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Study of the content, sources, and development of Malaysian foreign policy, 1957-1975 Saravanamuttu, Jayaratnam 1976

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A STUDY OF THE CONTENT, SOURCES, AND DEVELOPMENT OF MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1957  - 1975 by  JAYARATNAM SARAVANAMUTTU M.A., U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (The Department of P o l i t i c a l Science)  We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June, 1976  c)  Jayaratnam Saravanarauttu, 1976  In presenting t h i s thesis in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make it f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives.  It  is understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n  of this thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my writ ten pe rm i ss i on .  Department of  P o l i t i c a l science  The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 W e s b r o o k P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , Canada V6T 1W5  Date  June 30. 1976  ABSTRACT  Foreign p o l i c y studies of Third World countries i n general have been e i t h e r very narrow i n t h e i r focus, such as those based on the nonalignment theme, or comprehensive without being h i s t o r i c a l l y dynamic i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s , such as the e f f o r t s of the comparative scholars of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  Other studies have focused p r i m a r i l y  on the i d i o s y n c r a c i e s of Third World leaders i n e x p l a i n i n g f o r e i g n policy. This study i s aimed at c o r r e c t i n g these d e f i c i e n c i e s  through  the study of the content, sources and development of Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y across d i f f e r e n t issue-areas and over three h i s t o r i c a l periods spanning the years 1957 - 1975. By means of an a p r i o r i dynamic framework of f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n a l y s i s , t h i s study indeed found Malaysia to have had d e f i n i t e foreign p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , postures, s t r a t e g i e s and actions across the issue-areas of Defence and S e c u r i t y , Development and Trade, and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy i n the three h i s t o r i c a l periods of the study. Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y also e x h i b i t e d a p l u r a l i t y of sources, the potency of which v a r i e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y over the three h i s t o r i c a l periods and across the d i f f e r e n t issue-areas, demonstrating  that the  view that f o r e i g n p o l i c y formulation i s e l i t i s t may be overstated.  ii  iii In substantive terms Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y has s h i f t e d from a pro-Western, anti-communist posture w i t h i t s concomitant s t r a t e g i e s and actions i n the f i r s t period to a n e u t r a l i s t posture w i t h i t s concomitant p o l i c y outputs by the t h i r d period.  Thus, there has  been two s t a b l e periods of foreign p o l i c y , namely 1957 - 1963 1970 - 1975, and an unstable, t r a n s i t i o n a l period, 1964 -  and  1969,  marking the development of Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y from one extreme of the East-West p o l i t i c a l continuum to somewhere i n i t s mid-point. The change i n Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y , among other t h i n g s , demonstrates the s i g n i f i c a n c e of i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l feedback e f f e c t s a c t i n g upon extant p o l i c i e s . F i n a l l y , the study shows that Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s explained not merely by ranking the " r e l a t i v e potency" of the various sources of f o r e i g n p o l i c y but more importantly through the i n s i g h t f u l and l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n of these various sources to the d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y outputs i n a h o l i s t i c manner.  Chairman:  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page ABSTRACT  i i  LIST OF TABLES  v i i  LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS  viii  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  x  CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION Malaya and the Study of Foreign P o l i c y Methodology and Research Design  2  . . . .  1  . . . . . .  14  The Framework  15  Notes to Chapter 1  31  MALAYAN FOREIGN POLICY 1957 - 1963 Defence and Security  37  Development and Trade  48  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy The Sources of Malayan Foreign P o l i c y Notes to Chapter 2  . . .  59  . . . .  72 '93  iv  V  CHAPTER 3  Page MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1964 - 1969 Defence and Security  102  Development and Trade •  118  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy Foreign P o l i c y 1964-1969:  4  5  •  •  •  126  A Transitional  Foreign P o l i c y  131  Notes to Chapter 3  140  MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1970 - 1975 Defence and Security  148  Development and Trade  166  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy  .  .  .  185  Foreign P o l i c y 1970-1975:  •  .  .  193  Notes to Chapter 4 • CONCLUSION  New D i r e c t i o n s  •  A H o l i s t i c I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Foreign P o l i c y Notes to Chapter 5 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY  211 •  •  222 244 246  APPENDICES I  II  AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA ON EXTERNAL DEFENCE AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, SIGNED AT KUALA LUMPUR, ON 12 OCTOBER 1957 .  259  COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIVE POWER MINISTERIAL MEETING ON THE EXTERNAL DEFENCE OF MALAYA AND SINGAPORE, LONDON, 15-16 APRIL 1971 .  262  vi APPENDICES III  IV  Page  KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION BY ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AS A ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY, 27 NOVEMBER 1971 . . . , .  264  JOINT STATEMENT ON THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE BY INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE, 16 NOVEMBER 1971  267  LIST OF TABLES  Table 2.1  2.2  Page Malaya and the SEATO Countries: Percentage of Agreement on East-West Issues, 1957, 1960, 1963 i n UN Voting Defence and Security: 1957-1963  42  P o l i c y Outputs  .  47  2.3  Composition of Malayan Gross Exports (%)  2.4  D i r e c t i o n of Malayan Exports by  50  Destination 1958-63 (%)  52  2.5  Composition of Malayan Imports 1958 & 1963 (%).  .  .  53  2.6  Main Sources of Malayan Imports 1958 & 1963 (%)  .  .  54  2.7  Development and Trade: P o l i c y Outputs 1957-1963 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy: P o l i c y Outputs 1957-1963 Ownership of Assets i n Modern A g r i c u l t u r e and Industry, Peninsular Malaysia 1970  2.8 3.1 3.2 4.1  58 . . . .  71  . . . .  122  Ownership of Share C a p i t a l of Limited Companies, by Race and Sector, Peninsular Malaysia 1970 . Defence and Security:  .  124  P o l i c y Outputs  1970-1975  170  4.2  Breakdown of Exports by Major Commodities  4.3  Development and Trade:  4.4  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy: P o l i c y Outputs 1970-1975  . . . .  P o l i c y Outputs 1970-1975 .  vii  172 .  186 193  LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS  Figure 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4  '  Page  A Framework of Dynamic Foreign P o l i c y Analysis  16  The Sources of Malayan Foreign P o l i c y : A Thesis  74  Explanatory Chart of Defence and Security P o l i c y Outputs  82  Explanatory Chart of Development and Trade P o l i c y Outputs  85  Explanatory Chart of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy P o l i c y Outputs  . . .  88  Explanatory Chart of Major Foreign P o l i c y Outputs 1964-1969  135  The Sources of Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y 1970-1975: A Thesis  199  Explanatory Chart of Defence and P o l i c y Outputs  203  Security  Explanatory Chart of Development and Trade P o l i c y Outputs Explanatory Chart of  208  International  Co-operation and Diplomacy P o l i c y Outputs  .  .  .  211  Chart 4.1  Exports by Destination,  1963, 1974  4.2  Composition of Imports, 1963, 1974.  4.3  Imports by Major Countries of O r i g i n , 1963, 1974  viii  . . . . . . .  .  .  .  .  172 .  173 174  ix Charts 5.1  Page M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s - 1958  233  5.2(A).; M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s - 1975  234  5.2(B) 5.2(C) 5.2(D)  M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s - 1975 ( P o l i t i c a l Division)  235  M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s - 1975 (Economic & Information D i v i s i o n )  236  M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s - 1975 (Administration & General A f f a i r s , P r o t o c o l ) .  .  .  237  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  In researching t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , I have benefited from the e r u d i t i o n and advice of my supervisor, Professor K. J . H o l s t i , whose constant guidance a t the various stages of w r i t i n g has been a great boon to the t h e s i s . I would also l i k e to thank the other two members of my committee, Professor R. S. Milne and Professor M. W. Zacher who not only provided i n t e l l e c t u a l guidance but made p o s s i b l e the timely completion of the d i s s e r t a t i o n despite t h e i r many commitments. My thanks also go to the numerous i n d i v i d u a l s i n Malaysia who have a s s i s t e d me i n one way or another i n researching the d i s s e r t a t i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r , I am g r a t e f u l t o the New S t r a i t s Times, Kuala Lumpur, for a l l o w i n g me the use of i t s l i b r a r y f a c i l i t i e s and to a l l those unfortunate enough to have been interviewed and f i e l d e d the many questions I put to them. C e r t a i n l y not the l e a s t of my thanks go to the f r i e n d s of Malaysia and Canada who not only provided moral but, i n some cases, p h y s i c a l support at c r u c i a l stages of my progress. Needless to say, the sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a l l statements, opinions and judgements as w e l l as omissions and mistakes r e s t s e n t i r e l y on me.  CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  Malaysia and the Study of Foreign P o l i c y The independent, sovereign, t e r r i t o r i a l nation-state of the modern e r a continues to be the predominant actor on the world stage despite p r e d i c t i o n s of i t s e a r l y demise."'" Accordingly, the study of n a t i o n a l f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s has maintained a sustained i n t e r e s t among 2 scholars of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s even i f some a t t e n t i o n has 3  s h i f t e d to the study of non-national and supra-national actors. Despite the d i s c i p l i n e ' s continued emphasis on f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n a l y s i s , the f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s of Third World countries have not received the a t t e n t i o n commensurate with t h e i r growing importance i n world p o l i t i c s . U n t i l r e c e n t l y , preoccupation with the Cold War has tended to relegate foreign p o l i c y analyses of Third World countries to l a r g e l y c o l l e c t i v e 4  treatments such as those under the l a b e l of nonalignment, which i s i t s e l f a by-product of Cold War p o l i t i c s .  a term  A b i p o l a r world  of two i d e o l o g i c a l l y opposed power blocs and a more or l e s s nonaligned f l o a t i n g centre of Third World states i s f a s t becoming u n r e a l i s t i c , i f not already so.  While Third World countries s t i l l vaguely group  together under the banner of nonalignment, the issues that r e a l l y bind them today as a group are more often economic than p o l i t i c a l . " * The emergence of the r i c h versus poor, o r North-South, a x i s of conf l i c t on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene has i t s e l f diverted some a t t e n t i o n 1  2 away from the East-West c o n f l i c t and thereby l e d to the d e c l i n i n g importance of nonalignment  as a foreign p o l i c y posture and s t r a t e g y .  The sharpness of the post-war b i p o l a r world i s thus b l u r r e d by the emergence of t h i s and other new c r o s s - c u t t i n g cleavages, most important among which are the Sino-Soviet schism w i t h i n the Eastern b l o c and the French-American  dispute w i t h i n a d i s i n t e g r a t i n g Western b l o c .  It i s  i r o n i c that the very reduction of East-West tensions has l e d to the diminishing s i g n i f i c a n c e of nonalignment  considering that amelioration  of the Cold War was among i t s proponents' main aims.  Nevertheless,  s u f f i c i e n t Cold War-like s i t u a t i o n s i n the contemporary world remain to warrant c o n t i n u a l espousal of the concept or some v a r i a n t thereof f o r many T h i r d World countries groping f o r d i r e c t i o n i n f o r e i g n policy.  Sentimental and symbolic attachment to the concept w i l l also  ensure i t s p o l i t i c a l longevity.  However, as one w r i t e r points out,  the p r e s c r i p t i v e q u a l i t y of the concept has become somewhat suspect: The narrowness of nonalignment as a "theory" prevented i t from being adapted when e x t e r n a l circumstances so demanded. Nonalignment - or perhaps more p r e c i s e l y , i t s r o l e as a symbol of a l l the sentiments, past experiences and impressions of i t s advocates - began to a f f e c t the perspective i n which they saw the world. The behaviour of other nations might have been i n t e r p r e t e d l e s s r i g i d l y and perhaps more c o r r e c t l y w i t h i n the framework of a more f l e x i b l e a t t i t u d e f o r the new ... s t a t e s . They could have seen t h e i r own r o l e s more c l e a r l y . Decisions could have been based on evidence evaluated i n the l i g h t of t r a d i t i o n a l n a t i o n a l behaviours and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system rather than on preconceived notions f o r c i n g f a c t s to f i t nonaligned "theory. ? 11  I t follows that as an a n a l y t i c a l concept, nonalignment become suspect, or at best, would have only l i m i t e d value.  has also Even as a  d e s c r i p t i v e l a b e l of f o r e i g n p o l i c y the term conceals more than i t  3  reveals i n today's more complex, m u l t i p o l a r world. examples:  To take some  "nonaligned" Burma today e x h i b i t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t  f o r e i g n p o l i c y behaviours from "nonaligned" India or Egypt.  While  Burma has become almost i s o l a t i o n i s t and minimises contact w i t h i t s Southeast Asian neighbours and, indeed, w i t h most of the w o r l d , India and Egypt have been a c t i v e m i l i t a r i l y i n t h e i r respective regions. Both India and Egypt - e a r l y vanguards of the nonalignment movement are  also e f f e c t i v e l y but loosely a l l i e d to a superpower.  One could  c i t e other examples of nonaligned countries which do not s t r i c t l y conform to the t r a d i t i o n a l tenets of the concept but are nevertheless considered - or would l i k e to be considered - as members of the "Nonaligned Group" of s t a t e s . Some authors have preferred the term "neutralism" to nonalignment to depict the f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s of Third World c o u n t r i e s . Neutralism has the advantage of having a broader meaning of "noninvolvement i n g the Cold War"  or even perhaps noninvolvement i n any "hot" war w i t h  superpower p a r t i c i p a t i o n or support. Neutralism should however not be confused with " n e u t r a l i t y " which i s a s t r i c t l e g a l concept f o r a non9  combatant status i n any war.  Very o f t e n , nonalignment and neutralism  are used synonymously and n e u t r a l i t y i s taken to be neutralism.  The  muddled usage of these terms by statesmen has not helped to c l e a r the terminological situation.  The p i c t u r e i s further clouded by the use  of various epithets to s p e c i f y p a r t i c u l a r brands of the various concepts such as " p o s i t i v e " neutralism, " s t r i c t " nonalignment, "committed" and "uncommitted" neutralism and the l i k e .  Thus nonalignment scholars and  p r a c t i t i o n e r s a l i k e appear to be ensnared by a conceptual d i f f i c u l t y  4 that e n t a i l e d the procrustean use of concepts which to be a n a l y t i c a l l y meaningful should have d e f i n i t e and s p e c i f i c foreign p o l i c y r e f e r e n t s . Concepts such as nonalignment and neutralism cannot therefore provide the basis f o r a comprehensive a n a l y s i s of the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of a Third World country. explanations  They might be suited to short-range, narrow-gauged  of foreign p o l i c y v i s - a - v i s the major powers, but they  cannot account f o r the f u l l spectrum of foreign p o l i c y behaviours that a country may p o s s i b l y e x h i b i t over time.  In short, such concepts are  neither comprehensive nor u n i v e r s a l i n t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y to Third World s t a t e s . As f o r the explanation of f o r e i g n p o l i c y , these scholars by and large assumed that the e x t e r n a l environment of Cold War forced Third World states to g r a v i t a t e toward nonalignment.  I t i s true that  some analysts d i d point to n a t i o n a l a t t r i b u t e s and domestic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as sources of f o r e i g n p o l i c y but the importance of the e x t e r n a l f a c t o r remained a dominant theme of a n a l y s i s .  Thus Ernest W. Lefever  wrote : The philosophies of " p o s i t i v e neutralism" expounded by ... advocates of nonalignment i n A s i a , the Middle East and Black A f r i c a are v a r i a t i o n s on a c e n t r a l theme that finds expression i n the l e s s e r leaders of the emergent states throughout A s i a and A f r i c a ... They are a l l responding to the same h i s t o r i c a l forces i n t e r n a l weakness, a recent c o l o n i a l past, and global b i p o l a r i t y . The differences among n e u t r a l i s t s are differences of emphasis and s t y l e , f o r each moulds h i s p u b l i c philosophy to h i s p e r s o n a l i t y and to h i s p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l s e t t i n g and each adapts h i s p o l i c y ^ to changing circumstances i n s i d e and outside h i s country. Some analysts s p e c i f i c a l l y c i t e d domestic factors as determinants of  5 nonalignment.  As Robert C.  Good contended:  F o r e i g n p o l i c y p e r p e t u a t e s the c o h e s i v e r o l e of the r e v o l u t i o n a g a i n s t c o l o n i a l i s m ; u n d e r s c o r e s the e x i s t e n c e and i n t e g r i t y of the p o s t - c o l o n i a l s t a t e detached from the i d e n t i t y o f i t s former metropole; enhances the p r e s t i g e o f the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r a t home w h i l e r e d u c i n g the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of h i s o p p o s i t i o n ; and p r o v i d e s o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r d i v e r s i f y i n g the new s t a t e ' s r e l i a n c e on e x t e r n a l a s s i s t a n c e , thereby d i l u t i n g the potency of f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e i n i t s domestic l i f e . H By  t h i s he was  s u g g e s t i n g t h a t the  p a r t i c u l a r l i n e s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  demands of " s t a t e - b u i l d i n g " 12  I t i s not  dictated  c l e a r , however, t h a t  nonalignment p r o v i d e s the o n l y avenue toward such p u r s u i t s  as Good i n  13 h i s own  account seems to demonstrate.  Other authors i n l o o k i n g  e x p l a n a t i o n s of nonalignment found i n t e r e s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s versions  leaders  of nonalignment proposed and  World l e a d e r s  Tito.  to e x p l a i n why  The  main  different Third  a r r i v e d at b a s i c a l l y s i m i l a r f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s .  A newer crop of s c h o l a r s  - mainly a r e a s p e c i a l i s t s ^ - has  to s t r e s s i d i o s y n c r a t i c f a c t o r s and theme i n t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n  by  and  l a r g e drop the  of " f o r e i g n p o l i c y . "  s c h o l a r s have emphasized the p e r s o n a l i t y p o s i t i o n s and  the  p r a c t i s e d by v a r i o u s T h i r d World 14  such as Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, Nkrumah and  t h r u s t of t h e i r a n a l y s e s , however, was  in  for  chosen  nonalignment  In g e n e r a l ,  these  t r a i t s , psychological  dis-  even p a t h o l o g i e s of t o p - l e v e l p o l i c y - m a k e r s as c r u c i a l  v a r i a b l e s i n the e x p l a n a t i o n  of f o r e i g n p o l i c y behaviour.  ment below i s f a i r l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h i s genre of  The  state-  scholarship:  I t i s e v i d e n t that many of /the/ motivations behind the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s o f A s i a n statesmen c o r respond c l o s e l y to the p s y c h o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the s m a l l e l i t e i n charge of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . T h e i r i d i o s y n c r a c i e s had a f r e e r p l a y i n t h i s than i n any o t h e r sphere of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . In these m o t i v a t i o n s the p e r s o n a l i t i e s of the l e a d e r s and t h e i r p e r s o n a l involvement were p o w e r f u l l y i n f l u e n t i a l . What  6 many statesmen were t r y i n g to achieve f o r t h e i r states was at the same time what they were t r y i n g to achieve f o r themselves ...16 I t would seem that while the nonalignment scholars were looking f o r a common thread i n foreign p o l i c y outputs, the second group of analysts found uniquely i n t e r e s t i n g inputs stemming from the i d i o s y n c r a c i e s of policy-makers.  In one sense the area s p e c i a l i s t s were h i g h l i g h t i n g the  f i r s t group's problems i n lumping together a v a r i e t y of Third World foreign p o l i c i e s and t r e a t i n g them c o l l e c t i v e l y under nonalignment or neutralism.  While the nonalignment scholars saw d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l  s t y l e s as v a r i a t i o n s on the same theme, the area s p e c i a l i s t s underscored these very d i f f e r e n c e s i n p o l i t i c a l s t y l e s as the dominant thrust of t h e i r analyses.  The f o l l o w i n g passage from an a n a l y s i s of Malaysian  f o r e i g n p o l i c y formulation i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of a preoccupation  with  decision-making s t y l e : The Tunku presented a f a s c i n a t i n g study i n p o l i t i c a l s t y l e . He had a l l the i n s t i n c t s of a p o l i t i c i a n and a strong b e l i e f i n the e f f i c a c y of p o l i t i c s . "Government," he once warned, " i s not to be played with. P o l i t i c s i s a serious and dangerous business. I t must be treated l i k e something sacred." Bargaining, compromise, and persuasion were h i s way. H i s a b i l i t y to blunt the sharp edges of h o s t i l i t y was obviously c r u c i a l to making such a s t y l e work. Every problem was seen as e s s e n t i a l l y a human problem, and dealt with as such. H i s approach was i n the t r a d i t i o n of r o y a l t y : paternal and personal ... He responded to face-to-face encounters rather than i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d pressures ... His decisions were generally i n t u i t i v e rather than the r e s u l t of a d i s c i p l i n e d i n t e l l e c t u a l process.17 There i s nothing i n h e r e n t l y wrong with the a n a l y s i s of the d e c i s i o n making s t y l e s of p o l i t i c a l leaders.  The issue i s to what extent  one s t r e s s such i d i o s y n c r a t i c factors?  should  Have some analysts stressed  i d i o s y n c r a t i c f a c t o r s to the point that they were i n f a c t e x p l a i n i n g "decision-making s t y l e s " rather than the substance of foreign p o l i c y ?  7 The perspective of those analysts who emphasize i d i o s y n c r a t i c explanations of f o r e i g n p o l i c y seem to bear some resemblance to the 18 decision-making approach of Richard C. Snyder and h i s colleagues. However, there are at l e a s t two important d i f f e r e n c e s .  F i r s t , the  Snyder group attempted to systematize and categorize the various influences a f f e c t i n g decision-making while the area s p e c i a l i s t s had no e x p l i c i t framework of a n a l y s i s and thus analysed foreign p o l i c y i n an ad hoc fashion. Second, w h i l e the l a t t e r focussed on decision-making s t y l e s , Snyder and h i s associates were even more s p e c i f i c i n e x p l o r i n g "the d e c i s i o n " as the dependent v a r i a b l e .  The narrow focus of the  decision-making approach and the unwieldy a n a l y t i c a l framework doomed i t to remain i n the realm of theory.  Only one of the scheme's a p p l i 19  c a t i o n by Glenn D. Paige on The Korean D e c i s i o n ,  resulted.  I t has  been convincingly shown that the s u b j e c t i v e perceptions and evaluations of decision-makers, or t h e i r " d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n , " i s often a more important f a c t o r i n e x p l a i n i n g decisions than the o b j e c t i v e f a c t s 20 or circumstances impinging the decision-making  environment.  Nevertheless, decision-making a n a l y s i s i n general has f a i l e d to e x p l a i n anything l a r g e r than decisions or events, and i t s narrowness of focus makes i t a poor candidate f o r comprehensive f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n a l y s i s . For comprehensiveness one has to t u r n to the comparative  foreign  21 policy scholars.  According to these s c h o l a r s , the sources of f o r e i g n  p o l i c y are mixed and m u l t i f a r i o u s .  Both the e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l en-  vironment of the state as w e l l as i d i o s y n c r a t i c factors are important i n the explanation of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  So, too, are the more or l e s s  permanent n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of geography, h i s t o r y , c u l t u r e ,  8  c o l o n i a l h e r i t a g e , n a t u r a l endowments and the l i k e .  I t i s the i n t e r -  play of a l l these f a c t o r s that produces a p a r t i c u l a r type of f o r e i g n policy.  The analyst's task i s thus to i s o l a t e those v a r i a b l e s that  are most s i g n i f i c a n t i n the explanation of various f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s and, i f p o s s i b l e , to weigh t h e i r r e l a t i v e importance as "explanations." Pioneering the comparative study of f o r e i g n p o l i c y , James N. Rosenau 22  constructed a "pre-theory" of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  In t h i s scheme f o r e i g n  p o l i c y behaviour can be explained i n terms of f i v e sets of v a r i a b l e s i d i o s y n c r a t i c , r o l e , governmental, s o c i e t a l , and systemic.  States are  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d along the b a s i s of s i z e , economic development, degree of p o l i t i c a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and degree of penetration, while p o l i c i e s are delineated across four issue-areas - s t a t u s , t e r r i t o r i a l , human and non-human resources.  The Rosenau schema i s commendable i n a l e r t i n g us  to the various sources of f o r e i g n p o l i c y and t h e i r p o s s i b l e d i f f e r e n c e s under varying n a t i o n a l conditions and over d i f f e r e n t  issue-areas.  Following Rosenau, but aiming to synthesize and improve on e x i s t i n g frameworks, A n d r i o l e , Wilkenfeld and Hopple have presented a framework that attempts to s a t i s f y the conditions of comprehensiveness, compara23  b i l i t y , o p e r a t i o n a l i z a b i l i t y and p o l i c y relevance.  In e s s e n t i a l l y  Rosenauian terms, Andriole and associates l i s t f i v e sets of independent v a r i a b l e s s p e c i f y i n g the economic, governmental and c a p a b i l i t y dimensions of s t a t e s .  A typology of events i n terms of t h e i r s p a t i a l , r e l a t i o n a l ,  behavioural, s i t u a t i o n a l and s u b s t a n t i a l dimensions serve as the dependent v a r i a b l e s . While the Andriole group has succeeded i n improving  on  the o p e r a t i o n a l i z a b i l i t y and i n t e r n a l dynamics of the Rosenau model, i t , l i k e i t s predecessor,  s u f f e r s from three major drawbacks or defects.  9  The f i r s t two d e f i c i e n c i e s r e l a t e to the lack of h i s t o r i c a l dynamics.  The frameworks of the comparative scholars ignore or neglect  the time f a c t o r , leading to a temporal l e v e l of a n a l y s i s problem.  They  assume that general t h e o r i z i n g can be achieved by taking c r o s s - n a t i o n a l snapshots of the foreign p o l i c i e s of d i f f e r e n t kinds of states at p a r t i cular points i n time.  Such an assumption misleads, f o r the c h i e f reason  that the treatment of the e x t e r n a l behaviour of various states at d i f f e rent points of time complicates  comparability.  The problem i s l e s s  severe i f one i s analysing p a r t i c u l a r groups of nations such as Third World c o u n t r i e s , Western democracies or Communist s t a t e s , but the tempor a l problem remains as long as states w i t h i n each group are, to borrow a phrase, at d i f f e r e n t stages of politico-socio-economic  development.  A second problem with the comparative approach i s i t s "comparative statics."  The approach can seldom account f o r even the mildest changes  i n the operational environment of a state's foreign p o l i c y . A country's f o r e i g n p o l i c y n e c e s s a r i l y changes over time, say, T^, T^, T^ ... and should be analysed i n that h i s t o r i c a l progression.  T^,  Comparative  studies often analyse events of only a p a r t i c u l a r time (or p e r i o d ) , say, T^, or T^y  since the demands of c r o s s - n a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s r a r e l y allow  the luxury of l o n g i t u d i n a l , h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s . However, the most serious problem i s that the approach has l a r g e l y 24 f a i l e d to s p e c i f y what i n fact " f o r e i g n p o l i c y " i s .  Rosenau i n h i s  pre-theory neglected to t e l l us what h i s various categories of independent v a r i a b l e s were supposed to e x p l a i n .  Andriole and h i s colleagues use a  typology of events as dependent v a r i a b l e s , but t h e i r various "dimensions" remain u n s a t i s f a c t o r y because they are no more than surrogates f o r i s s u e -  10  areas.  Thus, "the s p a t i a l dimension r e f e r s to the s p e c i f i c geographic  areas i n which f o r e i g n p o l i c y events frequently occur" and "the subs t a n t i a l a t t r i b u t e s w i l l r e f e r to the p a r t i c u l a r issue-area of the event."  One s t i l l does not know what i n f a c t are the  aspects of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  substantive  A major problem with such typologies i s  that events cannot i n themselves be used to i n d i c a t e motives or goals, much l e s s something even broader such as " p o l i c y . " Charles Hermann a l e r t s us to the d i f f i c u l t i e s that continue to confront f o r e i g n p o l i c y analysts i n d e f i n i n g the dependent v a r i a b l e .  However, h i s own  formu-  l a t i o n leaves the issue f a r from resolved. The c r i t i c a l point remains that we now have no adequate c l a s s i f i c a t o r y systems and the c o l l e c t i o n of data on p o l i c y remains an e s s e n t i a l f i r s t step, not f o r the purpose of organizing the array of actions ( v i z . f i n d i n g pigeon holes f o r a l l possible a c t i o n s ) , but f o r the construction of comparative theory about f o r e i g n p o l i c y . This step must be followed by the t e s t i n g of r e l a t i o n ships selected to i n v e s t i g a t e the hypotheses advanced as explanations f o r the p r o f i l e s of foreign p o l i c y actions.25 The f o r e i g n p o l i c y framework presented i n t h i s study i s aimed at c o r r e c t i n g the major d e f i c i e n c i e s of the comparative approach.  It  w i l l categorize some independent v a r i a b l e s i n much the same fashion as the comparative f o r e i g n p o l i c y l i t e r a t u r e .  The categories, however,  are s u f f i c i e n t l y broad to allow f o r f l e x i b i l i t y i n uncovering the s p e c i a l and more p a r t i c u l a r sources of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the s i n g l e country case study.  They also allow f o r linkages between the indepen-  dent and dependent v a r i a b l e s i n a manner which s h a l l be explained  later.  More importantly, the framework s p e c i f i e s categories of dependent v a r i a b l e s - the a c t u a l substance of f o r e i g n p o l i c y - and e s t a b l i s h e s  11 general linkages among them.  F i n a l l y , f o r a dynamic, l o n g i t u d i n a l  treatment of the subject, the framework incorporates the notion of feedback over time.  A major emphasis of t h i s study i s that f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s change s i g n i f i c a n t l y over time and that there i s a gap i n the l i t e r a t u r e i n respect to the analysis of such change.  I n t h i s author's  view, f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s a f t e r t h e i r i n i t i a l formulation undergo changes according to the kinds of inputs that c o n t i n u a l l y feedback over time 26 i n t o t h e i r operation.  These inputs could range from r e v o l u t i o n s ,  coups d'etat and other domestic upheavals and events to whatever h i s t o r i c , s u b t l e , or c r i t i c a l changes occur i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment. Malaysia provides an e x c e l l e n t case f o r studying how a developing 2 country's f o r e i g n p o l i c y has emerged, changed and developed over time. The country's small s i z e , low l e v e l of m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and i t s narrow-based, l a r g e l y primary-producing but i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g economy are f a m i l i a r features of Third World countries w i t h r e l a t i v e l y recent colonial histories.  In a d d i t i o n , a tense p o l i t i c a l order fueled by a  p l u r a l s o c i a l f a b r i c - a l b e i t unique - has tended to focus a t t e n t i o n on problems of n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g .  Although i t s external goals have been  modest and low-key, Malaysia has engaged i n a wide range of f o r e i g n p o l i c y actions over various issue-areas.  I t s two major concerns have  been defence and s e c u r i t y w i t h i n and without i t s borders and s t a b i l i z a t i o n of i t s external revenue d e r i v i n g p r i m a r i l y from two or three commodities.  Malaysia has a l s o demonstrated some i n t e r e s t and support  toward g l o b a l issues of peace and co-operation.  While these concerns  have been stable external goals or objectives of the s t a t e , the a c t u a l  12 foreign p o l i c y postures, s t r a t e g i e s and actions are i n a constant state of f l u x and change and new objectives have been enunciated as well.  I t i s my i n t e n t i o n to i n q u i r e i n t o the reasons f o r such nuances,  s h i f t s and changes i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Changes i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y are i n d i c a t i v e of a state's continual e f f o r t s to seek new ways of promoting and achieving i t s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and goals, some of which are f a i r l y permanent and some of which are t r a n s i e n t .  (See f o l l o w i n g discussion on f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s ) .  Thus f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s something that i s constantly adjusted and attuned to the domestic needs of the n a t i o n - s t a t e . sense that i t i s an extension of domestic p o l i c y .  I t i s i n this This study hopes to  shed l i g h t on and e x p l a i n the linkage between domestic concerns and external p o l i c y .  On t h i s question I share the view of a recent  analyst  of Third World foreign p o l i c y : In most analyses foreign p o l i c y i s p i c t u r e d as having a p e c u l i a r i r r e l e v a n c e to the r e a l concerns of the nation. Sometimes i t appears as l i t t l e more than a game played by a s i n g l e performer or a small band of e l i t e players at the expense of the nation's r e a l i n t e r e s t s . Even when long-range f a c t o r s are adduced to e x p l a i n and j u s t i f y c e r t a i n p o l i c i e s , or when f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s seen u l t i m a t e l y as a product of forces beyond a nation's c o n t r o l , there i s the tendency to see f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i s o l a t i o n from the processes taking place w i t h i n the nation. Rarely i s foreign p o l i c y seen as a p o s i t i v e instrument i n the promotion of the nation's development or the s u s t a i n i n g of i t s p o l i t i c a l system. ° 2  However, changes and s h i f t s i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y cannot be s o l e l y a funct i o n of domestic concerns.  Very often the impetus f o r change comes  from the e x t e r n a l environment of the s t a t e .  For example, Malaysia's  recent s h i f t to a more relaxed or co-operative  orientation i n i t s  r e l a t i o n s with the communist countries may w e l l have been consequent  13  on the reduction of Western presence generally  i n Southeast Asia as  symbolized by the B r i t i s h p o l i c y of withdrawal east of Suez and the Nixon Doctrine of disengagement from Southeast A s i a .  In substantive  terms, Malaysia's foreign p o l i c y s h i f t e d from a pronounced pro-Western, anti-communist o r i e n t a t i o n to a more n e u t r a l i s t p o s i t i o n , bolstered by such foreign p o l i c y s t r a t e g i e s as the promotion of a "Zone of Peace Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y " i n Southeast A s i a .  The f i n a l step toward  neutralism came with the establishment of diplomatic  r e l a t i o n s w i t h the  People's Republic of China, a country that was u n t i l recently considered Malaysia's Number One external enemy.  The changes i n foreign p o l i c y  can c e r t a i n l y be i n t e r p r e t e d , but not e x c l u s i v e l y , as a function of i d i o s y n c r a t i c factors stemming from the p e r s o n a l i t y or p o l i t i c a l a t t i tudes and b e l i e f s of Malaysia's second prime m i n i s t e r , Tun Abdul Razak, who i n i t i a t e d the various foreign p o l i c y moves a f t e r succeeding the more conservative and pro-Western Tunku Abdul Rahman.  Then again,  b e l i e v e r s of r e a l p o l i t i k w i l l not h e s i t a t e to put down the p o l i c y changes as purely " p o l i t i c a l " moves aimed at defusing a  domestically  v o l a t i l e s i t u a t i o n represented by the continuing i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y threat of the communists to the government, o r , indeed, that the f o r e i g n p o l i c y moves were no more than attempts to woo support f o r the r u l i n g party from various groups i n the country w i t h an eye toward an impending general e l e c t i o n .  F i n a l l y , we cannot r u l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y  that  the foreign p o l i c y s h i f t s r e f l e c t and promote c e r t a i n r e a l and objective needs of the nation.  Each of these a l t e r n a t i v e explanations appear to  have an element of t r u t h i n i t and perhaps the whole t r u t h l i e s i n viewing them not as a l t e r n a t i v e but complementary explanations.  14 B e f o r e these q u e s t i o n s can be examined i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o e x p l a i n more s y s t e m a t i c a l l y the methodology and r e s e a r c h d e s i g n o f the study.  In so d o i n g , I w i l l be p r e s e n t i n g the  theoretical  framework which w i l l s t e e r and p r o v i d e the b a s i s f o r the a n a l y s i s o f the c o n t e n t , s o u r c e s and development of M a l a y s i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y f o r the p e r i o d under s u r v e y .  Methodology and Research The  Design  study i s o r g a n i z e d i n t o f o u r a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t t a s k s :  (a) t o c o n s t r u c t a. p r i o r i a comprehensive and e x h a u s t i v e framework w i t h a b s t r a c t c a t e g o r i e s o f the determinants over time.  The  framework i s based  and p r o c e s s of f o r e i g n  on the a u t h o r ' s own  f o r e i g n p o l i c y and c e r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l w r i t i n g s o f the relations literature The  notions  policy about  international  (which I b r i e f l y surveyed i n the f o r e g o i n g s e c t i o n . )  framework i s a p p l i c a b l e to the a n a l y s i s of the f o r e i g n p o l i c y o f  any s t a t e .  The  g e n e r a l manner i n which the s o u r c e s o f f o r e i g n  policy  are l i n k e d and r e l a t e d t o p o l i c y outputs i s shown i n the framework a l t h o u g h the s p e c i f i c manner i n which t h e i r e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n t s a r e r e l a t e d w i l l n a t u r a l l y depend on the case under study.  The  framework  should be seen as a g e n e r a l i z e d h e u r i s t i c d e v i c e f o r a n a l y s i n g f o r e i g n policy  behaviour.  (b) t o survey M a l a y s i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t h r e e h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d s , s p e c i f y i n g and o p e r a t i o n a l l y d e f i n i n g the dependent v a r i a b l e s o f the study o r what may  be simply c a l l e d  Malaysian foreign  policy.  the c o n t e n t o r substance  of  (c) t o advance e x p l a n a t i o n s o f M a l a y s i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y and i t s changes  15  i n each h i s t o r i c a l period.  This task i s accomplished by i d e n t i f y i n g  the c r u c i a l independent v a r i a b l e s and s p e c i f y i n g t h e i r r e l a t i v e importance and r e l a t i o n s h i p s by means of a number of i n t e r r e l a t e d hypotheses, (d) to present an o v e r a l l assessment of the explanations  of Malaysian  foreign p o l i c y over the three h i s t o r i c a l periods with a view toward generating h i g h e r - l e v e l hypotheses about Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y and about the f o r e i g n p o l i c y behaviour of developing countries i n general.  The Framework: In my framework of a n a l y s i s , the sources of f o r e i g n p o l i c y are suggested by the work of the comparative scholars of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 29  I t borrows considerably  from Rosenau's pre-theory of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  Rosenau s p e c i f i e d f i v e sets of f o r e i g n p o l i c y sources, i d i o s y n c r a t i c , r o l e , governmental, s o c i e t a l and systemic and selected four n a t i o n a l conditions of s i z e , economic development, nature of p o l i t y and degree of penetration.  In the i n t e r e s t of parsimony, I have reduced h i s  categories i n t o four basic sets of mutually exclusive f o r e i g n p o l i c y sources.  The strategy i s to be exhaustive while at the same time  allowing f o r f l e x i b i l i t y to employ imaginatively the categories to the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the i n d i v i d u a l case.  according  An excessive number of  categories tends to stymie the single-country i n v e s t i g a t o r who  may  hard put to f i n d the relevant e m p i r i c a l referents to f i l l the  categories.  The f i r s t set of sources are termed e c o - h i s t o r i c a l .  be  These r e f e r  to the r e l a t i v e l y permanent features or a t t r i b u t e s of the state such as i t s h i s t o r y , c u l t u r e or c u l t u r e s , geography, n a t u r a l endowments and like.  the  T r a d i t i o n a l l y , these sources are looked upon and described as 30 "background" f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Geopolitical factors  FIGURE 1.1 A FRAMEWORK OF DYNAMIC FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS  Sources  Eco-historical External Internal Idiosyncratic  P o l i c y Outputs  Foreign P o l i c y Objectives r  Foreign P o l i c y Postures  Strategies  •1  Actions  F E E D B A C K  Eco-historical External Internal Idiosyncratic  Foreign P o l i c y Objectives  Strategies  Foreign P o l i c y Postures  Actions  F E E D B A C K  1  17 such as a state's s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n or i t s l o c a t i o n w i t h i n various spheres of i n t e r e s t and influence would be considered external rather than as e c o - h i s t o r i c a l sources of foreign p o l i c y .  Thus the  t e r n a l sources are those that emanate from a state's external ment, that i s , influences which are the r e s u l t of actors and operating outside a state's n a t i o n a l boundaries.  sources ex-  environfactors  Rosenau uses the term  "systemic" to designate such sources while Andriole and associates d i s t i n g u i s h between the " i n t e r - s t a t e " and the " g l o b a l " components of t h i s variable.  For reasons of parsimony, my external sources therefore  incorporate both the systemic (or global) and i n t e r - s t a t e components of the Rosenau The  and Andriole frameworks.  i n t e r n a l sources r e f e r to the domestic influences  of actors  and factors operating w i t h i n a state's n a t i o n a l boundaries, such as those stemming from s o c i e t a l , p o l i t i c a l , economic and bureaucratic f a c t o r s .  governmental-  I n t e r n a l sources are d i f f e r e n t from eco-  h i s t o r i c a l sources i n two major aspects.  They are of a more transient  and p o l i t i c a l nature, while the l a t t e r are r e l a t i v e l y permanent and n o n - p o l i t i c a l i n nature.  For example, I would consider the Islamic  culture of Malaysia an e c o - h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c but Malaysian Muslims a g i t a t i n g f o r the non-recognition of I s r a e l w i l l be considered an i n t e r n a l source of foreign p o l i c y .  Another example i s that B r i t i s h  c o l o n i a l r u l e would be considered an e c o - h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r but  the  present-day workings of the B r i t i s h - t y p e p o l i t i c o - b u r e a u c r a t i c  struc-  ture of government would be considered an i n t e r n a l source of p o l i c y . The d i s t i n c t i o n i s subtle but  real.  F i n a l l y , there are the i d i o s y n c r a t i c sources which r e f e r to the  influences that stem s p e c i f i c a l l y from the i n d i v i d u a l or p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s of p o l i c y makers.  The Shorter Oxford Dictionary  defines  "idiosyncracy" as "the mental c o n s t i t u t i o n p e c u l i a r to a person or class."  This study uses the term i n i t s l a r g e r meaning and i s con-  cerned mainly with i t s p o l i t i c a l dimensions rather than with e c c e n t r i c i t i e s or pathologies  of p o l i t i c a l leaders.  have been used to "tap" t h i s f a c t o r .  the  Various concepts  Thus we have Michael Brecher's 31  " a t t i t u d i n a l prism" and " e l i t e images,"  corresponding roughly to 32  Ole H o l s t i ' s " b e l i e f system" and Kenneth Boulding's " n a t i o n a l image." Andriole and associates merely r e f e r to i t as the " p s y c h o l o g i c a l " component but includes under i t , psychodynamics, p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s , 33  b e l i e f systems and perceptions.  Again f o r reasons of parsimony, I  w i l l use the one term " i d i o s y n c r a t i c " to incorporate the most important dimensions of t h i s source of foreign p o l i c y . analyst may  In some instances, an  f i n d p a t h o l o g i c a l conditions of leaders to be s i g n i f i c a n t  while i n other instances these influences may be only marginal. My emphasis here i s to be comprehensive without being too i n f l e x i b l e 34  about categories.  Thus, f o l l o w i n g Rosenau  35  and Brecher,  idiosyn-  c r a t i c v a r i a b l e s can be defined as those aspects of e l i t e a t t r i b u t e s that are not a function of t h e i r r o l e occupancy.  Role i s thus ex-  cluded from my framework since i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e becomes dubious because of i t s d e f i n i t i o n a l status of being " n o n i d i o s y n c r a t i c . " any case i t can be considered  a governmental or bureaucratic  (and  thus i n t e r n a l ) source of foreign p o l i c y . The d i f f e r e n c e between i d i o s y n c r a t i c and i n t e r n a l sources i s based on a well-known d i s t i n c t i o n i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s literature.  I n i t i a l l y , t h i s was  stated as a " l e v e l of a n a l y s i s  In  problem"  but i s now adequately resolved.  Thus i d i o s y n c r a t i c  sources  are those at the i n d i v i d u a l or e l i t e l e v e l while i n t e r n a l sources r e f e r to n a t i o n a l or state l e v e l of i n f l u e n c e s . However, there i s a presumption i n t h i s study that one considers only the i d i o s y n c r a c i e s of the e l i t e which i s e f f e c t i v e l y i n power and not, say, the i d i o s y n cracies of the opposition leaders. The choice of categories i s s t i l l l a r g e l y a r b i t r a r y .  There i s  s u f f i c i e n t agreement, nevertheless, that sources are wide-ranging  and  m u l t i f a r i o u s and some consensus on the b e t t e r acknowledged categories. My e f f o r t , f a r from being the b e - a l l and e n d - a l l of c l a s s i f i c a t o r y schemes, has been to synthesize the wisdom of previous e f f o r t s i n a 37 manner that i t becomes s u i t a b l y relevant to my own  research.  Let us turn now to the f o r e i g n p o l i c y outputs.  As Hermann has  pointed out, c l a s s i f i c a t o r y schemes of the dependent v a r i a b l e i n foreign p o l i c y a n a l y s i s are at best rudimentary 38 l i t t l e or no agreement on concepts.  and there has been  I noted e a r l i e r that the  Andriole framework's typology of events i n t o d i f f e r e n t dimensions i s no more than a s u b s t i t u t e f o r a typology of issue-areas.  Hermann  suggests a mode of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n which he terms "progressive 39 differentiation."  This method d i v i d e s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t o various  classes of actions with each c l a s s having i t s own sub-class.  Thus  under "negative" a c t i o n s , we have "obstruct" and "object" which subd i v i d e f u r t h e r i n t o " f o r c e " and " t h r e a t " and i n t o "demonstrate" and "protest" r e s p e c t i v e l y . The same procedure i s followed f o r the other 40  two categories of " n e u t r a l " and " p o s i t i v e " a c t i o n s .  The e f f o r t i s  commendable but the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of categories i s bewildering and  20  d i s c o n c e r t i n g to the s i n g l e - c a s e a n a l y s t who a s c r i b e the c o r r e c t a c t i o n to the v a r i o u s patterns  categories.  of events or a c t i o n s r e v e a l l i t t l e  s t r a t e g i e s which are i m p l i e d by  w i l l be h a r d put  to  Moreover,  about m o t i v e s , g o a l s  the word " p o l i c y . "  and  T h i s study p o s i t s  t h a t " f o r e i g n p o l i c y " c o n s i s t s of v a r i o u s broad l e v e l s of p o l i c y outputs such as o b j e c t i v e s , p o s t u r e s and  more s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d  outputs such as s t r a t e g i e s and  Concepts such as these have  actions.  i n t u i t i v e a p p e a l s i n c e they are o f t e n the v e r y p r a c t i t i o n e r s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . degree of c o n c e p t u a l as they apply  c l a r i t y and  I have attempted to p r o v i d e  some  In my  framework, t h e n ,  p o s t u r e s occupy a c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n , and  combination, determine the k i n d s  of s t r a t e g i e s and  mented i n the a c t u a l conduct of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . on the exact  the  d e f i n i t i o n a l r i g o u r to these concepts  to the p r a x i s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s and in  terms used by  actions  imple-  Before e l a b o r a t i n g  n a t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among these key  concepts, i t  i s n e c e s s a r y to d e f i n e them more f u l l y . Foreign  Policy Objectives:  These are the e x t e r n a l g o a l s  sought by  a  41 state.  The  of p o l i t i c a l  most permanent of these o b j e c t i v e s are  the "core  values"  independence, t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and n a t i o n a l s u r v i v a l  which a l l s t a t e s must v a l u e  qua n a t i o n - s t a t e s .  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n are l i k e l y  to be  pursued by  states for a long  more c o n s i d e r i n g  the low  present  c o n d i t i o n of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system.  anarchic  n a t i o n - s t a t e s by require l i t t l e  l i k e l i h o o d o f any  These b a s i c g o a l s  d e f i n i t i o n seek to p r o t e c t  explanation  time  s u b s t a n t i a l change i n the  these core  beyond what I have a l r e a d y  from these b a s i c g o a l s , A r n o l d W o l f e r s has  of  Since a l l goals,  said.  they Apart  d i s t i n g u i s h e d between  21 " p o s s e s s i o n g o a l s " and " m i l i e u g o a l s . " at enhancing  42  The former a r e g o a l s aimed  n a t i o n a l v a l u e s and needs, w h i l e the l a t t e r r e f e r t o the  p u r s u i t o f c o n d i t i o n s which t r a n s c e n d n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s .  An example  of a p o s s e s s i o n g o a l i s b a r g a i n i n g f o r t r a d e c o n c e s s i o n s w i t h the view t o g a i n i n g economic advantage, w h i l e a common m i l i e u g o a l i s the p u r s u i t o f promotion o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace. core g o a l s a r e then s h o r t - r a n g e  F o l l o w i n g K. J . H o l s t i ,  o b j e c t i v e s o f immediate  p o s s e s s i o n g o a l s a r e middle-range o b j e c t i v e s , n o r m a l l y on o t h e r a c t o r s , and m i l i e u g o a l s a r e long-range  importance, involving  demands  g o a l s w i t h no s p e c i f i c  43 time  l i m i t s and o f grander  Foreign P o l i c y Postures:  pretensions. Postures  s t a t e toward o t h e r w o r l d a c t o r s .  are the general o r i e n t a t i o n of a They a r e d i f f e r e n t from o b j e c t i v e s  i n t h a t they a r e a s p i r a t i o n a l and a r e n o t f u n c t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i c i n purpose.  Together w i t h f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , they determine the  k i n d o f s t r a t e g i e s and a c t i o n s c a r r i e d out by a s t a t e .  However, s i n c e  p o s t u r e s a r e a s p i r a t i o n a l i n c h a r a c t e r they may not d i r e c t l y i n any f o r e i g n p o l i c y s t r a t e g y o r even a c t i o n s .  result  Thus s t r a t e g i e s and  a c t i o n s may be more a f u n c t i o n o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s than postures.  N e v e r t h e l e s s , s i n c e p o s t u r e s a r e the r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e  v a r i o u s sources o f a s t a t e ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y , they g i v e the g e n e r a l complexion and c h a r a c t e r t o a f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  F o r example,  although  the c o r e - v a l u e g o a l s e x i s t s o l e l y by v i r t u e o f n a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e , the manner i n which these g o a l s a r e sought be a f f e c t e d by a s t a t e ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y  ( s t r a t e g i e s and a c t i o n s ) w i l l postures.  22 In t h i s case the causal sequence i s : Strategies t  OBJECTIVES  > POSTURES  *1  Actions  In other instances, f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s are to a large extent determined by f o r e i g n p o l i c y postures. goals f a l l i n t o t h i s category.  In general, the middle-range  For example, a "developing-world"  posture i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y u s u a l l y leads to the p u r s u i t of developmental goals such as those sanctioned by many Third World forums.  In t h i s  case the causal d i r e c t i o n i s : Strategies POSTURES —:  ^  OBJECTIVES  >• Actions  The r e l a t i o n s h i p betwen o b j e c t i v e s and postures i s i n d i c a t e d i n my formal framework by means of two dashed arrows p o i n t i n g i n opposite d i r e c t i o n s , representing a two-way flow between the two concepts.  It  has already been mentioned that postures may not d i r e c t l y r e s u l t i n foreign p o l i c y s t r a t e g i e s or a c t i o n s . As the word suggests, postures do imply a degree of "posturing," that i s , the attempts by s t a t e s to play to the g a l l e r y and to take stands l a r g e l y f o r "home consumption" or f o r purely symbolic and p o l i t i c a l motives without any r e a l i n t e n t i o n of f o l l o w i n g through the pronouncements w i t h concrete a c t i o n s . Malaysia's adoption of a strong developing-world posture i n economic issues often has the r i n g of posturing p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the e a r l y and  23 mid-1960's.  F o r the most p a r t , however, t h i s study w i l l  concept i n i t s more f o r m a l and s e r i o u s of a s t a t e along various  sense as the g e n e r a l o r i e n t a t i o n  dimensions o r i s s u e - a r e a s  What i s c l e a r i s t h a t a s t a t e ' s  t r e a t the  of foreign p o l i c y .  f o r e i g n p o l i c y postures are of primary  importance i n the d e p i c t i o n o f i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Strategies:  These r e f e r t o t h e middle-range schemes, p l a n s and g e n e r a l  l i n e s o f a c t i o n which a s t a t e p r e s e n t s o r employs as a means o f s e c u r i n g i t s objectives.  A strategy  may be s i n g l e - p u r p o s e o r m u l t i - p u r p o s e .  That i s , i t may be aimed a t s e c u r i n g jectives.  While s t r a t e g i e s a r e d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to o b j e c t i v e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r texture  and c h a r a c t e r  f o r e i g n p o l i c y postures since one  one o r more f o r e i g n p o l i c y ob-  objective.  i s also a function of a state's  t h e r e a r e many ways o f s e c u r i n g any  To take a simple C o l d War example, a c o u n t r y not ,  h a v i n g the c a p a b i l i t y to p r o t e c t  i t s t e r r i t o r i a l b o u n d a r i e s may e i t h e r  t u r n t o t h e Americans o r t h e Russians f o r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . it has  their  Whether  goes to t h e Americans o r R u s s i a n s w i l l be determined by whether i t a pro-Western o r p r o - E a s t e r n f o r e i g n p o l i c y p o s t u r e , o r i f i t i s  n o n a l i g n e d , the s t r a t e g y would be t o s t e e r c l e a r o f e i t h e r s i d e o r p l a y o f f the i n t e r e s t s o f one a g a i n s t Actions:  the o t h e r .  These r e f e r t o the a c t u a l s t e p s taken a t the d i p l o m a t i c ,  p o l i t i c a l o r m i l i t a r y l e v e l s t o implement p o l i c y .  Actions  normally  flow from f o r e i g n p o l i c y s t r a t e g i e s b u t can a l s o flow d i r e c t l y foreign policy objectives not  I t i s unusual - b u t c e r t a i n l y  unknown - t o have a c t i o n s which a r e u n r e l a t e d  strategy, by  or postures.  objective  or posture.  from  to any f o r e i g n p o l i c y  Thus i t has been shown q u i t e  Graham A l l i s o n , employing n o n r a t i o n a l - a c t o r  paradigms t h a t  decisively actions  24 sometimes s i m p l y  o c c u r as s t a n d a r d  bureaucratic  procedures o r as  p o l i t i c a l r e s u l t a n t s o f an e x p l i c i t o r i m p l i c i t b a r g a i n i n g  process.  44  T h i s r a i s e s the i s s u e of the assumption o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n my f o r e i g n p o l i c y framework.  I have s t a t e d from the o u t s e t  study t h a t f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s c o n c e i v e d  l a r g e l y as a p u r p o s e f u l  geared t o t h e p u r s u i t o f n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s . not  t o t a l l y u n j u s t i f i e d given  p o l i c y of a small, developing goals and c o n s i d e r i n g formulation  the b i a s o f t h i s activity  Such a b i a s i s perhaps  t h a t t h i s i s a study o f the f o r e i g n country w i t h r e l a t i v e l y l i m i t e d e x t e r n a l  that o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s r e l a t i n g to p o l i c y  a r e not h i g h l y complex.  i s that while nonrational-actor  A more important argument, however,  paradigms a r e important i n t h e e x p l a n a -  t i o n o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g b e h a v i o u r , my focus  on the s u b s t a n t i v e  aspects  of f o r e i g n p o l i c y makes the r a t i o n a l - a c t o r paradigm the most s u i t a b l e c a n d i d a t e f o r my purposes.  I n any c a s e , t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y framework  p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s study does not exclude the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l process"  and " b u r e a u c r a t i c  p o l i t i c s " v a r i a b l e s , which can be  subsumed as i n t e r n a l s o u r c e s o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y . In c l o s i n g t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f the f o r e i g n p o l i c y o u t p u t s , l e t me i l l u s t r a t e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , postures,  s t r a t e g i e s and a c t i o n s w i t h a s u b s t a n t i v e  example from  25 Malaysian foreign  policy:  OBJECTIVE:  STRATEGY:  Protecting territorial integrity  A l i g n w i t h Western nations for protection  POSTURE:  ACTION: S i g n Anglo-Malayan defence pact  Pro-Western orientation -supporting Western i d e a l s  Thus f o r the purposes  of t h i s study, we  s h o u l d view f o r e i g n  p o l i c y outputs - o b j e c t i v e s , p o s t u r e s , s t r a t e g i e s , and a c t i o n s - as the dependent v a r i a b l e s , t h a t i s , the phenomena we w h i l e the v a r i o u s sources independent  (or i n p u t s ) of f o r e i g n p o l i c y r e p r e s e n t the  v a r i a b l e s o r the f a c t o r s w i t h which we  mena under study.  seek to e x p l a i n ,  I t i s c l e a r , however, t h a t one  f o r e i g n p o l i c y merely by examining  e x p l a i n the phenodoes not e x p l a i n  each of the p o l i c y outputs  dis-  c r e t e l y but r a t h e r i n the manner i n which they r e l a t e t o each o t h e r and  to t h e i r v a r i o u s s o u r c e s .  In a dynamic f o r e i g n p o l i c y  such as the one p r e s e n t e d , t h e r e may dependent and independent of  the c o n s t a n t feedback  variables.  be a tendency  framework  to confuse  the  T h i s c o u l d o c c u r i f one t h i n k s  p r o c e s s f u n c t i o n i n g as a r e c y c l i n g  device  26 whereby the p o l i c y outputs of time of foreign p o l i c y at time T^.  are converted back i n t o sources  For instance, a country may wage a  war at a p a r t i c u l a r time ( p o l i c y output) but at a l a t e r time the war w i l l have become i n t e r n a l i z e d as an h i s t o r i c a l experience and thus as an e c o - h i s t o r i c a l source of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  To avoid confusion,  therefore, we should at any one time, T , only speak of p o l i c y outputs and foreign p o l i c y sources as dependent v a r i a b l e s (d  x., 1  ,d ... d ) or independent v a r i a b l e s ( i , i ... i ) x. x x ' x„ x 2 n 1 2 n r  respectively.  Once a p o l i c y output has become i n t e r n a l i z e d as a source  of f o r e i g n p o l i c y and i s recognized as such, i t follows that i t can no more be spoken of as a p o l i c y output. I w i l l examine Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y across three broad i s s u e areas, namely, Defence and S e c u r i t y , Development and Trade and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy.  These are l a r g e l y i n t u i t i v e  categories which are again often used i n the vocabulary of statesmen. The categories are nevertheless meant to be exhaustive of the broad 45 range of f o r e i g n p o l i c y outputs that a s t a t e may evince.  While 46  there are c e r t a i n l y other p o s s i b l e ways of d e l i n e a t i n g issue-areas, I f i n d t h i s three-way c l a s s i f i c a t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y s u i t e d to my purposes.  In general, the three kinds of f o r e i g n p o l i c y objectives  i d e n t i f i e d e a r l i e r tend to correspond with r e l a t e d concerns i n the  27  three  issue-areas  Defence and  as  follows:  Security  Development and  C o r e - v a l u e Goals  Trade  P o s s e s s i o n Goals  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy  Each o f the respective  issue-areas  M i l i e u Goals  w i l l t h e r e f o r e be  surveyed i n terms of i t s  foreign p o l i c y objectives, postures, strategies  and  actions. Defence and toward i s s u e s and rity,  S e c u r i t y would cover M a l a y s i a ' s g e n e r a l  problems p e r t a i n i n g t o n a t i o n a l defence and  i t s s t r a t e g i e s and  actions  f o r ensuring  i t s b i l a t e r a l and m u l t i l a t e r a l defence and The  issue-area  orientation  therefore  or i t s e x i s t e n c e  cal unit.  Trade w i l l  Development and  j e c t i v e s , s t r a t e g i e s and  such s e c u r i t y , i n c l u d i n g  s e c u r i t y arrangements.  c o v e r s a l l m a t t e r s r e l a t e d to the  of M a l a y s i a ' s core v a l u e s ,  actions  protection  as an independent  politi-  cover M a l a y s i a ' s p o s t u r e s ,  ob-  i n m a t t e r s c o n c e r n i n g socio-economic  development g e n e r a l l y , i t s p o l i c i e s and  actions  i n such forums as  UNCTAD, and  i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n m u l t i l a t e r a l economic  such as the  I n t e r n a t i o n a l T i n Agreements.  Under t h i s i s s u e - a r e a ,  the investment p o l i c i e s M a l a y s i a p r o f f e r s v i s - a - v i s the  i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s , as w e l l as toward n o n - n a t i o n a l a c t o r s multi-national business corporations.  the  associations  would a l s o i n c l u d e q u e s t i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l j u s t i c e , and  secu-  International  I  aid,  rich, such  Co-operation  as  28 and Diplomacy c o v e r s the areas o f M a l a y s i a ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , i t s a g e n c i e s and o t h e r s u p r a - n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g r e g i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s such as ASA, Where such a c t i v i t y i s d i r e c t l y concerned  the Commonwealth.  o r connected w i t h n a t i o n a l  defence and s e c u r i t y o r w i t h development and c o n s i d e r e d t o f a l l under the two  ASEAN and  trade, i t s h a l l  l a t t e r categories.  The  between the i s s u e - a r e a s i s guided by r e f e r e n c e to f o r e i g n  be  distinction policy  o b j e c t i v e s as i n d i c a t e d i n the t a b l e p r e s e n t e d i n the p r e c e d i n g page. However, i n the a c t u a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y e v e n t s , some o v e r l a p i n the t h r e e broad  issue-areas i s unavoidable s i n c e f o r e i g n  p o l i c y a c t i o n s can o f t e n be m u l t i - p u r p o s e i n i n t e n t . The  f o r e i g n p o l i c y survey w i l l be c a r r i e d out over t h r e e h i s t o -  r i c a l periods.  There are both t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a -  t i o n s f o r d o i n g so.  I have emphasized from the o u t s e t a p r e f e r e n c e  f o r a d y n a m i c - h i s t o r i c a l approach  to f o r e i g n p o l i c y  analysis.  D i v i d i n g the a n a l y s i s i n t o s e p a r a t e p e r i o d s p r o v i d e s the o p p o r t u n i t y to examine the feedback t h i s p r o c e s s has While  p r o c e s s over time and the manner i n which  l e d to broad s h i f t s i n M a l a y s i a n f o r e i g n  policy.  i t i s p o s s i b l e to d i v i d e the a n a l y s i s i n t o many more time  p e r i o d s , i t would be d i f f i c u l t to do so.  to f i n d l o g i c a l h i s t o r i c a l  Second, i t i s not the purpose  demarcations  of t h i s study to examine every  d e t a i l o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y , but to a n a l y s e i t over broad sweeps o f  time  i n o r d e r t h a t the more g e n e r a l a s p e c t s o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y changes  may  be d i s c e r n e d .  The p a r t i c u l a r time p e r i o d s were chosen because  M a l a y s i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y has  tended  to e x h i b i t a c e r t a i n degree  d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s i n terms o f p o l i c y outputs i n each p e r i o d . ^  of  The  beginning or end of each period i s marked by an event or events which have a s i g n i f i c a n t impact generally on p o l i t i c s and i n p a r t i c u l a r on f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The periods, with t h e i r appropriate  designations,  are: 1957-1963  Malayan Foreign P o l i c y under Tunku Abdul Rahman  1964-1969  Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y under Tunku Abdul Rahman  1970-1975  Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y under Tun Abdul Razak  On August 31, 1957, Malaya became an independent nation under the prime m i n i s t e r s h i p of Tunku Abdul Rahman.  I t was under the Tunku  that the emergent Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y took shape and had i t s basic tenets enunciated.  By September 16, 1963, s t i l l under the Tunku's  leadership, the Malayan Federation was expanded to include the former B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r i e s of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah i n the new Federation of Malaysia.  (Singapore subsequently l e f t the  federation on August 9, 1965).  The formation of Malaysia brought i n  i t s wake the f i r s t , and to date, the only e x t e r n a l challenge to the p o l i t i c a l existence of the nation i n the form of Indonesian Confrontation.  The second period of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s thus a period  of turbulence as w e l l as t r a n s i t i o n .  I t i s not only of symbolic but  also of a n a l y t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e that the period closed with the domestic violence of May 13, 1969 and the subsequent retirement from p o l i t i c s of the Tunku.  The f i n a l period of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s thus a  period of change and c o n s o l i d a t i o n of change and i s marked by the enunciation of new d i r e c t i o n s i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I t could be s a i d to begin near the end of 1969 (September) when Tun Abdul Razak assumed charge as the D i r e c t o r of National Operations but Razak d i d not  succeed the Tunku as Prime M i n i s t e r u n t i l September 22, 1970.  For  convenience, I have designated the period as beginning i n 1970. The t r a g i c and unexpected death of Tun Razak i n January 1976, provides perhaps a symbolic end to the t h i r d period.  31 Notes to Chapter 1  See John H. Hertz, "The T e r r i t o r i a l State R e v i s i t e d : R e f l e c t i o n s on the Future of the Nation-State" i n J . N. Rosenau, ed., I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , Second E d i t i o n , New York, Free Press, 1969, pp. 76-89, f o r a candid r e - a p p r a i s a l of unexpected r e s i l i e n c e of the n a t i o n a l u n i t . 2 Indeed, f o r e i g n p o l i c y has been s a i d to be "the key subject i n the study of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . " See David V i t a l , "Back to M a c h i a v e l l i " i n Klaus Knorr and J . N. Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , P r i n c e t o n , Princeton Univ. Press, 1969, p. 151. However, the system-oriented scholars w i l l no doubt challenge such a view. See, f o r example, Morton A. Kaplan's c l a s s i c System and Process i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , New York, Wiley and Sons, 1957, and Richard Rosecrance's A c t i o n and Reaction i n World P o l i t i c s , Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1963, f o r two d i f f e r e n t genres of the systemic approach. 3 The c l a s s i c work i n the area i s I n i s Claude's Swords i n t o Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organization, New York, Random House, 1956, while new ground was broken i n the study of supra-nationalism i n terms of i n t e g r a t i o n theory i n K a r l Deutsch, e t . a l . , P o l i t i c a l Community i n the North A t l a n t i c Area, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1957 and i n terms of " f u n c t i o n a l i s m " i n Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 1964. There has followed a spate of studies on i n t e g r a t i o n theory too numerous to name here. 4 See, f o r example, C e c i l V. Crabb, The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment, New York, Praeger, 1965, Peter Lyon, Neutralism, L e i c e s t e r , L e i c e s t e r Univ. Press, 1964 and Laurence M a r t i n , ed., Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States i n World A f f a i r s , New York, Praeger, 1962,for various treatments of the subject. "*See the e x c e l l e n t statement and documentation of such a view by B r a n i s l a v Gosovic, "UNCTAD: North-South Encounter," I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , May 1968, No. 568, 80 pp. 6 Lyon, op_. c i t . , p. 62. Werner L e v i , The Challenge of World P o l i t i c s i n South and Southeast A s i a , Englewood C l i f f s , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1968, p. 113.  32 g  Lyon, op_. c i t . , p. 20.  9  Cf. K. J . H o l s t i , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , Englewood C l i f f s , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1967, pp. 103-110. "^Ernest W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism" i n M a r t i n , op_. c i t . , pp. 93-94. "'""''Robert C. Good, " S t a t e - B u i l d i n g as a Determinant of the Foreign P o l i c y i n New States" i n i b i d . , p. 11. 12 I b i d . , pp.  3-5.  13 Since the a r t i c l e appears i n a reader on nonalignment and neutralism, one assumes the w r i t e r i s attempting to r e l a t e h i s d i s cussion to that t o p i c . 14 Lyon, Neutralism, op. c i t . and Lefever, op_. c i t . "'""'There are c l e a r l y some area s p e c i a l i s t s who q u a l i f y as analysts of the f i r s t genre, a case i n point being Peter Lyon, whose work I have already c i t e d . See a l s o h i s War and Peace i n Southeast A s i a , London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1969. Other area s p e c i a l i s t s who emphasize long-term and e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s include Roger M. Smith, Cambodia's Foreign P o l i c y , Ithaca, C o r n e l l Univ. Press, 1965 and Claude S. P h i l l i p s , The Development of N i g e r i a n Foreign P o l i c y , Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press. A w r i t e r i n seeking to discover general trends and thrusts i n the l i t e r a t u r e may perhaps be allowed a degree of poetic l i c e n s e i n grouping scholars under c e r t a i n desc r i p t i v e l a b e l s without doing undue violence to t r u t h . " ^ L e v i , op. c i t . , p. 13. "^Marvin O t t , "Foreign P o l i c y Formulation i n Malaysia," Asian Survey, V o l . X I I , No. 3, March 1973, p. 226. 18 R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B. Sapin, eds., Foreign P o l i c y Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , New York, Free Press, 1962. 19  New York, Praeger,  1968.  33 20  See, f o r example, the works of C. F. Hermann, C r i s i s i n Foreign P o l i c y , New York, Bobb-Merill, 1969, Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of P o l i t i c a l Leaders and Decision-Making," I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies Quarterly, V o l . 13, No. 2, June 1969, and 0. R. H o l s t i , R. C. North, and R. A. Brody, "Perception and A c t i o n i n the 1914 C r i s i s " i n J . D. Singer, ed., Quantitative I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , New York, Free Press, 1968, f o r d i f f e r e n t approaches to phenomenological a n a l y s i s . 21 See, f o r example, J . N. Rosenau, The S c i e n t i f i c Study of Foreign P o l i c y , New York, Free Press, 1971, e s p e c i a l l y pp. 24-67 and 68-95, R. Barry F a r r e l l , ed., Approaches to Comparative and I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 1966, and the more t r a d i t i o n a l approach of Roy C. M a c r i d i s , ed., Foreign P o l i c y i n World P o l i t i c s , Englewood C l i f f s , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1967. 22 "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign P o l i c y " i n Rosenau, op. c i t . . p a r t i c u l a r l y , pp. 68-95 and 103-166. 23 Stephen J . A n d r i o l e , J . Wilkenfeld and G. W. Hopple, "A Framework f o r Comparative A n a l y s i s of Foreign P o l i c y Behaviour," I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies Quarterly, V o l . 19, No. 2, June 1975. 24 See K. J . H o l s t i , "National Role Conceptions i n the Study of Foreign P o l i c y , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies Quarterly, V o l . 4, No. 3, 1970, pp. 233-309, f o r an attempt at c o r r e c t i n g the lopsidedness i n foreign p o l i c y a n a l y s i s . H o l s t i f i n d s that apart from the standard l a b e l s of Western Bloc, Eastern Bloc and Nonalignment, countries could w e l l have a number of d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l r o l e conceptions such as " r e g i o n a l p r o t e c t o r , " "balancer," "bastion of r e v o l u t i o n " and so f o r t h . There i s also a need to develop a set of u n i v e r s a l categories to i n d i c a t e what i t i s that we seek to e x p l a i n of the substantive aspects of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Such c a t e g o r i z i n g i s attempted i n the framework presented i n t h i s study. 25 Charles F. Hermann, " P o l i c y C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : A Key to the Comparative Study of Foreign P o l i c y , " i n V. Davi and M. A. East, The A n a l y s i s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , New York, Free Press, 1972, pp. 58-79.  34 26  See, f o r example, Michael Brecher, "Inputs and Decisions f o r War and Peace," I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies Quarterly, V o l . 18, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 131-177, f o r an e x c e l l e n t study of the June 1967 I s r a e l i - A r a b War i n which the author makes abundant use of the feedback concept . The research design Brecher employs i s i n the genre of decision-making a n a l y s i s and i s s u i t e d more f o r the d e t a i l e d study of p a r t i c u l a r events rather than f o r broad aspects of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n which we are i n t e r e s t e d . 27 The study's t i t l e accordingly r e f l e c t s the dynamic approach employed. I t a l s o takes i t s point of departure from the f i r s t known study of Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y by T. H. S i l c o e k , "Development of a Malayan Foreign P o l i c y , " A u s t r a l i a n Outlook, V o l . 17, No. 3, 1963, pp. 42-53. W r i t i n g i n 1963, Prof. S i l c o e k succeeded admirably i n sketching out the broad o u t l i n e s of an emerging f o r e i g n p o l i c y . A d o c t o r a l t h e s i s of a s i m i l a r t i t l e by J . B. Dalton, The Development of Malayan E x t e r n a l P o l i c y , 1957-1963, D. P h i l . Thesis, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y , 1967, describes i n some d e t a i l Malaya's f o r e i g n p o l i c y v i s - a - v i s the Cold War, i t s Asian neighbours, the Commonwealth and the United Nations, but may be subject to the same c r i t i c i s m as Prof. S i l c o e k i n prematurely terming the f i r s t f i v e years of Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y as "development." 28 F r a n k l i n B. Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign P o l i c y i n Indonesia: An Approach to the A n a l y s i s of Foreign P o l i c y i n the Less Developed Countries," World P o l i t i c s , V o l . 24, No. 3, A p r i l 1972, pp. 356-357. 29 "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign P o l i c y , " l o c . c i t . 30 See, f o r example, Roy M a c r i d i s , op. c i t . , and J . E. Black and K. W. Thompson, Foreign P o l i c i e s i n a World of Change, New York, Harper and Row, 1963. 31 M. Brecher, "A Framework f o r Research on Foreign P o l i c y Behaviour," Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, V o l . 13, March 1969$ p. 86. 32 0. Study" i n New York, "National 33  R. H o l s t i , "The B e l i e f System and N a t i o n a l Images: A Case Rosenau, ed., I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , Free Press, 1969, pp. 543-550, and K. E. Boulding, Images and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Systems" i n i b i d . , pp. 422-431.  A n d r i o l e , et_. aj.., op_. c i t . , p.  182.  35 Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign P o l i c y , " op. cit. "^Brecher, op_. c i t . 36 J . D. Singer, "The L e v e l - o f - A n a l y s i s Problem i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s " i n Rosenau, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . , pp. 20-29. 37 This r a i s e s an epistemological i s s u e . My p o s i t i o n i s that the t r u t h of a s c i e n t i f i c explanation i s l a r g e l y context-dependent and bounded by the h y p o t h e t i c a l constructs with which explanation i s made and i s therefore dependent on the state of the science i n question. See, f o r example, Michael Scriven, " D e f i n i t i o n s , Explanations, and Theories" i n H. F e i g l e , et^. a l . , Minnesota Studies i n the Philosophy of Science, V o l . I I , pp. 9 9 f f , f o r h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the a n a l y t i c a l method of context a n a l y s i s to which t h i s author subscribes. 38 Hermann, op_. c i t . , pp. 58-61. 39 A f t e r a survey of various types of c l a s s i f i c a t o r y schemes, Hermann seems to s e t t l e f o r t h i s approach which i s borrowed from biology. See i b i d . , pp. 68-70. 40 , Ibxd. T  41 See K. J . H o l s t i , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , pp. 132-135. 42 "The Goals of Foreign P o l i c y " i n Arnold Wolfers, Discord and C o l l a b o r a t i o n , Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1962, pp. 73-74. H o l s t i , op_. c i t . , pp. 131-132. While i n Wolfer's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n possession goals include core-value goals, I p r e f e r to use the two terms as mutually e x c l u s i v e . Wolfers also d i s t i n g u i s h e s between " d i r e c t " and " i n d i r e c t " goals, that i s , those d i r e c t l y serving n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and those serving the i n t e r e s t s of p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s . This d i s t i n c t i o n i s not pertinent here since t h i s study i s i n general concerned w i t h only n a t i o n a l or state goals. See Wolf e r s , op_. c i t . , p. 77.  3  36 G. A l l i s o n , The Essence of Decision: E x p l a i n i n g the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s , Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1972. There also e x i s t s a school of thought which not only suggests but prescribes "the science of muddling through" as the b a s i s of the decision-making process. P o l i t i c a l decisions are thus seen as " d i s j o i n t e d " and "incremental" i n nature, guided as they are by inadequate information and understanding and thus subject to constant reconsideration and r e d i r e c t i o n . See David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of D e c i s i o n , New York, Free Press, 1963, pp. 61-66. 45 Cf. Brecher's four issue-areas of M i l i t a r y - S e c u r i t y , P o l i t i c a l Diplomatic, Economic-Developmental and C u l t u r a l - S t a t u s . Brecher, op. c i t . 46 Rosenau, f o r example, c l a s s i f i e s issues i n t o the s t a t u s , t e r r i t o r i a l , non-human and human resources areas. See "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign P o l i c y , " op. c i t . 47 Cf. Stephen Chee, "Malaysia's Changing Foreign P o l i c y " i n Yong Mun Cheong, ed., Trends i n Malaysia I I , ISEAS, 1974. Although Chee's periods (1957-62, 1963-67, and 1968-73) do not e n t i r e l y coincide with mine, h i s choice of three periods i s s i g n i f i c a n t .  CHAPTER 2 MALAYAN FOREIGN POLICY 1957 - 1963  Defence and Security The cornerstone of Malaya's e x t e r n a l defence p o l i c y was the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement of 1957 whereby B r i t a i n and Malaya were o b l i g a t e d to provide each other w i t h mutual a i d i n the event of an armed attack on e i t h e r Malaya or B r i t i s h possessions i n the Far East.  The relevant a r t i c l e reads:  In the event of armed attack against any of the t e r r i t o r i e s or forces of the Federation of Malaya or any of the t e r r i t o r i e s or protectorates of the United Kingdom i n the Far East or any of the forces of the United Kingdom w i t h i n any of those t e r r i t o r i e s or protectorates or w i t h i n the Federation of Malaya, the governments of the Federation of Malaya and the United Kingdom undertake to cooperate w i t h each other and w i l l take such a c t i o n as each considers necessary for the purpose of meeting the s i t u a t i o n effectively.^ The two governments were a l s o to consult each other i f the peace of 2 the mentioned t e r r i t o r i e s was threatened.  Should h o s t i l i t i e s  i n v o l v i n g e i t h e r party occur anywhere e l s e i n the world, "the Government of the United Kingdom s h a l l obtain p r i o r agreement of the Government of the Federation of Malaya before committing United Kingdom forces to a c t i v e operations i n v o l v i n g the use of bases i n 3 the Federation of Malaya ..."  Another p r o v i s i o n o b l i g a t e d the  p a r t i e s to consult each other "when major changes i n the character 37  38 or deployment of the f o r c e s m a i n t a i n e d  i n the F e d e r a t i o n  ... were  4 contemplated."  Beneath the f o r m a l language, t h i s p r o v i s o  was  e v i d e n t l y a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d not i n t r o d u c e n u c l e a r weapons i n t o Malaya without  the l a t t e r ' s  approval.  Malaya's o b j e c t i v e s i n n e g o t i a t i n g the t r e a t y were obvious I t had  fairly  g i v e n the s i z e of i t s armed f o r c e s a t the time of independence. o n l y one b a t t a l i o n of the Malay Royal Regiment, but no a i r  f o r c e or navy.  The Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r and Defence M i n i s t e r ,  Tun Abdul Razak, gave the f o l l o w i n g r a t i o n a l e f o r Malaya's defence policy: Today the c o s t of m a i n t a i n i n g defence f o r c e s i s extremely h i g h and can be s a i d to be p r o h i b i t i v e . The U n i t e d S t a t e s and the USSR may perhaps be the o n l y powers i n the w o r l d which can c l a i m to m a i n t a i n f o r c e s of s u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h to p r o t e c t themselves. Other c o u n t r i e s , a p a r t from s u p p o r t i n g the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , have t o combine t o g e t h e r forming c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y p a c t s such as NATO, CENTO and SEATO. As f a r as the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya i s concerned we are a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l n a t i o n w i t h many demands on our r e s o u r c e s . We have to c o n c e n t r a t e our e f f o r t s on improving the s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g o f our people and p r o v i d e them w i t h a m e n i t i e s and s o c i a l s e r v i c e s which a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r an independent and c i v i l i s e d c o u n t r y . T h e r e f o r e , we can o n l y a f f o r d to m a i n t a i n a s m a l l defence f o r c e and must depend f o r our e x t e r n a l defence on the h e l p of f r i e n d s and a l l i e s i n times of need. That i s why ... we e n t e r e d i n t o a mutual defence pact w i t h the U n i t e d Kingdom Government, a s s o c i a t e d by the governments of A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand .... Our defence p o l i c y i s , t h e r e f o r e , to c o n t r i b u t e toward a common Commonwealth e f f o r t i n the p r o t e c t i o n o f our t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h i s a r e a and f o r the maintenance of e x t e r n a l peace and s e c u r i t y of our country, to ensure t h a t the a u t h o r i t y of the l a w f u l government i s e f f e c t i v e l y e n f o r c e d anywhere g i n the F e d e r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g i t s t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s .  For B r i t a i n , the pact was used as a means to protect i t s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n the region with an eye p a r t i c u l a r l y toward i t s Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) commitments.  However,  the facade of formal language i n the pact couched a preoccupation with the communist threat to the region.  Malaya's long and b i t t e r  i n t e r n a l war w i t h the communists i n which the B r i t i s h played the major r o l e , l e f t the country, or at l e a s t the policy-makers, with a considerable degree of fear of communist expansionism i n Southeast Asia. Malaya's defence, p r i o r to independence on August 31, 1957,  had  been provided f o r by the ANZAM Agreement of 1949 between B r i t a i n , A u s t r a l i a and New  Zealand.  The Commonwealth Far East S t r a t e g i c  Reserve was formed i n 1955 and stationed i n Malaya, i t s functions being to contain communist i n s u r r e c t i o n , provide defence from external attack, and carry out SEATO o b l i g a t i o n s . ^ In the protracted negotiations over the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) i n g which l e t t e r s were exchanged u n t i l as l a t e as August 23, Malaya had e v i d e n t l y , "won  1957,  a maximum of s e c u r i t y with a minimum of  o b l i g a t i o n and i t had not compromised on two b a s i c p o l i c i e s of 9 r e j e c t i n g nuclear weapons and r e f u s i n g to j o i n SEATO." However, AMDA was not accepted at home without a b r i e f groundswell of opposition against the pact from n a t i o n a l i s t elements i n the United Malay N a t i o n a l Organization (UMNO) of the r u l i n g A l l i a n c e Party, the opposition p a r t i e s , and various trade union leaders and p u b l i c f i g u r e s , while the most v o c a l support f o r the pact came from the non-Malay partners i n the A l l i a n c e , the Malayan Chinese  A s s o c i a t i o n (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).  The  UMNO back-bench r e v o l t began when a party member, Tajuddin A l i , attacked the treaty as being "harmful to independent Malaya.""'""'' This sparked o f f the Johore UMNO Youth claim that the pact made Malaya i n d i r e c t l y a member of SEATO and l e d the UMNO Kedah branch to c a l l , f o r an emergency general session to discuss the i m p l i c a t i o n s 12  of the t r e a t y as i t considered some of the clauses too b i n d i n g . The Prime M i n i s t e r , Tunku Abdul Rahman, stood h i s ground amidst mounting c r i t i c i s m of the t r e a t y but was forced to c a l l an emergency meeting of the UMNO Executive Committee to " e x p l a i n " the pact. The Tunku placed h i s leadership a t stake by making the pact a "confidence i s s u e , " s t a t i n g that an emergency UMNO assembly debate on the pact 13  would be taken by him to be a vote of no confidence.  The Tunku's  t a c t i c succeeded and he won a unanimous vote from the Executive Committee and the demand f o r a general session subsided.  The Tunku,  however, d i d make the concession that the t r e a t y would be reviewed w i t h i n a year. Subsequently, i n October, AMDA was presented and debated i n the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . A number of back-benchers,  the opposition  p a r t i e s , and the trade union representatives continued to oppose the pact, i n general, arguing that i t compromised Malaya's sovereignty and independence, that m i l i t a r y pacts i n v i t e d m i l i t a r y t h r e a t s , and that Malaya was unnecessarily rushing i n t o a m i l i t a r y pact without 14  having had a f u l l debate on f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  The Tunku r e i t e r a t e d  the government's p o s i t i o n that the pact was a matter of n e c e s s i t y : ... l e t us face f a c t s , and the f a c t s are that we  have a t our command an army of l e s s than one d i v i s i o n i n strength; we have no a i r f o r c e , not even a s i n g l e plane o r a s i n g l e man; we have no navy, not even a s i n g l e s a i l o r and we have not even a sea-going c r a f t . With the revenue a t our command we can never be able t o b u i l d our forces to the strength which we would require f o r the defence of our country.15 The Tunku i n winding up the debate again staked h i s p o l i t i c a l career over the i s s u e , s t a t i n g " ... i f the people of t h i s country do not want [the t r e a t y ] , a simple thing can be done and that i s - t h i s i s a l l I ask of the people of t h i s country and of my party - to c a l l a meeting, a general meeting, of UMNO and pass a vote of 'no confidence' against me and my f r i e n d s and colleagues, and we can j u s t make way f o r some other clever 'Dicks' to come and run t h i s country.""^ As i t turned out, the motion of support f o r the treaty was unanimously passed, with those opposing i t , a b s t a i n i n g . In the l i g h t of the UMNO rear-guard opposition to AMDA, i t i s perhaps l e s s s u r p r i s i n g that Malaya had not j o i n e d SEATO. The leadership dared not hazard a formal t i e with the Western bloc even though SEATO was s p e c i f i c a l l y aimed a t containing communism, which, presumably, was the chief purpose of AMDA. Among the other reasons given f o r n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n SEATO was that Malaya would not have gained any m i l i t a r y advantage by j o i n i n g and that the organization was unpopular with India and Indonesia, the two non-communist Asian bulwarks to which Malaysia showed a great degree of deference. The Tunku, when asked about Malaya's d e c i s i o n not to j o i n SEATO, was quoted i n Canberra i n 1959 as saying:  "Well, I don't count, you  know. As the representative of my people, I have t o do as they want,  and SEATO i s rather unpopular among my people.  I don't know f o r what  ,,18 reason. Despite Malaya's many denials that i t had anything t o do w i t h 19 SEATO, Robert 0. Tilman has compiled evidence, produced below, that Malaya's v o t i n g i n the United Nations c l o s e l y approximated that of 20 the SEATO countries.  TABLE 2.1 Malaya and the SEATO Countries: Percentage of Agreement on East-West Issues, 1957, 1960, 1963' i n UN Voting*  Country  1957  Australia New Zealand United Kingdom United States Pakistan Philippines Thailand  N=17  a  a  79 79 79 79 85 85 88  1960  b  72 72 72 72 88 72 80  b  N=15  1963°  88 91 79 88 82 (N=ll) 96 91  N=12  C  *France, the eighth SEATO member, was excluded from the v o t i n g tallies. Source: R. 0. Tilman, Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y , S t r a t e g i c Studies Dept., Report RAC-R-63-2, 1969, p. 23.  43 The  t a b l e , which shows Malaya's v o t e s on East-West i s s u e s a t  the U n i t e d N a t i o n s computed a c c o r d i n g to the percentage  o f agreement  w i t h the s t i p u l a t e d c o u n t r i e s , i n d i c a t e s t h a t Malaya, a l t h o u g h i n SEATO, was  n e v e r t h e l e s s c i r c u m s t a n t i a l l y and i n s p i r i t  the o r g a n i z a t i o n .  The  Tunku h i m s e l f d i d not deny Malaya's  l i n k s w i t h the o r g a n i z a t i o n . he  not  c l o s e to indirect  In answer to a q u e s t i o n i n P a r l i a m e n t :  said: As you know, we are not i n SEATO. We a r e t i e d up w i t h B r i t a i n under the Defence Agreement but whether t h a t has i n d i r e c t l y t i e d us t o SEATO i s a q u e s t i o n t h a t would be d i f f i c u l t f o r me to answer. A l l I can say i s t h a t we are not i n SEATO. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , i f SEATO c o u n t r i e s a r e i n v o l v e d i n any war, we a r e not committed to the war, but on the o t h e r hand, i f B r i t a i n e n t e r e d the war and one o f the c o u n t r i e s which we a r e committed t o defend, l i k e Singapore, a B r i t i s h t e r r i t o r y , o r Borneo, i s a t t a c k e d , then we a r e t r e a t y bound to f i g h t . Perhaps you might say we are i n d i r e c t l y connected w i t h SEATO, but I can say q u i t e openly here and a s s u r e the House t h a t we are not i n SEATO.21 The pronounced anti-communism i n Malaya's f o r e i g n p o l i c y  e s p e c i a l l y e v i d e n t i n the c o u n t r y ' s o r i e n t a t i o n toward and w i t h the g r e a t powers o t h e r than B r i t a i n .  was  relations  The Tunku i n 1958  pro-  c l a i m e d to P a r l i a m e n t Malaya's n o n - n e u t r a l i t y on q u e s t i o n s o f East-West  conflict:  There i s no q u e s t i o n whatsoever of our a d o p t i n g a n e u t r a l p o l i c y w h i l e Malaya i s a t war w i t h the Communists. Only when we are c e r t a i n t h a t people here have become t r u l y Malayan-minded and have s e t t h e i r minds on making Malaya t h e i r o n l y home can the government d e c l a r e our p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y . So l o n g as t h i s f i g h t c o n t i n u e s , I c o n s i d e r t h a t we would be b r e a k i n g f a i t h w i t h the people i f t h i s government were t o e n t e r i n t o any form of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the communist c o u n t r i e s .... l e t me t e l l you t h a t t h e r e a r e no such t h i n g s as l o c a l communists. Communism i s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n  which aims f o r world domination, not by aggression i f they can avoid i t , but by the use of t a c t i c s and methods among the sons of the country to overthrow democracy and to set up i n i t s place a government a f t e r the pattern of a l l communist countries.22 With respect to Vietnam, Malaya gave i t s whole-hearted the United States and the South.  support to  Indeed, the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s f i r s t  o f f i c i a l v i s i t was to South Vietnam i n 1958 i n which he made pledges of s o l i d a r i t y w i t h President Ngo Dinh Diem.  Ngo returned the Tunku's  v i s i t i n 1960. Malaya's opposition to communism was perhaps most evident i n i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h China.  While i t accorded diplomatic r e c o g n i t i o n 23  to the Soviet Union and the Eastern European c o u n t r i e s ,  Malaya was  u n w i l l i n g to recognize China, being content to espouse the "two-China" p o l i c y at the United Nations.  This p o l i c y supported i n p r i n c i p l e  the admission of China w i t h the understanding that Taiwan would continue to be a UN member and that a vote f o r China's admission d i d 24 not imply r e c o g n i t i o n .  At the United Nations, Malaya had a l s o  been f o r t h r i g h t i n c r i t i c i z i n g  China's actions i n Tibet i n 1959  and i n the Sino-Indian h o s t i l i t i e s of 1962.  The Tunku even launched  a "Save Democracy Fund" which r a i s e d M$l m i l l i o n "to help I n d i a 25 defend h e r s e l f against Chinese aggression."  The excessive fear  of Chinese communism prompted Malaya's representative at the United Nations i n 1963 to depart somewhat from the two-China p o l i c y : ... we have been and are, indeed, too close to China to take an academic or t h e o r e t i c a l view of the s i t u a t i o n .... For ten long years and more, while the world has been s h i v e r i n g i n the c h i l l winds of the Cold War, we i n [Malaya] were r i g h t i n the storm centre of a shooting war a r i s i n g out of a  45  communist campaign which t h r e a t e n e d to overthrow our government ... China s t a r t e d unprovoked a g g r e s s i o n on I n d i a ... China has r e c e n t l y r e s i s t e d ... v i o l e n t l y the moderating i n f l u e n c e of even i t s g r e a t e s t a l l y ... China regards a g l o b a l c l a s s war not o n l y as i n e v i t a b l e but d e s i r a b l e ... In a l l these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , we cannot a v o i d a s k i n g o u r s e l v e s what good, i n p r a c t i c a l terms s h o u l d we do China o r to o u r s e l v e s by b r i n g i n g i t to the U n i t e d Nations.26 D e s p i t e i t s pronounced  anti-communism i n f o r e i g n  Tilman has noted t h a t Malaya was  policy,  "no more a l a c k e y of the West than 27  she was  a f e l l o w t r a v e l l e r o f the communists."  evidence t h a t Malaya  There i s some  t r i e d to s t e e r a course o f p o l i t i c a l  independence  w h i l e a t the same time making no s e c r e t o f i t s Western l e a n i n g s . T h i s o f t e n l e d to p o l i c y c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which o p p o s i t i o n p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s were q u i c k to p o i n t o u t . i s s u e s was  Malaya's  One  o f the f a v o u r i t e  opposition  t h a t the presence o f f o r e i g n Commonwealth troops compromised 28  p o l i t i c a l independence.  Malaya's  narrow course o f p o l i t i c a l independence toward nonalignment  was  attempts perhaps  t o s t e e r the  l e s s an  effort  than one which can b e s t be d e s c r i b e d as a  f o r e i g n p o l i c y p o s t u r e of " n o n - r i n t e r f e r e n c e . " Thus, s p e a k i n g a f t e r admission t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , Malaya's Dato I s m a i l  soon  representative,  said:  Our p o s i t i o n i n the w o r l d today i s ... unique i n t h a t we are f a i r l y content w i t h what we a l r e a d y p o s s e s s . We do not need v a s t sums o f money from our f r i e n d s t o t i d e us a l o n g i n our own a f f a i r s . We do not covet the goods and c h a t t e l s nor the t e r r i t o r y of o t h e r s ... The g r e a t e s t need of my c o u n t r y today i s peace and the g o o d w i l l o f a l l c o u n t r i e s w i t h which i t i s our d e s i r e to l i v e i n f r i e n d s h i p and mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g . We v e n t u r e to suggest t h a t our unique p o s i t i o n p e r m i t s us t o p l a y an i m p a r t i a l r o l e i n the a f f a i r s of the w o r l d .  To summarize, Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y w i t h respect to questions of defence and s e c u r i t y displayed a d i s t i n c t pro-Western, and concomitantly, anti-communist posture, tempered by a rather i n e f f e c t u a l attempt toward n e u t r a l i t y or what would be more c o r r e c t l y described as a posture of non-interference.  A keen observer of  Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y has characterized i t as the p o l i t i c a l s c h i z o 30  phrenia of a "committed n e u t r a l , "  but we would probably be nearer  the mark i f we described Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y as being more committed than n e u t r a l . Malaya's major f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s were the p r o t e c t i o n of i t s p o l i t i c a l sovereignty and i t s t e r r i t o r i a l boundaries against outside i n t e r f e r e n c e and aggression.  These are,  i n short, the basic core-value goals of s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n .  Given  the worldview of i t s policy-makers, the p u r s u i t of these o b j e c t i v e s t r a n s l a t e d as the p r o t e c t i o n against communist expansion and aggression.  The Anglo-Malayan Defence Treaty was the d i r e c t response  to meeting such e v e n t u a l i t i e s .  As f a r as f o r e i g n p o l i c y s t r a t e g i e s  were concerned, there was perhaps no great deal of thought given to planning complex p o l i c i e s .  Defence was the b a s i c o b j e c t i v e and 31  AMDA was an almost automatic response to Malaya's defence needs. However, since Malaya had unequivocally camped on one side of the East-West c o n f l i c t , i t also n a t u r a l l y behaved s t r a t e g i c a l l y as a minor " c o l d w a r r i o r . "  There was therefore a conscious e f f o r t on  Malaya's part to a l i g n w i t h the Western powers and concomitantly to disassociate w i t h the Eastern powers.  47 I summarize below i n t a b l e form the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of the period with respect to issues of n a t i o n a l defence and s e c u r i t y i n terms of foreign p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , postures, s t r a t e g i e s and the most important actions.  The summary should be taken only as a l i s t i n g of the  various p o l i c y outputs without any s p e c i f i c i n d i c a t i o n of t h e i r exact r e l a t i o n s h i p . This task w i l l be accomplished i n a l a t e r section. TABLE 2.2 Defence and Security:  P o l i c y Outputs 1957-1963 ACTIONS  OBJECTIVES  Signing Anglo-Malayan Defence Pact.  Maintaining political independence. Protecting territorial integrity. POSTURES Pro-Western Orientation - supporting i d e a l s of Western democracy or the "Free World" and t h e i r dissemination. Anti-Communist Orientation - opposing communist i d e a l s and t h e i r dissemination. Non-interference - respecting t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l sovereignty of other countries.  STRATEGIES A l i g n i n g with Western powers. Non-association with communist powers.  Supporting U.S. P o l i c y i n Vietnam, Cuba and Gulf of Tonkin. Not recognizing and/or having diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with c e r t a i n communist c o u n t r i e s . Following a two-China p o l i c y at UN. Condemning: - Chinese a c t i o n i n T i b e t , 1959. - Chinese h o s t i l i t i e s against India ' (launching "Save Democracy Fund" i n support of India) , 1962.  48 Development and Trade Colonialism's impact on Malaya's economy was perhaps more profound than i n any other area.  The B r i t i s h l e f t Malaya a raw  m a t e r i a l producing economy which was l a r g e l y geared to the expanding i n d u s t r i e s of the metropolis.  Thus, independent Malaya emerged as  e s s e n t i a l l y an a g r i c u l t u r a l country i n which rubber and t i n accounted for approximately 85 per cent of a l l exports and i n which 69 per cent of i t s two m i l l i o n working population was engaged i n a g r i c u l t u r e . In a d d i t i o n , continued B r i t i s h economic i n t e r e s t s i n the country e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l l e d much of i t s economy.  As a scholar and former  B r i t i s h c i v i l servant i n Malaya noted, most of the major agency houses and the giant holding companies that dominate a g r i c u l t u r e and commerce were s t i l l i n B r i t i s h hands a f t e r independence and t h a t , "at present (1963) a l l the t i n dredges, three-quarters of the large rubber estates, almost a l l of the new o i l palm e s t a t e s , p o s s i b l y two-thirds of Malayan foreign trade, and much of the new secondary i n d u s t r i e s 32 are i n overseas, mainly B r i t i s h , ownership and c o n t r o l . " Malaya's espousal of a l a i s s e z - f a i r e economic p o l i c y made the continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n of f o r e i g n enterprise not only possible but to a large extent, welcome.  In most p a r t , t h i s philosophy was  prompted by the b e l i e f that only foreign economic enterprise could provide the necessary c a p i t a l f o r growth and s t a b i l i t y .  At the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l , such a philosophy implied a strong commitment to i n t e r n a t i o n a l commerce and p r i v a t e f o r e i g n investment. As a d i r e c t consequence, Malaya concluded b i l a t e r a l investment pacts w i t h West Germany, Japan and the United States soon a f t e r independence,  49 and was a l s o a party to the ECAFE m u l t i l a t e r a l Investment Charter 33 (1958).  Malaya has a l s o granted tax r e l i e f f o r 'pioneer i n d u s t r i e s '  i n the country since 1958. In contrast to i t s l a s s e z - f a i r e posture toward f o r e i g n investment, Malaya's narrow-based economy caused i t to press strenuously f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of the p r i c e s of raw m a t e r i a l s . In p a r t i c u l a r , i t has been a leading p a r t i c i p a n t i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 34 t i n agreements and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Rubber Study Group. before we examine the s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s i n t h i s area, i t may  But be  i l l u m i n a t i n g to consider more thoroughly the nature and d i r e c t i o n of Malayan trade. A leading Malayan economist has noted that the country has a very high "export o r i e n t a t i o n " measured i n terms of Gross Export Proceeds over Gross Domestic Product.  Malaya ranked f i r s t among a  cross-section of Asian and European countries with an export o r i e n t a t i o n of 40 per cent while the United States at the other extreme had only a f i g u r e of 4 per cent. In Lim Chong Yah's words: The extent of export o r i e n t a t i o n can r e v e a l a good deal about the nature of a country's economy. For one t h i n g i t suggests a high degree of dependence on f o r e i g n markets, which leads i n turn to the dependence of the country's economic welfare on f o r e i g n economic f o r c e s . Insofar as a country produces goods that have high f o r e i g n marginal income e l a s t i c i t i e s of demand, as do most [Malayan] exports, the p r o s p e r i t y of i t s export i n d u s t r i e s i s d i r e c t l y c o r r e l a t e d with the p r o s p e r i t y of the importing countries.35 Thus, Malaya's economic p r o s p e r i t y was h e a v i l y t i e d to i t s e x t e r n a l trade, which i n turn was h e a v i l y dependent on i t s two major exports,  rubber and t i n .  The table below shows that rubber was by f a r the  most important Malayan product, accounting f o r more than 60 per cent of exports, w i t h t i n ranking a high second w i t h a f i g u r e of around 20 per cent.  Malaya's heavy dependence on these two primary  commodities made i t i n d i r e c t l y dependent on the major i n d u s t r i a l countries which were the chief buyers of rubber and t i n .  TABLE 2.3 Composition of Malayan Gross Exports  Commodity  (%)  1947-50  1951-55  1956-60  Rubber  64.0%  64.0%  63.0%  Tin  19.0  21.0  17.0  Iron  0.3  1.0  4.0  Timber  1.0  1.0  2.0  Palm O i l  2.0  2.0  2.0  A l l Other  13.7  11.0  12.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  TOTAL  Source: Lim Chong Yah, "West Malaysian External Trade, 1947-65" i n Theodore Morgan and Nyle Spoelstra, eds., Economic Interdependence i n Southeast A s i a , Madison, Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1969, p. 210.  The next  t a b l e shows the d i r e c t i o n of Malayan e x p o r t s  of the major buyers of Malayan goods.  Of the s i x major  i n terms  importers,  t h r e e were advanced Western c o u n t r i e s ( t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , the U n i t e d Kingdom and West Germany), one was country  (the S o v i e t Union) and,  (Japan) and, entreport  another,  an advanced communist an advanced A s i a n  the l a s t , a major t r a d i n g c e n t r e and  (Singapore).  between Singapore  and  However, t h e r e was  international  an important  the o t h e r f i v e c o u n t r i e s .  country  difference  U n l i k e the  which were f i n a l consumers of Malayan e x p o r t s , Singapore  five,  mainly 36  r e - e x p o r t e d Malaya's domestic p r o d u c t s  to other c o u n t r i e s .  the c h i e f buyers of Malayan e x p o r t s were the advanced countries.  Thus,  industrialized  52  TABLE 2.4 D i r e c t i o n of Malayan Exports by Destination 1958-63  Country  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  Singapore  23.8%  23.0%  21.5%  19.8%  19.8%  20.0%  United Kingdom  18.5  13.3  13.0  11.9  9.3  8.3  United States  10.6  11.5  10.3  12.6  14.5  14.4  Japan  9.4  12.8  12.6  14.5  13.8  14.7  West Germany  5.0  5.8  7.7  8.6  4.2  4.3  U.S.S.R.  3.9  8.2  3.7  6.0  8.5  7.7  71.2  74.6  68.8  73.5  70.1  69.4  Italy  3.8  3.5  3.6  3.8  3.7  4.1  China  2.9  0.9  0.2  -  -  India  2.7  2.1  2.8  2.9  2.8  2.4  France  2.6  3.2  3.8  3.8  3.7  2.8  Australia  1.7  1.6  1.9  1.0  1.7  1.7  Canada  1.6  1.4  1.3  1.8  1.9  2.4  Netherlands  1.5  1.1  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.8  89.5  89.5  84.5  88.9  86.3  88.6  Sub-total  Total  Source:  Calculated from Lim, op_. c i t . , p. 216.  53 The next two tables show the composition of Malayan imports and the main sources of Malayan imports.  TABLE 2.5 Composition of Malayan Imports 1958 & 1963 (%)  1958  1963  36.5%  28.5%  19.1  17.6  42.9  51.1  0.6 100.0  2.8 100.0  Food, beverages and tobacco Crude materials and mineral f u e l s Manufactured, c a p i t a l and consumer goods Others  Source:  Total  Calculated from Lim, op_. c i t . , pp. 223-224.  TABLE 2.6 Main Sources of Malayan Imports 1958 & 1963 (%)  Country  1958  1963  United Kingdom  25.0%  21.0%  Thailand  11.0  9.5  Indonesia  13.8  8.3  Singapore  8.4  9.3  Japan  5.7  9.9  63.9  58.0  China  5.7  5.2  Australia  5.4  5.1  Hong Kong  2.9  3.3  Burma  2.9  2.1  India  2.5  2.6  United States  2.5  5.2  West Germany  2.4  3.7  Netherlands  1.7  2.3  90.6  87.6  Sub-total  Total  Source:  From Lim, op_. c i t . , pp. 225-226.  55 The p i c t u r e on imports i s a l i t t l e more complex.  Britain,  however, dominated as Malaya's most important s u p p l i e r , again emphasizing the c o l o n i a l l i n k s .  Malaya's s u b s t a n t i a l imports of  manufactured and c a p i t a l goods made the country doubly dependent on i n d u s t r i a l countries, which, as noted, are a l s o the main buyers of i t s products.  Malaya a l s o imported considerably from i t s Southeast  Asian neighbours l a r g e l y i n terms of food and raw materials f o r 37 domestic use and i t s processing i n d u s t r i e s . Malayan trade f i g u r e s provide us w i t h a c l e a r e r understanding of the country's heavy dependence on e x t e r n a l trade and the extreme v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the Malayan economy to e x t e r n a l forces quite beyond the country's c o n t r o l .  I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , therefore,  that Malaya ardently espoused a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s to s t a b i l i z e the p r i c e s of primary commodities.  I t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the various  i n t e r n a t i o n a l t i n agreements was a d i r e c t response to the need to protect t i n p r i c e s .  Malaya also strenuously protested United States  releases of i t s s t o c k p i l e s of rubber and t i n acquired during the years of the Korean boom f o r s t r a t e g i c reasons. Such r e l e a s e s , whatever the U.S. motive, adversely a f f e c t e d the market p r i c e s of the two commodities and became the chief i r r i t a n t of U.S. - Malayan 38 relations.  In a d d i t i o n , U.S. production of synthetic rubber and  lack of support f o r commodity arrangements - i t has never been a party to the t i n agreements - have been a further source of annoyance to Malaya. T i n , u n l i k e rubber, has had a long h i s t o r y of p r i c e - f i x i n g 39 arrangements  and Malaya w i l l i n g l y joined the 1953 T i n Agreement  under B r i t a i n ' s aegis and p a r t i c i p a t e d a f t e r independence i n the 1960 agreement.  Apart from the pragmatic matter of o b t a i n i n g b e t t e r  p r i c e s from the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d , tin-consuming c o u n t r i e s , the t i n conferences have also provided Malaya w i t h the opportunity of expressing s o l i d a r i t y with other primary-producing, Third World countries.  T y p i c a l of Malaya's utterances at such conferences  was  t h i s statement made by the Malayan delegate i n complaining about the producing countries having to bear the burden of maintaining the b u f f e r stock, the mechanism f o r cushioning p r i c e f l u c t u a t i o n s : I t hurt none but the producer; the p r i n c i p l e seems to be: "To him that hath, more s h a l l be given; from him who g i v e t h , more s h a l l be taken away." The producer's burden w i l l not be lightened f o r another f i v e years. Condemned to the same o l d f l o o r p r i c e , he would a l s o be required to s u b s i d i z e the consumer by p r o v i d i n g out of h i s own meagre earnings the means w i t h ^ which to keep the p r i c e at or below the c e i l i n g . Apart from t i n agreements, Malaya also employed the strategy of n e g o t i a t i n g b i l a t e r a l trade agreements to overcome trade b a r r i e r s and thus ensure a ready market f o r i t s goods.  These trade agreements  t y p i c a l l y accorded to Malaya and the other country mutual most-favoured nation treatment i n various f i e l d s as w e l l as the a b o l i t i o n of duty i n c e r t a i n s p e c i f i e d areas.  The agreements were i n force f o r one to  three years and u s u a l l y renewed at the expiry of the p e r i o d .  Malaya  concluded the f i r s t such agreement with A u s t r a l i a i n August 1958 with the r e s u l t that rubber and t i n imports were allowed i n t o A u s t r a l i a free of duty i n exchange f o r s i m i l a r treatment and purchase of c e r t a i n 41 A u s t r a l i a n products.  The second trade agreement was concluded with  Japan i n May 1960 with the immediate impact of i n c r e a s i n g the export  of pineapples and timber to that country.  Subsequently, trade  agreements were signed with New Zealand i n February 1961, United Arab Republic i n February 1962 and w i t h South Korea i n January  1963.  43  Attempts were made to conclude a trade agreement w i t h India but i t never m a t e r i a l i s e d .  In a statement, the M i n i s t r y of Commerce and  Industry s a i d that i t was Malaya's p o l i c y to sign trade agreements w i t h any i n t e r e s t e d country.  The strategy of s i g n i n g trade agreements  may be r e l a t e d to Malaya's commitment to a l a i s s e z - f a i r e posture i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l commerce but pragmatic considerations of d i r e c t economic b e n e f i t were perhaps the more important motive. To r e c a p i t u l a t e :  Malaya's foreign p o l i c y i n the area of trade  and development was marked by a f a i r l y strong developing-world o r i e n t a t i o n which b e l i e d the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of i t s economy. At the same time, i t would seem that Malaya's c o l o n i a l t i e s tended to f o s t e r a l i b e r a l , l a i s s e z - f a i r e p o l i c y toward i n t e r n a t i o n a l commerce and foreign e n t e r p r i s e i n the country. r e i n f o r c e i t s Western-world  Malaya's trading t i e s tended to  leanings, although t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n d i d  not preclude i t s trading w i t h the Soviet Union and China.  My summary  of foreign p o l i c y with respect to development and trade appears below.  58 TABLE 2.7 Development and Trade:  P o l i c y Outputs 1957-1963 ACTIONS  OBJECTIVES Promoting economic development - industrialization - rural development - commercial development Stabilizing the p r i c e s of primary commodities POSTURES Laissez-faire Orientation - commitment to international commerce and free enterprise Developing-world Orientation - supporting p r i c e - f i x i n g of primary goods - opposing t a r i f f groupings against Third World  STRATEGIES Providing a good investment climate i n the country. (Having no n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n policy). Supporting and participating i n trade groupings of developing countries Negotiating bilateral trade agreements to overcome trade b a r r i e r s  Concluding bilateral investment agreements with Western Germany, Japan and United States (1957) Negotiating Multilateral Investment Charter i n ECAFE (1958) Participating i n International Tin Agreements (1953, 1960) Denouncing U.S. GSA releases of t i n and rubber stockpile Concluding trade agreements w i t h A u s t r a l i a (1958), Japan (1960), New Zealand (1961) , United Arab Republic (1962) and South Korea (1963)  59 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Cooperation and Diplomacy We have already noted that Malaya portrayed i t s e l f as an i m p a r t i a l actor i n world a f f a i r s at the United Nations.  Malaya 44  looked upon the UN as a r a l l y i n g point f o r the smaller nations  and  thus a c t i v e l y supported the i d e a l s and work of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l organization and not without d i s t i n c t i o n .  Tilman w r i t e s at some  length on t h i s p o i n t : The United Nations has played a large part i n the enunciation of [Malayan] f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and [Malaya] has played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the work of the UN. Malayan troops performed d i s t i n g u i s h e d s e r v i c e under the UN f l a g i n the Congo, an operation that Malaya supported not only w i t h troops but also f i n a n c i a l l y through the purchase of UN bonds. The Malayan representative opposed Soviet attempts to weaken the Secretary-Generalship a f t e r the death of Dag Hammerskjold, supported the appointment of U Thant to the vacant post, and has c o n s i s t e n t l y applauded a l l the e f f o r t s of the SecretaryGeneral to make the UN a more e f f e c t i v e i n f l u e n c e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s ... As a r e s u l t of i t s e n t h u s i a s t i c support of the a c t i v i t i e s of the UN, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that Malaya was e a r l y designated to take a nonpermanent seat on the Security C o u n c i l , a chair that i t held [ s i c ] during the 19th S e s s i o n . ^ Perhaps Malaya's most s i g n i f i c a n t a c t i o n i n support of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s i d e a l s was the country's p a r t i c i pation i n the Congo peacekeeping  i n 1960.  Malaya i n i t i a l l y contributed  613 personnel but increased t h i s to a t o t a l of 1,413 men when 46 reinforcements were sought by the Secretary-General.  I t strongly  supported Dag Hammerskjold when the Secretary-General came under attack from the Soviet Union. The Malayan delegate stated during the  60 emergency session of the UN on the Congo c r i s i s i n September 1960: Many u n j u s t i f i e d and erroneous accusations have been l e v e l l e d against the United Nations Command, whose i n t e g r i t y and s i n c e r i t y have been u n f a i r l y questioned by these accusations ... Under normal circumstances these charges because of t h e i r f a l l a c i o u s character could e a s i l y be dismissed but when they seem to have the i n t e n t i o n of p u b l i c l y d i s c r e d i t i n g the Secretary-General, and thereby endangering the a u t h o r i t y of the UN, i n which we small nations place our hope and f a i t h i n t h i s troubled age, my delegation f e e l s i t incumbent upon i t to speak up and take strong exception to these unwarranted and u n j u s t i f i e d accusations.^ Thus, throughout the duration of the Congo c r i s i s , the Malayan p o l i c y was to f o r e s t a l l any e f f o r t s of eroding the UN a u t h o r i t y i n the handling of the c r i s i s and also to prevent i t s engulfment i n t o c o l d war p o l i t i c s .  This apparently nonaligned p o s i t i o n , however, was  not  motivated by adherence to a t r u l y n e u t r a l or unbiased a p p r e c i a t i o n of the problem as the Tunku amply demonstrated i n e x p l a i n i n g Malaya's stand to Parliament: E x t e r n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e i n our i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s w i l l not be t o l e r a t e d , and we are mindful of the dangers that can come from extraneous i n f l u e n c e s . The Republic of Congo a k i n to us by reason of the f a c t that she i s but r e c e n t l y independent, must not be exposed i n her tender years to the dangers of subversion as perpetrated by i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism. Let us not be beguiled by the veneer of f r i e n d s h i p l i k e that o f f e r e d by the communists when t h e i r declared aim i s to gain c o n t r o l of the world and place i t under a system where there were no personal freedoms and democracy as we understand them ... In the communist book, peaceful co-existence i s a fraud designed to reduce i n t o a s t a t e of nonexistence those trapped v i c t i m s ... We are f i r m l y convinced that to keep the Congo free of unnecessary power bloc i n t e r f e r e n c e , a i d must be channelled through the UN. 48  The Tunku also described Soviet Premier Khrushchev's proposal of r e p l a c i n g the Secretary-General with a three-man " t r o i k a " s e c r e t a r i a t as "despicable" and a "mischievous i d e a " aimed at turning the UN i n t o the "Disunited Nations."  I t would seem that  the Tunku u n w i t t i n g l y drew Malaya i n t o cold war p o l i t i c s i n the Congo c r i s i s i n h i s pronouncements on the subject when Malaya formally took an i m p a r t i a l stand at the UN on the matter. Among the t o p i c s that came up r e g u l a r l y f o r debate a t the UN was the question of disarmament.  Malaya supported  the idea i n  p r i n c i p l e but tended to back the more conservative, u s u a l l y Westernb l o c , proposals on the problem.  For example, at the 12th Session  (1957) of the General Assembly, the newly-independent Malaya voted against a Soviet d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n proposing a f i v e - y e a r ban on the use of nuclear weapons with the p r o v i s i o n to reconsider the moratorium * at the end of that period,  and abstained on a second r e s o l u t i o n  c a l l i n g f o r the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament  Commission.  Yet, i t voted f o r the Western-sponsored d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n urging i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l covering reduction of armed forces and armaments, open i n s p e c t i o n to guard against s u r p r i s e attacks and immediate suspension of nuclear t e s t i n g . Session was s i m i l a r .  Malaya's v o t i n g at the 13th  Dr. I s m a i l , the Malayan delegate, explained  h i s country's support f o r a l i m i t e d plan f o r disarmament i n the The r e s o l u t i o n was r e j e c t e d by the F i r s t Committee by 45-11, with 25 abstentions. ** The r e s o l u t i o n was r e j e c t e d by 51-9, w i t h 21 abstentions. *** The r e s o l u t i o n was adopted by 57-9, with 15 abstentions.  62 f o l l o w i n g manner: I t i s p a i n f u l l y obvious to the world at large that under the strenuous conditions of modern l i f e , disarmament has become a sprawling complex of i n t e r r e l a t e d p a r t s , a many-headed hydra which w i l l t e s t our human ingenuity and resourcefulness to the l i m i t i f we are to overcome i t and yet survive i n the process. I t i s no longer p o s s i b l e to slay the monster with one clean sweep of the diplomatic sword. We must, therefore, turn to the venerable ancients f o r wise prededents and a t t a c k i n g each i n d i v i d u a l part of the problem, take care to s e a l i t o f f forever from i t s d r e a d f u l capacity of m u l t i p l y i n g i t s e l f a f t e r every attempt to destroy i t s many heads. In general, then, Malaya d i d not vote with the n e u t r a l i s t countries which tended to propose compromise r e s o l u t i o n s .  For example, Malaya  was not among the 14 n e u t r a l i s t countries which d r a f t e d a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r immediate discontinuance of nuclear tests u n t i l agreement was reached by the states concerned on c o n t r o l s necessary to ensure the stopping of such t e s t s .  Malaya abstained from v o t i n g i n both  the F i r s t Committee and the General Assembly on the r e s o l u t i o n . Dr. I s m a i l , i n defending Malaya's p o s i t i o n s a i d : The i n i t i a t i v e f o r t e s t discontinuance rests squarely with those powers which already have atomic weapons as w e l l as those i n a p o s i t i o n to set o f f test explosions i n the near f u t u r e . Nothing l e s s than a discontinuance of these t e s t s would meet humanitarian needs as world society prepares to engage i n the most ambitious and hopeful disarmament e f f o r t s i n modern times. In order to meet these needs, we, the other 78 members of the United Nations, are e n t i r e l y dependent upon the s i n c e r i t y and good i n t e n t i o n s of the three nuclear powers.  The r e s o l u t i o n was r e j e c t e d by both the F i r s t Committee (36-26, with 19 abstentions) and the General Assembly (42-27, with 13 abstentions).  63 Thus Malaya adhered b a s i c a l l y to a r e a l i s t , i f conservative, stand on disarmament, and u n l i k e i t s unequivocal support f o r UN  collective  s e c u r i t y , did not see the UN capable of c o n t r o l l i n g the arms race without the compliance of the armed. On questions of c o l o n i a l i s m and human r i g h t s , Malaya's p o s i t i o n was decidedly more Third-World oriented.  I t s response to the A l g e r i a n  s i t u a t i o n perhaps t y p i f i e s the r e a c t i o n to c o l o n i a l i s s u e s .  Except  on one occasion, i t supported a l l the Afro-Asian r e s o l u t i o n s on the A l g e r i a n question.  Only i n 1958, when reference was made to the  " P r o v i s i o n a l Government of the A l g e r i a n Republic," d i d Malaya c a u t i o u s l y abstain on a r e s o l u t i o n , but i n general i t voted f o r the r e c o g n i t i o n of the r i g h t of the A l g e r i a n people to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n and independence.  In the words of Dato Kamil, Malaya's UN delegate, i n  1960: As a nation which has j u s t a t t a i n e d i t s independence from c o l o n i a l r u l e , however b e n e f i c i e n t the regime may be, the Federation of Malaya has dedicated and continues to dedicate i t s e l f to the j u s t cause of peoples and nations everywhere f o r the r i g h t to self-determination and freedom from a l i e n bondage i n a l l forms, manifestations and guises. This dedication to the cause of freedom has become one of the c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e s that form the cornerstone of [my] government's f o r e i g n p o l i c y . - ^ Malaya's a t t i t u d e and v o t i n g behaviour on the West I r i a n question has 53 a l s o taken a s i m i l a r l i n e . A prominent aspect of Malaya's f o r e i g n p o l i c y with respect to i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation has been i t s a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the  64 many s p e c i a l i z e d and r e g i o n a l intergovernmental i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations.  P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n these organizations has i n general  been a boon to Malaya i n the areas of economic and t e c h n i c a l advancement.  For example, the IBRD i n 1958 made a loan of $28.6  m i l l i o n to Malaya to help finance the Cameron Highlands h y d r o - e l e c t r i c p r o j e c t , the biggest s i n g l e development p r o j e c t i n the Federation. A second loan of $51.9 m i l l i o n was given i n 1963 to finance the 54 second phase of the p r o j e c t .  We have already noted e a r l i e r  Malaya's strong support f o r the r o l e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i n a s s i s t i n g Third World socio-economic development.  This extends to  v i r t u a l l y a l l other s p e c i a l i z e d or specific-purpose organizations and i s a manifestation of what we may term a " f u n c t i o n a l i s t " o r i e n t a t i o n i n t h i s area of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Next i n importance to the United Nations was perhaps Malaya's a s s o c i a t i o n with the Commonwealth.  From the standpoint of defence,  the Anglo-Malayan Defence Pact (associated by the governments of Malaya's membership i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations by 1963 included: The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labour Organization (ILO), the Food and A g r i c u l t u r e Organization (FAO), the UN Educational, S c i e n t i f i c and C u l t u r a l Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund (IMF), the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank f o r Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development A s s o c i a t i o n (IDA), the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C i v i l A v i a t i o n Organization (ICAO), the U n i v e r s a l P o s t a l Union (UPU), the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Telecommunications Union (ITU), the World Meteorological Union (WMU), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the I n t e r n a t i o n a l T i n Council (ITC), the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Rubber Study Group, the General Agreement on Trade and T a r i f f s (GATT), the Economic Commission f o r A s i a and the Far East (ECAFE), and the Colombo Plan. See Malaysia i n B r i e f , Government P r i n t e r , Kuala Lumpur, 1963, p. 106.  A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand) automatically made Malaya an i n t e g r a l part of Commonwealth defence.  As Tun Razak put i t , Malaya's defence  p o l i c y was to contribute toward "a common Commonwealth e f f o r t i n the p r o t e c t i o n of our t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h i s area ..." ( f n . 6 ) . I n a d d i t i o n , p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Commonwealth also ensured c e r t a i n economic advantages to a developing country such as Malaya.  In particular,  the b e n e f i t s included c a p i t a l - a i d grants from advanced Commonwealth c o u n t r i e s , t e c h n i c a l and educational assistance from the Colombo Plan and i n d i r e c t advantages through membership i n the S t e r l i n g Area and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the system of Commonwealth trade  preferences.^^  The most s i g n i f i c a n t of these b e n e f i t s accrued from Malaya's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Colombo Plan o r i g i n a l l y designed f o r Commonwealth members only, but l a t e r included non-members as w e l l , notably the United States since 1958. The plan has benefited Malaya mostly i n terms of t e c h n i c a l assistance i n the t r a i n i n g of experts i n various economic, educational and p r o f e s s i o n a l p u r s u i t s .  The supposed  b e n e f i t s derived from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the S t e r l i n g Area and the 56 Commonwealth trade preferences are somewhat more c o n t r o v e r s i a l . The most contentious issue i n Malaya's Commonwealth p o l i t i c s has been South A f r i c a and apartheid.  I t was through the Tunku's  i n i t i a t i v e that the question of apartheid - h i t h e r t o a taboo t o p i c was brought up i n the 1960 Conference leading eventually to the South A f r i c a n Republic leaving the A s s o c i a t i o n i n 1961. The Tunku never minced words on the question of apartheid and as he t o l d  Parliament  66 in  1960: Those who r u l e South A f r i c a and c o n t r o l i t s destiny do not conform to our Commonwealth ideas and i d e a l s of human r i g h t s and j u s t i c e and I am beginning to think whether a country l i k e South A f r i c a has any r i g h t to be w i t h i n t h i s family of nations ... I f those who c o n t r o l the d e s t i n i e s of South A f r i c a w i l l not l i s t e n to our p r o t e s t i n the cause of humanity and j u s t i c e as a member of the Commonwealth, then again we should ask ourselves what r i g h t has South A f r i c a to be a member of t h i s Commonwealth of Nations.^7  A f t e r South A f r i c a n Premier Dr. Verwoerd decided to withdraw h i s country's a p p l i c a t i o n f o r membership i n May 1961, the Tunku s a i d : Nobody i s sorry. On the other hand, the Commonwealth now means something and has been given a new s t a t u r e . The Commonwealth nations can now speak up b o l d l y on a l l peaceful issues which include s o c i a l and r e l i g i o u s subjects.58 F i n a l l y , we w i l l examine Malaya's e f f o r t s toward r e g i o n a l Southeast Asian - cooperation.  Malaya was instrumental i n the forma-  t i o n of the A s s o c i a t i o n of Southeast A s i a (ASA), the f i r s t t r u l y r e g i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n i n the area i n that a l l i t s members belonged to Southeast A s i a .  ASA, formed i n 1961, appears, however, to have been  the m i s c a r r i e d o f f s p r i n g of the Tunku's e f f o r t s at a broader  grouping  of non-communist ( i f not, anti-communist) Southeast Asian s t a t e s . As e a r l y as A p r i l 1958, the Malayan Premier was reported to be toying with the idea of a "defence treaty o r g a n i z a t i o n c o n s i s t i n g of Malaya, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and [South] Vietnam ... outside the framework of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization." He had previously r e j e c t e d a Sukarno suggestion of an Islamic b l o c comprising Pakistan, Malaya, Indonesia, N. Borneo and Southern P h i l i p p i n e s as 59 "impossible."  The Tunku discussed h i s plans with President Garcia  of the P h i l i p p i n e s on a v i s i t i n January 1959, at t h i s stage denying reports that he was considering an "anti-communist pact f o r Southeast 60 Asian c o u n t r i e s . "  The upshot was a s u r p r i s i n g l y prompt announce-  ment of a plan f o r the formation of the Southeast A s i a Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET), an a s s o c i a t i o n with apparently only economic, trade and educational o b j e c t i v e s . Malaya undertook to d r a f t the t r e a t y and the diplomatic work i n i n v i t i n g Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Burma to p a r t i c i p a t e . However, the plan received lukewarm response except from Thailand and South Vietnam.  Indeed, Indonesia expressed o b j e c t i o n and even  h o s t i l i t y toward the idea.  The prevalent a t t i t u d e i n Indonesia was  expressed by The Times of Indonesia: I t would be a c h a r i t a b l e act on the part of the Indonesian Government i f i t nipped i n the bud the p u e r i l e , v a i n and flamboyant hopes expressed by Malaya and the P h i l i p p i n e s i n the Rahman-Garcia communique issued i n Manila on Tuesday f o r the s e t t i n g up of an economic and c u l t u r a l union of South-East A s i a . 6 1  The Indonesian objections were stated rather s u c c i n c t l y by the Consul-General  i n Singapore that "the P h i l i p p i n e s i s a member of  SEATO and Malaya has t i e s with B r i t a i n " and that "as long as a l l the member countries of such a pact are not r e a l l y independent, 62 there w i l l be s p l i t s which w i l l s p o i l the t i e s of u n i t y . " SEAFET was eventually abandoned and i n i t s place an A s s o c i a t i o n of South-East Asian States (ASAS, l a t e r , ASA) was proposed i n J u l y 1960, with Malaya, the P h i l i p p i n e s and Thailand as the sponsor-nations. The Indonesian response was again, i f not h o s t i l e , unreceptive, while the other Southeast Asian states were apparently i n d i f f e r e n t to the  68 project.  Nevertheless,  the organization was formed on J u l y 31, 1961,  with the three sponsors as founder members. the a s s o c i a t i o n were n o n - p o l i t i c a l .  The expressed aims, of  As embodied i n the Bangkok  Declaration, they were: To e s t a b l i s h an e f f e c t i v e machinery f o r f r i e n d l y c o n s u l t a t i o n s , c o l l a b o r a t i o n and mutual assistance i n the economic, s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l , s c i e n t i f i c and administrative f i e l d s ; To provide educational, p r o f e s s i o n a l , t e c h n i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and research f a c i l i t i e s i n . the respective countries f o r nationals and o f f i c i a l s of the associated countries; To exchange information on matters of common i n t e r e s t or concern i n the economic, c u l t u r a l , educational and s c i e n t i f i c f i e l d s ; To cooperate i n the promotion of Southeast Asian Studies; To provide a machinery f o r f r u i t f u l c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n the u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e i r respective n a t u r a l resources, the development of t h e i r a g r i c u l t u r e and i n d i r e c t l y , the expansion of t h e i r trade, the improvement of t h e i r transport and communication f a c i l i t i e s , and generally r a i s i n g the l i v i n g standards of t h e i r peoples; To cooperate i n the study of the problems of i n t e r n a t i o n a l commodity trade; and generally to consult and cooperate with one another so as to achieve the aims and purposes of the A s s o c i a t i o n , as w e l l as contribute more e f f e c t i v e l y to the work of e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations and a g e n c i e s . DJ  The aims of ASA were thus very general and broad.  At no point was  the a s s o c i a t i o n geared toward defence and s e c u r i t y .  The accomplish-  ments of ASA tend to confirm i t s l a r g e l y c u l t u r a l and diplomatic o r i e n t a t i o n as even the economic objectives were never s e r i o u s l y pursued.  Among such accomplishments were the a b o l i t i o n of v i s a  requirements f o r o f f i c i a l s and the waiver of v i s a fees f o r n a t i o n a l s  69  v i s i t i n g each other's c o u n t r i e s , an ASA express t r a i n s e r v i c e between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, several a t h l e t i c and c u l t u r a l exchanges, and consultations on an ASA a i r l i n e and a M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade and 64  Navigation Agreement.  The l a s t two p r o j e c t s never m a t e r i a l i z e d .  Soon a f t e r i t s troubled b i r t h , the f a t e of ASA began to be t i e d to the Tunku's Malaysia Plan which brought i n i t s wake the renewed P h i l i p p i n e s claim to Sabah and Indonesian Confrontation, which I s h a l l discuss i n the next chapter. In summary, Malaya's f o r e i g n p o l i c y on questions of i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation and peace was marked by a strong commitment to the United Nations and many of i t s i d e a l s , with the notion that perhaps the UN embodied the a s p i r a t i o n s of the s m a l l , developing  states and  that  any attempt at reducing UN a u t h o r i t y i n such matters as peacekeeping meant i n d i r e c t l y a threat to the p o s i t i o n of the m i l i t a r i l y weak states.  This foreign p o l i c y posture was best manifested i n Malaya's  stand i n the Congo c r i s i s and to some extent i s r e f l e c t e d i n i t s support f o r the f u n c t i o n a l UN agencies.  However, Malaya's posture  and actions with respect to such issues as disarmament b e l i e d a conservatism  and tendency to lean toward the Western-bloc of nations,  while on questions of c o l o n i a l i s m and human r i g h t s , Malaya was more f o r t h r i g h t l y Third-World oriented.  This was evident i n i t s p o s i t i o n  on the A l g e r i a n , West I r i a n and apartheid i s s u e s .  Apart from the  UN,  Malaya also showed a commitment to the Commonwealth l a r g e l y because of i t s mutual defence arrangement with B r i t a i n , but, one might argue, also f o r romantic, i f not i d e o l o g i c a l , reasons, since the Commonwealth i s decidedly a Western-bloc or Western-sponsored a s s o c i a t i o n .  Finally  70 Malaya i n i t i a t e d a concerted e f f o r t at r e g i o n a l cooperation i n Southeast A s i a but t y p i c a l l y the e f f o r t s , which culminated i n the formation of ASA, were marred by undertones of anti-communism or a pro-Western f l a v o u r , which tended to foreclose the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of countries such as Indonesia.  The b a s i c f o r e i g n p o l i c y strategy seemed  to be to promote the authority of the United Nations and other i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations so that t h i s would also i n d i r e c t l y promote and protect the i n t e r e s t s of the smaller countries such as M a l a y a . ^ There are two d e f i n i t e facets to t h i s general strategy which may be seen as two sub-strategies of (a) promoting and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n general-purpose, or f u n c t i o n a l l y d i f f u s e d , i n t e r n a t i o n a l groupings and associations such as the UN and the Commonwealth;  and (b) promo-  t i n g and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n specific-purpose groupings and r e g i o n a l bodies.  In general, the s t r a t e g i e s i n t h i s issue-area tend to be  somewhat d i f f u s e d since the goals are long-range and d i s t a n t i n nature. There i s , therefore, greater fusion between postures, s t r a t e g i e s and actions.  objectives,  A f o r e i g n p o l i c y posture or o b j e c t i v e does  not always have to have a corresponding f o r e i g n p o l i c y strategy.  A  strategy i s a premeditated, s p e c i f i c plan of a c t i o n , whereas a good number of f o r e i g n p o l i c y actions often flow d i r e c t l y from p o l i c y postures and o b j e c t i v e s .  This seems to be the case with Malaya's  posture of a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m . Adopting a standard posture such as t h i s l e d almost automatically to c e r t a i n kinds of a c t i o n s , i n p a r t i c u l a r voting i n support of Third-World issues at the UN.  Where no c l e a r - c u t  foreign p o l i c y strategy e x i s t s , f o r e i g n p o l i c y postures are often also of the "posturing" type, that i s , they are l a r g e l y designed f o r p u b l i c  consumption.  In t h i s sense, they are r e l a t e d to status and p r e s t i g e  questions which s h a l l be discussed i n the next s e c t i o n .  TABLE 2.8 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Cooperation and Diplomacy:  P o l i c y Outputs 1957-1963  OBJECTIVES  ACTIONS  Promoting UN ideals: - collective security - selfde tennina t ion & decolonization - human r i g h t s and social justice - disarmament  Participating i n UN peacekeeping i n the Congo (1960)  Promoting regional cooperation POSTURES International Orientation - supporting exercise of UN a u t h o r i t y Functional Orientation - supporting work of f u n c t i o n a l international organizations Anti-colonialism - supporting s e l f determination and human r i g h t s Regionalism - encouraging regional cooperation  STRATEGIES Promoting and legitimizing the a u t h o r i t y of the UN and other recognized IGO's so as to i n d i r e c t l y promote the i n t e r e s t s of small nations: - promoting goals of generalpurpose i n t e r n a t i o n a l groupings and a s s o c i a t i o n s - promoting goals of s p e c i f i c purpose i n t e r n a t i o n a l groupings and r e g i o n a l bodies  Participating i n UN s p e c i a l i z e d agencies and t h e i r work Participation i n the Commonwealth - j o i n i n g Colombo Plan, imperial trade preferences, S t e r l i n g Area Sponsoring and v o t i n g i n the UN on r e s o l u t i o n s calling for selfdetermination i n A l g e r i a , W. I r i a n Denouncing i n the UN and Commonwealth Conferences apartheid and boycotting S. A f r i c a n goods Founding, w i t h the P h i l i p p i n e s and Thailand, the A s s o c i a t i o n of South-East Asian (ASA), 1961.  72  The Sources of Malayan Foreign P o l i c y In surveying Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y from 1957-1963, I have used a number of d e s c r i p t i v e l a b e l s to depict i t s texture or character. I have c a l l e d these i t s postures and have also i d e n t i f i e d i t s major p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , s t r a t e g i e s and a c t i o n s .  The o v e r a l l p i c t u r e of  the emergent Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s that of a Western-leaning, conservative orientation.  f o r e i g n p o l i c y with a "low p r o f i l e " i n Third-World No s i n g l e hypothesis can f u l l y e x p l a i n the emergent  Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  The over-used i d i o s y n c r a t i c t h e s i s i s  c e r t a i n l y not adequate.  While i t w i l l be hard to deny that Malayan  foreign p o l i c y "owes more to the p e r s o n a l i t y of i t s Prime M i n i s t e r , 66  Tunku Abdul Rahman, than i s usual  one cannot ignore the  more fundamental, underlying sources i n e x p l a i n i n g the f u l l of Malayan foreign p o l i c y . to - s a y  character  I t i s c e r t a i n l y o v e r s t a t i n g the case  that the formulation of Malayan foreign p o l i c y i s  "the v i r t u a l prerogative of a small s t a b l e e l i t e comprising four or 67  f i v e men."  Much of the d i f f i c u l t y with many analysts of Third  World foreign p o l i c i e s i s that they i n v a r i a b l y spring upon the i d i o syncracies of p e r s o n a l i t i e s as the c r u c i a l explanatory because these are the most apparent and conspicuous.  variables Part of the  problem i s the emphasis on decision-making s t y l e rather than 'foreign policy.'  Were such analysts to appreciate and define the f u l l range  of foreign p o l i c y outputs or dependent v a r i a b l e s , t h e i r conclusions 68  might be somewhat d i f f e r e n t .  They may f i n d , f o r example, that the  importance of i d i o s y n c r a t i c v a r i a b l e s w i l l vary from issue-area to issue-area j u s t as i t w i l l l i k e l y vary depending on whether one i s  e x p l a i n i n g foreign p o l i c y postures, o b j e c t i v e s , s t r a t e g i e s or a c t i o n s . While not gainsaying the importance of i d i o s y n c r a t i c v a r i a b l e s i n the explanation of Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y , such f a c t o r s may best be appreciated as an intervening v a r i a b l e i n the p o l i c y - f o r m u l a t i o n process i n the sense that they represent the f i n a l " f i l t e r " through 69  which p o l i c y i s processed.  This manner of viewing the i d i o s y n -  c r a t i c v a r i a b l e s i n no way minimizes t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e , but I b e l i e v e , puts the other independent v a r i a b l e s i n correct  perspective.  In my a n a l y s i s , the term " e l i t e ideology" subsumes the i d i o s y n c r a t i c factors a f f e c t i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c y on the assumption that i t i s the more general p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s of leaders and p o l i c y makers rather than the p e c u l i a r , p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s that are important i n the analysis of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . ^  Before developing  t h i s point f u r t h e r , l e t me present i n a more systematic diagramatic  fashion a  expression of my basic t h e s i s with respect to the  sources of Malayan foreign p o l i c y .  74  FIGURE 2.1 THE SOURCES OF MALAYAN FOREIGN POLICY:  E x t e r n a l Sources  A THESIS  Strategies  Cold War Environment  Eco-historical Sources  Idiosyncratic Sources  B r i t i s h Rule  E l i t e Ideology  Emergency  Foreign Policy Objectives A i I  I  I I I I I  V  Foreign Policy Postures I n t e r n a l Sources Defence and Security Needs Actions  Developmental Needs Status Needs  In the t h e s i s , two e c o - h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s are l i n k e d to two c l u s t e r s of independent v a r i a b l e s  stemming from external and i n t e r n a l  sources, which are then translated i n t o foreign p o l i c y outputs v i a the intervening  v a r i a b l e , springing  from i d i o s y n c r a t i c sources.  The t h e s i s i s a d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n of the model presented i n the study.  Only the c r u c i a l independent (and intervening) v a r i a b l e s  75 have been i d e n t i f i e d and  conceptualized  developed i n the model.  I t i s by no means an e x h a u s t i v e s e l e c t i o n  of a l l the p o s s i b l e  i n terms of the  independent v a r i a b l e s  Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y but  t h a t might have  I hope to demonstrate the  i n which these f a c t o r s have shaped the  categories  influenced  c r i t i c a l manner  substance of Malayan  foreign  policy. Two  e c o - h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s which have had  impact on b o t h domestic and and  "The  Emergency."  a l a s t i n g and  f o r e i g n p o l i c y were B r i t i s h  colonization  B r i t i s h r u l e p r o v i d e d Malaya w i t h i t s funda-  mental p o l i t i c a l ethos of Western democratic norms and administrative  profound  infrastructure.  The  its politico-  r e l a t i v e l y peaceful  t r a n s i t i o n to  independence ensured a c o n t i n u i t y of t h i s p o l i t i c a l ethos  after  independence, which s h a l l be  The  i n t e r n a l war  w i t h the  Emergency," i s the a l s o be  discussed  policy.  at a l a t e r p o i n t .  and  "The  and  c u l t u r e are excluded from the than v a r i a b l e s .  thesis  O f t e n , they  geographical s i z e  as  are  and  r e s u l t i n g i n various  they r e l a t e d to the e x t e r n a l  Malaya, f a l l i n g w i t h i n  be  economic needs.  S i m i l a r l y , g e o p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s were perhaps o f importance i n s o f a r as  such  as i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t i n g to i n t e r n a l sources of  i t s n a t u r a l , or l a c k of n a t u r a l , endowments c o u l d  seen as c o n d i t i o n s  shall  Other e c o - h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s  Thus, Malaya's r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l  population  called  10-year  other s i g n i f i c a n t e c o - h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r which  "constants" rather  better appreciated  more f u l l y l a t e r .  communists, e u p h e m i s t i c a l l y  as geography, p o p u l a t i o n they tend to be  discussed  environment of the  the B r i t i s h sphere of i n f l u e n c e  of non-communist, Southeast A s i a , came w i t h i n  the  and  ' o r b i t ' of  only  Cold  War.  being  part  the  Western-bloc.  The most important external f a c t o r - and g e o p o l i t i c a l  factors are treated as such - was thus the Cold War of the post-World War I I i n t e r n a t i o n a l system.  I n Southeast A s i a the emergence of the  communist colossus of China and the onset of a spate of g u e r i l l a wars i n various Southeast Asian countries augmented the world-wide atmosphere of Cold War. As i l l u s t r a t e d i n the diagram, B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l r u l e , the Emergency and the e x t e r n a l Cold War environment combined to produce pro-Western, anti-communist f o r e i g n p o l i c y postures i n Malayan foreign p o l i c y i n general, and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n matters of defence and s e c u r i t y .  I n a c t i o n s , t h i s took the form of  a defence pact w i t h B r i t a i n and the many anti-communist pronouncements and acts described i n the previous s e c t i o n . However, I w i l l argue, and h o p e f u l l y demonstrate, that these factors i n and of themselves would not n e c e s s a r i l y have r e s u l t e d i n the p a r t i c u l a r character assumed by Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y were i t not f o r an e l i t e ideology already predisposed toward c e r t a i n values. In short, they were necessary but not s u f f i c i e n t conditions.  I t was  the e l i t e ideology that was l a r g e l y responsible f o r the most charact e r i s t i c features of Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  This e l i t e ideology was  epitomized i n the b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s of the Prime M i n i s t e r , Tunku Abdul Rahman, and most, i f not a l l , of h i s cabinet colleagues. Indeed, there i s strong evidence that i t pervaded much of the top echelons of government and f o r e i g n s e r v i c e .  I n essence, t h i s e l i t e  ideology was marked by a commitment to the Western form of democracy and i t s i d e a l s while i t s image of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment was that of the c l a s s i c b i p o l a r s i t u a t i o n i n which the "Free World" faced  77  the  growing menace of a messianic World Communism.  In economic  matters, t h i s ideology extended to a commitment to free e n t e r p r i s e and c a p i t a l i s m . There i s l i t t l e doubt that B r i t i s h r u l e i t s e l f provided the basis f o r the development of such an e l i t e ideology.  British  c o l o n i a l i s m had a durable and profound impact on Malayan p o l i t i c a l life.  While Malayan p o l i t i c s a r e c e r t a i n l y no carbon copy of B r i t i s h  p o l i t i c s , many of the i d e a l s , t r a d i t i o n s and i n s t i t u t i o n s of B r i t i s h parliamentary democracy s t i l l t h r i v e there.  Indeed, the group of  p o l i t i c i a n s which assumed power at the time of independence was schooled i n the B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n and i t was t h e i r p a r t i a l i t y to Western i d e a l s that perhaps prompted an e a r l y and smooth hand-over of power.''"'"  Marvin Ott has noted, f o r example, that seldom could one  f i n d a greater degree of shared values than i n the Malayan cabinet: The p o l i c y consensus i n the cabinet r e f l e c t e d the s t a b i l i t y and homogeneity of i t s membership. The men who counted - the Tunku, Tun Razak, Dr. I s m a i l , Tan Siew Sin, and K h i r J o h a r i were colleagues i n the independence movement and members of the cabinet throughout most of the post-independence period. They were a l l westernised, pragmatic, conservative and most of them were Malays. I n f l u e n t i a l Chinese l i k e Tan Siew S i n generally came from prominent f a m i l i e s long resident i n Malaya. The c i v i l s e r v i c e , the upper l e v e l s of the armed forces and much of the l o c a l business community have a l s o r e c r u i t e d men w i t h these same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . P o l i c y differences w i t h i n the cabinet were more a question of ^ nuance and implementation than of substance. Ott  goes on to suggest that the foreign p o l i c y - f o r m u l a t i n g e l i t e  comprise only four or f i v e men, namely the Tunku, who was primus i n t e r pares, Tun Razak, Dr. I s m a i l , Tan Siew Sin,  the three most important  78 cabinet ministers i n f l u e n c i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and Ghazali Shafie, the 73 Permanent Secretary to the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s . correct i n s o f a r as these men represent the 'core' e l i t e  Ott i s among whom 74  the highest l e v e l of decision-making  on f o r e i g n p o l i c y occurred.  I would suggest, however, that t h i s core e l i t e was backed by a much l a r g e r group of 'supportive' e l i t e of party s t a l w a r t s , ^ c i v i l servants and f o r e i g n s e r v i c e personnel, who by and large subscribed to the tenets of the e l i t e i d e o l o g y . ^  For example, James C. Scott  provides evidence from interviews w i t h a sample of senior Malaysian c i v i l servants that not only the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e but also the higher echelons of bureaucracy shared a strong commitment to an i d e a l i z e d model of Western democracy.^  Scott stressed the r o l e that secondary  s o c i a l i z a t i o n played toward i n c u l c a t i n g Western values i n h i s s u b j e c t s , and I quote him a t some length: A l l the men w i t h whom I spoke attended schools and u n i v e r s i t i e s patterned a f t e r the B r i t i s h model, where they followed c u r r i c u l a i d e n t i c a l to those i n England and learned Anglo-Saxon p r a c t i c e s and values. Later they were r e c r u i t e d by Englishmen to serve i n a B r i t i s h s t y l e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n system. The standards and goals of t h i s s t r u c t u r e were, and s t i l l are i n large measure, cast i n an unmistakeably E n g l i s h mould. Both i n school and i n the c i v i l s e r v i c e t h e i r success was gauged by how they had learned the lessons that England had sought to convey. Small wonder then that a l l of them came by t h e i r Western [ B r i t i s h ] o r i e n t a t i o n honestly. They are the more Western oriented since t h e i r E n g l i s h education and high a d m i n i s t r a t i v e posts are what set them apart from the general population and confer on them t h e i r status and p r e s t i g e . The maintenance of a western o r i e n t a t i o n among higher c i v i l servants i s f u r t h e r encouraged by a p o l i t i c a l e l i t e that i s i t s e l f l a r g e l y p r o - B r i t i s h and committed to l i b e r a l democratic i d e a l s . ^ 8  79 There i s l i t t l e wonder, then, t h a t Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y tended l e a n h e a v i l y toward  the West i f even s e n i o r b u r e a u c r a t s  to  exhibited 79  s t r o n g a f f e c t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n toward Western v a l u e s and But perhaps  i t was  ideals.  the b i t t e r war w i t h the communists which  left  the g r e a t e s t mark on Malaya's p o l i c y - m a k e r s , s u p p l y i n g a d d i t i o n a l ballast  to an a l r e a d y pro-Western e l i t e i d e o l o g y .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  Tunku's meeting w i t h the communist l e a d e r , Chin Peng, i n December j u s t p r i o r to independence, on communism.  seemed to have hardened the Premier's  the 1956, views  The Tunku s a i d a f t e r the a b o r t i v e s e s s i o n s i n which  C h i n Peng r e f u s e d to a c c e p t the amnesty terms o f f e r e d : C h i n Peng r e a l l y taught me what communism was. I had never r e a l l y understood and a p p r e c i a t e d i t s f u l l meaning. When I was b r i e f e d i n communism by the B r i t i s h e x p e r t s I always f e l t they were i n t e r e s t e d i n making a bad case a g a i n s t the communists. But t h e r e i n t h a t room i n B a l i n g , C h i n Peng taught me something I s h a l l not f o r g e t . He taught me t h a t Malaya and communism can never c o - e x i s t . 8 0 Thus, i t was  not u n t i l the Emergency was  o f f i c i a l l y ended i n 1960  Malaya would vote f o r China's admission i n t o the U n i t e d N a t i o n s  that (only  on the b a s i s o f the two-China p o l i c y ) , when p r i o r to t h i s the newly independent It  c o u n t r y was  not prepared even t o d i s c u s s the China q u e s t i o n ,  has been p o i n t e d out t h a t because the communist i n s u r g e n c y was  (Malayan) Chinese i n i n i t i a t i v e and  largely  c o m p o s i t i o n , the government c o u l d  not a f f o r d o v e r t u r e s to China w h i l e the i n s u r r e c t i o n was  still  in  82 progress.  Indeed,  i t was  the v e r y c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the i n s u r g e n c y  was  C h i n a - i n s p i r e d and a i d e d that caused Malaya to r e i n f o r c e i t s i n t e r n a l p o l i c y of combating 8  81  communism w i t h an e x t e r n a l p o s t u r e of c o n t a i n i n g  3  xt. T h i s c a l l e d f o r the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Malayan Communist P a r t y which the communist l e a d e r found u n a c c e p t a b l e .  80 The e x t e r n a l Cold War environment, w i t h the events of Hungary, Cuba, Vietnam, Tibet and the Sino-Indian c o n f l i c t , tended therefore to augment the e x i s t i n g image of communism i n the policy-makers' 84 minds.  There i s evidence that the e x i s t i n g e l i t e worldview  represented something akin to Boulding's 'national image' and 85 H o l s t i ' s ' b e l i e f system': The n a t i o n a l image ... i s the l a s t great stronghold of u n s o p h i s t i c a t i o n ... Nations are divided i n t o "good" and "bad" - the enemy i s a l l bad, one's own nation i s of spotless v i r t u e . Wars are e i t h e r acts of God or acts of other n a t i o n s , which always catch us completely by s u r p r i s e . The b e l i e f system, composed of a number of "images" of the past, present, and future ... may be thought of as the set of lenses through which information concerning the p h y s i c a l and s o c i a l environment i s received. I t o r i e n t s the i n d i v i d u a l to h i s environment, d e f i n i n g i t f o r him and i d e n t i f y i n g i t s s a l i e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . National images may be denoted as a subpart of the b e l i e f system. The Malayan e l i t e ideology comprised a b e l i e f system which had i t s fundamental tenets i n an adherence to Western democracy and i t s ideals.  On t h i s p o i n t , l e t me quote the Tunku: We have every reason to want to f o l l o w the Western [form o f ] democracy because i t s u i t s our people. We have had freedom to do what we l i k e ; to f o l l o w our own i n c l i n a t i o n , whereas w i t h the communists, you got to [ s i c ] lead a regimented l i f e , to f o l l o w whether you b e l i e v e i n i t or not, what you are asked to do. Such a l i f e would be f o r e i g n to our country and to our people, and so we n a t u r a l l y adhere to the Western form of democracy rather than f o l l o w communist ways. The Cabinet a l l along decided on t h i s l i n e . ^ 6  I t had a n a t i o n a l image i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y matters of "good" and "bad" i n which the actions of communist countries were i n v a r i a b l y i n t e r p r e t e d as bad, while the actions of Western or Western leaning a l l i e s were  81 more often than not deemed to be good.  The Tunku's statement above  and the Malayan government's r e a c t i o n to the events of Hungary, Cuba, Vietnam, Tibet and the Sino-Indian c o n f l i c t are good i n d i c a t i o n s of such a n a t i o n a l image.  Given such an image, Malaya found i t s e l f  w i l l y - n i l l y drawn i n t o the Cold War arena, supporting the Western bloc i n most questions of East-West c o n f l i c t as i t s v o t i n g at the United Nations would seem to i n d i c a t e .  (See supra, Table  2.1)  Figure 2.2 i l l u s t r a t e s the manner i n which the e l i t e ideology r e l a t e d to the other v a r i a b l e s i n determining the character of defence and s e c u r i t y p o l i c y outputs i n t h i s f i r s t period of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The e l i t e ideology i s located c e n t r a l l y to i n d i c a t e i t s importance as an i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e or the f i n a l " f i l t e r " through which a l l other influences on f o r e i g n p o l i c y are processed.  B r i t i s h r u l e and the  Emergency are seen as important antecedent v a r i a b l e s while the Cold War environment should be appreciated as a pervasive f a c t o r a c t i n g constantly on f o r e i g n p o l i c y during t h i s period.  Given the nature  of the e l i t e ideology, the impact of the Cold War was p r e d i c t a b l y i n the d i r e c t i o n of pro-Western, anti-communist p o l i c y outputs. defence and s e c u r i t y needs e x i s t e d by v i r t u e of nationhood,  Although British  c o l o n i a l r u l e and the Emergency tended to augment such needs.  Little  was done i n the c o l o n i a l era to provide an independent Malaya w i t h adequate m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y to defend i t s borders i n the event of e x t e r n a l attack, while the i n t e r n a l war not only sapped already meagre c a p a b i l i t i e s but even a f t e r i t s o f f i c i a l end loomed large as a l a t e n t threat to n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .  Moreover, the perception on the part of  the r u l i n g e l i t e that insurgency was e x t e r n a l l y fueled added an  82  FIGURE 2.2 EXPLANATORY CHART OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY OUTPUTS  Foreign P o l i c y Objectives:  Cold War British Rule  ELITE IDEOLOGY  Emergency  \ Defence  and security needs  Political Independence Territorial Integrity S t r a t e g i e s:  Foreign P o l i c y Postures: Pro-Western, Anti-CommunistOrientations  A l i g n i n g with Western powers, Disassociating with Communist powers  Actions: Signing mutual defence pact with B r i t a i n , Other pro-Western anti-Communist actions  i n t e r n a t i o n a l dimension to a s t r i c t l y i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y question. Given Malaya's low m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y and i t s leaders'  perception  of e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , AMDA seemed to be a l o g i c a l step toward the f u l f i l l m e n t of the country's b a s i c defence and s e c u r i t y needs, at l e a s t i n the eyes of the Tunku and h i s colleagues.  National "needs" can be  best appreciated as the obverse of " c a p a b i l i t i e s " - a well-known 87  concept i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e .  While i t  makes sense to t a l k of the c a p a b i l i t i e s of great powers, to speak i n s i m i l a r terms about s m a l l , developing countries would be somewhat inappropriate since these countries tend to have more needs than capabilities.  Yet there seems to be a woeful lack of f o r e i g n p o l i c y 88  a n a l y s i s of Third World countries from such a perspective. The importance of n a t i o n a l needs i s even more evident i n matters r e l a t i n g to economics.  I f Malaya was i n a weak p o s i t i o n with  respect  to defence and s e c u r i t y , i t s weakness and v u l n e r a b i l i t y was a l l the more evident i n matters of development and trade.  I have already  stressed how Malaya, as an underdeveloped country with an economy dependent on rubber and t i n , fought f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of raw materials' p r i c e s while opposing a l l forms of p r o t e c t i o n and t a r i f f b a r r i e r s against Third-World countries i n i t s pursuit of development goals.  However, despite t h i s developing-world o r i e n t a t i o n i n the  question of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade, Malaya neither espoused nor p r a c t i s e d a p o l i c y of economic nationalism at home.  Instead, i t was committed  to a l a i s s e z - f a i r e p o l i c y which l e f t i t s economy i n f o r e i g n , l a r g e l y B r i t i s h control.  I w i l l argue that t h i s was again a product of the  p r e v a i l i n g ideology which, apart from i t s Western-bloc o r i e n t a t i o n i n matters of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , also e x h i b i t e d a c a p i t a l i s t 89  economic philosophy.  The basic tenets of t h i s philosophy were a  commitment to free enterprise and the b e l i e f that f o r e i g n investment provided  the answer to economic s t a b i l i t y and advancement.  Minister  of Commerce, Tan Siew S i n , who l a t e r became the country's Finance  84 Minister,  e n u n c i a t e d such a p h i l o s o p h y as e a r l y as  to P a r l i a m e n t i n support of g r a n t i n g  1958  when s p e a k i n g  tax exemption t o p i o n e e r  industries: I t i s f r e q u e n t l y suggested t h a t the amount of f o r e i g n c a p i t a l coming i n t o i n d u s t r y i n t h i s c o u n t r y s h o u l d be l i m i t e d , e i t h e r by f i x i n g a maximum percentage of the shares which may be h e l d i n any company by f o r e i g n c a p i t a l , or i n some o t h e r way. In view of the extremely l a r g e amounts of c a p i t a l which w i l l be r e q u i r e d i f we are to b e a t the unemployment menace t h i s i s a t o t a l l y u n r e a l i s t i c approach to the problem. L i m i t i n g the amount of f o r e i g n c a p i t a l i n any e n t e r p r i s e i s tantamount to l i n k i n g the r a t e of i n d u s t r i a l development i n t h i s c o u n t r y to the amount of c a p i t a l which can be r a i s e d l o c a l l y ... In o t h e r words, the need f o r capi t a l i s so g r e a t t h a t t h e r e i s room f o r a l l the l o c a l and f o r e i g n c a p i t a l w i s h i n g to i n v e s t here, w i t h p l e n t y more room to s p a r e . The danger of today and tomorrow i s not a s u r p l u s of c a p i t a l as r a t h e r a d e a r t h o f i t . 9 0 Figure and  2.3  shows the r e l a t i o n s h i p among the independent  the development and  trade p o l i c y outputs.  British  variables  colonial rule  p r e - d i s p o s e d the Malayan economy to develop i n the p a r t i c u l a r on which I have a l r e a d y  elaborated.  C o l o n i a l r u l e was  fashion  therefore  most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r d e t e r m i n i n g the k i n d s of economic needs new  n a t i o n was  the the  to have.  O b v i o u s l y , f a c t o r s of c l i m a t e  and  n a t u r a l endowment are  i n i n f l u e n c i n g the n a t u r e of economic needs but  the  important  f a c t remains  that  c o l o n i a l i s m skewed Malaya's economic development i n p a r t i c u l a r 91 directions.  This  i n t u r n r e s u l t e d i n two  p o l i c y p o s t u r e s i n the  issue-area:  f a i r l y stable  foreign  a developing-world o r i e n t a t i o n  which sprung d i r e c t l y from i t s developmental needs, and a l a i s s e z - f a i r e o r i e n t a t i o n toward f o r e i g n economic e n t e r p r i s e which d e r i v e d from the  FIGURE.2.3 EXPLANATORY CHART OF DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE POLICY OUTPUTS  Foreign P o l i c y Promoting economic development British Rule  Objectives Stabilizing commodity prices  Developmental Needs  i Foreign  Elite Ideology  Policy  -I  Postures  Laissezfaire Orientation  DevelopingWorld Orientation  Strategy  Strategies  Providing good i n v e s tment climate  Supporting trade groupings Negotiating trade agreements  Actions  Actions  Investment Agreements with W. Germany, Japan and U.S. Granting 'pioneer s t a t u s ' to new industries  Denouncing U.S. s t o c k p i l e releases of t i n and rubber Joining T i n Agreements Concluding trade Agreements w i t h A u s t r a l i a , Japan, New Zealand, U.A.R. and S. Korea  86 dominant e l i t e ideology as w e l l as being based on needs.  The manner  i n which the two f o r e i g n p o l i c y postures r e l a t e to the economic objectives and t h e i r concomitant s t r a t e g i e s and actions i s shown i n the explanatory  chart.  A developing-world posture l e d to the pursuit of two common LDC objectives of promoting economic development (however a government choose to define t h i s ) and s t a b i l i z i n g commodity p r i c e s .  may  This, i n  t u r n , r e s u l t e d i n the adoption of f a i r l y standard economic s t r a t e g i e s of supporting LDC  trade groupings and negotiating trade agreements.  The r e s u l t a n t actions are enumerated i n Figure 2.3.  Malaya's other  posture i n issues of Development and Trade and the r e l a t e d strategy and actions were, however, more contrived, i n that they arose from d e f i n i t e i d e o l o g i c a l tenets.  Were Malaya's leaders to have adopted  a s o c i a l i s t ideology, f o r example, the foreign p o l i c y posture v i s - a - v i s f o r e i g n enterprise would have probably taken a more " n a t i o n a l i s t i c " hue with perhaps n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of major i n d u s t r i e s as i t s concomitant strategy.  As i t turned out, a l a i s s e z - f a i r e  o r i e n t a t i o n prompted the l i b e r a l strategy of providing f i s c a l  and  other incentives to f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e . In the issue-area of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy, a prominent aspect of Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y was m i l i e u or global goals.  i t s p u r s u i t of  Malaya, despite being a small country, was  rather a c t i v e i n i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s .  I t showed  considerable  support f o r the UN and i t s f u n c t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s , p a r t i c i p a t e d with keenness i n the Commonwealth, and succeeded i n f o r g i n g a c e r t a i n degree of regional cooperation  among i t s more sympathetic neighbours.  But  f o r the most p a r t , the pursuance o f these m i l i e u g o a l s  from what we may term as s t a t u s needs.  A new n a t i o n  spring  seeks r e c o g n i t i o n  and  acceptance from the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community and t h e U n i t e d  and  other  i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums a r e the most n a t u r a l p l a c e s  Nations  to pursue  92 these needs.  As a L a t i n American s c h o l a r has s t a t e d :  ... t h e r e a r e two types o f sources o f a n a t i o n ' s prestige: (1) those d e r i v e d from i n s t i t u t i o n a l bases t h a t make i t p o s s i b l e f o r a n a t i o n t o have h i g h r e a l s t a t u s from the economic and m i l i t a r y power p o i n t o f view; and (2) those d e r i v e d from the n a t i o n ' s b e h a v i o u r i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, whether t h i s be t o a c h i e v e a conformance w i t h the v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s o f t h i s system o r to o b t a i n an i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n not r e l a t e d to i t s m i l i t a r y might. y j  Since Malaya d i d not have the i n s t i t u t i o n a l bases o f p r e s t i g e , i t had t o depend upon i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y a c t i o n s t o boost i t s s t a t u s . Malaya's c o n t r i b u t i o n toward the Congo peacekeeping was perhaps geared, among other  aims, toward e s t a b l i s h i n g the new s t a t e ' s  status  94 i n the w o r l d community. evaluations conditions bility,  S t a t u s needs a r e based on the s u b j e c t i v e  o f the r u l i n g e l i t e as w e l l as on o b j e c t i v e domestic such as the presence o r absence of a l a r g e m i l i t a r y capa-  g r e a t w e a l t h , t e c h n o l o g y and the l i k e .  I n t h i s sense, they  are " i n t e r n a l " sources o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y , l i k e economic needs, b u t u n l i k e t h e l a t t e r a r e n o t s o l e l y based on o b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s . needs a r e r e a l , n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  Status  and a r e r e f l e c t i v e o f the contemporary  i n t e r n a t i o n a l system which o p e r a t e s on e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s a t the formal  l e v e l b u t e x h i b i t s v a s t i n e q u a l i t i e s among s t a t e s a t the 95  actual level. i s a greater  A l l s t a t e s to some degree have s t a t u s needs b u t t h e r e tendency f o r s t a t e s w i t h o u t the i n s t i t u t i o n a l bases o f  p r e s t i g e t o t r y and e l e v a t e t h e i r s t a t u s by way o f v a r i o u s  diplomatic  88  FIGURE 2.4 EXPLANATORY CHART OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DIPLOMACY POLICY OUTPUTS Foreign Developmental Needs  N  \  Status Needs Security Needs  Internationalist , Functionalist . Orientations I  ^Elite Ideology  Policy  Postures  AntiColonialism  Regionalism  I  I I  I Foreign t Promoting UN i d e a l s : - collective security, human r i g h t s I  i I I  l i  t  Promoting authority of UN and other gene r a l purpos^ ' groupings / I / l /  Policy  Objectives  Promoting decolonization & selfdetermination  Promoting regional cooperation  I I  i •*•  Strategies A  Actions  t  Promoting specificpurpose, regional groupings l I I t  Participating i n Congo peacekeeping and other UN activities  Voting, sponsoring issues of Algeria, West I r i a n  Participating in Commonwealth  Denouncing Particiapartheid pating & boycotting i n UN S. A f r i c a n specialized goods agencies  Founding and joining ASA  89 A  9  6  endeavours. A l t h o u g h s t a t u s needs dominated Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n m a t t e r s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n and  diplomacy, i t would be wrong to  a s s e r t t h a t such needs were the o n l y area.  Foreign  p o l i c y o u t p u t s are  tional i n intent.  s o u r c e s o f p o l i c y i n the  seldom s i n g l e - p u r p o s e or  Thus developmental and  issue-  unidirec-  even s e c u r i t y needs  i n d i r e c t l y impinged upon p o l i c y o u t p u t s i n the  issue-area.  In  p a r t i c u l a r , Malaya's f u n c t i o n a l i s t o r i e n t a t i o n i n s u p p o r t i n g s p e c i a l i z e d UN  a g e n c i e s and  general r e f l e c t  i t s support of UN  the i n f l u e n c e  Malaya a l s o f e l t  the  of these needs.  decolonization  as a f o r e i g n p o l i c y p o s t u r e was As  sharing  was  had  a former c o l o n y ,  toward c u l t u r a l and  of  Anti-colonialism  an almost a u t o m a t i c outcome  f o r Malaya's p u r s u i t of r e g i o n a l i s m ,  a similar heritage.  ideology  As  i n general.  therefore  m u l t i - d i r e c t i o n a l i n purpose, but the t h r u s t was  collective security in  o b l i g a t i o n to press f o r self-determination  c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s and  of independence.  the  it  f o r the most p a r t of the diplomatic  was  period,  exchange among  countries  F i n a l l y , a l t h o u g h the p r e v a i l i n g e l i t e  o n l y minimal impact i n t h i s i s s u e - a r e a ,  i t s pervasiveness  r e g i s t e r e d i n such i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s as disarmament, East-West  issues  i n g e n e r a l and  Figure  2.4,  the v a r i o u s  Congo q u e s t i o n .  of the  policy  issue-area. aspect of the  yet been d i s c u s s e d  foreign policy:  In  r e l a t i o n s h i p s between  s o u r c e s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y as they r e l a t e d to the  There i s one not  to the  I provide a d e t a i l e d charting  o u t p u t s i n the  t h a t has  also with respect  foreign p o l i c y formulation i n explaining  process  the emergent Malayan  to what e x t e n t d i d feedback e f f e c t s emanating from  the external and i n t e r n a l environment a f f e c t foreign p o l i c y ? For the most part, Malaya's policy-makers kept a t i g h t r e i n on p o l i c y and postures, and objectives and s t r a t e g i e s remained stable and coherent throughout the period.  The events of the external environ-  ment - the 'aggressive' acts of the Eastern states and the f r i e n d l y acts of the West - tended to p o s i t i v e l y r e i n f o r c e the basic of foreign p o l i c y .  thrusts  Given the e l i t e ideology, the feedback was thus  p o s i t i v e l y i n the d i r e c t i o n of continued anti-communist, pro-Western postures, s t r a t e g i e s and actions. I n t e r n a l l y , however, there was some i n d i c a t i o n of negative feedback toward c e r t a i n aspects of foreign p o l i c y . opposition  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  parliamentarians' c r i t i c i s m s and the UMNO back-bench r e v o l  against AMDA put the government on the defensive i n i t s f i r s t major foreign p o l i c y a c t i o n .  The Tunku was able, however, to summon h i s  personal a u t h o r i t y to stem r e j e c t i o n of AMDA but we may a t t r i b u t e Malaya's softened pro-Western l i n e to these i n t e r n a l feedback e f f e c t s We can c e r t a i n l y a t t r i b u t e Malaya's absence from SEATO as an e f f e c t 98  of the negative response to AMDA.  The feedback sequence would be:  Pro-Western, a n t i - , communist posture  A l i g n with West  Sign AMDA  UMNO opposition to AMDA  Soften proWestern posture  Malaya does not j o i n SEATO  In issue-areas other than defence and s e c u r i t y , the influence feedback on p o l i c y was or no opposition  n e g l i g i b l e or non-existent.  There was  of  little  to economic p o l i c i e s , and the government was  never  s e r i o u s l y challenged on i t s p o l i c i e s i n the t h i r d issue-area. E x t e r n a l l y , the environment more or l e s s p o s i t i v e l y r e i n f o r c e d  the  government's p o l i c y outputs i n these issue-areas, as w e l l .  one  instance,  In  Indonesian h o s t i l i t y toward the Tunku's scheme f o r a  r e g i o n a l organization probably explains  r e s u l t e d i n the troubled b i r t h of ASA  and  i t s innocuous and n o n - p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n .  However, negative Indonesian reactions  toward Malayan foreign p o l i c y  i n general probably confirmed e x i s t i n g images of Indonesia's procommunist leanings and therefore p o s i t i v e l y reinforced the p r e v a i l i n g foreign p o l i c y postures. This survey of the f i r s t period of foreign p o l i c y has  revealed  a remarkable s t a b i l i t y and coherence i n Malayan foreign p o l i c y outputs.  Notably, i d i o s y n c r a t i c sources tended to account for the  most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c aspects of foreign p o l i c y .  In p a r t i c u l a r , the  survey showed that Malayan foreign p o l i c y was by and large underpinned by an e l i t e ideology committed to c e r t a i n Western values.  It  was  t h i s e l i t e ideology that i n v a r i a b l y gave the f i n a l expression to more s i g n i f i c a n t facets of foreign p o l i c y .  the  However, p a r t i c u l a r  h i s t o r i c a l experiences proved to be s i g n i f i c a n t antecedent factors a f f e c t i n g p o l i c y and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment tended to p o s i t i v e l y r e i n f o r c e p r e v a i l i n g thrusts of foreign p o l i c y .  My analysis  also  confirms the notion that foreign p o l i c y i s a purposeful a c t i v i t y geared to the pursuit of c e r t a i n n a t i o n a l goals and i n t e r e s t s however these  may be defined and coloured by the p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s of the policy-makers.  I t strengthened the t h e s i s that from the  viewpoint of explanation, i t i s only meaningful to appreciate f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n a h o l i s t i c manner, that i s , i n terms of how the various inputs (sources) and outputs of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t e r a c t upon each other to produce t h e i r t o t a l e f f e c t .  93 Notes to Chapter 2  Agreement between the Government o f the U n i t e d Kingdom o f B r i t a i n and N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d and the Government o f the F e d e r a t i o n o f Malaya on Mutual Defence and Mutual A s s i s t a n c e , K u a l a Lumpur, Govt. P r i n t e r , 1957, A r t i c l e V I I . 2  l b i d . , A r t i c l e VI.  3  Ibid., Article  VIII.  4  Ibid., Article  IX.  ^Cf. Robert 0. T i l m a n , M a l a y s i a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y , S t u d i e s Dept., Report RAC-R-63-2, March 1969, p.7.  Strategic  Tun A b d u l Razak, "Radio Malaya T a l k on Defence P o l i c y " as p u b l i s h e d i n The S t r a i t s Times, October 4, 1961.  1963,  ^ J . B. D a l t o n , The Development of Malayan E x t e r n a l P o l i c y , u n p u b l i s h e d , D. P h i l . T h e s i s , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , 1972, p.  195764.  g See Malayan L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l Debates, October 2, 3271.  col.  9  D a l t o n , op_. c i t . , p.  66.  " ^ L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l Debates, October 2 and 3, 1957, D a l t o n , op_. c i t . , p. 67. n  ibid.,  1 2  Ibid.,  1957,  and  p. 68. pp. 68-69.  13 I b i d . , p. 68. 14 Malayan L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l Debates, October 2 and 3, c o l s . 3269ff and c o l s . 31318ff. I b i d . , October 2, c o l . 3282.  1957,  94 1 6  I b i d . , October 3, c o l . 3358.  "^R. S. Milne, Government arid P o l i t i c s i n Malaysia, Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n , 1967, p. 180, and R. S. M i l n e , "The Influence on Foreign P o l i c y of Ethnic M i n o r i t i e s w i t h E x t e r n a l T i e s " i n M. W. Zacher and R. S. Milne, eds., C o n f l i c t and S t a b i l i t y i n Southeast A s i a , New York, Doubleday, 1974, p. 108. See a l s o , T. H. S i l c o e k , op_. c i t . , p. 50. 18 Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 22. The Tunku, i n a personal communication, placed the most importance on the issue of m i l i t a r y advantage. In reply to my question of why Malaya had a defence pact w i t h B r i t a i n but d i d not j o i n SEATO, he s a i d , "We had a defence pact w i t h B r i t a i n under which B r i t a i n would come to our a i d i n the event of any aggression by any f o r e i g n power and we f e l t that was s u f f i c i e n t f o r our own s e c u r i t y and safety. SEATO i s a pact between the countries which include America, B r i t a i n , Pakistan ... but there was no *conc l u s i v e agreement to help one another i n the event of war. There was no need f o r us to enter i n t o any defence agreement w i t h other countries as we f e l t our agreement w i t h B r i t a i n was s u f f i c i e n t . " (The Tunku, a f t e r meeting me i n a b r i e f i n t e r v i e w , agreed to answer a schedule of questions. His r e p l i e s w i l l be h e r e i n a f t e r c i t e d as "Tunku, personal communication, June 1975!'). 19 Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 23. 20 On t h i s p o i n t , see a l s o , Robin Winks, "Malaysia and the Commonwealth: An Inquiry i n t o the Nature of Commonwealth T i e s " i n Wang Gungwu, ed., Malaysia: A Survey, New York, Praeger, 1964, p. 381. 21 L e g i s l a t i v e Council Debates, 4th Session, December, 1958, c o l . 6029 as c i t e d i n Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore i n Diplomacy, Sydney, Sydney Univ. Press, 1968, p. 42. 22 As c i t e d i n The S t r a i t s Times, December 7, 1958. 23 The Government put out a l i s t of 87 countries which i t recognized and named s i x which i t d i d not, namely, Communist China, N a t i o n a l i s t China, East Germany, North Korea, Outer Mongolia and North Vietnam, The S t r a i t s Times, November 7, 1957. Although the Government d i d not o f f i c i a l l y recognize N a t i o n a l i s t China (Taiwan), i t showed i t s p a r t i a l i t y by allowing the Taiwanese to set up a "consulate" i n Kuala Lumpur o s t e n s i b l y to f o s t e r trade r e l a t i o n s . See Malaysian Parliamentary Debates (Dewan Ra'ayat), December 15 and 16, 1964, c o l s . 75ff and 4738ff, i n which opposition members c r i t i c i z e d the Government f o r allowing t h i s .  95 24  Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 14.  Tunku Abdul Rahman, "Malaysia: Key Area i n Southeast A s i a , " Foreign A f f a i r s , J u l y 1965 as reproduced i n The P o l i t i c a l Element of N a t i o n a l Power, U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f College, (no date), p. 10. 26 C i t e d i n Tilman, l o c . c i t . 27 I b i d . , p. 11. 28  The S t r a i t s Times, December 1, 1959. 29 Tilman, l o c . c i t . 30 See R. 0. Tilman, "Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y : The Dilemmas of a Committed N e u t r a l " i n J . D. Montgomery and A. D. Hirschman, eds., P u b l i c P o l i c y , Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 115-159 and Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 37. 31 The Tunku i n reply to a question of whether policy-makers thought i n terms of goals and s t r a t e g i e s , s a i d , "a small country l i k e Malaysia does not have to go into s t r a t e g i e s and actions to formulate our f o r e i g n p o l i c y however, he stressed that f o r e i g n p o l i c y objectives were important, and considered defence a short range goal and development, a long range goal. Tunku, personal communicat i o n , June 1975. 32 J . M. G u l l i c k , Malaya, New York, Praeger, 1963, as c i t e d i n i b i d . , p. 36. 33  S i l c o c k , c)p_. c i t . , p. 47.  34  See Yap Gaik-Khoon, T r e a t i e s and Engagements A f f e c t i n g Malaya, 1940-1960, B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of Singapore, 1960, pp. 47ff. L i m Chong Yah, "West Malaysian E x t e r n a l Trade 1947-65" i n T. Morgan and N. Spoelstra, eds., Economic Interdependence i n Southeast A s i a , Madison, Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1969, p. 205. 3 5  3 6  I b i d . , p. 218.  37 See i b i d . , pp. 224-230 f o r a more d e t a i l e d explanation of the import s i t u a t i o n . These d e t a i l s are not of great importance to the analysis here.  96 38  See Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 16.  39 See Klaus E. Knorr, T i n Under C o n t r o l , Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 1945, and J . Saravanamuttu, Southern Bargaining i n North-South Trade: The Case of T i n , M.A. Thesis, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972, Ch. 2. 4 0  I b i d . , p. 87.  41 See Yap Gaik-Khoon, op_. c i t . , pp. 39-41. ^ ^ I b i d . , pp. 45-46. 43 See The Malay M a i l , February 6, 1961, The S t r a i t s Times, February 27, 1962, and The S t r a i t s Times, January 1, 1963. 44 Tunku, personal communication, June 1975. 45 Tilman, op_. c i t . , pp. 7-8. 46 The S t r a i t s Times, September 29, 1960. 47 C i t e d i n N. K. Hazra, Malaya's Foreign R e l a t i o n s , 1957-1963, M.A. Thesis, U n i v e r s i t y of Singapore, 1965, pp. 54-55. 48 The S t r a i t s Times, September 30, 1960. 49 Hazra, op_. c i t . , pp. 35-36. 5 0  I b i d . , pp. 37-38.  5 1  I b i d . , p. 40.  5 2  I b i d . , pp. 48-49.  97 53 However, the Tunku's p r i v a t e attempts at mediating i n the dispute were not appreciated by the Indonesians who perhaps thought the Malayan Prime M i n i s t e r presumptious i n undertaking the e f f o r t . In p a r t i c u l a r , a j o i n t Malayan-Dutch communique" which alluded to the Tunku's secret plan f o r r e s o l v i n g the c o n f l i c t was badly received i n Indonesia. See various reports of a f f a i r i n issues of The S t r a i t s Times and The Malay M a i l , November 26 - December 3, 1960. "^Hazra, op_. c i t . , p. 62. "'"'See I b i d . , pp. 90-104 f o r a discussion and documentation of these economic b e n e f i t s . 56 See S i l c o c k , op_. c i t . , pp. 45-46 and Winks, op_. c i t . , pp. 394396. 57 Hazra, op_. c i t . , p. 109. 58  The S t r a i t s Times, March 17, 1961. 59 The Malay M a i l , A p r i l 21, 1958, The S t r a i t s Times, A p r i l 18 and 22, 1958. ^ H a z r a , op_. c i t . , p. 126. 6 1  I b i d . , p. 129.  6 2  I b i d . , p. 130.  63 ASA: Report of the F i r s t Meeting of Foreign M i n i s t e r s , Kuala Lumpur, Govt. P r i n t e r , 1961, pp. 13-14. 64 Tilman, op_. c i t . , p. 19 and Hazra, op_. c i t . , pp. 146-147. 65 Tunku, personal communication, June 1975. ^ S i l c o c k , op_. c i t . , p. 42.  98 6 7Marvin C. Ott, "Foreign P o l i c y Formulation i n Malaysia," Asian Survey, V o l . X I I , No. 3, March 1972, p. 225. Ott nevertheless admits the " s a l i e n c e " of c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l experiences, and the " g e o - p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u " i n c l u d i n g Malaya's s t r a t e g i c r e g i o n a l l o c a t i o n , i t s vulnerable economy, and the impact of the Cold War. He also notes the importance of the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s . See h i s The Sources and Content of Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y Toward Indonesia and the P h i l i p p i n e s 1957-1965, Ph.D. Thesis, Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y , 1971, p. 19ff and passim. 68 Ott, i b i d . , i n dealing with country r e l a t i o n s eschewed the problem of d e f i n i n g the broad range of f o r e i g n p o l i c y dependent v a r i a b l e s . His a n a l y s i s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n general focusses on the independent v a r i a b l e s . 69 The " f i l t e r " idea i s drawn from the phenomenological approach of f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n a l y s i s . This view holds that the "perceptions" of policy-makers rather than o b j e c t i v e circumstances are c r u c i a l i n formulation of p o l i c y . See, f o r example, Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image, Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1956. ^My notion i s a k i n to Alexander George's concept of "operational code" although i t would have a s l i g h t l y more extensive meaning. According to George, "A p o l i t i c a l leader's b e l i e f s about the nature of p o l i t i c s and p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t , h i s views regarding the extent to which h i s t o r i c a l development can be shaped, and h i s notion of correct strategy and t a c t i c s - whether these b e l i e f s be r e f e r r e d to as 'operational code,' 'weltanchauung,' 'cognitive map' or an ' e l i t e p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e ' - are among the f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g the actor's d e c i s i o n s , " A. George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of P o l i t i c a l Leaders and Decision-Making," I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies Quarterly, V o l . 13, No. 2, June 1969, p. 197. ^The A l l i a n c e , l e d by the Tunku, i n winning the 1955 general e l e c t i o n s i n resounding fashion (51 out of 52 seats) ensured that B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n s would be passed on a f t e r independence. The party continues to dominate p o l i t i c s and l e d the N a t i o n a l Front i n capturing a l l but 19 of the 154 parliamentary seats i n the 1974 e l e c t i o n s . 72 Ott, "Foreign P o l i c y Formulation  op_. c i t . , p.  229.  73 See f n . 67. 74 Tun Tan Siew S i n t a l k e d of "the four of us," that i s , the Tunku, Razak, I s m a i l and himself, as being the most important decision-makers on f o r e i g n p o l i c y questions. Interview w i t h Tun Tan Siew S i n , June 27, 1975.  99  '"'See Leo Ah Bang, E l i t e Cohesion i n Malaysia: A Study of A l l i a n c e Leadership, M.Soc.Sci. Thesis, U n i v e r s i t y of Singapore, pp. 32-36. ^ O t t himself admits the supportive nature of the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , which he says "plays a r o l e second only to the Prime M i n i s t e r i n the shaping of ... f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " O t t , Ph.D. Thesis, op. c i t . , p. 4 3 f f . See also Tilman, op_. c i t . , pp. 43-45 i n which he discusses the " e l i t e p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . " James C. Scott, P o l i t i c a l Ideology i n Malaysia, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1968, e s p e c i a l l y Ch. 9. 78 I b i d . , p. 202. Scott does note, however, that commitment to an i d e a l i z e d model of Western democracy i s coupled w i t h a p e s s i m i s t i c outlook on i t s attainment i n Malaysia. This nevertheless does not detract from the fact of that commitment and i t s prevalence among c i v i l servants. While i t i s true that there was a dominant e l i t e which l a r g e l y supported the i d e a l s and values of the power-wielders, evidence points to the existence of a l a t e n t or p o t e n t i a l ' c o u n t e r - e l i t e ' w i t h i n the r u l i n g group, i n p a r t i c u l a r , w i t h i n UMNO. The b r i e f but aggressive opposition to AMDA was proof of i t s existence. The leaders and members of the opposition p a r t i e s can also be regarded as a c o u n t e r - e l i t e but t h e i r capacity to a f f e c t government decisions i s very l i m i t e d . I n employing the notion of an e l i t e ideology, one avoids having to define the s i z e and the a c t u a l i n d i v i d u a l s that comprise the e l i t e . I t i s the p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s of the acknowledged policy-makers rather than the policy-makers themselves w i t h which we are concerned. Harry M i l l e r , Prince and Premier, London, George G. Harrap, 1959, pp. 192-193. The Tunku confirmed that "... to a large extent Malaysia's strong anti-communist p o l i c y was due t o our trouble with the Malayan Communist Party at home and our knowledge of what was happening i n countries around us, Vietnam, Cambodia, and one time, Indonesia." Personal communication, June 1975. The S t r a i t s Times, September 26, 1957.  100 82  See, f o r example, Stephen Chee, "Malaysia's Changing Foreign P o l i c y " i n Yong Mun Cheong, ed., Trends i n Malaysia I I , I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Univ. Press, 1974, p. 39, Tilman, op. c i t . , pp. 37-39, and R. S. Milne, "The Influence on Foreign P o l i c y of Ethnic M i n o r i t i e s w i t h E x t e r n a l T i e s " i n Milne and Zacher, op. c i t . , pp. 108-109. 83 For a b r i e f period Malaya appeared to have softened i t s l i n e toward China when i n 1960 a f t e r the o f f i c i a l end of the Emergency, the Tunku s a i d i n Washington that China should be i n the UN and Malaya would support i t s admission. The i n c i d e n t created a furore at home and l e d the then M i n i s t e r of Foreign A f f a i r s , Dr. I s m a i l , to r e s i g n h i s p o r t f o l i o . The Tunku admits that I s m a i l thought "he had gone beyond the agreed p o l i c y on China." Tunku, personal communication, June 1975, see also Dalton, op_. c i t . , pp. 96-98. 84 The Tunku t o l d me, " A l l these events which took place i n Hungary, I n d i a , Vietnam and Tibet and elsewhere proved to us beyond any doubt the aggressive character of the communists." Personal communication, June 1975. 85 Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Systems" i n J . N. Rosenau, ed., I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s and Foreign P o l i c y , 2nd E d i t i o n , New York, Free Press, 1969, p. 430; and Ole R. H o l s t i , "The B e l i e f System and N a t i o n a l Images: A Case Study" i n Rosenau, op_. c i t . , p. 554. 86 Tunku, personal communication, June 1975. 87 Two other r e l a t e d concepts are "power" and " i n f l u e n c e . " See, for example, K a r l W. Deutsch, The A n a l y s i s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , Englewood C l i f f s , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1968, pp. 21-39, f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of the various dimensions of "power." For an a n a l y s i s of the three concepts of power, influence and c a p a b i l i t i e s , see K. J . H o l s t i , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , 2nd E d i t i o n , Englewood C l i f f s , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1972, pp. 154-171, and Joseph Frankel, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , London, Penguin, 1969, pp. .118-131. 88 Cf. Weinstein, op_. c i t . 89 Cf.  S i l c o e k , op_. c i t . , p. 47.  90 C i t e d i n V i c t o r Morais, ed., Blueprint f o r Unity, Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n , 1972, p. 115.  101 91  Taking Malaya's two major i n d u s t r i e s , f o r instance, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the rubber t r e e , while i t t h r i v e s i n Malayan topography and climate, i s s t r i c t l y not a 'native' since i t was introduced by the B r i t i s h from B r a z i l . T i n , on the other hand, i s a n a t u r a l endowment. The development of the two i n d u s t r i e s , however, was l a r g e l y a f u n c t i o n of c o l o n i a l i s m which expedited the l a r g e - s c a l e emigration of Indian labour f o r the rubber industry and Chinese labour f o r t i n . See Lim Chong-Yah, Economic Development of Modern Malaya, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1967. 92 An undersecretary of the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s s a i d Malaya's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Congo peacekeeping was part of the process of c r e a t i n g " c r e d i b i l i t y and a good image" i n the e a r l y years of independence. Interview w i t h Encik Yusof Hitam, Undersecretary I I I (Southeast A s i a ) , June 27, 1975. 93 Gustavo Lagos, I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t r a t i f i c a t i o n and Underdeveloped Countries, Chapel H i l l , Univ. of North C a r o l i n a Press, 1963, p. 132. 94 See f n . 92. 95 Cf. David V i t a l , The I n e q u a l i t y of States, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, passim. 96 I t i s true too that the p u r s u i t of p r e s t i g e may be j u s t an e f f o r t at maintaining a p a r t i c u l a r status such as the competition between the superpowers i n the arms race or space race, or i t could be aimed at recovering l o s s status ("atimia") as Lagos, op_. c i t . discusses at length. 97 The then Permanent Secretary to the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s denies vehemently that Malaya was ever "pro" Western, although he admitted i t was anti-communist. Interview with Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, M i n i s t e r of Home A f f a i r s , October 30, 1975. 98 See supra, pp. 22-25.  CHAPTER 3 MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1964 -  1969  Defence and Security "Malaysia" became an i n t e r n a t i o n a l issue even before i t a c t u a l l y came i n t o being."'"  As e a r l y as January 1963, the Indonesian  Foreign  M i n i s t e r , Dr. Subandrio, announced a p o l i c y of "Confrontation" against the Malaysia project which he c a l l e d " n e o - c o l o n i a l i s t " and 2 "neo-imperialist."  About the same time Indonesian Confrontation or  "Konfrontasi" was launched, the P h i l i p p i n e s renewed t h e i r  territorial  claim on Sabah, the North Borneo t e r r i t o r y that was to be included 3 i n t o the proposed new f e d e r a t i o n .  The Indonesian opposition was  further fueled by a r e v o l t i n Brunei under the leadership of the Brunei Party Rakyat leader, A. M. A z a h a r i , who opposed the formation of Malaysia and put forward h i s own plan f o r the c r e a t i o n of an independent state c o n s i s t i n g of the Sultanate of Brunei, North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak.  Although i t r e g i s t e r e d some i n i t i a l  success,  the Azahari Revolt was q u i c k l y suppressed by B r i t i s h troops at the 4 request of the Brunei Sultan, who himself opposed Azahari's scheme. Thereafter, the Malaysia issue seemed to have subsided to a detente with the meeting of the Tunku, President Sukarno and President Macapagal i n Manila i n August 1963.  The 'summit' brought about the  b i r t h of MAPHILINDO - a vague scheme of cooperation among the three countries - amidst the showering of 102 mutual compliments by the three  103 leaders."*  Maphilindo died s t i l l b o r n a l i t t l e over a month a f t e r i t  was proposed.  Following the proclamation of Malaysia on September 16,  1963, Malaysia broke o f f diplomatic t i e s with Indonesia and the Philippines.^  Although Indonesian Confrontation had not ceased a f t e r  Maphilindo, i t became more serious a f t e r Malaysia was o f f i c i a l l y declared.  The Indonesian acts ranged from aggressive p a t r o l l i n g of  the Malacca S t r a i t s , i n which Malaysian fishermen were harassed, to border clashes i n v o l v i n g members of the Tentera Nasional Kalimantan (North Borneo N a t i o n a l Army).  By 1964, Indonesian troops had landed  or were a i r dropped on Malayan coasts.  Konfrontasi continued w e l l  i n t o 1965 but began to simmer down a f t e r the September putsch of 1965 i n Indonesia.  There were various e f f o r t s of mediation between  1964-1966 but i t was only on August 12, 1966 that an accord was signed between Indonesia and Malaysia to cease a l l h o s t i l i t i e s and renew diplomatic t i e s .  Provided below i s a chronology of the main  events and i n c i d e n t s from the outset of Konfrontasi t i l l i t s termination.  (The chronology i s compiled from reports i n the S t r a i t s Times,  Malay M a i l and other secondary sources, p a r t i c u l a r l y A. G. Mezerik's "Malaysia-Indonesia C o n f l i c t , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Review S e r v i c e , V o l . X I , No. 86).  CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FROM THE OUTSET OF KONFRONTASI TILL ITS TERMINATION DATE  EVENT  1963 January 20  Dr. Subandrio, Indonesian Foreign M i n i s t e r , announces a p o l i c y of "Confrontation" against Malaysia i n a speech at Jogjakarta, denouncing the scheme as "neo-colonialist".arid " n e o - i m p e r i a l i s t . "  104 January  24  Tunku t e l l s Indonesia to "keep your hands o f f , " that "Malaysia" w i l l go ahead as scheduled on August 31.  January  28  Philippine-.UK t a l k s open i n London. P h i l i p p i n e s c a l l s f o r " r e s t o r a t i o n " of Sabah to the P h i l i p p i n e s i n the i n t e r e s t s of the s e c u r i t y of the region.  February  13  President Sukarno declares at a mass r a l l y that Indonesia now " o f f i c i a l l y " opposes Malaysia.  March 9  Tun Razak returns from Manila w i t h "diplomatic triumph" a f t e r meeting President Macapagal who had e a r l i e r met w i t h Dr. Subandrio.  April-June  A s e r i e s of meetings of representatives of Malaysia, Indonesia and the P h i l i p p i n e s , i n c l u d i n g a meeting of Sukarno and Tunku i n Tokyo on May 30.  June  T r i p a r t i t e Foreign M i n i s t e r s ' Meeting i n Manila i n . which accord i s reached that P h i l i p p i n e s and Indonesia w i l l drop t h e i r opposition to Malaysia on the understanding that there would be a United Nations assessment of the wishes of the Borneo people on Malaysia and p o s i t i v e steps w i l l be taken toward s e t t l i n g the Sabah claim.  7-11  J u l y 30 August 5  Manila Summit Conference convened. The Manila Declaration i s signed i n which Maphilindo i s proposed as a grouping of three nations bound together by " h i s t o r i c a l t i e s of race and c u l t u r e , " cooperating i n the p u r s u i t of common i n t e r e s t s i n the economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l f i e l d s and i n the struggle against c o l o n i a l i s m and imperialism. In a J o i n t Statement, the three leaders c a l l e d upon the UN Secretary-General to a s c e r t a i n the wishes of the Borneo people by a "fresh approach," i n p a r t i c u l a r , to v e r i f y whether Malaysia was a major i f not the main issue i n the recent e l e c t i o n s i n the two t e r r i t o r i e s ; whether the e l e c t i o n s were " f r e e ; " and whether votes were properly p o l l e d and r e g i s t e r s properly compiled. The three heads of government f u r t h e r acknowledged that f o r e i g n bases were of a temporary nature and w i l l not be used to subvert the n a t i o n a l independence of any of the three countries and that they w i l l each "abstain from the use of arrangements of c o l l e c t i v e defence to serve the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s of any of the b i g powers."  105 August 12  The UN names a nine-member mission to a s c e r t a i n the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak.  August 16  UN mission a r r i v e s i n Sarawak 'greeted' by demonstrat i o n s against Malaysia.  August 22  Dispute over observers holds up UN assessment.  August 26  UN survey i n Sarawak and Sabah begins w i t h P h i l i p p i n e and Indonesian observers s t i l l absent.  August 28  August 29  President Sukarno says i n nation-wide r a d i o t a l k , "We w i l l have to bow our heads and obey" i f the Borneo people want to j o i n Malaysia. Malaya announces that Malaysia w i l l be formed on September 16 instead of August 31 as o r i g i n a l l y scheduled since the UN survey w i l l not be completed u n t i l September 14.  September 3  Indonesia sends protest to Malaya on " r e c k l e s s and premature d e c i s i o n " to set formation of Malaysia on September 16 as a " u n i l a t e r a l act contravening the l e t t e r and s p i r i t of the Manila Summit Agreements."  September 5  UN team completes work.  September 14  UN assessment'is published. I t f i n d s that Malaysia was a major issue i n the recent e l e c t i o n s i n Sabah and Sarawak, that the e l e c t i o n s had been free and that "a large m a j o r i t y of the people favoured j o i n i n g Malaysia."  September 15  Indonesian Cabinet meets, decides Malaysia i s i l l e g a l and cannot be recognized. Dr. Subandrio says UN survey was not conducted i n accord w i t h the Manila agreement and was "hasty." P h i l i p p i n e s informs Malaya i t w i l l defer r e c o g n i t i o n of Malaysia.  September 17  Malaysia severs diplomatic r e l a t i o n s w i t h Indonesia and the P h i l i p p i n e s .  September 18  A Malaysian Defence Council i s formed with power to c a l l up reserves.  December 11  Tunku i n report to Parliament on Konfrontasi says 66 t e r r o r i s t s were k i l l e d and 31 captured i n 48 armed incursions since A p r i l 12.  106 1964 January  7-11  President Sukarno and Macapagal hold t a l k s i n Manila and issue statement saying "they c h e r i s h the hope that a t r i p a r t i t e 'mushawarah' would be convened to resolve e x i s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s amongst the three s i g n a t o r i e s to the (Manila) agreements."  January  13  Tunku says that another summit meeting must be preceded by c l a r i f i c a t i o n of whether Indonesia and the P h i l i p p i n e s recognize Malaysia as an independent sovereign s t a t e and whether Indonesia w i l l withdraw i t s troops from Malaysian s o i l . The U.S. announces that Robert Kennedy, Attorney-General, w i l l go to Japan'to discuss Malaysia w i t h Sukarno.  January  20  "Truth M i s s i o n " l e d by Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew i s o f f to A f r i c a to e x p l a i n "Malaysia."  January  21  Tunku agrees to meet Macapagal i n Cambodia a f t e r Prince Sihanouk a r r i v e s on a s u r p r i s e v i s i t to Kuala Lumpur.  January  22  Kennedy and Sihanouk i n Kuala Lumpur i n mediation e f f o r t s are hopeful of summit meeting.  January  23  Sukarno announces i n Jakarta that Indonesia, Malaysia and the P h i l i p p i n e s have agreed on a truce and summit meeting. Tunku agrees to r e c i p r o c a t e .  January  25  Sukarno's c e a s e f i r e order comes i n t o e f f e c t .  February  5-11  T r i p a r t i t e f o r e i g n ministers'meeting i n Bangkok. Agreement i s reached to continue c e a s e f i r e with Thailand supervising the truce w i t h UN consent. Another f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s ' meeting i s to be held w i t h i n a month.  February  22  Malaysia protests s i x v i o l a t i o n s of c e a s e f i r e to Indonesia.  March 2-4  Resumed Bangkok m i n i s t e r i a l t a l k s break down on ceasef i r e question with Malaysia i n s i s t i n g on the w i t h drawal of a l l Indonesian g u e r r i l l a s from i t s t e r r i t o r y i f there were to be any settlement.  107 March 27  Malaysia informs U Thant of 50 i n c i d e n t s between January 16 and March 27 with Indonesia, requesting Secretary-General to take any i n i t i a t i v e he deems desirable.  A p r i l 25  The A l l i a n c e i n general e l e c t i o n wins 89 of West Malaysia's 104 seats, a gain of 15 seats.  May 3  P h i l i p p i n e s and Malaysia issue j o i n t communique that they have agreed to e s t a b l i s h consular missions i n both countries on May 18.  June 18-19  T r i p a r t i t e m i n i s t e r i a l t a l k s i n Tokyo prepare agenda for summit meeting.  June 21  One-day summit conference of Sukarno, Tunku and Macapagal collapses on issue of g u e r r i l l a withdrawal. Indonesia says settlement should come f i r s t and there should be a f r e s h referendum i n Sabah and Sarawak.  July  Commonwealth Prime M i n i s t e r s ' Conference i n London. Prime M i n i s t e r s i n f i n a l communique' express "sympathy and support" f o r Malaysia.  8-15  J u l y 22-24  R i o t s i n v o l v i n g Malays and Chinese break out i n Singapore f o l l o w i n g a procession on the occasion of the Prophet Mohammed's b i r t h d a y .  August 17  Malaysia reports Indonesian u n i t of 40 armed r a i d e r s landing on west coast of Johore on Malayan mainland.  September 2  Indonesian a i r c r a f t f l i e s over south Malaya dropping around 30 armed paratroopers.  September 9-17  UN S e c u r i t y Council meets on Indonesia-Malaysia c o n f l i c t . A f t e r s i x meetings, Norwegian d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n r e g r e t t i n g and deploring Indonesian actions and c a l l i n g on the p a r t i e s "to r e f r a i n from a l l threat or use of f o r c e " receives 9 votes i n favour with Czechoslovakia and the USSR v o t i n g against the r e s o l u t i o n , the l a t t e r c o n s t i t u t i n g a veto. Tunku claims moral v i c t o r y .  September 25  Tunku appeals to heads of nations attending forthcoming nonaligned conference i n Cairo to give Malaysia a f a i r hearing a f t e r Malaysia's f a i l u r e to receive an i n v i t a t i o n to the conference.  108 October 5-11  Heads of 47 nonaligned countries meet i n C a i r o . President Nkrumah of Ghana suggests mediation i n Indonesia-Malaysia c o n f l i c t .  October 14  Tunku i n a l e t t e r to President Nasser of UAR declares h i s support f o r the p r i n c i p l e s of co-existence expressed i n the D e c l a r a t i o n of the Cairo Conference.  November 11  Razak, en route to Colombo Plan Conference i n London, to meet A f r i c a n and Middle East leaders to canvass support f o r Malaysia.  November 26-29  Razak wins diplomatic r e c o g n i t i o n f o r Malaysia from A l g e r i a , Morocco and T u n i s i a .  December 30  UN General Assembly, under formula of non-voting, e l e c t s Malaysia to serve on Security C o u n c i l .  December 31  In J a k a r t a , Sukarno announces t h a t Indonesia w i l l withdraw from the UN i n protest of Malaysia's seating i n the Security Council.  1965 January 7  President Sukarno formally announces Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN at a mass r a l l y i n J a k a r t a .  January March  Peace e f f o r t s by P a k i s t a n and Thailand f a i l to produce any r e s u l t s .  March 16  Tun Razak o f f on a tour of North and East A f r i c a (Sudan, E t h i o p i a , Kenya, Somalia, Malagasy and Uganda).  A p r i l 15  Razak on return claims "95%" support f o r Malaysia i n the countries v i s i t e d .  A p r i l 17  Tunku i n speech to A l l i a n c e Party Convention says Malaysia supports a l l U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and speaks of the need f o r B r i t i s h bases i n the country.  May  A Malaysian delegation's a p p l i c a t i o n f o r membership of the Afro-Asian People's S o l i d a r i t y Organization i s rejected at Winneba, Ghana. (China and Indonesia had threatened withdrawal i f Malaysia gained membership).  16  109 May  19  Tunku says the delegation to Winneba had no o f f i c i a l sanction. C a l l s organization "a communist set-up" and i s not surprised that the delegation f a i l e d to gain membership. The Tunku s a i d , "But what I am surprised i s why the Malaysians had gone there."  June  Goodwill missions by two m i n i s t e r s to West A f r i c a n and West Asian countries.  June 22  Report from Malaysian mission i n Manila that a t o t a l of 28 nations w i l l back Malaysia f o r the A l g i e r s nonaligned conference t h i s year, Malaysia's four sponsors being I n d i a , N i g e r i a , Ceylon and E t h i o p i a .  June 28  Report that the A l g i e r s conference i s postponed t i l l November. (The conference never came about as a r e s u l t of a r e b e l l i o n i n A l g e r i a which ousted President Ben B e l l a from power).  August 8  An A l l i a n c e Parliamentary Group on Foreign A f f a i r s while expressing s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the present f o r e i g n p o l i c y recommends "widest diplomatic representation possible with countries i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e i r ideologies."  August 9  Singapore separates from Malaysia f o l l o w i n g an amendment to the C o n s t i t u t i o n approved by Parliament under a C e r t i f i c a t e of Urgency.  September 30  Abortive pro-communist coup i n Indonesia r e s u l t s i n de facto m i l i t a r y takeover.  October 5  Pakistan severs diplomatic r e l a t i o n s w i t h Malaysia over Malaysia a l l e g e d l y t a k i n g sides w i t h India at the UN i n Indo-Pakistan c o n f l i c t .  1966 January 9  Report of Jakarta "peace f e e l e r s " from government and army o f f i c i a l s .  May 31 June 1  Bangkok Peace Talks between Malaysia, Indonesia and P h i l i p p i n e s leading to P h i l l i p i n e r e c o g n i t i o n of Malaysia and rapprochement between Malaysia and Indonesia. Agreement i s reached to submit proposals to end K o n f r o n t a s i .  June 3  Malaysia and P h i l i p p i n e s resume f u l l diplomatic r e l a t i o n s at the ambassadorial l e v e l .  110 August 12  NOTE:  Malaysia and Indonesia reach accord to cease h o s t i l i t i e s and r e s t o r e diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . In three years of h o s t i l i t i e s , 590 Indonesians were k i l l e d , 222 wounded and 771 captured. Commonwealth c a s u a l t i e s included 114 servicemen (64 B r i t i s h ) and 36 c i v i l i a n s (mostly Malaysians) k i l l e d , while 118 servicemen and 53 c i v i l i a n s were wounded.  Thus Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the issue-area of defence and s e c u r i t y f o r most of t h i s period was dominated by K o n f r o n t a s i and other events a r i s i n g from Malaysia's formation.  The c r e a t i o n of  Malaysia may be seen from one perspective as the p u r s u i t of a possession goal, or as Wolfers c a l l s i t , an act of s e l f - e x t e n s i o n , ^ since i t involved t e r r i t o r i a l expansion. method of pursuing, i r o n i c a l l y ,  I t may also be viewed as an i n d i r e c t s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s at l e a s t i n the  eyes of the Malayan policy-makers.  Foreign P o l i c y actions are seldom  single-purpose i n i n t e n t and the c r e a t i o n of Malaysia i s fraught w i t h m u l t i p l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as to the motives behind i t .  A strong case  can be made f o r the view that the Malaysia proposal grew out of a perceived s e c u r i t y t h r e a t posed by communism to the Malaysia region. The Tunku, who can be r e l i e d upon f o r h i s candidness, s a i d soon a f t e r Konfrontasi was launched:  "We have no t e r r i t o r i a l ambitions. A l l  we want to do i s t r y and save ourselves from the communists.  9 Otherwise, I won't want Malaysia."  Indeed, the Malaysia idea o r i -  g i n a l l y arose from the Singapore government's campaign f o r merger with Malaya l a r g e l y t o avert what the Singapore leaders saw as an imminent communist threat i f not i t s already d i s g u i s e d but widespread  Ill presence i n Singapore.  The Tunku, who had p r e v i o u s l y rebuffed  requests f o r merger, found t h i s argument s u f f i c i e n t l y compelling, but not wanting to upset the d e l i c a t e p o l i t i c o - r a c i a l balance i n Malaya with Singapore's overwhelming Chinese population, conceived of b r i n g i n g i n the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s into the new f e d e r a t i o n .  On t h i s  p o i n t , R. S. Milne w r i t e s : The i n c l u s i o n of the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s was not so urgent, but i t d i d promise to solve two problems at once. To some degree the addition of the indigenous i n h a b i t a n t s would "balance" the Singapore Chinese m a j o r i t y . This argument should not be overstressed; the indigenous peoples were indeed more numerous than the Chinese i n the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s , but the m a j o r i t y of them were n e i t h e r Malays nor Muslims. However, the Malays i n Malaya looked on the indigenous races as being t h e i r "brothers," and hoped that they could be persuaded to support Malaysia and also the A l l i a n c e P a r t y . H One might add that the Tunku's perception of the i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n i n the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s was probably a l s o an important f a c t o r i n prompting the rather h u r r i e d manner i n which the new r a t i o n was created.  As the Tunku t o l d Parliament, "We  fede-  cannot a f f o r d  to wait so long [ f o r B r i t a i n to grant the t e r r i t o r i e s independence] without p r o v i d i n g the communists w i t h the weapons they r e q u i r e f o r subversion, i n f i l t r a t i o n and d i s r u p t i o n with the u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of capturing these t e r r i t o r i e s .... The important aspect of the Malaysian i d e a l , as I see i t , i s that i t w i l l enable the Borneo t e r r i t o r i e s to transform t h e i r present c o l o n i a l status to self-government f o r themselves and absolute independence i n Malaysia simultaneously, 12 and balk the Communist attempt to capture these t e r r i t o r i e s . " Whatever the other motives f o r the Malaysia p r o j e c t , i t would not be  112 wrong to say that i t c a r r i e d undertones of anti-communism and r e f l e c t e d s e c u r i t y considerations which no doubt sprung from the p r e v a i l i n g 13 e l i t e ideology of the Malayan policy-makers. The immediate e f f e c t of Konfrontasi was to harden Malaysia's Western-world, anti-communist o r i e n t a t i o n .  For one t h i n g , i t t r i g g e r e d  i n t o operation the Anglo-Malayan Defence Pact thus r e s u l t i n g i n a major western power and two Commonwealth a l l i e s f i g h t i n g on Malaysian soil.  The Malaysian policy-makers themselves tended to view  Konfrontasi s u s p i c i o u s l y as a communist, PKI ( P a r t i Kommunis Indonesia) - i n s p i r e d project p o i n t i n g to a Jakarta-Peking-Hanoi-Pyongyang a x i s 14 with Malaysia as the target of China's expansionism.  But paradoxi-  c a l l y , i t was K o n f r o n t a s i that brought about a s o f t e n i n g of Malaysia's hard-line anti-communist p o l i c y i n the long run.  The Indonesian  m i l i t a r y and diplomatic o f f e n s i v e goaded the h i t h e r t o cautious 15 Malaysia i n t o a new foreign p o l i c y strategy of e x t e r n a l outreach  in  which a concerted diplomatic drive was c a r r i e d out to win f r i e n d s i n A f r o - A s i a , and l a t e r , Eastern Europe.  In p a r t i c u l a r , Malaysia's f a i l u r e  to gain a seat at the Cairo nonaligned nations conference l a r g e l y because of Indonesian propaganda sparked o f f a diplomatic counteroffensive which won Malaysia the dubious r e c o g n i t i o n of a number of A f r i c a n and A s i a n countries and eventually support from 28 countries to attend the next conference at A l g i e r s .  I t was a l s o at t h i s time  that the Tunku declared that Malaysia f u l f i l l e d the c r i t e r i a of nonalignment, when i n the past he had never f a i l e d to underscore Malaya's non-neutrality i n East-West issues. s e c u r i t y i n Chapter Two).  (See s e c t i o n on defence and  The Tunku was also quick to endorse the  Declaration of the Cairo conference on the p r i n c i p l e s of peaceful co-existence i n a l e t t e r to President N a s s e r . ^  Another s p i n - o f f  from Konfrontasi was the f i r s t p u b l i c review of Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y by a Parliamentary Group, a l b e i t of A l l i a n c e MP's, which while f i n d i n g that "the present independent and nonaligned f o r e i g n p o l i c y was i n conformity w i t h the A l l i a n c e Party's p r i n c i p l e s , " proposed "the widest diplomatic representation p o s s i b l e w i t h countries i r r e s p e c 18 t i v e of t h e i r i d e o l o g i e s . "  The Government a l s o received a f u s i l l a d e  of c r i t i c i s m from the Opposition and c e r t a i n p u b l i c f i g u r e s on i t s adamant, h a r d - l i n e anti-communist p o l i c y .  In p a r t i c u l a r , the  Government was taken to task for i t s support of the American bombing of North Vietnam at a time when i t was attempting t o win Afro-Asian 19 friends.  There i s some i n d i c a t i o n of the ascendancy of a counter-  force of A l l i a n c e and other p o l i t i c i a n s who were opposed to some of the views of the r u l i n g group on f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  An u n o f f i c i a l 20  Malaysian delegation l e d by UMNO Member of Parliament, Dr. Mahathir, attended the Afro-Asian People's S o l i d a r i t y Organization Conference a t Winneba, Ghana, i n May 1965, but i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to j o i n the organiza21 t i o n was r e j e c t e d .  The Tunku commenting on the Winneba i n c i d e n t  said he had "no knowledge" of the Malaysian mission and described the organization as a "communist set-up .... financed by Russia and China." Nonetheless, i t was i n the wake of the Winneba episode that the Parliamentary Group to review foreign p o l i c y was formed. However, i t was not u n t i l Konfrontasi a c t u a l l y ended that the r e t h i n k i n g i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y took a more d e f i n i t i v e shape.  The Tunku i n  a Malaysia Day broadcast i n 1966 admitted to a s h i f t i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y  114 ,.23  "to  keep pace w i t h the t r e n d of events i n the world  e a r l i e r , Tun in  ...  Two  months  I s m a i l as A c t i n g F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , had been more e x p l i c i t  i n d i c a t i n g the n a t u r e o f the s h i f t when s p e a k i n g t o the F o r e i g n  Correspondents'  Association:  We l o o k forward t o the day when o u t s i d e powers both g r e a t and s m a l l w i l l accept our r i g h t as a r e g i o n [ i . e . Southeast A s i a ] and as c o n s t i t u e n t n a t i o n s o f t h i s r e g i o n , to s u s t a i n our d i s t i n c t i v e ways of l i f e i n freedom and p r o s p e r i t y , w i t h o u t i n t e r f e r e n c e ... We do not oppose the communist system i n mainland China so l o n g as i t c o n f i n e s i t s e l f w i t h i n i t s own b o r d e r s . But we c a l l upon the People's R e p u b l i c o f China to keep i t s hands o f f our r e g i o n and to adopt a p o l i c y o f p e a c e f u l c o - e x i s t e n c e towards i t s f e l l o w A s i a n s i n Southeast Asia. We l o o k forward to a r e g i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n embracing T h a i l a n d , Burma, I n d o n e s i a , Singapore, M a l a y s i a , P h i l i p p i n e s , Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam ... Such a community would not be a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . It would n o t be an anti-communist a l l i a n c e . Nor, f o r t h a t m a t t e r , would i t be an a n t i - W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e ... I do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t m i l i t a r y b l o c s and a l l i a n c e s by themselves can p r o v i d e a l a s t i n g s o l u t i o n to the problem o f communist expansionism. I myself e n v i s a g e an o r g a n i z a t i o n which would be f i r s t and l a s t , pro-Southeast A s i a , pro-development p r o - r e g i o n a l c o - o p e r a t i o n and pro-peace.24 It  appeared  t h a t M a l a y s i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y was  anti-communist,  pro-Western  F o r e i g n p o l i c y was  a t t h i s stage s t i l l  p o l i c y - m a k e r s themselves M a l a y s i a was  appeared  "We  greater n e u t r a l i t y .  somewhat ambivalent and  to be a l i t t l e  nonaligned or n e u t r a l .  a p a r l i a m e n t a r y query s a i d : and we  o r i e n t a t i o n toward  s h i f t i n g from a h a r d - l i n e  the  c o n f u s e d as t o whether  For example, Tun I s m a i l i n answering  are not committed to any power b l o c  c r y s t a l i z e our a t t i t u d e on any i s s u e s t r i c t l y on i t s m e r i t s  and i n the l i g h t o f our n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t .  In t h a t sense we  aligned.  can n e v e r be n e u t r a l i n  We never c l a i m t o be n e u t r a l .  We  a r e not  115 the c h o i c e between r i g h t and wrong." to say t h a t M a l a y s i a  of i t s m i l i t a r y t i e s .  posture  had  Taking  nevertheless  i n t o one  a l i g n e d de f a c t o t o the West by v i r t u e  the cue  from P r e m i e r Khrushchev,  transformed i t s h a r d - l i n e  of " p e a c e f u l c o - e x i s t e n c e . "  p o l i c y s t r a t e g y o f the p e r i o d was still  I t i s perhaps more c o r r e c t  t r i e d to be n e u t r a l w i t h r e s p e c t t o p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l issues while being  Malaysia  25  one  The  anti-communist  general  of e x t e r n a l o u t r e a c h .  r e l y i n g on o l d a l l i e s , M a l a y s i a went out of i t s way  Afro-Asian  supporters  Considerations nations.  i n a d i p l o m a t i c war  o f t r a d e a l s o prompted new  In so d o i n g ,  foreign  against t i e s with  While  to  win  Indonesia. the E a s t e r n  European  the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y  became more and more apparent, n e c e s s i t a t i n g the change i n f o r e i g n policy  posture.  By 1968,  Tun  I s m a i l , who  had  e a r l i e r f o r h e a l t h r e a s o n s , put  r e t i r e d from the Cabinet  forward as a backbencher i n  s i x months Parliament  26 h i s s e m i n a l " I s m a i l Peace P l a n . " of Southeast A s i a guaranteed by n o n - a g g r e s s i o n p a c t s and  He  c a l l e d f o r the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  the major powers, the s i g n i n g of  the d e c l a r a t i o n of a p o l i c y of  co-existence:  The time i s ... r i p e f o r the c o u n t r i e s i n the r e g i o n t o d e c l a r e c o l l e c t i v e l y the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of South-East A s i a . To be e f f e c t i v e , [ t h i s ] must be guaranteed by the b i g powers, i n c l u d i n g Communist C h i n a , [Second], i t i s time t h a t the c o u n t r i e s i n South-East A s i a s i g n e d n o n - a g g r e s s i o n t r e a t i e s w i t h one another. Now i s a l s o the time f o r the c o u n t r i e s i n South-East A s i a to d e c l a r e a p o l i c y of c o - e x i s t e n c e i n the sense t h a t the c o u n t r i e s ... should not i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f each o t h e r and to accept whatever form o f government a country chooses t o e l e c t or adopt .... The a l t e r n a t i v e to the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n o f South-East A s i a guaranteed by the b i g powers ... i s an open i n v i t a t i o n by the r e g i o n to the c u r r e n t  116 b i g powers t o make i t a pawn i n b i g power p o l i t i c s . The a l t e r n a t i v e to the s i g n i n g of non-aggression t r e a t i e s among the countries i n the region i s an arms race among themselves which would be d e t r i mental t o t h e i r economy. The a l t e r n a t i v e to the d e c l a r a t i o n of the p o l i c y of co-existence i s increased tension and subversion i n the region.27 The Cabinet seemed t o show mixed response toward the I s m a i l suggestions. While the Tunku s a i d the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n idea was only "worth considerat i o n , " Razak s a i d Ismail's proposals had the f u l l support of the 28 government.  There must have doubtless been some d i f f e r e n c e s of  opinion on the I s m a i l proposals, with the Tunku perhaps t a k i n g a more adamant stand than the other cabinet members, but at any r a t e , the process of r e - t h i n k i n g i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y had begun t o a f f e c t the top policy-makers. I r o n i c a l l y , w i t h the end of Konfrontasi a downturn i n AngloMalaysian r e l a t i o n s a l s o developed. ties  exacerbated  The d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l  the general t u r m o i l of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t h i s  period.  I t began w i t h the separation of Singapore from Malaysia of 29 which B r i t a i n was apparently given very l i t t l e n o t i c e . Then came a cut-back i n B r i t i s h economic assistance r e s u l t i n g i n a Malaysian 30  request f o r $630 m i l l i o n i n defence a i d being turned down.  Relations  reached t h e i r n a d i r when the Tunku u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y accused  Britain  31 of t a l k i n g w i t h Indonesia about Malaysia behind i t s back.  At about  the same time, Malaysia was also taking a second look a t the AngloMalaysian Defence Pact as B r i t a i n , even before the Bangkok Peace Agreements of 1966, had announced i n a White Paper i t s i n t e n t i o n s to scale down troop commitments and o v e r a l l defence expenditures east of 32 the Suez Canal.  For Malaysia, B r i t i s h withdrawal was t o be e f f e c t i v e  117 by 1971 and completed by the mid-1970's.  33  Thus i n 1968, under the  urgings of the Tunku, t a l k s began f o r a five-power defence arrangement among Malaysia, Singapore, B r i t a i n , A u s t r a l i a and New arrangement was to replace the Anglo-Malaysian B r i t a i n p u l l e d out i n 1971.  Zealand.  This  Defence Pact a f t e r  In the course of a s e r i e s of t a l k s i n  34 1968 and 1969, worked out.  the i n t r i c a c i e s of the five-power defence scheme were  At one stage there were doubts expressed about A u s t r a l i a ' s 35  and New Zealand's p a r t i c i p a t i o n a f t e r 1971, expensive  but by e a r l y 1970  ($15 m i l l i o n ) m i l i t a r y exercise over two months was  an  carried 36  out to t e s t the v i a b i l i t y of the five-power defence arrangements. Whatever the merits of the scheme, i t became more and more evident to the Malaysian leaders that they could no longer lean as h e a v i l y on B r i t a i n and other a l l i e s i n matters of defence.  Tun I s m a i l made h i s  proposals i n the backdrop of B r i t i s h withdrawal from the region. Thus f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the issue-area of defence and s e c u r i t y during t h i s period was i n t r a n s i t i o n , i f not t u r m o i l .  The  previous  r i g i d i t y of Malaya's f o r e i g n p o l i c y began to give way under the e x i gencies created by Konfrontasi and i t s r e l a t e d events.  Therefore w i t h  the end of K o n f r o n t a s i a l s o came a noticeable s h i f t i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n and s t r a t e g i e s , even i f the l a t t e r at t h i s stage were not p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r - c u t . While Malaysia s t i l l hung on to i t s Westernworld peggings, by the end of the period i t had discarded i t s prev i o u s l y pronounced anti-communist posture f o r one of "peaceful coexistence."  This can perhaps be seen as an extension of the e a r l i e r 37  posture of "non-interference"  but i t would be d i f f i c u l t to deny a  q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e between the two concepts i n terms of the  118 praxis of Malaysian foreign p o l i c y .  Development and Trade Although Malaysia's f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s i n t h i s p e r i o d were dominated by Konfrontasi and s e c u r i t y matters, there were a t l e a s t two important events which r e l a t e d to economic p o l i c y , namely, the UNCTAD conferences of 1964 and 1968.  At both these conferences, Malaysia j o i n e d the  Group of 77 developing nations i n espousing developmental thus enhancing i t s developing-world image.  issues,  Thus Malaysia consciously  aligned i t s e l f w i t h the "South" i n the "North-South" c o n f l i c t between 38 r i c h and poor n a t i o n s .  I t was among the o r i g i n a l "75" c a l l i n g f o r  UNCTAD I to be held i n order to press a number of demands on the advanced, i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nations. The key demands which were embodied 39 i n the c o n t r o v e r s i a l "Prebish Report" were: 1) Creation of conditions f o r expansion of trade between countries a t a s i m i l a r l e v e l of development, at d i f f e r e n t stages of development or having d i f f e r e n t systems of s o c i a l and economic o r g a n i z a t i o n 2) Progressive reduction and e a r l y e l i m i n a t i o n of a l l b a r r i e r s and r e s t r i c t i o n s impeding the exports o f l e s s developed countries (LDC's) without r e c i p r o c a l concessions on t h e i r part 3) Increase the volume of exports of developing countries i n primary products, both raw and processed, to i n d u s t r i a l countries and s t a b i l i z a t i o n of p r i c e s a t f a i r remunerative p r i c e s 5) P r o v i s i o n of more adequate resources a t favourable terms so as to enable LDC's to increase t h e i r imports of c a p i t a l goods and i n d u s t r i a l raw m a t e r i a l s e s s e n t i a l for t h e i r economic development, and b e t t e r c o - o r d i n a t i o n of trade and a i d p o l i c i e s  119 6) Improvement o f the i n v i s i b l e t r a d e o f d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y by r e d u c i n g t h e i r payments f o r f r e i g h t and i n s u r a n c e and the burden o f t h e i r debt charges 7) Improvement o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements, i n c l u d i n g , i f n e c e s s a r y , t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f new machinery and methods f o r implementing t h e d e c i s i o n s a t UNCTAD I UNCTAD I c o u l d boast fact  o f no immediate, c o n c r e t e achievements, b u t t h e  t h a t i t was convened r e p r e s e n t e d a moral v i c t o r y f o r the LDC's  i n the f i r s t  few blows o f the North-South  conflict.  Soon a f t e r UNCTAD I , M a l a y s i a c a r r i e d the North-South b a t t l e i n t o the arena  of t i n conferences  i n bargaining f o r a higher  range f o r t h e 1965 T i n Agreement.  price  D i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e outcome o f  the n e g o t i a t i o n s , M a l a y s i a , t o g e t h e r w i t h B o l i v i a , threw c a u t i o n t o the winds and t h r e a t e n e d withdrawal p r i c e range was  not fixed.  40  from the Agreement i f a h i g h e r  The t h r e a t s were l a t e r withdrawn b u t  a t a subsequent T i n C o u n c i l meeting, the consuming c o u n t r i e s conceded 41 to a h i g h e r p r i c e range. was  By t h e time o f UNCTAD I I i n 1968, M a l a y s i a  s e l e c t e d t o s e r v e on t h e Trade and Development Board.  UNCTAD I I ' s  achievements i n c l u d e d a d o p t i o n o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development S t r a t e g y o f the Second UN Development Decade and a G e n e r a l i z e d System o f P r e f e r e n c e s , b o t h o f which measures M a l a y s i a s t r o n g l y In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e developed r a i s e new t a r i f f a g a i n s t imports countries.  c o u n t r i e s agreed  supported.  i n p r i n c i p l e not to  and n o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r s o r i n c r e a s e e x i s t i n g ones o f primary  products o f p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t  They a l s o agreed  to d e v e l o p i n g  t o a c c o r d p r i o r i t y , by r e d u c i n g o r e l i m i n a -  t i n g d u t i e s and o t h e r n o n - t a r i f f b a r r i e r s , to c e r t a i n imports mary p r o d u c t s o f e x p o r t i n t e r e s t  to d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s .  of p r i -  120 Thus i n questions of Development and Trade, Malaysia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y was marked by a continued adherence, i f not greater commitment, to i t s developing-world posture, and thereby to i t s p u r s u i t of developmental goals. At the same time, too, Malaysia d i d not d i s c a r d i t s l a i s s e z f a i r e p o l i c y i n respect to foreign e n t e r p r i s e . About the time when Anglo-Malaysian  r e l a t i o n s ebbed to a low p o i n t , Tun Razak toured the  United States i n l a t e 1966, wooing American c a p i t a l .  In a speech  made at the annual convention of the Far East American Council of Commerce and Industry i n New York, Tun Razak appeared eager to l a y Malaysia bare to American e n t e r p r i s e : Malaysia i s a peaceful and democratic country, p o l i t i c a l l y and economically s t a b l e and f r i e n d l y with the United States. We want to keep i t that way. But i t i s sometimes d i f f i c u l t to understand why even though your government i s so generous i n providing assistance to so many other developing c o u n t r i e s , i t yet seems reluctant to give f o r t h r i g h t and s u b s t a n t i a l a i d to Malaysia ... We are not l o o k i n g f o r d i r e c t hand-outs. We are l o o k i n g for people to have f a i t h i n us, and to i n v e s t i n our country and to play a part i n the development of industry and trade i n our country. On the other hand, as hard-headed businessmen you are l o o k i n g f o r o p p o r t u n i t i e s of expansion of your e n t e r p r i s e , and my main message to you today i s t h i s . I f you want to expand and i n v e s t and you look around the world f o r a s u i t a b l e place to do t h i s ; then I suggest you look towards Malaysia where you w i l l f i n d the b a s i c requirements you seek - p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y w i t h i n a democratic framework and potent i a l progress to mutual advantage of both our countries ....43 The l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e toward foreign e n t e r p r i s e s i n Malaysia has l e d to a s t a r t l i n g degree of foreign ownership and c o n t r o l of the Malaysian economy.  This gives the l i e to a popular but i n c o r r e c t notion that  121 the Chinese dominate Malaysia's economy.  Information released only  recently shows that f o r e i g n ownership of f i x e d assets i n the i n d u s t r i a l sector i n Peninsular Malaysia ( i . e . Malaya) i s more than h a l f of the t o t a l a t 57.2% (the Chinese share i s 26.2%) while i t stands a t an amazing 70.8% i n the modern a g r i c u l t u r e s e c t o r , a t t e s t i n g the enduring impact of c o l o n i a l r u l e despite more than a decade of independence.  The f o r e i g n ownership i n the non-corporate sectors i s  considerably l e s s , but as the Government i t s e l f puts i t : The o v e r a l l p i c t u r e i n d i c a t e s that f o r e i g n corporate ownership of assets i n Malaysia i s s u b s t a n t i a l i n a g r i c u l t u r e , manufacturing and mining, though t h i s i s already d e c l i n i n g i n a g r i c u l t u r e and mining. Further, ownership and c o n t r o l i s l a r g e l y i n the hands of a r e l a t i v e l y small number of m u l t i - n a t i o n a l f o r e i g n firms with d i v e r s i f i e d economic i n t e r e s t s . Among Malaysians, Chinese own the highest shares i n the corporate s e c t o r s , while t h e i r share i n the noncorporate sector of modern a g r i c u l t u r e i s more balanced ... (But) the value of assets accounted f o r by the non-corporate sector i s small ... In modern a g r i c u l t u r e , ( i t only) comprised 29.6% of the t o t a l planted acreage. In i n d u s t r y , the non-corporate sector made up only 12.6% of the t o t a l value of fixed a s s e t s . 4 4  TABLE 3.1 OWNERSHIP OF ASSETS IN MODERN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY, PENINSULAR MALAYSIA 1970* MODERN AGRICULTURE (planted acreage) CORPORATE SECTOR  INDUSTRY ( f i x e d assets)  NON-CORPORATE SECTOR  (000 acres)  (%)  (000 acres)  5.0  0.3  349.3  47.1  457.0  25.9  243.3  4.9  0.3  48.1  CORPORATE SECTOR (%)  ($m)  (%)  11.2  0.9  3.9  2.3  32.8  342.3  26.2  158.0  92.2  74.8  10.1  1.5  0.1  3.9  2.3  2.7  13.2  1.8  187.2  14.3  1.4  0.8  515.0  29.2  697.6  94.1  559.7  42.8  167.2  97.6  1249.6  70.8  44.0  5.9  747.3  57.2  4.1  2.4  -  -  17.0  2.3  17.5  1.3  -  -  741.6  100.0  1307.0  100.0  1764.6  100.0 70.4  (%)  29.6  ($m)  NON-CORPORATE SECTOR  87.4  171.3  100.0 12.6  (Next page f o r source and notes)  123 NOTE: Although the f i g u r e s are f o r 1970, they w i l l probably not d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from data f o r the period under survey. Since no e a r l i e r data were a v a i l a b l e , I am compelled to use the more recent s t a t i s t i c s . "'"Modern a g r i c u l t u r e covers estate acreage under rubber, o i l palm, coconut and tea. Ownership i s i n terms of t o t a l planted acreage. Government FELDA schemes are included under t h i s category i n the non-corporate sector. 2 The industry sector covers manufacturing, c o n s t r u c t i o n and mining. Ownership i s i n terms of f i x e d assets. T o t a l excludes unallocatable assets amounting to $25.2 m i l l i o n . 3 Government ownership of 17,000 acres i n modern a g r i c u l t u r e i s included i n the non-corporate sector, while ownership of $17.5 m i l l i o n of f i x e d assets i n industry i s included i n the corporate sector. Source:  Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Press, 1973, page 12.  The p i c t u r e f o r the ownership of share c a p i t a l i n Malaysia i s much the same, butressing the already dominant p o s i t i o n of f o r e i g n ownership i n f i x e d assets: The most s i g n i f i c a n t feature i s that f o r e i g n i n t e r e s t s accounted f o r as much as 61% of the t o t a l share c a p i t a l invested i n the corporate sector ... Foreign p a r t i c i pation i s e s p e c i a l l y dominant i n modern a g r i c u l t u r e and mining while i t amounts to about 50% to 60% of the t o t a l i n manufacturing, commerce and f i n a n c e . ^ 4  TABLE 3.2 OWNERSHIP OF SHARE CAPITAL OF LIMITED COMPANIES, BY RACE AND SECTOR . PENINSULAR MALAYSIA ($000)  MALAY 0D  CHINESE ($000) (% )  1970 INDIAN ($000) (%)  FOREIGN ($000) (%)  TOTAL ($000)  Agriculture, f o r e s t r y and f i s h e r i e s .. <. .13,724  0 .9  177,438  22 .4  16,191  0.1  1,079,714  75.3  1,432,400  Mining and quarrying .. .. . 3,876  0 .7  91,557  16 .8  2,488  0.4  393,910  72.4  543,497  Manufacturing .. .33,650  2 .5  296,363  22 .0  8,880  0.7  804,282  59.6  1,348,245  .. 1,258  2 .2  30,855  52 .8  447  0.8  19,937  24.1  58,419  10,875  13 .3  35,498  43 .4  1,903  2.3  9,845  12.0  81,887  .. ... 4,715  0 .8  184,461  30 .4  4,711  0.7  384,549  63.5  605,164  Banking and insurance .. ...21,164  3 .3  155,581  24 .3  4,434  0.6  332,790  52.2  636,850  ..13,349  2 .3  220,330  37 .8  13,348  2.3  182,862  31.4  582,516  102,611  1 .9  1,192,083  22 .5  52,402  1.0  3,207,889  60.7  5,288,978  Construction Transport and Communications Commerce  Total  The t o t a l includes share c a p i t a l ownership by Federal and State Government and Statutory Bodies and other Malaysian residents ( i n d i v i d u a l s and Nominee and l o c a l l y c o n t r o l l e d companies), amounting to about $734 m i l l i o n . In t h i s t a b l e , the r a c i a l shares i n each sector exclude these two groups. Source:  Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Press, 1973, p.83.  125 Towards the end beginning  of the p e r i o d t h e r e were s i g n s t h a t M a l a y s i a  was  t o temper i t s l a i s s e z - f a i r e a t t i t u d e towards f o r e i g n e n t e r -  p r i s e w i t h a g r e a t e r degree of governmental d i r e c t i o n i n the a r e a i n d u s t r i a l development.  The  f o r m a t i o n o f the F e d e r a l  Development A u t h o r i t y (FIDA) i n 1968 shift  in attitude.  was  of  Industrial  i n d i c a t i v e of the  slight  FIDA's main f u n c t i o n s were:  (a)  t o undertake or d i r e c t economic f e a s i b i l i t y s t u d i e s of the range o f i n d u s t r i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s  (b)  to undertake i n d u s t r i a l promotion work i n the and abroad  (c)  to f a c i l i t a t e exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n and c o o r d i n a t i o n among i n s t i t u t i o n s engaged i n or connected w i t h i n d u s t r i a l development  (d)  t o recommend p o l i c y on i n d u s t r i a l s i t e development and, where n e c e s s a r y , undertake the development of such s i t e s  (e)  to e v a l u a t e a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r p i o n e e r i n d u s t r i e s , which a r e e n t i t l e d to tax r e l i e f ('pioneer s t a t u s ' )  (f)  t o r e p o r t a n n u a l l y to the M i n i s t e r o f Trade and I n d u s t r y on the p r o g r e s s and problems of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and to make the n e c e s s a r y recommendations.  (g)  to g e n e r a l l y undertake such matters as may be i n c i d e n t a l t o o r c o n s e q u e n t i a l upon the e x e r c i s e o f i t s powers or the d i s c h a r g e of i t s f u n c t i o n s (under the A c t of P a r l i a m e n t by which i t was e s t a b l i s h e d )  (h)  t o a d v i s e the government g e n e r a l l y on measures f o r the p r o t e c t i o n and promotion of i n d u s t r i e s i n c l u d i n g the i m p o s i t i o n and a l t e r a t i o n o f , and exemption from customs and o t h e r d u t i e s , and import and e x p o r t licensing ^  country  4  Thus FIDA i n g e n e r a l c o o r d i n a t e d and development programme. Malaysia's  Although  systematized  Malaysia's  industrial  the a u t h o r i t y remained t r u e to  open-door p o l i c y toward f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e , w i t h i t s forma-  t i o n a l s o came a s h i f t  from the promotion o f i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i o n i n -  d u s t r i e s i n the e a r l y years i n d u s t r i e s toward the end  to a new  emphasis on  of the p e r i o d .  47  export-oriented  126 On the whole, Malaysia's basic foreign p o l i c y postures, goals and s t r a t e g i e s i n the area of trade and development remained much the same f o r t h i s period although there were signs of minor s h i f t s . I t s commitment to free e n t e r p r i s e d i d not stop Malaysia from seeking wider t i e s i n the area of trade, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n responding to overtures from the Eastern European countries.  Thus i n 1967, Malaysia  signed a Trade Agreement w i t h the U.S.S.R. - i t s f i r s t w i t h a communist country - as a prelude to f u l l diplomatic r e l a t i o n s .  About the same  time, Anglo-Malaysian economic t i e s had also become relaxed.  The  Malaysian d o l l a r was unpegged v i s - a - v i s the pound s t e r l i n g and the Commonwealth trade preference was removed f o r c e r t a i n commodities. The f o r e i g n p o l i c y of e x t e r n a l outreach, prompted by K o n f r o n t a s i , seemed to have s p i l l e d over to some extent i n t o the development and trade issue-area or at any rate i t d i d not escape the general turbulence created during t h i s period.  The o v e r a l l p i c t u r e i s thus one of  moderate t r a n s i t i o n i n contrast to the more d e f i n i t e t r a n s i t i o n occuring i n the issue-area of defence and s e c u r i t y .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy This was a period of f r e n z i e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y f o r Malaysia. I have already dwelt on i t s diplomatic d r i v e to win f r i e n d s and i n fluence nations i n a counter-offensive to Indonesian Confrontation. At the UN, Malaysia won something of a moral v i c t o r y when a Norwegian r e s o l u t i o n deploring the Indonesian landings on Malayan coasts received a f f i r m a t i v e votes except from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia i n an emergency Security Council session.  However, i t was not u n t i l the  dust of K o n f r o n t a s i had  s e t t l e d that Malaysia's  i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy b o r e f r u i t .  The  strenuous  r e s u l t a n t s o f t e n i n g of i t s  anti-communist l i n e l e d to the h i s t o r i c e s t a b l i s h m e n t t i e s w i t h the E a s t e r n European c o u n t r i e s .  s a i d , "The  of d i p l o m a t i c  Admittedly,  a l s o pragmatic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of trade which s p u r r e d August 1965,  efforts in  M a l a y s i a ' s Permanent R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t h e r e were  the d e t e n t e .  to the UN,  Mr.  In  Ramani,  c e n t r a l government's p o l i c y i s to c u l t i v a t e good t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s w i t h R u s s i a s i n c e i t i s d e s i r a b l e t h a t new f o r our rubber  and  t i n ... T h i s dynamic b u s i n e s s  markets be  of p o l i t i c a l  t h i n k i n g has been because of R u s s i a ' s p o l i c y of p e a c e f u l which i s a l s o the c e n t r a l government's theme."  48  found  re-  co-existence,  Thus i n A p r i l  1967,  f o l l o w i n g the s i g n i n g o f a Trade Agreement a f t e r week-long d i s c u s s i o n s , 49 M a l a y s i a and T h i s was  the S o v i e t Union agreed  f o l l o w e d by  to exchange d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s .  t i e s w i t h Y u g o s l a v i a and B u l g a r i a by  1969."^  With the end of K o n f r o n t a s i a l s o came a r e s u s c i t a t i o n of r e g i o n a l co-operation.  M a l a y s i a , i n June 1966,  P a c i f i c n a t i o n s t h a t agreed (ASPAC)."^ not  Although  to s e t up  ASPAC had  was  among the n i n e A s i a n  the A s i a n and P a c i f i c  Council  undertones of anti-communism, i t was  formed as an anti-communist m i l i t a r y p a c t .  l e a d e r of M a l a y s i a ' s  and  K h i r J o h a r i , the  d e l e g a t i o n to the Seoul conference  which s e t up  ASPAC, was  emphatic t h a t M a l a y s i a opposed a m i l i t a r y pact of any  sort:  " I t i s not  i n l i n e w i t h our p o l i c y  any  to be drawn i n t o o r encourage  m i l i t a r y p a c t s , even i f they are m i l i t a n t l y anti-communist. s t e e r e d c l e a r of such p a c t s and w i l l continue other more important  to do so  t h i n g s than m i l i t a r y p a c t s .  We  have  ... There are  Regional  development  52 of c u l t u r a l and economic t i e s i s more v i t a l i n t h i s r e g i o n . "  As  128 ASPAC foundered on i t s shaky beginnings, the Indonesian Foreign M i n i s t e r , Adam Malik i n i t i a t e d moves f o r a "larger-than-ASA" r e g i o n a l Southeast Asian o r g a n i z a t i o n . Although the Tunku d i d not appear to be i n i t i a l l y e n t h u s i a s t i c about r e p l a c i n g ASA, the Malaysian p o l i c y makers came around to accepting the need f o r a l a r g e r Southeast Asian organization which at l e a s t included Indonesia.  Thus i n August 1967  at Bangkok, a f t e r some q u i b b l i n g over the name f o r the new organizat i o n , the A s s o c i a t i o n of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was  born  with Thailand, Indonesia, P h i l i p p i n e s , Malaysia and Singapore as founder-member c o u n t r i e s . The goals of ASEAN as summarized i n the o f f i c i a l D e c l a r a t i o n were to accelerate economic growth w i t h i n the area; promote r e g i o n a l peace and s t a b i l i t y ; encourage c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n the s o c i a l , economic, c u l t u r a l , t e c h n i c a l , s c i e n t i f i c , and adminis t r a t i v e f i e l d s ; improve trade, industry and a g r i c u l t u r e ; promote Southeast Asian s t u d i e s ; and maintain close co-operation with other 53 i n t e r n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . s i g n i f i c a n t l y from those of ASA.  The aims do not d i f f e r  Membership, as w i t h ASA, was open  "to a l l states i n the region s u b s c r i b i n g to the ... aims, p r i n c i p l e s 54 and purposes of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . " Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t was a paragraph on f o r e i g n bases reminiscent of Maphilindo: ... a f f i r m i n g that a l l f o r e i g n bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y to subvert the n a t i o n a l independence and freedom of s t a t e s i n the area or prejudice the o r d e r l y processes of t h e i r n a t i o n a l development ....55 This undertaking may be considered the f u n c t i o n a l equivalent of a non-aggression pact i n i n t e n t i o n .  Malaysia d i d not hide i t s enthusiasm  f o r the new o r g a n i z a t i o n once i t was formed.  Tun Razak at one point  even suggested that ASEAN could p o t e n t i a l l y include defence ments:  arrange-  "A mutual defence a l l i a n c e i s always p o s s i b l e once we become  very c l o s e , w i t h a common i n t e r e s t and destiny."^^ The immediate e f f e c t of ASEAN was to s e a l the growing  entente  of the f i v e Southeast Asian neighbours thus marking the end of a period of t u r m o i l i n the region.  However, toward the end of 1968,  M a l a y s i a - P h i l i p p i n e s r e l a t i o n s were again temporarily s t r a i n e d over the Sabah i s s u e . A b i l l passed by the P h i l i p p i n e House of Representatives declared Sabah to be part of P h i l i p p i n e t e r r i t o r y . Malaysia responded by asking the P h i l i p p i n e s to withdraw i t s d i p l o matic s t a f f from Kuala Lumpur.  However, mediation e f f o r t s by Thailand's  Thanat Khoman l e d to a P h i l i p p i n e d e c i s i o n to observe a moratorium on 58 the Sabah issue u n t i l a f t e r Malaysia's General E l e c t i o n i n May 1969. By the end of 1969 a t the Third ASEAN Foreign M i n i s t e r ' s conference, i t was announced that Malaysia and the P h i l i p p i n e s would resume d i p l o 59 matic r e l a t i o n s .  Held i n the cool atmosphere of Malaysia's Cameron  Highlands, the m i n i s t e r s approved a l l the 98 recommendations put before them covering p r o j e c t s f o r co-operation i n the areas of commerce and industry, tourism, shipping, c i v i l a v i a t i o n , a i r t r a f f i c s e r v i c e s and meteorology,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and communication, food supply and pro-  duction, f i s h e r i e s , mass media, c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s and f i n a n c e . ^ They a l s o signed two agreements f o r the establishment of an ASEAN fund and f o r the promotion of co-operation i n mass media and c u l t u r a l activities.^" " 1  I t looked therefore l i k e ASEAN had begun to f u n c t i o n  smoothly i n f o s t e r i n g r e g i o n a l co-operation among i t s f i v e member countries.  Konfrontasi aside, Malaysia continued to p a r t i c i p a t e a c t i v e l y i n the UN and the Commonwealth.  We have already noted i t s e l e c t i o n  to the UN Security Council i n 1965.  At one point i n September 1965  a furore r e s u l t e d i n which the Malaysian representative at the Security Council was a l l e g e d to have taken sides i n the Indo-Pakistani 62 clash over Kashmir.  Despite the Malaysian government's assurance  to Pakistan of i t s n e u t r a l i t y i n the c o n f l i c t , Pakistan severed 63 diplomatic t i e s with Malaysia i n October that year.  On  questions  of d e c o l o n i z a t i o n , Malaysia continued to take a strong a n t i - c o l o n i a l and a n t i - a p a r t h e i d posture. prominent during t h i s period.  The Rhodesia question was  particularly  Apart from supporting a l l UN r e s o l u -  t i o n s on Rhodesia, Malaysia adopted the f o l l o w i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l measures against the r e b e l regime of Ian Smith:  a t o t a l trade ban  of imports and exports to and from Malaysia; non-recognition of passports and v i s a s issued by the Smith government; a surcharge on any l e t t e r s , parcels or communications a r r i v i n g by post i n the same manner as items having no stamps; exchange c o n t r o l measures excluding Rhodesia from the S t e r l i n g Area and r e s t r i c t i n g a l l payments and 64 f i n a n c i a l transactions of Rhodesian o r i g i n . In summary, Malaysia's basic o b j e c t i v e s , postures and s t r a t e g i e s on matters of i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation and diplomacy d i d not change appreciably over t h i s period although the general strategy of e x t e r n a l outreach tended to extend i n t o t h i s issue-area as w e l l .  The most  important development i n t h i s respect was the detente with Russia and the East European c o u n t r i e s .  The other important development of  the period, although i t did not r e f l e c t any change i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y  131 o b j e c t i v e s , postures or s t r a t e g i e s , was the r e s u s c i t a t i o n of r e g i o n a l co-operation i n the l a r g e r ASEAN, which succeeded the three-member ASA.  Foreign P o l i c y 1964-1969:  A T r a n s i t i o n a l Foreign P o l i c y  The most s t r i k i n g feature about the survey has been the general t u r m o i l that engulfed t h i s period of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  I t i s possible  to i d e n t i f y two d i s t i n c t phases of the turbulent f o r e i g n p o l i c y of t h i s period.  In the f i r s t phase, the exigency of Konfrontasi r e s u l t e d  i n a greater r i g i d i t y i n p r e v i o u s l y held foreign p o l i c y postures. The p r e v a i l i n g pro-Western, anti-communist e l i t e ideology was forced.  rein-  In the perception of the policy-makers, Konfrontasi was  communist-inspired  and u l t i m a t e l y l i n k e d to Peking.  hardened i t s anti-communist, anti-China l i n e .  Malaysia therefore  The support of the  Russians and the Czechs f o r the Indonesians at the Security Council re-affirmed the e x i s t i n g image of Konfrontasi as a project.  communist-inspired  The P h i l i p p i n e s , w i t h i t s c l a i m on Sabah, was seen merely  as an opportunist but i t s a c t i o n at a time when Malaysia was  already  pressured by Indonesia made Malaysia more adamant about i t s p o s i t i o n . The c r e a t i o n of Malaysia i t s e l f , as -  noted, to some extent grew out  of the fear of a growing communist threat to the region, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Singapore and Sarawak.  The Indonesian r e a c t i o n to "Malaysia" was  thus noturiexpeeted^asin the eyes of Malaysian policy-makers  Indonesia  had already moved toward Peking long before Malaysia was proposed. In a d d i t i o n , the unwillingness of Indonesia to j o i n ASA on the grounds that i t was "a t o o l of American imperialism" had also s t r a i n e d  132 Malayan-Indonesian  r e l a t i o n s and e s t a b l i s h e d i n the policy-makers'  minds Jakarta's l e f t i s t image.  Konfrontasi confirmed the Malaysian  policy-makers' perception, so i t seemed. The i n i t i a l hardening of f o r e i g n p o l i c y postures soon gave way to a c t i o n s which were turned toward i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the Afro-Asian world.  This began as " t r u t h missions" to propagate Malaysia's p o s i -  t i o n i n the Indonesia-Malaysia c o n f l i c t but f o l l o w i n g Malaysia's f a i l u r e to be seated f o r the Cairo Nonaligned Conference, i t became a campaign to win r e c o g n i t i o n as a nonaligned country.  These events  a l s o sparked considerable domestic debate on f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  The  Government was taken to task on a number of f o r e i g n p o l i c y issues by the o p p o s i t i o n and even members of i t s own party.  Furthermore,  a  non-government group attempted to gain membership i n the Afro-Asian People's S o l i d a r i t y Organization at Winneba and f a i l e d .  These events  added to the growing p u b l i c sentiment that Malaysia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y was inadequate i n the l i g h t of B r i t i s h withdrawal.  The A l l i a n c e  Parliamentary Group was formed to review f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  The  Government could not s i t back and f a i l to take heed. Thus began the second phase i n t h i s period of f o r e i g n p o l i c y a phase of r e - t h i n k i n g r e s u l t i n g i n the eventual d i s c a r d i n g of Malaysia's anti-communist posture f o r one of "co-existence."  This was followed  up by the establishment of diplomatic t i e s w i t h the Soviet Union and other Eastern European c o u n t r i e s . The e l i t e ideology had undergone, or at any r a t e , was undergoing, a q u a l i t a t i v e change.  The I s m a i l  Peace Plan, and the Tunku's and Razak's admissions of s l i g h t s h i f t s i n foreign p o l i c y are i n d i c a t i o n s of the general change taking place.  133 Perhaps i n an e f f o r t to enhance i t s Third World image, Malaysia a l s o became something of a leader i n the a f f a i r s of developing countries i n economic issues.  I t played a major r o l e i n r a i s i n g the  p r i c e of t i n i n 1965 t i n negotiations and became a member of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board i n 1968. The basic f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , postures and s t r a t e g i e s i n the area of development and trade, however, remained much the same, even i f they were pursued with greater vigour.  This was nevertheless a period of t r a n s i t i o n  i n which t r a d i t i o n a l t i e s with B r i t a i n became relaxed and a d r i v e was made to woo American c a p i t a l together with greater e f f o r t s to promote economic t i e s with Eastern Europe.  In short, Malaysia's economic  l i n k s became more diversified-, r e f l e c t i n g the general f o r e i g n p o l i c y strategy of e x t e r n a l  outreach.  This general f o r e i g n p o l i c y strategy a l s o tended to s p i l l - o v e r i n t o issues of i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation and peace.  We have already  discussed the widening of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y with Eastern Europe which can perhaps be best understood as a s p i n - o f f from events r e l a t e d to Konfrontasi.  As with trade and development,  there were no appreciable changes i n b a s i c o b j e c t i v e s , postures and s t r a t e g i e s i n t h i s issue-area although the t r a n s i t i o n i n o v e r a l l p o l i c y was a l s o r e f l e c t e d i n t h i s issue-area.  The major achievement  i n t h i s area was the formation of ASEAN, marking a renewed drive toward r e g i o n a l co-operation which was interrupted by Konfrontasi. But because of the thorny Sabah claim, t h i s promising r e s u s c i t a t i o n of r e g i o n a l co-operation f a l t e r e d , although i t was restored by the end of the period.  I t i s not u n t i l the next period of f o r e i g n p o l i c y  134 that ASEAN came i n t o i t s own. Thus f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t h i s period was dominated i n the e a r l i e r part with issues of defence and s e c u r i t y a r i s i n g out of Konfrontasi. The general turmoil that accompanied Konfrontasi r e s u l t e d i n an appreciable s h i f t i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y postures and s t r a t e g i e s . In a l l , t h i s was a period of t r a n s i t i o n f o r Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  I will  again r e s o r t to a g r a p h i c a l d i s p l a y to i l l u s t r a t e the feedback e f f e c t s of Konfrontasi and i t s r e l a t e d events i n what can be i d e n t i f i e d as two d i s t i n c t phases of Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the period under survey.  Since we have already i n d i c a t e d i n the previous chapter the  main sources of Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the three issue-areas, only the major events and developments of t h i s period are c i t e d , most of which are i n the issue-area of defence and s e c u r i t y . The chart nevertheless i l l u s t r a t e s the s p i l l - o v e r e f f e c t s of the defence and s e c u r i t y issues i n t o the other issue-areas.  135 FIGURE 3.1 Explanatory Chart' of Major Foreign P o l i c y Outputs 1964-1969 Phase I  OBJECTIVES  Konfrontasi  P o l i t i c a l independence T e r r i t o r i a l Integrity • POSTURES STRATEGIES  . Elite Ideology  Sabah Claim Communist support of Konfrontasi  R i g i d pro-Western, A l i g n with west anti-communist -V Disassociate w i t h Orientations communist powers  1  ACTIONS Severence of t i e s w i t h Indonesia and Philippines A c t i v a t i o n of AngloMalaysian defence treaty M i l i t a r y actions to combat Konfrontasi F E E D B A C K Phase I I OBJECTIVES  F a i l u r e to attend Cairo Conference Domestic c r i t i c i s m of Foreign P o l i c y  P o l i t i c a l independence Territorial integrity •  B r i t i s h p o l i c y of withdrawal east of Suez Russian posture of peaceful co-existence  Transitional Elite Ideology POSTURES  \  STRATEGIES  Relaxed pro-Western Relax t i e s w i t h the orientation y West Co-existence with Widen contacts with Eastern European A f r o - A s i a and Eastern Communist countries Europe (external outreach) ACTIONS Replacing AngloMalaysian defence pact w i t h f i v e power arrangement Diplomatic d r i v e in Afro-Asia Contacts with E. Europe leading to Trade Agreement w i t h USSR and diplomatic  t i e s w i t h USSR, Yugoslavia and B u l g a r i a . Removing c e r t a i n preferences f o r Commonwealth Goods Unpegging Malaysian d o l l a r from S t e r l i n g  The preponderance of external factors impinging on f o r e i g n p o l i c y p a r t i c u l a r l y during Phase I of t h i s period i s amply evident from the chart.  A l l the s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s - Konfrontasi, the P h i l i p p i n e s '  Sabah claim and communist support generally f o r Konfrontasi - emanated from the e x t e r n a l environment.  Their combined e f f e c t was  r e i n f o r c e e x i s t i n g e l i t e images.  This i n turn l e d to a  thus to continued  adherence, indeed, greater commitment, to p r e v a i l i n g foreign p o l i c y postures, objectives and s t r a t e g i e s with t h e i r r e s u l t a n t actions as shown i n the chart.  For the most p a r t , therefore, f o r e i g n p o l i c y  during Phase I can be explained almost e n t i r e l y by reference to external sources, given . the thrust of the p r e v a i l i n g e l i t e ideology.  The  second phase, however, shows the impact of both e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l sources of foreign p o l i c y .  In p a r t i c u l a r , i t was  the feedback e f f e c t  of various e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l events that l e d to a s h i f t i n Malaysia's  f o r e i g n p o l i c y postures and s t r a t e g i e s .  to show i n the chart the constant  I t i s not possible  feedback process a f f e c t i n g p o l i c y  65 actions.  However, we can attempt to trace the longer term e f f e c t s  of Konfrontasi on Malaysian  f o r e i g n p o l i c y , i n a s e r i e s of actions  137 and r e a c t i o n s , i n the f o l l o w i n g manner:  Konfrontasi  Enhances Malaysia's pro-Western image —  A c t i v a t i o n of Anglo-Malays i a n defence pact  F a i l u r e of Malaysia to be i n v i t e d f o r Cairo Nonaligned Conference  Changing e l i t e perceptions  B r i t i s h , Australian _^ and New Zealand troops f i g h t i n g together w i t h Malaysian forces  Domestic c r i t i c i s m of Foreign P o l i c y Diplomatic d r i v e to win Afro-Asian support  Softening of anti-communist, pro-Western l i n e  In a d d i t i o n to the long-term impact of Konfrontasi on f o r e i g n p o l i c y , the general B r i t i s h p o l i c y of withdrawal east of Suez and the Soviet Union's new posture of peaceful co-existence enhanced the movement toward softened pro-Western and anti-communist l i n e s .  Indeed, by the  end of the p e r i o d , Malaysia had l a r g e l y dropped i t s anti-communist l i n e f o r one of peaceful co-existence and was f a s t transforming i t s pro-Western stance f o r one of neutralism.  I t was not u n t i l the next  period, however, that these changes became r e a l l y  apparent.  There was also a tendency f o r the e f f e c t s of changes i n the Defence and S e c u r i t y issue-area to s p i l l - o v e r , as i t were, i n t o the other two issue-areas.  Thus Malaysia responded p o s i t i v e l y toward  Eastern European overtures to open trade and diplomatic t i e s . Konfrontasi also seemed to have shown Malaysian policy-makers  how  few  f i r m f r i e n d s the country r e a l l y had and r e s u l t e d i n the general strategy of reaching out toward the Afro-Asian world and the s e t t i n g up of diplomatic missions i n many of those s t a t e s .  In a l l , i t  seemed to have been a good lesson i n diplomacy f o r the new  nation.  Thus, while o b j e c t i v e s , postures and s t r a t e g i e s did not change s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n the issue-areas of Development and Trade and i n that of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation  and Diplomacy, p o l i c y actions not only  increased q u a n t i t a t i v e l y i n the two issue-areas, but became more p l u r a l i z e d i n terms of t h e i r targets. In general, then, the second period of f o r e i g n p o l i c y demonstrates the importance of the feedback process i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y formulation and the manner i n which t h i s process a f f e c t s s h i f t s i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . This i s another way of saying that f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s c o n t i n u a l l y t a i l o r e d to the e x i s t i n g needs of the nation as perceived by i t s policy-makers, who  constantly have to re-appraise and adjust p o l i c i e s  to changing e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l conditions.  For Malaysia's p o l i c y -  makers , various events and conditions from the e x t e r n a l environment signaled the need f o r an adjustment i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n s so that the n a t i o n a l goals could be b e t t e r pursued.  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  Malaysia found i t necessary to adjust i t s posture and s t r a t e g i e s i n the pursuit of i t s core-value goals i n the aftermath of Konfrontasi and i n the wake of various changes i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment. At home, the general t u r m o i l i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y induced a spate of c r i t i c i s m which d i d not f a i l to have i t s e f f e c t on the  policy-makers  139  as w e l l .  In short, the e l i t e ideology which had been r i g i d l y adhered  to was undergoing a r e v i s i o n . The previous  'black-and-white' n a t i o n a l  image which sprung from a c l a s s i c view of East-West struggle mellowed i n t o a r e c o g n i t i o n that co-existence was not only possible but necessary.  On the whole, i d i o s y n c r a t i c factors receded i n importance  or were overwhelmed i n the face of strong external pressures and domestic demands f o r a s h i f t i n foreign p o l i c y .  However, i t i s not  u n t i l the next period of foreign p o l i c y that these i n c i p i e n t changes i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y became consolidated and formalized.  140 Notes to Chapter 3  "•"The Tunku made the f i r s t p u b l i c proposal- f o r a f e d e r a t i o n c o n s i s t i n g of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo (Sabah), and p o s s i b l y , Brunei as e a r l y as May 1961. There followed various phases i n the Malaysia proposal t h e r e a f t e r . The p r o j e c t received o f f i c i a l sanction and p u b l i c i t y a f t e r a s e r i e s of Anglo-Malayan t a l k s from 1961-1962. See R. S. Milne, Government and P o l i t i c s i n Malaysia, 1967, pp. 60-73 f o r a succinct account of Malaysia's formation. For a more d e t a i l e d account see Noordin M. Sopiee P o l i t i c a l U n i f i c a t i o n i n the Malaysian Region 1945-1965, Kuala Lumpur, Pernerbit U n i v e r s i t i Malaya, 1974, pp. 125-182. 2 The S t r a i t s Times, January 22,  1963.  3 The claim was based essentially, on the contention that the Sultan of Sulu had merely "leased" and not "ceded" the t e r r i t o r y i n 1878 to the predecessors of the B r i t i s h North Borneo Company from which i t was passed on to the B r i t i s h Crown; that sovereignty could be t r a n s f e r r e d only to sovereigns; and that the P h i l i p p i n e Government was the h e i r to the Sultan of Sulu. See Milne, op_. c i t . , pp. 187-188. 4  I b i d . , pp. 185-186.  ^A sample of the outpouring of b r o t h e r l y love i s provided from the f o l l o w i n g statements of three leaders at the conclusion of the conference:- Macapagal: " I say that President Sukarno i s a great leader and Tunku Abdul Rahman a great statesman."; Sukarno: "The Tunku i s a great statesman, and Macapagal a great leader of the people of A s i a . " ; Tunku: "President Macapagal and Sukarno are dynamic leaders who have fought c o l o n i a l i s m and imperialism." The S t r a i t s Times, August 6, 1963. ^A s e r i e s of events p r i o r to Malaysia's proclamation l e d to a t o t a l breakdown of r e l a t i o n s among the three countries. Malaya had postponed the Malaysia formation from August 31 t i l l September 16 to give enough time f o r the UN Secretary General's report due to appear on September 14. The Secretary General deplored the f a c t that the date was f i x e d before h i s conclusions were made known and so d i d Indonesia. A f t e r the report had found that the majority of the Borneo people supported the p r o j e c t , Indonesia and the P h i l i p p i n e s chose not to accept the UN conclusions. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and C o l l a b o r a t i o n , Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1962, pp. 95-96.  141 g  For a thorough and d e t a i l e d examination of the motives and reasons behind Malaysia's formation, see Noordin Sopiee, P o l i t i c a l U n i f i c a t i o n i n the Malaysia Region 1945-1965: From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, Penerbit U n i v e r s i t i Malaya, 1974, pp. 143-145. 9  The S t r a i t s Times, February 8, 1963. 10 In a s e r i e s of twelve radio t a l k s c a l l e d "The B a t t l e f o r Merger," Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew s p e l l e d out the nature of the communist threat to Singapore and the Malaysia region i n general. See Lee Kuan Yew, The B a t t l e f o r Merger, Singapore, Govt. P r i n t i n g Office, (no date). 11 Milne, op_. c i t . , p. 63. See also Sopiee, op_. c i t . , pp. 144-145. 12  Cited i n J . M. G u l l i c k , Malaysia and I t s Neighbours, London, Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1967, p. 41. 13 The Tunku denies the importance of the Communist threat i n the formation of Malaysia but agrees that the r a c i a l balance theory has "some t r u t h . " He i n s i s t s that "the t r u t h of the matter ... was that the people l i v i n g under the same form of administration p r e v i o u s l y (that i s , B r i t i s h r u l e ) would n a t u r a l l y want to l i v e again under the same form of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n independent Malaysia." Tunku, personal communication, June 1975. The "same a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " nevertheless implies a pro-Western, non-communist p o l i t i c a l framework. 14 / Cf. Tilman, Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y , op. c i t . , pp. 47-48, Stephen Chee, "Malaysia's Changing Foreign P o l i c y , " op_. c i t . , p. 44. Former Permanent Secretary to the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h i s perception of K o n f r o n t a s i . See h i s " N e u t r a l i s a t i o n i n Southeast A s i a , " Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 4, No. 3, 1971, p. 49. ^The op. c i t 1  expression " e x t e r n a l outreach" i s employed by Stephen Chee,  16 The S t r a i t s Times 17The S t r a i t s Times 18 The S t r a i t s Times !  142 19  See The S t r a i t s Times, May 28, 1965, i n which the S o c i a l i s t Front MP, Dr. Tan Chee Khoon queries the Tunku on the issue i n a House debate. A PAP opposition member, Devan N a i r , wrote pointedly i n a l e t t e r to The S t r a i t s Times, "We do not advance our cause i n A f r o - A s i a by doing an e c s t a t i c j i g round the American totem." The S t r a i t s Times, June 5, 1965. 20 Other members of the delegation were Lee San Choon, A l l i a n c e MP, Abdullah Ahmad, P o l i t i c a l Secretary to the Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r , Musa Hitam, P o l i t i c a l Secretary t o the M i n i s t e r of Transport, Wong Leng Ken, PAP leader, Devan N a i r , PAP MP, James Puthucheary, lawyer, Samad I s m a i l , j o u r n a l i s t . These i n d i v i d u a l s comprised a "National Committee" according to PAP MP Devan Nair. See The S t r a i t s Times, May 20, 1965, and Dewan Ra'ayat Parliamentary Debates, May 26, 1965, c o l . 124. ^^Malaysia's support of the US bombing of North Vietnam was apparently the major obstacle to the delegation's acceptance. There was a l s o an element of i n t e r - p a r t y competition involved as Malaysia's s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s , the Labour Party, Party Rakyat and the Barisan S o c i a l i s of Singapore had been sponsored f o r membership by Indonesia although these p a r t i e s d i d not send any delegation to the Conference. Interview w i t h Encik Samad I s m a i l , e d i t o r , New S t r a i t s Times, May 19, 1975, and i b i d . . c o l s . 123-126. 22 The S t r a i t s Times, May 20, 1965. 23 The Malay M a i l , August 31, 1966 and The S t r a i t s Times, September 1,  1966. 2 4  I b i d . , June 24, 1966.  25 The S t r a i t s Times, June 21, 1966. 26 Tun I s m a i l said he had not discussed h i s proposals w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r or any of h i s former Cabinet colleagues, The S t r a i t s Times, January 24, 1968. 27 Dewan Ra'ayat Parliamentary Debates, January 23, 1968, c o l s . 1615-1616.  143 28  The S t r a i t s Times, January 28, 1968. Opposition party leader, Dr. Tan Chee Khoon a l l e g e s t h a t Tun I s m a i l r e s i g n e d from the C a b i n e t not o n l y because o f h e a l t h reasons but because he had d i f f e r e n c e s v i t h t h e Tunku on f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a t t e r s . Dr. Tan a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t I s m a i l wanted to h o l d the M i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s but the Tunku was adamant i n not g i v i n g up the p o r t f o l i o . The Tunku-Ismail conf l i c t d a t e s back t o the e a r l y y e a r s o f independence (see f n . 83, Chapter Two) and seems t o have an i d e o l o g i c a l dimension. I s m a i l i n the l a t e r y e a r s appeared to have changed h i s h a r d - l i n e anti-communist p o s i t i o n b u t the Tunku has remained uncompromising i n h i s a t t i t u d e toward communism and communist c o u n t r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y C h i n a . I n t e r v i e w w i t h Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, May 22, 1975, and Tunku, p e r s o n a l communicat i o n , June 1975. 29 See P e t e r Boyce, M a l a y s i a and Singapore i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Diplomacy, 1968, p. 144 and M i l n e , op_. c i t . , pp. 218-219. 30 31 32  T i l m a n , op. c i t . ,  p. 46.  I b i d . , pp. 46-47. Boyce, op. c i t . , pp. 132-133.  33 The B r i t i s h p u l l - o u t p l a n s announced were as f o l l o w s : Phase 1: Withdrawal o f 10,000 men by A p r i l 1968; Phase 2: Withdrawal o f a f u r t h e r 20,000 men by 1970-71, r e d u c i n g the s i z e o f B r i t i s h f o r c e s to about h a l f the p r e - C o n f r o n t a t i o n l e v e l o f 60,000; Phase 3: Total w i t h d r a w a l by about the mid-1970's. The Sunday Times, January 14, 1968. 34 V a r i o u s i s s u e s o f The S t r a i t s Times, January 1968 - November 1969. See a l s o C h i n K i n Wah, "The F i v e Power Defence Arrangement and AMDA," O c c a s i o n a l Paper No. 23, J u l y 1974, I n s t i t u t e o f Southeast A s i a n S t u d i e s , Singapore. 35 In F e b r u a r y 1969, the two c o u n t r i e s announced t h e i r d e c i s i o n s to m a i n t a i n t h e i r f o r c e s i n the r e g i o n a f t e r 1971, The Malay M a i l , February 26, 1969, but Tun Razak and the Tunku on a number o f o c c a s i o n s expressed doubts about t h i s commitment. See The S t r a i t s Times, August 8 and 10, 1969.  144 36  The Exercise dubbed "Bersatu Padu," which was widely p u b l i c i z e d , involved the deployment of 4,000 men, 500 a i r c r a f t and 50 s h i p s . The Malay M a i l , A p r i l 10, 1970. I t was not u n t i l A p r i l 1972 a f t e r a m i n i s t e r i a l meeting i n London that the five-power arrangement was f i n a l l y formalized i n a j o i n t communique issued by the f i v e governments, The Five-Power Arrangement, however, i s not a m i l i t a r y pact although i t s purpose was to replace AMDA which was terminated i n November 1971. See Chin, op_. c i t . , p. 1 and pp. 17-18. 37 For example, the Permanent Secretary t o the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s stated that "We have s t e a d f a s t l y maintained these p r i n c i p l e s [of peaceful co-existence] ever since our independence and most recently they have borne f r u i t i n the exchange of diplomatic missions between the Soviet Union and Malaysia ... I t i s not that the p r i n c i p l e s of co-existence have changed; i t i s rather that these p r i n c i p l e s ... which we ... have long espoused have won gradual acceptance." See Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, "The Elements of Foreign P o l i c y , " Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 2, Nos. 1 & 2, December 1969, pp. 12-13. Tan S r i G h a z a l i , i n an i n t e r v i e w , maintained that i t was the communist countries that had changed rather than Malaysia. Interview with Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, October 30, 1975. 38 See my M.A. Thesis, Southern Bargaining i n North-South Trade: The Case of T i n , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972, Chapter One, f o r a d i s c u s s i o n nature and issues of the North-South c o n f l i c t . See also B. Gosovic, "UNCTAD: North-South Encounter," I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n , May 1968, No. 568. 39 Proceedings of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 23 March - 16 June, UN P u b l i c a t i o n , Sales No. 64 I I B, 1964, V o l . I I , pp. 5-63. The o r i g i n a l demands of the developing countries were contained i n "The J o i n t Declaration of the Developing Countries made at the Eighteenth Session of the General A s s e m b l y G e n e r a l Assembly r e s o l u t i o n 1897 ( X V I I I ) , 11 November 1963. 40 I f both Malaysia and B o l i v i a had withdrawn from the Agreement, i t would have collapsed since Malaysia i s the leading t i n producer and B o l i v i a i s second i n l i n e . See my M.A. Thesis, pp. 109-110 and "Storm In a Tin Cup," The Far Eastern Economic Review, V o l . 51, January 20, 1966, pp. 90-91 f o r an account of the episode. 41 The p r i c e range was raised, from a l e v e l of 1,000 a l e v e l of 1,100 - 1,400 per ton, i b i d .  1,200 to  145 /2 Speech by K h i r J o h a r i , M i n i s t e r of Trade and Industry and leader of Malaysian delegation to UNCTAD I I I at Santiago, published i n Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 5, No. 2, June 1972, p. 39. 43 V i c t o r Morais, ed., Strategy f o r A c t i o n : The Selected Speeches of Tun H a j i Abdul Razak, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Center f o r Development Studies, Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Dept., 1969, p. 345. 44 Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysian Plan 1971-1975, Kuala Lumpur, Govt. Press, 1973, p. 11. 4  " * I b i d . , p. 81.  ^ M a l a y s i a Year Book 1973/74, The Malay M a i l , Kuala Lumpur, pp. 320-330. 47 " I n d u s t r i a l Development i n Malaysia and Incentives f o r Investment," speech by J . Jegathesan, D i r e c t o r , Investment Promotion, FIDA, to Malaysian Investment Conference, London, May 1975, pp. 3-4. 48 The S t r a i t s Times, August 28,  1965.  49 The S t r a i t s Times, A p r i l 4,  1967.  "^Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania were at t h i s time also reported to be seeking t i e s with Malaysia. See The Malay M a i l , J u l y 25, 1967 and The S t r a i t s Times, January 3, 1969. ''"'"The other ASPAC countries were: A u s t r a l i a , Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand, the P h i l i p p i n e s , South Vietnam, Thailand and South Korea. The S t r a i t s Times, June 12, 1966. The purported aim of the organization was cooperation i n the economic and c u l t u r a l f i e l d s , The S t r a i t s Times, June 19, 1966. Malaysia, together with Japan, had reportedly blocked moves to mould the organization as an a n t i communist f r o n t . On the whole, Malaysia was not p a r t i c u l a r l y e n t h u s i a s t i c about ASPAC. See The S t r a i t s Times, J u l y 5 and 7, 1967.  146 53  The S t r a i t s Times, August 9, 1967. The machinery f o r c a r r y i n g out the work of the r e g i o n a l body were as follows: an annual foreign m i n i s t e r s ' meeting; a standing committee with r o t a t i n g chairmanship, s i t t i n g i n the country of the foreign m i n i s t e r serving as chairman and comprising ambassadors of the other s t a t e s ; ad hoc and permanent committees of s p e c i a l i s t s and other o f f i c i a l s as needed; and a n a t i o n a l s e c r e t a r i a t i n each member country, Tilman, op. c a t . , p. 49. 5 4  Ibid. Ibid.  56  T h e S t r a i t s Times  57  T h e S t r a i t s Times  58  T h e S t r a i t s Times  59 "ASEAN J o i n t Communique," Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, V o l . 2, Nos. 1 & 2, December 1969, p. 47. 6  °Ibid., p. 49.  ^The ASEAN Fund was to have an i n i t i a l grant of $15 m i l l i o n , that i s , a c o n t r i b u t i o n of $3 m i l l i o n from each member s t a t e , The S t r a i t s Times, December 18, 1969. 62 The Malaysian Representative, Mr. Ramani, i n d i c a t e d that he would support a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g only on Pakistan to c e a s e f i r e s i n c e , he s a i d , India had already i n d i c a t e d i t would accept the ceasefire u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y , The S t r a i t s Times, September 21, 1965. The Tunku, i n defending Ramani, s a i d Malaysia's i n t e r n a t i o n a l t i e s were more important than i t s r e l i g i o u s t i e s , The S t r a i t s Times, September 27, 1965. fi  The Malay M a i l , October 6, 1965. The Malay M a i l , March 3, 1966.  147 See Michael Brecher, "Inputs and Decisions f o r War and Peace," I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies Quarterly, V o l . 18, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 131-177, f o r an e x c e l l e n t study of the June 1967 I s r a e l i - A r a b war i n these very terms of feedback to which we have a l l u d e d . The research design Brecher uses i s however designed f o r the d e t a i l e d study of p a r t i c u l a r events rather than f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n general with which I am concerned.  148  CHAPTER FOUR MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1970 - 1975  Defence and S e c u r i t y With the t u r m o i l of the 1960s behind i t , Malaysia moved toward c o n s o l i d a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the region.  Malaysia put the f i n a l  touches to i t s rapprochement w i t h Indonesia by s i g n i n g w i t h i t , i n March 1970, a Friendship Treaty and a D e l i m i t a t i o n of T e r r i t o r i a l Seas Treaty.^  The Friendship Treaty was a renewal of a s i m i l a r t r e a t y  signed i n 1959, the only such t r e a t y Malaysia has signed w i t h any country.  The 1970 t r e a t y has the aura of a non-aggression  pact.  A r t i c l e 3 states that "the two High Contracting P a r t i e s undertake that i n case any dispute on matters d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g them should a r i s e they w i l l not r e s o r t to the threat or use of force and s h a l l at a l l times endeavour to s e t t l e such a dispute through the usual diplomatic channels i n the true s p i r i t of f r i e n d s h i p and goodwill between good 2 neighbours."  In.the 1959 t r e a t y , a s i m i l a r a r t i c l e stated merely that  the p a r t i e s " s h a l l endeavour" to s e t t l e a dispute through peaceful means. The D e l i m i t a t i o n of T e r r i t o r i a l Seas Treaty had i n t e r n a t i o n a l r a m i f i c a tions and sprung from Malaysia's and Indonesia's claim of a 12-mile t e r 4 r i t o r i a l waters instead of the t r a d i t i o n a l 3 miles.  The t r e a t y r e l a t e d  i n p a r t i c u l a r to the S t r a i t s of Malacca, which being l e s s than 24 miles wide i n places meant that the two countries d i d not consider" the S t r a i t s  to be i n t e r n a t i o n a l waters.  J  In December 1971, Malaysia and Indo-  n e s i a , a f t e r t r i p a r t i t e consultations w i t h Singapore, announced that "the S t r a i t s of Malacca and Singapore are not i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r a i t s , while f u l l y recognising t h e i r use f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l shipping i n accordance with the p r i n c i p l e s of innocent passage."  Singapore, while  not holding t h i s p o s i t i o n , agreed w i t h Malaysia and Indonesia  that  the safety of navigation was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s and that there was need f o r t r i p a r t i t e cooperation on the question.  I t s p o s i t i o n i s understandable because of i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l  status as an entrepot and commercial center.  Malaysia's, and Indo-  nesia's p o s i t i o n s , however, arose from a wish to assert n a t i o n a l sovereignty over the S t r a i t s f o r a number of reasons.  While the two coun-  t r i e s claimed n a v i g a t i o n a l safety and p o l l u t i o n to be the most comp e l l i n g reasons f o r c o n t r o l l i n g the S t r a i t s , the obviously s t r a t e g i c i m p l i c a t i o n s of the move cannot be denied.^  important  At one p o i n t ,  Tunku Razaleigh, as President of the Associated Malay Chamber of Commerce, proposed that the S t r a i t s be turned i n t o "the Suez Canal of Southeast A s i a " and a shipping levy be imposed on a l l vessels passing through the S t r a i t s . sement, however.  The scheme received no o f f i c i a l endor-  The o f f i c i a l view on the extension to 12 miles of  t e r r i t o r i a l seas i s that i t was necessary f o r the day-to-day administ r a t i o n of defence and commercial s e c u r i t y and that Malaysia  was 9  merely " f a l l i n g i n l i n e w i t h the large majority of nations." In May 1970, Malaysia served on the three-nation mediation  task  force (Indonesia and Japan were the other two countries) which was appointed by a Jakarta conference to look i n t o the d e t e r i o r a t i n g war s i t u a t i o n i n Cambodia."*"^ Toward the year's end, Malaysia attended i t s  150 f i r s t nonaligned nations conference at Lusaka.  The event was  of Malaysia's f i n a l acceptance as a "nonaligned" nation.  symbolic  Malaysia's  delegation to Lusaka was l e d by Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r , Tun Abdul Razak, s h o r t l y before h i s succession as the nation's Prime M i n i s t e r . " ^ speech to the conference, Razak spoke i n glowing terms of  In h i s  nonalignment  and i d e n t i f i e d Malaysia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y goals with i t s p r i n c i p l e s : ....Today w i t h the detente between the two power b l o c s f s i t i s an important r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Non-Aligned Group to ensure that the i n t e r e s t of the b i g powers do not converge at the expense of the medium and small powers. The hegemonistic tendencies on the part of the major powers which appear to be under various guises and with various j u s t i f i c a t i o n s must be r e s i s t e d . Furthermore, the world today i s no longer b i p o l a r . I t i s at l e a s t t r i - p o l a r with the emergence of China and her l e g i t i m a t e r o l e i n the world cannot be simply washed away by those who are opposed to her. At the same time, i t i s a f a c t which a l s o cannot be washed away that the r e l a t i o n s between China and a number of countries remain u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . I submit that here the non-aligned countries have an extremely important r o l e to play and have a unique duty to discharge i f we are to remain l o y a l to the p r i n c i p l e s of co-existence and to our b a s i c tenets of non-alignment i n our e f f o r t s to b r i n g about a harmonisation of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s on the b a s i s of respect f o r independence and i n t e g r i t y of states.12  ,  I t was a l s o at the Lusaka Conference that Razak f o r the f i r s t time sought endorsement, at an i n t e r n a t i o n a l forum, f o r Malaysia's proposal 13 for  the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Southeast A s i a .  Although the scheme r e -  ceived only p a r t i a l endorsement at Lusaka, Malaysia continued to a i r i t at various i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferences, notably, the commemorative session of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations i n December 14  1970,  and then at the 1971 Commonwealth Conference at Singapore.  151 I quote Tun Razak i n h i s speech to the Commonwealth, summit: ...the non-alignment p r i n c i p l e s to which Malaysia whole-heartedly s u b s c r i b e s . . . c a l l f o r . . . r e s t r a i n t and consideration from the b i g powers i n t h e i r actions and decisions which a f f e c t smaller c o u n t r i e s . In keeping w i t h the l a t t e r , the non-aligned countries at Lusaka looked to the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Vietnam,. Laos and Cambodia. Malaysia f o r i t s part has taken t h i s a step f u r t h e r and c a l l e d f o r the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Southeast A s i a - a n e u t r a l i s a t i o n which n e c e s s a r i l y requires the endorsement of the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia cannot be considered i n i s o l a t i o n . They are very much a part of Southeast A s i a which has a l l the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of becoming an arena of c o n f l i c t of the super powers i n tent on the extension of t h e i r spheres of i n f l u e n c e . In our view, therefore, peaceland s t a b i l i t y i n t h i s region can only be a r e a l i t y i f the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n which should cover the e n t i r e area i s guaranteed by the U.S., U.S.S.R. and C h i n a . 15  Malaysia's n e u t r a l i z a t i o n proposal no doubt had i t s o r i g i n s i n the 1968 " I s m a i l Peace P l a n . "  However, i t was not u n t i l two years a f t e r Tun  I s m a i l had presented h i s proposals to Parliament that they became formalised as part of Malaysia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  I n i t i a l l y , the pro-  posal, as explained by party ideologue Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie involved "two l e v e l s " or p o l i c y : On the f i r s t l e v e l , the countries of Southeast A s i a should get together and c l e a r l y view t h e i r present s i t u a t i o n s and agree upon the f o l l o w i n g : * i n d i v i d u a l countries i n the region must respect one another's sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , and not p a r t i c i p a t e i n a c t i v i t i e s l i k e l y to d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y threaten the s e c u r i t y of another. This i s an e s s e n t i a l requirement. Non-interference and non-aggression are b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s which Southeast Asian countries must unequivocally accept before any f u r t h e r steps can be taken. * a l l f o r e i g n powers should be excluded from the region. * they should devise ways and .means of, and undertake the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , ensuring peace among member s t a t e s .  152 * they should present a c o l l e c t i v e view before the major powers on v i t a l issues of s e c u r i t y . * they should present a c o l l e c t i v e view before the major powers on v i t a l issues of s e c u r i t y . * they should promote r e g i o n a l co-operation. On the next l e v e l , the major powers (the United States, Russia, and China) must agree on the following: * Southeast A s i a should be an area of n e u t r a l i t y * the powers undertake to exclude countries i n the region from power struggle among themselves * the powers devise the supervisory means of guaranteeing Southeast Asia's n e u t r a l i t y i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l power struggle.16 The scheme, while ambitious, was based on a pragmatic a p p r e c i a t i o n of the Southeast Asian s i t u a t i o n .  I t thus became the most important of  Malaysia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y s t r a t e g i e s i n the area of defence and secur i t y i n t h i s period.  By November 1971, Malaysia p a r t i a l l y f u l f i l l e d  the " f i r s t l e v e l " of p o l i c y by persuading the four other ASEAN members to endorse the scheme.  In the h i s t o r i c Kuala Lumpur D e c l a r a t i o n , the  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s , "agreeing that the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of Souteast A s i a i s a d e s i r a b l e o b j e c t i v e and that we should explore ways and means of b r i n g i n g about i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . . . " stated' (1)  (2)  That Indonesia, Malaysia, the P h i l i p i n e s , S i n gapore and Thailand are determined to exert i n i t i a l l y necessary e f f o r t s to secure the r e c o g n i t i o n of and respect f o r , Southeast A s i a as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y , free from any form or manner of i n t e r f e r e n c e by outside powers That Southeast Asian countries should make concerted e f f o r t s to broaden the areas of cooperation which contribute»'to t h e i r strength, s o l i d a r i t y and c l o s e r ralationship-'-''  The n e u t r a l i z a t i o n scheme was subsequently also endorsed i n p r i n c i p l e by the Commonwealth Conference of Ottawa i n August 1973 and  153 the Fourth Nonaligned Summit Conference i n A l g i e r s i n September 1973. Endorsement i s of course a f a r cry from implementation and to date the b i g two, U.S. and U.S.S.R., have not responded o f f i c i a l l y to the scheme 18 although China has expressed v e r b a l support f o r the idea.  The slow-  ness of big-power response and the feedback from other countries, ; p a r t i c u l a r l y the ASEAN countries, on the scheme had l e d to a s l i g h t s h i f t i n emphasis i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y strategy.  I n c r e a s i n g l y the.  term " n e u t r a l i z a t i o n " has been dropped i n favour of the expression "Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y " or simply, "zonal n e u t r a l i t y . " " ^ Thus the emphasis today i s l e s s on big-power guarantee f o r neut r a l i z a t i o n than on ASEAN, or Southeast Asian, i n i t i a t i v e i n f o s t e r i n g zonal n e u t r a l i t y . Th^i-conceptjbf neutraliszja-tion implies big-power part i c i p a t i o n , or at any r a t e , c o n t r o l , and t h i s does not s i t w e l l w i t h some ASEAN countries which would prefer to see big-power disengagement 20 from the area.  The scheme has e v i d e n t l y made good progress since the  Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971.  By May 1975 during the ASEAN M i n i s -  t e r i a l conference i n Kuala Lumpur, i t was p u b l i c l y announced that a "Blueprint f o r the Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y " was i n the 21 process of being mooted and formulated by senior ASEAN o f f i c i a l s . The change of emphasis from big-power guarantee to n a t i o n a l and re-? g i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e was underscored by Tun Razak i n h i s speech to the ASEAN m i n i s t e r s : The premise of the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n proposal i s r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e . Southeast A s i a must stand on i t s own f e e t . We — i n d i v i dual countries as w e l l as the region as a whole — must be s e l f - r e l i a n t i f we wish to survive. I f a country or a people values i t s way of l i f e , i t must be prepared to defend i t against any  154 form of external encroachment. I f a people i s not prepared to f i g h t i n the defence of i t s sovereignty and i t s values, i t w i l l not survive — indeed i t does not deserve to survive. The best defence l i e s i n the people themselves — i n t h e i r commitment, t h e i r w i l l and capacity. This i s the premise of the neut r a l i t y system as i t applies both to i n d i v i d u a l count r i e s and to the region as a whole. I t i s not premised on vague hopes and euphoric dreams. I t i s premised on f r i e n d s h i p and goodwill, on an open-minded readiness to co-operate, and patience and perseverance i n working out d e t a i l e d arrangements — and equally on n a t i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e , on our readiness to f i g h t and defend our values and way of l i f e . . . . This i s the meaning of and thrust of the n e u t r a l i t y system.;..The key to our future s e c u r i t y and s t a b i l i t y l i e s not i n outdated and i r r e l e v a n t a t t i t u d e s of the c o l d war, but i n imaginative and constructive response to the new r e a l i t i e s of today.22 The s h i f t of emphasis i n the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n strategy was explained i n a more complete fashion by f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h e o r e t i c i a n and c u r r e n t l y Home A f f a i r s M i n i s t e r Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie.  In a t a l k on r e g i o n a l  s e c u r i t y to the Centre f o r S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies, 23 Jakarta,  Ghazali s p e l l e d out three s e c u r i t y issues-areas, namely,  i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y issues that a r i s e from i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s ; i n t r a - r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y issues that a r i s e out of i n t r a - r e g i o n a l (Southeast Asian) c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s ; and external s e c u r i t y issues that a r i s e out of e x t r a - r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s . He argued that these c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s could be a l l e v i a t e d by a "Southeast Asian N e u t r a l i t y System" which would e n t a i l the p u r s u i t of three " e s s e n t i a l elements" namely (1) n a t i o n a l cohesiveness and r e s i l i e n c y (2) r e g i o n a l cohesiveness and r e s i l i e n c y , and (3) the observance of a p o l i c y of equidistance by Southeast Asian states v i s - a - v i s the major powers. N a t i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e r e f e r s to a state's "capacity to mobilize ( i t s )  155  population f o r n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g and r a p i d economic development..." A s t a t e i s s a i d to be r e s i l i e n t i f " . . . i t s s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l system i s n a t i o n a l l y accepted and has the inherent a b i l i t y to meet the heightened expectations f o r greater p r o s p e r i t y and s o c i a l j u s t i c e of i t s population. The second element, r e g i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e , i s more than a mere extension of the n a t i o n a l concept and appears to incorporate some notion of r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n , The notion of r e g i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e may be defined as the a b i l i t y o f each s t a t e i n the region to be f u l l y committed to t h e i r [ s i c ] organised i n t e r relatedness and interdependence as the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . ASEAN i s c l e a r l y a f i r s t step i n that d i r e c t i o n . I t has focussed i n t e r e s t on the r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c c e l e r a t i n g economic development through increased i n t r a - r e g i o n a l trade, improvement of c o l l e c t i v e e x t r a - r e g i o n a l trade terms, s e c t o r a l plain-h a T r i m o n i z a t i o n as w e l l as c o l l e c t i v e u t i l i z a t i o n of a l a r g e r volume of e x t e r n a l resources through j o i n t r e g i o n a l projects.26 The t h i r d element, equidistance, i s taken to mean a p o l i c y of maint a i n i n g noninvolved and more or l e s s i m p a r t i a l or n e u t r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s with the great powers.  As Ghazali Shafie puts i t , " I n the short term,  equidistance r e i n f o r c e s the adoption of a neutral,non-aligned p o l i c y stance, which i n turn r e i n f o r c e s accommodation between e x t e r n a l powers. In the long term, equidistance w i l l entrench a r e g i o n a l p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y and nonalignment that w i l l f a c i l i t a t e arid perpetuate  great  27 power disengagement from Southeast A s i a . " He suggests that None of ..these p o l i c y trends are I.sic]xf undamentally unacceptable to any Southeast Asian s t a t e . I n f a c t these trends are already being pursued by most of  156  them, w i t h the r e s t already showing an i n c l i n a t i o n to adopt s i m i l a r p o l i c y trends. The elements necessary f o r a n e u t r a l i t y system are mutually r e i n f o r c i n g , such that once f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d , w i l l provide constant dynamics to the o v e r a l l s i t u a t i o n . The question r e a l l y i s not whether systemic n e u t r a l i t y w i l l eventually come about ( i t w i l l eventuate as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the entrenchment of the necessary p o l i c y trends) but rather whether i t w i l l eventuate spontaneously, or be i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d by c o l l e c t i v e agreement.28 Because of the changing nature of the n e u t r a l i t y proposal, some confusion has been generated over i t s precise meaning and doubts have a r i s e n w i t h respect to i t s p r a c t i c a l i t y .  As one f o r e i g n p o l i c y analyst  puts i t , The [ n e u t r a l i s a t i o n ] proposal may not be p r a c t i c a l ; indeed, may be Utopian as many of the c r i t i c s have argued. Quite r e a l i s t i c a l l y , Southeast A s i a i s not l i k e l y to develop i n t o a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y soon. Yet i t i s important to d i s t i n g u i s h between n e u t r a l i s a t i o n as an end or as a goal, and as a means, or more p a r t i c u l a r l y , a t h e o r e t i c a l framework — a process of t h i n k i n g , a r t i c u l a t i o n and formulation of i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e p o l i c i e s . 2 9 I t i s perhaps p o s s i b l e to overcome the conceptual d i f f i c u l t y  encountered  by the analyst here by r e f e r r i n g to the f o r e i g n p o l i c y model of t h i s study.  The n e u t r a l i z a t i o n scheme, accordingly, would be b a s i c a l l y a  f o r e i g n p o l i c y strategy, grounded on a number of f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , and springing from a f o r e i g n p o l i c y posture of nonalignment, as i t i s o f f i c i a l l y claimed, or, neutralism as I would prefer to c a l l i t .  My  contention i s that Malaysia's claim to nonalignment remains dubious as long as the Five-Power Defence Arrangement, however l o o s e l y , remains i n force. "  :  The proposal f o r zonal n e u t r a l i t y i s also hardly i n the  t r a d i t i o n of nonalignment, having perhaps greater affinity to European  157 neutrality.  30  The change i n emphasis r e c e n t l y i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y  strategy r e f l e c t s a continual adjustment toward e x t e r n a l developments and to some extent domestic events.  Although the strategy i s f l e x i b l e ,  Malaysia's basic posture of neutralism has been a s t a b l e facet of froreign p o l i c y f o r t h i s whole period, and one suspects, f o r a l o n g time more to come.  The n e u t r a l i z a t i o n scheme, because i t s p e c i f i e s  clear-cut l i n e s of a c t i o n and i s based on a p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i c a l or p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n may also be looked upon as a " d o c t r i n e . "  A foreign  Ministry, o f f i c i a l stressed, f o r example, that i t was a " t o t a l concept" on which a l l f o r e i g n p o l i c y actions were "tested" so that they conformed 31 However, f o r the purposes of t h i s study, I prefer to  to i t s premises.  use the term "strategy" to describe the concept as t h i s d o v e t a i l s with the other designated  f o r e i g n p o l i c y outputs.  Toward the end of the  p e r i o d , Malaysia had i n i t i a t e d , under ASEAN auspices, a " B l u e p r i n t " f o r Southeast Asian n e u t r a l i t y , which, according to a Wisma Putra o f 32 f i c i a l , enjoyed "90 percent support" of the other ASEAN countries. Malaysia's  f i n a l s t r i d e toward neutralism a c t u a l l y came with the  r e c o g n i t i o n and establishment Republic of China.  of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s w i t h the People's  While the move was s t r i c t l y a diplomatic matter,  i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Malaysia's n a t i o n a l defence and general s e c u r i t y w i l l become obvious i n the course of my account.  Steps toward rapproche-  ment with China became evident when Malaysia began to soften i t s China l i n e soon a f t e r the termination of Konfrontasi.  At various p o i n t s ,  Malaysian spokesmen p u b l i c l y lamented the absence of China from the UN, although they i n v a r i a b l y defended the r i g h t s of Taiwan.  Tun Razak i n  158 1966  c a l l e d t h i s p o s i t i o n the "One  China, one Formosa"  p o l i c y , not  wishing to be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the "two-China" p o l i c y . U n t i l  1970,  Malaysia held t h i s p o s i t i o n . Thus Tun I s m a i l t o l d the UN General Assembly i n December that year:  o  By 1971,  I t i s . . . a f a c t that the world today i s no longer b i p o l a r . I t i s , i f not m u l t i p o l a r , at l e a s t t r i p o l a r . S p e c i f i c a l l y , I am r e f e r r i n g , of course, to the People's Republic of China, whose absence from t h i s organization r e f l e c t s a serious shortcoming of the United Nations. Furthermore, the d e n i a l to a b i g power of i t s proper r o l e cannot be conduciL-M/e. to the establishment of a stable and harmonious world order....I should...wish to state the view here of my Government t h a t , taking i n t o account the r i g h t s of the people of Taiwan to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , a r i g h t which surely member states of t h i s organization cannot deny to any people, China should be properly and f u l l y represented i n t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n . The e x c l u s i o n of China from t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n and from the mainstream of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s i s un^ r e a l i s t i c and shortsighted and b e n e f i t s no one. the Malaysian p o s i t i o n on, China and Taiwan had become more  definite.  In a b r i i * e f i n g to the Commonwealth Parliamentary A s s o c i a t i o n ,  Tan S r i Zaiton, the Permanent Secretary to the M i n i s t r y of External Affairs said: Malaysia's p o l i c y on China i s t h i s : We subscribe not to a two-China p o l i c y or one China one Taiwan p o l i c y but r a t h e r , I say t h i s quite c a t e g o r i c a l l y , to a one China p o l i c y . But the problem of Taiwan remains a d i f f i c u l t i s s u e . The f a c t has to be accepted that a de facto government e x i s t s on t h i s i s l a n d , based on an ideology d i f f e r e n t from that e x i s t i n g on the maiiiland. On the other hand, f o r centuries i t has been accepted that Taiwan i s part of China. The problem i s w e l l - n i g h impossible to resolve unless there i s a s p i r i t of give and take on both s i d e s . I t i s f o r t h i s reason we say t h a t , while the problem i s e s s e n t i a l l y one f o r the Chinese people to decide, i n considering i t s s o l u t i o n ,  159 we urge that cognizance be taken of the p r i n c i p l e of self-determination t o assess the wishes of the twelve m i l l i o n or so people i n h a b i t i n g the i s l a n d of Taiwan....We do not seek to involve ourselves i n the minutiae of the Chinese problem.. We recognize that the problem of.Taiwan as a problem which must be sorted out by the Chinese people. Thus i n the 1971 UN General Assembly, Malaysia voted f o r the Albanian r e s o l u t i o n which allows f o r the seating of China and consequently, 36 Taiwan's expulsion.  There followed i n October 1971, a 19-man Trade  Mission to China, l e d by Pernas Chairman, Tengku Razaleigh, to e s t a b l i s h d i r e c t trade l i n k s with the People's Republic.  Subsequent missions  fol-  lowed, paving the way f o r u n o f f i c i a l negotiations on r e c o g n i t i o n and diplomatic t i e s .  The most important of these negotiations were c a r r i e d  out, i t was revealed l a t e r , ' t i n secret meetings between the Malaysian UN Representative at New York, Zakaria b i n Mohammed A l i , and h i s Chinese 37 counterpart, Huang Hua. were ambassadors to Canada.  The two men had f i r s t met i n Ottawa when they The Chinese p o s i t i o n at these meetings was  that diplomatic r e l a t i o n s should come f i r s t while Malaysia wanted the 38 outstanding issues s e t t l e d before t i e s could be formalised. Malaysian perspective, there were three main i s s u e s :  From the  China's support f o r  the Malayan Communist Party (MCP); the r e l a t e d question of "Suara Revolusi Malaya" (Malayan Voice of Revolution) radio broadcasts which emanated from China; and the status of the 220,000 s t a t e l e s s Chinese i n Malasia. China, apparently a f t e r a l i t t l e h e s i t a t i o n , agreed to discuss these and other issues and by December's end, agreement had been reached on the e n t i r e range of questions.  As a prelude to the China t i e s , Malaysia  had recognised without much fanfare the Mongolian Republic, North  160 Vietnam, North Korea and East Germany w i t h i n 1972-1973. Then, on May 27, 1974, a Malaysian entourage, l e d by Prime M i n i s t e r Tun Abdul Razak, l e f t f o r the People's Republic of China i n the the f i r s t h i g h - l e v e l o f f i c i a l contact of the two governments since Malaya's independence i n 1957.  On May 31, Malaysia and China announced  the normalisation of r e l a t i o n s to be followed by an exchange of ambassadors.  At the same time, Malaysia terminated diplomatic (consular)  r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan.  In the j o i n t communique announcing the normal-  i s a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s , the two governments agreed on the f o l l o w i n g chief p o i n t s : ...that although the s o c i a l systems of the People's Republic of China and Malaysia are d i f f e r e n t , t h i s should not c o n s t i t u t e an obstacle to the two Governments and people i n e s t a b l i s h i n g and developing peaceful and f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between the two countries on the basis of the p r i n c i p l e s of mutual respect f o r sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , mutual non-aggression, non-interference i n each other's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , e q u a l i t y and mutual benef i t , and peaceful co-existence. The two,Governments consider a l l f o r e i g n aggression, i n t e r f e r e n c e , c o n t r o l and subversion to be impermissible. They hold that the s o c i a l system of a country should be chosen and decided by i t s own people. They are opposed to any attempt by any country or group or countries to e s t a b l i s h hegemony or create spheres of influence i n any part of the world.39 S p e c i f i c a l l y , Malaysia stated that i t recognises "the Government of the People's Republic of China as the s o l e l e g a l Government of China and acknowledges the p o s i t i o n of the Chinese Government that Taiwan i s an i n a l i e n a b l e part of the t e r r i t o r y of the People's Republic of China."  The Chinese Government, on i t s p a r t , ....takes note of the f a c t that Malaysia i s a m u l t i r a c i a l country w i t h peoples of Malay, Chinese and  161  other ethnic o r i g i n s . Both the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia declare that they do not recognise dual n a t i o n a l i t y . Proceeding from t h i s p r i n c i p l e , the Chinese Govt, considers anyone of Chinese o r i g i n who has taken up of h i s own w i l l or a c q u i r i n g Malaysian n a t i o n a l i t y as automatically f o r f e i t i n g Chinese n a t i o n a l i t y . As f o r those residents who r e t a i n Chinese n a t i o n a l i t y of t h e i r own.will, the Chinese Government, a c t i n g i n accordance w i t h i t s consistent p o l i c y , w i l l e n j o i n them to abide by the law of the Government of Malaysia, respect the customs and habits of the people there and l i v e i n amity w i t h them. And t h e i r proper r i g h t s w i l l be protected by the Government of Ch^na and respected by the Government of Malaysia. Although not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned i n the j o i n t communique, i t seemed that China was prepared to stop a c t i v e l y supporting the MCP and base i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Malaysia on the f i v e Bandung p r i n c i p l e s of co-existence.  At any r a t e , i t appeared to be the Malaysian govern-  ment's understanding  that "non-interference" i n i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s was a  reference to the MCP issue.  Thus the Malaysian Prime M i n i s t e r said on  h i s r e t u r n that he had received assurances i n p r i v a t e t a l k s w i t h both Chairman Mao and Premier Chou that the MCP was Malaysia's " i n t e r n a l problem. " ^ 4  China also accepted Malaysia's p o s i t i o n on the issue of overseas Chinese (Huachiao), which i s based on the p r i n c i p l e of j u s s o l i . I n the past, China a p p l i e d the p r i n c i p l e of j u s sanguinis i n the fear that Taiwan would absorb the Huachiao i f the l o c a l s o c i e t i e s r e j e c t e d them.  As a quid pro• quo to the concessions made by China, Malaysia  discarded i t s ambivalent stand on Taiwan i n s t a t i n g p l a i n l y that the i s l a n d was an i n a l i e n a b l e part of the People's Republic of China and  162 i n so doing also breaking o f f t i e s w i t h the i s l a n d r e p u b l i c .  Premier  Chou also spoke favourably, i f only generally, of the Malaysian-ASEAN scheme f o r the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Southeast A s i a .  In h i s words,  "...  the Malaysian Government's p o s i t i o n f o r the establishment of a Zone of Peace and N e u t r a l i t y i n Southeast A s i a gives expression to the desire of the Southeast Asian People to shake o f f f o r e i g n i n t e r ference and c o n t r o l (and) has won support from many Third World countries. The China v i s i t represented a diplomatic breakthrough f o r Malaysia and a personal triumph f o r Tun Razak.  On h i s return from the  h i s t o r i c t r i p the Malaysian Premier s a i d w i t h considerable t r u t h : The p r e s t i g e of Malaysia has never been higher than iteis:'-today. The success of our f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y recognised. Every major power i n the world can. without equivocat i o n support our p o l i c y of f r i e n d s h i p because i t i s d i r e c t e d against nooone, our p o l i c y of nonalignment because i t i s f a i r and o b j e c t i v e , our strong commitment to regionalism because i t i s c o n s t r u c t i v e , and our p u r s u i t of r e g i o n a l neu- ^ t r a l i t y because i t would b r i n g and b u i l d peace. Thus with the establishment of diplomatic t i e s w i t h the People's Republic of China, Malaysia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y has more or l e s s come around f u l l c i r c l e .  I t can now claim w i t h greater c r e d i b i l i t y to have  a n e u t r a l i s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y and thereby pursue a p o l i c y of equidistance y i s - a - v i s the major powers.  As long as i t did not recognize China and  China did not recognize Malaysia, such a strategy of equidistance, ipso f a c t o , could not be pursued. A l i t t l e under a year a f t e r Malaysia's rapprochement w i t h China came the dramatic turn of events, i n A p r i l 1975, i n Indo-China.  In  163 unprecedented and r e l e n t l e s s m i l i t a r y offensives the revolutionary movements of South Vietnam and Cambodia - admittedly with generous support and p a r t i c i p a t i o n from Hanoi - overwhelmed the non-communist regimes of Thieu and Lon Nol w i t h i n a matter of months. v i c t o r i e s l e d to the establishment  The communist  of communist governments i n South  Vietnam and Cambodia under the N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n Front and the Khmer Rouge r e s p e c t i v e l y .  These events w i l l no doubt have far-reaching i m p l i -  cations f o r the s e c u r i t y of the Southeast A s i a region as a whole. Malaysia has extended r e c o g n i t i o n to the two new Indo-China governments.  I t has taken a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e of the events i n Indo-China.  This i s concomitant ©h i t s adherence to a n e u t r a l i s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . In the words of the Prime M i n i s t e r Tun Razak, speaking to the ASEAN Foreign M i n i s t e r s i n Kuala Lumpur i n May,  1975,  We meet today at a h i s t o r i c moment i n Southeast A s i a . Only days ago, we have seen the emergence of new governments i n Cambodia and South Vietnam, born out of the t u r m o i l of a protracted war and extraordinary and untold human s u f f e r i n g s . ... Southeast A s i a today i s a d i f f e r e n t place from what i t was only a few weeks ago. Peace, f o r the most p a r t , has come to t h i s region. This must i n deed be a d e c i s i v e moment i n our h i s t o r y . Never before i n the h i s t o r y of t h i s region have we the opportunity to create and e s t a b l i s h f o r ourselves a new world of Southeast A s i a — a world at peace and free from foreign domination and influence — a world i n which the countries of the region can co-operate with one another f o r the common good.... We are now at the threshold of e x c i t i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s . This i s the challenge which faces us i n Southeast A s i a today. This challenge brings new opportunities f o r peace, f r i e n d s h i p and co-operat i o n f o r us to grasp....Which path s h a l l we follow? The path of u n i t y or the path of d i v i s i o n ? The path of co-operation or of c o n f r o n t a t i o n ? . . . I t i s a h i s t o r i c choice - a h i s t o r i c opportunity - a h i s t o r i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which w i l l determine the  164 the future of our region and of our people. As brother Southeast Asians, we i n Malaysia are happy the guns of war i n the countries of IndoChina have at l a s t been muted....We extend our f r i e n d s h i p and goodwill to the governments and peoples of the Indo-China states w i t h whom i t i s our earnest desire to have f r i e n d l y and neighbourly r e l a t i o n s . B a s i c to our t h i n k i n g about the future i s our commitment to do.our utmost to ensure that the countries of Southeast A s i a i r respective of p o l i t i c a l ideology or s o c i a l system — can co-operate together i n ensuring peace and p r o s p e r i t y f o r a l l our p e o p l e s . ^ Malaysia's policy-makers made i t absolutely c l e a r that they did not subscribe to the s o - c a l l e d "Domino Theory."  Party t h e o r e t i c i a n  Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie went on Radio-Television Malaysia to e x p l a i n 46 what he c a l l e d "The Great Domino F a l l a c y . "  Ghazali submitted  that  the two s i m p l i s t i c assumptions of the theory are untenable, namely, the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of communist v i c t o r y , that i s , that i t would spread from country to country, and the assumption of the uniformity of Southeast Asian countries.  I n short he argued that the f a l l of  "American dominos" does not n e c e s s a r i l y presage the f a l l of other s t a t e s , which may not even be "dominos": In t h e o r e t i c a l as w e l l as p r a c t i c a l terms the domino theory has l i t t l e relevance to the states of Southeast A s i a . The collapse of American p o l i c y i n Indo-China does not determine the i n t e r n a l order of these s t a t e s , unl e s s t h e i r i n t e r n a l order happens to be a f u n c t i o n of American support, and that they depend on the United States for. the maintenance of t h e i r i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l system.... Whether or not a country goes communist depends on the success of the i n t e r n a l and ext e r n a l p o l i c i e s of that country i t s e l f . . . . In the years ahead the domino theory w i l l come to be regarded as being i n c r e a s i n g l y i r r e l e v a n t even by the United States.... I f  165 the Americans can begin to grasp the r e a l i t y that t h e i r global s e c u r i t y l i n k s are a c t u a l l y premised on p o l i t i c a l socio-economic and not m i l i t a r y eff i c a c y , there would be no cause f o r them to hold on to the myth of the domino t h e o r y . ^ In summary, Malaysia's general strategy of the period appeared 48  to be a s h i f t from the p u r s u i t of 'defence' to that of ' s e c u r i t y . ' 'Defence' implies a d e f i n i t e m i l i t a r y strategy of a state p r o t e c t i n g i t s borders, u s u a l l y by means of a m i l i t a r y pact where i t s own tary c a p a b i l i t i e s are thought to be inadequate.  mili-  'Security', on  the  other hand, suggests a more general - both p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y o r i e n t a t i o n toward minimizing grity.  threats to a state's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e -  In Malaysia's case, the emphasis on defence i n the f i r s t period  was manifested i n the Anglo-Malayan defence pact while the new  emphasis  on s e c u r i t y i n the t h i r d period i s r e f l e c t e d i n i t s p u r s u i t of r e g i o n a l neutrality.  For the most p a r t , then, the p u r s u i t of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y  dovetailed i n t o the p u r s u i t of r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y . strategy i n i t i a l l y was  Malaysia's major  the Swiss-style proposal f o r the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  of Southeast A s i a to be guaranteed by the major powers.  The  strategy  e v i d e n t l y underwent a s l i g h t m o d i f i c a t i o n and became the promotion of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y i n Southeast A s i a , a concept which was duly endorsed by a l l the ASEAN countries i n 1971.  There seems  to have appeared more r e c e n t l y another 'package' of s t r a t e g i e s with respect to the p u r s u i t of s e c u r i t y goals.  This consists of the promotion  of n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l " r e s i l i e n c e " and a p o l i c y of "equidistance" a-vis the major powers.  vis-  But these more general s t r a t e g i e s are no doubt  t i e d to the promotion of a zonal n e u t r a l i t y system which f o r the most  166 p a r t has been the c o r n e r s t o n e o f M a l a y s i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the period.  I t may be p o s s i b l e to o b t a i n t h e support and p a r t i c i p a t i o n 49  o f the o t h e r Southeast A s i a n c o u n t r i e s f o r t h e scheme of e q u a l importance major powers.  but perhaps  i s some form o f endorsement o r acceptance by the  The opening up o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h P e k i n g  by M a l a y s i a , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s and T h a i l a n d i s a r i g h t s t e p i n t h a t direction.  No doubt t h e r e w i l l be thorny d e t a i l s of implementation  to be worked out b e f o r e t h e n e u t r a l i t y zone can a c t u a l l y come i n t o f o r c e . I t  i s beyond t h e scope o f t h i s study to examine t h e i n t r i -  c a c i e s o f the n e u t r a l i t y p r o p o s a l . a today i t has proved  S u f f i c e i t t o say t h a t up  till  s  to be v i a b l e f o r e i g n p o l i c y s t r a t e g y f o r M a l a y s i a .  A summary o f t h e main f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , p o s t u r e s , s t r a t e g i e s and a c t i o n s f o r t h e p e r i o d i n the defence and s e c u r i t y i s s u e - a r e a appears below i n t a b l e Development and Trade  form.  There was some i n d i c a t i o n o f a change i n p o s t u r e and s t r a t e g i e s i n economic matters a l t h o u g h M a l a y s i a ' s economic p o l i c i e s i n broad terms —  p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s objectives —  d i d not change  fundamentally.  N o t a b l y , M a l a y s i a ' s d e v e l o p i n g - w o r l d p o s t u r e took on a more f o r c e f u l or even r a d i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n .  M a l a y s i a n spokesmen began to s t r e s s  more s t r e n u o u s l y the need to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e v a r i o u s measures aimed a t a l l e v i a t i n g p r i c e f l u c t u a t i o n s i n p r i m a r y commodities o f d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s and measures g e n e r a l l y aimed a t a more e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of w o r l d w e a l t h .  F o r example, a t t h e T h i r d UNCTAD Conference a t  TABLE 4.1 Defence and Security:  P o l i c y Outputs 1970 -  1975  OBJECTIVES  ACTIONS  Maintaining political independence Protecting territorial integrity  STRATEGIES Seeking securityrather than defence: I  POSTURES Neutralism -policy orientation of n e u t r a l i t y v i s - a - v i s major powers and cold war issues i n general Non-interference -respecting t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l sovereignty of other nations  (a) Promoting the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of Southeast Asia through b i g power guarantee (b) Promoting a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y i n Southeast A s i a  II  Promotingahationalional resilience, regional r e s i l i e n c e and equidistance with major powers  Signing Friendship Treaty and D e l i m i t a t i o n of T e r r i t o r i a l Seas Treaty with Indonesia (1970) Attending f i r s t nonaligned n a t i o n s conference at Lusaka (1970) 1  I n i t i a t i n g and signing with ASEAN nations, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of Southeast A s i a as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y (1971 ) Voting f o r China's admission i n t o the United Nations (1971) Establishment of diplomatic t i e s w i t h Mongolian Republic, North Vietnam, North Korea and East Germany (1972-73) Prime M i n i s t e r ' s t r i p to China leading r e c o g n i t i o n and d i p l o matic t i e s (1974) Recognition of the new commun i s t governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia (1975) Formulating with ASEAN count r i e s " B l u e p r i n t " f o r zonal n e u t r a l i t y (1975)  168 Santiago i n A p r i l 1971, Malaysia's chief delegate, i n complaining of the slow advancement of UNCTAD goals, s a i d : The debate and discussions i n UNCTAD and other forums of the UN have c e r t a i n l y added to our understanding of the problems of developing countries, but p o s i t i v e a c t i o n has not matched the pace of r h e t o r i c and we have so f a r f a i l e d to achieve a t r u l y interdependent and i n t e g r a t e d world economy....The terms of trade of the developing countries continue to grow worse. Their share of world trade and share of t h e i r c a r r i a g e of sea borne trade has p e r s i s t e n t l y d e c l i n e d . The flow of resources from developing countries to developing countries has not been commensurate w i t h the development needs of developing countries. Debt s e r v i c i n g has become an acute problem f o r developing countries and there i s c l e a r danger that the i n f l o w of development resources i n t o developing countries would be n u l l i f i e d by the outflow of c a p i t a l from developing countries. On the top of a l l these problems, we are saddled with the ailments of the wealthy n a t i o n s . ^ 5  The l a s t remark was i n reference to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary c r i s i s and s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h respect to the re-alignment of currencies among the major developed countries - the group of Ten — which prompted the developing countries to form i t s own Inter-Governmental  Group of  24 to look i n t o monetary i s s u e s . The i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary s i t u a t i o n d i d l i t t l e to ameliorate North-South r e l a t i o n s and the l a c k of progress of UNCTAD I I I r e f l e c t e d t h i s poor s t a t e of a f f a i r s .  There was also an  impending World M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade Negotiations to l i b e r a l i s e trade to b,e held h  i n Tokyo .' 1  i n 1973,  52  and t h i s tended to prompt the developed countries  to put things o f f . There were, nevertheless, s e v e r a l minor achievements at UNCTAD I I I .  These i n b r i e f were (a) r e c o g n i t i o n of the p o l l u t i o n  hazards i n the production of s y n t h e t i c s and s u b s t i t u t e s , (b) a d e c i s i o n to carry out a s e r i e s of studies on the marketing and d i s t r i b u t i o n  169 system of commodities of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t  to d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s ,  (c) agreement i n r e s p e c t of s h i p p i n g and s h o u l d be g i v e n adequate n o t i c e and  freight that Liner  t h a t c o n s u l t a t i o n precede  f r e i g h t i n c r e a s e s and p a r t i c u l a r account  Conferences any  be taken on the e f f e c t s of  such i n c r e a s e s on commodities of importance to d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , (d) agreement on the need of a code o f conduct and  (e) a d e c i s i o n to i n v i t e the IMF  for Liner  Conferences,  to c o n s i d e r e s t a b l i s h i n g a Com-  m i t t e e o f Twenty C e n t r a l Bank Governors i n the Fund to a d v i s e i t i n 53 r e f o r m of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary system. p r i v a t e achievements, i t was  As  f o r Malaysia's  r e - e l e c t e d to serve on the Trade  and  Development Board, which i s the governing body of UNCTAD, and  the  l e a d e r of the M a l a y s i a n the Conference.  d e l e g a t i o n a l s o served as a V i c e - P r e s i d e n t of  T h i s was  testimony  t h a t M a l a y s i a had become i n c r e a s - ,  i n g l y r e c o g n i s e d as a champion of Southern  causes w h i l e a t the same  time b e i n g more a c c e p t a b l e to the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  c o u n t r i e s than  per54  haps some of the more r a d i c a l A f r i c a n and L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s . The more a g g r e s s i v e tone of M a l a y s i a ' s o r i e n t a t i o n North-South i s s u e s was o t h e r UN b o d i e s .  toward  a l s o e v i d e n t from M a l a y s i a ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n  The M a l a y s i a n F i n a n c e M i n i s t e r , speaking a t the  annual meeting o f the IMF  and IBRD i n 1970  said, " . . . i t  i s c l e a r that  the d e v e l o p i n g w o r l d must r e - a p p r a i s e i t s b a s i c f i n a n c i a l and policies.  The  economic  c o u n t r i e s i n t h i s c a t e g o r y must a t t a i n i n d u s t r i a l  s u f f i c i e n c y a t whatever c o s t .  Whatever the s a c r i f i c e s needed, we  selfmust  reduce our imports of manufactured goods from the h i g h l y i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s and we must do t h i s as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e .  We  must form  t r a d i n g b l o c s which would be i n a p o s i t i o n to compete on more equal  170 terms with the developed w o r l d . "  JJ  The two notions or economic  strategies of " i n d u s t r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y at whatever cost" and that of "forming trading blocs" were voiced openly at an international forum for the f i r s t time.  In the past, Malaysia's spokesmen had been  content to speak mostly i n general terms of i n d u s t r i a l development and support f o r p r i c e - f i x i n g schemes such as that of t i n . Malaysia also began to throw i t s support behind the c a l l for a "new  economic world  order," a concept o r i g i n a l l y attributed to President Boumediene of A l g e r i a and which b a s i c a l l y consists of three premises:  ( i ) that  producer-countries should have absolute control over their own natural resources, ( i i ) that primary-producing countries should have remunerative returns for their primary produces, and ( i i i ) that prices of  56 primary products should be t i e d to the price trends of  manufactures.  On questions of a i d , Malaysia's attitude seemed to have become one of cynicism with regard to i t s e f f i c a c y .  Again l e t me quote the  Finance Minister, If I may say so, much of the so-called aid being given can hardly be c a l l e d aid because i t i s t i e d tott.he exports of the donor country. Malaysia has experienced great d i f f i c u l t y i n u t i l i s i n g such socalled aid which i s r e a l l y nothing more than export promotion on then part of the developed country. This i s f a i r enough, because even developed countries have a right to s e l l as much of t h e i r goods as possible but l e t us be honest about i t and not c a l l i t a i d . A l l that this exercise does i s to force the recipient of such credits to buy from this donor country at i n f l a t e d prices. In the.last analysis, this form of aid could benefit the donor more than the r e c i p i e n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y when the l a t t e r has managed i t s finances well and i s not short of foreign exchange. Malaysia i s one of those ^ countries i n this (dubiously) happy p o s i t i o n . v  171 In general, then, Malaysia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y posture toward the developed or i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries during t h i s period became more r a d i c a l i s e d and aggressive even i f i n the broad context of Third World 58 p o l i t i c s Malaysia was by no means regarded as a " r a d i c a l . "  It  nevertheless appeared to have gained acceptance .and even esteem among the l a r g e m a j o r i t y of Third World states. Before we discuss Malaysia's p o l i c i e s toward other economic i s s u e s , i t may be u s e f u l at t h i s juncture to re-examine the nature, composition and d i r e c t i o n of Malaysia's trade and compare t h i s w i t h the trade s t a t i s t i c s of the f i r s t years of independence.  This i s i n  keeping to the dynamic approach employed i n t h i s study.  From the  table on exports (4.1), i t i s evident that although there has been some degree of export d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , Malaysia i s s t i l l h e a v i l y dependent on primary commodities f o r nearly 70 percent of the value of its  exports (excluding petroleum and petroleum products).  of manufactured  The share  goods, included under "others," has however increased  from a,small 5 percent i n 1961 to a s i g n i f i c a n t 16 percent at the 59 value of $1,530 m i l l i o n by 1974.  As f o r the d i r e c t i o n of Malaysian  trade, t h i s has not changed s i g n i f i c a n t l y since the e a r l y years of i n dependence (see Chart 4.1).  Japan maintains i t s p o s i t i o n as the s i n g l e  most important buyer of Malaysian exports w i t h i t s share increased to to 18 percent today as compared to 15 percent i n 1963.  The o v e r a l l  p i c t u r e i s s t i l l one i n which Malaysia's major customers are the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries and Singapore acts as a purveyor of Malaysian goods to the Southeast Asian c o u n t r i e s .  TABLE 4.1  172  Breakdown of Exports by Major Commodities 1974 $M  1961 %  $M  %  Rubber  2,882  30  1,567  48  Timber  1,272  13  185  6  Tin  1,408  15  553  17  Palm O i l  1,022  11  61  2  940  10  212  7  2,056  21  660  20  .9,580  100  3,238  190  Petroleum and Petroleum Products Others Total Source:  Economic Report 1974-75, The Treasury, Malaysia, 1974. p. 22. CHART 4.1 Exports by D e s t i n a t i o n ^  *Excluding U.K.  **Includes U.S.S.R. 1974  **W. Germany, I t a l y , France, Holland 1963  Sources: Economic Report 1974-75, op. c i t . , p. 19 and Table 1.4, supra. The s t a t i s t i c s do not allow f o r perfect comparability i n some instances (such as "EEC" and "Western Europe") but t h i s does not m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t the general thrust of my a n a l y s i s . The same p o i n t applies to Charts 4.2 and 4.3  173 CHART 4.2 Composition of Imports  1974 Sources:  1963  Economic Report 1974-75, o p . c i t , , p. 71 and Table 1. ,  supra.  The composition of imports shows a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the heavy buying of manufactured and c a p i t a l goods (Chart 4.2). has increased over the l a s t decade by 16 percent.  In f a c t , t h i s  The l a r g e s t import  items i n 1974 were machinery and transport equipment, comprising 31 percent of t o t a l imports.  I t would appear therefore that a major por-  t i o n of Malaysia's f o r e i g n exchange earnings go i n t o the purchase of such c a p i t a l goods which are no doubt necessary f o r i n d u s t r i a l development.  This makes Malaysia doubly dependent on the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  countries, as we s h a l l see from the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n on Malaysia's major s u p p l i e r s .  The sources of Malaysian imports provide an  174 an i n t e r e s t i n g p i c t u r e o f change over the l a s t decade or so.  The most  outstanding fact i s Japan's r i s e as Malaysia's s i n g l e most important s u p p l i e r w i t h a s t a r t l i n g share o f 25 percent of t o t a l imports. Compare t h i s w i t h i t s f i g u r e of 10 percent i n 1963.  Together w i t h Japan's,  r i s e and concomitant upon i t , i s B r i t a i n ' s plunge from being major supp l i e r i n 1963 w i t h 21 percent share to a comparatively small 9 percent i n 1974.  Another i n t e r e s t i n g change i s the d e c l i n i n g imports from  Malaysia's Southeast Asian neighbours.  While Thailand, Singapore and  Indonesia supplied a s u b s t a n t i a l 28 percent o f Malaysia's imports i n 1963, ASEAN nations contribute only a 14 percent share of i t s imports today.• CHART 4.3  1974 Sources:  1963  Economic Report 1974-75, op. c i t . , p. 71, and Table 1.5, supra.  175 The foregoing d i s c u s s i o n on Malaysia's e x t e r n a l trade has underlined the continued importance of the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries to Malaysia's economic w e l l - b e i n g . Japan emerges as Malaysia's s i n g l e most important trading partner, buying 18 percent of Malaysia's exports and supplying 25 percent of i t s imports.  Malaysia continues to  be h e a v i l y dependent on s e v e r a l major primary commodities f o r e x t e r n a l revenue although there i s some i n d i c a t i o n of export d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r , the export of manufactures has shown impressive progress.  Since Malaysia's major buyers and suppliers are s t i l l the i n -  d u s t r i a l i s e d countries i t i s doubly dependent upon these countries and i t s economy remains vulnerable to the v i c i s s i t u d e s of e x t e r n a l economic forces.  (See Chart 4.3)  Under the circumstances, i t i s understandable  that Malaysia's Finance M i n i s t e r c a l l e d f o r the p u r s u i t of " i n d u s t r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y at whatever cost" and the formation of trading b l o c s . I t r e f l e c t s a f r u s t r a t i o n w i t h the persistence of the status quo i n the world economic order despite more than a decade of the promotion of developmental goals i n numerous i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisations. Let me again quote the Finance M i n i s t e r i n h i s major p o l i c y speech to World Bank and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund:  t  I now come to the most important problem of a l l , and that i s the trading r e l a t i o n s h i p between the developed and developing world. Broadly speaking, we inr.the developing world buy manufactured goods from the developed world and pay f o r them with the proceeds of sale of our primary commodities. As i s w e l l known, the p r i c e s of manufactured goods, compared w i t h pre-war p r i c e s , have r i s e n much f a s t e r than the p r i c e s of primary commodities i n the postwar period. Broadly speaking, therefore, we have to pay more and more f o r what we buy from the devveloped world which continues to pay l e s s and l e s s for what we s e l l to them. On t h i s b a s i s , no  176  developing country can be economically v i a b l e f o r reasons which are p a i n f u l l y obvious. Even i f we adopt the most prudent and s e n s i b l e p o l i c i e s and execute them w i t h maximum e f f i c i e n c y , we would s t i l l be i n the red because no amount of prudence, good sense and e f f i c i e n c y can overcome such overwhelming odds. The terms of trade which are so overwhelmingly loaded against the developing world w i l l continue to impoverish them whatever the b e a u t i f u l things are s a i d i n this...assembly and outside i t . We i n the developing world do not want c h a r i t y or even a i d from the developed w o r l d . ^ A l l we want i s f a i r terms of trade, a square deal. Since 1973, a group of 13 developing countries;;;, the Organizat i o n of Petroleum Exporting Counteiess (OPEC) has demonstrated that i t can turn the tables on the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countries w i t h devastating impact.  But t h i s i s only a small group of countries operating as a  c a r t e l w i t h an e s s e n t i a l , and up t i l l now, indispensable commodity. The bulk of developing countries are not i n t h i s happy p o s i t i o n , and indeed, the very a c t i o n of the OPEC countries i n quadrupling o i l p r i c e s i s not without i t s adverse e f f e c t s on the developing, e s p e c i a l l y the 61  very poor, countries.  As such, Malaysia's Finance M i n i s t e r ' s ob-  servations holds true i n large measure f o r the great bulk of developing c o u n t r i e s . I t i s i n the l i g h t of the perception of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic s i t u a t i o n that Malaysia has joined the c a l l f o r a new economic world order.  Accordingly, Malaysia has n o t i c e a b l y  modified i t s economic s t r a t e g i e s i n pursuing i t s economic o b j e c t i v e s at the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l .  Rather than use the e x i s t i n g t r a d i t i o n a l  frameworks and i n s t i t u t i o n s , there i s a greater i n c l i n a t i o n now to seek out new steps, or at any rate to reshape the o l d frameworks i n order to change the economic status quo. For example, Malaysia  177 r e c e n t l y took u n i l a t e r a l steps to s t a b i l i s e the p r i c e of rubber. According to a senior o f f i c i a l of the M i n i s t r y of Trade and Indust r y , the government has been operating a "mini b u f f e r stock scheme" on i t s own f o r some time by buying when the p r i c e was low and s e l l i n g 62 when i t went up.  This scheme received o f f i c i a l sanction i n J u l y  1975 through the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a Rubber S t a b i l i s a t i o n B i l l i n Parliament, allowing f o r the establishment o f a n a t i o n a l advisory coun63 c i l f o r rubber s t a b i l i s a t i o n and establishment of a rubber stock. However, i t i s i n r e l a t i o n to the question of f o r e i g n investment that Malaysia's economic postures and s t r a t e g i e s have seen the greater change.  The government's New Economic P o l i c y (NEP), which formed the  b a s i s f o r the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75, provided the point of departure f o r the general change i n economic posture.  The most im-  portant concept i n the NEP i n t h i s respect i s the notion of "economic balance."  Although the main emphasis appears to be the balance be-  tween Malay and non—Malay p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the economy, the concept undoubtedly has an external dimension, given the predominant r o l e of f o r e i g n c a p i t a l i n the country. I quote from the Second Malaysia Plan: Economic balance, i n a growing and dynamic economy, r e f e r s to the equitable and l e g i t i m a t e sharing of the rewards and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of economic development. The p r i n c i p a l reward of economic development the growing income generated by the n a t i o n a l economy must be equitably distributed....Balance also r e f e r s to r a c i a l shares i n management and ownership and i n employment i n the various sectors of the economy. At present, non-Malays and foreigners dominate the manuf a c t u r i n g and commercial sectors....The Government has set a target that w i t h i n a period of 20 years, Malays and other indigenous people w i l l manage and and own at l e a s t 30% of the t o t a l commercial and i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s i n a l l categories and scales of operation.64  178 In 1973,  the Mid-Term Review of the Plan recognised i n c l e a r terms  that the goal of economic balance n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l s the reduction of the share of foreign i n t e r e s t s i n the Malaysian economy: ...the attainment o f the growth targets of the Perspective Plan (1970-1990) w i l l enable nonMalay ownership of share c a p i t a l to expand by nearly 12% per year and to increase i t s share of the t o t a l to over 40% by 1990, nine times more than the 1970 l e v e l i n absolute terms. There w i l l also be ample opportunities f o r ownership by foreign i n t e r e s t s to increase by about 8% per year during the same period. I n r e l a t i o n to t o t a l share c a p i t a l , however, the expansion of the share of Malays and other i n digenous people from under 2% i n 1970 to 30% i n 1990 w i l l involve a s i z a b l e decline i n the share of f o r e i g n i n t e r e s t s from 61% to about 30% during the period.^5 In general, however, Malaysia's o r i e n t a t i o n toward f o r e i g n enterprise continued to be one of welcome although one. would be wrong to c a l l t h i s i s a l a i s s e z - f a i r e posture today.  There was an increas-  ing sense that f o r e i g n economic p a r t i c i p a t i o n must be trimmed to the p u r s u i t of n a t i o n a l goals.  But the p r e v a i l i n g a t t i t u d e remained that  f o r e i g n c a p i t a l was necessary f o r Malaysia's development and that the t r a n s f e r of p r o f e s s i o n a l and t e c h n i c a l know-how as w e l l as the jobc r e a t i o n f u n c t i o n of f o r e i g n enterprise outweighed the e f f e c t s of foreign economic c o n t r o l .  I quote FIDA on t h i s p o i n t ,  The Malaysian Government's p o l i c y towards new i n d u s t r i a l investments a n d . f o r e i g n c a p i t a l i n f l o w i s one of welcome. Malaysia s t i l l lacks the necessary expertise and knowhow i n many i i f i e l d s but i t has r i c h investment opportunities to o f f e r . . . t h e Malaysian Government encourages foreign investments i n the form of joint-ventures where Malaysian c a p i t a l and resources (are) combined with f o r e i g n t e c h n i c a l know-how, managegement, i n t e r n a t i o n a l marketing expertise and to some extent c a p i t a l . ^  Thus a t t r a c t i v e f i s c a l incentives continued to be granted to f o r e i g n 67 investors.  There are four major investment i n c e n t i v e s : (a)  Pioneer Status  (b)  Investment Tax Credit  (c)  Labour U t i l i s a t i o n R e l i e f , and  (d)  Export Incentives  Under Pioneer s t a t u s , incentives include t o t a l exemption from income tax f o r a period ranging from 2 - 5 years depending on the l e v e l of f i x e d c a p i t a l investment, extension of r e l i e f f o r up to another f i v e years 68 f o r a d d i t i o n a l investment, and f u r t h e r extension f o r a year i f the 69 company met c e r t a i n other conditions.  The Investment Tax Credit  allowed f o r the deduction from a company's taxable income of at l e a s t 25 percent of i t s expenditure on f i x e d assets and an a d d i t i o n a l 5 percent f o r meeting conditions of " l o c a t i o n , " " p r i o r i t y product" and ^Malaysian c o n t e n t . T h e  Labour U t i l i s a t i o n R e l i e f r e f e r s to the ex-  emption from income tax from 2 — 5 employees engaged.^  years depending on the number of  Export incentives are the various tax rebates  and deductions f o r companies manufacturing products mainly f o r export, and p a r t i c u l a r l y of Malaysian-based products. I t became evident, toward the end of the p e r i o d , that Malaysia would not be able to achieve the rather ambitious goals of the New Economic P o l i c y , p a r t i c u l a r l y those of the Perspective P l a n , which p r o j e c t s the targeted increases of Malay p a r t i c i p a t i o n and ownership 72 i n the economy to a 30 percent l e v e l by 1990.  I f these targets were  to be a t t a i n e d , i t seemed therefore that some d r a s t i c measures had to  180 taken i n the economic sphere.  Thus toward the end of 1974,  had edged toward a new economic posture.  Malaysia  The Prime M i n i s t e r i n  September that year t o l d a conference on Southeast Asia's Natural Resources and the World Economy that Malaysia believed i n the concept of "economic nationalism:" ....We i n Malaysia b e l i e v e i n economic nationalism i n guiding the e x p l o i t a t i o n of our n a t u r a l resources i n such a way that our people and country w i l l obtain the greatest b e n e f i t . We b e l i e v e that p r i v a t e enterp r i s e , whether domestic or f o r e i g n has an important r o l e to play i n our development. Our o b j e c t i v e i s to b r i n g about an e f f e c t i v e and equitable mixture of domestic and f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e on the one hand, and p r i v a t e and p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e on the other, so that o u r m a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t can be advanced to the context of an expanding, stable and equitable world economic order.^3 Tun Razak went on to e x p l a i n why  the Government set up a N a t i o n a l  Petroleum Corporation (Petronas) under the Petroleum Development Act, 1974.  The reason was  to ensure that Malaysians would reap the major  b e n e f i t s from t h i s v i t a l resource.  Accordingly, Petronas has been  given e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s i n the e x p l o r a t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n of o i l i n 74 Malaysia.  In p r a c t i c e , t h i s has meant a p o l i c y of signing explora-  t i o n and prodution sharing agreements w i t h o i l companies operating in Malaysia.^  Under the aggressive, and some would contend, r u t h -  l e s s , d i r e c t i o n and chairmanship of Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, Petronas has been conferred with f u r t h e r powers i n 1975  to acquire  an apparently innocuous one percent "management shares" i n f o r e i g n o i l companies which e f f e c t i v e l y allows i t to c o n t r o l the o i l companies' p o l i c i e s through a mechanism of weighted v o t e s . ^  This l e d to the  charge i n business c i r c l e s that the Government, i n p a r t i c u l a r  Petronas,  181  was pursuing a p o l i c y of " n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n without compensation." The upshot was off  77  the "temporary" p u l l - o u t of Exxon from o i l prospecting  the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia, presumably as a protest  against the sweeping powers of Petronas.  At one p o i n t , Tengku Raza-  l e i g h accused "several companies" of " t r y i n g to blackmail" the govern78  ment and of launching a campaign against Petronas.  Government of-  f i c i a l s deny that holding management shares i s tantamount to n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n or q u a s i - n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , p o i n t i n g out that Malaysia has a number of investment guarantee agreements with the major Western countries thereby f o r e c l o s i n g any p o s s i b i l i t y of n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n w i t h 79  out compensation of companies based i n these countries. They contend that the p r o v i s i o n f o r management shares i s merely a "contingency plan" to protect a very v i t a l resource.  80  No date has apparently been f i x e d  for the implementation of management shares, although according to the 81  Act, t h i s should be c a r r i e d out "as soon as p r a c t i c a b l e . " The changing posture and s t r a t e g i e s i n Malaysia's p u r s u i t of economic objectives was evident as w e l l i n areas other than o i l . Working w i t h i n the framework of the free enterprise system, Tengku 82  Razaleigh i n h i s capacity as the Chairman of PERNAS  , Malaysia's  government-funded corporation f o r the promotion of Bumiputra i n t e r e s t s , proceeded to acquire f o r the corporation major i n t e r e s t s i n a number of f o r e i g n and l o c a l companies.  These moves were i n accordance with  the New Economic P o l i c y of "economic balance" and promoting greater Bumiputra p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the economy.  Thus by a strategy of state  c a p i t a l i s m , Pernas S e c u r i t i e s , a PERNAS s u b s i d i a r y ,  83  succeeded by  182 1975 i n a c q u i r i n g , i n t e r a l i a , a 19 percent holding i n Island and Peninsular Development, 20 percent holding i n London Tin Corporation and a 10 percent share i n Sime Darby, a l l large companies w i t h major 84 i n t e r e s t s i n Malaysia s economy.  In a yet more ambitious  but  abortive p r o j e c t , Pernas S e c u r i t i e s announced i n J u l y 1975 i t s plan to acquire a c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t (40%) i n Haw Par Brothers Internat i o n a l , a Singapore-based company w i t h various i n t e r e s t s i n Malaysia 85 and abroad. At the height of the episode, Razaleigh s a i d that the government would continue to employ the technique of takeovers and swops u n t i l the NEP  target of 30 percent Bumiputra p a r t i c i p a t i o n was  86 achieved.  However, f o l l o w i n g the f a i l u r e of the Haw Par d e a l , no  new ventures had been undertaken by the end of the year.  The various  i n i t i a t i v e s and acts of Tengku Razaleigh ensured h i s r e t e n t i o n of a 87 Vice-President's post i n the UMNO during the 1975 General Assembly and won him the t i t l e of "Bapa Ekonomi Malaysia" (Father of Malaysia's Economy), conferred by the Malay Chamber of Commerce of which Tengku 88 Razaleigh i s the president.  In h i s speech to the Chamber, Tengku  Razaleigh chastised the f o r e i g n firms f o r not being responsive to Malaysia's n a t i o n a l needs and stressed h i s Chamber's support f o r "economic nationalism": I f other countries have l e g i s l a t i o n and regulations to ensure that t h e i r economies do not f a l l i n t o the hands of others, the time has come f o r Malaysians themselves to c o n t r o l the nation's r e s o u r c e s . 89  The i n c r e a s i n g concern over f o r e i g n ownership i n Malaysia's economy l e d to the s e t t i n g up i n February 1974 of a Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) which has i t s S e c r e t a r i a t w i t h the Economic Planning  183 Unit of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Department.  The FIC has been charged  with formulating guidelines on f o r e i g n investment i n a l l sectors of the economy i n accordance with the NEP and to supervise and  advise  a l l the pertinent M i n i s t r i e s and government agencies on a l l matters 90 concerning f o r e i g n investment.  I t s f i r s t act was  the  formulation  of guidelines f o r the r e g u l a t i o n of a c q u i s i t i o n of assets, mergers and take-overs with a view toward ensuring that such actions  "should  r e s u l t d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y i n a more balanced Malaysian p a r t i c i p a 91 t i o n i n ownership and c o n t r o l , " among other things. By the end of the period, however, Malaysia had begun to s o f t pedal i t s economic nationalism posture but without r e a l l y discarding it.  In a "Malaysian  Investment Seminar" held i n Kuala Lumpur i n  October, 1975, various cabinet members made speeches assuring f o r e i g n investors of the government's continued adherence to a p r i v a t e enterp r i s e - o r i e n t e d economic system.• The Prime M i n i s t e r , i n h i s address, admitted that there were recent "uneasy comments" and "misgivings" i n the f o r e i g n media about Malaysia's  investment climate but he t r i e d to  d i s p e l any idea that Malaysia e i t h e r did not want or need f o r e i g n investment: A major m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the New Economic P o l i c y concerns the government's a t t i t u d e towards the p r i v a t e enterprise system generally and the p r i v a t e sector i n p a r t i c u l a r . Let me r e i t e r a t e our p o s i t i o n once more. The Malaysian economy has prospered because of the open nature of the economy and the i n i t i a t i v e of i t s p r i v a t e sector ....The Government therefore r e a l i z e s that i t has a major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to a s s i s t the p r i v a t e sector to play i t s proper r o l e i n the s t r u c t u r a l transformation of the economy. We are only too  184  aware that a l l t h i s implies the need f o r pragmatism i n our economic p o l i c i e s and the maintenance of a healthy climate f o r investment and business i n the country. On the Petroleum Development  A c t ( s ) , the Prime M i n i s t e r explained  that because o i l was a v i t a l resource, the s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n  was  necessary to c o n t r o l i t s d e p l e t i o n , but he ensured the investors that " t h i s law w i l l be implemented f a i r l y and equitably and i n a manner that w i l l not a f f e c t adversely Malaysia's  investment climate 93  and our unblemished record of f a i r treatment to a l l i n v e s t o r s . " He ensured the investors that the other sectors of the economy w i l l continue to operate " w i t h i n the framework of normal and established ..94  practice. In summary, Malaysia's  f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the issue-area of  development and trade saw noticeable s h i f t s during t h i s period. p a r t i c u l a r , i t s developing-world  In  posture took on a more f o r c e f u l thrust  and Malaysia appeared ready to adopt more ' r a d i c a l ' measures i n i t s purs u i t Third-World economic goals i n general and i t s own developmental objectives i n particular.  However, the most s i g n i f i c a n t s h i f t occured  with respect^to the issue of f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n and investment i n the country's economy.  The adoption of the New  Economic P o l i c y l e d  to p o l i c i e s which were geared toward a reduction, i f not of the r o l e , at l e a s t of the share, of f o r e i g n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the economy.  The  process has j u s t begun and a l l i t s possible r a m i f i c a t i o n s are unknown at t h i s time.  Malaysia's a t t i t u d e toward f o r e i g n investment remains  one of "welcome" but i t has by and large dropped i t s l a i s s e z - f a i r e economic posture f o r one which i t s policy-makers now c a l l "economic  185  nationalism."  Summarized below are Malaysia's main postures, ob-  j e c t i v e s , s t r a t e g i e s and actions i n t h i s issue-area f o r the period surveyed. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation and Diplomacy For most of t h i s period, issues of i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation and diplomacy t i e d i n c l o s e l y with issues of n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l security.  Malaysia by and large paid l e s s a t t e n t i o n to long-range  m i l i e u goals and concentrated  on the medium-range goals of r e g i o n a l  s e c u r i t y which dovetailed n i c e l y i n t o i t s pursuit of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . While there was a r e c o g n i t i o n that defence was s t r i c t l y a n a t i o n a l matter, s e c u r i t y was seen more and more i n r e g i o n a l terms.  It is in  t h i s sense that a Wisma Putra O f f i c i a l spoke of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n as a " t o t a l concept" and that a l l f o r e i g n p o l i c y moves and actions must 95  be consistent with the concept.  Thus Malaysia throughout the  period was promoting i t s n e u t r a l i z a t i o n scheme at various i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums, notably at the Lusaka and Commonwealth Conferences, and diplomacy at t h i s l e v e l became l i n k e d to the general p u r s u i t of security.  At the r e g i o n a l l e v e l , the process was c a r r i e d out with  even greater vigour, most importantly through the d e c l a r a t i o n of an ASEAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y and the a c t i v e p u r s u i t of a " B l u e p r i n t " f o r such zonal n e u t r a l i t y . The detente with the communist countries, i n p a r t i c u l a r the establishment  of diplomatic  r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, should also be appreciated i n the l i g h t of the search f o r and p u r s u i t of s e c u r i t y through the avenue of i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy.  186  TABLE 4.3 Development and Trade P o l i c y Outputs 1970-75 OBJECTIVES  ACTIONS  Promoting economic development Stabilising p r i c e s of primary commodities  Adopting New Economic P o l i c y as basis of Second 5-Year Plan 1971-75 STRATEGIES Promoting and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n trade groupings and p r i c e s t a t i l i s a t i o n schemes of LDC's Operating u n i l a t e r a l s t a b i l i s a t i o n schemes ( rubb er )  POSTURES  Pursuing i n d u s t r i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y by encouraging p a r t i c u l a r kinds of f o r e i g n investment  DevelopingWorld Orientation Employing technique of -supporting s t a t e c a p i t a l i s m to gain p o l i c i e s and c o n t r o l of economy measures »I aimed at r a i s i n g the l o t of the LDC's Economic Nationalism - o r i e n t a t i o n of seeking n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of resources and economy  Attending UNCTAD I I I , supp o r t i n g developmental issues and measures (1971) C a l l i n g at various i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums, together w i t h other LDC's, f o r a "New Economic World Order" Participation i n Multil a t e r a l Trade Negotiations, Tokyo, 1973-75 Operating rubber p r i c e s t a b i l i s a t i o n scheme Opting out of the S t e r l i n g Area and f l o a t i n g Malaysian d o l l a r (1972) J o i n i n g I n t e r n a t i o n a l Sugar Agreement (1973) Establishment of Petronas under Petroleum Development Act 1974 Passing Petroleum Development (Amendment) Act, 1975 A c q u i r i n g , through Pernas, major and/or c o n t r o l l i n g i n terests i n various companies Formulating guidelines f o r a c q u i s i t i o n of assets, mergers and take-overs under Foreign Investment Committee (1974) Joining International Tin Agreement (1975) Holding investment seminar i n Kuala Lumpur (1975)  187 However, m i l i e u goals were not t o t a l l y ignored or discarded. Malaysia continued to support or pay l i p s e r v i c e to the many United Nations i d e a l s and s t i l l pursued, f o r example, a n t i - c o l o n i a l causes. I t a l s o began to develop i t s t i e s with the Muslim World.  What was  evident, however, was that much more emphasis was n o t given to r e g i o n a l (Southeast Asian) co-operation, when i n the other two periods, the United Nations and the Commonwealth took precedence over ASA.  I n t h i s p e r i o d , then, ASEAN took on a greater importance  than ever before.  A Foreign M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s a i d that Malaysia's  p u r s u i t of " i n t e r n a t i o n a l " goals can be appreciated i n terms of conc e n t r i c c i r c l e s , at the centre of which i s ASEAN, extending to A s i a 96 i n the next c i r c l e and so f o r t h to the r e s t of the world.  ASEAN  has indeed grown i n importance and has become the chief avenue of Malaysia's e f f o r t s at i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation.  I n h i s speech to  the 1975 UMNO General Assembly, Tun Razak t a l k e d glowingly of ASEAN having "reached maturity" and accorded a status s i m i l a r to that of an o r g a n i z a t i o n such as the Organization of A f r i c a n Unity (OAU) or 97 for that matter any other i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n .  The Prime  M i n i s t e r thought also that ASEAN was now ready to extend to the r e s t of Southeast A s i a f o l l o w i n g the cessation of war in..Indo-China. Emphasising i t s n o n - i d e o l o g i c a l nature, he t o l d the ASEAN f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s i n May, 1975. Some eight years ago, even as the war i n IndoChina was raging, we f i v e countries i n Southeast A s i a , e s t a b l i s h e d ASEAN and began n u r t u r ing a s t r u c t u r e of r e g i o n a l cooperation which over the years has proved i t s e l f c o n s t r u c t i v e  188 i n promoting r e g i o n a l understanding and f r i e n d s h i p ....The growth of ASEAN has been nurtured with care to maintain i t s non-antagonistic, non-military and non-ideological character. I think today we can t r u l y say that ASEAN's independent and progressi v e nature has won admiration from many quarters large and small powers a l i k e . . . . A t t h i s juncture, when the war i n Indo-China has ended, the countries of Southeast A s i a have the opportunity to extend the scope of r e g i o n a l cooperation throughout Southeast A s i a . I think I can say f o r the other ASEAN countries that ASEAN i s ready to cooperate with the new Governments of Indo-China and to o f f e r i t s hand of f r i e n d s h i p . . . t o them.98 Toward the end of the year* the newly appointed Malaysian  Foreign  M i n i s t e r , Tengku Ahmad Rithaudeen, made further overtures at the United Nations to non-ASEAN Southeast Asian countries to j o i n the organization, 99 r e i t e r a t i n g the ASEAN goal of zonal n e u t r a l i t y . Despite the emphasis placed on r e g i o n a l co-operation during t h i s p e r i o d , Malaysia had to contend with a major area of g l o b a l co-operat i o n (and controversy)  at the Law of the Sea Conference i n 1974, which  had important r a m i f i c a t i o n s f o r i t s stand on the S t r a i t s of Malacca. At the Caracas Conference, the Attorney-General  and M i n i s t e r of Laws  explained that Malaysia's p o s i t i o n on the Malacca S t r a i t s was based on the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s :  that while the s t r a i t s were a major water-  way f o r i n t e r n a l shipping, the c o a s t a l states were burdened with the sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of maintaining and cleaning up the s t r a i t s ; that the heavy usage of the s t r a i t s would i n e v i t a b l y lead to damage of the marine environment by p o l l u t i o n and accident; and that under the guise of commercial shipping, m i l i t a r y vessels may use the s t r a i t s with strategic intentions: What we would l i k e . . . t h e r e f o r e , to see i s a greater appreciation of our l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s and a  189 c l e a r e r enunciation of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l maritime community to be embodied i n the Convention that would emerge from t h i s Conference. Among other t h i n g s , the Convention should contain regulations to ensure unhindered passage f o r commercial shipping, adequate safety for p o l l u t i o n prevention standards, l i a b i l i t y and compensation f o r damage and passage f o r military vessels. In a d d i t i o n , Malaysia supported the c a l l by the bulk of Third- World countries f o r an economic zone exteriding to 200 n a u t i c a l miles and for an i n t e r n a t i o n a l machinery to regulate e x p l o i t a t i o n of seabed 101 resources i n accordance w i t h the i n t e r e s t s of developing c o u n t r i e s . Needless to say, l i t t l e was decided at Caracas and most of the Law of 102 Sea issues remain unresolved.  Malaysia's p o s i t i o n s f o r most part  are based simply on the p u r s u i t of s e l f - i n t e r e s t although i t tends i n general to support.issues propagated b.y the Third-World countries. An area of i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation and diplomacy which gained prominence during t h i s period was Malaysia's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Muslim world.  Although an Islamic s t a t e by v i r t u e of i t s predominant Muslim  population, Malaysia had on the whole maintained a "low p r o f i l e " i n Islamic a f f a i r s .  I t nevertheless has not recognized I s r a e l and has  generally supported Muslim causes.  Thus, i t p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the f i r s t  Islamic summit conference at Rabat i n 1969, held as a response to the I s r a e l i burning the Al-Alqua Mosque, and i n - a l l the subsequent conferences.  However, i n June 1974, Malaysia hosted the Islamic Summit  i n Kuala Lumpur.  Amidst considerable fanfare, Tun Razak spoke.in  grandiose terms of Islamic s o l i d a r i t y and i d e n t i f i e d Malaysia with the Arab and P a l e s t i n i a n cause i n the Middle East:  190 Since the h i s t o r i c F i r s t Islamic Summit i n Rabat i n 1969, we can f i n d s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the knowledge that we have l a i d a strong foundation f o r mutual cooperation. But we cannot s i t back on the progress we have made, encouraging though i t has been....The Islamic Conference must now enter a new phase i n i t s h i s t o r y . The concept of u n i t y and cooperat i o n has been e f f e c t i v e l y worked out; we must now give i t the necessary content and substance. We must enter a period of imaginative c o n s o l i d a t i o n , of b u i l d i n g on the foundation already l a i d , by implementing concrete measures, programmes and p r o j e c t s which w i l l make our aim of Islamic u n i t a r e a l i t y . Today, as our Arab brothers embark on the road of n e g o t i a t i o n s to seek peace and j u s t i c e , we i n t h i s Conference must, more than ever, remain s o l i d and united. We must not allow ourselves to become complacent by the current mode of expectancy or to be confused by the machinations of Zionism. Our u n i t y through t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n must be - c l e a r l y demonstrated so that the world w i l l know- that we w i l l not weaken and we w i l l not be divided....Let our voices r i n g c l e a r and loud i n t o t a l and united support f o r the Arab and the Islamic cause i n W. A s i a . 1 0 3  As a token of t h i s support a representative of the P a l e s t i n i a n L i b e r a t i o n Organization was present at the Conference. One suspects, however, that Malaysia's Muslim t i e s do suggest some degree of 'posturing.'  For Malaysia, the goals of Muslim  s o l i d a r i t y are vague and d i s t a n t , augmented by Malaysia's  geographical  distance from the hub of Muslim a c t i v i t y i n the Middle East.  Never-  t h e l e s s , there does seem to be a pragmatic edge to Malaysia's Muslim connections.  Because of i t s good r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Arab c o u n t r i e s ,  Malaysia was among the ten most favoured nations exempted from o i l  cutbacks i n the 1973 "energy c r i s i s . "  Domestically, there i s  p o l i t i c a l mileage to gain from Malaysia's i n t e r n a t i o n a l Muslim t i e s , considering i t s predominantly Muslim population.  Thus the  1974 Islamic Conference iinKuala Lumpur was n i c e l y timed j u s t before the General E l e c t i o n .  A Foreign M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l thought that t h i s  event had an even greater impact on the e l e c t i o n s than the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s China v i s i t . H e would be r i g h t on s t r i c t l y a r i t h metic terms since Malaysia has more Malays than i t has Chinese, a l though one would be f o o l i s h to deny the dramatic impact of the rapprochement w i t h China.  By 1975, Malaysia began to cash i n on i t s  Arab t i e s by concluding a number of c u l t u r a l , s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a l and economic agreements with several o i l - r i c h countries.  On a tour  of these countries i n January and February, the Prime M i n i s t e r signed s i x such agreements w i t h Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. In on-going e f f o r t s - ever since K r o n f r o n t a s i - to forge a p l u r a l i t y of diplomatic connections while maintaining o l d ones, the Malaysian Prime M i n i s t e r toward the end of 1975 paid courtesy s t a t e v i s i t s to A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand, two long-standing Commonwealth allies.  A C u l t u r a l Agreement w i t h A u s t r a l i a r e s u l t e d w i t h broad  aims f o r co-operation i n the f i e l d s of the a r t s , education, science, technology, the media, sports, youth a c t i v i t i e s and academic ex-, c h a n g e s . N e w Zealand was content to issue a j o i n t communique r e - a f f i r m i n g b a s i c mutual i n t e r e s t s . ^  7  One of the motives of the  v i s i t s concerned the p o s i t i o n and i n t e r e s t s of some 2,000 and 6,000  192 Malaysian students i n New Zealand and A u s t r a l i a r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The  students themselves advertised t h e i r presence when some of them, along w i t h A u s t r a l i a n s and New Zealanders, demonstrated against various " r e p r e s s i v e " measures i n Malaysia such as the I n t e r n a l 108 Security Act and the U n i v e r s i t y and Colleges (Amendment) Act. The Australian-New Zealand v i s i t s concluded Malaysia's diplomatic a c t i v i t i e s f o r the period and as i t turned out were the l a s t e x t e r n a l o f f i c i a l acts of the Prime M i n i s t e r Tun Razak before he passed away i n January  1976.  In summary then, Malaysia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n i n matters of International. Co-operation and Diplomacy underwent l i t t l e fundamental change during the t h i r d period although i t became i n creasingly evident that " i n t e r n a t i o n a l " goals were being pursued i n greater unisoro;with matters of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y .  Thus the detente  with the communist c o u n t r i e s , the proposal of zonal n e u t r a l i t y and r e g i o n a l co-operation i n ASEAN and overtures toward the new  Indo-China  states a l l dovetailed as part of Malaysia's broad plan f o r n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y .  Pragmatism seemed to be the philosophy of  the day as even Malaysia's Muslim t i e s seemed c a l c u l a t e d to reap real benefits.  The s h i f t . i n emphasis seemed to be concomitant with  a s h i f t toward the p u r s u i t of medium-range goals, instead of the more d i s t a n t long-range goals.  A senior Foreign M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l a t t r i b u t e d  the change to Malaysia's wide acceptance among the community of nations and the f a c t that i t d i d not have to prove i t s mettle i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y 109 any more as i t d i d i n i t s e a r l y years as a newly independent nation.  193 I summarise below the major postures, o b j e c t i v e s , s t r a t e g i e s and actions of Malaysia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t h i s issue-area during the period  surveyed. TABLE 4.4  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-bpefatiori and Peace:  P o l i c y Outputs 1970-75  OBJECTIVES  ACTIONS  Promoting r e g i o n a l cooperation and r e g i o n a l security  P a r t i c i p a t i n g i n and carr y i n g out ASEAN a c t i v i t i e s P a r t i c i p a t i n g i n UN s p e c i a l i s e d agencies and t h e i r work  Promoting i n t e r n a t i o n a l Muslim causes Promoting United Nations' ideals' POSTURES Regionalism - o r i e n t a t i o n of Southeast Asian s o l i d a r i t y Muslim S o l i d a r i t y -supporting i n t e r n a t i o n a l Muslim causes Internationalist, Functionalist Orientations ^ b e l i e v i n g i n usefulness of IGO's Anti-Colonialism -supporting self— determination and human rights  STRATEGIES  Supporting Arab and P a l e s t i n i a n cause i n the Middle East  Promoting goals of general and i _ specific-purpose. international organizations  Hosting F i f t h Islamic Foreign M i n i s t e r s ' Conference i n Kuala Lumpur (1974)  Promoting and enlarging r o l e of r e g i o n a l organizations  Attending Law of the Sea Conferences and v o t i n g generally w i t h Third World (1971, 1975) Recognition of and overtures to new Indo-China governments v i a ASEAN  S.TLC aumsn  Concluding c u l t u r a l , s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a l and economic agreements w i t h Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (1975) State v i s i t s to A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand (1975)  Foreign P o l i c y 1970-75:  New D i r e c t i o n s  The most prominent feature of the survey of t h i s period of f o r e i g n p o l i c y has been the new d i r e c t i o n s to which the Malaysian  policy-makers have steered the nation's f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  The  changes occurred i n the issue-area of defence and s e c u r i t y .  primary Signs  of detente with the communist countries became i n c r e a s i n g l y evident and culminated i n Malaysia's rapprochement w i t h China i n May  1974,  Malaysia also began p u b l i c l y to profess i t s "nonaligned" s t a t u s , pursue a posture of neutralism and promote i t s concept of Southeast Asian zonal n e u t r a l i t y .  The strategy of Promoting a Zone of Peace,  Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y i n the region has become the cornerstone of Malaysia's f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n matters of defence and s e c u r i t y i n much the same nanner as AMDA provided the anchor to f o r e i g n p o l i c y f o r the greater part of the f i r s t two periods.  There was also a tendency  f o r the more i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y - o r i e n t e d goals to be sought i n unison with the medium-range goals of s e c u r i t y , thus boosting the r o l e of ASEAN as an avenue f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation and the p u r s u i t of s e c u r i t y goals.  In matters of development and trade, while object-  ives remained fundamentally  unaltered, a more thorough-going posture  and a w i l l i n g n e s s to employ more r a d i c a l s t r a t e g i e s were evinced. I w i l l argue that the changes i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y r e f l e c t e d a change i n the e l i t e ideology, a change which arose out of a new  ap-  p r e c i a t i o n of the nature of Malaysia's n a t i o n a l needs and i n t e r e s t s and of the nature of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment. ideology takes i t s underpinnings  The new  elite  from the tenets of nonalignment, or  p r e f e r a b l y , neutralism, but i n large part i s also based on hard-nosed pragmatism.  A number of developments brought about the change i n  the e l i t e ideology but these f a c t o r s can be subsumed under two b,road categories: environment.  (I) domestic events, and ( i i ) the changing i n t e r n a t i o n a l  195  A domestic event which had a profound impact on Malaysian p o l i t i c a l l i f e i n general and which i n d i r e c t l y influenced the course of f o r e i g n p o l i c y was the 1969 May 13 r a c i a l r i o t s i n Kuala Lumpur and other major towns.  We need not concern ourselves here with the  d e t a i l s of May 13, but s u f f i c e i t to say that the aftermath brought about a c r i s i s of leadership i n the r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the UMNO. In the end, i t r e s u l t e d i n the retirement of the Tunku from p o l i t i c s , j u s t over a year a f t e r the c r i s i s , i n September 1970. Soon a f t e r the r i o t s , the Tunku came under mounting pressure from the UMNO rank-and-file and students to r e s i g n .  The " u l t r a s , "^"^  as they became known, attacked the Tunku on h i s poker-playing and horse-racing habits and h i s l a c k of "dynamic" leadership i n a rash of student demonstrations at the U n i v e r s i t y of Malaya and the MARA 111 I n s t i t u t e of Technology.  A member of the UMNO Executive C o u n c i l ,  Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, fueled the anti-Tunku campaign w i t h a scathing l e t t e r which he wrote the Tunku and which was widely c i r c u l a t e d among c i v i l servants and the Malays generally.  Although Mahathir was l a t e r  dismissed from the Executive Council and from UMNO, the leadership c r i s i s had set i n and the stage was set f o r easing the Tunku out of politics.  The Tunku has himself w r i t t e n of t h i s "power struggle"  w i t h i n the UMNO f o l l o w i n g the events of May 13, There i s no denying that there i s a struggle f o r power going on i n s i d e UMNO as between those who b u i l t the p a r t y and helped i n our independence and the new elements, the " u l t r a s " . . In fact t h i s struggle started two years ago, even longer back than that. The t r u l y l o y a l supporters of the party were  196 able to keep the " u l t r a s " I n check because UMNO was strong, and had the f u l l support of a l l who belonged to i t , from the top l e v e l f i g h t down to the lowest rung. As a r e s u l t of t h i s the so-called u l t r a s have g e n e r a l l y kept quiet although they have never ceased to be a c t i v e ; carrying out an intense underground campaign among the younger generation, the s o - c a l l e d "Intellectuals." 1 1 2  The Tunku i s a l s o i l l u m i n a t i n g on the goals of the u l t r a s , One might w e l l ask what i t i s that they are a f t e r . I n q u i r i n g through other people, I have t r i e d to f i n d out from some of these " u l t r a s " what the answer i s , and as f a r as I know they want to e s t a b l i s h a new order of things i n s i d e the UMNO and the country. For instance, they consider our p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g i s outdated and out of l i n e w i t h Afro-Asian p o l i c i e s . Among the ideas they have i n mind are probably to remove the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarchy and to set up Malaysia as a r e p u b l i c . I suppose t h a t , having proclaimed a Republic, they w i l l probably change our f o r e i g n p o l i c y to b r i n g us c l o s e r to the Afro-Asian group. 1  Indeed, the u l t r a s were elements of the same group of 'countere l i t e ' w i t h i n the UMNO r a n k - a n d - f i l e to which I have alluded e a r l i e r 114 i n the study.  Very p o s s i b l y , t h i s c o u n t e r - e l i t e had i t s o r i g i n s  i n the group that rose up i n o p p o s i t i o n to AMDA as f a r back as 1957,"'"''""' and i t s continued presence was f e l t , as the Tunku noted, i n the l a t t e r p a r t of the 1960s and i n the aftermath of FR o n f r o n t a s i by an u n o f f i c i a l delegation to the A f r o - Asian S o l i d a r i t y People's Organization a t Winneba i n 1965.  I t i s no coincidence that both Dr. Mahathir and 116  Datuk Musa were members of the Winneba delegation.  The events of  May 13 provided t h i s group w i t h the excuse to t r y to oust the Tunku by expulsion ofTunku Mahathir from the the fUMNO andmarked fromthe power but the survived i r s t Executive onslaught Council which was  197 Musa's removal as Secretary-General of the party.  There was l i t t l e  doubt, however, that the Tunku would i n time r e l i n q u i s h h i s leadership of UMNO as h i s image was already tarnished i n the eyes of the large majority of the Malays.  Thus i t was Tun Razak who assumed  c o n t r o l as D i r e c t o r of the N a t i o n a l Operations Council i n the Emergency f o l l o w i n g May 13.  With the accession of Tun Razak as Prime  M i n i s t e r , Mahathir and Musa eventually became Cabinet M i n i s t e r s . " ^ Again t h i s i s no coincidence but rather i n d i c a t e s the ascendancy of the  'counterS.elite' i n the UMNO leadership.  These various domestic  developments were perhaps more symptomatic of the Tunku's e x i t than of d i r e c t consequence to f o r e i g n p o l i c y but they nevertheless set the stage f o r the change i n the e l i t e perceptions w i t h respect to f o r e i g n policy.  The ascension of Tun Razak to power was the domestic impetus  to such a change as he had always shown a tendency to move toward the Afro-Asian block, of countries evemas Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r to the 118 Tunku.  Indeed, Tun Razak apparently considered the various moves i n 119  f o r e i g n p o l i c y to be h i s personal i n i t i a t i v e s .  Nonetheless, one  suspects i t was Razak's pragmatism rather than h i s i d e o l o g i c a l fervour that engendered the change i n e l i t e ideology j u s t as i t was the Tunku's adamance that probably postponed i t . I f domestic events provided the impetus f o r change, i t was the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment that p r e c i p i t a t e d i t . At the very l e a s t , the changing i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment made the t r a n s i t i o n smoother and acceptance e a s i e r e s p e c i a l l y f o r the old-guard elements i n the r u l i n g party.  Tun Razak a i r e d the new e l i t e perception of the i n t e r -  n a t i o n a l environment at the 1970 Lusaka Conference by h i s observations  198  on East-West detente and the Increasing m u l t i p o l a r i t y i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, Today with detente between the two power b l o c s , i t i s an important r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the nonaligned Group to ensure that the i n t e r e s t s of the Big Powers do not converge at the expense of the medium and small powers. The hegemonist tendencies on the part of the major powers which appear under various guises and w i t h various j u s t i f i c a t i o n s must be r e s i s t e d . Furthermore, the world today i s no longer b i p o l a r . I t i s at l e a s t t r i — p o l a r w i t h the emergence of China onto the i n t e r n a t i o n a l stage. The f a c t of China.and her l e g i t i m a t e r o l e i n the world cannot be simpl; washed away by those who are opposed to her. I t seemed therefore that the changing i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment i s l a r g e l y responsible f o r Malaysia's s h i f t i n foreign p o l i c y .  A Foreign  M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l was convinced that even i f the Tunku had remained i n power, i t would have been onlyaa matter of time before he too would have y i e l d e d to the overwhelming weight of external f a c t o r s .  121  Thus  out of the changing domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l scenes sprung a n e u t r a l i s t e l i t e ideology which underpinned f o r e i g n p o l i c y f o r t h i s period. The new e l i t e ideology comprised a b e l i e f system which was based on the  co—existence of the non—communist and communist ideologies but-  tressed by a n a t i o n a l image of a m u l t i p o l a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i n which a balance of power l a r g e l y e x i s t e d among the major i d e o l o g i c a l blocs and i n which Malaysia's n a t i o n a l interests were t i e d w i t h those of the Third World bloc of nations.  122  In economic matters, t h i s  ideology e x h i b i t e d a form of economic nationalism w i t h i n the bounds of a q u a s i - c a p i t a l i s t philosophy. I t w i l l be appropriate at t h i s juncture to present i n diagrammatic s t y l e the basic t h e s i s i n my a n a l y s i s of the  199 f i n a l period of Malaysian foreign p o l i c y .  The format follows that  of the f i r s t period and i s based on the t h e o r e t i c a l model developed i n Chapter One. FIGURE 4.1 The Sources of Malaysian Foreign P o l i c y 1970-75:  A Thesis  E x t e r n a l Sources Reduction of Western presence i n Southeast Asia  /  /  /  East-West detente  Foreign Policy Objectives X  Multipolar i n t e r n a t i o n a l sy: system  I  I  Eco-historical Sources  Strategies  B r i t i s h Rule  Idiosyncratic Sources  Emergency  E l i t e Ideology I  Kronfrontasi  Actions I  I n t e r n a l Sources May 13 and related p o l i t i c a l developments Defence and s e c u r i t y needs Developmental needs -J-»  I  i  i  Economic events and developments Status needs  Foreign Policy Postures  200 The e c o - h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r s of B r i t i s h Rule and the Emergency remain important, i f l e s s so, during t h i s period of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I n d i c a t i o n s of t h i s are the persistence of the Five-Power Defence Arrangements, however loose, and Malaysia's wariness i n i t s r e l a t i o n s with communist countries and the continued n a t i o n a l a l e r t n e s s with respect to communist insurgency i n the country.  Indeed, i t s strategy  of " n a t i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e " i s i n d i r e c t response to the recent spate of 123 insurgency i n the country. been added, namely Konfrontasi.  One other e c o - h i s t o r i c a l f a c t o r has K o n f r o n t a s i , which during the second  period acted as a c a t a l y s t f o r s h i f t s and changes i n the Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y , remained as a reminder of Malaysia's defence and s e c u r i t y needs prompting i t s policy-makers torrmaintain good r e g i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and wide-ranging t i e s w i t h the outside world generally. Among the most important v a r i a b l e s i n the e x t e r n a l environment that affected the course and content of Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y was the general reduction of Western presence i n Southeast A s i a , marked by the B r i t i s h East of Suez p u l l - o u t and the U.S. e x i t from Vietnam. I have already touched on the East-West thaw and the i n c r e a s i n g m u l t i p o l a r i t y i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system.  According to a Foreign M i n i s t r y  o f f i c i a l , these various developments i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment reinforced the b e l i e f that Malaysia "made steps i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n " when i t opted f o r a n e u t r a l i s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y despite cautioning by 124 i t s a l l i e s and neighbours. The most important domestic developments a f f e c t i n g the d i r e c t i o n of f o r e i g n p o l i c y were the events a r i s i n g out of the May 13 i n c i d e n t i n s o f a r as t h i s r e s u l t e d i n a leadership s h i f t .  Admittedly, the  201 process of f o r e i g n p o l i c y r e t h i n k i n g had already begun i n the a f t e r math of Konfrontasi as noted i n the previous chapter.  However, i t  was r e a l l y the May 13 events w i t h i t s r e s u l t a n t leadership s h i f t that brought about the f i n a l c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of the inchoate f o r e i g n p o l i c y changes of the second period.  May 13 notwithstanding, the  more ' s t a b l e ' i n t e r n a l sources remain as important determinants foreign policy.  of  Under the e x i s t i n g s t a t e - c e n t r i c world order, de-  fence and s e c u r i t y needs continue to demand a t t e n t i o n although Malaysia has been able to pursue so f a r an imaginative strategy of r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y w i t h minimal emphasis on defence to f u l f i l l needs.  these  Despite t h i s , current expenditure of s e c u r i t y ( i n c l u d i n g  that on i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y ) runs at 17 percent share of the Federal 125 Budget.  S i m i l a r l y , developmental needs continue to dominate  Malaysia's economic p o l i c i e s although a number of domestic events  and  developments — on which I s h a l l l a t e r elaborate —have changed to some extent the character or d e f i n i t i o n of such needs.  Status needs, while  always present, may have receded i n importance by the end of the  '  period f o l l o w i n g Malaysia's acceptance as a f u l l - f l e d g e d member of the Nonaligned Group of nations. F i n a l l y , under i d i o s y n c r a t i c sources, I have placed the new  elite  ideology which has developed l a r g e l y out of a leadership s h i f t i n the r u l i n g party.  The new e l i t e ideology r e f l e c t s the ascendancy of a  younger (or newer) crop of UMNO leaders under a Prime M i n i s t e r whowwas generally receptive to new ideas.  There i s some evidence that the top  echelons of the newer group draws i t s support from a l a r g e r supportive  202 core of UMNO rank-and-file who had been d i s s a t i s f i e d with the p o l i c i e s 126 of the Tunku era.  In foreign p o l i c y matters, the new e l i t e  ideology  takes i t s t h e o r e t i c a l underpinnings from the tenets of neutralism which I had discussed  earlier.  In my t h e s i s , then, the new e l i t e ideology acts as the phenomen o l o g i c a l ' f i l t e r ' f o r a l l the other various sources of f o r e i g n p o l i c y t r a n s l a t i n g 'them i n t o f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , postures, and a c t i o n s .  strategies  This i s e s p e c i a l l y . e v i d e n t i n the issue-area of defence  and s e c u r i t y as Figure 4..'2 i l l u s t r a t e s .  The e l i t e ideology has  dominated almost a l l the important actions i n the issue-area v i a i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y posture of neutralism and i t s chief strategy of promoting zonal n e u t r a l i t y . I have noted that Foreign M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s considered  the strategy to be the cornerstone of f o r e i g n p o l i c y and a  y a r d s t i c k by which a l l f o r e i g n p o l i c y actions are to be somehow 127 tested.  Toward the end of the period there was some i n d i c a t i o n  that f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the issue-area had become somewhat r o u t i n i s e d i n that the c r e a t i v e phase of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s was replaced by a phase i n which actions flowed almost automatically from the prevalent e l i t e ideology.  The almost automatic recognition of the new  Indo-China governments i s i n d i c a t i v e of t h i s r o u t i n i s a t i o n of f o r e i g n policy.  But more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the e l e v a t i o n of Special Functions 128 M i n i s t e r Tengku Rithauddeen to Foreign M i n i s t e r i n August 1975 showed that f o r e i g n p o l i c y had become perhaps s u f f i c i e n t l y clear-cut 129 for another man other than the Premier to hold the p o r t f o l i o . Tengku Rithauddeen i s thus the f i r s t person other than the Prime  203  'FIGURE 4/2Explanatory Chart of Defence and S e c u r i t y P o l i c y Outputs Reduction of Western Presence i n Southeast A s i a  Foreign P o l i c y Objectives  East-West detente  Political.independence  Multipolar i n t e r n a t i o n a l system  Territorial integrity I I I I  B r i t i s h Rule  Elite Ideology  Emergency Kronfrontasi  Y  Foreign P o l i c y —>. Postures Neutralism Non-interference  May 13 and r e l a t e d p o l i t i c a l developments Defence and Security needs  Strategies Seeking s e c u r i t y rather than defence - promoting zonal neutrality i n Southeast A s i a - promoting n a t i o n a l and regional resilience and equidistance with major powers  Actions Continuing 5-Power Arrangements Attending Lusaka Conference (1970) - proposing n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Southeast A s i a KL (ASEAN) Declarat i o n of Southeast A s i a as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y (1971) Establishment of diplomatic t i e s w i t h communist s t a t e s of Mongolia, N. Vietnam, N. Korea, E. Germany (1972-73)  Recognition and diplomatic t i e s with China (1974) Recognition of Communist Governments of Cambodia and S. Vietnam (1975) Formulating with ASEAN members a " B l u e p r i n t for Southeast Asian zonal n e u t r a l i t y (1975)  204 M i n i s t e r to hold the Foreign M i n i s t e r ' s p o r t f o l i o ever since the 130 l a t e Dr. I s m a i l r e l i n q u i s h e d i t a f t e r holding i t b r i e f l y i n 1-960. In Chapter Three I demonstrated the importance of the feedback process i n a f f e c t i n g the course of Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The impact of Konfrontasi with i t s t r a i n of developments was p e c i a l l y important.  es-  While i n that period there was a preponderance  of negative feedback effect's, i n the t h i r d period, feedback from both the i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l environment tended to be p o s i t i v e .  The  s h i f t i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y under Tun Razak was w e l l taken at home as even opposition members of Parliament supported the new t h r u s t s of 131 policy.  Abroad, Malaysia's new posture of neutralism was  generally  w e l l received and f i n a l l y won i t a place i n the Nonaligned Group of nations.  As f o r i t s n e u t r a l i z a t i o n strategy, there appeared to be no  adverse reactions to the proposal although the v i r t u a l l a c k of response from the great powers and varying enthusiasm among Malaysia's Asian ASEAN neighbours prompted s l i g h t s h i f t s i n the strategy.  The  and  feed-  back on the scheme has never been severely negative, but the changing nature of the proposal does suggest that Malaysia was responding to the varying feedback on the scheme.  The scheme had i t s roots i n the  I s m a i l proposals of 1968, but was o f f i c i a l l y p u b l i c i z e d only i n 1970 at Lusaka as a European-styled great power guarantee.  n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of Southeast A s i a with  The emphasis has since s h i f t e d to the ASEAN-  i n i t i a t e d proposal of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y .  The  c o r o l l a r y to t h i s — d r a f t i n g an ASEAN " B l u e p r i n t " f o r such zonal n a u t r a l i t y - i s s t i l l unclear at the time of w r i t i n g although Wisma  Putra o f f i c i a l s appear o p t i m i s t i c about i t s implementation. Two main factors have a f f e c t e d the change of emphasis i n the scheme.  The f i r s t i s the lack of great power response except China's 132  v e r b a l assurance that i t supports the scheme.  More importantly,  Malaysia's Southeast Asian, p a r t i c u l a r l y , ASEAN neighbours have shown a v a r i e d response to the o r i g i n a l scheme and are s t i l l not equally 133 e n t h u s i a s t i c about the present plan f o r z o n a l n n e u t r a l i t y .  Singa-  pore, f o r example,, i s known to p r e f e r some form of great power p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the region i n some k i n d of counterweight or balance-of134 power system.  This could presumably occur w i t h i n a a a n e u t r a l i t y  system which allows access to major powers.  Thailand and Indonesia  are perhaps c l o s e r to Malaysia i n wanting great power disengagement from the area, while the P h i l i p p i n e s has not indicated i t intends to ask the U.S. to withdraw from i t s m i l i t a r y bases.  The other countries  of Southeast A s i a , Burma and the Indo-China s t a t e s , would c l e a r l y not p a r t i c i p a t e i n any n e u t r a l i t y system without t o t a l great power disengagement from the area.  I t seems therefore that Malaysia's n e u t r a l i -  zation strategy w i l l remain f l e x i b l e and subject to minor adjustments depending ori p o l i t i c a l developments i n the region.  The evolution of  the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n scheme i n d i c a t e s therefore the importance of the feedback process on f o r e i g n p o l i c y , which can be b r i e f l y traced as follows:  206 Tun Ismail's proposal for the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of — Southeast A s i a and s i g n i n g of non-aggression pacts (1968)  Varying governmental response -h to proposals - no o f f i c i a l action  Leadership s h i f t i n UMNO (1969-70)  Malaysia o f f i c i a l l y proposes the n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of Southeast A s i a with great power guarantee at Lusaka (1970), United Nations (1970), Commonwealth Conference (1971)  General Support f o r concept at i n t e r n a t i o n a l conferences ASEAN Kuala Lumpur D e c l a r a t i o n of Southeast A s i a as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and N e u t r a l i t y 0-971)  Lack of great power response I  i  t ASEAN countries' and Southeast Asian countries' varying response  In the issue-area of development and trade, the e l i t e ideology w i t h i t s new emphasis on economic n a t i o n a l i s m l e d to more r a d i c a l , or at any r a t e , aggressive, s t r a t e g i e s and actions i n the p u r s u i t of the economic o b j e c t i v e s . For the most part domestic f a c t o r s caused the change i n p o l i c y .  As i n d i c a t e d i n Figure 4.3, the changes  i n p o l i c y may be seen as i n t e r n a l long-term feedback e f f e c t s .  Malay-  s i a ' s l a i s s e z - f a i r e p o l i c i e s i n the previous periods ( p a r t i c u l a r l y during the f i r s t ) l e d to the high l e v e l of f o r e i g n ownership and cont r o l of the economy.  This r e s u l t e d i n a r e - d e f i n i t i o n of economic  needs with the New Economic P o l i c y as a d i r e c t response.  However,  many of the major tenets of the NEP r e f l e c t purely p o l i t i c a l inputs. They nevertheless i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e to the question of f o r e i g n ownership.  This i s true, f o r example, f o r the 30 percent targets  207 of Bumiputra wealth, ownership and management, the achievement of which would ipso facto r e s u l t i n a lower percentage i n the l e v e l of f o r e i g n 135 capital.  The transformation i n e l i t e ideology ( i n economic mat-  ters) from the p r i s t i n e c a p i t a l i s t - f r e e e n t e r p r i s e v a r i e t y of the f i r s t period to the present q u a s i - c a p i t a l i s t - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t kind provided a f u r t h e r impetus f o r the new d i r e c t i o n s i n economic p o l i cies.  The end r e s u l t of a l l the various domestic inputs and t h e i r  i n t e r a c t i o n thereof,.as shown i n Figure 4.3', was the s h i f t i n economic posture.  While Malaysia's new posture of economic nationalism .  sprung from the domestic processes j u s t discussed, i t s developingworld o r i e n t a t i o n continued to be a d i r e c t f u n c t i o n of i t s developmental needs, on which I have already elaborated.  Malaysia's eco-  nomic o b j e c t i v e s were i n turn a f u n c t i o n of the nation's  developing-  world o r i e n t a t i o n but the manner i n which i t s o b j e c t i v e s are sought was c l e a r l y a f f e c t e d by i t s posture of economic n a t i o n a l i s m , as shown i n the chart. There was a l s o some i n d i c a t i o n of e x t e r n a l feedback e f f e c t s towards Malaysia's new economic nationalism posture and some of i t s r r e s u l t a n t p o l i c i e s by the end of the period.  To the point were the  negative reactions to the Petronas Development (Amendment) Act and the various actions of Petronas and Pernas S e c u r i t i e s Chairman Tengku Razaleigh.  The most severe r e a c t i o n was the withdrawal of Exxon from 136  prospecting f o r o i l o f f the east coast of Peninsula Malaysia.  By  the end of 1975, Malaysian spokesmen, i n c l u d i n g the Prime M i n i s t e r , had begun ensuring investors of Malaysia's continued p o l i c y of welcome  208  FIGURE 4.3 Explanatory Chart of Development and Trade P o l i c y Outputs B r i t i s h Rule  Laissez-faire policies  High l e v e l of foreign ownership and c o n t r o l of co economy  Foreign P o l i c y Promoting economic development  Developmental Needs -v | >v New  Economic  ^, E l i t e eology  Objectives  Stabilising y commodity f p r i c e s S  _For.e'rgn*"Poli'e-y. Postures *A Economic DevelopingNationalism WorIdOrientation Strategies Pursuing i n d u s t r i a l self-sufficiency by encouraging c e r t a i n types of investment projects  Promoting and participating i n trade groups and p r i c e stabilisation schemes  Employing technique of state c a p i t a l i s m to gain c o n t r o l of economy  Operating u n i lateral stabilisation schemes  1  Actions  \  Providing investment incentives for particular industries  Attending UNCTAD I I I (1971)  Acquiring, v i a Pernas, i n t e r e s t i n various companies  C a l l i n g f o r "New Economic World Order" Participating in M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade Negotiations, Tokyo (1973-75)  E s t a b l i s h i n g Petronas  (1974  Introducing 'management shares' i n petroleum industry (1975) Forming FIC and guidelines f o r mergers and take-overs (1974)  Operating, u n i l a t e r a l l y , rubber p r i c e s t a b i l i s a t i o n scheme Joining International Sugar Agreement (1973) Joining International Tin Agreement (1975)  toward f o r e i g n investment.  The s l i g h t hack-tracking did not, how-  ever, amount to a renunciation of the posture of economic n a t i o n a l i s m although i t i s c l e a r that Malaysian spokesmen w i l l i n future probably be l e s s aggressive or a n t a g o n i s t i c toward f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e .  I t was  common knowledge that the various moves and pronouncements of Razal e i g h were c a l c u l a t e d with s p e c i f i c p o l i t i c a l ends i n view, earning him, i n p a r t i c u l a r , a Vice-President's post i n UMNO, and the "Bapa 137 Ekonomi Malaysia" t i t l e .  Prom discussions w i t h various government  and p u b l i c persons, there was i n d i c a t i o n that  Razaleigh's actions  were not altogether w e l l received i n many government agencies  and  138 Ministries.  I t was therefore.not e n t i r e l y unexpected that  Malaysia would eventually soften what appeared to have become a hardl i n e n a t i o n a l i s t i c economic posture. In the issue-area of i n t e r n a t i o n a l cocoperation and diplomacy, the most s i g n i f i c a n t change here was that the various p o l i c y outputs became more c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h those of the defence and s e c u r i t y issue-area. policy-makers  This l a r g e l y r e f l e c t e d a s h i f t i n the perception of the i n which, the p u r s u i t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation and  peace was seen to be c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the p u r s u i t of s e c u r i t y , part i c u l a r l y r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y . Thus while i n the one case the shortrange goals of defence receded i n t o the background i n favour of the medium-range goals of s e c u r i t y , i n the other case the more d i s t a n t goals of g l o b a l c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y , f o r example, made way f o r what was thought to be the more a t t a i n a b l e goal of r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y v i a zonal n e u t r a l i t y .  In discussions with Wisma Putra o f f i c i a l s , t h i s  210 author got the d i s t i n c t impression that the main thrust of Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y was toward r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y and ASEAN was the avenue through which t h i s could most reasonably be attained.  The Foreign  M i n i s t r y consequently looked i n l e s s i d e a l i s t i c terms toward the more d i s t a n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the TJ.N. and i t s agencies.  The P r i n c i p a l A s s i s t a n t Secretary of the desk dealing with U.N.  a f f a i r s made the point that the thrust and emphasis of Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y could be best viewed i n terms of concentric c i r c l e s with ASEAN at the foMb and other i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s r a d i a t i n g 139 out (geographically)  i n importance.  Under the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  structure of the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , the U.N. i s now lumped i n with "Nonaligned Conferences, Americas and A f r i c a , South of Sahara." In 1958, the corresponding desk was "U.N. and I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u tions.""^  I n 1958, the re was also no s p e c i a l desk f o r  Southeast  A s i a , the appropriate desk being " A s i a , A u s t r a l i a and A f r i c a . "  Today,  there are two Southeast A s i a desks, one f o r ASEAN members and one f o r non-ASEAN. members and there i s also an Under-Secretary f o r economics 141 who i s also Secretary-General f o r ASEAN. Malaysia also began to h i g h l i g h t i t s t i e s with the Muslim world and here i d e o l o g i c a l and c u l t u r a l c o m p a t i b i l i t y were perhaps exploited with an eye toward economic and other r e a l gains.  Pragmatism became  the order of the day as the s i g n i f i c a n c e of status needs,  assiduously  pursued i n the f i r s t period, receded as source of foreign p o l i c y . Figure 4.4 provides a charting of the various sources of p o l i c y i n t h i s issue-area  as they r e l a t e to the p o l i c y outputs.  FIGURE 4 . 4 Explanatory Chart of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co-operation & Diplomacy P o l i c y Outputs Foreign P o l i c y Postures Security Needs Regionalism Muslim Internationalist, Anticolonialism Developmental Functionalist Solidarity Elite Needs orientations Ideology Status Needs  \  -~  Foreign gn P o l i c y Objectives  Promoting regional cooperation and s e c u r i t y  J-  Promoting international Muslim causes  I  Strategies Promoting goals of general and specific-purpose i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisations  Promoting goals and enlarging r o l e of regional organisations 1\  Promoting UN i d e a l s  Actions  Hosting 5th Islamic P a r t i c i p a t i n g i n UN and P a r t i c i p a t i n g i n and Foreign M i n i s t e r s ' s p e c i a l i s e d agencies carrying out work of Conference (1974) ASEAN Attending Law of the Sea - d e c l a r a t i o n of a Zongj Conferences (1974-1975) Supporting Arabaand of Peace, Freedom and -voting w i t h Third World P a l e s t i n i a n causes N e u t r a l i t y (1971) -formulating "Klueprint" '' Supporting a n t i - c o l o n i a l for zonal n e u t r a l i t y Concluding c u l t u r a l , •issues at UN, Commonwealth (1975) scientific, technical and economic agreements  212 Notes to Chapter Four F o r e l g n A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 3, No. 1, June 1970, p. 16. 2 See "Treaty of Friendship between the Government of Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia 1970 and 1959" i n Rujuk: Arahan Pejabat B i l . 13: P e r j a n j i a n Kerajaan Malaysia Dengan Kerajaan Asing, Kement e r i a n Pelajaran Malaysia. (No page numbers) 1  Ibid. 4 See M. Fathmanathan, "The S t r a i t s of Malacca: A Basis f o r C o n f l i c t or Co-operation?" i n Lau Teik Soon, ed., New D i r e c t i o n s i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relationships of Southeast A s i a , Singapore, S i n gapore U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1973, p. 189. He points out that Malaysia had i n 1969 u n i l a t e r a l l y declared the extension of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l waters to twelve miles under the Emergency ( E s s e n t i a l Powers) o r d i nance, No. 7, i b i d . , p. 190. 3  ^See " S t r a i t s of Malacca and Singapore - J o i n t Statement", Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 4, No. 4, December 1971, p. 54. 6  Ibid.  ^Pathmanathan, op. c i t . , 190-192, and passim. I b i d . , p. 189. 9 Interview w i t h Mr. L.C. Vohra, Head of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law D i v i s i o n , M i n i s t r y of Laws and Attorney-General Chambers, May 21, 1975. 8  "^The p a r t i c i p a t i n g countries were A u s t r a l i a , Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos, M a l a y s i a , P h i l i p p i n e s , Singapore, Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam, Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 5, No. 1, June 1970, p. 52. ''""'"The Lusaka Conference was held from September 8-10. Tun Razak returned to Malaysia and assumed the prime m i n i s t e r s h i p on September 22. 12 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 3, No. 2, December 1970. 13 I b i d . , p. 16. 14 See Tun Ismail's speech to the UN General Assembly of that year i n Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 3, No. 2, December 1970, pp. 58-59. "^Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 4, No. 1, March 1970, p. 14.  213 16  Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n of Southeast A s i a " i n P a c i f i c Community, October 1971, r e p r i n t e d i i i Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 4, No. 3, September 1971, pp. 51-52. 17  F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 4, No. 4, December 1971, p. 58.  18 China spoke favourably of the scheme during Tun Razak's v i s i t to China which l e d to f u l l diplomatic t i e s between the two countries. See t e x t , infra,, p. 162. 19 Interview w i t h Dr. Noordin Sopiee, l e a d e r - w r i t e r , New S t r a i t s Times, June 10, 1975, and i n t e r v i e w w i t h Encik M. Ben-Haron, P r i n c i p a l A s s i s t a n t Secretary, Planning and Research, M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , June 17, 1975. 20„ Ibid. 21 Address by the Prime M i n i s t e r , Tun Abdul Razak at the opening of the Eighth ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting, May 13, 1975, Siaran Akhbar, Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia. 22 Ibid. 23 Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, "ASEAN's Response to S e c u r i t y Issues i n Southeast A s i a " , t a l k d e l i v e r e d to Centre f o r S t r a t e g i c and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studlies, Conference on Regionalism i n Southeast A s i a : Problems, Perspectives and P o s s i b i l i t i e s , i n J a k a r t a , October 1974. (Handout from o f f i c i a l of the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s ) 2 4  I b i d . , p. 11. Ibid.  2  ^ I b i d . , p. 12.  27 I b i d . , p. 14. 2 8  Ibid., pvll  29 Stephen Chee, op. c i t . , p. 49. 30 There i s considerable semantic confusion here and the v a r i e d uses of the terms by p o l i t i c i a n s and academics a l i k e have not cleared the s i t u a t i o n . S u f f i c e i t to say that "non-alignment" denotes a cold war s i t u a t i o n , whereas "neutralism" has a meaning which i s more extensi v e , that i s , i t connotes n e u t r a l i t y i n s i t u a t i o n s other than the cold  214 war. A f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s a i d that Malaysia prefers "nonalignment" because i t has a " p o s i t i v e " connotation that the s t a t e i s pursuing an "independent" p o l i c y . Interview w i t h Encik L o o i Cheok Hin, P r i n c i p a l A s s i s t a n t Secretary, UN, America, A f r i c a and Nonalignment Conferences, M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , May 27, 1975. 31 Interview w i t h Encik Yusof Hitam, June 27,  1975.  32 I b i d . In February 1976, at the ASEAN summit conference i n B a l i , a Treaty of TA-'mity and Co-operation i n Southeast A s i a and an ASEAN D e c l a r a t i o n of Concord were signed by the f i v e countries as f u r t h e r steps toward the n e u t r a l i t y i d e a l . I t i s however, beyond the purview of t h i s study to analyse these events. See New S t r a i t s Times, February 25, 1976 and March 1, 1976. 33 The S t r a i t s Times, June 18, 1966. 34 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 3, No. 2, December 1970, p. 57. 35 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 4, No. 3, September 1971, pp. 43-44. 36 Stephen Chee, dp. c i t . , p. 50. 37 Noordin Sopiee, "Ties w i t h Peking: The Issues and the Promise", The S t r a i t s Times, May 21, 1974. 38 I b i d . , and S. Chee, op. c i t . , p. 50. 39 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 7, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 52-53. I b i d . , p. 53. 41 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 7, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 56-57. These "assurances" did not, however, prevent the People's Republic from sending a congratulatory message to the MCP i n A p r i l 1975, a l i t t l e over a year a f t e r the establishment of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . Malaysia protested the Chinese a c t i o n and s a i d that r e l a t i o n s would not remain as " c o r d i a l " i f the p r a c t i c e continued. The episode does not however r e present a serious s t r a i n i n r e l a t i o n s and the Chinese a c t i o n i s probab l y a routine a c t i o n rather than a premeditated scheme. See The'New S t r a i t s Times, June 23, 1975. 42 i< Chee, op. c i t . , and a l s o , Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, "The P o l i t i c a l Future of the P a c i f i c Basin" i n Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 6, No. 4, December 1973, pp. 10-11. 43 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 7, No. 2, p. 42. A d d r e s s by the Prime M i n i s t e r at the opening of the ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting at Kuala Lumpur, May 13, 1975, Siafari Akhbar, Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia. 44  215 45  Address by the Prime M i n i s t e r at the opening of the Eighth ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting at Kuala Lumpur, May 13, 1975, Siaran Akhbar, Jabatan Peneraggan Malaysia. 46 Tan S r i Ghazali Shafie, text of RTM broadcast, as published i n The S t r a i t s Times, May 7 and 8, 1975. Ibid. 48 Sopiee, "Ties w i t h P e k i n g . o p . c i t . 49 The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Indo-China countries remains problematic. While there was considerable optimism among Wisma Putra c i r c l e s that the new governments of South.Vietnam and Cambodia w i l l be ' n e u t r a l i s t ' (Interviews w i t h various o f f i c i a l s ) and thus endorse zonal n e u t r a l i t y , Malaysia, according to a top aide, w i l l keep an "open mind" on the subject and l a r g e l y adopt a "wait and see" approach. The imp l i c a t i o n i s "that the n e u t r a l i t y proposal i s subject to f u r t h e r review and e v o l u t i o n depending on the feedback from these countries. I n t e r view with Encik Zain A z r a a i , S p e c i a l P r i n c i p a l A s s i s t a n t Secretary to the Prime M i n i s t e r , November.,.1,~1975. "^One of the major problems w i l l be the question of enforcement that i s , the manner i n which v i o l a t i o n s should be d e a l t . Interview with Noordin Sopiee, June 10, 1975. See a l s o , Zain A z r a a i , " N e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Southeast A s i a " i n Lau.Teik.Soon, ed. New D i r e c t i o n s i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations of Southeast A s i a , Singapore, Singapore U n i v e r s i t y Press 1973, pp. 135-136. v  51 Speech by Encik M. K h i r J o h a r i , M i n i s t e r of Trade and Industry and Leader of the Malaysian delegation to UNCTAD I I I , Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 5, No..2, June 1971, p. 38. 52 Press statement by Encik K h i r J o h a r i on return from UNCTAD I I I , Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 5, No. 2, June 1971, p. 43. Malaysia i s a party to 'the'' M u l t i l a t e r a l Trade Negotiations which i s under GAT.T sponsorship. The negotiations are s t i l l i n progress. Interview with Encik Yee Che Fong, Deputy D i r e c t o r , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade D i v i s i o n , M i n i s t r y of Trade and Industry, May 31, 1975. 53 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, op. c i t . , pp. 44-46. "^Malaysia's standing has been described as "very good" among Third World countries by a senior M i n i s t r y of Trade and Industry o f f i c i a l . Interview w i t h Encik Yee Che Fong, May 31, 1975. "'"'Speech by Finance M i n i s t e r Tun Tan Siew Sin to the World Bank and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, September 22, 1970, Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 3, No. 2, December 1970, p. 43.  216 56,. Interview with Encik Yee Che Fong, May 31, 1975. "^Speech by Finance M i n i s t e r Tun Tan Siew S i n to the World Bank and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, op. c i t . , p. 41. 58 Interview w i t h Encik Fong Kwek Yuen, Planning O f f i c e r , Economic Planning U n i t , Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Department, May 22, 1975. 59 Economic Report 1974-75. op. c i t . , p. 26. 60 Speech by the Finance M i n i s t e r Tun Tan Siew S i n to the World Bank and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, op. c i t . , p. 42. ^"Htfhile there i s a tendency f o r the o i l revenues to be recycled back i n t o the i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s — the buying of c a p i t a l goods and armaments i s a" propos — the LDC's, which have l i t t l e to s e l l are l e f t out of the c y c l e Th a d d i t i o n to being saddled w i t h the higher o i l p r i c e s . See Time, October 14, 1974, pp. 42-43. 62 Interview w i t h Encik Yee Che Fong, May 31, 1975. /TO  New S t r a i t s Times. J u l y 12, 1975.  64 Second Malaysia P l a n , 1971-1975, Govt. P r i n t e r , 1971, pp. 41-42. Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, Govt. P r i n t e r , 1973, p. 85. 65  66 Malaysia I n d u s t r i a l Digest, V o l . 8, No. 1, 1975 (published by FIDA), p. 5.67 Economic Report 1974-1975, op. c i t . , p. I l l and a l s o , "Indust r i a l Development i n Malaysia and Incentives f o r Investmennt",speech by J . Jegathesan, D i r e c t o r , Investment Promotion, FIDA, to Malaysia Investment Conference, London, May 1975. (Handout) r  Q  Less than $250,000 - 2 years; more than $250,000 - 3 years; more than $500,000 - 4 years, and more than $1 m i l l i o n - 5 years. Economic Report, l o c . c i t . 69 These were (a) the l o c a t i o n of a factory i n a designed development area, (b) i f the product was a ' p r i o r i t y product' and (c) i f the required percentage of Malaysian content i n the employment of resources was a t t a i n e d . See i b i d . See ffin..6 9  .  F r o m 51 - 100 employees - 2 years; 101 - 200 - 3 years; 291 350 - 4 years; 350 and above - 5 years. Economic Report, op. c i t . , 71  217 72 See Mid-Term Review...op. c i t . , pp. 61-94. 73 As published i n New S t r a i t s Times, September 18, 1974. 74 Petroleum Development Act, 1974, Act. 144, Laws of Malaysia, Govt. P r i n t e r , August 22, 1974. ^ I n t e r v i e w w i t h Encik Z a i n a l Azman, Deputy Secretary, Foreign Investment Committee (FIC), Economic Planning U n i t , Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Department, May 29, 1975. 76 See Petroleum Development (Amendment) Act, 1975, Act A290, Laws of Malaysia, Govt. P r i n t e r , A p r i l 29, 1975. According to the Act, "the holder of management shares of a relevant company s h a l l be e n t i t l e d e i t h e r on a p o l l or by a show of hands to f i v e hundred votes f o r each management share held by. him upon any r e s o l u t i o n r e l a t i n g to the appointment or d i s m i s s a l of a d i r e c t o r or any member of the s t a f f of the relevant company...", i b i d . , p. 6, Since each management share i s equivalent to 500 ordinary shares, the government's one percent w i l l give i t more than f i v e times the number of shares held by other shareholders. In f a c t , i t need only hold 0.2 percent of management shares to have a s l i g h t edge over the other holders. ( I f x represents shares, 0.2% of management shares i s equal to 0.2% x 500x ¥ lOOx, whereas 99.8% of ordinary shares i s equal to only 99.8x). (Discuss i o n w i t h a senior executive of an o i l company.) ^ I n f o r m a l discussions w i t h a senior o i l company executive, various j o u r n a l i s t s and government o f f i c i a l s . See also New S t r a i t s T:imes, May 26, 1975, i n which the Chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce cans' on the government not to "deviate from the p r i n c i p l e of the free economic system" and adopt q u a s i - n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n p o l i c i e s . 78 New S t r a i t s Times, May 31, 1975. 79 Interview w i t h Encik M. Shanmughalingam, Deputy Under Secret a r y , Economic D i v i s i o n , The Treasury, May 19, 1975 and interviews with Encik Yee Che Fong and Encik Z a i n a l Aznam ( c i t e d e a r l i e r ) . 80 ... Ibid. T  8  ~4?etroleum Development (Amendment) Act 1975, op. c i t . , p. 4.  82 Perbadanan Nasional (National Corporation). I t was formed i n September 1969, roughly c o i n c i d i n g w i t h the enunciation of the NEP. "Pernas S e c u r i t i e s " i s a wholly-owned s u b s i d i a r y of PERNAS, and operates i n the commercial sector l i k e any p r i v a t e company. Razaleigh subsequently became chairman of Pernas S e c u r i t i e s a f t e r r e l i n g u i s h i n g c h a i r manship of PERNAS. 83  See f n  E r  82.  218 84  I s l a n d and P e n i n s u l a r Development i s one of the l a r g e s t housing d e v e l o p e r s i n M a l a y s i a and Singapore, w i t h i n t e r e s t s i n t i n , rubber and palm o i l ; London T i n C o r p o r a t i o n i s a B r i t a i n - b a s e d company w i t h major shares i n 12 t i n mining companies i n M a l a y s i a , T h a i l a n d and N i g e r i a ; and Sime Darby i s a M a l a y s i a - b a s e d company w i t h i n t e r e s t s i n rubber, t i n and v a r i o u s i n d u s t r i e s . See The Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, June 13, 1975, pp. 55-56. 85 The d e a l i n i t i a l l y appeared to be a c l e v e r l y maneuvered " r e v e r s e swop" whereby Pernas S e c u r i t i e s was to s u r r e n d e r a l l i t s h o l d i n g s to Haw Par f o r i t s c o n t r o l l i n g 40% stake i n the company which would then have c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t s iihllsiLand and P e n i n s u l a and London T i n C o r p o r a t i o n . The d e a l was abandoned when Haw Par was s u s pended by the Singapore government which then a u t h o r i s e d an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the company's a l l e g e d mismanagement. See the Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, June 13, 1975, pp. 55-56 and New S t r a i t s Times, J u l y 23, 1975. 86 He s a i d he hoped to a c h i e v e t h i s t a r g e t w i t h i n two years by u s i n g Pernas. New S t r a i t s Times, J u l y 4, 1975. 87 In a h o t l y c o n t e s t e d r a c e , R a z a l e i g h emerged w i t h the second h i g h e s t number of v o t e s f o r the t h r e e V i c e - P r e s i d e n t p o s t s up f o r election. See New S t r a i t s Times, June 22, 1975. 88 New S t r a i t s Times, J u l y 7, 1975. F o l l o w i n g Tun Razak's death i n 1976, R a z a l e i g h has become Finance M i n i s t e r i n Prime M i n i s t e r H u s s e i n Onn's c a b i n e t . 8 9  Ibid.  90 May  29,  91  I n t e r v i e w w i t h E n c i k Z a i n a l Azman, D e p u t y - S e c r e t a r y , 1975.  FIC,  The o t h e r major s t i p u l a t i o n s were t h a t such mergers and t a k e overs s h o u l d l e a d d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y to n e t economic b e n e f i t s i n ...the e x t e n t of M a l a y s i a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y Bumiputra p a r t i c i p a t i o n , ownership and management, income d i s t r i b u t i o n , growth, employment, e x p o r t s , q u a l i t y range of p r o d u c t s and s e r v i c e s , economic d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n s , p r o c e s s i n g and upgrading of l o c a l raw m a t e r i a l s , t r a i n i n g , e f f i c i e n c y , and r e s e a r c h and development". See G u i d e l i n e s f o r the R e g u l a t i o n of A c q u i s i t i o n of A s s e t s , Mergers and Take-overs, FIC, Govt. P r i n t e r , 1974, pp. 2-3. 92 New S t r a i t s Times, October 28, 1975. 93  absent  Ibid.  Ibid. Petronas chairman, Tengku Razaleigh., was c o n s p i c u o u s l y , from the seminar i n which., a p a r t from the P r e m i e r , the M i n i s t e r 9 4  219 of Trade and Industry, the M i n i s t e r f o r Home A f f a i r s , the AttorneyGeneral and the Deputy Finance M i n i s t e r also p a r t i c i p a t e d . 95 See fh.., 31. 96 Interview w i t h Encik Looi Cheok Hin, P r i n c i p a l A s s i s t a n t Secretary, UN, America, A f r i c a and Nonalignment Conferences, May 27, 1975. 97 New Sunday Times, June 22, 1975. 98 Address by the Prime M i n i s t e r , Tun Abdul Razak, to the Eighth ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l Meeting, bp. c i t . 99 The S t a r , October 7, 1975. The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation concluded at the B a l i summit i n February 1976 i s open to the accession o f other Southeast Asian states w i t h the view that the Indo-. China states and Burma may a t some point wish to accede to. i t . See New S t r a i t s Times, February 25, and March 1, 1976. "^Statement by Tan S r i Dato H a j i Abdul Kadir b i n Yusof, A t t o r ney-General of Malaysia to the Plenary Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Se!a, Caracas, J u l y 10, 1975. (Handout) "'"'^Interview w i t h Encik L.C. Vohra, Head of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law D i v i s i o n , M i n i s t r y of Laws and A-G s Chambers, May 21, 1975. r  Ibid. 103 Address by the Prime M i n i s t e r , Tun Abdul Razak, at the opening ceremony of the F i f t h Islamic Conference of Foreign M i n i s t e r s , June 21, 1974, Kuala Lumpur, Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 7, No. 2, June 1974, pp. 65 and 67. 104 Interview w i t h Encik M. Ban-Haron, P r i n c i p a l A s s i s t a n t Secretary, Planning and Research, June 17, 1975. "^""See Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia, V o l . 8, No. 1, March 1975, pp. 55-56. 106  N e w S t r a i t s Times, October 17, 1975.  1 0 7  I b i d . , October 16, 1975.  108 See i b i d . The f i r s t act allows f o r p o l i t i c a l detention without t r i a l i n matters of i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y , while the second prevents students from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n p o l i t i c s . 109 Interview w i t h Encik Yusof Hitam, Under Secretary, Southeast A s i a , June 27, 1975. •'"^The term was used to describe the extremist elements i n respect of Malay demands w i t h i n the UMNO and the Malay community at l a r g e . Among such " u l t r a s " were Dr. Mahathir, presently Deputy Prime  220 M i n i s t e r. and Datuk Musa Hitam, M i n i s t e r of Primary I n d u s t r i e s . ;  v  Ill See Tunku Abdul Rahman, May 13: Before and A f t e r , Utusan Melayu Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, pp. 122-124. 112 The Tunku i s r e f e r r i n g to the furore a r i s i n g out of the N a t i o n a l Language B i l l of 1967 i n which the D i r e c t o r of the Language and L i t e r a r y I n s t i t u t e (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka), Syed N a s i r , an acknowledged u l t r a , was sacked from the UMNO Executive Council f o r a g i t a t i n g against the slowness of implementing Malay as the sole o f f i c i a l language. See Margaret Roff, "The P o l i t i c s of Language i n Malaysia", Asian Survey, V o l . 7, No. 5, 1967. 113 Tunku, op. c i t . , p. 136. 114 I b i d . , p. 120. '^''See Chapter Two, supra, f h n 79'.9. 116 Chapter Three, supra, fhn.20. ''""'"^Seven years a f t e r May 13, Mahathir became the s u r p r i s e choice of Premier Hussein Onn f o r Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r . See New S t r a i t s Times, March 2, 1976. 118 According tio.-ta Eloseoaidej. none-.of^Razak'.srspeeches .even when he wasHhe Tunku's deputy could be s a i d to be b l a t a n t l y a n t i communist_or pro-Western and he (Razak) had always put a premium on Afro-Asian r e l a t i o n s . Interview w i t h Encik Zain A z r a a i , November 1, 1975. 119 Interview w i t h Dr. Noordin Sopiee of New S t r a i t s Times, June 10, 1975. 120 Foreign A f f a i r s Malaysia,Vol. 3, No. 2, December 1971, p.L 15. s  121 122  Interview w i t h Encik Yusof Hitam, June 27, 1975. Cf. Chapter One, p. 54.  123 In l i n e w i t h t h i s strategy, the Government has launched the "Rukun Tetangga" (Community S e l f - R e l i a n c e ) , which c a l l s f o r the c i t i z e n r y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n community s e c u r i t y , and there are plans to commence n a t i o n a l service i n about two years time. The recent spate of insurgent a c t i v i t y include the gunning down of S p e c i a l Branch o f f i c e r s and the bombing of the N a t i o n a l Monument. Various issues of New S t r a i t s Times, August and September, 1975.  221 124 125 126  I n t e r v i e w w i t h E n c i k Hasmy Agam, May Economic Report See  1974-75, op.  supra, Chapter  Two,  pp.  30,  1975.  c i t . , p. 3. 39-40, and  ,  Chapter  Three,  p.  113.  127 I n t e r v i e w s w i t h E n c i k Yusof Hitam, E n c i k Ban-Haron and E n c i k L o o i Cheok Him, c i t e r e a r l i e r . 128 New S t r a i t s Times, August 7, 1975. 129 In the l i g h t of r e v e l a t i o n s about Tun Razak's f a i l i n g h e a l t h , t h i s f a c t o r may have prompted the Prime M i n i s t e r to g i v e up the p o r t f o l i o a l i t t l e e a r l i e r than he had i n t e n d e d . 130 See Chapter Two,-fih 83. 131 I n t e r v i e w w i t h Dr. Tan Chee Khoon (Pekemas), May 22, 1975, En. Lim K i t Siang (DAP), J u l y 10, 1975 and En. Fan Yew Teng (DAP), J u l y , 1975. 132 The S o v i e t Union has i t s e l f made a vague p r o p o s a l f o r an " A s i a n C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y " system. See Sheldon W. Simon, A s i a n N e u t r a l i s m and U.S. P o l i c y , Wash., D . C , American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e f o r P u b l i c P o l i c y Research, 1975, pp. 64-74. 1 3 3  I b i d . , pp.  49-74.  134 C f . I b i d . , p. 135  52.  I n t e r v i e w w i t h E n c i k Z a i n a l Aznam, May  136  See  s u p r a . , pp.  29,  1975.  180-181  137 I n t e r v i e w s w i t h v a r i o u s government o f f i c i a l s , who w i s h to be named, and j o u r n a l i s t s . 138 ,., Ibid. T  139 I n t e r v i e w w i t h E n c i k L o o i Cheok H i n , May "*" ^See i n f r a , pp.  233-235.  ''"^"''See i n f r a , pp.  235-236<?.nd  4  ;  .  27,  1975.  d i d not  222  CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION  A HOLISTIC INTERPRETATION OF FOREIGN POLICY  In reviewing Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y over the three h i s t o r i c a l periods, one i s at once struck by i t s progression and dynamics over time.  One i s a l s o struck by a c e r t a i n symmetry i n the development  of Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y since independence.  Among the most  s a l i e n t features of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l progression and symmetry are: (i)  the existence of two f a i r l y s t a b l e periods of foreign p o l i c y separated by an unstable, t r a n s i t i o n a l period;  (ii)  the dominance i n the two stable periods of an e l i t e ideology, which however took i t s underpinnings from d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i c a l paradigms, and the mixed nature of e l i t e perceptions i n the t r a n s i t i o n a l period;  (iii)  a major s h i f t i n Malaysian f o r e i g n p o l i c y - as represented by the replacement of one s t a b l e period f o r another - which may be v i s u a l i z e d as a movement from an extreme end to a middle p o s i t i o n on the East-West i d e o l o g i c a l continuum.  223 The  development of M a l a y s i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r  progression  and  i n t e r n a l and The  symmetry r e a l l y u n d e r s c o r e s the s i g n i f i c a n c e of  e x t e r n a l feedback e f f e c t s a c t i n g upon f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  s t a b i l i t y of the f i r s t  p e r i o d marked the preponderance of  p o s i t i v e l y r e i n f o r c i n g feedback on Malayan f o r e i g n p o l i c y , o r , a t any  r a t e , the l a c k of s e v e r e l y n e g a t i v e  s t a b i l i t y was  upset i n i t i a l l y  by  feedback.  In time,  the extreme n e g a t i v e  this  external  feedback of Indonesian K o n f r o n t a s i which i n t u r n brought about negative The  i n t e r n a l feedback e f f e c t s from elements i n the body  t u r m o i l i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y generated i n the second p e r i o d  together  w i t h domestic p o l i t i c a l developments c u l m i n a t i n g  leadership and  s h i f t - p r o p e l l e d f o r e i g n p o l i c y toward the new  s t a b i l i t y of the t h i r d p e r i o d .  The  continuing  i n t e r n a l and policy.  e x t e r n a l environment t o the new  only p o s s i b l e  the  the  but  i n a study  Within  each p e r i o d ,  the  for  I have demonstrated t h a t t h e r e were some feedback e f f e c t s  which were s u f f i c i e n t general  of  (and n e c e s s a r y ) to i n d i c a t e  most important of the feedback e f f e c t s . instance,  equilibrium  directions i n foreign  Feedback r e a l l y i s an u n c e a s i n g p r o c e s s ,  such as t h i s , i t was  -  in a  stability  t h i r d p e r i o d r e f l e c t s the g e n e r a l l y p o s i t i v e feedback from  politic.  to cause minor changes w i t h o u t a f f e c t i n g the  thrust of f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  A l o n g w i t h the s u b s t a n t i v e  observations  p o l i c y over three h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d s t h e o r e t i c a l f i n d i n g s and  about M a l a y s i a n f o r e i g n  a r e a number o f  important  i m p l i c a t i o n s which t h i s study has  brought  to  224 light: (1)  that f o r e i g n p o l i c y - as observed from the Malaysian case - i s a purposeful  activity  geared to the pursuit of various r e a l and/or perceived n a t i o n a l needs and i n t e r e s t s no matter how  these may  be coloured and  by the psychological and operational  influenced constraints  a c t i n g upon the policy-makers. (2)  that (a) a p l