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Kant's subject-object distinction Porsche, Stephen 1967-08-19

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KANT'S SUBJEGT-OBJlEGTr DISTINCTION; b y Stephen Porsche B i A . , University of British Columbia, 1965 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment' of the Requirements for the Degree of MAST-ERP. OF ARTS in the Department of PHILOSOPHY We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April, 1967 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced deg ree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g ree t h a t t h a L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r ag ree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Depar tment o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Depar tment o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada Abstract In chapters two and three of t h i s t h e s i s , the d i s t i n c t i o n between the subject and object of knowledge and perception i n Kant's C r i t i q u e of Pure Reason i s examined i n terms of what Kant c a l l s , " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . " These r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s are not, i n g eneral, as the name might suggest, p i c t u r e s i n the mind, or copies of o b j e c t s . They are i s o l a t e d b i t s of i n f o r m a t i o n which the mind has about the world; or, i n other words, e l e  mentary ways i n which the subject i s r e l a t e d to the o b j e c t s which i t knows or perceives. The subject i s c o n s t i t u t e d by the grouping of rep r e s e n t a t i o n s i n t o d i f f e r e n t kinds of rep r e  s e n t a t i o n s , mainly on the b a s i s of s i m i l a r i t i e s , so that we have the same s o r t s of i n f o r m a t i o n about d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t s . The object i s that which rep r e s e n t a t i o n s r e l a t e to when se l e c t representations of many d i f f e r e n t kinds are combined, mainly on the b a s i s of coherence, so that we have d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of i n f o r m a t i o n about the same o b j e c t . Chapter one i s devoted to Kant's d o c t r i n e of the object i n i t s e l f , which i s discussed i n terms of the d i s t i n c t i o n be tween knowledge and b e l i e f . Objects i n themselves are o b j e c t s apart from our r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of them. In s p i t e of the f a c t that they cannot be known, objects i n themselves are s i g n i f i  cant i n s o f a r as the f a l s e b e l i e f that we can know them i s an I n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t of the c a p a c i t y of the subject to combine repre s e n t a t i o n s i n d i f f e r e n t ways, i n c l u d i n g the combination of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n the concept of an unknowable o b j e c t . Table of Contents I n t r o d u c t i o n . p. 1. Chapter One: Objects i n Themselves. p. 5. Chapter Two: Representations and Appearances, p. 26. Chapter Three: Subject and Object. p. 64. Conclusion. p. 76. B i b l i o g r a p h y . P. 80. Acknowledgment Discussions with P.N.Stewart were helpful in the i n i t i a l development of some of the ideas in this thesis, and Dr. Peter Remnant's thorough and thoughtful c r i t i c a l comments were indispensable. Thanks, also, to Wulfing von Schleinitz, for proofreading. Introduction There i s hardly a section i n the Critique of Pure  Reason which does not make use of the subject-object- distinction. This distinction i s for Kant an ever- present dualism which hauntfc his more explicit monistic Idealism. Kant himself says that- a transcendental idealist may be a dualist.* That this dualism i s pres ent: i s not suprlsing considering the overall plan of the Critique, for reason i s differentiated from logic at the outset; because " i t has to deal not with i t s e l f alone but also with objects," because i t involves the relation ships between the thinking subject' and objects, not just between one thought and another thought without refer ence to objects. What i s suprlsing i s that Kant should begin without giving an explicit analysis of this dis tinction which i s seemingly more basic tohls theory of knowledge than the categories or even space and time. The importance of the subject-object distinction; In the f i r s t Critique i s obscured by the extreme emphasis which i s given to the perceiving subjects i n Kant's term inology. Opening the Critique of Pure Reason at random one comes across term after term concerning the thinking, A370. A l l references are to the standard page numbecs of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Norman Kemp&" Smith's translation i s used through-out. 2 Bix. -2- perceiving subject without a corresponding array of; terms concerning the perceived objects towards which thought Is directed. On the side of the subject Kant's terminology distinguishes such faculties of mind as sensibility, understanding, and reason, as well as such entities and processes as sensible impressions, images, schemata, concepts, ideas, principles, perceptions, intuitions, and judgments. Oh the side of the objects there are only the terms "object" and "object In i t s e l f . " There i s also the term, "appearance," but i t i s by no means obvious whether this term belongs on the side of the thinking subject or on the side of the objects. While this wealth of terms for referring to the subV Ject reflectts, prima facie, a lopsided preference on Kant's part for the subject over the object, i t i s possible to step back and consider-the problem from another point of view, namely, from the vantage point of the term, "repre sentation." A l l the aspects of the perceiving subject which Kant considers—sensible impressions, categories, forms of intuition, and so on—have this i n common: They are a l l representations. Prom this perspective the bal ance between subject and object i s restored to the extent that we can seek our goal of understanding the subject- object distinction quickly by asking some general questions about representations rather than losing ourselves i n a maze of concepts, schemata, and sensations which seems to go around in circles and keep the objects of perception which we seek permanently hidden from us. Concerning rep resentations, the questions are: What do a l l representa tions have in common which makes them a l l representations? What Is the relationship between a representation and that;: which Is represented? To what extent can problems about the subject-object distinction be c l a r i f i e d , stated, and resolved i n terms of representations? Three quotations from completely different parts of the f i r s t C r i t i q u e I l l u s t r a t e some of the problems i n  volved i n understanding what representations are and how they relate to other entities: A l l our intuition i s nothing but the representation of appearance.3 How things may be in themselves, apart from the representations through which they affect.us, i s entirely outside our sphere of knowledge.4 External objects (bodies), however, are mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of my representations.-* What Is especially problematic here are the meanings of and relationships between the terms, "things i n themselves, "appearances," and "representations." If representation Is 3A42. 4A190. 5A370. " o f a p p e a r a n c e " b u t ' a p p e a r a n c e s a r e s t i l l " a s p e c i e s o f my r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , " d o e s t h i s i m p l y t h a t a p p e a r a n c e s a r e i n t u r n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f s o m e t h i n g e l s e — o f t h e t h i n g i n i t s e l f ? C a n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s b e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f s o m e t h i n g w h i c h i s unknown , , a s t h e y w o u l d h a v e t o be i f t h e y w e r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h i n g s i n t h e m s e l v e s ? O f c a n a p p e a r a n c e b e a s p e c i a l k i n d o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i c h i s n o t a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g e l e e ? I n a n y c a s e , I t a k e i t a s e v i d e n t t h a t K a n t wan t i s t o make some s o r t o f d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e o b v i o u s l y c l o s e l y r e l a t e d e n t i t i e s , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d a p p e a r a n c e s , a s w e l l a s t o e s t a b l i s h some s o r t o f r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e o b - v i o a s l y d i s t i n c t k n o w a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d u n k n o w a b l e t h i n g s i n t h e m s e l v e s . I s h a l l t h e r e f o r e b a s e my a n a l y s i s o f K a n t ' s s u b j e c t s - o b j e c t d i s t i n c t i o n o n a p r e l i m i n a r y e x  a m i n a t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n o b j e c t s i n t h e m s e l v e s a n d r e p r e s e n t a t l o n s ? a n d o n a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . Chapter One: Objects in Themselves Kant says that objects in themselves, that la, objects apart from the conditions under which they are sensed, are completely unknown to human beings:* Objects in themselves are 1 . ) unknown and 2.) contrasted to objects of sensation, and thus the object in itself may be properly characterized only by saying that i t is not an object of sensible intu- ition (intuition being direct relation to an object ). Perhaps i t is because this bare something-we-know- not-what is such an unpromising topic for conversation that many of Kant's readers have been baffled by the thing In itself in particular, and Kant's broader agnosticism in general. Why posit that there is something about which we cannot know anything? If we cannot know anything about the object in itself, why think that there is an object In Itself at all? Why does Kant insist repeatedly that we cannot know objects in themselves as i f this were a signif icant denial^ rather than Just a result of the way thing In Itself is defined. Furthermore, is not agnosticism in gen eral the meaningless claim that there are things which we cannot know buat we can be in doubt that eannot know them or even know for certain that we cannot know them? How can 1A42. 2A18. -6- we know t h a t t h e r e i s something we cannot know? How can the unknown even o c c u r t o us so as t o make n e c e s s a r y t h e a g n o s t i c ' s modest d e n i a l o f knowledge? T h i s s t r a n g e unknown o b j e c t i n i t s e l f i s i m p o r t a n t enough t o Kant f o r him t o have employed a t l e a s t two terms t o r e f e r t o i t , f o r the term "noumenon" i s equated t o t h e term " o b j e c t i n i t s e l f ( though I s u s p e c t t h a t t h e r e a r e c o n n o t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e two terms) so t h a t "the concept o f a noumenon" i s s a i d t o be t h e concept o f "a t h i n g w h i c h i s not t o be thought as o b j e c t o f the senses but as a t h i n g i n i t s e l f . " 3 A l s o , Kant d i s t i n g u i s h e s between a n e g a t i v e and a pos i t i v e sense o f t h e term " o b j e c t - i n . i t s e l f " a l i a s "noumenon" i n w h i c h t h e n e g a t i v e sense means "a t h i n g so f a r as I t i s not an o b j e c t o f our s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n , " w h i l e t h e p o s i t i v e sense r e f e r s t o "an obj e c t o f a n o n - s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n . " 4 I t i s n o t e w o r t h y t h a t Kant t a k e s " n o n - s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n " t o mean " i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n ^ although,, on p u r e l y l o g i c a l grounds, I t would be p o s s i b l e f o r " n o n - s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n " t o be a genus i n c l u d i n g Innumerable s p e c i e s o f i n t u i t i o n , s o t h a t a S p i n o z i s t i c God w i t h i n f i n i t e a t t r i b u t e s might a l s o have i n f i n i t e modes o f n o n - s e n s i b l e I n t u i t i o n . However, Kant does not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between n o n - s e n s i  b l e i n t u i t i o n i n g e n e r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n i n 3A254. 4 B307. particular, but rather equates non-sensible intuition and intellectual intuition. Kant does not speculate about modes of intuition belonging to non-human faculties of knowledge. He does speculate about a non-human mode of intuition be longing to a human faculty of knowledge, a faculty of know ledge which we actually have but without intuitive powers, the faculty of understanding. Thus Kant's denial that we can know objects in them selves i s the specific denial that we can intuit objects intellectually, and Kant, far from positing an unknown some thing Just for the sake of tautologically denying that we can know i t , i s on the contrary concerned to show that we cannot know some things which the very nature of human under standing tempts us to believe we can know: It i s only by considering the distinction between belief and knowledge, i n addition to the distinction between the known and the un known, that Kant's doctrine of the object i n i t s e l f can be understood. By belief I mean the affirmation or assumption that something i s true on the basis of one element of knowl edge where knowledge consists of more than one element. The profundity of Kant's agnosticism i s his analysis of knowledge as the union of conceptual thought and sensory Intuition, so that either element may be present without the other but without qualifying as knowledge, making i t "Just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that i s , to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our -8- i n t u i t i o n s i n t e l l i g i b l e , t h a t i s , t o b r i n g them under 5 c o n c e p t s . M Thought and knowledge are t o be c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d : "To know an o b j e c t I must be able t o prove i t s p o s s i b i l i t y , e i t h e r from I t s a c t u a l i t y as a t t e s t e d by experience, o r a p r i o r i by means o f reason. But I can t h i n k whatever I p l e a s e , p r o v i d e d o n l y that I do not c o n t r a d i c t myself."^ W i t h i n t h i s framework a g n o s t i c i s m i s q u i t e meaningful, s i n c e , although I cannot know something that I cannot know, knowing and not knowing are not the only a l t e r n a t i v e s . I can t h i n k something I cannot know, and,Inasmuch as thought o f t e n a c t u a l l y i s f u l f i l l e d i n sensory I n t u i t i o n , i t occurs t o me q u i t e n a t u r a l l y t h a t , when I have o n l y one element of knowledge, the thought, i t might q u i t e w e l l be p o s s i b l e that t h e r e i s an object which corresponds t o l t , and i f the thought i s of something which cannot be sensed, I w i l l be tempted t o search around f o r a non-sensory mode of i n t u i t i o n , and s i n c e the o n l y o t h e r f a c u l t y o f knowledge I possess b e s i d e s s e n s i b i l i t y I s understanding, I s h a l l l i k e l y s e t t l e f o r a supposed i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n r a t h e r than p a t i e n t l y suspend my Judgment. W i t h i n t h i s framework the thought o f the unknown w i l l always be o c c u r r i n g t o me, without, of course, being known to me. To r e t u r n to the object i n i t s e l f , the q u e s t i o n was: 5A5.1. ^ B x x v l i n . I f we cannot know anything about the object i n i t s e l f , why think that there i s an object i n i t s e l f at a l l ? The an swer i s that we can e a s i l y think—indeed, we can't r e s i s t thinking about—much that we cannot know. The thing i n I t s e l f does not s i g n i f y a mere unknown which to deny knowl edge of i s t r i v i a l , but a much more s p e c i f i c e n t i t y which we can or can t r y to think and which we are perpetually tempted to claim that we can also know. Thought extends beyond i n t u i t i o n f o r Kant i n the same way w i l l extends behead I n t e l l e c t f o r Descartes. Kant suggests that there are two general kinds of ob jects of I n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n or noumena i n the po s i t i v e sense: "Doubtless, indeed, there are i n t e l l i g i b l e e n t i t i e s corresponding to the sensible e n t i t i e s ; there may also be i n t e l l i g i b l e e n t i t i e s to which our sensible f a c u l t y of i n t u i t i o n has no r e l a t i o n whatsoever." This l a s t sort of i n t e l l i g i b l e e n t i t y l i k e l y r e f e r s to the supposed objects of the transcendental i d e a s — t h e concepts of the uncondi tioned, such as God and the immortal soul, which have no objects corresponding to them i n sense-experience. The hypostatizatlon of these ideas r e s u l t s i n the transcendental i l l u s i o n s , these being i l l u s i o n s which aris e not accident a l l y from sophistry or carelessness, but in e v i t a b l y from the very nature of reason i t s e l f . 7B308-309. 8A339. - 1 0 - What le striking here ie the close similarity of the transcendental illusions i n the last half of the Critique to the thing i n i t s e l f in4he f i r s t half of the Critiques The thing i n i t s e l f i s virtually a transcendental i l l u s i o n , an a l l but unavoidable temptation to claim to know something that we can think,but which we cannot know because i t i s unconditioned. There i s nothing perverse, then, in repeating over and over again, as Kant does, that we cannot know something which we eannot know, provided, as i s the case with the thing i n i t s e l f , that people believe that i t i s something which can be known. The object i n Itself i s not defined as unknown; It i s defined as an object as l t i s apart from the conditions of human sensibility, from which i t follows as a matter of f a c t — o r , rather, as a matter of metaphysics— that i t cannot be known by human beings. For the denial that we know objects i n themselves to be significant^the human mind must be such that i t creates the belief that we can know objects i n themselves. Let us see how this belief arises. I have a concept of a book of over 300 pages in length with a green cloth cover, and whose pages are at least three inches wide and five inches high. Does such a book exist? The question i s over-cautious since doubtless there are many instances i n the world of individual books which f i t this description. I would create even better odds that -11- there actually exist books corresponding to my concept by simply removing one of the conditions, such as the color of the cover, so to think of a book of over 300 pages of the specified dimensions with a cloth cover of any color. And one by one I can abstract the other characteristics so that at last I am conceiving of a book in general, a book of any number of pages and any measurable dimensions bound in any material of any color, so long only as i t qualifies as a book. On the other hand, I can think of more, rather than lees, specific characteristics. I can conceive of a book of exactly 300 pages, the pages exactly four inches wide, with a dark green cover and an ink smudge on page 250 and with part of page 168 torn out. I do not know whether such a book exists^ since I have never seen one f i t t i n g this de scription; I have only the concept, and not the intuition. I did not arrive at the concept of this hypothetical book by describing something I observed, but simply by combining cer tain representations which I already possessed. These thoughts about books Illustrate three character i s t i c s of the human mind: Fi r s t , i t i s the very nature of thought to abstract from the conditions under which specific objects of sensation exist. Second, these abstractions or concepts are potentially applicable to new objects never before Intuited as long as these objects are of the sort - 1 2 - with which the concept i s concerned. Third, the hypothe sized not-yet-intulted objects can be more specifically described by such resources as the understanding has by com bining concepts and specifying characteristics of the object. The concept of a book with a green cover and more than 300 pages, etc., can correspond to many instances of actu a l l y existing books Just because i t leaves out many specific characteristics which a particular book might have. Further, i t i s by means of this characteristic of concepts—to be equally applicable to many particular instances—that the concept of a green book applies to future possible green books as well as those already perceived. Finally, by com bining In a new way characteristics of already observed books, the concept of a unique book could be produced whether or not such a book actually exists. Having illustrated three characteristics of thought with these examples involving an empirical object, I shall now apply them as a three step thought process to objects In gen eral. F i r s t , there i s the abstraction from particular i n  stances, then the supposition that there are objects to which the concept corresponds other than those objects already experienced on the occasion of which the concept was origin a l l y abstracted, and f i n a l l y , there i s the attempt to con ceive of the specific characteristics of the new objects supposed in the second step. These three steps may be called: Abstraction, hypostatization, and specification - 1 3 - of the hypothesized abstraction. To conceive of books abstractly i s to disregard a l l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c e r t a i n objects save only that they are books. Objects can be conceived i n a p a r a l l e l manner as abstractly as possible by disregarding everything about ob ject's except that they are objects, abstracting from a l l conditions under which p a r t i c u l a r objects are perceived. The abstraction, hypostatization, and s p e c i f i c a t i o n of ob jects i n general i s as follows: 1. The object considered as abstractly as possible i s the representation of an object.abstracted from the conditions of s e n s i b i l i t y . This may be what Kant means by the transcendental object = x. 2. The hypostatization of the mere representation of an object i n general i s the assumption that there are ob jects corresponding to the bare representation of objects as things outside of ourselves which are not the objects of sensory i n t u i t i o n . This i s the negative sense of noumenon. 3. The more s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which are as cribed to the hypostatization of the mere representation of an object i n general are that these objects are related to us under the conditions of a supposed i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i  t i o n . This i s the p o s i t i v e sense of noumenon. The representation of an object i n general corresponds to innumerable actual objects because i t does not concern the s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the objects but only - 1 4 - that they are objects. The concept, "object," like the concept, "book," applies to new entities other than those from which the concept was f i r s t abstracted because It i s the very nature of a concept to transcend any particular Instances of that which has been conceptualized. The difference between these two cases i s that swhile the con cept of a hook in general does not abstract from the con ditions of sensory intuition,the concept of an object In general does so abstract, or so Kant would maintain. Only because we can think abstractly can—no, must—it occur to us that there might be new instances of old concepts. When the thought abstracts from the conditions of sensory intuition, as i s the case with the concept of an object in general, i t i s possible that the new instances corresponding to the concept w i l l not be objects of sensory intuition. Though f a l l i n g far short of knowledge, the mere concept of something which Is not an object of sensory intuition i s sufficient for the belief that such objects exist to occur, and insofar as the belief occurs 9it i s significant to deny that this belief could be known to be true, that i s , i t i s significant to deny that we can know objects i n themselves. If this limitation on our knowledge i s ignored^it i s possible to posit different sorts of objects i n themselves. This quixotic attempt to differentiate one object In Itself from another proceeds i n two ways: Either partially ab stracted, semi-conditioned concepts of sensory objects are - 1 5 - h y p o s t a t i z e d j o r some r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r c o m b i n a t i o n o f r e p  r e s e n t a t i o n s w h i c h w e r e n e v e r d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h s e n  s o r y o b j e c t s i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e i s t h o u g h t o f a s a n i n t e l  l e c t u a l l y i n t u i t e d o b j e c t . T h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e r n s t h e o b j e c t s o f i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n w h i c h - d o r r e s p o n d t o s e n s i b l e e n t i t i e s , a n d t h e s e c o n d , o b j e c t s o f i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n w h i c h do n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o s e n s i b l e e n t i t i e s . 7 T h e f i r s t , i n a t t e m p t i n g t o c h a r a c t e r i z e s p e c i f i c a l l y o b  j e c t s w h i c h a r e n o t o b j e c t s o f s e n s o r y i n t u i t i o n , , f a l l s i n t o c o n t r a d i c t i o n a n d t h e o b j e c t s a r e t h u s u n k n o w a b l e , a n d t h e s e c o n d a v o i d s c o n t r a d i c t i o n b y s u c h u t t e r a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m a l l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t t h e r e i s no way t o i n t u i t t h e o b j e c t s , w h i c h a r e t h u s a l s o u n k n o w a b l e . A n e x a m p l e o f t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e w o u l d b e t h e a t  t e m p t t o d e s c r i b e a n d p o s i t a s a n o b j e c t t h e b o o k i n i t s e l f w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e k n o w a b l e b o o k a s s e n s o r y a p p e a r  a n c e . S i n c e i t i s a b o o k , wha t s i z e a r e I t s p a g e s ? 3 x 5 i n c h e s ? B u t t o h a v e s i z e i t mus t b e i n s p a c e a n d o b j e c t s i n t h e m s e l v e s a r e n o t i n s p a c e . How many s i z e l e s s p a g e s d o e s t h i s b o o k h a v e ? 300? B u t i n o r d e r t o k n o w t h a t , i t w o u l d h a v e t o b e p o s s i b l e t o c o u n t t h e p a g e s , a n d c o u n t i n g t a k e s t i m e , a n d s i n c e o b j e c t s i n t h e m s e l v e s a r e n o t I n t i m e we c a n n o t know how many s i z e l e s s p a g e s a b o o k i n I t s e l f h a s . T h e n p e r h a p s i t d o e s n ' t h a v e p a g e s ? T h e n i t i s n ' t a b o o k . B308-309. C f . p . 9 a b o v e . -16- An example of the second alternative i s the f i r s t anti nomy interpreted i n terms of i t s solution, which states that we can have no experience of an absolute limit, and that the idea of an absolute limit, though not contradictory,cannot be known because i t cannot be Intuited**^ We constantly employ i n experience the concept of something having a be- ginning in time and limits i n space. By abstracting from time and space we arrive at the concepts of an unconditioned beginning and of unconditioned limitations which we then at tempt to apply to the universe as a whole, so to conceive of the beginning of the universe and the edge of the universe. Now beginning and limitation cannot be here thought of as respectively temporal and spatial since the only way we reached a degree of abstraction suitable for application to the universe as a whole in the f i r s t place was to remove i n thought the conditions of space and time. If beginning and limitation are not conceived as temporal and spatial, then, though there i s no contradiction i n a non-temporal beginning or non-spatial limitation, we have no way of intuiting such empty concepts. Therefore we could not possibly know whether or not the universe has a beginning or limitations. As a matter of strict definition the object i n Itse l f and the noumenon are one and the same, but in connotation they are different. "Noumenon," suggesting nous, the Greek 10A517 f f . word for mind, sounds much more removed from sensibility than "thing in i t s e l f " which has a more concrete, physical sound. Noumena would thus be the objects of intellectual intuition which do not correspond to sensible entities, the object of the concepts of the unconditioned Kant calls the transcendental ideas, while objects i n themselves would be something much more specific which we tend to think we can know when we don't attend to the contradictions i n  volved, something very much li k e physical objects—except unconditioned: First we experience ordinary objects of sensation, then we posit the unconditioned existence of these very same objects, only apart from the conditions of our sensibility. Whereas "noumenon" suggests cosmic pro fundities, "thing in i t s e l f " suggests more substantial copies of everyday objects. Whereas transcendental ideas are unconditioned from the start, objects in themselves are only conditioned things, things as appearances, con sidered as unconditioned at the last moment. The object i n i t s e l f , i f I may offer the long-awaited description, i s the woman in the Picaseo paintings whose face shows a l l sides at once. The object In i t s e l f has color where there i s no light and weight where there i s no gravity; i t has shape which Is not distorted by being viewed from different angles, and i t appears the same size no matter how close to i t or far from i t one i s . The object in i t s e l f Is Just a l i t t l e bit more vivid and certain and immediate than anything we actually experiences It i s a feather bed whose softness i s revealed i n the spaces be tween the feathers, an anvil which i s hard even i n the void between the atoms; It i s sugar which i s sweet because i t i s white and granular without there being any danger of i t s being salt; i t i s located in a naive realist's heaven in which flames are hot because of their semi-transparent orange-red color, where MacBeth's dagger i s sharp because of i t s metallic g l i t t e r , where sticks never bend when thrust into water, and where the most deafening noises are made by trees f a l l i n g in uninhabited forests millions of miles from ear or eye or beast or man or the stealthlest percepts in the mind of God. It i s the third of the steps I mentioned—the attempt to specify the characteristics of hypostatized abstractions- which creates the impression that there i s a gradual tran sition from the objects of experience to the objects in themselves which support them. The various degrees of ab straction, arrived at as the conditions under which we per ceive something are removed one by one i n thought, are thought of as corresponding to similar degrees of absense of conditions i n the object. Then, since sensory intuition does not disclose this unconditioned object as l t Is in thought, we think of the objects we sense as confused im pressions of the objects i n themselves, the objects In themselves consisting of more solid stuff which we half -19- e x p e e t w o u l d r e v e a l i t s e l f t o u s a t a n y m o m e n t , i f o n l y o u r s e n s e s w e r e a b i t s h a r p e r o r o u r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s m o r e t h o r o u g h . B u t , a l a s , t h e o b j e c t i n i t s e l f h a s a l w a y s J u s t l e f t w h e n w e t u r n t o l o o k a t i t ; i t e v a d e s o u r g r a s p l i k e a m o n s t e r e s c a p i n g t o t h e d e p t h s a n d l e a v i n g b e h i n d h i s f o o t  p r i n t s i n t h e d e l i c a t e f r e s h - f a l l e n s n o w o f o u r s e n s o r y I n  t u i t i o n . We c a n o n l y w a i t a n d h o p e f o r i t s e v e n t u a l e m e r  g e n c e i n t o t h e r e a l m o f k n o w l e d g e l i k e a n i c e b e r g r i s i n g f r o m s t i l l g r e e n f a t h o m s t o f l o a t , n o t J u s t i t s t i p , b u t i t s f u l l v o l u m e , o n t h e r e s t l e s s , s w e l l i n g s u r f a c e o f t h e s e a o f a p p e a r a n c e s , l i k e a d i n o s a u r s l o w l y a w a k e n i n g f r o m a g e s o f p e t r i f i c a t i o n a n d e m e r g i n g w i t h m a s s i v e a w k w a r d s t e p s o u t o f t h e o o z i n g m u d p i t s o f t h e u n k n o w n I n t o t h e s u n l i g h t o f t h e c a t e g o r i e s s h i n i n g d o w n u p o n t h e l a n d o f i n t u i t i o n . K a n t w a r n s a g a i n s t s u c h s e a r c h i n g o r w a i t i n g f o r o b  j e c t s i n t h e m s e l v e s : W h a t " o b j e c t s m a y b e i n t h e m s e l v e s w o u l d n e v e r b e c o m e k n o w n t o u s t h r o u g h t h e m o s t e n l i g h t e n e d k n o w l e d g e o f t h a t w h i c h i s a l o n e g i v e n t o u s , n a m e l y , t h e i r a p p e a r a n c e . " 1 1 " i t i s n o t t h a t b y o u r s e n s i b i l i t y we c a n n o t k n o w t h e n a t u r e o f t h i n g s i n t h e m s e l v e s i n a n y s a v e a c o n f u s e d f a s h i o n ; we d o n o t a p p r e h e n d t h e m i n a n y f a s h i o n „ 1 o w h a t s o e v e r . B y i n s i s t i n g o n c a l l i n g t h e o b j e c t s w h i c h we c a n k n o w , 1 1A43. 1 2A44. "appearances," Kant forces us to constantly think of what we can know in contrast to what we cannot know, of objects as appearances in contrast to objects in themselves. While on the one hand, this puts us ever on gaurd against mis taking something we can at best merely think for something we can f u l l y know, on the other hand, i t i s confusing inas much as i n ordinary usage "appearance" often means " i l l u j - sion" or "that which seems," whereas Kantian objects as ap pearance are just what are not illusory objects or seeming objects. Kant i s hardly to be praised for such unfortunate terminology. S t i l l , by careful attention we can understand what he means, for Kant recognized that his distinction between objects in themselves and appearances might be con fused with another, but "merely empirical," distinction which could be made using the same terms—the distinction between essential and accidental Intuition, between that which "holds for sense i n a l l human beings" and that which "is valid not in relation to sensibility In general but only In relation to a particular standpoint or to a peculiarity of structure in this or that sense." 1 3 On a dark night my friend's coat might seem to be black, but in better light I realize that l t i s really dark blue. As I am passing the display window of a clothing store one 13A45. - 2 1 - of the manikins appears to move, but on closer inspection I see that i t i s really one of the workers at the store dusting off the Inanimate objects. The distinction made i n these examples could be indicated by saying that the black coat and the animate manikin were appearances and the dark blue coat and the hired help were the objects In them selves. Perhaps some of those who are baffled by Kant's pronouncements that we cannot know objects i n themselves are thinking of examples of this sort: They think that Kant i s denying that we can correct mistakes arising from a limited point of view by relating such a point of view to the more general conditions under which i t occurs. However, It i s not the conditioned but the unconditioned, not the transition from limited to general conditions but the leap from general conditions to the unconditioned, which Kant wants to disallow. If someone wants to claim that i t i s obvious that we can know objects i n themselves and that Kant denied some everyday event, he w i l l do well to check what he means by "object i n Itsel f " against what Kant meant. Likely he w i l l find that Kant referred to this everyday-event-object-in- i t s e l f by some other term such as "essential Intuition" or "object as appearance." This helps us understand the dis tinction between objects i n themselves and appearances i n  sofar as we are careful not to confuse this distlnc$ion -22- with the di s t i n c t i o n ' "between esse n t i a l and accidental i n t u i t i o n . 14 The categories apply only to appearances. This i s not to say, however, that categories apply to sense-data- l i k e e n t i t l e s . "Appearances" are not, i n Kant's d i c t i o n  ary, "the way objects seem," as the d i s t i n c t i o n between essen t i a l and accidental I n t u i t i o n shows: Accidental i n t u  i t i o n , an object seen from a p a r t i c u l a r standpoint only, i s the way a thing seems. In Kant's example, the rainbow Is the way the r a i n seems from a p a r t i c u l a r standpoint, while the r a i n i s the object as appearance: "Rain w i l l then be viewed only as that which, In a l l experience and i n a l l i t s various positions r e l a t i v e to the senses, i s determined thus, 15 and not otherwise, i n our i n t u i t i o n . " Thus to say that appearances are things which we take as objects of our senses 1^ i s to say more than that appearances are what i s given to one sense i n one position (which may be what some people mean by "sense-data"), but i s also to include among appearances f u l l scale objects such as raindrops perceived from various positions (plural) r e l a t i v e to the senses ( p l u r a l ) . Objects i n themselves are r e i f i e d patterns of thought. Their r e l a t i o n s h i p to the knowable objects as appearances i s 1 4 A239 1 5 A 4 5 . 1 6 A 3 4 . -23- t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h a t w h i c h appears and the appear ance. Though t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p can o n l y be tho u g h t , n o t kn o w n , 1 7 Kant t h i n k s t h a t the pr e s e n c e o f t h i s thought i n a l l our e x p e r e i e n c e i s so i m p o r t a n t t h a t we s h o u l d c o n s t a n t l y t h i n k o f what we know as depending on what we do not know, though o f c o u r s e t h i s way o f t h i n k i n g can never be knowl edge. Thus Kant speaks o f o b j e c t s as appearances as b^ .'ng t h e mode i n w h i c h we a r e a f f e c t e d by " t h a t something" w h i c h 1 ft a p p e a r s . T h i s i s c o n f u s i n g , s i n c e b e i n g " a f f e c t e d by some t h i n g " s u g g e s t s t h a t a p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n i s wanted. But i f " t h a t something" w h i c h appears i s t h e o b j e c t i n i t  s e l f , p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s a r e i r r e l e v a n t , s i n c e t h e ob j e c t s o f p h y s i o l o g y a r e o b j e c t s as appearances: I t i s the f l a m e as appearance w h i c h burns my f l e s h as appearance, w h i l e t h e flame i n I t s e l f and t h e f l e s h i n i t s e l f a r e i r r e l e v a n t . Of c o u r s e , I do not know the p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f most o f my p e r c e p t i o n s . T h i s , however, I s m a i n l y because I am not p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n p h y s i o l o g y , not because such e x p l a n a t i o n s are i n p r i n c i p l e unknowable. Perhaps t h e c o n f u s i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between sense organs and the o b j e c t s w h i c h a f f e c t them, b o t h c o n s i d e r e d as appearances, w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between o b j e c t s as appear ances and t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g o b j e c t s i n t h e m s e l v e s c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e I m p r e s s i o n a l r e a d y n o t e d t h a t t h e r e i s a g r a d u a l 17Bxxvi. 1 8 A 4 4 . - 2 4 - transition from the object i n Itself to the object as ap pearance. At any rate, whereas any causal relationship between objects i n themselves and objects as appearances are i n principle unknowable, any causal relationship between sense organs as appearances and other objects as appearances which affect the senses, while i n principle knowable, are Irrelevant to metaphysics, since to discover causal rela tionships between objects and sense organs i s an empirical matter which presupposes that l t i s already possible to know objects (including sense organs as observed by other sense organs) and to perceive causal relationships, whereas It i s Just these pos s i b i l i t i e s which metaphysics seeks to under stand: How i s i t possible to know or experience objects or to perceive causal relationships? Of course, Kant and other eplstemologists constantly refer to the senses, but they do this primarily to Identify different sorts of sensory i n  formation as experienced by the perceiving subject, not to discuss the physical nature of the sense organs as objects of perception. The purpose of the doctrine of objects i n themselves i s to show that the a b i l i t y to think much that cannot be given i n sense experience does not Involve the capacity to know objects as they are apart from the conditions of sensory intuition. Kant shows that we cannot know while at the same time we can hardly help but believe that objects - 2 5 - look exactly the same when no one i s looking at them as when someone i s , that there i s something more empirical than sensation hidden under the shapes and colors of the world, that there are i n t e l l i g i b l e entities corresponding to the objects which we sense—in short, that there are noumena supporting the phenomena. Chapter Two: Representations and Appearances Contrasted to the objects i n themselves which cannot be known are the objects as appearances which can be known, because, unlike objects i n themselves, they do come within the range of sensation: The objects which we can know are objects as they appear under the conditions of human sensibility. How are the objects which we can know related to the representations of them? In attempting to differentiate these objects as appearances from the representations of them, Kant says that "that which l i e s In the successive ap prehension i s here viewed as representation, while the ap pearance which i s given to me, notwithstanding that l t i s nothing but the sum of these representations i s viewed as their object." 1 How much of a distinction does this make? If, as Is not clear from this passage alone, the sum of representations which constitutes an object as appearance i s i t s e l f a representation, then, as Kant says in an entirely different passage, "mere appearances" are "nothing but a 2 species of my representations." A distinction has s t i l l been made, of course, even If "appearances" are Just another species of the genus "repre sentations." But this modest distinction does not always 1A19U 2A3T0. -27- seem adequate te Kant's theories. In the "Refutation of Idealism," for instance, Kant says that there i s something permanent i n perception and that this permanent i s possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representat ion of a thing outside me; and consequently the deter- minatlon of my existence in time i s possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me.3 These "actual things" are presumably objects as appearances, in which ease objects as appearances would be as distinct from representations, and thus no mere species of repre sentations, on the one hand, as they are distinct from ob jects i n themselves, on the other hand. The question, "What i s the distinction between repre sentations and appearances?", provokes the more general questions, "What i s the relationship between a representa tion and that which i s represented?" and "What i s a repre sentation?" That there are such a great variety of entities included among representations makes these questions both especially interesting and d i f f i c u l t . When Kant deliberately classifies representations, he includes among representations the following: Perception, sensation, knowledge, intuition, concept, and idea. 4 Else where Kant refers to Judgments^ and schemata*^ as repre- ^ 7 5 . 4A320. 5A68. 6A138. - 2 8 - sentations. Space and time, as species of intuition, and principles, as a type of Judgment, are also representations. It may seem strange to include, say, knowledge and space among representations, but nonetheless Kant does so. That we are concerned with a diversity of sorts of things here can be seen by considering that representations may be active or passive, a pri o r i or a posteriori, universal or particular, and mediate or immediate. Thus Kant contrasts the spontaneity of conceptual thought with the receptivity of intuition, and, while the categories are a priori and universal, sensation i s a posteriori and particular, space and time are particular and a p r i o r i , and concepts and int u i  tions are respectively mediate and immediate knowledge of ob jects. The case of concepts w i l l serve to il l u s t r a t e what I mean by the relationship between a representation and that represented. To the concept of a book as an abstraction correspond many instances of particular books as objects in space and time present to sensation. It i s because the concept i s concerned only with what these particular objects have in common, with no references to the endless differences in detail, that the concept can apply to many cases. Here, the concept i s the representation ?and the particular books are those things which are represented. This i s the familiar relationship between unlversals and particulars. - 2 9 - Obvlously the relationship between universals and particulars i s not the relationship between representations of a l l kinds and the respective sorts of things represented, since some representations, for instance, space and time, are themselves particular i n nature. Kant himself makes this comparison between concepts and forms of intuition as concerns space (and in a similar passage as concerns time): Space i s not a discursive or, as we say, general concept of relations of things i n general, but a pure intuition. For. . .we can represent to ourselves only one space; and i f we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Now every concept must be thought of as a repre sentation which i s contained i n an i n f i n i t e number of different possible representations (as their common character), and which therefore contains these under Itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as containing an i n f i n i t e number of repre sentations within Itself. It i s in this latter way, however, that space i s thought.' These relationships of being subsumed under a concept and being contained within space have this in common: In both cases there i s a relationship of unity to diversity, even though in the case of space the unifying factor i s as particular as are the diverse objects contained within i t . However, the relationship of unity to diversity cannot be the general relationship of representations to that repre sented, since l t does not apply to sensations, which are also representations. A25. Gf. A 31-32 -30- Th rough sensation we acquire a diversity of informa tion concerning detailed characteristics of objects. The few examples Kant gives of sensations show/; that he i s con cerned primarily with qualitatively different sorts of information of a fleeting, contingent sort, rather than with the processes by which objects affect the sense or- o gans. For instance, i n one passage Kant identifies as belonging to sensation, impenetrability, hardness, and color, 9 and in another passage, again colors and also sounds and heat. 1 0 Sensation, as supplying detailed Information about ob jects, has i n common with conceptualization the relationship of being about a limited aspect of what i s being represented. The weight and color of a heavy green book are isolatable sorts of Information about the book, yet they are s t i l l about the book. Both concept and sensation are about iso lated characteristics of that which i s represented. Since space and time are not characteristics of objects but ways in which objects are ordered, the relationship between a representation and that represented cannot be so specific as "x i s about isolated characteristics of y." However, though the ways objects are ordered are not characteristics of the objects, they are s t i l l about or concerned with objects. DCf. pp. 23-24 above. 9A21. 1 G A28. - 3 1 - This relationship, "x i s about y," the relationship between representations and that represented, I shall c a l l , "trans i t i v i t y . " Again and again Kant refers to representations i n terms of function and purpose. Representations are said to relate to, to be directed towards, and to apply to ob- Jects or to other representations. Thus Kant says that a l l thought i s directed as a means to intuition and intuition i n turn relates to objects, 1 1 and again that "thought i s the act which relates given intuition to an object." Also: "Pure reason never relates directly to objects, but to the concepts which the understanding frames i n regard to ob jec t s ; " 1 ^ Here the relationship to objects i s indirect, but s t i l l present. "Even space and time. . .would yet be with out objective validity, senseless and meaningless, i f their necessary application to the objects of experience were not established."1 4 The function of a representation i s i t s direction to something outside Itself so as to be of or about something. In order for a representation to f u l f i l l this function there must be something outside that representation—perhaps only other representations—to be represented. Certain verbs 11 12 13 A19. A247. A 3 3 5 . 1 4A156. -32- are called transitive i f they require a grammatical object to complete their meaning. Analogously, representations are transitive ? since they require that which i s represented to complete their meaning. So space and time could not be ways i n which other representations or appearances are ordered i f there were no such other entities to be ordered. Nor could a concept refer to an Isolated characteristic of various particular objects, i f there were no such objects to be conceptualized. If representations require something that i s repre sented to complete their meanings, they are, insofar as they can be isolated, incomplete, and, though l i k e l y too primitive to be s t r i c t l y definable, they may at least be characterized i n a manner complementary to the transitive relationships they enter into. So a representation i s an Incomplete ref erence to that which i s represented; i t characteristically refers to that which i s outside i t s e l f . To return to the distinction between appearances and representations, since appearances are something that i s representedjand that which i s represented i s what repre sentations require to complete their meaning, appearances are among the things which may complete the meanings of representations. This follows from the general nature of representations and their relationship to that which i s represented. However, some questions about the specific nature of representations and appearances remain: There i s -33- the question whether appearances are completely outside our r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s or not, and the question of Just what are these o b j e c t s as appearances to which Kant c o n s t a n t l y c o n t r a s t s o b j e c t s i n themselves. Appearances are something, though not the only t h i n g s , which are represented. Since r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s can be repre sented by other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and thus be the t h i n g which i s represented, i t may be the case that appearances are a species of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , but i t does not f o l l o w j u s t because the t h i n g represented may be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n that appearances as something represented a c t u a l l y are of t h i s s o r t . Are appearances a species of re p r e s e n t a t i o n s or not? Are appearances d i s t i n c t i v e c o l l e c t i o n s of re p r e s e n t a t i o n s or something completely d i f f e r e n t from representations? That Kant c o n t r a d i c t s h i m s e l f on these p o i n t s , there i s no doubt, though a s s e r t i o n s that appearances are a species of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s are f a r more frequent than a s s e r t i o n s to the c o n t r a r y . I t may t u r n out, however, that the infrequent d e n i a l that appearances are re p r e s e n t a t i o n s leads t o a more acceptable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Kant's philosophy. The typ i c a l statement on t h i s matter i s that "appearances, as mere re p r e s e n t a t i o n s , are In themselves r e a l only i n percepti o n , which pe r c e p t i o n I s i n f a c t nothing but the r e a l i t y of an empirical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , that i s , appearance." 1^ A493. Gf. A491, A498-9, A5C-8. -34- The untypical statement i s that of the "Refutation of Idealism," i n which i t i s quite emphatically asserted that the things which we perceive outside ourselves are actually things, not mere representations of things. 1 6 Of course, the term "appearance" is not used in this passage, but there can be no doubt that the things which we perceive outside ourselves are the empirical objects which we can know In contrast to the objects i n themselves which we cannot know— and i t i s Just these knowable empirical objects to which the term, "appearances," refers. Another reason, other than consideration of the "Refu tation of Idealism," for doubting that appearances are repre sentations i s the d i f f i c u l t y of accounting for intransitivity i f appearances are representations. The d i f f i c u l t y arises i n this way: Representations are always about something other than themselves, and this something may be another representation. Por instance, an "idea," in Kant's technical sense of this term, Is about the concepts of understanding, and in i t s proper employment represents as much unity as possible among concepts. This makes ideas representations of represent at lons;sinee ideas and concepts are both represent ations and the one represents the other. Since concepts are representations, they w i l l also represent something other than themselves, so that i t i s evidently possible to have a series of representations in which the f i r s t representation represents a second representation, the second representation - 3 5 - being i n turn a representation of a third representation, . . . And so on, Indefinitely? No. The series of repre sentations has i t s terminating point in the intransitive appearances: That i s what appearances are—those things which are represented without in turn being representations of something else. The point i s not that transitivity implies an intransitive starting point. There might, for a l l I know, be a universe in which representations are representations of representations in an in f i n i t e series, or in a f i n i t e series so that a represents b, b represents c, and c i s again a representation of a. The point i s that human experience of this universe—or at least Kant's theory of such experience— requires intransitive objects towards which the series of representations i s directed. Kant distinguishes different kinds of representations from each other by the manner ha which they relate to the objects as appearances which term inate the series. How i s this Intransitivlty of appearances to be ac- acounted for? A straight-forward way would be to suppose that appearances are entirely distinct from the representations of them so that the intransitivlty of appearances would be as primitive a part of the universe as the transitivity of representations. If appearances are a species of repre sentations, however, intransitivlty must somehow be derived from tr a n s i t i v i t y . Is intransitivlty primitive or derived? Are appearances -36- primitive or derived? Are appearances completely distinct from (though s t i l l related to) representations, or are they a species of representations? It i s easy to find material i n the f i r s t Critique to support apparently op posing answers to these questions. In ordfir to help de termine the significance of such opposing trends in Kant's philosophy^ and to discover to what extent the contradict ory material can be reconciled, I shall develop these diverging tendencies into two distinct interpretations of the relationship between representations and the objects as appearances represented. I shall c a l l these two interpret ations, respectively, the "correspondence theory of ob jects," and the "coherence theory of objects." Suppose that appearances are not representations,or combinations of representations. Then the object as ap pearance i s both distinct from the representation of the object as appearance, and distinct from the object In Itself. From the denial that we can know objects apart from the way we perceive them, i t does not necessarily follow that ob jects as we do know and perceive them are in our minds. The third alternative, i n addition to objects existing completely apart from the mind or existing only in our representations, i s that they exist as related to us without being in us, so that the objects would exist separately from but correspond ing to our representations. This i s the correspondence theory of objects. -37- Suppose that appearances are representations—or at least combinations of representations, which i s presumably what Kant means when he says that appearances are a mere species of representations. Then the object as appearance i s reduced to combinations of representations. Appearances would s t i l l be distinct from representations, but only as distinct as representations in general are from specified combinations of representations, so that the objects would be distinguished from the representations of them only as being more consistent, interrelated series of representations which are grouped i n certain ways. This i s the coherence theory of objects. Of course3 considerations of coherence are not absent in the correspondence theory. Even i f objects are separate from the sum total of a l l the representations of them, the ab i l i t y to combine and separate representations would s t i l l be a necessary condition for experience to be possible. Likewise, i n the coherence theory there would s t i l l be the correspondence between the representation and the object represented. The difference between the two theories i s not that they respectively assert the existence of one of the relations, coherence or correspondence, and deny the exist ence of the other, but that they offer completely different interpretations of the nature and existence of objects as appearances. In the correspondence theory, representations are -38- combined and separated, and compared and contrasted, in accordance with the greatest coherence, but the objects represented are distinct from these coherently interrelated representations. The object i s that in the external world which corresponds to the combination of representations. NO amount of coherence among representations i s a substi tute for the independently existing, externally given ob ject, in relation to which representations and combinations of representations alike are merely means to perception. In the coherence theory, there i s s t i l l the correspondence between representations and that represented, hut i t i s only the correspondence of the part to the whole, of isolated representations to the ways in which those same represent ations are combined. In the correspondence theory, i t i s of the very nature of the objects that they correspond to the representations of them, and the bare coherence of those representations does not determine whether or not they correspond to the ob ject. In the coherence theory, objects are nothing other than the ways i n which representations are combined, and the correspondence of representation to object occurs only when an isolated representation can enter into a coherent combi nation of representations. What does Kant say which Justifies my differentiation of two such distinct ways of interpreting the role of ob jects as appearances and their relationship to the repre sentations of them? -39- As far as the correspondence theory i s concerned, Independently existing objects are given to Intuition: "Objects are given to us by means of s e n s i b i l i t y . " 1 7 "Our mode of intuition i s dependent upon the existence of the ob ject, and Is therefore possible only i f the subject*s fac- 18 ulty of representation Is affected by that object." In the correspondence theory, then, objects as appear ances are externally given, but s t i l l conditioned, the cond itions being, primarily, relation to, rather than coherence among, the representations of the subject: "Representation i n i t s e l f does not produce i t s object in so far as exist ence i s concerned, for we are not here speaking of i t s causality by means of the w i l l . None the less the repre sentation i s a priori determinant of the object, i f i t be the case that only through the representation i s l t possible to know anything as an object." 1 9 According to the corre spondence theory^ understanding does not make the existence of objects possible, but only makes knowledge of objects possible. Furthermore, Kant occasionally refers to that which corresponds to sensation i n a manner which cannot be under stood i n terms of the sort of correspondence which i s 17 18 A19. B72. 19 A92. -40- possible within the coherence theory of objects: "That i n the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term Its matter." 2 0 "Reality. . . i s that which corresponds to a sensation in general." "What corresponds i n empirical 22 intuition to sensation i s reality." If Kant had consis tently thought of objects i n terms of the coherence theory tendencies in his philosophy, he need only have said, "that In the appearance which i s sensation i s the matter of ap pearance," and, "reality i s sensation In general." The phrase, "that which corresponds to sensation," suggests some thing both distinct from sensation and distinct from the combinations of representations into which sensations can ent er. And as for the coherence theory, far from always nain- tainlng that our intuition depends on externally given ob jects, Kant soUStimes says that appearances are represent ations, and as such "must not be taken as objects capable of 23 existing outside of our power of representation." Con trasting to the assertion that representations make knowl edge, as distinct from the existence of, objects possible, Kant says that apart from consciousness "appearances could never be for us an object of knowledge, and so would be 2 0A20. 2 1A143. 2 2A168. 2 5A104. nothing to us; and since i t has i n Itself no objective reality, but exists only i n being known, l t would be nothing at a l l . " 2 4 Here representations are s t i l l only said to concern knowledge of objects, but the existence of that knowledge i s said to constitute the existence of the objects known. It i s this reduction of existence to knowl edge which gives rise to interpretations of Kant i n which the mind i s said to create objects. Whereas, in the correspondence theory^ appearances form an intervening realm between the representations of the mind and the objects In themselves, aceording.to the coherence theory, the only alternative to something's being as object in i t s e l f Is for l t to be an object in the mind: "What ob jects may be i n themselves, and apart from a l l this recep t i v i t y of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us. 25 We know nothing but our mode of perceiving them." The object in Itself would, of course, be unknown i n any inter- preta©tlon of Kant. But the object in i t s e l f need not be equated with the object which affects the senses, as i t seems to be In this passage. Here Kant i s seemingly attempting to reduce that which i s received to receptivity, that which i s perceived to a mode of perception, and actuality to capacity. Since, whatever objects as appearances may be, i t Is by means of Judgment that representations relate to their ^A120. 2 5A42. - 4 2 - objects, I shall have to introduce an interpretation of Kant's views on Judgment. Then I can further develop this comparison of the coherence theory of objects and the corre spondence theory of objects, with a view to i l l u s t r a t i n g and evaluating these opposing tendencies in the Critique of  Pure Reason. Consider the procedure of a geologist confronted with a strange rock specimen. In order to find out what kind of rock i t i s he may f i r s t note some ordinary facts about the rock, i t s color and texture, as well as the natural setting in which the specimen was found. Perhaps he w i l l break the rock to see what kind of pattern results, whether the planes of fracture result in Jagged, conchoidal, or f l a t surfaces. For more exact identification he w i l l determine how hard the specimen i s on an established scale by attempting to scratch the rock with implements or other rocks whose degree of hard ness i s already known. Finally, the crystal structure of the specimen can be examined under a microscope. I shall Interpret this procedure of identification in terms of the Judgments involved, since i t i s in terms of judgments that representations are related to objects, whether these objects are combinations of representations or quite distinct from such combinations. It i s possible, of course, that the geologist w i l l not l i t e r a l l y say out loud or even to himself, "This rock i s black and smooth and has a perfect conchoidal fracture," but this does not matter, since - 4 3 - judgments, for Kant, are not defined "by the words or sen tences which may or may not be used to express and communicate the Judgments. Judgment i s "the mediate knowledge of an object, that i s , the representation of a representation of i t . In every judgment there i s a concept which holds of many represent ations, and among them of a given representation that i s immediately related to an object."2*^ Thus, in, "this rock i s black," "black" applies to many objects, but i s here ap plied to a particular object, "this rock." Since Kant defines judgment in terms of representations and in terms of the relationship between the thinking sub ject and objects, the Judgment, "this rock i s black," though I cannot write i t out here without using words, need not take a linguistic form to qualify as a Judgment. The geologist, having wondered what kind of rock he has Just picked up, might suddenly realize that one clue to the iden t i t y of the rock i s that i t i s black—and he might realize this without having put his realization into words. This realization would qualify as a Kantian judgment. Something happened i n the geologist's mind: At f i r s t he Just perceived "this rock," then he noticed that l t was a black rock; an immediate object was represented and subsumed under a more general representation without a word having been said or thought. The ab i l i t y to put this judgment into words might be a necessary condition for the judgment's hayjing been made, -44- but this actual Judgment need not thereby be put into words. Judgment, as the representation of a representation, though not necessarily being expressed in language, may s t i l l be quite deliberate, as l t i s in the example of the geologist. "This rock:" i s an object as appearance. Only through the mediating activity of the mind Is the knowledge that this rock i s black possible, since i t i s only by representing in one's mind this object and further subsuming this repre sentation under the more general representation, "black," that one can realize that "this rock i s black;" otherwise the immediate object, "this rock," would be forgotten before there was time to realize or judge or know anything about i t . The geologist's procedure, then, can be interpreted as so many deliberate judgments. "This rock has a conchoidal fracture," "This rock i s extremely hard on a standard scale," "This rock Is f l i n t , " are a l l judgments which consist of mediate and general representations of the immediate and particular object as appearance which i s being represented, and about which the judgments are made. However, Kant i s concerned less with judgments, such as those in the above examples, which are made in the course of inquiry, than he i s concerned with the conditions which must be met before there i s even the possibility of making Judg ments. Above I discussed the Judgment, "This rock i s black." What i f i t i s asked how we even know'this i s a rock"? - 45 - Doubtless there are occasions on which this Judgment could be made, but usually there i s no discernable passage of time i n one's experience of a simple object l i k e a rock between one's perceiving the object and perceiving i t as a rock. In the case of the geologist, he recognized the rock as a rock as soon as he saw It (by hypothesis); He did not see an indeterminate object f i r s t , wonder what i t was, and then have It dawn upon him suddenly that It was a rock; He saw i t as a rock from the start. Surely this happens countless times every day with simple objects with which we are familiar. In spite of the fact that the geologist perceived a rock immediately, there i s s t i l l something mediate and syn thetic about this perception for several reasons. Fi r s t , i t i s possible, say for a child who has never seen, or at least never attended to, a rock, to see an indeterminate object f i r s t , and only later learn that i t i s a rock. Second, l t i s possible^ in theory^ to make a Judgment here; even though one already knows what the object i s ; i t i s possible to distinguish "this," as something which i s immediately present, from "a rock" as a general concept, and then to re-combine the two into the Judgment, "this i s a rock." Third, i t i s possible to be mistaken, so that what one immediately perceived as a rock turns out later to be a papier-mtche' imitation of a rock which some ev i l genius has put there to deceive us. Such a mistake could be analyzed i n terms of -46- judgments, since i t would s t i l l be true that one perceived " t h i s , " something immediately present, but not true that " t h i s i s a rock." So here i s a p e c u l i a r i t y of perception: When I con front a strange object, I become f a m i l i a r with i t by making a number of Judgments, not necessarily l i n g u i s t i c a l l y expressed, hut quite conscious and deliberate. Thereafter, when I encounter the object, I perceive i t immediately as a rock, or as a tree, or as whatever i t i s , without making j udgment s. Though t h i s sort of perception of objects with which we are f a m i l i a r i s not a judgment, i t does involve a combination of elements of the percept ion, which can be analyzed i n terms of the capacity to judge. This i s why judgment i s relevant to perception: The conditions which make i t possible to make a Judgment l i k e , "This rock i s black," are the very same conditions which make i t possible to perceive something immediately as a rock without making a Judgment. The whole routine of judgments 3which the geologist makes; presupposes a number of conditions, such as the a b i l i t y to perceive d i s t i n c t objects enduring i n time and located In space, without which the Judgments would be impossible. For Instance, I f the geologist wants to examine rock c r y s t a l s under a microscope i n order to base a sophisticated judgment on the magnified image, he w i l l have to be able to recognize and adjust a microscope. He could not recognize a microscope -47- were he not capable of apprehending c e r t a i n very general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s about i t which are so general that they apply to any other object coming w i t h i n h i s experience a l s o . At a given moment the g e o l o g i s t sees the microscope f r o m — s a y — a side-view: He sees q u i t e c l e a r l y the way the base i s attached to the neck of the microscope, w i t h the stage f o r h o l d i n g s l i d e s attached at the bottom of the neck, and a v e r t i c a l , a d j u s t a b l e tube^ w i t h an eyepiece at the top and a lense on the bottom, attached at the top of the neck. Now suppose he turns the microscope so that he sees the adj u s t a b l e tube from the f r o n t . The tube i s c l o s e r to him than the neck, which i s almost e n t i r e l y hidden by the tube so that the only part of the neck that can be seen i s through the gap below the lense and above the stage. Then again, seen from the back, the neck blocks much of the lower part of the tube from view, as w e l l as the center of the edge of the stage. From the s i d e , back, and f r o n t , only a t h i n p l a t e  l i k e edge of the stage can be seen, though the stage looks c i r c u l a r l o o k i n g s t r a i g h t down from the top. Between the s i d e , f r o n t , back, top, and bottom views of the microscope there are an i n f i n i t e number of intermediate views. Thus there i s a view at an angle h a l f way between a side and a f r o n t view, at an angle turned three-quarters of the way towards the f r o n t from the s i d e , seven-eighths of the way towards the f r o n t , and so on. Any one of these views may be considered as a u n i t , and -48- any number of them as a p l u r a l i t y of u n i t s , and any s e r i e s of these u n i t s which go together to form a s i g n i f i c a n t p a t t e r n , as a t o t a l i t y of u n i t s . I n t h i s case, the si d e view of the microscope i s a u n i t . The s e r i e s of views between the side view and the f r o n t view i s a p l u r a l i t y . T h i s p l u r a l i t y i s f u r t h e r u n i f i e d i n a t o t a l i t y , since there are s i g n i f i c a n t s i m i l a r i t i e s between the d i f f e r e n t views i n the s e r i e s . For i n s t a n c e , the neck of the microscope seems to be a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t shape i n a f u l l s i d e view than i t does i n a view from the side turned one-quarter of the way towards the f r o n t . I f the one-quarter angle view i s com pared to the one-eighth angle view, there w i l l a l s o be a s l i g h t d i f f e r e n c e . But as the angle chosen gets smaller and smaller, there w i l l e v e n t u a l l y be two p o i n t s of view between which there i s no d i f f e r e n c e i n the way the shape of the neck of the microscope seems i n one view and i n the other. I t might, f o r example, be impossible to d i s t i n g u i s h a d i f f e r  ence i n the d i s t o r t i o n of the side view ( t a k i n g the side view as un d i s t o r t e d ) between the neck of the microscope as seen at an angle which i s turned 5/32nds towards the f r o n t , and as seen from an angle which i s turned 6/32nds towards the f r o n t . I t i s thus w i t h a l l the views of the microscope: Since there are an i n f i n i t e number of angles from which the microscope may be viewed, f o r any two views, no matter how d i v e r s e , there w i l l always be a s e r i e s of views i n t r a n s i t i o n from one view to the other, such t h a t , at any point i n the t r a n s i t i o n , -49- there are two views which are so similar as to be indistin guishable in normal perception. 1 It i s not as i f a microscope when turned at a slight angle changed into a baked potato, and when turned just a bit more suddenly became a two-headed talking giraffe; rather, there are complex interrelationships among views of varying degrees of difference and similarity. It i s such complex interrelationships which make a totality, not just a plurality of views. The plurality of views, "microscope, baked potato, giraffe," suceeding one another within a fraction of a second could not really occur at a l l , since there would not be time to recognize the f i r s t view as a view of a microscope, or even as a view of anything at a l l , and likewise for the succeeding views. But the series of views, "microscope seen from the side, microscope seen as turned l/32nd of the way towards the front, as seen 2/32nds turned towards the front, as seen 3/32nds turned towards the front, e t c . " — t h i s series could easily be apprehended i f i t continued for a few seconds (within the larger experience of a l i v i n g person, of course), because i t i s not just a plurality of individual units, but a tot a l i t y in which there i s something which a l l the units have in common which makes them a l l go together. In this example I have utili z e d the f i r s t set of categories, the constitutive categories of quantity, and the development of these categories into schemata and principles. -50- That each isolated view of the microscope Is a unit, that: there are a plurality of such units, and that these units are Interconnected into a t o t a l i t y — a l l this Is an applica tion of the categories, Unity, Plurality, Totality, in their development in the section, "Axioms of Intuition." This section i s concerned with showing that " a l l intuitions are extensive magnitudes," that i s , that for ordinary ob jects of experience there are certain parts of the object for which "the representation of the parts makes possible, and therefore necessarily precedes, the representation of the whole:" 2 7 It i s impossible to become familiar with a whole microscope unless one sees i t from a l l sorts of d i f  ferent angles first:, in addition to sensing i t in other ways. Each of these isolated representations of a microscope i s subsumed under the more general representation, "microscope." Though there are isolated points of view of a micro scope which are perceived one after another, these views are not perceived like the stop-action in a movie; they are not perceived Jerkily or with a vacuum between each point of view. Rather, there i s a continuous experience of a microscope as i t i s turned from one angle to another. Though Kant mentions this continuity of experience i n the section, "Anticipations of Perception," he i s partly referring back to the "Axioms of Intuition" when he says that a l l appearances "are 2 7A162 continuous magnitudes, alike in their intuition, as exten sive, and i n their mere perception (sensation and with i t reality) as intensive." 2 8 It i s the continuity of extensive magnitudes which I am now i l l u s t r a t i n g with the microscope example. So, the number of views of the microscope between a side view and a front view cannot be apprehended before the continuous experience of a microscope, since there are an in f i n i t e number of such intermediate views, and i f a l l of them had to be apprehended before the whole microscope was apprehended, this would take an i n f i n i t e length of time, and we could never come to perceive the microscope. It i s as i f the i n f i n i t e points of view (which we experience as contin uity) were subsumed under the common representation, "micro scope. " (It i s easily seen that the microscope ean only be per ceived i n space and time, since the views of the microscope could not be perceived as views of different parts, such as the neck, and the lense, and the eyepiece, without perceiving them spatially, as existing outside of one another, beside, in front, i n back, above, below one another, etc.; also, the different views follow one another i n the experience of the perceiver, and the microscope endures: It is perceived in tlme.) A170. -52- In i n t e r p r e t i n g these i l l u s t r a t i o n s of Judgment and perc e p t i o n i n terms of the correspondence theory of o b j e c t s and the coherence theory of o b j e c t s , i t might seem that the correspondence theory i s more appropriate f o r the examples of a c t u a l Judgment, while the coherence theory deals b e t t e r w i t h the cases of perception presupposing the c a p a c i t y to judge. So, the procedure of i d e n t i f y i n g a rock would be analyzed I n terms of coherence. The g e o l o g i s t examining a rock would already be aware of the rock as being present outside him when he undertook the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of l t . H i s judgments, " t h i s rock i s b l a c k , " " t h i s rock has conchoidal f r a c t u r e , " would simply be a matter of forming r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which adequately corresponded to the f a c t s he discovered about the o b j e c t . As f o r h i s immediate pe r c e p t i o n of something as a rock, which preceded t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , that would not depend so mueh on whether there was something outside him as on h i s a b i l i t y to perceive a d i v e r s i t y of sensory impressions as separated i n t o v arious groups or combined i n t o more or l e s s d i s t i n c t shapes. I f correspondence and coherence were l i m i t e d to d e a l i n g w i t h such separate aspects of experience, they would not be i n competition, but would simply be two d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s about d i f f e r e n t t o p i c s . However, the coherence and correspondence t h e o r i e s of ob j e c t s cannot be so e a s i l y r e c o n c i l e d . I have already s a i d (PP. 37-38) that there are coherence and correspondence co n s i d e r a t i o n s i n both t h e o r i e s . I t i s t r u e that the g e o l o g i s t -53- would form Judgments corresponding to the facts he discovered, but in the f i n a l analysis, his discovery might be only that the only way that the diversity of his representations could be unified at a certain time was under the concept of a black rock with concholdal fracture, the correspondence being between the representations, "rock," "black," and "concholdal fracture," as they are when considered in i s o l  ation, and as they are when considered in combination. Or, concerning the immediately perceived rock, i t might turn out that the capacity to represent sensible impressions as shaped objects situated in space i s only a necessary con dition for actually perceiving such objects, the added con dition for perception being the external presence of the objects. In either case, one can always attempt to analyze corre spondence i n terms of coherence or subordinate coherence to a more profound correspondence. And as far as the nature of objects as appearances i s concerned, i t i s important to be careful what sort of coherence or correspondence i s being considered. The only relevant type of coherence or corre spondence here i s that which i s a sufficient condition for the existence of objects as appearances as things which are represented without In turn being representations of some thing in turn, while other sorts of coherence or corre spondence, as for instance in the coherence and correspond ence theories of truth, would not be immediately relevant. The problem i s whether the intransitivlty of object's as appearances i s derived from the combination of repre sentations i n our minds, or whether this intransitivlty i s a primitive element of perception which our represent ations come up against outside the mind. In the case of the perception of a microscope as an object': as appearance, various limited viewpoints serve as examples of isolated representations. Prom the top, the eyepiece i s seen as a round piece of glass encircled by the top of the cyli n d r i  cal adjustable tube, and with parts of the stage and base and neck of the microscope visible below. Seen from the front, the stage and the tube w i l l be closest to the ob server and hide parts of the microscope from view. From the back, the connection of the tube to the stage and base by the neck of the microscope w i l l be most obvious. Other representations are the intermediate points of view between top, front, back, etc. The tran s i t i v i t y of these representations i s clear:: microscope as seen from the top" i s a representation which requires a microscope to complete Its meaning, since, i f there were no such thing as a microscope, there would be no way of seeing a microscope from the top. Although a representation of a microscope from the top i s not the same thing as a more comprehensive representation of a micro scope, the former, as a limitation of the latter, presupposes the latter. -55- However, t h i s may seem a r t i f i c i a l , s i n c e I d e l i b e r a t e l y chose r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which required a microscope as t h e i r o b j e c t . What i f these r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s are i n t u r n analyzed i n terms of other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ? A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of an eyepiece might be part of a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of some other instrument other than a microscope. A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a c i r c u l a r piece of g l a s s need not be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of part of an eyepiece. A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a smooth, t r a n s  parent surface need not be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a c i r c u l a r piece of g l a s s . But, e v i d e n t l y , no mattier how i s o l a t e d and l i m i t e d a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s i t i s s t i l l perceived as some t h i n g : Something smooth, something transparent, a surface, a c i r c u l a r shape. I t i s f u r t h e r evident that experience does not c o n s i s t of the consciousness of an I s o l a t e d smoothness i n a vacuum, f o l l o w e d by an i n t e r v a l of complete absense of consciousness, and then by consciousness of a c i r c u l a r shape i n a vast emptiness, not even emptiness, but an unsupported c i r c u l a r shape w i t h no r e l a t i o n s h i p to the previous smoothness, no memory or e x p e c t a t i o n of any other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , then another p e r i o d of unconsciousness, then a completely new consciousness of a t i m e l e s s transparency w i t h no reference to smooth or round. Rather, experience Involves continuous consciousness of r e l a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . On the one hand, a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of something smooth need not be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of something which i s a l s o -56- circular, much less he the representation of the surface of the eyepiece of a microscope. On the other hand, the representation of something smooth cannot be the represent ation of nothing smooth, that i s , of smoothness unrelated to any other representations. If we can be conscious of something, i t can be represented in various relationships with other things we are conscious of, and i f we actually are conscious of i t , i t must actually be represented In some specific relationships? It i s similar to some representations and different than others, simultaneous/with some, before some, and after others. As far as the coherence theory of objects i s concerned, i t i s much easier to see the manner i n which isolated, transitive representations would yield intransitive objects In combination, than It i s to show that this combination i s actually the source of objects: It i s simply a matter of the parts being Incomplete by themselves, but complete when forming a part of the whole. The representations, " c i r c l e , " "something smooth," "surface," do not necessarily constitute a specific intransitive object, since they can be combined in different ways, so that " c i r c l e " could Just as well be about a table, a coin, or a piece of glass which i s part of a microscope. Eut If enough representations are combined, eventually the point i s reached where the things represented are represented as specific combinations of representations which are not representations of something else in turn. -57- For instance, though the representations, " c i r c l e , " "sur face," "transparent," do not necessarily go together, when these representations are given and ordered in time and space, when they not necessarily but i n fact go to gether, the representation of a smooth, transparent, c i r  cular surface arises without being a representation of some thing else. Though a sum of representations, i t i s not i t s e l f a representation, but i s the object represented. Likewise, while the representation of a circular piece of glass need not be the representation of part of an eyepiece of a microscope as seen from the top, a microscope of which one also has various other views from the side, front, and back, i f i t i s in facf. so represented, i t i s so, not as a means to representing something else, but as an intransitive object as appearance of the sort towards which a l l repre sentations are directed. It i s not combinations of representations into one ob ject rather than another with which the coherence theory of objects i s concerned, but with the possibility of combination, and of objects at a l l . If one has enough representations of a microscope, including concepts, spatio-temporal position, and a wealth of sensory Impressions, one i s , as far as the coherence theory i s concerned, in the presence of the object without having gone outside one's own representations. It Is as i f , when enough vaporous representations wrap around eachi other, they condense into an object. - 5 8 - Insofar as representations can be combined so as to form in unison the goal towards which the isolated repre sentations are directed, they form the sort of object required by the coherence theory of objects. Since there i s nothing in the requirement that representations be grouped into consistently inter-related wholes which demands one way of grouping rather than another, as long as the resulting totality of representations i s something that i s represented without representing something else in turn, the coherence theory of objects supplies only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of objects as appearances which are distinct from other objects as ap pearances. When I perceive a microscope, I have many other sen sations other than those which are represented as sensations of a microscope, and, of course, I always have access to a lot of other concepts besides the concept of a microscope. Why cannot some of the sensations,which can form part of the representation of a microscope^be combined with some of the other representations in my perceptual f i e l d , and these sensations be re-arranged to form a completely different ob ject other than a microscope? As long as the coherence of representations i s supposed to be the sufficient condition for the existence of one object rather than another, I can not see why this wouldn't happen. If, however, the -59- existence of objects i s constituted, not ih mere combina tions of representations, but i n something outside these combinations which correspond to them, this correspondence could determine which of the possible coherent combinations of representations actually indicated an existing object at a given time. There i s , then, a sense i n which, after a l l , the coherence theory of objects and the correspondence theory of objects are complementary and not competitive. The ques tion, "What i s the sufficient condition for the existence of objects as appearances?", contains this ambiguity: Is i t the existence of any objects at a l l which i s in question, or the existence of one object rather than another? Is i t the existence of a rock rather than an unintelligible jumble of representations, or i s l t the existence of a rock rather than a microscope, which i s in question? The coherence and corre spondence theories are compatible insofar as coherence deter mines the existence of representations as object's, and z'\. correspondence determines the existence of objects as rocks and microscopes and other things as diverse. "That which l i e s in the successive apprehension i s here viewed as representation, while the appearance which i s given to me, notwithstanding that l t i s nothing but the sum of these representations, i s viewed as their object^" 2 9 I pick up a rock, look at l t from various angles, and make 29A191. -60- some simple experiments, and in so doing discover that i t is black, has concholdal fracture, and is hard on a standard scale. My knowledge of the object grows step by step in this process of familiarization. Each bit of information I hold in my mind is a representation—it is about something and is different than the thing it is about. But i f I add together, one by one, each of these representations into an inter-related whole, I end up with a sum which is indistin guishable from the object. Once I become thoroughly famil iar with an object by sensation, conceptualization, and location in space and time, I cannot distinguish the object from the sum of these representations. Since it is equally true of any object that it is , in the sense illustrated in the above paragraph, a sum of representations, Insofar as an object is a sum of represent ations, no two objects are different. But, as i t is evident that the objects which we perceive and know about and exper ience are not a l l identical, but diverse, the differences among objects will have to be accounted for in some other way than as a result of objects being a sum of representations. The principles in Kant's "Transcendental Analytic" cannot account for the differences, since these principles are the same for every object, and not a differential. Differences in sensations alone cannot account for the differences between objects, because sensations, such as, "black," "smooth," "hard," can be combined in different ways, and one - 6 1 - always has so many different sensations that various combinations would be possible. There would be no reason why one combination would be preferred to another, unless i t so happens that the ab i l i t y to receive and combine representations establishes a relationship of these repre sentations and combinations of representations to something which corresponds to them i n the objects outside our repre sentations. How are the objects which we can know related to the representations of them? What i s the distinction between appearances and representations? Each of these questions may be given two answers. If the objects as appearances i n these two questions are objectts as opposed to complete chaos, then the relationship between representations and their objects i s the relationship of one aspect of an object: to the whole object, of the part to the whole, of one unit of perception to an inter-related t o t a l i t y of perception, and the distinction between representations and appearances is that the representations concern an incomplete aspect of, or isolated relationships between, the appearances, while the appearance i s that which completes the meaning of the representation and which enters into various relationships. If the objects are objects as opposed to other objects, then the relationship of representations to their objects., and the distinction between representation and appearance, -62- is that the representation is about something in the ob ject as appearance which corresponds to i t , and while the appearances do not exist separately from their relation ships to the representations of the subject, they are some thing outside of the subject, and quite distinct from the representations of them, i f only while they are being represented. Is the intransitivlty of appearances primitive or derived? Again there are two answers: The intransitivlty Involved in combinations of representations is derived from separate representations by combination. The intrans i t iv l ty of the objects outside of our representations Is primitive. Are appearances a species of representations? Here again one may say, yes, in regard to coherence consid erations, and, no, as concerns correspondence. However, considering that appearances as combinations of represent ations have such distinct characteristics from uncombined representations, Kant's insistence that appearances are representations remains baffling. If the coherence and correspondence theory tendencies in Kant's thought are reconcilable, they are s t i l l not actually reconciled by Kant. Their presence Is revealed less by open opposition than by ambiguity. For instance, when Kant says that nature "is merely an aggregate of ap pearances, so many representations of the mind," 3 0 does he 50 A114. -63- mean that the various objects which we come across i n the course of experience are a l l i n our minds, or that these ob j e c t s are r e l a t e d t o but d i s t i n c t from the mind, w h i l e nature, as that i d e a l t o t a l i t y of ob j e c t s i n thorough-going i n t e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h each other, i s only i n the mind, since t h i s t o t a l i t y f a r transcends experience? When Kant says that "an object i s that i n the concept of which the manifold of a given i n t u i t i o n i s u n i t e d , " ^ does he mean that there would be no ob j e c t at a l l i f the concept didn't Impose order on the i n t u i  t i o n s , or that the i n t u i t i o n s are u n i f i e d i n a manner so as t o correspond to the o b j e c t , which i s d i s t i n c t from the i n t u i  t i o n s , the concept, and the combination of the two? In s p i t e of such a m b i g u i t i e s , some d e f i n i t e conclusions about re p r e s e n t a t i o n s and the obj e c t s which they represent can be made. The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s always about the appearance, which i s the goal towards which the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s d i r e c t e d i n p e rception and knowledge. The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n concerns i s o  l a t e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the object i n the cases of conceptts and sensations, and r e l a t i o n s h i p s between ob j e c t s or pa r t s of obje c t s i n the cases of space and time. The object i s the thoroughly experienced goal of percepti o n , that which i s per c e i v e d as an end, and not as a means to perceiving" something e l s e , that which i s ex h a u s t i v e l y i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms of the d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s : I t i s l o c a t e d i n space and time, sensed i n various ways, and conceptualized. 3 1B137. Chapter Threes: Subject and Object In discussing objects in themselves and objects as appearances, I put the emphasis on the fact that it was objects that I was concerned with. H did not deal directly with the subjecte as a definite entity contrasted to objects, but I dealt with the subject only insofar as i t is Implied by. objects. I. do not here wish to give an exhaustive treat ment of the thinking, perceiving subject in Kant's philo sophy. However, I wil l attempt to make more explicit some thing which is Implicit in chapters one and two—that sub ject and object cannot exist or be described separately from one another. To say nothing more of objects in themselves as opposed to objects as appearances, than that the former are in principle unknowable and that the latter are in fact known, is already to involve the subject, for it is the subject which knows or does not know. And in the case of Kant, to introduce the question of whether or not something is in principle knowable is to bring in, not only the subject, but also a relationship of the subject to objects, for some thing cannot be known merely in being thought; there must! also be an Intuition of—an immediate relation to—the ob ject. It is because there is no Intuition of objects apart from sensibility that objects in themselves are unknown. Moreover, in further specifying the reasons why objects -65- as appearances can be known and objects in themselves can not, the subject is mentioned in specific relations to ob jects: Human intuition consists of sensation and the a priori representations of space and time, and so only those objects outside us which can be sensed and are in space and time can be known. In spite of the fact that objects in themselves are unknowable, i t is s t i l l significant to go to the trouble of denying that they can be known insofar as belief in objects in themselves arises from the very nature of thought. We have the ability to abstract, to remove conditions in thought, so that, concerning a book of 300 pages measuring 3 X 5 Inches and with a green cover and hard binding, we can Ignore some characteristics and attend to others and conceptualize the book merely as, say, having 300 pages without specifying any other characteristics. We can also add conditions in thought, even to the extent of constructing a concept of something we have never perceived, even of something which couldn't possibly be perceived, of an object in i tse l f which we can believe to, but not know to, exist on the insufficient basis of one element of knowledge, on the basis of an empty concept. Al l this again Involves the subject even though lt is objects which are being discussed. More comprehensive than the specific relationships between belief and knowledge and their objects is the relationship between representations in general and their -66- objects. Here the Inter-relationships between subject and object are most obvious, for being represented by a subject is at least a necessary condition for the existence of ob jects at a l l . So far I have referred .^o "isolated repre sentations" and "combinations of representations" infcrder to contrast representations as they are separate from one another and as they are in the combinations which relate to objects as appearances. Something needs to be said about "isolated representations," since I have been using this expression only in a negative sense, to mean, "representations insofar as they are not combined so as to relate to objects as appearances." Isolated representations, in a positive sense, are not completely isolated, but more or less isolated. Represent ations do not exist In complete separation from a l l other representations or separate from the continuous experience of the world by a thinking, perceiving subject. One case in which representations are more or less isolated is that in which an object Is seen from a certain angle. In this sense, "a microscope as seen from the top" is a representation. A case of a greater degree of isolation is that of represent ations which could enter Into any one of a number of combi nations. Representations such as, "circle," "smooth," "black," and "surface," are of this sort. How are representations of this last sort related to one another when they are separated from the combinations -67- which r e l a t e t o obj e c t s as appearances? They are, I t h i n k , r e l a t e d i n b a n n e r such that they can be c l a s s i f i e d i n h i e r a r c h i c a l order. By saying that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s can be c l a s s i f i e d , I mean that there are d i s t i n c t k inds of repre s e n t a t i o n s : A c i r c l e as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n without respect to any p a r t i c u l a r object as appearance I s not Just a c i r c l e ; i t i s a f i g u r e contrasted to t r i a n g l e s , squares, and other f i g u r e s . L i k e w i s e , smoothness i s not j u s t smoothness, but i s a te x t u r e contrasted to roughness, and black i s not Just b l a c k , but i s a c o l o r d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from white and red and yellow. This i s not t o say that I have a chart of repre s e n t a t i o n s hovering before my mind, but only that i n order to be conscious of i s o l a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , so that objects as appearances would not be the only t h i n g s I amr;consclous o f , I must be able to r e l a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to other repre s e n t a t i o n s o f the same k i n d , and that such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s are part of the meaning o f the re p r e s e n t a t i o n s . Part of what "black" means I s : Not some other c o l o r . I s o l a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s do not f l o a t away when t h e i r reference to a p a r t i c u l a r object as appearance i s cut away, only because they are s t i l l t i e d to other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s by var i o u s i n t e r - r e l a t e d s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s . By the h i e r a r c h i c a l order of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , I mean that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s may be about other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s only i n the sense that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which are more remotely r e l a t e d to objects as appearances can represent other / -68- r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which are l e s s remotely r e l a t e d t o obj e c t s as appearances. This means p a r t l y that black i s a c o l o r but c o l o r i s not a b l a c k , but mainly that one can concept u a l i z e sensory impressions but one cannot have a sensory Impression of a concept (though one can sense the object of a concept). Ideas, i n Kant's t e c h n i c a l sense, are a way of r e p r e s e n t i n g c a t e g o r i e s , and categories are a way of re p r e s e n t i n g things i n space and time, but th i n g s i n space and time cannot represent categories, nor can cate g o r i e s represent i d e a s . Representations, i n order t o q u a l i f y as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , must be capable of e n t e r i n g i n t o two kinds of r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s : They must be able to enter i n t o combinations which r e l a t e t o , i f not c o n s t i t u t e , o b j e c t s as appearances, and they must be capable of f i t t i n g i n t o the h i e r a r c h i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of represent a t i o n s . So, "black," "conchoidal f r a c t u r e , " and "hard," can be combined i n the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a hunk of f l i n t , and can a l s o be r e l a t e d t o other representations as being species of s e n s i b l e impressions, o f c o l o r s , of the concept of f r a c t u r e , and so on. The f l i n t could not be black i f "black" could not be meaningfully contrasted t o "white" and "yellow," nor could such a contrast be made i f there were no instances of co l o r e d o b j e c t s . Objects as we know them would cease to e x i s t i f we were unable to combine re p r e s e n t a t i o n s of d i f f e r e n t k i n d s , while -69- we would be unable to combine re p r e s e n t a t i o n s of d i f f e r e n t k i n d s , i f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s d i d not have s i m i l a r i t i e s which permitted them to be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o kinds of represent a t i o n s . We could not stand back and make judgments about o b j e c t s i f there were no o b j e c t s , and there would be no ob j e c t s i f we could not stand back and make Judgments. Thus Kant i s a very un-Cartesian d u a l i s t : Subject and Object, u n l i k e mind and body, are thoroughly inter-dependent and cannot e x i s t s e p a r a t e l y from one another. Prom t h i s point of view, the greatest d i f f i c u l t y i n conceiving of i m m o r t a l i t y i s : What would the subject t h i n k about i f separated from the obj e c t s of sensation? My experience of my own s u b j e c t i v i t y occurs only under the con d i t i o n s of a continuous experience of the world. Since I can remove c o n d i t i o n s i n thought, I can form the transcen d e n t a l i d e a of a subject I n i t s e l f , a subject apart from the c o n d i t i o n s of experience, but sin c e the object of t h i s idea cannot be i n t u i t e d , I cannot have knowledge of t h i s unconditioned u n i t y of the t h i n k i n g s u bject. Though I cannot u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y i n t u i t my own thoughts, I can c o n d i t i o n a l l y i n t u i t them, the c o n d i t i o n being " i n n e r sense," that i s , time. Or, as Kant puts i t , I do not know myself as I am i n myself but only as I appear t o myself: 1 1B68, B153 f f -70- I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of s e l f i s thus very f a r from being a knowledge of the s e l f . . .1 e x i s t as an i n t e l l i g e n c e which i s conscious s o l e l y of i t s power of combination; but i n respect of the manifold which i t has to com bine I am subjected to a l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n (en t i t l e d i n n e r sense), namely, that t h i s combina t i o n can be made i n t u i t a b l e only according to r e l a t i o n s of time.2 I mention t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the " i " which t h i n k s and the " I " which i n t u i t s i t s e l f , not because I wish to d i s c u s s I t at any l e n g t h , but because i t Involves a sort of object which I have so f a r s a i d nothing of, a knowable ob j e c t which i s i n time without being i n space or being capable of a f f e c t i n g our senses. In f a c t , our own minds., as d i s t i n c t e n t i t i e s as they appear to ourselves, are not the only such o b j e c t s , f o r "everything," Kant says, "every r e p r e  s e n t a t i o n even, i n so f a r as we are conscious of l t , may be e n t i t l e d o b j e c t . " 3 In t h i s broad sense, In which aix object i s something one i s conscious of, more or l e s s I s o l a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and spatio-temporal-sensory o b j e c t s would both be o b j e c t s . Confusion may a r i s e i f there are passages where Kant r e f e r s to o b j e c t s ambiguously, so that the reader cannot t e l l whether ob j e c t s i n the very general sense of something one i s conscious of ( i n c l u d i n g , I suppose, mathematical equations, concepts, dreams, and h a l l u c i n a t i o n s ) i s meant, or 2B158-159. 3 A189. i f the more s p e c i f i c sense of something sensed i n space and time i s meant. However, there i s no problem i n p r i n c i p l e , since the nature and s i g n i f i c a n c e of objects i n the genera l , and i n the more s p e c i f i c , sense are q u i t e d i s t i n c t . Something i n s o f a r as we are conscious of i t i s one t h i n g , and something i n s o f a r as we are conscious of i t by means of sensation and as l o c a t e d i n space and time i s another, much more s p e c i f i c , t h i n g . That the spatio-temporal-sensory object plays a much more s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the C r i t i q u e than that which i s an object merely because we are conscious of i t , i s e a s i l y shown c o n s i d e r i n g that Kant says that we have s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i knowledge of outer appearances—that i s , of s p a t i o - ffnporal-sensory o b j e c t s — o n l y and not inn e r appearances, and that the question of how a p r i o r i s y n t h e t i c judgments are p o s s i b l e i s "The General Problem of Pure Reason,"^ and the question to which the e n t i r e C r i t i q u e i s the answer, a question which concerns knowledge of spatio-temporal-sensory o b j e c t s . When Kant says that the proper employment of the cat e g o r i e s i s to appearances, not thi n g s i n themselves, he means outer appearances, spatio-temporal-sensory o b j e c t s , o n l y : "The categ o r i e s have meaning only I n r e l a t i o n to the un i t y of i n t u i t i o n i n space and t i m e . " 6 4 „ A 3 8 1 . 5B19. 6B308. -72- One f u r t h e r p o i n t I s h a l l d e a l w i t h , by way o f i l l u s  t r a t i n g t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between, and t h e Inter-dependence o f , s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , i s the c o n t r a s t between m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . By mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , I mean n o t h i n g more un u s u a l t h a n , and, i n d e e d , n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n , t h e t y p e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w h i c h I have been d i s  c u s s i n g a l l a l o n g : I d e a s , c o n c e p t s , t i m e , s e n s a t i o n s , Judg ments, and so on. By p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , I mean such t h i n g s as photographs, p a i n t i n g s , d r a w i n g s , maps, and diagrams. I t may seem s t r a n g e t h a t I d i d not men t i o n p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n o r d e r t o h e l p u n d e r s t a n d m e n t a l r e p r e  s e n t a t i o n s . I f I h o l d up a photograph b e f o r e me a t the spot from w h i c h i t was t a k e n , I can compare t h e photograph as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o t h e scene photographed as t h a t r e p r e s e n t e d . There i s a house i n the photograph w h i c h l o o k s l i k e t h e house b e f o r e me, and a l a r g e e v e r g r e e n t r e e , t w i c e as t a l l as the house and t o t h e l e f t o f t h e house, I n b o t h t h e photo g r a p h and i n t h e scene b e f o r e me. There a r e two s m a l l e r d e c i d u o u s t r e e s t o t h e r i g h t o f t h e house i n b o t h t h e r e p r e  s e n t a t i o n and t h e scene r e p r e s e n t e d . Does t h i s not o f f e r a p e r f e c t a n a l o g y f o r t h e d i s c e r n i n g e p l s t e m o l o g i s t , so t h a t , i n the same way t h a t a ph o t o g r a p h can be compared t o t h e scene w h i c h was photographed, t h e c o n c e p t s , images, and s e n s a t i o n s o f t h e p e r c e i v e r can be com p a r e d to t h a t i n t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d w h i c h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z e d , i m a g i n e d , and sensed? I t h i n k n o t , f o r t h e concept i s not -73- compared to the thing conceptualized, but is something by  means of which comparison is possible. In order to compare the scene as it appears in the photograph with the scene as i t appears to a person on the spot, I must be able to recog nize the photograph as a photograph, and the houses and trees as houses and trees, rather than as unconnected phenomena. Also, I must be able to perceive similarities in shape, texture, relative position, and proportion between such diverse entities as a tree and a house in a photograph and a real tree and house. The photograph is as much an object of sensation located in space and time as are the trees and the house of which the photograph was taken. The photograph is a definite size, shape, and weight, and it is possible to consider the arrangement of shapes and colors on it Just as an arrangement of shapes and colors, not as a represent ation of something. Mental and physical representations are both about something that is represented, but while a physical representation has additional characteristics of its own of the same sort as the thing represented, the mental representation has no other characteristic than its being about something other than itself. Since a physical representation has physical character istics of its own, in addition to its being a representation, it can be described in detail without the fact that i t is -74- a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n being mentioned. There i s , f o r i n s t a n c e , on page 170 of a c e r t a i n text-book something which i s three inches wide and two inches high. In t h i s space there are some l i n e s i n black i n k va r y i n g i n width from l / l 6 t h to | of an i n c h . Some of these l i n e s are curved and some s t r a i g h t , some interconnected and some i s o l a t e d , some f a i n t and some dark. I n c i d e n t a l l y , these l i n e s can be taken as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the human heart. Far from the understanding of p h y s i c a l representations being necessary f o r the understanding of mental represent a t i o n s , p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s presuppose mental repre s e n t a t i o n s . For the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a re c t a n g u l a r piece of paper w i t h v a r i o u s c o l o r e d shapes, In a d e f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s to one another^on i t to be perceived as a photograph and not as a s e r i e s of unrelated phenomena, the p e r c e l v e r must be able to recognize the markings on the paper as shapes of a p a r t i c u l a r sort d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from other shapes. And the photograph must be there i n a d e f i n i t e place i n order f o r sensation and c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n to be stimulated i n t o a c t i o n . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between mental and p h y s i c a l repre sentations i n which the mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s take p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s as t h e i r object i s no d i f f e r e n t than the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of the p e r c e i v i n g subject and any other o b j e c t . The p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s Just another o b j e c t , and not a b a s i s f o r t h e o r i z i n g about " p i c t u r e s i n the mind." -75- In terms of t h i s comparison of mental and p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , i t can be seen why I t h i n k that Kant's "immediately given o b j e c t " can be equated both t o the spatio-temporal-sensory object and to that which i s repre sented without representing something e l s e i n t u r n . The mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , though an object i n the weak sense of being something we are conscious of, i s n e i t h e r an ob j e c t i n the sense i n which s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i judgments apply to o b j e c t s , nor i s l t immediately given, r a t h e r i t i s t h a t — i n r e l a t i o n to other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n the h i e r a r c h  i c a l order of d i f f e r e n t kinds of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which form the s u b j e c t — t o which o b j e c t s are given. And p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s do not o f f e r a counter-example of a s p a t i o - temporal- sensory object which i s not only represented but a l s o represents, because the sense i n which p h y s i c a l repre sentations represent i s completely d i f f e r e n t from the sense i n which mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s represent. A mental repre s e n t a t i o n i s a way i n which the subject r e l a t e s to o b j e c t s , while a p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , beyond being an o b j e c t , i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between two ob j e c t s i n which the p e r c e i v e r i n t e r p r e t s c e r t a i n character i s t i c s of one object as corresponding to c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the other. Conclusion Kant's subject-object d i s t i n c t i o n can be understood i n terms of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . The subject c o n s i s t s of repre s e n t a t i o n s i n s o f a r as they are r e l a t e d to other represent a t i o n s of the same k i n d and the var i o u s k i n d s of represent a t i o n s enter i n t o h i e r a r c h i c a l order, and these c l a s s i f i a b l e , orderable r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s are compared, contrasted, and inter-connected as a means to perception. The object i s that which r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s r e l a t e to as an end by e n t e r i n g i n t o combinations of rep r e s e n t a t i o n s from d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s i n the h i e r a r c h i c a l order; i.e., the combination cannot be of sensations only, but a l s o of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , space and time, and of concepts. Besides the spatio-temporal-sensory o b j e c t , there are two other k i n d s of o b j e c t s according to Kant: There i s the object as anything we are conscious of, and the object i n i t s e l f . Both o f these kinds of obj e c t s can only be under stood by r e l a t i n g them to the subject-object d i s t i n c t i o n . a s s t a t e d above. Anything so f a r as we are conscious of i t in c l u d e s even I s o l a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , but i s o l a t e d repre sentations can only e x i s t i n s o f a r as they maintain some r e l a t i o n s h i p to the h i e r a r c h i c a l order of re p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n the subject; they are more or l e s s I s o l a t e d : They do not n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e to an object present to the p e r c e l v e r at a given time, but they do have d e f i n i t e s i m i l a r i t i e s -77- and d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , and are, com pared to other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , more, or l e s s , remotely r e l a t e d to spatio-%mporal-sensory o b j e c t s . The importance of something which i s an object only i n s o f a r as we are conscious of i t i s limited,because i t i s not i n any sense an object which i s outside ourselves, nor i s I t b e l i e v e d to be p a t s i d e us. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the object i n i t s e l f i s that i t i s an object which we do b e l i e v e to be outside o u r s e l v e s , i n s p i t e of the f a c t that i t cannot be sensed or l o c a t e d i n space and time. I t i s e a s i e r to point out and d i f f e r e n t i a t e the v a r i o u s k i n d s of obj e c t s d e a l t w i t h by Kant than i t i s to show j u s t how he thought the d i f f e r e n t kinds of obj e c t s are r e l a t e d . I discussed the problem of how r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s are r e l a t e d to appearances, of whether the o b j e c t s which we can know are combinations of re p r e s e n t a t i o n s or something ou t s i d e of those combinations to which the combinations of represent a t i o n s r e l a t e . I f one can never be sure which a l t e r n a t i v e Kant would p r e f e r , there are s i m i l a r i t i e s i n the d i s t i n c t i o n made i n e i t h e r case: The object as appearance, whether outside of our rep r e s e n t a t i o n s or a mere combination of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , i s s t i l l that w i t h i n the realm of the know- able which i s perceived as an end and not as a means t o p e r c e i v i n g something e l s e . Kant's views of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between ob j e c t s as appearances and obj e c t s i n themselves are confusing, since -78- the former are sometimes r e f e r r e d to as I f they were the knowledge we have of the l a t t e r , even though the l a t t e r are unknowable. Thus Kant says that "appearances are only r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of t h i n g s which are unknown as regards what they may be i n themselves." 1 This seemingly contra d i c t s my o f t e n repeated o p i n i o n that the appearances are represented without r e p r e s e n t i n g anything i n t u r n . How ever, the c o n t r a d i c t i o n dissappears, i f we consider how Kant c o n s t a n t l y f o r c e s us to compare our modest b i t of knowledge w i t h the vast regions outside of knowledge which surround and threaten to engulf us: I t i s w i t h i n the realm of the knowable that appearances are represented without r e p r e s e n t i n g something e l s e i n t u r n , and only i n the frame work of thoughts and b e l i e f s , w i t h no corresponding i n t u  i t i o n s , that appearances are re p r e s e n t a t i o n s of obj e c t s i n themselves. We can no more know that appearances are represent a t i o n s of t h i n g s i n themselves than we can not b e l i e v e that they are. To know that appearances are rep r e s e n t a t i o n s of obje c t s i n themselves we would have to know objects i n them se l v e s . But objects i n themselves are obj e c t s as they are Independently of our knowledge o f them, so, we can n e i t h e r know obj e c t s i n themselves nor that appearances are repre sentations of them. In order not to tend to b e l i e v e that B164 -79- appearances are re p r e s e n t a t i o n s of ob j e c t s In themselves, we would have to be incapable o f abst r a c t thought and the a b i l i t y to conceive of th i n g s we have never experienced, and to conceive of things we do experience apart from our experience of them. An appearance may be an appearance to someone or an appearance of something. As f a r as knowledge i s concerned, objects as appearances are objects as they appear to the subject which knows, and only w i t h i n the wider context of b e l i e f i n the unconditioned are objects as appearances the appearances of ob j e c t s i n themselves. Appearances may be rep r e s e n t a t i o n s of th i n g s which are unknown, but we cannot': know they are. W i t h i n the realm of the knowalbe, repre sentations are re p r e s e n t a t i o n s of appearances. To say that these appearances are i n t u r n representations i s t o forsake the knowable f o r thaywhlch can be b e l i e v e d , i n spit.e of the fa c t that i t i s i n p r i n c i p l e unknowable. For Kant, the complexity and p r e c i s i o n of knowledge occurs as a l i m i t a t i o n on, and a d i s c i p l i n e o f , the tempt a t i o n — I n s e p a r a b l e from the a b i l i t y to t h i n k a b s t r a c t l y — of b e l i e f In the unconditioned. The l a n d of t r u t h i s an i s l a n d "surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the na t i v e home of i l l u s i o n . " 2A235. Bibliography Ayer, A.J. The Problem of Knowledge. Penguin Books. 1956. Bird, Graham. Kant's Theory of Knowledge. London. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1962. Ewing, A.C. A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure  Reason. London. Methuen and Co. Ltd. 1938. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. N.K. Smith, trans. New York. The Humanities Press. 1950. Sartre, Jean-Paul. The Transcendence of the Ego. Forest Williams and Robert Kirkpatriek, trans. New York. Noonday Press. 1957. Smith, Norman Kemp. A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure  Reason,' Second ed. London. MacMillan and Co. 1923. 

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