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Propositional knowledge in Plato Anglin, William Sherron Raymond 1975

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PROPOSITTONAL KNOWLEDGE IN PLATO  by  WILLIAM SHERRON RAYMOND ANGLIN  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  i n the Department of Philosophy  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d  stafi&ard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1 9 7 5  In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s  thesis  an advanced degree at the L i b r a r y s h a l l I  f u r t h e r agree  in p a r t i a l  fulfilment of  the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h  make it  freely available  that permission  for  the requirements f o r  Columbia,  I agree  r e f e r e n c e and  f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f  this  that  study. thesis  f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s of  representatives.  this  written  thesis  is understood that  f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l  permission.  Department of  Philosophy  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h  2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5  Date  It  August,  1975  Columbia  copying or p u b l i c a t i o n  not be allowed without my  ii  ABSTRACT Contemporary philosophers d i s t i n g u i s h a c e r t a i n "propositional knowledge (KP)" from other sorts of knowledge such as "knowledge by acquaintance  (KA)".  However, when Plato began to do philosophy no one had formulated  the concept of KP, indeed, no one had f o r -  mulated the notion of what we c a l l a "proposition".  On  the contrary, the ancient Greeks unreflectedly presupposed that a l l knowledge was simply some sort of acquaintance with the object of knowledge.  This pre-  supposition of theirs n a t u r a l l y caused a great deal of confusion i n their epistemology and at the beginning of h i s career, Plato himself was victim and perpetrator of this confusion.  However, as the following thesis  shows, Plato began to make e x p l i c i t and to question the presupposition that a l l knowledge was KA and he did make progress towards finding the c r u c i a l l y missing category, KP.  I t was not that he succeeded t o t a l l y i n  i s o l a t i n g the notion ofSKP.  For that matter, he never  attained to a notion of "proposition" i n a l l i t s modern generality.  However, he d i d come to hold that some-  times knowledge involves not only acquaintance with the object of knowledge but also a knowledge of i n t e r r e l a t i o n s among things known.  Having at f i r s t t r i e d to  iii understand a l l knowledge i n terms of a model that construed i t as nothing more complex than some sort of acquaintance with the object of knowledge, Plato subsequently abandoned this model and proceeded to develop an epistemology capable of accomodating cases of what we would c a l l KP.  I s h a l l argue that Plato did this  after he had written the Charmides and before he wrote the Theaetetus.  iv  TABLE OP CONTENTS  Page INTRODUCTION THE SOVEREIGNTY OP KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE  1  27  THE PICTURE WINDOW THEORY OF LANGUAGE . KNOWLEDGE IN THE REPUBLIC  35 i+9  CONCLUSION  72  BIBLIOGRAPHY  9k  INTRODUCTION  Contemporary p h i l o s o p h e r s  distinguish a certain  " p r o p o s i t i o n a l knowledge (KP)" from other  s o r t s o f know-  ledge such as "knowledge by acquaintance (KA)". when P l a t o began to do philosophy  no one had  However,  formulated  the concept o f KP, indeed, no one had formulated the n o t i o n o f what we c a l l a " p r o p o s i t i o n " .  On the c o n t r a r y  the ancient Greeks u n r e f l e c t e d l y presupposed that a l l knowledge was simply o b j e c t o f knowledge.  some s o r t o f acquaintance w i t h the This presupposition  n a t u r a l l y caused a great d e a l o f c o n f u s i o n  of theirs i n their  epistemology and a t the b e g i n n i n g o f h i s c a r e e r , h i m s e l f was v i c t i m and p e r p e t r a t o r w i l l be shown.  However,  Plato  o f t h i s c o n f u s i o n as  as the f o l l o w i n g a l s o  P l a t o began to make e x p l i c i t and to q u e s t i o n  shows,  the presup-  p o s i t i o n that a l l knowledge was KA and he d i d make p r o g r e s s towards f i n d i n g the c r u c i a l l y m i s s i n g KP.  category,  I t was not t h a t he succeeded t o t a l l y i n i s o l a t i n g  the n o t i o n o f KP.  F o r t h a t matter, he never a t t a i n e d to  a n o t i o n o f " p r o p o s i t i o n " i n a l l i t s modern g e n e r a l i t y . However, he d i d come to h o l d that sometimes knowledge i n v o l v e s n o t o n l y acquaintance w i t h the o b j e c t o f knowledge but a l s o a knowledge o f i n t e r r e l a t i o n s among t h i n g known.  Having a t f i r s t  t r i e d to understand a l l knowledge  i n terms of a model that construed i t as nothing more complex than some sort of acquaintance with the object of knowledge, Plato subsequently abandoned t h i s model and proceeded to develop an epistemology capable of accomodating cases of what we would c a l l KP. Up to t h i s point my sketch of Plato's epistemol o g i c a l development i s i n agreement with what W.  G.  Runciman says i n h i s Plato's Later Epistemology. ^ Runciman holds that the early and even the middle Plato thought of a l l knowledge as "a sort of mental touching." Even as l a t e as the Theaetetus "Plato continued to think of knowledge as a sort of mental seeing or touching." However f i n a l l y Sophist  3  but only by the time he wrote the  Plato at l a s t abandoned t h i s view and came  to understand that "knowledge of c e r t a i n Forms involves knowledge of the connecting properties which they possess, and the philosopher i s now  concerned less with contem-  p l a t i o n than c o r r e l a t i o n . " ^  On Runciman s view, then, 1  m ^ ^ * ?*. » Plato's Later Epistemology (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1962). W  2  3  R u n c i r a a n  Ibid., p. 1 0 . Ibid., p. 52.  ^ Ibid., p. 1 2 9 .  3 P l a t o d i d make some p r o g r e s s towards d i s t i n g u i s h i n g KP from KA.  Runciman would t h e r e f o r e accept the account  sketched above.  However, he would want to add to t h i s  account that i t was o n l y towards the end o f P l a t o ' s l i f e that he made t h i s p r o g r e s s .  He t h e r e f o r e r e p r e s e n t s  P l a t o as p r o p a g a t i n g f o r most o f h i s l i f e d o c t r i n e that a l l knowledge i s KA.  the f a l s e  A c c o r d i n g to  Runciman, i n s p i t e o f a l l h i s t h i n k i n g about knowledge the e a r l y and middle P l a t o completely overlooked even the p o s s i b i l i t y o f knowledge t h a t was not KA.  Runciman  goes to the d i a l o g u e s w i t h the q u e s t i o n , "how f a r d i d P l a t o a r r i v e a t a d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge t h a t ... and knowledge by acquaintance?" ^  and he comes back w i t h  an answer t o the e f f e c t that P l a t o d i d make some p r o g r e s s but o n l y towards the end o f h i s l i f e .  On Runciman's  view, then, when we measure P l a t o ' s a b i l i t i e s a g a i n s t the contemporary d i s t i n c t i o n between KP and KA, then, f o r whatever reasons, P l a t o does n o t r e a l l y come up t o standard:  he spent most o f h i s l i f e under the d e l u s i o n  that every case o f knowing must somehow be understood o n l y in  terms o f "mental  seeing or touching".  -> I b i d . , p. 1. ^ Runciman*s Theory has r e c e n t l y been endorsed by Jaakko H i n t i k k a . Vide Jaakko H i n t i k k a , Knowledge and the Known ( D o r d r e c h t - H o l l a n d : D. R e i d e l P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1971+) p. ltt f f .  k What I intend to argue i n what follows, however, i s that, on the contrary, Plato began to break through t h i s delusion not i n h i s l a t e period but i n h i s middle period.  Indeed, i t was by the time he had completed  the Republic  that Plato had achieved  a l l the progress  towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n that Runciman ascribes to him only on the basis of the Sophist.  In the Sophist,  I claim, Plato was merely applying an insight about knowledge which had l e d him to abandon as f a r back as the Republic his attempt to understand a l l knowledge i n terms of a simple acquaintance model: the Sophist was not the debut of t h i s i n s i g h t , as Runciman holds, but rather i t s marriage to a perplexing problem connected with "non-being" arranged by Plato i n order to produce as o f f s p r i n g a solution to t h i s problem.  Thus whereas  I want to argue on Runciman*s behalf that Plato d i d indeed abandon a "KA only" model of knowledge i n favour of a model capable of accomodating cases of KP, I want to say against Runciman that Plato had the good sense to do t h i s long before he wrote the Sophist. Before beginning to investigate the truth of t h i s matter, i t i s necessary to have some idea of what i s meant by KP and KA.  Exactly what i s t h i s KP/KA d i s -  t i n c t i o n that, on Runciman's view, Plato completely  5 overlooked f o r most o f h i s l i f e ?  Who a c t u a l l y d i d make  t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n completely e x p l i c i t ? it  i t s d e f i n i t i v e form?  difficult  Who f i r s t  gave  I n t e r e s t i n g l y , we s h a l l f i n d i t  to answer these q u e s t i o n s .  As we are about  to see, the d i s t i n c t i o n i n terms o f which Runciman judges P l a t o i s a d i s t i n c t i o n  that i s n o t w e l l  explicated  even today. B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l was probably the f i r s t  philosopher  to t a l k i n terms o f h a v i n g "knowledge by acquaintance" as opposed to "knowing p r o p o s i t i o n s . "  As e a r l y as  1905  he had mentioned "the d i s t i n c t i o n between acquaintance and knowledge about." ^ The word 'know' i s ... used i n two d i f f e r e n t senses. (1) I n i t s f i r s t use i t i s a p p l i c a b l e to the s o r t o f knowledge which i s opposed to e r r o r , the sense i n which what we know i s t r u e , the sense which a p p l i e s to our b e l i e f s and conv i c t i o n s , i . e . to what are c a l l e d judgements. In t h i s s s e n s e o f the word we know t h a t something i s the case. T h i s s o r t o f knowledge may be d e s c r i b e d as knowledge o f t r u t h s . (2) I n the second use o f the word 'know' the word a p p l i e s t o our knowledge o f t h i n g s , which we may c a l l acquaintance. T h i s i s the sense i n which we know sense-data. (The d i s t i n c t i o n i n v o l v e d i s r o u g h l y t h a t between s a v o i r and c o n n a i t r e i n French, o r between wissen  ""—— —— —  —  —  —  —  and kennen i n German.)  Q  ' B. R u s s e l l , "On Denoting" ( I n Mind Ik. p.  ^ — — • —  (1905))  479. Q  B. R u s s e l l , Problems o f P h i l o s o p h y (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959) p. 44*  6 According  to  cognitive  relation  however,  Russell  could  universale  be  and  the  included nor very  would when  of  KA.  normally  object."  in  this  be  we  (as  of was  call  KA.  some p h i l o s o p h e r  entities a  Of such  as  he  does  not  mean t h a t  sense  data  and  universals  is  a  with  sense  objects,  speaking  and  that  ascribed  to  is  could  go  further  Green  and. C o . ,  ^  1  B.  0  and  Russell, 1925)  Ibid.,  p.  they  a  places  not the  the  and KA  ancient  are  sense  data),  Russell as  only  of  what to  we  say,  that  a l l knowledge that  knowable.  The  doctrine have  to  Plato  acquaintance It  is  KA  peculiar  to  Russell  Greeks.  Of  course,  and  that  Logic  a  possible  claims  on.  by  not  presupposed  so  Mysticism 209.  data,  "that  needless  to  claim  2H4..  to  for  KA  actually  p.  object,  sense  acquainted  were  imputes  direct  apprehended  that  i t i s possible  persons,  broadly  every  qualified  presupposed  Runciman  i n which  Not  wrote,  Runciman  was  i n which  are  course,  Greeks  sense  "a  specialized sort  ancient  only  he  Thus  certain KA,  was  only  opposed  minds."  His  ^  way:  seen,"  which  objects  people's  object  certain entities  with  physical  some  that  "It will  l i m i t e d number  objects  of  known  objects  other  to  perhaps  introspection. among  KA  someone  (London:  one  like  Longmans,  P l a t o d i d h o l d p r e c i s e l y R u s s e l l ' s view on acquaintance but  that would be t a k i n g another step a l t o g e t h e r and  r a i s i n g an i s s u e that need not and w i l l not be r a i s e d i n t h i s paper.  For our purposes the o b j e c t s o f  acquaintance need not be l i m i t e d i n any s p e c i a l way such as R u s s e l l ' s . As f a r as KP i s concerned, R u s s e l l i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n KP g e n e r a l l y so much as i n KP having to do w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n t a i n i n g d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s which denote o b j e c t s with which we are not i n R u s s e l l ' s sense acquainted. designated  Indeed i t i s the knowledge o f o b j e c t s  by d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s that i n t e r e s t s  R u s s e l l and not so much the KP connected w i t h t h i s knowledge. What I wish to d i s c u s s i s the nature o f our knowledge concerning o b j e c t s i n cases where we know that there i s an o b j e c t answering to a d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n , though we are not acquainted w i t h any such o b j e c t . This i s a matter which i s concerned e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h definite descriptions.  1  1  Thus although R u s s e l l i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the KP that the 12 candidate who gets most votes w i l l be e l e c t e d ^  he is  not i n t e r e s t e d i n the KP t h a t , say, t h i s c o l o u r w i t h 1 1  Ibid.  1 2  I b i d . , p. 209.  8 which I am  acquainted i s b r i g h t e r  Russell i s therefore  q u i t e r i g h t not  ledge that i n t e r e s t s him  to c a l l  the know-  d e a l i n g w i t h KP  i n general  to c a l l i t "knowledge by d e s c r i p t i o n " .  "knowledge by d e s c r i p t i o n " he r i g h t f u l l y from h i s "knowledge of t r u t h s . "  In a sense, then, i t was  R u s s e l l who  However, he made i t not  sake as f o r the  sake of the  the  latter  se.  f i r s t made the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n u s i n g terminology.  This  distinguishes  I t i s only  that i s p r o p o s i t i o n a l knowledge per  own  one.  " p r o p o s i t i o n a l knowledge"  which would imply that he was but  than that  our  actually contemporary  so much f o r i t s  epistemological  work he  wished to do i n connection w i t h d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s . Thus he nowhere s t u d i e d great  the d i s t i n c t i o n i t s e l f at  any  length. Since R u s s e l l ' s work on the  subject,  a certain  13  amount of work has very l i t t l e has  been done on KP  been done on KA,  KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n .  Indeed i n 1969  a r t i c l e i n Philosophy and sole purpose was  but,  J  nor  surprisingly,  a f o r t i o r i on  there appeared  the an  Phenomelogical Research whose  to remind people that there was  Cf., e.g., G i l b e r t Ryle, The (London: Hutchinson and Co., 19ii9) pp.  a topic  Concept of Mind 27-32.  9 c a l l e d KA and that i t deserved some a t t e n t i o n . author o f t h i s a r t i c l e ,  The  Paul Hayner, wrote that he hoped  to "keep a l i v e an i s s u e which I b e l i e v e has r e c e i v e d much l e s s a t t e n t i o n that i t deserves." ^  Since R u s s e l l ,  then, very l i t t l e work has been done i n t h i s a r e a . Indeed,  j u s t as there was no well-defended, d e f i n i t i v e  f o r m u l a t i o n o f the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i n P l a t o ' s time, so 1 £ i n f a c t , there xs none today. Perhaps  ^  at t h i s stage the reader i s wondering  t h i s matters so much.  why  Why, a f t e r a l l , i s i t necessary  to understand the d i s t i n c t i o n Runciman used any b e t t e r Paul Hayner, "Knowledge by Acquaintance" ( I n Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 ( 1 9 b b - 1 9 6 9 ) p. 4 2 3 . ^ The one e x c e p t i o n to t h i s i s Jaakko H i n t i k k a ' s "Knowledge by Acquaintance - I n d i v i d u a t i o n by Acquaintance" ( i n Knowledge and the Known, pp. 2 1 2 - 2 3 3 ) . In t h i s a r t i c l e H i n t i k k a attempts a " r e d u c t i o n " of KA to KP. He analyses "a knows b" (where "b" denotes an i n d i v i d u a l ) by " ( 3 x ) a knows that (b = x)",where " ( 3 x ) " i s used as a q u a n t i f i e r " r e l y i n g on acquaintance".. There are s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s with t h i s a n a l y s i s . For one t h i n g , suppose f o r example that a knows Harry even though a does not know t h a t Harry i s c a l l e d . "Harry". I t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e f o r a to know Harry even i f . a has never heard the word "Harry". Yet on H i n t i k k a ' s view, a's knowing Harry i s to be understood as a's having knowledge o f the f a c t that Harry and t h i s c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l (with whom a i s acquainted) are one and the same. a's knowing Harry amounts to,a's knowing the f a c t that t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s Harry. But a does not know t h i s f a c t . S u r e l y knowing a person i s d i f f e r e n t from knowing a f a c t about a person and s u r e l y knowing a person i s d i f f e r e n t from know what name ( o r d e s c r i p t i o n ) a p p l i e s to him.  10  than Runciman did?  In any case, i s not the d i s t i n c t i o n  already clear and obvious?  The point, p r e c i s e l y , i s  that the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i s not clear, that i t i s not easy to understand and that therefore someone who  had  not r e a l l y studied i t might very well misapply i t .  In  p a r t i c u l a r i t i s quite possible that Runciman misapplied i t to Plato and i t i s at l e a s t as l i k e l y that we  shall  misapply i t to Runciman s evaluation of Plato unless 1  are more aware of i t s problems and profundities. s h a l l therefore take a closer look at KP, KA and  we  We the  d i s t i n c t i o n between them, doing a l i t t l e of the work that has been l e f t undone since Russell and thereby also more than convincing the reader of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved. KA, b a s i c a l l y , i s immediate apprehension of things (or else memory of such apprehension).  To know  something by KA i s just d i r e c t l y to apprehend i t (or else to have a memory (perhaps unconscious) of apprehending i t ) .  KA i s "cognitive contact" with an object, this  object being contacted as a unity.  The things that can  be known i n this way need not be mere sense data. the ancient Greeks at any rate, one could know by persons, places and p a r t i c u l a r s . Insofar as one  For KA was  11 w i l l i n g to r e i f y p r o p e r t i e s , p r e d i c a t e s o r s i t u a t i o n s (  as we s h a l l see, the a n c i e n t Greeks were more than  w i l l i n g to do t h i s ) , one c o u l d know these too by KA. However, j u s t what i s t h i s  "immediate  apprehension" that i s the essence of KA? difficult  to e s t a b l i s h .  T h i s i s very  L e t us c o n s i d e r the.case of  someone's b e i n g acquainted w i t h a c e r t a i n group o f mountains.  C e r t a i n l y someone who has grown up i n these  mountains has had the "immediate apprehension" o f them s u f f i c i e n t f o r h a v i n g KA o f them but what about  someone  who merely v i s i t s them o r someone who f l i e s over them on b u s i n e s s t r i p s ?  What i f p o l i t i c a l  circumstances  are such t h a t they appear l i v e on c o l o u r e d t e l e v i s i o n every evening on the news?  Do we say that the  businessman o r the t e l e v i s i o n viewer has "immediate apprehension" o f them?  How are we to understand  this  " c o g n i t i v e c o n t a c t " w i t h the o b j e c t o f knowledge? One c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h i s "apprehension" i s the f o l l o w i n g f a c t : i f something that something must e x i s t .  i s known by KA, then  Whatever the r e q u i r e d  "apprehension," i t i s a t l e a s t an apprehension o f some existing thing.  Thus g i v e n the non-existence o f say,  L i t t l e Red R i d i n g Hood, i t i s p o s s i b l e without any f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n about the world to d i s c o u n t a l l  12 c l a i m s to the e f f e c t  that someone i s a c t u a l l y  acquainted  w i t h L i t t l e Red R i d i n g Hood. Another c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h i s  "apprehension"  i s that the knower may be s a i d to know the o b j e c t o f knowledge r e g a r d l e s s o f what words are used to d e s c r i b e that o b j e c t .  H i s " c o g n i t i v e c o n t a c t " w i t h i t ensures  that i t s d e s i g n a t i o n i s i r r e l e v a n t .  Thus to be  acquainted w i t h John i s to be acquainted w i t h A l e x even i f one does not know that John i s a l s o c a l l e d Hence KA i s what Quine would c a l l transparent." ^  "referentially  KP, on the other hand, does not  possess t h i s p r o p e r t y : i t i s " r e f e r e n t i a l l y For  "Alex".  opaque".  example, someone who has met a s t r a y donkey whose  name ("Daniel") he has no way of knowing w i l l  know t h a t  t h i s donkey i s t h i s donkey but he w i l l not know that t h i s donkey i s D a n i e l .  Although t h i s donkey i s i n  f a c t D a n i e l , we are not e n t i t l e d i n cases of KP to s u b s t i t u t e one d e s i g n a t i o n o f the o b j e c t o f knowledge f o r another.  On the o t h e r hand, one's knowing  this  donkey by KA does imply that he knows D a n i e l by KA. We have j u s t  seen, then, that the "immediate  apprehension" which i s KA can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the  W. V. 0 . Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I . T. P r e s s , i960) pp. l k l - l ^ b & 166-169.  13 fact  that  exists  i t is  and  parent.  by  the  Given  matter,  apprehension  these  fact  the are,  ing  the  can  single  correct  which  they  may  not  involve  some p e r s o n x  is  a  of  KP  difference  explicitly a l l the  that  A  terms  designated  nouns,  adjectives,  not  be  of  by  two  KP,  words  trans-  on  the  even  both  about  first  of  or  know-  set  of  with  called  in  the  way  entities  typically  i f i t is  said  that  assume  that  the  may  constituents. i t makes  designate  these  better  say  to  Since, a  great  more  t-^, t^t  of  "x"  ...  are  as  such  terms  may  in  where  t^,  "x".  (These  predicates, like  "a",  etc.  "the",  in  may  knows x ( t - ^ , t 2 , . . . ) where and  a  entities  etc.)  opaque,  be  be  therefore,  we  terms  contact  more  These  various  i t would  not  might  Thus  KP,  of  which  Thus  indeed  will  sort  concepts,  is referentially  constituents.  are  knows x  that  well-defined  raised  the  what  entities.  c o m p l e x made u p  moreover, deal  "A"  two  we  are  some  relates  Cases of  knowledge  only  actually related.  number  object  area.  involves  that  exist.  a  this  properties,  are  the  then  involves  judgement  things,  in  KP  of  questions  These  object,  (i.e.  or  KA  single  Unfortunately,  the  questions  Whereas one  KA.  answer  mountains.  unanswered  state  moreover, of  a  i t is referentially  present  characterizations together  that  of  and,  t^,  of  "which",  course, etc.)  ...  be they  Ik  A second point to note i n connection with KP i s that whereas i n KA the verb "know" takes a d i r e c t object, i n cases of KP i t takes what i s i n effect a subordinate clause, very often a subordinate clause introduced by the conjunction "that". t y p i c a l example of KP we might have:  Thus as a Peter knows that  the outcome i s glorious.  The terms i n this case are  "outcome" and "glorious".  The subordinate clause i s  "that the outcome i s glorious" and i t i s indeed introduced by "that".  Of course,;lit i s a proposition  that i s introduced by this "that" and since i t i s impossible  to know something f a l s e , this proposition  must, of course, be true.  Indeed, i t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of KP that i n every case there i s some true proposition that i s known. Now although KP i s often c a l l e d "knowledge that" and f o r the reason that the subordinate clause we have just mentioned i s , indeed, often introduced by "that", there are many cases of KP i n which this con-junction i s absent.  There are also many cases of KP i n which the  true proposition known by the knower i s not e x p l i c i t i n the statement a t t r i b u t i n g this knowledge to him.  For  example, we might have a case i n which A knows which c i t y his aunt i s v i s i t i n g .  This c i t y i s , say, T i b e r i a s .  Now  15 A has never even seen T i b e r i a s on t e l e v i s i o n much l e s s in real l i f e  and thus i t i s true to say that A has no  KA o f T i b e r i a s .  Nonetheless he knows which c i t y h i s  aunt i s v i s i t i n g .  The reason t h a t t h i s i s p o s s i b l e , o f  course, i s that i n a s c r i b i n g to A the knowledge o f which c i t y h i s aunt i s v i s i t i n g , what we are r e a l l y is  claiming  j u s t that A knows that h i s aunt i s v i s i t i n g T i b e r i a s .  That i s , the case i n which A knows which c i t y h i s aunt i s v i s i t i n g i s simply "city",  a case o f KP.  " h i s aunt" and " v i s i t " .  The terms are  The subordinate  clause  i s "which ( c i t y ) h i s aunt i s v i s i t i n g " and the true p r o p o s i t i o n i s " h i s aunt i s v i s i t i n g Tiberias".  Note t h a t i n t h i s ,  true p r o p o s i t i o n c o n t a i n s clause  the c i t y o f  as i n s i m i l a r cases, the  a l l the terras o f the subordinate  ( p l u s one o f i t s own) and, furthermore, that KP  o f the true p r o p o s i t i o n i m p l i e s the o r i g i n a l KP. As another example, c o n s i d e r knows i f Tom has decided "Tom", "decide"  and " b e l i e v e " .  i s " i f Tom has decided is,  to b e l i e v e .  p r o p o s i t i o n contains clause  Here the terms are  The subordinate  to b e l i e v e " .  say, "Tom has not decided  a case i n which A  clause  The true p r o p o s i t i o n  to b e l i e v e " .  This  true  a l l the terms o f the subordinate  and, furthermore, knowledge o f i t i m p l i e s the  o r i g i n a l knowledge a s c r i b e d to A.  16  We h a v e j u s t s e e n t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f KP are r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y , a subordinate some i n t e r r e l a t i o n , sarily explicit  clause  and a t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n n o t n e c e s -  i n t h e knowledge  imputation.  noted i n p a r t i c u l a r that the conjunction be m e n t i o n e d .  We  have  " t h a t " need n o t  I n t h i s way we c a n s e e q u i t e c l e a r l y  KP i s n o t r i g i d l y form.  expressing  that  t i e d down t o one p a r t i c u l a r g r a m m a t i c a l  T h i s w i l l be made e v e n more c l e a r b y t h e n e x t  example,  an example  o f KP i n w h i c h n o t o n l y t h e t r u e  p r o p o s i t i o n but also the subordinate  clause  i s n o t made  explicit. S u p p o s e t h a t A knows t h e h e r o i n e  o f Middlemarch.  S i n c e M i d d l e m a r c h i s f i c t i o n we c a n n o t s a y t h a t A knows the h e r o i n e  ("Dorothea")  b y KA  c a s e o f KA o f a n o n - e x i s t e n t being  object.  What, t h e n , i s  s a i d when we s a y t h a t A knows t h e h e r o i n e  Middlemarch?  o f M i d d l e m a r c h i s , t h a t i s , A knows  that the heroine a c a s e o f KP.  imputes knowledge of knowledge  of  S u r e l y w h a t we a r e s a y i n g i s t h a t A knows  who t h e h e r o i n e  is  o r we s h a l l h a v e a  o f Middlemarch i s Dorothea. The mere a p p e a r a n c e  Here,  then,  of a sentence which  t o someone d o e s n o t e s t a b l i s h t h e s o r t  imputed.  17  Thus f a r we have b r o u g h t out a few o f t h e minor c o m p l e x i t i e s and d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n . Now we s h a l l t u r n t o the r e a l p r o b l e m s . One might h o l d the view t h a t among e x i s t i n g s i n g u l a r s are v a r i o u s s i t u a t i o n s o r s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s . F o r example, we might have a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i n A r g e n t i n a such as the Communists b e i n g about t o t a k e over.  As a n o t h e r example, (one due t o Meinong), we  might have as a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i n John's l i v i n g room the c a t ' s b e i n g on the mat.  F u r t h e r m o r e , as w i l l  be  shown i n the n e x t c h a p t e r , t h e a n c i e n t Greeks were among those who would have h e l d t h i s view.  Now  i f a state of  a f f a i r s c o u n t s as an e x i s t i n g s i n g u l a r , t h e r e i s no r e a s o n why i t s h o u l d n o t be an o b j e c t o f a c q u a i n t a n c e . G r a n t e d t h a t t h e r e i s such a t h i n g as a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n i n A r g e n t i n a , s u r e l y i t i s p o s s i b l e t o know i t by KA.  However, what p r e c i s e l y i s t h e d i f f e r e n c e  between  knowing by KA the s i t u a t i o n o f the Communists b e i n g about t o t a k e o v e r and knowing by KP t h a t t h e Communists a r e about t o t a k e o v e r ? To t a k e a n o t h e r example, suppose t h a t John knows the c a t ' s b e i n g on the mat.  Does he n o t have t o know  t h a t the c a t i s on t h e mat?  Not n e c e s s a r i l y .  F o r sup-  pose John i s a two y e a r j o l d c h i l d who has not y e t l e a r n t  18  how  to t a l k .  acquainted mat,  Then i s i t n o t t r u e t h a t a l t h o u g h he i s  w i t h the s i t u a t i o n o f the c a t ' s b e i n g on  t h a t he i s n o n e t h e l e s s  terms and  not i n p o s s e s s i o n  judgements n e c e s s a r y f o r KP?  of  the  Or do we  say  t h a t he has KP t h a t the c a t i s on the mat has not y e t l e a r n e d how not.  to use  I t seems  P e r h a p s , t h e n , the c h i l d has no KA o f the  s h o u l d t h a t be?  separately.  S u r e l y he i s a c q u a i n t e d  s i t u a t i o n s such as h i s b e i n g hungry. know the c a t ' s b e i n g on the mat? we  even though he  the word " c a t " ?  but o n l y o f the c a t and the mat  the  Why  situation  But  why  w i t h some s h o u l d he  I t seems, then,  not  that  cannot b l i t h e l y assume t h a t i f A knows some s i t u a t i o n ,  t h a t he t h e r e f o r e must know t h a t p where "p" denotes a p r o p o s i t i o n d e s c r i b i n g the s i t u a t i o n : f o r A might not be i n command o f the terms used i n p and A might not  be  i n command o f the terms u s e d i n any p r o p o s i t i o n e q u i v a l e n t t o i t f o r the purposes o f d e s c r i b i n g the F u r t h e r m o r e , what we  situation.  can assume i n a case l i k e the  one  described i s uncertain. Suppose, however, t h a t John i s an a d u l t and he knows by KA the c a t ' s b e i n g on the mat  and t h a t  a l s o knows by KP t h a t the c a t i s on the mat. the one  knowledge d i f f e r from the o t h e r ?  How  For one  that he does thing,  19 the KA i s t r a n s p a r e n t whereas the KP i s opaque.  Suppose  t h a t John i s completely unaware t h a t the c a t c o n s i s t e n t l y wins a l l the beauty p r i z e s f o r c a t s . will  Then although he  s t i l l know by KA the s i t u a t i o n o f the world's most  b e a u t i f u l c a t being on the mat, he w i l l not know that that world's most b e a u t i f u l c a t i s on the mat.  For a  second t h i n g , John's KA cannot be t r a n s m i t t e d to someone who l i v e s i n another c i t y and who has never seen nor heard o f the c a t , whereas John's KP can be t r a n s m i t t e d to such a p e r s o n .  F o r although there i s no way i n which  the other person can become acquainted w i t h the c a t ' s b e i n g on the mat ( s h o r t o f coming to s e e ) , t h i s o t h e r person can e a s i l y come t o know t h a t the c a t i s on the mat:  f o r John can simply telephone him and r e p o r t the  matter.  Then, on the b a s i s o f John's r e l i a b l e  report,  that other person w i l l have KP that the c a t i s on the mat.  I t seems, t h e r e f o r e , q u i t e c e r t a i n that one can  have KP about a s i t u a t i o n without h a v i n g KA o f i t .  What  i s n o t c e r t a i n , however, i s whether, as i n the case o f the c h i l d , one can have KA o f a s i t u a t i o n without h a v i n g any KP about i t .  What the example o f the c h i l d has to  say about the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n I am not sure. Another p r o b l e m a t i c area f o r the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i s the area o f "knowledge as".  F o r example,  l e t us  suppose t h a t A knows A r i s t o t l e as a b r i g h t student.  Is  20 t h i s a case of KP or of KA?  At f i r s t we  are somewhat  tempted to say t h a t i t i s at l e a s t p a r t l y Perhaps, however, A i s not A r i s t o t l e ' s merely the graduate student who  a case of  teacher  but knows him case A can  only as a b r i g h t student.  s t i l l be  no KA  then, the o r i g i n a l case was we  were a s s e r t i n g was  b r i g h t student. Aristotle's  teacher,  Aristotle  as a b r i g h t  of A r i s t o t l e .  Perhaps,  a case of KP.  Perhaps a l l  that A knows t h a t A r i s t o t l e  However, l e t us now that A has  impressed by A r i s t o t l e ' s  papers.  Surely i n t h i s  s a i d to know A r i s t o t l e  student although A has  but  marks A r i s t o t l e ' s  Perhaps, moreover, t h i s marker has never met  KA.  is a  suppose t h a t A i s  been very  favourably  c l a s s performance, but  that A  does not i n f a c t know that A r i s t o t l e i s c a l l e d "Aristotle". names of any  L i k e most p r o f e s s o r s , A does not know the of h i s undergraduate students.  course i t i s s t i l l  i s not  However, g i v e n the o p a c i t y of  in  row  KP,  true to say t h a t A knows A r i s t o t l e i s a b r i g h t  student: A knows o n l y that the r e d - h a i r e d front  of  true to say that A knows A r i s t o t l e  as a brightfestudent. it  Now  i s a b r i g h t student.  student i n the  Thus i t i s not  true  that  a s c r i b i n g the o r i g i n a l "knowledge as" to A,  that  we  were merely saying t h a t he knew that A r i s t o t l e was b r i g h t student.  As  another t r y , then, we  a  might l e t 's*  21 denote some d e s i g n a t i o n which A h i m s e l f can use to denote or r e f e r to A r i s t o t l e .  Then we might construe A's know-  ledge o f A r i s t o t l e as a b r i g h t student as the knowledge that si i s a b r i g h t student.  Thus where A i s A r i s t o t l e ' s  p r o f e s s o r , what we are saying i s t h a t A knows that the r e d - h a i r e d student i n the f r o n t row i s a b r i g h t  student  and where A i s A r i s t o t l e ' s marker, what we are saying i s that A knows t h a t the student who "Aristotle"  i s a b r i g h t student.  signs himself However, t h i s w i l l not  do e i t h e r f o r , r e t u r n i n g to the case where A i s the marker, we can f u r t h e r suppose t h a t although A r i s t o t l e ' s work made a d i s t i n c t impression on A, there i s no d e s i g n a t i o n which A can use to denote or r e f e r to A r i s t o t l e other than " t h a t b r i g h t student".  We can sup-  pose that A has f o r g o t t e n e v e r y t h i n g about A r i s t o t l e ' s work, even the name o f i t s author, except t h a t i t was the work of a c e r t a i n b r i g h t student.  In answer to the  q u e s t i o n , "does the marker know A r i s t o t l e at a l l ? " t h i n k we would s t i l l student."  I  r e p l y , "he knows A r i s t o t l e as a b r i g h t  However, the o n l y p o s s i b i l i t y f o r " s " seems  to be " t h a t b r i g h t student", and on the present  analysis  A's knowledge o f A r i s t o t l e as a b r i g h t student i s then understood  as the knowledge t h a t t h a t b r i g h t student i s  a b r i g h t student.  However, when we say that A knows  A r i s t o t l e as a b r i g h t student, we are not s a y i n g t h a t A  22 has some a n a l y t i c knowledge. allow  " s " to be nothing  like this.  Perhaps, then, we  should  more than " t h a t person" i n cases  But i s A's knowledge the knowledge t h a t  person i s a b r i g h t student?  that  I f i t were A would have  p r o p o s i t i o n a l knowledge about a r e f e r e n t f o r which he can g i v e o n l y one d e s c r i p t i o n , a d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t i s not a d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n , a r e f e r e n t , moreover, w i t h which A i s not acquainted.  Are we s a y i n g that i t i s p o s s i b l e  f o r A to have knowledge about t h i s r e f e r e n t under these conditions? e x a c t l y sure. as".  what are we saying,  then?  We are not  Nor i s t h i s the o n l y case o f "knowledge  Even i f we c o u l d analyze t h i s case i n terms o f KP,  how would we analyze:  that c h i l d knows the Head o f the  P h i l o s o p h y Department as h i s f a t h e r ? assuming t h a t the c h i l d i n q u e s t i o n  On the one hand, i s as y e t unable to  t a l k , we w i l l have d i f f i c u l t i e s imputing to the c h i l d even the KP that h i s f a t h e r i s h i s f a t h e r ( r e c a l l our d i s c u s s i o n a few pages back), and on the other  hand,  i f we t r y to understand the case p u r e l y i n terms o f KA, we s h a l l be unable to account f o r the i m p l i e d i d e n t i t y of the Head o f the P h i l o s o p h y Department and the f a t h e r . Indeed, g i v e our contemporary knowledge about KP, KA and  the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n , we are simply  p o s i t i o n to understand A's knowledge as.  not i n a How  can we  23  account f o r cases, l i k e the immediately preceding  case,  which seen to be cases of KA? How can we account f o r cases that, on the other hand, at least seem to be purely propositional (e.g., he knows electrons as merely theoretical  entities)?  F i n a l l y , how do we deal with  cases that seem to s i t r i g h t i n the middle (e.g., Plato's "pure" knowledge of various Forms as related i n certain ways to the Good)? We have now characterized and i l l u s t r a t e d the d i s t i n c t i o n between KP and KA.  We have seen some of the  d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n this d i s t i n c t i o n and we have seen how i t has not yet been f u l l y worked out. We have seen, i n p a r t i c u l a r ,  that there are some cases of "know-  ledge as" which share features of both KP and KA i n a way that i s not f u l l y understood.  We can conclude,  therefore, that the d i s t i n c t i o n which Runciman has used as a standard against which to judge Plato i s a d i s t i n c t i o n that i s not yet properly explicated.  We  may hope, however, that the work we have just done on the previous pages has improved our knowledge of the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n at least to the point where we w i l l not say anything too f o o l i s h i n our own evaluation of Plato. We s h a l l conclude this Introduction by noting a  2ii few  miscellaneous  thesis  that  of  KP/KA  the  completed  Plato  the  distinction  a  word  for  that  we  clear  by  proving  towards  the  time  in  chapter  presuppose not  the  order  that  of  the  he  fact  b e e n made w h e n P l a t o  term.  to  be  shows  that  expect  "proposition"  the  KP/KA  sions  i n language  KP  someone,  and  my  discovery  had  One  KP/KA  began that  require  to  not  progress  do  indeed  KA.  Plato  philo-  have in  the  was  that  contemporary need  making  the  a l l knowledge  or  as  one  can  whereas  cannot.  The  point  with  the  repercussions  what  i t is  that  Plato  - 1 7 constructions  always  in  to  a  name  for  searching  of  is a  rise  yet  C f . I o n 537e  certain  For  example,  use  the  that  to  to  these  still  be  repercus-  in  "know  ascribing that"  someone,  someone  distinction  c o r r e c t l y use and  has  a s c r i b i n g KA  note  gives may  distinction thought.  construction  example,  and  the  concept.  Third  to  be  need  mean in  make p r o g r e s s  following  did  for  now  concept  not  The  Greeks  sophers  must  had  Second a  to  Republic. we  philosophy.  have  did  relevant  distinction,  First  ancient  points  can  one  be  without  realizing  repercussions.  dozens unable  of to  "know  familiar  For that"  formulate  '  the  25 KP/KA  distinction. Fourth  towards shown held  the discovery  t o be f a l s e that  example,  KA  terms  For  i f Plato  second have  sort  this  different  from  KA,  then  Plato  discovering  of  t h e KP/KA  enough  I f ,  that  i n terms sort  o f KA,  then  o f knowledge  made  or KP  true.  he  a must  was  somewhat  progress  like  towards  he h a d a l s o  sorts  for  like  to understand  distinction t h e two  was  i s shown t o be  i t i s not necessary  o f making  knowledge  Plato  o f knowledge.  o f knowledge  done and  their interrelations. Fifth  signs  Plato  trying  had not only  i snot  his life  a n d i f i t was m o r e o v e r  some w o r k i n c o m p a r i n g probing  distinction  o f knowledge  second  progress  trying to explicate  the thesis  o f knowledge  that  KP,  sort  consciously  seen  a  sort  then  made  throughout  consciously  another  was  Plato  o f t h e KP/KA  the basic  was  o f KA,  that  i f even  was  Plato  characterize in  the thesis  a KP/KA  about  i f he makes  about  Forms  KP/KA  distinction  nonetheless generality.  distinction  sensible  be making p r o g r e s s  with  this  regard  T o make  i n connection  progress  Plato  towards  with  making  to  In order  distinction  to cases some  show a n y  regard  particulars.  towards  i twith  or classes.  that  that i t i s  o f knowledge  version Forms  cases  o f the  or classes i s  i ti n a l l i t s  proper  26 Lastly, my thesis about Plato's progress i s of course validated i f Plato, having i n h i s e a r l i e r dialogue characterized knowledge as KA, then decides i n his late dialogues KP  to characterize i t as some sort of  but given that Plato understands that he has  characterized f i r s t one, then another sort of knowledge.  27  THE SOVEREIGHNTY OP KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE  In must f i r s t  o r d e r to understand P l a t o ' s epistemology, we be aware that the a n c i e n t Greeks  that a l l knowledge was KA.  presupposed  Ask one o f P l a t o ' s  contemporaries what knowledge i s and he w i l l answer that it  i s acquaintance w i t h the o b j e c t o f knowledge, i ft  immediate  apprehension o r p e r c e p t i o n o f i t .  T h i s chapter does n o t g i v e a complete p r o o f f o r this assertion.  What i t does do i s to c i t e some  r e f e r e n c e s and a u t h o r i t i e s and to s k e t c h t h e i r o p i n i o n s on the matter,  A f u l l p r e s e n t a t i o n o f evidence to sup-  p o r t the c l a i m would r e q u i r e a t h e s i s o f i t s own.  For  our purposes, however, what mainly matters i s that o f a l l the  a n c i e n t Greeks at l e a s t the e a r l y P l a t o  presupposed  that a l l knowledge was KA and t h i s f a c t i s proved not o n l y by the i n d i c a t i o n s i n the p r e s e n t chapter but i n the  remainder o f t h i s work as w e l l . In  h i s paper, " H e r a c l i t u s , Parmenides,  and the  Naive Metaphysics o f Things," Alexander Mourelatos as an e x p l a n a t o r y backdrop  offers  to a n c i e n t Greek thought h i s  "Naive Metaphysics o f Things (NMT)".  He proves  that  r e g a r d l e s s o f the h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y o f NMT, i t i s Cf.  Theaetetus  l5le.  28 c e r t a i n l y h e l p f u l to assume that a n c i e n t Greek p h i l o s o p h e r s had i t somewhere i n the back of t h e i r minds as they wrote whatever they d i d . we  Using t h i s  can b e t t e r understand much of what they One  tenant of NMT  said.  i s t h a t a l l knowledge i s d i r e c t  acquaintance (or e l s e memory of d i r e c t with things.  assumption  acquaintance)  These t h i n g s , moreover, are p a r a d i g -  m a t i c a l l y persons, p l a c e s , massive bodies or homogeneous substances. of NMT  Hence someone whose l i f e  i s l i v e d i n terms  can know you and your c o u s i n and your f a m i l y but  he cannot know the p r o p o s i t i o n that you and your c o u s i n are r e l a t e d by way Furthermore,  of h a v i n g the same g r a n d f a t h e r .  i f someone knows of faraway p l a c e s or  awe-  i n s p i r i n g gods, i t i s o n l y because he has v i s i t e d them and had d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h them.  T h i s i m p l i e s of  course that they e x i s t and, indeetd, i t i s a c o r o l l a r y of NMT's view of knowledge that n o t h i n g can be known except e x i s t i n g  things.  19  I f Mourelatos i s r i g h t , we  should expect t h i s  KA  to t u r n up i n the Greek p h i l o s o p h e r s as the o n l y major  A. P. D. Mourelatos, " H e r a c l i t u s , Parmenides and the Naive Metaphysics of T h i n g s " ( I n E x e g e s i s and Argument. ed. E. N. Lee; A. P. D. Mourelatos; and R. M. R o r t y . Assen, the Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Comp., 1973)  PP. 17-33.  29  s o r t of " t r u e " knowledge l i v e s i n terms of NMT first  not that they l i v e d  their  but that i n r e f l e c t i n g f o r the  time on the nature o f knowledge, NMT  metaphysics w i t h which they would s t a r t .  would be the In any  case  the e a r l y Greek p h i l o s o p h e r s do r e a c t j u s t as Mourelatos' theory about NMT  p r e d i c t s : they do r e g a r d KA  as the o n l y t r u e s o r t of knowledge.  Hermann F r a n k e l has  shown of Xenophanes, f o r example, t h a t he  "characterizes  as c e r t a i n and exhaustive only that knowledge that i s e m p i r i c a l l y grounded. He h o l d s o n l y o p s i s ,  'vision',  and  20 historie,  ' d i r e c t acquaintance*, as r e l i a b l e . "  Another  s c h o l a r who  has r e c o g n i z e d t h i s  "tendency  to t h i n k of knowledge i n terms of some s o r t of d i r e c t acquaintance w i t h the o b j e c t s of knowledge, e.g. i n terms 21  of seeing them or of w i t n e s s i n g them" Hintikka.  i s Jaakko  H i n t i k k a concludes that f o r the Greeks  an eyewitness's knowledge counted as genuine and he then uses t h i s f a c t i n showing how  only  knowledge,  i t was  that they  thought that the o b j e c t s of knowledge must be c h a n g e l e s s . ^ H. P r a n k e l , "Xenophanes' E m p i r i c i s m and H i s C r i t i q u e of Knowledge (B3IL)" (In The P r e - S o c r a t e s , ed. A. P. D. Mourelatos. Garden C i t y , New York: DouDleday and Co., 1971+) p. 1 3 0 . u  J . H i n t i k k a , Time and N e c e s s i t y (Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1973) p. 72 f f . 2  1  30  The c o r o l l a r y to a l l t h i s , that a l l objects of knowledge are existing things, likewise shows up i n the early Greek philosophers.  In p a r t i c u l a r i t shows up i n  the curious fact that the Greeks treated properties as i f they were substances i n t h e i r own  right.  This of  course they would have to do i f they wanted to claim knowledge of properties within the l i m i t a t i o n s of the given c o r o l l a r y .  Thus evidence that they held that  properties were things constitutes evidence that they did indeed construe knowledge as acquaintance.  At any rate  Parmenides, f o r example, did think of properties as things and f o r him predicates were rather l i k e proper names.  J  Plato himself held a similar view i n h i s  e a r l i e r dialogues.  At Charmides I58e-l59a, f o r example,  Socrates i n s i s t s that i f Charmides i s r e a l l y temperate (as his admirers claim) then he w i l l have some "temperance inside him as a perceptible substance: i f you have temperance with you, you can hold an opinion Cdoxa] about i t . For being i n you, I presume i t must, i n that Case, afford some perception from which you can form some opinion of what temperance i s , and what kind of thing i t i s .... And since you understand the Greek tongue... you can t e l l me, I suppose, your view of this p a r t i c u l a r thought of yours.... Then i n order  A. P. D. Mourelatos, op. c i t . , pp. 18-22. Ibid., p. I4.3.  31 that we may make a guess whether i t i s i n you or not, t e l l me... what you say of temperance according to your opinion.  ^  A l i t t l e l a t e r Socrates p e r s i s t s : Charmides, attend more c l o s e l y and look into yourself; r e f l e c t on the q u a l i t y that i s given you by the presence of temperance, and what q u a l i t y i t must have to work t h i s e f f e c t on you. Take stock of a l l this and t e l l me l i k e a good, brave fellow, what i t appears to 2^ you to be.  ^  Further evidence that Plato thought of properties as things i s found at Lysis 217c-e where "white" i s subs t a n t i a l i z e d and at Phaedo 102-106 where, among other properties, "being t a l l e r " i s said to be an ingredient of t a l l e r persons, one  that either "withdraws or  perishes" when the t a l l e r persons are compared with things yet t a l l e r than they. I t should not be s u r p r i s i n g that Plato  reified  properties once i t i s r e a l i z e d that this follows from the b e l i e f that a l l knowledge i s KA of things, f o r c e r t a i n l y i t i s not an unknown f a c t that the early Plato did hold t h i s b e l i e f .  Of a l l the texts that might be  quoted to support this f a c t , however, one of the most 2  ^ Charmides lf>8e-l59a, trans, by Lamb.  per  Charmides l60d-e, trans, by Lamb.  32 i n t e r e s t i n g sees Plato brush r i g h t up against the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n only to reject i t i n favour of NMT's "KA only" view of knowledge. About h a l f way through Charmides, C r i t i a s  decides  that temperance i s the knowledge or science whose sub26 ject matter i s sciences.  Socrates then proceeds to  commit him to the view that the temperate man qua temperate man i s a s c i e n t i s t of sciences who knows only whether or not a given thing i s a science.  The science  of sciences s t r i c t l y speaking does not give i t s possessor any knowledge of the subject matter of any other science but only the knowledge of science per se. In other words, the s c i e n t i s t of sciences qua s c i e n t i s t of sciences w i l l know that chemistry i s a science whereas astrology i s not (170a) but he w i l l not know any chemicals nor anything about chemistry nor any zodical signs nor:anything  about astrology.  He w i l l know  medicine (qua medicine) regardless of whether or not he as an i n d i v i d u a l knows anything of health and disease. Socrates quite properly finds t h i s paradoxical and points out that he who would inquire into the nature of medicine must test i t i n health and disease, which are  Cf. Charmides 166c.  33  the sphere of medicine, and not i n what i s 27  extraneous and i s not i t s sphere. Later on, i n r e f e r r i n g back to this puzzling r e s u l t , Socrates notes the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a man knowing i n a sort of way that which he does not know at a l l . According to our admission, he knows that which he does not know --- than which nothing, as I think, can be more i r r a t i o n a l . Now to express p r e c i s e l y this paradox, Socrates 170c  says at  that the s c i e n t i s t of sciences, " w i l l not know  what he knows, but only that he knows," this point being immediately  elaborated:  Then being temperate, or temperance, w i l l not be this knowledge of what one knows or does not know, but, i t would seem merely knowing that 29  one knows or does not know. The point i s t h i s :  qua s c i e n t i s t of sciences,  s c i e n t i s t of sciences i s not acquainted  the  with the objects  of any science: he merely knows whether or not he or someone else possesses what can properly be c a l l e d a science.  Hence he knows that he or someone else knows  something, but something with which he i s not acquainted. Here notably seems to be a case of KP which i s very 27 Charmides 171a-b, trans, by Jowett. 28  Charmides 1 7 5 c , trans, by Jowett.  29  Charmides 1 7 0 c , trans, by Lamb.  314-  d e f i n i t e l y n o t a case o f KA. P l a t o were saying: knowledge."  However, i t i s not as i f  " l o o k j here we have two s o r t s o f  On the c o n t r a r y , he i s p o i n t i n g to t h i s  s i t u a t i o n as the absurdum to which C r i t i a s leads.  I t i s as i f he were s a y i n g :  1  position  "stupid Critias]  l o o k a t the s i l l y d i s t i n c t i o n to which your science o f sciences gives r i s e .  T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s absurd and  thus your s c i e n c e o f s c i e n c e s i s absurd too." Charmides,  then, P l a t o i s seen s t i l l  In  very much c l i n g i n g  to the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t a l l knowledge i s KA, and, on the b a s i s o f t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , r e j e c t i n g an a s s e r t i o n t h a t suggests t h a t there i s some k i n d o f knowledge t h a t i s n o t KA.  L e t us c a l l the e a r l y P l a t o ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n the " a l l K i s KA" p r e s u p p o s i t i o n .  35  THE  One  PICTURE WINDOW THEORY OF LANGUAGE  of the ways i n which the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n  can be made i s i n terms of r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y . noted above, i n cases of KA  the knower may  be  said  know the o b j e c t of knowledge r e g a r d l e s s of how d e s c r i b e d whereas i n cases of KP  As  t h i s i s not  we to  i t is  so.  To  know t h a t a i s c i s not: . n e c e s s a r i l y to know t h a t b i s c, even though, i n f a c t , a = b.  Given t h i s way  of making  the d i s t i n c t i o n , however, i t w i l l f o l l o w t h a t anyone who  presupposed that a l l K i s KA w i l l be committed to  the view t h a t a l l knowledge i s t r a n s p a r e n t . a person the two  statements, "Tom  "Toms knows 5 + 7 i s 12" be f a l s e .  knows 12  w i l l either  What t h i s present  For  such  i s 12"  and  both be t r u e or both  chapter attempts to do i s  to uncover the more g e n e r a l phenomenon which u n d e r l i e s this paradoxical position,  to uncover the  o f language" r e q u i r e d by Mourelatos'  NMT.  L e t us b e g i n by l o o k i n g a t a few demus 279a-c we things".  f i n d Socrates  "transparency  texts.  making a l i s t o f "good  Having mentioned t h a t wisdom and good  are among the good t h i n g s what he has  (279c), Socrates  s a i d and r e a l i z e s  At Euthy-  reconsiders  that:  A. P. D. Mourelatos, op.  c i t . , p.  fortune  32  36 We h a v e a l m o s t made o u r s e l v e s laughing-stocks.• Why a f t e r p u t t i n g g o o d f o r t u n e i n o u r f o r m e r l i s t , we h a v e j u s t b e e n d i s c u s s i n g t h e same thing again.... S u r e l y i t i s r i d i c u l o u s , when a t h i n g has been before us a l l the time, to set i t f o r t h a g a i n a n d g o o v e r t h e same g r o u n d twice.... W i s d o m . . . . i s p r e s u m a b l y [_ a c a u s e o r part It  o f ] good  i s as i f Socrates  different "numbers by  5"  would been  sets that  that  e n d i n 0"  over  3  1  trying to l i s t numbers  r e a l i z e s that  "surely  numbers  b y 5.  ground  find  i tridiculous?  same  as good  that  i f something  then  i t i s ridiculous to l i s t  descriptions denote  fortune,  Socrates L|.32d-e. He when  why  goes  divisible  end i n 0 a r e  stupid!"  he  a thing  B u t why  should  under  does  i s prima  i t be t r u e  two names  has and  Socrates f a c i e the  generally  or descriptions,  t h e two names o r that  they  refer  to or  thing? makes  a s i m i l a r remark  and Glaucon  suddenly  that  "How  i f wisdom  and y e t n o t r e a l i z e  t h e same  are  to set i t f o r t h again  twice."  Even  mentioned  that  i t i s r i d i c u l o u s , when  us a l l the time,  t h e same  entirely  and h a v i n g  and "numbers  are d i v i s i b l e  think, before  were  of natural  suddenly  numbers  go  fortune.  Socrates  Euthydemus  have  been  "hunting"  r e a l i z e s that  279d,  trans,  at  by  they  Lamb.  Republic f o r justice have  37 unknowingly been speaking of i t a l l the time:  i t is  just the p r i n c i p l e that each c i t i z e n should "do h i s business".  own  Once again Socrates finds i t most puzzling  that they did not r e a l i z e that " j u s t i c e " and "doing one's own business" referred to the same thing. Socrates says: the thing app arently was tumbling about our feet from the start and yet we couldn't see i t , but were most ludicrous, l i k e people who 32  sometimes hunt f o r what they hold i n  their'hands.  F i n a l l y , Theaetetus 195d-200c provides us with yet another case of Socrates' being incredulous i n the face of the fact that a man  can know two names or  descriptions of the same thing without knowing that both these names or descriptions r e f e r to the same thing. How "12"  i s i t , he wonders, that a man  can know "5 + 7"  and yet not know that these are just two  f o r the same number?  How  and  designations  can he think that 5" + 7 i s  other than 12, given that he knows both 5 + 7  and 12?  An  adherent to the KA only view can give no s a t i s f a c t o r y answer to this question.  He i s not i n a p o s i t i o n to  point out that one can know 5> 7* and 12 without necesemphasis.  Republic k.32d-e, trans, by Shorey, with my Note the KA imagry of "holding".  38 s a r i l y knowing t h a t they are i n t e r r e l a t e d i n c e r t a i n ways. In each o f these three  cases, then, Socrates i s  presupposing ( e i t h e r i n P l a t o ' s b e h a l f o r at l e a s t on behalf  o f those who h o l d that a l l K i s KA) t h a t :  Someone who i s i n p o s s e s s i o n  o f two names or  d e s c r i p t i o n s both o f which he knows how to use i n ordinary  language and both o f which r e f e r to o r denote  the  same t h i n g w i l l not only know these two t h i n g s  two  names or d e s c r i p t i o n s but w i l l  under  a l s o n e c e s s a r i l y know  that the two names o r d e s c r i p t i o n s r e f e r to the same thing.  I n other words, someone who i s acquainted w i t h  a t h i n g under two names or d e s c r i p t i o n s and  (e.g.,  "wisdom"  "good f o r t u n e " ) i n the sense that he at l e a s t knows  how to use or to understand the two names o r d e s c r i p t i o n s w i l l moreover n e c e s s a r i l y have what we would c a l l KP that the two names or d e s c r i p t i o n s r e f e r to the same thing.  Thus, f o r example, he who has met C l a r k Kent and  who has a l s o met Superman and who t h e r e f o r e knows how to use  these two names w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y know that C l a r k Kent  i s Superman.  Having met the man i n h i s s e c r e t i d e n t i t y  as C l a r k Kent and having met the man i n h i s uniform as Superman, one w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y know that the two men are the  same man.  L e t us c a l l t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n the  39 "Ka & Kb & a = b s=^ K(a = b)" presupposition or "PKab" f o r short. Needless to say, PKab i s as.powerful as i t i s curious.  I t implies, f o r example, that i f I know some  x, then given any y such that I understand how to use "y" i n ordinary language, i f x = y, then I s h a l l know that x = y, and furthermore only i f x 4 y s h a l l I not know that x = y. However, i f i n the l a t t e r case I r e f l e c t that (assuming PKab) my ignorance of x = y can only be due to the fact that they are not i d e n t i c a l , I s h a l l come to the knowledge that x # y.  The converse  i s also true: i f to know x i s to know f o r a l l known y o  whether y = x, then i t follows that PKab. 1  Let us consider some of the repercussions of  presupposing PKab.  F i r s t l y , i f any two (known) things  such as courage and virtue are r e a l l y the same'thing, then one may easily ascertain this fact simply by knowing courage and virtue i n a way that i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r being able to talk about them i n a given language. Secondly there w i l l be no problem i n deciding whether or not a given d e f i n i t i o n a c t u a l l y defines the term i t i s meant to define: f o r example, the p r i n c i p l e that each c i t i z e n should "do h i s own business" w i l l immediately be seen to be the same thing as j u s t i c e .  Thirdly, given  ko any  d e s c r i p t i o n of a given  t h i n g , one w i l l know that  t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n does d e s c r i b e for  that t h i n g .  This  entails,  example, that young c h i l d r e n who have j u s t l e a r n t  the alphabet w i l l have marvelous s p e l l i n g a b i l i t i e s . pose such a c h i l d wishes to s p e l l "mouse". a l s o knowing the f i r s t  Sup-  Knowing m and  l e t t e r i n theefword "mouse", the  c h i l d w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y know that the two names or d e s c r i p t i o n s "m" and "the f i r s t  l e t t e r i n the word  'mouse'" r e f e r to the same t h i n g . to w r i t e down the f i r s t  This w i l l enable him  letter correctly.  S i m i l a r l y he  w i l l know what to w r i t e down f o r the second l e t t e r , and so on.  Another way o f l o o k i n g at t h i s i s as f o l l o w s : i f  to know x i s to know f o r a l l known y, whether y = x, then to know m i s to know whether the f i r s t l e t t e r in,r the word "mouse" = m.  Hence, i f only by m e t h o d i c a l l y  going through the alphabet, the c h i l d w i l l e a s i l y enough come to know which l e t t e r to w r i t e down f i r s t , which to w r i t e down second, and so on. able  to s p e l l not only "mouse" but any word w r i t t e n i n  Roman l e t t e r s . for  I n t h i s manner he w i l l be  Needless to say, PKab h o l d s great promise  a d u l t s as w e l l .  Methodical a p p l i c a t i o n of a th  d e s c r i p t i o n such as "the n in  l e t t e r or punctuation  the E n g l i s h paragraph which best  mark  summarizes the con-  t e n t s o f t h i s book" w i l l enable one to l e a r n the contents  of any book ( i n any language) without having to read i t . I t should besnoted t h a t , once again, puzzled  Socrates i s very  that such marvelous p o s s i b i l i t i e s are not  e x p l o i t e d i n everyday l i f e .  Why should  someone s e t  about r e a d i n g , he wonders at Theatetus 1 9 8 e - 1 9 9 a » when they already know a l l the l e t t e r s ?  f  Having seen j u s t how c u r i o u s  the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  PKab r e a l l y i s , we are r a t h e r l e f t wondering how i t was that P l a t o c o u l d ever have allowed i t to i n f l u e n c e h i s thinking.  Why d i d P l a t o allow h i s Socrates to assume  the t r u t h of PKab even f o r a moment? question  One answer to t h i s  i s that P l a t o was s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by a view  that language somehow m i r r o r s presupposition  that:  or p i c t u r e s r e a l i t y , by a  Names, d e s c r i p t i o n s or statements  p i c t u r e or d i s p l a y what they name, d e s c r i b e We s h a l l c a l l t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  the " P i c t u r e Window  Theory o f Language" or "PWTL" f o r s h o r t . not  or state.  I want to say  that P l a t o h e l d t h i s view but simply that he was  i n f l u e n c e d by i t . At C r a t y l u s IjJOb, f o r example, i t i s agreed that "the name i s an i m i t a t i o n o f the t h i n g . "  Hence one might  e a s i l y take the view that "as the name i s so..also i s the t h i n g , and... he who knows the one w i l l a l s o know the other  (lt3i?d)."  S i m i l a r l y i n the Phaedo, there i s the  k2 passage  99d-100a where Socrates compares ( a l b e i t  t e m p o r a r i l y ) the words that make up a theory ( l o g o s ) to water i n which i s r e f l e c t e d theory s t u d i e s .  the r e a l i t i e s that the  At Theaetetus 206d, moreover, S o c r a t e s  d e s c r i b e s speech ( l o g o s ) as a "stream that flows through the  l i p s " and i n which one sees an image o f the speaker's  thought " l i k e a r e f l e c t i o n i n a m i r r o r o r i n water." Again a t S o p h i s t 221d, i t i s i n s i s t e d that someone's name "must s u r e l y express h i s n a t u r e . "  F i n a l l y , along  s i m i l a r l i n e s we are t o l d i n Timaeus 29b that we may assume that words f l o g o s i are a k i n to the matter which they d e s c r i b e ; when they r e l a t e to the l a s t i n g and permanent and i n t e l l i g i b l e , they ought to be l a s t i n g and u n a l t e r a b l e , and, as f a r as t h e i r nature a l l o w s , i r r e f u t a b l e and invincible  nothing l e s s .  ^  On t h i s view, t h e r e f o r e , he who knows the name or d e s c r i p t i o n o f a t h i n g knows the t h i n g  j u s t as he  who sees a good, genuine, f r o n t - v i e w photograph o f somet h i n g sees what i t p o r t r a y s .  Of course, i f names or  d e s c r i p t i o n s a c t u a l l y d i s p l a y t h e i r o b j e c t s , then i n l i n e w i t h PKab i t w i l l be obvious when two such names or d e s c r i p t i o n s r e f e r to o r denote the same t h i n g  —-  j u s t as i t i s obvious when two good f r o n t - v i e w photographs  Timaeus 29b, t r a n s , by Jowett.  1+3 p i c t u r e the  same t h i n g .  PWTL i m p l i e s PKab.  t h a t C l a r k Kent i s Superman because he name p i c t u r e s the one  and  a completely transparent  same man.  One  knows  sees that each  Each name i s l i k e  window o v e r l o o k i n g  the  reality  that i s i t s r e f e r e n t . I t w i l l be worthwhile at t h i s p o i n t to look more c l o s e l y at the i n f l u e n c e exerted For i n s o f a r as t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  on P l a t o by PWTL.  i n s i s t s on a r a d i c a l  transparency of language, i t bars the way of KP,  given  even  to the  the l a t t e r ' s i m p l i e d o p a c i t y .  One  notion of  the  ways i n which P l a t o might make progress towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n , then, would be  to r e j e c t t h i s  presupposition  and f o r that matter to r e j e c t i t s s i m i l a r l y o f f s p r i n g , PKab.  restricting  Indeed I hope to show t h a t , p r e c i s e l y ,  P l a t o does make p r o g r e s s towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i n e x a c t l y t h i s way. out e x a c t l y how  F i r s t , however, we must t r y to f i n d  P l a t o understood PWTL and  e x a c t l y how  he  f e l t i t s influence. Throughout the C r a t y l u s Socrates  i s arguing  names ( i . e . , nouns, proper names, a d j e c t i v e s , and are not mere products of c o n v e n t i o n . l e a s t , i s an e x p r e s s i o n  that verbs)  A "good" name, at  of the nature of the t h i n g to  which i t r e f e r s , $ust as a good s h u t t l e i s an of the " t r u e or i d e a l s h u t t l e " to which the  expression  carpenter  Uk looks as he makes the good shuttle (383-390).  Sometimes,  indeed, the very l e t t e r s that make up a word can be likened to colours which are used to paint a t r u e - l i f e picture of the referent of that word (k2kd-k25a, k j l c ) . For example, the  of " ^ o ^ " (stream) depicts the  motion of streams, the tongue being "least at rest i n the pronunciation  of this l e t t e r " (k26-e, k3kb-c).  Always, however, there i s some way i n which "the correct name indicates the nature of the thing (k28e))", i n which "the name i s an imitation of the thing (k30b)." Up u n t i l Cratylus k28e, we f i n d Socrates and Cratylus i n basic agreement about a l l t h i s , as indeed throughout the dialogue they are i n agreement against those who argue that names are arbitrary conventions. However, at k29 there errupts a dispute i n which Socrates claims that some names are bad imitations of t h e i r referents and Cratylus claims that a l l names (that r e a l l y name anything) are good imitations of t h e i r referents. Both agree that names are l i k e "pictures" of their referents (k/JOb), only Socrates allows that names may sometimes be bad pictures (k31c-e) whereas Cratylus does not (k31e-ii32a).  In fact i t i s Cratylus, not Socrates,  who takes the p o s i t i o n of complete transparency of language that supports PKab.  For Socrates' p o s i t i o n  allows that i n some cases PKab w i l l be f a l s e  for  just as i t sometimes happens that a man who sees two bad photographs of the same thing does not recognize that they are photographs of the same thing, so i t may sometimes happen that a man who knows a thing under two bad names or descriptions does not know that these two names or descriptions refer to the same thing.  Prom  Cratylus, then, we can conclude that whenever Plato wrote that dialogue, ^  he was already beginning to  reject the influence of PWTL and also that of PKab and hence also that of a l l K i s KA.  On the other hand, he  s t i l l took them seriously enough to give long and caref u l arguments against Cratylus* p o s i t i o n .  J  J  Another area i n which we can examine the influence of PWTL on Plato i s the area of non-being and falsehood. Here we f i n d Plato greatly troubled by a certain paradox that led to the conclusion that no statements are f a l s e . Roughly, this paradox argued that to speak f a l s e l y was to say something that did not exist and hence to say nothing,  Cratylus i s not a late dialogue. Cf. David Ross, Platonic Theory of Ideas (Oxford; Clarendon Press,  1953) pp. 1-10.. 35  Cf. Charles H. Kahn, "Language and Ontology i n the Cratylus" (In Exegesis and Argument) pp. 157-  Ii6 i.e., up  not  this  to u t t e r  paradox  283e-28iic,  Sophist.  and  why  Plato's that  Problem  Plato  believed  take  i t so  was  that  article  has  lies to  so  anyone this 3  brings  Euthydemus  who  the major  beneath  this  makes  problem  of  paradox  first  Meaning, one  J  by  and  heart?  "Sentence  enchanted  of affairs.  Plato  places:  shown i n t h e  o f Non-Being,"  "something",  state  what  David Wiggins  his excellent  than four  It i s ostensibly  However,  did Plato As  less  sentence.  k.29d-lL30a, T h e a e t e t u s l88c-l89b  Cratylus  the  ing  a t no  236e-2iilc.  Sophist  of  a meaningful  of  the paradox a  section  Negation,  the  reasons  was  s t a t e m e n t must  "something"  being  a  and  that  he  be  say-  situation  or  7  I t seems t h a t j u s t a s a n onoma (name) i n t h e C r a t y l u s i s an i n s t r u m e n t o f t e a c h i n g and s o r t i n g o u t R e a l i t y (... 388 A - C ) , whose c o r r e c t n e s s l i e s i n t h e p u r p o s e o f s h o w i n g how things a r e . . . , so on t h e v i e w o f s e n t e n c e s w h i c h g i v e s t h e p a r a d o x a s e n t e n c e may b e s e e n a s s h o w i n g , or drawing the h e a r e r ' s a t t e n t i o n t o , or d i s p l a y i n g f o r h i m . . . some s i t u a t i o n i n R e a l i t y a s i t u a t i o n i n t h e w o r l d o f whose e x i s t e n c e he w i l l as  a result  David Plato's Problem V l a s t o s , Garden  p p . 268-280. 3  a  n  d  7  Ibid.,  Sophist 3  8  of  this  informed.  W i g g i n s , "Sentence Meaning, N e g a t i o n , and o f Non-Being" ( I n P l a t o I , ed. Gregory C i t y , New Y o r k : . D o u b l e d a y a n d C o . , 1971)  pp.  270,  237d-e.  Ibid.,  a c t become  p.  278.  278  &  280;  c f . Theaetetus  189a  47 Of c o u r s e , i f i t i s always t h e case t h a t the s i t u a t i o n d i s p l a y e d by a sentence e x i s t s i n the w o r l d , i n R e a l i t y , then i t i s always the case t h a t a sentence i s t r u e ! To p u t t h i s i n terms o f what we s a i d b e f o r e ,  since  PWTL i m p l i e s t h a t statements a r e l i k e good, genuine photographs o f what they s t a t e ( i . e . , t h e i r r e f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s ) ; and s i n c e a l l good, genuine photographs a r e photographs o f e x i s t i n g t h i n g s ; t h e r e f o r e a l l statements s t a t e e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n s as r e f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , and hence a l l statements s t a t e what i s t r u e .  Indeed, i f  t h e r e were any f a l s e statements t h e y would be l i k e photographs o f t h i n g s t h a t do n o t e x i s t , and j u s t as photographs o f t h i n g s t h a t do n o t e x i s t a r e n o t , p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , p h o t o g r a p h s , so i n t h e same way f a l s e s t a t e ments would n o t , p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , be s t a t e m e n t s . Hence i f a n y t h i n g i s a s t a t e m e n t , t h e n i t must be a t r u e s t a t e ment. I n t h i s way, t h e n , we see t h a t P l a t o ' s  difficulties  w i t h t h i s paradox were caused l a r g e l y by h i s sympathies w i t h PWTL.  Furthermore h i s r e s o l v i n g t h i s paradox w i l l  show t h a t he has a l r e a d y c o m p l e t e l y thrown o f f these sympathies.  Ibid.,  pp.,"270-271  and c f . Parmenides  l6le.  1+8  E x a c t l y what p o i n t have we now reached i n our attempt to show that P l a t o made progress towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n ?  At t h i s p o i n t we are now aware o f  three NMT p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  that d i d i n f l u e n c e P l a t o and  that d i d stand i n the way o f h i s making the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n . These three p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s K i s KA, PKab, and PWTL.  were that a l l  I n what f o l l o w s , we s h a l l see  that P l a t o r e j e c t e d the i n f l u e n c e o f each o f these, thereby a l r e a d y making some headway towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n , and t h a t , moreover, as e a r l y as the Republic he had r e j e c t e d t h e i r i n f l u e n c e to the p o i n t where he was w i l l i n g and able to accomodate c e r t a i n cases o f what we would c a l l KP.  49  KNOWLEDGE IN THE REPUBLIC In order to understand the epistemology of the Republic, by the  i t i s essential to understand what Plato meant  "hypotheses"  of the Divided Line texts and to  understand the way i n which he thought they could be known.  I f he thought that they were simply concepts and  that they were known merely by acquaintance, merely by being "seen" with the "eye of the soul", then there i s no reason to think that Plato had advanced from h i s p o s i t i o n i n the Charmides.  I f , however, he thought that the  hypotheses were propositions and that they were known by means of i n t e r r e l a t i n g various concepts and deducing various conclusions, then there i s every reason to think that Plato had gone very f a r indeed not only i n discovering the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n but i n establishing i t .  What I  claim i s that Plato thought of the ^'hypotheses" i n neither of these ways but i n a way that straddled these two ways. I claim that he thought of the hypotheses under a d i s junctive concept allowed them to be either concepts or propositions.  By a "disjunctive concept" i s meant a con-  cept such as "Easter coloured" yiwhich covers two or more "ordinary" concepts, e.g. "yellow" and "mauve".  Arguments  about objects f a l l i n g under such concepts do not have to make the relevant d i s t i n c t i o n between the two disjunctss  50 e.g.  an argument showing t h a t E a s t e r c o l o u r e d  need not be r e d does n o t have to s p l i t o b j e c t s i n t o two c l a s s e s .  objects  the E a s t e r  coloured  I a l s o c l a i m that P l a t o  thought  t h a t the hypotheses c o u l d be known by means o f a p r o c e s s that i n v o l v e d both becoming acquainted w i t h c e r t a i n and  things  a l s o i n v o l v e d e s t a b l i s h i n g i n t e r r e l a t i o n s , coming to  what we would c a l l KP o f c e r t a i n concepts.  Thus I do not  c l a i m that P l a t o advanced so f a r that he thought i n terms o f a p u r e l y p r o p o s i t i o n a l model w i t h r e s p e c t t o the hypotheses but, on the other hand, I c l a i m that he was no longer f o r c i n g a l l knowledge i n t o a KA only mould, t h a t he thought of the hypotheses and o f knowing the hypotheses i n a way not a p p r o p r i a t e that could accomodate KP.  to mere KA but i n a way  I do n o t t h i n k t h a t P l a t o was  completely c l e a r about what he was doing i n every but  I do t h i n k he was q u i t e c l e a r that he was no longer  handling  knowledge i n a way that was a p p r o p r i a t e  KA only model. his  I c l a i m that he had c o n s c i o u s l y  view that a l l knowledge was simply  "mental seeing or touching" his  respect  to the abandoned  some s o r t o f  and t h a t he was  reformulating  ideas on knowledge i n such a way that they c o u l d  accomodate what we (but n o t P l a t o , o f course) would c a l l "KP". arguing  In p a r t i c u l a r the D i v i d e d L i n e t e x t s see him to the e f f e c t that i n some cases a knowledge o f  51 c e r t a i n i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s among Forms i s necessary f o r knowing some g i v e n h y p o t h e s i s and t h i s , o f c o u r s e , • i s d i s t i n c t l y n o t i n the s p i r i t o f a KA only model o f knowledge. Indeed, to say t h a t P l a t o was here h a n d l i n g knowledge i n a way a p p r o p r i a t e to a KA o n l y model o f knowledge would be to say t h a t a KA only model o f knowledge should embrace a f e a t u r e t h a t p r o p e r l y belongs o n l y to KP  namely, the f e a t u r e o f i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  ever, as we saw i n the f i r s t  How-  chapter, KA i n v o l v e s n o t h i n g  more i n t r i c a t e than an "immediate apprehension"  o f the  s i n g l e o b j e c t o f knowledge. L e t us now t r y to prove  the a s s e r t i o n s I have  just  made. To b e g i n w i t h l e t us r e c a l l from the D i v i d e d L i n e t e x t s t h a t a t 5 l 0 c Socrates complains  about the students  of mathematics t h a t they f i r s t p o s t u l a t e the odd and the even and the v a r i o u s f i g u r e s [e.g., the square] and three kinds o f angles and other t h i n g s a k i n to these i n each branch o f s c i e n c e , r e g a r d then as known, and t r e a t i n g them as absolute assumptions ^ h y p o t h e s i s !, do n o t deign t o render any f u r t h e r account LlogosH o f them t o themselves or o t h e r s , t a k i n g i t f o r granted t h a t they are obvious t o everybody. They take t h e i r s t a r t from these, and p u r s u i n g the i n q u i r y from t h i s p o i n t on c o n s i s t e n t l y , conclude w i t h t h a t f o r the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f which they s e t o u t .  ^° R e p u b l i c 5l0c-d, 533c  t r a n s , by Shorey. C f . Republic  52  The complaint against the students of mathematics i s not that t h e i r "hypotheses" are f a l s e , non-existent or i n some other way incapable of being properly known but that the students too e a s i l y take them f o r granted and f a i l to investigate them.  As Socrates admits, these  students could avoid t h i s defect i f only they went "back to the beginning" i n t h e i r studies --- f o r the things themselves that these students study "are i n t e l l i g i b l e s when apprehended i n conjunction with a f i r s t p r i n ciple."  Unfortunately the "mental habit" of these  students i s such that they do not go "back to the beginning" but p e r s i s t i n r e l y i n g on what they f e e l i s obvious.  What, then, should these students do?  As i s  revealed especially at Republic 533» they must be taught to make use of the f a c u l t y of d i a l e c t i c .  For  dialectic i s the only process of inquiry that advances i n t h i s manner, doing away with hypotheses [.qua hypotheses], up to the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f [ i . e . the Good c f . 5 3 2 a - b ] i n order to f i n d confirmation there.  ^  Thus i t i s with the help of d i a l e c t i c that they could ^  Republic 5 l l d .  ^  Republic 533c-d, trans, by Shorey.  53 indeed "go back to the b e g i n n i n g " as r e q u i r e d and f o r the first  time apprehend t h e i r hypotheses  with a f i r s t p r i n c i p l e " .  " i n conjunction  D i a l e c t i c w i l l enable them  to r i s e to that which r e q u i r e s no assumption f h y p o t h e s i s ] and i s the s t a r t i n g p o i n t of a l l , and a f t e r a t t a i n i n g to that again t a k i n g h o l d of the f i r s t dependencies from i t , so to proceed downward to the c o n c l u s i o n [ i . e . the hypot h e s i s or e l s e something based on the h y p o t h e s i s ] , making no use whatever o f any o b j e c t o f sense but o n l y of pure i d e a s fForms] moving on through ideas to i d e a s and ending w i t h i d e a s .  ^  Once they have gone through t h i s "progress of they w i l l at l a s t  thought"  be able to g i v e a logos f o r the hypo-  t h e s i s and thus t h e i r "understanding" w i l l be i n t o true knowledge of s c i e n c e . " ^  "converted  They w i l l no l o n g e r  f a l l under the complaint t h a t they "do not deign to render any f u r t h e r l o g o s " ^ It  for their  hypotheses.  should be emphasized i n t h i s connection t h a t  the reason here that P l a t o complained  t h a t the  students  of mathematics d i d not have the " t r u e knowledge or s c i e n c e " which belongs o n l y to the h i g h e s t s e c t i o n of the  ^  Republic 5 l l h - c , t r a n s , by Shorey.  ^  Republic 5 3 3 c and c f . a l s o  ^  Republic  5l0c-d.  53kb.  Divided Line ^  was  that they did not bother to give a  logos f o r their hypotheses.  At the time he was writing  the Divided Line texts of the Republic, Plato had come to hold that being able to give a logos was condition f o r knowing.  The man who  a necessary  cannot give a logos,  " i n so f a r as he i s incapable of giving a logos to hims e l f and others, does not possess f u l l reason and ligence about the matter." ^ "understanding" was  intel-  The problem with the  of the students of mathematics, then,  that i t did not require the capacity to give such a  logos. ^ This much having been said, we can at l a s t begin to answer the questions, "what did Plato think h i s "hypotheses" were?"  and,  "how  did he think they could be  known rather than merely taken f o r granted?"  We  should  want to know, of course, whether he thought of them as objects (e.g. Forms) or propositions or both, and, correspondingly, whether he thought of the logoi  ^  necessary  Republic 5l0c-d.  ^ Republic 53i|-t>. Cf. also Republic 5l0c, 531e532a, 533b-d. Evidence of Plato's view that knowledge requires a logos can also be found at Phaedo 76b-c and Symposium 202a. 7  1 + 8  Cf. Republic 5l0c & 533b-d.  55 to t h e i r being known as being  d e f i n i t i o n s or p r o o f s  accounts or a l l these things  together.  In chapter X of h i s P l a t o ' s E a r l i e r Robinson claimed  or  Dialectic  t h a t " P l a t o here t r e a t s as hypotheses  c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s which the mathematicians they know, which they c o n s i d e r Without at a l l arguing  think  ' p l a i n to a l l . ' "  ^  f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n he goes on  to say t h a t " d i a l e c t i c , i n c o n t r a s t to mathematics, does not  take f o r granted c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s  that ought  50 to be merely h y p o t h e s i z e d . " ^ thesis" i s a conclusion  For Robinson the  that must be deduced from  p r o p o s i t i o n s and u l t i m a t e l y from the Good". [??3  a demonstration, i n which c o n c l u s i o n s  drawn from the anhypotheton axiom."  T h i s leads him  £ the GoodJ  other  "Plato  conceives of the downward p a t h as a p r o o f ,  deduction,  "hypo-  surely  a are  as from an  so f a r as to have P l a t o  think-  i n g not o n l y of the hypotheses but a l s o of the Good as 52 being  a p r o p o s i t i o n or perhaps a set of p r o p o s i t i o n s .  k9 ^ R. Robinson, "Hypothesis i n the R e p u b l i c " (Reprinted i n P l a t o I, ed.. V l a s t o s . New York; Doubleday and Co., 1 9 7 1 ) . p. lOlx w i t h my emphasis. 5  ^  0  2  I b i d . , p.  108.  I b i d . , p.  116.  I b i d . , pp.  110-111.  56 For Robinson, then, the hypotheses are p r o p o s i t i o n s the way  i n which they come to be known i s by  them from the Good.  and  deducing  Hence the logos necessary f o r t h i s  knowledge would be a deduction  or  proof.  Of course i f Robinson were r i g h t t h i s would more than prove my the KA  p o i n t that P l a t o had  c o n s c i o u s l y abandoned  only model of knowledge by the time he wrote  Republic.  Unfortunately  there are a number o f  difficulti  w i t h Robinson's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , some of which are brought out by R. M. Hare i n h i s " P l a t o and First theses  the Mathematicians."  there i s the f a c t t h a t the examples of hypo-  t h a t P l a t o g i v e s at Republic  5l0c are not  examples  of p r o p o s i t i o n s but of concepts o r , perhaps, Forms. are "the odd  and the even and  the squareJ  and  a k i n to  the v a r i o u s f i g u r e s  three kinds o f angles  and other  They  £e.g., things  these." Second there i s the f a c t that the f a c u l t y  of  d i a l e c t i c i s s a i d by P l a t o to make use not of p r o p o s i t i o n ! "but only o f pure i d e a s to i d e a s and  ["FormsJ  ending with i d e a s . " ^  moving on through i d e a s Now  presumably  R. M. Hare, " P l a t o and the Mathematicians" (In New Essays on P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e , ed. R. Bambrough. London; Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1965). ^  Republic  5llc.  57 somewhere end),  along  mind  i t s dialectic  encounters  out.  However,  movement  only  encounters  among  the  proposition  to  Plato  ideas  or  but  an  idea  and  Form  the  logos  Propositions, Only  things  hypotheses essences  would the  his  be  there  having  i s the  that  opinions  consistently  and  object  to  be  "seen"  it  an  axiom  55  Cf.  was  and  be  Plato's on  square  itself).  the  of  not  this,  a  then,  proofs  but  logos is  given  thing.  have  (or perhaps  or  set  of  essences. the being) definitions  i t simply  imagry  described  was  that the  nonetheless  axioms.  On  far  seems  divorced  although Good  really  as  he an  held  that  RobinsonJs  view i t  c f . Republic  53l+b,  5llb.  c i t . ,  p.  22 a n d  57 N o t e t h a t " l o g o s " c a n b e "proof"  that  the: m a t t e r  t h a t he  Republic  or  a  hypothesis  do  not  point  forcefully  56 H a r e , o p . "definition"  not  essences.  to h o l d  real  the  involves  mind  point  the  Given  would  when  the  i t set  journey  (ousia)  not  things  logoi  of  at  which  encounter  (e.g.,  essence are  from  then  i s Hare's  essences.  these  Finally ridiculous  the  however,  have  and  displaying  of  (perhaps  the  Forms,  i t must  or  this  says,  i s r e q u i r e d f o r knowledge  be  from  as  hypothesis  hypothesis,  Third that  xf  the  journey  depending  t r a n s l a t e d as e i t h e r on t h e c o n t e x t .  58 seems  that  did  Plato  had  held  surely that  i n describing was  that  Robinson  four  has ascribed  treats  what  does  Hare  has argued  treat  how  f o r Plato  view,  Plato  seems  this  reasons  ^  as Hare  requirement  t o o much  o f them  t o assume  con-  that  that  sort  (which  actually  elsewhere  that  Plato's  p p . 22-23,  E.g.,  a t Phaedo  99d  Hare,  op. c i t . , p.  f f . 23.  at  R.  M.  Line  5l0c  are capable exist). explaining  as t h i n g s ,  as p r o p o s i t i o n s . "  states  were  " i t requires  perhaps  However,  of the Divided they  of hypotheses  "Plato  Robinson,  says  op. c i t . ,  Hare,  conclude  Against  and which  realizes,  speak  Hare  o f some  59 ' 0  to the e f f e c t  certain propositions."  58  6  a hint  a s o p h i s t i c a t i o n not found  j u s t what he  and i n d e e d  t o speak  must  the "hypotheses"  defined  can here  we  to Plato  entities  properly  elsewhere, he  I f Plato  o f the opposite  as h y p o t h e s e s ?  that  mathematical  this  he  o r s e t o f axioms,  dropped  be c a u t i o u s  as h y p o t h e s e s  he  were  On  an axiom  I t i s simply  here  being  was  at least  should  these  the text.  of  i n which  o f the imagry.  For  texts  have  h i s reader  i n t h e way  deliberately misleading.  t h e Good  he would  notations  in  being  t h e Good  i n the To  whereas Republic, answer  conception  59 of  knowledge  was KP  was  gradually model  moving  was  thought  i s an  matter.  conception this  i s precisely  whereas  Hare  i s necessary  he  had  model  Thus  as  and  actually  i t stands Sitting  Taylor's Professor  judgement  "Plato  and  Hare's  claim  Hare's  that  that  embarked  Views."  own  on  Hare's  of  Robinson's  they  Plato's  and transition  sometime left  before  the  KA  transition.  i s weak.  article  are.  that  the  transition,  had  An  takes  the hypotheses are not that  noted,  views on  of the  this  Taylor  have  proved,  Plato  explanation on  will  indeed  the Mathematicians:  e n d e a v o r s t o show  defending  my  t o be  i t was  i n one  i s Hare's  the d e t a i l s  that  of  to  sometimes  merely states  needs  about  t o show  then  with  a  not been completed,  i s i n a process  completed the Republic  only  and  Hare  what most  i s vague  it  Hare's  whereas  thing  he  to  the o b j e c t  the reader  i n harmony  o f knowledge  had  o f knowledge  F u r t h e r m o r e , as  However,  from a  This  In fact  o f knowledge  f o r Plato  the change  i n another.  explanation  model  changing  of the object  explanation. it  Hence  Because  sometimes  of transition.  f r o m a KA  gradually  proposition.  way,  state  o f knowledge.  knowledge  he  i n a  i s C.  C.  W.  Examination exception  of  to  propositions  In fact,  Taylor  i s  position.  C. C. W. T a y l o r , " P l a t o a n d t h e An E x a m i n a t i o n o f P r o f e s s o r . H a r e ' s V i e w s " Q u a r t e r l y 17 ( 1 9 6 7 ) p p . 1 9 3 - 2 0 3 .  Mathematicians: (In Philosophical  60 Opening the  meaning  argues to  sort  that  Medicine  author  most  refers  However, he admits  from  mean  on  "postulated  as e x i s t i n g ) .  a treatise  On  Further-  Ancient  i s used i n  undifferentiatedly.  In other  words, t h e  from  as capable  of being  and  postulated  entities.  hypotheses  passage  the word  the word  o f the passage  concludes  o f the time  Taylor  as he argues,  ing  of  s e c t i o n on  f o r "hypothesis".  postulated  a passage  i n which,  senses  word  i t c a n sometimes  (i.e. entity  more he q u o t e s  both  that  i s a valuable  of proposition.  behalf  entity"  paper  o f the Greek  vigorously  some  Hare's  Taylor's  that  that  On A n c i e n t  "hypotheses"  Plato  With gives  be r e g a r d e d  both  regard  i s treat-  propositions  t o t h e examples  a t 5l0c,  t h e use o f t h e word  "should  Medicine  then,  Taylor  "hypotheses"  i n that  as an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d use  6? similiar is  to that  i n effect  that  both  arguing  (at least  hypotheses  i n On A n c i e n t  i n this  under  next  undermining  passage)  Plato  assumed"  Thus  my  own  thought that  and " e n t i t i e s  section of Taylor's  Hare's  Ibid.,  i s i n fact  a d i s j u n c t i v e concept  "propositions The  on what  Medicine."  paper  behalf o f the  included  postulated". i s devoted  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Republic  p. 196  Taylor  533b-c.  to I  61 have not mentioned this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and (especially i f Taylor i s right) there i s no need to.  However, to  get to the crux of Taylor's paper, we turn to page 198 where he asks, "on the t r a d i t i o n a l assumption that the hypotheses of the Republic ositions are they?" ^3  are propositions, what prop-  He proceeds to argue that they  are propositions of the form: "the square e x i s t s " ; "the three kinds of angles e x i s t " ; etc. and also propositions defining the square, the three kinds of angles, etc.  On  this view, then, the mathematicians are being accused by Plato of not proving the existence of their objectsv,and, curiously, of not proving the truth of their d e f i n i t i o n s . However, a l l this i s on the assumption that the hypotheses of the Republic  are propositions.  And  although  Taylor has argued that these hypotheses are not  simply  things, he nowhere argues against the p o s s i b i l i t y that they were i n Plato's mind either things (of a special sort) or propositions (of some kind).  This p o s s i b i l i t y  i s l e f t wide open. Where then does the Robinson^Hare-Taylor debate leave us?  Ibid., p.  198  - Ibid., p.  199  DJ5  6ij  F i r s t l y we s t i l l cannot, as Robinson and  Taylo  62 do, merely assume t h a t the hypotheses are n o t h i n g than p r o p o s i t i o n s .  Besides  other  the f o u r as yet unanswered 56-58)  d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h i s assumption g i v e n above (pp. there i s now  the a d d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n that the Greek  word f o r " h y p o t h e s i s "  c o u l d be used u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d l y .  Secondly we would f i n d i t very d i f f i c u l t  to h o l d , as Hare  does, that the hypotheses are simply o b j e c t s . the f a c t that the word " h y p o t h e s i s " has  Besides  s t r o n g con-  n o t a t i o n s to the c o n t r a r y there i s a l s o another f a c t that f o r P l a t o the knowledge of these hypotheses r e q u i r e d knowledge about t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p with the Good.  How-  ever, knowledge about t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Good i s not  simple  acquaintance:  i t i s p r o p o s i t i o n a l . Yet, i f  as Hare says, the hypotheses were f o r P l a t o simply it  is difficult  to see why  he i n t r o d u c e d such new  e l a b o r a t e methods f o r knowing them r a t h e r than saying t h a t they c o u l d be for  objects, and  simply  "seen" or " r e c o l l e c t e d " .  Why,  i n s t a n c e , does P l a t o e x u l t that the p h i l o s o p h e r  does  /  not merely "see"  the o b j e c t s of knowledge but  t h i n g s i n t h e i r connection"?  ^  Why  "views  does P l a t o  such enthusiasm i n the f a c t t h a t the d i a l e c t i c teaches the p h i l o s o p h e r Republic  537c.  about the hypotheses  take journey  their  63 " r e l a t i o n and reference to the Good"? ^6  a  nswer to  these questions must be to the effect that Plato i s now handling the objects of knowledge i n a way that i s suited at least as much to propositions as to things. In the end, then, we f i n d ourselves uneasy about agreeing with Robinson and Taylor and we also f i n d ourselves uneasy about agreeing with Hare. A l l uneasiness could be d i s p e l l e d , however, and a l l d i f f i c u l t i e s met i f only we held that Plato thought of his hypotheses under a disjunctive concept and that, i n harmony with t h i s , he described the epistemology of the Divided Line generally i n such a way as could accomodate both things and propositions as objects of knowledge, i n other words, as could accomodate both KA and KP.  Under this interpretation, f o r example, the  logos necessary f o r knowledge of the hypothesis sometimes be a d e f i n i t i o n  could  as required by the fact  that at Republic 534-° i t i s said to be the logos of an essence  or i t could also be a proof of some sort  as seems to be required by the fact that the d i a l e c t i c journey involves various interconnections and i s thus deductive i n nature.  Republic  To make this move, moreover, we  506a.  64 would  n o t have  clear  about  to hold  this  that  matter  h e was now  it.  We  been  f o r c i n g a l l knowledge  in  the Republic  would  call  capable my  own  from  Plato  that  but also  We  belief  we,  only  turn  would  o f the objects  propositions,  what  presupposed  mould, we  that  This  Plato)  one  then  will  c a n come n o t  be  only  the Robinson-Hare-Taylor by Montgomery F u r t h  article  f o r just  i s the passage o f knowledge  "faculties"  o f knowledge  as b e i n g  either things  F o r whatever he h o l d s  them  n  476e-  Plato  the objects  knowledge  i s whether  ^7 j .  moment.  i n which  from  that  a  and  or " a b i l i t i e s " .  t o know  o r as being  here  (but not  o f knowledge", o r KP.  o f the fact  want  that  simply  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to Republic  to this  the objects  only  f o r which  an a r t i c l e  476e-480a  are different  ositions.  What  Plato only  con-  things,  or prop-  t o be h e r e  he  will  Montgomery F u r t h , "Elements o f E l e a t i c O n t o l o g y " The P r e - S o c r a t i c s ) p p . 2kl-2k7, e s p e c i a l l y p . 245. 6  (In  from  on the b a s i s  o f course,  ceives  advancing  i t resolves  are but  i n a way  a KA  e i t h e r KA  a similar  shall  distinguishes  belief  was  we  entirely  i n t h e Charmides he h a d  into  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n support  Republic  of  whereas  o f accomodating  which he g i v e s  480a.  that  that  knowledge  a "disjunctive analysis  the f a c t  debate  handling  hold  was h i m s e l f  i n t h e way  that  could  Plato  7  65 probably not  hold  too  far  connection either under and  them  away. with  things what  or  Furth  of  that  i s or  Furth  the  be  Now  this  propositions  asks  to  in  the  Divided  precisely  passage  is  propositions, calls  a  what that  that  "fused"  of  i s not?"  they  argues  are  in  they  ii76e  at  in  fact  embracing  "is i t  Glaucon  passages  for Plato  When  knowledge, and  Furth  notion  disjunctively.  object  Line  fell things  Socrates  something  replies,  "that i s " ,  comments:  Glaucon's assent i s e n t i r e l y reasonable; for the p r i n c i p l e i s none o t h e r t h a n the fused f o r m o f t h e two t h e s e s , a x i o m a t i c f o r k n o w ledge [ KA.] and knowledge [ K P ] on any account, a p t h a t n e c e s s a r i l y i f s o m e t h i n g i s known , t h e n i t e x i s t s , and t h a t n e c e s s a r i l y i f s o m e t h i n g i s known , t h e n i t i s t h e c a s e o r o b t a i n s . Thus the t r u i s m thus: (6a) is t  Hence,  h  Necessarily, k n o w n , i s (= e  c a s e  just  texts,  Glaucon  accepts  (= I  that so  want are  Furth  to  knowledge  at  objects  of  knowledge  are  p.  of  maintains  of  Ibid.,  maintain  objects  objects  2i|5.  the  can  be  split  (6b) Necessarily, i s known,.is  what is  >> as  "hypotheses" Line  which  end  either  exists).  with  of  in  respect Book  things  8  respect  knowledge  with  6  V, or  what  to the  to that  the Divided  the these  propositions  66 and it  the knowledge o f them i s e i t h e r KA or KP.  Of course  i s not true t h a t P l a t o would have seen i t j u s t  way  this  he would have c o n s i d e r e d h i m s e l f to be d e a l i n g  w i t h knowledge g e n e r a l l y and would not have thought that he was e i t h e r i n c l u d i n g or o m i t t i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n ween two s o r t s o f knowledge what was going on.  bet-  but i n e f f e c t t h i s i s  On Furth's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n P l a t o has  what a t l e a s t we would c a l l a " f u s e d " o r d i s j u n c t i v e  69 a n a l y s i s of knowledge.  And t h i s i s e x a c t l y what I  want to m a i n t a i n w i t h r e s p e c t to the D i v i d e d L i n e t e x t s . My p o s i t i o n , f i n a l l y , i s t h i s : f i r s t l y t h a t P l a t o thought o f the D i v i d e d L i n e hypotheses under a d i s j u n c t i v e concept i n c l u d i n g both o b j e c t s and propositions.  T h i s p a r t o f my p o s i t i o n i s v i n d i c a t e d i n the  f o l l o w i n g ways: ( 1 ) i t can accept theses" a t 5 l 0 c  at f a c e value;  the examples o f "hypo-  ( 2 ) i t can allow f o r the  f a c t that mind i s d e s c r i b e d as moving on i t s d i a l e c t i c journey  from i d e a [FormJ to i d e a and not from, say,  statement to statement; ( 3 ) i t allows the hypotheses sometimes to have ( o r be) d e f i n a b l e essences as r e q u i r e d by Republic  534b;  (ix) i t allows the Good to be a Form  r a t h e r than a s e t o f axioms ( a l b e i t a Form i n v i r t u e o f The same c o n c l u s i o n i s reached by G o s l i n g . C f . J . C. B. G o s l i n g , P l a t o (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1973) PP. 1 2 9 - 1 3 2 .  67 which not just Forms but also propositions can be known); (5) i t accords p e r f e c t l y with the fact of the undifferentiated use of the word "hypothesis"; (6)  i t explains  why Plato develops a quasi-deductive " d i a l e c t i c journey" rather than sticking to the simple model of knowing as "seeing"; (7)  i t explains why Plato s t i l l uses v i s u a l  imagry f o r knowing  even though on i t s own this v i s u a l  imagry i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r what he wants to say; (8) i t accords with Furth s interpretation of another related 1  passage also i n the Republic; (9) i n doing a l l the above i t makes a d e f i n i t e advance over the Robinson-Hare-Taylor debate.  From t h i s i t i s clear that the hypotheses are  indeed either things (e.g. Forms) or propositions (e.g. definitions). The second part of my p o s i t i o n follows immediately from the f i r s t part.  Insofar as the hypotheses  were f o r  Plato objects, the logos necessary to their being known was f o r Plato a d e f i n i t i o n of some kind; insofar as the hypotheses were f o r Plato propositions, the logos necessary to their being known was' for Plato a deduction of ?  some kind.  Thus just as he viewed the hypotheses under a  disjunctive concept so he viewed the logoi under a d i s junctive concept.  S i m i l a r l y , of course, he conceived of  knowledge under a disjunctive concept: insofar as the  68 hypotheses were things and the l o g o i were d e f i n i t i o n s the knowledge of these hypotheses was by KA;  insofar as  the hypotheses were propositions and the l o g o i were deductions the knowledge of these hypotheses was KP.  To  put i t i n other words Plato was handling what he thought was  a single thing c a l l e d "knowledge" but i n a way  was  appropriate to the fact that, as we know, this  "knowledge" consists of two disjuncts, KA and KP. just as the Divided Line model of knowledge was  that  Thus  able to  accomodate both things and propositions as objects of knowledge so i t was  able to accomodate both KA and  KP.  Hence whereas before Plato had been e n t i r e l y closed to the p o s s i b i l i t y of KP and he had t r i e d to subject a l l cases of knowing to h i s a l l K i s KA forcing them into a KA mould, now  presupposition,  Plato has loosened  up  and i s allowing into h i s epistemology the propositions, i n t e r r e l a t i o n s , etc. that are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of KP.  He  i s no longer thinking about knowledge solely i n v i s u a l terms: he has now  added to h i s account and imagry of  knowledge a d i a l e c t i c journey that involves mapping out "dependencies", "connections"  and " r e l a t i o n s " . Indeed  as Runciman would want to say only about the described i n the Sophist,  philosopher  we would say of the  philosopher described i n the Republic,  that "the  69 p h i l o s o p h e r i s now concerned correlation".  l e s s w i t h contemplation  than  ^  We can a l s o see t h e t r u t h o f t h i s i n some o t h e r ways as w e l l .  F o r one t h i n g , r e g a r d l e s s o f the s t a t u s o f  the hypotheses i t seems t h a t the l o g o s w h i c h t h e s t u d e n t s o f mathematics are l a c k i n g i s some account  or expression  o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p ("R") o f the hypotheses and the Good whereby the former i s known.  Indeed even i f the l o g o s  were a mere d e f i n i t i o n o f some e n t i t y i t would seem t h a t i t would have t o c o n t a i n a r e f e r e n c e t o the Good.  Thus  i n knowing the h y p o t h e s i s one w i l l know i t ajj i t i s r e l a t e d i n some way R t o the Good.  Now as we n o t e d i n  the f i r s t c h a p t e r , "knowledge a s " i s a s o r t o f knowledge not y e t p r o p e r l y understood.  Thus i n a case l i k e  this  i t might t u r n o u t t o i n v o l v e n o t h i n g more than KA o f , s a y , the s e t whose t h r e e members a r e the h y p o t h e s i s , the Good and R.  However, i t a t l e a s t seems much more p l a u s i b l e  to h o l d t h a t knowing an h y p o t h e s i s _as i t i s r e l a t e d i n way R t o the Good i s j u s t knowing t h a t the h y p o t h e s i s i s r e l a t e d i n way R t o t h e Good.  And i f s o , P l a t o has  c e r t a i n l y accomodated KP i n the D i v i d e d L i n e  epistemology.  U n f o r t u n a t e l y , o f c o u r s e , we do n o t o u r s e l v e s have a c l e a r  Runciman, op. c i t . , p. 129 (my  emphasis).  70 i d e a o f what i s going on i n cases of "knowledge  as".  However, as another p o i n t , t h i s time c l e a r l y i n our favour,  there  t e x t s P l a t o has PWTL.  As we  of these two  i s the f a c t that i n the D i v i d e d  i m p l i c i t l y r e j e c t e d PKab and,  saw  i n the p r e v i o u s  presuppositions  was  chapter the  a  Line  fortiori,  influence  a b a r r i e r to P l a t o ' s  making any progress towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n . f a c t , then, that they do not Divided Line texts provides conclusion has  exert t h e i r i n f l u e n c e i n the some c o r r o b o r a t i o n f o r  j u s t above that here i n the Republic  a l r e a d y made some progress towards that Suppose then t h a t the Good can be  as " t h a t which i s r e l a t e d i n way to "the use  square e x i s t s " ) " .  but  distinction.  to the square (or  Then someone can know how  can a l s o know how  to use  t r a v e l l e d the d i a l e c t i c  no means know that these two  R'  to  to  the  the word "good"  journey he w i l l  t h i n g s are one  and  impressed i t s e l f on P l a t o .  i s q u i t e an outstanding  and  D i v i d e d L i n e epistemology that  general  by  the same.  have, t h e r e f o r e , a counterexample to PKab and  no doubt i n some way it  Plato  as i s very c l e a r from the D i v i d e d L i n e passages,  unless he has  We  R'  our  characterized  the words " t h a t which i s r e l a t e d i n way  square" and he  The  f e a t u r e of  one  that  Indeed the  interrelationships•among  things are hard to l e a r n about, that i n f a c t knowledge i s  71 not e a s i l y acquired as PKab would imply i t was e a s i l y acquired.  I t i s not at a l l enough simply to look at  the word "good" i n order to "see" the Good i t s e l f .  The  Divided Line passages, on the contrary, open the doors to the f a c t of the " r e f e r e n t i a l opacity" of knowledge. The all-embracing transparency  implied by PKab and,  ultimately, by PV/TL i s v i r t u a l l y dead: i f we see any further traces of these presuppositions we s h a l l see Plato not wrestling with l i v i n g creatures so much as digging out f o s s i l s .  72  CONCLUSION  In a sense t h i s t h e s i s has a l r e a d y been concluded. Our  a n a l y s i s o f the hypotheses i n the D i v i d e d L i n e  has made i t q u i t e c l e a r that even i n Republic  texts  Plato  had progressed beyond the KA o n l y model o f knowledge. Furthermore i t c o u l d e a s i l y be shown that from then on P l a t o ' s epistemology c o n s i s t e n t l y accounted f o r the f a c t t h a t knowledge sometimes i n v o l v e s p r o p o s i t i o n a l elements such as i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . F o r as the reader i s no doubt aware p r o p o s i t i o n a l f a c t o r s such as i n t e r r e l a t i o n ships are e s s e n t i a l to the d i a i r e s i s h i e r a r c h i e s that are i n t r o d u c e d  i n the Phaedrus, and these d i a i r e s i s  h i e r a r c h i e s occupy the centre o f the l a t e r P l a t o ' s i n g on knowledge.  Indeed, i f space p e r m i t t e d  think-  i t could  even be shown that P l a t o regarded the making o f d i a i r e s i s h i e r a r c h i e s as a d i a l e c t i c a l a c t i v i t y and one that was i n many ways foreshadowed by the d i a l e c t i c a l  activity  71 i n the D i v i d e d L i n e passages. Now while the reader w i l l h o p e f u l l y accept a l l t h i s , I can e a s i l y imagine that before he g i v e s h i s T h i s c l a i m i s adopted and defended by J u l i u s S t e n z e l i n . h i s P l a t o ' s Method o f D i a l e c t i c , t r a n s , and ed. by D. J . A l l a n (New. York: Arno Press, 1973). C f . a l s o J . M. E..Moravcsik, "The Anatomy o f P l a t o ! s D i v i s i o n s " ( I n Exegesis and Argument).  73  wholehearted assent  to my c o n c l u s i o n s , t h a t he would  l i k e to know what i t was t h a t induced Runciman to c l a i m otherwise.  I n p a r t i c u l a r , what i n the Theaetetus l e d  Runciman to say t h a t "the g e n e r a l impression the Theaetetus i s that P l a t o continued  l e f t by  to t h i n k o f know72  ledge course  as a s o r t o f mental seeing o r touching"? the reader w i l l  Of  .  a l s o want to know some good  reasons why I t h i n k t h a t Runciman s impression was" 1  unfounded, why I t h i n k t h a t he should t h e r e f o r e have concluded  t h a t P l a t o broke w i t h the KA only model not  a f t e r w r i t i n g the Theaetetus but b e f o r e . The  Theaetetus c o n t a i n s three  attempts to d e f i n e knowledge.  unsuccessful  The f i r s t  o f these  i s an attempt to d e f i n e knowledge as p e r c e p t i o n . as i s c l e a r from our f i r s t  attempts However,  chapter, p e r c e p t i o n i s simply  what we c a l l e d "immediate apprehension" o f the t h i n g p e r c e i v e d and as such i t i s a a s p e c i a l s o r t o f KA.  Thus  i n r e j e c t i n g as he does the view that knowledge i s perc e p t i o n , P l a t o i s r e j e c t i n g a c e r t a i n KA only modeil o f knowledge.  Thus i n t h a t p a r t o f the Theaetetus where  t h i s p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n o f knowledge i s being d i s c u s s e d , i t would be a l i t t l e s u r p r i s i n g i f we c o u l d ' p. 5 2 .  Runciman, P l a t o ' s L a t e r Epistemology, op. c i t . ,  7i| f i n d evidence there t h a t a l l K i s KA.  t h a t P l a t o was s t i l l We  should  presupposing  r a t h e r expect t o f i n d  evidence t h a t he was prepared to say t h a t some knowledge was not KA.  I t i s most i n t r i g u i n g ,  f i r s t passage that Runciman c i t e s ascription cisely  t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the  i n support of h i s  o f a KA onlyonodel to P l a t o comes from pre-  this  s e c t i o n of the Theaetetus.  very climax o f P l a t o ' s argument a g a i n s t perception "offers  In f a c t  i t i s the  the knowledge i s  t h e s i s ( t h i s a t l 8 l i b - l 8 7 a ) t h a t Runciman says  clear  evidence that P l a t o does not d i s t i n g u i s h  between i n t e l l e c t u a l knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance."  7  3  Of course to say that P l a t o does not  " d i s t i n g u i s h " KP from KA might j u s t mean that P l a t o d i d not  e x p l i c i t l y formulate j u s t  that d i s t i n c t i o n  those words, and i n t h a t case I would agree.  i n just However, i t  seems f a i r l y l i k e l y that Runciman's c o n c l u s i o n d i d not " d i s t i n g u i s h " between KP and KA was i n g i v i n g r i s e to h i s "general  impression"  that Plato  influential that  Plato  d i d not even allow f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a distinction.  I n any case, i f we could, i t would be good  to show on our own b e h a l f  that the passage i n q u e s t i o n  should by a l l r i g h t s give r i s e  Ibid.,  pp. 15-16.  to the c o n t r a r y  "general  75  impression" that Plato was allowing f o r a KP/KA distinction. The passage i n question ( l 8 k b - l 8 7 a )  i s the passage  i n which Socrates claims that we must have a mind over and above our senses.  This i s f o r two reasons: f i r s t  because we do make judgements which relate sense data peculiar to two or more senses and which therefore could not  be made by just one of these senses but only by some  f a c u l t y which serves as a meeting point f o r t h e i r sense data, this faculty being the mind ( l 8 5 a - b ) j and second because we do "contemplate" certain "common terms" such as existence and difference that, being intangible, cannot be "contemplated" through the senses and which must therefore be "contemplated" through some other f a c u l t y , namely, as i t turns out, the mind ( l 8 5 b - e ) . (Note that the mind does not merely "contemplate" these intangibles but as i n the case of the sense data, i t makes judgements r e l a t i n g them ( l 8 6 a - b , 187a) .) Granted 1  his  claim that we do have minds answering these descriptions,  Socrates then points out that f o r corresponding reasons, knowledge cannot be perception: f i r s t because "knowledge i s not i n the sensations but i n the process of reasoning about them ( l 8 6 d ) " ; and second because we cani have knowledge of the intangibles although we cannot perceive them  76 (l86e).  In other  because  whereas  not extend  solely  knowledge  doesj  conclusion  the  with  that  "common  Runciman  this  argument  and t h e r e f o r e  "contemplating"  by  considerations  to  Plato's  Runciman  do n o t i n c l u d e  on t h e f a c t  "contemplating"  sensations  cannot  statement  that  but i n the process  tolithis  argument with  passage  the mind  According  i s the crux  "knowledge  does.  t a l k s about ^  about  perceptions  knowledge  terms".  only  perception  judgements  respect  Plato  the whole  concerned  be  a n d (2)  t o i n t a n g i b l e s whereas  Runciman's rests  knowledge  (1) p e r c e p t i o n s  sensations do  words  to  o f the whole i s dominated  KA.  With  respect  i s not i n the  of reasoning  about  them"  comments  t h i s i s , o f c o u r s e , t r u e ; and i t amounts t o a v i r t u a l statement t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l knowledge is propositional. But t h i s i s n o t , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , the  point  But  why  i s this  For  Plato  just there of  once  Plato  wishes  not "the point  certainly  takes  but several  a r e knowledge  this  that  that  he  ^ 7  ^  Ibid. Ibid.  i s perception,  care talks  .judgements.  r e f u t a t i o n Theaetetus  knowledge  that  great  times  t o make. Plato  wishes  t o make about  Indeed  withdraws there  ^ t o make"?  i t and n o t  the fact  when  that  i n the face  h i s contention  i s no q u e s t i o n  of  77 h i s t r y i n g out the t h e s i s t h a t knowledge i s "contemplation" - —  <  r a t h e r he goes s t r a i g h t on i n t o  defending the t h e s i s t h a t i t i s true judgement and l a t t e r t h e s i s i m p l i e s that i t i s p r o p o s i t i o n a l .  this  Further-  more even i f the f a c t that " i n t e l l e c t u a l knowledge i s p r o p o s i t i o n a l " was  not  the p o i n t that P l a t o wished to  make, s t i l l he d i d a c t u a l l y make i t and Runciman s own 1  thus on  admission, the t r u t h o f i t must  have c r o s s e d P l a t o ' s mind and  therefore  i f that were so P l a t o  c e r t a i n l y r e a l i z e d that some cases o f knowledge were not cases of acquaintance. P l a t o " d i s t i n g u i s h e d " KP not,  Thus, r e g a r d l e s s  of whether  and KA here, he was  certainly  as even Runciman i n the end would have to agree,  continuing  "to t h i n k of knowledge as a s o r t o f mental  seeing or touching." "general  impression"  that P l a t o had We  7  ^  Thus even f o r Runciman the  l e f t by t h i s passage ought to  abandoned any  KA.  have j u s t seen t h a t the f i r s t passage t h a t  Runciman c i t e s i n connection " P l a t o continued  with h i s contention  that  to t h i n k of knowledge as a s o r t of mental  seeing or touching" tention.  view that a l l K i s  be  does not i n f a c t support t h i s con-  What other passages, then, does Runciman o f f e r  I b i d . , p.  52  78  in  support o f h i s p o s i t i o n ?  As a b a s i s f o r f u r t h e r  e v i d e n c e Runciman p o i n t s f i r s t t o the argument a t l 8 8 a - c 77  w h i c h opens the d i s c u s s i o n o f f a l s e judgement  1  and  then t o t h e whole s e c t i o n (from 188 t o 2 0 0 ) i n w h i c h the problem o f f a l s e judgement i s d i s c u s s e d .  7 8  According  to Runciman t h i s whole s e c t i o n presupposes what he would c a l l the " a s s i m i l a t i o n  o f a l l t y p e s o f knowledge t o know79  l e d g e by a c q u a i n t a n c e . "  1 7  F u r t h e r m o r e , i f we e x c e p t a  v e r y b r i e f and c o m p l e t e l y u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d remark i n conn e c t i o n w i t h the famous "Dream", the s e c t i o n on f a l s e judgement i s the o n l y passage o t h e r than l 8 l j . b - l 8 7 a t h a t Runciman c i t e s as e v i d e n c e f o r h i s v i e w .  (The remark i n  c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e Dream o c c u r s i n a p a r a g r a p h where Runciman p o i n t s o u t t h a t knowing by a c q u a i n t a n c e l e t t e r s or n o t e s i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m knowing "whether something i s true or f a l s e " .  Runciman makes t h e u n j u s t i f i e d  comment: "but P l a t o ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e 'dream' makes 8o c l e a r h i s unawareness o f the d i f f e r e n c e " . out  Then, w i t h -  f u r t h e r comment, Runciman p r o c e e d s t o d i s c u s s a I b i d . , p. 2 9 . 7  7  7  8  7  9  8  0  I b i d . , p. 3iV I b i d . , p. 52. I b i d . , p.  Ir5»  79 passage i n the Sophist.)  Thus i f we can show t h a t the  s e c t i o n on f a l s e judgement does not i n f a c t imply t h a t P l a t o was m a i n t a i n i n g the " a s s i m i l a t i o n " of which he i s accused,  then we w i l l have undermined the o n l y support  f o r Runciman's making t h i s a c c u s a t i o n .  left  We w i l l have shown  that there i s n o t h i n g from Runciman that should stop us from a c c e p t i n g the c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t were reached i n the last  chapter. Let us f i r s t look at the argument at l 8 8 a - c which  Runciman s p e c i f i c a l l y c i t e s i n h i s f a v o u r .  Does i t r e a l l y  depend on a " c o n f u s i o n of knowledge t h a t and knowledge by •  acquaintance"  AT  as Runciman says or does i t ,  on the  c o n t r a r y , allow f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t some cases of knowledge are not cases of KA?  The argument, as the reader  w i l l r e c a l l , i s designed to prove assumptions,  that given c e r t a i n  f a l s e judgement i s i m p o s s i b l e .  These  assumptions are q u i t e e x p l i c i t l y l a i d out: (1) f a l s e  judge-  ment i s n o t h i n g more or l e s s than the m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of two t h i n g s both o f which can be known by KA; and (2)  cases  of becoming acquainted with these t h i n g s or f o r g e t t i n g them are to be d i s c o u n t e d .  Given these assumptions there  are f o u r p o s s i b l e cases i n which a f a l s e judgement might be made:  the case i n which the judger knows by I b i d . , p. 29  KA  80 each of the t h i n g s he m i s i d e n t i f i e s ;  the c a s e ' i n which  he knows by KA n e i t h e r of these t h i n g s ; the case i n which he knows the f i r s t  t h i n g by KA but not the  and the case i n which he knows the second but not the f i r s t .  second;  t h i n g by  KA  The main p a r t of the argument at  l88a-c simply sees Socrates and Theaetetus  look at each  of these f o u r p o s s i b i l i t i e s and d i s c o u n t i t .  They con-  clude t h e r e f o r e t h a t there are no p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r making a f a l s e  judgement.  Of course, as the reader i s  a l s o aware, Socrates and Theaetetus  were wrong i n every  case: someone c o u l d e a s i l y make the mistake ing,  of i d e n t i f y -  say, the Russian spy and the Mathematics p r o f e s s o r  and r e g a r d l e s s of whether he was n e i t h e r , or $ust one o f them. and Theaetetus  How,  come to be wrong?  f i r s t possibility for false knows both t h i n g s by KA,  acquainted w i t h both, then, d i d S o c r a t e s  With r e s p e c t to the  judgement, where the  judger  the t e x t makes i t q u i t e c l e a r  that they d i s c o u n t t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y on the b a s i s of an assumption  to the e f f e c t t h a t a l l knowledge i s  r e f e r e n t i a l l y transparent. who  t h i n k s what i s f a l s e  Socrates asks, " i s the  man  supposing t h a t t h i n g s he knows  are not those t h i n g s but other t h i n g s he knows, so t h a t , while he knows both, he f a i l s Theaetetus  r e p l i e s , "no,  to r e c o g n i z e e i t h e r ?  11  that i s impossible, Socrates".  81 C l e a r l y S o c r a t e s ' q u e s t i o n c o n t a i n s an i m p l i c i t  rejection  of the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t knowledge be opaque and c l e a r l y it  i s i n a c c e p t i n g t h i s i m p l i c i t r e j e c t i o n that Theaetetus  agrees w i t h S o c r a t e s .  With r e s p e c t to the other  p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r f a l s e judgement, the t e x t makes i t e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t these are d i s c o u n t e d on the b a s i s o f an assumption that one cannot make any judgements about t h i n g s w i t h which one i s n o t acquainted. the argument from l88a-c.  Does i t support  T h i s then i s Runciman's  Op  conclusions? I t c e r t a i n l y presupposes t h a t we cannot have KP that one t h i n g i s the same as another  t h i n g u n l e s s we  are acquainted w i t h both t h i n g s and i t a l s o presupposes that t h i s KP i s r e f e r e n t i a l l y t r a n s p a r e n t . furthermore  Presuming  t h a t l i k e f a l s e judgement, true judgement  (which e i t h e r i s o r goes i n t o knowledge) i s simply an attempt t o i d e n t i f y two t h i n g s , the argument a t l88a-c i s i n e f f e c t a l s o presupposing  t h a t a l l KP reduces to  knowledge o f the s o r t that a i s a, where a i s known by KA.  Needless t o say, KA i s here making heavy i n c u r s i o n s  i n t o the t e r r i t o r y o f KP.  However, as Runciman seems  A. E."".Taylor s t u d i e d the argument a t l88a-c i n the l i g h t o f . t h e KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i n h i s P l a t o ; the Man and H i s Work (Frome. and London: Methuen & Co., 1926) pp. 339-34-1 *d 347-348. T a y l o r ' s c o n c l u s i o n s agree w i t h mine. ar  82 to  have  ment  forgotten, the f a c t  i s not simply  judgement, truth But  dealing with  and a judgement  of a relation,  judgements  place  supposing  what  a l l types  failure.  KA,  The argument  i t nowhere  single thing that  other  Hence  than  there  i s a  judgement  argument  does n o t support  model  this  than  find  simply o f KP.  of  be  pre-  assimilation  the a s s i m i l a t i o n does  was  other  itself  that  Runciman's  does  as i t  be  o f some  single  judgement itself,  but  a  Thus t h e  contention.  committed  argument  by  o f some  assert  o f KP.  on f a l s e h o o d  i t even l e s s  particular  than  a  accomodate  As much  apprehension"  i s a feature only  f a r as the s e c t i o n we  bad  apprehension"  to nothing  and t h i s  concerned,  no  i f this  i n v o l v e d and i n the g i v e n  relation  As  have  i t must  t h e judgement  an "immediate  thing i s related  nonetheless  that  The " i m m e d i a t e  i s certainly  identity.  o f a l l types  a very  i n question type  of  a  the  t h e c o n s t i t u e n t s o f the judgement  insists  thing.  t o KA:  of a certain  about knowing  nothing  model.  be c a l l e d  o f knowledge  argu-  but with  precisely,  by a c q u a i n t a n c e " ,  can only  possibility  talks  the r e l a t i o n  p r e s u p p o s e s an " a s s i m i l a t i o n t o knowledge  the  only  the  attempts to assert  and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s ,  knowledge  of  remains that  acquaintance  which  i f only  w h a t s o e v e r i n a KA  argument  still  generally i s t o a KA  i n i t .  only  F o r example  83  at 192c-d Socrates has retracted h i s assertion that one cannot misidentify two things with both of which one i s acquainted, and he now says: "Take things you know. You can suppose them to be other things which you ... know". He thus correctly denies what i s i n effect the r e f e r e n t i a l transparency e a r l i e r ascribed to judgement making.  Hence insofar as he understand that judgement  making i s essential to some cases of knowledge ( i . e . cases of KP), Socrates understands  that these cases of knowledge  preclude the feature of the s u b s t i t u t i v i t y of i d e n t i c a l s , the feature i n other words, of transparency. We can come to the same conclusion i f we consider for a moment Socrates' treatment of the example of misi d e n t i f y i n g 5 + 7 and 11.  8  3  For although he f a i l s to  give a good explanation of t h i s m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , he i s nonetheless quite aware that i t i s possible and he i s furthermore aware that this means that i t i s possible to misidentify two things both of which are known by KA ( c f . 196b-c), and hence he must be aware that some sorts of knowing, such as knowing that one number equals another, are not transparent.  On a KA only model of knowledge,  however, a l l knowledge i s transparent.  Cf. Theaetetus 195e f f  Precisely, then,  84 Socrates  i s not working w i t h a KA  only model of know-  ledge. Hence, on the whole, the passage on f a l s e  judge-  ment does not seem to presuppose t h a t a l l K i s KA.  It  cannot simply be d e s c r i b e d as " c o n f u s i n g " KP w i t h KA " a s s i m i l a t i n g " KP w i t h KA. ing  Rather i t seems to be  o f f j u s t t h i s c o n f u s i o n and  Indeed we  or  throw-  just this assimilation.  f i n d d i s t i n c t f e a t u r e s of a view that  knowledge to be p r o p o s i t i o n a l and, moreover, we  allows find  that  these l a t t e r f e a t u r e s are a s s e r t e d and explored at the expense of a KA  only model.  At t h i s stage what can Runciman say? there i s l e f t to  to him from h i s book are a few  A l l that remarks  the e f f e c t t h a t P l a t o uses c e r t a i n terms i n a  compatible  w i t h e i t h e r a KA  ^  way  or a KP model of knowledge.  Of course, r a t h e r than e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t P l a t o t h e r e f o r e confused own  KA  and KP,  t h i s usage may  o p i n i o n that P l a t o was  a n a l y s i s of knowledge.  K i s KA  our  working with a d i s j u n c t i v e  In f a c t , then,  nothing l e f t f o r Runciman to say. simply  simply c o n f i r m  there i s r e a l l y  Theaetetus-  188-200  i s not a show o f P l a t o ' s a l l e g i a n c e to the a l l presupposition.  Runciman, op.  c i t . , p.  34*  85 Runciman out of the way, l e t us conclude t h i s account by suggesting our own interpretation of the section on f a l s e judgement.  As the reader w i l l r e c a l l  from our t h i r d chapter, Plato was influenced by two NMT presuppositions, PKab and PWTL.  As we proved i n that  chapter, the second of these implies the f i r s t , and either of them implies the presupposition that a l l knowledge i s transparent.  Hence either of them rules out  the p o s s i b i l i t y of KP f o r KP i s opaque.  Therefore, as  we noted at the time, any progress Platoremight make towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n would have to go hand i n hand with a r e j e c t i o n of these presuppositions. Of course, as we saw i n the previous chapter, Plato d i d make progress towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n and, indeed, he did  reject PKab and PWTL.  However, as we also saw, he  rejected PKab and PWTL only i n d i r e c t l y , only i m p l i c i t l y . Nowhere i n the Republic d i d he meet them face on.  Now  what I claim Plato i s doing i n the section on f a l s e judgement i n Theaetetus i s trying f o r the f i r s t time to deal d i r e c t l y with these presuppositions, to attack them not i m p l i c i t l y but as e x p l i c i t l y as possible.  1  And> of  course, i f this i s true, Plato i s bysno means assimilating a l l knowledge to KA - — rather he i s making more secure the progress towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n achieved i n the Republic.  86  That PKab i s present i n Theatetus 188-200 should be p e r f e c t l y obvious from the fact that one of the three main passages i n Plato that l e d us to discover PKab i n the f i r s t place was the passage on the Aviary and the d i f f i c u l t i e s with the m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of 5 + 7 and 11.  Given PKab, of course, such m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  would never occur.  The point to make, of course, i s that  Plato knew p e r f e c t l y well that such m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s do occur.  Furthermore, as Plato also r e a l i z e d , such mis-  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s constitute knockdown counterexamples to any view that implies otherwise. did  I t i s true that Plato  not with his Aviary provide a model adequate f o r  explaining how the m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s occur but there i s no doubt that he knew that they d i d occur.  Thus although  Plato was apparently not i n a p o s i t i o n to explain the how's and why's of the matter, he was s t i l l i n a p o s i t i o n to refute PKab.  Thus regardless of the f a i l u r e of the  Aviary model, we s t i l l f i n d i n Theaetetus 188-200 an almost completely e x p l i c i t statement of PKab together with a f a t a l counterexample to i t .  Since PKab i s a consequence  of PWTL we therefore also f i n d a f a t a l counterexample to PWTL. As further evidence that Plato was attacking PKab and PWTL i n this section, r e c a l l from the t h i r d chapter  87 of t h i s t h e s i s that P l a t o was g r e a t l y t r o u b l e d by a c e r t a i n paradox which s t a t e d that to speak f a l s e l y was to say something that d i d not e x i s t and hence t o say nothing,  i . e., not to u t t e r a meaningful sentence.  As  we saw i n that chapter the reason P l a t o was t r o u b l e d by t h i s paradox was that he was i n f l u e n c e d by a view that a statement was l i k e a photograph o f a s i n g l e , e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n , t h i s being Theaetetus l 8 8 c - l 8 9 b  a c o r o l l a r y o f PWTL. At  we f i n d a paradox e x a c t l y l i k e  this  paradox except that o p i n i n g f a l s e l y i s s u b s t i t u t e d f o r speaking f a l s e l y .  T h i s d i f f e r e n c e , however, i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t from P l a t o ' s p o i n t o f view s i n c e f o r P l a t o an o p i n i o n i s j u s t a c e r t a i n s o r t o f statement "pronounced, not aloud oneself".  8  ^  t o someone e l s e , but s i l e n t l y to  Thus the only d i f f e r e n c e between o p i n i n g  f a l s e l y and u t t e r i n g a f a l s e statement expressing  one's  opinion  ( o r "judgement") i s the absence or presence o f  sound.  Thus P l a t o i s i n f a c t d i s c u s s i n g the very  paradox as before PWTL.  5  26kb.  and t h i s paradox i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f  Furthermore, P l a t o i s n o t d i s c u s s i n g  manifestation  same  o f PWTL i n order  this  to pay t r i b u t e to i t but  Theaetetus l89e-190a and c f . Sophist  263d-  88 rather that not  to  attack  opine  exist.  must He  to  be  i t . He  falsely  He  something  falsely  suggests which  is  that  affirms  they  are  the  is  to  concludes,  then proceeds  opine  rejects  the  opine  "thinking  to  offer a  to  mismatch  false  of  two,  new  of  something  d i f f e r e n t from  a  premiss  that  £ opining]  thinking  judgement  existent is  an  paradox  does falsely  what  suggestion,  two  the  is  that  not." to  objects.  "inner"  He  statement  d i f f e r e n t , e x i s t i n g things  that  same.  We do r e c o g n i z e the e x i s t e n c e o f f a l s e judgement as a s o r t o f m i s j u d g e m e n t [ a l l o d o x i a ] that o c c u r s when a p e r s o n i n t e r c h a n g e s i n h i s mind two t h i n g s , b o t h o f w h i c h a r e , and a s s e r t s t h a t the It  is  that but  one  true  theory  shall  in  the  this  true  ^  i s merely discarded that  occupies  see,  behind  mismatch  i s no  came  to  given as  i t lies  about  the  half  being  a  of  the  the  suggestion  mere  suggestion  but  suggestion  unhelpful  behind  definitive  Thus  hold.  as  the  that a  a  189b.  Theaetetus  l89b-c,  trans,  by  on  of  false  this  Cornford.  as  falsehood  falsehood  position  P r e c i s e l y , however,  Theaetetus  tablet"  ultimately,  treatment  and  (190e)  "wax  section  1930-191x0) a n d ,  (cf. especially  Sophist.  actually  other.  first  also  judgement  a  at  that  we  the  that  i t is i t is  is  that  is Plato  position  89 i s i n d i r e c t o p p o s i t i o n t o the PWTL p o s i t i o n t h a t a statement i s simply situation.  a pointer to a s i n g l e e x i s t i n g  F o r P l a t o to h o l d t h a t a c e r t a i n s o r t o f  judgement isomismatch i s f o r P l a t o t o h o l d that a s t a t e ment expressing  t h a t judgement i s a statement r e l a t i n g  the two t h i n g s that are thereby mismatched.  Such a  statement i s n o t a t a l l a p o i n t e r t o a s i n g l e e x i s t i n g t h i n g but, i f anything,  a p o i n t e r t o two e x i s t i n g t h i n g s  which, moreover, r e l a t e s those two t h i n g s . i n g as he d i d the theory  t h a t a judgement can be a  mismatch, P l a t o was h o l d i n g a theory PWTL.  Having d i s c o u n t e d  that c h a l l e n g e s  which c o n t r a d i c t s  a paradox that has i t s b a s i s  i n PWTL, P l a t o has p o s t u l a t e d o p p o s i t i o n to PWTL.  Thus i n h o l d -  a theory  that i s i n  He i s r e j e c t i n g a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  the p r o g r e s s he had made towards the KP/KA  d i s t i n c t i o n i n the R e p u b l i c . F i n a l l y , l e t us look a t the a n a l y s i s o f f a l s e h o o d i n the S o p h i s t .  There we s h a l l see that P l a t o i s i n f a c t  a p p l y i n g a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e r s i o n o f the theory f a l s e opinions  or statements are mismatches.  that  There we  s h a l l see PWTL n o t o n l y p u t i n a museum but boarded up as w e l l .  At Sophist  261-263 P l a t o c h a r a c t e r i z e s a s t a t e -  ment as a s t r i n g o f words, roughly together"  speaking, that " f i t  i n such a way as t o be meaningful.  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  90 the simplest statement i s a combination  of one "name"  ronomal and one "verb" or "predicate" fremal .  Such a  statement gives information, i t "get you somewhere by 88 weaving together verbs with names".  (Plato apparently  f a i l e d to think about sentence l i k e Crombie's "Tuesday walks".)  Against PWTL which construes a statement as a  mere pointer to one single existing entity, Sophist 261262 construes a statement as a complex combination, i t s two parts pointing each of them to a single existing entity.  The statement as a whole relates these parts  and this somehow i n accordance with the relations among forms that make discourse possible i n the f i r s t place (cf. 260a).  As i s emphasized at Sophist 263&, then, a  statement involves two components each of which refers 89 to "things that e x i s t " . Ontologically, the statement (and hence also i t s mental equivalent the judgement) i s no longer  supported  by a single p i l l a r , v i z . the s i t u a t i o n i t describes, but by twin p i l l a r s , one supporting the name, the other the verb.  To inquire into the f a l s i t y of a statement,  we no longer have to smash down the one supporting p i l Sophist 262d. Cf. Theaetetus 189c.  91 l a r thereby destroying the statement i t s e l f : we need now only look to see i f , as i t were, the p i l l a r s are properly matched for length so that the statement " l i e s true" or whether they are not i n which case the statement " l i e s false"  without thereby toppling over.  Literally  speaking, Plato has explicated the notion of statement i n such a way that i t s truth or falsehood depends not on the existence of the (meaningful) statement but on the existence of the asserted relationship between an e x i s t ing name and an existing verb.  To get a statement r i g h t  i s not (only) to refer to e x i s t i n g things but to get the r e l a t i o n between them r i g h t .  The relevant question i s :  does the e x i s t i n g subject of the statement actually relate to the existing verb i n the way the statement asserts? To make a f a l s e statement, then, i s b a s i c a l l y to relate two existent objects that are not related i n the manner asserted.  I t i s to "mismatch" a name and a verb.  At Theaetetus l89b-c a f a l s e judgement was said to be a sort of misjudgement C a l l o d o x i a l that occurs when a person interchanges i n h i s mind two things, both of which are, and asserts that the one i s the other. In this way he i s always thinking of [ doxa] something which i s , but of one thing i n place of [ e t e r o n l another, and since he misses the mark he may f a i r l y be said  92  90  t o be j u d g i n g  falsely.  S o p h i s t 2 6 3 b , ( t o use M o r a v c s i k ' s t r a n s l a t i o n f a l s e statement i s s a i d t o be one t h a t  91  A t  ), a  e x p r e s s e s t h i n g s o t h e r than [ eteron"] those t h a t a r e r e l a t e d t o you. (The f a l s e one) e x p r e s s e s t h i n g s w h i c h a r e n o t as i f . t h e y were. Namely, i t e x p r e s s e s t h i n g s t h a t a r e , b u t a r e o t h e r than £ e t e r o n ] those t h i n g s w h i c h a r e r e l a t e d t o you. F o r , as we have s a i d b e f o r e £at 2 5 l a , 2 5 6 e , 259a-b, i n d i s c u s s i n g p r e d i c a t i o n ] , i n r e l a t i o n t o each t h i n g much i s and much i s n o t . C e r t a i n l y by S o p h i s t 2 6 3 b , t h e mismatched p a i r a r e n o t any mis-equated p a i r o f s i m p l e o b j e c t s , b u t a c a r e f u l l y d e f i n e d "name" and a c a r e f u l l y d e f i n e d " v e r b " whose e x i s t e n c e and whose p u r p o r t e d  i n t e r r e l a t i o n (e.g. p r e d i -  c a t i o n ) i s backed by an e l a b o r a t e m e t a p h y s i c s . the i d e a o f m i s m a t c h i n g i s s t i l l p r e s e n t .  Nonetheless  Given the  u n c e r t a i n t i e s o f the passage, we do .not know j u s t e x a c t l y what P l a t o had i n mind by t h i s m i s m a t c h i n g o r m i s c o n nection —  we cannot be sure what h i s e x p l i c a t i o n o f a  t r u e statement was.  I n s p i t e o f t h i s , however, we can  say t h a t f o r P l a t o a statement o r judgement i n v o l v e d some ( a l b e i t unknown t o u s ) r e l a t i o n between name and v e r b w h i c h i f a c t u a l l y h o l d i n g g i v e s us a statement t h a t  Theaetetus l89b-c, t r a n s , by 91  states  Cornford.  J . M o r a v c s i k , " B e i n g and Meaning i n t h e S o p h i s t " ( A c t a P h i l o s o p h i c a F e n n i c a F a s c . X I V , 1962), p. 77 and see a l s o the c o n t e x t .  93  about the named subject  "the things that are [ e x i s t }  as they are" concerning  the subject, and i f not holding,  gives us a statement that states about the subject that exist but which are somehow " d i f f e r e n t "  things  feteronj  from the things that are i n the case of the subject. For our purposes, however, i t i s enough to note that true or f a l s e , a statement or judgement i s no longer understood as naming a single, existing s i t u a t i o n .  PWTL  92  has been thrown o f f . '  I f i t i s suggested that i n the Sophist Plato thought that knowing, say, that Theaetetus i s s i t t i n g was just the same as being acquainted with the situation of Theaetetus s i t t i n g , then whoever suggests this w i l l have to account f o r the fact that Plato to some extent understood, as we have seen, that knowledge can be opaque. 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