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The epistemology of the transformation problem in Marx’s Capital Nelson, Malcolm MacKinnon 1975

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THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE 'TRANSFORMATION PROBLEM' IN MARX'S CAPITAL by MALCOLM MACKINNON NELSON B.A. (Hons.), Simon Fraser University, 1971 A Thesis Submitted i n P a r t i a l Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of Anthropology and Sociology We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA APRIL 1975 In presenting th i s thes i s in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment o f the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary shal l make it f ree ly ava i lab le for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th i s thes i s for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th is thes i s f o r f i nanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my writ ten permission. Department of ••*»*> The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date -Omit C r e s t Date * ® ' No. o f v o l . B i n d e v e r y t h i n g u A s i s " B i n d a l l b u t back c o v e r s Put TPC i n 1st book No Mai n TP Use f r o n t c o v e r no . No. mai n- c o n t e n t s No main i n d e x I n d i v i d u a l , c o n t e n t s ; Tog. a t f r o n t Where t h e y appear Inc 1 ude a 11 t e x t i n: F r o n t a d v t s . Back a d v t s . V o 1 s . s e p . by ; k r a f t & s t i f f a d v t s . V o 1 s . s p l i t i n t o b o o k s : Put Index i n book f r o n t c o v e r P o c k e t F o l d e d m a t e r i a l T r i m Co 1 our A r rangemen t C R - 5 CO o 2^ o J £ i © V3 >< o - i i -ABSTRACT T h i s t h e s i s i n t r o d u c e s the arguments of the new French S t r u c t u r a l i s t school of Marxism l e d by L o u i s A l t h u s s e r , and attempts t o t e s t the v a l i d i t y of t h e i r p r o p o s a l s by a p p l y i n g them t o a t r a d i t i o n a l economic problem i n C a p i t a l ; t h a t of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem. The f i r s t c h a pter o u t l i n e s the s t r u c t u r a l i s t perspec-t i v e , i t ' s uniqueness, and it»s e f f e c t on a r e a d i n g of Marx, by comparing i t t o the more popul a r t h e o r e t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s w i t h i n Marxism of h i s t o r i c i s m and humanism. The c o n c l u s i o n s of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i t ' s e p i s t e m o l o g l c a l rami-f i c a t i o n s , are then extended i n a re-examination of E n g e l s ' r e l a t i o n s h i p t o Marx, and the determinate r o l e which he (Engels) p l a y e d i n " i n t e r p r e t i n g " h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . Working from Engels' understanding of the t r a n s f o r -mation problem (the t r a n s i t i o n from volume I t o volume, I I I i n C a p i t a l ) , the extant l i t e r a t u r e surrounding the debate I s i n t r o d u c e d i n chapter t h r e e , and s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n i s p a i d to how the b a s i c premises of t h i s problem have r e - s u r f a c e d i n r ecent n e o - R i c a r d i a n debates. I n other words, an attempt i s made t o c o n s t r u c t a continuum between the e a r l y c r i t i c i s m s of Marx, — Bohm-Bawerk", B o r t k i e w i t z , e t c . — and the r a t i o n a l e of P l e r r o S r a f f a * s work as i t has been employed by Maurice Dobb and Ronald Meek. - i i i - -F o l l o w i n g t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , the e a r l y t h e o r e t i c a l r o o t s of the l a b o u r theory of value — i . e., Adam Smith and David R i c a r d o — are developed so as to p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r understanding Marx's t h e o r e t i c a l "break" with the t r a d i t i o n a l o b j e c t of p o l i t i c a l economy. Here, the emphasis i s p l a c e d on the d i s s i m i l a r i t y of Marx's problematic from t h a t of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy, and how t h i s d i s s i m i l a r i t y i s due to h i s new e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . The i n t e n t of t h i s study i s t o i l l u s t r a t e t h a t , by f o l l o w i n g the s t r u c t u r a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of C a p i t a l , the " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem" i s , and never was, an o b s t a c l e i n the l o g i c of Marx's d i s c o u r s e ; secondly, t h a t the " i s s u e " of the " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem has had i t ' s r o o t s i n a s e r i e s of e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l misconceptions over the r e a l nature of Marx's probl e m a t i c i n C a p i t a l . I n s h o r t , t h i s t h e s i s attempts t o i d e n t i f y a new o b j e c t i n Marx's work ac c o r d i n g to the s t r u c t u r a l i s t r e a d i n ? . - i v -TABLE OF CONTENTS Page T i t l e Page 1 Abstract i i Table of Contents i v L i s t of Tables v i i Introduction 1 CHAPTER I Questions Concerning Epistemology 8 Weszaro•s Humanism 10 A Critique of Philosophical Anthropology 2k Colletti» s Hiistoriclsm Jk The Meaning of History . 37 Empiricism and Historicism, Both an E s s e n t i a l Hegelianism kj Summary Sk CHAPTER II Engelsson Marx's Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Engels and Hegel 58 Engels' Notion of H i s t o r i c a l Materialism 6? Engels' Interpretation of Marx's Concept of History 71 - V -Page The Transformation Problem • ?8 Engels, and the Labour Theory of Value 80 Marx's Transformation . 8^ Von Bortkiewitz and 'Marx's Error' 93 The Transformation Problem and the Return to Ricardo 109 CHAPTER IV The Form of a New Solution 125 Part A: Theories of C l a s s i c a l P o l i t i c a l Economy Adam Smith 126 Embodied Versus Command Theory of Value 130 David Ricardo 137 Ricardo's Critique of Smith l 4 l Part B: Marx Versus P o l i t i c a l Economy 155 Marx's Re d e f i n i t i o n of Use-Value and Exchange-Value 155 i ) The Invariable Measure of Value 170 Significance of Marx's D i s t i n c t i o n s 177 Summary • 185 CHAPTER V Is the Transformation Problem Irrelevant? 186 The Law of Value and the Equivalent Exchange . . . . 190 How do the S t r u c t u r a l i s t s Situate the Trans-formation Problem 197 In Conclusion: Structuralism and the Sympto-matic Reading 199 - v i -Page Bibliography 203 - v i i -LIST OF TABLES Page Table I Marx' s Transformation Table 92 Table II Equilibrium Model 97 Table III Marx* s Value Model Under Equilibrium Conditions 98 Table IV Marx's Price C a l c u l a t i o n . . . . . . . 98 Table V Pr i c e s of Production According to Bortkiewitz 99 Table VI Sraffa's Subsistence Economy I l l Table VII Surplus Producing System 113 Table VIII A Random "Unproportloned" Economic System 119 Table IX 'Proportional' Industry 119 - 1 -INTRODUCTION T h i s t h e s i s i n t r o d u c e s what f o r many w i l l be a new p e r s p e c t i v e i n the t r a d i t i o n of M a r x i s t p h i l o s o p h y . The ch a l l e n g e of i n t r o d u c i n g the arguments of L o u i s A l t h u s s e r , and what has become known as the " s t r u c t u r a l i s t s " school has been motivated by the i n c r e a s i n g number of world-wide and u n u s u a l l y sharp c o n t r o v e r s i e s on the l e f t . I n the l a s t few ye a r s i t has become more and more Important, both p o l i t i c a l l y and t h e o r e t i c a l l y , f o r the p r i n c i p l e s of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t ' s paradigm t o be expanded and put to t e s t and t h i s i s the endeavor of t h i s t h e s i s . The fundamental i s s u e s which are e x p l o r e d here concern the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s surrounding the l a t e r w r i t i n g s of Marx, and i n p a r t i c u l a r those d e v e l o p i n g out of C a p i t a l . I n t t h e arguments which are to f o l l o w , I s h a l l propose, by u t i l i z i n g the s t r u c t u r a l i s t r e a d i n g of Marx, t h a t the key to most of the misunderstandings i n C a p i t a l are a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the i n c o r r e c t e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of the "orthodox l e f t " . To t e s t the s t r u c t u r a l i s t ' s p o s i t i o n we s h a l l examine a t r a d i t i o n a l economic problem i n C a p i t a l (the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem), i n context of the broader e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s which the s t r u c t u r a l i s t s have i n t r o d u c e d . An o b j e c t i o n may be made t h a t , by a c c e p t i n g , r a t h e r u n c r i t i c a l l y , the premises of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t ' s argument, t h i s t h e s i s f a l l s i n i t ' s attempt t o t e s t t h e i r s u p p o s i t i o n s . However, the i n t e n t of - 25 — t h i s study i s not as much to p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y debate the v a l i d i t y of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t paradigm* as t o i s o l a t e and extend t h e i r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s onto those "so-c a l l e d " anomalies w i t h i n C a p i t a l . I n t h i s way, through what Thomas Kuhn has d e s c r i b e d as the p r o c e s s of "normal s c i e n c e " , and which i m p l i e s the p r o v i s i o n a l acceptance of a paradigm, I hope t o be able t o s u b s t a n t i a t e the c l a i m s of s t r u c t u r a l i s t , and to a l l i n t e n s i v e purposes, f u r t h e r e s t a b l i s h i t as a compatible r e a d i n g of Marx. U n f o r t u n a t e l y the development of t h i s complex i n t e r -r e l a t i o n s h i p between q u e s t i o n s of epistemology and the t r a n s -f o r m a t i o n problem has n e c e s s i t a t e d t h a t I provide o n l y v i g -n e t t e s , as i t were, of the w r i t i n g s of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t , and no attempt i s made t o t r e a t t h e i r e n t i r e works i n t h e i r systematic content. Thus we b e g i n , i n chapter one, with a schematic p r e -s e n t a t i o n of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t t h e s i s by comparing i t with two more po p u l a r " M a r x i s t " t h e o r i e s ; h i s t o r i c i s m and humanism. To be sure, the arguments of t h i s f i r s t c hapter may appear to be extraneous t o the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem, but through the course of t h i s t h e s i s I i n t e n d t o demonstrate why i n f a c t 1. Paradigm, i n t h i s c o n t e x t , i s s i m i l a r t o Thomas Kuhn's d e s c r i p t i o n of a paradigm as t h a t p r o c e s s which r e -c o n s t r u c t s new fundamentals " h a n d l i n g the same bundle of data as b e f o r e , but p l a c i n g them i n a new system of r e l a t i o n s w i t h one another by g i v i n g them a d i f f e r e n t framework". The  S t r u c t u r e of S c i e n t i f i c R e v o l u t i o n , p. 8 5 , 1 9 6 2 . these arguments are v i t a l t o the s o l u t i o n of t h i s problem. Among thej.more s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t s e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h i s chap-t e r are the r a d i c a l d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t p o s i t i o n , t h a t i s t o say, i t ' s anti-humanist and a h i s t o r i c a l r e a d i n g of Marx, as w e l l as the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r o o t s f o r our l a t e r c r i t i c i s m of E n g e l s ' " h i s t o r i e l s m " . E s s e n t i a l l y we w i l l be d i s c u s s i n g the v a r i o u s ways one may schematize h i s -t o r y , and the problems of p e r c e p t i o n which t h i s q u e s t i o n i n -v o l v e s , between the object of knowledge and the obj e c t i t s e l f . A l t h u s s e r has been accused i n t h i s debate of a c c e p t i n g a s e p a r a t i o n of subject and o b j e c t , of r e v i v i n g the K a n t i a n d u a l i t y , because he sees the order of concepts as being d i f -f e r e n t from the order of the r e a l . T h i s does not mean th a t f o r A l t h u s s e r the concepts are never adequate t o t h e i r o b j e c t , what i t does mean i s th a t the order i n thought must be com-p l e t e l y c o n s c i o u s of i t ' s subject ( i . e., because the subject may never r e a l l y know the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f ) . F o r A l t h u s s e r the concept i s adequate t o i t ' s o b j e c t , which i s an o b j e c t i n theor y . The q u e s t i o n b a s i c a l l y r e v o l v e s around the adequacy of the concept t o i t ' s o b j e c t . He thus i n t r o d u c e s the 'con-cept of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' (as opposed t o r e f l e c t i o n ) i n the famous n o t i o n of Dart S t e l l u n g . In NO r e s p e c t does A l t h u s s e r agree with Kant, i n s t e a d he d e a l s with Kant's unknowable "thing»in-itself" as a f i c t i t i o u s o b j e c t t h a t i s no t h i n g more than the f a l s e knowledge of c l a s s i c a l metaphysics. In chapter two, the problems of E n g e l s 1 e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l assumption are examined i n d e t a i l . The po i n t t o be made here, - 4 - • f o l l o w i n g the f i r s t chapter, i s t h a t E n g e l s does not p r o g r e s s beyond the c o n f i n e s of Hegel's p e r c e p t i o n of the o b j e c t and subject r e l a t i o n s h i p , and t h a t i n f a c t , he simply r e p l a c e s the H e g e l i a n "Absolute Idea" ( a s the su b j e c t of the p r o c e s s ) , with "Absolute H i s t o r y " , By demonstrating an I n t e r c o n n e c t i o n between E n g e l s ' e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s u p p o s i t i o n s and h i s ex-p l a n a t i o n of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem, i t becomes c l e a r t h a t E n g e l s , and the " h i s t o r i c i s t " r e a d i n g i n g e n e r a l , does not i d e n t i f y the r e a l p r o b l e m a t i c of C a p i t a l and hence cannot s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s o l v e the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n debate. F i n a l l y , i n chapter t h r e e , c o n s i d e r a b l e time i s spent o u t l i n i n g the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem through a synopsis of the extant l i t e r a t u r e on the s u b j e c t . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , here we examine how and why such M a r x i s t c r i t i c s as Bohm-Bawerk, and Ludwig B o r t k i e w i t z have l o c a t e d the t r a n s f o r -mation problem as "the A c h i l l e s h e e l " o f Marx's system. Furthermore I attempt t o prove t h a t B o r t k i e w i t z ' s argument i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h a t the l a t e r day q u a n t i t a t i v e and e m p i r i c i s t r e a d i n g s of Marx d i r e c t l y appear t o stem from these o r i g i n a l c r i t i c i s m s . F o r example, the more r e c e n t w r i t i n g s o f the Neo-Ricardians, e s p e c i a l l y S r a f f a ' s d i s -c u s s i o n of the l a b o u r theory of v a l u e , are d i s c u s s e d i n terms of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p with B o r t k i e w i t z and Bawerk's p r o b l e m a t i c . Through t h i s k i n d o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n , an attempt i s made t o exemplify a continuum between these e a r l i e r arguments and some of the more r e c e n t e f f o r t s of M a r x i s t economists. Ronald Meek and Maurice Dobb are used as examples t o i l l u s t r a t e j u s t - 5 -how the S r a f f i a n p r o b l e m a t i c has been t r a n s f e r r e d onto the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem by M a r x i s t s i n hopes of c o u n t e r i n g c r i t i c i s m made by such r e c e n t opponents as P a u l Samuelson. The t h e o r e t i c a l core t o both Meek and Dobb» s p o s i t i o n , we s h a l l f i n d , i s t h a t Marx d i d s u c c e s s f u l l y " s o l v e " , or at l e a s t attempt t o so l v e , the e a r l i e r d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered by R i c a r d o i n h i s defense of the la b o u r t h e o r y of value — i . e., as the onl y means f o r s t a n d a r d i z i n g a commodity's v a l u e . However, t h i s t h e s i s argues t h a t Marx d i d not simply extend the pr o b l e m a t i c of Adam Smith or R i c a r d o , even a l -though t h e i r language was, by n e c e s s i t y , o f t e n s i m i l a r . I n other words, t h i s t h e s i s argues that Marx i n t r o d u c e d a new paradigm which e f f e c t i v e l y t r a n s g r e s s e d the p e r i m e t e r s of c l a s s i c a l economic thought, and that t h i s new paradigm i s l o c a t e d i n the t h e o r e t i c a l s t r u c t u r e of mode of p r o d u c t i o n . Moreover, i t argues t h a t we have not been able t o reco g n i z e t h i s "break" w i t h the c l a s s i c a l paradigm, i n f a c t we have s t i f l e d such a n o t i o n as a "break", p r e c i s e l y because we have continued t o read Marx* s pr o b l e m a t i c only i n terms of 2 the c l a s s i c a l n o t i o n of economics. ( f o o t n o t e on next page) Having at l e a s t posed the q u e s t i o n i n chapter t h r e e , i t i s the ta s k of chapter f o u r t o enlarge upon the c r i t i c a l elements i n Marx's break w i t h c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy. - 6 -This i s done i n two ways; f i r s t , a lengthy synopsis of the works and thought of both Ricardo and Smith i s presented to show the i n t r i n s i c s i m i l a r i t y of t h e i r problematics. Secondly, an attempt i s made to substantiate the uniqueness of Marx's notion of value, use-value, and exchange-value through h i s own comments and c r i t i c i s m s of c l a s s i c a l economics as well as by reconstructing the questions which C a p i t a l addresses. I t i s especially through t h i s l a t t e r perspective that the transformation, or the t r a n s i t i o n from volume one to volume three, can be understood and explained v i s a v i s the s t r u c t u r a l i s t frame of reference. The t h e o r e t i c a l movement within C a p i t a l i s thus found not to proceed from the more abstract to the more concrete as Sweezy has stated, but from the general to the p a r t i c u l a r ; i . e., volume one constructs the general notion of mode of/production and volume three i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s construct under>>peculiar ( c a p i t a l i s t ) con-d i t i o n s . 2. Marx's comments i n a c i r c u l a r l e t t e r to Bebel are appropriate; "There are attempts to bring s u p e r f i c i a l l y mastered s o c i a l i s t ideas into harmony with the exceedingly varied t h e o r e t i c a l standpoints which these gentlemen (petty bourgeois i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the party) have brought with them from the un i v e r s i t y or elsewhere and of which owing to the  process of decomposition which the remnants of German P h i l o -sophy are at present undergoing, one i s more confused than the other. Instead of thoroughly studying the new science themselves to begin with, each of them preferred to trim i t to f i t the point of view he had already brought along". (My Emphasis), Marx & Engels; Selected Works, Volume I I I , P. 93. The f i n a l chapter t r i e s to embricate the epistemo-logical problems directly into the transformation problem, as well as pointing in general terms to the effect of the structuralist reading on the labour theory of value. In summary, I propose to examine the epistemology of the transformation problem in five stages: 1. Examination of some of the divergent views on the questions of what historical materialism comprises, and in particular i t ' s interpretation in Capital. 2. Illustration of how Engels, rather than being the orthodox interpreter of Marx, actually provided the stimulus for revising histo r i c a l materialism into an Economlsm. 3. Articulation of the highlights of the transformation debate and correlate the arguments to recent Marxist tendencies. 4. Identification, through the development of classical economic theory, of the fundamental distinctiveness of Marx's problematic and the implications i t has upon an understanding of historical materialism. 5. Summation of the structuralist contributions to an understanding of Capital, and i t ' s effect on the labour theory of value. - 8 -" t h i s f r o n t i e r i s impassable i n p r i n c i p l e be-cause i t cannot be a f r o n t i e r , because th e r e i s no common homogeneous space ( s p i r i t or r e a l ) between the a b s t r a c t of the concept of a t h i n g and the e m p i r i c a l concrete of t h i s t h i n g which would j u s t i f y the use of the concept of a f r o n -t i e r " . 1 CHAPTER I Q u e s t i o n s Concerning Epistemology E s s e n t i a l t o any understanding of Marx's w r i t i n g s i s a knowledge of h i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . Des-p i t e the seeming obviousness of t h i s statement, i t i s of paramount importance, p r e c i s e l y because of the l a c k i n Marx's own w r i t i n g s of a t e x t c l e a r l y s p e c i f y i n g h i s methodology. The p r o b l e m a t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of Marx* s method or of d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m i s r e f l e c t e d i n the money s u b s t i t u t e which have been p r o f f e r e d i n i t ' s absence; and by the p o l i t i c a l d e v i a t i o n s from s c i e n t i f i c s o c i a l i s m which have c h a r a c t e r i z e d the Communist movement i n the 20th century. What I propose t o attempt i n t h i s f i r s t chapter, i s an i n t r o d u c t i o n t o some of the key t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n s i n the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l debate amongst M a r x i s t s c h o l a r s today. You must re c o g n i z e t h a t t h i s debate i f i t were developed 1. L o u i s A l t h u s s e r , Reading C a p i t a l , p. 190 - 9 -f u l l y , would r e q u i r e a study i n i t s e l f , so I have here c i r -cumvented a l l but the e s s e n t i a l d i s p a r i t i e s . Before b e g i n -n i n g , l e t me f i r s t comment on what I b e l i e v e t o be the f e c u n d i t y of such a l i m i t e d examination. F i r s t , i n the e x p l i c a t i o n of the s p e c i f i c i t y of what has been d e s c r i b e d as 2 the • s t r u c t u r a l i s t ' p o s i t i o n , I hope t o be abl e t o i l l u s -t r a t e t h a t , from t h i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n , we may read Marx's C a p i t a l i n a r a d i c a l l y new f a s h i o n , one which promises to overcome some of the h e r e t o f o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y enigmatic d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Marx's d i s c o u r s e . Secondly, I i n t e n d t o show the e f f e c t of the e p l s -t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n , or p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m a t i c t o f c e r t a i n t h e o r i s t s i n t h e i r ' s o l u t i o n ' of the ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem'. With t h i s i n mind, my extremely schematic p r e s e n t a t i o n of the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n i s , I t h i n k , j u s t i f i e d i f o n l y because of i t ' s a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r the reader t o l o c a t e the unique r u b r i c s of the argument which f o l l o w s . To f a c i l i t a t e the understanding of the ' t r a n s f o r -mation problem' debate I have decided t o compare the * s t r u c -t u r a l i s t s ' p o s i t i o n — the w r i t i n g s of L o u i s A l t h u s s e r , E t i e n n e B a l i b a r , Jacques R a n c i e r e , e t c . — with the two p r e -2. T h i s i s r a t h e r a vague and m i s l e a d i n g term — f o r the most comprehensive e x p r e s s i o n of i t ' s p r i n c i p l e s one should r e f e r t o the r e s p e c t i v e authors mentioned below. - 10 vailing interpretations of Marx's thought; the principles of The Humanists which are here represented by the writings of Istvon Meszaros, and those of The Historicists, represented by Luclo c o l l e t t i . I begin then with an examination of the Humanist's theses, working from the presumption that the reader has at least a limited knowledge of both 'Struc-turalism' and 'The Humanism'. Meszaros' Humanism We find that i n his recent book, 'Marx on Alienation', Meszaros depicts the principles of 'economics' within Marx's Philosophic and Economic Manuscripts of 18^4 as a new phenomenon in the writings of the young Hegelians. It i s this new element, which, he believes, linked with the phenomenon of 'estranged labour' and the •supersession' J of labour's self-alienation, provides the real overriding pro-blem within the Manuscripts. Indeed this problematic, Mes-zaros conjectures, stands unaltered even i n Marx's later writings; i n other words, the object of Capital like that of the Manuscripts continues to articulate the "'transcendence of labour's s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n ' F o r Meszaros, and many other •Marxists', the uniqueness of Marx's theory of historical 3. L. Althusser remarks on this "innocent but sly concept of 'supersession' (Aufhebung) ... (as) merely the empty anticipation of it's end in the i l l u s i o n of an immanence of truth", For Marx, p. 82. 4. Istvon Meszaros, Marx on Alienation, p. 19. materialism i n these early works i s characterized hy a synthesis of the problematic of the young Hegelians (the d i a l e c t i c ) and Marx"s c r i t i c a l economic analysis (Indeed Marx himself had remarked that h i s discoveries were estab-li s h e d "by means of a wholly empirical analysis based on a conscientious c r i t i c a l study of p o l i t i c a l economy").^ For them, the key to Marx's the s i s i s located i n the conjuncture of Hegel and P o l i t i c a l Economy, or better, i n the product of t h i s conjuncture — Marx's theory of a l i e n a t i o n . In re-i n f o r c i n g t h i s proposition, Meszaros' book surveys i n great d e t a i l the main phases i n the development of the concept of a l i e n a t i o n preceding Marx. For example i n chapter two he follows the concept through the r e l i g i o u s • Judeo-Christian' sphere; feudal society; and the presuppositions of both the anthropological and i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n s . He divides the h i s -t o r i c a l conceptual background into two ontological schools, the h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i v i s t s (the philosophers of enllghtment, etc.) and the d i a l e c t i c a l h l s t o r i c i s t s (Hegel, etc.) Both express fundamentally opposing approaches to the concept of man, either as anthropological man, or h i s t o r i c a l man i n an i d e a l i s t sense. What was necessary, according to Meszaros, f o r a r e a l understanding of the phenomenon of al i e n a t i o n , was a m a t e r i a l i s t d i a l e c t i c a l ontology. And the 5. Marx, Philosophic and Economic Manuscripts of 1844. ed. Struick, p. 63. - 1 2 — c r e d i t , " t h e r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g i d e a s o f such a s y n t h e s i s , how-ev e r d i d n o t appear i n t h e h i s t o r y o f human thought b e f o r e t h e s k e t c h i n g s o f Marx's Economic M a n u s c r i p t s " . ^ The f a i l u r e o f a l l p r e v i o u s p h i l o s o p h e r s l a y i n t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o go beyond t h e a p r i o r l s m s o f t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l o n t o l o g y . T h i s s h i f t i n p e r s p e c t i v e which Marx i s t o make, ( i . e., h i s g r e a t t h e o r e t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n ) , i n v o l v e d , a t l e a s t f o r M e s z a r o s "The c r i t i c a l a d o p t i o n of t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f l a b o u r f rom which t h e c a p i t a l i s t i c p r o c e s s o f o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n c o u l d appear a s a 7 p r o c e s s o f a l i e n a t i o n " . I n i l l u s t r a t i n g Marx's p o s i t i o n as one which i s r a d i c a l l y new he summarizes t h r e e g e n e r a l phases i n t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l development p r i o r t o Marx's concept o f a l i e n a t i o n : f i r s t , t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a c r i t i q u e o f a l i e n a t i o n by Rousseau and S c h i l l e r ; second, t h e s p e c u l a t i v e i d e a l i s m o f H e g e l w i t h i t ' s n e c e s s i t y o f s u p p r e s s i o n o f c a p i t a l i s t i c a l i e n a t i o n ; t h i r d , and f i n a l l y , t h e s c h o o l o f young H e g e l i a n s whose p r o p o s i t i o n of e l i m i n a t i n g c a p i t a l i s t a l i e n a t i o n was based on a c r i t i c a l s p e c u l a t i v e method combined w i t h m o r a l 6. M e s z a r o s , p. 19* 7. I b i d . , p. 6^. L i k e w i s e L u k a c ' s comments i n ' H i s -t o r y and G l a s s C o n s c i o u s n e s s ' , " I c a n s t i l l remember even t o -day t h e overwhelming e f f e c t p roduced i n me by Marx's s t a t e -ment t h a t o b j e c t i v i t y was the p r i m a r y m a t e r i a l a t t r i b u t e of a l l t h i n g s and r e l a t i o n s . T h i s l i n k s up w i t h t h e i d e a a l r e a d y mentioned t h a t o b j e c t i f i o a t l o n i s a n a t u r a l means by which man m a s t e r s t h e w o r l d and a s such i t c a n be e i t h e r p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e f a c t . By c o n t r a s t , a l i e n a t i o n i s a s p e c i a l v a r i a n t o f t h a t a c t i v i t y t h a t becomes o p e r a t i v e i n d e f i n i t e s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s " , p. x x x v i . - 13— p o s t u l a t e s . Thus v e r y l i t t l e emphasis, i n f a c t , v e r y l i t t l e mention i s made by Meszaros, of Feuerbach, as be i n g s i g -n i f i c a n t i n the ' i n t e r n a l development' of the concept f o r Marx. C h r o n o l o g i c a l l y , i n f a c t , h e sees Marx c o n f r o n t i n g the prob l e m a t i c of a l i e n a t i o n as e a r l y as the C r i t i q u e of the H e g e l i a n P h i l o s o p h y of the Right (1843) and a l s o i n the Jewish Q u e s t i o n (1843), however Marx's understanding of the problem at t h i s p a r t i c u l a r time was hampered because he was econ o m i c a l l y n a i v e , and thu s h i s a n a l y s i s was onl y p a r t i a l . F o r Meszaros, the concept of a l i e n a t e d l a b o u r t r u l y became manifest i n i t ' s u n i v e r s a l e x p l i c a t i o n w i t h i n the 'Economic  and P h i l o s o p h i c M a n u s c r i p t s of 1844*• He expounds, f o r Instance, t h a t " I n the co n c r e t e r e a l i z a t i o n of the poten-t i a l i t y of Marx's genius, h i s grasp of the concept of 'labo u r s s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n ' r e p r e s e n t e d the c r u c i a l element: Q the Archemedian p o i n t of h i s great s y n t h e s i s " . Thus i t I s i n the "1844 Manuscripts" t h a t Marx r e p u t a b l y r e c o g n i z e d p r o -d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y ( l a b o u r ) as the mediator between man and nature ; the nexus of h i s concept of a l i e n a t i o n thus becomes c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the r o l e which p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y p l a y s i n the f o r m a t i o n of s o c i a l c o n sciousness. I t i s through t h i s c e n t r a l r o l e ( I l l u s t r a t e d w i t h i n the "Manuscripts") of a c t i v i t y , o r l a b o u r ' s s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n , t h a t the pr o c e s s of r e i f i c a t i o n t r a n s f e r s s o c i a l a l i e n a t i o n i n t o the c o n s c i o u s -ness of man. And i t i s the r o l e of the mediator between Man 8. I b i d . , p. 76 and Nature p l a y e d by l a b o u r which o n t o l o g i c a l l y l i n k s Marx with Hegel's m o n i s t i c p e r s p e c t i v e of ' i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y ' . He w r i t e s , " I t may seem p a r o d o x i c a l at f i r s t t h a t , i n s p i t e of the m a t e r i a l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n shared by both Marx and Feuerbach, and i n s p i t e of the much c l o s e r p o l i t i c a l a f f i n i t y between them t h a n Marx and Hegel, the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t Marx and the i d e a l i s t Hegel i s incom-Q p a r a b l y more deeply r o o t e d than Marx and Feuerbach". I n other words, whereas f o r Hegel the n o t i o n of ' i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y * was the i n a d v e r s i t y of l i n k i n g Man and Nature (o f overcoming K a n t i a n d u a l i s m ) , Marx's genius was t o i n v e r t , t o r e p l a c e ' i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y ' with p r o -d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y i n g e n e r a l . Consequently Feuerbach's K a n t i a n d u a l i s t i c approach was i r r e c o n c i l a b l e w i t h Marx, as Meszaros adds, 'For dualism remains dualism even i f i t I s 10 t u r n e d the other way around'. The f o r m u l a t i o n of ( a l i e n a t e d ) l a b o u r ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r o l e ( a c c o r d i n g t o Mes-zaros) p r e s e n t s the u n d e r l y i n g f o u n d a t i o n s of the whole of the l a t e r Marxian 'system' developed i n C a p i t a l ; i t d e f i n e s 9 . I b i d . , p. 85 . 10. I b i d . , p. 86, On the same hand A l t h u s s e r w r i t e s i n For Marx "...'the s e t t i n g back on t o i t ' s f e e t ' of the H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y ( d i a l e c t i c ) f o r i f i t were r e a l l y a matter merely of an I n v e r s i o n , a r e s t o r a t i o n of what had been upside down, i t i s c l e a r t h a t t o t u r n an o b j e c t r i g h t around changes n e i t h e r i t ' s nature nor i t ' s content by v i r t u e merely of a r o t a t i o n * " , p. 7 3 . - 15 -the r e a l p e r i m e t e r s of Marx's c o n c e p t u a l framework; "The Man u s c r i p t s of 1844, as we have seen" s t a t e s Meszaros " l a y down the f o u n d a t i o n s of the Marxian system, c e n t e r e d on the 11 concept of a l i e n a t i o n " . T h i s i s t o say t h a t Marx's l a t e r works ( i n c l u d i n g C a p i t a l ) . e m p i r i c a l l y s u b s t a n t i a t e the con-cept of a l i e n a t e d l a b o u r , e f f e c t i v e l y i l l u s t r a t i n g how t h i s a l i e n a t i o n i s r e a f f i r m e d by the m y s t i f y i n g b o u r g e o i s n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s , p h i l o s o p h y , and p o l i t i c a l economy, e t c . I n other words, we are t o l d t h a t Marx demonstrated how these d i s -c i p l i n e s r e f l e c t a f e t i s h i c i z e d e x i s t e n c e through t h e i r i n t e g r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with commodity p r o d u c t i o n , s p e c i f i c a l l y because they a ct as r e l f i c a t i o n s of the r e l a t i o n s and means 12 of p r o d u c t i o n . Hence a l i e n a t i o n as seen through the eyes of the mediator (the l a b o u r e r here as the subject of the process) i s a s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l n e c e s s i t y , determined uncon-s c i o u s l y , i n response t o the b a s i c c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y and l a b o u r . A ' s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l n e c e s s i t y ' a l s o i n the sense t h a t l a b o u r a c t s as both the c r e a t o r of new needs, and at the same time as the means f o r a s s e r t i n g man's supremacy over nature and consequently of s a t i s f y i n g these needs. What Meszaros p o r t r a y s Marx as c r i t i c i z i n g 11. I b i d . , p. 93. 12. C f . , pp. 112-4. I b i d . Or a g a i n Lukac's i n H i s t o r y and C l a s s Consciousness w r i t e s " T h i s t a k e s r e -i f l c a t i o n t o i t ' s u l t i m a t e extreme: i t no lon g e r p o i n t s d i a l e c t l c a l l y t o an y t h i n g beyond i t s e l f : i t ' s d i a l e c t i c i s mediated only be ( s i c ) the r e i f i c a t l o n of the immediate forms of p r o d u c t i o n " , pp. 184-5. w l t h i n the ' M a n u s c r i p t s 1 , I s not la b o u r , but the s o c i a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of wage l a b o u r ; a c c o r d i n g l y , he d e c l a r e s the "Transcendence of a l i e n a t i o n i s then a transcendence of the s o c i a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and the f e t i s h e s of ph i l o s o p h y and p o l i t i c a l economy can onl y be p r o v i d e d from t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , or the c r i t i c a l l y adopted standpoint of la b o u r i n i t ' s s e l f -13 t r a n s c e n d i n g u n i v e r s a l i t y " . The d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of t h i s new d i a l e c t i c a l ontology f o r Meszaros was supposedly augmented by Marx's s y n t h e s i s of the m a t e r i a l i s m of the c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economist's a n a l y s i s of man's p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y . F o r Marx, we are t o l d , the d i a l e c t i c a l method of Hegel allowed the c r i t i c i s m of c l a s s i c a l economists at the core of t h e i r f a i l u r e , namely at t h e i r atemporal, and a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of man. But we may ask why indeed was t h i s m a t e r i a l i s m so e s s e n t i a l t o the d i a l e c t i c a l ontology? Meszaros t e l l s us t h a t "The ve r y f o u n d a t i o n of human e x i s t e n c e and of a l l human a t t r i b u t e s i s the purpos i v e p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y which has, .... a r e l a t i v e p r i o r i t y over the concept of man; i f one cannot present l a b o u r i n a h i s t o r i c a l framework, showing the a c t u a l p r o c e s s i n which purpo s i v e p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y becomes wage lab o u r ( o r ' a l i e n a t e d labour') one has no grounds f o r en-14 v i s a g i n g a s u p e r s e s s i o n " . 1 3 . I b i d . , p. 1 13 . Ik. I b i d . , p. 1 2 5 . - 17 -I n b r i e f , we f i n d t h a t Meszaros c r e d i t s on the one hand the c l a s s i c a l economists ( e s p e c i a l l y Adam Smith) f o r uncoveri n g the f a c t t h a t the accumulation of c a p i t a l c o i n -c i d e s with the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r , and t h a t the governing power of modern s o c i e t y was i n essence not p o l i t i c a l but economic ( i . e., i n the p u r c h a s i n g power of c a p i t a l ) . On the other hand, t h e i r shortcomings were l o c a t e d i n t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o prove the a s s e r t i o n * t h a t the essence of p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y i s la b o u r (Smith's f i r s t t h e o r y of v a l u e - l a b o u r q u a n t i f i e d ) and thus of l i n k i n g the r e a l nature of the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r with the t h e o r y of a l i e n a t i o n . "One weak-ness, i n the c l a s s i c a l economists' m a t e r i a l i s m however, l i e s i n t h e i r attempts at founding the d i v i s i o n of la b o u r I n human nature" or i n other words i n Smith's c o n f u s i o n over the d i s t i n c t i o n between the s o c i a l nature of the d i v i s i o n of la b o u r and the nature of the d i v i s i o n of la b o u r which was p e c u l i a r t o h i s time. Subsequent t o t h i s c o n f u s i o n , Adam Smith's s u p p o s i t i o n ( o f man, as 'economic man', i . e., h i s p r o p e n s i t y t o t r u c k , b a r t e r and tra d e ) was pe r p e t u a t e d as the ab s o l u t e p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r exchange, t h a t i s t o say, as the c o n d i t i o n i n d i s p e n s i b l e f o r the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r , o r as the c o n d i t i o n which was beyond " s u p e r s e s s i o n " . From t h i s l i g h t Meszaros t e l l s us, t h a t Marx was t o c r i t i c i z e c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy by simply r e v e r s i n g the h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n -ship between exchange and the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r ; l a b o u r be-comes r e s p o n s i b l e f o r exchange and p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y — consequently, h i s c r i t i c i s m c u l m i n a t e s i n a new concept of man. Indeed, Meszaros propounds "Marx's whole approach i s characterized by a constant reference to man as opposed to wage-labourer. This i s made possible only because h i s approach i s based on a conception of human nature r a d i c a l l y 16 opposed to that of p o l i t i c a l economy". The profundity of the conceptual analysis of the 'Manuscripts' i s thus con-tained i n Marx's ' species-being' as a h i s t o r i c a l concept: where man, through h i s own productive a c t i v i t y formulates a dynamic qu a l i t y of human nature. Only then may private pro-perty and i t % human consequences be explained i n terms of i t ' s mediations, and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of i t ' s transcendence be a r t i c u l a t e d or comprehended. Only then i s i t "expected that human nature ( s o c i a l i t y ) l i b e r a t e d from i n s t i t u t i o n -a l i z e d egoism (the negation of s o c i a l i t y ) w i l l supersede 17 ' r e l f i c a t l o n ' . 'abstract labour', and imaginary appetites"• This, of course, i s to reduce the whole problematic of Marx's system down to the supersession (non-alienation) of produc-t i v e a c t i v i t y i n i t ' s threefold framework, i . e., to man's freedom from natural necessity ( s c a r c i t y ) , i n h i s freedom from unequal s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s (or'the i n t e r f e r i n g power of  other men') and f i n a l l y , i n the freedom f o r man to exercise h i s e s s e n t i a l powers. However, i t i s through these three 15. But even Ricardo was to c r i t i c i z e Smith's emphasis of the exchange process. We s h a l l expand upon the nature of the c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economists' analysis l a t e r i n chap-te r IV. 16. I b i d . , p. 148. (My Emphasis). 17. Ibid., p. 149. forms (with Man as the sub j e c t of the process) t h a t Meszaros' ' h i s t o r i c a l s p e c i e s being' remains at the l e v e l of s p e c u l a t i v e anthropology. The a l i e n a t i o n of the ' e s s e n t i a l powers* of man, i s the a l i e n a t i o n of "the s p e c i f i c human powers and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , i . e., those which d i s t i n g u i s h men from 18 other p a r t s of natur e " . I n other words, l a b o u r as the f r e e l y determined a c t i v i t y o f man, may be c o n t r a s t e d with the baser animal f u n c t i o n s of e a t i n g , d r i n k i n g , and p r o c r e a t i o n which belong t o the realm of n e c e s s i t y . And i t i s because man i s enslaved by the l a b o u r s of n e c e s s i t y under c a p i t a l i s m , t h a t h i s ' e s s e n t i a l powers' are sublimated, and t h a t there e x i s t s such a 'fragmented s o c i e t y ' composed of 'impoverished' i n d i v i d u a l s . I n t h i s i n s t a n c e wage labour t h e r e f o r e becomes r e f l e c t i v e of the p r o c e s s of a l i e n a t i o n ; the a c t i v i t i e s of . human labour no longer belong t o the worker; hence a l i e n a t e d l a b o u r .represents an i n v e r s i o n of h i s essence. "Human f r e e -dom*! Meszaros argues " i s not the n e g a t i o n of the s p e c i f i c a l l y n a t u r a l i n the human b e i n g — a n e g a t i o n f o r the sake of what appears t o be a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l Idea — but on the c o n t r a r y 19 i t ' s a f f i r m a t i o n " . I n f a c t he d e p i c t s Marx as p r e s e n t i n g a t w o - f o l d ' r e a l ' human b e i n g , one i n which Man e x i s t s as a l i e n a t e d 'commodity man' and another p o t e n t i a l l y i n what Marx, and Meszaros, c a l l s the " r i c h human be i n g " . The con-cept of the i n d i v i d u a l i s thus dependent upon i t ' s form b e i n g 18. I b i d . , p. 157. 19. I b i d . , p. 162. Imposed by the n a t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l needs of man, and by the p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y of human l a b o u r . I f t h e r e i s a con-gruency between these two, i f l a b o u r i s d i r e c t e d t o the n a t u r a l needs of man, he i s a b e i n g f o r h i m s e l f , he i s t r u l y a ' r i c h s p e c i e s b e i n g ' . I n t h i s sense, the ' s o c i a l b e i n g ' or h i s t o r i c a l s p e c i e s being i s n e c e s s a r i l y a " s o c i a l " s e l f whose nature i s o u t s i d e i t s e l f . Meszaros a f f i r m s t o us, t h a t »'having one's nature o u t s i d e o n e s e l f i s the necessary mode of e x i s t e n c e 20 of every n a t u r a l being" and a l s o t h a t " s o c i e t y i s man's •second nature', the sense i n which the o r i g i n a l n a t u r a l needs are transformed by i t , and at the same time i n t e g r a t e d i n t o an enormously more e x t e n s i v e network of needs which are 21 a l l t o g e t h e r the product of s o c i a l l y a c t i v e man". A l i e n -a t i o n t h e r e f o r e r e s u l t s I n the d i v o r c i n g of the i n d i v i d u a l • s p e c i e s b e i n g ' s ' needs from the s o c i a l , or b e t t e r , the n a t u r a l from the s e l f - c o n s c i o u s ; e., a l i e n a t i o n t r a n s -forms spontaneous a c t i v i t y i n t o 'coerced l a b o u r ' an a c t i v i t y which i s a mere means t o o b t a i n e s s e n t i a l l y animal ends ( e a t i n g , d r i n k i n g , p r o c r e a t i n g ) , and th u s "what i s animal 22 becomes human and what i s human becomes animal". I n 20. I b i d . , p. 169. 21. I b i d . , p. 170. 22. I b i d . , p. 159. s h o r t , t h i s means t h a t the nature of man i s a r e i f i c a t i o n of h i s i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h nature ( p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y ) on the one Instance, and a l s o as a r e i f i c a t i o n of h i s i n t e r -r e l a t i o n s h i p with o t h e r s i n the h i s t o r i c a l form of the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r . New needs and demands are thus produced w i t h i n the second nature of man which are a l i e n , and estranged from the f i r s t , i . e., "there i s n o t h i n g i n h e r e n t l y human about the accumulation of wealth. The aim should, a c c o r d i n g t o Marx, be the enrichment of the human b e i n g , of h i s i n n e r wealth, and not simply the enrichment of the »physical sub-23 j e c t ' " . D What Meszaros i s attempting t o c o n f e r here as Marx's pro b l e m a t i c i s a d u a l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n of man, much l i k e t h a t -of Feuerbach*s, and y e t , i n a c t u a l f a c t , we f i n d t h a t Meszaros d i s t i n g u i s h e s Marx from Feuerbach's c o n c e p t u a l framework. T h i s i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p with Feuerbach f o r example, i s found q u i t e c l e a r l y i n Feuerbach's Essence of C h r i s t i a n i t y where "Man", i n d i s t i n c t i o n from the b r u t e , "has both an i n n e r and an outer l i f e . The i n n e r l i f e of man i s the l i f e which has r e l a t i o n t o h i s s p e c i e s — t o h i s g e n e r a l as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from h i s i n d i v i d u a l nature ... Man i n f a c t i s at once I and Thou;; he can put h i m s e l f i n the p l a c e of another, f o r t h i s reason t h a t t o him h i s s p e c i e s , h i s e s s e n t i a l nature and not merely h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y , an o b j e c t t o which a subject 23. I b i d . , p. 178 - 22 -e s s e n t i a l l y , necessarily r e l a t e s , i s nothing else than t h i s 24 subject's own but objective nature ...» According to Meszaros, the Marx of the 'Manuscripts' i s d i s i l l u s i o n e d with Feuerbach's p o l i t i c a l and c r i t i c a l tendencies. For Meszaros, the point of connection between Marx and Feuerbach i s more terminological than anything else. Subsequently, he contends that "Terminology i n Marx's sense of course; i . e., implying that even a mystified terminology r e f l e c t s a problem of r e a l i t y that ought to be grasped i n it's proper setting. In other words, t h i s kind of terminology contract should not be crudely s i m p l i f i e d as ' l i p service' or mere 25 • t a c t i c s * " . Meszaros reasons that, behind the terminology of Feuerbach^Marx conceals a new conceptual framework i n contradiction to i t ' s heritage. This i s due, as he argues, to the t r a n s i t i o n i n the object or problematic by the syn-th e s i s of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy with Hegel's d i a l e c t i c . Together they emanate into a new conception of a l i e n a t i o n and species being. Thus Feuerbach's species being recedes i n the terminology of the presentation. When Marx i s speaking of 'species being', i t i s not i n a Feuerbachian sense but as a 24. s t r u i c k , '1844 Manuscripts' by Marx, p. 24l. Synonymously Marx writes "Man makes h i s l i f e a c t i v i t y I t s e l f the object of h i s w i l l and of h i s consciousness. I t i s not a determination with which he d i r e c t l y merges. Conscious l i f e a c t i v i t y distinguishes man Immediately from animal l i f e act-i v i t y . I t i s f i r s t because of t h i s that h i s i s a species being; or rather i t i s only because h i s i s a species being that he i s a conscious being". 2 5 . Meszaros ( 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 2 3 6 . • r e a l h i s t o r i c a l man', which i s i n u n i f o r m i t y with h i s most mature works. Hence Meszaros p o s t u l a t e s throughout h i s book t h a t Marx was not a l i g n e d with an i d e a l i s t i c n o t i o n of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l b e i n g i n .his e a r l y w r i t i n g s , t h a t i t i s h i s t o r i c a l and t h e r e f o r e " q u i t e the opposite of a break (between the e a r l i e r and l a t e r w r i t i n g s of Marx); the most 26 remarkable c o n t i n u i t y " e x i s t s . I n summary then, we may say that Meszaros views Marx's r e a l c o n c e p t u a l framework as t h a t of a l i e n a t i o n with h i s -t o r i c a l men as i t ' s s u b j e c t , and i t ' s s i g n i f i c a n c e , i t ' s c e n t r a l i t y , as not l i m i t e d Just to the e a r l y works, but r a t h e r "as we have seen i n v a r i o u s p a r t s of t h i s study, the  concept of a l i e n a t i o n i s a v i t a l l y Important p i l l a r of the 27 Marxian system as a whole, and not merely one b r i c k of i t " . A l s o , what supposedly supports t h i s 'system', i s Marx's m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e which as he says, i s a product of h i s unique s y n t h e s i s (and c r i t i q u e ) of t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y and p o l i t i c a l economy. I n o t h e r words, i t i s the i n s i g h t s which Marx has gained from the study of p o l i t i c a l economy combined w i t h h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c i s m , i . e., h i s new methodology of h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , which make him more profane and comprehensive than ever b e f o r e . As a r e s u l t , we f i n d t h a t f o r Meszaros, i t i s p r o per t o i d e n t i f y Marx's h i s -2 6 . I b i d . , p. 2 2 0 . 2 7 . I b i d . , p. 2 2 7 . - 24 -t o r i c a l materialism, h i s philosophy of history, as simul-taneously h i s theory of a l i e n a t i o n , i . e., "The Marxian 28 ontology i s dynamically h i s t o r i c a l and objectively dynamic", Marx does not 'deduce' human society from an abstract set of categories but on the contrary sees the society as s p e c i f i c modes of existence of the s o c i a l being. As such, he defines the ontological substance of t h i s conception as "the s e l f -mediating being of nature; i . e., as an objective being who 29 cannot help being Inherently h i s t o r i c a l " , or even more 30 simply "History i s the true natural history of man". In a  very programatic manner then, these are the outlines of Meszaros* argument. We have skipped many of the nouences which he introduces, but the above should provide s u f f i c i e n t material f o r a comparison with the epistemology of the s t r u c t u r a l ! st s. A Critique of Philosophical Anthropology In p o l a r i t y to Meszaros, we f i n d that Althusser con-siders Marx as ph i l o s o p h i c a l l y aligned with Feuerbach i n the early writings (including the 'Manuscripts'). Hegel, we are t o l d , projected history as s e l f - c f e a t i n g ; t h i s i s to say, subjective thought produces i t ' s own existence and hi s t o r y moves i n accordance to the movement of these ' r a t i o n a l ideas*. 28. Ibid . , p. 244. 2 9 . I b i d . , p. 2 5 1 . 3 0 . I b i d . , p. 1 7 0 . - 2§ -But Feuerbach r e p l a c e s the H e g e l i a n 'Idea' with r e a l concrete MAN as both the subject of h i s t o r y , and the commander of i t ' s movement. Man a g a i n becomes the subject of h i s t o r y , not i t ' s o b j e c t . C l a r i f y i n g Marx's r e l a t i o n t o Hegel i n these e a r l y w r i t i n g s , A l t h u s s e r p r o c l a i m s "Not o n l y i s Marx's terminology from 1842 and 1845 Feuerbachian ( a l i e n a t i o n , s p e c i e s b e i n g , t o t a l b e i n g , i n v e r s i o n of subject and p r e d i c a t e , e t c . ) but what i s probably more important, so i s the b a s i c p h l l o -31 s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m a t i c " . I n f a c t Marx's e a r l y c r i t i q u e of Hegel was p o s i t e d from s i m i l a r p h i l o s o p h i c a l and humanist p e r s p e c t i v e as t h a t of Feuerbach, a p e r s p e c t i v e , which A l t h u s s e r contends he was l a t e r t o break from i n 1845. "Marx set h i m s e l f apart from Feuerbach when he r e a l i z e d t h a t the F e u erbachian c r i t i q u e of Hegel was a c r i t i q u e from w i t h i n 32 H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f " . F o r example, we f i n d t h a t Feuerbach i n Essence and C h r i s t i a n i t y , poses "Man" as making God a p r o j e c t i o n of h i s best a t t r i b u t e s . A l i e n a t i o n t h e r e -f o r e becomes d e f i n e d as the p r o c e s s of p r o j e c t i n g man's a t t r i b u t e s onto a f o r e i g n o b j e c t . R e l i g i o n i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , i s the p r o c e s s of a l i e n a t i o n . But more than t h i s , Feuerbach reduces a l l p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s down t o the q u e s t i o n "What i s Man? ", and the answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n i s found f o r him by examining r e l i g i o n , because r e l i g i o n i s the 31. L o u i s A l t h u s s e r , F o r Marx, p. 45 32. I b i d . , p. 48. - 26 -a l i e n a t e d r e f l e c t i o n , the m i r r o r image, of the a t t r i b u t e s of man. Thus Feuerbach r e p l a c e s the Idea of Hegel with Man, Humanity ( s p e c i e s b e i n g ) , becomes the s u b j e c t - o b j e c t of the p r o c e s s , and the o r i g i n a l grounds f o r consciousness. A l l o b j e c t s t h u s become an a l i e n a t i o n (not of the Idea) but of humanity. The young Marx's concept of essence i s founded on the m e t a p h y s i c a l Feuerbachian concept of essence. F o r Marx, the a l i e n a t i o n p r o c e s s i s l o c a t e d i n the p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y of wage l a b o u r , that i s t o say, the l a b o u r p r o c e s s produces the a l i e n a t i o n of the products of l a b o u r from the l a b o u r e r , the a l i e n a t i o n of the p r o c e s s of l a b o u r , the a l i e n a t i o n of o n e s e l f (one's s p e c i e s - l i f e ) , and f i n a l l y the a l i e n a t i o n from one's fellow-man. T h e r e f o r e , whereas f o r Feuerbach man produces God, f o r Marx the worker produces commodities. F o r both Marx and Feuerbach the p r o d u c t s of l a b o u r c o n t a i n a s u b j e c t i v e p a r t of the producer i n t h e i r a l i e n a t i o n . One of A l t h u s s e r ' s primary c o n t e n t i o n s then, i s t h a t the young Marx, (up t o and i n -c l u d i n g ... 'The Holy Family' and 'The 1844 Manuscripts') has a s i m i l a r p r o b l e m a t i c t o Feuerbach, at l e a s t i n h i s p o i n t 33 of d e p a r t u r e . 33. E n g e l s ' comments on Marx's f u r t h e r development of Feuerbach's t h o u g h t , i n Ludwig Feuerbach, "But the step which Feuerbach d i d not take n e v e r t h e l e s s had t o be taken. The c u l t of a b s t r a c t man which formed the k e r n e l of Feuerbach's new r e l i g i o n had t o be r e p l a c e d by the science of r e a l men and of t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l development. T h i s f u r t h e r development of Feuerbach's standpoint beyond Feuerbach h i m s e l f was i n -augurated by Marx i n 1845 i n The Holy F a m i l y " , p. 4-1. - 2? -T h i s l i n k w i t h i n the "Manuscripts', between Feuerbach and Marx, i s excaberated by Marx's use of the concept of s p e c i e s b e i n g . Indeed f o r A l t h u s s e r , Marx may be p o r t r a y e d as simply t r a n s f e r r i n g the concept of a l i e n a t i o n from the realm of Feuerbachian t h e o l o g y t o the economic anthropology of Adam Smith, although A l t h u s s e r q u a l i f i e s t h i s i n s t a t i n g t h a t Marx i s unconscious of these c o n s c i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l t r a n s f e r s . Consequently, i n response t o Meszaros* argument t h a t Marx was simply u t i l i z i n g an i n v e r t e d H e g e l i a n p r o -b l e m a t i c , A l t h u s s e r r e p l i e s t h a t " i f i t were r e a l l y a matter of an i n v e r s i o n , a r e s t o r a t i o n of what had been upside down, i t i s c l e a r t h a t t o t u r n an o b j e c t r i g h t around changes n e i t h e r i t ' s 'nature nor i t ' s content by v i r t u e merely of a 34 r o t a t i o n " . I n other words, a simple i n v e r s i o n w i l l not remove the f a l s e p r o b l e m a t i c which sees the concept o f man as the subject of the p r o c e s s of h i s t o r y from i t ' s i d e o l o g i c a l domain. Thus the r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of Marx's a f f i n i t y with Feuerbach i s i n t h e i r communality of p r o b l e m a t i c s . Indeed, by "borrowing a s y s t e m a t i c a l l y i n t e r r e l a t e d set of concept, borrowing a r e a l p r o b l e m a t i c cannot be a c c i d e n t a l , i t bends 35 the borrower", o r more e x p l i c i t l y , f o r A l t h u s s e r "a com-p a r i s o n of the Ma n i f e s t o and of Marx's e a r l y works shows q u i t e c l e a r l y t h a t f o r two or t h r e e y e a r s Marx l i t e r a l l y es-poused Feuerbach's p r o b l e m a t i c ; t h a t he p r o f o u n d l y i d e n t i f i e d h i m s e l f with i t " . 3 6 3 4 . I b i d . , p. 7 3 . 3 5 . I b i d . , p. 46. 3 6 . I b i d . - 2:8 -But what i m p l i c a t i o n s d i d t h i s common pro b l e m a t i c have upon Marx's w r i t i n g s ? Feuerbach, a c c o r d i n g t o A l t h u s s e r , succeeded i n doing what Marx has been a c c r e d i t e d ; he "poses the problems of German i d e a l i s m w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of g i v i n g them a H e g e l i a n type of s o l u t i o n : indeed, he t r i e s t o pose t n e u n i t y of the K a n t i a n d i s t l n c t l o n s or a b s t r a c t i o n s i n some-t h i n g resembling the H e g e l i a n i d e a . T h i s 'something' resembling the H e g e l i a n i d e a , while being i t ' s r a d i c a l i n -v e r s i o n , i s Man or Nature or S i n n l l o h k e l t ( s i m u l t a n e o u s l y sensuous m a t e r i a l i t y r e c e p t i v i t y and sensuous I n t e r s u b j e c -37 t l v i t y ) " . What t h i s means i s t h a t Feuerbach succeeds i n the Impossible, he u n i f i e s , v i a the concept of s p e c i e s b e i n g or c o n c r e t e man, the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which had haunted the German p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c h o o l s f o r c e n t u r i e s , i . e., the subject  v s o b j e c t — and yet he succeeds i n t h i s u n d e r t a k i n g as a p r i s o n e r of t h e i r immense l a y e r s of i d e o l o g y . A l t h u s s e r com-ments "Thus, wi t h Feuerbach, Man i s the unique, p r i m o r d i a l and fundamental concept, the factotum, which stands i n f o r Kant's T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Subject, Noumenal Su b j e c t , E m p i r i c a l 38 Subject and Idea, which a l s o stands i n f o r Hegel's Idea". The subject of h i s t o r y , a l l of h i s t o r y ' s nuances, each event, becomes but a moment of Man's m e d i a t i o n with n a t u r e ; the con-c r e t e i s u n i f i e d with the i d e a l , the t h e o r e t i c a l t o the p r a c -t i c a l , god with man, e t c . , ad nausseum. L i k e w i s e f o r Marx, 37. L o u i s A l t h u s s e r , P o l i t i c s and H i s t o r y , p. 178 38. I b i d . , p. 179. - 2 9 -Man becomes the subject of history, not as an Anthropological Man as proffered by the c l a s s i c a l Economists, but as a h i s -t o r i c a l "Man". This then i s the kind of philosophic humanism which Marx projected i n the 1844 Manuscripts and e a r l i e r to c r i t i c i z e Hegel, and t h i s i s the same philosophical humanism which i s advanced today as Marxism by Meszaros. The young Marx thus did not work a transformation on Hegel 1s d i a l e c t i c — he simply substituted i n the order of Hegel 1s d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c the concept of h i s t o r i c a l men for the Absolute Idea. For Hegel, the notion of hist o r y lacked man as i t ' s subject, history's development was projected as the development of ideas, the ' s p i r i t ' acted as i t ' s subject. "History i s not the a l i e n a t i o n of Man ( f o r Hegel) but the a l i e n a t i o n of the idea of the s p i r i t , i . e., the ultimate moment of the 39 a l i e n a t i o n of the idea". In other words, fo r Hegel, h i s -tory i s the process of the a l i e n a t i o n of ideas, a process with the structure (alienation) as i t ' s subject. But for the '1844 Marx', his t o r y i s the process of a l i e n a t i o n with Men as i t ' s subject. The a l i e n a t i o n process i s hence between men and human r e l a t i o n s and t h i s i s also the problematic which Meszaros presents as that of the mature Marx. C a p i t a l would therefore become simply the expression of an e t h i c a l c r i t i q u e of the p r e v a i l i n g form of ( h i s t o r i c a l ) Man, of Man's sub-limation of h i s 'Rich S e l f , of h i s v i o l a t i o n of h i s human 3 9 . I b i d . , p. 182. essence, e t c . , v i a the p r o c e s s of a l i e n a t i o n and the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r . And t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y why A l t h u s s e r , c o n t r a r y t o Mes-zar o s , r e g a r d s these e a r l y works, e s p e c i a l l y the "Manus-c r i p t s 1 as j u s t a more profound a p p l i c a t i o n of the F e u e r -b a c h i a n concepts of a l i e n a t i o n , and as such, j u s t as f a l s e ; f a l s e i n the sense t h a t they are c l o a k e d with the i d e o l o g y of Feuerbachian humanism which d i s t o r t s r e a l i t y — but I s h a l l say more on t h i s l a t e r . A l t h u s s e r , i n d i r e c t p o l a r i t y , has t e n d e n t i o u s l y s i t u a t e d a "break' i n Marx's w r i t i n g s ; t h i s break (approx-imated around the 1845 T h e s i s on Feuerbach and The German  Ideology) was not c o r r o b e r a t e d by Marx's examination of new elements, but r a t h e r by t h e i r f o r m u l a t i o n i n t o a new con-c e p t u a l framework, a new paradigm, which a l l o w s Marx t o break  with h i s ' e r s t - w h i l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s 1 , and i n t r o -duce a new s c i e n c e of h i s t o r y . I n a premature way, the T h e s i s on Feuerbach announces t h i s new s c i e n c e ('"The p h i l o -40. Mind you the 'Eleventh Theses' p r o c l a m a t i o n f o r A l t h u s s e r , ( i n h i s e a r l i e r t e x t s up t o , and i n c l u d i n g L e n i n  & P h i l o s o p h y ) , was simply ahead of i t ' s time i n announcing a new p h i l o s o p h y . The p h i l o s o p h y of Marx ( d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l -ism) was t o f o l l o w much l a t e r h i s new science o f h i s t o r y . More r e c e n t l y i n h i s s e l f - c r i t i c i s m w i t h i n Marxism Today (November 1972) he w r i t e s "You can of course argue q u i t e s e r i o u s l y t h a t t h e r e i s a sense i n which p h i l o s o p h y , as Hegel s a i d ... always " l a g s behind" s c i e n c e or the s c i e n c e s ; but from another p o i n t of view which i s e s s e n t i a l here, you have t o say the o p p o s i t e and argue t h a t i n the h i s t o r y of Marx's thought the p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e v o l u t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y 'preceded' the s c i e n t i f i c breakthrough", p. 3^6. (See next page) sophers have only interpreted the world i n various ways, the 4-0 point i s to change i t " ) , although i t i s spoken s i l e n t l y i n the 'language' of Feuerbach. In other words, at t h i s par-t i c u l a r time we f i n d that Marx's problematic Is indeed con-cerned with a l i e n a t i o n of a h i s t o r i c a l species being,but the question remains, does i t form the •object' of Capital? In the f i n a l analysis the two problematics of early and l a t e r Marx, prove to be incongruous. For within the • 184-4- Manus-c r i p t s ' the central noumenon i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between per-son and things, i . e., between man and nature, whereas within C a p i t a l — following the s t r u c t u r a l i s t s — the subject (per-son) acts as an agent of the structure (production process) and s i m i l a r l y the things (nature, etc.) are merely i t ' s supports. As agents to the production process t h e i r place and function becomes determined by the process; the agent of pro-duction (Man) thus becomes defined as a support (or conscious personification) of the process (of the means and r e l a t i o n s of production). Man f o r Althusser, "intervenes here not as a c o n s t i t u t i v e subject but as a perceiving subject t r y i n g to 4-1 explain to i t s e l f the economic r e l a t i o n s that i t perceives". In other words, i n C a p i t a l Marx writes: "... we are not dealing with concrete men, but only with men insofar as they f u l f i l c e r t a i n determinate functions i n the structure: - bearers of labour - power... 4-1. Jacques Ranciere, "'The Concept of C r i t i q u e ' and 'The C r i t i q u e of P o l i t i c a l Economy'", Theoretical P r a c t i c e . Number two. ": - 32 " To designate these i n d i v i d u a l s , he (Marx) s y s t e m a t i c a l l y uses the term T r a g e r , which i s most o f t e n t r a n s l a t e d i n t o Eng-l i s h as support. Men do not appear i n the t h e o r y except i n the form of supports f o r the connexion i m p l i e d hy the s t r u c -t u r e , and the forms of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i t y as determinate e f f e c t s of the s t r u c t u r e " . ^ 2 We must not underestimate t h i s p o i n t , f o r i t s t r i k e s a t what I b e l i e v e the h e a r t of e a r l y Marx's (and Meszaros') i d e o -l o g i c a l p r o b l e m a t i c . I n C a p i t a l , on the other hand, the c r i t e r i o n which d e f i n e s men, i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , e t c . , i s t h e i r o b j e c t i v e p l a c e i n p r o d u c t i o n and the owner-ship or non-ownership of the means of p r o d u c t i o n . L i k e w i s e , c a p i t a l (which i s used t o purchase labour) i s t o t a l l y removed from the moral e x p l o i t a t i o n s of the l a b o u r , r a t h e r i t ' s f u n c t i o n p e r t a i n s t o the q u e s t i o n of what produces p r o f i t s . I n an i d e n t i c a l f a s h i o n , the c a p i t a l i s t , l i k e the l a b o u r e r , i s d e f i n e d as the p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of c a p i t a l , not endowed with a consciousness, i . e., as Marx w r i t e s , " I n t h i s c a p a c i t y the c a p i t a l i s t shares with the miser a p a s s i o n f o r wealth as wealth. 'But t h a t which i n the miser i s a mere I d i o s y n c r a s y , i s i n the c a p i t a l i s t the e f f e c t of the s o c i a l 43 mechanism, of which he i s but one of the wheels'". I f "the agents of a s o c i a l f o r m a t i o n 'men*are not c o n s i d e r e d as the b e a r e r s of o b j e c t i v e i n s t a n c e s ( a s they are 42. E t i e n n e B a l i b a r , Reading C a p i t a l , p. 2 5 2 . 4 3 . Marx C a p i t a l , V o l . I , Jordon, p. 3 0 8 . - 33 -f o r Marx) but as the genetic p r i n c i p l e of the l e v e l s of the s o c i a l whole", i t be-comes "... a problematic of so c i a l actors, of i n d i v i d u a l as the origin^of s o c i a l action: s o c i o l o g i c a l research thus leads f i n a l l y , not to the study of the objective co-ordinates that determine the d i s t r i -bution of agents into s o c i a l classes and the contradictions between these classes, but to the search f o r f i n a l i s t explanations founded on the motivations of conduct of the i n d i v i d u a l actors" In other words, i n the 'Manuscripts' the subject Man func-tioned as the concept upon which the process was organized. Man instead of acting i n tune to Hegel's idea, acted i n accordance with the development of h i s human essence. In t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l order (Man as the subject of the process), the perceiving subject becomes the const i t u t i v e form i n the in t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of appearances. Human labour i s directed to confirm the perception of the con s t i t u t i v e subject, the motives of labour become the expression of one's human essence. Alienation i n t h i s framework, emerges as the nexus f o r categorizing forms of a c t i v i t y i n accordance with the pr e v a i l i n g notion of species being, ' h i s t o r i c a l ' , anthro-p o l o g i c a l , or otherwise. Thus we may conclude that the al i e n a t i o n process ( e s p e c i a l l y i n i t ' s humanistic form) does compose, as for Feuerbach, the conceptual framework of the early'Manuscripts', but the remainder of t h i s paper w i l l kk. Nicos Poulantzas, 'The Problem of the C a p i t a l i s t State', Ideology i n Social Sciences, ed. by Robin Blackburn, Fontana C o l l i n s , 1977. p. 242. A"prac,tlce, by the way, which MaxsWebSr was to l a t e r a r t i c u l a t e . attempt t o argue, with the s t r u c t u r a l ! s t s s f o r a new 'object* w i t h i n the t e x t of C a p i t a l . Before we examine t h i s q u e s t i o n I would l i k e t o d w e l l on one f u r t h e r concept of a l i e n a t i o n as i t i s u t i l i z e d by the ' h i s t o r i c i s t s ' School of Marxism. I t ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s are q u i t e d i s p a r a t e from those of the 'humanists', but they too, as we s h a l l see, are sus-c e p t i b l e t o fundamental k i n d s of c r i t i c i s m s . C o l l e t t i ' s H i s t o r l c l s m L u c i o c o l l e t t i i s an I t a l i a n M a r x i s t , and one of the most g i f t e d and w e l l known students of D e l i a V o l p e . I n h i s two r e c e n t books t r a n s l a t e d i n t o E n g l i s h under the t i t l e s of k5 Rousseau t o L e n i n and Marx t o Hegel, he i n t r o d u c e s a some-what unique e x p o s i t i o n on the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s u p p o s i t i o n s o f C a p i t a l . H i s r e a d i n g of C a p i t a l i s congruent i n many ways t o the economist's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (both c l a s s i c a l and neo-c l a s s i c a l ) , and a glimpse at i t ' s p r i n c i p l e s w i l l , I am sure, have b e n e f i c i a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s t o our l a t e r examination of these c r i t i c s i n chapter t h r e e . I have headed t h i s s e c t i o n under the r u b r i c of h i s t o r i c i s m , i t c o u l d e q u a l l y w e l l have been e n t i t l e d 'empiricism', f o r , as we s h a l l see, the f i e l d of these two t h e o r e t i c a l p r o b l e m a t i c s are i d e n t i c a l . 4 5 . L u c i o C o l l e t t i , Rousseau t o L e n i n NLB 1 9 7 2 , Marx to . H e g e l . NLB 1 9 7 3 . C o l l e t t i c o n f e r s us wit h a 'non-humanist h l s t o r i c i s m ' , in?Jother words, with a c o n c e p t i o n of h i s t o r y as a p r o c e s s which i s not simply r e f l e c t i n g the development of Man's essence (even a h i s t o r i c ! z e d man) but r a t h e r as a p r o c e s s of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , between the f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n and r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . Man here p l a y s a determined r o l e r a t h e r than a determinate one. And here h i s t o r y appears as a p r o c e s s without a subject l i k e t h a t o f Hegel's; indeed so much so, i t u t i l i z e s the dominant p r i n c i p l e of the H e g e l i a n d i a l e c t i c as i t ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l b a s i s , and as i t , ' s sub-j e c t . What i s e s s e n t i a l t o C o l l e t t i ' s n o t i o n of h i s t o r y i s i t ' s t e l e o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e ; from i t ' s o r i g i n s i t i s i n p u r s u i t of a g o a l ( l i k e t h a t of absolute knowledge) which i s i d e n t i c a l t o the key s t r u c t u r e of the H e g e l i a n d i a l e c t i c , 1. e., t o the p r i n c i p l e o f the n e g a t i o n o f the n e g a t i o n . And i t i s due t o t h i s c o n c e p t u a l framework t h a t we f i n d t h a t C o l l e t t i c o n c e i v e s the order of Marx's a b s t r a c t i o n s as proceeding i n the i n v e r s e order t o the " r e a l ' h i s t o r i c a l . He promulgate s: " i f the science i s t o be the scie n c e of the r e a l , i t cannot aim at the past o t h e r than bywway of i t ' s d i f f e r e n c e s with r e s p e c t t o the pre sent (which i s the only e x i s t e n t ) and hence must move from the express 46. Cf., A l t h u s s e r , Reading C a p i t a l , p. 139. c a t e g o r i e s of the p r e s e n t .... so i t would as Marx wrote, be ' i m p r a c t i c a l and erroneous 1 f o r science t o adopt c a t e g o r i e s i n the order i n which they have been determined i n the g e n e r a l course of h i s t o r y . T h e i r o r d er of sequence, a c c o r d i n g t o Marx, i s decided r a t h e r by t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o ,one another i n modern bour g e o i s society.; t h i s order i s p r e c i s e l y the Inverse of t h e i r n a t u r a l suc-c e s s i o n , as w e l l as of t h e i r development i n time" , * r I n other words, C o l l e t t i ' s argument — l i k e t h a t of D e l i a V o l p e ' s — p l a c e s the c o n c e p t u a l order i n the exact r e v e r s e of the c h r o n o l o g i c a l concurrence of h i s t o r i c a l events. Likewise he d e s i g n a t e s the ' o b j e c t ' of Marx's C a p i t a l as the c a p i t a l i s t mode of p r o d u c t i o n , i . e., "Marx i s concerned with one s o c i e t y alone, modern C a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y ... I n other words, C a p i t a l i s not a study of s o c i e t y as such, t h a t i s of the a b s t r a c t i o n s o c i e t y ' i n g e n e r a l ' , but a study of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y , which means t h a t the a n a l y s i s con-c e r n s not an i d e a (an i d e a l o b j e c t ) but a m a t e r i a l l y d e t e r -mined or r e a l object 1,!.^ u There are two q u e s t i o n s emanating from t h i s quote which d i r e c t l y e f f e c t the p r o b l e m a t i c of C a p i t a l ; one con-c e r n s h i s c o n c e p t i o n of h i s t o r y , the other concerns the term " r e a l o b j e c t " . 47. L u c i o C o l l e t t i , Rousseau to L e n i n , p. 28 48. I b i d . , p. 3. - 37 -The Meaning of H i s t o r y Not only i s h i s t o r y f o r C o l l e t t i , c a t e g o r i z e d i n an i n v e r s e order, but i t i s a l s o arranged i n accordance with the n o t i o n of a l i e n a t i o n . Thus he d e c l a r e s : "the d e c i s i v e p o i n t i n the e n t i r e M a r x i s t theory of e x p l o i t a t i o n — a p o i n t on which our own r e a d i n g of the theory of v a l u e as  a theory of a l i e n a t i o n can h e l p t o throw l i g h t . I t i s the dependence which t i e s the workers to the w i l l of the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s , andxinot t h e i r a b s o l u t e p o v e r t y t h a t r e p -r e s e n t s 'the d i f f e r e n t i a s p e c i f i c a of c a p i t a l i s t p r o d u c t i o n ' . I n other words, c a p i t a l i s t a p p r o p r i a t i o n i s not e x c l u s i v e l y or p r i m a r i l y an a p p r o p r i a t i o n of t h i n g s , but r a t h e r an a p p r o p r i a t i o n of s u b j e c t i v i t y , of working energy i t s e l f , o f the p h y s i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l powers of man".^9 I t f o l l o w s from t h i s j p o i n t of view then, that C a p i t a l i s e x p l i c a t i n g the C a p i t a l i s t mode of p r o d u c t i o n as a s p e c i f i c mode, or ' d i f f e r e n t i a s p e c i f i c a l In which man's s u b j e c t i v i t y I s a l i e n a t e d v i a a p e c u l i a r p r o c e s s of e x p l o i t a t i o n . So we can see t h a t the p r o c e s s of h i s t o r y f o r C o l l e t t i becomes the p r o c e s s of forms of a l i e n a t i o n , some which are v e i l e d ( f e t i s h i z e d ) and o t h e r s which are commonly v i s i b l e — h i s t o r y t hus r e f l e c t s the p r o g r e s s i o n of the a l i e n a t e d forms of man's r e l a t i o n t o h i s means of p r o d u c t i o n . And i f t h i s p r o c e s s of a l i e n a t i o n o r d e r s the ' r e a l ' world i t c o n c u r r e n t l y must a l s o order the t h e o r e t i c a l ; i . e., " t h i s c o n f l u e n c e of the theory 49. I b i d . , p. 102 of v a l u e and the theory of f e t i s h i s m o r a l i e n a t i o n i n Marx p r e s e n t s not onl y h i s main d i f f e r e n c e o f p r i n c i p l e w i t h the c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economists, f o r whom the theory of a l i e n a t i o n i s a b s o l u t e l y i n c o n c e i v a b l e , i t a l s o c o n s t i t u t e s the b i r t h and d e s t i n y of p o l i t i c a l economy as a s c i e n c e " . ^ But w i t h i n the c a p i t a l i s t mode of p r o d u c t i o n we f i n d t h a t the p r o c e s s of a l i e n a t i o n ( i n t h i s case, the p r o c e s s of h i s t o r y ) i s d i s g u i s e d or m y s t i f i e d i n such a way t h a t the c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economists c o u l d not p e r c e i v e the b a s i c c a t e g o r i e s of the mode or the u n d e r l y i n g f o r c e s of h i s t o r y ' s movement. According t o C o l l e t t i , C a p i t a l ' s t a s k was thus t o unshroud, t o de-mystify these f e t i s h i z e d forms, t o break through t o the dominant c a t e g o r i e s i n the a n a l y s i s of a l i e n a t i o n . So he h i m s e l f w r i t e s , "The t a s k of p o l i t i c a l economy as a science c o n s i s t e d f o r Marx e s s e n t i a l l y — i f we accept a neologism — i n the d e - f e t l s h i z a t l o n of the world 51 of commodities". I n other words i t was on account of Marx's audacious p e r c e p t i o n o f the f e t i s h i z l n g p r o c e s s o f c a p i t a l i s m t h a t he was able to grasp the t r u e form, the " r e a l " form of h i s t o r y ' s development and i s o l a t e the 'essen-t i a l r e l a t i o n s * of a l i e n a t i o n . A good example of t h i s o p e r a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o C o l l e t t i , i s i n the c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g of the d i s t i n c t i o n between labour-power and wages where 50. I b i d . , p. 102. (My Emphasis) 51. I b i d . , p. 89. - 39 -(labour-power i s the " r e a l " c a t e g o r y ) , which f o r Marx t o ... "grasp the ' p a r t i c u l a r ' phenomenon under examination (labour-power) i s thus simply t o understand a l l the d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t i t p r e s e n t s as compared to other phenomenon of i t ' s k i n d . I t must, t h e r e f o r e , I n v o l v e r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s k i n d but o n l y n e g a t i v e l y , i . e., i n order t o s e i z e the o p p o s i t i o n or e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e which p r e c i s e l y de-f i n e s the s p e c i f i c , or fundamental cha r a c -t e r of the modern l a b o u r e r " . " and more s p e c i f i c a l l y .... " T h i s r e f e r e n c e i s not an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n or c o n f u s i o n , but an o p p o s i t i o n . The element common to a l l p a r t forms i n v o l v e d i n order t o understand the p r e s e n t , but only to be excluded from i t , i . e., o n l y i n o r d e r t o r e v e r s e how the s o c i e t y of today i s not any of these other s o c i e t i e s but d i f f e r s e s s e n t i a l l y from them". Here h i s t o r y i s d e f i n e d as a p r o c e s s of a l i e n a t i o n l i k e t h a t of Hegel's; where h i s t o r y , i n s t e a d of thought, i s the subject of the p r o c e s s of a l i e n a t i o n . " A l i e n a t i o n i s thus the d i a l e c t i c i n i t ' s f i n a l p r i n c i p l e , . ! 1. e., the n e g a t i o n of the 5k n e g a t i o n or Aufhebung". Here the f o r c e s of h i s t o r y evolve by an o p e r a t i o n of n e g a t i o n or c o n t r a d i c t i o n r a t h e r than i d e n t i t y . I t f o l l o w s from t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , t h a t the science of h i s t o r y may be d e s c r i b e d as a b i f u r c a t i n g p r o c e s s of the e s s e n t i a l forms ( r e a l forms) from the i n e s s e n t i a l m y s t i -f i c a t i o n s , a p r o c e s s , i n other words, where the ' k e r n e l i s 52. I b i d . , p. 22. 53- I b i d . 54. L o u i s A l t h u s s e r , P o l i t i c s and H i s t o r y , p. 182. severed from the husk'. Knowledge i n t h i s sense becomes the proc e s s of e m p i r i c a l l y e x t r a c t i n g the r e a l essence from the  r e a l , the r e a l o b j e c t i s t h e r e f o r e p r o j e c t e d as a com-b i n a t i o n of two e s s e n t i a l components; the e s s e n t i a l and the i n e s s e n t i a l , which i n t u r n are i d e n t i f i e d by the p r o c e s s of e x t r a c t i o n ( o b j e c t i f l c a t i o n ) . The c r i t e r i a n e cessary f o r deducing such d i s t i n c t i o n s w i t h i n t h i s c o n c e p t i o n or know-ledge of h i s t o r y , thus must be e x t r a c t e d from the p e c u l i a r i t y of the combinations w i t h i n the phenomenal forms of the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s . ^ ^ Again h i s t o r y must p r o -v i d e the c r i t e r i o n f o r d e c i d i n g which i d e a s are t r u e and which are f a l s e . H i s t o r y , on t h i s a c c o unt,iiss m a r s h a l l e d a c c o r d i n g t o those forms of la b o u r ( o r p o s s i b l e forms) which are or are not a l i e n a t e d ; which means simply t h a t C o l l e t t i c o n t r a s t s one combination o f ' f o r c e s and r e l a t i o n s of p r o -d u c t i o n ' ( c a p i t a l i s m ) with other p r e - c a p i t a l i s t forms which are a l i e n a t e d but not f e t l s h i z e d . Marx, he a s s e r t s , "opens a g e n e r a l p e r s p e c t i v e on h i s t o r y p r e c i s e l y t o the extent t h a t he d evelops h i s a n a l y s i s of the p r e s e n t : i . e., p r e c i s e l y t o the extent t h a t he s e i z e s the extreme or e s s e n t i a l d i f -f e r e n c e s by which the present d e f i n e s or i l l u m i n a t e s , even i f i n d i r e c t l y , the p a s t " . But i t i s t h i s s e q u e n t i a l o r d e r 55. What A l t h u s s e r r e f e r s t o as a simple c o n t r a d i c -t i o n C f . «0n C o n t r a d l t i o n ' i n F o r Marx and B a l i b a r ' s "The Elements of the s t r u c t u r e and T h e i r H i s t o r y " i n Reading  C a p i t a l . 56. C o l l e t t i (1972), p. 23. - 41 -which I b e l i e v e suggests the e s s e n t i a l t e l e o l o g y of C o l l e t t i * s 57 system. For he adjucated the past from the p e r s p e c t i v e of the p r e s e n t , the f u t u r e i s denied — f o r knowledge ( o f h i s -t o r y ) i s l i m i t e d t o the present — knowledge i s a t t a i n e d only i n r e t r o s p e c t i o n . He e l a b o r a t e s t h i s f o r example when he w r i t e s t h a t " P r e c i s e l y i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n which the c h r o n o l o g i c a l - h i s t o r i c a l order seems t o be i n -v e r t e d , can we then understand how the determinate r e l a t i o n -ship i n other s o c i e t i e s was the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h nature and, t o go f u r t h e r back, how b e f o r e human s o c i e t i e s t here was • 58 only n a t u r e " . Which i m p l i e s t h a t only by i n v e r t i n g the c h r o n o l o g i c a l sequences and the t h e o r e t i c a l order of the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of co n c e p t i o n can we come t o know • r e a l i t y ' . Thus e v e n t u a l l y , even i n t h e i r i n v e r s e order, we f i n d t h a t these concepts adopt a contemporoniety (Gramsci), a r e l a - ; t i v i t y w ith the 'time' of h i s t o r y ; the advancement of h i s -t o r i c a l concepts thus s t a y s i n rhythm with the advancement of the h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s — but i n r e v e r s e . T h i s a l s o c l e a r l y i m p l i e s t h a t the contour of t h e o r e t i c a l development i s a smooth and continuous p r o c e s s — as i f i t were an a f f i r -mation of h i s t o r y ' s auto-development, as i f a one-to-one r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t e d between i t ' s appearances and i t ' s essence. 5 7 . One c o u l d say a 'reversed t e l e o l o g y ' , but t h i s would make as much sense as an ' i n v e r t e d d i a l e c t i c ' . 5 8 . I b i d . , p. 2 4 . - 42 -I n the same way we would f i n d t h a t the o p e r a t i o n of a b s t r a c -t i o n or of s c i e n c e , would i n t h i s context produce l i n e a r concepts which act as moments detached from ' r e a l * h i s -t o r y . As i f those forms of development a r t i c u l a t e d by ab-s t r a c t i o n (and ordered i n accordance w i t h the s t r u c t \ i r e of the p r o c e s s of a l i e n a t i o n ) are e q u i v a l e n t , are e m p i r i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s of the ' r e a l ' stages of h i s t o r i c a l development, i n other words, as i f they are h i s t o r y ' s a d j u n c t s , arranged as r e l f i c a t i o n s of i t ' s ' r e a l * form. As a r e s u l t , we f i n d t h a t f o r C o l l e t t i , h i s t i o g r a p h y simply remains schematized by time. The s t r u c t u r e of the p r o c e s s can c o n t a i n no more o b j e c t i v i t y than t h a t which c o i n c i d e s with the development of h i s t o r y ; t h a t i s t o say, C o l l e t t i i s unable t o c o n s t r u c t any o b j e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e e x t r i n s i c t o the c o n f i n e s of h i s t o r y ' s s e l f - e v i d e n t events, e x t r i n s i c t o i t ' s time. L e t us approach t h i s from a more d i r e c t angle. The core of C o l l e t t i ' s system of a b s t r a c t i o n (which i s d e p i c t e d as Marx's) I s h a l l argue, i s f a l s e and wrong. I t i s wrong because he embarks on h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n from the phenomenal forms of the p r e s e n t ; t h e r e a f t e r , o r d e r i n g the development of h i s t o r y so as t o v a l i d a t e the i n i t i a l t h e o r e t i c a l con-s t r u c t s . I n t h i s f a s h i o n he f i n d s i t p o s s i b l e to f i n d the a b s t r a c t essence i n each determinate phenomenon ('deter-minate' as h i s t o r i c a l r a t h e r than a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l a b s t r a c t i o n ) . E v e r y t h i n g which a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t s the order of t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l development i s p r o c l a i m e d i n e s s e n t i a l . Hence 'the husk i s d e l i n e a t e d from the k e r n e l ' by an i d e o l o g i c a l oper-- 43 -a t i o n , h i s t o r y i s r e p r e s e n t e d as a s e p a r a t i o n / u n i t y con-t r a d i t i o n between the f o r c e s and r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . Here a l i e n a t i o n becomes not o n l y the c e n t r a l category i n the ord e r o f t h e o r e t i c a l development of h i s t o r y but i t f u r t h e r -more c h a r a c t e r i z e s the motion of ' r e a l ' ' h i s t o r y i t s e l f . E m p i r i c i s m and H i s t o r l c l s m , Both an E s s e n t i a l H e g e l l a n l s m We r e t u r n now to the second problem mentioned e a r l i e r , 1. e., t o C o l l e t t i 1 s n o t i o n of the term ' r e a l * . The problem a r i s e s , as I have mentioned, from h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t , (1. e., i n h i s method of a b s t r a c t i o n ) f o r i t i s from h i s l e v e l of departure — the phenomenal forms ('determinate a b s t r a c t i o n s ' ) of the prese n t — t h a t h i s schema c o n t a i n s , o r i s reduced t o a comparative a n a l y s i s of d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l forms. E s s e n -t i a l l y we may say t h a t he f a l l s t o i s o l a t e the c r i t i c a l ques-t i o n ( e s p e c i a l l y w i t h i n C a p i t a l ) of the form, separated from  t h e i r phenomenal e x i s t e n c e . C o l l e t t i homologlzes the pheno-menal forms of c a p i t a l i s m ( f e t i s h l z e d commodity p r o d u c t i o n ) down to a u n i t y , t o an essence ( a l i e n a t i o n ) , which then determines i t ' s g e n e t l c a l p r e s e n t a t i o n i n a l l i t ' s d i f f e r e n t phases. Even although t h i s g e n e t l c a l p r o c e s s of ' d e t e r -minate a b s t r a c t i o n ' f u n c t i o n s i n re v e r s e , , - i t s t i l l does not a l t e r i t ' s e s s e n t i a l H e g e l i a n nature. I t s t i l l c o n f i n e s i t ' s c a t e g o r i e s t o moments or s l i c e s of h i s t o r y I t s e l f ; beyond which knowledge i s f o r b i d d e n t o proceed ('that i s why no H e g e l i a n p o l i t i c s are p o s s i b l e s t r i c t l y speaking, and i n f a c t - kk -59 why t h e r e has never been a H e g e l i a n p o l i t i c i a n " . Indeed C o l l e t t i t e s t i f i e s t h a t " o n l y from the m a t e r i a l i t y of the p r e s e n t can s c i e n t i f i c a b s t r a c t i o n or h y p o t h e s i s , t h a t i s c a u s a l - a n a l y t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n , be d e r i v e d ; j u s t as, i n v e r s e l y , only the r e a l matter of o b s e r v a t i o n , as E n g e l s c o r r e c t l y noted i n a passage i n h i s D i a l e c t i c s of Nature, can "weed out these hypotheses, doing away with some and c o r r e c t i n g o t h e r s , u n t i l f i n a l l y the law i s e s t a b l i s h e d i n a pure form. To l o s e s i g h t of m a t e r i a l i s m i s to abandon s c i e n c e ; but t o abandon the l a t t e r , and hence the determlnacy or s p e c i -f i c i t y of a b s t r a c t i o n s , means In t u r n t o l o s e a l l r e f e r e n c e t o r e a l i t y " . What i s t h i s »real order of o b s e r v a t i o n 1 t o which C o l l e t t i i s r e f e r r i n g ? I t c e r t a i n l y cannot be the H e g e l i a n c o n n e c t i o n , where the i d e a i s primary over matter; f o r both C o l l e t t i and D e l i a Volpe were h i g h l y c r i t i c a l o f such a n o t i o n . I t i s r a t h e r a p r i n c i p l e of a b s t r a c t i o n ( o b s e r v a t i o n ) mediated by the phenomenal conjuncture of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n , and by the determinate e f f e c t s t h a t these r e l a t i o n s p l a y . And y e t t h i s k i n d of o b s e r v a t i o n can-not c o n c e p t u a l i z e a schema of a b s t r a c t i o n o u t s i d e of the immediacy of the h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon. Jacques Ranciere 59. A l t h u s s e r , R.c., p. 95. 60. c o l l e t t i (1972), pp. 28-9. - 45 -w r i t e s t h a t "the h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s t h e o r y of determinate a b s t r a c t i o n as i t i s found p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the D e l i a v o l p e school depends "upon" the r e l a t i o n s between the a b s t r a c t I n thought and the r e a l c o n c r e t e " . The determinate a b s t r a c t i o n then appears t o be theoone which s o l i d l y p r e -6 1 serves the r i c h n e s s of the " r e a l c o n c r e t e " . F o r C o l l e t t i the p r o c e s s of a b s t r a c t i o n , or s c i e n c e , operates by p a r r i n g the i n e s s e n t i a l thought from the e s s e n t i a l r e a l . I m p l i c i t to t h i s k i n d of a b s t r a c t i o n ( i . e.. M a t e r i a l of o b s e r v a t i o n "which, p r e c i s e l y because i t i s m a t e r i a l , can »weed out' ... 6 2 h y p o t h e s i s , doing away some and c o r r e c t i n g o t h e r s " ), i s t h a t s c i e n c e , or a t l e a s t the knowledge o f h i s t o r y , becomes the " s i m p l e s t c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of a c o n c r e t e o b j e c t of study. 6 T and hence a r e a l aspect of the o b j e c t i t s e l f " . ^ C o l l e t t i 1 s a b s t r a c t i o n consequently appears t o e x t r i c a t e an essence from the p r e - g i v e n ' r e a l ' o b j e c t , as i f the a b s t r a c t i o n i s a p a r t i c l e of the • r e a l 1 concrete i t s e l f . The supports of the p r o c e s s ( p r o d u c t s of man, e t c . ) I n the a b s t r a c t , are con-sequently p r e s e n t e d as the r e a l essence of the phenomenon. But even more i m p o r t a n t , i s t h a t through t h i s p r o c e s s of o b j e c t i f y i n g from the ' r e a l concrete* ( i . e., under the f o r -mal c o n d i t i o n s where matter i s primary over thought), he 61. Jacques Ranciere, T h e o r e t i c a l Practice.,#2. p. 4-0. 62. c o l l e t t i (1972), p. 42. 63. I b i d . , p. 43. - 46 -submits a p a r t i a l r e a l (the r e a l essence, the e s s e n t i a l ) as r e f l e c t i n g the r e a l c o n c r e t e . 'The r e a l order of obser-v a t i o n ' becomes the pr o c e s s of searc h i n g f o r the e s s e n t i a l b u r l e d and o f t e n d i s g u i s e d ( i . e., through f e t i s h i s m i n C a p i t a l i s m ) i n the i n e s s e n t i a l . The e s s e n t i a l and i n -e s s e n t i a l i n the meanwhile are pre-determined by the s t r u c -t u r e of a l i e n a t i o n as the subj e c t of the p r o c e s s . E a r l i e r we saw t h a t f o r Meszaros the pre-determining s u b j e c t was man's needs, e t c . , and s i m i l a r l y f o r C o l l e t t i a l l p a r t s o f the whole, i n t h i s case the c a p i t a l i s t s o c i a l f o r m a t i o n , are seen as embodying a s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e , which can then be read throughout the system by a pr o c e s s of simple a b s t r a c t i o n . Furthermore, as t r u e of a l l i d e o l o g i e s , we f i n d t h a t f o r them what i s e x t r a c t e d as e s s e n t i a l d i r e c t l y determines and l i m i t s the combinations which are u t i l i z e d t o conceive of h i s t o r y , mode of p r o d u c t i o n , e t c . What i s e s s e n t i a l and i n e s s e n t i a l becomes dependent upon the s k i l l of the observer, or of the ext r a c t o r ^ and the c o n d i t i o n s of h i s time. The o p e r a t i o n i s reduced t o a r e l a t i v i s m much l i k e t h a t of George Lukac's, where the d i s t i n c t i o n between what i s i d e o l o g i c a l and what i s s c i e n t i f i c i s based upon the author's p e r c e p t i o n , or at l e a s t h i s c l a s s p e r s p e c t i v e . "On the one hand, as w e l l as be i n g a s c i e n c e " , c l a i m s C o l l e t t i , "Marxism i s r e v o l u t i o n a r y i d e o l o g y . I t i s the a n a l y s i s of r e a l i t y from the viewpoint 64 of the working c l a s s " . i t f o l l o w s from such a f o r m u l a t i o n , 64. I b i d . , p. 230. (My Emphasis) - 47 -t h a t Marxism i s a science p r e c i s e l y because i t uses r e a l i t y i t s e l f t o defeat i d e o l o g y . " M a r x - u t i l i z i n g an aspect of r e a l i t y — overthrows the arguments of the economists and p o i n t s t o the overthrow of c a p i t a l i s m I t s e l f . Marxism i s t h e r e f o r e s c i e n c e " . 6 ' ' A c c o r d i n g then t o C o l l e t t i ' s argu-ment, Marx's c r i t i c a l procedure w i t h i n C a p i t a l t r a n s p i r e s as a necessary r e l f l c a t i o n of the pr o c e s s which oc c u r s i n ' r e a l i t y i t s e l f , p r o p t e r hoc, he sees a c t u a l l y no d i s t i n c -t i o n between the concept of the concrete r e a l and the con-c r e t e t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f . "The whole of knowledge", w r i t e s A l t h u s s e r , " i s thus i n v e s t e d i n the r e a l , and knowledge never a r i s e s except as a r e l a t i o n i n s i d e i t ' s r e a l o b j e c t between the r e a l l y d i s t i n c t p a r t s of t h a t r e a l o b j e c t " . 6 6 W i t h i n t h i s schema the l o g i c a l becomes i d e n t i c a l ' i n essence' with the r e a l order i t s e l f . 'Realness' i s d e f i n e d by the pro c e s s of o b j e c t i v i c a t l o n ( i . e., s t r u c t u r e of a l i e n a t i o n ) such t h a t "the sole way of guaranteeing the p o s s i b i l i t y of a s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s can only be t h a t of i n v e s t i g a t i n g society.jat i t ' s m a t e r i a l l e v e l , i . e., at the l e v e l of the r e a l b a s i s which s p e c i f i e s i t and p r e v e n t s i t ' s d i s s o l u t i o n 67 i n t o an i d e a " . C o l l e t t i ' s modus operandi i s t h e r e f o r e t o i d e n t i f y a determined r e l a t i o n s h i p between the knowledge of the o b j e c t and the r e a l o b j e c t , which i n t u r n , propagates 6 5 . I b i d . , p. 2 3 5 . 6 6 . A l t h u s s e r , R.C.. p. 3 9 . 6 7 . C o l l e t t i ( 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 5 . - 48 -the 'determinate a b s t r a c t i o n ' by a p r o c e s s of e x t r a c t i n g the i n v i s i b l e k e r n e l from the r e a l concrete o b j e c t . The foun-d a t i o n s f o r h i s f o r m u l a t i o n of an i n v e r t e d order i n the sub-o r d i n a t i o n of t h e o r e t i c a l concepts thus stems from h i s con-t e m p l a t i o n of t h i s correspondence, t h i s p a r e n t h e t i c a l r e l a t i o n -s h i p , which does not e x i s t — i . e., between the a b s t r a c t con-cept and the ' r e a l * . That i s why when he i n f a c t speaks of m a t e r i a l t h i n g s he assumes t h a t he has i d e n t i f i e d the r e a l o b j e c t . Yet f o r C o l l e t t i our knowledge of t h i n g s , of what they are and what they are not (and hence our assessment of t h e i r past and t h e i r f u t u r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s ) , i s independent of those t h i n g s themselves which i n t h e i r autonomous e x i s t e n c e exclude both t h e i r past and f u t u r e . He adheres t o the d i s t i n c -t i o n between b e i n g and thought, between t h i n g s and concepts, but t h i s i s only because i t i s conducive i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t w i t h i n Marx's concept of m a t e r i a l i s m matter i s primary over  thought. Lukacs, on the o t h e r hand, simply r e p r e s e n t e d Hegel as a p r o t o - m a t e r i a l i s t , i . e., t h a t Marx's m a t e r i a l i s m was an i n v e r s i o n of the thought-being r e l a t i o n s h i p . F o r both C o l l e t t i and D e l i a Volpe t h i s k i n d of f a c i l e o p e r a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s an e m p i r i c i s m synonymous only t o Hegel's i d e a l i s m . T h e i r s o l u t i o n , however, was t o rearrange the t h e o r e t i c a l o r d e r of concepts; they r e v e r s e d the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of concepts r e l a t i v e t o the c h r o n o l o g i c a l sequences of h i s t o r y . Yet, even w i t h i n i t h i s r e v e r s e order, we f i n d t h a t the form of development of the t h e o r e t i c a l are s t i l l e q u i v a l e n t t o the stages of h i s t o r i c a l development, i . e., "In s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t - 49 -a b s t r a c t dialectics» he cannot conceive of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of an o b j e c t i v i t y which does not c o i n c i d e with the develop-68 ment of a h i s t o r y " . As such, t h i s a n a l y s i s becomes a r e d u c t i o n o p e r a t i o n , r e d u c i n g the present t o i t ' s essence, i . e., by r e p r e s e n t i n g the essence, the p r i m i t i v e , as the undeveloped seed of the p r e s e n t . T h i s i s the way C o l l e t t i apprehends Marx's own t h e o r e t i c a l development, he p e r c e i v e s C a p i t a l i n the l i g h t of the '1844 Manuscripts', r e d u c i n g the i d e a s espoused i n C a p i t a l t o a congruent but l e s s developed form I n the e a r l y works, r e d u c i n g " a l i e n a t i o n " i n C a p i t a l i n i t s complex f e t i s h l z e d form t o the founding p r i n -69 c i p l e s of the '1844 M a n u s c r i p t s ' . One may o n l y remark on t h i s k i n d of t e l e o l o g i c a l m e t h o d as A l t h u s s e r does, I f "The h i s t o r y of p h i l o s o p h y i s w r i t t e n i n the f u t u r e a n t e r i o r : u l t i m a t e l y , a r e -f u s a l t o admit t h i s i s a d e n i a l of the h i s t o r y and the e r e c t i o n of o n e s e l f as I t ' s , founder i n the manner of Hegel: I have em-p h a s i z e d the l a s t two sentences d e l i b e r a t e l y . But the reader w i l l have done so h i m s e l f , a s t o n i s h e d t o see a t t r i b u t e d t o Marxism p r e -c i s e l y the H e g e l i a n c o n c e p t i o n of the h i s -t o r y of p h i l o s o p h y and, as the summit of t h i s c o n f u s i o n .... f i n d h i m s e l f accused of H e g e l i a n l s m i f he r e j e c t s i t ...V" 7 0 68. Jacques R a n c i e r e , T h e o r e t i c a l P r a c t i c e #6, p. 45. 69. W i t h i n C a p i t a l i t s e l f , f o r example, he views the law of value of vol. I as the essence of p r i c e s of produc-t i o n i n V o l . III. 7 0 . L o u i s A l t h u s s e r , F o r Marx, p. S u r e l y the I n v e r t e d t h e o r e t i c a l order acknowledges a d i s -t i n c t i o n between the thought o b j e c t and the o b j e c t , but Marx's m a t e r i a l i s m I s s t i l l p r e s e n t e d as a b a s i c e m p i r i c i s m . I n o t h e r words, even i n t h i s seemingly o b j e c t i v e r e v e r s e order there remains an u n e q u i v o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the o b j e c t and i t ' s concept. Again, i n the words of A l t h u s s e r : ».... t h i s a n a l y t l c o - t e l e o l o g i c a l method ... which I s c o n s t a n t l y judging cannot make the  s l i g h t e s t judgment of any t o t a l i t y u n l i k e i t s e l f . Could t h e r e be a f r a n k e r admission t h a t I t merely Judges I t s e l f , r e c o g n i z e s i t s e l f behind the o b j e c t s i t c o n s i d e r s , t h a t I t never moves o u t s i d e i t s e l f , t h a t the development I t hopes t o t h i n k i t cannot d e f i n i t i v e l y t h i n k other than a development  of I t s e l f w i t h i n i t s e l f ? And t o anyone whose response I s t o the u l t i m a t e l o g i c t h a t I have drawn from t h i s method i s t o say ' t h a t I s p r e c i s e l y what makes I t d i a l e c t i c a l ' — my answer..is ' D i a l e c t i c a l , yes, but H e g e l i a n l " ' ' 1 What t h i s q u o t a t i o n suggests i s t h a t , f o r C o l l e t t i , h i s t o r i c a l p r a c t i c e ( e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n or p r a x i s ) e q u a l s t h e o r e t i c a l p r a c t i c e . H i s t o r y has i t ' s moment of 'hypo-t h e s i s * l i k e t h a t of s c i e n c e , and s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and p h i l o s o p h y are hence f l a t t e n e d down t o the ' h i s t o r i c a l p r a c t i c e ' , t o the course of r e a l h i s t o r y . I n t h i s manner the M a r x i s t t o t a l i t y becomes simply a v a r i a n t of the H e g e l i a n t o t a l i t y . A l t h u s s e r on the other hand, exposes the knowledge pr o c e s s i n M a r x 1 s l a t e r w r i t i n g s , as m a n i p u l a t i v e not of 71. I b i d . , p. 68. the ' r e a l object 1 but of a t h e o r e t i c a l object, of a raw material which i s peculiar to that p a r t i c u l a r knowledge process and which i s separated from the r e a l object. The knowledge process ( s p e c i f i c a l l y science) from t h i s perspec-t i v e , becomes the process of modifying the concept of the 72 object rather than the r e a l object i t s e l f . As a d i r e c t r e s u l t we f i n d that there may be d i f f e r e n t modes of t h e o r e t i c a l production both i n an i d e o l o g i c a l form (those which postulate a one-to-one correspondence to the object and i t ' s concept), and i n a s c i e n t i f i c form; the two must be distinguished by t h e i r d i f f e r e n t raw materials or •objects', and by the d i f f e r e n t p r a c t i c e s (means of pro-duction) by which the knowledges are produced. Hence f o r Marx, according to Althusser^the categories of knowledge do not correspond or express d i r e c t l y the r e a l h i s t o r i c a l order; i n t h i s case the problematic of C a p i t a l , i t ' s 'object', does not concern the connection between the two orders ( t h e o r e t i c a l and real) but the peculiar combination at the t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l which allows f o r a s c i e n t i f i c theory f o r understanding h i s t o r y . On t h i s account, the employment of abstract con-72. His a r t i c l e "Marx and the Critique of P. 1.", which rebels against a statement, espoused by Norman Geras i n that " i t i s the absurdity not of an I l l u s i o n , but of r e a l i t y i t s e l f " ; i . e«, how may r e a l i t y be absurd, other than by way of a metaphorical concept? S i m i l a r l y f o r Col-l e t t i ^ " r e a l " implies the 'concrete' r e a l ; he writes "Reality i s c e r t a i n l y upside down - otherwise revolution would not be necessary", Rousseau to Lenin, p. 235. - 52 -cepts Is for Marx the correct starting point j indeed i t i s only by approaching the object from the abstract (by inver-ting i t ' s manifest theories) can there be produced a scien-t i f i c analysis. He purports that "It would appear to be correct to start with the real and concrete .... However, a closer look reveals that this i s false .... the latter (the method of those economic systems which move from general notions to 'concrete' ones) i s decidedly the correct scien-73 t i f l c method". In eother words, by conjecturing the relationship between the object and i t ' s concept as one of two separate orders, one may speak of concrete; reality i n a Marxist materialist sense, i . e., of a knowledge process which Is capable of conceptualizing contemporary forms, phenomenal forms, i n an abstract and objective manner. Al-thusser declares that: "The order i n which the concepts are articulated In the analysis i s the order of Marx's scien-t i f i c proof: «... (It) has no direct, one-to-one relationship with the order In which any particular category may have appeared i n his-tory .... Without this theory of the dis-tinction between the two orders It i s impossible to examine whether i t i s legitimate to pose this question (which i s by no means certain: This  question might be meaningless --we have grounds  to think that i t Is meaningless).. Quite to the contrary, Marx spends his time showing, not without malice, that the real order contradicts the logical order, and i f verbally he occasion-al l y goes so far as to say that there i s an •inverted' relationship between the two orders, 73. Althusser, FM, pp. l85-6>' - 53 -we cannot take t h i s word l i t e r a l l y as a concept, 1. e., as a r i g o r o u s a f f i r m a t i o n , which takes i t ' s meaning not from the f a c t t h a t i t has been put forward, but from the f a c t t h a t i t belongs by r i g h t t o a d e f i n i t e t h e o r e t i c a l f i e l d " . ? 4 I . e., when Marx comments i n the p r e f a c e t o the second German e d i t i o n of C a p i t a l , on Hegel's d i a l e c t i c , t h a t "The m y s t i f i c a t i o n which the d i a l e c t i c s u f f e r s i n Hegel's hands, by no means p r e v e n t s him from b e i n g the f i r s t t o p r e s e n t i t ' s g e n e r a l form of working i n a comprehensive and con-s c i o u s manner.^ With him (Hegel) i t i s s t a n -d i n g on i t ' s head. I t must be tu r n e d r i g h t side up a g a i n , i f you would d i s c o v e r the r a t i o n a l k e r n e l w i t h i n the m y s t i c a l s h e l l " , ( D he i s employing the term ' i n v e r s i o n ' i n a m a t a p h o r i c a l sense, not i n an attempt t o r e -p l a c e i d e a l i s m with m a t e r i a l i s m , nor to simply p r o j e c t the t h e o r e t i c a l o r d e r ( i n accordance w i t h the h i s t o r i c a l ) i n r e v e r s e l i k e t h a t of C o l l e t t i . The concept of i n -v e r s i o n here i s r e f e r r i n g t o the need of t r a n s f o r m i n g the H e g e l i a n d i a l e c t i c , of m a i n t a i n i n g the i d e a of the d i a l e c t i c ( i . e., the r a t i o n a l k e r n e l — the p r o c e s s 'without' a subject) and dropping i t ' s t e l e o l o g l c a l o rder, i n o t h e r words by dropping the dominant p r i n c i p l e of the n e g a t i o n of the n e g a t i o n . ' b T h i s k i n d of r e a d i n g of C a p i t a l we s h a l l f i n d , i s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n demonstrating t h a t the ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n p r o -7k, A l t h u s s e r , R.C., p. kd, 7 5 . Marx, C a p i t a l , V o l . I , p. 2 5 . 7 6 . A l t h u s s e r comments " I t h i n k I can a f f i r m : t h i s category of a p r o c e s s without a s u b j e c t , which must of course be t o r n from the g r i p of the H e g e l i a n t e l e o l o g y , undoubtedly r e p r e s e n t s the g r e a t e s t t h e o r e t i c a l debt l i n k i n g Marx t o Hegel", P o l i t i c s and H i s t o r y , p. 1 8 3 ; and "By t a k i n g t h i s tendency i n t o account we can a p p r e c i a t e the t r a c e s of H e g e l i a n i n f l u e n c e which remains In Volume. One as s u r v i v a l s on the way t o s u p e r s e s s i o n " , L e n i n and P h i l o s o p h y , p. 91. - 5k -blem* i s a product of an empiricist epistemology, which mis-takes the • r e a l " nature of Marx*s object. Hopefully through the course of the remainder of t h i s work we s h a l l be able to locate and more f u l l y illuminate the r e a l meaning of Marx's object i n i t ' s s c i e n t i f i c discourse. Summary Before concluding t h i s chapter, I should l i k e to r e -c a l l some of the main distinguishing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which have separated the three previous authors 1 positions on Marx's epistemology. F i r s t , we found that f o r Meszaros;.. the process of a l i e n a t i o n (and history) was centered around the subject of MAN. For him, Marx! s d i a l e c t i c represented most simply the Hegelian I d e a l i s t d i a l e c t i c inverted and grounded i n 'con-crete' h i s t o r i c a l man. From a related viewpoint, we saw that f o r C o l l e t t i , the process of history had as i t ' s subject the structure of a l i e n a t i o n , i n other words, men acted merely as supports to the structure of h i s t o r y , t h e i r nature being determined by t h i s structure. But also that he retained within t h i s system the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c , more s p e c i f i c a l l y , he retained the teleology of the p r i n c i p l e of the negation of the negation or a l i e n a t i o n . By so doing, we noted that he pre-determined the structure of the r e l a t i o n s between the forces and r e l a t i o n s of production (and t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l structures) - 5 5 -by specifying that the process of a l i e n a t i o n was part of ' r e a l i t y ' of history i t s e l f . F i n a l l y , f o r Althusser, we found that the process of history was represented as a pro-cess without a subject (other than i t ' s own peculiar struc-ture) which was determined by the conjuncture of the forces and the r e l a t i o n s of production and t h e i r / i n t e r n a l complex combinations of elements (pertinences). The problematic of Marx was thus c l e a r l y made d i s t i n c t from the realm of ' r e a l objects', and the order f o r conceptualizing r e a l i t y ' s move-ment was approached by means of the abstract object. In commenting on Marx's epistemology i n C a p i t a l , and on h i s r e l a t i o n to Hegel, Althusser writes: "The question posed then i s as follows: what are the conditions of the process of history? Here Marx no longer owes anything to Hegel: on the decisive point he contributes some-thing without any precedent, 1. e.: there i s  no such thing as a process except i n r e l a t i o n s (sous des rapports): the r e l a t i o n s of pro-duction (to which C a p i t a l i s r e s t r i c t e d ) and other ( p o l i t i c a l ; i d eological) r e l a t i o n s " • ( l What follows hereafter i s thus a two-fold argument. On the one hand we s h a l l see that the arguments presented here by both Meszaros and C o l l e t t i lead to an incorrect approach to the transformation problem. Indeed i n chapter three we s h a l l look.in d e t a i l at how t h e i r solutions have produced more contradictions within Marx's work than they have resolved. 77. Althusser, PH, pp. 185-6. - 56 -Ons'-the other hand, by t e s t i n g A l t h u s s e r ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s by a p p l y i n g them to t h i s debate, we s h a l l a l s o be a s s i s t i n g i n the s u b s t a n t i a t i o n of i t ' s v e r a c i t y as a re a d i n g of Marx. However, b e f o r e we plunge d i r e c t l y i n t o the debate surrounding the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem, I should l i k e t o make one f i n a l detour. I f i n d t h i s next chapter a necessary one; s p e c i f i c a l l y i n terms of the counter-arguments which have been waged a g a i n s t the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem i n the name of En g e l s . T h e r e f o r e we s h a l l v e r y b r i e f l y examine E n g e l s ' r o l e i n the pr o p a g a t i o n of the * h i s t o r i c i s t s*' t h e s i s which w i l l prove b e n e f i c i a l l a t e r i n our d i s c u s s i o n s of v a l u e . As you s h a l l see, Engels' h i s t o r i c i s m a c t s as a v a r i a t i o n upon those s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o l l e t t i and D e l i a Volpe. - 57 -"Engels was not so bold when i t came to thinking t h i s revolution's e f f e c t s on the  object of the theory .... the ambiguities of h i s conception on t h i s point of which he was very much aware .... c a n , a l l be r e -duced to the empiricist confusion .between the object of knowledge and the r e a l object. Engels c l e a r l y fears that by r i s k i n g himself beyond the (Imaginary) security of the empiricist t h e s i s he may lose the guarantees he obtains by pro-claiming a r e a l i d e n t i t y between the 1 object of knowledge and the r e a l "object". CHAPTER II Engels on Marx's Epistemology Engels* i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Marx's concept of h i s t o r i c a l materialism (and the problematic of Capital) has had, as we are a l l aware, an enormous Impact on the evolution of Marxism and the s o c i a l i s t movement. Indeed one could conjecture that the overwhelming force behind the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the Hegelian influence i n Marx's work was due to the immense prestige which Engels enjoyed as the defender and interpreter 2 of Marx's thought a f t e r h i s death. In general, Engels' observations have been taken as the i n c i s i v e and true des-1. Louis Althusser & Eti^nne Balibar, Reading C a p i t a l . PP. 1 5 5 - 6 . 2 . Donald Hodges notes that "Engels i s portrayed as the foremost systemizer and disseminator of Marx's thought, and also as the f i r s t and most i n f l u e n t i a l r e v i s i o n i s t " , "Engels' Contribution to Marxism", S o c i a l i s t Register 1 9 6 5 . P. 2 9 7 . - 58 -c r i p t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Marx and Hegel. But i t i s worth spending a l i t t l e time i n v e s t i g a t i n g how E n g e l s reads t h i s p r o b l e m a t i c i n t o Marx. We examine i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l t h r e e p o i n t s , they a r e : f i r s t , E n g e l s 1 t h e o r e t i c a l a f f i l i a -t i o n w i t h Hegel; second, h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m (the d i a l e c t i c ) * and f i n a l l y , h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Marx's concept of h i s t o r y . E n g e l s and Hegel What I should l i k e t o argue i n t h i s s e c t i o n ( i n con-j u n c t i o n w i t h our d i s c u s s i o n i n Chapter I) i s t h a t E n g e l s 1 concept of the d i a l e c t i c remains f o r the most p a r t w i t h i n the f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e of Hegel's n o t i o n of the d i a l e c t i c . T h i s l i n k i s perhaps most i n t e l l i g i b l e i n t h e i r common c r i t i c i s m of m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a s o n i n g . We f i n d , f o r example, t h a t f o r Hegel t h i s c r i t i c i s m took the form of a c a t e g o r i c a l o p p o s i t i o n between understanding ( i n t e l l e c t ) and s p e c u l a t i v e r e a s on ( d i a l e c t i c ) . S t a t e d i n the most g e n e r a l terms pos-s i b l e , Hegel's d i s t i n c t i o n may be b r i e f l y summarized i n the f o l l o w i n g manner. F i r s t , Understanding was d e f i n e d as thought i n i t ' s a n a l y t i c a l form, i t symbolized a d e s c r i p t i v e p r o c e s s of d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between e m p i r i c a l g i v e n s , f i n i t e forms, e t c . , which are c l a s s i f i e d i n terms of t h e i r f i x e d d i s t i n c t i o n s . The nature of i t ' s c a t e g o r i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s remains at the l e v e l o f immediate sensory p e r c e p t i o n and common sense, they are shallow and a b s t r a c t l i k e the em-p i r i c i s m of Locke and Hume. The boundaries of t h i s a n a l y s i s , - 59 -of common sense, are l i m i t e d by the confines of the imperish-able and empirically "absolute" r e a l i t y . Those that u t i l i z e t h i s p r i n c i p l e of Understanding, cannot perceive the true r e a l i t y according to Hegel, f o r they f a l l to conceptualize the i d e n t i t y of opposites, the negation of the negation, and the quantitative change which makes q u a l i t a t i v e t r a n s f o r -3 mations — they are trapped i n the obviousness of "being"/* In a somewhat i d e n t i c a l fashion, Engels s t r i k e s out at those proponents of metaphysics (and empiricism) i n h i s book Antl-Duhrlng, he elucidates that "To the metaphysician, things and t h e i r mental images, ideas, are i s o l a t e d ; to be considered one af t e r the other apart from each other, r i g i d fixed objects of inve s t i g a t i o n given once f o r a l l . He thinks i n absolutely discontinuous a n t i -theses. His communication i s : "Yea, yea, nay, nay, f o r what solve i s more than these cometh of e v i l " . For him a thing ei t h e r e x i s t s , or i t does not ex i s t , i t i s equally impossible f o r a thing to be i t s e l f and at the same time something else a posit i v e and negative absolutely exclude one another, 'cause and e f f e c t stand i n an equally r i g i d a n t i - t h e s i s one to the other'. At f i r s t sight t h i s mode of thought seems to us extremely pl a u s i b l e , because i t i s the mode of thought of so-called common sense. But sound common sense, respectable fellow as he i s within the homely precincts of h i s own four walls, has most wonderful adventures as soon as he ventures out into 3 . Quentln Laver defines Hegel's notion of Under-standing as "the i n t e l l e c t u a l process of abstract concep-t u a l i z a t i o n , a process which grasps abstractly whatiis thought about but does not grasp (begriefin) the process of thought i t s e l f . . . " ( f o r Hegel, even Kant's 'transcendental l o g i c ' does not go beyond understanding) Hegel's Idea of  Philosophy (1971)t p. 24. - 6 0 -the wide world of s c i e n t i f i c research. Here the metaphysical mode of outlook, j u s t i -f i a b l e and even necessary as i t i s i n domains whose extent v a r i e s according to the nature of the object under invest i g a t i o n neverthe-l e s s sooner or l a t e r always reaches a l i m i t beyond which i t becomes one-sided, l i m i t e d , abstract, and loses i t ' s way i n lnsoluable contradictions". On the other hand 4for Hegel, speculative reason ( d i a l e c t i c a l reason) functioned as the absolute c r i t i q u e of the ' i n t e l l e c t of thought' as i t was represented i n the form of understanding. Speculative reason comprehends the s e l f -contradictory nature of every form, i t apprehends that everything contains within I t s e l f (within i t ' s unity of being and thought) i t ' s own negation — i n other words i t apprehends prec i s e l y what i s ignored by understanding.^ In Fact to go beyond the f i n i t e of understanding, the f i n i t e must be con-sidered i n what i t i s not, and t h i s what i t Is not, i s simul-taneously i t ' s essence. By the very nature of the^object i t s e l f , through i t ' s own movement, i t transcends i t ' s f i n i t e being, i t becomes I n f i n i t e through the process of the negation 4. Engels, Antl-Duhring. pp. 2 7 - 2 8 , or Socialism, Utopian and S c i e n t i f i c , pp. 46-47. 5 . Again Laver defines Hegel's "Reason ... (as) the t o t a l human process. I t i s not confined to i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y , but i s the t o t a l i t y of s p i r i t u a l a c t i v i t y and i s recognizable both as subjective, i n the a c t i v i t y and as objec-ti v e i n the r e s u l t s of the a c t i v i t y " , p. 24 (a971). For one of the better discussions on Hegel,, refer to C o l l e t t i ' s Marx  to Hegel (1973). oh. 1-ix. or to ZA. Jordan's The Evolution  of D i a l e c t i c a l materialism ( 1 9 6 7 ) e s p e c i a l l y pp. 101-110. - 61 -of the negation — through contradiction rather than i d e n t i t y . Reason grasps the unity of opposites, f o r i t contains "the capacity of thought to transcend the 'elther-or' mode of thinking (yea or nay) and to recognize the unity, the d i f -ference, and the i d e n t i t y of opposltes which, according to the Understanding ( i n t e l l e c t ) are incompatible with each other".** However, although Reason pierces through the des-c r i p t i v e conceptions of understanding, understanding (the 'old metaphysics of philosophy') 7 acts as the f i r s t stage i n the process of Reason, understanding provides the f i n i t e categories by excluding contradictions* i n other words i t describes the immediate data of the common sense conscious-ness. Reason, as the d i a l e c t i c a l process of reasoning, f i r s t must employ these f i n i t e categories i n order to discover how  these categories deduce themselves. I t i s i n t h i s context that the d i a l e c t i c becomes of prime importance to Engels' work; he comments "But f o r d i a l e c t i c s , which grasps things and t h e i r images, Ideas, e s s e n t i a l l y i n t h e i r interconnection, i n t h e i r sequence, t h e i r movement, t h e i r b i r t h and death, such processes are those mentioned above are so many corroborations of i t ' s own method of treatment. Nature i s the test of the d i a l e c t i c s , and i t must be said f o r modern natural science t h a t l i t has furnished extremely r i c h and d a i l y increasing 6. Jordan, The Evolution of D i a l e c t i c a l Materialism (1967). p. 102. ~~ : - 62 -materials for this test, and has thus proved that i n the last analysis Nature's process i s diale c t i c a l and not meta-7 physical" • Hence, Just as for Hegel, where the history of philosophy i s divided between reason (philosophy speculation) and i t ' s dialectical method, arid Intellect (the philosophy of understanding) and i t ' s analytic or deductive procedures, so for Engels this distinction i s v i t a l for his demonstration of the temporality of philosophy. From this standpoint, Engels argues that a l l previous scientific methods were meta-physical, for without the universal explication of the laws of the dialectic, a "science" was unscientific. For Marx on the other hand (as he writes In the Holy Family) speculative philosophy i s also an absolute metaphysics 'which had nothing to do with scientific procedure i n philosophy'. To be sure this does not mean to imply that Engels wholly accepted the dialectic as i t stood i n i t ' s Hegelian form; rather i n his interpretation, he deemed i t necessary to extract i t ' s 'revolutionary and c r i t i c a l form' from the dialectic through an inversion. He writes, "We (Engels here includes Marx) comprehended the concepts In our heads more material!s-7. Engels'Ant1-Duhrlng. p. 29. My Emphasis. - 63 -t i c a l l y — as images of real things instead of regarding the real things as images of this or that stage of development of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced i t s e l f to the science of the general laws of motion — both of the external world and of human thought — two sets of laws which are identical i n substance, but d i f f e r i n their expression i n so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while i n nature and also up to now for the most part in human hi story, these laws assert them-selves unconsciously i n the form of exter-nal necessity i n the midst of an endless series of seemingly accidents. Thereby  the dialectic of the concept Itself become  merely the conscious reflex of the dialec-t i c a l motion of the real world and the  dialectic of Hegel was placed upon It's  head; or rather, turned off i t ' s head, on  which i t was standing before f and placed  upon It's feet again."° But this equivocal statement ignores the basic premises of the dialectic. For Hegel, It was only through the conception of the identity of absolute thought (of the combination of the f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e , or of reason and understanding) that an epistemological identity could be made between 'being' (the concrete real) and thought (the concept of concrete real). "Hegel says 'real are not those things external to thought, but those things penetrated by thought, for they are no longer things but thoughtgobjects. In immediacy a thing i s only appearance and contingency. I t i s real only as a moment 9 of the idea". Nature for Hegel i s thus an alienated 8. Engels Ludwlg Feuerbach, p. 44, My Emphasis. 9. Gareth Stedman Jones, "Engels and the End of Classical German Philosophy'!, New Left Review, #79. p. 27. moment of the Idea; the opposition between being and thought, or material r e a l i t y and the knowledge of that r e a l i t y i s re-duced to a homogeneity (monism) where material r e a l i t y be-comes a r e f l e c t i o n of the absolute knowledge — i n other words 'being' i s reduced to a s l i c e of thought. Therefore i t i s only through the l o g i c of opposites ( d i a l e c t i c s ) that he may pose the l o g i c a l unity of opposltes i n the r e a l object I t s e l f — not vice versa. Furthermore, i t i s t h i s unity of opposites, and the p r i n c i p l e s of the negation of the negation, etc., which provide the motion to Hegel's l o g i c a l structure. The general law of motion as a process, i s thus independent of motion i n the h i s t o r i c a l process even a l -though i t i s true that Hegel projects t h i s process onto hi s t o r y . The process of movement (of the d i a l e c t i c ) i s  therefore a purely l o g i c a l process with the Absolute know-ledge as I t ' s subject. I t ' s causation of motion i s not due to the synthesis of r e a l composites (1. e,, the separation of thought from being as i n Engels') but that of l o g i c a l categories primarily i n t h e i r i d e n t i t y of the r e a l and thought through the unity of opposites. We may conclude y therefore fthat as a fundamental proposition or general law f o r the existence of the d i a l e c t i c that i t ' s process may only be a process of l o g i c , where "being" i s united with "thought". I t i s t h i s s p e c i f i c d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between thought and being which i s not made the central issue by the orthodox Marxist l i t e r a t u r e , and correspondingly, the d i s t i n c t i o n bet-ween the Hegelian and the Marxist d i a l e c t i c i s not developed uniformly from t h i s point. - 65 -We f i n d t h a t f o r E n g e l s , f o r example, the p r o c e s s becomes not a l o g i c a l p r o c e s s per se but a p r o c e s s of the r e a l concrete i t s e l f . Whereas Hegel had p r o f f e r e d the d i a l e c t i c with the Absolute Idea as I t ' s s u b j e c t , E n g e l s I n v e r t s ( r e p l a c e s ) the sub j e c t i n o r d e r t h a t the d i a l e c t i c may become the 'conscious r e f l e x ' of the ' r e a l world. I n t h i s case, the d i a l e c t i c a l movement becomes the process of  h i s t o r y I t s e l f , o r b e t t e r , i t becomes the p r o c e s s of m a t e r i a l  r e a l i t y . Thought here a c t s as the r e f l e c t i o n ( r e i f l c a t l o n ) of the p r o c e s s . I n other words, we f i n d E n g e l s s e p a r a t i n g — through h i s i n v e r s i o n — the e s s e n t i a l u n i t y i n Hegel's d i a l e c t i c , the u n i t y of Absolute knowledge, t h a t i s , b e t -ween b e i n g and thought. As Stedman Jones a p t l y comments, "But t h i s i n v e r s i o n l e a d s t o r e s u l t s t h a t are l o g i c a l l y absurd. F o r e i t h e r thought r e f l e c t s the I d e n t i t y of b e i n g and thought and t h e r e f o r e thought i s r e f l e c t i n g i t s e l f . Or thought r e f l e c t s b e i n g not endowed w i t h thought, but then 10 there i s no d i a l e c t i c " : i . e., "We can have m a t e r i a l i s m or we can have the g e n e r a l law of motion. But we cannot have both".""*1 P a r a d o x i c a l l y , E n g e l s c r i t i c i z e s Hegel f o r a p p l y i n g these laws on nature and h i s t o r y I n stead of deducing 10. I b i d . , p. 2?. 11. I b i d . , p. 28. - 66 -them dlrectlyirfrom nature and hist o r y . This notion Is e s p e c i a l l y c l e a r i n a statement made i n h i s book the D i a l e c t i c s of Nature. " I t i s , therefore, from the history of nature and human society that the laws of d i a l e c t i c s are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of h i s t o r i c a l development, as well as of thought i t s e l f . And indeed they can be reduced i n the main to three: the law of the t r a n s f o r -mation of quantity into quality and vice  versa; the law of the interpenetration of opposites; the law of the negation of the negation. A l l three are developed by Hegel i n h i s i d e a l i s t fashion as mere laws of thought: .... the mistake l i e s i n the fact  that these laws are f o i s t e d on nature and  history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them".1-? Which means that the denouement of Hegel 1s conceptual mytho-logy i s an expression of the fact that he was only capable of t r e a t i n g the object (history) contemplatively, i . e., ex-t e r n a l l y . I t was e s p e c i a l l y i n these l a t e r writings (Ludwlg  Feuerbach, D i a l e c t i c s of Nature, and Antl-Duhrlng) that 12. Franz Wledman describes t h i s confusion, i n that "Engels completely f a i l e d to understand what Hegel meant by the "Absolute Idea". According to Hegel's p r i n c i p l e of i d e n t i t y . Nature Is not to be regarded as a copy of the Ab-solute Idea, but rather as t h i s Idea i t s e l f i n a d i f f e r e n t being. Yet the "misconception of copy" was the basis f o r the controversial "reversal" of Hegelian d i a l e c t i c s into material-i s t i c d i a l e c t i c s ... ( f o r Engels) only the viewpoint that thinking i s derived from nature and that r e a l i t y does not issue from the Idea can be c a l l e d materialism. The statement that "our notions are copies of r e a l things" i s not made by materialism, but by a naive epistemological realism". Hegel (1968) Begasus, pp. 127-8. 13. Engels, D i a l e c t i c s of Nature, p. 20. My Emphasis. - 67 -E n g e l s p o s i t e d the d i a l e c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e as a s c i e n t i f i c p h i l o s o p h y of nature as w e l l as t h a t of h i s t o r y . Indeed i t i s i n these works t h a t the d i a l e c t i c becomes a metascience i n which "the same d i a l e c t i c a l laws which i n h i s t o r y govern the apparent f o r t u i t o u s n e s s of events; the same laws as those s i m i l a r l y form the t h r e a d running through the h i s t o r y of the development of the human thought . ..." A E n g e l s ' N o t i o n of " H i s t o r i c a l " M a t e r i a l i s m The problem we face i s t h a t E n g e l s had the tendency of r e a d i n g more Into Marx's comments on Hegel than t h e i r meta-p h o r i c a l v a l u e (1. e., the concept of I n v e r s i o n quoted e a r l i e r on page 42 above). I n so f a r as t h i s r e s u l t e d i n E n g e l s ' l i t e r a l i n v e r s i o n of Hegel's d i a l e c t i c , i t f u r t h e r i m p l i e d the use of the p r i n c i p l e of the n e g a t i o n of the n e g a t i o n as the law of development or the o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e upon which h i s t o r y and thought were t o be ordered and which l a t e r became l o g i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e by the o r g a n i c p r o c e s s of the m a t e r i a l r e a l i t y i t s e l f . 1 " ' Moreover, whereas we saw t h a t f o r Hegel i t was the u n i t y of o p p o s i t e s o r the p r i n c i p l e s of c o n t r a d i c t i o n which d e s t r o y e d the s t a t i c concepts of the i d e n t i t y of the i n t e l l e c t (understanding, f o r E n g e l s , ( i . e., w i t h the 14. E n g e l s . Antl-Duhrlng, p. 1 6 , a l s o C f . pp. 3 6 , 194, 455P; i n D i a l e c t i c s of. Nature (Moscow 1954) p. 2 7 , 82, 5 8 P , and i n Ludwlg Feuerbach, pp. " 6 5 - 7 , 2 9 . 15. I b i d . , A n t l - D u h r l n g . pp. 15^-5. - 68 -dialectic i n i t ' s 'inverted' form) this operation was achieved by the real process of history, that i s to say i t became the 'materialist' dialectic (nature) which subverted the concepts of metaphysical reasoning. By rejecting the Hegelian order of unity (between thought and beiEig) Engels repudiates the concept of the Absolute Idea and the deter-minate causality of the thought-being identity. But he rejects this unity from the perspective of real history i t s e l f . In his construction the materialist dialectic substitutes His-tory for the Hegelian Absolute Idea. The Hegelian dialectic, i t ' s logical structure and assumptions remain intact, what has been changed i s merely the subject of the process. As the replacement of the Absolute Idea, History explains every-thing, i t transforms ^Historical materialism' from an open-ended infant science ... into •••• a system already capable 16 of explaining a l l events". The principles of Hegel's dialectic, instead of distinguishing between the f i n i t e and the i n f i n i t e , are employed by Engels i n nature,and human his-tory to distinguish the "real" and "true" from the unscientific. And, therefore, "Those who asserted the primacy of sp i r i t to nature and, ... i n the last instance, assumed world creations in some form or other ... comprised the camp of Idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the 16. Stedman Jones, N. L. R. #79, p. 28. 17. Engels, Ludwlg Feuerbach. p. 21. - 6.9 -17 v a r i o u s s c h o o l s o f m a t e r i a l i s m " . I n s h o r t , D i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ~ a s t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f movement — becomes a n a l a g o u s t o t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e movement o f m a t e r i a l r e a l i t y ( h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ) . The l a t t e r i s used not i n a complimentary r e l a t i o n , b u t a s p r o o f o f t h e f i r s t . Sub-s e q u e n t l y , t h e a n a l y s i s o f h i s t o r y a p p e a r s t o recede i n a d e t e r m i n a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h n a t u r e — p r e s e n t i n g Marx more as a n a t u r a l i s t (economic d e t e r m l n i s t ) t h a n a s a m a t e r i a l i s t . T h i s t h e n was t h e n o t i o n o f t h e d i a l e c t i c w h i c h E n g e l s ( l i k e Hegel) employed a s h i s " c r i t i q u e o f t h e a b s o l u t e by 18 h i s t o r l e a l r e l a t l v i sm». Pe r h a p s t h e most i m p o r t a n t consequence o f t h i s n o t i o n i s t h a t ' t h i s h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i v i s m ' does not go o u t s i d e o f H e g e l i a n d i a l e c t i c a l s t r u c t u r e , I t p o s t u l a t e s an I m p o s s i b l e  c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e l o g i c a l development and h i s t o r i c a l  development. F o r E n g e l s t h e p r o c e s s o f s c i e n t i f i c t h o u g h t and t h e p r o c e s s o f r e a l h i s t o r y merged i n t o one c o n c e p t : e i t h e r h i s t o r y o r p r o c e s s . And w i t h i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e d i a l e c t i c a s t h e s c i e n c e o f t h e g e n e r a l l a w s o f m o t i o n , we a l s o f i n d a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e e v o l u t i o n a r y movement w i t h i n H e g e l ' s d i a l e c t i c , 1. e., t h e movement o f i n t e r -c o n n e c t i o n between o r i g i n s ( e s s e n c e ) and e n d i n g s . I t i s h i s conc e p t o f emergent e v o l u t i o n ( and i t ' s e s s e n t i a l t e l e o l o g y ) w h i c h E n g e l s sees e x p r e s s e d v i a " t h e d i a l e c t i c ( w hich) 18. L o u i s A l t h u s s e r , P o l i t i c s and H i s t o r y (1970), p. 175. - 70 -Je . . reveals the t r a n s i t o r y character of everything and i n every-thing; nothing can endure before i t except the uninterrupted process of becoming and passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And d i a l e c t i c a l philosophy i t s e l f i s nothing more than the mere r e f l e c t i o n of t h i s pro-19 cess i n the thinking brain". Although Engels seemingly r e j e c t s the teleology of Hegel (with absolute knowledge as i t ' s goal), he f a l s e l y believes he has cleansed the d i a l e c t i c ' s l o g i c by 'inverting i t ' . But as Althusser suc-c i n c t l y t e l l s us, "To c r i t i c i z e the Hegelian philosophy of History because i t i s t e l e o l o g l o a l , because from i t ' s o r i g i n s I t Is In pursuit of a goal (the r e a l i z a t i o n of Absolute Know-ledge), hence to r e j e c t the teleology i n the philosophy of history, but to return to the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c as such at the same time, i s to f a l l i nto a strange contradiction: f o r the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c too, i s t e l e o l o g i c a l i n i t ' s struc-ture ( i , e., as i n C o l l e t t i ' s structure of alienation) since the key structure of the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c Is the negation  of the negation, which i s the teleology I t s e l f , within the 19. Engels Ludwlg Feuerbach, p. 12. He also expresses h i s a f f i n i t y with Hegel i n another passage from a l e t t e r written to F. A. Lange on March 29, 1&65, "The modern scien-t i f i c doctrine of the c o r r e l a t i o n of natural forces .... Is a f t e r a l l only another expression, or rather i t i s the pos i t i v e proof, of the Hegelian development of cause and e f f e c t , Interaction, force, etc. 'I am of course no longer a Hegelian, but I s t i l l have a great f e e l i n g of piety and devotion towards the c o l o s s a l old chap". Selected Corres-pondence , p. 200 - 71 -20 dialectic". Hence simply by inverting the Hegelian dialectic one does not cleanse It's teleological structure; what i t does change i s the nature of the subject — i . e. t from a process of alienation of the Idea, to a process or alienation of real history. But what value does this 'revolutionary and c r i t i c a l ' schema have as a scientific method for examining history? It appears to be nothing more than the shadow of Hegel's teleological process of alienation, and as a necessary consequence, i t cannot be used as a method of research, i t can only act as a proof of that which has already been discovered, a proof indeed valid only post fao-4 - 21 turn. Engels' Interpretation of Marx's Concept of History It i s clear that these loans from Hegel's method forced Engels to remain i n many ways a prisoner of i t ' s assumptions. This dependency, exemplified in his later writings, has greatly contributed to the mystification of the real trans-formation which Marx worked on Hegel's dialectic ( i . e., his 20. Louis Althusser, P o l i t i c s & History, p. l 8 l . 21. And this i s precisely the way i n which Marx uses the principles of the negation of the negation, etc., i . e^, as a summary of what has already been illustrated. Cf. especially Capital. Vol. I, pp. 337-338, 837. - 72 -, 22 elimination of a subject from the process). But for our examination, as for Stedman Jones 1, "The gravest consequence of Engels 1 theory of the dialectic, stemmed not from his unsuccessful attampt to use i t as a bridge between different sciences, but rather i n the way in which i t distorted the character of historical materialism i t s e l f and unwittingly transformed i t from an open-ended infant science in the course of elaboration into the appearance, of a finished sys-tem already capable of explaining a l l events great and small"• In other words, Engels connected Marlsm philosophically with •naturalistic materialism* but the attempt to make nature dialec t i c a l while relying on the natural sciences inevitably led to the opposite result. The dialectic was naturalized. This attempt to make nature histo r i c a l , i„ e., dia l e c t i c a l , leaves the historic a l dialectic Itself more or less undis-turbed, while the attempt to Include history i n the realm of nature must distort the dial e c t i c a l structure of history i t -self and transform the theoretical and practical praxis of men to i t . It i s no accident therefore that this inter-pretation of the dialectic led to a primitive and distorted 2 2 . In other words, i n radical contrast to Engels* com-ments on Marx's relationship to Hegel made i n Ludwlg Feuerbach, that "Hegel was not simply put aside (by Marx) on the contrary, one started out from his revolutionary side described above, from the di a l e c t i c a l method. But i n i t ' s Hegelian form this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics i s the self-development of the concept", p. 4 3 . 2 3 . Stedman Jones. N. L. R., p. 28. - 73 -materialism. The p r i n c i p l e f a u l t of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was therefore i n the manner i n which Engels ( l i k e C o l l e t t i ) pro-jected Marx's concept of history as a 1 m a t e r i a l i s t ' iden-t i f i c a t i o n of the l o g i c a l with the h i s t o r i c a l , or more g e n e r a l l y ; i n the manner i n which they projected a one-to-one correspondence between the concrete r e a l and the concept of the r e a l . Engels, (and the h l s t o r i c l s t s i n general), by i n -verting the Hegelian d i a l e c t i c , ordered history according to the laws of the d i a l e c t i c , presuming that thereafter every-2k thing becomes 'simple and clear as noonday'. As Engels characterizes Marx's concept of history " i n the course of h i s t o r y , as i n i t ' s l i t e r a r y r e f l e c t i o n , the evolutions proceed by and large from the simple to the more complex r e l a t i o n s , the h i s t o r i c a l development of p o l i t i c a l economy constituted a natural clue, which the c r i t i q u e could take as a point of departure, and then the economic  categories would appear on the whole In  the same order as i n the l o g i c a l expo-s i t i o n ... The l o g i c a l method of approach was therefore the only suitable one. This, however, i s indeed nothing but the h i s t o r i c a l method,*only stripped of the h i s t o r i c a l form and d i v e r t i n g chance occurrences. Thefpoint where t h i s history begins must also be the sta r t i n g point of the t r a i n of thought, and I t ' s further pro-gress w i l l be simply the r e f l e c t i o n , i n 2k. Engels f o r example t e l l s us that the "Marxist con-ception of h i s t o r y tfputs an end to philosophy i n the realm of history, Just as the d i a l e c t i c a l conceptions of nature made a l l natural philosophy both unnecessary and impossible. I t i s no longer a question anywhere of in v e r t i n g interconnections from out of our brains', but of discovering them i n the f a c t s . " Ludwlg Feuerbach. p. 59. - 74 -a b s t r a c t and t h e o r e t i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t form, of the h i s t o r i c a l course. Though the r e f l e c t i o n i s c o r r e c t e d , i t i s c o r r e c t e d i n accordance with laws p r o v i d e d by the a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l course, since each f a c t o r can be examined a t the stage of development where i t reaches i t ' s f u l l m a t u r i t y , i t ' s c l a s s i c a l f o r m " . 2 5 But Marx h i m s e l f , as we s h a l l see, never Juxtaposed h i s t o r i c a l and l o g i c a l a n a l y s e s i n the ways t h a t E n g e l s d i d . H i s d i a l e c t i c a l laws of motion were not re p r e s e n t e d as a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l laws working behind h i s t o r i c a l e v ents. " I t would" s t a t e s Marx, "be in e x p e d i e n t and wrong t h e r e f o r e t o present the economic c a t e g o r i e s s u c c e s s f u l l y i n the order i n which 26 they have p l a y e d the dominant r o l e i n h i s t o r y " . To e x p l a i n h i s t o r y otherwise, t o e x p l a i n i t i n a t e l e o l o g i c a l f a s h i o n , would be t o e x p l a i n e v e r y t h i n g and yet e x p l a i n n o t h i n g a t a l l . F o r E n g e l s on the oth e r hand, h i s t o r y l i k e ..that of l o g i c , i s governed by the p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r e ' s d i a l e c t i c a l laws, i t ' s motion t h e r e f o r e i s c a t e g o r i z e d a c c o r d i n g t o time. The ex-p r e s s i o n of t h i s h l s t o r i c i s t p r o b l e m a t i c suppresses the very d i s t i n c t i o n s which must n e c e s s a r i l y be made between one s o c i a l 25. E n g e l s " K a r l Marx; A C o n t r i b u t i o n t o the C r i t i q u e of P o l i t i c a l Economy", P a r t One (Review), P» 255, K. Marx C o n t r i b u t i o n s of 1859. 26. K. Marx I n t r o d u c t i o n t o a C o n t r i b u t i o n t o the C r i t i q u e o f P o l i t i c a l Economy, I b i d . , p. 213, and on p. 103, he w r i t e s "There are c a t e g o r i e s which are common t o a l l stages of p r o d u c t i o n and are e s t a b l i s h e d by re a s o n i n g as g e n e r a l c a t e g o r i e s ; the s o - c a l l e d g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s of a l l and any p r o d u c t i o n , however, are n o t h i n g but a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t i o n s which do not d e f i n e any of the a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l stages of p r o d u c t i o n " . - 75 -form and another; i t stresses i n contrast the gentico-evolutionary process of society as a necessary development of i t ' s essence. The absence of pertinent distinctions i n the argument of the h i s t o r i c i s t s leads them to identify his-t o r i c a l time with physical time. From this perspective we see that the epistemological problematic of the h i s t o r i c i s t s i n the f i n a l analysis reduces to an economism or empiricism quite distinct from Marx's concept of history and materialism. In an extended but lucid quote, Althusser captures what I think are the real epistemological premiss of Engels, and the historic1st's i n general; "with the extraordinary honesty he (Engels) points out the theoretical preconditions for this identification (logical with hi s t o r i c a l ) : the affirmation that these two developments are Identical i n order depends on the fact that the necessary concepts of any theory of history are affected i n their conceptual substance, by the propertles of the real object. 'Where things are conceived ... as changing, their mental reflections, the concepts, are likewise subject to change and trans-formation' . In order to be able to identify the development of the concepts and the development of real history, he therefore had to identify the object of knowledge with the real object, and to subject the concepts to the real determination of real history. In this way, Engels applies to the concepts of the theory of history a coefficient of  mobility borrowed directly from the concrete empirical sequence (from the ideology of history), transposing the 'real concrete' into the 'thought concrete' and the his-t o r i c a l as real change into the concept i t s e l f . Given these premises, the argu-ment i s bound to conclude that every definition i s unscientific: 'to science. definitions are worthless; since 'the only  real definition i s the development of the - 76 -thing i t s e l f , but t h i s Is no longer a , d e f i n i t i o n 1 . Once again the r e a l thing has been substituted f o r the concept and the development of the r e a l thing ( i . e., the r e a l h i s t o r y of concrete genesis) has been 2 7 substituted for the •development of forms'. Accordingly, within the domain of t h i s epistemological assumption, we f i n d that f o r Engels the law of value becomes a concept v a l i d only for that p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l period preceding pr i c e s of production. He formulates a concept of the labour theory of value which regresses back to the »bear and deer' example of Adam Smith's (developed below i n Chap-ter IV). In the same way, i t i s t h i s notion of Marx's h i s -t o r i c a l materialism which led Engels to write i n a l e t t e r to Conrad Schmidt, that "Hegel's d i a l e c t i c i s upside down because i t i s supposed to be the »self-develop-ment of thought', of which the d i a l e c t i c of f a c t s therefore i s only a r e f l e c t i o n ; whereas r e a l l y the d i a l e c t i c i n our heads . i s only the r e f l e c t i o n s of the actual development which i s f u l f i l l e d i n the world of nature and of human history i n obedience to d i a l e c t i c a l forms. I f you  compare the development of the commodity  from Being to Essence i n Hegel, you w i l l get quite a good p a r a l l e l f o r the con-crete development which r e s u l t s from f a c t s " . 27. Louis Althusser, Reading C a p i t a l , p. 114. 28. "Engels to Conrad Schmidt, November 1, 1891", Selected correspondence, p. 495. c These are thus the c o n f i n e s of the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s . However, i t remains f o r us t o pursue the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on Marx's concept of h i s t o r y , and i t ' s e f f e c t s on the r e a d i n g s o f Marx's l a b o u r theory of v a l u e i n C a p i t a l , v i s a v i s the ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem*• - 78 -As an unorthodox 'Marxist' l i k e Joan Robinson has once said, " I t i s obyious enough that i t (the 'transformation problem 1) i s not a problem about r e a l i t y but a puzzle i n analysis, which appears to be a problem only because ideology has got mixed up with algebra, i t i s a puzzle, however, that up t i l l now was never s a t i s f a c t o r i l y solved". 1 CHAPTER II I The Transformation Problem In order to f u l l y comprehend the ramifications of Engels' discussion of Marx's theory of value which we have just developed, I think i t i s necessary to set out the con-text i n which t h i s arguement has most commonly been situated. To begin with, and as you may well know, the f i r s t two volumes of Marx's C a p i t a l are deliberated i n terms of h i s notion of value, but a f t e r chapter ten of volume three, we f i n d that Marx transfers the discussion from value terms to price of production. I t i s p r e c i s e l y at t h i s point, we are t o l d , that the famous problem — the 'transformation problem' — Is evoked. The point at issue here, i s e s s e n t i a l l y that the volume one analysis sp e c i f i e d that commodities tend to s e l l at p r i c e s which correspond to t h e i r values, i n other words, i n correspondence to the amount of labour embodied i n 1, Joan Robinson, Collected Economic Papers I I I , 1°65» P. 175. - ?9 -them, whereas i n volume t h r e e we f i n d t h a t p r i c e s are not s o l d i n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e i r v a l u e s , but t h a t indeed, they tend t o d e v i a t e from these v a l u e s . Since the p u b l i c a t i o n of volume three, the c r i t i c s of Marx have g e n e r a l l y maintained t h a t t h i s divergence between p r i c e s and v a l u e s i s not caused by temporary f l u c t u a t i o n s , but t h a t the two prove t o be b a s i c a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e f o r the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of r e l a t i v e p r i c e s . The A u s t r i a n Von Bohm-Bawerk — perhaps one of the f i r s t t o c r i t i c i z e t h i s s p e c i f i c p o i n t — i n 1898 summarized the problem i n the f o l l o w i n g way: " F o r , l o n g as Marx delayed t o open h i s eyes t o the f a c t s of r e a l l i f e , he had t o do i t some time or o t h e r . He had a t l a s t t o con-f e s s t o h i s r e a d e r s t h a t i n a c t u a l l i f e commodities do not exchange, r e g u l a r l y and of n e c e s s i t y , i n p r o p o r t i o n t o the working time i n c o r p o r a t e d i n them, but i n p a r t ex-change above and i n p a r t below t h i s p r o -p o r t i o n , a c c o r d i n g as the c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d demands a s m a l l e r or a l a r g e r amount of the average p r o f i t , i n short t h a t , b e s i d e s working time, investment of c a p i t a l forms a c o - o r d i n a t e determinate of the exchange r e l a t i o n s of commodities. From t h i s p o i n t he was c o n f r o n t e d w i t h two d i f f i c u l t t a s k s . I n the f i r s t p l a c e he had t o J u s t i f y him-s e l f t o h i s r e a d e r s f o r having i n the e a r l i e r p a r t s of h i s work and f o r so l o n g taught t h a t l a b o r was the sole determinant of exchange r e l a t i o n s ; and secondly — what was perhaps the more d i f f i c u l t t a s k — he had a l s o t o g i v e h i s r e a d e r s a t h e o r e t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n which c e r t a i n l y c o u l d not f i t i n t o h i s l a b o r t h e o r y of v a l u e without l e a v i n g a r e s i d i u m , but which must not, on the o t h e r hand, c o n t r a d i c t i t " . 2 2. Bohm-Bawerk, c l o s e of M arx 1s System, e d i t e d by P a u l Sweezy, p. 89. - 80 -For the most part^however, t h i s c r i t i c i s m was used more as a platform for Bawerk to a r t i c u l a t e h i s own theory of i n t e r e s t s on c a p i t a l (and the subjective valuation of goods by u t i l i t y as the only means f o r understanding r e l a t i v e price) than as a rigorous c r i t i q u e of Marx's analysis. In essence, he argued that the deviation i n price from value necessarily proved that contrary to Marx, there was no one-to-one r e l a t i o n s h i p between value and p r i c e , and further-more that p r i c e s being regulated "by u t i l i t y or demand were determined i n the sphere of consumption rather than produc-t i o n . For him, p r i c e s "are the only " r e a l ' economic world, and therefore «prices of production were s u f f i c i e n t to ex-p l a i n prices' • Meanwhile; we f i n d that the defenders of Marx had s p l i t i nto two f a i r l y d i s t i n c t and yet interdependent positions on the problem, one of which was strongly Influenced by Engels' h i s t o r i c i s t reading, the other attempting to demon-strate that Marx's transformation was inherently correct. 1. Engels. and the Labour Theory of Value I t was p a r t l y i n response to the c r i t i c i s m s which were being raised against the law of value as i t was proposed i n volume one, and p a r t l y a r e f l e c t i o n of Engels' long developed epistemological p o s i t i o n that led him to make a number of comments i n h i s supplement to volume three, the most Infamous of which was the following: - 81— " I n a word: the Marxian law of value h o l d s g e n e r a l l y , as f a r as economic laws are v a l i d at a l l , f o r the whole p e r i o d of simple commodity' p r o d u c t i o n , t h a t i s , up t o the time when the l a t t e r s u f f i c e s a m o d i f i c a t i o n through the appearance of the c a p i t a l i s t form 'of p r o d u c t i o n . Up t o ; t h a t time p r i c e s gravifeate towards the v a l u e s f i x e d a c c o r d i n g t o the Marxian law and o s c i l l a t e around those v a l u e s , so t h a t the more f u l l y simple commodity p r o d u c t i o n develops, the more the average p r i c e s over long p e r i o d s u n i n t e r r u p t e d by ex-t e r n a l v i o l e n t d i s t u r b a n c e s c o i n c i d e w i t h v a l u e s w i t h i n a n e g l i g i b l e margin.. Thus the  Marxian law of v a l u e has g e n e r a l economic  v a l i d i t y f o r a p e r i o d l a s t i n g from the be-g i n n i n g of exchange, which tr a n s f o r m s p r o d u c t s  i n t o commodities, down t o the f i f t e e n t h cen-t u r y of the present e r a . But the exchange of commodities dates from a time b e f o r e a l l w r i t t e n h i s t o r y , which i n Egypt goes back t o a t l e a s t 2500 B. C , perhaps 6000 B. C , thus the law of value has p r e v a i l e d d u r i n g a p e r i o d of from f i v e t o seven thousand y e a r s " . 3 I t i s c l e a r , both from our p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n and from t h i s quote, t h a t f o r E n g e l s , Marx's theory of value d e l i n e a t e s a determinate stage of h i s t o r i c a l development. As a r e s u l t , i n E n g e l s ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , we are l e f t with the suggestion t h a t Marx*s p r i c e of p r o d u c t i o n a n a l y s i s ( V o l . I l l ) i s t h e c o n l y v a l i d category w i t h i n c a p i t a l i s m . What t h i s would mean i s t h a t the whole of Marx's t h e o r e t i c a l o r d e r w i t h i n C a p i t a l would simply become subordinate t o chrono-l o g i c a l sequences. I n o t h e r words, v a l u e s would be c o r -r e l a t i v e t o p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n only i n terms of t h a t h i s -3. E n g e l s ' "On Marx's C a p i t a l " . Moscow, 194-0, pp. 179-80, or C a p i t a l V o l . I l l , p. .... (My Emphasis) t o r i c a l (and t e l e o l o g i c a l ) scheme where appearances are a d j u d i c a t e d t o the development o f h i s t o r y ' s essence. Here i n E n g e l s 1 'Absolute H i s t o r y ' we would f i n d each category subordinate t o i t ' s p r e c e d i n g category — f o r as i t does i n h i s t o r y , so i t does i n l o g i c . Some of the f a l l a c i e s of t h i s k i n d of argument have a l r e a d y been suggested. But the q u e s t i o n remains. Where does t h i s l e a v e Marx's argument? Does E n g e l s ' i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n i n f a c t f a i t h f u l l y reproduce the p r o b l e m a t i c or • o b j e c t ' of Marx's l a b o u r theory of value as i t . appears i n C a p i t a l ? I d o t n o t t t h i n k so. What I should l i k e t o main-t a i n — as I have argued e a r l i e r — i s t h a t the advancement i n Marx's a b s t r a c t i o n from v a l u e t o p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n i s not a h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s , but an advancement to another l e v e l of the t h e o r e t i c a l p r o c e s s . What we s h a l l f i n d determines the p r o d u c t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n of s u r p l u s value f o r the whole of the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s i s the law of v a l u e . We s h a l l f i n d t h a t v a l u e and p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n correspond t o two d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s o f a b s t r a c t i o n which should not be confused w i t h a b s t r a c t models, because a b s t r a c t i o n i n t h i s c ontext ( t h a t of E n g e l s and C o l l e t t i ) i s only thought of as moments detached from l i n e a r h i s t o r y i t s e l f , i . e., as forms of development e q u a l t o stages of h i s t o r i c a l development. We s h a l l see t h a t the p o p u l a r i t y of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o s t e r e d by E n g e l s I s perhaps most e v i d e n t by the f a c t t h a t i t r e -appears a g a i n and a g a i n i n the defence of Marx's s o - c a l l e d - 8 3 -t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . S t i l l t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s only one p a r t of the argument i n the v i n d i c a t i o n of Marx's t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . We f i n d t h a t on a much more developed l e v e l , t h e r e i s a l s o a q u a n t i t a t i v e r e p l y t o the problem, indeed, we n o t i c e i n f a c t t h a t E n g e l s 1 h i s t o r i c i s m i s most f r e q u e n t l y used i n con-j u n c t i o n with t h i s l a t t e r k i n d of argument as a support. I n order f o r us t o become min i m a l l y conversant with t h i s 'quan-t i t a t i v e argument', I t h i n k we should f i r s t have t o e l a b o r a t e upon a few o f the s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s of Marx's s o - c a l l e d t r a n s -f o r m a t i o n . 4 . Perhaps one of the b e t t e r examples of such a p o s i t i o n i s the e i g h t hundred pages of E r n e s t Mandel's M a r x i s t Economic Theory. I n the i n t r o d u c t i o n he t e l l s us f o r example, "Now one ought not t o confuse method of p r e s e n t a t i o n  w i t h o r i g i n of knowledge. While Marx I n s i s t s on the f a c t t h a t the concrete cannot be understood without f i r s t b e i n g analyzed i n t o the a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s h i p s which make i t up, he e q u a l l y s t r e s s e s t h a t these r e l a t i o n s h i p s themselves can-not be the outcome of a mere b r i l l i a n t i n t u i t i o n or s u p e r i o r c a p a c i t y f o r a b s t r a c t i o n ; they must emerge from the study of e m p i r i c a l data, the raw m a t e r i a l of every science'!, p. 1 6 , or more e x p l i c i t l y , " i n p e t t y commodity s o c i e t y , i n d i v i d u a l l a b o u r a c q u i r e s i t ' s q u a l i t y as s o c i a l l a b o u r only i n d i r e c t l y , through the mechanisms of exchange, by the o p e r a t i o n of the law of v a l u e " but "these r u l e s n e v e r t h e l e s s remain q u i t e obvious at the b e g i n n i n g of the p e r i o d of commodity produc-t i o n . The p r o o f i s t o be seen i n the f a c t t h a t i n the c o r -p o r a t i o n s of A n t i q u i t y and i n those of China, of Byzantium, of the European and Arab Middle Ages, e t c . . f i x e d r u i e s , known t o a l l , l a i d down a l i k e tehe labour-time t o be devoted t o the making of each o b j e c t , the l e n g t h of a p p r e n t i c e s h i p , i t ' s c o s t , and the e q u i v a l e n t normally t o be asked f o r each commodity", p. 6 8 , e t c . , e t c . Marx 1s T r a n s f o r m a t i o n I n volume one of C a p i t a l , as most of us are aware, Marx proceeds t o demystify the forms of s o c i a l and produc-t i o n r e l a t i o n s as they manifest themselves under C a p i t a l i s m . The key t o t h i s examination, f o c u s e s not o n l y upon the source o f p r o f i t and of v a l u e , but a l s o on the form neces-sary f o r i t ' s p r o d u c t i o n . We are t o l d by Marx t h a t h i s a n a l y s i s ( i n volume I) i s c o n d i t i o n e d by the assumption t h a t the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s I s l i m i t e d to a s i n g l e branch of i n d u s t r y where the r a t i o of the t o t a l number of workers to t h a t of the t o t a l of machinery, raw m a t e r i a l s ( I n Marx's words, constant c a p i t a l ) i s i s o m e t r i c . As the s t o r y goes, Marx d i s c o v e r s t h a t the only p o s s i b l e source f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n of a new increment of value — i . e . , p r o f i t or s u r p l u s - v a l u e — i s v i a the exchange between the c a p i t a l i s t s and l a b o u r i n the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s . Although t h i s exchange appears t o be e q u a l , i t proves t o be q u i t e the o p p o s i t e , f o r the c a p i t a l i s t p r o c u r e s an amount of p r o d u c t i v e labour-time (labour-power) above and beyond the o r i g i n a l redemption t o the l a b o u r e r . I n other words,Marx a s c e r t a i n s t h a t i n the exchange between the c a p i t a l i s t and the worker, the c a p i t a l i s t o b t a i n s a s u r p l u s of labour-power by exchanging with the worker on l y f o r the time, wages, or commodites, necessary f o r the r e p r o d u c t i o n of the worker ( a s the agent of labour-power). And y e t the c a p i t a l i s t — entrepreneur t h a t he i s , employs the worker f o r a p e r i o d of time ( o r i n t e n s i t y ) beyond t h a t - 8 5 -necessary f o r h i s r e p r o d u c t i o n . Hence e x t r a labour-power i s employed t o produce e x t r a exchange-values, which are a p p r o p r i a t e d by the c a p i t a l i s t f o r h i s p e r s o n a l consumption, re-investment, e t c . I n o t h e r words, the mass of l a b o u r -power set i n motion by the c a p i t a l i s t i s always g r e a t e r than the exchange-value a s s i g n e d t o i t by wages, i . e., "the v a l u e ofllabour-power, and the v a l u e which t h a t labour-power c r e a t e s i n the l a b o u r p r o c e s s , are two e n t i r e l y d i f -f e r e n t magnitudes; and t h i s d i f f e r e n c e of the two v a l u e s was what the c a p i t a l -i s t had i n view, when he was pu r c h a s i n g the l a b o u r power".5 The e f f e c t of t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n i s t h a t i t i s assumed t h a t because l a b o u r I s sole source f o r the p r o d u c t i o n of v a l u e , and thus f a r the p r o d u c t i o n of s u r p l u s - v a l u e , t h a t the r a t e of s u r p l u s - v a l u e should t h e r e f o r e tend t o be r e l a t i v e t o the t o t a l amount of l a b o u r which i s u t i l i z e d I n the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s . I n o t h e r words, i n a system based on the assump-t i o n t h a t t h e r e are equal r a t e s of e x p l o i t a t i o n ( r a t i o o f v a r i a b l e c a p i t a l - l a b o u r - p o w e r >to unpaid labour-power) and equal q u a n t i t i e s of constant c a p i t a l employed, the r a t e of s u r p l u s value would be equal between i n d u s t r i e s . But working w i t h i n t h i s same assumption we would a l s o f i n d t h a t when the r e are not e q u a l q u a n t i t i e s of c a p i t a l employed per labour-power ( i . e., machinery p e r worker) t h a t the r a t e of 5 . Marx, Volume I , C a p i t a l , p. 2 l 6 . —86 -s u r p l u s value between i n d u s t r i e s would d i f f e r . Thus the r a t e oof s u r p l u s - v a l u e i s dependent upon the o r g a n i c com-p o s i t i o n of c a p i t a l ( i i e., the t o t a l s of v a r i a b l e and con-stant c a p i t a l ) . Marx h i m s e l f s t a t e s something s i m i l a r , i . e . : "Since c a p i t a l s i n d i f f e r e n t spheres of p r o -d u c t i o n viewed i n percentages — or as c a p i t a l s of equal magnitudes — are d i v i d e d d i f f e r e n t l y i n t o v a r i a b l e and constant c a p i t a l ( o r g a n i c composition of c a p i t a l ) , s e t t i n g i n motion unequal q u a n t i t i e s of l i v i n g l a b o u r and producing s u r p l u s - v a l u e s and t h e r e f o r e p r o f i t s , i t f o l l o w s t h a t the r a t e of p r o f i t , which c o n s i s t s p r e c i s e l y of the r a t i o s of s u r p l u s - v a l u e t o t o t a l c a p i t a l i n p e r c e n t , must a l s o d i f f e r " . " However, we soon l e a r n — both from Marx and h i s c r i t i c s a l i k e — t h a t i n a c t u a l f a c t the r a t e s of p r o f i t (as the average tend towards e q u a l i t y , and t h a t the o r g a n i c compositions of c a p i t a l ( r a t i o of l a b o u r t o machinery, raw m a t e r i a l s , e t c . ) are i n c l i n e d more towards i n e q u a l i t y between d i f f e r e n t branches of p r o d u c t i o n s . I t i s f o r t h i s reason, t h a t i n volume three we n o t i c e the o r i g i n a l l i m i t i n g assumptions of volume one are removed; s u r p l u s - v a l u e I s transformed i n t o p r o f i t s , and v a l u e s i n t o p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n . Here Marx i n d i c a t e s t o us that the p r o f i t which the c a p i t a l i s t g a i n s i n each branch of i n d u s t r y i s c a l c u l a t e d no l o n g e r j u s t I n terms of v a r i a b l e c a p i t a l , but i n terms of the t o t a l mag-6. K. Marx, C a p i t a l , V o l . I l l , Moscow, p. 1^9. n i t u d e of c a p i t a l (both constant and v a r i a b l e ) which i s em-p l o y e d . The r e s u l t i s t h a t over the economy as a whole the p r o f i t which the c a p i t a l i s t e x t r a c t s corresponds t o an average r a t e of p r o f i t . I n t h i s new s i t u a t i o n i t becomes c l e a r l y e v i d e n t t h a t the p r o f i t t h a t the c a p i t a l i s t makes may d i f f e r c o n s i d e r a b l y from the amount of s u r p l u s - v a l u e a c t u a l l y produced by h i s own i n d u s t r y . Marx accounts f o r t h i s a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a -d i c t o r y c o n d i t i o n by proposing t h a t the average r a t e of p r o -f i t r e p r e s e n t s an average of the t o t a l aggregate s u r p l u s -v a l u e produced i n i t h e economy as a whole, i n o t h e r words, "the law (as a g e n e r a l tendency) t h a t p r o f i t s are r e l a t e d t o one another as the magnitude of the c a p i t a l s and t h a t , con-sequently, c a p i t a l s of equal magnitudes y i e l d e q u a l p r o f i t s 7 i n e q u a l p e r i o d s ..." I t f o l l o w s from t h i s , t h e r e f o r e , t h at p r o f i t s are dependent on the r a t i o of constant c a p i t a l t o v a r i a b l e c a p i t a l , and hence, t h a t r e l a t i v e p r i c e s do not n e c e s s a r i l y have t o correspond t o t h e i r l a b o u r v a l u e s . . M arx 1s e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s d i v e r s i v e phenomenon went as f o l -lows: the aggregate average of s u r p l u s - v a l u e i s r e - a l l o c a t e d through c o m p e t i t i o n among the d i f f e r e n t branches of In d u s t r y , such t h a t they are rewarded i n terms of t h e i r t o t a l c a p i t a l ( r a t h e r than t o t a l wages) spent In p r o d u c t i o n . I n ot h e r 7. I b i d . , p. 153 - 88 -words. I n h i s c h a i n of r e a s o n i n g , the volume one a n a l y s i s was not only not c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o the phenomenal forms of c a p i t a l i s m , but Indeed, i t a c t e d as the very b a s i s upon which magnitudes of the average r a t e of p r o f i t ( d e r i v a t i v e s of the t o t a l c a p i t a l ) c o u l d be determined. He s u c c i n c t l y summarizes t h i s c o n t r a d i c t o r y and d e c e p t i v e movement of c a p i t a l i n a l e t t e r t o E n g e l s : "Competition ( t r a n s f e r of c a p i t a l or w i t h -drawal of c a p i t a l from one trade t o a n o t h e r ) , b r i n g s i t about t h a t e q u a l sums of c a p i t a l i n d i f f e r e n t t r a d e s , d e s p i t e t h e i r d i f f e r e n t o r g a n i c composition, y i e l d the same average r a t e of p r o f i t . I n o t h e r words, the average p r o f i t which a c a p i t a l of 100 (pounds) f o r i n s t a n c e , makes i n a c e r t a i n t r a d e i s not made as the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a p i t a l , nor r e l a t e d , t h e r e f o r e , t o the p a r -t i c u l a r aim with which the s u r p l u s value I s produced, but I s made as an a l i q u o t p a r t of the t o t a l c a p i t a l of the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s . I t i s a share on which i n p r o p o r t i o n t o I t ' s s i z e , d i v i d e n d s are p a i d from the t o t a l sum of s u r p l u s value ( o r unpaid labour) which the t o t a l v a r i a b l e c a p i t a l ( l a i d out i n wages) of the c l a s s produces ... c o m p e t i t i o n does not t h e r e f o r e reduce commodities t o t h e i r v a l u e s , but t o t h e i r c o s t p r i c e , which i s above, below or e q u a l t o t h e i r v a l u e , a c c o r d i n g t o the o r g a n i c composition of the r e s p e c t i v e c a p i t a l " . B We d i s c e r n then, t h a t with the equal r e t u r n s on t o t a l c a p i t a l , and the ensuing t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of s u r p l u s value i n t o p r o f i t s , Marx f i n d s i t necessary a l s o t o t r a n s f o r m v a l u e s i n t o p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n . I n volume one as we remember, Marx had p r e -8. Marx & E n g e l s . S e l e c t e d Correspondence. ' L e t t e r t o E n g e l s of August 2, 1862', p. 131. - 89 -sumed that commodities produced i n one branch of i n d u s t r y were bought and s o l d at t h e i r v a l u e s (1. e., i n terms of t h e i r q u a n t i t i e s of s o c i a l l y necessary l a b o u r ) ^ , but t h a t now under p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n , commodities tend not t o s e l l at t h e i r v a l u e s but at t h e i r c o s t of p r o d u c t i o n p l u s the average r a t e  of p r o f i t . As Marx h i m s e l f w r i t e s : "Hence, the p r i c e of p r o d u c t i o n of a commodity i s equal t o i t ' s c o s t - p r i c e p l u s the p r o f i t , a l l o t t e d t o i t i n p e r c e n t , i n accordance with the g e n e r a l r a t e of p r o f i t , or,> i n other words, t o i t ' s c o s t -p r i c e p l u s the average p r o f i t " . 1 0 We see t h e n t h a t t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e dependent upon the p r i c e ' s t r a n s i t i o n of s u r p l u s value i n t o p r o f i t . I n s h o r t , the r a t e of p r o f i t was determined by the r a t i o of t o t a l s u r p l u s t o t o t a l c a p i t a l . However, the q u e s t i o n s t i l l remains, why i s there a tendency f o r the e q u a l i z a t i o n of the average r a t e of p r o f i t among d i f f e r e n t spheres of I n d u s t r y ? On an i n t u i t i v e l e v e l one c o u l d simply answer t h i s by saying t h a t wherever t h e r e i s an average r a t e of p r o f i t , and thus a g e n e r a l r a t e of p r o f i t f o r a l l i n d u s t r y , such an average p r o f i t cannot be but a p r o f i t on an average s o c i a l c a p i t a l . T h i s would be one J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the assumption made by Marx t h a t the t o t a l sum of v a l u e s must e q u a l the t o t a l 9. Marx makes t h i s l i m i t i n g assumption i n a f o o t n o t e on p ; . o of C a p i t a l . V o l . I . 10. K. Marx. C a p i t a l . V o l . I l l , p. 157. - 90 -sum of p r i c e s . Or as he declares "... the sum of the p r o f i t s i n a l l spheres of production must equal the sum of the sur-plus values, and the sum of the p r i c e s of production of the 11 t o t a l s o c i a l c a p i t a l equal the sum of i t ' s values". But t h i s kind of answer seems somewhat ambiguous i n l i g h t of the fa c t that i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s average rate of p r o f i t which Marx i s attempting to explain. On the other hand, and more c o r r e c t l y , we f i n d that f o r Marx c a p i t a l i s t production i s a s o c i a l process which i s i n d i f f e r e n t to p a r t i c u l a r use-values, i t ' s concern i s surplus value, i . e., the appropriation of surplus labour. For t h i s reason one sphere of production i s just as good or as bad as another, f o r a l l y i e l d the same p r o f i t . I f commodities out-side of t h i s s o c i a l space were sold at t h e i r values, very d i f f e r e n t rates of p r o f i t would be r e a l i z e d , but through the transference of c a p i t a l , and the search f o r the highest average p r o f i t , the rate of p r o f i t equalizes into a general rate — "and values are, therefore, converted i n t o p r i c e s of 12 production". Insother words^it Is c a p i t a l as a s o c i a l body, or a s o c i a l r e l a t i o n which succeeds i n equalizing the rate of p r o f i t . And i t i s only because I t succeeds i n equalizing the 11. I b i d . , p. 173. We also f i n d l a t e r , that these two conditions are those necessary f o r the equilibrium i n Marx's simple reproduction model i l l u s t r a t e d below on page 9 0 ; 12. I b i d . , pp. 195-6. - 91 -rate of profit that these "prices which obtain as the average of the various roles of profit i n the different spheres of production added to the cost-prices of the different spheres 13 of production, constitute the prices of production". We thus have a chain of consequences which make up the transformation, such that, as Marc Blaug, a modern bour-geoise c r i t i c of Marx has summarized: "F i r s t , we derive the total amount of surplus value from the amount of variable capital employed, next we calculate the average rate of profit on total capital invested by dividing the total surplus value by the amount of capital i n the economy, and then we add profits at the going rate to the cost price to arrive at prices". 1 We may therefore say that the source of transformation problem arises from the dilemma whereby the exchange ratios tend not in fact to be equal to embodied labour ratios, unless the capitals are similarly constituted, 1. e., i n Marx's terminology, unless their organic compositions are equal. Once we come face to face with the fact that i f a l l capitals tend to have unequal organic compositions of capital^then the return on individual capital seems to no longer relate to one part of capital — i . e., that part which i s spent on wages. If one has argued, as Marx has i n volume one, that the only source of profit i s through the 13. Ibid., p. 157. 14. Marc Blaug. Economic Theory i n Retrospect, p. 232. - 92 -extraction of surplus labour from the workers by the c a p i t a l i s t s , i t should follow as Bohm Bawerk mentioned, that the volume three analysis should substantiate that t h i s t r u l y i s the case — a feat however, which i t seemingly f a i l s to do. Perhaps the objections which arise i n the tra n s f o r -mation of values into p r i c e s , and surplus value into p r o f i t s are best expressed i n Marx 1s own transformation procedure outlined i n Table I below. Marx i n volume three considers f i v e d i f f e r e n t spheres of production, each with a d i f f e r e n t organic composition, but a l l possessing a common rate of exp l o i t a t i o n ( i . e., r a t i o of surplus to necessary labour — i n t h i s example i t i s equal to one hundred percent) to com-15 pose the following schema. TABLE I Marx's Transformation Table Used Used Surp Value Cost Bate Price Price > up up - l u s of Price of of Value c v v a l - Comm. c+v Pro- Produc-ues odity f i t t l o n C a p i t a l s o+v+s s/o+v O+V+P(c+v) I. 80 c+20 v 50 20 20 90 70 22 92 +2 I I . 7 0 c + 3 0 v 51 30 30 111 81 22 103 -8 I I I . 60 c+40 v 51 40 40 131 91 22 113 -18 IV. 85c+15v V. 40 15 15 70 55 22 77 +7 95c+ 5v 10 5 5 20 15 22 37 +17 Totals 3 9 0 C + 1 1 0 V 202 110 110 422 312 110 422 0 15. Extracted from tables on pages 155-7 (beginning of chapter 9) of C a p i t a l , V o l . I l l , I nternational Publishers. According t o Marx i n the above c a l c u l a t i o n s there must e x i s t two fundamental c o n d i t i o n s f o r a s u c c e s s f u l • t r a n s f o r -mation* ; i . e., the t o t a l sum of v a l u e s must e q u a l the sum of p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n and the sum of s u r p l u s v a l u e must equal the sum of p r o f i t s . Both of these c o n d i t i o n s we may note are met i n the above formula. I n any event, the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem remains as f o l l o w s : can the r e l a t i o n between v a r i o u s branches of i n d u s -t r y ^ a n d the assumed c o n d i t i o n s of e q u i l i b r i u m ( i n the simple r e p r o d u c t i o n model)^ a l l o w f o r a mathematical e q u a t i o n a l sys-tem such t h a t p r i c e s may be d e r i v e d from&values? I n s t r i c t l y mathematical terms, Ludwlg von B o r t k i e w i t z was probably one of the f i r s t and most capable s t a t i s t i c i a n s t o t e s t the v e r a c i t y 16 of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n . Von B o r t k i e w i t z and 'Marx* s E r r o r * The key t o the argument, f o r B o r t k i e w l t z a w a s t h a t i n the t r a n s i t i o n from v a l u e s t o p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n , not o n l y does the r a t e of s u r p l u s v a l u e n e c e s s a r i l y need t o be t r a n s -formed as a f a c t o r i n c a l c u l a t i n g p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n , but t h a t constant and v a r i a b l e c a p i t a l must a l s o be transformed l6o Ludwlg von B o r t k i e w i t z . "On the C o r r e c t i o n of Marx's Fundamental T h e o r e t i c a l C o n s t r u c t i o n i n the T h i r d Volume of C a p i t a l " — i n Sweezy* s The C l o s e of Marx 1 s System, a l s o B o r t k i e w i t z , "Value and P r i c e " , I n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic  Papers, 1952. - 9> -into costs of production in order to determine prices of pro-duction. He writes: "Marx ..... made the mistake of carrying over certain magnitudes without alterations from the table of values into that of prices. In transforming values into prices, i t i s l n -admissable to exclude from the recalculation the constant and variable capital invested in the various spheres of production". 1' Bortkiewitz endeavors to prove this thesis u t i l i z i n g 1 8 assumptions originally adopted by Tugan-Baranowsky i n which i t was assumed: 1) that the advanced aggregate of capital turns over once a year, and 2) that the five different spheres of production which Marx uti l i z e d i n Table I, may be reduced-down to the three departments of production of Marx1s simple reproduction model developed i n Volume II of Capital. Bortkiewitz reveals that unless variable and constant capital are simultaneously transformed, total profit w i l l not equal total surplus-value except for a few rare anomalies. He states for example, that: "Marx's error i s due to the i l l o g i c a l method reused i n deriving prices from values, i t i s not caused primarily by any confusion between the concept of value as the index of an exchange relationship and the concept of absolute value and such a confusion might at most have been an accessory, for when Marx's calculations led him to the result that 17. Ludwlg von Bortkiewitz. "Value & Price, p. 9. 18. Tugan-Baranowsky ";''\\7 - 95 -t o t a l p r i c e e q u a l s t o t a l v a l u e , i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t he should have seen i n t h i s a c o n f i r m a t i o n of the view t h a t the val u e of a l l goods taken t o g e t h e r had a s i g n i f i c a n c e which c o u l d not be m o d i f i e d by the " c a p i t a l -i s t i c method of c a l c u l a t i o n " ( i . e., by a p p l y i n g the p r i n c i p l e of p r i c e c a l c u l a t i o n " . Although he acknowledges t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e — g i v e n these above assumptions — of making the sum of s u r p l u s - v a l u e i n the t a b l e of v a l u e s , e q u a l t o the sum of p r o f i t i n p r i c e of p r o d u c t i o n , but t h a t " I t would thus not be p e r m i s s i b l e t o equate t o t a l p r i c e w i t h t o t a l v a l u e w h i l s t s i m u l -t a n e o u s l y equating t o t a l p r o f i t w i t h t o t a l s u r p l u s v a l u e . I n M a r x 1 s e x p o s i t i o n , how-ever, the i d e n t i t y t o t a l p r i c e equal t o t a l v a l u e appears not as a p e r m i s s i b l e , though a r b i t r a r y , assumption, but as the conse-quence of a s e r i e s o f mutu a l l y incompatible i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s of c e r t a i n magnitudes of p r i c e with the cor r e s p o n d i n g magnitudes of v a l u e . The i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of these i d e n -t i f i c a t i o n s can be seen from the mere f a c t t h a t they l e a d t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t o t a l p r i c e e q u a l s t o t a l v a l u e , which when the measure of p r i c e s i s I d e n t i c a l w i t h t h a t of v a l u e s as i s the case w i t h Marx — i s not o b v i o u s l y wrong, o r can be r i g h t only by a c c i d e n t " . 2 0 Andtfas a c o r o l l a r y , "we are thus d r i v e n t o r e j e c t Marx's d e r i v a t i o n of p r i c e and p r o f i t from value and s u r p l u s v a l u e " . 19. B o r t k i e w i t z . "Value & P r i c e " , pp. 1 1 - 1 2 . 2 0 . I b i d . , pp. 1 2 - 1 3 . F o r such an a c c i d e n t r e f e r t o P a u l Sweezy's Theory of C a p i t a l i s t Development, p. 1 2 3 . 2 1 . I b i d . , p. 1 3 . a F o r the most p a r t , B o r t k i e w i t z ' s examination r e t a i n s the i n t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t s of Marx's p r i c e of p r o d u c t i o n system, and he e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t the fundamental eq u i v a l e n c e between the sum of the v a l u e s and the sum of the p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n , and t h a t of the sum of s u r p l u s v a l u e w i t h the sum of p r o f i t s are both, at one and the same time, not p o s s i b l e . H i s s o l u t i o n t o the ' e r r o r o f Marx' was t o t r a n s f o r m s i m u l -t a n e o u s l y both i n p u t s and outputs of Marx's p r i c e o f produc-t i o n , and, concurrent w i t h t h i s , he a l s o reduces the f o u r unknowns (1. e., the r a t i o s between v a l u e and p r i c e f o r the th r e e departments of the simple r e p r o d u c t i o n Model, and f o u r t h l y , the r a t i o between the r a t e of s u r p l u s v a l u e and the r a t e of p r o f i t ) down t o th r e e e q u a t i o n s , such t h a t the same number of eq u a t i o n s are r e p r e s e n t e d by the same number of unknowns. He undertakes such a r e d u c t i o n by assuming a))'that the value scheme was expressed i n teams of money, and b) t h a t g o l d i s the money commodity produced i n Department I I I , I n which case, we may reasonably take the r a t i o between v a l u e and p r i c e I n Department I I I as e q u a l t o u n i t y , 1. e., "the good 22 used as value and p r i c e measure belongs t o Department I I I " . I n t h i s scheme I t i s because p r o d u c t i o n i n Department I I I i s g i v e n as e q u a l t o the s o c i a l l y average o r g a n i c composition, t h a t i t f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t the sum of p r i c e s w i l l come out equal t o the sum of v a l u e s f o r t h a t i n d u s t r y . 22. B o r t k i e w i t z , p. 205. - 97 -Perhaps t h i s would be made a l l the more simple i f we were to follow t h i s reduction v i a Bortkiewitz's i l l u s t r a t i o n s . But f i r s t , l e t me c l a r i f y that Marx's equilibrium model of simple reproduction i s based on defining the conditions bet-ween surplus value ( s ) , variable c a p i t a l (v), and constant c a p i t a l ( c ) , as the sources of expenditures by both the workers and c a p i t a l i s t s , and, also on the conditions of the reproduction of the three mainMepartments of production? i . e.. Department I, c a p i t a l goods; Department I I , wage goods; and Department I I I , luxury goods, or c a p i t a l i s t consumer goods. From t h i s we may derive an equilibrium model expressed i n an equation l i k e such: TABLE II Equilibrium M o d e l 2 3 Dept. I c i + v i + 81 = c 1 + eg + 03 Dept. II C2 + V2 + S2 = V i + V2 + V 3 Dept. I l l 0 3 + V 3 + 33 = s i + S2 + S3 23. Maurice Dobb summarizes t h i s reduction as follows: "Bortkiewitz used a three-sector model; one sector producing wage-goods, another elements of constant c a p i t a l and the t h i r d luxury goods consumed out of surplus-value. On the assumption of s t a t i c conditions with zero net investment (Marx's simple reproduction), i t followed that the supply of output from each sector department of an industry must equal the demand for i t a r i s i n g from the sum of the relevant incomes generated In the three departments ( i n h i s tables the sum of the columns must equal the sum of the relevant rows; eg. t o t a l price of wage goods equal to the sum of the wages paid i n a l l three sectors)". Theories of Value and  D i s t r i b u t i o n Since Adam Smith, Cambridge, pp. 159-60. - 98 -Applying t h i s equilibrium model to Marx's schema of value analysis we may, according to Bortkiewitz, render Marx's o r i g i n a l model (Table I) into the following equilibrium model: TABLE I I I Marx's Value Model Under Equilibrium Conditions Constant C a p i t a l Variable C a p i t a l Surplus Value Value of Product Dept. I 225 90 60 375 Dept. II 100 120 80 300 Dept. I l l 50 90 60 200 Tot a l s 375 300 200 875 Here we see that the rate of surplus value ( s ) i s equal to 66.6 percent; and the rate of p r o f i t ( s ) i s equal to 29 c+v percent. Also the equilibrium conditions outlined above i n Table I I are maintained, the t o t a l products of each department correspond to the t o t a l s of c, v, and s, ponsumed i n the pro-duction process. Now, following t h i s model, we can proceed to express Marx's transformation of values into p r i c e s i n the following manner: 24 TABLE IV Marx's Price Calculation Constant Variable P r o f i t Price of C a p i t a l C a p i t a l Products Dept. I 225 90 93 9/27 408 9/27 Dept. II 100 120 65 5/27 285 5/27 Dept. I l l 50 90 41 13/27 l 8 l 13/27 Totals 375 300 200 875 24. Footnote, p. 992. - 99 -I n Marx 1s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i l l u s t r a t e d above, we n o t i c e t h a t v a r i a b l e and constant c a p i t a l are not transformed, more-over, the c o n d i t i o n s of e q u i l i b r i u m necessary f o r the simple r e p r o d u c t i o n model are a l s o not met. F o r example t o t a l con-stant c a p i t a l (375)» does not equal the t o t a l p r i c e of p r o -ducts of Department I (408 9/27)• Yet compared with T a b l e I I I we f i n d t h a t the two fundamental c o n d i t i o n s of e q u i v a l e n c e — between the t o t a l s of v a l u e and p r i c e , and s u r p l u s v a l u e and p r o f i t — remain i n t a c t . But i n order t o m a i n t a i n the e q u i l i b r i u m c o n d i t i o n s of the simple r e p r o d u c t i o n model, B o r t k i e w i t z a p p l i e s a s i m u l -taneous t r a n s f o r m a t i o n on constant and v a r i a b l e c a p i t a l i n the above model, t o produce the f o l l o w i n g schema: 2<$ TABLE V P r i c e s of P r o d u c t i o n According t o B o r t k i e w i t z J Constant C a p i t a l V a r i a b l e C a p i t a l _ P r o f i t P r i c e of Product s Dept. I 288 96 96 480 Dept. I I 128 128 • 64 320 Dept. I l l 64 96 40 200 T o t a l s 480 320 200 1000 24. (from p r e v i o u s page) Both Table I I I and IV f o l l o w B o r t k i e w i t z * s r e d u c t i o n model i n "on the c o r r e c t i o n o f Marx*s ...», p. 204. Table I I I a c c o r d i n g t o B o r t k i e w i t z ( c p . p. 205 f n ) was taken from Tugan-Baranowsky, while the a l g e b r a i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the problem i s c r e d i t e d t o D i m e t r i e v who worked out a s i m i l a r s o l u t i o n many y e a r s e a r l i e r i n h i s work o s - ioo -The r a t e s of s u r p l u s v a l u e thus e q u a l s 6 2 . 5 $ and the r a t e of p r o f i t e q u a l s 2 5 $ . Here In B o r t k i e w i t z 1 s new model he has o b t a i n e d an e q u i l i b r i u m c o n d i t i o n * achieved by t r a n s f o r m i n g both constant and v a r i a b l e c a p i t a l as i n p u t s as w e l l as i n outputs i n t o p r i c e s . But a t the same time we end up wi t h the sum of p r i c e s not e q u a l l i n g the sum of v a l u e s (1. e. t Table I I I ) , although i t s t i l l remains t h a t the r a t e s of s u r p l u s value i n a b s o l u t e terms appear t o be equal w i t h the sum of the r a t e s of p r o f i t . T h i s i n e q u a l i t y between the sum of p r i c e s and v a l u e s i s due, as B o r t k i e w i t z h i m s e l f admits, t o h i s r e d u c t i o n of the f o u r unknowns down t o t h r e e e q u a t i o n s , or more s p e c i f i c -a l l y , by h i s a r b i t r a r y assumption t h a t the g o l d i n d u s t r y (Dept. I l l ) has an average o r g a n i c composition of c a p i t a l such t h a t v a l u e s were e q u i v a l e n t t o p r i c e s . He e x p l a i n s , " t h a t the t o t a l p r i c e exceeds the t o t a l v a l u e a r i s e s from the f a c t t h a t Department I I I , from which the good s e r v i n g as v a l u e and p r i c e measure i s taken, has a r e l a t i v e l y low o r g a n i c c o m p o s i t i o n of c a p i t a l . But the f a c t t h a t the good used as value.and p r i c e measure belongs t o Department I I I 2 5 . (from p r e v i o u s page) R e f e r t o B o r t k i e w i t z 1 s 'on the c o r r e c t i o n of Marx*s » i n Sweezy's 'Close of Marx's System', p. 204, Table I I . F o r a s i m i l a r o u t l i n e o f the t a b u l a r i l l u s t r a t i o n s of Baudin, Tugan-Baranowsky, and N a t a l i e Maskowska* s s o l u t i o n , a l s o r e f e r t o A g h i r i Emmanuel* s Unequal Exchange, p. 3 9 6 . 2 6 . I b i d . , p. 2 0 5 . - 101,-In other words, B o r t k i e w i t z ' s problem I s c o n f i n e d t o h i s use of the g o l d i n d u s t r y as the standard of measure. T h i s can r e a d i l y be demonstrated. I t i s c l e a r , f i r s t , t h a t i f i n the g o l d i n d u s t r y the h i g h e s t o r g a n i c composition of c a p i t a l e x i s t s the p r i c e of g o l d w i l l be g r e a t e r than i t ' s v a l u e . T h i s f o l l o w s from the f a c t t h a t i n p r i c e c a l c u l a t i o n , p r o f i t i s p r o p o r t i o n a l t o v a r i a b l e c a p i t a l a l o n e . Consequently, i f a l l o t h e r commodities are expressed i n terms of g o l d , t h e i r t o t a l p r i c e (depending on t h e i r o r g a n i c composition) must be l e s s than t h e i r t o t a l v a l u e . Beyond t h i s problem, we a l s o n o t i c e t h a t the r a t e s of s u r p l u s v a l u e and p r o f i t i n Table V ( 6 2 . 5 $ : 2 5#) are no long e r equal t o the o r i g i n a l v alue t a b u l a t i o n s o f Table I I I ( 6 6 . 6 $ : 2 9 ^ ) ; i n other words, the r a t e s of e x p l o i t a t i o n — which Marx had d e f i n i t e l y taken as constant — a l s o have been a l t e r e d . What has B o r t h i e w i t z proven? He has demonstrated on the one hand, t h a t i n order f o r th e r e t o be a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , v a r i a b l e s a n d constant c a p i t a l cannot be converted i n the p r o -duct ( o u t p u t ) , without a corres p o n d i n g t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t h e i r i n p u t . He succeeds i n accomplishing t h i s simultaneous t r a n s -f o r m a t i o n , and as w e l l , m a i n t a i n s the f i n a l f o r m u l a t i o n w i t h -i n the e q u i l i b r i u m c o n d i t i o n s . As a r e s u l t we f i n d t h a t he i s able t o c a l c u l a t e the r e l a t i v e v a l u e s c o r r e c t l y , but, i n order t o do so, we a l s o f i n d t h a t he abandons completely the p r i n c i p l e of q u a n t i t i e s of l a b o u r as the means f o r measuring - 102 ,-p r i c e s . I n s t e a d , he changes the measure of v a l u e from l a b o u r q u a n t i t i e s t o an 'average l a b o u r ' — or b e t t e r , t o the average c a p i t a l r a t i o of the p r o d u c t i o n of g o l d i n Department I I I . I n o t h e r words, i n B o r t k i e w i t z ' s model, t o t a l value w i l l e qual t o t a l p r i c e s " o n l y i n the s p e c i a l case where the o r -g a n i c composition of the c a p i t a l employed i n Department I I I i s e q u a l t o the s o c i a l average t h a t the sum of the p r i c e s w i l l  come out e q u a l t o the sum of the v a l u e s " . 2 ? j j i s s o l u t i o n of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i s thus o b t a i n e d by s t a r t i n g from a d i f -f e r e n t b a s i s than Marx, t h a t i s , by s t a r t i n g from p r i c e s themselves. T h i s o b j e c t i o n thus f o r m a l l y e f f e c t s the whole p o s s i b i l i t y of such a t h i n g as a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . On the o t h e r hand, we a l s o f i n d t h a t he demonstrates mathematically t h a t e i t h e r the sum of p r i c e s w i l l e q u a l the sum of v a l u e s , or the sum of p r o f i t s w i l l e q u a l the sum of s u r p l u s - v a l u e , but t h a t the two e q u a t i o n s — w i t h i n an e q u i l i b r i u m model — prove to be mutually Incompatible, and t h a t i t would normally prove Impossible t o e f f e c t a s i m u l -taneous t r a n s f o r m a t i o n which would meet e q u i v a l e n c e s i n both e q u a t i o n s . I n o t h e r words, he concludes t h a t the t r a n s f o r -mation p r o c e s s as Marx o u t l i n e d i t , was c a t e g o r i c a l l y im-p o s s i b l e . For a l o n g p e r i o d of time a f t e r B o r t k i e w i t z , i t seems t h a t very l i t t l e , as f a r as any profound a d d i t i o n s , were made t o the q u a n t i t a t i v e s o l u t i o n . 2?. Ronald Meek, S t u d i e s i n the Labour Theory of V a l u e . P. 195. - 1 0 3 W i n t e r n i t z i n h i s a r t i c l e "'Values and P r i c e s ' : a p Q S o l u t i o n of the S o - c a l l e d T r a n s f o r m a t i o n Problem" , f o r example, simply r e v e a l s t h a t B o r t k i e w i t z ' s method of p r o o f was somewhat cumbersome, but he too proves t h a t e i t h e r the two fundamental e q u i v a l e n c e s may be met without an e q u i -l i b r i u m model, or working w i t h i n the e q u i l i b r i u m model, t h a t only one equivalence i s p o s s i b l e . The debate remains at t h i s p o i n t f o r a good many y e a r s . P a u l Sweezy, who had e a r l i e r commented on the problem i n h i s Theory of C a p i t a l i s t Development, argued a l o n g with B o r t -k i e w i t z , t h a t i t i s because he s e l e c t s the g o l d i n d u s t r y of Department I I I as equal t o the average o r g a n i c composition of c a p i t a l i n the g o l d i n d u s t r y , which i s lower than average, — t h a t " i t f o l l o w s t h a t i n g e n e r a l the B o r t k i e w i t z method 29 l e a d s t o a p r i c e t o t a l d i f f e r i n g from the value t o t a l " . Not s a t i s f i e d with B o r t k i e w i t z ' s inadequate s o l u t i o n , he d e v i s e d a new method of t r a n s f o r m i n g v a l u e s i n t o p r i c e s , which he b e l i e v e d was f r e e of the o b j e c t i o n s which Marx had opened. H i s s o l u t i o n was t o reduce the unknowns ( f o u r ) , l i k e 28. W i n t e r n i t z "Values & P r i c e s : A S o l u t i o n of the S o - c a l l e d T r a n s f o r m a t i o n Problem", Economic J o u r n a l , June 194-8, pp. 276-80; Ronald Meek comments on h i s ' s o l u t i o n ' as "an e f f e c t i v e r e p l y t o those who s a i d t h a t i t was not f o r m a l l y p o s s i b l e t o t r a n s f o r m v a l u e s i n t o p r i c e s when elements of i n -puts as w e l l as outputs were i n v o l v e d " S t u d i e s i n the Labour Theory of Value", p. 196. 29. P a u l Sweezy, Theory of C a p i t a l i s t Development, p. 122. - 104 -Bortkiewitz, down to the number of equations (three), but, instead of considering Department III as producing gold, he presumed that i t produced money, such that "Instead of c a l c u l a t i n g the value schema i n terms of u n i t s of labour time we might have put i t _ i n money terms. Thus the value of each commodity would not be expressed i n u n i t s of labour but i n terms of the number of u n i t s of the monex commodity f o r which i t would exchange".-5 Using Bortkiewitz's formula, Sweezy f i n d s a p r i c e s of produc-t i o n schema which agrees both i n terms of equal sums of values and p r i c e s , and i n equal sums of p r o f i t s and surplus-value within the equilibrium model. This, as was l a t e r to be discovered, proved to be an exceptional example, but Sweezy, confident at the time that he had solved the problem, con-cluded; "with the help of the Bortkiewitz method we have shown that a system of p r i c e c a l c u l a t i o n can be derived from a 31 system of value c a l c u l a t i o n " . But on top of t h i s , Sweezy also attempted to transfer the debate onto new ground. For him, what became of greatest importance i n Marx's formulation was that "the proportions of the price scheme ( r a t i o of t o t a l p r o f i t to t o t a l p r i c e , of outputs 30. I b i d . , p. 117. 31. I b i d . , p. 123. - 105 -of constant c a p i t a l t o output of wage goods* e t c e t e r a ) w i l l come out the same, and i t i s the r e l a t i o n s e x i s t i n g among the v a r i o u s elements of the system r a t h e r than the ob-s o l e t e f i g u r e s i n which they are expressed which are important".-^ More r e c e n t l y , one of the b e t t e r accounts o f t h i s debate has been summarized by author Ronald Meek, a noted and •sympathetic 1 M a r x i s t , H i s p a r t i c u l a r r e n d i t i o n may be 33 found i n a v a r i e t y of sources, the most p o p u l a r o f which e x i s t s i n h i s S t u d i e s I n the Labour Theory of Value, Meek commenting on B o r t k i e w i t z • s n o t i o n of a simultaneous t r a n s -f o r m a t i o n of i n p u t s and outputs i n the r e p r o d u c t i o n schema w r i t e s " I t i s normally i m p o s s i b l e t o e f f e c t a s i m u l -taneous t r a n s f o r m a t i o n which w i l l make t o t a l p r o f i t e q u a l t o t o t a l s u r p l u s v a l u e and at the same time make the t o t a l p r i c e s o f p r o -d u c t i o n e q u a l t o t o t a l v a l u e s . I n a l l but v e r y e x c e p t i o n a l cases, (1, e,, Sweezy 1s) we may preserve one of these equations, but not both". 34 What Meek, l i k e Sweezy, c o n c e i v e s i s of impor t a n c e ^ i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , i s not t h a t the two sums of v a l u e / p r i c e . 3 2 . I b i d , 3 3 . 1) Some Notes on the T r a n s f o r m a t i o n Problem", Economic J o u r n a l , V o l , 66, 1956; l i ) Economics and Ideology and other E s s a y s , Chapman & H a l l , London, 1967, ch, 6 & 9; and f i n a l l y , i l l ) S t u d i e s I n the Labour Theory of Value , Lawrence & Wishart, e i t h e r 1956 o r 1972, ch. 5. 3 4 . Ronald Meek. S t u d i e s i n the Labour Theory o f Value, p. 191. - 106 s u r p l u s - v a l u e / p r o f i t , are e q u a l , but t h a t the r a t i o s b e t -ween value and s u r p l u s - v a l u e are maintained i n the p r i c e of p r o d u c t i o n scheme, i . e., " a f t e r the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of v a l u e s i n t o p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n the fundamental r a t i o s between the value of l a b o u r power and the value of com-m o d i t i e s i n g e n e r a l , upon which p r o f i t depended c o u l d s t i l l be s a i d t o be determined i n a c c o r -dance w i t h the Volume I a n a l y s i s " ; 35 or a g a i n , i n an almost i d e n t i c a l f a s h i o n : "the e s s e n t i a l p o i n t f o r Marx, as we have seen, was t h a t a f t e r aggregate s u r p l u s value had been converted i n t o p r o f i t , and v a l u e s con-sequently transformed i n t o p r i c e s , the f u n -damental r a t i o between the value of l a b o u r power and the volume of commodities i n g e n e r a l , upon which p r o f i t depended, c o u l d be regarded as remaining u n a l t e r e d as a r e s u l t of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " . 3 " Although i n Meek 1s examples, he overcomes some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s encumbered by B o r t k i e w i t z ' s and W i n t e r n l t z ' s s o l u t i o n (and yet he uses t h e i r e s s e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s i n h i s c a l c u l a t i o n s ) * he succeeds no b e t t e r than the former attempts of i n s u r i n g the i n v a r i a b i l i t y of the r a t i o s of the v a l u e of labour-power t o s u r p l u s - v a l u e I n the p r i c e of p r o -ductioneschema. 3 5 . I b i d . , p. 1 9 2 . " "• ." i. : 3 6 . I b i d . , p. 1 9 2 . 3 7 . Cf., h i s Economics & Ideology, p. 154 . - 107- -I n f a c t h i s g e n e r a l pessimism over h i s l o g i c a l (quan-t i t a t i v e ) s o l u t i o n t o Marx's d i f f i c u l t i e s i s summed up as f o l l o w s : " I n my more h e r e t i c a l moods, I sometimes wonder whether much of r e a l Importance would be l o s t from the Marxian system i f the q u a n t i t a t i v e side of the a n a l y s i s of r e l a t i v e p r i c e s were conducted i n terms of something l i k e the ft t r a d i t i o n a l supply and demand a n a l y s i s " . - ' But the debate f o r Meek ( e s p e c i a l l y i n the 1956 39 e d i t i o n ) , c o u l d not be l e f t i n such a s t a t e of a f f a i r s . To supplement h i s l o g i c a l s o l u t i o n , and as a f u r t h e r r e p l y t o the c r i t i c s of Marx, Meek a l s o i n t r o d u c e s the h i s t o r i c a l defense f o r Marx's law of value ( V o l . I a n a l y s i s ) which appears i n many ways i d e n t i c a l t o EngelSli p o s i t i o n o u t l i n e d e a r l i e r . He propounds: "We must t u r n t o economic h i s t o r y and metho-dology r a t h e r than t o mathematics. The d e v i a t i o n of p r i c e s from v a l u e s , a c c o r d i n g t o Marx's g e n e r a l economic method, must be regarded as a h i s t o r i c a l as w e l l as a l o g i c a l p r o c e s s . I n " d e r i v i n g p r i c e s from v a l u e s " we are r e a l l y r e p r o d u c i n g i n our minds, i n l o g i c a l and s i m p l i f i e d form, a p r o c e s s which has a c t u a l l y happened In h i s -t o r y . Marx began with the assumption t h a t good s o l d " a t t h e i r v a l u e s " under c a p i t a l i s m (so t h a t p r o f i t r a t e s i n the v a r i o u s branches of p r o d u c t i o n were o f t e n v e r y d i f f e r e n t ) , not only because t h i s appeared t o be the proper s t a r t i n g p o i n t from the l o g i c a l p o i n t of view but a l s o because he b e l i e v e d t h a t i t had 3 8 . Ronald Meek, Economics & Ideology, p. 155 3 9 . S t u d i e s I n the Labour Theory of V a l u e . - 108-" o r i g i n a l l y " been so. He proceeded on t h i s b a s i s t o t r a n s f o r m v a l u e s i n t o p r i c e s , not only because t h i s course appeared t o be l o g i c a l l y necessary but a l s o because he be-l i e v e d t h a t h i s t o r y I t s e l f had e f f e c t e d such  a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " . ^ I t i s c l e a r , t h a t Meek i s here i m p l y i n g t h a t the theory of v a l u e as i t i s expounded i n Volume I of C a p i t a l , as a theory which " a p p l i e s * t o a 'simple commodity mode of p r o d u c t i o n * , but which does not apply t o the ' c a p i t a l i s t mode of p r o d u c t i o n ' . I n other words, Volume I cannot only be understood as a form l o g i c a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y p r e c e d i n g g e n e r a l commodity p r o d u c t i o n , but a l s o as the only form ' i n -side* the 'law of v a l u e ' , 1. e., "Marx b e g i n s with an a n a l y s i s of the commodity as such, and then goes on t o c o n s i d e r , ' i t ' s i d e o l o g i c a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y secondary form, a e a p l t a l l s -41 t l c a l l y m o d i f i e d commodity". Meek seems t o leave t h i s argument short a f t e r presen-t i n g but one quote from C a p i t a l , suggesting t h a t "Marx d i d not pursue the h i s t o r i c a l a s p e c t s of the problem of the t r a n s -42 f o r m a t i o n of v a l u e s i n t o p r i c e s v e r y much f a r t h e r than t h i s " , but, he r e a f f i r m s t h a t "Marx would have co n t i n u e d t o take the view t h a t t h i s l o g i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of v a l u e s i n t o p r i c e s 40. I b i d . ; a l s o r e f e r t o S t u d i e s i n the Labour Theory  of Value, pp. 180-2 f o r s i m i l a r comments. (My Emphasis) 41. R. Meek, S t u d i e s i n the Labour Theory of V a l u e . p. 140. 42. I b i d . , p. 155. were t h e 1 c o r r e c t m i r r o r image* of some a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " . That i s t o say "a c o r r e c t e d m i r r o r image but c o r r e c t e d a c c o r d i n g t o laws f u r n i s h e d by the r e a l course 43 of h i s t o r y i t s e l f " . J More r e c e n t l y however, we f i n d t h a t Meek — l i k e numerous other M a r x i s t s — has, while m a i n t a i n i n g the h i s -44 t o r i c l s t p o s i t i o n , r e t u r n e d t o the c l a s s i c a l economists f o r a s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem. The T r a n s f o r m a t i o n Problem and the Return t o R i c a r d o Meek proposes t h a t g e n e r a l l y as f a r as the t r a n s f o r -mation problem was concerned he had "tended to underestimate i t ' s Importance" and t h a t now ( i n 1972)"^, he would "wish t o urge t h a t t h i s i n q u i r y should be conducted w i t h i n a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t con-c e p t u a l framework — t h a t p r o v i d e d by S r a f f a i n h i s P r o d u c t i o n of commodities by Means of Commodities" E s s e n t i a l l y what i s at i s s u e I n the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem,as i t has been set out, i s t h a t i n the r e d u c t i o n of 43. I b i d . , pp. 156-7. 44. Cf. Meek«s »The introduction* of Studies i n the  Labour Theory of Value, (1972), pp. xv & xxiv. 45. Actually t h i s view was expressed.as early as 196l i n h i s a r t i c l e i n the Scottish Journal of P o l i t i c a l Economy. June 196l, also i n Science and society. Summer. 1961. 46. Meek. Studies i n the Labour Theory of Value, p. x x x i i , (1972). - no -the f o u r unknowns i n simple r e p r o d u c t i o n model down t o t h r e e e q u a t i o n s , one i n d u s t r y or department must prove t o a c t as a u n i t of reckoning or numeraire (Dobb: 1955)* I n o t h e r words, i t must a l l o w f o r an i n v a r i a n t l i n k between v a l u e and p r i c e of p r o d u c t i o n . F o r B o r t k i e w i t z we noted t h a t t h i s l i n k was found i n Department I I I , i n the p r o d u c t i o n of g o l d ; but we a l s o noted t h a t c a l c u l a t i o n s i n q u a n t i t i e s of l a b o u r u n i t s (and the n o t i o n of ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n 1 ) had been completely d i s p e l l e d . 47 For Meek, l i k e Maurice Dobb , the o b j e c t of modern M a r x i s t economics i s t o r e i n s t a t e the c a l c u l a t i o n s of r e l a t i v e p r i c e s i n terms of l a b o u r u n i t s ; the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r such a r e - i n s t i t u t i o n was p r o v i d e d f o r them by P i e r r o S r a f f a . S r a f f a ' s name i s perhaps best a s s o c i a t e d with h i s 48 arduous e d i t i n g of the works of R i c a r d o , and y e t , i n h i s own t h e o r e t i c a l w r i t i n g s , h e has p r o f f e r e d not only an i n t e r e s t i n g new s o l u t i o n t o the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem, but as w e l l , a c r i t i q u e of noe-Walraslan theory by demonstrating t h a t r e l a t i v e p r i c e s , where the s c a l e of p r o d u c t i o n i s u n a l t e r e d , are independent of consumption and demand. 47. Maurice Dobb; T h e o r i e s of Value and D i s t r i b u t i o n  Since Adam Smith, e s p e c i a l l y ch. 9; a l s o I would here i n c l u d e A g h l r i Emmanuel's Unequal Exchange, pp. 402-26. 48. P i e r r o S r a f f a ; The Works and Correspondence of  David R i c a r d o . - I l l -Because i t a p p e a r s t h a t h i s s o l u t i o n t o t h e t r a n s f o r -m a t i o n problem i s r a p i d l y becoming adopted by many M a r x i s t e c o n o m i s t s , I t h i n k we s h o u l d here a t l e a s t p r e s e n t a b r i e f o u t l i n e o f h i s t h e o r y . We n o t i c e ) f i r s t o f f , t h a t i n t h e b e g i n n i n g o f S r a f f a ' s a n a l y s i s he p r o c e e d s on t h e p r e m i s e s o u t l i n e d e a r l i e r i n Marx's s i m p l e r e p r o d u c t i o n model. I n d e e d we f i n d t h a t h i s f i r s t model e x p r e s s e s e s s e n t i a l l y the e q u i l i b r i u m c o n d i t i o n s examined back i n T a b l e I I . H i s f i r s t model of an economic system t h u s c h a r a c t e r i z e s a s u b s i s t e n c e economy i n which t h e r e i s no s u r p l u s p r o duced; i . e.: kg TABLE V I S r a f f a ' s S u b s i s t e n c e Economy 7 Wheat i n d u s t r y 280 g r . wheat + 12 t . l r o n - ? 4 0 0 g r . wheat I r o n i n d u s t r y 120 g r . wheat + 8 t . Iron—;> 20 t . i r o n 400 20 What i s i m m e d i a t e l y e v i d e n t i n t h i s model — l i k e t h a t o f B o r t k i e w i t z — i s t h a t the e q u i l i b r i u m c o n d i t i o n s o f s i m p l e r e p r o d u c t i o n a r e met. S r a f f a however p r e f a c e s t h i s system w i t h two l i m i t i n g a s s u m p t i o n s ; f i r s t , he assumes t h a t t h e s u b s i s t e n c e goods of l a b o u r a r e i n c l u d e d w i t h i n t o t a l i n p u t s o r means o f p r o d u c t i o n ( i n o t h e r words, t h e n e c e s s a r y 49. C f . S r a f f a ; P r o d u c t i o n o f Commodities by Means o f  Commodities, p. 3. subsistence of the worker enters "the system on the same footing as the f u e l f o r the engines or the f i e l d f o r the 50 c a t t l e " ) ; secondly, he assumes that i n order f o r reproduc-t i o n of the system, the pric e s of commodities are exchanged i n proportion to a fi x e d r a t i o , i . e. : "a unique set of exchange-values which i f adopted by the market restores the o r i g i n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of the products and makes i t possible for the process to be repeated; such values spring d i r e c t l y from the methods of production. In the p a r t i c u l a r example we have taken (Table VI), the. exchange-value required i s 10 gr. of wheat f o r 1 ton of ir o n " . - 3 1 In any case, the c a l c u l a t i o n here remains i n terms of physical commodity r a t i o s ( i . e«, one commodity value In r a t i o to another). In order to transfer t h i s r a t i o into p r i c e s , he takes — l i k e Bortkiewitz — one commodity as a standard of value such that i t ' s price i s equal to unity ( S r a f f a : I960, 5). A l l the other commodities maintain t h e i r e a r l i e r physical r a t i o s but now i n price form. S r a f f a then proposes a second economic system i n which a surplus i s pro-duced within the society as a whole. 50. Ib i d . , p. 9. 51. I b i d . , p. 3. TABLE V I I " S u r p l u s Producing System Wheat i n d u s t r y 280 g r . wheat + 12 t . i r o n - * 5 7 5 g r . wheat I r o n i n d u s t r y 120 g r . wheat + 8 t . I r o n —^20 t . i r o n 400 20 Under t h i s scheme, S r a f f a m a i n t a i n s the f i r s t assump-t i o n of T a b l e VI ( 1 . e., t h a t rewards t o la b o u r are completely taken care o f by the two Inputs of means of p r o d u c t i o n ) , but he drops the second assumption of the f i x e d r a t i o s of com-m o d i t i e s found under e q u i l i b r i u m c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s must be dropped because, as we n o t i c e , t h e r e i s a s u r p l u s of 75 g r . of wheat produced i n t h i s new model. F o r S r a f f a , t h i s s u r -p l u s value must be d i s t r i b u t e d between the two i n d u s t r i e s so 53 t h a t an average r a t e of p r o f i t i s maintained J , i . e., so t h a t the i r o n I n d u s t r y must have a comparable r e t u r n t o t h a t of the wheat In d u s t r y . We f i n d t h a t i n order f o r t h i s c o n d i t i o n t o p r e v a i l — where the i n p u t s of the i r o n i n d u s t r y r e t u r n e q u a l p r o f i t s with the wheat i n d u s t r y — one t o n of i r o n must exchange f o r f i f t e e n q u a r t e r s of wheat i n s t e a d of as i n Table V I I , where one t o n of i r o n exchanged f o r t e n g r . of wheat. By changing t h i s r a t i o , i t becomes a simple matter t o a s c e r -t a i n t h a t an average r a t e of p r o f i t e x i s t s between the two i n d u s t r i e s of 2 5 $ . 5 2 . I b i d . , p. 7 . S r a f f a l i m i t s t h i s economic system t o the p r o d u c t i o n of non-luxury o r ' b a s i c goods'. 5 3 . I n other words, l i k e R i c a r d o , S r a f f a assumes an average r a t e of p r o f i t . - 114 -T h i s concludes the f i r s t stage of h i s argument. F o r the remainder of h i s book, S r a f f a removes the f i r s t assump-t i o n made i n Table V I I , such t h a t wages are not assured t o e x i s t at the sub s i s t e n c e l e v e l (1. e., as mere c a t t l e fodder maintained a t a constant l e v e l ) , I n s t e a d , they are c o n s i d e r e d as a p p r o p r i a t i n g a p r o p o r t i o n of the s u r p l u s produced i n s o c i e t y as a whole,-' What t h i s means I s t h a t wages become c o n s i d e r e d as a v a r i a b l e element i n the c a l c u l a t i o n of r e l a t i v e p r i c e s . T h i s seems c o u n t e r - I n t u i t i v e , f o r as S r a f f a comments, i t appears t o be " a p p r o p r i a t e , when we come t o con-s i d e r the d i v i s i o n of the s u r p l u s between c a p i t a l i s t s and workers, t o separate the two component p a r t s of the wage and r e g a r d only the ' s u r p l u s ' p a r t as v a r i a b l e " . < I n any event, S r a f f a changes the wage completely from a constant t o a v a r i a b l e element deducing i t now from t h a t p a r t of the s u r p l u s product a l o n e . T h i s has the e f f e c t of I n c r e a s i n g the number of v a r i a b l e s from our o r i g i n a l two ( r e l a t i v e p r i c e s and the r a t i o of p r o f i t ) , t o t h r e e . We saw e a r l i e r t h a t with only two unknowns ( o r a t l e a s t two unknown r a t i o s ) * S r a f f a c o u l d perform the simple r e d u c t i o n o p e r a t i o n adopted by B o r t k i e w i t z ( i . e., where one commodity a c t e d as the standard), but now with three unknowns we f i n d t h a t one must be g i v e n b e f o r e the remainder of the unknowns i n the eq u a t i o n may be f i x e d . 54-. T h i s i s combined with the important assumption t h a t wages, c o n t r a r y t o the c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economists, are p a i d "post factum as a share of the annual product". 5 5 . I b i d . , p. 9 . - 115 -S r a f f a approaches t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by e x p l a i n i n g t h a t wages i n t h e i r v a r i a b l e s t a t e , may range from a con-d i t i o n where wages absorb a l l the s u r p l u s - v a l u e (net product) t o where they a p p r o p r i a t e none of the net product. I n other words, where wages may range from one t o z e r o . H i s o b j e c t t h e r e a f t e r becomes t o demonstrate what happens t o the r a t e of p r o f i t and p r i c e s when wages range b e t -ween these two c o n d i t i o n s . He f i n d s i n the f i r s t case, t h a t i f wages absorb a l l the s u r p l u s v a l u e , we r e t u r n t o the model o u t l i n e d e a r l i e r i n T a b l e VI (the subsistence economy) ex-cept t h a t i n t h i s new model we must e x p l i c i t l y note quan-t i t i e s of l a b o u r as an element I n the means of p r o d u c t i o n . I t i s c l e a r of course, i f you r e t u r n t o T a b l e VI, t h a t i n t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s the p r i c e s and r a t e of p r o f i t o f com-m o d i t i e s would become d i r e c t l y p r o p o r t i o n a l t o the quan-t i t i e s of l a b o u r employed i n t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n , i . e., "The value of each end-product w i l l be equal t o the sum of i t ' s Inputs at wage c o s t , which of course i m p l i e s ( i f wages are uniform) t h a t p r i c e r a t i o s w i l l be e q u a l t o embodied l a b o u r r a t i o s " . 5 0 I n the second case, where wages do not absorb the com-p l e t e s u r p l u s , or more d i r e c t l y , where a c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s appears and a p p r o p r i a t e s some o r a l l of the s u r p l u s v a l u e , we f i n d t h a t wages w i l l f a l l p r o p o r t i o n a l l y In r e l a t i o n t o 5 6 . R. Meek; Economics & Ideology, p. 167 . - 116 -the means of p r o d u c t i o n . T h i s I s t o say, t h a t the f l u c -t u a t i o n s I n the r a t e of p r o f i t ( 1 , e., p r o p o r t i o n of s u r p l u s going t o wages v e r s u s t h a t going to p r o f i t s ) changes i n accordance with a l t e r a t i o n s i n the composition of the means of p r o d u c t i o n , or more s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t changes wi t h the r a t i o s of q u a n t i t i e s of l a b o u r t o means of p r o d u c t i o n ( o r g a n i c composition) used i n the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s . I n t h i s case, as the c a p i t a l i s t a p p r o p r i a t e s more of the net product ( 1 . e., where wages are l e s s than one), we l e a r n t h a t the o r g a n i c composition c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y a l t e r s , and t h a t t h i s I n t u r n e f f e c t s the p r i c e s of the product. I t ' s e f f e c t on p r i c e s however, proves to be q u i t e decep-t i v e . On a common sense l e v e l , i t would appear t h a t i f the wages were t o f a l l in:<an Ind u s t r y with a low p r o p o r t i o n of l a b o u r t o means of p r o d u c t i o n , i t would seem t h a t p r i c e s should r i s e a c c o r d i n g l y (because, the p r i c e of the means of p r o d u c t i o n would have i n c r e a s e d r e l a t i v e l y ) . I n a way t h i s I s what R i c a r d o had c o n j e c t u r e d . But, a c c o r d i n g t o S r a f f a , what must be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s the c o s t of producing 'the means of p r o d u c t i o n ' used i n the above case. I n o t h e r words, t h i s 'means o f p r o d u c t i o n ' i s a l s o a commodity, i t too has been a product of a p r e v i o u s p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s , and consequently i t ' s p r i c e s are a l s o e f f e c t e d by the f a l l i n wages. We c o u l d , f o r example, f i n d t h a t t h i s 'means of p r o d u c t i o n ' was a p r o -duct o f an i n d u s t r y with a s e v e r e l y h i g h p r o p o r t i o n of l a b o u r - 117 -t o means of p r o d u c t i o n such t h a t the p r i c e s of t h i s product ('the means of p r o d u c t i o n 1 ) would most c e r t a i n l y tend t o f a l l . I n a sense then, S r a f f a i s a s k i n g us to l o o k behind every com-modity employed i n the i n d u s t r y under examination i n order t o d i s c o v e r t h e i r "organic compositions'. That i s t o say, the p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n depend not only on t h e i r o r g a n i c com-p o s i t i o n ( c ), but a l s o on the p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n ( c ) c+v c+v of the means of p r o d u c t i o n . He w r i t e s : "the r e l a t i v e price-movements of two p r o d u c t s come t o depend, not onl y oh-the ' p r o p o r t i o n s ' o f a l a b o u r t o means of p r o d u c t i o n by which they are r e s p e c t i v e l y produced, but a l s o on the ' p r o p o r t i o n s ' by which those means have themselves been produced, and a l s o on the • p r o p o r t i o n s ' by which the means of produc-t i o n of those means of p r o d u c t i o n have been produced, and so o n " . 5 7 Once t h i s i s done, we may d i s c o v e r t h a t f o r example i n our above case, c o n t r a r y t o what i s expected, w i t h f a l l i n g wages the p r i c e s o f t h i s i n d u s t r y tend not to r i s e but i n f a c t f a l l . I n any case, the q u e s t i o n a t i s s u e i s how does t h i s prove u s e f u l i n demonstrating t h a t q u a n t i t i e s o f l a b o u r may determine r e l a t i v e p r i c e s ? F i r s t , these p o s t u l a t e s are used by S r a f f a t o c o n s t r u c t a h y p o t h e t i c a l model of an i n d u s t r y which c o n t a i n s a s o c i a l average composite of means of p r o d u c t i o n t o la b o u r i n the h i s t o r y of each element. T h i s i n d u s t r y would thus p r e c l u d e 5 7 . I b i d . , p. 1 5 . - 118 -t h a t any of i t ' s i n p u t s or means of p r o d u c t i o n were not p r o -d u c t s o f a p r e v i o u s average p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s , e t c , ad  I n f i n i t u m . The t h e o r e t i c a l v alue of such an i n d u s t r y would be t h a t the p r i c e s o f i t ' s p r o d u c t s would not r i s e o r f a l l i n v a l u e r e l a t i v e t o any o t h e r commodity when wages rose o r f e l l . Indeed i t would a c t as an i n v a r i a b l e standard o f measure, the p r i c e s of t h i s i n d u s t r y would m a i n t a i n a c o n s i s t e n t r a t i o between i t ' s p r i c e s and i t ' s means of p r o d u c t i o n ( l i k e t h a t of our sub s i s t e n c e economy i n Table V I . Ob v i o u s l y , due t o the c o n d i t i o n s necessary, t h i s i n d u s t r y c o u l d not e x i s t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , f o r S r a f f a , a hypo-t h e t i c a l composite of such p r o p o r t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s c o u l d be c o n s t r u c t e d f o r any group of i n d u s t r i e s t o be examined. So^ as we have seen, there are two c o n d i t i o n s which would i d e n -t i f y such a p r o p o r t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n "namely" as S r a f f a s t a t e s "the q u a n t i t y - r a t i o t o d i r e c t t o i n d i r e c t l a b o u r employed, 58 and the v a l u e - r a t i o of net product t o means of p r o d u c t i o n " . S r a f f a e l e c t s t o use the l a t t e r r a t i o as the guide t o the 'standard commodity'. The problem remains however, how do we ' d i s t i l ' t h i s i n v a r i a n t i n d u s t r y from a sample c o l l e c t i o n of u n p r o p o r t i o n a l i n d u s t r i e s ? F o r t h i s p r o c e s s I t h i n k Ronald Meek p r o v i d e s a sim-p l i f i e d v e r s i o n of Sraffa«s method of ' d i s t i l l i n g ' a b a s i c 59 p r o p o r t i o n a l standard i n d u s t r y . 58. I b i d . , p. 17. 59. C f . Meek; Economics & Ideology, p. 171, Meek*s model i s as follows: 60 T.ABLE VIII A Random 'Unproportloned' Eoonomlo System Wheat industry 375 gr. wheat + 6 t . i r o n —'750 gr. wheat Iron industry 300 gr. wheat + 24 t . i r o n —* 40 t . i r o n 675 3° As a r e s u l t , we see that here, the net product equals 750 gr. wheat and 40 tons of i r o n — the r a t i o between the two commodities i n the net product i s thus ( 7 5 * k ) » This r a t i o i s c l e a r l y not equal to the r a t i o which e x i s t s between the two t o t a l means of pr o d u c t i o n , i l . e., ( 6 7 5 : 3 0 ) . Therefore t h i s Industry f a i l s to sa t i s f y the conditions of a standard proportional industry. In order to achieve a co-ordinating r a t i o between the net product and the means of production (and thus i d e n t i f y a composite industry) we would have to separate off 2/3 of the wheat Industry and § of the .iron industry. Meek does Just t h i s , to obtain the following model: TABLE IX 'Proportional' Industry Wheat industry 250 gr. wheat + 4 t . i r o n 500 gr. wheat Iron Industry 150 gr. wheat + 12 t . i r o n 20 t . i r o n 400 16 6 0 . Sraf fa's model uses the same p r i n c i p l e s , but employs three i n d u s t r i e s rather than two; r e f e r to 'Production of Com-modities, p. 19. In general, Seton proved e a r l i e r that t h i s method would function on »n» number of in d u s t r i e s . - 1 2 0 -We are thus l e f t w i t h a net product of 100 g r . of wheat, and 4- tons of i r o n , 1 . e., wit h a r a t i o of ( 1 0 0 : 4 - ) , Moreover, we f i n d t h a t there e x i s t s a p r o p o r t i o n a l r a t i o between the v a l u e of the net product o f t h i s p r o p o r t i o n a l I n d u s t r y (100:4-) t o the r a t i o between the value of i t ' s t o t a l means of p r o d u c t i o n ( 4 - 0 0 : 1 6 ) . As a consequence, S r a f f a concludes t h a t t h i s newly d i s t i l l e d i n d u s t r y would s a t i s f y the c o n d i t i o n s o u t l i n e d e a r l i e r , i n which there e x i s t s an e q u a l " v a l u e - r a t i o o f net product t o means o f p r o d u c t i o n " . We have thus d i s c o v e r e d a standard r a t i o which would "remain the same whatever v a r i a t i o n s o c c u r r e d i n the d i v i s i o n of the net product between wages and 61 p r o f i t s and whatever the consequent p r i c e changes". Hence i n T a b l e IX above, t h i s i n v a r i a n t r a t i o . w o u l d be 1/25 and I t would be maintained i r r e g a r d l e s s of wage and p r i c e f l u c -t u a t i o n s . But how much c l o s e r have we come t o deter m i n i n g r e l a t i v e p r i c e s by q u a n t i t i e s of labour? Have we, f o r example, been able t o i d e n t i f y any of the unknowns i n our simple r e p r o -d u c t i o n system? S r a f f a proceeds t o answer t h i s q u e s t i o n by i n v e s t i g a t i n g what happens t o the r a t e o f ^ p r o f i t i n the composite standard i n d u s t r y when wages change. Given the magnitude of wages he b e l i e v e s i t p o s s i b l e t o i d e n t i f y the r e l a t i v e p r i c e s and t h e i r average r a t e of p r o f i t . 6 l . S r a f f a ; ' P r o d u c t i o n of Commodities?.p. 2 1 . A c c o r d i n g l y , he c o n s t r u c t s an e q u a t i o n where the r a t i o of the net product t o the t o t a l means of p r o d u c t i o n ( r e p r e s -ented i n Table IX above, as 100: 4 ) e q u a l s the maximum r a t e 460:16 of p r o f i t p o s s i b l e f o r the standard i n d u s t r y and i s s i g -n i f i e d by the l e t t e r R. A l s o wages, or w, r e p r e s e n t s the  t o t a l wages i n p r o p o r t i o n t o the net product. I n o t h e r words, here we have two symbols,©one r e p r e s e n t i n g the maximum r a t e of p r o f i t f o r the standard i n d u s t r y and the o t h e r the l e v e l o f wage (between 1 t o z e r o ) . I n order t o determine the average r a t e of p r o f i t of the i n d u s t r y ( r ) , we e xpress the l a t t e r t h r e e i n the f o l l o w i n g e q u a t i o n : r o R(I-w) We know t h a t i n our standard i n d u s t r y of T a b l e IX the maximum r a t e of p r o f i t (R), between which the r a t e of p r o f i t and wages are t o be d i v i d e d e q u a l s i , such t h a t our e q u a t i o n now be-comes: r = i ( I - w ) I f R i s e q u a l to and g i v e n t h a t w, or wages, i s e q u a l t o 3/4, the average r a t e of p r o f i t f o r the i n d u s t r y as a whole would be the remaining \ of the net product over the t o t a l means o f p r o d u c t i o n such t h a t : 1 t o n i r o n + 2 5 g r . wheat = 1 16 t o n i r o n + 400 g r . wheat To" The r a t e of p r o f i t t h e r e f o r e e q u a l s t o l / l 6 and I t ' s mag-nit u d e would i n c r e a s e or decrease i n d i r e c t p r o p o r t i o n t o the — 1 2 2 -s i z e o f the wage a l l o t m e n t , depending of course, on the l i m i t s of R. Hence, when we are g i v e n q u a n t i t i e s of l a b o u r u n i t s ( f o r S r a f f a these are e q u a l t o wages) and r e l a t i v e p r i c e s ; then r a t e s of p r o f i t , e t c . , may be determined by the la b o u r t h e o r y o f v a l u e . Moreover f o r S r a f f a , t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t -ween wages and p r o f i t s i s not l i m i t e d Just t o the Imaginary 'standard system' alone, b u t, as Meek comments "the a c t u a l system, S r a f f a argues, c o n s i s t s of the same b a s i c e q u a t i o n s as the "standard" system, only I n d i f f e r e n t p r o p o r t i o n s , so t h a t "once the wage i s g i v e n , the r a t e o f p r o f i t s i s determined f o r both systems r e g a r d l e s s of the p r o p o r t i o n s of the equations 62 i n e i t h e r of them". So S r a f f a succeeds i n overcoming the c e n t r a l problem of the ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ' , but by so doing, does he not a l s o e l i m i n a t e the ve r y o b j e c t o f Marx's p r o b l e m a t i c ? By t a k i n g t h a t wages are e q u i v a l e n t t o the labour-fower purchased from the worker, and by assuming an average r a t e of p r o f i t , does he not d e s t r o y the ve r y b a s i s f o r understanding the source of su r p l u s - v a l u e which Marx had so r i g o r o u s l y developed? Does not, as A l f r e d o Medio was to comment, "the n e o - R i c a r d i a n t h e o r y , while p r o v i d i n g the a n a l y t i c a l t o o l s f o r a c o r r e c t 6 2 . R. Meek; Economics & Ideology, p. 1 7 3 . - 1 2 3 -s o l u t i o n of the ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem', a t the same time 63 d e n i e s i t ' s r e l e v a n c e " ? The whole p r o b l e m a t i c of the q u a n t i t a t i v e t r a n s f o r -mation problem c o u l d perhaps be t y p i f i e d by Ronald Meek when he w r i t e s t h a t "suppose, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t we accept Marx's b a s i c i d e a t h a t we ought t o s t a r t with ... "some p r i o r con-c r e t e magnitudes", but t h a t we s e l e c t f o r thisj?purpose not the value of the commodities concerned but the commodities 64 themselves" or a g a i n t h a t Marx's " p r i o r concrete mag-n i t u d e s " may be conc e i v e d i n commodity terms r a t h e r than i n val u e terms, and i t i s p o s s i b l e t o e r e c t on t h i s b a s i s a t h e o r e t i c a l system, not e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from Marx's, i n which p r i c e s and incomes are mutually and simultaneously determined" The q u e s t i o n which i s a t i s s u e here — and the q u e s t i o n which Meek and o t h e r s appear t o ignore — i s whether or not Marx s t a r t s from "some p r i o r c o n c r e t e magnitude" l i k e every p o l i t i c a l economist b e f o r e him, or, whether he i n t r o d u c e d the 6 3 . Alfredo Medio; "Profits & Surplus-Value: Appearance & Reality i n Capitalist Production" i n A Critique of Economic  Theory, edited by E. K. Hunt & J. G.« Schwartz, p. 326 fn., see also Michael Lebowetz i n Science & Society, winter, 1973-^. for criticisms of Sraffa along the same lines. 64. R. Meek; ^Studies In the Labour Theory of Value" (1972), pp. xxvl-vil. 6 5 , Ibid,, p, xxix. -124 -a n a l y s i s of p r o f i t s , p r i c e s , e t c . , onto a new and d i f f e r e n t p l a i n ? Or more c o n c i s e l y , the q u e s t i o n must be asked i s S r a f f a * s s o l u t i o n t o the R i c a r d i a n p r o b l e m a t i c at a l l u s e f u l f o r us t o understand Marx*s C a p i t a l ? That i s , i s Marx*s pro b l e m a t i c t h a t of R i c a r d o ' s ? I t i s these k i n d s of q u e s t i o n s which we must address o u r s e l v e s t o i n our next chapter. - 125 -"But what do we f i n d i f we examine the h i s t o r y of p o l i t i c a l economy? We f i n d t h i n k e r s who have merely thought w i t h i n the l i m i t s of t h e i r p r e s e n t , unable t o run ahead of t h e i r times".-1-CHAPTER IV The Form of a New S o l u t i o n I n t h i s c hapter, we s h a l l a g a i n employ the r e a d i n g of Marx's l a t e r w r i t i n g s which have been advanced by A l t h u s s e r , B a l i b a r , R a n c i e r e , and o t h e r s . The major c o n t e n t i o n i n t h i s c h a p t e r i s t h a t Marx*s o b j e c t i n C a p i t a l , i s not a simple e x t e n s i o n of the p r o b l e m a t i c of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy, as the a u t h o r s d i s c u s s e d i n the p r e c e d i n g chapter, have con-s t r u e d i t t o be. My examination, f o l l o w i n g t h a t of the " s t r u c t u a l i s t s " , w i l l emphasize the divergence of Marx's o b j e c t from t h a t of Smith and R i c a r d o , and i n so doing w i l l f o c u s not so much on Marx's s o l u t i o n s , as the k i n d s of ques-t i o n s which he posed. To t h i s end, i t would seem a propos t o d i g r e s s f o r a short p e r i o d , and s c h e m a t i c a l l y o u t l i n e some of the key con-1. L o u i s A l t h u s s e r & E t i e n n e B a l i b a r , Reading C a p i t a l , pp. 1 2 2 - 3 . - 126 -c e p t s of the c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economists — s p e c i f i c a l l y those of Adam Smith and David R i c a r d o . F o l l o w i n g t h i s , we s h a l l t r a c e the s p e c i f i c i t y of Marx* s pr o b l e m a t i c as opposed t o t h a t of c l a s s i c a l economists with emphasis on t h e i r common d i s c u s s i o n s on v a l u e . F i n a l l y , when t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s e s t a b l i s h e d , we s h a l l i n the l a s t chapter r e t u r n t o the T r a n s -f o r m a t i o n Problem, re-examining i t i n terms of the " s t r u c -t u r a l i s t " p e r s p e c t i v e . Our f i r s t t ask i s thus t o i s o l a t e the r u b r i c s of t h i s " t h e o r e t i c a l break", f o r as A l t h u s s e r a p t l y w r i t e s , such a d i s t i n c t i o n " d e a l s d i r e c t l y with the f o u n d a t i o n of the economic and h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s c o n t a i n e d i n i t ' s t e x t ( C a p i t a l ) : i t should t h e r e f o r e be able t o r e s o l v e c e r t a i n r e a d i n g d i f f i c u l -t i e s which have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been opposed t o Marx by h i s 2 opponents as d e c i s i v e o b j e c t i o n s " . P a r t A T h e o r i e s of C l a s s i c a l P o l i t i c a l Economy  Adam Smith Adam Smith, the S c o t t i s h moral p h i l o s o p h e r and econo-m i s t , c o n s o l i d a t e d i n the Wealth of N a t i o n s 3 what has become known as one of the f i r s t comprehensive and i n t e g r a t e d 2. I b i d . , p. 77. 3. Adam Smith, Wealth of Na t i o n s . - 12? -t r e a t i s e s on economic p r i n c i p l e ever prepared by C l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy. Indeed, i t i s s a i d t h a t i t was through the s i n g u l a r success of t h i s l i t e r a r y work t h a t Smith d e r i v e d h i s t i t l e as the f a t h e r of p o l i t i c a l economy. Smith's enquiry, as the t i t l e i n f e r s , f o c u s e s on the accumulation of wealth, and e m p h a t i c a l l y s t r e s s e s the bene-f i t s which are d e r i v e d from the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r or the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of the pro c e s s of exchange through man's n a t u r a l " p r o p e n s i t y t o t r u c k , b a r t e r , and exchange". H i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the p r o g r e s s i v e expansion of the d i v i s i o n of labour was su b d i v i d e d i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s , the s o c i a l and the i n d u s t r i a l . W i t h i n the f i r s t ( the s o c i a l d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r ) , Smith observed an i n c r e a s i n g tendency toward s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i n the h i s t o r y and development of the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s . T h i s s p e c i a l i z a t i o n or s o c i a l d i v i s i o n , was thus the f o r c e which a t t r i b u t e d f o r the r a p i d expansion of the c o n d i t i o n s f o r exchange and, moreover, these c o n d i t i o n s c o u l d be I s o l a t e d as the a c t u a l cause f o r the accumulation of wealth. I n other words, the p r o g r e s s i v e s u b d i v i s i o n of human la b o u r was l i m i t e d by the extent of the market, or more c l e a r l y ^ f o r him, the expansion of the c o n d i t i o n s of exchange proved t o be synony-mous with the c o n d i t i o n s of accumulation. The second category (the i n d u s t r i a l d i v i s i o n of labour) was formulated In terms of the v a r i a t i o n s i n the c h a r a c t e r o f 4. Cf., Adam Smith; Wealth of N a t i o n s . Book I , Chapter 3. - 128 -l a b o u r which c o n s t i t u t e d the d i f f e r e n t I n d u s t r i e s of p r o d u c t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the l a b o u r f o r c e was d i v i d e d between those forms of employment which were p r o d u c t i v e or u s e f u l , and those unproductive forms, which i n g e n e r a l hindered the accumulation p r o c e s s and the p r o s p e r i t y of the s o c i e t y . P r o d u c t i v e k i n d s of employment tended t o be emphasized as those forms which u t i l i z e f i x e d c a p i t a l i n the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s , and which were l a t e r used by Smith, as a means of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t -ween those forms of p r o d u c t i o n which r e a l i z e d p r o f i t from those t h a t d i d n ' t . As a c o n c l u s i o n t o h i s a n a l y s i s of the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r , Smith d e s i g n a t e d the market s i t u a t i o n as b o t h the r e g u l a t o r of the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r , and the determining f a c t o r i n the p r o d u c t i o n of v a l u e . T h i s p o s i t i o n was sup-p o r t e d by h i s treatment of commodities which, l i k e t h a t of h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s , saw commodities t o be the fundamental mode of e x p r e s s i n g the mutual exchange of p r o d u c t s of i n d i v i d u a l p r o -ducers. I n order t o f i n d out jffcust how the value of the com-modity was r e g u l a t e d , he f i r s t d i r e c t e d h i s a t t e n t i o n t o the problem of how value was t o be measured. I n p u r s u i t of the r e g u l a t o r of v a l u e . Smith presented what has now become the c l a s s i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n of the two forms of value — between use-value and exchange-value: "The word v a l u e , i t i s to be observed, has two d i f f e r e n t meanings and sometimes expresses the u t i l i t y of some p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t , and - 129 -sometimes the power of p u r c h a s i n g o t h e r goods which the p o s s e s s i o n of t h a t o b j e c t conveys. The one may be c a l l e d "value i n use", the o t h e r "value i n exchange". The t h i n g s which have the g r e a t e s t value i n exchange have f r e q u e n t l y l i t t l e or no v a l u e i n use. Nothing i s more u s e f u l than water: but i t w i l l purchase scarce a n y t h i n g ; scarce a n y t h i n g can be had i n exchange f o r i t . A diamond, on the c o n t r a r y , has scarce any v a l u e i n use; but a very g r e a t q u a n t i t y of o t h e r goods max f r e q u e n t l y be had i n exchange f o r it".-5 The e f f i c a c y of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , and i t ' s i n f l u e n c e on l a t e r day p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m i s t s ; I s obvious, e s p e c i a l l y as regards the n o t i o n of v a l u e I n use or of u t i l i t y , which has been so over-employed by m a r g i n a l u t i l i t a r i a n t h e o r i s t s and wel-f a r e economists i n measuring "normal needs of s o c i e t y " or of a commodity®s M a b i l i t y t o s a t i s f y needs". The concept of u t i l i t y f o r Smith was not an apparatus f o r measuring the ex-change v a l u e of I n d i v i d u a l goods, l i k e t h a t of the marginal u t i l i t a r i a n ' s , but r a t h e r the means f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i n g on a g e n e r a l l e v e l between those goods or commodities which f u l -f i l l e d the s o c i a l needs of man ( o r of homo-economicus) from those which d i d not. The concept of use-value as a sub-d i v i s i o n of " v a l u e " , a c t e d f o r him, as the index t o those economic f a c t s which were m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of human needs and thus s u b j e c t s f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Smith's a t t e n t i o n from t h i s p o i n t onwards, i s d i r e c t e d towards the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a mechanism f o r measuring 5. Smith; Wealth of N a t i o n s , p. 22. exchange-value. I n t h i s d i r e c t i o n he d i v i d e d the category of exchange-value i n t o r e a l v a l u e and nominal or r e l a t i v e v a l u e . O p e r a t i n g with these two k i n d s o f concepts, Smith attempted t o uncover f i r s t , what the substance o f a r e a l measure of value would be; secondly, what i t " s component p a r t s would c o n s i s t o f ; and f i n a l l y , why th e r e i s a tendency f o r d e v i a t i o n s between a commodity 1s r e a l v a l u e and I t ' s nominal form. Smith's f i r s t p r o b l e m a t i c — one which s h a l l prove I d e n t i c a l t o R i c a r d o ' s — was concerned w i t h the i d e n -t i f i c a t i o n of a need f o r an i n v a r i a b l e means of measuring  v a l u e . Such a c o n t r i v a n c e he b e l i e v e d would a l l o w him t o s p e c i f y why market p r i c e s v a c i l l a t e d around n a t u r a l p r i c e s , and empower him t o a c c u r a t e l y measure the accumulation of " r e a l v a l u e " over an extended p e r i o d of time. But the i d e n -t i f i c a t i o n of " r e a l v a l u e " was f u r t h e r complicated by the e x i s t e n c e of at l e a s t two d i f f e r e n t means of e x p l a i n i n g v a l u e with l a b o u r as i t ' s source. Embodied Versus Command Theory of Value The f i r s t of these a l t e r n a t i v e s (which he l a t e r r e -jecte d ) argued t h a t the value of a commodity c o u l d be s t r i c t l y determined by the q u a n t i t y of l a b o u r which i s "embodied" i n i t ' s p r o d u c t i o n . T h i s theory, which was p o p u l a r i z e d by the famous deer and beaver i l l u s t r a t i o n , was designated the "Labour theory of v a l u e " and was r e s t r i c t e d by Smith, t o " t h a t e a r l y and rude s t a t e of s o c i e t y which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of l a n d , (where) the p r o p o r t i o n between the q u a n t i t i e s of l a b o u r necessary f o r a c q u i r i n g d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t s seems t o be the only c i r c u m s t a n c e s which can a f f o r d any r u l e f o r exchanging them f o r one another". However, a c c o r d i n g t o Smith, when p r o d u c t i o n became mora complex, when the d i v l s i o n s o f l a b o u r reached a stage where p r o d u c t i o n becomes performed not by Independent p r o -ducers, but by dependent l a b o u r e r s under the c o n t r o l of mas-t e r s of p r o d u c t i o n ( c a p i t a l i s t s ) , the whole product of l a b o u r — and i t ' s exchange-value — may no l o n g e r en b l o c be a t t r i b u t e d t o the l a b o u r e r . I n other words, i n the l o g i c of Smith's paradigm, exchange-value would have t o be e q u i v a l e n t t o wages. So i t i s necessary i n t h i s more complex c l i m a t e of p r o d u c t i o n , f o r the l a b o u r e r , i n the r e a l i z a t i o n of the value of h i s p r o d u c t s - t o r e l i n q u i s h p r o p o r t i o n a t e amounts of h i s product t o the c a p i t a l i s t and the l a n d l o r d . Thus Smith's second s u p p o s i t i o n was t h a t , w i t h Increased d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r and continued accumulation of f i x e d c a p i t a l , the v a l u e of a commodity i s no l o n g e r determined by the l a b o u r i t embodies, but r a t h e r by the magnitude of l a b o u r which the product of l a b o u r may purchase or "command" on the market. Smith s p e c i f i e s "The value of any commodity, t h e r e f o r e , t o the p e r -son who possesses i t , and who means not t o use or consume i t h i m s e l f , but to exchange i t f o r other commodities, i s equal t o the q u a n t i t y of l a b o u r which i t enables him to purchase 6. I b i d . , p. 38 - 132 -7 . or command". But t h i s discursive method contains c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s , f o r , by measuring the value of a thing by the amount of labour i t commands, i t l i m i t s I t s e l f to those peculiar modes of production where labour may be purchased In the form of wages, or more concisely, where labour i t s e l f has become a commodity. In other words, Smith 1s command theory i s c o r r e l a t i v e or contemporaneous, to those phenomenal forms v i s i b l e i n the l a t e 18th century - 7 namely, petty-commodity production. In synopsis then, we may say that Smith constructs a dual scheme0 whereby value i s constituted by the labour theory of value i n that "early and rude state", and by "the command theory" i n capitalism. The next question i n Smith's discourse, i s how the com-mand theory of value can explain the r e a l i z a t i o n of p r o f i t . Smith proclaims "the quantity of labour, which the national product would purchase or command ( i . e., the value of the product) was generally greater than the quantity of labour required to produce i t ( i . e., than the cost of the product) and the difference between these two quantities of labour was a measure of the amount of accumulation which i t was possible f o r the community to carry out i n the next period of pro-8 duetion". 7. I b i d . , p. 24. 8. Ibid., p. 5 6 ; also quoted by Bonald Meek; Studies  i n the Labour and Theory of Value. 1956 p. 6 6 . - 133 -The n a t u r a l p r i c e of a commodity must be s u f f i c i e n t t o compensate the C a p i t a l i s t and the l a n d l o r d ; the r e g u l a t o r of v a l u e , or the amount of l a b o u r i t may command, t h e r e f o r e , becomes the combination of e q u i l i b r i u m l e v e l s of wages, p r o -f i t , and r e n t . I n o t h e r words, w i t h i n C a p i t a l i s m , the n a t u r a l p r i c e of a commodity i s determined by the sum o f a l l the f a c t o r s of p r o d u c t i o n , and these same c o n s t i t u e n t s o f n a t u r a l p r i c e - f u n c t i o n as Independent r e g u l a t o r s i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the " r e a l v a l u e " of the commodity. Smith e x a l t s "wages, p r o f i t , and r e n t (as) the three o r i g i n a l 9 sources of a l l exchangeable v a l u e s . The new Increment of v a l u e , of p r o f i t ( r e n t & p r o f i t ) , which i s e x t r a c t e d from the commodity through the r e a l i z a t i o n of i t ' s value i n the exchange p r o c e s s f u n c t i o n s as the i n d i c a t o r of the pace of the accumulation of wealth. The l o g i c of t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n i s somewhat c i r c u l a r , f o r once an i n e q u a l i t y between the v a l u e of i n p u t ( c o s t s of p r o d u c t i o n ) and the v a l u e of output ( p r o -d u c t s command over labour) i s d i c t a t e d or imposed, i t becomes somewhat t a u t o l o g i c a l t o e x p l a i n the i n e q u a l i t y as t h a t por-t i o n which i s t o be d i s t r i b u t e d t o the l a n d l o r d and c a p i t a l i s t . I n summary, we may say then^that Smith f o r m u l a t e s h i s concept of n a t u r a l p r i c e , b e g i n n i n g with the c i r c u m s t a n t i a l o r d e r of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth, and 9. I b i d . , p. 51 - I 3 k -t h e r e a f t e r proceed t o d e s c r i p t i v e l y b u i l d the g r e a t e r p a r t , or at l e a s t the most e s s e n t i a l elements of h i s a n a l y t i c a l f s t r u c t u r e around i t . The second m o d a l i t y of Smith's t r e a t i s e on exchange-v a l u e concerns the m a r k e t - p r i c e , which he d i s t i n g u i s h e s from n a t u r a l p r i c e developed above. Market p r i c e i s governed by the spasmodic p r e s s u r e s of the e f f e c t i v e demand of s o c i e t y , i n c o n j u n c t i o n with the a v a i l a b l e supply of p r o d u c t s . F o r example, i f the demand f o r goods rose above i t i s supply, the "market p r i c e " would r i s e above i t ' s ' n a t u r a l p r i c e ' , but new r e s o u r c e s would then be q u i c k l y engaged I n the i n d u s t r y , f o r c i n g the market p r i c e back i n t o i s o m e t r i c s w i t h i t ' s n a t u r a l p r i c e , ( c f . Wealth of N a t i o n s . Book I , Chapter 6 & 7)» The i n v e r s e would of course occur f o r f a l l i n g market p r i c e s , such t h a t i n the l o n g r u n p r e s s u r e s of the " i n v i s i b l e hand" or c o m p e t i t i o n , would tend t o e q u a l i z e market p r i c e s w i t h the n a t u r a l p r i c e s , and permit the optimum a l l o c a t i o n of scarce r e s o u r c e s . I n g e n e r a l , although, t h i s command t h e o r y of v a l u e d i d not adequately overcome a number of fundamental problems. The foremost of these, and one which was a l s o t o p e r p l e x R i c a r d o , was the problem of the i n v a r i a b l e measure of v a l u e . The e s s e n t i a l enigma- was t h a t the i n p u t or c o s t of produc-t i o n depended t o a l a r g e degree on the v a l u e of l a b o u r , or on wages. Wages i n t u r n were r e f i n e d by Smith t o the v a l u e of food g r a i n s o r "com", which was the main component necessary - 135 -f o r the con t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e of the l a b o u r e r . T h e r e f o r e s i n c e c o r n p l a y e d such a dominating r o l e i n command theory of v a l u e , i t ' s e x i s t e n c e , i t ' s v a l u e , became the necessary p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the command theory of v a l u e . T h i s k i n d of f o r m u l a t i o n became ex c e e d i n g l y ambiguous when, i n measuring the n a t u r a l p r i c e o f c o r n , you deduct average p r o f i t and r e n t from i t ' s output v a l u e ; the r e s u l t i s t h a t you are l e f t with the "value 10 of labour" measuring the value of l a b o u r . Secondly, i f wages f a l l (1. e., i f the va l u e of c o r n f a l l s ) while o t h e r p r i c e s and income shares remain cons t a n t , output, expressed as command over l a b o u r , would appear t o have expanded even when no change I n p r o d u c t i o n had a c t u a l l y o c c u r r e d . Smith's d i s p o s i t i o n towards wages on t h i s account was t o assume t h a t they maintained a s t a b l e value over an extended p e r i o d ( c f . Wealth of N a t i o n s , Chapter 8-11), which c o n t r a d i c t e d h i s primary t h e s i s , t h a t through the course o f the accumulation of wealth t h a t the s o c i e t y as a whole would b e n e f i t , 1. e., t h a t wage l a b o u r ' s share I n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of s o c i e t y ' s wealth would a l s o p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y r i s e . R i c a r d o 10. Marx's comments are appropriate:"Here he (Smith) makes the exchange v a l u e of l a b o u r the measure f o r the value of commodities. I n f a c t , he makes wages the measure; f o r wages are equal t o the q u a n t i t y o f commodities bought with a d e f i n i t e q u a n t i t y of l i v i n g l a b o u r , o r t o the q u a n t i t y of la b o u r t h a t can be bought by a d e f i n i t e q u a n t i t y o f com-m o d i t i e s . The v a l u e of l a b o u r , o r r a t h e r of labour-power, changes, l i k e t h a t o f any oth e r commodity, and i s i n no way s p e c i f i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from the value o f o t h e r commodities. Here value" i s made the measuring r o d and the b a s i s f o r the e x p l a n a t i o n of v a l u e — So we have a v i c i o u s c i r c l e ' ! , Marx T h e o r i e s of Su r p l u s Value, P a r t I , pp. ?0-l. - 136 -c r i t i c a l l y accentuated the i n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n of S m i t h 1 s " f i x e d p r o p o r t i o n s of d i s t r i b u t i o n " t h e o r y , but as we s h a l l see, h i s s o l u t i o n , indeed h i s q u e s t i o n , was as e q u a l l y im-p o s s i b l e * I n resume, t h e r e f o r e , Smith*s c o n c e p t i o n o f . t h e p r o c e s s of accumulation as the consequence of the d i v i s i o n o f la b o u r and as the governor o f economic expansion can not be d i s -s o c i a t e d from the order of the d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f wealth p r e -dominating among the c l a s s e s o f h i s day. Indeed, i n i t * s i d e o l o g i c a l c a p a c i t y , i t r e - a f f i r m e d t h i s o r d e r . Furthermore, i n h i s t h e o r y , the va l u e o f a commodity v a r i e d d i r e c t l y i n concurrence with any v a r i a t i o n s i n the d i v i s i o n of the product between wages, p r o f i t , and r e n t , independent of any d e v i a t i o n s i n the c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . The main i s s u e i n Smith's a n a l y s i s o f growth c o u l d thus be viewed i n terms of the manner i n which the r e c i p i e n t s of p r o f i t s and r e n t s e x e r c i s e d t h e i r command over l a b o u r . But t o be sure, Smith made l a s t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o p o l i t i c a l economy; he f o r example, i s o l a t e d the source of v a l u e i n the d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r or i n the la b o u r p r o c e s s i n g e n e r a l . T h i s was i n r a d i c a l p o l a r i t y t o the c o n c e p t i o n e a r l i e r propagated by the p h y s i o c r a t s , t h a t v a l u e was produced s o l e l y by a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r , and a l s o from the p e r s p e c t i v e of the m e r c a n t i l i s t s who saw the source o f wealth a s synony-mous with the accumulation of g o l d . Smith w r i t e s "Labour alone, t h e r e f o r e , never v a r y i n g i n i t * s own v a l u e . I s alone - 137 -the u l t i m a t e and r e a l standard by which the v a l u e of a l l commodities can be estimated ..... I t i s t h e i r " r e a l p r i c e 1 ! • David R i c a r d o Both Smith and R i c a r d o o s t e n s i b l y appear t o share the same pr o b l e m a t i c i n endeavoring t o tinder stand the laws, of accumulation, and I n se a r c h i n g f o r the t o o l s with which t o measure the i n c r e a s e s ( o r at l e a s t f l u c t u a t i o n s ) i n the wealth of n a t i o n s . T h e i r c o n c e p t u a l order,however, i s q u i t e d i s s i m i l a r . As we have seen, Smith's theory c o n c e n t r a t e d on those p r i n c i p l e s determinate i n the pro c e s s of accumulating wealth, but the laws which ordered the d i s t r i b u t i o n s of t h i s wealth were r e c o g n i z e d as a secondary problem. R i c a r d o on the other hand, was t o examine the p r o c e s s o f accumulation s t r i c t l y i n the l i g h t of i t ' s e f f e c t on the d i s t r i b u t i o n s of shares o f " p r o f i t " between the c a p i t a l i s t and l a n d l o r d . T h i s i n t e r e s t was congruent w i t h the i d e o l o g i c a l r i v a l r y between the landed and I n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t s , which i n h i s time was r a g i n g over the c o r n laws and p a r l i a m e n t a r y reform, R i c a r d o ' s p o s i t i o n i n t h i s debate was as you may w e l l know, sympathetic t o the sentiments of the r i s i n g b o urgeoise, as he saw t h a t the predominant g a i n i n accumulation was through i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l . 11. Marx, C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o the c r i t i q u e of P o l i t i c a l  Economy of 1859. f o o t n o t e p. 59 or Wealth of N a t i o n s . Book I , Chapter V. - 138 -In the early years of Ricardo*s economic writing, h i s concern was s t r i c t l y with monetary problems, s p e c i f i c a l l y currency and exchange phenomenon, which became of increased i n t e r e s t a f t e r the suspensions of "specie" payments by the Bank of England i n 1797• At t h i s time, he made but passing comments on what affected the changes i n : r e l a t i v e values, Indeed, h i s theory as l a t e as 1810 was primarily a very crude monetary theory where paper currency represented a "standard measure of value" somewhat similar to that which was l a t e r to be named an "Invariable measure of value". In Notes on  Bentham of 1810-11, f o r instance, Ricardo began f o r the most part where Smith had l e f t o f f . He accepted Smith* s notion of value, i . e., the d i s t i n c t i o n between use-value and ex-change-value, writing "I l i k e the d i s t i n c t i o n which Adam Smith makes between value i n use and value i n exchange. According to that opinion u t i l i t y i s not the measure of value". Furthermore Ricardo, l i k e Smith, accepted i n h i s early works the form of the r e l a t i o n s of production i n the c a p i t a l i s t mode as the pregiven conditions f o r the consideration of any economic laws. He even adhered to Smith's assumption that the d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth i s proportioned i n fi x e d r a t i o s , such that when there i s a r i s e i n wages, p r i c e s must also r i s e , and also to the notion that the rate of p r o f i t i s maintained at a general average through the competition of c a p i t a l s . To 12. Refer Ronald Meek; Studies i n the Labour and of Value, p. 88. — — - 139 -some degree t h i s l a t t e r s u p p o s i t i o n stemmed from Smith's " c o r n t h e o r y of a g r i c u l t u r e " , but I t was m o d i f i e d by R i c a r d o when he combined the c o n c e p t i o n t h a t c o m p e t i t i o n f o r c e s the r a t e of p r o f i t t o f a l l , with the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the f a l l i n g p r i c e of c o r n means h i g h e r p r o f i t s . The movement of the g e n e r a l r a t e of p r o f i t and i t ' s tendency t o d e c l i n e , became a s s o c i a t e d more with R i c a r d o ' s theory of the law of d i m i n i s h i n g r e t u r n s i n a g r i c u l t u r e (which was r o u g h l y t h a t when l e s s f e r t i l e l a n d was u t i l i z e d , the c o s t - p r i c e s and l a b o u r embodied i n the p r o d u c t i o n of g r a i n tended t o d r i v e the r a t e of p r o f i t f o r the farmer downward)• Hence i t was because a g r i c u l t u r e was primary i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the value of wages, and because the r a t e of p r o f i t i n a g r i -c u l t u r e determined the g e n e r a l r a t e of p r o f i t t o which a l l o t h e r s must a d j u s t or y i e l d t oo, t h a t the g e n e r a l r a t e of p r o -f i t d e c l i n e d . T h i s s h i f t away from Smith's c o n j e c t u r e , was symptomatic of R i c a r d o ' s e a r l y t e n d e n c i e s t o emphasize l a b o u r v i s si v i s c a p i t a l as the c o n t r o l l i n g source i n the p r o d u c t i o n of wealth. B e s i d e s i t ' s t h e o r e t i c a l Import, t h i s t h e o r y of p r o f i t was p o l i t i c a l l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the debates over the corn laws. I n t h i s polemic, R i c a r d o was a r g u i n g t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n s on i m p o r t i n g c o r n from abroad would n e c e s s a r i l y e f f e c t a l o w e r i n g i n the r a t e o f p r o f i t . Malthus' answer was t h a t the r a t e of p r o f i t r e s t e d on the p r i n c i p l e s of Say's law whereby "demand would be r e g u l a t e d by i t ' s supply", t h e r e f o r e , f o r him, the i n c r e a s e i n c a p i t a l s u p p l i e s (due t o accumulation - 140 -i n wealth made by the landed g e n t r y through h i g h r a t e s of p r o f i t and r e n t i n a g r i c u l t u r e ) would i n c r e a s e the g e n e r a l l e v e l of consumption and accumulation of the c a p i t a l i s t s . F o r R i c a r d o on the o t h e r hand, the accumulation of c a p i t a l would have the negative tendency of I n c r e a s i n g the demand f o r food, which was i n t u r n , r e g u l a t e d by the f e r t i l i t y o f the s o i l and — b a r r i n g no improvements i n a g r i c u l t u r a l t e c h -nology — would cause a r i s i n g c o s t f o r m a i n t a i n i n g wage l a b o u r (wages), and hence produce a d e c r e a s i n g r a t e of p r o f i t . Wherefore,contrary t o Say's law, R i c a r d o p i c t u r e d demand as remaining c o n s t a n t , o r even of I n c r e a s i n g , i r r e g a r d l e s s ( w i t h i n f i x e d l i m i t s ) of the movement of supply. However,In h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g s , R i c a r d o became more and more preocc u p i e d w i t h the problem of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth and i t ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p with a g r i c u l t u r e . H i s theory of p r o f i t s and wages a l s o a s time went by, became i n e x o r a b l y connected t o h i s laws of d i m i n i s h i n g r e t u r n s i n a g r i c u l t u r e r he comments, " I f with every accumulation of c a p i t a l we c o u l d t a c k a p r i c e of f r e s h f e r t i l e l a n d t o our I s l a n d , p r o f i t s 13 would never f a i l " . I n ot h e r words, f o r him the laws of d i m i n i s h i n g r e t u r n s i n a g r i c u l t u r e founded the p r i n c i p i u m f o r h i s t h e o r y of r e n t , whereby, the g r a d u a l expansion of a g r i -c u l t u r e f o r c e d the u t i l i z a t i o n o f mar g i n a l l a n d , and i n g e n e r a l lowered the farmers' r a t e s of p r o f i t . I t f o l l o w e d 13. Ibid., p. 92. - 141 -from t h i s , that i n the process of the accumulation of c a p i t a l , corn pr i c e s would tend to r i s e and wages would correspondingly r i s e , leaving a l l other commodities at t h e i r o r i g i n a l p r i c e and fo r c i n g the general rate of p r o f i t to f a l l due to the general r i s e i n wages. Even although the role of a g r i c u l t u r a l production (corn) remained a prime function i n h i s theory (even within the " P r i n c i p l e s " ) , he was to rej e c t the determinate r e l a t i o n -ships between the farmers' rate of p r o f i t and the general rate of p r o f i t . Ricardo reasoned that i f the price of corn regulated the price of a l l commodities, and i f i t ' s price increased, and the price of a l l commodities also Increased, then p r o f i t s might not f a l l with a general r i s e i n wages. The breaking of t h i s dependent t h e o r e t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p was, as we s h a l l see, i n d e x l c a l of a f a r deeper break with Adam Smith. Ricardo's Critique of Smith In the " P r i n c i p l e s of P o l i t i c a l Economy and Taxation" 1^, Ricardo parts with Smith's notion of " f i x e d shares" i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth, affirming that "The product of the e a r t h - a l l that i s derived from i t ' s surface by the united application of labour machinery and c a p i t a l , i s divided 14. Ricardo; " P r i n c i p l e s of P o l i t i c a l Economy and Taxation", edited by Sraff a . — - 142 -among the three c l a s s e s of the community; namely, the p r o p r i e t o r of the l a n d , the owner of the stock or c a p i t a l necessary f o r i t ' s c u l t i v a t i o n , and the l a b o u r e r s by whose i n d u s t r y i t i s c u l t i v a t e d . But i n d i f f e r e n t stages, the p r o p o r t i o n s of the whole produce of the e a r t h which w i l l be a l l o t t e d t o each of these c l a s s e s , under the names of r e n t , p r o f i t s , and wages, w i l l be e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t , depending mainly on the a c t u a l f e r t i l i t y of the s o i l , on the accumulation of c a p i t a l and p o p u l a t i o n , and on the s k i l l , i n g e n u i t y , and instruments employed i n a g r i c u l t u r e ' ! . 15 He now speaks of p r o f i t , i n i t ' s aggregate form, as l i m i t e d foremost by the t o t a l s o c i a l e f f o r t which a s o c i e t y as a whole must expend on the support of i t ' s l a b o u r e r s . I n t r i n s i c t o t h i s view i s t h a t the value of a commodity i s no l o n g e r determined through the exchange p r o c e s s but r a t h e r by the f a c i l i t y or d i f f i c u l t y of p r o d u c t i o n . These s h i f t s i n approach f o l l o w from R i c a r d o ' s c r i t i q u e of Adam Smith's "source of much e r r o r " i n the t r e a t ment of the provenance of v a l u e ( C f . "The P r i n c i p l e s , Chap-t e r I , "on V a l u e " ) . R i c a r d o r e l o c a t e s from h i s e a r l i e r work the l i m i t s of h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , u t i l i z i n g Adam Smith's d i f -f e r e n t i o n between use-value and exchange-value, he e l i m i n a t e a l l those commodities from examination whose exchange-values are measured by u t i l i t y alone (although r e - a f f i r m i n g t hat u t i l i t y i s s t i l l an e s s e n t i a l requirement f o r any commodity) 15. I b i d . , p. 5 - 143 -T h i s I s t o say: " U t i l i t y then I s not the measure of exchange-able v a l u e although i t i s a b s o l u t e l y essen-t i a l t o i t . I f a commodity were i n no way u s e f u l — i n other words, i f i t c o u l d In no way c o n t r i b u t e t o our g r a t i f i c a t i o n — i t would be d e s t i t u t e of exchangeable v a l u e , however scarce i t might be, or whatever q u a n t i t y of la b o u r might be necessary t o procure i t " . 1 6 And a g a i n : " I n speaking then of commodities, of t h e i r exchangeable v a l u e , and of the laws which r e g u l a t e t h e i r r e l a t i v e p r i c e s , we mean always such commodities on l y as can be I n -creased i n q u a n t i t y by the e x e r t i o n of human In d u s t r y , and on the p r o d u c t i o n of which c o m p e t i t i o n operates without r e s -t r a i n t " . 1/ Thus use-value s t i l l a c t s ( l i k e t h a t of Smith), as the d e c i s i v e c r i t e r i a by which the economic f a c t s are i s o l a t e d f o r Inves-t i g a t i o n . I n oth e r words, although he a l t e r s t o some degree the scope of the phenomena, R i c a r d o s t i l l employs u t i l i t y as the formal d e f i n i t i o n standing behind exchange-value. A l s o , w i t h i n these f i r s t few pages, he s t r i k e s out at Smith's "command la b o u r theory", w r i t i n g , "The value of a commodity, or the q u a n t i t y of any other commodity f o r which I t w i l l exchange, depends on the r e l a t i v e q u a n t i t i e s of l a b o u r s 16. I b i d . , p. 11 17. I b i d . , p. 12 - 144 -which i s necessary f o r i t ' s p r o d u c t i o n and not on the g r e a t e r 18 or l e s s compensation which i s p a i d f o r t h a t l a b o u r " . He reproaches Smith f o r r e l e g a t i n g the la b o u r embodied theory of value t o an " e a r l y and rudimentary s t a t e " , and f o r modify-i n g t h i s t h e o r y i n t o the command la b o u r theory on the b a s i s of a change i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the value o f commodities. F o r i f i n the " e a r l y and rude s t a t e " of a f f a i r s the l a b o u r e r r e c e i v e d the f u l l v a lue of h i s la b o u r , and t h a t i f , i n the c a p i t a l i s t mode of p r o d u c t i o n , the l a b o u r e r no l o n g e r r e c e i v e s the t o t a l v a l u e , t h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y i n f e r t h a t the va l u e of the commodity produced has changed. I n o t h e r words, the simple r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the p r o p o r t i o n a t e rewards t o the agents of p r o d u c t i o n , w i l l not p e r f o r c e e f f e c t t h e i r r e a l v a l u e s . R i c a r d o i s t h e r e f o r e condemning Smith's treatment of value because i t i s "as i f , when p r o f i t s and r e n t were t o be p a i d , they would have some I n f l u e n c e ontthe r e l a t i v e v a l u e of commodities, Independent of the mere q u a n t i t y of la b o u r t h a t was nece s s a r y t o t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n " . 1 ^ I n R i c a r d o ' s d i s c u s s i o n of value on the other hand, d i s t r i b u t i o n p l a y s a s u p e r f l u o u s r o l e i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of v a l u e , i t i s an e f f e c t r a t h e r than a cause of the p r o d u c t i o n of v a l u e . The q u a n t i t a t i v e measurement of l a b o u r ( l a b o u r -time) f o r him, becomes the f o u n d a t i o n and source of v a l u e . 18. I b i d . , p. 11. 19. R. Meek;"Studies p. 100 - l k 5 -not only f o r p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s but a l s o f o r c a p i t a l i s m . The main problem which he f a c e d i n e v i n c i n g t h i s t h e s i s , was t o demonstrate, c o n t r a r y t o Smith, t h a t the payment of p r o f i t and r e n t d i d not c o n t r a d i c t the theory of l a b o u r embodiment as the determinant of v a l u e . Smith p r o f e s s e d as I have a l -ready mentioned, t h a t the p r i c e of c o r n would have a d e t e r -minant e f f e c t on the r e l a t i v e p r i c e s of a l l commodities i n g e n e r a l . He t h e r e f o r e c o n j e c t u r e s the two v a l u e s , of corn and l a b o u r , as i n v a r i a b l e . T h i s i s t o say, t h a t when the p r i c e of c o r n (and of labour) d e c l i n e , t h i s s i g n i f i e s not a d e c l i n e i n these f i x e d v a l u e s , but r a t h e r a g e n e r a l r i s e i n a l l o t h e r commodities' exchange-values. But R i c a r d o asks "... i s not the v a l u e of l a b o u r e q u a l l y v a r i a b l e , b e i n g not o n l y a f f e c t e d , as a l l other t h i n g s are, by the p r o p o r t i o n s between the supply and demand which u n i f o r m l y v a r i e s with every change i n the c o n d i t i o n s of the community, but a l s o by the v a r y i n g p r i c e of food and o t h e r n e c e s s a r i e s , on which the wages of l a b o u r are expended? " 2 0 F o r R i c a r d o , g o l d as a money-commodity. I s a l s o a commodity and would s i m i l a r l y be e f f e c t e d by a r i s e i n wages. A change In the p r i c e of c o r n would t h e r e f o r e i n c r e a s e wages and decrease p r o f i t s but would not e f f e c t the v a l u e of the commodities. There would be no change i n r e l a t i v e v a l u e s ( p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n ) , 1. e., I n the r a t i o of g o l d to a l l other commodities. 2 0 . I b i d . , p. 9 9 . - 146 -Moreover, he proposed, that a r i s e In wages, may In f a c t , when any f i x e d c a p i t a l i s used i n the production of a commodity, produce an absolute f a l l i n the price of some commodities, " t h i s f a l l being greater as the proportion of f i x e d to c i r c u l a t i n g c a p i t a l was greater". Which i s to say, that when wage rates r i s e , p r o f i t s are forced down, and price s remain the same or even decrease. This decline of prices and p r o f i t s was found to be most noticeable i n those Industries with a higher proportion of f i x e d c a p i t a l to c i r c u l a t i n g c a p i t a l , i . e., "as a re s u l t of a r i s e i n wages ... Ricardo contested ( i n opposition to Smith and predecessors) .... none (of the values of commodities) would i n fact r i s e , and the great majority would actually 21 f a l l " . Again, i t was these same contentions which inspired Ricardo to elucidate i n a l a t t e r to James M i l l i n 1818, that ... "Adam Smith thought, that as i n the early stages of society, a l l the produce of labour belonged to the labourer, and as a f t e r stock was accumulated, a part went to p r o f i t s , that accumulation, necessarily, without any regard to the d i f f e r e n t degree of d u r a b i l i t y of c a p i t a l or any other circumstances what-ever, raised the prices or exchangeable value of commodities, and consequently that t h e i r value was no longer regulated by the quantity of labour necessary to t h e i r pro-duction. In opposition to him, I maintain that i t i s not because c a p i t a l accumulates, that exchangeable value varies, but i t i s i n a l l stages of society, owing only to two 21. I b i d . , p. 105 - 14-7 -sources: one the more or l e s s of quantity of labour required, the other the greater or l e s s d u r a b i l i t y of c a p i t a l ; that the former i s never superseded by_the l a t t e r , but Is only modified by i t " In short, h i s p o s i t i o n was to reject Smith's contention that the labour embodiment theory was solely applicable to early forms of labour intensive production, and that with the accumulation of c a p i t a l i t could be successfully modified 23 into a cost of production theory. From t h i s same text quoted above, we may also extricate the second cause which Ricardo introduces i n the determination of exchange-value, namely, the greater or l e s s d u r a b i l i t y of c a p i t a l . This, he hoped, would act as a useful expedient i n defending the labour embodiment theory of value as the only e f f e c t i v e means of discerning exchange-values i n capitalism. The dilemma which he confronted, was that f o r equal quantities of c a p i t a l (with unequal r a t i o s of f i x e d to c i r c u l a t i n g c a p i t a l ) there was produced equal p r o f i t s , that i s , value appears to be proportional to the magnitude of c a p i t a l advanced, t o t a l l y ambivalent to the quantity of labour embodied i n the production. 22. Ricardo, " P r i n c i p l e s of P. E., V o l . I, x x x v i - v i i , Cf. Sraffa's introduction. 23. Pierro Sraffa mentions the controversy over Ricardo's so-called retreat from the labour embodiment theory; i n response, he q u a l i f i e s Ricardo's t e r r a c i t y to the labour theory of value with a l e t t e r written i n Jan. 1821, i n which he emphasizes "I an f u l l y pursuaded that In f i x i n g on the quantity of labour r e a l i z e d i n commodities as the rule which governs t h e i r r e l a t i v e values are on the right course"; i b i d . , p. x i i . - 148 -p r o c e s s . T h i s j u x t a p o s i t i o n a c c o r d i n g l y a p p e a r s a s a c o n t r a -d i c t i o n b e t w e e n l a b o u r a s t h e s o u r c e o f v a l u e , a n d l a b o u r a s t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e r e g u l a t o r o f m a r k e t v a l u e s , a n d m o r e o v e r , i t a p p e a r s s o m e w h a t a n a l o g o u s t o t h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f M a r x 1 s " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n p r o b l e m " — w e s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h i s s u b j e c t i n a f e w m o m e n t s . R i c a r d o w a s s t i l l c o n f i d e n t t h a t c h a n g e s w h i c h m a y o c c u r b e t w e e n t w o c o m m o d i t i e s ' e x c h a n g e v a l u e s , o c c u r p r i m a r i l y i n r e s p o n s e t o a l t e r a t i o n s i n o n e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o m m o d i t y ' s v a l u e s i n i s o l a t i o n . T h e q u e s t i o n w a s h o w t o m e a s u r e t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l c o m m o d i t y v a l u e s w i t h o u t e m p l o y i n g r e l a t i v e k i n d s o f t o o l s f o r m e a s u r e m e n t . H i s s o l u t i o n , l i k e t h a t o f S m i t h ' s , w a s t o r e l e g a t e e x c h a n g e v a l u e ( i n t h i s c a s e r e l a t i v e p r i c e s ) a n d t h e d e t e r m i n a n t f a c t o r s o f t h e i r v a r i a t i o n , e x o g e n i c t o t h e r e a l m o v e m e n t o f a b s o l u t e v a l u e . W i t h o u t t h i s t y p e o f s t r u c t u r e , w i t h o u t r e l a t i v e v a l u e d i s -t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a b s o l u t e v a l u e , c h a n g e w o u l d b e d o o m e d t o a n a b s o l u t e r e l a t i v i s m w h e r e , " w h e n s o m e g o o d s b e c o m e c h e a p e r , 24 t h e r e s t n e c e s s a r i l y b e c o m e d e a r e r " , o r t o t h e q u e s t i o n , t h a t " i f w h e a t b u y s m o r e c l o t h n o w t h a n b e f o r e , i s i t t h a t w h e a t h a s b e c o m e m o r e c o s t l y t o p r o d u c e , o r t h a t t h e p r o d u c -25 t i v i t y o f l a b o u r i n t h e t e x t i l e i n d u s t r y h a s r i s e n ? " 2 4 . M a r c B l a u g . R i c a r d i a n E c o n o m i c s , p . 1 9 . 25. I b i d . - 149 -R i c a r d o 1 s denouement i n t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y , was t o modify the p r i n c i p l e s of the l a b o u r embodiment t h e o r y t o take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the employment of machinery and other f i x e d and durable c a p i t a l . He adopted c a t e g o r i e s which d i f f e r e n t i a t e d between the d u r a b i l i t y of f i x e d and c i r c u l a t i n g c a p i t a l . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , i n a way s i m i l a r t o t h a t of Smith's, was based p r i m a r i l y on the p h y s i c a l a t t r i -b utes of the c a p i t a l , such t h a t f i x e d c a p i t a l was p e r c e i v e d as a stage i n the p r o g r e s s i v e m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n of c i r c u -l a t i n g c a p i t a l or l a b o u r . He then a s c e r t a i n e d , t h a t i n p r o p o r t i o n t o the d u r a b i l i t y of c a p i t a l employed i n the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s (durable i n the sense of i t ' s l o n g e v i t y of s e r v i c e t o the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s ) , the r e l a t i v e p r i c e s of those commodities which have more durable c a p i t a l employed i n t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n , w i l l f a l l as wages r i s e and r i s e as wages f a l l . The key t o t h i s c o l l o c a t i o n was the r a t i o of c i r c u l a t i n g t o f i x e d c a p i t a l ; a c c o r d i n g l y , he acknowledged t h a t "on account .... of the d i f f e r e n t degrees of d u r a b i l i t y of t h e i r c a p i t a l s , or, which i s the same t h i n g , on account of the time i n which must elapse b e f o r e one set of commodi-t i e s can be brought t o market, they w i l l be v a l u a b l e , not e x a c t l y i n p r o p o r t i o n t o the q u a n t i t y of l a b o u r bestowed on them — they w i l l not be as two t o one, but something more, t o compensate f o r the g r e a t e r l e n g t h of time which must 26 elapse b e f o r e the most v a l u a b l e can be brought t o market". 26. R i c a r d o ; ' P r i n c i p l e s ' , p. 3k« - 150 -I n other words, c a p i t a l i s t s may employ the same q u a n t i t i e s of l a b o u r i n the p r o d u c t i o n of t h e i r commodities, but t h e i r v a l u e w i l l d i f f e r i n r e f e r e n c e t o the d i f f e r e n t q u a n t i t i e s of f i x e d c a p i t a l , or accumulated and m a t e r i a l i z e d l a b o u r each employs. Commensurate with t h i s schema, i n the t h i r d sec-t i o n , chapter one, of the ' P r i n c i p l e s 1 — t i t l e d "On an I n -v a r i a b l e Measure of Value" — R i c a r d o proceeds t o d i s t i n g u i s h between those spheres of i n d u s t r y with e i t h e r a h i g h or low p r o p o r t i o n of durable c a p i t a l . Subsequently,In c o n c l u d i n g t h i s endeavor, he p o s t u l a t e s t h a t although i t would be expedient t o possess an i n v a r i a b l e element f o r the measurement of the movement of r e a l or a b s o l u t e v a l u e w i t h i n commodities, i t appears as i f there can be no such appurtenance, because, "th e r e i s none which i s not s u b j e c t to r e q u i r e more or l e s s 27 l a b o u r f o r i t ' s p r o d u c t i o n " . So R i c a r d o r e t u r n s , i n f u l l c i r c l e , t o t h a t p o s i t i o n e n t e r t a i n e d by Smith, where a l l elements ( i n c l u d i n g both l a b o u r and corn) are s t i l l s u bject i n t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n of v a l u e to V a r i a t i o n s i n p r o p o r t i o n s of f i x e d and c i r c u l a t i n g c a p i t a l , v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e i r d u r a b i l i t y , and v a r i a t i o n s I n the time r e q u i s i t e f o r b r i n g i n g the goods to market. That i s , they are subject t o circumstances "which ... d i s q u a l i f y any commodity t h a t can be thought of from b e i n g a p e r f e c t l y 27. I b i d . , p. 44 - 151 -28 a c c u r a t e measure of v a l u e " . Indeed the theory of R i c a r d o appears t o be reduced t o the c o n d i t i o n s (circumvented by Smith by d i s m i s s i n g the l a b o u r embodied theory) where l a b o u r , as an i n v a r i a b l e measure of the v a l u e of commodities, i s f u n c t i o n a l as a determining p r i n c i p l e of exchange-value only i n the l i m i t e d domain of the exchange of commodities produced with i s o m e t r i c magnitudes of l a b o u r ( c i r c u l a t i n g c a p i t a l ) , and commensurate p r o p o r t i o n s of f i x e d c a p i t a l . T h i s i s t o say, where the c a p i t a l s employed are composed of equal d u r a b i l i t y , or where no f i x e d c a p i t a l i s used i n the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s whatsoever, i . e., Smith's 'crude and e a r l y s t a t e ' . But R i c a r d o v a l i a n t l y opposes such a r e t r o -g r e s s i o n . H i s p e r p l e x i n g answer was to s e l e c t a measuring device which was of a mean average combination of l a b o u r , c a p i t a l , and d u r a b i l i t y , which was t o p l a y the r o l e of the ' i n v a r i a b l e measure o f v a l u e ' — and t h i s was g o l d . As I mentioned, the d i s c u s s i o n s encompassing the p r o -blem of the i n v a r i a b l e measure of value (by both R i c a r d o and Smith) were synonymous i n c o n f i g u r a t i o n t o Marx's t r a n s f o r -mation problem e a r l i e r o u t l i n e d . Or more a c c u r a t e l y , the enigma of how l a b o u r as the source of v a l u e (Marx's v a l u e , R i c a r d o ' s a b s o l u t e value) can account f o r the f a c t t h a t i n c a p i t a l i s m , p r i c e s , (Marx's p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n , R i c a r d o ' s r e l a t i v e - p r i c e s ) are r e g u l a t e d i n terms o f the magnitude of 28. I b i d . - 152 -c a p i t a l employed i r r e g a r d l e s s of the q u a n t i t y of l a b o u r employed. T h i s analogy has been posed i n perhaps i t ' s most s t r i k i n g form, 29 i n a work by A. C. Whltaker 7 H i s t o r y and C r i t i c i s m of the  Labour Theory of V a l u e . I t would seem p r o f i t a b l e t h e r e f o r e t o quote from t h i s account i n some l e n g t h . " M c c u l l o c h a n t i c i p a t e d ... " w r i t e s Whltaker, " K a r l Marx's s o l u t i o n of the " o r g a n i c c o m p o s i t i o n of c a p i t a l problem. Marx c l o s e d h i s theory of v a l u e , i n the f i r s t volume of Das K a p i t a l , w i t h the con-f u s i o n t h a t , t o a l l appearances, the f a c t s of market v a l u e s c o n t r a d i c t the t h e o r y . He promised, however, t o show, i n a l a t e r volume, t h a t i n r e a l i t y t h e r e i s no c o n t r a d i c t i o n .... The answer to the enigma, as i t appeared i n the posthumous t h i r d volume of Das K a p i t a l , i s p r e c i s e l y the one McCulloch gave t o the same qu e s t i o n " . 3 ° "The f a t a l d i f f i c u l t y i n which the Marxian t h e o r y of v a l u e culminated, due t o the f a c t , as Marx d e s c r i b e d i t , t h a t the " o r g a n i c composition of c a p i t a l i s , f o r t e c h n i c a l reasons, d i f f e r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t l i n e s of b u s i n e s s . The make-up of the e n t r e p r e n e u r s o u t l a y w i t h r e s p e c t t o these p r o -p o r t i o n s Marx c a l l s the " o r g a n i c composition" of h i s c a p i t a l . The f a c t s of l i f e are t h a t e q u al c a p i t a l s , i n the sense of equal o u t l a y s , I n d i f f e r e n t employments tend t o produce equal " p r o f i t funds", r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r o r g a n i c com-p o s i t i o n . Now what the p r o f i t fund a c t u a l l y t u r n s out t o be, depends on the s e l l i n g p r i c e or v a lue of the product. I f we take a c a p i t a l spent I n l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n f o r l a b o u r , the l a r g e amount of s u r p l u s l a b o u r time e x p l o i t e d ought t o g i v e the product a v a l u e v e r y much i n excess of the o u t l a y , and a f f o r d a l a r g e p r o f i t fund. I f we take a p r e c i s e l y e q u a l c a p i t a l , spent i n v e r y small p r o p o r t i o n f o r l a b o u r , and almost e n t i r e l y 2 9 . By c o i n c i d e n c e Whltaker was a student of A d o l f Wagner who, i n "Notes on Wagner ....". was s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i z e d by Marx f o r ,his muddled c o n c e p t i o n of v a l u e . 30 A. C. Whitaker's ' H i s t o r y & C r i t i c i s m of the Labour  Theory of V a l u e , 1 9 0 6 , p. 62*1 - 153 -f o r machinery, e t c . , the r e l a t i v e l y small amount of s u r p l u s l a b o u r time e x p l o i t e d ought t o make the v a l u e o f a product not n e a r l y so gre a t as t h a t o f the f i r s t c a p i t a l . Since Marx f r a n k l y admits t h a t i n . f a c t com-p e t i t i o n makes the value of these p r o d u c t s equal  I n s t e a d of unequal, how does he 'solve the con-t r a d i t i o n ' and redeem h i s theory?" and f i n a l l y .... "The p o i n t d e s i r e d t o be made here, i s t h a t R i c a r d o ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s o f " f i x e d and c i r c u l a t i n g c a p i t a l i s the same as i n the Marxian theory".31 I t f o l l o w s from the l i n e s o f t h i s t e n d e n t i o u s argument, that Marx p r o v i d e s — or i s a t l e a s t attempting t o p r o v i d e > — a s o l u t i o n t o the pr o b l e m a t i c of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy. 3 2 One must r e a d i l y admit t h a t t h e r e does seem t o be a remarkable resemblance between the two e x p o s i t i o n s o f the ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem' and the ' i n v a r i a b l e measure of v a l u e ' . But, as .1 s h a l l develop i n the l a t t e r h a l f of t h i s chapter, the s i m i -l a r i t y i s not due t o a common p r o b l e m a t i c , but r a t h e r , a p r o -duct of the misre a d i n g o f Marx's o b j e c t , o r b e t t e r , the r e a d i n g 31. I b i d . , p. 68. 32. Marc B l a u g i n R l c a r d i a n Economics - A H i s t o r i c a l  Study, f u r n i s h e s the same k i n d s of a n a l o g i e s w i t h r e g a r d t o the • t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem', w r i t i n g " I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e -f o r e , t h a t Marx secures the same answers as R i c a r d o when he c o n s i d e r s a R l c a r d i a n problem: the e f f e c t o f a change i n wage upon p r i c e s " ! p. 233 ( C f . , a l s o the whole Appendix A - on R i c a r d o & Marx), f o r an e q u i v a l e n t p o s i t i o n by Joan Robinson r e f e r t o her C o l l e c t e d Economic Papers I I I , pp. 150-1; a l s o t o Schumpetar i n H i s t o r y of Economic A n a l y s i s , p. 390, where he poses Marx as a minor R l c a r d i a n . - 154 -of the p r o b l e m a t i c o f c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy i n t o Marx's d i s c o u r s e . Before p a s s i n g on to t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i n d e t a i l . I should l i k e t o make one f i n a l comment on R i c a r d o 1 s t h e s i s . I t h i n k we may c o r r e c t l y s t i p u l a t e , t h a t , w i t h i n the ' P r i n c i p l e s 1 , the c e n t r a l problem with which he was mainly concerned, was i n d e f i n i n g the ' i n v a r i a b l e measure of v a l u e ' and i t ' s r o l e i n determining exchange-value; even although the s o l u t i o n 33 seems t o move away from the l a b o u r theory of v a l u e . I n g e n e r a l , h i s f a i l u r e i n s o l v i n g t h i s complex problem was ex-p r e s s e d as f o l l o w s : "I am more convinced than ever t h a t the g r e a t r e g u l a t o r of v a l u e i s the q u a n t i t y of l a b o u r r e q u i r e d t o produce the commodity v a l u e d . There are many m o d i f i c a t i o n s which must be admitted i n t o t h i s d o c t r i n e , from the circum-stances o f the unequal t i m e s t h a t commodities r e q u i r e t o be brought t o the market,©but t h i s does not i n v a l i d a t e the d o c t r i n e i t s e l f . I am not s a t i s f i e d with the e x p l a n a t i o n which I have g i v e n of the p r i n c i p l e s which r e g u l a t e v a l u e . I wish a more able pen would under-take i t . The f a u l t i s not i n the inadequacy of the d o c t r i n e t o account f o r a l l d i f f i c u l -t i e s , b ut i n the adequacy of him who has attempted t o e x p l a i n i t " • 3 4 3 3 . We noted, t h a t i n h i s l a s t essay, he converged s p e c i f i c a l l y on the development of the concept of Absolute v a l u e , and re-emphasized t h a t the substance o f the Absolute form p r o v i d e d only l a b o u r as the p o s s i b l e source. 3 4 . R i c a r d o ' s Works, e d i t e d by S r a f f a , V o l . V I I I , p. 142. - 155 -I n summation of our d i s c u s s i o n of the c l a s s i c a l economists, we may e x t r a c t two c o n c l u s i o n s : F i r s t , and most important, i s t h a t the p r o b l e m a t i c of the ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem' (1. e., d e t e r m i n a t i o n of exchange-value), as o u t l i n e d i n the p r e c e d i n g chapter, appears t o be congruent with the p r o -b l e m a t i c of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economist's ' i n v a r i a b l e measure of v a l u e ' ; second, and t h i s i s something which I wish t o expand upon l a t e r , l a b o u r a c t s f o r them as the sole source of the p r o d u c t i o n of v a l u e , e i t h e r i n the form of the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r , as i n Smith, or as the composite f o r Absolute v a l u e In R i c a r d o . P a r t B Marx Ver s u s P o l i t i c a l Economy I t now remains — through a programatic p r e s e n t a t i o n of some of the elements of the ' s t r u c t u r a l i s t s ' r e a d i n g — t o i l l u s t r a t e the r a d i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s between the p r o b l e m a t i c of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy and t h a t of Marx. By so doing, I hope t o be able t o e s t a b l i s h , t h a t the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n p r o -blem i s the producttiof an Inaccurate and i d e o l o g i c a l r e a d i n g of Marx's o b j e c t i n C a p i t a l . I . Marx's R e d e f i n i t i o n of Use-Value and Exchange-Value Marx's rupture with the c l a s s i c a l economists i s most c l e a r l y shown i n t h e i r common treatment of the concepts of use-value and exchange-value. I have b r i e f l y o u t l i n e d the manner i n which Smith and R i c a r d o t r e a t e d these c a t e g o r i e s , - 156 -and I concluded t h a t f o r them use-value f o r i n s t a n c e , was de-f i n e d as a sub-unit of the concept of v a l u e , which i n t u r n , was a product of the l a b o u r p r o c e s s or the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r . Smith spoke of the word 'value' as the d e r i v a t i v e which ex-pressed two d i v e r s e meanings — of exchange and use, and R i c a r d o m o d i f i e d t h i s by r e - a f f i r m i n g the f a c t t h a t b o t h u n i t s were necessary p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r la b o u r t o produce value,. Both n o t i o n s of value were t h e r e f o r e regarded as sh a r i n g a common essence of la b o u r i n i t ' s concrete, i n d i v i d u a l form. On the other hand, on the f i r s t page of C a p i t a l , Marx separates h i m s e l f c a t e g o r i c a l l y from t h i s k i n d of con-s t r u c t i o n , he begins, "The wealth of those s o c i e t i e s i n which the c a p i t a l i s t mode of p r o d u c t i o n p r e v a i l s , p r e s e n t s i t s e l f as "an immense accumulation of commodities 1 1, i t ' s u n i t s being a s i n g l e commodity. Our i n v e s t i g a t i o n must 35 t h e r e f o r e b e g i n with the a n a l y s i s of a commodity". (M. E.) He i s not here beginning from a mere word, nor i s he attempting t o make a simple semantical d i s t i n c t i o n , h i s purpose i s t o i n t r o d u c e , as he has announced, the a n a l y s i s of a commodity. From the concrete e n t i t y of the commodity ( c o n c r e t e ; not i n i t ' s e m p i r i c i s t sense), he f i n d s t h a t i t c o n t a i n s both a use-value and an exchange-value; but he f i n d s t h a t these two c a t e g o r i e s are e n t i r e l y d i s s i m i l a r t o those of the c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economists, because, as he says i n 3 5 . Marx; C a p i t a l I , p. 4-1 - 157 -36 Notes on Wagner .... "I do not s t a r t from 'concepts 1 and hence do not s t a r t from the 'concept' of v a l u e , and t h e r e -f o r e do not have t o ' d i v i d e ' the l a t t e r i n any way. What I s t a r t from i s the simplest s o c i a l form In which the l a b o u r product i s r e p r e s e n t e d i n contemporary s o c i e t y , and t h i s i s the commodity. I analyze t h i s and Indeed, j u s t i n the form  i n which i t appears. Here I f i n d t h a t on the one hand i t i s i n i t ' s n a t u r a l form a t h i n g of use, a l i a s a use-value, on the o ther a b e a r e r of exchange-value, and i n t h i s r e s p e c t i t s e l f •exchange-value•. F u r t h e r a n a l y s i s o f the l a t t e r shows me t h a t exchange-value i s o n l y a phenomenal form', an independent mode of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the v a l u e c o n t a i n e d i n the commodity and then I proceed t o analyze the l a t t e r A commodity i s a use-value or o b j e c t of u t i l i t y , and a 'value'. I t i s r e p r e s e n t e d as t h i s two f o l d t h i n g t h a t I t i s , as soon a s i t ' s v a lue possesses a s p e c i f i c phenomenal form d i f f e r e n t  from i t ' s n a t u r a l form v i z . , the form of exchange-value "and a g a i n , i n even a c l e a r e r manner'' thus i t i s not I who d i v i d e 'value' i n t o use-value and exchange-value as o p p o s i t i o n s i n t o which the d i s t r a c t i o n 'value' d i v i d e s i t s e l f , but the concrete s o c i a l form ( c o n c r e t e i n the sense t h a t i t i s r e -f e r r i n g t o s p e c i f i c s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n ) of the labou r product, a 'commodity'. i s on the one hand use-value 36. Marx, M a r g i n a l Notes on Adolph Wagner's 'Lehr-bruch der P o l i t l s c h e n Okonomle' T h e o r e t i c a l P r a c t i c e Issue #5 Sp r i n g 1972, pp. 50-1. — - 158 -and on the other 'value', not exchange-value f o r the mere phenomenal form 1s not I t • s t r u e content"• The one g e n e r a l p o i n t t o be made here i s t h a t the subject under a n a l y s i s , i s not the concept 'value' i n a vacuum, but the commodity form which the product of l a b o u r i n c a p i t a l i s m t a k e s on. A l s o f u r t h e r on i n t h i s same t e x t , Marx contends t h a t value may e x i s t i n an independent form from exchange-value; i n o t h e r words, a t h i n g may have value as a product o f labour and yet I t may not be a commodity. Or as he s t a t e s i n C a p i t a l "Whoever d i r e c t l y s a t i s f i e s h i s wants with the produce of h i s own labo u r , c r e a t e s , indeed, use-values, but not com-37 m o d i t i e s " . T h e r e f o r e v a l u e e x i s t s i n a mode d i s t i n c t from exchange-value as i t m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f In the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c form of a commodity. A l a b o u r e r who produces a good f o r h i s d i r e c t consumption, produces u s e - v a l u e s and y e t he does not produce a commodity. Use-value d e s c r i b e s a product which s a t i s f i e s the needs of the producers, o r of human l a b o u r , but by so doing, a l l human l a b o u r does not n e c e s s a r i l y p r o -duce commodities; commodities are a product of "use-values 38 f o r o t h e r s , s o c i a l use-value«£. What t h e r e needs t o be, as Marx h i m s e l f s t a t e s ^ l s a d i s t i n c t i o n between the n o t i o n of •value' and 'value form'. I n other words, " F i r s t , the v a l i d exchange-value of a g i v e n commodity expresses something e q u a l , 37. Marx, C a p i t a l , p. 48 38. I b i d . - 159 ~ secondly the exchange-value, g e n e r a l l y , i s o n l y the mode of e x p r e s s i o n , the phenomenal form, of something c o n t a i n e d i n 39 i t , y et d i s t i n g u i s h e d from i t " . He g i v e s us a c o n c e p t u a l example of the e x i s t e n c e of v a l u e o u t s i d e of the common form i n the f o l l o w i n g statement: "the p a t r i a r c h a l i n d u s t r i e s of a peasant f a m i l y t h a t produces c o r n , c a t t l e , yarn, l i n e n and c l o t h i n g f o r home use. These d i f f e r e n t a r t i c l e s a r e , as r e g a r d s the f a m i l y , so many pr o d u c t s of i t ' s l a b o u r , but as between themselves they are not com-m o d i t i e s . The d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of l a b o u r , such as t i l l a g e , c a t t l e t e n d i n g , s p i n n i n g , weaving and making c l o t h e s which r e s u l t In the v a r i o u s p r o d u c t s , are i n themselves, and such as they a r e , d i r e c t s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s , because f u n c t i o n s of the f a m i l i e s , which, j u s t as much as a s o c i e t y based on the p r o -d u c t i o n of commodities, possesses a spon-t a n e o u s l y developed system of d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r . The d i s t r i b u t i o n of the work w i t h i n the f a m i l y , and the r e g u l a t i o n of the l a b o u r time of the s e v e r a l members, depend as w e l l upon d i f f e r e n c e s of age and sex as upon n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s v a r y i n g with the seasons. The l a b o u r power o f each i n d i v i d u a l by i t ' s very nature, operates i n t h i s case merely as a d e f i n i t e p o r t i o n of the whole l a b o u r power of the f a m i l y , and t h e r e f o r e the measure of the expenditure of I n d i v i d u a l l a b o u r power by i t ' s d u r a t i o n , appears here" by i t ' s v e r y nature a s n a s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e i r l a b o u r " . and from Notes on Wagner "Herr Rodbertus t a k e s h i s measure of the q u a n t i t y of value from R i c a r d o ; but no more 3 9 . Marx, C a p i t a l . V o l . I , p. 37 40. I b i d . , pp. 7 7 - 8 . - i6o -than R i c a r d o has he i n v e s t i g a t e d or under-stood the substance of value i t s e l f ; f o r example, the •common1 c h a r a c t e r of the ( l a b o u r process) In the p r i m i t i v e community as the common organism of the c o r r e l a t i v e labour powers and hence t h a t of t h e i r l a b o u r , 1, e,, of the expenditure of those powers". 1 I t i s t h i s form i n which v a l u e I s c o n d i t i o n e d i n t o i n com-modity p r o d u c t i o n which Marx wishes t o i n v e s t i g a t e , not the concept of use^value as an Independent concept. That i s to say, what i s a t i s s u e i s the r a i s o n d ' e t r e f o r i t ' s e x i s -tence b e i n g determined by a s p e c i f i c mode of s o c i a l o r g a n i -z a t i o n . C l a s s i c a l economists, on the o t h e r hand, imputed use value and I t ' s a b i l i t y t o s a t i s f y the needs of men, as a p r o p e r t y of the ' t h i n g ' or the ' o b j e c t i n i t s e l f . On the c o n t r a r y .j Marx t e l l s us, use-value does not i d e n t i f y the •value' of a commodity, indeed v a l u e must simultaneously be d i f f e r e n t from i t ' s own use-value. As he w r i t e s , "Value as an aspect o f the commodity i s not expressed I n i t ' s own use-v a l u e , or i n i t ' s e x i s t e n c e as use-value. Value m a n i f e s t s I t s e l f when commodities are expressed i n o t h e r u s e - v a l u e s , t h a t i s , i t m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n the r a t e a t which t h e i r 4-2 o t h e r u s e - v a l u e s are exchanged f o r them". (1, e., when 4-1.'Marx's' Notes on A d o l f Wagner: An I n t r o d u c t i o n ' by Athar Hussein, T h e o r e t i c a l P r a c t i c e , p. 39. 4-2. I b i d . , p. 4-4. - i 6 i -the commodity t a k e s on the r e l a t i v e form, C f . C a p i t a l , V o l . I . . PP. 57-81. As f o r exchange-value, we saw how bot h R i c a r d o and Smith t r e a t e d i t as i f i t were a q u a n t i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p which was p u r e l y r e l a t i v e , 1. e., as an a t t r i b u t e o f the ' t h i n g ' which simply expresses tantamount p r o p o r t i o n s of use-value i n a r e l a t i v e and e x t r i n s i c manner. I n other words, f o r them, exchange-value measured the magnitude of q u a n t i t i e s o f u s e - v a l u e s . Marx, on exchange-value, s t i p u -l a t e d t h a t : "As use-values, commodities are , above a l l , of d i f f e r e n t q u a l i t i e s , but as exchange v a l u e s they are merely d i f f e r e n t q u a n t i t i e s , and consequently do not c o n t a i n an atom of use-value". He t h e r e f o r e proposes a dilemma whereby a commodity's exchange-value cannot be reduced t o use-value, and y e t , both are necessary f o r the e x i s t e n c e of the com-modity; how can such c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t ? The d i s t i n c t i o n , or b e t t e r the c o n t r a d i c t i o n c which Marx a r t i c u l a t e s between use-value and exchange-value w i t h i n commodities, i s r e p r e s e n -t a t i v e of the two k i n d s or c o n d i t i o n s of l a b o u r which are n e c e s s a r i l y presupposed i n the p r o d u c t i o n of a commodity. T h i s i s t o say, the n o t i o n of a commodity harbours these two c o n t r a d i c t o r y forms — (exchange) value and use-value — by way of i t ' s r o l e of r e p r e s e n t i n g the 'two-fold n a t u r e ' of la b o u r . Or as Marx expounds "On the one hand a l l l a b o u r i s , speaking p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y , an expenditure of human l a b o u r -power, and I n i t ' s c h a r a c t e r of i d e n t i c a l a b s t r a c t human - 162 -l a b o u r , i t c r e a t e s and forms the value of commodities. On the other hand, a l l l a b o u r i s the expenditure of human l a b o u r -power In a s p e c i a l form and w i t h a d e f i n i t e aim, and i n t h i s , i t ' s c h a r a c t e r of concrete u s e f u l l a b o u r , I t produces use-43 v a l u e s " . or " I n t h e course of time, t h e r e f o r e , some por-t i o n s at l e a s t of the p r o d u c t s o f l a b o u r must be produced wi t h a s p e c i a l view to exchange. From t h a t moment the d i s -t i n c t i o n becomes f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d between the u t i l i t y of an o b j e c t f o r the purposes of consumption, and i t ' s u t i l i t y f o r the purpose of exchange. I t ' s use-value becomes d l s t i n -44 guished from I t ' s exchange-value". I n other words, there i s l a b o u r which i s at once of a p a r t i c u l a r concrete and q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t n a t u r e , which produces the u s e - v a l u e s of the commodity, and c o - e x i s t i n g w i t h the l a t t e r , t h e r e i s a l s o an a b s t r a c t g e n e r a l s o c i a l form of l a b o u r which expresses no q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n s , but s o l e l y the q u a l i t y of b e i n g human la b o u r i n the form of v a l u e , or magnitudes of exchange-value. Marx w r i t e s , "Where-as l a b o u r p o s i t i n g exchange-value i s a b s t r a c t , u n i v e r s a l and u n i f o r m l a b o u r , l a b o u r p o s i t i n g use-value, i s c o n c r e t e , and d i s t i n c t i v e l a b o u r comprising i n f i n i t e l y v a r y i n g k i n d s of l a b o u r as r e g a r d s i t ' s form and the m a t e r i a l t o which i t I s 45 a p p l i e d " . ^ I t was the d i s c o v e r y of the double nature of 43. I b i d . , p. 54. (M.E.) 44. I b i d . , p. 100. 45. Marx, 'Notes on Wagner ....' T h e o r e t i c a l P r a c t i c e Issue #5, p. 36, (M.E.) - 1 6 3 -l a b o u r ( 1 . e. t a b s t r a c t and concrete) which r e f l e c t e d the I n t r o d u c t i o n of a completely new co n c e p t u a l schema f o r p o l i t i c a l economy. C l a s s i c a l economics had found the sub-stance f o r the c a l c u l a t i o n of exchange-value t o be la b o u r , but I t had n e g l e c t e d t o e x p l a i n the c o n d i t i o n s which were necessary f o r such an e q u i v a l e n c e . The q u e s t i o n s are t h e r e -f o r e , d i r e c t e d at the r e l a t i o n s necessary f o r an e q u i -valence between the commodity's exchange-value and the value of l a b o u r . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , magnitudes of 'exchange-value' must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from 'value'. Marx Informs us t h a t " the v a l u e (use-value) of a commodity o b t a i n s independent and d e f i n i t e e x p r e s s i o n , by t a k i n g the  form of exchange-value. When at the begin n i n g of t h i s c h a pter (Chapter I o f C a p i t a l ) we s a i d i n common p a r l a n c e , t h a t a commodity i s both a use-value and an exchange-value, we were, a c c u r a t e l y speaking wrong. A commodity i s a use-value or o b j e c t o f u t i l i t y , and a v a l u e . I t m a n i f e s t s I t s e l f as t h i s t w o - f o l d t h i n g , t h a t i t i s , as soon as i t ' s value assumes an Independent form, — v i z . , the form of 46 exchange-value". He d i s t i n g u i s h e s v a l u e from exchange-v a l u e , such t h a t value r e p r e s e n t s a common substance which i s r e a l i z e d In the exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p by exchange-value. F o r c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economists i n the pr o c e s s of exchange, both use-value and exchange-value were r e a l i z e d and r e p -46. Marx, C a p i t a l , p. 7 0 , (M.E.) - 164 -r e s e n t e d d i r e c t l y i n i t ' s nominal form, 1. e., wages, p r o f i t , r e n t , market p r i c e s , e t c . But f o r Marx t h e r e a re t h r e e forms which c a t e g o r i c a l l y may be i d e n t i f i e d as necessary elements f o r commodity p r o d u c t i o n . There i s the use-value of a commodity, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a p a r t i c u l a r and concrete form of l a b o u r , t h e r e i s v a l u e i n g e n e r a l which i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of l a b o u r i n g e n e r a l or b e t t e r as a b s t r a c t s o c i a l l a b o u r , (which i s common t o every mode) and t h e r e i s exchange-value, which i s the phenomenal form of v a l u e , t h a t i s , a s p e c i f i c e x p r e s s i o n of a b s t r a c t human l a b o u r under c a p i t a l i s m . I n othe r words, exchange-value, as a form of s o c i a l l y a b s t r a c t l a b o u r " d i d not happen from the be g i n n i n g , but only i n a c e r t a i n p e r i o d of s o c i a l development, hence at a determinate stage of h i s t o r i c a l development. Exchange-value i s t h e r e -47 f o r e a • h i s t o r i c a l concept"'. We may conclude then t h a t the u n i t y of concrete and a b s t r a c t labjour expresses the s p e c i a l form t h a t the g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of la b o u r t a k e s i n a determinate mode of p r o d u c t i o n . From t h i s d e f i n i t i o n the "law of v a l u e " I s t h a t which s p e c i f i e s the r e l a t i o n b e t -ween a b s t r a c t s o c i a l l a b o u r and concre t e l a b o u r . But here I do not wish t o suggest, as many o t h e r s have, t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , between v a l u e and exchange-v a l u e > d e n o t e s a Hegelian-'essence t o phenomena' r e l a t i o n -4 7 . Marx, op. c i t . , p. 55 (+ p. 4 5 ) . - 1 6 5 " \ 48 s h i p . Rather, my p o s i t i o n would be that i t c h a r a c t e r i z e s a d i s t i n c t i o n between 'value' as a common f a c t o r t o every mode, and I t ' s 'mode o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' which expresses the p a r t i c u l a r 'form' of the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s . And i n t h i s sense a l s o , a b s t r a c t l a b o u r may onl y be conc e i v e d not as an Independent form — but as one which i s a 'mode of r e p -r e s e n t i n g ' the labour p r o c e s s i n g e n e r a l , which under p a r -t i c u l a r endemic c o n d i t i o n s — namely those of the exchange of commodities — t a k e s the form of commodity. Commodities 'value' are thus a l r e a d y presumed as v a l u e s i n d i s t i n c t i o n from t h e i r u s e - v a l u e s b e f o r e they may re p r e s e n t value i n exchange. "Our a n a l y s i s has shown" w r i t e s Marx " t h a t the form or e x p r e s s i o n of the value of a commodity o r i g i n a t e s i n the nature of v a l u e , and not t h a t value and 48. F o r example, C o l l e t i saw a b s t r a c t l a b o u r r a t h e r than exchange-value as s p e c i f i c only t o the c a p i t a l i s t mode, he com-ments " I n the p r o d u c t i o n of commodities, ... where s o c i a l l a b o u r i s presented as equal or a b s t r a c t l a b o u r , the l a t t e r i s not merely c a l c u l a t e d l r r e s p e c t i v e of the i n d i v i d u a l and concret e l a b o u r s , but a l s o a c q u i r e s a d i s t i n c t e x i s t e n c e i n -dependent of them ... t h i s a b s t r a c t i o n of la b o u r from the con-c r e t e l a b o u r i n g s u b j e c t , t h i s a c q u i s i t i o n of I t ' s Independence from man, c u l m i n a t e s i n the form of the modern wage l a b o u r e r ... e t c . " I d e o l o g l a e S o c i e t y ( B a r i 1970), p. 114, quoted by Athar Hussain, T h e o r e t i c a l P r a c t i c e # 5 . p. 3^» °r as Sweezy w r i t e s , " • r e d u c t i o n of a l l l a b o u r t o a common denominator not an ad hoc a b s t r a c t i o n but "as Lukacs c o r r e c t l y observes, an ab-s t r a c t i o n .». which belongs t o the essence of c a p i t a l i s m ' " , p. 31, The Theory of C a p i t a l i s t Development. - 166 -I t ' s magnitude o r i g i n a t e i n the mode of t h e i r e x p r e s s i o n as e x c h a n g e - v a l u e o r n ^ l i commodities are non-use-values f o r t h e i r owners, and use-values f o r t h e i r non-owners. Con-sequently, they must a l l change hands. But t h i s change of hands i s what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e i r exchange, and the l a t t e r p u t s them i n r e l a t i o n with each o t h e r s as v a l u e s , and r e a l i z e s them as v a l u e s . Hence commodities must he r e a l i z e d  as v a l u e s b e f o r e they can be r e a l i z e d as u s e - v a l u e s " . ^ The common substance of the phenomenal form of value (ex-change value) i s not t h e r e f o r e " l a b o u r " as c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the c l a s s i c a l c o n c e p t i o n — as u s e f u l — but r a t h e r value ( a b s t r a c t ) . The va l u e form of o b j e c t s (an example would be the exchange-value of commodities) are determined by the i i o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s of i t ' s e x i s t e n c e , i n other words, by the conjuncture of the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ( p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s ) and the la b o u r p r o c e s s or means of p r o d u c t i o n . (The la b o u r p r o c e s s here r e f e r s t o the means of ' r e a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n ' of nature which i s the common f a c t o r t o a l l forms of p r o d u c t i o n , although d i f f e r e n t i a b l e by the p e c u l i a r combination o f i t ' s elements. As Marx r e p o r t s "The elementary f a c t o r s of the la b o u r - p r o c e s s are (1) the p e r s o n a l a c t i v i t y o f man, i . e., work i t s e l f , (2) the subject of t h a t work, and, (3) I t ' s 4 9 . Marx, C a p i t a l , p. 7 0 . 5 0 . I b i d . , p. 9 7 . (My Emphasis) - 1 6 7 -instruments".^' 1' The substance of value i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s common c h a r a c t e r of the labour p r o c e s s ; exchange v a l u e s are th u s the mode of r e p r e s e n t i n g the p r o d u c t i o n of goods ( o f value)under s p e c i f i c s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , i . e., under g e n e r a l i z e d commodity p r o d u c t i o n . I n short, exchange-value i d e n t i f i e s the s p e c i f i c ' s o c i a l space' i n which the p r o d u c t i o n of va l u e i s expressed i n the form of a b s t r a c t s o c i a l l a b o u r . F o r example, com-m o d i t i e s may be e q u i v a l e n t i n exchange, under the c a p i t a l i s t mode of p r o d u c t i o n , with unequal use- v a l u e s ( o r forms of con-c r e t e labour necessary f o r t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n ) ; infothe exchange p r o c e s s t h i s non-equivalence between u s e f u l l a b o u r i s b r i d g e d by the commodies* p r o p o r t i o n s of equal amounts of exchange-v a l u e , which a c t s as the necessary p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r exchange. I n other words, whattallows the eq u i v a l e n c e of these two o b j e c t s ? What a c t s as "... the r e s i d u e of each of these p r o d u c t s ; ( i s that)} i t c o n s i s t s of the same u n s u b s t a n t i a l r e a l i t y i n each, a mere c o n g e l a t i o n of homo-geneous human labo u r , of labour-power expended without r e g a r d t o the mode of i t ' s expenditure. A l l t h a t these t h i n g s now t e l l us i s , t h a t human labour-power has been expended i n t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n , t h a t human labour i s embodied i n them. When looked a t as c r y s t a l s o f t h i s s o c i a l substance, common t o them a l l , they are — v a l u e s " . 5 51. I b i d . , p. 1 9 8 ; a l s o cf. B a l i b a r ' s a r t i c l e i n Reading C a p i t a l . "From p e r i o d i z a t l o n tofcto the modes of p r o d u c t i o n " . 52. I b i d . , p. 45. - 168 -Hence, a l t h o u g h u n e q u a l q u a l i t a t i v e l y ; t h e i r e q u i v a l e n c e i s e s t a b l i s h e d v i a f i r s t , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f such an e q u i v a l e n c e ( p r o d u c t s of s o c i a l l a b o u r ) and t h e n by quan-t i t i e s o f exchange-value u n i t s . Thus a commodity "As t h e em-bodiment o f l a b o u r - t i m e , i t i s v a l u e i n g e n e r a l , as t h e em-bodiment o f a d e f i n i t e q u a n t i t y o f l a b o u r - t i m e , i t i s a 5 3 d e f i n i t e magnitude o f v a l u e " o r e x c h a n g e - v a l u e . But how i s t h i s d i f f e r e n t f r om R i c a r d o ' s f o r m u l a t i o n ? R i c a r d o , as we remember, c o n c e p t u a l i z e d t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t -ween u s e - v a l u e and exchange-value on t h e f f o u n d a t i o n s o f human l a b o u r i n g e n e r a l , a s t h e source f o r b o t h t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f v a l u e i n exchange, and o f i t ' s e s s e n c e , u s e - v a l u e . Hence embodied l a b o u r I n i t ' s q u a l i t a t i v e f o r m , o r u s e - v a l u e , i s measured i n te r m s o f exc h a n g e - v a l u e . R i c a r d o ' s immediate problem i s t h e l a w s w h i c h r e g u l a t e t h e exchange o f e q u a l q u a n t i t i e s o f l a b o u r such t h a t exchange-value i s r e d u c e d t o u s e - v a l u e ; u s e - v a l u e i d e n t i f i e s t h e 'economic o b j e c t s ' ( t h e i r a b i l i t y t o s a t i s f y men's n e e d s ) , w h i l e exchange-value measures t h e i r q u a n t i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p . The whole c o n c e p t u a l frame-work app e a r s f l a t and homogeneous. R i c a r d o f a l l s t o c o n -c e p t u a l i z e (and t h u s d i s c o v e r ) t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y e x i s t e n c e w h i c h v a l u e t a k e s e i n t h e commodity form, i . e., i n t h e need 52. I b i d . , p. 45. 53« K. Marx, T h e o r i e s o f S u r p l u s - V a l u e . P a r t I I I , 19.., Moscow, p. 128. - 16,9 -f o r a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of concre t e l a b o u r i n the p r o d u c t i o n of v a l u e , and, at the same time^the need f o r it»s exact opposite i n a form conducive f o r exchange; i n a b s t r a c t s o c i a l l a b o u r . I n other words, R i c a r d o combines the theory of form (the r e l a t i o n s h i p of a b s t r a c t l a b o u r and concre t e labour) with the p e c u l i a r development of t h a t form (the r e l a t i o n s h i p between exchange-value and concrete l a b o u r ) . "As regards v a l u e s i n g e n e r a l , i t i s the weak p o i n t of the c l a s s i c a l school of p o l i t i c a l economy t h a t i t nowhere e x p r e s s l y and wit h f u l l c onsciousness, d i s t i n g u i s h e s between labo u r , as i t appears i n the va l u e of a p r o -duct and the same la b o u r , as i t appears i n the use-value of t h a t product. Of course the d i s t i n c t i o n i s p r a c t i c a l l y made since t h i s school t r e a t s l a b o u r , at one time under i t ' s q u a n t i t a t i v e aspect, at another under i t ' s q u a l i t a t i v e a s p e c t . But i t has not the l e a s t i d e a , t h a t when the d i f f e r e n c e between v a r i o u s k i n d s of l a b o u r i s t r e a t e d as p u r e l y q u a n t i t a t i v e , t h e i r q u a l i t a t i v e u n i t y or e q u a l i t y , and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r r e d u c t i o n t o a b s t r a c t l a b o u r , i s i m p l i e d " . 5 k What t h i s i m p l i e s i s that R i c a r d o expresses the e q u i v a l e n c e , and y e t he cannot e x p l a i n t h i s e q u i v a l e n c e . That i s he cannot conceive of anything o u t s i d e of the commodity form, f o r he mistakes t h i s form as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the product i t s e l f , i . e . : "The only t h i n g t h a t R i c a r d o can be accused of i n t h i s context i s t h a t , i n e l a b o r a t i n g the concept of v a l u e , he does not c l e a r l y d i s t i n -g u i s h between the v a r i o u s a s p e c t s , between 5 k . K a r l Marx, C a p i t a l , V o l . I , p. 92 - 1?0 -1 t h e exchange v a l u e of the commodity, as i t m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f (appears i n the p r o c e s s o f commodity exchange) and the e x i s t e n c e of the commodity as value as d i s t i n c t from i t ' s e x i s t e n c e as an o b j e c t , product, use-value"- ?- ) and " .... the b o u r g e o i s form of l a b o u r " , f o r R i c a r d o , " i s regarded .... as the e t e r n a l n a t u r a l form of s o c i a l l a b o u r " . 5 ° i ) The I n v a r i a b l e Measure of Value T h i s consequently l e a d s R i c a r d o and Smith's a n a l y s i s i n t o a search f o r an ' i n v a r i a b l e measure of v a l u e ' which possesses the d u a l q u a l i t i e s of b e i n g q u a n t i t a t i v e l y measurable as per the exchange p r o c e s s , and yet r e t a i n i n g the p e c u l i a r form of u s e f u l or concrete l a b o u r necessary f o r the p r o d u c t i o n of goods. Marx concludes t h a t " R i c a r d o o f t e n g i v e s the impression and sometimes Indeed w r i t e s , as i f the q u a n t i t y of l a b o u r i s the s o l u t i o n t o the f a l s e or f a l s e l y c o n c e i v e d problem of an ' i n v a r i a b l e measure of v a l u e ' i n the same way as c o r n , money, wages, etc."--" which i s to say, t h a t R i c a r d o f a i l s t o separate the magnitude of value from i t ' s g e n e r a l form, as l a b o u r independent o f i n d i v i d u a l l a b o u r , I. e., as say s o c i a l l y a b s t r a c t l a b o u r . And thus, he i s i n -capable of a r t i c u l a t i n g why l a b o u r , as the substance of v a l u e , 5 5 . K a r l Marx, T h e o r i e s of S u r p l u s Value. P a r t I I I , p. 1 2 5 . . 5 6 . K a r l Marx, C o n t r i b u t i o n t o the C r i t i q u e of  P o l i t i c a l Economy of 1859. 1971. Moscow, p. 60. 5 7 . Marx, T.S.V.. P a r t I I I , p. 137 . - 171 -must take t h i s form — such as wages, p r o f i t , r e n t , com-m o d i t i e s , e t c . , — but simply a c c e p t s them as the g i v e n economic space, as the r e a d i l y ' v i s i b l e ' and t r a d i t i o n a l c r i t e r i a t o be i n v e s t i g a t e d without comprehending the c o n t r a d i c t o r y nature of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . I e a r l i e r t r a c e d , somewhat p r o g r a m a t i c a l l y , the con-c e p t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n s which Smith and R i c a r d o a r t i c u l a t e d b e t -ween use-value and exchange-value, and we found t h a t t h e i r e s s e n t i a l concern was with e x p l a i n i n g exchange-value. Furthermore, i t was found t h a t they c o n t i n u o u s l y seem t o con-fus e or reduce v a l u e t o exchange-values. As f o r example R i c a r d o ' s n o t i o n of r e a l v alue or absolute v a l u e , which was determined by magnitudes of l a b o u r embodied i n the p r o d u c t i o n of a commodity. C e n t r a l t o t h i s d e f i n i t i o n was t h a t i t ' s essence was a r r o g a t e d by i t ' s e x i s t e n c e as a product of u s e f u l l a b o u r , as a means of s a t i s f y i n g the needs of man. F o r Marx, on the other hand, the comparative r e l a t i o n s expressed between two t h i n g s , "the d i s t a n c e " r e v e a l e d i n the exchange pr o c e s s , r e q u i r e s , indeed demands as i t ' s p r e -r e q u i s i t e , a formal d e f i n i t i o n of a • s p a c i a l dimension' which adequately l i m i t s or l o c a t e s t h a t zone I n which the two o b j e c t s are t o be compared. More than j u s t the v i s i b l e , p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s must be c o n j e c t u r e d , what behooves e x p l a n a t i o n , i s the c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p ; as Marx h i m s e l f expresses i t » ... a dimension of space, i t i s a c e r t a i n l e n g t h which may w e l l express the d i s t a n c e of two - 172 -other things besides those compared" fo r example "What i s the distance between the s y l l a b l e A and a table? The question would be nonsensical. In speaking of the distance of two things, we speak of t h e i r difference i n space, to be points of space, and only a f t e r having them equalized sub specie spatic (under the aspect of space) we d i s t i n g u i s h them as d i f f e r e n t points of space. To belong to space Is t h e i r unity" Marx's problematic i n Volume I, i s thus, not that of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s of magnitude or essence of exchange value, but rather of what conditions necessarily mediate that human  labour In general be represented i n the value form. In other  words, what determines the space, the form, i n which the  notion of value must reside — f o r 'value' communicates more than a r e l a t i o n between two concrete 'things'. 'Things' are not equal, e i t h e r i n form or quantity, outside of a space which conditions a need for such an equivalence — and i t i s t h i s space as a determinant force, which Marx wishes to investigate. Therefore space as the s t r u c t u r a l conditions which are determinate i n the l a s t instance, rather than mag-nitudes of human labour as the essence of wealth, becomes the object of Marx's p o l i t i c a l economy. As Ranciere comments: N 58. K. Marx; T.5.V., Part I I I , p. 143; also see J . Ranciere 'The Concept of C r i t i q u e ' and the 'Critique of P o l i t i c a l Economy', Theoretical Practice #2. - 173 " "What determines the co n n e c t i o n between the e f f e c t s (the r e l a t i o n s between the com-modi t i e s ) i s the cause (the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of production) I n s o f a r as i t i s absent. T h i s absent cause i s not labour as a s u b j e c t , i t i s the i d e n t i t y of a b s t r a c t l a b o u r and concret e l a b o u r inasmuch as i t ' s g e n e r a l i -z a t i o n expresses the s t r u c t u r e o f a c e r t a i n mode of p r o d u c t i o n * the c a p i t a l i s t mode of production". 5 9 F o r i n s t a n c e , a l l p r o d u c t s which possess v a l u e , and which are produced f o r other than d i r e c t consumption by the producer , ( i . e., commodities), express a s o c i a l l y a b s t r a c t form of m a t e r i a l i z e d l a b o u r i n d i s t i n c t i o n , from t h e i r contem-poraneous e x i s t e n c e s as us e - v a l u e s . And t h i s i s so because: "A s u p e r f i c i a l o b s e r v a t i o n of t h i s f a c t , namely, t h a t i n the eq u a t i o n of v a l u e , the equivalence f i g u r e s e x c l u s i v e l y as a simple q u a n t i t y o f some a r t i c l e , of some use-value, has m i s l e d B a i l e y , as a l s o many o t h e r s , both b e f o r e and a f t e r him, i n t o seeing, i n the e x p r e s s i o n of v a l u e , merely a q u a n t i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n . The t r u t h b e i n g , t h a t when a com-modity a c t s as e q u i v a l e n t , no q u a n t i t a t i v e , d e t e r m i n a t i o n of i t ' s v a l u e i s expressed". Hence Smith and R i c a r d o ' s search f o r an ' i n v a r i a b l e measure of v a l u e ' I s a f a l s e problem, a f a l s e q u e s t i o n ; f o r j u s t the opposite q u a l i t i e s are r e q u i r e d i n the commodity form. What i s r e q u i r e d i s a common substance, a r e l a t i v e f o r m , 6 1 which 59. R a n c i e r e , The Concept of C r i t i q u e T.P. #2 , P. 3 6 . " 6 0 . K. Marx, C a p i t a l , V o l . I , p. 64-5. (M.E.) 6 1 . Cf., Marx's C a p i t a l , V o l . I , Chapter I, P a r t I , f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n between the r e l a t i v e and e q u i v a l e n t forms. 1 - 1 7 4 -i s the manifest product of the c a p i t a l i s t s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and which expresses the compared object's q u a l i t i e s as a use-v a l u e , as concrete l a b o u r . R i c a r d o i d e n t i f i e s v alue with the concept of an ' i n v a r i a b l e measure of v a l u e ' but  v a r i a b i l i t y i s p r e c i s e l y the c h a r a c t e r r e q u i r e d f o r v a l u e . "The term i n v a r i a b l e " s t a t e s Marx "expresses the f a c t t h a t the imminent measure of v a l u e must not I t s e l f be a commodity, a v a l u e , but r a t h e r something which c o n s t i t u t e s value and 62 which i s t h e r e f o r e a l s o the imminent measure of v a l u e " . I n summary then, the v a l u e of a commodity i s n e i t h e r s o l e l y i t ' s use-value or i t ' s e xchange-value; f o r f i r s t , use-value as a s p e c i f i c i n t e g r a n t , d e s c r i b e s the means of s a t i s f y i n g the needs of thepproducer — but t h i s i s not t o produce a commodity; second, exchange value simply d e s c r i b e s the magnitude of value which i s p r e s c r i b e d by the s o c i a l  space of comparison p e c u l i a r t o the form and needs of com-modity p r o d u c t i o n ( i . e., f o r M-C-M). Thus i n the formal c o n d i t i o n s f o r a commodity's e x i s t e n c e , i t cannot be composed of e i t h e r one or the other type of l a b o u r ; the commodity i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a double e x i s t e n c e , c o n t a i n i n g both concrete and a b s t r a c t l a b o u r which are r e s p e c t i v e l y expressed i n exchangelvalue and v a l u e . Thus both R i c a r d o and Smith f a i l t o "examine the form — the p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 6 2 . K. Marx, T.S.V., P a r t I I I , p. 155 - 175 -l a b o u r t h a t c r e a t e exchange — value or m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n exchange-value — the nature of t h i s l a b o u r " , ^ 3 r a t h e r .... "Right from the s t a r t " Marx c o n t i n u e s , "Ricardo i s o n l y concerned w i t h the magnitude of v a l u e , 1. e., the f a c t t h a t the magnitude of the v a l u e s of the commodities are p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the q u a n t i t i e s of l a b o u r which are r e q u i r e d f o r t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n . R i c a r d o proceeds from here and he e x p r e s s l y names Adam Smith as h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t " H i s method i s as f o l l o w s : He b e g i n s w i t h the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the magnitudes of value of the commodity by labour-time and t h e n examines whether the other economic r e l a t i o n s and c a t e g o r i e s con-t r a d i c t t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of v a l u e or to what extent they modify i t . The h i s t o r i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s method of procedure, i t ' s s c i e n t i f i c n e c e s s i t y i n the h i s t o r y of economics, are e v i d e n t at f i r s t s i g n s , but so i s , at the same time, i t ' s s c i e n t i f i c inadequacy. T h i s inadequacy not only shows i t s e l f i n the method of p r e s e n t a t i o n ( i n a formal sense) but l e a d s t o erroneous r e s u l t s because I t omits some e s s e n t i a l l i n k s and  d i r e c t l y seeks t o prove the c o n g r u i t y of the ^ economic c a t e g o r i e s with one another". (M.E.) Or even more c o n c i s e l y , he w r i t e s i n a l e t t e r t o Dr. K u g e l -mann dated J u l y 11, 1868, t h a t "... s c i e n c e c o n s i s t s p r e c i s e l y i n demon-s t r a t i n g how the law of v a l u e o p e r a t e s . So t h a t i f one wanted at the v e r y b e g i n -n i n g t o " e x p l a i n " a l l the phenomenon which a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t the law, one would have t o present the science b e f o r e the s c i e n c e " and o f t e n "... i t i s p r e c i s e l y R i c a r d o ' s mistake t h a t i n h i s f i r s t chap-t e r on v a l u e he t a k e s as g i v e n a l l pos-63. K. Marx, T.S.V., P a r t I I , p. l64. 64. K. Marx, T.S.V., P a r t I I , pp. 164-5. - 176 -s l b l e c a t e g o r i e s which have s t i l l t o be  developed f o r us, In order t o prove t h e i r  c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the law of value".°0 What Marx i s p o i n t i n g t o here, i s not on l y the absence of concepts and c a t e g o r i e s w i t h i n c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy, but more, t h i s absence, as symbolic of t h e i r complete l a c k of a n o n - e m p i r i c a l and s t r u c t u r e d c o n c e p t u a l schema. T h i s i s t o say, t h a t the reason behind R i c a r d o and Smith's f a l s e p r o b l e m a t i c i s t h e i r inadequate s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , i n t h e i r acceptance of the forms o f appearance (with man as t h e i r subject) as the raw m a t e r i a l f o r t h e i r t h e o r i e s i n a crude and u n c r i t i c a l manner. From t h i s p o i n t onwards, they are i n c a p a b l e of c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g anything but a d i r e c t i d e n t i t y or an u n e q u i v o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between on the one hand the l a b o u r e r , h i s p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y , h i s needs, and on the ot h e r , the e x p r e s s i o n of h i s product as v a l u e i n the market. That i s why, the i n t r o d u c t i o n by Marx of new c a t e g o r i e s of v alue and s u r p l u s - v a l u e s i g n i f i e s the end f o r the des-c r i p t i v e (and a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l ) c a t e g o r i e s of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy, and pronounces a new o b j e c t f o r p o l i t i c a l economy. So much so, t h a t one c o u l d i n f a c t say t h a t the t i t l e of C a p i t a l , as "A C r i t i q u e of P o l i t i c a l Economy" i s m i s l e a d i n g . I t i s m i s l e a d i n g , because i t i s not a c r i t i q u e 65. K. Marx, S e l e c t e d Works. V o l . I I , p. 419. - 177 -of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy alone, i t i s more than a c r i t i c a l o p e r a t i o n , i t p r o j e c t s the o b j e c t of p o l i t i c a l economy onto a new plane, ;>onto a m u l t i - l e v e l complex s t r u c -t u r e , where forms of appearance — the homogeneous plane of c l a s s i c a l economists — are e x p l a i n e d s c i e n t i f i c a l l y by laws which p e n e t r a t e , or b e t t e r , are i n v e r t e d from t h e i r pedes-t r i a n e x p r e s s i o n . S i g n i f i c a n c e of Marx's D i s t i n c t i o n s At f i r s t s i g h t the r e d e f i n i t i o n of the concepts use-v a l u e and exchange-value may appear t o the reader as a simple s emantical r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n which s t i l l o c c u p i e s the p r o b l e m a t i c of Smith and R i c a r d o . What one may be tempted t o c l a s s i f y as merely a ' c l e a r i n g up' of bad terminology. But q u i t e the c o n t r a r y t o t h i s k i n d of a f u n c t i o n , we f i n d t h a t Marx's neologisms symbolize a break with c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economyfin two fundamental ways. The f i r s t of these, as we have a l r e a d y mentioned, was i n Marx's break i n V o l . I w i t h the c l a s s i c a l economist's h a b i t of d e f i n i n g  economic f a c t s exchange-value by t h e i r a b i l i t y t o be quan-t i f i e d o r measured. The second aspect, which i s l i n k e d with the f i r s t , and which I should l i k e t o develop i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l , i s t h e i r p r a c t i c e of c o r r e l a t i n g these 'economic f a c t s ' i n accordance with a common essence of the needs o f man and h i s l a b o u r . L o u i s A l t h u s s e r has c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h i s custom, as one of i d e n t i f y i n g economic f a c t s i n terms of t h e i r u t i l i t y t o MAN, and r e d u c i n g exchange-value to the - 178 -essence of man's p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y . As A l t h u s s e r p u t s i t : " I n the concept of the sphere of needs, economic f a c t s are thought as based i n t h e i r economic essence on human s u b j e c t s who are a prey t o •need*: on the homo oeconomicus, who I s a ( v i s i b l e , observable) g i v e n too. The homogeneous p o s i t i v i s t f i e l d of measurable economic f a c t s depends on a world of s u b j e c t s whose a c t i v i t y as p r o d u c t i v e s u b j e c t s i n the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r has as i t ' s aim and e f f e c t the p r o d u c t i o n of o b j e c t s of consumption, d e s t i n e d t o s a t i s f y these same s u b j e c t s of needs. The s u b j e c t s , as s u b j e c t s of needs, support the a c t i v i t y of the s u b j e c t s as producers of u s e - v a l u e s . The f i e l d of economic phenomena i s thus i n o r i g i n as i n aim, founded on the ensemble o f human s u b j e c t s whose needs d e f i n e them as economic s u b j e c t s . The p e c u l i a r t h e o r e t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e of P o l i t i c a l Economy depends on Immediately  and d i r e c t l y r e l a t i n g t o g e t h e r a homogeneous space  of g i v e n phenomena and i t ' s space on man as the  s u b j e c t s of needs (the g i v e n e s s of the homo  oeconomicus)" Thus these p o l i t i c a l economists reduced the obviousness of the o b j e c t , o f the commodity, down t o the e x p r e s s i o n ofhhuman la b o u r , whereupon t h e i r exchange-value i s t r e a t e d as b e l o n g i n g t o the t h i n g i t s e l f . The n o n - d i s t i n c t i o n between use-value and exchange-value ( o r f o r t h a t matter, va l u e ) d e l i v e r s a set of phenomena, or o b j e c t s , p r e - d e f i n e d by the s u b j e c t , t h a t i s , by the needs of men i n the accumulation of wealth. T h i s whole schema r e - a f f i r m s the p e c u l i a r form of the<>objects — the commodity form — as the a b s o l u t e space, moreover the o n l y space, i n which the i n v e s t i g a t i o n may proceed. I n o t h e r words, they e f f e c t i v e l y l i m i t the a n a l y s i s of the p r i n c i p l e s of 66. L o u i s A l t h u s s e r & Reading C a p i t a l , p. 162. - 179 -p o l i t i c a l economy t o human s u b j e c t s , such t h a t i t i s the 6 7 needs of man " t h a t d e f i n e s the economic i n economics". The o b j e c t of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy hence f u s e s a u n i t y between a c o n c e p t i o n of man, a p h i l o s o p h i c a l anthropology, and the f i x e d forms of wealth. The o b j e c t which c o n d i t i o n s t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n becomes how man, »homo oeconomicus', proceeds t o s a t i s f y h i s needs a n d ^ t h e r e f o r e , how commodities may f u l f i l these needs. We f i n d t h a t i t i s these needs — and t h e i r I d e o l o g i c a l r o l e — which u n d e r l i e s and c o n s o l i d a t e s the t h e o r e t i c a l concepts of c l a s s i c a l p o l i -t i c a l economy. I t i s t h i s u n i t y of the homogeneous f i e l d of i n v e s t i g a t i o n ( q u a n t i t i e s of human labour) and l a t e n t Anthropology (man's needs) which adequately c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e i r r e a l c o n c e p t u a l framework. F o r Marx, on the other hand, the category of use-value was not one r e g u l a t e d by the needs of human nature, but r a t h e r , the needs were ' h i s t o r i c a l * . H i s t o r i c a l i n the sense t h a t they were determined by the form of the s t r u c t u r e of the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s , i . e., by the f o r c e s of p r o d u c t i o n ( l e v e l of p r o d u c t i v i t y , or the p e c u l i a r m a t r i x of the.elements w i t h i n the means of p r o d u c t i o n , e t c . ) and by the r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n ( c l a s s r e l a t i o n s ) . Thus Marx t r a n s f e r s the subject of p o l i t i c a l economy from man, q u a n t i t i e s , e t c . , t o 67. I b i d . , p. 163 - 186 -the s t r u c t u r e of the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s . S c h e m a t i c a l l y , an example of Marx's t r a n s i t i o n , i s p r o v i d e d i n h i s d i v i s i o n of the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s i n t o two Departments where Department one produces the means of p r o -d u c t i o n , and Department two produces the means of p r o d u c t i o n . The f i r s t I s concerned w i t h producing goods f o r the means of p r o d u c t i o n (constant c a p i t a l ) and the second with the goods to he consumed by the l a b o u r e r s of b o t h Departments. W i t h i n t h i s schema, h a l f of consumption i s thus absorbed by the needs of f u r t h e r p r o d u c t i o n , or, i n the r e p r o d u c t l o n ^ o f the means of p r o d u c t i o n by Department one. S i m i l a r l y , the other h a l f , the consumption by the I n d i v i d u a l s or l a b o u r e r s w i t h i n the c a p i t a l i s t mode, i s simply an aspect of r e p r o d u c i n g the c o n t i n u i n g and f u t u r e sources of labour-power. Marx suc-c i n c t l y comments "The i n d i v i d u a l consumption of the l a b o u r e r , ... forms t h e r e f o r e a f a c t o r of the p r o d u c t i o n and r e -p r o d u c t i o n of c a p i t a l ... Even i t ' s i n d i v i d u a l consumption i s , w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s , a mere f a c t o r i n the p r o c e s s o f 68 p r o d u c t i o n " . Hence an o b j e c t ' s use~value i s not d e f i n e d by the needs of MAN, a t h i n g i s u s e f u l i n terms of i t ' s f u n c t i o n i n the l a b o u r p r o c e s s : "We see, t h a t whether a use-value i s to be regarded as raw m a t e r i a l , as instrument of 68. Marx, C a p i t a l , V o l . I , pp. 627-8. - 181 -labour, or as product, t h i s I s determined e n t i r e l y by i t ' s f u n c t i o n i n the l a b o u r p r o c ess, by the p o s i t i o n i t t h e r e o c c u p i e s ; as t h i s v a r i e s , so does i t ' s c h a r a c t e r " A l s o : "Here i n d i v i d u a l s are d e a l t with only i n so f a r as they are the p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n s of economic c a t e g o r i e s , embodiments of p a r -t i c u l a r c l a s s - r e l a t i o n s and c l a s s - i n t e r e s t s . My standpoint .... can l e s s than any other, make the i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b l e f o r r e l a t i o n s whose c r e a t u r e he s o c i a l l y remains, however much he may s u b j e c t i v e l y r a i s e h i m s e l f above them". f ° Man i n the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s , a c t s merely as a support,as , agent, t o t h i s f u n c t i o n . Whereas c l a s s i c a l economists con-t i n u o u s l y p l a c e d l a b o u r , and the d i v i s i o n of l a b o u r , as the o b j e c t of t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n , l a b o u r a c t e d as the sole source of a l l exchange-value. They t h e r e f o r e i d e n t i f i e d a u n i t y w i t h i n t h e i r t h e o r i e s between commodities as use-v a l u e s ( t h e i r a b i l i t y t o s a t i s f y man's needs), and human labour as the producer of u s e - v a l u e s . The v a l u e of a com-modity was subsequently reduced t o the value of l a b o u r . "In the e x p r e s s i o n 'value of l a b o u r ' " , Marx w r i t e s : "the i d e a of value I s not only completely o b l i t e r a t e d , but a c t u a l l y r e v e r s e d . I t i s an e x p r e s s i o n as imaginary as the v a l u e of the e a r t h . These imaginary e x p r e s s i o n s . 69. I b i d . , p. 203. (M.E.) 70. Marx; C a p i t a l , V o l . I l l , quoted by Maurice G o d e l l R a t i o n a l i t y & I r r a t i o n a l i t y i n Economics. N.L.B. - 182 -'arise, however, from the r e l a t i o n s of production themselves. They are categories f o r the phenomenal forms of e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s . That i n t h e i r appearance things often represent themselves i n inverted form i s pretty well known i n every science except p o l i t i c a l economy" "What economists therefore c a l l 'value of labour*, i s i n f a c t the value of labour-power as i t e x i s t s i n the personality of the labourer, which i s as d i f -ferent from i t ' s function, labour, as a machine Is from the work i t performs".' 1 The labourer or homogeneous human labour, as the subject of the analysis, i s replaced f o r Marx, by labour-power or the labourer's capacity f o r s o c i a l l y productive a c t i v i t y . Thus the subject of Marx's examination of the production process becomes labour-power, and again here the labourer acts merely to support t h i s function. Contrary to C l a s s i c a l P o l i t i c a l Economy, Marx also acknowledges that the means of production (nature) plays as s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the production of use-values as that of labour. He propounds that "... labour i s not the only source of material wealth, of use»values produced by labour. As William Petty puts i t . labour i s i t ' s father and the earth 72 i t ' s mother". In considering the production process, the d i s t i n c t i o n s between variable and constant c a p i t a l , and t h e i r production i n Department I and I I , the reproduction of the means of production, (1. e., that of Department I ) , 71. Ibid., pp. 588-9. (M.E.) 72. Ibid., p. 50. - 183 -p l a y s as Important a f u n c t i o n as t h a t of the p r o d u c t i o n of consumer goods. So the m a t e r i a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s which are necessary f o r p r o d u c t i o n i n a l l modes, must be c o n s i d e r e d i n the f o r m a t i o n of value or wealth, 1. e.; "Thus Nature becomes one of the organs of h i s a c t i v i t y , one t h a t he annexes to h i s own b o d i l y organs, adding s t a t u r e t o him-s e l f i n s p i t e of the B i b l e . As the e a r t h i s h i s o r i g i n a l l a r d e r , so too i t i s h i s o r i g i n a l t o o l house. I t s u p p l i e s him, f o r i n s t a n c e with stones f o r throwing, g r i n d i n g , p r e s s i n g , c u t t i n g , e t c . " 7 ^ I n summation then, we may formulate two p o i n t s : F i r s t , the p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s and the r e p r o d u c t i o n of i t ' s elements, determines the k i n d s of p r o d u c t s which s h a l l be produced. The o b j e c t of p o l i t i c a l economy becomes the s t r u c t u r e r a t h e r than Man's needs, or homogeneous human lab o u r , i n determining the form of p r o d u c t i o n . Secondly, wealth i s no l o n g e r the product of human lab o u r alone, the l a b o u r p r o c e s s (as a common element t o every mode) i s composed of both the m a t e r i a l and t e c h n i c a l means of p r o d u c t i o n i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the p r o p o s i t i o n s of c l a s s i c a l economists e s p e c i a l l y t h a t of Smith. Marx c o n s i d e r s the wealth s u p p l i e d by nature i t s e l f , and i t ' s r o l e as i n s t r u -ments of p r o d u c t i o n i n the l a b o u r p r o c e s s . The d e t e r m i n a t i o n 73. I b i d . , p. 199. Cf. Marx, A C o n t r i b u t i o n t o the C r i t i q u e of P o l i t i c a l Economy, pp. 35^T". - 184 -of the labour process by these material conditions i s at once also a denial of the humanist idealism that labour i s the creature of a l l wealth. Smith f o r example, excluded any recognition of a need f o r reproducing the means of production (and thus of a theory of reproduction, Cf. Vol. I I , C a p i t a l ) . In the same way that i t "made i t possible f o r Marx, i n the 1844 Manuscripts, to c a l l Smith the 'Luther of P o l i t i c a l Economy' because he reduced a l l wealth ( a l l use-value) to human labour alone; and to sealeone t h e o r e t i c a l union of 74 Smith and Hegel". Hence MAN or human r e l a t i o n s , the form of a 'philo-sophical anthropology', i s eradicated from i t ' s p o s i t i o n as the beginning (the source) and the end (the consumption) of economic analysis. Before concluding with what eff e c t these d i s t i n c t i o n s have upon the object of volume one; and t h e i r ramifications on the 'transformation problem', I should l i k e to provide a summary of the main points which have been sketched i n t h i s chapter. 74. Althusser, R. C . p. 171. Incldently t h i s i s the sense i n which Joan Robinson interprets Marx's notion of the labour theory of value; Cf. An Essay on Marxian Economics. London, 1947, p. 13. - 185 -Summary F i r s t , Marx, Instead of r e f e r r i n g t o the immediate o b j e c t s themselves as the economic f a c t s , c o n s t r u c t s i n the orde r of h i s d i s c o u r s e i n C a p i t a l , the concept of the o b j e c t . He t h e r e f o r e r e j e c t s both the homogeneous f i e l d and the p h i l o s o p h i c a l Anthropology which predominated c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy. He r e p l a c e s t h i s vacuum — where v i s i b l e economic f a c t s are d e f i n e d by the subject homo oeconomicus — w i t h a complex m u l t i - l e v e l s t r u c t u r e as the o b j e c t of p o l i t i c a l economy. Secondly, as p a r t of t h i s new complex space of i n v e s -t i g a t i o n , he no longer c o n f i n e s h i m s e l f t o measurable and comparable e n t i t i e s . A l l ' o b j e c t s ' are no l o n g e r measurable, f o r as A l t h u s s e r emphasizes "Mathematical f o r m a l i z a t i o n must 75 be subordinate t o c o n c e p t u a l f o r m a l i z a t i o n " . A c c o r d i n g l y , volume one i s not a d i s c u s s i o n of the q u a n t i t a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of the phenomena exchange-value, but, of v a l u e , independent 76 of i t ' s phenomenal form. 75« A l t h u s s e r , R. C., p. 1 8 3 . 7 6 . P a u l Sweezy, i n Theory of C a p i t a l i s t Development, e x p l i c i t l y b e l i e v e s t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o s k i p the ' n o t i o n v a l u e ' and d e a l d i r e c t l y with the value 'form' i n quan-t i t a t i v e terms. Although acknowledging, i t i s p r e f e r a b l e t o f i r s t i n t r o d u c e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s i n the understanding of ' p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n ' , r e f e r pp. 128 - 1 3 0 . We d i s c u s s t h i s i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n our next c h a p t e r . - 186 -"We never leave a b s t r a c t i o n on the way from volume one t o volume t h r e e , i . e., we never leave knowledge, the 'product o f t h i n k i n g and c o n c e i v i n g ' we never le a v e the concepts". CHAPTER V I s the T r a n s f o r m a t i o n Problem I r r e l e v a n t ? The q u e s t i o n t h a t remains, and which l o g i c a l l y f o l l o w s from our p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o ^ i s how may we now p e r c e i v e the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of the t h r e e volumes of C a p i t a l ? Does, on the one hand, volume one remain i n a vacuum separated i n a sense from the a n a l y s i s of c a p i t a l i s m , or, on the other, does i t provide some new q u a n t i t a t i v e mechanism f o r c a l -c u l a t i n g exchange-value? To answer these q u e s t i o n s I t h i n k we have t o r e f l e c t momentarily upon the r e a d i n g s of C a p i t a l which were e l a b o r a t e d upon i n chapter t h r e e . You remember, f o r example, our d i s c u s s i o n of E n g e l s ' h i s t o r i c i s t t h e s i s which d i f -f e r e n t i a t e d between the f i r s t two volumes and volume th r e e by t h e i r r e l a t i v e h i s t o r i c a l determinacy. Volume one i n t h i s i n s t a n c e p o r t r a y s a simple commodity producing economy 1 . It. A l t h u s s e r , R. c . . p. 19 - 187 -which precedes h i s t o r i c a l l y and l o g i c a l l y t h a t of c a p i t a l i s m ; whereas,,volume t h r e e remains as the i n c i s i v e t e x t w i t h which t o understand c a p i t a l i s m . Meanwhile the q u a n t i t a t i v e a r g u -ment (Meek and Maurice Dobb i n p a r t i c u l a r ) attempted t o sys-t e m a t i c a l l y d e l i n e a t e the p r o b l e m a t i c of Marx t o t h a t of R i c a r d o . Here the o b j e c t of C a p i t a l a g a i n appears as the i n v a r i a b l e measure of v a l u e . I n both cases i t appears r a t h e r c l e a r t h a t Marx's t r a n s i t i o n from volume one t o volume three i s somewhat un-warranted, and at the v e r y l e a s t an o v e r l y cumbersome approach tot-the problem at hand. Many of these problems may be a t t r i b u t e d t o the f a c t t h a t i n Marx's break with the c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economists, he l a c k e d a c o n c e p t u a l l a n -guage t o express h i s break i n p h i l o s o p h y . C a p i t a l becomes c o n f u s i n g because Marx was f o r c e d t o a l l u d e t o t h i s break wi t h the p h i l o s o p h i c a l concepts of h i s time. Because of t h i s , the " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n problem" has gained a c e r t a i n degree of l e g i t i m a c y f o r M a r x i s t s c h o l a r s , and c e r t a i n l y has p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the debate over the l o g i c a l d i s c o u r s e of C a p i t a l . However, I do not b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s n e c e s s a r i l y needs t o be the case. Simply, on an i n t u i t i v e l e v e l , one should beware c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t Marx, i n what E n g e l s r e f e r r e d t o as h i s magnus opus, would n a i v e l y attempt t o r e i t e r a t e — w i t h i n the i d e n t i c a l p e r i m e t e r s — a problem which had p r e -v i o u s l y been demonstrated as unworkable by both Smith and R i c a r d o . T h i s would c e r t a i n l y not f o l l o w i n terms of Marx's - 188 -e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s , and i t c e r t a i n l y does not f o l l o w f o r the t h e o r e t i c a l o r d e r of C a p i t a l * Of course, the second a l t e r n a t i v e would be to con-s i d e r , as some have, t h a t Marx's C a p i t a l developed and extended c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy by the a d d i t i o n , or b e t t e r by the s y n t h e s i s , of the H e g e l i a n d i a l e c t i c . The d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of h i s l a b o u r theory of v a l u e s thus b e i n g i n i t ' s h i s t o r i c a l frame of r e f e r e n c e . Again, i t appears t o me t h a t t h i s i s f a r from the r e a l nature of Marx's c o n t r i b u t i o n . I t h i n k i f one c a r e f u l l y examines the d i s c o u r s e of C a p i t a l i t becomes c l e a r t h a t Marx c o n t i n u e s h i s d i s c u s s i o n of both v a l u e and p r i c e s of produc-t i o n not as an essence/phenomena r e l a t i o n s h i p , but as concepts l o c a t e d on equal l e v e l s of a b s t r a c t i o n . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e you w i l l f i n d t h a t Marx's p r o b l e m a t i c , f a r from i n c o n s i s t e n t , f o l l o w s a h i g h l y coherent and ordered development. Moreover, i t I s through t h i s method of a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t we d i s c o v e r Marx's s c i e n t i f i c c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the understanding of the h i s t o r y of s o c i e t y . I n essence, d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , or even perhaps the n o t i o n of f e t i s h i s m , c a p t u r e s the admonition t h a t "the f i r s t r u l e of advocacy i s t h a t n o t h i n g must be taken as s e l f - e v i d e n t " ; i n other words, i n Marx's own words, " t h a t i n t h e i r appearance t h i n g s o f t e n r e p r e s e n t themselves i n i n v e r t e d form i s p r e t t y w e l l known i n every sc i e n c e 2 except p o l i t i c a l economy". But t h i s i s not an ad hoc 2. Marx quoted by R a n c i e r e , T h e o r e t i c a l P r a c t i c e #111, p. 32. - 189 -i n v e r s i o n done as a mechanical p r i n c i p l e of n e g a t i o n , but an i n v e r s i o n r e l a t e d t o a g e n e r a l but r a d i c a l model — 1. e., t h a t o f a n o n - e m p i r i c i s t c o n c e p t u a l model. Thomas S. Kuhn has a p t l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d the o p p o s i t e of such a p r o c e s s with r e g a r d s to the Copernican r e v o l u t i o n , suggesting t h a t the " i d e a t h a t the e a r t h moves seems i n i t i a l l y e q u a l l y absurd. Our senses t e l l us a l l we know of motion, and they i n d i c a t e no motion f o r the e a r t h . U n t i l i t i s r e -educated, common sense t e l l s us t h a t , i f the e a r t h i s i n motion, t h e n the a i r , c l o u d s , b i r d s , and other o b j e c t s , n o t a t t a c h e d to the e a r t h must be l e f t behind .... s i n c e none of these e f f e c t s a r e t seen, the e a r t h i s at r e s t . O b s e r v a t i o n and reason have combined t o prove I t " . - * Marx, l i k e C opernicus, approached the s o c i a l phenomenon v i a the p r o b l e m a t i c of p o l i t i c a l economy i n a new manner. He w r i t e s : " I t i s not our i n t e n t i o n t o c o n s i d e r , here, the way i n which the laws, Imminent i n c a p i t a l i s t p r o d u c t i o n , manifest themselves In the movements of i n d i v i d u a l masses of c a p i t a l , where they a s s e r t themselves as c o e r c i v e laws of c o m p e t i t i o n , and are brought home t o the mind and c o n s c i o u s n e s s of the i n d i v i d u a l c a p i t a l i s t as the d i r e c t i n g motives of h i s o p e r a t i o n s . But t h i s much i s c l e a r , a s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s of c o m p e t i t i o n i s not p o s s i b l e , b e f o r e we have a c o n c e p t i o n of the i n n e r nature of c a p i t a l , j u s t as the apparent motions of the h e a v e n l y r b b d l e s - a r e not i n t e l l i g i b l e t o any but him, who i s acquainted with t h e i r r e a l motions, motions which are not d i r e c t l y p e r c e p t i b l e by the senses".^ 3. T. S. Kuhn, The Copernican R e v o l u t i o n . Harvard, 1966, p. 4-3. — . 4-. K. Marx, C a p i t a l , V o l . I , p. 34-7. - 190 -I n other words, here Marx makes i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t h i s o p e r a t i o n of a b s t r a c t i o n I s one which transcends the symptomatic s t r u c t u r e of sensuous o b j e c t s . L i k e w i s e , i n s t e a d of f e t i s h i s m b e i n g regarded s o l e l y as a s u b j e c t i v e aspect of commodity p r o d u c t i o n ( a l i e n a t i o n from i t ' s i n n e r essence) we f i n d t h a t i t becomes a g e n e r a l means of p e r c e i v i n g every c o n d i t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n of a c l a s s n a t u r e / T h i s i s to say, t h a t the p r o c e s s of d e - f e t i s h i z i n g r e p r e s e n t s the s c i e n t i f i c o p e r a t i o n by which we may examine h i s t o r y . Let us study t h i s p a r t i c u l a r aspect more c l o s e l y . The Law of Value and E q u i v a l e n t Exchange We saw-for example t h a t the exchange between the c a p i t a l i s t and the worker appears at f i r s t s i g h t t o be an equal exchange. How c o u l d i t be otherwise; d i d not A r i s t o t l e t e l l us t h a t exchange i s based on f a i r and equal r e c i p r o c i t y ? The t o t a l exchange va l u e produced by the l a b o u r e r appears to be equal t o h i s p o r t i o n of exchange-value d i s t r i b u t e d i n wages. As Marx noted: "Every c o n d i t i o n of the p r o d u c t i o n i s s a t i s f i e d , while the laws t h a t r e g u l a t e the exchange of commodities, have been i n no way v i o l a t e d . E q u i v a l e n t s have been exchanged f o r e q u i v a l e n t s . F o r the c a p i t a l i s t as buyer p a i d f o r each com-modity, f o r the c o t t o n , the s p i n d l e and the labour-power, it'?s f u l l v a lue ( p r o -p o r t i o n of t o t a l s o c i a l l a b o u r necessary f o r i t ' s r e p r o d u c t i o n ) . He then d i d what - 191 -I s done by every purchaser of-commodities, he consumed t h e i r u s e - v a l u e " • 5 J u s t as the exchange p r o c e s s appears t o take p l a c e by the e q u i v a l e n t exchange of goods, so these same laws seem t o r e g u l a t e the exchange between worker and c a p i t a l i s t . We know howeverjthat t h i s i s not the case. The worker f o r Marx has nothing but h i s labour t o exchange, and he exchanges i t f o r a v a l u e which "appears" e q u i v a l e n t t o the v a l u e of the goods produced, but which i n essence i s equal t o the value of the goods necessary f o r h i s own r e p r o d u c t i o n . Thus we f i n d , t h a t what r e g u l a t e s the exchange between c a p i t a l i s t and worker i s not t h a t of the " i d e o l o g y of e q u i v a l e n t exchange" ( s t r u c t u r a l m y s t i f i c a t i o n ) but r a t h e r t h a t i t i s the e f f e c t of the p e c u l i a r space i n which l a b o u r , as a commodity, i s set f r e e from the means of p r o d u c t i o n . Hence the development of the concrete forms w i t h i n c a p i t a l i s m stem from the unequal u n i t y of the p r o d u c t i o n and c i r c u l a t i o n p r o c e s s such t h a t l a b o u r power^s use-value becomes unequal t o i t ' s exchange-v a l u e , 1. e., a r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s concealed such t h a t "the wage form thus e x t i n g u i s h e s every t r a c e o f the d i v i s i o n of the working day i n t o necessary l a b o u r and s u r p l u s l a b o u r i h t o p a i d and unpaid l a b o u r " . 6 5. I b i d . , p. 217. 6. I b i d . , p. 591. - 1 9 2 -Consequently, wages are not p a i d i n accordance with the p r i n c i p l e s of e q u a l exchange; r a t h e r labour-power's use-v a l u e i s f o r c e d by the means of the s t r u c t u r e of ( r e - ) p r o d u c t i o n t o produce more than i t ' s e q u i v a l e n c e i n wages. We can surmise then, t h a t i n r a d i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n from the c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economists, Marx d e f i n e s the economic s t r u c t u r e s as e f f e c t s of those c l a s s r e l a t i o n s which mediate the d i s t r i b u t i o n of goods and t h e i r v a l u e . As the s t r u c t u r -a l i s t s were t o say with r e g a r d s t o Marx's r e l a t i o n s h i p with the p r o b l e m a t i c of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy, "Marx's a n a l y t i c a l e f f o r t took the form p r e c i s e l y of a c r i t i q u e of t h i s i l l u s o r y f o u n d a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l economy and r e s u l t e d  In the replacement by another, which puts the s c i e n c e of economic r e l a t i o n s on a d i f f e r e n t b a s i s . T h i s i s what i s 7 meant by Marx's break with p o l i t i c a l economy". F o r example, j u s t as R i c a r d o b e l i e v e d a good possessed an "exchange-value-ln-itse«lf" , as i f the c a l c u l a t i o n of a good's v a l u e emanated s t r i c t l y i n accordance with i t ' s magnitude of embodied human la b o u r , so d i d he accept t h a t c a p i t a l , as a p h y s i c a l e n t i t y ( i n h i s terminology durable c a p i t a l ) , produced an average r a t e of p r o f i t . The p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n f o r him are thus formulated by c a l c u l a t i n g the average r a t e of p r o f i t on the average c o s t of p r o d u c t i o n . 7. A g h i r i Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange, quoted from C h a r l e s B e t t l e h i e m ' s appendix, p. 312, My Emphasis. - 193 -But t h i s i n I t s e l f c o n c e a l s a much more important f a c t , namely th a t the t o t a l average r a t e of p r o f i t , f a r from a p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r of c a p i t a l , speaks of the t o t a l s u r p l u s v a l u e a p p r o p r i a t e d by the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s . The s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of s u r p l u s value are l o s t i n the form of p r o f i t ; Marx's object i s t o r e l o c a t e the movement of the forms (concepts) which i n p r o c e s s o f t h e o r e t i c a l p r o d u c t i o n of c a p i t a l i s m are not apparent. Thus we d i s c o v e r that the category of p r o f i t d e t e r -mines the d i s t r i b u t i o n of s u r p l u s - v a l u e but not i t ' s p r o -d u c t i o n . P r o f i t expresses the d i s t r i b u t i o n of s u r p l u s - v a l u e , and the order of t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n appears to be c o n s t i t u t i v e of the e x i s t e n c e of s u r p l u s - v a l u e . The r e a l r e l a t i o n s on the other hand are t h a t p r o f i t as a category depends upon the p r o d u c t i o n of s u r p l u s value v i a the l a b o u r p r o c e s s . Sub-sequently, i n s t e a d o f v a l i d a t i n g the law of v a l u e t o the phenomenal forms, Marx shows why they must n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t r a -d i c t i t , and yet how they are determined by i t . The c o n c l u s i o n which the c l a s s i c a l economists were f o r c e d t o c o n s i d e r , were e i t h e r to d i s r e g a r d the p e r c e i v e d phenomena which c o n t r a d i c t e d the law of v a l u e , or t o drop the law i t s e l f , i . e., l i k e t h a t of "Adam Smith who, having sent the law of v a l u e packing to pre-adomatic times, d e t e r m i n i n g the value of the commodities by the theory of the three 8. (top of page 187). k. Marx, C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o the C r i t i q u e of P. E. of 1869. p. 59. "~ - 194 -4 8 sources (wages, p r o f i t and r e n t ) " . Or again, t o f o l l o w the course of R i c a r d o , and m a i n t a i n the law, s a c r i f i c i n g i t t o such c o n t r a d i c t i o n s as the average r a t e of p r o f i t . Rather than b e g i n n i n g , as he does, with the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of l a b o u r i n i t ' s q u a n t i t a t i v e term as the determiner of exchange-v a l u e , and t h e r e a f t e r s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y checking to see i f t h i s c o n t r a d i c t e d the apparent economic phenomenon and modifying h i s theory a c c o r d i n g l y , he should have begun, l i k e Marx, with  the simplest form, 1. e., with the n o t i o n of a commodity. In other words, what I have attempted t o argue i s t h a t i t was the a n a l y s i s of the commodity, as an i s o l a t e d a b s t r a c t i o n , which allowed Marx t o r e c o n s t r u c t the concrete p r o c e s s con-c e p t u a l l y . What R i c a r d o and Smith f a i l e d t o q u e s t i o n i s the form, the concepts, separated from t h e i r " e m p i r i c a l obvious-ness". T h e i r a n a l y s i s as a consequence i s p o r t r a y e d by Marx as a comparative a n a l y s i s of homogeneous forms. Marx sums up h i s a p p r a i s a l of R i c a r d o , and i n a sense the whole of 9 c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy, i n t h i s f o l l o w i n g quote: " R i c a r d o .... c o n s c i o u s l y a b s t r a c t s from the form of c o m p e t i t i o n , from the appearance of c o m p e t i t i o n , i n order t o comprehend the laws as such. On the one hand he must be reproached f o r not going f a r enough, f o r not c a r r y i n g h i s a b s t r a c -t i o n t o completion, f o r i n s t a n c e , when he a n a l y s e s the value of the commodity, he at once a l l o w s h i m s e l f to be i n f l u e n c e d 9. Marx's comments on t h e i r f a i l u r e a l s o i n T.S.V., Part I I , p. 172 or p. 191, Moscow, 1968. - 195 -by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of a l l k i n d s of concrete c o n d i t i o n s . On the o t h e r hand one must reproach him f o r r e g a r d i n g the phenomenal form as immediate and d i r e c t p roof as ex-p o s i t i o n of the g e n e r a l laws, and f o r f a i l i n g t o i n t e r p r e t i t . I n r e g a r d t o the f i r s t , h i s a b s t r a c t i o n i s too incomplete; In r e g a r d t o the second, i t I s a f o r m a l -a b s t r a c t i o n which i n i t s e l f i s wrong", 1 0 A c c o r d i n g l y , we may say t h a t i n d i s t i n c t i o n from R i c a r d o , the whole of Marx's d i s c o u r s e i n C a p i t a l i s of an extremely a b s t r a c t n a t u r e . A b s t r a c t i n order t o l o g i c a l l y " i n t e r p r e t " the phenomenal form at the c o n c e p t u a l l e v e l . Marx's n o t i o n of m a t e r i a l i s m t h e r e f o r e never reaches the "concrete" r e a l i t y of empiricism, f o r t h i s l i n k was c o n c e p t u a l l y im-p o s s i b l e . The o b j e c t of C a p i t a l was r a t h e r t o demystify the n o t i o n s which were p r e v a l e n t , ( i . e., those which were p r o -pounded by the c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economists) and p r e s e n t the r e a l form of c a p i t a l i s m . I n t h i s r e s p e c t Marx demon-s t r a t e s t h a t the form of p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n , p r o f i t s , e t c . , are no more than e x p r e s s i o n s , or b e t t e r , a t h e o r e t i c a l mode of r e p r e s e n t i n g a set of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and means of p r o -11 d u e t i o n . I n so doing,he formed a s c i e n t i f i c c o n s t r u c t which was arranged independent of a l l h i s t o r i c a l e x i g e n c i e s , and 1 0 . I b i d . , p. 1 0 6 . 11 . Marx's method c o u l d be used as w e l l t o e x p l a i n the f e t i s h i z e d s o c i a l forms w i t h i n Fuedalism. I n o t h e r words, i n e x p l a i n i n g the c r u c i a l r o l e which r e l i g i o u s i d e o l o g y p l a y e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g the c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . - 196 " which, because of t h i s , allowed f o r the f i r s t time the c a t e g o r i z a t i o n of h i s t o r y i n an a n a l y t i c a l manner extraneous t o those e a r l i e r d e s c r i p t i v e accounts which had simply mimicked h i s t o r y ' s auto-development. Thus the concept of value o u t l i n e d i n volume one undermines i n more g e n e r a l terms the concept of exchange-va l u e p i c t u r e d as a r e f l e c t i o n of i n h e r e n t p h y s i c a l a t t r i -b u t es of the commodity. (1. e., from those accounts where each commodity's value was equal t o i t ' s u s e - v a l u e ) . We are l e f t then with a means of c o n c e i v i n g the r a t e of p r o f i t as a symptomatic response t o c a u s a l l i n k s at the c o n c e p t u a l l e v e l . Today, f o r example, i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the above, we f i n d t h a t t y p i c a l l y i n econometric models the p r o b l e m a t i c i s t r a n s f e r r e d to i s o l a t i n g the "moment of exchange" r a t h e r than s i t u a t i n g i t w i t h i n the f i e l d of p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s and p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s , f a i l i n g t h e r e f o r e t o i n t e g r a t e i t s e l f i n t o the world system of s t r u c t u r e s . And y e t , i f t h e r e i s a withdrawal from the a n a l y s i s of s t r u c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o a t h e o r e t i c a l model which i n s t e a d m i r r o r s the immediate appearances ( i . e., flow of money, e t c . ) , thenjyou l o s e the i n s i g h t s n e c e s s a r i l y gained through a b s t r a c t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , any attempt to reform Marx's C a p i t a l i n t o a s c i e n c e of immediacy ( i n an e m p i r i c i s t sense) m u t i l a t e s and t r a nsforms Marx's concepts i n t o an a l i e n p r o b l e m a t i c . - 1 9 7 -How do the S t r u c t u r a l i s t s S i t u a t e the T r a n s f o r m a t i o n Problem? In essence t h i s r e t u r n s us back to our opening ques-t i o n . C l e a r l y i n the s t r u c t u r a l i s t r e a d i n g of C a p i t a l we may say that there can be no c o n t r a s t between v a l u e and p r i c e of p r o d u c t i o n . F o r them there are not two separate t h e o r i e s ; i n other words, the law of value as i t i s expounded i n volume one does not apply t o a simple commodity produc i n g s o c i e t y separate from t h a t of the c a p i t a l i s t mode. Whereas we have seen t h a t i n the h i s t o r i c i s t and q u a n t i t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the l a b o u r theory of v a l u e , volume one i s r e p r e s e n t e d as an economy where onl y labour a c t s as the source of v a l u e , and as such, w i t h i n t h i s economy, the d i s t r i b u t i o n and magnitude of value i s determined by q u a n t i t i e s of l a b o u r . S i m i l a r l y , t h e y 1 2 r e p r e s e n t c a p i t a l i s m as a s o c i e t y where two f a c t o r s , l a b o u r and the means of p r o d u c t i o n , p l a y an i n s t r u m e n t a l r o l e i n p roducing v a l u e . Volume one i s thus c o n t r a s t e d with volume t h r e e i n terms of the number of v a r i a b l e s under con-s i d e r a t i o n . The s t r u c t u r a l i s t s argue i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h i s , t h a t both f a c t o r s are common to each and every mode — Marx h i m s e l f had argued t h i s same p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t Smith ( C f . C a p i t a l , V o l . I I "Former P r e s e n t a t i o n s of the S u b j e c t " ) . To be sure then 7Marx must not be looked upon as d e v e l o p i n g two 12. T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e of A g h i r i Emmanuel who has developed an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of C a p i t a l and the t r a n s -f o r m a t i o n problem based on the 'one v e r s u s two v a r i a b l e ' theory. C f . pp. 402-26, Unequal Exchange. - 198 -" h i s t o r i c a l " c o n d i t i o n s * but r a t h e r * t h a t i n the d i s c u s s i o n s of volume one a frame of r e f e r e n c e i s c o n s t r u c t e d which cap-t u r e s the common elements of every mode; t h a t i s t o say, he c o n s t r u c t s a concept of 'mode of p r o d u c t i o n ' . Once t h i s n o t i o n of the 'mode of production* i s e s t a b l i s h e d , i t merely becomes a pro c e s s of e x t e n s i o n , t h a t p r i c e s of p r o d u c t i o n developed i n volume t h r e e , are a r t i c u l a t e d as the e f f e c t of  the determined d i s t r l b u t i o n c o f s o c i a l l y necessary l a b o u r time  between the d i f f e r e n t branches o f p r o d u c t i o n . Marx's n o t i o n of the l a b o u r theory of v a l u e , h i s law of v a l u e , i s thus more than a signpost t o exchange-value, I t i s a way of under-standing h i s t o r y , i t I s proof of the statement — f o r the most p a r t c o n j e c t u r e d i n the Communist M a n i f e s t o — t h a t "the h i s -t o r y of a l l h i t h e r t o e x i s t i n g s o c i e t y i s the h i s t o r y of c l a s s s t r u g g l e " (p. 9. Appleton-century, 1955)• The e x e r c i s e of reducing the value of v a r i o u s p r o -d u c t s t o t h a t of embodied l a b o u r r a t i o s — l i k e R i c a r d o , Meek, et a l — i s hence a t once r e a l i z e d t o be a f a l s e and f e t i s h i z e d problem. Meek, by u s i n g the l o g i c of Sraffa,may p r o v i d e the s o l u t i o n t o the " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " , but by so doing, he revokes the very framework which Marx had developed. L i k e those b e f o r e Marx, t h e i r frame of r e f e r e n c e a g a i n d e n i e s s c i e n c e a s b e i n g anything but the e x p r e s s i o n of e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y i n immediate terms. And again, as A l t h u s s e r comments, f o r them ... "Marx's o b j e c t (becomes) no more than R i c a r d o ' s o b j e c t . The h i s t o r y of p o l i t i c a l economy from R i c a r d o t o Marx - 199 -thus becomes a b e a u t i f u l •-unbroken con-t i n u i t y , which i s no l o n g e r a problem. I f there i s a misunderstanding, i t i s elsewhere, i n R i c a r d o and i n Marx — no l o n g e r between R i c a r d o and Marx, but between the whole of the c l a s s i c a l economics of l a b o u r - v a l u e , which Marx merely b r i l l i a n t l y touched up And i n f a c t , when we read c e r t a i n of Gramsci's commentaries ( M a r x i s t p h i l o -sophy i s R i c a r d o g e n e r a l i z e d 1 3 ) , Rosen-t h a l ' s t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s or even the much more c r i t i c a l remarks of D e l i a Volpe and h i s d i s c i p l e s , we are s t r u c k by the f a c t t h a t we never f o r s a k e t h i s c o n t i n u i t y o f t i o b j e c t . These authors see no e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between Smith's and R i c a r d o 1 s o b j e c t and Marx's o b j e c t " . 1 4 I n C o n c l u s i o n ; S t r u c t u r a l i s m and the Symptomatic Reading The uniqueness of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t r e a d i n g can t h u s be d e l i n e a t e d down t o the f a c t t h a t i n t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n , Marx r e v o l u t i o n i z e d the n o t i o n s of economics and h i s t o r y , because e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y he r e c o g n i z e d t h a t i t was necessary t o f i r s t detour, t o r e c o n s t r u c t , and a r t i c u l a t e the concept of  the o b j e c t t o be examined; t h i s must be done bef o r e t h a t o b j e c t may become t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e t o understand. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n opposes the orthodox d i s t i n c t i o n developed i n c h apter one, where Marx's method was one of d e - f e t i s h i z i n g 13. L. A l t h u s s e r , R. C.. pp. 85-6. 14. As Antonio Gramsci wrote i n the P r i s o n Notebooks. "One c o u l d say i n a sense, I t h i n k , t h a t the p h i l o s o p h y of p r a x i s equals Hegel p l u s David R i c a r d o " , p. 400, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s . Indeed, Gramsci was a p e r s o n a l f r i e n d o f P ieno S r a f f a . - 200 -the phenomenal surface with a t r u e r v i s i o n ( i . e. t "the p r o -l e t a r i a n p e r s p e c t i v e " ) t o uncover the more r e a l and concrete r e l a t i o n s h i p s of i t ' s essence. That I s to say, t h a t H e g e l i a n  s t r u c t u r a l d i s t i n c t i o n , which opposes l e v e l s of the r e a l  o b j e c t i t s e l f ( 1. e., the i n n e r essence with the out e r s u r f a c e , the e s s e n t i a l from the e s s e n t i a l ) as i f t h e r e e x i s t e d a one-15 to-one i d e n t i t y between the o b j e c t of knowledge and knowledge. The s t r u c t u r a l i s t s , on the c o n t r a r y , revoke the schema of posing the i n t e r i o r i t y (the essence of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ) t o t h a t of i t ' s s u r f a c e (economic Ideology) — i n s t e a d they view t h i s i n t e r i o r i t y as n o t h i n g but the concept. I n oth e r words, the i n t e r i o r i t y i s not p a r t of the r e a l o b j e c t but the know-ledge of i t . Hence there i s no s p l i t - l e v e l r e a l i t y w i t h an i n s i d e and o u t s i d e , i n s t e a d the I n s i d e and o u t s i d e are p r o -g r e s s i v e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of r e a l i t y . Thus i n c o n t r a -d i c t i o n t o .... " a l l those arguments .... which p r e s e n t the development of the concepts as the t r a n s i t i o n from the a b s t r a c t t o the c o n c r e t e , a t r a n s i t i o n understood as  the t r a n s i t i o n from the e s s e n t i a l , i n  p r i n c i p l e a b s t r a c t I n t e r i o r i t y t o the  c o n c r e t e , v i s i b l e and p a l p a b l e o u t e r " d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , a t r a n s i t i o n summed up i n the t r a n s i t i o n from volume one t o volume t h r e e . A l l these ambiguous arguments depend once a g a i n on the con-f u s i o n between the thought-concrete, which Marx completely i s o l a t e d from the r e a l - c o n c r e t e i n the Introduc11on 1 0, and 15. A good example of t h i s i s P a u l M a t t i c k ' s a r t i c l e "The T r a n s f o r m a t i o n of Marxism i n t o B o u r g e o i s Economics", Science & S o c i e t y , F a l l , 1972. 16. The I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the C o n t r i b u t i o n of the C r i t i q u e of P. E. - 201 -t h i s same real-concrete -- whereas i n r e a l i t y , the concrete of volume three, i . e,, the knowledge of ground, p r o f i t and i n t e r e s t , i s , l i k e a l l knowledge, not the empirical concrete but the con-cept, and therefore s t i l l always an abstraction" , 1 7 The t r a n s i t i o n from volume one to volume three (the "transformation"), therefore becomes the passing "within the abstraction of knowledge from the concept of the structure (mode of production) and of i t ' s most general e f f e c t s , to the concepts of the structure's p a r t i c u l a r effects". 1"^ The transformation problem i s thus no longer the tr a n s f e r of theory to concrete r e a l i t y ; i t remains therefore not as the A c h i l l e s heel of C a p i t a l , but as a t h e o r e t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n from the general to the s p e c i f i c . The value of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t reading therefore l i e s i n the fact that i t locates the r e a l t h e o r e t i c a l space of Marx's argument; just as Marx had himself relocated the space of c l a s s i c a l p o l i t i c a l economy. They take Marx's texts i n Capital back to the conceptual l e v e l , outside of the absoluteness of empirical history, and here they capture the r e a l problematic' of Ca p i t a l — breaking from the fetishisms of i t ' s empiricist reading. 17. Althusser, R. C , p. 189. 18. Ib i d . , p. 190. - 202 -O n e c o u l d w e l l c o n c l u d e t h a t , j u s t a s M a r x ' s s c i e n c e a p p e a l s t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h i s t o r y , s o i n a s e n s e d o e s i t a p p e a l t o a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h i s o w n w r i t i n g s . - 2 0 3 -BIBLIOGRAPHY A l t h u s s e r , L o u i s ; F o r Marx, Vintage Books, 1970. 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