UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Preliminary inquiries in crisis management Smart, Carolyne Faith 1976

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PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT by CAROLYNE SMART B.Com., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1966 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION In t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Comme r c e We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d : THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA M a r c h 1976 In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree l y ava i l ab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th i s thes is for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th i s thes is for f i nanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i tten pe rm i ss ion . Depa rtment The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date Cke^U* ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the process of cr i s e s decision making in organizations through three stages: a) p r e c r i s i s , b) c r i s i s management, c) post c r i s i s . At each stage the behavior of the organization (in p a r t i c u l a r the decision unit) i s diagnosed and certa i n pathologies noted. The l a t e r portion of the paper offers some prescriptions to attempt to correct these pathologies. Analysis of the stage of p r e c r i s i s i s char-acterized by an assessment of the p r o b a b i l i t y that an organi-zation w i l l f i n d i t s e l f i n c r i s i s . An organization may be threatened by an event occurring i n i t s environment. Certain conditions make some organizations p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable to threats. The probable objective impact of a threat on organiza-t i o n a l goals i s evaluated. If the event i s perceived as a :. threat by the organization, i t has the choice of two responses, either routine or c r i s i s mode. If the event i s characterized by high stress, shortened decision time and i s a surprise to the organization, then a c r i s i s w i l l be triggered. Once a c r i s i s occurs, organizations attempt to manage i t . A repertoire of management styles and postures are available t o c h o o s e f r o m , d e p e n d i n g u p on t h e o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e o r g a n i z a -t i o n a n d t h e d y n a m i c s o f t h e s y s t e m t o w h i c h i t b e l o n g s . The i n t e r n a l . d y n a m i c s o f t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t a r e e x a m i n e d and i n p a r t i c u l a r a number o f p a t h o l o g i e s a r e n o t e d . A s g r o u p s a t t e m p t t o manage c r i s e s t h e y q u i t e o f t e n make p o o r d e c i s i o n s a s a r e s u l t o f , a) p r e m a t u r e c o n s e n s u s , b) i n f o r m a t i o n d i s -t o r t i o n , c) e r r o r s i n j u d g m e n t and d) i m p l e m e n t a t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s . P o s t c r i s i s a n d t h e r e a l i g n m e n t o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s y s t e m s a n d r e s o u r c e s m a r k s t h e f i n a l s t a g e o f c r i s i s . The a t t r i b u t e s o f a c r i s e s d i s a s t e r a r e e x a m i n e d . i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 2. P r e - c r i s i s b e h a v i o r 5 2.1 P r o b a b i l i t y o f t h r e a t e n i n g e v e n t s 6 2.2 The i m p a c t o f t h r e a t s 14 2.3 P e r c e p t i o n o f t h r e a t s 16 2.3.1 The a t t e n t i v e p r o c e s s 16 2.3.2 The p r o c e s s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . . . 24 2.4 The t r i g g e r o f c r i s i s 47 2.4.1 Type o f g o a l t h r e a t e n e d 47 2.4.2 I m m e d i a c y o f t h r e a t 4 9 2.4.3 U n c e r t a i n t y a n d s u r p r i s e 49 2.4.4 P e r s o n a l i t y 51 2.4.5 The i m p a c t o f s t r e s s 51 3. C r i s i s management 54 3.1 The macro s e t t i n g o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s . . 54 4. C r i s i s management s t y l e s 62 4.1 I n c r e m e n t a l a n d s a t i s f i c i n g s t r a t e g i e s . . . . 62 4.2 ' C r a z y ' o r i r r a t i o n a l s t y l e s a n d m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s 67 i v Page 5. The dynamics of c r i s i s 76 5.1 Some determinants of postures 83 5.2 More about the dynamics of postures 8 5 6. Micro analysis of c r i s i s management: the inte r n a l process 88 6.1 The narrowing of cognitive processes 9 3 7. Post c r i s i s : the case of major dislocations 103 8. Prescriptions for c r i s i s management and prevention: a preliminary analysis 108 9. Prescriptions for restoration 124 v LIST OF TABLES Page Table 1 . . 114a v i 1. 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n I n an age o f s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c d i s c o n -t i n u i t i e s , g o v e r n m e n t s , o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d i n d i v i d u a l s o f t e n f i n d t h e m s e l v e s i l l p r e p a r e d t o c o p e w i t h u n e x -p e c t e d e v e n t s o f l a r g e i m p o r t a n c e . F r e q u e n t l y t h e r e p e r -t o i r e o f r e s p o n s e s , t h e s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s , become o b s o l e t e o r d i s f u n c t i o n a l . Y e t t h e s i t u a t i o n s r e q u i r e a c h o i c e o f d e c i s i v e a c t i o n s w i t h l i t t l e i n f o r -m a t i o n a b o u t t h e new c o n t i n g e n c i e s , t h e o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e t o c o p e w i t h them, and t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f c h o s e n a c t i o n s . D e c i s i o n m a k e r s f a c i n g t h e n e e d f o r q u i c k a n d s h a r p r e -a l i g n m e n t s o f p r o b l e m s o l v i n g p r o c e d u r e s a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s , e x p e r i e n c e h i g h l e v e l s o f e m o t i o n a l a n d p h y s i c a l s t r e s s . S t r e s s , s u r p r i s e , r e s t r i c t e d amount o f t i m e f o r r e s p o n s e , a n d t h r e a t s t o h i g h p r i o r i t y g o a l s c h a r a c t e r i z e a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n . H e r m a n n ( 1 9 7 2 , p. 1 3 ) , f o r e x a m p l e , d e f i n e s a c r i s i s as a s i t u a t i o n " T h a t t h r e a t -e n s h i g h p r i o r i t y g o a l s o f t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g u n i t , r e -s t r i c t s t h e amount o f t i m e a v a i l a b l e f o r r e s p o n s e . . . and s u r p r i s e s t h e members o f t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g u n i t s b y i t s o c c u r r e n c e . " O t h e r a u t h o r s h a v e e m p h a s i z e d t h e mag-n i t u d e o f t h e t h r e a t a s a k e y f a c t o r i n d e f i n i n g a c r i s i s ( e . g . a t h r e a t o f w a r ) . The s t u d y o f c r i s i s d e c i s i o n m a k i n g i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations has been the subject of a voluminous body of l i t e r a t u r e (see e.g. Hermann (1972), H o l s t i (1971), Paige (1968), McClelland (1961), A l l i s o n (1971), Zinnes et a l . (1966). The approaches taken by various authors ranged in t h e i r f o c i from general investigations of r e a l i z e d associations of macro-patterns of c r i s i s behaviour (e.g. association'of national response styles and variables r e f l e c t i n g the state of a p a r t i c u l a r country) to invest-igations of micro decision processes (e.g. the impact of i n d i v i d u a l stress and personality upon c r i s i s decisions) There are many competing hypotheses and what appears to be contradictory evidence to explain c r i s i s behaviour. While some of the contradictions can be explained on bases of differences i n methodological rigour, others may be resolved by an increase i n t h e o r e t i c a l rigour. For example, some authors,Wolstetter & Wolstetter (1965) and Verba (1961) / suggested that decision making during c r i s i s tends to be more r a t i o n a l than routine decision making. Others emphasized the i r r a t i o n a l attributes of c r i s i s decision making (Janis, 1972). These contradic-tions can be e a s i l y resolved i f one separates " i r r a t i o n -a l i t y " i n problem d e f i n i t i o n , from " i r r a t i o n a l " choice of actions. I t i s possible that the r e s t r i c t i o n s i n time a v a i l a b i l i t y increase the tightness of bounds on r a t i o n a l i t y (limited search for options, incomplete goal 3. i d e n t i f i c a t i o n e t c . ) , y i e l d i n g a s i m p l i f i e d b u t m i s l e a d i n g p r o b l e m f o r m u l a t i o n . H a v i n g a s i m p l i f i e d p r o b l e m , i t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t d e c i s i o n m a k e r s w o u l d make more c o n s i s t e n t c h o i c e s t h a n t h e o n e s t h e y w o u l d make i f t i m e p e r m i t t e d a more c o m p l e x f o r m u l a t i o n , w i t h p e r h a p s r e -c o g n i t i o n o f c o n f l i c t i n g g o a l s p r e v a l e n t i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o a l i t i o n s . G e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t r a t i o n a l i t y may m i s l e a d u n l e s s t h e y s p e c i f y w h a t e l e m e n t s o f t h e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s a r e r e f e r r e d t o ( m a k i n g t h e r i g h t d e c i s i o n s f o r t h e w r o n g p r o b l e m s o r m a k i n g t h e w r o n g d e c i s i o n s f o r t h e c o r r e c t p r o b l e m s ) . H e r m a n n ( 1 9 7 2 , p. 282) p o i n t e d o u t t h e same t h e o r e t i c a l p r o b l e m , s t a t i n g " . . . c o m p e t i n g h y p o -t h e s e s c a n be t r u e u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d . . . t h e t a s k i s t o i d e n t i f y t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s o r i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i -a b l e s t h a t h a v e n o t b e e n made e x p l i c i t i n t h e o r i g i n a l f o r m u l a t i o n s " . One o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s p a p e r i s t o p r o v i d e an i n i t i a l s t e p t o w a r d s u c h d e e p e n i n g o f t h e t h e o r y o f c r i s i s b e -h a v i o u r . A n o t h e r r e l a t e d o b j e c t i v e i s t o p r o v i d e a c o n -c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k w h i c h p e r m i t s some i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e o r e t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d f i n d i n g s i n t h e f i e l d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s . A l l i s o n (1971) a d v o c a t e d t h e u s e o f m u l t i p l e p a r a -d i g m s t o v i e w a c r i s i s r e s o l u t i o n p r o c e s s . E m p l o y i n g e s t a b l i s h e d " t h e o r i e s " o f d e c i s i o n m a k i n g he p r o v i d e d 4. t h r e e b a s i c c o n c e p t u a l l e n s e s ( p a r a d i g m s i n h i s t e r m i n -o l o g y ) t o v i e w c r i s i s d e c i s i o n making. T h e s e i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w i n g b a s i c l e n s e s : t h e r a t i o n a l a c t o r , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r o c e s s and t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l p o l i t i c s m o d e l s . Hermann s u g g e s t e d f o u r m o d e ls t o e x p l a i n c r i s i s b e h a v i o u r : i n d i v i d u a l s t r e s s , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e s p o n s e , h o s t i l e i n t e r a c t i o n and c o s t c a l c u l a t i o n . The c a s e f o r v i e w i n g c r i s i s p r o c e s s e s f r o m a v a r i e t y o f p o i n t s o f v i e w i s made by A l l i s o n (19 71, p.v) who s t a t e s t h a t "by c o m p a r i n g and c o n t r a s t i n g t h e . . . [ a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t u a l ] . ..frameworks, we s e e what e a c h m a g n i f i e s , h i g h l i g h t s , and r e v e a l s as w e l l as what e a c h b l u r s o r n e g l e c t s . " The r e s e a r c h c y c l e r e q u i r e s p h a s e s o f e n r i c h m e n t and e x p a n s i o n meshed w i t h p h a s e s o f c o n s o l i d a t i o n and i n t e -g r a t i o n . I n t h i s p a p e r we a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e some f r a m e -work f o r m e s h i n g e l e m e n t s f r o m a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t u a l l e n s e s t o o b t a i n an i n t e g r a t e d p o i n t o f v i e w . The p a p e r i s o r g a n i z e d a l o n g t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n s . (1) What a r e t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s o f c r i s e s f r e q u e n c i e s ? (2) How a r e c r i s e s managed and what a r e t h e d i s t i n g u i s h -i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f c r i s i s as o p p o s e d t o n o n - c r i s i s management? (3) What a r e t h e g e n e r a l p a t t e r n s o f p o s t c r i s i s r e a l i g n -ments and what a r e t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s o f r e s t o r a t i o n ? The d e s c r i p t i v e i n s i g h t s g a i n e d i n t o t h e s e p r o c e s s e s 5. p r o v i d e t h e b a s i s f o r t h r e e p r e s c r i p t i v e f o c i . (1) How t o r e d u c e t h e c h a n c e o f c r i s i s ? [ p r e v e n t i o n ] . (2) How t o manage a c r i s i s when t h e c o n t i n g e n c y a r i s e s ? [management]. (3) How t o manage p o s t c r i s i s r e c o v e r y ? [ r e s t o r a t i o n ] . C l e a r l y t h i s p a p e r c a n n o t p r e t e n d t o p r o v i d e c o m p l e t e a n s w e r s b u t d o e s o f f e r some p r e l i m i n a r y h i n t s a t p o s s i b l e d i r e c t i o n s w h i c h r e s e a r c h i n t h i s f i e l d c o u l d t a k e . 2. P r e - C r i s i s b e h a v i o u r We f i r s t a t t e m p t t o i d e n t i f y some o f t h e f a c t o r s w h i c h d e t e r m i n e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y a d e c i s i o n u n i t may f i n d i t s e l f i n a c r i s i s . T h e r e a r e t h r e e m a j o r c o m p o n e n t s i n e s t i m a t i n g t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a c r i s i s . The f i r s t i s t h e o b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t an e v e n t w h i c h may t h r e a t e n i m p o r t a n t g o a l s o f t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t w i l l o c c u r . The s e c o n d component i s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t s u c h an e v e n t w i l l b e p e r c e i v e d b y t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t when i t o c c u r s a n d i n t e r p r e t e d as a n i m p o r t a n t t h r e a t . The t h i r d e l e -ment i s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t s u c h an e v e n t w i l l be p e r -c e i v e d w i t h s u r p r i s e , r e q u i r e a c t i o n i n a l i m i t e d amount o f t i m e , a n d p r o d u c e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a n d / o r i n d i v i d u a l s t r e s s . A n a l y s i s o f t h e f i r s t c o m p o n ent w i l l f o c u s u p o n t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y o r s u s c e p t a b i l i t y o f a d e c i s i o n u n i t t o t h r e a t s . The a n a l y s i s m ust f o c u s i n i t i a l l y u pon 6. classes of factors which determine the frequency of threatening events and t h e i r magnitude. Subsequently the analysis must proceed to i d e n t i f y those conditions related to the state of the decision unit which magnify or i n h i b i t the possible impact of an event. The analysis of event frequencies and the seriousness of t h e i r ex-pected impacts i s not s u f f i c i e n t to determine frequen-cies of c r i s e s , as there are subjective elements to a c r i s i s . Selective processes of perception and i n t e r -pretation as well as alternative tolerance l e v e l s to threats may a l t e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y the response patterns of a decision unit. Eco-cide threats, for example, pre-c i p i t a t e c r i s e s for some, while evoking indifference and routine responses from others. To complete the analysis of c r i s i s frequencies we s h a l l focus therefore on those elements i n the goals and decision structures, resources, psychological p r o f i l e s and history of decision units which influence recognition of events, i n t e r p r e t -ation of t h e i r impact and the sensation of surprise and stress. 2.1 P r o b a b i l i t y of threatening events We c l a s s i f y events with p o t e n t i a l threats into three general classes: (a) major changes i n the exogenous environment of the 7. decision unit; (b) "threats" which are a function of the state of the decision unit; (c) events which are induced by i n t e r n a l demands of the decision unit. The susceptability to exogenous changes i n the en-vironment depends upon the degree to which a decision unit i s linked functionally to i t s environment. A trad-ing country such as B r i t a i n for example, i s linked strongly to events i n environments related to i t s v i t a l economic l i n e s of supplies and marketing. Canada, where major economic t i e s are continental (American), i s buf-fered to a larger extent from the impact of l o c a l events away from i t s continent. The lin k s need not be economic, however, for c u l t u r a l t i e s , commitments, treaties, etc. are a l l factors which determine the relevant scope of the external environment. With a wider range and scope and a high i n t e n s i t y of functional l i n k s the p r o b a b i l i t y of occurrence of a threatening event increases. Economic s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y and int e r n a t i o n a l i s o l a t i o n i s t i c p o l i t -i c a l postures, for example, reduce, c e t e r i s paribus, the chance of an exogenous event having a threatening impact. However, such p o l i c i e s have an impact upon the pa r t i c u -l a r structure and dynamics of the global system of i n t e r -relationships which affects i n turn the chance of occur-8. rence of threatening events. A complex system, with m u l t i l a t e r a l diverse l i n k s of mutual dependence, may, for example, ensure a higher l e v e l of cooperation and s t a b i l i t y by imposing a deterring cost on non cooperat-ing e n t i t i e s . For a given system, p o l i t i c a l i s o l a t i o n -ism and economic s e l f s u f f i c i e n c y may prove to be factors which reduce the relevant set of threatening events. A cooperative system of mutual dependence, however, may reduce the global frequency of threats, hence compensate for increased horizons of involvement. Short sighted decision makers may opt for economic and p o l i t i c a l i s o -lationism as threat reduction strategies without consid-ering the i n d i r e c t impacts upon t h e i r environment and state of such strategies. The general important variables which determine the frequency of threatening events i n a general system of international relations include: (a) behavioural modes (b) differences i n p r i o r i t i e s among decision units (c) system imbalances (d) s t r u c t u r a l flaws The establishment of cooperative non-aggressive response modes among nations and the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the international system to contain or l o c a l i z e c o n f l i c t by i n s t i t u t i o n a l means or by deterrence have received 9. great attention i n the l i t e r a t u r e . (Studies of regional and international i n s t i t u t i o n s and mechanisms at t h e i r disposal, such as peace keeping forces, as well as the stra t e g i c l i t e r a t u r e of deterrence and c o n f l i c t contain-ment) . Attention was drawn recently to the necessity for reduction i n p r i o r i t y differences among nations. Such e f f o r t s were r e f l e c t e d for example i n the World Food Conference, Rome, 1974 where attempts were made to reduce the f i r s t and t h i r d world discrepancies i n p r i o r i t i e s regarding food and raw materials production and d i s t r i b u t i o n . Concern about system imbalances has focussed recently mainly upon str a t e g i c weaponry (Stra-tegic Arms Limitation Talks). L i t t l e understanding exists at t h i s moment about the s t r u c t u r a l components which may induce sharp d i s -c o n t i n u i t i e s i n a system's behaviour. While the f i r s t three determinants of the frequencies of c r i s i s occur-rence relate to parameters of the system i . e . to short run behaviour, the l a s t determinant (flaws i n the struc-ture of the system) centers upon topologies of the system. I t i s concerned with the long range pattern of behaviours, e s p e c i a l l y those which i n e v i t a b l y produce sharp d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s and dislocations i n the system. Rene Thorn (1970 , 1972, 1973) has pioneered i n developing a mathematical f i e l d of topology which i s d i r e c t l y r e l -evant to the question of system dynamics and discontin-u i t i e s . He named i t the theory of catastrophes. Zeeman (19 74) explored the implications of the theory to the s o c i a l sciences and .provided examples of two int e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n processes, arms race and national war making pol i c y . While the theory i s i n i t s infancy, the a v a i l -able models demonstrate the p o s s i b i l i t y that the grains of major dislocations may be embedded i n the "geometry" of the int e r n a t i o n a l system of i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s , not only i n i t s parametric behavior (the p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t -egic moves of decision e n t i t i e s i n the system). The "state" of the decision unit i s an important determinant of i t s susceptability to threatening events. Attributes of the system which make i t subject to predatory interests from others constitute one class of "state" variables. Attractiveness to predators can be calculated on the basis of the balance of costs and benefits of predation. Benefit assessments are based on the importance of the resources a decision unit con-t r o l s to potential predators, or the role i t plays i n th e i r global strategy. Resources may include raw mat-e r i a l s , land, people, know-how, energy sources, and production c a p a b i l i t i e s . The quest for "Lebensraum" of over populated Germany has posed a major threat to i t s neighbours twice during the century. Cuba's role l i -a s a s t r a t e g i c b r i d g e h e a d t o t h e A m e r i c a n c o n t i n e n t h a d i n c r e a s e d i t s a t t r a c t i o n t o b o t h t h e U.S.S.R. a n d t h e U.S.A. when s t r a t e g i c c a p a b i l i t i e s w e r e h i g h l y c o n s t r a i n -e d b y d i s t a n c e t o t a r g e t s . The p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f I.C.B.M.'s h a s r e d u c e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i t s i m p o r t a n c e , e x c e p t a s b r i d g e h e a d f o r l i m i t e d s u b v e r s i v e a c t i v i t i e s d i r e c t e d a t S o u t h A m e r i c a . C o s t s d e p e n d upon t h e d e t e r r e n c e power o f t h e p o t e n -t i a l p r e y , i . e . t h e c o s t s i t may i n f l i c t u pon t h e i n i t i a -t o r o f t h r e a t s . S a u d i A r a b i a ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s t o s h u t down i n a s e m i - p e r m a n e n t f a s h i o n i t s o i l w e l l s r e d u c e d . t h e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s t o t h e w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s , o f o v e r t a g g r e s -s i v e a c t i o n s a g a i n s t i t . Y e t t h e s i t u a t i o n may c h a n g e o n c e i n t e r m e d i a t e r a n g e s e l f s u f f i c i e n c y i s o b t a i n e d i n E u r o p e a nd t h e U.S.A. due t o t h e N o r t h S e a a n d t h e P r u d -hoe B ay o i l r e s o u r c e s . G e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n may d e t e r m i n e t o a l a r g e e x -t e n t t h e s u s c e p t a b i l i t y o f a c o u n t r y t o t h r e a t s . P r o x -i m i t y t o a w a r p r o n e z o n e , o r a g e o g r a p h i c p o s i t i o n w h i c h makes a c o u n t r y a " n a t u r a l " b a t t l e f i e l d b e t w e e n a d v e r -s a r i e s , i n c r e a s e s s i g n i f i c a n t l y t h e c h a n c e o f t h r e a t e n i n g e v e n t s . F i n a l l y t h r e a t s may be t r i g g e r e d as a r e s u l t o f t h e i n t e r n a l d y n a m i c s o f a d e c i s i o n u n i t . I n t e r n a l i n s t a b -i l i t i e s l a c k o f c o n t r o l upon p a r t i c u l a r e l e m e n t s ( e . g . 12. t h e m i l i t a r y ) may l e a d t o u n i n t e n d e d a c t i o n s w h i c h may i n d u c e t h r e a t e n i n g r e s p o n s e s f r o m t h e e x o g e n o u s e n v i r -onment. W h i l e t h r e a t s c a n a r i s e a s u n i n t e n d e d c o n s e q u e n c e s o f i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e and d y n a m i c s o f t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t , t h e y may p u r p o s e l y be i n d u c e d as p a r t o f t h e i n t e r n a l management s t r a t e g y o f t h e u n i t . C r i s e s may h a v e a f u n c t i o n . B u c h a n (.1966, p. 20) comments: " C r i s e s a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y e n g e n d e r e d b y o u r a d -v e r s a r i e s : t h e y c a n a r i s e f r o m t h e d e l i b e r a t e d e c i s i o n on o u r own p a r t t o r a i s e t h e l e v e l o f e x i s t i n g d i p l o m a t i c o r m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t i n o r d e r t o f o r c e a d e c i s i o n . . . . " V a r i o u s a u t h o r s h a v e s u g g e s t e d t h a t a c r i s i s i s a n e c -e s s a r y e v e n t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s d e s p i t e t h e ob-v i o u s d a n g e r s i n h e r e n t i n a d o p t i n g s u c h a t a c t i c . W r i t -i n g g e n e r a l l y o n t h e p s y c h o l o g y o f c o n f l i c t , C o s e r (.1956, p. 39) n o t e s : " C o n f l i c t i s s e e n as p e r f o r m i n g g r o u p - m a i n t a i n i n g f u n c t i o n s i n s o f a r a s i t r e g u l a t e s s y s t e m s o f r e -l a t i o n s h i p s . I t ' c l e a r s t h e a i r ' , . . . i t e l i m i n a t e s t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f b l o c k e d a n d b a l k e d h o s t i l e d i s p o s i t i o n s b y a l l o w i n g t h e i r f r e e b e h a v i o u r a l e x p r e s s i o n . " The s u g g e s t i o n i s a l s o made t h a t t h e r e i s a n e e d f o r c o n -13. f l i c t i n the system to act as a safety-valve when a very r i g i d s o c i a l structure e x i s t s . An example of how c o n f l i c t may serve to 'clear the a i r ' i s seen i n diplomatic nego-t i a t i o n s . C o n f l i c t over t r i v i a may be considered a re-lease strategy or surrogate to more serious c r i s e s . McClelland (1961, p. 202) has suggested that c r i s e s are necessary to p u l l flagging a l l i e s back into the f o l d . He developed a model of international r e l a t i o n s where the world was viewed as a bi-polar system of c o n f l i c t with the U.S. and U.S.S.R. the major protagonists, each supported by a l l i a n c e s . "One of the weaknesses of a system of c o n f l i c t i s the problem of maintaining tension and a sense of motion i n the system. C o n f l i c t s are subject to obsolescence, the waging of a c r i s i s refreshes the stream of c o n f l i c t i n t e r a c t i o n , almost as a trans-fusion to the system. F a l t e r i n g or wayward mem-bers of the c o a l i t i o n s may be j o l t e d into new a l -legiance by a c r i s i s . The fear of war and the need for national s o l i d a r i t y and e f f i c i e n c y are brought home to domestic publics by the s p i l l - o v e r s of i n -formation and action connected with major c r i s e s . " B e l l (1971, p. 116) proposes that c r i s e s are desirable as mechanisms for inducing change. T r a d i t i o n a l l y changes i n the world order have been achieved by means of war. 14. However i n a n u c l e a r a g e , n o t e v e n c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r i s w h o l l y r e a l i s t i c , t h e r e f o r e c r i s i s i s u s e d a s a s u b s t i -t u t e . " C r i s i s p r o v i d e s a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h p o l i t i c a l r e s -o l u t i o n a n d m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e m e a s u r e d a g a i n s t e a c h o t h e r , t o d r a m a t i z e an a c t o f c h o i c e , w i t h o u t w a r n e c e s s a r i l y e v e n t u a t i n g . " C o s e r (1956) s u g g e s t s t h a t c o n f l i c t c a n be v i e w e d a s an e l e m e n t w h i c h b i n d s p a r t i e s t o e a c h o t h e r w h e r e t h e y p r e v i o u s l y h a d no r e l a t i o n . A c r i s i s b e t w e e n n a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e s r e l a t i o n s o f a r u d i m e n t a r y n a t u r e a n d more n o r m a l i z e d d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s may f o l l o w a s a r e s u l t . The U.S. p o s i t i o n on C h i n a may be an e x a m p l e o f t h i s p r o -c e s s . As C h i n a e v o l v e d i n t o a n u c l e a r f o r c e , c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e U.S. i n c r e a s e d . T h e s e c o n f l i c t s c o u l d n o t r e a s -o n a b l y be managed s i n c e t h e U.S. h a d no f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a . A s e r i e s o f s m a l l c r i s e s i n t h e U.S. p r e c i p -i t a t e d b y C h i n a ' s a c t i o n s i n a t m o s p h e r i c n u c l e a r t e s t s a n d i n v o l v e m e n t i n N o r t h V i e t Nam may w e l l h a v e c o n t r i b -u t e d t o U.S. r e c o g n i t i o n o f C h i n a a n d e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . 2.2 The i m p a c t o f t h r e a t s We h a v e s o f a r a n a l y z e d t h o s e e l e m e n t s i n t h e e n v -i r o n m e n t s t a t e a n d i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t w h i c h a f f e c t i t s s u s c e p t a b i l i t y t o " t h r e a t s " . The 15. p o t e n t i a l i m p a c t o f t h r e a t s d e p e n d s h o w e v e r upon t h e c o p i n g r e s o u r c e s , g o a l s t r u c t u r e a n d g e n e r a l " r i s k s p r e a d -i n g " p o s t u r e o f t h e u n i t . C o p i n g r e s o u r c e s a r e m e a s u r e d b y t h e p r e p a r e d n e s s o f t h e u n i t v i z a v i z p o s s i b l e e v e n t s . A u n i t w h i c h h a s p r e v i o u s l y e x p e r i e n c e d a p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s o f e v e n t s a n d d e v e l o p e d a p p r o p r i a t e a d a p t i v e r e s p o n s e s t o t h em, i s more l i k e l y t o r e d u c e t h e i m p a c t o f t h e e v e n t by a b u i l t - i n i m m u n i t y . A c o n t i n u o u s s e q u e n c e o f l o c a l i z e d m i l i t a r y c l a s h e s may e n s u r e a d e g r e e o f r e a d i n e s s w h i c h a v e r t s i n p a r t , t h e s e r i o u s n e s s o f a t o t a l i n v a s i o n . A p p r o p r i a t e r e s p o n s e r e p e r t o i r e s , f l e x i b l e modes o f r e s o u r c e d e p l o y m e n t ( t h e a b i l i t y t o m o b i l i z e r e s o u r c e s t o meet t h r e a t s ) , b u i l t i n b u f f e r s ( t e r r i t o r i a l b u f f e r s , e a r l y w a r n i n g s y s t e m s , i n v e n t o r i e s a n d o t h e r s l a c k v a r i -a b l e s , e t c . ) , c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e r e a d i n e s s o f a u n i t i n m e e t i n g t h r e a t s . G o a l s t r u c t u r e s w h i c h a r e i n s e n s i t i v e t o m i n o r c h a n g -e s i n s p e c i f i c d i m e n s i o n s , a v e r t t h e s u b j e c t i v e i m p o r t -a n c e o f e v e n t s . S t r u c t u r e s w h i c h h e l p i n s p r e a d i n g r i s k , b y l o c a l -i z a t i o n o f t h r e a t s ( e . g . g e o g r a p h i c a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ) o r b y e n s u r i n g a g a i n s t them ( r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n , a l -l i a n c e s e t c . ) , r e d u c e t h e s e r i o u s n e s s o f i m p a c t o f t h r e a t s . I t i s t h i s a r e a o f p o s s i b l e m o d i f i c a t i o n s w h i c h p r o v i d e s 16. a w i d e domain f o r c r i s e s p r e v e n t i o n moves t o be d i s c u s s e d i n t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e p r o p o s a l s e c t i o n o f t h i s s t u d y . 2.3 P e r c e p t i o n o f t h r e a t s "We n e v e r r e s p o n d t o t h e a c t u a l e v e n t o r s i t u a t i o n b u t t o o u r v i e w o f i t . " (de R i v e r a , 1968, p. 3 1 ) . An i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r c e p t i o n a c t s as a p r o c e s s o f s e l -e c t i v e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h f u r t h e r m o d i f i e s t h e r a t i o n a l a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e i m p a c t o f t h r e a t . I n d i v i d u a l p e r c e p t i o n c a n d i s t o r t o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . T h i s s u b j e c t i v e c o l o u r i n g o f e v e n t s c a n l e a d us t o p e r -c e i v e a t h r e a t where t h e r e i s none and c o n v e r s e l y , we c a n f a i l t o s e e t h r e a t where i n d e e d i t e x i s t s . A l l i n -d i v i d u a l s c o n s t r u c t t h e i r own r e a l i t y . T h i s r e a l i t y i s t h e f i l t e r t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l s c r e e n s e v e n t s w h i c h may o r may n o t l e a d t o a c r i s i s r e s p o n s e p a t t e r n . T h e r e a r e two e l e m e n t s i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f a t h r e a t . F i r s t t h e r e i s t h e a t t e n t i v e p r o c e s s . T h i s i s t h e p r o -c e s s o f s e l e c t i o n o f s t i m u l i . The s e c o n d sub p r o c e s s i s t h e p r o c e s s by w h i c h s t i m u l i r e c e i v e a m e aning or-a r e e n t e r e d i n t o t h e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . 2.3.1 A t t e n t i v e p r o c e s s T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l f a c t o r s b o t h i n t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l w h i c h d e t e r m i n e what e v e n t s w i l l be b r o u g h t t o one's a t t e n t i o n . 17. T h e s e f a c t o r s i n c l u d e a) b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e , b) i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t , c) c h a n n e l s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , d) i n f o r m a t i o n n e t w o r k s . B e l i e f s Our b e l i e f s a f f e c t n o t o n l y how we w i l l i n t e r p r e t a g i v e n s t i m u l u s b u t w h e t h e r o r n o t we p a y a t t e n t i o n t o t h a t s t i m u l u s i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . Hyman a n d S h e a t s l e y (194 7) h a v e shown t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s s e l e c t i v e l y e x p o s e t h e m s e l v e s t o i n f o r m a t i o n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e i r b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e a n d s c r e e n o u t p o t e n t i a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e i n -f o r m a t i o n . M o s t i n d i v i d u a l s a r e u n a w a r e o f t h i s a t t e n -t i v e b i a s . de R i v e r a (19 6 8) p o i n t s o u t t h a t s u c h s e l e c t i v e p r o -c e s s e s o c c u r i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l s . An o r g a n i z a t i o n may become s e l e c t i v e l y a t t e n t i v e t o c e r -t a i n s t i m u l i as a r e s u l t o f i n d i v i d u a l b i a s e s i n t r o d u c e d t h r o u g h t h e p o l i c i e s o f t h e s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s o r m a n a g e r s . The U.S. i n a b i l i t y t o a c h i e v e v i c t o r y i n V i e t Nam, f o r e x a m p l e , was i n p a r t a r e s u l t o f a v a s t u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n o f V i e t Cong f i g h t i n g s t r e n g t h . C I A r e s e a r c h e r s w e r e a b l e t o p r o d u c e r e v i s e d e s t i m a t e s o f enemy s t r e n g t h , f r o m f i e l d d a t a , much h i g h e r t h a n t h e ' o f f i c i a l ' e s t i m a t e s p r o v i d e d by t h e A g e n c y . I n s p i t e o f t h e i r a t t e m p t s t o p r o v i d e t h e i r s u p e r i o r s w i t h c o r r e c t f i g u r e s , t h e i r e f -18. f o r t s t o t r a n s m i t c o r r e c t e d i n f o r m a t i o n w e r e c o n s t a n t l y r e b u f f e d . E v e n d i r e c t a p p e a l s t o s e n i o r g o v e r n m e n t o f -f i c i a l s h a d no r e s u l t s . I n f a c t , t h e y r e s u l t e d i n t h e t r a n s f e r o f t h e C I A o f f i c i a l r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c h a l l e n g i n g t h e e s t i m a t e s t o a r e l a t i v e l y o b s c u r e s e c t i o n . The o f -f i c i a l a n d i n a c c u r a t e enemy c o u n t r e m a i n e d . R e a l i t y was d i s t o r t e d s i n c e t h e b e l i e f s o f t h e s e n i o r C I A o f f i c i a l s as t o enemy s t r e n g t h w e r e s e l e c t e d a g a i n s t i n c o m p a t i b l e i n f o r m a t i o n . I n t e r e s t B i a s e s c a n a l s o o c c u r when an i n d i v i d u a l i s a t t e n -t i v e t o o n l y a p a r t o f a s t i m u l u s . I f one i s u n f a m i l i a r o r u n i n t e r e s t e d i n some a s p e c t o f a s t i m u l u s , t h e i n d i v -i d u a l i s a t t e n t i v e t o o n l y t h o s e p a r t s w h i c h a r e f a m i l i a r ; i n w h i c h he i s i n t e r e s t e d ; o r w h i c h he f e e l s a r e i m p o r -t a n t . W i t h a p s y c h o l o g i c a l s e t t o w a r d c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o r e v e n t s , t h e r e i s a h i g h e r p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h o s e a s -p e c t s a r e t h e o n e s t h a t w i l l be s e l e c t e d f r o m t h e s t i m -u l u s a n d o t h e r more c r u c i a l a s p e c t s w i l l b e i g n o r e d . F o r i n s t a n c e , i f an i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r h a d t h e j o b o f e x a m i n i n g a e r i a l r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p h o t o g r a p h s b u t h a d n o t l e a r n e d t o r e c o g n i z e m i s s i l e i n s t a l l a t i o n s , e v i d e n c e o f new i n s t a l l a t i o n s , w h i c h c o u l d be o f s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t -a n c e , w o u l d be s c r e e n e d o u t o f t h e s t i m u l u s . 19. As an adjunct to this phenomena, individuals to some extent determine which st i m u l i w i l l confront them. The actions of an i n d i v i d u a l can a f f e c t the presence of the stimulus. de Rivera (196 8) gives the invasion of Korea as an i l l u s t r a t i o n . In the spring of 19 50 the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea went to Washington to request arms and equipment for the South Korean Army. In June, after his return to Korea, the Ambassador sent a cable to the State Dept. documenting a mobilization of North Korean troops along the 38th p a r a l l e l . When t h i s cable was received, o f f i c i a l s i n the State Dept. saw i t as supporting evidence for the previous request for funds to buy arms, rather than a warning of poten t i a l attack. As a re s u l t , the cable was f i l e d away and the information content l o s t . When the invasion occurred a few weeks l a t e r , State Dept. o f f i c i a l s were hampered i n th e i r plan-ning of a counter-attack by a lack of data on the size of the North Korean Forces. The Ambassador's cable was forgotten i n the f i l e s with complete d e t a i l s of North Korean strength. Thus the actions of ind i v i d u a l s , i n this instance, removed a c r i t i c a l stimulus and produced a bias of attention. Channels of communication Individual b e l i e f s and interests can r e s u l t i n fault y 20. attention to s t i m u l i . D istortion of stimuli can also occur before i t reaches the i n d i v i d u a l decision maker as a r e s u l t of the channels of communication within the organization or the stimuli can be screened out altogether. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (19 62) point out the importance of communication channels. They suggest that organiza-tions may r e s i s t new information or the sign i f i c a n c e of new information may be l o s t as a r e s u l t of the way mes-sages are labeled, transmitted and stored. Design of com-munications channels within the organization insures at-tention to stimuli that the members of the hierarchy think are important, or stimuli which they believe t h e i r sup-er i o r s w i l l f i n d important. This upward f i l t e r i n g of communications results i n a bias of attention, reducing the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of new types of messages, or unexpected messages to flow up i n the system. de Rivera (1968, p. 57) notes: "[An organization's]... entire communications system i s biased by the ideas and plans of the top decision makers. A subordinate i s re-warded for communicating information that interests his superior....When a subordinate has ideas which his sup-e r i o r may disagree with, he may be tempted to water down his report so that i t i s more acceptable. As a r e s u l t the superior may e a s i l y interpret i t i n a way that does not a l e r t him to facts he should know." 21. T h i s f i l t e r i n g o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s i s i l l u s t r a t e d b y e v e n t s i n t h e 196 7 A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t . On J u n e 5, 196 7, t h e I s r a e l i A i r F o r c e l a u n c h e d a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k a g a i n s t k e y E g y p t i a n a i r b a s e s a n d d e s t r o y e d m o s t o f t h e E g y p t i a n A i r F o r c e on t h e g r o u n d . I n f o r m a t i o n g l e a n e d by v a r i o u s m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n s i n d i c a t e s t h a t a l t h o u g h P r e s i d e n t N a s s e r o f E g y p t was aware o f t h e a t t a c k , no one a d v i s e d h i m o f t h e s e r i o u s n e s s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . I n f a c t , b e c a u s e t h e y f e a r e d h i s a n g e r , t h e E g y p t i a n C h i e f s o f S t a f f d i d n o t a d v i s e N a s s e r o f t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e a i r f o r c e u n t i l l a t e i n t h e d a y o f J u n e 5, many h o u r s a f t e r t h e a t t a c k . On t h e same d a y , I s r a e l i t r o o p s h a d a d v a n c e d i n t o t h e S i n a i a n d e n g a g e d t h e E g y p t i a n Army. One o f t h e most d i s a s t r o u s p r o b l e m s f o r t h e E g y p t i a n s was i n a d e q u a t e c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d a n i n a b i l i t y t o c o n v e y m e s s a g e s o f a f a c t u a l n a t u r e . N a s s e r was l e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t h i s f o r c e s i n S i n a i a n d G a z a h a d r e p u l s e d t h e I s r a e -l i s . B y f o r d - J o n e s ( 1 9 6 7 , p. 62) i n h i s h i s t o r y o f t h e w a r , t e l l s u s : " E a r l y i n t h e day E g y p t i a n h e a d q u a r t e r s i n t h e S i n a i , i n t h e name o f G e n e r a l M u s h i n K a m a l M u r t a j i , GHQ i n t h e G a z a S t r i p , i n t h e name o f L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l A b d u l H u s s u n , h a d s e n t o f f f r o m t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s s i t u a t i o n r e p o r t s o f t h e e a r l y f i g h t i n g w h i c h v i e d i n t h e i r i m a g i n a t i v e c o n t e n t w i t h t h e more f l i g h t y 22. tales of the Arabian Nights. True to the practice of Arabic i n f e r i o r s they t o l d t h e i r superiors what they wanted to know rather than admit d i s t a s t e f u l truths. A chain of Egyptian s o l d i e r s , o f f i c e r s of higher and s t i l l higher ranks, passed on from one to another wholly inaccurate versions of a l l b a t t l e s . They l e f t out every unpleasant fact i n the fo r l o r n hope that A l l a h must soon wake up to the fact that his miracles were needed to handle and contain the i n f i d e l . " In these instances, the channels of communication and the sele c t i v e screening of information within the channels, resulted i n a bias of perception, on the part of Nasser through attention to a distorted stimulus, which was d i s -astrous to the Egyptian war e f f o r t . While events would probably not have been d i f f e r e n t had the true s i t u a t i o n been known, Nasser could have taken actions to reduce the impact of events. For instance he could possibly have ca l l e d for a U.N. cease-fire, i n which event I s r a e l would have been unable to achieve i t s f u l l objectives. Information networks As i l l u s t r a t e d by the Egyptian example, the lack of information or a v a i l a b i l i t y of inaccurate information, affects the content of the stimulus presented to an i n d i -23. v i d u a l d e c i s i o n m aker. I f an o r g a n i z a t i o n h a s a very-p o o r i n t e l l i g e n c e s y s t e m , i m p o r t a n t s t i m u l i w i l l e i t h e r be m i s s e d e n t i r e l y o r p o s s i b l y m i s i n t e r p r e t e d b e f o r e b e i n g t r a n s m i t t e d t h r o u g h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . E v e n i f t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e s y s t e m i s a d e q u a t e , t h e s t a n d a r d o p e r a t -i n g p r o c e d u r e s r e q u i r e d t o c o o r d i n a t e a l a r g e i n f o r m a t i o n n e t w o r k may r e s u l t i n d e l a y s i n t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f i n -f o r m a t i o n s t i m u l i w h i c h u l t i m a t e l y p r o d u c e s a p e r c e p t u a l b i a s . An e x a m p l e o f t h i s d e l a y h a s b e e n g i v e n b y A l l i s o n (1971) i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s . S o v i e t m i s s i l e s i n Cuba w e r e n o t d i s c o v e r e d b y U.S. i n t e l l i g e n c e u n t i l O c t . 14, 1962. T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n w o u l d h a v e b e e n a v a i l a b l e as much as 3 weeks e a r l i e r i f a U2 f l i g h t h a d f l o w n o v e r t h e w e s t e r n e n d o f Cuba b e f o r e t h e 1 4 t h . B i t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m s h i p p i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e , r e f u g e e r e p o r t s a nd C I A a g e n t r e p o r t s w e r e a l s o ' i n t h e s y s t e m ' p r i o r t o O c t . 14. I f t h e c o l l a t i o n a n d t r a n s -m i s s i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n c o u l d h a v e b e e n i n s t a n t a n e o u s , a n d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n n e t w o r k s more t h o r o u g h (more f r e q u e n t U2 f l i g h t s o v e r t h e c r i t i c a l a r e a ) , t h e P r e s i d e n t w o u l d p o s s i b l y h a v e r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n o f m i s s i l e i n s t a l l a -t i o n w e eks e a r l i e r . The t i m e l a g s i n t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e n e t w o r k s l e d t h e c h i e f s o f i n t e l l i g e n c e t o p r e s e n t t h e P r e s i d e n t w i t h a f a u l t y s t i m u l u s - t h a t i n t h e i r j u d g m e n t t h e S o v i e t s w o u l d n ' t i n t r o d u c e m i s s i l e s i n t o C u b a , t h e 24. exact opposite of the true s i t u a t i o n . In t h i s instance, distorted stimuli r e s u l t i n g from f a i l u r e s i n the i n f o r -mation networks, affected the decision making process. 2.3.2. The process of inte r p r e t a t i o n The biases r e s u l t i n g from sele c t i v e attention are compounded by errors of judgment and concept formation i n interpreting the information at hand. Decision makers develop and employ models (mental or formal) of their environment. These models play a dual r o l e . They provide a framework for assessment of decision consequences as well as a framework for further information c o l l e c t i o n . These models are the images of r e a l i t y upon which decision processes are based. For example, Boulding (1959, p. 120) emphasizes: "We must recognize that the people whose decisions determine the p o l i c i e s and actions of nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts of the s i t u a -t i o n , whatever that may mean, but to th e i r 'image' of the s i t u a t i o n . I t i s what we think the world i s l i k e , not what i t i s r e a l l y l i k e , that determines our behaviour." The development of models or images and th e i r processes by which they are revised when more data becomes a v a i l -able to the decision maker are affected by several sources of errors. These are c l a s s i f i e d for our purposes as: 25. (1) e r r o r s stemming f r o m c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e r e s o l u t i o n (2) e r r o r s stemming f r o m c u l t u r a l b i a s e s (3) e r r o r s stemming f r o m c o n c e p t u a l m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g and (4) e r r o r s stemming f r o m p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s . We s h a l l e x p l o r e now t h e r o l e p l a y e d by e a c h s o u r c e o f e r r o r . C o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e r e s o l u t i o n The t h e o r y o f c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e a d v a n c e d by F e s t i n g e r (1957) s u g g e s t s t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l w i l l t r y t o make h i s p e r c e p t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y c o n -s i s t e n t . To t h i s end, c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e p r o v i d e s m o t i v a t i o n t o a l t e r o ne's i n f o r m a t i o n s e l e c t i o n a n d / o r e v a l u a t i o n o f i n c o m i n g i n f o r m a t i o n t o e n s u r e c o n s i s t e n c y . T h e r e f o r e a p e r s o n ' s b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e s i n p a r t h i s p e r c e p t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n . Thus a s t i m u l u s w i l l be i n t e r p r e t e d i n a manner w h i c h e i t h e r d oes n o t c o n t r a d i c t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s e x i s t i n g b e l i e f s o r t h a t r e q u i r e s t h e l e a s t r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h o s e b e l i e f s . A d e c i s i o n maker t e n d s t o c o n s t r u c t p s y c h o l o g i c a l m o d e l s o f c e r t a i n e v e n t s o r i n d i v i d u a l s , s u c h a s i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h c o m p e t i t o r s o r a d v e r s a r i e s . As e v e n t s t i m u l i a r e r e c e i v e d t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s r a t i o n a l i z e d t o make them f i t w i t h t h e s e m o d e l s . de R i v e r a (19 68, p. 29) N o t e s : " S i n c e t h e model does p r o v i d e a way o f o r g a n i z i n g many f a c t s , t h e e x p e r t t r i e s t o p e r s e r v e h i s model 26. a g a i n s t e v i d e n c e t h a t s u g g e s t i t s c h a n g e . He s e l e c t s t h o s e a s p e c t s o f t h e d a t a t h a t c o n f o r m t o h i s model and c o n s i d e r s t h e r e s t n o n e s s e n t i a l . " I t c a n be p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y p a i n f u l f o r an i n d i v i d u a l t o a l t e r h i s b e l i e f s t r u c t u r e , so s t r o n g l y d o e s one f e e l t h a t h i s p e r s o n a l r e a l i t y i s o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . B e l i e f s a r e h i g h l y r e s i s t a n t t o change e v e n i n t h e f a c e o f s t r o n g e v i d e n c e t h a t c o n t r a d i c t s . t h e m . C o n s i d e r f o r example t h e b e h a v i o u r o f Abba Eban, t h e f o r m e r f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r o f I s r a e l . H i s f i r m b e l i e f i n d i p l o m a t i c means o f d i s p u t e s e t t l e m e n t , l e d him t o m i s i n t e r p r e t t h e c r i t i c a l p r o b l e m w h i c h f a c e d I s r a e l d u r i n g t h e 1967 c r i s i s . Eban f a i l e d t o i n t e r p r e t and communicate an i m p o r t a n t h i n t f r o m P r e s i d e n t J o h n s o n u n t y i n g I s r a e l ' s hands t o t a k e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . Wagner (1974, p. 48) p o i n t s o u t : " F o r two d a y s Eban f a i l e d t o r e p o r t t o t h e I s r a e l i c a b i n e t a remark by J o h n s o n t h a t ' i n t h e end t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n i s y o u r s . ' The remark was p e r c e i v e d by most d e c i s i o n makers i n t e r v i e w e d a s a t i p - o f f by t h e P r e s i d e n t o f A m e r i c a n s u p p o r t f o r an I s r a e l i s t r i k e . J o h n s o n ' s remark was d e l e t e d by Eban b e c a u s e o f h i s b i a s i n f a v o u r o f a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n . " S i n c e i n d i v i d u a l s o f t e n h o l d d i f f e r e n t p r i o r b e l i e f s , i t f o l l o w s t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e same e v e n t may 27. d i f f e r . The i n v a s i o n of Korea i n 1950 i s another example of d i f f e r e n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the same s t i m u l u s , de R i v e r a (1968, p. 29) p o i n t s out the d i f f e r e n t b e l i e f s of the a c t o r s : "The Chairman of the J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f b e l i e v e d t h a t the S o v i e t Union might t r y to move i n t o I r a n . A h i g h o f f i c i a l i n the St a t e Department b e l i e v e d t h a t S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y was q u i t e c a u t i o u s i n i t s expansionism. The P r e s i d e n t b e l i e v e d t h a t a n a t i o n d i d not become b e l l i g e r e n t u n l e s s i t thought i t s opponents too weak to f i g h t . Hence, when news of the Korean a t t a c k f i r s t reached government o f f i c i a l s , i t was p e r c e i v e d i n s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t ways. The Chairman of the J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f appears to have seen the event as a d i v e r s i o n a r y move b e f o r e a major blow a g a i n s t I r a n . The St a t e Department o f f i c i a l i n t e r p r e t e d the i n v a s i o n as a t e n t a t i v e p r o b i n g a c t i o n . (He was reminded of Lenin's remark t h a t i f one's bayonet runs i n t o c o n c r e t e he w i t h -draws, w h i l e i f i t h i t s a s o f t b e l l y he conti n u e s to t h r u s t . ) The P r e s i d e n t saw the a t t a c k as s i m i l a r to H i t l e r ' s i n v a s i o n of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a . " To a c e r t a i n extent, one's p e r c e p t i o n i n the i n t e r -n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s arena, as i n f l u e n c e d by b e l i e f s , may become a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy. T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e of p e r c e p t i o n s of h o s t i l i t y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . 28 P r i o r to the outbreak of the 1967 Middle East c r i s i s , Egypt allegedly perceived the threat of I s r a e l i aggres-sion. As a r e s u l t there was a major escalation of counter-threats and h o s t i l e actions against I s r a e l , which Israel i n turn perceived as a threat to i t s security. So intense was the perceived threat, that I s r a e l was motivated to launch a pre-emptive attack against Egypt. Thus Egypt's perceptions (which may or may not have been accurate) led i t to produce a r e a l i t y i t believed i t had seen a l l along. Cultural bias Different cultures use d i f f e r e n t cognitive s t y l e s , have d i f f e r e n t b e l i e f and value systems and have a host of unique s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l norms. Hall (1964) spoke of d i f f e r e n t cultures as "inhabiting d i f f e r e n t sensory worlds" i n the sense that they place varying emphasis on p a r t i c u l a r sensory imput channels for generating information. For instance many cultures r e l y i n d i f f e r -e n t i a l degrees on non-verbal cues i n communications. Bodily orientation, proximity and physical contact are c u l t u r a l l y determined cues and many western mannerisms are not received i n the same s p i r i t they were intended. La Barre (1964) suggests: "Consider...how Chinese hate to be touched, slapped on the back, or even shake hands; how e a s i l y America 29. c o u l d a v o i d o f f e n s e by m e r e l y o m i t t i n g t h e s e i n t e n d e d g e s t u r e s o f f r i e n d l i n e s s . " A l l o f us t e n d t o g i v e h i g h l y e t h n o c e n t r i c i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n s t o e v e n t s , e s p e c i a l l y i f u n f a m i l i a r w i t h an o p p o s -i n g c u l t u r e . Thus t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f p e r c e p t u a l e r r o r o c c u r r i n g between n a t i o n s o r i n d i v i d u a l s o f d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s looms l a r g e . S u l e i m a n (19 67) g i v e s an example o f how c u l t u r e - b o u n d f o r m s o f r h e t o r i c l e a d s t o p e r c e p t u a l e r r o r . He s t u d i e d and compared- t h e s p e e c h e s o f N a s s e r and Eden o v e r t h e 1956 Suez c r i s i s . The f i n d i n g s were t h a t N a s s e r ' s v a g u e n e s s , r e p e t i t i o n , e x a g g e r a t i o n and a s s e r t i o n and Eden's u n d e r s t a t e m e n t were l a r g e l y r e s p o n -s i b l e f o r t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s w h i c h a r o s e between them. T h e s e same s p e e c h p a t t e r n s o f N a s s e r and o t h e r A r a b l e a d e r s have c o n t i n u e d t o r e s u l t i n m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s and t e n s i o n s i n n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h I s r a e l and o t h e r w e s t e r n n a t i o n s . W o l s t e t t e r and W o l s t e t t e r (1965, p. 20) i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s o f t h e Cuban M i s s i l e c r i s i s , p o i n t o u t t h a t c u l t u r a l b i a s was an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r . They s u g g e s t t h a t t h e c r i s i s i l l u s t r a t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f m i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h r o u g h p e r c e p t u a l e r r o r . B o t h t h e S o v i e t s and t h e A m e r i c a n s " ...made t h e e r r o r o f t o o e a s i l y a s s u m i n g an i d e n t i t y i n modes o f t h o u g h t s and v a l u e s . " A m i s p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e a d v e r s a r y ' s m o t i v e s c o u l d r e s u l t i n v e r y s e r i o u s c o n s e -q u e n c e s . 30. D a n i l l i a n (1967) made reference to the importance of c u l t u r e - d i f f e r e n t i a t e d negotiation techniques as a possible source of perceptual error. Anglo-TAmerican culture sees p o l i t i c a l compromise as a r a t i o n a l technique for reaching consensus between p a r t i e s . Other cultures, however, view compromise as connoting p o l i t i c a l s t u p i d i t y and weakness and thus to be avoided at a l l costs. An American negotiator would view a reluctance to reach a compromise on an issue as extremely intransigent and unreasonable behaviour. de Rivera (1968, p. 279) suggests: "Most persons assume that the other's p o s i t i o n must be based on the same ' r e a l i t y ' . They believe they understand the other's position, when i n f a c t they have a pseudo-understanding achieved by d i s t o r t i n g the other's motives.' This i l l u s i o n of understanding i s preserved by the lack of contact that usually exists between a l i e n worlds and the lack of motiva-tion — since e f f e c t i v e communication often requires changing one's own world." Conceptual misunderstandings Bias leading to perceptual error also occurs as a r e s u l t of f a u l t y techniques for concept generation. Tversky and Kahneman (19 74) suggest that individuals are prone to cognitive errors as a r e s u l t of over-reliance 31. on c e r t a i n i n t u i t i v e h e u r i s t i c s a s a means o f ma k i n g judgments u n d e r u n c e r t a i n t y . A l t h o u g h t h e s e h e u r i s t i c s sometimes p r o d u c e good e s t i m a t e s o f s u b j e c t i v e p r o b -a b i l i t i e s , most o f t e n l a r g e e r r o r s a r e c o n s i s t e n t l y made. One way i n w h i c h s y s t e m a t i c b i a s i s i n t r o d u c e d i s by a r e l i a n c e on t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s h e u r i s t i c . T h i s h e u r i s t i c s u g g e s t s t h a t i f an e v e n t X i s v e r y s i m i l a r t o e v e n t Y, t h e n i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l j u d g e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f X o r i g i n a t i n g f r o m Y t o be v e r y h i g h . I t h a s b e e n f o u n d t h a t sample s i z e and p r i o r p r o b a b i l i t i e s a r e l a r g e l y i g n o r e d when making t h e s e p r e d i c t i o n s e v e n t h o u g h t h e y do n o t i n f l u e n c e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s and s h o u l d be t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . S l o v i c , K u n r e u t h e r and W h i t e (1974, p. 192) g i v e a d r a m a t i c example o f how f a u l t y p r e d i c t i o n s c a n be made by i g n o r i n g sample s i z e . I n t h i s i n s t a n c e t h e sample was v e r y s m a l l : "... t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f two e a r t h q u a k e s i n London i n 1750, e x a c t l y one L u n a r month a p a r t (28 d a y s ) , w i t h t h e s e c o n d more s e v e r e t h a n t h e f i r s t , l e d t o p r e d i c t i o n s t h a t a t h i r d and more t e r r i b l e e a r t h q u a k e w o u l d o c c u r 2 8 d ays a f t e r t h e s e c o n d . A c o n t a g i o u s p a n i c s p r e a d t h r o u g h t h e c i t y , and w h i c h l e d t o i t s b e i n g a l m o s t c o m p l e t e l y e v a c u -a t e d . " The w e l l known 'gambler's f a l l a c y ' p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r example o f how b i a s i s i n t r o d u c e d by e x p e c t a t i o n s o f l o c a l 32. representativeness and misperceptions of randomness. Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1125) note: "After observing a long run of red on the roulette wheel, for example, most people erroneously believe that black i s now due, presumably because the occurrence of black w i l l r e s u l t i n a more represen-t a t i v e sequence than the occurrence of an additional red. Chance i s commonly viewed as a s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g process i n which a deviation i n one d i r e c t i o n induces a deviation i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n to restore the equilibrium." Individuals also tend to have great confidence i n predic-tions they make which are based on redundant input v a r i -ables and at the same time tend to ignore the high prob-a b i l i t y of regression toward the mean. They expect that extreme input values w i l l produce extreme output. Bias - i n the estimation of the pr o b a b i l i t y of event occurrence i s also introduced by the frequent use of the a v a i l a b i l i t y h e u r i s t i c . Individuals tend to assess pr o b a b i l i t y of an event based on the ease with which other instances of occurrence can be brought to mind. Much of the research on natural hazards has found that people tend to assign a low pr o b a b i l i t y to events i f they cannot e a s i l y r e c a l l an occurrence from th e i r past exper-ience. Kates (1962, p. 140) discussing perceptions of 33. p r o b a b i l i t y o f n a t u r a l h a z a r d o c c u r r e n c e , s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e f u t u r e i s a m i r r o r o f a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s p a s t . "A m a j o r l i m i t a t i o n t o human a b i l i t y t o u s e i m p r o v e d f l o o d h a z a r d i n f o r m a t i o n i s a b a s i c r e l i a n c e o n e x p e r i e n c e . Men o n f l o o d p l a i n s a p p e a r t o be v e r y much p r i s o n e r s o f t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e . . . r e c e n t l y e x p e r -i e n c e d f l o o d s a p p e a r t o s e t a n u p w a r d bound t o t h e s i z e o f l o s s w i t h w h i c h m a n a g e r s b e l i e v e t h e y o u g h t t o be c o n c e r n e d . " The b i a s s t e m m i n g f r o m a v a i l a b i l i t y f a c t o r s p r o v i d e s an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r c a l c u l a t e d u n p r e c e d e n t e d moves c a p i t a l i z -i n g on t h e s u r p r i s e v a l u e o f t h e move. F o r e x a m p l e t h e E g y p t i a n c r o s s i n g o f t h e Suez C a n a l i n 1972 w i t h o u t a p r e l u d e o f a l o n g s t r e t c h o f a r t i l l e r y a c t i o n , c o n s t i t u t e d s u c h a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d move. A m i l i t a r y a c t i o n by t h e U.S. a g a i n s t C a n a d a , o r e v e n a s e r i o u s d i p l o m a t i c move s u c h a s a m b a s s a d o r r e c a l l a r e c o n s i d e r e d a l m o s t an i m p o s s -i b i l i t y by C a n a d a ' s p o l i c y m a k e r s i r r e s p e c t i v e o f e i t h e r t e m p t a t i o n s o f f e r e d by C a n a d a ' s r e s o u r c e s o r t h e p r o v o -c a t i o n s s t e m m i n g f r o m h i g h l y n a t i o n a l i s t i c p o l i c i e s i n C a n a d a . A t h i r d h e u r i s t i c u s e d b y i n d i v i d u a l s t o i n t e g r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n i s a n c h o r i n g a n d a d j u s t m e n t . I n a s s e s s i n g p r o b a b i l i t i e s a n a t u r a l s t a r t i n g p o i n t i s s e l e c t e d a s a f i r s t a p p r o x i m a t i o n , o r a n c h o r , a n d t h e n t h i s f i g u r e i s 34. adjusted by obtaining additional information or p a r t i a l computations. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found that people tend to develop algorithms to calculate adjustments and that the r e s u l t i n g adjustments are usually i n s u f f i -c i ent. People think they have a much better estimate of the s i t u a t i o n than they r e a l l y do and place great con-fidence i n these estimates. Biases introduced by i n s u f f i -cient adjustments are p a r t i c u l a r l y c r i t i c a l for the interpretation of events with a conjunctive character. There i s a tendency to be overly optimistic i n the asses-sment of the p r o b a b i l i t y of success i n a new undertaking, for example opening a new business, or i n the case of the U.S., the Bay of Pigs invasion. Conversely, people underestimate the p r o b a b i l i t y of f a i l u r e . This bias of adjustment can be i l l u s t r a t e d by the previous example of CIA estimations of V i e t Cong strength. The selection of a wrong anchoring point and i n s u f f i c i e n t adjustment led to an estimate of enemy strength that was i n error by 50%*. This fundamental error had c r i t i c a l implications for the Americans a b i l i t y to achieve a v i c t o r y i n V i e t Nam. Personality t r a i t s The personality of the decision-maker can be an * The o f f i c i a l count derived from the 'order of b a t t l e ' was 270,000 while u n o f f i c i a l figures compiled by researchers showed 600,000 V i e t Cong. .35. important factor a f f e c t i n g the interpretation of event s t i m u l i . The so c a l l e d 'well balanced' or 'normal* personality i s of limited i n t e r e s t . However, ind i v i d u a l s who exhibit certain aberrant personality t r a i t s , such as psychoses, warrant study since they are prone to perceptual error. For instance, a national leader with a persecution complex would interpret the most innocent acts of a neighbouring nation as a threat to his country. Such individuals take the point of view that 'the world i s out to get him'. Some writers have suggested that many of history's leaders such as Napolean and H i t l e r were psychotic p e r s o n a l i t i e s , and much of th e i r behaviour can be explained by thi s factor. Most of us have aberrant personality t r a i t s i n one degree or another. Usually they are quite harmless. But when these t r a i t s are ag-gravated by stress as i n the case of national leaders, fau l t y interpretation r e s u l t s i n perceptions of threat and subsequent responses which lead to c r i s i s , where indeed no objective threat existed. While psychologists agree that the personality of the i n d i v i d u a l i s important, and have i d e n t i f i e d c e r t a i n t r a i t s that produce f a u l t y perceptions, only tentative hypotheses have been advanced about personality t r a i t s which characterize good decision-makers, with accurate perceptions. de Rivera (1968, p. 184) has noted that 36. c e r t a i n o f t h e s e 'good' t r a i t s a r e i d e n t i f i a b l e . I n p a r t i c u l a r he s u g g e s t s t h a t a P r e s i d e n t o f t h e U.S. s h o u l d h a v e : " . . . g o o d j u d g m e n t when p r e s e n t e d w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l s , a s e n s e o f t i m i n g , t h e a b i l i t y t o make d e c i s i o n s a n d b e a r t h e w e i g h t o f v a s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i t h o u t o v e r w o r r y i n g , g o o d j u d g m e n t o f c h a r a c t e r a n d a b i l i t i e s o f men, a s e n s e o f w h e r e power l i e s , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a b i l i t y , a l a r g e amount o f e n e r g y , a n d a c h a r i s m a t i c p e r s o n a l c h a r m . " B u t he n o t e s t h a t l i t t l e p r o g r e s s h a s b e e n made i n d e f i n -i n g t h e e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e s o f t h e s e t r a i t s o r i n m e a s u r i n g them. Kennan (1960) p r o v i d e s u s w i t h t h e e x a m p l e o f S t a l i n , as a l e a d e r who d i s p l a y e d e x t r e m e a b e r r a n t p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s . He n o t e s t h a t S t a l i n was m e n t a l l y u n b a l a n c e d a n d h a d a d e e p i n f e r i o r i t y c o m p l e x . M o s t o f S t a l i n ' s a c t i o n s w e r e a i m e d a t p r o t e c t i n g h i s own p o s i t i o n i n t h e S o v i e t h i e r a r c h y r a t h e r t h a n a d v a n c i n g t h e p o s i t i o n o f h i s c o u n -t r y . To t h i s e n d , t h e f r e q u e n t p u r g e s o f S t a l i n ' s e r a w e r e m e a s u r e s u n d e r t a k e n o n h i s own b e h a l f b u t i n t h e g u i s e o f p r o t e c t i n g R u s s i a f r o m h e r e n e m i e s . I n t h e 1936 p u r g e S t a l i n e l i m i n a t e d 1,966 members o f t h e 1 7 t h P a r t y C o n g r e s s , and a p p r o x i m a t e l y h a l f a m i l l i o n S o v i e t c i t i z e n s . Kennan ( 1 9 6 0 , p. 258) s u g g e s t s t h a t S t a l i n 37. became incapable of d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between dangers to himself and to Russia. The most innocent remarks would be interpreted as a personal threat. "Unlike Lenin, who could view objective r e a l i t y as something apart from himself, S t a l i n was able to see the world only through the prism of his own ambitions and his own fears." Organizational Network We have focused so far upon factors which a f f e c t i n d i v i d u a l s e l e c t i v i t y i n attending to and interpreting events i n terms of t h e i r relevance and seriousness to the organization. To determine however the 'timing 1 and 'image' through which the event presents i t s e l f to a central decision unit — the 'candidate' for a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n — we must explore the p o s i t i o n of the decision unit i n the organizational network, and the impact such a p o s i t i o n may have upon the time and manner information about the event reaches the unit. In h i e r a r c h i c a l organizations the l e v e l of the unit i n the hierarchy i s an important factor. A stimulus which must travel through a lengthy screening and f i l t e r i n g path i s l i k e l y to reach the decision unit with a time delay, and i n a form which represents the accumulation of impacts of information processing s e l e c t i v i t i e s i n the various intermediary units. Downs (1967) calculates 38. that with a six l e v e l hierarchy, there may be a 9 8% loss of informational content between the f i r s t and highest l e v e l i n the organization. Tullock (1965) points out that information t r a v e l l i n g upward i n an organization i s subject to 'hie r a r c h i c a l d i s t o r t i o n ' , both i n quantity and qua l i t y . The quantity of information being received by senior o f f i c i a l s i s reduced as a r e s u l t of high costs of communication — time, transmission costs, channel capacity, etc., and also because of the limited cognitive capacities of the ind i v i d u a l decision-makers receiving the communications. Secondly, the qua l i t y of information i s d i s t o r t e d as i t moves up the hierarchy as a r e s u l t of perceptual d i f f e r -ences of o f f i c i a l s at each l e v e l . A l l the i n d i v i d u a l types of perceptual biases such as culture, personality, cognitive dissonance, etc. account for t h i s d i s t o r t i o n of stimuli by each lower l e v e l decision-maker before being passed on. The necessity of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i n large organiza-tions w i l l also account for d i s t o r t i o n i n information screening. Individuals at lower leve l s i n the organiza-tion have a much narrower range of o f f i c i a l i n terests than senior decision-makers. They naturally abstract parts of the stimuli that are most relevent for t h e i r needs. This portion of the information stimuli i s passed 39. u p w a r d , t h e r e s t i s d i s c a r d e d . I n d i v i d u a l s a l s o h a v e d i f f e r e n t i a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t s a n d t r a n s m i t s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n o f a t y p e a n d i n a manner as s u i t s t h e i r p u r p o s e s . Downs (196 7 , p. 136) n o t e s : " . . . i n a ny l a r g e , m u l t i - l e v e l b u r e a u , a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n o f a l l t h e a c t i v i t y b e i n g c a r r i e d o u t i s c o m p l e t e l y u n r e l a t e d t o t h e b u r e a u ' s f o r m a l g o a l s , o r e v e n t o t h e g o a l s o f i t s t o p m o s t o f f i c i a l s . " A l l i s o n ( 1 9 7 1 , p. 120) comments o n t h e d i f f e r i n g i n t e r e s t s o f v a r i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e v e l s : " . . . t h o s e who d e c i d e w h i c h i n f o r m a t i o n t h e i r b o s s s h a l l s e e r a r e l y s e e t h e i r b o s s e s ' p r o b l e m . " As a r e s u l t o f t h i s d i s t o r t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n a l c o n t e n t , when s t i m u l i f i n a l l y r e a c h t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r a t t h e t o p o f t h e h i e r a r c h y , many c r i t i c a l p i e c e s may h a v e b e e n l o s t a n d w h a t r e m a i n s may n o t be o f much u s e . A c k o f f (19 67) p o i n t s o u t t h a t m o s t m a n a g e r s s u f f e r f r o m a n ' o v e r a b u n -d a n c e o f i r r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n ' . Many d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a r e a w a r e o f t h e s e i n f o r m a t i o n d i s t o r t i o n s t h u s i n an e f f o r t t o o f f s e t them, c o u n t e r -b i a s s t r a t e g i e s a r e a t t e m p t e d . A s u p e r i o r may make a d j u s t m e n t s t o a l l i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d f r o m s u b o r d i n a t e s t o t r y and c o u n t e r a c t t h e d i s t o r t i o n s . I f h o w e v e r , t h e c o r r e c t i o n i s n o t made i n t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n s , a f u r t h e r d i s t o r t i o n o f t h e s t i m u l u s t a k e s p l a c e . Downs (19 6 7 , p. 122) s u g g e s t s : 40. "The uncertainties involved force the counter-biasing o f f i c i a l s to make distorted decisions i n the very process of attempting to counteract d i s t o r t i o n . " While the disto r t i o n s accruing i n the process of f i l t e r -ing tend to bring about errors of the t h i r d type (wrong problem d e f i n i t i o n ) , the time delays involved i n the process of information transmission bring about what Raiff a (1968) termed errors of the fourth type — that i s defining and solving c o r r e c t l y the problem, but too lat e . To ensure coordination and e f f i c i e n t routine res-ponses, organizations develop standard operating procedures which permit some measure of decentralization i n decision making. The nature of organizational standard operating procedures, while ensuring p r e d i c t i b i l i t y of decision unit actions, hence permitting higher degrees of controls by the central decision unit, introduces another element of conservatism and r i g i d i t y into the organizational decision process. Standard operating procedures Standard operating procedures are developed by organizations to coordinate complex routines and tasks and large numbers of people. Standard operating proced-ures play a s i g n i f i c a n t role i n information f i l t e r i n g and 41. d i s t o r t i o n . T ed S o r e n s o n ( 1 9 6 6 , p. 303) n o t e s : " P r o c e d u r e s do a f f e c t d e c i s i o n s . They e s p e c i a l l y a f f e c t w h i c h i s s u e s r e a c h t h e t o p and w h i c h o p t i o n s a r e p r e s e n t e d , a n d t h i s may, i n t h e l a s t a n a l y s i s , m a t t e r more t h a n t h e f i n a l a c t o f d e c i s i o n i t s e l f . " M o s t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r i s c e n t e r e d a r o u n d t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e s e s t a n d a r d p r o c e d u r e s o r r o u t i n e s . A l l i s o n (1971) s u g g e s t s t h a t m o s t SOP's a r e h i g h l y r e s i s -t a n t t o c h a n g e s i n c e t h e y a r e u s u a l l y g r o u n d e d i n t h e norms o r b a s i c a t t i t u d e s o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d t h e o p e r a t i n g s t y l e o f i t s members. I s s u e s o r e v e n t s t h a t do n o t ' f i t ' t h e SOP's o f a g i v e n d e p a r t m e n t w i l l be d i s c a r d e d i n f a v o u r o f t h o s e t h a t do ' f i t ' , o r e v e n t s t i m u l i w i l l be i n t e r p r e t e d i n l i g h t o f s t a n d a r d p r o -c e d u r e s . I t i s t h e r e f o r e p o s s i b l e t h a t e v e n t s a r e e i t h e r i g n o r e d o r d i s t o r t e d by v a r i o u s c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e o r g a n -i z a t i o n b e f o r e b e i n g c o m m u n i c a t e d t o h i g h e r l e v e l s o f t h e h i e r a r c h y . B e c a u s e m o s t l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e s o c o m p l e x , i t t a k e s t i m e t o a s s e m b l e a n d d i s s e m i n a t e i n f o r m a t i o n . P r o c e d u r e s f o r d o i n g s o a r e f i x e d , t h e r e f o r e t h e o r g a n -i z a t i o n i s q u i t e o f t e n i n s e n s i t i v e t o c r i t i c a l t i m i n g f a c t o r s i n d a t a t r a n s m i s s i o n . A t h r e a t may r e s u l t i n a r e s p o n s e d e l a y a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y a c r i s i s d e v e l o p s m e r e l y b e c a u s e t h e SOP's o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n w e r e t o o 42. cumbersome t o b r i n g i t t o t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r ' s a t t e n t i o n i n t i m e . The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r o c e s s p a r a d i g m d e v e l o p e d b y A l l i s o n (1971) l e a d s h i m t o s u g g e s t t h a t SOP's make i t p o s s i b l e f o r v a r i o u s p a r t s o f a n o r g a n i z a t i o n t o p u r s u e d i v e r g e n t p a t t e r n s o f a c t i v i t y . T h e r e f o r e p a r t s o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n c a n h a v e e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s t i m u l i d e p e n d i n g on t h e i r i n t e r e s t s a n d t h e p r o c e d -u r e s d e v e l o p e d f o r p u r s u i n g t h a t i n t e r e s t . A l l compon-e n t s do n o t h a v e t h e same p r o c e d u r e s t o b r i n g c r i t i c a l p i e c e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e e n v i r o n m e n t t o t h e i r a t t e n t i o n . Thus i n f o r m a t i o n r e a c h i n g t h e d e c i s i o n p o i n t i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n c a n o n l y be a s g o o d a s a l l o w e d b y t h e v a r i o u s SOP's o f c o n t r i b u t i n g c o m p o n e n t s . A s a s e n i o r d e c i s i o n - m a k e r , e s p e c i a l l y i n l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , h a s o n l y l i m i t e d i n d e p e n d e n t s o u r c e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n a n d a d v i c e , t h e p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e v a r i o u s p a r t s o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n t r u l y become h i s p e r c e p t i o n s . SOP's g e n e r a t e d p e r c e p t i o n s o f f a l s e s e c u r i t y o n t h e p a r t o f E g y p t a nd i n p a r t a c c o u n t e d f o r t h e e l e m e n t o f s u r p r i s e a c h i e v e d b y t h e I s r a e l i s i n t h e 1967 w a r . E g y p t ' s l e a d e r s t e n d e d t o d i s c o u n t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u r p r i s e a t t a c k s b y I s r a e l due t o a s s u r a n c e s f r o m t h e m i l i t a r y t h a t a new S o v i e t d e s i g n e d a n d i n s t a l l e d r a d a r s y s t e m w o u l d p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e w a r n i n g . The S o v i e t l o n g 43. range system was e f f i c i e n t up to 500 miles but i n a narrow beam of 50 - 60 degrees orientated i n the d i r e c t i o n from which the enemy was expected to come. Because of Egypt's geography, the m i l i t a r y perceived the problem as a simple one. Surrounded on three sides by water and fr i e n d l y states, standard procedures dictated that Egypt's radar defences be orientated to the east, the d i r e c t i o n from which Israel was expected to attack. Instead, when the attack came, i t was made from the north and north-west afte r I s r a e l i planes f i r s t flew far out to sea. As a r e s u l t , the Egyptian long range radar did not detect the invasion. Thus Egypt's leaders, i n thi s instance, had a faul t y perception of security engendered by the perceptions of the m i l i t a r y which i n turn were based on flawed SOP's. I n t e r n a l - P o l i t i c s There are two c r i t i c a l dimensions which stem from in t e r n a l organizational p o l i t i c a l struggles, one effects d i s t o r t i o n of information transmitted while the other effects the e f f i c i e n c y of information d i f f u s i o n . The f i r s t dimension relates to the d i v e r s i t y i n goals and reward . structures i n the organization. The perceptions of decision-makers.are often i n f l u -enced by the process of bargaining between leve l s and individuals i n the organizational hierarchy. Members of 44. various le v e l s can be conceptualized as players i n a game whose perceptions are biased by a highly person-a l i z e d goal structure of organizational and personal i n t e r e s t s . The aphorism "where you stand depends on where you s i t " ( A l l i s o n , 1971, p. 176) r e f l e c t s the premise that the bargaining position of each player r e f l e c t s his own perceptions of p r i o r i t i e s and issues. The power and s k i l l of individuals or departments within an organization often determine which issues are brought to the attention of senior o f f i c i a l s and also which interpretation of events i s adopted. As A l l i s o n (1971, p. 144) notes, decisions are made "...not by a single, r a t i o n a l choice but by the p u l l i n g and hauling that i s p o l i t i c s . " Halberstam's (1969, p. 179) description of the American experience i n Vi e t Nam provides a fascinating example of perceptual d i s t o r t i o n s r e s u l t i n g from p o l i -t i c a l bargaining within the U.S. government. "The immediate r e s u l t of the Kennedy decision i n December [1961] to send a major advisory and support team to Viet Nam was the a c t i v a t i o n of a new player, a major, m i l i t a r y player, to run a major American command i n Saigon. At f i r s t , when Kennedy took o f f i c e , the pressure had come only from Diem; then because of his p o l i c y to reassure Diem and 45. make him t h e i n s t r u m e n t o f o u r p o l i c y , Kennedy had s e n t o v e r F r i t z N o l t i n g , who w o u l d soon seem t o many t o be more Diem's envoy t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a n v i c e v e r s a . Now, by a p p o i n t i n g L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l P a u l D. H a r k i n s t o a new command, Kennedy was s e n d i n g one more p o t e n t i a l p l a y e r a g a i n s t him, a f i g u r e who w o u l d r e p r e s e n t t h e p r i m a c y o f S a i g o n and t h e war, as o p p o s e d t o t h e p r i m a c y o f t h e Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h u s one more m a j o r b u r e a u -c r a t i c p l a y e r who m i g h t n o t r e s p o n d t o t h e same p r e s s u r e s t h a t Kennedy was r e s p o n d i n g t o , t h e r e b y f e e d i n g a s e p a r a t e and p o t e n t i a l l y h o s t i l e b u r e a u -c r a t i c o r g a n i s m . H a r k i n s began by c o r r u p t i n g t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s coming i n . Up u n t i l 1961 t h e y had b een r e a s o n a b l y a c c u r a t e , c l e a r , u n c l o u d e d by b u r e a u c r a t i c a m b i t i o n ; t h e y had r e f l e c t e d t h e a m b i v a l e n c e o f t h e A m e r i c a n commitment t o Diem, and t h e Diem f l a w s had b e en a p p a r e n t b o t h i n CIA and, t o a s l i g h t l y l e s s e r d e g r e e , i n S t a t e r e p o r t i n g . N o l t i n g w o u l d change S t a t e ' s r e p o r t i n g , and t o t h a t w o u l d now be added t h e m i l i t a r y r e p o r t i n g , f o r c e f u l , d e t a i l e d and h i g h l y e r r o n e o u s , r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e new commander's b e l i e f t h a t h i s o r d e r s were t o make s u r e t h i n g s l o o k e d w e l l on t h e s u r f a c e . I n t u r n t h e Kennedy A d m i n i s -t r a t i o n w o u l d w a s t e p r e c i o u s e n e r g i e s d e b a t i n g 46. w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e w a r was b e i n g won, w a s t i n g t i m e t r y i n g t o d e t e r m i n e t h e f a c t u a l b a s i s on w h i c h t h e d e c i s i o n s w e r e b e i n g made, b e c a u s e i n e f f e c t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d c r e a t e d a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e i t l i e d t o i t s e l f . " The s e c o n d c r i t i c a l d i m e n s i o n o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s v i e w s i n f o r m a t i o n a s one o f t h e r e s o u r c e s a u n i t c a n m a n i p u l a t e t o a c h i e v e a power b a s e i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . B a r t h and V e r t i n s k y ( 1 9 7 3 , p. 127) o b s e r v e d : "The one u n i v e r s a l o b s e r v a t i o n w h i c h e m e r g e d f r o m t h e a n a l y s i s o f i n f o r m a t i o n f l o w s was t h a t i n t e r -u n i t d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n seemed a p p r e c i a b l y more u n e g a l i t a r i a n t h a n t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g n e t w o r k . The e x e c u t i v e s i n t e r v i e w e d a t t r i b u t e d t h i s phenome-non t o t h e s t a t u s r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t h a d b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d . T h e s e a p p e a r e d t o be b a s e d p r i m a r i l y on t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e a s c r i b e d t o t h e f o c a l p e r s o n o f a g i v e n d e c i s i o n s t a t i o n . " They c o n c l u d e t h a t m o n o p o l i z a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n by c e r t a i n d e c i s i o n u n i t s c a n be v i e w e d a s moves t o i n c r e a s e t h e b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r s o f t h e s e u n i t s . E t z i o n i (1968) t h e o r i z i n g a b o u t t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f d y n a m i c c o n t r o l s .. o b s e r v e d t h e t e n d e n c i e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o d i s t r i b u t e i n f o r m a t i o n l e s s e q u a l l y t h a n o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s . W h i l e s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s p r e s c r i b e w h a t i n f o r m a t i o n i s made a v a i l a b l e t o whom, d e l a y s i n 47. d i f f u s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n a r e h a r d t o c o n t r o l , p e r m i t t i n g u n i t s t o m a n i p u l a t e i n f o r m a t i o n r e l e a s e t i m e s f o r t h e i r a d v a n t a g e . The c o m b i n a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n d i s t o r t i o n t h r o u g h s e l e c t i v i t y and f i l t e r i n g c o u p l e d w i t h m a n i p u l a -t i o n o f t i m i n g e x p l a i n s t o a l a r g e e x t e n t t h e r e l a t i o n -s h i p between a ' t h r e a t ' a p p e a r i n g i n t h e h o r i z o n s o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and t h e s t i m u l u s e x p e r i e n c e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n u n i t . 2.4 The t r i g g e r o f c r i s i s : s t r e s s - s t i m u l i r e l a t i o n s h i p s We have d e f i n e d a ' c r i s i s ' a s a d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n where c r i t i c a l g o a l s a r e t h r e a t e n e d and p a r t i c u l a r s t r e s s c o n d i t i o n s a r e e x p e r i e n c e d by t h e d e c i s i o n makers ( i n p a r t i c u l a r a f e l t p r e s s u r e t o r e s p o n d i n a l i m i t e d t i m e ) . The d e g r e e o f s t r e s s e x p e r i e n c e d by d e c i s i o n makers i s a f u n c t i o n o f s e v e r a l v a r i a b l e s t h e most p r o m i n e n t o f w h i c h a r e t h e f o l l o w i n g : (1) t y p e o f g o a l s t h r e a t e n e d (2) immediacy o f t h r e a t (3) s u r p r i s e and u n c e r t a i n t y , and (4) p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s r e l e v a n t t o s t r e s s c o p i n g a b i l i t i e s . 2.4.1 Type o f g o a l t h r e a t e n e d I n d i v i d u a l s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s have a h i e r a r c h y o f g o a l s r a n g i n g f r o m f a i r l y low p r i o r i t y t o t h o s e o f g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e . Hermann and B r a d y (19 72) have s u g g e s t e d 48. that the national goals most important to a nation's leaders, concern the physical s u r v i v a l of the nation and survival of certain core values which define the society. These they have c a l l e d s u r v i v a l goals. The degree of f e l t stress i s p o s i t i v e l y correlated with the l e v e l of goals threatened. The more critical the goal, the greater the f e l t stress. Wagner (1974) has noted that there are certain threats which are A PRIORI defined by a nation as a trigger for c r i s i s i n international r e l a t i o n s . These threats are usually to the highest l e v e l goals and a f f e c t national security. An example i s afforded by the 19 67 Middle East c r i s i s and the event which triggered i t . Prior to May 22, 19 67, Israel had regarded mounting threats from the Arabs as primarily b l u f f i n the continu-ous skirmishing which had existed since 194 8. However on May 22, Egypt closed the S t r a i t s of Tiran to a l l I s r a e l i shipping. The S t r a i t s were Israel's connection with Asia and East A f r i c a and closure meant that trade with the east was cut off as well as v i t a l o i l supplies. The Gulf of Aqaba was Israel's l i f e l i n e and when t h i s l i f e l i n e was threatened,' the nation's very existence was threatened. Closure of the S t r a i t s of Tiran with the resultant threat to survival goals, was to I s r a e l , CAUSUS BELLI a trigger of c r i s i s . 49. 2.4.2. Immediacy of threat The l e v e l of stress i s also a function of how soon the impact of threat w i l l be f e l t . Some threats may have p o t e n t i a l l y serious impact on an organization. However, i f this impact i s far i n the future, the l e v e l of f e l t stress w i l l be low. The combined factors of threat to high p r i o r i t y goals and immediacy of impact have a synergistic a f f e c t on stress l e v e l . Combined, the l e v e l of stress i s greater than that produced by the sum of the two factors singly. The e f f e c t of the immediacy of impact of threat on f e l t stress can be i l l u s t r a t e d by two current s i t u a t i o n s . There has been much written concerning growing world populations and the high p r o b a b i l i t y of food shortages with accompanying world-wide famines i n the future. While famine surely poses a threat to high p r i o r i t y goals, i n this case, s u r v i v a l goals, the f a c t that the threat i s not immediate, but 20 or 30 years away does not induce a state of stress i n most North American leaders. The impact i s simply too far i n the future. The energy c r i s i s on the other hand, brought about by the embargo triggered a c r i s i s because the immediacy of the threat has created stress of a high l e v e l i n most nations. 2.4.3 Uncertainty and surprise F a m i l i a r i t y with a type of threat, or surprise 50. associated with i t s occurrence have considerable influence upon the degree of stress f e l t . If a threat i s of a type that i s unfamiliar to the organization and i t has been recognized as a threat, the l e v e l of stress w i l l be higher than that generated by more 'familiar' threats. Lack of experience induces higher stress since the organ-i z a t i o n has no repertoire of responses to help i t cope with the threat and the e f f e c t s of the p o t e n t i a l impact are uncertain. Fink, Beak and Taddeo (1971) have suggested that the i n t e n s i t y of c r i s i s depends upon the degree of change required i n the organizational system i n order to adapt successfully. The more unfamiliar the threat, the greater w i l l be the requirement for adaptation and change to cope with the threat and thus, the greater the l e v e l of stress generated. While dealing with uncertainty (unfamiliar situations) induces stress, surprise occurrence of f a m i l i a r situations may induce stress but such stress has a shorter l i f e span than the stress produced by uncertainty. In the f i r s t s i t u a t i o n , there i s need to develop a model of the s i t u a -tion with appropriate repertoire of responses, such con-cept formation process t y p i c a l l y i s slow, as i t implies a sequence of quick f o c i changes, i . e . , discrimination among alternative models of the s i t u a t i o n coupled with estimation of t h e i r parameters. In the second s i t u a t i o n , 51. the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a model for the s i t u a t i o n permits quick convergence i n r e c o n c i l i n g new data (the surprise) with ex i s t i n g concepts i n the organization. 2.4.4 Personality t r a i t s Personality of the i n d i v i d u a l decision-maker i s the f i n a l factor which contributes to stress. Previously we have discussed the e f f e c t of the personality bias and i t s contribution to perceptual error. Certain person-a l i t i e s are stress-prone and t h i s bias becomes more pronounced under conditions of threat. As stress develops in the i n d i v i d u a l , psychotic and neurotic tendencies which may have been latent, are aggravated. They i n turn elevate the l e v e l of perceived stress i n a self-perpetuat-ing cycle. de Rivera (1968) notes that as stress increases, individuals d i s t o r t r e a l i t y as a means of keeping emotional balance. Hermann and Brady (19 72) have suggested that national policy makers tend to i n t e r n a l i z e national goals and to treat them as personal objectives toward which they are motivated. Therefore a national threat becomes a personal threat, which further compounds the f e l t stress in the i n d i v i d u a l . 2.4.5 The impact of stress For purposes of analysis i t i s possible to discern three states of stress impact that are associated with the onset of a c r i s i s . These are i d e a l states only but they 52. do allow us to make some observations as to i n d i v i d u a l behaviour at certa i n c r i s i s l e v e l s . At the upper end of the continuum we can i d e n t i f y a l e v e l of stress which e l i c i t s a state of c r i s i s so extreme that i t can be c a l l e d the 'no hope' syndrome. At this l e v e l of stress the i n d i v i d u a l displays a passive t r a n q u i l i t y since he has already accepted the i n e v i t a b i l -i t y of his doom. Mintz (19 51) f i r s t advanced the hypothe-s i s that i n instances where perceived danger i s extremely high, i f there i s seen to be l i t t l e chance of avoiding i t , there w i l l be l i t t l e panic but a calm acceptance of one's fate. Williams (19 57) found that calm behaviour resulted from c r i s i s situations where the i n d i v i d u a l could do nothing about the s i t u a t i o n but had some know- • lege about the danger. Numerous examples of thi s type of calm acceptance of the inevi t a b l e are avai l a b l e . In wartime esp e c i a l l y we often hear of heroic behaviour where men have held out for days against overwhelming odds. Religious martyrs have also manifested the same calm behaviour under extreme stress. The second l e v e l of stress impact that can be i d e n t i f i e d i s manifested by panic responses. At thi s stage the i n d i v i d u a l has not given up a l l hope. There i s the b e l i e f that there are s t i l l some options open to overcome the threat. Some of these options are i n the nature of the 'long shot' and what the options are, may not be readi l y i d e n t i f i a b l e . Individual behaviour i s e r r a t i c as a r e s u l t of being under great stress but there i s search for alternative actions. Much of the behaviour exhibited by individuals i n natural disasters i s of t h i s type. The t h i r d l e v e l of stress we can i d e n t i f y i s that which we c a l l management. I t i s th i s category which i s of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t . Stress i s high but not at a l e v e l that i s completely d e b i l i t a t i n g to the i n d i v i d u a l . There i s conscious search for new behavioural patterns to cope with the threat. In th i s attempt to f i n d new patterns, or to manage c r i s i s , the organization develops certain pathologies. H o l s t i (1971) has noted that i n high stress situations, there i s a narrowing of cognitive pro-cesses. Behaviour becomes less adaptive and individuals lose the broad perspective of situations, developing an. i n a b i l i t y to see the esse n t i a l aspects of a s i t u a t i o n . The vast majority of organizational c r i s e s f a l l into t h i s category of stress. However i n a complex organization one must recognize that the onset of c r i s i s i s character-ized by an organizational mosaic of stress, where decision units experience and cope d i f f e r e n t l y with stress. While epidemics of panic responses or submission to fate 54. euphoria are a p o s s i b i l i t y , i t i s l i k e l y that those units attuned to c r i s i s management w i l l replace or contain those decision units which manifest pathological responses to the threat. In discussing the normative implication of t h i s paper we s h a l l enumerate strategies employed by decision units to contain c r i s i s decision pathologies. 3. C r i s i s Management We take two points of view of c r i s i s management, the f i r s t perspective provides a macro analysis of the arena of c r i s e s among nations, focusing upon the reper-t o i r e of actions and counter actions available to adver-saries, the rules and dynamics of the " c r i s i s game". The second perspective centers upon micro-analysis of the nature and impact of the i n t e r n a l decision making process during c r i s i s upon the p a r t i c u l a r s t y l e of game played by the decision unit and i t s competence at i t . 3.1 The macro setting of international c r i s i s While our d e f i n i t i o n of c r i s i s was inward looking, i . e . , i t was defined i n terms of a s i t u a t i o n that a decision unit experiences, we now broaden the d e f i n i t i o n to include situations which are l i k e l y to produce c r i s i s decision making for one or several units. This broader d e f i n i t i o n i s the one which often, for empirical reasons i s used i n the international r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e . A 55. c r i s i s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s m u s t h a v e a p r e c i s e f o c u s o f c o n f l i c t . The t e r m i n o l o g y ' c r i s i s ' h a s no m e a n i n g i f i t i s a p p l i e d t o a b r o a d c o n f l i c t s u c h a s t h e s e c o n d W o r l d War o r t h e V i e t Nam War. R a t h e r c r i s i s r e f e r s t o an e v e n t w h i c h i s a d e c i s i v e p o i n t t h a t a l t e r s t h e r e l a -t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n n a t i o n s . B u c h a n ( 1 9 6 6 , p. 21) s u g g e s t s t h a t c r i s i s i m p l i e s a d e l i b e r a t e c h a l l e n g e a nd a d e l i b e r -a t e d r e s p o n s e b y two a d v e r s a r i e s o v e r a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e w i t h e a c h h o p i n g f o r a n outcome t h a t w i l l c h a n g e h i s t o r y i n t h e i r f a v o u r : " . . . a c r i s i s i s a p e r i o d i n a c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n two o r more s t a t e s when one s i d e h a s c h a l l e n g e d t h e o t h e r on a d e f i n e d o r d e f i n a b l e i s s u e , a n d a d e c i s i o n m u s t be r e a c h e d on t h e r e a c t i o n t o t h e c h a l l e n g e . The c r i s i s p e r i o d c o v e r s t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e c h a l l e n g e , t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e i s s u e , t h e d e c i s i o n on t h e a p p r o p r i a t e r e a c t i o n t o t h e c h a l l e n g e , t h e i m p a c t o f s u c h a r e a c t i o n u p o n t h e a d v e r s a r y , a n d t h e c l a r i -f i c a t i o n o f h i s r e s p o n s e . . . a c r i s i s i s n o t some a c c i d e n t a l o r b r i e f f l a r e - u p i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f two h o s t i l e s y s t e m s — a row a t C h e c k p o i n t C h a r l i e , a s t o r m y e x c h a n g e i n t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , an a i r -c r a f t b l u n d e r i n g i n t o t h e a d v e r s a r y ' s e a r l y w a r n i n g s y s t e m , o r a s l a n g i n g m a t c h b e t w e e n P e k i n g r a d i o a n d t h e V o i c e o f A m e r i c a . " 56. C r i s i s refers to the decision point — the time period when responses to threat are formulated. This decision point or c r i s i s , may be a few hours, as i n the length of time required for the U.S. to declare war against Japan i n 1941, or i t may be weeks. The Cuban M i s s i l e c r i s i s i s generally considered to have lasted 13 days, from Oct. 16-28, 1962. The period of c r i s i s facing Israel p r i o r to the 1967 Six Day War lasted from May 14, when Egypt placed i t s forces on f u l l a l e r t and started mobilizing i n Sin a i , to June 2, when the I s r a e l i government made the decision to launch i t s pre-emptive attack. The actual attack did not take place u n t i l June 5, 19 67. Actions, counteractions repertoire i n international c r i s e s To understand the dynamics of a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n , we must f i r s t i d e n t i f y broad classes of actions which constitute the repertoire of actions and responses i n international r e l a t i o n s . We base the analysis upon the World Event/Interaction Survey Category System developed by McClelland. The class of actions which i n i t i a l l y involves small or i n d i r e c t use of force are i d e n t i f i e d as "threats". A nation may threaten another with or without mention of s p e c i f i c sanctions. Such sanctions may be either m i l i t a r y , such as use of force, or they may be economic. An example of a threat inducing c r i s i s i s provided by the Lebanese 57. c i v i l war. Israel threatened Syria that movement of Syrian troops into Lebanon would require Israel to take certain defensive actions. What these actions would be, were not spelled out s p e c i f i c a l l y . However they were interpreted by Syria and other Arab groups as meaning Israel would use force against them. A similar threat was made by the U.S.A. to Russia over p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Angola c i v i l war. These threats resulted i n the generation of c r i s i s for the parties involved, a l b e i t at a r e l a t i v e l y low l e v e l . A second type of c r i s i s i s that brought on by a Display of Force. This i s usually i n the nature of a mobilization of the armed forces of one country or a display of firepower or technology. The f i r s t c r i s i s i n the I s r a e l i government p r i o r to the 19 67 war, came as a re s u l t of a mobilization of Egyptian troops. This was interpreted by Israel as Egyptian preparation for an attack i n the S i n a i . President Nixon's action of plac-ing American forces on a l e r t status during the period of the f i r s t large price increases i n o i l by OPEC, resulted i n a c r i s i s for many a l l i e d nations, although American action was non-specific. The Cuban M i s s i l e c r i s i s i s perhaps the best known example of a c r i s i s engendered by a display of firepower. An int e r e s t i n g non-military example, i s the c r i s i s that resulted i n the U.S. as a 58. r e s u l t of the f i r s t Sputnick put into o r b i t by the U.S.S.R. i n 1957. A more serious c r i s i s may occur as a r e s u l t of an Al t e r a t i o n of the O f f i c i a l Relationship between nations. Various types of events can take place i n this category. F i r s t economic sanctions may be applied. For instance the U.S. may cut off foreign aid to another country as a means of indicating a threat. There i s also a range of diplomatic actions that can be taken, from c a l l i n g up an ambassador for consultations to expelling an ambassador and breaking off diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . Foreign nationals may also be expelled from a country. Various instances of c r i s e s r e s u l t i n g from an a l t e r a t i o n of the o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p come to mind. For instance President Sadat's action of expelling Soviet M i l i t a r y advisors from Egypt undoubtedly resulted i n a c r i s i s i n the Soviet Union as the action threatened to change the balance of power i n the Middle East. Also the r e c a l l of diplomatic personnel between China and the Soviet Union have at times escalated that long simmering c o n f l i c t into new c r i s i s points. A s t i l l higher level.of c r i s i s may be caused by actions which R e s t r i c t Access to strategic areas. In this category of actions are included such things as closure of borders, r e s t r i c t i o n of passage, blockades, etc. A much higher l e v e l of c o n f l i c t exists and force 59. i s employed but not always against the possessions of the second nations d i r e c t l y . Rather, the interests of the second nation may be affected. Examples of c r i s e s i n this category would be the second l e v e l of the Cuban M i s s i l e c r i s i s when the U.S. imposed a blockade against Soviet ships carrying materiel; closure of the S t r a i t s of Tiran by Egypt i n 1967; construction of the B e r l i n Wall by the Soviet Union; and closure of China's borders and expulsion of foreigners. A l l of these actions gen-erated a serious c r i s i s i n the affected nations. The highest l e v e l of c r i s i s i s that which i s brought about by the use of Overt Force by one nation against another or i t s a l l i e s . Actions i n thi s category such as seizure of possessions, destructive acts, invasions, etc. are usually tantamount to declarations of war. Obvious examples of actions which resulted i n extreme l e v e l s of c r i s i s are H i t l e r ' s invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbour, the North Korean invasion of S. Korea, and the Egyptian attack against I s r a e l i n 1973. The d e f i n i t i o n of c r i s i s should be kept in mind when considering t h i s p a r t i c u l a r class of actions. C r i s i s as we defined i t , does not include the continuing c o n f l i c t that may r e s u l t from the i n i t i a l quick series of actions and responses, once that c o n f l i c t assumes a re p e t i t i v e pattern which triggers standard operating 60. procedures of response. Analysis of the repertoire of actions tends to suggest a hierarchy of c r i s i s situations intimately connected to the l e v e l of force i n use. This assertion does not hold u n i v e r s a l l y i n a l l theaters of international interaction but depends upon the d e f i n i t i o n of goal structures of potential p a r t i c i p a n t s . For instance, Averch and Lavin (1967, p. 17) suggest that: "The prestige and v i t a l i n terests of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are so e x p l i c i t i n the European theater that c r i s e s can more re a d i l y elevate there than i n other c r i s i s areas where the i n t e r e s t s of nations are more ambiguous and provide more room for non-escalating c r i s i s maneuvres." H o l s t i , Brady and North (1967) point out i n some s i t u a -tions the actions of one nation i n p r e c i p i t a t i n g the -c r i s i s are so unambiguous that the response i s easy to predict. For example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour would have been very u n l i k e l y to bring any other response than a U.S. declaration of war. The response of a nation to threatening actions i s primarily a function of which goals are threatened. As we pointed out previously, threats to certain national goals w i l l be regarded by some nations as CAUSUS BELLI for war, even though the threat i n i t i a l l y may have been at a f a i r l y low l e v e l . As Hermann and Brady (1972, p. 296) have proposed: 61. "In response to c r i s i s , p o l i cy makers w i l l take action designed to eliminate or minimize the danger presented by the c r i s i s to major national goals." The Actors i n C r i s i s There i s a tendency to think that the protagonists in a c r i s i s are always h o s t i l e adversaries such as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. or Isr a e l and the Arab nations. The opposing p o l i c i e s and goals of the major nations of the West and Communist Bloc i n p a r t i c u l a r , account for a large propor-tion of the world's c r i s e s . However, cr i s e s can also occur between a l l i e s or be pre c i p i t a t e d by smaller t h i r d party nations. B e l l (1971) has developed a useful typology of international c r i s e s . Of major importance to the entire world, are those c r i s e s she c a l l s Adversary Crises of Central Balance. These c r i s e s involve head-on clashes between the major nuclear powers — China, U.S. and U.S.S.R. They usually ar i s e as a r e s u l t of attempts to enlarge a sphere of influence-or change the balance of power. Examples i n thi s category are cr i s e s which r e s u l t -ed from construction of the B e r l i n Wall and deployment of Soviet missiles i n Cuba. A second category of events, are those c a l l e d Adversary Crises of Local Balance. Con-f l i c t i n thi s instance i s not between the super powers but l o c a l adversaries. The suggestion i s made that the effe c t s of the c o n f l i c t can be l o c a l i z e d . Examples are 62. t h e 1956, 1967, and 1973 c r i s e s b e t w e e n t h e A r a b s and I s r a e l i s a nd t h e 1965 K a s h m i r c r i s i s b e t w e e n I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n . One m u s t be w a r y o f t h i s c a t e g o r i z a t i o n s i n c e t h e r e i s an i n c r e a s i n g t e n d e n c y f o r t h e m a j o r p o w e r s t o become i n v o l v e d i n t h e s e l o c a l c o n f l i c t s a s s u p p l i e r s o f arms and ' a d v i s o r s ' . B e l l p r o p o s e s t h a t two c a t e g o r i e s o f c r i s e s c a n o c c u r b e t w e e n a l l i e s . The f i r s t i s a n I n t r a m u r a l c r i s i s b e t w e e n t h e power s p h e r e s o r a l l i a n c e s o f t h e m a j o r p o w e r s . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e c r i s i s and r e s u l t i n g war i n C y p r u s i n 1974 was b e t w e e n two NATO a l l i e s , G r e e c e and T u r k e y . The S k y b o l t a f f a i r i n 19 62 was a c r i s i s w h i c h d e v e l o p e d b e t w e e n two v e r y c l o s e a l l i e s , t h e U.S. a n d B r i t i a n . I n t h e C o m m u n i s t B l o c , t h e c r i s e s b e t w e e n C z e c h o s l o v a k i a a n d t h e U.S.S.R. an d H u n g a r y and t h e U.S.S.R. a r e e x a m p l e s . The f o u r t h s u g g e s t e d c a t a g o r i z a t i o n o f c r i s e s i s I n t r a m u r a l C r i s e s o f R e g i o n a l A l l i a n c e s . C r i s e s i n t h i s c a t e g o r y do n o t u s u a l l y d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e t h e d o m i n a n t p o w e r s o r t h e i r a l l i e s . E x a m p l e s o f t h i s t y p e a r e B i a f r a , w h i c h was a c r i s i s b e t w e e n members o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r A f r i c a n U n i t y , and o t h e r c i v i l s t r u g g l e s i n T h i r d W o r l d n a t i o n s . 4. C r i s i s management s t y l e s 4.1 I n c r e m e n t a l and S a t i s f i c i n g S t r a t e g i e s M c C l e l l a n d ( 1 9 6 1 , p. 194) s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e c r i s i s 63. behaviour of nations i s conditioned by the type of s o c i a l organization that has evolved i n the state. In p a r t i c u l a r he notes that: "Highly modernizing s o c i e t i e s can be characterized as following a bureaucratized l i n e of minimum action." Many national decisions are the product of bargaining between large bureaucratic organizations ( A l l i s o n , 1971) rather than a r a t i o n a l means-end c a l c u l a t i o n to maximize goals. In addition, during c r i s e s , nations have a low propensity for r i s k . Snyder (1972, p. 243) suggests that r i s k reduction seems to take p r i o r i t y over coercive r i s k manipulation. Most nations i n periods of c r i s e s w i l l not f i n d strategies of comprehensive r a t i o n a l i t y feas-i b l e . Instead, incremental or s a t i s f i c i n g strategies may be adopted that require only a minimum action. Lindblom (1965, p. 14 8) suggests that people develop strategies to cope with problems, not to solve them and as a r e s u l t they proceed to search for alternatives that require the l e a s t movement away from the status quo or the smallest increment of change. This desire to main-t a i n status quo was also noted by Fink, Beak and Taddeo (1971, p. 17). They found that: " I n i t i a l phases of reaction to c r i s i s are character-ized by predominance of maintenance forces and a 64. s t r o n g r e s i s t a n c e t o c h a n g e . " The a d o p t i o n o f i n c r e m e n t a l s t r a t e g i e s p r e s e r v e s t h i s l i n e o f minimum a c t i o n a n d a l s o a l l e v i a t e s some o f t h e s t r a i n s on t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h a t a r i s e i n c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s . L i n d b l o m ( 1 9 6 5 , p. 144) n o t e s : " I n c r e m e n t a l p r o b l e m s o l v i n g e n o r m o u s l y r e d u c e s t h e r a n g e o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n s t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n maker m u s t u n d e r t a k e , a n d e n o r m o u s l y r e d u c e s t h e s t r a i n s o n h i s c o g n i t i v e c a p a c i t y t h a t a t t e n d t h e a t t e m p t t o c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y e v a l u a t e s o c i a l s t a t e s . Thus i t a d a p t s t o h i s l i m i t e d i n t e l l e c t , r e d u c e s h i s demands f o r i n f o r m a t i o n , and makes c o n c e s s i o n s t o t h e c o s t l i n e o f a n a l y s i s . M o r e o v e r , i n c r e m e n t a l a n a l y s i s t u r n s h i s a t t e n t i o n t o m a t e r i a l s w h i c h a r e m o s t f a m i l i a r t o h i m , l e a s t s p e c u l a t i v e , a n d r e l a t i v e l y c o n c r e t e . " A number o f e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s c o n f i r m t h a t i n c r i s e s , n a t i o n s q u i t e o f t e n a d o p t i n c r e m e n t a l s t r a t e g i e s o f l o w ' r i s k a n d minimum c h a n g e r a t h e r t h a n m a x i m i z i n g s t r a t e g i e s w h i c h c o u l d p r o d u c e a n e s c a l a t i o n o f t h e c r i s i s . I n a s t u d y o f S o v i e t / A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s , S c h w a r t z (19 67, p.484) s u g g e s t s t h a t : " A t t h e p e a k o f c r i s e s , a f t e r f e l t - t h r e a t h a s g e n -e r a l l y r i s e n , b o t h t h e U.S. and U.S.S.R. s o m e t i m e s p r e f e r a l t e r n a t i v e s w i t h l o w e r g a i n s b u t a l s o 65. l o w e r c o s t s a n d r i s k s , t o p o l i c i e s p r o m i s i n g g r e a t e r b e n e f i t s a t h i g h e r c o s t and r i s k l e v e l s . " K o r e a a n d L e b a n o n a r e s u g g e s t e d a s e x a m p l e s o f t h i s b e h a v i o u r . I n b o t h c r i s e s , t h e S o v i e t s a p p e a r e d t o s h i f t f r o m m o d e r a t e - t o - h i g h u t i l i t y a n d m o d e r a t e - t o - l o w c o s t - r i s k b e h a v i o u r , t o a c t i o n s w h i c h seemed t o o f f e r f e w e r a d v a n t a g e s b u t a l s o f e w e r r i s k s and c o s t s . R o b i n -s o n , Hermann a n d Hermann (1969) a l s o f o u n d e v i d e n c e t h a t s u g g e s t s d e c i s i o n m a k e r s a d o p t i n c r e m e n t a l s t r a t e g i e s i n c r i s e s . They n o t e t h a t i n c r i s i s a s o p p o s e d t o n o n -c r i s i s , l e s s s e a r c h f o r a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n i s made and f e w e r a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e i d e n t i f i e d b y n a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n m a k e r s . I n a d d i t i o n , s e a r c h f o r i n f o r m a t i o n i s l i m i t e d by p r e s s u r e s on t h e d e c i s i o n maker n o t l i m i t e d b e c a u s e t h e s i t u a t i o n i s w e l l d e f i n e d . S a t i s f i c i n g s t r a t e g i e s a r e v e r y s i m i l a r t o i n c r e -m e n t a l s t r a t e g i e s , i n f a c t t h e y may be c o n s i d e r e d a s u b s e t . S a t i s f i c i n g d e c i s i o n m a k e r s s e e k o b j e c t i v e s and g o a l s t h a t a r e f e a s i b l e a n d d e s i r a b l e ; t h a t a r e g o o d e n o u g h b u t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t h e b e s t . L i k e i n c r e m e n t a l d e c i s i o n m a k e r s , s a t i s f i c e r s a l s o s e e k t o m i n i m i z e t h e number and m a g n i t u d e o f c h a n g e s f r o m s t a t u s quo. A c k o f f ( 1 9 7 1 , p. 4) n o t e s t h a t s a t i s f i c i n g s t r a t e g i e s r e s u l t i n : " . . . c o n s e r v a t i v e p l a n s t h a t c o m f o r t a b l y c o n t i n u e 66. m o s t c u r r e n t p o l i c i e s , c o r r e c t i n g o n l y o b v i o u s d e f i c i e n c i e s . S u c h p l a n n i n g t h e r e f o r e a p p e a l s t o o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t a r e more c o n c e r n e d w i t h s u r -v i v a l t h a n w i t h d e v e l o p m e n t a nd g r o w t h . " The m a j o r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i n c r e m e n t a l and s a t i s f i c -i n g s t r a t e g i e s i s i n t h e number o f a l t e r n a t i v e s s o u g h t . I n c r e m e n t a l i s m assumes s e a r c h , e v a l u a t i o n a n d c h o i c e o f a c t i o n f r o m a l i m i t e d number o f a l t e r n a t i v e s e a c h r e q u i r -i n g o n l y m a r g i n a l c h a n g e f r o m s t a t u s quo. A l l p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e n o t c o n s i d e r e d , o n l y a s e l e c t e d number o f f e a s i b l e o n e s . S a t i s f i c i n g r e q u i r e s s e a r c h f o r and c h o i c e o f o n l y one a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t s a t i s f i e s t h e r e q u i r e -m e nts o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . A s a t i s f i c e r a d o p t s t h e f i r s t s a t i s f a c t o r y a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t comes a l o n g . O t h e r s may n o t e v e n be c o n s i d e r e d . I n t h i s s e n s e , s a t i s f i c i n g s t r a t e g i e s r e s u l t i n an e v e n more n a r r o w r a n g e o f o p t i o n s b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d t h a n i n c r e m e n t a l s t r a t e g i e s . S a t i s f i c i n g s t r a t e g i e s may be t h e management t e c h -n i q u e t h a t i s a d o p t e d b y n a t i o n s d u r i n g a c o n t i n u i n g c r i s i s , a f t e r t h e i n i t i a l a c t i o n - r e s p o n s e t h r e a t s . M c C l e l l a n d ( 1 9 6 2 , p. 212) n o t e s : "The s t a t e m e n t o f g o a l s o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y c a n n o t be d e p e n d e d u p on f o r much more t h a n a n i n i t i a l p o s t u r e a t t h e o n s e t o f a c r i s i s . D e c i s i o n - m a k e r s c a n be e x p e c t e d t o d e v i s e , r a p i d l y a n d r e a l i s t i c a l l y , t h e n e e d e d ' s a t i s f i c i n g ' c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n t o meet s h i f t s i n t h e c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n . " S a t i s f i c i n g i s t h e l e a s t a d a p t i v e .of management s t r a t e g i e s R e a l i s t i c a l l y , t h i s i s p e r h a p s t h e a c t i o n t h a t w o u l d be m o s t p r e v a l e n t g i v e n t h e s t r e s s on t h e d e c i s i o n maker d u r i n g c r i s e s . S n y d e r (1962) s u g g e s t s t h a t f e w e r a l t e r n a -t i v e s a r e c o n s i d e r e d when a c t i o n s i n t h e e n v i r o n m e n t f o r c e a d e c i s i o n . 4.2 ' C r a z y ' o r i r r a t i o n a l s t y l e s and m i x e d s t r a t e g i e s H i s t o r y i s p u n c t u a t e d by i n s t a n c e s o f n a t i o n s e x h i b i t i n g s e e m i n g l y i r r a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r w h i c h h a s d i s r u p t e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r and t h r e a t e n e d t h e s e c u r i t y o f v a r i o u s c o u n t r i e s . D r o r (1971) has d e v e l o p e d a t h e o r y o f C r a z y S t a t e s w h i c h s e e k s t o c a t e g o r i z e s u c h i n s t a n c e s o f i r r a t i o n a l o r c r a z y b e h a v i o u r . The s u g g e s -t i o n i s made t h a t t h e i n c i d e n c e o f c r a z y s t a t e s i s i n c r e a s i n g a n d g i v e n t h e a d v a n c e s o f modern t e c h n o l o g y , t h e i r p o t e n t i a l i m p a c t i s c o n s i d e r a b l e and a m a j o r d a n g e r 68. to the world. Nazi Germany i s the most s t r i k i n g example of a nation which has exhibited the behaviour of a crazy state. Other h i s t o r i c a l examples are provided by the Crusaders, Holy Wars, and various i m p e r i a l i s t i c states such as pre-World War II Japan. Modern day examples are t e r r o r i s t groups such as Black September and urban g u e r r i l l a s such as SLA and FLQ which seem not bound by the more 'rat i o n a l ' conventions accepted by most nations. Dror develops the concept of craziness along f i v e dimensions which can be regarded as parts of a multi-dimensional objective function. A given crazy state i s characterized by the shape of i t s objective function. D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n takes place along the following dimen-sions: a) Goal content: the extent to which goals involve aggressive a c t i v i t i e s against other groups — c l a s s i f i e d as reasonable, unreasonable, counter-reasonable . b) Goal commitment: the i n t e n s i t y with which goals are held — c l a s s i f i e d as low, medium, high. c) Risk propensity: the evaluation of the ri s k i n e s s of given p o l i c i e s — c l a s s i f i e d as low, medium, high. d) Means-goals r e l a t i o n : to what extent given goals are served by cert a i n means — c l a s s i f i e d as i n s t r u -69. m e n t a l , n o n i n s t r u m e n t a l , c o u n t e r i n s t r u m e n t a l . e) S t y l e : t h e e x t e n t . t o w h i c h two a s p e c t s o f b e h a v i o u r a r e d i s p l a y e d : i ) s t r o n g r i t u a l i s t i c - d o g m a t i c f i x a t i o n on s p e c i f i c t y p e s o f b e h a v i o u r a n d e x p r e s s i o n s . i i ) p r o p e n s i t y a n d p r e f e r e n c e f o r s t y l i s t i c i n n o v a -t i o n s w h i c h a r e n o t b o u n d by a c c e p t e d o p i n i o n s a n d n o t r e g u l a t e d b y a c c e p t e d p a t t e r n s . — c l a s s i f i e d a s a c c e p t e d , u n a c c e p t e d , c o u n t e r -a c c e p t e d . H y p o t h e t i c a l l y a l a r g e number o f c o m b i n a t i o n s o f t h e d i m e n s i o n s a r e p o s s i b l e w h i c h w o u l d p r o d u c e a t a x o n o m y o f c r a z y s t a t e s . However t o i l l u s t r a t e D r o r 1 s t h e s i s , ( p . 27-29) t h r e e p r o t o t y p e s o f s t a t e s e x h i b i t i n g v a r y i n g d e g r e e s o f c r a z i n e s s a r e g i v e n b e l o w . T h e s e p r o t o t y p e s c a n a p p l y t o b o t h n a t i o n s and n o n - n a t i o n s . N o r m a l s t a t e : G o a l c o n t e n t s — r e a s o n a b l e S t a t u s quo o r m i n o r e x t e r n a l g o a l s , s u c h a s : v o l u n -t a r y c o m m e r c i a l t r a d e a c t i v i t i e s ; m i n o r i n f l u e n c e on p o l i c i e s o f o t h e r s t a t e s ; l i m i t e d d i f f u s i o n o f i d e o l o g y ; no t e r r i t o r i a l c h a n g e o r v e r y m i n o r b o r d e r a d j u s t m e n t s . G o a l commitment — l o w D e v o t i o n o f m i n o r p a r t s o f b u d g e t and l i m i t e d man-power t o e x t e r n a l g o a l s ; no r e a d i n e s s t o s a c r i f i c e i n t e r n a l g o a l s f o r e x t e r n a l g o a l s . R i s k p r o p e n s i t y — l o w t o medium T e n d e n c y t o r e d u c e r i s k s b y a v o i d i n g more r i s k y p o l i c i e s . M e a n s - g o a l s r e l a t i o n — i n s t r u m e n t a l D e s i r e t o be r a t i o n a l ; j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f means i n t e r m s o f g o a l s ; u s u a l l y means do n o t o b v i o u s l y c o n -t r a d i c t g o a l s ; e f f o r t s t o d e v e l o p a n d u s e m e t h o d -o l o g i e s t o i m p r o v e m e a n s - g o a l s r e l a t i o n s ( s u c h a s s y s t e m s a n a l y s i s , PPBS, a n d p o l i c y s c i e n c e s ) ; w h e r e e a s i l y u s a b l e c r i t e r i a a r e a v a i l a b l e , means t e n d t o f i t g o a l s . S t y l e — a c c e p t e d N e a r l y f u l l c o m p l i a n c e w i t h p r e s e n t s t y l e s , e v e n u n d e r p r o v o c a t i o n ; some d e v i a t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s t a k e p l a c e i n s t y l i z e d f o r m s w i t h i n s p e c i a l a n d i s o l a t e d u n i t s , s u c h a s t h e C I A . Some e l a s t i c i t y , i n c r e m e n t a l c h a n g e c a p a c i t y , a n d a d j u s t m e n t t o c o n t e x t . May be some f i x a t i o n a n d r i g i d i t y i n r e s p e c t t o more o r l e s s a c c e p t e d s t y l e s . C r a z y - s t a t e ; G o a l s c o n t e n t s — c o u n t e r r e a s o n a b l e V e r y e x t e n s i v e e x t e r n a l g o a l s , s u c h a s f u l l c o n t r o l o v e r e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t i e s o f o t h e r s t a t e s ; f u l l c o n t r o l of a l l p o l i c i e s of other states; t o t a l conversion of others to ideology; r a d i c a l changes i n borders up to destruction of other states and absorption or l i q u i d a t i o n of t h e i r population. Goal commitment — high Devotion of most of budget, GNP, and manpower to external goals; the in t e r n a l goals regarded only as means for external goals; external goals accepted as national mission, up to readiness to s a c r i f i c e self-existence to achieve external goals. Risk propensity — medium to high Acceptance of r i s k , with a mix between more r i s k y and very r i s k y p o l i c i e s . Means-goals r e l a t i o n — instrumental to noninstrumental Desire to be r a t i o n a l ; j u s t i f i c a t i o n of means i n terms of goals; some means by obviously contradicting goals; e f f o r t s to improve means-goals r e l a t i o n s ; where e a s i l y usable c r i t e r i a are available, means tend to f i t goals. Style — counteraccepted Extreme deviation from present styles (and morals) such as genocide (here as a sty l e of operation, not as goal content); mass assassination of leaders; food poisoning; systematic sabotage of c i v i l i a n peace-f u l f a c i l i t i e s ; countervalue terror against schools, hospitals, recreation areas, c i v i l transportation, 72. e t c . ; e x t e n s i v e k i l l i n g o f d i p l o m a t s ; f u l l b i o c h e m i c a l w a r f a r e . Some e l a s t i c i t y , i n c r e m e n t a l c h a n g e c a p a c -i t y , and a d j u s t m e n t t o c o n t e x t . C r a z y n o n i n s t r u m e n t a l m a r t y r s t a t e ; G o a l c o n t e n t s — c o u n t e r r e a s o n a b l e Same a s c r a z y s t a t e . G o a l commitment — h i g h Same a s c r a z y s t a t e . R i s k p r o p e n s i t y — e x t r e m e l y h i g h P r e f e r e n c e f o r v e r y r i s k y p o l i c i e s , up t o i d e o l o g i c a l c ommitment t o a d v e n t u r i s m a n d r i s k - t a k i n g a s a p r e f e r a b l e l i f e s t y l e . M e a n s - g o a l s r e l a t i o n — c o u n t e r i n s t r u m e n t a l I d e o l o g y c o m p l e t e l y i g n o r e s o r r e j e c t s r a t i o n a l i t y ; no j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f means i n t e r m s o f g o a l s ; many means o b v i o u s l y c o n t r a d i c t g o a l s ; e x p l i c i t r e s i s t -a n c e t o m e a n s - g o a l s r e l a t i o n - i m p r o v i n g m e t h o d o l o g y a n d e x p l i c i t p r e f e r e n c e f o r n o n r a t i o n a l m e t h o d s , s u c h a s a s t r o l o g y a n d a r b i t r a r y l e a d e r m y t h s ; e v e n w h e r e e a s i l y u s a b l e c r i t e r i a a r e a v a i l a b l e , means v e r y o f t e n do n o t f i t g o a l s . S t y l e — c o u n t e r a c c e p t e d Same a s c r a z y s t a t e p l u s t h e r e may be f i x a t i o n a n d r i g i d i t y i n r e s p e c t t o s p e c i f i c c o u n t e r a c c e p t e d s t y l e s . 73-As D r o r ( 1 9 7 1 , p. 60) p o i n t s o u t " . . . a s t a t e c a n be c r a z y a n d i n s t r u m e n t a l a t t h e same t i m e , t h e c r a z i n e s s b e i n g r e l a t e d t o t h e g o a l c o n t e n t s , g o a l c o mmitment, r i s k p r o p e n s i t y a n d s t y l i s t i c i n n o v a t i o n — b u t n o t t o t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n g o a l s a n d means." I n t h i s way a c r a z y s t a t e c a n b e h a v e " r a t i o n a l l y 1 . I t c a n p i c k i n s t r u m e n t s o r s t r a t e g i e s w h i c h a r e h i g h l y e f f e c t i v e f o r a c h i e v i n g i t s c r a z y g o a l s . W i t h t h i s p o i n t i n m i n d , a c r a z y s t a t e i s more l i k e l y t o s e l e c t a r e p e r t o i r e o f s t r a t e g i e s w h i c h i s more u n i q u e a nd more i m p o r t a n t t o t h e i r s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s t h a n a n o r m a l s t a t e . C r a z y s t a t e s o f t h e n o n i n s t r u m e n t a l a n d c o u n t e r i n s t r u m e n t a l t y p e may d e v e l o p t h e same s t r a t e g i e s , b u t t h i s u s u a l l y h a p p e n s a c c i d e n t l y s i n c e t h e y do n o t a c t ' r a t i o n a l l y ' . T h o s e a c t i o n s o r s t r a t e g i e s o f p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e t o c r a z y s t a t e s a r e g i v e n b e l o w : a) d e c e p t i o n — d e g r e e t o w h i c h a c r a z y s t a t e w i l l t r y t o h i d e t h e f e a t u r e s o f i t s c r a z i n e s s . b) i n f i l t r a t i o n a n d t a k e - o v e r f r o m w i t h i n — e s t a b l i s h -ment o f g u e r r i l l a g r o u p s a nd o t h e r s u b v e r s i v e g r o u p s . c) c o n v e r s i o n — a t t e m p t t o sway p o p u l a t i o n s t o c r a z y s t a t e i d e o l o g i e s v i a c o m m u n i c a t i o n s i n s t r u m e n t s . d) e r o s i o n — p h a s e d a n d i n c r e m e n t a l t a k e - o v e r o f t a r g e t s . e) i s o l a t i o n — i s o l a t i o n o f a d v e r s a r i e s f r o m e x t e r n a l s u p p o r t s . 74. f ) a l l i a n c e s — g a i n e x t e r n a l s u p p o r t f o r a c t i v i t i e s a n d i n h i b i t c o u n t e r c r a z y s t r a t e g i e s . g) p r o v o c a t i o n — i n d u c e o v e r - r e a c t i n g b e h a v i o u r o n t h e p a r t o f a n a d v e r s a r y i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e p r o v o k e r . h) b l a c k m a i l — p l a y o n f e a r s a n d e x p l o i t c o s t - b e n e f i t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f a d v e r s a r y . i ) o c c u p a t i o n — may be a means o f a c h i e v e m e n t o f o t h e r g o a l s . j ) d e s t r u c t i o n — a s a n a u x i l i a r y s t r a t e g y c a n g i v e c r e d i b i l i t y t o b l a c k m a i l and s e r v e a s f o r m o f p r o v o -c a t i o n ; a s a m a i n s t r a t e g y , s e r v e s t o a d v a n c e t h e g o a l s o f t h e c r a z y s t a t e , k) t i m i n g — p r e f e r a b l e t o e n g a g e i n a c t i v i t i e s w h i l e t h e m a j o r s u p e r c o u n t r i e s a r e o t h e r w i s e o c c u p i e d . N a t i o n s may a d o p t s t r a t e g i e s w h i c h may a p p e a r i r r a t i o n a l a s a c r i s i s m a n o e u v r e . S c h e l l i n g (1963) s u g g e s t s t h a t f o r s t r a t e g i c r e a s o n s a d e c i s i o n maker m i g h t w i s h t o g i v e t h e i m p r e s s i o n o f i r r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r . T h i s d e c e p t i o n may be e m p l o y e d i n an a t t e m p t t o i n v o k e a r a t i o n a l r e s p o n s e f r o m t h e o p p o n e n t . Hermann (1971, p. 297) s u g g e s t s t h a t d e c i s i o n m a k e r s may g i v e t h e a p p e a r -a n c e o f i r r a t i o n a l i t y o r i n a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l e v e n t s a s a t a c t i c t o s h i f t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r m o d i f y i n g a p o s i t i o n t o t h e o p p o n e n t . 75. W h i l e c r a z y s t r a t e g i e s may p r o v i d e a n a t i o n w i t h c e r t a i n a d v a n t a g e s , t h e r e a r e a l s o i n h e r e n t d a n g e r s i n t h e i r u s e . F i r s t , madness o r i r r a t i o n a l i t y may be a u s e f u l s t a n c e t o a d o p t , b u t a n a t i o n m u s t f i r s t e s t a b l i s h i t s image a s an i r r a t i o n a l a c t o r . One way t o e s t a b l i s h s u c h image i s t o move i n u n p r e d i c t a b l e d i r e c t i o n s w i t h l a r g e s t e p s i z e s b e t w e e n s u b s e q u e n t p o s i t i o n s a n d t o c h a n g e t h e i s s u e s and i n t e r e s t s o f t h e p a r t i e s r a p i d l y by e r r a t i c b e h a v i o u r . D e u t s c h ( 1 9 6 3 , p. 70) s u g g e s t s t h e i n h e r e n t a s s u m p t i o n o f t h i s s t r a t e g y p a r t i c u l a r l y a s i t a p p l i e s t o d e t e r r e n c e . He s t a t e s t h a t a f t e r f i r s t f r u s t r a t i n g o n e ' s o p p o n e n t s by f r i g h t e n i n g them v e r y b a d l y , one m u s t t h e n r e l y o n t h e i r c o o l - h e a d e d r a t i o n a l i t y f o r s u r v i v a l . When a n a t i o n t a k e s v i o l e n t a c t i o n s , i t m u s t be p r e p a r e d t o t a k e t h e r i s k t h a t t h e a d v e r s a r y may n o t r e s p o n d ' r a t i o n a l l y ' o r i n t h e a n t i c i p a t e d manner a n d t h e r e b y e s c a l a t e s t h e c r i s i s ( e r r o r s i n c a l c u l a t i o n ) . The c o n t i n u e d u s e o f s t r a t e g i e s o f i r r a t i o n a l i t y may p r e c l u d e t h e w i l l i n g n e s s o f a n a d v e r s a r y t o r e a c h a n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t . W o l s t e t t e r a n d W o l s t e t t e r ( 1 9 6 5 , p. 16) n o t e : " T h r e a t s o f u n c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y s h o u l d be a d m i n i s t e r e d by p r e s c r i p t i o n , a g a i n s t s p e c i a l d a n g e r s , a n d i n s m a l l d o s e s . I t s u s e i n e x t r e m i s i s n o t c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a r e p u t a t i o n f o r b e i n g b o t h s a n e a nd m e a n i n g w h a t one s a y s . " 76. They suggest that both acts and words a f f e c t the a n t i c i p a -tions of the adversary and incompatible actions and state-ments may r e s u l t i n undesired responses. The d i f f i c u l t y i n dealing with a 'crazy' opponent i s that one cannot accurately predict his moves. Nations may therefore abandon any attempt to deal r a t i o n a l l y with such an adversary and resort to more v i o l e n t means. A clear trade-off emerges between choices of in c r e -mental r a t i o n a l styles and i r r a t i o n a l looking s t y l e s . Incremental st y l e s of consistent actions permit predict-a b i l i t y of actions and therefore lead to a loss of strategic advantage. In contrast, while ' i r r a t i o n a l looking' strategies maintain the surprise value, they tend to narrow the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of settlements through communications and may lead to t o t a l loss of control over the dynamics of the c r i s i s by a l l actors. 5.0 The Dynamics of C r i s i s Two basic postures*, can be i d e n t i f i e d r e f l e c t i n g the degree of h o s t i l e intent of a player: an aggressive pos-ture and a posture of containment. An aggressive posture We s h a l l not discuss a t h i r d possible posture i n a c r i s i s , a posture of active cooperation. C r i s i s i n these circumstances w i l l a r i s e from noise i n communica-tions. For example, consider the 'Battle of the Sexes' example i n Luce and R a i f f a (1958, p. 90). 77. is characterized by a set of objectives which by i t s nature demands s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n the e x i s t i n g equilibrium, changes which c o n f l i c t with objectives of other decision units. The means to these ends pose therefore a 'threat' to which other decision units must respond. War the ultimate means of aggression " . . . i s an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to f u l f i l l our w i l l " (von Clausewitz, 1956, Book I, Chap. 1, p. 2). A posture of containment i s characterized by objectives which are attuned to restoration of some previous equilibrium posi-tion between adversaries, preservation of e x i s t i n g equilibrium on attainment of equilibrium in the neighbor-hood of an e x i s t i n g state. The means of containment displays a lower l e v e l of h o s i t i l i t y , but nevertheless may involve h o s t i l e aggressive actions. An i n i t i a l posture may change over time, as through experience e n t i t i e s learn about th e i r objectives. Changes in state lead to r e v i s i o n i n objectives, or the employ-ment of means aff e c t s objectives. Observing the Korean War, one can i d e n t i f y an i n i t i a l posture of containment: repulsing North Korean aggression and not establishing the p a r t i t i o n at the 38th P a r a l l e l . After the landing at Inchon and the destruction of the North Korean armies, the posture of containment was replaced by one of aggression. When China became a non-declared b e l l i g -78. erent the U.S. appeared to have taken again as i t s goal the containment of c o n f l i c t and restoration of the status  quo ante. Later i n thi s section we s h a l l explore i n more depth the in t e r n a l processes i n a decision unit which a f f e c t s h i f t s i n posture. A s h i f t i n posture, however, cannot be ascertained only from analysis of means-employed. I f , for example, we assume that the preliminary posture of the U.S. i n the Korean War was one of aggression, the s h i f t s i n means could be interpreted as re s u l t i n g from revisions i n c a l -culations as more information became avai l a b l e . Without a documentation of intents at the various stages of the war both competing explanations, the one which attributes changes i n intermediate objectives and actions to change i n posture and the other which attributes these changes to r e v i s i o n i n ca l c u l a t i o n s , are compatible. A decision unit committed to containment may seek for example absolute victory i n a war i f i t perceives the enemy as an unyielding aggressor (e.g. the observation that H i t l e r would have continued to the very end of the struggle). The same unit perceiving the enemy as aggres-sion with l i m i t e d objectives i n mind, or as holding a basic posture of containment, may make concessions or respond with l o c a l i z e d aggressive moves of low in t e n s i t y and limited duration. Misperception of H i t l e r ' s intentions 79. account for the early B r i t i s h appeasement moves. Learn-ing through experience led the B r i t i s h to the unconditional surrender objective. The posture of containment however did not change throughout the war. The arsenal of s t r a t -egies employed by decision units with aggressive postures can be c l a s s i f i e d i n two groups: (1) Overt exercises of force and threats. (2) Diversionary moves and covert or i n d i r e c t exercise of inducements (threats and bribes). The f i r s t class of behaviours conforms to the general stereotype of aggressive decision units, and requires either submission of an adversary to the w i l l of the aggressor or defensive counter response. The situations which aris e are t y p i c a l l y situations of confrontation. The second class of behaviors does not provide an immedi-ate focus to the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the adversaries. Underlying this class of moves i s the intention to induce responses from a r i v a l which are advantageous to the p r e c i p i t a t i o n of the action. The b l u r r i n g of signals i n an action for a focus and delimitation of the nature and range of confrontation, i s designed to foster decisions and responses from adversaries based upon miscalculations. "In July 1941 the slogan ' l o c a l i z a t i o n of the con-f l i c t ' was bandied by Vienna at the very moment the Austrian cannon were s h e l l i n g Belgrade" (Aron, 1973, p. 75). 80. Containment postures o f f e r a repertoire of actions which can be c l a s s i f i e d as those which provide inducements and signals to adversaries to converge upon some e q u i l i b -rium state, and as those actions or stands which aim at deterrence. The f i r s t class can be further subdivided into bribes and concessions and threats or penalties. Appeasement moves, concessions, etc., intend to signal to the adversaries the containment intentions of the p r e c i p i t a t o r or induce a change i n his calculations making some solution more prominent or desirable to him. Pen-a l t i e s or threats aim mainly to the costs involved i n either non or slow convergence upon the s p e c i f i e d e q u i l i -brium of containment. The danger inherent i n these actions of flagging and inducement stem from misinterpre-t a t i o n . Appeasement or concessions may be interpreted as signals of weakness. On the other hand, aggressive actions or threats may be interpreted by r i v a l s as signaling aggressive postures. President Kennedy i n the aftermath of the Cuban M i s s i l e c r i s i s r e f l e c t e d : "I think looking.back on Cuba, what i s of concern i s the f a c t that both governments were so far out of contact..." (Kennedy, 1963). Deterrence aims to preserve an equilibrium by attempting to a f f e c t calculations of r i v a l s through con-81. tingent threats. Aron (1973, p. 45) termed a deterence strategy as a strategy of "peace by t e r r o r " . By increas-ing the expected costs of undesirable actions to the r i v a l , the employer of a deterrence strategy intends to reduce the p r o b a b i l i t y of such actions. The success of deterrence depends upon two factors: (1) - the c r e d i b i l i t y of deterrence threats and (2) the learning a b i l i t y of r i v a l s and the sensivity of t h e i r choices to changes i n expectations. Wolstetter and Wolstetter (1965) suggest that the e f f i c a c y of deterrence tends to increase with the inten-s i t y of the threat, but there i s a threshold from which the c r e d i b i l i t y of the threat i s reduced. They point out that the threat of war, for example, i n the nuclear age involves high costs to the p r e c i p i t a t o r of the threat, so that the c r e d i b i l i t y of the threat i s reduced: "...that war can be so massive a disaster tempts us to use threat of t h i s disaster to paralyse an adversary bent on aggression, but i t may end i n our own p a r a l y s i s . " (p. 19). The process of achieving balance of terror.through threats and counter-threats which i s a necessary condi-tion for deterrence may escalate and r e s u l t i n an imple-mentation of threats, even when such implementation threatens a l l the p a r t i e s . Wolstetter and Wolstetter 82. ( 1 9 6 5 , p. 17) s u g g e s t : "Even t h o u g h t h e new l e v e l o f v i o l e n c e i s l i k e l y t o l e a v e b o t h o f them w o r s e o f f t h a n b e f o r e t h e s e q u e n c e o f t h r e a t s a n d p r e - w a r m a n o e u v r e s h a d s t a r t e d , n o n e t h e l e s s , t h e r e may be some p o i n t o f no r e t u r n i n t h e s e q u e n c e . A t t h a t p o i n t t h e o u tcome may a p p e a r t o be b e t t e r t h a n t h e r i s k o f s t o p p i n g . " S c h w a r t z (1967) s u g g e s t s t h a t a b y - p r o d u c t o f t h e p r o c e s s o f t h r e a t e s c a l a t i o n i s a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e s e a r c h f o r a l t e r n a t i v e s . The r e s p o n s e may n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be t h e one e x p e c t e d by t h e a c t o r s i n i t i a t i n g t h e t h r e a t s . The e s c a l a t i o n p r o c e s s may r e s u l t i n " . . . i n d u c i n g s u c h a l e v e l o f t h r e a t and t e n s i o n t h a t t h e o p p o n e n t h a s n e i t h e r t i m e n o r i n c l i n a t i o n t o k e e p s e e k i n g p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s " . ( p . 4 8 3 ) . 83. 5.1 Some determinants of postures As we indicated, postures may change as a function of the p a r t i c u l a r sequence of moves chosen by the r i v a l s . The l i t e r a t u r e i n international relations o f f e r s some clues concerning the factors which determine i n i t i a l postures and the stimuli leading to a change i n posture. Paige (1969) found that goal-involvement and the p r i o r i t y attached to goals i s p o s i t i v e l y related to aggressive responses i n a c r i s i s . Hermann (1971) also proposed that the more the survival goals of a nation are threatened, the greater w i l l be the l i k l i h o o d of h o s t i l e (aggressive) actions to protect major goals. This perceived h o s t i l i t y by the r e c i p i e n t w i l l inturn r e s u l t i n a more intense expression of h o s t i l i t y . The ho s t i l e action-response pattern of aggression-aggressio,n can rapidly escalate a c r i s i s . During c o n f l i c t s , nations tend to s e l e c t i v e l y perceive only those aspects of the sit u a t i o n that help their own cause. Diesing (1961) has suggested that t h i s distortion of perceptions r e s u l t s i n the creation of secondary c o n f l i c t s . These secondary c o n f l i c t s become attached to and viewed as part of the major c o n f l i c t , which leads to the exacerbation of the o r i g i n a l c r i s i s . Hermann (1967, p. 411) further suggests that even a weak nation may adopt an aggressive posture i f the perceived threat i s of s u f f i c i e n t magnitude. 84. "If a state's perception of injury (or f r u s t r a t i o n , d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , h o s t i l i t y , or threat) to i t s e l f i s ' s u f f i c i e n t l y ' great, t h i s perception w i l l o f f -set perceptions of i n s u f f i c i e n t c a p a b i l i t y , making the perception of c a p a b i l i t y much less important a factor i n a decision to go to war." The previous c r i s i s reactions of a nation w i l l also influence the p a r t i c u l a r management sty l e chosen. Pre-vious aggressive actions against an adversary w i l l i n -crease the propensity for both sides to adopt aggressive postures i n future sit u a t i o n s . Boulding (1969, p. 426) suggests that: "Most nations seem to f e e l that t h e i r enemies are more h o s t i l e toward them than they are toward t h e i r enemies. This i s a t y p i c a l paranoid reaction: the nation v i s u a l i z e s i t s e l f as surrounded by h o s t i l e nations toward which i t has only the nicest and f r i e n d l i e s t of intentions." Hermann (1972) and Zinnes (1968) suggest that as a nation perceives h o s t i l i t y from other nations, i t w i l l express more h o s t i l i t y i t s e l f . Thus i f an aggressive nation perceives f r i e n d l y or non-hostile behaviour from an adver-sary, i t may be encouraged to a l t e r i t s own behaviour. The choice of an aggressive as opposed to a contain-ment posture may also be dependent upon the directness 85. o f t h e c r i s i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m a j o r a d v e r s a r i e s . I f t h e c r i s i s i s one n o t d i r e c t l y i n v o l v i n g t h e s u p e r -p o w e r s , b u t o c c u r s o n a l o c a l s c a l e o r i n v o l v e s a l l i e s , t h e r e may be l e s s f e l t - t h r e a t f o r t h e m a j o r n a t i o n s a n d t h e r e f o r e a l e s s e n e d n e e d f o r a g g r e s s i v e s t r a t e g i e s . S c h w a r t z (1967, p. 486) s u g g e s t s t h a t i n d i r e c t c r i s i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e U.S. a n d U.S.S.R., a s t r a t e g y o f e s c a l a t i o n may become more c r e d i b l e . The a c t o r s w i l l p e r c e i v e a g r e a t e r r e s o l u t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f t h e a d v e r -s a r y t o a d o p t a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o u r modes. An e x a m p l e i s p r o v i d e d : "The r e l a t i v e l a c k o f p r o x i e s o r a l l i e s i n t h e B e r l i n a n d Cuban c r i s e s i s r e f l e c t e d i n v e r y h i g h o b s e r v e d S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s o f f e l t - t h r e a t a n d U.S. r e s o l v e . L e s s e r l e v e l s o f d i r e c t n e s s [ o f c o n t r o n t a t i o n ] i n K o r e a , S u e z , L e b a n o n , Quemoy, C y p r u s a nd T o n k i n a r e g e n e r a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l e s s t h r e a t a n d w i t h l o w e r S o v i e t a s s e s s m e n t o f U.S. r e s o l v e . " 5.2 More a b o u t t h e d y n a m i c s o f p o s t u r e s a) P r i m a r y p r o c e s s e s (no p o s t u r e c h a n g e ) T h e r e a r e t h r e e p a t t e r n s o f p o s t u r e m a t c h i n g : (1) c o n t a i n m e n t — c o n t a i n m e n t (2) a g g r e s s i o n — a g g r e s s i o n (3) c o n t a i n m e n t — a g g r e s s i o n I f b o t h r i v a l s s u b s c r i b e t o c o n t a i n m e n t , b r i b e s a r e more 86. e f f e c t i v e and l e s s u n c e r t a i n t h a n t h r e a t s . Appeasement t h r o u g h m i n o r c o n c e s s i o n s p r o v i d e l e s s ambiguous s i g n a l s f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n o r r e t u r n t o e q u i l i b r i u m , t h a n t h r e a t s and p u n i s h m e n t s . The e x e r c i s e o f t h r e a t s a i m e d a t d e t e r -r e n c e , o r a c t i v e s t e p s t a k e n t o p e n a l i z e a r i v a l m oving f r o m a d e s i r e d e q u i l i b r i u m may t r i g g e r a p r o c e s s o f e s c a l a t i o n w h i c h may go b e y o n d t h e bounds o f t h e c o n t r o l s o f t h e a c t o r s . The d y n a m i c s o f a g g r e s s i o n - a g g r e s s i o n p o s t u r e s depends upon t h e b a l a n c e o f powers and t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e r i v a l s t o a p p r a i s e a c c u r a t e l y t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f o p p o n e n t s . B a l a n c e o f power w i t h u n b i a s e d c a p a b i l i t i e s o f c o s t - b e n e f i t c a l c u l u s may t r i g g e r a c o n v e r g e n c e upon an e q u i l i b r i u m s o l u t i o n . L a g s i n l e a r n i n g and m i s i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n when a b a l a n c e o f power s i t u a -t i o n e x i s t s t e n d t o b r i n g a b o u t an e s c a l a t i o n p r o c e s s and i n t e n s i f i e d u s e o f a g g r e s s i v e means. When b a l a n c e o f power does n o t e x i s t and b o t h s i d e s a d o p t a g g r e s s i v e p o s t u r e s t h r o u g h means o f v i o l e n c e , one p a r t y ( t h e one w h i c h d i d n o t a p p r a i s e h i s r e s o u r c e s c o r r e c t l y ) w i l l be b r o u g h t t o s u b m i s s i o n . A c o n t a i n m e n t - a g g r e s s i o n p o s t u r e w i l l t e n d t o p r o d u c e e s c a l a t i o n o f v i o l e n c e , whence t h e p a r t y s u b s c r i b i n g t o c o n t a i n m e n t may p r o d u c e s i g n a l s w h i c h c a n a c c e l e r a t e t h e s e q u e n c e o f moves p l a n n e d by i t s r i v a l s . I n t h i s s i t u a -87. tion the employment of active deterrence and imposition of penalties by the party subscribing to containment may lead to deacceleration of violence, while concessions may induce aggressive moves by opponents. b) Secondary processes (posture change) As we already noted i n the preceeding sections, aggressive moves by opponents tend to influence the posture of an actor by inducing h o s t i l i t y , hence a ten-dency to switch to aggressive postures. Concessions and appeasement may, i f interpreted as signs of weakness, also support those elements i n the r i v a l decision unit which advocate aggressive postures. Elements which support containment tend on the other hand to benefit from f a i l u r e s and costs associated with aggressive moves espec i a l l y i f these costs accrue over a prolonged period of time (for example the costs of the V i e t Nam war) or i f the national ideology to sustain such costs i s weak or nonexistent. Hermann (1972) for example, has suggested that i f the i n i t i a t i o n or continuation of certa i n aggressive actions i n the c r i s i s threatens to destroy survival goals of a nation, a change i n strategy w i l l be made. The actor w i l l seek to negotiate a settlement, r e f r a i n i n g from any actions which reduces the l i k l i h o o d of s e t t l e -ment. F a i l i n g a successful negotiation, any threatened 88. non-survival goals w i l l be f o r f e i t e d . The domination of secondary objectives i n complex situations Whatever the i n i t i a l posture of the r i v a l s , there i s a tendency i n the dynamics of the game for secondary objectives to assume a prominent role as guidance p r i n -c i p l e s . One of the most important secondary objectives i s the objective of winning. de Rivera (1968), for example suggest that the average c o n f l i c t between nations i s a competitive power struggle, where winning i s more import-ant than other objectives such as tension reduction. During the game, the means (winning) may become the end. 6. Micro-analysis of c r i s i s management; the in t e r n a l  process of decision making A l l i s o n (1971) has suggested that most analysts predict the behaviour of nations i n terms of the 'rational actor 1 or c l a s s i c a l conceptual model. This model assumes that decisions are made by a r a t i o n a l , unitary decision-maker (the government). Actions are taken by t h i s unit that w i l l maximize strategic goals and objectives. How-ever t h i s s i m p l i s t i c model f a i l s to take account of the influence complex modern organizations and innumerable actors have on the decision process. Decisions are not made by unitary e n t i t i e s . Two additional models have been suggested. The Organizational Process Model recog-89. n i z e s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a h i g h l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e . I n t h i s m o d e l d e c i s i o n c h o i c e s a r e a n a l y z e d a s o u t p u t s o f l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s f u n c t i o n i n g a c c o r d i n g t o s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s . C r i t i c a l a c t i o n s a r e d e t e r m i n e d n o t by t h e c a r e f u l d e l i b e r a t i o n s o f n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s b u t by o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r o u t i n e s . The t h i r d m o d e l , t h e G o v e r n m e n t a l P o l i t i c s M o d e l , e x a m i n e s d e c i s i o n b e h a v i o u r as a c t s t h a t r e s u l t f r o m t h e sum o f i n n u m e r a b l e a nd o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g a c t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l s a t v a r i o u s l e v e l s o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s m o d e l s u g g e s t s t h a t n a t i o n a l g o a l s , i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s , a n d i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s a r e n o t a l w a y s c o m p a t i b l e . A c t i o n s t a k e n b y a n a t i o n a r e t h e r e s u l t o f b a r g a i n i n g games b e t w e e n v a r i o u s a c t o r s a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s a n d b r a n c h e s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t . I t c a n be w e l l d o c u m e n t e d , t h r o u g h h i s t o r i c a l e x a m p l e s , ( i . e . , B a y o f P i g s ) t h a t d u r i n g c r i s e s , d e c i s i o n s o f p o o r q u a l i t y a r e o f t e n made. Some o f t h e s e f a u l t y d e c i s i o n s r e s u l t f r o m l i m i t e d i n d i v i d u a l a b i l i t i e s — p r e j u d i c e s , p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s , l i m i t e d c o g n i t i v e c a p a c i t i e s a n d o t h e r f a c t o r s m e n t i o n e d p r e v i o u s l y a s c o n t r i b u t i n g to-p e r c e p t u a l e r r o r . O t h e r d e f i c i e n c i e s i n d e c i s i o n m a k i n g r e s u l t f r o m t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s , s u c h as t h o s e e x a m i n e d b y A l l i s o n ' s m o d e l s I I and I I I . O t h e r d e f i c i e n c i e s r e s u l t f r o m t h e g r o u p d y n a m i c s o f p a r t i c u l a r 90. u n i t s i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t i s o u r i n t e n t i o n t o examine some o f t h e s e g r o u p d y n a m i c s o f t h e d e c i s i o n p r o -c e s s as t h e y r e l a t e t o i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t i o n a nd p r o c e s s -i n g , c h o i c e and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . The key d e c i s i o n s i n a c r i s i s a r e o f t e n made by a s m a l l , r e l a t i v e l y t i g h t - k n i t g r o u p o f i n d i v i d u a l s . The s i z e o f t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t r e l a t i v e t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a t i t s command s u g g e s t s d i f f i c u l t i e s i n p r o c e s s i n g t h e l a r g e volume o f d a t a d u r i n g a c r i s i s . T h e r e may be i n f o r m a t i o n o v e r l o a d . D e c i s i o n makers do n o t know and c a n n o t c o n s i d e r a l l a l t e r n a t i v e s . M o s t d e c i s i o n s t h e r e -f o r e a r e made u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f bounded r a t i o n a l i t y . I n f o r m a t i o n f l o w s w i t h i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n d u r i n g c r i s e s , t a k e on a v e r y g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e . I n t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n a l P r o c e s s M o d e l , A l l i s o n (1971) has p o i n t e d o u t how t h e s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n c a n work a t odds w i t h t h e n e e d o f d e c i s i o n makers f o r a c c u r a t e and t i m e l y i n f o r m a t i o n . I n 19 62 i n t e l l i g e n c e p r o c e d u r e s r e s u l t e d i n a two week l a g i n t h e t i m e f r o m when t h e f i r s t h i n t s o f S o v i e t a c t i v i t y i n Cuba were d e t e c t e d , u n t i l P r e s . Kennedy was i n f o r m e d o f m i s s i l e i n s t a l l a t i o n s . P i e c e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a r e g a t h e r e d by t h e v a r i o u s i n f o r m a t i o n u n i t s . B u t t h e s e p i e c e s a r e o f t e n r e c e i v e d s i n g l y and l a c k t h e s t r e n g t h t o c o u n t e r a c t t h e p r e c o n c e i v e d b e l i e f s o f t h o s e 91. i n d i v i d u a l s r e c e i v i n g them. B e c a u s e o f a l l t h e v a r i o u s f a c t o r s t h a t a f f e c t p e r c e p t i o n , much n e g a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n may be r e j e c t e d o r e x p l a i n e d away. We h a v e a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e i s u s u a l l y a b i a s i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f p e r c e i v i n g a g r e e a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n . de R i v e r a ( 1 9 6 8 , p. 61) n o t e s : " ( i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) ... i n f o r m a t i o n n e v e r b u i l d s up t o f o r m a t r o n g e n o u g h c a s e t o o v e r c o m e t h e p o w e r f u l p s y c h o l o g i c a l o p p o s i t i o n i n t o p d e c i s i o n m a k e r s . " E v e n i f e n o u g h n e g a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n o f a t h r e a t e n i n g n a t u r e c o u l d be a c c u m u l a t e d t o b u i l d a c a s e , t h e r e i s a s t r o n g p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t w o u l d n e v e r r e c e i v e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n p u t . I n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n , we s h a l l d e m o n s t r a t e how a n d why i n d i v i d u a l s may d e l i b e r a t e l y b l o c k i n p u t o f t h r e a t e n i n g i n f o r m a t i o n t o t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t . The d i s t a n c e o f u n i t s w i t h m a j o r r e s p o n s b i l i t i e s f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n f r o m t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t , s u g g e s t s t h e g r e a t p o s s i b l i t y f o r e r r o r s t o o c c u r i n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a c t i o n s . MacCrimmon ( 1 9 7 3 , p. 8) n o t e s : "When a s e p a r a t e u n i t c a r r i e s o u t t h e d e c i s i o n , t h e r e s u l t [ o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ] may be c o n s i d e r a b l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m w h a t t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t i n t e n d e d . . . . When t h e a c t i o n u n i t h a s no d i r e c t t i e w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t , t h e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a c c i d e n t a l o r p u r p o s e f u l m i s - i m p l e m e n t a t i o n i n c r e a s e s . " 92. The d i f f i c u l t i e s o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a d e c i s i o n when t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n u n i t i s d i s t a n t f r o m t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t , c a n be d o c u m e n t e d b y a number o f e x a m p l e s . A v e r c h a n d L a v i n (1964) n o t e d t h a t d e c i s i o n s a r e o f t e n s u b j e c t e d t o r e s i s t a n c e , u n d e r c u t t i n g and d i v e r s i o n s e v e n when t h e y a r e P r e s i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n s . D u r i n g t h e Cuban M i s s i l e • c r i s i s , P r e s i d e n t K e nnedy e n d u r e d g r e a t f r u s t r a t i o n o v e r h i s i n a b i l i t y t o h a v e J u p i t e r m i s s i l e s r e m o v e d f r o m T u r k e y . On two p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n s K e nnedy h a d o r d e r e d r e m o v a l o f t h e m i s s i l e s b u t h i s o r d e r s had n o t b e e n c a r r i e d o u t . A t t h e h e i g h t o f t h e M i s s i l e C r i s i s , he a g a i n o r d e r e d t h e i r r e m o v a l . A l l i s o n ( 1 9 7 1 , p. 143) d e s c r i b e s t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e d e c i s i o n : " . . . a s i n t h e two p r e v i o u s c a s e s , t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s o r d e r c o u l d n o t remove t h e m i s s i l e s i n s t a n t l y . R a t h e r , i t moved men i n t h e P e n t a g o n t o b e g i n e x a m i n -i n g t h e t e c h n i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r d e f u s i n g t h e m i s s i l e s , w e i g h i n g t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s a c t i o n f o r o u r NATO a l l i e s , . d r a f t i n g c a b l e s , and so f o r t h . G i v e n s u f f i c i e n t t i m e , t h e P r e s i d e n t w o u l d a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y h a v e had h i s way ( t h o u g h i n i t i a l d e v e l o p -ment s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e m i s s i l e s w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n w i t h d r a w n e i t h e r a s q u i c k l y o r as s m o o t h l y a s he d e s i r e d . ) " The U.S. i n v o l v e m e n t i n V i e t Nam a l s o p r o v i d e s u s w i t h 93. an example of implementation d i f f i c u l t i e s . Lyndon Johnson found out the hard way, as had Kennedy, that m i l i t a r y actions are not always implemented i n the manner which the decision unit wishes. Halberstam (1972, p. 209) comments: "...the capacity to control a policy involving the mi l i t a r y i s greatest before the po l i c y i s i n i t i a t e d , but once started, no matter how small the i n i t i a l step, a policy has a l i f e and a thrust of i t s own, i t i s an organic thing. More, i t s thrust and i t s drive may not be i n any way akin to the desires of the President who i n i t i a t e d i t . " 6.1 The narrowing of cognitive processes During cri s e s when individuals are under great stress and important decisions must be made i n short time frame-works, certain pathologies may arise i n the decision unit that reduces the pr o b a b i l i t y of good, r a t i o n a l decisions being made. H o l s t i (1971, p. 62) suggests that "... i n -creasingly severe c r i s i s tends to make creative p o l i c y -making both more important and less l i k e l y . " Creative decision making i n part, depends on a fresh input of ideas from a wide variety of individuals from many level s of the organization. Hermann (1963) notes that during a c r i s i s , there i s a tendency for a contraction of authority to occur i n an organization. Authority for decision making s h i f t s to higher levels and there i s a reduction i n the 94. number o f p e r s o n s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e d e c i s i o n . M u l d e r , v a n E c k a n d De J o n g ( 1 9 7 1 , p. 21) f o u n d t h a t : " I n c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s , some k i n d o f p o w e r f u l l e a d -e r s h i p i s f u n c t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d , a nd w i l l o c c u r more o f t e n , o r w i l l be more o f t e n c o n s i d e r e d n e c e s s a r y by g r o u p members, t h a n i n n o n - c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s . " T h i s phenomena i s i n c o n t r a s t t o a more p e r s o n a l a nd p a r t i c i p a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n l e a d e r s a n d o t h e r s y s t e m members w h i c h i s more s u i t a b l e a n d a p p r e c i a t e d d u r i n g n o r m a l t i m e s . A s t h e d e c i s i o n / a u t h o r i t y u n i t c o n t r a c t s , t h e amount o f s t r e s s p e r c e i v e d b y t h e d e c i s i o n m a k e r s i n c r e a s e s . E a c h member f e e l s a g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p o t e n t i a l f a i l u r e . A s s t r e s s i n c r e a s e s , t h e r e i s a h i g h e r p r o b -a b i l i t y o f n o n - a d a p t i v e i n d i v i d u a l b e h a v i o u r o c c u r r i n g . H o l s t i ( 1 9 7 1 , p. 58) s u g g e s t s : " . . . i n s i t u a t i o n s o f h i g h s t r e s s t h e r e i s a n a r r o w -i n g o f t h e c o g n i t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e moment, t h e i n d i v i d u a l l o s e s b r o a d e r p e r s e p c t i v e , he i s no l o n g e r a b l e t o s e e e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t s o f t h e s i t u a -t i o n a n d h i s b e h a v i o u r becomes c o n s e q u e n t l y l e s s a d a p t i v e . " T h i s m a l a d a p t i v e b e h a v i o u r c a n t a k e a number o f f o r m s . P a i g e ( 1 9 6 9 , p. 262) s u g g e s t s t h a t u n d e r g r e a t s t r e s s , d e c i s i o n makers become i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h s h o r t 95. r a n g e i s s u e s a t t h e e x p e n s e o f l o n g e r r a n g e p o s s i b l e o u t c o m e s . S t r e s s a l s o p r o m o t e s a r i g i d i t y i n p r o b l e m s o l v i n g s t y l e , o r f u n c t i o n a l f i x e d n e s s . L o o m i s ( 1 9 6 0 , p. 147) n o t e s : " . . . u n d e r s t r e s s t h e r e i s a t e n d e n c y t o i s o l a t e o n e s e l f f r o m i m m e d i a t e o n - g o i n g e v e n t s , a n d h o l d o n t o a f a m i l i a r , s t a b l e p e r c e p t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . " S t r e s s d e c r e a s e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s a b i l i t y t o p r o c e s s i n f o r m a t i o n a n d c o n s i d e r a l t e r n a t i v e s . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , i n s t e a d o f a w i d e r number o f a l t e r n a t i v e s b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d , w h i c h may p r o d u c e a b e t t e r d e c i s i o n , f e w e r a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e u s u a l l y c o n s i d e r e d . N a t h a n ( 1 9 7 5 , p. 259) s u m m a r i z e d t h e s i t u a t i o n : "The c o n s e n s u s o f m o s t b e h a v i o u r a l r e s e a r c h i s t h a t men o p e r a t i n g u n d e r . . . a c u t e s t r e s s a r e s c a r c e l y c a p a b l e o f c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t . S t r a i n a n d f a t i g u e commonly p r o d u c e a c t i o n s w h i c h a r e c a r i c a t u r e s o f d a y - t o - d a y b e h a v i o u r . C h a n ges i n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s p r o c e s s t h r o u g h o u t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s o c o n t r i b u t e t o a r e d u c e d p r o b a b i l i t y o f g o o d d e c i s i o n s . U n d e r c r i s i s i n d u c e d s t r e s s Hermann (1965) s u g g e s t s t h e number o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n c h a n n e l s u s e d f o r c o l l e c t i o n a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t a n d t h e r e s t o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l be r e d u c e d . T h i s . i s i n p a r t a r e s u l t o f a d e c r e a s e d 96. number of decision makers coupled with a high volume of information. Heavy frequency of information over a res-t r i c t e d number of channels re s u l t s i n a communications overload. Thus the p r o b a b i l i t y of d i s t o r t i o n of informa-t i o n increases which leads to decision error. Shortened time horizons also accentuate t h i s tendency. Fewer sources of information w i l l be r e l i e d on i f the decision unit perceives i t must make a decision quickly. As stress increases, there i s a higher p r o b a b i l i t y of increased c o n f l i c t between the decision unit and other organizational units. This i s manifested i n the form of factionalism and role c o n f l i c t . Certain units may view the actions of the decision unit as an infringement of th e i r power. This partly explains some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n implementation of decisions. A l l i s o n (1971) gives us the example of Kennedy's confrontation with the Navy dur-ing the Cuban M i s s i l e c r i s i s . Kennedy ordered the block-ade of Cuba moved closer to the island and gave instruc-tions that no ships were to be stopped without further orders from Excom. This was to allow the Soviets to back down i f possible and prevent the s i t u a t i o n from degenerat-ing into a l l - o u t c o n f l i c t . The Navy protested t h i s order b i t t e r l y and with open antagonism since they had developed the i r own procedures for handling such actions. The Navy also viewed the c r i s i s as primarily a m i l i t a r y action 97. while the decision unit wished to confine the c o n f l i c t to a p o l i t i c a l action. As well as certain i n d i v i d u a l pathologies that occur as a r e s u l t of stress, there are also group pathologies that can lead to a faul t y decision. We have already noted that under conditions of c r i s i s induced stress there i s a tendency for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the decision to be li m i t e d to a small number of in d i v i d u a l s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the i n d i -viduals included i n the decision unit w i l l be from the highest l e v e l s of the organization and they w i l l have the personal confidence of the head of state. Members w i l l usually be handpicked by the leader. Hermann (19 72, p. 288) notes: "...individuals who do not hold high l e v e l o f f i c e , w i l l not be included unless the head of state has extremely high personal confidence i n them." Thus i n many c r i s i s situations the central decision unit i s composed of a t i g h t l y k n i t , homogeneous group, led by a strong leader. The members, enjoying the confidence of the leader, and a l l being under considerable stress w i l l usually be insulated from the r e s t of the organiza-tion by the i r sense of great r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In such decision groups f a u l t y decisions can be made for a number of reasons. An i n s u f f i c i e n t number of alternatives may be considered. Under pressure, the decision unit may opt 98. for the most obvious action. For example, de Rivera suggests the U.S. never considered any other action i n 1950, except going to war against North Korea. The decision unit may f a i l to f u l l y evaluate the ramifications of a l l losses and gains of a p a r t i c u l a r a l t e r n a t i v e . There also may be wrong i n t e l l i g e n c e , information over-load, fatigue, or any number of personality defects. A l l of these things can contribute to very bad decisions. In addition, very special dynamics of the group structure i t s e l f , can contribute to error. Janis (1972) suggests that during c r i s e s , under a special combination of c i r -cumstances, in-group pressures i n the decision unit bring about a deterioration of mental e f f i c i e n c y , r e a l i t y testing and moral judgment. This promotes a condition which i s c a l l e d 'groupthink. 1. Janis (1972, p. 13) notes: "The concept of groupthink pinpoints an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t source of trouble, residing neither i n the i n d i v i d u a l nor i n the organizational setting. Over and beyond a l l the f a m i l i a r sources of human error i s a powerful source of defective judgment that arises i n cohesive groups — the concurrence-seeking tendency, which fosters overoptimism, lack of v i g i l a n c e , and s l o g a n i s t i c thinking about the weakness and immorality of out groups." The suggestion i s made that c e r t a i n fiascoes such as the 99. Bay o f P i g s i n v a s i o n a n d t h e d e c i s i o n t o e s c a l a t e t h e K o r e a n War o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e o f g r o u p t h i n k i n t h e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . I n d i v i d u a l s become c o m m i t t e d t o g r o u p d e c i s i o n s and a s a r e s u l t , t h e i r own p e r s o n a l a t t i t u d e s a n d m o d e l s o f r e a l i t y w i l l s h i f t t o r e f l e c t t h a t o f t h e g r o u p i n a n a t t e m p t t o m a i n t a i n i n n e r c o n s i s t e n c y . de R i v e r a ( 1 9 6 8 , p. 27) h a s a l s o n o t e d t h e e f f e c t s o f g r o u p p r e s s u r e s o n t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s s e n s e o f r e a l i t y : " . . . c h a n g i n g h i s v i e w o f r e a l i t y means l o s i n g e m o t i o n a l c o n t a c t w i t h t h e g r o u p , h i s b e l i e f s a r e a n c h o r e d i n w h a t t h e g r o u p p e r c e i v e s a s r e a l . " G r o u p t h i n k i s m o s t l i k e l y t o o c c u r u n d e r t h e f o l l o w -i n g c o n d i t i o n s : when t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t d i s p l a y s h i g h c o h e s i v e n e s s ; when t h e r e i s i n s u l a t i o n o f t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t f r o m t h e a d v i c e o f q u a l i f i e d e x p e r t s ; when t h e r e i s a c t i v e p r o m o t i o n o f a p r e f e r r e d s o l u t i o n b y a s t r o n g l e a d e r . C o h e s i v e g r o u p s a r e n o t a l l p r o n e t o g r o u p t h i n k , i t d e p e n d s upon w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e p r e s e n t d u r i n g t h e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . F o r e x a m p l e , v i r t u a l l y t h e same d e c i s i o n u n i t was i n v o l v e d i n t h e Bay o f P i g s i n v a s i o n and t h e Cuban M i s s i l e c r i s i s . The f i r s t d e c i s i o n was a n u n m i t i g a t e d d i s a s t e r , w h i l e t h e s e c o n d i s u s u a l l y c o n s i d e r e d a m o d e l o f r a t i o n a l c r i s i s d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . T h e r e a r e e i g h t m a j o r symptoms o f g r o u p t h i n k w h i c h a 100. decision unit may exhibit. F i r s t , groups develop an i l l u s i o n of i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y which i s shared by most members of the decision unit. This i l l u s i o n promotes excessive optimism and encourages decisions of very high r i s k . The group comes to believe i t can do nothing wrong. This i s much the same i l l u s i o n that was held by H i t l e r , on an i n d i v i d u a l basis, during the closing months of W.W. I I . There are also group attempts to r a t i o n a l i z e away any warnings which might lead to a reassessment of past policy decisions. The status quo i s usually accepted unquestioned. Third, groups come to display an i n v i o l a t e b e l i e f i n th e i r own morality. The e t h i c a l and moral consequences of th e i r decisions may be e n t i r e l y ignored. In addition, stereotyped views of the enemy are held. The adversary i s regarded as immoral and too e v i l to attempt genuine negotiations, or too stupid and weak to take any e f f e c t i v e counteractions. Such gross stereo-types can r e s u l t i n a. major decision error. In the 19 67 Middle East c r i s i s , the low regard with which Egypt held the I s r a e l i threat, blinded the country to i t s own danger. The Egyptian (and Arab) leadership showed symptoms of groupthink i n t h e i r stereotyped view of the I s r a e l i popu-l a t i o n . Laquer (1968, p. 102) t e l l s us: "The Arabs saw themselves as a brave, proud, and strong people, distinguished by a l l the manly v i r t u e s , 101. r e a d y f o r s a c r i f i c e , h e r o i c i n b a t t l e . The p o p u l a r image o f t h e Jew was, a t b e s t , t h a t o f a s m a l l m i n o r i t y d i s p e r s e d among t h e A r a b w o r l d and b a r e l y t o l e r a t e d , l e a d i n g a m a r g i n a l e x i s t e n c e , a s e c t o f m e r c h a n t s , m o n e y - l e n d e r s , many p o o r p e o p l e , and some i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The Jew was t h o u g h t t o be t h e v e r y o p p o s i t e o f t h e A r a b i n h i s l a c k o f p r i d e and m i l i t a r y q u a l i t i e s . " A f u r t h e r symptom o f g r o u p t h i n k , i s t h e a t t e m p t by t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t t o a p p l y p r e s s u r e t o any member who t r i e s t o e x p r e s s a v i e w p o i n t d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e d o m i n a n t g r o u p b e l i e f s . I n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e s e a t t e m p t s t o p r e s s u r e wayward members, t h e r e emerges t h e phenomena o f 'm i n d g u a r d s ' . T h e s e a r e s e l f - a p p o i n t e d members who t r y t o s h i e l d t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t f r o m a d v e r s e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t may go a g a i n s t s h a r e d b e l i e f s . J a n i s ( 1 9 7 2 , p. 42) s u g g e s t s t h a t Dean Rusk p l a y e d t h i s r o l e d u r i n g t h e d e c i -s i o n s t a g e o f t h e Bay o f P i g s i n v a s i o n . " ( R u s k ) . . . f u n c t i o n e d as a m i n d g u a r d , p r o t e c t i n g t h e l e a d e r and t h e members f r o m unwelcome i d e a s t h a t m i g h t s e t them t o t h i n k i n g a b o u t u n f a v o u r a b l e c o n -s e q u e n c e s o f t h e i r p r e f e r r e d c o u r s e o f a c t i o n and t h a t m i g h t l e a d t o d i s s e n s i o n i n s t e a d o f a c o m f o r t -a b l e c o n s e n s u s . " R o b e r t McNamara p l a y e d much t h e same r o l e i n d e b a t e s a b o u t 102. American involvement i n V i e t Nam. If the decision u n i t had known more about the V i e t Cong, more about Vietnamese society and had more information generally, perhaps the U.S. would not have become involved to such an extent. Halberstam (1972, p. 259) points out: "...one reason there was so l i t t l e knowledge about the enemy and the other side was that no one was as f o r c e f u l as he [McNamara] was i n blocking i t s entrance into the debates." A f i n a l symptom of groupthink i s the tendency for members of the decision unit to supress t h e i r own doubts about a p a r t i c u l a r course of action. This occurs not because of a lack of f a i t h i n one's own ideas, but through a fear of losing approval of one's fellow members. As a r e s u l t , there i s a shared i l l u s i o n of unanimity among the members about a course of action. This i s augmented by the assumption that silence means consent. In such a climate, the potential negative ramifications of a decision are never discussed. When a decision unit displays most of these symptoms in a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n , i t w i l l generally produce poor quality decisions that are l i k e l y to bring on a disaster for the organization. 103. 7.0 Post c r i s i s : the case of major dis l o c a t i o n s The evolution of new standard operating procedures, and the gradual reduction of stress i n decision units marks the end of a c r i s i s . A c r i s i s may have led to c r i t i c a l i r r e v e r s i b l e adjustments i n the organization and i t s resource base, or to temporary realignments which tend with the elimination of stress to reverse to the o r i g i n a l patterns. The p r o b a b i l i t y of returning to the 'old' regime depends upon the image developed through the c r i s i s episode, of i t s effectiveness and contribution to organizational s u r v i v a l and it's compatability with new ideologies or symbols which were triggered through the c r i s i s . The 'old regime' may be associated with normality and hence i t s return desired as a symbol of s t a b i l i t y , or i t may be associated by organizational constituencies with the cause of f a i l u r e , triggers of the c r i s i s , etc. and hence be r e s i s t e d i n t o t a l . Generally one expects some learning to occur, and expansion of standard operating procedures by those actions which seemed to be successful during the c r i s i s . B e l l (1971, p. 25) for example notes: " . . . c r i s i s management i s c e r t a i n l y a learned behaviour, and one must therefore expect the benefits of the learning curve to show up sooner or l a t e r . " If a crisis r e s u l t s i n major d i s l o c a t i o n i n the organ-104. i z a t i o n ( d i s a s t e r ) a n d i t s r e s o u r c e b a s e , s e v e r a l s p e c i a l a t t r i b u t e s t e n d t o g e n e r a l l y e v o l v e . M o s t o f t h e i n f o r m a -t i o n a b o u t t h e s e o r i g i n a t e f r o m s t u d i e s o f t h e a f t e r m a t h o f n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r s . F r i t z a n d M a r k s (1954) s u g g e s t t h a t one o f t h e m a j o r p r o b l e m s f a c i n g a n o r g a n i z a t i o n a f t e r a d i s a s t e r i s d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n o f i t s s y s t e m s . D i s r u p t i o n s o f t h e s o c i a l s y s t e m s a r e p a r t i c u a l r l y g r e a t i f t h e d i s -a s t e r was o f a n u n f a m i l i a r t y p e a n d / o r l i t t l e w a r n i n g h a d b e e n g i v e n b e f o r e i m p a c t o f t h e t h r e a t ( i . e . , b o m b i n g s o f N a g a s a k i and H i r o s h i m a ) . I n t h e a f t e r m a t h o f d i s a s t e r s , o r g a n i z a t i o n s may show e v i d e n c e o f s y s t e m f r a g m e n t a t i o n . A t t e m p t s a t r e s t o r a -t i v e a c t i o n s a r e made b u t v a r i o u s g r o u p s a n d i n d i v i d u a l s w o r k i n d e p e n d e n t l y , o f t e n w i t h d u p l i c a t i o n a n d w a s t e d e f f o r t . T h e r e i s l i t t l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n g r o u p s a nd i n f o r m a t i o n f o r t h e common good o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n i s n o t s h a r e d . T h e r e i s h i g h m o t i v a t i o n f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members t o engage i n a c t i v i t y b u t a l o w l e v e l o f e f f e c t i v e -n e s s . Some r e s e a r c h e r s h a v e c a l l e d t h i s s t a t e t h e ' c o u n t e r -d i s a s t e r s y n d r o m e ' ( B a r t o n , 1 9 6 3 ) . I n i t i a l l y t h e r e a r e f e e l i n g s o f h i g h g r o u p s o l i d a r i t y a n d h i g h m o r a l e w h i c h a i d s r e o r g a n i z a t i o n a t t e m p t s . H owever, t h e f o r m e r h i e r -a r c h i c a l a n d s t a t u s r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i l l g r a d u a l l y r e t u r n a s t h e f i r s t e f f e c t s o f t h e d i s a s t e r d i s s i p a t e . F o r a n i n d i v i d u a l , t h e e f f e c t s o f a d i s a s t e r c a n 105. cause acute psychological disturbances. In p a r t i c u l a r , Faber (1967) notes that i n d i v i d u a l s who have suffered the trauma of war, may tend to become paranoid, aggressive, and have low s e l f esteem. Psychosomatic i l l n e s s e s , chronic depression and acute psychoses are also more serious conditions that can develop. The bombing of Hiroshima resulted i n immense disl o c a t i o n s of a l l facets of society but p a r t i c u l a r l y affected i n d i v i d u a l survivors. L i f t o n (1964) notes that even 17 years a f t e r the event, interviews with survivors of Hiroshima indicated that they manifested severe psychological e f f e c t s such as feelings of doom and f u t i l i t y . After c r i s e s that end i n disasters, there i s a major functional need for strong and authori-t a t i v e leadership to coordinate organizational acti v i t i e s , , (Farber, 1967 and Williams, 1957). However, some of the effects of these various psychological conditions on leaders may hamper the i r c a p a b i l i t i e s to provide t h i s strong leadership. (Most studies on the ef f e c t s of d i s -asters have been confined to North American s i t u a t i o n s . There are c u l t u r a l differences which w i l l a f f e c t i n d i v i d u a l responses.) In the wake of disasters there appears to be a need on the part of individuals and organizations to reconcile events with current b e l i e f s and value systems or to provide some explanation for the disaster. For instance 106. some cultures may a t t r i b u t e to the disaster some r e l i g i o u s s ignificance ( i . e . , 'the w i l l of God'). Organizations may try to place the blame on scapegoats — either c e r t a i n individuals ( i . e . Watergate conspirators) or on outgroups ( i . e . , Jews have blamed at various times for everything from the Black Plague to m i l i t a r y defeats): In the a f t e r -math of W.W. I, m i l l i o n s of Germans refused to accept the fact of a m i l i t a r y defeat at the hands of the A l l i e s . They instead, preferred to believe that Germany had been betrayed by the c i v i l i a n government of the Social Demo-c r a t i c Party which had formed a new republican government when the Kaiser f l e d . Shirer (1959, p. 54) notes: "(the republican government)...was not responsible for the German collapse. The blame for that rested on the old order which had held power. But m i l l i o n s of Germans refused to concede t h i s . They had to f i n d scapegoats for the defeat and for t h e i r humilia-tion and misery. They e a s i l y convinced themselves that they had found them i n the 'November criminals' who had signed the surrender and established demo-c r a t i c government i n the place of the old autocracy." Perversely, i n the aftermath of a disaster individuals discount the p r o b a b i l i t y of a similar event occurring. There i s a fa u l t y perception of r i s k . In studies of flood p l a i n hazards, Burton, Kates and White (1968) note a 107. t e n d e n c y f o r i n d i v i d u a l s t o endow n a t u r a l h a z a r d s w i t h a r i g i d p e r i o d i c i t y . F o r e x a m p l e i f t h e r e i s a r i s k o f a f l o o d i n a n a r e a e v e r y 10 y e a r s , i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l assume t h a t i t w i l l o c c u r a t e x a c t l y 10 y e a r i n t e r v a l s a n d d i s c o u n t t h e i r r i s k a t o t h e r t i m e s . I n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n a t i o n may c o n t i n u e t o f o l l o w t h e same p o l i c i e s a f t e r a d i s a s t e r , t h a t l e d i t t o d i s a s t e r i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . The p r o b a b i l i t y o f a s i m i l a r d i s a s t e r o c c u r r i n g a s a r e s u l t o f c e r t a i n p o l i c i e s may be d i s c o u n t e d . Some o f t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s m e n t i o n e d s u g g e s t t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n s do n o t l e a r n f r o m a d i s a s t e r . R a t h e r m e t h o d s a r e s o u g h t t o r a t i o n a l i z e d e f e a t s . No c h a n g e s i n b e h a v i o u r o c c u r t h a t m i g h t p r e v e n t a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n ( i . e . , t h e A r a b s d i d n o t show e v i d e n c e o f l e a r n i n g b e h a v i o u r i n s p i t e o f t h r e e d e f e a t s a t t h e h a n d s o f I s r a e l i n 1948, 1956 a n d 1967) . 108. 8.0 Prescriptions for c r i s i s prevention and management In the preceding sections of th i s paper an attempt was made to i d e n t i f y (1) those circumstances- which contribute to the onset of a c r i s i s i n a decision unit, (2) the co n s t e l l a t i o n of relationships within the decision unit and among decision units that a f f e c t the nature and qual i t y of c r i s i s dynamics and resolution and f i n a l l y (3) those processes of realignment which follow a c r i s i s . This examination suggests some problem areas in which improvements may (1) prevent c r i s e s or reduce th e i r frequencies, or (2) improve decision q u a l i t y during a c r i s i s period and prevent counter productive consequences of chosen actions or (3) improve the effectiveness of post c r i s i s restor-ation processes, leading to better realignment with new environ-ments. In th i s section we exploit the diagnostic findings of the previous sections to generate alt e r n a t i v e prescriptions for c r i s i s prevention and management as well as post c r i s i s realignment. The proposals presented here must be considered only as i l l u s t r a t i o n s , as no universal comprehensive solutions e x i s t and often improvement i n one problem dimension may lead to creation of new problems. Preventing c r i s e s or reducing t h e i r frequencies-A c t i v i t i e s of c r i s i s prevention consist of elimination of potential sources of threats, r i s k spreading and impact buffering and decision and psychological preparedness. 109. As a group, decision units may improve t h e i r system of int e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s to minimize the chance of unintended con-sequences. This can be achieved by the strengthening of the international machinery of c o n f l i c t resolution, through improved international communication networks, bargaining procedures and generation of equilibrium maintenance systems, e.g. building an e f f e c t i v e international deterrence system. Individual decision units may eliminate sources of c o n f l i c t s by increasing alignment of p r i o r i t i e s through side-bets which increase incentives for concerted actions manifesting themselves i n the extreme, through formal p o l i t i c a l unions (horizontal and v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n ) . More frequently these side-bets are achieved through i n t e r -national trade li n k s providing mutual advantages to a l l partners. The international l e g i t i m i z a t i o n of non-violent behavioral modes, complemented by enrichment of diplomacy as a vehicle for conducting international r e l a t i o n s i s another building block in the e f f o r t for minimization of unintended consequences of the dynamics of international r e a l t i o n s . Diplomacy, for example, by creating a regimented culture with new sets of norms and symbols provides an arena for bargaining where noise r e s u l t i n g from domination of incongruent c u l t u r a l - s p e c i f i c norms and symbols i s minimized. Trained professionals (diplomats) carry-out the i n t r i c a t e process of cross national communication and bargaining. The diplomatic arena provides mechanisms for c o n f l i c t - d i f f u s i o n through a repertoire of issue-diversion 110. m e c h a n i s m s , w h i c h p e r m i t a g r a d u a l s h i f t o f f o c u s f r o m non e s s e n t i a l c o n f l i c t d o m a i n s t o c r i t i c a l d o m a i n s . ( F o r e x a m p l e , d i s c u s s i o n o f s e a t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s , l o c a t i o n o f t h e n e g o t i a -t i o n s , e t c . a r e i m p o r t a n t m e c h a n i s m s o f i s s u e d i v e r s i o n , w h i c h p r o v i d e e x c e l l e n t t r a i n i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r n e g o t i a t o r s , o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r i n i t i a l c a t h a r s i s , and t h r o u g h t h e i r r e s o l u -t i o n , p r o v i d e a momentum t o t h e n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s . ) I n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n u n i t s may u n i l a t e r a l l y r e d u c e s o u r c e s o f c o n f l i c t by m a i n t a i n i n g a p o s i t i o n o f s t r e n g t h w h i c h b a l a n c e s on t h e one h a n d , t h e demands f o r h i g h e r s t r e n g t h i m p o s e d by t h e o b j e c t i v e o f r e d u c i n g p r e d a t o r y t e m p t a t i o n s f r o m p o t e n t i a l o p p o n e n t s , and on t h e o t h e r h and d o e s n o t i n d u c e f e a r s and m i s t r u s t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e t r u e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t . [ I n t h e p a s t , arms t e c h n o l o g y p e r m i t t e d an e a s i e r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n d e f e n s i v e and o f f e n s i v e w e a p o n a r y . S u c h d i s t i n c t i o n s a t p r e s e n t a r e o b s o l e t e . ] I n a c h i e v i n g a b a l a n c e d s t r e n g t h , due a t t e n t i o n m u s t be p a i d t o t h e i n t e r n a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f s u c h a p o s t u r e . C r e a t i o n o f a f o r e c e f u l i n t e r n a l i n t e r e s t g r o u p r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e m i l i t a r y and i t s a s s o c i a t e d i n d u s t r i a l c o m p l e x , i f n o t c o n t a i n e d , may l e a d t o e x c e s s e s o f power b u i l d i n g b e y o n d t h o s e l e v e l s n e c e s s a r y t o a v o i d p r e d a t o r s . T h e s e e x c e s s e s may p r o v i d e t h e s e e d s f o r an arms r a c e a n d i n c r e a s e t h e e v e n t u a l p r o b a b i l i t y o f c o n f l i c t . I n a w o r l d w h e r e t h r e a t e n i n g e v e n t s a r e r a r e , t h e i m p a c t o f s u c h an e v e n t upon t h e s t a t e o f t h e d e c i s i o n u n i t may be s e v e r e and t h e s u r p r i s e a n d s t r e s s g e n e r a t e d by i t may r e d u c e 111. s i g n i f i c a n t l y t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s c o p i n g a b i l i t i e s . T h e r e f o r e , a p r o g r a m o f c r i s i s p r e v e n t i o n must c o n s i d e r two a d d i t i o n a l c l a s s e s o f a c t i v i t i e s : (1) R i s k s p r e a d i n g a n d b u f f e r i n g ( 2 ) P s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r e p a r e d n e s s The two most p r o m i n a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l mechanisms f o r s p r e a d i n g r i s k s a r e a) d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and b) d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . A d e c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e p e r m i t s l o c a l c o n t a i n m e n t o f i m p a c t . In a d e c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e , autonomy o f sub u n i t s and a measure o f i n d e p e n d e n c e among them r e d u c e s t h e c h a n c e t h a t i a s i n g l e e v e n t w o u l d l e a d t o a t o t a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e o r g a n i -z a t i o n . D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n a s a means o f r i s k s p r e a d i n g may m a n i f e s t i t s e l f p h y s i c a l l y ( e . g . s p r e a d i n g i n d u s t r i a l c o m p l e x e s o v e r a wide a r e a ) a n d / o r i n terms o f d e c i s i o n n e t w o r k s ( e . g . r e d u c i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f " h e a d q u a r t e r s " and c o m m u n i c a t i o n l i n e s between u n i t s ) . D i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i n t e r m s o f i n t e r e s t s , t e c h n o l o g i e s and r e s o u r c e s , l i k e d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , h e l p s t o c o n t a i n t h e i m p a c t o f an e v e n t . W h i l e i n t h e c a s e o f d e c e n t r a l i -z a t i o n , i m p a c t c o n t a i n m e n t i s a c h i e v e d by l o c a l i z a t i o n , d i v e r -s i f i c a t i o n l e a d s t o c o n t a i n m e n t o f an e v e n t i m p a c t , i n a p a r -t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n . D i v e r s i f i c a t i o n o f i n t e r e s t s i s a c h i e v e d by encour a g e m e n t o f s i d e - b e t t a k i n g , and i s e q u i -v a l e n t t o a b s o r b i n g an i m p a c t t h r o u g h i n s u r a n c e . B u i l d i n g b u f f e r s t o a b s o r b t h e i m p a c t o f an e v e n t c a n be a c c o m p l i s h e d i n s e v e r a l ways. S l a c k b u i l d i n g o r p l a n n e d 1 1 2 . i n e f f i c i e n c i e s are one common form of buffering. Organizations, by building overlapping systems, hedge against possible f a i l u r e i n a system component. Inventories of resources which can be mobilized to meet unexpected contingencies are another form of buffering. With improvement i n early warning systems the need and the extent of buffers required i s reduced. The quality of organizational i n t e l l i g e n c e assumes therefore an important weight i n determining the trade off between planned i n e f f i c i e n c i e s and the demands for buffers. Preparedness both i n psychological terms and i n terms of decision c a p a b i l i t i e s , i s an important determinant i n inducing stress r e s u l t i n g from surprise, and i n the a b i l i t y of an organization to cope with the event. As we indicated previously, r a r i t y of events contribute to the surprise they generate once they occur. An organization which i s engaged i n constant d r i l l s i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of rare events may avoid the s t r a t e g i c damage inherent i n surprise. Constant scanning of the organiza-t i o n a l environment for possible threats, coupled with imagina-t i v e scenario construction of yet unrealized contingencies, may reduce the chance of. surprise. Institutions with major r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for i d e n t i f y i n g possible rare events with threat p o t e n t i a l , which are freed from day to day organizationl decision making may o f f e r a possible advantage to the organi-zation i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of the future. The problem associated with such independent centers however, i s that of c r e d i b i l i t y . O f t e n t h e h y p e r - i n n o v a t i v e t e n d e n c i e s o f s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s r e s u l t i n a l o s s o f c r e d i b i l i t y a nd i s o l a t i o n f r o m p o w e r , w i t h r e s u l t i n g i n a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s . I n v o l v i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members t h r o u g h r o t a t i o n i n a c t i v i t i e s o f s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s may e l i m i n a t e t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t t h i s p r o b l e m o f c r e d i b i l i t y . E n r i c h m e n t o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e p e r t o i r e o f r e s p o n s e s ( c o n t i n g e n c y p l a n s ) w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e s e n s i t i v e t r i g g e r mech-a n i s m s may r e d u c e t h e c h a n c e o f c r i s i s , b y e i t h e r m i t i g a t i n g a g a i n s t t h e s e r i o u s n e s s o f a n e v e n t by a t i m e l y a p p r o p r i a t e r e s p o n s e , o r by r e d u c i n g s u r p r i s e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t . F i n a l l y a p r o g r a m f o r c r i s i s p r e v e n t i o n m u s t c o n s i d e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n maker and h i s a b i l i t y t o a v o i d s t r e s s , o r h a n d l e i t . C a r e f u l s e l e c t i o n o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members p o s i t i o n e d i n s t r e s s p r o n e p o s i t i o n s , n o t m e r e l y by t e c h n i c a l c o m p e t e n c e and know-how, b u t a l s o i n t e r m s o f c a p a b i l i t i e s t o h a n d l e s t r e s s i s d e s i r a b l e . A v a r i e t y o f s t r e s s r e d u c i n g t e c h n i q u e s i s a v a i l a b l e , and s u c h t e c h n i q u e s c a n be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e d a i l y r o u t i n e o f a p p r o p r i a t e r o l e p l a y e r s . A l t e r n a -t i v e l y , r o t a t i o n o f r o l e p l a y e r s o r t h e i r r e p l a c e m e n t d u r i n g h i g h s t r e s s d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s w i t h new r o l e p l a y e r s s e l e c t e d a n d t r a i n e d f o r t h e s e s i t u a t i o n s i s a n o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y w h i c h c a n be e x e r c i s e d . 114 . Management o f c r i s i s P r e s c r i p t i o n s o f management o f c r i s i s c o v e r t h e t o t a l d o main o f management and t h e i n f i n i t e c o n t i n g e n c i e s i t may-f a c e . I t i s t h e r e f o r e i n f e a s i b l e t o p r o v i d e g e n e r a l p r e s c r i p -t i o n s . I n t h i s s e c t i o n we a t t e m p t t o f o c u s o n l y upon some o f t h e p r o m i n a n t p a t h o l o g i e s w h i c h were a s s o c i a t e d i n t h e l i t e r a -t u r e w i t h c r i s i s management. T a b l e 1 i s a summary o f t h e s e m a j o r p r o b l e m s and t h e f a c t o r s u n d e r l y i n g them w i t h some s u g g e s t e d s o l u t i o n s . Many o f t h e p r e s c r i p t i o n s o f f e r e d w i l l have a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on c o u n t e r a c t i n g - x s o m e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p a t h o l o g i e s . However t h e y a r e n o t w i t h o u t drawbacks i n t h e f o r m o f u n d e s i r a b l e s i d e e f f e c t s . The m a j o r p o i n t t o r e c o g n i z e , i s t h a t improvements t y p i c a l l y come a t a c o s t . The b a l a n c e o f c o s t s and b e n e f i t s d e p e n d s upon t h e c o n t i n g e n c y , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and t h e p a r t i c u l a r r o l e p l a y e r s i n t h e d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n . We s h a l l a t t e m p t t o i l l u s t r a t e some o f t h e s e t r a d e - o f f s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g more d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n o f some s u g g e s t e d s o l u t i o n s t o p r e v e n t s o u r c e s o f low q u a l i t y d e c i s i o n m a k i n g d u r i n g a c r i s i s . P r e v e n t i o n o f p r e m a t u r e c o n s e n s u s Dominant l e a d e r s h i p has been r e c o g n i z e d as an e l e m e n t o f g r o u p d y n a m i c s t h a t c a n l e a d t o e r r o r i n t h e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s , p a r t i c u l a r l y as s u c h l e a d e r s h i p p r o m o t e s a t o o q u i c k c o n v e r g e n c e on a s i n g l e a l t e r n a t i v e , t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e s Major Problems C o n t r i b u t i n g F a c t o r s S o l u t i o n s premature consensus: l i m i t e d number of a l t e r n a t i v e s considered s t r o n g c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p may promote a p r e f e r r e d s o l u t i o n reduced c o g n i t i v e a b i l i t i e s as a r e s u l t of i n c r e a s e d s t r e s s l i m i t e d i n f o r m a t i o n from fewer sources as a r e s u l t of the pressures & s t r e s s r e d u c t i o n i n d e c i s i o n u n i t s i z e -fewer a l t e r n a t i v e p o i n t s of view from a l l p a r t s of o r g a n i z a t i o n ( i n s u l a t i o n ) f u n c t i o n a l f i x e d n e s s i n problem s o l v i n g a t t e n t i o n t o shor t range i s s u e s a t the expense - of long range - leader should ericouarge c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n and po i n t s of view ( J a n i s , 1971) - leader should remain n o n - e v a l u a t i v e a t o u t s e t of p o l i c y s e s s i o n (Thibaut & K e l l e y , 1961) - r o t a t e d e c i s i o n members or .have separate c r i s i s & n o n - c r i s i s d e c i s i o n u n i t s - development of s t r e s s p r o f i l e s on' l e a d e r s and use of s t r e s s r e d u c t i o n techniques (T.M., R e l a x a t i o n ) - d r i l l s to t o l e r a t e s t r e s s (develop coping mech-anisms through behavior m o d i f i c a t i o n techniques) - v a r i a t i o n of group members to expose a l t e r n a t i v e p o i n t s of view (Maier, 1967) - e x p l i c i t idea & a l t e r n a t i v e g e n e r a t i o n d i f f e r e n t from c u r r e n t s o l u t i o n f o r a s t r u c t u r e d p e r i o d - members of d e c i s i o n u n i t should d i s c u s s proceed-ings w i t h a s s o c i a t e s i n t h e i r own u n i t s & seek f r e s h opinions & r e a c t i o n s which are r e p o r t e d back to the d e c i s i o n u n i t ( J a n i s , 1971) - i n v i t e o u t s i d e experts to g i v e t h e i r o p i n i o n s to the d e c i s i o n group - u s e of c r e a t i v e problem s o l v i n g techniques f o r a l t e r n a t i v e g e neration ( b r a i n s t o r m i n g , s y n e c t i c s , morphology, etc.) (Arnold, 1962; S t e i n , 1974) - s h i f t focus d e l i b e r a t e l y to evaluate L.R. i s s u e s - develop s p e c i a l i z e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to advocate the long range p e r s p e c t i v e - i n t e n t i o n a l generation of a d d i t i o n a l a l t e r n a -t i v e s w ith long range focus by e n t i r e d e c i s i o n group i n f o r m a t i o n d i s t o r t i o r i n f o r m a t i o n o v e r l o a d as a r e s u l t of reduced s i z e of the d e c i s i o n u n i t & i n c r e a s e d i n f o r m a t i o n i n p u t s - time delays i n i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s b e t t e r scanning techniques & e f f i c i e n t m o n i t o r i n g devices to f l a g trends above t h r e s h o l d l e v e l s ; s p e c i a l formats of i n f o r m a t i o n p r e s e n t a t i o n s p e c i a l i n f o r m a t i o n systems f o r c r i s i s based on data compression & e f f e c t i v e sampling techniques s p e c i a l communications channels ( h o t l i n e s ) s p e c i a l c r i s i s u n i t s f o r data assembly & c o o r d i n . s e t up o u t s i d e channels o f i n f o r m a t i o n t o cut through h i e r a r c h y development of new f l e x i b l e S.O.P.'s £ — : : : f»— CONTINUED i n f o r m a t i o n d i s t o r t i o n (continued) p e r s o n a l b i a s e s to accept agreeable i n f o r m a t i o n - mindguards stereotypes of the adversary ( e v i l , s t u p i d , e t c . ) , c u l t u r a l b l o c k s * - d i v e r s i f i a c t i o n of jobs - r o l e p l a y i n g ; psychodramas - p r o t e c t i o n of m i n o r i t y p o i n t s of view - d i r e c t communications w i t h o u t s i d e groups not p a r t of the d e c i s i o n u n i t - c o n s t r u c t a l t e r n a t i v e s c e n a r i o s of adversary's a l t e r n a t i v e s ( J a n i s , 1971) - c a r e f u l l y r e - c o n s i d e r & r e - i n t e r p r e t s i g n a l s from adversary - use of e x p e r t a d v i c e on f o r e i g n c u l t u r e s ; c r o s s -c u l t u r a l t r a i n i n g e r r o r s i n judgment i l l u s i o n s of i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y of d e c i s i o n group and h i g h r i s k p r o p e n s i t y * r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of warnings which may f o r c e a reassessment of c u r r e n t p o l i c i e s * b e l i e f i n the i n h e r e n t m o r a l i t y of the d e c i s i o n group* pressures on members to conform to accepted group p o l i c i e s * suppression of p e r s o n a l doubts* c o g n i t i v e b i a s e s & f a u l t y c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n independent resource & c a p a b i l i t y a p p r a i s a l s s h i f t r i s k p r o p e n s i t y from group l e v e l to lower i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l s - p r e v i o u s l y r e c o r d a c c e p t a b l e r i s k l e v e l s before a l t e r n a t i v e i s s e l e c t e d c o n s t r u c t worst outcome s c e n a r i o s f o r r e a l i s t i c a p p r a i s a l of s e r i o u s n e s s of proposed a l t e r n a t i v e s a t l e a s t one member of d e c i s i o n group should be assigned the r o l e of d e v i l ' s advocate ( J a n i s , 1971; Mason, 1969) . s t r u c t u r e d e v a l u a t i o n of each p r o p o s a l , empha-s i z i n g negative aspects ( d i a l e c t i c a l approach) (Mason, 1969) f o r m a t i o n of subgroups to reduce the p o s s i b i l i t y of the group dev e l o p i n g a concurrence - seeking norm p r o t e c t i o n of m i n o r i t y s t y l e s d i a l e c t i c approach and/or independent groups to work on the same problems but w i t h d i f f e r e n t l e a d e r s l e a d e r must encourage e x p r e s s i o n of o b j e c t i o n s & doubts ( J a n i s , 1971; Maier, 1967) anonymous channels f o r e x p r e s s i o n of o p i n i o n & p r o v i s i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n t o group ( d e l p h i tech.) formal b i a s c o r r e c t i n g programs (computer r o u t i n e s ) f o r assessment of s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) CONTINUED Table 1 (Continued) Major Problems C o n t r i b u t i n g F a c t o r s S o l u t i o n s implementation d i f f i c u l t i e s l a c k of m o t i v a t i o n and/or sense or urgency S.O.P's P o l i t i c a l games-dif-f e r e n t goals. r o l e c o n f l i c t s ( A l l i s o n (1971) Model I I & I I I u n i t s don't understand Or are a l i e n a t e d expand o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e t o i n c l u d e more groups i n d e c i s i o n making (Maier, 1967) ( N a t i o n a l u n i t y governments) . ' independent p o l i c y planning & e v a l u a t i o n groups composed of members from a c t i o n , u n i t s i n d o c t r i n a t i o n programs (goal t r a i n i n g to c r e a t e c l i m a t e ) manipulate r i t u a l s to focus on primary goa l s place t r u s t e d people i n the f i e l d to c o o r d i n a t e d r i l l s to s y n t h e s i z e c r i s e s t r i g g e r i n g cues f o r automatic implementation c l a r i f i c a t i o n of communications - shorten channels Note: groupthink strong c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p cohesiveness i n s u l a t i o n from o r g a n i z a t i o n produce symptoms marked w i t h a s t e r i s k (*) O 115. ( J a n i s , 1971; M a i e r , 1 9 6 7 ) . T h i s t e n d e n c y c a n be a l l e v i a t e d by t h e d e c i s i o n l e a d e r e n c o u r a g i n g c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n o f p o l i t i c e s , p e r h a p s a s s i g n i n g a s p e c i f i c r o l e t o e a c h g r o u p member and e n c o u r a g i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f a v a r i e t y o f d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s o f v i e w and e x p r e s s i o n s o f d o u b t s . V a r y i n g o p i n i o n s f r o m members a r e more l i k e l y t o be c o n s i d e r e d i f , as T h i b a u t and K e l l e y (1961) s u g g e s t , t h e l e a d e r r e f r a i n s f r o m c r t i c i a l e v a l u a -t i o n , b u t m e r e l y a c t s t o g u i d e t h e d i s c u s s i o n . W h i l e t h i s p r o c e d u r e c a n work i f t h e l e a d e r i s c o m m i t t e d t o e n s u r i n g c r i t i c a l a p p r a i s a l , i t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r most o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members t o overcome t r a d i t i o n a l h e i r a r c h i c a l norms o f d e f e r e n c e t o t h e l d a d e r . I f one g r o u p o r i n d i v i d u a l i s i n t e n t on p l e a s -i n g t h e l e a d e r , t h e p r o c e s s can-be s u b v e r t e d . J a n i s (1971) p o i n t s o u t t h a t open c r i t i c i s m i n d e b a t e s c a n l e a d t o damaged f e e l i n g s i f members a r e c a r r i e d away i n t h e i r r o l e s o f c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t o r s . He n o t e s (p. 210)': " F e e l i n g s o f r e j e c t i o n , d e p r e s s i o n , and a n g e r m i g h t be e v o k e d so o f t e n when t h i s r o l e a s s i g n m e n t i s p u t i n t o p r a c t i c e t h a t i t c o u l d have a c o r r o s i v e e f f e c t on m o r a l e and w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e g r o u p . " I m p a r t i a l i t y by t h e l e a d e r i n a d i s c u s s i o n may a l s o be a draw-b a c k . The g r o u p may be d e p r i v e d o f t h e s e r v i c e s o f one o f t h e b e s t d e c i s i o n makers i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . The r e s u l t may be a p o o r e r d e c i s i o n t h a n w o u l d have o t h e r w i s e r e s u l t e d i f t h e l e a d e r p a r t i c i p a t e d . T h e r e i s a l s o t h e d a n g e r t h a t n o n d i r e c t i o n by t h e l e a d e r may r e s u l t i n a d e c i s i o n w h i c h i s c o m p l e t e l y unacceptable to him. The proper r o l e of the leader obviously l i e s somewhere between the two extremes. C r i t i c i a l evaluation and the exploration of a wide range of policy alternatives i s a time consuming process. The organization may not have the time to adopt such procedures. Es p e c i a l l y i n international c r i s e s , a decision on a response must be reached very quickly to head o f f a potential d i s a s t e r . In c r i s e s periods the l e v e l of f e l t stress on the decision unit i s very high, contributing to reduced cognitive a b i l i t i e s . Increased alternative generation and evaluation may have the e f f e c t of contributing to information overload. This i n turn w i l l increase the p r o b a b i l i t y of problems of information d i s -t o r t i o n occurring — another source of error. Solutions such as i n v i t i n g the opinions of outside experts, seeking opinions from associates i n the organization and e x p l i c i t idea genera-ti o n through use of creative problem solving techniques (brain-storming, synectics, etc.) while preventing premature consensus, also substantially increase the p r o b a b i l i t y of information overload. Janis (1971) also notes that while the use of out-side experts and trusted associates provides the decision unit with fresh perspectives, there i s always the danger of a breach of security or an information leak i n an expanded group. If expert assistance i s to be used e f f e c t i v e l y , i t must be consulted early i n the decision process before the group has started to converge on a p a r t i c u l a r a l t e r n a t i v e . For example, Senator W. Fulbright was i n v i t e d by President Kennedy to express his 117. opinion on the proposed U.S. Bay of Pigs Invasion. He pointed out to the decision group some of the undesirable p o l i t i c a l and moral consequences of the plan. However, since Fulbright had been in v i t e d to give his views a f t e r a decision had been reached, his advice went unheeded. Special e f f o r t should be made by the leader to ensure that a long range perspective i s introduced into the delibera-tions by assigning special r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to certa i n members for developing such a focus. Incremental decisions made for short run expediency may have severe consequences on future p o l i c i e s and negotiating positions. Halberstam (1972) suggests that i n part, U.S. problems i n Vi e t Nam resulted from a series of short-sighted actions over many years with l i t t l e thought to long term ramifications or o v e r a l l /American policy i n S.E. Asia. Preventing information d i s t o r t i o n Information overload i s a serious problem for decision units given the requirements of increased information flows versus the d e b i l i t a t i n g e f f e c t s of increased stress and shortened time horizons during a c r i s i s . More information does not necessarily mean better information however. Improved scanning techniques and monitoring devices of the information environ-ment and presentation i n special formats can help ensure that information received by the decision unit i s of the proper 118. quality as well as a managable quantity. Special information systems may be developed for c r i s i s situations working on the basis of data compression through e f f e c t i v e sampling tech-niques and flagging only those c r i t i c a l trends above a given threshold. Such special systems could include extraordinary channels of communication to cut through the organizational hierarchy and i n some instances, to u t i l i z e d i r e c t l i n k s with the environment ( i . e . the hotline between America and Russia). These techniques w i l l also help reduce the e f f e c t s of time delays and decision unit i n s u l a t i o n as well as the screening process performed by various le v e l s of the hierarchy as informa-tion i s f i l t e r e d upward (A l l i s o n 1971) . However i n terms of resources, such systems can be costly for the organization. In many instances, personnel can be diverted from th e i r regular pursuits to man these ' c r i s i s systems' but t h i s may only be at the expense of other parts of the organization's day-to-day functioning. Most c e r t a i n l y there are costs of system develop-ment that must be incurred. Expansion of organizational systems may also have the drawback of making the organization more unwieldly, e s p e c i a l l y i n the a b i l i t y to e f f e c t coordination. Through the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of subgroups there i s an increased danger of empire building which can lead to intra-organizational c o n f l i c t and bargaining. This i n turn w i l l a f f e c t the a b i l i t y to implement decisions. Major contributing factors to information d i s t o r t i o n are the roles played by personal biases and stereotypes of the 119. a d v e r s a r y . J a n i s (1971) a d v o c a t e s t h e u s e o f r o l e p l a y i n g a n d / o r p s y c h o - d r a m a s a s a means o f o v e r c o m i n g t h e i n f l u e n c e o f s t e r e o t y p e s and a i d i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e a d v e r s a r y . S c e n a r i o b u i l d i n g i s a n o t h e r t e c h n i q u e w h i c h p r o m o t e s u n d e r -s t a n d i n g o f a r i v a l ' s a c t i o n s and w a r n i n g s and e n a b l e s t h e d e c i s i o n g r o u p t o p r e d i c t p r o b a b l e r e s p o n s e s t o an a c t i o n w i t h g r e a t e r a c c u r a c y . S u c h r o l e p l a y i n g c a n be e x p a n d e d t o i n c l u d e g e n e r a l c r i s i s t r a i n i n g o r d r i l l s w h i c h a l s o h a s t h e s e c o n d a r y e f f e c t o f r e d u c i n g s t r e s s o n i n d i v i d u a l s when a r e a l c r i s i s comes a l o n g . We m u s t r e c o g n i z e h o w e v e r , t h a t t e c h n i q u e s l i k e r o l e p l a y i n g and c r o s s - c u l t u r a l t r a i n i n g a r e g e n e r a l l y t o o t i m e c o n s u m i n g t o u t i l i z e e x t e n s i v e l y d u r i n g t h e o n g o i n g p e r i o d o f a c r i s i s . I d e a l l y t h e s e t e c h n i q u e s s h o u l d be d e v e l o p e d a s p a r t o f a p r e c r i s i s t r a i n i n g p a c k a g e . P r e v e n t i o n o f e r r o r s i n j u d g m e n t M o s t e r r o r s o f j u d g m e n t a r e t h e r e s u l t o f g r o u p d y n a m i c s and a r e m a n i f e s t e d i n symptoms o f •'• . g r o u p t h i n k ' . S o l u -t i o n s t o s u c h p r o b l e m s o f h i g h r i s k p r o p e n s i t y a n d i l l u s i o n s o f i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y c a n be f o u n d t h r o u g h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f r o l e p l a y i n g and s c e n a r i o b u i l d i n g p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d . I n a d d i t i o n , a t t e m p t s s h o u l d be made t o s h i f t r i s k p r o p e n s i t y f r o m g r o u p t o a n i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l , s i n c e t h i s w i l l be c o n s i d e r a b l y l o w e r . T e c h n i q u e s s u c h a s c o n s t r u c t i o n o f w o r s t o u t c o m e s c e n a r i o s w i l l 120. aid i n evaluating the seriousness of proposed actions r e a l i s -t i c a l l y and reduce the propensity toward high r i s k a l t e r n a t i v e s . Since units subject to 'groupthink' try to r a t i o n a l i z e away warnings and other disturbing data that may require a re-evaluation of policy, to ensure f u l l evaluation of a l l alternatives, at least one member should be assigned the r o l e of d e v i l ' s advocate. In t h i s manner, both good and bad aspects of a proposal are examined. There i s a danger however, that d e v i l ' s advocates may become 'pets' or tokens. President Johnson used the d e v i l ' s advocate approach during deliberations over V i e t Nam. However his advocates were 'domesticated' and were allowed to express dissent only to the extent deemed acceptable to the decision group. Very l i t t l e true dissent was allowed to surface that may have brought about a re-examina-tion of U.S. p o l i c i e s . An i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d d e v i l ' s advocate can paradoxically lead to a f a l s e sense of security i n the decision u n i t . Group members may develop the ". . .comforting f e e l i n g that they have considered a l l sides of the issue and that the policy chosen has weathered challenges from within the decision-making c r i c l e " (Janis 1971, p. 215). One way to avoid tokenism i s to rotate the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to play d e v i l ' s advocate among the group members. The d i a l e c t i c a l approach i s a more formal vehicle which uses structured debate to bring forth alternative views-of-the-world. Mason (1969, p. B408) notes that use of d i a l e c t i c s forces ". . .exposing 121. hidden assumptions and developing a new conceptualization of the planning problem/the organization faces." Pressures on group members to conform to majority opinions has been recognized as a major contributing factor of judgmental error (Janis 1971). Thus i t i s important to provide an atmosphere which does not push group members into a b l i n d conformity but e l i c i t s free opinions. The use of subgroups which meet separately under d i f f e r e n t chairmen and report back to the decision unit, while time consuming, su b s t a n t i a l l y reduces the tendency for the entire group to develop a con-currence seeking norm. It also ensures a c r i t i c a l examination of p o l i c i e s by encouraging the expression of i n d i v i d u a l doubts and'klissenting opinion. Techniques such as Delphi, allow anonymous expression of opinion and questioning and thus could serve to protect minority viewpoints by prevention of group pressures on known dissenters. In large organizations, most problems are of a type that require the support of others for implementation of solutions. Very rarely does the decision unit i t s e l f have the a b i l i t y to implement d i r e c t l y . Thus an actual decision may be timely, well thought out and represent the best action alterna-t i v e in a c r i s i s , but the organization may s t i l l end up i n a disaster through fau l t y implementation techniques. MacCrimmon (1973) suggests that i n organizations with multiple implemen-tatio n units, there i s considerable room for discretionary action r e s u l t i n g i n accidental or purposeful misimplementation. 122. D i f f i c u l t i e s i n implementation seem rooted i n three areas: action units are not motivated to carry out the decision selected; noisy channels of communication and i n f l e x i b l e proce-dures a f f e c t i n g coordination may delay receipt of message and timing of actions; the action units may not understand th e i r orders . Motivation of implementation units to carry out decisions can be improved by involving at least a representative from each unit i n the actual decision process. When a group solves a problem, each member of the group p a r t i c i p a t i n g f e e l s responsible for making the solution work. If a solution has been imposed without consultation however, there i s not the same commitment to implementation. Action groups involved with the decision w i l l also be more aware of c r i t i c a l timing factors. Maier ( 1 9 6 7 , p. 433) notes that: "A low-quality solution that has good acceptance can be more e f f e c t i v e than a higher-quality solution that lacks acceptance." Motivation of implementation units can also be improved by thorough indoc-t r i n a t i o n programs for a l l members of the organization to develop a heightened commitment to goals. While t h i s procedure w i l l not e n t i r e l y remove the problems of p o l i t i c a l games and bargaining between units, there w i l l be some reduction i n the problems of incompatibility of goal structures between the diverse units of the organization. Problems of comprehension are also reduced by par-t i c i p a t i o n i n the decision process. Implementation units frequently do not understand the reasons for choice of a p a r t i c u l a r course of action which they regard as stupid or a r b i t r a r y . Hence they tend to drag t h e i r feet on putting the solution into practice. By i n c l u s i o n i n the decision process there i s increased understanding of how the decision developed, what other alternatives were considered and why they were discarded. There i s a widened perspective of the t o t a l c r i s i s , including o v e r a l l organizational goals, not just a narrow perspective, dominated by s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Commitment to, and understanding of the decision also helps ensure d i f f u s i o n of information throughout the implementation unit, e s p e c i a l l y those i n the f i e l d . Noisy channels of communication between decision and implementation units can r e s u l t i n misinterpretation and lack of coordination. This i n part can be a l l e v i a t e d by the decision unit placing trusted people i n the f i e l d to e f f e c t coordination. Usually such people w i l l be i n d i r e c t communica-tion with the decision unit, to reduce the p r o b a b i l i t y of error. Implementation may be misdirected by the types of SOP's of the responsible unit but SOP's can be made to work to the advantage of the organization. Special cues for t r i g g e r i n g new automatic programs for c r i s i s situations can be developed. These cues can be reinforced by the use of p r e - c r i s i s d r i l l s and simulations. Thus during an actual c r i s i s much of the implementation behavior i s pre-programmed, reducing the l a t i t u d e for error. 124. For major improvements to be made i n implementation, the organization must make a strong commitment to p r e - c r i s i s t r a i n i n g . Most of these solutions, with the exception of greater p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the decision process, cannot be carri e d out during an on-going c r i s i s . The organization must also be prepared to allocat e resources for development of these programs since they are not without cost, both i n time and money. 9.0 Prescriptions for restoration The diagnosis of post c r i s i s realignment processes indicates two important elements upon which a restoration strategy should be b u i l t : (1) meaning of "pre c r i s i s " regime symbols and values, (2) the remaining stable socio-organizational i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s . P r e - c r i s i s attributes of the system may assume either a symbolic meaning of "normality" or may be viewed as symbols of those attributes which led to the disaster. I d e n t i f i -cation of the dominant values associated with p r e - c r i s i s structures, procedures and habits i s c r u c i a l to design a strategy of restoration. If "normality" i s the coveted state, a strategy which attempts to restore established SOP's and regularize organizational l i f e would be successful. Restoration of v i s i b l e symbols and r i t u a l s of the past provide the necessary motivation 125. i n m o b i l i z i n g s o c i e t a l r e s o u r c e s f o r r e s t o r a t i o n . The d a n g e r i n h e r e n t i n s u c h a s t r a t e g y i s t h e t e n d e n c y t o a v o i d r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e d i s a s t e r , t o t h e d e t r i m e n t o f l e a r n i n g f r o m i t , and p r e p a r a t i o n f o r f u t u r e p o s s i b l e d i s a s t e r s . I f "blame" i s t h e d o m i n a t i n g v a l u e o f t h e p o s t - c r i s i s e r a , "change" must become t h e m a i n theme o f r e s t o r a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s . D o m i n a t i o n o f change v a l u e s must, however, be c o n s t r u c t i v e , t h r o u g h c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e p a s t and a d o p t i o n o f a new m o d e l o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . E r r a t i c q u e s t s f o r change may l e a d t o a n a r c h y i n p o s t - c r i s i s p e r i o d s , a t i m e when e f f i c i e n t d i s c i p l i n e d , use o f r e s o u r c e s i s n e e d e d . The a d o p t i o n o f a f e d e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c m o d e l by p o s t - w a r West Germany p e r m i t t e d , f o r example, s u c h d i s c i p l i n e d d e p a r t u r e f r o m a r e g i m e w h i c h was v i e w e d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p a s t f a i l u r e s . I n a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e s t o r a t i o n s t r a t e g i e s must m o b i l i z e t h o s e r e m a i n i n g s t a b l e i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e s where d i s l o -c a t i o n s were a t a minimum. E m p h a s i s , f o r example, upon f a m i l y u n i t s and r e l i g i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n p o s t c r i s i s r e b u i l d i n g e f f o r t s a r e examples o f s u c h b a s i c i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e s w i t h " i m p o r t a n t s t a b i l i t y p r o p e r t i e s . M o b i l i z a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s i n ways w h i c h d e s t r o y s t h e s e i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e s may o f t e n impose g r e a t l o n g - r u n c o s t s on t h e p r o c e s s o f r e s t o r a t i o n . 126 REFERENCES ACKOFF, R.L., A Concept of Corporate Planning. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970. ACKOFF, R.L., "Management misinformation systems," Management Science, Vol. XIV, No. 4, December 1967, pp. 147-156. 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