Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Acción Democrática : the evolution of a democratic revolutionary party in Venezuela Bejar, Flaury 1975

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1975_A8 B43.pdf [ 8.31MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0093401.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0093401-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0093401-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0093401-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0093401-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0093401-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0093401-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0093401-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0093401.ris

Full Text

s ACCTCN: DEMO CRATICA: THE EVOLUTION' OF A DEMOCRATIC REVOEUTTO.NARY PARTY IN VENEZUELA by FLAURY BE JAR B.A., University of British Columbia, 1969 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS ln the Department of HISPANIC AND ITALIAN STUDIES We accept this thesis as conforming to the require^ standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH: COLUMBIA September, 1975 In presenting t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s re p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. Department of Jju^^ur^. 7 The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date fOcLfT' 6 1 W5~ 1 ABSTRACT The Accion Democratlca party of Venezuela was o f f i c i a l l y established on September 13, 19^1. Its founders, led by Romulo Betancourt, begarr their p o l i t i c a l careers as members of the radi-cal student "Generation of '28rt during the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Go'mez. Accio'h Democrat!ca (AD) was conceived as a democratic revo-lutionary party dedicated to 1) the establishment of a constitu-tional government; 2) the eradication of the semi-feudal system of landowner ship; and 3) the development of a self-sufficient diversified economy, independent of foreign exploitation of Vene-zuelan resources. Many AD militants envisioned a democratic- evolu-tion towards socialism, in particular, government control of basic industries. This goal was reaffirmed at successive AD National Conventions, However, part of the leadership has always been willing to compromise in the name of practical p o l i t i c s . From October 18, 19^5 to November 24, 19*4-8 Accion Democratica held the reins of government in Venezuela and attempted to imple-ment many of i t s promised reforms. On November 24, 1948 a coup d'etat led by Colonel Marcos Perez Jimenez established a military dictatorship which would l a s t ten years. The senior AD leaders spent this period in exile, while within the country the clandes-tine party organization was l e f t to a younger generation of uni-versity students. The Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), previously a s t i f f competitor with AD for control of labor unions, collaborat-ed with the young Hade cos " i n the struggle against military dicta-torship. However, simultaneously Romulo Betancourt and his colleagues i i i n e x i l e supported the United States 1 anti-communist e f f o r t s i n the Korean War i n an attempt to obtain U.S. support for a return to constitutional government i n Venezuela. The overthrow of the Pe'rez Jimenez regime on January 2 3 , 1958 marked the culmination of a j o i n t e f f o r t by many sectors of Vene-zuelan society: dissident m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s , businessmen, the Catholic Church, and a large c i v i l i a n population that s t i l l had hopes for an authentic democratic revolution. In p a r t i c u l a r , the young adecos who had fought Perez Jime'nez were committed to AD democratic revolutionary doctrine. The success of the Cuban Revo-l u t i o n on January 1 , 1959 re-enforced t h e i r revolutionary fervor. Although Betancourt s t i l l seemed to advocate the r e a l i z a t i o n of AD p o l i c y , a f t e r h i s election as president on December 7 , 1958 i t was evident that he and the "Old Guard" were more concerned with staying i n power by maintaining the support of the m i l i t a r y , the foreign c a p i t a l i s t s , and the l a t t e r ' s a l l i e s : the Venezuelan economic e l i t e . The Inevitable r e s u l t of t h i s compromise i n ideology by the senior AD leaders was the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of party unity and the defection of those party members who would attempt to maintain the orthodoxy of AD doctrine. This paper traces the evolution of Aecio'n Demo er o t i c a , from i t s i d e o l o g i c a l inception i n the 1 9 3 0 's to i t s f a c t i o n a l d i v i s i o n i n the 1960's, with p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on the role played by the senior AD leadership i n the transformation of Accion Democra'tica from a p o t e n t i a l l y democratic revolutionary party to a moderate— i f not r i g h t of center—representative of the private-sector economic e l i t e i n Venezuela. i l l TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i Chapter I History of Accion Democratica: 1928-1945 1 From Student Movement to P o l i t i c a l Party Chapter II October 18, 1945 Coup and AD "Trienio' 1 24 Chapter III 1948-1958 Dictatorship 55 Chapter IV Return of the "Guardia Vieja" 75 Chapter V The Emergence of AD Factionalism 92 Epilogue 109 Conclusion 113 Notes 114 Bibliography 136 Appendix 139 CHAPTER I HISTORY OP ACGION DEMOGRATIGA: 1928-1945 Prom Student Movement to P o l i t i c a l Party The Venezuelan university student: activists of 1928 were^  confronted with a social, p o l i t i c a l , and economic situation which seemed to offer revolution as the only viable solution to the country's many problems. The yearr 1928 marked the twentieth anniversary of the dictatorship of General Juan Vicente Gomez. During the Gomez regime the commercial exploi-tation of petroleum by foreign-owned companies made Venezuela the world's second producer and exporter of o i l . However,, the majority of the country's population l i v e d off agriculture,, barely subsisting~in a semi-feudal rural society where-a small minority controlled vast landholdings. Indeed, Gomez and his family became the largest landholders of them a l l . . This phenomenon of p o l i t i c a l and economic? domination by a V i l i t a r y " 'caudlllo-' dates back to Venezuela's emergence as; an independent? nation. The Independence Movement' (1810 to 1821) resulted i n the replacement of Spanish p o l i t i c a l and economic domination by that of the Venezuelan Creole oligarchy. The failure of the Movement to establish a democratic tradition and to demilitarize? a large segment) of the independence army contributed to the: p o l i t i c a l chaos of the nineteenth century. Between 1830 and 1899 Venezuela endured thirty-seven revolutions. Regional caudillism reached itis-height 1 afterr the Federal War (I859-I863) when the Federalist "liberals" decentralized the^ army into a mass of ri v a l partisan armies with a disproportionate number of o f f i c e r s . 1 -2-At the turn of the?.nineteenth century, the Andean State of Tfifchira provided 23# of the national coffee crop, at the 2 time Venezuela's dominant export crop. The emergence of a class of Mnouveau>r richer in Tachira was accompanied by increased political awareness. A declining world coffee-market; prompted Tachireih demands for government' support? which went':unheeded in Caracas. Consequently, on May 23, 1899 a Tachiren caudillo*, Cipriano Castro, declared a "Revolucion RestauradoraH. With a private army that was largely urban-based with educated young officers, Castro marched 500 miles through the Andes to Caracas?-and succeeded ln seizing power, thus establishing a line of Tachiren generals-turned-presidents that would dominate Venezuelan-; politics for half a century.^ On November 24, 1908 Castro wentt to Germany to cure a kidney ailment. He left in charge Gen. Juan Vicente Gomez, whom he had appointed Governor of the Federal District in 1899 and had promoted to Vice: President'in 1904. Gomez promptly requested; Washington LT.C. for United States warships to guard-Venezuelan coasts after public protests against Castro began. This U.S.-Gomez alliance later prevented Castro from returning-tb Venezuelan soil, and thus Gomez Initiated his record twenty-seven-year dictatorship.** Gomez's regime, re!nowned for its corrupt and autocratic: longevity, has also gone down in history as the government that brought Venezuela out of debt, due to the exploitation of petroleum. Venezuela's first oil well, discovered in 1876 and - 3 -owned by the Comparixa, P e t r o l f f e r a del Tachira, only produced f i f t e e n b a r r e l s a day. In 1908 Go'mez gave f i f t y - y e a r petroleum concessions to h i s friends who, a few years l a t e r , sold them to foreign o i l companies. The most famous o f these concessions were those given to Rafael Max Valladares. In July of 1910 he received the exploration and expl o i t a t i o n r i g h t s f o r various zones, which he promptly turned over to the Benmidez Ob., a subsidiary of General Asphalt. The 1910 Mines Law sett the maximum f o r concession l o t s at 8000 hectares. Nevertheless i n January, 1912 Gomez gave Valladares another concession encom-passing eleven states* with a t o t a l of 27,000,000 hectares (or 68,000,000 acres). Two days l a t e r Valladares ceded the contract to another subsidiary of the General Asphalt t r u s t : the Caribbean Petroleum Cd.^ The Caribbean Petroleum Co. exploited Venezuela's f i r s t commercially successful o i l well, Mene Grande (Zulla Stated i n 191^. Soon afterwards, the? company was bought out by Royal -Dutch Shell f o r $1,500,000 plus 8% royalty. Between 1918 andf 1920 the B r i t i s h Controlled O i l f i e l d , L t d . , which was d i r e c t l y controlled by the B r i t i s h Government, acquired several thousands? of square miles of concessions, s t r a t e g i c a l l y located close to the- Venezuelan coast and i n the Orinoco Delta. The American o i l companies, dominated by Standard O i l of New Jersey, d i d not e s t a b l i s h themselves l n Venezuela u n t i l the 19^0's.^ Gomez did not merely encourage foreign investment. When, i n 1920, the foreign o i l companies objected to portions of the f i r s t Hydrocarbons Law passed by Congress, Gomez actually allowed the petroleum companies* lawyers to d r a f t a more? s a t i s -factory version of the law, which was subsequently passed i n 1922, In 1925 petroleum exports, equaling Bs. 191,000,000, ex-ceeded those o f coffeeeand cacao f o r the f i r s t time. By 1928 Venezuela was the world's second leading producer and exporter of o i l . Thus Gomez was able to pay o f f Venezuela's foreign Q debt and most of i t s i n t e r n a l debt by 1930. L i t t l e of Venezuela's o i l revenues t r i c k l e d down to benefit the masses. Although some money was spent on p u b l i c works such as roads and buildings, there was no government housing and n e g l i g i b l e health and education a i d . Eighty percent of the adult population was i l l i t e r a t e . The country's increased income was p a r a l l e l e d by the increased importation of consumer o items.- However, the development of l o c a l industry was stag-nant, and^ the government did not demonstrate any concern f o r the fate o f the Venezuelan economy when the petroleum deposits r would be depleted. Nor did the government do anything to a l l e v i a t e the decline i n agriculture production and exports. Indeed, Gomez^was more preoccupied with becoming Venezuela;*s l a r g e s t landholder. He "nationalized" h i s opponents' lands i n h i s own name, thus accumulating over 700,000 hectares. Along with monopoliessin various other sectors of the Venezuelan economy, Gomez's capi-t a l within Venezuela amounted to Bs. 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 1 0 The students at the Central University l n Caracas In 1928 constituted an e l i t e group of potential professionals who could 11 have prospered l n spite of the d i c t a t o r s h i p . However, they would not condone the s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , and economical i n j u s -tices-perpetuated by the CkTmez regime,- and they f e l t compelled 1 to lead^the vanguard i n the struggle f o r a democratic: revolution i n Venezuela. The Federaeion de Estudlante<jrde Venezuela was formed i n 1927* I t was not a p o l i t i c a l party but i n practice acted l i k e one. Most of i t s members were influenced by the Mexican Revolu-t i o n of 1910 and the Russian Revolution of 1917. Jose Flo Tamayo was the leading Marxist influence of the organization. L i v i n g i n e x i l e , he had been an anti-Gomez propagandist:, and he became' a Communist Party member i n New York. He was 1 at err expelled from Panama i n 1925 f o r i n s t i g a t i n g a strike there; a few months l a t e r he was expelled from Guatemala; and i n 1927 he made?his way to Caracas where, at the age of t h i r t y , he made fri e n d s with and became the "indoctrlnator" of members of the Pederacion de Estudi a n t e s . 1 2 In February, 1928 Tamayo organized the- Semana del Estudianter, along with law student Romulo Betancourt 1, Jovito V i l l a l b a , and: Guillermo Prince Lara. The o f f i c i a l goal of the f e s t i v i t i e s ? ; was to r a i s e funds to b u i l d the Casa Andres B e l l o , a student: residence^ but i n f a c t i t was an anti-Gomez demonstration, with 1 *a speeches and poetry r e c i t a l s to that e f f e c t . J The leaders?or the event were consequently arrested and 210 more students - 6 -o f f e r e d themselves f o r arrest In s o l i d a r i t y . To the students 1 surprise, the Caracas populace declared a general s t r i k e i n their? support-which succeeded i n obtaining t h e i r release. Romulq> Betancourt! re l a t e d h i s retrospective impressions of t h i s event1 i n an interview to Colombian j o u r n a l i s t L u i s Enrique Osorio i n 19^3: H I had the f i r s t concrete revelation that: the popular mass was beginning to intervene i n Venezuelan history as a new f a c t o r . The student movement had I n i t i a l l y been wrapped within i t s own pride. We students considered ourselves...as chosen to transform the coun-t r y . Then our people suddenly made known t h e i r presence; and without leaders$- without labor and p o l i t i c a l organi-zations, without action committees or s t r i k e funds> . the people organized a massive demonstration l n Caracas. The freed students then conspired with young o f f i c e r s of the Miraflores Battalion i n an unsuccessful attempt to seize the Pre s i d e n t i a l Palace? (unoccupied at the: time) and the Cuartel San Carlos on A p r i l 7, 1928. As a r e s u l t Betancourt and' otherr student leaders were sent into e x i l e , while other arrested students were put to work on labor gangs building highways. As Gomez c y n i c a l l y declared In the o f f i c i a l newspaper) g E l Nuevo Diarlo 1"": "Co mo no querfan estudlar, l o s estoy en sen an do a trabajar...!' 1^ In 1929 e x i l e d Venezuelan General Ramon Delgadd Chalbaud attempted an unsuccessful invasion of Venezuela from Santo Domingo. Among the Invading forces was ca small boat of twelve: Venezuelans, including Romulo Betancourt and Raul Leonl. However they were forced to return to the Dominican Republic when t h e i r unseaworthy launch sprung a l e a k . 1 ? -7-After t h i s l a t e s t fiasco the revolutionary youths elected to concentrate on i d e o l o g i c a l problems, studying Venezuela fromr the frame of reference of Marx's d i a l e c t i c a l materialism. Betan-court settled i n Costa Rica where i n 1930 he helped organize 18 that: country' s Communl st Party. Gonzalo Barrio s went to Spain; andLeoni, Valmore Rodriguez, Rlcardo M o n t l l l a , Alberto Garnevali, Mariano Picon-Salas, Carlos D'Ascoli,> and Simo/n Betancourt (no r e l a t i o n to Romulo) went to Colombia where they formed the Agrupacion Revolueionaria de l a Izquierda (ARDI). Another group of young Venezuelan revolutionaries was based i n Trinidad. They followed d i r e c t i v e s issued from Moscow and thef Third Interna-t i o n a l and'! included future prominent economi st s~ and^ p o l i t i c i a n s Salvador de l a Plaza, Gustavo Machado, Miguel Otero S i l v a , and-Jovito V i l l a l b a . 1 9 The Marxist n a t i o n a l i s t s of A.R^D.I. believed that: there? should be two progressive stages towards Marxism: 1) a minimum program i n order to win the support:of the-:middle c l a s s and bourgeois groups; and 2) a f u l l ! Marxist program, once p o l i -t i c a l power was- obtained. On March 22, 1931 Betancourt, then twenty-three years o l d , and the members of A.R.D.I. published the Plan de Barranquilla. I t s c a l l " f o r revolution beyond consitutional reforms would l a t e r be echoed by the Accion Demo -c r a t i c a l e f t i s t s of i960: " . . . S i en l a a l i a n z a l a t i fundi s t a - c a u d i l l l s t a se apoyaron primero l a s oligarqufas y luego l a auto-c r a c i a para explotar a l p a i s , minar esa a l l a n z a , luchar contra e l l a hasta d e s t r u i r l a , debe ser l a aspiracion con s c i en te de l o s venezolanos con un nuevo y menos gaseoso concepto de l a l i b e r t a d que e l profesado por l o s jacoblnos de todos l o s tlempos de l a republica, -8-eonvencidos Ingenues de que sufragio u n i v e r s a l , e l x j u i -clo por Jurados y o t r a s conquistas de orden democra-t l c o bastan para asegurar e l 'respeto a l a l e y ' y ' l a f e l i o i d a d de l o s pueblos', Nuestra revolucio'h debe ser social y no meramente pol£tica..."20 Regarding foreign influence l n Venezuela: HEntre el capitalismo extranjero y l a casta 1 a t i -fundi s t a - c a u d i l l l s t a c r i o l l a ha habido una alianza t a o i t a en toda epoca. ..La Standard O i l , l a Royal Dutch, e l Royal Bank, cuatro o cinco eompanias mas con capi-t a l s s lntegrados en su t o t a l l d a d en dol ares o l i b r a s e s t e r l l n a s , control an oasi toda l a eeonomfa naclonal. En cambio de esa p o l f t l c a de puerta ablerta para l a explotacion lmperiallsta-. . l a internacional de l o s go-biernos c & p i t a l l s t a s l e ha prestado re s u e l t a ayuda, en todos l o s terrenos, a l despotlsmo. " 2 1 The Minimum- Program i s summed up i n eight demands: I. C i v i l i a n control of government; I I . Guarantee of c i v i l r i g h t s : free speech,- press, etc. I I I . Confiscation o f Gomez's wealth. IV. Creation of a "Tribunal de Salud Publica" to Investigate crimes under despotism. V. Immediate d e c r e e s f o r protection of the exploited labor c l a s s . VI. Intense l i t e r a c y campaign f o r worker and peasant masses; technical and a g r i c u l t u r a l education; u n i v e r s i t y autonomy. VII. Revision of contracts with national and foreign companies* Adoption of an economic p o l i c y contrary to the contraction of loans. Nationalization of waterfalls. State o r municipal control of public- services. VIII. Convocation within one year of a Constituent Assembly to e l e c t a provisional government, reform the c o n s t i t u t i o n , and revise laws... The document1 ends with an oath of s o l i d a r i t y signed by twelve future "adecos": "Los que susoriben este plan se^comprometen a luchar por l a s reivlndicaciones en e l sustentadas y a ingresar como m i l i t a n t e s activos en e l partido po-l i t i c o que se organ!zara dentro del pals sobre sus bases.." 2 2 -9-During h i s stay l n Colombia, Betancourt, l i k e others of the exiled Generation of '28, supported himself by s e l l i n g f r u i t . His Colombian p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s Included the founding of the "Allanza Unionists de l a Gran Colombia" which resurrected the Boli v a r i a n i d e a l of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela united for democracy and forming the nucleus of a "Hispanoamerlcan Union", The primary goals of the Allanza were: automatic universal c i t i z e n -ship of the three countries? and a common market. However,, some months a f t e r its-founding the Allanza disintegrated, and Fetancourt returned to Costa Rica and h i s a c t i v i t i e s with the Communist P a r t y , 2 ^ In Costa Rica Betancourt; was d i r e c t o r and editor of the? communist weekly -Trabajo :. He also indoctrinated 1 mil i t ants i n c e l l meetings and gave l e c t u r e s on economic and p o l i t i c a l theory Oh. at the "universidad popular". Although the GostayRlcan! Communist Party maintained r e l a t i o n s with the Comintern, i t did: not subject i t s e l f to i t s orders. Nevertheless, Betancourt f i n a l l y resigned from the party i n 1935, urging national ratherr than international Marxism. As he l a t e r explained i n a 1944 "apology"()for h i s a f f i l i a t i o n with oommunism: "...I was-seeking a t r u l y American doctrine or ideology or set of answers."2-* Gt/mez's natural death, at age seventy-nine, i n December of 1935 provoked r i o t i n g and l o o t i n g throughout Venezuela. Thes ruling ~ - —. p ycli(|U£ U 4 ' chose-Minister of War, General Eleazar Lopez Obntreras? to succeed Gomez, and i n 1936 they elected him President f o r another five-year term. -10-After public-order was restored, p o l i t i c a l prisoners were released, press censorship relaxed, and p o l i t i c a l opponents and e x i l e s were allowed to resume public l i f e , with the resultant emergence of several p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . P r i n c i p a l among the new p a r t i e s was the Union Nacional Republicana (UNR) which represented a l l anti-Gomecistas. However, two groups splintered from i t , . leaving"the UNR as a l i b e r a l bourgeois p a r t y * 2 ^ The more m i l i t a n t s p l i n t e r group was the Partido Republican© Progresista ( P R F ) , l e d by Miguel Acosta Saignes, which was the new-legal name for the clandestine Venezuelan Communist Party o r i g i n a l l y established i n 1931. The second group, Organization Venezolana (ORVE), was formally constituted on March 1, 1936. Led by Mariano Picon-Salas, I t attempted to unite a l l democrats i n "looking f o r whattunites us and avoiding what divides us". Otherrmembers of ORVE1 included Betancourt, Leoni, L u i s B?. Prleto Pigueroa, Gonzalo Barrios, and poet Andre's Eloy Blanco. 2? ORVE considered i t s e l f an e l e c t o r a l front rather than a p o l i t i c a l party. I t s p o l y c l a s s i s t approach, attributed by some observers to Peruvian Hay a de l a Torre's Idea of " f rentes de claseJs**; replaced the Marxist : concept of "luchas de c l a s e s " adhered to previously by some of ORVE» s members.2** I t was i n ORVE's Caracas headquarters on October 28, 1936, that the d i r e c t precursor to Accion Demo or a t i c a , the Partido Democratic© Nacional (PDN) was founded. The new party o f f i c i a l l y united ORVEvwith the Partido Republican© Progresista, the Federacion de Estudiantes de Venezuela (FEV)? 9 the Bloque Nacional -11-Democratlco (founded by writer Valmore Rodriguez i n Maraoalbo), the Prente Obrero, and the Prente Nacional de Trabajadores. Also known as the "Partido Unico de l a Izquierda", the PDNi was l e d by FEV leader Jovitb V i l l a l b a as Secretary-General, Romulo Betancourt as Secretary of Organization, Carlos D'Ascoll as Secretary of I n t e r i o r Relations, Juan Oropeza as Press~Secretary, Mercedes Fermfii as Secretary of Feminine A f f a i r s , and Francisco Olive as Secretary of "Peasant A f f a i r s . ^ The PDN Program, published October 28, 1936, stressed the implantation of an authentic democracy; r a i s i n g the standard-of l i v i n g of the masses; and " l a l i b e r t a d nacional de to do yugo imperial i s ta extranjero ". Because of the controversial Law of Public Order or "Ley Lara" which punished any written or verbal c r i t i c i s m of the "republican organization" o r of the "regime of private property" with four to six years imprisonment", the PEN had to camouflage i t s s o c i a l i s t tendencies, f o r example with nationalism: "El nacional ismo es para no so tiros creaclon y de-fen sa de l a i n d u s t r i a nacional, explotaclon de nuestras cuantlosas riquezas natural es en bien de l a to t a l i dad del pueblo venezolano. "3i In respect to agrarian reform, the PDN c a l l e d f o r the; d i v i s i o n of the lands confiscated from the Gomez family and other government embezzlers, and the handing over of these?land parcels to poor peasants • Other proposals included the creation of a g r i c u l t u r a l colonies on suitable land; the creation of coopera-t i v e s f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l andUivestock production and also coopera-t i v e s f o r the purchase and sale of a g r i c u l t u r a l and l i v e s t o c k products; the a b o l i t i o n of debts and mortgages of the poorer:, peasants; and long-term, low-interest loans. Discreetly Inserted -12-i n the Program was "Legisiaclon que 11mlte l o s l a t l f u n d l o s y tlenda a su parcelaclon."32 Regarding natural resources,- the: PDNi c a l l ed f o r the • creation of a progressive tax on p r o f i t s of companies exploiting natural resources; and the construction of a national o i l r e f i n e r y f o r supplying the country's needs of petroleum der i v a t i v e s . In the hope of receiving l e g a l recognition from a c a p i t a l -i s t - o r i e n t e d government, the PEN proposed the stimulations of national industry and a g r i c u l t u r a l production by awakening-'and: supporting "private i n i t i a t i v e 1 " by means of low-interest loans, t a r i f f protection, and tax reforms. Likewise i t encouraged" social and labor reforms i n order to augment the consumer-eom-paolty of the masse ss However, the PBN strategy did not work.. In spite of the: f a c t thatt the PEN was a c o a l i t i o n - o f six previously l e g a l i z e d groups, the party was denied l e g a l status by the Governor .of the? Federal D i s t r i c t on the basis of the "Ley Lara" which also gave federal a u t h o r i t i e s the right: to withhold approval of a party i f its-proposed program weree Judged "irresponsible". On November 25 the PEN, denying any a f f i l i a t i o n with communism, unsuccess* f u l l y appealed the Governor's decision to the Gbrte Federal y de Casaolon. v Meanwhile on the labor f r o n t , 20,000 petroleum workers-began a s t r i k e on December 14, 1936 that continued u n t i l January 22, 1937. Consequently* the Lo'pez Cbntreras regime dissolved the Congress o f Venezuelan Vbrkers, the country's firstt:national -13-trade union, with the excuse that: i t attempted to intervene i n p o l i t i c s ; Thirty labor "agitators" were arrested and l a t e r ex* p e l l ed from the Maracaibo region. ^ Immediately following the s t r i k e , on January 28, 1937» congressional e l e c t i o n s wereeheld. The conservative oligarchy organized to support Lopez Contreras and h i s colleagues with the Agrupaoiones Cfvlcas Bolivarianas (ACE). Rafael Galdera*s social C hristian group (now c a l l e d Accion Nacional afterr the UNE students graduated u n i v e r s i t y ) was~allled with the AGBr.-^  In spite of the i n d i r e c t elections,3 ? l e f t i s t oppositions candidates-succeeded? i n winning t h i r t y seats. Amongi the;more: prominent of the "o r v i s t a s " were Andres ELoy Blanco, Gonzalo Barrios, L u i s Bi Fr i e t o F., Juan Oropeza, and Raul Leonl. Other: successful l e f t i s t s ' i n c l u d e d 1 Jovito V i l l a l b a , Juan Fablo Pere<z Al fonzo, and" the? f e'no'wnsd; no vel i st and fo rmer Mini ster o f Fubl i c Instru c t i o n , Romulo G a l l egos. Although the ACBr'maintained i t s t r a d i t i o n a l majority,, the: government, under pressure from more conservative elements i n the army, reacted severely to the opposition's v i c t o r i e s ? On February 3 several opposition p o l i t i c i a n s were arrested, and-von the following day the a c t i v i t i e s of the FDN^-member organiza-t i o n s were prohibited. The Corte Federal y de Casaelon n u l l i f i e d the: elections i n the states but did not dare do so i n the Federal D i s t r i c t f o r fear o f provoking adverse p u b l i c reaction.38 Then on March 13, 1937 the government'* s Gaceta O f l c l a l announced the expulsion from Venezuela of forty-seven opposition) -14-leaders f o r a one year period because of a f f i l i a t i o n with com-munist; doctrine 1 and f o r being " p r e j u d i c i a l to public order. •• ? The e x i l e d included Betancourt, Barrios, D'Ascoli, Leoni, Salva-dor de l a Plaza, Communist Party founder Gustavo Maehado, future; Finance Mini sterr Jo ae Antonio Mayobre, Jovito V i l l a l b a , and peasant leaderrBamon Quijada. Betancourt succeeded i n going into hiding and thus undertook the immense task o f l a y i n g the^ groundwork f o r the future party organization-of Accion Democrat l e a . The major issue confronting the PDN during it's clandestine period was the i n t e r n a l power struggle with the oommunist factionv The l a t t e r fought tb gain control of the PDN • s directing; "cuadros". In retrospect,, AD*s early leaders regarded t h e i r attempt at collaboration-with the communists as a mistake, since i t tempo-r a r i l y weakened the forces of the democratic-left ^9 The communists wanted to focus economics programs almostt exclusively on the labor claps, whereas the non-communists?main-tained t h e i r p o l y c l a s s i s t viewpoint. Be tancourtt l a t e r wrote" l n h i s major work Venezuela: PoljCtica y Petroleo: "The t h e s i s advanced by the communists was hardly r e a l i s t i c . . . u r b a n middle classes, the students and pro-f e s s i o n a l s , the varied body of smalli farmers.• .would not Join i n workers p a r t i e s , but rather? would Join tho setoff f u l l and comprehensive national revolutionary plans.... In l a t e r years, v i s i b l e and concrete f a c t s cleared away the doctrinaire dispute, showing who was r i g h t ; "40 Following c r i t i c i s m of the PDN democrat's by the; eommunist pub l i c a t i o n "EL M a r t i l l o " , the PDN published a manifesto on February 14, 1938 i n which i t reaffirmed i t s p o s i t i o n as "revolu-tionary, democratic j anti-imperial i s t , , and polyclassiwst^ 1. The d e f i n i t e break between the two f a c t i o n s was when the democrats -15-demanded that the communists sever r e l a t i o n s with the Communist International. • The d i v i s i o n of the PDN produced intense competition f o r student and organized labor support throughout the country. The^ PDN? became a "pocket organization" with a c e l l u l a r structure that spread from Caracas to the'state c a p i t a l s . Betancourt's colleagues, i n addition to Prieto and Perez Alfonzo who had not gone into e x i l e , were such r i s i n g student leaders as L u i s Lander, L u i s Augustb Dubuc, and Leonardo Ruiz Pineda. At the termination of the one-year e x i l e period, Valmore Rodriguez, L u i s Troconis Guerrero, and Inocente Palacios returned from Colombia and assumed the leadership posts on thee Regional Executive Committees of Z i i l i a , Tachira, and the Federal D i s t r i c t i * r e s pectively. Jovito V i l l a l b a also returned 5 from Colombia, but 42 soon returned there?afterrresigning from the PDN. The PDN washable to function under moderate government: harassment. In 1939 the r PDN d i r e c t i o n composed an Agrarian Law which was introduced to Congress?by the PDN) deputies? The pro-posed law, which was defeated} proposed confiscation:of Gomez's lands to be sold to poor farmers (preferably those who already occupied the lands) i n ten to f i f t y hectare p a r c e l s , payable i n twenty years;-^ On September 30, 1939 the PDN, with an approximate^member-ship between 600 and 800, held It s : f i r s t : National Conference l n Caracas. Some f i f t y delegates-met to reformulate the; party's program, p o l i t i c a l t h e s i s , and organizational statutess The -16-resultant document concisely summarized Venezuela's economic; i l l s which had remained unchanged during the Lopez Cbntreras LU. regime: "Venezuela e s u n pais semi col o n i a l y semi feudal, un pais atado al imperial!smo economic© f i s c a l y p o l i t i e a -mente, con una economia predomlnantemente agropecuaria estanoada por e l l a t i f u n d i smo e incapaz en su forma actual para asegurar por s i nuestra independencla econo-mlca; carente de grandes i n d u s t r l a s naoionales de trans-formacion y que se h a l l a forzadb, por l o tanto, a impor-te r mercaderlas extranjeras por cantidades cinco vecegr? mayores a l a exportacidh a g r l e o l a y a depender f o r t u l t a -mente del re s i duo que nos deja una indu s t r i a extractive de duracidn l i m i t a d a y controlada en t o t a l l d a d por e l c a p i t a l financier© internacional• "^' Throughout the PDN's "Tesis P o l f t i c a " there i s no mention o f revolution, but rather of a more t a c t f u l "transformaciora democratica y a n t i i m p e r i a l i s t a de l a Naeion venezolana". Only l n the Programa i s the more r a d i c a l term employed: "un nacional-isfa© revoluolbnario" directed towards international imperialism. Again the?PDN described i t s e l f a "popular" as opposed to c l a s s i s t t l i k e the communist party, stressing that i t wasvimposs-i b l e f o r the l a t t e r to d i r e c t a vast movement of national scope.7 1 ^ In order not to antagonize the^government and to pave the way f o r l e g a l i z a t i o n , the party program had to appear vague and:1 non-revolutionary, and also show that i t defended p r i v a t e owner-ship. Following the r e l a t i v e l y moderate conference, p o l i c e r e s t r i c t i o n s eased up. The PDN leadership softened i t s attacks on the Lopez Cbntreras government1, although e f f o r t s were increased to extend the party organization. Betancourt was preparing to leave the country f o r a while, v o l u n t a r i l y , when he was arrested 47 and sent into e x i l e . -17-After spending one year of e x i l e i n Chile, Betancourt returned to Venezuela i n 1940 to d i r e c t the opposition campaign of Romulo G a l l egos f o r president. The prominent n o v e l i s t , who had also been one of Betancourt's hlghschool i n s t r u c t o r s , accept-ed the PDN's i n v i t a t i o n to be the party's symbolic candidate,,, and he proved to be an e f f e c t i v e campaigner, stimulating p u b l i c lift debateeover the candidates. On h i s return from Chile Betancourt was interviewed by MAhorac:' e d i t o r , L u i s Feraza, and questioned whether h i s party would adopt an attitude o f "cerrada o p o s i c i o n w i f Lopez Cbntreras* chosen successor, General Isaias Medina Angarita, were elected president. Betancourt responded di p l o m a t i c a l l y : MDe ninguna manera. Si es elect© e l Gen. Medina, o cualquier otro candidato de extraccion o f i c i a l , nosotros no asumiriamos frente a l Jefe del Estado, y a su gobierno, una actitud de i r r e e o n c i l i a b l e pugna. Eso revel a r i a estrecho sectarismo y de t a l enfermedad de l n f a n c i a — e l inevitable; • sarampion' de to do movimiento social inmaduro—esta deflnitivamente curado nuestro sector p o l i t i c o . "^9 Betancourt" q u a l i f i e d t h i s statement with the b a s i c assumption that-opposition p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s enjoy l e g a l status*. Despite the FDN's demands f o r d i r e c t p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s , Lopez Obntreras ordered the state l e g i s l a t u r e s to e l e c t the^ senators, and the municipal councils to ele c t the deputies f o r Congress. Then on A p r i l 28, 1941 Congress d u t i f u l l y elected the Tachiren Minister of War, Gen. Isaias Medina Angarita, as president. After Medina was elected by a vote of 130 out of 143, the p Secretary of Congress, Francisco Carreno Delgado, c y n i c a l l y announced: wAqui en l a cupula del C a p i t o l i o , e l Gen. Isaias -18-Medlna Angarita ha sldo e l i g l d o por el 150$ de l o s votos del parlamento. "5° As president, Medina continued the trend begun by Lopez Cbntreras to d e - p o l i t i c i z e the a r m y , w h i l e he also broke h i s predecessors* t r a d i t i o n by selecting non-Andeans as Ministers of War: Col. Carlos Meyer, and l a t e r Gen. Manuel Moran. Medina was also democratically Inclined, allowing freedom of speech, press, and opposition p o l i t i c a l organizations. During h i s four year term, there were purportedly no p o l i t i c a l prisoners or e x i l e s . 52 The PDN submitted an application f o r l e g a l i z a t i o n on May 13, 19^1, and permission was granted on July 29. By the end of August, PDN\ " s e c t i o n a l s H were constituted i n Caracas? the Federal D i s t r i c t , Z u l i a , Guarico and Falcon; while organizing commissions were set:up i n other states. On September 13 the party was renamed Accion Democratica, and at a public: r a l l y i n Caracas'?a crowd of 10,000 was addressed by AD: president Romulo Gall egos and other leaders. Betancourt spoke on "Party and Venezuelan Economics". His speech began with a c o n c i l i a t o r y t o n e : ^ "Nos reincorporamos a l a actuaclon publica sin rencores personales contra nadie, menos lmpulslvos que: ajrer, compenetrados mejor de l a realldad venezolana,, mas saturados del sent 1 do de nuestra responsabllldad 1 s o c i a l . "54 He then went on to discuss^Venezuela's declining economy due to an over-dependence: on o i l : between 1920 and 1930 averagerannual exports (excluding o i l and gold) equaled Bs. 130,000,000; l n 1940 they equaled only Bs. 31,000,000. v.^ . :.••?,»• „o,;\V -19-Betancourt again stressed the need f o r agrarian reform, maintaining i t would not be necessary to confiscate anyone's la n d . Land p a r c e l s could be provided from the estates already confiscated from Gomez, from state and municipal uncultivated lands, and from the purchase of abandoned estates whose owners resided i n c i t i e s * ^ Medina's administration: coincided with the second Wbrld War*. As a major supplier o f petroleum to the a l l i e d n a t i o n s , Venezuela; f e l tt continuously threatened by the ; Axis powers who would sabo-tage t h e e o i l Industry In order to outt a l l i e d supplies. Fecause o f t h i s tense s i t u a t i o n , AD l e a d e r s emphasized the continued' spreading^ o f the party organization rather than the fomenting-o f ant 1-Medina sentiment. The ATX motto was* "not a single d i s t r i c t nor single municipality without a party o r g a n i z a t i o n * " The party's newspaper "EL Pais 1 9 was also founded at t h i s time-.-*? In 19^1 the communl star were also allowed to form a l e g a l party under the^name o f Union Popular (Up)* The UK supported Medina because he was a n t i - A x i s . ^ In 19^2 Congress' granted Medina "emergency powers" because o f the war, and he suspended c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees. He also used these powers to stop l a b o r disputes, thus a l i e n a t i n g a sector of the Union Popular*. UP l e a d e r s Gustavo and Eduardo Machado, Hodolfo Quintero, and: other trade union l e a d e r s were anti-Medina. In A p r i l , 1944 Medina dissolved the communist-controlled Confederaclon de -20 Trabajadores Venezolana (GW) and recognized the AD* con t r o l l e d unions. ^ F i n a l l y , i n 1945 Juan B a t i s t a Fuenmayor l e f t the UP~ and formed the pro-Medina Partido Comunista. The UP changed i t s name to Partido Comunista U n i t a r i o , maintaining i t s a n t i -6 0 Medina stance. Although AD assumed'an attitude of compromise at 1 the begin* ning of Medina's term, i n 1942 the party unleashed "one of the most f i e r c e n a t i o n a l i s t i c : b a t t l e s i n i t s existence" when the government1:planned0to contract a loan f o r Bs. 68,000,000. AD protested that" t h e ' o i l companies should be taxed more, ci t i n g ^ the f a c t t h a t : i n 1941 the governmentt received only Bs. 85,000,000 or 12.3$ of the Bs. 690,000,000 o i l production of that year; In fact,, the p r i c e per ton had decreased while the quantity exploited increased J l o f u l f i l l Ameri can needs. 6 1 Medina's p o l i t i c a l a l l i e s also supported the AD p o s i t i o n ; nevertheless, the executive reacted negatively. AD c r i t i c i z e d the l a t t e r l n the o f f i c i a l party publications "Accio'n Democratica": "...en Venezuela siguen rigiendo l o s contratos celebrados en l o s dfas del general Gomez* conforme a leyes redactadas por l o s abogados y gerentes de l a s empresas...No planteamos l a nacionalizaoioxr inmediata por decreto de l a indu s t r i a p e t r o l e r a , s i no viables? medldas de defensa econo'mioa y f i s c a l de l a nacion. Pedimos simple y llanamente, e l aumento hasta 1 finites de J u s t i c l a y equldad de l a p a r t i clpacion nacional en l a rlqueza petrolera."62 On February 14, 1942 German submarines sank seven o i l tankers en route to the r e f i n e r i e s of Aruba and^ Curacao. The r e s u l t of t h i s tanker shortage was a twenty-five percent drop i n Venezuelan crude o i l production, with the consequent unemployment and'de--21-crease i n government o i l revenues. These problems l e d tb Medina's decision to revise the existing hydrocarbon l e g i s l a t i o n . On March 13, 19^3 & new Hydrocarbons Law was promulgated. I t increased government revenues, and the o i l companies,, pressured by the United' States government to reach a satisfactory agree-ment with Venezuela i n order to insure continued petroleum sup-p l i e s f o r the war e f f o r t , agreed to change ex i s t i n g contracts to abide by the new law. Howevert? A D : c r i t i c i z e d the law, which was more l i k e a l e g a l contract, as " l a sanatoria absoluta de to do v l c l o anterior", since I t "absolved" the o i l companies of any past i l l e g a l i t y and thus renounced government l i t i g a t i o n - to recover past debts. The government also agreed to abide by the terms of t h i s law f o r the next f o r t y years. In addition, AD estimated that the increase i n o i l revenues f o r the government-would be Bs. 3*500,000 monthly: enough to c o v e r - f i s c a l d e f i c i t s but not enough to finance i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n or social programs.^ AD also c r i t i c i z e d the law f o r not forbidding the granting o f new concessions and f o r not':alluding'to the o b l i g a t i o n of lowering ;oil-derivative product p r i c e s within Venezuela. Party leaders suggested that: i n January, 1944 when the "Valladares-concession" expired, i t should revert to the government rather than be renewed. The concession produced twelve m i l l i o n b a r r e l s of o i l per year, and I t also Included the San Lorenzo r e f i n e r y which d i s t i l l e d 100,000,000 l i t r e s of gasoline annually. How-eve r the government Ignored the suggestion.^ AD decided to abstain during the 1943 congressional e l e c t i o n s , - 2 2 -slnce I t was obvious the government would maintain i t s majority due to the i n d i r e c t voting system and l i m i t e d e l e c t o r a t e ; 0 ^ However, Andres ELoy Blanco and Betancourt were allowed to run f o r o f f i c e i n the Federal D i s t r i c t and i n Miranda, re s p e c t i v e l y * While Betancourt was defeated by a small margin, Blanco won. A f t e r the e l e c t i o n s , Medina formed an o f f i c i a l party,, o r l g i n v a l l y c a l l e d P a r t l d a r i o s de l a Po l l " t i c s del Gobierno and l a t e r -changed to Partido Democratic© Venezolano (PDF). This was a move to c u l t i v a t e c i v i l i a n ( p r i n c i p a l l y bourgeois) support: and' thus f u r t h e r detach himself from the t r a d i t i o n a l m i l i t a r y support o f the w l e p e c i s t a s w . Medina selected as h i s p o l i t i c a l advisor a l i b e r a l c i v i l i a n , . Arturo U s l a r P l e t r i , who l a t e r became the-president's p r i n c i p a l apologist after- the October 18 coup. 0 0 Although the PDV: had a.majority Iii Congress^ Medina d i d notr want to r i s k the granting of new petroleum concessions i n 1944 and 1945 to congressional debate. Instead, the: concessions were? 67 transacted p r i v a t e l y , amounting to a t o t a l o f 6,561,769 hectares* With the end of World War I I , Medina had to r e l i n q u i s h h i s emergency powers. This restated i n the renewed surge o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , which was not e x c l u s i v e l y l i m i t e d to the c i v i l i a n sector. SUMMARY ' During the period 1928-1945 the Venezuelan democratic revo-l u t i o n a r y movement went through two main stages o f development: the f i r s t Involved laying^ the: foundations of party Ideology, - 2 3 -followed by a second period which emphasized the strengthening and d i fusion of the party organization; During the Gomez d i c -tatorship, the student leaders who were to form the nucleus of the Accion Democrat!ca Party were o r i g i n a l l y Marxist-oriented, After devoting years i n e x i l e to the study of Venezuelan prob-lems, they arrived at an ideology of progressive democratic socialism i n a p o l y c l a s s i s t s o c i e t y * while others of t h e i r c o l -leagues i n e x i l e continued to prof ess-international Marxism as -espoused by the Soviet .Union, The death of Gomez I n i t i a t e d a slow t r a n s i t i o n period" from dic t a t o r s h i p to democracy i n Venezuela, The repatriated revo-l u t i o n a r i e s unlfced i n a l e f t i s t block (PDN) but id e o l o g i c a l 1 difference sc-and lnter--f actional r i v a l r y to dominate thee l e f t i s t movement1: brought the a l l i a n c e to an end. After the communist defection from the PDN7, emphasls--was-placed on spreading the party organization throughout the country i n an attempt to win student: and l a b o r union support from the communists', and to consolidate^ the party' s considerable peasant support. I t was the hope of PDN/AD:leaders to change the: systear a f t e r a t t a i n i n g power by workings, within the system; In order; to avoid government: harassment:, p u b l i c manifestos-of party doctrine were watered down to appear reasonably moderate. However,, f r u s t -r a t i o n i n AD?ranks was?intensified by unpopular government: p o l i c i e s ^ and President Medina's reluctance to democratize the?electoral 1 process;- After supporting the "f i g h t f o r democracy" during World War I I , Venezuelans, and p a r t i c u l a r l y adecos, were:impatient to implement an authentic democratic regime i n t h e i r own country. CHAPTER II OCTOBER 18, 1945 COUP-AND: AD "TRIENIO" According to Romulo Betancourt, Venezuela p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a post-World War II trend toward l e f t i s t governments: the-Labour Party defeated Winston Churchill i n B r i t a i n ; thernew government's of Prance and I t a l y were l e f t i s t oriented; In Peru, Bustamantee Rivero triumphed over Ureta, with an " a p r l s t a " majority i n Con-gress; i n Cuba, Grau San Martin defeated Batista's c o a l i t i o n ; a coup expelled Guatemalan d i c t a t o r Ublco along with h i s successor, General Ponce, and a u n i v e r s i t y professor, Juan Jose' TTrevalo became president; i n E l Salvador, Hernandez Martinez and Osmin Aguirre were also overthrown.* Although Medina Implemented certain reforms f o r the m i l i t a r y , such as increased fringe benefits f o r o f f i c e r s (pensions, low in t e r e s t rates f o r loans, e t c . ) , many of the Junior o f f i c e r s were s t i l l discontenWwith the lack of reform l n the m i l i t a r y hierarchy. Second lieutenants earned l e s s pay than the average s k i l l e d l a -borer, while senior o f f i c e r s misused public: funds and were involved i n large-scale g r a f t . Moreover, many of the Junior o f f i c e r s had-studied at the superior War College of C h o r i l l o s , Peru. They were Impressed with i t s technical advancement and the professional character of the i n s t i t u t i o n . The "lo g i a m i l i t a r " or secret lodge idea was borrowed i n d i r e c t l y from Argentina v i a Peru. C h o r i l l o s "alumni" Lieutenant Martin Marquez Anez, Captain: Marcos Peirez Jimenez, Captain Mario Ricardo Vargas and hissbrother Major J u l i o Cesar Vargaf formed the leadership o f dissident c e l l s that by the end of 19^4 were established i n the barracks of - 2 5 -Caracas, and i n the Maracay garrison, a i r force, and M i l i t a r y School. In mid-1945 thee Union P a t r l o t i c a M i l l t a r (UPM)) was-of f i c a l l y founded by Captain Vargas, Captain Perez Jimenez, and L i e u -tenants Edito J . Ramirez and Marquez Anez.3 The UPM wanted popular support and through a process?of / , 4 elimination selected AceiozmDemocratica as I t s prospective a l l y . A i r Force Lieutenant Horaclo Lopez Conde, a member of the UPM central committee, asked a r e l a t i v e , Caracas doctor Edmundo Fer-nandez (who happened to be a f r i e n d of Romulo Betancourt's) to arrange a meeting between UPM leaders and the AD leadership* The meeting was held on July 6, 1945 and was attended by AD Secretary-General Betaneourtf and Raul Leoni,, and f i v e members of the UPM, lnoluding promoted Major Pe'rez Jimenez.^ The adecos were informed that more than 100 o f f i c e r s were involved l n a conspiracy to overthrow Medina. The UPM' assured them that t h e i r aims were: 1) to abolish corrupt and incompetent government!; 2) to introduce universal suffrage and cons t i t u t i o n a l reforms; and 3) to create a pr o f e s s i o n a l , a p o l i t i c a l m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n . The UPM: charter maintained they had no personal 1 or ol a s s s l n t e r e s t s to defend, and as proof they endeavored to a l l y themselves with AD~, the p o l y o l a s s l s t p a r t y ^ Betancourt and Leoni returned from the meeting favorably Impressed. However the AD7 leaderships was reluctant to endorse? a "golpe de estado", as they had frequently denounced m i l i t a r y intervention i n p o l i t i c s . As Gonzalo Barrios prophesied .: "a cycle of adventurism and of low ambitions might be unleashed and"1 terminate...in a m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p . H ? -26-Meanwhlle, President Medina chose as h i s party's presidential" candidate Diogenes E seal ante, the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States. The choice of Escalante, a Tachiren c i v i l i a n and l i b e r a l , was a gesture of compromise with the l e f t . Escalante' promised e l e c t o r a l reform and AD?agreed to support him as a Na-t i o n a l Unity candidate* However:, In early August Escalante suffer-ed a nervous breakdown, and on September 11 Medina announced the? candidacy of Angel Blagglnl. Biagginl was a Tachiren lawyer who was serving as Minister of Agriculture. Although he had authored the l i b e r a l Agrarian Reform Law (which never had time to be put into e f f e c t ) , he was considered by AD to be a puppet candidate. The Communist Party, however,, agreed to support him.® Romulo G a l l egos attempted to persuade Medina to select a neutral p r o v i s i o n a l president f o r one year u n t i l Constitutional reforms could be effected and d i r e c t elections held. When Medina refused, the ADC leadership then decided to support the UPM insurrec-t i o n , which was going to occur with o r without c i v i l i a n support. According to Winfield J Burggraaff's /The Venezuelan Armed  Forces l n F d l l t l c s . the public: was prepared psychologically f o r a revolution because of the h o s t i l e atmosphere created by the Agrupadones Pro-Gandidatura Presidenclal de Lo'pez Cbntreras. The l o p e c l s t a s , composed of reactionary landholders and generals, repeatedly attacked Medina as " f a s c i s t " and " t o t a l i t a r i a n " i n the Caracas paper •i*Ahora-t* a f t e r Medina refused to nominate Lopez~ Contreras as h i s successor. 9 The UPM and AD: f i n a l l y agreed to i n s t i g a t e the coup at the end of November, although the UPM "watchword" was "The movement - 2 7 -beglns at the f i r s t a r r e s t . " On October 16 the UPM" learned that Medina had received a l i s t of UPM leaders. However, even a f t e r being warned of a possible i n s u r r e c t i o n , Medina was naively sceptical that Junior o f f i c e r s rather than the l o p e c i s t a senior o f f i c e r s would be the insurgents. ( I r o n i c a l l y , Medina did not give the Junior o f f i c e r s a planned pay r a i s e before the e l e c t i o n s because he did not want to appear to be "buying" t h e i r support. The o f f i c e r s interpreted t h i s as d i s i n t e r e s t and n e g l e c t . ) 1 0 F i n a l l y on the morning of October 18, 19^5 Majors Perez Jimenez and J u l i o Cesar Vargas were arrested f o r questioning; on the suspected conspiracy. Soon afterwards the insurrections coms-menced at the M i l i t a r y School, supported by i t s entire o f f i c e r s t a f f . (The academics d i r e c t o r of the school, Major Carlos Del-gado Chalbaud, had Just:agreed to support the UPM i n September*) A By the evening of the 18th, the UPM had taken control of the Maracay armored b a t t a l i o n , air//force> and Army central supply depot. Although a former Minister o f War, Medina had had no f i g h t -ing experience and was unable to function i n a complex m i l i t a r y c r i s i s . In addition, the young o f f i c e r s were be t t err trained and* knew more about strategy than t h e i r seniors. Medina recognized h i s i n e v i t a b l e defeat and surrendered i n the morning of the 19th. By October 22 the UPM was i n control throughout the country, with c a s u a l f t i e s estimated between 400 and 2 5 0 0 ; 1 2 On October 19 a provisional government was organized at" M l r a f l o r e s Palace. Betancourt headed a seven*man Junt& whose other members included adecos Haul Leonl, Gonzalo Barrios, L u i s B. -28-Prieto P.; an Independent, Dr. Edmundo Fernandez; and from the army, Captain J u l i o Cesar Vargas and Major Carlos Delgado Chal-baud, the latterrhaving, maneuvered h i s way into the Junta i n spite of h i s r e l a t i v e l y recent membership of the UPM. During the ins u r r e c t i o n AD* s r o l e was mainly "propagandiz-ing " the confused Venezuelans (who had been expecting a reaction-ary r e v o l t from the lop e c i s t a s ) into accepting the coup. In retrospect, Betancourt r a t i o n a l i z e d AD! Involvement l n the coup, adhering to the philosophy that the end J u s t i f i e s then means: " . . . s i e l origen mi smo de ese golpe de Est ado es~ materia controvertible, t a l debet03resultaria esearceo academic©, y hasta teolb'gioo, ante e l heeho complldo de l a democratizaclon l n s t i t u c l o n a l , del sane ami en to inexorable de l a s p r a c t i c e s administfatlvas y de l a p o l i t i c a p e t r o l e r a energieamente n a c i o n e l i s t e realized© s por e l Gbbierno que de aquel neoio. w l 3 According tb Burggreeff,, the 19^5 Revolution had three immediate e f f e c t s : i t brought to a h a l t the slow evolution to-ward democracy i n i t i a t e d by Lopez Contreres and Medine; l t ; marked the end of the "contlnulsmo andino"; and most important, it^-rea-ver sed thecmllitary depolIticallzatibns p o l i c y also begun by the two previous presidents. 1** AD IN POWER The f i r s t task of the AD: government was to convince Vene-zuelans and the world community of the revolution's legitimacy.-In a speech on October 30, 19^5 Betancourt announced that'the new government; had received recognition by the United States, Great B r i t a i n , France, and other L a t i n American countries, while n a t i o n a l l y "El respaldo fervoroso dado por el pueblo a l a revolu-clon, l a l e g i t i m e . " Betancourt went on to stress: -29-"La finalldad- basica de nuestro movimiento es l a de l i q u i d a r , de una vez por todas, l o s v i c i o s de adminis-tracldh, e l peculado y el s i sterna de imposicioh personal-i s t a y autdcratica, sin l i b r e con suit a de l a voluntadr-popular, que fueron c a r a c t e r i s t i c a s de l o s gobiemos de Lopez Contreras y Medina Angarita. w l 5 The Junta President warned the-ACFiof Lcipez Cbntreras and the PDV o f Medina that the people would not tolerate t h e i r reappear-ance on the p o l i t i c a l scene". The previous government'' s l i b e r a l programs were also branded as f a l s e promises. Betancourt; reassured the foreign sector t h a t ' t h e i r Invest-ments were not i n Jeopardy under the new government, while re-affirming the government's decision to obtain a f a i r share of the p r o f i t s through t a x a t i o n . 1 ^ In order to convince the m i l i t a r y of the revolution's good~ intentions, the Junta allocated the armed forces a budget of Bs. 75,000,000, i n contrast to Medina's planned budget of Bs. 40 m i l l i o n . A l l o f f i c e r s above the rank of major p r i o r to thee revo-l u t i o n were discharged. 1? The Junta appointed a predominantly ATX cabinet^ to run the Revolutionary Governmentf u n t i l elections could be held: Betan-court, President; Prleto P., Secretary of the Junta; Barrios, Governor of Federal D i s t r i c t ; Leonl, Minister of National Defense and Minister of Labor; V. Rodriguez, Minister of Communications; D'Ascoll, Minister of the Treasury; Pe^rez Alfonzo, Minister of Development; Mario Vargas, Minister of I n t e r i o r Relations; Del-18 gado Chalbaud, second Minister of National Defense. Rafael" Caldera was appointed Atto rwey-General. p/rez Jimenez headed the General Staff and directed the reorganization of the Ministry of Defense. - 3 0 -Glen L. Kolb, i n h i s book • Democracy and Dictatorship i n Venezuela 1945-1958/', compares AD during the t r l e n i o with the ••New Deal" Brain Trust of the Democrats under Roosevelt i n 1 9 3 3 * 1 9 Blank suggests AD maintained i t s dominant ippjsition i n an attempt to simulate the Partido Revoluclonario I n s t i t u c i o n a l of Mexico, 2 0 In any case, f o r two years Betancourt ruled Venezuela by decree.. The f i r s t decrees, which succeeded i n winning popular support for the AD government, lowered the p r i c e s of food staples. Many important matters were decided upon-by the AD "Cbmlte Ejecutivo Nacional "(GEN), As Congress was suspended during t h i s period,, there was no p a r t i c i p a t i o n by non-adecos, who consequently were?1 angered by ADi's a r b i t r a r y methods and f a i l u r e to hold c o u n c l l Y " However,-on November 17, 1945 a major i s s u e — t h a t of e l e c t o r a l reform--was Intrusted to a committee of widely-esteemed public: figures from various p o l i t i c a l backgrounds. These included: Lorenzo Fernandez (GDFEI); L u i s Hernandez (URB?); Andre's Eloy Blanco (AD:); and Independent s Jeguts Enrique Lo sada, Nicomedes Zuloaga, German Suarez Flamerich, Ambrosio Oropesa, Eduardo Mon-santo, and Martin Fe'rez Guevara. The f r u i t of the committee's lab o r s was revealed i n Decree #216, which was announced on March 15, 1946. The new el e c t o r a l law removed voting r e s t r i c t i o n s on women and i l l i t e r a t e s , allowing f o r universal suffrage from: the age of eighteen. A l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s would be free to nominate? candidates f o r the constituent assembly and representation would correspond to the percentage of votes each party received. I f a party f a i l e d to el e c t either senators or deputies, provisions were made to provide i t with a minimum representation.' 2'' On the same day, constitutional freedoms were restored, with the resultant l e g a l i z a t i o n o f t h i r t e e n p o l i t i c a l groups.. Three of these, i n addition to AD, attained national stature: The Comite' de Organizacion P o l i t i o a E l e c t o r a l Independientee (COPEI) was founded on January 13, 19^6, the: evolved r e s u l t of Rafael Caldera's so c i a l Christian Accion Nacional. COPEI repre-sented the i n t e r e s t s of the middle class? and of thee Church, and: i t s membership was increased by former l o p e c i s t a s who wereeunable to f i n d a more conservative party to f u l f i l l t h e i r needs* 2^ The Unl<$n Republicana Democratica (URD) was founded on March 12, 19^6 by Doctors E l i a s Toro, Isaac Pardo, Reyes Baena, and Inocente?Palacios. Jovito V i l l a l b a was i n v i t e d to Join the; party and became i t s Secretary-General• By the end of 19^7 V i l l a l b a was-the sole leader* as the-others had resigned out of disagreement: with him. While the bulk o f AK: support!: came from peasants and1 workers, UR© attracted the urban mlddle r c l a s s * including formers supporters of Medina* s defunct: PDF. 2^ The two communist parties; held a Unity Congress -in Novembers 19^6, r e s u l t i n g : i n the merger of Fuenmayor's and the Machadd bro-thers* respective factions. However, another Ms s i den tt group,, l e d by L u i s Miquilena and Rodblfo Quintero, emerged and formed-the?Partido Revolucidnario Proletarlo (PRPc).2^ The Partido 1<femxn<-i s t a Venezolano (PCV/) c r i t i c a l l y supported the AD: government dur-ing the t r l e n l o , and PCV labor unions Joined the? AD-domihated Cdnfederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela. The PRP15 maintained* -32-unrelanting h o s t i l i t y toward AD and referred to the PGV as the " t r a i t o r s " . 2 6 On October 27, 1946 Venezuela experienced i t s first;: t r u l y democratic: e l e c t i o n s . T h i r t y - s i x percent of thee population: voted? f o r delegates to the Constituent Assembly. AD: p o l l e d 1,099,691 voters? (78.8 %), winning 137 of the 160 seat's. COPEI won nineteen; seats, with 13.2$ of the votes? URD won two seat's, and the^two communist: factions each won one seat. The Constituent! Assembly convened on December 17, 1946, l e d by l e g i s l a t i v e President Andres Eloy Blanco, second Vice President' Augusto Malave V l l l a l b a (a l a b o r organizer), and AD parliamentary leader L u i s Lander,, a "recently emerged student". 2'' Venezuela's twenty-second' Constitution was promulgated on July 5» 1947. Largely labor o r i e n t e d , - i t guaranteed labor's right' to work, organize and s t r i k e , i n addition to the r i g h t to fringe benefits such as pensions, vacation pay, sick pay, severence pay, and pro f i t - s h a r i n g ; The State would be responsible f o r : pro-vid i n g economic housing f o r workers j plus sufficient- educational and health f a c i l i t i e s ; < Private property was also guaranteed protection; 28 The President:would be elected by d i r e c t , universal suffrage f o r a four-year term. Elghtt years must* elapse before a President could"be r e - e l e c t e d T h e bi-camaV'al Congress would also be elected by d i r e c t voter; However^, the new Constitution s t i l l ! pro-vided forr state? governors to be appointed by the President. - 3 3 -POLICIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AD GOVERNMENT Betancourt* considered the main accomplishments of thee AD? t r i e n i o as: universal suffrage, the war against corruption i n government, and a nationalistic:petroleum p o l i c y . Considerable progress was also made In the areas of health and education,- and-i n the development of agriculture and national i n d u s t r i e s . Petroleum Po l i c y On December 31, 1945 the Junta issued Decree #112 which pro-vided f o r an extraordinary tax rangingr from six to twenty percent on o i l companies* p r o f i t s . This was l a t e r tb become the p o l i c y of H 50-50 M whereby "In no case w i l l the companies be able tb re=-ceive annual p r o f i t s greater than those received by the Venezuelan Government*.2^ According tb the M 50-50 H o i l p o l i c y , i f the sum t o t a l of government" Income from r o y a l t i e s , income tax and muni-c i p a l taxes equalled lesspthan 50$ of the gross o i l p r o f i t s * then the o i l companies and the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum were tb hold year-end consultations to determine how the difference would be made up: e i t h e r by d i r e c t tax payment or by the? com-panies* investment i n housing o r some other mutually agreed so-c i a l project. 3° In addition to the r a i s i n g of taxes, o t h e r points of the AD:petroleum; p o l i c y program included: 1) d i r e c t saleeof r o y a l t i e s i n kind to the international market; 2) non-renewal of concessions to private companies; the e s t a b l i s h -ment of a State o i l company; 3) i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of most of the o i l inside the country; - 3 4 -organization o f a national r e f i n e r y (with State or mixed^ c a p i t a l ) ; 4) conservation o f o i l ; u t i l i z a t i o n of natural gas; 5) re-investmentt of parttof o i l companies 1 p r o f i t s i n Venezuelan a g r i c u l t u r a l and l i v e s t o c k development*; 6) better s a l a r i e s and working-conditions, etc-., f o r Venezuelan o i l workers and technicians; 7) use of o i l 1 revenues by the government: to d i v e r s i f y the economy. 3 1 In June, 19^7, for the f i r s t time the Venezuelan Government: entered the o i l business by accepting part of i t s r o y a l t i e s " i n kind" and s e l l i n g them on the world market. (In March, 19^8 thee i l l f a t e d Gallegos administration i n i t i a t e d plans to createe a State o i l company f o r the exploitation of the National Reserve f i e l d s . )32 Nationalization o f the? o i l industry s t i l l remained a goal of the distant future. As Betancourt onee wrote* "Carecemos de l o s element©s tecnicos y del respaldo de una eeonomfa pro p i a di v e r s i f i c a d a , , que no s permitan adopter una aotitud tan audazmente com© l a quee constltuye e l me Jo r timbre de g l o r i a de l a Admini straclonmexicana? de Lazaro Cardenass "33 When Cardenas nationalized the Mexican o i l industry, the i n t e r s national o i l c a r t e l and a l l i e d governments boycotted Mexican o i l i i Venezuela could not take that r i s k , f o r i i n 1944, of the? #326,000,000 entering the country, #300,000,000 were from the o i l Industry.. Betancourt also points out that; i n the 1948 National Congress debate-over Att:petroleum p o l i c y , none of the other parliamentary f a c t i o n s — i n c l u d i n g the: communists—called f o r the immediate -35-n a t l o n a l i z a t i o n of the "industry. ^ Iron-Ore Pol i c y The ALT iron-ore p o s i t i o n was lesseaggresslve than i t s petro-leum p o l i c y . I t consisted of three? basic? tenets* w l ) Estimular e l arraigo en el p a i s de l a s impresas? que encontramos ya trebajando cuando llegamos a l poder y o r i e n t a r sus inversiones de cap/it a l f i jo de acuerdo con l a s necesldades generalesr; 2) V i g i l a r l a s u t i l i d a d e s de esas companies y tomar so tore e l l as una p a r t i olpaclb'n edecueda y Juste? y 3) Proceder s i n demore e crearruna Industrie siderur-g i c a naclonel, agenclada directamente por e l Est ado para que;no se r e p i t l e s e l a experlencla negativa del petrol eoy exportado en bruto del p a i s durante tanto 8 ano s. M35 The f i r s t mining concessions of substance, those of E l Pao i n Guayane, were given tb Iron Mines Co., a subsidiary of Bethle-hem Steel Corp. (part of the Bookefeller-controHed group of in d u s t r i e s ) i n 1932. Iron Mines was protected by the 1928 Mines Law which exempted i t from e x p l o i t a t i o n tax. According to Betan-court, the inadequate 1928 law was not modified during: the AD t r i e n i o because "apenes s i un Congreso o r d i n a r i o — e l de 1948— pudo funcioner be Jo e l regimen deffibcratloo. M In 1938 the com-pany discovered an Iron deposit of 60$ tenor near San F e l i x on the banks of the Orinoco. This concession included reserves of 100,000,000 tons.3° The huge, high-quality i r o n deposits of Cerro B o l i v a r i n Guayana were conceded i n 194? to O l i v e r Iron Mining, a subsidiary o f United States S t e e l . The company, whose name was l a t e r changed tb Orinoco Mining Co., was under 1945 law, whereby i t paid'-eno -36-average tax of Bs* .2 per ton of ore?exploited.37 Venezuela was hesitant to implement an agressive iron-ore? p o l i c y out of f e a r that thee companies would abandon thee country, forrCerro Bolivar's discovery coincided with the discovery of valuable?deposits i n Labrador and L i b e r i a , i n addition to other-s i t e s . However, Venezuelan i r o n , i n addition to being of 60% tenor, had the advantage of being-at easy access'to U.S.. ports^ and of being mined i n open p i t s rather than i n tunnelsi~38 The new tax pact of 1948 Included a 50-50 tax on i r o n pro-f i t s . The main drawback, as with the petroleum Industry, was that:the government had 1to accept the s t a t i s t i c s presented'by the?companies*- The companies had-to be v i g i l a t e d to prevent" the transferrof p r o f i t s to a subsidiary company or the "matrix" steel producer. The i r o n companies were informed that the government retained the^authority to modify c o n t r a c t s - i f necessary f o r nation-a l i n t e r e s t s . 3 ° The Venezuelan Governmenttmaintained that Swedish and; Canadian Iron p r i c e s should serve as an index for:Venezuelan p r i c e s , but i n f a c t the companies sold Venezuelan i r o n substantially below world market p r i c e s , thus greatly reducing Venezuela's potential income from that industry.** 0 Venezuela had s u f f i c i e n t need f o r i t s own steel industry: i n t e r n a l consumption of i r o n and steel between 1945-1947 was more than 200,000 tons annually; during the f i r s t h a l f of 1948 Iron and steel imports totaled 212,000 tons. In addition, there was the potential of a large L a t i n American market. The e s t a b l i s h --37-ment of a national steel industry was studied at length during-the AITtrlenio and the Gall egos Government: would have begun the undertaking In 19^9. The major hindrance was the lack of coking; c o a l . During the t r i e n l o the extent"of the massive reserves?of Cerro Bolivar: was not completely known. Consequently, rather than obtain coal by trading i r o n ore,< methods were: studied f o r smelting-the ore with e l e c t r i c i t y orrnatural gasg Cbrporacion Venezolana de Fbmentb The AD t r i e n i o proved, according to Romulo Betancourt, that: Venezuelan production would respond favorably to government impe-tus! HS1 e l Est ado se empenatia en l a faena creadora de impulsar,, o r i e n t a r y estimular l a producoloh netamente? venezolana, e l e s p i r l t u industrioso y l a voluntad de trabajo del hombre de nuestfa t i e r r a harian l o demas. 1 , 4 2 To t h i s end} on May 29, 19^6, Decreee#319 established the? Cbrporacion Venezolana de Pomento (CVF). The CVF would receives concessions and"contracts-to organize, develop and administer; any a g r i c u l t u r a l o r i n d u s t r i a l enterprise?of economic o r s o c i a l interest: to the country. To improve means of production and more e f f i c i e n t l y e x plbit Venezuela's natural resources, the CVF o f f e r e d technical and f i n a n c i a l assistance to State and private? enter-p r i s e s . I t could also purchase shares of private companies and i n c o l l abb r a t i o n with these, or with State-run organisms,, ereate? experimental plants* However, Art. 29 of the Decree e x p l i c i t l y states? " . . . l a Corporacioni se esforzara por coordinar su accion con l a s 1 abb res de l o s p a r t i cul ares, a f i n de no entorpecer, n i l n t e r f e r l r con el desarrollo de l a i n i c i a t i v a p r i v a d a s " ^ - 3 8 -The CVF i i i coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture and' stook-rais i n g spent Bs. 35,000,000 i n 1947-1948 on the "Han de Fomento Peeuarlo" i n order tb overcome the country's 30,000 ton d e f i c i t of meat. The funds were spent on supervised c r e d i t s , the r importa-tion; of foreign l i v e s t o c k f o r breeding; the d r i l l i n g of water: wells and construction o f lagunas, and veterinary as s i stance The c r e d i t s - ( o f a Bs; 25,000 maximum) were issued through the Banco Agro-Pecuario (B.A.Py) which u n t i l 1936 had granted loans t o t a l i n g Bs. 1,000,000 a year. Between 1936-1946 loans Increased 1 to a sum of Bs. 10,000,000 yearly* However, with the advent: of the CVF the numberrof credits^-Increased dramatically: 1946 - Bs. 57,200,000 1947 = 81,900,000 1948 = 116,000,000 The number of B.A.P. agencies also increased, from fo r t y ins 1945 to seventy i n 1947. -JEhe B;A.P. guaranteed minimum: p r i c e s f o r crops, and i n order tb prevent: theryearly l o s s ^ o f 20-2$% of grain* surpluses, the GV/E implemented a Silo Plan i n 1 9 4 7 . ^ In sum, between January, 1946 and December, 1948 the CVF; lent'out'Bsi. 58,000,000 f o r Industry and Bs. 99*000,000 f o r a g r i -culture and Mockcaising, l n addition to making d i r e c t investments* amounting to Bs.28,200,000. One CVF transaction that: became a subject of controversy was the so-called "Plan Rockefeller". In accordance with the AD~ pro-posal that o i l companies r e i n v e s t - some of t h e i r p r o f i t s i n the r Venezuelan economy, the plan entailed an agreement: between the CVF: and the: Cbrporacion Venezolana de Economia Baslca (financed by Rockefeller's group of o i l companies) to e s t a b l i s h e nterprises -39-f o r the production of " a r t i c u l o s de prim&ra necesidad".**'? The Joint venture was financed 50% by the Cbrporacion Vene-zolana de Economia Basics (which l a t e r spread to B r a z i l , EL Sal-vador, Puerto Rico, and Peru, under the name International Basle: Economy Corporation (IBEC)), and $0% by Venezuelan c a p i t a l (private and p u b l i c ) . The major enterprises Included a dairy and a f i s h e r y , with the varied objectives of- s e l l i n g - f r e s h f i s h throughout the: country, importing motors and r e f r i g e r a t o r s f o r boats? and'organ-i z i n g fishermen into cooperatives. When these enterprises began to d i s t r i b u t e p r o f i t s ? both partners would be obligated to s e l l l stock to the private sector, and within ten years? the? t o t a l num-ber of shares should be i n Venezuelan hands. To a l l a y suspicions that thes AE Government had become "entre-g u i s t a " to the head of the o i l company that, along with i t s sub-s i d i a r i e s , controlled 60% of Venezuelan o i l production (render.--lng more than $0% o f Standard-Oil of New Jersey*s world p r o f i t s ) , * * 9 Betancourt wrote i n a l e t t e r to Nelson Rockefeller: "...Tenemos e l concepto claro de que Venezuela ne-c e s i t a e l aporte de experlencia administrative, de i n s t r u -mental tecnico y de capltale s que l e sean aportados?por paises con mayor desarrollo economico que e l nuestro. "Perp ese aporte debe r e a l i z a r s e con f i n e s de co-laboraclon para e l negocio l i c i t b y no de colonizaclon monopolizadora.••?50 F l o t a Meroante? Gran- Oblomblana In order: to counteract the high f r e i g h t charges l e v i e d by the American-dominated "Car/}ibbean Conference" shipping, c a r t e l V the AD Government:negotiated with Colombia and Ecuador' i n the establishment o f a Joint merchant f l e e t , known as the^Plota Mer--40-cante Gran-Colomblana 9 commemorating the Bolivar!an i d e a l of a Gran Colombia. In 19^7 the eight-ship f l e e t began operations* financed with $20,000,000? Colombia and Venezuela each c o n t r i -buting 45^, and Ecuador 10%„ 5 1 The Gran Cblomblana successfully defied United States State? Department pressure on behalf o f U.S. shipping i n t e r e s t s . An amusing anecdote In Betancourt 9 s Venezuela: P o l i t i c s y Petroleo r e c a l l s how the State Department attempted to pressure the Colom-bian Government^ reminding i t o f a treaty between the two nations, whereby Colombia agreed to give preference to American merchant ships. The Colombian press, a f t e r a l i t t l e research o f i t s own, reminded the U.Si t h a t " t h i s same treaty recognized Colombian sovereignty over- the Isthmus of PanamaJ52 AD Advances i n Health and Education When AD came to power i n 19^5> 50% o f the adult population was i l l i t e r a t e , while only 131,000 o r one t h i r d o f school-age c h i l d r e n attended classes. Bs. 38,000,000 were a l l o c a t e d f o r education. During the AF administration primary school enrolment trebled and secondary and u n i v e r s i t y enrolments doubled. By 1948 the education budgetthad Increased to Bs. 119 ,000,000 with some 500,000 c h i l d r e n attending schools. In 19^5 there were only twenty-nine State secondary schools, while $0% o f high school-age students attended p r i v a t e schools. In 19^8 the number o f State -41-hlgh schools Increased to forty-seven, and"only 22% of the students were? sent to private schools. During;the t r l e n i b classrooms were constructed tb aecflmodater: 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 students. Bs. 9»000?000 were? spent: yearly tb feed students-at school ! f a c i l i t i e s . > The numberrof children served by school c a f e t e r i a s ifacreased from: a mere 1 0 0 0 l n 1 9 4 5 tb 3 8 , 0 0 0 i i i 1 9 4 8 . 5 4 The AD:Government also I n i t i a t e d poly technical i n s t r u c t i o n i n the university.. AD was the f i r s t Venezuelan Government: tb concern i t s e l f with thee health of the masses* Up u n t i l 1 9 4 5 20% of the population contracted malaria each year. By the end of 1 9 4 7 the diseases-carrying mosqultbs had nearly been exterminated by DDT Dur-ing t h e:trienlo Bs. 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 were spent i n hospital construction. Sim i l a r l y did the government endeavor to increase sewer and water-works s e r v i c e s . ^ 1947" Elections In l a t e 1 9 4 7 AD held i t s - V I I National Convention, i t r a n t i -cipation o f the f i r s t democratic^presidential elections. Andres? Eloy: Blanco replaced BoWlo G a l l egos as party president when the-l a t t e r was again nominated as the party*'s p r e s i d e n t i a l candidate. This was, according :to Bodolfo Luzardo, "por sentimental!smo y por exclusion". Por sentimental reasons, because he had rum sym-b o l i c a l l y against Medina i n a l o s t cause i n 1 9 4 1 ; and "por exclusion" because Decree #9 of the Junta Revolueionarlo forbade any Junta member to run f o r the presidency.£° Ga l l egos campaigned f o r State-sponsored Industrial and a g r i -c u l t u r a l development, f o r more and better health and education -42-f a c l l i t i e s , f o r more public works, and f o r Increased benefits? f o r labor. He condemned the communists as undemocratic: "agents of Russian imperial ism", and he warned against the Falangist and1 J e s u i t influences i n 00 PEI. 57 Antagonism between AD and the other p a r t i e s had been i n -creasing steadily. In 1946 Rafael Caldera resigned as^Atto .rney-General i n order: to devote himself to opposition a c t i v i t i e s . On September 19 of the: same yearrCOPEI issued a Manifest* of Its? c r i t i c i s m of ADT: "Apareeio" GO PEI para que l a s elecciones prometidas" al pueblo por l a Revolucidn de octubre no constltuyeran una farsa mas...para que a l regimen seudo demo critic© que precedid a l a revolucio'n, = con mo no polio de to das l a s a c t l -vidades publicas porrun solo partido, e l Partido O f i c l a l , , no sucediera un simple cambio de no more y personas slno que hubiera un juego efectivo de fuerzas p o l f t i c a s organ!-zadas en partidos capaces de d i s e n t l r , de luchar por l a defensa de sus idealessy por l a intervenclo'rr en l a d i -reccldn de l o s asuntos colectivos. "...De acuerdo con estapconcepcio'n; democratica:,: COPKIIha fustigado l a s lnconsecuenclas de un grupocpollf-t i c o que a l l l e g a r a l poder olvido con i n c r e i b l e t r i v l a l i -dad'y ligereza«lo querprometiera dfesde l a oposicidn. Cuan^ do exige queeel gobierno no sea ejercido en provecho de un grupo,, slno pensando en l o s a l t o s intereses naclbnalest cuando ha c r i t l c a d b l a s vlolaclones a l a s garantias c l u -d ad anas; cuando ha censuradb e l uso de medio s del poder p a r a t o r o e r oonclencias o violentarractitudess C0PE1T ha est ado luohando por l a democraoia. "5° Caldera,, as h i s party's p r e s i d e n t i a l candidate^, also promised more labor benefits and social peace,, accusing thee ADT "Marxists?" of provoking class struggles? He also proposed thee a b o l i t i o n of government! control over Church appointments. Gustavo Maohado was the communist candidate^ while URD? presented congressional candidates o n l y . ^ -43 Gallegos won the December 14, 194? elections by a "landslide", p o l l i n g 871,752 votes to Caldera's 262,204 and Machado's 36,514,. The Congressional elections r e s u l t s were as follows* Senate Chamber of Deputies?^ AD: 38 83 COPEI 4 21 UHD, 1 4 PCV 1 3 Gallegos' cabinet included Andres Eloy Blanco-Exterior Relations; Col. Carlos Delgado Chalbaud-Defense; Juan Pablo Pe'rez Alfonso-Development; Edmundo Femdndez-Health and Welfare?; Raul Leoni-Labor; Leonardo Ruiz Pineda-Communications; and L u i s B. Prieto F.-Education. 6 1 Agrarian Reform The short-lived Gallegos administration: i s credited with one major piece o f l e g i s l a t i o n : the Agrarian Reform Law, promulgated October 18, 1948. Like i t s immediate predecessor at theeend of" Medina's regime, the AD Ley Agrarla never had time to be put into e f f e c t . The major purpose o f the agrarian reform law was to endow the hundreds of thousands of landless^Venezuelan peasants with enough land to support themselves and t h e i r families*, and to supply f i n a n c i a l and technical a id i n the hope of increasing production and thus eliminate Venezuela's need to import food. The exi s t i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l s i t u a t i o n consisted of a small minority of landowners who possessed a disproportionatepamount of land, much of which was i d l e and unproductive* Many of thesee "1 a t i f u n d i s t a s " had inherited land that was o r i g i n a l l y usurped -44-from municipal p u b l i c lands (ejidales) or that had been obtained 62 by other l e g a l l y dubious means* In addition to the social i n e q u i t i e s of the l a t i f u n d i o system i t also proved to be economically unproductive. In data compiled by the Banco Agro-Pecuaria i n June, 1939, i t was revealed thatt o f 800,870 hectares mortgaged by that bank,-74# were uncultivated.°3 In J u l y , 1949 the Corporacion Venezolana de Pomento reveal-ed s t a t i s t i c s which i l l u s t r a t e d the magnitude of the problems facing! Venezuelan land reformers: State Number of Owners % of land owned64 Anzoategu* 121 90 Aragua 151 80 Barlnas 17 90 Bolivar 34 90 Carabbbo 145 90 Gdjedes 95 90 Guarlco 110 90 Tachire 69 30 Miranda 21 57 D l s t . Federal 56 90 The vast majority of rural farmers, who composed two t h i r d s of the nation's population duringnthe t r i e n i o , were forced tb work as sharecroppers on the l a t i f u n d i o s . The "conuquero" would give the l a t i f u n d i s t a 50$ of h i s crop as rent; I f he worked f o r the owner, i n addition, he was paid "starvation wages" l n the^form of consumer goods, rather than l n money. To make ends meet u n t i r crops were harvested, he would obtain goods on c r e d i t based on h i s own 50$ of the crop; According, to the M i n i s t r y of Agriculture \ i n 1946, there were only seventy lightweight machines ( i . e . tractors) i n Venezuela and not one bulldozer or other heavy machinery useful f o r d e f o r e s t a t i o n . 6 6 - 4 5 -The 1948 Ley Agraria created the Institute Agrario Nacional (IAN) to implement the proposed reforms. The IAN was endowed with Bs. 100,000,000 i n i t i a l l y and would receive two to four per-cent of future national budgets. The IAN would organize the following types-of land u t i l i z a -t i o n : ity colony: a group of ind i v i d u a l land parcels i n the same zone; the farmer owns h i s land but can not transfer or mortgage i t ' without the authorization of the IAN. 2) cooperative: members-use land,, ereditt and machinery i n common. 3) community: not'less than 500 hectares of land used by H a society of workers"; land, c r e d i t s , etc., are used i n common?,; with each individual having h i s own garden. 4) individual farm. 6 7 Depending on.the i n d i v i d u a l case, lands were to be d i s t r i -buted f o r sale, with long-term, low-lnteresttmortgage rates; for: r e n t a l , with or without an option to buy; f o r "usufructb", with thee o b l i g a t i o n to c u l t i v a t e the land and pay a f i x e d feec ("pres-^ 68 taolon"); and f o r "precarious use" with a probation period. A r t i c l e 80 of the law provided f o r the expropriation by the IAN of large extensions of i d l e lands* of l a n d s - i n d i r e c t l y e x p l o i t -ed by absentee landlords; and of c u l t i v a t i b l e land unduly used as pastureeland f o r l i v e s t o c k . These lands would be expropriated; only a f t e r attempts^to purchase them had f a i l e d . Payment would be p a r t i a l l y made l n government: bonds which would pay annual i n t e -r e s t s of between three? to f i v e percent.^9 -46-Lands not l i a b l e f o r expropriation included farms not ex-ceeding: 1 50 hectares of f i r s t class^land ( f i r s t classr= permanent i r r i g a t i o n , humidity) o r 300 hectares of second-class land (second class? = dry); and l i v e s t o c k ranches not exceeding? 5000 hectares? f i r s t ^ c l a s s r o r 25,000 second c l a s s . The new law was not agalnstt productive private enterprises A r t i c l e 10? authorized the IAN to grant temporary concessions of in e x p r o p r l a b i l i t y to "personas naturalespy Jurfdicasnque desean establecer explotaclones racionales y mecanizadas en grandes ex-tensiones de terrenos. " 7 ° OPPOSITION TO AD LEADING TO THE COUP OF NOVEMBER 24, 1948 The Ley Agraria, according to some authors, was a major fac-t o r which contributed to the a l l i a n c e of the reactionary land-holding class? with the dissident m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s that overthrew? the Gallegos Government* However, l t f i s more probable that! sec-t a r i a n party p o l i t i c s * rather than any ind i v i d u a l l e g i s l a t i v e issue,, brought: about the demise of ADT national leadership,. The AD t r i e n l o had a history of attempted insurrections* i n January, 19^6 a pl o t by high o f f i c i a l s of the Lopez Cbntreras^and Medina regimes was uncovered, followed six months l a t e r by another l o p e o l s t a attempt; on December 11, 19^6 there was f i g h t i n g - i n Maraoay and Valencia, which included Chief of Staff Marcos Perez^ Jimenez's brother, Col. Juan Fe'rez Jimenez, as one of the insurgent leaders; and Major J u l i o Cesar Vargas,, resentful and c r i t i c a l ever since h i s place on the Junta was "usurped" by Delgado Chalbaud,, was dismissed from active service and subsequently became involved i n another u n f r u i t f u l conspiracy to overthrow the government, 7 1 Several movements were foreign sponsored, f o r example the^ January, 19^8. conspiracy which implicated involvement* by Domini-can Republic:: d i c t a t o r Rafael T r u j i l l o and Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua, along with a Venezuelan c i v i l i a n , Pedro Estrada, who l a t e r became head of the notorious National Security P o l i c e under Perez Jimenez.72 AD's huge e l e c t o r a l successes were due to i t s superior and more experienced party organization. The party's platform appeal-ed to the masses, many of whom were i l l i t e r a t e s enjoying the franchise f o r the f i r s t : time. Nevertheless? public: enthusiasm f o r the democratic: pro cess waned when Venezuelans were c a l l e d to the p o l l s f o r the t h i r d time i n eighteen months f o r the municipal' el e c t i o n s of May 9, 19^8. At that time: the voter turn-out was?-comparatively small': 693,15^ compared to the 1,395*200 voters i n October, 19^6 and the 1,183,470 who turned out at the December, . 19^7 p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . However,: i n spite o f the decrease i n t o t a l votes, both AD and COPEI received approximately the same percentage of votes: as In the previous two e l e c t i o n s . 7 ^ AD held i t s VIII National Convention at the end of May, 19^8, and i n addition to ele c t i n g new o f f i c i a l s , the party attempted to deal with o r g a n i z a t i o n d e f e c t s . Party leadership had deteriorated when the experienced leaders, such as Betancourt and Leoni, be-came involved with running the national government". Betancourtt became party president again, with f i r s t v i c e president - Valmore Rodriguez, second v i c e president - L u i s Lander, Secretary-General -48-L u l s August© Dubuc* Agrarian Secretary - Ramon QuiJada.?^ Another) organizational problem was that of sheer numbers: the party had undergone a dramatic increase i n membership, approach-ing one h a l f m i l l i o n . Although AD was the country's most exper-ienced p o l i t i c a l party, the enormous tasks which confronted i t — thatt of running a massive party organization and the adminlstra* t l o n of a nation—were to prove overwhelming i n the face of the opposition fomented by AD*s r i v a l factions i n society. As John Martz commented, ADD was "by no means s u f f i c i e n t l y equipped o r experienced tb operate?and i n s t i t u t e the far-reaching national revolution- envisioned by i t s leadership. "75 I f dialogue bettween AD and the opposition p a r t i e s had been l e s s than cordi a l before Gallegos' e l e c t i o n , afterwards i t was p r a c t i c a l l y non-existent. Occasionally COPEI and URD) r a l l i e s wereedisrupted* and some l o c a l opposition leaders were?temporarily J a i l e d on dubious charges. 7^ URD: was scornfully considered by AD'&a an instrument: of Jovito V i l l a l b a ' s caudlllism and personal ambition. Neither would the adecos recognize GOPEI as a reformist organization, due to i t s connections with l b p e c i s t a s and strong c l e r i c a l elements. (Indeed* AD's attitude toward: these two p a r t i e s hardened a f t e r the November, 1948 coup, accusing them of " i n t e l l e c t u a l l y " par-ticipating;: i n the counter-revolutlbn and subsequently collaborat-ing with the new m i l i t a r y Junta.)77 In a speech made i n Caracas on October 18, 1946 Betancourt: claimed AD was exercising just and impartial government1* citings that out of 7000 p u b l i c employees i n the Federal D i s t r i c t * onlyv -49-300 were AD:members. However the opposition p a r t i e s l a t e r main-tained AD monopolized the lower strata of the government bureau-cracy,, despite Betancourt*s attempts to discourage this.''® One event, that alienated a large segment of Venezuelan so-c i e t y was thefJurado de Re sponsabilldad C i v i l y Administrative,, a nine-month t r i a l that began i n 1946, with the purpose of repos-sessing the i l l i c i t f i & y obtained wealth of previous government: o f f i c i a l s . One hundred and f i f t y persons were t r i e d , almost a l l of whom were convicted, and $120,000,000 i n property was con* 79 fiseated by the ADGovernment.' 7 The labor: movement, along with the peasants, constituted the main bulwark of AD: support. AD encouraged the?organization of unions: i n 1946 500 new l o c a l s and thirteen national federations were formed, and the following year the:Confederacidn de Trabaja-dores de Venezuela (CTV) was established, thus consolidating; AD*s labor support.. During the course of government a r b i t r a t i o n i n labor-management contracts, labor's cause was normally favored. Thus during the t r i e n i o the "real wages" of Venezuelans rose by 65$. On the other hand, the business sector of the society be-came alienated from AD^ due to r i s i n g costs r e s u l t i n g from union demands.® 0 In 1948 AD leaders expelled Red communist leaders from FEDE-PETROL, the petroleum workers* union, over a contract dispute* As a consequence, the communists also condoned theemilltary take-81 over: In November of that*: year. Even the Catholic: Church had i t s grudge against AD: l t r e -sented government interference i n parrochial schools, with a new requirementtthat these: obtain government c e r t i f i c a t i o n * - 5 0 -< AD RAPPORT. WITH MILITARY AD t r i e d to maintain UPM goodwill by increasing o f f i c e r s a l a r i e s by 30$. In e f f e c t , i n i t s f i r s t two years the AD'Govern-ment-allocated more money to the m i l i t a r y budget than i t ! d i d f o r education. Almost the? same amount—some Bs. 23,750,000—was c spent on the construction of barracks as con the construction of On school buildings. A l l the while the ADTGovernment stressed the necessity of a professional n o n - p o l i t i c a l army responsible to the c i v i l i a n government.®3 This was frequently reaffirmed by o f f l c e r s ? i n public? declarations. (Up u n t i l mld-19^8 Perez Jimenez stated p u b l i c l y that he defended the?party i n power, and indeed"5 he had helped put down various conspiracies agalnst-the government, including the one l e d by h i s brother*) However,, during t h e t r l e n i o there were attempted coups l e d by i n d i v i d u a l UPM members. AD was accused o f reacting to these by fomenting?anti-military sentiment: among ; the public -; The m i l i -tary also accused AD--and other c i v i l i a n groups—of applying pres-sure on the m i l i t a r y to get t h e i r support. In protest of c i v i l i a n interference, Defense Minister Delgado Chalbaud addressed: the Constituent Assembly back l n January of 19^7. C i v i l i a n pressure on the army increased a f t e r Gallegos' election.®-* Burggraaff suggests that the o f f i c e r s were disturbed by the constant p o l i t i c a l campaigning and propaganda l n the c i v i l i a n ' sec-t o r . Not accustomed to such pre-election fervor and turmoil, they assumed the AD Government was at f a u l t f o r not maintaining p u b l i e t r a n q u i l i t y . 8 6 -51-L t . Col. Perez Jimenez was considered the greatest threat to the AD Government. He maintained a personal following among; the UPM o f f i c e r s , along with h i s as s i s t a n t , L t . Col. L u i s Felipe Llovera Paez. Delgado Chalbaud was also suspected of having ambitions. He t r i e d to maintain a stroig p o s i t i o n with c i v i l i a n s and m i l i t a r y , and to t h i s end formed an " a l l i a n c e " with Perez Jimenez: the l a t t e r had the support of the o f f i c e r s while he was unpopular with the adecos; Delgado-Chalbaud, due to h i s French m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g with i t s emphasis on engineering:", and h i s high-r society background, was more r e a d i l y accepted by c i v i l i a n s * 8 ? The government wanted to send Perez Jimenez to the Venezuelan Embassy i n B r a z i l , but Delgado Chalbaud opposed the plan i n order? not to antagonize the army. Pe'rez Jimenez was f i n a l l y sent on a tour of other South American countries, but ended up i n Caracas, again Chief of S t a f f . 8 8 Meanwhile, back: i n the barracks, the Junior o f f i c e r s ' com-p l a i n t s about AD increased. They accused the adecos of persecut-ing p o l i t i c a l adversaries and of unwillingness to d i s t i n g u i s h be-tween party and government; of attempting-to sow discord among? the m i l i t a r y ; of arming a c i v i l i a n m i l i t i a (although when thee coup did occur, there was no c i v i l i a n resistence); of causlngrfood shor-tages and r a i s i n g the cost of l i v i n g ? of lacking a " n a t i o n a l i s t i c f e r v o r " i n economic a f f a i r s ( i . e . assuring ; o i l companies t h a t the? basic- petroleum law would not be changed, and opening new sectors of the economy to foreign investors such as the Plan R o c k e f e l l e r — however Rockefeller's IBEGT did not begin to expand u n t i l 1949, a f t e r the coup I - 5 2 -The opposition p a r t i e s endeavored to provoke m i l i t a r y action, both covertly and o v e r t l y . An example of the l a t t e r was an a r t i -cle published i n * E l G r a f l o o / (November 1, 1 9 W by a young COPEI leader, L u i s A. Herrera Campins, e n t i t l e d "El merlto de una revo-l u c l o n traioionada". The a r t i c l e c r i t i c i z e d the o f f i c e r s * apparent support of the AD regime and c a l l e d f o r i t s rectification.^° The Junior o f f i c e r s , impatient with Delgado Chalbaud, Perez Jimenez and others who appeared to serve as r e s t r a i n i n g forces,, were determined to change the status quo. On November 14, 1948 they commissioned Delgado Chalbaud and Perez Jimenez to present an ultimatum to Gallegos which included the f o l i o wing" demands: 1) AD must stop politicizing;:army personnel. 2) Independents must substitute some adecos i n the Cabinet. 3) The "party m i l i t i a " must be disarmed. 4) Betancourt must leave the country I n d e f i n i t e l y * ? 1 Gallegos refused to comply to these demands. He also refused the suggestion of Maracay garrison commander L t . Col. Gamez Are-lla n o to arrest Delgado Chalbaud l n order to f o r e s t a l l 1 the coup.. Betancourt*s suggestion to appeal to organized labor f o r t a c t i c a l support, such as paralyzing the economy with a s t r i k e by petroleum workers, was also rejected. In an attempt to negotiate, Gallegos brought AD-ally L t . Col. Mario Vargas back from the New York sanatorium where he was under treatment f o r tuber culo s i s.^ 2 On November 20 (the same day censorship was imposed on p o l i -t i c a l news) Vargas began a series of meeting*with m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s i n search of a compromise. He was Joined on the 22nd by an independent, Jose A. Giacoplni Zarraga, a temporary - 5 3 -Secretary-General of the 19^5 Revolutionary Junta who had close' contacts with the m i l i t a r y . The army proposed a compromise allow-ing three AD cabinet ministers and the disarming of a l l c i t i z e n s , not just adecos. G a l l egos refused t h i s compromise and, confronted with Intense m i l i t a r y pressure and h o s t i l i t y , naively declared the m i l i t a r y should apologize and submit to d i s c i p l i n a r y action. ?3 A secret meeting was held the night of November 22, attended by Delgado Chalbaud, Llovera Paez, Giacoplni, Betancourt, Alberto Carnevall, and Gonzalo Barrios. The m i l i t a r y agreed to have six adecos i n the Cabinet, with independents composing the balance. Fe tan court agreed to go into e x i l e even i f the party were against l t . (He had v o l u n t a r i l y l e f t the country when Ga l l egos assumed the presidency, but had returned i n September when the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n became Increasingly v o l a t i l e . ) ^ The AD leadership s t i l l objected to the Cabinet change. The party had received an overwhelming majority i n the elections which made a minority p o s i t i o n on the Cabinet unacceptable. However,, AD was w i l l i n g to change some state governors and lower o f f i c i a l s . The entire Cabinet resigned i n order to f a c i l i t a t e a compromise,, but on November 23 meetings between the President, mediators, and AD and m i l i t a r y leaders f a i l e d to reach a mutually acoepted solu-t i o n . The government p u b l i c l y announced that the s i t u a t i o n was under control, but negotiations broke o f f the same day.. I t Is not p u b l i c l y known how much Influence foreign govern-ments exercised during the events leading up to the November 24 coup. Surely, the Venezuelan m i l i t a r y were encouraged by United States recognition of the m i l i t a r y regime that overthrew the three--54-year o l d Peruvian democratic government i n October, 1948. On the-other hand, the f a i l u r e of the Truman administration to declare i t s approval and support of the AD Government'when the l a t t e r was confronted with the threatened coup must also be considered a contributing factor to the coup's success. Manuel Cableses Donoso purports that a United States Embassy attache, Col. Adams, was In permanent contact with the m i l i t a r y leaders that'overthrew; G a l l egos. Although there i s no evidence that the o i l companies over t l y supported the coup, i t i s interesting^to note that on November 23 the Mene Grande O i l Co., a subsidiary of Standard O i l Co., bought up the entire stock of the Orinoco O i l Co.^ The immediate J u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the coup on November 24 was that'the AD-controlled Confederacidn de Trabajadores de Venezuela had given orders f o r a general s t r i k e . The army maintained that such a strik e would bring economic disas t e r and c i v i l war, and thus intervention was necessary. That day President G a l l egos wrote p r i o r to h i s a r r e s t : "The m i l i t a r y coup culminates an in s u r r e c t i o n a l process by the forces of the Caracas garrison and of the m i l i t a r y high command, i n i t i a t e d ten days ago with the' intent of exerting pressure l n order tb impose a certa i n l i n e of p o l i t i c a l conduct on me...Against such pretensions I have energetically fought l n defense of the dignity of c i v i l " 1 power, against^which t h i s blow has been directed i n order to esta b l i s h a m i l i t a r y dictatorship."97 There was no armed resistance by students, workers, o r peasants, and the coup was complete within a matterrof hours. CHAPTER III 1948-1958 DICTATORSHIP THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT!' On November 24, 1948 a triumVerant junta was formed, composed of Delgado Chalbaud, Perez Jimenez, and Llovera Paez. Delgado Chalbaud was supposedly reluctant at f i r s t to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the Junta, since he had been Minister of Defense of the AD< Government. However? once h i s decision was made, he then declared himself Junta President", due to h i s higher rank. Perez Jimenez was number tw> . ., assuming the o f f i c e of Minister o f Defense. Llovera Paez, l e a s t ambitious of the three, became Minister of I n t e r i o r Relations. The Junta selected Independents and former lopeolstas ana medinistas f o r high c i v i l i a n posts. C i v i l i a n s (from the upper: middle class) constituted a majority of the Cabinet. Some "urre-d i s t a s " and copeyanos received appointments to state governorships and l e s s e r posts a f t e r Jovito V i l l a l b a and Rafael Caldera declared' t h e i r support f o r the new government. (The leaders of both com-munist factions likewise gave the Junta t h e i r support.) 2 On December 7 the Junta decreed the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Accion Democratlea Party, accusing i t s members of having maintained a clandestine m i l i t i a , of attempting to i n c i t e workers' unions and r u r a l leagues to a general s t r i k e , and of creating a State withini a State. Thus i t was "the ineluctable duty ©-f the Provisional Government, i n accordance with one of the fundamental p o l i t i c a l aims which originated the Provisional Government, to promote the re-establishment of i n s t i t u t i o n a l normalcy i n the country and to eliminate I r r e g u l a r i t i e s born of p o l i t i c a l opportunism, of the f a l s i f i c a t i o n of the legitimate function of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s within a democratic regime, and of the undue use of partisanship i n government functions."3 The Junta continued i n power u n t i l November, 1950, during -56-which time i t ruled according to the 1945-amended 1936 Constitu-t i o n , consequently annulling AD* s reform decrees and laws. For example, on May 9, 1949 the Junta Minister of Development, Pedro Ignacio Aguerreverl, held a press conference i n Caracas which amounted to an open i n v i t a t i o n f o r increased foreign investment i n Venezuela, He announced that the Junta would reduce taxes on foreign companies and that i t would not i n s i s t on 50% of the o i l p r o f i t s . In addition, the Junta had decided to revoke the AD rule of "no more concessions",^ y Another s i g n i f i c a n t reversal i n AD po l i c y was Decree #270* issued September 16, 19^9. This n u l l i f i e d the 1946 judgments of the Jury of C i v i l and Administrative Responsibility and authorized the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of Be. 240,000,000 to dozens of the convicted "reos de peculado".^ AD UNDERGROUND AND IN EXILE When the coup occurred, Betancourt' took refuge at the Colom-bian Embassy. The Chilean government petitioned f o r OAS: i n t e r -vention i n order to make the Junta give Betancourt safeconduct out of the country. This action offended the Junta, which subsequent-l y broke o f f diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with Chile. Betancourt f i n a l l y ' received safeconduct out of Venezuela on January 2 3 , 1949. Thee senior MDrieader: took refuge i n Havana where he remained u n t i l Fulgencio B a t i s t a overthrew Frio Socarras i n 1952, a f t e r which Betancourt l i v e d mainly i n Puerto Rico and Costa Rica.^ Other centers f o r "Old Guard" AD leaders i n e x i l e included Buenos Aires, Santiago, San Jose' (Costa Rica), Mexico City, and New York City. Committees were established i n these c i t i e s which -57-were directed by the ComltecGb-ordlnador del Exterior (CCE), based p r i n c i p a l l y i n Costa Rica. The CCE maintained contact with ADC leaders i n Venezuela, and eventually convened the Cbnferencia de Exilados l n 1956, The exi l e d leaders retained supreme author-i t y over ther party organization, but f o n p r a c t i c a l purposes the clandestine leaders made the f i n a l decisions on matters d i r e c t l y concerning*; int e r n a l a f f a i r s , ? Within Venezuela the task o f maintainingrtheporganizatlon o f the clandestine party f e l l to the party youth and u n i v e r s i t y stu-dents. These enjoyed r e l a t i v e " p o l i t i c a l anonymity" but werecin-experlenced i n the running of a d i s c i p l i n e d underground organiza-t i o n ; . D i s c i p l i n e was hard to maintain, as many adecos were i n favor of a oounter«-coup rather than: working at reorganizing, ther party and atfc establishing an a l l i a n c e with democratics m i l i t a r y men; 8 A l l AD conventions,; assemblies, and theeCbmite Dlrectivo Nacional were suspended i n d e f i n i t e l y . The Comlte EjecutiVo Nacl6>-nal became the party's supreme authority withing; the country,. Lower party u n i t s had to accept CENT d i r e c t i v e s unconditionally,, wi thou t debate; 9 ELIMINATION OF DELGADO CHALBAUD: Junta President; Delgado Chalbaud promised el e c t i o n s and" was reluctant to persecute AD". Pe'rez Jimenez and Llovera Paez pre-fered an e f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p over a return to the tur-moil of heated democratic e l e c t i o n campaigns. On November 13» 1950 Delgado Chalbaud was abducted while on: - 5 8 -h i s way to Miraflores Palace. There were purportedly twenty men Involved, l e d by Rafael Simon Urblna who had once l e d an unsuccess-f u l expedition against Gdmez i n 1931.• Delgado Chalbaud was taken tb a vacant house and shot. Urblna was also accidentally shot i n the foot by a cohort. He sought refuge at the Nicaraguan Embassy and sent: Perez Jimenez a note which was l a t e r entered i n the o f f i -c i a l record of the assassination Inquest: "As I t o l d you...1 want"no other President but you. Delgado was mortally wounded, although I did not want them to k i l l him...I pray that you come to my aid l n the Embassy of Nicaragua, where I am badly wounded." 1 0 Urblna was subsequently captured at thee Embassy and was k i l l e d "attempting to escape" (although he probably could not 1 even walk!) Perez Jimenez denied any complicity i n the matter, although he withdrew from c i r c u l a t i o n - t h e o f f i c i a l summary of the t r i a l o f those persons in d i c t e d f o r Delgado's assassination? To further remove himself from suspicion Pe'rez Jimenez ap-pointed a c i v i l i a n "puppet" president of the Junta: Caracas law-yer German Suarez Plamerich, a former dean of the Central Univer-s i t y ' s Law School who had served as l e g a l advisor to the Junta i n 1948 and who was : t h e n " Ambassador to P e r u . 1 1 The assassination of Delgado Chalbaud provoked student' r i o t s with the resultant closing of Caracas secondary schools and the Central University. The l e g a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s agitated f o r free e l e c t i o n s . Clandestine adecos were subjected to i n t e n s i f i e d persecution,-and the government opened the infamous detention camp fo r p o l i t i c a l prisoners on Guasina Island i n the Orinoco Delta. (Between 1951-1952 over 4000 adecos were sent to t h i s jungle con-IP centration camp.) - 5 9 -THE 1952 ELECTION, FRAUD In A p r i l , 1951 a new el e c t o r a l law was effected which made voting compulsory f o r a l l c i t i z e n s between the ages of 21-65 (Including i l l i t e r a t e s ) . The law allowed f o r d i r e c t e l e c t i o n s , however i t was accompanied by another law which r e s t r i c t e d p o l i -t i c a l party a c t i v i t i e s . In addition to having to get government-approval to campaign, the p a r t i e s wereerequired to furnish the government with d e t a i l s regarding public-meetings, memliership, and finances. Campaigning must be subdued" and the p a r t i es- could: not have access to broadcasting media. Coverage of OOPEIi and1 URDC a c t i v i t i e s was also censored l n the press; C r i t i c i s m of the Junta regime mustalso be subdued. *3 Several pro-government: groups formed the Frente E l e c t o r a l Independlente (FBI) with Perez Jimenez as i t s p r e s i d e n t i a l candi-date, and material progress as i t s platform. URD: candidate Jovito V i l l a l b a denounced FEU as a front f o r m i l i t a r y dictatorship and-demanded d r a s t i c social and economical reforms i n h i s platform;. He also accused COPEI of being reactionary and c l e r i c a l . Rafael Caldera of COPEI proposed moderate reforms and honest adminlstra-t i o n . 1 ^ The exiled AD leaders published a manifesto declaring-the e l e c t i o n s a farce and urged adecos not to vote. However, during* the Constituent Assembly elections held on November 30, 1952 URD received heavy AD support. Betancourt maintained that^a few days? before the elections the AD leadership decided AD should support URD", but did not declare t h i s p u b l i c l y f o r fear of providing the government with an excuse to n u l l i f y the elect i o n s . However, the -60-u r r e d i s t a s i n s i s t t h i s support was spontaneous.^"-' Over 30% of the votes were counted when an International News Service b u l l e t i n l n Caracas announced URD v i c t o r i e s i n a l l but two Andean states (which supported COPEI). FEI was t r a i l i n g URD) by 150,000 votes. Thereafter the news was censored. 1 6 Meanwhile, PeVez Jime'nez was sounding out the support of h i s army commanders at Maracay and other garrisons. By the evening-of December 1 he had decided to follow h i s chief advisor Laureano V a l l e n i l l a Lanz*s counsel and n u l l i f y the ele c t i o n s . At 3:00 AM on December 2 Fe'rez Jimenez sent a telegram to the URD leadership accusing URDIof conn 7 vlng with the outlawed FCY and AD. That*: evening the Suarez Flamerich Junta resigned and the Armed Forces named Perez Jime*nez Provisional President. 1''' During the month of December many army o f f i c e r s suspected of liberalijsm were "arrested,, j a i l e d , transferred, demoted, o n de-ported" i n order to prevent any organized m i l i t a r y opposition to what was v i r t u a l l y another coup by Perez Jimenez. I t i s possible, but there i s no p u b l i c proof, that Perez Jimenez had the approval of the United States Ambassador, Fletcher Warren, p r i o r to the e l e c t i o n fraud. I t i s known that Warren was a close f r i e n d of Security Chief Pedro Estrada and that he also held Pe'rez Jimenez i n high regard. The foreign press denounced the f a c t that Perez Jimenez had broken the e l e c t o r a l law l e g i s l a t -ed by h i s own government. However, the United States saw no pro-blem i n recognizing the new government, since i t was basically- the same regime as before, and Washington proceeded to grant i t s re-cognition without delay. ^ -61-On December 16 Jovito V l l l a l b a , accompanied by six other UBD leaders, protested to the new Minister of I n t e r i o r Relations, Laureano V a l l e n i l l a Lanz. V l l l a l b a offered to compromise with an independent provisional president and Pe'rez Jimenez as Minister of Defense. His plan was rejected; he and h i s colleagues were arr e s t -ed as they l e f t the Ministry and deported that same evening. 2 0 On January 9, 1953 the Constituent Assembly met, boycotted by the majority of URDC and COPEI delegates. In March the assembly adopted a military-approved Constitution which gave the executive a disproportionate amount of power. L i s t e d among-the duties of c i t i z e n s (Art. 33) was: "No tomar parte en activldades p o l f t i c a s ^ diferentes de l a s del e j e r c i c l o d e l sufragio, cuando este l e s corresponda. " 2 1 {"r.^"^- & On A p r i l 16, 1953 the FEI-dominated Congress appointed Perez Jimenez constitutional President f o r a term of f i v e years. Inter-nal espionage and p o l i t i c a l persecution was i n t e n s i f i e d by the National Security Pol i c e (SN) under Pedro Estrada. Rafael Galdera was temporarily imprisoned, and members of URDTand COPEI began to 22 Join t h e i r adeco compatriots on Guasina Island. Hundreds of labor leaders were also imprisoned, and equal numbers of teachers l i n k e d with AD were dismissed, imprisoned,, or e x i l e d . While AD and the PCV were the p r i n c i p a l victims of SN persecution, Rodolfo Quintero's "Black" communists supported the Pe'rez Jimenez regime i n exchange f o r major control over labor unions. 2 3 - 6 2 -AD PERSECUTION" Diiringqthe m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p AD leadership endured con-tinuous government! persecution i n an attempt to completely suppress" party a c t i v i t y . After the 1948 coup, Secretary-General L u i s A, Dubuc became^ the d i r e c t o r of clandestine a c t i v i t i e s but within a few weeks he was captured and imprisoned, Octavib Lepage assumed party leader* ship temporarily, followed by Leonardo Ruiz Pineda, who had been Oh, Minister of Communications under G a l l egos.. Ruiz Pineda c o n f l i c t e d with the? exiled Betancourt over declar-ing s o l i d a r i t y with the United States i n the Korean War. Betan-court was i n favor of the U.S"., anti-communist actions, while Ruiz believed supporting the U.Sv would be tantamount to Mselling?-one-s e l f " i n order tb regain power. 2^ According-; tb Domingo Alberto Rang e l , Ruiz's biggest error was involving himself deeply i n m i l i t a r y conspiracy. Ruiz, an inteUsc-it wall and poet, with a charismatic personality, was from Tachlra, and he was able to gain the confidence of many m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s , f / 26 including collaborators of Perez Jimenez. The elimination of Leonardo Ruiz Pineda was effected on October 21, 1952 when he was: shot down by p o l i c e on a Caracas street. Ruiz was succeeded by Alberto Carnevali as ADr Secretary-General. Carnevali was a strategist'and p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t who believed l n a revolution of the masses. After the December, 1952 e l e c t i o n fraud, Carnevali proclaimed AD In a state of permanent r e b e l l i o n against the d i c t a t o r s h i p and he proposed the u n i f i c a t i o n - 6 3 -of a l l " anti-government groups. On January 18, 1953 government agents attacked. Carnevali's residence i n Caracas, k i l l i n g several adecos. Carnevali was arrested and eventually succumbed in- J a i l from cancer a f t e r the government refused pleas to have him moved-' to a h o s p i t a l . 2 7 Former Minister of I n t e r i o r Relations E l i g i o Anzola Anzola became acting Secretary-General, but he was also captured on A p r i l 24, 1953 and sent into e x i l e a f t e r suffering physical abuse i n J a i l . Antonio Pinto Salinas 1 tenure as AD Secretary-General was even shorter: l n June, 1953 he was ambushed and k i l l e d on a highway. 2 8 Thus were AD* s clandestine leaders systematically persecuted throughout the Perez Jimenez-regime. Many others were imprisoned and tortured. Meanwhile, i n October, 195^, United States P r e s i -dent Eisenhower awarded the avowed anti-communist Venezuelan d i c -t ator the Legion of Merit medal. 2 9 RISE OF THE PCV Between 1953 and 1957 AD reslstence was reduced to a student vanguard and i s o l a t e d groups of workers. As Rangel put i t : the party became "un est ado de alma" rather than an organization; The AD youth "no reciben l a expreslon d i r e c t a de l a s masas n i tienen lftstrumentos para g r a v i t a r sobre. e l l as. "3° The Partido Comunista Venezolano (PCV), on the other hand, managed to recuperate i t s strength that had dissipated during the: 1941-1945 period of i n t e r n a l s t r i f e . Unlike AD, the PCV did not l o s e i t s most important leaders during the clandestine period. The -64-party was able to maintain the continuous c i r c u l a t i o n of i t s paper whereas the AD paper Resistenoia appeared s p o r a d i c a l l y . J Also during the Resistence, the PCV experienced a "metamor-phasls" i n philosophy and membership: u n t i l 1946 the party f o l -lowed the d i c t a t e s of the Soviet Union, relegating Venezuela's national problems to a secondary p o s i t i o n of importance. During? the Resistence the party, which was previously composed of i n -t e l l e c t u a l s and "consciencious workers", attracted a broader membership of students and members of the labor c l a s s . The change l n party philosophy was i n i t i a t e d by Pompeyo Marquez while PCV' leaders Jesus Farias and the Machado brothers were: i n j a i l ; Ma*r-quez analyzed the Venezuelan economy and proposed strategy to make the PCV an e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l instrument that f could deal with the diverse problems (e.g. foreign economic" imperialism, agrarian re-form, and labor problems) confronting the n a t i o n , 3 2 "MATERIAL PROGRESS" UNDER PEREZ JIMENEZ Like h i s father before him, Laureano V a l l e n l l l a Lanz authored the "apology" of h i s t o t a l i t a r i a n head of State. V a l l e n l l l a Lanz, Sr. wrote Cesari smo Demooratloo f o r Juan Vicente Gomez; h i s son chose to t i t l e h i s work Nuevo Idearlo Naclonal . 33 In Nuevo Idearlo Naoional the author r a t i o n a l i z e s Perez J i -menez's contempt f o r democracy, maintaining?that the underdevelop-ed Venezuelan masses were'not ready f o r self-government. Instead, the President was determined to " d e p o l l t i c i z e " the nation and con-centrate on achieving material progress; "the conquest of the physical environment".34 - 6 5 -Perez Jimenez was motivated by the obsession to make Venezuela the "showcase" of L a t i n America, and thus surpass the material progress r e a l i z e d by other L a t i n American strongmen Manuel Odria, Juan Peron, Rafael T r u j i l l o , and Getullo Vargas,35 To t h i s end Perez Jimenez embarked on a public works program that would eventually lead Venezuela to bankruptcy. He completed' many projects that; were i n i t i a t e d by the AD Government: the Gara-cas-La Gualra freeway; the petrochemical i n d u s t r i a l complex near Puerto Cabello, workers' housing i n Caracas; hydroelectric: and steel plants on the Caroni' River, and the Guarioo i r r i g a t i o n dam. His own projects included the Centro Bolivar (the Caracas equivalent of Rockefeller Center), many luxury hotels (including; one "whiter elephant" overlooking the slums of Caracas), and the most expensive o f f i c e r s ' club i n the world.36 More than 50$ of public-funds were spent i n Caracas. However, school construction was Ignored, and expenditures f o r health f a c i -l i t i e s and soc i a l programs were reduced. Agrarian reform and the development of the i n t e r i o r i n general were neglected i n favor o f the nation's capital.3 7 The public-works projects were financed by the o i l revenues which greatly increased as crude o i l production more than doubled 1 i n response tb market demands. The increased demand f o r o i l was attributed to post-World War II reconstruction i n Europe; rearma-ment i n the United States; and i n 195^ to the temporary n a t i o n a l i -zation of Iranian o i l , followed by the Suez C r i s i s of 1956.3® Perez Jimenez f u l l y cooperated with the o i l companies,: per-mitting a 25% reduction i n the labor force l n s p i t e of the increased -66-production. 39 petroleum taxes remained unaltered, and the^govern-ment? abandoned plans f o r a competitive national o i l company and: r e f i n e r y . The exl stingy o i l revenue was not s u f f i c i e n t to finance a l l the previously-mentioned projects?* and consequently the govern-ment disregarded AD's conservation p o l i c y and sold the o i l 1 com-panies new concessions* equivalent to t h e i r e x i s t i n g holdings*. Perez Jimenez also encouraged expansion of thee foreign-owned i r o n industry. Powerful national monopolies emerged during the P^rez Jimenez regime, p r i n c i p a l among these being'the Mendoza-Vbllmer group. Financed by the Chase Manhattan Bank and the F i r s t National Bank: of New York, the group's cement companies supplied 60% of the ce«. ment fo r the government-* s building - spree. I t " was also involved-i n the construction of Caracas hbusingrpro j e c t s , f o r which i t was allowed to import construction equipment and materials. As a w s i d e l i n e " , the Mendoza-Vbllmer group dominated the beer industry, i n addition to c o n t r o l l i n g part of the sugar and paper industries?. ' To f u l f i l l ' the needs of the construction industry, the govern-ment encouraged the immigration of European s k i l l e d laborers.. Over two hundred thousand I t a l i a n s , Spaniards, and Portuguese came? to Venezuela between 1948 and 1957, the majority s e t t l i n g i n Cara-cas. Many landless-peasants also went to the c a p i t a l looking f o r work during the construction: boom. They were unable to competec with the more s k i l l e d Europeans, but they remained In the city,. Joining the swelling; population of slum-dwellers.^ 2 The Perez Jimenez government turned a deaf ear tb demands that public- funds should be channeled f o r use as a g r i c u l t u r a l credits'? -67-and also to foment native Industry. Instead, the o i l revenues were spent on the import of food, luxury items, and machinery which only aggravated the massive unemployment s i t u a t i o n . Wair materiel also accounted f o r a substantial p r o p o r t i o n o f publico expenditures as Perez Jimenez endeavored to r e t a i n m i l i t a r y support by supplying the Navy with destroyers and other ships, the A i r Force with modem bombers and transport planes, and the Army with tanks, a r t i l l e r y , and other weapons.^ A s i g n i f i c a n t portion of government revenue was l o s t t through graft,, particulany by the President and h i s m i l i t a r y cohorts who pocketed m i l l i o n s by means of payoffs f o r construction contracts and parking meter concessions,, embezzlement of the National Lottery, e t o j 1 * MOBILIZATION. 0Ft THE OPPO SI H O N In early 1956 the adecos In e x i l e held a Conferencia de E x i l l -ados i n Puerto Rico.*1'-' The assembled party members reaffirmed ADT p r i n c i p l e s dating back to PDN times, with the recognition t h a t "La Convencidn Nacional del Partido de 1958 ten-dra entre sus mas seftalados objetlvos e l de adecuar e l pro gram a del Partido a l o s cambios que se nan o per ado en l a estructura econdmica-social del pals. "^ 6 Foreign investment i n Venezuela was condoned as long as a responsible government l i m i t e d foreign a c t i v i t i e s and insured:! reasonable p r o f i t margins f o r both the companies and the State. Progressive "Venezolization H of i n d u s t r i e s derived from the ex* p l o l t a t i o n of natural resources remained the party's ultimate goal. Regarding agrarian reform, the party continued b a s i c a l l y to support the Agrarian Reform Law of 19^8 and the er adlcation of -68-the l a t i f u n d i o system, with i t s replacement by one based on the prlnclp/e that "the land should belong to the one who works on i t . " The State should promote and finance i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y but Insure against the creation of "una prepotente o l i g a r q u i a de l o s negocios, desvlnculada de l o s intereses del p a i s y m u l t i -m i l l o n a r i a a costa del consumidor y del trabajador". Steel plants and petroleum r e f i n e r i e s b u i l t by the State should be excluded from the free-enterprlse system and be managed by State-run organs. In addition, l e g i s l a t i o n should be passed reserving certain eco-nomic a c t i v i t y to national financing. ° The party favored benefits to l a b o r , but i n s i s t e d on d i s c i -p l ined and e f f i c i e n t workers who would not resort to p o l i t i c a l demagoguery, r e s u l t i n g i n a permanent "state of war" with manage-ment. Regarding international influence within the country: " . . . S i negamos que Venezuela pueda ser un s a t e l l t e de EE.UU., rechazamos lgualmente, con l a misma energfa, l a idea de que un partido p o l i t i c o venezolano devenga sate'lite ideoldglco de l a Unlo'n Sovie'tica... And f i n a l l y , regarding party d i s c i p l i n e : "Las corrientes f r a o c l o n a l i s t a s no se toleran, y de spue's de haber sido trazado una norma c o l e c t i v a de conducta p o l i t l c a por l o s organ!smos estatutariaiioaente capaoitadas para haoerlo, esa norma es de o b l i g a t o r i o cumplimiento por toda l a m i l i t a n c i a . "49 In a n t i c i p a t i o n of the 1957 e l e c t i o n year i n Venezuela,, AD" proposed "La Nueva Tac t l c a " , o f f e r i n g a sincere p o l i c y of coopera-t i o n with a l l other opposition p a r t i e s . The Pe'rez Jimenez r e -gime's lack of International prestige and Increasing domestic unpopularity were already evident, and an "inevitable governmen-t a l c r i s i s " was expected, e s p e c i a l l y i n the wake o f the recently -69-overthrown dictatorships l n Argentina, Colombia, and Peru.5° To further promote r e c o n c i l i a t i o n among exiled Venezuelan p o l i t i c i a n s , an interparty e x i l e directorate was proposed, to be established i n Bogota. However, before t h i s could be r e a l i z e d , the events leading to Pe'rez Jimenez's downfall began to escalate. The u n i v e r s i t y students were the vanguard of organized oppo-s i t i o n to Perez Jimenez. In 1955 a clandestine national Univer-s i t y Front was established, with the d i c t a t o r ' s overthrow as i t s aim. The r u r a l sector of Venezuelan society d i s l i k e d the Perez Jimenez regime f o r i t s neglect of r u r a l needs. The £araquenbs'-i were resentful of the favoritism shown the foreign investors and new immigrants, who helped to treble the c a p i t a l ' s population to 1 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 5 1 Perez Jimenez even succeeded i n alienating sectors of the m i l i t a r y establishment, despite h i s attempts to maintain t h e i r favor with large m i l i t a r y expenditures. The President and h i s clique of multi-millionaire embezzlers generated condemnation— and envy—among the Junior o f f i c e r s . Key positions were awarded on the basis of l o y a l t y rather than f o r professional merit. Many younger o f f i c e r s expressed the same complaints as the UPM had done back i n 19^5* Indeed, even former UPM members were imprisoned f o r c r i t i c i z i n g , government actions, such as L t . Col. Martin Marquez Anez, Perez Jimenez's classmate at C h o r i l l o s . Perez Jimenez tended to favor the army, considering t h i s branch o f the m i l i t a r y to be more l o y a l to him personally, since he was an army man. The - 7 0 -l n t e r - s e r v i c e r i v a l r y t h i s generated ultimately resulted i n the A i r Force and Navy playing a decisive r o l e i n the 1958 coup.^ 2 The e l i t e status conferred on the secret p o l i c e , Seguridad Nacional (SN), incurred the resentment of. a l l branches of the m i l i t a r y . Any m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r had to be searched by SNC agents before having an audience with the President. SN agents were also planted as spies insi d e m i l i t a r y garrisons . 5 3 The Church had i n i t i a l l y favored the m i l i t a r y regime, since the l a t t e r supported parochial education, as opposed to State schools which became centers of p o l i t i c a l a g i t a t i o n . However, on May 1, 1957 Caracas Archbishop Rafael Arias Blanco issued a Pas-t o r a l L e t t e r c a l l i n g " f o r social j u s t i c e and c r i t i c i z i n g p o l i t i c a l corruption. Either the Church had undergone a profound change i n so c i a l conscience,; or e l s e , l i k e other segments of Venezuelan society, i t was beginning to sense the impending downfall of the Perez Jimenez regime. As V a l l e n l l l a Lanz put l t : "The Church i s eternal and wise. I t does not associate i t s e l f with l o s t causes. In June, 1957 Fabriclo OJedo, an u r r e d i s t a and Journalist f o r the newspaper -El N a c i o n a l u n i t e d a small number of opposi-t i o n a c t i v i s t s from various sectors of Venezuelan society, forming the nucleus of the Junta Patrio'tiaa (JP). The Junta's three ob-j e c t i v e s were: 1) to restore respect f o r the Constitution; 2) to convoke democratic p r e s i d e n t i a l elections; and 3) to insure the establishment of a government respectful of c i v i l r i g h t s . On June 29, the st a r t of the^Semana de l a P a t r i a " the JP d i s -tributed 200,000 f l y e r s (printed on the PCV's Trlbuna Popular press) urging Venezuelans to put up a united front against the r e - e l e c t i o n of Perez Jimenez. By-August the JP was publishing hundreds of -71-thousands of l e a f l e t s each week, denouncing the Perez Jimenez government.5 6 The Junta Patrio'tlca began smuggling arms into the country f o r the overthrow of Perez J imenez following the arrest of Rafael Caldera and the announcement on November 4 that the pr e s i d e n t i a l el e c t i o n s scheduled f o r December 15 would be replaced by a p l e b i s -c i t e . 5 7 By the end of 1957 the JP consisted of two representatives? from URD", AD, COPEI and the PCV, plus l o p e c i s t a s , medinlstas, and other representatives from industry, commerce, i n t e l l e c t u a l s , the Church, students, and women's organizations. DECEMBER: 15, 1957 PLEBISCITE!: THE LAST STRAW Perez Jimenez was unable to v o l u n t a r i l y r e l i n q u i s h h i s power, and he hoped to s a t i s f y the public's desire to p a r t i c i p a t e l n c i v i c - a f f a i r s by allowing them to vote "s£" or M n o w i n a p l e b i s -c i t e that would l e g a l i z e h i s continued tenure i n o f f i c e * Even Minister of I n t e r i o r Relations V a l l e n i l l a Lanz opposed t h i s plan as being too "caesarlst",, and he l a t e r wrote that Perez Jimenez's greatest error was "underestimating public opinion and the effectiveness of propaganda". D After the p l e b i s c i t e was announced on November 4 , Caracas students promptly r i o t e d and the Junta Patrio'tica began a campaign urging abstention at the p o l l s . The c i t i z e n r y was further angered with the announcement that foreigners residing i n Venezuela f o r two years would also be allowed to vote. (The I t a l i a n Ambassador, i n v i o l a t i o n of diplomatic? pro to c o l , urged the substantial I t a l i a n -72-community to vote f o r Pe'rez Jimenez, ) ^ Perez Jimenez was proclaimed president f o r another five-year term a f t e r the " o f f i c i a l " t a l l y was published on December 20: 2,374,790 s i 364,182 no 186,013 i n v a l i d 0 0 The Junta P a t r i d t i c a accused the Ministry of I n t e r i o r Relations of inventing the s t a t i s t i c s , maintaining that the people had"ab-stained from voting. The Venezuelan bourgeoisie, increasingly nervous over thee government's delinquency i n payment of debts, spent July to Decem-ber, 1957 observing and analysing the strength of the Perez Jimenez regime. In December they sent representatives to New York to "sound out" Betancourt and Jdvito V l l l a l b a . Eugenic Mendoza— -the "Nelson Rockefeller of the t r o p i c s " , worth some Bs, 1,000,000,000-and Dr. Carlos Ramirez MacSregor talked to Betancourt^ while New York bank functionary, Mario D^ez spoke with V l l l a l b a . A l l came to the conclusion that neither AD nor URDT' would threaten the foundation of the Venezuelan economy.^1 On January 1, 1958 Assistant Chief of S t a f f , L t . Col. Hugo Enrique Trejo, l e d a r e v o l t by A i r Force and Army junior o f f i c e r s -which was put down the f o l i o wing: day by l o y a l i s t forces. Although* v i c t o r i o u s , Perez Jimenez l o s t conf idence and became emotionally unstable. Senior m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s pressured him to reorganize the Cabinet and on January 10 the unpopular V a l l e n l l l a Lanz and" Pedro Estrado wereeforced to go Into e x i l e . °2 With the elimination of the SN chief, and consequent decrease of SN surveillance, m i l i t a r y conspirators were able to meet: with - 7 3 -Junta Pat r i o t ! c a l i a s o n men Bias Lambert!, Oscar Centeno Sucinchli and Fabricio OJeda. The JP I n t e n s i f i e d i t s a c t i v i t i e s , end there were d a i l y confrontations between students and p o l i c e . Between January 10 and January 23 manifestos against the regime were? issued by groups of I n t e l l e c t u a l s , professionals, and businessmen. Several m i l i t a r y c o n s p i r a t o r i a l groups competed to be the f i r s t to overthrow the d i c t a t o r . Even some of Perez Jimenez's fri e n d s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n insurgent groups l n order to absolve their, " g u i l t by association" with the unpopular p r e s i d e n t . ^ On January 21 a general stri k e was ca l l e d i n Caracas, which was accompanied by intensive street 1 fighting? To quotecGlen L. Kolb:: "It was a true popular revolution of Venezuelan c i t i z e n s of a l l ages and social classes, armed with rocks, clubs, home-made grenades, and 'Molotov c o c k t a i l s ' , against a ferocious and well-trained police force equipped with ar-mored v e h i c l e s , sub-machine guns, r i f l e s , revolvers, machetes and tear gas."°5 At 6:00 P.M. on the 22nd, a coordinated r e b e l l l b n was i n i t i a t e d 1 by the army and naval forces, and by 2:00 A'.M. in-the morning/of the 23rd, Perez Jimenez was en route to e x i l e i n the Dominican R e p u b l i c Rear Admiral Wolfgang-Larraza*bal was made President of ther Provisional Junta. Other members of the a l l - m i l i t a r y Junta includ-ed Army Cols. Roberto Casanova and Pedro Jose Quevedo; A i r Force Col. Abel Romero V i l l a t e ; and FAC Col. Carlos L u i s Araque.^ Neither the Junior o f f i c e r s nor the Junta Patrio'tica had been consulted about the formation of t h i s Provisional Junta, which was not i n accordance with the o r i g i n a l c i v i l - m i l i t a r y plan. The -74-masses of the Reslstence were r e j o i c i n g i n the streets, celebrat-ing the d i c t a t o r ' s downfall 1. However, protest'demonstrations were organized when ltt was learned that' two of the Junta's members were Casanova and Romero V l l l a t e , both of whom had been staunch Perez Jimenez supporters duringcthe January 1 r e v o l t . Street violence continued u n t i l the two men were out of the c o u n t r y 6 7 They were replaced by Junta P a t r i o t ! c a leader Bias Lambert! and i n d u s t r i a l -i s t Eugenio Mendoza, both chosen by the bourgeoisie. In retrospect, Domingo Alberto Rangel r e a l i z e s AD's mistake? i n allowing the bourgeoisie to dominate the formation of the new government. However, at the time both ADand the PCV' supported Mendoza. The Cabinet!"was composed e n t i r e l y of representatives* of the capit a l 1st "bourgeoisie, including Minister of Finance, Dr. Arturo Sosa (employed ten years by Mendoza-Vbllmer); Exterior? Relations, Dr. Garcfa V e l u t i n i , another member of the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy; Agriculture, Dr. Eduardo Galavis, a member of the agrar-i a n bourgeoisie; and Mines, Dr. Perez de l a Cbva, a veteran of 68 the Venezuelan Embassy i n Washington, D.C.. CHAPTER IV RETURN OF THE "GUARDIA VIEJA" The Larrazabal Junta effected a purge of Pe'rez Jimenez supporters from the army, p o l i c e , and executive branch of govern-ment; A l l l e g i s l a t i v e bodies were dissolved i n preparation f o r democratic ele c t i o n s . Press censorship was l i f t e d , p o l i t i c a l •i prisoners freed, and e x i l e s were welcomed to return. In addition to a number of unsuccessful attempts by dissident m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s to e f f e c t t a counter-coup, the Larrazabal Govern-ment was confronted with severe economic problems. The recession: i n i t i a t e d by the United States' r e s t r i c t i o n s on Venezuelan o i l 1 imports was aggravated by the continuous e x i t of foreign c a p i t a l a f t e r January 23. Construction company stockholders and land speculators, i n - p a r t i c u l a r , were responsible f o r a substantial reduction of the nation's foreign currency reserves. The lack o f confidence i n Venezuela's economy was contagious, and Venezuelan capitalist's began to deposlte t h e i r money i n United States banks,, further draining the national foreign reserves of an estimated #300,000,000 between 1958 and I960. 2 Early i n 1958 l e f t i s t leaders proposed abolishing: the free^ exchange of Bolfvares into d o l l a r s i n order to curb t h i s disas-trous trend. However, the provisional government's Ministers of Finance, Sosa and l a t e r Mayobre, dismissed the l e f t i s t s ' plan-as? being unnecessary. (Three years l a t e r , a f t e r $1,000,000,000 had^ been removed from the country, Mayobre, now Minister of Finance under Betancourt, f i n a l l y Imposed these c o n t r o l s — t o o l a t e to have any effect. ) 3 -76-Mayobre also opposed the l e f t i s t proposition to convert Pe'rez Jimenez's Public: forks debt o f some Bs. 5,000,000,000 to a long-term loan,, such as England and Prance had done after: World War I I . Since Gomez's days, Venezuela had enjoyed the reputation of being the quintessence of punctuality on debt payments, and: the Junta Government refused to r i s k the country's international pres-t i g e . ^Consequently, the Junta undertook to pay o f f Venezuela's debts i n one year, and thus l e f t the country's treasury devoid of funds essential f o r the financing of a much-needed national indu s t r i a l l z a t i o m program. 1958 was also the year of the "Plan de Emergencia", l n which the government" spent Bs. 400,000,000 i n an attempt to a l l e v i a t e the massive unemployment produced by the slump i n construction. However, rather than paying the unemployed to work on permanent projects such as roads, buildings, and bridges, the workers were? sent to do "make-up" Jobs on parks, highways, etc. Furthermore,,, t h i s unemployment subsidization attractedfhoasvjncfr of u n s k i l l e d landless peasants to the c i t i e s , thus aggravating the slum s i t u a -t i o n and resultant increase i n crime. 5 Meanwhile,, Bomulo Betancourt and other AD leaders In e x i l e returned to Venezuela to resume t h e i r r o l e s i n national p o l i t i c s . . According: to D.A. Rangel, Betancourt's dominant theme during? h i s ten years i n e x i l e was no longer Venezuela's need f o r l i b e r a -t i o n from economic Imperialism, but the necessity of a government to insure respect f o r human r i g h t s . During the McCarthy period, -77-Betancourt was duly anti-communi st. He sought support against Perez Jimenez from conservative groups, rather than the l e f t i s t groups which were i n o f f i c i a l disfavor. He c u l t i v a t e d r e l a t i o n s with AFL-CTO President George Meany, and other "conservative" labor leaders; and he also maintained several U.S. State Department contacts, such as Alan Steward, a high functionary at the U.S. Embassy i n Costa Rica.^ Betancourt and the other "Old Guard" adecos returned to Vene-zuela as moderates with constitutional goals: c i v i l l i b e r t i e s , universal suffrage, and " a l t e m a b i l i d a d en el Poder". They now believed i t imperative to regain the confidence of international and native investors i n order to avoid a repeat of the 1948 exper-ience. Thus i t was necessary to play down the n a t i o n a l i s t i c : themes of the past, and to r e f r a i n from c r i t i c i z i n g the creole o l i g a r c h y . 7 Soon a f t e r h i s return to Venezuela Betancourt held meetings with creole business magnates. He then gave a series of t a l k s tb various Chambers of Commerce. In Valencia, he even proposed the sale to private c a p i t a l of sugar r e f i n e r i e s created by the Cbrporacidn de Pomento, a proposal which shocked the; AD National Direction since i t contradicted party doctrine. S t i l l faced with substantial"military resistence, Betancour* undertook the task of p a t i e n t l y v i s i t i n g a l l those i n the m i l i t a r y hierarchy who were opposed to him or to AD. He also endeavored to establish-rapport with younger o f f i c e r s , v i a o l d o f f i c e r friends-from October 18 times who were now restored to command positions.. 9 - 7 8 -On July 4, 1958 AD" held i t s f i r s t mass: gathering? since the 1948 coup, at the Nuevo Circo i n Caracas. According to JohnMartz, Betancourt delivered an "eloquent history of the party antagonism to International communism"10 Nevertheless, Betancourt", In p u b l i c , always emphatically presented himself as non-sectarian and non-v i n d i c t i v e : "Nosotros sostenemos e l legitimo derecho del Partido Cbmunista a actuar en Venezuela como organlzaclon l e g a l l -zada. Cuando gobernamos respetamos ese derecho. Creemos que l a s 'cacerias de brujas* en e l slglo XX son contraries a l a esencia misma del re'glmen democrfiftico... M l l When Betancourt spoke with party "comrades", i n the absence of j o u r n a l i s t s , he revived AD"sectarianism, referring^to Accion Democratica as "the Party of the Resistence, ; of the martyrs, of the 10,000 prisoners throughout ten years"; the party whose "mani-f e s t ! destiny" i t was to transform Venezuela through agrarian re-12 form - and a n a t i o n a l i s t i c - economic- po l i c y . . The f i r s t major confrontation between the Old Guard leader-ship and the l e f t i s t f a c t i o n of AD occured at the party's IX'Nation-a l Convention held i n Caracas on August 10, 1958. The l e f t i s t s - , r eferred to as the "muchachos", were a conglomeration of progres-sive l i b e r a l s , anarcho-syndicalists, Marxists, and "revolUoibnarlbs medio sentlmentales". These included leaders from the "generation of 1945", some union representatives, and the party's youth move-ment—most notable being Domingo Alberto Rangel, Sim^n Saez Merida, Simon Alberto Consalvi,. Gumersindo Rodriguez, and Americo Martin.. They c a l l e d f o r public-control: of the economy, including the na--79-t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the petroleum industry. And because they had-suffered the r i g o r s of clandestine l i f e and imprisonment during^ the Perez Jimenez regime, they f e l t they were worthy of increased representation on the Comlte' Ejecutivo Nacional, 1^ In addition to the l e f t i s t s , there was another group of adecos vying f o r party leadership with the Old Guard. They had r i s e n to prominence while Betancourt and h i s generation were r u l -ing the country during-the t r i e n i o . Now l e d by Raul Ramos Gimenez, Jesi/s Angel Paz Galarraga, Jose' Manzo Gonzalez, Jose Angel C i l i b e r -to, and Ceaar Ronddri Llovera, they formed the ARS f a c t i o n , adopt-5 ing the i n i t i a l s of a Venezuelan advertizing agency whose slogan was " l e t us think for you".11'' In retrospect Rangel regrets that these two factions committed the error of competing against each other at conventions and assem-b l i e s , thus enabling-.the Old Guard to maintain control over the party and assuring the candidacy of Betancourt f o r the December, 1958 p r e s i d e n t i a l elections.*5 In fact', both the " a r s i s t a s " and the l e f t i s t s had favored a united front candidate with URD and COPEI Tin order to undermine Betancourt's power. However, beginning l n A p r i l , 1958 Jovito V l l l a l b a awakened AD sectarianism with anti-AD r h e t o r i c to the e f f e c t that AD did not even have the r i g h t to present candidates, and that i f an AD candidate were successful, i t would provoke an-other m i l i t a r y coup. In response to t h i s challenge, Betancourt 1 fi became the Inevitable AD candidate. 1 0 In Comite'Ejecutivo Nacional (CEN) elections, Romulo Gallegos -80-was made Honorary President with Betancourt as active President of the party. Leoni and Barrios became f i r s t and second Vice Presidents, respectively. The powerful p o s i t i o n of Secretary-General was contested by Prieto F, , Ramos Gimenez, Dubuc, and Rangel. Ramos Gimenez and Dubuc withdrew In favor of P r i e t o , who consequently defeated Rangel 210-140. Indeed ARS a l l i e d i t -s e l f with the Old Guard i n every key e l e c t i o n . Thus a r s i s t a J o s / Manzo Gonzalez was able to defeat Saez Merida f o r Secretary of Organization. Only two l e f t i s t s succeeded i n getting? elected: Rangel as a P o l i t i c a l Secretary, and Consalvl as Press Secretary. Of a t o t a l of nineteen positions on the CENv, a r s i s t a s acquired f i v e , with the Old Guard maintaining I t s dominance with the ba-lance. 1 7 The party's program and theses were also revised at the National Convention. In general, the same goals were expressed 1 as i n the previous party programs regarding administration,, edu-cation, health and social welfare, and International r e l a t i o n s . The "Tesis P e t r o l e r a " was referred to as "un programa para un periodo de t r a n s l c i d n " , with the hope that, i n time, l t could be transformed Into an authentic revolutionary program. Heading-the l i s t of propositions was that c a l l i n g f o r the creation of a State-owned Petroleum Company, integrating a l l aspects of the Industry: production, r e f i n i n g , transportation (including a f l e e t of o i l tankers), and sales. Other major points Included: re-v i s i o n of the tax system to increase State revenue; no more con-cessions to private companies; State p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n decisions regarding markets, production and Importation quotas; more c o l l a -- 8 1 -boratlon by the petroleum companies i n the country's plans forr economic development; and the "Venezolization" of 75% of the s t a f f of the o i l companies (including technicians and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . ) 1 8 The "Tesls Agraria" opposed the theory of "reforma agrfoola" which would convert the feudal l a t i f u n d i o system to a c a p i t a l i s t one i n which the 500,000 Venezuelan landless peasants would be-come a r u r a l p r o l e t a r i a t , while the landholdlng class became an a g r i c u l t u r a l bourgeoisie. , Instead, as representative of the pea-sant c l a s s , AD had to i n s i s t on the expropriation (with compensa-tion) of the lands on which these peasants labored, and on the d i v i s i o n of these lands among ,the peasants, es p e c i a l l y to those 330,000 peasants who were heads of f a m i l i e s . This constituted the only means to dismember the l a t i f u n d i o and democratize the landholdlng system. 19 However, the agrarian reform would not a f f e c t those capi-t a l i s t " a g r i c u l t u r a l ! s t s ^ u sing;; modern teonlques and employing f a i r -l y s a l a r i e d workers, but only the unproductive l a t i f u n d i o . State-owned lands should be used to est a b l i s h Agrarian Co-l o n i e s and c o l l e c t i v e Communities geared toward the r e - e s t a b l i s h -ment of displaced peasants l i v i n g i n c i t y alums, or of those l i v i n g i n abject poverty i n Isolated r u r a l areas. The Agrarian Com-munities should be s t r a t e g i c a l l y set up i n d i f f e r e n t regions of the country, and they should be used to experiment c o l l e c t i v e methods of production. And f i n a l l y , the " t e a l s " stipulated that the sugar r e f i n e r i e s belonging to the Cbrporacion Venezolana de Foment© should remain? i n the l a t t e r ' s possession, but that the surrounding land belong* -82-ing to the CVF ought to be parceled out to peasants i n the estab-lishment of a cooperative f o r the c u l t i v a t i o n of sugar cane. The party's guideline should be: "Las plantas i n d u s t r l a l e s en poder del Estado, l a s t i e r r a s y e l cultivo en manos de l o s a g r i c u l t o r e s . " In the M T e s i s S l n d i c a l M AD's union representatives emphati-c a l l y declared t h e i r conception of the democratic revolution as.? "una marcha hacia e l s o c i a l ! smo". They maintained that" the workers were against the "revolucidn democratico-burguesa M as envisioned by many p o l i t i c a l leaders i n the democratic movement. Such a bourgeois revolution would favor private i n d u s t r i a l develop-ment and a g r i c u l t u r a l capitalism which "coloearia a Accidn Demo-c r a t i c a como instrumento p o l i t i c o de l a burguesia nacional y perderia l a adhesion de l a clase o b r e r a . " 2 1 Key Industries, such as s t e e l , e l e c t r i c a l , petrochemical, and <Lother heavy i n d u s t r i e s should be State monopolies. And i f the State should b u i l d f a c t o r i e s f o r such l i g h t i n d u s t r i e s as t e x t i l e s o r food, these should also remain l n State hands. 2 2 In prophesy of AD's future f a c t i o n a l i s t l c problems, the " t e s i s " demanded adherence to party orthodoxy: "Cuando declmos que Accio'n Democratica e.s e l Partido del Pueblo es porque es e l partido de l a clase obrera, del campesinado y de l a clase media...Por eso no pueden m i l i t a r en nuestras f i l a s l a s o l i g a r q u i a s financleras n i l o s monopolistas c r l o l l o s o sus aflnes. Una des-vlaoldn respecto a este postulado podria traducirse en oportunismo, en su sentido revoluclonario, y aun en agotamiento h i s t d r i c o del Partido que incurra en t a l desvlacidn." 23 DECEMBER 7 , 1958 ELECTIONS After Pe'rez Jimenez's downfall, i t was decided to hold general - 8 3 -e l e c t i o n s f o r a l l o f f i c e s — f r o m municipal councilman to President-only once every f i v e years i n order to prevent the partisan a g l t a -t l o n that could provoke a coup d'etat. Throughout 1958 representatives from AD, URD, and GOPEI held "round t a b l e " discussions i n an apparent attempt to reach an agreement on a united front p r e s i d e n t i a l candidate. Unable to overcome the obstacle of party sectarianism, an a l t e r n a t i v e solu-t i o n was chosen and documented i n the "Pacto de Pun to Pi j o " , 2 5 The Pacto de Punto F i j o , signed on October 31, 1958, out-l i n e d the following p r i n c i p l e s : 1) A l l p a r t i e s adhering to the Pact must above a l l defend constitutional government i f the l a t t e r i s threatened by a coup d'etat or other subversive a c t i v i t y , 2) The party receiving the majority of votes i n legitimate e l e c t i o n s shall form a c o a l i t i o n "National Unity" government, i n order to avoid the systematic opposition that would weaken the democratic movement. Therefore, the Executive Cabinet s h a l l be composed of representatives from national p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , i n addition to those from independent sectors of the country, 3) In order to f a c i l i t a t e interparty cooperation during-the e l e c t i o n campaign period and l a t e r during the exercise of Constitutional Government,, the p a r t i e s have agreed on a Minimum Program that shall serve as basis f o r each party's i n d i v i d u a l program, with public discussions of the l a t t e r remaining-within the l i m i t s of tolerance and mutual r e s p e c t , 2 6 A "Comlsion I n t e r p a r t i d i s t a de Unidad" was consequently created to supervise the maintenance of t h i s p o l i t i c a l pact, thus -84-acting as a safeguard against i n d i v i d u a l deviations o r excessive sectarianism which could compromise the democratic f r o n t . Signing the document were Jovito V i l l a l b a , Ignacio L u i s Arcaya, and Manuel Lo^pez Rlvas f o r URD; Rafael Caldera, Pedro del C o r r a l , and Lorenzo Fernandez f o r COPEI; Romulo Betancourt, Raul Leoni, and Gonzalo Barrios f o r AD.2? Betancourt was elected AD's p r e s i d e n t i a l candidate, opposed only by Rangel, Paz Galarraga, Ramos Gimenez, and some other delegates who were mainly youth leaders. As b e f i t t i n g AD t r a d i -t i o n , the party surpassed i t s competitors In the organization o f the e l e c t i o n campaign. Although the AD campaign center was l n Caracas, Betancourt concentrated h i s energies i n the i n t e r i o r where i n the period of f o r t y - f i v e days he made 132 speeches and held two dozen press conferences. In h i s speech c l o s i n g the AD e l e c t i o n campaign, on December 5» 1958 i n Caracas, Betancourt reaffirmed AD's n a t i o n a l i s t i c economic doctrine: *I no nos limitamos a obtener que l a s CompanrjLas Petr o l eras aporten a l Estado mayores ingresos, sino que tamblen sera' creada l a F l o t a P e t r o l e r a Nacional, sino que tamblen seran a t r l b u i d a s a una Empresa Nacional de Petroleos l a s reservas nacionales, y n i un solo centimetre de t e r r i t o r i o nacional sera otorgado en concesio'n. Y una refiner£a del Estado.. .refinara', para ser d i s t r i -buidos por l a Empresa Nacional del Petroleo todos l o s derivados, todos l o s carburantes l f q u i d o s . . . *Y junto con esto...defenderemos l a Petroquimlca como empresa del Estado.. .poniendo su comando en manos se r i a s y responsables; y esa Petroqufmica junto con l a Siderurgica, n l hoy, n i mariana, n i nunca, deben s a l l r de l a s manos del Estado Venezolano."29 In May, 1958 Jovito V i l l a l b a spoke l n Barquisimeto declaring: h i s opposition to the p r e s i d e n t i a l candidacy of Larrazabal o r any m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r . However, a f t e r Larrazabal's steadfast defense o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government when confronted by the -85-threat of a, m i l i t a r y coup i n July, and the consequent surge i n popularity of the Junta President, V i l l a l b a permitted Larraza*bal~ to be selected as URD;* s pr e s i d e n t i a l candidate (with the oppor-t u n i s t i c hope of becoming the president succeeding Larrazabal.)3® Larrazabal accepted the candidacy only one month before the el e c t i o n s . He also received the support of the PCV, and f o r t h i s reason COPEI. f e l t obligated to nominate i t s own "middle of the road" candidate, Rafael Caldera.3 1 On December 6, 1958 the three p r e s i d e n t i a l candidates met to sign a Declaration of P r i n c i p l e s , renewing t h e i r p a r t i e s ' pledge to support the e l e c t i o n v i c t o r and subsequent: c o a l i t i o n government. The e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s conformed to AD expectations ("Saiga sapo o saiga rana, Betancourt es e l que gana"—•slogan of the "muchachos"): Betancourtt 1,284,092 Larrazabal 9°3,479 35# Caldera 423,262 16% The congressional el e c t i o n r e s u l t s were:32 ~S Senate Chamber of Deputies AD 32 73 URDL; 11 33 COPEI 6 20 PCV 2 7 In Caracas, Betancourt 1 s v i c t o r y provoked two days of r i o t -ing by supporters of Larrazabal. According to Rangel, the Federa-t i o n of Chambers of Commerce (FEDECAMARAS) panicked at the pros-pect o f another insurrection and arranged f o r various leaders tb appear on t e l e v i s i o n i n order to calm down the masses. (URD leaders -86-did not p a r t i c i p a t e s ) The m i l i t a r y was also persuaded not to intervene In favor of Larrazabal.33 THE BET AN COURT ADMINISTRATION: President Betancourt made h i s inaugural address before the? National Congress on February 13, 1959. During the course of the speech he lauded the u n i v e r s i t y students' r o l e i n the democratic revolution: "El estudiantado de l a s Universldades de l a Republica ocupo-slempre l o s lugares de mayor riesgo, con alardos y hermosa decision j u v e n i l , cuando se vlslubraron, o se concretaron, p e l l g r o s de retroceso en l a evoluclon del pais hacia l a constituclonal!dad. "3^ Although the PCV/ had requested p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n ther "National Unity" cabinet, Betancourt was determined to exclude the com-munists from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n h i s administration. His announce-ment to t h i s e f f e c t In the Inaugural speech provoked overt com-munist opposition to the AD-coalltion government-, which was de-clared on the same day o f Betancourt(s inauguration, and l a t e r published l n "EL Nacional" on February 14, 1959: "With regard to the antl-Communist aggression con-tained i n the Message directed by President Betancourt to the nation today, the Communist Party declares the? following: "...The enemies of democracy are not to be found i n our ranks. ..The source which nourishes 'coup d'etatism i s the great foreign monopolies which have always generated dict a t o r s h i p s f o r the benefit of t h e i r own shady i n t e r e s t s and p r i v i l e g e s , both economic and p o l i t i c a l . "...Our Party has fought l o y a l l y and with firmness f o r the v i c t o r y of a constitutional regime. I t i s grossly i r o n i c that the f i r s t act of the constitutional president i s an aggression against those of us who have fought for the constitutional regime. - 8 7 -"...This anti-unity, opportunist po s i t i o n . • .does not conform to any Venezuelan motive, but has as i t s objec-t i v e the courting of favor i n r u l i n g c i r c l e s and those of North American monopolistic consortiums,: which have no place i n our i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and our sovereignty as an Independent country. "...Nor are we sure either that President Betancourt i s authorized to attack us i n the name of the URD; Copei p a r t i e s o r even of h i s own AD party. We say t h i s because u n t i l today we have not been attacked—since January 2 3 (1958)—by the leaders of those p a r t i e s . " . . . F i n a l l y , the P o l i t i c a l Bureau of the Communist Party points out the misfortune which might r e s u l t from a government that begins by breaking the unity achieved i n the long struggles of our people,, weakening the front: of resistance against coup d'etatism. The anti-Communist aggression has been and w i l l be dangerous f o r the sta-b i l i t y of a constitutional government. "35 Betancourt's cabinet included two adecos (Minister of I n t e r i o r Relations, L u i s Augusto Dubuci and Minister of Mines and Hydro-carbons, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo); three copeyanos, three urre-d i s t a s , and six independents.3^ The commencement of Betancourt's tenure i n o f f i c e coin-cided with the dramatic triumph of the Cuban Revolution. Indeed, on January 23, 1959, only twenty-two days a f t e r F i d e l Castro's successful overthrow o f the B a t i s t a regime, the charismatic Cu-ban hero was i n Caracas commemorating the Venezuelan revolution: o f the previous year. Castro spoke to a crowd of 100,000 i n Caracas, promising Venezuela Cuban aid i n the struggle against reactionary forces. Promo ting^ L a t i n American s o l i d a r i t y , he de-cl a r e d : "Basta ya de l e v a n t a r l e estatuas a Bolivar sin cumplUr sus ideas. ..La consigna ha de ser l a unidad de l a s Naciones. "37 The Cuban Revolution became the symbol of L a t i n American defiance to the pressures of United States economic domination,, while at the same time i t undermined the empirical r a t i o n a l e sup-porting Betancourt's rapprochement with m i l i t a r y , oligarchy, and foreign i n t e r e s t s . The avoidance of a Castro-type revolution served as an impetus f o r the i n s t a l l a t i o n of a "democratic" or "indicative planning system" i n Venezuela. According to Blank, the basis of the Indicative planning system (referred to by its< l e f t i s t opponents as o l i g a r c h i c or e l i t i s t planning) i s the be-l i e f that: "...public p o l i c y should r e s u l t from a t e c h n i c a l l y based,, i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d n e g o t i a t i o n or dialogue between the national executive and the representatives of the various concrete economic-interest associations. "38 Furthermore, "In return f o r supporting;:the elected governments-since 1958, the private-sector economic e l i t e has i n s i s t e d that government administration be separated from partisan p o l i t i c s . "39 The resultant discrepency between party doctrine and government actions gave r i s e to the inner-party factionalism that manifested i t s e l f i n i960. In f a c t , Betancourt has been accused of "de-industri a l l z i ng" Venezuela, at l e a s t from the n a t i o n a l i s t i c point of view. Pe'rez Jim/nez's petrochemical project began i n 1957 with a small o i l d i s t i l l a t i o n plant i n Moroni. The second stage of the project was to be a larger 1 r e f i n e r y processing' 60,000 b a r r e l s of o i l a day, accompanied by a plant producing petroleum derivatives such as p l a s t i c s and synthetic rubber. The Betancourt Government abandon-ed Stage 2 of the project, l e t t i n g the d i s t i l l i n g plant continue processing i t s i n s i g n i f i c a n t 1800 b a r r e l s a day.!1'0 - 8 9 -Subsequently, Mobil O i l Ob. b u i l t a large re f i n e r y near the petrochemical s i t e , and another company (of the Standard O i l group) i n s t a l l e d a petrochemical plant on Trinidad where i t s o i l r e f i n e r -i e s were located. The Venezuelan Government then made a deal to purchase petrochemical products from the Trinidad-established plant. 2* 1 As Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Perez Alfonzo said i n a speech to the College of Engineers at the end of 1959: "no v e i a l a necesidad de que e l Estado construyera r e f i n e r i e s dado que e l pais estaba convenientemente abestecldo de derivados del petrdleo por l a s companies extranjeras."42 In February and A p r i l of 1959 the o i l t r u s t s u n i l a t e r l l y lowered the price of crude o i l from Venezuela and the Middle East, while the subsidiaries of the t r u s t s raised the pr i c e s of gasoline and other derivatives. To counteract such a r b i t r e r y policy-making, Pe'rez Alfonzo p a r t i c l pet ed l n the founding of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) i n September, i 9 6 0 . The member-nations (including Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) agreed to defend t h e i r r i g h t to assign f a i r and steble p r i c e s to t h e i r petroleum, and they also resolved not to cooperate with any o i l company that might try to e f f e c t a r e p r i s a l against one or more of the OPEC; members.2* 3 Positive measures were also effected regarding social welfare: as during the t r i e n i o , the Betancourt Government made immense st r i d e s i n improving the education and health f a c i l i t i e s of the Venezuelans. To t h i s end, the budgets o f both programs were doubled.2*** -90-POUR-YEAB PLAN On A p r i l 29,. I960 Betancourt'-presented h i s Pour-Year Plan ("Plan Cuatrienal") before the Venezuelan Leg i s l a t u r e . The AD pledge of no more o i l concessions was reaffirmed, along with the promise to e s t a b l i s h a State-run o i l c o m p a n y . s i m i l a r l y , Betan-court promised no new concessions to private i r o n companies.. While on the one hand he guaranteed the continuation of the I n s t i -tute Venezolano de SlderurgJua as an exclusively National company which should grow unlimitedly "en medida de sus exitos", he l a t e r provided a rationale f o r encouraging foreign expansion i n that indu stry: "Por o t r a parte, l a explotacidn y proceso del mineral, exclusi? ftamente por el Estado, l o l l e v a r l a a desatender a otros sectores de inversion publlca, o a reducir e l ritmo de expldtacion de esos recursos. Por estb l a Nacidh adoptara' formulas que tiendan a i n -crementar e l procesamiento del mineral de hlerro en Venezuela. "Tales formulas impllcan l a aportacldn por e l Estado de minerales provenientes de sus reservas y de energia e l e c t r i c a , bajo su d i recto control, mediante arreglos especiales que signifiquen una p a r t i c l p a c i d n adecuada para l a Nacldn."^ 6 Por similar f i n a n c i a l reasons? " . . . e l Grobiemo considera que e l desarrollo de l a quf-mica del petrol eo venezolano debe extender se del ambito del Institute Venezolano de Petroqufmica, mediante e l establecimientb de nuevas Plantas por l a i n i c i a t i v a privada, con o sin l a p a r t i clpacidn del Estado..." 4" The Four-Year Plan provided a budget of Bs. 440,000,000 per year f o r c r e d i t s to be Issued by the Banco Agrfcola y Pecuario i n accordance with the new Agrarian Reform Law promulgated on March 5, I960. 4 8 -91-The i960 Agrarian Reform Law was similar to those of the Gallegos and. Medina administrations. I t s purpose, as before, would be to provide land to the 80% of the Venezuelan peasants who work on an average of three hectares of land without owning^ i t . By breaking up the unproductive l a t i f u n d i o system, the Govern-ment hoped to overcome the 1.25 m i l l i o n metric tons food d e f i c i t : facing the country annually (in addition to the one half m i l l i o n metric ton d e f i c i t of l i v e s t o c k f e e d . ) ^ AD peasant leader RamdnrQuijada characterized theenew law as: "...una Ley moderada, producto de l a s circun s t a n d as especiales que caracterizan e l momentb p o l i t i c o que atra-viese e l pais. Es e l producto de un esfuerzo plausible,, de buena voluntad, reallzado por di versos y di similes sectbres sociales, empenados en transformar l a situacion del campo y de mejorar l a s condiciones de vlda de l a s masas rur a l e s , sin afectar senslblemente determlnados intereses creados. "50 Indeed, the law was drawn up by representatives of a i r p o l i -t i c a l p a r t i e s , including the PCV. 5 1 The law was such that i t could be oriented i n one or a l l of three d i r e c t i o n s : 1) colonization of new areas; 2) "reforma a g r f c o l a w i n favor of the creation o r a c a p i t a l i s t a g r i c u l t u r a l bourgeoisie; and 3) a true agrarian reform e n t a i l i n g the break-up of latifundios,.. giving the peasants ownership of the land on which they work; Peasant leaders agreed i t was up to the peasant organizations to exert Influence i n government i n order to insure the r e a l i z a t i o n of number ( 3 ) . 5 2 CHAPTER ;<V THE EMERGENCE OP AD FACTIONALISM In January,, 19^7 Domingo Alberto Rangel wrote an article entitled "Explicacidn Histdrica de l a Revolucidn Venezolana" in which he stated? ••Para Venezuela, y en general para l a America Latina, no ha llegado l a hora del social!smo porque todavia no se nan agotado l a s posibllidades de l a democracla. m 1 For Venezuela, the l i f t i n g of the yoke of caudllllsm and the effect-ing of universal suffrage were revolutionary lh themselves. How-ever, "...toda obra p o l i t i c a que no se complementer con innova-clones eoonomlcas sera esteril como ensayo de progreso." Rangel went on to il l u s t r a t e the economic Innovations introduced during? the AD trienio, concluding with the conviction that: "...16s hombres que comandan l a revolucidn venezolana nan querido instaurar una etapa democratica, pero sin copiar lbs patrones europeos... Ahora l a revolucidn de-mo cra'tiera...ha de realizarse por el proletariadb y las~ biases medias conforme a normas materlallstas...De l a democracla iremos al sociallsmo que habrsTde realizarse tambieh de acuerdo con nuestra vocacidn nacional y com elementos extfafdos de nuestra lntransferible realldad econdmloa. "2 THE MOVIMIENTO DE IZQUIERDA REVOLUCIDN ARIA (MIR) At the tenth AD National Convention i n August, 1959, the ARS faction of the party was able to acquire a majority position-on the Cbmite Ejecutivo Nacional (CEN), since many Old Guard adecos were now occupied in the national coalition government.. The l e f t i s t s did not object to the election of arsista Paz Galarraga as Secretary-General. However, they were strongly opposed to Raul Leoni's promotion to AD President (thus making him the most l i k e l y - 9 3 -candidate f o r the 1963 national p r e s i d e n t i a l elections. )3 Even before the Convention the AD l e f t i s t s maintained they were the victims of slanderous defamation by party leaders on both the regional and national l e v e l , , who accused them of being "com-munist s M and undemocratic.^ After the Convention, t h i s a n t i - l e f t i s t campaign i n t e n s i f i e d as l e f t i s t leaders Domingo Alberto Rang e l , He'ctor Pe'rez Marcano, Rafael Jose 7 Muhoz, and Americo Martin began to p u b l i c l y voice t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s of " o f f i c i a l " AD and government p o l i c i e s . In a public; speech on January 21, i960 Betancourt referred to the l e f -t i s t s as "cabezas c a l i e n t e s " who were c r e a t i n g ; d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r democratic^ s t a b i l i t y . And during the Comite Directivo Nacional meeting held a few days l a t e r , Betancourt unsuccessfully proposed that Rangel should appear before the Tribunal D l s c i p l i n a r i o Nacion-a l , and that other l e f t i s t s , e s p e c i a l l y those on the Euro Juvenil Nacional, should be suspended from the p a r t y . 5 In January, i960 Rangel was assigned to be an advisor during: contract negotiations between FEDEFETRO (the o i l workers' union) and the o i l companies. According to Martz, Rangel had agreed with the terms of the contract during; the AD Buro' P o l i t i c o meetings but l a t e r i n February wrote a newspaper a r t i c l e c r i t i c i z i n g the com-panies and stating<•--."non-party" views. This action was construed as a breach of party d i s c i p l i n e and the CEN!ordered Rangel to ap-pear before the Tribunal D l s c i p l i n a r i o . 6 In March, Americo Martin also incurred the wrath of the C E N J when he published a r t i c l e s c r i t i c i z i n g AD a l l i e s APRA of Peru,. Jose -94-Figueres of Costa Rica, and L u i s Munoz Marfn of Puerto Rico. On March 29» the GENJ suspended the? el even leaders of AD* s Buro' Juve-n i l Nacional with the objective of impeding the convocation! of the "Fleno Nacional de l a Juventud de AD;M which was scheduled f o r A p r i l 8 i n Maracaibb. The rationale f o r the suspension was thee public?;protest the youth leaders made regarding GEN3 d i s c i p l i n a r y sanctions against Rangel and Americo Martin,7 The l e f t i s t s accused the? ARS^dominated CENi o f applying^;dis-c i p l i n a r y sanctions in?an attempt to have the A D : l e f t i s t s e x p e l l -ed from the party, and thus consolidaterARS power,. They also accused the CENi of violating? A r t i c l e 10 of the party statutes°by refusing;: to take the matter? before a National Convention?!,8 The l e f t i s t s i n s i s t e d that: the problem was not one of d i s c i -p l i n e but of ideology. They maintained they did not lnstigate^the d i v i s i o n i n the party, but rather were being persecuted because they upheld the orthodoxy of AD doctrine. The Old Guard leaders collaborated i n the expulsion of the r a d i c a l wing-of the party because the presence of the latterrwas an obstacle to conserving^; big?business leaders* and senior m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s ' confidence lm the c o a l i t i o n government^ The C E N M was also accused of using a double standard^: In an a r t i c l e concerning the l a y o f f of petroleum workers, AD Secretary-General Jesi/s Paz Galarraga affirmed that the State was an asso-ciate of the o i l 1 companies,, insinuating; that future salary increases' f o r petroleum workers would be detrimental to the o i l revenue re-ceived by the State. This anti-labor p o s i t i o n was accepted as -95-though i t were i n accordance with AD doctrine, and r a t i o n a l i z e d as a wpaso t a c t i c o " . Meanwhile the l e f t i s t s were sent to the 10 D i s c i p l i n a r y Tribunal and l a b e l l e d as communists. Denying the l a b e l of communist, the l e f t i s t s defended t h e i r ideology as "enralzada en l a doctrina nacional-revolucionarla que dio raz/n de ser a Accidn Democratica..." They condemned the wave of "professional ant 1-communism" that has saturated the p o l i t i c a l atmosphere of a l l L a t i n America and which was being u t i l i z e d as an "Ignoble instrument" i n the i n t e r n a l struggles of A D j 1 1 "En Venezuela esa campana ha impedldo el acceso de grandes sectores de l a juventud a l a s f l l a s del Partido, ,pues nuestro pueblo, sin ser afecto a l comunismo, siente respeto no s6lo por l a conducta digna de l o s dirigentes comunistas durante e l decenlo. d i c t a t o r i a l , slno tambieh porque e l anticomunl smo fue e l lenguaje co-tidiano de l a Dictadura cuando pretendfa J u s t i f l c a r cual-quler atropello contra l a s l l b e r t a d e s publioas y contra-l o s intereses del p a i s , y es el idloma favorito de todas,^ l a s demas dictaduras americanas y de l o s gobiernos y monopolies que control an nuestra riqueza y desarrollo y se oponen a nuestra l l b e r a c i d n n a c i o n a l . " 1 2 The Pleno Juvenil was held as scheduled, despite p r o h i b i t i o n by the CEN. The emotional p u b l i c meetings was highlighted by speeches by Ame'rico Martin, Gumersindo Rodriguez, Simoon Saez Me"rl-da, and climaxed by the empassloned oratory of Doming? Alberto Rangel. The creation-of a separate national revolutionary party/ was-proposed,. which was l a t e r r a t i f i e d on A p r i l 12 following the o f f i c i a l expulsion of sixteen l e f t i s t AD leaders. (Rangel and Am^rico Mart/n had refused tb even appear before the D i s c i p l i n a r y T r i b u n a l . ) 1 3 On the evening of the 12th, Domingo Alberto Rangel became Secretary-General of the AD de Izqulerda which was to change i t s -96-name the following month to Movimiento de Izquierda Revoluolonaria (MIR). Subsequently AD was to lose 80% of its.youth movement to the new p a r t y . 1 4 On A p r i l 1 9, 1960, before the o f f i c i a l founding of MIR7, the l e f t i s t adecos published an extensive "Documento de l o s Jovenes de AD" i n the Caracas paper "La Esfera" i n which they explained t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the current c r i s i s confronting AD. The document was signed by over 100 l e f t i s t and youth leaders. The Betancourt Government- was c r i t i c i z e d for i t s attitude towards the popular masses. Indeed, "El-companero Betancourt esta revelando una a l e r g l a c s s i incurable hacia l a s masas, y l a sola palabra pronunciada por un acciondemocratista l o enf erma." The l e f t i s t s f e l t the masses should be c a l l e d on to support the govern-ment, providing s o l i d a r i t y i n the face of attempted reactionary coups. They c r i t i c i z e d Betancourt f o r dealing severely against peasants who attempted to take possession of land not o f f i c i a l l y t h e i r s (although some attempted to occupy land o r i g i n a l l y grant-ed them during-the tr i e n l o ) , , while on the other hand the govern-ment tolerated the "economic blackmail" exerted by certain business sectors. Likewise, potential "golpistas" were merely sent out of the country on o f f i c i a l missions.?-^ Regarding .International r e l a t i o n s , the future MIR c a l l e d f o r closer and more cordial contact 4 with Cuba: "No hemos soli c l t a d o l a copia al carbon del proceso cubano, sino l a aslmilacio'n de algunas de sus ensefianzas y l a decldida a c t i t u d de def enderlo, porque constituye hoy por hoy l a mejor esperanza de l a l i b e r a c i d n nacional latinoamericana. " l D In addition, the l e f t i s t s defended the establishment of diplomatic -97-and commercial r e l a t i o n s with the Soviet Union, China, and other nations of the " S o c i a l i s t World". Again, emphasizing the necessity o f serving the masses and consolidating t h e i r support, the l e f t i s t s accused the National Direction of AD of employing the party tenet of polyclassism as a means of e f f e c t i n g "capitulacion ideologica". The government was accused of imprudently postponing social reforms while curry-ing the favor of the f i n a n c i a l o l i g a r c h y . 1 7 Regarding economic p o l i c y : i t was the duty of AD", as the axis of the c o a l i t i o n government, to defend the Venezuelan economy from the offensives of international trusts* At the end of 1959 the government O f l c i n a de Coordlnacion y F l a n i f i c a c i o n (CORDIPLAN) submitted to the AD~Buro P o l i t i c o a document proposing the dena-t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the steel and petrochemical i n d u s t r i e s and re-questing the support^ of the party. The l e f t i s t adecos responded: "Prente a ese document© reacionamos casi con v i o l e n c i a y expresamos nuestra i r r e d u c t i b l e oposicion. " The party rejected the CORDIFLAN project, but i t s fate was s t i l l unknown at the time of the a r t i -1 ft c l e ' s publication. ° The l e f t i s t ' s were equally adament concerning .the government's controversial plan of granting an aluminum concession to Reynold International: "Sobre este caso tenemos una posicion muy c l a r a . Y no por puro afah p a t r i o t e r o , sino por correcto e s p i r i t u acciondemocratista. Nuestro Partido en su t e s i s s i n d l c a l ha defendido l a idea de que l a s Industrias ba'sicas^per-tenezcan a l Estado, porque l a propiedad estatal es clave para pasar a una forma de socledad en que vayan desapare-ciendo gradualmente l a s contradicciones sociales del s i s -tema c a p i t a l ! s t a . Entregar el aluminio s e r i a tanto como -98-r e p e t i r l o ocurrldb con el petroleo y e l h i e r r o , cuyo sal do h i s t d r l c o conocemos de so bra. M l 9 The l e f t i s t s -went on to c r i t i c i z e the government's handling; o f the f i s c a l c r i s i s r e s u l t i n g from the exodus o f foreign and domestic- c a p i t a l . They also c r i t i c i z e d various organs of the party's d i r e c t i o n f o r disdaining a plan submitted by a l e f t i s t AD economist, which could have prevented the lopsided balance of payments-* aggravated by the Betancourt Government's d e f i c i t ' spend-ing , that eventually l e d to the government's need to contract a loan from a New York bank. The Four-Year Flan was c r i t i c i z e d for a l l o c a t i n g an i n s u f f i -cient Bs. 100,000,000 f o r i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , thus making i t man-datory to eithe r s o l i c i t foreign c a p i t a l o r e f f e c t - a decline l n development due to la c k of f i n a n c i a l b a c k i n g * 2 0 The recently promulgated Agrarian Reform Law was deemed ade-quate providing the government was prepared to energetically con-front those i n t e r e s t s opposing the transformation o f the r u r a l sec* t o r of society. However, the l e f t i s t s exprecssed t h e i r doubts by c r i t i c i z i n g the government for using e v i c t i o n to solve certain^ peasant*!andhblder disputes when other means were available f o r T a r r i v i n g at a s o l u t i o n . 2 1 The "Documento..." concludes with a reaffirmation of AccldttJ Democratica's democratic revolutionary doctrine and an entreaty f o r I t s v i g i l e n c e : "...No podfamos guardar s i l e n c i o mas tiempo. En el pais y en e l Partido se impone proceder de este modo para contribUir a despertar l a s conciencias y a enderezar l o s rumbos...el p a i s camina hacia nuevas formas de sojuzga-miento exterior y e l Gobierno estimula l a creacidn de - 9 9 -T una poderosa o l l g a r q u i a que terminara senoreando nuestra economia...' "For d e c l r y sostener todas estas cosas se nos ha perseguido, se nos ha acusado falsamente y ahora se nos pretende expulsar del Fartido. A l i i e s t a ' l a razdn de nuestras dlscrepanclas. A l l ! e s t a ' l a razdn de l a s medi-das d i s c i p l i n a r i a s que repudiamos energicamente.. • 1 , 2 2 MIR*s defection from AD, and, as a consequence, from the c o a l i t i o n government^, resulted l n Increased harrassmentt f o r i t s leaders. In June, i960 p o l i c e raided Deputy D.A. Rangel's house and i n the same month arrested Deputy Jesus Maria Casal „ also of MIR*23 On September 7, i960 URD: announced that i n November i t would; also withdraw from the c o a l i t i o n government, claiming i t was not f a i r l y represented i n the c o a l i t i o n , and urging l e s s cooperation with the United States and stronger support f o r Cuba. Mlnisterrof Exterior Relations Ignaclo L u i s Arcaya was the f i r s t u r r e d i s t a to resign, a f t e r he refused to sign the "Declaraclon de San Jos6" which condemned Cuba at the VII Foreign Ministers* Conference i n Costa Rica. 2 2* In October, i960 the headquarters of several opposition news-papers, including those of URDI and the PCV were ransacked. In November, Gustavo Machado accused Betancourt before the Supreme Court of unconstitutionally ordering the temporary occupation of the PCV newspaper "Tribuna Popular". However the charges were? thrown out due to lack of documentary p r o o f . 2 5 Press censorship was v o l u n t a r i l y accepted by the Asociaclon: Venezolana de Periodistas l n May, 1959, on behalf of defending the Betancourt regime against Perez Jimenez reactionaries who - 1 0 0 -would discredit 1 the? democratic?governments. However, a f t e r the? Cuban expropriation?of United States property* an anti-Cuban' campaign was i n i t i a t e d i n Washington, D. C., and pro-Cuban p e r i o d i -c a l s were banned in" Venezuela. The Venezuelan press? was instructed to p r i n t no favorable news concerning Cuba and they were urged to join.the anti-Communist propagandists. (Only 'EL Nacional' refused to succumb to government-pressure.) This formal censor-ship i n i t i a l l y applied to news a r t i c l e s only,, but was l a t e r extend-ed to e d i t o r i a l s and paid advertisements. News coverage of street violence,, labor s t r i k e s , g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s * and c r i t i c i s m s by opposition p o l i t i c i a n s , union and student leaders were also even-t u a l l y prohibited. Radio broadcast's were also subjected to similar censorship. ° DEFECTION OF ARS" In December, 1961 the ARS" f a c t i o n of A D " f u l f i l l e d the l e f t i s t s ' prophesy by attempting to take over complete control of the party. Inn v i o l a t i o n of party statutes, the ARS-dominated CENi intervened in-the Sectional Conventions which selected the state delegates? to the party's XHrNational Convention; 2 7 The Old Guards convoked the Comite' Direct!vo Nacional (CDN) whose authority was superior to that of the CEN; They s t i l l mainv talned a majority on the CDN and succeeded in-bio eking ARS i n t e r -vention l n the l a s t two Sectional Conventions to be held, by a vote of 63 to 56. ARS maintained that only t h e i r 56 votes were? leg i t i m a t e , and consequently, on January 1 2 , I 9 6 2 tra> National Conventions were held, marking the d e f i n i t i v e destruction of AD*s -101-monollthl co image. The regular: convention, with 567? delegates, was headed by Raul Leoni and i t o f f i c i a l l y expelled the a r s i s t a s ; while a r s l s t a Raul Ramos Gimenez l e d the AD-Oppo s i t i b n Convention, with 373 delegates, which l n turn " o f f i c i a l l y expelled" the non-arsista adecos. 2® The Old Guard adecos maintained the s p l i t was motivated by personal ambitions and was not Ideological at a l l 1 . However, ARS accused the Old Guard of f a i l i n g to l i v e up to AD" revolutionary doctrine. Ramos Gimenez i s quoted as saying: "Solo sabemos que e l sefldr Presidente quiere termi-ner su peribdo constituclonal y entregar l o s sfmbblbs del mando a otro venezolano electo por e l pueblo. Es una legitime aspiraclo'h que^toda Venezuele respalda, pero no puede c o n s t i t u i r l a unlca n i l a mexime aspiraclo'h de un pafs que en sus sectbres obreros y campesinos espera realizeciones mucho mas concretes y profundas. " 2 ° In edditlon to Federecion Campesina de Venezuela president" Ramon-Qui jade, the ARS defectors included key union leaders, thus undermining much of AD's labor support. ARS joined the opposition c o a l i t i o n i n the Chamber of Deputies, leaving the AD-COPEI c o a l i -tion: with only f i f t y - f i v e seats out of 133, while AD barely main* talned a majority l n the Senete with 27 out of 51 s e e t s . 3 0 A mejor "bone of contention" between the two factions l n Con-gress was the repeated suspension of Constitutional guarantees during the Betancourt regime. Indeed, from February 13, 1959 to January 3» 1963 the Constitutional guarantees were: suspended a t o t a l of 761 out of 1421 days. 3 1 The causes for the suspensions included PCV-inspired street demonstrations by unemployed workers, high school and un i v e r s i t y -102-student bus burnings and police confrontations i n pro-Cuba mani-fe s t a t i o n s , and an attempt to assassinate Betancourt on June 24r. I960 by agents of Dominican Republic d i c t a t o r Rafael T r u j l l l o . Besides the l a t t e r event, the most dramatic event prompting the renewal of Constitutional suspensions was thecNaval and Marine Corps r e b e l l i o n at Carupaiw on May 4, 1962. PCV Deputy Eloy Torres.1" was caught with a group of s a i l o r s while attempting to escape from the Carupano garrison in-the wake of the insurrection's f a i l u r e . . In a subsequent congressional debate, both PCV and MIR deputies acknowledged t h e i r p a r t i e s ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the unsuccessful re-v o l t . 32 On May 9, 1962 Betancourt Issued Decree No. 752, counter-signed by h i s cabinet members, which suspended the PCV and MIR, prohibited a l l t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , and ordered the seizure of t h e i r headquarters,- archives, and other property. One month l a t e r another Naval and Marine Corps u p r i s i n g took place at Puerto Cabellb. This r e l a t i v e l y v i o l e n t r e v o l t was also suppressed, and m i r i s t a Simdrr Saez Merida was among the captured prisoners.33 There followed an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y , which had begun on a small scale l n the west Andean states i n A p r i l , 1962. The "Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacidn Nacional" (FALN) were o f f i c i a l l y formed at the end of 1962, with i t s p o l i t i c a l organ, the "Frente de Liberacidn Nacional" (FLN). In addition to the PCV and MIR, more than 100 m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s belonged to the FALN. UHD: deputy Fabrlcio Ojeda (ex-President of the Junta P a t r i d t l c a which fought Perez Jimenezr) resigned from Congress l n July, 1962 and assumed -103-command of the g u e r r i l l a group "Jose'Leonardo Chirinos." In the c i t i e s , Unidades Tacticas de Combate (UTC) were formed to le a d the offensive against United States businesses, government police,, and other representatives of the foreign economic-Betancourt a l l i a n c e . ^ According toFALN apologist Manuel Cableses Donoso, FALN fought "violence with violence". He accuses Betancourt of falsely-a t t r i b u t i n g bank robberies and similar gangster violence to FALN a c t i v i s t s . Likewise, he maintains that the government!*s discovery i n November, 1963 of a threes-ton cache of "Cuban-supplied arms" was a f a b r i c a t i o n of the foreign press. According to Cableses, most of the g u e r r i l l a s * arms were captured from government forces, Including many during the Carupano and Puerto Cabello uprisings.3 5 Betancourt diplomatically played the m i l i t a r y against the FALN, and i n September, 1963, under m i l i t a r y influence, he had hundreds of l e f t i s t extremists arrested, while the army fought the FALN i n the streets. MIR and PGF senators and deputies l o s t t h e i r con-gressional immunity and were also arrested.3 6 1963 ELECTIONS "On July 2, 1963 AD held i t s XIII National Convention to select the party's candidate f o r the December 1 p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s . Betancourt wanted the Convention to choose a slate of f i v e or s i x names, from which the CEN'would choose one candidate i n conference with COPEI leaders. For the f i r s t time, the supreme AD leader* s wishes were contradicted, and the Convention-opted to choose one candidate. Without even consulting COPEI, Raul Leon! (whom: COPEI -104-considered unacceptable as a c o a l i t i o n candidate) was elected,37 In e f f e c t , COPEI f e l t i t deserved to have Rafael Caldera chosen as the c o a l i t i o n candidate, i n reward f o r f i v e years* co-operation with AD i n the c o a l i t i o n government. However, AD was? determined to prove i t could s t i l l win an e l e c t i o n i n spite of the d e b i l i t a t i n g d i v i s i o n s i t had endured. Thus, on August 23, COPEI unanimously proclaimed Caldera the party's p r e s i d e n t i a l candidate, and the AD-COPEI c o a l i t i o n was d i s s o l v e d . 3 8 The opposition was unable to come up with a united front can-didate. Consequently, Jdvito V l l l a l b a was chosen to represent URD; AD-ARS nominated Raul Ramos Gimenez; Ramon Quljada withdrew from ARS and he and h i s supporters backed Senator Arturo Uslar P i e t r i (formerly President Medina's p r i n c i p a l advisor) who ran as the candidate of the Independientes^por un Frente Nacional (IPFN); and the "one-man" Frente Democratico Popular (PDF) of ex-mirista Jorge Dager nominated Wolfgang L a r r a z a b a l . J 7 AD's campaign platform r e l i e d heavily on the party's past achievements, such as universal suffrage, educational advances, and the eradication of malaria. I t emphasized the continued con>-sol i d a t i o n of the democratic system, opposing the " t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m imposed upon the Cuban people". AD was committed to State c a p i t a l -ism and the creation of Jobs. The agrarian reform would continue and be extended. Reliance on foreign industry would be reduced. . The party also promised to construct 375,000 homes to a l l e v i a t e the estimated d e f i c i t of 700,000. 4 0 COPEI • s platform was similar to that of AD. Just as AD had begun a swing to the r i g h t , so did COPEI begin a leftward trend, -105-influenced by Fdpe John XXIII i n the l a t e 1950's and by the ex-perience of young COFEI leaders who observed Christian Democratic p a r t i e s i n West Germany, I t a l y , and France. In addition, the party's c o a l i t i o n with AD~ enabled COFEI to make large inroads into the r u r a l electorate (which now constituted l e s s than one t h i r d of the t o t a l population). Copeyano Gimenez Landfnez was Minister of Agriculture and by the end of 1963 COFEII had the support of one t h i r d of the Federacion Campesina de Venezuela.^ 1 The party took cr e d i t f o r the popular accomplishments by the c o a l i t i o n government, while disassociating i t s e l f from the l e s s popular deeds. URD; promised an expanded social security system, more and im-proved education and health f a c i l i t i e s , increased i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ' with more employment, an improved agrarian reform, and amnesty with the FLN. AD-ARS pledged to work f o r Venezuelan food f o r everyone, free books f o r students, and 750,000 new jobs f o r workers. 1 + 2 Although the FALN c a l l e d f o r a curfew on the e l e c t i o n day, 91.3$ of the registered voters turned out at the p o l l s . S i g n i f i -cantly, AD~only received 16.3# of the Caracas vote, but due to i t s continued support i n the I n t e r i o r , the party succeeded in) staying; i n power by obtaining;957,699 of the t o t a l votes (33$). The other candidates received the following: Caldera (COFEI) 589,372 20% Uslar F l e t r i (IFFN) 551,120 19% V i l l a l b a (URD) 469,240 16% Larrazabal, (FDF) 275,304 10%' Ramos Gimenez (ARS) 66,837 Z% The d i s t r i b u t i o n i n Congress-was as follows: Senate Chamber of Deputies^ A D : COFEI U R D ? 21 9 6 64 40 27 -106-IPFN 3 19 FDP, 3 14 AR£> 3 - 1 Thus on March 11,. 1964 R&mulo Betancourt f i n a l l y f u l f i l l e d h i s ambition to be Venezuela's f i r s t democratically elected p r e s i -dent to transfer power to a legitimate successor.* By the f a l l 1 of 1964, URD" (minus i t s recently expelled l e f t wing) and Uslar P l e t r i ' s new formal party, Frente Nacional Democratic©, joined AD to form a three-party c o a l i t i o n government. 4 4 MOVIMIENTO ELECTORAL DEL PUEBLO (MEP) In 1966 former p o l i t i c a l adversaries Domingo Alberto Rangel and Raul Ramos Gimenez and t h e i r respective followings united to form the Partido Revolucionario de Integracid'n Nacional (PRIN). The party aspired to become the nucleus of a broad-based l e f t i s t c o a l i t i o n , but by 1968 l t had become incorporated as a left-wing f a c t i o n withln-the l a t e s t ADTdissident faction-turned party: the^ Movimlento E l e c t o r a l del Pueblo (MEP).45 According to Blank, Venezuela was apparently warned by the World Bank in^the mld-1960's not to raise petroleum taxes, due to the country's "unfavorable competitive p o s i t i o n l n the world market". Instead, the Alliance f o r Progress Committee of Nine encouraged the Venezuelan Government to propose l e g i s l a t i o n r a i s i n g domestic taxes. 4 ^ This coincided i n part with a reform of the income tax system * See Appendix f o r a discussion of the repercussions of the December 1 e l e c t i o n s on the revolutionary movement. -107-envisloned by AD l i b e r a l s , headed by party President L u i s B. Prieto F. and Secretary-General Jesus Paz Galarraga. While President Leoni continued Betancourt* s p o l i c y of c u l t i v a t i n g the supportof the growing-urban sector, es p e c i a l l y the private business-community, Prieto F. and Paz Galarraga strove to reenforce AD rapport with popular sectors of society and thus reverse the decline i n party popularity demonstrated i n the 1963 elections.**? In 1966 the AD l i b e r a l s drafted several reform measures e f f e c t -ing education, the regulation of p r i c e s , control of land speculation, and the income tax system. The opposition p a r t i e s boycotted thee special session of Congress scheduled f o r July, 1966 to consider the proposed tax reform. The business community, represented by FEDECAMARAS, spent $500,000 on a p u b l i c i t y campaign against any tax reform whatsoever. To calm the si t u a t i o n , the 1966 AD National Convention replaced Paz Galarraga with Minister of I n t e r i o r Relations Gonzalo Barrios as Se ere tary-General, and i n l a t e 1966 a moderate 4 8 version of the tax l e g i s l a t i o n was passed by Congress; In 1967 the internal party c o n f l i c t over reform measures developed into a c r i s i s over the party's p r e s i d e n t i a l nomination f o r the 1968 national e l e c t i o n s . In July, 1967 f o r the f i r s t time i n AD hi s t o r y , the party labor bureau divided. Jose"Gonzalez Navarro, President of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV) announced h i s support f o r Prieto F.. CTV Secretary-General Augusto Malave V i l l a l b a then proclaimed h i s support f o r Barrios. From h i s self-imposed Swiss e x i l e Betancourt adamently opposed Prieto*s candidacy. However, an inner-party primary on September 24, 1967 gave Prieto a majority of the votes. In l a t e October the -108-party o f f i c i a l l y s p l i t , and i n December the Paz Galarraga-Prieto F. f a c t i o n formed the Movimlento E l e c t o r a l del Pueblo (MEP). 4 9 During the 1968 campaign AD harassed MEP leaders and r a l l i e s i n an attempt to s t i f l e the breakaway f a c t i o n . However, MEP was able to a t t r a c t 19% of the t o t a l votes, thus contributing to AD» s f i r s t e l e c t o r a l defeat. The elections r e s u l t s were: Rafael Caldera (COPEI) 1,083,712 29% Gonzalo Barrios (ADC) 1,050,806 28$ Miguel Angel B u r e l l i Rlvas^ 0 826,758 22$ L u i s B. Prieto F. (MEP)51 719,461 19% The Congressional r e s u l t s were: Senate Chamber of Deputle AD 19 63 COPEI 16 59 MEP 5 25 CCN 4 21 URD_ 3 20 FDP 2 10 FND 1 4 PRIN 1 PCV (UFA) 1 5 Thus f o r the f i r s t time i n Venezuelan hi s t o r y a constitu-t i o n a l l y - e l e c t e d president relinquished h i s power to the success-f u l candidate of an opposition party. AD was not tb be consoled by t h i s momentous event, and to "add i n s u l t to i n j u r y " , the perez-Jimenlsta Cruzada Cfvica Naclonalista (CCN) obtained 26% of the Metropolitan Caracas l e g i s l a t i v e votes, thus e l e c t i n g former d i c -tator Perez Jimenez as Senator from the Federal District.-?-? EPILOGUE Ihi 1968 President Leoni had most of the imprisoned PCV? l e a d e r s released and allowed them to form a f r o n t party, the Unidn para Avanzar (UPA), which pa r t i c i p a t e d i n the 1968 elections, receiv-ing: 100,000 l e g i s l a t i v e votes.-'' Simon Saez Merida and other imprisoned MIR leaders were also released during the 1968 amnesty.2-- MIR: was s t i l l the f l d e l i s t " party, but a f t e r h i s release Saez Merida c a l l e d for the end of violence. In January, 1968 MIR- formed a c o a l i t i o n with the PCV/ to win theeCentral University student elections with nearly 60% of the vote. However they received l e s s than 5% of the votes In the December, 1968 general elections. " By 1970, Paz Galarraga had replaced the aging-Prieto F. as MEP Dleader, and MEP~formed a "new force" c o a l i t i o n with URD and! the PCV. This l e f t i s t trend provoked the defection of some of the party's conservative leaders, such as former CTV president9 Jose' Gonzalez Navarro • -The PCV underwent an internal d i v i s i o n also. In December,, 1970 an anti-soviet 1 f a c t i o n l e d by Teodoro Petkoff and Pompeyo Marquez established the Movlmientb a l Soclallsmo (MAS). Supported by Q0% of the Juventud Comunista, by 1972 MAS had replaced the PCV' as the dominant p o l i t i c a l force among the Central University student 1973 ELECTIONS According to D.A. Rangel, "En Accid'n Democratica l a s derrotas han sido e l forceps de l a degeneracion ideologica. " Rangel, i n h i s book analysing the 1973 p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s , purports that AD's -110-defeat l n 1968 accelerated the party's evolution to the r i g h t . In i t s attempt to c u l t i v a t e the f i n a n c i a l oligarchy's support,, AD displaced COPEI as the conservative party. From Rangel' s viewpoint 4: "AD ya no es e l partido u t i l i z a d o por l a clase d l r i g e n t e . Es l a clase dlrigente en funcidn publica. n'& When AD l o s t power, many former administrators went to work as advisors f o r large companies, or they founded t h e i r own b u s i -nesses. Among those who worked fo r "big business;" were former revolutionaries Gumersindo Rodriguez, ("el arrepentido prof eta de l a insurreccidn popular") and Juan Manuel Sucre T r i a s . Rodriguez and Sucre T r i a s were also on AD* s Cbmision Nacional E l e c t o r a l dur-ing the p r e s i d e n t i a l campaign of former Betancourt protege Carloe Andre's Perez for the 1973 elections. In effect,. Rodriguez and other r e h a b i l i t a t e d revolutionaries Fernando Baez and Rafael Jose Munoz were among Carlos Andre's Perez's ghostwriters. 7 The 1973 e l e c t i o n campaign holds the record f o r being the longest, c o s t l i e s t and most orderly l n the country's h i s t o r y . Both AD~and COPEI employed United States p u b l i c - r e l a t i o n s firms.. Rangel^estimates AD's campaign expenses between 1972-1973 at Bs. 160,700,000. 8 Among the several banking groups that contributed to Carlos Andres Perez's campaign was the Banco de Occldente, whose p r i n c i -pal d i r e c t o r , L u i s Jugo Amador, had been a close f r i e n d of the AD? candidate's for f i f t e e n years. Other AD supporters from the finan-c i a l oligarchy included the Vollmer family (CVTV t e l e v i s i o n station, plus industry),. Diego Cisneros (Pepsi Cola, Venevision television^ - I l l -station), in addition to various construction firms that had re-ceived government contracts since 1958. Financial support also came from foreign enterprises: Exxon Corp. (petroleum), Indulac (milk), General Motors, and Bayer Chemical.9 10 The results of the December 9, 1973 elections were as follows: Carlos Andre's Perez (AD) 2,006,214 48.61$ Lorenzo Fernandez (COFEI) 1,518,385 36.79% JestTs Faz Galarraga (MEP) 210,513 5.10$ Jose' Vicente Rangel (MAS) 17*,954 4.21$ Jdvito V i l l a l b a (URD) 126, 401 3.< " Legislative: A D L : - 1,833,730 44.32$ C O F E I 1,252,761 30.28$ M A S 216,473 5.23$ M E P 207,785 5.02$ 4.30$ C C N 178,089 U R D 132,780 3.20$ F D P 51,3*7 1.24$ P C V 49,455 1.19$ M I R 42,186 1.01$ Jose Vicente Rangel of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), the most prominent of the l e f t i s t parties in the campaign, suffered a blow at the polls which reflected the discouragement resulting from the recent overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile. As Rangel remarked in a newspaper interview: "Many people here sympathized with Allende, but they saw that Allende's way was not able to build a socialist society. They were angry, of course, but the poor Venezuelans are very r e a l i s t i c . They understood that an Allende in Venezuela would mean a military regime here too. 1 , 1 1 Since AD's return to power, the government has embarked on the nationalization of i t s iron and petroleum industries. In an interview for the ~:Washlngton Po st :. government spokesmen (and former miristas) Planning Minister Gumersindo Rodriguez and Acting Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Fernando Baez "made l t clear -112.-that Venezuela was not seeking a confrontation with the United States or American companies over n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . " 1 2 In December, 1974 an amicable n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n agreement was signed with the American-owned Orinoco Mining (U.S. Steel) and; Iron Mines Ob. (Bethlehem Steel Co.), whereby the companies were: to be paid t h e i r net book value i n bonds at 7% i n t e r e s t over" ten years. The agreement included renewable one-year management con-t r a c t s with U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel Co., plus a guarantee that the nationalized mines would continue to supply the two 1-5 steel companies with i r o n ore f o r seven years. y This agreement served as the model f o r the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the petroleum industry, which was effected i n August, 1975* CONCLUSION Accidn Democratica, since the days of i t s inception, has overcome many obstacles i n i t s attempt to achieve and subsequently maintain i t s status as the p r i n c i p a l p o l i t i c a l party i n Venezuela. In the name of the "party of the people" AD has collaborated with communists, the armed forces, foreign i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , peasant and labor confederations, and with the Venezuelan economic e l i t e . Like a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s that have attained power through constitu-t i o n a l means, AD has had to make compromises. U n t i l 1958 Accidn Democratlea considered i t s e l f a democratic revolutionary party. In i t s endeavor to compromise and thereby guarantee i t s tenure i n o f f i c e , the party has ceased to be "revolu-tionary". I t s apologists would remind AD c r i t i c s of the fate of Salvador Allende's l e f t i s t government, not to mention the I l l -fated AD t r i e n i o . Those adecos who would l i m i t ' the extent of AD accommodation have been forced to leave AD and establish new p a r t i e s to serve as vehi c l e s for expounding p r i n c i p l e s once considered "acciondemocra-t i s t a s " . However, as the 1973 e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e , the small l e f t i s t p a r t i e s can not compete r e a l i s t i c a l l y with the well-financed p o l i t i c a l machines of AD and COPEr. As Domingo Alberto Rangel remarked l n a l e t t e r to the author: "...Aqui como en toda Latinoame'rica o actuan l o s partidos burgueses o se imponen l a s fuerzas genuinamente revolu-cionarlas. Si de algo estoy convencido es que l a s i z -quierdas nada tienen que hacer en l o s parlamentos y en l a s elecciones." -114-NOTES TO CHAPTER I 1. For example, i n Carabobo i n 1873, out of a population-of 22,952 adult males, 3*50 were o f f i c e r s , including 449 generals and 627 colonels. Winfield J . Burggraaff, The Venezuelan Armed Forces i n P o l i t i c s 1935-1959 (Columbia. Missouri, 1972)p. 13. 2. By 1898 coffee exports totaled Bs. 61,847,500 out of t o t a l exports worth Bs. 7*,*89,000. Rafael Gallegos O r t i z , La H l s t o r l a F o l f t l o a de Venezuela (de  Clpriano Castro a Perez Jimenez) (Caracas. I960) p. 57. " 3. Galleogos O r t i z , p. 63. 4. Gallegos O r t i z , p. 97. Castro's refusal to pay foreign debts had made him ex-tremely unpopular with foreign companies and t h e i r governments. 5. Romulo Betancourt-, Venezuela: P o l i t l o a y Fetro'leo (Bogota, 1969, Third Edltion)p. 41. 6. Betancourt, p. 47. 7. Betancourt, p. 63. 8. Petroleum Exports: 1926 = Bs. 259,000,000 1927 = 359,000,000 1928 = 5*5,000,000 1929 = 619,000,000 Gallegos O r t i z , "La Hlstorla...!? p. 130. 9. Consumer item imports: 1916 = Bs. 90,000,000 1926 = 358,000,000 1935 = 225,000,000 Gallegos Ortiz,, p. 132. 10. Gallegos O r t i z , p. 125. 11. A l l came from middle and upper-middle c l a s s f a m i l i e s , including the Machado brothers who were to found the Vene-zuelan Communist Party. 12. Rodolfo Luzardo, Notas Hlstorlco-Economlcas 1928-1963 (Caracas, 1963)p. 19. -115-13. Tamayo r e c i t e d a poem to the Student Queen: "...Como me acuerdo, Reinal/ Temblando bajo sombras l a amaba con angustias/ En-mis venas corrieron l o s miedos por su v i d a . / . ..Y un dfa me l a raptaron./—y un d i a me l a l l e v a r o n . / ..•y el nombre de esa novla se me parece a vos:/ Llamose: L i b e r t a d l " Luzardo, p. 20. 14. John D. Martz, Accidn Democratica: Evolution of a Modern  P o l i t i c a l Party l n Venezuela (Princeton. N. J . . 1966) p . 24. 15. Tamayo was released a f t e r Gomez's death but he never recovered from the trauma of h i s prison experience. 16. Leoni was a fellow student of the "Generation of '28" who would l a t e r succeed Betancourt as President of Venezuela i n 1964. 17. Martz, "Aocld'n Demoora^tlca... g p. 121. 18. Barrios was AD's unsuccessful p r e s i d e n t i a l candidate i n 1968. 19. Luzardo, "Notes...? p. 28. 20. Luzardo, p. 231. 21. Luzardo, p. 232. 22. Luzardo, p. 234. 23. E s c r i t o r e s de Venezuela y de America (Luis Peraza), Romulo  Betancourt. Semblanza de un P o l i t i c o Popular (Caracas, 1948) p. 156. 24. Diogenes de l a Rosa, "Testlmonio a Rdmulo Betancourt", POLITICA, I I I , No. 32, March 1964, p. 168. 25. Martz, "Aocl6n Democratlca...2 p. 122. 26. Manuel Vicente Magallanes, Partidos P o l i t i c o s Venezolanos (Caracas, 1959) p. 79. 27. Magallanes, p. 83. t • 28. L u i s Alberto Sanchez, "Testimonlo... ", p. 45. 29. / On May 8 , 1936 a group l e d by Rafael Caldera and Pedro Jose Lara Pena l e f t the PEV and formed the Union Nacional E s t u d i a n t i l (UNE). The future founders of the Social Christian Democratic party COPEI dissented when the PEV proposed the -116-expulsion of the J e s u i t s from Venezuela. Magallanes, "Partido s... V p. 97. 30. Martz, "Acolon Demoora'tioa... ¥ p. 34. 31. Presidencia de l a Republica, Documentos que Hlcleron Hlstorla. (Caracas, 1962) Vol. I I , p. 2?U 32. Presidencia de l a Repu'bllca, p..245. 33. Presidencia de l a Republica, p. 240. 34. Martz, "Acoion Democratica...? p. 37. 35. Edwin Lieuwen, Venezuela (London, 1965) P« 53* 36. Betancourt, "Venezuela... ? p. 115. 37. From I858 to 1936 a l l males over twenty-one could vote for municipal councilmen and members of state l e g i s l a t i v e assemblies. These two, l h turn, elected the national deputies and senators, respectively. The National Congress then chose the president. In 1936 suffrage was l i m i t e d to l i t e r a t e males over twenty-one, thus reducing the electorate to 1% of the population. Betancourt, p. 123. 38. Betancourt, p. 124. 39. Martz, "Aoclon Democratica...? p. 127. 40. Martz, p. 129. 41. Robert J . Alexander, The Communist Party of Venezuela (Stan-ford, 1969) P. 7. 42. Martz, "Acclc^n Democr/tlca... g p. 130. 43. Betancourt, "Venezuela... ? p. 150. 44. In spite o f the government's slogan, "sembrar e l p e t r 6 l e o " , agriculture remained s t a t i c and government support of school and hospital construction was the same as under Gdmez. The government received only 13^ on the d o l l a r per barrel of petro-leum. This sum included a l l r o y a l t i e s and taxes. (The Panama Canal Co. received 10^ on the d o l l a r from the tankers that went to the P a c i f i c v i a the canal.) -117-The Hydrocarbons Law of 1938 Increased government re-venue and allowed m u n i c i p a l i t i e s to apply additional taxes. However, the o i l companies' exis t i n g contracts were exempt from t h i s law, and the companies refrained from requesting new concessions that would be subject to the recent l e g i s l a -t i o n . Luzardo , "Notas.... p. 83. 45. Accion Democratica, "Doctrina y Programa" (Caracas, 1962)p. 20. 46. Accion Democratica, p. 40. 47. Martz. "Accion Democratica...'.' p. 132. 48. Martz, p. 42. 49. E s c r i t o r e s de Venezuela y de Ame'rica (Luis Peraza), "Romulo  Betancourt...", p. 113. 50. L u i s B. Prieto P., "Testimonio...", p. 22. 51. He was l a t e r prljblelzed by. National Gtfard Commandant, Oscar Tamayo Sadrez: "The President" had p r a c t i c a l l y severed " " r i h i s connection with the Armed Forces. ..He attempted to r e -legate the Armed I n s t i t u t i o n to the function of a simple praetorian guard." Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...? p. 55. 52. Burggraaff, p. 49. 53. Martz, "Accion Demooratlca...? p. 47. 54. Presidencia de l a Republica, "Dooumentos... " p» 307. 55. Presidencia de l a Republica, p. 308. 56. Presidencia de l a Republica, p. 313. 57. Betancourt, "Venezuela...p. 165. 58. Before H i t l e r attacked Russia, L a t i n American communist p a r t i e s considered England and Prance to be f i g h t i n g an i m p e r i a l i s t war. However, with the invasion of Russia, the communist p a r t i e s were instructed by Moscow to support the L a t i n American governments that had severed r e l a t i o n s with Germany, even i f these governments were reactionary them-selves. Thus did the communists give t h e i r support to Prado Ugarteche i n Peru, Getulio Vargas i n B r a z i l , Fulgencio B a t i s t a l n Cuba, and Calderon Guardla i n Costa Rica. In Venezuela, t h e i r slogan was: "Con Medina contra l a reaccion". Betancourt, p. 178. -118-59. David Eugene Blank, Pol. 1 t i e s In Venezuela (Boston, 1973)p. 133. 60. Nevertheless, the Partido Comunista Unitarlo fought with Medina's army against the October 18 coup. Though a n t i -Medina, i t was even more anti-AD. 61. Betancourt, "Venezuela... g p. 170. 62. Betancourt, p. 174. 63. Betancourt, p. 191. In addition to the extremely high i l l i t e r a c y rate i n Venezuela, deplorable health conditions existed, such as those documented by a Joint study of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Departamento Sanitorlo Nacional i n 1940 which found that 90% o f the Venezuelan population suffered from I n t e s t i n a l parasites. The Boletfn de l a O f i c i n a Sanitoria Panamericana (Septem-ber, 1941) reported that out of 75*993 examinations i n six-teen d i f f e r e n t l o c a l e s : 51$ of 5 to 14 year olds had tuber-c u l o s i s ; and 83.2$ of the population over 14 years o l d had TB. Betancourt, p. 205. 64. Betancourt, p. 192. 65. For example, l n the January, 1942 elections f o r the Cara-cas Municipal Council, there were only 9000 voters out of a t o t a l population of 400,000. Martz. "Accidn Democratica...g p. 51» 66. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 61. 67. Betancourt, "Venezuela... g p. 211. NOTES TO CHAPTER II 1. Betancourt, p. 221. 2. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...g p. 56. 3. Burggraaff, p. 58. 4. As an alternative to the medinistas, the UPM rejected the l o p e c i s t a s who represented the s e m i - i l l i t e r a t e corrupt general and the landed aristocracy. The communists were considered too r a d i c a l ; thus AD was the only remaining major party. Burggraaff, p. 60. -119-5. Burggraaff, p. 62. 6. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 69. 7. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed....? p. 62. 8. David E. Blank suggests that AD r e a l l y opposed Blaggini's nomination because i t feared that the implementation of the l a t t e r ' s agrarian reform might weaken peasant support f o r AD. Blank, " P o l i t i c s . . . ? p. 21. 9• Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...V p. 54. 10. Burggraaff, p. 71. 11. Burggraaff, p. 71. 12. Burggraaff, p. 74. 13. Betancourt, "Venezuela...? p. 243. 14. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...? p. 77. 15. Presidencia de l a Republica, "Documentos... ? p. 344. 16. Presidencia de l a ReptSbllca, p. 350. 1$. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...? p. 82. 18. Martz, "Accidn Democratica...? p. 63. 19. Glen L. Kolb, Democracy and Dictatorship l n Venezuela 1945-1958 (Hamden, Connecticut, 1974) p. 39. 20. Blank, " P o l i t i c s . . . ? p. 135. 21. Martz, "Aoclon Democratica...? p. 80. 22. Martz, p. 65. 23. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 71. 24. V l l l a l b a , himself, had supported Medina i n l£ 4 l and had been elected to the Senate as a member of the PDV. Kolb, "Democracy...? p. 22. 25. The PRP was known as the Black Communists because of the color used to represent i t f o r i l l i t e r a t e s at el e c t i o n time. The Partido Comunista Venezolano (PCV) was known as the Red Communists f o r the same reason. Alexander, "The Communist... ? p. 15. -120-26. 27. Alexander, p. 24. Martz, "Aoolon Democratica »». y p. 69. 28. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 74. 29. Lleuwen, p. 77. 30. Alexander, "The Communist... '.' p. 17. Communist economist Salvador de l a Plaza c r i t i c i z e d the "convenio secreto 50-50" f o r considering r o y a l t i e s as taxes, maintaining they should not be Included i n the ca l c u l a t i o n of government o i l revenue or "particlpacidn de beneficios". Salvador de l a Plaza, Desarrollo Econdmico e Industrlas Basloas (Caracas, 1962) p. 100. 31. Betancourt, "Venezuela...p. 283. 32. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 78. 33. Betancourt, "Venezuela...? p. 282. 34. Betancourt, p. 282. 35. Betancourt, p. 477. 36. Betancourt, p. 475. 37. Manuel Cableses Donoso, Venezuela. Okeyl (Santiago, 1963)p. 91. 38. Betancourt, "Venezuela... ? p. 477. 39. Betancourt, p. 478. 40. Cableses, Venezuela. Okeyl. p. 92. 41. Betancourt, "Venezuela.. . If. TO . 481. 42. Betancourt, p. 485. 43. Presidencia de l a Bepublica, "Documentos...'.' p. 370. 44. Betancourt, "Venezuela...V p. 387. 45. Betancourt, p. 293. 46. Betancourt, p. 484. 47. Romulo Betancourt, Trayectorla Democratica de una Bevolucldn (Caracas, 1948)p. 95. -121-48. Betancourt, p. 96. 49. Cableses, Venezuela. Okeyt, p. 75. 50. Betancourt, "Trayectorla.. . g p. 242. After the 1948 coup, the IBEG expanded i t s a c t i v i t i e s inside Venezuela: the Compania Ano'nima Dist r i b u i d o r a de Alimentos (CADA) established the f i r s t of a chain of super-markets i n Maracaibo i n 19*9; also i n 19*9 IBEC bought In-dustr i e s Lacteas de Carabobo (INLACA) which dominated the dairy market and also controlled Industrias Lacteas de P e r i -Ja (ILAPECA) which markets several brands of powdered milk. Later on, i n i960 IBEG: and another Rockefeller company, Arbor Acres, and a "symbolic p a r t i c i p a t i o n of Venezuelan c a p i t a l i s t s " founded ©esarrollo Avicola C.A. (DEACA) which produces f e r t i l e ^ e g g s . The Rockefeller group also exercises control over poultry farms and poultry feed f a c t o r i e s ; a f i s h cannery and fishmeal factory. In 1959 IBEC:, i n association .with the American firm R o l l i n s , Burdick and Hunter, formed the Insurance company Rolibec Consultores de Seguros C.A. , whose business included management of the insurance that the Venezuelan Government was obliged to provide to guarantee American private invest-ments. Rockefeller also owned Industrias Integradas S.A. (INSA), an assembly plant f o r domestic appliances and manufacturer of auto parts. To complete the p i c t u r e , the Chase Manhattan Bank (direct-ed by David Rockefeller) was the most powerful i n Venezuela, and i n November, 1961 i t acquired c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t of the Banco Mercantil y Agrloola. A l l i n a l l , the Rockefeller group of companies i n Vene-zuela reaped more than $600,000,000 i n p r o f i t s yearly (as compared to the #400,000,000 rendered by the other foreign companies combined.) Cableses, Venezuela. 0key>« p. 77. 51. ' Kolb, "Democracy... g p. 35. 52. Betancourt, "Venezuela.. . V p. 375. 53t L u i s B. Prieto. Figueroa, De Una Educaolon de Castas a Una  Eduoaol6n de Masas (La Habana, 1951) p. 171. 54. P r i e t o , p. 7. 55 • Lieu wen, Venezuela, p. 80. 56. Luzardo, "Notas...p. 147. -122-57. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 75. 58. Presidencia de l a Rerabl 1 ca. "Dooumento s... V p. 387. 59. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 75. 60. Lleuwen, p. 76. 61. Luzardo, "Notas...? p. 1*7. 62. Ramon Quijada, Reforma Aararla en Venezuela (Caracas, 1963)p. 2. 63. Quijada, p. 37. 64. Betancourt, "Venezuela.. . g p. 419. 65. Quljada, "Reforma...", p. 38. 66. Betancourt, "Trayectorla... ? p. 131, 67. Betancourt, "Venezuela...p. 432. 68. Betancourt, p. 433. 69. Betancourt, p. 433* 70. Betancourt, p. 433. 71. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...'.' p. 92. 72. Burggraaff, p. 93. 73. Martz, "Accion Democr/tloa... ? p. 77. 74. Of note are future l e f t i s t leaders Domingo Alberto Rangel (Cultural Secretary) and Jorge Dager (Youth Secretary). Martz, p. 78. 75. Martz, p. 80. 76. Martz, p. 78. 77. Martz, p. 322. 78. Betancowrt, "Trayectorla... If p. 82. 79. Lleuwen, "Venezuela? p. 86. 80. Lleuwen, p. 86. -123-81. Alexander, "The Communlst...g p. 25. 82. Betancourt, "Trayectorla...g p. 212. 83. The 1947 Constitution prohibited active m i l i t a r y person-nel from Joining p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and voting. Betancourt, p. 212. 84. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...g p. 93. 85. Burggraaff, p. 97. 86. Burggraaff, p. 97. 87. Burggraaff, p. 95-88. Luzardo, "Notas... g p. 150. 89. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...g p. 91. 90. Burggraaff, p. 98. 91. Burggraaff, p. 101. 92. Kolb, "Democracy... g p. 46. 93. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...g p. 105. 94. Burggraaff, p. 105. 95. Burggraaff, p. 107. 96. Cableses, Venezuela. Okeyl. p. 50. 97. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...g p. 109. NOTES TO CHAPTER III ' l . Burggraaff, p. 113. 2. Burggraaff, p. 117. 3. Burggraaff, p. 211. 4. Kolb, "Democracy...g p. 71. 5. Kolb, p. 72. 6. Martz, "Acclon Democratica...g p. 135. 7. Martz, p. 135. -124-8. Martz, p. 141. 9. Martz, p. 135. 10. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...p. 121. 11. Burggraaff, p. 123. 12. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 92. 13. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...g p. 126. 14. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 91. 15. Martz, " Ao cion Demo cr a^bl c a... V p. 326. Some authors attribute the large AD voter turnout to the adecos* determination to r e g i s t e r t h e i r disapproval of the m i l i t a r y regime following the assassination of Leonardo Ruiz Pineda, AD Secretary-General, on October 21, 1952. 16. The " f i n a l r e s u l t s " were published on December 13* PEI 788,086 URD? 638,336 COPEI 300,309 Others 41,259 Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...g p. 128. 17. Kolb, "Democracy...g p. 114. 18. Kolb, p. 121. 19. Kolb, p. 125. 20. Martz, "Accion Democratica...g p. 127. 21. Luzardo, "Notas... g p. 186. 22. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 92. 23. The PCV had been outlawed since May, 1950. Kolb, "Democracy...g p. 65. 24. Martz, "Accion Democratica...g p. 136. 25. Domingo Alberto Rangel, La Revoluclon de l a s Fantasias (Caracas, 1966) p. 16. -125-26. In l a t e 1952 Captain Wllfredo Omana, commander of the Boca de Rio A i r Base In Aragua State, Joihed the AD under-ground a f t e r he and some of h i s colleagues f a i l e d i n an attempt to take over the a i r base. Kolb, "Democracy... V p. 106. 27. Martz, "Accidn Democratica...? p. 142. 28. Martz, p. 142. 29. Luzardo, "Notas... ? p. 172. 30. Rangel, "La Revoluolo^n... ? p. 21. 31. Rangel, p. 22. 32. Rangel, p. 24. 33. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 95* 34. Lleuwen, p. 95. 35. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...? p. 131. 36. , Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 95. 37. Lleuwen, p. 97. 38. Rangel, "La Revolucidn...? p. 29. 39. In 1947 61,000 o i l workers produced 1,400,000 b a r r e l s a day. By 1955 the work force was reduced to 36,000, but production increased to 2,225,300 b a r r e l s a day. Production^ per worker increased 340$, while s a l a r i e s only increased by 20$. Machado maintains the increased production was not merely due to technical advance, but also to working the men harder, at a f a s t e r pace. In addition, he claims the Perez Jimenez regime allowed the o i l companies a t o t a l of $1,366,000,000 In "extraordinary p r o f i t s " In payment f o r t h e i r support of the government. Eduardo Machado, Petroleo en Venezuela (Caracas, 1958) p. 53. 40. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 96. 41. Rangel, "La Revoluolon... ?, p. 37. 42. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 97. 43. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...? p. 132. -126-44. The d i c t a t o r h a s t i l y went into e x i l e following the January 23, 1958 revolution, leaving behind a suitcase con-taining over #1,000,000 i n cash, plus deposit s l i p s t o t a l l i n g #13,5A3»576. Another $200,000,000 i s purportedly deposited i n Perez Jimenez's name i n secret Swiss bank accounts. Kolb, "Democracy... g p. 187. 45. By t h i s time, high-level leaders Andres. ELoy Blanco, Valmore Rodriguez, and L u i s Troconls Guerrero had died of natural causes. Martz, "Accion Democratica...g p. 144. 46. Accion Democratica, "R a t i f i c a c i o n de P r i n c i p i o s Teoricos^y de Orientacion Programatica Normatives de Accion Democratica" (Caracas, 1958) p. 1. 47. Accion Democratica, p. 12. 48. Accion Democratica, p. 14. 49. Accion Democratica, p. 23. 50. Martz, "Aoclo'n Democratlca... V p. 144. 51. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 99. 52. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...? p. 153* 53. Burggraaff, p. 153. 54. Kolb, "Democracy...g p. 168. 55. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...g p. 147. 56. Kolb, "Democracy...g p. I65. 57. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 101. 58. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed... g-p. 149. 59. Burggraaff, p. 149. 60. Burggraaff, p. 149. 61. Rangel, "La Revoluclon...g p. 46. 62. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...g p. 159. 63. Burggraaff, p. 158. 64. Rangel, "La Revoluclon...g p. 88. -127-65. Kolb, "Democracy...'.' P . 175. 66. Burggraaff, "The Venezuelan Armed...g p. 164. 67. Final casualties of the r e v o l t i o n were 300 dead, 1000 wounded. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 102. 68. Rangel, "La Revoluolon.. .g p. 116. NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 1. Lleuwen, Venezuela t p. 102. 2. J o s / Rivas Rivas, E l Goblerno de Romulo Betancourt (Caracas, 1965) p. 9 (Appendix). 3. Rangel, "La Revolucl6 >n.. . g p. I85. 4. Rangel, p. 189. The Venezuelan public debt i n m i l l i o n s of Bs. ( S t a t i s t i c s of the Banco Central de Venezuela): 1951 = - 27.77 i955 = + 8.93 1952 = + 24.11 1956 = + 1040.75 \ n e w 1953 = + 129.06 1957 = + 1029.17 J concessions 1954 = + 39.75 1958 = - 1553.66 Luzardo, "ftotas.. .g p. 177. 5. Rangel, "La Revoluclon.. . g p. 191. 6. Rangel, p. 129. 7. Rangel, p. 126. 8. Rangel, p. 133. 9. Rangel, p. 134. 10. Martz, "Acclort Democratica.. .g p. 99. 11. Ro'mulo Betancourt, Poslolon y Doctrlna (Caracas* 1958) p. 229. 12. Rangel, "La Revoluclon.. . g p. 135. 13. Rangel, p. .136. 14. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the moderate weekly 'Mg-mento"- referred to AD* s " f i v e key men^ as Betancourt, Ramos Gime%ez, Paz Galarraga, Rangel, and Saez Merida. Martz, "Accion Demooratlca.. .g p. 102. -128-15. Rangel, "La Revoluclon... ',' p. 141. 16. Rangel, p. 139. 17. Martz, "Aocldh Democratica... '.' p. 102. 18. Accion Democratica, "Tesis Petrolera" (Caracas, 1958)p. 103-19. Accion Democratica, "Tesis Agraria" (Caracas, 1958) p. 192. 20. Accion Democratica, p. 183. 21. Accion Democratica, "Doctrina y Programa" (Caracas, 1962) p.. 144. 22. Accion Democratica, p. 135. 23. Accidn Democratica, p. 116. 24. Blank, " P o l i t i c s . . . ? p. 89. 25. "Punto Pi Jo" was the name of Rafael Caldera 1 s home i n Caracas where the party leaders met on September 30, 1958. Luzardo , "Notas... " p. 188. 26. Among the propositions of the Minimum Platform were: "Una p o l l t l c a n a c i o n a l i s t a del petrdleo y del h i e r r o , des-cartada de e l l a l a idea de nacional izacidn por Ley o Decreto de esas in d u s t r l a s ; . . . e l mantenimiento del control estatal" sobre l a Siderurgica y l a Fetroqufmlca..." Betancourt, "Fosloldh...'.' p. 264. 27. Presidencia de l a Republica, "Documentos... ? p. 449. 28. Martz, "Accidn Democratica...? p. 105. 29. Betancourt, "Poslclon... ? p. 282. 30. Rangel, "La Revolucidn...", p. 245. 31. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 104. 32. Lleuwen, p. 104. 33. Rangel, "La Revolucidn... ? p. 250. 34. Presidencia de l a Repiiblica, "Documentos... ? p. 461. Later during the Betancourt Administration the President was quoted as c a l l i n g the u n i v e r s i t y "nido de t e r r o r i s t a s " and "guarIda de malhechores". Cableses, Venezuela, Okeyt, p. 218. -129-35. Alexander, "The Communlst... V p. 59. 36. Martz, "Accion Democratica...? p. 107. 37. Rivas, "El Goblerno...'.' p. 6. 38. Blank, "Politics...'. 1 p. 104. Such foreign agencies as the petroleum companies, the World Bank, and the Alliance f o r Progress influence Venezuelan domestic policy-making through representation i n the i n d i c a -t i v e planning system. 39. Some of the resultant mixed commissions include: the National Boards of Ag r i c u l t u r a l Production, the National Committee of Ag r i c u l t u r a l Planning, the Programming Group f o r the Automotive Industry, the Coordinating Committee on-Housing Programs, Programming Group f o r the Petro-chemical Industry, and the Programming Group f o r the Metallurgical Industry. Labor unions were excluded from formal p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the mixed i n d u s t r i a l programming groups i n order to avoid partisan p o l i t i c a l controversies. Blank, p. 108. 40. Cableses, Venezuela. Okeyl. p. 100. 41. Cableses, p. 100. 42. Plaza, "Desarrollo...". p. 110. Between 1952 and i960 Venezuela Imported more than 1,000,000 tons of o i l - d e r i v a t i v e combustibles and l u b r i c a n t s , at a cost of Bs. 412,300,000. Cableses, Venezuela. Okeyl. p. 90. 43. Rivas, "El Goblerno...? p. 77. 44. In 1957-1958 there were 600,000 children attending o f f i -c i a l schools which employed 21,000 teachers. In 1959-1960 more than 1,000,000 school children were being taught by 33,000 teachers. Ro'mulo Betancourt, Tres Anbs de Goblerno Democratlco 1959-1962 (Caracas, 1962),p. 296. 45. U n t i l 1964 the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation lacked the c a p i t a l necessary to compete with the foreign companies. -130-The "no more concessions" pledge was compromised i n October, 1961 when Perez Alfonzo eliminated the r e s t r i c t i o n c a l l i n g f o r a 1200 meter buffer zone between an exploited concession and the borders of National Reserve lands. Such a zone was to avoid the private o i l companies' draining the o i l deposites of these lands. ( A r t i c l e 18 of the Hydrocarbons Law required one h a l f of a l l explored concessions to remain National Reserves.) Plaza, "Desarrollo...g p. 121. 46. Betancourt, "Tres Ands... ? p. 283. In 1961 i r o n ore production equalled 14,565,000 tons, of which 14,564,000 were exported. When the Slden£r#ica Nacional opened two e l e c t r i c smelts i n Matanza State (Guayana) i n July, 1962, the State-owned Corporacidn Venezolana de Guayana had to buy i r o n ore form the United States i r o n com-panlesi (In March, 1961, the U.S.-owned Koppers Co., Inc. was given a contract to take over the administration and planning of the Corporacidn Venezolana de Guayana, receiving $11,854,000 fo r six years.) In 1962 the i r o n companies made p r o f i t s equalling 32.2$ of t h e i r Invested c a p i t a l , while the Venezuelan Government received only Bs. 85,000,000 i n taxes on the production of 13,266,000 tons of i r o n ore. (Taxes on cigarettes were more pr o f i t a b l e f o r the government.) Up u n t i l December 31, 1962, of the 26,893 hectares i n concession f o r the exploitation of iron ore, only 4000 were exploited by Venezuelan c a p i t a l i s t s . According to Cableses, Betancourt then secretly gave a concession of 10,000 hectares l n Apure State to the Venezuela A t l a n t i c Refining Co. (of the Rockefeller group) which previously had only dealt i n the o i l industry. When the Venezuelan Government eliminated i t s coking coa/ plant connected with the Sidenirgica Nacional, the P h i l l i p s Petroleum Co. then I n s t a l l e d i t s e l f i n Guayana to produce metalurgical coa l . Cableses, "Venezuela. OkeyI V p. 103 47. Betancourt, "Tres Anos...if p. 286. 48. Betancourt, p. 274. 49. Ramo/n Quijada, Reforma Agrarla en Venezuela (Caracas, 1963)p, 65. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to compare that i n 1955 agriculture rendered B s . 647,000,000 i n earnings to 700,000, while the petroleum industry paid Bs. -743,000,000 i n wages to 37,000 persons/ Quijada, p. 67. -131-50. Quijada, p. 75. 51. A united Commufldst Party was formed i n 1959, under the leadership of the Machado brothers, Cruz V i l l e g a s , and Rodolfo Quintero. Alexander, "The Communlst... I? p. 48. 52. Quijada, "Reforma... g p. 211. According to the o f f i c i a l Joint survey made by the Ministry of Agriculture and Breeding, the Banco Agricola y Pecuaria, the Institute Agrario Nacional, and the govern-ment O f i c i n a de Coordinacidn y Pi a n i f icacion (OORDIPLAN), by September 31, 1961 371 landholdings, including 167 p u b l i c lands, were acquired by the Institute Agrario Nacional. These amounted to 1,445,569 hectares, of which 569,107 were sold to 35,622 peasants at a nominal p r i c e . Salvador De l a Plaza, Reforma Agrarla en Venezuela (Caracas, 1964) p. 49. By 1970 30$ of the estimated 100,000 f a m i l i e s settled (mostly on public lands) had abandoned t h e i r a l l o t t e d parcels,. Blank o f f e r s as a reason that t h i s 30$ misspent t h e i r i n i t i a l government cred i t and were i n e l i g i b l e for renewed c r e d i t . Blank-, " P o l i t i c s . . . g p. 66. NOTES TO CHAPTER V 1. Domingo Alberto Rangel, "Explicacidn H i s t 6 r i c a de l a Revolu-clon Venezolana", OJADERN0S AMERICANOS, VI, May-June 1947, p.16. 2. Rangel, p. 20. 3. Martz, "Accion Demo ora'tl ca... g p. 180. 4. Rivas, "El Goblerno...g p. 6 (Appendix). 5. Rivas, p. 6 (Appendix). 6. Martz, "Aooien Demooratlca...g p. 180. 7. Rivas, "El Goblerno...g p. 14. 8. Even before the Buro* Juvenll leaders were expelled from the party, the CEN had appointed a commission to take over the rein s of AD youth leadership. This commission consisted of Cesar Rondon Llovera, JJos4 Maria Machin, Manuel Alfredo Rodriguez, Juan Pablo Penaloza, and Raul Ramos Gimenez. Rivas, p. 15. -132-9. Rlvas, p..6 (Appendix). 10. Rlvas, p. 6 (Appendix). 11. Rlvas, p. 6 (Appendix). 12. Rlvas, p. 6 (Appendix). 13. Rlvas, P. 19. 14. Martz, ••Accidn Democratica 15. Rlvas, '•El Gobierno... •.' o. 16. Rlvas, p. 8 (Appendix). 17. Rlvas, p. 8 (Appendix). 18. Rlvas, p. 9 (Appendix). The government was to continue i t s unnatlonalistic policies regarding these industries, as explained i n the previous chapter. 19. Rlvas, p. 9 (Appendix). Government Decrees 217 and 218 of February 5» I960 declared Mtodo el terrltorio nacional zona reservada para el niquel, el aluminio y el manganeso." However, a concession to exploit aluminum in Guayana was given to Reynolds International which founded Aluminio del CaroniT S.A. (ALCASA) in February, 1961. The company was co-financed by the Venezuelan Government, which provided half of the Bs. 120,000,000 i n i t i a l capital. Reynolds had the right to choose the company's president, in addition-to three of i t s six directors. Ironically, the government had used the lack of bauxite as an excuse for not establishing a national aluminum com-pany previously, but soon after the agreement with Reynolds was made, deposits of the needed mineral were "discovered". Cableses, Venezuela, Okeyl, p. 103. 20. Rlvas, "El Gobierno...? p. 10 (Appendix). 21. Rivas, p. 10 (Appendix). 22. Rivas, p. 11 (Appendix). 23. Cableses, Venezuela, Okeyl. p. 187. 24. Rivas, "El Gobierno...? p. 73. -133-25. Alexander, "The Communist M » » » . P. 65. 26. Cableses, Venezuela. Okey t. p. 145. Martz. "Aoolo'n Democratica... g p. I85. 27. 28. Martz, p. 187. 29. Cableses, Venezuela. Okeyt. p. 178. 30. Martz, "Acclo^ Democratica...g p. 109. However, the AD Government ultimately succeeded i n undermining the AHS party's strength by refusing to grant important government subsidies to the unions and organiza-tions under ARS control. 31. Cableses, Venezuela. OkeyI. p. 168. 32. Alexander, "The Communlst... g p. 79. 33. Alexander, p. 79. 34. Cableses, Venezuela. Okeyl. p. 224. 35. Cableses, p. 225. 36. Lleuwen, Venezuela, p. 190. 37. Martz, "Acol6*n Democratica... g p. 3*0. 38. Martz, p. 3*0. 39. Martz, p. 3*2. 40. Martz, p. 3 * * . 41. Blank, " P o l i t i c s . . . g P . 169. 42. Martz, "Accion Democratica...g p. 3*6. 43. Martz, p. 3*6. 44. Martz, p. 337. 45. Blank, " P o l i t i c s . . . g p. 179. 46. Blank, p. 257. 47. Blank, p. 159. 48. Blank, p. 159. 49. Blank, p. 160. -134-50. B u r e l l i Rlvas, an independent, was supported by URD, Fuerzas Democratlcas Populares (FDP)j and Frente Nacional Democratica (FND). Blank, p. 149. 51. PRIN contributed 68,417 votes. Blank, p. 179. 52. Blank, p. 155. 53. Because of a constitutional t e c h n i c a l i t y which requires a l l candidates to vote i n the el e c t i o n s (Perez Jimenez was i n Spain at the time), the el e c t i o n was consequently n u l l i -f i e d . Blank, p. 123. NOTES TO EPILOGUE 1. Blank, p., 197. After Caldera's innauguration, the PCV was l e g a l i z e d . 2. Perez Jimenez also benefitted from t h i s p o l i t i c a l amnesty. He was released from prison a f t e r serving four years f o r embezzlement, following lengthy extradition pro-cedures i n the United States. 3. In early 1970, following the kidnapping of West Germany's ambassador to Venezuela by l e f t i s t students at the University of the Andes, the National Congress voted to end u n i v e r s i t y autonomy and student p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n u n i v e r s i t y governing bodies. Blank, p. 5 L 4. Blank, p. 180. 5. "Entrevista con Teodoro Petkoff", SINTESIS 6, October, 1973,. p.49. 6. Domingo Alberto Rangel, E l Gran Negooio (Caracas, 1974) p. 75. 7. Rangel, p. 91. 8. Rangel, p. 91. 9. Rangel, p. 74. 10. L a t i n American Newsletter, VII, No. 51, December 21, 1973. 11. Vancouver Sun, June 11, 1974, p. 4. -135-12. Vancouver Sun, December 27, 197*, p. 27. 13. Vancouver Sun, p. 27. -136-BIBLIOGRAPHY Alexander. Robert J . : The Communist Party of Venezuela (Stanford, 1969). Barrios, Gonzalo: Los Dfas y l a P b l i t l c a (Caracas, 1963). Betancourt, Romulo: Fosloldn y Doctrlna (Caracas, 1958). Trayectoria Democratica de una Revolucidn (Caracas, 1948). Tres And s de Goblerno Democratlco 1959-1962 (Caracas, 1962). Venezuela: P o l i t l o a y Petrdleo (Bogota, 1969, Third E d i t i o n ) . Blank, David Eugene: P o l i t i c s l n Venezuela (Boston, 1973). Burggraaff, Wlnfield J . : The Venezuelan Armed Forces i n P o l i t i c s  1935-1959 (Columbia, Missouri, 1972). Cableses Dono so, Manuel: Venezuela, Okeyt (Santiago, 1963). E s c r i t o r e s de Venezuela y de America: Rdmulo Betancourt,  Semblanza de un P o l i t i c o Popular (Caracas, 1948). Gallegos O r t i z , Rafael: La H l s t o r l a P o l i t l o a de Venezuela  (de Clpriano Castro a Perez Jimenez) (Caracas. I960). Kolb, Glen L.: Democracy and Dictatorship l n Venezuela 1945-1958 (Hamden, Connecticut, 1974). Lleuwen, Edwin: Venezuela (London, 1965). Luzardo, Rbdolfo: Notas Hlstdrloo-Econdmloas 1928-1963 (Caracas, 1963). Magallanes, Manuel Vicente: Partidos P o l i t i c o s Venezolanos (Caracas, 1959). Martz, John D.: Accidn Democratica: Evolution of a Modern P o l i t i c a l  Party l n Venezuela (Princeton. N.J. . 1966). Partido Comunista de Venezuela: Sobre l a Cuestidn Agrarla en Venezuela por l a Cbmlsldn Agrarla Nacional del P.CV. (Caracas, I960). Plaza, Salvador de l a : Desarrollo Eoondmlco e Industrias Ba^sicas (Caracas, 1963). La Reforma Agrarla (Caracas, 1959). Reforma Agrarla en Venezuela (Caracas, 1964). -137-Presidencia de l a Republica: Documentos que Hlcleron H l s t o r l a (Caracas, 1962) Vol. I I . Prieto Figueroa, L u i s Bi : De una Educacldn de Castas a una  Educaoldn de Masas (La Habana, 1951)• Quijada, Ramon: Reforma Agrarla en Venezuela (Caracas, 1963). Rangel, Domingo Alberto: E l Gran Negoolo (Caracas, 197*). La Revoluclon de l a s Fantasias (Caracas, 1966). Una Doctrlna para l a Revoluclon Democratica (Caracas, 1958). Rivas Rivas, Jose (Edito r ) : E l Goblerno de Romulo Betancourt (Caracas, 1965). S i l v a Michelena, Jose' A.: The I l l u s i o n of Democracy l n Dependent Nations (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). PAMPHLETS-DO OJMENTS Accion Democratica: "Doctrlna y Programa" (Caracas, 1962). " R a t l f i c a c i o n de P r i n c i p i o s Teoricos y de Orientacidn Pro-gramatlca Normativos de Accion Democratica" (Caracas, 1958). "Tesis Agraria" (Caracas, 1958). "Tesis Petrolera" (Caracas, 1958). "Tesis P o l i t l c a " (Caracas, 1962). Gimenez Landinez, V i c t o r M.: "Informe sobre Folrftica Agraria de l a Republica de Venezuela" (Mexico, I960). Government of Venezuela: "Documento del M.I.R. Sobre su C r i s i s Interna", CONFIDENCIAL, No. 1 (Caracas, May 1, 1964). Machado, Eduardo: "Petroleo en Venezuela" (Caracas,.1958). Perez, Carlos Andres; L u i s Pinerua Ordaz; Salom Meza: "La Sub-version Extremists en Venezuela" (Caracas, 1964). ARTICLES Petkoff, .Teodoro: "Entrevista con Teodoro Petkoff", SINTESIS 6, October, 1973. Prieto F., L u i s B.; Diogenes de l a Rosa; L u i s Alberto Sanchez: "Testimonio a Romulo Betancourt", POLITICA, I I I , No. 32, March, 1964. -138-Rangel, Domingo Alberto: "Explicacion H i s t d r i c a de l a Revoluclon Venezolana", CUADERNOS AMERICANOS, VI, May-June 1947. NEWSPAPERS New York Times: December 10, 1973. December 11, 1973. December 12, 1973. December 13, 1973. Vancouver Sun: June 11, 197*. December 7, 197*. December 27, 197*. MISC. Rangel, Domingo Alberto: l e t t e r to author, July 15, 1974. -139-APFENDIX DIVISION OF MIR (based on the Venezuelan Government publication "Documento del M.I.R. Sobre su C r i s i s Interna", CONFIDENCIAL, No. 1 (Caracas, May 1, 1964)). The r e s u l t s of the December 1, 1963 elections had repercussions i n the d i r e c t i o n of the revolutionary movement. Soon a f t e r the elec t i o n s , Domingo Alberto Rangel, the Imprisoned Secretary-General of MIR, wrote l e t t e r s to leaders of the "democratic opposition" expressing views to the e f f e c t that since the masses had voted f o r pea ce, the revolutionary movement should r e c t i f y i t s o r i e n t a t i o n accordingly. Later, at the end of January, 1964 the National Secretariat of MIR met to discuss the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the party doctrine which espoused armed struggle as the superior form of "lucha de masas". The l a t t e r was essential i f Venezuela were to a t t a i n National L i -beration, given the political-economic r e a l i t y of the country. The National Secretariat also discussed a document submitted by Rangel which expressed h i s divergent views, emphasizing the need f o r MIR to "recuperate i t s l e g a l i t y " . The strategic l i n e of the party was r a t i f i e d , s t i p u l a t i n g that the armed struggle i n Venezuela would henceforth take the form of a prolonged war. The pa c i f i c 'lucha de masas" to achieve l e g a l i t y must complement the armed struggle, but i t could not re-place the l a t t e r as the highest p r i o r i t y i n the revolutionary movement: "Convertir l a lucha por l a l e g a l i d a d , que es impor-tante sin duda, en un objetivo primarlo, colocahdolo por encima de l a l i b e r a c i d n nacional, es caer en el oportunismo. -140-" . . . a l i d e n t l f i c a r l a lucha de masas con l a lucha pac£-f i c a , . . . s e a t e r r i z a en el paclflsmo. La p o s i b l l i d a d de una "via p a c i f i c a " en Venezuela es absurda...Es des-conocer todo l o que ha ocurrido en nuestro pals en l o s ultimos aftos; es ilusionarse desconociendo e l caraoter agresivo del Imperialismo; es o l v i d a r l a represion gubernamental, etc." According to the National Directorate of MIR, Rangel's opinions did not receive the l e a s t support during the meeting of the National Secretariat. However, a short time l a t e r some of the party members who had attended the meeting and had approved the party strategy suddenly began to involve themselves i n f r a c t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s . These new dissidents joined forces with Rafael Jose Munoz and Juan Paez A v i l a , who already had been censured for breach of d i s c i p l i n e . They began to correspond with Rangel, voicing "com-p l a i n t s and gossip" concerning the party Directorate. Meanwhile, acting Secretary-General of MIH-, Simon Saez Merida, was arrested by the p o l i c e . This served as an impetus f o r the dissident m l r i s t a s to Intensify t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . Rangel discon-tinued writing to the National Directorate i n spite of t h e i r attempts to maintain correspondence with him. The National Directorate attempted to maintain party unity through persuasive means, rather than precede against the f r a c -t i o n a l ! sts with d i s c i p l i n a r y sanctions. However, while Rangel and other m l r i s t a s dialogued with Saez Merida, who was i n the same prison, they secretly c i r c u l a t e d a l e t t e r giving orders to divide the party organization, creating a separate "Comando Nacional", separate "Comandos Regionales", etc. Thus, while m i r i s t a d i s s i -- I n -dents were pretending to negotiate with the National Directorate, they were actually l n the process of establishing a new party. Althou8gh the MIR Directorate maintained the party suffered a l i m i t e d l o s s of revolutionary m i l i t a n t s to the "democratic camp", the d i v i s i o n of MIR i n May, 1964 marked the beginning of the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the armed revolutionary movement.* * Between 1965-1969 the FALN, backed by Cuba, made several attempts to revive g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s . The PCV, meanwhile, began to attempt to regain l e g a l i z a t i o n by renouncing v i o l e n t t a c t i c s , and on March 15, 1967 the PCV p u b l i c l y denounced the Castro Government f o r intervening i n Venezuelan int e r n a l a f f a i r s . Blank, P o l i t i c s i n Venezuela, p. 121. 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0093401/manifest

Comment

Related Items