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Kant's subject-object distinction Porsche, Stephen 1967

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KANT'S SUBJEGT-OBJlEGTr DISTINCTION;  by  Stephen Porsche B i A . , University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1965  A Thesis Submitted i n P a r t i a l Fulfilment' of the Requirements f o r the Degree of MAST-ERP. OF ARTS i n the Department of PHILOSOPHY  We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1967  In  presenting  for that  this  an a d v a n c e d  degree  tha L i b r a r y  study. thesis  thesis  shall  I f u r t h e r agree for  Department  f u l f i l m e n t of  the U n i v e r s i t y o f  make  it  that  permission  or  representatives..  w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n  this  thesis  for  permission.  of  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, C a n a d a  Columbia  It  requirements I  reference  for extensive  p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d  by h i s  the  B r i t i s h Columbia,  freely available for  scholarly  or p u b l i c a t i o n of  Department  at  in p a r t i a l  agree  and  copying of  this  by t h e Head o f my  is understood  f i n a n c i a l gain  shall  that not  be  copying allowed  Abstract  I n c h a p t e r s two and t h r e e o f t h i s t h e s i s , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between the s u b j e c t and o b j e c t o f knowledge  and p e r c e p t i o n i n  K a n t ' s C r i t i q u e o f Pure Reason i s examined i n terms o f what Kant c a l l s , " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . "  These r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e n o t ,  i n g e n e r a l , as the name might s u g g e s t , p i c t u r e s i n the mind, or copies of o b j e c t s .  They a r e i s o l a t e d b i t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n  w h i c h the mind has about the w o r l d ; o r , i n o t h e r words,  ele-  mentary ways i n w h i c h the s u b j e c t i s r e l a t e d t o the o b j e c t s w h i c h i t knows o r p e r c e i v e s .  The s u b j e c t i s c o n s t i t u t e d by  the g r o u p i n g o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n t o d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , m a i n l y on t h e b a s i s o f s i m i l a r i t i e s , so t h a t  we  have t h e same s o r t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n about d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t s . The o b j e c t i s t h a t w h i c h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s r e l a t e t o when s e l e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f many d i f f e r e n t k i n d s a r e combined, m a i n l y on the b a s i s o f coherence, so t h a t we have d i f f e r e n t s o r t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n about the same o b j e c t . Chapter one i s devoted t o Kant's d o c t r i n e of t h e o b j e c t i n i t s e l f , which i s d i s c u s s e d i n terms o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge  and b e l i e f .  O b j e c t s i n themselves a r e o b j e c t s  a p a r t from our r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f them.  I n s p i t e o f the f a c t  t h a t they cannot be known, o b j e c t s i n themselves a r e  signifi-  cant i n s o f a r as t h e f a l s e b e l i e f t h a t we can know them i s an I n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t o f t h e c a p a c i t y o f the s u b j e c t t o combine r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n d i f f e r e n t ways, i n c l u d i n g the c o m b i n a t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n the concept o f an unknowable o b j e c t .  Table o f  Contents  Introduction.  p.  1.  Chapter One:  O b j e c t s i n Themselves.  p.  5.  Chapter Two:  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and Appearances,  p.  26.  p.  64.  Chapter Three:  Subject and O b j e c t .  Conclusion.  p. 76.  Bibliography.  P.  80.  Acknowledgment  Discussions with P.N.Stewart were helpful i n the i n i t i a l development of some of the ideas i n t h i s thesis, and Dr. Peter Remnant's thorough and thoughtful c r i t i c a l comments were indispensable.  Thanks, also, to Wulfing  von Schleinitz, f o r proofreading.  Introduction  There i s hardly a section i n the C r i t i q u e of Pure Reason which does not make use of the subject-objectdistinction.  This d i s t i n c t i o n i s f o r Kant an ever-  present dualism which hauntfc h i s more e x p l i c i t monistic Idealism.  Kant himself says that- a transcendental  i d e a l i s t may be a d u a l i s t . *  That t h i s dualism i s pres-  ent: i s not suprlsing considering the o v e r a l l plan of the Critique, f o r reason i s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from l o g i c at the outset; because " i t has to deal not with i t s e l f but also with objects,"  alone  because i t involves the r e l a t i o n -  ships between the thinking subject' and objects, not just between one thought and another thought without r e f e r ence to objects.  What i s suprlsing i s that Kant should  begin without giving an e x p l i c i t analysis of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n which i s seemingly more basic tohls theory of knowledge than the categories or even space and time. The importance of the subject-object d i s t i n c t i o n ; In the f i r s t Critique i s obscured by the extreme emphasis which i s given to the perceiving subjects i n Kant's terminology.  Opening the C r i t i q u e o f Pure Reason at random  one comes across term a f t e r term concerning  the thinking,  A370. A l l references are to the standard page numbecs of Kant's C r i t i q u e of Pure Reason. Norman Kemp&" Smith's t r a n s l a t i o n i s used through-out. 2 Bix.  -2perceiving subject without a corresponding  array of; terms  concerning the perceived objects towards which thought Is directed.  On the side of the subject Kant's  terminology  distinguishes such f a c u l t i e s of mind as s e n s i b i l i t y , understanding, and reason, as well as such e n t i t i e s and processes as sensible impressions,  images, schemata,  concepts, ideas, p r i n c i p l e s , perceptions, i n t u i t i o n s , and judgments.  Oh the side of the objects there are only the  terms "object" and "object In i t s e l f . "  There i s also the  term, "appearance," but i t i s by no means obvious whether t h i s term belongs on the side of the thinking subject or on the side of the objects. While t h i s wealth of terms f o r r e f e r r i n g to the subV Ject reflectts, prima f a c i e , a lopsided preference on Kant's part f o r the subject over the object, i t i s possible to step back and consider-the problem from another point of view, namely, from the vantage point of the term, "representation."  A l l the aspects of the perceiving subject  which Kant c o n s i d e r s — s e n s i b l e impressions,  categories,  forms of i n t u i t i o n , and so on—have t h i s i n common: are a l l representations.  They  Prom t h i s perspective the b a l -  ance between subject and object i s restored to the extent that we can seek our goal of understanding the subjectobject d i s t i n c t i o n quickly by asking some general  questions  about representations rather than l o s i n g ourselves i n a  maze of concepts,  schemata, and sensations which seems to  go around i n c i r c l e s and keep the objects of perception which we seek permanently hidden from us. resentations, the questions are:  Concerning rep-  What do a l l representa-  tions have i n common which makes them a l l representations? What Is the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a representation and that;: which Is represented?  To what extent can problems about  the subject-object d i s t i n c t i o n be c l a r i f i e d , stated, and resolved i n terms of representations? Three quotations from completely different parts of the f i r s t C r i t i q u e I l l u s t r a t e some of the problems i n volved i n understanding  what representations are and  how  they r e l a t e to other e n t i t i e s : A l l our i n t u i t i o n i s nothing but the representation of appearance.3 How things may be i n themselves, apart from the representations through which they affect.us, i s e n t i r e l y outside our sphere of knowledge. 4  External objects (bodies), however, are mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of my representations.-* What Is especially problematic here are the meanings of and relationships between the terms, "things i n themselves, "appearances," and "representations."  3  A42.  4  A190.  5  A370.  I f representation Is  "of  appearance"  but' appearances  my r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , "  does  in  turn representations  in  itself?  this of  a  be a  special  representation of I n any case,  make  some s o r t  related as  to  things of  of  it  as  amination of the  evident  that  between the  ?  representat  ions.  Kant  i f Of can is  wantis  obviously  and appearances,  not  therefore  distinction  closely as  well ob-  b a s e my a n a l y s i s  on a p r e l i m i n a r y  on a d i s c u s s i o n  to  and unknowable  r e l a t i o n s h i p s between o b j e c t s  and r e p r e s e n t a t l o n s a n d  be  o f r e l a t i o n s h i p between the  I shall  subjects-object  of  elee?  representations  i n themselves.  thing  i n themselves?  d i s t i n c t knowable representations  Kant's  the  are  of representation which  something  I take  of  appearances  be r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  things  kind  e s t a b l i s h some s o r t  vioasly  that  "a species  something e l s e — o f  of distinction  entities,  s t i l l  unknown,,as t h e y w o u l d h a v e t o  t h e y were r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s appearance  imply  Can r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  something which i s  are  of the  in  ex-  themselves  nature  of  Chapter One: Objects i n Themselves  Kant says that objects i n themselves, that l a , objects apart from the conditions under which they are sensed, are completely unknown to human beings:* Objects i n themselves are 1 . ) unknown and 2.) contrasted to objects of sensation, and thus the object i n i t s e l f may be properly characterized only by saying that i t i s not an object of sensible intui t i o n (intuition being direct relation to an object ). Perhaps i t i s because this bare something-we-knownot-what i s such an unpromising topic for conversation that many of Kant's readers have been baffled by the thing In i t s e l f i n particular, and Kant's broader agnosticism i n general.  Why posit that there i s something about which we  cannot know anything?  If we cannot know anything about  the object i n i t s e l f , why think that there i s an object In Itself at all?  Why does Kant insist repeatedly that we  cannot know objects i n themselves as i f this were a significant denial^ rather than Just a result of the way thing In Itself i s defined.  Furthermore, i s not agnosticism i n gen-  eral the meaningless claim that there are things which we cannot know buat we can be i n doubt that eannot know them or even know for certain that we cannot know them?  A42.  1  2  A18.  How can  -6we know t h a t t h e r e i s s o m e t h i n g we c a n n o t know?  How c a n  t h e unknown e v e n o c c u r t o u s s o a s t o make n e c e s s a r y t h e a g n o s t i c ' s modest d e n i a l o f k n o w l e d g e ? T h i s s t r a n g e unknown o b j e c t i n i t s e l f  i s important  enough t o K a n t f o r h i m t o h a v e e m p l o y e d a t l e a s t  two t e r m s  t o r e f e r t o i t , f o r t h e t e r m "noumenon" i s e q u a t e d t o t h e term " o b j e c t i n i t s e l f  (though I suspect  that there are  c o n n o t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e two t e r m s ) s o t h a t " t h e c o n c e p t o f a noumenon" i s s a i d t o be t h e c o n c e p t o f " a t h i n g w h i c h i s n o t t o be t h o u g h t a s o b j e c t o f t h e s e n s e s b u t a s a thing i n i t s e l f . "  3  A l s o , Kant d i s t i n g u i s h e s between itive  a negative and a pos-  sense o f t h e term " o b j e c t - i n . i t s e l f "  alias  "noumenon"  i n w h i c h t h e n e g a t i v e s e n s e means " a t h i n g s o f a r a s I t i s not an o b j e c t o f o u r s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n , " w h i l e t h e p o s i t i v e sense r e f e r s t o "an o b j ect o f a n o n - s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n . " i s noteworthy t h a t Kant takes mean " i n t e l l e c t u a l  4  It  "non-sensible i n t u i t i o n " to  i n t u i t i o n ^ although,, on p u r e l y  logical  g r o u n d s , I t w o u l d be p o s s i b l e f o r " n o n - s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n " t o be a g e n u s  i n c l u d i n g Innumerable s p e c i e s o f i n t u i t i o n , s o  that a S p i n o z i s t i c  God w i t h i n f i n i t e  h a v e i n f i n i t e modes o f n o n - s e n s i b l e  a t t r i b u t e s might Intuition.  H o w e v e r , Kant d o e s n o t d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n ble  intuition  A254. 4  3  B307.  also  i n g e n e r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l  non-sensi-  intuition i n  p a r t i c u l a r , but rather equates non-sensible intellectual intuition. of i n t u i t i o n belonging  i n t u i t i o n and  Kant does not speculate about modes to non-human f a c u l t i e s of knowledge.  He does speculate about a non-human mode of i n t u i t i o n belonging to a human faculty of knowledge, a f a c u l t y of knowledge which we a c t u a l l y have but without i n t u i t i v e powers, the f a c u l t y of understanding. Thus Kant's denial that we can know objects i n themselves i s the s p e c i f i c denial that we can i n t u i t  objects  i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , and Kant, f a r from positing an unknown something Just f o r the sake of t a u t o l o g i c a l l y denying that we can know i t , i s on the contrary concerned to show that we cannot know some things which the very nature of human understanding tempts us to believe we can know:  It i s only by  considering the d i s t i n c t i o n between b e l i e f and knowledge, i n addition to the d i s t i n c t i o n between the known and the unknown, that Kant's doctrine of the object i n i t s e l f can be understood.  By b e l i e f I mean the affirmation or assumption  that something i s true on the basis of one element of knowledge where knowledge consists of more than one element. The profundity of Kant's agnosticism of knowledge as the union of conceptual  i s h i s analysis  thought and sensory  I n t u i t i o n , so that either element may be present without the other but without q u a l i f y i n g as knowledge, making i t "Just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that i s , to add the object to them i n i n t u i t i o n , as to make our  -8intuitions  intelligible,  that  i s , t o b r i n g them u n d e r  5  concepts.  Thought  M  distinguished: its  "To know a n o b j e c t  possibility,  experience,  a n d k n o w l e d g e a r e t o be c l e a r l y  t h i n k whatever I please,  b y means o f r e a s o n . provided  only  that  t h i s framework a g n o s t i c i s m  I do n o t  i s quite  s i n c e , a l t h o u g h I c a n n o t know s o m e t h i n g t h a t k n o w i n g a n d n o t k n o w i n g a r e not t h e o n l y think  But I c a n  myself."^  Within  can  t o prove  e i t h e r from I t s a c t u a l i t y as a t t e s t e d by  or a priori  contradict  I must b e a b l e  meaningful,  I cannot  know,  alternatives.  I  s o m e t h i n g I c a n n o t know, and,Inasmuch a s t h o u g h t  often actually i s f u l f i l l e d  i n sensory I n t u i t i o n , i t occurs  t o me q u i t e n a t u r a l l y t h a t , when I h a v e o n l y  one element o f  k n o w l e d g e , t h e t h o u g h t , i t m i g h t q u i t e w e l l be p o s s i b l e that  there  thought  i s an object  i s o f something which cannot  tempted t o s e a r c h and  other  s e n s i b i l i t y I s understanding, I s h a l l l i k e l y  s u s p e n d my Judgment. unknown w i l l  course, To  5  being  Within  ^Bxxvlin.  settle  i n t u i t i o n r a t h e r than p a t i e n t l y this  framework t h e t h o u g h t o f  a l w a y s be o c c u r r i n g t o me, w i t h o u t , o f  known t o me.  r e t u r n to t h e object  A5.1.  be  f a c u l t y o f knowledge I p o s s e s s  f o r a supposed i n t e l l e c t u a l  the  be s e n s e d , I w i l l  a r o u n d f o r a n o n - s e n s o r y mode o f i n t u i t i o n ,  since the only  besides  w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s t o l t , and i f t h e  i n itself,  the question  was:  I f we cannot know anything about the object i n i t s e l f , why t h i n k that t h e r e i s an o b j e c t i n i t s e l f at a l l ?  The an-  swer i s that we can e a s i l y t h i n k — i n d e e d , we can't t h i n k i n g about—much t h a t we cannot know.  resist  The t h i n g i n  I t s e l f does not s i g n i f y a mere unknown which t o deny knowledge o f i s t r i v i a l , but a much more s p e c i f i c e n t i t y which we can o r can t r y t o t h i n k and which we a r e p e r p e t u a l l y tempted t o c l a i m that we can a l s o know.  Thought extends  beyond i n t u i t i o n f o r Kant i n the same way w i l l extends behead I n t e l l e c t f o r Descartes. Kant suggests t h a t t h e r e a r e two g e n e r a l k i n d s o f obj e c t s o f I n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n o r noumena i n the p o s i t i v e sense:  "Doubtless, indeed, t h e r e a r e i n t e l l i g i b l e  entities  corresponding t o t h e s e n s i b l e e n t i t i e s ; t h e r e may a l s o be i n t e l l i g i b l e e n t i t i e s t o which our s e n s i b l e f a c u l t y o f i n t u i t i o n has no r e l a t i o n whatsoever."  This l a s t  sort o f  i n t e l l i g i b l e e n t i t y l i k e l y r e f e r s t o t h e supposed o b j e c t s o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i d e a s — t h e concepts t i o n e d , such as God and t h e immortal  o f the uncondi-  s o u l , which have no  o b j e c t s corresponding t o them i n sense-experience.  The  h y p o s t a t i z a t l o n o f these i d e a s r e s u l t s i n the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i l l u s i o n s , these being i l l u s i o n s which a r i s e not a c c i d e n t a l l y from s o p h i s t r y o r c a r e l e s s n e s s , but i n e v i t a b l y from the very nature o f reason  7  B308-309.  8  A339.  itself.  -10-  What l e s t r i k i n g here i e the close s i m i l a r i t y of the transcendental i l l u s i o n s i n the l a s t half of the Critique to the thing i n i t s e l f in4he f i r s t half of the Critiques The thing i n i t s e l f i s v i r t u a l l y a transcendental i l l u s i o n , an a l l but unavoidable temptation to claim to know something that we can think,but which we cannot know because i t i s unconditioned. There i s nothing perverse, then, i n repeating over and over again, as Kant does, that we cannot know something which we eannot know, provided, as i s the case with the thing i n i t s e l f , that people believe that i t i s something which can be known.  The object i n I t s e l f i s not defined as  unknown; It i s defined as an object as l t i s apart from the conditions of human s e n s i b i l i t y , from which i t follows as a matter of f a c t — o r , rather, as a matter of metaphysics— that i t cannot be known by human beings. For the denial that we know objects i n themselves to be s i g n i f i c a n t ^ t h e human mind must be such that i t creates the b e l i e f that we can know objects i n themselves.  Let us see  how t h i s b e l i e f arises. I have a concept  of a book of over 300 pages i n length  with a green cloth cover, and whose pages are at least three inches wide and f i v e inches high.  Does such a book exist?  The question i s over-cautious since doubtless there are many instances i n the world of i n d i v i d u a l books which f i t t h i s description. I would create even better odds that  -11-  there a c t u a l l y exist books corresponding  to my concept by  simply removing one of the conditions, such as the color of the cover, so to think of a book of over 300 pages of the s p e c i f i e d dimensions with a cloth cover of any color. And one by one I can abstract the other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s so that at l a s t I am conceiving of a book i n general, a book of any number of pages and any measurable dimensions bound i n any material of any color, so long only as i t q u a l i f i e s as a book. On the other hand, I can think of more, rather than lees, s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  I can conceive of a book  of exactly 300 pages, the pages exactly four inches wide, with a dark green cover and an ink smudge on page 250 with part of page 168 torn out.  and  I do not know whether such  a book exists^ since I have never seen one f i t t i n g t h i s des c r i p t i o n ; I have only the concept, and not the i n t u i t i o n . I did not arrive at the concept of t h i s hypothetical book by describing something I observed, but simply by combining cert a i n representations which I already possessed. These thoughts about books I l l u s t r a t e three characteri s t i c s of the human mind:  F i r s t , i t i s the very nature of  thought to abstract from the conditions under which s p e c i f i c objects of sensation exist.  Second, these abstractions or  concepts are p o t e n t i a l l y applicable to new objects never before Intuited as long as these objects are of the sort  -12-  with which the concept i s concerned.  Third, the hypothe-  sized not-yet-intulted objects can be more s p e c i f i c a l l y described by such resources as the understanding has by combining concepts and specifying c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the object. The concept of a book with a green cover and more than 300 pages, etc., can correspond to many instances of actua l l y e x i s t i n g books Just because i t leaves out many s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which a p a r t i c u l a r book might have. Further, i t i s by means of t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of concepts—to  be  equally applicable to many p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s — t h a t  the  concept of a green book applies to future possible green books as well as those already perceived. bining In a new  way  F i n a l l y , by com-  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of already observed  books, the concept of a unique book could be produced whether or not such a book a c t u a l l y e x i s t s . Having i l l u s t r a t e d three c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of thought with these examples involving an empirical object, I s h a l l  now  apply them as a three step thought process to objects In general.  F i r s t , there i s the abstraction from p a r t i c u l a r i n -  stances, then the supposition that there are objects to which the concept corresponds other than those objects already experienced  on the occasion of which the concept was  origin-  a l l y abstracted, and f i n a l l y , there i s the attempt to conceive of the s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the new supposed i n the second step.  objects  These three steps may  c a l l e d : Abstraction, hypostatization, and  be  specification  -13-  o f the hypothesized To conceive  abstraction.  of books a b s t r a c t l y i s t o d i s r e g a r d a l l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f c e r t a i n o b j e c t s save o n l y that they are books.  Objects  can be conceived  i n a p a r a l l e l manner as  a b s t r a c t l y as p o s s i b l e by d i s r e g a r d i n g e v e r y t h i n g about object's except that they are o b j e c t s , a b s t r a c t i n g from a l l c o n d i t i o n s under which p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t s a r e p e r c e i v e d . The  a b s t r a c t i o n , h y p o s t a t i z a t i o n , and s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f ob-  j e c t s i n general 1.  i s as f o l l o w s :  The object c o n s i d e r e d  as a b s t r a c t l y as p o s s i b l e  i s the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an o b j e c t . a b s t r a c t e d from the conditions of s e n s i b i l i t y . the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 2.  T h i s may be what Kant means by  o b j e c t = x.  The h y p o s t a t i z a t i o n o f t h e mere r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f  an o b j e c t i n g e n e r a l j e c t s corresponding  i s the assumption that t h e r e are obt o t h e bare r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f o b j e c t s  as t h i n g s o u t s i d e o f o u r s e l v e s which are not the o b j e c t s o f sensory i n t u i t i o n . 3.  T h i s i s the negative  sense o f noumenon.  The more s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which are a s -  c r i b e d to the h y p o s t a t i z a t i o n o f the mere r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an object  i n general a r e that these o b j e c t s a r e r e l a t e d t o  us under the c o n d i t i o n s o f a supposed i n t e l l e c t u a l tion.  intui-  T h i s i s the p o s i t i v e sense o f noumenon. The  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an o b j e c t i n g e n e r a l  corresponds  t o innumerable a c t u a l o b j e c t s because i t does not concern the s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e o b j e c t s but only  -14-  that they are objects.  The concept, "object," l i k e the  concept, "book," applies to new e n t i t i e s other than those from which the concept was f i r s t abstracted because It i s the very nature of a concept to transcend any p a r t i c u l a r Instances of that which has been conceptualized.  The  difference between these two cases i s that while the cons  cept of a hook i n general does not abstract from the cond i t i o n s of sensory i n t u i t i o n , t h e concept of an object In general does so abstract, or so Kant would maintain.  Only  because we can think abstractly can—no, m u s t — i t occur to us that there might be new instances of o l d concepts. When the thought abstracts from the conditions of sensory i n t u i t i o n , as i s the case with the concept of an object i n general, i t i s possible that the new instances corresponding to the concept w i l l not be objects of sensory i n t u i t i o n . Though f a l l i n g f a r short of knowledge, the mere concept of something which Is not an object of sensory i n t u i t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r the b e l i e f that such objects exist to occur, and insofar as the b e l i e f o c c u r s i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to deny 9  that t h i s b e l i e f could be known to be true, that i s , i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to deny that we can know objects i n themselves. If t h i s l i m i t a t i o n on our knowledge i s ignored^it i s possible to posit d i f f e r e n t sorts of objects i n themselves. This quixotic attempt to d i f f e r e n t i a t e one object In I t s e l f from another proceeds i n two ways:  Either p a r t i a l l y ab-  stracted, semi-conditioned concepts of sensory objects are  -15-  hypostatizedjor  some  representation  resentations  w h i c h were  sory  i n the  objects  lectually the  intuited  objects  sensible  first  are  not  second,  correspond to  objects  of  and the  second  c o n t r a d i c t i o n by  all  conditions that  which  are  to  describe  Since i t  inches? in  But to  themselves  does t h i s  to  takes time, we c a n n o t  to  is  be  and  the  to  sensory are  of  an  intel-  concerns  thus  to  intellectual  sensible  entities.  specifically  7  ob-  intuition,,falls  into  unknowable,  the  such u t t e r  and  abstraction  intuit  size  not  alternative  the  as  an object  what it  300?  Then perhaps i t  doesn't  B308-309.  p.  9  the  from  objects,  be  to  count  in  space  above.  the  in  to  atitself  appear3 x 5  pages? and  objects  sizeless  pages  know t h a t , i t  pages,  i n themselves  sizeless have  sensory Its  How m a n y  be t h e  book  are  But i n o r d e r  objects  know how many  size  must  i n space.  since  would  knowable book as  possible  Cf.  objects  no way t o  first  a book,  have  are  is  and p o s i t  book have?  would have  as  sen-  unknowable.  o f the  which corresponds ance.  objects  there  thus also  An example tempt  of  with  alternative  characterize  contradiction avoids  thought  The f i r s t  and the  i n attempting  which  is  rep-  i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n which-dorrespond  w h i c h do n o t  The f i r s t ,  combination of  d i r e c t l y concerned  place  object.  entities,  intuition  jects  of  never  or  and  are  counting  not  In  pages a book i n I t s e l f  pages?  Then i t  isn't  a  time has.  book.  -16An example of the second alternative i s the f i r s t a n t i nomy interpreted i n terms of i t s solution, which states that we can have no experience of an absolute l i m i t , and that the idea of an absolute l i m i t , though not contradictory,cannot be known because i t cannot be Intuited**^  We constantly  employ i n experience the concept of something having a beginning i n time and l i m i t s i n space.  By abstracting from  time and space we a r r i v e at the concepts of an unconditioned beginning and of unconditioned l i m i t a t i o n s which we then a t tempt to apply to the universe as a whole, so to conceive of the beginning of the universe and the edge of the universe. Now beginning and l i m i t a t i o n cannot be here thought  of as  respectively temporal and s p a t i a l since the only way we reached a degree of abstraction suitable f o r application to the universe as a whole i n the f i r s t place was to remove i n thought  the conditions of space and time.  I f beginning and  l i m i t a t i o n are not conceived as temporal and s p a t i a l , then, though there i s no contradiction i n a non-temporal beginning or non-spatial l i m i t a t i o n , we have no way of i n t u i t i n g such empty concepts.  Therefore we could not possibly know  whether or not the universe has a beginning or l i m i t a t i o n s . As a matter of s t r i c t d e f i n i t i o n the object i n I t s e l f and the noumenon are one and the same, but i n connotation they are d i f f e r e n t .  10  A517 f f .  "Noumenon," suggesting nous, the Greek  word f o r mind, sounds much more removed from s e n s i b i l i t y than "thing i n i t s e l f " which has a more concrete, physical sound.  Noumena would thus be the objects of i n t e l l e c t u a l  i n t u i t i o n which do not correspond to sensible e n t i t i e s , the object of the concepts of the unconditioned Kant c a l l s the transcendental ideas, while objects i n themselves would be something much more s p e c i f i c which we tend to think we can know when we don't attend to the contradictions i n volved, something very much l i k e physical objects—except unconditioned:  F i r s t we experience ordinary objects of  sensation, then we posit the unconditioned existence of these very same objects, only apart from the conditions of our s e n s i b i l i t y .  Whereas "noumenon" suggests cosmic pro-  f u n d i t i e s , "thing i n i t s e l f " suggests more substantial copies of everyday objects.  Whereas transcendental ideas  are unconditioned from the s t a r t , objects i n themselves are only conditioned things, things as appearances, considered as unconditioned at the l a s t moment. The object i n i t s e l f , i f I may o f f e r the long-awaited description, i s the woman i n the Picaseo paintings whose face shows a l l sides at once.  The object In i t s e l f has  color where there i s no l i g h t and weight where there i s no gravity; i t has shape which Is not distorted by being viewed from different angles, and i t appears the same size no matter how close to i t or f a r from i t one i s . The object i n i t s e l f Is Just a l i t t l e b i t more v i v i d and c e r t a i n and  immediate than anything we actually experiences  It i s a  feather bed whose softness i s revealed i n the spaces between the feathers, an a n v i l which i s hard even i n the void between the atoms; It i s sugar which i s sweet because i t i s white and granular without there being any danger of i t s being s a l t ; i t i s located i n a naive r e a l i s t ' s heaven i n which flames are hot because of t h e i r  semi-transparent  orange-red color, where MacBeth's dagger i s sharp because of i t s m e t a l l i c g l i t t e r , where sticks never bend when thrust into water, and where the most deafening noises are made by trees f a l l i n g i n uninhabited f o r e s t s m i l l i o n s of miles from ear or eye or beast or man  or the stealthlest  percepts i n the mind of God. It i s the t h i r d of the steps I mentioned—the attempt to specify the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of hypostatized abstractionswhich creates the impression that there i s a gradual trans i t i o n from the objects of experience to the objects i n themselves which support them.  The various degrees of ab-  straction, arrived at as the conditions under which we perceive something are removed one by one i n thought,  are  thought of as corresponding to similar degrees of absense of conditions i n the object.  Then, since sensory i n t u i t i o n  does not disclose t h i s unconditioned object as l t Is i n thought, we think of the objects we sense as confused  im-  pressions of the objects i n themselves, the objects In themselves consisting of more s o l i d stuff which we half  -19expeet  would  senses  were  But, when  we  bit  alas,  i n  to  the We  into s t i l l  f u l l  volume,  oozing  on  would  never  appearance." know  confused  the  of  the  i t  and  and  emerging  pits  of  the  down  against  that  which  not  Just  left  grasp  l i k e  a  behind  of i t s  our  i t s  of  awkward  unknown  the  land  such  searching  "objects  to  us  not  that  nature  of  things  we  do  not  on  c a l l i n g  in  given by  our  but  i t s  sea  ages  steps  sunlight  waiting  be  i n  the  of  out of  of  of  the  to  us,  them  in  ob-  enlightened  namely,  s e n s i b i l i t y i n  for  themselves  most  themselves  apprehend  emer-  i n t u i t i o n .  or  may  through  alone  of  the  from  w i t h massive  In-  rising  t i p ,  surface  Into  foot-  sensory  iceberg  Just  his  eventual  awakening  the  is  always  an  swelling slowly  is  fashion;  l i k e  f l o a t ,  " i t  1 1  for  our thorough.  our  snow  upon  What  known  has  only  more  leaving  hope  knowledge  dinosaur  moment, i f  investigations  evades  and  to  any  i t s e l f  restless,  a  become  of  at  our  depths  wait  themselves:  knowledge  us  in  i t ;  fathoms  l i k e  warns  i n  not  only  shining  jects  at the  realm  mud  categories Kant  to  green  p e t r i f i c a t i o n the  or  object  look  can  appearances,  sharper  to  delicate fresh-fallen  the  from  i t s e l f  the  escaping  tuition. gence  a  turn  monster prints  reveal  any any  we  their can  save  a  fashion  „ 1o whatsoever. By  1 1  A43.  12  A44.  insisting  the  objects  which  we  can  know,  "appearances,"  Kant forces us to constantly think of what  we can know i n contrast to what we cannot know, of objects as appearances i n contrast to objects i n themselves. While on the one hand, t h i s puts us ever on gaurd against mistaking something we can at best merely think f o r something we can f u l l y know, on the other hand, i t i s confusing inasmuch as i n ordinary usage "appearance" often means " i l l u j sion" or "that which seems," whereas Kantian objects as appearance are just what are not i l l u s o r y objects or seeming objects. Kant i s hardly to be praised f o r such unfortunate terminology.  S t i l l , by c a r e f u l attention we can understand  what he means, f o r Kant recognized that h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between objects i n themselves and appearances might be confused with another, but "merely empirical," d i s t i n c t i o n which could be made using the same terms—the d i s t i n c t i o n between e s s e n t i a l and accidental I n t u i t i o n , between that which "holds f o r sense i n a l l human beings" and that which " i s v a l i d not i n r e l a t i o n to s e n s i b i l i t y In general but only In r e l a t i o n to a p a r t i c u l a r standpoint of structure i n t h i s or that s e n s e . "  or to a p e c u l i a r i t y  13  On a dark night my friend's coat might seem to be black, but i n better l i g h t I r e a l i z e that l t i s r e a l l y dark blue. As I am passing the display window of a clothing store one  13  A45.  -21-  of the manikins appears to move, but on closer inspection I see that i t i s r e a l l y one of the workers at the store dusting o f f the Inanimate objects.  The d i s t i n c t i o n made  i n these examples could be indicated by saying that the black coat and the animate manikin were appearances and the dark blue coat and the h i r e d help were the objects In themselves. Perhaps some of those who are b a f f l e d by Kant's pronouncements that we cannot know objects i n themselves are thinking of examples of t h i s sort:  They think that  Kant i s denying that we can correct mistakes a r i s i n g from a l i m i t e d point of view by r e l a t i n g such a point of view to the more general conditions under which i t occurs. It i s not the conditioned but the unconditioned,  However,  not the  t r a n s i t i o n from l i m i t e d to general conditions but the leap from general conditions to the unconditioned,  which Kant  wants to disallow. If someone wants to claim that i t i s obvious that we can know objects i n themselves and that Kant denied some everyday event, he w i l l do well to check what he means by "object i n I t s e l f " against what Kant meant. f i n d that Kant referred to t h i s  L i k e l y he w i l l  everyday-event-object-in-  i t s e l f by some other term such as " e s s e n t i a l I n t u i t i o n " or "object as appearance."  This helps us understand the d i s -  t i n c t i o n between objects i n themselves and appearances i n sofar as we are c a r e f u l not to confuse t h i s d i s t l n c $ i o n  -22w i t h the d i s t i n c t i o n ' "between e s s e n t i a l and a c c i d e n t a l intuition. 14  The c a t e g o r i e s apply only t o appearances.  This i s  not t o say, however, that c a t e g o r i e s apply t o sense-datalike entitles. ary, "the way  "Appearances" are not, i n Kant's d i c t i o n o b j e c t s seem," as the d i s t i n c t i o n between  e s s e n t i a l and a c c i d e n t a l I n t u i t i o n shows:  Accidental  intu-  i t i o n , an o b j e c t seen from a p a r t i c u l a r standpoint o n l y , i s the way  a t h i n g seems.  In Kant's example, the rainbow I s  the way the r a i n seems from a p a r t i c u l a r s t a n d p o i n t , w h i l e the r a i n i s the o b j e c t as appearance:  "Rain w i l l then be  viewed o n l y as that which, In a l l e x p e r i e n c e and i n a l l i t s v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s r e l a t i v e t o the senses, i s determined thus, 15  and not o t h e r w i s e , i n our i n t u i t i o n . "  Thus to say that  appearances are t h i n g s which we take as o b j e c t s o f our s e n s e s ^ i s to say more than that appearances a r e what i s 1  g i v e n to one sense i n one p o s i t i o n  (which may  be what some  people mean by "sense-data"), but i s a l s o to i n c l u d e among appearances f u l l  s c a l e o b j e c t s such as r a i n d r o p s p e r c e i v e d  from v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s  ( p l u r a l ) r e l a t i v e t o the senses  (plural). O b j e c t s i n themselves are r e i f i e d p a t t e r n s o f thought. T h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to the knowable o b j e c t s as appearances i s 14  A239  1 5  A4 .  16  A34.  5  -23the  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  ance.  T h o u g h t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p c a n o n l y be t h o u g h t , n o t  known, all  that which appears and the appear-  1 7  Kant  thinks that  the presence o f t h i s thought i n  o u r e x p e r e i e n c e i s so i m p o r t a n t  t h a t we s h o u l d  constantly  t h i n k o f what we know a s d e p e n d i n g o n what we do n o t know, t h o u g h o f c o u r s e t h i s way o f t h i n k i n g c a n n e v e r be k n o w l edge.  Thus K a n t  s p e a k s o f o b j e c t s a s a p p e a r a n c e s a s b^.'ng  t h e mode i n w h i c h we a r e a f f e c t e d b y " t h a t  something" which  1 ft  appears.  This  i s confusing,  since being  " a f f e c t e d b y some-  t h i n g " s u g g e s t s t h a t a p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n i s wanted. But i f " t h a t  something" which appears i s the object  s e l f , physiological explanations jects of physiology  are irrelevant,  i n i t -  s i n c e t h e ob-  are objects as appearances:  I t i sthe  f l a m e a s a p p e a r a n c e w h i c h b u r n s my f l e s h a s a p p e a r a n c e , the  flame i n I t s e l f  Of c o u r s e ,  and t h e f l e s h i n i t s e l f a r e i r r e l e v a n t .  I do n o t know t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s  most o f my p e r c e p t i o n s . not  T h i s , however,  I s mainly  p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n physiology,  explanations  while  are i n p r i n c i p l e  Perhaps t h e confusion  of  b e c a u s e I am  not because  such  unknowable.  o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between  sense  o r g a n s a n d t h e o b j e c t s w h i c h a f f e c t them, b o t h c o n s i d e r e d appearances, w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between ances and t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g  1  7Bxxvi.  1 8  A44.  o b j e c t s as appear-  objects i n themselves  to the Impression already noted that there  as  i sa  contributes  gradual  -24-  t r a n s i t i o n from the object i n I t s e l f to the object as appearance.  At any rate, whereas any causal r e l a t i o n s h i p  between objects i n themselves and objects as appearances are i n p r i n c i p l e unknowable, any causal r e l a t i o n s h i p between sense organs as appearances and other objects as appearances which affect the senses, while i n p r i n c i p l e knowable, are Irrelevant to metaphysics, since to discover causal r e l a tionships between objects and sense organs i s an empirical matter which presupposes that l t i s already possible to know objects (including sense organs as observed by other sense organs) and to perceive causal r e l a t i o n s h i p s , whereas It i s Just these p o s s i b i l i t i e s which metaphysics seeks to understand:  How i s i t possible to know or experience  to perceive causal relationships?  objects or  Of course, Kant and other  eplstemologists constantly r e f e r to the senses, but they do t h i s primarily to Identify different sorts of sensory i n formation as experienced  by the perceiving subject, not to  discuss the physical nature of the sense organs as objects of perception. The purpose of the doctrine of objects i n themselves i s to show that the a b i l i t y to think much that cannot be given i n sense experience  does not Involve the capacity to  know objects as they are apart from the conditions of sensory i n t u i t i o n .  Kant shows that we cannot know while at  the same time we can hardly help but believe that objects  -25-  look exactly the same when no one i s looking at them as when someone i s , that there i s something more empirical than sensation hidden under the shapes and colors of the world, that there are i n t e l l i g i b l e e n t i t i e s corresponding to the objects which we s e n s e — i n noumena supporting the phenomena.  short, that there are  Chapter Two:  Representations  and Appearances  Contrasted to the objects i n themselves which cannot be known are the objects as appearances which can be known, because, unlike objects i n themselves, they do come within the range of sensation:  The objects which we can  know are objects as they appear under the conditions of human s e n s i b i l i t y . How are the objects which we can know related to the representations of them?  In attempting  to d i f f e r e n t i a t e  these objects as appearances from the representations of them, Kant says that "that which l i e s In the successive apprehension i s here viewed as representation, while the appearance which i s given to me, notwithstanding  that l t i s  nothing but the sum of these representations i s viewed as t h e i r object."  1  How much of a d i s t i n c t i o n does t h i s make?  I f , as Is not clear from t h i s passage alone, the sum of representations which constitutes an object as appearance i s i t s e l f a representation, then, as Kant says i n an e n t i r e l y different passage, "mere appearances" are "nothing but a  2 species of my representations." A d i s t i n c t i o n has s t i l l been made, of course, even I f "appearances" are Just another species of the genus "representations." 1  2  A19U  A3T0.  But t h i s modest d i s t i n c t i o n does not always  -27seem adequate te Kant's theories.  In the "Refutation of  Idealism," f o r instance, Kant says that there i s something permanent i n perception and that t h i s permanent i s possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representat ion of a thing outside me; and consequently the determinatlon of my existence i n time i s possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me.3 These "actual things" are presumably objects as appearances, i n which ease objects as appearances would be as d i s t i n c t from representations, and thus no mere species of representations, on the one hand, as they are d i s t i n c t from objects i n themselves, on the other hand. The question, "What i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between representations and appearances?", provokes the more general questions, "What i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a representat i o n and that which i s represented?" and "What i s a representation?"  That there are such a great variety of e n t i t i e s  included among representations makes these questions both especially i n t e r e s t i n g and d i f f i c u l t . When Kant d e l i b e r a t e l y c l a s s i f i e s representations, he includes among representations the following:  Perception,  sensation, knowledge, i n t u i t i o n , concept, and i d e a . Else4  where Kant r e f e r s to Judgments^ and schemata*^ as repre-  ^75. 4  A320.  5  A68.  6  A138.  -28-  sentations.  Space and time, as species of i n t u i t i o n , and  p r i n c i p l e s , as a type of Judgment, are also representations. It may seem strange to include, say, knowledge and space among representations, but nonetheless Kant does so. That we are concerned with a d i v e r s i t y of sorts of things here can be seen by considering that representations may be active or passive, a p r i o r i or a p o s t e r i o r i , universal or p a r t i c u l a r , and mediate or immediate.  Thus Kant contrasts  the spontaneity of conceptual thought with the r e c e p t i v i t y of i n t u i t i o n , and, while the categories are a p r i o r i and universal, sensation i s a p o s t e r i o r i and p a r t i c u l a r , space and time are p a r t i c u l a r and a p r i o r i , and concepts and i n t u i tions are respectively mediate and immediate knowledge of objects. The case of concepts w i l l serve to i l l u s t r a t e what I mean by the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a representation and that represented.  To the concept of a book as an abstraction  correspond many instances of p a r t i c u l a r books as objects i n space and time present to sensation.  It i s because the  concept i s concerned only with what these p a r t i c u l a r objects have i n common, with no references to the endless differences i n d e t a i l , that the concept can apply to many cases.  Here,  the concept i s the representation and the p a r t i c u l a r books ?  are those things which are represented.  This i s the  f a m i l i a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between unlversals and p a r t i c u l a r s .  -29Obvlously the r e l a t i o n s h i p between universals and p a r t i c u l a r s i s not the r e l a t i o n s h i p between representations of a l l kinds and the respective sorts of things  represented,  since some representations, f o r instance, space and time, are themselves p a r t i c u l a r i n nature.  Kant himself makes  t h i s comparison between concepts and forms of i n t u i t i o n as concerns space (and i n a similar passage as concerns time): Space i s not a discursive or, as we say, general concept of r e l a t i o n s of things i n general, but a pure i n t u i t i o n . For. . .we can represent to ourselves only one space; and i f we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Now every concept must be thought of as a representation which i s contained i n an i n f i n i t e number of d i f f e r e n t possible representations (as t h e i r common character), and which therefore contains these under I t s e l f ; but no concept, as such, can be thought as containing an i n f i n i t e number of representations within I t s e l f . It i s i n t h i s l a t t e r way, however, that space i s thought.' These relationships of being subsumed under a concept and being contained within space have t h i s i n common: In both cases there i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p of unity to diversity, even though i n the case of space the unifying factor i s as p a r t i c u l a r as are the diverse objects contained within i t . However, the r e l a t i o n s h i p of unity to d i v e r s i t y cannot be the general r e l a t i o n s h i p of representations to that represented, since l t does not apply to sensations, which are also representations.  A25.  Gf. A 3 1 - 3 2  -30Th rough sensation we acquire a d i v e r s i t y of informat i o n concerning detailed c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of objects.  The  few examples Kant gives of sensations show/; that he i s concerned primarily with q u a l i t a t i v e l y different sorts of information of a f l e e t i n g , contingent sort, rather than with the processes by which objects affect the sense oro  gans.  For instance, i n one passage Kant i d e n t i f i e s as  belonging to sensation, impenetrability, hardness, and color, and  and i n another passage, again colors and also sounds  9  heat.  10  Sensation, as supplying detailed Information about obj e c t s , has i n common with conceptualization the relationship of  being about a l i m i t e d aspect of what i s being represented.  The weight and color of a heavy green book are i s o l a t a b l e sorts of Information about the book, yet they are s t i l l about the book.  Both concept and sensation are about i s o -  lated c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of that which i s represented.  Since  space and time are not c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of objects but ways i n which objects are ordered, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a representation and that represented cannot be so s p e c i f i c as "x i s about i s o l a t e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of y."  However, though  the ways objects are ordered are not c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the objects, they are s t i l l about or concerned with objects. D  Cf.  9  pp. 23-24 above.  A21.  1G  A28.  -31-  This r e l a t i o n s h i p , "x i s about y," the r e l a t i o n s h i p between representations and that represented, I s h a l l c a l l , "transitivity." Again and again Kant refers to representations i n terms of function and purpose.  Representations  are said  to r e l a t e to, to be directed towards, and to apply to obJects or to other representations.  Thus Kant says that a l l  thought i s directed as a means to i n t u i t i o n and i n t u i t i o n i n turn r e l a t e s to o b j e c t s , act  11  and again that "thought i s the  which relates given i n t u i t i o n to an object."  Also:  "Pure reason never r e l a t e s d i r e c t l y to objects, but to the concepts which the understanding  frames i n regard to ob-  j e c t s ; " ^ Here the r e l a t i o n s h i p to objects i s i n d i r e c t , but 1  s t i l l present.  "Even space and time. . .would yet be with-  out objective v a l i d i t y , senseless and meaningless, i f t h e i r necessary a p p l i c a t i o n to the objects of experience were not established."1  4  The function of a representation i s i t s d i r e c t i o n to something outside I t s e l f so as to be of or about something. In order f o r a representation to f u l f i l l t h i s function there must be something outside that representation—perhaps other r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s — t o be represented.  11 A19.  12  A247.  13 A 3 3 5 . 14  A156.  only  Certain verbs  -32are c a l l e d t r a n s i t i v e i f they require a grammatical object to complete t h e i r meaning.  Analogously,  representations  are t r a n s i t i v e since they require that which i s represented ?  to complete t h e i r meaning.  So space and time could not be  ways i n which other representations or appearances are ordered i f there were no such other e n t i t i e s to be ordered. Nor could a concept r e f e r to an Isolated c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of various p a r t i c u l a r objects, i f there were no such objects to be  conceptualized. If representations require something that i s repre-  sented to complete t h e i r meanings, they are, i n s o f a r as they can be i s o l a t e d , incomplete,  and, though l i k e l y too primitive  to be s t r i c t l y definable, they may at least be characterized i n a manner complementary to the t r a n s i t i v e relationships they enter into.  So a representation i s an Incomplete r e f -  erence to that which i s represented; i t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y refers to that which i s outside i t s e l f . To return to the d i s t i n c t i o n between appearances and representations, since appearances are something that i s representedjand  that which i s represented i s what repre-  sentations require to complete t h e i r meaning, appearances are among the things which may complete the meanings of representations.  This follows from the general nature of  representations and t h e i r relationship represented.  to that which i s  However, some questions about the s p e c i f i c  nature of representations and appearances remain:  There i s  -33the q u e s t i o n whether appearances a r e c o m p l e t e l y  outside  our r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r n o t , and t h e q u e s t i o n o f J u s t what are t h e s e o b j e c t s a s appearances t o w h i c h Kant c o n s t a n t l y c o n t r a s t s objects i n themselves. Appearances a r e something, though not t h e o n l y t h i n g s , which a r e r e p r e s e n t e d .  S i n c e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c a n be r e p r e -  sented by o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and t h u s be t h e t h i n g w h i c h i s represented,  i t may be t h e case t h a t appearances a r e a  s p e c i e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , but i t does not f o l l o w j u s t because t h e t h i n g r e p r e s e n t e d may be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t appearances as something r e p r e s e n t e d sort.  a c t u a l l y are of t h i s  Are appearances a s p e c i e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r n o t ?  Are appearances d i s t i n c t i v e c o l l e c t i o n s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r something c o m p l e t e l y  d i f f e r e n t from r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ?  That Kant c o n t r a d i c t s h i m s e l f on t h e s e p o i n t s , t h e r e i s no doubt, though a s s e r t i o n s t h a t appearances a r e a s p e c i e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e f a r more f r e q u e n t the c o n t r a r y .  than a s s e r t i o n s t o  I t may t u r n o u t , however, t h a t t h e i n f r e q u e n t  d e n i a l t h a t appearances a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s l e a d s t o a more acceptable  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Kant's philosophy.  The t y p -  i c a l statement on t h i s m a t t e r i s t h a t "appearances, as mere r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , a r e I n themselves r e a l only i n p e r c e p t i o n , which p e r c e p t i o n I s i n f a c t n o t h i n g but t h e r e a l i t y o f an empirical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h a t i s , a p p e a r a n c e . " ^ 1  A493.  Gf. A491, A498-9, A5C-8.  -34The untypical statement i s that of the "Refutation of Idealism," i n which i t i s quite emphatically asserted that the things which we perceive outside ourselves are actually things, not mere representations of t h i n g s .  1 6  Of course,  the term "appearance" i s not used i n t h i s passage, but there can be no doubt that the things which we perceive outside ourselves are the empirical objects which we can know In contrast to the objects i n themselves which we cannot know— and i t i s Just these knowable empirical objects to which the term, "appearances," r e f e r s . Another reason, other than consideration of the "Refut a t i o n of Idealism," f o r doubting that appearances are representations i s the d i f f i c u l t y of accounting f o r i n t r a n s i t i v i t y i f appearances are representations. i n t h i s way:  Representations  The d i f f i c u l t y arises  are always about something  other than themselves, and t h i s something may be another representation.  Por instance, an "idea," i n Kant's technical  sense of t h i s term, Is about the concepts of understanding, and i n i t s proper employment represents as much unity as possible among concepts.  This makes ideas representations of  represent at lons;sinee ideas and concepts are both representations and the one represents the other.  Since concepts are  representations, they w i l l also represent  something other  than themselves, so that i t i s evidently possible to have a series of representations i n which the f i r s t representation represents a second representation, the second representation  -35-  being i n turn a representation of a t h i r d representation, . . . And so on, I n d e f i n i t e l y ? No.  The series of repre-  sentations has i t s terminating point i n the i n t r a n s i t i v e appearances:  That i s what appearances a r e — t h o s e  which are represented without something else.  things  i n turn being representations of  The point i s not that t r a n s i t i v i t y implies an  i n t r a n s i t i v e starting point.  There might, f o r a l l I know, be  a universe i n which representations are representations of representations i n an i n f i n i t e series, or i n a f i n i t e series so that a represents b, b represents c, and c i s again a representation of a. The point i s that human experience of t h i s u n i v e r s e — o r at least Kant's theory of such experience— requires i n t r a n s i t i v e objects towards which the series of representations i s directed.  Kant distinguishes different  kinds of representations from each other by the manner ha which they relate to the objects as appearances which terminate the series. How i s t h i s I n t r a n s i t i v l t y of appearances to be acacounted for?  A straight-forward way would be to suppose  that appearances are e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t from the representations of them so that the i n t r a n s i t i v l t y of appearances would be as primitive a part of the universe as the t r a n s i t i v i t y of representations.  I f appearances are a species of repre-  sentations, however, i n t r a n s i t i v l t y must somehow be derived from t r a n s i t i v i t y . Is i n t r a n s i t i v l t y primitive or derived?  Are appearances  -36primitive or derived?  Are appearances completely  distinct  from (though s t i l l related to) representations, or are they a species of representations?  It i s easy to f i n d  material i n the f i r s t Critique to support apparently opposing answers to these questions.  In ordfir to help de-  termine the significance of such opposing trends i n Kant's philosophy^ and to discover to what extent the contradictory material can be reconciled, I s h a l l develop these diverging tendencies into two d i s t i n c t interpretations of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between representations and the objects as appearances represented.  I s h a l l c a l l these two i n t e r p r e t -  ations, respectively, the "correspondence theory of obj e c t s , " and the "coherence theory of objects." Suppose that appearances are not representations,or combinations of representations.  Then the object as ap-  pearance i s both d i s t i n c t from the representation of the object as appearance, and d i s t i n c t from the object In I t s e l f . From the denial that we can know objects apart from the way we perceive them, i t does not necessarily follow that objects as we do know and perceive them are i n our minds. t h i r d a l t e r n a t i v e , i n addition to objects existing  The  completely  apart from the mind or existing only i n our representations, i s that they exist as related to us without  being i n us, so  that the objects would exist separately from but corresponding to our representations. theory of objects.  This i s the correspondence  -37-  Suppose that appearances are r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s — o r at least combinations of representations, which i s presumably what Kant means when he says that appearances are a mere species of representations.  Then the object as appearance  i s reduced to combinations of representations.  Appearances  would s t i l l be d i s t i n c t from representations, but only as d i s t i n c t as representations i n general are from specified combinations of representations, so that the objects would be distinguished from the representations of them only as being more consistent, interrelated series of representations which are grouped i n certain ways.  This i s the coherence  theory of objects. Of course considerations of coherence are not absent 3  i n the correspondence theory.  Even i f objects are  separate  from the sum t o t a l of a l l the representations of them, the a b i l i t y to combine and separate representations would s t i l l be a necessary condition f o r experience to be possible. Likewise, i n the coherence theory there would s t i l l be the correspondence between the representation and the object represented.  The difference between the two theories i s not  that they respectively assert the existence of one of the r e l a t i o n s , coherence or correspondence, and deny the e x i s t ence of the other, but that they o f f e r completely  different  interpretations of the nature and existence of objects as appearances. In the correspondence theory, representations are  -38combined and separated, and compared and contrasted, i n accordance with the greatest coherence, but the objects represented are d i s t i n c t from these coherently i n t e r r e l a t e d representations.  The object i s that i n the external world  which corresponds to the combination of representations. NO amount of coherence among representations i s a substitute f o r the independently  existing, externally given ob-  ject, i n r e l a t i o n to which representations and combinations of representations a l i k e are merely means to perception. In the coherence theory, there i s s t i l l the correspondence between representations and that represented, hut i t i s only the correspondence of the part to the whole, of i s o l a t e d representations to the ways i n which those same representations are combined. In the correspondence theory, i t i s of the very of the objects that they correspond  nature  to the representations  of them, and the bare coherence of those representations does not determine whether or not they correspond ject.  to the ob-  In the coherence theory, objects are nothing other  than the ways i n which representations are combined, and the correspondence of representation to object occurs only when an i s o l a t e d representation can enter into a coherent  combi-  nation of representations. What does Kant say which J u s t i f i e s my d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of two such d i s t i n c t ways of interpreting the r o l e of objects as appearances and t h e i r relationship to the representations of them?  -39As f a r as the correspondence theory i s concerned, Independently existing objects are given to I n t u i t i o n : "Objects are given to us by means of s e n s i b i l i t y . "  1 7  "Our  mode of i n t u i t i o n i s dependent upon the existence of the obj e c t , and Is therefore possible only i f the subject*s fac18  u l t y of representation Is affected by that object." In the correspondence theory, then, objects as appearances are externally given, but s t i l l conditioned, the condi t i o n s being, primarily, r e l a t i o n to, rather than coherence among, the representations of the subject:  "Representation  i n i t s e l f does not produce i t s object i n so f a r as e x i s t ence i s concerned, f o r we are not here speaking of i t s causality by means of the w i l l .  None the less the repre-  sentation i s a p r i o r i determinant of the object, i f i t be the case that only through the representation i s l t possible to know anything as an o b j e c t . " spondence theory^ understanding  19  According to the corre-  does not make the existence  of objects possible, but only makes knowledge of objects possible. Furthermore, Kant occasionally r e f e r s to that which corresponds to sensation i n a manner which cannot be understood i n terms of the sort of correspondence which i s 17A19. 18 1  B72.  9 92. A  -40possible within the coherence theory of objects:  "That i n  the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term I t s matter."  20  "Reality. . . i s that which corresponds to a  sensation i n general."  "What corresponds i n empirical 22  i n t u i t i o n to sensation i s r e a l i t y . "  I f Kant had consis-  tently thought of objects i n terms of the coherence theory tendencies i n h i s philosophy, he need only have said, "that In the appearance which i s sensation i s the matter of appearance," and, " r e a l i t y i s sensation In general."  The  phrase, "that which corresponds to sensation," suggests some thing both d i s t i n c t from sensation and d i s t i n c t from the combinations of representations into which sensations can ent er. And as f o r the coherence theory, f a r from always naintainlng that our i n t u i t i o n depends on externally given obj e c t s , Kant soUStimes says that appearances are representations, and as such "must not be taken as objects capable of 23  existing outside of our power of representation."  Con-  t r a s t i n g to the assertion that representations make knowledge, as d i s t i n c t from the existence of, objects possible, Kant says that apart from consciousness  "appearances could  never be f o r us an object of knowledge, and so would be 20  A20.  21  A143.  22  A168.  25  A104.  nothing to us; and since i t has i n I t s e l f no objective r e a l i t y , but exists only i n being known, l t would be nothing at a l l . "  2 4  Here representations are s t i l l only  said to concern knowledge of objects, but the existence of that knowledge i s said to constitute the existence of the objects known.  It i s t h i s reduction of existence to knowl-  edge which gives r i s e to interpretations of Kant i n which the mind i s said to create objects. Whereas, i n the correspondence theory^ appearances form an intervening realm between the representations of the mind and the objects In themselves, aceording.to the coherence theory, the only alternative to something's being as object i n i t s e l f Is f o r l t to be an object i n the mind:  "What ob-  jects may be i n themselves, and apart from a l l t h i s recept i v i t y of our s e n s i b i l i t y , remains completely  unknown to us. 25  We know nothing but our mode of perceiving them."  The  object i n I t s e l f would, of course, be unknown i n any i n t e r preta©tlon of Kant.  But the object i n i t s e l f need not be  equated with the object which affects the senses, as i t seems to be In t h i s passage.  Here Kant i s seemingly attempting to  reduce that which i s received to r e c e p t i v i t y , that which i s perceived to a mode of perception, and a c t u a l i t y to capacity. Since, whatever objects as appearances may be, i t Is by means of Judgment that representations relate to t h e i r ^A120. 2 5  A42.  -42-  objects, I s h a l l have to introduce an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Kant's views on Judgment.  Then I can further develop t h i s  comparison of the coherence theory of objects and the correspondence theory of objects, with a view to i l l u s t r a t i n g  and  evaluating these opposing tendencies i n the Critique of Pure Reason. Consider the procedure of a geologist confronted with a strange rock specimen. rock i t i s he may  In order to f i n d out what kind of  f i r s t note some ordinary facts about the  rock, i t s color and texture, as well as the natural setting i n which the specimen was  found.  Perhaps he w i l l break the  rock to see what kind of pattern r e s u l t s , whether the planes of fracture result i n Jagged, conchoidal, or f l a t For more exact i d e n t i f i c a t i o n he w i l l determine how  surfaces. hard the  specimen i s on an established scale by attempting to scratch the rock with implements or other rocks whose degree of hardness i s already known.  F i n a l l y , the c r y s t a l structure of the  specimen can be examined under a microscope. I s h a l l Interpret t h i s procedure of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n terms of the Judgments involved, since i t i s i n terms of judgments that representations  are related to objects,  whether these objects are combinations of representations quite d i s t i n c t from such combinations.  or  It i s possible, of  course, that the geologist w i l l not l i t e r a l l y say out loud or even to himself, "This rock i s black and smooth and has a perfect conchoidal  fracture," but t h i s does not matter, since  -43-  judgments, f o r Kant, are not defined "by the words or sentences which may or may not be used to express and communicate the Judgments. Judgment i s "the mediate knowledge of an object, that i s , the representation of a representation of i t .  In every  judgment there i s a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that i s immediately related to an object." *^ 2  Thus, i n , " t h i s rock  i s black," "black" applies to many objects, but i s here app l i e d to a p a r t i c u l a r object, " t h i s rock." Since Kant defines judgment i n terms of representations and i n terms of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the thinking subject and objects, the Judgment, " t h i s rock i s black," though I cannot write i t out here without using words, need not take a l i n g u i s t i c form to q u a l i f y as a Judgment. The geologist, having wondered what kind of rock he has Just picked up, might suddenly r e a l i z e that one clue to the ident i t y of the rock i s that i t i s b l a c k — a n d he might r e a l i z e t h i s without having put h i s r e a l i z a t i o n into words. r e a l i z a t i o n would q u a l i f y as a Kantian judgment. happened i n the geologist's mind:  This  Something  At f i r s t he Just  perceived  " t h i s rock," then he noticed that l t was a black rock; an immediate object was represented  and subsumed under a more  general representation without a word having been said or thought.  The a b i l i t y to put t h i s judgment into words might  be a necessary condition f o r the judgment's hayjing been made,  -44but t h i s actual Judgment need not thereby be put into words. Judgment, as the representation of a representation, though not necessarily being expressed  i n language, may s t i l l be  quite deliberate, as l t i s i n the example of the geologist. "This rock:" i s an object as appearance.  Only through  the mediating a c t i v i t y of the mind Is the knowledge that t h i s rock i s black possible, since i t i s only by representing i n one's mind t h i s object and further subsuming t h i s representation under the more general representation, "black," that one can r e a l i z e that " t h i s rock i s black;"  otherwise  the immediate object, " t h i s rock," would be forgotten before there was time to r e a l i z e or judge or know anything about i t . The geologist's procedure, then, can be interpreted as so many deliberate judgments.  "This rock has a conchoidal  fracture," "This rock i s extremely hard on a standard scale," "This rock Is f l i n t , " are a l l judgments which consist of mediate and general representations of the immediate and p a r t i c u l a r object as appearance which i s being  represented,  and about which the judgments are made. However, Kant i s concerned l e s s with judgments, such as those i n the above examples, which are made i n the course of inquiry, than he i s concerned with the conditions which must be met before there i s even the p o s s i b i l i t y of making Judgments. Above I discussed the Judgment, "This rock i s black." What i f i t i s asked how we even know'this i s a rock"?  -45Doubtless there are occasions on which t h i s Judgment could be made, but usually there i s no discernable passage of time i n one's experience of a simple object l i k e a rock between one's perceiving the object and perceiving i t as a rock.  In the case of the geologist, he recognized the rock  as a rock as soon as he saw It (by hypothesis); He did not see an indeterminate object f i r s t , wonder what i t was, and then have It dawn upon him suddenly that It was a rock; He saw i t as a rock from the s t a r t .  Surely t h i s happens  countless times every day with simple objects with which we are f a m i l i a r . In  spite of the fact that the geologist perceived a  rock immediately,  there i s s t i l l something mediate and syn-  thetic about t h i s perception f o r several reasons.  First, i t  i s possible, say f o r a c h i l d who has never seen, or at least never attended to, a rock, to see an indeterminate object f i r s t , and only l a t e r learn that i t i s a rock.  Second, l t  i s possible^ i n theory^ to make a Judgment here even though ;  one already knows what the object i s ; i t i s possible to distinguish "this," as something which i s immediately present, from "a rock" as a general concept, and then to re-combine the two into the Judgment, " t h i s i s a rock."  Third, i t i s  possible to be mistaken, so that what one immediately perceived as a rock turns out l a t e r to be a papier-mtche' imitation of a rock which some e v i l genius has put there to deceive us. Such a mistake could be analyzed i n terms of  -46-  judgments, s i n c e i t would s t i l l be t r u e t h a t one  perceived  " t h i s , " something immediately present, but not t r u e that "this i s a  rock."  So here i s a p e c u l i a r i t y of p e r c e p t i o n :  When I con-  object, I become f a m i l i a r with i t by making  f r o n t a strange  a number of Judgments, not n e c e s s a r i l y l i n g u i s t i c a l l y expressed,  hut q u i t e conscious  and d e l i b e r a t e .  Thereafter,  when I encounter the o b j e c t , I p e r c e i v e i t immediately as a rock, o r as a t r e e , o r as whatever i t i s , without  making  j udgment s. Though t h i s sort of p e r c e p t i o n o f o b j e c t s w i t h which  we  are f a m i l i a r i s not a judgment, i t does i n v o l v e a combination of elements o f the percept i o n , which can be analyzed o f the c a p a c i t y t o judge. to p e r c e p t i o n :  The  T h i s i s why  judgment i s r e l e v a n t  c o n d i t i o n s which make i t p o s s i b l e t o  make a Judgment l i k e ,  "This rock i s b l a c k , " are the  same c o n d i t i o n s which make i t p o s s i b l e t o p e r c e i v e immediately as a rock without The  i n terms  very something  making a Judgment.  whole r o u t i n e o f judgments which the g e o l o g i s t 3  makes presupposes a number o f c o n d i t i o n s , such as the ;  t o p e r c e i v e d i s t i n c t o b j e c t s enduring space, without Instance,  ability  i n time and l o c a t e d In  which the Judgments would be i m p o s s i b l e .  I f the g e o l o g i s t wants to examine rock  For  crystals  under a microscope i n order to base a s o p h i s t i c a t e d judgment on the magnified  image, he w i l l have to be a b l e to  and adjust a microscope.  recognize  He could not r e c o g n i z e a microscope  -47were he not c a p a b l e o f apprehending c e r t a i n v e r y g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s about i t which a r e so g e n e r a l t h a t t h e y a p p l y t o any o t h e r o b j e c t coming w i t h i n h i s e x p e r i e n c e a l s o . At  a g i v e n moment t h e g e o l o g i s t sees t h e m i c r o s c o p e  f r o m — s a y — a s i d e - v i e w : He sees q u i t e c l e a r l y t h e way t h e base i s a t t a c h e d t o t h e neck o f t h e m i c r o s c o p e , w i t h t h e stage f o r h o l d i n g s l i d e s a t t a c h e d at t h e bottom o f t h e neck, and a v e r t i c a l , a d j u s t a b l e tube^ w i t h an e y e p i e c e a t t h e t o p and a l e n s e on t h e bottom, a t t a c h e d at t h e t o p o f t h e neck. Now suppose he t u r n s t h e m i c r o s c o p e so t h a t he sees t h e a d j u s t a b l e tube from t h e f r o n t .  The tube i s c l o s e r t o him  t h a n t h e neck, which i s almost e n t i r e l y h i d d e n by t h e tube so t h a t t h e o n l y p a r t o f t h e neck t h a t can be seen i s t h r o u g h the  gap below t h e l e n s e and above t h e s t a g e .  Then a g a i n ,  seen from t h e back, the neck b l o c k s much o f t h e l o w e r p a r t o f the  tube from v i e w , as w e l l as t h e c e n t e r o f t h e edge o f t h e  stage.  From t h e s i d e , back, and f r o n t , o n l y a t h i n p l a t e -  l i k e edge o f t h e s t a g e c a n be seen, though t h e stage l o o k s c i r c u l a r l o o k i n g s t r a i g h t down from t h e t o p . Between t h e s i d e , f r o n t , back, t o p , and bottom views o f the  microscope t h e r e a r e an i n f i n i t e number o f i n t e r m e d i a t e  views.  Thus t h e r e i s a view at an a n g l e h a l f way between a  s i d e and a f r o n t v i e w , at an a n g l e t u r n e d t h r e e - q u a r t e r s o f the  way towards t h e f r o n t from t h e s i d e , s e v e n - e i g h t h s o f  the  way towards t h e f r o n t , and so on. Any one o f t h e s e views may be c o n s i d e r e d as a u n i t , and  -48any number o f them as a p l u r a l i t y o f u n i t s , and any s e r i e s of t h e s e u n i t s w h i c h go t o g e t h e r t o form a s i g n i f i c a n t p a t t e r n , as a t o t a l i t y o f u n i t s . view o f t h e m i c r o s c o p e i s a u n i t .  I n t h i s case, t h e s i d e The s e r i e s o f views  between t h e s i d e view and t h e f r o n t view i s a p l u r a l i t y . This p l u r a l i t y i s further u n i f i e d i n a t o t a l i t y , since there are  s i g n i f i c a n t s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h e d i f f e r e n t views i n  the  series.  F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e neck o f t h e m i c r o s c o p e seems  to be a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t shape i n a f u l l s i d e view t h a n i t does i n a view from t h e s i d e t u r n e d o n e - q u a r t e r o f t h e way towards t h e f r o n t .  I f the o n e - q u a r t e r a n g l e view i s com-  p a r e d t o t h e o n e - e i g h t h a n g l e v i e w , t h e r e w i l l a l s o be a slight difference.  But as t h e a n g l e chosen g e t s s m a l l e r and  s m a l l e r , t h e r e w i l l e v e n t u a l l y be two p o i n t s o f v i e w between which t h e r e i s no d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e way t h e shape o f t h e neck o f t h e m i c r o s c o p e seems i n one v i e w and i n t h e o t h e r . I t m i g h t , f o r example, be i m p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h a d i f f e r ence i n t h e d i s t o r t i o n o f t h e s i d e view ( t a k i n g t h e s i d e view as u n d i s t o r t e d ) between t h e neck o f t h e m i c r o s c o p e as seen at  an a n g l e which i s t u r n e d 5/32nds towards t h e f r o n t , and as  seen from an a n g l e which i s t u r n e d 6/32nds towards t h e f r o n t . I t i s t h u s w i t h a l l t h e views o f t h e m i c r o s c o p e : are  Since there  an i n f i n i t e number o f a n g l e s from which t h e microscope  may be viewed, f o r any two v i e w s , no m a t t e r how d i v e r s e , t h e r e w i l l always be a s e r i e s o f views i n t r a n s i t i o n from one view t o t h e o t h e r , such t h a t , a t any p o i n t i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n ,  -49there are two views which are so similar as to be i n d i s t i n guishable i n normal perception.  1  It i s not as i f a microscope when turned at a slight angle changed into a baked potato, and when turned just a bit more suddenly became a two-headed talking g i r a f f e ; rather, there are complex i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s among views of varying degrees of difference and s i m i l a r i t y .  It i s such  complex i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s which make a t o t a l i t y , not just a p l u r a l i t y of views.  The p l u r a l i t y of views, "microscope,  baked potato, g i r a f f e , " suceeding one another within a f r a c t i o n of a second could not r e a l l y occur at a l l , since there would not be time to recognize the f i r s t view as a view of a microscope, or even as a view of anything at a l l , and likewise f o r the succeeding views.  But the series of  views, "microscope seen from the side, microscope seen as turned l / 3 2 n d of the way towards the front, as seen 2/32nds turned towards the front, as seen 3/32nds turned towards the  front, e t c . " — t h i s series could e a s i l y be apprehended i f  i t continued f o r a few seconds (within the larger experience of a l i v i n g person, of course), because i t i s not just a p l u r a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l units, but a t o t a l i t y i n which there i s something which a l l the units have i n common which makes them a l l go together. In t h i s example I have u t i l i z e d the f i r s t set of categories, the constitutive categories of quantity, and the development of these categories into schemata and p r i n c i p l e s .  -50That each i s o l a t e d view of the microscope Is a unit, that: there are a p l u r a l i t y of such units, and that these units are Interconnected  into a t o t a l i t y — a l l t h i s Is an applica-  t i o n of the categories, Unity, P l u r a l i t y , T o t a l i t y , i n t h e i r development i n the section, "Axioms of I n t u i t i o n . " This section i s concerned with showing that " a l l i n t u i t i o n s are extensive magnitudes," that i s , that for ordinary jects of experience  ob-  there are c e r t a i n parts of the object  for which "the representation of the parts makes possible, and therefore necessarily precedes, the representation of the whole:"  27  It i s impossible to become f a m i l i a r with a  whole microscope unless one sees i t from a l l sorts of d i f ferent angles first:, i n addition to sensing i t i n other ways. Each of these i s o l a t e d representations of a microscope i s subsumed under the more general representation, "microscope." Though there are isolated points of view of a microscope which are perceived one a f t e r another, these views are not perceived l i k e the stop-action i n a movie; they are not perceived J e r k i l y or with a vacuum between each point of view. Rather, there i s a continuous experience  of a microscope as  i t i s turned from one angle to another.  Though Kant mentions  t h i s continuity of experience  i n the section, "Anticipations  of Perception," he i s partly r e f e r r i n g back to the "Axioms of I n t u i t i o n " when he says that a l l appearances "are  2 7  A162  continuous magnitudes, alike i n t h e i r i n t u i t i o n , as extensive, and i n t h e i r mere perception (sensation and with i t r e a l i t y ) as i n t e n s i v e . "  28  It i s the continuity of extensive  magnitudes which I am now i l l u s t r a t i n g with the microscope example. So, the number of views of the microscope between a side view and a front view cannot be apprehended before the continuous experience of a microscope, since there are an i n f i n i t e number of such intermediate views, and i f a l l of them had to be apprehended before the whole microscope was apprehended, t h i s would take an i n f i n i t e length of time, and we could never come to perceive the microscope.  It i s as i f  the i n f i n i t e points of view (which we experience as continuity) were subsumed under the common representation, "microscope. " (It i s e a s i l y seen that the microscope ean only be perceived i n space and time, since the views of the microscope could not be perceived as views of different parts, such as the neck, and the lense, and the eyepiece, without perceiving them s p a t i a l l y , as existing outside of one another, beside, i n front, i n back, above, below one another, etc.; also, the different views follow one another i n the experience of the perceiver, and the microscope endures: tlme.)  A170.  It i s perceived i n  -52-  I n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s e i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f Judgment and p e r c e p t i o n i n terms o f t h e correspondence t h e o r y o f o b j e c t s and t h e coherence t h e o r y o f o b j e c t s , i t might seem t h a t t h e correspondence t h e o r y i s more a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e examples o f a c t u a l Judgment, w h i l e t h e coherence t h e o r y d e a l s b e t t e r w i t h t h e cases o f p e r c e p t i o n p r e s u p p o s i n g t h e c a p a c i t y t o judge.  So, the p r o c e d u r e o f i d e n t i f y i n g a r o c k would be  a n a l y z e d I n terms o f coherence.  The g e o l o g i s t examining a  r o c k would a l r e a d y be aware o f t h e r o c k as b e i n g p r e s e n t o u t s i d e him when he undertook t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f l t .  His  judgments, " t h i s r o c k i s b l a c k , " " t h i s r o c k has c o n c h o i d a l f r a c t u r e , " would s i m p l y be a m a t t e r o f f o r m i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w h i c h a d e q u a t e l y c o r r e s p o n d e d t o t h e f a c t s he d i s c o v e r e d about the o b j e c t .  As f o r h i s immediate p e r c e p t i o n o f something as a  r o c k , w h i c h preceded t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t would not depend so mueh on whether t h e r e was something o u t s i d e h i m as on h i s a b i l i t y t o p e r c e i v e a d i v e r s i t y o f s e n s o r y i m p r e s s i o n s as s e p a r a t e d i n t o v a r i o u s groups o r combined i n t o more o r l e s s d i s t i n c t shapes.  I f correspondence and coherence were l i m i t e d  t o d e a l i n g w i t h such s e p a r a t e a s p e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h e y would not be i n c o m p e t i t i o n , but would s i m p l y be two d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s about d i f f e r e n t  topics.  However, t h e coherence and correspondence t h e o r i e s o f obj e c t s cannot be so e a s i l y r e c o n c i l e d .  I have a l r e a d y s a i d  (PP. 37-38) t h a t t h e r e a r e coherence and correspondence considerations i n both t h e o r i e s .  I t i s t r u e t h a t the g e o l o g i s t  -53would form Judgments corresponding  to the f a c t s he discovered,  but i n the f i n a l analysis, h i s discovery might be only that the only way that the d i v e r s i t y of his representations could be unified at a certain time was under the concept of a black rock with concholdal fracture, the correspondence being between the representations, "rock," "black," and "concholdal f r a c t u r e , " as they are when considered i n i s o l ation, and as they are when considered i n combination.  Or,  concerning the immediately perceived rock, i t might turn out that the capacity to represent  sensible impressions as  shaped objects situated i n space i s only a necessary cond i t i o n f o r a c t u a l l y perceiving such objects, the added cond i t i o n f o r perception being the external presence of the objects. In either case, one can always attempt to analyze correspondence i n terms of coherence or subordinate coherence to a more profound correspondence.  And as f a r as the nature  of objects as appearances i s concerned, i t i s important to be careful what sort of coherence or correspondence i s being considered.  The only relevant type of coherence or corre-  spondence here i s that which i s a s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r the existence of objects as appearances as things which are represented without  In turn being representations of some-  thing i n turn, while other sorts of coherence or correspondence, as f o r instance i n the coherence and correspondence theories of truth, would not be immediately relevant.  The problem i s whether the i n t r a n s i t i v l t y of object's as appearances i s derived from the combination of representations i n our minds, or whether t h i s i n t r a n s i t i v l t y i s a primitive element of perception which our representations come up against outside the mind. the  In the case of  perception of a microscope as an object': as appearance,  various l i m i t e d viewpoints serve as examples of i s o l a t e d representations.  Prom the top, the eyepiece i s seen as a  round piece of glass encircled by the top of the c y l i n d r i cal adjustable tube, and with parts of the stage and base and neck of the microscope v i s i b l e below.  Seen from the  front, the stage and the tube w i l l be closest to the observer and hide parts of the microscope from view. the  From  back, the connection of the tube to the stage and base  by the neck of the microscope w i l l be most obvious. Other representations are the intermediate points of view between top, front, back, etc. The t r a n s i t i v i t y of these representations i s clear:: microscope as seen from the top" i s a representation which requires a microscope to complete I t s meaning, since, i f there were no such thing as a microscope, there would be no way of seeing a microscope from the top.  Although a  representation of a microscope from the top i s not the same thing as a more comprehensive representation of a microscope, the former, as a l i m i t a t i o n of the l a t t e r , presupposes the  latter.  -55However, t h i s may  seem a r t i f i c i a l ,  since I deliberately  chose r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w h i c h r e q u i r e d a microscope as object.  What i f t h e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e i n t u r n  i n terms o f o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ?  their analyzed  A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of  an  e y e p i e c e might be p a r t o f a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f some o t h e r instrument  other than a microscope.  A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a  c i r c u l a r p i e c e o f g l a s s need not be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f p a r t of an e y e p i e c e .  A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a smooth, t r a n s -  parent s u r f a c e need not be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a c i r c u l a r p i e c e of g l a s s .  But, e v i d e n t l y , no mattier how  isolated  and  l i m i t e d a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s i t i s s t i l l p e r c e i v e d as something:  Something smooth, something t r a n s p a r e n t , a s u r f a c e ,  a c i r c u l a r shape. It  i s f u r t h e r evident that experience  does not c o n s i s t  of the c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f an I s o l a t e d smoothness i n a vacuum, f o l l o w e d by an i n t e r v a l o f complete absense o f  consciousness,  and t h e n by c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f a c i r c u l a r shape i n a v a s t e m p t i n e s s , not even e m p t i n e s s , but an unsupported c i r c u l a r shape w i t h no r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the p r e v i o u s  smoothness, no  memory o r e x p e c t a t i o n o f any o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , t h e n a n o t h e r p e r i o d of u n c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e n a c o m p l e t e l y consciousness of a t i m e l e s s transparency t o smooth o r round.  Rather, experience  consciousness of r e l a t e d  new  w i t h no  reference  Involves  continuous  representations.  On t h e one hand, a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f something smooth need not be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f something which i s a l s o  -56c i r c u l a r , much l e s s he the representation of the surface of the eyepiece of a microscope.  On the other hand, the  representation of something smooth cannot be the representation of nothing smooth, that i s , of smoothness unrelated to any other representations.  I f we can be conscious of  something, i t can be represented  i n various relationships  with other things we are conscious of, and i f we a c t u a l l y are conscious of i t , i t must a c t u a l l y be represented In some s p e c i f i c relationships?  It i s similar to some representations  and d i f f e r e n t than others, simultaneous/with  some, before  some, and after others. As f a r as the coherence theory of objects i s concerned, i t i s much easier to see the manner i n which i s o l a t e d , t r a n s i t i v e representations would y i e l d i n t r a n s i t i v e objects In combination, than It i s to show that t h i s combination i s actually the source of objects:  It i s simply a matter of the  parts being Incomplete by themselves, but complete when forming a part of the whole.  The representations, " c i r c l e , "  "something smooth," "surface," do not necessarily constitute a s p e c i f i c i n t r a n s i t i v e object, since they can be combined i n different ways, so that " c i r c l e " could Just as well be about a table, a coin, or a piece of glass which i s part of a microscope.  Eut I f enough representations are combined,  eventually the point i s reached where the things represented are represented as s p e c i f i c combinations of representations which are not representations of something else i n turn.  -57For instance, though the representations, " c i r c l e , " "surface," "transparent," do not necessarily go together, when these representations are given and ordered i n time and space, when they not necessarily but i n fact go together, the representation of a smooth, transparent, cular surface a r i s e s without thing else.  cir-  being a representation of some-  Though a sum of representations, i t i s not  i t s e l f a representation, but i s the object  represented.  Likewise, while the representation of a c i r c u l a r piece of glass need not be the representation of part of an eyepiece of a microscope as seen from the top, a microscope of which one also has various other views from the side, front, and back, i f i t i s i n facf. so represented, i t i s so, not as a means to representing something else, but as an i n t r a n s i t i v e object as appearance of the sort towards which a l l representations are directed. It i s not combinations of representations into one object rather than another with which the coherence theory of objects i s concerned, but with the p o s s i b i l i t y of combination, and of objects at a l l .  I f one has enough representations of  a microscope, including concepts,  spatio-temporal position,  and a wealth of sensory Impressions, one i s , as f a r as the coherence theory i s concerned, i n the presence of the object without  having gone outside one's own representations.  It Is  as i f , when enough vaporous representations wrap around eachi other, they condense into an object.  -58-  Insofar as representations can be combined so as to form i n unison the goal towards which the isolated representations are directed, they form the sort of object required by the coherence theory of objects.  Since there  i s nothing i n the requirement that representations be grouped into consistently i n t e r - r e l a t e d wholes which demands one way of grouping rather than another, as long as the r e s u l t i n g t o t a l i t y of representations i s something that i s represented without  representing something else i n turn, the  coherence theory of objects supplies only a necessary but not a s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r the existence of objects as appearances which are d i s t i n c t from other objects as appearances. When I perceive a microscope, I have many other sensations other than those which are represented as sensations of a microscope, and, of course, I always have access to a lot of other concepts besides the concept of a microscope. Why cannot some of the sensations,which  can form part of the  representation of a microscope^be combined with some of the other representations i n my perceptual f i e l d , and these sensations be re-arranged to form a completely different object other than a microscope?  As long as the coherence of  representations i s supposed to be the s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r the existence of one object rather than another, I can not see why t h i s wouldn't happen.  I f , however, the  -59existence of objects i s constituted, not i h mere combinations of representations, but i n something outside these combinations which correspond to them, t h i s correspondence could determine which of the possible coherent  combinations  of representations actually indicated an e x i s t i n g object at a given time. There i s , then, a sense i n which, a f t e r a l l , the coherence theory of objects and the correspondence theory of objects are complementary and not competitive.  The ques-  t i o n , "What i s the s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r the existence of objects as appearances?", contains t h i s ambiguity:  Is i t  the existence of any objects at a l l which i s i n question, or the existence of one object rather than another?  Is i t the  existence of a rock rather than an u n i n t e l l i g i b l e jumble of representations, or i s l t the existence of a rock rather than a microscope, which i s i n question? spondence theories are compatible  The coherence and corre-  insofar as coherence deter-  mines the existence of representations as object's, and z'\. correspondence determines the existence of objects as rocks and microscopes and other things as diverse. "That which l i e s i n the successive apprehension i s here viewed as representation, while the appearance which i s given to me, notwithstanding  that l t i s nothing but the sum  of these representations, i s viewed as t h e i r o b j e c t ^ "  29  pick up a rock, look at l t from various angles, and make  29A191.  I  -60-  some simple experiments, and in so doing discover that i t i s black, has concholdal fracture, and is hard on a standard scale.  My knowledge of the object grows step by step in  this process of familiarization.  Each bit of information  I hold in my mind i s a representation—it is about something and is different than the thing it i s about.  But i f I add  together, one by one, each of these representations into an inter-related whole, I end up with a sum which is indistinguishable from the object.  Once I become thoroughly famil-  iar with an object by sensation, conceptualization, and location i n space and time, I cannot distinguish the object from the sum of these representations. Since i t i s equally true of any object that it i s , in the sense illustrated in the above paragraph, a sum of representations, Insofar as an object i s a sum of representations, no two objects are different.  But, as i t i s evident  that the objects which we perceive and know about and experience are not a l l identical, but diverse, the differences among objects w i l l have to be accounted for i n some other way than as a result of objects being a sum of representations. The principles i n Kant's "Transcendental Analytic" cannot account for the differences, since these principles are the same for every object, and not a differential.  Differences  in sensations alone cannot account for the differences between objects, because sensations,  such as, "black,"  "smooth," "hard," can be combined i n different ways, and one  -61-  always has so many different sensations that various combinations would be possible.  There would be no reason  why one combination would be preferred to another, unless i t so happens that the a b i l i t y to receive and combine representations establishes a r e l a t i o n s h i p of these representations and combinations of representations to something which corresponds to them i n the objects outside our representations. How are the objects which we can know related to the representations of them?  What i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between  appearances and representations? may be given two answers.  Each of these  questions  I f the objects as appearances i n  these two questions are objectts as opposed to complete chaos, then the r e l a t i o n s h i p between representations and t h e i r objects i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p of one aspect of an object: to the whole object, of the part to the whole, of one unit of perception to an i n t e r - r e l a t e d t o t a l i t y of perception, and the d i s t i n c t i o n between representations and appearances i s that the representations concern an incomplete  aspect of,  or i s o l a t e d relationships between, the appearances, while the appearance i s that which completes the meaning of the representation and which enters into various r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I f the objects are objects as opposed to other objects, then the r e l a t i o n s h i p of representations to t h e i r objects., and the d i s t i n c t i o n between representation and appearance,  -62-  is that the representation is about something i n the object as appearance which corresponds to i t , and while the appearances do not exist separately from their relationships to the representations of the subject, they are something outside of the subject, and quite distinct from the representations of them, i f only while they are being represented. Is the intransitivlty of appearances primitive or derived?  Again there are two answers:  The intransitivlty  Involved in combinations of representations is derived from separate representations by combination.  The intrans-  i t i v l t y of the objects outside of our representations Is primitive.  Are appearances a species of representations?  Here again one may say, yes, in regard to coherence considerations, and, no, as concerns correspondence.  However,  considering that appearances as combinations of representations have such distinct characteristics from uncombined representations, Kant's insistence that appearances are representations remains baffling. If the coherence and correspondence theory tendencies in Kant's thought are reconcilable, they are s t i l l not actually reconciled by Kant.  Their presence Is revealed  less by open opposition than by ambiguity.  For instance,  when Kant says that nature "is merely an aggregate of appearances, so many representations of the mind,"  50 114. A  30  does he  -63mean t h a t t h e v a r i o u s o b j e c t s w h i c h we come a c r o s s i n t h e course o f experience  a r e a l l i n o u r minds, o r t h a t t h e s e ob-  j e c t s a r e r e l a t e d t o but d i s t i n c t from t h e mind, w h i l e as t h a t i d e a l t o t a l i t y  nature,  o f o b j e c t s i n thorough-going i n t e r -  r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h each o t h e r , i s o n l y i n t h e mind, s i n c e t h i s totality  f a r transcends  experience?  When Kant says t h a t "an  o b j e c t i s t h a t i n t h e concept o f which t h e m a n i f o l d o f a g i v e n i n t u i t i o n i s u n i t e d , " ^ does he mean t h a t t h e r e would be no obj e c t at a l l i f t h e concept d i d n ' t Impose o r d e r on t h e i n t u i t i o n s , o r t h a t t h e i n t u i t i o n s a r e u n i f i e d i n a manner so as t o c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e o b j e c t , which i s d i s t i n c t from t h e i n t u i t i o n s , t h e c o n c e p t , and t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e two? I n s p i t e o f such a m b i g u i t i e s , some d e f i n i t e  conclusions  about r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and t h e o b j e c t s which they r e p r e s e n t c a n be made.  The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s always about t h e appearance,  w h i c h i s t h e g o a l towards which t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s d i r e c t e d i n p e r c e p t i o n and knowledge.  The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c o n c e r n s i s o -  l a t e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e o b j e c t i n t h e cases o f conceptts and  s e n s a t i o n s , and r e l a t i o n s h i p s between o b j e c t s o r p a r t s o f  o b j e c t s i n t h e cases o f space and t i m e . thoroughly  experienced  The o b j e c t i s t h e  g o a l o f p e r c e p t i o n , t h a t w h i c h i s per-  c e i v e d as an end, and not as a means t o p e r c e i v i n g " something e l s e , t h a t which i s e x h a u s t i v e l y i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms o f t h e different kinds of representations:  I t i s l o c a t e d i n space  and t i m e , sensed i n v a r i o u s ways, and c o n c e p t u a l i z e d .  3 1  B137.  Chapter Threes: Subject and Object  In discussing objects i n themselves and objects as appearances, I put the emphasis on the fact that it was objects that I was concerned with.  H did not deal directly  with the subjecte as a definite entity contrasted to objects, but I dealt with the subject only insofar as i t i s Implied by. objects.  I. do not here wish to give an exhaustive treat-  ment of the thinking, perceiving subject in Kant's philosophy.  However, I w i l l attempt to make more explicit some-  thing which i s Implicit in chapters one and two—that subject and object cannot exist or be described separately from one another. To say nothing more of objects in themselves as opposed to objects as appearances, than that the former are in principle unknowable and that the latter are in fact known, i s already to involve the subject, for i t i s the subject which knows or does not know.  And in the case of Kant, to  introduce the question of whether or not something is i n principle knowable i s to bring i n , not only the subject, but also a relationship of the subject to objects, for something cannot be known merely i n being thought; there must! also be an Intuition of—an immediate relation to—the object.  It i s because there is no Intuition of objects apart  from sensibility that objects i n themselves are unknown. Moreover, in further specifying the reasons why objects  -65-  as appearances can be known and objects i n themselves can not, the subject i s mentioned i n specific relations to objects:  Human intuition consists of sensation and the a  priori representations of space and time, and so only those objects outside us which can be sensed and are in space and time can be known. In spite of the fact that objects in themselves are unknowable, i t is s t i l l significant to go to the trouble of denying that they can be known insofar as belief in objects in themselves arises from the very nature of thought. We have the a b i l i t y to abstract, to remove conditions in thought, so that, concerning a book of 300 pages measuring 3 X 5 Inches and with a green cover and hard binding, we can Ignore some characteristics and attend to others and conceptualize the book merely as, say, having 300 pages without specifying any other characteristics.  We can also add conditions i n thought,  even to the extent of constructing a concept of something we have never perceived, even of something which couldn't possibly be perceived, of an object i n i t s e l f which we can believe to, but not know to, exist on the insufficient basis of one element of knowledge, on the basis of an empty concept. A l l this again Involves the subject even though l t i s objects which are being discussed. More comprehensive than the specific relationships between belief and knowledge and their objects i s the relationship between representations in general and their  -66-  objects.  Here the Inter-relationships between subject and  object are most obvious, for being represented by a subject i s at least a necessary condition for the existence of objects at a l l .  So far I have referred ^.o "isolated repre-  sentations" and "combinations of representations" infcrder to contrast representations as they are separate from one another and as they are in the combinations which relate to objects as appearances.  Something needs to be said about  "isolated representations," since I have been using this expression only in a negative sense, to mean, "representations insofar as they are not combined so as to relate to objects as appearances." Isolated representations, in a positive sense, are not completely isolated, but more or less isolated.  Represent-  ations do not exist In complete separation from a l l other representations or separate from the continuous experience of the world by a thinking, perceiving subject.  One case i n  which representations are more or less isolated is that in which an object Is seen from a certain angle.  In this sense,  "a microscope as seen from the top" is a representation.  A  case of a greater degree of isolation is that of representations which could enter Into any one of a number of combinations.  Representations such as, "circle," "smooth,"  "black," and "surface," are of this sort. How are representations of this last sort related to one another when they are separated from the combinations  -67w h i c h r e l a t e t o o b j e c t s as appearances?  They a r e , I t h i n k ,  r e l a t e d i n b a n n e r such t h a t t h e y can be c l a s s i f i e d i n h i e r a r c h i c a l order.  By s a y i n g t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c a n be  c l a s s i f i e d , I mean t h a t t h e r e a r e d i s t i n c t k i n d s o f r e p r e sentations:  A c i r c l e as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h o u t  respect  t o any p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t as appearance I s not J u s t a c i r c l e ; it  i s a f i g u r e c o n t r a s t e d t o t r i a n g l e s , s q u a r e s , and o t h e r  figures.  L i k e w i s e , smoothness i s not j u s t smoothness, but  i s a t e x t u r e c o n t r a s t e d t o roughness, and b l a c k i s not Just b l a c k , but i s a c o l o r d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from w h i t e and r e d and yellow.  T h i s i s not t o say t h a t I have a c h a r t o f r e p r e -  s e n t a t i o n s h o v e r i n g b e f o r e my mind, but o n l y t h a t i n o r d e r t o be c o n s c i o u s  o f i s o l a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , so t h a t  objects  as appearances would not be t h e o n l y t h i n g s I amr;consclous o f , I must be a b l e t o r e l a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t o o t h e r  repre-  s e n t a t i o n s o f t h e same k i n d , and t h a t such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s a r e p a r t o f t h e meaning o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . what " b l a c k " means I s :  Not some o t h e r c o l o r .  Part o f Isolated  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s do not f l o a t away when t h e i r r e f e r e n c e t o a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t as appearance i s cut away, o n l y because they a r e s t i l l t i e d t o o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s by v a r i o u s i n t e r - r e l a t e d s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s . By t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , I mean t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s may be about o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  only  i n t h e sense t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which a r e more r e m o t e l y r e l a t e d t o o b j e c t s as appearances can r e p r e s e n t /  other  -68-  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which a r e l e s s remotely as appearances. but  related to objects  T h i s means p a r t l y t h a t b l a c k i s a c o l o r  c o l o r i s not a b l a c k , but m a i n l y  t h a t one can c o n c e p t -  u a l i z e sensory i m p r e s s i o n s but one cannot have a Impression  sensory  o f a concept (though one can sense t h e o b j e c t  of a concept).  I d e a s , i n Kant's t e c h n i c a l sense, a r e a way  o f r e p r e s e n t i n g c a t e g o r i e s , and c a t e g o r i e s a r e a way o f r e p r e s e n t i n g t h i n g s i n space and t i m e , but t h i n g s i n space and time cannot r e p r e s e n t represent  c a t e g o r i e s , n o r can c a t e g o r i e s  ideas.  Representations, must be capable  i n o r d e r t o q u a l i f y as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ,  o f e n t e r i n g i n t o two k i n d s o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s  with other representations:  They must be a b l e t o e n t e r i n t o  c o m b i n a t i o n s which r e l a t e t o , i f not c o n s t i t u t e , o b j e c t s as appearances, and they must be capable o f f i t t i n g i n t o t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t sorts of representations.  So, " b l a c k , " " c o n c h o i d a l f r a c t u r e , " and " h a r d , " can  be combined i n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a hunk o f f l i n t , and can a l s o be r e l a t e d t o o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s as b e i n g s p e c i e s o f s e n s i b l e i m p r e s s i o n s , o f c o l o r s , o f t h e concept o f f r a c t u r e , and  so on.  The f l i n t  not be m e a n i n g f u l l y  c o u l d not be b l a c k i f " b l a c k " c o u l d  c o n t r a s t e d t o " w h i t e " and " y e l l o w , " n o r  c o u l d such a c o n t r a s t be made i f t h e r e were no i n s t a n c e s o f colored objects. O b j e c t s as we know them would cease t o e x i s t i f we were unable t o combine r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f d i f f e r e n t k i n d s , w h i l e  -69-  we would be unable t o combine r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f d i f f e r e n t k i n d s , i f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s d i d not have s i m i l a r i t i e s w h i c h p e r m i t t e d them t o be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o k i n d s o f r e p r e s e n t ations.  We c o u l d not s t a n d back and make judgments about  o b j e c t s i f t h e r e were no o b j e c t s , and t h e r e would be no obj e c t s i f we c o u l d not s t a n d back and make Judgments. Kant i s a v e r y u n - C a r t e s i a n d u a l i s t :  Thus  Subject and O b j e c t ,  u n l i k e mind and body, a r e t h o r o u g h l y i n t e r - d e p e n d e n t and cannot e x i s t s e p a r a t e l y from one a n o t h e r . Prom t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n c e i v i n g o f i m m o r t a l i t y i s : What would t h e s u b j e c t t h i n k about i f s e p a r a t e d from t h e o b j e c t s o f s e n s a t i o n ?  My  e x p e r i e n c e o f my own s u b j e c t i v i t y o c c u r s o n l y under t h e cond i t i o n s o f a continuous experience of the world.  Since I  can remove c o n d i t i o n s i n thought, I can form t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i d e a o f a s u b j e c t I n i t s e l f , a s u b j e c t a p a r t from the c o n d i t i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e , but s i n c e t h e o b j e c t o f t h i s i d e a cannot be i n t u i t e d , I cannot have knowledge o f t h i s unconditioned u n i t y of the t h i n k i n g subject. Though I cannot u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y i n t u i t my own t h o u g h t s , I can c o n d i t i o n a l l y i n t u i t them, t h e c o n d i t i o n b e i n g " i n n e r sense," t h a t i s , t i m e .  Or, as Kant puts i t ,  I do not know  m y s e l f as I am i n m y s e l f but o n l y as I appear t o m y s e l f :  1  B68,  B153 f f  1  -70I have no knowledge o f m y s e l f as I am but merely as I appear t o m y s e l f . The c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f s e l f i s t h u s v e r y f a r from b e i n g a knowledge o f the s e l f . . .1 e x i s t as an i n t e l l i g e n c e which i s c o n s c i o u s s o l e l y o f i t s power o f c o m b i n a t i o n ; but i n r e s p e c t o f the m a n i f o l d w h i c h i t has t o comb i n e I am s u b j e c t e d t o a l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n (ent i t l e d i n n e r s e n s e ) , namely, t h a t t h i s combinat i o n can be made i n t u i t a b l e o n l y a c c o r d i n g t o r e l a t i o n s o f time.2 I mention t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the " i " which t h i n k s and t h e " I " which i n t u i t s i t s e l f , not because I w i s h t o d i s c u s s I t at any l e n g t h , but because i t I n v o l v e s a s o r t o f o b j e c t which I have so f a r s a i d n o t h i n g o f , a knowable obj e c t w h i c h i s i n time w i t h o u t b e i n g i n space o r b e i n g capable o f a f f e c t i n g our senses.  I n f a c t , our own minds., as  d i s t i n c t e n t i t i e s as t h e y appear t o o u r s e l v e s , a r e not  the  o n l y such o b j e c t s , f o r " e v e r y t h i n g , " Kant s a y s , "every r e p r e s e n t a t i o n even, i n so f a r as we are c o n s c i o u s o f l t , may entitled object."  3  be  I n t h i s broad sense, I n w h i c h aix o b j e c t  i s something one i s c o n s c i o u s o f , more o r l e s s  Isolated  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l - s e n s o r y o b j e c t s would b o t h be o b j e c t s . C o n f u s i o n may  a r i s e i f t h e r e a r e passages where Kant  r e f e r s t o o b j e c t s ambiguously, so t h a t the r e a d e r cannot t e l l whether o b j e c t s i n the v e r y g e n e r a l sense o f something one i s c o n s c i o u s o f ( i n c l u d i n g , I suppose,  mathematical  e q u a t i o n s , c o n c e p t s , dreams, and h a l l u c i n a t i o n s ) i s meant, o r  2  3  B158-159. A189.  i f t h e more s p e c i f i c sense o f something sensed i n space a n d time i s meant.  However, t h e r e i s no problem i n p r i n c i p l e ,  s i n c e t h e nature and s i g n i f i c a n c e o f o b j e c t s i n t h e g e n e r a l , and i n t h e more s p e c i f i c , sense a r e q u i t e d i s t i n c t .  Something  i n s o f a r a s we a r e c o n s c i o u s  o f i t i s one t h i n g , and something  i n s o f a r a s we a r e c o n s c i o u s  o f i t by means o f s e n s a t i o n and  as l o c a t e d i n space and t i m e i s a n o t h e r , much more s p e c i f i c , thing. That t h e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l - s e n s o r y  o b j e c t p l a y s a much  more s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n t h e C r i t i q u e t h a n t h a t which i s an o b j e c t m e r e l y because we a r e c o n s c i o u s  of i t ,  i s easily  shown c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t Kant says that we have s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i knowledge o f o u t e r a p p e a r a n c e s — t h a t i s , o f s p a t i o f f n p o r a l - s e n s o r y o b j e c t s — o n l y and not i n n e r appearances, and t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f how a p r i o r i s y n t h e t i c judgments are p o s s i b l e i s "The G e n e r a l Problem o f Pure Reason,"^ and the q u e s t i o n t o w h i c h t h e e n t i r e C r i t i q u e i s t h e answer, a q u e s t i o n w h i c h concerns knowledge o f objects.  spatio-temporal-sensory  When Kant says that t h e p r o p e r employment o f t h e  c a t e g o r i e s i s t o appearances, not t h i n g s i n t h e m s e l v e s , he means o u t e r appearances, s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l - s e n s o r y only:  "The c a t e g o r i e s have meaning o n l y I n r e l a t i o n t o t h e  u n i t y o f i n t u i t i o n i n space and t i m e . " 4  objects,  „  A381.  5  B19.  6  B308.  6  -72One f u r t h e r p o i n t  I s h a l l d e a l w i t h , b y way o f i l l u s -  t r a t i n g t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between, of,  and the Inter-dependence  s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , i s t h e c o n t r a s t between m e n t a l and  physical representations.  By m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , I  mean n o t h i n g more u n u s u a l t h a n ,  and, i n d e e d , n o t h i n g o t h e r  t h a n , t h e t y p e s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w h i c h I have been cussing a l l along: m e n t s , a n d so o n .  dis-  Ideas, concepts, time, sensations, By p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , I mean  Judgsuch  t h i n g s a s p h o t o g r a p h s , p a i n t i n g s , d r a w i n g s , maps, a n d d i a g r a m s . It  may seem s t r a n g e t h a t  I d i d not m e n t i o n  physical  representations i n order t o h e l p understand mental sentations.  repre-  I f I h o l d up a p h o t o g r a p h b e f o r e me a t t h e s p o t  f r o m w h i c h i t was t a k e n , I c a n compare t h e p h o t o g r a p h a s a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o t h e scene photographed  as that r e p r e s e n t e d .  There i s a house i n t h e photograph which l o o k s l i k e t h e h o u s e b e f o r e me, a n d a l a r g e e v e r g r e e n t r e e , t w i c e a s t a l l the  house and t o t h e l e f t  o f t h e house,  g r a p h a n d i n t h e s c e n e b e f o r e me. deciduous t r e e s t o the right  as  I n both the photo-  T h e r e a r e two s m a l l e r  o f t h e house i n both t h e r e p r e -  s e n t a t i o n and t h e scene r e p r e s e n t e d . Does t h i s n o t o f f e r a p e r f e c t a n a l o g y f o r t h e d i s c e r n i n g e p l s t e m o l o g i s t , so t h a t , i n t h e same way t h a t a p h o t o g r a p h c a n be c o m p a r e d t o t h e s c e n e w h i c h was p h o t o g r a p h e d , t h e c o n c e p t s , i m a g e s , a n d s e n s a t i o n s o f t h e p e r c e i v e r c a n be compared to that i n t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d which i s conceptualized, i m a g i n e d , and sensed?  I t h i n k n o t , f o r t h e concept i s not  -73compared to the thing conceptualized, but is something by means of which comparison is possible.  In order to compare  the scene as i t appears in the photograph with the scene as i t appears to a person on the spot, I must be able to recognize the photograph as a photograph, and the houses and trees as houses and trees, rather than as unconnected phenomena.  Also, I must be able to perceive similarities  in shape, texture, relative position, and proportion between such diverse entities as a tree and a house i n a photograph and a real tree and house. The photograph is as much an object of sensation located in space and time as are the trees and the house of which the photograph was taken.  The photograph i s a  definite size, shape, and weight, and i t i s possible to consider the arrangement of shapes and colors on i t Just as an arrangement of shapes and colors, not as a representation of something.  Mental and physical representations  are both about something that is represented, but while a physical representation has additional characteristics of i t s own of the same sort as the thing represented, the mental representation has no other characteristic than i t s being about something other than i t s e l f . Since a physical representation has physical characteri s t i c s of i t s own, in addition to i t s being a representation, i t can be described in detail without the fact that i t i s  -74a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b e i n g mentioned.  There i s , f o r i n s t a n c e ,  on page 170 o f a c e r t a i n t e x t - b o o k  something w h i c h i s t h r e e  i n c h e s wide and two i n c h e s h i g h .  I n t h i s space t h e r e a r e  some l i n e s i n b l a c k i n k v a r y i n g i n w i d t h from l / l 6 t h t o | of an i n c h .  Some o f these l i n e s a r e c u r v e d and some  s t r a i g h t , some i n t e r c o n n e c t e d and some i s o l a t e d , some f a i n t and some dark.  I n c i d e n t a l l y , these l i n e s can be t a k e n as  a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e human h e a r t . F a r from the u n d e r s t a n d i n g being necessary  of physical representations  f o r the understanding  o f mental  represent-  a t i o n s , p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s presuppose mental r e p r e sentations.  For the representation of a rectangular piece  o f paper w i t h v a r i o u s c o l o r e d shapes, I n a d e f i n i t e  relations  t o one another^on i t t o be p e r c e i v e d as a photograph and not as a s e r i e s o f u n r e l a t e d phenomena, t h e p e r c e l v e r must be a b l e t o r e c o g n i z e t h e markings on t h e paper as shapes o f a p a r t i c u l a r s o r t d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from o t h e r shapes.  And t h e  photograph must be t h e r e i n a d e f i n i t e p l a c e i n o r d e r f o r s e n s a t i o n and c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n t o be s t i m u l a t e d i n t o action.  The r e l a t i o n s h i p between mental and p h y s i c a l r e p r e -  s e n t a t i o n s i n w h i c h t h e mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t a k e p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s as t h e i r o b j e c t i s no d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h e p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t and any o t h e r o b j e c t .  The p h y s i c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s J u s t a n o t h e r o b j e c t , and not a b a s i s f o r t h e o r i z i n g about " p i c t u r e s i n t h e mind."  -75-  I n terms o f t h i s comparison o f m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , i t can be seen why I t h i n k t h a t Kant's "immediately  g i v e n o b j e c t " can be equated b o t h t o the  spatio-temporal-sensory sented w i t h o u t  o b j e c t and t o t h a t w h i c h i s r e p r e -  r e p r e s e n t i n g something e l s e i n t u r n .  The  m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , though an o b j e c t i n t h e weak sense o f b e i n g something we a r e c o n s c i o u s  o f , i s n e i t h e r an ob-  j e c t i n t h e sense i n w h i c h s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i a p p l y t o o b j e c t s , nor i s l t i m m e d i a t e l y  judgments  given, rather i t i s  t h a t — i n r e l a t i o n to other representations i n the h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r o f d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which form t h e s u b j e c t — t o which o b j e c t s a r e g i v e n .  And p h y s i c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s do not o f f e r a counter-example o f a s p a t i o t e m p o r a l - sensory  o b j e c t w h i c h i s not o n l y r e p r e s e n t e d  but  a l s o r e p r e s e n t s , because the sense i n which p h y s i c a l r e p r e sentations represent  i s completely  d i f f e r e n t from t h e sense  i n which mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s represent.  A mental r e p r e -  s e n t a t i o n i s a way i n which the s u b j e c t r e l a t e s t o o b j e c t s , w h i l e a p h y s i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , beyond b e i n g an o b j e c t , i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between two obj e c t s i n w h i c h the p e r c e i v e r i n t e r p r e t s c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f one o b j e c t as c o r r e s p o n d i n g o f the o t h e r .  to c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  Conclusion  Kant's s u b j e c t - o b j e c t d i s t i n c t i o n can be understood i n terms o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s .  The s u b j e c t c o n s i s t s o f r e p r e -  s e n t a t i o n s i n s o f a r as they a r e r e l a t e d t o o t h e r  represent-  a t i o n s o f t h e same k i n d and t h e v a r i o u s k i n d s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s e n t e r i n t o h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r , and t h e s e  classifiable,  o r d e r a b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e compared, c o n t r a s t e d , and i n t e r - c o n n e c t e d as a means t o p e r c e p t i o n .  The o b j e c t i s  t h a t which r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s r e l a t e t o as an end by e n t e r i n g i n t o c o m b i n a t i o n s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s from d i f f e r e n t i n t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r ; i.e., t h e c o m b i n a t i o n  levels  cannot be o f  s e n s a t i o n s o n l y , but a l s o o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , space and t i m e , and o f c o n c e p t s . Besides the spatio-temporal-sensory two  object, there are  other kinds o f o b j e c t s according to Kant:  There i s t h e  o b j e c t as a n y t h i n g we a r e c o n s c i o u s o f , and t h e o b j e c t i n itself.  Both o f t h e s e k i n d s o f o b j e c t s can o n l y be under-  s t o o d by r e l a t i n g them t o t h e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t s t a t e d above.  Anything  distinction.as  so f a r as we a r e c o n s c i o u s o f i t  i n c l u d e s even I s o l a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , but i s o l a t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s can o n l y e x i s t i n s o f a r as they m a i n t a i n some r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l order of representations i n t h e s u b j e c t ; t h e y a r e more o r l e s s I s o l a t e d : not n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e t o an o b j e c t present at a g i v e n t i m e , but t h e y do have d e f i n i t e  They do  to the percelver similarities  -77and d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , and a r e , compared t o o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , more, o r l e s s , remotely r e l a t e d t o spatio-%mporal-sensory The  objects.  importance o f something w h i c h i s an o b j e c t  i n s o f a r as we a r e c o n s c i o u s o f i t i s l i m i t e d , b e c a u s e  only i ti s  not i n any sense an o b j e c t which i s o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s , n o r i s I t b e l i e v e d t o be p a t s i d e u s .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e  o b j e c t i n i t s e l f i s t h a t i t i s an o b j e c t which we do b e l i e v e t o be o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s , i n s p i t e o f t h e f a c t t h a t i t cannot be sensed o r l o c a t e d i n space and t i m e . I t i s e a s i e r t o p o i n t out and d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e v a r i o u s k i n d s o f o b j e c t s d e a l t w i t h by Kant t h a n i t i s t o show j u s t how he thought t h e d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f o b j e c t s a r e r e l a t e d . I d i s c u s s e d t h e problem o f how r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e r e l a t e d t o appearances, o f whether t h e o b j e c t s w h i c h we can know are c o m b i n a t i o n s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r something o u t s i d e o f those combinations to which the combinations of representations relate.  I f one can never be sure w h i c h a l t e r n a t i v e  Kant would p r e f e r , t h e r e a r e s i m i l a r i t i e s i n t h e d i s t i n c t i o n made i n e i t h e r c a s e :  The o b j e c t as appearance, whether  o u t s i d e o f o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r a mere c o m b i n a t i o n representations, i s s t i l l  of  that w i t h i n t h e r e a l m o f t h e know-  a b l e w h i c h i s p e r c e i v e d as an end and not as a means t o p e r c e i v i n g something e l s e . Kant's views o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between o b j e c t s as appearances and o b j e c t s i n themselves a r e c o n f u s i n g ,  since  -78the former a r e sometimes r e f e r r e d t o as I f they were t h e knowledge we have o f t h e l a t t e r , even though t h e l a t t e r a r e unknowable.  Thus Kant says t h a t "appearances a r e o n l y  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h i n g s w h i c h a r e unknown as r e g a r d s what t h e y may be i n t h e m s e l v e s . " d i c t s my o f t e n repeated represented  without  1  T h i s seemingly c o n t r a -  o p i n i o n t h a t t h e appearances a r e  representing anything  ever, the c o n t r a d i c t i o n dissappears,  i n turn.  How-  i f we c o n s i d e r how  Kant c o n s t a n t l y f o r c e s us t o compare o u r modest b i t o f knowledge w i t h t h e vast r e g i o n s o u t s i d e o f knowledge which s u r r o u n d and t h r e a t e n t o e n g u l f us:  I t i s w i t h i n t h e realm  of the knowable t h a t appearances a r e r e p r e s e n t e d  without  r e p r e s e n t i n g something e l s e i n t u r n , and o n l y i n t h e framework o f t h o u g h t s and b e l i e f s , w i t h no c o r r e s p o n d i n g  intu-  i t i o n s , t h a t appearances a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f o b j e c t s i n themselves. We can no more know t h a t appearances a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h i n g s i n themselves t h a n we can not b e l i e v e t h a t they are.  To know t h a t appearances a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f  o b j e c t s i n themselves we would have t o know o b j e c t s i n themselves.  But o b j e c t s i n t h e m s e l v e s a r e o b j e c t s as t h e y a r e  I n d e p e n d e n t l y o f our knowledge o f them, s o , we can n e i t h e r know o b j e c t s i n t h e m s e l v e s n o r t h a t appearances a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f them.  B164  I n o r d e r not t o t e n d t o b e l i e v e t h a t  -79-  appearances a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f o b j e c t s I n t h e m s e l v e s , we would have t o be i n c a p a b l e o f a b s t r a c t thought and t h e a b i l i t y t o conceive  o f t h i n g s we have never  and t o c o n c e i v e o f t h i n g s we do e x p e r i e n c e experience  experienced, apart from o u r  o f them.  An appearance may be an appearance t o someone o r an appearance o f something.  As f a r as knowledge i s concerned,  o b j e c t s as appearances a r e o b j e c t s as t h e y appear t o t h e s u b j e c t which knows, and o n l y w i t h i n t h e w i d e r c o n t e x t o f b e l i e f i n the unconditioned  a r e o b j e c t s as appearances t h e  appearances o f o b j e c t s i n themselves.  Appearances may be  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h i n g s w h i c h are unknown, but we cannot': know t h e y a r e .  W i t h i n t h e realm o f t h e knowalbe, r e p r e -  s e n t a t i o n s a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f appearances.  To say t h a t  these appearances a r e i n t u r n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i s t o f o r s a k e the knowable f o r t h a y w h l c h can be b e l i e v e d , i n spit.e o f t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s i n p r i n c i p l e unknowable. F o r Kant, t h e c o m p l e x i t y and p r e c i s i o n o f knowledge o c c u r s as a l i m i t a t i o n on, and a d i s c i p l i n e o f , t h e tempta t i o n — I n s e p a r a b l e from t h e a b i l i t y t o t h i n k a b s t r a c t l y — of b e l i e f I n t h e u n c o n d i t i o n e d .  The l a n d o f t r u t h i s an  i s l a n d "surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, t h e n a t i v e home o f i l l u s i o n . "  2  A235.  Bibliography  Ayer, A.J.  The Problem of Knowledge. Penguin Books.  Bird, Graham. Kant's Theory of Knowledge. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1962.  1956.  London.  Ewing, A.C. A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London. Methuen and Co. Ltd. 1938. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. N.K. New York. The Humanities Press. 1950.  Smith, trans.  Sartre, Jean-Paul. The Transcendence of the Ego. Forest Williams and Robert Kirkpatriek, trans. New York. Noonday Press. 1957. Smith, Norman Kemp. A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,' Second ed. London. MacMillan and Co. 1923.  

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