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James Britton’s theory of language and learning and the recent ’affective’ literary critics McBurney, Robert Philip 1976

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JAMES BRITTON S THEORY OF LANGUAGE AND LEARNING 1  AND THE RECENT 'AFFECTIVE' LITERARY CRITICS by ROBERT PHILIP McBURNEY B.A. U n i v e r s i t y of Manitoba, 1968 B.  Ed. U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l g a r y , 1971  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE  REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  in THE  FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department o f E n g l i s h )  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d  THE  standard  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1976  ©  Robert P h i l i p McBurney, 1976  In presenting this thesis  in partial fulfilment of the requirements for  an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this  thesis  for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives.  It  is understood that copying or publication  of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  .  Department of n  f  ENGLISH  The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5  fifipt.embea.  f  1976  I. 1  ABSTRACT  T h i s t h e s i s examines the •affective*  literary critics  theory of language and  t h e o r i e s of some r e c e n t  i n the  learning.  erary c r i t i c i s m generally  has  l i g h t of James B r i t t o n ' s U n t i l recently,  not been concerned w i t h  r e l a t i o n s h i p between the t e x t and  the reader;  as i n New  C r i t i c i s m , or w i t h the  r e l a t i o n s h i p , as i n b i o g r a p h i c a l neglect  of the t e x t - r e a d e r  l i t e r a t u r e has  the  i t has  concerned i t s e l f e i t h e r w i t h the poem as a s t a t i c object,  lit-  verbal  writer-text  criticism.  With  r e l a t i o n s h i p , the  the  study of  a l s o ignored a b a s i c a e s t h e t i c p r i n c i p l e  -- t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a work of a r t and i t s p e r c i p i e n t i s a dynamic i n t e r a c t i o n where  'ordinary'  experience cannot be  separated from a e s t h e t i c  experience.  Chapter I d e l i n e a t e s  t h i s p r i n c i p l e proposed p r i m a r i l y  by John Dewey, whose theory i s complemented by those of R.G.  Collingwood, Susanne Langer, and  Chapter I I i d e n t i f i e s and  examines the r e c e n t  of seven l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s who r e l a t i o n s h i p between the  George K e l l y .  discuss  reader and  the  the  theories  'affective'  t e x t -- Norman  H o l l a n d , Standly F i s h , Roland Barthes, Wolfgang I s e r , Georges P o u l e t , Wayne Booth, and  Walter S l a t o f f .  Two  ii  ideas emerge which a r e r e l a t e d t o the a e s t h e t i c p r i n c i p l e espoused by John Dewey and o t h e r s :  1) our a e s t h e t i c  responses to l i t e r a t u r e a r e n a t u r a l extensions o f our mundane s e l v e s ;  and 2) l i t e r a t u r e as a r t i s s t i l l a  l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e , and as such i s r e l a t e d t o other o r d i n a r y kinds of language use. rudimentary  But these ideas a r e  and fragmented and there i s a need f o r a  more g e n e r a l theory t o i n t e g r a t e them.  James B r i t t o n ' s  theory o f language i n Chapter I I I , c o n t a i n e d mainly  i n his  book Language and L e a r n i n g , p r o v i d e s a s t r u c t u r e which subsumes these fragmented ideas so t h a t a p e r s p e c t i v e can be gained on t h i s new c r i t i c i s m .  B r i t t o n puts f o r t h the  view t h a t l i t e r a t u r e i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f man's l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t y i n what he c a l l s the 'spectator r o l e * . theory i n t e g r a t e s the c r i t i c a l  This  ideas a r i s i n g out o f  Chapter I I and a l s o p l a c e s l i t e r a t u r e i n a new perspect i v e w i t h other of man's s p e c t a t o r r o l e a c t i v i t i e s ,  both  linguistic  (gossip, p e r s o n a l l e t t e r - w r i t i n g ) and non-  linguistic  (play, dream, f a n t a s y , r i t u a l ) .  Britton  p o i n t s t o the importance o f s p e c t a t o r r o l e a c t i v i t i e s i n p e r s o n a l development.  iii  TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction  1  I  4  P e r c e p t i o n and A e s t h e t i c Response a)  The Nature of Experience  b)  A e s t h e t i c Experience  4 15  Footnotes IT  27  The Recent A f f e c t i v e L i t e r a r y C r i t i c i s m a);  W. K, Wimsatt:  b)  Norman H o l l a n d :  c)  Stanley F i s h :  d);  Roland Barthes:  e);  Wolfgang I s e r :  f)  Georges P o u l e t :  g)  Wayne Booth:  30  The A f f e c t i v e F a l l a c y Psychoanalytic  Theory.. 35  Affective Stylistics  ITI  43  Indeterminacy  48  Phenomenology  Interests,  Walter S l a t o f f :  Footnotes  .... 39  Structuralist Analysis  Subjectivity  ,  53  Emotions, . '' Beliefs  h)  .. 32  56 60 67  James B r i t t o n  73  a)  The Nature o f Experience  76  b)  The Role o f Language ... ;  82  c)  L i t e r a t u r e As Experience  89  d)  P e r c e p t i o n o f Form  97  e)  Implications  101  Footnotes Bibliography  107 ,  115  iv  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  I would l i k e t o thank Dr. Graham Good who helped i n r e a d i n g my work and who gave an e x c e l l e n t seminar i n l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m , out o f which t h i s t h e s i s grew;  Dr. F r e d  Bowers, who p r o v i d e d s u p e r v i s i o n and encouragement w i t h t h i s t a s k which was, at times, most d i f f i c u l t f o r me;  and  Dr. Merron Chorny, of the U n i v e r s i t y of C a l g a r y , who helped s t i m u l a t e t h e o r i g i n a l idea f o r t h i s  study.  1  INTRODUCTION  In the r e a d i n g of any work of l i t e r a t u r e , a r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between the w r i t e r , the t e x t , and reader.  U n t i l recently,  l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m has  the been con-  cerned e i t h e r w i t h the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the w r i t e r  and  the t e x t , as i n b i o g r a p h i c a l  the  t e x t i t s e l f , as i n New tween the reader and  c r i t i c i s m , or s o l e l y w i t h  Criticism.  the  t e x t has  The  relationship  been i m p l i e d  or  be-  ignored  altogether. With the n e g l e c t the  of the t e x t - r e a d e r  study of l i t e r a t u r e has  tic principle — a r t and  also  relationship,  ignored a b a s i c  aesthe-  t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a work o f  i t s p e r c i p i e n t i s a dynamic i n t e r a c t i o n where  'ordinary'  experience cannot be  separated from  aesthetic  experience. Recently, however, a group of c r i t i c s has consider  the t e x t - r e a d e r  T h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s no New  Criticism;  i s no  r e l a t i o n s h i p more  with these  formal a n a l y s i s .  c o n s i d e r e d a school i n f l u e n c e upon one common concern —  thoughtfully.  longer presupposed, as i t was ' a f f e c t i v e ' c r i t i c s , the  longer viewed as a s t a t i c o b j e c t  only by  begun to  to which we  with text  respond  These c r i t i c s cannot r e a l l y  as they have had another, but  relatively  be  little  t h e i r views r e p r e s e n t a  a r e a c t i o n to the New  Critical  approach.  2  James B r i t t o n ' s i n t e r e s t i n man's l i n g u i s t i c  act-  i v i t y has l e d him, from a d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n t o the same problem.  B r i t t o n proposes a theory  of man's  linguistic  a c t i v i t y o f which l i t e r a t u r e i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t .  I be-  l i e v e t h a t through B r i t t o n , because o f h i s wider perspect i v e , we are able t o see much more c l e a r l y the v a l i d i t y o f t h i s new t r e n d i n ' a f f e c t i v e ' c r i t i c i s m and t o see, as w e l l , where t h i s trend i s l e a d i n g . Chapter I d e l i n e a t e s a b a s i c a e s t h e t i c p r i n c i p l e proposed p r i m a r i l y by John Dewey, whose theory perception  of a r t and  i s complemented by those of R. G. Collingwood,  Susanne Langer, and George K e l l y .  Dewey's c l a i m i s t h a t  there i s no r e a l q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e between a r t and l i f e , between a e s t h e t i c experience and o r d i n a r y  experience.  T h i s p r i n c i p l e i s p i c k e d up and developed piecemeal the v a r i o u s c r i t i c s B r i t t o n ' s theory  i n Chapter I I , and i s c e n t r a l to James  i n Chapter I I I .  Chapter I I examines the ' a f f e c t i v e ' c r i t i c s have begun t o look a t t h e t e x t - r e a d e r the a e s t h e t i c p r i n c i p l e  discussed  saying  who  relationship.  Here  i n Chapter I i s d e v e l -  oped s p e c i f i c a l l y i n terms o f l i t e r a t u r e . critics  by  We f i n d some  t h a t when we respond a e s t h e t i c a l l y t o  l i t e r a t u r e , our responses are, can only be, n a t u r a l i n t e n t i o n s o f our mundane s e l v e s .  I n t e r e s t i n g l y , o t h e r s move  i n t o the area o f language, making a r e l a t e d c l a i m  that  3  l i t e r a t u r e as a r t i s s t i l l  a l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e , and as  such i s r e l a t e d t o o r d i n a r y l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s .  The  ideas which emerge from a study of these c r i t i c s are f r a g mented, u n r e l a t e d , even crude.  There i s need f o r a more  g e n e r a l theory t o i n t e g r a t e these  ideas.  Chapter I I I d e l i n e a t e s James B r i t t o n ' s theory o f language and l e a r n i n g which has i n t e g r a t e d , i both..^  Dewey's  a e s t h e t i c p r i n c i p l e about experience,  and the n o t i o n t h a t  l i t e r a r y language cannot be separated  from o r d i n a r y l a n g -  uage.  For B r i t t o n , l i t e r a t u r e a r i s e s q u i t e o r g a n i c a l l y  out o f l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t y i n what he c a l l s the 'spectat o r mode. The  ' a e s t h e t i c ' experience  of reading l i t e r a t u r e i s  l i k e w i s e o r g a n i c a l l y connected t o 'ordinary' A e s t h e t i c experience,  experience.  i n the end,has not so much t o do with  a r t as with p e r s o n a l growth.  B r i t t o n provides a general  theory which subsumes the i n s i g h t s o f the ' a f f e c t i v e ' t i c s , e n a b l i n g us to g a i n a p e r s p e c t i v e on them.  cri-  4  I - PERCEPTION AND  I f we we  AESTHETIC RESPONSE  look beyond the bounds, of l i t e r a r y theory,  immediately encounter an i d e a which has been l a r g e l y  ignored u n t i l r e c e n t l y by l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m .  The  fore-  most c l a i m o f the f i r s t major a e s t h e t i c theory i n the E n g l i s h language, John Dewey's A r t As Experience (1934) i s t h a t a r t cannot be separated from l i f e .  A e s t h e t i c expe-  r i e n c e has i t s r o o t s i n o r d i n a r y experience;  the former  n a t u r a l l y extends out of the l a t t e r . Chapter I d e l i n e a t e s t h i s i d e a c o n t a i n e d i n Dewey's book and complemented by s e v e r a l other t h e o r i e s of percept i o n and a e s t h e t i c response: c i p l e s of A r t ality  Collingwood's The  Prin-  (1938), George K e l l y ' s A Theory o f Person-  (1955), and Susanne Langer's Philosophy i n a New  (1942) and F e e l i n g and Form a)  R.G.  Key  (1953).  The Nature of Experience A c c o r d i n g to Dewey, our concept of the p h y s i c a l  world as f i n i t e i s an i l l u s i o n . c e i v e i n our environment constructions.  The  'wholeness' we per-  i s e n t i r e l y o f our own  What we normally r e g a r d as our  s t r e t c h e s out i n t o the i n f i n i t y of the u n i v e r s e .  individual 'world' There  are no bounds which mark o f f our p l a n e t as a u n i f i e d whole; t h a t i s to say, there are no bounds which e x i s t o f thems e l v e s , f o r the bounds which we p e r c e i v e we have c o n f e r r e d  5  upon o u r s e l v e s .  "We are accustomed t o t h i n k o f p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s as having bounded edges," s t a t e s Dewey, " t h i n g s l i k e r o c k s , c h a i r s , books, houses,  t r a d e , and s c i e n c e w i t h  i t s e f f o r t s a t p r e c i s e measurement, have confirmed belief.  this  Then we u n c o n s c i o u s l y c a r r y over t h i s b e l i e f i n  the bounded c h a r a c t e r o f a l l o b j e c t s  o f experience  (a be-  l i e f founded u l t i m a t e l y i n the p r a c t i c a l e x i g e n c i e s of our d e a l i n g s with t h i n g s ) i n t o our c o n c e p t i o n o f experience i t self."  We experience the world  ' s u b j e c t i v e l y * and a l -  though the o b j e c t i v e world i s not c h a o t i c , our experience of  i t can be.  T h i s o n l y makes sense, f o r we begin as  r e l a t i v e l y i n e x p e r i e n c e d organisms  c o n f r o n t i n g an i n f i n i t e  whole which we can p e r c e i v e only piecemeal.  The u n i v e r s e  i t s e l f runs l i k e a clockwork, but as s u b j e c t i v e  organisms  we n a t u r a l l y cannot grasp any such c o n c e p t i o n of wholeness at the o u t s e t o f l i f e . For example, the images on a t e l e v i s i o n screen a r e two q u i t e d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s t o a s i x month o l d c h i l d and t o i t s mother.  Obviously there i s an accumulation o f some  k i n d where we b u i l d our own e x p e r i e n c e s .  I n a sense we  b u i l d our world, o r a t l e a s t our view o f the world, as we grow.  Dewey m a i n t a i n s t h a t as organisms, we seek whole-  ness;  we c o n s t r u c t i t o u t o f our s u b j e c t i v e experience of  the world.  Although our experiences take p l a c e i n an  6  i n d e f i n i t e t o t a l s e t t i n g where o b j e c t s i n the world " ... are only f o c a l p o i n t s i n a here and now indefinitely,"  we  w i t h i n a wholeness — our world.  "The  t h a t s t r e t c h e s out  sense t h a t our experience takes p l a c e our f a m i l y , our c i t y , our country,  sense of an e x t e n s i v e and u n d e r l y i n g  whole," s t a t e s Dewey, " i s the context of every experience 3 and i t i s the essence of s a n i t y . " How  then does the e x p e r i e n t i a l content of the s i x  month o l d c h i l d expand to the extent t h a t the c h i l d  will  be able t o make sense out of the images on the t e l e v i s i o n screen?  George K e l l y ' s A Theory of P e r s o n a l i t y  some i n s i g h t s .  "There i s a world which i s happening a l l  the time," s t a t e s K e l l y . of  i t which i s happening  simple one:  "Our experience i s t h a t p o r t i o n 4 to us."  i n our exposure  Kelly's claim i s a  t o the circumstances i n our  vironment, we n e c e s s a r i l y look f o r something itself.  provides  en-  t h a t repeats  "Once we have a b s t r a c t e d t h a t p r o p e r t y , " s t a t e s  K e l l y , "we  have a b a s i s f o r s l i c i n g o f f chunks of time  and  r e a l i t y and h o l d i n g them up f o r i n s p e c t i o n one a t a time. On the other hand, i f we  fail  to f i n d such a p r o p e r t y , we  are l e f t swimming i n a s h o r e l e s s stream, where there are no beginnings and no endings t o a n y t h i n g . " Langer,  i n Philosophy i n a New  Key,  For Susanne  the organism  i s i n the  unavoidable p o s i t i o n of " ... c o n s t r u i n g the pandemonium of  7  sheer impressions ... " to engulf i t .  which surrounds and t h r e a t e n s  Her p o i n t i s s i m i l a r to K e l l y ' s ;  according  to Langer the t h i n g s which r e p e a t themselves i n the e n v i ronment  (and thus which we are capable of c o n s t r u i n g ) , are  d e r i v e d of the e t e r n a l r e g u l a r i t i e s and rhythms of nature and t h e i r subsequent r a m i f i c a t i o n s on human b e h a v i o r . ability  The  to 'construe' ( K e l l y ' s term) r e p e t i t i o n s i n the  flow of circumstances which surround the organism i s f o r Langer the a b i l i t y to r e c o g n i z e forms.  And our way o f  p e r c e i v i n g these forms i s to r e p r e s e n t them to o u r s e l v e s . K e l l y c h a r a c t e r i z e s l i f e as i n v o l v i n g " ... an i n t e r e s t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between p a r t s of our u n i v e r s e wherein i n one p a r t , the l i v i n g  c r e a t u r e , i s able t o b r i n g h i m s e l f 7  around t o r e p r e s e n t another p a r t , h i s environment." K e l l y i n i t i a l l y makes no d i s t i n c t i o n between animal  life  and human l i f e but i m p l i e s t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e l i e s i n the r e l a t i v e s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . ever, i s more e x p l i c i t . man  Langer, how-  For her, the key to what separates  from the o t h e r animals i s man's unique a b i l i t y  n i z e symbolic forms.  to r e c o g -  Out o f the bedlam of circumstance  about us, " ... our sense organs must s e l e c t c e r t a i n p r e dominant  forms, i f they are to make r e p o r t o f t h i n g s and  g not  of mere d i s s o l v i n g sensa."  The human organism i s  unique because i t has the a b i l i t y to r e p r e s e n t t h i n g s  8  (symbolize) r a t h e r than merely i n d i c a t e them  (signify).  Thus we are able t o represent.experience t o o u r s e l v e s . i n the f o r m a t i v e stages o f the organism's l i f e t h i s  And  repre-  s e n t a t i o n i s achieved through an " ... unconscious appre9 c i a t i o n o f forms ... " The human organism, then, f i n d s i t s e l f  confronted  w i t h a f l u x o f circumstances and e n e r g i e s out of which i t must make some sense.  In Dewey's view, the organism abso-  l u t e l y must make sense o f i t s surroundings i n o r d e r t o s u r v i v e , i n order, q u i t e l i t e r a l l y ,  t o grow.  The organism,  by v i r t u e o f being a l i v e , a c t s upon the environment which, i n a l l normal human a c t i v i t i e s r e s i s t s , causes d i s p a r i t y or disharmany as i n the organism's s t a t e o f hunger, f o r example. it  The i n f a n t i s hungry and l e f t unfed;  i s fed.  i t cries;  In the normal process o f l i v i n g the human o r -  ganism undergoes a l t e r n a t i v e phases o f harmony and disharmony. I t i s bound to r e c o v e r from disharmony alive.  Moreover,  i f i t i s t o remain  i n the r e c o v e r y , the organism never r e -  turns t o i t s p r i o r s t a t e , but i s e n r i c h e d by the d i s p a r i t y ; growth o c c u r s :  " L i f e growns when a temporary f a l l i n g out  i s a t r a n s i t i o n t o a more e x t e n s i v e balance of e n e r g i e s o f the organism w i t h those o f the c o n d i t i o n s under which i t lives."  1  0  Thus the organism, through many such s u c c e s s -  i v e phases o f d i s p a r i t y and harmony, b u i l d s a more e l a b o r a t e  9  and s o p h i s t i c a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the environment. In K e l l y ' s view, "The person moves out toward making more and more o f the world p r e d i c t a b l e  ... " ^  Kelly's  view o f man i s t h a t he i s e s s e n t i a l l y a p r e d i c t i v e  animal  who comes t o understand h i s world through a s u c c e s s i v e s e r i e s o f approximations o f h i s experience i n i t ; c o n s t a n t l y seeking to improve h i s p r e d i c t i v e  he i s  apparatus.  K e l l y c a l l s our ways o f c o n s t r u i n g the world ' c o n s t r u c t s ' , which, i n the i n i t i a l  stages of l i f e ,  a r e very crude but  which as we grow, evolve i n t o an e l a b o r a t e and s o p h i s t i cated system.  "Man looks a t h i s world through t r a n s p a r e n t  p a t t e r n s or templates," s t a t e s K e l l y , and then attempts  t o f i t over the r e a l i t i e s o f which the  world i s composed." or  inadequate  "which he c r e a t e s  12  . . As c o n s t r u c t s become i n o p e r a t i v e  i n p r e d i c t i n g the r e a l i t i e s o f the world,  they are d i s c a r d e d or m o d i f i e d i n order t o accommodate i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n the f a c e o f d i s p a r a t e experiences which confront;  us.  And, a c c o r d i n g to K e l l y , a person w i l l norm-  a l l y choose t o e l a b o r a t e h i s system o f c o n s t r u c t s . C o n s t r u c t s are not n e c e s s a r i l y even c o n s c i o u s . Langer maintains t h a t our r e c o g n i t i o n o f forms i s not necess a r i l y c o n f i n e d t o forms which are conceived through d i s q u r s i v e thought.  "Now,  I do not b e l i e v e t h a t  'there i s a  world which i s not p h y s i c a l or not i n space-time'," she  10  s t a t e s , "but I do b e l i e v e t h a t i n t h i s p h y s i c a l , space-time world of our experience there are t h i n g s which do not f i t the  grammatical scheme of t h i n g s .  But they are not  necessarily blind, inconceivable, mystical a f f a i r s ; are  they  simply matters which r e q u i r e t o be c o n c e i v e d through 13  some s y m b o l i s t i c schema other than d i s c u r s i v e language." For  Langer there i s a ' n o n - d i s c u r s i v e symbolism' which con-  s i s t s of the a b s t r a c t i o n s made by our sense organs, cont a i n i n g meanings which are too complex t o be handled by a discursive representation. What, then, c o n s t i t u t e s what we c a l l ence'?  an  'experi-  The organism, having achieved a s t a t e of harmony  w i t h i t s environment, a c t s , meets r e s i s t a n c e , and  falls  i n t o a s t a t e of d i s p a r i t y from which i t must r e c o v e r . Upon r e c o v e r i n g , a c h i e v i n g a s t a t e of harmony, the organism  has grown.  I t i s no longer what i t was,  p e r c e i v e i t s environment i n the same way. the  In a sense,  organism has achieved an awareness of new  by v i r t u e o f the experience i t has undergone, can p r e d i c t p o s s i b i l i t i e s s o p h i s t i c a t e d manner.  nor does i t  possibilities; the organism  f o r f u t u r e a c t i v i t i e s i n a more  In K e l l y ' s terms, the organism  has e l a b o r a t e d i t s c o n s t r u c t system i n o r d e r t h a t the system be b e t t e r capable of p r e d i c t i n g f u t u r e e x p e r i e n c e . The i n t e r a c t i o n between the organism and i t s environment,  11  i n which the organism can be s a i d t o have grown, i s what Dewey d e f i n e s as e x p e r i e n c e , a d e f i n i t i o n which can be a p p l i e d t o human and non-human organisms.  But human ex-  p e r i e n c e i s then t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d as 'conscious' experience.  The r e l a t i o n s between organism and environment,  which remain those of 'cause and effect', f o r most animals, become r e l a t i o n s of 'means and consequence' ings.  f o r human be-  Animals are r i v e t e d t o the c o n c r e t e world because,  a c c o r d i n g t o Langer, they l a c k the a b i l i t y t o symbolize. But human beings are capable of r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e i r world. The awareness  o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f e x p e r i e n c e i s an aware-  ness of p a t t e r n o r form.  Langer has suggested t h a t our  r e c o g n i t i o n of such forms i s not n e c e s s a r i l y an awareness which i s d i s c u r s i v e l y known, r a t h e r these forms a r e p a t t e r n s o f f e e l i n g s and emotions which we r e c o g n i z e  intui-  t i v e l y and which o f t e n remain i n a r t i c u l a t e i n any d i s c u r s i v e way. What i s the nature of the change which we undergo i n having an experience? or modify our c o n s t r u c t s .  K e l l y has s a i d t h a t we d i s c a r d Dewey e x p l a i n s :  "There i s ...  an element of undergoing, of s u f f e r i n g i n i t s l a r g e sense, i n every e x p e r i e n c e .  Otherwise there would be no t a k i n g 14  i n o f what preceeded."  These new e x p e r i e n c e s are not  merely understood i n t e l l e c t u a l l y and c a t a l o g u e d ;  i f we  12  are t o b e l i e v e K e l l y , there i s a much more s u b t l e and found process a t work:  " /Construing/  t h a t happens to a person on o c c a s i o n ;  pro-  i s not something i t i s what makes  15 him a person i n the f i r s t p l a c e . " is significant:  Thus the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a hu-  being and h i s environment i s never s t a t i c .  maintains t h a t as we  Dewey  a c t upon our environment and as our  a c t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d or thwarted, we reflection:  are f o r c e d i n t o  " ... what i s turned back upon i s the  t i o n of h i n d e r i n g c o n d i t i o n s to what the s e l f  rela-  possesses 16  working c a p i t a l i n v i r t u e of p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e s . " s e n t i a l l y we  man  he sees the i n d i v i d u a l as a dynamic pro-  cess of p e r c e p t i o n . man  K e l l y ' s view of  are f o r c e d t o be s p e c t a t o r s on our own  Eslives,  to look a t our new  experience i n the l i g h t of our expe-  r i e n c e accumulated  from the p a s t .  i s incongruous w i t h our accumulated is,  i f we  fail  I f the new  c o n s t r u c t system, t h a t  to p r e d i c t a c c u r a t e l y , our p e r c e p t i o n w i l l  i n i t i a l l y be c h a o t i c and must be ordered i f we t i n u e to grow.  experience  are t o con-  Thus, to achieve harmony, the p a s t must  be r e c o n s t r u c t e d , e l a b o r a t e d t o encompass t h i s new e x p e r i ence:  "The  j u n c t i o n of the new  and the o l d i s not a mere  composition of f o r c e s , but i s a r e - c r e a t i o n i n which the p r e s e n t impulsion gets form and s o l i d i t y while the o l d , the  ' s t o r e d , m a t e r i a l i s l i t e r a l l y revived, given 1  new  13  l i f e and s o u l through having to meet a new  situation."  What i s s u c c e s s i v e l y r e c o n s t r u c t e d i s our r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of  the world, or world view.  our world view grows w i t h us. t i a l f o r growth i s i n f i n i t e .  I f we continue to grow, E s s e n t i a l l y , the poten"There i s , i n f a c t , "  says 18  Langer,  "no such t h i n g as the form of the ' r e a l ' world." For  Dewey, the a e s t h e t i c experience and the c r e -  a t i v e process have t h e i r r o o t s i n o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e . In  the organism's  reattainment of harmony and  w i t h i t s environment,  Dewey sees t h i s l i n k :  equilibrium "For o n l y  when an organism shares i n the ordered r e l a t i o n s of i t s environment living.  does i t secure the s t a b i l i t y e s s e n t i a l to  And when the p a r t i c i p a t i o n comes a f t e r a phase  of  d i s r u p t i o n and c o n f l i c t , i t bears w i t h i n i t the germs 19  of  the e s t h e t i c . "  In P r i n c i p l e s of A r t ,  R. G. C o l -  lingwood, by no means committed  to Dewey's way  at  c u r i o u s l y s i m i l a r to what  t h i n g s , y e t s t a t e s something  Dewey proposes:  " ^ t h e a e s t h e t i c emotion_7  of l o o k i n g  resembles  the  f e e l i n g of r e l i e f t h a t comes when a burdensome i n t e l l e c t ual  or moral problem has been s o l v e d .  i f we  We may  call i t ,  l i k e , the s p e c i f i c f e e l i n g of having s u c c e s s f u l l y  expressed o u r s e l v e s ;  and there i s no reason why 20  not be c a l l e d a s p e c i f i c a e s t h e t i c emotion."  i t should Dewey  would be more adamant about t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between  14  the o r d i n a r y and a e s t h e t i c ;  the two experiences a r e not  s i m i l a r but i d e n t i c a l , or a t the l e a s t , the l a t t e r i s d e r i v e d out o f the former. What Dewey maintains i s t h a t the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f our world view i s e s s e n t i a l l y or g e r m i n a l l y an a e s t h e t i c act.  When we c o n f r o n t a new experience, much o f what  'happens' i s too u n r e l a t e d or mechanical as conscious experience.  t o be p e r c e i v e d  What governs our c o n s t r u c t i o n  of the experience and hence r e - c o n s t r u c t i o n o f our world view and serves as the u n i f y i n g f a c t o r i s emotion: t i o n i s the moving and cementing f o r c e .  "Emo-  I t s e l e c t s what  i s congruous and dyes what i s s e l e c t e d w i t h i t s c o l o r , 21 thereby g i v i n g q u a l i t a t i v e u n i t y t o m a t e r i a l s . " if  I understand  Langer,  her, would e l a b o r a t e t o say our s e n t i e n t  being has the a b i l i t y t o a b s t r a c t p a t t e r n s of experience which a r e not o f t e n conscious and c e r t a i n l y too complex to be expressed i n d i s c u r s i v e symbolism.  Moreover, Lan-  ger maintains t h a t these p a t t e r n s or forms o f f e e l i n g c e i v e d i n o r d i n a r y experience are expressed f a c t , can only be expressed i n a r t .  per-  i n art, i n  "Form," Dewey s t a t e s ,  "as i t i s present i n the f i n e a r t s , i s the a r t o f making c l e a r what i s i n v o l v e d i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f space and time p r e f i g u r e d i n every course of a d e v e l o p i n g  life-  22 experience."  F o r Langer these a r e the forms of f e e l i n g ;  15  j u s t as d i s c u r s i v e forms a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f metaphysics, so forms o f f e e l i n g a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f a r t . experience i s the f u l f i l l m e n t of an organism g l e s and achievements  "Because  i n i t s strug-  i n a world o f t h i n g s , " s t a t e s 23  Dewey, " i t i s a r t i n germ."  The a r t i s t c r e a t e s out  of the powerful f e e l i n g s and experiences he undergoes i n the world.  The r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f our world view which  we must c a r r y out i n the f a c e of powerful experiences i s germinal t o a r t i n the case of the a r t i s t .  He expresses  h i s emotional experience, though not i n any d i s c u r s i v e way.  And as p e r c i p i e n t s o f a r t , we undergo an experience  s i m i l a r or i d e n t i c a l t o ' r e a l * e x p e r i e n c e .  Dewey s t a t e s :  " ... i n order t o p e r c e i v e e s t h e t i c a l l y , / t h e p e r c i p i e n t _ / must remake h i s p a s t experiences so t h a t they can e n t e r 24 i n t o a new p a t t e r n . "  Thus the a r t o b j e c t does not ex-  i s t independently o f i t s p e r c i p i e n t . b) A e s t h e t i c Experience The a r t i s t , then, expresses h i s emotional  experi-  ences through c o n s t i t u t e d n o n - d i s c u r s i v e symbolic forms of f e e l i n g .  The p o i n t a t which we r e - c r e a t e our world  view i n the f a c e o f new experience i s p r e c i s e l y the p o i n t where Dewey f e e l s t h a t human a c t i v i t y has the p o t e n t i a l t o become a r t i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n . ings  J u s t as o r d i n a r y human be-  ' c r e a t e ' experience i n the a c t o f p e r c e p t i o n and  16  ' r e c o n s t r u c t ' t h e i r accumulation dergo the process o f l i v i n g ,  o f experience as they un-  so does the a r t i s t  'create'  experience, o n l y i n h i s case, i t i s i m a g i n a t i v e experience g i v e n concrete form through  some medium i n the environment  r-- stone, p a i n t , language.  F o r Langer,  the a r t i s t does  not d i r e c t l y express h i s powerful f e e l i n g s , but he abs t r a c t s them i n t o symbolic forms;  these forms are made  a r t i c u l a t e f o r us (though, again, not d i s c u r s i v e l y ) i n the work of a r t .  Langer s t a t e s :  " ... what a r t expresses i s  not a c t u a l f e e l i n g , but ideas o f f e e l i n g ;  as language 25  does not express a c t u a l t h i n g s but ideas of them." Dewey's s i m i l a r c l a i m i s t h a t the a r t i s t c l a r i f i e s and d i s t i l l s by way of form meanings found i n s c a t t e r e d and weakened ways i n o r d i n a r y experience: of  the s e l f  of  a r t , i s i t s e l f - a prolonged  " ... the e x p r e s s i o n  i n and through a medium, c o n s t i t u t i n g the work i n t e r a c t i o n of something  i s s u i n g from the s e l f w i t h o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s , a process i n which both o f them a c q u i r e a form and order they d i d 26 not a t f i r s t possess." of  T h i s i s s i m i l a r t o the process  a c q u i r i n g 'ordinary' experience.  (raw)experience)  What i s p e r c e i v e d  i s a s s i m i l a t e d by the p e r c e i v e r , but a t  the same time the p e r c e i v e r must 'grow' i n order t o accommodate d i s p a r a t e e x p e r i e n c e .  J u s t as the o r d i n a r y per-  c e i v e r c r e a t e s an experience out o f the raw m a t e r i a l s of  17  sense impressions by s e l e c t i n g what he i s capable, a t that. p a r t i c u l a r time, o f accommodating, so the a r t i s t c r e a t e s a work o f a r t which i s , i n a very r e a l way, an 'experience. Collingwood attempts proposes  to c l a r i f y t h i s process.  He  t h a t the a r t i s t ' s inward experience of crude  sen-  s a t i o n , emotion, impression i s converted i n t o i m a g i n a t i v e experience by an a c t o f consciousness.  This imaginative  experience i s then e x t e r n a l i z e d as a work o f a r t . act  The  o f consciousness i s not d i s c u r s i v e l y formulated;  ther i t i s p r e - d i s c u r s i v e .  There are genuine modes o f  thought whose f i n a l a r t i c u l a t i o n i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y istic.  ra-  lingu-  In the p e r c e p t i o n o f a r t , t h e r e i s a converse  p r o c e s s , a c c o r d i n g t o Collingwood, where t h e p e r c e i v e r begins w i t h the outward experience o f the work o f a r t : " ... the outward experience comes f i r s t ,  and t h i s i s  converted i n t o t h a t inward experience which alone i s aes27 thetic."  Dewey s t a t e s t h a t ^ t h e r e i s an o r g a n i c con-  n e c t i o n between the a r t i s t ' s a c t o f e x p r e s s i o n and the p e r c i p i e n t ' s a e s t h e t i c experience.  The p e r c i p i e n t must  r e c r e a t e f o r h i m s e l f the i m a g i n a t i v e a c t o f the a r t i s t ; he must undergo r e l a t i o n s s i m i l a r t o what the a r t i s t experienced i n creation:  "Without the a c t o f r e c r e a t i o n , the 28  o b j e c t i s not p e r c e i v e d as a work o f a r t . "  I f Dewey  i s c o r r e c t i n saying t h a t the processes i n having an  1  18  an  ' a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e ' a r e s i m i l a r , and not merely an-  alogous, t o the processes we undergo i n having an ' o r d i nary' experience, then our world r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (or i n K e l l y ' s terms our c o n s t r u c t system) o f accumulated  past  experiences w i l l be c a l l e d i n t o p l a y as we respond  to a r t .  Dewey s t a t e s :  " ... when excitement  about s u b j e c t matter  goes deep, i t s t i r s up a s t o r e of a t t i t u d e s and meanings 29 d e r i v e d from p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e . "  How h e a v i l y do our  world views come t o bear on a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n ? d i s c u s s i o n of p i c t o r i a l a r t , Collingwood  states:  In a "The  imaginary experience which we g e t from the p i c t u r e i s not merely  the k i n d o f experience the p i c t u r e i s capable o f  a r o u s i n g , i t i s the k i n d of experience we a r e capable of 30 having."'  The work o f a r t i s a new experience;  i t will  b r i n g t o bear a l l those processes which we normally undergo i n having an e x p e r i e n c e .  The a b i l i t y t o p e r c e i v e a r t  i s n o t a constant, b u t i s dependent upon the m a t u r i t y o f the p e r c e i v e r .  There can r e a l l y be no such t h i n g as an  ' o b j e c t i v e ' response. t i c response,  To understand  the nature o f aesthe-  then, one must r e a l i z e t h a t the i n t e r a c t i o n  between work and p e r c i p i e n t i s paramount. In l a n g e r ' s words, what the a e s t h e t i c does to us i s :  experience  " ... to formulate our conceptions of  f e e l i n g and our conceptions o f v i s u a l , f a c t u a l , and audi b l e r e a l i t y together.  I t g i v e s us forms of i m a g i n a t i o n  19  and forms o f f e e l i n g , i n s e p a r a b l e ;  t h a t i s t o say, i t  c l a r i f i e s and o r g a n i z e s i n t u i t i o n i t s e l f .  That i s why i t  has the f o r c e o f a r e v e l a t i o n , and i n s p i r e s a f e e l i n g o f deep i n t e l l e c t u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n , though  i t e l i c i t s no con31  s c i o u s i n t e l l e c t u a l work ( r e a s o n i n g ) . "  Moreover, the  work o f a r t does not p r e s e n t s y m b o l i c a l l y a s e r i e s o f f e e l ings which the a r t i s t wished itself  i s a s i n g l e symbol,  to express.  The work o f a r t  not a s t r i n g o f symbols.  The  c o r o l l a r y t o t h i s i s t h a t the i n t u i t i v e p e r c e p t i o n o f the work of a r t must be i n t o t o .  The import o f an a r t work i s  grasped i n i t i a l l y or not a t a l l .  Dewey agrees t h a t  art-  i s t i c p e r c e p t i o n i n v o l v e s j u s t such d i r e c t and unreasoned perception.  The a r t symbol i s nothing t h a t can be ex-  plained discursively; work of a r t .  no one can e x p l a i n the import o f a  T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y apparent i n l i t e r a t u r e ,  when our attempts t o convey  the import  (say) o f King Lear  so o f t e n degenerate  i n t o banal moral statements o r emo--  t i o n a l responses.  The i n s i g h t s o f s c i e n t i f i c thought, un-  l i k e those o f a r t , can be conveyed forms.  by d i s c u r s i v e  symbolic  Instead o f the i n t u i t i v e grasp o f the whole as i n  a r t , a s c i e n t i f i c t r e a t i s e leads us step by step from one i n s i g h t to the next, t o the f i n a l import o f the t r e a t i s e . On the other hand, a c c o r d i n g t o Langer, the a r t i s t : " ... i s not s a y i n g anything, not even about the nature  20  of  feeling;  he i s  showing.  He i s showing us the appear-  ance of a f e e l i n g , i n a p e r c e p t i b l e symbolic p r o j e c t i o n ; but  he does not r e f e r t o the p u b l i c o b j e c t , such as a gen-  e r a l l y known " s o r t  1  o f f e e l i n g , o u t s i d e h i s work.  Only  i n so f a r as the work i s o b j e c t i v e , the f e e l i n g i t e x h i b i t s 32 becomes p u b l i c ;  i t i s always bound t o i t s symbol."  Thus i n l i t e r a t u r e even the knowledge o f the d i s c u r s i v e l i n g u i s t i c symbols f o r the emotions which a poet might want to express w i l l  not help him.  I t i s , i n fact, i n  l i t e r a t u r e where i t i s most d i f f i c u l t t o see how  the a r t -  i s t p r e s e n t s a form symbolic of human f e e l i n g because the m a t e r i a l of the poet's a r t i s a l s o the means o f d i s c u r s i v e reasoning.  Langer sees grave l i m i t a t i o n s to the know-  ledge which d i s c u r s i v e language i s capable of e x p r e s s i n g . Her book Philosophy i n a New  Key s e t s out t o d e s t r o y the  n o t i o n t h a t human knowledge must be bound by the l i m i t a t i o n s o f what can be expressed d i s c u r s i v e l y .  Quite  simply,  t h e r e a r e o t h e r ways o f 'knowing' and o t h e r t h i n g s t o • 'know'.  Such i s the essence of a r t .  Through a r t we are  capable of e x p r e s s i n g or e x p e r i e n c i n g , as the case may  be,  experiences which are not f o r m a l l y amenable to d i s c u r s i v e expressions. to  Philosophy i n a New  Key, i n f a c t , attempts  account f o r r i t u a l , myth, f a n t a s y , dream w i t h d i f f e r e n t  l i n e s of t h i s same p r i n c i p l e .  A r t has the o f f i c e o f  21  e x p r e s s i n g " ... the rhythms of l i f e , and mental  o r g a n i c , emotional,  ... ", the very rhythms which Dewey c h a r a c t e r -  i z e s as the p e r p e t u a l a l t e r n a t i v e stages of harmony and d i s p a r i t y which a growing  organism  undergoes.  A l l toge-  t h e r these rhythms compose: " ... the dynamic p a t t e r n of feeling.  I t i s t h i s p a t t e r n t h a t o n l y n o n - d i s c u r s i v e sym-  b o l i c forms can p r e s e n t , and t h a t i s the p o i n t and  purpose  33 of  a r t i s t i c construction." 34 "unspeakable r e a l i t i e s . "  A r t provides i n s i g h t And thus f o r Dewey:  into  "If a l l  meaning c o u l d be adequately expressed i n words, the a r t s 35 of p a i n t i n g and music would not e x i s t . " ive  'meanings' w i l l i n e v i t a b l y manifest  Non-discursthemselves.  Collingwood sees no d i s t i n c t i o n i n k i n d  between  the e x p r e s s i o n of the a r t i s t and the response of the p e r cipient.  The p e r c i p i e n t must undergo the same p r o c e s s e s ,  though r e v e r s e d , which the a r t i s t underwent i n the c r e a t i o n of h i s work.  The d i f f e r e n c e between the two  activi-  t i e s i s t h a t w h i l e the a r t i s t expresses h i m s e l f , the audience i s made to respond because the a r t i s t to respond.  shows i t how  Of course t h a t i s not accomplished  by the  a r t i s t i n any o v e r t way.  Rather the work of a r t i t s e l f  must do t h i s f o r him;  'showing' w i l l be  the  implicit.  "By c r e a t i n g f o r o u r s e l v e s an imaginary experience or a c t i v i t y , " says Collingwood,  "we  express our  emotions;  22  and  t h i s i s what we c a l l a r t . "  do something;  The work o f a r t must  i n C o l l i n g w o o d s terms, i t must show us how 1  to express our f e e l i n g s , and the q u a l i t i e s embodied i n a work o f a r t must be funded i n such a way t h a t t h i s a c t i s accomplished f o r i t s p e r c i p i e n t s . Dewey concurs w i t h Collingwood here, as i n poetry f o r example, where Dewey b e l i e v e s t h a t i f a poem i s read p r o p e r l y , t h a t i s t o say a r t i s t i c a l l y o r p o e t i c a l l y , a new poem i s c r e a t e d ation.  a t each reading  i n the r e a d e r s imagin1  Emotion i s not rendered i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ,  rather,  i n Dewey's words, a r t "does the deed t h a t breeds the emo37 tion."  In a very  s i g n i f i c a n t sense, an o b j e c t o f a r t  i s what i t i s because o f what i t does.  In s c i e n c e ,  course leads us. step by step t o an i n s i g h t .  dis-  Once the  i n s i g h t has been achieved, much o f the d i s c o u r s e  can be  discarded  leading  since i t consisted of sequential parts  to the i n s i g h t .  In a r t nothing  can be d i s c a r d e d .  A  work o f a r t does not l e a d i t s p e r c i p i e n t t o an e x p e r i e n c e . Rather i t c o n s t i t u t e s an e x p e r i e n c e . an i n t e g r a l whole.  An o b j e c t o f a r t i s  "Through a r t , " s t a t e s Dewey, "mean-  ings of o b j e c t s t h a t a r e otherwise dumb, inchoate, t r i c t e d and r e s i s t e d a r e c l a r i f i e d and concentrated,  resand  not by thought working l a b o r i o u s l y upon them, nor by escape i n t o a world of mere sense, but by the c r e a t i o n o f a new  23  experience."  T h i s e x p l a i n s f o r Dewey why  we  have the  f e e l i n g i n responding t o a r t t h a t what we p e r c e i v e i s an impression of l i f e . viewed as a new  I f the a e s t h e t i c experience can  experience, though of a very s p e c i a l k i n d ,  then we must respond as an experience.  i n a very r e a l way  to the work of a r t  That i s to say a l l those  which I have d e s c r i b e d i n connection w i t h  work of a r t w i l l have the a b i l i t y ways of f e e l i n g , new  processes  ' o r d i n a r y ' ex-  p e r i e n c e are c a l l e d i n t o p l a y i n our response  new  be  to a r t .  to show us new  A  insights,  ways of knowing which, s i n c e  these experiences are new  and hence d i s p a r a t e , w i l l  call  i n t o p l a y t h a t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of our world view, of our c o n s t r u c t system — growth.  t h a t process which i s so e s s e n t i a l to  I t i s as i f the work of a r t p r e s e n t s us w i t h a  ^preTordered*  experience where our  done f o r us a l r e a d y .  The c o r o l l a r y here i s t h a t a r t ex-  i s t s o n l y by v i r t u e of the way ordinary experience.  ' s e l e c t i n g ' has been  The  human beings p e r c e i v e  experience of a r t i s not ana-  logous to our o r d i n a r y experience, but i s a very r e a l and v i t a l e x t e n s i o n of i t . At the beginning of t h i s chapter, I d i s c u s s e d Dewey's view of the world as mass of e n e r g i e s and  circumstances  which the organism must construe i n order t o s u r v i v e . c o n s t r u a l amounts to the cumulative c o n s t r u c t i o n of a  This  24  world view o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n which we must c o n s t a n t l y preserve from fragmentation  (through r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ) i n  the f a c e o f d i s p a r a t e experience. attempt  In normal l i f e we  t o m a i n t a i n an e x t e n s i v e and u n d e r l y i n g whole  which i s the essence  o f our s a n i t y .  Dewey i s convinced  of  the r o l e of a r t i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t wholeness:  "A work  of  a r t e l i c i t s and accentuates t h i s q u a l i t y o f being a  whole and o f b e l o n g i n g t o the l a r g e r , a l l - i n c l u s i v e , whole which i s the u n i v e r s e i n which we l i v e .  This f a c t , I  t h i n k , i s the e x p l a n a t i o n of t h a t f e e l i n g of e x q u i s i t e intelligibility  and c l a r i t y we have i n the presence  o f an  o b j e c t t h a t i s experienced w i t h e s t h e t i c i n t e n s i t y .  It  e x p l a i n s a l s o the r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g t h a t accompanies i n 39 tense e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n . " Langer has suggested art  t h a t what we expereince  through  we may w e l l not be a b l e t o experience any other way.  She p o i n t s t o a s t r a i n o f human a c t i v i t y which may be n e c e s s a r i l y a r t i s t i c , perhaps n o t a r t i s t i c i n the s t r i c t sense, but a c t i v i t y which i s i n the ' a r t i s t i c mode', the use o f which would be t o p r e s e r v e our world views fragmentation.  Langer s t a t e s :  from  " ... a r t p e n e t r a t e s deep  i n t o the p e r s o n a l l i f e because i n g i v i n g form t o the world, i t a r t i c u l a t e s human nature:  sensibility,  energy,  25  p a s s i o n , and m o r t a l i t y .  More than anything e l s e i n ex40  p e r i e n c e , the a r t s mold our a c t u a l l i f e o f f e e l i n g . " Of course, s o c i e t i e s and i n d i v i d u a l s can e x i s t  without  h i g h a r t , but there i s a p o s i t i v e need t o express p a t t e r n s of  f e e l i n g s and rhythms o f l i f e which cannot be a r t i c -  u l a t e d by d i s c u r s i v e means, f o r the ideas o f them a r e too complex.  Philosophy i n a New Key p o i n t s t o other human  a c t i v i t i e s which are encompassed i n what I w i l l c a l l the a r t i s t i c mode o f l i f e — dream. art',  Although  sacrament, r i t u a l ,  f a n t a s y , myth,  not n e c e s s a r i l y c u l m i n a t i n g i n 'high  the a r t i s t i c mode always m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f  i n human  activity. Dewey's i d e a , t h a t a e s t h e t i c experience i s a very n a t u r a l e x t e n t i o n of o r d i n a r y expereince i s v a l u a b l e , and the complementary t h e o r i e s which support i t l e n d  credence  to  i t s importance.  Though t h i s p r i n c i p l e has been i g n o r e d  to  an a s t o n i s h i n g extent by l i t e r a r y t h e o r i s t s and c r i t i c s ,  we w i l l f i n d i n Chapter ing  I I recent l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m  w i t h t h i s i d e a , and w i t h another c l o s e l y r e l a t e d  t h e t i c problem —  language i n l i t e r a t u r e .  experience  o r d i n a r y experience, so some o f these l i t e r a r y  r e l a t e the a e s t h e t i c use o f language  aes-  J u s t as Dewey,  considering a r t i n general, relates aesthetic to  grapl-  critics  (that i s , l i t e r a t u r e )  26  to o r d i n a r y uses of language. Dewey was  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t John  so b l a t a n t l y ignored f o r so l o n g .  r i e n c e , p u b l i s h e d ihr. 1934,  i s s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r i n theory  to James B r i t t o n ' s Language and Learning The  A r t as Expe-  (1970).  ideas which a r i s e out of the next chapter, how-  ever, are fragmented and piecemeal. B r i t t o n ' s theory i n Chapter  see how  l o o s e l y l a b e l the  c r i t i c s can be i n t e g r a t e d .  James  I I I , where Dewey's a e s t h e t i c  p r i n c i p l e i s again taken up, we w i l l i n s i g h t s of the group we  But through  the fragmented 'affective'  27  John Dewey, A r t As E x p e r i e n c e (1932: C a p r i c o r n Books, 1958), p. 193  York:  r p t . New  2 Dewey, p. 193 3 Dewey, p. 194 4 George A. K e l l y , A Theory o f P e r s o n a l i t y : The Psychology of P e r s o n a l C o n s t r u c t s (1955: r p t . New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1963), p. 120 5  K e l l y , p. 120  g Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy i n a New Key: A Study i n the Symbolism o f Reason, R i t e , and A r t (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1957), p. 58 7  K e l l y , p.8  g Philosophy i n a New Key, p. 89  9  1  0  Ibid.,  p. 89 .  Dewey,  p. 14  11 K e l l y , p, 157 1  2  K e l l y , pp. 8-9  28  13  Philosophy i n a New Key, p. 88  Dewey, p. 41  1 5  K e l l y , p. 75  16 Dewey, p. 60 17 Dewey, p. 60 18 Philosophy i n a New Key, p. 91 Dewey, p. 15 20 rpt.  R. G. Collingwood, The P r i n c i p l e s o f A r t (1938; New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972), p. 117 21 Dewey, p. 42 22 Dewey, p. 24 23 Dewey, p. 19 24 Dewey, p. 138  29  25  Susanne K. Langer, F e e l i n g and Form: A Theory of A r t Developed from Philosophy i n a New Key (New York: C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r ' s Sons, 1953), p. 59 Dewey, p. 6 5 2 7  Collingwood, pp. 301-302  28 Dewey, p. 54 29 Dewey, p, 65 30 Collingwood, p, 150 31 F e e l i n g and Form, p. 397 3 2  I b i d . , p. 394  3 3  I b i d . , p. 241  34 Philosophy i n a New Key, p. 260 35 „ Dewey, p. 74 36 Collingwood, p. 151 37 Dewey, p. 67 3  ^ Dewey, p. 132  39 Dewey, p. 195 40  F e e l i n g and Form, p. 401  30  II - THE  I f we  RECENT 'AFFECTIVE' LITERARY CRITICISM  entertain see  the  I, then we  can  o b j e c t and  i t s percipient  aesthetic  t h a t the  p r i n c i p l e i n Chapter  r e l a t i o n s h i p between an  (a l i t e r a r y t e x t and  art  i t s reader)  i s dynamic, v i t a l l y connected t o p e r s o n a l development. We  only need c o n s i d e r how  our  wards a s i n g l e novel i n the t h a t our  responses are not  course of a l i f e t i m e to static.  a t t i t u d e , however, where the verbal  object  (a v e r b a l  a t t i t u d e might change t o -  New  New  Critical  text i s considered a  icon) has  p r i n c i p l e espoused by Dewey and s i t e extreme.  The  ignored the  o t h e r s , and  static  aesthetic  i s an oppo-  C r i t i c s assumed t h a t meanings of  poems were more or l e s s f i x e d and  that  ings c o u l d be determined from the  s t a t i c structures  text.  see  'objective'  meanof  the  Recently, however, c e r t a i n c r i t i c s have r e c o g n i z e d  the  s i g n i f i c a n c e of the  the  literary New  text.  C r i t i c i s m , perhaps c r y s t a l l i z e d by W.  Wimsatt's "The a verbal  reader's p e r s o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h  Affective Fallacy"  object,  the  (1947), saw  import of which was  s o l e l y i n terms of i t s formal f e a t u r e s .  to be The  method became f i r m l y entrenched i n England and America i n the  1940's and  K.  the poem as explained New  Critical  North  1950's as a c r i t i c a l and  an  31  educational t o o l .  But perhaps when l i t e r a r y study  to the n o v e l , the New became inadequate.  turned  C r i t i c a l method of c l o s e r e a d i n g U n l i k e the s h o r t poem, the n o v e l can-  not be p e r c e i v e d a t once as a whole;  s i n c e the r e a d i n g  process must o b v i o u s l y take p l a c e i n time, the a n a l y s i s of s t a t i c forms i s inadequate  and i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  C r i t i c s of the n o v e l , beginning w i t h Wayne Booth (The R h e t o r i c of F i c t i o n , 1962), became concerned  with  d i f f e r e n t aspects of l i t e r a r y a n a l y s i s , r e s u l t i n g i n a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of l i t e r a r y t h e o r y .  Serious c r i t i c s  of the novel have had to c o n s i d e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the reader and the t e x t .  Thus, a h a n d f u l of c r i t i c s ,  whose i n f l u e n c e upon one another i s minimal, struggling  (each i n h i s own  way)  dynamic experience of r e a d i n g .  has been  t o account f o r the Though, as we  shall  see,  the concerns of each d i v e r g e c o n s i d e r a b l y , I choose (with r e s e r v a t i o n s ) to c a l l these c r i t i c s  ' a f f e c t i v e ' because  t h e i r i n t e r e s t l i e s i n the t e x t - r e a d e r r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h i s chapter w i l l present an overview  of t h i s r e -  c e n t t r e n d i n c r i t i c i s m a f t e r a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of Wimsatt's i n f l u e n c e on c r i t i c a l thought.  We w i l l  see  these c r i t i c s coming t o r e a l i z a t i o n s about l i t e r a t u r e language which are correspondent  to Dewey's a e s t h e t i c  and  32  p r i n c i p l e about experience —  o r d i n a r y and a e s t h e t i c  —  d e l i n e a t e d i n Chapter I . a)  W. K. Wimsatt:  The A f f e c t i v e  Fallacy  W. K. Wimsatt's i n f l u e n t i a l essay F a l l a c y " i s an attempt, of  "The A f f e c t i v e  not t o deny the emotional  aspects  l i t e r a r y response, but t o c l a r i f y the r e l a t i o n s h i p of  emotion t o p o e t r y .  Wimsatt wrote h i s essay w i t h a polem-  i c a l i n t e n t as a r e a c t i o n t o the c r i t i c a l and r e l a t i v i s m which had preceded such c r i t i c i s m , he maintained,  him:  impressionism  the outcome of  " ... i s t h a t the poem i t -  s e l f , as an o b j e c t of s p e c i f i c a l l y c r i t i c a l  judgement,  tends t o disappear."" " 1  Wimsatt d e a l s i n t u r n with what he l a b e l s the emot i v e , i m a g i n a t i v e , p h y s i o l o g i c a l , h a l l u c i n a t o r y , and h i s t o r i c a l forms o f a f f e c t i v e c r i t i c i s m .  In the emotive and  i m a g i n a t i v e forms r e s p e c t i v e l y , c r i t i c s would d e s c r i b e the f e e l i n g s they experienced as they read, o r they would emp a t h i z e w i t h the p o e t i c s i t u a t i o n .  What Wimsatt c a l l s  p h y s i o l o g i c a l c r i t i c i s m judged poetry by b o d i l y r e a c t i o n s l i k e the t i n g l i n g o f spines o r the b r i s t l i n g o f s k i n .  In  h a l l u c i n a t o r y o r h y p n o t i c c r i t i c i s m , the reader gave hims e l f wholly to the p o e t i c i l l u s i o n and d e s c r i b e d h i s r e actions to this  ' m y s t i c a l ' experience.  Finally, a his-  torical affective c r i t i c ,  r a t h e r than d e f i n i n g h i s own  emotive r e a c t i o n s t o a poem, attempted t o exhume those o f the o r i g i n a l r e a d e r s . "The  By way o f summary Wimsatt s t a t e s :  r e p o r t o f some readers . . . . t h a t a poem o r s t o r y i n -  duces i n them v i v i d images, i n t e n s e f e e l i n g s , a heightened consciousness, i s n e i t h e r anything nor anything  which can be r e f u t e d  which i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r the o b j e c t i v e  to take i n t o account.  critic  The p u r e l y a f f e c t i v e r e p o r t i s 2  e i t h e r too p h y s i o l o g i c a l o r too vague." Now Wimsatt does not deny t h a t we r e a c t to poetry,  emotionally  but he does i n s i s t t h a t we must look t o the  poem as an o b j e c t i f we are t o d i s c e r n i t s emotive q u a l i t y . "The it and  o b j e c t i v e c r i t i c , " he s t a t e s , " ... must admit t h a t  i s not easy t o e x p l a i n complicated  ... how poetry makes ideas  enough t o hold on t o emotions."  r e s t s on E l i o t ' s e x p l a n a t i o n tive'.  an  Wimsatt  of the ' o b j e c t i v e c o r r e l a -  In h i s essay on Hamlet, E l i o t had s a i d :  way o f expressing  thick  "The only  emotion i n the form o f a r t i s by f i n d i n g  'objective c o r r e l a t i v e ' .  i n other words, a s e t o f ob-  j e c t s , a s i t u a t i o n , a c h a i n o f events, which s h a l l be the formula o f t h a t p a r t i c u l a r emotion;  such t h a t when t h e  e x t e r n a l f a c t s , which must terminate i n sensory experience, are g i v e n ,  the emotion i s immediately evoked."  Wimsatt  3'4  uses t h i s theory t o e x p l a i n why p o e t r y i s e t e r n a l , why i t can o u t l i v e i t s own time, and why readers i n l a t e r cent u r i e s can respond t o i t .  "Poetry i s a way o f f i x i n g emo-  t i o n s , " Wimsatt s t a t e s , "or making them more  permanently  p e r c e p t i b l e when o b j e c t s have undergone a f u n c t i o n a l change from c u l t u r e t o c u l t u r e , or when as simple f a c t s o f h i s t o r y 5 they have l o s t t h e i r emotive v a l u e w i t h l o s s o f immediacy." In the end Wimsatt attempts, as a r e a c t i o n t o imp r e s s i o n i s m , t o propose a theory o f how l i t e r a t u r e works. Wimsatt has demarcated  two i n t e r r e l a t e d concerns.  One i s  h i s c u r i o s i t y about the l i t e r a r y o b j e c t and t h a t o b j e c t ' s a b i l i t y t o have an emotional e f f e c t on i t s r e a d e r s . the second, a r i s i n g out o f the f i r s t , e x p l a i n how poetry.works,  And  i s h i s concern t o  t o e x p l a i n e s s e n t i a l l y the na-  t u r e of our processes as we read and respond t o l i t e r a ture.  Wimsatt suggests t h a t l i t e r a r y o b j e c t s are c o n s t i -  t u t e d o f s e t s o f o b j e c t s , chains o f events, or s i t u a t i o n s which have f i x e d emotional meaning.  F o r Wimsatt, p o e t r y  works, a t l e a s t by analogy, by d i s c u r s i v e means;  "Poetry  i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y a discourse- about both emotions and objects."  And thus poets become " ... e x p o s i t o r s o f  the laws o f f e e l i n g . "  (my emphases).  Wimsatt suggests t h a t because  affective  responses  are too p h y s i o l o g i c a l or too vague they should not be d e a l t  35  w i t h by the l i t e r a r y c r i t i c .  There i s a danger here,I  t h i n k , because Wimsatt would seem to l i m i t  'legitimate'  responses only to those which can be expressed d i s c u r sively..  We  must remember Langer's view t h a t a l l a r t  presses n o n - d i s c u r s i v e  ex-  symbolic forms of f e e l i n g which,  •ghe would suggest, can only be expressed i n a r t .  To deny  the v a l i d i t y of a l l but d i s c u r s i v e forms of response i s to dehumanize l i t e r a t u r e . Wimsatt a l s o has l i t e r a t u r e being  nothing  to say about works of  'constituted experiences.  He would  1  say t h a t poems are autonomous v e r b a l o b j e c t s which e x i s t i n t h e i r own  r i g h t e x c l u s i v e of any  psychoanalytic  theory  perceiver.  of Norman Holland  c o n t r a s t to Wimsatt's.  The  o f f e r s a good  Wimsatt*s g r e a t e s t f e a r of a f -  f e c t i v e c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t the t e x t a l l but  disappears.  In Holland's view, the v e r b a l s t r u c t u r e of the t e x t i s considered  much l e s s important than the  f a n t a s i e s generated by the b)  Norman H o l l a n d : "The  Norman Holland  text.  Psychoanalytic  psychoanalytic  psychological  theory  Theory  of l i t e r a t u r e , "  i n Dynamics of L i t e r a r y Response^'holds  t h a t the w r i t e r expresses and d i s g u i s e s c h i l d h o o d sies.  The  states  reader unconsciously  elaborates  the  fantafantasy  content o f the l i t e r a r y work with his.own v e r s i o n s o f these fantasies The  ... "  8  l i t e r a r y t e x t p r o v i d e s the reader with a n u c l e a r  f a n t a s y t o which he r e a c t s u n c o n s c i o u s l y .  The f a n t a s y o f  the w r i t e r becomes the r e a d e r ' s , or a t the l e a s t , an a g g r e s s i v e f a n t a s y i n the reader.  triggers  Then there f o l l o w s  aa subsequent d e f e n s i v e m o d i f i c a t i o n o f the a g g r e s s i v e f a n t a s y which r e s u l t s , u l t i m a t e l y , i n i n t e l l e c t u a l meaning.  L i t e r a t u r e transforms  the reader's p r i m i t i v e wishes  and f e a r s i n t o s i g n i f i c a n c e and coherence through form.  literary  Unconscious meaning u n d e r l i e s a l l other meanings,  which a r e a r r i v e d a t only through s u c c e s s i v e a b s t r a c t i o n of the n u c l e a r f a n t a s y presented  i n the t e x t .  form i s a mastery o f t h a t f a n t a s y ;  Literary  the l i t e r a r y work i s  a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f a f a n t a s y , and a c c o r d i n g t o psychoa n a l y t i c theory, t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i s what g i v e s us p l e a s u r e when we read. couscious  The c l a s s i c c o n f l i c t of the un-  i s the s t r u g g l e between  the subsequent compromise.  d r i v e and defense with  For Holland the t e n s i o n be-  tween l i f e and a r t , between an a g g r e s s i v e f a n t a s y and the defense o f i t , i s another  manifestation of that struggle.  L i t e r a t u r e a t t a i n s i t s f o r c e from the t e n s i o n :  "Iti s  from such deep and f e a r f u l r o o t s of our most p e r s o n a l experxence t h a t l i t e r a t u r e d e r i v e s i t s power and d r i v e . "  g  P a r t o f t h i s l i t e r a r y process  i s achieved  because  the reader i s disengaged o r d e r a i l e d from the normal, p u r p o s e f u l a c t i o n by the a c t o f r e a d i n g ; up i n the a f f a i r s o f the world  f o r the time t h a t he reads.  The reader i s a b l e t o experience experience of  i t at least  the world.  ture;  he i s not caught  h i s fantasy v i c a r i o u s l y ,  'once removed  1  from the a c t i v i t y  T h i s i s one o f the a t t r a c t i o n s o f l i t e r a -  i t allows the reader a l l the t r a p p i n g s o f a f a n t a s y  with none o f the r e a l l i f e says H o l l a n d ,  consequences.  "In e f f e c t , "  "the l i t e r a r y work dreams a dream f o r u s . " ^  For the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r i s t , t h i s accounts f o r p a r t o f our p l e a s u r e i n the experience o f r e a d i n g .  The  other p a r t o f our p l e a s u r e comes from the management o f f a n t a s i e s while we experience  them.  ment o f f a n t a s i e s causes a n x i e t y . speak, has i t both ways.  U s u a l l y the manageBut the reader,  so t o  He gains p l e a s u r e from the  enactment of an a g g r e s s i v e f a n t a s y , w h i l e a t the same time t a k i n g p l e a s u r e i n the way the author has managed t o cont r o l h i s own f a n t a s y through form:  "In l i f e ,  defenses  stand o f f and modify d r i v e s and so c u t down the amount of p l e a s u r e we get even i f the d r i v e s are s a t i s f i e d .  If,  however, the defense i t s e l f g i v e s p l e a s u r e , there i s a net i n c r e a s e i n p l e a s u r e , and t h a t i n c r e a s e i n p l e a s u r e  38  (according to Freud) buys a permit  f o r 'a s t i l l  p l e a s u r e a r i s i n g from deeper p s y c h i c a l s o u r c e s , t i f i c a t i o n of the d r i v e (or, i n l i t e r a t u r e , content)."''""'"  greater the g r a -  1  unconscious  As w e l l , our i n e v i t a b l e search f o r mean-  i n g i n a t e x t i s a k i n d of d e v i c e or defense we  employ i n  order to j u s t i f y our p r i m i t i v e p l e a s u r e s d e r i v e d from the experiences "we  of the f a n t a s y .  "In a way,"  says  seek l i t e r a r y forms because we wish we  Holland,  c o u l d manage 12  l i f e i t s e l f as a d r o i t l y as a sonnet does." r e a d i n g a work we  f e e l g u i l t or p a i n o r a n x i e t y , the work  w i l l manage those f e e l i n g s f o r us;  as w e l l , the  i s only a v i c a r i o u s one upon which we a c t and r e a c t i n the  'real'  Holland s t r i k e s two  are not r e q u i r e d to  s i g n i f i c a n t chords.  (but does not develop) the  of the communication of author i s important  of v i c a r i o u s fantasy.  Second,  significance  and reader through the t e x t ;  to the reader as a v a l u a b l e  source  Holand u l t i m a t e l y d i f f e r s from  Langer because he equates dream and both may  First,  a l i t e r a r y work p r o -  v i d e s readers with a k i n d of v i c a r i o u s f a n t a s y .  the author  fantasy  world.  he views l i t e r a t u r e as experience;  he i d e n t i f i e s  Even i f i n  literature;  while  be m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of our a f f e c t i v e being, he  de-  emphasizes the f a c t t h a t w r i t i n g l i t e r a t u r e i s a h i g h l y conscious  act.  33  c)  Stanley F i s h :  Affective  S t a n l e y F i s h ' s essay  Stylistics  " L i t e r a t u r e i n the Reader:  A f f e c t i v e S t y l i s t i c s , " i f not d i r e c t l y a t t a c k i n g some o f Wimsatt's n o t i o n s , a t l e a s t uses them as a springboard from which to propose a d i v e r g e n t theory.  "The A f f e c -  t i v e F a l l a c y , " Wimsatt has s a i d , " i s a c o n f u s i o n between the poem and i t s r e s u l t s  (what i t is_ and what i t does)  13 ... "  While Wimsatt has maintained  t h a t poems must  be c o n s i d e r e d as o b j e c t i v e v e r b a l s t r u c t u r e s , F i s h  just  as e m p h a t i c a l l y denies the v a l i d i t y o f t h i s approach because i t ignores the r e a d i n g p r o c e s s . F i s h c l a i m s t h a t much contemporary c r i t i c i s m l i t e r a t u r e s h o r t because i t l a r g e l y ignores t h a t  sells  responses  to the l i t e r a r y t e x t take p l a c e as processes w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l readers:  " / ~ C r i t i c i s m _ 7 transforms a temporal ex-  p e r i e n c e i n t o a s p a t i a l one;  i t steps back and i n a  s i n g l e glance takes i n a whole (sentence, page, work) which the reader knows ( i f a t a l l ) o n l y b i t by b i t , moment 14 by moment." it,  The experience o f r e a d i n g , as F i s h  takes p l a c e i n time;  readers respond  sees  not t o whole u t -  terances but t o t h e i r word by word temporal  flow.  There  i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n meaning, t o i l l u s t r a t e w i t h h i s simple examples, between the statements  'He i s s i n c e r e ' and  'Doubtless, he i s s i n c e r e , different things.  1  because as statements  F i s h d e l i n e a t e s h i s method:  they do "The con-  cept i s simply the r i g o r o u s and d i s i n t e r e s t e d a s k i n g o f the q u e s t i o n , what does t h i s word, phrase, graph, chapter, n o v e l , p l a y , poem do?;  sentence,  para-  and the e x e c u t i o n  i n v o l v e s an a n a l y s i s o f the d e v e l o p i n g responses  o f the  reader i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e words as they succeed one anot h e r i n time. c i a l emphasis.  Every word i n t h i s statement  bears a spe-  The a n a l y s i s must be o f the d e v e l o p i n g  responses  t o d i s t i n g u i s h i t from the atomism o f much  stylistic  criticism."  15 For F i s h , works o f l i t e r a t u r e do what they mean. H i s theory denies the i n i t i a l importance  o f 'deep s t r u c -  t u r e ' i n the r e a d i n g process i n favour of 'surface s t r u c ture.  1  'He i s s i n c e r e  1  and 'Doubtless, he i s s i n c e r e '  may possess the same e x t r a c t a b l e meanings but because they do n o t 'do the same meaning'-," t h e i r meanings a r e d i f f e r ent.  The e x t r a c t e d meaning o f a deep s t r u c t u r a l  i s somehow secondary ponse t o a response.  f o r F i s h , what he would c a l l 1  analysis a 'res-  Hence two r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t  sen-  tences making the same 'point' i n no way mean the same thing.  " I t i s the experience o f an u t t e r a n c e , " F i s h  states, " —  a l l o f i t and n o t anything t h a t c o u l d be s a i d  about i t , i n c l u d i n g anything  I c o u l d say —  t h a t is_ i t s  16 meaning."  F i s h h a p p i l y confesses t h a t h i s method i s  d e s c r i p t i v e and  impractical.  He makes no attempt to  d i s t i n g u i s h between l i t e r a t u r e and preaching  or propaganda or  " ... a d v e r t i s i n g or  'entertainment'."  "For some  t h i s w i l l seem a f a t a l l i m i t a t i o n of the method," s t a t e s Fish,  "I welcome i t , s i n c e i t seems to me  too long, and without notable  t h a t we  have f o r  r e s u l t s , been t r y i n g to  determine what d i s t i n g u i s h e s l i t e r a t u r e from  ordinary  17 language."  Here F i s h wants to view works of  ture not as a e s t h e t i c o j b e c t s but as v e r b a l thus h i s view of l i t e r a t u r e i s not  litera-  utterances;  normative.  In h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the reader who  reads h i s  book i n time, word by word, from l e f t to r i g h t , page by page he  i s d i r e c t l y opposed to Wimsatt.  answer the q u e s t i o n : p l a i n l y j u s t does, and describe  How  What does l i t e r a t u r e do?  a b a s i c word by word response.  who  Literature  a l l F i s h i s concerned about i s to The  i s t h a t the reader must s t r i v e to become 'the reader'  would F i s h  c o r o l l a r y here informed  possesses semantic competence and whose t e x t 18  u a l methodology i s ' r a d i c a l l y h i s t o r i c a l . "  "In  a n a l y s i s of a reading  come to  experience, when does one  the p o i n t ? " F i s h asks c o y l y .  "The  the  answer i s , 'never',  42  o r , no sooner t h a t than the pressure  to do so becomes  un-  19 bearable ( p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ) . " Wimsatt has  said that with a f f e c t i v e criticism,-  t e x t tends to disappear.  F i s h g l a d l y agrees:  "The  the  ob^-i  j e c t i v i t y of the t e x t i s an i l l u s i o n , and moreover a dangerous i l l u s i o n , because i t i s so p h y s i c a l l y c o n v i n c i n g . 2 The  i l l u s i o n i s one  J u s t as Holland  of s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y and  completeness."  p l a y s down the importance of the  formal  f e a t u r e s of the t e x t , so F i s h welcomes the disappearance of the t e x t as v e r b a l o b j e c t . art,"  the g r e a t m e r i t of which i s " ... t h a t i t f o r c e s  to become aware of f o r e no  'it'  cludes  as a changing o b j e c t —  'object' a t a l l —  s e l f as c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  The  any  and  and  there-  F i s h ' s method p r e -  a n a l y s i s o f s t a t i c s t r u c t u r e s of the  text.  d i f f e r e n c e here between Wimsatt and F i s h i s g r e a t .  works as a d i s c o u r s e 'discourse'  s t a t i c s t r u c t u r e which  about the emotive q u a l i t y of  objects,  from which meaning can be e x t r a c t e d .  F i s h a poem i s a k i n e t i c a r t which 'does not l e n d  For itself  to s t a t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n because i t r e f u s e s to stay 22 and  you  a l s o to be aware of your21  changing."  For Wimsatt a poem i s a formal,  a  Literature i s "kinectic  doesn't l e t you  still  stay s t i l l e i t h e r . "  F i s h ' s tendency i s to view a work of l i t e r a t u r e a v e r b a l utterance  which takes p l a c e i n time  (that i s ,  as  43.  at  a c e r t a i n time i n h i s t o r y ) and which must be read i n  time  (not only at another time i n h i s t o r y , but a l s o word  by word, from l e f t to r i g h t on the page). c r i t i c a l concern i s t o analyze of an d)  'informed'  the d e v e l o p i n g  Structuralist Analysis  Roland Barthes:'.  theory  ;  i s an i n t e r e s t i n g counter-  While F i s h w i l l not acknowledge the  ' l i t e r a r y o b j e c t ' , Barthes does. compatible.  of a s t r u c t u r a l i s t .  "The  Yet t h e i r t h e o r i e s are  Barthes proposes an a n a l y s i s of the  o b j e c t to d i s c o v e r how  t e x t achieves  responses  reader.  Roland Barthes:  p a r t to F i s h ' s .  His prime  i t works, but from the p o i n t of view He  f i r s t assumes t h a t the  literary  i t s s t a t u s as an o b j e c t because of i t s form.  g o a l of a l l s t r u c t u r a l i s t a c t i v i t y , " says  Barthes,  "whether r e f l e x i v e or p o e t i c , i s to r e c o n s t r u c t an in  such a way  literary  as to m a n i f e s t  'object*  thereby the r u l e s of f u n c t i o n 23  ing  ('the  functions') of t h i s object."  The  functions  of an o b j e c t are i t s i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s which h o l d i t together  and m a i n t a i n  i t s i n t e g r i t y as an o b j e c t .  The  s t r u c t u r a l i s t f i r s t attempts a d i s s e c t i o n of the o b j e c t t o determine the s m a l l e s t u n i t s of i t s f u n c t i o n s , and  a sub-  sequent a r t i c u l a t i o n which r e s o l v e s these u n i t s i n t o the o b j e c t once again by e s t a b l i s h i n g f o r them " c e r t a i n r u l e s  43  of a s s o c i a t i o n . " *  H  Much s t r u c t u r a l i s t a c t i v i t y has c e n t e r e d on the study of language,  s p e c i f i c a l l y the s e n t e n c e - o b j e c t . 1  ,:  In "An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the S t r u c t u r a l i s t A n a l y s i s o f 25 Narrative,"  Barthes s t a t e s :  "Structurally,  narrative  belongs w i t h the sentence without ever b e i n g r e d u c i b l e to the sum o f i t s sentences:  a narrative i s a large  sentence, j u s t as any d e c l a r a t i v e sentence i s , i n a c e r 26 t a i n way, the o u t - l i n e o f a l i t t l e n a r r a t i v e . "  The  s t r u c t u r a l i s t a n a l y s i s o f the sentence, then, i s t o be more than a mere g u i d i n g analogy t o f a c i l i t a t e the study of a l i t e r a r y t e x t :  p r e c i s e l y the same p r i n c i p l e s apply  i n both cases. The f u n c t i o n a l u n i t s o f the sentence are the l e v e l s of the c o n t e x t u a l , grammatical, p h o n o l o g i c a l , and p h o n e t i c ; moreover, these l e v e l s are h i e r a r c h i a l , the c o n t e x t u a l subsuming the grammatical, p h o n o l o g i c a l and so on.  the grammatical  subsuming the  Although we read a sentence d i s -  t r i b u t e d word by word from l e f t t o r i g h t on a page, i t does not f o l l o w t h a t our understanding o f i t i s the r e s u l t of our c o n s t r u a l o f i t s l i n e a r p r o g r e s s i o n .  Clearly,  t h e r e i s more a f o o t : S i g n d i s t o r t i o n s e x i s t i n language, and S a l l y analyzed them i n h i s comparative study of French and German; d y s t a x i e /dystaxy/ occurs  45  as soon as the s i g n s (of a l i n g u i s t i c message) are no l o n g e r juxtaposed, as soon as the l i n e a r ( l o g i c a l ) order i s d i s turbed ( f o r i n s t a n c e the p r e d i c a t e preceedi n g the s u b j e c t ) . One t y p i c a l form o f dystaxy occurs when the d i f f e r e n t p a r t s o f . one s i g n are separated by other signs--along the c h a i n o f the message ( f o r i n s t a n c e the negative ne jamais and the verb a pardonne i n : elle ne nous a jamais pardonne) : the s i g n being f r a c t u r e d , i t s s i g n i f i e d i s d i s t r i b u t e d among s e v e r a l s i g n i f i e r s , separ a t e d from each o t h e r , none of which can be understood by i t s e l f . 27 What Barthes proposes i s t h a t as we read we construe not only l i n e a r l y  ( d i s t r i b u t i v e l y , s y n t a g m a t i c a l l y ) but we  a l s o construe i n an h i e r a r c h i c a l manner, r e s o l v i n g the v a r i o u s f u n c t i o n a l u n i t s o f the sentence the meaning o f the whole. the end o f the sentence  i n order t o grasp  We do not have t o read t o  and then f i g u r e out i t s meaning.  Barthes would i l l u s t r a t e h i s 'sentence-object' w i t h axes —  the d i s t r i b u t i v e c o n c t r u i n g o f s i g n s on a h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s , the h i e r a r c h i c a l c o n s t r u i n g of s i g n s on a v e r t i c a l axis. Now Barthes  a s s e r t s t h a t i n our c o n s t r u i n g o f a  l i t e r a r y t e x t , p r e c i s e l y the same t h i n g happens, only the u n i t s o f the t e x t are d i f f e r e n t .  Instead o f the h i e r -  a r c h i c a l l i n g u i s t i c l e v e l s of contextual, and  grammatical,  so on, there a r e t h r e e t e x t u a l l e v e l s —  a c t i o n , and n a r r a t i o n .  Perhaps c e r t a i n  function,  'non-structur-  46  alist  1  comparisons can be drawn:  1) f u n c t i o n s  ments' which occur, both t r i v i a l and  —  'move-  important, such as  the l i g h t i n g of a c e r t a i n brand of c i g a r e t t e by the hero of a James Bond n o v e l , or h i s shooting 2) a c t i o n —  the l e v e l of c h a r a c t e r s  i n i t i a t e and  respond to f u n c t i o n s ;  of the  villain;  ( a c t a n t s ) which 1  1  3) n a r r a t i o n —  the  n a r r a t i v e presence, the a t t i t u d e to the c h a r a c t e r s events.  As  i n h i s understanding of sentences,  and  the  reader construes a n a r r a t i v e t e x t both d i s t r i b u t i v e l y and  hierarchically.  T h i s makes a good d e a l of common  sense because i f a reader only construed the l i n e a r p r o g r e s s i o n of events he would have a b s o l u t e l y no i d e a character end  or n a r r a t i v e a t t i t u d e u n t i l he had  of the t e x t .  The  l e v e l of f u n c t i o n s  the l e v e l of a c t i o n , and "To  reached  i t by the l e v e l of  i n i t a number of  of the s t o r y but  'strata,  1  narration.  also to  to p r o j e c t the  to read a n a r r a t i v e  only recognize  horizontal  concatenations of the n a r r a t i v e onto an i m p l i c i t l y i c a l axis;  the  i s subsumed by  understand a n a r r a t i v e , " says Barthes, " i s not  to f o l l o w the u n f o l d i n g  of  vert-  (or l i s t e n to i t ) i s not  only to pass from one word to the next, but a l s o from  one  28 l e v e l to the next." s t o r e d around a given  F u n c t i o n s are i n t e g r a t e d actant  and  to g i v e us the c o n c e p t i o n of  47  a character.  Then as a c t a n t s  are themselves i n t e g r a t e d ,  the reader becomes aware of the f o r c e which i s g i v i n g shape to events;  the t e x t i s construed  as a k i n d of  world i n which a c t a n t s p a r t i c i p a t e i n events. D e s c r i b i n g what s t r u c t u r a l i s t a n a l y s i s of the attempts to accomplish, Barthes s t a t e s :  " ... the  i s to g i v e a s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n to the  text  goal  chronological  29 illusion  ..."  In summary, Barthes s t a t e s :  t i v e thus appears as a s u c c e s s i o n mediate and  immediate elements;  "Narra-  of t i g h t l y i n t e r l o c k i n g dystaxy i n i t i a t e s a  ' h o r i z o n t a l r e a d i n g , w h i l e i n t e g r a t i o n superimposes 30 a  ' v e r t i c a l ' reading."  on i t  A structuralist analysis i s  unemotional or non-emotional;  there i s no attempt to  go  beyond the t e x t , to g i v e , f o r example, p s y c h o l o g i c a l qual i t i e s to an actant;  " J u s t as l i n g u i s t i c s stops a t  sentence, the a n a l y s i s of n a r r a t i v e stops of d i s c o u r s e :  from t h a t p o i n t on, 31  r e s o r t to another s e m i o t i c s . "  a t the  analysis  i t i s necessary to If this horizontal/  v e r t i c a l c o n s t r u a l of the t e x t , however, i s i n f a c t any  normal reader reads, then i t i s easy to see  a c t a n t s may  be viewed as c h a r a c t e r s  the  how  that  or people, and  not  A  mere 'etres de p a p i e r . '  By the same notion/;, the  r a t i v e l e v e l becomes a view or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  nar-  the  48  world.  Barth.es' method, though o b j e c t i v e i n i t s e l f ,  p r o v i d e important  may  i n s i g h t s i n t o our more s u b j e c t i v e r e s -  ponses to l i t e r a t u r e . F i s h makes no d i s t i n c t i o n between kinds of istic  utterances;  Barthes does.  Barthes  1  lingu-  structuralist  a n a l y s i s complements F i s h ' s theory, a l l o w i n g f o r a d i f ference between n o n - d i s c u r s i v e and d i s c u r s i v e utterances.  As Langer has s a i d , we  c u r s i v e symbols as we an i n s i g h t .  linguistic  tend to d i s c a r d  dis-  use them t o l e a d us step by step t o  In a n o n - d i s c u r s i v e symbolic form, such  a n o v e l , we d i s c a r d n o t h i n g :  as we  as  construe l i n e a r l y ,  we  a l s o do so v e r t i c a l l y , c o n s t r u c t i n g , i n the case of the novel, a v i r t u a l  world.  Wolfgang I s e r proposes in  something s i m i l a r to Barthes  suggesting t h a t the n a r r a t i v e t e x t i s a 'performative'  utterance. e)  Wolfgang I s e r :  Indeterminacy  Wolfgang I s e r ' s approach t o l i t e r a t u r e shares a s i m i l a r concern, a t l e a s t i n i t i a l l y ,  w i t h t h a t of F i s h .  His essays "The  Phenomenological  Approach" and  Reading Process:  "Indeterminacy  a  and the Reader's Response  i n Prose F i c t i o n " both s t r e s s the n e c e s s i t y of cons i d e r i n g the reader's response  i n t h a t no t e x t can  exist  49  independently of a reader f o r i t i s he who or l i f e to the t e x t . of  g i v e s meaning  Meanings are generated by the  act  reading. I s e r proposes t h a t the l i t e r a r y t e x t i s what he  calls  'performance' r a t h e r than 'statement', an u t t e r a n c e  that creates objects  i t s own  i n the  o b j e c t and  ' r e a l ' world:  does not r e f e r to  "/ The  specific  l i t e r a r y text_7  f e r s from other forms of w r i t i n g i n t h a t i t n e i t h e r c r i b e s nor c o n s t i t u t e s r e a l o b j e c t s ;  difdes-  ... i t diverges  from  the r e a l experiences of the reader i n t h a t i t o f f e r s views and  opens up p e r s p e c t i v e s  i n which the e m p i r i c a l l y known 32  world of one'is own  personal  I s e r i s r a t h e r imprecise, and  experience appears changed." however, about t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n  acknowledges h i s c o n f u s i o n :  how  can  literary  texts  which do not r e f e r to anything o b j e c t i v e l y r e a l be dered r e a l i s t i c "The  (as they commonly are)?  l i t e r a r y t e x t a c t i v a t e s our own  us to r e c r e a t e  the world i t  consi-  I s e r answers:  faculties, 33 presents."  enabling  Having e s t a b l i s h e d , or a t l e a s t proposed t h i s  ex-  p l a n a t i o n of the nature of l i t e r a r y t e x t s , I s e r then s e t s out to d e s c r i b e reader.  the dynamic r e l a t i o n s h i p between t e x t  His i n i t i a l  explanation  process between the t e x t and  and  i s t h a t the r e c i p r o c a l  the reader takes p l a c e a t  the  50  l e v e l o f the sentences,  which are read i n time:  " ... the  a c t i v i t y o f r e a d i n g can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a s o r t o f kaleidoscope of perspectives, p r e i n t e n t i o n s , r e c o l l e c t i o n s . Every  sentence c o n t a i n s a preview of the next and forms a  k i n d o f v i e w f i n d e r f o r what i s t o come;  and t h i s i n t u r n  changes the 'preview' and so becomes a 'viewfinder' f o r 34 what has been read."  S i m i l a r l y , upon the second  r e a d i n g o f a t e x t , the reader w i l l b r i n g d i f f e r e n t expect a t i o n s with him.  Every reading f o r I s e r i s unique.  I s e r proceeds t o say t h a t the l i n g u i s t i c  apparatus  o f a t e x t w i l l s e t up e x p e c t a t i o n s i n the reader which, i n good t e x t s , a r e e i t h e r f r u s t r a t e d or m o d i f i e d .  This  e s s e n t i a l l y i s h i s phenomenon o f 'indeterminacy'.  This  b u i l d i n g up of e x p e c t a t i o n s and the subsequent m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f them are engineered indeterminacy',"  by what I s e r l a b e l s  'gaps o f  which are the product o f a r e p e r t o i r e o f  structures.manipulated  by the author.  n o v e l , t o take an obvious  A chapter i n a  example, which ends<:at a very  s u s p e n s e f u l moment w i l l produce such a gap, which the reader must f i l l  i n f o r h i m s e l f , and then gauge the ac-  curacy o f h i s e x p e c t a t i o n s  later.  More s u b t l e gaps  might be produced by a sudden s h i f t i n p o i n t o f view, o r even a change o f tense. l e v e l s i n the t e x t —  These gaps can occur a t many  a t the l e v e l o f n a r r a t i v e s t r a t e g y ,  51  c h a r a c t e r p o r t r a y a l o r a t s y n t a c t i c and semantic —  levels  a l l these gaps working on the same p r i n c i p l e t h a t the  reader must f i l l tion  them i n f o r h i m s e l f and await  confirma-  (or m o d i f i c a t i o n ) o f h i s e x p e c t a t i o n s as he proceeds  to read.  According t o I s e r , the author never g i v e s the  reader the 'whole s t o r y ! . As he reads, the reader seeks a c o n s i s t e n t p a t t e r n i n the t e x t and a worthwhile  p i e c e of l i t e r a t u r e  will  s t r e t c h the reader beyond the l i m i t s o f what he normally expects.  T h i s e x p l a i n s f o r I s e r why some l i t e r a t u r e has  the power t o move us deeply:  "In seeking the balance / o r  c o n s i s t e n c y / we i n e v i t a b l y have t o s t a r t out w i t h c e r t a i n e x p e c t a t i o n s , the s h a t t e r i n g of which i s i n t e g r a l t o the 35 a e s t h e t i c experience."  I t i s th.ep f o r c e d expansion of  reader e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t leads I s e r t o conclude t h a t r e a d i n g l i t e r a t u r e i s analagous  t o having an a c t u a l expe-  rience: The e f f i c a c y o f a l i t e r a r y t e x t i s brought about by the apparent e v o c a t i o n and subsequent n e g a t i o n of the f a m i l i a r . What at. f i r s t seemed t o be an a f f i r m a t i o n o f our assumptions leads t o our own r e j e c t i o n o f them, thus tending t o prepare us f o r r e - o r i e n t a t i o n . And i t i s only when we have o u t s t r i p p e d our preconceptions and l e f t the s h e l t e r of the f a m i l i a r t h a t we are i n a p o s i t i o n t o gather new e x p e r i e n c e s . As the l i t e r a r y t e x t i n v o l v e s the reader i n the format i o n o f i l l u s i o n s and the simultaneous format i o n o f means whereby the i l l u s i o n i s  52  punctured, r e a d i n g r e f l e c t s the process by which we g a i n experience. So f o r I s e r the l i t e r a r y t e x t i s something d i f f e r ent from w r i t t e n a s s e r t i o n s o f f a c t , something t h a t c r e ates i t s own o b j e c t by d e s c r i b i n g , not o b j e c t s i n the r e a l world, but r e a c t i o n s t o them.  The r e a d i n g process i s  f a c i l i t a t e d by gaps o f indeterminacy which draw t h e reader i n t o the t e x t and make him an i n s e p a r a b l e element o f i t . In t h i s process, the reader undergoes something l i k e an experience which, i n good l i t e r a t u r e , expands h i s imagination.  While Wimsatt would say t h a t g r e a t works of l i t -  e r a t u r e a r e e t e r n a l because they d i s c o u r s e e t e r n a l  1  laws  of f e e l i n g ,  1  the ' r e a l  and hence mutable world o f r e f e r e n t i a l w r i t i n g )  1  I s e r says l i t e r a t u r e c r e a t e s a world (but not  i n t o which the reader i s drawn through the s t r u c t u r e o f the t e x t . Three important ideas which o t h e r s have so f a r touched upon a r e r e i n f o r c e d by I s e r .  First, a literary  t e x t i s an u t t e r a n c e , as F i s h has mentioned. l i t e r a r y t e x t i s an o b j e c t — formative utterance —  Second, the  i n I s e r ' s words a per-  as Barthes has c l a i m e d .  Third,  the i n t e r a c t i o n between the t e x t and reader i s an exper i e n c e , a c l a i m f o r which H o l l a n d attempted  t o make a case.  53  f)  Georges P o u l e t :  Phenomenology  Georges P o u l e t extends the view of l i t e r a t u r e as utterance.  H i s essay  "Phenomenology of Reading"  begins  with a c a s u a l d i s c u s s i o n o f the p h y s i c a l r e a l i z a t i o n s of a r t o b j e c t s such as vases o r s t a t u e s as compared t o the p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s of books.  For Poulet a statue  remains e s s e n t i a l l y e x t e r n a l and impermeable whereas a book opens i t s e l f  t o i t s reader,  e n t e r s i n t o the reader.  T h i s i s s i m i l a r t o I s e r ' s c l a i m t h a t the e x i s t e n c e of the t e x t i s dependent upon the r e a d e r s b r i n g i n g i t t o 1  life. But there are s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s between I s e r and P o u l e t on t h i s p o i n t . to  say t h a t the reader's  l i t e r a r y text.  P o u l e t goes so f a r as  consciousness  i s usurped by the  He d e s c r i b e s i t thus:  At the p r e c i s e moment t h a t I see, s u r g i n g out of the o b j e c t I hold open before me, a q u a n t i t y of s i g n i f i c a t i o n s which my mind grasps, I r e a l i z e t h a t what I h o l d i n my hands i s no longer j u s t an o b j e c t , o r even simply a l i v i n g t h i n g . I am aware o f a r a t i o n a l being, o f a consciousness, the consciousness o f another, no d i f f e r e n t from the one I a u t o m a t i c a l l y assume i n every human b e i n g I encounter, except t h a t i n t h i s case the cousciousness i s open t o me, welcomes me, l e t s me look deep i n s i d e i t s e l f , and even allows me, w i t h unheard-of l i c e n s e , t o t h i n k what i t t h i n k s and t o f e e l what i t f e e l s . ^ 7  54  T h i s l a s t aspect, the reader's f a c i l e a b i l i t y to t h i n k the thoughts and f e e l the emotions of another c o n s c i o u s n e s s , c u r i o u s l y d i s t u r b s P o u l e t i n one sense.  "I become the  38 prey of language,"  he comments, i m p l y i n g t h a t he  has  g i v e n up the d i r e c t p e r c e p t i o n of r e a l i t y to surround himself with u n r e a l i t y .  He a l s o c l a i m s to i d e n t i f y a  c u r i o u s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l problem which i s the unique c o n d i t i o n of r e a d i n g a l i t e r a r y word: to have as o b j e c t s of h i s own  "I am someone who  happens  thought, thoughts which are  p a r t of a book I am r e a d i n g , and which are t h e r e f o r e the c o g i t a t i o n s of another. and y e t i t i s I who  They are the thoughts of another,  am t h e i r s u b j e c t .  the thoughts of another. cause f o r astonishment of another.  ... I am  thinking  Of course, there would be  i f I were t h i n k i n g i t as the 39  But I t h i n k i t as my v e r y own."  no thought  Accord-  ing t o P o u l e t , then, the reader e n t e r t a i n s thoughts which are a l i e n to h i m s e l f and a l s o , by n e c e s s i t y , he e n t e r t a i n s the f o r c e or p r i n c i p l e which has shaped those  thoughts,  an a l i e n consciousness. P o u l e t d i s c u s s e s a t some l e n g t h the nature of t h i s consciousness as something  a k i n t o a n a r r a t i v e presence,  but by no means to be i d e n t i f i e d as the b i o g r a p h i c a l e n t i t y o f the author.  I t would be more a c c u r a t e to  55  d e s c r i b e t h i s consciousness as a f o r c e shaping the events of  the book and imbuing How,  i t with c e r t a i n  attitudes.  then, does l i t e r a t u r e work, i n P o u l e t ' s view?  While he has d e s c r i b e d the r e a d i n g process as an  initial  u s u r p a t i o n of the reader's c o n s c i o u s n e s s , he a s s e r t s t h a t the reader i s not v i c t i m i z e d by the a l i e n c o n s c i o u s n e s s . P o u l e t ' s abstruse c o r o l l a r y here i s t h a t a reader i s a b l e to  e n t e r t a i n the consciousness of another  (as h i s  own)  and a t the same become aware of t h a t a l i e n c o n s c i o u s n e s s . More simply perhaps,  the reader i s a b l e t o e v a l u a t e the  a t t i t u d e of n a r r a t i v e presence a t the same time he i n v o l v e d i n the l i t e r a r y work.  "I am a c o n s c i o u s n e s s , " s t a t e s  P o u l e t , " a s t o n i s h e d by an e x i s t e n c e which i s not mine, but 40 which I experience as though i t were mine."  This re-  minds us of I s e r ' s c l a i m t h a t gaps of indeterminacy have the power t o modify  the reader's e x p e c t a t i o n s t o the p o i n t  where he undergoes a broadening  experience.  P o u l e t ' s more  f l a v o u r f u l conclusion i s that:  " ... a work of  literature  becomes ... a s o r t of human being, /which/ i s a mind cons c i o u s of i t s e l f and c o n s t i t u t i n g i t s e l f j e c t of i t s own  object."  i n me  as the sub-  ^  A work of l i t e r a t u r e ceases t o be an o b j e c t i n the ' r e a l ' world when i t i s read, u n l i k e the s t a t u e and vase.  I t i s transformed i n t o an  'interior object . 1  the  56  "In s h o r t , " says P o u l e t , "the e x t r a o r d i n a r y f a c t i n the case of a book i s the f a l l i n g away of b a r r i e r s between #ou and i t .  You are i n s i d e i t ;  i t i s i n s i d e you;  there i s  42 no longer e i t h e r o u t s i d e o r i n s i d e . " The v i t a l element i n r e a d i n g l i t e r a t u r e i s , a c c o r d i n g t o P o u l e t , our response the t e x t . . istic  to the consciousness  He i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned  structures.  behind  about l i n g u -  The experience o f l i t e r a t u r e i s the  i n t e r a c t i o n between the consciousness o f the t e x t and t h a t of the reader. Wayne Booth and Walter S l a t o f f develop the same i d e a along s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t g)i  Wayne Booth:  lines.  I n t e r e s t s , Emotions, B e l i e f s  In Wayne Booth's The R h e t o r i c of F i c t i o n , the chapter entitled  "Emotions, B e l i e f s , and the Reader's Object-  i v i t y " rejects  the n o t i o n t h a t the reader must be d i s p a s -  s i o n a t e , keeping an ' a e s t h e t i c d i s t a n c e ' from the t e x t . "Every l i t e r a r y work o f any power", Booth s t a t e s , " — whether or not i t s author composed i t w i t h h i s audience i n mind —  i s i n f a c t an e l a b o r a t e system o f c o n t r o l s over  the reader's involvement l i n e s of i n t e r e s t .  and detachment along v a r i o u s  The author i s l i m i t e d only by the  range o f human i n t e r e s t s . "  4  3  57  Booth d i v i d e s these human i n t e r e s t s i n t o t h r e e types which he c a l l s i n t e l l e c t u a l , q u a l i t a t i v e , and tical. may  F i r s t , as we  be engaged and we  'factsbe  read, our  intellectual  d e s i r e to know the  prac-  curiosities  ' t r u t h ' or  i t the f a c t s of a case i n a d e t e c t i v e  or on a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d l e v e l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l phical truth.  the  novel,  or  philoso-  A q u a l i t a t i v e i n t e r e s t i s d e f i n e d by  as a d e s i r e to see a p a t t e r n or form  (of n a r r a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e f o r example) completed or developed. b a s i c l e v e l the reader's i n t e r e s t i s caught by e f f e c t patterns  i n the p l o t .  t i o n s of l i t e r a r y conventions. e x p l o i t these and  basic  Booth  or  At a cause-and-  There are a l s o expecta(Writers can,  s h a t t e r conventions:)  o f course,  Booth a l s o  iden-  t i f i e s c e r t a i n abstaiact forms as q u a l i t a t i v e i n t e r e s t : balance, symmetry, r e p e t i t i o n , c o n t r a s t , example.  comparison f o r  F i n a l l y c e r t a i n 'promised q u a l i t i e s ' may  be  i d e n t i f i e d by the reader a t the o u t s e t of the t e x t , which he d e s i r e s to see c o n t i n u e d : example, or an o r i g i n a l  a stylistic brilliance,  for  wit.  P r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t s operate a t the l e v e l of character. terested.  The  characters  ":if we  great novels,"  are people i n whom we  become i n -  look c l o s e l y a t our r e a c t i o n s  says Booth, "we  discover  t h a t we  to most feel a  58  strong concern  f o r the c h a r a c t e r s as people;  about t h e i r good or bad f o r t u n e .  we care  In most works o f any  s i g n i f i c a n c e , we are made t o admire o r d e t e s t , t o l o v e or hate, or simply t o approve o r disapprove o f a t l e a s t one c e n t r a l c h a r a c t e r , and our i n t e r e s t i n r e a d i n g from page t o page, l i k e our judgment upon the book a f t e r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i s i n s e p a r a b l e from t h i s emotional i n 44 volvement."  These pragmatic  i n e i t h e r of the other l e v e l s .  i n t e r e s t s can a l s o e x i s t In the i n t e l l e c t u a l  sphere  we may d e s i r e an i n t e l l e c t u a l change i n a c h a r a c t e r .  Or  i n the q u a l i t a t i v e sphere, we may a p p r e c i a t e the author's p o r t r a y a l of a c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r because i t i s 'round' r a t h e r than  flat.  C h a r a c t e r s become people who are important who are cause f o r our concern,  t o us,  and, a c c o r d i n g to Booth,  we w i l l not be able t o a v o i d judging c h a r a c t e r s on t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral b e h a v i o r . seem, Booth maintains  that:  As mundane as t h i s may  " ... the very s t r u c t u r e o f  f i c t i o n , and hence of our a e s t h e t i c apprehension  of i t  i s o f t e n b u i l t o f such p r a c t i c a l , and i n themselves 45 seemingly  'non-aesthetic,  1  materials."  Booth proceeds t o d i s c u s s the r o l e o f the reader's b e l i e f i n the r e a d i n g p r o c e s s .  Since the reader cannot  59  avoid judging  the moral q u a l i t y of the c h a r a c t e r s ,  seem t h a t h i s b e l i e f s are n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i c a t e d .  i t would Booth's  theory i s t h a t the author c r e a t e s an i m p l i e d reader f o r the t e x t he w r i t e s who to h i s a t t i t u d e .  w i l l be sympathetic to h i s b e l i e f s ,  I t i s as i f the author, i n g i v i n g shape  to the event he p o r t r a y s , has i n mind some k i n d of hypot h e t i c a l reader who  w i l l approve of h i s c r e a t i o n .  Thus  E, M. F o r s t e r s a i d he wrote f o r the people whose r e s p e c t he d e s i r e d and John M i l t o n wrote f o r h i s ' f i t though few'.  The c o r o l l a r y here i s t h a t the  audience, (implied)  reader must l a r g e l y agree w i t h the a t t i t u d e s and b e l i e f s of the author i f he i s to a p p r e c i a t e  f u l l y the l i t e r a r y work.  Booth i s outspoken about t h i s matter:  "To pretend t h a t  we read otherwise, to c l a i m t h a t we can make into objective, dispassionate,  thoroughly t o l e r a n t r e a d e r s  i s i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s nonsense." For Booth,then,  ' implied  '  ^  the l i t e r a r y o b j e c t e x i s t s as a k i n d  of r h e t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n where an cates an  ourselves  'implied'  author i m p l i -  reader by i n t e r e s t i n g him on one or  a combination of l e v e l s —  the i n t e l l e c t u a l , the qua-  l i t a t i v e , and the p r a c t i c a l .  Booth suggests t h a t the  p r a c t i c a l l e v e l of i n t e r e s t i s more i n t e g r a l to the reading  process than i s u s u a l l y assumed.  Even i n  g r e a t l i t e r a t u r e our a e s t h e t i c responses f o l l o w our  60  p r a c t i c a l , emotional response. work, the author counts on  And  i n structuring his  this.  A major t e n e t of Booth's theory i s s i m i l a r to Poulet's:  t h e r e i s an i n t e r a c t i o n o f consciousnesses  i n Booth's case, the i m p l i e d author and r e a d e r .  —  For  Booth, too, l i t e r a t u r e i s u t t e r a n c e as the t i t l e of h i s book i m p l i e s . h)  Walter J . S l a t o f f :  Subjectivity  L i k e Booth, Walter S l a t o f f i s concerned w i t h the reader's s u b j e c t i v e responses t o l i t e r a t u r e ;  h i s tone,  however, i n With Respect t o Readers, i s much more p o l e m i c a l . Whereas Booth i n c l u d e s the response to formal q u a l i t i e s s t r u c t u r e s i n a work as ' q u a l i t a t i v e i n t e r e s t s , '  and  Slatoff  doubts the i n t e g r i t y o f responding to those t h i n g s a t a l l : "To l i m i t our concern t o l i t e r a r y h i s t o r y or formal a n a l ysis  ... , to ignore, problems o f v a l u e and human response,  i s to i g n o r e the very q u a l i t i e s of l i t e r a t u r e which have 47 led  us to be concerned w i t h i t i n the f i r s t  place."  His  o p i n i o n stems from a f r a n k b e l i e f i n the i n a b i l i t y o f  d i s c u r s i v e thought t o a r t i c u l a t e or c o n t a i n the responses we  f e e l when r e a d i n g l i t e r a t u r e .  S l a t o f f also deni-  g r a t e s the i d e a o f the d i s i n t e r e s t e d , i d e a l reader ' i n voked' by c e r t a i n c r i t i c s , because he f i n d s t h i s  hopelessly  61  naive and inhuman.  In f a c t he marvels t h a t t h e r e can be  such a consensus o f response  about a p a r t i c u l a r p i e c e o f  l i t e r a t u r e when one c o n s i d e r s the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r i d i o syncratic readings. i n d i v i d u a l responses to the reasons  F i r s t of a l l ,  according to S l a t o f f ,  t o a g i v e n t e x t w i l l vary a c c o r d i n g  t h a t t e x t i s read:  purposes o f an examination  a t e x t read f o r the  w i l l furnish a different res-  ponse when read f o r p l e a s u r e .  Then, i n reading any book,  there w i l l be an i n e v i t a b l e d i s t o r t i n g temporal  gap between  the time the book i s w r i t t e n and when i t i s read which, as t h a t gap i n c r e a s e s , w i l l i n c r e a s e i t s p o s s i b i l i t y t o d i s t o r t response.  F i n a l l y , there are i n e v i t a b l e psycho-  l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s between reader and reader;  individuals  w i l l vary g r e a t l y i n t h e i r r e a c t i o n t o r e a l human s u f f e r i n g and, hence, f i c t i o n a l human s u f f e r i n g .  T h i s same k i n d  of d i f f e r e n c e can e x i s t between the author and the r e a d e r . Booth touched  on t h i s c o n f l i c t , m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t we may  simply d i s l i k e the a t t i t u d e which an ' i m p l i e d a u t h o r  1  adopts t o the c h a r a c t e r s and events he d e p i c t s . T h i s sense o f a u t h o r i a l presence Slatoff:  11  i s paramount f o r  ... l i t e r a r y works r e q u i r e t h a t we respond not  only t o the words and formal s t r u c t u r e s themselves but t o q u a l i t i e s o f mind and temperament t h a t they suggest and 48 reflect."  When we read we have " ... a sense o f being  62  t a l k e d t o by someone." ^  Again t h i s  'someone' i s not  to be a s s o c i a t e d d i r e c t l y w i t h the b i o g r a p h i c a l e n t i t y o f the author, but more w i t h a k i n d o f n a r r a t i v e presence which e x i s t s w i t h i n and only w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r work. S l a t o f f even goes so f a r as t o say t h a t p a r t of our r e s ponse i s a s h a r i n g o f the author's a r t i s t i c attempts t o handle h i s m a t e r i a l ;  thus we respond t o formal  elements,  but those by no means are the necessary focus o f our r e s ponse.  Nor i s t h a t response to the presence o f the  author c o n f i n e d t o f i c t i o n : Slatoff,  "But I b e l i e v e t o o , " says  " i t i s moEe g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d  u s u a l l y the u t t e r a n c e s  t h a t poems a r e  o f p a r t i c u l a r consciousnesses and 50  are responded t o as such." S l a t o f f a l s o a t t a c k s the n o t i o n t h a t  characters  are t o be conceived  as mere v e r b a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s , who have  no ' r e a l ' e x i s t e n c e  o u t s i d e the t e x t .  to t h i n k o f c h a r a c t e r s to work.  In f a c t , we have  as r e a l people i n order  for fiction  That we do i n f a c t imagine c h a r a c t e r s  i n this  manner i s shown by the f a c t t h a t we imagine c h a r a c t e r s as having ongoing l i v e s ,  j u s t l i k e people;  i f we d i d not,  i f c h a r a c t e r s were mere v e r b a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s ,  they would  have t o be r e c r e a t e d each time they appeared 'on the scene'.  As w e l l , d e s p i t e the g r e a t v a r i e t y i n l i t e r a r y  63  s t r u c t u r e s and v e r b a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s , we c e i v e of c h a r a c t e r s — way,  and Pamela —  are able t o cone  say Emma, M o l l y Bloom, Mrs.  i n much the same way,  Dallo-  t h a t i s , as  peo51  pie  who  are " s i m i l a r l y immediate, f u l l ,  T h i s i s a k i n d of ' f i l l i n g  and  i n ' which i s r e q u i r e d of the  reader i n order to make l i t e r a t u r e work; c o n f i n e d to c h a r a c t e r s . with  'scenes' and  alive."  We  and i t i s not  do the same k i n d of t h i n g  'atmospheres'.  F i n a l l y , S l a t o f f main-  t a i n s t h a t to d i s t i n g u i s h between r e a l and r a c t e r s i s to m a i n t a i n too g l i b l y t h a t we  literary  cha-'  have a s o l i d  understanding of the essence of r e a l people.  (In an  i r o n i c sense, f i c t i o n a l people can be more r e a l than people f o r we  'real'  are allowed t o know them b e t t e r ) .  L i t e r a t u r e has the a b i l i t y to move the reader profoundly, even d i s t u r b i n g l y ; And  indeed, t h i s i s i t s v a l u e .  i t s power to do so l i e s i n the i m p l i c a t i o n of our  deepest emotions and i n t e l l e c t u a l b e l i e f s .  And  the power to d i s t u r b us because i t opens up new for  us, d i f f e r e n t ways of t h i n k i n g and knowing.  word," says S l a t o f f ,  i t has experiences "In a  "because l i t e r a t u r e counts on i t ,  reader must b r i n g h i s own  the  consciousness and experience t o  52 bear."  For S l a t o f f then, what l i t e r a t u r e does i s to  i m p l i c a t e us, to extend our experience, our ways of knowing  64  and f e e l i n g .  L i t e r a t u r e i s c l o s e l y linked with l i f e  S l a t o f f sees a danger i n the attempts  and  o f c r i t i c i s m to sepa-  r a t e them. S l a t o f f ' s p o s i t i o n may  be regarded, from our view-  p o i n t , as a refinement of Booth's.  In the  interaction  between author and reader, the author i m p l i c a t e s and p l a y s upon the reader's b e l i e f s . We  concluded Chapter  I by suggesting the need f o r  l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m to examine more c l o s e l y the between t e x t and reader.  The  done t h a t , each i n h i s own  way.  has suggested,  'affective*  interaction  c r i t i c s have  Some have found, as Dewey  t h a t a e s t h e t i c experience cannot be  r a t e d from o r d i n a r y experience.  Booth has argued  sepavehe-  mently t h a t our mundane f e e l i n g s are i m p l i c a t e d as we  read  l i t e r a t u r e , and are n e c e s s a r i l y so to make l i t e r a t u r e work. Both I s e r and Holland m a i n t a i n t h a t i n l i t e r a t u r e , we access to v i c a r i o u s experience  have  (fantasy, i n Holland's c a s e ) ,  and I s e r suggests a c o n n e c t i o n between r e a d i n g  literature  and p e r s o n a l development, a c o n n e c t i o n which Dewey suggests about a r t and which B r i t t o n takes up i n h i s theory. As w e l l , F i s h , I s e r , S l a t o f f , and Barthes a l l h i t upon the i d e a t h a t we,  as r e a d e r s , are c a l l e d upon to f i l l  in  65  n a r r a t i v e gaps i n f i c t i o n from our own  experience of the 53  world;  i n f a c t , f o r them, t h i s i s how A t the same time, we  f i c t i o n works.  see a p a r a l l e l a e s t h e t i c  c i p l e d e v e l o p i n g w i t h these c r i t i c s —  prin-  the i d e a t h a t a  work of l i t e r a t u r e as a l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e cannot  really  be d i v o r c e d from other kinds of v e r b a l u t t e r a n c e s .  This,  as we  s h a l l see, i s a b a s i c t e n e t of B r i t t o n " s t h e o r y .  F i s h begins by s t a t i n g t h a t he sees no p o i n t i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the l i t e r a r y use of language and o t h e r uses of language.  Most s t r i k i n g l y , P o u l e t , Booth, I s e r ,  H o l l a n d , and S l a t o f f a l l d i s c u s s the sense of being to by someone when they read — Also Barthes  1  a narrative  talked  presence.  s t r u c t u r a l i s t a n a l y s i s of n a r r a t i v e p r o v i d e s  f o r the n a r r a t i v e presence. what Booth has c a l l e d the  The r e l a t i o n s h i p between  ' i m p l i e d ' author and the  p l i e d ' reader i s a l s o developed  by B r i t t o n .  'im-  Finally, i t  i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t F i s h and P o u l e t f i n d t h a t a work of l i t e r a t u r e can have no e x t r a c t a b l e meaning, For t h i s ,  too  i s an u l t i m a t e i m p l i c a t i o n of B r i t t o n ' s t h e o r y . The  i d e a s of t h i s c r i t i c a l movement, though  ant, are fragmented.  import-  There i s a need to i n t e g r a t e them  i n t o a more g e n e r a l t h e o r y .  James B r i t t o n ' s theory of  response p r o v i d e s a s t r u c t u r e which subsumes these  66  fragmented i d e a s , e n a b l i n g us to g a i n a p e r s p e c t i v e these c r i t i c s and point.  on  to d i s c e r n the d i r e c t i o n i n which they  67  Footnotes W. K. Wimsatt, "The A f f e c t i v e F a l l a c y , " The V e r b a l Icon; S t u d i e s i n the Meaning o f Poetry (Lexington, Ky.: The U n i v e r s i t y Press o f Kentucky, 1954), p. 21. 1  2 Wimsatt, p. 32 " W i m s a t t , pp. 34-35 4 T. S. E l i o t , "Hamlet," S e l e c t e d Essays Faber and Faber L t d . , 1934), p. 145  (London:  5 Wimsatt, p. 38 6  Wimsatt, p. 39  7 Wimsatt, p. 39 8  ^ Norman N. H o l l a n d , The Dynamics-of L i t e r a r y Response  (New York:  Oxford U n i v e r s i t y  9 1 0  1  1  12  H o l l a n d , p. 30 H o l l a n d , p. 75  H o l l a n d , p. 132  H o l l a n d , p. 161  Press, 1968T, p. 52.  68  13  Wimsatt, p. 21,  14 S t a n l e y F i s h , " L i t e r a t u r e i n the Reader: A f f e c t i v e S t y l i s t i c s , " Self-Consuming A r t i f a c t s : , The E x p e r i ence o f Seventeenth Century L i t e r a t u r e (Berkeley:. Univers i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1972), p. 401. 1  5  F i s h , pp. 387-388.  1 6  F i s h , p. 393  1 7  F i s h , p. 408  1R  F i s h , p. 407  1 9  F i s h , p. 410  2 0  F i s h , p. 401  2  1  F i s h , pp. 400-401  2  2  F i s h , pp. 400-401  23 Roland Barthes, "The S t r u c t u r a l i s t A c t i v i t y , " The S t r u c t u r a l i s t s from Marx t o L e v i - S t r a u s s , ed. Richard T. and Fernande M. De George (Garden C i t y , N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972), p. 149. 2 4  I b i d . , p. 152  69  25 pp.  1-27  F i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n Communications V I I I  (1966)  26 Roland Barthes, "An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the S t r u c t u r a l i s t A n a l y s i s of N a r r a t i v e , " New L i t e r a r y ^ xt.nry VI, 2 (1975), p. 241. ^ J L  2 7  Ibid., p. 266  2 8  Ibid.^ p. 243  2 9  I b i d . , p. 251  3 0  I b i d . , p.270  3 1  Ibidv,- p. 26 5  32 Wolfgang I s e r , "Indeterminacy and the Reader's Response i n Prose F i c t i o n , " Aspects o f N a r r a t i v e , ed. J . H i l l i s M i l l e r (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1972), p. 8, 33 Wolfgang I s e r , "The Reading P r o c e s s : A Phenomeno l o g i c a l Approach," New L i t e r a r y H i s t o r y , I I I (1972), p. 284. 3 4  I b i d . , p. 284  3 5  I b i d . , p.292  70  3 6  I b i d . , p. 295  37 Georges P o u l e t , "Phenomenology of Reading," Issues i n Contemporary C r i t i c i s m , ed. Gregory T. P o l l e t t a (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, and Company, 1973), p. 104 3 8  P o u l e t , p. 105  3 9  P o u l e t , p. 106  4 0  P o u l e t , p.  110  41 P o u l e t , p. 109  4  2  P o u l e t , p. 104  43 Wayne Booth, "Emotions, B e l i e f s , and the Reader's O b j e c t i v i t y , " The R h e t o r i c o f F i c t i o n (1961; r p t . Chicago: The U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1970), p. 123. 4  4  Booth, p. 129  45 Booth, p. 133 4 6  Booth, p. 147  47 Walter J . S l a t o f f , With Respect t o Readers: Dimensions of L i t e r a r y Response (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1970), p. 24.  71  48  S l a t o f f , p.  132  49 S l a t o f f , p. 93 50 S l a t o f f , p.  99n.  M. H. Abrams a l s o expresses s i m i l a r ideas about poetry i n " B e l i e f and the Suspension of D i s b e l i e f , " l_ L i t e r a t u r e arid B e l i e f : E n g l i s h I n s t i t u t e Essays 1957 (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1958)_/ ~~ " ... I t h i n k the i s s u e of m o r a l i t y and b e l i e f i n poetry has been made to seem u n n e c e s s a r i l y r e c o n d i t e because of the common tendency to d e f i n e a poem as a s p e c i a l k i n d of language, or a s p e c i a l s t r u c t u r e of words and meanings, and then to s l i p i n c h a r a c t e r s and a c t i o n s q u i e t l y through the back door." (p. 13) "The s k i l l f u l poet c o n t r i v e s which of our b e l i e f s w i l l be c a l l e d i n t o p l a y , to what degree, and w i t h what emotional e f f e c t . Given a t r u l y impassive reader, a l l h i s b e l i e f s suspended or a n a e s t h e t i z e d , he would be as h e l p l e s s i n h i s attempts t o endow h i s work w i t h i n t e r e s t and power, as though he had to w r i t e f o r an audience from Mars." ;(p.l7) 5 1  S l a t o f f , p. 16  5 2  S l a t o f f , p. 66  There i s some i n t e r e s t i n g r e c e n t p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i r e s e a r c h which suggests t h a t something l i k e t h i s happens i o r d i n a r y v e r b a l communication. {_ B r a n s f o r d , J . D., B a r c l a y , J . R., and Franks, J . J . , "Sentence Memory: A C o n s t r u c t i v e Versus I n t e r p r e t i v e Approach," Cognitive Psychology, I I I (1972, 193-209_7 "In a broader sense," the study concludes, "the c o n s t r u c t i v e approach argues a g a i n s t the t a c i t assumption t h a t sentences " c a r r y meaning." People c a r r y meanings, and l i n g u i s t i c i n p u t s  72  merely a c t as cues which people can use to r e c r e a t e and modify t h e i r p r e v i o u s knowledge of the world. What i s comprehended and remembered depends on an i n d i v i d u a l s g e n e r a l knowledge of h i s environment." (p. 207) 1  73  III  U n l i k e the c r i t i c s  -  James B r i t t o n  i n the p r e v i o u s chapter, James  B r i t t o n i s not s o l e l y concerned e r a r y response.  w i t h l i t e r a t u r e and  He approaches those t o p i c s from  much broader overview  of man's e n t i r e l i n g u i s t i c  lit-  the activity,  p l a c i n g l i t e r a t u r e i n a more encompassing p e r s p e c t i v e than most l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s do. man,  f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes,  participant — world —  B r i t t o n theorizes that  assumes e i t h e r the r o l e of  to c a r r y out p r a c t i c a l matters  or the r o l e of s p e c t a t o r —  in his  to detach h i m s e l f  from h i s world and e v a l u a t e h i s l i f e and the l i v e s of those around him.  Each r o l e i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a spe-  c i a l k i n d of language use —  l i t e r a t u r e being a mani-  f e s t a t i o n of language use i n the s p e c t a t o r r o l e . major statement  The  of h i s l i n g u i s t i c theory i s c o n t a i n e d i n  Language and L e a r n i n g  (1970).  "Response to L i t e r a t u r e "  As w e l l , two  (1968) and  "The  essays,  Role of Fantasy"  (1971) complement the theory put f o r t h i n h i s book. I t should be noted a t the o u t s e t t h a t B r i t t o n ' s viewpoint i s p r i m a r i l y , though not e x c l u s i v e l y , t h a t of an educator:  h i s views on l i t e r a t u r e are grounded i n  s t u d i e s of p h i l o s o p h y , psychology,  s o c i o l o g y , and  l i n g u i s t i c s , as w e l l as l i t e r a r y theory.  To a c e r t a i n  74  extent B r i t t o n i s b e h a v i o r a l l y o r i e n t e d , concerned as he i s w i t h t h e o r i e s , experiments, and p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n s about how we use language.  Such p r a c t i c a l concerns  serve t o l i b e r a t e B r i t t o n from the p o t e n t i a l myopia o f a viewpoint which i s s o l e l y l i t e r a r y .  Indeed, h i s e x t r a -  l i t e r a r y background makes h i s view o f l i t e r a t u r e a l l the more i n t e r e s t i n g and e x t e n s i v e . At the end of the l a s t c h a p t e r , we saw t h a t two s i g n i f i c a n t i d e a s about the nature of l i t e r a r y  response  emerged ffom a d i s c u s s i o n o f what we might c a l l the 'affective' c r i t i c s . mentary  The i d e a s however remained  and u n r e l a t e d .  rudi-  James B r i t t o n ' s theory of  l i t e r a r y response w i l l prove u s e f u l i n i n t e g r a t i n g these fragmented  ideas.  "The r o l e o f Fantasy" i s a b r i e f a r t i c l e about the nature o f c h i l d r e n ' s p l a y ; ' ... t h a t the a r t s  i n i t James B r i t t o n suggests:  (including l i t e r a t u r e ) represent a  h i g h l y o r g a n i z e d a c t i v i t y w i t h i n the g e n e r a l area of *plav' -  v  x  " '''  T h i s statement may a t f i r s t seem absurd,  or c e r t a i n l y n a i v e , but B r i t t o n ' s assumption i s based on a b e l i e f , suggested by Langer, t h a t l i f e has i t s ' a r t i s t i c mode'.  Basing h i s views on the study o f c h i l d r e n ,  B r i t t o n b e l i e v e s t h a t man's experience comes t o him p r i m a r i l y i n the form of images which antedate h i s use  75  of words (his d i s c u r s i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) , and which continue to f u n c t i o n i n a s s o c i a t i o n with, words.  On the one  and  independently o f ,  hand B r i t t o n has d i s t i n g u i s h e d a mode  of a c t i v i t y whereby man  attempts to understand the  world, t o p i c t u r e an i n c r e a s i n g l y more accurate t a t i o n of i t —  actual  represen-  h i s a c q u i s i t i o n of d i s c u r s i v e knowledge.  But on the other hand, there are times when human beings improvise on t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r a c t i c a l purposes.  f o r seemingly very  T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e of  im-  child-  ren's p l a y , or of a d u l t day-dreaming, or of dreams themselves.  The  p o i n t B r i t t o n wishes to make here i s t h a t  w h i l e we  are i n v o l v e d i n such f a n t a s t i c a c t i v i t i e s ,  there may  be l i t t l e concern f o r v e r i s i m i l i t u d e and  events acted out may s e n t a t i o n of the  the  take p l a c e i n an u n f a i t h f u l r e p r e -  ' r e a l * world, but t h a t t h i s does not mean  t h a t the a c t i v i t y l a c k s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l t o g e t h e r . Langer, B r i t t o n c l a i m s  Like  there are a l t e r n a t i v e ways of  g a n i z i n g experience, a l t e r n a t i v e ways of knowing. e s t i n g l y B r i t t o n sees l i t e r a t u r e to which we a e s t h e t i c a l l y , as a m a n i f e s t a t i o n  orInter-  respond  of the same mode of  o r g a n i z a t i o n which operates i n c h i l d r e n ' s p l a y .  76  a)  The Nature of Experience L i k e Dewey, B r i t t o n b e l i e v e s t h a t we c o n s t r u c t f o r  o u r s e l v e s a view o f the world, which changes and grows as we a s s i m i l a t e experience. Britton states:  In Language and Learning  " ... we c o n s t r u c t a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f  the world as we experience i t ,  and from t h i s r e p r e s e n t a -  t i o n , t h i s cumulative r e c o r d of our p a s t , we generate our e x p e c t a t i o n s concerning the f u t u r e ;  e x p e c t a t i o n s which,  as moment by moment t h e f u t u r e becomes the p r e s e n t , en2 able us t o i n t e r p r e t the p r e s e n t . "  I have suggested  t h a t we c o n s t r u c t t h i s world view by two modes of understanding —  i n Langer's  non-discursive. organism  terms, the d i s c u r s i v e and the  Dewey has hypothesized t h a t the human  i s p e r p e t u a l l y i n v o l v e d i n the a c t i v i t i e s of  'doing'' and 'undergoing':' t h i s a c t i o n i s thwarted, reflection.  the organism the organism  a c t s , and when  i s forced into  For Dewey t h i s , i n essence,  rhythm o f human l i f e .  i s the fundamental  Forced i n t o r e f l e c t i o n , we must  b r i n g t o bear our p a s t experience t o d e a l w i t h a new, d i s parate experience.  Having  r e - a c h i e v e d a s t a t e of harmony  a f t e r a p a r t i c u l a r d i s t u r b i n g phase of d i s p a r i t y , we are conscious of having had a very powerful experience. what g i v e s t h i s experience i t s power i s i t s emotion.  And The  77  organism's r e f l e c t i o n i s not p u r e l y d i s c u r s i v e ; t i e n t being  comes i n t o  our sen-  play.  B r i t t o n has i d e n t i f i e d two main a c t i v i t i e s by which human beings d e a l w i t h t h e i r world which he c a l l s the 3 p a r t i c i p a n t r o l e and the s p e c t a t o r r o l e . In the p a r t i c i p a n t r o l e we a r e preoccupied t i n g t h i n g s done i n the world, and t h i s i n v o l v e s which i s both o v e r t p u r p o s e f u l activity.  with  get-  behavior  a c t i v i t y , and c o v e r t mental  Our c h i e f concern i s t o f u n c t i o n i n o r t o  e s t a b l i s h a coherent, accurate  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the  world. In the r o l e o f s p e c t a t o r , however, our concerns a r e no longer  so p r a c t i c a l .  The mode of a c t i v i t y i n the  s p e c t a t o r r o l e -- as opposed t o p a r t i c i p a n t a c t i v i t y : overt purposeful  activity;  i n t e l l e c t u a l comprehension;  and p e r c e p t i o n ~- i s the mode o f detached e v a l u a t i o n In the p a r t i c i p a n t r o l e , we a r e concerned with t h i n g s are' i n the world; cern i s with  'the way  i n the s p e c t a t o r r o l e , our con-  'the way we f e e l about things'."  a t i o n i s an emotional one.  Our e v a l u -  T h i s i s not t o say t h a t we  adopt the r o l e of s p e c t a t o r only when we a r e i s o l a t e d from participant  activities.  Certainly  there are times when  we do, b u t o f t e n we a r e e v a l u a t i n g almost as we  78  participate;  i n f a c t , as we l i v e we adopt and i n t e r c h a n g e  the two r o l e s c o n t i n u o u s l y , o f t e n almost s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . But there w i l l a l s o be times when we d e l i b e r a t e l y  detach  o u r s e l v e s from our a c t i v i t i e s i n the world i n o r d e r t o step back and e v a l u a t e what we are doing o r what i s going on around us.  A l s o , i t i s important t o r e a l i z e t h a t both  r o l e s of a c t i v i t y e x i s t a t every l e v e l of human endeavour, however mundane o r s o p h i s t i c a t e d . and  "Both ' s p e c t a t o r '  'participant'," states Britton,"  s p e c i a l and r e s t r i c t e d sense:  ... are used i n a  ' p a r t i c i p a n t ' i s the key  word t o mark out someone who i s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the world's affairs:  ' s p e c t a t o r ' i s the l a b e l f o r someone on a h o l i -  day from the world's a f f a i r s ,  someone contemplating  expe-  r i e n c e s , e n j o y i n g them, v i v i d l y r e c o n s t r u c t i n g them p e r 5 haps -T but experiences i n which he i s not t a k i n g p a r t . " Two t h i n g s should be noted here.  In the f i r s t p l a c e ,  p a r t i c i p a t i o n does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean p h y s i c a l  action;  our concern as p a r t i c i p a n t s i s w i t h 'the way t h i n g s are', and our a c t i v i t y may w e l l be mental.  In the second p l a c e ,  detached e v a l u a t i o n i n the s p e c t a t o r mode does not imply t h a t we a r e not i n v o l v e d i n what we observe.  Britton  i l l u s t r a t e s the d i f f e r e n c e i n the two modes of a c t i v i t y . He c l a i m s t h a t i n e i t h e r mode, we tend to c l a s s i f y t h i n g s  79  i n our world.  A domestic c a t c l a s s i f i e d by 'the way  t h i n g s are' belongs t o the same group as the t i g e r . c l a s s i f i e d according  But  t o 'the way we f e e l about t h i n g s ' , the  domestic c a t becomes something q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from the tiger.  The p o i n t B r i t t o n makes i s t h a t both  classifica-  t i o n s are e s s e n t i a l and i n e v i t a b l e t o the f o r m u l a t i o n of a coherent and balanced r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the world. Dewey has mentioned the r o l e o f emotion i n c o n s t r u ing experience our  and Langer has w r i t t e n of the a b i l i t y of  s e n t i e n t being  t o 'perceive' experience.  These two  ideas r e l a t e t o B r i t t o n ' s theory o f the s p e c t a t o r where our detached e v a l u a t i o n i s an emotional one. three t h e o r i e s p o i n t to the formative spectator r o l e .  role, All  importance o f the  As s p e c t a t o r s we can c a r r y out our  a c t i v i t y o f detached e v a l u a t i o n as i n d i v i d u a l s where we witness and evaluate  a c t u a l events.  What comes i n t o p l a y  i n our e v a l u a t i o n s are our i n t e r e s t s , d e s i r e s , sentiments, and  ideals.  We are no longer  interested necessarily i n  comprehending events and c o u l d q u i t e w e l l be concerned only f o r the appearance of t h i n g s .  F o r example, a t a  f o o t b a l l game, we may cease t o be concerned about how the game works and become caught up i n the game's s i m i l a r i t y to war.  The a t t i t u d e s evoked i n us can be more or l e s s  80  i n t e n s e depending upon our pants and  upon the b e a r i n g the event has  of v a l u e s . our  r e l a t i o n s h i p to the  I f we  personally  f o o t b a l l game, or i f we  r i e s of our  own  know one  to our  have v i v i d and  be  some event we  at  evaluative  I t i s perhaps worth r e s t a t i n g  o f t e n be unconscious, or i n e f f a b l e ;  i n a s i t u a t i o n where we  system  e x c i t i n g memo-  here Langer's view t h a t the p a t t e r n s of our ings may  own  of the p l a y e r s  f o o t b a l l games i n youth, our  a t t i t u d e s w i l l be a f f e c t e d .  partici-  sentient thus, we  have a powerful r e a c t i o n  have witnessed and  not  be-  r e a l l y know  to  why.  I mentioned e a r l i e r t h a t the mode of detached a t i o n can  where we  evalu-  e x i s t i n close association with p a r t i c i p a n t  activities. c l o s e r we  may  Our  detachment however w i l l be v i t i a t e d the  are to p a r t i c i p a n t a c t i v i t i e s , as i n s i t u a t i o n s have t r i e d u n s u c c e s s f u l l y  or have n e g l e c t e d  an  o b l i g a t i o n to p a r t i c i p a t e i n events or i n a s i t u a t i o n where we  are p r e p a r i n g f o r o v e r t  can detach o u r s e l v e s , evaluation. aware of our  activity.  more  the more comprehensive w i l l be  we our  Such detachment enables us to be more surroundings, more aware of p o s s i b i l i t i e s  experience, simply by v i r t u e of watching and events around us i n terms o f the way No  The  doubt what we  we  of  evaluating  f e e l about them.  see w i l l not merely c o n f i r m what  we  81  a l r e a d y f e e l but w i l l s u r p r i s e us and extend our t i o n s of human e x p e r i e n c e .  expecta-  T h i s n o t i o n r e l a t e s to the  t h e o r i e s of growth proposed by Dewey and K e l l y .  Britton  Has  s t a t e d t h a t as s p e c t a t o r s :  " ... i n contemplating  new  (the experience of which we  are s p e c t a t o r s ) we  the  are  g more than u s u a l l y concerned w i t h our t o t a l world view." We  are concerned w i t h o r g a n i z i n g the new  experience i n the  l i g h t of the o l d , w i t h a n t i c i p a t i n g f u t u r e events, and w i t h p r e s e r v i n g our world view from  fragmentation.  One more aspect of our r o l e as i n d i v i d u a l s p e c t a t o r s must be mentioned. a c t u a l events, we  While we are a b l e t o witness  are a l s o a b l e t o remember and e v a l u a t e  t h i n g s i n the p a s t and perhaps, by v i r t u e of t h i s , pate f u t u r e events;  we  antici-  a l s o might imagine what we might  have Been, or what might be, as i n f a n t a s y or day-dreams. But our s o c i a l experience as s p e c t a t o r s i s l i a b l e to have an even more profound e f f e c t upon us. be no doubt t h a t we  are i n e s c a p a b l y s o c i a l .  surrounded by our f e l l o w s , we may  There  can  As s p e c t a t o r s  witness a c t u a l events;  here we can be i n f l u e n c e d even by the non-verbal r e a c t i o n s of those around us, t h e i r g e s t u r e s , t e a r s , l a u g h t e r .  Un-  doubtedly, we d e f i n e o u r s e l v e s C a n t a g o n i s t i c a l l y , or cong e n i a l l y ) , by those around us.  And  here language  has a  82  g r e a t i n p a c t upon our s p e c t a t o r experience because we  are  a b l e t o l i s t e n to someone's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of events which have happened.  There are s o c i a l c o u n t e r p a r t s to the  s o l i t a r y s p e c t a t o r a c t i v i t i e s of day-dreaming, remembering past events, a n t i c i p a t i n g f u t u r e events.  One  counterpart the c  i s the c o o p e r a t i v e p l a y which c h i l d r e n engage i n ; other i s g o s s i p .  9  B r i t t o n has s t a t e d t h a t i n the s p e c t a t o r r o l e are more than u s u a l l y concerned one aspect of our concern  we  w i t h our world view, and :  i s to p r e s e r v e i t from fragmen-  t a t i o n , or, i n Dewey's terms, to m a i n t a i n the sense of a u n i f i e d whole which i s the essence  of s a n i t y .  p r o v i d e s us w i t h the o p p o r t u n i t y of s o c i a l where we  interaction  can share experiences and our a t t i t u d e s to those  experiences. Britton,  Gossip  "We  become experienced people," s t a t e s  " ... as a r e s u l t of the f u s i o n of o t h e r  experience w i t h our own,"  1 0  people's  Spectator r o l e a c t i v i t y i s  l i f e i n the a r t i s t i c mode ( i n Langer's s e n s e ) .  For  B r i t t o n , what we  litera-  have come to regard as a r t i s t i c  ture i s o r g a n i c a l l y rooted i n gossip. b)_  The Role of Language B r i t t o n ' s main i n t e r e s t i s i n the  linguistic  a c t i v i t y . p f the p a r t i c i p a n t and s p e c t a t o r r o l e s ,  83  p a r t i c u l a r l y the l a t t e r . Learning;  he s t a t e s :  In the Foreword t o Language and  "As s p e c t a t o r s we use language t o  contemplate what has happened  t o us o r t o other people, o r  what might c o n c e i v a b l y happen;  i n other words, we impro-  v i s e upon our world r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and we may do so e i t h e r to e n r i c h i t ,  to f i l l  i t s gaps and extend i t s f r o n t i e r s ,  or t o i r o n out i t s i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s .  In B r i t t o n * s view,  l i t e r a t u r e i s one, but only one, m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t y i n the s p e c t a t o r r o l e .  Here B r i t t o n ' s  d i f f e r e n c e from the c r i t i c s d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter I I must be s t r e s s e d ;  t h e i r p o i n t s of view a r e almost e x c l u s i v e l y  c o n f i n e d t o l i t e r a t u r e , whereas B r i t t o n ' s encompasses  lin-  g u i s t i c a c t i v i t y i n general. B r i t t o n s t r e s s e s the c r u c i a l p a r t which language p l a y s i n our l i v e s ;  i t i s the prime t o o l by which we  n e g o t i a t e experience, can  'make something  1  Britton states: o f experience,  "Before  a child  i n the sense o f t u r n -  i n g i t t o h i s advantage, he must make something of i t i n the sense of reducing  f l u x t o order and there can be no  doubt whatever t h a t language i s a p r i n c i p a l agent i n a c h i e v i n g t h i s i n a l l normal cases." use language i s u n i q u e l y human.  This a b i l i t y to  In the rudimentary stages  of our development as c h i l d r e n , our speech i s r i v e t e d t o  84  the c o n c r e t e environment u n t i l we  l e a r n t h a t words can  take the p l a c e of o b j e c t s i n i t .  For the human being  words become symbols, and,  as Susanne Langer e m p h a t i c a l l y  p o i n t s out, man's power of symbolizing i s the essence his  humanity.  of  B r i t t o n , agreeing w i t h Jerome Bruner,  s t a t e s t h a t a c h i l d ' s f i r s t use of language serves t o r e g u l a t e , o r g a n i z e , and extend the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of h i s world made i n the ception.  ' e n a c t i v e ' and  I t i s as i f we  ' i c o n i c ' modes of per-  c o n s t r u c t a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of  the world by c o n s t r u c t i n g a f i l i n g  system which p r o -  cesses the images of our e x p e r i e n c e .  Language then 12  f a c i l i t a t e s a more e x t e n s i v e and e f f i c i e n t Britton states:  system.  " ... language i s a h i g h l y o r g a n i z e d ,  systematic means of r e p r e s e n t i n g e x p e r i e n c e , and as  such  i t a s s i s t s us t o o r g a n i z e a l l other ways of r e p r e s e n t 13 ing."  Language used s t r i c t l y i n t h i s manner i s  language used i n the p a r t i c i p a n t r o l e .  It i s essentially  d i s c u r s i v e , a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system a c c o r d i n g to 'the t h i n g s a r e , and i s used t o c o n s t r u c t an 1  way  increasingly  f a i t h f u l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the world.., In  our d i s c u r s i v e use of language we  are  concerned-..: w i t h p r a c t i c a l matters, w i t h the way !rwe d i d observe, however," s t a t e s B r i t t o n ,  largely things are.  " t h a t our  85  representation  o f the world i s a f f e c t e d a l s o by the p r o -  j e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l f e e l i n g s , our needs and d e s i r e s : l e t us regard  t h i s now as i n v o l v i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e mode  of c l a s s i f y i n g —  a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n accordance w i t h  '•the way I f e e l about t h i n g s . '  1  5 J  n  B  r  i  t  t  o  n  ,  s  v  i  e  W  kind of p o l a r i t y e x i s t s i n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t y .  /  a  Dis-  c u r s i v e thought g i v e s r i s e t o a s c i e n t i f i c use of language which becomes g r a d u a l l y more o b j e c t i v e so as t o evolve  i n t o pure symbol systems.  Non-discursive  thought,  on the other hand, g i v e s r i s e t o l i t e r a t u r e and a r t , generally.  On one end of t h i s language a c t i v i t y c o n t i -  nuum, then, we have the d i s c u r s i v e use o f language which culminates i n a s c i e n t i f i c t r e a t i s e ; have the n o n - d i s c u r s i v e  on the other  use o£ language  culminates i n a work of- l i t e r a t u r e .  (gossip)  end we  which  In between these two  poles f a l l what c o u l d be c a l l e d a r t i s t i c and s c i e n t i f i c modes of a c t i v i t y ;  a c t i v i t i e s i n these modes, o f course,  culminate i n n e i t h e r a r t nor s c i e n c e , but l i e somewhere i n between.  Moreover, B r i t t o n would say t h a t  activity  i n the a r t i s t i c mode i s t h a t o f the s p e c t a t o r r o l e , and a c t i v i t y i n the s c i e n t i f i c mode i s t h a t of the p a r t i c i pant.  Language i n the s p e c t a t o r r o l e B r i t t o n c a l l s the  p o e t i c use of language;  language i n p a r t i c i p a n t r o l e ,  86  transactional:  s c i e n t i f i c mode (activity)  a r t i s t i c mode (activity)  t r a n s a c t i o n a l mode (language)  p o e t i c mode (language)  PARTICIPANT ROLE  SPECTATOR ROLE  ART  SCIENCE  'the way we f e e l about t h i n g s '  'the way t h i n g s a r e '  But t h i s model, . . i i s s t i l l undeveloped and so misr e p r e s e n t s our language a c t i v i t y .  A l l speech a c t s  imply  an audience, and thus f a r I have had l i t t l e t o say about audience.  I have mentioned g o s s i p , c h a r a c t e r i z i n g i t i s  a k i n d o f b a s i c language a c t i v i t y i n the s p e c t a t o r In gossip,  role.  f o r example, one i s able t o r e c a l l a p a s t ex-  p e r i e n c e , g i v e shape t o i t i n the t e l l i n g , and convey, through language and other means, an a p p r o p r i a t e a t t i t u d e to t h a t p a s t experience.  My audience i s f a i r l y  immediate;  people can stop me and i n t e r j e c t t h e i r own comments conveying t h e i r own a t t i t u d e s , thus e l a b o r a t i n g and embell i s h i n g my r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  I t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e f o r some-  one whom I do not know t o l i s t e n t o my g o s s i p and enjoy (or disapprove  of); the a t t i t u d e s which I convey.  The p o i n t o f a l l t h i s i s t o i n d i c a t e an even more  87  'rudimentary tions  c l a s s of u t t e r a n c e s than g o s s i p , which f u n c -  1  i n what B r i t t o n  a c l a s s of u t t e r a n c e situation,  calls  'the e x p r e s s i v e mode'.-  i s e n t i r e l y embedded i n the immediate  and can o n l y be understood  that s i t u a t i o n .  by those i n v o l v e d i n  For example, a good f r i e n d of mine  ask me what I t h i n k of so-and-so, a mutual My  yet  syllable reply,  friend;  there i s no doubt how  our mutual acquaintance.  grimace.  not even a word r e a l l y ,  i t s 'meaning' w i l l be conveyed i n a p e r f e c t l y  f a s h i o n to my  may  acquaintance.  r e p l y might be simply, "Ugh!" accompanied by a  Here i s a one  Such  and  clear  I f e e l about  I can get away w i t h my  sparse  r e p l y because of the a b s o l u t e m u t u a l i t y and r e c i p r o c i t y have w i t h my ence.  friend —  we  T h i s combination  I  share a common world of e x p e r i of speech  (or sound) and  which together becomes a k i n d of speech more commonly than we perhaps r e a l i z e .  gesture  a c t occurs much The e x p r e s s i v e  mode comes i n t o p l a y whenever speaker and l i s t e n e r  share  a common world of experience, f o r however b r i e f a time. Even when I seek to purchase  gasoline at a service  station,  o f t e n a l l I need t o do i s h o l d up a f i v e d o l l a r b i l l indicate  the a p p r o p r i a t e pump to the a t t e n d a n t .  The  example of language use i n the e x p r e s s i v e mode, the change w i t h my  and first  inter-  f r i e n d , might be c o n s i d e r e d as a c l a s s i f i c a -  88  t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o the way I f e e l about t h i n g s tor r o l e ) ;  the second i s a ' g e s t u r e - u t t e r a n c e ' f o r the  purpose of g e t t i n g t h i n g s done i n the world pant r o l e ) .  (the s p e c t a -  (the p a r t i c i -  But as u t t e r a n c e s d i v o r c e d from t h e i r r e s -  p e c t i v e r e c e i v e r s ( i . e . removed from the immediate t i o n ) , they would be t o t a l l y meaningless.  Speech i n the  e x p r e s s i v e mode i s e n t i r e l y dependent upon a shared of experience between speaker  situa-  world  and h e a r e r .  The c o r o l l a r y t o t h i s i s t h a t t h e r e w i l l be p r e s sure on the e x p r e s s i v e mode as soon as one o f the hearers no longer shares a common world of e x p e r i e n c e .  My f r i e n d  may ask me what I t h i n k of so-and-so, a person of whom he knows v i r t u a l l y n o t h i n g . my s t a t i o n attendant's  Or, t o take our other example,  son, who knows nothing about gaso-  l i n e pumps, i s l e f t t o mind the s t a t i o n when I happen t o a r r i v e i n my c a r . and  In each o f these s i t u a t i o n s my hearer  I no longer share the same context o f e x p e r i e n c e .  If  I r e p l y "Ugh!" t o my f r i e n d ' s request, he w i l l not know what I mean.  Of i f I g e s t u r e t o the boy a t the g a s o l i n e  pumps, he w i l l f i r s t need t o have more e x p l i c i t i n f o r m a t i o n b e f o r e he can comply w i t h my r e q u e s t .  We a r e f o r c e d out  of the e x p r e s s i v e c e n t r e i n t o the t r a n s a c t i o n a l o r p o e t i c mode of language use, as the case may be.  89  Now  as the hearer shares l e s s and  l e s s of h i s  speaker's world o f e x p e r i e n c e , the u t t e r a n c e s  must become  g r a d u a l l y more e x p l i c i t to account f o r t h i s l a c k of mutuality.  In the t r a n s a c t i o n a l mode, as we move from the  expressive  centre to the p o l e , we  the t r a n s a c t i o n a l use hearer have l e s s and  have m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  of  of language i n which the speaker l e s s personal  reciprocity —  the  and play-  by-play d e s c r i p t i o n of a t e l e v i s e d hockey game, an on-the scene news r e p o r t , a newspaper a r t i c l e , a s c i e n t i f i c book.  text  Each of these i s i n c r e a s i n g l y more e x p l i c i t .  Lan-  ger maintains t h a t d i s c u r s i v e symbolism, as opposed to s e n t a t i o n a l , culminates i n symbolic l o g i c , an e x p l i c i t d i s c u r s i v e form.  I t should  absolutely  be added t h a t  a c t i o n a l language a c t i v i t i e s are o f t e n embellished r h e t o r i c a l devices  from the p o e t i c mode.  But  t i o n a l speaking and w r i t i n g g e n e r a l l y d e a l the are*  i n the world;  e s s e n t i a l l y w i t h the  transwith  transac'way  things  t r a n s a c t i o n a l language i s concerned ' f a c t s ' of the world, however t r a n s -  i e n t and mutable these c)  pre-  ' f a c t s ' may  prove to  be.  L i t e r a t u r e as Experience Of the t r a n s a c t i o n a l and p o e t i c modes of language  activity, Britton states:  "We  a l l use  language i n both  these ways, to get t h i n g s done i n the outer world and  to  90  manipulate the i n n e r world. to the former use;  A c t i o n and d e c i s i o n belong  freedom from them i n the l a t t e r en-  ables us t o attend t o other t h i n g s — language, the p a t t e r n s o f events,  t o the forms of  the f e e l i n g s .  up as i t were the r o l e of s p e c t a t o r s :  We  take  s p e c t a t o r s o f our  own past l i v e s , our imagined f u t u r e s , other men's l i v e s , impossible events.  When we speak t h i s language, the near-  e s t name I can g i v e i t i s 'gossip';  when we w r i t e i t , i t  17 is  literature."  not normative;  B r i t t o n ' s d e f i n i t i o n , of course, i s t h a t i s , he does not d e f i n e l i t e r a t u r e as  w r i t i n g which surpasses ther, f o r B r i t t o n ,  Ra-  l i t e r a t u r e i s w r i t i n g i n the s p e c t a t o r  r o l e and h i s i n t e r e s t if  some t h r e s h o l d o f e x c e l l e n c e .  l i e s i n studying  i t s r o o t s l i e i n common  l i t e r a t u r e t o see  experience.  I have a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d g o s s i p t o some e x t e n t . Through,gossip, i t ' i s p o s s i b l e f o r someone t o represent, to me, f o r my e v a l u a t i o n , an event we have both p a r t i c i pated  i n , o r , e q u a l l y , an event I may have missed  gether. one,  alto-  From here i t i s only a step, though a c r u c i a l  t o say t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r someone t o r e p r e s e n t  to me f o r my e v a l u a t i o n an event which might happen, an imaginary  event.  when we t e l l  And t h i s i s e s s e n t i a l l y  stories,  what happens  and s i m i l a r l y , t h e r e f o r e , when we  91  write  stories.  A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s view, a l l forms o f  s t o r y t e l l i n g , t r u e or f i c t i o n a l ,  spoken or w r i t t e n , a r e  n a r r a t i v e s which i n v i t e onlookers to j o i n i n e v a l u a t i n g 18 some p o s s i b i l i t y of e x p e r i e n c e . As  the form o f d i s c o u r s e  i s conditioned gradually mode.  i n the t r a n s a c t i o n a l mode  by the audience, or more s p e c i f i c a l l y by a  l e s s immediate audience, so, t o o , i n the p o e t i c  I might w r i t e  a l e t t e r t o a c l o s e f r i e n d , i n which  I t e l l him an anecdote about some mutual acquaintances. This  l e t t e r , i f made p u b l i c , would be i n t e l l i g i b l e t o only  a few people,  A n o v e l i s t , on the o t h e r hand, must w r i t e  f o r an unknown p u b l i c , and t h i s audience w i l l put p r e s s u r e 19 on hxm t o o b j e c t i f y h i s w r i t i n g .  In t r a n s a c t i o n a l  w r i t i n g an author o f f s e t s the p e r s o n a l anonymity o f h i s audience by making h i s d i s c o u r s e has  characterized  more e x p l i c i t .  Langer  a r t as a n o n - d i e c u r s i v e symbol, as opg  posed t o d i s c u r s i v e a r t i c u l a t i o n , so i t f o l l o w s  t h a t the  n o v e l i s t must make h i s c r e a t i o n more i m p l i c i t t o account f o r h i s p u b l i c audience. ated o b j e c t  rather  i n the world.  A piece  of l i t e r a t u r e i s a cre-  than a d i s c u r s i v e e x p o s i t i o n  of objects  A simple i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i s i m p l i c i t n e s s -  e x p l i c i t n e s s p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t a t e x t which i s c l e a r l y t transactional w i l l  s t a t e i t s i n t e n t i o n , as, f o r example,  92  $; have i n t h i s t h e s i s :  Whereas i n l i t e r a t u r e the i n t e n -  t i o n i s not s t a t e d but i m p l i c i t , embedded i n the u t t e r a n c e 20 itself.  A n o v e l w i l l o f t e n plunge  midst o f the a c t i o n . i t s own c o n t e x t . of r e a l i t y  i t s reader i n t o the  I t i s as i f the u t t e r a n c e s u p p l i e s  D i s c u r s i v e w r i t i n g d e a l s w i t h a world  (though perhaps mutable) which i s e x t e r n a l  the reader, w h i l e l i t e r a t u r e must c r e a t e a f i c t i v e i n which the reader p l a c e s h i m s e l f .  to  world  At t h i s point Britton's  theory c l a r i f i e s some o f the ideas which emerged from Chapt e r IT.  F o r example, B r i t t o n ' s theory o f i m p l i c i t  writ-  i n g c o i n c i d e s w i t h Booth's theory of the i m p l i e d author and r e a d e r .  As w e l l , I s e r has mentioned t h a t what makes  a l i t e r a r y t e x t unique  i s t h a t the reader i s drawn i n t o  the world of the n o v e l . B r i t t o n regards l i t e r a t u r e as a h i g h l y s p e c i a l i z e d way of e n l a r g i n g and extending the d i s c u s s i o n s which we 21 o r d i n a r i l y have w i t h each other about l i f e .  The author  o f f e r s the reader some p o s s i b i l i t y o f experience; structures h i s attitude  he  (the way he f e e l s ) towards h i s cha-  r a c t e r s and events i n a way he f e e l s a p p r o p r i a t e .  Both  c h a r a c t e r s and events a r e open t o e v a l u a t i o n by the reader who can agree or d i s a g r e e and who w i l l u l t i m a t e l y be e i t h e r e n t h u s i a s t i c or d i s a p p o i n t e d w i t h what the author  offers.  93  The reader i s a l s o f r e e t o e v a l u a t e the a t t i t u d e which the author conveys towards the events he d e s c r i b e s , an a t t i t u d e which i s as o f t e n i m p l i c i t as e x p l i c i t .  The author  here  i s i m p l i e d , t h a t i s , the author behind the events and char a c t e r s i n a novel i s not n e c e s s a r i l y t o be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the b i o g r a p h i c a l e n t i t y o f the author.  Nonetheless, we  do not ignore the a u t h o r i a l presence g i v i n g shape t o h i s 22 discussions;  r a t h e r we e v a l u a t e h i s a t t i t u d e .  Here,  what P o u l e t , Booth, S l a t o f f , and t o some e x t e n t H o l l a n d say about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the author and the reader becomes c l e a r .  P a r t o f the power o f l i t e r a t u r e i s indeed  the r e c i p r o c i t y o f consciousnesses which r e s u l t s when the author imbues h i s f i c t i v e world w i t h h i s p e r s o n a l implicit) attitudes.  In B r i t t o n ' s mind, such  (though  reciproci-  t i e s are q u i t e l i t e r a l l y d i s c u s s i o n s o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of e x p e r i e n c e . What does B r i t t o n have t o say about l i t e r a t u r e i s art?  that  The g o s s i p who shapes h i s s t o r y , g i v i n g form t o  h i s e x p e r i e n c e s , undergoes the same b a s i c processes as the 23 w r i t e r of f i c t i o n a l l i t e r a t u r e .  Of course, each has a  d i f f e r e n t audience, but both, as they move out of the exp r e s s i v e mode, become caught up i n the t e l l i n g o f the s t o r y ; the s t o r y becomes something  important f o r i t s own sake,  94  something t o be shaped.  "As e x p r e s s i v e w r i t i n g moves  towards p o e t i c , " s t a t e s B r i t t o n , audience  " ... i t reaches a wider  ... by h e i g h t e n i n g or i n t e n s i f y i n g the  implicit.  By the d e l i b e r a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n s of sounds, words, images, events, f e e l i n g s  by formal arrangement i n other words  -- p o e t i c w r i t i n g i s a b l e to g i v e resonance  to items which  i n a l e s s c a r e f u l l y o r g a n i z e d u t t e r a n c e would be so i n e x p l i c i t -- so m i n i m a l l y supported or e x p l a i n e d i n the t e x t •— as to be merely p u z z l i n g to a reader who  was  not  inti-  24 mate w i t h the w r i t e r and h i s audience." L i t e r a t u r e , then, i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of language use i n the s p e c t a t o r mode and B r i t t o n views a work of e r a t u r e as a s p e c i a l convention whereby the author  lit-  'dis-  cusses'' some p o s s i b i l i t y of experience w i t h the r e a d e r . L i t e r a t u r e , of course, i s communication of a s p e c i a l The  sort.  s o p h i s t i c a t e d reader i s aware t h a t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h the author i s a s p e c i a l one. jectified;  The w r i t i n g i s ob-  the events read or heard are not r e a l ,  but  25 virtual.  In r e a d i n g a work of l i t e r a t u r e we  i l l u s i o n of having an experience; of  experienced events.  s t o r y , says B r i t t o n ,  "The  have the  t h e r e i s a semblance  s a t i s f a c t i o n I have i n the  " i s the k i n d of s a t i s f a c t i o n 1 de-  r i v e , not from having an experience, but from l o o k i n g back  95  on one I have had:  i t i s as though I were to go back over 26  an experience I have hot had!"  Thus, f o r B r i t t o n ,  experience of l i t e r a t u r e i s not v i c a r i o u s but, as i t were, v i c a r i o u s s p e c t a t i n g .  the  participation, Literature  en-  a b l e s us to achieve an i m a g i n a t i v e i n s i g h t i n t o the exper i e n c e s of o t h e r s . Here B r i t t o n i n t e g r a t e s another i d e a from IT.  Chapter  Both I s e r and H o l l a n d made c l a i m s t h a t a work of  e r a t u r e i s an experience which the reader undergoes.  litLess  e x p l i c i t l y , Booth, P o u l e t , and S l a t o f f support t h i s view as well.  B r i t t o n r e l a t e s two  important concepts:  literature  as experience and l i t e r a t u r e as u t t e r a n c e .  Now  to see how  How,  the two n o t i o n s are compatible.  we  are able  then, does  B r i t t o n account f o r our a e s t h e t i c responses t o l i t e r a t u r e ? B r i t t o n accounts f o r them much i n the same way Dewey has accounted  f o r our responses to a r t .  as  The power  of l i t e r a t u r e , taken i n B r i t t o n ' s sense of v i r t u a l exper i e n c e , i s t h a t i t can be as f o r m a t i v e as raw  experience.  The processes which are c a l l e d i n t o p l a y i n the a s s i m i l a t i o n of primary e x p e r i e n c e , can a l s o be c a l l e d i n t o p l a y to a s s i m i l a t e v i r t u a l e x p e r i e n c e .  We  are a b l e , and some-  times f o r c e d , t o r e c o n s t r u c t our world view. states:  " ... new  experiences are i n t e r p r e t e d ,  Britton structured  96  i n the l i g h t of the o l d , and i n t h a t m o d i f i e d form porated:  incor-  the body of experience, the world r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  i s m o d i f i e d , r e i n t e r p r e t e d , i n the l i g h t of the new, i t s comparative  u n i t y and coherence  and  as f a r as p o s s i b l e  27 maintained."  We  a c q u i r e i m a g i n a t i v e i n s i g h t i n t o the  experience of o t h e r s , thereby b u i l d i n g up the s o c i a l t e x t i n which we  live.  "Looked back on," B r i t t o n  con-  states,  "the experience o t h e r s have r e l a t e d merge i n t o the exper i e n c e s we  have had o u r s e l v e s :  as a b a s i s f o r making  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s , judgments d e c i s i o n s , we We  c a l l upon both.  become experienced people, i n other words, as a r e s u l t H  of the f u s i o n of other peoples' experience w i t h our  2?  own.  B r i t t o n maintains u l t i m a t e l y t h a t t h e r e i s a p o s i t i v e human need f o r the s p e c t a t o r r o l e —  the need t o preserve  our world views from fragmentation.  A c c o r d i n g t o Dewey,  t h i s p r e s e r v a t i o n o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the world view i s the source of the a e s t h e t i c emotion.  I t f o l l o w s t h a t our  c a p a c i t y to a s s i m i l a t e v i r t u a l experience i s not constant;  the a b i l i t y to respond  (literature) to more s o p h i s -  t i c a t e d works of l i t e r a t u r e i s r e l a t e d t o a corresponding growth of the world view.  Our  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of  response  to l i t e r a t u r e w i l l grow as we g a i n more experience i n both l i f e and l i t e r a t u r e .  We  have a l l had the experience of  r e - r e a d i n g a novel and f i n d i n g what was  once engrossing  97  r e - r e a d i n g a novel and f i n d i n g what was has Become f l a t and t r i v i a l . of  once e n g r o s s i n g  But t h e r e are other works  l i t e r a t u r e which grow i n r i c h n e s s as we grow, and  some we  even  f i n d rewarding where once we were i n c a p a b l e of  response.  For B r i t t o n , t h i s i n v o l v e s the p e r c e p t i o n of  forms i n l i t e r a t u r e . d)  P e r c e p t i o n of Form In  to  the s p e c t a t o r r o l e , j u s t as the w r i t e r i s a b l e  concentrate on the form of h i s w r i t i n g , so the reader  i s a b l e t o pay more a t t e n t i o n t o form.  For B r i t t o n ,  the  p e r c e p t i o n of forms i n l i t e r a t u r e i s not excluded to the p e r c e p t i o n of the forms of the medium i t s e l f ;  we  p e r c e i v e the p a t t e r n of events and the changing and i n t e r a c t i o n s of f e e l i n g .  tensions  Our a B i l i t y to p e r c e i v e  l i t e r a r y form i s g r a d u a l l y achieved. i n c r e a s e s , " says B r i t t o n ,  also  "Our  sense of  form  "as our frame of r e f e r e n c e of  r e a l i t y grows w i t h experience, primary and  secondary,  of  28 the world we  live in."  As we  p e r i e n c e more of the world, we  read more and as we  are a b l e t o respond  s o p h i s t i c a t e d works of l i t e r a t u r e .  The  tween the a c q u i s i t i o n of both primary and  ex-  t o more  interaction  be-  secondary  expe-  r i e n c e i s r e c i p r o c a l , each extending the o t h e r .  "Progress  98  / i n p e r c e i v i n g l i t e r a r y form/ l i e s i n p e r c e i v i n g more complex p a t t e r n s  of events," says B r i t t o n , " i n p i c k -  i n g up c l u e s more w i d e l y separated character,  and  gradually  and more d i v e r s e i n  i n f i n d i n g s a t i s f a c t i o n i n patterns  events l e s s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o ... e x p e c t a t i o n s particularly  ... d e s i r e s ;  of  and,  more  at the same time, i t l i e s i n  a l s o p e r c e i v i n g the form of the v a r y i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s between elements i n the s t o r y and  r e a l i t y , as i n c r e a s i n g l y  /"~we_7 ... come to know t h a t commodity." 30 to which we  Thus the forms  respond i n l i t e r a t u r e , are not c o n f i n e d  the l i n g u i s t i c forms.  Britton states:  ." ... the forms  of language i t s e l f -- i t s words w i t h t h e i r meanings a s s o c i a t i o n s , i t s syntax, i t s sounds and ages  to  and  rhythms, i t s im-  these c o n t r i b u t e to the t o t a l form, not as f r i n g e 31  b e n e f i t s but as i n s e p a r a b l e  elements of a s i n g l e e f f e c t . "  B r i t t o n sees a d i s t o r t i o n i n responding only to l i n g u i s t i c apparatus.  Here B r i t t o n draws upon Langer's  d i s t i n c t i o n between d i s c u r s i v e and form:  non-discursive  "A work of a r t ... i s not a sequence of  a l l y r e l a t e d symbolic items —  I t has  r e f l e c t s i n some way  symbolic  systematic-  as a l o g i c a l v e r b a l s t a t e -  ment i s , or an a l g e b r a i c equation — p l e t e symbol.  the  'organic'  the t e n s i o n s  but  i s i t s e l f a com-  shape, t h a t i s to say i t and  rhythms t h a t  are  99  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of every a c t of a l l l i v i n g achieves uniqueness  creatures.  It  and u n i t y as a r e s u l t of the way  div-  erse modes of experience i n t e r l o c k w i t h i n i t s h i g h l y  com-  32 plex s t r u c t u r e . "  A s u c c e s s f u l p i e c e of  literature  possesses s i g n i f i c a n t form or v i t a l import, much as any other work of a r t .  Our response t o t h a t v i t a l import  be, i n Dewey's sense, d i r e c t and  will  unreasoned.  A work of l i t e r a t u r e does not l e a d d i s c u r s i v e l y to an i n s i g h t :  rather, i t i s a constituted insight.  In  Dewey's words, i t does the deed t h a t breeds i n s i g h t . Langer  and B r i t t o n the term  'meaning' as a p p l i e d to a r t ,  i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e and m i s l e a d i n g ; ing.  For  a r t has import not mean-  J u s t as the import of a work of a r t cannot be  p l a i n e d , so there can be no formulas f o r producing works of a r t and, hence, i m i t a t i o n s are shabby.  ex-  genuine The  per-  c e p t i o n of form i n l i t e r a t u r e i n v o l v e s a paradox of s o r t s : a p i e c e of l i t e r a t u r e i s a n o n - d i s c u r s i v e symbolic which takes what we normally regard as d i s c u r s i v e for  i t s matter.  form symbols  Moreover, our h a n d l i n g of these d i s c u r -  s i v e symbols on t h e i r own  terms i s t i e d c l o s e l y t o our p e r -  sonal growth, our world view.  To contemplate  form i n  l i t e r a t u r e p r e s e n t s us w i t h a problem which does not con33 f r o n t us i n the other a r t s , for l i t e r a t u r e presents  100  us w i t h an a l l - e m b r a c i n g ' s i g n i f i c a n t form' which u n i f i e s the p i e c e o f l i t e r a t u r e and i s the essence o f i t s import. L i t e r a t u r e , then, i s v i r t u a l experience, a k i n d o f v i c a r i o u s way of s p e c t a t i n g on other peoples'  experience.  L i t e r a t u r e , i n B r i t t o n s view, can serve a purpose which r  i s q u i t e pragmatic.  Reading l i t e r a t u r e i s one o f sev-  e r a l i m a g i n a t i v e s p e c t a t o r a c t i v i t i e s which f u n c t i o n s '•' ... t o p r e s e r v e our view o f the world from  fragmentation  and disharmony, t o m a i n t a i n i t as something we can con34 t i n u e t o l i v e w i t h as h a p p i l y as may be." as we have seen, t h i s a l s o accounts responses  to l i t e r a t u r e .  F o r Dewey,  f o r our a e s t h e t i c  A c c o r d i n g t o B r i t t o n we  cease  to operate on the a c t u a l world v i a the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n we have made of i t ^ and begin t o operate d i r e c t l y on the representation I t s e l f .  "Why do men improvise upon t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the world?" B r i t t o n asks.  "Basically  because we never cease t o long f o r more l i v e s than the one we have;  i n the r o l e of s p e c t a t o r we can p a r t i c i p a t e i n 35 an i n f i n i t e number." B r i t t o n ' s theory p r o v i d e s a s t r u c t u r e through which we are b e t t e r able t o e v a l u a t e the nature and t r e n d of the ' a f f e c t i v e ' c r i t i c i s m d e s c r i b e d i n the p r e v i o u s chapter.  He s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t e g r a t e s i t s two major ideas  101  which p r e v i o u s l y appeared somewhat u n r e l a t e d as a e s t h e t i c experience and  as a e s t h e t i c use  —  literature  i s r e l a t e d to o r d i n a r y  experience,  of language i s r e l a t e d to o r d i n a r y  use of language. el  Implications The  t h e o r i e s d e l i n e a t e d i n Chapter I I  represent,  a t l e a s t i n p a r t , a t r e n d t h a t i s a r e a c t i o n to the tremes of New was  C r i t i c i s m where i t was  ex-  assumed t h a t a poem  an autonomous v e r b a l o b j e c t , the meaning of which  i n g more or l e s s e t e r n a l . to l i t e r a t u r e has  That we  respond a e s t h e t i c a l l y  always been taken f o r granted.  * a f f e c t i v e ' c r i t i c s have a l s o proposed t h a t we a work of l i t e r a t u r e as an experience or both*  or an  The  respond to  utterance,  James B r i t t o n s u b s t a n t i a t e s t h i s new  ment i n c r i t i c a l t h i n k i n g ;  be-  develop-  he i s , i n f a c t , i n the main-  stream of i t even though he i s not even a l i t e r a r y  critic.  B r i t t o n ""s theory of l i t e r a r y response m a i n t a i n s ,  first,  that l i t e r a t u r e i s a manifestation  activity  i n the s p e c t a t o r mode, and  that i t i s a natural  of q u i t e o r d i n a r y language use. a non-discursive emotional import; events or  symbolic  of l i n g u i s t i c  extension  A work of l i t e r a t u r e i s  form possessed of a p a r t i c u l a r  i t conveys the i l l u s i o n of  • v i r t u a l experience'.  experienced  I t i s t h i s semblance of  102  experienced events t o which we respond. t u r e enacts i t s meaning; able meaning.  A work of l i t e r a -  i t i s not a r e p o s i t o r y of e x t r a c t -  I t 'does i t s meaning*, and i s , i t s e l f , the  most p e r f e c t e x p r e s s i o n  of what i t means.  B r i t t o n has c l e a r l y demonstrated the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the ideas of viewing l i t e r a t u r e as a r t , l i t e r a t u r e as experience, and l i t e r a t u r e as a p a r t i c u l a r l i n g u i s t i c 36 phenomenon ( u t t e r a n c e ) . fective'  1  The d i f f i c u l t y w i t h the ' a f -  c r i t i c s i s t h a t none adequately i n t e g r a t e s these  views o f l i t e r a t u r e .  Undoubtedly what enables B r i t t o n  to g a i n an advantageous p e r s p e c t i v e  on l i t e r a t u r e i s sim-  p l y t h a t he i s not s o l e l y preoccupied w i t h l i t e r a t u r e and l i t e r a r y theory. more g e n e r a l  H i s main concern i s t o e s t a b l i s h a  theory  of language use and t h i s n e c e s s a r i l y  leads him i n t o other  fields —  psychology, l i n g u i s t i c s .  philosophy,  sociology,  . Indeed, h i s theory  i s a l l the  more s i g n i f i c a n t because much of i t has been d e r i v e d actual observation  of man's l i n g u i s t i c  from  habits.  The major i m p l i c a t i o n o f B r i t t o n ' s theory i t f u r n i s h e s a new way of l o o k i n g a t l i t e r a t u r e .  i s that Stanley  F i s h has mentioned t h e t the meaning of a work o f l i t e r a t u r e l i e s i n what i t does, and t h a t t o view i t as a r e p o s i t o r y o f e x t r a c t a b l e meaning i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  103  Perhaps we have f o r t o o long tended t o view p i e c e s of l i t e r a t u r e as a r t i f a c t s or p r o d u c t s .  According to  Dewey, Langer, and B r i t t o n , works of a r t ( l i t e r a t u r e i n cluded) a r e n o n - d i s c u r s i v e symbolic forms which possess a v i t a l import t o which we respond i n t u i t i v e l y .  Some of  our responses may be phrased i n d i s c u r s i v e language, but e q u a l l y , many may w e l l not be amenable t o d i s c u r s i v e Langer has suggested t h a t a r t e x i s t s because  o f the i n -  a b i l i t y of d i s c u r s i v e forms t o accommodate the f u l l ing'  of l i f e ,  forms.  'mean-  A l l t h i s suggests t h a t i t i s wrong t o  s a n c t i o n o n l y d i s c u r s i v e responses, as New C r i t i c i s m d i d . One may a l s o q u e s t i o n the study and t e a c h i n g of l i t e r a t u r e as i f i t were a body of knowledge w i t h e x t r a c t a b l e meaning;  we have perhaps  long been l a b o u r i n g under an i l l u -  sion. In  "The Role o f Fantasy," B r i t t o n suggests t h a t i t  i s a p p r o p r i a t e to view l i t e r a t u r e children's play.  i n the same l i g h t as  His claim f o r play i s that i t allows a  c h i l d t o improvise upon h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the world in  order t o extend i t o r make sense of i t .  In other words,  .play i s a process by which a c h i l d l e a r n s t o handle the n o n - d i s c u r s i v e a s p e c t s of h i s e x p e r i e n c e .  In a sense,  then, the end r e s u l t of p l a y i s r a t h e r p r a c t i c a l .  He  104  holds a s i m i l a r view of l i t e r a t u r e ; of  l i t e r a t u r e , we a r e not examining  are i n v o l v e d i n a process — to our p e r s o n a l growth.  vhen we read works them as p r o d u c t s , we  one which i s c l o s e l y  related  We assume the s p e c t a t o r r o l e ,  where we are i n v o l v e d i n d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h other human bei n g s , much the same as we g o s s i p w i t h one another the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f l i f e . normative  view o f l i t e r a t u r e .  about  Thus, B r i t t o n holds a nonHe c o n s i d e r s any w r i t i n g  i n the s p e c t a t o r mode as l i t e r a t u r e . B r i t t o n ' s p e r s p e c t i v e on l i t e r a t u r e  One might diagram thus:  105  A work o f l i t e r a t u r e p l a c e d i n B r i t t o n ' s p e r s p e c t i v e tends t o disappear  as an objects of c d i s c u r s i v e : : study.  There a r e a l s o consequent r a m i f i c a t i o n s f o r what has  long been c a l l e d  ' a e s t h e t i c response?;  Britton  would say t h a t a l l of what we come t o c a l l experience i n the s p e c t a t o r r o l e i s a e s t h e t i c , a work o f a r t o r l i t e r a t u r e p r o v i d i n g a very that r o l e .  s p e c i a l k i n d o f experience i n  Dewey's theory c e r t a i n l y supports t h i s  view o f t h i n g s .  Langer claims t h a t there is a s i d e o f  man which i s ' a r t i s t i c ' by nature and which w i l l itself;  manifest  t h i s s i d e of man might be c a l l e d man i n the  spectator r o l e .  One can say, I t h i n k t h a t i t i s our  s p e c t a t o r r o l e a c t i v i t y which p r o v i d e s element i n our l i v e s .  the a e s t h e t i c  Our r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a work  of a r t i s a proce ss which, i d e a l l y , continues a lifetime.  T h i s process  a l e a r n i n g experience  throughout  might a p p r o p r i a t e l y be c a l l e d  f o r our p e r s o n a l growth i s i n t i -  mately i m p l i c a t e d . B r i t t o n ' s experience  as an educator p r o v i d e s him  w i t h a view of l i t e r a t u r e as a m a n i f e s t a t i o n 'Tanguaging' a c t i v i t y .  of man's  A p i e c e o f l i t e r a t u r e i s not only  an acknowledged c l a s s i c , i t i s a l s o a schoolboy's poem about t a d p o l e s .  The s i n g l e most i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t about  106  B r i t t o n s theory i s t h a t he q u i t e l i t e r a l l y puts r  literature  i n i t s p l a c e , and he i s a b l e to do so because h i s perspect i v e i s not s o l e l y uage r e f l e c t s ,  literary.  His p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h l a n g -  i n turn, a preoccupation with  thus the t i t l e of h i s book.  learning:  To expand one's view of the  world i s to l e a r n , and l i t e r a t u r e p r o v i d e s an i n v a l u a b l e source of secondary we  experience by which t o do t h i s .  read l i t e r a t u r e and respond  to i t , we  o u r s e l v e s and about the world around us. such  l e a r n <— For  ' l e a r n i n g ' i s the a e s t h e t i c experience of  As  about  Britton literature.  10(7  Footnotes  James N. B r i t t o n , "The Role o f Fantasy," E n g l i s h i n Education, V.3 (Winter, 1971), p. 42 1  2 James N, B r i t t o n , Language and Learning r p t . London: P e l i c a n Books, 1972), p. 13  (1970;  3 The theory o f the s p e c t a t o r - p a r t i c i p a n t r o l e s was f i r s t put f o r t h by D.W. Harding i n two essays. The ideas he proposed i n "The Role o f the Onlooker" {_ S c r u t i n y , V I , 3 (1937), pp. 247-58_/-he l a t e r developed i n " P s y c h o l o g i c a l Processes i n the--Reading of F i c t i o n " / B r i t i s h J o u r n a l of A e s t h e t i c s , I I 2 (1962), pp. 133-45_7Harding proposes t h a t i n these r o l e s we a r e i n v o l v e d i n d i f f e r e n t modes of a c t i v i t y : PARTICIPANT  *  »  I evert .... activity  SPECTATOR  } intellectual . . comprehension  c  .. perception *  detached . . . evaluation  In the p a r t i c i p a n t r o l e we engage i n p u r p o s e f u l a c t i o n i t s e l f , a c t i v i t y t o g e t p r a c t i c a l t h i n g s done i n the world. But we a l s o comprehend i n t e 1 T e c t u a 1 l y t h i n g s around us, as (say) i n f i g u r i n g out how a machine works. As w e l l , we look a t t h i n g s and l i s t e n t o them, n o t always t o understand them i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , but sometimes t o o r g a n i z e them a t the l e v e l o r p e r c e p t i o n ; we study a phenomenon o r an experience f o r i t s own sake (as i n l o o k i n g a t a s t r e t c h of landscape or studying the s t r u c t u r e o f a b u i l d i n g ) and make no attempt t o "evaluate. In t h i s mode o f p e r c e p t i o n We are p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the p a t t e r n of t h i n g s . Harding s t a t e s t h a t we attempt: " ... the e f f o r t simply to extend and r e f i n e our p e r c e p t u a l experience and t o u n i f y i t i n t o i n c r e a s i n g l y complex and s u b t l e wholes,  108  always a t the l e v e l of p e r c e p t i o n . " ("The Role of the Onlooker," p. 249). F u n c t i o n i n g i n t h i s mode of p e r c e p t i o n , however, we o f t e n cease t o a p p r e c i a t e the mere p a t t e r n of t h i n g s . In l o o k i n g a t the p a t t e r n of a country s i d e , f o r example, we might o f t e n make statements about how p l e a s a n t the view i s , or how i t reminds us of the p l a c e where we grew up. A s u b t l e s h i f t has taken p l a c e : we have adopted the r o l e of s p e c t a t o r . We are no longer concerned about e s t a b l i s h i n g a coherent, acc u r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the world. The mode o f the s p e c t a t o r r o l e i s the mode of detached e v a l u a t i o n .  Language and L e a r n i n g , p.  104  D. W. Harding s t a t e s i n "The Role of the Onlooker": "The event we look on a t from a d i s t a n c e a f f e c t s us, but i t i s s e t i n a wider c o n t e x t than the u r g e n c i e s of p a r t i c i p a t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s u s u a l l y permit us t o c a l l up around events. And f o r t h i s reason, i f we c o u l d o b l i t e r a t e the e f f e c t s on a man of a l l o c c a s i o n s when he was 'merely a s p e c t a t o r ' i t would be p r o f o u n d l y to a l t e r h i s c h a r a c t e r and o u t l o o k . " (p. 253)  ' Harding s t a t e s i n " P s y c h o l o g i c a l Processes i n the Reading o f F i c t i o n " : "Detached and d i s t a n c e d e v a l u a t i o n i s sometimes sharper f o r a v o i d i n g the b l u r r i n g s and b u f f e r i n g s t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t a c t i o n b r i n g s , and the spect a t o r o f t e n sees the event i n a broader c o n t e x t than the p a r t i c i p a n t can t o l e r a t e . " (p. 136)  Language and L e a r n i n g , p.  121  9 In "The Role of the Onlooker," Harding s t a t e s : "Gossip i s the second method through which the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of experience r e p o r t e d or imagined -- may be communicated and e v a l u a t e d . " (p.257)  109  10  11  12  13  15  Language arid L e a r n i n g , p. 116  Language arid L e a r n i n g , p. 19  See  Language arid L e a r n i n g , p. 190 f f .  I b i d . , p. 21  Language arid L e a r n i n g , pp. 105-106  16  The model i s l a r g e l y adapted from B r i t t o n . I have added the ' s c i e n t i f i c mode' and the ' a r t i s t i c mode'. 17 James N. B r i t t o n , "Response t o L i t e r a t u r e , " Response t o L i t e r a t u r e : The Dartmouth Seminar Papers, ed, James R. Squire (Champaign, 111,: N.C.T.E., 1968), p. 9 18 In " P s y c h o l o g i c a l Processes i n the Reading of F i c t i o n , " Harding's i n t e n t i o n i s " ... t o view the reading of a novel as a process of l o o k i n g on a t a representa^ t i o n of imagined events, o r , r a t h e r , of l i s t e n i n g to a d e s c r i p t i o n o f them." (p.134) 19 Collingwood_has s a i d : _ "The audience i s p e r p e t u a l l y present t o / t h e a r t i s t / as a f a c t o r i n h i s a r t i s t i c labour; not as an a n t i - a e s t h e t i c f a c t o r , c o r r u p t ing t h e s i n c e r i t y of h i s work by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f reput a t i o n and reward, but as an a e s t h e t i c f a c t o r , d e f i n i n g what the problem i s which as an a r t i s t he i s t r y i n g t o solve what emotions he i s t o express — and what cons t i t u t e s a s o l u t i o n of i t . The audience which the a r t i s t thus f e e l s as c o l l a b o r a t i n g w i t h h i m s e l f may be a l a r g e one o r a small one, but i t i s never absent.  iao  An apparant c o n t r a d i c t i o n of t h i s would be somet h i n g l i k e Paradise L o s t , where M i l t o n s t a t e s h i s i n t e n t i o n i s t o j u s t i f y God's way to man. Yet the f u l f i l l ment (or f a i l u r e to do so) of t h i s i n t e n t i o n i s not r e a l l y why we a p p r e c i a t e M i l t o n ' s e p i c .  D i s c u s s i o n s of l i f e may i n c l u d e , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , events which are c l e a r l y not p o s s i b l e i n r e a l i t y — fantasies. "In a l l forms of f a n t a s y , " s t a t e s Harding, "whether dreams, day-dreams, p r i v a t e musings or make-believe p l a y , we g i v e e x p r e s s i o n to p e r f e c t l y r e a l preoccupations, f e a r s , and d e s i r e s , however b i z a r r e or impossible the imagined events embodying them." ("Psychological Processes i n the Reading of F i c t i o n , " p. 136)  Harding e l a b o r a t e s ; "The ' d i s c u s s i o n ' may seem a one-sided a f f a i r s i n c e the reader i s unable to answer back. But he i s none the l e s s a c t i v e i n a c c e p t i n g or r e j e c t i n g what the author a s s e r t s . In the f i r s t p l a c e , the author o f f e r s what he claims to be p o s s i b i l i t y of experience; the reader may i n e f f e c t say 'No: that a c t i o n of the hero i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what he has s a i d or done b e f o r e ; t h a t monster of i n i q u i t y i s n ' t humanly possible; t h a t sudden repentence c o u l d never have happened ... '• Secondly, the author conveys what he r e gards as a p p r o p r i a t e a t t i t u d e s towards events, charact e r s and a c t i o n s . He i s c o n s t a n t l y <— but of course t a c i t l y — saying: ' I s n ' t t h i s e x c i t i n g ... He's a t t r a c t i v e , i s n ' t he ... Wasn't t h a t t r a g i c ... Isn't t h i s moving ...?' Again the reader accepts or r e j e c t s the i m p l i e d assessments." ( I b i d . , pp 139-40)  " B r i t t o n ' s u l t i m a t e c l a i m holds f o r poetry as well: "spectator r o l e a c t i v i t y i s p r i m a r i l y a s s i m i l a t i v e in function. Freed from the demands made upon us as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the world's a f f a i r s , we are able to take more f u l l y i n t o account our experience as a whole. To put the same p o i n t r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t l y , even where a poet may focus narrowly upon some t i n y p a r t i c u l a r such as a snowflake, y e t i t i s w i t h the whole of h i m s e l f t h a t he  11BL  looks. T h i s item of h i s experience becomes as i t were a s m a l l peephole through which we can see a g r e a t d e a l of his personality. A concern w i t h the world-as'-I-haveknown-it, w i t h my t o t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , i s e s s e n t i a l l y an a s s i m i l a t i v e a c t i v i t y — a d i g e s t i v e a c t i v i t y , i f the crude f i g u r e can be accepted." ("The Role of Fantasy," p.- 42) A l s o , Langer s t a t e s : "Every s u c c e s s f u l work of l i t e r a t u r e ... i s an i l l u s i o n of e x p e r i e n c e . I t always c r e a t e s the semblance of mental process — t h a t i s , of l i v i n g thought, awareness of events and a c t i o n s , memory, reflection, etc. Yet t h e r e need not be any person i n the v i r t u a l world who sees and r e p o r t s . The semblance of l i f e i s simply the mode i n which v i r t u a l events are made." (Feeling and Form, p. 245) Although t h e r e i s an obvious d i f f e r e n c e between l y r i c p o e t r y (say) and the n o v e l , Langer suggests the d i f f e r e n c e i s i n r h e t o r i c not i n k i n d : "The v i r t u a l h i s t o r y t h a t a l y r i c poem c r e a t e s i s the occurence of a l i v i n g thought, the sweep of an emotion, the i n t e n s e experience of a mood ... The r h e t o r i c a l form / " i n l y r i c expression_7 i s a means of c r e a t i n g an impersonal subj e c t i v i t y , which i s the p e c u l i a r e x p e r i e n t i a l i l l u s i o n of a genre t h a t c r e a t e s no c h a r a c t e r s and no p u b l i c events." (pp. 259-60)  Language and L e a r n i n g , p.  177  B r i t t o n adopts the n o t i o n of v i r t u a l experience from Langer. One of Langer's b a s i c t e n e t s i s t h a t a l l works of a r t c r e a t e i l l u s i o n s of r e a l i t y . " A l l forms i n a r t , " she says, " ... are a b s t r a c t e d forms: T h e i r cont e n t i s o n l y a semblance, a pure appearance, whose f u n c t i o n i s to make them, too, apparent — more f r e e l y and wholly apparent than they c o u l d be i f they were exemplif i e d i n a context of r e a l circumstance and anxious i n terest. I t i s i n t h i s elementary sense t h a t a l l a r t i s abstract. I t s very substance, q u a l i t y without p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , i s an a b s t r a c t i o n from m a t e r i a l  112  existence." ( F e e l i n g and Form, pp. 50-51) Thus, she says, i n l i t e r a t u r e the poet " ... uses d i s c o u r s e t o c r e a t e an i l l u s i o n , a pure appearance, which i s nond i s c u r s i v e symbolic form." (p. 211) The d i s c u r s i v e forms of language when used i n l i t e r a t u r e become, i n a sense, t r a n s p a r e n t i n o r d e r to f a c i l i t a t e the p o e t i c iTIusion. "The experiences of events i n our a c t u a l l i v e s , " says Langer, are fragmentary, t r a n s i e n t , and o f t e n i n d e f i n i t e , l i k e most of our e x p e r i e n c e s — like the space we move i n , the time we f e e l p a s s i n g , the human and inhuman f o r c e s t h a t c h a l l e n g e us. The poet's business i s to c r e a t e the appearance of 'experiences,' the semblance of events l i v e d and f e l t , and to o r g a n i z e them so they c o n s t i t u t e a p u r e l y and completely experienced r e a l i t y , a piece of v i r t u a l l i f e . " (p.212) The key t o understanding a r t , f o r Langer, l i e s i n the p r i n c i p l e t h a t we are p e r p e t u a l l y c o n s t r u c t i n g a sense of wholeness i n our world; the work of a r t e l i c i t s and accentuates t h i s sense of wholeness. Thus, a s t a t u e , to i l l u s t r a t e from the p l a s t i c a r t s , c r e a t e s i t s own t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l u n i v e r s e by c r e a t i n g the i l l u s i o n of wholeness, of v i r t u a l k i n e t i c volume, out of the i n f i n i t y of volume around i t ; i t makes t a c t u a l space v i s i b l e . The p l a s t i c a r t s , Langer says, c r e a t e the primary i l l u s i o n o f v i r t u a l space. The primary i l l u s i o n of l i t e r a t u r e , she says, xs v i r t u a l e x p e r i e n c e . J u s t as language i s the dynamic symbolism of d i s c u r s i v e thought, so, i n a r t , i t has the a b i l i t y to r e p r e s e n t experience i n t i m a t e l y , i n f a c t , c r e a t e the i l l u s i o n of e x p e r i e n c e . "Every s u c c e s s f u l work of l i t e r a t u r e , " s t a t e s Langer, "... > always c r e a t e s the semblance of mental process — t h a t i s , of l i v i n g thought, awareness of events and a c t i o n s , memory, and r e f l e c t i o n ... " (p. 245)  Language arid L e a r n i n g , p.  103  Language and L e a r n i n g , p.  117  28 I b j d . , p.  116  113  2 9 'Response 30  31  32  t o L i t e r a t u r e , " p. 5  I b i d . , pp:~ .4-5  I b i d . , p.  5  Language and Learning, p.  214  33 Langer, i n c l a i m i n g t h a t any s u c c e s s f u l , poem i s a n o n - d i s c u r s i v e symbolic form, c l a i m s insistence upon the e x t r a c t a b l e meaning of a p i e c e of l i t e r a t u r e i s caused by a c o n f u s i o n i n r e a l i z i n g t h a t the a r t i s t has used l i n g u i s t i c ( d i s c u r s i v e ) forms as a medium to c r e a t e a n o n - d i s c u r s i v e symbol. "The n a t u r a l r e s u l t of the c o n f u s i o n between d i s c o u r s e and c r e a t i o n , " she s t a t e s , ' i s a p a r a l l e l c o n f u s i o n between a c t u a l and v i r t u a l experiences. The problem of " A r t and L i f e , " which i s only of secondary importance f o r the other a r t s , becomes a central issue i n l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m . " This confusion has i m p l i c a t e d l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m i n what Langer charact e r i z e s as a "welter of morals and p o l i t i c s , r e l i g i o n and modern p s y c h i a t r y . " ( F e e l i n g and Form, pp. 234-235) 34 Language and L e a r n i n g , p.  117  35 "Response  to L i t e r a t u r e , " pp.9-10  36 For an i n t e r e s t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of B r i t t o n ' s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of language use i n v o l v i n g spec i f i c works of l i t e r a t u r e , see the second chapter, "The Modes of D i s c o u r s e , " of a d i s s e r t a t i o n by A r t h u r Applebee /"The S p e c t a t o r Role: T h e o r e t i c a l and Developmental S t u d i e s of Ideas about and Responses t o L i t e r a t u r e , with  U S  S p e c i a l Reference t o Four Age L e v e l s , unpublished d i s s e r tation (The U n i v e r s i t y of London, 1973) .y  115  BIBLIOGRAPHY Applebee, A r t h u r N. The S p e c t a t o r Role: T h e o r e t i c a l and Developmental S t u d i e s of Ideas about arid Responses to L i t e r a t u r e , w i t h S p e c i a l Reference to Four Age Levels, unpublished d i s s e r t a t i o n . University of London, 1973. Barthes, Roland. "An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the S t r u c t u r a l i s t A n a l y s i s of N a r r a t i v e . " New L i t e r a r y H i s t o r y . VI, 2 (1975), 237-72. _______ "The S t r u c t u r a l i s t A c t i v i t y . " The S t r u c t u r a l i s t s : : From Marx to L e v i - S t r a u s s • ed. R i c h a r d T. DeGeorge and Fernande M. DeGeorge. Garden C i t y , New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972, 148-54. Booth, Wayne C. The R h e t o r i c of F i c t i o n . Chicago: The U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1970. B r a n s f o r d , J , D., B a r c l a y , J , R., and Franks, J , J . "Sentence Memory: A C o n s t r u c t i v e Versus I n t e r p r e t i v e Approach." C o g n i t i v e Psychology. I l l (1972), 193-209. B r i t t o n , James N, Language arid L e a r n i n g . P e l i c a n Books, 1972.  London:  "Response to Literature.'.? Response to Lite"ra"ture: The Dartmouth Seminar Papers ed. James R. S q u i r e . 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II, 2(1962),  133-47T  '' "Response to L i t e r a t u r e : The Report of the Study Group." Response to L i t e r a t u r e : The Dartmouth Seminar Papers. ed. James R. S q u i r e . Champaign, 111: N.C.T.E., 1968, 11-29. . "The Role of the Onlooker." VI, 3(1937), 247-58.  Scrutiny.  H o l l a n d , Norman N. The Dynamics of L i t e r a r y Response. New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968.  117  I s e r , Wolfgang. "Indeterminacy and the Reader's Response i n Prose F i c t i o n . " Aspects o f N a r r a t i v e . ed. J. H i l l i s M i l l e r . BerKeiey: -rne u n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1972, 1-45. ________ Approach." 279-99.  "The Reading P r o c e s s : A Phenomenological New L i t e r a r y H i s t o r y I I I (1972),  K e l l y , George A. A Theory of P e r s o n a l i t y : The Psychologyof P e r s o n a l C o n s t r u c t s . New York: W. W. Norton and Company, I n c . , 1963. Langer, Susanne K. 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"The A f f e c t i v e F a l l a c y . " The V e r b a l Icon: S t u d i e s i n the Meaning of P o e t r y . Lexington, Ky: The U n i v e r s i t y Press of Kentucky, 1954, 21-39.  

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