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The International Control Commission for Vietnam; the diplomatic and military context Brosnan, Vivienne 1975

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THE  INTERNATIONAL CONTSOL COMMISSION FOR VIETNAM; THE  DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY CONTEXT.  by VIVIENNE BROSNAN B.A.,  U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia,  1948  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  i n t h e Department of History  We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o t h e required, s t a n d a r d  THE  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA March, 1975  In p r e s e n t i n g  t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l  f u l f i l m e n t o f the  requirements f o r  an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y  a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and  I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  written  gain  permission.  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada  shall  not  thesis  Department or  I t i s understood that c o p y i n g o r  Department of  Date  copying of t h i s  be granted by the Head of my  of this thesis f o r f i n a n c i a l  study.  publication  be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t  my  ii  ABSTRACT.  On J u l y 21,  1954,  Canada was  asked t o assume, w i t h Poland and  India,  the s u p e r v i s i o n o f the Cease F i r e Agreements (CFA) i n what had been F r e n c h Indochina.  The CFA marked t h e end o f French r u l e i n I n d o c h i n a , a r u l e t h a t  had n e v e r been u n q u e s t i o n e d , and t h a t , s i n c e December o f 1946, France i n a b i t t e r and c o s t l y At the end o f 1953  had  involved  war. a s e r i e s o f events l e d t o a d e c i s i o n t o seek a  n e g o t i a t e d peace i n I n d o c h i n a .  A f t e r e i g h t y e a r s o f f i g h t i n g t h a t had d r a i n e d  away manpower and r e s o u r c e s , France had l o s t The death o f S t a l i n i n R u s s i a brought new  c o n t r o l o f l a r g e areas o f  l e a d e r s t o power who  were anxious t o  s e c u r e a l e s s e n i n g o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s so t h a t t h e y c o u l d t u r n a t t e n t i o n t o improving the l o t o f t h e average R u s s i a n . t o embark on t h e i r f i r s t  F i v e Year P l a n , and wished  their  The Chinese were about  t o be f r e e o f the heavy  burden t h a t s u p p l y i n g the V i e t m i n h war machine e n t a i l e d . the Americans,  Vietnam.  The  V i e t m i n h and  on the o t h e r hand, seem t o have come t o the c o n f e r e n c e t a b l e  o n l y on the i n s i s t e n c e o f t h e i r a l l i e s .  The V i e t m i n h c o n s i d e r e d t h a t  final  v i c t o r y was w i t h i n t h e i r g r a s p and d i d n o t wish t o s t o p s h o r t o f t h e i r o b j e c t i v e c o n t r o l over the whole o f Vietnam. U.S.  was  The new  R e p u b l i c a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the  committed t o " r o l l i n g back" Communism, and foresaw a n o t h e r v i c t o r y f o r  Communism i n t h e proposed peace c o n f e r e n c e . P r o c e e d i n g s a t the Geneva Conference c o n f l i c t o f aims among the p a r t i c i p a n t s . p r a c t i c a l purposes was  soon showed the d i v e r s i t y  The U.S.  and  soon r e t i r e d f o r a l l  from a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and f o r q u i t e l o n g p e r i o d s t h e r e  not even an o f f i c i a l head o f the U.S.  D e l e g a t i o n p r e s e n t i n Geneva.  The  L a n i e l Government f e l l i n France d u r i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s , and L a n i e l was r e p l a c e d  -  iii  by Mendes France, largely on the strength of his promise to conclude a peace within thirty days.  Britain and the USSR acted as co-chairmen of the Conference  and were active i n moving their a l l i e s closer together;  they share the re-  sponsibility for the eventual successful outcome of the Conference. Of the differences that developed between the two sides at Geneva, the most significant was the difference of opinion over the composition of an International Control Commission (ICC) to supervise the Cease Fire.  A compromise  was f i n a l l y reached on India, Poland and Canada. During the f i r s t two years of the Commission's existence i t supervised the withdrawal and regroupment of forces provided for in the Geneva Agreement. Particularly i n the evacuation of Haiphong and Hanoi the ICC valuable service.  was able to render  By the end of this two year period, however, the^FUFJhad  l e f t Vietnam, leaving the South Vietnamese to continue to enforce the Cease Fire Agreement, and the RVN had of course refused to consider i t s e l f bound by the Agreements.  The Diem Government refused to contemplate the holding of  elections that would have re-unified the country and brought to an end the ICC's task in Vietnam. Of a l l the members of the ICC, i t was India's foreign policy that most affected the decisions and the work of the Commission.  Indian policy was non-  aligned, and must even more importantly be clearly seen to be non-aligned.  At  the same time India had an almost instinctive dislike of Communism, a dislike that appeared i n India's lukewarm support for anti-colonial struggles i n Asia that were dominated by Communists.  Although the Indian Delegation sided with  the Poles more often than with the Canadians during the l i f e of the Commission, on important decisions that affected the South*s ability to maintain i t s security, India sided with the Canadians. After 1956,  the Commission became increasingly ineffective.  Its  iv  freedom t o i n v e s t i g a t e was  eroded, f i n a n c i a l support was  e v e n t u a l l y the i n c r e a s i n g tempo o f the war  lacking,  i n Vietnam swept the  ICC  and aside  as l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t . The  ICC  i s o n l y one  has been i n v o l v e d . s e r v i c e on the ICC  o f many peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s  UN m i s s i o n s have tended t o be p o p u l a r w i t h i n Canada, w h i l e has not been g e n e r a l l y approved.  been as n e u t r a l o r as p a r t i s a n as p u b l i c o p i n i o n has  In f a c t Canada has assumed.  t i o n s t e n d t o i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n peacekeeping m i s s i o n s , have been p r e s e n t  i n o t h e r m i s s i o n s as w e l l as i n the  In r e c e n t y e a r s ,  Canada has  it  has  But  Canada has  s u i t e d her t o be i n v o l v e d .  the p r e s s u r e s  and  Certain  these  not condi-  conditions  ICC.  been i n c r e a s i n g l y r e l u c t a n t t o take  peacekeeping d u t i e s where i t i s judged the not been g r e a t .  i n which Canada  chance f o r e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n  has  not been i n v o l v e d i n p e a c e k e e p i n g s i m p l y In f u t u r e dangerous and  difficult  on us t o p a r t i c i p a t e might w e l l be too s t r o n g t o  resist.  on  because  situations  V  TABLE OF CONTENTS.  Page No.  NOTES .ON SOURCES  : vi  CHAPTER I .  INTRODUCTION  1  CHAPTER I I .  THE ROAD TO GENEVA  6  CHAPTER I I I .  THE GENEVA CONFERENCE  20  CHAPTER IV.  THE FIRST TWO YEARS  41  CHAPTER V.  THE EFFECT OF INDIAN POLICY  59  CHAPTER V I .  THE FINAL YEARS  83  CHAPTER V I I .  THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION  CHAPTER V I I I .  AS A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION  102  CONCLUSIONS - THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE  124  BIBLIOGRAPHY  137  vi  NOTE ON SOURCES.  The Reports o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l Commission f o r Vietnam have been p r i n t e d by the B r i t i s h F o r e i g n O f f i c e , as have t h e p r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Korea and I n d o c h i n a a t Geneva i n  1954•  The Canadian Department o f E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s has from time t o time p u b l i s h e d statements and a r t i c l e s on Indochina i n i t s monthly p u b l i c a t i o n  "External  Affairs". P r a c t i c a l l y everyone i n v o l v e d i n t h e ending o f t h e I n d o c h i n a conflict  and t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f the French has p u b l i s h e d Memoires.  A full  account o f t h e Geneva Conference, based on i n t e r v i e w s and o f f i c i a l s o u r c e s , i s found i n Lacouture and D e v i l l e r s , "La F i n d'une Guerre;  Indochine,  1954".  The Canadian Government has n o t made p u b l i c t h e documents r e l a t i n g t o Canadian s e r v i c e on the I n d o c h i n a Commissions.  One work p r e p a r e d w i t h  a c c e s s t o these f i l e s i s i n v a l u a b l e as a source f o r m a t e r i a l on t h e f i r s t y e a r - C h r i s t o p h e r Dagg's u n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t , "The Three Hundred Days". A copy i s i n t h e UBC i n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s l i b r a r y , and: I understand t h a t i t w i l l e v e n t u a l l y be p u b l i s h e d b y t h e Canadian I n s t i t u t e o f International Relations.  - 1 -  1.  CHAPTER  INTRODUCTION.  On J u l y 21,  1954,  Canada was asked t o assume, w i t h Poland and I n d i a ,  the s u p e r v i s i o n o f the Cease F i r e Agreements i n what had been French I n d o c h i n a . The Agreements had j u s t been concluded, and were s i g n e d by t h e Commanders o f t h e French Union F o r c e s and o f the People's Army o f Vietnam.  In March, 1973,  the  l a s t members o f t h e S u p e r v i s o r y Commission s e t up under t h e Geneva Agreements Vietnam.  left  In between l a y what P a u l M a r t i n has c h a r a c t e r i z e d as " ... i n many ways  ... the s e v e r e s t t e s t t o which i n t e r n a t i o n a l peacekeeping has been put."^" T h i s paper d e s c r i b e s t h e work o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission f o r Superv i s i o n and C o n t r o l (ICC) i n Vietnam, w i t h p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t w i t h i n which i t o p e r a t e d . i n t h e ICC f o r Vietnam began i n l a t e 1959.  My own involvement w i t h and i n t e r e s t From December 1959  to A p r i l ,  1961,  I served as S e n i o r P o l i t i c a l A d v i s e r w i t h the Canadian D e l e g a t i o n t o the ICC i n Vietnam, and t h e n f o r the next y e a r I was desk o f f i c e r i n Ottawa, f o r Vietnam o r i g i n a l l y , eventually f o r a l l o f Indochina. Events i n s i d e Vietnam and changes i n t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y o f o t h e r powers i n e v i t a b l y a f f e c t e d t h e way t h a t t h e Commission was a b l e t o c a r r y out t h e mandate g i v e n i t by t h e Geneva Agreements. tions.  The same i s t r u e o f a l l peacekeeping o p e r a -  Such o p e r a t i o n s , w i t h i n o r without t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , have r e s u l t e d when  a group o f n a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the Great Powers, have combined t o achieve an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t a b l e s o l u t i o n t o a d i s p u t e , and when t h e powers engaged i n the d i s p u t e have agreed t o accept t h e s e t t l e m e n t and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r c e t h a t i s to supervise i t .  The s e t t l e m e n t has seldom gone beyond an immediate Cease  F i r e and a s e p a r a t i o n o f f o r c e s , and the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h a t Cease F i r e and t h e f i n a l s o l u t i o n t o the problems t h a t caused the o r i g i n a l d i s p u t e are always out o f t h e hands o f the peacekeeping body.  On o c c a s i o n , and both Vietnam and the  M i d d l e E a s t are examples, the Cease F i r e has n o t been f o l l o w e d by an e f f e c t i v e  -  2  s o l u t i o n o f the o r i g i n a l d i s p u t e .  -  I n t h a t case the Cease F i r e e v e n t u a l l y breaks  down, and a renewal o f h o s t i l i t i e s o c c u r s .  I t i s c u r i o u s t h a t i n Vietnam  there  has been a tendency t o blame the peacekeeping body i t s e l f , the ICC, f o r t h i s down.  I t i s the c o n t e n t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s t h a t t h e ICC i n Vietnam  t h a t i t was  break-  accomplished a l l  o r i g i n a l l y s e t up t o do - the s e p a r a t i o n o f f o r c e s a f t e r the Cease F i r e  and the s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h a t s e p a r a t i o n f o r a p e r i o d o f two y e a r s . t h a t time e l e c t i o n s were t o have u n i t e d the two the j o b o f the ICC.  I n s t e a d , the fundamental  At t h e end  h a l v e s o f the c o u n t r y and d i v e r g e n c e between the two  of  ended parts of  the c o u n t r y became e v i d e n t and f i n a l l y l e d t o a renewal o f h o s t i l i t i e s , w i t h the Government i n the South o p e n l y supported by the U.S.  and t h e government i n the  North supported by China and the USSR, a l t h o u g h l e s s o p e n l y and In  f a c t the p o l i t i c a l  completely.  s e t t l e m e n t e n v i s a g e d i n the F i n a l D e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e  Geneva Agreement o f 1 9 5 4 can s u r e l y have been l i t t l e more than a p i o u s hope.  The  Commander o f the F r e n c h Union F o r c e s s i g n e d t h e Agreement on b e h a l f o f a l l t h e  anti-  Communist groups i n Vietnam, p o l i c y developed  but d u r i n g t h e Conference  " ... a sharp d i v e r g e n c e o f  ... between F r a n c e , which i n t e n d e d t o withdraw from I n d o c h i n a ,  and  2  the S t a t e o f Vietnam,  which i n t e n d e d t o e x e r c i s e the r i g h t t o govern  Vietnam."  "The Conference i g n o r e d the p o s i t i o n o f the government who c l a i m e d t o speak f o r the m a j o r i t y o f t h e non-Communist community i n Vietnam. The p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s o f the governments r e p r e s e n t i n g the two communities i n Vietnam were i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t , /and became more and more e v i d e n t i n the months f o l l o w i n g J u l y , 1 9 5 4 . The Government o f Vietnam, i n s t e a d o f c o l l a p s i n g , as many o b s e r v e r s at the time expected i t t o so, c o n s o l i d a t e d i t s p o s i t i o n , and by so d o i n g i t a c h i e v e d the a b i l i t y t o r e s i s t i n p r a c t i c e the p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t which i t had opposed throughout t h e Geneva Conference."3  this7  When Canada was for  Vietnam,  l i t t l e was  asked t o s e r v e on the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l Commission  known i n t h i s c o u n t r y about I n d o c h i n a .  I n d o c h i n a i n g e n e r a l and i n Vietnam  situation i n  i n p a r t i c u l a r came up f o r review i n l a t e 1 9 5 2 ,  when Canada d e c i d e d t o r e c o g n i s e the t h r e e S t a t e s o f Vietnam, S t a t e s " w i t h i n the French Union."  The  There was  Laos and Cambodia as  no g r e a t enthusiasm  f o r recognition,.!  and t h e q u i t e severe r e s t r i c t i o n s on s o v e r i g n t y t h a t t h e s e c o u n t r i e s s u f f e r e d , even  at  t h a t l a t e s t a g e , were w e l l u n d e r s t o o d .  S t i l l i t was  thought t h a t  r e c o g n i t i o n might h e l p t o encourage more r a p i d p r o g r e s s t o complete a r a d i o i n t e r v i e w on A p r i l 23, 1954,  of  a g e n e r a l t o u r d ' h o r i z o n about the p r o p o s a l s f o r a Conference on I n d o c h i n a which  for  Mr.  Pearson's  L e s t e r Pearson was  independence.  In  were t h e n c u r r e n t .  Mr.  international  asked i n t h e course  comments c o u l d have been r e p e a t e d almost v e r b a t i m  p r a c t i c a l l y any p a r t o f the w o r l d .  He s a i d t h a t Canada was  concerned", a l t h o u g h , u n l i k e the case o f Korea, we had no d i r e c t "As a P a c i f i c as w e l l as an A t l a n t i c c o u n t r y , we in  and  responsibility.  are n a t u r a l l y extremely  interested  a n y t h i n g which can be done t o s t a b i l i z e the s i t u a t i o n i n I n d o c h i n a , and t o  s t r e n g t h e n the s e c u r i t y o f Southeast Asia."^" Canadians in  "interested  I t i s p r o b a b l y t r u e t o say t h a t  i n g e n e r a l knew f a r more about the s t r u g g l e • f o r independence  I n d o n e s i a t h a n they d i d about  The Background o f the C o n f l i c t . *  Indochina.  5  The e a r l i e s t p e n e t r a t i o n o f Vietnam by Europeans was sionaries.  i n I n d i a and  by Portuguese  mis-  The Portuguese were e a r l y r e p l a c e d by the F r e n c h , and as happened so  o f t e n i n the s t o r y o f European s i o n a r y and the merchant.  c o l o n i s a t i o n , the f l a g e v e n t u a l l y f o l l o w e d the m i s -  The French o c c u p a t i o n o f I n d o c h i n a was  not  completed  u n t i l the l a t e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , when Cochin China was made a c o l o n y , and Annam and Tonkin i n Vietnam became p r o t e c t o r a t e s .  (Laos and Cambodia became p r o t e c t o r -  a t e s i n the same p e r i o d . ) The Vietnamese  themselves g a i n e d l i t t l e  Rubber t r e e s were i n t r o d u c e d i n t o Vietnam,  and i n the North m i n e r a l s were mined, but  t h e b e n e f i t s a l l a c c r u e d t o the French c o l o n s who f a c i l i t i e s were p r o v i d e d f o r Vietnamese, age o n l y 6,200 boys and 1,000 was  l i m i t e d u n t i l 1918  Perhaps  came t o Vietnam.  but i n 1924,  Some e d u c a t i o n a l  o f 600,000 c h i l d r e n o f s c h o o l  g i r l s were r e c e i v i n g an e d u c a t i o n , and h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n  t o a combined f a c u l t y o f medicine and pharmacy a t Hanoi.^  the main advantage  t h a t Vietnam d e r i v e d from French r u l e was  a middle c l a s s d i d d e v e l o p out o f the new c r e a t e d by the F r e n c h .  from the French o c c u p a t i o n .  the f a c t  that  o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r employment t h a t were  T h i s m i d d l e c l a s s l a t e r p r o v i d e d t h e l e a d e r s h i p f o r an  independent Vietnam.  I t a l s o o f course p r o v i d e d the l e a d e r s h i p f o r the v a r i o u s  independence movements t h a t began almost a t once, p a r t l y because t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r advancement and f o r the use o f the e d u c a t i o n so p a i n f u l l y a c q u i r e d were l a r g e l y d e n i e d t o Vietnamese.  France never d i d d e v e l o p a c i v i l s e r v i c e based on m e r i t t o  s t a f f her empire as the B r i t i s h d i d .  P o s i t i o n s i n the c o l o n i e s were l a r g e l y the  g i f t o f p o l i t i c a l patronage, and most o f t h o s e p o s i t i o n s French.  were r e s e r v e d f o r the  Even p o l i c e m e n and customs o f f i c i a l s i n Vietnam were F r e n c h , n o t Vietnam-  ese. The Vietnamese had a l o n g h i s t o r y o f o p p o s i t i o n t o f o r e i g n o c c u p a t i o n , and r e s i s t a n c e movements soon sprang up.  There was  i n time some p r o v i s i o n f o r  Vietnamese r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on r e g i o n a l C o n s u l t a t i v e A s s e m b l i e s , but the number o f e n f r a n c h i s e d c i t i z e n s was  s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d , and the A s s e m b l i e s ' c h a r t e r s con-  f i n e d debates w i t h i n narrow l i m i t s .  The F r e n c h a u t h o r i t i e s were s u c c e s s f u l i n  b l o c k i n g o r d i s r u p t i n g a l l attempts by the Vietnamese t o r e f o r m t h e i r government o r t o o b t a i n some r e l a x a t i o n o f t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e i r l i b e r t i e s . c h i n e s e Communist p a r t y was formed i n 1929.  and i t was  The  Indo-  one among many groups  k seeing  g r e a t e r independence f o r Vietnam.  The a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e s e groups  s e v e r e l y r e p r e s s e d , and t h e i r members were j a i l e d o r e x i l e d . o c c u p a t i o n i n 1941  I t was the Japanese  t h a t f i n a l l y gave Vietnamese n a t i o n a l i s t s t h e i r  The Japanese o c c u p a t i o n was  at f i r s t  was  almost i n v i s i b l e .  opportunity. A f t e r the  fall  o f France Vietnam was i n no p o s i t i o n t o r e s i s t Japanese demands, and i n r e t u r n f o r French c o - o p e r a t i o n the Japanese l e f t t h e network o f F r e n c h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n In 1945  t h e p r o s p e c t o f imminent  throw o f the Japanese o c c u p a t i o n .  intact.  a l l i e d v i c t o r y l e d the F r e n c h t o o r g a n i z e the o v e r The Japanese, g e t t i n g wind o f the p r e p a r a t i o n s ,  i n t e r n e d t h e F r e n c h and s e i z e d power o p e n l y .  Bao D a i was i n s t a l l e d as a puppet  emperor. The new it.  s i t u a t i o n found o n l y the Communist-led  V i e t m i n h ready t o e x p l o i t  In t h e p e r i o d between t h e Japanese t a k e o v e r i n March, 1945,  and t h e d e f e a t o f  Japan i n August, t h e V i e t m i n h had "succeeded i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e i r a u t h o r i t y , by  sheer a u d a c i t y , sense o f s t r a t e g y , and exaggerated  claims to a l l i e d  support...."'  The A l l i e d powers had agreed t o d i v i d e t h e o c c u p a t i o n o f Vietnam, w i t h Chinese f o r c e s a c c e p t i n g t h e Japanese s u r r e n d e r n o r t h o f the s i x t e e n t h p a r a l l e l , and B r i t i s h t r o o p s south o f t h a t l i n e .  North o f the s i x t e e n t h p a r a l l e l , t h e  Chinese t r o o p s were " i n t e n t on e x p l o i t i n g t o t h e f u l l t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f p r o f i t g t h a t t h e o c c u p a t i o n o f Tonkin o f f e r e d . "  They were n o t anxious t o see t h e r e t u r n  o f the F r e n c h , and under t h e i r benevolent n e u t r a l i t y e l e c t i o n s were h e l d which gave the V i e t m i n h a c l e a r m a j o r i t y o f Assembly s e a t s .  In South Vietnam  the B r i t i s h ,  u s i n g m o s t l y I n d i a n t r o o p s , c l e a r e d t h e way f o r t h e r e t u r n o f the F r e n c h .  General  Gracey went beyond h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s i n so d o i n g , b u t i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t h i s a c t i v i t i e s were much d i s a p p r o v e d i n London, h a v i n g r e g a r d t o B r i t a i n ' s a n x i e t y t o m a i n t a i n h e r own p o s i t i o n i n h e r A s i a n c o l o n i e s . In October, 1 9 4 5 , French t r o o p s r e t u r n e d t o Cochin China, and G e n e r a l L e c l e r c embarked on "the p a c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . " s a t i o n s began between t h e  L a t e i n 1 9 4 5 conver-  F r e n c h and t h e Chinese, and on F e b r u a r y 2 8 t h , 1 9 4 6 ,  agreements were s i g n e d by which China agreed t o withdraw h e r t r o o p s from t h e northern part o f the country. While  France had secured Chinese agreement f o r the r e t u r n o f h e r f o r c e s ,  Ho C h i Minn's agreement was another m a t t e r .  But Jean S a i n t e n y had been i n Hanoi  s i n c e September, 1 9 4 5 , and n e g o t i a t i o n s c o n t i n u e d almost non-stop u n t i l March 6, when an agreement was s i g n e d w i t h Ho C h i Minh by which France r e c o g n i z e d t h e DRVN as a f r e e s t a t e , f o r m i n g p a r t o f t h e Indochinese F e d e r a t i o n and t h e French  Union.  French t r o o p s were t o be a l l o w e d t o occupy Vietnam, b u t i n f i v e y e a r s t h e y were a l l to leave. support  The Vietminh s i g n e d t h e agreement because t h e y had l o s t  (Chinese and American), because t h e y were e c o n o m i c a l l y unprepared  a l o n g s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e French, and because t h e y hoped t h a t  international to sustain  post-liberation  France would a l l o w them t o a c h i e v e independence p e a c e f u l l y . The g e n e r a l aims o f t h e March 6 agreement needed c l a r i f i c a t i o n , and l a t e r c o n f e r e n c e s a t D a l a t and F o n t a i n e b l e a u were c a l l e d t o s p e l l o u t t h e exact degree o f  - 5a independence the Vietnamese s t a t e was  to enjoy.  modus v i v e n d i s i g n e d on September 14, 1946 questions.  The  Nothing was  a t t a i n e d , and  d i d nothing to s e t t l e outstanding  atmosphere became i n c r e a s i n g l y t e n s e , and i n l a t e November French  r e t a l i a t i o n f o r an i n c i d e n t i n Haiphong r e s u l t e d i n the d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e namese q u a r t e r w i t h heavy c a s u a l t i e s . and Ho  C h i Minh f l e d from t h e c a p i t a l .  From t h a t moment on the French had  d e t e r i o r a t e d s t e a d i l y over the next e i g h t y e a r s . France was  lost  situation  In the end, and a f t e r a b i t t e r  t o concede t o f o r c e o f arms f a r more than she c o u l d  have a t t a i n e d by more generous c o n c e s s i o n s i n 1946. o f December 30, 1946  Viet-  On December 19 f i g h t i n g broke out i n Hanoi,  any p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e e i n g a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t , and the m i l i t a r y  and c o s t l y war,  a  The  Singapore  S t r a i t s Times  saw the s i t u a t i o n w i t h p r o p h e t i c a c c u r a c y :  "The p o s i t i o n i n I n d o c h i n a now i s t h a t France i s on t h e verge o f a f u l l s c a l e c o l o n i a l war - something t h a t we hoped would never o c c u r a g a i n i n the h i s t o r y o f A s i a . . . . Any c o l o n i a l power which p u t s i t s e l f i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f meeting t e r r o r i s m w i t h t e r r o r i s m might as w e l l wash i t s hands o f the whole b u s i n e s s and go home.... U n l e s s events take a v e r y unexpected t u r n f o r the b e t t e r , we are about t o see a French army reconquer the g r e a t e r p a r t o f Indochina, o n l y t o make i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r any French merchant o r p l a n t e r t o l i v e t h e r e o u t s i d e barbed wire p e r i m e t e r s t h e r e after. Whatever may be the s o l u t i o n t o the problems o f c o l o n i a l A s i a , t h i s i s not i t . " ^  - 5b -  CHAPTER 1 FOOTNOTES.  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.  External Affairs, June, 1967, p. 222 Paul Martin, i n a lecture at Columbia University on April 27, 1967, printed in External Affairs. June, 1967, p. 224 ibid., p. 226 ibid., May, 1954, p. 162 Material for this section has been drawn from Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, and Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina. Lancaster, op. c i t . , p. 67 ibid., p. 120 ibid., p. 126 quoted i n Hammer, op. c i t . , p. 188  - 6-  CHAPTER I I . THE ROAD TO GENEVA. Any discussion o f the International Control Commissions or o f the recent h i s t o r y of Indochina must s t a r t with a consideration o f the Geneva Agreements o f 1954.  The Agreements drew the boundaries and l a i d down guide-  l i n e s f o r the conduct of the states that emerged from the French Empire i n Indochina, and they defined the r o l e o f the International Control Commissions which were t o observe and supervise the execution of the Cease F i r e .  But behind  and beyond the actual wording of the Agreements, the attitudes and bargaining positions of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g powers and the extent t o which t h e i r main aims and objectives were e i t h e r met or frustrated played a very considerable i n d i c t a t i n g the course of future events i n Indochina.  part  And since no peace-  keeping operation can function unaffected by the context of events within which i t operates, the c o n f l i c t i n g attitudes o f the two sides towards the Supervisory Commissions, and the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the Agreements themselves that was f e l t to a greater or l e s s e r degree by a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s , influenced from the outset the scope and effectiveness of the International Commissions' work i n Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. A series of events, diplomatic and m i l i t a r y , had occurred during 1953 which paved the way t o a negotiated settlement.  At the end o f 1952 the m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n had further deteriorated f o r the French, with a Vietminh offensive i n t o Laos, r e s u l t i n g i n the establishment province o f Sam Neua.  o f a revolutionary Government i n the  On the diplomatic f r o n t , the death of S t a l i n i n March  1953 brought a perceptible lessening of the tensions of the cold war.  This  bore f r u i t i n Asia i n a lessening of Chinese intransigence at Panmunjom. Korean armistice was signed on July 27, 1953*  The  - 7 -  With the end of Chinese involvement i n Korea, i t was evident to the French Army that the Vietminh could expect to receive increased m i l i t a r y a i d from the Chinese.  At the same time the French m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n i n the v i t a l l y  important Red River Delta area was becoming increasingly untenable.  On May  9,  1953 General Navarre was appointed Commander of the French forces i n Indochina. His objectives, as he had related i n h i s memoirs, were "...creer l e s conditions m i l i t a i r e s d'une solution p o l i t i q u e s honorable q u ' i l appartiendra de prendre l e moment venu. ^ w  Perhaps the severest blow to r a p i d l y ebbing French enthusiasm f o r the war i n Indochina was dealt by the Vietnamese Government i n Saigon. c a l l e d a National Congress, held from October 12-17, 1953• ed complete independence  Bao Dai  The Congress demand-  and the right to leave the French Union,  "Cette f o i s , l e v o i l e est dechire. En France, chacun a compris enfin ce qui e t a i t , depuis l e debut, s i c l a i r : meme v i c t o r i e u s e , l a France devra q u i t t e r L'lndoehine. .... Le climat parliamentaire evolue rapidement. L'idee s'y f a i t jour que l a France ne combat plus pour ses i n t e r e t s nationaux et que l'independance promise aux baodaistes,... aboutira simplement a l ' a r r i v e e au pouvoir d ' u l t r a n a t i o n a l i s t e s tout aussi decides que l e Vietminh a eliminer l a France de l a v i e vietnamienne. Dans cette perspective, l a charge de^la guerre apparait soudain ecrasante, i n t o l e r a b l e . " At the end of 1953 the Vietminh, who had withdrawn the bulk of t h e i r forces from Laos, made another foray into that country, s t r i k i n g almost as f a r as Luang Prabang.  In order to protect Laos from further attack, and i n the  b e l i e f that the Vietminh could not supply a major attack i n the d i f f i c u l t and mountainous border t e r r a i n , the French established and garrisoned a f o r t i f i e d camp at Dien Bien Phu.  The stage had been set f o r the f i n a l tragedy i n the  French campaign i n Indochina. By the end of 1953 therefore, the increasingly shaky French p o s i t i o n  - 8 -  i n Indochina, and Russian and Chinese desire f o r an easing o f cold war tensions, combined to produce a general consensus i n favour of a negotiated end t o the war i n Indochina.  On October 2 Premier L a n i e l declared himself w i l l i n g to  discuss terms of settlement with the Vietminh, and t h i s was followed by Ho Chi Minh's statement t o the Swedish newspaper Expressen i n November that a negotiated end to the war was possible.  In January and February 1954 B r i t a i n ,  France, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. met i n B e r l i n t o discuss German r e - u n i f i c a t i o n and an Austrian t r e a t y .  The B e r l i n Conference f a i l e d t o achieve i t s purpose  but i t d i d achieve agreement f o r a meeting some weeks l a t e r i n Geneva to discuss Korea and Vietnam.  Invitations were sent i n due course to B r i t a i n ,  France,  the U.S.A., the Soviet Union, China, the DRVN, the Republic of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia f o r the part o f the Conference dealing with Indochina.  Convened  i n Geneva on A p r i l 26, 1954 the Conference completed i t s deliberations on J u l y 21. I f war weariness, a s t e a d i l y worsening m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n , and a r e a l i z a t i o n that even her Vietnamese a l l i e s were committed to bringing French authority i n Indochina to an end had brought France to the bargaining t a b l e , what considerations had influenced the Viet Minn?  In f a c t , i t seems from the  evidence that there was no great enthusiasm f o r a negotiated peace among the leaders of the Democratic Republic o f Vietnam (DRVN).  Amid a d u t i f u l chorus  of support f o r the p r i n c i p l e of negotiated settlement f o r Far Eastern disputes i n the press of Communistic bloc countries during the spring and summer of 1953, the DRVN press and Government leaders remained stubbornly s i l e n t .  In August  and September a r t i c l e s appeared i n the Cominform Journal e n t i t l e d "We Are Sure o f F i n a l V i c t o r y " by Din (probably Ho Chi Minh) and "People of Vietnam w i l l Win F i n a l Victory i n Struggle f o r Freedom and National Independence" by  Pham Van Dong.  5  Then i n November there was  a major change i n Vietminh p o l i c y .  At the opening session of the World Peace Council i n Vienna on November 23 the DRVN's Representative  stated:  "To stop the Vietnam war through peaceful  negotiations i s completely necessary and also p o s s i b l e .  We Vietnam people  long f o r peace, and we stand f o r an end to the Vietnam war and peaceful s e t t l e ment of the Vietnam question by means of peaceful negotiations."^ followed a few days l a t e r by an interview with Ho Chi Minh which was i n the Swedish newspaper Expressen of November 29,  1953  This  was  published  i n which Ho stated that  i f the French Government desired to solve the Vietnam problem by peaceful means, "the people and Government of the DRVN are ready to meet t h i s d e s i r e . " The DRVN Government leaders appear therefore to have given i n to pressure from the Chinese and the Soviet Union f o r a negotiated end to the Indochina war.  The most immediate and e f f e c t i v e pressure probably came from China,  whose help with war materials, t r a i n i n g , advice, and even to a l i m i t e d extent with personnel  ( i t i s thought that there were Chinese a n t i - a i r c r a f t b a t t e r i e s  at Dien Bien Phu) gave the Vietminh the c a p a b i l i t y f o r the f i n a l successful push i n 1953-54*  The Chinese appear to have been i n part supporting the Soviet  desire f o r a general lessening of i n t e r n a t i o n a l tensions, i n t h e i r advocacy of negotiations over Indochina and i n the display of a more reasonable attitude at Panmunjom that resulted i n the signing of a Korean armistice on J u l y 27, 1953*  But China's own best i n t e r e s t s would be served by peace i n Indochina.  Nineteen f i f t y three saw the beginning of the f i r s t Chinese Five Year Plan, with i t s emphasis on i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .  The continued provision of quantities of  m i l i t a r y a i d to the DRVN (estimated to amount to 3,000 tons per month i n and 4,000 tons per month i n 1954) of t h i s goal.  1953  would have severely hampered the attainment  Moreover the Chinese could not have welcomed the re-appearance  of an American threat on t h e i r borders, recently banished from Korea, now show-  - 10 ing every sign of replacing the weakening French.  F i n a l l y , Geneva offered  the f i r s t chance f o r China to play a role on the world stage commensurate with her power and importance, excluded as she had been from i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums by American opposition. The main impetus f o r the Geneva Conference, on the Communist side, came from the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union remained the power most anxious to see the continuation of the Conference when i t threatened to break down, the country which was w i l l i n g to foree concessions from her a l l i e s when t h e i r i n t r a n sigence threatened the collapse of negotiations. The death of S t a l i n i n March, 1953 gave the leaders i n the Kremlin the opportunity they had sought to r e l a x tensions and to turn energies and economic resources away from the demands of the cold war and toward improving the l i v i n g standards of the people of the Soviet Union.  The growing strength  of Germany i n the west and i n p a r t i c u l a r the threat of German rearmament through the proposed German p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the European Defence Community (EDC) was the major pre-occupation of Soviet foreign p o l i c y .  The Indochina war had  weakened France to the extent that she was no longer able to contribute as e f f e c t i v e l y as i n the past to European defence.  In t h i s s i t u a t i o n she was under  pressure from the United States t o agree to German troops making up the difference. A strong France was a f a r more acceptable threat so f a r as the Soviet Union was concerned than a resurgent Germany would have been. Europe was and always had been f a r more important i n Soviet eyes than the Far East.  The c o l o n i a l Communist parties i n the Far East had been con-  sidered l a r g e l y as appendages of the Communist parties of the metropole, and the lead i n c o l o n i a l matters was l e f t l a r g e l y to t h e i r guidance.  In 1946  and  e a r l y 1947 i t seemed quite possible that France would elect a Communist majority to the Chamber of Deputies, and i n these circumstances an independent l i n e by the  - 11 Indo-Chinese Communist party i n Vietnam could be more of an embarrassment than  9 an asset.  The French Communists i n Saigon prepared a document f o r the Indo-  chinese Communist Party, dated two days a f t e r the French had seized power i n the c i t y on t h e i r return a f t e r the Second World War.  The document advised the  Vietnamese before they acted too rashly t o consider whether t h e i r struggle __met7 w  the requirements of Soviet p o l i c y . "  I t warned that any premature adventures  towards independence might "not be i n l i n e with Soviet p e r s p e c t i v e s . " ^ Although the Soviet l i n e i n Indochina changed i n l a t e 1947 and 1948, as i t became evident that the power and prestige of Communism had passed t h e i r peak i n France, Soviet attitudes as r e f l e c t e d i n the press were more anti-French than proVietnamese.^" Soviet p o l i c y i n Vietnam therefore had always been concerned f i r s t with the requirements o f Soviet national p o l i c y , and p a r t i c u l a r l y with the requirements of Soviet p o l i c y i n Europe.  The f r i e n d l y assistance that the Soviet Union gave  i t s Vietnamese brothers during the Geneva Conference was therefore a two-edged sword - i t increased the strength of the DRVN's bargaining p o s i t i o n , but i t was exerted on behalf of the DRVN only to the extent that Vietnamese aims coincided with Soviet p o l i c y . A l l t h i s i s not to say that a negotiated peace was e n t i r e l y against the i n t e r e s t s of the DRVN.  The French were more war-weary than they had ever been,  and i n these circumstances gains could probably be made more cheaply than on the f i e l d of b a t t l e .  Moreover although the Vietminh forces were i n e f f e c t i v e con-  t r o l of large parts of the countryside, they had yet to take a major urban centre. Haiphong and Hanoi were s t i l l i n French hands, and although they were next on the agenda f o r conquest, could not be taken without a c o s t l y struggle. the advantage of time was on the Vietminh's s i d e .  Above a l l ,  The m i l i t a r y balance could  only continue to go against the French with every day that passed.  In these  - 12 circumstances, protracted negotiations that held out the hope of eventually ending the war peacefully would e f f e c t i v e l y immobilize the French while i t permitted the Vietminh to continue to widen the t e r r i t o r i e s under t h e i r command. What were the motives that influenced the other participants i n the Geneva Conference?  For t h e i r part, the Laotians and Cambodians hoped to gain  a clear statement of t h e i r independence and an undertaking that Vietminh troops would leave t h e i r t e r r i t o r y immediately.  The Government of the Republic of Viet<  nam on the other hand was t r u l y between the d e v i l and the deep blue sea.  I t had  no means of continuing the f i g h t on i t s own, and r e a l i z e d that any concessions made by the French during the course of the negotiations could only be made ultimately at i t s own expense. The B r i t i s h were as anxious to b r i n g an end to the f i g h t i n g i n Vietnam as the Russians were on t h e i r side, and f o r reasons more intimately concerned with events i n the Far East.  The campaign against the Communist g u e r i l l a s i n  Malaya was at that time i n a c r i t i c a l phase.  I f a l l of Indochina had become  part of the Communist bloc i t seemed l i k e l y that Thailand would follow and i f the Communist g u e r i l l a s i n Malaya had a l l i e s i n a country with whom they shared a common border, the task of the B r i t i s h i n Malaya would go from d i f f i c u l t to impossible.  S i r Anthony Eden has said that "The restoration of peace i n Indo-  china was the most dangerous and acute of the problems with which I had to deal  12 during my l a s t four years as Foreign Secretary."  Throughout the  Conference  therefore the B r i t i s h Delegation sought s t e a d i l y to f i n d some form of agreement that would permit the establishment of a buffer zone that would protect Malaya and the other countries of Southeast Asia from d i r e c t Communist pressure.  They  threw t h e i r considerable influence behind proposals that would buy security and independence f o r the southern part of the country at the expense of concessions i n the north. Of a l l the participants i n the Geneva Conference, the United States  - 13 appeared l e s s c e r t a i n of what i t r e a l l y wanted and more divided i n i t s assessment of how t o go about i t .  American p o l i c y during t h i s period often appeared  as inscrutable to America's a l l i e s (and indeed to i t s own people) as i t d i d to i t s adversaries.  Indeed, books have been written to t r y to explain the twists  13 and turns of U.S. p o l i c y at t h i s time. American i n t e r e s t i n and concern f o r Vietnam goes back to the period near the end of the Second World War when the A l l i e s were s t a r t i n g to re-draw the map of the world.  United States concern to be l i s t e d i n the ranks of the  a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s t s l e d to active discouragement of French e f f o r t s to return to Indochina and a good deal of sympathy and u n o f f i c i a l encouragement of Vietminh elements by U.S. personnel i n I n d o c h i n a . W i t h the v i c t o r y of the Communists i n China there was a sudden demand f o r a re-appraisal of U.S. attitudes towards European colonies i n the Far East.  There remained a great reluctance to support  c o l o n i a l powers jsfecf showed no signs of y i e l d i n g to the legitimate aspirations of c o l o n i a l nationalism, but the U.S. now was unprepared to support independence movements r e l y i n g i n any way on Communist support.  The s i t u a t i o n i n Indochina there-  fore presented great d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r American p o l i c y makers, and they attempted to meet both requirements of U.S. p o l i c y by providing assistance f o r the French i n the form of arms and money ( i t i s estimated that by 1953  the U.S. was underwriting  two-thirds of the French e f f o r t i n Indochina) while prodding the French into meeting the demands of the n a t i o n a l i s t s i n Indochina. U.S. p o l i c y towards Indochina at t h i s time was strongly influenced by events on the domestic p o l i t i c a l f r o n t . 1952  The Republicans took o f f i c e i n November  a f t e r a long period of Democratic party r u l e .  There would i n any case have  been a natural tendency to redesign U.S. foreign p o l i c y from the a t t i c to the c e l l a r , but the severe f r u s t r a t i o n s that the American people as a whole had f e l t i n seeing a l l t h e i r economic and m i l i t a r y might unable to prevent the "Communist takeover" of China and a m i l i t a r y stalemate i n Korea made i t inevitable that a "new look" i n  - 14 foreign policy would be one of the f i r s t tasks of the new administration. In fact by 1950 the former bi-partisan approach to foreign affairs in the United States was already coming apart.  Many Republicans believed that  bi-partisanship was essentially wrong - i t deprived the country of needed debate on foreign policy.  Moreover as a matter of practical policies i t was unwise in  that i t deprived the Republican party of recognizable issues of i t s own."^  The  burden of continued vigilance against a potential enemy who could never be defeated and would never grow weaker was increasingly seen as intolerable by a large number of Americans. The f i r s t blow for a new, recognizably Republican, foreign policy was struck by John Foster Dulles i n an article published in Life. May 19,  1952.  Denouncing the Truman policy of containment, he called for the liberation of those who lived behind the Iron Curtain.  The only solution to reduce the threat of  war was ... for the free world to develop the w i l l to organize the means to reM  taliate instantly against open aggression by Red Armies /toj strike back where i t hurts, by means of our own choosing."^  This became known as the theory of  '•massive retaliation", and probably terrified America's a l l i e s more than i t did her enemies. The Republican Party platform, adopted i n convention on July 10, was largely written by Dulles.  1952,  It promised to "end containment", "end the neg-  lect of the Far East", and "repudiate a l l commitments ... which aid Communist 17 enslavements."  This party platform had a greater influence on the formation  of American policy than platforms usually do, partly because the person most responsible for drafting i t soon became charged with the responsibility for conducting U.S. foreign policy - (Dulles became Secretary of State i n November) but also because President Eisenhower considered himself bound by the provisions of 18 the party platform. The new Republican administration that assumed office at the end of 1952  - 15 had therefore committed i t s e l f to a more a c t i v i s t r o l e i n the Far East, to a more r i g i d opposition to Communism everywhere i n the world, and to a promise that i t would not agree to any more people "disappearing behind the Iron Curtain". These commitments meant that the Administration was opposed i n p r i n c i p l e to nego t i a t i o n s with the Communist bloc - indeed Eisenhower has said that he considered B r i t i s h f a i t h i n negotiations over Indochina "... u n r e a l i s t i c .  To my knowledge  the f a c t that Communists were to participate i n any i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference never 19  implied that they would either make concessions or keep promises."  They also  made i t i n e v i t a b l e that when concessions were made to the Vietminh at Geneva, and i n p a r t i c u l a r when p a r t i t i o n became the agreed solution, the United States would repudiate the Agreement. During 1953 while the French m i l i t a r y position i n Indochina was gradu a l l y becoming more untenable, and while the French were f i n a l l y coming to the r e a l i z a t i o n that a negotiated end to the war would have to be found, the  Americans  seem to have maintained t h e i r optimism concerning the outcome of the war.  The  French, dependent on U.S. aid i n Indochina, were no doubt l a r g e l y responsible f o r giving the Americans t h i s impression.  Consequently when the chief of the French  General S t a f f , General E l y , v i s i t e d Washington on March 20, h i s gloomy assessment of the future of Dien Bien Phu and of the e f f e c t of i t s f a l l on the whole French e f f o r t i n Indochina, f e l l l i k e a bombshell.  The f i r s t major Vietminh attack on  the f o r t r e s s had occurred from March 13-15, and revealed that the impossible had been accomplished - the Vietminh had succeeded i n carrying a r t i l l e r y and a n t i a i r c r a f t guns to the top of the h i l l s surrounding the camp.  Within these f i r s t  few days of the b a t t l e outlying defences were captured, the a i r s t r i p was made i n operable and from then on the French could supply Dien Bien Phu only by a i r - an impossible task f o r the meagrely equipped French a i r force i n Indochina. The news had a galvanic i f confused e f f e c t on American p o l i c y .  Admiral  Radford offered General E l y a massive U.S. bombing attack on Dien Bien Phu i f the  - 16 French thought that i t would be e f f e c t i v e .  But by the time that an affirmative  opinion could be received from the French commanders on the spot, the Americans had had second thoughts about the o f f e r - or perhaps i t i s more accurate to say  20 that the more cautious had prevailed over the advice of the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s . From then u n t i l the opening date of the Geneva Conference, U.S.  p o l i c y appeared  to be thoroughly contradictory, with the Government's point of view varying from day to day and depending on who  happened to be the spokesman at the moment.  The administration appeared to be divided between the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t s , notably Admiral Redford, the Chief of Staff, and Vice President Nixon on the one hand, and those who were opposed to intervention unless a l l i e d Governments could be persuaded to intervene too - the President, General Ridgeway, and probably Dulles belonged i n the l a t t e r company.  In the end, a f t e r a great deal of public f i s t -  shaking, the non-interventionists won out and the U.S. d i d not go to war over Dien Bien  Phu. Attempts to f i n d a c l e a r cut l i n e i n the c o n f l i c t i n g s h i f t s of  U.S.  21 p o l i c y during the weeks preceding Geneva have been made, at best.  but are  unconvincing  In f a c t the Administration was caught between what would seem to be  the demands of i t s new foreign p o l i c y f o r resolute opposition to Communist expansion everywhere i n the world, and the hard f a c t that neither Congress nor public opinion would support another war i n the Far East.  Disillusionment over Korea  had had a great deal to do with the Republican e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r y i n the f i r s t place.  A p o l l taken on C a p i t o l H i l l by the Administration i n l a t e A p r i l report-  ed that "there were no more than f i v e men  at the most to be found i n a l l of Con-  gress who were p o s i t i v e and unequivocal i n t h e i r approval of quick and decisive  22 action."^ President Eisenhower has summed up the requirements f o r U.S.  action i n  Indochina at that time as being "... f i r s t ... a l e g a l r i g h t under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law;  second ... a favourable climate of world opinion;  and t h i r d , favourable  action by the C o n g r e s s . I n search of the l a t t e r two requirements,  Dulles  bent a l l h i s e f f o r t s towards achieving a promise of B r i t i s h intervention i n Indochina.  The B r i t i s h however refused to consider intervention u n t i l negotiations  had been t r i e d and f a i l e d .  They were also quite aware that t h e i r agreement was  needed l a r ^ g e l y f o r American domestic p o l i t i c a l requirements, i n h i s memoirs.  as Eden makes c l e a r  " S i r Winston summed up the p o s i t i o n by saying that what we were  being asked to do was to a s s i s t i n misleading Congress i n t o approving a m i l i t a r y operation, which would i n i t s e l f be i n e f f e c t i v e , and might w e l l bring the world to the verge of a major  war."  The e f f e c t on the outcome of the Conference of U.S. belligerence has been debated.  Whether i t was i n f a c t u s e f u l i n strengthening the French p o s i t i o n  or whether i t created i l l w i l l and suspicion while being unconvincing i n i t s e l f as a credible threat, i s even now impossible to decide.  What i t d i d do was  to  create a r i f t between the B r i t i s h and American Governments that was never r e a l l y bridged over i n the  Far East, and that eliminated one more possible prop f o r the  Agreement obtained at Geneva.  U.S. belligerence also had an e n t i r e l y negative  e f f e c t on neutral opinion i n Asia and p a r t i c u l a r l y on Indian opinion.  Since  India was to become the key member of the body which was tosupervise the Cease F i r e , the Americans might p r o f i t a b l y have been a l i t t l e l e s s c a v a l i e r i n t h e i r dismissal of public opinion i n the Third World. The day that the Indochina phase of the Geneva Agreement opened the assembled Delegates heard the news of the f a l l of Dien Bien Phu. too pat to be accidental. at  The timing  was  The Vietminh could probably have captured the f o r t r e s s  any time a f t e r the i n i t i a l attack i n the middle of March, but f i n a l v i c t o r y  delayed u n t i l i t would have maximum impact.  was  In the interim the courage and the  sufferings of the garrison had become the symbol of the whole French e f f o r t i n Indochina.  The wisdom of choosing to make a stand i n that place had always been  debatable, although perhaps the consequences could only have been c l e a r l y seen  with the advantage of hind sight. The capture of the f o r t may have had l i t t l e r e a l e f f e c t on the v a l i d i t y of the French position i n Indochina, although the French army l o s t i t s crack troops and with t h e i r loss the whole spearhead of the French e f f o r t i n Indochina blunted.  was  But psychologically the defeat marked the end of the French empire i n  the Far East, and both sides knew i t .  The Geneva Conference to end the war could  scarcely have had a worse beginning f o r the French.  They were meeting a s e l f -  confident, successful adversary across the conference t a b l e , and the course of future events on the b a t t l e f i e l d i n Indochina only increased the determination of the DRVN Delegation.  F i n a l l y i t was only the insistence of the DRVN's more power-  f u l a l l i e s that forced concessions which brought the conference to a close.  In  the end i t was perhaps t h i s fact more than any other that brought about the breakdown of the Geneva settlement of 1954 long war i n Vietnam.  and the opening of another chapter i n the  - 19 CHAPTER I I FOOTNOTES.  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.  quoted i n Lacouture e t D e v i l l e r s , La F i n d'une Guerre, p. 39. i b i d , p. 43 A.W. Cameron, (ed.) Vietnam C r i s i s , a Documentary History, V o l . 1 p. 218. i b i d . , p. 223-4 King C. Chen, Vietnam and China. 1938-1954, pp. 285-6 A.W. Cameron, op. c i t . , p. 218 i b i d . pp. 223-4 King C. Chen, op. c i t . , p. 276 Bernard B. F a l l , "Tribulations o f a Party Line: The French Communists and Indochina" Foreign A f f a i r s . A p r i l 1955, p. 499 Harold R. Isaacs, No Peace f o r Asia, p. 173 W. Raymond Duncan, Soviet P o l i c y i n Developing Countries, p. 174 The Memoirs of S i r Anthony Eden: F u l l C i r c l e , p. 77 See p a r t i c u l a r l y Robert R. Randle, Geneva 1954. and V i c t o r Bator, Vietnam: A Diplomatic Tragedy. c . f . Jean Sainteny, Histoire d'un Paix Manque. Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism, p. 13 John Foster Dulles, "A P o l i c y of Boldness" L i f e , May 19, 1952, p. 150 Republican Platform o f 1952 quoted i n Current History. October, 1952,  pp. 246-54  Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate f o r Change, p. 194 i b i d . , p. 349 20. LAMUf<f*TLaaiei et D e v i l l e r s , op. c i t . , pp. 73-77 21. See p a r t i c u l a r l y Randle, op. c i t . 22. The C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor. Apr. 29, 1954 23. Eisenhower, op. c i t . , p. 340 24* Eden, op. c i t . , p. 105 25. For a f u l l discussion see Jules Roy, The Battle of Dien Bien Phu.  - 20 -  CHAPTER III. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. The delegations gathered in Geneva on May 8 under the shadow of the f a l l of Dien Bien Phu.  Their task was, as the Economist expressed i t ,  "... to  try to find a modus V i v e n d i between the unacceptable and the unobtainable ....""'" Formal discussions in the Indochina phase of the Conference began on May 9.  Be-  fore the f i n a l settlement was reached on July 21, there had been eight plenary and eighteen restricted sessions.  The plenary sessions promised to be "... a stage 2  for the striking of attitudes by both sides", and from May 14 u n t i l the f i n a l meeting, open sessions were therefore abandoned i n favour of private meetings, either at restricted sessions, or more informally in talks between two or three of the participants. The trend of negotiations was influenced by two factors outside of the Conference - by the p o l i t i c a l scene in France, and by the progress of the war in Vietnam.  French p o l i t i c a l l i f e had been increasingly embittered by the war in  Vietnam, and the disaster suffered at Dien Bien Phu and the nearly imperceptible rate of progress observable at Geneva combined to topple the Laniel Government six weeks after the Conference had begun.  The future of the European Defence  Community was also a factor in the f a l l of the Laniel Government.  Laniel support-  ed the idea of German re-armament, and the Russians displayed an intransigence (particularly at the meeting on June 8) that made i t clear to the French Parliament that the Soviet bloc were not inclined to negotiate with the Laniel Government on 3  the question of Indochina.  The Laniel Government f e l l on June 12, and was re-  placed on June 18 by a Government headed by M. Mendes France. M. Mendes France was a member of the Radical-Socialist Party who had consistently denounced the war in Vietnam for the past seven years.  He was  - 21  -  l a r g e l y distrusted by h i s fellow deputies, but one sentence i n h i s declaration of  intent seized the attention of the Chamber.  t i o n i f within one month, on July 20, i n Indochina.^  He promised to submit h i s resigna-  he had been unable to obtain a Cease F i r e  That promise obtained f o r him the support of the majority of the  Chamber of Deputies.  I t also set a time l i m i t on the Conference and i n e v i t a b l y  had an e f f e c t on the shape of the f i n a l settlement. "Diplomacy has r a r e l y been able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or held on the b a t t l e f i e l d . "  The words are those of Bedell  Smith, the leader of the American Delegation, on h i s return from Geneva at the end 5  of the Conference. or  They deserve to be quoted at the beginning of every comment  c r i t i c i s m on t r e a t i e s that end wars, f o r they express a great truism that i s  often ignored.  The progress of the war i n Indochina had a very marked e f f e c t on  the progress of negotiations, and was r e f l e c t e d i n the f i n a l settlement. There i s not unanimous agreement on the state of the m i l i t a r y balance sheet immediately a f t e r the f a l l of Dien Bien Phu and during the months that followed.  The disagreements i n great part r e f l e c t the rancors of French p o l i t i c a l l i f e ,  with Mendes France and h i s supporters endeavouring to show that the French forces were on the verge of humiliating defeat, and with L a n i e l and h i s supporters concerned to prove that there was no m i l i t a r y reason f o r the concessions made at Geneva.  General Navarre's testimony must also be approached with caution - as  the commanding o f f i c e r i n Indochina he was responsible f o r the decision to defend Dien Bien Phu, and he would n a t u r a l l y therefore wish to minimize the impact that the f a l l of the f o r t r e s s had had on the French position i n Vietnam. The f a l l of Dien Bien Phu, coming as i t d i d on the eve of the Conference's opening day, cast i t s shadow over a l l the proceedings.  The heroic defense of the  f o r t r e s s , the no less heroic exertions of the Vietminh i n taking i t , had engaged the breathless attention of the world press f o r weeks.  Certainly the importance  - 22 of  the d e f e a t was  exaggerated i n the p r o c e s s .  r i g h t i n c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e d e f e a t was one.  G e n e r a l Navarre i s undoubtedly-  a grave t a c t i c a l r e v e r s e , but n o t a s t r a t e g i c  The defense o f the f o r t r e s s saved Laos, stopped s e r i o u s r e v e r s e s i n t h e  D e l t a and i n o t h e r areas o f Vietnam,  and caused l o s s e s i n t h e V i e t m i n h corps de  b a t a i l l e i n g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n s t h a n the F r e n c h . ^ of  Nevertheless the French l o s s  c r a c k t r o o p s c o u l d not be made up as e a s i l y as Vietminh l o s s e s - indeed V i e t -  minh r e c r u i t m e n t was made v e r y much e a s i e r a f t e r t h e i r s p e c t a c u l a r v i c t o r y . the v i c t o r y had ominous l e s s o n s f o r the f u t u r e .  The French were no l o n g e r f a c e d  w i t h g u e r i l l a f o r c e s t h a t would melt away at the f i r s t s i t i o n , but w i t h a determined f o e t h a t was and t h a t had demonstrated was  And  s i g n o f r e a l l y s t r o n g oppo-  w e l l s u p p l i e d w i t h s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons  the c a p a c i t y t o use them.  The a t t a c k on Dien B i e n Phu  n o t o n l y on a f a r g r e a t e r s c a l e than a n y t h i n g the V i e t m i n h had attempted up t o  t h e n , the b a t t l e was  also i n s i g n i f i c a n t respects quite different i n kind.  then on the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t armour and a i r c r a f t might be s u p p l i e d by the haunted F r e n c h m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s i n P a r i s and i n Hanoi and S a i g o n .  From Chinese  Apart from t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l shock t h a t the f a l l o f D i e n B i e n Phu had d e l i v e r e d t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e were a l s o s e r i o u s m i l i t a r y r e p e r c u s s i o n s on the French p o s i t i o n i n I n d o c h i n a . Even b e f o r e the f a l l o f Dien B i e n Phu, abandoning je  attempts t o h o l d a l l o f T o n k i n .  G e n e r a l Navarre had  recommended  " P l a c e devant d ' i n e v i t a b l e o p t i o n s ,  pense que c ' e s t en Tonkin que d o i v e n t e t r e c o n s e n t i r l e s s a c r i f i c e s .  Aussi  b i e n , c ' e s t s u r ce t e r r i t o i r e que l a s i t u a t i o n p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a i r e s ' e s t l e p l u s degrade tial  au c o u r s des annees passes  ...."^  G e n e r a l Navarre recommended t h a t  p o s i t i o n s s o u t h o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h p a r a l l e l s h o u l d be r e - i n f o r c e d a t the  pense o f r e t r a c t i o n s i n the d e l t a .  essenex-  The  " d e l t a u t i l e " - zones around Hanoi  and  Haiphong and t h e road c o n n e c t i n g t h e two  c i t i e s - s h o u l d be r e - i n f o r c e d and  de-  fended.  U l t i m a t e l y a f a l l back on the p o r t o f Haiphong was  e n v i s a g e d where t h e  g F r e n c h army c o u l d h o l d o u t , supported by a i r and s e a power. The essence o f t h i s s t r a t e g y , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e recommendation t o con-  - 23 centrate French e f f o r t s south o f the eighteenth p a r a l l e l , became known as the "Navarre Plan" and received wide p u b l i c i t y at the time.  I t s acceptance by the  French Defense planners made i t i n e v i t a b l e , i f the underlying m i l i t a r y r e a l i t i e s had not already done so, that the f i n a l settlement f o r Vietnam would leave the Vietminh i n control i n the north and the French i n the south. The Committee of National Defense met i n Paris on May 14 and 15 t o consider the future o f the war i n Indochina.  The Committee met just a few days  a f t e r the s t a r t of the Geneva Conference.  There was no way of knowing i f the  Conference would be successful i n achieving a settlement of the Indochina war i n f a c t i t had just been made clear that i t was unable t o do so i n the case o f Korea.  The Committee therefore decided that i n formulating measures t o be taken  f o r the prosecution of the war the most unfavourable conditions should be assumed i n a b i l i t y to achieve a settlement i n Geneva, and increased Chinese a i d creating i n o e f f e c t 'another war'.  The recommendations of the Committee were accepted by the  Government and were sent as instructions t o General Navarre.  General E l y was  sent to Saigon, accompanied by Generals Salan and P e l i s s i e , to present the Government's d i r e c t i v e s . The Committee o f National Defense set as the p r i n c i p a l objectives, before a l l other considerations, the safeguarding o f the Expeditionary Corps.  The  s i t u a t i o n below the eighteenth p a r a l l e l was to be cleaned up to prepare f o r a withdrawal below that l i n e i f the s i t u a t i o n made i t necessary i n the future. North of that l i n e , p o l i t i c a l considerations must not come before m i l i t a r y ones. The French forces should withdraw, f i r s t to the "delta u t i l e " , and secondly, should i f necessary f a l l back on Haiphong where support by sea would be p o s s i b l e . ^ Although these instructions seem to follow exactly General Navarre's recommendations to the Committee of Defense already quoted above, one part of the Government's d i r e c t i v e was received by General Navarre with dismay.  He was  instructed to p u l l back French forces to the zone between Hanoi and Haiphong  - 24 within 10-15 days after receiving the directive.  He f e l t that the proposed  withdrawals would encourage a Vietminh attack, and, above a l l , would mean weakening the French position before the conclusion of the negotiations.^"  Nor  did he feel that an immediate offensive in the Delta was probable, - enemy losses and the nearness of the rainy season made i t unlikely that a f u l l scale attack 12 could be mounted before autumn.  On General Navarre's recommendation, and with  General Ely's agreement, French forces holding positions i n the south and west were replaced by units of the new Vietnamese army.  These units were also pulled  back i n late June, leaving most of the delta, including the Catholic bishoprics, 13 in Vietminh hands. The Committee of National Defense met again on May 26 to hear General Ely's report on his return from Vietnam.  The deliberations of the Committee  leaked to the press within a day or two.  The Generals appear to have returned  with a generally gloomy and alarming view of the situation i n Tonkinj  they re-  ported that the French war map had deteriorated very much more than they had expected.^ Both Laniel and Navarre have denounced what they consider the overreaction of the press and of the Mendes-France Government to the military situation after Dien Bien Phu, and what they describe as a "peace at any price" a t t i 15 tude.  The U»S. State Department i s reported to have thought at the time that  the French regroupment was a mistake that weakened the French negotiating position at Geneva.^  But was the French Government really stampeded into concluding a  worse peace than i t might have obtained because of exaggerated fears of French military weakness?  When the objectives of those who hold this view are com-  pared to what was actually attained at Geneva, i t i s hard to conclude that i t was. Nor does there seem to be much substance to this charge when the most optimistic assessment of the French military position i s contrasted with the most pessimistic.  - 25 The optimists envisaged a r e a l l y serious threat to the security of the French forces developing i n the autumn, when a re-constituted, strengthened and equipped  17 enemy would again face French troops.  The pessimists thought that t h i s  sit-  uation would develop within a few weeks.  Even i f we accept the o p t i m i s t i c view as  the accurate one, would the Vietminh have concluded an unsatisfactory peace i n July when they could have obtained either a better agreement or a m i l i t a r y v i c tory i n September?  The optimists have said that the French could have held out  i n d e f i n i t e l y i n Haiphong while the bulk of the French forces held a l i n e along the eighteenth p a r a l l e l .  But why should one assume that the  Vietminh high  command would be so obliging as to t i e up the bulk of t h e i r forces i n attacking the French i n Haiphong?  Is i t not more l i k e l y that they would have turned t h e i r  major attention to i n f i l t r a t i n g south of the eighteenth p a r a l l e l , and that the l i k e l y outcome of t h i s scenario would have been the loss of south Vietnam as w e l l as north?  By a l l reports the eighteenth p a r a l l e l i s more e a s i l y defended than  the seventeenth, but i n view of the Vietminh's proven capacity f o r mountain warfare and the French army's proven (and admitted) incapacity, t h i s consideration does not seem to weigh very heavily. Those who claim that the French concluded an unsatisfactory peace i n Geneva have been vague about what they thought could have been attained.  The  French c e r t a i n l y hoped f o r a d i v i s i o n along the eighteenth p a r a l l e l , and L a n i e l  18 speaks vaguely of compensation f o r French concessions i n the north.  Neverthe-  l e s s , the seventeenth p a r a l l e l guaranteed most of what the French considered. e s s e n t i a l - a large enough area around Hue and Tourane and possession of B.C. 19 9 connecting Laos with the coast of Annam.  No.  And as f a r as "concessions" to the  French i n North Vietnam are concerned, i t i s hard to imagine that they could have been worth the paper they were written on.  Once the Vietminh were i n f u l l control  north of the seventeenth p a r a l l e l any concessions north of that l i n e would depend e n t i r e l y on Vietnamese good w i l l .  -  26 -  The Geneva Agreement was an unpalatable one for many people, on both sides.  But i t i s hard to escape the conclusion that i t accurately reflected  what had been "gained /and/ held on the battlefield". The Geneva Conference lasted for nearly three months, and the discussions at times seemed to be headed for defeat.  Near the end of June the main p a r t i c i -  pants a l l l e f t - Eden to v i s i t Washington, Molotov to return to Russia, and Chou En Lai to v i s i t India.  In their absence meetings continued between the military  representatives of the two high commands, but made l i t t l e progress on the main issues.  About a week before the end of the thirty days which Mendes-France had  allowed himself for the conclusion of an agreement the leaders of the  Delegations  returned to Geneva, and i n a last minute burst of activity the Agreement was completed early i n the morning of July 21. The U.S. Delegation took l i t t l e part i n the negotiations leading to a settlement.  The U.S. had come to Geneva reluctantly, and the American Delega-  tion seems to have been composed in large part, with the notable exception of i t s leader, Bedell Smith, of those chosen primarily for the purity of their anticommunism.  (Eden remarked of Walter Robertson, one of their number, that his  approach was "... so emotional as to be impervious to argument or indeed to 20  fact ....")  During the Conference the U.S. continued i t s efforts to set up  a Defense Treaty that would protect Southeast Asia against Communist expansion as NATO had protected Europe.  They failed at that time to make headway with  this project, largely because of Eden's conviction that the formation of a m i l i tary alliance would hinder the achievement of a negotiated settlement and his reluctance (and Australian and New Zealand reluctance) to take any steps i n that 21  direction u n t i l every effort at negotiation had been tried and had failed. As the Conference proceeded the Americans were increasingly unhappy with the trend i t was taking.  It was becoming apparent that the core of any  agreement would be the division of Vietnam, abandoning at least part of the country  - 27 to the Communists.  A good deal of the British, and also of the French, effort  at the Conference had to be devoted to keeping the United States at the conference table.  Eden has said "I had never known a conference of this kind.  ... we  22 were i n constant danger of one or another backing out of the door." At the June meeting in Washington Eden and Churchill succeeded i n pinning the U.S. Government down to a l i s t of minimum terms which the U.S. (and Britain) would feel able to accept.  The "seven Anglo-American points" as they  became known, were communicated to the French Government.  Both Governments de-  clared themselves willing to respect an armistice agreement i n Indochina which would: 1)  preserve Laotian and Cambodian integrity and independence and assure the withdrawal of Vietminh forces.  2)  preserve the southern half of Vietnam, and i f possible an enclave i n the deltaj the dividing line to be drawn west from Dong Hoi. (Dong Hoi i s about 50 miles north of the seventeenth parallel).  3)  place no restrictions on the three states that would impair their capacity to maintain stable non-communist regimes, adequate forces for internal security, arms and foreign advisers.  4)  contain no p o l i t i c a l provisions that would risk loss of the retained area to communist control.  5)  not exclude the possibility of ultimate re-unification of Vietnam by peaceful means.  6)  provide for the transfer of people from one zone to another.  7)  provide effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement.  The French Government agreed with the seven points (indeed at that stage i t was hoping to secure a division along the eighteenth parallel, north of the line mentioned i n the Anglo American note).  But i n spite of strong French repre-  sentations, Dulles at f i r s t refused to send a representative of ministerial rank to Geneva for the concluding phases of the Geneva Conference.  He sent a message  to Mendes-France on July 11, claiming that the French would be unable to persuade  - 28 the other side to accept the seven points.  It would be more damaging than  useful i f a high ranking American were put i n the position of having to disso2L.  ciate himself from the Agreement.  A few days later Dulles and Mendes-France  met i n Paris, and Mendes-France was able to persuade Dulles that there was a very good prospect that the seven points could be attained.  Dulles agreed to  send Bedell Smith back to Geneva for the concluding phase of the Conference. There were three main areas of disagreement between the two sides at Geneva - the status;; to be accorded the Communist "governments" of Laos and Cambodia, where the dividing line between the two Vietnams was to run, and the composition and duties of a supervisory Commission to control and supervise the Cease Fire. In his opening speech of the Conference, Pham Van Dong, the head of the Delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) proposed that the Conference invite "the o f f i c i a l representatives of the Government of Resistance of Khmer and the Government of Resistance of the Pathet Lao to take part in i t s 25 work".  This proposal to inflate the importance of resistance "Governments"  that were the creation of the DRVN was resisted by the non-communist delegations. The DRVN and i t s a l l i e s kept up the effort for over a month, but f i n a l l y abandoned i t on June 16 after Eden had strongly hinted at the possible breakup of the Conference.  On that day Chou En Lai visited Eden to talk about Laos and Cambodia.  He said he thought he could persuade the Vietminh to withdraw from these two countries, and that China would recognise their royal governments, provided there 26 were no American bases i n their territory. The question of partition represented a particularly t i c k l i s h problem. Apart from American feelings on the question, there were those of the South Vietnamese to be considered, and the Vietnamese Government had declared i t s e l f unalterably opposed to the idea.  The French were therefore unable to propose  partition themselves, although most members of the French Delegation regarded  - 29 p a r t i t i o n as i n e v i t a b l e .  However, on May 25 i n a speech i n r e s t r i c t e d session  Pham Van Dong c a l l e d f o r an exchange of t e r r i t o r i e s , with each side acquiring holdings that would be r e l a t i v e l y large, and that would f a c i l i t a t e economic 27 a c t i v i t y and administrative control i n each respective area.  From then on  the question where the d i v i d i n g l i n e would run became the main issue of the Conference.  The DRVN began by suggesting  a l i n e around the sixteenth p a r a l l e l ,  but suddenly a t the end of June, s h i f t e d t h e i r demands t o the twelfth or thirteenth p a r a l l e l further south.  The tougher stand may have been i n part a  bargaining ploy, but was more probably the r e s u l t of the absence of Molotov and Chou En L a i from Geneva, both of whom exerted a moderating influence over the DRVN Delegation.  The most important factor i n the s t i f f e n i n g Vietminh p o s i t i o n  however was undoubtedly the changes i n the m i l i t a r y balance sheet that at the end of June.  occurred  I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that French forces abandoned attempts  to hold Tonkin except f o r the "delta u t i l e " .  The strengthened Vietminh m i l i -  tary p o s i t i o n was undoubtedly r e f l e c t e d i n a more intransigent attitude at the bargaining t a b l e .  The question was not f i n a l l y resolved u n t i l the l a s t twenty  four hours of the Conference, when Molotov suggested that both sides compromise on the seventeenth p a r a l l e l . The clearest and most c a r e f u l l y detailed of the clauses of the Geneva Agreement are those concerning groupment of forces.  the implementation of the Cease F i r e and the r e -  The French were at f i r s t unwilling t o t a l k d i r e c t l y to the  Vietminh, but t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to get the Russians to intercede on the question of prisoners of war f i n a l l y brought them r e l u c t a n t l y to a face to face confrontation. Then on June 9 a M i l i t a r y Committee, headed by Colonel Ha Van Lau f o r the DRVN and Colonel de Brebisson on the French side began work on detailed plans f o r the Cease F i r e and a regroupment of forces. One of the most vexatious questions of the whole Conference was that of the supervision and control of the Cease F i r e .  What a l l the western powers would  - 30 have preferred would have been a Supervisory Conimission under the direction of the United Nations, and the proposal was made by Eden at a plenary session on 28 May 12.  But the fact that this proposal was rejected by the other side can  have come as no surprise.  The day before, M. Molotov had dealt with the question  of a Supervisory Commission for Korea i n a plenary session of the Korean Conference, and his statement slammed the door on any possibility of a role for the United Nations.  "In the eyes of the peoples of the whole world the transform-  ation of the United Nations into one of the belligerents has greatly impaired the authority of this international organization.  In the situation which has  arisen the United Nations has deprived i t s e l f of the possibility of acting as 29 an impartial international organ ...."  Eventually, the Korean part of the  Conference was wrecked on the shoals of disagreement over how supervision of the settlement was to be implemented.  A declaration by the Sixteen Nations on  June 15, 1954 (signed by Canada among others) declared that this question of the authority of the United Nations was one of "the principal issues between us ...."  "Secondly ... i t i s clear that the Communists w i l l not accept impartial 30  and effective supervision ...."^ The sudden ending of the Korean Conference i s thought to have shaken Chou En Lai and to have brought about the concession on Communist forces i n Laos and Cambodia that saved the Indochina Conference, widely rumoured also to be i n 31 imminent danger of break up.  But i t probably had i n the long run an effect on  the provisions of the Agreement relating to the International Control Commissions for Indochina as well*  It was now evident that this was an issue on which the  Conference could founder, and therefore neither side was willing to push their requirements to the limit. How far apart the two sides were i s evident from the record of the Conference.  Western powers called for placing the implementation of the Agree32  ment proposals underfor the these supervision Commissions of International were circulated Commissions. by the FrenchDetailed Delegation, French and  - 31 summarised i n a speech by M. Bidault on June 8.  He c a l l e d i n part f o r "... a  complete supervisory system, p a r t l y f i x e d and p a r t l y mobile, and equipped with modern transport, communications, and observation f a c i l i t i e s .  ... a s o l i d  organization, numerous and f l e x i b l e enough to meet changing needs .... ... w i l l i n a l l cases be taken by a majority  Decisions  33 vote".  On the other hand the f i r s t proposals of the Communist powers envisaged supervision by only "mixed commissions composed of representatives of the b e l l 's  igerent sides."  (Speech by Pham Van Dong on May 10)  L  However, on May  14  M. Molotov suggested " ... a supervisory commission composed of neutral countries 35 ....",  and on June 8 he s p e c i f i e d that t h i s Commission could be composed of  India, Poland, Czechoslovakia  and Pakistan.  In his reply to t h i s speech,  Mr. Eden referred to i n t e r n a t i o n a l supervision as " ... now before the Conference."  the c e n t r a l issue  He accepted the case f o r j o i n t committees of the  b e l l i g e r e n t s , i n addition to i n t e r n a t i o n a l supervision, but said i t should " ... c l e a r l y understood that t h e i r functions were mainly t e c h n i c a l and  two be  clearly  subordinate to the authority of an International Supervisory Commission." suggested that the Asian Powers represented  He  at the Colombo Conference - Burma,  Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan - be asked to assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 37 of supervisory arrangements reached at the Conference. The pattern f o r the Neutral Nations Commission proposed by the Communist powers was of course that of the International Commission which was the Korean armistice.  There Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and  supervising  Czechoslovakia  provided members f o r a Commission which had been thoroughly i n e f f e c t i v e , with each side cancelling out the other.  Bedell Smith, head of the U.S.  Delegation,  speaking i n the Korean Conference on June 5, said that " ... the N.N.S.C. i n Korea, which i s a pattern of whatiwe have been offered today, has been completely ineffective  t h i s sort of a supervisory commission means, at l e a s t , no 38 supervision at a l l . "  - 32 It was not until the closed meeting on June 16, after the break-up of the Korean Conference and when i t seemed likely that the Indochina Conference might also end i n deadlock, that M. Molotov made a concession on armistice cont r o l - he proposed a Commission composed of Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Poland and Czechoslovakia, a Commission in which, for the f i r s t time, a majority of non39 Communist states was conceded. No further progress on the question of membership i n the Commission was made u n t i l the last few days of the Conference.  "The f i r s t indication that  the Conference might at last be on the verge of success came on the afternoon of July 18, when Chou En-Lai proposed .... that the supervisory commission should consist of India, Canada and Poland.  After a l l the argument, this was a definite  step towards us and the proposal was accepted by a l l three Western powers.  From  that moment the tangled ends of the negotiations began to sort themselves out."^ This was also the f i r s t time that Canada's name had been mentioned as a possible member.  Canada had of course participated i n the Korean phase of the conference  that was going on concurrently with the conference on Indochina.  John Holmes  has said that "Canada had already acquired, over Korea and other issues, the reputation of being the most objective of the NATO countries, and i t i s believed that Krishna Memon persuaded Chou En Lai that Canada would be the best Western candidate. " ^ The Geneva Agreements that were signed on July 21, 1954 were concerned almost entirely with ending h o s t i l i t i e s . enduring p o l i t i c a l settlement.  There was l i t t l e attempt to frame an  In part this was the result of Mendes-France•s  promise to the Chamber of Deputies.  The desperate haste of the last few days  before the expiry of the thirty days he had given himself caused the postponement of a l l considerations except those necessary for the achievement of an immediate cease f i r e .  The lack of a clearly defined long term settlement also reflected  the lack of agreement between the delegations on this point.  The Vietminh's  - 33 ambitions  c e r t a i n l y extended w e l l beyond the boundary at the seventeenth p a r a l l e l .  But t h e i r m i l i t a r y successes had been l a r g e l y confined to the north  (although  there were areas i n the south under the Vietminh's c o n t r o l , notably the e n t i r e Camau peninsula south of Saigon) and t h e i r a l l i e s were not w i l l i n g to back them i n the immediate attainment of t h e i r aims i n the south.  The Vietminh had held  out f o r elections within s i x months, but i n the l a s t few hours of the Conference Molotov suggested a compromise of two years.  The provision f o r elections i s not  even mentioned i n the Agreement on the Cessation of H o s t i l i t e s f o r Vietnam - only i n A r t i c l e 7 of the F i n a l Declaration, a Declaration that South Vietnam and the United States both refused to sign - i n f a c t the Declaration was not signed at a l l , only i n i t i a l l e d by some of the p a r t i c i p a n t s . The "Geneva Agreements" consisted of three b i l a t e r a l Cease F i r e Agreements (for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), a number of u n i l a t e r a l declarations, and the unsigned F i n a l Declaration of the Conference. The Cease Fire Agreement f o r Vietnam  provided f o r the f i x i n g of a  p r o v i s i o n a l m i l i t a r y demarcation l i n e and d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone ( a r t i c l e 1, a r t s . 3-9).  The regroupment of forces on e i t h e r side of t h i s l i n e was to take place  within three hundred days ( a r t . 2).  A r t i c l e s 10-13  and 15 outlined p r i n c i p l e s  and procedures governing the cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s and the movement of troops. A r t i c l e 14 was l a t e r known as the "freedoms" a r t i c l e .  Each party undertook to  " r e f r a i n from any r e p r i s a l s or discrimination against persons or organisations on account of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s during the h o s t i l i t i e s " ( a r t i c l e 14c), and to permit and help "any c i v i l i a n s residing i n _^one assigned to the other party."  zone7  ( a r t i c l e 14d)  who wish to go and l i v e i n the zone A r t i c l e s 16-20  p r o h i b i t the i n t r o -  duction of fresh troops and m i l i t a r y personnel (rotation or replacement was of a d d i t i o n a l m i l i t a r y equipment (again replacements were allowed), of new bases or of any base under the control of a foreign state.  allowed) military  The points of entry  f o r rotation of personnel and replacements of material are l i s t e d ( a r t . 20).  - 34 A r t i c l e s 28 to 47 govern the establishment  and the functions of a Joint Commission  and of an International Commission f o r Supervision and  Control.  A r t i c l e 28 provided that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the execution of the Agreement " s h a l l rest with the p a r t i e s " .  The Joint Commission was  given the responsi-  b i l i t y f o r ensuring the execution of the provisions f o r the Cease F i r e and r e groupment of armed forces and of the observance of the demarcation l i n e s . was  It  to help the parties to execute the provisions of the Cease F i r e , and to t r y to  solve disputes between them ( a r t . 33)•  A r t i c l e 35 governed the establishment  and  operation of "fixed and mobile inspection teams" of the International Commission. A r t i c l e 36 l i s t e d the I.C.C.'s duties and r e s p o n s i b i l i t e s - the c o n t r o l , superv i s i o n of movement of armed forces and of movement into the country of m i l i t a r y personnel and arms.  Provision was made f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n ( a r t . 38) and f o r report  to the members of the Geneva Conference ( a r t . 43)•  A r t i c l e s 41 and 42 dealt with  voting i n the Commission. Recommendations of the International Commission were to be adopted by majority vote, except f o r "recommendations concerning  amendments or additions"  to the Cease F i r e Agreement ( a r t . 41) and "when dealing with questions  concerning  v i o l a t i o n s or threats of v i o l a t i o n s , which might lead to a resumption of h o s t i l i t i e s . " (art. 42)  In these cases, decisions of the International Commission must be  unanimous. The Agreements f o r Cambodia and f o r Laos were s i m i l a r i n t h e i r prov i s i o n s , with the exception of those governing the introduction of fresh troops, m i l i t a r y personnel,  armaments and munitions.  Geneva Conference, the Cambodian Representative  During the f i n a l hours of the refused to accept r e s t r i c t i o n s  on Cambodia's sovereignty that were i m p l i c i t i n sections of the d r a f t Agreement dealing with m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s and foreign aid i n war material.  Molotov f i n a l l y  agreed that Cambodia - and Laos - should be permitted foreign m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s i f they chose.  Accordingly the Cambodian Delegation made a u n i l a t e r a l Declaration  -  35 -  quoted i n A r t i c l e 7 of the Cambodia Agreement, that the Royal Government would not enter into any m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e "not i n conformity with the p r i n c i p l e s o f the Charter o f the United Nations, or as long as i t s security i s not threatened, the o b l i g a t i o n to e s t a b l i s h bases / f o r foreign f o r c e s / " .  Foreign m i l i t a r y a i d would  not be s o l i c i t e d "except f o r the purpose of the e f f e c t i v e defence of the t e r r i t o r y . " A r t i c l e s 6 - 8 of the Laotian Agreement prohibited the introduction into Laos of reinforcements of troops or m i l i t a r y personnel from outside of Laos, or the establishment of new bases.  Some French forces were permitted to remain.  Article  9 however stated that the introduction of munitions and m i l i t a r y equipment was proh i b i t e d , except f o r a "specified quantity of armaments i n categories s p e c i f i e d as necessary f o r the defence o f Laos."  And the Laotian Government made a separate  Declaration i n which i t promised not to enter into an agreement f o r a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e "not i n conformity with the p r i n c i p l e s of the Charter of the U.N. for of the C.F.A__7" or t o e s t a b l i s h bases on Laotian t e r r i t o r y "unless i t s s e c u r i t y i s threatened." The Laotian Agreement provided (Art. 14) that f i g h t i n g u n i t s of the Pathet Lao " s h a l l move i n t o the Provinces o f Phong Saly and Sam Neua".  This  a r t i c l e was t o cause a good deal of d i f f i c u l t y i n the months ahead, with one side declaring that the two provinces were intended to act as a zone of permanent occupation, and the other that the provinces had only the same status as other r e groupment areas. The regulations governing voting i n the International Commission ( a r t i c l e s 41 and 42) had been the subject of a prolonged struggle during the Conference.  The Communist powers had at f i r s t i n s i s t e d on unanimity i n a l l decisions  of the International Commission, and the English and French negotiators had c a l l e d f o r majority vote at a l l times.  The compromise proved an acceptable one, and i n  practice the Commissions were not t o f i n d themselves hampered i n t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s by provisions f o r unanimity that survived i n the Agreement.  - 36 The F i n a l Declaration of the Geneva Conference contains t h i r t e e n paragraphs, most o f which merely "take note" o f c e r t a i n clauses i n the Agreement on the Cessation of H o s t i l i t i e s . to the Agreements.  Paragraphs 6 and 7 are the only s i g n i f i c a n t additions  Para. 6 provides that "the m i l i t a r y demarcation l i n e i s prov-  i s i o n a l and should not i n any way be interpreted as constituting a p o l i t i c a l o r t e r r i t o r i a l boundary", and para. 7 mentions "free general elections by secret b a l l o t . ... general elections s h a l l be held i n J u l y 1956, under the supervision o f ... the International Supervisory Commission ...."  Consultations were t o be held between  a u t h o r i t i e s o f the two sides from July 20, 1955 onwards.  The only place therefore  that elections are mentioned a t a l l i s i n the F i n a l Declarationj  and both Vietnam  and the United States refused to be associated with the Declaration. The most serious weakness o f the Geneva Agreements was t h e i r f a i l u r e t o provide adequate guarantees or sanctions against v i o l a t i o n s o f the Agreements.  Eden  had given some thought to t h i s problem, and h i s proposed solution was discussed during the v i s i t o f C h u r c h i l l and himself t o Washington i n June.  Eden favoured a  system "of the Locarno type", so that " i f the settlement were broken, guarantors could act without waiting f o r unanimity."  In addition, he favoured a c o l l e c t i v e  defense agreement, s i m i l a r t o the American proposals f o r SEATO.  Eden's idea o f  a "Locarno" type agreement, a r e c i p r o c a l defensive arrangement i n which each member gives guarantees, was inaccurately but f i r m l y connected i n American minds with Munich and the bad o l d days o f appeasement, and was never implemented.  Whether  the idea would i n fact have proved workable, and whether the co-authors o f the Geneva Agreement would have been any more w i l l i n g to take action under a Far Eastern Locarno than they proved w i l l i n g t o do under SEATO, i s debatable.  But an arrange-  ment o f t h i s kind might at least have had value i n establishing an "organization i n being" t o whom the International Commissions could report, and from whom they might have received guidance and d i r e c t i o n from time t o time.  The Geneva Agreements  provide f o r periodic reports from the International Commission t o the membership o f  - 37 the Geneva Conference ( a r t . 43),  and under the terms of t h i s a r t i c l e the Commission  has supplied the co-chairmen of the Conference, B r i t a i n and Russia, with interim reports of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s .  Occasionally they have asked f o r guidance and help.  The co-chairmen publish the reports and send copies to other members of the Conference, but never on any occasion has the Commission received a reply to i t s requests f o r guidance. In the end the F i n a l Declaration of the Geneva Conference was never signed.  The United States refused to associate i t s e l f with the Declaration,  although i t issued i t s own declaration taking note of what had been decided undertaking not t o d i s t u r b the settlement.  and  The Government of Vietnam, unable to  accept the p a r t i t i o n of Vietnam, also refused to s i g n .  I t too issued a  separate  declaration, undertaking not to use force to r e s i s t the procedures f o r carrying the cease f i r e into e f f e c t .  The F i n a l Declaration was i n the end i n i t i a l l e d by seven  of the nine p a r t i c i p a n t s , although the names of a l l nine were given i n a heading that l i s t e d the p a r t i c i p a n t s of the Conference.  The three Cease F i r e Agreements,  f o r Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, were signed by the Commanders-in-chief of the French Armed Forces on the one hand, and by the Peoples' Army of Vietnam and of the  Pathet  Lao and Khmer Issarak forces on the other. In most of the world the signing of the Geneva Agreements was with profound r e l i e f . were s i g n i f i c a n t .  This sentiment was not however u n i v e r s a l , and the  greeted exceptions  Although Bedell Smith on his return from Geneva referred to the  Agreement as "the best which we could possibly have attained under the  circumstances"  opinion generally i n the United States thought that i t was only the best of a bad bargain.  Angry speeches i n Congress referred to "appeasement" and  and the administration emphasized that i t was  "surrender",  "pursuing discussions... with a view  to the rapid organization of c o l l e c t i v e defense i n Southeast Asia i n order to prevent further d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t Communist eggression i n that general a r e a " . ^  The  Vietminh leaders i n t h e i r t a l k s with Western press representatives were vocal i n  - 38 t h e i r disappointment at whati the peace settlement had attained f o r them.  They  blamed Chou En L a i and Molotov f o r agreeing to concessions that gave the Vietminh less than they should r i g h t f u l l y have attained, when within another year t h e i r forces could have driven the French from North Vietnam and could have taken most in  of the south.  Vietminh complaints have sometimes been dismissed as simply one-  more move i n the game, but t h e i r assessment of t h e i r own m i l i t a r y strength would seem to be f a i r l y accurate - or at the very l e a s t to be based on reasonable assumptions.  I t should be remembered that the' Vietminh demands had s t i f f e n e d considerably  as the Conference went on, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the absence of Chou En L a i and Molotov. The concessions made i n the closing hours of the Conference were made by Molotov, not  by Pham Van Dong.  The Vietminh disappointment would seem to be genuine; i t  was as poor an augury f o r the permanence of the settlement just attained as the American attitude was. International agreements sometimes represent the achievement o f genuine and l a s t i n g compromises. the  A l l too often the achievements are l a r g e l y semantic -  production of a formula that a l l can agree on and that conceals a fundamental  disagreement on important points. kinds of achievement.  The Geneva Agreement contains examples of both  The provision f o r the temporary d i v i s i o n o f Vietnam i n t o  two parts, and the regulations covering the cease f i r e and the disengagement of combatants represented genuine compromises.  Although the working out of these  provisions was not free from incident, i n general they were s a t i s f a c t o r i l y carried out.  In other cases however the wording of the Agreements concealed fundamental  differences of opinion which were revealed again when the Agreements began to be applied.  The two most serious areas o f disagreement were over the f i n a l p o l i t i c a l  settlement and over the r o l e of the International  Commission.  There was i n fact no agreement over a f i n a l p o l i t i c a l settlement. Neither South Vietnam nor the United States agreed to the provisions f o r elections, and when i n 1955 the South Vietnamese Government refused to hold consultations with  - 39 appropriate 1956,  authorities i n North Vietnam leading to the holding of elections i n  there was nothing that could be done about i t .  The truce so p a i n f u l l y  established at Geneva r e p i d l y broke down, and the two halves of the country d r i f t e d into progressively more intensive warfare. Nor was  the record of negotiations over the composition and role of  the International Commission an encouraging sign f o r the future.  The Communist  states t r i e d to obtain a Commission that would be powerless by the very f a c t of i t s composition, and that would be rendered even more helpless by the necessity of achieving unanimity on a l l questions.  They t r i e d to r e s t r i c t and hamper the  scope of the Commission's a c t i v i t i e s i n every d i r e c t i o n .  The West won some  s i g n i f i c a n t concessions on paper regarding the nature and composition of the International Supervisory  Commission, but the subsequent attitudes and  reactions  of the North Vietnamese party to the Agreements, and of the P o l i s h member of the International Commission, could surely have been predicted from the record of the negotiations i n Geneva.  - 40 -  CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES.  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.  Economist. May 8, 1954. Vol. 171, P. 430 Eden, op. c i t . , p. 118 Lacouture and Devillers, op. c i t . , p. 205 ibid, p. 223 New York Times, July 23 Navarre, Agonie de L'Indochine, p. 259 Ely, Memoiresr L'Indochine dans l a Tourmente, p. 122 ibid, p. 123 idib, p. 128 Laniel, La Drame Indochinois, pp. 106-7 Navarre, op. c i t . , p. 269-70 ibid, p. 270 Ely, op. c i t . , p. 166 Lacouture and Devillers, op. c i t . , p. 165 Navarre, op. c i t . , p. 260, Laniel, op. c i t . , p. I l l Randle, op. c i t . , p. 303 Navarre, op. c i t . , p. 271 Laniel, op. c i t . , p. I l l Ely, op. c i t . , p. 203 Eden, op. c i t . , p. 113 ibid, p. 131 ibid, p. 128 ibid, p. Lacouture and Devillers, op. c i t . , p. 247 Great Britain, Papers by Command, Cmd. 9186, p. 112 Eden, op. c i t . , p. 129 Lacouture and Devillers, p. 188 Cmd. 9186, p. 127 ibid, p. 43 ibid, p. 101 Lacouture and Devillers, op. c i t . , p. 217 Cmd. 9186, p. 110 ibid, p. 140 ibid, p. 119 ibid, p. 131 ibid, p. 145 ibid, p. 152 ibid, p. 71 Lacouture and Devillers, op. c i t . , p. 218 Eden, op. c i t . , p. 141 J.W. Holmes, "Geneva 1954", i n International Journal, Vol. 22 p. 458 The Geneva Agreements are printed i n Cmd. 9239, pp. 6-42 Eden, op. c i t . , p. 132 New York Times, July 23, 1954 New York Times, July 22, 1954 ibid, New York Times, July 24, 1954  CHAPTER IV. THE FIRST TWO  YEARS.  The three nations comprising the International Control Commission, Canada, India and Poland, began the task that was to become so much longer, harder, and more f r u s t r a t i n g than any of them foresaw at the time, i n moods ranging from cautious optimism (Canada) to euphoric enthusiasm (India).  The  Polish attitude can only be guessed at, but i t may be supposed that Poland welcomed the opportunity to play an expanded r o l e on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l stage and to increase her usefulness and therefore her influence within the Communist bloc.  But i f c o n f l i c t i n g attitudes towards the authority of the Supervisory  Commission that had been revealed at Geneva had not dampened enthusiasm,then a consideration of the events taking place within Vietnam and i n the P a c i f i c area should have done so. International peace-keeping forces often have to operate i n an atmosphere of d i s t r u s t and rancour - i t i s after a l l the very i n a b i l i t y of the parties to agree that brings the international force onto the scene i n the f i r s t place. But experience since 1954  has shown, and nowhere more v i v i d l y than i n Vietnam,  that intervention by outside interests can make the task of the peace-keepers an impossible one.  This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true i f the i n t e r e s t s concerned are  those of the major powers.  I t seems a reasonable conjecture that i f the Inter-  national Control Commission had i n f a c t undertaken the task i t appeared at the time to have assumed - to supervise the winding down of a c o l o n i a l war - then i t s duties would have been c r e d i t a b l y discharged. t h e i r duties ended with elections i n 1956  And as a matter of f a c t had  as the Cease F i r e Agreement provided,  the Commission's work would s t i l l have stood as a successful example of peace keeping, i n spite of the escalating cold war i n the P a c i f i c .  Neither of these  -  conditions was to be  42  -  fulfilled.  The United States had come very close i n e a r l y 1 9 5 4 to intervening i n the war i n Indochina. the U.S.  Only v i v i d memories of the Korean c o n f l i c t among  public and the reluctance of i t s a l l i e s prevented m i l i t a r y operations  that a large part of the administration and the armed forces believed to be necessary.  Although the United States undertook to do nothing to upset the  Agreements, i t refused to sign them or to agree to be bound by them.  Neither  would the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) sign the Cease F i r e Agreement. The r e f u s a l of the Republic of Vietnam to accept the Cease F i r e Agreement was p a r t i c u l a r l y serious.  Not only was i t s co-operation necessary i f the work of  the Commission was to be e f f e c t i v e i n South Vietnam, but the withdrawal of France from Vietnam ( i n accord with agreements signed between France and Vietnam i n June, 1 9 5 4 ) l e f t the Cease Fire Agreement without a base i n law.  The Inter-  national Control Commission decided simply to ignore t h i s inconvenient f a c t and to operate as i f the R.V.N, were l e g a l l y bound by the Agreement, and the R.V.N, usually found i t advisable to co-operate with the Commission.  But the Agree-  ment s p e c i f i c a l l y stated (Art. 28) that the Parties were responsible f o r the implementation of the Agreement. High Command Representatives  South Vietnam's r e f u s a l to replace the French  on the Joint Commission, the body responsible f o r  the implementation, a f t e r the departure of French troops i n A p r i l , 1 9 5 6 , l e f t the future of the Agreement i n grave doubt. Nor did events outside Vietnam contribute to the lessening of tensions and h o s t i l i t i e s or provide an atmosphere of t r u s t and goodwill that would have been conducive to peace and unity within Vietnam.  I t i s i r o n i c that S t a l i n ' s  death should have brought a desire f o r a lessening of i n t e r n a t i o n a l tensions and a willingness to consider more pragmatic and l e s s i d e o l o g i c a l solutions withi n the Communist bloc p r e c i s e l y at the moment when an opposite movement was  taking  place within the United States.  con-  U.S.  foreign r e l a t i o n s seemed often to be  - 43 ducted i n a f i t of bad temper, and b l u s t e r and threat characterized many, i f not a l l statements of U . S . p o l i c y . U . S . actions however, i n contrast to speech, were often c o n c i l i a t o r y . Up u n t i l l a t e 1961 the U . S . t r i e d i t s e l f t o keep i t s a i d to Vietnam w i t h i n the l i m i t s imposed by the Geneva Agreements, and i t put pressure on the Vietnamese to co-operate with the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Control Commission, even beyond the p o i n t where t h i s p o l i c y aroused Vietnamese resentment.  Evidence now shows^" that the  U.S. was i n favour of holding the e l e c t i o n s c a l l e d f o r i n 1956 by the Geneva Agreements, and t r i e d to persuade the Vietnamese to do so. e f f e c t of these i n t e n t i o n s was l o s t .  Once again the good  The advice of the Vietnamese to agree to  e l e c t i o n s was s e c r e t , but the swing to approval once Ngo Dinh Diem had?proved  obdurate  was p u b l i c and v o c i f e r o u s . The world can h a r d l y be blamed f o r t a k i n g U . S . b e l l i g e r e n c e at face value.  In p a r t i c u l a r the conclusion of the SEATO pact at Manila on September 8,  1954 with i t s protocols s p e c i f i c a l l y extending the p r o t e c t i o n of the pact to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia seemed to non-aligned states l i k e I n d i a as w e l l as t o North Vietnam and China a d i r e c t threat to the Geneva settlement as w e l l as to peace i n the P a c i f i c a r e a .  The f a c t that the pact was defensive i n nature and  that the help forthcoming was to be considerably l e s s than automatic  (nations  would "act i n accordance with t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l processes" i n considering r e quests f o r help - a c l e a r reminder that the U . S . would require Congressional approval f o r any a c t i o n taken under SEATO) d i d not weigh n e a r l y so h e a v i l y as the fact that a U.S. m i l i t a r y threat had now moved i n t o Southeast A s i a .  China had  made compromises at Geneva i n exchange f o r assurances that no U . S . bases would be permitted i n Southeast A s i a .  The conclusion of the SEATO Agreement may w e l l  have made China more w i l l i n g t o support the DRVN i n equipping i t with the means to u n i f y Vietnam by force i f necessary. The three members of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission, and Canada i n p a r t i c u -  -  lar,  44 -  were given l i t t l e opportunity to prepare or to plan f o r the job that, i n  Canada's case, was not to end u n t i l nineteen years l a t e r . the co-chairmen was sent on July 21.  The i n v i t a t i o n from  The Commission's teams were required t o  be i n place by 8.00 AM on August 11, Peking mean time.  India presumably had  been able to give at least a l i t t l e time to the consideration of the implications of  serving on the Commissions, since India's name had been on every short l i s t  proposed f o r the composition of the Supervisory Commissions. been given some advance warning by the Soviet Union.  Poland may have  But the choice of Canada  was a l a s t minute compromise and the Department o f External A f f a i r s had no p r i o r notice of the i n v i t a t i o n to serve. almost immediately,  The decision to accept had t o be taken  and planning was not only hurried, but was done with only  the haziest idea of conditions i n Indochina - geographic, climatic and p o l i t i c a l or of the l i k e l y e f f e c t s that service on the Commissions would have on Canada's own i n t e r e s t s . On J u l y 28, 1954 Canada announced her decision t o accept the responsibi l i t y of membership (India and Poland had announced t h e i r acceptance a few days before).  A preparatory Conference opened i n New Delhi on August 1, to make  the necessary administrative arrangements. up f o r the secretariats and requirements  Tentative establishments were drawn  f o r accommodation f o r o f f i c e s and l i v i n g  quarters, f o r transportation, and f o r communications were a l l considered.  By  August 11 at l e a s t a few people from each delegation were present at each headquarters - i n Hanoi f o r Vietnam, Vientiane f o r Laos, and Phnom Penh f o r Cambodia. (A group of army o f f i c e r s who came by a i r from Korea provided most of the i n i t i a l Canadian representation on the f i x e d and mobile inspection teams.) Air  The Indian  Force flew the Commissioners and s t a f f from New Delhi to Indochina, and on 2  August 11 the three Commissions held t h e i r f i r s t meetings. At the f i r s t meeting of the International Commission f o r Vietnam a meeting had been arranged with the Joint Commission.  The Joint Commission, com-  posed of representatives of the two armed forces, French and Vietminh, had been  - 45 in operation since the Cease Fire i n July 27.  It was the Joint Commission,  the body representing the two signatories of the Cease Fire Agreement, which was responsible for the execution of the Cease Fire Agreements.  As Brigadier  Sherwood Lett, the f i r s t Canadian Commissioner i n Vietnam, emphasized in a radio interview on September 27, 1954, "I should like to make i t clear that the functions of the ^/International/ Commission are supervisory, judicial and mediatory. It can make recommendations but cannot of i t s e l f enforce recommendations that 3  i t may make." This distinction between the functions of the International Commission and of the Joint Commission, between the obligations assumed by the parties and the duties of the International Commission, i s extremely important.  The fact  that the International Control Commission was not responsible for executing or enforcing the Cease Fire Agreement i s made clear in Articles 27, 28 and 29 of the Vietnam Agreement (and i n comparable articles of the Laos and Cambodia Agreements), but the distinction was never clear i n the public mind.  Even to-  day one w i l l find writers who should know better declaring that the International Commission proved unable to enforce the Cease Fire Agreement.  The International  Commission may be f a i r l y criticized for many inadequacies, but failure to secure compliance with the Agreement i s not one of themj entrusted to i t and that i t never assumed.  that i s a task that was never  The public failure to recognize that  the International Commission had only "supervisory, judicial and mediatory" functions, led to unrealistically high expectations for the International Commission, and to consequent disappointment when these expectations were not f u l f i l l e d . In the process the modest successes that the Commission could claim were lost sight of. The work of the International Control Commission for Vietnam might be considered to f a l l into roughly two periods - that of the f i r s t two years, and particularly of the f i r s t three hundred days, the period within which the "move-  - 46 ment of a l l forces of e i t h e r party i n t o a re-grouping  zone on either side of  the p r o v i s i o n a l m i l i t a r y demarcation l i n e w i l l be completed...."  (Article 2  of the Cease F i r e Agreement), and the remainder of the time u n t i l the f i n a l winding up of the Vietnam Commission i n 1973*  The Commission was  expected to complete i t s work during the f i r s t two years. elections i n July 1956  originally  The holding of  as envisaged i n the F i n a l Declaration would have l e f t  nothing further f o r the Commission to do. During t h i s early period the I.C.C. f o r Vietnam was  concerned l a r g e l y  with supervising the regroupment of forces and the transfer of t e r r i t o r y , with the movement of c i v i l i a n personnel from one zone to another according to t h e i r choice ( a r t i c l e 14d),  with the guarantee of "democratic freedoms" ( a r t i c l e  14c)  and with the clauses of the Agreement concerning the ban on the introduction of fresh troops and m i l i t a r y personnel or of foreign m i l i t a r y bases ( a r t i c l e s 16-19). The Commission sent reports of i t s a c t i v i t i e s to the B r i t i s h and Soviet cochairmen from time to time. of a r t i c l e s 16-19  (Because the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the supervision  of the Agreement was to become a continuing and growing r e -  s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t w i l l be best to postpone consideration of that part of the Commission's duties u n t i l Chapter VI.) A r t i c l e 14c - Democratic freedoms. A r t i c l e 14 of the CFA concerns " P o l i t i c a l and administrative measures i n the two re-grouping  zones" - i . e . north and south Vietnam.  Section c d i r e c t -  ed the p a r t i e s to " r e f r a i n from any r e p r i s a l s or discrimination against persons or organisations on account of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s during the h o s t i l i t i e s and to guarantee t h e i r democratic l i b e r t i e s . "  The war i n Vietnam had been more than  an a n t i - c o l o n i a l struggle - i t had divided people along i d e o l o g i c a l l i n e s as w e l l . Although the vast majority of the Vietnamese wanted to bring about an end to French r u l e , they were not united i n t h e i r choice of the means to accomplish t h i s , nor i n t h e i r views about the kind of government they wanted a f t e r independence.  - 47 There was as bitter opposition to the Vietminh among some sections of the Vietnamese population as there was among the French - i n fact the Catholic bishoprics of Phat Dien and Bui Chu had organised their own m i l i t i a to fight against the Vietminh. The fate of the supporters of one party l e f t behind in the territory of.the other therefore had rightly concerned the delegates at Geneva, and Article 14c was an attempt to protect these pockets of opposition.  It failed  completely  in achieving i t s purpose, and was perhaps bound to do so, affecting as i t did the whole question of national sovereignty and the treatment extended to i t s own citizens by each government.  The International Control Commission issued a  press release on September 2, 1954 asking the parties to give wide publicity to the provisions of the Geneva Agreement regarding "democratic liberties" in general.  It received petitions from individuals who complained that their rights  were being infringed, and i t set up a "Freedoms Committee" to deal with these petitions.  The Committee acted through the Commission's inspection teams to  investigate complaints, and the Commission then, on the basis of these reports, made recommendations to the parties.  The Commission received 17,397 petitions  alleging violations of Articles 14c and 14d in the period from August 11 to December 10, 1954.^  In fact, "by the end of the three hundred days these rather  than more purely military armistice terms of the Agreement had become the ICC's 5  principal pre-occupation." Although the Commission could properly claim some success so far as the implementation of Article 14d i s concerned, i t i s doubtful i f i t improved the lot of anyone whose cause i t espoused under Article 14c  In North Vietnam the  DRVN Government soon established i t s authority throughout the countryside, and petitioners were no longer allowed to approach the Commission's teams.  South  Vietnam had not signed the Geneva Agreement and resented the Commission's interference with what i t regarded as an internal matter.  In time the defense to  a l l complaints from the north concerning the infringement of democratic  liberties  was that the people concerned were being prosecuted f o r a c t i v i t i e s that had occurred since the Cease F i r e .  The Commission accepted t h i s as an adequate defence.  A r t i c l e 14c became, even more than the other provisions of the Agreement, simply an occasion on the part of one of the p a r t i e s , i n t h i s case the DRVN, f o r propaganda against the other.  Article  14d. A r t i c l e 14d of the Agreement provided that, u n t i l the movement of  troops was completed, c i v i l i a n s were permitted to move from one zone to another according to t h e i r choice.  The Commission decided, and so advised the parties,  that those affected by t h i s section should not only be permitted to move, but should be a c t i v e l y assisted to do so.^ How  f a r either north or south Vietnam was prepared f o r the large migra-  t i o n from north to south i s debatable.  Certainly the magnitude of the problem  put an immense s t r a i n on the resources of the south, and on the ICC which was to supervise t h i s movement.  As much as one quarter of the formal meetings i n the  f i r s t eleven months were taken up with discussions of a r t i c l e 14d.  Of 60 Mobile  Teams deployed by the ICC during the f i r s t year i n f i e l d investigations, t h i r t y  7 f i v e were to investigate complaints about v i o l a t i o n s of a r t i c l e In a l l 892,876 northerners chose to move south of the p a r a l l e l within the time a l l o t t e d . south to north).  14d. seventeenth  (In the other d i r e c t i o n , 4>269 moved from  The refugee problem received wide p u b l i c i t y - i t was undoubtedly  the aspect of the Commission's work that aroused most i n t e r e s t i n Canada, and there were questions i n the House of Commons and frequent public statements the Government on the i s s u e .  The migration was interpreted by the  by  RVN as a  resounding propaganda v i c t o r y , and every e f f o r t was made to encourage as many as  - 49 possible to move south.  On August 3, 1954  Diem delivered a speech i n Hanoi  i n which he exhorted the population to " r a l l y to the south i n order to continue the struggle f o r independence and l i b e r t y . " ^  He sent a message to President  Eisenhower requesting American assistance i n the evacuation of  civilians.  The Seventh Fleet was ordered to s a i l f o r Indochina. American assistance arrived i n another form.  The Saigon M i l i t a r y  Mission, the team headed by Edward G. Lansdale, occupied  i t s e l f spreading rumours  i n Tonkin about the dreadful fate i n store f o r those who  remained under Communist  rule.  1 1  These t a c t i c s quite probably did have some e f f e c t on the movement of  refugees, but how much i s debatable.  They were perhaps as necessary to the  success of the operation as the Watergate burglary was to the r e - e l e c t i o n of President Nixon. The DRVN complained frequently to the Commission that those who moved had been subjected to systematic, f a l s e propaganda, and that many who to the south regretted i t and wished to return. viewed about  had moved  The Commission's teams i n t e r -  25,000 people i n the refugee camps i n the south, "and on the basis  of t h i s enquiry, reported that there was no foundation f o r the a l l e g a t i o n that thousands of persons were victims of a systematic propaganda and many of them wished to go back to the PAVN^zone, and that none of the persons contacted the teams complained of forced evacuation PAVN z o n e . "  by  or expressed a desire to return to the  12  The Commission received many complaints that the DRVN authorities were obstructing the passage of refugees.  While admitting that the DRVN authorities  had the r i g h t to set up necessary administrative machinery f o r regulating the issue of permits, the Commission held that:  "... the administrative processes  should not be so clumsy, slow and complex as i n e f f e c t to defeat the provisions  of A r t i c l e 14d."  13  The Third Interim Report of the ICSC f o r Vietnam was  sent to the co-  -  chairmen on April 25, 1955.  50  -  On that date the Commission reported that progress  in implementing Article 14d "... w i l l continue to be unsatisfactory unless administrative arrangements and the provision of transport f a c i l i t i e s are urgently improved;  ... i t i s not possible to state at this stage that Article 14d w i l l  be implemented in f u l l within the time laid down.""^' L  The Canadian Delegation  appended a note to this Report calling the co-chairmen's attention to this find15 ing.  The British Government then proposed to the Soviet Government that the  two parties to the Agreement should be invited to continue to implement the provisions of Article 14d of the Agreement u n t i l the ICC was satisfied that the Article had been implemented in f u l l . ^ *  In their reply the Soviet Government  declined to consider changing the clauses of the Agreement in this way,  but  "... intimated that the Vietminh were willing to continue for one month the evacuation  17 ...." The ICC made i t s f i n a l report to the co-chairmen on the implementation 18  of Article 14d in the Fourth Interim Report, submitted in October, 1955.  The  Commission stated that at each stage there had been d i f f i c u l t i e s , due to the "narrow and complicated administrative procedures" of the PAVN, and /confusion/ and lack of system" in the areas under the FUFHC".^ "Religious, social and local influences" were used by both sides to try to persuade people to change their 19 zone of residence." However "... by 18th May the bulk of the persons who 20 wanted to change the zone of their residence had succeeded in doing so." This even-handed apportioning of blame did not accurately reflect the views of the Canadian Delegation, and i t accordingly submitted i t s own amendment 21 to this section of the Fourth were Interim Report. Theaway" Canadian Delegation occasion, intending evacuees "forcibly dragged to prevent their commeeting plained of22 "obstruction and hindrance" of i t s work on the part of the PAVN. the team.  On  These obstructions and hindrances amounted to "an organized plan."  Article 14d had " s t i l l not been satisfactorily implemented."^  The Canadian  - 51 Delegation thought that the Commission should continue to help those individuals who had expressed a wish to move from one zone to another before J u l y 20, and that a further extension of time should be granted f o r that purpose. When the record of the whole operation i s considered now,  some years  l a t e r , the Canadian Delegation's desire f o r s t i l l a further extension of time for  A r t i c l e 14d seems somewhat u n r e a l i s t i c .  As the Delegation i t s e l f acknowledged,  "... given the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l circumstances e x i s t i n g i n Vietnam, ... the work that had been done by the Commission ... represents an achievement which should be recorded."  Throughout both Canada and the United States, intense i n t e r e s t  had been aroused i n the p l i g h t of the emigrants.  Canadian team o f f i c e r s had  witnessed at f i r s t hand the obstructiveness of DRVN authorities and the i n t i m i dation of those who wished to take advantage of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement, and the Canadian Amendment was an attempt to put t h i s on the record. The supervision of A r t i c l e 14d i s nevertheless one of the s o l i d achievements of the Commission during the early years.  There can be no doubt that  without the presence of the Commission teams very few would have been able to take advantage of A r t i c l e  14d.  The Cease F i r e . Regroupment and Separation of Forces. The actual t i t l e of the Vietnam Agreement i s the "Agreement on the Cessation of H o s t i l i t i e s i n Vietnam."  I t i s signed by the Commanders i n Chief  of the two sides, and of the 41 a r t i c l e s of the Agreement, almost h a l f are concerned with theCease F i r e and Regroupment of Forces.  These a r t i c l e s were the  most c a r e f u l l y drafted of the whole, and are of course of l e a s t importance to the f i n a l solution i n Vietnam.  During the long weeks at Geneva while the dele-  gates were unable to make progress on the l a r g e r issues, representatives of the French army and the PAVN were meeting at Truong Gia to work out the d e t a i l s of the Cease F i r e . ment.  The agreed a r t i c l e s were then incorporated i n the f i n a l Agree-  - 52 The International Commissions were not required to supervise the actual Cease Fire.  In Vietnam, the Cease Fire took place at different sectors of the  country, at 8 AM on July 27, August 1 and August 11, 1954*  The last Cease Fire  had therefore taken place by the time the International Commission met for the f i r s t time. The Commission did however render considerable assistance at some stages of the evacuation of troops, particularly of French troops from North Vietnam.  The Armistice Agreement provided that the French Union Forces were to  withdraw from Hanoi within eighty days, from Hai Duong within 100 days, and from Haiphong, i n the f i n a l stage of evacuation from North Vietnam, within three hundred days.  A similar timetable was set for the evacuation of Vietminh forces  from south and central Vietnam.  Assembly areas were allocated in Vietminh  controlled areas i n the Plaine des Jones, the Camau Peninsula, , and in Central Vietnam i n the provinces of Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh. The separation of French and Vietminh troops, intertwined over the whole of Vietnam and without clearly defined battle lines, and the transfer of cities and provinces, was an enormous undertaking.  Before the regroupment period  was over, as many as 250,000 troops, 950,000 refugees and dependents and released prisoners had changed zones, taking with them over 200,000 tons of military supplies and equipment.  Perhaps as much as one third of the territory of Viet25  nam formally changed hands. The Joint Commission bore the burden of planning and co-ordinating this process.  The International Commission as observer and mediator became involved  only with the f i n a l steps i n the process; they were not required to supervise the withdrawal of troops into provisional assembly areas and i n fact they were not even asked to be present.  It was in the transfer of the cities, and particu-  l a r l y of Haiphong, that the International Commission was able to make the greatest contribution.  The Saigon Government wished to remove as much equipment as  possible, and ugly incidents threatened to develop.  When the parties appeared  to be deadlocked, the Commission was often able to suggest acceptable compromises and to get things moving a g a i n . ^ The transfer of Haiphong, i n the words of the historian of the period, 27  "stands out as the ICC's greatest success."  By that time feeling was  running  so high between the parties that they were unable, even with the Commission's help, to arrive at acceptable solutions.  Then the International Commission  imposed i t s own solution on the parties, "based not on a compromise between a reasonable position and a less reasonable one (as was often the case) but on what seemed sensible, f a i r and p r a c t i c a l .  Once i t had imposed the solution i t  refused to deviate from i t , rejecting or simply ignoring every attempt by autho r i t i e s of either side to effect delays, to trim procedures to their advantage, 28  or to interfere with the other's actions." The Regroupment and Separation of Forces proceeded r e l a t i v e l y smoothly because both sides wanted the operation to succeed, and because the clauses of the Agreement governing the separation of forces were carefully drafted and represented an agreed position.  The differences of opinion that arose needed to  be resolved immediately, and the Commission exerted i t s e l f to help to solve them. In l a t e r years, when the problems that came before the Commission reflected a much more fundamental d i v i s i o n , i t was often content simply to reflect the divisions that existed between the parties and to make no r e a l effort to solve them. Elections. The Cease Fire Agreement i t s e l f refers only i n passing to the elections that were to be held to determine the f i n a l p o l i t i c a l settlement.  Explicit  reference to these elections i s found i n para. 7 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, which provided that "... general elections s h a l l be held i n July 1 9 5 6 , under the supervision of an International Commission composed of  - 54 representatives of the Member States of the I.S.C....; Consultations w i l l be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones 29 from July 20, 1955 onwards."  Perhaps nowhere else i n the whole agreement i s  the tendency of the Geneva Conference to sweep unsolved problems under the rug more clearly demonstrated than i n this section of the Final Declaration.  The  Delegates at Geneva were simply unable to come to an agreement on the long term prospects for Vietnam, and rather than endanger the practical achievements i n agreement on the terms of a Cease F i r e , the whole question of arrangements for an election was l e f t to the future.  The prospect of elections can have seemed  l i t t l e more than a pious hope, depending as they obviously did on arrangements between the governments, one of which had s p e c i f i c a l l y rejected both the Agreement and the F i n a l Declaration.  In due course the government of the southern  part of the country refused to consider the question of all-Vietnam elections or to begin consultations with the DRVN authorities, marking their displeasure with the Geneva Agreement by a mob attack on the two hotels where the members of the International Commission were quartered, on the very day that consultations were supposed to begin. Both B r i t a i n and France were anxious to avoid any public repudiation of the Geneva Agreement, and urged Diem to agree to talk to the DRVN.  Contrary  to what i s generally supposed, the United States was not at f i r s t opposed to holding the elections.  A draft policy toward all-Vietnam elections, produced  i n May, 1955 "... held that to give no impression of blocking elections while avoiding the policy of losing them, Diem should i n s i s t on free elections by 30 secret ballot with s t r i c t supervision."  In Korea and Germany similar s t i p -  ulations (free elections under International supervision) had been rejected.  It  seemed l i k e l y that these conditions would also be rejected i n Vietnam by the DRVN, and Diem's Government could have avoided the opprobrium of refusing to hold elections.  Diem proved adamant, and i n a public statement on July 16 he refused  - 55 to consider any proposal from the Communists. The Geneva Agreement had not made the International Commission responsi b l e for conducting the elections, or for making preparations for them.  The  Commission was not even responsible for bringing the representatives of the two zones together to begin consultations. when they were f i n a l l y held.  I t was merely to supervise the elections  I t could therefore do no more than look on help-  l e s s l y as i t became increasingly evident that the date when i t s duties might be concluded was retreating into the uncertain future, and as one of the two parties to the Agreement l e f t the scene.  (On A p r i l 28, 1956, the French Union High  Command informed the International Commission that the last of i t s forces had been withdrawn from Vietnam.)  In the Fourth Interim Report, submitted to the  co-chairmen i n October, 1955, the Commission informed the co-chairmen that i t was "... faced with the prospect of continuing i t s a c t i v i t i e s indefinitely and ... so f a r as the zone under the control of the State of Vietnam i s concerned, without any sanction for i t s working  I t cannot, however, continue to  function with any effectiveness unless the d i f f i c u l t i e s mentioned ... above ... are resolved s a t i s f a c t o r i l y by the co-chairmen and the Geneva Powers at a very 31 early date."  The co-chairmen then sent a message (May 6, 1956) to the French  Government i n v i t i n g them to discuss the problem with the authorities of South Vietnam and to t r y to work out some practical arrangement that would enable the 32 Joint Commission to continue functioning.  The International Commission b e l -  ieved that the Joint Commission was "an essential part of the machinery for the implementation of the Cease Fire Agreement, and that i t s non-functioning adversely affects the execution of the Agreement, particularly i n respect of the administra33 tion of the demarcation l i n e and the demilitarised zone." Essential or not, the Joint Commission simply ceased to exist.  The  Government of the RVN was prepared passively to allow the International Commission to continue to exist;  i t was not prepared actively to assist i t to function  - 56 effectively.  Moreover the South Vietnamese Government then and l a t e r d i s p l a y e d  t h e most l i v e l y repugnance a t t h e p r o s p e c t o f any d i r e c t d e a l i n g s w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e Communist Government i n the n o r t h .  Besides r e f u s i n g t o  on the J o i n t Commission t h e y r e f u s e d any l o n g e r t o a l l o w PAVN o f f i c e r s t o  serve serve  as l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s t o the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l Commission i n the s o u t h , o r t o send South Vietnamese r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o serve as l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s ; i n t h e a n o r t h . T h i s meant t h a t from t h a t time on the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f Commission i n v e s t i g a t i o n s was much reduced;  no member o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission spoke Vietnamese,  and the teams were t h e r e f o r e f o r c e d t o a c c e p t the v e r s i o n o f statements o f f e r e d by the p a r t i e s ' own  i n t e r p r e t e r s when i n t e r v i e w i n g w i t n e s s e s , w i t h o u t the check  t h a t would have been p r o v i d e d by the o t h e r p a r t y ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . Whatever s a t i s f a c t i o n the members o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission have f e l t i n r e f l e c t i n g on the accomplishments o f the f i r s t two  y e a r s o f the  Commission's e x i s t e n c e , t h e y c o u l d not have l o o k e d t o t h e f u t u r e w i t h any of  confidence.  indefinitely.  degree  C r i t i c s o f the Commission's performance have o f t e n asked why i t  not wind up i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n 1956  did  may  Not one  when the p r o s p e c t o f e l e c t i o n s was  o f the members, even Canada, who  shelved  had been the most d i s -  s a t i s f i e d w i t h the performance o f the Commission, seems t o have s e r i o u s l y e n t e r t a i n e d the i d e a .  When the p r o p o s a l i s examined i n the l i g h t o f events  it  why.  i s e a s y t o see  1956,  in  In the f i r s t p l a c e , the Commission c o u l d r i g h t f u l l y f e e l a sense o f accomplishment i n i t s work f o r the f i r s t two y e a r s . war, had  Vietnam had known two y e a r s o f comparative  peace.  A f t e r eight years of The  Geneva  civil  Conference  seemed c l o s e t o f a i l u r e r i g h t up t o the l a s t few days, and the p r e c a r i o u s  agreement a c h i e v e d t h e r e seemed w e l l worth t r y i n g t o p r e s e r v e .  C e r t a i n l y the  west had no cause t o b e l i e v e t h a t any change would be i n t h e i r f a v o u r .  North  Vietnam had found an i n t e r n a t i o n a l sjaunding board  had  f o r i t s g r i e v a n c e s , and  proved f a r more adept a t d e a l i n g w i t h the Commission than the South Vietnamese.  -  57  Neither China nor the Soviet Union was the United States, which had now  -  prepared for a d i r e c t confrontation with  completely  replaced the French, and removing,the  shield of the Cease F i r e Agreement might have provided the occasion f o r one. B r i t a i n and France were both anxious not to upset the truce i n Indochina, and the United States, although not enthusiastic, was more reconciled to the status quo than i t had been i n 1 9 5 4 * was undimmedj  India's enthusiasm f o r service on the Commissions  to India's statesmen i t was a perfect example of the f i v e p r i n c i p l e s  of peaceful co-existence  (Panch Sheel) i n operation.  objectives of the rest of the Sino-Soviet bloc.  Poland maintained the  I f therefore Canada had been  determined to withdraw from the International Control Commission i n 1 9 5 6 ,  she  would have had to do so i n the face of strong disapproval from a l l of her friends and a l l i e s , with the possible exception of the United States, and with the possi b i l i t y that the withdrawal of the Commission would have brought about the collapse of the Cease F i r e Agreement. could have undertaken.  It was  a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that no Canadian Government  - 58 -  CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES.  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. •19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.  Pentagon Papers, Gravel e d i t i o n , p. 239 External A f f a i r s . Feb. 1955, pp. 34-37 i b i d . , Oct. 1954, p. 299 F i r s t Interim Report of the ICSC i n Vietnam, Cmd. 9461, p. 21 C. Dagg, "The Three Hundred Days"; Unpublished manuscript, Ch 4/21 F i r s t Interim Report Dagg, op. c i t . , 4/24 Fourth Interim Report, Cmd. 9654 p. 30 ibid. D. Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina, p. 343 Pentagon Papers, Gravel e d i t i o n , p. 575 Fourth Interim Report, Cmd. 9654, p. 12 F i r s t Interim Report, p. 23 Cmd. 9499, p. 9 i b i d . , p. 4 i b i d . , p.3 ibid. Cmd. 9654 i b i d . , p. 12 i b i d . , p. 13 i b i d . , pp. 19-24 i b i d . , p. 20 ibid. i b i d . , p. 24 Dagg, OP* c i t . , 4/21 ibid. i b i d . N/4 ibid. Cmd. 9239, p. 10 Pentagon Papers, p. 239 Cmd. 9706, pp. 18-19 Sixth Interim Report, Cmd. 31, p. 9 i b i d . , p. 10  -  59  -  CHAPTER V. THE EFFECT OF INDIAN POLICY. The membership of most peace-keeping groups has been c a r e f u l l y chosen to provide as objective an assessment of the s i t u a t i o n as can possibly be obtained.  The case of the ICC i n Indochina was d i f f e r e n t ; i t s membership was  d e l i b e r a t e l y chosen to represent both sides i n the cold war.  In these c i r -  cumstances the views of the t h i r d member became v i t a l l y important, and i t i s not too much to say that as time went on the decisions of the ICC r e f l e c t e d considerations of Indian foreign p o l i c y as much as they did events i n Vietnam.  In  these circumstances some understanding of what considerations affected Indian foreign p o l i c y , and how that p o l i c y changed over the years that the International Commission was : i n existence, becomes necessary i n assessing what the Commission accomplished. The f i r s t , the most important, and the most obvious f a c t about Indian foreign p o l i c y i s that i t was non-aligned. for  At independence, when India could  the f i r s t time command the d i r e c t i o n of her own foreign p o l i c y , Nehru chose  not t o a l i g n India with either of the great power blocs.  The decision was  Nehru's, f o r Nehru was f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes and f o r at l e a s t the f i r s t f i f t e e n years o f India's existence as an independent state, the sole a r b i t e r o f India's foreign p o l i c y .  But the decision was f u l l y supported by the overwhelming  majority of Indians, at l e a s t u n t i l the d i r e c t attack on India by China i n I960 brought discontent to the surface and public opinion forced a s t i l l reluctant Nehru to abandon at l e a s t some of his basic assumptions. There were several reasons f o r t h i s general s a t i s f a c t i o n with nonalignment, and one of them must surely be that the doctrine o f ahimsa or non violence goes a long way back i n Indian h i s t o r y , and has been adopted by i n f l u -  - 60 e n t i a l figures i n Indian p o l i t i c a l l i f e from the Emperor Asoka to Gandhi.  The  p o l i c y moreover g r a t i f i e d Indian pride - i t gave India a d i s t i n c t i v e voice i n world councils, and one that was l i s t e n e d to with respect i f also occasionally with i r r i t a t i o n by the major powers.  The knowledge that i n being i n favour of  peace and against war they were on the side of the angels gave the Indians deep moral s a t i s f a c t i o n , a moral s a t i s f a c t i o n that often seemed moral arrogance to outsiders, conscious as they often were that the safety of the Indian p o s i t i o n depended more on the current m i l i t a r y stalemate than on anything within India's own c o n t r o l . The more immediate and p r a c t i c a l reasons f o r non-alignment were described by Nehru. own  Non-alignment, he declared, was  progress and growth.  And i f there i s a war,  "absolutely e s s e n t i a l f o r our big or small, i t comes i n the  way of that growth which i s f o r us the primary f a c t o r . " lack of m i l i t a r y a l l i e s would be dangerous. invasion or attack on India....  1  He did not think the  "I do not conceive of any kind of  Any country attacking India merely adds to i t s  2 troubles." I t was of course non-alignment that gave India her place on the Indochina Commissions.  Indians were i n c l i n e d to go farther and to emphasize the  i m p a r t i a l i t y of t h e i r p o s i t i o n . ested, and India was  But non-alignment i s not necessarily d i s i n t e r -  to f i n d n e u t r a l i t y a d i f f i c u l t tightrope to walk.  In  truth of course India was not i n any r e a l sense i n d i f f e r e n t to the outcome of the c o n f l i c t between communism and i t s opponents, p a r t i c u l a r l y where the c o n f l i c t occurred i n her own  back yard.  An analysis of Indian attitudes to the Korean  war and to the struggle f o r independence i n Burma, Indonesia and Indochina o f f e r s some i n t e r e s t i n g and i n s t r u c t i v e differences. India's attitude to the Korean war was not one of indifference to i t s outcome.  India strongly objected to the U.N.  Command's decision to carry the  war beyond the 38th p a r a l l e l , but the o r i g i n a l invasion was  also denounced.and  - 61  -  India supported the U.N. m i l i t a r y action i n Korea, although she refused to contribute troops.  Nehru explained that a troop contribution would be beyond India's  capacity, and would i n any case make l i t t l e difference to the outcome of the However, India made what contribution she could (comparable f o r instance to Zealand's) and an Indian Medical Mission was sent to South Korea.  war. New  Throughout  the Korean war the Indian Ambassador i n Peking was the u n o f f i c i a l point of contact between China and the United Nations.  India f i r s t proposed the formation  of a r e p a t r i a t i o n commission, and t h i s suggestion was accepted by the General Assembly and rejected by the Chinese and North Koreans.  An Indian served as  3 chairman of the United Nations Repatriation Commission. In the e a r l y days of Indian independence, n a t i o n a l i s t leaders i n Vietnam and i n Indonesia appealed to India f o r support i n t h e i r struggle f o r independence. levels.  The appeal struck a deep responsive chord among Indians of a l l  One of the p i l l a r s of Indian foreign p o l i c y was support f o r a n t i -  c o l o n i a l movements wherever they might be found i n the world, but i n p a r t i c u l a r i n Asia.  There had been much indignation i n India at the end of World War I I  that the B r i t i s h Government should have used Indian troops to suppress l o c a l opposition to the return of Dutch and French authority i n Indonesia and Nehru t o l d a p o l i t i c a l r a l l y i n Jaipur, "We  Indochina.  have watched B r i t i s h intervention  there with growing anger, shame and helplessness that Indian troops should be thus used f o r doing B r i t a i n ' s d i r t y work against our friends who the same f i g h t as  are f i g h t i n g  we."^  But i f Nehru was unwilling to see Indian troops intervening i n Vietnam on behalf of the French, he was equally unwilling to see them intervene on the side of the Vietminh.  When the Vietminh resumed h o s t i l i t i e s i n November, 1946,  a f t e r the bombardment of Haiphong, Ho Chi Minn sent a delegate to India to ask f o r Indian help.  The request was made to Sarat Chandra Bose, a member of Nehru's  interim cabinet and as older brother of the Subhas Chandra Bose who had formed an  - 62 army to f i g h t against the B r i t i s h during World War I I .  Bose was  sympathetic,  and called on Indians "to rush i n thousands and tens of thousands to help the  5 brave Vietnamese."  The c a l l was answered e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y i n many areas, and  volunteers and supplies were collected f o r service with the Vietminh.  But Nehru  refused to make the necessary t r a v e l arrangements, or to allow Indian volunteers to proceed to Indochina on t h e i r  own.  An Asian Relations Conference was held i n New Delhi from March 23 to April  12, 1947*  At t h i s conference, attended by delegations from twenty f i v e  Asian countries, Nehru was under great pressure to permit evident Indian sympathy for the Vietminh to be expressed i n more p r a c t i c a l ways. gate said "We  have used enough words about Asian unity.  As the Vietminh deleNow l e t us act."^  Nehru  r e p l i e d that the Government of India "could not give more than moral support." Nehru "did not see how the Government of India could be expected to declare war 7  on France."  The mixed feelings that India had about the Vietminh i s r e f l e c t e d  i n the fact that there were indeed two Vietnamese delegations at the New  Delhi  Conference - one representing the Vietminh and one the rather ambiguous Frenchsupported regimes of Cambodia, Laos and Cochin China. Indian reaction to the independence movement i n Indonesia was very different.  When negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic broke  down i n 1947,  India brought the matter to the attention of the Security Council.  In January, 1949,  Nehru c a l l e d a Conference on Indonesia i n New D e l h i .  India  denied a l l f a c i l i t i e s to Dutch a i r c r a f t and shipping, and persuaded Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Saudi Arabia and Iraq to apply s i m i l a r sanctions.  India sent a  Red Cross medical unit to Indonesia, granted asylum to Sultan Sjahir, and g  extended  de facto recognition to the Indonesian Republic. The difference between the amount of help India was prepared to give to independence movements i n Indonesia and Indochina i s too s t r i k i n g to be ignored. For the Vietminh the Indian Government was prepared to do l i t t l e more than to make  - 63 sympathetic noises i n favour of independence and to denounce the French.  (Al-  though India f i n a l l y did give some p r a c t i c a l assistance to the Vietminh:  in  response to public pressure, and a f t e r repeated requests from Ho Chi Minn, i n February 1947  India prohibited French operational or combat a i r c r a f t from f l y i n g  across India, although permitting ambulance and other non-military planes to  9 cross. Y  In the case of Indonesia, Indian help went much further and was  crete and valuable.  con-  The conclusion i s inescapable - the Indian Government d i s -  l i k e d colonialism, but i t d i s l i k e d Communism just as much.  Where the two  ele-  ments of anti-colonialism and Communism were i n e x t r i c a b l y mixed, the Indian Government would not betray i t s o r i g i n s and i t s own emotional roots by supporting a c o l o n i a l regime, but i t would not d e l i b e r a t e l y help a communist power to entrench i t s e l f either. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to speculate how Indian p o l i c y would have been altered toward Indochina i f a genuine and strong n a t i o n a l i s t movement had evolved i n opposition to the Vietminh.  Such speculation i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g i n  the l i g h t of the s i t u a t i o n i n Malaya, where B r i t a i n had declared her intention of not granting independence u n t i l the armed r e b e l l i o n of the Malayan Communist party was crushed.  The Indian Government openly condemned that r e b e l l i o n .  The Indian  deputy minister of External A f f a i r s declared that the Malayan insurgents were "bandits", and Nehru t o l d a press conference i n Singapore i n 1951 d i s l i k e d terrorism "intensely". whole human race and reduces men  that Indians  "This method of terrorism i s degrading to the to the l e v e l of beasts." ^ 1  S i m i l a r l y i n Burma, where the Communists attempted to overthrow the government through armed r e b e l l i o n , the Indian Government supplied the Government of U Nu with arms, ammunition and money, and i n March 1950  India contributed one  sixth of the s i x m i l l i o n pound loan raised by f i v e Commonwealth governments to a s s i s t the Burmese i n t h e i r f i g h t against Communism.  At home Nehru cracked down  hard on Communist terrorism wherever i t occurred, and banned the Communist party  -  i t s e l f i n a number of s t a t e s . These two  64  -  1 1  strands i n Indian foreign p o l i c y , a desire to be independent  of both the cold war power blocs, and an almost i n s t i n c t i v e d i s l i k e and d i s t r u s t of Communism, were to influence Indian decisions on the International Control Commission.  The two strands were to some extent incompatible,  actions on the Commission a certain a i r of u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y .  and gave to Indian Too often the  inherent contradictions i n the Indian stand l e d simply to p a r a l y s i s .  Where i t  was not clear that Commission a c t i v i t y i n any p a r t i c u l a r circumstance could make positive contribution to h a l t i n g the spread of Communist influence, and where a decision i n favour of a c t i v i t y would on the other hand require the Indian member to decide i n favour of one side rather than the other, the Indians preferred to s i t on the fence;  the inspection team was not despatched to investigate a par-  t i c u l a r incident, or the l e t t e r of censure was not There was  sent.  a t h i r d f a c t o r influencing Indian p o l i c y on the International  Control Commissions.  The Indians saw t h e i r role as p r i m a r i l y one of encouraging  and helping to create confidence  and goodwill between the p a r t i e s , of removing  suspicions and de-emphasizing differences of opinion.  They saw t h e i r r o l e mainly  as that of a mediator, not of a judge, and they hoped that the ICC could act t o gether to accomplish t h i s task.  I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that Krishna Menon, i n announc-  ing the f i n a l communique issued by the advance committee of the ICC that had worked out administrative procedures, chose to emphasize that "every delegation displayed a genuine desire to reconcile differences and come to unanimous decisions 12 on every issue that was  raised."  The harmonious accord that was  possible i n  organizational and procedural matters was not to l a s t very long when important p o l i t i c a l questions arose - and could hardly have been expected to do so.  But  the Indian desire to avoid confrontation both within and without the Commission was emphasized again and again i n public statements.  As M.J.  Desai, the f i r s t  chairman of the ICSC i n Vietnam, described the task of the ICSC, i t s purpose was  - 65 "not to point the accusing finger but to investigate and lead both parties to 13 f u l f i l l assurances they had given at Geneva." Perhaps no tendency of the Indian member of the Commission was to arouse more frustration and i r r i t a t i o n i n successive Canadian Delegations than t h i s refusal "to point the accusing finger" i n cases where i t was warranted.  But t h i s  approach of the Indian Delegation had deeper foundations than the passing demands of Indian foreign policy, nor was i t founded simply on the spinelessness and pusillanimity of individual Indians, as exasperated Canadians were inclined to suspect.  The whole Indian attitude to law and j u d i c i a l procedure, although i t  shared with Canadians a common background i n English common law, was profoundly influenced also by an indigenous Indian tradition that had never touched Canadian experience.  The difference between Anglo Saxon and Indian conceptions of justice  has been expressed as follows: "The adversary mode of western procedure ... i s expected to result i n a declaration that one side has won and the other lost. /Indian legal practise as expressed in7 v i l l a g e t r i bunals, on the other hand, / t r i e s / to compromise differences so that parties to a case can go home with the appearance- at least of harmony and with their dignity intact.... The village tribunal, because i t s members reside among the d i s puting parties and find t h e i r own l i v e s touched by their d i s contents, i s less anxious to find "truth" and give "justice" than to abate c o n f l i c t and promote harmony."14 These two strands of legal tradition continue today to exist side by side, and a l l Indians have to some extent been formed and influenced by both of them. "India's dual legal system continues to exhibit three legal cultures: within the parochial system, where most legal behaviour i s s t i l l to be found, non-official tribunals continue to use t r a d i t i o n a l procedure and customary law to settle d i s putes, maintain order, regulate change; within the national legal system, the o f f i c i a l administration of justice r e l i e s primarily but not exclusively on B r i t i s h legal ideas, procedures and law; and influencing both are the social norms of Brahman high culture law. "15 As Canadians, we are perhaps too ready to accept the norms of our own particular system as the only acceptable ones, the "justice" achieved by our own  - 66 j u d i c i a l system as the only possible d e f i n i t i o n of the word.  Canadians should  not forget that there are both other goals and other methods, and that these goals and methods are as honored and as v a l i d f o r other s o c i e t i e s as ours are v a l i d f o r us. forms of  We need not necessarily accept the proposition that these other  j u s t i c e are the best possible ways to tackle i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems,  but we should at l e a s t understand that we are l i k e l y to encounter them i n serving on i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i b u n a l s , and we should be f l e x i b l e enough to  recognise  them f o r what they are and to r e t a i n at the very l e a s t our understanding, our equanimity and our temper i n dealing with them. Although the main goals of Indian foreign p o l i c y and the predispositions and attitudes of Indians conducting that p o l i c y have remained reasonably constant  since independence, the changing balance of power i n the P a c i f i c  has  exerted an-, influence on the ways that India has gone about a t t a i n i n g these goals.  In p a r t i c u l a r the v i c t o r y of the Communists i n China and the c o n f l i c t  between American and Communist influence i n Vietnam have dictated s h i f t s i n Indian p o l i c y .  The anti-Communist bias of Indian p o l i c y has remained, but the  f a c t that a powerful Communist state now  exists on India's northern f r o n t i e r has  dictated greater caution i n expressing that bias.  Nor have Indians been i n  favour of what they consider the frequently provocative American m i l i t a r y presence i n Asia, p a r t i c u l a r l y as expressed i n m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e such as SEATO.  Indian  opposition to SEATO has been often expressed, and India refused to become a member.  Indians have both p r i v a t e l y and p u b l i c l y warned Americans that China's  fears f o r her safety must not be d e l i b e r a t e l y aroused. Tensions developed early between China and India over the question. i t was  The KMT  Tibetan  Government i n China had claimed sovereignty over Tibet, but  exercised so loosely that Tibet existed almost as an independent country.  This s i t u a t i o n suited India very w e l l .  Then i n 1950 the new  regime i n Peking  claimed and imposed f u l l authority over Tibet, and there was alarm and objection  - 67 from New D e l h i .  In 1954  the Chinese seized the opportunity with the Geneva Con-  ference on Indochina to inaugurate a warmer and more relaxed era i n Sino-Indian relations.  Chou En L a i v i s i t e d India on h i s way to China during the Geneva Con-  ference, and an agreement was signed between the two countries on the " f i v e p r i n c i p l e s of peaceful co-existence", or panchasheel.  The agreement was h i g h l y g r a t i -  f y i n g to Indian s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s , based as i t was on Nehru's contribution to the philosophy of i n t e r n a t i o n a l detente, and i t a l l e v i a t e d Indian fears f o r Chinese intentions, with i t s provision f o r mutual respect f o r each other's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and  non-aggression.  The era of goodwill begun so auspiciously on the eve of the ICC's debut continued, and reached i t s highest point a year l a t e r at the Bandung Conference of non-aligned states. Bandung i n A p r i l 1955.  "Sino-Indian friendship reached i t s zenith i n  In the Bandung Conference of Asian-African nations, Chou  En L a i and Nehru worked i n closest co-operation with each other."  I t i s reason-  able to i n f e r that the removal of India's anxieties concerning the safety of her northern border and the relaxed and f r i e n d l y attitude toward China that had been inaugurated i n t h i s new era would have made India anxious to avoid disturbing the new relationship by decisions i n the ICC that would not be welcome to China. Then through the year 1959  steady Chinese pressure and a series of  incidents on the northern boundary eroded the good f e e l i n g that had been b u i l t up over the previous f i v e years.  In January of that year Chou En L a i wrote to  Nehru questioning the v a l i d i t y of the established border between India and China. In March there was an uprising i n Tibet leading to h o s t i l i t i e s between the Tibetans and Chinese armed forces.  The Dalai Lama f l e d to India, and a storm of a n t i -  Chinese f e e l i n g swept through India.  Nehru, with the whole basis of his foreign  p o l i c y threatened, struggled to restore calm and to play down the incident.  The  Dalai Lama was granted asylum, but the Tibetans were refused any further help i n side Tibet.  In July and October there were border incidents, with Chinese troops  - 68 On September 8, 1959,  f i r i n g on I n d i a n b o r d e r p a t r o l s . claim t o  China f o r m a l l y l a i d  50,000 square m i l e s o f I n d i a n t e r r i t o r y . The  Prime M i n i s t e r s and teams o f o f f i c i a l s met throughout  t o s e t t l e t h e b o r d e r q u e s t i o n , b u t without  success.  Then i n  I960 t o t r y  September and  October o f 1962 t h e Chinese l a u n c h e d a f u l l s c a l e a t t a c k i n both e a s t e r n and western s e c t o r s o f t h e b o r d e r .  I n d i a n t r o o p s proved t o be b a d l y prepared and  s u p p l i e d , and I n d i a s u f f e r e d a r a p i d and h u m i l i a t i n g d e f e a t .  On November 27,  1962, the Chinese t r o o p s suddenly broke o f f t h e engagement and withdrew, l e a v i n g behind  t h e broken p i e c e s o f the S i n o - I n d i a n  accord.  But i n August, 1954, when t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l Commission began i t s work t h i s unhappy break i n S i n o - I n d i a n horizon.  r e l a t i o n s was n o t even a c l o u d on t h e  I n f a c t a new e r a o f p e a c e f u l c o - o p e r a t i o n  ushered i n .  appeared t o have been  The f a r - r e a c h i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e o f Chou En L a i ' s v i s i t t o New D e l h i  i n June, 1954 and o f t h e agreement based on panchasheel t h a t emerged from t h a t visit  seems t o have been o n l y d i m l y p e r c e i v e d i n t h e west.  whose e x p e r i e n c e  To western statesmen  o f n o n - a g g r e s s i o n p a c t s had made them c y n i c a l , the f i v e  c i p l e s of peaceful co-existence  sounded l i k e p i o u s p l a t i t u d e s .  I n d i a n people took them s e r i o u s l y .  prin-  But Nehru and t h e  Nehru b e l i e v e d t h a t changes i n the d i r e c t i o n  o f Communist b l o c p o l i c y a f t e r S t a l i n ' s d e a t h and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o b r i n g about a n e g o t i a t e d national relations. genuinely  settlement  i n Indochina  heralded  a new e r a i n i n t e r -  He b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union and China were b o t h  s e e k i n g a p e r i o d o f r e l a x e d t e n s i o n s , and t h a t t h i s development  be welcomed i n t h e west.  should  The r a t h e r uneasy s i t u a t i o n t h a t had e x i s t e d on I n d i a ' s  n o r t h e r n b o r d e r a f t e r t h e Chinese army o c c u p i e d  T i b e t appeared now t o have been  d i s s o l v e d , and Nehru was v e r y anxious t h a t new c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h i n a i n A s i a should n o t j e o p a r d i s e t h e new e r a o f e n t e n t e .  The  I n d i a n l e a d e r s b e l i e v e d t h a t events had j u s t i f i e d t h e i r approach, and t h a t conf r o n t a t i o n and power p o l i t i c s were o u t o f p l a c e i n t h e new atmosphere i n A s i a .  - 69 They were correspondingly impatient with a l l who wanted to bring confrontation into the settlement of disputes, within o r without the International Control Commission. I f the Indians had been impressed with the peaceableness of Chinese p o l i c y , contrasted with what appeared to be the unwarranted belligerency of the Americans, they were equally impressed by what seemed to be the sweet reasonableness of the DRVN.  "For at least two years a f t e r the Geneva Conference of 1954,  India's r e l a t i o n s with the DRVN were f a r more c o r d i a l than with the government  17 of South Vietnam."  The DRVN had signed the Geneva Agreements, and had, i n  Indian eyes, " i n words and deeds l a r g e l y demonstrated i t s willingness to implement 18  the Geneva Agreements."  Not only had the RVN not signed the Agreement, i t  took every possible occasion to express i t s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the Agreement's provisions.  ( i n i t s strident opposition to the Geneva pact, the RVN i n fact  often seemed less co-operative than i n the event i t turned out to be.)  When  Nehru returned from a v i s i t to Peking i n October, 1954, he stopped o f f i n Saigon, where the rancorous public demonstrations that greeted him on a r r i v a l contrasted unfavourably with the warmth and c o r d i a l i t y of h i s public reception i n Hanoi a few days e a r l i e r .  Some months l a t e r the South Vietnamese Government chose the  occasion of the anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Agreement (July 20, 1955) t o demonstrate i t s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n by mob attacks on the Saigon quarters 19  of the Polish and Indian o f f i c e r s serving i n the ICC have had o f f i c i a l sanction and approval.  - attacks that can only  Throughout the history of the Vietnam  Commission, t h i s contrast, between the prudent and c a r e f u l p o l i c y of the regime i n the north toward the ICC and the intemperate f o l l y of the Saigon government, was to continue to plague the e f f o r t s of the Canadian Delegation to secure a f a i r hearing f o r the South's cause.  Many a case with genuine merit f a i l e d to secure  the approval of a majority on the Commission, simply because o f i n e f f i c i e n c y or sheer 'bloody-mindedness' on the part of South Vietnamese government or o f f i c i a l s .  - 70 1  A dispassionate appraisal of the survival chances of the two regimes  i n 1954 can hardly have pre-disposed the Indians i n favour of the regime i n the south. Vietnam south of the seventeenth p a r a l l e l was divided among quarreling religious sects and their armies, and the capital c i t y i t s e l f was under the thumb of the Binh Xuyen, a gang of river pirates who ran the gambling casinos and the police. support.  The only advantage Diem appeared to enjoy was his certainty of American I t would not be surprising i f the Indians had agreed with Eisenhower  that i n 1954 80 percent of the people were l i k e l y to vote for Ho Chi Minn. There was another factor.  From my own experience, I should say that  the prejudices of the individual members of Indian Delegations were not evenly divided between the north and the south.  Although Indians, so f a r as I am aware,  were always unanimous i n their disapproval of the heavy-handed dictatorship that existed i n North Vietnam, paradoxically the regime i n South Vietnam was disliked much more than the regime i n the north.  This undoubtedly arose partly because the  members of the Commission were much more isolated i n North Vietnam than they were i n the south, and i n large measure they were unaware of the day to day effect of government policy i n North Vietnam.  For a l l of the Saigon government's d i s l i k e  of opposition and i t s attempts to eliminate i t , the defects and deficiencies of the administration i n the south were there for a l l to see.  The individual mem-  bers of the Indian Delegation were i r r i t a t e d beyond measure by the hypocrisies of the Diem government, i n particular, i n South Vietnam. hand what a democracy was l i k e .  The Indians knew at f i r s t  They enjoyed free speech at home, and saw that  a government could operate perfectly safely and effectively i n the face of often vigorous p o l i t i c a l opposition.  In South Vietnam the government paid l i p service  to individual freedom and to l i b e r t y and democracy, but i t persecuted and j a i l e d and tortured a l l who were suspected of being less than enthusiastic i n their support for those i n power.  The Indians tended to shrug t h e i r shoulders when  these things happened i n the north - what can you expect of Communists after a l l ?  - 71 But i n the south these were regarded as grave defects.  I suspect that i t was  t h i s i r r i t a b l e contempt f o r what they saw as south Vietnamese hypocrisy that l a y at the root of some Indian-Polish majority decisions against South Vietnam, and p a r t i c u l a r l y where charges were v i o l a t i o n s of A r t i c l e 14c,  the a r t i c l e guarantee-  ing the preservation of "democratic freedoms." Analysts have at times t r i e d to divine the trend of Indian p o l i c y i n Southeast Asia by counting the number of times the Indians sided with the  Poles  against the Canadians i n c i t i n g South Vietnam f o r v i o l a t i o n s of the Geneva Agreement, and subtracting the number of times they sided with the Canadians against the Poles.  The arithmetical r e s u l t i s then held to represent the extent of  Indian sympathy f o r and support of North Vietnam.  The lack of d e t a i l i n most  of the Commission's reports and the d e l i b e r a t e l y undramatic method of presentation perhaps make such s i m p l i s t i c methods i n e v i t a b l e .  More sophisticated analysis  y i e l d s rather more i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t s . In the e a r l y days of the Vietnam Commission, the differences and d i s agreements among the three members of the face;  Commission did not appear on the sur-  unanimous decisions were arrived at and the f i r s t three Interim Reports  of the ICC f o r Vietnam show unanimous conclusions.  This s i t u a t i o n r e f l e c t e d the  over-riding Indian concern to achieve a consensus.  The f a c t that t h i s e a r l y  period of apparent harmony co-incided with the Commission's period of maximum usefulness has always appeared to Indian observers as proof that the one was pre-condition of the other.  The parties were prepared to pay attention to the  Commission when i t spoke with one voice; authority.  when i t spoke with many, i t l o s t i t s  This conclusion of course ignores the f a c t that the P o l i s h Delegate  was never independent - the P o l i s h vote represented was  the  prepared to concede.  only what the DRVN wished or  I t could more reasonably be argued that the Commission's  successes during the early period rested on Indian willingness to abandon attempts to achieve agreement between the parties and to impose a solution by the Commission where attempts to achieve agreement had evidently f a i l e d .  The transfer of  - 72 Haiphong from French Union forces to the PAVN provides a good example.  In the  e a r l i e r transfer of Hanoi, the Commission "had t r i e d t o leave the two High 20 Commissions to work out t h e i r disputes between themselves." ever, presented a d i f f e r e n t set of problems.  Haiphong, how-  Disputes arose over what property  and equipment was to be transferred to the south.  The three hundred days during  which withdrawals could be made were drawing to a close.  In these circumstances  delay helped the PAVN, f o r anything not evacuated by the May 18 deadline must be l e f t behind.  The Indian chairman was not w i l l i n g to carry i n a c t i v i t y to the  point where i t would give one side an u n f a i r advantage.  "The i n a b i l i t y of the  ... High Commands to work i n concert ... caused a remarkable s h i f t i n the Commi s s i o n 's positions with respect to the role i t was w i l l i n g to play i n the Haiphong t r a n s f e r .  Whereas i n November i t was w i l l i n g to take the part of observer,  and, i f necessary, of c o n c i l i a t o r , i t had by February accepted the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 21 for r u l i n g on the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r each and every removal ...." The Haiphong transfer took place on time, and the ICC solution, "imposed on the p a r t i e s " was 22 "based on what seemed sensible, f a i r and p r a c t i c a l , "  not on compromise.  The f i r s t break i n unanimity came with the Fourth Interim Report, when the  Canadian Delegation submitted two amendments, one amplifying the record of  the  Commission's e f f o r t s to ensure freedom of movement f o r a l l those wishing to 23  change zones, ( a r t i c l e 14d),  and placing on the record i n greater d e t a i l the  e f f o r t s of the DRVN to obstruct the free exercise of t h i s r i g h t , and the other explaining the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the French High Command i n f u l f i l l i n g i t s o b l i gations i n South Vietnam where authority had been transferred to the Government of the RVN. the  The report does not show the Indian Delegation as disagreeing with  Canadian Delegation i n p r i n c i p l e , but as evidently being unwilling to blame  one party more than the other. From the f i f t h interim report to the ninth (which covers the period up to January 31, 1959), the o f f i c i a l record of the ICC gives an impression of con-  t i n u a l v i o l a t i o n s of the Geneva Agreement by the South, and of l a r g e l y IndianPolish majority decisions.  There were t h i r t e e n occasions on which India sided  with Poland, and only s i x on which Canada and India formed a majority. DRVN made good use of the o f f i c i a l f i g u r e s ;  The  DRVN propagandists and t h e i r friends  could quote an impressive number of times i n which the Commission had found the RVN g u i l t y o f non-co-operation or of v i o l a t i o n of the Agreement (each c i t a t i o n usually covered a number of i n d i v i d u a l cases.)  But as the Canadian-Indian  majority noted i n the eleventh interim report, ... there have been many instances of non-co-operation by both Parties which have impeded the work of the Commi s s i o n and i t s Teams. These have not i n a l l cases reached the stage of formal c i t a t i o n s because of evasions and lack of co-operation on the part o f the Party concerned. For t h i s reason the two Delegations agree that, i n the experience of the Commission, the number of formal c i t a t i o n s i n i t s e l f i s no f a i r measure of the degree of co-operation received from either party. "^5 11  The DRVN recognized the value of the ICC as a means of presenting t h e i r case against the South, and the Commission was u s u a l l y flooded with complaints from the DRVN's Liason Mission t o the ICC.  F u l l d e t a i l s concerning the alleged  v i o l a t i o n s were provided, and usually within a few days of the event.  (This  f a c t alone was proof of the extent and effectiveness of the DRVN's agencies i n the south.)  The RVN of course d i d not have an equivalent network i n the north, and  most of t h e i r complaints concerned DRVN a c t i v i t i e s south of the seventeenth p a r a l l e l , complaints that the Commission f o r so long refused to consider. But although the Commission's decisions i n favour of the DRVN were morally damaging to the south, not one i n a l l t h i s time had the e f f e c t of dimini s h i n g the south's m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l or of weakening i t s security.  Of the  thirteen Indian-Polish decisions against South Vietnam, s i x concerned A r t i c l e 21 (Prisoners of war and C i v i l i a n Internees);  two concerned A r t i c l e 14c ( r e p r i s a l s  or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s during the h o s t i l i t i e s ) ;  one was i n response to a South Vietnamese f a i l u r e to  - 74  -  s u p p l y i n f o r m a t i o n on MAAG (the U.S.  M i l i t a r y A i d A d v i s o r y Group);  time l i m i t a t i o n s on team movements;  and  16  and  17  concerned  o n l y t h r e e were concerned w i t h  Articles  (ban on the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f f r e s h t r o o p s , arms and m u n i t i o n s ) .  the l a t t e r , two  seem t o be  concerned w i t h f a i l u r e to n o t i f y , and one  the i m p o r t a t i o n o f armoured launches i n t o Vietnam b e f o r e 17  one  had been e s t a b l i s h e d .  "The  any  Of  disallowed  c r e d i t s under A r t i c l e  Commission has, however, a d j u s t e d t h i s  introduc-  26 t i o n against a c r e d i t given  subsequently."  There were, however, some cases when t h e Commission agreed unanimously t h a t arms and m u n i t i o n s had been imported i n t o Vietnam i n v i o l a t i o n o f A r t i c l e In most c a s e s , t h e s e v i o l a t i o n s were p r o b a b l y t o n o t i f y the Commission's teams i n t i m e .  t e c h n i c a l ones, and  In f a c t , o f c o u r s e , a t l e a s t  m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s i n South Vietnam i n c r e a s e d a f t e r 1961, the RVN  t o import  war m a t e r i a l i l l e g a l l y .  f o r Vietnam p r o v i d e s t h a t "war destroyed,  involved  A r t i c l e 17c  t h e r e was  until  no need f o r  o f the Geneva Agreement  m a t e r i a l , arms and m u n i t i o n s which have been  be r e p l a c e d on the b a s i s o f p i e c e f o r p i e c e o f the same type and w i t h The  J u l y , 1954,  were ample t o meet t h e requirements o f the RVN  d u c t i o n o f U.S.  similar  troops i n  possessed  f o r c e s u n t i l the  the b a l a n c e  o f s t r e n g t h i n Vietnam.  The  DRVN had n e v e r on  o c c a s i o n n o t i f i e d t h e ICC o f i m p o r t a t i o n o f war m a t e r i a l , n o r had the ever found any i n t h e i r r o u t i n e checks, even though A r t i c l e 17c ment a l l o w s the DRVN a l s o t o import  Particularly after (On one  intro-  concern  any  Commission  o f the Agree-  replacements f o r m a t e r i a l used up o r worn o u t .  T h i s does n o t mean t h a t the Commission was  h i d e the f a c t .  in  1962.  In o t h e r ways the v o t i n g o f the I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n shows I n d i a ' s to preserve  may  French Union f o r c e s i n Vietnam had never s u f f e r e d from  want o f equipment, and the c r e d i t s which e s t a b l i s h e d what t h e y had  imported.  failure  damaged, worn out o r used up a f t e r the c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s  characteristics."  17.  I960,  unaware t h a t war  m a t e r i a l had  been  the DRVN d i d not even take g r e a t p a i n s  o c c a s i o n the Commission team i n s p e c t i n g G i a Lam  to  airport  outside of Hanoi saw helicopters with Russian markings i n the process of being repainted.)  I f the Commission's teams were unable to stop the import of war  material, they were nevertheless able to form a f a i r l y shrewd idea of the m i l i tary strength of both sides - the teams were a f t e r a l l made up of trained m i l i tary observers and were stationed at widely spaced teamsites within each country. The Indian awareness of North Vietnam's m i l i t a r y strength may well have affected t h e i r decision with regard to American assistance to South Vietnam. Cn A p r i l 25, 1956 the Commission received a request f o r the entry of 350 m i l i t a r y personnel of the U.S. Army Service Corps into South Vietnam, cons t i t u t i n g a mission c a l l e d TERM' - Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission - "whose duties would be to examine war material and m i l i t a r y equipment l y i n g i n South Vietnam which was the property of the U.S. Government f o r the purpose of s e l e c t ing material to be exported from Vietnam and to protect and preserve t h i s material." The  Commission asked f o r assurances that the functions of TERM would be s o l e l y as  described, and f o r further d e t a i l s .  I t was of course expected that t h i s mission  would soon complete i t s duties and leave. Complaints had also been received from the DRVN concerning  the presence  i n Vietnam of the American t r a i n i n g mission, the M i l i t a r y Aid Advisory Group (MAAG), a presence that was alleged to constitute proof of the existence of a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e between the U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam.  Asked to comment,  the RVN replied that MAAG had been i n existence since 1950, and that i t had never 28  exceeded i t s o r i g i n a l strength nor had there been any change i n i t s a c t i v i t i e s . The Commission asked f o r further d e t a i l s , which the RVN was slow i n supplying. This therefore was where matters stood at the end of 1959, up to the end of the period covered by the Ninth Interim Report. to be more sympathetic to Hanoi than to Saigon.  India had often appeared  But the Commission's decisions,  although g r a t i f y i n g to the DRVN, were not ones that were r e a l l y very important. The Indian Delegation during t h i s time were able to postpone making a decision  -  76  -  on TERM or MAAG, although by the very act of postponement they were t a c i t l y allowing the e x i s t i n g m i l i t a r y a i d to South Vietnam to continue. On the question of subversion also the Indian Delegation dragged i t s feet.  This problem w i l l be treated more f u l l y i n the next chapter, but b r i e f l y  the subversion issue refers to complaints the Commission had been receiving from the South Vietnamese Liaison Mission f o r years, charging that acts of terrorism and murder and of armed insurrection against the Government of the RVN had been planned and directed from north of the seventeenth p a r a l l e l .  Subversion as such  was not mentioned i n the Geneva Agreement, and the Polish Delegation claimed that the South Vietnamese complaints d i d not, i n the l e g a l phrase, " a t t r a c t " the Geneva Agreement and therefore the ICC could not deal with them. Legal Committee examined t h i s question, and concluded, by an majority (June, 1956)  The Commission's Indian-Canadian  that the complaints d i d a t t r a c t the Geneva Agreement.  When  the Legal Committee report came before the Commission, the Indian member changed sides and voted with the Polish delegate to send the question back to the Legal Committee (November, 1956). to keep a l l i t s options open.  What the Indian Delegation had done of course  was  The majority decision of the Legal Committee was  there i f the Indians wanted to use i t , but i t could continue to be buried at the Committee stage i f they should not. The subversion issue was undoubtedly a very d i f f i c u l t one f o r the Indian Government.  Whether or not the Hanoi regime was d i r e c t i n g the insurrection i n  the south went to the heart of the whole question of American intervention.  If  the Saigon Government was i n fact threatened by an external danger, then the American intervention was morally j u s t i f i e d .  I f on the other hand the war i n Vietnam  was a c i v i l war, conducted by an oppressed people against a repressive regime, American intervention was much harder to j u s t i f y .  This explains the extreme  s e n s i t i v i t y that both the P o l i s h Delegation and the Government of the DRVN d i s played to the question of subversion.  And i t also explains the reluctance of  t h e I n d i a n D e l e g a t i o n t o have a n y t h i n g t o do w i t h t h e t h o r n y q u e s t i o n , as l o n g as t h e y c o u l d p u t o f f making a d e c i s i o n .  A d e c i s i o n e i t h e r way on t h e s u b v e r s i o n  q u e s t i o n would i n e v i t a b l y have been i n t e r p r e t e d as p r o o f t h a t t h e I n d i a n s had chosen one s i d e o v e r t h e o t h e r . U n t i l t h e end o f 1959, then, t h e I n d i a n D e l e g a t i o n appeared from t h e r e c o r d t o have been more f a v o u r a b l y d i s p o s e d t o t h e DRVN t h a n t o t h e RVN. b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e Tenth  I n t e r i m Report  s i o n s t h a t were u n f a v o u r a b l e  t o t h e DRVN  Then,  a change o c c u r r e d , and a s e r i e s o f d e c i was r e c o r d e d b y t h e Commission.  Two  s e p a r a t e and a p p a r e n t l y u n r e l a t e d c h a i n s o f events e x p l a i n t h e change. In December, 1959, t h e r e o c c u r r e d t h e a t t a c k on t h e RVN army p o s t a t T h a i Ninh near t h e Cambodian b o r d e r t h a t s i g n a l e d a new phase i n t h e war i n V i e t nam. RVN  Throughout 1959 t h e mounting a s s a s s i n a t i o n campaign had t h r e a t e n e d t h e  Government c o n t r o l over v i l l a g e s a l l through Vietnam, and now p r a c t i c a l l y  the e n t i r e f a r western p a r t o f t h e c o u n t r y passed the V i e t Cong.  permanently i n t o t h e hands o f  The end o f 1959 saw a s i g n i f i c a n t worsening o f r e l a t i o n s between  China and I n d i a .  I n September, 1959, China had l a i d f o r m a l c l a i m t o 50,000  square m i l e s o f I n d i a n t e r r i t o r y .  S t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s culminated  a t t a c k s on I n d i a n b o r d e r p a t r o l s i n September and October, becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y p o l a r i s e d i n Southeast  P o s i t i o n s were  A s i a , and t h e I n d i a n D e l e g a t i o n was  swept u n h a p p i l y a l o n g i n t h e wake o f t h e g a t h e r i n g storm. t e n t h and e l e v e n t h I n t e r i m Reports  1962.  i n Chinese  Decisions i n the  and i n t h e S p e c i a l Report t o t h e co-chairmen  o f June 2, 1962, r e f l e c t e d t h a t i n c r e a s i n g I n d i a n The l a s t two r e g u l a r I n t e r i m Reports  involvement.  o f t h e Vietnam Commission ( t h e  e l e v e n t h and t w e l f t h ) , show t h a t t h e number o f P o l i s h - I n d i a n m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n s were now e x a c t l y balanced by t h e number o f Canadian-Indian e l e v e n each.  But w h i l e t h e P o l i s h - I n d i a n m a j o r i t i e s were i n q u e s t i o n s  i n g A r t i c l e s 14c, Indian-Canadian  majority decisions concern-  14d and 21 ( a i r p o r t c o n t r o l s and t h e D e m i l i t a r i z e d Zone), t h e  d e c i s i o n s were f a r more s i g n i f i c a n t , a f f e c t i n g as t h e y d i d i n  s e v e r a l important  ways t h e a b i l i t y o f the RVN Government t o r e s i s t t h e c h a l l e n g e s  - 78 to  i t s a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n Vietnam.  10/59  and  These d e c i s i o n s concerned TERM, MAAG,  Subversion. Mounting t h r e a t s t o the a u t h o r i t y o f the RVN  the p a s s i n g o f a law t h a t would i n e f f e c t for  crimes a g a i n s t the s t a t e .  The  14c  In A p r i l ,  Government r e s u l t e d i n  substitute m i l i t a r y courts f o r  Commission r e c e i v e d a complaint  PAVN L i a i s o n M i s s i o n t h a t t h i s law was icle  Law  civil  from  the  b e i n g used i n ways t h a t would v i o l a t e A r t -  I960, the Commission d e c i d e d (Canadian-Indian  majority)  t h a t "... the law does n o t c o n t a i n any p r o v i s i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s i g n e d  to  c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t , o r s u b j e c t to r e p r i s a l s , p e r s o n s o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s on o f t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g the h o s t i l i t i e s , and  t h e r e f o r e Law  10/59  dis-  account  as such does 30  not a t t r a c t A r t i c l e 14c o r any o t h e r A r t i c l e o f t h e Geneva Agreement." TERM had i s s i o n had There was  o r i g i n a l l y been i n t r o d u c e d  i n t o Vietnam i n 1956.  Comm-  o r i g i n a l l y expected t h a t i t s a c t i v i t i e s would end w i t h i n a few months. widespread s u s p i c i o n , no doubt w e l l founded, t h a t TERM o f f i c e r s were  b e i n g used t o t r a i n Vietnamese t r o o p s .  Now,  i n December, 1959,  gate i n s i s t e d t h a t TERM be wound up immediately and r e q u i r e d to l e a v e Vietnam w i t h i n two months. the Canadian t o a l l o w TERM'S e x t e n s i o n I960.  The  The  the P o l i s h d e l e -  the o f f i c e r s concerned Indian Delegation voted  be with 31,  f o r another f u l l y e a r - u n t i l December  3 1  If  the I n d i a n D e l e g a t i o n had  hoped t h a t the q u e s t i o n o f MAAG's l e g a l i t y  c o u l d be postponed i n d e f i n i t e l y , i t was Saigon Government informed  t o be d i s a p p o i n t e d .  the Commission t h a t i t had  ment t o i n c r e a s e t h e s t r e n g t h o f MAAG from 342 Geneva Agreement and t h e number t h a t was  French i n s t r u c t o r s present  requested  t h e U.S.  I960, the Govern-  (the number i n Vietnam b e f o r e  t h e r e f o r e a l l o w a b l e ) t o 685.  p o i n t e d out t h a t t h i s f i g u r e would s t i l l be below the MAAG and  In A p r i l ,  the  It  was  combined s t r e n g t h o f  888  i n Vietnam a t the time o f the a r m i s t i c e .  Whether American A d v i s e r s c o u l d be p e r m i t t e d the terms o f the Geneva Agreement was  t o r e p l a c e French under t h e terms o f  f a r l e s s c e r t a i n , and  a good case c o u l d  - 79 c e r t a i n l y be made that they were not.  However, the Indian Delegation proposed  simply sending a l e t t e r to the Government of the RVN  stating that "the Commission  had noted the contents of the party's l e t t e r pertaining to the subject and that the Commission understood  that a d d i t i o n a l m i l i t a r y instructors w i l l not be i n t r o -  duced except i n conformity with the procedure stipulated i n A r t i c l e l6f and g of  32 the Geneva Agreement."  With the P o l i s h Delegation dissenting, the l e t t e r  was  sent. F i n a l l y , the d e t e r i o r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n i n Vietnam caused the Indian Government to decide at l a s t to grasp the n e t t l e of subversion. a Canadian-Indian  On June 24,  1961,  decision was taken that the Commission had "the competence and  33 duty to entertain and investigate such complaints."  Subsequently the Legal  Committee examined s p e c i f i c complaints and concluded that "there i s evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the zone i n the north to the zone i n the south with the object of supporting, organizing and carrying out h o s t i l e a c t i v i t i e s , including armed attacks directed against the Armed Forces and Administration of the zone i n the qi  south." The Commission also concluded that i n receiving increased m i l i t a r y aid from the United States a f t e r December, 1961, the South Vietnamese had been 35  g u i l t y of v i o l a t i o n of A r t i c l e s 16, 17 and 19 of the Geneva Agreement. This report marked the high water mark of India's willingness to i n d i c t the north f o r i t s part i n the c i v i l war i n Vietnam.  A further Special Report to  36  the co-chairmen  c a l l e d t h e i r attention to the serious s i t u a t i o n created i n  Vietnam by U.S. bombing attacks on m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n North Vietnam. Indian Delegation refused again to couple U.S.  The  action with the DRVN's d i r e c t i o n  of the war i n the south, and i t was l e f t to the Canadian Delegation i n a minority  37 report to do so and to quote from the 1962  Special Report to t h i s e f f e c t .  The Commission's decisions on Law 10/59, TERM, MAAG and placed a severe s t r a i n on relations between the DRVN and India.  Subversion Violent demon-  strations took place i n North Vietnam against both Delegations, but the main  - 80 force of the attack was against the Indians.  Three months a f t e r the 1962 Special  Report was made China and India were at war.  The DRVN refrained from p u b l i c l y  supporting China i n t h i s event, perhaps as much because of concern to keep i t s r e l a t i o n s with the USSR and China i n balance as out of tenderness f o r Indian f e e l og  ings.  I t was not u n t i l 1963 that the DRVN openly supported the Chinese. Was the trend of decisions that were unfavourable t o the DRVN a f t e r 1959  attributable to Indian d i f f i c u l t i e s with the Chinese?  The DRVN c e r t a i n l y thought  so, and taxed the Indian Delegate d i r e c t l y with the charge. gate denied that t h i s was so.)  (The Indian Dele-  As we have seen, however, these decisions were  a l l i n keeping with India's reluctance to see Communism make further gains i n Southeast Asia, and e a r l i e r events i n Indian foreign p o l i c y might have forecast t h e i r outcome.  On the other hand would the Indian Delegation have been quite so  forthcoming i f Indian relations with the Chinese had been better?  Perhaps we can  say t e n t a t i v e l y that the decisions on increased U.S. m i l i t a r y assistance would not have been d i f f e r e n t , but that the clear statement on subversion may well have been an involuntary g i f t from the Chinese. This does not at a l l mean that the Indian decision on subversion was based on p o l i t i c a l grounds without any regard f o r the merits of the case.  If  the Indians had thought that the RVN's case was unfounded, i t would have been only too glad so to decide at an early date, permanently burying an embarrassing issue that, as i t was, remained a bomb t i c k i n g i n the c e l l a r f o r years.  The  Indians did t r y to balance t h e i r condemnation of North Vietnam with a f i n d i n g that South Vietnam had also v i o l a t e d the Geneva Agreement, but the impact o f the two statements was not equal. the c i v i l war i n Vietnam.  The DRVN had never admitted i t was implicated i n  Both the U.S. and the RVN on the other hand f r e e l y  admitted that the extent of U.S. aid was greater than that permitted by the Geneva Agreement, but they pleaded the necessity of combatting attacks from the DRVN. The Commission's decision provided support f o r that j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  - 81  -  Although, as we have seen, there i s l i t t l e support i n the record f o r the proposition that India favoured the DRVN i n i t s decisions, i n another way the demands of Indian foreign p o l i c y had an unfortunate e f f e c t on the way Commission was  able to carry out i t s duties.  foreign p o l i c y was  the  The f i r s t requirement of Indian  perhaps l e s s that i t should be non-aligned than that i t  should be c l e a r l y seen to be non-aligned.  As the inherently unstable s i t u a t i o n  i n Vietnam d r i f t e d towards open warfare, i t became more and more d i f f i c u l t f o r India to avoid coming down on one side or the other.  For as long as she possibly  could India avoided commitment, and the easiest way to do t h i s was  to be as i n -  active as possible - to postpone decisions f o r as long as possible, and above a l l to avoid conducting investigations that might turn up embarrassing r e s u l t s . As a consequence, what a b i l i t y the Commission might have had to make any cont r i b u t i o n to peace was  severely c r i p p l e d .  Although India welcomed her appointment to the ICC as an to play an active role i n an area that was  opportunity  important to her, the r e s u l t s of her  involvement can hardly have been a subject f o r congratulation.  The Indian h i s -  tory on the ICC proves that i n a f i e r c e l y contested game the l o t of the umpire i s a hard one. involvement. for  the new  In the end neither Saigon nor Hanoi wanted continued  Indian  The absence of India's name from every l i s t of proposed members ICC's a r i s i n g out of the US-DRVN negotiations may  i t must also surely have been a humiliation.  have been a r e l i e f ;  - 82 -  CHAPTER V FOOTNOTES.  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.  7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.  19. 20. 21. 22.  M. B r e c h e r , Nehru, a P o l i t i c a l Biography, p . 356 ibid. K.R. P i l a i , I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 36 New York Times. January 1. 1946. p. 11 Times. London, January 22, 1947 P r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e Conference, quoted i n K.G. B h a n s a l i , I n d i a ' s Role i n t h e S e t t l e m e n t o f t h e I n d o c h i n a C o n f l i c t . U n p u b l i s h e d PhD T h e s i s , p . 31 i b i d . , p . 32 D.R. S a r D e s a i , I n d i a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y i n Cambodia. Laos and Vietnam, p. 14 i b i d . , p. 18 i b i d . , p . 17 ibid. New York Times. August 7, p. 3 London Times. September 27, 1954, p . 18 L.G. and S.H. Rudolph, The M o d e r n i t y o f T r a d i t i o n : P o l i t i c a l Development i n I n d i a , p. 258 i b i d . , p. 254 P i l a i , op. c i t . p . 16 S a r D e s a i , op. c i t . , p . 75 ibid., F o u r t h I n t e r i m Report, Cmd. 9654, p . 16 Dagg, op. c i t . , p . L 1 i b i d . , p . L 14 i b i d . , p. N 4  23.  Cmd. 9654, PP. 19-24  24.  i b i d . , pp. 24-25 Cmd. 1551, 1961 E i g h t h I n t e r i m Report, Cmd. 509, 1958 S i x t h I n t e r i m R e p o r t , Cmd. 31, 1957, p . 25 Seventh I n t e r i m R e p o r t , Cmd. 335, 1957, p . 17 I was p r e s e n t a t a meeting o f t h e Vietnam Commission l a t e i n I960 when i t appeared f o r a moment as i f t h e I n d i a n s might be on the p o i n t o f b r i n g i n g t h e s u b v e r s i o n q u e s t i o n back from t h e L e g a l Committee. The e n t i r e P o l i s h D e l e g a t i o n t u r n e d green and c l u t c h e d t h e edge o f the t a b l e .  25. 26. 27. 28. 29.  30.  31. 32. 33* 34. 35.  36. 37. 38. 39.  E l e v e n t h I n t e r i m Report, Cmd. 1551, 1961, p . 9 Tenth I n t e r i m Report, Cmd. 1040, I960, p . 19 E l e v e n t h I n t e r i m Report, p . 18 S a r D e s a i , op. c i t . , p . 203 S p e c i a l Report t o the co-chairmen, Cmd. 1955, 1962, p. 7 i b i d . , p . 10 Cmd. 2609, 1965, F e b r u a r y 13, 1965 i b i d . , pp. 12-15 S a r D e s a i , op. c i t . , p . 208 i b i d . , p. 202  -  83  -  CHAPTER VI. THE FINAL YEARS. July 21, 1956,  the date on which elections were to be held that were to  unite a l l of Vietnam, passed with scarcely a r i p p l e to mark the occasion.  When  the RVN refused to send delegates to confer with the DRVN on preparations f o r the elections,  there was nothing that the Commission could do except to take note of  the f a c t .  But no member, even Canada, which was always the- most anxious to l i m i t  commitments, seems to have seriously contemplated winding up the Commission.  John  Holmes has said that by the summer of 1955 he was "already convinced there would be no e l e c t i o n s , and I raised the question whether we should stay on or n o t . "  1  But  "We never walked out because we feared the vacuum that would be created i f we did."' I f the members could have foreseen that t h e i r task would l a s t f o r another sixteen years, and that i t would be carried out i n increasing ineffectiveness and f r u s t r a t i o n , would t h e i r reactions have differed? that the s i t u a t i o n i n July  At the time, what was certain was  1956 was i n f i n i t e l y preferable to that of July 1954*  The withdrawal of the Commission would have been the sign of the collapse of the Geneva Agreements, and would probably have been followed by a renewal of the b i t t e r f i g h t i n g that had torn Indochina into r i v a l f a c t i o n s .  No member of the Commission  would have cared to take the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r bringing about the collapse of the Geneva Agreement, no matter how shaky the structure might have been. By 1956,  both North and South Vietnam appeared to be more evenly matched  than two years before.  The French army l e f t i n A p r i l of that year, but the  Americans were pouring a i d into Vietnam, both economic and m i l i t a r y .  Diem had  subdued the sects, with t h e i r private armies, and the area south of the seventeenth p a r a l l e l seemed more s e t t l e d and u n i f i e d than i t had been.  The enormous i n f l u x  of Catholic refugees had placed a great s t r a i n on the regime, but with foreign a i d  -  84  -  they had been s e t t l e d and provided a bloc of support f o r the new President, Ngo Dinh Diem, and a pool of talent f o r the new Government.  (The f a c t that so many  northerners were i n positions of power i n Diem's government was of course a weakness as well, because t h e i r prominence was often resented by the Cochin-Chinese who formed the bulk o f the population.) made with the help of Soviet and pletely i n control.  In the north, great strides had been  Chinese a i d , but the regime was s t i l l not com-  The over-zealous application of a land reform scheme copied  from the Chinese and i l l suited to Vietnamese conditions had resulted i n a great burst o f resentment against the Government.  In October a f u l l scale r e b e l l i o n  was under way among some small farmers, and the army had to be called out to subdue it.  There were several shortages of food i n the North, which had even under the  French been a net importer of food. The Geneva Agreements had been a compromise, as a l l such Agreements are. The Communist bloc secured the greater advantage because they held the stronger position m i l i t a r i l y , and this too i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a l l Agreements that end wars. The Soviet Union and Chinese wanted a period of peace and consolidation, and so they were w i l l i n g to r e s t r a i n the Vietnamese and to bring the f i g h t i n g to an end before North Vietnam's ultimate goals had been won. assurances that Indochina would be neutralized.  In exchange, they gained  The North Vietnamese were promised  elections that they, and undoubtedly every one else too, expected would give them the South peacefully i n two years time.  By 1956,  i t was evident that the s i t u a -  t i o n as i t had been s t a b i l i z e d by the Geneva Agreements had been very much a l t e r e d . The U.S. had replaced France as the main f r i e n d and support of South Vietnam, and i t was u n l i k e l y that the new situation would be acceptable to the Russians or the Chinese, l e t alone the DRVN. The DRVN had other reasons besides frustrated ambitions to seek to r e u n i f y Vietnam by force.  Most of Vietnam's mineral resources and what industry  there was was located north of the seventeenth p a r a l l e l , but the area had never been self-supporting i n food production.  Access to the r i c e producing areas of  - 85 the Mekong Delta  was therefore v i t a l l y necessary to North Vietnam i f i t was to  feed i t s own population. In several respects therefore the chances f o r long term success of the ICC's peacekeeping had worsened.  The Commission was no longer operating i n an  area that had been neutralized, but i n one i n which at least two of the Great Powers were i n d i r e c t confrontation. operate i n these circumstances. situation  No other peacekeeping mission has had to  (It i s s i g n i f i c a n t that when a confrontation  evolved i n the Middle East, the heretofore successful UN peacekeeping  operation had to be withdrawn.  When i n 1967  Egypt f e l t strong enough with  Soviet a i d to tackle I s r a e l , she asked UNEF to leave.  The UN force was with-  drawn immediately, and i t has never gone back.) The ICC was not equipped to undertake a peacekeeping job that would l a s t f o r years.  I t had no organization to report t o , no-one to provide l o g i s t i c support,  no-one to a l t e r i t s terms of reference when they became out of date.  With per-  sonnel that never exceeded a few hundred, i t was responsible f o r protecting the "Democratic l i b e r t i e s " of those who might be persecuted f o r what side they had chosen to f i g h t on before 1954.  f o r preventing the import of war material over  amounts allowed under the Geneva Agreement, f o r preventing armed attacks across the border.  I t i s worth remembering f o r purposes of comparison that UNEF's "sole  important duty" was to prevent i n f i l t r a t i o n over the border, and that i t required a force of 5,000 men and an annual expenditure of approximately $17,250,000 to p a t r o l a f r o n t i e r of l e s s than 200 miles, more than h a l f of which ran through a 3  desert.  Even then sporadic raids across the border occurred.  The ICC was more-  over required to operate i n the t e r r i t o r y of p a r t i e s , one of which had never considered i t s e l f bound by the Geneva Agreement, and the other had i n practise bent every e f f o r t to f r u s t r a t i n g the e f f o r t s of the ICC to f u l f i l l i t s obligations. In the e a r l y months, p a r t i c u l a r l y during the f i r s t three hundred days, the Commission made a useful contribution, not only i n the lessening of i n t e r national tensions, but useful i n the opinion of the p a r t i e s .  Both sides wanted  - 86 to end the f i g h t i n g and separate t h e i r forces with as l i t t l e further bloodshed as possible, and were happy to have the ICC around to s e t t l e disputes. the  But once  period of re-settlement and re-location had been completed, the ICC could only  be a nuisance i f i t were to do the thorough job of investigating and reporting that i t was supposed to do.  Both sides s e t t l e d down to using the Commission f o r what-  ever propaganda advantage they could get out of i t , and f r u s t r a t i n g any e f f o r t of the  Commission to prevent them from doing what they wished to do.  In the process,  the  prestige and authority of the Commission simply drained away.  The mere pass-  age of time also diminished the authority of the ICC.  In the beginning, when the  Geneva Conference was fresh i n men's minds and when the Commission's a c t i v i t i e s commanded the attention of the world's press, i t s recommendations were l i k e l y to be heeded because f l o u t i n g the authority of the Commission would be sure to bring unfavourable p u b l i c i t y .  Five years l a t e r the Commission was no longer news;  i t s pronouncements could safely be ignored because they were u n l i k e l y to a t t r a c t much attention. During the f i r s t few months of the Commission's l i f e , practices developed or gaps i n the Agreement became evident that were to a f f e c t very much the day to day operations and the effectiveness of the Commission. not  The methods were perhaps  of great significance at the time, but they were to become so l a t e r .  The f i r s t  part of the Cease F i r e became e f f e c t i v e s i x days a f t e r the signing of the Geneva Agreement, the l a s t twenty one days l a t e r .  There was no time to think out pro-  cedures ahead of time - the Commission had to devise i t s methods as i t went along. This involved "... taking decisions on such fundamental and c r u c i a l issues as the right of the Commission and i t s teams to move f r e e l y i n Vietnam, the c r i t e r i a to be used when determining whether a v i o l a t i o n of the Agreement had occurred, the extent to which the Commission should take the i n i t i a t i v e i n v e r i f y i n g the implementation of the clauses of the armistice agreement, and the degree to which the Commission could dictate i t s w i l l to the two High Commands. In short, the decisions made were  - 87 -  of such a nature that they determined the Commission's course and, indeed, i t s role i n Vietnamese a f f a i r s , not only for the short term but f o r the duration of i t s existence. ... later ... the Commission was to become i n f l e x i b l e , unable or unwilling to change i t s direction or to reform i t s methods once they had been set. I t was to become an organization unduly bound by precedents, many of them unfortunate and many dating from the three hundred days."^ Some of the factors which were to influence the capacity of the Commission to do the job assigned to i t , particularly f o r the long term, were finance, freedom to investigate, and the rule of precedent. Finance. I t was decided at Geneva that the costs involved i n the operation of the Joint Commission and of i t s Joint Groups, and of the International Commission and i t s inspection teams, would be shared equally between the two parties.  The  contributions were established i n d e t a i l at the i n i t i a l meeting of the Supervisory powers (India, Canada and Poland) i n New Delhi i n 1954.  The pay and allowances  of a l l personnel were borne by the Supervisory powers.  "Common Pool" expenses -  food, lodging, medical services and transportation to and from the home country of Delegation personnel was borne by the contributing powers - China, France, the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. - i n equal shares.  Local expenses - particularly l o c a l  transport - was assumed by the parties to the Geneva Agreement ( i . e . the DRVN and France) i n equal shares. France later claimed that she had paid more than her legitimate share, and i n December 1956 the French National Assembly voted to allow no further sums for the expenses of the Commission.  In fact when India raised money to f i l l the  gap, France claimed a refund for previous overpayment.  When the French High  Command withdrew from South Vietnam i n August, 1956, the French Liaison Mission went too, and the Liaison Mission had provided transport for the ICC i n both the North and the South.  -  88  -  Contributions were always l a t e , and the Commission was perpetually i n dire s t r a i t s .  This was p a r t i c u l a r l y serious so f a r as expenses f o r l o c a l trans-  port were concerned.  The o r i g i n a l equipment was never replaced, and became  increasingly hard to r e p a i r .  I t was a l l too easy f o r both p a r t i e s , who were  each responsible f o r the care and maintenance of Commission vehicles i n t h e i r own zone, to claim that patrols could not be undertaken because the Commission's cars and jeeps were under repair or were unsafe.  The problem was so serious that the  provision of transport to be owned and maintained by the Commission i t s e l f became one of the p r i n c i p a l aims of the Canadian Delegation at the second Geneva Con1962.  ference on Laos i n  Freedom to investigate. The Geneva Agreement d i d not give the International Commission the power to move f r e e l y i n a l l parts of Vietnam.  Fourteen Fixed Team s i t e s were named i n  the Geneva Agreement, seven i n the north and seven i n the south.  (These s i t e s  were also the points of entry f o r rotation of personnel and replacement of material.)  The Commission was also empowered to e s t a b l i s h mobile inspection teams,  and the zones of action of the mobile teams were to be 'the regions bordering the land and sea f r o n t i e r s of Vietnam, the demarcation l i n e s between the re-grouping zones and the demilitarized zones.  Within the l i m i t s of these zones they s h a l l  have the right to move f r e e l y . . . . "  "Beyond the zones of action as defined above,  the mobile teams may, by agreement with the command of the party concerned, carry out other movements within the l i m i t of the tasks given them by the present agreement."  (Article  35)  The wording of A r t i c l e 35 r e s t r i c t e d the movement of mobile teams, but not of Fixed teams.  During the early months of the Commission's l i f e the Canadian  Delegation fought hard to give the teams as much freedom and independence as possible.  Communist bloc delegations at Geneva had i n s i s t e d that any supervisory  - 89 body should respect the independence and sovereignty of the P a r t i e s .  At an  early meeting of the ICC, the three Delegations were i n accord that Fixed Teams should have complete freedom of movement throughout Vietnam.  Then the PAVN  l i a i s o n Mission i n s i s t e d on a s t r i c t interprepation of A r t i c l e 35, and the P o l i s h Delegation changed i t s stand.^  Authorities both north and south of the seventeenth  p a r a l l e l i n s i s t e d on advance notice of a l l team movements "so that necessary ments could be made f o r the teams' s e c u r i t y . " position.  "The  arrange-  ICC found i t s e l f i n a d i f f i c u l t  I t was anxious to maintain the element of surprise, but i t had also  i n s i s t e d that the Parties be completely responsible f o r providing transport, accommodation and services necessary f o r the operation of the teams.  Ultimately  the ICC found i t impossible to object i n p r i n c i p l e when the Parties argued that i f they were to discharge t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s properly, they had to have advance notice of team movements."^ The teams were also l i m i t e d to some extent i n what they could by t h e i r mere s i z e . i n July 1954 three.  accomplish  It had been established at the preliminary meeting i n Delhi  that fixed teams were to consist of s i x members, and mobile teams of  The d i f f i c u l t y of increasing t h e i r strength l a y i n the reluctance of the  three supervisory governments, p a r t i c u l a r l y Canada, to increase s i g n i f i c a n t l y what was already an onerous drain of manpower.  The result was that "During the period  of maximum coverage, ... the 3,500 mile long land and sea f r o n t i e r of Vietnam was  n under the sporadic surveillance of only 96 men."  When i t i s remembered that  much of t h i s f r o n t i e r region i s mountainous, i t i s evident that close control over the import of arms or m i l i t a r y personnel was  simply impossible.  In t h i s respect  i t was much easier to see what came i n t o South Vietnam than what came i n i n the North, simply because everything that arrived i n the South had to come by sea at points where the Commission's Fixed Teams were stationed, while i n the North imports could also come across a land f r o n t i e r , one that was i n most places mountainous and i n a c c e s s i b l e .  - 90 The rule of precedent* The unfortunate effect of the rule of precedent has been mentioned. It was perhaps natural that the Canadians and Indians, with a l e g a l system that was governed by precedent, should make use of t h i s method i n deciding cases before the Commission.  Although i t probably saved re-arguing points that had already  been decided, and to that extent seems to have been an inevitable development, i t gave the Commission's procedures an undesirable r i g i d i t y .  The Commission "...  was to become i n f l e x i b l e , unable or unwilling to change i t s d i r e c t i o n or to reform i t s methods .once they have been set.  It was to become an organization 8  unduly found by precedent, many of them unfortunate ...."  The Indian Delegation  i n p a r t i c u l a r often seemed adept at finding precedents to prevent the Commission acting where they might have found a c t i v i t y embarrassing.  During 1961 f o r i n -  stance, the Indians managed to block a team investigation of alleged i n t r u s i o n of armed personnel into the western part of the demilitarized zone because of some 9  p e c u l i a r i t y i n the way that the investigation had been asked f o r . The undesirable reliance on precedent that developed i n Commission pract i s e was undoubtedly a function of the lack of the kind of continual supervision and oversight that the UN Secretariat was able to give i t s peacekeeping operations. Other peacekeeping bodies have not had to look to past practise f o r guidance because the Secretariat could exercise continued d i r e c t i o n .  The Indians have found  precedent a comfort i n deciding which way to cast the deciding vote - a decision i n accord with past practise i s f a r less v i s i b l e an indicator of p o l i c y than a new departure would be. Liaison O f f i c e r s . In the e a r l y days of the ICC, the ICC's teams were always accompanied by l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s of both p a r t i e s .  This was a u s e f u l measure - f o r one thing  i t was to come extent a check on the accuracy of the t r a n s l a t i o n that was provided by the teams' i n t e r p r e t e r .  No member of a Commission team was l i k e l y to speak  - 91 Vietnamese, and the translators the Commission could employ would be l i k e l y to be under the control of the Government of the area.  But when the French l e f t  Vietnam and the Saigon Government assumed t h e i r duties toward the Commission, they refused either to provide representatives on the Joint Commission or to allow l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s of the PAVN to accompany Commission teams south of the seventeenth p a r a l l e l . The ICC had completed i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r a good part of the Geneva Agreement by July 31, 1956.  What remained was r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the  supervision of A r t i c l e 14c,  "democratic freedoms";  t a r i z e d zone:  16-20, a ban on the introduction of fresh troops,  and A r t i c l e s  A r t i c l e s 1-9,  the d e m i l i -  m i l i t a r y personnel, arms and munitions. Article  14c. Of these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , A r t i c l e 14c r a p i d l y became, f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l  purposes, a dead l e t t e r .  Perhaps i t was inevitable that i t should be so, f o r  outside interference i n a government's treatment of i t s own c i t i z e n s i s something that few governments would be prepared to tolerate f o r long.  The question never  became an issue i n the Horth simply because a close and e f f e c t i v e control over the population once the Government's authority had been established prevented anyone approaching the Commission with complaints.  On the other hand the Commission  was bombarded with complaints from the North about the treatment i t s supporters were receiving i n the South.  For a time the Commission's teams were able to  investigate these complaints, but the Saigon Government eventually refused to permit them to do so any longer.  On A p r i l 11, 1957  the ICC informed the co-  chairmen that the GRVN had decided "not to give any more r e p l i e s to the complaints /under A r t i c l e 14c7  and not to permit investigations of such complaints through  the machinery of Mobile Teams ....  The Commission i s therefore no longer able  to supervise the imposition of t h i s A r t i c l e by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam....""''^  The Government of the RVN did i n fact relent so f a r as replying  - 92 t o t h e Commission's l e t t e r s was concerned, team i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  b u t t h e y never a g a i n a l l o w e d a mobile  The Commission's a c t i v i t y i n r e l a t i o n t o t h i s a r t i c l e t h e r e -  f o r e c o n s i s t e d t h e r e a f t e r i n r e l a y i n g t h e complaints o f t h e PAVN L i a i s o n M i s s i o n t o t h e RVN, and sending t h e RVN's r e p l y back t o t h e L i a i s o n M i s s i o n . The  s t a n d a r d r e p l y t o the Commission's e n q u i r i e s under A r t i c l e 14c was  t h a t t h e people  concerned  were under a r r e s t n o t because o f a c t i v i t i e s p r i o r t o  t h e c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s , b u t because o f i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s s i n c e t h e Cease Fire.  The RVN's a t t i t u d e toward t h e ICC was n o t enhanced by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e  Commission was d i l i g e n t i n e n q u i r i n g about a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s o f A r t i c l e  14c,  w h i l e i t c o n t i n u e d t o d e f e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f c o m p l a i n t s about t h e k i n d o f a c t i v i t i e s t h a t had l e d t o t h e a r r e s t s i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e .  Ban on the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f f r e s h t r o o p s and military supplies. The  Commission d i d i t s b e s t t o d i s c h a r g e i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s under  t h i s c h a p t e r o f t h e Geneva Agreement, w i t h more success i n t h e South than i n the North.  I n the South a War M a t e r i a l s R e g i s t e r was e s t a b l i s h e d , and c r e d i t s were  r e g i s t e r e d f o r a l l war m a t e r i a l used up, d e s t r o y e d o r e x p o r t e d . checked  Imports were  a g a i n s t t h e r e g i s t e r , and i f t h e r e was no c r e d i t f o r t h e equipment  cerned, t h e Government was o r d e r e d t o export i t a g a i n . y e a r s t h e Americans d i d attempt  con-  In general, i n the e a r l y  t o l i v e w i t h i n t h e terms o f t h e Geneva Agreement,  a l t h o u g h c e r t a i n l y t h e y d i d t r y t o s t r e t c h t h e terms o f the Agreement as f a r as possible.  "Theyembarrassed t h e Canadians from time t o time by some o f t h e p r o -  p o s a l s t h e y thought  up t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e Vietnamese w i t h o u t t e c h n i c a l l y  t h e terms, b u t t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t t h e i r r e c o r d was r e s p e c t a b l e " .  violating  1 1  In the N o r t h , t h e Government n e v e r r e p o r t e d t h e import o f war m a t e r i a l , and t h e Commission was never a b l e t o c a t c h them i n the a c t , a l t h o u g h i n l a t e r y e a r s t h e DRVN d i d n o t even t r o u b l e t o h i d e modern arms o r equipment o f f o r e i g n make once t h e y had been imported.  The teams were a b l e t o move o n l y a f t e r n o t i c e ,  - 93 and t h e r e were many o c c a s i o n s when t h e y were not p e r m i t t e d t o l e a v e the teams i t e s f o r days a t a t i m e . As the s i t u a t i o n south o f t h e s e v e n t e e n t h p a r a l l e l d e t e r i o r a t e d , the Americans ment.  began t o p r e s s h a r d e r a g a i n s t the r e s t r i c t i o n s i n the Geneva Agree-  F o r as l o n g as p o s s i b l e the Commission ( o r a t l e a s t the Canadian-Indian  m a j o r i t y on the Commission) accommodated the b u i l d - u p o f p e r s o n n e l w i t h i n the l i m i t s e s t a b l i s h e d by the number o f combined French and American  instructors i n  12  1954>  Vietnam i n  but f i n a l l y t h e Americans  i n t e r v e n e d on a s c a l e t h a t  the l i m i t s a l l o w e d , and a l l t h r e e members o f the Commission found t h a t  exceeded this  13 i n t e r v e n t i o n was  i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f the Geneva Agreement,  a l t h o u g h the  Canadian  and I n d i a n members found t h a t t h e s e h o s t i l e a c t i v i t i e s i n the South a g a i n s t the RVN  had been i n c i t e d , encouraged  and supported from the N o r t h . ^ 1  John Holms has s a i d o f t h i s a s p e c t o f the Commission's  activities:  "... i n t h e North the ICC was unable t o observe v i o l a t i o n s o f the arms c o n t r o l s t i p u l a t i o n but never a b l e t o m a i n t a i n adequate i n s p e c t i o n t o be a s s u r e d t h a t no v i o l a t i o n s were t a k i n g p l a c e . In the South the s t r u g g l e was w i t h the i n d i f f e r e n c e and r e l u c t a n c e o f the a u t h o r i t i e s and the p e r s i s t e n t e f f o r t o f the Americans t o p r e s s the terms o f the Agreement f a r t h e r t h a n t h e y c o u l d p r o p e r l y be s t r e t c h e d . The v i o l a t i o n s i n the South were, n e e d l e s s t o say, o b s e r v a b l e , and the a t t i t u d e o f the Americans was n e g a t i v e but d e c e n t . The Commission was i n a p o s i t i o n t o prove Southern but n o t Northern v i o l a t i o n s . The Southerners and Americans i n e v i t a b l y complained and i n c r e a s i n g l y i n s i s t e d t h a t the known i f n o t proved d i s r e g a r d o f the arms c o n t r o l p r o v i s i o n s by the Communists n o t o n l y j u s t i f i e d but made e s s e n t i a l t h e i r d o i n g l i k e w i s e . " Subversion. From 1959 was  t o 1962  the most d i f f i c u l t problem t h a t the Commission f a c e d  what came t o be known w i t h i n the ICC as the s u b v e r s i o n i s s u e .  When i t became  e v i d e n t t h a t t h e e l e c t i o n s c a l l e d f o r i n the Geneva Agreement would not t a k e p l a c e , the RVN Vietnam.  began t o e x p e r i e n c e widespread c h a l l e n g e s t o i t s a u t h o r i t y throughout These  c h a l l e n g e s were p a r t i c u l a r l y s e r i o u s when t h e y took the form o f  assassination of government o f f i c i a l s , teachers and welfare workers.  The  pattern began to emerge i n 1957, and by 1961 there were 4,000 assassinations a year.  Those who had watched the experience of the French i n Vietnam began to  see a s i m i l a r sequence of events developing a g a i n . ^  Contact between the v i l l -  ages and the Government was broken, too many good men were l o s t , and too many others discouraged from supporting or serving the government.  In Vietnam, the  DRVN claimed that these troubles were a manifestation of opposition to the Government i n the South, and that t h i s opposition was completely independent of any d i r e c t i o n or encouragement from outside.  The RVN on the other hand claimed that  i r r e g u l a r forces had been l e f t behind and had not been repatriated north of the seventeenth p a r a l l e l a f t e r the Cease Fire with the deliberate intention of siezing power l a t e r on.  Both the French and l a t e r the RVN c a l l e d the ICC's attention to  evidence that i t had found supporting t h i s contention, p a r t i c u l a r l y evidence of arms and munitions that had been hidden a f t e r the Cease F i r e . In the United States the question who was responsible f o r the war i n the South was of academic interest u n t i l the increasing cost of the war to the American people and the wide exposure of the war on TV screens across the nation made the Vietnamese war the overriding and passionate issue of the 60*s.  In looking f o r  the o r i g i n s of the war, both sides espoused the theory that would give t h e i r own argument the greater moral advantage.  The hawks saw the matter e n t i r e l y as an  insurgency directed from outside the RVN, the doves were equally convinced that the only explanation was to be found i n spontaneous opposition to the oppressive regime of Diem and h i s American supporters.  The question was undoubtedly muddied  by the American (perhaps we should say North American) tendency to see a l l good on the side you are supporting, and a l l e v i l i n your opponents.  Since neither  side has been above manufacturing evidence to support i t s own case, and since a l l the evidence i s not i n any event available, d e f i n i t e conclusions are not possible. But enough evidence i s available to support the conclusion that both sides are  - 95 p a r t i a l l y right and p a r t i a l l y wrong.  There was strong and vigorous opposition to  the Government i n the South, and the p o l i c i e s of the Government increasingly alienated the population, but the seriousness of the threat and ultimately the success of the opposition was undoubtedly dependent on outside encouragement and support - there i s plenty of evidence that that encouragement and support existed. 17 The Pentagon Papers give a frank and persuasive assessment.  It i s  long and involved, but the following quotations give a f a i r summary of the report's conclusions on t h i s question. "The primary question concerning Hanoi's role i n the o r i g i n s of the insurgency i s not so much whether i t played a r o l e or not - the evidence of d i r e c t North Vietnamese p a r t i c i p a t i o n . . . i s now extensive - but when Hanoi intervened i n a systematic way. Most attacks on US p o l i c y have been based on the proposit i o n that the DRV move on the South came with manifest reluctance and a f t e r massive US intervention i n 1961 so much of t h i s argument as rests on the existence of genuine r e b e l l i o n i s probably v a l i d . .... Moreover there were indications that some DRV Leaders d i d attempt t o hold back southern rebels on the grounds that "conditions" were not ripe f o r an uprising. Further, there was apparently d i v i s i o n within the Lao Dong Party hierarchy over the question of strategy and t a c t i c s i n South Vietnam. However, the evidence indicates that the p r i n c i p a l strategic debate over t h i s issue took place between 1956 and 1958j a l l information now available (Spring 1968) points to a decision taken by DRV leaders not l a t e r than Spring, 1959. a c t i v e l y to seek the overthrow of Diem. Thereafter the DRV pressed toward that goal by m i l i t a r y force and subversive aggression, both i n Laos and South Vietnam."^ "The evidence supports the conclusions, therefore, that whether or not the r e b e l l i o n against Diem i n South Vietnam proceeded independently of, or even contrary to d i r e c t i v e s from Hanoi through 1958, Hanoi moved thereafter t o capture the revolution. There i s l i t t l e doubt that Hanoi exerted some influence over certain insurgents i n the South throughout the years following Geneva, and there i s evidence which points to i t s preparing f o r active support of large-scale insurgency as e a r l y as 1958 i n e a r l y 1959 ... the DRV ... undertook to provide strategic d i r e c t i o n and leadership cadres to b u i l d systematically a base system i n Laos and South Vietnam for subsequent, large-scale g u e r r i l l a warfare. Persuasive evidence exists that by i960 DRV support of the insurgency i n  - 96 i n South Vietnam included material as well as personnel." '  The French became disturbed about continued subversive a c t i v i t y i n the southern sector soon a f t e r the Cease Fire came into e f f e c t .  In mid December of 1954 the  accusation was made during a debate i n the French National Assembly that i t was "common knowledge" that demobilized Vietminh were r e a l l y men destined to form a Vietminh administration i n South Vietnam.  The French complained of a c t i v i t i e s  of Vietminh assassination squads and the presence of Vietminh arms caches.  "The  20 Commission d i d l i t t l e more than subject them to perfunctory examination." Both the French and the Vietminh had made use of g u e r r i l l a s during the course of the war.  The French had made an unsuccessful attempt at Geneva t o  include i n the Agreements a s p e c i f i c provision c a l l i n g f o r the disarming of army i r r e g u l a r s who were not regrouped.  "... whether the units or personnel were  "regulars" or " i r r e g u l a r s " ... did not matter;  the maintenance of a m i l i t a r y  structure by one High Command i n the other's zone would constitute a v i o l a t i o n  21 of the Agreement i n either event." "According to evidence l a t e r put before the Commi s s i o n - convincing evidence so f a r as the Canadian Government was concerned - the DRVN authorities d i d not confine themselves to leaving behind p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s and other sympathizers i n South Vietnam; evidence also indicated that the DRVN authorities also l e f t m i l i t a r y personnel behind, not demobilized g u e r r i l l a s who would be returning to c i v i l i a n pursuits, but trained m i l i t a r y cadres who remained i n contact with Hanoi and whose task i t was to continue h o s t i l e a c t i v i t i e s against the Government of South Vietnam and that these authorities, through personnel i n South Vietnam who were responsive to Hanoi, d i r e c t l y i n t e r fered i n the adminstration of the southern zone - a l l v i o l a t i o n s of the Cease Fire Agreement." An account of how the RVN's complaints about subversion fared i n the Commission has already been given i n Capter V.  F i n a l l y the increasingly serious  s i t u a t i o n i n South Vietnam forced the Indian Delegation to consider the whole question, at the same time that t h e i r deteriorating r e l a t i o n s with China made them  -  97  -  w i l l i n g t o take a d e c i s i o n t h a t would c e r t a i n l y be b i t t e r l y r e s e n t e d b y DRVN and by i t s f r i e n d s and The a c t was  the  supporters.  i s s u e t h a t f i n a l l y convinced  the I n d i a n D e l e g a t i o n t h a t i t had  the p u b l i c o u t c r y over the kidnap and murder o f C o l . Hoang Thuy  to  Nam,  t h e C h i e f o f the Vietnamese M i s s i o n i n charge o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission.  The RVN  a l l e g e d t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h e North were i m p l i c a t e d 23  i n h i s capture and murder. i n t h i s case,  The  c o m p l i c i t y o f the North has never been proved  (indeed i t seems on the f a c e o f i t u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e y would have  been r e s p o n s i b l e , ) but t h e impatience  o f the South Vietnamese w i t h the  d i l a t o r i n e s s i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e i r complaints  f i n a l l y overflowed.  Commission's  For a while  I n d i a n s and P o l e s on the Commission were i n some p e r s o n a l danger - t h e i r were surrounded and a t t a c k e d and r i o t s r e m i n i s c e n t o f the J u l y 1955 the M a j e s t i c H o t e l took p l a c e . the a l l e g a t i o n s o f the RVN, examination  In November, 1961,  and evidence was  cars  attack  the Commission met  on  to consider  sent t o the L e g a l Committee f o r  - n o t t o see i f t h e a l l e g a t i o n s were warranted, but i f t h e y a t t r a c t e d  pi any p r o v i s i o n o f the Geneva Agreement. The  L e g a l Committee r e p o r t e d  examined t h e c o m p l a i n t s ,  and  concluded  ( P o l i s h Member d i s s e n t i n g ) t h a t i t had t h a t A r t i c l e s 10, 19, 24 and 27 o f the 25  Geneva Agreement would f o r b i d the k i n d o f behaviour  complained o f .  I t went  be-  yond t h i s narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i t s i n s t r u c t i o n s , however, and examined the mass o f evidence  t h a t the RVN  i n s u r r e c t i o n i n the South was  had p r e s e n t e d  b e i n g supported  i n s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s t h e r e was arms, m u n i t i o n s  to s u b s t a n t i a t e i t s c l a i m that the  evidence  from the N o r t h .  I t concluded  t o show " t h a t armed and unarmed  that  personnel,  and o t h e r s u p p l i e s have been sent from the zone i n the North t o  the zone i n the South w i t h the o b j e c t o f s u p p o r t i n g , o r g a n i z i n g and  c a r r y i n g out  h o s t i l e a c t i v i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g armed a t t a c k s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e Armed F o r c e s 26 A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the zone i n the South." c l u s i o n s reached  The  Commission accepted  by the L e g a l Committee (the P o l i s h D e l e g a t i o n  the  con-  dissented.)  and  -  98  -  The Special Report of June 2, 1962 represented the high water mark of the activities of the ICC i n Vietnam.  The Legal Committee report had prom-  ised to provide "in due course a f u l l report setting out i n detail the complaints made by the South Vietnamese Mission, the evidence forwarded in relation to these 27 complaints, and our specific observations thereon",  but in spite of continual  efforts by the Canadian Delegation to get the Legal Committee to act'on this question, i t never did.  The eleventh Interim Report of the ICC i n Vietnam cover28  ing the period February 1, I960 to February 28, 1961  and submitted on September  18, 1961 was the last regular report that the Commission ever made.  On February  12, 1965, the North Vietnamese authorities demanded the withdrawal of the Commission's teams.  The DRVN asserted that i t was no longer able to guarantee the  teams' security because of US a i r strikes.  In the late sixties, restrictions  on the movements of teams i n the South practically eliminated their activities there too. The Commission came to l i f e briefly on February 13, 1965 when i t 29 -.. sent a further special report to the co-chairmen  drawing the co-  chairmen's attention to the amount of US aid to the RVN and to the fact that 30 "military action had been taken against military installations in the DRVN". The report went on to state "These documents point to the seriousness of the 31 situation and indicate violations of the Geneva Agreement."  The Canadian Dele-  gation, while agreeing that a report should be made to the co-chairmen, dissented from the terms of the majority report and submitted a minority statement.  The  Canadian Delegation thought that the majority report gave "a distorted picture 32 of the nature of the problem in Vietnam and i t s underlying causes"  and went on  to note that the South Vietnam Mission had "brought to the Commission's attention mounting evidence to show that the Government of North Vietnam has expanded i t s aggressive activities directed against the Government of South Vietnam and has infiltrated growing numbers of armed personnel and increasing amounts of military equipment into South Vietnam for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of  - 99 33 South Vietnam by f o r c e . " In t h e l a t e s i x t i e s , t h e war i n Vietnam c o n t i n u e d t o e s c a l a t e i n s c a l e and i n t e n s i t y , and t h e ICC seemed i n c r e a s i n g l y an anachronism.  I t stayed  on, l a r g e l y because i t might prove t o be an i n s t r u m e n t o f m e d i a t i o n o r because i t might have some u s e f u l f u n c t i o n t o f i l l war was f i n a l l y o v e r . remaining. Commission  i n t h e disengagement  o f t r o o p s when t h e  At l e a s t t h a t was t h e Canadian D e l e g a t i o n ' s reason f o r  The Canadians n e v e r a q u i e s c e d i n t h e s t a t e o f somnolence seemed t o have f a l l e n i n t o a f t e r 1965.  sought t o have t h e Commission  fulfill  "Canada from time t o time  i t s t r a d i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n , e.g. i n v e s t i g a t i n g  and r e p o r t i n g on t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e d e m i l i t a r i z e d zone; d i d n o t agree w i t h t h i s approach.  that the  but t h e o t h e r members  Between 1964 and 1968, t h e Canadian  Govern-  ment which was p u b l i c l y p u t t i n g f o r w a r d peace p r o p o s a l s o f i t s own, a l s o t o i n t e r e s t t h e o t h e r governments  on t h e Commission  tried  i n u s i n g t h e Commission as  a v e h i c l e f o r "bringing the p a r t i e s c l o s e r together";  t o t h i s i n i t i a t i v e the  o t h e r s ' response was u n e n t h u s i a s t i c . " In 1964 and 1965 t h e Canadian Commissioner  on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s c a r r i e d  messages t o t h e DRVN from t h e US Government w h i l e i n t h e course o f o f f i c i a l t o Hanoi.  F i v e messages were c a r r i e d i n a l l ,  was brought back from t h e DRVN.  visits  and on t h r e e o c c a s i o n s a r e p l y  S e p a r a t e l y , i n 1966, t h e Canadian Government  sent C h e s t e r Ronning, a r e t i r e d d i p l o m a t and F a r E a s t e r n s p e c i a l i s t , t o Hanoi as a special representative.  "Mr. Ronning's m i s s i o n , which took him t w i c e t o N o r t h  Vietnam, was c a r r i e d out w i t h t h e knowledge and a p p r o v a l o f t h e US Government and brought an o f f e r o f Canada's good o f f i c e s as a means o f i n i t i a t i n g d i r e c t talks.  There was no thought o f m e d i a t i o n .  a d i a l o g u e between t h e c o n t e n d i n g s i d e s .  peace  The i n t e n t i o n was m e r e l y t o s t a r t  Although t h a t l a t e r happened, t h i s  35 1966 Canadian e f f o r t came t o naught." The Commission  i n Vietnam came t o an unhappy and u n d i g n i f i e d end.  In  1972, I n d i a r a i s e d i t s d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n North Vietnam from a c o n s u l a t e t o an embassy, l e a v i n g i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n Saigon a t t h e c o n s u l a r l e v e l .  The  - 100  move m o r t a l l y o f f e n d e d to leave. was  The  the South Vietnamese Government, which i n s t r u c t e d the  Indiana  Commission t r a n s f e r r e d i t s h e a d q u a r t e r s back t o Hanoi, where i t  not t o remain f o r l o n g .  In March, 1973  i o n , composed o f Canada, I n d i a and Commission f o r C o n t r o l and and,  -  f o r a while,  Canada.  Poland was  t h e o l d I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l Commissr e p l a c e d by a new  International  S u p e r v i s i o n , composed o f Poland, Hungary,  Indonesia,  - 101 -  CHAPTER V I FOOTNOTES.  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. • 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.  35.  J . Holmes, "Geneva, 1954", I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , V o l . XXII, No. 3, P. 480 i b i d . , p . 481 Wainhouse, op. c i t . , p . 289. Dagg, op. c i t . , p . 4/18 i b i d . , pp. B9-12 i b i d . , p. B/56 i b i d . , p . 6/38 i b i d . , p . 4/18 See E l e v e n t h I n t e r i m Report, Cmnd 1551, 1961, p . 7 p a r a . 8 f o r a p a r t i a l and incomplete account. Cmnd. 2834, M i s c . No. 25 (1965) Documents r e l a t i n g t o B r i t i s h involvement i n t h e Indo-Chinese C o n f l i c t , p . 128 J . Holmes, op. c i t . , p. 475 See Tenth I n t e r i m Report, Cmnd. 1040, p a r a . 47 and E l e v e n t h I n t e r i m R e p o r t , Cmnd. 1551, p a r a . 50 S p e c i a l Report t o t h e co-chairmen, June 2, 1962, Cmnd. 1755 p a r a . 20 i b i d . , p a r a . 9(3) John Holmes, "Techniques o f Peacekeeping i n A s i a " , i n A l a s t a i r Buchan, ed. China and t h e Peace o f A s i a , p . 245 B. F a l l , op. c i t . , p. 360 Pentagon Papers, G r a v e l E d i t i o n , V o l . 1, pp. 242-346 i b i d . , p . 260 i b i d . , p . 265 Dagg. op. c i t . , p . F/26 i b i d . , p . F/6 i b i d . , p . F/23 Cmnd. 1755, p a r a . 8 ibid., i b i d . , p. 6 i b i d . , p. 7 ibid., Cmnd. 1551 Cmnd. 2609 i b i d . , p. 4 ibid., i b i d . , p . 12 i b i d . , p . 13-14 P a u l B r i d l e , "Canada and t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l Commission i n I n d o c h i n a , 1954-72", i n C o n f l i c t and S t a b i l i t y i n Southeast A s i a . M.W. Zacher and R.S. M i l n e , ed., p . 432 i b i d . , p . 433  - 102 -  CHAPTER V I I .  THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION AS A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION.  Peacekeeping has been d e f i n e d as "an i n t e r n a t i o n a l d e v i c e t h a t came i n t o use a f t e r World War 1 t o denote i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n t o d e t e r , d i s c o u r a g e , prevent or terminate threatened or a c t u a l h o s t i l i t i e s " .  1  The d i s t i n c t i o n i s  o f t e n drawn between "peace o b s e r v a t i o n " and "peacekeeping", the l a t t e r b e i n g d e s c r i b e d as "a form o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n by which a c o n s i d e r a b l e m i l i t a r y f o r c e i s  2 used t o b r i n g about a c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s " . are  examples o f "peacekeeping", t h e n Kashmir,  I f Korea, t h e Congo and  Cyprus  I n d o n e s i a , UNEF and the ICC i n  Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are c l e a r l y examples o f "peace o b s e r v a t i o n " .  The  d i s t i n c t i o n i s not o f t e n m a i n t a i n e d i n c a s u a l speech, and w i l l n o t be i n the course o f t h i s c h a p t e r , but i t i s n o n e t h e l e s s a u s e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n .  More t h a n  a q u e s t i o n o f semantics i s i n v o l v e d h e r e , f o r "peacekeeping" has a f i n e  positive  r i n g t o i s t h a t i s l a c k i n g i n "peace o b s e r v a t i o n " , and undoubtedly the widespread use o f the former term has l e d t o u n r e a l i s t i c e x p e c t a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y o f course i n the case o f the I n d o c h i n a Commissions.  The deployment  f o r c e t o b r i n g about a c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s the  of a large m i l i t a r y  has been used o n l y t h r e e times i n  e n t i r e h i s t o r y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n t o p r e v e n t wars, and the enormous c o s t s  i n v o l v e d would usually  alone be enough t o ensure t h a t t h i s method w i l l not be the one  chosen. Peace o b s e r v a t i o n i s not a new  phenomenon - about t h i r t y d i s p u t e s were  d e a l t w i t h under the League o f N a t i o n s from 1920  t o 1940.  They u s u a l l y  involved  d i s p u t e d c l a i m s a r i s i n g out o f the break up o f the A u s t r i a n - H u n g a r i a n and R u s s i a n Empires and were t h e r e f o r e i n Europe.  I n most cases o n l y Europeans,  including  -  103  -  always a t l e a s t one o f the Great Powers, s e r v e d as members o f the League's i n v e s t i g a t i v e Commissions. two  Canadians succeeded  Saar.  Japan and the USA  were on o c c a s i o n r e p r e s e n t e d ,  each o t h e r as members o f the Governing  But the Saar Commission was  Commission o f t h e  the o n l y one on which Canadians s e r v e d .  Canadian l a c k o f i n t e r e s t i n peace o b s e r v a t i o n , i n marked c o n t r a s t t o t h e a f t e r World War  11, was  and  events  o f course symptomatic o f Canadian l a c k o f i n t e r e s t gen-  e r a l l y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l ' o b l i g a t i o n s , and r e f l e c t e d Canada's c o n v i c t i o n t h a t she l i v e d " i n a f i r e p r o o f house f a r from inflammable- m a t e r i a l s . A f t e r the second World War t h a t Senator Dandurand expressed  had  swept away the c o m f o r t a b l e c o n v i c t i o n s  so e l o q u e n t l y , Canadian a t t i t u d e s t o  i n m u l t i - n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s a t k e e p i n g the peace changed r a d i c a l l y . t h i s a r t and  s c i e n c e has become o f s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t because we  involvement  "For Canadians  have been i n v o l v e d  i n i t more t h a n almost any o t h e r c o u n t r y , and i t has, i n f a c t , been i n c o r p o r a t e d  3 i n t o our image o f our r o l e i n the w o r l d . "  Canadians have served on n e a r l y e v e r y  U n i t e d N a t i o n s f o r c e , and, o u t s i d e the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , on the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l Commission i n I n d o c h i n a . P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Indochina Commissions came e a r l y i n the e x p e r i e n c e w i t h peacekeeping  Canadian  o p e r a t i o n s , and has gone on f o r l o n g e r than any o t h e r .  Before 1 9 5 4 Canadians had s e r v e d on the UN m i l i t a r y o b s e r v e r Group i n I n d i a and Pakistan  (Kashmir), Canadian t r o o p s had  fought i n Korea, and from February, 1 9 5 4  Canadians had s e r v e d on the UN Truce S u p e r v i s o r y O r g a n i z a t i o n i n P a l e s t i n e . Canadian e x p e r i e n c e on UN b o d i e s has t h e r e f o r e l a r g e l y developed  s i d e by s i d e w i t h  e x p e r i e n c e i n Indochina, and the c o n t r a s t between the two k i n d s o f o p e r a t i o n s has o f t e n been p a i n f u l .  The  apparent  i m p a r t i a l i t y o f Canadian p o l i c y on  groups has c o n t r a s t e d u n f a v o u r a b l y w i t h the advocacy o f one Canadians have had t o assume i n I n d o c h i n a .  UN  side's position that  Widespread p u b l i c a p p r o v a l w i t h i n  Canada f o r our r o l e i n UN m i s s i o n s has not been echoed f o r our r o l e i n Indochina, where Canadians have o f t e n seemed advocates  o f the unpopular  s i d e i n an  unpopular  - 104 war.  Above a l l ,  the apparent  success o f many UN m i s s i o n s has made the Indo-  c h i n a Commissions seem more i n e f f e c t u a l than perhaps t h e y deserve Perhaps a c l e a r e r i d e a o f how  the Indochina  to  do.  Commissions i n g e n e r a l  and  the Vietnam Commission i n p a r t i c u l a r compare t o o t h e r methods o f keeping the peace can be g a i n e d i f we  U n i t e d Nations  examine a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e sample o f UN  S p e c i a l Committee on the Balkans  UNSCOB was  operations.  (UNSCOB)  c r e a t e d by G e n e r a l Assembly R e s o l u t i o n o f October 1,  1947,  t o e n q u i r e i n t o a l l e g e d b o r d e r v i o l a t i o n s a l o n g the f r o n t i e r between Greece on  the  one hand and A l b a n i a , B u l g a r i a and Y u g o s l a v i a on the o t h e r , and  t o use i t s good  o f f i c e s to s e t t l e disputed matters.  to supply  The  S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l was  staff  f o r the Committee and t o " e n t e r i n t o a s t a n d i n g arrangement w i t h each o f the ' f o u r Governments concerned  t o assure  ... f u l l freedom o f movement and  f a c i l i t i e s f o r the performance o f i t s functions."'*  The  Commission o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n  s e t up by the Committee c o n s i s t e d o f e l e v e n d e l e g a t e s , from A u s t r a l i a , China, France, Mexico, the N e t h e r l a n d s , S t a t e s , Poland and the USSR.  t o co-operate  w i t h the group, and  Brazil,  P a k i s t a n , the U n i t e d Kingdom, t h e U n i t e d  A s u b s i d i a r y group was  i n v e s t i g a t e a l l e g e d border v i o l a t i o n s .  a l l necessary  e s t a b l i s h e d at Salonika to  A l b a n i a , B u l g a r i a and Y u g o s l a v i a r e f u s e d  the S o v i e t Union a l s o r e f u s e d t o  co-operate  d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the group went beyond the terms o f the S e c u r i t y Council resolution.  On the spot i n v e s t i g a t i o n s were t h e r e f o r e r e s t r i c t e d t o the  Greek s i d e o f the b o r d e r .  F i v e o b s e r v a t i o n p o s t s were e s t a b l i s h e d on the  each c o n s i s t i n g o f f o u r o b s e r v e r s from the d e l e g a t i o n s w i t h s i x a u x i l i a r y  border, personnel  from the S e c r e t a r i a t .  A l l d e l e g a t i o n s were t h e r e f o r e not r e p r e s e n t e d a t each  observation post.  groups were l e n t mobile  The  crews, r a d i o o p e r a t o r s , mechanics and p r i n c i p a l l y by the US, The  and by the UN  Commission conducted  n e s s e s and monitored  and r a d i o equipment, a i r c r a f t  and  i n t e r p r e t e r s by the v a r i o u s d e l e g a t i o n s , Secretariat.  on the spot i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , i n t e r r o g a t e d w i t -  radio broadcasts.  The  Commission i n i t s r e p o r t  concluded  - 105 t h a t Greece's t h r e e n o r t h e r n n e i g h b o u r s had  "encouraged, a s s i s t e d , t r a i n e d and  s u p p l i e d the Greek g u e r r i l l a s i n t h e i r armed a c t i v i t i e s a g a i n s t the Greek Government,"^ and made c e r t a i n p r o p o s a l s . t o the c o n c l u s i o n s and the On December 7,  The  P o l i s h and  Soviet Delegations  objected  proposals.  1951,  UNSCOB was  dissolved.  The  p o l i t i c a l situation i n  Greece had been s t a b i l i z e d , and t h r e a t s from g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s had almost appeared.  Although  these f a c t o r s were t h e most important,  the UN  dis-  operation  undoubtedly made an a p p r e c i a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n .  Palestine.  The U n i t e d N a t i o n s  Truce  Supervisory Organization  (UNTSO)  The U n i t e d N a t i o n s became i n v o l v e d i n P a l e s t i n e a f t e r A p r i l , 1947  when  the B r i t i s h gave n o t i c e o f t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o s u r r e n d e r t h e i r mandate over P a l e s t i n e . The  problem has been c o n t i n u o u s l y b e f o r e the O r g a n i z a t i o n s i n c e t h a t t i m e .  have been more than t e n UN  There  Committees, groups o r a u t h o r i z e d i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h some  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r peace o b s e r v a t i o n and f a c t f i n d i n g .  Of these the most  ant have been UNTSO and the UN Emergency Force  A Security Council Resol-  u t i o n o f November 16,  1948  t o an immediate a r m i s t i c e . a UN m e d i a t o r , and Lebanon, Jordan (MAC)  and  (UNEF).  import-  c a l l e d on both p a r t i e s t o seek agreement w i t h a view N e g o t i a t i o n s were conducted under the chairmanship  r e s u l t e d i n f o u r separate Syria.  t o s u p e r v i s e the t r u c e .  a r m i s t i c e agreements - w i t h Egypt,  Each agreement p r o v i d e d f o r a Mixed A r m i s t i c e Commission The  Commissions  c o n s i s t e d o f an e q u a l number o f  members chosen by each s i d e , w i t h a chairman d e s i g n a t e d by t h e C h i e f o f S t a f f o f UNTSO.  UNTSO, although  Commission, c o n t i n u e d and  i t had been r e c r u i t e d o r i g i n a l l y f o r the e a r l i e r  t o e x i s t a f t e r the a r m i s t i c e .  I t f u r n i s h e d the  f u n c t i o n s a s s i g n e d by the Mixed A r m i s t i c e Agreements.  the  O r i g i n a l l y personnel f o r  p r o v i d e d by Belgium, the US and France, but a f t e r 1953  expanded t o i n c l u d e o f f i c e r s from Denmark, Sweden, Canada, New countries.  Truce  personnel  s e r v i c e s needed t o observe and m a i n t a i n t h e Cease F i r e and t o perform  UNTSO was  of  membership Zealand  and  was other  - 106 As time went on, i t became e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e MAC's was c o n f i n e d  t o the consideration o f v i o l a t i o n s o f the Armistice  Agreements  t h a t had a l r e a d y taken p l a c e and had been brought t o t h e MAC's by one o f t h e p a r t i e s , and UNTSO's f u n c t i o n s were l i m i t e d t o p r o v i d i n g p e r s o n n e l and s e r v i c e s t o the MAC's. The  MAC's were n o t o f u n i f o r m e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  c l e a r l y d e l i m i t e d and f o l l o w e d  formerly w e l l recognized  When t h e b o u n d a r i e s were b o u n d a r i e s , (eg. t h a t  between I s r a e l and S y r i a and Jordan,) t h e r e were n o t many i n c i d e n t s .  I n t h e case  o f t h e S y r i a n f r o n t i e r , t h e i n s t a b i l i t y o f t h e S y r i a n Government and t h e b i t t e r ness t h a t d i v i d e d t h e two c o u n t r i e s ensured however t h a t what v i o l a t i o n s o c c u r r e d would be s e r i o u s ones.  On t h e J o r d a n i a n  " l i t e r a l l y thousands o f i n c i d e n t s . "  and E g y p t i a n  f r o n t i e r s t h e r e were  "The v a s t number o f b o r d e r i n c i d e n t s arose  more from t h e a r t i f i c i a l n a t u r e o f t h e boundary than from p o l i t i c a l t e n s i o n s .  The  boundary l i n e f r e q u e n t l y d i v i d e d v i l l a g e s from t h e f i e l d s which supported t h e i r populations,  from t h e i r sources o f water, and even from t h e i r cemet<gries.  There  7 had  never been an i n t e r n a t i o n a l boundary l i n e i n t h i s The  area."  S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n o f August 11, 1949, n o t e d t h a t " t h e  s e v e r a l A r m i s t i c e Agreements ... p r o v i d e  f o r t h e i r s u p e r v i s i o n by t h e P a r t i e s them-  s e l v e s , r e l i e s upon t h e P a r t i e s t o ensure t h e continued  a p p l i c a t i o n and observance  o f t h e s e agreements." The the  machinery o f t h e MAC's and o f UNTSO proved inadequate t o d e a l w i t h  situation.  I n c r e a s i n g b i t t e r n e s s and t e n s i o n and an i n c r e a s i n g number o f  b o r d e r v i o l a t i o n s f i n a l l y r e s u l t e d i n t h e I s r a e l i i n v a s i o n o f Egypt on October 29, 1956.  The I s r a e l i a t t a c k came as a complete s u r p r i s e t o UNTSO.  The I s r a e l -  Egypt MAC had had no advance warning o f I s r a e l i m o b i l i z a t i o n , even i n an area where o b s e r v e r s were s t a t i o n e d .  The I s r a e l i a t t a c k was f o l l o w e d b y combined  B r i t i s h and F r e n c h a t t a c k s on t h e Suez C a n a l .  When t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and France  v e t o e d a S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g on I s r a e l t o withdraw i t s f o r c e s from  • -  107  -  Egypt, the s e c u r i t y C o u n c i l c a l l e d an emergency s e s s i o n o f the G e n e r a l Assembly t o d e a l w i t h the problem.  The U.N.  Emergency F o r c e . From t h i s emergency s e s s i o n o f the G e n e r a l Assembly came t h e d e c i s i o n  t o p l a c e a U.N.  f o r c e i n the a r e a between the I s r a e l i and E g y p t i a n f o r c e s .  That  f o r c e was made up o f c o n t i n g e n t s from UN member s t a t e s " o t h e r than permanent members o f the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . "  The  f i r s t UNEF f o r c e s were a i r l i f t e d t o  on November 1 5 , and by March 8, 1 9 5 7 the l a s t o f the I s r a e l i , E n g l i s h and t r o o p s had  Egypt  French  withdrawn. The  composition o f an o b j e c t i v e group, even l e a v i n g out permanent mem-  b e r s o f the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , was o f January 23,  by no., means an easy t a s k .  In an a i d e memoire  1 9 5 7 , t h e I s r a e l i Prime M i n i s t e r had d e c l a r e d t h a t on no  would I s r a e l agree  " t o the s t a t i o n i n g o f a f o r e i g n f o r c e , no m a t t e r how  account called, i n  9 her t e r r i t o r y , o r i n any o f the areas o c c u p i e d by h e r . "  Egypt was  a l l o w the s t a t i o n i n g o f UN t r o o p s i n h e r t e r r i t o r y , and so UNEF was o n l y . o n the E g y p t i a n s i d e o f the l i n e .  Egypt now  w i l l i n g to a b l e t o operate  began t o r a i s e d i f f i c u l t i e s about  Canadian t r o o p s f o r m i n g p a r t o f t h a t f o r c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e the regiment u n f o r t u n a t e l y s e l e c t e d was The  named the Queen's Own  have f o l l o w e d A u s t r a l i a and New E g y p t i a n r e b u f f now embarrassing.  s t a t i o n the UN  f o r c e f o r Suez had not  There were many who  met  b e l i e v e d t h a t Canada should  Zealand i n s u p p o r t i n g the B r i t i s h a t t h e UN.  on the q u e s t i o n o f Canadian t r o o p s would have been  In the end the E g y p t i a n s were persuaded  t r i b u t i o n i n the form o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and The  Rifles.  Canadian Government's p r o p o s a l f o r a UN  w i t h unanimous a p p r o v a l at home.  perhaps  An  extremely  t o accept a Canadian  con-  supporting troops."^  S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l o b t a i n e d the consent o f the E g y p t i a n Government t o f o r c e i n Egypt.  been g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d .  "The  That such consent was keystone  t i o n s i s the p r i n c i p l e o f consent.  n e c e s s a r y seems t o have  o f the t h e o r y o f n e u t r a l p o l i c i n g  Without consent the o p e r a t i o n , by  opera-  definition,  - 108  would be c o e r c i v e :  -  t h u s , f o r the G e n e r a l Assembly a t l e a s t , b o t h i l l e g a l  p o l i t i c a l l y unwise:  and  i l l e g a l because the Assembly has no a u t h o r i t y t o c o e r c e ;  p o l i t i c a l l y unwise because i t would r i s k i n c i t i n g o p p o s i t i o n by a Great Power." "'" 1  The  G e n e r a l Assembly i n t e n t i o n t o make UNEF c o m p l e t e l y independent  the Great Powers proved  impossible to o b t a i n .  o c c a s i o n p r o v i d e d l o g i s t i c support f o r the  Both the US and B r i t a i n have on  force.  The employment o f a l a r g e number o f t r o o p s t o s e p a r a t e t h e two secured the s u c c e s s o f UNEF, compared t o the f a i l u r e i n t h i s a r e a o f the E g y p t i a n MAC  and UN o b s e r v e r s .  sides Israeli-  F o c u s s i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n on t h i s t r o u b l e d  a r e a p r o b a b l y a l s o d i d much t o reduce the number o f i n c i d e n t s a f t e r UNEF was place.  of  in  " I t seems c e r t a i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l concern f o r m a i n t a i n i n g the a r m i s t i c e ,  and a w i l l i n g n e s s t o take p o s i t i v e a c t i o n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h v i o l e n t  breaches, 12  i n f l u e n c e d a l l t h e c o u n t r i e s i n the a r e a t o pursue more p e a c e f u l p o l i c i e s . " But a l t h o u g h UNEF has been accounted  one o f the success s t o r i e s o f  p o l i c i n g o p e r a t i o n s , i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o peace i n the a r e a was  UN  o n l y temporary.  No p r o g r e s s was made i n o b t a i n i n g a l a s t i n g s e t t l e m e n t , i n f a c t perhaps p r o g r e s s was  not p o s s i b l e .  I t might even be s a i d t h a t peace o b s e r v a t i o n f o r c e s ,  v e n i n g b e f o r e a f i n a l m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n i s reached, may ment o f a l a s t i n g peace.  As G e n e r a l Burns has  even prevent the  interestablish-  remarked,  "... the UN has o b l i g e d the Arabs and the I s r a e l i s t o stop t h e i r war, but i t cannot o b l i g e them t o make peace. U s u a l l y peace i s made when one s i d e has won such v i c t o r i e s i n the war t h a t i t s opponent sees t h a t i t would be b e t t e r to agree t o the v i c t o r ' s terms r a t h e r than c o n t i n u e , and f i n d i t s e l f i n worse p l i g h t . Or both s i d e s become so exhausted o r t i r e d o f the armed c o n f l i c t t h a t t h e y p r e f e r compromise o r a n e g o t i a t e d peace t o c o n t i n u e d f i g h t i n g . N e i t h e r o f these c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n e d when the UN succeeded i n stopping the f i g h t i n g i n P a l e s t i n e . Both s i d e s c l a i m t h a t t h e y c o u l d have d e f e a t e d t h e o t h e r and have a t t a i n e d t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s but f o r the i n t e r f e r e n c e o f the U n i t e d Nations." 1  3  Throughout 1966  and 1967  p a r t i c u l a r l y the S y r i a n f r o n t i e r .  incidents m u l t i p l i e d i n Israel's other f r o n t i e r s , F i n a l l y I s r a e l i Prime M i n i s t e r Leon E s h k o l  - 109  -  warned the  Syrians that i f t e r r o r i s m continued,  p l a c e , and  the means t o c o u n t e r the  Nasser responded by moving t r o o p s the  Secretary  across  As l e a d e r o f the Arab b l o c ,  the Suez C a n a l .  f o r c e would l e a v e  18 Nasser asked t h a t the  followed  aggression."  s h a l l choose the t i m e , the  On May  17,  G e n e r a l t o withdraw UNEF from i t s p o s i t i o n s a l o n g the  U Thant r e p l i e d t h a t the UN On May  "we  Nasser asked  I s r a e l i border.  i f the E g y p t i a n s asked i t t o do  f o r c e be withdrawn from Egypt.  The  so.  " s i x day  war"  soon a f t e r .  Lebanon• In 1958, Arab R e p u b l i c  b o t h Lebanon and  Jordan accused the Government o f the  o f i n t e r f e r i n g i n t h e i r domestic a f f a i r s .  brought b e f o r e  the  Security Council.  The  v i o l e n t r a d i o and p r e s s population  a r e s o l u t i o n , on June 10, first  s e r v i n g on UNTSO, and  adopted.  by UN The  posts  In i t s r e p o r t s t o the reported  i f t h e y had  By June 25,  i n any  days a f t e r the  Security  personnel  ninety five  already  observers,  b o r d e r zones were p a t r o l l e d ,  S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , UNOGIL s t a t e d t h a t i t s p a t r o l s  i n f i l t r a t e d from o u t s i d e .  "...  case composed o f  overthrow o f the Government o f I r a q . i n Jordan.  adopted  difficult.  In the m i d d l e o f J u l y t e n s i o n s  troops  Roads and  s u b s t a n t i a l movements o f armed men,  the v a s t m a j o r i t y was  the  e s t a b l i s h e d , a l t h o u g h the mountainous t e r r a i n i n  the b o r d e r r e g i o n s made o b s e r v a t i o n  had  waging a  Security Council  o b s e r v e r s were drawn from UN  i n c l u d e d a Canadian.  permanent o b s e r v a t i o n  The  o b s e r v e r s began two  s u p p l i e d by e l e v e n UN members, were on d u t y . and  was  c a l l i n g f o r t h e d i s p a t c h o f an o b s e r v e r group t o Lebanon.  reconaissance  C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n was  t h a t the UAR  that  campaign a g a i n s t the Lebanese Government, c a l l i n g on  t o overthrow the e s t a b l i s h e d government.  The  Both c o m p l a i n t s were  Government o f Lebanon c l a i m e d  armed bands from S y r i a were i n f i l t r a t i n g Lebanon, and  United  but  there  i t was  is little  not  possible to  say  doubt, however, t h a t  Lebanese." ^ 1  i n the a r e a i n c r e a s e d  g r e a t l y with  US t r o o p s were landed i n Lebanon and  the British  - 110 There c o n t i n u e d t o be a d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n between UNOGIL and t h e US c o n c e r n i n g t h e e x t e n t o f o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e on events i n Lebanon.  "The moun-  t a i n o u s t e r r a i n i n which t h e group operated c r e a t e d problems i n s p o t t i n g tration.  infil-  D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d when Lebanon was under F r e n c h mandate, t h e F r e n c h  found i t d i f f i c u l t t o f u l l y suppress t h e smuggling o f arms by t h e S y r i a n s who o p e r a t e d i n t h e same t e r r a i n n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e presence o f thousands o f armed French s o l d i e r s .  I n comparing t h e performance o f UNOGIL w i t h a h a n d f u l o f men,  and t h a t o f t h e thousands o f armed F r e n c h s o l d i e r s , i t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e  15 former was handicapped i n c a r r y i n g o u t i t s m i s s i o n . " The s i t u a t i o n i n Lebanon was f i n a l l y r e s o l v e d by P r e s i d e n t Chamoun d e c i d i n g n o t t o seek r e - e l e c t i o n .  P r e s i d e n t Chamoun was t h e c a n d i d a t e o f t h e  C h r i s t i a n , pro-western f a c t i o n i n Lebanon, and i t was h i s d e c i s i o n t o seek r e e l e c t i o n c o n t r a r y t o t h e terms o f t h e Lebanese c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h a t had aroused the  o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e Mohammedan, pro-Arab s e c t i o n s o f t h e c o u n t r y .  With t h e  removal o f t h i s problem t h e c r i s i s i n Lebanon e v a p o r a t e d . Yemen. In i n Yemen.  September, 1962,  a r e p u b l i c a n r e v o l t overthrew t h e r o y a l  government  The r e p u b l i c a n s were s u p p o r t e d by P r e s i d e n t Nasser o f t h e U n i t e d Arab  R e p u b l i c , and Saudi A r a b i a sent a i d t o the r o y a l i s t s .  An agreement  f o r a phased  withdrawal o f E g y p t i a n t r o o p s i n exchange f o r a h a l t t o Saudi A r a b i a n a i d t o t h e r o y a l i s t s was secured a f t e r n e g o t i a t i o n s s u p e r v i s e d by t h e US.  The UN was t o  p l a y a r o l e i n o b s e r v i n g and v e r i f y i n g t h e disengagement. On June 13th t h e advance p a r t y o f t h e O b s e r v a t i o n M i s s i o n i n Yemen (UNYOM) under t h e command o f Major G e n e r a l C a r l Van Horn o f Sweden, a r r i v e d i n Yemen. the  The m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n i n c l u d e d a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e u n i t and an a i r u n i t ,  former composed o f 114  o f f i c e r s and men from t h e Y u g o s l a v c o n t i n g e n t i n UNEF,  and the l a t t e r o f f i f t y o f f i c e r s and men o f t h e RCAF.  UNYOM was t o check and  c e r t i f y t h e two p a r t i e s observance o f t h e disengagement agreement, i n c l u d i n g t h e  - Ill withdrawal of t r o o p s . UNYOM had more r e s t r i c t e d d u t i e s than UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNEF o r UNOC. I t had no m e d i a t i o n c e r t i f y i n g and  o r c o n c i l i a t i o n f u n c t i o n s , but was  reporting.  G e n e r a l Van  r e s t r i c t e d to  observing,  Horne r e s i g n e d two months a f t e r UNYOM  began i t s work, p a r t l y i n p r o t e s t a g a i n s t what he f e l t were inadequate terms o f reference.  The  life  o f the O b s e r v a t i o n  t o t h r e e month p e r i o d s , a l t h o u g h  Mission continued  i t s presence was  unable t o prevent  m a t e r i a l s from o u t s i d e r e a c h i n g the a n t a g o n i s t s . o f March 3,  1964  s t a t e d t h a t arms and  r e a c h i n g the r o y a l i s t s , and  t h a t UAR  t o be extended f o r  The  two  a i d i n men  S e c r e t a r y General's  and  report  ammunition i n a p p r e c i a b l e amounts were f o r c e s were a c t i v e i n ground and  a i r operations  w i t h i n Yemen. UNYOM was  terminated  on September 4,  d e s c r i b e d the m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n as  by t h e UAR  the t h r e a t t o peace and  The  Secretary  General  "somewhat improved" i n h i s f i n a l r e p o r t ,  a s u b s t a n t i a l amount o f f i g h t i n g was Yemen supported  1964.  airforce.  s e c u r i t y had  going on a g a i n s t r o y a l i s t s t r o n g h o l d s The  Secretary General  diminished  although i n North  f e l t nonetheless  d u r i n g the M i s s i o n ' s  that  existence  "to a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t because o f i t s a c t i v i t i e s . "  J u s t how  e f f e c t i v e are peacekeeping a c t i v i t i e s , e i t h e r UN d i r e c t e d  o r under o t h e r a u s p i c e s ? be mixed, and  From the examples r e l a t e d above, t h e r e s u l t s seem t o  success o f t e n seems t o be r e l a t e d to f a c t o r s o u t s i d e o f the c o n t r o l  o f the s u p e r v i s o r y group. s t r e n g t h and  In the case o f UNSCOB, f o r i n s t a n c e , the growing  s t a b i l i t y o f the c e n t r a l government i n Greece was  the decrease i n the number o f i n c i d e n t s . UNEF proved u l t i m a t e l y capable UN  e f f o r t s t o prevent  t h e main cause o f  In the M i d d l e E a s t , n e i t h e r UNTSO n o r  o f b r i n g i n g about a permanent p e a c e f u l  settlement.  h o s t i l i t i e s were s u c c e s s f u l f o r a t i m e , but the p a r t i e s  were unable t o make p r o g r e s s  i n s e t t l i n g deep-seated d i f f e r e n c e s , and UNEF  f i n a l l y swept away when the war  was  renewed.  Settlement  was  of issues that disturb  - 112  -  t h e peace can o n l y be undertaken by the p a r t i e s t o the disagreement, p r o g r e s s i s made i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n the peacekeeping  and i f no  force w i l l ultimately  fail.  Indeed t h e r e i s some q u e s t i o n i f the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a peacekeeping m i s s i o n not i n f a c t h e l p t o p r e v e n t the emergence o f a more s e t t l e d s i t u a t i o n .  may  "The  v e r y a c t o f f r e e z i n g a d i s p u t e and o f s e p a r a t i n g the p r o t a g o n i s t s i s l i k e l y reduce the p r e s s u r e s on them t o come t o terms on a v i a b l e s e t t l e m e n t . " " ^  to I f the  f a i l u r e o f e f f o r t s t o f i n d a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n t o t h e problems o f t h e M i d d l e E a s t s h o u l d n o t be l a i d a t t h e door o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s n o r a t t r i b u t e d t o s h o r t comings o f i t s organs, UNTSO and UNEF, n e i t h e r s h o u l d c o n t i n u i n g c o n f l i c t i n Vietnam be l a i d a t the door o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l Commission. When the u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e p a r t i e s t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n i s g r a n t e d , t h e r e remain c e r t a i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t a f f e c t how k e e p i n g m i s s i o n can be i n any g i v e n s i t u a t i o n . the performance  h e l p f u l the  The d i f f i c u l t i e s  that  peace-  affected  o f the ICC have u s u a l l y been t r a c e d t o the ICC's t r o i k a f o r m a t i o n .  But a l t h o u g h the f a c t t h a t the ICC c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n i t s e l f the c o n f l i c t s o f the c o l d war  c e r t a i n l y d i d a f f e c t the work o f the Commission, many o f i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s  can be l a i d t o c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t i t shared w i t h o t h e r peacekeeping The f i r s t  requirement f o r e f f e c t i v e peacekeeping  groups.  seems t o be t h a t t h e  i s s u e s i n v o l v e d must not be those i n which a Great Power b e l i e v e s i t s own i n t e r e s t s t o be i n v o l v e d . to  I t i s o f course the Great Powers' l a c k o f w i l l i n g n e s s  submit t h e i r d i s p u t e s t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n t h a t has made the  k e e p i n g f u n c t i o n s o f the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ( A r t i c l e s a dead l e t t e r .  39-50 o f the C h a r t e r ) such  i s as a matter o f p r a c t i c e not  The Congo, I n d o n e s i a , Kashmir, Yemen, Cyprus and the M i d d l e E a s t were  o n l y p o s s i b l e a r e a s o f e f f e c t i v e UN a c t i o n because e i t h e r the USA to  peace-  But t h e e f f e c t o f Great Power involvement goes f u r t h e r than t h a t ,  and where i t o c c u r s i n t e r n a t i o n a l peacekeeping possible.  vital  they were n o t a r e a s where  o r the S o v i e t Union were prepared t o push t h e i r o p p o s i n g  a l o g i c a l conclusion.  The M i d d l e E a s t must now  interests  o f course be s u b t r a c t e d from  - 113 those n e u t r a l a r e a s . now c o u n t e r a c t e d  The i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t support f o r t h e Arab powers has  US support f o r I s r a e l , and s i n c e the " s i x day war" t h e r e has 3b'  been no UN presence on t h e b o r d e r between Egypt and I s r a e l , The  ICC i n Vietnam has o f course attempted t o keep t h e peace i n an  area where two Great Powers have c o n c e i v e d  t h e i r v i t a l i n t e r e s t s t o be concerned.  South Vietnam has been supported m i l i t a r i l y and e c o n o m i c a l l y Vietnam by China and t h e USSR.  I t should  b y t h e US and North  n o t be s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e e f f o r t has  been a f a i l u r e . A second requirement f o r e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n seems t o be t h a t t h e superv i s o r y group should  n o t remain i n r e s i d e n c e  e v e n t u a l l y i n e f f e c t i v e UN o p e r a t i o n the ICC i n Vietnam.  f o r too long.  The e a r l i e r and  i n P a l e s t i n e , UNTSO, has many p a r a l l e l s w i t h  Both groups have been charged w i t h t h e maintenance o f an  a r t i f i c i a l boundary, when both s i d e s have been d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e s e t t l e m e n t . Both groups have remained t o s u p e r v i s e  an a r m i s t i c e t h a t was r e c o g n i z e d  as a  temporary arrangement l o n g past t h e time when t h e y c o u l d c o n t i n u e t o do so e f f e c t ively.  The c o n c l u s i o n has been drawn from t h e P a l e s t i n e e x p e r i e n c e t h a t " i f an  a r m i s t i c e l a s t s t o o l o n g without t u r n i n g i n t o a peace, t h e p r e s t i g e o f t h e i n t e r national organization l e s s respect  Violence  conducting the truce s u p e r v i s i o n erodes.  The p a r t i e s show  f o r t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y and d e l i b e r a t e l y f l o u t t h e a r m i s t i c e . 17  increases  and u l t i m a t e l y t h e a r m i s t i c e breaks down."  c o u l d be made, word f o r word, about t h e t r u c e i n Vietnam. September 16, 1948 t o the S e c r e t a r y  General,  The o b s e r v a t i o n  In h i s report o f  Count Bernadotte o b s e r v e d :  "There i s a p e r i o d d u r i n g which the p o t e n t i a l f o r cons t r u c t i v e a c t i o n , which f l o w s from t h e f a c t t h a t a t r u c e has been achieved by i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n , i s a t a maximum. I f , however, t h e r e appears no p r o s p e c t o f r e l i e v i n g t h e e x i s t i n g t e n s i o n by some arrangement which h o l d s c o n c r e t e promise o f peace, t h e machinery o f t r u c e s u p e r v i s i o n w i l l i n time l o s e i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s and become an o b j e c t o f c y n i c i s m . I f t h i s p e r i o d ... i s n o t s e i z e d , the advantage gained b y i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n may w e l l be l o s t . "  - 114 -  In Vietnam f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t  was p r o v i d e d  f o r i n t h e Geneva Agreements;  e l e c t i o n s were t o take p l a c e i n J u l y , 1956 which were t o end t h e d i v i s i o n o f t h e country.  When the e l e c t i o n s d i d n o t t a k e p l a c e , t h e ICC was l e f t i n p l a c e  because no one c o u l d t h i n k o f a b e t t e r arrangement. mission  simply  The p r e s t i g e t h a t t h e Com-  had g a i n e d i n i t s u s e f u l a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g t h e f i r s t y e a r o r two g r a d u a l l y  eroded, and i t was g e n e r a l l y d i s r e g a r d e d  and t r e a t e d w i t h contempt, n o t o n l y by  the p a r t i e s , b u t by world o p i n i o n i n g e n e r a l . In o r d e r t o c a r r y o u t i t s d u t i e s e f f e c t i v e l y , a peacekeeping needs t o be a b l e t o move about f r e e l y .  mission  A good d e a l o f a t t e n t i o n has been p a i d t o  the q u e s t i o n whether o r n o t a c o u n t r y i s r e q u i r e d t o r e c e i v e a UN m i s s i o n , i t may d e c i d e a t any time t o c a l l f o r t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e UN f o r c e . question  h i n g e s on how t h e p a r t i e s a r e bound by t h e UN C h a r t e r ,  and i f  The l e g a l  and t h e answer  seems t o be t h a t consent i s n o t n e c e s s a r y f o r a c t i o n taken by t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , but t h a t f o r o p e r a t i o n s  under t h e d i r e c t i o n o f the G e n e r a l Assembly consent i s  19 required. and  Where consent i s r e q u i r e d i t may l o g i c a l l y be withdrawn a t any time,  t h i s seems t o be the m a j o r i t y  opinion.  U Thant defended h i s agreement t o  withdraw UNEF on t h e demand o f Egypt i n May, 1967 on t h e grounds t h a t UNEF c o u l d 20 remain o n l y by d e f y i n g the w i l l o f i t s h o s t by f o r c e o r the t h r e a t o f f o r c e . Canadians have g e n e r a l l y been anxious t o emphasize t h e o b l i g a t i o n s o f countries accepting  peacekeeping f o r c e s .  The Canadian Government was v e r y r e l u c -  t a n t t o concede i n 1967 t h a t Egypt had the r i g h t t o d e c i d e which c o u n t r i e s would c o n t r i b u t e f o r c e s t o UNEF, and when P r e s i d e n t  Nasser asked UNEF t o l e a v e  Egypt  i n 1967, P a u l M a r t i n , t h e M i n i s t e r a t t h e t i m e , expressed t h e view t h a t " i n g i v i n g i t s consent t o the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f the f o r c e t h e E g y p t i a n  accepted a l i m i t a t i o n o f i t s s o v e r e i g n t y ,  Government  and ... i t i s now t h e p r e r o g a t i v e o f  the UN r a t h e r t h a n o f the UAR Government t o determine when t h e UN f o r c e has com21 pieted i t s task..." In t h e case o f t h e ICC, t h e r i g h t o f t h e Commission t o be i n Vietnam  - 115 -  depended on the r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e i r s o v e r e i g n t y which t h e p a r t i e s accepted when t h e y s i g n e d the Cease F i r e Agreement. these r e s t r i c t i o n s ) .  (South Vietnam o f course n e v e r  accepted  S i m i l a r l y t h e r i g h t o f the Commission t o move about i n  p u r s u i t o f i t s d u t i e s i n Vietnam r e s t e d upon t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e CFA, which t h e Canadian Government has g e n e r a l l y been anxious t o i n t e r p r e t as b r o a d l y as p o s s i b l e , and which t h e p a r t i e s on t h e o t h e r hand have sought t o i n t e r p r e t as r e s t r i c t i v e l y as p o s s i b l e . keeping  T h i s d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n i s found t o some extent i n a l l peace-  operations.  F o r example, G e n e r a l Burns d e s c r i b e s t h e s i t u a t i o n f o r  UNEF a s f o l l o w s : "... both s i d e s r e s t r i c t e d t h e o b s e r v e r s ' movements from time t o time, e s p e c i a l l y when t h e y thought t h a t t h e i r " m i l i t a r y s e c u r i t y " would be p r e j u d i c e d - t h a t i s , when t h e y had something t o h i d e , e i t h e r o f f e n s i v e p r e p a r a t i o n s o r some i n f r a c t i o n o f t h e terms o f t h e GAA, such as having t r o o p s o r d e f e n s i v e works i n zones where none should have been. In i t s r e s o l u t i o n s t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e p e a t e d l y requested t h e p a r t i e s t o a l l o w t h e o b s e r v e r s f u l l freedom o f movement, but these r e q u e s t s were d i s r e g a r d e d when the next c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n arose."22 In h i s r e p o r t o f October 9, 1958 t o the G e n e r a l Assembly, t h e S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l noted t h a t " I n Gaza and elsewhere i n i t s a r e a o f o p e r a t i o n s , UNEF has been a b l e t o f u n c t i o n without  any q u e s t i o n a r i s i n g o f i t s presence i n f r i n g i n g upon  s o v e r e i g n r i g h t s on the b a s i s t h a t a t t h e i n v i t a t i o n o f t h e E g y p t i a n Government, i n accordance w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e General Assembly, t h e UN a s s i s t s i n m a i n t a i n i n g  23 quiet...."  The S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l warned t h a t "some o f t h e above mentioned c i r -  cumstances a r e o f such a n a t u r e t h a t i t c o u l d n o t r e a s o n a b l y be expected would o f t e n be d u p l i c a t e d elsewhere.  Nor can i t be assumed t h a t t h e y  a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s t o warrant i n d i s c r i m i n a t e p r o j e c t i o n o f t h e UNEF  that  they  provide  experience....**'  In Egypt t h e UN f o r c e s were c o n f i n e d t o a r e l a t i v e l y narrow b o r d e r a r e a , and t h e i r d u t i e s were c o n f i n e d t o p r e v e n t i n g i n f i l t r a t i o n a c r o s s t h e border o r a renewal o f hostilities.  In Vietnam t h e ICC teams were s t a t i o n e d i n many areas o f North and  South Vietnam, and t h e i r d u t i e s ranged from p r e v e n t i n g t h e i m p o r t a t i o n o f war  - 116 m a t e r i a l t o p r o t e c t i n g the "democratic  freedoms" o f the p o p u l a t i o n .  With  such  wide terms o f r e f e r e n c e and w i t h such w i d e l y s c a t t e r e d bases i t i s no wonder t h a t both North and  South Vietnam sought t o r e s t r i c t the teams' a c t i v i t i e s as much as  p o s s i b l e and o f t e n c o n s i d e r e d those a c t i v i t i e s t o be an i n f r i n g e m e n t o f t h e i r sovereignty. of its  Even i n Jordan the S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l noted t h a t "... the  presence  a UN f o r c e has been regarded by the government as d i f f i c u l t t o r e c o n c i l e w i t h own  exercise of f u l l  s o v e r e i g n t y over the people and t e r r i t o r y o f the  country. " ^ Whatever the l e g a l b a s i s may of  a peacekeeping  be f o r the presence  and freedom o f movement  f o r c e w i t h i n the h o s t c o u n t r y , i n p r a c t i c a l terms the d e s i r e o f  the h o s t Government cannot  s a f e l y be i g n o r e d .  those i n c o n t r o l o f any one  N e i t h e r i n f a c t can the w i l l o f  s e c t i o n o f the c o u n t r y , even i f t h a t a u t h o r i t y i s not  the l e g a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d government o f t h a t t e r r i t o r y .  When the q u e s t i o n o f  UN  t r o o p s ' r i g h t o f e n t r y i n t o Katanga p r o v i n c e i n the Congo a r o s e , Hammarskjold m a i n t a i n e d b o t h t h a t Katanga had an o b l i g a t i o n t o a l l o w UN t r o o p s t o e n t e r , and t h a t he c o u l d not d i r e c t t r o o p s t o e n f o r c e t h e i r r i g h t o f e n t r y u n l e s s the  26 S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l d e c i d e d t o do t h i s as an enforcement measure. The d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t can f a c e a peacekeeping r i g h t o f movement i n a s i t u a t i o n o f c i v i l war obvious.  f o r c e t r y i n g to a s s e r t i t s  o r d i s t u r b a n c e w i t h i n a c o u n t r y are  D u r i n g Canada's b r i e f s e r v i c e on the second  Vietnam Commission i n  (with I n d o n e s i a , Poland and Hungary) Canadians e v i d e n t l y d e c i d e d t o a s s e r t r i g h t o f f r e e movement, even when unaccompanied by o t h e r team members. bers o f the Canadian p a t r o l were promptly m i s t r e a t e d by NLF  forces  h e l p but suspect both t h a t t h e NLF had immediately  r e p e a t e d had  Canada remained on the  their  The mem-  s e i z e d and were beaten and i n o t h e r ways  i n the a r e a t h e y were a t t e m p t i n g t o p a t r o l .  the Canadian move, and t h a t t h e experiment  1973  understood  One  cannot  the s i g n i f i c a n c e of  would have been u n l i k e l y t o have been  Commission.  F i n a n c i a l support i s n e c e s s a r y i f a peacekeeping  m i s s i o n i s t o do  an  - 117 -  adequate j o b .  Adequate f i n a n c i a l support has always been a problem i n the UN  because some powers, n o t a b l y pay f o r o p e r a t i o n s  the USSR and France, have c o n s i s t e n t l y r e f u s e d t o  t h a t were n o t a u t h o r i s e d  by t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l .  The w i l l i n g -  ness o f the US t o make e x t r a c o n t r i b u t i o n s and t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e UN t o c o n t i n u e r u n n i n g a d e f i c i t has d i s g u i s e d t h e problem f o r some time, b u t r e c e n t l y bad d e b t s have been c a t c h i n g up w i t h t h e UN.  The O b s e r v a t i o n M i s s i o n  i n Yemen was f i n a n c e d  by t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e d i s p u t e who p a i d t h e c o s t s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n at  a time.  f o r two months  The l i f e o f UNYOM a f t e r t h e end o f each two month p e r i o d was t h e r e -  f o r e c o n d i t i o n a l on t h e p a r t i e s ' w i l l i n g n e s s t o pay.  The ICC has a l s o  from l a c k o f f i n a n c e s , and t h e problem has been much more s e r i o u s .  suffered  The ICC  i s p a r t l y dependent on t h e f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s , p a r t l y on t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f t h e Geneva Powers. has  Lack o f money f o r t r a n s p o r t and equipment  s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d t h e Commission's e f f e c t i v e n e s s . Peacekeeping m i s s i o n s can work o n l y w i t h i n t h e terms o f r e f e r e n c e  vided.  I n t h e case o f UN peacekeeping m i s s i o n s ,  by t h e G e n e r a l Assembly o r t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l ;  t h e terms o f r e f e r e n c e  pro-  are set  i n t h e case o f t h e ICC, t h e  terms o f r e f e r e n c e were t h e Geneva Agreement o f 1954.  Where t h e r e  agreement among t h e d r a f t e r s o f t h e terms o f r e f e r e n c e ,  then t h e mandate i s a  c l e a r one and t h e t a s k o f the peacekeeping m i s s i o n But  i s general  i s made v e r y much e a s i e r .  there have been s i t u a t i o n s where c o n f l i c t i n g views have made t h e t a s k o f t h e  UN a d i f f i c u l t one. i s described  J u s t how much o f a s t r a i n t h i s can p l a c e on t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n  by a Canadian d i p l o m a t who s e r v e d  R e f e r r i n g t o t h e UN o p e r a t i o n Secretary  f o r a p e r i o d i n the UN S e c r e t a r i a t .  i n t h e Congo, he s a i d " L a c k i n g  s o l i d support  G e n e r a l was f r e q u e n t l y i n a v e r y d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n .  ordeal drained  away t h e p a t i e n c e  and d i p l o m a t i c  ... t h e  The p r o l o n g e d  s k i l l of Secretariat o f f i c i a l s ,  the morale and support o f member s t a t e s , and t h e m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s  and p o l i t i c a l  27 c r e d i t o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n . "  Paul Martin,  d e l i v e r i n g an address on "Canada's  Role i n UN Peacekeeping" a t Columbia U n i v e r s i t y i n A p r i l , 1967, p o i n t e d  t o "...  - 118 the r i s k t h a t inadequate  terms o f r e f e r e n c e might do s e r i o u s harm t o the p r e s -  t i g e o f the UN and t o i t s f u t u r e e f f e c t i v e n e s s . "  He s a i d t h a t "... the Canadian  Government w i l l be found t o g i v e more s e a r c h i n g examination  to requests f o r  a s s i s t a n c e i f i t i s n o t s a t i s f i e d t h a t the mandate p r o v i d e s s u f f i c i e n t  guidance  28 f o r t h e conduct  o f the t r o o p s on the ground."  Mr. M a r t i n was i n the ICC as he was  p r o b a b l y t h i n k i n g as much o f the Canadian  o f UN o p e r a t i o n s i n d e l i v e r i n g h i s warning.  experience The  s t r u g g l e d f o r n i n e t e e n y e a r s under an i n a d e q u a t e l y drawn document.  ICC  Inadequate  t o b e g i n w i t h , i t r a p i d l y became out o f d a t e , because o f c o u r s e i t s p r o v i s i o n s were o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d t o be a p p l i e d o n l y f o r two y e a r s , u n t i l e l e c t i o n s r e - u n i t e the c o u n t r y .  At l e a s t UN peacekeeping  should  o p e r a t i o n s e n j o y the advantage  t h a t terms o f r e f e r e n c e can be changed o r r e d r a f t e d as c i r c u m s t a n c e s as the i n a d e q u a c i e s o f the o r i g i n a l terms became e v i d e n t .  change o r  But as John Holmes  has remarked, " t h e r e i s bound t o be i m p r o v i s a t i o n i n c r i s e s . "  In these  s t a n c e s , " ... where world o r d e r t o t t e r s , b a t t l i n g armies and f l e e i n g  circum-  refugees  are l i g h t i n g flames which c o u l d spread anywhere, the important t h i n g i s t o s t o p the f i g h t i n g by g e t t i n g some k i n d , almost any k i n d , o f agreement. a c h i e v a b l e , u s u a l l y , i s a p r o c e d u r a l agreement.  The o n l y k i n d  The most a c h i e v a b l e form o f  p r o c e d u r a l agreement i s t o s e t up a body o f any k i n d t o i n v e s t i g a t e o r p a t r o l ,  29 even i f i t i s more symbolic t h a n r e a l . " i n e v i t a b l e tendency  I n c o n d i t i o n s o f c r i s i s , t h e r e i s an  " ... t o f u z z t h e terms, even i n t h e awareness t h a t t h i s  cause t r o u b l e l a t e r .  will  The l a t e r t r o u b l e , i t i s assumed, can be d e a l t w i t h i n a  30 period of t r a n q u i l l i t y . " Canadians s t r u g g l i n g w i t h the i n a d e q u a c i e s o f a b a d l y d r a f t e d document have seemed a t t i m e s t o b e l i e v e t h a t c l e a r l y drawn i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v i n g the wide powers t o i n v e s t i g a t e and p a t r o l would guarantee  ICC  an e f f e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n .  no document i s worth the paper i t i s w r i t t e n on i f i t does not r e a l i s t i c a l l y t h e s i t u a t i o h t h a t the peacekeeping  f o r c e w i l l be meeting on the ground.  But reflect  During  - 119  -  the second conference on Laos at Geneva i n 1961-2, a l l three factions of the Laotian Government were adamant i n t h e i r insistence that investigations could only be undertaken with the consent of the Laotian Government, and the r i g h t wing f a c t i o n under Phoumi was more r e s t r i c t i v e i n what i t would permit the Commission to do than were the other two.  The p r i n c i p l e of Laotian Government sovereignty  had to be accepted because there was no alternative, but also because i t was evident that i f the Government had wished to prevent any p a r t i c u l a r p a t r o l from taking place i t had ample means at i t s disposal f o r preventing i t besides outright r e f u s a l .  S i m i l a r l y i n Vietnam a declaration that roads i n the area were  impassable, or that the security of the team could not be guaranteed, were quite s u f f i c i e n t to prevent team controls from taking place. I t has been a generally accepted p r i n c i p l e i n peacekeeping operations under the United Nations that the delegations represented must be as nearly neutral as possible.  Although the Great Powers were o r i g i n a l l y represented on peace-  keeping bodies, since UNEF i t has been generally accepted that troops w i l l usually not be contributed by the permanent members of the Security Council.  (One  exception of course i s Cyprus where B r i t i s h troops have formed the largest contingent.)  The importance of n e u t r a l i t y i f a group i s to be e f f e c t i v e was noted by  the Secretary General i n h i s survey study of the experience derived from the establishment and operation of UNEF:  "... the force has functioned under a clear  cut mandate which has e n t i r e l y detached i t from involvement i n any i n t e r n a l or l o c a l problem, and also has enabled i t to maintain i t s n e u t r a l i t y i n r e l a t i o n to international p o l i t i c a l issues.  The fact that UNEF was designed to meet the ends  of t h i s s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n l a r g e l y determined i t s m i l i t a r y components, geographical 31 composition, deployment and status, and also i t s effectiveness." have not however been completely independent of Great Power support. i n UNEF and the Congo American l o g i s t i c support has been necessary.  UN forces Particularly UN operations  have taken place i n the face of opposition from the USSR, but i n view of UN dependence on American f i n a n c i a l support, i t i s u n l i k e l y that they could take place i f  - 120 t h e y met w i t h t h e d i s a p p r o v a l o f the USA. Canadians have tended t o s t r e s s t h e i r n e u t r a l i t y and t h e d i s i n t e r e s t e d n a t u r e o f t h e i r s e r v i c e on peacekeeping b o d i e s ,  and t h e y have o f t e n f e l t  acutely  uncomfortable a t t h e p a r t i s a n r o l e t h e y have been f o r c e d t o assume i n t h e ICC. But  Canadian i m p a r t i a l i t y i s n o t a q u a l i t y t h a t i s u n i v e r s a l l y t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d .  Canada i s a m i l i t a r y a l l y o f t h e USA, l a r g e l y dependent i n a n u c l e a r world on American p r o t e c t i o n .  Canada i s a l s o a member o f NATO - i n f a c t Canadians a r e  proud o f t h e f a c t t h a t the i d e a o f NATO was o r i g i n a l l y proposed by Prime M i n i s t e r St. Laurent. to provide  The USSR r a i s e d o b j e c t i o n s when t h e S e c r e t a r y  G e n e r a l asked Canada  s i g n a l s p e r s o n n e l f o r t h e Congo, p o i n t i n g out t h a t Canada was a NATO  p a r t n e r o f Belgium.  Although Mr. Pearson had been perhaps t h e s i n g l e most  important person i n p r o p o s i n g and o r g a n i z i n g UNEF, E g y p t i a n  o b j e c t i o n s kept Canadian  i n f a n t r y f o r c e s o u t o f UNEF, and o n l y w i t h d i f f i c u l t y were t h e y persuaded t o accept a Canadian c o n t r i b u t i o n i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and s u p p o r t i n g has  troops.  G e n e r a l Burns  said that " I t appeared t h a t t h e E g y p t i a n a t t i t u d e towards c o n t r i b u t i o n s from t h e s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s was determined b y h e r g e n e r a l p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h them and h e r o p i n i o n as t o how f a r t h e y supported h e r p o l i c i e s i n t h e U n i t e d Nations."32 «... my i m p r e s s i o n ... t h a t t h e r e a l reason Canadians were n o t d e s i r e d was t h e f e a r t h a t Canadian p o l i c y , w h i l e so f a r f a v o u r a b l e t o Egypt i n the G e n e r a l Assembly, might l a t e r v e e r t o t h e "Western" i f n o t t h e B r i t i s h stand i n r e g a r d t o t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e Canal."33 A l a s t a i r T a y l o r has p o i n t e d  out t h a t "Canada i s a p a r t o f t h e dead-  l o c k e d f o r c e s o f t h e r i v a l b l o c s , and t h e r e i n g i n seeking  i s perhaps an element o f w i s h f u l  think-  t o be a t once a l o y a l member o f the Western a l l i a n c e , and an un•2 1  a t t a c h e d m i d d l e power w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e  freedom o f a c t i o n . "  I f Canada has n o t been so n e u t r a l a member o f UN peacekeeping m i s s i o n s as she would l i k e t o b e l i e v e , n e i t h e r has she been as automatic a s u p p o r t e r  of the  US i n South Vietnam as c r i t i c s o f Canadian Government p o l i c y have b e l i e v e d , o r as the US would have l i k e d h e r t o be.  Canada has always i n s i s t e d t h a t v i o l a t i o n s  - 121 o f the  Geneva Agreement would not be  condoned.  T h i s has  contrasted  with  the  P o l i s h a t t i t u d e towards v i o l a t i o n s o f the Geneva Agreement by the DRVN. p o l i c y has  been t o support the DRVN i n e v e r y way  even when t h i s p o l i c y has  p o s s i b l e and  l e d t o l u d i c r o u s extremes.  know o f , i n a c o n t r o l o f G i a Lam  To  i n a l l circumstances,  c i t e one  a i r p o r t (near Hanoi) i n the  example t h a t  not  t o base t o w r i t e  i t s r e p o r t , the  Indian  21, 1954).  When the team  i n c r e a s i n g l y f u r i o u s Indian  h i s s t a n d , and  the  chairman was  returned  no  Americans, and  Department o f E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , t h a t the USA  f o r a more r e l i a b l e a l l y t o serve on the  with  At the  time  was  looking  around  r e - c o n s t i t u t e d Laos Commission i n  place  Canadians. When the r e c o r d o f UN  ICC  kinds of operations,  i m p r e s s i o n s might suggest.  tage o f the b r e a t h i n g  of  accomplished. the  Where the  ICC  two  does not  And  i n comparing  the  come o f f as b a d l y  s i d e s are a b l e t o take advan-  space t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n p r o v i d e s i n o r d e r t o  compose d i f f e r e n c e s and been d e s c r i b e d  record  t h a t peacekeeping as a whole i n v o l v e s enormous  expense i n r e l a t i o n t o what can be  e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f the two as f i r s t  peacekeeping a c t i v i t i e s i s read w i t h the  i n Vietnam, i t i s e v i d e n t  e f f o r t and  has  felt  Laos Conference t h e r e were rumours, rumours t h a t were immediately  b e l i e v e d i n the  the  report  South Vietnamese, o f t e n  Canadian e f f o r t s t o be i m p a r t i a l , gave the DRVN an u n f a i r advantage.  o f the  majority  a Polish minority  t h a t t h i s k i n d o f automatic P o l i s h support f o r North Vietnam, c o n t r a s t e d  o f the 1962  j  helicopters."  a Canadian-Indian  been seen a t Hanoi a i r p o r t , and  helicopters there.  GA,  unable t o move the P o l i s h member from  team r e p o r t when i t went i n c o n t a i n e d  r e p o r t t h a t h e l i c o p t e r s had t h a t t h e r e were no  field  chairman r e f e r r e d t o the h e l i c o p t e r s .  " H e l i c o p t e r s , h e l i c o p t e r s ? " s a i d the P o l i s h team member, " I saw An  landing  allowed t o have h e l i c o p t e r s under the terms o f the  because i t d i d not p o s s e s s them b e f o r e J u l y  I  s p r i n g o f l°6l, F i x e d  Team Hanoi n o t i c e d h e l i c o p t e r s w i t h R u s s i a n markings parked on the (North Vietnam was  Polish  come t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e n t h e peacekeeping m i s s i o n  as a s u c c e s s .  Where b i t t e r n e s s and  fundamental d i f f e r e n c e s  - 122 -  have p r e v e n t e d a s e t t l e m e n t , then the t r u c e imposed by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l e v e n t u a l l y breaks down and war breaks out a g a i n .  presence  The l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n has been  the case i n Indochina, but i t has e q u a l l y been the case i n o t h e r p a r t s o f the w o r l d , n o t a b l y the M i d d l e E a s t , where t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s has i n t e r v e n e d .  - 123 -  CHAPTER VII FOOTNOTES.  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.  8. 9. 10.  David W. Wainhouse et a l . , International Peace Observation, p. 2 ibid. A l a s t a i r Taylor et a l . , Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response, p. v i i The examples are drawn from Case Studies, i n Wainhouse, op. c i t . i b i d . , p. 225 i b i d . , p. 232 i b i d . , p. 264  S/1376 (p. 257)  12. 13.  quoted i n i b i d . , p. 279 A f u l l account w i l l be found i n ELM Burns, Between Arab and I s r a e l i , pp. Mona H. Gagnon, "Peace Forces and the Veto: The Relevance of Consent", International Organization. V o l . 21 No. 4, p. 819 Wainhouse, op. c i t . , p. 288 Burns, op. c i t . , p. 30  15. 16. 17.  Wainhouse, op. c i t . , p. 384 Taylor, op. c i t . , p. 36 Wainhouse op. c i t . , p. 272  19. 20. 21.  Gagnon, op. c i t . , pp. 812-36 i b i d . , p. 824 House of Commons, Debates. May 18, 1967, p. 342 op. c i t . , p. 277 A/3943, Oct. 9, 1958, para. 150 i b i d . , para. 151 ibid. Gagnon, op. c i t . , p. 821 G.S. Murray, "U.N. Peacekeeping and Problems of P o l i t i c a l Control", International Journal. V o l . 18. p. 453 External A f f a i r s , V o l . 19, June, 1967, p. 240 J . Holmes, "Geneva, 1954", International Journal, V o l . 22, p. 458 i b i d . , p. 459 A/3943, para. 149 Burns, op. c i t . , p. 235 i b i d . , p. 200 Taylor, op. c i t . , p.  11.  14.  18.  22.  23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.  S/4040, pp. 8, 9  A/648, p t . 2. p. 26  - 124 -  CHAPTER V I I I . CONCLUSIONS - THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE.  The message from t h e co-chairmen i n v i t i n g Canadian p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e ICC's i n I n d o c h i n a was sent u n t i l J u l y 27-  r e c e i v e d on J u l y 21,  1954.  The Canadian r e p l y was n o t  The Canadian Government announced  i t s acceptance o f t h e  i n v i t a t i o n " o n l y a f t e r d e t a i l e d study o f t h e Cease F i r e and A r m i s t i c e Agreements ... and w i t h f u l l knowledge and a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and t h a t w i l l go w i t h membership. complexity of the t a s k . "  difficulties  There are no i l l u s i o n s about the magnitude  or  1  These were the e a r l y days o f Canadian involvement i n peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s , and p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n g e n e r a l seemed t o welcome t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p a r t i c i pate i n any t h a t came a l o n g .  Newspaper comment was o f t e n r a t h e r c r i t i c a l o f t h e  Government's u n e n t h u s i a s t i c r e s p o n s e .  However, t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t t h e Govern-  ment foresaw soon became c l e a r t o everyone. Perhaps t h e most u n c o m f o r t a b l e and h u m i l i a t i n g a s p e c t o f involvement, so f a r as Canadians were concerned, was  t h e e x t e n t t o which p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e Com-  m i s s i o n appeared t o make Canada a s u p p o r t e r o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s . has always appeared t o Canadians t o depend on how be o f U.S. p r e s s u r e s and i n f l u e n c e s .  independent we  S e l f respect c o u l d appear t o  P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the ICC t h r e a t e n e d our  self  r e s p e c t , e s p e c i a l l y as t h e r e were many rumours c i r c u l a t i n g from time t o t i m e , p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the v a s t l y i n c r e a s e d U.S. involvement i n Vietnam i n 1962,  that  t h r e a t s and economic p r e s s u r e s were used t o coerce d e c i s i o n s i n the Commission would be f a v o u r a b l e t o the  that  U.S.  I t i s o f t e n f o r g o t t e n t h a t t h e western i n t e r e s t s i n Vietnam t h a t Canada had presumably undertaken t o defend were o r i g i n a l l y French i n t e r e s t s , n o t And the way  American.  i n which Canadians were l e d t o become p r i m a r i l y t h e d e f e n d e r s o f F r e n c h  - 125 o r South Vietnamese p o s i t i o n s i n the Commission has been d e s c r i b e d by the h i s t o r i a n o f the e a r l y months o f the Commission as f o l l o w s  :  "... p r o c e e d i n g s soon t o o k on a p a t t e r n t h a t was t o become typical. The P o l i s h d e l e g a t e sought t o ensure t h a t the committee r e p o r t i n c l u d e d o n l y such m a t e r i a l as would r e f l e c t u n f a v o u r a b l y on the South Vietnamese a u t h o r i t i e s and t o exclude any r e f e r e n c e s t o the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e s e a u t h o r i t i e s might have been j u s t i f i e d i n some o f t h e i r a c t i o n s . The Canadian member impressed on h i s c o l l e a g u e s the n e c e s s i t y o f c o n s i d e r i n g the arguments o f b o t h s i d e s , and, t o counter the P o l e s ' t a c t i c s , drew a t t e n t i o n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s put f o r ward by the Franco-Vietnamese a u t h o r i t i e s . I n e v i t a b l y and u n f o r t u n a t e l y , the Canadian D e l e g a t i o n r e p o r t e d to Ottawa, the member was f o r c e d by the t a c t i c s o f h i s P o l i s h c o u n t e r - p a r t t o act i n a manner t h a t made him appear t o be an " a p o l o g i s t " f o r the French Union s i d e . The I n d i a n member sought t o e f f e c t compromises i n an attempt t o produce a unanimous r e p o r t . " So f a r as U.S.  pressures  on Canada are concerned, t h e y appear t o be more  the product o f overheated i m a g i n a t i o n s  than a n y t h i n g  else.  My  own  p e r i o d o f con-  c e r n w i t h Commission a f f a i r s ' c o i n c i d e d w i t h the p e r i o d when t h e r e was t o be p r e s s u r e  - d u r i n g I 9 6 0 and  1961,  when the U.S.  namese a b i l i t y to r e s i s t armed i n s u r g e n c y d e f i n e d by the Geneva Agreements. and  while  Persuasion  annoyance a l s o on o c c a s i o n , but never any  A f t e r 1962,  and  was  most  t r y i n g t o b u i l d up V i e t -  s t i l l s t a y i n g w i t h i n the t h e r e undoubtedly was,  attempt t o use  p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the June, 1962  likely  other  limits  and  anger  pressures.  S p e c i a l Report t o the  co-chair-  3 men  s t a t i n g t h a t the U.S.  b u i l d u p was  i n v i o l a t i o n o f the 1954  was  l i t t l e t h a t the Commission c o u l d have done i n any  Nor  was  ing  o f the Commission on t h i s o c c a s i o n - the U.S.  t h e r e any  attempt by the U.S.  Agreement, t h e r e  case t o embarrass the  t o persuade Canada t o v o t e a g a i n s t the  s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n on the onists. access  Hanoi was  so  declared.  i n Vietnam mounted, Canada t r i e d t o use  Commission to encourage c o n v e r s a t i o n s  p r o b a b l y more i s o l a t e d t h a n any o t h e r  to the Government t h e r e was  find-  always appeared t o understand  Canada's p o s i t i o n t h a t c l e a r v i o l a t i o n s o f the Agreement must be As the tempo o f the war  U.S.  an a s s e t t h a t i t was  between the  c a p i t a l , and  felt  should  be  "In 1964 and 1965, i n the course o f o f f i c i a l v i s i t s t o Hanoi, the Canadian Commissioner c a r r i e d to the government t h e r e a t o t a l o f f i v e messages from the U.S. Government which, a t i t s  her antag-  Canadian exploited.  - 126 r e q u e s t , t h e Canadian Government had agreed t o convey; on t h r e e o c c a s i o n s he was a l s o a b l e t o b r i n g back North Vietnamese r e a c t i o n s . " "The Canadian Government b e l i e v e d t h a t , i n a l l o w i n g i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o c a r r y these messages and t o r e p o r t r e a c t i o n s , i t would reduce t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f misunders t a n d i n g , and i t regarded t h i s o f f i c e as c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as a member o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission." Canadian p u b l i c r e a c t i o n t o t h i s w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d e f f o r t , when i t became known, was immediate, angry, and remarkably s i l l y .  The charge most commonly  heard was t h a t t h e Canadian Government had " c a r r i e d U.S. t h r e a t s t o Hanoi." f a c t t h a t i t undoubtedly must have c a r r i e d Hanoi's appeared t o o c c u r t o no-one.  each o t h e r .  ' t h r e a t s ' back t o t h e U.S.  When two governments who have been engaged i n b i t t e r  warfare b e g i n t o t a l k , t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n or f o r moderation.  The  i s n o t u s u a l l y noted e i t h e r f o r  The important t h i n g i s t h a t t h e y should  courtesy  begin t o t a l k t o  As G e n e r a l Bernard Montgomery r a t h e r i n e l e g a n t l y expressed i t ,  "jaw-jaw i s b e t t e r than war-war." What appeared t o t r o u b l e c r i t i c s i n Canada was t h a t t h e Canadian Government might be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h U.S. p o l i c i e s i n t h e minds o f t h e North Vietnamese. That t h i s was n o t so was demonstrated e l o q u e n t l y r e a c t i o n t o the proposal the Cease F i r e i n 1973member;  t h a t Canada should  serve  enough i n t h e North Vietnamese on the new ICC's t o s u p e r v i s e  North Vietnam was q u i t e p r e p a r e d t o a c c e p t Canada as a  i t was t h e South t h a t o b j e c t e d .  Government spokesmen f o r t h e RVN  complained t h a t Canada had never been committed t o t h e i r cause as t h e P o l e s were t o t h e DRVN. Canada's a t t i t u d e t o h e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s on t h e ICC has been w e l l summed up by one  has f r e q u e n t l y been concerned i n recommending Canadian p o l i c i e s  on the Commissions "Canada has t r i e d t o a c t i m p a r t i a l l y as a member o f t h e Commissions. I t was always understood t h a t Canada would b r i n g a western o u t l o o k t o t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s , j u s t as I n d i a and Poland would b r i n g n e u t r a l i s t and Communist o u t l o o k s r e s p e c t i v e l y , but i t was e q u a l l y expected t h a t , i n j u d g i n g a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e , a l l t h r e e would do t h e i r b e s t  - 127 t o be o b j e c t i v e . Canadian d e l e g a t i o n s a t t a c h e d importance t o t h i s both i n p r i n c i p l e and i n p r a c t i c e . " " I t i s i m p o r t a n t , when forming an o p i n i o n about the o b j e c t i v i t y o f Canada i n t h e Commission, t o have i n mind t h e d i s t i n c t i o n , n e c e s s a r i l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e work o f a l l t h r e e d e l e g a t i o n s , between t h e i r r o l e as "advocates" and t h e i r r o l e s as "judges". I t was i n t h e n a t u r e o f t h i n g s t h a t Canadians s h o u l d be a l e r t t o t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e nonCommunist s i d e and ready t o defend those i n t e r e s t s i f n e c e s sary. T h i s was n e i t h e r r e p r e h e n s i b l e n o r , i n the l o n g r u n , u n h e l p f u l i f matched by i m p a r t i a l i t y i n r e a c h i n g c o n c l u s i o n s and i n t a k i n g n e c e s s a r y a c t i o n s r e g a r d l e s s o f which s i d e was i n t h e dock. In t h i s regard-Canadian d e l e g a t i o n s were s e l dom, i f e v e r , found wanting."  Poland's P o l i c y i n the ICC. Perhaps t h e most remarkable t h i n g about P o l i s h p o l i c y on t h e ICC was i t s consistency.  We have seen how changes i n the I n d i a n o u t l o o k on t h e world  t o some e x t e n t t o i n f l u e n c e t h e i r d e c i s i o n s i n t h e Commission.  Nothing  tended  comparable  happened i n the case o f Poland, even though a t l e a s t as g r e a t changes took p l a c e w i t h i n Poland over t h e l i f e t i m e o f t h e Commission. a b l e t o e x e r c i s e much g r e a t e r independence i n 1954.  By the e a r l y 60's Poland was  from d i r e c t i o n from o u t s i d e t h a n i t had  But P o l i s h support f o r t h e DRVN i n t h e Commission was as unwavering a t  the end as i t had been i n the b e g i n n i n g .  We can o f course o n l y s p e c u l a t e on t h e  reasons f o r t h i s , b u t i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the S i n o - S o v i e t s p l i t i n t h e Communist b l o c may have had some b e a r i n g on P o l i s h The A s i a n Communist p a r t i e s  attitudes.  (even i n c l u d i n g , s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e A u s t r a l i a n  Communist p a r t y ) f o l l o w e d t h e Chinese l i n e . S o v i e t Union.  The European  p a r t i e s supported t h e  The one c o u n t r y which managed f o r y e a r s t o keep a f o o t i n both  camps was t h e DRVN.  I t i s a t l e a s t a p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t Poland f e l t t h e  d e l i c a c y o f h e r p o s i t i o n as a s u p p o r t e r o f t h e USSR and t h e advocate o f t h e DRVN i n t h e Commission. it  I f h e r commitment t o the DRVN's cause had ever seemed t o waver  c o u l d have had t h e e f f e c t o f p u s h i n g the DRVN c l o s e r t o C h i n a .  That a t l e a s t  seems t h e o n l y s e n s i b l e reason f o r a p o l i c y t h a t was o f t e n , t o s a y the l e a s t o f i t , counterproductive.  Many o f t h e ^ P o l i s h a c t i v i t i e s on t h e Commission d i d l i t t l e t o  a i d t h e DRVN, w h i l e t h e y o f t e n earned t h e a c t i v e i l l - w i n d and resentment  o f the  - 128  I n d i a n members o f the on  several occasions  Commission.  -  P o l i s h intransigence  and  refusal to  compromise,  t h a t I know o f , pushed the I n d i a n s f u r t h e r i n support o f  Canadian p o s i t i o n than t h e y had  intended  Divergence between p u b l i c o p i n i o n o f f i c i a l p o l i c y i n Canada.  to  go.  and  Perhaps the u n h a p p i e s t r e s u l t o f Canadian p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the the degree t o which i t caused a r i f t between o f f i c i a l p o l i c y and T h i s has  occurred  policy;  Suez i s perhaps the o n l y o t h e r o c c a s i o n .  for  the U.S.  South's cause i n the  came under f i r e  In 1963  cause i n Vietnam.  a g a i n s t the North on the promised t o examine and  ICC,  and  t h e r e f o r e o f course a l s o  He was  from a l l r e p o r t s , he  issue.  The  but the  delegation  The  Canadian Govregarded  was  h a v i n g on the people o f Vietnam.  as  Government  the North American  tendency t o see a l l i s s u e s as e i t h e r b l a c k o r white f u r t h e r confused the were a g a i n s t the war t h a t the war  had  i n the f i r s t p l a c e , ran headlong i n t o p u b l i c dismay  p u b l i c o p i n i o n began t o t a l k at c r o s s purposes, and  contention  was  Indian  ernment's i n c r e a s i n g f r u s t r a t i o n over Commission i n a c t i o n on what was  NLF  on  S p e c i a l Report o f June, 1962  d i s p l a y e d a marked r e l u c t a n c e t o b e g i n work on the c o m p l a i n t s .  Those who  question  Commission's r e c o r d i n making p u b l i c the South's case  r e p o r t on s p e c i f i c complaints,  over the e f f e c t t h a t the war  U.S.  i n Canada.  subversion  the b a s i c cause f o r the war  became  Increasingly,  P a u l M a r t i n became M i n i s t e r f o r E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s .  p a r t i c u l a r l y unhappy a t the  foreign  as the Vietnam war  done, made Canadians  most i s s u e s an a c t i v i s t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , and,  p o l i c y and  opinion.  the growing c e r t a i n t y t h a t the  j u s t as -the French had  apparent Canadian c o n t r i b u t i o n to the U.S.  Canadian support f o r the  But  was  S t a t e s , so i t became a p u b l i c i s s u e i n Canada.  e v i d e n t m i s e r y o f the Vietnamese p e o p l e , and  would e v e n t u a l l y l o s e the war any  public  ICC  remarkably seldom s i n c e Canada began c o n d u c t i n g her own  the o v e r - r i d i n g i s s u e i n the U n i t e d The  the  was  issue.  f o r h u m a n i t a r i a n reasons accepted as dogma the e n t i r e l y a m a t t e r o f anti-government sentiment i n  - 129 the  South, and t h a t  "the U.S. had no b u s i n e s s b e i n g i n Vietnam."  Government, making such e f f o r t s w i t h i n the Commission  The  Canadian  t o put t h e o r i g i n s o f the  war on t h e r e c o r d , found i t s e l f h a v i n g t o r e - i t e r a t e t h e same p r i n c i p l e s t o d i s t u r b e d p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Canada.  To p u b l i c o p i n i o n i t o f t e n seemed t h a t t h o s e t r u s t e d  w i t h t h e conduct o f Canadian f o r e i g n p o l i c y were c a l l o u s l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e o v e r r i d i n g m o r a l i s s u e o f the day. P a r t o f the d i f f i c u l t y i n f o r m u l a t i n g p o l i c y on t h i s i s s u e u n d o u b t e d l y a r o s e from t h e f a c t t h a t f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes Canada had no p o l i c y toward I n d o c h i n a s e p a r a t e from h e r p o l i c y on the Commission. the ICC.  Anything that occurred i n  a r e a tended t o be c o n s i d e r e d o n l y i n the l i g h t o f the e f f e c t t h a t i t had on t h e Canadians c o u l d and d i d have s t r o n g and s e p a r a t e views on the course o f  events i n C h i n a , and the U.S. was  aware o f them.  On the conduct o f the war i n  Vietnam o r on U.S. p o l i c y t h e r e , t h e r e seemed t o be l i t t l e independent views - Canadian a t t e n t i o n was Great B r i t a i n supported the U.S. those aims were implemented,  attempt t o f o r m u l a t e  r i v e t t e d on events i n t h e  Commission.  aims i n Vietnam, but was o f t e n c r i t i c a l o f the  and i t s views were undoubtedly made known t o the  The o n l y i n d i c a t i o n t h e r e has been o f any s i m i l a r Canadian approach was  He r e c a l l e d t h a t on h i s v i s i t t o the U.S.  Johnson asked "what s h o u l d we do about Vietnam?"  i n 1965  U.S.  g i v e n by  Mr. Pearson i n the course o f an i n t e r v i e w r e c o r d e d f o r the t e l e v i s i o n s e r i e s Person S i n g u l a r " .  way  "First  President  To which Mr. Pearson r e p l i e d  "Get out o f i t " . The c o n f l i c t between o f f i c i a l p o l i c y and p u b l i c o p i n i o n came t o a head o v e r the  S p e c i a l Report t o the co-chairmen o f 1965.^  In t h a t Report the I n d i a n and  P o l i s h m a j o r i t y drew the co-chairmen's a t t e n t i o n t o U.S. bombing i n North Vietnam, q u o t i n g t h e U.S.  communique announcing t h a t m i l i t a r y a c t i o n had been taken a g a i n s t  m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n t h e DRW, without d e l a y these v i o l a t i o n s . . . . "  and the PAVN's r e q u e s t t h a t the ICC "condemn The ICC r e q u e s t e d t h e co-chairmen " t o con-  s i d e r t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y o f i s s u i n g an immediate  a p p e a l t o a l l concerned w i t h a view  - 130 to reducing  t e n s i o n and p r e s e r v i n g peace i n Vietnam and t a k i n g whatever measures  7 are n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r t o stem the d e t e r i o r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n . "  The wording o f  the m a j o r i t y r e p o r t seemed innocuous enough, b u t t h e Canadian D e l e g a t i o n unable t o s i g n i t . a v e r y l i m i t e d aspect  felt  I t annexed i t s own r e p o r t c l a i m i n g t h a t by c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on  o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Vietnam, t h e m a j o r i t y r e p o r t runs t h e  s e r i o u s r i s k o f g i v i n g t h e members o f the Geneva Conference a d i s t o r t e d p i c t u r e o f the n a t u r e o f t h e problem i n Vietnam and i t s u n d e r l y i n g  causes."  The " c o n t i n u i n g  i n s t a b i l i t y " i n Vietnam had "as i t s most important cause, t h e d e l i b e r a t e and p e r s i s t e n t pursuit o f aggressive  b u t l a r g e l y c o v e r t p o l i c i e s by North Vietnam d i r e c t e d  9 against  South Vietnam."  I t went on t o quote t h e L e g a l Committee's f i n d i n g , quoted  i n t h e S p e c i a l Report o f 1962,  supporting  g a t i o n gave i t as i t s " c o n s i d e r e d  this assertion.  The Canadian D e l e -  view" t h a t "the events which have taken  place  i n b o t h North and South Vietnam s i n c e F e b r u a r y 7 a r e t h e d i r e c t r e s u l t o f t h e i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n o f the aggressive  p o l i c y o f t h e Government o f North V i e t n a m . " ^ 1  In t a b l i n g t h e Report i n t h e House o f Commons on March 8, 1965, Mr. Martin  s t a t e d t h a t Canada d i d n o t deny t h e f a c t s on which t h e m a j o r i t y r e p o r t was  based, b u t b e l i e v e d t h a t i t p r e s e n t e d an " o v e r s i m p l i f i e d and m i s l e a d i n g o f t h e r o o t causes o f t h e dangerous i n s t a b i l i t y i n V i e t n a m . "  impression  1 1  "Our independent o b s e r v e r p o s i t i o n i n Vietnam has brought us f a c e t o f a c e w i t h an i n s i d i o u s form o f a g g r e s s i o n , w i t h which the f r e e world has y e t t o d e v i s e adequate means o f d e a l i n g . . . . In whatever form a g g r e s s i o n m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f , i t must be r e c o g n i z e d as such and i t must be stopped, n o t l e a s t because we cannot a f f o r d t o l e t t h e p r a c t i t i o n e r s o f t h i s t e c h n i q u e come t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i t pays d i v i d e n d s . T h i s i s s u r e l y t h e b a s i c i s s u e a t stake i n Vietnam today, and i t i s o f v i t a l i n t e r e s t t o a l l members o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission."12 Although t h e Canadian D e l e g a t i o n  may w e l l have been j u s t i f i e d i n r e p e a t -  i n g t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e 1962 S p e c i a l Report on t h e r o o t causes o f t h e war i n V i e t nam, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see why i t c o u l d n o t a t t h e same time have j o i n e d t h e Indian and P o l i s h D e l e g a t i o n s  i n r e g r e t t i n g t h e bombing.  P a u l B r i d l e has s a i d  o f Canadian p o l i c y on the Commission t h a t "... a t l e a s t from t h e p o i n t o f view o f  - 131 t h e o t h e r d e l e g a t i o n s , Canadians sometimes had  a tendency t o be o v e r l y  legalistic  13 and t o d i s p l a y m i s s i o n a r y r e a c t i o n t o t h e 1965  zeal i n pursuit of goals."  S p e c i a l Report seems t o support  The the  Canadian  "other  Delegation's  delegations"  opinion. Conclusion. I t was composition,  recognized  r i g h t from the v e r y b e g i n n i n g  Commission's  embodying w i t h i n i t s e l f the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f the c o l d war,  make i t s o p e r a t i o n d i f f i c u l t . J u l y 27,  t h a t the  1954,  pointed  would  However, as t h e Departmental P r e s s R e l e a s e o f  out,  "... i n c a r r y i n g out t h e i r t a s k s t h e ICC's s h o u l d be a b l e t o f u n c t i o n more e f f e c t i v e l y than the N e u t r a l N a t i o n s S u p e r v i s o r y Commission i n Korea which because o f e q u a l Communist and non-Communist r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , v e r y o f t e n had e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n b l o c k e d , and which c o u l d r e p o r t o n l y t o the two m i l i t a r y commands."!^ "A study o f the i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e has l e d us t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the Commissions have a reasonable chance o f o p e r a t i n g e f f e c t i v e l y and o f making a c o n s t r u c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the s u c c e s s f u l implementation o f t h e Cease F i r e Agreement, and hence t o peace i n Southeast Asia. I f our e x p e c t a t i o n s u n f o r t u n a t e l y prove i l l founded, and the Commissions are f r u s t r a t e d by o b s t r u c t i o n , then, o f course, no u s e f u l purpose would be s e r v e d by c o n t i n u i n g t h e i r existence." -* 1  The  experience  o f the f i r s t two  assessment t h a t the Commission had When i t was  y e a r s seemed t o b e a r out t h e  "a r e a s o n a b l e  chance o f o p e r a t i n g  Department's  effectively".  implementing s p e c i f i c p a r t s o f the Agreement f o r which a d e f i n i t e under-  s t a n d i n g had been a r r i v e d at i n Geneva, i t f u n c t i o n e d e f f e c t i v e l y .  A l l three  d e l e g a t i o n s u s u a l l y worked t o g e t h e r harmoniously, but when t h e y d i d not the  Indian  D e l e g a t i o n f e l t no h e s i t a n c y i n b r e a k i n g t h e d e a d l o c k t o ensure what seemed a reasonable  and f a i r  s o l u t i o n - as f o r example d u r i n g t h e t r a n s f e r o f Haiphong.  Even i n the e a r l y y e a r s , however, the c o n t r o l o f new imported i n the South was ment was  e n t i r e l y a dead  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , and  m a t e r i a l or m i l i t a r y  personnel  i n the North t h i s p a r t o f the  Agree-  letter.  As time went on, and the f i n a l  political  s o l u t i o n r e t r e a t e d i n t o the  dim  - 132 and d i s t a n t f u t u r e , t h e i n a b i l i t y o f t h e Commission t o c o n t r i b u t e e f f e c t i v e l y t o the s i t u a t i o n became i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r .  The DRVN, i n t h e p e r i o d between t h e  f a l l o f Dien B i e n Phu and t h e s i g n i n g o f t h e Geneva Agreement i n J u l y , 1954, had i n c r e a s e d i t s e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l over l a r g e p a r t s o f Vietnam.  When i n 1956 i t  d i s c o v e r e d t h a t i t was t o be denied t h e c o n t r o l over a l l o f Vietnam t h a t i t f e l t i t had won by f o r c e o f arms and had been f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes promised i n the Agreement, i t determined t o c o n t i n u e t h e s t r u g g l e t o g a i n i t s o b j e c t i v e s . [poa-^tzzd ~?LVSflno\iLt Tefyti tr> Ttii "ien/u r//e?iz<s"D ~z-**>) F i f t e e n ICC t e a m s , ^ c o n s i s t i n g o f t h r e e t o s i x men each, and s c a t t e r e d over and South Vietnam, were c l e a r l y unequal t o t h e t a s k o f p r e v e n t i n g t h i s  North  takeover.  The Commission c o u l d p o s s i b l y have done more e f f e c t i v e work than i t d i d in  i n v e s t i g a t i n g and i n r e p o r t i n g i t s f i n d i n g s , i f t h e I n d i a n D e l e g a t i o n had n o t  been so exposed i n i t s p o s i t i o n as t i e - b r e a k e r , and i f I n d i a n p o l i c y had n o t been so concerned to  t o be seen t o be n o n - a l i g n e d .  Too o f t e n t h e s a f e s t t h i n g t o do seemed  be t o do n o t h i n g . How f a r t h e Commission c o u l d have been e f f e c t i v e i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g where  the host Government d i d n o t want an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s d e b a t a b l e .  The Commission  was  g i v e n f a r t o o much t o do over f a r t o o l a r g e an a r e a f o r i t s meagre r e s o u r c e s .  The  j o b i t was g i v e n t o do i n t e r f e r e d i n t o o many ways i n t o o many s e p a r a t e  areas  where an independent s t a t e must take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s own a c t i v i t i e s .  The  teams were almost  t o t a l l y dependent on t h e i r host governments - f o r s u p p l i e s , f o r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , and f o r t h e i r s a f e t y . The  c o - o p e r a t i o n o f t h e P a r t i e s t o t h e Agreement was e s s e n t i a l i f t h e  Commission was t o f u l f i l to  i t s duties.  In t h e b e g i n n i n g both s i d e s had something  g a i n by c o - o p e r a t i n g w i t h t h e Commission.  use t h e Commission as a sounding board  But i n t h e l o n g run, both t r i e d t o  f o r propaganda, w h i l e p r e v e n t i n g t h e Com-  m i s s i o n from d o i n g a n y t h i n g t h a t was a g a i n s t t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . The  Canadian Government had warned t h a t " i f our e x p e c t a t i o n s u n f o r t u n a t e l y  prove i l l founded, and t h e Commissions a r e f r u s t r a t e d by o b s t r u c t i o n , then, o f course, no u s e f u l purpose would be served b y c o n t i n u i n g t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . " - ^  - 133 The Vietnam Commission was existence.  Why  " f r u s t r a t e d by o b s t r u c t i o n " f o r almost  d i d Canada c o n t i n u e t o serve?  e a s i e r t o get onto a peacekeeping  I t seems e v i d e n t t h a t i t i s much  m i s s i o n than i t i s t o get o f f .  were advanced from time t o time f o r s t a y i n g - t h a t i t was evidence  i t s entire  Various  important  reasons  t o keep some  o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n the a r e a a l i v e , t h a t t h e Commission might  e v e n t u a l l y have a u s e f u l r o l e to perform  as mediator  w i l l i n g to come t o an agreement, t h a t the presence some r e s t r a i n i n g e f f e c t on t h e p r o g r e s s o f e v e n t s . v a l i d and i m p o r t a n t .  i f b o t h s i d e s f i n a l l y were  o f the Commission had  at l e a s t  These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were a l l  But the main r e a s o n f o r s t a y i n g was  probably simply that  Canada c o u l d not take the r i s k o f making t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Vietnam worse than i t a l r e a d y was.  Embarrassment, f r u s t r a t i o n , the c o n s c i o u s n e s s  of f u t i l i t y - a l l  these have been worth b e a r i n g because Canada c o u l d not accept t h e s o l e s i b i l i t y f o r d i s s o l v i n g t h e Commission i f i t s disappearance worsen a bad  s i t u a t i o n or delay i t s f i n a l  In r e c e n t y e a r s , Canada has peacekeeping  respon-  would i n any  way  settlement.  shown i n c r e a s i n g r e l u c t a n c e t o t a k e  on  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s where the chance o f e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n has not been  17 great.  As e a r l y as 1967  i n a speech a t Columbia U n i v e r s i t y  l i n e d what he f e l t t o be the p r e - r e q u i s i t e s f o r e f f e c t i v e UN  Paul Martin action.  t h i n g s , the f o r c e ' s mandate must " p r o v i d e s u f f i c i e n t guidance  out-  Among o t h e r  f o r the troops  the ground", and the Canadian Government would " g i v e more s e a r c h i n g  on  examination  t o r e q u e s t s f o r a s s i s t a n c e i f i t i s not  s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e mandate p r o v i d e s  s u f f i c i e n t guidance  M a r t i n had e a r l i e r r e c o g n i z e d t h a t " i f  ....", a l t h o u g h Mr.  the s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v e s i n t e r n a l d i s o r d e r , i t w i l l be v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o l a y down a c l e a r cut mandate.  There w i l l be o t h e r k i n d s o f s i t u a t i o n where the degree o f  consensus e x i s t i n g i n the C o u n c i l i s so f r a g i l e t h a t n o t h i n g can be agreed  on  18 o t h e r than a g e n e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n t o prevent  c o n f l i c t or to supervise a t r u c e . "  These passages from the same speech show j u s t how  difficult  i t would be  f o r the Canadian Government t o l a y down f i r m g u i d e l i n e s f o r o c c a s i o n s when i t  - 134 would o r would not agree t o serve as p a r t o f a peacekeeping f o r c e . r e a l l y s a y i n g t h a t Canada might  Was  Mr.  r e f u s e t o serve where " i n t e r n a l d i s o r d e r " was  f a c t o r , o r where "the degree o f consensus ... / i s  such7  that nothing  can be  on o t h e r t h a n a g e n e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n t o p r e v e n t c o n f l i c t or t o s u p e r v i s e One  Martin a  agreed  a truce"?  would hope n o t , because t h e s e would seem l i k e l y t o be p r e c i s e l y the s i t u a t i o n s  most dangerous t o w o r l d peace where i t would be most important t o make some c o n t r i b u t i o n , however s m a l l , t o e a s i n g The  1970  tensions.  White Paper on F o r e i g n P o l i c y , "A F o r e i g n P o l i c y f o r Canadians",  suggested t h a t t h e r e would be a change i n d i r e c t i o n , or a t l e a s t a s h i f t i n Canadian f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  No  l o n g e r would the major e f f o r t be i n c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o world peace o r i n e a s i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s ; i n l o o k i n g a f t e r Canada's own  i n emphasis,  interests.  the main emphasis now  To many c r i t i c s , i t seemed t h a t  would the  framers o f t h a t new  p o l i c y f a i l e d t o show t h a t p a r t i c u l a r Canadian i n t e r e s t s had  e v e r been n e g l e c t e d  i n the p u r s u i t o f world g o a l s .  And  t o g a i n than most from the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f w o r l d peace.  Canada p r o b a b l y We  no  be  has more  longer l i v e i n " a  f i r e p r o o f house, f a r from the scene o f c o n f l a g r a t i o n " , i f indeed  we  ever d i d .  I t seems l i k e l y t h a t those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r Canadian f o r e i g n p o l i c y have s i n c e found t h a t the d i r e c t i o n o f t h a t p o l i c y s i n c e the war own,  and  the 1973  cannot be  changed o v e r n i g h t .  has  a momentum o f i t s  I t i s t r u e t h a t Canada d i d withdraw from  ICC's f o r Vietnam, but t h e r e are s e v e r a l i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h a t body  never intended  i n any  c o u l d withdraw w i t h  case as more than window d r e s s i n g behind which the  some measure o f d i g n i t y .  (The  f a c t t h a t the U.S.  a p p a r e n t l y without prolonged o b j e c t i o n , a Commission composed o f two and two t h i s was  non-Communist members, i s one p r e c i s e l y the composition  such i n d i c a t i o n .  s o l v e d i n the f i n a l days.)  U.S.  accepted, Communist  I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d  that  o f the o l d t r u c e s u p e r v i s o r y body i n Korea;  Communist e f f o r t s t o c r e a t e a body o f t h a t k i n d t o s u p e r v i s e the 1954 Cease F i r e n e a r l y brought the 1954  was  Geneva Conference to a h a l t and was  Moreover a f t e r n e a r l y twenty y e a r s  Vietnam only re-  i t would have been  - 135 d i f f i c u l t t o say t h a t Canada had Canada has cause i t has  an o b l i g a t i o n t o s t a y  not been i n v o l v e d i n peacekeeping so f r e q u e n t l y simply  s u i t e d Canadians t o be  i n v o l v e d simply  because she had  involved.  In many cases Canada has  c a p a b i l i t i e s t h a t no  f a c t t h a t Canada i s a b i l i n g u a l c o u n t r y , our h i g h and  the  on. be-  been  other nation possessed.  The  s t a t e o f i n d u s t r i a l development,  s o p h i s t i c a t e d equipment o f the Canadian armed f o r c e s , as w e l l as our  long  e x p e r i e n c e i n peacekeeping, w i l l no doubt c o n t i n u e to make us d e s i r a b l e members o f peacekeeping b o d i e s .  We  can expect t h e n t h a t i n dangerous and  n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s t h e r e w i l l be take p a r t i n peacekeeping It dangerous and  considerable  pressure  brought t o bear on us  to  seems l i k e l y t h a t i n the world o f the f u t u r e t h e r e w i l l be more d i f f i c u l t i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s r a t h e r than l e s s , more times occur.  In t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s what-  ever c o n t r i b u t i o n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l peacekeeping body can make may the e f f o r t , no m a t t e r how  s m a l l t h a t c o n t r i b u t i o n may  t h a t Canada c o u l d f i n d h e r s e l f again as f r u s t r a t i n g as the  been.  inter-  operations.  when s i t u a t i o n s t h a t are not t o our l i k i n g  and  difficult  be.  The  w e l l be  worth  chances seem good  a p a r t o f a peacekeeping group as  difficult  I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l Commissions i n I n d o c h i n a have  - 136 -  CHAPTER V I I I FOOTNOTES.  1. 2. 3. 4. 5.  6.  7. 8. 9. 10. 11.  Canadian Government P r e s s R e l e a s e o f J u l y 27, 1954. " Quoted i n E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , August, 1954, p . 258 Dagg, op. c i t . , p . H/3 Cmnd. 1755 P a u l B r i d l e , op. c i t . , p . 432 i b i d . , p . 446 Cmnd. 2609 i b i d . , p. 5 i b i d . , p . 12 ibid. i b i d . , p . 14 House o f Commons, Debates, March 8, 1965 pp. 12065-7 i b i d . , p . 12066  12. 13.  op. c i t . , p. 446-7  14. 15. 16. 17.  External Affairs, i b i d . , p . 259 ibid. External Affairs.  18.  i b i d . , pp. 240-241  August 1954, p . 258  June, 1967, pp. 239-244  - 137 -  BIBLIOGRAPHY.  A.  Newspapers and  Periodicals.  The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r Current  History  The Economist The New  York Times  The Times  (London)  B.  Chen, K.,  A r t i c l e s i n Journals.  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