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Two concepts of ideology Taft, George Roger 1975

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TWO CONCEPTS OF IDEOLOGY by GEORGE ROGER TAFT B.A., Western I l l i n o i s University, 1972 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA November, 1974 In presenting th i s thesis in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary shal l make it f ree ly ava i l ab le for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th i s thes is for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th is thes is fo r f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my writ ten permission. Department of. P o l i ' t i c a l S c i e n c e The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8. Canada , Date Nagrenrber 29. 1974 Abstract There are two major conceptions of ideology, a liberal and a Marxist notion. The liberal concept of ideology variously claims that ideology is a highly integrated value system, a con- fusion of value for fact, a result of intellectuals in po l i t i c s , and/or a result of strain. However, when examined closely these arguments are either fallacious, ad hominem, or of such a general notion as to equate ideology with social philosophy. Thus the u t i l i t y of liberal notions of ideology for social analysis is severely limited: i t is primarily a means to discount the arguments of one's opponents. The Marxist notion of ideology views ideology as the ruling ideas or "false consciousness" a ruling class fosters to help perpetuate i t s dominance. As such this concept of ideology focuses on the materialistic origins, propagation and acceptance of ideas. Thus Marx's notion of ideology is more useful than the liberal notion because i t calls for investigation of legitimation, mass media, education, religion as significant factors in building and perpetuating a p o l i t i c a l regime. i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract i i Introduction 1 The Liberal Conception of Ideology 6 Ideology as a Belief System 8 Ideology as the Confusion of Values for Facts 23 Ideology and the Intelligentsia 27 Strain Theory 32 Marx: Ideology as Ruling Ideas 41 Conclusion 68 Footnotes 73 Bibliography 77 i i i The afterthoughts with which you justify your accommodation of the E v i l one are not yours but those of the E v i l one. Franz Kafka iv The popularity of the term "ideology" and the widespread study of different ideologies obscures the conceptual d i f f i c u l t i e s of the term. Most discussions of ideology assume the existence of a single definition of the term "ideology", when in fact there appear to be numerous defin- itions of "ideology". Second, there are problems of giving an adequate definition to ideology such that i t corresponds to the real world. Both of these d i f f i c u l t i e s are compounded when the various and problematic conceptions of ideology are carried w i l l y - n i l l y into the study of ideol- ogies, without regard for the diversity of conceptions or the definitional problems. This situation has resulted in many studies of ideology having incompatible uses of the term "ideology", and other studies blending dif- ferent conceptions of ideology. This conceptual confusion has resulted in a hopeless muddying of the dimensions of the ideology at hand. It is small wonder that one writer was led to comment, exasperatedly, that, Few concepts in social analysis have inspired such a mass of commentary, yet few have stimulated the production of so l i t t l e cumulative knowledge about society and po l i t i c s . The lack of cumulation is due above a l l , to recurrent confusion of empirical with definitional issues and of both with norm- ative concerns. Moreover, most of the speculation has been pervasively culture-bound. The absence of conceptual clarity has been matched only by the nearly total lack of "hard" (i.e. replicable) empirical evidence."'" While this writer does not share Mr. Putnam's view about the confusion of normative concerns with "empirical" work the gist of his complaint is otherwise valid. Thus, an adequate account of ideology must start with a clear and appropriate conception of ideology. But since covering defin- itional and empirical problems is beyond the scope of this paper, only the former w i l l be attempted. Further, though several other writers have -2- attempted a typology of conceptions of ideology, this writer will proceed to the subject matter first hand instead of through a critique of the proposed typologies. Lest this analysis of the conceptual problems of ideology seem a t r ivial semantic dispute, it should be noted that the conceptual issue involves questions of legitimate subject matter, scope of inquiry, pre- suppositions about the subject matter, and (disSatisfaction with existing social arrangements: the tools one employs influence what one works on and how one works at i t . In remarks about the sociology of knowledge, C. W. Mills noted the importance of the conceptual level. In acquiring a technical vocabulary with its terms and classifications, the thinker is acquiring as i t were, a set of colored spectacles. He sees the world of objects that are technically tinted and patternized. A specialized language constitutes a veritable a priori form of perception and cognition which are certainly relevant to the results of the inquiry and this language is not without social- historical imprint failure to recognize such junctures in inquiry that are relevant to the "truthfulness", "object- ivity" and "impartiality" of the results of the inquiry issues in an arbitrary limitation of the legitimate subject matter of an empirical sociology of knowledge.^ Need one add that this warning could easily be extended to political science? The first problem facing a discussion of conceptions of ideology is how to get a handle on the subject, i .e . a preliminary way of ordering the discussion. It is quite possible that the plethora of definitions of "ideol- ogy" may be a strong point instead of the weak point i t is usually assumed to be. Perhaps the different conceptions are necessary for different levels of social analysis. The different concepts of ideology may correspond, for example, to a psychological plane as opposed to other concepts which may be intended or appropriate for a political or even a sociological analysis. In this case a different concept of ideology is necessary i f one deals with the personal level, or the political plane, or the socio-logical level. -3- Psychological ideology complements, but must be kept separate from p o l i t i c a l ideology. On this assumption the plethora of definitions does not present a problem, so long as the appropriate level of analysis and the corresponding conceptions of ideology are borne in mind. But insofar as ideas are expressed in a total social context and not in neat academic disciplines, i t becomes almost impossible to stop an exploration of ideology at the borders of these disciplines. To explain the occurrence of ideology on the p o l i t i c a l level often necessitates a sociological, cultural or psychological explanation. These objections to this approach seem borne out in fact, as we shall see below when psychological strain and personality types are used to support p o l i t i c a l analysis. Consequently, the differing conceptions of ideology appear to be not amenable to dissection "horizontally" by academic discipline; rather the conceptions of ideology are "vertical", in that they cut across the psychological, p o l i t i c a l and sociological planes. Another possible approach, is a dichotomy of conceptions which plays against the pejorative connotation of ideology: a preliminary division into pejorative and non-pejorative conceptions of ideology. Scientific neutrality appears to demand a non-pejorative, i.e. a non-prejudging, notion of ideology. This is the approach that some discussions have taken, especially those that claim ideology as value-judgements posing as facts. But as w i l l be developed below, the attempts to sketch a non-pejorative and therefore "objective" con- cept of ideology f a l l short of their goal by retaining the pejorative connot- ation and i t s "subjectivism". This shortcoming is not, however, due to these writers' shoddy, intellectual work. Rather, let us suggest that i t lies in certain unrealizable strictures of objectivity. For, Objectivity in social questions can mean no more than a certain open-mindedness, a willingness to acknowledge that one is one- self a party, or at least has p r i o r i t i e s ; a willingness to examine a l l the information available, a l l the arguments and a willingness to answer them. It cannot mean presenting an answer over and above the answers of the existing parties to a dispute, adopting the posture of a God, who sees a l l things as -4- they "really are". Of course, in practice, mediation or arbit- ration is sometimes useful, but this is an ad hoc procedure to either split the difference or strengthen one side; i t is not revealing the true nature of reality which has been obscured by factional prejudice for we are a l l prejudiced.^ The attempts to reconcile the various conceptions of ideology as some- how complementary by academic discipline and attempts to cut across the notions of ideology with the touchstone of objectivity, thus leaves the dis- cussion at the starting blocks. Another alternative, as suggested above, is to immerse ourselves in the disputes of ideology. From this perspective the pejorative, "unobjective" connotation of ideology is not a fault. Rather i t is through their biased character that the different conceptions of ideology have meaning and are therefore possibly useful to us. By way of introduc- tion to the possibility of this approach, an observation is in order. Paradoxically, "ideology" has i t s e l f become ideological. Most discussions of ideology center on the role of revolutionary movements and their idea- systems in their attempt to change social and p o l i t i c a l systems. The struggle for power over the existing dominant groups by those advocating change is informed by a set of sociopolitical ideas. The power struggle is also seen ultimately as a battle of ideas. Freedom, equality, and fraternity contend with divine right, honour and rank; while socialism and communism fight bourgeois capitalist democracy. The differing conceptions of ideology have also been projected into this larger struggle of ideas. The term "ideology" has joined this battle of ideas, with the l e f t i s t advocates of change pro- posing one definition of ideology, while the liberal intellectual represent- atives stress a different notion of ideology. Other discussions of ideology treat ideas and thinking as fundamentally shaped or determined by material or "concrete" human relations or existence. In this sense of ideology, ideas betray the interest of the group holding the ideas. In particular -5- dominant groups foster dominant ideas that act to preserve the basic social relations. To proponents of this conception of ideology, presenting ideology as abstract thinking, a battle of ideas, p o l i t i c a l religion, or value judge- ments as facts is ideological (tending to reinforce a ruling group's authority) because i t overlooks the social basis of ideas. That i s , ideology as a battle of ideas is ideological. From the observation that the term ideology is i t s e l f ideological, one finds a method of giving a preliminary order to the subject of ideology that does not pose the a r t i f i c i a l strictures of an "objectivity" on the discussion: by understanding and entering the p o l i t i c a l battles of the le f t and right we can order the discussion, and draw out aspects that other approaches would not account for. For i t is not possible to avoid the issue of the immediate p o l i t i c a l uses of the term "ideology" or the p o l i t i c a l assumptions that these notions rest on. The approach that follows w i l l pit the liberal conception of ideology against the conception of ideology which more or less derives from Marx. A sketch of the different notions of ideology, w i l l be followed by evaluations of these concepts. It w i l l be argued that the liberal nation of "ideology" while appearing superficially valid, lacks a solid core of truth: this notion of ideology remains so general as to be applicable to thought-systems deemed by the writers involved as non-ideological. Thus i t s generality reduces i t to t r i v i a l i t y and to l i t t l e further investigation of social ideas; this notion is with l i t t l e u t i l i t y in social investigation and explanation. If the liberal notion of ideology is asked further questions beyond the general level, i t quickly degenerates into questionable historical arguments, limitations on "rationality" and ad- hominem arguments. The result of the generality of the notion and i t s erroneous deeper arguments is to expose the ideology of this notion of ideology. The p o l i t i c a l philosophical assumptions -6- of liberalism become the remaining factors invigorating this conception. Awareness of the importance of liberalism for this notion of ideology, would not be so unacceptable i f the notion originally had some merit. But since i t is so general, the major u t i l i t y of this notion of ideology is in argu- ments with "ideological" p o l i t i c a l opponents. The liberal notion of ideology is polemics without a substantive argument behind i t . Indeed one could argue that this liberal "ideology" is ideological in Marx's sense of the word. For, the liberal notion seeks a rationalization and continuance of Western "democracies". It is thus part of the ruling system's ruling ideas. The second half of the essay w i l l examine the Marxian notion of ideology, followed by an evaluation of i t . The argument presented is that the notion of ideology as ruling ideas or "false consciousness", while not without problems, (mainly due to misinterpretation and a grand historical scheme) does contain a solid core. Further i t leads to useful areas of social investigation and explanation. This section and the essay w i l l then close with a brief look at some of the recent applications of Marx's notion of ideology to socialization, legitimation and p o l i t i c a l , philosophical interpretation. The Liberal Conception of Ideology What is referred to here as the liberal conception of ideology is actually a conglomerate of several notions of ideology. While there are important differences among them, usually of emphasis on particular factors, these several conceptions of ideology assume a common core. They are a changing combination of several strands (basic ideas) that overlap and inter- connect with other conceptions of ideology. The ideas tend to complement and not contradict each other. In this f i r s t section we w i l l seek to isolate and scrutinize these strands, by probing those writers who have laid stress on a -7- particular aspect of ideology. It is not this writer's intention to claim that these categories are completely exhaustive of a l l liberal thinking on ideology. Rather, in an effort to he brief this writer has chosen authors who, (1) have dealt with ideology at the conceptual level and/or (2) appear to this writer to have explained the major outlines upon which other discussions of ideology rely. The discussion w i l l not stop to point out how, for instance, Bell's use of ideology-* is largely encompassed by Shils' conception of ideology. Those connections w i l l be lef t for the reader to make. The object is to see some common trends and not aim at exhaustiveness. Briefly, ideology is simultaneously and/or alternatively viewed as the following: (1) A highly integrated, closed, belief system built on a few values. (2) A symbol system that relies on a confusion of value for fact for it s justification. (3) A recent social trend due to the rise of a free intelligentsia. (4) A result of psychological, sociological, or cultural strain and cr i s i s with ideology f u l f i l l i n g a symbolic outlet function. In addition to these specific characteristics the liberal notions contain at least two other common assumptions. First, i t assumes a ho s t i l i t y to what i t labels extremism of the right or l e f t . At bottom, i t is a centrist, consensual, moderate doctrine. Thus i t is often not clear whether what is labelled an ideology is so called because i t is l e f t i s t or rightist. Ideologies exist on the fringe (by definition) of p o l i t i c a l beliefs, while the moderate, reasonable center is non-ideological. Second, ideology is assumed to be irrational, unreasonable and/or unworkable, not on the indiv- idual merits of the content of the ideology, but from i t s existence as an ideology, per se. In the f i r s t notion of ideology as a pre-eminent value -8- system, the irrationality is introduced as the passionate side of ideology and as a c a l l for the application of systematic standards that are i r r e l - evant (unreasonable and therefore unworkable) to pol i t i c s . In ideology as a confusion of fact and value the irrationality is inherent in the confusion i t s e l f . The implication is that a fully rational belief system is non- ideological. Ideology as due to the rise of free intellectuals largely reproduces the sense of irrationality developed in ideology as a belief system. Finally the strain theory of ideology claims that the irrationality results from either personal inadequacies or social inadequacies. Ideology is a compensation device to relieve a strain, much like psychological dis- turbances are to relieve a strain. Ideologies are not "rational" solutions or actions aimed at solving a problem but are like psychological "reflexes". Thus ideology is an attempt to close the universe of social discourse to a l l except "moderate", "reasonable" opinion. It amounts to a denial of ration- a l i t y , a p r i o r i . Ideology as a Belief System E. Shils' discussion of ideology as a belief system pivots on his thesis that there are certain variables by which a l l belief systems can be rated; and depending on the presence or absence of these factors one can sort out ideologies, creeds, and outlooks. "An ideology differs, therefore, from a prevailing outlook and its creeds through i t s greater explicitness, i t s greater internal integration or systemization, i t s greater comprehensive- ness, the greater urgency of it s application, and it s much higher intensity of concentration focused on certain central propositions or evaluations. Ideologies have a high degree of explicit formulation and an author- itative and explicit promulgation over a wide range of subjects. Outlooks lack one authoritative and explicit promulgation. "The centrality of this -9- (ideological belief) has required that i t radiate into every sphere of l i f e , that i t replace religion, that i t provide aesthetic c r i t e r i a , that i t rule over scientific research and philosophic thought, that i t regulate sexual and family l i f e . " ^ v Outlooks tend to have a plu r a l i s t i c internal structure and do not have the highly systematized or integrated pattern that ideologies form around one or a few pre-eminent values. "What is so malign, is the elevation of one value, such as equality or national or ethnic solidarity, to supremacy over others, and the insistence on it s exclusive domination in every sphere 8 of l i f e . " These ideological pre-eminent values take on a sacred symbolism, that demands a total transformation of society for their realization. Ideological politics has the assumption that politics should be conducted from the stand point of a coherent comprehensive set of beliefs which must override every other consideration. These beliefs attribute supreme significance to one group or class - the nation, the ethnic folk, the proletariat and the leader. And the party as the true representatives of these residences of a l l virtue and they correspondingly view as the seat and source of a l l e v i l a foreign power, an ethnic group like the Jews or the bourgeois class. y On the other hand, outlooks do not form a consistent system based on one theme or a few values. They seek piecemeal change not total change, reform not revolution. "Ideologies are responses to insufficient regard for some particular element in the dominant outlook and are attempts to place that neglected element in a more central position and to bring i t into f u l f i l l m e n t . " 1 0 Ideologies claim a distinctiveness from other belief systems and resist doctrinal innovation, while outlooks are open to diverse elements from other creeds and ideologies. "Ideological politics are the politics of 'friend-foe 1, 'we-they', 'who-whom'. Those who are not on the side of the ideological politician are according to the ideologist himself against h i m . O u t l o o k s often contain divergent creeds, which stress different -10- elements i n a basic outlook. Ideologies have affective overtones, demand consensus and individual subservience to the ideology and have a corporate c o l l e c t i v e organization (the ideological primary group) for membership and propagation of the ideology. Outlooks are unaffective and have an unevenness of pressure for observance of the b e l i e f elements. Outlooks and creeds are the b e l i e f patterns i n sections of society which affirm or accept the existing order of society, and consequently ideologies are not usually espoused by incumbents and custodians of central i n s t i t u t i o n s and value systems. While outlooks have a loose relationship i n regulating conduct, creeds have a greater influence on conduct but are less orthodox than ideologies. Creeds are p a r t i a l , fragmentary and occas- ional. But as such they can become alienated from central i n s t i t u t i o n s and may develop into ideologies. Ideologies must also be distinguished from other i n t e l l e c t u a l systems. While systems and movements of thought are elaborate and i n t e r n a l l y integ- rated, they do not i n s i s t on consensus of b e l i e f or behaviour and are not closed i n r e l a t i o n to other i n t e l l e c t u a l constructs. Programs have too limited an objective to be confused with ideologies. Other dissensual move- ments lack the intensity of affect, completeness of self-separation, i n t e l - l e ctual closure and the encompassing of a l l objects and events. Thus the effect of ideologies i s an encroachment on r a t i o n a l judgements and reasonable moral action. And "with reference to the cognitive truthfulness of ideologie i t should be pointed out that no great ideology has ever regarded the d i s c i p l i n e d pursuit of truth - by s c i e n t i f i c procedures and i n the mood 12 characteristic of modern science - as part of i t s obligations". When ideology i s strong enough " i t paralyze (s) the free d i a l e c t i c of i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e , introducing standards irrelevant to discovery and creation. And i n -11- p o l i t i c s i t constricted or broke the f l e x i b l e consensus necessary for a free and spontaneous order". Shils goes on to discuss the origins of ideologies i n terms of the " s t r a i n " aspect and as the problem of free i n t e l l e c t u a l s . But since these can be l o g i c a l l y separated from the above elaborated notion of ideology and we w i l l deal with them shortly, i t i s time to examine the merits of ideology as a pre-eminent value system. F i r s t some observations on spec i f i c assertions, then a review as a whole. The contention that, ideologies are not usually held by central i n s t i t - utions and value systems ostensibly contradicts twentieth century experience. Communism and fascism (the two most l i k e l y candidates for the label ideology) have been held by many central i n s t i t u t i o n s and value systems. By S h i l s ' logic the Soviet Union, Spain, China, Eastern Europe, etc., are pervaded by outlooks. This paradoxical situation i s resolved by claiming that soon after an ideological primary group assumes power they f a i l to implement their ideology because, (1) there i s a strong attachment i n the society to the prevailing outlook and (2) the ideological primary group f a l l s back to the basic so c i a l outlook. 1^ By this reasoning none of the above mentioned states are ideological but actually are a continuation of the t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l outlook of each nation. There i s a germ of truth i n this argument: no ideology makes a complete break with the society or prevailing outlook that spawns i t . S hils i s quite correct that ideologies are not completely ex- traneous to the parent society or b e l i e f s of that society. P o l i t i c a l practice also can often be seen as a continuation of some "pre-revolutionary" patterns by "post revolutionary" groups. The monopoly of p o l i t i c a l power by the Russian Czar and the n o b i l i t y i s continued by and through the Communist party; and H i t l e r ' s national socialism, with close business-government ti e s resembled Bismarck's state-led i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . But there i s a si g n i f i c a n t -12- difference between the Communist system's values (whether i t i s merely rhetoric i s another matter) of equality, i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and the Czarist land-tied p o l i t i c a l system based on feudal t i e s and values of rank, deference, etc. The contention that ideologies ultimately f a l l back to outlooks i s merely the denial that s i g n i f i c a n t , "revolutionary" change i s possible. Beneath the d i f f i c u l t i e s of explaining these anomalous ideological regimes i s S h i l s ' contention that ideological p o l i t i c s i s not feasible. I t has been a major fault of ideological p o l i t i c s that they have made the mistake of thinking that a coherent systematic doctrine could guide conduct u n f a i l i n g l y along a straight l i n e which made no compromise with e v i l . Ideological p o l i t i c s believes that the more s t r i c t l y one was attracted to i t , and the more completely one f u l f i l l e d i t the better would be one's actions ultimately ideology i s a n t i - political.''"^ As an alternative, Shils proposes a p o l i t i c s of c i v i l i t y b u i l t on the virtue of the c i t i z e n who shares r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n his own self-government and respects t r a d i t i o n and the need for continuity. But th i s i s not a clear opposition to ideology. A complete disavowal of every line of a f f i n i t y between civ- i l i t y and ideology w i l l not only be false i n fact but would turn c i v i l i t y into an ideology. C i v i l i t y would become an ideology of pure p o l i t i c s concerned with no substantive values except the acquisition of power and the maintenance of public order and absolutely no other interests. C i v i l i t y would take upon i t s e l f the onus of the very same moral separatism for which i t c r i t i c i z e s ideological p o l i t i c s , i f i t denied i t s a f f i n i t y with the substantive values which 1 ft the ideological outlook holds and;distorts. By the admission that c i v i l i t y l i k e ideology shares an a f f i n i t y for values, the d i s t i n c t i o n between ideologies and outlooks i s narrowed i f not called into question. And by exhibiting the common ground of ideologies and outlooks, - Shils exposes even more poignantly that the problem underlying these above mentioned d i f f i c u l t i e s l i e s at the conceptual l e v e l where one wishes to deny ideological p o l i t i c s . Another apparent problem i s having the focus for discussion on ideology - 1 3 - as primarily a value-system. Marxism-Leninism i s not, according to i t s own presentation, a claim for the r e a l i z a t i o n of certain values. I t i s not primarily a system of ethics. I t claims s c i e n t i f i c v a l i d i t y , just as Fascist racialism claimed s c i e n t i f i c v a l i d i t y . The claim i s for fact as opposed to value claims, r e a l i t y not b e l i e f s , s c i e n t i f i c statements not moral platitudes. Many Marxist-Leninists have deplored and rejected attempts to view Marxism as a value oriented claim and not a science. For example, the humanist Marxism of Western countries i s often attacked on just such grounds. That Shils focuses on value-claims and not science claims i s revealing because he misses this aspect of ideologies. The point i s also revealing because by having ideology based on pre-eminent values without reference to s c i e n t i f i c claims reduces ideology to a conception of a funda- mentalist r e l i g i o n . (As Shils notes the millenarian t r a d i t i o n i s the oldest source of the ideological temperment.) Once placed i n these terms the ideology-outlook argument resembles the enlightenment r a t i o n a l i s t who could only see r e l i g i o n as being i r r a t i o n a l . The ideologist seeking the r e a l i z - ation of the pre-eminent values becomes the twentieth-century priest. The conception of ideology as a system of pre-eminent values may speak for a certain amount of truth, for values do obviously play a part i n ideologies. But by approaching ideology i n this over-simplified manner Shils misses the most important point about modern so c i a l theories: a l l claim s c i e n t i f i c status and not just value judgements. The notion of ideology as a system of pre-eminent values f a i l s to give an accurate reading of the ideologues' contentions; thus i t i s irrelevant as a rebuttal, and as a concept, for further s o c i a l inquiry. This si t u a t i o n i s nevertheless h e l p f u l , because i t reveals more about S h i l s ' assumptions than about his ostensible subject matter. Because ideology i s fundamentally a " r e l i g i o n " , i t does not apply solely to those - 1 4 - i t was intended to mark. This leads to two conclusions. F i r s t , t his con- cept of ideology reinforces the opposition to ideology we saw above. The opposition i s again expressed not on the content of the ideology but because the ideology f i t s an a p r i o r i category - " r e l i g i o n " . Second, ideology becomes a code word for "our adversaries", which i s understood only from a sp e c i f i c s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l perspective, i.e. Western liberalism. The claim that ideologies seek the r e a l i z a t i o n of the "sacred" by t o t a l change, and outlooks only seek segmental change conceals the possib- i l i t y that outlooks seek piecemeal change or reform because their "ideolog- i c a l t o t a l change" i s h i s t o r i c a l l y behind them; an outlook's desire for reform and piecemeal change often presupposes a revolution, a t o t a l change that elevated the outlook to i t s present pre-eminent place. Thus outlooks may have ideological elements, but as these elements are part of the existing s o c i a l arrangements they do not raise controversy among immediate p o l i t i c a l power contenders. Recent p o l i t i c a l theorists have been apt to under emphasize the extent to which a l l the elements which enter into the consensus operate as a necessary condition of effective p o l i t i c a l bargaining and compromise. Ideology (the moral argument about the ends and ways of l i f e ) may be no less an important element i n a p o l i t i c a l and soc i a l controversy. and i n any given state of society there w i l l be well est- ablished i n s t i t u t i o n s and habits of moral thinking which are central i n the sense that they protect important elements and which operate to l i m i t objectives, methods and types of change which are accepted as patterns for p o l i t i c a l policy and governmental action, so that at any given time that part of the soc i a l structure that i s at a l l generally recognized as subject to p o l i t i c a l action and change i s always comparatively small. But i t i s i n r e l a t i o n to what must be called the i n s t i t u t i o n a l and ideological infrastructure that ideological ferment and ideological p o l i t i c s have a very important function. They have their important effects below the l e v e l of 'rational' or programmatic p o l i t i c a l action, i n eroding or loosening established moral and ideological habits and c e r t a i n t i e s , i n producing the climate of opinion i n -15- which i t i s ultimately possible for new sorts of p o l i t i c a l or social objectives, new forms of social action to be accepted as parts of the ordinary programmes of p o l i t i c a l parties.-^ But S h i l s ' conception of ideology precludes such an analysis being applied to a l l s o c i a l systems, including those pervaded by outlooks. We saw above that Shils claims that ideologies -are not usually held by central i n s t i t u - tions or central value systems; and that i f an ideological primary group does achieve power the older s o c i a l outlook quickly reasserts i t s power. The argument i s against the p o s s i b i l i t y of ra d i c a l a l t e r a t i o n of the value system or the s o c i a l system. It i s the denial of a connection between the central i n s t i t u t i o n s and value system. And from this denial a change i n the central i n s t i t u t i o n s - a revolution - i s not s u f f i c i e n t for a replace- ment by the ideological values. Thus Shils assumes that there i s one path of h i s t o r i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y (tradition) before which even those who consciously stri v e w i l l eventually have to bend. This i s the assumption that t r a d i t i o n a l outlooks and t r a d i t i o n a l practice (which i s l e f t vague) w i l l always persist and that change i s minutely incremental and slow-paced. This i s the conserv- ative bias which anchors the argument. But i n the argument on ideology this assumption i s not presented as such but as fact. Thus the total-segmental change dichotomy becomes another tool to mark the adversary as unacceptable before dealing with the spe c i f i c issues raised. The general scheme of ideology as a pre-eminent value system does not help these particular problems but only establishes them. The central problem i s that the dichotomy between ideologies on the one hand and outlooks and creeds on the other i s false; and i t only makes sense from inside the assumptions of the l i b e r a l i s m of Western democracies. Outside of these assumptions i t loses i t s cutting edge. Let us look closer at the dichotomy. Ideologies have a high degree of explicitness and formulation over a -16- wide range of objects. Outlooks do not. This dichotomy i s surely spurious. For example, outlook "spokesmen" i n c a p i t a l i s t countries, when asked about property relations or economics, e x p l i c i t l y uphold private property and "free enterprise". This i s both an e x p l i c i t and general reaction. The outlook of Western democracies i s quite e x p l i c i t i n regards to economics, property, the state, democracy, who i t s adversaries are, etc., etc. And on the other side of the argument, a l l ideologies are vague over large portions of the objects and events they must deal with. For instance, i t has often been noted that Marxist ideology was spectacularly weak (and remains so even with modern versions) i n i t s analysis of the role of the state i n pre and post-revolutionary epochs. Even i n economics Marx was not a l l that e x p l i c i t . For instance, his thinking on the causes of economic crises 1 8 (surely not a minor point) was ambiguous i f not contradictory. I t could be argued that the difference that this dichotomy points to i s due to a s u p e r f i c i a l non-explicitness of outlooks that hides a very e x p l i c i t core of soc i a l r e l a t i o n s , upon which outlooks are b u i l t . These supposed polar q u a l i t i e s can also be seen as another way of saying that because outlooks are accepted, i.e. are the central value system, they need not be e x p l i c i t , for the fundamental soci a l relations are not i n contention. But leaving aside these hypothetical counter-arguments, the impression this d i s t i n c t i o n leaves i s that a l l that outlooks seek i s openness and undogmatic "sweet" reasonableness. Ideologies maintain- authoritative and e x p l i c i t promulgation, while outlooks lack this factor. Some of the above paragraph tends to refute this point. The problem with this point i s that maintenance of authoritative and e x p l i c i t promulgation i s carried on by both ideologies and outlooks. Further there i s also a high degree of ambiguity of promulgations not only i n out- looks but also i n ideologies. For example, the "abolition of private -17- property" or the ending of "wage slavery" may sound e x p l i c i t and authorit- ative but both phrases concealed generalities that generated tremendous debate over what was meant. The p o l i t i c a l ambit of these phrases e a s i l y ran from mild s o c i a l i s t s to anarchist-communists. On the other hand the absence of authoritative and e x p l i c i t promulgations by outlooks i s not the case. The e x p l i c i t and repeated defense of the "free enterprise" system, the defending of "democracy", the right to "s e l f determination", the s t r i c t adherence to private versus public spheres could a l l be cited as examples of the types of promulgation that i s supposed to be reserved for ideologies. Once again the supposed dichotomy i s spurious because i t i s so general as to be applied to almost a l l value-systems. This particular difference of ideologies and outlooks also lacks v a l i d i t y because i t does not raise the necessary question of parties and one-party states. The issue of authorit- ative and e x p l i c i t promulgation cannot be adequately addressed without also asking the question of how central i n s t i t u t i o n s and values (whether through a one-party state or a p o l i t i c a l party) influence the formation and propa- gation of ideas. Ideologies are highly integrated or systematized around one or a few pre-eminent values. This i s the heart of the conception of ideology; and l i k e the other variables rests on the implicitness of outlook values as opposed to the explicitness of ideological values. The outlooks must have some integration around a core or value-set that drives the system otherwise there would be no unifying factor. Here as above, i t can be suggested that what outlooks describe and value do not appear as integrated as ideologies because their integrated character l i e s i n the socia l h i s t o r i c a l given set of circumstances and values. The outlook i s accepted,the values are i m p l i c i t and therefore the differences of creed stand out as unintegrated. The system looks unintegrated because most discussion occurs on the lev e l of -18- finer points, with a l l parties accepting a basic common core of values. Probably a good case could be made for a few unifying, integrative values underlying "outlooks": for instance, continuity, tradition, property, authority. On the other side of the coin ideologies do not have as high a degree of integration around a few values as is attributed to them. They often contain disparate elements or even beliefs that are not logically connected. Marx's sociology and the values that move i t can be severed from his philosophy of history. An ideology is a closed system, insisting on i t s distinctiveness from other doctrines and resisting doctrinal changes. Contrarily, outlooks are open to diverse elements and contain divergent creeds. Again, this point has a limited applicability and mainly rests on the level of the belief system one is referring to. The distinctiveness of ideologies can be seen as a direct consequence of being built on a divergent value system. Further to insist that outlooks and creeds do not engage in a process of separation from other belief systems is an over simplification that approaches mis- representation. Liberalism may have absorbed many l e f t i s t ideas (a two-way street when one considers the positivist influence on Marxism-Leninism) but it s core values remain the same. Western democratic "outlooks" are s t i l l built on the assumption of the rational, acquisitive individual. At a more superficial level than the common core of liberalism, divergences and a limited pluralism of values do exist, but this situation is also found in many ideologies. Perhaps the best example of outlooks maintaining a sep- aration from other beliefs is the outlook/ideology dichotomy. Ideologies demand consensus and individual subservience to the ideology. Outlooks have uneven pressure for observance, consensus and behavior. Another erroneous distinction. What else were the Red scares of the 1920's, 1930's and 1950's in the U.S., Britain, etc. i f not consensus demand and -19- regulation of individuals not conforming to the dominant outlook. These were not just fringe movements, but purges by central institutions with acceptance and encouragement by the value system. It could be argued that, for instance, the toleration of dissent in the U.S. in the past twenty years (especially during the Vietnam era) proves the uneven pressure thesis. This point is soon lost when one examines the information that has been revealed in the past several years in regard to U.S. government activity against dissident movements. For example, Robert Wall wrote about his experience in the F.B.I. Red Squad, post-1967. While i t is true that the F.B.I.'s anti-Communist Party activity had almost ended (only three Party members remained in Washington, D.C.) the Bureau did maintain a counter- intelligence program against the New Left. "This program was designed to develop means to thwart and undermine the activities and organizations that f e l l into the category 'New Left'." 1^ After explaining some of the tactics used by this squad and the surveillance of the college campuses and black organizations he concludes the following: "My experience has shown me that the F.B.I, in i t s pursuit of blacks, the anti-war movement and college activists was not an impartial, disinterested finder of facts but rather a relentless guardian of orthodoxy, a police force which sought to cause harm to movements that boldly questioned the policies of the government" and " the agency is a l l too effective in harassing legitimate p o l i t i c a l 20 activity". This is merely one example of "uneven pressure" and could 21 easily be multiplied. These cases are obviously not as overt or repressive as the Soviets' treatment of dissidents but nonetheless they do constitute a continuing pressure for conformity to "outlook" values. Outlooks are unaffective and lack a corporative body to organize and propagate them. Ideologies are just the opposite. The charge of passionate ideology/dispassionate outlook is part of the attempt to see outlooks as -20- merely the most logical answer, i.e. scientific and the one a l l reasonable men would choose. This claim for unaffective outlooks hides behind the laudatory connotations of democracy, freedom, pluralism and (the highly passionate) nationalism or patriotism. The lack of corporative bodies of implementation for outlooks conceals the possibility that outlooks need less continuous propagation because they are already predominant. Further this charge hides the many institutions which help to propagate outlooks - schools, churches, the different state offices, economic institutions, etc. The distinction that Shils claims divides beliefs systems into ideol- ogies and outlooks, when looked at closely, collapses. The outlooks contain similar variables to the variables that are supposed to be distinctive of ideologies. Shils' categories thus do not distinguish ideologies from outlooks. The crux of the distinction is the assertion that ideologies are built on a few pre-eminent values, while outlooks are not. But as we saw above this is not true. Western liberal democracies (outlooks) also have a pre-eminent value system based on "free enterprise", individualism, and private property. But i f one takes into account these qualifications, the distinction collapses into saying that ideologies are value systems divergent from the central value system. And as the untenable distinction evaporates so does the cutting edge of ideology. If this concept of ideology is reconstructed after accounting for the problems raised above, one is left with saying that ideologies are a divergent belief or value system that one does not care for. The definition of ideology as a highly-integrated, closed intellectual system built on a few pre-eminent values does not give us a better handle on or act as an explanation of p o l i t i c a l situations or problems. The dichotomy into outlook and ideology is cast in such general terms that the supposed generally exclusive terms of one can be applied to the other. Since the -21- d i s t i n c t i o n i s not r e a l , i t cannot lead to further analysis of p o l i t i c a l situations. Further even i f the d i s t i n c t i o n were v a l i d , the s i m p l i s t i c anal- ysis of social ideas that accompanies i t would severely l i m i t i t s usefulness. Many of the connections and consequences of ideology are l e f t unanswered and are presumably to be f i l l e d by the assumed common outlook of l i b e r a l dem- ocracies. The lack of "connective t i s s u e " between how ideologies tend to explain the t o t a l i t y of events and the practice of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i s just one such gap. Much of the explanatory power of this notion of ideology i s probably easily handled by other approaches to Communism or Fascism. Analyses of bureaucracies, parties, p o l i t i c a l economy, revolutions, etc., etc. are probably adequate to the task of explaining the differences Shils claims are due to "ideologies". The p o l i t i c a l systems of the East and West are d i f f e r e n t ; what has been argued here i s that these differences are not explained by use of the concept of ideology as a pre-eminent value system. For, that concept makes no sense. Explanation of the differences between Communist and Western regimes must be sought i n other terms. Implicit i n S h i l s ' argument are two theses that are c r u c i a l to the argument but unsubstantiated. F i r s t there i s the implication of an inexor- able connection between the " t o t a l i z i n g " aspect of ideologies (their tendencies to penetrate a l l aspects of l i f e and explain a l l events) and the t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m of Communism and Fascism. Unfortunately, the connection f a l l s f l a t , for no necessity i s established. I t i s quite possible for a value system to explain a l l events and to proffer values for a l l aspects of l i f e without involving extremely authoritarian practices. Others have done a better job explaining the t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m of the Soviet Union or Fascism by using a conjunction of ideas, h i s t o r i c a l practices and unique circumstances. For example, Lichtheim's discussion of Marxist-Leninist t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m draws on Marxist ideology, i t s translation into a party -22- guide at the hands of Lenin, the position of the Russian social democratic movements, i t s aims and tactics vis-a-vis the Western European social dem- 22 ocrats, the influence of the Russian populist movement, etc. The second implication is that because ideologies are built on a narrow view, i.e. a few pre-eminent values, they cannot possibly be the basis for a f u l l p o l i t i c a l regime. For, ideologies are too simplistic an approach to a very complicated p o l i t i c a l reality. But in a l l fairness, i t seems reasonable that i f the pre-eminent values were broad and basic a p o l i t i c a l regime could easily "rest" on this basis. Both of these implications raise the question of the totalizing aspect of ideologies; and once again this returns this concept of ideology to the general notion of a social philosophy. To say that an ideology en- compasses a l l events, spheres of l i f e and values is merely another way of expressing the notion that the values sought are basic; that the difference is one of social philosophy. And, i t is the nature of every philosophy to account for i t s universe, in this case the social universe. Thus one sees that this notion of ideology is more a device to mark the "enemies" and cut the ground from under their argument by limiting social rationality to traditional modes of thinking and acting, than i t is a tool to explain social phenomena. Divested of this disagreeable component the con- cept retains a definition of ideologies as being variant value-systems. Thus i t t e l l s us the obvious. It offers no c r i t e r i a on which to evaluate these social philosophies or their place in society. So with the shortcomings of this aspect of the concept of ideology, the brunt of Shils 1 explanation shifts to his ideas of strain and c r i s i s , which we w i l l examine below. -23- Ideology as the Confusion of Values for Facts We saw above that Shils builds his notion of ideology on the integration of a few pre-eminent values; and that one of the consequences of this ap- proach i s to not deal with many ideologies' claim to s c i e n t i f i c status. An alternative approach to ideology that many discussions use posits a dis- t i n c t i o n between fact and value as the proper method of understanding how ideology forms a b e l i e f system. The essence of these expositions claims that ideology i s a confusion of value for fact. One of the most i n f l u e n t i a l persons who holds this particular conception of ideology i s T. Parsons. An ideology then i s a system of be l i e f s held i n common by the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y , i.e. a soci a l or s u b - c o l l e c t i v i t y of one - including a movement deviant from the main culture of the society - a system of ideas which i s oriented to the evaluative integration of the c o l l e c t i v i t y , by interpretation of the empirical nature of the c o l l e c t i v i t y and of the s i t u - ation i n which i t i s placed, the process by which i t has developed to i t s given state, the goals to which i t s members are c o l l e c t i v e l y oriented, and their r e l a t i o n to the future 7% course of events. When the cognitive interests dominate a b e l i e f system i t i s labelled s c i e n t i f i c or philosophical. On the other hand, when the b e l i e f system i s dominated by evaluative commitment, though i t draws on s c i e n t i f i c and p h i l - osophical b e l i e f s , i t i s ideological. Thus ideology has the added feature of evaluative commitment to the b e l i e f as an aspect of membership i n a group. Beli e f i n the b e l i e f system i s an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d part of the role of group membership. Ideology d i f f e r s from instrumental b e l i e f s because of ideologies' concern for group welfare and the b e l i e f system, not just the particular goals of instrumental b e l i e f s . The central focus of ideologies i s on empirical aspects but these are combined with non-empirical elements at the point of j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the ultimate goals and values of c o l l e c t i v e action. Ideology thus serves as one of the primary bases of cognitive legitimation of patterns of value-orientation. Value-orient- ation patterns i t w i l l be remembered, always constitute -24- de f i n i t i o n s of the situation i n terms of direction of solution of action-dilemmas An ideology " r a t i o n a l i z e s " these value-selections, i t gives reasons why one direction of choice rather than i t s alternatives should be selected, why i t i s right and proper that t h i s should be so. The distortions of ideology which are introduced by the s t r a i n of the need for action, are subject to s c i e n t i f i c canons and w i l l be found by s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s . But the very fact that ideology unlike science has integ- rative functions i n the so c i a l system involving relations to many other interests than the cognitive interests of s c i e n t i s t s , means that these ( s c i e n t i f i c ) standards w i l l very generally not prevail i n the determination o'f'what be l i e f s are actually held. I f they do not, there have to be adjustive mechanisms which are homologus to the mech- anisms of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n the personality system.^5 A second source of ideological error l i e s i n the needs of mass psychology. A t h i r d source of error occurs when the evaluative element link s up with a wishful or romantic Utopian element. This conception of ideology i s more succinctly expounded by G. Bergmann. The motive power of a value judgement i s often greatly increased when i t appears within the rationale of those who hold i t not under i t s proper l o g i c a l flag as a value- judgement but i n the disguise of a statement of fact. A statement of this kind, that i s a value judgement disguised as, or mistaken for a statement of fact, I s h a l l c a l l an ideological statement. A rationale that contains i n l o g i c a l l y c r u c i a l places ideological statements, I s h a l l >gicaily c r u c i a l p i l l an ideology. c a l According to Bergmann the creation of an objective sociology free from Mannheim's paradox of " s u b j e c t i v i t y " i s similar to the problem of an objec- tiv e theory of knowledge: both are pseudo-problems that seem to end i n a hopeless subjectivity because one has not made the d i s t i n c t i o n of facts from values. The d i s t i n c t i o n between fact, value, physical object, percept and i l l u s i o n are problems of l o g i c a l analysis, not sociological analysis. These categories are prior to and independent of sociological considerations. The major fault of ideology as a confusion of value for fact l i e s i n -25- i t s generality. When one boils down Parsons' jargon he i s saying something l i k e the following: "An ideology i s a set of b e l i e f s that promotes a group's integration by evaluating the nature, history and goals of the group. While science and philosophy are mainly concerned with questions of truth, an ideology's prime concern i s evaluation even though i t may use science and philosophy. Ideology may be concerned with factual problems; but i t r e l i e s on evaluations for j u s t i f i c a t i o n of goals, values and actions. An Ideology rationalizes why value-choices are made. But since ideology i s also concerned to maintain the group i t w i l l not be solely concerned with s c i e n t i f i c canons. S c i e n t i f i c canons w i l l not direct the action choices available or the b e l i e f s to be held". This may very well be true. But i f i t i s then i t can be applied to a l l b e l i e f systems. I t could be argued that according to Parsons' notion, Western democracies, Communist systems and even primitive societies a l l rest on ideologies. This i s surely an interesting point, for i t obviously drops some of the weaker points of S h i l s ' notion of ideology. But on a second look at Parsons' scheme one must ask what i s the difference between a so c i a l philosophy and an ideology? The generality of Parsons' notion makes them synonymous: i t t e l l s us that soc i a l philosophies (with their evalu- ation of the history, goals, and pattern of a group) are common to a l l soci a l systems. This i s an improvement over S h i l s ' contention that outlooks lack an integrated character, but i t i s not carried to new explanations. Parsons ends by t e l l i n g us the obvious. The addition of the notion of confusion of value for fact may not even be that helpful. Without trying to open the Pandora's box of the fact/ value d i s t i n c t i o n i t should be noted that the p o s i t i v i s t ' s "turn" (as Bergmann c a l l s i t ) may be just one of these places that evaluation replaces s c i e n t i f i c canons. For the i n i t i a l hypothesis of the fact/value d i s t i n c t i o n -26- remains beyond v a l i d a t i o n . This i s not to deny that c e r t a i n things may be facts and are subject to s c i e n t i f i c v a l i d a t i o n or that there are values that cannot be validated by fact s . Rather i t i s to say that i t seems reas- onable that the fact/value d i s t i n c t i o n i s not absolute. Thus there may be elements of b e l i e f systems that are beyond factual t e s t i n g or s c i e n t i f i c v a l i d a t i o n that nonetheless cannot also be c a l l e d values. Let one suggest here that these problematic areas of s c i e n t i f i c v a l i d a t i o n may be very c r u c i a l i n a b e l i e f system i n regards to i t s r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . Thus the problem of the fact/value d i s t i n c t i o n begs the question about these problem- a t i c areas and would have us la b e l a b e l i e f system an ideology though the c r i t e r i o n of ideology has a c t u a l l y f a i l e d . This question o f fact versus value only exhibits how far away from a p o l i t i c a l context t h i s notion c a r r i e s ideology. Ideology has now become a to o l for the l o g i c i a n i n the t e s t i n g of s p e c i f i c ideas and theories for i m p l i c i t value judgements and factual statements. The p o l i t i c a l context of ideology i s stripped away. One could s t i l l l a b e l an opponent's b e l i e f systems as i d e o l o g i c a l , but only at the r i s k of e x h i b i t i n g one's own evalu- ative underpinnings. One shou l d note, however, the assumptions of t h i s notion of ideology and how i t t i e s i n to the other l i b e r a l concepts of ideology. Ideology i s heavily committed to action, i t i s primarily persuasive, i t i s used for mass ps y c h o l o g y and i n v o l v e s w i s h - f u l f i l l m e n t or U t o p i a n thinking. I t i s clear that the intended targets are the p o l i t i c a l movements of the r a d i c a l r i g h t and l e f t . We noticed that for both Parsons and Bergmann the reason for the confusion of fact and value at c r u c i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n points i s the " s t r a i n s " , induced by the other uses that the b e l i e f system i s implemented for. Because th i s general notion of ideology i s so general and also because the fact/value -27- distinetion may not be as neat as this notion requires, the balance of this conception of ideology is shifted to the postulate of why individuals and groups adopt ideologies. That i s , the argument turns to the validity and meaning of the strain that induces the ideological confusion. Ideology and the Intelligentsia Another dimension of the liberal conception of ideology sees ideology as a phenomenon peculiar to the modern era and specifically as a consequence of the rise of an independent intelligentsia. Though the ideological orientation has always existed'1' i t has always been separate from p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The beginnings of ideological politics date from the French revolution, with the new publicness of politics and (more importantly) with the rise of the intellectual class as a major factor in p o l i t i c s . The invention of the printing press, the Protestant emphasis on the Bible instead of on priests and on individual contact with God, and the rise of the European masses from their torpor contributed to the forma- tion of ideological p o l i t i c s . But the most crucial element was the "creation of a class of intellectuals no longer dependent on patronage or inheritance for their livelihood". ° And since ideology is the realization of the need for contact with the sacred, i t is not accidental that most modern intellectuals seem to dispose themselves towards the ideological outlook. There are numerous problems with this historical explanation of ideology. F i r s t , one notes the recurrence of the dichotomy of outlooks and ideologies, with the contention that the central value systems are not ideological. We objected to this contention above on the grounds that indeed one can see a pre-eminent value-system for social systems that are labelled "outlooks". It should be noted once again, but this time in a -28- historical vein, that there is a strong case for claiming that pre-1789 pol- i t i c s was also pervaded by a system of highly integrated pre-eminent values, i.e. ideologies. The medieval wedding of throne and altar, contained a pre- eminent value system based on Christian virtues. The Protestant communities were similar in their use of integrated values in po l i t i c s . The main point is that both established regimes and, in periods of social upheaval, revolu- tionary elements used what Shils terms "ideologies". This conclusion is not circumvented by pointing to the "new publicness" of p o l i t i c s . The transition from a "closed" politics (tight-knit ruling groups) to an "open" politics (political parties, mass elections) does not address the question of the use of pre-eminent values. It may say something about the method of transmission of values, e.g. the use of newspapers, books, etc., and the need for an increased class of intellectuals to f i l l these posts. But the transition to "open" politics does not speak to the use of values in the f i r s t place. Shils would no doubt deny the use of pre-eminent values for "as long as politics was not an instrument of justice or the right social order and were concerned with the mere maintenance of order, the conservation of power of dynasties and classes which already had or sought i t , there was no room ? Q for ideological p o l i t i c s " . This historical division of non-ideological from the ideological has an echo (and perhaps helps explain the thesis) in Samuel Beer's contention that the evolution of politics from 17th century to 20th century Britain involved a change from a politics of honor and interest to one of party and principle. But both Shils' and Beer's theses ignore the continuity of p o l i t i c a l activity: struggles over interests have a habit of enlisting principles and values. Second, the major contention that the rise of ideologies resulted from o -i the creation of a class of intellectuals independent of church and state patronage and privilege is an empirical sociological problem: one must -29- f i r s t show the existence of a class of i n t e l l e c t u a l s free from church and state controls, then one must show that these i n t e l l e c t u a l s as a c l a s s did not become t i e d to a new power so that they could pursue t h e i r quest for j u s t i c e unfettered; f i n a l l y one must show that these i n t e l l e c t u a l s as a class did indeed formulate and pursue through p o l i t i c s the so-called i d e o l - ogies. The thesis requires v a l i d a t i o n . But S h i l s does not provide the necessary data and arguments, nor does he inform h i s readers of where to find such proof. The thesis, however, appears questionable; and oddly enough i t i s from a hint i n S h i l s ' own treatment of i n t e l l e c t u a l s that a plausible counter thesis may be advanced. The f e t t e r s of patronage and inheritance preclude the i d e o l o g i c a l propensities of i n t e l l e c t u a l s from m a t e r i a l i z i n g . They subordinate t h e i r natural i n t e l l e c t u a l s t r i v i n g s to meet the requirements that church and state place on t h e i r being employed as i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The purse-strings of patronage and inheritance curbs the i d e o l o g i c a l propensity into useful p o l i t i c a l work. I f a class of i n t e l - l e c t u a l s a r i s e s that i s not dependent on church and state for a l i v e l i h o o d , they must make t h e i r l i v i n g elsewhere. With the r i s e of l i t e r a c y and p r i n t i n g the new i n t e l l e c t u a l s supposedly make the i r l i v i n g by w r i t i n g for sale on the market. The decline of the church and state was simultaneous with the r i s e of market r e l a t i o n s , with the r i s e of capitalism. The c a p i t a l i s t s may not have controlled the state (in the same sense that Louis XIV could claim he was the state) or the church; but they did control the market, the means of production, and through the control of money, endow- ments. The important point i s that i n t e l l e c t u a l s were not free but had to accommodate themselves to the c a p i t a l i s t p o l i t i c a l order. They were " f r e e " i n the same sense that labor was "free". This does not mean that i n t e l l e c - tuals faced as severe a censorship under c a p i t a l i s t market r e l a t i o n s as they faced under church and state control. And no doubt many i n t e l l e ctuals - 3 0 - were able to write what they thought, inc l u d i n g condemnations of capitalism. The tremendous outpouring of s o c i a l i s t l i t e r a t u r e i n the nineteenth century points to t h i s increased i n t e l l e c t u a l freedom of c a p i t a l i s m as opposed to the ancient regimes. But nonetheless, as a class, i n t e l l e c t u a l s were dep- endent on c a p i t a l i s t market r e l a t i o n s (whether as an i n d i v i d u a l entrepreneur or through a publisher or newspaper) for a l i v e l i h o o d . Generally they faced poverty for outspoken c r i t i c i s m of capitalism. Thus from an extension of S h i l s 1 own thinking we should see not the blossoming of ideologies (which were pri m a r i l y a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t ) but a new dependence. Curiously, the r i s e of ideologies seems to be i n spite of the new found freedom of i n t e l l e c t u a l s and not because of i t . The question remains, but with renewed i n t e r e s t : how does one account for the r i s e of what S h i l s c a l l s ideologies, i . e . socialism, Fascism, etc. One cannot address t h i s question with a f u l l answer here, but a tentative answer may do and may also help one understand the p o s i t i o n of i n t e l l e c t u a l s under the older "non-ideological" regimes. As a class the new " f r e e " i n t e l - l e c t u a l s probably performed a s i m i l a r function for the c a p i t a l i s t society that the patronage and p r i v i l e g e i n t e l l e c t u a l s performed for the ancient regimes. They served to j u s t i f y , r a t i o n a l i z e and systematize the s o c i a l order and the dominance of the r u l i n g c l a s s . The new language of t h i s j u s t - i f i c a t i o n - r e a s o n , science, r a t i o n a l i t y , freedom, natural law, etc. could be used as a c a l l to revolution and "extremism". This i s not unique to modern society. Similar twisting of the language occurred with the ancient regimes' godly j u s t i f i c a t i o n , at the hands of the Anabaptists and other r e l i g i o u s and peasant movements and r e b e l l i o n s . This i s not to say that socialism, Fascism, etc. were due to an insidious twisting of the i n h e r i t e d culture by i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The o r i g i n s l i e i n s o c i a l conditions which people wanted remedied, and to which declasse i n t e l l e c t u a l s gave a r t i c u l a t i o n and -31- systemization. They often expressed these ideas of needed change through a r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the dominant c u l t u r a l symbols. Thus reformation sought not extraneous values l i k e atheism but a renewed divine order. Socialism sought the equality and freedom that l i b e r a l i s m promised but could not r e a l i z e . What S h i l s c a l l s ideology i s not a problem of the i n t e l l e c t u a l s as a class but of s o c i a l conditions and of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e l - l e c t u a l s who express these needs. Third, the argument may be that ideologies are due to an increase i n the number of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n p o l i t i c s and p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e as compared to these professions' previous influence. This d i s t i n c t i o n emphasizes the composition and occupational d i s t r i b u t i o n of those who are p o l i t i c a l l y a c tive, as opposed to the second point which involved the i n t e l l e c t u a l class i n the whole society. The question of the v a l i d i t y of t h i s approach and t h i s assertion hangs to a large degree on what groups constitute t h i s class of i n t e l l e c t u a l s . I f one means writers, j o u r n a l i s t s , teachers, professors and students, t h e i r p o l i t i c a l involvement and influence v a r i e s from country to country. But i f one admits that the opening up of p o l i t i c s involved a place for these middle class groups to p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c s , t h e i r economic dependencies point away from the i d e o l o g i c a l tendency. This i s borne out by the generally l i b e r a l ( i . e . conserving) nature of professionals including j o u r n a l i s t s , teachers, professors and students (although students often have an independence which allows a greater i n t e l l e c t u a l freedom). Thus even t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ideology thesis makes l i t t l e sense. The argument that ideology i s due to i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n p o l i t i c s i s a plea to leave p o l i t i c s to the t r a d i t i o n a l r u l i n g groups. In Western dem- ocracies t h i s notion becomes a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for conservative l i b e r a l i s m . It i s an argument against a r a t i o n a l i s t approach to p o l i t i c s ; i t i s not only a condemnation of the r a t i o n a l i s m of socialism but can also be used -32- against the welfare liberals' plans for "social engineering" and schemes of planned reform. As this concept of ideology loses i t s creditability the weight of the argument once again shifts to the strain and c r i s i s theory; this theory supposedly gives psychological motivation for intellectuals to act as they do and the sociological reasons for their mass appeal. Strain Theory The burden of the liberal conception of ideology continually shifted to the explanation of ideology as resulting from strain or c r i s i s ; this occurred because the various explanations and notions of ideology were found wanting or too general to be useful. Ideology as a value system dis- missed ideologies ab i n i t i o in the very words used to describe ideology. The concept of ideology as confusion of value for fact included the asser- tion that the confusion resulted from the strains of evaluation and action, mass psychology, and the smuggling of Utopian doctrines into factual work. And the notion that ideology is due to intellectuals posited a personal strain for intellectuals and a sociological c r i s i s as the-key factor to the acceptance of ideologies. For E. Shils ideology is a product of man's need for imposing intel- lectual order on the world. Ideology rises in conditions of c r i s i s and in sections of society to whom the prevailing outlook has become unacceptable. This latter condition arises because strong felt needs are not met by the prevailing outlook. "Ideologies are responses to insufficient regard for some particular element in the dominant outlook and are attempts to place that neglected element in a more central position and to bring i t into fulfillment." But ideologies reject the dominant outlook and have a vision of a proposed alternative. -33- Ideologies are the creations of charismatic persons in possession of powerful, expansive, and simplified visions of the world. Some people are ideological by nature. That i s , they have a continuous need for a clearly ordered picture; they need a clear criterion of right and wrong. (The implication is that because intellectuals deal with these.questions by profession they have a propensity, especially strong in the absence of church and state, patronage and privilege, to ideology.) Others become ideological under private and public c r i s i s which heightens the need for order. "It takes a hyper-sensitivity to ultimate standards, to the sacred, and this is a quality which although rare in a l l populations is found in some measure at a l l times and particularly at times of c r i s i s . " But then as the c r i s i s abates people become less ideological. Ideology has much to do with individual temperament. It (millenarianism, the source of ideology) is always there for those who have the ideological need to be in saving contact with the ultimate. Every society has i t s outcasts, it s wretched, and i t s damned who cannot f i t into the routine requirements of social l i f e at any level of auth- ority and achievement. and Those who are constricted, who find l i f e as i t is lived too hard, are prone to the acceptance of the ideological outlook on l i f e . ^ Those who are the ideologues have a peculiar psychology in addition to the "need for order". Ideologues have paranoid tendencies. That is why the ideological orientation so frequently draws to i t s e l f madmen f u l l of hatred and fear - the paranoids who play such an important role in Professor Conn's interpretation For this reason the ideolog- i c a l outlook is f u l l of the imagery of violence and destruction and i t s practice is often crowded with actual acts of brutality and a heartless asceticism, while preaching a message of an ultimate condition of love and peace enveloping a l l human beings.^ A more systematic and studied development of the strain theory of -34- ideology i s presented by C. Geertz. His a r t i c l e on "Ideology as a C u l t u r a l System" i s a rebutt a l to what he terms the i n t e r e s t theory of ideology and a reformulation of s t r a i n ideology by the addition of a " c u l t u r a l symbolic" component. Afte r noting that ideology s t i l l retains a polemical e f f e c t , for those professing a neutral concept, Geertz moves to a consideration of Mannheim's paradox - the non-objectivity of s o c i o l o g i c a l analysis. He hopes to solve both dilemmas. But what - by a curious s e l e c t i v e omission the unkind might well i n d i c t as i d e o l o g i c a l i s not so often considered i s the p o s s i b i l i t y that a great part of the problem (Mannheim's paradox) l i e s i n the lack of conceptual s o p h i s t i c a t i o n within s o c i a l science i t s e l f , that the resistance of ideology to s o c i o l o g i c a l analysis i s so great because such analyses are i n fact fundamentally inadequate, the t h e o r e t i c a l frame- work they employ conspicuously incomplete. 3 7 After knocking down what he c a l l s the i n t e r e s t theory of ideology (ideologies are concealed i n t e r e s t s ) by pointing to the barrenness of i t s psychological motivation, Geertz develops the " s t r a i n " theory as a more systematic (but not unproblematic) portrayal of psychological motivation and the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l context. The s t r a i n theory claims a chronic malintegration of society: d i f f e r e n t people and sectors pursue d i f f e r e n t goals. Thus s o c i a l f r i c t i o n appears on the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l as psycho- l o g i c a l s t r a i n , induced by the sociologie malintegration. The r e s u l t i n g condition i s that most humans l i v e l i v e s of patterned desperation. Ideology i s one response to t h i s desperation because i t allows a symbolic outlet for emotional disturbances generated by the s o c i a l d isequilibrium. And given a basic personality type, the s o c i a l disturbances common to a group should e l i c i t s i m i l a r i d e o l o g i c a l reactions. Ideology i s thus a malady and demands diagnosis. The image i s of ideology acting on a symbolic l e v e l the way c e r t a i n neuroses, e.g. n a i l b i t i n g , paranoia, etc. act on the behavioral level for psychologically stressed persons. Thus ideology functions are essentially four fold: i t acts as a safety valve, builds morale, creates group solidarity and raises problems of the social system. But as Geertz states these functions or products of ideology seem accid- ental of a process that is originally aimed in a different direction. The attempt at social transformation has the paradoxical effect of more firmly embedding the social system i t seeks to change. Geertz claims that this paradox is due to strain theorists not understanding symbols as patterns of meaning. They do not have an adequate understanding of how ideologies transform sentiment into significance. Cultural patterns - religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scie n t i f i c , ideological - are 'programs'; they provide a template or blue print for the organization of social and psychological processes, just as genetic systems provide such a template for the organization of organic processes. (Thus) i t is through the construction of ideologies, schematic images of the social order, that man m ^ e s him- self for better or for worse a p o l i t i c a l animal. The need for these templates is strongest where the "institutionalized guides for behavior, thought or feeling, are weak or absent" - when societies exper- ience periods of c r i s i s and when these cultural patterns are questioned. Then ideologies flourish as attempts to provide new meaningful patterns to replace the decaying old ones. It is a loss of orientation that most directly gives rise to ideological activity and an inability for lack of usable models to comprehend the universe of c i v i l rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located. The development of a differentiated polity (or of greater internal differentiation within such a polity), may and commonly does bring with i t severe social dislocation and psychological tension. But i t also brings with i t con- ceptual confusion, as the established images of public order fade into irrelevance or are driven into disrepute.^ Ideologies are a response to this cultural symbolic and psychological strain which seek to render meaning to the situation. The four consequences of ideology that appeared adventitious to the cruder strain theories with the -36- addition of a cultural symbolic level can be explained as intentional. Once transferred to the psychological and sociological dimensions for explanation the "ordinary" conceptions of ideology reveal even more fully than the previous analysis not only their inadequacy but also their skewed nature. In its most blatant form the strain explanation of ideology claims that ideologies are a form of mental illness. The ideologues are sick, paranoids suffering a form of mental illness. They need medical attention. (Ironically, this sounds similar to the o f f i c i a l Soviet reasons for detaining their dissidents in mental h o s p i t a l s . ) ^ The followers of the ideologues are poor deluded souls driven by a larger social strain. The difference between Shils 1 emphasis on intellectuals and Geertz 1 on meaning is significant for i t corresponds to the differing importance of leaders. For Shils the focus is on the responsibility of the intel- lectuals as the leaders and the creators of ideologies. His analysis is strong on the role that ideologues play, while the analysis is weak on the reception of ideologies, by the mass public. This aspect of the strain theory approaches a "bad man" theory of p o l i t i c a l e v i l . "Yet to identify 'ideology' with the activities of Charlatans is to miss the most important area of a l l , the audience. The question is not how or why unscrupulous men work but why audiences r e s p o n d . I t is in response to this weak- ness, that Geertz offers his amendments and refocusing. His "strain" theory turns the spotlight away from the leaders. (He claims that this strain remains in the background.) The acceptance of ideology on a mass scale is not due to mass neurosis or to duping by leaders, but to the mean- ing ideologies convey, an attribute the previous strain theory claims is irrelevant and in error. For Shils the appeal that ideologies have almost makes the ideology's followers into dupes. The air rings of conspiracy. While, Geertz focuses on the social situation and the group strains and - 3 7 - dimensions of c r i s i s . Because s t r a i n theory labels ideology i n mental i l l n e s s terms, i t i s an obvious attempt to l i m i t discussions of s o c i a l questions by c a l l i n g one's fundamental opponents i r r a t i o n a l , s i c k humans. As one commentator on S h i l s 1 conception of ideology notes, Ideology, on an i n d i v i d u a l plane, i s a problem for psychi- a t r i c treatment rather than serious i n t e l l e c t u a l consid- eration. It was noted i n connection with the f i r s t common sense d e f i n i t i o n of ideology that the usage implied a clear mistake had been made by the ideologue. Here i t i s implied one need not argue with him for he i s c l e a r l y sick, and sickness i s answered with treatment not argument.^ With t h i s meaning ideology c a r r i e s a pejorative connotation and exceeds the bounds of the above mentioned conceptions of ideology which seek to dismiss whatever " f i t s " i n the category, i . e . ab i n i t i o . Here i t emerges as a blunt ad hominem argument. We noted above that the conception of ideology as a b e l i e f system operated on an assumed common s o c i a l outlook and only made sense within that outlook. We see here a recurrence of t h i s s i t u a t i o n . Underlying t h i s notion of ideology i s the notion that sane men agree on the basics of s o c i a l l i f e : that i f one believes that s o c i a l l i f e can encompass va l u e s , r e l a t i o n s , etc., other than what "sane" men believe then one i s obviously not r a t i o n a l . At the heart of th i s l i e s the l i b e r a l theory of a consensus p o l i t i c s and p o l i t i c s as negotiating and bargaining by roughly equal groups, with the ends of s o c i a l l i f e assumed to be the same for a l l r a t i o n a l men. This assumed l i b e r a l perspective i s even more evident i n the p l u r a l i s t thesis of the o r i g i n of s t r a i n : the chronic malintegration of the independent s o c i a l sectors. But i t i s p r e c i s e l y at th i s l e v e l that ideologies make t h e i r challenges: i n addition to fundamentally d i f f e r e n t value systems ideologies also contain d i f f e r i n g conceptions of p o l i t i c s and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . I f one accepts p o l i t i c s as consensus, then s t r a i n theory makes sense. But from outside of -38- th is assumption politics as consensus and ideology as strain appears as a way to limit discussion to one form of po l i t i c s . Once again we see that the conception of ideology is being used to mark the acceptable from the non-acceptable (a valid exercise in i t s e l f ) . But this is done from a stand point that is not stated, but held hidden within the intellectual construct by the writer and assumed as common ground with other "rational" humans. Even the strain theory is not without internal d i f f i c u l t i e s . Geertz' reformulation of strain theory stems from a two fold concern: the obvious subjective and pejorative side of ideology is not compatible with an objec- tive social science and the strain theory is psychologically and sociolog- ic a l l y good, but i t s functional explanation is thin. So as Geertz' presen- tation is more sophisticated than other concepts of strain we shall examine i t more carefully. The central problem of Geertz' reformulation of strain theory lies in an equivocation and most likely an abdication of strain theory. To functionally explain why ideologies have the consequences they do, Geertz invests meaning into ideologies on both a personal level for the ideologist and on a cultural level as a new possible cultural symbol pattern. This appears as an amendment to the excess of the more blatantly pejorative notions, and appears to solve the curious paradox of strain theory, by adding a conceptual sophistication that explains the ideological false statements in terms of metaphors, tropes, etc. But at the same time i t introduces a strange equivocation into the rejuvenated "strain" system. Presumably the psycho- logical and sociological strains that lead to ideology as a malady, i.e. mental sickness, are retained. Thus, cultural c r i s i s should lead to a conclusion that now ideology expresses cultural or social "sickness". Presumably this new level of ideological c r i s i s should retain the unrelated- -39- ness to r e a l i t y that ideology possessed i n the previous s t r a i n theory. Ideology as a r e s u l t of c u l t u r a l c r i s i s should portray the confusion of fact and value, and the pre-eminence of a few values - neither of which are "true". But when we look for t h i s i n Geertz we do not find t h i s connotation, despite h i s claim that he retains the psychorsociological dimensions. The problem l i e s at the heart of h i s reformulation: the a t t r i b u t i o n of meaning to ideologies. I f ideologies are c u l t u r a l symbol patterns s i m i l a r to philosophy, science, etc., which seek to explain r e a l i t y as these systems do, then one cannot continue to describe ideologies as a malady, an i l l n e s s . For as Geertz notes, the concept of ideology as a map of problematic r e a l i t y does not give any i n d i c a t i o n as to the truth of the propositions. In other words, Geertz 1 reformulation i s a complete defusing of any pejorative or subjective meaning to ideology, but not by a sophisticated analysis as he claims. Rather, i t c a r r i e s the notion of ideology to such a general l e v e l that (once again) ideology becomes synonomous with s o c i a l philosophy. His amendment to s t r a i n theory i s not compatible with the diagnostic s t r a i n theory. We can see t h i s tendency to define ideology as a s o c i a l philosophy not as a s i t u a t i o n peculiar to Geertz 1 conception of ideology but as a micro- cosm of the tensions and contradictions of the l i b e r a l conception of ideology; i t i s caught between a general conception of ideology which makes i t p r a c t i c a l l y synonomous with s o c i a l philosophy and a very s p e c i f i c con- ception which l i m i t s " r a t i o n a l i t y " and defines ideology as a variant of mental i l l n e s s . Now S h i l s , Parsons, and Bergmann move away from the con- ception of ideology as a s o c i a l philosophy i n part to deny the v a l i d i t y of t h i s category to ideology. To admit an ideology as a s o c i a l philosophy then requires a systematic attack on the content and not the s t y l e ; then t h i s admission exposes the roots of one's own b e l i e f s to the p o s s i b i l i t y -40- of the confusion of fact and value or the implementation of pre-eminent values. To admit that ideologies are possibly v a l i d s o c i a l philosophies with nothing to condemn them ab i n i t i o renders ideologies equal to one's own b e l i e f pattern. Ideology as a s o c i a l philosophy i s a two-edged sword, when these writers want only a single-edged razor. To avoid the questioning of one's own thought, a category i s established that condemns as " f a l s e " , "wrong", by the mere categorization as an ideology. But then to explain why ideologies are wrong one r e l i e s on the concept " s t r a i n " . But the c r e d i t a b i l i t y of the s t r a i n concept becomes overtaxed when one asks s p e c i f i c a l l y what i s meant by " s t r a i n " and how does i t account for the consequences of ideology. S t r a i n becomes ad homenim, ultimately c a l l i n g one's opponents sick. But to make th i s system creditable means investing meaning back into ideology, i . e . i t involves a move back to s o c i a l philosophy. But t h i s reformulation does not stay within " s t r a i n " theory. It loses the s p e c i f i c i t y of s t r a i n theory as a trade o f f for c r e d i t a b i l i t y . Geertz has rendered meaning to the notion of s t r a i n i n ideology but only at the expense of e s t a b l i s h i n g a category by which to condemn ideologies and an explanation of why ideologies must f a i l . To S h i l s , Parsons, and Bergmann ideologies must f a i l because they do not have a true grasp of r e a l i t y , while for Geertz ideologies may have truth or errors. Thus the l i b e r a l conception of ideology returns again to the most general l e v e l . Now the question must be asked: what does the s t r a i n conception of ideology i n i t s many forms bring to discussions of p o l i t i c a l matters? S t r a i n as a malady and i t s attendant conceptions of leaders, etc. c l e a r l y o f f e r s a way to l i m i t s o c i a l questioning and to b a t t l e one's opponents. But i n terms of key insights to be expanded for s o c i a l inquiry into the nature and function of s o c i a l ideas i t o f f e r s skimpy portions of food. On the other hand, the formulation of s t r a i n as meaningful response, at least sets out on a better -41- foot Geertz 1 observations about the distortion of ideology being the result of attempts to create new meaning by employing tropes, metaphors, etc., is a very convincing argument and actually quite a useful method of interpreting, not only p o l i t i c a l propaganda, but everyday p o l i t i c a l rhetoric, too. However, when coupled to the other parts of the strain theory, the total system becomes equivocal. At best Geertz 1 total argument on ideology ends up hopelessly general. To claim that ideology is a new social philosophy arising from cultural c r i s i s appears needless; a new name for an old object without new insights or distinctions is redundant, but perhaps understandable in the highly charged p o l i t i c a l debate of the twentieth century. Marx: Ideology as Ruling Ideas But men developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter along with their real existence, their think- ing and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by l i f e . ^ With these enigmatic words Marx summarized the connection he saw between men's thinking and their social existence. And i t is at this general level of how circumstances and thought interact that his theory of ideology operates: for Marx, ideology is a basic component of understanding how a l l thought systems originate and are sustained. Now i t might be objected at this point that because what has been called the liberal notion of ideology does not seek to explain the origins of a l l thought systems, but merely how certain thought patterns run amok, the author is really comparing apples and oranges; that what has evolved under the common name of ideology is actually two different conceptions that refer to two distinct phenomenon, that the liberal concept of ideology wants to explain revolutionary ideas, while Marx wants to explain how ideas are used by established power, i.e. conservative ideas. Further, i t might be argued that the liberal notion addresses certain social questions, while Marx - 4 2 - addresses other (though perhaps more important) s o c i a l questions. The l i b e r a l concept of ideology deals with revolutionary s i t u a t i o n s , which are only intermittent. Marx's concept asks questions that are perhaps applic- able more often and perhaps at a more basic s o c i a l l e v e l , i . e . what i s the r e l a t i o n of the economy to ideas. While these objections have a c e r t a i n measure of v a l i d i t y , they are based on an o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of the two notions of ideology. For, l i b e r a l "ideology" seeks to comprehend Marxism and Fascism while i t i s i n power also; and Marx's "ideology" t r i e s to explain the r i s e of revolutionary ideas and movements, too, e.g. the r i s e of the bourgeosie and t h e i r supplanting of feudal s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and con- ceptions of society, state, etc. The objection misses the generality of Marx's concept, and thus i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y to almost a l l thought systems. Thus while Marx may be including much more " t e r r i t o r y " i n h i s conception of ideology than the l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s , he i s including a l l the t e r r i t o r y they seek to cover. The broadness of Marxian "ideology" speaks from a deeper l e v e l of s o c i a l explanation and thus i s i n c l u s i v e of the l i b e r a l notion. Because Marx's notion of ideology i s at such a general, philosophical l e v e l , the discussion of ideology must follow him on to what may appear an a r i d p l a i n . Marx's i n t e l l e c t u a l construct tends to be rather complicated and the notion of ideology i s buried deep i n the middle. But for an adequate understanding of ideology the discussion must focus on how the concept f i t s into the larger system. The abstractness of t h i s p h i losophical approach i s compounded by the Hegelian t r a d i t i o n that Marx wrote i n opposition to but did not completely transcend. Thus the discussion w i l l take a long detour through Marx's system and i t s development. Ultimately t h i s i s necessary for a f u l l comprehension of the worth of h i s concept of ideology. But the need for an inquiry into the philosophical aspects of the concept of ideology i s not s o l e l y necessitated by Marx's i n d i v i d u a l approach to s o c i a l discourse. -43- In a trend report published fifteen years ago N. Birnbaum noticed that the study of ideology between 1940 and 1960 had divided into two tendencies, one empirical and the other theoretical. But both were truncated foci of ideology. The empirical predilection had diffused into a study of numerous ideologies. And, "in nearly a l l cases a direct attack on the theoretical problem of ideology has been renounced: the general conditions under which ideology is produced have hardly been considered".^ The other tendency does treat ideology in a general fashion, as one component of society. But here, "the concept of ideology has been severed from i t s philosophical bases and discussions of i t no longer entail epistemological disputes".^ Because Marx's concept of ideology does operate on a philosophical plane i t tends to f u l f i l l the shortcomings of both trends that Birnbaum noticed. Marx's ideology seeks to explain the general conditions of ideology within a phil- osophical and epistemological framework. This philosophical approach is not for i t s own sake but is a key to a rejuvenation of the concept of ideology and i t s practical study. Marx combined a dialectical view of materialism (in opposition on the one hand to the Hegelian dialectical Idealists, and on the other to the mechanical materialists) with a form of historicism that admitted, however, of understanding beyond one's limited historical perspective, i f one posses- sed the proper key. This resulted in ideology being conceived of as false consciousness or the ruling ideas of an epoch arising from a historical ruling group's exercise of power through the control of the means of production. Before proceeding to an elaboration of these notions, one should note that Marx's use of the term "ideology" differs not only from many of the writers of the above sections but also from many of his intellectual heirs. Most importantly Marx's "ideology" is not the same as Lenin's "ideology". -44- Lenin's insistence on "socialist ideology" confounds Marx's subtle historica and sociological arguments. For Lenin, "ideology" had a meaning that is closely approximated by the term class-consciousness. Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology form- ulated by the working mass themselves in the process of their movement, the only choice is either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a "third" ideology and moreover in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology).^ Lenin's concept of ideology is clearly dependent on Marx's concept, but nevertheless Lenin's is clearly at variance with Marx's. Lenin's con- cept is both a popularization and an even further "p o l i t i c a l i z a t i o n " of the term; both of these changes can be seen as pragmatic alterations made to lend efficiency to the p o l i t i c a l battles Lenin faced. Lenin starts from Marx's notion of ideology as ruling class ideas (or consciousness) and then opposes to this working class consciousness (proletarian thinking), Marxism or socialist ideology. This extension of "ideology" to the proletarian's thinking is significant. First, for Marx a clear opposition existed between ideology (a false mirror of reality) and science (a true picture of reality) Lenin's use of the term "socialist ideology" can be seen as leading to the curious notions (latter expressed in o f f i c i a l Marxism-Leninism) of distinct bourgeois science and socialist science. The point is not just that for Lenin socialist science and ideology are by definition true, but i t is rathe that Marx's perspective assumed a cumulative development of science and not a supplanting of bourgeois science. For i f bourgeois science was science then i t was true. Marx's dichotomy of science and ideology is also part of his assumption that communism was to be built on capitalism's back (specif- i c a l l y Western Europe) and could not proceed from the sc i e n t i f i c a l l y and economically backward regions. It was part of his uni-linear theory of social development. - 4 5 - Second, Lenin's changes of "ideology" are a mechanical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Marx's thesis that the economic structure determines the s o c i a l thinking (as part of the superstructure); whereas, Marx conceived a d i a l e c t i c a l con- nection with more f l e x i b i l i t y and a more complicated connection. For Lenin, i f the economy produces thinking and society i s s p l i t into economic classes, then the bourgeoisie and the p r o l e t a r i a t must each have t h e i r own forms of consciousness, t h e i r own d i s t i n c t thinking as another a t t r i b u t e of class membership. The hole i n the argument appears to be that the p r o l e t a r i a t i s not spontaneously class-conscious, not aware of i t s own true i n t e r e s t s despite i t s class membership. Lenin's answer to t h i s anomalous lack of class-consciousness emphasized the role of the party and party i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n forming a class-conscious workers' movement. Marx, on the other hand, viewed the economy and consciousness as developing from inputs from each other, i . e . the economy causes changes i n thinking which then react back on the economy. This dynamic model of society and thinking resolves some problems Lenin's s t a t i c conception does not. The anomalous lack of class- consciousness i s p a r t i a l l y explained by Marx's insistence that the subordin- ate classes are subject to the r u l e r ' s ideology. The spontaneous class- consciousness can be "blocked" by ideology. One can only say " p a r t i a l l y explained" because the p r a c t i c a l problem that Lenin encountered a c t u a l l y l i e s latent i n Marx's thinking, and i s not completely resolved. Thus the r e l a t i o n s h i p of economy to ideology i s not as automatic or mechanical as Lenin's concept of ideology would have i t . But t h i s mechanical interpreta- t i o n of Marx's ideology i s i n part also prefigured i n Marx because of an inadequate psychological mechanism that would relate the material and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s to men's thinking. And t h i r d , Lenin's concept of "ideology", while perhaps a good propa- ganda device, focuses on revolutionary action and not on the c r i t i q u e of - 4 6 - how s o c i a l systems of domination operate to preclude change. Lenin's "ideology" narrows the major focus of Marx's "ideology" to the immediate p o l i t i c a l arena (though one that includes economics and v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n ) . Marx emphasized ideology as a more pervasive factor a f f l i c t i n g the e n t i r e society. The preceeding comparison of Marx's and Lenin's use of "ideology" i s not meant to be exhaustive but only schematic and to help one e s t a b l i s h the following preliminary note: despite a c e r t a i n amount of overlap between the two, one should not confuse Lenin's concept of ideology with Marx's concept of ideology. Marx's concept of ideology i s a blend of ideas inherited from the ph i l o s o p h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l struggles i n post-Hegelian Germany. Cu r s o r i l y , ideology i s the inverted ideas and thinking - the r e v e r s a l of true s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s as the image i n a camera i s inverted - that i s a consequence of the alienated material, economic r e l a t i o n s . It i s important to be clear i n exactly what sense ideas are "inverted" (or a " r e f l e x i o n " of) material r e l a t i o n s . I t seems reasonable that Marx did not mean that ideas are the exact opposite of what the material, r e a l r e l a t i o n s are. He was not a s s e r t i n g that ideologies had the exact opposite correspondence to what they claimed to protray. Rather "inverted" refers to the I d e a l i s t assumption that was prevalent i n Hegelian and bourgeois thinking. Ideology was inverted because ideas seemed to precede and cause material r e l a t i o n s . By using the word "inverted" Marx was asserting the m a t e r i a l i s t thesis that matter i s p r i o r to ideas and thus "determines" ideas. Second, ideology presents the idea-form and ideal-form of material r e l a t i o n s . And insofar as the i d e a l presentation of the material r e l a t i o n s i s a d i s t o r t i o n of the facts the ideas are (metaphorically) inverted: the best i s a c t u a l l y not the best, the i d e a l i s not i d e a l . And i n t h i s sense the ideas are a d i s t o r t e d or false - 4 7 - conception of reality. Thus, following the materialist thesis, a condition of material alienation results in ideas and thinking being alienated. Since Marx's concept of ideology is closely bound to his criticism of the German "ideologist", one needs to examine the left Hegelian's inversion of Hegel's Idealism and Hegel's propositions on history and consciousness. For Hegel the dialectical unfolding of Knowledge and Consciousness produce history. History thus is the realization by stages of increasing Freedom, Consciousness and Knowledge. The increased consciousness and knowledge of man is known only after a particular stage of history has been transcended. "The problem of ideology (in the sense of 'false consciousness' or imperfect consciousness) arises for Hegel because in his view individuals and even entire nations are instruments of history, executors of a process whose meaning is concealed from them and which becomes self-conscious only post-festum in the philosopher who sums up the sense of the e p o c h . T h e young Hegelians (and Feuerbach and Marx after them) retained this dialec- t i c a l historical process and the idea of consciousness in process. Feuerbach "inverted" Hegel's idealism into a materialism and thus viewed religion as man's alienated essence. Then Marx, following Feuerbach and retaining his materialist inversion of the Hegelian dialectical process, shifted human alienation from religion to the material, and economic relations. Thus, for Marx, men's thinking alters not as the realization of self-moving ideas, but as the realization of new material relations gives birth to new ideas. Thinking changes because the real, material relations change. Marx placed- primary importance on understanding social conditions as opposed to the young Hegelians who sought the understanding of abstract principles of "freedom", "reason", etc. Standing Hegel "on his feet", Marx transposed the Hegelian dialectical ideating process to the "reflection" in men's heads of the dialectical material process. "The Marxian conception of ideology thus -48- fuses two d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s : Hegel's insi g h t into the tr a n s i t o r y character of the successive manifestations of the s p i r i t and Feuerbach's m a t e r i a l i s t inversion of Hegel, with i t s stress on the this-worldly character of natural existence. Marx's characterization of material existence as a series of d i a l e c t i c a l ^changes dependent i n the l a s t instance on the economic mode of production was the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g mark separating him from the Hegelian Idealism of Stir n e r and Bauer and the materialism of Feuerbach. At the heart of h i s thinking, Marx claimed that s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s - and ideas and idea-systems - depend on or are determined by the economic mode of production. Ideas and ideologies constitute part of the "superstructure" dependent on the economic base. As the mode of production changes d i a l e c t i c a l l y through h i s t o r y so the systems of ideas change. This economic materialism as a c a u s a l i t y p r i n c i p l e was given a revol- utionary twist by the addition of the d i a l e c t i c a l h i s t o r i c a l component i n which p a r t i c u l a r classes of men overthrow the economic system which had come to appear as beyond change, the l o g i c a l extension of abstract ideas and i d e a l . This appearance of an unchangeable society i s based on the r e a l i t y of an a l i e n a t i o n at the determining (economic) l e v e l of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . Because the c a p i t a l i s t mode of production i s a system of a l i e n - a t i o n of men from th e i r fellow workers, from the product of t h e i r labor and from human species l i f e , the idea system of capitalism reproduces t h i s a l i e n - ation i n an idea system. As a l i e n a t i o n i s a separation of men from t h e i r work, fellows, species, i . e . i t i s a shortening, a reduction, of human existence into a p a r t i a l existence (a merely laboring existence) so a l i e n - ated thinking and ideas i s a truncation of ideas from the t o t a l r e a l i t y they should encompass. Ideologies are p a r t i a l (and therefore f a l s e ) and do not r e f l e c t a true picture of the whole of l i f e . As economic a l i e n a t i o n -49- treats humans as mere labor power, an economic commodity and ignores humans' manifold s o c i a l existence and p o t e n t i a l , so i n t e l l e c t u a l a l i e n a t i o n treats thinking as merely abstract ideas and ignores the connections of ideas to r e a l i t y . Thinking i s thus separated from i t s manifold existence, i . e . the dependence and v a l i d a t i o n by the r e a l world. But just as a l i e n a t i o n of labor i s material e x p l o i t a t i o n , so i n t e l l e c t u a l a l i e n a t i o n operates for i d e a l i s t e x p l o i t a t i o n . Ideology reinforces dominant material r e l a t i o n s , seeks to j u s t i f y t h i s dominance and projects the ideals of the dominant class. The a l i e n a t i o n of material r e l a t i o n s reproduces an inverted d i s t o r t e d picture of the world. In th i s sense ideology i s a fa l s e or p a r t i a l consciousness: i t d i s t o r t s the p o r t r a i t of r e a l i t y to the benefit of those who control the mode of production - the r u l i n g c l a s s . For Hegel successively truer consciousnesses developed through h i s t o r y . For Marx successive development of the alienated modes of production begat d i f f e r e n t ideologies for d i f f e r e n t epochs. With t h i s background on the o r i g i n s and assumptions of Marx's ideas, l e t us turn to Marx's sketch of ideology: The ideas of the r u l i n g class are i n every epoch the r u l i n g ideas, i . e . the class which i s the r u l i n g material force of the society i s at the same time i t s r u l i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l force. The class which has the means of material production at i t s disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that, thereby, generally speaking the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to i t . The r u l i n g ideas are nothing more than the i d e a l expression of the dominant material r e l a t i o n s h i p s grasped as i d e a l s ; hence, of the re l a t i o n s h i p s which make the one class the r u l i n g one, therefore the idea of i t s dominance. The in d i v i d u a l s composing the r u l i n g class possess among other things consciousness and therefore think. Insofar therefore as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, i t i s self-evident that they do t h i s i n t h e i r whole range, hence among other things rule as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the prod- uction and d i s t r i b u t i o n of ideas of their^age. Thus the i r ideas are the r u l i n g ideas of the epoch. The key phrase i n th i s passage for understanding Marx's concept of ideology i s that the r u l i n g ideas (ideology) are " dominant material -50- relationships grasped as ideals ". Ideology is the projection of the relations of domination as being the good, the proper, the moral, the reasonable and rational end which a l l men strive for. Ideology is the idealization of what is not ideal, for i t contains repugnant aspects whether as potential consequences (in the case of a not yet fully dominant class) or in actual practice. This seamy side of the ideology is either le f t undev- eloped, ignored or passed over lightly with a euphemism. The ruling class members themselves see their ideas and rule as universally valid and not as products of their particular material interests: their ideals are a l l men's ideals. Marx expanded further on this universality of ideas and i t s histor- i c a l development. If now considering the course of history we detach the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class i t s e l f and attrib- ute them an independent existence, i f we confine ourselves to saying that these ideas were dominant without bothering ourselves about the conditions of production and the producers of the ideas, we can say for instance that during the time the aristocracy was dominant the concepts honour, loyalty, etc. were dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc. The ruling class i t s e l f imagines this to be so. This conception of history which is common to a l l historians particularly since the 18th century, w i l l necessarily come up against the phenomena that increas- ingly take on the form of universality. For each new class which puts i t s e l f in the place of the one before i t is compelled to represent i t s interests as the common interest of a l l members of society put in ideal form: i t w i l l give its ideas the form of universality and represent them as the SO only rational universal valid ones. There are several more important points in these passages. The ruling ideas as they are presented in ideology are shorn of the explicit connection to historically determined material relations, which they idealize and pro- ject on a trans-historical plane. The ruling ideas appear as universally valid for a l l times and a l l peoples: they appear as science. The ruling class does not acknowledge that i t rules over the material world. The classe subject to material exploitation and domination are also subject to the ideal portrait and also do not grasp the material domination as the real motor of -51- the abstract ideas. Marx directs these comments to the young Hegelians and to Feuerbach, who saw history as the realization of abstract principles. Marx agrees that ideas are approaching the universal (approximating truth and science). But he claims that this is only because of the increasing "universalization" of the basis of rule. As the succeeding ruling classes more closely approximate the universals of common interest, science, dem- ocracy, etc., their ruling ideas also seem more universal and abstract. So when the most universal class - the proletariat as the true representative of human species l i f e - is the ruling "class" - i t w i l l mean the achieve- ment of the common interest, science and the abolition of class. A l l w i l l be universals; no partial consciousness or partial associations. The key to this "universalization" process is the universalization of the means of production, the common ownership of the means of production: communism. This discussion of universals and abstract ideas holding sway appears very metaphysical and is almost the type of approach that Marx wished to leave behind. (Much of the metaphysical tone of the discussion appears foreordained in the Hegelianism he retained as his basic outlook.) However, one should not overlook the very practical aspects of this approach to social ideas. For the practical effect of ideologies is to generate "s p i r i t u a l " support from the exploited classes and to give an account of society such that change is made more d i f f i c u l t . Ideology is a means for a ruling class to maintain i t s ruling status by effectively limiting the range of alternatives to their rule. While the economic relations wrest material wealth and physical support from the lower classes, the ideology connected with the mode of production is a method to create the acceptance and mental support for the exploitation. The ideological system further acts to hide the basis of the exploitation by focusing on "freedom", "God", "natural law", "obligation", etc. In particular, "class ideologies create -52- three images of the class that is struggling for dominance: an image for i t s e l f ; an image of i t s e l f for other classes which exalts i t ; an image of i t s e l f for other classes, which devalues them in their own eyes, drags them down, tries to defeat them, so to speak, without a shot being fired Ideology as ruling ideas is thus important for social systems as the means of legitimation of a particular social system. Ideology as legitimation of a ruling group's domination is a more efficient means of social control than constant use of the police or military force. It might be objected that Marx's concept contains a severe contra- diction. His position claims an economic determinism that seems to conflict i f not with his revolutionism, at least with his own personal practice. On the one hand the economic determinism seems to allow no freedom of action for the class actors: the economic laws appear to assume a process a l l their own, before which men bend, thus leaving men no room for revolutionary action. On the other hand the historicism in Marx's ideology appears a self-destruc- tive principle: both of these team up to raise fundamental questions against ideology. If ideas are dependent on the material conditions, ultimately on the mode of production, and a ruling class controls the production of ideas, how do revolutionary ideas occur? And more basically, i f ideas are determined by the economy i t seems that one can only wait for the economy to change before new social relations and a revolution occur, for ideas have no power in themselves. Marx's economic determinism appears to drive the argument away from action into fatalism. And what is more, i t almost guarantees the absence of revolutionary ideas. Ultimately the question- is how to explain revolutions and even Marx as a revolutionary theorist and actor. Part of this seeming contradiction lies in a s t r i c t interpretation of Marx's determination in the last instance by the economic sector. But the -53- r e l a t i o n s between the mode of production and the i d e o l o g i c a l superstructure are not so i n f l e x i b l e as to preclude revolutionary change. It i s clear from the quotation at the beginning of t h i s section that Marx did not have a s t r i c t determination (and d e f i n i t e l y not i n the sense of predetermined) i n mind. For i t i s men that ultimately make the mode of production, enact s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and i t i s a p a r t i c u l a r group of men (the r u l i n g c l a s s ) that controls the society. He i s not saying that the mode of production moves of i t s e l f and comes to control men as somehow being a cosmic fate moving of i t s own self-contained laws. The s t r i c t determinist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the kind o h i s t o r i c a l view that Marx wants to show as being i n error. The determinist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the evolution of economy i s a r e i f i c a t i o n - the projection as a Law of Nature. Marx seeks to replace such r e i f i c a t i o n s with the notion that i t i s men that make t h e i r society and the mode of production; and that men, armed with correct i n t e l l e c t u a l tools ( i . e . s c i e n t i f i c socialism) can change the oppression they l i v e i n . The answer to t h i s contradiction of economic determinism l i e s i n the d i a l e c t i c a l approach •» as opposed to a mechanical determination - and the proposition that modes of production contain within i t the seeds of i t s destruction. For example, to be the r u l i n g c l ass, the bourgeoisie must create, through the process of being a r u l i n g class, a new revolutionary class with i t s own revolutionary ideas. The bourgeoisie acting i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t create the p r o l e t a r i a t who puruse (enlightened by s c i e n t i f i c ideas about the operation of society) t h e i r i n t e r e s t and so i n s t i t u t e the true common i n t e r e s t . Thus the economic deter- minism and the economic determination of ideas i s not as s t r i c t as i s often interpreted. In fact., Marx can be accused of placing too great an emphasis on the independence of ideas. As W. A. Williams notes, Marx could not discount ideas for the simple reason that he was p r i n c i p a l l y concerned with the c e n t r a l axioms and dynamic propensities of c a p i t a l i s t development.. Indeed one might - 5 4 - argue with considerable e f f e c t that i t was h i s very over- emphasis on the power of ideas that lead him repeatedly, and i n a way that contradicted another part of h i s analysis of ideas, to underestimate the time required for the f u l l evolution of the dynamic features he defined as being the causal engines of the c a p i t a l i s t process. He was very prone to assume that men would perceive the true nature of t h e i r condition, and proceed to improve i t much more quickly than they a c t u a l l y did - or have. ^ Lest the h i s t o r i c a l succession of classes appear as an endless chain of revolutionary classes each producing i t s own ideology based on i t s rule and then being supplanted by another class's rule ad infinitum, one should bear i n mind the role of the p r o l e t a r i a t as the u n i v e r s a l actor, i . e . as the most general actor, which acts to benefit a l l humans. It i s also because of t h i s f i n a l r e s o l u t i o n of the class c o n f l i c t s and the d i v i s i o n of ideology and science that Marx can claim that s c i e n t i f i c socialism transcends the h i s t o r i c i s m of e a r l i e r thought systems. The r e s o l u t i o n of the alienated economic conditions through the communal ownership of the means of production also e n t a i l s the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of ideas and material conditions. Communism also ends the i d e o l o g i c a l reversal of ideas and material with i t s p a r t i a l , f a l s e portrayal of the world through r u l i n g ideas. The d i s t o r t e d , p a r t i a l ideas based as they are on one portion of society's i n t e r e s t r u l i n g , gives way to the coincidence of ideas and the r e a l world, because the general i n t e r e s t i s now based on general, universal ru l e . Thus science i s born. Communism i s also the end of ideology. "This whole semblance, that rule of a c e r t a i n class i s only the rule of c e r t a i n ideas, comes to a natural end of course as soon as society ceases to be organized i n the form of c l a s s - r u l e , that i s to say as i t i s no longer necessary to represent a p a r t i c u l a r interest. CO as a general i n t e r e s t of the 'general i n t e r e s t ' as r u l i n g . ' 0 For Marx, ideas are h i s t o r i c i s t , because they are based on a p a r t i a l development of the material conditions. His own ideas escape the h i s t o r i c i s t dictum because he claims they foreshadow the u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n of ideas - the -55- complete a b s t r a c t i o n and r e a l i z a t i o n based on the u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n of the mode of production. Another c o m p l i c a t i o n of Marx's concept of ideology was expressed by H. M. Drucker. He claimed that Marx i m p l i c i t l y used "ideology" i n two senses: one fo r a r i s i n g c l a s s i n which case the ideology i s honest or p o s s i b l y s c i e n t i f i c , and one fo r a c l a s s i n power, which i s apo l o g e t i c of i t s dominance. The common ground that Marx wished to emphasize, i s that "they are both the product of a p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s (as opposed to humanity i n general. Both these kinds of t h i n k i n g , d i f f e r e n t though they are i n content, guide and defend that c l a s s and both are, what i s more important, wrong". (This d i s t i n c t i o n i s reminiscent, though not i d e n t i c a l w i t h Mannheim's b i f u a c a t i o n of Marx's "ideology" i n t o " ideology" and " u t o p i a " . T h e two should not be confused.) But t h i s i s unnecessary s p l i t t i n g of h a i r s and the two senses can be adequately r e c o n c i l e d w i t h the no t i o n of ideology as f a l s e consciousness. The bourgeoisie, i n a d d i t i o n to a c q u i r i n g c o n t r o l of the means of production during t h e i r r i s e to power, ap p l i e d science to the economy and i n t h e i r b a t t l e s w i t h the a r i s t o c r a c y . The then j u s t emerging n a t u r a l sciences were ap p l i e d by the bourgeoisie as i t s method of a c q u i r i n g power from the ol d e r r u l i n g c l a s s and as the means of e x p l o i t i n g the sub- ordinate c l a s s e s . The bourgeoisie a p p l i e d p h y s i c s , chemistry and mechanics (e.g. the steam engine) to accumulate t h e i r wealth and power; the a r i s t o c - racy d i s d a i n i n g merchant a c t i v i t i e s , e v e n t u a l l y l o s t power i n a s o c i e t y that was i n c r e a s i n g l y dominant by a market place. But these forms of science were not complete. They had not been extended to the s o c i a l sphere. Thus these ideas may have been adequate i n the p o l i t i c a l s t r u ggle with the a r i s t o c r a c y . They were more s c i e n t i f i c than the a r i s t o c r a t ' s t h e o l o g i c a l l y based explanations. But t h i s c l a i m to s c i e n t i f i c t r u t h would n e c e s s a r i l y s t a r t to dwindle and seem l e s s tenable a f t e r the r i s i n g c l a s s assumed power, - 5 6 - for then i t st a r t s the struggle with a newer r i s i n g c l ass, which i s more univ e r s a l , less p a r t i a l , than i t i s . And i n the idea-struggle with the newer class the p a r t i a l and false nature of the established science becomes clear . I t i s not so much that a class would have to change i t s ideas, or that the ideas would degenerate but that the debate with the newer class shows them to be i n error. Though Marx never made th i s point e x p l i c i t l y , i t i s a reasonable inference from h i s writings that though the bourgeoisie had mastered the natural sciences they had not re l i e v e d the s o c i a l sciences (including much of economics) of the i d e o l o g i c a l bias. Communism would bu i l d on the accomplishments of bourgeois science, but would make the s o c i a l studies s c i e n t i f i c also, for i t would remove the cause of ideology - a part- i c u l a r i n t e r e s t r u l i n g as general. Thus, one need not make the d i s t i n c t i o n between the s c i e n t i f i c , honest and the apologetic stages to explain why Marx lumps Smith (whom he respected) with Bentham (whom he c a l l e d a "genius i n the way of bourgeois s t u p i d i t y " ) . There are several c r i t i c i s m s of Marx's concept of ideology that must be made. Many of these have to do with "metaphysical" approach, which not only sheds useful l i g h t on s o c i o l o g i c a l analysis but also attempts to explain the whole course of human h i s t o r y . Marx probably f e l t that h i s ideas were l o g i c a l l y connected and formed an integrated whole. But Marx's h i s t o r i c a l scheme can be severed from h i s s o c i o l o g i c a l observations. Although the concept of ideology i s one of Marx's fundamental dichotomies and operates i n both h i s over-arching h i s t o r i c a l scheme and h i s c r i t i q u e of society, we need not accept the whole system to derive a measure of u t i l i t y from the concept of ideology. Though Marx's h i s t o r i c a l scheme explains the course of h i s t o r y as necessarily culminating with the s o c i a l revolution and then communism, the concept of ideology i s part of the scheme but i t i s not e s s e n t i a l to the - 5 7 - motor of the system. I f i t had played a more important part i n Marx's thinking, i . e . i f he had developed i t more, he might have been more pessi- m i s t i c about the tendencies he saw developing i n c a p i t a l i s t society. Further, h i s concept of ideology can be divorced from the s p e c i f i c tendencies he saw developing. The famous immiseration and p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n thesis, the tendency for the concentration of property, etc., though s t i l l open to debate, do not depend on h i s "ideology". Neither Marx's grand h i s t o r i c a l process nor the s p e c i f i c s of h i s t o r y require the support of h i s "ideology". Second, though Marx posited an end to ideology ( i . e . the synthesis - u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n of material and ideas) as the consciousness-counterpart to communism, we need not view t h i s apparent h i s t o r i c a l p r e d i c t i o n as a necessary component of "ideology". Actually, the idea of the union of theory and practice i s not so much a h i s t o r i c a l p r e d i c t i o n as an i d e a l and appears to be almost a s t r i c t l y l o g i c a l outcome of the Hegelian categories Marx retained. One should not completely dismiss t h i s point, for a more pedestrian approach to " u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n " of ideas i s almost a common place idea about science. For i f people are m a t e r i a l l y free and l i v e i n economically and p o l i t i c a l l y harmonious community, then the f e t t e r s (the r u l i n g class's i n t e r e s t s ) to science break down. Actually, t h i s thesis i s a Hegelianized version of the l i b e r a l dictum about l i b e r t y leading to truth. Third, we need not even accept a s t r i c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the thesis that economics determines the rest of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , to salvage some meaning for the concept of ideology. As was argued above a s t r i c t economic determinism leads to contradictions with other portions of Marx's system. It was also suggested that a less mechanical model was intended by Marx: determination and causation was meant to have a d i a l e c t i c a l meaning. The s t r i c t economic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the o r i g i n s of ideology i s also over- blown since Marx spoke of " s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s " and " l i f e " and not s p e c i f i c a l l y -58- the economy or the mode of production. So that, the thesis of thought being dependent on social relations, conditions, etc. begins to take on some truth and possibly some u t i l i t y . We w i l l leave i t to the Marx scholars to finally decide in what sense he was an "economic determinist". If we approach ideology as being the result of material interests, broadly conceived, we drop the terminological disputes and move on to the application of his notion. Fourth, Marx's assumptions about the progress of human knowledge and the capabilities of science to conquer man's problems appears untenable fend almost curious) from the mid-20th century vantage point. These assumptions can be partially excused as an example of the historicism of ideas: a historically determined excessive belief in the a b i l i t i e s of science that was common to the middle 19th century. His pitting of ideology against science is too simplistic a formulation and led many of his intellectual heirs into a positivist interpretation of his work. He was from hindsight an over-optimistic rationalist. But despite the historicism of Marx's scientism, his conception of ideology, ironically, offers some insight into the more complicated position of science in modern society. Marx's assump- tion that the most rational, scientific is the real, i.e. a completely rational social order would be communism, is also the assumption that science and rationality are incompatible with oppression and exploitation: truth is revolutionary. Thus Marx's assumptions lead away from the following questions: what happens when science becomes part of an established order, when it s monopoly is used to serve a ruling class's interests? If one ignores Marx's opposition of science to ideology and instead focuses on ideology as ruling ideas, one can conceive of science and rationality as the basis for an exploitative regime. The institutionalization of science, in both government and business might lead a 20th century Marx to write about how science had become a new ideology, a ruling idea, a false - 5 9 - consciousness of a bureaucratic, technologically, sophisticated, class society. With the gradual closing of th i s demension (of opposition) by the society, the s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n of thought assumes a larger s i g n i f i c a n c e . The i n t e r e l a t i o n between the scien- t i f i c - p h i l o s o p h i c a l and s o c i e t a l processes, between t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l Reason, asserts i t s e l f 'behind the back' of the s c i e n t i s t s and philosophers. The society bars a whole type of oppositional operations and behavior; consequently the concepts pertaining to them are rendered i l l u s o r y or meaningless. H i s t o r i c a l trans- cendence appears as metaphysical transcendence not acceptable to science and s c i e n t i f i c thought. The operational and behavior point of view, practised as a 'habit of thought' at large becomes the view of the established universe of discourse and action, needs and aspirations. The 'cunning of Reason' works, as i t so often did, i n the i n t e r e s t of the powers that be. The insistence on operational and behavioral concepts turns against the e f f o r t s to free thought and behavior from the given r e a l i t y and for the suppressed a l t e r n - a t i v e s . Theoretical and p r a c t i c a l Reason, academic and s o c i a l behaviorism meet on common ground: that of an advanced society which makes s c i e n t i f i c and technical S7 progress into an instrument of domination.' And l a s t l y , though Marx referred to himself as a m a t e r i a l i s t , he cannot be held to a s t r i c t m a t e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n . As noted above Marx sought to di s t i n g u i s h himself from the "mechanical m a t e r i a l i s t s " by holding to a d i a l - e c t i c a l materialism. The contradictions i n Marx's "materialism" becomes c r u c i a l for h i s concepts of a l i e n a t i o n and ideology. Ultimately, these two concepts r e l y on the author claiming an insig h t into the "hidden" r e a l i t y behind the r e a l world's appearance. The writer claims to know the true nature that a l i e n a t i o n and ideology do not properly describe or portray. This writer i s not sure whether t h i s problem of a l i e n a t i o n introduces a " r e l i g i o u s " factor or i d e a l i s t i c factor into Marx's thinking. But l e t i t be suggested that unless the problem of idealism versus materialism i s considered c r u c i a l (and I submit i t i s not for a p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of the concept of ideology) then t h i s p a r t i c u l a r enigma can be passed over. Having made these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s on the dimensions of Marx's concept - 6 0 - of ideology l e t us inquire as to what areas of i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h i s notion of ideology opens up, what p o l i t i c a l problems i t leads us to and what i t ex- plains that other concepts of ideology do not. Marx's global, i f you w i l l , viewpoint of s o c i a l questions and ideology i n v i t e s one to transcend the usual bounds placed on the term " p o l i t i c s " . The adoption of an organic, h o l i s t i c perspective allows one to see sections of society that are commonly ( l i b e r a l l y ) viewed as independent, as i n t e r - dependent. An e c o l o g i c a l perspective emphasizing s o c i a l wholes, i s sub- s t i t u t e d for a mechanical, atomistic perspective that emphasizes the mal- integ r a t i o n of s o c i a l sectors. What t h i s d i f f e r e n t perspective adds i s not only an explanation of how parts of a whole are related, but adds a new l e v e l of explanation for previously inadequate explanations of s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s . P o l i t i c s i s no longer just bargaining (who getting what, when, and where) among e l i t e s , but also how e l i t e s come to be e l i t e s , and how they stay e l i t e s . " P o l i t i c s " i s broadened to include not only what happens at the top of a society but also what occurs throughout the society - not j u s t elections but also how the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power and authority a f f e c t s everyday l i f e of non-elites. From t h i s global perspective Marx's concept of ideology t i e s what and how people think of t h e i r society to the d i s t r i b - u t i o n of power i n that society. This "ideology" p o l i t i c i z e s educational, r e l i g i o u s and s c i e n t i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n s by asking how they are used to bu i l d a s o c i a l order. It asks how i n d i v i d u a l psychology and family and kin t i e s lend order to society, how these factors inculcate adjustment to the established p o l i t i c a l system. This concept of ideology points to a more ro. basic l e v e l of s o c i a l i z a t i o n than most discussions proceed on. I t asks not just how these i n s t i t u t i o n s and processes influence e l e c t i o n s , but how they mold basic p o l i t i c a l consciousness and how they lend credence and weight to the continued rule of a dominant c l a s s . Marx's primary question -61- addresses the structure of society; and further i t asks what functions the parts perform for the whole. The focus is on the major structures and institutions of society. In terms of the ideology concept, the questions concern how the organizational and institutional aspects of society circum- scribe thinking and foster ruling ideas. The liberal notion of ideology only attempts to explain divergent ideas systems. It relies on the notion of "strain", which as we saw rests on tenuous psychological grounds. While the liberal concept of ideology does have a relation to the social context, this social context is one of inter- mittent "crises" of society, or "cultural strain" as Geertz expresses i t . Marx's notion of ideology asks a more fundamental question: how are a l l idea systems generated. Its social context thus includes what the liberals term "crises" but also the normal periods that the liberal ideology views as not "ideological". The second important aspect of Marx's concept of ideology is that i t is more useful because i t does not set an a p r i o r i limit to rationality or to the discussion of the origins of ideas or the idea-systems to be inves- tigated. This concept is calling attention to a common denominator of a l l p o l i t i c a l societies and asks how different social systems realize the con- nection of ideas with the social basis. Because i t asks these questions of a l l p o l i t i c a l systems, i t is non-partisan in the sense that i t does not favor one p o l i t i c a l system or idea over another. (Actually, i t is partisan in a different, wider sense, for i t is in opposition to a l l p o l i t i c a l systems.) This concept of ideology is not'ideological (as we saw the liberal notion was) for i t is not a justification of a ruling group: i t is applic- able to Western democracies, communist regimes and third world countries. Though Marx's concept of ideology operates on a more basic level than the liberal notion does, this does not mean that the two are complementary: the -62- two o r i g i n a t e i n divergent epistemologies. Marx emphasizes the connection to the material conditions as the basis for b e l i e f s while the l i b e r a l s emphasize the causation for b e l i e f s i n r a t i o n a l i t y . Marx did not elaborate h i s concept of ideology very thoroughly. But some of h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l h e i r s have made some f r u i t f u l a p p l i c a t i o n of h i s idea. These studies, however, generally remain as pregnant beginnings. We s h a l l end th i s discussion by noting some p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s where Marx's concept i s applicable. To do t h i s , we s h a l l draw on some of the recent p o l i t i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l work that can be viewed as consonant with Marx's notion of ideology. Perhaps t h i s i s the best way to judge the usefulness of Marx's "ideology". Despite the o r i g i n of Marx's concept of ideology i n the r a r e f i e d atmosphere of Hegelian d i a l e c t i c s , the concept does focus on some very concrete s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s . Brought down from i t s general formulation as a thesis about the r e l a t i o n of material conditions to ideas such that ideas are a prop for s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , t h i s concept asks "what i s the p o l i t i c a l influence of and on the mass media, educational i n s t i t u t i o n s and mass s p i r i t u a l organizations?". I t asks about the influence not just on the form of these i n s t i t u t i o n s , e.g. who owns them and who runs them (what t h e i r class o r i g i n s are) but also asks about t h i s f i r s t part's r e l a t i o n to the content and the meaning that these i n s t i t u t i o n s communicate. The sociology of knowledge i s probably the most well known and most widely applied case of ideology as fa l s e consciousness. Unfortunately the questions raised i n the controversies with the s o c i o l o g i s t s of knowledge have tended to remain p a r o c i a l , with the primary question being, "can s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s escape the paradox of r e l a t i v i s m that seemed to be the consequence of the sociology of knowledge?". Not wishing to embroil the discussion i n the merits of that controversy, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to point to the r e s t r i c t e d -63- a p p l i c a t i o n of the concept of ideology that most discussions i n the sociology of knowledge e n t a i l . The focus on the problems of ideology i n the i n t e l l e c - t u a l class i s but one instance of a broader phenomenon. Marx's concept of ideology opens the door to a study of the process of l e g i t i m a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l regimes by asking what are the material i n t e r e s t s of a regime. I t deflates the notion that p o l i t i c a l authority i n and of i t s e l f i s inherently legitimate. Although h i s use of the term ideology does not follow Marx's use, R. Miliband's discussion of l e g i t i m a t i o n i n The State and C a p i t a l i s t Society i s e s s e n t i a l l y a discussion of how Western r u l i n g groups use d i f f e r e n t means to preserve t h e i r dominance of the thinking of t h e i r subjects. While i n c a p i t a l i s t countries the r h e t o r i c of freedom i s not a complete sham, th i s r h e t o r i c i s used as a s h i l : i t becomes a way to absorb or relegate to i n s i g n i f i c a n c e those views that clash fundamentally with the "dominant material r e l a t i o n s " . The techniques of ideology do not require outright censorship, but are compatible with overwhelming the divergent views with ideas that reinforce e x i s t i n g s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . Another method of l e g i t i m a t i o n involves the l e g i t i m a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for parties of r a d i c a l change. From the problem of r a i s i n g s u f f i c i e n t funds to support l e f t i s t parties to the confusion within l e f t i s t p a r t i e s about th e i r fundamental objectives, the conservative s o c i a l forces tend to define " l e g i t i m a t e " p o l i t i c a l objectives away from r a d i c a l solutions. Miliband, a f t e r noting the well-known conservative influences of organized r e l i g i o n s and nationalism i n Western s o c i e t i e s , remarks about the business community's d i r e c t role i n i d e o l o g i c a l s o c i a l i z a t i o n . I mean rather the e f f o r t business makes to persuade society not merely to accept the p o l i c i e s i t advocates but also the ethos, the values and the goals which are i t s own, the economic system of which i t forms the c e n t r a l part, the 'way of l i f e ' which i s at the core of i t s being. Insofar as the b e l i e f i n c a p i t a l i s t enterprise i s an e s s e n t i a l part -64- of conservative ideology, business i t s e l f plays an import- ant part in propagating i t . - ^ On top of these areas of socialization into the legitimate forms of p o l i t i c a l consciousness, Miliband, lastly, adds an analysis of how schools, and universities, while appearing to c r i t i c i z e the society actually help to reinforce the established distribution of p o l i t i c a l and social power. For while universities are centres of intellectual, ideol- ogical and p o l i t i c a l diversity, their students are mainly exposed to ideas, concepts, values and attitudes much more designed to foster acceptance of the 'conventional wisdom' than acute dissent from it.^0 Though Miliband's discussion of legitimation marks a good beginning in the study of how ruling ideas are fostered, one can extend the process of legitimation and ideology into other areas. For instance, ideology as legitimation can be seen in many p o l i t i c a l philosophers' works. One of the major focuses of a l l p o l i t i c a l philosophy has been to explain man's oblig- ation to obey p o l i t i c a l authority: the problem is one of changing de facto power into de jure authority. With the concept of ideology, an "ideological reading" of p o l i t i c a l philosophy looks for the material interests that the philosopher either assumes or explicitly rests his theory of p o l i t i c a l obligation on. A good example of this approach is C. B. Macpherson's recon- struction of Hobbes' and Locke's theories in the light of certain unspoken assumptions about the nature of humans and society. Macpherson argues that Hobbes and Locke assumed the then developing market society as the only possible form of society, the only natural one. To the 17th century p o l i t i c a l theorists, the individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor a part of a"larger social whole but as an owner of himself. The relationship of ownership, having become for more and more men the c r i t i c a l l y important relation determining their actual freedom and actual prospect of realizing their f u l l potentialities, was read back into the nature of the individual. The individual i t was thought is free -65- in as much as he is proprietor of his person and capacities. The human essence is freedom from dependence on the wills of others, and freedom is a function of possession. Society becomes a lot of free equal individuals related to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and of what they have acquired by their exercise. Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. P o l i t i c a l society becomes a calculated device for the protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange.^1 This particular case seems to be a straightforward case of the "material relations as ideal". And there are other writers who paint the picture of ideology's relation to p o l i t i c a l philosophy in much broader, bolder strokes: "other disciplines, such as p o l i t i c a l theory, and history are also directly ideological in that their main task is to present for the society a coherence between a given set of ideas and a supposed social reality". L The point is clear: the ideological functions of social dis- course is not just manifested by who controls a researcher's purse strings but also invades the discourse i t s e l f . Adjacent to concerns about the ideological component of highly intellectual work, must be a concern for the often ideological nature of language, especially in societies with a complex mass media. Perhaps the most well-known portrayal of such "po l i t i c a l i z a t i o n " of language is contained in Orwell's 1984. Despite i t s often cutting edge and the incisive insight into methods of population control, Orwell's account of the use of language is not often carried into social analysis. The fiction-form of Orwell's account lends i t s e l f to an interpretation of language distortion as contin- gent on having a dictatorial government and/or a war c r i s i s situation. But on a more basic plane of politics i t is perhaps useful to look for the "ordinary" and peacetime and non-governmental sources of ideological language. In writing on the language of total administration, Marcuse hopes to explain how the Orwellian language of contradiction (war is peace) is not solely that of terroristic totalitarianism, but comes to pervade even - 66- th e Western democracies and the socialist non-totalitarian countries. The language of a l l but common objects becomes ritual-invocation that conveys l i t t l e meaning and strips words of their content and ability to transcend the established social relations. Language seeks an unthinking reaction. As the substance of the various regimes (democratic and non-democratic, capitalist and non-capitalist) no longer appears in alternative modes of l i f e , i t ' comes to rest in alternative techniques of manipulation and control. Language not only reflects these controls but becomes i t s e l f an instrument of control even where i t does not transmit orders, but information; where i t demands, not obediance but choice, not submission, but freedom. ^ The private and public sectors in the "Western Democracies", because of their tremendous powers and interrelations tend to adopt similar methods of language control. Public relations men, advertising personnel, and press secretaries coin words and phrases to portray their actions in the best light; they also by their overwhelming impact on the mass media can circum- scribe a universe of thinking such that i t blocks opposition to established powers. If the language of politics tends to become that of adver- tising thereby bridging the gap between two formerly very different realms of society then this tendency seems to express the degree to which domination and administration have ceased to be a separate and independent function in the technological society. This does not mean that the power of the professional politicians has decreased Their domination has been incorporated into the daily performances and relaxation of the citizens, and the "symbols" of politics are also those of business, commerce and fun but business and fun are s t i l l the pol- i t i c s of domination.^ And fi n a l l y , the process of legitimation includes the more fundamental issue of socialization or enculturation of new members of the society. This is in part a problem of psychology, of how social and p o l i t i c a l norms and expectations,- the limits of acceptable p o l i t i c a l behavior - are intern- alized by the individual. In his analysis of the virtues and foibles of the strain and interest theories of ideology, Geertz noted that the interest -67- theory (mainly of Marxist origin) is psychologically too weak to give an adequate account of ideology. The main defects of the interest theory are that i t s psych- ology is too anaemic and it s sociology too muscular Within such a framework, the analyst is faced with the choice of either revealing the thinness of his psychology by being so specific as to be thoroughly implausible or concealing the fact that he does not have any psycho- logical theory at a l l by being so general as to be t r u i s t i c . 6 6 Geertz' criticism of interest "ideology" is correct, but the weakness of many interest treatments of ideology lies in the superficiality of the pop- ularized notion of ideology. This is only another reason for a fresh appreciation of the subtlety, generality, yet depth of Marx's concept of ideology. If ideology operates on the more fundamental level of the relation of the society to the ideas, the analysis of social psychology looks for how the primary determinants of individual psychology shape primary p o l i t i c a l thinking, as opposed to only explaining why divergent beliefs are accepted. Marx and Engel's emphasis on economics set the pattern for their followers to view a critique of society in economic terms instead of supplementing the theory with a psychological component. The addition of a psychological explanation to complement Marx's economic thinking was only tentatively taken in the 1930's and 1940's when W. Reich and H. Marcuse attempted to wed Marx to a reconstituted Freud. The result of this fusion is a social psychological explanation of the sexual mechanisms for the internalization of the existing social power patterns. Reich's analysis of the p o l i t i c a l influences of the role of sexuality on personality formation lead him to a critique of the family as the "conveyor belt between the economic structure of conservative society and it s ideological superstructure".^ The sexual repression of society at large and the patriarchal family in particular tends to produce people who "lack independence, will-power and c r i t i c a l faculties". -68- Sexual repression lays the mass psychological basis for an authoritarian social order. Marcuse's Freudo-Marxism, takes a much more theoretical approach by arguing some finer points of Freudian theory, but he also introduces the concept of surplus sexual repression.^ y Surplus sexual repression is the psychological counterpart to Marx's surplus labor and like the latter is the (psychological) method for dominant classes to extract wealth and obedience from subject classes. But as Marcuse rarely descends to the practical con- nections of sexual repression to the rule of a class, his formulation remains in even more need of documentation than Reich's sketch. These summaries of some of the possible applications of Marx's concept of ideology are not meant to be exhaustive or even particularly c r i t i c a l . Space requirements necessitate this brief overview; further, most of this work remains at a preliminary, though promising, stage. Conclusion There are two major conceptions of ideology, one with liberal assump- tions, one with Marxian assumptions. Liberal uses of the term equate ideology with extremism, irrationality, an integrated belief system, and strain. Marxian uses of the term equate ideology with the ideas a ruling stratum uses to attain or retain power. The liberal notion of ideology speaks from the assumption of an open society, with intellectual freedom, a general consensus on reasonable p o l i t i c a l action, a notion of politics as bargaining negotiating among equally powerful parts of society. The liberal notion views ideology as an irrational fringe movement. Ideology is dogmatic, passionate, false, totalitarian, etc. The major problem of liberal uses of ideology lies in an inner tension that on the one hand seeks to deny the validity of ideology as a thought-system a pr i o r i (thus drawing a distinction between liberal -69- th i n k i n g and i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g ) and on the other, to define " i d e o l o g y " i n such broad strokes that i t i s a p p l i e d to a l l s o c i a l philosophy. This p u l l i n g i n opposite d i r e c t i o n s was e x h i b i t e d i n an e s p e c i a l l y acute form i n the s t r a i n aspect of l i b e r a l "ideology". Driven to r e s o l v e t h i s t e n s i o n l i b e r a l " i deology" loses the s p e c i f i t y of the subject matter. Thus one reads studies of ideology where ideology has become synonymous with " b e l i e f system", " s o c i a l philosophy" or " p o l i t i c a l ideas". The only major u t i l i t y o f having t h i s g e n e r a l i z e d n o t i o n of ideology i s as a synonym; and l a c k i n g a s p e c i f i c meaning, t h i s concept of ideology cannot lead to i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of unique types of thought-systems or a unique conjunction of ideas and the s o c i e t y . On the other hand, i f one keeps the n o t i o n of ideology w i t h i n the f i r s t h a l f of t h i s t e n sion, i . e . marking i d e o l o g i e s from acceptable b e l i e f systems w i t h a p r i o r i c a t e g o r i e s , one i s d r i v e n to dubious p r o p o s i t i o n s . I f ideology i s held to be an i n t e g r a t e d system of pre-eminent va l u e s , the next question i s what b e l i e f system i s not an i n t e g r a t e d value system. The c l a i m that "outlooks" l a c k the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i d e o l o g i e s i s a h i g h l y suspect t h e s i s . The uses of t h i s n o t i o n of ideology are p r i m a r i l y those of polemics w i t h one's " e x t r e m i s t " opponents. Studies of ideology that use t h i s n o t i o n would analyse b e l i e f systems to show how a pre-eminent value s t r u c t u r e was i r r a t i o n a l and t o t a l i t a r i a n . The r e l a t i o n of the content and s o c i a l context of the ideology, which others c l a i m make the ideology mean- i n g f u l , would f a l l to the background as unimportant. The s o c i a l context would only be consulted to ask why " i r r a t i o n a l i s m " , i . e . ideology, f e l l on f e r t i l e ground. I f the n o t i o n of ideology as a confusion of value f o r f a c t i s adopted, one i s forced to accept an absolute demarcation between f a c t s and values. However, u s e f u l a loose d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t s and values may be, the s t r i c t " p o s i t i v i s t ' s " t w i s t i s probably an over s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . I f one chooses not to accept the " p o s i t i v i s t ' s " t w i s t , then one loses the -70- criterion for distinguishing ideologies from non-ideologies. If one accepts the fact/value distinction, the uses of this notion are, nevertheless, severely limited: ideology is reduced to a linguistic logician's tool for the separation of testable statements from untestable statements. Few p o l i t i c a l issues or consequences flow from this notion of ideology. The notion of ideology that claims i t is rooted in the modern "free" intellectual class assumes the division of ideology from outlook and suffers from this notion's weaknesses. But over and above that weakness is a further weakness. Strictly speaking, the proposition is an empirical argument that needs valid- ation. But no documentation is given. The proposition i s , however, quest- ionable and a strong argument against i t and favoring the continuation of conformity and not favoring the elaboration of ideologies can be made. If the notion that intellectuals as a class caused ideologies is taken seriously, the u t i l i t y of this notion is also severely limited. The notion results in an exhortation to keep the "free" intellectual out of politics and to keep the rest under p o l i t i c a l control. In other words, exclude intellectuals who seek radical social changes. The final notion claims that ideology is the result of "strain". The metaphor of sickness is complemented by the treat- ment of ideologues in mental illness terms. This notion of ideology is a direct ad hominem argument, and is a successful way to dismiss the ideologue's argument as irrational. If this form of the strain theory is accepted, the p o l i t i c a l uses of this term are small in number. "Ideology" becomes a psychologist's concept, and leads to a "bad man" theory of p o l i t i c s : one need only ferret the mad men and ideology is cured. In a subtler form of the strain theory, ideology is a result of cultural strain: ideology is an attempt to bring meaning to the c r i s i s situations of whole societies. While this form of strain theory is a better approach to ideology, i t ends in a notion of ideology that closely approximates the meaning of "social - 7 1 - philosophy" or " b e l i e f system". F o l l o w i n g t h i s n o t i o n , i d e o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s would examine the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s that lead to a breakdown of o l d e r c u l t u r a l symbols. But t h i s n o t i o n o f f e r s l i t t l e i n s i g h t or c r i t e r i o n as to the d i s t i n c t i v e features of ideology. The n o t i o n remains at a super- f i c i a l l e v e l and consequently has l i t t l e u t i l i t y f o r s o c i a l a n a l y s i s or explanation. The l i b e r a l n o t i o n of ideology's r e a l use l i e s i n l i b e r a l i s m ' s p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e w i t h i t s "extremist" 1 opponents. A f t e r i t s conceptual l i m i t a t i o n s are appreciated, i t s main f u n c t i o n i s to l i m i t acceptable, " r a t i o n a l " , s o c i a l d i s c o u r s e : i t i s a t o o l i n the " c l o s i n g of the universe of d i s c o u r s e " , to use a phrase from Marcuse. In the l i b e r a l notion's more s p e c i f i c forms, t h i s f u n c t i o n i s q u i t e obvious and has d r i v e n others to r e c o n s t i t u t e the theory i n l e s s b l a t a n t l y p e j o r a t i v e terminology. When t h i s task i s accomplished the term becomes h o p e l e s s l y n o n - s p e c i f i c ; but i t does not lose i t s l i b e r a l assumptions or f u n c t i o n s . The formerly overt naming of i d e o l o g i c a l t a r g e t s becomes the assumption that everyone (who accepts the l i b e r a l assumptions) knows which are the i d e o l o g i e s . The p o l i t i c a l uses of the term remain i t s d r i v i n g force but i n a s u b t l e r form. Marx's n o t i o n of ideology speaks from the assumptions of a c l a s s - d i v i d e d s o c i e t y , of s o c i e t i e s being i n t e g r a t e d wholes, of p o l i t i c s being a s t r u g g l e of the v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t s ( u l t i m a t e l y c l a s s i n t e r e s t s ) . While Marx's n o t i o n of ideology i s p e j o r a t i v e and claims that ideology i s f a l s e , i t does not seek to dismiss ideology, ab i n i t i o . Rather i t attempts to understand why admittedly p a r t i a l and f a l s e ideas are accepted as t r u e , to some extent work and then are r e j e c t e d . Ideology as r u l i n g ideas springs from a s p e c i f i c theory of knowledge and thus achieves both a general and s p e c i f i c s t a t u s . I t i s a d o c t r i n e about a l l ideas. But since i t claims a s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n of ideas to s o c i e t y i t i s more than a synonym f o r s o c i a l -72- philosophy. Marx's noti o n views ideology as the ideas a r u l i n g group uses to a t t a i n and r e t a i n i t s power. This i s a d o c t r i n e about the s p e c i f i c uses of ideas. Ideas o r i g i n a t e from how man i n t e r a c t s w i t h the world. Because i n c l a s s s o c i e t i e s a p a r t i c u l a r group c o n t r o l s the means of production and other centres of power, they a l s o c o n t r o l the production of ideas. These ideas are used to help j u s t i f y the p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s ' s r u l e , and complement the a c t u a l power with a l e g i t i m a t i o n of power. Ideology i s one of the ways de facto power i s t r a n s l a t e d i n t o de jure power. Marx's n o t i o n of ideology leads d i r e c t l y to the study of important p o l i t i c a l problems, that pervade a l l p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s . L e g i t i m a t i o n , education, f a m i l y s t r u c t u r e , economic s t r u c t u r e , s o c i a l c l a s s e s , language, s o c i a l i z a t i o n , the mass media, u n i v e r s i t i e s , r e l i g i o n , m o r a l i t y , and e t h i c s are some of the t o p i c s which Marx's n o t i o n of ideology i n f u s e s w i t h a p o l i t i c a l character. Marx's n o t i o n adds these f a c t o r s as another l e v e l to help e x p l a i n how p o l i t i c a l systems are -constructed. In t h i s sense, Marx's n o t i o n i s more u s e f u l than the l i b e r a l notions of ideology and deserves more e x p l o r a t i o n that i t has received. FOOTNOTES R. D. Putnam, "Studying E l i t e P o l i t i c a l Culture: The Case of Ideology", Mass P o l i t i c s i n Industrial Societies, (ed.) Di Palma, G., (Chicago: Markham, 1972), p.339. 2 Nevertheless, a short l i s t of objections to other typologies may be helpful. The most serious drawback of D. W. Minor's typology ("Ideology and P o l i t i c a l Behavior", Midwest Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science V, Nov. 1961, No. 4, pp.317-331) of s i x notions of ideology i s that they are not neatly d i s t i n c t types, but overlap and reinforce each other. This typology separates where i t should unite and interrelate types of ideologies. Putnam's fourteen variables of ideology ("Studying E l i t e P o l i t i c a l Culture") suffer from the same kind of weaknesses. In addition, Putnam treats the fourteen possible conceptions as co-equal when some are c l e a r l y derivative from a few basic notions about ideology. Actually the fourteen variables closely correspond to the presentation of E. Shils (see below) but lack S h i l s 1 integration; and as such they are r e a l l y only one conception of ideology. For a discussion of Geertz' s t r a i n versus interest theory ("Ideology as a Cultural System", i n D. Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent, New York: The Free Press, 1964, pp.47-76) see below. C. W. M i l l s , "Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XLVI, 1940, p.322. ^N. Harris, Beliefs i n Society, (London: C. A. Watts & Co. Ltd., 1968), pp.252-253. 5D. B e l l , The End of Ideology, (New York: Free Press, 1956). E. Shils, "Ideology: The Concept and Function of Ideology", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (ed.) D. S i l l s , Vol. VII, (New York: MacMillian and Free Press, 1968), p.68. 7E. S h i l s , "Ideology and C i v i l i t y : On the P o l i t i c s of the I n t e l l e c t u a l " , Sewanee Review Vol. LXVI (1958) p.450-451. Ibid., p.478. 9 I b i d . , p.450. ] 1 0 S h i l s , "Ideology: Concept and Function... ", P- 67. U S h i l s , "Ideology and C i v i l i t y . . . .", p. 452. 1 2 S h i l s , "Ideology: Concept and Function.. . P- 73. S h i l s , "Ideology and C i v i l i t y . . . .", p. 450. 1 4 S h i l s , "Ideology: Concept and Function... P. 72. 1 5 S h i l s , "Ideology and C i v i l i t y . . ..", pp. 472-•473. 16 T,., Ibid., p.478. -74- 1 7P. H. Partridge, "Politics, Philosophy, Ideology", R. H. Cox (ed.) Ideology, Politics and P o l i t i c a l Theory, p.126. -I Q G. Lichtheim, Marxism, (New York: Praeger 1965), p.194. 19R. Wall, "Special Agent for the F.B.I.", New York Review of Books, Vol. XVII No. 12, January 27, 1972, p.14. ^ I b i d . , p. 18. 21 For example, the widespread use of agent provocateurs against dissidents has become apparent. The UUAW Gainsville 8 T r i a l , The Camden 28 T r i a l and other p o l i t i c a l t r i a l s have amply illustrated this point. The F.B.I, program cited above also had more specific targets; a socialist workers' party disruption program dates from 1961. Also c f . the f i l e s stolen from the F.B.I, office in Media, Pennsylvania and N. Chomsky "Watergate and Other Crimes", Ramparts Vol. XII No. 11 (June 1974), pp.31-37. 77 Lichtheim, Marxism, Part VI. po T. Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1951), p.349. 2 4 I b i d . , p.351. 2 5 I b i d . , p.354. 2 6G. Bergmann, "Ideology", Ethics 61, (April, 1951), p.218. 71 "It (millenarianism, the oldest source of ideology) is a phenomenon of the sinks and corners of society (and is) available on the edge of our culture It is always there for those who have the ideological need to be in saving contact with the ultimate. Every society has i t s outcasts, i t s wretched and i t s damned who cannot f i t into the routine requirements of social l i f e at any level of authority and achievement." Shils, 'Ideology and C i v i l i t y . . . " , pp. 461-463. 2 8 I b i d . , p.458. 2 9 I b i d . , p.458. S. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age, (New York: Knopf 1966), p.8. 31 It should be noted that Shils is not making the simple argument that intellectuals are the ones who fashion ideologies or even simply lead ideological parties. Both are obvious. One must be a "head worker" in order to be articulate to lead other people or write an ideology. Shils 1 argument is in the stronger sense of intellectuals as a class or group responsible for ideologies. Though Lenin also saw intellectuals as helping the Party, his argument was not that a correlation exists between the freeing of intellectuals and the incidence of ideologies. ,'• He argued, rather, that intellectuals as a class remain attached to the bourgeois and that de classe intellectuals help to -75- articulate the workers' interests. Lenin is also not saying that a cor- relation exists between an increase in intellectuals in politics and an increase in ideology. For Lenin the cause of ideology was always in social conditions. 32 Shils, "Ideology: Concept and Function...", p.67. 33 Ibid. 3 4 S h i l s , "Ideology and C i v i l i t y . . . " , pp.463-464. 35 " • Ibid., p.463. 3^Ibid., p.464. 37 C. Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System", in D. Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent, (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp.48-49. 3 8 I b i d . , pp.62-63. 39 Ibid., p.64. 40 c f . , R. & Z. Medvedev, A Question of Madness, (New York: Random House, 1971). 4 1 H a r r i s , p.11. 42 Ibid., p.8. 43 K. Marx, The German Ideology, (New York: International Publishers Inc. 1970), p.47. 44 N. Birnbaum, "The Sociological Study of Ideology, 1940-1960", Current Sociology, IX, 1960, No. 2, p.115. 4^Ibid., p.116. 4^V. Lenin, "What is to be Done?";, Collected Works Vol. V, (Moscow: Foreigh Language Publishing House, 1961), p.384. 47 G. Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays, (New York: Random House, 1967), p.15. 48.,., Ibid., p.16. 49 Marx, pp.64-65. It Ibid, , pp. 65- 66. '̂ 51 H. Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx, (New York: Random House, 1968) p. 76. p.28. 52 W. A. Williams, The Great Evasion, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968) -76- 53 Marx, p.66. -^H. M. Drucker, "Marx's Concept of Ideology", Philosophy Vol. (April, 1972), p.154. -̂ K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc. 1955). 5 6Drucker, p.157. -*7H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 15-16. the concept of 'political socialization', meaning to take one definition of i t , 'the process through which values, cognitions, and symbols are learned and internalized, through which operative social norms regarding politics are implanted, p o l i t i c a l roles institutionalized and p o l i t i c a l consensus created, either effectively or ineffectively'. The weakness of this formulation and much of the discussion of 'political socialization' in relation to Western p o l i t i c a l systems i s that i t tends to be rather coy about the specific ideological content of that socialization and about the fact that much of the process is intended in these regimes to foster acceptance of a capitalist social order and of i t s values, an adaptation to i t s requirements, a rejection of alternatives to i t : in short, that what is here is very largely a process of massive indoctrination." R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, (London: Quartet Books, 1973) p.164. 5 9 I b i d . , p.190. 6°Ibid., p.230. 61 C. B. Macpherson, The P o l i t i c a l Theory of Possessive Individualism, (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1962), p.3. (emphasis added). J. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p.494. 63 Marcuse, pp.85-104. 6 4 I b i d . , pp.102-103. 6 5 I b i d . , pp.103-104. ^Geertz, p. 53. 67 W. 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