question w i l l appear l a t e r on i n your questionnaire. Please f i l l out the questionnaire on your own without consulting anyone else. I f there are any questions just raise your hand and I ' l l t r y to answer them. Post-experimental questionnaires were d i s t r i b u t e d and when they had been completed and co l l e c t e d , the verbal debrief-ing began. An attempt was made to assess the extent of the subjects' suspiciousness about the v e r i d i c a l i t y of the shocks and the closed c i r c u i t T.V. broadcast. After they had been asked not to reveal the nature of the experiment to t h e i r peers u n t i l i t was completed, subjects received a written summary of the purpose of the experiment along with the experimenter's thanks for t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 50 CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS The results of the MANOVA performed to test the Just World Hypothesis are presented before the c o r r e l a t i o n a l findings which are pertinent to the performance before personality sub-hypothesis. Neither hypothesis was confirmed but t h e o r e t i c a l l y and s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t differences and correlations were found. The l a s t r esults presented are concerned with the i n - . ternal v a l i d i t y of the experiment. A. Fai l u r e to Confirm the Just World Hypothesis E s s e n t i a l l y , the Just World Hypothesis was phrased as an inte r a c t i o n between inequity and Just World B e l i e f . The hypo-thesis was tested within the framework of a 2 x 2 f a c t o r i a l multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on 33 dependent variables and l i n e a r transformations thereof. The COMJWB factor had two l e v e l s . Subjects were categorized into two groups on the basis of a median s p l i t . There were 32 observers c l a s s i f i e d as Unjust World Believers and 31 c l a s s i f i e d as Just World Believers. The in t e r a c t i o n between shock contingency and COMJWB was not s i g n i f i c a n t (multivariate F = 0.5 36; df = 13/47; ns). Neither was there any main e f f e c t for COMJWB (multivariate F = 1.023; df = 13/47; ns). There was, however, a s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t for shock contingency (multivariate F = 7.55; df = 20/40; p<.0001). Before discussing t h i s l e t us make sure that the Just World Hypothesis was thoroughly and adequately tested. A closer examination of the Just World 51 B e l i e f measures and t h e i r d i v i s i o n into factor l e v e l s i s i n order. F i r s t of a l l , the descriptive s t a t i s t i c s on COMJWB are reported. Rubin and Peplau 1s scale s i g n i f i c a n t l y correlates with the C o l l i n s scale (r = .451; df = 118; p< .001). The eigen-value for the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e component ( i . e . COMJWB) was 1.45 and, of course, since there were only two input variables, the values i n the eigenvector are i d e n t i c a l for each scale (.852). The eigenvector values are i d e n t i c a l with the c o r r e l a t i o n co-e f f i c i e n t s between COMJWB and the two input measures (r = .852; df = 61; p < .001). Since the eigenvalue i s considerably greater than 1.00 and the correlations are a l l very s i g n i f i c a n t (p<.001) the pr i n c i p l e component analysis seems to have succeeded i n produc-ing a highly i n t e r n a l l y consistent measure of Just World B e l i e f . Nevertheless further analyses were performed as a pre-cautionary measure. The scores from Rubin and Peplau's Just World B e l i e f Scale were used to construct the second MANOVA factor. In terms of significance l e v e l s , the results on the two main ef f e c t s and the i n t e r a c t i o n were a l l the same as those obtained using COMJWB. In order to examine the p o s s i b i l i t y that only extreme scores on these measures would react according to predictions, the sample was divided into three groups by means of a t e r t i l e s p l i t . This yielded a three-level Just World factor and a 2 x 3 MANOVA. Table III shows the resultant c e l l frequencies and marginal sums for the median and t e r t i l e s p l i t s performed Table III Frequencies Produced by Median and T e r t i l e S p l i t s on Two Measures of Just World B e l i e f Factor CS NCS Total COMJWB Median:* Just 16 15 31 Unjust 15 17 32 T e r t i l e Just 12 9 21 Neutral 9 11 20 Unjust 10 12 22 Rubin & Pelau's Scale Median Just 17 19 36 Unjust 14 13 27 T e r t i l e Just 8 8 16 Neutral 16 15 31 Unjust 7 9 16 *This was the major analysis i n the experiment. I t was used to calculate the M7ANOVA results reported. 53 on both COMJWB and Rubin and Peplau 1s scale. They are a l l intersected with shock contingency conditions. Again, the t e r t i l e s p l i t s did not change the significance l e v e l s of the resul t s found using a median s p l i t on COMJWB. The unavoidable conclusion i s that Just World B e l i e f had no predictive value whatsoever. B. Main E f f e c t for Shock Contingency Having dealt with the non-significant MANOVA results l e t us now consider what s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s were found. Under the multivariate main e f f e c t for shock contingency there were ten dependent variables with s i g n i f i c a n t univariate F rations. Their means, F rati o s and significance l e v e l s are summarized i n Table IV. Attributions of undifferentiated r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the victim and for the vi c t i m i z e r were inversely related across conditions. The vict i m was rated as more responsible i n the CS condition than i n the NCS condition (p < .001). The victim-i z e r was seen as more responsible i n the NCS condition (p<-0002). Moreover, i n the CS condition, more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was attributed to the v i c t i m than to the v i c t i m i z e r (p < .0001) . In the NCS condition they are reversed. This i s most c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d by the t h i r d variable on Table IV ("V-E Resp"). It was constructed by subtracting the v i c t i m i z e r ' s u n d i f f e r e n t i -ated r e s p o n s i b i l i t y score from the victim's. The personality evaluations for the victim and the victim-i z e r were also inversely related across conditions. The vi c t i m Table IV MANOVA Summary of Shock Main E f f e c t Multivariate F = 7.5514, p .0001, df = 20/40 Item (Code No.)* Univariate F (df = 1/59) P X CS X NCS Means Key 1 V undifferentiated R (VRl) 48.84 .0001 4. 032 7. 750 R = lower number 2 E undifferentiated R (ER1) 17.17 .0002 6. 161 3. 312 R = lower number 3 V-E Resp (#l-#2) 47.83 .0001 -4. 270 8. 780 VR = negative "-' 4 Raw score V evaluation (VE9) 6.65 .0125 92. 290 129. 300 »+» VE = higher 5 Difference score E eval. (EE10) 6.09 .0165 0. 650 -6. 469 derogation = "-" 6 Victim blame (VB8) 15.00 .0003 4. 548 7. 000 blame = lower 7 Experimenter blame (EB8) 9.01 .0004 6. 194 4. 062 blame = lower 8 V-E Blame (#6-#7) 15.97 .0003 -3. 270 5. 680 VB = negative 9 V unspecified act R (VR2) 105.25 .0001 2. 290 7. 344 R = lower number 10 Fairness of experiment 8.650 .0047 3. 258 4. 844 f a i r = lower *See Table I for key to item code numbers. V = vic t i m R = r e s p o n s i b i l i t y E = experimenter 55 was rated more p o s i t i v e l y i n the NCS condition than i n the CS condition (p<.0125). The v i c t i m i z e r was perceived more p o s i -t i v e l y i n the CS condition than i n the NCS condition (p<.0165). In short, the greater inequity of the NCS condition made the vi c t i m seem nicer and the vi c t i m i z e r seem n a s t i e r . The results on the undifferentiated a t t r i b u t i o n s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the personality evaluations can be used to determine the occurrence of any blaming response. Since, i n the NCS condition, for example, the v i c t i m i z e r was both devalued and held responsible, blaming did occur. As would be expected then, the at t r i b u t i o n s of blame per se also d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i -cantly across shock contingency conditions. The victim was perceived as more blameworthy i n the CS condition than i n the NCS condition (p<.000 3). The reverse was true for the victim-i z e r (p<.0004). The eighth variable on Table IV ("V-E Blame") compares the r e l a t i v e blame attributed to victim vs. victim-i z e r across conditions. Like the V-E Resp variable, i t was constructed by subtracting v i c t i m i z e r blame scores from victim blame scores. In the CS condition the victim was perceived as s l i g h t l y more blameworthy than the v i c t i m i z e r . In the NCS condition, however, the vi c t i m i z e r was rated as a great deal more blameworthy than the victim (p<.0003). Therefore the greater inequity of the NCS condition resulted i n blame for the v i c t i m i z e r and sympathy for the victim. The ratings of the extent to which the victim "did some-thing" to bring about her own suffering, portrayed the victim as more responsible i n the CS condition (p < .0001). In a 56 s t r i c t l y behavioral sense, the vic t i m did exactly the same things i n both conditions. She was selected to receive shocks and complied i n the same way both times. She made the same responses over the same number of t r i a l s i n both conditions. Yet the observers' ratings produced a huge univariate F (105.25) i n d i c a t i n g that t h e i r perceptions of how much she did to bring the suffering on herself were d r a s t i c a l l y d i f f e r -ent from one condition to the other. In the CS condition she was seen as performing some unspecified act which caused her suffering. In the NCS condition she was seen as largely help-l e s s , an innocent pawn. Surprisingly, however, the victim's "unspecified act" item was not s i g n i f i c a n t l y correlated with her r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a r i s i n g from eith e r her memorization rate or her continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the experiment. What i s more, the data from the open ended item on what alternatives she had available do not shed any l i g h t on exactly what the observers i n the CS condition thought she had done to bring the misfortune upon herself. When asked i f the "learner" ( i . e . victim) could have done anything other than what she actually did, 36% of the CS observers said "NO" while 64% said "YES". In the NCS condition 53% said "NO" and 47% said "YES". A chi square showed these frequencies to be within 2 the range of chance v a r i a t i o n ('X = 1.82; df = 1; NS). Furthermore, p o i n t - b i s e r i a l correlations of these "alterna-t i v e s " items with a l l other performed act r e s p o n s i b i l i t y items revealed no s i g n i f i c a n t correlations. Thus, i t remains unknown exactly what the victim was perceived to have done i n the CS condition to bring the suffering upon her s e l f . 57 As for the l a s t variable on Table I ' l l , ' the treatment of the victim in the CS condition was rated as s i g n i f i c a n t l y more f a i r than the treatment she received i n the NCS condition (p <.0047). This indicates that the greater inequity of the non-contingent shock was interpreted as less f a i r treatment of the victim. Summarizing the results r e l a t i n g to the f i r s t hypothesis, no support was found for the Just World Hypothesis but a blaming reaction was observed. Where the victim should have been devalued the most, she received sympathy and the victim-i z e r was blamed. C. Failu r e to Confirm the Performance Before Personalty  Subhypothesis The performance before personality subhypothesis was the second hypothesis i n t h i s experiment. I t received no support whatsoever. The.alternative hypothesis was the blaming reaction. The evidence supported a modified version of t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e . A l l the evidence bearing on the performance before personality subhypothesis was c o r r e l a t i o n a l . The elements being correlated were personality evaluations and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u t i o n s . The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u t i o n s f e l l into three rough categories. These were d i s p o s i t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a r i s i n g from s p e c i f i c acts and global respon-s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u t i o n s . 58 D i s p o s i t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was assessed by the item VR6. I t represents the personality part of the phrase "per-formance before personality". According to the hypothesis, observers who devalued the victim should have attributed a high degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to her on t h i s item. They did not. The c o r r e l a t i o n with raw score v i c t i m evaluations was non-significant (r = .0534; df = 61; ns). The performance part of the phrase "performance before personality" covers a t t r i b u t i o n s based on s p e c i f i c acts by which the v i c t i m might have brought her s u f f e r i n g upon herself. These att r i b u t i o n s were measured by the items VR3, VR4 and VR5. They refere to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a r i s i n g from memorization rate, continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the experiment and whatever else the subject can specify himself. The performance before personality subhypothesis predicts that:attributions of a low degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on any or a l l of these would be accompanied by v i c t i m derogation. I t was not. A l l of the correlations with both measures of the v i c t i m 1 s personality were non-significant. Attributions: of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the basis of s p e c i f i c acts were unrelated to v i c t i m devaluation. The item assessing r e s p o n s i b i l i t y attributed on the basis of an Unspecified act (VR2) i s also subsumed by the "performance" part of the subhypothesis. I t was not cor-related with victim devaluation i n the predicted d i r e c t i o n either. As Table V shows, however, i t was s i g n i f i c a n t l y correlated (p <.05) i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n with raw score vi c t i m evaluations. The more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y attributed, 59 the more victim devaluation. This i s the blaming response. To summarize a l l the comparisons relevant to the per-formance before personality subhypothesis, two things must be noted. F i r s t , absolutely no support was found for the sub-hypothesis although some support was found for the a l t e r n a t i v e hypothesis of blaming. Second, one possible explanation for the f a i l u r e of victim evaluations were not related to respon-s i b i l i t y ratings i n the predicted manner i s that, since so l i t t l e v i c t i m devaluation occurred, the results are based on d i f f e r e n t psychological processes from those covered by the subhypothesis. In other words, since i t was the victim-i z e r who was held responsible there were no data r e l a t i n g to observers' preferences for types of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u -t i o n when i t i s the v i c t i m who they hold responsible. D. Victimizer Blame and Victim Sympathy There are two apparent loopholes i n the performance before personality hypothesis. They state that when the v i c t i m has been neither held responsible nor devalued, observers attribute the i n j u s t i c e to e i t h e r the s i t u a t i o n or the victim-i z e r . As mentioned i n Chapter I I , the Just World Hypothesis i s incapable of e i t h e r predicting or explaining such reactions. Nonetheless, since the victim was neither held responsible nor devalued, the two addenda items must be examined. The correlations between victim evaluations and a t t r i b u t i o n s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to s i t u a t i o n a l factors (VS7) were non-significant. The second addendum, however, produced s i g n i f i c a n t c o r r e l a t i o n s . 60 Attributions of greater unspecified r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the v i c t i m i z e r (ERl) were correlated with more po s i t i v e raw score victim evaluations (r = .2566; df = 61; p<.05). The same was true for greater a t t r i b u t i o n s of blame to the v i c t i m i z e r (r = -. 3037; df = 61; p<.02). The set of variables which are relevant to the blaming reaction are s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t insofar as the blaming hypo-thesis does not make any d i s t i n c t i o n among types of r e s p o n s i b i l -i t y . Table V shows a l l the variables included i n the blaming c l u s t e r . This alternative hypothesis does, however, maintain the d i s t i n c t i o n between r e s p o n s i b i l i t y variables and personality evaluations. As indicated i n Table V, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y variables form a t i g h t c l u s t e r while the personality evalua-tions tend to be more peripheral. Because no necessary d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between per-formance- and personality-based r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the undiffer-entiated r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u t i o n s and the a t t r i b u t i o n s of blame form a central part of t h i s c l u s t e r . Just as central are a t t r i b u t i o n s of victim r e s p o n s i b i l i t y based on an unspecified act. These r e s p o n s i b i l i t y attributions are of a global nature insofar as observers did not agree on what i t was that made the targets responsible. The only personality evaluation measure which correlates s i g n i f i c a n t l y with variables i n the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y c l u s t e r i s raw score v i c t i m evaluations. The raw score v i c t i m evalua-tions were more posit i v e when the victim was seen as less responsible owing to an unspecified act (p<.05). Conversely, Table V Correlation Matrix for Blame Cluster of Variables Item (Code No.)* 1 2 3 4 5 6 VR1 V undifferentiated R ER1 E undifferentiated R -.433 d VB8 Victim blame .671 d -.257 a EB8 Experimenter blame -.379° .579d -.493 d VR2 V unspecified act R .783 d -.349° .516d -.317 b VE9 Raw score VE .236 -.257 a .145 -.304b .292a EE 9 Raw score EE -1.56 .133 -.170 .201 .004 -.0 35 VE10 Difference score VE -.073 .239 -.023 -.020 .046 .-34 EE10 Difference score EE -.237 .220 -.053 .039 - .210 -.141 *See Table I for key to item code numbers. df = 61 E = experimenter R = r e s p o n s i b i l i t y V = victim a) b) c) p .05 p .02 p .01 d) p .001 CTl 62 the greater the v i c t i m i z e r ' s undifferentiated r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the greater his blameworthiness, the more p o s i t i v e the victim i s rated (p <.05 and p< .02, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . This leads to a minor modification of the blaming hypothesis. I t i s not a c t u a l l y the most responsible target who i s l i k e l y to be devalued. Rather, i f target A i s held more responsible, target B i s rated more p o s i t i v e l y . At least t h i s was the case for two out of the three variables which correlated s i g n i f i c a n t l y with a measure of personality evaluation. E. Internal V a l i d i t y : Marginal Order E f f e c t The following are two analyses which are germaine to the i n t e r n a l v a l i d i t y of the experiment. Since they are based on control factors, they do not t e s t the predictions of any hypotheses. Taking advantage of the Solomon four group design (cf. Campbell and Stanley, 1963, p. 24) an analysis was performed to determine the extent of any pretest s e n s i t i z a t i o n i n the experiment. A 2 x 2 x 2 f a c t o r i a l MANOVA was performed on a l l dependent variables using shock contingency and pretesting vs. no pretesting as independent variables. The t h i r d indepen-dent variable was order, form A Vs. form B of the post-experimental questionnaire. The o v e r a l l F r a t i o for the main e f f e c t of pretesting (F<1.0; df = 13/73) was not s i g n i f i c a n t . Likewise, the i n t e r a c t i o n of shock contingency with pretesting (F<1.0; df = 13/73) was not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . Thus, 63 the n u l l hypothesis that there was no pretest s e n s i t i z a t i o n , was not rejected. There was a marginal main e f f e c t (F = 1.619; df = 13/73; p<.10) for the order of items on the post-experimental questionnaire. This was a r e s u l t of the s i g n i f i c a n t u n i v a r i -ate F 1 s on four dependent variables. They a l l had 1 and 85 degrees of freedom. They were; the amount of blame for the v i c t i m i z a t i o n attributed to the victim (F = 4.63; p<.05) and the v i c t i m i z e r (F = 9.92; p<.01), the v i c t i m i z e r s degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the d i f f i c u l t y of the learning task (F = 9.69; p .01), and V-E Blame (F = 11.85; p<.001). On form A the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y items followed the person-a l i t y evaluations of the target persons. In form B the order was reversed. On a l l the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y items lower scores indicate greater attributed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the scales were the L i k e r t type ranging from 1 to 9. More blame was a t t r i -buted to the victim on form B (x = 5.35) than on form A (x = 6.42) while the reverse was true for the v i c t i m i z e r (form A, x = 3.69; form B, x = 5.60). The comparative blame variable highlights t h i s e f f e c t . On form A the v i c t i m i z e r was seen as more blameworthy than the victim (x = 2.77). On form B, however, they were both equally blameworthy (x = -0.221), or unblameworthy. The form B means for both victim and v i c t i m i z e r blame f a l l between the 5th and 6th scale points. The midpoint of the scale i s f i v e . Verbally t h i s would translate into a statement to the e f f e c t that the target person was equally blameworthy and blameless, or, that he was neither completely 64 to blame nor completely blameless. The ratings of the victim-i z e r ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the d i f f i c u l t y of the learning task also f e l l near the midpoint on form B (x = 5.43). From the observer's point of view, the number of shocks delivered may be seen as a function of the number of t r i a l s needed to learn the l i s t . This i n turn may be related, i n some observer's minds, to the l e v e l of task d i f f i c u l t y pre-established by the vic t i m i z e r . Thus, observers who hold the v i c t i m i z e r repon-s i b l e for the suffering can use t h i s item as a means of expressing t h e i r perception of the vi c t i m i z e r ' s i n d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the number of shocks delivered. This i s exactly what form A observers did as a whole (x = 3.8 3). The marginal order e f f e c t can be summarized as a tendency for observers to see the v i c t i m i z e r as more blameworthy when they had already made ratings of his and the victim's person-a l i t i e s . Observers who made the attributions of blame and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f i r s t (form B) tended to rate both targets as neither completely blameworthy nor completely blameless. I t should also be noted that order had no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the evaluations of the targets' p e r s o n a l i t i e s . F. Summary The Just World Hypothesis was not supported. Neither the COMJWB measure nor Rubin and Peplau's scale produced the predicted i n t e r a c t i o n . There was a s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t for shock contingency but no vi c t i m devaluation occurred. The performance before personality subhypothesis received no support 65 but the alternative blaming hypothesis was strongly supported. In the NCS condition the vi c t i m i z e r was blamed and the vic t i m received sympathy. There was no pretest s e n s i t i z a t i o n but a marginally s i g n i f i c a n t order e f f e c t was found. CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION A. Inequity Anxiety as an Intensity Parameter and the Inefficacy Of Just World B e l i e f The aspect of the Just World Hypothesis dealing with the influence of i n d i v i d u a l differences i n Just World B e l i e f received no support whatsoever. Not even under high inequity anxiety (NCS condition) did Just World B e l i e f predict evaluations of the victim, or the v i c t i m i z e r . Nor did i t predict any type of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u t i o n . Rubin and Peplau's (1973) study was the only other one published which tested the e f f i c a c y of Just World B e l i e f . On four dependent variables they found victim derogation as a function of Just World B e l i e f but on three others they found a "compassionate" tendency. Although Just World B e l i e f may predict behavior i n some situations, i t seems as though those situations are highly s p e c i f i c and t h e i r defining parameters are mysterious. Lerner attributed to observers a need to believe that the world i s just. This a t t r i b u t i o n was apparently made on the basis of the observers' tendency to say that the victim deserved his fate. There may be many reasons why observers sometimes claim that the victim deserved to suffer. The need to protect a b e l i e f i n a just world does not appear to be prepotent among these reasons. As far as inequity anxiety i s concerned, the more inequitable condition i n the present study (NCS) led to less victim derogation. 67 This r e s u l t need not lead to a complete r e j e c t i o n of Lerner 1s hypothesis. Although inequity anxiety might not be d i r e c t l y p redictive of the d i r e c t i o n or target of derogation, i t i s , as Lerner implied, a factor a f f e c t i n g the i n t e n s i t y of the observer's response. As was pointed out i n Chapter 1, one response to inequity anxiety might be to admit that the world i s unjust and then to decide what to do about that state of a f f a i r s . This, of course, i s based on the assumption that inequity produces inequity anxiety. Strictly.speaking, the evidence for the e f f i c a c y of inequity anxiety i s just as tenuous as that for Just World B e l i e f . Therefore, the more parsimonious conclusion would be that the degree of inequity i n a s i t u a t i o n a f f e c t s the inten-s i t y of observers' responses. This, however, begs the question of motivation. We would s t i l l want to know how inequity i t s e l f produces various e f f e c t s . The most obvious candidate for replacing inequity 'anxiety' would be some form of balance model. But then we would want to know why people seek cognitive consistency. This question has led some (Kagan, 1972) r i g h t back to postulating motives which appear quite similar to Lerner's inequity anxiety. In short, the elimination of inequity anxiety from the explanation does not advance our understanding of the phenomenon any more or any less than the invocation of the concept did. 68 B. Responsibility Attributions and Personality Evaluations F a i l u r e of the Performance Before Personality Predictions: No support was found for the performance before personality subhypothesis. The relevant performed acts were the victim's continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the experiment and her memorization rate i n the learning task. Although these could conceivably be the basis for either performance or personality a t t r i b u t i o n s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the re s u l t s s t i l l disconfirm the subhypothesis. If observers had seen these acts as leading d i r e c t l y to the suffering, there should have been a negative c o r r e l a t i o n between attributed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and vic t i m devaluation. There was no such c o r r e l a t i o n . I f , on the other hand, observers used these acts to make d i s p o s i t i o n a l a t t r i b u t i o n s about the vic t i m there should have been a po s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between a t t r i -buted r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and vic t i m devaluation. This c o r r e l a t i o n did not materialize either. One cannot even invoke the argument that the nomothetic averaging of subjects' responses obscured these divergent tendencies i n the data. I f that were the case, one would expect the undifferentiated r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u -tions and the attr i b u t i o n s for an unspecified act to be uncorrelated with victim devaluation. Although the reasoning underlying observers' ratings on these two items remains un-known, they are both s t i l l a t t r i b u t i o n s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . If some observers were a t t r i b u t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the basis of performance and others were a t t r i b u t i n g i t on the basis of infe r r e d personality, everyone would agree that the vic t i m was 69 responsible on these two items. But according to the sub-hypothesis the former observers would rate the victim's personality p o s i t i v e l y while the l a t t e r observers would devalue her. When these two opposing trends were averaged, they would neutralize each other. Therefore, the two global r e s p o n s i b i l -i t y items would not correlate s i g n i f i c a n t l y with evaluations of the victim. But, i n f a c t , they do correlate. They correlate p o s i t i v e l y . The less the vic t i m i s held responsible for her fate, the less she i s devalued. This relationship only holds for global a t t r i b u t i o n s of r e s p o n s i b i l -i t y . The data did l i t t l e to c l a r i f y what observers mean when they simply rate a vic t i m as not responsible for her su f f e r i n g . One thing they do mean i s that she did not "do something" to bring the su f f e r i n g upon herself. A l l we know about the "something" i s that the v i c t i m i z e r i s the one who did i t . Unpredicted Blame and Sympathy: In the more inequitable condition the vi c t i m received sympathy and the vic t i m i z e r was blamed. Several explanations can be suggested for thi s f i n d -ing. The Just World approach would be to say that since the vic t i m i z e r was blamed, there was no need to blame the victim. If observers can i d e n t i f y some act performed by the vict i m i z e r as the cause of the i n j u s t i c e then they at least have an orderly world i f not a just world. This explanation abandons a l l hope of saving the Just World Hypothesis and opts for a watered down, yet to be a r t i c u l a t e d , Orderly World hypothesis. Unfor-tunately, there i s already evidence against i t . Observers could not, i n fact, i d e n t i f y any act performed by the v i c t i m i z e r 70 as the cause of the i n j u s t i c e . They held the v i c t i m i z e r responsible only on the global, non-specific r e s p o n s i b i l i t y items. C. Explanations for the Absence of Victim Devaluation The results reported here would seem quite straight forward were i t not for the existence of a l l the Just World l i t e r a t u r e . I t i s the discrepancy between these results and the results reported i n the l i t e r a t u r e which necessitates some comment. I t seems that the Just World Hypothesis cannot account for the findings of the present study. I t was not designed to account for them. I t only purports to explain victim devaluation, not v i c t i m i z e r devaluation or victim sympathy. Nonetheless, i t also purports to specify the condi-tions under which v i c t i m devaluation occurs. These conditions appear to have been met i n the present experiment. What follows i s an attempt to explain the unexpected absence of any victim devaluation. Adequacy Of the Deception: One possible explanation can be ruled out immediately. I t might be argued that a f a i l u r e to achieve adequate deception impaired the i n t e r n a l v a l i d i t y of the experiment. Subjects who know that the v i c t i m i s only acting do not devalue her (Lerner, 1971b). However, i t i s also u n l i k e l y that they would devalue the v i c t i m i z e r . Moreover, i f observers did not think that the victim was r e a l l y s u f f e r -ing why did they rate the severity of her pain as worse than average? Also, why did they rate the NCS condition as more 71 unfair? Was there something less convincing about the decep-t i o n i n the CS condition? I f so, what was i t ? Since these questions remain unanswered i t must be assumed that the observers were adequately deceived. Interaction Between Victimizer Evaluations and Perceived  Unfairness: There are several things which d i f f e r e n t i a t e the procedure of t h i s study from those of other studies which did f i n d victim devaluation, and which t h i s experiment has i n common with the two others which did f i n d v i c t i m i z e r blaming (Lincoln and Levinger, 1972; Chaikin and Darley, 1973). The l a t t e r a l l took measures of the vi c t i m i z e r " s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and personality. These items may serve to focus blame on the v i c t i m i z e r through demand c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The very act of asking for evaluations of the v i c t i m i z e r might encourage observers to look beyond the videotaped experimenter's role to the human being performing that r o l e . Also, when observers are asked to rate the extent of the v i c t i m i z e r ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the suffering there may be an i m p l i c i t message being simultaneously transmitted. Observers might perceive t h i s as an i n d i c a t i o n that the v i c t i m i z e r was i n some way respon-s i b l e . They might think, " I f the experimenter was r e a l l y beyond reprehension why would we be asked how blameworthy he was?" If t h i s were the case, the observer might be encouraged to set aside his usual deference towards the role of "experi-menter" . Once the authority and v a l i d i t y of the v i c t i m i z e r -experimenter's role has been questioned, he becomes a possible target for blame. In the present study, however, the request 72 for v i c t i m i z e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and personality evaluations was not enough i n i t s e l f to evoke v i c t i m i z e r blame and v i c t i m sympathy. Likewise, i t was not enough by i t s e l f i n the other two studies which found v i c t i m i z e r blame and v i c t i m sympathy. In those two studies, as i n the one reported here, the victim-i z e r was only blamed i n the condition where the victim's fate was perceived as more unfair. This f a i r l y r e l i a b l e observation may have t h e o r e t i c a l ramifications. D. A r t i f a c t u a l Information Variables as Direction Parameters The i n t e r a c t i o n of unfairness with items appraising the v i c t i m i z e r could be construed as an i n t e r a c t i o n between a motivational and an informational variable. The unfairness creates the prerequisite l e v e l of inequity anxiety necessary for any blaming or devaluation to occur. The request for ascriptions of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s for the v i c t i m i z e r determines the d i r e c t i o n of the response. The motivation comes from inequity anxiety and the information comes from experimental demand c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In the studies which found victim devaluation, there are a number of a r t i -f actual information sources which d i r e c t the blame towards the victim. The most obvious i s absence of any other target to be rated. Also, Godfrey and Lowe (197 3) showed that informa-t i o n about who was most responsible for the suffering i s subtly provided to observers i n the t y p i c a l paradigm. The ostensibly spontaneous verbal exchange between the experimenter and the victim-confederate immediately upon the selection of the l a t t e r 73 for receiving shocks provides observers with personality revealing behavioral information. Generally, t h i s explanation portrays the observer as taking the information available about the s i t u a t i o n along with previous information about similar situations and trying to apply i t to the problem with which he i s presented. In most experiments, that problem has been one of making i n f e r -ences about the person who i s suffering. In the author's experience, at lea s t one subject-observer i n every experiment spontaneously objects that the task i s bound to produce meaning-less results since he fe e l s he does not have enough information, about the target to make personal evaluations. Nonetheless, observers oblige the experimenter and try to make t h e i r inferences as best they can despite t h e i r qualms about having to guess i n order to respond. They decide whether or not the suffering was deserved by taking into account such things as what the experimenter says the suffering i s going to prove and how the vic t i m was selected. P a r t i c u l a r l y close attention i s paid to any role discrepant behavior on the part of targets, since t h i s information can provide glimpses of the personality behind the ro l e . F i n a l l y , of course, since the re a l experi-menter (not the videotaped E) i s the only one i n the room who r e a l l y knows what the experiment i s about, i t i s important to pay attention to what he does, says and asks about the s u f f e r -ing, the people, and the experiment i n order to get clues about how j u s t i f i e d the suffering might be. 74 E. A t t r i b u t i o n a l Set: Ah Informational Prerequisite for  Blame and Sympathy? If the information-oriented sketch of the observer's mental processes were accurate one would expect such informa-tion processing variables as a t t r i b u t i o n a l set to influence reactions to the incident of vi c t i m i z a t i o n . Observers using d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t i o n a l sets would e s s e n t i a l l y be asking them-selves d i f f e r e n t questions about what i s tran s p i r i n g . Since t h i s would lead them to attend to d i f f e r e n t information, they would make d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t i o n s . There i s evidence which suggests that t h i s does happen. The marginal order e f f e c t reported here may be interpreted as a r e s u l t of an a t t r i b u t i o n a l set induced by the format of the post-experimental questionnaire. Observers who received form B made r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u t i o n s f i r s t . They l i k e l y assumed that t h e i r task was to judge imp a r t i a l l y the g u i l t and innocence of the target persons. The reference to jurors i n the cover story may have primed observers to interpret the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y items i n t h i s way. This w i l l therefore be c a l l e d the "juror" a t t r i b u t i o n set. In order to perform th i s task they would have had to r e c a l l d e t a i l s of the "crime" and the rights and obligations of the participants i n t h e i r respec-tive roles as subject and experimenter. Thus, they would have asked themselves such questions as, "Was the procedure for selecting the learner f a i r ? " , "Did the experimenter inform her of her rights?", and "Did the purpose of the experiment 75 j u s t i f y the suffering?" Having focused on these questions, i t i s not surprising that the form B observers attributed equal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to both vi c t i m and v i c t i m i z e r . When, however, they came to the personality evaluations t h e i r a t t r i b u t i o n a l set had to change because the nature of the task changed. Instead of being involved i n l i t i g a t i o n they were involved i n the psychological assessment of personal-i t y . The switch to personality assessment may have led form B observers to abandon t h e i r juror set and assume what w i l l be referred to as the "psychologist" a t t r i b u t i o n set. When operating under t h i s set they would be l i k e l y to try to r e c a l l more of the features of the target's behavior which indicated something about his a b i l i t i e s , his i n t e r -personal s t y l e , his t r a i t s , and so f o r t h . Therefore, the observer would now have to ask himself questions l i k e , "Did the learner appear upset when her number was drawn?", "Did she hesitate to go on with the experiment?", "''Did the experi-menter de l i v e r the shocks with an apologetic demeanor or did he conduct the session with a tone of cold, impartial objec-t i v i t y ? " , and, "Was lack of either a b i l i t y or motivation a factor i n the learner's memorization rate or did she perform at a normal leve l ? " Being set to extrapolate from the informa-tion provided by these personality revealing behaviors i t i s understandable how observers could make t r a i t ascriptions to the target. The observers who received form A started out with the psychologist a t t r i b u t i o n a l set. Naturally, t h e i r target 76 evaluations were no d i f f e r e n t from those given by form B observers. Unlike form B observers, however, the form A group continued to use the psychologist set while making the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t t r i b u t i o n s . That i s , they may have interpreted the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y items as dealing less with performance than personality. For example, the question about the victim's memorization rate could be interpreted as a question about her a b i l i t y or her motivation. Yandell (1973) has found evidence i n d i c a t i n g that subjects w i l l continue to use the same a t t r i b u t i o n a l set across a series of items unless the perceived intent of the item changes i n such a way as to require a new set. Form B observers might have perceived such a change i n the intent of the items while form A observers might have seen no need to adopt a new a t t r i b u t i o n a l set. Hence, both groups of observers made simi l a r ratings on the personality evaluations because they were both using the psychologist set. On the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y items, however, the form B group was less l i k e l y to assign serious g u i l t to one target and v i r t u a l innocence to the other because they were using the more impartial juror set. This suggests the hypothesis that the psychologist a t t r i b u t i o n set i s a prerequisite for both blam-ing and sympathizing. The foregoing i s , of course, a l l highly speculative. 77 F. Suggestions for Future Research Using an Information  Orientation Problems to be Considered: I t seems, then, that the best way to conceptualize the phenomenon of v i c t i m derogation i s as an i n t e r a c t i o n of motivational and informational factors. In attempting to explain the v i c t i m i z e r blame and victim sympathy found i n the high inequity condition several arguments have been presented emphasizing the importance of the observer's active attempts to seek and process information. In t h e i r search for inforamtion, the observers i n the t y p i c a l paradigm seem to be very s e n s i t i v e to i n c i d e n t a l items of information coming from numerous and diverse sources (e.g. minor variations i n cover s t o r i e s , non-verbal reactions of victims to being selected, r e a c t i v i t y to dependent measures). This creates tremendous problems i n c o n t r o l l i n g the information to be obtained and used by observers i n making t h e i r a t t r i b u t i o n s . The Just World hypothesis i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y useful i n providing guidelines f o r t h i s enterprise. What i s needed i s a set of hypotheses that r e l a t e items of information available to observers to the directions of t h e i r reactions. We also need hypotheses which deal with an expanded range of phenomena. The reactions of blaming and a t t r i b u t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y must be made predictable along with personality evaluations. Reactions to v i c t i m i z e r s as well as victims must also be explained. F i n a l l y , an account must be given of what factors produce p o s i t i v e , sympathetic reactions as well as neutral and negative reactions. 78 A move toward integrating t h i s expanded range of pheno-mena into an informational approach has already been made above. The concepts of personality revealing behavior and a t t r i b u t i o n a l set, however, must be more c l e a r l y defined before they are l i k e l y to lead to any unequivocal operationalizations. Other possible l i n e s of approach may be provided through a consideration of i n d i v i d u a l differences i n information proces-sing, e s p e c i a l l y of threatening information, (e.g. Repression-Sensitization) and a t t r i b u t i o n a l s t y l e s . These may be c l o s e l y related to perceptual styles such as f i e l d dependence/indepen-dence (Witkin et al^. , 1962). An observer who can abstract the victim's behavior ( i . e . figure) from the context of the s i t u a t i o n i n which i t occurs ( i . e . ground) might be less l i k e l y to equate the victim's experience of being "punished" with the contextually produced state of deserving punishment. Advantages of Greater Mundane Realism: Probably the most promising d i r e c t i o n for future research would be i n the d i r e c t i o n of more mundane realism (cf. Aronson and Carlsmith, 1968, p. 22). The majority of v i c t i m i z a t i o n does not involve physical pain. In the verbal learning task paradigm the victim seems more l i k e a laboratory K i t t y Genovese. Although the study of observers' reactions to victims i n emergency situations or criminal acts where p y s i c a l pain i s involved i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n i t s own r i g h t , i t seems l i k e a misplaced emphasis i f one i s interested i n generalizing to reactions to the more common, everyday, non-crisis victim. 79 The observer of a non-crisis victim t y p i c a l l y learns about, the v i c t i m i z a t i o n through the news media. For example, the person watching the evening news on T.V. hears a report on the increasing municipal welfare r o l l s and spontaneously characterizes welfare recipients as lazy parasites. I f the focus of research interests were s h i f t e d to t h i s aspect of the v i c t i m blaming phenomenon, many methodological problems could be overcome. Simulated T.V. or newspaper reports allow a much greater control over c r u c i a l items of information available to the observer. The simulated physical assault devised by Lerner and Simmons does not provide for t h i s control. As the focus of research s h i f t s from motivational to informational approaches, an appropriate new paradigm may be c a l l e d for. Although Godfrey and Lowe (1973) have managed to manipulate some important pieces of inforamtion using the 'verbal learning task' paradigm, there may be other paradigms which make the control of input information easier, broader and more ce r t a i n . The information-oriented approach of presenting observers with simulated media reports about everyday non-emergency victims would require the investigator to make research decisions on the basis of personal b e l i e f s and values. To labe l anyone as an innocent victim the investigator must i m p l i c i t l y assert that the person has experienced an i n j u s t i c e . Injustice and j u s t i c e , however, are concepts which could mean d i f f e r e n t things to people of d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i c a l persuasions. Lerner (1974) has alluded to the connection between various 80 ideologies or b e l i e f systems (e.g. Marxism, Protestant Ethic) and d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e (e.g. d i s t r i b u t i o n accord-ing to need, equity). William Ryan (1971) has described how p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s can influence reactions to everyday non-crisis victims. Ryan sees v i c t i m blaming as a negative by-product of taking a " p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c " , instead of a " u n i v e r s a l i s t i c " approach to s o c i a l problems. According to Ryan, popular l i b e r a l thinking assumes that the U.S. s o c i a l and economic system i s , i n general, j u s t . This p o s i t i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c insofar as i t looks to d e f i c i e n c i e s i n the victims of that system for explanations of the obvious i n e q u i t i e s . Thus, remedial s o c i a l programs are directed at changing the personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the poor, for example, i n such a way that they w i l l be able to obtain greater equity within that system. The u n i v e r s a l i s t i c approach would be to blame and change the system. Ryan's p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c vs. u n i v e r s a l i s t i c d i s t i n c t i o n seems to describe the dimension of comparison underlying the psychologist vs. juror a t t r i b u t i o n a l sets. This suggests the i n t e r e s t i n g hypothesis that the p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c approach which Ryan scorns may be a prerequisite for sympathizing with the victim as well as for blaming him. In any case, i t i s clear that Ryan encountered p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l variations i n the d e f i n i t i o n of an "innocent" victim. These issues, how-ever, also a r i s e i n the discussion of simulated victims. Although the novelty and a r t i f i c i a l i t y of laboratory incidents of v i c t i m i z a t i o n may i n i t i a l l y obscure the 81 investigator's biases and personal b e l i e f s , these biases and b e l i e f s continue to play a necessary part i n the opera-t i o n a l i z a t i o n of such concepts as "innocence" and " i n j u s t i c e " . Even in the verbal learning task paradigm c e r t a i n value judge-ments about the ethics of shocking human research subjects underlie the d e f i n i t i o n of the learner as a victim. For example, one could hold that shocking a subject i s e t h i c a l l y permissable when the subject has given informed consent. Starting from t h i s assumption, the learner could not be c a l l e d a victim. Moreover, the learner could be c a l l e d " f o o l i s h " or " i n t e l l i g e n t " i f she consented to pa r t i c i p a t e when she r e a l l y did not want to. Thus, by taking a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n on the ethics of research with human subjects one could seriously assert that Lerner and Simmons f a i l e d to adequately operation-a l i z e the concept of an "innocent" victim. In any case, no re a l increase i n s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y or precision has been obtained by avoiding making p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l value judgements about the forces acting upon r e a l people (not con-federates) i n society. G. Summary Just World B e l i e f scores did not predict the sympathetic reaction to the victim or the blaming of the v i c t i m i z e r . Just World B e l i e f may be related to victim devaluation but the Just World Hypothesis i s neither detailed nor e x p l i c i t enough to predict with much certainty when victim devaluation w i l l occur. 82 Inequity anxiety nonetheless does seem to control the i n t e n s i t y of the reactions to both victims and v i c t i m i z e r s . The unexpected absence of v i c t i m devaluation may be a r e s u l t of an i n t e r a c t i o n between information provided by post-experimental questionnaire items and the perceived unfairness of the shock contingency conditions. The f a c t that an experi-menter was asking subjects to comment on his own research ethics may have created demand c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e s p e c i a l l y i n the condition where the v i c t i m suffered greater inequity. In any case, whatever caused the unexpected victim sympathy and v i c t i m i z e r blame, i t s e f f e c t was s l i g h t l y attenu-ated by the order i n which post-experimental questionnaire items were presented. This e f f e c t along with a l l the results taken together seem most e a s i l y assimilated by an a t t r i b u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of reactions to victims. In order to study the a t t r i b u t i o n a l process, however, a greater control of input information would be necessary. There are many alternate pathways or directions which the inequity anxiety might take to manifest i t s e l f . A move towards more mundane realism i n t h i s l i n e of research might eliminate some of the pathways which arise primarily from a r t i f a c t u a l sources of information imbedded i n the context of the psychology experiment i t s e l f . 83 BIBLIOGRAPHY Adair, J.G. Pre-experimental attitudes towards psychology as a determinant of subject behavior. Paper read at a symposium on "Methodological Problems i n Research with Human Subjects" at the meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba, May, 1970. Adair, J.G. and Fenton, D.P. Subject's attitudes toward psychology as a determinant of experimental r e s u l t s . Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 1971, 3, 268-275. Aronson, E. and Carlsmith, J.M. Experimentation i n s o c i a l psychology. In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Eds.), The  Handbook Of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, 2nd e d i t i o n , Don M i l l s , Ont.: Addison-Wesley, 1968. Campbell, D.T. and Stanley, J.C. Experimental and Quasi- Experimental Designs for Research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 196 3. Chaikin, A.L. and Darley, J.M. Victim or perpetrator?: Defensive a t t r i b u t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the need for order and j u s t i c e . Journal of Personality and  Soci a l Psychology, 1973, 25, 268-275. C o l l i n s , B.E. Four components of the Rotter Internal-External Scale: B e l i e f i n a d i f f i c u l t world, a just world, a predictable world, and a p o l i t i c a l l y respon-sive world. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- chology, 1974, 29, 381-391. Godfrey, B.W. and Lowe, C.A. Devaluation of innocent victims: An a t t r i b u t i o n analysis within the just world paradigm. Journal of Personality and Soc i a l Psychology, 1975, 31, 944-951. Hardy, J.E. Just world theory, religiousness and compassion. Unpublished master's t h e s i s , University of Western Ontario, 1972. Kagan, J. Motives and development. Journal of Personality  and S o c i a l Psychology, 1972, 2_2, 51-66. Lerner, M.J. The desire for j u s t i c e and reactions to victims. In L. Berkowitz and J . Macaulay (Eds.), Altruism and Helping Behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1970. 84 Lerner, M.J. Observer's evaluations of a victim: J u s t i c e , g u i l t and v e r i d i c a l perception. Journal of Personality  and Social Psychology, 1971, 2_0, 127-135. (b) Lerner, M.J. Social psychology of interpersonal a t t r a c t i o n . In T. Houston (Ed.), Foundations of Interpersonal A t t r a c t i o n . New York: Academic Press, 1974. Lerner, M.J., and Agar, E. The consequences of perceived s i m i l a r i t y : A t t r a c t i o n and r e j e c t i o n , approach and avoidance. Journal Of Experimental Research i n Person- a l i t y , 1972, 6, 69-75. Lerner, M.J., and Matthews, J . Reactions to suffering of others under conditions of i n d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Journal of Personality and S o c i a l Psychology, 167, 5_, 319-325. Lerner, M.J., and Simmons, C.W. Observer's reactions to the "innocent victim": Compassion or rejection? Journal of  Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4_, 203-210. Lincoln, A. and Levinger, G. Observer's evaluations of the victim and attacker i n an aggressive incident. Journal  of Personality and S o c i a l Psychology, 1972, 22, 202-210. Novak, D., and Lerner, M.J. Rejection as a consequence of perceived s i m i l a r i t y . Journal of Personality and S o c i a l  Psychology, 1968, 9, 147-152. Rotter, J.B. Generalized expectancies for i n t e r n a l versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Mono- graphs , 1966, 80 (1 Whole No. 609). Rubin, Z. and Peplau, A. B e l i e f i n a just world and reactions to another's l o t : A study of participants i n the national draft l o t t e r y . Journal of Social Issues, 1973, 29, 73-93. Ryan, W. Blaming the Victim. New York: Random House, 1971. Sorrentino, R.M., and B o u t i l i e r , R.G. Evaluation of a victim as a function of fate s i m i l a r i t y / d i s s i m i l a r i t y . Journal  of Experimental Social Psychology, 1974, 10, 84-93. Yandell, T.B. A t t r i b u t i o n of thoughts and attitudes when behavior i s constrained. Master's t h e s i s , University of North Carolina, Chapel H i l l , 1973. Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language. (3rd ed., unabridged) S p r i n g f i e l d , Mass.: G. & C. Merriam, 1964. Witkin, H.A., Dyk, R.B., Faterson, H.F., Goodenough, D.R. and Karp, S.A. Psychological D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . New York: Wiley, 1962. Zuckerman, M. B e l i e f i n a just world and a l t r u i s t i c behavio Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31 972-976. 86 APPENDIX A: Pretest Questionnaire Name T E S T BOOKLET INSTRUCTIONS I.D. Number Section No. (Prof.)__ Telephone # •. • •  Your responses to t h i s series of tests w i l l remain com-p l e t e l y anonymous. They w i l l be compared with the responses of your group i n a l a t e r experimental session. In order to make i t possible to contact you for voluntary p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n that l a t e r sessions, however, i t i s necessary that you write your name and student I.D. number at the top of t h i s question booklet. At no point w i l l your name be matched d i r e c t l y with your te s t scores. When t h i s research project i s completed there w i l l be no way of tracing your questionnaire responses back to either your name or your I.D. number. This series of tests i s composed of four scales. The f i r s t two scales are of the True/False format. The l a s t two provide 5 answer alt e r n a t i v e s : strongly agree, agree, un-decided, disagree, strongly disagree. Four computer cards are provided for the answers. There i s approximately one computer card for each scale. There are 50 columns on each computer card but a l l of the scales have s l i g h t l y more or less than 50 questions to them. Nonetheless, beside each question you w i l l f i n d two numbers. The "card number t e l l s you on which of the four cards you should place your answer for that question. The "column number" t e l l s you which column of that card i s reserved 87 the answer to that question. So, for example, the answer to question 2-30 goes i n the 30th column of the 2nd card. The Computer Answer Cards 1. The marks must be made only with p e n c i l . Make your marks heavy and black but stay within the brackets. 2. Marks should be erased completely: i n the event of an error. Crossing marks out w i l l only lead to the question being scored improperly. Doodling on the answer cards should be avoided. Stray marks may be picked up by the IBM card reader and could possibly lead to incorrect scores. 4. Take the four computer cards and write the 10 figures of your student. I.D. number i n the 10 columns headed " I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Number". Be sure to indicate your I.D. number twice, f i r s t i n the boxes at the top and then i n the proper combination of brackets of each column. 5. In the single column headed "Answer Card Number" number the cards from 1 to 4. These are the "card numbers" that form the f i r s t part of the numbers for the questions i n the t e s t s . Below you w i l l f i n d detailed instructions for answering the True/False questions. Later on i n the t e s t booklet you w i l l encounter the detailed instructions f o r answering the Agree/ Disagree-type questions. 88 True/F aIs e Questions Read each statement and decide whether i t i s true as applied to you or fals e as applied to you. Find the appropri-ate card column for that question. I f a statement i s TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE, i n your opinion, blacken between the f i r s t set of brackets i n the column. I f a statement i s FALSE or NOT USUALLY TRUE, i n your opinion, blacken the second space i n the column. 1 = TRUE 2 = FALSE Remember to get the r i g h t questions matched with the same cards and columns. Do not skip any questions and do not spend too much time pondering any one question. Work quickly giving your f i r s t impressions. c •O I SCALE 1 (Card #1) 1 = TRUE 2 = FALSE td o u u 1-1. B a s i c a l l y , the world i s a just place. 1-2. The p o l i t i c a l candidate who st i c k s up for his p r i n c i p l e s rarely gets elected. 1-3. I've found that a person r a r e l y deserves the reputation he has. 1-4. People who f i n d money i n the street have often done a good deed e a r l i e r that day. 1-5. I t i s a common occurrence for a g u i l t y person to get o f f free i n Canadian courts. 1-6. Movies i n which good triumphs over e v i l are u n r e a l i s t i c . 1-7. Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in school. 1-8. Crime doesn't pay. 1-9. When parents punish t h e i r children, i t i s almost always for good reasons. 89 c -a § aj o 1 = TRUE 2 = FALSE U U 1-10. Although there may be some exceptions, good people often lead l i v e s of s u f f e r i n g . 1-11. I t i s often impossible for a person to receive a f a i r t r i a l i n Canada. 1-12. In almost any business or profession, people who do t h e i r job well r i s e to the top. 1-13. Although e v i l men may hold p o l i t i c a l power for a while, i n the general course of history good wins out. 1-14. By and large, people deserve what they get. 1-15. Canadian parents tend to overlook the things most to be admired i n t h e i r children. 1-16. I t i s rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to j a i l . 1-17. I t makes me said to see a lonely stranger i n a group. 1-18. People make too much of the feelings and s e n s i t i v i t y of animals. 1-19. I often f i n d public displays of a f f e c t i o n annoying. 1-20. I am annoyed by unhappy people who are just sorry for themselves. 1-21. I become nervous i f others around me seem to become nervous. 1-22. I f i n d i t s i l l y f or people to cry out of happiness. 1-23. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend's problems. 1-24. Sometimes the words of a love song can move me deeply. 1-25. I tend to lose control when I am bringing bad news to people. 1-26. The people around me have a great influence on my moods. 1-27. Most foreigners I have met seemed cool and unemotional. 1-28. I would rather be a s o c i a l worker than work i n a job t r a i n i n g centre. 1-29. I don't get upset just because a fri e n d i s acting upset. 1-30. I l i k e to watch people open presents. 1-31. Lonely people are probably unfriendly. 90 U rH 1 = TRUE 2 = FALSE fd O cj u 1-32. Seeing people cry upsets me. 1-33. Some songs make me happy. 1-34. I r e a l l y get involved with the feelings of the characters i n a novel. 1-35. I get very angry when I see someone being i l l - t r e a t e d . 1-36. I am able to remain calm even though those around me worry. 1-37. When a f r i e n d starts to talk about his problems I t ry to steer the conversation to something else. 1-38. Another's laughter i s not catching for me. 1-39. Sometimes at the movies I am amused by the amount of crying and s n i f f i n g around me. 1-40. I am able to make decisions without being influenced by people's feel i n g s . 1-41. I cannot continue to f e e l OK i f people around me are depressed. 1-42. I t i s hard for me to see how some things upset people so much. 1-4 3. I am very upset when I see an animal i n pain. 1-44. Becoming involved i n books or movies i s a l i t t l e s i l l y . 1-45. I t upsets me to see helpless o l d people. 1-46. I become more i r r i t a t e d than sympathetic when I see someone's tears. 1-4 7. I become very involved when I watch a movie. 1-48. I often f i n d that I can remain cool i n spite of the excitement around me. 1-49. L i t t l e children sometimes cry for no apparent reason. SCALE 2 (Card #2) 1 = TRUE 2 = FALSE 2-1. I am c e r t a i n l y lacking i n self-confidence. 2-2. Even when I am with people I f e e l lonely much of the time. 2-3. There i s very l i t t l e love and companionship i n my family as compared to other homes. 91 'u cH 1 = TRUE 2 = FALSE fd o 2-4. At times I think I am no good at a l l . 2-5. I am i n c l i n e d to take things hard. 2-6. I have been disappointed i n love. 2-7. One or more members of my family i s very nervous. 2-8. I am a f r a i d of finding myself i n a closet or small closed place. 2-9. Sometimes some unimportant thought w i l l run through my mind and bother me for days. 2-10. When I am f e e l i n g very happy and active, someone who i s blue or low w i l l s p o i l i t a l l . 2-11. I sometimes f e e l that I am about to go to pieces. 2-12. I am apt to take disappointments so keenly that I can't put them out of my mind. 2-13. I have nightmares every few nights. 2-14. I am e a s i l y embarrassed. 2-15. I f e e l unable to t e l l anyone a l l about myself. 2-16. I believe I am being plotted against. 2-17. At times I have been so entertained by the cleverness of a crook that I have hoped he would get by with i t . 2-18. I t bothers me to have someone watch me at work even though I know I can do i t well. 2-19. I usually have to stop and think before I act even i n t r i f l i n g matters. 2-20. Once i n a while I think of things too bad to talk about. 2-21. I am a f r a i d when I look down from a high place. 2-22. I do not have a great fear of snakes. 2-2 3. L i f e i s a s t r a i n f o r me much of the time. 2-24. I am sure I get a raw deal from l i f e . 2-25. Much of the time I f e e l as i f I have done something wrong or e v i l . 2-26. Once i n a while I f e e l hate toward members of my family whom I usually love. 2-2 7. I have not l i v e d the r i g h t kind of l i f e . 92 n H 1 = TRUE 2 = FALSE rd o u u 2-28. I have often f e l t g u i l t y because I have pretended to f e e l more sorry about something than I r e a l l y was. 2-2 9. I do many things which I regret afterwards (I regret things more or more often than others seem-to). 2-30. I have often f e l t that strangers were looking at me c r i t i c a l l y . 2-31. No one seems to understand me. 2-32. People often disappoint me. 2-33. I do not mind meeting strangers. 2-34. I f e e l l i k e giving up quickly when things go wrong. 2-35. I t makes me nervous to have to wait. 2-36. I f given the chance I could do some things that would be of great benefit to the world. 2-37. I sometimes keep on at a thing u n t i l others lose t h e i r patience with me. 2-38. Even when I am with people I f e e l lonely much of the time. 2-39. Once a week or oftener I become very excited. 2-40. Bad words, often t e r r i b l e words, come into my mind and I cannot get r i d of them. 2-41. Someone has i t i n for me. 2-42. People say i n s u l t i n g and vulgar things about me. 2-43. I t makes me f e e l l i k e a f a i l u r e when I hear of the success of someone I know well. 2-44. At times I have worn myself out by undertaking too much, 2-45. Any person can always r i s e above the pressures of the moment and the forces of habit to make a free choice about what he w i l l do. 2-46. Human behavior can always be explained i n terms of the present circumstances and previous environments that individuals experience. 2-4 7. People's decisions are always completely determined by b i o l o g i c a l and environmental factors. 2-4 8. A person i s always free to choose an alternate course of action at any point i n his l i f e . 93 Leave the l a s t two columns, of Card #2 blank ( i . e . 2-49 and 2-50) and go on to Card #3 a f t e r reading the following instructions. For the next two scales (3 &4) select the response which best describes your feelings on each statement i n accordance with the following scale: 1= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = undecided, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree. I f , f o r example, you strongly agree with the statement, blacken i n the number 5 space i n the column corresponding to that question. I f you strongly disagree with i t , blacken i n the number 1 space i n the column corresponding to that ques-t i o n . Disregard the T and F format of the previous scales. Make your judgements i n accordance with your degree of accep-tance or r e j e c t i o n of the statement. However, you should try to avoid the "undecided" response as much as possible, as i t i s your feelings (either p o s i t i v e or negative) towards each of the statements that i s being sought. Scale 3 has 52 questions i n i t . Answer the l a s t two questions i n the f i r s t two columns of card #4 ( i . e . questions 51 and 52 go i n columns 4-1 and 4-2, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , c ro % SCALE 3 (Cards #3 and #4) 1 •= strongly disagree ^ 5 = strongly agree u u 3-1. Most psychology experiments are worthless since even the most c a r e f u l l y controlled experiments lead to inconclusive r e s u l t s . 3-2 . Through experimentation psychologists have made a r e a l contribution to the understanding of man. 94 s 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = undecided, ^ Q1 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree u u 3-3. Psychologists would be better advised to forget the laboratory, and go into the f i e l d where the " r e a l people and problems" are. 3-4. Many of the questions asked i n testing are personal and are none of the experimenter's business. 3-5. Given a free choice, most students would be w i l l i n g to volunteer for experiments. 3-6. Many experimenters are smug and take a pretty high-handed attitude with subjects. 3-7. Most experiments i n psychology are concerned with t r i v i a l observations of a r t i f i c i a l behavior. 3-8. Tests and other experimental manipulations are generally not r e l i a b l e measures of personality and behavior. 3-9. Most experiments deal with such a small segment of behavior that they are meaningless i n the broad picture. 3-10. People generally express t h e i r r e a l feelings on psy-chological t e s t s . 3-11. Psychology experiments are fun but do not prove anything. 3-12. Human behavior i s too complex to cut up and study piece by piece i n the laboratory. 3-13. Most people would say that t h e i r experience as a sub-je c t i n psychological experiments was favourable. 3-14. When an i n d i v i d u a l signs up for an experiment, i t involves a commitment to do what i s asked to the best of his a b i l i t y . 3-15. Most students p a r t i c i p a t e w i l l i n g l y i n experiments. 3-16. People rarely express t h e i r " r e a l " selves i n psychology experiments. 3-17. Experiments i n psychology have no value because of the inherent d i v e r s i t y of man and his environment. 3-18. Many experimenters ask too much from t h e i r subjects. 3-19. Experiments are nothing but "busy work" for psycholo-g i s t s . 95 g 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = undecided, a 'Q 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree u u 3-20. Psychology experiments are too time consuming. 3-21. Some experimenters just seem to be waiting for the subjects to make fools of themselves. 3-22. As a matter of personal pride, most individuals would try to do th e i r best when acting as a subject. 3-23. Experimentation i s of no p r a c t i c a l value i n the under-standing of the fundamental causes of behavior. 3-24. The psychological journals are mostly f i l l e d with un-important t r i v i a . 3-25. I t doesn't matter too much what subjects do; the experi-menter usually manipulates the data to prove his hypothesis anyway. 3-26. Psychological tests are generally r e l i a b l e measures of personality. 3-27. Laboratory studies i n psychology are too a r t i f i c i a l to produce v a l i d data. 3-2 8. Most students are "good" subjects, that i s , they perform well i n t h e i r role as experimental subjects. 3-29. Many subjects i n psychological experiments go through the motions without r e a l l y t r y i n g . 3-30. The experimental method can be used e f f e c t i v e l y i n the study of human beahvior. 3-31. Subjects i n most psychology experiments are treated with respect. 3-32. The experimental approach to psychology has been both f r u i t f u l and help f u l i n understanding human nature. 3-33. Most experimenters are considerate and p o l i t e i n t h e i r treatment of subjects. 3-34. P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n psychology experiments i s not a great imposition on students. 3-35. Psychologists sometimes forget that subjects are s t i l l human beings. 3-36. Through psychological tests and experiments psychologists have acquired the knowledge to predict behavior i n many rea l l i f e s i t u a t i o n s . 96 rd: O t> U g 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = undecided. 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree 3-37. Most students follow the experimenter's instructions c a r e f u l l y so that they w i l l be able to perform as a good subject. 3-38. Laboratory studies i n psychology have contributed s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the knowledge of mankind. 3-39. The complexity of individ u a l s make i t necessary to study human behavior under controlled conditions. 3-40. From experiments, psychologists can v a l i d l y generalize to the population at large. 3-41. Subjects i n most psychology experiments are treated as guinea pigs. 3-4 2. Many students do not cooperate and therefore make poor subj ects. 3-4 3. Psychology has proven i t s worth as an experimental science. 3-4 4. Any minor discomfort that subjects may go through such as e l e c t r i c shock, embarrassment, etc., i s worth i t i n the long run. 3-45. Psychological data i s useless because i t s in t e r p r e t a -t i o n i s based on the manipulation of s t a t i s t i c s . 3-46. Many students f e e l a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to cooperate i n any way possible i n the pursuit of knowledge. 3-4 7. Subjects frequently f e e l manipulated by the experimenter, 3-4 8. P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n psychological experiments i s a waste of the student's time. 3-49. Students should not be asked to give up th e i r time to serve as subjects. 3- 50. College students tend to share with experimenters the hope that the study i n which they are p a r t i c i p a t i n g w i l l i n some material way contribute to science. (Card #4.) 4- 51. Subjects i n psychology experiments are "contributors to science." 97 c 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = undecided, ^ o 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree u u 4-52. Experiments i n psychology almost always involve decep-t i o n or " t r i c k i n g " the subject i n some way. SCALE 4 The questions i n scale 4 go i n columns 3 to 49 of card #4. 4-3. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be i n the r i g h t place f i r s t . 4-4. Most students don't r e a l i z e the extent to which t h e i r grades are influenced by accidental happenings. 4-5. There w i l l always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them. 4-6. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones. 4-7. As far as world a f f a i r s are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control. 4-8. I t i s impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role i n my l i f e . 4-9. The average c i t i z e n can have an influence i n government decision. 4-10. In the long run people get the respect they deserve i n t h i s world. 4-11. People's misfortunes r e s u l t from the mistakes they make. 4-12. What happens to me i s my own doing. 4-13. With enough e f f o r t we can wipe out p o l i t i c a l corruption. 4-14. One of the major reasons why we have wars i s because people don't take enough in t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c i s . 4-15. Without the ri g h t breaks one cannot be an e f f e c t i v e leader, 4-16. No matter how hard you try to some people just don't l i k e you. 4-17. Capable people who f a i l to become leaders have not taken advantage of t h e i r opportunities. 98 G 1 = strong disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = undecided, ^ o 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree u u 4-18. People are lonely because they don't t r y to be f r i e n d l y . 4-19. Becoming a success i s a matter of hard work, luck has l i t t l e or nothing to do with i t . 4-20. Many of the unhappy things i n people's l i v e s are p a r t l y due to bad luck. 4-21. Most people don't r e a l i z e the extent to which t h e i r l i v e s are c ontrolled by accidental happenings. 4-22. In my case getting what I want has l i t t l e or nothing to do with luck. 4-2 3. I t i s d i f f i c u l t for people to have much control over the things p o l i t i c i a n s do i n o f f i c e . 4-24. This world i s run by the few people i n power, and there i s not much the l i t t l e guy can do about i t . 4-25. Sometimes I f e e l that I don't have enough control over the d i r e c t i o n my l i f e i s taking. 4-26. I have often found that what i s going to happen w i l l happen. 4-27. By taking an active part i n p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l a f f a i r s the people can control world events. 4-28. The idea that teachers are unfair to students i s nonsense. 4-29. People who can't get others to l i k e them don't under-stand how to get along with others. 4-30. Most misfortunes are the r e s u l t of lack of a b i l i t y , ignorance, laziness, or a l l three. 4-31. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying i s r e a l l y useless. 4-32. Getting people to do the r i g h t things depends upon a b i l i t y ; luck has l i t t l e or nothing to do with i t . 4-33. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are. 4-34. In the long run the people are responsible for bad govern-ment on a national as well as on a l o c a l l e v e l . 4-35. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a d e f i n i t e course of action. 9 9 c 1 = strongly disagree, 2 =. disagree, 3 =. undecided, n § ^ Q1 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree o o 4 - 3 6 . Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give. 4 - 3 7 . Many times we might as well decide what to do by f l i p p i n g a coin. 4 - 3 8 . I t i s hard to know whether or not a person r e a l l y l i k e s you. 4 - 3 9 . I t i s not always wise to plan too fa r ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow. 4 - 4 0 . There i s a d i r e c t connection between how hard I study and the grades I get. 4 - 4 1 . Most of the time I can't understand why p o l i t i c i a n s behave the way they do. 4 - 4 2 . Getting a good job depends mainly on being i n the ri g h t place at the r i g h t time. 4 - 4 3 . Many times I f e e l that I have l i t t l e influence over the things that happen to me. 4 - 4 4 . Unfortunately, an ind i v i d u a l ' s worth often passes un-recognized no matter how hard he t r i e s . 4 - 4 5 . There r e a l l y i s no such thing as "luck". 4 - 4 6 . When I make plans, I am almost cert a i n that I can make them work. 4 - 4 7 . In the case of the well prepared student there i s rar e l y i f ever such a thing as an unfair t e s t . 4 - 4 8 . There's not much use i n tryi n g too hard to please people, i f they l i k e you, they l i k e you. Leave the l a s t columns of card #4 blank ( i . e . 4 - 4 9 and 4 - 5 0 ) and turn i n (a) your booklet (b) your answer cards and (cj your p e n c i l . Before leaving pick up the handout giving d e t a i l s of the next experimental session. THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING! 100 APPENDIX B: Posttest Questionnaire (form A) Sex: M F Student Number: Section: Date: INSTRUCTIONS On the following questionnaire you w i l l be asked to make several ratings on nine point scales. The following i s an example of the scale: "How pleasant do you think the weather i s today?" extremely T i i A ^ z i n Q extremely pleasant _ ^ J « o o / o ? unpleasant If you thought that today's weather was extremely un-pleasant you would c i r c l e the 9_ and i f you thought that i t was extremely pleasant you would c i r c l e the 1_. I f you thought that today's weather was average you would c i r c l e 5_. I f you thought that i t was somewhere between extreme and average, you would c i r c l e the appropriate number i n between (2_, _3,_, or 6^i]_,8) . Please answer the questions c a r e f u l l y and do not skip any questions. 101 1) Rate the learner on the following scales, i n t e l l i g e n t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 u n i n t e l l i g e n t l i k a b l e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unlikable uncooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 cooperative bossy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 easygoing immature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 mature imaginative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unimaginative irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 responsible nervous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 calm patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 impatient reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unreasonable r i g i d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 f l e x i b l e courteous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 rude s e l f i s h 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unselfish warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 cold sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 insincere 102 2) Rate the tele v i s e d experimenter (the 'teacher') on the following scales. i n t e l l i g e n t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 u n i n t e l l i g e n t l i k a b l e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unlikable uncooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 cooperative bossy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 easygoing immature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 mature imaginative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unimaginative irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 responsible nervous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 calm patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 impatient reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unreasonable r i g i d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 f l e x i b l e courteous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 rude s e l f i s h 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unselfish warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 cold sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 insincere 103 3) On the following scales, make ratings r e f l e c t i n g your impressions on the 'average university student'. i n t e l l i g e n t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 u n i n t e l l i g e n t l i k a b l e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unlikable uncooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 cooperative bossy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 easygoing immature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 mature imaginative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unimaginative irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 responsible nervous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 calm patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 impatient reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unreasonable r i g i d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 f l e x i b l e courteous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 rude s e l f i s h 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unselfish warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 cold sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 insincere 4) On the following scales make ratings r e f l e c t i n g your impressions of the 'average psychology experimenter 1. i n t e l l i g e n t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 u n i n t e l l i g e n t l i k a b l e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unlikable uncooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 cooperative bossy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 easygoing immature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 mature imaginative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unimaginative irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 responsible nervous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 calm patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 impatient reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unreasonable r i g i d 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 f l e x i b l e courteous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 rude s e l f i s h 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 unselfish warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 cold sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 insincere 105 5) To what extent was the learner responsible for his being shocked? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l 6) To what extent was the experimenter responsible for the learner being shocked? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l 7) To what extent were the shocks a r e s u l t of something the learner did? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l 8) To what extent were the shocks a r e s u l t of something the experimenter did? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l 9) To what extent was the learner responsible for his rate of learning being as i t was? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l 10) To what extent was the experimenter responsible for the l i s t being of the same degree of d i f f i c u l t y to the learner as i t was? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l 11) Could the learner have done anything other than what he actually did? No Yes I f "Yes", what could he have done (B r i e f l y ) ? 12) Could the experimenter have done anything other than what he actually did? No Yes I f "Yes", what could he have done (B r i e f l y ) ? 106 13) 14) 15) 16) 17) 18) 19) 20) 21) To what extent was the learner responsible for his own continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the experiment? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l To what extent was the experimenter responsible for the learner's continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the experiment? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l To what extent was the learner's behavior a r e s u l t of the s i t u a t i o n he found himself in? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l To what extent was the experimenter's behavior a r e s u l t of the s i t u a t i o n he found himself in? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l To what extent was the learner's behavior a r e s u l t of his personality c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and dispositions at the time? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l To what extent was the experimenter's behavior a r e s u l t of his personality c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and dispositions at the time? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l To what extent i s the learner to blame for his being shocked? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l To what extent i s the experimenter to blame for the learner's being shocked? completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 not at a l l How f a i r l y was the learner treated i n the present experiment? extremely f a i r l y 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 extremely u n f a i r l y 107 22) How f a i r l y are subjects treated i n the average psychology experiment? extremely , O - J / L K C T Q Q extremely f a i r l y 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 u n f a i r l y 23) How severe was the pain suffered by the learner? extremely x 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 extremely severe mild 24) How many psychology experiments have you pa r t i c i p a t e d i n since September (including t h i s one)? 25 ) Are you the oldest c h i l d i n your family? 

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