Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Study of the content, sources, and development of Malaysian foreign policy, 1957-1975 Saravanamuttu, Jayaratnam 1976

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1976_A1 S27.pdf [ 12.67MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0093814.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0093814-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0093814-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0093814-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0093814-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0093814-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0093814-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0093814-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0093814.ris

Full Text

A STUDY OF THE CONTENT, SOURCES, AND DEVELOPMENT OF MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1957 - 1975 by JAYARATNAM SARAVANAMUTTU M.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (The Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June, 1976 c) Jayaratnam Saravanarauttu, 1976 In presenting th is thesis in par t ia l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library shal l make it f reely avai lable for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thesis for scholar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publ icat ion of this thesis for f inanc ia l gain shal l not be allowed without my writ ten pe rm i ss i on . Department of P o l i t i c a l science The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date June 30. 1976 ABSTRACT Foreign policy studies of Third World countries i n general have been either very narrow i n their focus, such as those based on the nonalignment theme, or comprehensive without being h i s t o r i c a l l y dynamic i n their analysis, such as the eff o r t s of the comparative scholars of foreign policy. Other studies have focused primarily on the idiosyncracies of Third World leaders i n explaining foreign policy. This study i s aimed at correcting these deficiencies through the study of the content, sources and development of Malaysian foreign policy across different issue-areas and over three h i s t o r i c a l periods spanning the years 1957 - 1975. By means of an a p r i o r i dynamic framework of foreign policy analysis, t h i s study indeed found Malaysia to have had def i n i t e foreign policy objectives, postures, strategies and actions across the issue-areas of Defence and Security, Development and Trade, and International Co-operation and Diplomacy i n the three h i s t o r i c a l periods of the study. Malaysian foreign policy also exhibited a p l u r a l i t y of sources, the potency of which varied s i g n i f i c a n t l y over the three h i s t o r i c a l periods and across the different issue-areas, demonstrating that the view that foreign policy formulation i s e l i t i s t may be overstated. i i i i i In substantive terms Malaysian foreign policy has shifted from a pro-Western, anti-communist posture with i t s concomitant strategies and actions i n the f i r s t period to a n e u t r a l i s t posture with i t s concomitant policy outputs by the t h i r d period. Thus, there has been two stable periods of foreign policy, namely 1957 - 1963 and 1970 - 1975, and an unstable, t r a n s i t i o n a l period, 1964 - 1969, marking the development of Malaysian foreign policy from one extreme of the East-West p o l i t i c a l continuum to somewhere i n i t s mid-point. The change i n Malaysian foreign policy, among other things, demonstrates the significance of i n t e r n a l and external feedback effects acting upon extant p o l i c i e s . F i n a l l y , the study shows that Malaysian foreign policy i s explained not merely by ranking the " r e l a t i v e potency" of the various sources of foreign policy but more importantly through the i n s i g h t f u l and l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n of these various sources to the different policy outputs i n a h o l i s t i c manner. Chairman: TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT i i LIST OF TABLES v i i LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS v i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT x CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Malaya and the Study of Foreign Policy . . . . 1 Methodology and Research Design . . . . . . 14 The Framework 15 Notes to Chapter 1 31 2 MALAYAN FOREIGN POLICY 1957 - 1963 Defence and Security 37 Development and Trade 48 International Co-operation and Diplomacy . . . 59 The Sources of Malayan Foreign Policy . . . . 72 Notes to Chapter 2 '93 i v V CHAPTER Page 3 MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1964 - 1969 Defence and Security 102 Development and Trade • 118 International Co-operation and Diplomacy • • • 126 Foreign Policy 1964-1969: A Transitional Foreign Policy 131 Notes to Chapter 3 140 4 MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1970 - 1975 Defence and Security 148 Development and Trade 166 International Co-operation and Diplomacy . . . 185 Foreign Policy 1970-1975: New Directions • . . 193 Notes to Chapter 4 • • 211 5 CONCLUSION A H o l i s t i c Interpretation of Foreign Policy • • 222 Notes to Chapter 5 244 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 246 APPENDICES I AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA ON EXTERNAL DEFENCE AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, SIGNED AT KUALA LUMPUR, ON 12 OCTOBER 1957 . I I COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIVE POWER MINISTERIAL MEETING ON THE EXTERNAL DEFENCE OF MALAYA AND SINGAPORE, LONDON, 15-16 APRIL 1971 . 259 262 v i APPENDICES Page I I I KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION BY ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AS A ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY, 27 NOVEMBER 1971 . . . , . 264 IV JOINT STATEMENT ON THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE BY INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE, 16 NOVEMBER 1971 267 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 2.1 Malaya and the SEATO Countries: Percentage of Agreement on East-West Issues, 1957, 1960, 1963 i n UN Voting 42 2.2 Defence and Security: Policy Outputs 1957-1963 . 47 2.3 Composition of Malayan Gross Exports (%) 50 2.4 Direction of Malayan Exports by Destination 1958-63 (%) 52 2.5 Composition of Malayan Imports 1958 & 1963 (%). . . 53 2.6 Main Sources of Malayan Imports 1958 & 1963 (%) . . 54 2.7 Development and Trade: Policy Outputs 1957-1963 58 2.8 International Co-operation and Diplomacy: Policy Outputs 1957-1963 . . . . 71 3.1 Ownership of Assets i n Modern Agriculture and Industry, Peninsular Malaysia 1970 . . . . 122 3.2 Ownership of Share Capital of Limited Companies, by Race and Sector, Peninsular Malaysia 1970 . . 124 4.1 Defence and Security: Policy Outputs 1970-1975 170 4.2 Breakdown of Exports by Major Commodities . . . . 172 4.3 Development and Trade: Policy Outputs 1970-1975 . . 186 4.4 International Co-operation and Diplomacy: Policy Outputs 1970-1975 193 v i i LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure ' Page 1.1 A Framework of Dynamic Foreign Policy Analysis 16 2.1 The Sources of Malayan Foreign Policy: A Thesis 74 2.2 Explanatory Chart of Defence and Security Policy Outputs 82 2.3 Explanatory Chart of Development and Trade Policy Outputs 85 2.4 Explanatory Chart of International Co-operation and Diplomacy Policy Outputs . . . 88 3.1 Explanatory Chart of Major Foreign Policy Outputs 1964-1969 135 4.1 The Sources of Malaysian Foreign Policy 1970-1975: A Thesis 199 4.2 Explanatory Chart of Defence and Security Policy Outputs 203 4.3 Explanatory Chart of Development and Trade Policy Outputs 208 4.4 Explanatory Chart of International Co-operation and Diplomacy Policy Outputs . . . 211 Chart 4.1 Exports by Destination, 1963, 1974 . . . . . . 172 4.2 Composition of Imports, 1963, 1974. . . . . . . 173 4.3 Imports by Major Countries of Origin, 1963, 1974 174 v i i i i x Charts Page 5.1 Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s - 1958 233 5.2(A).; Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s - 1975 234 5.2(B) Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s - 1975 ( P o l i t i c a l Division) 235 5.2(C) Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s - 1975 (Economic & Information Division) 236 5.2(D) Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s - 1975 (Administration & General A f f a i r s , Protocol). . . 237 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT In researching this d i s s e r t a t i o n , I have benefited from the erudition and advice of my supervisor, Professor K. J. H o l s t i , whose constant guidance at the various stages of wri t i n g has been a great boon to the thesis. I would also l i k e to thank the other two members of my committee, Professor R. S. Milne and Professor M. W. Zacher who not only provided i n t e l l e c t u a l guidance but made possible the timely completion of the dissertation despite t h e i r many commitments. My thanks also go to the numerous individuals i n Malaysia who have assisted me i n one way or another i n researching the disser t a t i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r , I am grateful to the New St r a i t s Times, Kuala Lumpur, for allowing me the use of i t s l i b r a r y f a c i l i t i e s and to a l l those unfortunate enough to have been interviewed and fielded the many questions I put to them. Certainly not the least of my thanks go to the friends of Malaysia and Canada who not only provided moral but, i n some cases, physical support at c r u c i a l stages of my progress. Needless to say, the sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for a l l statements, opinions and judgements as wel l as omissions and mistakes rests e n t i r e l y on me. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Malaysia and the Study of Foreign Policy The independent, sovereign, t e r r i t o r i a l nation-state of the modern era continues to be the predominant actor on the world stage despite predictions of i t s early demise."'" Accordingly, the study of national foreign p o l i c i e s has maintained a sustained interest among 2 scholars of international relations even i f some attention has 3 shifted to the study of non-national and supra-national actors. Despite the d i s c i p l i n e ' s continued emphasis on foreign policy analysis, the foreign p o l i c i e s of Third World countries have not received the attention commensurate with their growing importance i n world p o l i t i c s . U n t i l recently, preoccupation with the Cold War has tended to relegate foreign policy analyses of Third World countries to largely c o l l e c t i v e 4 treatments such as those under the l a b e l of nonalignment, a term which i s i t s e l f a by-product of Cold War p o l i t i c s . A bipolar world of two id e o l o g i c a l l y opposed power blocs and a more or less nonaligned f l o a t i n g centre of Third World states i s fast becoming u n r e a l i s t i c , i f not already so. While Third World countries s t i l l vaguely group together under the banner of nonalignment, the issues that r e a l l y bind them today as a group are more often economic than p o l i t i c a l . " * The emergence of the r i c h versus poor, or North-South, axis of con-f l i c t on the international scene has i t s e l f diverted some attention 1 2 away from the East-West c o n f l i c t and thereby led to the declining importance of nonalignment as a foreign policy posture and strategy. The sharpness of the post-war bipolar world i s thus blurred by the emergence of th i s and other new cross-cutting cleavages, most important among which are the Sino-Soviet schism within the Eastern bloc and the French-American dispute within a disintegrating Western bloc. It i s ir o n i c that the very reduction of East-West tensions has led to the diminishing significance of nonalignment considering that amelioration of the Cold War was among i t s proponents' main aims. Nevertheless, s u f f i c i e n t Cold War-like situations i n the contemporary world remain to warrant continual espousal of the concept or some variant thereof for many Third World countries groping for dire c t i o n i n foreign policy. Sentimental and symbolic attachment to the concept w i l l also ensure i t s p o l i t i c a l longevity. However, as one writer points out, the prescriptive quality of the concept has become somewhat suspect: The narrowness of nonalignment as a "theory" pre-vented i t from being adapted when external circum-stances so demanded. Nonalignment - or perhaps more precisely, i t s role as a symbol of a l l the sentiments, past experiences and impressions of i t s advocates - began to affect the perspective i n which they saw the world. The behaviour of other nations might have been interpreted less r i g i d l y and perhaps more correctly within the framework of a more f l e x i b l e attitude for the new ... states. They could have seen their own roles more c l e a r l y . Decisions could have been based on evidence evaluated i n the l i g h t of t r a d i t i o n a l national behaviours and the international system rather than on preconceived notions forcing facts to f i t nonaligned "theory. 1 1 ? I t follows that as an a n a l y t i c a l concept, nonalignment has also become suspect, or at best, would have only limited value. Even as a descriptive l a b e l of foreign policy the term conceals more than i t 3 reveals i n today's more complex, multipolar world. To take some examples: "nonaligned" Burma today exhibits s i g n i f i c a n t l y different foreign policy behaviours from "nonaligned" India or Egypt. While Burma has become almost i s o l a t i o n i s t and minimises contact with i t s Southeast Asian neighbours and, indeed, with most of the world, India and Egypt have been active m i l i t a r i l y i n the i r respective regions. Both India and Egypt - early vanguards of the nonalignment movement -are also e f f e c t i v e l y but loosely a l l i e d to a superpower. One could c i t e other examples of nonaligned countries which do not s t r i c t l y con-form to the t r a d i t i o n a l tenets of the concept but are nevertheless considered - or would l i k e to be considered - as members of the "Nonaligned Group" of states. Some authors have preferred the term "neutralism" to nonalignment to depict the foreign p o l i c i e s of Third World countries. Neutralism has the advantage of having a broader meaning of "noninvolvement i n g the Cold War" or even perhaps noninvolvement i n any "hot" war with superpower p a r t i c i p a t i o n or support. Neutralism should however not be confused with " n e u t r a l i t y " which i s a s t r i c t l e g a l concept for a non-9 combatant status i n any war. Very often, nonalignment and neutralism are used synonymously and n e u t r a l i t y i s taken to be neutralism. The muddled usage of these terms by statesmen has not helped to clear the terminological s i t u a t i o n . The picture i s further clouded by the use of various epithets to specify p a r t i c u l a r brands of the various concepts such as "positi v e " neutralism, " s t r i c t " nonalignment, "committed" and "uncommitted" neutralism and the l i k e . Thus nonalignment scholars and practitioners a l i k e appear to be ensnared by a conceptual d i f f i c u l t y 4 that entailed the procrustean use of concepts which to be a n a l y t i c a l l y meaningful should have d e f i n i t e and s p e c i f i c foreign policy referents. Concepts such as nonalignment and neutralism cannot therefore pro-vide the basis for a comprehensive analysis of the foreign policy of a Third World country. They might be suited to short-range, narrow-gauged explanations of foreign policy v i s - a - v i s the major powers, but they cannot account for the f u l l spectrum of foreign policy behaviours that a country may possibly exhibit over time. In short, such concepts are neither comprehensive nor universal i n t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y to Third World states. As for the explanation of foreign p o l i c y , these scholars by and large assumed that the external environment of Cold War forced Third World states to gravitate toward nonalignment. I t i s true that some analysts did point to national attributes and domestic characteris-t i c s as sources of foreign policy but the importance of the external factor remained a dominant theme of analysis. Thus Ernest W. Lefever wrote : The philosophies of "positive neutralism" expounded by ... advocates of nonalignment i n Asia, the Middle East and Black A f r i c a are variations on a central theme that finds expression i n the lesser leaders of the emergent states throughout Asia and A f r i c a ... They are a l l responding to the same h i s t o r i c a l forces -in t e r n a l weakness, a recent c o l o n i a l past, and global b i p o l a r i t y . The differences among neut r a l i s t s are differences of emphasis and s t y l e , for each moulds his public philosophy to his personality and to his p o l i -t i c a l and c u l t u r a l setting and each adapts his policy ^ to changing circumstances inside and outside his country. Some analysts s p e c i f i c a l l y cited domestic factors as determinants of 5 nonalignment. As Robert C. Good contended: Foreign p o l i c y perpetuates the cohesive r o l e of the r e v o l u t i o n against colonialism; underscores the existence and i n t e g r i t y of the p o s t - c o l o n i a l state detached from the i d e n t i t y of i t s former metropole; enhances the prestige of the n a t i o n a l leader at home while reducing the effectiveness of h i s opposition; and provides opportunities for d i v e r s i f y i n g the new state's r e l i a n c e on external assistance, thereby d i l u t i n g the potency of foreign influence i n i t s domestic l i f e . H By t h i s he was suggesting that the demands of " s t a t e - b u i l d i n g " dictated 12 p a r t i c u l a r l i n e s of foreign p o l i c y . I t i s not c l e a r , however, that nonalignment provides the only avenue toward such pursuits as Good i n 13 h i s own account seems to demonstrate. Other authors i n looking for explanations of nonalignment found i n t e r e s t i n g differences i n the versions of nonalignment proposed and practised by various Third World 14 leaders such as Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, Nkrumah and T i t o . The main thrust of t h e i r analyses, however, was to explain why d i f f e r e n t Third World leaders a r r i v e d at b a s i c a l l y s i m i l a r foreign p o l i c i e s . A newer crop of scholars - mainly area s p e c i a l i s t s ^ - has chosen to stress i d i o s y n c r a t i c factors and by and large drop the nonalignment theme i n t h e i r explanation of "foreign p o l i c y . " In general, these scholars have emphasized the personality t r a i t s , psychological d i s -p o s i t i o n s and even pathologies of t o p - l e v e l policy-makers as c r u c i a l v a r i a b l e s i n the explanation of foreign p o l i c y behaviour. The s t a t e -ment below i s f a i r l y representative of t h i s genre of scholarship: It i s evident that many of /the/ motivations behind the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s of Asian statesmen cor-respond c l o s e l y to the psychological c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the small e l i t e i n charge of foreign p o l i c y . Their i d i o s y n c r a c i e s had a f r e e r play i n t h i s than i n any other sphere of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . In these motivations the p e r s o n a l i t i e s of the leaders and t h e i r personal involvement were powerfully i n f l u e n t i a l . What 6 many statesmen were trying to achieve for their states was at the same time what they were trying to achieve for themselves ...16 It would seem that while the nonalignment scholars were looking for a common thread i n foreign policy outputs, the second group of analysts found uniquely interesting inputs stemming from the idiosyncracies of policy-makers. In one sense the area s p e c i a l i s t s were highlighting the f i r s t group's problems i n lumping together a variety of Third World foreign p o l i c i e s and treating them c o l l e c t i v e l y under nonalignment or neutralism. While the nonalignment scholars saw different p o l i t i c a l styles as variations on the same theme, the area s p e c i a l i s t s underscored these very differences i n p o l i t i c a l styles as the dominant thrust of their analyses. The following passage from an analysis of Malaysian foreign policy formulation i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of a preoccupation with decision-making s t y l e : The Tunku presented a fascinating study i n p o l i t i c a l s t y l e . He had a l l the i n s t i n c t s of a p o l i t i c i a n and a strong b e l i e f i n the efficacy of p o l i t i c s . "Government," he once warned, " i s not to be played with. P o l i t i c s i s a serious and dangerous business. It must be treated l i k e something sacred." Bargaining, compromise, and persuasion were his way. His a b i l i t y to blunt the sharp edges of h o s t i l i t y was obviously c r u c i a l to making such a style work. Every problem was seen as es s e n t i a l l y a human problem, and dealt with as such. His approach was i n the t r a d i t i o n of royalty: paternal and personal ... He responded to face-to-face encounters rather than i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d pressures ... His decisions were generally i n t u i t i v e rather than the result of a d i s c i p l i n e d i n t e l l e c t u a l process.17 There i s nothing inherently wrong with the analysis of the decision-making styles of p o l i t i c a l leaders. The issue i s to what extent should one stress such idiosyncratic factors? Have some analysts stressed idiosyncratic factors to the point that they were i n fact explaining "decision-making s t y l e s " rather than the substance of foreign policy? 7 The perspective of those analysts who emphasize idiosyncratic explanations of foreign policy seem to bear some resemblance to the 18 decision-making approach of Richard C. Snyder and his colleagues. However, there are at least two important differences. F i r s t , the Snyder group attempted to systematize and categorize the various influences a f f e c t i n g decision-making while the area s p e c i a l i s t s had no e x p l i c i t framework of analysis and thus analysed foreign policy i n an ad hoc fashion. Second, while the l a t t e r focussed on decision-making s t y l e s , Snyder and his associates were even more s p e c i f i c i n exploring "the decision" as the dependent variable. The narrow focus of the decision-making approach and the unwieldy a n a l y t i c a l framework doomed i t to remain i n the realm of theory. Only one of the scheme's a p p l i -19 cation by Glenn D. Paige on The Korean Decision, resulted. I t has been convincingly shown that the subjective perceptions and evaluations of decision-makers, or thei r " d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n , " i s often a more important factor i n explaining decisions than the objective facts 20 or circumstances impinging the decision-making environment. Nevertheless, decision-making analysis i n general has f a i l e d to explain anything larger than decisions or events, and i t s narrowness of focus makes i t a poor candidate for comprehensive foreign policy analysis. For comprehensiveness one has to turn to the comparative foreign 21 policy scholars. According to these scholars, the sources of foreign policy are mixed and multifarious. Both the external and inte r n a l en-vironment of the state as w e l l as idiosyncratic factors are important i n the explanation of foreign policy. So, too, are the more or less permanent national characteristics of geography, hist o r y , culture, 8 c o l o n i a l heritage, natural endowments and the l i k e . I t i s the i n t e r -play of a l l these factors that produces a p a r t i c u l a r type of foreign policy. The analyst's task i s thus to i s o l a t e those variables that are most s i g n i f i c a n t i n the explanation of various foreign p o l i c i e s and, i f possible, to weigh thei r r e l a t i v e importance as "explanations." Pioneering the comparative study of foreign p o l i c y , James N. Rosenau 22 constructed a "pre-theory" of foreign policy. In t h i s scheme foreign policy behaviour can be explained i n terms of f i v e sets of variables -idi o s y n c r a t i c , r o l e , governmental, s o c i e t a l , and systemic. States are dif f e r e n t i a t e d along the basis of s i z e , economic development, degree of p o l i t i c a l accountability and degree of penetration, while p o l i c i e s are delineated across four issue-areas - status, t e r r i t o r i a l , human and non-human resources. The Rosenau schema i s commendable i n a l e r t i n g us to the various sources of foreign policy and their possible differences under varying national conditions and over different issue-areas. Following Rosenau, but aiming to synthesize and improve on e x i s t i n g frameworks, Andriole, Wilkenfeld and Hopple have presented a framework that attempts to s a t i s f y the conditions of comprehensiveness, compara-23 b i l i t y , o p e r a t i o n a l i z a b i l i t y and policy relevance. In e s s e n t i a l l y Rosenauian terms, Andriole and associates l i s t f i v e sets of independent variables specifying the economic, governmental and ca p a b i l i t y dimensions of states. A typology of events i n terms of their s p a t i a l , r e l a t i o n a l , behavioural, s i t u a t i o n a l and substantial dimensions serve as the depen-dent variables. While the Andriole group has succeeded i n improving on the o p e r a t i o n a l i z a b i l i t y and in t e r n a l dynamics of the Rosenau model, i t , l i k e i t s predecessor, suffers from three major drawbacks or defects. 9 The f i r s t two deficiencies relate to the lack of h i s t o r i c a l dynamics. The frameworks of the comparative scholars ignore or neglect the time factor, leading to a temporal l e v e l of analysis problem. They assume that general theorizing can be achieved by taking cross-national snapshots of the foreign p o l i c i e s of different kinds of states at p a r t i -cular points i n time. Such an assumption misleads, for the chief reason that the treatment of the external behaviour of various states at d i f f e -rent points of time complicates comparability. The problem i s less severe i f one i s analysing p a r t i c u l a r groups of nations such as Third World countries, Western democracies or Communist states, but the tempo-r a l problem remains as long as states within each group are, to borrow a phrase, at different stages of politico-socio-economic development. A second problem with the comparative approach i s i t s "comparative s t a t i c s . " The approach can seldom account for even the mildest changes i n the operational environment of a state's foreign p o l i c y . A country's foreign policy necessarily changes over time, say, T^, T^, T^ ... T^, and should be analysed i n that h i s t o r i c a l progression. Comparative studies often analyse events of only a p a r t i c u l a r time (or period), say, T^, or T^y since the demands of cross-national analysis rarely allow the luxury of longitudinal, h i s t o r i c a l analysis. However, the most serious problem i s that the approach has largely 24 f a i l e d to specify what i n fact "foreign p o l i c y " i s . Rosenau i n his pre-theory neglected to t e l l us what his various categories of independent variables were supposed to explain. Andriole and his colleagues use a typology of events as dependent variables, but their various "dimensions" remain unsatisfactory because they are no more than surrogates for issue-10 areas. Thus, "the s p a t i a l dimension refers to the s p e c i f i c geographic areas i n which foreign policy events frequently occur" and "the sub-s t a n t i a l attributes w i l l refer to the p a r t i c u l a r issue-area of the event." One s t i l l does not know what i n fact are the substantive aspects of foreign policy. A major problem with such typologies i s that events cannot i n themselves be used to indicate motives or goals, much less something even broader such as "policy." Charles Hermann alerts us to the d i f f i c u l t i e s that continue to confront foreign policy analysts i n defining the dependent variable. However, his own formu-l a t i o n leaves the issue far from resolved. The c r i t i c a l point remains that we now have no adequate c l a s s i f i c a t o r y systems and the c o l l e c -t i o n of data on policy remains an essential f i r s t step, not for the purpose of organizing the array of actions ( v i z . finding pigeon holes for a l l possible actions), but for the construction of comparative theory about foreign policy. This step must be followed by the testing of r e l a t i o n -ships selected to investigate the hypotheses advanced as explanations for the p r o f i l e s of foreign policy actions.25 The foreign policy framework presented i n t h i s study i s aimed at correcting the major deficiencies of the comparative approach. I t w i l l categorize some independent variables i n much the same fashion as the comparative foreign policy l i t e r a t u r e . The categories, however, are s u f f i c i e n t l y broad to allow for f l e x i b i l i t y i n uncovering the special and more pa r t i c u l a r sources of foreign policy i n the single-country case study. They also allow for linkages between the indepen-dent and dependent variables i n a manner which s h a l l be explained l a t e r . More importantly, the framework specifies categories of dependent variables - the actual substance of foreign policy - and establishes 11 general linkages among them. F i n a l l y , for a dynamic, longitudinal treatment of the subject, the framework incorporates the notion of feedback over time. A major emphasis of this study i s that foreign p o l i c i e s change s i g n i f i c a n t l y over time and that there i s a gap i n the l i t e r a t u r e i n respect to the analysis of such change. In t h i s author's view, foreign p o l i c i e s after their i n i t i a l formulation undergo changes according to the kinds of inputs that continually feedback over time 26 into t h e i r operation. These inputs could range from revolutions, coups d'etat and other domestic upheavals and events to whatever h i s t o r i c , subtle, or c r i t i c a l changes occur i n the international environment. Malaysia provides an excellent case for studying how a developing 2 country's foreign policy has emerged, changed and developed over time. The country's small s i z e , low l e v e l of m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and i t s narrow-based, largely primary-producing but i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g economy are fa m i l i a r features of Third World countries with r e l a t i v e l y recent colonial h i s t o r i e s . In addition, a tense p o l i t i c a l order fueled by a p l u r a l s o c i a l fabric - a l b e i t unique - has tended to focus attention on problems of nation-building. Although i t s external goals have been modest and low-key, Malaysia has engaged i n a wide range of foreign policy actions over various issue-areas. I t s two major concerns have been defence and security within and without i t s borders and s t a b i l i z a -t i o n of i t s external revenue deriving primarily from two or three commodities. Malaysia has also demonstrated some interest and support toward global issues of peace and co-operation. While these concerns have been stable external goals or objectives of the state, the actual 12 foreign policy postures, strategies and actions are i n a constant state of f l u x and change and new objectives have been enunciated as we l l . I t i s my intention to inquire into the reasons for such nuances, s h i f t s and changes i n foreign policy. Changes i n foreign policy are indicati v e of a state's continual e f f o r t s to seek new ways of promoting and achieving i t s national i n -terests and goals, some of which are f a i r l y permanent and some of which are transient. (See following discussion on foreign policy objectives). Thus foreign policy i s something that i s constantly adjusted and attuned to the domestic needs of the nation-state. I t i s i n this sense that i t i s an extension of domestic policy. This study hopes to shed l i g h t on and explain the linkage between domestic concerns and external policy. On this question I share the view of a recent analyst of Third World foreign policy: In most analyses foreign policy i s pictured as having a peculiar irrelevance to the r e a l concerns of the nation. Sometimes i t appears as l i t t l e more than a game played by a single performer or a small band of e l i t e players at the expense of the nation's r e a l in t e r e s t s . Even when long-range factors are adduced to explain and j u s t i f y certain p o l i c i e s , or when foreign policy i s seen ultimately as a product of forces beyond a nation's control, there i s the ten-dency to see foreign p o l i c y i n i s o l a t i o n from the processes taking place within the nation. Rarely i s foreign policy seen as a positive instrument i n the promotion of the nation's development or the sustaining of i t s p o l i t i c a l system.2° However, changes and s h i f t s i n foreign policy cannot be solely a func-tion of domestic concerns. Very often the impetus for change comes from the external environment of the state. For example, Malaysia's recent s h i f t to a more relaxed or co-operative orientation i n i t s relations with the communist countries may w e l l have been consequent 13 on the reduction of Western presence generally i n Southeast Asia as symbolized by the B r i t i s h policy of withdrawal east of Suez and the Nixon Doctrine of disengagement from Southeast Asia. In substantive terms, Malaysia's foreign policy shifted from a pronounced pro-Western, anti-communist orientation to a more n e u t r a l i s t posit i o n , bolstered by such foreign policy strategies as the promotion of a "Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality" i n Southeast Asia. The f i n a l step toward neutralism came with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, a country that was u n t i l recently considered Malaysia's Number One external enemy. The changes i n foreign policy can c e r t a i n l y be interpreted, but not exclusively, as a function of idiosyncratic factors stemming from the personality or p o l i t i c a l a t t i -tudes and b e l i e f s of Malaysia's second prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak, who i n i t i a t e d the various foreign policy moves after succeeding the more conservative and pro-Western Tunku Abdul Rahman. Then again, believers of r e a l p o l i t i k w i l l not hesitate to put down the policy changes as purely " p o l i t i c a l " moves aimed at defusing a domestically v o l a t i l e s i t u a t i o n represented by the continuing i n t e r n a l security threat of the communists to the government, or, indeed, that the foreign policy moves were no more than attempts to woo support for the r u l i n g party from various groups i n the country with an eye toward an impend-ing general election. F i n a l l y , we cannot rule out the p o s s i b i l i t y that the foreign policy s h i f t s r e f l e c t and promote certain r e a l and objective needs of the nation. Each of these alternative explanations appear to have an element of truth i n i t and perhaps the whole truth l i e s i n viewing them not as alternative but complementary explanations. 14 Before these questions can be examined i n greater d e t a i l , i t i s necessary to explain more systematically the methodology and research design of the study. In so doing, I w i l l be presenting the t h e o r e t i c a l framework which w i l l steer and provide the basis for the analysis of the content, sources and development of Malaysian foreign p o l i c y f o r the period under survey. Methodology and Research Design The study i s organized into four a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t tasks: (a) to construct a. p r i o r i a comprehensive and exhaustive framework with abstract categories of the determinants and process of foreign p o l i c y over time. The framework i s based on the author's own notions about foreign p o l i c y and c e r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l writings of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e (which I b r i e f l y surveyed i n the foregoing section.) The framework i s applicable to the analysis of the foreign p o l i c y of any state. The general manner i n which the sources of foreign p o l i c y are linked and r e l a t e d to p o l i c y outputs i s shown i n the framework although the s p e c i f i c manner i n which t h e i r empirical referents are rel a t e d w i l l n a t u r a l l y depend on the case under study. The framework should be seen as a generalized h e u r i s t i c device for analysing foreign p o l i c y behaviour. (b) to survey Malaysian foreign p o l i c y i n three h i s t o r i c a l periods, s p e c i f y i n g and operationally d e f i n i n g the dependent variables of the study or what may be simply c a l l e d the content or substance of Malaysian foreign p o l i c y . (c) to advance explanations of Malaysian foreign p o l i c y and i t s changes 15 i n each h i s t o r i c a l period. This task i s accomplished by i d e n t i f y i n g the c r u c i a l independent variables and specifying t h e i r r e l a t i v e impor-tance and relationships by means of a number of in t e r r e l a t e d hypotheses, (d) to present an o v e r a l l assessment of the explanations of Malaysian foreign policy over the three h i s t o r i c a l periods with a view toward generating higher-level hypotheses about Malaysian foreign policy and about the foreign policy behaviour of developing countries i n general. The Framework: In my framework of analysis, the sources of foreign policy are suggested by the work of the comparative scholars of foreign p o l i c y . 29 I t borrows considerably from Rosenau's pre-theory of foreign p o l i c y . Rosenau specified f i v e sets of foreign policy sources, i d i o s y n c r a t i c , r o l e , governmental, s o c i e t a l and systemic and selected four national conditions of s i z e , economic development, nature of p o l i t y and degree of penetration. In the interest of parsimony, I have reduced h i s categories into four basic sets of mutually exclusive foreign policy sources. The strategy i s to be exhaustive while at the same time allowing for f l e x i b i l i t y to employ imaginatively the categories according to the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the i n d i v i d u a l case. An excessive number of categories tends to stymie the single-country investigator who may be hard put to find the relevant empirical referents to f i l l the categories. The f i r s t set of sources are termed e c o - h i s t o r i c a l . These refer to the r e l a t i v e l y permanent features or attributes of the state such as i t s h i s t o r y , culture or cultures, geography, natural endowments and the l i k e . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , these sources are looked upon and described as 30 "background" factors influencing foreign policy. Geopolitical factors FIGURE 1.1 A FRAMEWORK OF DYNAMIC FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS Sources Policy Outputs Eco-historical External Internal Idiosyncratic Foreign Policy Objectives r Foreign Policy Postures Strategies • 1 Actions F E E D B A C K Eco-historical External Internal Idiosyncratic Foreign Policy Objectives Foreign Policy Postures Strategies 1 Actions F E E D B A C K 17 such as a state's strategic location or i t s location within various spheres of interest and influence would be considered external sources rather than as e c o - h i s t o r i c a l sources of foreign policy. Thus the ex-ternal sources are those that emanate from a state's external environ-ment, that i s , influences which are the result of actors and factors operating outside a state's national boundaries. Rosenau uses the term "systemic" to designate such sources while Andriole and associates d i s -tinguish between the " i n t e r - s t a t e " and the "global" components of this variable. For reasons of parsimony, my external sources therefore incorporate both the systemic (or global) and inter-state components of the Rosenau and Andriole frameworks. The i n t e r n a l sources refer to the domestic influences of actors and factors operating within a state's national boundaries, such as those stemming from s o c i e t a l , p o l i t i c a l , economic and governmental-bureaucratic factors. Internal sources are different from eco-h i s t o r i c a l sources i n two major aspects. They are of a more transient and p o l i t i c a l nature, while the l a t t e r are r e l a t i v e l y permanent and n o n - p o l i t i c a l i n nature. For example, I would consider the Islamic culture of Malaysia an e c o - h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c but Malaysian Muslims agitating for the non-recognition of I s r a e l w i l l be considered an i n t e r n a l source of foreign policy. Another example i s that B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l rule would be considered an e c o - h i s t o r i c a l factor but the present-day workings of the British-type politico-bureaucratic struc-ture of government would be considered an i n t e r n a l source of policy. The d i s t i n c t i o n i s subtle but r e a l . F i n a l l y , there are the idiosyncratic sources which refer to the influences that stem s p e c i f i c a l l y from the i n d i v i d u a l or personality t r a i t s of policy makers. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines "idiosyncracy" as "the mental constitution peculiar to a person or class." This study uses the term i n i t s larger meaning and i s con-cerned mainly with i t s p o l i t i c a l dimensions rather than with the e c c e n t r i c i t i e s or pathologies of p o l i t i c a l leaders. Various concepts have been used to "tap" t h i s factor. Thus we have Michael Brecher's 31 " a t t i t u d i n a l prism" and " e l i t e images," corresponding roughly to 32 Ole H o l s t i ' s " b e l i e f system" and Kenneth Boulding's "national image." Andriole and associates merely refer to i t as the "psychological" component but includes under i t , psychodynamics, personality t r a i t s , 33 b e l i e f systems and perceptions. Again for reasons of parsimony, I w i l l use the one term " i d i o s y n c r a t i c " to incorporate the most important dimensions of t h i s source of foreign policy. In some instances, an analyst may find pathological conditions of leaders to be s i g n i f i c a n t while i n other instances these influences may be only marginal. My emphasis here i s to be comprehensive without being too i n f l e x i b l e 34 35 about categories. Thus, following Rosenau and Brecher, idiosyn-c r a t i c variables can be defined as those aspects of e l i t e attributes that are not a function of their role occupancy. Role i s thus ex-cluded from my framework since i t s significance becomes dubious because of i t s d e f i n i t i o n a l status of being "nonidiosyncratic." In any case i t can be considered a governmental or bureaucratic (and thus internal) source of foreign p o l i c y . The difference between idiosyncratic and i n t e r n a l sources i s based on a well-known d i s t i n c t i o n i n the international relations l i t e r a t u r e . I n i t i a l l y , t h i s was stated as a " l e v e l of analysis problem" but i s now adequately resolved. Thus idiosyncratic sources are those at the ind i v i d u a l or e l i t e l e v e l while i n t e r n a l sources refer to national or state l e v e l of influences. However, there i s a presumption i n t h i s study that one considers only the idiosyncracies of the e l i t e which i s e f f e c t i v e l y i n power and not, say, the idiosyn-cracies of the opposition leaders. The choice of categories i s s t i l l largely a r b i t r a r y . There i s s u f f i c i e n t agreement, nevertheless, that sources are wide-ranging and multifarious and some consensus on the better acknowledged categories. My e f f o r t , far from being the b e - a l l and end-all of c l a s s i f i c a t o r y schemes, has been to synthesize the wisdom of previous e f f o r t s i n a 37 manner that i t becomes suitably relevant to my own research. Let us turn now to the foreign policy outputs. As Hermann has pointed out, c l a s s i f i c a t o r y schemes of the dependent variable i n foreign policy analysis are at best rudimentary and there has been 38 l i t t l e or no agreement on concepts. I noted e a r l i e r that the Andriole framework's typology of events into different dimensions i s no more than a substitute for a typology of issue-areas. Hermann suggests a mode of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n which he terms "progressive 39 d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . " This method divides foreign policy into various classes of actions with each class having i t s own sub-class. Thus under "negative" actions, we have "obstruct" and "object" which sub-divide further into "force" and "threat" and into "demonstrate" and "protest" respectively. The same procedure i s followed for the other 40 two categories of "neutral" and " p o s i t i v e " actions. The e f f o r t i s commendable but the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of categories i s bewildering and 2 0 disconcerting to the single-case analyst who w i l l be hard put to ascribe the correct action to the various categories. Moreover, patterns of events or actions reveal l i t t l e about motives, goals and s t r a t e g i e s which are implied by the word " p o l i c y . " This study p o s i t s that "foreign p o l i c y " consists of various broad l e v e l s of p o l i c y outputs such as objectives, postures and more s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d outputs such as strategies and actions. Concepts such as these have i n t u i t i v e appeal since they are often the very terms used by the p r a c t i t i o n e r s of foreign p o l i c y . I have attempted to provide some degree of conceptual c l a r i t y and d e f i n i t i o n a l rigour to these concepts as they apply to the praxis of foreign p o l i c y . In my framework, then, foreign p o l i c y objectives and postures occupy a c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n , and i n combination, determine the kinds of s t r a t e g i e s and actions imple-mented i n the actual conduct of foreign p o l i c y . Before elaborating on the exact nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among these key concepts, i t i s necessary to define them more f u l l y . Foreign P o l i c y Objectives: These are the external goals sought by a 41 state. The most permanent of these objectives are the "core values" of p o l i t i c a l independence, t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and n a t i o n a l s u r v i v a l which a l l states must value qua nation-states. These basic goals of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n are l i k e l y to be pursued by states for a long time more considering the low l i k e l i h o o d of any s u b s t a n t i a l change i n the present anarchic condition of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. Since a l l nation-states by d e f i n i t i o n seek to protect these core goals, they require l i t t l e explanation beyond what I have already s a i d . Apart from these basic goals, Arnold Wolfers has distinguished between 21 42 "possession goals" and "milieu goals." The former are goals aimed at enhancing n a t i o n a l values and needs, while the l a t t e r r e f e r to the pursuit of conditions which transcend national boundaries. An example of a possession goal i s bargaining f o r trade concessions with the view to gaining economic advantage, while a common m i l i e u goal i s the pursuit of promotion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace. Following K. J . H o l s t i , core goals are then short-range objectives of immediate importance, possession goals are middle-range objectives, normally i n v o l v i n g demands on other actors, and m i l i e u goals are long-range goals with no s p e c i f i c 43 time l i m i t s and of grander pretensions. Foreign P o l i c y Postures: Postures are the general o r i e n t a t i o n of a state toward other world actors. They are d i f f e r e n t from objectives i n that they are a s p i r a t i o n a l and are not f u n c t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i c i n purpose. Together with foreign p o l i c y o bjectives, they determine the kind of str a t e g i e s and actions c a r r i e d out by a state. However, since postures are a s p i r a t i o n a l i n character they may not d i r e c t l y r e s u l t i n any foreign p o l i c y strategy or even actions. Thus str a t e g i e s and actions may be more a function of foreign p o l i c y objectives than postures. Nevertheless, since postures are the r e f l e c t i o n of the various sources of a state's foreign p o l i c y , they give the general complexion and character to a foreign p o l i c y . For example, although the core-value goals e x i s t s o l e l y by v i r t u e of nation a l existence, the manner i n which these goals are sought (strategies and actions) w i l l be affected by a state's foreign p o l i c y postures. 22 In t h i s case the causal sequence i s : OBJECTIVES > POSTURES In other instances, foreign policy objectives are to a large extent determined by foreign policy postures. In general, the middle-range goals f a l l into t h i s category. For example, a "developing-world" posture i n foreign policy usually leads to the pursuit of developmental goals such as those sanctioned by many Third World forums. In th i s case the causal direction i s : Strategies POSTURES —: ^ OBJECTIVES >• Actions The relationship betwen objectives and postures i s indicated i n my formal framework by means of two dashed arrows pointing i n opposite directions, representing a two-way flow between the two concepts. I t has already been mentioned that postures may not d i r e c t l y result i n foreign policy strategies or actions. As the word suggests, postures do imply a degree of "posturing," that i s , the attempts by states to play to the gallery and to take stands largely for "home consumption" or for purely symbolic and p o l i t i c a l motives without any r e a l intention of following through the pronouncements with concrete actions. Malaysia's adoption of a strong developing-world posture i n economic issues often has the ring of posturing p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the early and Strategies t * 1 Actions 23 mid-1960's. For the most part, however, t h i s study w i l l t r e a t the concept i n i t s more formal and serious sense as the general o r i e n t a t i o n of a state along various dimensions or issue-areas of foreign p o l i c y . What i s cl e a r i s that a state's foreign p o l i c y postures are of primary importance i n the depiction of i t s foreign p o l i c y . Strategies: These r e f e r to the middle-range schemes, plans and general l i n e s of action which a state presents or employs as a means of securing i t s objectives. A strategy may be single-purpose or multi-purpose. That i s , i t may be aimed at securing one or more foreign p o l i c y ob-j e c t i v e s . While strategies are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to objectives, t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r texture and character i s also a function of a state's foreign p o l i c y postures since there are many ways of securing any one objective. To take a simple Cold War example, a country not , having the c a p a b i l i t y to protect i t s t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries may e i t h e r turn to the Americans or the Russians f o r m i l i t a r y assistance. Whether i t goes to the Americans or Russians w i l l be determined by whether i t has a pro-Western or pro-Eastern foreign p o l i c y posture, or i f i t i s nonaligned, the strategy would be to steer c l e a r of e i t h e r side or play o f f the i n t e r e s t s of one against the other. Actions: These r e f e r to the actual steps taken at the diplomatic, p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y l e v e l s to implement p o l i c y . Actions normally flow from foreign p o l i c y strategies but can also flow d i r e c t l y from foreign p o l i c y objectives or postures. It i s unusual - but c e r t a i n l y not unknown - to have actions which are unrelated to any foreign p o l i c y strategy, objective or posture. Thus i t has been shown quite d e c i s i v e l y by Graham A l l i s o n , employing nonrational-actor paradigms that actions 24 sometimes simply occur as standard bureaucratic procedures or as 44 p o l i t i c a l resultants of an e x p l i c i t or i m p l i c i t bargaining process. This r a i s e s the issue of the assumption of r a t i o n a l i t y i n my foreign p o l i c y framework. I have stated from the outset the bias of t h i s study that foreign p o l i c y i s conceived l a r g e l y as a purposeful a c t i v i t y geared to the pursuit of n a t i o n a l objectives. Such a bias i s perhaps not t o t a l l y u n j u s t i f i e d given that t h i s i s a study of the foreign p o l i c y of a small, developing country with r e l a t i v e l y l i m i t e d external goals and considering that organizational structures r e l a t i n g to p o l i c y formulation are not highly complex. A more important argument, however, i s that while nonrational-actor paradigms are important i n the explana-t i o n of decision-making behaviour, my focus on the substantive aspects of foreign p o l i c y makes the r a t i o n a l - a c t o r paradigm the most s u i t a b l e candidate f o r my purposes. In any case, the foreign p o l i c y framework presented i n t h i s study does not exclude the consideration of "organi-z a t i o n a l process" and "bureaucratic p o l i t i c s " v a r i a b l e s , which can be subsumed as i n t e r n a l sources of foreign p o l i c y . In c l o s i n g t h i s discussion of the foreign p o l i c y outputs, l e t me i l l u s t r a t e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between foreign p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , postures, s t r a t e g i e s and actions with a substantive example from 25 Malaysian foreign p o l i c y : OBJECTIVE: STRATEGY: Protecting t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y A l i g n with Western nations for protection POSTURE: ACTION: Pro-Western o r i e n t a t i o n Sign Anglo-Malayan defence pact -supporting Western id e a l s Thus for the purposes of t h i s study, we should view foreign p o l i c y outputs - objectives, postures, s t r a t e g i e s , and actions - as the dependent v a r i a b l e s , that i s , the phenomena we seek to explain, while the various sources (or inputs) of foreign p o l i c y represent the independent variables or the factors with which we explain the pheno-mena under study. I t i s c l e a r , however, that one does not explain foreign p o l i c y merely by examining each of the p o l i c y outputs d i s -c r e t e l y but rather i n the manner i n which they r e l a t e to each other and to t h e i r various sources. In a dynamic foreign p o l i c y framework such as the one presented, there may be a tendency to confuse the dependent and independent v a r i a b l e s . This could occur i f one thinks of the constant feedback process functioning as a r e c y c l i n g device 26 whereby the policy outputs of time are converted back into sources of foreign policy at time T^ . For instance, a country may wage a war at a pa r t i c u l a r time (policy output) but at a l a t e r time the war w i l l have become internalized as an h i s t o r i c a l experience and thus as an eco - h i s t o r i c a l source of foreign policy. To avoid confusion, therefore, we should at any one time, T , only speak of policy outputs and foreign policy sources as dependent variables (d , d ... d ) or independent variables ( i , i ... i ) x., x. x r x ' x„ x 1 2 n 1 2 n respectively. Once a policy output has become internalized as a source of foreign policy and i s recognized as such, i t follows that i t can no more be spoken of as a policy output. I w i l l examine Malaysian foreign policy across three broad issue-areas, namely, Defence and Security, Development and Trade and International Co-operation and Diplomacy. These are largely i n t u i t i v e categories which are again often used i n the vocabulary of statesmen. The categories are nevertheless meant to be exhaustive of the broad 45 range of foreign policy outputs that a state may evince. While 46 there are certainly other possible ways of delineating issue-areas, I f i n d this three-way c l a s s i f i c a t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y suited to my purposes. In general, the three kinds of foreign policy objectives i d e n t i f i e d e a r l i e r tend to correspond with related concerns i n the 2 7 three issue-areas as follows: Defence and Security Core-value Goals Development and Trade Possession Goals International Co-operation and Diplomacy M i l i e u Goals Each of the issue-areas w i l l therefore be surveyed i n terms of i t s respective foreign p o l i c y objectives, postures, s t r a t e g i e s and actions. Defence and Security would cover Malaysia's general o r i e n t a t i o n toward issues and problems per t a i n i n g to n a t i o n a l defence and secu-r i t y , i t s s t r a t e g i e s and actions for ensuring such s e c u r i t y , i n c l u d i n g i t s b i l a t e r a l and m u l t i l a t e r a l defence and s e c u r i t y arrangements. The issue-area therefore covers a l l matters r e l a t e d to the p r o t e c t i o n of Malaysia's core values, or i t s existence as an independent p o l i t i -c a l u n i t . Development and Trade w i l l cover Malaysia's postures, ob-j e c t i v e s , s t r a t e g i e s and actions i n matters concerning socio-economic development generally, i t s p o l i c i e s and actions i n such forums as the UNCTAD, and i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n m u l t i l a t e r a l economic associations such as the International T i n Agreements. Under t h i s issue-area, I would also include questions of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l j u s t i c e , a i d , and the investment p o l i c i e s Malaysia p r o f f e r s v i s - a - v i s the r i c h , i n d u s t r i a l countries, as w e l l as toward non-national actors such as multi-national business corporations. International Co-operation 28 and Diplomacy covers the areas of Malaysia's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the United Nations, i t s agencies and other supra-national organizations, including regional associations such as ASA, ASEAN and the Commonwealth. Where such a c t i v i t y i s d i r e c t l y concerned or connected with n a t i o n a l defence and security or with development and trade, i t s h a l l be considered to f a l l under the two l a t t e r categories. The d i s t i n c t i o n between the issue-areas i s guided by reference to foreign p o l i c y objectives as indicated i n the table presented i n the preceding page. However, i n the actual d e s c r i p t i o n of foreign p o l i c y events, some overlap i n the three broad issue-areas i s unavoidable since foreign p o l i c y actions can often be multi-purpose i n i n t e n t . The foreign p o l i c y survey w i l l be c a r r i e d out over three h i s t o -r i c a l periods. There are both t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l considera-tions for doing so. I have emphasized from the outset a preference for a dynamic-historical approach to foreign p o l i c y a n a l y s i s . Dividing the analysis into separate periods provides the opportunity to examine the feedback process over time and the manner i n which t h i s process has led to broad s h i f t s i n Malaysian foreign p o l i c y . While i t i s possible to divide the analysis into many more time periods, i t would be d i f f i c u l t to f i n d l o g i c a l h i s t o r i c a l demarcations to do so. Second, i t i s not the purpose of t h i s study to examine every d e t a i l of foreign p o l i c y , but to analyse i t over broad sweeps of time i n order that the more general aspects of foreign p o l i c y changes may be discerned. The p a r t i c u l a r time periods were chosen because Malaysian foreign p o l i c y has tended to e x h i b i t a c e r t a i n degree of d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s i n terms of p o l i c y outputs i n each p e r i o d . ^ The beginning or end of each period i s marked by an event or events which have a s i g n i f i c a n t impact generally on p o l i t i c s and i n pa r t i c u l a r on foreign policy. The periods, with their appropriate designations, are: 1957-1963 1964-1969 1970-1975 Malayan Foreign Policy under Tunku Abdul Rahman Malaysian Foreign Policy under Tunku Abdul Rahman Malaysian Foreign Policy under Tun Abdul Razak On August 31, 1957, Malaya became an independent nation under the prime ministership of Tunku Abdul Rahman. I t was under the Tunku that the emergent Malayan foreign policy took shape and had i t s basic tenets enunciated. By September 16, 1963, s t i l l under the Tunku's leadership, the Malayan Federation was expanded to include the former B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah i n the new Federation of Malaysia. (Singapore subsequently l e f t the federation on August 9, 1965). The formation of Malaysia brought i n i t s wake the f i r s t , and to date, the only external challenge to the p o l i t i c a l existence of the nation i n the form of Indonesian Confrontation. The second period of foreign policy i s thus a period of turbulence as w e l l as t r a n s i t i o n . I t i s not only of symbolic but also of a n a l y t i c a l significance that the period closed with the domestic violence of May 13, 1969 and the subsequent retirement from p o l i t i c s of the Tunku. The f i n a l period of foreign policy i s thus a period of change and consolidation of change and i s marked by the enunciation of new directions i n foreign policy. I t could be said to begin near the end of 1969 (September) when Tun Abdul Razak assumed charge as the Director of National Operations but Razak did not succeed the Tunku as Prime Minister u n t i l September 22, 1970. For convenience, I have designated the period as beginning i n 1970. The tragic and unexpected death of Tun Razak i n January 1976, provides perhaps a symbolic end to the t h i r d period. 31 Notes to Chapter 1 See John H. Hertz, "The T e r r i t o r i a l State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State" i n J. N. Rosenau, ed., International  P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , Second Ed i t i o n , New York, Free Press, 1969, pp. 76-89, for a candid re-appraisal of unexpected r e s i l i e n c e of the national unit. 2 Indeed, foreign policy has been said to be "the key subject i n the study of international r e l a t i o n s . " See David V i t a l , "Back to Machiavelli" i n Klaus Knorr and J. N. Rosenau, eds., Contending  Approaches i n International P o l i t i c s , Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1969, p. 151. However, the system-oriented scholars w i l l no doubt challenge such a view. See, for example, Morton A. Kaplan's c l a s s i c System and Process i n International P o l i t i c s , New York, Wiley and Sons, 1957, and Richard Rosecrance's Action and Reaction i n World P o l i t i c s , Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1963, for two different genres of the systemic approach. 3 The c l a s s i c work i n the area i s Inis Claude's Swords into  Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, New York, Random House, 1956, while new ground was broken i n the study of supra-nationalism i n terms of integration theory i n K a r l Deutsch, et. a l . , P o l i t i c a l Community i n the North A t l a n t i c Area, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1957 and i n terms of "functionalism" i n Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 1964. There has followed a spate of studies on integration theory too numerous to name here. 4 See, for example, C e c i l V. Crabb, The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment, New York, Praeger, 1965, Peter Lyon, Neutralism, Leicester, Leicester Univ. Press, 1964 and Laurence Martin, ed., Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States i n World  A f f a i r s , New York, Praeger, 1962,for various treatments of the subject. "*See the excellent statement and documentation of such a view by Branislav Gosovic, "UNCTAD: North-South Encounter," International  C o n c i l i a t i o n , May 1968, No. 568, 80 pp. 6 Lyon, op_. c i t . , p. 62. Werner L e v i , The Challenge of World P o l i t i c s i n South and  Southeast Asia, Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall, 1968, p. 113. 32 g Lyon, op_. c i t . , p. 20. 9 Cf. K. J. H o l s t i , International P o l i t i c s , Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 103-110. "^Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism" i n Martin, op_. c i t . , pp. 93-94. "'""''Robert C. Good, "State-Building as a Determinant of the Foreign Policy i n New States" i n i b i d . , p. 11. 12 I b i d . , pp. 3-5. 13 Since the a r t i c l e appears i n a reader on nonalignment and neutralism, one assumes the writer i s attempting to relate his d i s -cussion to that topic. 14 Lyon, Neutralism, op. c i t . and Lefever, op_. c i t . "'""'There are c l e a r l y some area s p e c i a l i s t s who qualify as analysts of the f i r s t genre, a case i n point being Peter Lyon, whose work I have already c i t e d . See also his War and Peace i n Southeast Asia, London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1969. Other area s p e c i a l i s t s who emphasize long-term and external factors include Roger M. Smith, Cambodia's Foreign P o l i c y, Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press, 1965 and Claude S. P h i l l i p s , The Development of Nigerian Foreign P o l i c y , Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press. A writer i n seeking to discover general trends and thrusts i n the l i t e r a t u r e may perhaps be allowed a degree of poetic license i n grouping scholars under certain des-c r i p t i v e labels without doing undue violence to truth. "^Levi, op. c i t . , p. 13. "^Marvin Ott, "Foreign Po l i c y Formulation i n Malaysia," Asian  Survey, Vol. XII, No. 3, March 1973, p. 226. 18 R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B. Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy  Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International P o l i t i c s , New York, Free Press, 1962. 19New York, Praeger, 1968. 33 20 See, for example, the works of C. F. Hermann, C r i s i s i n Foreign  P o l i c y , New York, Bobb-Merill, 1969, Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of P o l i t i c a l Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1969, and 0. R. H o l s t i , R. C. North, and R. A. Brody, "Perception and Action i n the 1914 C r i s i s " i n J. D. Singer, ed., Quantitative International P o l i t i c s , New York, Free Press, 1968, for different approaches to phenomenological analysis. 21 See, for example, J. N. Rosenau, The S c i e n t i f i c Study of Foreign  Policy, New York, Free Press, 1971, especially pp. 24-67 and 68-95, R. Barry F a r r e l l , ed., Approaches to Comparative and International  P o l i t i c s , Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 1966, and the more t r a d i t i o n a l approach of Roy C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy i n World P o l i t i c s , Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall, 1967. 22 "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign P o l i c y " i n Rosenau, op. c i t . . p a r t i c u l a r l y , pp. 68-95 and 103-166. 23 Stephen J. Andriole, J. Wilkenfeld and G. W. Hopple, "A Framework for Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Behaviour," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 1975. 24 See K. J. H o l s t i , "National Role Conceptions i n the Study of Foreign P o l i c y , " International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1970, pp. 233-309, for an attempt at correcting the lopsidedness i n foreign policy analysis. H o l s t i finds that apart from the standard labels of Western Bloc, Eastern Bloc and Nonalignment, countries could w e l l have a number of different national role conceptions such as "regional protector," "balancer," "bastion of revolution" and so forth. There i s also a need to develop a set of universal categories to indicate what i t i s that we seek to explain of the substantive aspects of foreign policy. Such categorizing i s attempted i n the framework presented i n t h i s study. 25 Charles F. Hermann, "Policy C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : A Key to the Comparative Study of Foreign P o l i c y , " i n V. Davi and M. A. East, The Analysis of International P o l i t i c s , New York, Free Press, 1972, pp. 58-79. 34 26 See, for example, Michael Brecher, "Inputs and Decisions for War and Peace," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 131-177, for an excellent study of the June 1967 Israeli-Arab War i n which the author makes abundant use of the feedback concept . The research design Brecher employs i s i n the genre of decision-making analysis and i s suited more for the detailed study of par t i c u l a r events rather than for broad aspects of foreign policy i n which we are interested. 27 The study's t i t l e accordingly r e f l e c t s the dynamic approach employed. I t also takes i t s point of departure from the f i r s t known study of Malayan foreign policy by T. H. Silcoek, "Development of a Malayan Foreign Policy," Australian Outlook, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1963, pp. 42-53. Writing i n 1963, Prof. Silcoek succeeded admirably i n sketching out the broad outlines of an emerging foreign policy. A doctoral thesis of a si m i l a r t i t l e by J. B. Dalton, The Development  of Malayan External P o l i c y , 1957-1963, D. P h i l . Thesis, Oxford University, 1967, describes i n some d e t a i l Malaya's foreign policy v i s - a - v i s the Cold War, i t s Asian neighbours, the Commonwealth and the United Nations, but may be subject to the same c r i t i c i s m as Prof. Silcoek i n prematurely terming the f i r s t f i v e years of Malayan foreign policy as "development." 28 Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign Policy i n Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy i n the Less Developed Countries," World P o l i t i c s , Vol. 24, No. 3, A p r i l 1972, pp. 356-357. 29 "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," loc. c i t . 30 See, for example, Roy Macridis, op. c i t . , and J. E. Black and K. W. Thompson, Foreign P o l i c i e s i n a World of Change, New York, Harper and Row, 1963. 31 M. Brecher, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour," Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, Vol. 13, March 1969$ p. 86. 32 0. R. H o l s t i , "The Be l i e f System and National Images: A Case Study" i n Rosenau, ed., International P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , New York, Free Press, 1969, pp. 543-550, and K. E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems" i n i b i d . , pp. 422-431. 33 Andriole, et_. aj.., op_. c i t . , p. 182. 35 Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign P o l i c y , " op. c i t . "^Brecher, op_. c i t . 36 J . D. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem i n International Relations" i n Rosenau, International P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . , pp. 20-29. 37 This raises an epistemological issue. My position i s that the truth of a s c i e n t i f i c explanation i s largely context-dependent and bounded by the hypothetical constructs with which explanation i s made and i s therefore dependent on the state of the science i n question. See, for example, Michael Scriven, "Definitions, Explanations, and Theories" i n H. Feigle, et^. a l . , Minnesota Studies i n the Philosophy  of Science, Vol. I I , pp. 99ff, for his discussion of the a n a l y t i c a l method of context analysis to which this author subscribes. 38 Hermann, op_. c i t . , pp. 58-61. 39 After a survey of various types of c l a s s i f i c a t o r y schemes, Hermann seems to s e t t l e for this approach which i s borrowed from biology. See i b i d . , pp. 68-70. 40 T, Ibxd. 41 See K. J. H o l s t i , International P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , pp. 132-135. 42 "The Goals of Foreign P o l i c y " i n Arnold Wolfers, Discord and  Collaboration, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1962, pp. 73-74. H o l s t i , op_. c i t . , pp. 131-132. While i n Wolfer's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 3 possession goals include core-value goals, I prefer to use the two terms as mutually exclusive. Wolfers also distinguishes between "d i r e c t " and " i n d i r e c t " goals, that i s , those d i r e c t l y serving national interests and those serving the interests of private individuals. This d i s t i n c t i o n i s not pertinent here since t h i s study i s i n general concerned with only national or state goals. See Wolf ers, op_. c i t . , p. 77. 36 G. A l l i s o n , The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban  M i s s i l e C r i s i s , Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1972. There also exists a school of thought which not only suggests but prescribes "the science of muddling through" as the basis of the decision-making process. P o l i t i c a l decisions are thus seen as "disjointed" and "incremental" i n nature, guided as they are by inadequate information and under-standing and thus subject to constant reconsideration and redirection. See David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, New York, Free Press, 1963, pp. 61-66. 45 Cf. Brecher's four issue-areas of M i l i t a r y - S e c u r i t y , P o l i t i c a l -Diplomatic, Economic-Developmental and Cultural-Status. Brecher, op. c i t . 46 Rosenau, for example, c l a s s i f i e s issues into the status, t e r r i t o r i a l , non-human and human resources areas. See "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign P o l i c y , " op. c i t . 47 Cf. Stephen Chee, "Malaysia's Changing Foreign P o l i c y " i n Yong Mun Cheong, ed., Trends i n Malaysia I I , ISEAS, 1974. Although Chee's periods (1957-62, 1963-67, and 1968-73) do not e n t i r e l y coincide with mine, his choice of three periods i s s i g n i f i c a n t . CHAPTER 2 MALAYAN FOREIGN POLICY 1957 - 1963 Defence and Security The cornerstone of Malaya's external defence policy was the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement of 1957 whereby B r i t a i n and Malaya were obligated to provide each other with mutual aid i n the event of an armed attack on either Malaya or B r i t i s h possessions i n the Far East. The relevant a r t i c l e reads: In the event of armed attack against any of the t e r r i t o r i e s or forces of the Federation of Malaya or any of the t e r r i t o r i e s or protectorates of the United Kingdom i n the Far East or any of the forces of the United Kingdom within any of those t e r r i t o r i e s or protectorates or within the Federation of Malaya, the governments of the Federation of Malaya and the United Kingdom undertake to cooperate with each other and w i l l take such action as each considers necessary for the purpose of meeting the si t u a t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y . ^ The two governments were also to consult each other i f the peace of 2 the mentioned t e r r i t o r i e s was threatened. Should h o s t i l i t i e s involving either party occur anywhere else i n the world, "the Government of the United Kingdom s h a l l obtain p r i o r agreement of the Government of the Federation of Malaya before committing United Kingdom forces to active operations involving the use of bases i n 3 the Federation of Malaya ..." Another provision obligated the parties to consult each other "when major changes i n the character 37 38 or deployment of the forces maintained i n the Federation ... were 4 contemplated." Beneath the formal language, t h i s proviso was evidently a recognition that B r i t a i n could not introduce nuclear weapons in t o Malaya without the l a t t e r ' s approval. Malaya's objectives i n negotiating the treaty were f a i r l y obvious given the s i z e of i t s armed forces at the time of independence. I t had only one b a t t a l i o n of the Malay Royal Regiment, but no a i r force or navy. The Deputy Prime Minis t e r and Defence M i n i s t e r , Tun Abdul Razak, gave the following r a t i o n a l e for Malaya's defence p o l i c y : Today the cost of maintaining defence forces i s extremely high and can be s a i d to be p r o h i b i t i v e . The United States and the USSR may perhaps be the only powers i n the world which can claim to maintain forces of s u f f i c i e n t strength to protect themselves. Other countries, apart from supporting the United Nations, have to combine together forming c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y pacts such as NATO, CENTO and SEATO. As f a r as the Federation of Malaya i s concerned we are a r e l a t i v e l y small nation with many demands on our resources. We have to concentrate our e f f o r t s on improving the standard of l i v i n g of our people and provide them with amenities and s o c i a l services which are necessary for an independent and c i v i l i s e d country. Therefore, we can only a f f o r d to maintain a small defence force and must depend for our external defence on the help of friends and a l l i e s i n times of need. That i s why ... we entered i n t o a mutual defence pact with the United Kingdom Government, associated by the governments of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand .... Our defence p o l i c y i s , therefore, to contribute toward a common Commonwealth e f f o r t i n the protection of our t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h i s area and for the maintenance of external peace and s e c u r i t y of our country, to ensure that the authority of the lawful government i s e f f e c t i v e l y enforced anywhere g i n the Federation, i n c l u d i n g i t s t e r r i t o r i a l waters. For B r i t a i n , the pact was used as a means to protect i t s national interests i n the region with an eye p a r t i c u l a r l y toward i t s Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) commitments. However, the facade of formal language i n the pact couched a preoccupation with the communist threat to the region. Malaya's long and b i t t e r i n t e r n a l war with the communists i n which the B r i t i s h played the major r o l e , l e f t the country, or at least the policy-makers, with a considerable degree of fear of communist expansionism i n Southeast Asia. Malaya's defence, prior to independence on August 31, 1957, had been provided for by the ANZAM Agreement of 1949 between B r i t a i n , A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand. The Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve was formed i n 1955 and stationed i n Malaya, i t s functions being to contain communist insurrection, provide defence from external attack, and carry out SEATO obligations.^ In the protracted negotiations over the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) i n g which l e t t e r s were exchanged u n t i l as late as August 23, 1957, Malaya had evidently, "won a maximum of security with a minimum of obligation and i t had not compromised on two basic p o l i c i e s of 9 rejecting nuclear weapons and refusing to j o i n SEATO." However, AMDA was not accepted at home without a b r i e f ground-swell of opposition against the pact from n a t i o n a l i s t elements i n the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) of the r u l i n g A l liance Party, the opposition parties, and various trade union leaders and public figures, while the most vocal support for the pact came from the non-Malay partners i n the A l l i a n c e , the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). The UMNO back-bench revolt began when a party member, Tajuddin A l i , attacked the treaty as being "harmful to independent Malaya.""'""'' This sparked off the Johore UMNO Youth claim that the pact made Malaya i n d i r e c t l y a member of SEATO and led the UMNO Kedah branch to c a l l , for an emergency general session to discuss the implications 12 of the treaty as i t considered some of the clauses too binding. The Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, stood his ground amidst mounting c r i t i c i s m of the treaty but was forced to c a l l an emergency meeting of the UMNO Executive Committee to "explain" the pact. The Tunku placed his leadership at stake by making the pact a "confidence issue," stating that an emergency UMNO assembly debate on the pact 13 would be taken by him to be a vote of no confidence. The Tunku's t a c t i c succeeded and he won a unanimous vote from the Executive Committee and the demand for a general session subsided. The Tunku, however, did make the concession that the treaty would be reviewed within a year. Subsequently, i n October, AMDA was presented and debated i n the Legisla t i v e Council. A number of back-benchers, the opposition parties, and the trade union representatives continued to oppose the pact, i n general, arguing that i t compromised Malaya's sovereignty and independence, that m i l i t a r y pacts invited m i l i t a r y threats, and that Malaya was unnecessarily rushing into a m i l i t a r y pact without 14 having had a f u l l debate on foreign policy. The Tunku reiterated the government's position that the pact was a matter of necessity: ... l e t us face facts, and the facts are that we have at our command an army of less than one di v i s i o n i n strength; we have no a i r force, not even a single plane or a single man; we have no navy, not even a single s a i l o r and we have not even a sea-going c r a f t . With the revenue at our command we can never be able to bui l d our forces to the strength which we would require for the defence of our country.15 The Tunku i n winding up the debate again staked his p o l i t i c a l career over the issue, stating " ... i f the people of this country do not want [the t r e a t y ] , a simple thing can be done and that i s - t h i s i s a l l I ask of the people of this country and of my party - to c a l l a meeting, a general meeting, of UMNO and pass a vote of 'no confidence' against me and my friends and colleagues, and we can just make way for some other clever 'Dicks' to come and run this country.""^ As i t turned out, the motion of support for the treaty was unanimously passed, with those opposing i t , abstaining. In the l i g h t of the UMNO rear-guard opposition to AMDA, i t i s perhaps less surprising that Malaya had not joined SEATO. The leadership dared not hazard a formal t i e with the Western bloc even though SEATO was s p e c i f i c a l l y aimed at containing communism, which, presumably, was the chief purpose of AMDA. Among the other reasons given for non-participation i n SEATO was that Malaya would not have gained any m i l i t a r y advantage by jo i n i n g and that the organization was unpopular with India and Indonesia, the two non-communist Asian bulwarks to which Malaysia showed a great degree of deference. The Tunku, when asked about Malaya's decision not to j o i n SEATO, was quoted i n Canberra i n 1959 as saying: "Well, I don't count, you know. As the representative of my people, I have to do as they want, and SEATO i s rather unpopular among my people. I don't know for what ,,18 reason. Despite Malaya's many denials that i t had anything to do with 19 SEATO, Robert 0. Tilman has compiled evidence, produced below, that Malaya's voting i n the United Nations closely approximated that of 20 the SEATO countries. TABLE 2.1 Malaya and the SEATO Countries: Percentage of Agreement  on East-West Issues, 1957, 1960, 1963' i n UN Voting* Country 1957 a 1960 b 1963° Aus t r a l i a 79 72 88 New Zealand 79 72 91 United Kingdom 79 72 79 United States 79 72 88 Pakistan 85 88 82 (N=ll) Philippines 85 72 96 Thailand 88 80 91 aN=17 bN=15 CN=12 *France, the eighth SEATO member, was excluded from the voting t a l l i e s . Source: R. 0. Tilman, Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y , Strategic Studies Dept., Report RAC-R-63-2, 1969, p. 23. 43 The table, which shows Malaya's votes on East-West issues at the United Nations computed according to the percentage of agreement with the s t i p u l a t e d countries, indicates that Malaya, although not i n SEATO, was nevertheless c i r c u m s t a n t i a l l y and i n s p i r i t close to the organization. The Tunku himself d i d not deny Malaya's i n d i r e c t l i n k s with the organization. In answer to a question i n Parliament: he said: As you know, we are not i n SEATO. We are t i e d up with B r i t a i n under the Defence Agreement but whether that has i n d i r e c t l y t i e d us to SEATO i s a question that would be d i f f i c u l t f o r me to answer. A l l I can say i s that we are not i n SEATO. In t h i s respect, i f SEATO countries are involved i n any war, we are not committed to the war, but on the other hand, i f B r i t a i n entered the war and one of the countries which we are committed to defend, l i k e Singapore, a B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r y , or Borneo, i s attacked, then we are treaty bound to f i g h t . Perhaps you might say we are i n d i r e c t l y connected with SEATO, but I can say quite openly here and assure the House that we are not i n SEATO.21 The pronounced anti-communism i n Malaya's foreign p o l i c y was e s p e c i a l l y evident i n the country's o r i e n t a t i o n toward and r e l a t i o n s with the great powers other than B r i t a i n . The Tunku i n 1958 pro-claimed to Parliament Malaya's non-neutrality on questions of East-West c o n f l i c t : There i s no question whatsoever of our adopting a neutral p o l i c y while Malaya i s at war with the Communists. Only when we are c e r t a i n that people here have become t r u l y Malayan-minded and have set t h e i r minds on making Malaya t h e i r only home can the government declare our p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y . So long as t h i s f i g h t continues, I consider that we would be breaking f a i t h with the people i f t h i s government were to enter into any form of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s h i p with the communist countries .... l e t me t e l l you that there are no such things as l o c a l communists. Communism i s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l organization which aims for world domination, not by aggression i f they can avoid i t , but by the use of t a c t i c s and methods among the sons of the country to overthrow democracy and to set up i n i t s place a government after the pattern of a l l communist countries.22 With respect to Vietnam, Malaya gave i t s whole-hearted support to the United States and the South. Indeed, the Prime Minister's f i r s t o f f i c i a l v i s i t was to South Vietnam i n 1958 i n which he made pledges of s o l i d a r i t y with President Ngo Dinh Diem. Ngo returned the Tunku's v i s i t i n 1960. Malaya's opposition to communism was perhaps most evident i n i t s relations with China. While i t accorded diplomatic recognition 23 to the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, Malaya was unwilling to recognize China, being content to espouse the "two-China" policy at the United Nations. This policy supported i n p r i n c i p l e the admission of China with the understanding that Taiwan would continue to be a UN member and that a vote for China's admission did 24 not imply recognition. At the United Nations, Malaya had also been forthright i n c r i t i c i z i n g China's actions i n Tibet i n 1959 and i n the Sino-Indian h o s t i l i t i e s of 1962. The Tunku even launched a "Save Democracy Fund" which raised M$l m i l l i o n "to help India 25 defend herself against Chinese aggression." The excessive fear of Chinese communism prompted Malaya's representative at the United Nations i n 1963 to depart somewhat from the two-China p o l i c y : ... we have been and are, indeed, too close to China to take an academic or theoretical view of the sit u a t i o n .... For ten long years and more, while the world has been shivering i n the c h i l l winds of the Cold War, we i n [Malaya] were righ t i n the storm centre of a shooting war a r i s i n g out of a 45 communist campaign which threatened to overthrow our government ... China started unprovoked aggression on India ... China has recently r e s i s t e d ... v i o l e n t l y the moderating influence of even i t s greatest a l l y ... China regards a global class war not only as i n e v i t a b l e but desirable ... In a l l these circumstances, we cannot avoid asking ourselves what good, i n p r a c t i c a l terms should we do China or to our-selves by bringing i t to the United Nations.26 Despite i t s pronounced anti-communism i n foreign p o l i c y , Tilman has noted that Malaya was "no more a lackey of the West than 27 she was a fellow t r a v e l l e r of the communists." There i s some evidence that Malaya t r i e d to steer a course of p o l i t i c a l independence while at the same time making no secret of i t s Western leanings. This often l e d to p o l i c y contradictions which opposition parliamenta-rians were quick to point out. One of the favourite opposition issues was that the presence of foreign Commonwealth troops compromised 2 8 Malaya's p o l i t i c a l independence. Malaya's attempts to steer the narrow course of p o l i t i c a l independence was perhaps l e s s an e f f o r t toward nonalignment than one which can best be described as a foreign p o l i c y posture of "non-rinterference." Thus, speaking soon a f t e r admission to the United Nations, Malaya's representative, Dato Ismail s a i d : Our p o s i t i o n i n the world today i s ... unique i n that we are f a i r l y content with what we already possess. We do not need vast sums of money from our friends to tide us along i n our own a f f a i r s . We do not covet the goods and chattels nor the t e r r i t o r y of others ... The greatest need of my country today i s peace and the goodwill of a l l countries with which i t i s our desire to l i v e i n friendship and mutual understanding. We venture to suggest that our unique p o s i t i o n permits us to play an i m p a r t i a l r o l e i n the a f f a i r s of the world. To summarize, Malayan foreign policy with respect to questions of defence and security displayed a d i s t i n c t pro-Western, and concomitantly, anti-communist posture, tempered by a rather i n -effectual attempt toward n e u t r a l i t y or what would be more correctly described as a posture of non-interference. A keen observer of Malayan foreign policy has characterized i t as the p o l i t i c a l schizo-30 phrenia of a "committed neutral," but we would probably be nearer the mark i f we described Malayan foreign policy as being more committed than neutral. Malaya's major foreign policy objectives were the protection of i t s p o l i t i c a l sovereignty and i t s t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries against outside interference and aggression. These are, i n short, the basic core-value goals of self-preservation. Given the worldview of i t s policy-makers, the pursuit of these objectives translated as the protection against communist expansion and aggression. The Anglo-Malayan Defence Treaty was the direct response to meeting such eventualities. As far as foreign policy strategies were concerned, there was perhaps no great deal of thought given to planning complex p o l i c i e s . Defence was the basic objective and 31 AMDA was an almost automatic response to Malaya's defence needs. However, since Malaya had unequivocally camped on one side of the East-West c o n f l i c t , i t also naturally behaved s t r a t e g i c a l l y as a minor "cold warrior." There was therefore a conscious e f f o r t on Malaya's part to a l i g n with the Western powers and concomitantly to disassociate with the Eastern powers. 47 I summarize below i n table form the foreign policy of the period with respect to issues of national defence and security i n terms of foreign policy objectives, postures, strategies and the most important actions. The summary should be taken only as a l i s t i n g of the various policy outputs without any s p e c i f i c indication of th e i r exact relationship. This task w i l l be accomplished i n a l a t e r section. TABLE 2.2 Defence and Security: P o l i c y Outputs 1957-1963 OBJECTIVES Maintaining p o l i t i c a l independence. Protecting t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . POSTURES Pro-Western  Orientation - supporting ideals of Western democracy or the "Free World" and the i r dissemination. Anti-Communist  Orientation - opposing communist ideals and their dissemination. Non-interference - respecting t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l sovereignty of other countries. STRATEGIES Aligning with Western powers. Non-association with communist powers. ACTIONS Signing Anglo-Malayan Defence Pact. Supporting U.S. Policy i n Vietnam, Cuba and Gulf of Tonkin. Not recognizing and/or having diplomatic relations with certain communist countries. Following a two-China policy at UN. Condemning: - Chinese action i n Tibet, 1959. - Chinese h o s t i l i t i e s against India ' (launching "Save Democracy Fund" i n support of India) , 1962. 48 Development and Trade Colonialism's impact on Malaya's economy was perhaps more profound than i n any other area. The B r i t i s h l e f t Malaya a raw material producing economy which was largely geared to the expanding industries of the metropolis. Thus, independent Malaya emerged as ess e n t i a l l y an a g r i c u l t u r a l country i n which rubber and t i n accounted for approximately 85 per cent of a l l exports and i n which 69 per cent of i t s two m i l l i o n working population was engaged i n agriculture. In addition, continued B r i t i s h economic interests i n the country e f f e c t i v e l y controlled much of i t s economy. As a scholar and former B r i t i s h c i v i l servant i n Malaya noted, most of the major agency houses and the giant holding companies that dominate agriculture and commerce were s t i l l i n B r i t i s h hands after independence and that, "at present (1963) a l l the t i n dredges, three-quarters of the large rubber estates, almost a l l of the new o i l palm estates, possibly two-thirds of Malayan foreign trade, and much of the new secondary industries 32 are i n overseas, mainly B r i t i s h , ownership and control." Malaya's espousal of a l a i s s e z - f a i r e economic policy made the continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n of foreign enterprise not only possible but to a large extent, welcome. In most part, this philosophy was prompted by the b e l i e f that only foreign economic enterprise could provide the necessary c a p i t a l for growth and s t a b i l i t y . At the international l e v e l , such a philosophy implied a strong commitment to international commerce and private foreign investment. As a direct consequence, Malaya concluded b i l a t e r a l investment pacts with West Germany, Japan and the United States soon after independence, 49 and was also a party to the ECAFE m u l t i l a t e r a l Investment Charter 33 (1958). Malaya has also granted tax r e l i e f for 'pioneer industries' i n the country since 1958. In contrast to i t s l a s s e z - f a i r e posture toward foreign investment, Malaya's narrow-based economy caused i t to press strenuously for international control of the prices of raw materials. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t has been a leading participant i n the international 34 t i n agreements and the International Rubber Study Group. But before we examine the s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s i n t h i s area, i t may be illuminating to consider more thoroughly the nature and d i r e c t i o n of Malayan trade. A leading Malayan economist has noted that the country has a very high "export orientation" measured i n terms of Gross Export Proceeds over Gross Domestic Product. Malaya ranked f i r s t among a cross-section of Asian and European countries with an export orientation of 40 per cent while the United States at the other extreme had only a figure of 4 per cent. In Lim Chong Yah's words: The extent of export orientation can reveal a good deal about the nature of a country's economy. For one thing i t suggests a high degree of dependence on foreign markets, which leads i n turn to the dependence of the country's economic welfare on foreign economic forces. Insofar as a country produces goods that have high foreign marginal income e l a s t i c i t i e s of demand, as do most [Malayan] exports, the prosperity of i t s export industries i s d i r e c t l y correlated with the prosperity of the importing countries.35 Thus, Malaya's economic prosperity was heavily t i e d to i t s external trade, which i n turn was heavily dependent on i t s two major exports, rubber and t i n . The table below shows that rubber was by far the most important Malayan product, accounting for more than 60 per cent of exports, with t i n ranking a high second with a figure of around 20 per cent. Malaya's heavy dependence on these two primary commodities made i t i n d i r e c t l y dependent on the major i n d u s t r i a l countries which were the chief buyers of rubber and t i n . TABLE 2.3 Composition of Malayan Gross Exports (%) Commodity 1947-50 1951-55 1956-60 Rubber 64.0% 64.0% 63.0% Tin 19.0 21.0 17.0 Iron 0.3 1.0 4.0 Timber 1.0 1.0 2.0 Palm O i l 2.0 2.0 2.0 A l l Other 13.7 11.0 12.0 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Lim Chong Yah, "West Malaysian External Trade, 1947-65" i n Theodore Morgan and Nyle Spoelstra, eds., Economic Interdependence  i n Southeast Asia, Madison, Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1969, p. 210. The next table shows the d i r e c t i o n of Malayan exports i n terms of the major buyers of Malayan goods. Of the s i x major importers, three were advanced Western countries (the United States, the United Kingdom and West Germany), one was an advanced communist country (the Soviet Union) and, another, an advanced Asian country (Japan) and, the l a s t , a major trading centre and i n t e r n a t i o n a l entreport (Singapore). However, there was an important difference between Singapore and the other f i v e countries. Unlike the f i v e , which were f i n a l consumers of Malayan exports, Singapore mainly 36 re-exported Malaya's domestic products to other countries. Thus, the chief buyers of Malayan exports were the advanced i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries. 52 TABLE 2.4 Direction of Malayan Exports by Destination 1958-63 Country 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 Singapore 23.8% 23.0% 21.5% 19.8% 19.8% 20.0% United Kingdom 18.5 13.3 13.0 11.9 9.3 8.3 United States 10.6 11.5 10.3 12.6 14.5 14.4 Japan 9.4 12.8 12.6 14.5 13.8 14.7 West Germany 5.0 5.8 7.7 8.6 4.2 4.3 U.S.S.R. 3.9 8.2 3.7 6.0 8.5 7.7 Sub-total 71.2 74.6 68.8 73.5 70.1 69.4 I t a l y 3.8 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.7 4.1 China 2.9 0.9 0.2 - -India 2.7 2.1 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.4 France 2.6 3.2 3.8 3.8 3.7 2.8 Au s t r a l i a 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.0 1.7 1.7 Canada 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.9 2.4 Netherlands 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 Total 89.5 89.5 84.5 88.9 86.3 88.6 Source: Calculated from Lim, op_. c i t . , p. 216. 53 The next two tables show the composition of Malayan imports and the main sources of Malayan imports. TABLE 2.5 Composition of Malayan Imports 1958 & 1963 (%) 1958 1963 Food, beverages and tobacco 36.5% 28.5% Crude materials and mineral fuels 19.1 17.6 Manufactured, c a p i t a l and consumer goods 42.9 51.1 Others 0.6 2.8 Total 100.0 100.0 Source: Calculated from Lim, op_. c i t . , pp. 223-224. TABLE 2.6 Main Sources of Malayan Imports 1958 & 1963 (%) Country 1958 1963 United Kingdom 25.0% 21.0% Thailand 11.0 9.5 Indonesia 13.8 8.3 Singapore 8.4 9.3 Japan 5.7 9.9 Sub-total 63.9 58.0 China 5.7 5.2 Au s t r a l i a 5.4 5.1 Hong Kong 2.9 3.3 Burma 2.9 2.1 India 2.5 2.6 United States 2.5 5.2 West Germany 2.4 3.7 Netherlands 1.7 2.3 Total 90.6 87.6 Source: From Lim, op_. c i t . , pp. 225-226. 55 The picture on imports i s a l i t t l e more complex. B r i t a i n , however, dominated as Malaya's most important supplier, again emphasizing the c o l o n i a l l i n k s . Malaya's substantial imports of manufactured and c a p i t a l goods made the country doubly dependent on i n d u s t r i a l countries, which, as noted, are also the main buyers of i t s products. Malaya also imported considerably from i t s Southeast Asian neighbours largely i n terms of food and raw materials for 37 domestic use and i t s processing industries. Malayan trade figures provide us with a clearer understanding of the country's heavy dependence on external trade and the extreme v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the Malayan economy to external forces quite beyond the country's control. I t i s not surprising, therefore, that Malaya ardently espoused a l l international e f f o r t s to s t a b i l i z e the prices of primary commodities. Its p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the various international t i n agreements was a direct response to the need to protect t i n prices. Malaya also strenuously protested United States releases of i t s stockpiles of rubber and t i n acquired during the years of the Korean boom for strategic reasons. Such releases, whatever the U.S. motive, adversely affected the market prices of the two commodities and became the chief i r r i t a n t of U.S. - Malayan 38 relati o n s . In addition, U.S. production of synthetic rubber and lack of support for commodity arrangements - i t has never been a party to the t i n agreements - have been a further source of annoyance to Malaya. Tin, unlike rubber, has had a long history of p r i c e - f i x i n g 39 arrangements and Malaya w i l l i n g l y joined the 1953 Tin Agreement under Br i t a i n ' s aegis and participated after independence i n the 1960 agreement. Apart from the pragmatic matter of obtaining better prices from the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d , tin-consuming countries, the t i n conferences have also provided Malaya with the opportunity of ex-pressing s o l i d a r i t y with other primary-producing, Third World countries. Typical of Malaya's utterances at such conferences was this statement made by the Malayan delegate i n complaining about the producing countries having to bear the burden of maintaining the buffer stock, the mechanism for cushioning price fluctuations: I t hurt none but the producer; the p r i n c i p l e seems to be: "To him that hath, more s h a l l be given; from him who giveth, more s h a l l be taken away." The producer's burden w i l l not be lightened for another f i v e years. Condemned to the same old f l o o r p r i c e , he would also be required to subsidize the consumer by providing out of his own meagre earnings the means with ^ which to keep the price at or below the c e i l i n g . Apart from t i n agreements, Malaya also employed the strategy of negotiating b i l a t e r a l trade agreements to overcome trade barriers and thus ensure a ready market for i t s goods. These trade agreements t y p i c a l l y accorded to Malaya and the other country mutual most-favoured nation treatment i n various f i e l d s as w e l l as the a b o l i t i o n of duty i n certain specified areas. The agreements were i n force for one to three years and usually renewed at the expiry of the period. Malaya concluded the f i r s t such agreement with A u s t r a l i a i n August 1958 with the result that rubber and t i n imports were allowed into A u s t r a l i a free of duty i n exchange for s i m i l a r treatment and purchase of certain 41 Australian products. The second trade agreement was concluded with Japan i n May 1960 with the immediate impact of increasing the export of pineapples and timber to that country. Subsequently, trade agreements were signed with New Zealand i n February 1961, United 43 Arab Republic i n February 1962 and with South Korea i n January 1963. Attempts were made to conclude a trade agreement with India but i t never materialised. In a statement, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry said that i t was Malaya's policy to sign trade agreements with any interested country. The strategy of signing trade agreements may be related to Malaya's commitment to a l a i s s e z - f a i r e posture i n international commerce but pragmatic considerations of direct economic benefit were perhaps the more important motive. To recapitulate: Malaya's foreign policy i n the area of trade and development was marked by a f a i r l y strong developing-world orientation which belied the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of i t s economy. At the same time, i t would seem that Malaya's c o l o n i a l t i e s tended to foster a l i b e r a l , l a i s s e z - f a i r e policy toward international commerce and foreign enterprise i n the country. Malaya's trading t i e s tended to reinforce i t s Western-world leanings, although t h i s orientation did not preclude i t s trading with the Soviet Union and China. My summary of foreign policy with respect to development and trade appears below. 58 TABLE 2.7 Development and Trade: Policy Outputs 1957-1963 OBJECTIVES Promoting economic development - i n d u s t r i a l i -zation - r u r a l development - commercial development S t a b i l i z i n g the prices of primary commodities POSTURES Laissez-faire Orientation - commitment to international commerce and free enterprise Developing-world  Orientation - supporting p r i c e - f i x i n g of primary goods - opposing t a r i f f groupings against Third World STRATEGIES Providing a good investment climate i n the country. (Having no nationalization p o l i c y ) . Supporting and par t i c i p a t i n g i n trade groupings of developing countries Negotiating b i l a t e r a l trade agreements to overcome trade barriers ACTIONS Concluding b i l a t e r a l investment agreements with Western Germany, Japan and United States (1957) Negotiating M u l t i l a t e r a l Investment Charter i n ECAFE (1958) Pa r t i c i p a t i n g i n International Tin Agreements (1953, 1960) Denouncing U.S. GSA releases of t i n and rubber stockpile Concluding trade agreements with A u s t r a l i a (1958), Japan (1960), New Zealand (1961) , United Arab Republic (1962) and South Korea (1963) 59 International Cooperation and Diplomacy We have already noted that Malaya portrayed i t s e l f as an impartial actor i n world a f f a i r s at the United Nations. Malaya 44 looked upon the UN as a r a l l y i n g point for the smaller nations and thus act i v e l y supported the ideals and work of the international organization and not without d i s t i n c t i o n . Tilman writes at some length on t h i s point: The United Nations has played a large part i n the enunciation of [Malayan] foreign p o l i c y , and [Malaya] has played a s i g n i f i c a n t role i n the work of the UN. Malayan troops performed distinguished service under the UN f l a g i n the Congo, an operation that Malaya supported not only with troops but also f i n a n c i a l l y through the purchase of UN bonds. The Malayan representative opposed Soviet attempts to weaken the Secretary-Generalship after the death of Dag Hammerskjold, supported the appointment of U Thant to the vacant post, and has consistently applauded a l l the ef f o r t s of the Secretary-General to make the UN a more ef f e c t i v e influence i n international a f f a i r s ... As a result of i t s enthusiastic support of the a c t i v i t i e s of the UN, i t i s not surprising that Malaya was early designated to take a nonpermanent seat on the Security Council, a chair that i t held [sic] during the 19th Session.^ Perhaps Malaya's most s i g n i f i c a n t action i n support of the international organization and i t s ideals was the country's p a r t i c i -pation i n the Congo peacekeeping i n 1960. Malaya i n i t i a l l y contributed 613 personnel but increased t h i s to a t o t a l of 1,413 men when 46 reinforcements were sought by the Secretary-General. I t strongly supported Dag Hammerskjold when the Secretary-General came under attack from the Soviet Union. The Malayan delegate stated during the 60 emergency session of the UN on the Congo c r i s i s i n September 1960: Many un j u s t i f i e d and erroneous accusations have been l e v e l l e d against the United Nations Command, whose i n t e g r i t y and s i n c e r i t y have been u n f a i r l y questioned by these accusations ... Under normal circumstances these charges because of their f a l l a c i o u s character could e a s i l y be dismissed but when they seem to have the intention of pu b l i c l y d i s c r e d i t i n g the Secretary-General, and thereby endangering the authority of the UN, i n which we small nations place our hope and f a i t h i n t h i s troubled age, my delegation feels i t incumbent upon i t to speak up and take strong exception to these unwarranted and u n j u s t i f i e d accusations.^ Thus, throughout the duration of the Congo c r i s i s , the Malayan policy was to f o r e s t a l l any e f f o r t s of eroding the UN authority i n the handling of the c r i s i s and also to prevent i t s engulfment into cold war p o l i t i c s . This apparently nonaligned position, however, was not motivated by adherence to a t r u l y neutral or unbiased appreciation of the problem as the Tunku amply demonstrated i n explaining Malaya's stand to Parliament: External interference i n our i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s w i l l not be tolerated, and we are mindful of the dangers that can come from extraneous influences. The Republic of Congo akin to us by reason of the fact that she i s but recently independent, must not be exposed i n her tender years to the dangers of subversion as perpetrated by international communism. Let us not be beguiled by the veneer of friendship l i k e that offered by the communists when their declared aim i s to gain control of the world and place i t under a system where there were no personal freedoms and democracy as we understand them ... In the communist book, peaceful co-existence i s a fraud designed to reduce into a state of non-existence those trapped victims ... We are firmly convinced that to keep the Congo free of unnecessary power bloc interference, aid must be channelled through the UN. 4 8 The Tunku also described Soviet Premier Khrushchev's proposal of replacing the Secretary-General with a three-man " t r o i k a " secretariat as "despicable" and a "mischievous idea" aimed at turning the UN into the "Disunited Nations." I t would seem that the Tunku unwittingly drew Malaya into cold war p o l i t i c s i n the Congo c r i s i s i n his pronouncements on the subject when Malaya formally took an impartial stand at the UN on the matter. Among the topics that came up regularly for debate at the UN was the question of disarmament. Malaya supported the idea i n p r i n c i p l e but tended to back the more conservative, usually Western-bloc, proposals on the problem. For example, at the 12th Session (1957) of the General Assembly, the newly-independent Malaya voted against a Soviet draft resolution proposing a five-year ban on the use of nuclear weapons with the provision to reconsider the moratorium * at the end of that period, and abstained on a second resolution c a l l i n g for the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission. Yet, i t voted for the Western-sponsored draft resolution urging international control covering reduction of armed forces and armaments, open inspection to guard against surprise attacks and immediate suspension of nuclear testing. Malaya's voting at the 13th Session was s i m i l a r . Dr. Ismail, the Malayan delegate, explained his country's support f o r a l i m i t e d plan f o r disarmament i n the The resolution was rejected by the F i r s t Committee by 45-11, with 25 abstentions. ** The resolution was rejected by 51-9, with 21 abstentions. *** The resolution was adopted by 57-9, with 15 abstentions. 62 following manner: I t i s p a i n f u l l y obvious to the world at large that under the strenuous conditions of modern l i f e , disarmament has become a sprawling complex of interrelated parts, a many-headed hydra which w i l l test our human ingenuity and resourcefulness to the l i m i t i f we are to overcome i t and yet survive i n the process. I t i s no longer possible to slay the monster with one clean sweep of the diplomatic sword. We must, therefore, turn to the venerable ancients for wise prededents and attacking each indiv i d u a l part of the problem, take care to seal i t off forever from i t s dreadful capacity of multiplying i t s e l f after every attempt to destroy i t s many heads. In general, then, Malaya did not vote with the n e u t r a l i s t countries which tended to propose compromise resolutions. For example, Malaya was not among the 14 n e u t r a l i s t countries which drafted a resolution c a l l i n g for immediate discontinuance of nuclear tests u n t i l agreement was reached by the states concerned on controls necessary to ensure the stopping of such tests. Malaya abstained from voting i n both the F i r s t Committee and the General Assembly on the resolution. Dr. Ismail, i n defending Malaya's position said: The i n i t i a t i v e for test discontinuance rests squarely with those powers which already have atomic weapons as w e l l as those i n a position to set off test explosions i n the near future. Nothing less than a discontinuance of these tests would meet humanitarian needs as world society prepares to engage i n the most ambitious and hopeful disarmament eff o r t s i n modern times. In order to meet these needs, we, the other 78 members of the United Nations, are e n t i r e l y dependent upon the s i n c e r i t y and good intentions of the three nuclear powers. The resolution was rejected by both the F i r s t Committee (36-26, with 19 abstentions) and the General Assembly (42-27, with 13 abstentions). 63 Thus Malaya adhered b a s i c a l l y to a r e a l i s t , i f conservative, stand on disarmament, and unlike i t s unequivocal support for UN c o l l e c t i v e security, did not see the UN capable of c o n t r o l l i n g the arms race without the compliance of the armed. On questions of colonialism and human r i g h t s , Malaya's position was decidedly more Third-World oriented. Its response to the Algerian si t u a t i o n perhaps t y p i f i e s the reaction to colonial issues. Except on one occasion, i t supported a l l the Afro-Asian resolutions on the Algerian question. Only i n 1958, when reference was made to the "Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic," did Malaya cautiously abstain on a resolution, but i n general i t voted for the recognition of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence. In the words of Dato Kamil, Malaya's UN delegate, i n 1960: As a nation which has just attained i t s independence from colonial r u l e , however beneficient the regime may be, the Federation of Malaya has dedicated and continues to dedicate i t s e l f to the just cause of peoples and nations everywhere for the right to self-determination and freedom from a l i e n bondage i n a l l forms, manifestations and guises. This dedication to the cause of freedom has become one of the cardinal principles that form the corner-stone of [my] government's foreign pol i c y . - ^ Malaya's attitude and voting behaviour on the West I r i a n question has 53 also taken a si m i l a r l i n e . A prominent aspect of Malaya's foreign policy with respect to international cooperation has been i t s active p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the 64 many specialized and regional intergovernmental international organizations. P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n these organizations has i n general been a boon to Malaya i n the areas of economic and technical advancement. For example, the IBRD i n 1958 made a loan of $28.6 m i l l i o n to Malaya to help finance the Cameron Highlands hydro-electric project, the biggest single development project i n the Federation. A second loan of $51.9 m i l l i o n was given i n 1963 to finance the 54 second phase of the project. We have already noted e a r l i e r Malaya's strong support for the role of international organization i n a s s i s t i n g Third World socio-economic development. This extends to v i r t u a l l y a l l other specialized or specific-purpose organizations and i s a manifestation of what we may term a " f u n c t i o n a l i s t " orientation i n this area of foreign policy. Next i n importance to the United Nations was perhaps Malaya's association with the Commonwealth. From the standpoint of defence, the Anglo-Malayan Defence Pact (associated by the governments of Malaya's membership i n international organizations by 1963 included: The International Labour Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN Educational, S c i e n t i f i c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International C i v i l Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the World Meteorological Union (WMU), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Tin Council (ITC), the International Rubber Study Group, the General Agreement on Trade and T a r i f f s (GATT), the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), and the Colombo Plan. See Malaysia i n B r i e f , Government Pr i n t e r , Kuala Lumpur, 1963, p. 106. A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand) automatically made Malaya an i n t e g r a l part of Commonwealth defence. As Tun Razak put i t , Malaya's defence policy was to contribute toward "a common Commonwealth e f f o r t i n the protection of our t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h i s area ..." (fn. 6). In addition, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Commonwealth also ensured certain economic advantages to a developing country such as Malaya. In p a r t i c u l a r , the benefits included c a p i t a l - a i d grants from advanced Commonwealth countries, technical and educational assistance from the Colombo Plan and i n d i r e c t advantages through membership i n the St e r l i n g Area and par t i c i p a t i o n i n the system of Commonwealth trade preferences.^^ The most s i g n i f i c a n t of these benefits accrued from Malaya's pa r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Colombo Plan o r i g i n a l l y designed for Commonwealth members only, but l a t e r included non-members as w e l l , notably the United States since 1958. The plan has benefited Malaya mostly i n terms of technical assistance i n the t r a i n i n g of experts i n various economic, educational and professional pursuits. The supposed benefits derived from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Sterl i n g Area and the 56 Commonwealth trade preferences are somewhat more controversial. The most contentious issue i n Malaya's Commonwealth p o l i t i c s has been South A f r i c a and apartheid. I t was through the Tunku's i n i t i a t i v e that the question of apartheid - hitherto a taboo topic -was brought up i n the 1960 Conference leading eventually to the South African Republic leaving the Association i n 1961. The Tunku never minced words on the question of apartheid and as he told Parliament 66 i n 1960: Those who rule South A f r i c a and control i t s destiny do not conform to our Commonwealth ideas and ideals of human rights and j u s t i c e and I am beginning to think whether a country l i k e South A f r i c a has any right to be within t h i s family of nations ... I f those who control the destinies of South A f r i c a w i l l not l i s t e n to our protest i n the cause of humanity and j u s t i c e as a member of the Commonwealth, then again we should ask ourselves what right has South A f r i c a to be a member of this Commonwealth of Nations.^7 After South African Premier Dr. Verwoerd decided to withdraw his country's application for membership i n May 1961, the Tunku said: Nobody i s sorry. On the other hand, the Commonwealth now means something and has been given a new stature. The Commonwealth nations can now speak up boldly on a l l peaceful issues which include s o c i a l and r e l i g i o u s subjects.58 F i n a l l y , we w i l l examine Malaya's ef f o r t s toward regional -Southeast Asian - cooperation. Malaya was instrumental i n the forma-tion of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), the f i r s t t r u l y regional association i n the area i n that a l l i t s members belonged to Southeast Asia. ASA, formed i n 1961, appears, however, to have been the miscarried offspring of the Tunku's eff o r t s at a broader grouping of non-communist ( i f not, anti-communist) Southeast Asian states. As early as A p r i l 1958, the Malayan Premier was reported to be toying with the idea of a "defence treaty organization consisting of Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and [South] Vietnam ... outside the framework of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization." He had previously rejected a Sukarno suggestion of an Islamic bloc comprising Pakistan, Malaya, Indonesia, N. Borneo and Southern Philippines as 59 "impossible." The Tunku discussed his plans with President Garcia of the Philippines on a v i s i t i n January 1959, at th i s stage denying reports that he was considering an "anti-communist pact for Southeast 60 Asian countries." The upshot was a surprisingly prompt announce-ment of a plan for the formation of the Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET), an association with apparently only economic, trade and educational objectives. Malaya undertook to draft the treaty and the diplomatic work i n i n v i t i n g Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Burma to par t i c i p a t e . However, the plan received lukewarm response except from Thailand and South Vietnam. Indeed, Indonesia expressed objection and even h o s t i l i t y toward the idea. The prevalent attitude i n Indonesia was expressed by The Times of Indonesia: I t would be a charitable act on the part of the Indonesian Government i f i t nipped i n the bud the puerile, vain and flamboyant hopes expressed by Malaya and the Philippines i n the Rahman-Garcia communique issued i n Manila on Tuesday for the setting up of an economic and c u l t u r a l union of South-East A s i a . 6 1 The Indonesian objections were stated rather succinctly by the Consul-General i n Singapore that "the Philippines i s a member of SEATO and Malaya has t i e s with B r i t a i n " and that "as long as a l l the member countries of such a pact are not r e a l l y independent, 62 there w i l l be s p l i t s which w i l l s p o i l the t i e s of unity." SEAFET was eventually abandoned and i n i t s place an Association of South-East Asian States (ASAS, l a t e r , ASA) was proposed i n July 1960, with Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand as the sponsor-nations. The Indonesian response was again, i f not h o s t i l e , unreceptive, while the other Southeast Asian states were apparently i n d i f f e r e n t to the 68 project. Nevertheless, the organization was formed on July 31, 1961, with the three sponsors as founder members. The expressed aims, of the association were n o n - p o l i t i c a l . As embodied i n the Bangkok Declaration, they were: To establish an ef f e c t i v e machinery for fr i e n d l y consultations, collaboration and mutual assistance i n the economic, s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l , s c i e n t i f i c and administrative f i e l d s ; To provide educational, professional, technical and administrative and research f a c i l i t i e s i n . the respective countries for nationals and o f f i c i a l s of the associated countries; To exchange information on matters of common interest or concern i n the economic, c u l t u r a l , educational and s c i e n t i f i c f i e l d s ; To cooperate i n the promotion of Southeast Asian Studies; To provide a machinery for f r u i t f u l collaboration i n the u t i l i z a t i o n of their respective natural resources, the development of their agriculture and i n d i r e c t l y , the expansion of their trade, the improvement of their transport and communication f a c i l i t i e s , and generally r a i s i n g the l i v i n g standards of thei r peoples; To cooperate i n the study of the problems of i n t e r -national commodity trade; and generally to consult and cooperate with one another so as to achieve the aims and purposes of the Association, as well as contribute more e f f e c t i v e l y to the work of ex i s t i n g international organizations and agencies. D J The aims of ASA were thus very general and broad. At no point was the association geared toward defence and security. The accomplish-ments of ASA tend to confirm i t s largely c u l t u r a l and diplomatic orientation as even the economic objectives were never seriously pursued. Among such accomplishments were the a b o l i t i o n of visa requirements for o f f i c i a l s and the waiver of visa fees for nationals 69 v i s i t i n g each other's countries, an ASA express t r a i n service between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, several a t h l e t i c and c u l t u r a l exchanges, and consultations on an ASA a i r l i n e and a M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade and 64 Navigation Agreement. The l a s t two projects never materialized. Soon after i t s troubled b i r t h , the fate of ASA began to be t i e d to the Tunku's Malaysia Plan which brought i n i t s wake the renewed Philippines claim to Sabah and Indonesian Confrontation, which I s h a l l discuss i n the next chapter. In summary, Malaya's foreign policy on questions of international cooperation and peace was marked by a strong commitment to the United Nations and many of i t s i d e a l s , with the notion that perhaps the UN embodied the aspirations of the small, developing states and that any attempt at reducing UN authority i n such matters as peacekeeping meant i n d i r e c t l y a threat to the position of the m i l i t a r i l y weak states. This foreign policy posture was best manifested i n Malaya's stand i n the Congo c r i s i s and to some extent i s reflected i n i t s support for the functional UN agencies. However, Malaya's posture and actions with respect to such issues as disarmament belied a conservatism and tendency to lean toward the Western-bloc of nations, while on questions of colonialism and human r i g h t s , Malaya was more fo r t h r i g h t l y Third-World oriented. This was evident i n i t s position on the Algerian, West I r i a n and apartheid issues. Apart from the UN, Malaya also showed a commitment to the Commonwealth largely because of i t s mutual defence arrangement with B r i t a i n , but, one might argue, also for romantic, i f not i d e o l o g i c a l , reasons, since the Commonwealth i s decidedly a Western-bloc or Western-sponsored association. F i n a l l y 70 Malaya i n i t i a t e d a concerted e f f o r t at regional cooperation i n Southeast Asia but t y p i c a l l y the e f f o r t s , which culminated i n the formation of ASA, were marred by undertones of anti-communism or a pro-Western flavour, which tended to foreclose the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of countries such as Indonesia. The basic foreign policy strategy seemed to be to promote the authority of the United Nations and other i n t e r -national organizations so that this would also i n d i r e c t l y promote and protect the interests of the smaller countries such as Malaya.^ There are two d e f i n i t e facets to th i s general strategy which may be seen as two sub-strategies of (a) promoting and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n general-purpose, or functionally diffused, international groupings and associations such as the UN and the Commonwealth; and (b) promo-ting and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n specific-purpose groupings and regional bodies. In general, the strategies i n t h i s issue-area tend to be somewhat diffused since the goals are long-range and distant i n nature. There i s , therefore, greater fusion between postures, objectives, strategies and actions. A foreign policy posture or objective does not always have to have a corresponding foreign policy strategy. A strategy i s a premeditated, s p e c i f i c plan of action, whereas a good number of foreign policy actions often flow d i r e c t l y from policy postures and objectives. This seems to be the case with Malaya's posture of anti-colonialism. Adopting a standard posture such as t h i s led almost automatically to certain kinds of actions, i n p a r t i c u l a r voting i n support of Third-World issues at the UN. Where no clear-cut foreign policy strategy e x i s t s , foreign policy postures are often also of the "posturing" type, that i s , they are largely designed for public consumption. In t h i s sense, they are related to status and prestige questions which s h a l l be discussed i n the next section. TABLE 2.8 International Cooperation and Diplomacy: Policy Outputs 1957-1963 OBJECTIVES Promoting UN ideals: - c o l l e c t i v e security - s e l f -de tennina t ion & decolonization - human rights and s o c i a l j u s t i c e - disarmament Promoting regional cooperation POSTURES International  Orientation - supporting exercise of UN authority Functional  Orientation - supporting work of functional international organizations Anti-colonialism - supporting s e l f -determination and human rights Regionalism - encouraging regional cooperation STRATEGIES Promoting and le g i t i m i z i n g the authority of the UN and other recognized IGO's so as to i n d i r e c t l y pro-mote the interests of small nations: - promoting goals of general-purpose i n t e r -national groupings and associations - promoting goals of s p e c i f i c -purpose i n t e r -national groupings and regional bodies ACTIONS Pa r t i c i p a t i n g i n UN peacekeeping i n the Congo (1960) Pa r t i c i p a t i n g i n UN specialized agencies and their work Pa r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Commonwealth - jo i n i n g Colombo Plan, imperial trade preferences, Ster l i n g Area Sponsoring and voting i n the UN on resolutions c a l l i n g for s e l f -determination i n Alg e r i a , W. I r i a n Denouncing i n the UN and Commonwealth Conferences apart-heid and boycotting S. African goods Founding, with the Philippines and Thailand, the Association of South-East Asian (ASA), 1961. 72 The Sources of Malayan Foreign Policy In surveying Malayan foreign policy from 1957-1963, I have used a number of descriptive labels to depict i t s texture or character. I have cal l e d these i t s postures and have also i d e n t i f i e d i t s major policy objectives, strategies and actions. The ov e r a l l picture of the emergent Malayan foreign policy i s that of a Western-leaning, conservative foreign policy with a "low p r o f i l e " i n Third-World orientation. No single hypothesis can f u l l y explain the emergent Malayan foreign policy. The over-used idiosyncratic thesis i s certainly not adequate. While i t w i l l be hard to deny that Malayan foreign policy "owes more to the personality of i t s Prime Minister, 66 Tunku Abdul Rahman, than i s usual one cannot ignore the more fundamental, underlying sources i n explaining the f u l l character of Malayan foreign policy. I t i s certainly overstating the case to -say that the formulation of Malayan foreign policy i s "the v i r t u a l prerogative of a small stable e l i t e comprising four or 6 7 f i v e men." Much of the d i f f i c u l t y with many analysts of Third World foreign p o l i c i e s i s that they invariably spring upon the i d i o -syncracies of personalities as the c r u c i a l explanatory variables because these are the most apparent and conspicuous. Part of the problem i s the emphasis on decision-making style rather than 'foreign policy.' Were such analysts to appreciate and define the f u l l range of foreign policy outputs or dependent variables, their conclusions 68 might be somewhat di f f e r e n t . They may f i n d , for example, that the importance of idiosyncratic variables w i l l vary from issue-area to issue-area just as i t w i l l l i k e l y vary depending on whether one i s explaining foreign policy postures, objectives, strategies or actions. While not gainsaying the importance of idiosyncratic variables i n the explanation of Malayan foreign p o l i c y , such factors may best be appreciated as an intervening variable i n the policy-formulation process i n the sense that they represent the f i n a l " f i l t e r " through 69 which policy i s processed. This manner of viewing the idiosyn-c r a t i c variables i n no way minimizes their significance, but I believe, puts the other independent variables i n correct perspective. In my analysis, the term " e l i t e ideology" subsumes the idiosyncratic factors affecting foreign policy on the assumption that i t i s the more general p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and attitudes of leaders and po l i c y -makers rather than the peculiar, personality t r a i t s that are important i n the analysis of foreign p o l i c y . ^ Before developing th i s point further, l e t me present i n a more systematic fashion a diagramatic expression of my basic thesis with respect to the sources of Malayan foreign policy. 74 FIGURE 2.1 THE SOURCES OF MALAYAN FOREIGN POLICY: A THESIS External Sources Cold War Environment Eco- h i s t o r i c a l  Sources B r i t i s h Rule Emergency Idiosyncratic Sources E l i t e Ideology Internal Sources Defence and Security Needs Developmental Needs Strategies Foreign Policy Objectives A i I I I I I I I V Foreign Policy Postures Actions Status Needs In the thesis, two eco- h i s t o r i c a l factors are linked to two clusters of independent variables stemming from external and in t e r n a l sources, which are then translated into foreign policy outputs v i a the intervening variable, springing from idiosyncratic sources. The thesis i s a direct application of the model presented i n the study. Only the c r u c i a l independent (and intervening) variables 75 have been i d e n t i f i e d and conceptualized i n terms of the categories developed i n the model. I t i s by no means an exhaustive s e l e c t i o n of a l l the possible independent variables that might have influenced Malayan foreign p o l i c y but I hope to demonstrate the c r i t i c a l manner i n which these factors have shaped the substance of Malayan for e i g n p o l i c y . Two e c o - h i s t o r i c a l factors which have had a l a s t i n g and profound impact on both domestic and foreign p o l i c y were B r i t i s h c o l o n i z a t i o n and "The Emergency." B r i t i s h r u l e provided Malaya with i t s funda-mental p o l i t i c a l ethos of Western democratic norms and i t s p o l i t i c o -administrative i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . The r e l a t i v e l y peaceful t r a n s i t i o n to independence ensured a continuity of t h i s p o l i t i c a l ethos a f t e r independence, which s h a l l be discussed more f u l l y l a t e r . The 10-year i n t e r n a l war with the communists, euphemistically c a l l e d "The Emergency," i s the other s i g n i f i c a n t e c o - h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r which s h a l l also be discussed at a l a t e r point. Other e c o - h i s t o r i c a l factors such as geography, population and culture are excluded from the thesis as they tend to be "constants" rather than v a r i a b l e s . Often, they are better appreciated as i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t i n g to i n t e r n a l sources of p o l i c y . Thus, Malaya's r e l a t i v e l y small geographical s i z e and population and i t s n a t u r a l , or lack of n a t u r a l , endowments could be seen as conditions r e s u l t i n g i n various economic needs. S i m i l a r l y , g e o p o l i t i c a l factors were perhaps of importance only i n s o f a r as they r e l a t e d to the external environment of the Cold War. Malaya, f a l l i n g within the B r i t i s h sphere of influence and being part of non-communist, Southeast Asia, came within the ' o r b i t ' of the Western-bloc. The most important external factor - and g e o p o l i t i c a l factors are treated as such - was thus the Cold War of the post-World War I I international system. In Southeast Asia the emergence of the communist colossus of China and the onset of a spate of g u e r i l l a wars i n various Southeast Asian countries augmented the world-wide atmosphere of Cold War. As i l l u s t r a t e d i n the diagram, B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l r u l e , the Emergency and the external Cold War environment combined to produce pro-Western, anti-communist foreign policy postures i n Malayan foreign policy i n general, and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n matters of defence and security. In actions, t h i s took the form of a defence pact with B r i t a i n and the many anti-communist pronouncements and acts described i n the previous section. However, I w i l l argue, and hopefully demonstrate, that these factors i n and of themselves would not necessarily have resulted i n the par t i c u l a r character assumed by Malayan foreign policy were i t not for an e l i t e ideology already predisposed toward certain values. In short, they were necessary but not s u f f i c i e n t conditions. I t was the e l i t e ideology that was largely responsible for the most charac-t e r i s t i c features of Malayan foreign policy. This e l i t e ideology was epitomized i n the b e l i e f s and attitudes of the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and most, i f not a l l , of his cabinet colleagues. Indeed, there i s strong evidence that i t pervaded much of the top echelons of government and foreign service. In essence, this e l i t e ideology was marked by a commitment to the Western form of democracy and i t s ideals while i t s image of the international environment was that of the c l a s s i c bipolar s i t u a t i o n i n which the "Free World" faced 77 the growing menace of a messianic World Communism. In economic matters, this ideology extended to a commitment to free enterprise and capitalism. There i s l i t t l e doubt that B r i t i s h rule i t s e l f provided the basis for the development of such an e l i t e ideology. B r i t i s h colonialism had a durable and profound impact on Malayan p o l i t i c a l l i f e . While Malayan p o l i t i c s are cer t a i n l y no carbon copy of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s , many of the ideals, traditions and i n s t i t u t i o n s of B r i t i s h parliamentary democracy s t i l l thrive there. Indeed, the group of p o l i t i c i a n s which assumed power at the time of independence was schooled i n the B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n and i t was their p a r t i a l i t y to Western ideals that perhaps prompted an early and smooth hand-over of power.''"'" Marvin Ott has noted, for example, that seldom could one find a greater degree of shared values than i n the Malayan cabinet: The policy consensus i n the cabinet reflected the s t a b i l i t y and homogeneity of i t s membership. The men who counted - the Tunku, Tun Razak, Dr. Ismail, Tan Siew Sin, and Khir Johari -were colleagues i n the independence movement and members of the cabinet throughout most of the post-independence period. They were a l l westernised, pragmatic, conservative -and most of them were Malays. I n f l u e n t i a l Chinese l i k e Tan Siew Sin generally came from prominent families long resident i n Malaya. The c i v i l service, the upper levels of the armed forces and much of the l o c a l business community have also recruited men with these same char a c t e r i s t i c s . Policy differences within the cabinet were more a question of ^ nuance and implementation than of substance. Ott goes on to suggest that the foreign policy-formulating e l i t e comprise only four or f i v e men, namely the Tunku, who was primus i n t e r pares, Tun Razak, Dr. Ismail, Tan Siew Sin, the three most important 78 cabinet ministers influencing foreign p o l i c y , and Ghazali Shafie, the 73 Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s . Ott i s correct insofar as these men represent the 'core' e l i t e among whom 74 the highest l e v e l of decision-making on foreign policy occurred. I would suggest, however, that t h i s core e l i t e was backed by a much larger group of 'supportive' e l i t e of party s t a l w a r t s , ^ c i v i l servants and foreign service personnel, who by and large subscribed to the tenets of the e l i t e i d eology.^ For example, James C. Scott provides evidence from interviews with a sample of senior Malaysian c i v i l servants that not only the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e but also the higher echelons of bureaucracy shared a strong commitment to an idealized model of Western democracy.^ Scott stressed the role that secondary s o c i a l i z a t i o n played toward inculcating Western values i n his subjects, and I quote him at some length: A l l the men with whom I spoke attended schools and unive r s i t i e s patterned after the B r i t i s h model, where they followed c u r r i c u l a i d e n t i c a l to those i n England and learned Anglo-Saxon practices and values. Later they were recruited by Englishmen to serve i n a B r i t i s h s t y l e administration system. The standards and goals of this structure were, and s t i l l are i n large measure, cast i n an unmistakeably English mould. Both i n school and i n the c i v i l service their success was gauged by how they had learned the lessons that England had sought to convey. Small wonder then that a l l of them came by their Western [ B r i t i s h ] orientation honestly. They are the more Western oriented since t h e i r English education and high administrative posts are what set them apart from the general population and confer on them their status and prestige. The maintenance of a western orientation among higher c i v i l servants i s further encouraged by a p o l i t i c a l e l i t e that i s i t s e l f largely p r o - B r i t i s h and committed to l i b e r a l democratic ideals.^8 79 There i s l i t t l e wonder, then, that Malayan foreign p o l i c y tended to lean heavily toward the West i f even senior bureaucrats exhibited 79 strong a f f e c t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n toward Western values and i d e a l s . But perhaps i t was the b i t t e r war with the communists which l e f t the greatest mark on Malaya's policy-makers, supplying a d d i t i o n a l b a l l a s t to an already pro-Western e l i t e ideology. In p a r t i c u l a r , the Tunku's meeting with the communist leader, Chin Peng, i n December 1956, j u s t p r i o r to independence, seemed to have hardened the Premier's views on communism. The Tunku said a f t e r the abortive sessions i n which Chin Peng refused to accept the amnesty terms off e r e d : Chin Peng r e a l l y taught me what communism was. I had never r e a l l y understood and appreciated i t s f u l l meaning. When I was b r i e f e d i n communism by the B r i t i s h experts I always f e l t they were i n t e -rested i n making a bad case against the communists. But there i n that room i n Baling, Chin Peng taught me something I s h a l l not forget. He taught me that Malaya and communism can never co-exist.80 Thus, i t was not u n t i l the Emergency was o f f i c i a l l y ended i n 1960 that Malaya would vote f o r China's admission i n t o the United Nations (only on the basis of the two-China p o l i c y ) , when p r i o r to t h i s the newly independent country was not prepared even to discuss the China question, It has been pointed out that because the communist insurgency was l a r g e l y (Malayan) Chinese i n i n i t i a t i v e and composition, the government could not a f f o r d overtures to China while the i n s u r r e c t i o n was s t i l l i n 82 progress. Indeed, i t was the very conviction that the insurgency was China-inspired and aided that caused Malaya to r e i n f o r c e i t s i n t e r n a l p o l i c y of combating communism with an external posture of containing 8 3 xt. 81 This c a l l e d f o r the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Malayan Communist Party which the communist leader found unacceptable. 80 The external Cold War environment, with the events of Hungary, Cuba, Vietnam, Tibet and the Sino-Indian c o n f l i c t , tended therefore to augment the ex i s t i n g image of communism i n the policy-makers' 84 minds. There i s evidence that the ex i s t i n g e l i t e worldview represented something akin to Boulding's 'national image' and 85 Holsti's 'belief system': The national image ... i s the l a s t great stronghold of unsophistication ... Nations are divided into "good" and "bad" - the enemy i s a l l bad, one's own nation i s of spotless v i r t u e . Wars are either acts of God or acts of other nations, which always catch us completely by surprise. The b e l i e f system, composed of a number of "images" of the past, present, and future ... may be thought of as the set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and s o c i a l environment i s received. I t orients the in d i v i d u a l to his en-vironment, defining i t for him and id e n t i f y i n g i t s salient c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . National images may be denoted as a subpart of the b e l i e f system. The Malayan e l i t e ideology comprised a b e l i e f system which had i t s fundamental tenets i n an adherence to Western democracy and i t s ideals. On t h i s point, l e t me quote the Tunku: We have every reason to want to follow the Western [form of] democracy because i t suits our people. We have had freedom to do what we l i k e ; to follow our own i n c l i n a t i o n , whereas with the communists, you got to [sic] lead a regimented l i f e , to follow whether you believe i n i t or not, what you are asked to do. Such a l i f e would be foreign to our country and to our people, and so we naturally adhere to the Western form of democracy rather than follow communist ways. The Cabinet a l l along decided on t h i s line.^6 I t had a national image i n foreign policy matters of "good" and "bad" i n which the actions of communist countries were invariably interpreted as bad, while the actions of Western or Western leaning a l l i e s were 81 more often than not deemed to be good. The Tunku's statement above and the Malayan government's reaction to the events of Hungary, Cuba, Vietnam, Tibet and the Sino-Indian c o n f l i c t are good indications of such a national image. Given such an image, Malaya found i t s e l f w i l l y - n i l l y drawn into the Cold War arena, supporting the Western bloc i n most questions of East-West c o n f l i c t as i t s voting at the United Nations would seem to indicate. (See supra, Table 2.1) Figure 2.2 i l l u s t r a t e s the manner i n which the e l i t e ideology related to the other variables i n determining the character of defence and security policy outputs i n t h i s f i r s t period of foreign policy. The e l i t e ideology i s located centrally to indicate i t s importance as an intervening variable or the f i n a l " f i l t e r " through which a l l other influences on foreign policy are processed. B r i t i s h rule and the Emergency are seen as important antecedent variables while the Cold War environment should be appreciated as a pervasive factor acting constantly on foreign policy during this period. Given the nature of the e l i t e ideology, the impact of the Cold War was predictably i n the direction of pro-Western, anti-communist policy outputs. Although defence and security needs existed by virtue of nationhood, B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l rule and the Emergency tended to augment such needs. L i t t l e was done i n the co l o n i a l era to provide an independent Malaya with adequate m i l i t a r y capability to defend i t s borders i n the event of external attack, while the in t e r n a l war not only sapped already meagre c a p a b i l i t i e s but even after i t s o f f i c i a l end loomed large as a latent threat to national security. Moreover, the perception on the part of the r u l i n g e l i t e that insurgency was externally fueled added an 82 FIGURE 2.2 EXPLANATORY CHART OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY OUTPUTS Cold War B r i t i s h Rule Emergency \ ELITE IDEOLOGY Defence and security needs Foreign Policy  Objectives: P o l i t i c a l Independence T e r r i t o r i a l Integrity Foreign Policy  Postures: Pro-Western, Anti-Communist-Orientations Strategies: Aligning with Western powers, Disassociating with Communist powers Actions: Signing mutual defence pact with B r i t a i n , Other pro-Western anti-Communist actions international dimension to a s t r i c t l y i n t e r n a l security question. Given Malaya's low m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and i t s leaders' perception of external threat, AMDA seemed to be a l o g i c a l step toward the f u l -fillment of the country's basic defence and security needs, at least i n the eyes of the Tunku and his colleagues. National "needs" can be best appreciated as the obverse of " c a p a b i l i t i e s " - a well-known 87 concept i n the international relations l i t e r a t u r e . While i t makes sense to t a l k of the c a p a b i l i t i e s of great powers, to speak i n similar terms about small, developing countries would be somewhat inappropriate since these countries tend to have more needs than c a p a b i l i t i e s . Yet there seems to be a woeful lack of foreign policy 88 analysis of Third World countries from such a perspective. The importance of national needs i s even more evident i n matters r e l a t i n g to economics. I f Malaya was i n a weak position with respect to defence and security, i t s weakness and v u l n e r a b i l i t y was a l l the more evident i n matters of development and trade. I have already stressed how Malaya, as an underdeveloped country with an economy dependent on rubber and t i n , fought for international control of raw materials' prices while opposing a l l forms of protection and t a r i f f barriers against Third-World countries i n i t s pursuit of development goals. However, despite t h i s developing-world orientation i n the question of international trade, Malaya neither espoused nor practised a policy of economic nationalism at home. Instead, i t was committed to a l a i s s e z - f a i r e policy which l e f t i t s economy i n foreign, largely B r i t i s h control. I w i l l argue that this was again a product of the prevailing ideology which, apart from i t s Western-bloc orientation i n matters of international security, also exhibited a c a p i t a l i s t 89 economic philosophy. The basic tenets of this philosophy were a commitment to free enterprise and the b e l i e f that foreign investment provided the answer to economic s t a b i l i t y and advancement. Minister of Commerce, Tan Siew Sin, who l a t e r became the country's Finance 84 M i n i s t e r , enunciated such a philosophy as early as 1958 when speaking to Parliament i n support of granting tax exemption to pioneer i n d u s t r i e s : I t i s frequently suggested that the amount of foreign c a p i t a l coming into industry i n t h i s country should be l i m i t e d , e i t h e r by f i x i n g a maximum percentage of the shares which may be held i n any company by foreign c a p i t a l , or i n some other way. In view of the extremely large amounts of c a p i t a l which w i l l be required i f we are to beat the unemployment menace t h i s i s a t o t a l l y u n r e a l i s t i c approach to the problem. L i m i t i n g the amount of foreign c a p i t a l i n any enterprise i s tantamount to l i n k i n g the rate of i n d u s t r i a l development i n t h i s country to the amount of c a p i t a l which can be r a i s e d l o c a l l y ... In other words, the need for cap-i t a l i s so great that there i s room for a l l the l o c a l and foreign c a p i t a l wishing to invest here, with plenty more room to spare. The danger of today and tomorrow i s not a surplus of c a p i t a l as rather a dearth of i t . 9 0 Figure 2.3 shows the r e l a t i o n s h i p among the independent v a r i a b l e s and the development and trade p o l i c y outputs. B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l rule pre-disposed the Malayan economy to develop i n the p a r t i c u l a r fashion on which I have already elaborated. C o l o n i a l r u l e was therefore the most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r determining the kinds of economic needs the new nation was to have. Obviously, factors of climate and natural endowment are important i n i n f l u e n c i n g the nature of economic needs but the f a c t remains that c o l o n i a l i s m skewed Malaya's economic development i n p a r t i c u l a r 91 d i r e c t i o n s . This i n turn r e s u l t e d i n two f a i r l y stable foreign p o l i c y postures i n the issue-area: a developing-world o r i e n t a t i o n which sprung d i r e c t l y from i t s developmental needs, and a l a i s s e z - f a i r e o r i e n t a t i o n toward foreign economic enterprise which derived from the FIGURE.2.3 EXPLANATORY CHART OF DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE POLICY OUTPUTS Foreign P o l i c y Objectives B r i t i s h Rule Developmental Needs E l i t e Ideology Promoting economic development S t a b i l i z i n g commodity prices i - I L a i s s e z -f a i r e O r ientation Foreign P o l i c y Postures Developing-World Orientation Strategies Supporting trade groupings Negotiating trade agreements Strategy Providing good inves tment climate Actions Actions Investment Agreements with W. Germany, Japan and U.S. Granting 'pioneer status' to new indu s t r i e s Denouncing U.S. stock-p i l e releases of t i n and rubber Joining T i n Agreements Concluding trade Agreements with A u s t r a l i a , Japan, New Zealand, U.A.R. and S. Korea 86 dominant e l i t e ideology as w e l l as being based on needs. The manner i n which the two foreign policy postures relate to the economic objectives and t h e i r concomitant strategies and actions i s shown i n the explanatory chart. A developing-world posture led to the pursuit of two common LDC objectives of promoting economic development (however a government may choose to define this) and s t a b i l i z i n g commodity prices. This, i n turn, resulted i n the adoption of f a i r l y standard economic strategies of supporting LDC trade groupings and negotiating trade agreements. The resultant actions are enumerated i n Figure 2.3. Malaya's other posture i n issues of Development and Trade and the related strategy and actions were, however, more contrived, i n that they arose from def i n i t e ideological tenets. Were Malaya's leaders to have adopted a s o c i a l i s t ideology, for example, the foreign policy posture vi s - a - v i s foreign enterprise would have probably taken a more " n a t i o n a l i s t i c " hue with perhaps nationalization of major industries as i t s concomitant strategy. As i t turned out, a l a i s s e z - f a i r e orientation prompted the l i b e r a l strategy of providing f i s c a l and other incentives to foreign enterprise. In the issue-area of International Co-operation and Diplomacy, a prominent aspect of Malayan foreign policy was i t s pursuit of milieu or global goals. Malaya, despite being a small country, was rather active i n i t s international relations. I t showed considerable support for the UN and i t s functional a c t i v i t i e s , participated with keenness i n the Commonwealth, and succeeded i n forging a certain degree of regional cooperation among i t s more sympathetic neighbours. But f o r the most part, the pursuance of these m i l i e u goals spring from what we may term as status needs. A new nation seeks recognition and acceptance from the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community and the United Nations and other i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums are the most natural places to pursue 92 these needs. As a L a t i n American scholar has stated: ... there are two types of sources of a nation's prestige: (1) those derived from i n s t i t u t i o n a l bases that make i t possible f o r a nation to have high r e a l status from the economic and m i l i t a r y power point of view; and (2) those derived from the nation's behaviour i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, whether t h i s be to achieve a conformance with the value-orientations of t h i s system or to obtain an i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n not r e l a t e d to i t s m i l i t a r y m i g h t . y j Since Malaya did not have the i n s t i t u t i o n a l bases of prestige, i t had to depend upon i t s foreign p o l i c y actions to boost i t s status. Malaya's contribution toward the Congo peacekeeping was perhaps geared, among other aims, toward e s t a b l i s h i n g the new state's status 94 i n the world community. Status needs are based on the subjective evaluations of the r u l i n g e l i t e as well as on objective domestic conditions such as the presence or absence of a large m i l i t a r y capa-b i l i t y , great wealth, technology and the l i k e . In t h i s sense, they are " i n t e r n a l " sources of foreign p o l i c y , l i k e economic needs, but unlike the l a t t e r are not s o l e l y based on objective f a c t o r s . Status needs are r e a l , nevertheless, and are r e f l e c t i v e of the contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l system which operates on e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s at the formal l e v e l but ex h i b i t s vast i n e q u a l i t i e s among states at the 95 actual l e v e l . A l l states to some degree have status needs but there i s a greater tendency f o r states without the i n s t i t u t i o n a l bases of prestige to t r y and elevate t h e i r status by way of various diplomatic 88 FIGURE 2.4 EXPLANATORY CHART OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DIPLOMACY POLICY OUTPUTS Foreign Policy Postures Developmental Needs \ Security Needs Status Needs ^E l i t e Ideology Inter-n a t i o n a l i s t , F u n c t i o n a l i s t N . Orientations I I I Foreign A n t i -Colonialism I Regionalism I t Promoting UN ideal s : - c o l l e c t i v e security, human rights I i I I l i t Promoting authority of UN and other gen-e r a l purpos^ ' groupings / I / l / P a r t i c i p a t i n g i n Congo peacekeeping and other UN a c t i v i t i e s Policy Objectives Promoting decoloni-zation & s e l f -determina-ti o n I I i •*• Strategies A Actions Voting, sponsoring issues of Alge r i a , West I r i a n Promoting regional cooperation t Promoting s p e c i f i c -purpose, regional groupings l I I t Founding and joi n i n g ASA Pa r t i c i p a t i n g i n Commonwealth Denouncing apartheid & boycotting S. African goods P a r t i c i -pating i n UN specialized agencies 89 A 9 6 endeavours. Although status needs dominated Malayan foreign p o l i c y i n matters of i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation and diplomacy, i t would be wrong to assert that such needs were the only sources of p o l i c y i n the i s s u e -area. Foreign p o l i c y outputs are seldom single-purpose or u n i d i r e c -t i o n a l i n i n t e n t . Thus developmental and even s e c u r i t y needs i n d i r e c t l y impinged upon p o l i c y outputs i n the issue-area. In p a r t i c u l a r , Malaya's f u n c t i o n a l i s t o r i e n t a t i o n i n supporting the s p e c i a l i z e d UN agencies and i t s support of UN c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i n general r e f l e c t the influence of these needs. As a former colony, Malaya also f e l t the o b l i g a t i o n to press f o r self-determination of c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s and decolonization i n general. A n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m as a foreign p o l i c y posture was therefore an almost automatic outcome of independence. As f o r Malaya's pursuit of regionalism, i t was m u l t i - d i r e c t i o n a l i n purpose, but for the most part of the period, the thrust was toward c u l t u r a l and diplomatic exchange among countries sharing a s i m i l a r heritage. F i n a l l y , although the p r e v a i l i n g e l i t e ideology had only minimal impact i n t h i s issue-area, i t s pervasiveness was r e g i s t e r e d i n such i n t e r n a t i o n a l issues as disarmament, East-West issues i n general and also with respect to the Congo question. In Figure 2.4, I provide a d e t a i l e d charting of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the various sources of foreign p o l i c y as they r e l a t e d to the p o l i c y outputs i n the issue-area. There i s one aspect of the foreign p o l i c y formulation process that has not yet been discussed i n explaining the emergent Malayan foreign p o l i c y : to what extent did feedback e f f e c t s emanating from the external and int e r n a l environment affect foreign policy? For the most part, Malaya's policy-makers kept a tight rein on polic y and postures, and objectives and strategies remained stable and coherent throughout the period. The events of the external environ-ment - the 'aggressive' acts of the Eastern states and the fri e n d l y acts of the West - tended to p o s i t i v e l y reinforce the basic thrusts of foreign policy. Given the e l i t e ideology, the feedback was thus p o s i t i v e l y i n the direction of continued anti-communist, pro-Western postures, strategies and actions. Internally, however, there was some indication of negative feed-back toward certain aspects of foreign policy. In p a r t i c u l a r , opposition parliamentarians' c r i t i c i s m s and the UMNO back-bench revol against AMDA put the government on the defensive i n i t s f i r s t major foreign policy action. The Tunku was able, however, to summon his personal authority to stem rejection of AMDA but we may attrib u t e Malaya's softened pro-Western l i n e to these i n t e r n a l feedback effects We can certainly attribute Malaya's absence from SEATO as an effect 98 of the negative response to AMDA. The feedback sequence would be: Pro-Western, a n t i - , communist posture Al i g n with West Sign AMDA UMNO opposition to AMDA Soften pro-Western posture Malaya does not j o i n SEATO In issue-areas other than defence and security, the influence of feedback on policy was n e g l i g i b l e or non-existent. There was l i t t l e or no opposition to economic p o l i c i e s , and the government was never seriously challenged on i t s p o l i c i e s i n the t h i r d issue-area. Externally, the environment more or less p o s i t i v e l y reinforced the government's policy outputs i n these issue-areas, as w e l l . In one instance, Indonesian h o s t i l i t y toward the Tunku's scheme for a regional organization resulted i n the troubled b i r t h of ASA and probably explains i t s innocuous and n o n - p o l i t i c a l orientation. However, negative Indonesian reactions toward Malayan foreign policy i n general probably confirmed ex i s t i n g images of Indonesia's pro-communist leanings and therefore p o s i t i v e l y reinforced the prevailing foreign policy postures. This survey of the f i r s t period of foreign policy has revealed a remarkable s t a b i l i t y and coherence i n Malayan foreign policy outputs. Notably, idiosyncratic sources tended to account for the most characteristic aspects of foreign policy. In p a r t i c u l a r , the survey showed that Malayan foreign policy was by and large underpinned by an e l i t e ideology committed to certain Western values. I t was this e l i t e ideology that invariably gave the f i n a l expression to the more s i g n i f i c a n t facets of foreign policy. However, p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l experiences proved to be s i g n i f i c a n t antecedent factors affecting policy and the international environment tended to p o s i t i v e l y reinforce prevailing thrusts of foreign policy. My analysis also confirms the notion that foreign policy i s a purposeful a c t i v i t y geared to the pursuit of certain national goals and interests however these may be defined and coloured by the p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and attitudes of the policy-makers. I t strengthened the thesis that from the viewpoint of explanation, i t i s only meaningful to appreciate foreign policy i n a h o l i s t i c manner, that i s , i n terms of how the various inputs (sources) and outputs of foreign policy interact upon each other to produce their t o t a l e f f e c t . 93 Notes to Chapter 2 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of  B r i t a i n and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Federation of  Malaya on Mutual Defence and Mutual Assistance, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. P r i n t e r , 1957, A r t i c l e VII. 2 l b i d . , A r t i c l e VI. 3 I b i d . , A r t i c l e VIII. 4 I b i d . , A r t i c l e IX. ^Cf. Robert 0. Tilman, Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y , Strategic Studies Dept., Report RAC-R-63-2, March 1969, p.7. Tun Abdul Razak, "Radio Malaya Talk on Defence P o l i c y " as published i n The S t r a i t s Times, October 4, 1961. ^ J . B. Dalton, The Development of Malayan External P o l i c y , 1957- 1963, unpublished, D. P h i l . Thesis, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y , 1972, p. 64. g See Malayan L e g i s l a t i v e Council Debates, October 2, 1957, c o l . 3271. 9 Dalton, op_. c i t . , p. 66. " ^ L e g i s l a t i v e Council Debates, October 2 and 3, 1957, and Dalton, op_. c i t . , p. 67. n i b i d . , p. 68. 1 2 I b i d . , pp. 68-69. 13 Ib i d . , p. 68. 14 Malayan L e g i s l a t i v e Council Debates, October 2 and 3, 1957, c o l s . 3269ff and c o l s . 31318ff. Ibid., October 2, c o l . 3282. 94 1 6 I b i d . , October 3, c o l . 3358. "^R. S. Milne, Government arid P o l i t i c s i n Malaysia, Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n , 1967, p. 180, and R. S. Milne, "The Influence on Foreign Po l i c y of Ethnic Minorities with External Ties" i n M. W. Zacher and R. S. Milne, eds., Conflict and S t a b i l i t y i n  Southeast Asia, New York, Doubleday, 1974, p. 108. See also, T. H. Silcoek, op_. c i t . , p. 50. 18 Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 22. The Tunku, i n a personal communication, placed the most importance on the issue of m i l i t a r y advantage. In reply to my question of why Malaya had a defence pact with B r i t a i n but did not j o i n SEATO, he said, "We had a defence pact with B r i t a i n under which B r i t a i n would come to our aid i n the event of any aggression by any foreign power and we f e l t that was s u f f i c i e n t for our own security and safety. SEATO i s a pact between the countries which include America, B r i t a i n , Pakistan ... but there was no *con-clusive agreement to help one another i n the event of war. There was no need for us to enter into any defence agreement with other countries as we f e l t our agreement with B r i t a i n was s u f f i c i e n t . " (The Tunku, after meeting me i n a b r i e f interview, agreed to answer a schedule of questions. His replies w i l l be hereinafter c i t e d as "Tunku, personal communication, June 1975!'). 19 Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 23. 20 On t h i s point, see also, Robin Winks, "Malaysia and the Commonwealth: An Inquiry into the Nature of Commonwealth Ties" i n Wang Gungwu, ed., Malaysia: A Survey, New York, Praeger, 1964, p. 381. 21 Le g i s l a t i v e Council Debates, 4th Session, December, 1958, co l . 6029 as ci t e d i n Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore i n Diplomacy, Sydney, Sydney Univ. Press, 1968, p. 42. 22 As c i t e d i n The S t r a i t s Times, December 7, 1958. 23 The Government put out a l i s t of 87 countries which i t recognized and named s i x which i t did not, namely, Communist China, Nationalist China, East Germany, North Korea, Outer Mongolia and North Vietnam, The S t r a i t s Times, November 7, 1957. Although the Government did not o f f i c i a l l y recognize Nationalist China (Taiwan), i t showed i t s p a r t i a l i t y by allowing the Taiwanese to set up a "consulate" i n Kuala Lumpur ostensibly to foster trade relat i o n s . See Malaysian Parliamentary  Debates (Dewan Ra'ayat), December 15 and 16, 1964, cols. 75ff and 4738ff, i n which opposition members c r i t i c i z e d the Government for allowing t h i s . 95 24 Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 14. Tunku Abdul Rahman, "Malaysia: Key Area i n Southeast Asia," Foreign A f f a i r s , July 1965 as reproduced i n The P o l i t i c a l Element  of National Power, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (no date), p. 10. 26 Cited i n Tilman, l o c . c i t . 27 Ibid ., p. 11. 28 The S t r a i t s Times, December 1, 1959. 29 Tilman, l o c . c i t . 30 See R. 0. Tilman, "Malaysian Foreign Policy: The Dilemmas of a Committed Neutral" i n J. D. Montgomery and A. D. Hirschman, eds., Public P o l i c y , Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 115-159 and Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 37. 31 The Tunku i n reply to a question of whether policy-makers thought i n terms of goals and strategies, said, "a small country l i k e Malaysia does not have to go into strategies and actions to formulate our foreign policy however, he stressed that foreign policy objectives were important, and considered defence a short range goal and development, a long range goal. Tunku, personal communica-t i o n , June 1975. 32 J. M. G u l l i c k , Malaya, New York, Praeger, 1963, as ci t e d i n i b i d . , p. 36. 3 3 Silcock, c)p_. c i t . , p. 47. 3 4 See Yap Gaik-Khoon, Treaties and Engagements Affecting Malaya, 1940-1960, B.A., University of Singapore, 1960, pp. 47ff. 3 5 L i m Chong Yah, "West Malaysian External Trade 1947-65" i n T. Morgan and N. Spoelstra, eds., Economic Interdependence i n  Southeast Asia, Madison, Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1969, p. 205. 3 6 I b i d . , p. 218. 37 See i b i d . , pp. 224-230 for a more detailed explanation of the import s i t u a t i o n . These de t a i l s are not of great importance to the analysis here. 96 38 See Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 16. 39 See Klaus E. Knorr, Tin Under Control, Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 1945, and J. Saravanamuttu, Southern Bargaining i n  North-South Trade: The Case of Tin, M.A. Thesis, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972, Ch. 2. 4 0 I b i d . , p. 87. 41 See Yap Gaik-Khoon, op_. c i t . , pp. 39-41. ^^ I b i d . , pp. 45-46. 43 See The Malay M a i l , February 6, 1961, The S t r a i t s Times, February 27, 1962, and The S t r a i t s Times, January 1, 1963. 44 Tunku, personal communication, June 1975. 45 Tilman, op_. c i t . , pp. 7-8. 46 The S t r a i t s Times, September 29, 1960. 47 Cited i n N. K. Hazra, Malaya's Foreign Relations, 1957-1963, M.A. Thesis, University of Singapore, 1965, pp. 54-55. 48 The S t r a i t s Times, September 30, 1960. 49 Hazra, op_. c i t . , pp. 35-36. 5 0 I b i d . , pp. 37-38. 5 1 I b i d . , p. 40. 5 2 I b i d . , pp. 48-49. 97 53 However, the Tunku's private attempts at mediating i n the dispute were not appreciated by the Indonesians who perhaps thought the Malayan Prime Minister presumptious i n undertaking the e f f o r t . In p a r t i c u l a r , a j o i n t Malayan-Dutch communique" which alluded to the Tunku's secret plan for resolving the c o n f l i c t was badly received i n Indonesia. See various reports of a f f a i r i n issues of The S t r a i t s  Times and The Malay M a i l , November 26 - December 3, 1960. "^Hazra, op_. c i t . , p. 62. "'"'See I b i d . , pp. 90-104 for a discussion and documentation of these economic benefits. 56 See Silcock, op_. c i t . , pp. 45-46 and Winks, op_. c i t . , pp. 394-396. 57 Hazra, op_. c i t . , p. 109. 58 The S t r a i t s Times, March 17, 1961. 59 The Malay Ma i l, A p r i l 21, 1958, The S t r a i t s Times, A p r i l 18 and 22, 1958. ^Hazra, op_. c i t . , p. 126. 6 1 I b i d . , p. 129. 6 2 I b i d . , p. 130. 63 ASA: Report of the F i r s t Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. P r i n t e r , 1961, pp. 13-14. 64 Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 19 and Hazra, op_. c i t . , pp. 146-147. 65 Tunku, personal communication, June 1975. ^ S i l c o c k , op_. c i t . , p. 42. 98 6 7 Marvin C. Ott, "Foreign Policy Formulation i n Malaysia," Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 3, March 1972, p. 225. Ott nevertheless admits the "salience" of certain h i s t o r i c a l experiences, and the " g e o - p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u " including Malaya's strategic regional l o c a t i o n , i t s vulnerable economy, and the impact of the Cold War. He also notes the importance of the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s . See his The Sources and Content of Malaysian Foreign Policy Toward Indonesia  and the Philippines 1957-1965, Ph.D. Thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1971, p. 19ff and passim. 68 Ott, i b i d . , i n dealing with country relations eschewed the problem of defining the broad range of foreign policy dependent variables. His analysis of foreign policy i n general focusses on the independent variables. 69 The " f i l t e r " idea i s drawn from the phenomenological approach of foreign pol i c y analysis. This view holds that the "perceptions" of policy-makers rather than objective circumstances are c r u c i a l i n formulation of policy. See, for example, Kenneth E. Boulding, The  Image, Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1956. ^My notion i s akin to Alexander George's concept of "operational code" although i t would have a s l i g h t l y more extensive meaning. According to George, "A p o l i t i c a l leader's b e l i e f s about the nature of p o l i t i c s and p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t , his views regarding the extent to which h i s t o r i c a l development can be shaped, and his notion of correct strategy and t a c t i c s - whether these b e l i e f s be referred to as 'operational code,' 'weltanchauung,' 'cognitive map' or an ' e l i t e p o l i t i c a l culture' - are among the factors influencing the actor's decisions," A. George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of P o l i t i c a l Leaders and Decision-Making," International  Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1969, p. 197. ^The A l l i a n c e , led by the Tunku, i n winning the 1955 general elections i n resounding fashion (51 out of 52 seats) ensured that B r i t i s h traditions would be passed on after independence. The party continues to dominate p o l i t i c s and led the National Front i n capturing a l l but 19 of the 154 parliamentary seats i n the 1974 elections. 72 Ott, "Foreign Policy Formulation op_. c i t . , p. 229. 73 See fn. 67. 74 Tun Tan Siew Sin talked of "the four of us," that i s , the Tunku, Razak, Ismail and himself, as being the most important decision-makers on foreign policy questions. Interview with Tun Tan Siew Sin, June 27, 1975. 99 '"'See Leo Ah Bang, E l i t e Cohesion i n Malaysia: A Study of All i a n c e Leadership, M.Soc.Sci. Thesis, University of Singapore, pp. 32-36. ^ O t t himself admits the supportive nature of the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , which he says "plays a role second only to the Prime Minister i n the shaping of ... foreign p o l i c y . " Ott, Ph.D. Thesis, op. c i t . , p. 43ff. See also Tilman, op_. c i t . , pp. 43-45 i n which he discusses the " e l i t e p o l i t i c a l culture." James C. Scott, P o l i t i c a l Ideology i n Malaysia, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1968, especially Ch. 9. 78 I b i d . , p. 202. Scott does note, however, that commitment to an idealized model of Western democracy i s coupled with a pessimistic outlook on i t s attainment i n Malaysia. This nevertheless does not detract from the fact of that commitment and i t s prevalence among c i v i l servants. While i t i s true that there was a dominant e l i t e which largely supported the ideals and values of the power-wielders, evidence points to the existence of a latent or potential 'counter-elite' within the r u l i n g group, i n p a r t i c u l a r , within UMNO. The b r i e f but aggressive opposition to AMDA was proof of i t s existence. The leaders and members of the opposition parties can also be regarded as a counter-elite but their capacity to affect government decisions i s very l i m i t e d . In employing the notion of an e l i t e ideology, one avoids having to define the size and the actual individuals that comprise the e l i t e . I t i s the p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and attitudes of the acknowledged policy-makers rather than the policy-makers them-selves with which we are concerned. Harry M i l l e r , Prince and Premier, London, George G. Harrap, 1959, pp. 192-193. The Tunku confirmed that "... to a large extent Malaysia's strong anti-communist policy was due to our trouble with the Malayan Communist Party at home and our knowledge of what was happening i n countries around us, Vietnam, Cambodia, and one time, Indonesia." Personal communication, June 1975. The S t r a i t s Times, September 26, 1957. 100 82 See, for example, Stephen Chee, "Malaysia's Changing Foreign Pol i c y " i n Yong Mun Cheong, ed., Trends i n Malaysia I I , I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Univ. Press, 1974, p. 39, Tilman, op. c i t . , pp. 37-39, and R. S. Milne, "The Influence on Foreign Policy of Ethnic Minorities with External Ties" i n Milne and Zacher, op. c i t . , pp. 108-109. 83 For a b r i e f period Malaya appeared to have softened i t s l i n e toward China when i n 1960 after the o f f i c i a l end of the Emergency, the Tunku said i n Washington that China should be i n the UN and Malaya would support i t s admission. The incident created a furore at home and led the then Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s , Dr. Ismail, to resign his p o r t f o l i o . The Tunku admits that Ismail thought "he had gone beyond the agreed policy on China." Tunku, personal communication, June 1975, see also Dalton, op_. c i t . , pp. 96-98. 84 The Tunku to l d me, " A l l these events which took place i n Hungary, India, Vietnam and Tibet and elsewhere proved to us beyond any doubt the aggressive character of the communists." Personal communication, June 1975. 85 Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems" i n J. N. Rosenau, ed., International P o l i t i c s and Foreign  Po l i c y , 2nd Ed i t i o n , New York, Free Press, 1969, p. 430; and Ole R. H o l s t i , "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study" i n Rosenau, op_. c i t . , p. 554. 86 Tunku, personal communication, June 1975. 8 7 Two other related concepts are "power" and "influence." See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall, 1968, pp. 21-39, for a discussion of the various dimensions of "power." For an analysis of the three concepts of power, influence and c a p a b i l i t i e s , see K. J. H o l s t i , International P o l i t i c s , 2nd E d i t i o n , Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall, 1972, pp. 154-171, and Joseph Frankel, International P o l i t i c s , London, Penguin, 1969, pp. .118-131. 88 Cf. Weinstein, op_. c i t . 89 Cf. Silcoek, op_. c i t . , p. 47. 90 Cited i n Victor Morais, ed., Blueprint for Unity, Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Chinese Association, 1972, p. 115. 101 91 Taking Malaya's two major industries, for instance, i t i s interesting to note that the rubber tree, while i t thrives i n Malayan topography and climate, i s s t r i c t l y not a 'native' since i t was introduced by the B r i t i s h from B r a z i l . Tin, on the other hand, i s a natural endowment. The development of the two industries, however, was largely a function of colonialism which expedited the large-scale emigration of Indian labour for the rubber industry and Chinese labour for t i n . See Lim Chong-Yah, Economic Development of Modern  Malaya, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1967. 92 An undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s said Malaya's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Congo peacekeeping was part of the process of creating " c r e d i b i l i t y and a good image" i n the early years of independence. Interview with Encik Yusof Hitam, Undersecretary I I I (Southeast Asia), June 27, 1975. 93 Gustavo Lagos, International S t r a t i f i c a t i o n and Underdeveloped  Countries, Chapel H i l l , Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1963, p. 132. 94 See fn. 92. 95 Cf. David V i t a l , The Inequality of States, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, passim. 96 I t i s true too that the pursuit of prestige may be just an e f f o r t at maintaining a p a r t i c u l a r status such as the competition between the superpowers i n the arms race or space race, or i t could be aimed at recovering loss status ("atimia") as Lagos, op_. c i t . discusses at length. 97 The then Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s denies vehemently that Malaya was ever "pro" Western, although he admitted i t was anti-communist. Interview with Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, Minister of Home A f f a i r s , October 30, 1975. 98 See supra, pp. 22-25. CHAPTER 3 MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1964 - 1969 Defence and Security "Malaysia" became an international issue even before i t actually came into being."'" As early as January 1963, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, announced a policy of "Confrontation" against the Malaysia project which he called "neo-colonialist" and 2 "neo-imperialist." About the same time Indonesian Confrontation or "Konfrontasi" was launched, the Philippines renewed their t e r r i t o r i a l claim on Sabah, the North Borneo t e r r i t o r y that was to be included 3 into the proposed new federation. The Indonesian opposition was further fueled by a revolt i n Brunei under the leadership of the Brunei Party Rakyat leader, A. M. Azahari, who opposed the formation of Malaysia and put forward his own plan for the creation of an independent state consisting of the Sultanate of Brunei, North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak. Although i t registered some i n i t i a l success, the Azahari Revolt was quickly suppressed by B r i t i s h troops at the 4 request of the Brunei Sultan, who himself opposed Azahari's scheme. Thereafter, the Malaysia issue seemed to have subsided to a detente with the meeting of the Tunku, President Sukarno and President Macapagal i n Manila i n August 1963. The 'summit' brought about the b i r t h of MAPHILINDO - a vague scheme of cooperation among the three countries - amidst the showering of mutual compliments by the three 102 103 leaders."* Maphilindo died s t i l l b o r n a l i t t l e over a month after i t was proposed. Following the proclamation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963, Malaysia broke off diplomatic t i e s with Indonesia and the Philippines.^ Although Indonesian Confrontation had not ceased after Maphilindo, i t became more serious after Malaysia was o f f i c i a l l y declared. The Indonesian acts ranged from aggressive p a t r o l l i n g of the Malacca S t r a i t s , i n which Malaysian fishermen were harassed, to border clashes involving members of the Tentera Nasional Kalimantan (North Borneo National Army). By 1964, Indonesian troops had landed or were a i r dropped on Malayan coasts. Konfrontasi continued w e l l into 1965 but began to simmer down after the September putsch of 1965 i n Indonesia. There were various e f f o r t s of mediation between 1964-1966 but i t was only on August 12, 1966 that an accord was signed between Indonesia and Malaysia to cease a l l h o s t i l i t i e s and renew diplomatic t i e s . Provided below i s a chronology of the main events and incidents from the outset of Konfrontasi t i l l i t s termina-t i o n . (The chronology i s compiled from reports i n the S t r a i t s Times, Malay Mail and other secondary sources, p a r t i c u l a r l y A. G. Mezerik's "Malaysia-Indonesia C o n f l i c t , " International Review Service, Vol. XI, No. 86). CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FROM THE OUTSET OF KONFRONTASI TILL ITS TERMINATION DATE EVENT 1963 January 20 Dr. Subandrio, Indonesian Foreign Minister, announces a policy of "Confrontation" against Malaysia i n a speech at Jogjakarta, denouncing the scheme as "neo-colonialist".arid "neo-imperialist." 104 January 24 January 28 February 13 March 9 Tunku t e l l s Indonesia to "keep your hands o f f , " that "Malaysia" w i l l go ahead as scheduled on August 31. Philippine-.UK talks open i n London. Philippines c a l l s for "restoration" of Sabah to the Philippines i n the interests of the security of the region. President Sukarno declares at a mass r a l l y that Indonesia now " o f f i c i a l l y " opposes Malaysia. Tun Razak returns from Manila with "diplomatic triumph" after meeting President Macapagal who had e a r l i e r met with Dr. Subandrio. April-June June 7-11 July 30 -August 5 A series of meetings of representatives of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Phi l i p p i n e s , including a meeting of Sukarno and Tunku i n Tokyo on May 30. T r i p a r t i t e Foreign Ministers' Meeting i n Manila i n . which accord i s reached that Philippines and Indonesia w i l l drop thei r opposition to Malaysia on the understanding that there would be a United Nations assessment of the wishes of the Borneo people on Malaysia and positive steps w i l l be taken toward s e t t l i n g the Sabah claim. Manila Summit Conference convened. The Manila Declaration i s signed i n which Maphilindo i s proposed as a grouping of three nations bound together by " h i s t o r i c a l t i e s of race and culture," cooperating i n the pursuit of common interests i n the economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l f i e l d s and i n the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. In a Joint Statement, the three leaders called upon the UN Secretary-General to ascertain the wishes of the Borneo people by a "fresh approach," i n p a r t i c u l a r , to v e r i f y whether Malaysia was a major i f not the main issue i n the recent elections i n the two t e r r i t o r i e s ; whether the elections were "free;" and whether votes were properly polled and registers properly compiled. The three heads of government further acknowledged that foreign bases were of a temporary nature and w i l l not be used to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries and that they w i l l each "abstain from the use of arrangements of c o l l e c t i v e defence to serve the pa r t i c u l a r interests of any of the big powers." 105 August 12 August 16 August 22 August 26 August 28 August 29 September 3 September 5 September 14 September 15 September 17 September 18 December 11 The UN names a nine-member mission to ascertain the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak. UN mission arrives i n Sarawak 'greeted' by demonstra-tions against Malaysia. Dispute over observers holds up UN assessment. UN survey i n Sarawak and Sabah begins with Philippine and Indonesian observers s t i l l absent. President Sukarno says i n nation-wide radio t a l k , "We w i l l have to bow our heads and obey" i f the Borneo people want to j o i n Malaysia. Malaya announces that Malaysia w i l l be formed on September 16 instead of August 31 as o r i g i n a l l y scheduled since the UN survey w i l l not be completed u n t i l September 14. Indonesia sends protest to Malaya on "reckless and premature decision" to set formation of Malaysia on September 16 as a " u n i l a t e r a l act contravening the l e t t e r and s p i r i t of the Manila Summit Agreements." UN team completes work. UN assessment'is published. I t finds that Malaysia was a major issue i n the recent elections i n Sabah and Sarawak, that the elections had been free and that "a large majority of the people favoured j o i n i n g Malaysia." Indonesian Cabinet meets, decides Malaysia i s i l l e g a l and cannot be recognized. Dr. Subandrio says UN survey was not conducted i n accord with the Manila agreement and was "hasty." Philippines informs Malaya i t w i l l defer recognition of Malaysia. Malaysia severs diplomatic relations with Indonesia and the Philippines. A Malaysian Defence Council i s formed with power to c a l l up reserves. Tunku i n report to Parliament on Konfrontasi says 66 t e r r o r i s t s were k i l l e d and 31 captured i n 48 armed incursions since A p r i l 12. 106 1964 January 7-11 January 13 January 20 January 21 January 22 January 23 January 25 February 5-11 President Sukarno and Macapagal hold talks i n Manila and issue statement saying "they cherish the hope that a t r i p a r t i t e 'mushawarah' would be convened to resolve e x i s t i n g differences amongst the three signatories to the (Manila) agreements." Tunku says that another summit meeting must be pre-ceded by c l a r i f i c a t i o n of whether Indonesia and the Philippines recognize Malaysia as an independent sovereign state and whether Indonesia w i l l withdraw i t s troops from Malaysian s o i l . The U.S. announces that Robert Kennedy, Attorney-General, w i l l go to Japan'to discuss Malaysia with Sukarno. "Truth Mission" led by Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew i s off to A f r i c a to explain "Malaysia." Tunku agrees to meet Macapagal i n Cambodia after Prince Sihanouk arrives on a surprise v i s i t to Kuala Lumpur. Kennedy and Sihanouk i n Kuala Lumpur i n mediation e f f o r t s are hopeful of summit meeting. Sukarno announces i n Jakarta that Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have agreed on a truce and summit meeting. Tunku agrees to reciprocate. Sukarno's ceasefire order comes into e f f e c t . T r i p a r t i t e foreign ministers'meeting i n Bangkok. Agreement i s reached to continue ceasefire with Thailand supervising the truce with UN consent. Another foreign ministers' meeting i s to be held within a month. February 22 Malaysia protests s i x v i o l a t i o n s of ceasefire to Indonesia. March 2-4 Resumed Bangkok m i n i s t e r i a l talks break down on cease-f i r e question with Malaysia i n s i s t i n g on the with-drawal of a l l Indonesian g u e r r i l l a s from i t s t e r r i t o r y i f there were to be any settlement. 107 March 27 Malaysia informs U Thant of 50 incidents between January 16 and March 27 with Indonesia, requesting Secretary-General to take any i n i t i a t i v e he deems desirable. A p r i l 25 The Alliance i n general election wins 89 of West Malaysia's 104 seats, a gain of 15 seats. May 3 Philippines and Malaysia issue j o i n t communique that they have agreed to establish consular missions i n both countries on May 18. June 18-19 T r i p a r t i t e m i n i s t e r i a l talks i n Tokyo prepare agenda for summit meeting. June 21 One-day summit conference of Sukarno, Tunku and Macapagal collapses on issue of g u e r r i l l a withdrawal. Indonesia says settlement should come f i r s t and there should be a fresh referendum i n Sabah and Sarawak. July 8-15 July 22-24 August 17 September 2 September 9-17 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference i n London. Prime Ministers i n f i n a l communique' express "sympathy and support" for Malaysia. Riots involving Malays and Chinese break out i n Singapore following a procession on the occasion of the Prophet Mohammed's birthday. Malaysia reports Indonesian unit of 40 armed raiders landing on west coast of Johore on Malayan mainland. Indonesian a i r c r a f t f l i e s over south Malaya dropping around 30 armed paratroopers. UN Security Council meets on Indonesia-Malaysia c o n f l i c t . After s i x meetings, Norwegian draft resolution regretting and deploring Indonesian actions and c a l l i n g on the parties "to r e f r a i n from a l l threat or use of force" receives 9 votes i n favour with Czechoslovakia and the USSR voting against the resolution, the l a t t e r constituting a veto. Tunku claims moral vic t o r y . September 25 Tunku appeals to heads of nations attending forthcoming nonaligned conference i n Cairo to give Malaysia a f a i r hearing after Malaysia's f a i l u r e to receive an i n v i t a t i o n to the conference. 108 October 5-11 October 14 November 11 November 26-29 December 30 December 31 1965 January 7 January -March March 16 A p r i l 15 A p r i l 17 May 16 Heads of 47 nonaligned countries meet i n Cairo. President Nkrumah of Ghana suggests mediation i n Indonesia-Malaysia c o n f l i c t . Tunku i n a l e t t e r to President Nasser of UAR declares h i s support for the principles of co-existence expressed i n the Declaration of the Cairo Conference. Razak, en route to Colombo Plan Conference i n London, to meet African and Middle East leaders to canvass support for Malaysia. Razak wins diplomatic recognition for Malaysia from Alg e r i a , Morocco and Tunisia. UN General Assembly, under formula of non-voting, elects Malaysia to serve on Security Council. In Jakarta, Sukarno announces that Indonesia w i l l withdraw from the UN i n protest of Malaysia's seating i n the Security Council. President Sukarno formally announces Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN at a mass r a l l y i n Jakarta. Peace e f f o r t s by Pakistan and Thailand f a i l to produce any results. Tun Razak off on a tour of North and East A f r i c a (Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Malagasy and Uganda). Razak on return claims "95%" support for Malaysia i n the countries v i s i t e d . Tunku i n speech to Alliance Party Convention says Malaysia supports a l l U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and speaks of the need for B r i t i s h bases i n the country. A Malaysian delegation's application for membership of the Afro-Asian People's S o l i d a r i t y Organization i s rejected at Winneba, Ghana. (China and Indonesia had threatened withdrawal i f Malaysia gained membership). 109 May 19 June June 22 June 28 August 8 August 9 September 30 October 5 1966 January 9 May 31 -June 1 June 3 Tunku says the delegation to Winneba had no o f f i c i a l sanction. Calls organization "a communist set-up" and i s not surprised that the delegation f a i l e d to gain membership. The Tunku said, "But what I am surprised i s why the Malaysians had gone there." Goodwill missions by two ministers to West African and West Asian countries. Report from Malaysian mission i n Manila that a t o t a l of 28 nations w i l l back Malaysia for the Algiers nonaligned conference this year, Malaysia's four sponsors being India, Nigeria, Ceylon and Ethiopia. Report that the Algiers conference i s postponed t i l l November. (The conference never came about as a result of a rebellion i n Algeria which ousted President Ben Bella from power). An Alliance Parliamentary Group on Foreign A f f a i r s while expressing s a t i s f a c t i o n with the present foreign poli c y recommends "widest diplomatic representation possible with countries irrespective of the i r ideologies." Singapore separates from Malaysia following an amendment to the Constitution approved by Parliament under a C e r t i f i c a t e of Urgency. Abortive pro-communist coup i n Indonesia results i n de facto m i l i t a r y takeover. Pakistan severs diplomatic relations with Malaysia over Malaysia allegedly taking sides with India at the UN i n Indo-Pakistan c o n f l i c t . Report of Jakarta "peace feelers" from government and army o f f i c i a l s . Bangkok Peace Talks between Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines leading to P h i l l i p i n e recognition of Malaysia and rapprochement between Malaysia and Indonesia. Agreement i s reached to submit proposals to end Konfrontasi. Malaysia and Philippines resume f u l l diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial l e v e l . 110 August 12 Malaysia and Indonesia reach accord to cease h o s t i l i t i e s and restore diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . NOTE: In three years of h o s t i l i t i e s , 590 Indonesians were k i l l e d , 222 wounded and 771 captured. Commonwealth casualties included 114 servicemen (64 B r i t i s h ) and 36 c i v i l i a n s (mostly Malaysians) k i l l e d , while 118 servicemen and 53 c i v i l i a n s were wounded. Thus Malaysian foreign policy i n the issue-area of defence and security for most of this period was dominated by Konfrontasi and other events a r i s i n g from Malaysia's formation. The creation of Malaysia may be seen from one perspective as the pursuit of a possession goal, or as Wolfers c a l l s i t , an act of self-extension,^ since i t involved t e r r i t o r i a l expansion. I t may also be viewed as an i n d i r e c t method of pursuing, i r o n i c a l l y , security interests at least i n the eyes of the Malayan policy-makers. Foreign Po l i c y actions are seldom single-purpose i n intent and the creation of Malaysia i s fraught with multiple interpretations as to the motives behind i t . A strong case can be made for the view that the Malaysia proposal grew out of a perceived security threat posed by communism to the Malaysia region. The Tunku, who can be r e l i e d upon for his candidness, said soon a f t e r Konfrontasi was launched: "We have no t e r r i t o r i a l ambitions. A l l we want to do i s try and save ourselves from the communists. 9 Otherwise, I won't want Malaysia." Indeed, the Malaysia idea o r i -g i n a l l y arose from the Singapore government's campaign for merger with Malaya largely to avert what the Singapore leaders saw as an imminent communist threat i f not i t s already disguised but widespread I l l presence i n Singapore. The Tunku, who had previously rebuffed requests for merger, found this argument s u f f i c i e n t l y compelling, but not wanting to upset the delicate p o l i t i c o - r a c i a l balance i n Malaya with Singapore's overwhelming Chinese population, conceived of bringing i n the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s into the new federation. On t h i s point, R. S. Milne writes: The incl u s i o n of the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s was not so urgent, but i t did promise to solve two problems at once. To some degree the addition of the indigenous inhabitants would "balance" the Singapore Chinese majority. This argument should not be over-stressed; the indigenous peoples were indeed more numerous than the Chinese i n the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s , but the majority of them were neither Malays nor Muslims. However, the Malays i n Malaya looked on the indigenous races as being their "brothers," and hoped that they could be persuaded to support Malaysia and also the Alliance Party.H One might add that the Tunku's perception of the i n t e r n a l security si t u a t i o n i n the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s was probably also an important factor i n prompting the rather hurried manner i n which the new fede-ration was created. As the Tunku told Parliament, "We cannot afford to wait so long [for B r i t a i n to grant the t e r r i t o r i e s independence] without providing the communists with the weapons they require for subversion, i n f i l t r a t i o n and disruption with the ultimate objective of capturing these t e r r i t o r i e s .... The important aspect of the Malaysian i d e a l , as I see i t , i s that i t w i l l enable the Borneo t e r r i -t ories to transform their present co l o n i a l status to self-government for themselves and absolute independence i n Malaysia simultaneously, 12 and balk the Communist attempt to capture these t e r r i t o r i e s . " Whatever the other motives for the Malaysia project, i t would not be 112 wrong to say that i t carried undertones of anti-communism and reflected security considerations which no doubt sprung from the p r e v a i l i n g 13 e l i t e ideology of the Malayan policy-makers. The immediate effect of Konfrontasi was to harden Malaysia's Western-world, anti-communist orientation. For one thing, i t triggered into operation the Anglo-Malayan Defence Pact thus r e s u l t i n g i n a major western power and two Commonwealth a l l i e s f i g h t i n g on Malaysian s o i l . The Malaysian policy-makers themselves tended to view Konfrontasi suspiciously as a communist, PKI ( P a r t i Kommunis Indonesia) - inspired project pointing to a Jakarta-Peking-Hanoi-Pyongyang axis 14 with Malaysia as the target of China's expansionism. But paradoxi-c a l l y , i t was Konfrontasi that brought about a softening of Malaysia's hard-line anti-communist policy i n the long run. The Indonesian m i l i t a r y and diplomatic offensive goaded the hitherto cautious 15 Malaysia into a new foreign policy strategy of external outreach i n which a concerted diplomatic drive was carried out to win friends i n Afro-Asia, and l a t e r , Eastern Europe. In p a r t i c u l a r , Malaysia's f a i l u r e to gain a seat at the Cairo nonaligned nations conference largely because of Indonesian propaganda sparked off a diplomatic counter-offensive which won Malaysia the dubious recognition of a number of African and Asian countries and eventually support from 28 countries to attend the next conference at A l g i e r s . I t was also at t h i s time that the Tunku declared that Malaysia f u l f i l l e d the c r i t e r i a of non-alignment, when i n the past he had never f a i l e d to underscore Malaya's non-neutrality i n East-West issues. (See section on defence and security i n Chapter Two). The Tunku was also quick to endorse the Declaration of the Cairo conference on the pri n c i p l e s of peaceful co-existence i n a l e t t e r to President Nasser.^ Another spin-off from Konfrontasi was the f i r s t public review of Malaysian foreign policy by a Parliamentary Group, alb e i t of All i a n c e MP's, which while finding that "the present independent and nonaligned foreign policy was i n conformity with the Alliance Party's p r i n c i p l e s , " proposed "the widest diplomatic representation possible with countries irrespec-18 t i v e of their ideologies." The Government also received a f u s i l l a d e of c r i t i c i s m from the Opposition and certain public figures on i t s adamant, hard-line anti-communist policy. In p a r t i c u l a r , the Government was taken to task for i t s support of the American bombing of North Vietnam at a time when i t was attempting to win Afro-Asian 19 friends. There i s some indication of the ascendancy of a counter-force of All i a n c e and other p o l i t i c i a n s who were opposed to some of the views of the r u l i n g group on foreign p o l i c y . An u n o f f i c i a l 20 Malaysian delegation led by UMNO Member of Parliament, Dr. Mahathir, attended the Afro-Asian People's S o l i d a r i t y Organization Conference at Winneba, Ghana, i n May 1965, but i t s application to j o i n the organiza-21 tion was rejected. The Tunku commenting on the Winneba incident said he had "no knowledge" of the Malaysian mission and described the organization as a "communist set-up .... financed by Russia and China." Nonetheless, i t was i n the wake of the Winneba episode that the Parliamentary Group to review foreign policy was formed. However, i t was not u n t i l Konfrontasi actually ended that the re-thinking i n foreign policy took a more d e f i n i t i v e shape. The Tunku i n a Malaysia Day broadcast i n 1966 admitted to a s h i f t i n foreign policy 114 , . 2 3 "to keep pace with the trend of events i n the world ... Two months e a r l i e r , Tun Ismail as Acting Foreign Mi n i s t e r , had been more e x p l i c i t i n i n d i c a t i n g the nature of the s h i f t when speaking to the Foreign Correspondents' As s o c i a t i o n : We look forward to the day when outside powers both great and small w i l l accept our r i g h t as a region [ i . e . Southeast Asia] and as constituent nations of t h i s region, to sustain our d i s t i n c t i v e ways of l i f e i n freedom and prosperity, without interference ... We do not oppose the communist system i n mainland China so long as i t confines i t s e l f w ithin i t s own borders. But we c a l l upon the People's Republic of China to keep i t s hands off our region and to adopt a p o l i c y of peaceful co-existence towards i t s fellow Asians i n Southeast A s i a . We look forward to a regional a s s o c i a t i o n embracing Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, P h i l i p p i n e s , Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam ... Such a community would not be a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . I t would not be an anti-communist a l l i a n c e . Nor, f o r that matter, would i t be an anti-Western a l l i a n c e ... I do not be l i e v e that m i l i t a r y blocs and a l l i a n c e s by themselves can provide a l a s t i n g s o l u t i o n to the problem of communist expansionism. I myself envisage an organization which would be f i r s t and l a s t , pro-Southeast A s i a , pro-development pro-regional co-operation and pro-peace.24 It appeared that Malaysian foreign p o l i c y was s h i f t i n g from a hard-line anti-communist, pro-Western o r i e n t a t i o n toward greater n e u t r a l i t y . Foreign p o l i c y was at t h i s stage s t i l l somewhat ambivalent and the policy-makers themselves appeared to be a l i t t l e confused as to whether Malaysia was nonaligned or neutral. For example, Tun Ismail i n answering a parliamentary query s a i d : "We are not committed to any power bloc and we c r y s t a l i z e our attitu d e on any issue s t r i c t l y on i t s merits and i n the l i g h t of our national i n t e r e s t . In that sense we are not aligned. We never claim to be n e u t r a l . We can never be n e u t r a l i n 115 25 the choice between r i g h t and wrong." It i s perhaps more correct to say that Malaysia t r i e d to be neutral with respect to p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l issues while being aligned de facto to the West by v i r t u e of i t s m i l i t a r y t i e s . Taking the cue from Premier Khrushchev, Malaysia had nevertheless transformed i t s hard-line anti-communist posture into one of "peaceful co-existence." The general foreign p o l i c y strategy of the period was one of external outreach. While s t i l l r e l y i n g on old a l l i e s , Malaysia went out of i t s way to win Afro-Asian supporters i n a diplomatic war against Indonesia. Considerations of trade also prompted new t i e s with the Eastern European nations. In so doing, the contradictions i n i t s foreign p o l i c y became more and more apparent, n e c e s s i t a t i n g the change i n foreign p o l i c y posture. By 1968, Tun Ismail, who had r e t i r e d from the Cabinet s i x months e a r l i e r f or health reasons, put forward as a backbencher i n Parliament 26 h i s seminal "Ismail Peace Plan." He c a l l e d f o r the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of Southeast A s i a guaranteed by the major powers, the signing of non-aggression pacts and the declaration of a p o l i c y of co-existence: The time i s ... r i p e for the countries i n the region to declare c o l l e c t i v e l y the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of South-East A s i a . To be e f f e c t i v e , [ t h i s ] must be guaranteed by the b i g powers, i n c l u d i n g Communist China, [Second], i t i s time that the countries i n South-East Asia signed non-aggression t r e a t i e s with one another. Now i s also the time for the countries i n South-East A s i a to declare a p o l i c y of co-existence i n the sense that the countries ... should not i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of each other and to accept whatever form of government a country chooses to e l e c t or adopt .... The a l t e r n a t i v e to the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of South-East Asia guaranteed by the b i g powers ... i s an open i n v i t a t i o n by the region to the current 116 big powers to make i t a pawn i n big power p o l i t i c s . The alternative to the signing of non-aggression treaties among the countries i n the region i s an arms race among themselves which would be d e t r i -mental to t h e i r economy. The alternative to the declaration of the policy of co-existence i s increased tension and subversion i n the region.27 The Cabinet seemed to show mixed response toward the Ismail suggestions. While the Tunku said the neutralization idea was only "worth considera-t i o n , " Razak said Ismail's proposals had the f u l l support of the 28 government. There must have doubtless been some differences of opinion on the Ismail proposals, with the Tunku perhaps taking a more adamant stand than the other cabinet members, but at any rate, the process of re-thinking i n foreign policy had begun to affect the top policy-makers. I r o n i c a l l y , with the end of Konfrontasi a downturn i n Anglo-Malaysian relations also developed. The deterioration of t r a d i t i o n a l t i e s exacerbated the general turmoil of foreign policy i n th i s period. I t began with the separation of Singapore from Malaysia of 29 which B r i t a i n was apparently given very l i t t l e notice. Then came a cut-back i n B r i t i s h economic assistance r e s u l t i n g i n a Malaysian 30 request for $630 m i l l i o n i n defence aid being turned down. Relations reached their nadir when the Tunku uncharacteristically accused B r i t a i n 31 of t a l k i n g with Indonesia about Malaysia behind i t s back. At about the same time, Malaysia was also taking a second look at the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Pact as B r i t a i n , even before the Bangkok Peace Agreements of 1966, had announced i n a White Paper i t s intentions to scale down troop commitments and overall defence expenditures east of 32 the Suez Canal. For Malaysia, B r i t i s h withdrawal was to be effec t i v e 117 33 by 1971 and completed by the mid-1970's. Thus i n 1968, under the urgings of the Tunku, talks began for a five-power defence arrangement among Malaysia, Singapore, B r i t a i n , A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand. This arrangement was to replace the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Pact after B r i t a i n pulled out i n 1971. In the course of a series of talks i n 34 1968 and 1969, the i n t r i c a c i e s of the five-power defence scheme were worked out. At one stage there were doubts expressed about Australia's 35 and New Zealand's p a r t i c i p a t i o n after 1971, but by early 1970 an expensive ($15 m i l l i o n ) m i l i t a r y exercise over two months was carried 36 out to test the v i a b i l i t y of the five-power defence arrangements. Whatever the merits of the scheme, i t became more and more evident to the Malaysian leaders that they could no longer lean as heavily on B r i t a i n and other a l l i e s i n matters of defence. Tun Ismail made h i s proposals i n the backdrop of B r i t i s h withdrawal from the region. Thus foreign policy i n the issue-area of defence and security during t h i s period was i n t r a n s i t i o n , i f not turmoil. The previous r i g i d i t y of Malaya's foreign policy began to give way under the e x i -gencies created by Konfrontasi and i t s related events. Therefore with the end of Konfrontasi also came a noticeable s h i f t i n foreign policy orientation and strategies, even i f the l a t t e r at t h i s stage were not p a r t i c u l a r l y clear-cut. While Malaysia s t i l l hung on to i t s Western-world peggings, by the end of the period i t had discarded i t s pre-viously pronounced anti-communist posture for one of "peaceful co-existence." This can perhaps be seen as an extension of the e a r l i e r 37 posture of "non-interference" but i t would be d i f f i c u l t to deny a q u a l i t a t i v e difference between the two concepts i n terms of the 118 praxis of Malaysian foreign policy. Development and Trade Although Malaysia's foreign relations i n t h i s period were dominated by Konfrontasi and security matters, there were at least two important events which related to economic policy, namely, the UNCTAD conferences of 1964 and 1968. At both these conferences, Malaysia joined the Group of 77 developing nations i n espousing developmental issues, thus enhancing i t s developing-world image. Thus Malaysia consciously aligned i t s e l f with the "South" i n the "North-South" c o n f l i c t between 38 r i c h and poor nations. I t was among the o r i g i n a l "75" c a l l i n g for UNCTAD I to be held i n order to press a number of demands on the advanced, i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nations. The key demands which were embodied 39 i n the controversial "Prebish Report" were: 1) Creation of conditions for expansion of trade between countries at a simi l a r l e v e l of development, at different stages of development or having different systems of s o c i a l and economic organization 2) Progressive reduction and early elimination of a l l barriers and r e s t r i c t i o n s impeding the exports of less developed countries (LDC's) without reciprocal concessions on their part 3) Increase the volume of exports of developing countries i n primary products, both raw and processed, to i n d u s t r i a l countries and s t a b i l i z a t i o n of prices at f a i r remunerative prices 5) Provision of more adequate resources at favourable terms so as to enable LDC's to increase t h e i r imports of c a p i t a l goods and i n d u s t r i a l raw materials es s e n t i a l for their economic development, and better co-ordination of trade and aid p o l i c i e s 119 6) Improvement of the i n v i s i b l e trade of developing countries, p a r t i c u l a r l y by reducing t h e i r payments for f r e i g h t and insurance and the burden of t h e i r debt charges 7) Improvement of i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements, i n c l u d i n g , i f necessary, the establishment of new machinery and methods f o r implementing the decisions at UNCTAD I UNCTAD I could boast of no immediate, concrete achievements, but the fact that i t was convened represented a moral v i c t o r y f o r the LDC's i n the f i r s t few blows of the North-South c o n f l i c t . Soon a f t e r UNCTAD I, Malaysia c a r r i e d the North-South b a t t l e into the arena of t i n conferences i n bargaining f o r a higher p r i c e range f o r the 1965 T i n Agreement. D i s s a t i s f i e d with the outcome of the negotiations, Malaysia, together with B o l i v i a , threw caution to the winds and threatened withdrawal from the Agreement i f a higher 40 p r i c e range was not f i x e d . The threats were l a t e r withdrawn but at a subsequent T i n Council meeting, the consuming countries conceded 41 to a higher p r i c e range. By the time of UNCTAD I I i n 1968, Malaysia was selected to serve on the Trade and Development Board. UNCTAD II's achievements included adoption of the International Development Strategy of the Second UN Development Decade and a Generalized System of Preferences, both of which measures Malaysia strongly supported. In p a r t i c u l a r , the developed countries agreed i n p r i n c i p l e not to ra i s e new t a r i f f and n o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r s or increase e x i s t i n g ones against imports of primary products of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t to developing countries. They also agreed to accord p r i o r i t y , by reducing or elimina-t i n g duties and other n o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r s , to c e r t a i n imports of p r i -mary products of export i n t e r e s t to developing countries. 120 Thus i n questions of Development and Trade, Malaysia's foreign policy was marked by a continued adherence, i f not greater commitment, to i t s developing-world posture, and thereby to i t s pursuit of deve-lopmental goals. At the same time, too, Malaysia did not discard i t s l a i s s e z -f a i r e policy i n respect to foreign enterprise. About the time when Anglo-Malaysian relations ebbed to a low point, Tun Razak toured the United States i n l a t e 1966, wooing American c a p i t a l . In a speech made at the annual convention of the Far East American Council of Commerce and Industry i n New York, Tun Razak appeared eager to lay Malaysia bare to American enterprise: Malaysia i s a peaceful and democratic country, p o l i t i c a l l y and economically stable and f r i e n d l y with the United States. We want to keep i t that way. But i t i s sometimes d i f f i c u l t to understand why even though your government i s so generous i n providing assistance to so many other developing countries, i t yet seems reluctant to give f o r t h -right and substantial aid to Malaysia ... We are not looking for direct hand-outs. We are looking for people to have f a i t h i n us, and to invest i n our country and to play a part i n the development of industry and trade i n our country. On the other hand, as hard-headed businessmen you are looking for opportunities of expansion of your enterprise, and my main message to you today i s t h i s . I f you want to expand and invest and you look around the world for a suitable place to do t h i s ; then I suggest you look towards Malaysia where you w i l l f i n d the basic requirements you seek - p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y within a democratic framework and poten-t i a l progress to mutual advantage of both our countries ....43 The l i b e r a l attitude toward foreign enterprises i n Malaysia has led to a s t a r t l i n g degree of foreign ownership and control of the Malaysian economy. This gives the l i e to a popular but incorrect notion that 121 the Chinese dominate Malaysia's economy. Information released only recently shows that foreign ownership of fixed assets i n the i n -d u s t r i a l sector i n Peninsular Malaysia ( i . e . Malaya) i s more than half of the t o t a l at 57.2% (the Chinese share i s 26.2%) while i t stands at an amazing 70.8% i n the modern agriculture sector, attesting the enduring impact of colo n i a l rule despite more than a decade of independence. The foreign ownership i n the non-corporate sectors i s considerably l e s s , but as the Government i t s e l f puts i t : The o v e r a l l picture indicates that foreign corporate ownership of assets i n Malaysia i s substantial i n agriculture, manufacturing and mining, though t h i s i s already declining i n agriculture and mining. Further, ownership and control i s largely i n the hands of a r e l a t i v e l y small number of multi-national foreign firms with d i v e r s i f i e d economic in t e r e s t s . Among Malaysians, Chinese own the highest shares i n the corporate sectors, while their share i n the non-corporate sector of modern agriculture i s more balanced ... (But) the value of assets accounted for by the non-corporate sector i s small ... In modern agriculture, ( i t only) comprised 29.6% of the t o t a l planted acreage. In industry, the non-corporate sector made up only 12.6% of the t o t a l value of fixed a s s e t s . 4 4 TABLE 3.1 OWNERSHIP OF ASSETS IN MODERN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY, PENINSULAR MALAYSIA 1970* MODERN AGRICULTURE (planted acreage) INDUSTRY (fixed assets) CORPORATE NON-CORPORATE CORPORATE NON-CORPORATE SECTOR (000 acres) (%) SECTOR (000 acres) (%) SECTOR ($m) (%) SECTOR ($m) (%) 5.0 0.3 349.3 47.1 11.2 0.9 3.9 2.3 457.0 25.9 243.3 32.8 342.3 26.2 158.0 92.2 4.9 0.3 74.8 10.1 1.5 0.1 3.9 2.3 48.1 2.7 13.2 1.8 187.2 14.3 1.4 0.8 515.0 29.2 697.6 94.1 559.7 42.8 167.2 97.6 1249.6 70.8 44.0 5.9 747.3 57.2 4.1 2.4 - - 17.0 2.3 17.5 1.3 - -1764.6 100.0 741.6 100.0 1307.0 100.0 171.3 100.0 70.4 29.6 87.4 12.6 (Next page for source and notes) 123 NOTE: Although the figures are for 1970, they w i l l probably not d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from data for the period under survey. Since no e a r l i e r data were available, I am compelled to use the more recent s t a t i s t i c s . "'"Modern agriculture covers estate acreage under rubber, o i l palm, coconut and tea. Ownership i s i n terms of t o t a l planted acreage. Government FELDA schemes are included under t h i s category i n the non-corporate sector. 2 The industry sector covers manufacturing, construction and mining. Ownership i s i n terms of fixed assets. Total excludes unallocatable assets amounting to $25.2 m i l l i o n . 3 Government ownership of 17,000 acres i n modern agriculture i s included i n the non-corporate sector, while ownership of $17.5 m i l l i o n of fixed assets i n industry i s included i n the corporate sector. Source: Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Press, 1973, page 12. The picture for the ownership of share c a p i t a l i n Malaysia i s much the same, butressing the already dominant position of foreign ownership i n fixed assets: The most s i g n i f i c a n t feature i s that foreign interests accounted for as much as 61% of the t o t a l share c a p i t a l invested i n the corporate sector ... Foreign p a r t i c i -pation i s especially dominant i n modern agriculture and mining while i t amounts to about 50% to 60% of the t o t a l i n manufacturing, commerce and finance. 4^ TABLE 3.2 OWNERSHIP OF SHARE CAPITAL OF LIMITED COMPANIES, BY RACE AND SECTOR . PENINSULAR MALAYSIA 1970 MALAY CHINESE INDIAN FOREIGN TOTAL ($000) 0 D ($000) (% ) ($000) (%) ($000) (%) ($000) Agriculture, forestry and fis h e r i e s .. < . .13,724 0 .9 177,438 22 .4 16,191 0.1 1,079,714 75.3 1,432,400 Mining and quarrying .. . . . 3,876 0 .7 91,557 16 .8 2,488 0.4 393,910 72.4 543,497 Manufacturing . . .33,650 2 .5 296,363 22 .0 8,880 0.7 804,282 59.6 1,348,245 Construction .. 1,258 2 .2 30,855 52 .8 447 0.8 19,937 24.1 58,419 Transport and Communications 10,875 13 .3 35,498 43 .4 1,903 2.3 9,845 12.0 81,887 Commerce .. . .. 4,715 0 .8 184,461 30 .4 4,711 0.7 384,549 63.5 605,164 Banking and insurance .. . ..21,164 3 .3 155,581 24 .3 4,434 0.6 332,790 52.2 636,850 ..13,349 2 .3 220,330 37 .8 13,348 2.3 182,862 31.4 582,516 Total 102,611 1 .9 1,192,083 22 .5 52,402 1.0 3,207,889 60.7 5,288,978 The t o t a l includes share c a p i t a l ownership by Federal and State Government and Statutory Bodies and other Malaysian residents (individuals and Nominee and l o c a l l y controlled companies), amounting to about $734 m i l l i o n . In t h i s table, the r a c i a l shares i n each sector exclude these two groups. Source: Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Press, 1973, p.83. 125 Towards the end of the period there were signs that Malaysia was beginning to temper i t s l a i s s e z - f a i r e a t t i t u d e towards fo r e i g n enter-p r i s e with a greater degree of governmental d i r e c t i o n i n the area of i n d u s t r i a l development. The formation of the Federal I n d u s t r i a l Development Authority (FIDA) i n 1968 was i n d i c a t i v e of the s l i g h t s h i f t i n a t t i t u d e . FIDA's main functions were: (a) to undertake or d i r e c t economic f e a s i b i l i t y studies of the range of i n d u s t r i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s (b) to undertake i n d u s t r i a l promotion work i n the country and abroad (c) to f a c i l i t a t e exchange of information and coordination among i n s t i t u t i o n s engaged i n or connected with i n -d u s t r i a l development (d) to recommend p o l i c y on i n d u s t r i a l s i t e development and, where necessary, undertake the development of such s i t e s (e) to evaluate applications for pioneer i n d u s t r i e s , which are e n t i t l e d to tax r e l i e f ('pioneer status') (f) to report annually to the Minister of Trade and Industry on the progress and problems of indus-t r i a l i z a t i o n and to make the necessary recommendations. (g) to generally undertake such matters as may be i n c i -dental to or consequential upon the exercise of i t s powers or the discharge of i t s functions (under the Act of Parliament by which i t was established) (h) to advise the government generally on measures f o r the protection and promotion of i n d u s t r i e s i n c l u d i n g the imposition and a l t e r a t i o n of, and exemption from customs and other duties, and import and export l i c e n s i n g 4 ^ Thus FIDA i n general coordinated and systematized Malaysia's i n d u s t r i a l development programme. Although the authority remained true to Malaysia's open-door p o l i c y toward foreign e n t e r p r i s e , with i t s forma-t i o n also came a s h i f t from the promotion of import-substitution i n -dustries i n the e a r l y years to a new emphasis on export-oriented 47 i n d u s t r i e s toward the end of the period. 126 On the whole, Malaysia's basic foreign policy postures, goals and strategies i n the area of trade and development remained much the same for this period although there were signs of minor s h i f t s . I t s commitment to free enterprise did not stop Malaysia from seeking wider t i e s i n the area of trade, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n responding to over-tures from the Eastern European countries. Thus i n 1967, Malaysia signed a Trade Agreement with the U.S.S.R. - i t s f i r s t with a communist country - as a prelude to f u l l diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . About the same time, Anglo-Malaysian economic ti e s had also become relaxed. The Malaysian d o l l a r was unpegged vis- a - v i s the pound s t e r l i n g and the Commonwealth trade preference was removed for certain commodities. The foreign policy of external outreach, prompted by Konfrontasi, seemed to have s p i l l e d over to some extent into the development and trade issue-area or at any rate i t did not escape the general turbu-lence created during this period. The overall picture i s thus one of moderate t r a n s i t i o n i n contrast to the more d e f i n i t e t r a n s i t i o n occuring i n the issue-area of defence and security. International Co-operation and Diplomacy This was a period of frenzied international a c t i v i t y for Malaysia. I have already dwelt on i t s diplomatic drive to win friends and i n -fluence nations i n a counter-offensive to Indonesian Confrontation. At the UN, Malaysia won something of a moral vi c t o r y when a Norwegian resolution deploring the Indonesian landings on Malayan coasts received affirmative votes except from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia i n an emergency Security Council session. However, i t was not u n t i l the dust of Konfrontasi had s e t t l e d that Malaysia's strenuous e f f o r t s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy bore f r u i t . The resultant softening of i t s anti-communist l i n e l e d to the h i s t o r i c establishment of diplomatic t i e s with the Eastern European countries. Admittedly, there were also pragmatic considerations of trade which spurred the detente. In August 1965, Malaysia's Permanent Representative to the UN, Mr. Ramani, said, "The c e n t r a l government's p o l i c y i s to c u l t i v a t e good trade r e l a t i o n s with Russia since i t i s desirable that new markets be found f o r our rubber and t i n ... This dynamic business of p o l i t i c a l r e -thinking has been because of Russia's p o l i c y of peaceful co-existence, 48 which i s also the c e n t r a l government's theme." Thus i n A p r i l 1967, following the signing of a Trade Agreement a f t e r week-long discussions, 49 Malaysia and the Soviet Union agreed to exchange diplomatic missions. This was followed by t i e s with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria by 1969."^ With the end of Konfrontasi also came a r e s u s c i t a t i o n of regional co-operation. Malaysia, i n June 1966, was among the nine Asian and P a c i f i c nations that agreed to set up the Asian and P a c i f i c Council (ASPAC)."^ Although ASPAC had undertones of anti-communism, i t was not formed as an anti-communist m i l i t a r y pact. Khir Johari, the leader of Malaysia's delegation to the Seoul conference which set up ASPAC, was emphatic that Malaysia opposed a m i l i t a r y pact of any s o r t : " I t i s not i n l i n e with our p o l i c y to be drawn into or encourage any m i l i t a r y pacts, even i f they are m i l i t a n t l y anti-communist. We have steered clear of such pacts and w i l l continue to do so ... There are other more important things than m i l i t a r y pacts. Regional development 52 of c u l t u r a l and economic t i e s i s more v i t a l i n t h i s region." As 128 ASPAC foundered on i t s shaky beginnings, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik i n i t i a t e d moves for a "larger-than-ASA" regional Southeast Asian organization. Although the Tunku did not appear to be i n i t i a l l y enthusiastic about replacing ASA, the Malaysian p o l i c y -makers came around to accepting the need for a larger Southeast Asian organization which at least included Indonesia. Thus i n August 1967 at Bangkok, after some quibbling over the name for the new organiza-t i o n , the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born with Thailand, Indonesia, Phi l i p p i n e s , Malaysia and Singapore as founder-member countries. The goals of ASEAN as summarized i n the o f f i c i a l Declaration were to accelerate economic growth within the area; promote regional peace and s t a b i l i t y ; encourage collaboration i n the s o c i a l , economic, c u l t u r a l , technical, s c i e n t i f i c , and admini-s t r a t i v e f i e l d s ; improve trade, industry and agriculture; promote Southeast Asian studies; and maintain close co-operation with other 53 international and regional organizations. The aims do not d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from those of ASA. Membership, as with ASA, was open "to a l l states i n the region subscribing to the ... aims, prin c i p l e s 54 and purposes of the organization." Of p a r t i c u l a r interest was a paragraph on foreign bases reminiscent of Maphilindo: ... affirming that a l l foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y to subvert the national independence and freedom of states i n the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development ....55 This undertaking may be considered the functional equivalent of a non-aggression pact i n intention. Malaysia did not hide i t s enthusiasm for the new organization once i t was formed. Tun Razak at one point even suggested that ASEAN could p o t e n t i a l l y include defence arrange-ments: "A mutual defence a l l i a n c e i s always possible once we become very close, with a common interest and destiny."^^ The immediate effect of ASEAN was to seal the growing entente of the f i v e Southeast Asian neighbours thus marking the end of a period of turmoil i n the region. However, toward the end of 1968, Malaysia-Philippines relations were again temporarily strained over the Sabah issue. A b i l l passed by the Philippine House of Representatives declared Sabah to be part of Philippine t e r r i t o r y . Malaysia responded by asking the Philippines to withdraw i t s dip l o -matic s t a f f from Kuala Lumpur. However, mediation e f f o r t s by Thailand's Thanat Khoman led to a Philippine decision to observe a moratorium on 58 the Sabah issue u n t i l a f ter Malaysia's General Election i n May 1969. By the end of 1969 at the Third ASEAN Foreign Minister's conference, i t was announced that Malaysia and the Philippines would resume diplo-59 matic r e l a t i o n s . Held i n the cool atmosphere of Malaysia's Cameron Highlands, the ministers approved a l l the 98 recommendations put before them covering projects for co-operation i n the areas of commerce and industry, tourism, shipping, c i v i l a v iation, a i r t r a f f i c services and meteorology, transportation and communication, food supply and pro-duction, f i s h e r i e s , mass media, c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s and f i n a n c e . ^ They also signed two agreements for the establishment of an ASEAN fund and for the promotion of co-operation i n mass media and c u l t u r a l activities.^" 1" I t looked therefore l i k e ASEAN had begun to function smoothly i n fostering regional co-operation among i t s f i v e member countries. Konfrontasi aside, Malaysia continued to participate ac t i v e l y i n the UN and the Commonwealth. We have already noted i t s election to the UN Security Council i n 1965. At one point i n September 1965 a furore resulted i n which the Malaysian representative at the Security Council was alleged to have taken sides i n the Indo-Pakistani 62 clash over Kashmir. Despite the Malaysian government's assurance to Pakistan of i t s n e u t r a l i t y i n the c o n f l i c t , Pakistan severed 6 3 diplomatic t i e s with Malaysia i n October that year. On questions of decolonization, Malaysia continued to take a strong a n t i - c o l o n i a l and anti-apartheid posture. The Rhodesia question was p a r t i c u l a r l y prominent during this period. Apart from supporting a l l UN resolu-tions on Rhodesia, Malaysia adopted the following international measures against the rebel regime of Ian Smith: a t o t a l trade ban of imports and exports to and from Malaysia; non-recognition of pass-ports and visas issued by the Smith government; a surcharge on any l e t t e r s , parcels or communications a r r i v i n g by post i n the same manner as items having no stamps; exchange control measures excluding Rhodesia from the S t e r l i n g Area and r e s t r i c t i n g a l l payments and 64 f i n a n c i a l transactions of Rhodesian o r i g i n . In summary, Malaysia's basic objectives, postures and strategies on matters of international co-operation and diplomacy did not change appreciably over this period although the general strategy of external outreach tended to extend into t h i s issue-area as w e l l . The most important development i n this respect was the detente with Russia and the East European countries. The other important development of the period, although i t did not r e f l e c t any change i n foreign policy 131 objectives, postures or strategies, was the resuscitation of regional co-operation i n the larger ASEAN, which succeeded the three-member ASA. Foreign Policy 1964-1969: A Transitional Foreign Policy The most s t r i k i n g feature about the survey has been the general turmoil that engulfed this period of foreign policy. I t i s possible to i d e n t i f y two d i s t i n c t phases of the turbulent foreign policy of this period. In the f i r s t phase, the exigency of Konfrontasi resulted i n a greater r i g i d i t y i n previously held foreign policy postures. The prevailing pro-Western, anti-communist e l i t e ideology was r e i n -forced. In the perception of the policy-makers, Konfrontasi was communist-inspired and ultimately linked to Peking. Malaysia therefore hardened i t s anti-communist, anti-China l i n e . The support of the Russians and the Czechs for the Indonesians at the Security Council re-affirmed the e x i s t i n g image of Konfrontasi as a communist-inspired project. The Philippines, with i t s claim on Sabah, was seen merely as an opportunist but i t s action at a time when Malaysia was already pressured by Indonesia made Malaysia more adamant about i t s position. The creation of Malaysia i t s e l f , as - noted, to some extent grew out of the fear of a growing communist threat to the region, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Singapore and Sarawak. The Indonesian reaction to "Malaysia" was thus noturiexpeeted^asin the eyes of Malaysian policy-makers Indonesia had already moved toward Peking long before Malaysia was proposed. In addition, the unwillingness of Indonesia to j o i n ASA on the grounds that i t was "a tool of American imperialism" had also strained 132 Malayan-Indonesian relations and established i n the policy-makers' minds Jakarta's l e f t i s t image. Konfrontasi confirmed the Malaysian policy-makers' perception, so i t seemed. The i n i t i a l hardening of foreign policy postures soon gave way to actions which were turned toward i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the Afro-Asian world. This began as "truth missions" to propagate Malaysia's posi-tion i n the Indonesia-Malaysia c o n f l i c t but following Malaysia's f a i l u r e to be seated for the Cairo Nonaligned Conference, i t became a campaign to win recognition as a nonaligned country. These events also sparked considerable domestic debate on foreign p o l i c y . The Government was taken to task on a number of foreign policy issues by the opposition and even members of i t s own party. Furthermore, a non-government group attempted to gain membership i n the Afro-Asian People's S o l i d a r i t y Organization at Winneba and f a i l e d . These events added to the growing public sentiment that Malaysia's foreign policy was inadequate i n the l i g h t of B r i t i s h withdrawal. The Alliance Parliamentary Group was formed to review foreign p o l i c y . The Government could not s i t back and f a i l to take heed. Thus began the second phase i n t h i s period of foreign policy -a phase of re-thinking resulting i n the eventual discarding of Malaysia's anti-communist posture for one of "co-existence." This was followed up by the establishment of diplomatic t i e s with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. The e l i t e ideology had undergone, or at any rate, was undergoing, a q u a l i t a t i v e change. The Ismail Peace Plan, and the Tunku's and Razak's admissions of s l i g h t s h i f t s i n foreign policy are indications of the general change taking place. 133 Perhaps i n an e f f o r t to enhance i t s Third World image, Malaysia also became something of a leader i n the a f f a i r s of developing countries i n economic issues. I t played a major role i n r a i s i n g the price of t i n i n 1965 t i n negotiations and became a member of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board i n 1968. The basic foreign policy objectives, postures and strategies i n the area of development and trade, however, remained much the same, even i f they were pursued with greater vigour. This was nevertheless a period of t r a n s i t i o n i n which t r a d i t i o n a l t i e s with B r i t a i n became relaxed and a drive was made to woo American c a p i t a l together with greater e f f o r t s to promote economic t i e s with Eastern Europe. In short, Malaysia's economic l i n k s became more diversified-, r e f l e c t i n g the general foreign policy strategy of external outreach. This general foreign policy strategy also tended to s p i l l - o v e r into issues of international cooperation and peace. We have already discussed the widening of diplomatic relations, p a r t i c u l a r l y with Eastern Europe which can perhaps be best understood as a spin-off from events related to Konfrontasi. As with trade and development, there were no appreciable changes i n basic objectives, postures and strategies i n this issue-area although the t r a n s i t i o n i n ov e r a l l policy was also reflected i n th i s issue-area. The major achievement i n t h i s area was the formation of ASEAN, marking a renewed drive toward regional co-operation which was interrupted by Konfrontasi. But because of the thorny Sabah claim, t h i s promising resuscitation of regional co-operation f a l t e r e d , although i t was restored by the end of the period. I t i s not u n t i l the next period of foreign policy 134 that ASEAN came into i t s own. Thus foreign policy i n this period was dominated i n the e a r l i e r part with issues of defence and security a r i s i n g out of Konfrontasi. The general turmoil that accompanied Konfrontasi resulted i n an appreciable s h i f t i n foreign policy postures and strategies. In a l l , t h i s was a period of t r a n s i t i o n for Malaysian foreign policy. I w i l l again resort to a graphical display to i l l u s t r a t e the feedback effects of Konfrontasi and i t s related events i n what can be i d e n t i f i e d as two d i s t i n c t phases of Malaysian foreign policy i n the period under survey. Since we have already indicated i n the previous chapter the main sources of Malayan foreign policy i n the three issue-areas, only the major events and developments of this period are ci t e d , most of which are i n the issue-area of defence and security. The chart nevertheless i l l u s t r a t e s the s p i l l - o v e r effects of the defence and security issues into the other issue-areas. FIGURE 3.1 Explanatory Chart' of Major Foreign Policy Outputs 1964-1969 135 Phase I Konfrontasi Sabah Claim . E l i t e Ideology Communist support of Konfrontasi OBJECTIVES P o l i t i c a l independence T e r r i t o r i a l Integrity • POSTURES STRATEGIES Rigid pro-Western, Align with west anti-communist Orientations -V Disassociate with communist powers 1 ACTIONS Severence of t i e s with Indonesia and Philippines Activation of Anglo-Malaysian defence treaty M i l i t a r y actions to combat Konfrontasi F E E D B A C K Phase I I Failure to attend Cairo Conference Domestic c r i t i c i s m of Foreign Policy • B r i t i s h policy of withdrawal east of Suez Russian posture of peaceful co-existence OBJECTIVES P o l i t i c a l independence T e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y Transitional E l i t e Ideology \ POSTURES STRATEGIES Relaxed pro-Western Relax t i e s with the orientation y West Co-existence with Eastern European Communist countries Widen contacts with Afro-Asia and Eastern Europe (external outreach) ACTIONS Replacing Anglo-Malaysian defence pact with f i v e -power arrangement Diplomatic drive i n Afro-Asia Contacts with E. Europe leading to Trade Agreement with USSR and diplomatic t i e s with USSR, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Removing certain pre-ferences for Commonwealth Goods Unpegging Malaysian d o l l a r from Ster l i n g The preponderance of external factors impinging on foreign policy p a r t i c u l a r l y during Phase I of this period i s amply evident from the chart. A l l the s i g n i f i c a n t factors - Konfrontasi, the Philippines' Sabah claim and communist support generally for Konfrontasi - emanated from the external environment. Their combined effect was thus to reinforce e x i s t i n g e l i t e images. This i n turn led to a continued adherence, indeed, greater commitment, to prevailing foreign policy postures, objectives and strategies with th e i r resultant actions as shown i n the chart. For the most part, therefore, foreign policy during Phase I can be explained almost e n t i r e l y by reference to external sources, given . the thrust of the prevailing e l i t e ideology. The second phase, however, shows the impact of both external and i n t e r n a l sources of foreign policy. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t was the feedback effect of various external and i n t e r n a l events that led to a s h i f t i n Malaysia's foreign policy postures and strategies. I t i s not possible to show i n the chart the constant feedback process affecting policy 65 actions. However, we can attempt to trace the longer term effects of Konfrontasi on Malaysian foreign p o l i c y , i n a series of actions 137 and reactions, i n the following manner: Konfrontasi Activation of Anglo-Malays ian defence pact B r i t i s h , Australian _^ and New Zealand troops fi g h t i n g together with Malaysian forces Enhances Malaysia's pro-Western image — Failure of Malaysia to be i n v i t e d for Cairo Nonaligned Conference Domestic c r i t i c i s m of Foreign Policy Diplomatic drive to win Afro-Asian support Changing e l i t e perceptions Softening of anti-communist, pro-Western l i n e In addition to the long-term impact of Konfrontasi on foreign p o l i c y , the general B r i t i s h policy of withdrawal east of Suez and the Soviet Union's new posture of peaceful co-existence enhanced the movement toward softened pro-Western and anti-communist l i n e s . Indeed, by the end of the period, Malaysia had largely dropped i t s anti-communist l i n e for one of peaceful co-existence and was fast transforming i t s pro-Western stance for one of neutralism. I t was not u n t i l the next period, however, that these changes became r e a l l y apparent. There was also a tendency for the effects of changes i n the Defence and Security issue-area to s p i l l - o v e r , as i t were, into the other two issue-areas. Thus Malaysia responded p o s i t i v e l y toward Eastern European overtures to open trade and diplomatic t i e s . Konfrontasi also seemed to have shown Malaysian policy-makers how few firm friends the country r e a l l y had and resulted i n the general strategy of reaching out toward the Afro-Asian world and the setting up of diplomatic missions i n many of those states. In a l l , i t seemed to have been a good lesson i n diplomacy for the new nation. Thus, while objectives, postures and strategies did not change s i g n i -f i c a n t l y i n the issue-areas of Development and Trade and i n that of International Co-operation and Diplomacy, policy actions not only increased quantitatively i n the two issue-areas, but became more plur a l i z e d i n terms of the i r targets. In general, then, the second period of foreign policy demonstrates the importance of the feedback process i n foreign policy formulation and the manner i n which t h i s process affects s h i f t s i n foreign policy. This i s another way of saying that foreign policy i s continually t a i l o r e d to the existing needs of the nation as perceived by i t s policy-makers, who constantly have to re-appraise and adjust p o l i c i e s to changing external and i n t e r n a l conditions. For Malaysia's p o l i c y -makers , various events and conditions from the external environment signaled the need for an adjustment i n foreign policy orientations so that the national goals could be better pursued. In p a r t i c u l a r , Malaysia found i t necessary to adjust i t s posture and strategies i n the pursuit of i t s core-value goals i n the aftermath of Konfrontasi and i n the wake of various changes i n the international environment. At home, the general turmoil i n foreign policy induced a spate of c r i t i c i s m which did not f a i l to have i t s effect on the policy-makers 139 as w e l l . In short, the e l i t e ideology which had been r i g i d l y adhered to was undergoing a revision. The previous 'black-and-white' national image which sprung from a c l a s s i c view of East-West struggle mellowed into a recognition that co-existence was not only possible but necessary. On the whole, idiosyncratic factors receded i n importance or were overwhelmed i n the face of strong external pressures and domestic demands for a s h i f t i n foreign policy. However, i t i s not u n t i l the next period of foreign policy that these incipient changes i n foreign policy became consolidated and formalized. 140 Notes to Chapter 3 "•"The Tunku made the f i r s t public proposal- for a federation consisting of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo (Sabah), and possibly, Brunei as early as May 1961. There followed various phases i n the Malaysia proposal thereafter. The project received o f f i c i a l sanction and p u b l i c i t y after a series of Anglo-Malayan talks from 1961-1962. See R. S. Milne, Government and P o l i t i c s i n Malaysia, 1967, pp. 60-73 for a succinct account of Malaysia's formation. For a more detailed account see Noordin M. Sopiee P o l i t i c a l U n i f i c a t i o n i n the Malaysian  Region 1945-1965, Kuala Lumpur, Pernerbit U n i v e r s i t i Malaya, 1974, pp. 125-182. 2 The S t r a i t s Times, January 22, 1963. 3 The claim was based essentially, on the contention that the Sultan of Sulu had merely "leased" and not "ceded" the t e r r i t o r y i n 1878 to the predecessors of the B r i t i s h North Borneo Company from which i t was passed on to the B r i t i s h Crown; that sovereignty could be transferred only to sovereigns; and that the Philippine Government was the heir to the Sultan of Sulu. See Milne, op_. c i t . , pp. 187-188. 4 I b i d . , pp. 185-186. ^A sample of the outpouring of brotherly love i s provided from the following statements of three leaders at the conclusion of the conference:- Macapagal: "I say that President Sukarno i s a great leader and Tunku Abdul Rahman a great statesman."; Sukarno: "The Tunku i s a great statesman, and Macapagal a great leader of the people of Asia."; Tunku: "President Macapagal and Sukarno are dynamic leaders who have fought colonialism and imperialism." The S t r a i t s Times, August 6, 1963. ^A series of events prior to Malaysia's proclamation led to a t o t a l breakdown of relations among the three countries. Malaya had postponed the Malaysia formation from August 31 t i l l September 16 to give enough time for the UN Secretary General's report due to appear on September 14. The Secretary General deplored the fact that the date was f i x e d before h i s conclusions were made known and so did Indonesia. After the report had found that the majority of the Borneo people supported the project, Indonesia and the Philippines chose not to accept the UN conclusions. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1962, pp. 95-96. 141 g For a thorough and detailed examination of the motives and reasons behind Malaysia's formation, see Noordin Sopiee, P o l i t i c a l  U n i f i c a t i o n i n the Malaysia Region 1945-1965: From Malayan Union  to Singapore Separation, Penerbit U n i v e r s i t i Malaya, 1974, pp. 143-145. 9 The S t r a i t s Times, February 8, 1963. 10 In a series of twelve radio talks called "The Battle for Merger," Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew spelled out the nature of the communist threat to Singapore and the Malaysia region i n general. See Lee Kuan Yew, The Battle for Merger, Singapore, Govt. P r i n t i n g Office, (no date). 11 Milne, op_. c i t . , p. 63. See also Sopiee, op_. c i t . , pp. 144-145. 12 Cited i n J. M. G u l l i c k , Malaysia and It s Neighbours, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, p. 41. 13 The Tunku denies the importance of the Communist threat i n the formation of Malaysia but agrees that the r a c i a l balance theory has "some truth." He i n s i s t s that "the truth of the matter ... was that the people l i v i n g under the same form of administration previously (that i s , B r i t i s h rule) would naturally want to l i v e again under the same form of administration i n independent Malaysia." Tunku, personal communication, June 1975. The "same administration" nevertheless implies a pro-Western, non-communist p o l i t i c a l framework. 14 / Cf. Tilman, Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . , pp. 47-48, Stephen Chee, "Malaysia's Changing Foreign P o l i c y , " op_. c i t . , p. 44. Former Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, also indicates t h i s perception of Konfrontasi. See his "Neutralisation i n Southeast Asia," Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1971, p. 49. op. c i t 16 17 18 1^The expression "external outreach" i s employed by Stephen Chee, The S t r a i t s Times The S t r a i t s Times !The S t r a i t s Times 142 19 See The S t r a i t s Times, May 28, 1965, i n which the S o c i a l i s t Front MP, Dr. Tan Chee Khoon queries the Tunku on the issue i n a House debate. A PAP opposition member, Devan Nair, wrote pointedly i n a l e t t e r to The S t r a i t s Times, "We do not advance our cause i n Afro-Asia by doing an ecs t a t i c j i g round the American totem." The  Str a i t s Times, June 5, 1965. 20 Other members of the delegation were Lee San Choon, Alliance MP, Abdullah Ahmad, P o l i t i c a l Secretary to the Deputy Prime Minister, Musa Hitam, P o l i t i c a l Secretary to the Minister of Transport, Wong Leng Ken, PAP leader, Devan Nair, PAP MP, James Puthucheary, lawyer, Samad Ismail, j o u r n a l i s t . These individuals comprised a "National Committee" according to PAP MP Devan Nair. See The S t r a i t s Times, May 20, 1965, and Dewan Ra'ayat Parliamentary Debates, May 26, 1965, c o l . 124. ^^Malaysia's support of the US bombing of North Vietnam was apparently the major obstacle to the delegation's acceptance. There was also an element of inter-party competition involved as Malaysia's s o c i a l i s t parties, the Labour Party, Party Rakyat and the Barisan So c i a l i s of Singapore had been sponsored for membership by Indonesia although these parties did not send any delegation to the Conference. Interview with Encik Samad Ismail, editor, New S t r a i t s Times, May 19, 1975, and i b i d . . cols. 123-126. 22 The S t r a i t s Times, May 20, 1965. 1966. 23 The Malay Ma i l, August 31, 1966 and The S t r a i t s Times, September 1, 2 4 I b i d . , June 24, 1966. 25 The S t r a i t s Times, June 21, 1966. 26 Tun Ismail said he had not discussed his proposals with the Prime Minister or any of his former Cabinet colleagues, The S t r a i t s  Times, January 24, 1968. 27 Dewan Ra'ayat Parliamentary Debates, January 23, 1968, cols. 1615-1616. 143 28 The S t r a i t s Times, January 28, 1968. Opposition party leader, Dr. Tan Chee Khoon alleges that Tun Ismail resigned from the Cabinet not only because of health reasons but because he had differences v i t h the Tunku on foreign p o l i c y matters. Dr. Tan also alleged that Ismail wanted to hold the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s but the Tunku was adamant i n not giving up the p o r t f o l i o . The Tunku-Ismail con-f l i c t dates back to the e a r l y years of independence (see f n . 83, Chapter Two) and seems to have an i d e o l o g i c a l dimension. Ismail i n the l a t e r years appeared to have changed h i s hard-line anti-communist p o s i t i o n but the Tunku has remained uncompromising i n h i s a t t i t u d e toward communism and communist countries, e s p e c i a l l y China. Interview with Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, May 22, 1975, and Tunku, personal communica-t i o n , June 1975. 29 See Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore i n International  Diplomacy, 1968, p. 144 and Milne, op_. c i t . , pp. 218-219. 30 Tilman, op. c i t . , p. 46. 31 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 32 Boyce, op. c i t . , pp. 132-133. 33 The B r i t i s h pull-out plans announced were as follows: Phase 1: Withdrawal of 10,000 men by A p r i l 1968; Phase 2: Withdrawal of a further 20,000 men by 1970-71, reducing the siz e of B r i t i s h forces to about h a l f the pre-Confrontation l e v e l of 60,000; Phase 3: T o t a l withdrawal by about the mid-1970's. The Sunday Times, January 14, 1968. 34 Various issues of The S t r a i t s Times, January 1968 - November 1969. See also Chin Kin Wah, "The Five Power Defence Arrangement and AMDA," Occasional Paper No. 23, July 1974, I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. 35 In February 1969, the two countries announced t h e i r decisions to maintain t h e i r forces i n the region a f t e r 1971, The Malay M a i l , February 26, 1969, but Tun Razak and the Tunku on a number of occasions expressed doubts about t h i s commitment. See The S t r a i t s Times, August 8 and 10, 1969. 144 36 The Exercise dubbed "Bersatu Padu," which was widely publicized, involved the deployment of 4,000 men, 500 a i r c r a f t and 50 ships. The  Malay Ma i l , A p r i l 10, 1970. I t was not u n t i l A p r i l 1972 after a m i n i s t e r i a l meeting i n London that the five-power arrangement was f i n a l l y formalized i n a j o i n t communique issued by the f i v e governments, The Five-Power Arrangement, however, i s not a m i l i t a r y pact although i t s purpose was to replace AMDA which was terminated i n November 1971. See Chin, op_. c i t . , p. 1 and pp. 17-18. 37 For example, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s stated that "We have steadfastly maintained these pri n c i p l e s [of peaceful co-existence] ever since our independence and most recently they have borne f r u i t i n the exchange of diplomatic missions between the Soviet Union and Malaysia ... I t i s not that the princ i p l e s of co-existence have changed; i t i s rather that these pri n c i p l e s ... which we ... have long espoused have won gradual acceptance." See Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, "The Elements of Foreign P o l i c y , " Foreign  A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 2, Nos. 1 & 2, December 1969, pp. 12-13. Tan S r i Ghazali, i n an interview, maintained that i t was the communist countries that had changed rather than Malaysia. Interview with Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, October 30, 1975. 38 See my M.A. Thesis, Southern Bargaining i n North-South Trade: The Case of Tin, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972, Chapter One, for a discussion nature and issues of the North-South c o n f l i c t . See also B. Gosovic, "UNCTAD: North-South Encounter," International C o n c i l i a t i o n , May 1968, No. 568. 39 Proceedings of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 23 March - 16 June, UN Publication, Sales No. 64 I I B, 1964, Vol. I I , pp. 5-63. The o r i g i n a l demands of the developing countries were contained i n "The Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries made at the Eighteenth Session of the General A s s e m b l y G e n e r a l Assembly resolution 1897 (XVIII), 11 November 1963. 40 I f both Malaysia and B o l i v i a had withdrawn from the Agreement, i t would have collapsed since Malaysia i s the leading t i n producer and B o l i v i a i s second i n l i n e . See my M.A. Thesis, pp. 109-110 and "Storm In a Tin Cup," The Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 51, January 20, 1966, pp. 90-91 for an account of the episode. 41 The price range was raised, from a l e v e l of 1,000 - 1,200 to a l e v e l of 1,100 - 1,400 per ton, i b i d . 145 / 2 Speech by Khir Johari, Minister of Trade and Industry and leader of Malaysian delegation to UNCTAD I I I at Santiago, published i n Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 5, No. 2, June 1972, p. 39. 43 Victor Morais, ed., Strategy for Action: The Selected Speeches  of Tun Haji Abdul Razak, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Center for Development Studies, Prime Minister's Dept., 1969, p. 345. 44 Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysian Plan 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Press, 1973, p. 11. 4"*Ibid., p. 81. ^ M a l a y s i a Year Book 1973/74, The Malay Ma i l , Kuala Lumpur, pp. 320-330. 47 " I n d u s t r i a l Development i n Malaysia and Incentives for Investment," speech by J. Jegathesan, Director, Investment Promotion, FIDA, to Malaysian Investment Conference, London, May 1975, pp. 3-4. 48 The S t r a i t s Times, August 28, 1965. 49 The S t r a i t s Times, A p r i l 4, 1967. "^Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania were at t h i s time also reported to be seeking t i e s with Malaysia. See The Malay M a i l , July 25, 1967 and The S t r a i t s Times, January 3, 1969. ''"'"The other ASPAC countries were: A u s t r a l i a , Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand and South Korea. The S t r a i t s Times, June 12, 1966. The purported aim of the organization was cooperation i n the economic and c u l t u r a l f i e l d s , The S t r a i t s Times, June 19, 1966. Malaysia, together with Japan, had reportedly blocked moves to mould the organization as an a n t i -communist front. On the whole, Malaysia was not p a r t i c u l a r l y enthusiastic about ASPAC. See The S t r a i t s Times, July 5 and 7, 1967. 146 53 The S t r a i t s Times, August 9, 1967. The machinery for carrying out the work of the regional body were as follows: an annual foreign ministers' meeting; a standing committee with rotating chairmanship, s i t t i n g i n the country of the foreign minister serving as chairman and comprising ambassadors of the other states; ad hoc and permanent committees of s p e c i a l i s t s and other o f f i c i a l s as needed; and a national secretariat i n each member country, Tilman, op. cat., p. 49. 5 4 I b i d . Ibid. 5 6The St r a i t s Times 5 7The St r a i t s Times 5 8The St r a i t s Times 59 "ASEAN Joint Communique," Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Vol. 2, Nos. 1 & 2, December 1969, p. 47. 6°Ibid., p. 49. ^The ASEAN Fund was to have an i n i t i a l grant of $15 m i l l i o n , that i s , a contribution of $3 m i l l i o n from each member state, The  St r a i t s Times, December 18, 1969. 62 The Malaysian Representative, Mr. Ramani, indicated that he would support a resolution c a l l i n g only on Pakistan to ceasefire since, he said, India had already indicated i t would accept the ceasefire unconditionally, The S t r a i t s Times, September 21, 1965. The Tunku, i n defending Ramani, said Malaysia's international t i e s were more important than i t s r e l i g i o u s t i e s , The S t r a i t s Times, September 27, 1965. fi The Malay M a i l , October 6, 1965. The Malay M a i l , March 3, 1966. 147 See Michael Brecher, "Inputs and Decisions for War and Peace," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 131-177, for an excellent study of the June 1967 Israeli-Arab war i n these very terms of feedback to which we have alluded. The research design Brecher uses i s however designed for the detailed study of p a r t i c u l a r events rather than foreign policy i n general with which I am concerned. 148 CHAPTER FOUR MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1970 - 1975 Defence and Security With the turmoil of the 1960s behind i t , Malaysia moved toward consolidation of relationships i n the region. Malaysia put the f i n a l touches to i t s rapprochement with Indonesia by signing with i t , i n March 1970, a Friendship Treaty and a Delimitation of T e r r i t o r i a l Seas Treaty.^ The Friendship Treaty was a renewal of a si m i l a r treaty signed i n 1959, the only such treaty Malaysia has signed with any country. The 1970 treaty has the aura of a non-aggression pact. A r t i c l e 3 states that "the two High Contracting Parties undertake that i n case any dispute on matters d i r e c t l y affecting them should arise they w i l l not resort to the threat or use of force and s h a l l at a l l times endeavour to s e t t l e such a dispute through the usual diplomatic channels i n the true s p i r i t of friendship and goodwill between good 2 neighbours." In.the 1959 treaty, a si m i l a r a r t i c l e stated merely that the parties " s h a l l endeavour" to s e t t l e a dispute through peaceful means. The Delimitation of T e r r i t o r i a l Seas Treaty had international ramifica-tions and sprung from Malaysia's and Indonesia's claim of a 12-mile t e r -4 r i t o r i a l waters instead of the t r a d i t i o n a l 3 miles. The treaty related i n p a r t i c u l a r to the S t r a i t s of Malacca, which being less than 24 miles wide i n places meant that the two countries did not consider" the S t r a i t s to be international waters. J In December 1971, Malaysia and Indo-nesia, after t r i p a r t i t e consultations with Singapore, announced that "the S t r a i t s of Malacca and Singapore are not international s t r a i t s , while f u l l y recognising th e i r use for international shipping i n ac-cordance with the p r i n c i p l e s of innocent passage." Singapore, while not holding t h i s position, agreed with Malaysia and Indonesia that the safety of navigation was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the l i t t o r a l states and that there was need for t r i p a r t i t e cooperation on the question. I t s position i s understandable because of i t s international status as an entrepot and commercial center. Malaysia's, and Indo-nesia's positions, however, arose from a wish to assert national sover-eignty over the S t r a i t s for a number of reasons. While the two coun-t r i e s claimed navigational safety and p o l l u t i o n to be the most com-p e l l i n g reasons for controlling the S t r a i t s , the obviously important strategic implications of the move cannot be denied.^ At one point, Tunku Razaleigh, as President of the Associated Malay Chamber of Commerce, proposed that the S t r a i t s be turned into "the Suez Canal of Southeast Asia" and a shipping levy be imposed on a l l vessels passing through the S t r a i t s . The scheme received no o f f i c i a l endor-sement, however. The o f f i c i a l view on the extension to 12 miles of t e r r i t o r i a l seas i s that i t was necessary for the day-to-day adminis-t r a t i o n of defence and commercial security and that Malaysia was 9 merely " f a l l i n g i n l i n e with the large majority of nations." In May 1970, Malaysia served on the three-nation mediation task force (Indonesia and Japan were the other two countries) which was appointed by a Jakarta conference to look into the deteriorating war s i t u a t i o n i n Cambodia."*"^ Toward the year's end, Malaysia attended i t s 150 f i r s t nonaligned nations conference at Lusaka. The event was symbolic of Malaysia's f i n a l acceptance as a "nonaligned" nation. Malaysia's delegation to Lusaka was led by Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, shortly before his succession as the nation's Prime Minister."^ In his speech to the conference, Razak spoke i n glowing terms of nonalignment and i d e n t i f i e d Malaysia's foreign policy goals with i t s p r i n c i p l e s : ....Today with the detente between the two power blocsfs i t i s an important r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the , Non-Aligned Group to ensure that the interest of the big powers do not converge at the expense of the medium and small powers. The hegemonistic tendencies on the part of the major powers which appear to be under various guises and with various j u s t i f i c a t i o n s must be resisted. Furthermore, the world today i s no longer bipolar. I t i s at least t r i - p o l a r with the emergence of China and her legitimate role i n the world cannot be simply washed away by those who are opposed to her. At the same time, i t i s a fact which also cannot be washed away that the relations between China and a number of countries remain unsatisfactory. I submit that here the non-aligned countries have an extremely important role to play and have a unique duty to discharge i f we are to remain l o y a l to the principles of co-existence and to our basic tenets of non-alignment i n our e f f o r t s to bring about a harmonisation of international relations on the basis of respect for independence and i n t e g r i t y of states.12 I t was also at the Lusaka Conference that Razak for the f i r s t time sought endorsement, at an international forum, for Malaysia's proposal 13 for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia. Although the scheme re-ceived only p a r t i a l endorsement at Lusaka, Malaysia continued to a i r i t at various international conferences, notably, the commemorative session of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations i n December 14 1970, and then at the 1971 Commonwealth Conference at Singapore. 151 I quote Tun Razak i n his speech to the Commonwealth, summit: ...the non-alignment principles to which Malaysia whole-heartedly subscribes...call for . . . r e s t r a i n t and consideration from the big powers i n their actions and decisions which affect smaller countries. In keeping with the l a t t e r , the non-aligned countries at Lusaka looked to the neutralisation of Vietnam,. Laos and Cambodia. Malaysia for i t s part has taken this a step further and called for the neutralisa-tion of Southeast Asia - a neutralisation which necessarily requires the endorsement of the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia cannot be considered i n i s o l a t i o n . They are very much a part of Southeast Asia which has a l l the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of becoming an arena of c o n f l i c t of the super powers i n -tent on the extension of thei r spheres of influence. In our view, therefore, peaceland s t a b i l i t y i n this region can only be a r e a l i t y i f the neutralisation which should cover the entire area i s guaranteed by the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China. 1 5 Malaysia's neutralization proposal no doubt had i t s origins i n the 1968 "Ismail Peace Plan." However, i t was not u n t i l two years after Tun Ismail had presented his proposals to Parliament that they became formalised as part of Malaysia's foreign policy. I n i t i a l l y , the pro-posal, as explained by party ideologue Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie involved "two l e v e l s " or policy: On the f i r s t l e v e l , the countries of Southeast Asia should get together and c l e a r l y view thei r present situations and agree upon the following: * in d i v i d u a l countries i n the region must respect one another's sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , and not participate i n a c t i v i t i e s l i k e l y to d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y threaten the security of another. This i s an essential requirement. Non-interference and non-aggression are basic principles which Southeast Asian countries must unequivocally accept before any further steps can be taken. * a l l foreign powers should be excluded from the region. * they should devise ways and .means of, and under-take the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , ensuring peace among member states. 152 * they should present a c o l l e c t i v e view before the major powers on v i t a l issues of security. * they should present a c o l l e c t i v e view before the major powers on v i t a l issues of security. * they should promote regional co-operation. On the next l e v e l , the major powers (the United States, Russia, and China) must agree on the following: * Southeast Asia should be an area of ne u t r a l i t y * the powers undertake to exclude countries i n the region from power struggle among themselves * the powers devise the supervisory means of guaranteeing Southeast Asia's n e u t r a l i t y i n the international power struggle.16 The scheme, while ambitious, was based on a pragmatic appreciation of the Southeast Asian s i t u a t i o n . I t thus became the most important of Malaysia's foreign policy strategies i n the area of defence and secu-r i t y i n this period. By November 1971, Malaysia p a r t i a l l y f u l f i l l e d the " f i r s t l e v e l " of policy by persuading the four other ASEAN members to endorse the scheme. In the h i s t o r i c Kuala Lumpur Declaration, the ASEAN countries, "agreeing that the neutralization of Souteast Asia i s a desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . . . " stated' (1) That Indonesia, Malaysia, the P h i l i p i n e s , Sin-gapore and Thailand are determined to exert i n i t i a l l y necessary e f f o r t s to secure the rec-ognition of and respect f o r , Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers (2) That Southeast Asian countries should make con-certed e f f o r t s to broaden the areas of co-operation which contribute»'to their strength, s o l i d a r i t y and closer ralationship-'-'' The neut r a l i z a t i o n scheme was subsequently also endorsed i n pr i n c i p l e by the Commonwealth Conference of Ottawa i n August 1973 and 153 the Fourth Nonaligned Summit Conference i n Algiers i n September 1973. Endorsement i s of course a far cry from implementation and to date the big two, U.S. and U.S.S.R., have not responded o f f i c i a l l y to the scheme 18 although China has expressed verbal support f o r the idea. The slow-ness of big-power response and the feedback from other countries, ; p a r t i c u l a r l y the ASEAN countries, on the scheme had led to a s l i g h t s h i f t i n emphasis i n the foreign policy strategy. Increasingly the. term "neutralization" has been dropped i n favour of the expression "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" or simply, "zonal n e u t r a l i t y . " " ^ Thus the emphasis today i s less on big-power guarantee for neu-t r a l i z a t i o n than on ASEAN, or Southeast Asian, i n i t i a t i v e i n fostering zonal n e u t r a l i t y . Th^i-conceptjbf neutraliszja-tion implies big-power par-t i c i p a t i o n , or at any rate, control, and this does not s i t w e l l with some ASEAN countries which would prefer to see big-power disengagement 20 from the area. The scheme has evidently made good progress since the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971. By May 1975 during the ASEAN Minis-t e r i a l conference i n Kuala Lumpur, i t was pu b l i c l y announced that a "Blueprint for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" was i n the 21 process of being mooted and formulated by senior ASEAN o f f i c i a l s . The change of emphasis from big-power guarantee to national and re-? gional i n i t i a t i v e was underscored by Tun Razak i n his speech to the ASEAN ministers: The premise of the neutralisation proposal i s regional and national r e s i l i e n c e . Southeast Asia must stand on i t s own feet. We — i n d i v i -dual countries as we l l as the region as a whole — must be s e l f - r e l i a n t i f we wish to survive. I f a country or a people values i t s way of l i f e , i t must be prepared to defend i t against any 154 form of external encroachment. I f a people i s not prepared to f i g h t i n the defence of i t s sovereignty and i t s values, i t w i l l not survive — indeed i t does not deserve to survive. The best defence l i e s i n the people themselves — i n their commitment, their w i l l and capacity. This i s the premise of the neu-t r a l i t y system as i t applies both to i n d i v i d u a l coun-t r i e s and to the region as a whole. I t i s not pre-mised on vague hopes and euphoric dreams. I t i s pre-mised on friendship and goodwill, on an open-minded readiness to co-operate, and patience and perse-verance i n working out detailed arrangements — and equally on national r e s i l i e n c e , on our readiness to fight and defend our values and way of l i f e . . . . This i s the meaning of and thrust of the n e u t r a l i t y system.;..The key to our future security and s t a b i l -i t y l i e s not i n outdated and irrelevant attitudes of the cold war, but i n imaginative and constructive response to the new r e a l i t i e s of today.22 The s h i f t of emphasis i n the neutralization strategy was explained i n a more complete fashion by foreign policy theoretician and currently Home A f f a i r s Minister Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie. In a t a l k on regional security to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 23 Jakarta, Ghazali spelled out three security issues-areas, namely, inte r n a l security issues that arise from i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t situations; intra-regional security issues that arise out of intra-regional (Southeast Asian) c o n f l i c t situations; and external security issues that arise out of extra-regional c o n f l i c t situations. He argued that these c o n f l i c t situations could be a l l e v i a t e d by a "Southeast Asian Neutrality System" which would e n t a i l the pursuit of three "essential elements" namely (1) national cohesiveness and r e s i l i e n c y (2) re-gional cohesiveness and r e s i l i e n c y , and (3) the observance of a policy of equidistance by Southeast Asian states v i s - a - v i s the major powers. National r e s i l i e n c e refers to a state's "capacity to mobilize ( i t s ) 155 population for nation-building and rapid economic development..." A state i s said to be r e s i l i e n t i f " . . . i t s s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l system i s nationally accepted and has the inherent a b i l i t y to meet the height-ened expectations for greater prosperity and s o c i a l j u s t i c e of i t s population. The second element, regional r e s i l i e n c e , i s more than a mere extension of the national concept and appears to incorporate some notion of regional integration, The notion of regional r e s i l i e n c e may be defined as the a b i l i t y of each state i n the region to be f u l l y committed to their [sic] organised i n t e r -relatedness and interdependence as the f i r s t p r i n -c i p l e of foreign policy. ASEAN i s c l e a r l y a f i r s t step i n that d i r e c t i o n . I t has focussed interest on the r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y of accelerating economic development through increased intra-regional trade, improvement of c o l l e c t i v e extra-regional trade terms, sectoral plain-h a T r i m o n i z a t i o n as well as c o l l e c t i v e u t i l i z a t i o n of a larger volume of external resources through j o i n t regional projects.26 The t h i r d element, equidistance, i s taken to mean a policy of main-taining noninvolved and more or less impartial or neutral relationships with the great powers. As Ghazali Shafie puts i t , "In the short term, equidistance reinforces the adoption of a neutral,non-aligned policy stance, which i n turn reinforces accommodation between external powers. In the long term, equidistance w i l l entrench a regional policy of ne u t r a l i t y and nonalignment that w i l l f a c i l i t a t e arid perpetuate great 27 power disengagement from Southeast Asia." He suggests that None of ..these policy trends are I.sic]xf undamentally un-acceptable to any Southeast Asian state. In fact these trends are already being pursued by most of 156 them, with the rest already showing an i n c l i n a t i o n to adopt s i m i l a r policy trends. The elements nec-essary for a n e u t r a l i t y system are mutually r e -inforc i n g , such that once firmly established, w i l l provide constant dynamics to the o v e r a l l s i t u a t i o n . The question r e a l l y i s not whether systemic n e u t r a l i t y w i l l eventually come about ( i t w i l l eventuate as a dir e c t r e s u l t of the entrenchment of the necessary policy trends) but rather whether i t w i l l eventuate spontaneously, or be i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d by c o l l e c t i v e agreement.28 Because of the changing nature of the neu t r a l i t y proposal, some confusion has been generated over i t s precise meaning and doubts have arisen with respect to i t s p r a c t i c a l i t y . As one foreign policy analyst puts i t , The [neutralisation] proposal may not be p r a c t i c a l ; indeed, may be Utopian as many of the c r i t i c s have argued. Quite r e a l i s t i c a l l y , Southeast Asia i s not l i k e l y to develop into a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality soon. Yet i t i s important to distinguish between neutralisation as an end or as a goal, and as a means, or more p a r t i c u l a r l y , a theoretical framework — a process of thinking, a r t i c u l a t i o n and formulation of indi v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e policies.29 I t i s perhaps possible to overcome the conceptual d i f f i c u l t y encountered by the analyst here by re f e r r i n g to the foreign policy model of this study. The n e u t r a l i z a t i o n scheme, accordingly, would be b a s i c a l l y a foreign policy strategy, grounded on a number of foreign policy objectives, and springing from a foreign policy posture of nonalignment, as i t i s o f f i c i a l l y claimed, or, neutralism as I would prefer to c a l l i t . My contention i s that Malaysia's claim to nonalignment remains dubious as long as the Five-Power Defence Arrangement, however loosely, remains i n force. " : The proposal for zonal n e u t r a l i t y i s also hardly i n the t r a d i t i o n of nonalignment, having perhaps greater affinity to European 157 30 ne u t r a l i t y . The change i n emphasis recently i n the foreign policy strategy r e f l e c t s a continual adjustment toward external developments and to some extent domestic events. Although the strategy i s f l e x i b l e , Malaysia's basic posture of neutralism has been a stable facet of froreign policy for t h i s whole period, and one suspects, for a long time more to come. The neutralization scheme, because i t specifies clear-cut l i n e s of action and i s based on a pa r t i c u l a r ideological or p o l i t i c a l position may also be looked upon as a "doctrine." A foreign Ministry, o f f i c i a l stressed, for example, that i t was a " t o t a l concept" on which a l l foreign policy actions were "tested" so that they conformed 31 to i t s premises. However, for the purposes of t h i s study, I prefer to use the term "strategy" to describe the concept as this dovetails with the other designated foreign p o l i c y outputs. Toward the end of the period, Malaysia had i n i t i a t e d , under ASEAN auspices, a "Blueprint" for Southeast Asian n e u t r a l i t y , which, according to a Wisma Putra of-32 f i c i a l , enjoyed "90 percent support" of the other ASEAN countries. Malaysia's f i n a l s t r i d e toward neutralism actually came with the recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. While the move was s t r i c t l y a diplomatic matter, i t s implications for Malaysia's national defence and general security w i l l become obvious i n the course of my account. Steps toward rapproche-ment with China became evident when Malaysia began to soften i t s China l i n e soon after the termination of Konfrontasi. At various points, Malaysian spokesmen pu b l i c l y lamented the absence of China from the UN, although they invariably defended the rights of Taiwan. Tun Razak i n 158 1966 called this position the "One China, one Formosa" po l i c y , not wishing to be i d e n t i f i e d with the "two-China" policy. U n t i l 1970, Malaysia held this position. Thus Tun Ismail t o l d the UN General Assembly i n December that year: I t i s . . . a fact that the world today i s no longer bipolar. I t i s , i f not multipolar, at least t r i -polar. S p e c i f i c a l l y , I am r e f e r r i n g , of course, to the People's Republic of China, whose absence from this organization r e f l e c t s a serious short-coming of the United Nations. Furthermore, the denial to a big power of i t s proper role cannot be conduciL-M/e. to the establishment of a stable and harmonious world order....I should...wish to state the view here of my Government that, taking into account the rights of the people of Taiwan to self-determination, a right which surely member states of t h i s organization cannot deny to any people, China should be properly and f u l l y represented i n this organization. The exclusion o of China from t h i s organization and from the mainstream of international a c t i v i t i e s i s un- ^ r e a l i s t i c and shortsighted and benefits no one. By 1971, the Malaysian position on, China and Taiwan had become more de f i n i t e . In a brii*efing to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Tan S r i Zaiton, the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of External Af-f a i r s said: Malaysia's policy on China i s t h i s : We subscribe not to a two-China policy or one China one Taiwan policy but rather, I say this quite c a t e g orically, to a one China policy. But the problem of Taiwan remains a d i f f i c u l t issue. The fact has to be ac-cepted that a de facto government exists on this i s l a n d , based on an ideology d i f f e r e n t from that e x i s t i n g on the maiiiland. On the other hand, for centuries i t has been accepted that Taiwan i s part of China. The problem i s well-nigh impossible to resolve unless there i s a s p i r i t of give and take on both sides. I t i s for this reason we say that, while the problem i s e s s e n t i a l l y one for the Chinese people to decide, i n considering i t s solution, 159 we urge that cognizance be taken of the p r i n c i p l e of self-determination to assess the wishes of the twelve m i l l i o n or so people inhabiting the island of Taiwan....We do not seek to involve ourselves i n the minutiae of the Chinese problem.. We recognize that the problem of.Taiwan as a problem which must be sorted out by the Chinese people. Thus i n the 1971 UN General Assembly, Malaysia voted for the Albanian resolution which allows for the seating of China and consequently, 36 Taiwan's expulsion. There followed i n October 1971, a 19-man Trade Mission to China, led by Pernas Chairman, Tengku Razaleigh, to establish direct trade l i n k s with the People's Republic. Subsequent missions f o l -lowed, paving the way for u n o f f i c i a l negotiations on recognition and diplomatic t i e s . The most important of these negotiations were carried out, i t was revealed later,'tin secret meetings between the Malaysian UN Representative at New York, Zakaria bin Mohammed A l i , and his Chinese 37 counterpart, Huang Hua. The two men had f i r s t met i n Ottawa when they were ambassadors to Canada. The Chinese position at these meetings was that diplomatic relations should come f i r s t while Malaysia wanted the 38 outstanding issues settled before t i e s could be formalised. From the Malaysian perspective, there were three main issues: China's support for the Malayan Communist Party (MCP); the related question of "Suara Revolusi Malaya" (Malayan Voice of Revolution) radio broadcasts which emanated from China; and the status of the 220,000 stateless Chinese i n Malasia. China, apparently after a l i t t l e h e s itation, agreed to discuss these and other issues and by December's end, agreement had been reached on the entire range of questions. As a prelude to the China t i e s , Malaysia had recognised without much fanfare the Mongolian Republic, North 160 Vietnam, North Korea and East Germany within 1972-1973. Then, on May 27, 1974, a Malaysian entourage, led by Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, l e f t for the People's Republic of China i n the the f i r s t high-level o f f i c i a l contact of the two governments since Malaya's independence i n 1957. On May 31, Malaysia and China announced the normalisation of relations to be followed by an exchange of ambas-sadors. At the same time, Malaysia terminated diplomatic (consular) relations with Taiwan. In the j o i n t communique announcing the normal-i s a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s , the two governments agreed on the following chief points: ...that although the s o c i a l systems of the People's Republic of China and Malaysia are d i f f e r e n t , this should not constitute an obstacle to the two Gov-ernments and people i n establishing and developing peaceful and f r i e n d l y relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , mutual non-aggression, non-interference i n each other's in t e r n a l a f f a i r s , equality and mutual bene-f i t , and peaceful co-existence. The two,Govern-ments consider a l l foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion to be impermissible. They hold that the s o c i a l system of a country should be chosen and decided by i t s own people. They are op-posed to any attempt by any country or group or countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence i n any part of the world.39 S p e c i f i c a l l y , Malaysia stated that i t recognises "the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole le g a l Government of China and acknowledges the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan i s an inalienable part of the t e r r i t o r y of the People's Republic of China." The Chinese Government, on i t s part, ....takes note of the fact that Malaysia i s a m u l t i -r a c i a l country with peoples of Malay, Chinese and 161 other ethnic origins. Both the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia declare that they do not recognise dual n a t i o n a l i t y . Proceeding from t h i s p r i n c i p l e , the Chinese Govt, considers anyone of Chinese o r i g i n who has taken up of his own w i l l or acquiring Malaysian n a t i o n a l i t y as automatically f o r f e i t i n g Chinese n a t i o n a l i t y . As for those residents who retain Chinese na t i o n a l i t y of their own.will, the Chinese Government, acting i n accordance with i t s consistent p o l i c y , w i l l enjoin them to abide by the law of the Government of Malaysia, respect the customs and habits of the people there and l i v e i n amity with them. And thei r proper rights w i l l be protected by the Government of Ch^na and respected by the Government of Malaysia. Although not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned i n the j o i n t communique, i t seemed that China was prepared to stop act i v e l y supporting the MCP and base i t s relations with Malaysia on the f i v e Bandung princ i p l e s of co-existence. At any rate, i t appeared to be the Malaysian govern-ment's understanding that "non-interference" i n inte r n a l a f f a i r s was a reference to the MCP issue. Thus the Malaysian Prime Minister said on his return that he had received assurances i n private tal k s with both Chairman Mao and Premier Chou that the MCP was Malaysia's " i n t e r n a l problem. " 4^ China also accepted Malaysia's position on the issue of over-seas Chinese (Huachiao), which i s based on the p r i n c i p l e of jus s o l i . In the past, China applied the p r i n c i p l e of jus sanguinis i n the fear that Taiwan would absorb the Huachiao i f the l o c a l societies rejected them. As a quid pro• quo to the concessions made by China, Malaysia discarded i t s ambivalent stand on Taiwan i n stating p l a i n l y that the isla n d was an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China and 162 i n so doing also breaking off t i e s with the island republic. Premier Chou also spoke favourably, i f only generally, of the Malaysian-ASEAN scheme for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia. In his words, "... the Malaysian Government's position for the establishment of a Zone of Peace and Neutrality i n Southeast Asia gives expression to the desire of the Southeast Asian People to shake off foreign i n t e r -ference and control (and) has won support from many Third World countries. The China v i s i t represented a diplomatic breakthrough for Malaysia and a personal triumph for Tun Razak. On h i s return from the h i s t o r i c t r i p the Malaysian Premier said with considerable truth: The prestige of Malaysia has never been higher than iteis:'-today. The success of our foreign policy i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y recognised. Every major power i n the world can. without equivoca-tion support our policy of friendship because i t i s directed against nooone, our policy of non-alignment because i t i s f a i r and objective, our strong commitment to regionalism because i t i s constructive, and our pursuit of regional neu- ^ t r a l i t y because i t would bring and b u i l d peace. Thus with the establishment of diplomatic t i e s with the People's Republic of China, Malaysia's foreign policy has more or less come around f u l l c i r c l e . I t can now claim with greater c r e d i b i l i t y to have a n e u t r a l i s t foreign policy and thereby pursue a policy of equidistance y i s - a - v i s the major powers. As long as i t did not recognize China and China did not recognize Malaysia, such a strategy of equidistance, ipso facto, could not be pursued. A l i t t l e under a year after Malaysia's rapprochement with China came the dramatic turn of events, i n A p r i l 1975, i n Indo-China. In 163 unprecedented and relentless m i l i t a r y offensives the revolutionary movements of South Vietnam and Cambodia - admittedly with generous support and p a r t i c i p a t i o n from Hanoi - overwhelmed the non-communist regimes of Thieu and Lon Nol within a matter of months. The communist v i c t o r i e s led to the establishment of communist governments i n South Vietnam and Cambodia under the National Liberation Front and the Khmer Rouge respectively. These events w i l l no doubt have far-reaching i m p l i -cations for the security of the Southeast Asia region as a whole. Malaysia has extended recognition to the two new Indo-China govern-ments. I t has taken a positive attitude of the events i n Indo-China. This i s concomitant ©h i t s adherence to a n e u t r a l i s t foreign policy. In the words of the Prime Minister Tun Razak, speaking to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers i n Kuala Lumpur i n May, 1975, We meet today at a h i s t o r i c moment i n Southeast Asia. Only days ago, we have seen the emergence of new governments i n Cambodia and South Vietnam, born out of the turmoil of a protracted war and extraordinary and untold human sufferings. ... Southeast Asia today i s a different place from what i t was only a few weeks ago. Peace, for the most part, has come to this region. This must i n -deed be a decisive moment i n our history. Never before i n the history of t h i s region have we the opportunity to create and establish for ourselves a new world of Southeast Asia — a world at peace and free from foreign domination and influence — a world i n which the countries of the region can co-operate with one another for the common good.... We are now at the threshold of exciting p o s s i b i l -i t i e s . This i s the challenge which faces us i n Southeast Asia today. This challenge brings new opportunities for peace, friendship and co-opera-tion for us to grasp....Which path s h a l l we follow? The path of unity or the path of division? The path of co-operation or of confrontation?...It i s a h i s t o r i c choice - a h i s t o r i c opportunity - a h i s t o r i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which w i l l determine the 164 the future of our region and of our people. As brother Southeast Asians, we i n Malaysia are happy the guns of war i n the countries of Indo-China have at l a s t been muted....We extend our friendship and goodwill to the governments and peoples of the Indo-China states with whom i t i s our earnest desire to have friendl y and neigh-bourly rela t i o n s . Basic to our thinking about the future i s our commitment to do.our utmost to ensure that the countries of Southeast Asia i r -respective of p o l i t i c a l ideology or s o c i a l system — can co-operate together i n ensuring peace and prosperity for a l l our peoples.^ Malaysia's policy-makers made i t absolutely clear that they did not subscribe to the so-called "Domino Theory." Party theoretician Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie went on Radio-Television Malaysia to explain 46 what he called "The Great Domino Fallacy." Ghazali submitted that the two s i m p l i s t i c assumptions of the theory are untenable, namely, the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of communist vi c t o r y , that i s , that i t would spread from country to country, and the assumption of the uniformity of Southeast Asian countries. In short he argued that the f a l l of "American dominos" does not necessarily presage the f a l l of other states, which may not even be "dominos": In theoretical as well as p r a c t i c a l terms the domino theory has l i t t l e relevance to the states of Southeast Asia. The collapse of American policy i n Indo-China does not deter-mine the in t e r n a l order of these states, un-less their i n t e r n a l order happens to be a function of American support, and that they depend on the United States for. the mainte-nance of th e i r i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l system.... Whether or not a country goes communist de-pends on the success of the i n t e r n a l and ex-ternal p o l i c i e s of that country i t s e l f . . . . In the years ahead the domino theory w i l l come to be regarded as being increasingly irrelevant even by the United States.... I f 165 the Americans can begin to grasp the r e a l i t y that the i r global security l i n k s are actually premised on p o l i t i c a l socio-economic and not m i l i t a r y ef-ficacy, there would be no cause for them to hold on to the myth of the domino theory.^ In summary, Malaysia's general strategy of the period appeared 48 to be a s h i f t from the pursuit of 'defence' to that of 'security.' 'Defence' implies a d e f i n i t e m i l i t a r y strategy of a state protecting i t s borders, usually by means of a m i l i t a r y pact where i t s own m i l i -tary c a p a b i l i t i e s are thought to be inadequate. 'Security', on the other hand, suggests a more general - both p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y -orientation toward minimizing threats to a state's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e -g r i t y . In Malaysia's case, the emphasis on defence i n the f i r s t period was manifested i n the Anglo-Malayan defence pact while the new emphasis on security i n the t h i r d period i s reflected i n i t s pursuit of regional n e u t r a l i t y . For the most part, then, the pursuit of national security dovetailed into the pursuit of regional security. Malaysia's major strategy i n i t i a l l y was the Swiss-style proposal for the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of Southeast Asia to be guaranteed by the major powers. The strategy evidently underwent a s l i g h t modification and became the promotion of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality i n Southeast Asia, a concept which was duly endorsed by a l l the ASEAN countries i n 1971. There seems to have appeared more recently another 'package' of strategies with respect to the pursuit of security goals. This consists of the promotion of national and regional " r e s i l i e n c e " and a policy of "equidistance" v i s -a-vis the major powers. But these more general strategies are no doubt ti e d to the promotion of a zonal n e u t r a l i t y system which for the most 166 part has been the cornerstone of Malaysia's foreign p o l i c y i n the period. I t may be possible to obtain the support and p a r t i c i p a t i o n 49 of the other Southeast Asian countries f o r the scheme but perhaps of equal importance i s some form of endorsement or acceptance by the major powers. The opening up of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with Peking by Malaysia, the P h i l i p p i n e s and Thailand i s a r i g h t step i n that d i r e c t i o n . No doubt there w i l l be thorny d e t a i l s of implementation to be worked out before the n e u t r a l i t y zone can a c t u a l l y come into f o r c e . I t i s beyond the scope of t h i s study to examine the i n t r i -cacies of the n e u t r a l i t y proposal. S u f f i c e i t to say that up t i l l a s today i t has proved to be v i a b l e foreign p o l i c y strategy f o r Malaysia. A summary of the main foreign p o l i c y objectives, postures, st r a t e g i e s and actions f o r the period i n the defence and security issue-area appears below i n table form. Development and Trade There was some i n d i c a t i o n of a change i n posture and strategies i n economic matters although Malaysia's economic p o l i c i e s i n broad terms — p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s objectives — did not change fundamentally. Notably, Malaysia's developing-world posture took on a more f o r c e f u l or even r a d i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n . Malaysian spokesmen began to stress more strenuously the need to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e various measures aimed at a l l e v i a t i n g p r i c e f l u c t u a t i o n s i n primary commodities of developing countries and measures generally aimed at a more equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of world wealth. For example, at the Third UNCTAD Conference at TABLE 4.1 Defence and Security: Policy Outputs 1970 - 1975 OBJECTIVES Maintaining p o l i t i c a l independence Protecting t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y ACTIONS POSTURES Neutralism -policy orientation of neutrality vis-a-vis major powers and cold war issues i n general Non-interference -respecting t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l sovereignty of other nations STRATEGIES Seeking security-rather than defence: I (a) Promoting the neutralization of Southeast Asia through big power guarantee (b) Promoting a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality i n South-east Asia I I Promotingahationalional r e s i l i e n c e , regional resil i e n c e and equi-distance with major powers Signing Friendship Treaty and Delimitation of T e r r i t o r i a l Seas Treaty with Indonesia (1970) Attending f i r s t nonaligned nations 1 conference at Lusaka (1970) I n i t i a t i n g and signing with ASEAN nations, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (1971 ) Voting for China's admission into the United Nations (1971) Establishment of diplomatic t i e s with Mongolian Republic, North Vietnam, North Korea and East Germany (1972-73) Prime Minister's t r i p to China leading recognition and d i p l o -matic t i e s (1974) Recognition of the new commu-n i s t governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia (1975) Formulating with ASEAN coun-t r i e s "Blueprint" for zonal n e u t r a l i t y (1975) 168 Santiago i n A p r i l 1971, Malaysia's chief delegate, i n complaining of the slow advancement of UNCTAD goals, said: The debate and discussions i n UNCTAD and other forums of the UN have cert a i n l y added to our understanding of the problems of developing countries, but positive action has not matched the pace of rhetoric and we have so far f a i l e d to achieve a t r u l y interdependent and integrated world economy....The terms of trade of the develop-ing countries continue to grow worse. Their share of world trade and share of their carriage of sea borne trade has persistently declined. The flow of resources from developing countries to develop-ing countries has not been commensurate with the development needs of developing countries. Debt servicing has become an acute problem for dev-eloping countries and there i s clear danger that the inflow of development resources into develop-ing countries would be n u l l i f i e d by the outflow of c a p i t a l from developing countries. On the top of a l l these problems, we are saddled with the ailments of the wealthy nations. 5^ The l a s t remark was i n reference to the international monetary c r i s i s and s p e c i f i c a l l y with respect to the re-alignment of currencies among the major developed countries - the group of Ten — which prompted the developing countries to form i t s own Inter-Governmental Group of 24 to look into monetary issues. The international monetary situ a t i o n did l i t t l e to ameliorate North-South relations and the lack of progress of UNCTAD I I I reflected t h i s poor state of a f f a i r s . There was also an impending World M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade Negotiations to l i b e r a l i s e trade to b,e held h 52 i n Tokyo1.' i n 1973, and this tended to prompt the developed countries to put things o f f . There were, nevertheless, several minor achievements at UNCTAD I I I . These i n brief were (a) recognition of the p o l l u t i o n hazards i n the production of synthetics and substitutes, (b) a decision to carry out a series of studies on the marketing and d i s t r i b u t i o n 169 system of commodities of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t to developing countries, (c) agreement i n respect of shipping and f r e i g h t that Liner Conferences should be given adequate notice and that consultation precede any f r e i g h t increases and p a r t i c u l a r account be taken on the e f f e c t s of such increases on commodities of importance to developing countries, (d) agreement on the need of a code of conduct for Liner Conferences, and (e) a decision to i n v i t e the IMF to consider e s t a b l i s h i n g a Com-mittee of Twenty Central Bank Governors i n the Fund to advise i t i n 53 reform of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary system. As for Malaysia's pr i v a t e achievements, i t was re-elected to serve on the Trade and Development Board, which i s the governing body of UNCTAD, and the leader of the Malaysian delegation also served as a Vice-President of the Conference. This was testimony that Malaysia had become increas- , i n g l y recognised as a champion of Southern causes while at the same time being more acceptable to the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries than per-54 haps some of the more r a d i c a l A f r i c a n and L a t i n American countries. The more aggressive tone of Malaysia's o r i e n t a t i o n toward North-South issues was also evident from Malaysia's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n other UN bodies. The Malaysian Finance M i n i s t e r , speaking at the annual meeting of the IMF and IBRD i n 1970 said, " . . . i t i s clear that the developing world must re-appraise i t s basic f i n a n c i a l and economic p o l i c i e s . The countries i n t h i s category must a t t a i n i n d u s t r i a l s e l f -s u f f i c i e n c y at whatever cost. Whatever the s a c r i f i c e s needed, we must reduce our imports of manufactured goods from the highly i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries and we must do t h i s as quickly as possible. We must form trading blocs which would be i n a p o s i t i o n to compete on more equal 170 terms with the developed world." J J The two notions or economic strategies of "industrial self-sufficiency at whatever cost" and that of "forming trading blocs" were voiced openly at an international forum for the f i r s t time. In the past, Malaysia's spokesmen had been content to speak mostly in general terms of industrial development and support for price-fixing schemes such as that of t i n . Malaysia also began to throw i t s support behind the c a l l for a "new economic world order," a concept originally attributed to President Boumediene of Algeria and which basically consists of three premises: (i) that producer-countries should have absolute control over their own natural resources, ( i i ) that primary-producing countries should have remuner-ative returns for their primary produces, and ( i i i ) that prices of 56 primary products should be tied to the price trends of manufactures. On questions of aid, Malaysia's attitude seemed to have become one of cynicism with regard to i t s efficacy. Again let me quote the Finance Minister, If I may say so, much of the so-called aid being given can hardly be called aid because i t i s tied tott.he exports of the donor country. Malaysia has experienced great d i f f i c u l t y in u t i l i s i n g such so-called aid which is really nothing v more than export promotion on then part of the developed country. This is f a i r enough, because even dev-eloped countries have a right to s e l l as much of their goods as possible but l e t us be honest about i t and not c a l l i t aid. A l l that this ex-ercise does is to force the recipient of such credits to buy from this donor country at i n -flated prices. In the.last analysis, this form of aid could benefit the donor more than the recipient, particularly when the latter has managed i t s finances well and is not short of foreign exchange. Malaysia is one of those ^ countries in this (dubiously) happy position. 171 In general, then, Malaysia's foreign policy posture toward the developed or i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries during t h i s period became more radicalised and aggressive even i f i n the broad context of Third World 58 p o l i t i c s Malaysia was by no means regarded as a " r a d i c a l . " I t nevertheless appeared to have gained acceptance .and even esteem among the large majority of Third World states. Before we discuss Malaysia's p o l i c i e s toward other economic issues, i t may be useful at t h i s juncture to re-examine the nature, composition and direction of Malaysia's trade and compare th i s with the trade s t a t i s t i c s of the f i r s t years of independence. This i s i n keeping to the dynamic approach employed i n this study. From the table on exports (4.1), i t i s evident that although there has been some degree of export d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , Malaysia i s s t i l l heavily de-pendent on primary commodities for nearly 70 percent of the value of i t s exports (excluding petroleum and petroleum products). The share of manufactured goods, included under "others," has however increased from a,small 5 percent i n 1961 to a s i g n i f i c a n t 16 percent at the 59 value of $1,530 m i l l i o n by 1974. As for the direc t i o n of Malaysian trade, this has not changed s i g n i f i c a n t l y since the early years of i n -dependence (see Chart 4.1). Japan maintains i t s position as the single most important buyer of Malaysian exports with i t s share increased to to 18 percent today as compared to 15 percent i n 1963. The ove r a l l picture i s s t i l l one i n which Malaysia's major customers are the i n -d u s t r i a l i s e d countries and Singapore acts as a purveyor of Malaysian goods to the Southeast Asian countries. TABLE 4.1 172 Breakdown of Exports by Major Commodities 1974 $M % $M Rubber 2,882 30 1,567 Timber 1,272 13 185 Tin 1,408 15 553 Palm O i l 1,022 11 61 Petroleum and Petroleum Products 940 10 Others 2,056 21 Total .9,580 100 1961 212 660 3,238 % 48 6 17 2 7 20 190 Source: Economic Report 1974-75, The Treasury, Malaysia, 1974. p. 22. CHART 4.1 Exports by Destination^ *Excluding U.K. **Includes U.S.S.R. 1974 **W. Germany, I t a l y , France, Holland 1963 Sources: Economic Report 1974-75, op. c i t . , p. 19 and Table 1.4, supra. The s t a t i s t i c s do not allow for perfect comparability i n some instances (such as "EEC" and "Western Europe") but th i s does not materially affect the general thrust of my analysis. The same point applies to Charts 4.2 and 4.3 173 CHART 4.2 Composition of Imports 1974 1963 Sources: Economic Report 1974-75, op.cit,, p. 71 and Table 1. , supra. The composition of imports shows a continuation of the heavy buying of manufactured and c a p i t a l goods (Chart 4.2). In f a c t , t h i s has increased over the l a s t decade by 16 percent. The largest import items i n 1974 were machinery and transport equipment, comprising 31 percent of t o t a l imports. I t would appear therefore that a major por-tion of Malaysia's foreign exchange earnings go into the purchase of such c a p i t a l goods which are no doubt necessary for i n d u s t r i a l develop-ment. This makes Malaysia doubly dependent on the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries, as we s h a l l see from the following discussion on Malaysia's major suppliers. The sources of Malaysian imports provide an 174 an interesting picture of change over the l a s t decade or so. The most outstanding fact i s Japan's r i s e as Malaysia's single most important supplier with a s t a r t l i n g share of 25 percent of t o t a l imports. Com-pare this with i t s figure of 10 percent i n 1963. Together with Japan's, r i s e and concomitant upon i t , i s B r i t a i n ' s plunge from being major sup-p l i e r i n 1963 with 21 percent share to a comparatively small 9 percent i n 1974. Another interesting change i s the declining imports from Malaysia's Southeast Asian neighbours. While Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia supplied a substantial 28 percent of Malaysia's imports i n 1963, ASEAN nations contribute only a 14 percent share of i t s imports today.• CHART 4.3 1974 1963 Sources: Economic Report 1974-75, op. c i t . , p. 71, and Table 1.5, supra. 175 The foregoing discussion on Malaysia's external trade has underlined the continued importance of the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries to Malaysia's economic well-being. Japan emerges as Malaysia's single most important trading partner, buying 18 percent of Malaysia's ex-ports and supplying 25 percent of i t s imports. Malaysia continues to be heavily dependent on several major primary commodities for external revenue although there i s some indication of export d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r , the export of manufactures has shown impressive pro-gress. Since Malaysia's major buyers and suppliers are s t i l l the i n -d u s t r i a l i s e d countries i t i s doubly dependent upon these countries and i t s economy remains vulnerable to the v i c i s s i t u d e s of external economic forces. (See Chart 4.3) Under the circumstances, i t i s understandable that Malaysia's Finance Minister called for the pursuit of " i n d u s t r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y at whatever cost" and the formation of trading blocs. I t r e f l e c t s a f r u s t r a t i o n with the persistence of the status quo i n the world economic order despite more than a decade of the promotion of developmental goals i n numerous international organisations. Let me again quote the Finance Minister i n his major policy speech to World Bank and International Monetary Fund: I now come to the most important problem of a l l , and that i s the trading relationship between the developed and developing world. Broadly speaking, we inr.the developing world buy manufactured goods from the developed world and pay for them with the proceeds of sale of our primary commodities. As i s well known, the prices of manufactured goods, com-pared with pre-war prices, have risen much faster t than the prices of primary commodities i n the post-war period. Broadly speaking, therefore, we have to pay more and more for what we buy from the dev-veloped world which continues to pay less and less for what we s e l l to them. On this basis, no 1 7 6 developing country can be economically viable for reasons which are p a i n f u l l y obvious. Even i f we adopt the most prudent and sensible p o l i c i e s and execute them with maximum ef f i c i e n c y , we would s t i l l be i n the red because no amount of prudence, good sense and ef f i c i e n c y can overcome such over-whelming odds. The terms of trade which are so overwhelmingly loaded against the developing world w i l l continue to impoverish them whatever the beautiful things are said i n this...assembly and outside i t . We i n the developing world do not want charity or even aid from the developed w o r l d . ^ A l l we want i s f a i r terms of trade, a square deal. Since 1973, a group of 13 developing countries;;;, the Organiza-tion of Petroleum Exporting Counteiess (OPEC) has demonstrated that i t can turn the tables on the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries with devastating impact. But th i s i s only a small group of countries operating as a ca r t e l with an esse n t i a l , and up t i l l now, indispensable commodity. The bulk of developing countries are not i n t h i s happy position, and indeed, the very action of the OPEC countries i n quadrupling o i l prices i s not without i t s adverse effects on the developing, especially the 6 1 very poor, countries. As such, Malaysia's Finance Minister's ob-servations holds true i n large measure for the great bulk of develop-ing countries. I t i s i n the l i g h t of the perception of the i n t e r -national economic si t u a t i o n that Malaysia has joined the c a l l for a new economic world order. Accordingly, Malaysia has noticeably modified i t s economic strategies i n pursuing i t s economic objectives at the international l e v e l . Rather than use the existing t r a d i t i o n a l frameworks and i n s t i t u t i o n s , there i s a greater i n c l i n a t i o n now to seek out new steps, or at any rate to reshape the old frameworks i n order to change the economic status quo. For example, Malaysia 177 recently took u n i l a t e r a l steps to s t a b i l i s e the price of rubber. According to a senior o f f i c i a l of the Ministry of Trade and Indus-try , the government has been operating a "mini buffer stock scheme" on i t s own for some time by buying when the price was low and s e l l i n g 62 when i t went up. This scheme received o f f i c i a l sanction i n July 1975 through the introduction of a Rubber S t a b i l i s a t i o n B i l l i n Par-liament, allowing for the establishment o f a national advisory coun-63 c i l for rubber s t a b i l i s a t i o n and establishment of a rubber stock. However, i t i s i n r e l a t i o n to the question of foreign investment that Malaysia's economic postures and strategies have seen the greater change. The government's New Economic Policy (NEP), which formed the basis for the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75, provided the point of departure for the general change i n economic posture. The most im-portant concept i n the NEP i n this respect i s the notion of "economic balance." Although the main emphasis appears to be the balance be-tween Malay and non—Malay p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the economy, the concept undoubtedly has an external dimension, given the predominant role of foreign c a p i t a l i n the country. I quote from the Second Malaysia Plan: Economic balance, i n a growing and dynamic economy, refers to the equitable and legitimate sharing of the rewards and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of economic develop-ment. The p r i n c i p a l reward of economic development -the growing income generated by the national economy -must be equitably distributed....Balance also refers to r a c i a l shares i n management and ownership and i n em-ployment i n the various sectors of the economy. At present, non-Malays and foreigners dominate the manu-facturing and commercial sectors....The Government has set a target that within a period of 20 years, Malays and other indigenous people w i l l manage and and own at least 30% of the t o t a l commercial and i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s i n a l l categories and scales of operation.64 178 In 1973, the Mid-Term Review of the Plan recognised i n clear terms that the goal of economic balance necessarily entails the reduction of the share of foreign interests i n the Malaysian economy: ...the attainment of the growth targets of the Perspective Plan (1970-1990) w i l l enable non-Malay ownership of share c a p i t a l to expand by nearly 12% per year and to increase i t s share of the t o t a l to over 40% by 1990, nine times more than the 1970 l e v e l i n absolute terms. There w i l l also be ample opportunities for ownership by foreign interests to increase by about 8% per year during the same period. In re l a t i o n to t o t a l share c a p i t a l , however, the expansion of the share of Malays and other i n -digenous people from under 2% i n 1970 to 30% i n 1990 w i l l involve a sizable decline i n the share of foreign interests from 61% to about 30% during the period.^5 In general, however, Malaysia's orientation toward foreign enterprise continued to be one of welcome although one. would be wrong to c a l l t h is i s a l a i s s e z - f a i r e posture today. There was an increas-ing sense that foreign economic p a r t i c i p a t i o n must be trimmed to the pursuit of national goals. But the prevailing attitude remained that foreign c a p i t a l was necessary for Malaysia's development and that the transfer of professional and technical know-how as w e l l as the job-creation function of foreign enterprise outweighed the effects of foreign economic control. I quote FIDA on th i s point, The Malaysian Government's policy towards new i n d u s t r i a l investments a n d . f o r e i g n c a p i t a l inflow i s one of welcome. Malaysia s t i l l lacks the necessary expertise and knowhow i n many i i f i e l d s but i t has r i c h investment opportunities to offer...the Malaysian Government encourages foreign investments i n the form of joint-ventures where Malaysian c a p i t a l and resources (are) -combined with foreign technical know-how, manage-gement, international marketing expertise and to some extent c a p i t a l . ^ Thus at t r a c t i v e f i s c a l incentives continued to be granted to foreign 6 7 investors. There are four major investment incentives: (a) Pioneer Status (b) Investment Tax Credit (c) Labour U t i l i s a t i o n R e l i e f , and (d) Export Incentives Under Pioneer status, incentives include t o t a l exemption from income tax for a period ranging from 2 - 5 years depending on the l e v e l of fixed c a p i t a l investment, extension of r e l i e f for up to another f i v e years 68 for additional investment, and further extension for a year i f the 69 company met certain other conditions. The Investment Tax Credit allowed for the deduction from a company's taxable income of at least 25 percent of i t s expenditure on fixed assets and an additional 5 per-cent for meeting conditions of "location," " p r i o r i t y product" and ^Malaysian c o n t e n t . T h e Labour U t i l i s a t i o n Relief refers to the ex-emption from income tax from 2 — 5 years depending on the number of employees engaged.^ Export incentives are the various tax rebates and deductions for companies manufacturing products mainly for export, and p a r t i c u l a r l y of Malaysian-based products. I t became evident, toward the end of the period, that Malaysia would not be able to achieve the rather ambitious goals of the New Economic Pol i c y , p a r t i c u l a r l y those of the Perspective Plan, which projects the targeted increases of Malay p a r t i c i p a t i o n and ownership 72 i n the economy to a 30 percent l e v e l by 1990. I f these targets were to be attained, i t seemed therefore that some drastic measures had to 180 taken i n the economic sphere. Thus toward the end of 1974, Malaysia had edged toward a new economic posture. The Prime Minister i n September that year told a conference on Southeast Asia's Natural Resources and the World Economy that Malaysia believed i n the concept of "economic nationalism:" ....We i n Malaysia believe i n economic nationalism i n guiding the exploitation of our natural resources i n such a way that our people and country w i l l obtain the greatest benefit. We believe that private enter-pr i s e , whether domestic or foreign has an important role to play i n our development. Our objective i s to bring about an effective and equitable mixture of domestic and foreign enterprise on the one hand, and private and public enterprise on the other, so that ourmational interest can be advanced to the context of an expanding, stable and equitable world economic order.^3 Tun Razak went on to explain why the Government set up a National Petroleum Corporation (Petronas) under the Petroleum Development Act, 1974. The reason was to ensure that Malaysians would reap the major benefits from this v i t a l resource. Accordingly, Petronas has been given exclusive rights i n the exploration and exploitation of o i l i n 74 Malaysia. In practice, this has meant a policy of signing explora-tion and prodution sharing agreements with o i l companies operating i n M a l a y s i a . ^ Under the aggressive, and some would contend, ruth-l e s s , direction and chairmanship of Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, Petronas has been conferred with further powers i n 1975 to acquire an apparently innocuous one percent "management shares" i n foreign o i l companies which e f f e c t i v e l y allows i t to control the o i l companies' p o l i c i e s through a mechanism of weighted v o t e s . ^ This led to the charge i n business c i r c l e s that the Government, i n p a r t i c u l a r Petronas, 181 was pursuing a policy of "nationalization without compensation." 7 7 The upshot was the "temporary" pull-out of Exxon from o i l prospecting off the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia, presumably as a protest against the sweeping powers of Petronas. At one point, Tengku Raza-lei g h accused "several companies" of "trying to blackmail" the govern-78 ment and of launching a campaign against Petronas. Government of-f i c i a l s deny that holding management shares i s tantamount to nation-a l i z a t i o n or quasi-nationalization, pointing out that Malaysia has a number of investment guarantee agreements with the major Western countries thereby foreclosing any p o s s i b i l i t y of nationalization with-79 out compensation of companies based i n these countries. They contend that the provision for management shares i s merely a "contingency plan" 80 to protect a very v i t a l resource. No date has apparently been fixed for the implementation of management shares, although according to the 81 Act, this should be carried out "as soon as practicable." The changing posture and strategies i n Malaysia's pursuit of economic objectives was evident as w e l l i n areas other than o i l . Working within the framework of the free enterprise system, Tengku 82 Razaleigh i n his capacity as the Chairman of PERNAS , Malaysia's government-funded corporation for the promotion of Bumiputra interests, proceeded to acquire for the corporation major interests i n a number of foreign and l o c a l companies. These moves were i n accordance with the New Economic Policy of "economic balance" and promoting greater Bumiputra p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the economy. Thus by a strategy of state 83 capitalism, Pernas Securities, a PERNAS subsidiary, succeeded by 182 1975 i n acquiring, int e r a l i a , a 19 percent holding i n Island and Peninsular Development, 20 percent holding i n London Tin Corporation and a 10 percent share i n Sime Darby, a l l large companies with major 84 interests i n Malaysia s economy. In a yet more ambitious but abortive project, Pernas Securities announced i n July 1975 i t s plan to acquire a co n t r o l l i n g interest (40%) i n Haw Par Brothers Interna-t i o n a l , a Singapore-based company with various interests i n Malaysia 85 and abroad. At the height of the episode, Razaleigh said that the government would continue to employ the technique of takeovers and swops u n t i l the NEP target of 30 percent Bumiputra p a r t i c i p a t i o n was 86 achieved. However, following the f a i l u r e of the Haw Par deal, no new ventures had been undertaken by the end of the year. The various i n i t i a t i v e s and acts of Tengku Razaleigh ensured his retention of a 87 Vice-President's post i n the UMNO during the 1975 General Assembly and won him the t i t l e of "Bapa Ekonomi Malaysia" (Father of Malaysia's Economy), conferred by the Malay Chamber of Commerce of which Tengku 88 Razaleigh i s the president. In his speech to the Chamber, Tengku Razaleigh chastised the foreign firms for not being responsive to Malaysia's national needs and stressed h i s Chamber's support for "economic nationalism": I f other countries have l e g i s l a t i o n and regulations to ensure that t h e i r economies do not f a l l into the hands of others, the time has come for Malaysians themselves to control the nation's resources. 8 9 The increasing concern over foreign ownership i n Malaysia's economy led to the setting up i n February 1974 of a Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) which has i t s Secretariat with the Economic Planning 183 Unit of the Prime Minister's Department. The FIC has been charged with formulating guidelines on foreign investment i n a l l sectors of the economy i n accordance with the NEP and to supervise and advise a l l the pertinent M i n i s t r i e s and government agencies on a l l matters 90 concerning foreign investment. I t s f i r s t act was the formulation of guidelines for the regulation of acquisition of assets, mergers and take-overs with a view toward ensuring that such actions "should res u l t d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y i n a more balanced Malaysian p a r t i c i p a -91 tion i n ownership and control," among other things. By the end of the period, however, Malaysia had begun to s o f t -pedal i t s economic nationalism posture but without r e a l l y discarding i t . In a "Malaysian Investment Seminar" held i n Kuala Lumpur i n October, 1975, various cabinet members made speeches assuring foreign investors of the government's continued adherence to a private enter-prise-oriented economic system.• The Prime Minister, i n his address, admitted that there were recent "uneasy comments" and "misgivings" i n the foreign media about Malaysia's investment climate but he t r i e d to dispel any idea that Malaysia either did not want or need foreign investment: A major misinterpretation of the New Economic Policy concerns the government's attitude towards the private enterprise system generally and the private sector i n p a r t i c u l a r . Let me r e i t e r a t e our position once more. The Malaysian economy has prospered because of the open nature of the economy and the i n i t i a t i v e of i t s private sector ....The Government therefore realizes that i t has a major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to a s s i s t the private sector to play i t s proper role i n the structural transformation of the economy. We are only too 184 aware that a l l this implies the need for pragmatism i n our economic p o l i c i e s and the maintenance of a healthy climate for investment and business i n the country. On the Petroleum Development Act(s), the Prime Minister explained that because o i l was a v i t a l resource, the special l e g i s l a t i o n was necessary to control i t s depletion, but he ensured the investors that " t h i s law w i l l be implemented f a i r l y and equitably and i n a manner that w i l l not affect adversely Malaysia's investment climate 93 and our unblemished record of f a i r treatment to a l l investors." He ensured the investors that the other sectors of the economy w i l l continue to operate "within the framework of normal and established ..94 practice. In summary, Malaysia's foreign policy i n the issue-area of development and trade saw noticeable s h i f t s during this period. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t s developing-world posture took on a more for c e f u l thrust and Malaysia appeared ready to adopt more 'radical' measures i n i t s pur-s u i t Third-World economic goals i n general and i t s own developmental objectives i n p a r t i c u l a r . However, the most s i g n i f i c a n t s h i f t occured with respect^to the issue of foreign p a r t i c i p a t i o n and investment i n the country's economy. The adoption of the New Economic Policy led to p o l i c i e s which were geared toward a reduction, i f not of the r o l e , at least of the share, of foreign p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the economy. The process has just begun and a l l i t s possible ramifications are unknown at t h i s time. Malaysia's attitude toward foreign investment remains one of "welcome" but i t has by and large dropped i t s l a i s s e z - f a i r e economic posture for one which i t s policy-makers now c a l l "economic 185 nationalism." Summarized below are Malaysia's main postures, ob-je c t i v e s , strategies and actions i n this issue-area for the period surveyed. International Co-operation and Diplomacy For most of th i s period, issues of international co-operation and diplomacy t i e d i n closely with issues of national and regional security. Malaysia by and large paid less attention to long-range milieu goals and concentrated on the medium-range goals of regional security which dovetailed nicely into i t s pursuit of national security. While there was a recognition that defence was s t r i c t l y a national matter, security was seen more and more i n regional terms. I t i s i n thi s sense that a Wisma Putra O f f i c i a l spoke of neutralization as a " t o t a l concept" and that a l l foreign policy moves and actions must 95 be consistent with the concept. Thus Malaysia throughout the period was promoting i t s neutralization scheme at various interna-t i o n a l forums, notably at the Lusaka and Commonwealth Conferences, and diplomacy at th i s l e v e l became linked to the general pursuit of security. At the regional l e v e l , the process was carried out with even greater vigour, most importantly through the declaration of an ASEAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and the active pursuit of a "Blueprint" for such zonal n e u t r a l i t y . The detente with the communist countries, i n p a r t i c u l a r the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, should also be appreciated i n the l i g h t of the search for and pursuit of security through the avenue of international diplomacy. 186 TABLE 4.3 Development and Trade Policy Outputs 1970-75 OBJECTIVES Promoting economic development S t a b i l i s i n g prices of primary commodities POSTURES Developing-World Orientation -supporting p o l i c i e s and measures »I aimed at r a i s i n g the l o t of the LDC's Economic Nationalism -orientation of seeking national control of resources and economy STRATEGIES Promoting and p a r t i -cipating i n trade groupings and price s t a t i l i s a t i o n schemes of LDC's Operating u n i l a t e r a l s t a b i l i s a t i o n schemes ( rubb er ) Pursuing i n d u s t r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y by encouraging p a r t i c u l a r kinds of foreign investment Employing technique of state capitalism to gain control of economy ACTIONS Adopting New Economic Policy as basis of Second 5-Year Plan 1971-75 Attending UNCTAD I I I , sup-porting developmental issues and measures (1971) Call i n g at various i n t e r -national forums, together with other LDC's, for a "New Economic World Order" Pa r t i c i p a t i o n i n M u l t i -l a t e r a l Trade Negotiations, Tokyo, 1973-75 Operating rubber price s t a b i l i s a t i o n scheme Opting out of the Ster l i n g Area and f l o a t i n g Malaysian dol l a r (1972) Joining International Sugar Agreement (1973) Establishment of Petronas under Petroleum Development Act 1974 Passing Petroleum Development (Amendment) Act, 1975 Acquiring, through Pernas, major and/or co n t r o l l i n g i n -terests i n various companies Formulating guidelines for acquisition of assets, mergers and take-overs under Foreign In-vestment Committee (1974) Joining International Tin Agreement (1975) Holding investment seminar i n Kuala Lumpur (1975) 187 However, milieu goals were not t o t a l l y ignored or discarded. Malaysia continued to support or pay l i p service to the many United Nations ideals and s t i l l pursued, for example, a n t i - c o l o n i a l causes. I t also began to develop i t s t i e s with the Muslim World. What was evident, however, was that much more emphasis was n o t given to regional (Southeast Asian) co-operation, when i n the other two periods, the United Nations and the Commonwealth took precedence over ASA. In this period, then, ASEAN took on a greater importance than ever before. A Foreign Ministry o f f i c i a l said that Malaysia's pursuit of "international" goals can be appreciated i n terms of con-centric c i r c l e s , at the centre of which i s ASEAN, extending to Asia 96 i n the next c i r c l e and so fo r t h to the rest of the world. ASEAN has indeed grown i n importance and has become the chief avenue of Malaysia's e f f o r t s at international co-operation. In his speech to the 1975 UMNO General Assembly, Tun Razak talked glowingly of ASEAN having "reached maturity" and accorded a status similar to that of an organization such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or 97 for that matter any other international organization. The Prime Minister thought also that ASEAN was now ready to extend to the rest of Southeast Asia following the cessation of war in..Indo-China. Emphasising i t s non-ideological nature, he to l d the ASEAN foreign ministers i n May, 1975. Some eight years ago, even as the war i n Indo-China was raging, we f i v e countries i n South-east Asia, established ASEAN and began nurtur-ing a structure of regional cooperation which over the years has proved i t s e l f constructive 188 i n promoting regional understanding and friendship ....The growth of ASEAN has been nurtured with care to maintain i t s non-antagonistic, non-military and non-ideological character. I think today we can t r u l y say that ASEAN's independent and progress-ive nature has won admiration from many quarters large and small powers alike....At this juncture, when the war i n Indo-China has ended, the countries of Southeast Asia have the opportunity to extend the scope of regional cooperation throughout South-east Asia. I think I can say for the other ASEAN countries that ASEAN i s ready to cooperate with the new Governments of Indo-China and to offer i t s hand of friendship...to them.98 Toward the end of the year* the newly appointed Malaysian Foreign Minister, Tengku Ahmad Rithaudeen, made further overtures at the United Nations to non-ASEAN Southeast Asian countries to j o i n the organization, 99 r e i t e r a t i n g the ASEAN goal of zonal n e u t r a l i t y . Despite the emphasis placed on regional co-operation during this period, Malaysia had to contend with a major area of global co-opera-tion (and controversy) at the Law of the Sea Conference i n 1974, which had important ramifications for i t s stand on the S t r a i t s of Malacca. At the Caracas Conference, the Attorney-General and Minister of Laws explained that Malaysia's position on the Malacca S t r a i t s was based on the following points: that while the s t r a i t s were a major water-way for i n t e r n a l shipping, the coastal states were burdened with the sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of maintaining and cleaning up the s t r a i t s ; that the heavy usage of the s t r a i t s would inevitably lead to damage of the marine environment by p o l l u t i o n and accident; and that under the guise of commercial shipping, m i l i t a r y vessels may use the s t r a i t s with strategic intentions: What we would like...therefore, to see i s a greater appreciation of our legitimate interests and a 189 clearer enunciation of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the international maritime community to be embodied i n the Convention that would emerge from this Conference. Among other things, the Convention should contain regulations to ensure unhindered passage for commercial shipping, adequate safety for p o l l u t i o n prevention standards, l i a b i l i t y and compensation for damage and passage for m i l i t a r y vessels. In addition, Malaysia supported the c a l l by the bulk of Third- World countries for an economic zone exteriding to 200 nautical miles and for an international machinery to regulate exploitation of seabed 101 resources i n accordance with the interests of developing countries. Needless to say, l i t t l e was decided at Caracas and most of the Law of 102 Sea issues remain unresolved. Malaysia's positions for most part are based simply on the pursuit of s e l f - i n t e r e s t although i t tends i n general to support.issues propagated b.y the Third-World countries. An area of international co-operation and diplomacy which gained prominence during t h i s period was Malaysia's relations with the Muslim world. Although an Islamic state by v i r t u e of i t s predominant Muslim population, Malaysia had on the whole maintained a "low p r o f i l e " i n Islamic a f f a i r s . I t nevertheless has not recognized I s r a e l and has generally supported Muslim causes. Thus, i t participated i n the f i r s t Islamic summit conference at Rabat i n 1969, held as a response to the I s r a e l i burning the Al-Alqua Mosque, and i n - a l l the subsequent con-ferences. However, i n June 1974, Malaysia hosted the Islamic Summit i n Kuala Lumpur. Amidst considerable fanfare, Tun Razak spoke.in grandiose terms of Islamic s o l i d a r i t y and i d e n t i f i e d Malaysia with the Arab and Palestinian cause i n the Middle East: 190 Since the h i s t o r i c F i r s t Islamic Summit i n Rabat i n 1969, we can find s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the knowledge that we have l a i d a strong foundation for mutual cooperation. But we cannot s i t back on the progress we have made, encouraging though i t has been....The Islamic Conference must now enter a new phase i n i t s history. The concept of unity and coopera-tion has been e f f e c t i v e l y worked out; we must now give i t the necessary content and substance. We must enter a period of imaginative con s o l i -dation, of building on the foundation already l a i d , by implementing concrete measures, pro-grammes and projects which w i l l make our aim of Islamic unit a r e a l i t y . Today, as our Arab brothers embark on the road of negotiations to seek peace and j u s t i c e , we i n t h i s Conference must, more than ever, remain s o l i d and united. We must not allow ourselves to become complacent by the current mode of expectancy or to be confused by the machinations of Zionism. Our unity through t h i s organization must be - c l e a r l y demonstrated so that the world w i l l know- that we w i l l not weaken and we w i l l not be divided....Let our voices ri n g clear and loud i n t o t a l and united support for the Arab and the Islamic cause i n W. A s i a . 1 0 3 As a token of this support a representative of the Palestinian Liberation Organization was present at the Conference. One suspects, however, that Malaysia's Muslim t i e s do suggest some degree of 'posturing.' For Malaysia, the goals of Muslim s o l i d a r i t y are vague and distant, augmented by Malaysia's geographical distance from the hub of Muslim a c t i v i t y i n the Middle East. Never-theless, there does seem to be a pragmatic edge to Malaysia's Muslim connections. Because of i t s good relations with the Arab countries, Malaysia was among the ten most favoured nations exempted from o i l cutbacks i n the 1973 "energy c r i s i s . " Domestically, there i s p o l i t i c a l mileage to gain from Malaysia's international Muslim t i e s , considering i t s predominantly Muslim population. Thus the 1974 Islamic Conference iinKuala Lumpur was nicely timed just before the General Election. A Foreign Ministry o f f i c i a l thought that t h i s event had an even greater impact on the elections than the Prime Minister's China v i s i t . H e would be right on s t r i c t l y a r i t h -metic terms since Malaysia has more Malays than i t has Chinese, a l -though one would be f o o l i s h to deny the dramatic impact of the rap-prochement with China. By 1975, Malaysia began to cash i n on i t s Arab t i e s by concluding a number of c u l t u r a l , s c i e n t i f i c , technical and economic agreements with several o i l - r i c h countries. On a tour of these countries i n January and February, the Prime Minister signed s i x such agreements with Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. In on-going e f f o r t s - ever since Kronfrontasi - to forge a p l u r a l i t y of diplomatic connections while maintaining old ones, the Malaysian Prime Minister toward the end of 1975 paid courtesy state v i s i t s to Au s t r a l i a and New Zealand, two long-standing Commonwealth a l l i e s . A Cultural Agreement with A u s t r a l i a resulted with broad aims for co-operation i n the f i e l d s of the ar t s , education, science, technology, the media, sports, youth a c t i v i t i e s and academic ex-, c h a n g e s . N e w Zealand was content to issue a j o i n t communique re-affirming basic mutual i n t e r e s t s . ^ 7 One of the motives of the v i s i t s concerned the position and interests of some 2,000 and 6,000 192 Malaysian students i n New Zealand and A u s t r a l i a respectively. The students themselves advertised t h e i r presence when some of them, along with Australians and New Zealanders, demonstrated against various "repressive" measures i n Malaysia such as the Internal 108 Security Act and the University and Colleges (Amendment) Act. The Australian-New Zealand v i s i t s concluded Malaysia's diplomatic a c t i v i t i e s for the period and as i t turned out were the l a s t external o f f i c i a l acts of the Prime Minister Tun Razak before he passed away i n January 1976. In summary then, Malaysia's foreign policy orientation i n mat-ters of International. Co-operation and Diplomacy underwent l i t t l e fundamental change during the t h i r d period although i t became i n -creasingly evident that "international" goals were being pursued i n greater unisoro;with matters of national security. Thus the detente with the communist countries, the proposal of zonal n e u t r a l i t y and regional co-operation i n ASEAN and overtures toward the new Indo-China states a l l dovetailed as part of Malaysia's broad plan for national and regional security. Pragmatism seemed to be the philosophy of the day as even Malaysia's Muslim t i e s seemed calculated to reap r e a l benefits. The s h i f t . i n emphasis seemed to be concomitant with a s h i f t toward the pursuit of medium-range goals, instead of the more distant long-range goals. A senior Foreign Ministry o f f i c i a l attributed the change to Malaysia's wide acceptance among the community of nations and the fact that i t did not have to prove i t s mettle internationally 109 any more as i t did i n i t s early years as a newly independent nation. 193 I summarise below the major postures, objectives, strategies and actions of Malaysia's foreign pol i c y i n this issue-area during the period surveyed. TABLE 4.4 International Co-bpefatiori and Peace: P o l i c y Outputs 1970-75 OBJECTIVES Promoting regional co-operation and regional security Promoting international Muslim causes Promoting United Nations' ideals' POSTURES Regionalism -orientation of South-east Asian s o l i d a r i t y Muslim S o l i d a r i t y -supporting international Muslim causes In t e r n a t i o n a l i s t , Functionalist Orientations ^believing i n usefulness of IGO's Anti-Colonialism -supporting self— determination and human rights STRATEGIES Promoting goals of general and i _ specific-purpose. international organizations Promoting and enlarging role of regional organiza-tions S.TLC aumsn ACTIONS Par t i c i p a t i n g i n and car-rying out ASEAN a c t i v i t i e s P a r t i c i p a t i n g i n UN specialised agencies and the i r work Supporting Arab and Palestinian cause i n the Middle East Hosting F i f t h Islamic Foreign Ministers' Con-ference i n Kuala Lumpur (1974) Attending Law of the Sea Conferences and voting generally with Third World (1971, 1975) Recognition of and over-tures to new Indo-China governments v i a ASEAN Concluding c u l t u r a l , s c i e n t i f i c , technical and economic agreements with Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (1975) State v i s i t s to Aust r a l i a and New Zealand (1975) Foreign Policy 1970-75: New Directions The most prominent feature of the survey of this period of foreign policy has been the new directions to which the Malaysian policy-makers have steered the nation's foreign policy. The primary changes occurred i n the issue-area of defence and security. Signs of detente with the communist countries became increasingly evident and culminated i n Malaysia's rapprochement with China i n May 1974, Malaysia also began p u b l i c l y to profess i t s "nonaligned" status, pursue a posture of neutralism and promote i t s concept of Southeast Asian zonal n e u t r a l i t y . The strategy of Promoting a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality i n the region has become the cornerstone of Malaysia's foreign policy i n matters of defence and security i n much the same nanner as AMDA provided the anchor to foreign policy for the greater part of the f i r s t two periods. There was also a tendency for the more internationally-oriented goals to be sought i n unison with the medium-range goals of security, thus boosting the role of ASEAN as an avenue for international cooperation and the pursuit of security goals. In matters of development and trade, while object-ives remained fundamentally unaltered, a more thorough-going posture and a willingness to employ more r a d i c a l strategies were evinced. I w i l l argue that the changes i n foreign policy reflected a change i n the e l i t e ideology, a change which arose out of a new ap-preciation of the nature of Malaysia's national needs and interests and of the nature of the international environment. The new e l i t e ideology takes i t s underpinnings from the tenets of nonalignment, or preferably, neutralism, but i n large part i s also based on hard-nosed pragmatism. A number of developments brought about the change i n the e l i t e ideology but these factors can be subsumed under two b,road categories: (I) domestic events, and ( i i ) the changing international environment. 195 A domestic event which had a profound impact on Malaysian p o l i t i c a l l i f e i n general and which i n d i r e c t l y influenced the course of foreign policy was the 1969 May 13 r a c i a l r i o t s i n Kuala Lumpur and other major towns. We need not concern ourselves here with the det a i l s of May 13, but su f f i c e i t to say that the aftermath brought about a c r i s i s of leadership i n the r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the UMNO. In the end, i t resulted i n the retirement of the Tunku from p o l i t i c s , j ust over a year after the c r i s i s , i n September 1970. Soon after the r i o t s , the Tunku came under mounting pressure from the UMNO rank-and-file and students to resign. The " u l t r a s , "^"^ as they became known, attacked the Tunku on his poker-playing and horse-racing habits and his lack of "dynamic" leadership i n a rash of student demonstrations at the University of Malaya and the MARA 111 In s t i t u t e of Technology. A member of the UMNO Executive Council, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, fueled the anti-Tunku campaign with a scathing l e t t e r which he wrote the Tunku and which was widely circulated among c i v i l servants and the Malays generally. Although Mahathir was l a t e r dismissed from the Executive Council and from UMNO, the leadership c r i s i s had set i n and the stage was set for easing the Tunku out of p o l i t i c s . The Tunku has himself written of t h i s "power struggle" within the UMNO following the events of May 13, There i s no denying that there i s a struggle for power going on inside UMNO as between those who b u i l t the party and helped i n our independence and the new elements, the "u l t r a s " . . In fact this struggle started two years ago, even longer back than that. The t r u l y l o y a l supporters of the party were 196 able to keep the " u l t r a s " In check because UMNO was strong, and had the f u l l support of a l l who belonged to i t , from the top l e v e l fight down to the lowest rung. As a result of this the so-called u l t r a s have generally kept quiet although they have never ceased to be active; carrying out an intense underground campaign among the younger generation, the so-called " I n t e l l e c t u a l s . " 1 1 2 The Tunku i s also illuminating on the goals of the u l t r a s , One might we l l ask what i t i s that they are af t e r . Inquiring through other people, I have t r i e d to find out from some of these " u l t r a s " what the answer i s , and as far as I know they want to establish a new order of things inside the UMNO and the country. For instance, they consider our p o l i t i c a l thinking i s outdated and out of l i n e with Afro-Asian p o l i -cies. Among the ideas they have i n mind are probably to remove the constitutional monarchy and to set up Malaysia as a republic. I suppose that, having proclaimed a Republic, they w i l l probably change our foreign p o l i c y to bring us closer to the Afro-Asian group. 1 Indeed, the ultras were elements of the same group of 'counter-e l i t e ' within the UMNO rank-and-file to which I have alluded e a r l i e r 114 i n the study. Very possibly, t h i s counter-elite had i t s origins i n the group that rose up i n opposition to AMDA as far back as 1957,"'"''""' and i t s continued presence was f e l t , as the Tunku noted, i n the l a t t e r part of the 1960s and i n the aftermath of FR onfrontasi by an u n o f f i c i a l delegation to the Afro- Asian S o l i d a r i t y People's Organization at Winneba i n 1965. I t i s no coincidence that both Dr. Mahathir and 116 Datuk Musa were members of the Winneba delegation. The events of May 13 provided t h i s group with the excuse to try to oust the Tunku from power but the Tunku survived the f i r s t onslaught which was marked by the expulsion of Mahathir from the UMNO Executive Council and 197 Musa's removal as Secretary-General of the party. There was l i t t l e doubt, however, that the Tunku would i n time relinquish h i s leader-ship of UMNO as his image was already tarnished i n the eyes of the large majority of the Malays. Thus i t was Tun Razak who assumed control as Director of the National Operations Council i n the Emer-gency following May 13. With the accession of Tun Razak as Prime Minister, Mahathir and Musa eventually became Cabinet M i n i s t e r s . " ^ Again this i s no coincidence but rather indicates the ascendancy of the 'counterS.elite' i n the UMNO leadership. These various domestic developments were perhaps more symptomatic of the Tunku's exit than of d i r e c t consequence to foreign policy but they nevertheless set the stage for the change i n the e l i t e perceptions with respect to foreign policy. The ascension of Tun Razak to power was the domestic impetus to such a change as he had always shown a tendency to move toward the Afro-Asian block, of countries evemas Deputy Prime Minister to the 118 Tunku. Indeed, Tun Razak apparently considered the various moves i n 119 foreign policy to be his personal i n i t i a t i v e s . Nonetheless, one suspects i t was Razak's pragmatism rather than his ideological fervour that engendered the change i n e l i t e ideology just as i t was the Tunku's adamance that probably postponed i t . I f domestic events provided the impetus for change, i t was the international environment that precipitated i t . At the very least, the changing international environment made the t r a n s i t i o n smoother and acceptance easier especially for the old-guard elements i n the rul i n g party. Tun Razak aired the new e l i t e perception of the i n t e r -national environment at the 1970 Lusaka Conference by his observations 198 on East-West detente and the Increasing multipolarity i n the i n -ternational system, Today with detente between the two power blocs, i t i s an important r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the non-aligned Group to ensure that the interests of the Big Powers do not converge at the expense of the medium and small powers. The hegemonist tendencies on the part of the major powers which appear under various guises and with various j u s t i f i c a t i o n s must be resisted. Furthermore, the world today i s no longer bipolar. I t i s at least t r i — p o l a r with the emergence of China onto the international stage. The fact of China.and her legitimate role i n the world cannot be simpl; washed away by those who are opposed to her. I t seemed therefore that the changing international environment i s largely responsible for Malaysia's s h i f t i n foreign policy. A Foreign Ministry o f f i c i a l was convinced that even i f the Tunku had remained i n power, i t would have been onlyaa matter of time before he too would out of the changing domestic and international scenes sprung a neutral-i s t e l i t e ideology which underpinned foreign policy for t h i s period. The new e l i t e ideology comprised a b e l i e f system which was based on the co—existence of the non—communist and communist ideologies but-tressed by a national image of a multipolar international system i n which a balance of power largely existed among the major ideological blocs and i n which Malaysia's national interests were tied with those 122 of the Third World bloc of nations. In economic matters, this have yielded to the overwhelming weight of external factors. 121 Thus ideology exhibited a form of economic nationalism within the bounds of a q u a s i - c a p i t a l i s t philosophy. I t w i l l be appropriate at t h i s juncture to present i n diagrammatic st y l e the basic thesis i n my analysis of the 199 f i n a l period of Malaysian foreign policy. The format follows that of the f i r s t period and i s based on the theoretical model developed i n Chapter One. FIGURE 4.1 The Sources of Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y 1970-75: A Thesis External Sources Reduction of Western presence i n Southeast Asia East-West / detente / Multipolar international sy: / system Eco - h i s t o r i c a l Sources B r i t i s h Rule Emergency Kronfrontasi Internal Sources May 13 and related p o l i t i c a l developments Defence and security needs Developmental needs -J--» i I i Economic events and developments Status needs Foreign Policy Objectives X I I Idiosyncratic  Sources E l i t e Ideology I I Foreign P o l i c y Postures Strategies Actions 200 The ec o - h i s t o r i c a l factors of B r i t i s h Rule and the Emergency remain important, i f less so, during this period of foreign policy. Indications of th i s are the persistence of the Five-Power Defence Arrangements, however loose, and Malaysia's wariness i n i t s relations with communist countries and the continued national alertness with respect to communist insurgency i n the country. Indeed, i t s strategy of "national r e s i l i e n c e " i s i n direct response to the recent spate of 123 insurgency i n the country. One other ec o - h i s t o r i c a l factor has been added, namely Konfrontasi. Konfrontasi, which during the second period acted as a catalyst for s h i f t s and changes i n the Malaysian foreign p o l i c y , remained as a reminder of Malaysia's defence and security needs prompting i t s policy-makers torrmaintain good regional relations and wide-ranging t i e s with the outside world generally. Among the most important variables i n the external environment that affected the course and content of Malaysian foreign p o l i c y was the general reduction of Western presence i n Southeast Asia, marked by the B r i t i s h East of Suez pull-out and the U.S. ex i t from Vietnam. I have already touched on the East-West thaw and the increasing m u l t i -p o l a r i t y i n the international system. According to a Foreign Ministry o f f i c i a l , these various developments i n the international environment reinforced the b e l i e f that Malaysia "made steps i n the right d i r e c t i o n " when i t opted for a n e u t r a l i s t foreign policy despite cautioning by 124 i t s a l l i e s and neighbours. The most important domestic developments affecting the direc t i o n of foreign p o l i c y were the events a r i s i n g out of the May 13 incident insofar as this resulted i n a leadership s h i f t . Admittedly, the 201 process of foreign policy rethinking had already begun i n the a f t e r -math of Konfrontasi as noted i n the previous chapter. However, i t was r e a l l y the May 13 events with i t s resultant leadership s h i f t that brought about the f i n a l c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of the inchoate foreign poli c y changes of the second period. May 13 notwithstanding, the more 'stable' i n t e r n a l sources remain as important determinants of foreign p o l i c y . Under the existing state-centric world order, de-fence and security needs continue to demand attention although Malaysia has been able to pursue so far an imaginative strategy of regional security with minimal emphasis on defence to f u l f i l l these needs. Despite t h i s , current expenditure of security (including that on i n t e r n a l security) runs at 17 percent share of the Federal 125 Budget. S i m i l a r l y , developmental needs continue to dominate Malaysia's economic p o l i c i e s although a number of domestic events and developments — on which I s h a l l l a t e r elaborate —have changed to some extent the character or d e f i n i t i o n of such needs. Status needs, while always present, may have receded i n importance by the end of the ' period following Malaysia's acceptance as a f u l l - f l e d g e d member of the Nonaligned Group of nations. F i n a l l y , under idiosyncratic sources, I have placed the new e l i t e ideology which has developed largely out of a leadership s h i f t i n the r u l i n g party. The new e l i t e ideology r e f l e c t s the ascendancy of a younger (or newer) crop of UMNO leaders under a Prime Minister whowwas generally receptive to new ideas. There i s some evidence that the top echelons of the newer group draws i t s support from a larger supportive 202 core of UMNO rank-and-file who had been d i s s a t i s f i e d with the p o l i c i e s 126 of the Tunku era. In foreign policy matters, the new e l i t e ideology takes i t s theoretical underpinnings from the tenets of neutralism which I had discussed e a r l i e r . In my thesis, then, the new e l i t e ideology acts as the phenome-nological ' f i l t e r ' for a l l the other various sources of foreign policy translating 'them into foreign p o l i c y objectives, postures, strategies and actions. This i s especially.evident i n the issue-area of defence and security as Figure 4..'2 i l l u s t r a t e s . The e l i t e ideology has dominated almost a l l the important actions i n the issue-area v i a i t s foreign p o l i c y posture of neutralism and i t s chief strategy of pro-moting zonal n e u t r a l i t y . I have noted that Foreign Ministry o f f i c i a l s considered the strategy to be the cornerstone of foreign p o l i c y and a yardstick by which a l l foreign p o l i c y actions are to be somehow 127 tested. Toward the end of the period there was some indication that foreign policy i n the issue-area had become somewhat routinised i n that the creative phase of foreign policy i n i t i a t i v e s was replaced by a phase i n which actions flowed almost automatically from the pre-valent e l i t e ideology. The almost automatic recognition of the new Indo-China governments i s indicati v e of this r o u t i n i s a t i o n of foreign policy. But more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the elevation of Special Functions 128 Minister Tengku Rithauddeen to Foreign Minister i n August 1975 showed that foreign policy had become perhaps s u f f i c i e n t l y clear-cut 129 for another man other than the Premier to hold the p o r t f o l i o . Tengku Rithauddeen i s thus the f i r s t person other than the Prime 'FIGURE 4/2-Explanatory Chart of Defence and Security Policy Outputs 203 Reduction of Western Presence i n Southeast Asia East-West detente Multipolar international system B r i t i s h Rule Emergency Kronfrontasi E l i t e Ideology May 13 and related p o l i t i c a l developments Defence and Security needs Strategies Seeking security rather than defence - promoting zonal n e u t r a l i t y i n Southeast Asia - promoting national and regional r e s i l i e n c e and equidistance with major powers Foreign Po l i c y  Objectives Political.independence T e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y I I I I Y Foreign Policy —>. Postures Neutralism Non-interference Actions Continuing 5-Power Arrangements Attending Lusaka Conference (1970) - proposing neutralisation of Southeast Asia KL (ASEAN) Declara-tion of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (1971) Establishment of diplomatic t i e s with communist states of Mongolia, N. Vietnam, N. Korea, E. Germany (1972-73) Recognition and diplomatic t i e s with China (1974) Recognition of Communist Governments of Cambodia and S. Vietnam (1975) Formulating with ASEAN members a "Blueprint for Southeast Asian zonal n e u t r a l i t y (1975) 204 Minister to hold the Foreign Minister's p o r t f o l i o ever since the 130 late Dr. Ismail relinquished i t after holding i t b r i e f l y i n 1-960. In Chapter Three I demonstrated the importance of the feed-back process i n affecting the course of Malaysian foreign policy. The impact of Konfrontasi with i t s t r a i n of developments was es-p e c i a l l y important. While i n that period there was a preponderance of negative feedback effect's, i n the t h i r d period, feedback from both the i n t e r n a l and external environment tended to be p o s i t i v e . The s h i f t i n foreign policy under Tun Razak was well taken at home as even opposition members of Parliament supported the new thrusts of 131 policy. Abroad, Malaysia's new posture of neutralism was generally well received and f i n a l l y won i t a place i n the Nonaligned Group of nations. As for i t s neutralization strategy, there appeared to be no adverse reactions to the proposal although the v i r t u a l lack of response from the great powers and varying enthusiasm among Malaysia's Asian and ASEAN neighbours prompted s l i g h t s h i f t s i n the strategy. The feed-back on the scheme has never been severely negative, but the changing nature of the proposal does suggest that Malaysia was responding to the varying feedback on the scheme. The scheme had i t s roots i n the Ismail proposals of 1968, but was o f f i c i a l l y publicized only i n 1970 at Lusaka as a European-styled neutralization of Southeast Asia with great power guarantee. The emphasis has since shifted to the ASEAN-i n i t i a t e d proposal of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. The corollary to t h i s — drafting an ASEAN "Blueprint" for such zonal n a u t r a l i t y - i s s t i l l unclear at the time of writing although Wisma Putra o f f i c i a l s appear optimistic about i t s implementation. Two main factors have affected the change of emphasis i n the scheme. The f i r s t i s the lack of great power response except China's 132 verbal assurance that i t supports the scheme. More importantly, Malaysia's Southeast Asian, p a r t i c u l a r l y , ASEAN neighbours have shown a varied response to the o r i g i n a l scheme and are s t i l l not equally 133 enthusiastic about the present plan for zonalnneutrality. Singa-pore, for example,, i s known to prefer some form of great power p a r t i -cipation i n the region i n some kind of counterweight or balance-of-134 power system. This could presumably occur withinaaaneutrality system which allows access to major powers. Thailand and Indonesia are perhaps closer to Malaysia i n wanting great power disengagement from the area, while the Philippines has not indicated i t intends to ask the U.S. to withdraw from i t s m i l i t a r y bases. The other countries of Southeast Asia, Burma and the Indo-China states, would c l e a r l y not participate i n any n e u t r a l i t y system without t o t a l great power disen-gagement from the area. I t seems therefore that Malaysia's n e u t r a l i -zation strategy w i l l remain f l e x i b l e and subject to minor adjustments depending ori p o l i t i c a l developments i n the region. The evolution of the n e utralization scheme indicates therefore the importance of the feedback process on foreign p o l i c y , which can be b r i e f l y traced as follows: 206 Tun Ismail's proposal for the neutralization of — Southeast Asia and signing of non-aggression pacts (1968) Leadership s h i f t i n UMNO (1969-70) General Support for concept at international conferences Lack of great power response I i t ASEAN countries' and Southeast Asian countries' varying response Varying governmental response -h to proposals - no o f f i c i a l action Malaysia o f f i c i a l l y proposes the neutralization of Southeast Asia with great power guarantee at Lusaka (1970), United Nations (1970), Commonwealth Conference (1971) ASEAN Kuala Lumpur Declaration of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 0-971) In the issue-area of development and trade, the e l i t e ideology with i t s new emphasis on economic nationalism led to more r a d i c a l , or at any rate, aggressive, strategies and actions i n the pursuit of the economic objectives. For the most part domestic factors caused the change i n policy. As indicated i n Figure 4.3, the changes i n policy may be seen as in t e r n a l long-term feedback effects. Malay-sia's l a i s s e z - f a i r e p o l i c i e s i n the previous periods ( p a r t i c u l a r l y during the f i r s t ) led to the high l e v e l of foreign ownership and con-t r o l of the economy. This resulted i n a r e - d e f i n i t i o n of economic needs with the New Economic Pol i c y as a direct response. However, many of the major tenets of the NEP r e f l e c t purely p o l i t i c a l inputs. They nevertheless i n d i r e c t l y relate to the question of foreign ownership. This i s true, for example, for the 30 percent targets 207 of Bumiputra wealth, ownership and management, the achievement of which would ipso facto result i n a lower percentage i n the l e v e l of foreign 135 c a p i t a l . The transformation i n e l i t e ideology (in economic mat-ters) from the p r i s t i n e c a p i t a l i s t - f r e e enterprise variety of the f i r s t period to the present q u a s i - c a p i t a l i s t - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t kind provided a further impetus for the new directions i n economic p o l i -cies. The end result of a l l the various domestic inputs and the i r interaction thereof,.as shown i n Figure 4.3', was the s h i f t i n economic posture. While Malaysia's new posture of economic nationalism . sprung from the domestic processes just discussed, i t s developing-world orientation continued to be a direct function of i t s develop-mental needs, on which I have already elaborated. Malaysia's eco-nomic objectives were i n turn a function of the nation's developing-world orientation but the manner i n which i t s objectives are sought was c l e a r l y affected by i t s posture of economic nationalism, as shown i n the chart. There was also some ind i c a t i o n of external feedback effects towards Malaysia's new economic nationalism posture and some of i t s rresultant p o l i c i e s by the end of the period. To the point were the negative reactions to the Petronas Development (Amendment) Act and the various actions of Petronas and Pernas Securities Chairman Tengku Razaleigh. The most severe reaction was the withdrawal of Exxon from 136 prospecting for o i l off the east coast of Peninsula Malaysia. By the end of 1975, Malaysian spokesmen, including the Prime Minister, had begun ensuring investors of Malaysia's continued policy of welcome FIGURE 4.3 Explanatory Chart of Development and Trade Policy Outputs 208 B r i t i s h Rule Laissez-faire p o l i c i e s Developmental Needs -v High l e v e l of | > v foreign ownership and control of co economy New Economic ,^ E l i t e eology Foreign Policy Objectives Promoting S t a b i l i s i n g economic y commodity development f p r i c e s S For.e'rgn*"Poli'e-y. Postures _ Developing-WorId-Orientation *A Economic Nationalism Strategies Pursuing i n d u s t r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y by encouraging certain types of investment projects Employing technique of state capitalism to gain control of economy Promoting and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n trade groups and price s t a b i l i s a t i o n schemes Operating uni-l a t e r a l s t a b i l i s a t i o n schemes 1 Actions \ Providing investment incentives for p a r t i c u l a r industries Acquiring, v i a Pernas, interest i n various companies Establishing Petronas (1974 Introducing 'management shares' i n petroleum industry (1975) Forming FIC and guidelines for mergers and take-overs (1974) Attending UNCTAD I I I (1971) Ca l l i n g for "New Economic World Order" Pa r t i c i p a t i n g i n M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade Negotiations, Tokyo (1973-75) Operating, u n i l a t e r a l l y , rubber price s t a b i l i s a t i o n scheme Joining International Sugar Agreement (1973) Joining International Tin Agreement (1975) toward foreign investment. The s l i g h t hack-tracking did not, how-ever, amount to a renunciation of the posture of economic nationalism although i t i s clear that Malaysian spokesmen w i l l i n future probably be less aggressive or antagonistic toward foreign enterprise. I t was common knowledge that the various moves and pronouncements of Raza-lei g h were calculated with s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l ends i n view, earning him, i n p a r t i c u l a r , a Vice-President's post i n UMNO, and the "Bapa 137 Ekonomi Malaysia" t i t l e . Prom discussions with various government and public persons, there was indication that Razaleigh's actions were not altogether well received i n many government agencies and 138 M i n i s t r i e s . I t was therefore.not e n t i r e l y unexpected that Malaysia would eventually soften what appeared to have become a hard-l i n e n a t i o n a l i s t i c economic posture. In the issue-area of international cocoperation and diplomacy, the most s i g n i f i c a n t change here was that the various po l i c y outputs became more closely i d e n t i f i e d with those of the defence and security issue-area. This largely reflected a s h i f t i n the perception of the policy-makers i n which, the pursuit of international co-operation and peace was seen to be closely related to the pursuit of security, par-t i c u l a r l y regional security. Thus while i n the one case the short-range goals of defence receded into the background i n favour of the medium-range goals of security, i n the other case the more distant goals of global c o l l e c t i v e security, for example, made way for what was thought to be the more attainable goal of regional security v i a zonal n e u t r a l i t y . In discussions with Wisma Putra o f f i c i a l s , t h i s 210 author got the d i s t i n c t impression that the main thrust of Malaysian foreign policy was toward regional security and ASEAN was the avenue through which t h i s could most reasonably be attained. The Foreign Ministry consequently looked i n less i d e a l i s t i c terms toward the more distant international i n s t i t u t i o n s , including the TJ.N. and i t s agen-cies. The P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary of the desk dealing with U.N. a f f a i r s made the point that the thrust and emphasis of Malaysian foreign policy could be best viewed i n terms of concentric c i r c l e s with ASEAN at the foMb and other international relations radiating 139 out (geographically) i n importance. Under the organizational structure of the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , the U.N. i s now lumped i n with "Nonaligned Conferences, Americas and A f r i c a , South of Sahara." In 1958, the corresponding desk was "U.N. and International I n s t i t u -t i o n s . " " ^ In 1958, the re was also no special desk for Southeast Asia, the appropriate desk being "Asia, A u s t r a l i a and A f r i c a . " Today, there are two Southeast Asia desks, one for ASEAN members and one for non-ASEAN. members and there i s also an Under-Secretary for economics 141 who i s also Secretary-General for ASEAN. Malaysia also began to highlight i t s t i e s with the Muslim world and here ideological and c u l t u r a l compatibility were perhaps exploited with an eye toward economic and other r e a l gains. Pragmatism became the order of the day as the significance of status needs, assiduously pursued i n the f i r s t period, receded as source of foreign policy. Figure 4.4 provides a charting of the various sources of policy i n thi s issue-area as they relate to the policy outputs. FIGURE 4 . 4 Security Needs Developmental Needs Status Needs Explanatory Chart of International Co-operation & Diplomacy Policy Outputs Foreign Policy Postures E l i t e Ideology Regionalism \ Muslim Sol i d a r i t y -~ Foreign Inter n a t i o n a l i s t , Functionalist orientations Anticolonialism Policy Objectives Promoting regional cooperation and security J-Promoting goals and enlarging role of regional organisations Promoting international Muslim causes I Strategies Promoting UN ideals 1\ Promoting goals of general and specific-purpose i n t e r -national organisations Part i c i p a t i n g i n and carrying out work of ASEAN -declaration of a Zongj of Peace, Freedom and Actions Hosting 5th Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference (1974) Supporting Arabaand Palestinian causes Neutrality (1971) -formulating "Klueprint" '' for zonal ne u t r a l i t y Concluding c u l t u r a l , (1975) s c i e n t i f i c , technical and economic agreements P a r t i c i p a t i n g i n UN and specialised agencies Attending Law of the Sea Conferences (1974-1975) -voting with Third World Supporting a n t i - c o l o n i a l •issues at UN, Commonwealth 212 Notes to Chapter Four 1Forelgn A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 3, No. 1, June 1970, p. 16. 2 See "Treaty of Friendship between the Government of Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia 1970 and 1959" i n Rujuk: Arahan Pejabat  B i l . 13: Perjanjian Kerajaan Malaysia Dengan Kerajaan Asing, Kemen-terian Pelajaran Malaysia. (No page numbers) 3 I b i d . 4 See M. Fathmanathan, "The S t r a i t s of Malacca: A Basis for Co n f l i c t or Co-operation?" i n Lau Teik Soon, ed., New Directions  i n the International Relationships of Southeast Asia, Singapore, Sin-gapore University Press, 1973, p. 189. He points out that Malaysia had i n 1969 u n i l a t e r a l l y declared the extension of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l waters to twelve miles under the Emergency (Essential Powers) o r d i -nance, No. 7, i b i d . , p. 190. ^See " S t r a i t s of Malacca and Singapore - Joint Statement", Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 4, December 1971, p. 54. 6 I b i d . ^Pathmanathan, op. c i t . , 190-192, and passim. 8 I b i d . , p. 189. 9 Interview with Mr. L.C. Vohra, Head of the International Law Di v i s i o n , Ministry of Laws and Attorney-General Chambers, May 21, 1975. "^The p a r t i c i p a t i n g countries were A u s t r a l i a , Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia,Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam, Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 5, No. 1, June 1970, p. 52. ''""'"The Lusaka Conference was held from September 8-10. Tun Razak returned to Malaysia and assumed the prime ministership on September 22. 12 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 3, No. 2, December 1970. 13 Ib i d . , p. 16. 14 See Tun Ismail's speech to the UN General Assembly of that year i n Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 3, No. 2, December 1970, pp. 58-59. "^Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1970, p. 14. 213 16 Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, "Neutralization of Southeast Asia" i n P a c i f i c Community, October 1971, reprinted i i i Foreign A f f a i r s  Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 1971, pp. 51-52. 1 7 F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 4, December 1971, p. 58. 18 China spoke favourably of the scheme during Tun Razak's v i s i t to China which led to f u l l diplomatic t i e s between the two countries. See text, infra,, p. 162. 19 Interview with Dr. Noordin Sopiee, leader-writer, New S t r a i t s  Times, June 10, 1975, and interview with Encik M. Ben-Haron, P r i n c i -pal Assistant Secretary, Planning and Research, M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , June 17, 1975. 20„ Ibid. 21 Address by the Prime M i n i s t e r , Tun Abdul Razak at the opening of the Eighth ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting, May 13, 1975, Siaran Akhbar, Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia. 22 Ibid. 23 Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, "ASEAN's Response to Security Issues i n Southeast Asia", talk delivered to Centre for Strategic and Inter-national Studlies, Conference on Regionalism i n Southeast Asia: Problems, Perspectives and P o s s i b i l i t i e s , i n Jakarta, October 1974. (Handout from o f f i c i a l of the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s ) 2 4 I b i d . , p. 11. Ibid. 2 ^ I b i d . , p. 12. 27 Ib i d . , p. 14. 2 8 I b i d . , p v l l 29 Stephen Chee, op. c i t . , p. 49. 30 There i s considerable semantic confusion here and the varied uses of the terms by p o l i t i c i a n s and academics a l i k e have not cleared the s i t u a t i o n . Suffice i t to say that "non-alignment" denotes a cold war s i t u a t i o n , whereas "neutralism" has a meaning which i s more extens-ive , that i s , i t connotes n e u t r a l i t y i n situations other than the cold 214 war. A foreign ministry o f f i c i a l said that Malaysia prefers "non-alignment" because i t has a "positi v e " connotation that the state i s pursuing an "independent" policy. Interview with Encik Looi Cheok Hin, P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary, UN, America, A f r i c a and Non-alignment Conferences, Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , May 27, 1975. 31 Interview with Encik Yusof Hitam, June 27, 1975. 32 Ibid. In February 1976, at the ASEAN summit conference i n B a l i , a Treaty of TA-'mity and Co-operation i n Southeast Asia and an ASEAN Declaration of Concord were signed by the f i v e countries as further steps toward the n e u t r a l i t y i d e a l . I t i s however, beyond the purview of this study to analyse these events. See New S t r a i t s Times, February 25, 1976 and March 1, 1976. 33 The S t r a i t s Times, June 18, 1966. 34 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 3, No. 2, December 1970, p. 57. 35 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 1971, pp. 43-44. 36 Stephen Chee, dp. c i t . , p. 50. 37 Noordin Sopiee, "Ties with Peking: The Issues and the Promise", The S t r a i t s Times, May 21, 1974. 38 Ib i d . , and S. Chee, op. c i t . , p. 50. 39 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 52-53. Ibi d . , p. 53. 41 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 56-57. These "assurances" did not, however, prevent the People's Republic from sending a congratulatory message to the MCP i n A p r i l 1975, a l i t t l e over a year after the establishment of diplomatic relat i o n s . Malaysia pro-tested the Chinese action and said that relations would not remain as " c o r d i a l " i f the practice continued. The episode does not however re-present a serious s t r a i n i n relations and the Chinese action i s proba-bly a routine action rather than a premeditated scheme. See The'New  St r a i t s Times, June 23, 1975. 42 i< Chee, op. c i t . , and also, Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, "The P o l i -t i c a l Future of the P a c i f i c Basin" i n Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 6, No. 4, December 1973, pp. 10-11. 43 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 42. 4 4Address by the Prime Minister at the opening of the ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting at Kuala Lumpur, May 13, 1975, Siafari Akhbar, Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia. 215 45 Address by the Prime Minister at the opening of the Eighth ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting at Kuala Lumpur, May 13, 1975, Siaran  Akhbar, Jabatan Peneraggan Malaysia. 46 Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, text of RTM broadcast, as published i n The S t r a i t s Times, May 7 and 8, 1975. Ibid. 48 Sopiee, "Ties with P e k i n g . o p . c i t . 49 The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Indo-China countries remains prob-lematic. While there was considerable optimism among Wisma Putra c i r c l e s that the new governments of South.Vietnam and Cambodia w i l l be 'neutralist' (Interviews with various o f f i c i a l s ) and thus endorse zonal n e u t r a l i t y , Malaysia, according to a top aide, w i l l keep an "open mind" on the subject and largely adopt a "wait and see" approach. The im-p l i c a t i o n i s "that the n e u t r a l i t y proposal i s subject to further review and evolution depending on the feedback from these countries. Inter-view with Encik Zain Azraai, Special P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary to the Prime Minister, November.,.1,~1975. "^One of the major problems w i l l be the question of enforcement that i s , the manner i n which v i o l a t i o n s should be dealt. Interview with Noordin Sopiee, June 10, 1975. See also, Zain Azraai, " N e u t r a l -i s a t i o n of Southeast Asia" i n Lau.Teik.Soon, ed. New Directions i n  the International Relations of Southeast Asia, Singapore, vSingapore University Press 1973, pp. 135-136. 51 Speech by Encik M. Khir Johari, Minister of Trade and Industry and Leader of the Malaysian delegation to UNCTAD I I I , Foreign A f f a i r s  Malaysia, Vol. 5, No..2, June 1971, p. 38. 52 Press statement by Encik Khir Johari on return from UNCTAD I I I , Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 5, No. 2, June 1971, p. 43. Malaysia i s a party to 'the'' M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade Negotiations which i s under GAT.T sponsorship. The negotiations are s t i l l i n progress. Interview with Encik Yee Che Fong, Deputy Director, International Trade Div i s i o n , Ministry of Trade and Industry, May 31, 1975. 53 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, op. c i t . , pp. 44-46. "^Malaysia's standing has been described as "very good" among Third World countries by a senior Ministry of Trade and Industry of-f i c i a l . Interview with Encik Yee Che Fong, May 31, 1975. "'"'Speech by Finance Minister Tun Tan Siew Sin to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, September 22, 1970, Foreign  A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 3, No. 2, December 1970, p. 43. 216 56,. Interview with Encik Yee Che Fong, May 31, 1975. "^Speech by Finance Minister Tun Tan Siew Sin to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, op. c i t . , p. 41. 58 Interview with Encik Fong Kwek Yuen, Planning O f f i c e r , Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department, May 22, 1975. 59 Economic Report 1974-75. op. c i t . , p. 26. 60 Speech by the Finance Minister Tun Tan Siew Sin to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, op. c i t . , p. 42. ^"Htfhile there i s a tendency for the o i l revenues to be recycled back into the i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s — the buying of c a p i t a l goods and armaments i s a" propos — the LDC's, which have l i t t l e to s e l l are l e f t out of the cycle Th addition to being saddled with the higher o i l prices. See Time, October 14, 1974, pp. 42-43. 62 Interview with Encik Yee Che Fong, May 31, 1975. /TO New S t r a i t s Times. July 12, 1975. 64 Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975, Govt. P r i n t e r , 1971, pp. 41-42. 6 5Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, Govt. P r i n t e r , 1973, p. 85. 66 Malaysia I n d u s t r i a l Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1975 (published by FIDA), p. 5.-6 7 Economic Report 1974-1975, op. c i t . , p. I l l and also, "Indus-t r i a l Development i n Malaysia and Incentives for Investmennt",speech by J. Jegathesan, Director, Investment Promotion, FIDA, to Malaysia Investment Conference, London, May 1975. (Handout) r Q Less than $250,000 - 2 years; more than $250,000 - 3 years; more than $500,000 - 4 years, and more than $1 m i l l i o n - 5 years. Economic Report, loc. c i t . 69 These were (a) the location of a factory i n a designed develop-ment area, (b) i f the product was a ' p r i o r i t y product' and (c) i f the required percentage of Malaysian content i n the employment of resources was attained. See i b i d . See f fin.. 6 9 . 7 1From 51 - 100 employees - 2 years; 101 - 200 - 3 years; 291 350 - 4 years; 350 and above - 5 years. Economic Report, op. c i t . , 217 72 See Mid-Term Review...op. c i t . , pp. 61-94. 73 As published i n New S t r a i t s Times, September 18, 1974. 74 Petroleum Development Act, 1974, Act. 144, Laws of Malaysia, Govt. P r i n t e r , August 22, 1974. ^Interview with Encik Zainal Azman, Deputy Secretary, Foreign Investment Committee (FIC), Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department, May 29, 1975. 76 See Petroleum Development (Amendment) Act, 1975, Act A290, Laws of Malaysia, Govt. P r i n t e r , A p r i l 29, 1975. According to the Act, "the holder of management shares of a relevant company s h a l l be e n t i t l e d either on a p o l l or by a show of hands to f i v e hundred votes for each management share held by. him upon any resolution r e l a t i n g to the appointment or dismissal of a director or any member of the staff of the relevant company...", i b i d . , p. 6, Since each management share i s equivalent to 500 ordinary shares, the government's one percent w i l l give i t more than f i v e times the number of shares held by other shareholders. In fact, i t need only hold 0.2 percent of management shares to have a s l i g h t edge over the other holders. (If x represents shares, 0.2% of management shares i s equal to 0.2% x 500x ¥ lOOx, whereas 99.8% of ordinary shares i s equal to only 99.8x). (Discus-sion with a senior executive of an o i l company.) ^Informal discussions with a senior o i l company executive, various j o u r n a l i s t s and government o f f i c i a l s . See also New S t r a i t s  T:imes, May 26, 1975, i n which the Chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce cans' on the government not to "deviate from the p r i n c i p l e of the free economic system" and adopt quasi-nationalisation p o l i c i e s . 7 8 New S t r a i t s Times, May 31, 1975. 79 Interview with Encik M. Shanmughalingam, Deputy Under Secre-tary, Economic D i v i s i o n , The Treasury, May 19, 1975 and interviews with Encik Yee Che Fong and Encik Zainal Aznam (cited e a r l i e r ) . 80 T... Ibid. 8~4?etroleum Development (Amendment) Act 1975, op. c i t . , p. 4. 82 Perbadanan Nasional (National Corporation). I t was formed i n September 1969, roughly coinciding with the enunciation of the NEP. "Pernas Securities" i s a wholly-owned subsidiary of PERNAS, and operates i n the commercial sector l i k e any private company. Razaleigh subse-quently became chairman of Pernas Securities after relinguishing chair-manship of PERNAS. 8 3See f n E r 82. 218 84 Island and Peninsular Development i s one of the largest housing developers i n Malaysia and Singapore, with i n t e r e s t s i n t i n , rubber and palm o i l ; London Tin Corporation i s a Britain-based com-pany with major shares i n 12 t i n mining companies i n Malaysia, Thai-land and N i g e r i a ; and Sime Darby i s a Malaysia-based company with i n t e r e s t s i n rubber, t i n and various i n d u s t r i e s . See The Far Eastern  Economic Review, June 13, 1975, pp. 55-56. 85 The deal i n i t i a l l y appeared to be a c l e v e r l y maneuvered "reverse swop" whereby Pernas S e c u r i t i e s was to surrender a l l i t s holdings to Haw Par for i t s c o n t r o l l i n g 40% stake i n the company which would then have c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t s iihllsiLand and Peninsula and London Tin Corporation. The deal was abandoned when Haw Par was sus-pended by the Singapore government which then authorised an i n v e s t i -gation into the company's alleged mismanagement. See the Far Eastern  Economic Review, June 13, 1975, pp. 55-56 and New S t r a i t s Times, July 23, 1975. 86 He said he hoped to achieve t h i s target within two years by using Pernas. New S t r a i t s Times, July 4, 1975. 87 In a h o t l y contested race, Razaleigh emerged with the second highest number of votes for the three Vice-President posts up for e l e c t i o n . See New S t r a i t s Times, June 22, 1975. 88 New S t r a i t s Times, J u l y 7, 1975. Following Tun Razak's death i n 1976, Razaleigh has become Finance M i n i s t e r i n Prime Minis t e r -Hussein Onn's cabinet. 8 9 I b i d . 90 Interview with Encik Zainal Azman, Deputy-Secretary, FIC, May 29, 1975. 91 The other major s t i p u l a t i o n s were that such mergers and take-overs should lead d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y to net economic benefits i n ...the extent of Malaysian p a r t i c i p a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y Bumiputra par-t i c i p a t i o n , ownership and management, income d i s t r i b u t i o n , growth, employment, exports, q u a l i t y range of products and services, economic d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s , processing and upgrading of l o c a l raw materials, t r a i n i n g , e f f i c i e n c y , and research and development". See Guidelines  for the Regulation of A c q u i s i t i o n of Assets, Mergers and Take-overs, FIC, Govt. P r i n t e r , 1974, pp. 2-3. 92 New S t r a i t s Times, October 28, 1975. 93 Ibi d . 9 4 I b i d . Petronas chairman, Tengku Razaleigh., was conspicuously, absent from the seminar i n which., apart from the Premier, the M i n i s t e r 219 of Trade and Industry, the Minister for Home A f f a i r s , the Attorney-General and the Deputy Finance Minister also participated. 95 See fh.., 31. 96 Interview with Encik Looi Cheok Hin, P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary, UN, America, A f r i c a and Nonalignment Conferences, May 27, 1975. 97 New Sunday Times, June 22, 1975. 98 Address by the Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, to the Eighth ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting, bp. c i t . 99 The Star, October 7, 1975. The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation concluded at the B a l i summit i n February 1976 i s open to the accession of other Southeast Asian states with the view that the Indo-. China states and Burma may at some point wish to accede to. i t . See New S t r a i t s Times, February 25, and March 1, 1976. "^Statement by Tan S r i Dato Haji Abdul Kadir bin Yusof, Attor-ney-General of Malaysia to the Plenary Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Se!a, Caracas, July 10, 1975. (Handout) "'"'^Interview with Encik L.C. Vohra, Head of International Law Divi s i o n , Ministry of Laws and A-Grs Chambers, May 21, 1975. Ibid. 103 Address by the Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, at the opening ceremony of the F i f t h Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, June 21, 1974, Kuala Lumpur, Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 65 and 67. 104 Interview with Encik M. Ban-Haron, P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary, Planning and Research, June 17, 1975. "^ ""See Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 1975, pp. 55-56. 1 0 6New S t r a i t s Times, October 17, 1975. 1 0 7 I b i d . , October 16, 1975. 108 See i b i d . The f i r s t act allows for p o l i t i c a l detention without t r i a l i n matters of inte r n a l security, while the second pre-vents students from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n p o l i t i c s . 109 Interview with Encik Yusof Hitam, Under Secretary, South-east Asia, June 27, 1975. •'"^ The term was used to describe the extremist elements i n respect of Malay demands within the UMNO and the Malay community at large. Among such " u l t r a s " were Dr. Mahathir, presently Deputy Prime 220 M i n i s t e ;r. v and Datuk Musa Hitam, Minister of Primary Industries. I l l See Tunku Abdul Rahman, May 13: Before and After, Utusan Melayu Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, pp. 122-124. 112 The Tunku i s referring to the furore a r i s i n g out of the National Language B i l l of 1967 i n which the Director of the Language and L i t e r a r y I n s t i t u t e (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka), Syed Nasir, an acknowledged u l t r a , was sacked from the UMNO Executive Council for agitating against the slowness of implementing Malay as the sole o f f i c i a l language. See Margaret Roff, "The P o l i t i c s of Language i n Malaysia", Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 5, 1967. 113 Tunku, op. c i t . , p. 136. 114 I b i d . , p. 120. '^ ''See Chapter Two, supra, fhn 79'.9. 116 Chapter Three, supra, fhn.20. ''""'"^ Seven years after May 13, Mahathir became the surprise choice of Premier Hussein Onn for Deputy Prime Minister. See New S t r a i t s  Times, March 2, 1976. 118 According tio.-ta Eloseoaidej. none-.of^Razak'.srspeeches .even when he swasHhe Tunku's deputy could be said to be blatantly a n t i -communist_or pro-Western and he (Razak) had always put a premium on Afro-Asian relations. Interview with Encik Zain Azraai, November 1, 1975. 119 Interview with Dr. Noordin Sopiee of New S t r a i t s Times, June 10, 1975. p.L 15. 120 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia,Vol. 3, No. 2, December 1971, 121 Interview with Encik Yusof Hitam, June 27, 1975. 122 Cf. Chapter One, p. 54. 123 In l i n e with this strategy, the Government has launched the "Rukun Tetangga" (Community Self-Reliance), which c a l l s for the c i t i z e n r y to participate i n community security, and there are plans to commence national service i n about two years time. The recent spate of insurgent a c t i v i t y include the gunning down of Special Branch o f f i c e r s and the bombing of the National Monument. Various issues of New S t r a i t s Times, August and September, 1975. 221 124 Interview with Encik Hasmy Agam, May 30, 1975. 125 Economic Report 1974-75, op. c i t . , p. 3. , 126 See supra, Chapter Two, pp. 39-40, and Chapter Three, p. 113. 127 Interviews with Encik Yusof Hitam, Encik Ban-Haron and Encik Looi Cheok Him, c i t e r e a r l i e r . 128 New S t r a i t s Times, August 7, 1975. 129 In the l i g h t of revelations about Tun Razak's f a i l i n g health, t h i s factor may have prompted the Prime M i n i s t e r to give up the port-f o l i o a l i t t l e e a r l i e r than he had intended. -130 See Chapter Two,-fih 83. 131 Interview with Dr. Tan Chee Khoon (Pekemas), May 22, 1975, En. Lim K i t Siang (DAP), July 10, 1975 and En. Fan Yew Teng (DAP), July, 1975. 132 The Soviet Union has i t s e l f made a vague proposal for an "Asian C o l l e c t i v e Security" system. See Sheldon W. Simon, Asian  Neutralism and U.S. P o l i c y , Wash., D.C, American Enterprise I n s t i t u t e for Public P o l i c y Research, 1975, pp. 64-74. 1 3 3 I b i d . , pp. 49-74. 134 Cf. I b i d . , p. 52. 135 Interview with Encik Zainal Aznam, May 29, 1975. 136 See supra., pp. 180-181 137 Interviews with various government o f f i c i a l s , who did not wish to be named, and j o u r n a l i s t s . 138 T,., I b i d . 139 Interview with Encik Looi Cheok Hin, May 27, 1975. "*"4^See i n f r a , pp. 233-235. ''"^ "''See i n f r a , pp. 235-236<?.nd ; . 222 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION A HOLISTIC INTERPRETATION OF FOREIGN POLICY In reviewing Malaysian foreign policy over the three h i s t o r i c a l periods, one i s at once struck by i t s progression and dynamics over time. One i s also struck by a certain symmetry i n the development of Malaysian foreign policy since independence. Among the most salient features of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l progression and symmetry are: (i) the existence of two f a i r l y stable periods of foreign policy separated by an unstable, t r a n s i t i o n a l period; ( i i ) the dominance i n the two stable periods of an e l i t e ideology, which however took i t s under-pinnings from different ideological paradigms, and the mixed nature of e l i t e perceptions i n the t r a n s i t i o n a l period; ( i i i ) a major s h i f t i n Malaysian foreign policy - as represented by the replacement of one stable period for another - which may be visu a l i z e d as a movement from an extreme end to a middle position on the East-West ideological continuum. 223 The development of Malaysian foreign p o l i c y i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r progression and symmetry r e a l l y underscores the s i g n i f i c a n c e of i n t e r n a l and external feedback e f f e c t s a c t i n g upon foreign p o l i c y . The s t a b i l i t y of the f i r s t period marked the preponderance of p o s i t i v e l y r e i n f o r c i n g feedback on Malayan foreign p o l i c y , or, at any rate, the lack of severely negative feedback. In time, t h i s s t a b i l i t y was upset i n i t i a l l y by the extreme negative external feedback of Indonesian Konfrontasi which i n turn brought about negative i n t e r n a l feedback e f f e c t s from elements i n the body p o l i t i c . The turmoil i n foreign p o l i c y generated i n the second period -together with domestic p o l i t i c a l developments culminating i n a leadership s h i f t - propelled foreign p o l i c y toward the new equilibrium and s t a b i l i t y of the t h i r d period. The continuing s t a b i l i t y of the t h i r d period r e f l e c t s the generally p o s i t i v e feedback from the i n t e r n a l and external environment to the new d i r e c t i o n s i n foreign p o l i c y . Feedback r e a l l y i s an unceasing process, but i n a study such as t h i s , i t was only possible (and necessary) to i n d i c a t e the most important of the feedback e f f e c t s . Within each period, for instance, I have demonstrated that there were some feedback e f f e c t s which were s u f f i c i e n t to cause minor changes without a f f e c t i n g the general thrust of foreign p o l i c y . Along with the substantive observations about Malaysian foreign p o l i c y over three h i s t o r i c a l periods are a number of important t h e o r e t i c a l findings and implications which t h i s study has brought to 224 l i g h t : (1) that foreign policy - as observed from the Malaysian case - i s a purposeful a c t i v i t y geared to the pursuit of various r e a l and/or perceived national needs and interests no matter how these may be coloured and influenced by the psychological and operational constraints acting upon the policy-makers. (2) that (a) a p l u r a l i t y of sources and factors have impinged upon Malaysian foreign policy over time; (b) t h i s study has i d e n t i f i e d at least four important broad categories of variables influencing foreign p o l i c y , v i z . , e c o - h i s t o r i c a l , i d i o s y n c r a t i c , external and i n t e r n a l , each set of which has been c r u c i a l at different points of time and over different issue-areas i n influencing the course and content of Malaysian foreign policy; and that (c) the view that foreign policy i n Malaysia (and Third World countries generally) i s e l i t i s t may be greatly exaggerated. (3) that (a) foreign policy can be meaningfully appre-ciated as comprising various types or levels of outputs with actions constituting the sine qua non of foreign policy praxis, postures e x i s t i n g / by virtue of various national aspirations and 225 orientations v i s - a - v i s other states and actors, objectives as a necessary aspect of a goal-oriented a c t i v i t y such as foreign p o l i c y , and strategies existing or absent - or with levels of sophistication - depending upon the p a r t i c u l a r development of a state's foreign p o l i c y ; and that (b) Malaysian foreign policy over time and over different issue-areas manifested a l l four types of foreign policy outputs. (4) that the explanation of foreign policy by means of an a. p r i o r i a n a l y t i c a l framework e n t a i l s more than the mere spec i f i c a t i o n of the r e l a t i v e potency of the sources of foreign p o l i c y ; rather, i t e n t a i l s the i n s i g h t f u l but l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n of the various sources as they impinge upon the various levels of policy outputs i n a h o l i s t i c manner. Let me now expand upon these theoretical findings. (1) This study found Malaysia epitomized the contention that a developing, Third World country's foreign policy i s heavily geared toward the fulfilment of various national needs since such a country has few, or largely undeveloped, c a p a b i l i t i e s and resources. In Malaysia's case the absence of the t r a d i t i o n a l elements of m i l i t a r y power gave r i s e to considerable defence and security needs. The heavy dependence on B r i t i s h and Commonwealth m i l i t a r y assistance provides evidence for this assertion. Malaysia, l i k e a l l nation-states of a state-centric world order, continued to have such needs i n the t h i r d period although i t has increasingly, i f not t o t a l l y assumed re s p o n s i b i l i t y over i t s own defence. Nevertheless, i t s promotion of the strategy for a neutral zone i n Southeast Asia belies i t s funda-mentally weak m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n and i t s ever-present security needs. However, inte r n a l developments, idi o s y n c r a t i c - i d e o l o g i c a l factors and a changing external si t u a t i o n do intervene and have intervened i n influencing a change i n both the true nature and the perception of defence and security needs, as elaborated i n e a r l i e r chapters. It i s perhaps i n the economic realm that the significance of national needs has become axiomatic. By most standards, i t would be f o o l i s h to contend that the Malaysian economy has 'taken o f f on the path to sustained economic growth. Indeed, Malaysia i s s t i l l heavily dependent on i t s a g r i c u l t u r a l sector i n which a small number of primary commodities constitute the mainstay of the economy. Moreover, inspite of the increased l e v e l of a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l d i -v e r s i f i c a t i o n , this has not reduced Malaysia's chronic dependence on the r i c h , i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries which are not only Malaysia's most important trading partners but the main source of i t s foreign investment as w e l l . In short, economic needs continue to dominate foreign policy outputs i n the issue-area of Development and Trade even more than i n the area of Defence and Security. The endurance of economic needs notwithstanding, various i n t e r n a l and external inputs have caused a degree of r e - d e f i n i t i o n of these needs and the pursuit of new strategies to f u l f i l these same needs. Thus i n Malaysia's persistent quest to gain a more advantageous position v i s - a - v i s the 227 r i c h , developed countries, i t maintained a strong developing-world posture demanding various concessions from the r i c h countries v i a different i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d and non-institutionalized means. Malaysia, however, discarded i t s l a i s s e z - f a i r e orientation toward foreign enterprise for one of economic nationalism with strategies for main-taining control of i t s natural and other resources, short of nat i o n a l i z a t i o n . This s h i f t i n approach reflected the impact of the various i n t e r n a l and external inputs on p o l i c y , p a r t i c u l a r l y the unceasing feedback effects on extant economic p o l i c i e s on which I have already elaborated. Status needs, although elusive, were a major factor i n Malaysia's pursuit of global or milieu goals. This was p a r t i c u l a r l y evident during the f i r s t period where a s t r i c t separation between defence and security questions and the more 'international' issues seemed to obtain. In the Konfrontasi period, t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n became somewhat blurred although the intense l e v e l of diplomatic a c t i v i t y can be seen as a manner of enhancing Malaysia's status i n the face of Indonesian propaganda to do the very opposite. Thus Malaysia, to combat Indonesian propaganda, began to p u b l i c l y profess and l a t e r practise a posture of neutralism. This, i n turn, brought about acceptance from the Nonaligned Group of nations, i n time reducing the need to further pursue or enhance i t s status as an independent, sovereign and neutral state by the t h i r d period. Policy outputs i n International Co-operation and Diplomacy - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the area of regional co-operation - were thus increasingly dovetailed into the pursuit of security needs and some economic needs as status needs 228 receded into secondary importance i n the issue-area. /(See Chart 4.3, supra, p. 174) (2) Employing es s e n t i a l l y the approach of the comparative school with modifications, t h i s study has found indeed a p l u r a l i t y of foreign policy sources impinging upon the substance of Malaysian foreign policy over time i n different issue-areas. This assertion has im-plic a t i o n s for two related philosophical debates i n the international relations and p o l i t i c a l science l i t e r a t u r e , v i z . , the r a t i o n a l i t y versus non-rationality of the decision-making and foreign policy formulation process"'" and the e l i t i s t versus p l u r a l i s t views of 2 p o l i t i c s . In foreign policy i t i s probably more useful to conceive of the debate i n terms of the degree or variation i n the p l u r a l i t y (or lack of p l u r a l i t y ) of sources affecting foreign policy or simply i n terms of the r e l a t i v e potency of the sources affecting foreign 3 policy. In order to shed l i g h t on the debate from the Malaysian case, I w i l l b r i e f l y recapitulate foreign policy over the three issue-areas and periods i n terms of the explanatory power of the various 'sources' of foreign policy specified i n th i s study. I t must be stressed that the observations made are only preliminary hypotheses which require much more research before their v a l i d i t y can be established. The picture that emerges of the sources of Malaysian foreign policy i s a mixed one but there are nevertheless some broad generali-zations that can be made. For example, idiosyncratic variables tended to dominate foreign policy i n the issue—area of defence and security, that i s , the formulation of policy tended to e l i t i s t i n 229 nature. In large part, t h i s corroborates the observations of a 4 number of previous foreign p o l i c y studies of Malaysia. But even here, i d i o s y n c r a t i c factors - as symbolized by an e l i t e ideology committed to c e r t a i n Western values - were p o s i t i v e l y reinforced by inputs from the external environment of Cold War and bolstered by antecedent h i s t o r i c a l factors ( B r i t i s h r u l e and the Emergency), inf l u e n c i n g foreign p o l i c y i n the same general d i r e c t i o n . Nevertheless, the prevalence of i d i o s y n c r a t i c elements during the f i r s t period i s d i f f i c u l t to dispute. In t h i s the Tunku's personality came out rather strong. By contrast, the second period was marked by the predominance of external factors p a r t i c u l a r l y during i t s f i r s t phase i n the form of inputs leading to and d e r i v i n g from Konfrontasi. Thereafter -during the second phase - foreign p o l i c y manifested the impact of mounting negative domestic feedback upon extant p o l i c i e s . I d i o s y n c r a t i c factors while remaining important i n the omnipresent figu r e of the Tunku began to wane as h i s influence and sway suffered severe setbacks by the end of the period. For the most part of the second period the influence of e c o - h i s t o r i c a l factors was n e g l i g i b l e . The t h i r d period saw a leadership s h i f t which although i t arose out of domestic p o l i t i c a l developments - p a r t i c u l a r l y the events of May 13 - had i n d i r e c t importance for foreign p o l i c y . These develop-ments prepared the ground f o r the ascendance of a new e l i t e ideology marked by material changes i n e l i t e perceptions of the i n t e r n a l and external r e a l i t y . C e r t a i n l y the external feedback e f f e c t s s p i l l i n g over from the second period were a f a c t o r i n i n f l u e n c i n g the new e l i t e perceptions but more importantly i t was the changing (or changed) international environment that prompted the substantive changes i n foreign policy. Thus the t h i r d period underlined the importance of the i d i o s y n c r a t i c , i n t e r n a l and external sources of foreign policy with their i n d i v i d u a l ascendancy closely linked to the development of h i s t o r i c a l events. Put d i f f e r e n t l y , i t was largely the external and i n t e r n a l feedback e f f e c t s , long-term and short-term, that dictated the course, i f not content, of foreign policy for the period. In the issue-area of development and trade, i n t e r n a l sources have been of greatest importance attesting to a ' r a t i o n a l ' (in the sense of ends-means calculation) pursuit of policy i n this issue-area since these int e r n a l sources stem largely from the nature of the Malaysian economy and i t s needs. However, there i s a good case that antecedent e c o - h i s t o r i c a l factors deriving from co l o n i a l rule con-tributed considerably to the nature of policy outputs especially during the f i r s t period. Undoubtedly, by the second period, i n t e r n a l domestic needs had risen to a dominant role i n determining policy. Idiosyncratic variables, by contrast, had l i t t l e or negligible impact. In the t h i r d period, while in t e r n a l economic needs remained of paramount importance, idiosyncratic factors took on a more s i g n i -f i c ant r o l e . This was symbolized by the adoption a new economic philosophy engendered by the ascendancy of a newer crop of UMNO leaders and perhaps epitomized i n the pragmatism of Prime Minister Tun Razak himself. The period also i l l u s t r a t e d the significance of the long-term i n t e r n a l feedback effects of previous p o l i c i e s which prompted a r e - d e f i n i t i o n of economic needs. Turning f i n a l l y to the issue-area of international co-operation and diplomacy, the most important generalization i s that for the most part status considerations were of primary importance i n determining policy. By the t h i r d period there was a tendency for policy to dovetail into that i n the defence and security issue-area and thus derive from much the same sources. The second period as a result of Konfrontasi, tended to be dominated by external factors. Since many of the p o l i c i e s and decisions i n th i s issue-area tend to be of a more routine nature, the bureaucracy has perhaps played a greater role here i n the enunciation of policy than i t has, for example, i n defence and security. By that token, idiosyncratic factors are not as important i n influencing policy i n the issue-area. Returning, then, to the debate of the e l i t i s t versus p l u r a l i s t view of p o l i t i c s , whilst i t cannot hope to resolve the debate, the Malaysian case demonstrates that a p l u r a l i t y of factors impinge upon foreign policy behaviour and that various factors or sources are important or r i s e i n ascendancy at different times over different issue-areas. However, the Malaysian case does suggest that the e l i t i s t view of foreign policy formulation i n Third World countries has perhaps been overstated. For example, Henry A. Kissinger c l a s s i f i e s "domestic structures" i n the aspect of leadership patterns into three types: (a) bureaucratic-pragmatic, (b) i d e o l o g i c a l , (c) revolutionary-charismatic."' The p a r a l l e l s are supposedly obvious the Western democracies represent (a), the s o c i a l i s t - t o t a l i t a r i a n states (b), and the Third World states (c). In fact this i s a gross 232 s i m p l i f i c a t i o n as, indeed, Malaysia on the basis of my analysis could s a t i s f y c r i t e r i a for a l l three (!) i n the three different h i s t o r i c a l periods. I t could qualify as (b) and presumably (c) during the f i r s t period, as (b) i n the second period, and as (a) i n the t h i r d . This ex .ercise merely shows the f u t i l i t y of c l a s s i f i c a t o r y schemes such as these although Kissinger's major point of domestic structures influencing foreign policy i s w e l l taken. What should not be assumed i s that the structures of Third World states are necessarily top heavy or e l i t i s t . To follow through t h i s point, I w i l l b r i e f l y examine the formal structure and functioning of the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s as they affect the foreign policy formulation process. There i s some evidence that the foreign policy formulation has become more p l u r a l i s t i c with time. An indication of this assertion i s the expansion of the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s i n terms of personnel and i t s coverage of issue-areas. At i t s establishment i n 1957, the Ministry maintained a s t a f f of only 21 Branch A (Division One) o f f i c e r s ^ and even at the height of Konfront a s i i n 1964, the entire Malaysian diplomatic service comprised only 30 such o f f i c e r s . 7 By 1967 the number had increased to 71 and including p o l i t i c a l appointees and attaches g t o t a l l e d 171 persons. Although the structure of the Ministry has not changed functionally as indicated by the organization charts for 1958 and 1975 (Charts 5.1 & 5.2), coverage has expanded considerably as shown by the increase i n the number of 'desks.' There has also been the addition of an economic d i v i s i o n which was absent at inde-pendence. In the present structure, the highest c i v i l servant CHART 5.1 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - 1958 MINISTER PERMANENT SECRETARY I DEPUTY SECRETARY PAS: ADMINISTRATION DIVISION SENIOR PROTOCOL OFFICER PAS: POLITICAL AND INFORMATION DIVISION 1 ADMINISTRATION SECURITY & COMMUNICATIONS ASIA AUSTRALASIA AND AFRICA EUROPE AND AMERICA UN AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS CONTROLLER OF IMMIGRATION CONFERENCE & SUPPLY CONSULAR PILGRIMAGE CONTROL PAS = PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT SECRETARY CHART 5.2 (A) MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1975 MINISTER SECRETARY GENERAL DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL (POLITICAL) DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL (ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION) DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL (ADMINISTRATION AND GENERAL AFFAIRS) CHIEF OF PROTOCOL N 5 CHART 5.2 (B) DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL (POLITICAL DIVISION) UNDER SECRETARY I PAS: UN, NONALIGNED 1 PAS: LAW OF CONFERENCES, AMERICA THE SEA & AFRICA, SOUTH OF CONFERENCE SAHARA UNDER SECRETARY I I UNDER SECRETARY I I I PAS: PLANNING & RESEARCH PAS: EAST ASIA PAS-. SOUTH ASIA & PACIFIC PAS: EUROPE & COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS PAS: WEST ASIA & AFRICA, NORTH OF SAHARA PAS: NEUTRALIZATION & DEFENCE LIAISON PAS: SOUTHEAST ASIA I (ASEAN COUNTRIES) PAS: SOUTHEAST ASIA (II) (NON-ASEAN COUNTRIES) PAS = PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT SECRETARY ho CHART 5.2 (C) DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL (ECONOMIC & INFORMATION DIVISION) UNDER SECRETARY (ECONOMICS) & SECRETARY GENERAL FOR ASEAN PAS: ASEAN & OTHER REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS PAS: ECONOMICS & TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION DIRECTOR OF EXTERNAL INFORMATION SENIOR INFORMATION OFFICER: PRESS RELATIONS SENIOR RESEARCH OFFICER: RESEARCH SENIOR RESEARCH OFFICER: PUBLICATIONS CHIEF EDITOR MALAYSIAN DIGEST SENIOR INFORMATION OFFICER: CULTURAL PROMOTION SENIOR INFORMATION OFFICER: SERVICING PAS = PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT SECRETARY N3 CHART 5.2 (D) DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL (ADMINISTRATION & GENERAL AFFAIRS) CHIEF OF PROTOCOL HEAD OF INSPECTORATE PAS UNDER SECRETARY (ADMINISTRATION, SUPPLY & FINANCE) DEPUTY CHIEF OF PROTOCOL I SENIOR PROTOCOL OFFICER ASSISTANT SECRETARY: TREATY PAS: ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL & SERVICE PAS: SUPPLY & FINANCE PAS: CONSULAR & COMMUNICATIONS PAS = PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT SECRETARY 238 d i r e c t l y below the Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s i s the Secretary General ( i n the past, the Permanent Secretary) who has below him three Deputy Secretary Generals and a Chief of Protocol. The Deputy Secretary Generals head the three divisions of the Ministry, namely, the P o l i t i c a l D i v i s i o n , the Economic and Information Division and the Administration and General A f f a i r s D i v i s i o n . The largest and most important d i v i s i o n i s the P o l i t i c a l D i v i s i o n which has three Under Secretaries i n charge of three geographical areas. This organizational t i e r was absent i n 1958. The work-horses of the Ministry are the P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretaries who man the various geographical and functional 'desks.' Having sketched the structure of the Foreign Ministry, i t w i l l be useful to look into i t s day-to-day functioning. A Foreign Ministry Under Secretary denied that decision-making i n Wisma Putra was an 9 ad hoc process. On the other hand, he said there was an i n s t i t u -t i o n a l i z e d procedure for deciding on and administering policy. This consisted of a daily round table meeting of a l l the Senior o f f i c e r s (down to P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretaries) i n the Ministry. Any matter requiring attention i s brought up at this d a i l y morning meeting and every o f f i c e r i s given a chance to a i r his view on the subject. If action i s to be taken, recommendation i s made to the Minister and the Cabinet v i a the Secretary General after a l l the of f i c e r s have had their say. I f i t was an important matter which did not require immediate attention, such as a policy position on an issue or for some conference, the document would go through various drafts s t a r t i n g at the P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary l e v e l before i t was presented to the Cabinet. There i s some evidence that the Ministry today i s a closer approximation of the c l a s s i c bureaucratic model than i t was perhaps i n the days when Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie (now Minister of Home A f f a i r s ) was Permanent Secretary. Tan S r i Ghazali was noted for his rather non-bureaucratic, inter-personal and flamboy-ant s t y l e and also for his r e c e p t i b i l i t y to new i d e a s . ^ On the other hand, an o f f i c i a l describes the present Secretary General, Tan S r i Zaiton Ibrahim as "more or less a straight-laced bureaucratic type.""'""'" Marvin Ott has given the non-verifiable and exaggerated estimate that "80-90% of the important decisions which shaped the course of ... foreign policy derived from the interaction of Ghazali and the Tunku:" The relationship may best be characterized as one i n which Ghazali and his Ministry provide the i n i t i a t i v e and ideas while the Tunku acts as a "screen of acceptable and feasible p o l i c i e s " -selecting and modifying.12 From his own account i t would seem that Ott admits that the bureaucracy had a considerable influence on the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e , and as he himself notes, "from a l l evidence ... the Tunku, the Ministry, and the Cabinet have seen eye to eye on most questions. The Ministry enjoys the respect of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister and his 13 attitude i s largely reciprocated." The present-day Ministry, with the absence of Ghazali Shafie, i s closer to the c l a s s i c bureau-c r a t i c model but perhaps no less i n f l u e n t i a l i f only because the 14 present leaders are more l i k e l y to consult and use i t . Tun Razak himself rose from c i v i l service ranks, was wel l known for his pragmatism and was not known to make important decisions without extensive consultation.""""' There i s also evidence that there i s a great degree of rapport between the p o l i t i c a l leaders and the Ministry and that the large majority of Wisma Putra o f f i c i a l s are themselves convinced about the soundness of the present-day e l i t e 16 perceptions on foreign policy. My discussion of the structure and functioning of the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s lends credence to the view that i t probably behaves l i k e most bureaucracies of a Western-democratic format. Interviews with government o f f i c i a l s i n economic divisions of other ministries tend to confirm t h i s view, the majority of these o f f i c i a l s themselves perceiving the policy formulation process to be p l u r a l i s t i c i n the sense that there i s a p l u r a l i t y of stages i n the process as well as inputs at various horizontal levels of decision-making."'"'7 Foreign Ministry o f f i c i a l s i n general also tended to see the policy formulation process as p l u r a l i s t i c although they were careful to note 18 that the major guidelines were largely l a i d down by the politicians'. One Wisma Putra o f f i c i a l suggested that i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere one has to use "the underdeveloped s o c i e t a l model" to appreciate foreign policy whereby the bureaucracy does not challenge the premises of 19 policy but rather rat i o n a l i z e s them. While government o f f i c i a l s were a l i t t l e p a r t i a l toward the p l u r a l i s t policy formulation model, po l i t i c a n s and jour n a l i s t s interviewed invariably saw the process as 20 e l i t i s t . One feels that there may be a considerable degree of selective perception among the interviewees, but there i s s u f f i c i e n t prima facie evidence for the contention that Malaysia's formal foreign policy formulation process i s certainly not too different to that existent i n other Western-democratic type governments. 241 (3) Turning now to the dependent variables or foreign policy outputs, this study found that Malaysian foreign policy could indeed be meaningfully appreciated in i t s broad contours in terms of objectives, postures, strategies, and actions. The study has thus lent validity to these largely a p r i o r i concepts. A major drawback in foreign policy analysis in general as noted in Chapter One has been the emphasis on the input side (independent variables) to the neglect of analysis of the output side (dependent variables). Analysts often get so caught up with the independent variables - the idiosyncracies of Third World p o l i t i c a l leaders has occupied a particularly prominent place - that they often lose sight of the phenomena they are seeking to explain. Throughout this study, I have found Malaysia to have definite objectives, proffered certain postures, advanced a number of strategies to achieve i t s goals and executed numerous actions vis-a-vis other national and non-national actors over different issue-areas. A word should be added on the e l i t i s t versus pluralist views of p o l i t i c s from the perspective of the policy outputs. It is lik e l y true - although much more research has to be undertaken here -that policy formulation w i l l tend to be e l i t i s t or pluralist depending to some extent upon which level or type of output is in question. Thus, from my study, a prima facie case can be made that objectives and strategies and their concomitant actions w i l l tend to have a pluralist base since they entail considerable bureaucratic processing before they are formalized. On the other hand, postures and actions which are not goal-oriented or arise directly out of ideological tenets tend to be e l i t i s t since these are in the one case (postures) based 242 on broad aspirational-normative considerations or 'imponderables,' or i n the second case (actions) arise out of idiosyncratic performance. (Off-the-cuff statements are a good example of the l a t t e r . ) I must stress, however, that these observations are highly tentative and further research i s required to test their v a l i d i t y . (4) In this study, then, I have attempted by means of an a_ p r i o r i a n a l y t i c a l framework to explain various levels or types of Malaysian foreign policy outputs i n terms of four sets of sources or variables. A major finding of this study i s that the explanation of foreign policy e n t a i l s more than the mere s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the r e l a t i v e potency of foreign policy sources, as suggested by the comparative scholars. Rather, i t e n t a i l s the i n s i g h t f u l and l o g i c a l l i n k i n g of independent and dependent variables i n a h o l i s t i c manner. Relationships between variables are seldom on a one-to-one correspondence but highly complex and the constant changes occuring i n the praxis of foreign policy makes the ranking of these sources sometimes a f u t i l e exercise. On the dynamics of choice i n foreign p o l i c y , Kissinger has written: Any society i s part of an evolutionary process by means of two seemingly contradictory mechanisms. On the one hand, the span of possible adaptions i s delimited by the physical environment, the in t e r n a l structure, and, above a l l , by previous choices. On the other hand, evolution proceeds not i n a straight l i n e but through a series of complicated variations which appear anything but obvious to the chief actors. In retrospect a choice may seem to have been nearly random or else to have represented the only available alternative. In either case, the choice i s not an i s o l a t e d act but an accumulation of.previous / decisions r e f l e c t i n g history or t r a d i t i o n and values as w e l l as the immediate pressures of the need for survival.21 To borrow a notion of gestalt theory, one might add further that 22 the whole i s never equal to the mere sum of i t s parts. This by and large has been the main thrust of my analysis of Malaysian foreign policy. Among the major findings of this study then i s that Malaysian foreign policy has been geared to the pursuit of certain r e a l and perceived needs and interests and that although seeking these needs and interests have remained stable goals of p o l i c y , the manner i n which they have been pursued has changed dramatically over the three h i s t o r i c a l periods surveyed. The change i s reflected i n the changing character of foreign policy outputs, i n part i c u l a r foreign policy postures, strategies and actions i n the three periods surveyed. Changes are also reflected i n the ascendancy and the s h i f t i n g potency of the various sources of foreign policy over the three h i s t o r i c a l periods. F i n a l l y , I have also found marked differences i n both the input side as w e l l as the policy outputs i n the three issue-areas examined, namely defence and security, development and trade and international cooperation and peace. In conclusion, l e t me state that this study has found a h o l i s t i c interpretation and explanation of Malaysian foreign policy to be f r u i t f u l and rewarding. 244 Notes to Chapter 5 See Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality i n Models of the International System" i n J . N. Rosenau, ed., International P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , New York, Free Press, 1969, p. 218 and passim. 2 See P. Bachrach and M. S. Baratz "Two Faces of Power" i n C. A. McCoy and J. Playford, eds., A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s , New York, T. Y. Crowell, 1967, pp. 146-57, for a succinct statement of the debate and a c r i t i q u e of the two viewpoints. The c l a s s i c a l statement of the debate was of course Robert A. Dahl's Who Governs? Democracy and  Power i n an American C i t y , New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1961. See also Graham A l l i s o n , Essence of Decision, Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1971, who succeeds i n some measure i n r e l a t i n g the two debates. 3 Cf. J. N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign P o l i c y , " c i t e d i n Chapter One, fn. 1, supra. 4 See the works of Silcoek, Dalton and Ott, ci t e d e a r l i e r i n Chapter One, fn. 12 and Chapter Two, fn. 67, supra. ^Henry A. Kissinger "Domestic Structure and Foreign Po l i c y " i n J. N. Rosenau, ed., International P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , Revised Edi t i o n , New York, Free Press, 1969, pp. 267-273. A Branch A, since 1966, Division One, o f f i c e r as i n the Malaysian C i v i l Service generally i s required to possess a degree from a recognized university. 7 0 t t , The Sources and Content of Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . , p. 45. 8 I b i d . 9 Interview with Encik Yusof Hitam, cited e a r l i e r . The account of the decision-making process i n Wisma Putra i s largely derived from this interview. "^Interviews with Encik Hasmy Agam and M. Ben-Haron, cit e d e a r l i e r . "Agam. 245 12 Ott, op_. c i t . , p. 56. 13 Ibid ., p. 58. 14 It i s interesting to note that Ghazali himself considers that Malaysia's foreign policy formulation process i s "no di f f e r e n t " from that of the developed countries. Interview with Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, cited e a r l i e r . "'"^ From various interviews and discussions. " ^ A l l Wisma Putra o f f i c e r s to whom I spoke gave me this impression. "^Interviews with Encik M. Shanmughalingam (Treasury), Encik Fong Kwek Yuen and Encik Zainal Aznam (Economic Planning U n i t ) , and Encik Yee Che Fong (Ministry of Trade and Industry), c i t e d e a r l i e r . 18 Interviews with Encik Yusof Hitam, Encik Looi Cheok Hin, Encik Hasmy Agam and Encik M. Ben-Haron, cited e a r l i e r . Also i n t e r -view with Encik L. C. Vohra of Ministry of Laws, cited e a r l i e r . 19 Interview with Encik M. Ben-Haron. 20 Interviews with Dr. Tan Chee Khoon (Pekemas), Encik Fan Yew Teng and Encik Lim K i t Siang (DAP), Dr. Goh Cheng Teik (Gerakan), Tun Tan Siew Sin (MCA), Encik Lee Siew Yee, Encik Samad Ismail, Encik Dhahari A l i , Dr. Noordin Sopiee ( j o u r n a l i s t s ) , c i t e d e a r l i e r . 21 Kissinger, op_. c i t . , p. 273. 22 Cf. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York, C o l l i e r and MacMillan, 1968, pp. 166-167. 246 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY O f f i c i a l Publications and Documents Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of B r i t a i n  and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Federation of Malaya on  Mutual Defence and Mutual Assistance, Kuala Lumpur, Government Pr i n t e r , 1957. ASA: Report of the F i r s t Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Kuala Lumpur, Government Pr i n t e r , 1961. Diplomatic L i s t , Consular L i s t , Foreign A f f a i r s Staff L i s t , Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , Kuala Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , August 1974. Economic Report 1974-75, The Treasury Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Government Pr i n t e r , 1974. Guidelines for the Regulation of Acquisition of Assets, Mergers  and Take-overs, Kuala Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , 1974. Laws of Malaysia, Act 144, Petroleum Development Act, 1974, Kuala Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , 1974. Laws of Malaysia, Act A290, Petroleum Development (Amendment)  Act, 1975, Kuala Lumpur, Government Pri n t e r , 1975. Malaysian Parliamentary (Dewan Ra'ayat) Debates, 1964-1970, Kuala Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r . (Various volumes). Malayan Le g i s l a t i v e Council Debates, 1957, 1958, Kuala Lumpur, Government Pri n t e r . (Various volumes). Malaysia Year Book 1973/74, Kuala Lumpur, Times Publishing. Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , 1973. Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and  Development, Geneva, 23 March - 16 June 1964, UN Publication, Sales No. 64 IIB, 1964, Vol. I I . Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur, Government Pr i n t e r , 1971. 247 "Treaty of Friendship between the Governments of Malaya/Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia, 1970 and 1959" i n Rujuk: Arahan  Pejabat B i l 13, Perjanjiari Kerajaan Malaysia derigan Kerajaan Asing, Ministry of Education, Malaysia. (No date). Theses and Dissertations Dalton, J. B. The Development of Malayan External P o l i c y , 1957-1963, D. P h i l . Thesis, Oxford University, 1967. Hazra, N. K. Malaysia's Foreign Relations, 1957-1963, M.A. Thesis, University of Singapore, 1965. Leo Ah Bang. E l i t e Cohesion i n Malaysia: A Study of Al l i a n c e  Leadership, M. Soc. S c i . Thesis, University of Singapore, 1972. Ott, Marvin C. The Sources and Content of Malaysian Foreign  Policy toward Indonesia and the Phil i p p i n e s , Ph. D. Thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1971. Saravanamuttu, J. Southern Bargaining i n North-South Trade: The  Case of Tin. M.A. Thesis, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972. Yap Gaik-Khoon. Treaties and Engagements Affecting Malaya, 1940-1960, B.A. Academic Paper, University of Singapore, 1960. Books Abdul Rahman, Tunku. May 13 - Before and Af t e r , Kuala Lumpur, Utusan Melayu Press, 1969. A l l i s o n , Graham T. The Essence of Decision: . Explaining the  Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s , Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1971. Black, Joseph E. and K. W. Thompson. Foreign P o l i c i e s i n a World  of Change, New York, Harper and Row, 1963. Braybrooke, David and Charles Lindblom. A Strategy of Decision, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Boulding, Kenneth E. The Image, Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1956. 248 Boyce, Peter. Malaysia and Singapore i n International Diplomacy, Sydney, Sydney Univ. Press, 1968. Butwell, Richard. Southeast Asia Today and Tomorrow: Problems  of P o l i t i c a l Development, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1969. Crabb, C e c i l V. The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment, New York, Frederick Praeger, 1962. Charlesworth, James C , ed. Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Analysis, New York, The Free Press, 1967. Davis, Vincent & M.A. East,eds. The Analysis of International  P o l i t i c s , New York, Free Press, 1972. Deutch, Karl W., et. a l . P o l i t i c a l Communisty and the North  A t l a n t i c Area, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1956. . The Analysis of International Relations, Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall, 1968. Dahl, Robert A. Who Governs? Democracy and Power i n an American  Ci t y , New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1961. Easton, David. A Framework for P o l i t i c a l Analysis, New York, Frederick Praeger, 1965. F a r r e l l , R. Barry, ed. Approaches to Comparative and International  P o l i t i c s , Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 1966. F e i g l , Herbert, et. a l . , eds. Minnesota Studies i n the Philosophy  of Science, Vol. I I , Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958. Frankel, Joseph. International. P o l i t i c s , London, Penguin, 1969. Gordon, Bernard K. The Dimensions of Con f l i c t i n Southeast Asia, Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall, 1966. _• Toward Disengagement i n Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign P o l i c y , Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall, 1969. Gu l l i c k , J. M. Malaya, New York, Frederick Praeger, 1969. • Malaysia, New York, Frederick Praeger, 1969. . Malaysia and I t s Neighbours, New York, Barnes and Noble, 1967. Haas, Ernst B. Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 1964. Hermann, Charles F. C r i s i s i n Foreign P o l i c y , New York, Bobb-Merill, 1969. 249 Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation, New York, Doubleday, 1964. Hla Myint. The Economies of Developing Countries, New York, Praeger, 1965. H o l s t i , K. J. International P o l i t i c s : A Framework for Analysis, Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall, 1967.. Horowitz, David. Hemispheres North and South: Economics  Disparity Among Nations, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. _. Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International S t r a t i f i c a t i o n , New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1966. Issues for the Seventies, AIESEC Seminar for Student Leaders, Kuala Lumpur, Wai Meng P r i n t i n g Co. (No Date). Jenkins, Robin. Exploitation: The World Power Structure and  the Inequality of Nations, London, Paladin, 1971. Kaplan, Morton A. System and Process i n International P o l i t i c s , New York, Wiley and Sons, 1957. Knorr, Klaus E. Tin Under Control, Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 1945. and J. N. Rosenau, eds. Contending Approaches i n International P o l i t i c s , Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1969. Lagos, Gustavo. International S t r a t i f i c a t i o n and Underdeveloped  Countries, Chapel H i l l , Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1963. Lau Teik Soon, ed. New Directions i n the International Relations  of Southeast Asia: The Great Powers and Southeast Asia, Singapore, Singapore Univ. Press for ISEAS, 1973. Lee Kuan Yew. The Battle for Merger, Singapore, Government Pri n t i n g Office. (No date). Levi , Werni. The Challenge of World P o l i t i c s i n South and  Southeast Asia, Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall, 1968. Lim Chong-Yah. Economic Development of Modern Malaya, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1967. Lyon, Peter. Neutralism, Leicester, Leicester Univ. Press, 1964. . War and Peace i n Southeast Asia, London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1969. 250 Macridis, Roy C., ed. Foreign Policy In World P o l i t i c s , Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall, 1967. McCoy, Charles A. and John Playford, eds. A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s :  A Critique Behavioralism, New York, T. Y. Crowell, 1967. Martin, Laurence W., ed. Neutralism and Nonalignment: The  New States i n World A f f a i r s , New York, Praeger, 1962. M i l l e r , Harry. Prince and Premier, London, George G. Harrap, 1959. Milne, R. S. Government and P o l i t i c s i n Malaysia, Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n , 1967. and M. W. Zacher, eds. Con f l i c t and S t a b i l i t y i n Southeast Asia, New York, Anchor/Doubleday, 1974. Morais, Victor, ed. Strategy for Action: The Selected Speeches  of Tun Haji Abdul Razak, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Centre for Development Studies, PM's Department, 1969. • _. Blueprint for Unity: The Selected Speeches of Tun Tan Siew Sin, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Chinese Assocation, 1972. Morgan, T. and N. Spoelstra, eds. Economic Interdependence i n  Southeast Asia, Madison, Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1969. Paige, Glenn D. The Korean Decision, New York, Praeger, 1968. P h i l l i p s , Claude S. The Development of Nigerian Foreign P o l i c y , Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964. Pincus, John. Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich and Poor  Nations, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1967. Ratnam, K. J. and R. S. Milne. The Malayan Parliamentary Election  of 1964, Singapore, University of Malaya Press, 1967. Rosecrance, Richard. Action and Reaction i n World P o l i t i c s , Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1963. Rosenau, James N., ed. International P o l i t i c s and Foreign  Policy: A reader i n Research and Theory, Revised Ed i t i o n , New York, The Free Press, 1969. • - The S c i e n t i f i c Study of Foreign Po l i c y , New York, The Free Press, 1971. Russett, Bruce M. Trends i n World P o l i t i c s , New York, McMillan, 1965. 251 Scott, James C. P o l i t i c a l Ideology i n Malaysia, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1968. Simon, Sheldon W. Asian Neutralism arid U.S. P o l i c y , Washington, D.C, American Enterprise I n s t i t u t e for Public Policy .Research, 1975. Singer, J. D. Quantitative International P o l i t i c s , New York, Free Press, 1968. Smith, Roger M. Cambodia's Foreign P o l i c y , Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press, 1965. Sopiee, Noordin M. P o l i t i c a l U n i f i c a t i o n i n the Malaysian Region  1945-1965: From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, Kuala Lumpur, Penerbit U n i v e r s i t i Malaya, 1974. Snyder, Richard C , H. W. Bruck and B. Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy  Decision-Making, New York, The Free Press, 1962. Tilman, Robert 0. Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y , Strategic Studies Department, Report RAC-R-63-2, McLean, Va., Research Analysis Corporation, 1969. V i t a l , David. The Inequality of States, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967. Von Vorys, K a r l . Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and  P o l i t i c a l S t a b i l i t y i n Malaysia, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1975. Waltz, Kenneth. Man, the State and War, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1959. Wang, Gungwu, ed. Malaysia: A Survey, New York, Frederick Praeger, 1964. Ward, Barbara. The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations, New York, W. W. Norton, 1962. Wolfers, Arnold. Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. Yong Mun Cheong, ed. Trends i n Malaysia I I , Singapore, Singapore Univ. Press for ISEAS, 1974. Young, Roland, ed. Approaches to the Study of P o l i t i c s , Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 1958. 252 A r t i c l e s , Periodicals and Newspapers Abdul Rahman, Tunku. "Looking Back" (a weekly s e r i a l of memoirs), The Star, 1975, various issues. Abdul Razak, Tun. "Elements of Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y , " Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 1974, pp. 56-59. . "The Challenge i n Southeast Asia," Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 4, December 1971, pp. 76-83. Andriole, Stephen J . , J. Wilkenfeld and G. W. Hopple. "A Framework for Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Behaviour," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 1975, pp. 160-198. Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power" i n C. A. McCoy and J. Playford, eds., A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s , New York, T. Y. Crowell, 1967, pp. 146-157. Brecher, Michael. "Inputs and Decisions for War and Peace," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 131-177. ; et_. a l . "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour," Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, Vol. 13, March 1969, pp. 75-101. Boulding, Kenneth E. "National Images and International Systems: i n J. N. Rosenau, ed., International P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , Revised Ed., New York, Free Press, 1969, pp. 422-431. Boyce, Peter J . "The Machinery of Southeast Asian Regional Diplomacy" i n Lau Teik Soon, ed., New Directions i n the International  Relations of Southeast Asia, Singapore, Singapore Univ. Press, 1973, pp. 173-185. Chee, Stephen. "Malaysia's Changing Foreign P o l i c y " i n Yong Mun Cheong, ed., Trends i n Malaysia I I , Singapore, Singapore Univ. Press, 1974. Chin Kin Wah, "The Five Power Defence Arrangement and AMDA," Occas ional Paper No. 23, July 1974, I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp. 21. D e v i l l e r s , Philippe, "A Neutralized Southeast Asia?" i n Lau Teik Soon, ed., New Directions i n the International Relations of  Southeast Asia, Singapore, Singapore Univ. Press, 1973. 253 George, Alexander. "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of P o l i t i c a l Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1969. Ghazali Shafie, Tan S r i . "Neutralisation i n Southeast Asia," Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 1971, pp. 46-53. . "The P o l i t i c a l Future of the P a c i f i c Basin," Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 6, No. 4, December 1973, pp. 5-14. . "Elements of Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y , " Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 2, Nos. 1 & 2, December 1969, pp. 11-13. . "ASEAN's Response to Security Issues i n Southeast Asia," Talk delivered to Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Conference on "Regionalism i n Southeast Asia: Problems, Perspectives and P o s s i b i l i t i e s , " i n Jakarta, October 1974. (Handout). . "The Great Domino Fallacy," Radio Television Malaysia broadcast, as published i n New S t r a i t s Times, May 7 and 8, 1975. G i r l i n g , J. L. S. "The Changing Role of the United States i n Southeast Asia" i n Lau Teik Soon, ed., New Directions i n the  International Relations of Southeast Asia, Singapore, Singapore Univ. Press, 1973, pp. 83-91. Good, Robert C. "State-Building as a Determinant of the Foreign Policy i n New States," i n Laurence Martin, ed., Neutralism and  Nonalignment, New York, Praeger, 1962, pp. 3-12. Gosovic, Branislav. "UNCTAD: North-South Encounter," International C o n c i l i a t i o n , May 1968, No. 568, 80 pp. Hermann, Charles F. "Policy C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : A Key to the Comparative Study of Foreign P o l i c y , " i n V. Davis- and M. A. East, The Analysis of International P o l i t i c s , New York, Free Press, 1972, pp. 58-79. Hertz, John H. "The T e r r i t o r i a l State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State" i n J. N. Rosenau, ed., International  P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , Revised Ed., New York, Free Press, 1969, pp. 76-89. H o l s t i , K. J. "National Role Conceptions i n The Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1970, pp. 233-309. 254 H o l s t i , Ole R. "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study" i n J. N. Rosenau, ed., International P o l i t i c s and Foreign  Po l i c y , Revised Ed., New York, Free Press, 1969, pp. 543-550. , R. C. North and R. A. Brody. "Perception and Action i n the 1914 C r i s i s , " i n J. D. Singer, ed., Quantitative  International P o l i t i c s , New York, Free Press, 1968, pp. 123-158. Ibrahim, Tan S r i Zaiton, "Malaysia's Policy on China," Foreign  A f f a i r s Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 3, September 1971, pp. 41-45. Kissinger, Henry A. "Domestic Structure and Foreign P o l i c y " i n J. N. Rosenau, ed., International P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , Revised Ed., New York, Free Press, 1969, pp. 261-275. Lefever, Ernest W. "Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism," i n L. W. Martin, ed., Neutralism and Nonalignment, New York, Praeger, 1962, pp. 93-120. Lim Chong Yah. "West Malaysian External Trade 1947-65" i n T. Morgan and N. Spoelstra, eds., Economic Interdependence i n Southeast  Asia, Madison, Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1969,. pp. 203-238. Milne, R. S. "The Influence on Foreign Policy of Ethnic Minorities with External Ties," i n R. S. Milne and M. W. Zacher, eds., Con f l i c t  and S t a b i l i t y i n Southeast Asia, New York, Anchor/Doubleday, 1974, pp. 81-120. Mezerik, A.G. "Malaysia-Indonesia C o n f l i c t " International  Review Service, Vol. XI, No. 86. Mozingo, David. "China's Future Role i n Southeast Asia" i n Lau Teik Soon, ed., New Directions i n the International Relations of  Southeast Asia, Singapore, Singapore Univ. Press, 1973, pp. 45-52. Ott, Marvin C. "Foreign Policy Formulation i n Malaysia," Asian  Survey, Vol. XII, No. 3, March 1972, pp. 225-239. Pathmanathan, M. "The S t r a i t s of Malacca: A Basis for Con f l i c t or Cooperation?" i n Lau Teik Soon, ed., New Directions i n the  International Relations of Southeast Asia, Singapore, Singapore Univ. Press, 1973, pp. 186-196. P h i l l i p s , Warren R. "Where Have A l l the Theories Gone?," World  P o l i t i c s , Vol. XXVI, No. 2, January 1974, pp. 155-188. Reid, Anthony. "The Kuala Lumpur Riots and the Malaysian P o l i t i c a l System," Australian Outlook, Vol. 23, No. 3, December 1969, pp. 258-278. 255 "Malaysia: Key Area i n Southeast Asia," Foreign A f f a i r s , July 1965, as reprinted i n The P o l i t i c a l Element of National Power, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. (No date), pp. 3-15. Robinson, James A. and R. Roger Majak. "The Theory of Decision-Making" i n J. C. Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Analysis, New York, The Free Press, 1967, pp. 175-188. Roff, Magaret. "The P o l i t i c s of Language i n Malaysia," Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 5, 1967, pp. 316-328. Rosenau, J. N. "The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis" i n J. C. Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Analysis, New York, The Free Press, 1967, pp. 189-211. . "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign P o l i c y " i n J. N. Rosenau, The S c i e n t i f i c Study of Foreign P o l i c y , New York, Free Press, 1971, pp. 68-116. Scriven, Michael. "Definitions, Explanations and Theories" i n Herbert F e i g l , e_t. a l . , eds., Minnesota Studies i n the Philosophy of  Science, Vol. I I , Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958, pp. 99-195. Senkuttavan, Arun. " P o l i t i c s of the Haw Par Swap," Far Eastern  Economic Review, June 13, 1975, pp. 55-57. Silcoek, T. H. "Development of a Malayan Foreign P o l i c y , " Australian Outlook, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1963, pp. 42-53. Sopiee, Noordin. "Ties with Peking: The Issues and the Promise," New S t r a i t s Times, May 21, 1974. . "In Search of a Better World Order," Malaysian Panorama (Special issue), no date, pp. 2-5. Stargardt, A. W. "Neutrality within the Asian System of Powers" i n Lau Teik Soon, ed., New Directions i n the International Relations  of Southeast Asia, Singapore, Singapore Univ. Press, 1973, pp. 104-113. Snyder, Richard C. "A Decision-Making Approach to the Study of P o l i t i c a l Phenomenon" i n Roland Young, ed., Approaches to the Study of  P o l i t i c s , Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 1958. "Storm i n a Teacup," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 51, January 20, 1966, pp. 90-91. "The Tunku's Tin Trouble," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 51, January 20, 1966, pp. 88-91. 256 "Tin: Is the Price too High?," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 53, August 18, 1966, pp. 321-324. Tilman, R. 0. "Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y : The Dilemmas of a Committed Neutral" i n J. D. Montgomery and A. D. Hirsehman, eds., Public P o l i c y , Cambridge, Mass., Havard Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 115-159. Verba, Sidney. "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality i n Models of the International System" i n J. N. Rosenau, ed., International  P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , Revised Ed., New York, Free Press, 1969, pp. 217-231. V i t a l , David. "Back to Machiavelli" i n K. Knorr and J. N. Rosenau, eds., Contemporary Approaches i n International P o l i t i c s , Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 144-157. Weinstein, Franklin B. "The Uses of Foreign Policy i n Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy i n Less Developed Countries," World P o l i t i c s , Vol. 24, No. 3, A p r i l 1972, pp. 356-381. Winks, Robin. "Malaysia and the Commonwealth: An Inquiry into the Nature of Commonwealth Ties" i n Wang Gungwu, ed., Malaysia: A  Survey, New York, Frederick Praeger, 1964. Wolfers, Arnold. "The Goals of Foreign P o l i c y " i n A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. Yong Mun Cheong. "Malaysia i n 1973: The Search for a New P o l i t i c a l and Economic Order" i n Yong Mun Cheong, ed., Trends i n  Malaysia I I , Singapore, Singapore Univ. Press, 1974, pp. 3-34. Zain Azraai. "Neutralization and Southeast Asia" i n Lau Teik Soon, ed., New Directions i n the International Relations of Southeast  Asia, Singapore, Singapore Univ. Press, 1973, pp. 129-136. Interviews ( i n alphabetical order) Abdul Rahman, Tunku. Former Prime Minister, Malaya and Malaysia, personal communication received June 12, 1975 after short interview. Ben-Haron, M. P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary, Planning and Research, Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , June 17, 1975. Choo Siew Kioh. P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary, Southeast Asia I I , October 22, 1975. 257 Dhahari A l i . News Editor, New S t r a i t s Times, May 19, 1975. Fan Yew Teng. Member of Parliament, Democratic Action Party, July 9, 1975. Fong Kwek Yuen. Planning O f f i c e r , Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department, May 22, 1975. Ghazali Shafie, Tan S r i . Minister of Home A f f a i r s and former Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , October 30, 1975. Goh Cheng Teik, Dr. Parliamentary Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, June 16, 1975. Hasmy Agam. P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary, Southeast Asia I I , Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , May 30, 1975. Lee Siew Yee. Editor-in-Chief, New S t r a i t s Times Group, May 19, 1975. Lim K i t Siang. Member of Parliament, Chairman, Democratic Action Party, July 10, 1975. Looi Cheok Hin. P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary, United Nations, Americas, A f r i c a and Nonalignment Conferences, Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , May 27, 1975. Nik Kamil, Tan S r i . Speaker, House of Representatives and former Ambassador to the UN (1959-62), July 10, 1975. Noordin Sopiee, Dr. Leader-writer, New S t r a i t s Times, June 10, 1975. Samad Ismail. Editor, New S t r a i t s Times, May 19, 1975. Shanmughalingham M. Deputy Under-Secretary, Economic D i v i s i o n , Treasury, May 27, 1975. Tan Chee Khoon, Dr. Member of Parliament, Chairman, Pekemas, May 22, 1975. Tan Siew Sin, Tun. Former Finance Minister and President of the Malaysian Chinese Association, June 27, 1975. Vohra, L. C. Head of International Law Di v i s i o n , Ministry of Laws and Attorney-General Chambers, May 21, 1975. Yee Che Fong. Deputy Director, International Trade D i v i s i o n , Ministry of Trade and Industry, May 31, 1975. 258 Yusof Hitam. Under Secretary I I I , Southeast Asia, Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , June 27, 1975. Zain Azraai. Special P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary to the Prime Minister, November 1, 1975. Zainal Aznam. Deputy Secretary, Foreign Investment Committee, Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department, May 29, 1975. 259 APPENDIX I AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN  AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA  ON EXTERNAL DEFENCE AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, SIGNED AT  KUALA LUMPUR, ON 12 OCTOBER 1957. Extracts A r t i c l e I The Government of the United Kingdom undertakes to afford to the Government of the Federation of Malaya such assistance as the Government of the Federation of Malaya may require for the external defence of i t s t e r r i t o r y . A r t i c l e I I The Government of the United Kingdom w i l l furnish the Government of the Federation of Malaya with the assistance ... as may from time to time be agreed between the two governments for the tra i n i n g and development of the armed forces of the Federation. A r t i c l e I I I The Government of the Federation of Malaya w i l l afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right to maintain i n the Federation such naval, land and a i r forces including a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve as are agreed between the two Governments to be necessary for the purposes of A r t i c l e I of this Agreement and for the fulfilment of Commonwealth and international obligations. I t i s agreed that the forces referred to i n th i s A r t i c l e may be accompanied by authorised service organisations, and c i v i l i a n components (of such size as may be agreed between the two governments to be necessary) and dependants. 260 A r t i c l e IV The Governments of the Federation of Malaya agrees that the Government of the United Kingdom may for the purposes of this Agreement have, maintain and use bases and f a c i l i t i e s i n the Federation ... and may establish, maintain and use such additional bases and f a c i l i t i e s as may from time to time be agreed between the two Governments. The Government of the United Kingdom s h a l l at the request of the Government of the Federation of Malaya vacate any base or any part thereof; i n such event the Government of the Federation of Malaya s h a l l provide at i t s expense agreed alternative accommodation and f a c i l i t i e s . A r t i c l e V In the event of a threat of armed attack against any of the t e r r i t o r i e s or forces of the Federation of Malaya or any of the t e r r i t o r i e s or protectorates of the United Kingdom i n the Far East or any of the forces of the United Kingdom within those t e r r i t o r i e s or protectorates or within the Federation of Malaya, or other threat to the preservation of peace i n the Far East, the Governments of the Federation of Malaya and of the United Kingdom w i l l consult together on the measures to be taken j o i n t l y or separately to ensure the f u l l e s t cooperation between them for the purpose of meeting the si t u a t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y . A r t i c l e VI In the event of an armed attack against any of the t e r r i t o r i e s or forces of the Federation of Malaya or any of the t e r r i t o r i e s or protectorates of the United Kingdom i n the Far East or any of the forces of the United Kingdom within any of those t e r r i t o r i e s or protectorates or within the Federation of Malaya, the Governments of the Federation of Malaya and of the United Kingdom undertake to cooperate with each other and w i l l take such action as each considers necessary for the purpose of meeting the si t u a t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y . 261 A r t i c l e VII In the event of a threat to the preservation of peace or the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s elsewhere than i n the area covered by Artcles V and VI the Government of the United Kingdom s h a l l obtain the p r i o r agreement of the Government of the Federation of Malaya before committing United Kingdom forces to active operations involving the use of bases i n the Federation of Malaya; but t h i s s h a l l not affect the right of the Government of the United Kingdom to withdraw forces from the Federation of Malaya. A r t i c l e VIII The Government of the United Kingdom w i l l consult the Government of the Federation of Malaya when major changes i n the character or deployment of the forces maintained i n the Federation of Malaya as provided for i n accordance with A r t i c l e I I I are contemplated. A r t i c l e IX The Government of the Federation of Malaya and the Government of the United Kingdom w i l l afford each other an adequate opportunity for comment upon any major administrative or l e g i s l a t i v e proposals which may affect the operation of this Agreement. 262 APPENDIX I I COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIVE POWER MINISTERIAL  MEETING ON THE EXTERNAL DEFENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE, LONDON, 1 5 - 1 6 APRIL 1971. 1. Ministers of the Government of A u s t r a l i a , Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom met i n London on 15th and 16th A p r i l 1971, i n order to consider matters of common interest to a l l f i v e Governments r e l a t i n g to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore. 2. The Ministers of the f i v e Governments affirmed, as the basic principles of their discussions, their continuing determination to work together for peace and s t a b i l i t y , their respect for the sovereignty, p o l i t i c a l independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of a l l countries, and their b e l i e f i n the settlement of a l l international disputes by peaceful means i n accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. 3. In the context of their Governments' determination to continue to cooperate closely i n defence arrangements which are based on the need to regard the defence of Malaysia and Singapore as i n d i v i s i b l e , the Ministers noted with g r a t i f i c a t i o n on the development of the defence cap a b i l i t y of Malaysia and Singapore, to which the other three Governments had given assistance, and the decisions of the Governments of A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand and the United Kingdom, which had been welcomed by the other two Governments, to continue to station forces there after the end of 1971. 4. In discussing the contribution which each of the f i v e Governments would make to defence arrangements i n Malaysia and Singapore, the Ministers noted the view of the United Kingdom Government that the nature of i t s commitment under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement required review and that that Agreement should be replaced by new p o l i t i c a l arrangements. They declared that their Governments would continue to cooperate, i n accordance with the i r respective p o l i c i e s , i n the f i e l d of defence after the termination of the Agreement on 1st November 1971. 263 5. The Ministers also declared, i n r e l a t i o n to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, that i n the event of any form of armed attack externally organised or supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia and Singapore, their Governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken j o i n t l y or separately i n r e l a t i o n to such attack or threat. 6. The Ministers reviewed the progress made regarding the establishment of the new defence arrangements. In pa r t i c u l a r : a. They welcomed the p r a c t i c a l steps being taken to establish the Integrated A i r Defence System for Malaysia and Singapore on 1st September 1971. b. They agreed to establish an A i r Defence Council, comprising one senior representative of each of the fi v e nations, to be responsible for the functioning of the Integrated A i r Defence System, and to provide dire c t i o n to the Commander of the Integrated A i r Defence System on matters affecting the organization, training and development and operational readiness of the system. c. They noted the progress made by the Five Power Naval Advisory Working Group. d. They decided to set up a Joint Consultative Council to provide a forum for regular consultation at the senior o f f i c i a l l e v e l on matters r e l a t i n g to the defence arrangements. Ministers also noted that further discussion would take place between Governments on the p r a c t i c a l arrangements required for the accommodation and f a c i l i t i e s for the ANZUK forces to be stationed i n the area. They looked forward to the early and successful conclusion of these discussions as an essential basis for the completion of plans for the new defence arrangements. 7. The Ministers agreed that from time to time i t might be appropriate for them to meet to discuss their common interests. I t would also be open to any of them, the p a r t i c i p a t i n g Governments to request at any time, with due notice, a meeting to review these defence arrangements. 264 APPENDIX I I I KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION BY ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SOUTHEAST  ASIA AS A ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY,• 27 NOVEMBER 1971. WE the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phili p p i n e s , Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand: Firmly believing i n the merits of regional co-operation which has drawn our countries to co-operate together i n the economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l f i e l d s i n the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; Desirous of bringing about a relaxation of international tension and of achieving a l a s t i n g peace i n Southeast Asia; Inspired by the worthy aims and objectives of the United Nations, i n part i c u l a r by the princ i p l e s of respect for the sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of a l l States, abstention from the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of i n t e r -national disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference i n the in t e r n a l a f f a i r s of States; Believing i n the continuing v a l i d i t y of the "Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation" of the Bandung Conference of 1955, which, among others, enunciates the principles by which States may co-exist peacefully; Recognising the right of every State, large or small, to lead i t s national existence free from outside interference i n i t s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s as this interference w i l l adversely affect i t s freedom, independence and i n t e g r i t y ; 265 Dedicated to the maintenance of peace, freedom and independence unimpaired; Believing i n the need to meet present challenges and new developments by co-operating with a l l peace and freedom loving nations, both within and outside the region, i n the furtherance of world peace, s t a b i l i t y and harmony; Cognizant of the s i g n i f i c a n t trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones, as i n the "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons i n Latin America" and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming A f r i c a a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of international c o n f l i c t s and tensions; Reiterating our commitment to the p r i n c i p l e i n the Bangkok Declaration which established ASEAN i n 1967, "that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for strengthening the economic and s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure thei r s t a b i l i t y and security from external interference i n any form or manifestation i n order to preserve thei r national i d e n t i t i e s i n accordance with the ideals and aspirations of th e i r people"; Agreeing that the neutralization of Southeast Asia i s a desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about i t s r e a l i z a t i o n , and Convinced that the time i s propitious for j o i n t action to give eff e c t i v e expression to the deeply f e l t desire of the peoples of Southeast Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and s t a b i l i t y indispensable to their independence and their economic and s o c i a l well-being: Do hereby state (1) that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert i n i t i a l l y necessary e f f o r t s to secure the recognition of, and respect f o r , Southeast Asia as Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers; (2) that Southeast Asian countries should make concerted ef f o r t s to broaden the areas of co-operation which would contribute to their strength, s o l i d a r i t y and closer relationship. Done at Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, the 27th of November, 1971. On behalf of the Republic of Indonesia (Adam Malek) Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s On behalf of Malaysia (Tun Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussein) Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s On behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (Carlos P. Romulo) Secretary of Foreign A f f a i r s On behalf of the Republic of Singapore (S. Rajaratnam) Minister for Foreign A f f a i r s On behalf of the Kingdom of Thailand (Thanat Khoman) Special Envoy of the National Executive Council 267 APPENDIX IV JOINT STATEMENT ON THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE BY INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE,16 NOVEMBER 1971. THE Governments of the Republic of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia held consultations with a view to adopting a common position on matters r e l a t i n g to the S t r a i t s of Malacca and Singapore. Consultations between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore were held at the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , Singapore on October 8, 1971 and attended by the Minister of Communications, H.E. Major General Soenarso, representing Indonesia while Singapore was represented by the Minister for Communications, Mr. Yong Nyuk L i n , the Minister of Defence, Dr. Goh Keng Swee and the Acting Minister for Foreign A f f a i r s , Mr. E. W. Barker. Consultations between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia were held at the Attorney General's  Chambers, Kuala Lumpur on October 14, 1971 and attended by the Minister of Communications, H.E. Frans Seda, the Indonesian Ambassador to Malaysia, H.E. Tan S r i Major General H. A. Thalib, PMN and the Indonesian Ambassador to Singapore, H.E. Major General Soenarso representing Indonesia, while Malaysia was represented by the Attorney General, the Hon'ble Tan S r i Haji Abdul Kadir bin Yusof and the Deputy Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , Enche Zainal Abidin bin Sulong. The results of the above-mentioned consultations were as follows:-(i ) the three Governments agreed that the safety of navigation i n the S t r a i t s of Malacca and Singapore i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the coastal states concerned; 268 ( i i ) the three Governments agreed on the need for t r i p a r t i t e co-operation on the safety of navigation i n the two s t r a i t s ; ( i i i ) the three Governments agreed that a body for co-operation to co-ordinate e f f o r t s for the safety of navigation i n the S t r a i t s of Malacca and Singapore be established as soon as possible and that such body should be composed of only the three coastal states concerned; (iv) the three Governments also agreed that the problem of the safety of navigation and the question of int e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the s t r a i t s are two separate issues; (v) the Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and of Malaysia agreed that the S t r a i t s of Malacca and Singapore are not international s t r a i t s , while f u l l y recognising the i r use for international shipping i n accordance with the p r i n c i p l e of innocent passage. The Government of Singapore takes note of the position of the Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and of Malaysia on t h i s point; (vi) on the basis of this understanding, the three Governments approved the continuation of the hydrographic survey. 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            data-media="{[{embed.selectedMedia}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0093814/manifest

Comment

Related Items