UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Propositional knowledge in Plato Anglin, William Sherron Raymond 1975

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1975_A8 A54.pdf [ 4.68MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0093390.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0093390-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0093390-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0093390-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0093390-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0093390-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0093390-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0093390-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0093390.ris

Full Text

PROPOSITTONAL KNOWLEDGE IN PLATO by WILLIAM SHERRON RAYMOND ANGLIN A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of Philosophy We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required stafi&ard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1975 In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree l y ava i l ab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thes is for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t i on of th is thes is for f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my writ ten permission. Department of Philosophy  The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date August, 1975 i i ABSTRACT Contemporary philosophers distinguish a certain "propositional knowledge (KP)" from other sorts of knowledge such as "knowledge by acquaintance (KA)". However, when Plato began to do philosophy no one had formulated the concept of KP, indeed, no one had for-mulated the notion of what we c a l l a "proposition". On the contrary, the ancient Greeks unreflectedly pre-supposed that a l l knowledge was simply some sort of acquaintance with the object of knowledge. This pre-supposition of theirs naturally caused a great deal of confusion i n their epistemology and at the beginning of his career, Plato himself was victim and perpetrator of this confusion. However, as the following thesis shows, Plato began to make explicit and to question the presupposition that a l l knowledge was KA and he did make progress towards finding the crucially missing category, KP. It was not that he succeeded totally in isolating the notion ofSKP. For that matter, he never attained to a notion of "proposition" in a l l i t s modern generality. However, he did come to hold that some-times knowledge involves not only acquaintance with the object of knowledge but also a knowledge of inter-relations among things known. Having at f i r s t tried to i i i understand a l l knowledge i n terms of a model that construed i t as nothing more complex than some sort of acquaintance with the object of knowledge, Plato sub-sequently abandoned this model and proceeded to develop an epistemology capable of accomodating cases of what we would c a l l KP. I shall argue that Plato did this after he had written the Charmides and before he wrote the Theaetetus. iv TABLE OP CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 1 THE SOVEREIGNTY OP KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 27 THE PICTURE WINDOW THEORY OF LANGUAGE . 35 KNOWLEDGE IN THE REPUBLIC i+9 CONCLUSION 72 BIBLIOGRAPHY 9k INTRODUCTION Contemporary philosophers d i s t i n g u i s h a c e r t a i n "propositional knowledge (KP)" from other sorts of know-ledge such as "knowledge by acquaintance (KA)". However, when Plato began to do philosophy no one had formulated the concept of KP, indeed, no one had formulated the notion of what we c a l l a "proposition". On the contrary the ancient Greeks unreflectedly presupposed that a l l knowledge was simply some sort of acquaintance with the object of knowledge. This presupposition of theirs n a t u r a l l y caused a great deal of confusion i n t h e i r epistemology and at the beginning of h i s career, Plato himself was victim and perpetrator of thi s confusion as w i l l be shown. However, as the following also shows, Plato began to make e x p l i c i t and to question the presup-p o s i t i o n that a l l knowledge was KA and he did make progress towards fi n d i n g the c r u c i a l l y missing category, KP. I t was not that he succeeded t o t a l l y i n i s o l a t i n g the notion of KP. For that matter, he never attained to a notion of "proposition" i n a l l i t s modern generality. However, he did come to hold that sometimes knowledge involves not only acquaintance with the object of know-ledge but also a knowledge of i n t e r r e l a t i o n s among thing known. Having at f i r s t t r i e d to understand a l l knowledge in terms of a model that construed i t as nothing more complex than some sort of acquaintance with the object of knowledge, Plato subsequently abandoned this model and proceeded to develop an epistemology capable of accomodating cases of what we would c a l l KP. Up to this point my sketch of Plato's epistemo-logical development i s in agreement with what W. G. Runciman says i n his Plato's Later Epistemology. ^ Runciman holds that the early and even the middle Plato thought of a l l knowledge as "a sort of mental touching." Even as late as the Theaetetus "Plato continued to think of knowledge as a sort of mental seeing or touching." 3 However f i n a l l y but only by the time he wrote the Sophist Plato at last abandoned this view and came to understand that "knowledge of certain Forms involves knowledge of the connecting properties which they possess, and the philosopher i s now concerned less with contem-plation than correlation." ^ On Runciman1s view, then, m ^ ^ W* ?*. R u n c i r a a n» Plato's Later Epistemology (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1962). 2 Ibid., p. 10 . 3 Ibid., p. 52. ^ Ibid., p. 129 . 3 Plato did make some progress towards distinguishing KP from KA. Runciman would therefore accept the account sketched above. However, he would want to add to t h i s account that i t was only towards the end of Plato's l i f e that he made thi s progress. He therefore represents Plato as propagating f o r most of hi s l i f e the f a l s e doctrine that a l l knowledge i s KA. According to Runciman, i n spite of a l l his thinking about knowledge the early and middle Plato completely overlooked even the p o s s i b i l i t y of knowledge that was not KA. Runciman goes to the dialogues with the question, "how f a r did Plato arrive at a d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge that ... and knowledge by acquaintance?" ^ and he comes back with an answer to the eff e c t that Plato did make some progress but only towards the end of hi s l i f e . On Runciman's view, then, when we measure Plato's a b i l i t i e s against the contemporary d i s t i n c t i o n between KP and KA, then, f o r whatever reasons, Plato does not r e a l l y come up to standard: he spent most of hi s l i f e under the delusion that every case of knowing must somehow be understood only i n terms of "mental seeing or touching". -> Ibid., p. 1. ^ Runciman*s Theory has recently been endorsed by Jaakko Hintikka. Vide Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and the Known (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1971+) p. ltt f f . k What I intend to argue in what follows, however, is that, on the contrary, Plato began to break through this delusion not in his late period but in his middle period. Indeed, i t was by the time he had completed the Republic that Plato had achieved a l l the progress towards the KP/KA distinction that Runciman ascribes to him only on the basis of the Sophist. In the Sophist, I claim, Plato was merely applying an insight about knowledge which had led him to abandon as far back as the Republic his attempt to understand a l l knowledge i n terms of a simple acquaintance model: the Sophist was not the debut of this insight, as Runciman holds, but rather i t s marriage to a perplexing problem connected with "non-being" arranged by Plato i n order to produce as offspring a solution to this problem. Thus whereas I want to argue on Runciman*s behalf that Plato did indeed abandon a "KA only" model of knowledge in favour of a model capable of accomodating cases of KP, I want to say against Runciman that Plato had the good sense to do this long before he wrote the Sophist. Before beginning to investigate the truth of this matter, i t i s necessary to have some idea of what i s meant by KP and KA. Exactly what i s this KP/KA dis-tinction that, on Runciman's view, Plato completely 5 overlooked f o r most of h i s l i f e ? Who actually did make th i s d i s t i n c t i o n completely e x p l i c i t ? Who f i r s t gave i t i t s d e f i n i t i v e form? Interestingly, we s h a l l f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to answer these questions. As we are about to see, the d i s t i n c t i o n i n terms of which Runciman judges Plato i s a d i s t i n c t i o n that i s not well explicated even today. Bertrand Russell was probably the f i r s t philosopher to talk i n terms of having "knowledge by acquaintance" as opposed to "knowing propositions." As early as 1905 he had mentioned "the d i s t i n c t i o n between acquaintance and knowledge about." ^ The word 'know' i s ... used i n two d i f f e r e n t senses. (1) In i t s f i r s t use i t i s applicable to the sort of knowledge which i s opposed to error, the sense i n which what we know i s true, the sense which applies to our b e l i e f s and con-v i c t i o n s , i . e . to what are c a l l e d judgements. In thisssense of the word we know that something i s the case. This sort of knowledge may be described as knowledge of truths. (2) In the second use of the word 'know' the word applies to our knowledge of things, which we may c a l l acquaintance. This i s the sense i n which we know sense-data. (The d i s t i n c t i o n involved i s roughly that between savoir and connaitre i n French, or between wissen " " — — — — — — — — — Q ^ — — • — and kennen i n German.) ' B. Russell, "On Denoting" (In Mind Ik. (1905)) p. 479. Q B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959) p. 44* 6 A c c o r d i n g t o R u s s e l l KA o f some o b j e c t was " a d i r e c t c o g n i t i v e r e l a t i o n t o t h a t o b j e c t . " ^ Not e v e r y o b j e c t , however, c o u l d be known i n t h i s way: o n l y s e n s e d a t a , u n i v e r s a l e and p e r h a p s c e r t a i n e n t i t i e s a p p r e h e n d e d by i n t r o s p e c t i o n . " I t w i l l be s e e n , " he w r o t e , " t h a t among t h e o b j e c t s w i t h w h i c h we a r e a c q u a i n t e d a r e n o t i n c l u d e d p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s ( a s o p p o s e d t o s e n s e d a t a ) , n o r o t h e r p e o p l e ' s m i n d s . " Thus f o r R u s s e l l o n l y a v e r y l i m i t e d number o f e n t i t i e s q u a l i f i e d as p o s s i b l e o b j e c t s o f KA. H i s was a s p e c i a l i z e d s o r t o f what we w o u l d n o r m a l l y c a l l KA. Of c o u r s e , n e e d l e s s t o s a y , when some p h i l o s o p h e r s u c h as Runciman c l a i m s t h a t c e r t a i n a n c i e n t G r e e k s p r e s u p p o s e d t h a t a l l knowledge was KA, he does n o t mean t h a t t h e y p r e s u p p o s e d t h a t o n l y s e n s e d a t a and u n i v e r s a l s were k n o w a b l e . The s e n s e i n w h i c h Runciman i m p u t e s a KA d o c t r i n e t o P l a t o i s a s e n s e i n w h i c h i t i s p o s s i b l e t o have a c q u a i n t a n c e w i t h o b j e c t s , p e r s o n s , p l a c e s and so on. I t i s KA b r o a d l y s p e a k i n g and n o t t h e KA p e c u l i a r t o R u s s e l l t h a t i s a s c r i b e d t o t h e a n c i e n t G r e e k s . Of c o u r s e , one c o u l d go f u r t h e r and a c t u a l l y c l a i m t h a t someone l i k e ^ B. R u s s e l l , M y s t i c i s m and L o g i c ( L o n d o n : Longmans, G r e e n and. Co., 1925) p. 2 0 9 . 1 0 I b i d . , p . 2H4.. Plato did hold p r e c i s e l y Russell's view on acquaintance but that would be taking another step altogether and r a i s i n g an issue that need not and w i l l not be raised i n this paper. For our purposes the objects of acquaintance need not be li m i t e d i n any special way such as Russell's. As f a r as KP i s concerned, Russell i s not interested i n KP generally so much as i n KP having to do with propositions containing d e f i n i t e descriptions which denote objects with which we are not i n Russell's sense acquainted. Indeed i t i s the knowledge of objects designated by d e f i n i t e descriptions that i n t e r e s t s Russell and not so much the KP connected with t h i s know-ledge. What I wish to discuss i s the nature of our knowledge concerning objects i n cases where we know that there i s an object answering to a d e f i n i t e description, though we are not acquainted with any such object. This i s a matter which i s concerned exclusively with d e f i n i t e descriptions. 1 1 Thus although Russell i s interested i n the KP that the 12 candidate who gets most votes w i l l be elected^ he is not interested i n the KP that, say, this colour with 1 1 Ibid. 1 2 Ibid., p. 209. 8 which I am acquainted i s brighter than that one. Russell i s therefore quite r i g h t not to c a l l the know-ledge that i n t e r e s t s him "propositional knowledge" which would imply that he was dealing with KP i n general but to c a l l i t "knowledge by description". This "knowledge by description" he r i g h t f u l l y distinguishes from hi s "knowledge of truths." I t i s only the l a t t e r that i s propositional knowledge per se. In a sense, then, i t was Russell who actually f i r s t made the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n using our contemporary terminology. However, he made i t not so much for i t s own sake as f o r the sake of the epistemological work he wished to do i n connection with d e f i n i t e descriptions. Thus he nowhere studied the d i s t i n c t i o n i t s e l f at any great length. Since Russell's work on the subject, a c e r t a i n 13 amount of work has been done on KP J but, s u r p r i s i n g l y , very l i t t l e has been done on KA, nor a f o r t i o r i on the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n . Indeed i n 1969 there appeared an a r t i c l e i n Philosophy and Phenomelogical Research whose sole purpose was to remind people that there was a topic Cf., e.g., G i l b e r t Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson and Co., 19ii9) pp. 2 7 - 3 2 . 9 c a l l e d KA and that i t deserved some attention. The author of this a r t i c l e , Paul Hayner, wrote that he hoped to "keep a l i v e an issue which I believe has received much less attention that i t deserves." ^ Since Russell, then, very l i t t l e work has been done i n this area. Indeed, just as there was no well-defended, d e f i n i t i v e formulation of the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i n Plato's time, so 1 £ i n f a c t , there xs none today. ^ Perhaps at this stage the reader i s wondering why this matters so much. Why, after a l l , i s i t necessary to understand the d i s t i n c t i o n Runciman used any better Paul Hayner, "Knowledge by Acquaintance" (In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (19bb-1969) p. 4 2 3 . ^ The one exception to this i s Jaakko Hintikka's "Knowledge by Acquaintance - Individuation by Acquaintance" (i n Knowledge and the Known, pp. 2 1 2 - 2 3 3 ) . In thi s a r t i c l e Hintikka attempts a "reduction" of KA to KP. He analyses "a knows b" (where "b" denotes an individual) by "(3x) a knows that (b = x)",where " ( 3 x ) " i s used as a quanti f i e r " r e l y i n g on acquaintance".. There are serious d i f f i c u l t i e s with this analysis. For one thing, suppose for example that a knows Harry even though a does not know that Harry i s called. "Harry". I t i s quite possible for a to know Harry even i f . a has never heard the word "Harry". Yet on Hintikka's view, a's knowing Harry i s to be understood as a's having knowledge of the fac t that Harry and this certain i n d i v i d u a l (with whom a i s acquainted) are one and the same. a's knowing Harry amounts to,a's knowing the fac t that t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s Harry. But a does not know thi s f a c t . Surely knowing a person i s d i f f e r e n t from knowing a fac t about a person and surely knowing a person i s d i f f e r e n t from know what name (or description) applies to him. 10 than Runciman did? In any case, i s not the distinction already clear and obvious? The point, precisely, i s that the KP/KA distinction i s not clear, that i t i s not easy to understand and that therefore someone who had not really studied i t might very well misapply i t . In particular i t i s quite possible that Runciman misapplied i t to Plato and i t i s at least as li k e l y that we shall misapply i t to Runciman1s evaluation of Plato unless we are more aware of i t s problems and profundities. We shall therefore take a closer look at KP, KA and the distinction between them, doing a l i t t l e of the work that has been l e f t undone since Russell and thereby also more than convincing the reader of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved. KA, basically, i s immediate apprehension of things (or else memory of such apprehension). To know something by KA i s just directly to apprehend i t (or else to have a memory (perhaps unconscious) of apprehend-ing i t ) . KA i s "cognitive contact" with an object, this object being contacted as a unity. The things that can be known in this way need not be mere sense data. For the ancient Greeks at any rate, one could know by KA persons, places and particulars. Insofar as one was 11 w i l l i n g to r e i f y properties, predicates or situations ( as we s h a l l see, the ancient Greeks were more than w i l l i n g to do t h i s ) , one could know these too by KA. However, just what i s th i s "immediate apprehension" that i s the essence of KA? This i s very d i f f i c u l t to es t a b l i s h . Let us consider the.case of someone's being acquainted with a ce r t a i n group of mountains. Certainly someone who has grown up i n these mountains has had the "immediate apprehension" of them s u f f i c i e n t for having KA of them but what about someone who merely v i s i t s them or someone who f l i e s over them on business t r i p s ? What i f p o l i t i c a l circumstances are such that they appear l i v e on coloured t e l e v i s i o n every evening on the news? Do we say that the businessman or the t e l e v i s i o n viewer has "immediate apprehension" of them? How are we to understand t h i s "cognitive contact" with the object of knowledge? One characterization of t h i s "apprehension" i s the following f a c t : i f something i s known by KA, then that something must e x i s t . Whatever the required "apprehension," i t i s at lea s t an apprehension of some exist i n g thing. Thus given the non-existence of say, L i t t l e Red Riding Hood, i t i s possible without any further information about the world to discount a l l 12 claims to the eff e c t that someone i s actually acquainted with L i t t l e Red Riding Hood. Another characterization of this "apprehension" i s that the knower may be said to know the object of knowledge regardless of what words are used to describe that object. His "cognitive contact" with i t ensures that i t s designation i s i r r e l e v a n t . Thus to be acquainted with John i s to be acquainted with Alex even i f one does not know that John i s also c a l l e d "Alex". Hence KA i s what Quine would c a l l " r e f e r e n t i a l l y transparent." ^ KP, on the other hand, does not possess th i s property: i t i s " r e f e r e n t i a l l y opaque". For example, someone who has met a stray donkey whose name ("Daniel") he has no way of knowing w i l l know that this donkey i s th i s donkey but he w i l l not know that th i s donkey i s Daniel. Although th i s donkey i s i n fac t Daniel, we are not e n t i t l e d i n cases of KP to substitute one designation of the object of knowledge for another. On the other hand, one's knowing this donkey by KA does imply that he knows Daniel by KA. We have just seen, then, that the "immediate apprehension" which i s KA can be characterized by the W. V. 0. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, i960) pp. l k l - l ^ b & 166-169. 13 f a c t t h a t i t i s a p p r e h e n s i o n o f a s i n g l e o b j e c t t h a t e x i s t s and by t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s r e f e r e n t i a l l y t r a n s -p a r e n t . G i v e n t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e o f knowledge on t h e m a t t e r , t h e s e a r e , m o r e o v e r , t h e o n l y two w e l l - d e f i n e d c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s o f KA. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , n o t e v e n b o t h t o g e t h e r c a n answer t h e q u e s t i o n s we r a i s e d a b o u t know-i n g t h e m o u n t a i n s . T h e s e t h e n a r e t h e f i r s t s e t o f u n a n s w e r e d q u e s t i o n s i n t h i s a r e a . Whereas KA i n v o l v e s some s o r t o f c o n t a c t w i t h one s i n g l e o b j e c t , KP i n v o l v e s what m i g h t be c a l l e d a c o r r e c t judgement t h a t r e l a t e s two o r more e n t i t i e s ( i . e . t h i n g s , p r o p e r t i e s , c o n c e p t s , e t c . ) i n t h e way i n w h i c h t h e y a r e a c t u a l l y r e l a t e d . T hese e n t i t i e s may o r may n o t e x i s t . C a s e s o f KP, t h e r e f o r e , t y p i c a l l y i n v o l v e a number o f e n t i t i e s . Thus i f i t i s s a i d t h a t some p e r s o n "A" knows x by KP, we may assume t h a t t h e x i s a complex made up o f v a r i o u s c o n s t i t u e n t s . S i n c e , m o r e o v e r , KP i s r e f e r e n t i a l l y opaque, i t makes a g r e a t d e a l o f d i f f e r e n c e w h i c h terms d e s i g n a t e t h e s e c o n s t i t u e n t s . Thus i t w o u l d be b e t t e r t o s a y more e x p l i c i t l y t h a t A knows x(t-^,t2,...) where t-^, t^t ... a r e a l l t h e terms o f "x" and where t ^ , t ^ , ... a r e i n d e e d d e s i g n a t e d as s u c h i n "x". ( T h e s e terms may be n o u n s , a d j e c t i v e s , p r e d i c a t e s , e t c . and, o f c o u r s e , t h e y w i l l n o t be words l i k e " a " , " t h e " , " w h i c h " , e t c . ) Ik A second point to note in connection with KP i s that whereas in KA the verb "know" takes a direct object, in cases of KP i t takes what i s in effect a subordinate clause, very often a subordinate clause introduced by the conjunction "that". Thus as a typical example of KP we might have: Peter knows that the outcome i s glorious. The terms in this case are "outcome" and "glorious". The subordinate clause is "that the outcome is glorious" and i t i s indeed introduced by "that". Of course,;lit i s a proposition that i s introduced by this "that" and since i t i s impossible to know something false, this proposition must, of course, be true. Indeed, i t i s characteristic of KP that in every case there i s some true proposition that i s known. Now although KP i s often called "knowledge that" and for the reason that the subordinate clause we have just mentioned i s , indeed, often introduced by "that", there are many cases of KP in which this con-junction is absent. There are also many cases of KP in which the true proposition known by the knower i s not explicit in the statement attributing this knowledge to him. For example, we might have a case in which A knows which city his aunt i s vi s i t i n g . This city i s , say, Tiberias. Now 15 A has never even seen Tiberias on t e l e v i s i o n much les s i n r e a l l i f e and thus i t i s true to say that A has no KA of Ti b e r i a s . Nonetheless he knows which c i t y h i s aunt i s v i s i t i n g . The reason that t h i s i s possible, of course, i s that i n ascribing to A the knowledge of which c i t y h i s aunt i s v i s i t i n g , what we are r e a l l y claiming i s just that A knows that his aunt i s v i s i t i n g T i b e r i a s . That i s , the case i n which A knows which c i t y h i s aunt i s v i s i t i n g i s simply a case of KP. The terms are " c i t y " , "his aunt" and " v i s i t " . The subordinate clause i s "which (c i t y ) h i s aunt i s v i s i t i n g " and the true proposition i s "his aunt i s v i s i t i n g the c i t y of Tib e r i a s " . Note that i n t h i s , as i n sim i l a r cases, the true proposition contains a l l the terras of the subordinate clause (plus one of i t s own) and, furthermore, that KP of the true proposition implies the o r i g i n a l KP. As another example, consider a case i n which A knows i f Tom has decided to believe. Here the terms are "Tom", "decide" and "believe". The subordinate clause i s " i f Tom has decided to believe". The true proposition i s , say, "Tom has not decided to believe". This true proposition contains a l l the terms of the subordinate clause and, furthermore, knowledge of i t implies the o r i g i n a l knowledge ascribed to A. 16 We have j u s t seen t h a t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f KP are r e f e r e n t i a l o p a c i t y , a s u b o r d i n a t e c l a u s e e x p r e s s i n g some i n t e r r e l a t i o n , and a t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n n o t n e c e s -s a r i l y e x p l i c i t i n the knowledge i m p u t a t i o n . We have n o t e d i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t the c o n j u n c t i o n " t h a t " need n o t be mentioned. I n t h i s way we can see q u i t e c l e a r l y t h a t KP i s n o t r i g i d l y t i e d down t o one p a r t i c u l a r g r a m m a t i c a l form. T h i s w i l l be made even more c l e a r by t h e n e x t example, an example o f KP i n wh i c h n o t o n l y the t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n but a l s o the s u b o r d i n a t e c l a u s e i s n o t made e x p l i c i t . Suppose t h a t A knows the h e r o i n e o f Mid d l e m a r c h . S i n c e M i d d l e m a r c h i s f i c t i o n we cannot say t h a t A knows the h e r o i n e ("Dorothea") by KA o r we s h a l l have a case o f KA o f a n o n - e x i s t e n t o b j e c t . What, t h e n , i s b e i n g s a i d when we say t h a t A knows t h e h e r o i n e o f Middlemarch? S u r e l y what we a r e s a y i n g i s t h a t A knows who the h e r o i n e o f M i d d l e m a r c h i s , t h a t i s , A knows t h a t the h e r o i n e o f M i d d l e m a r c h i s D o r o t h e a . Here, t h e n , i s a case o f KP. The mere appearance o f a sentence w h i c h imputes knowledge t o someone does n o t e s t a b l i s h the s o r t o f knowledge imputed. 1 7 Thus f a r we have brought out a few of the minor co m p l e x i t i e s and d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n . Now we s h a l l t u r n to the r e a l problems. One might h o l d the view that among e x i s t i n g s i n g u l a r s are various s i t u a t i o n s or st a t e s of a f f a i r s . For example, we might have a s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n Argentina such as the Communists being about to take over. As another example, (one due to Meinong), we might have as a s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n John's l i v i n g room the cat's being on the mat. Furthermore, as w i l l be shown i n the next chapter, the ancient Greeks were among those who would have h e l d t h i s view. Now i f a s t a t e of a f f a i r s counts as an e x i s t i n g s i n g u l a r , there i s no reason why i t should not be an object of acquaintance. Granted t h a t there i s such a t h i n g as a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n i n Argentina, s u r e l y i t i s p o s s i b l e to know i t by KA. However, what p r e c i s e l y i s the d i f f e r e n c e between knowing by KA the s i t u a t i o n of the Communists being about to take over and knowing by KP that the Communists are about to take over? To take another example, suppose that John knows the cat's being on the mat. Does he not have to know th a t the cat i s on the mat? Not n e c e s s a r i l y . For sup-pose John i s a two year jo l d c h i l d who has not yet l e a r n t 18 how to t a l k . Then i s i t not t r u e t h a t although he i s acquainted w i t h the s i t u a t i o n of the cat's being on the mat, that he i s nonetheless not i n possession of the terms and judgements necessary f o r KP? Or do we say that he has KP that the cat i s on the mat even though he has not yet learned how to use the word "cat"? I t seems not. Perhaps, then, the c h i l d has no KA of the s i t u a t i o n but only of the cat and the mat s e p a r a t e l y . But why should that be? Surely he i s acquainted w i t h some s i t u a t i o n s such as h i s being hungry. Why should he not know the cat's being on the mat? I t seems, then, that we cannot b l i t h e l y assume that i f A knows some s i t u a t i o n , t h a t he t h e r e f o r e must know that p where "p" denotes a p r o p o s i t i o n d e s c r i b i n g the s i t u a t i o n : f o r A might not be i n command of the terms used i n p and A might not be i n command of the terms used i n any p r o p o s i t i o n e q u i v a l e n t to i t f o r the purposes of d e s c r i b i n g the s i t u a t i o n . Furthermore, what we can assume i n a case l i k e the one described i s u n c e r t a i n . Suppose, however, that John i s an a d u l t and that he knows by KA the cat's being on the mat and that he a l s o knows by KP that the cat i s on the mat. How does the one knowledge d i f f e r from the other? For one t h i n g , 19 the KA i s transparent whereas the KP i s opaque. Suppose that John i s completely unaware that the cat consistently wins a l l the beauty prizes f o r cats. Then although he w i l l s t i l l know by KA the si t u a t i o n of the world's most beau t i f u l cat being on the mat, he w i l l not know that that world's most beautiful cat i s on the mat. For a second thing, John's KA cannot be transmitted to someone who l i v e s i n another c i t y and who has never seen nor heard of the cat, whereas John's KP can be transmitted to such a person. For although there i s no way i n which the other person can become acquainted with the cat's being on the mat (short of coming to see), this other person can e a s i l y come to know that the cat i s on the mat: f o r John can simply telephone him and report the matter. Then, on the basis of John's r e l i a b l e report, that other person w i l l have KP that the cat i s on the mat. I t seems, therefore, quite cer t a i n that one can have KP about a si t u a t i o n without having KA of i t . What i s not certai n , however, i s whether, as i n the case of the c h i l d , one can have KA of a s i t u a t i o n without having any KP about i t . What the example of the c h i l d has to say about the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n I am not sure. Another problematic area f o r the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i s the area of "knowledge as". For example, l e t us suppose that A knows A r i s t o t l e as a bright student. Is 20 t h i s a case of KP or of KA? At f i r s t we are somewhat tempted to say that i t i s at l e a s t p a r t l y a case of KA. Perhaps, however, A i s not A r i s t o t l e ' s teacher but merely the graduate student who marks A r i s t o t l e ' s papers. Perhaps, moreover, th i s marker has never met A r i s t o t l e but knows him only as a bright student. Surely i n t h i s case A can s t i l l be said to know A r i s t o t l e as a bright student although A has no KA of A r i s t o t l e . Perhaps, then, the o r i g i n a l case was a case of KP. Perhaps a l l we were asserting was that A knows that A r i s t o t l e i s a bright student. However, l e t us now suppose that A i s A r i s t o t l e ' s teacher, that A has been very favourably impressed by A r i s t o t l e ' s class performance, but that A does not i n f a c t know that A r i s t o t l e i s c a l l e d " A r i s t o t l e " . Like most professors, A does not know the names of any of h i s undergraduate students. Now of course i t i s s t i l l true to say that A knows A r i s t o t l e as a brightfestudent. However, given the opacity of KP, i t i s not true to say that A knows A r i s t o t l e i s a bright student: A knows only that the red-haired student i n the  front row i s a bright student. Thus i t i s not true that i n ascribing the o r i g i n a l "knowledge as" to A, that we were merely saying that he knew that A r i s t o t l e was a bright student. As another try, then, we might l e t 's* 21 denote some designation which A himself can use to denote or re f e r to A r i s t o t l e . Then we might construe A's know-ledge of A r i s t o t l e as a bright student as the knowledge that si i s a bright student. Thus where A i s A r i s t o t l e ' s professor, what we are saying i s that A knows that the  red-haired student i n the front row i s a bright student and where A i s A r i s t o t l e ' s marker, what we are saying i s that A knows that the student who signs himself " A r i s t o t l e " i s a bright student. However, this w i l l not do either f o r , returning to the case where A i s the marker, we can further suppose that although A r i s t o t l e ' s work made a d i s t i n c t impression on A, there i s no designation which A can use to denote or ref e r to A r i s t o t l e other than "that bright student". We can sup-pose that A has forgotten everything about A r i s t o t l e ' s work, even the name of i t s author, except that i t was the work of a certain bright student. In answer to the question, "does the marker know A r i s t o t l e at a l l ? " I think we would s t i l l reply, "he knows A r i s t o t l e as a bright student." However, the only p o s s i b i l i t y f o r "s" seems to be "that bright student", and on the present analysis A's knowledge of A r i s t o t l e as a bright student i s then understood as the knowledge that that bright student i s a bright student. However, when we say that A knows A r i s t o t l e as a bright student, we are not saying that A 22 has some analytic knowledge. Perhaps, then, we should allow "s" to be nothing more than "that person" i n cases l i k e t h i s . But i s A's knowledge the knowledge that that  person i s a bright student? I f i t were A would have propositional knowledge about a referent f o r which he can give only one description, a description that i s not a d e f i n i t e description, a referent, moreover, with which A i s not acquainted. Are we saying that i t i s possible f o r A to have knowledge about th i s referent under these conditions? what are we saying, then? We are not exactly sure. Nor i s t h i s the only case of "knowledge as". Even i f we could analyze t h i s case i n terms of KP, how would we analyze: that c h i l d knows the Head of the Philosophy Department as h i s father? On the one hand, assuming that the c h i l d i n question i s as yet unable to talk, we w i l l have d i f f i c u l t i e s imputing to the c h i l d even the KP that his father i s his father ( r e c a l l our discussion a few pages back), and on the other hand, i f we t ry to understand the case purely i n terms of KA, we s h a l l be unable to account f o r the implied i d e n t i t y of the Head of the Philosophy Department and the father. Indeed, give our contemporary knowledge about KP, KA and the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n , we are simply not i n a p o s i t i o n to understand A's knowledge as. How can we 23 account for cases, like the immediately preceding case, which seen to be cases of KA? How can we account for cases that, on the other hand, at least seem to be purely propositional (e.g., he knows electrons as merely theoretical entities)? Finally, how do we deal with cases that seem to s i t right in the middle (e.g., Plato's "pure" knowledge of various Forms as related i n certain ways to the Good)? We have now characterized and illustrated the distinction between KP and KA. We have seen some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved in this distinction and we have seen how i t has not yet been f u l l y worked out. We have seen, in particular, that there are some cases of "know-ledge as" which share features of both KP and KA in a way that i s not f u l l y understood. We can conclude, therefore, that the distinction which Runciman has used as a standard against which to judge Plato i s a distinction that i s not yet properly explicated. We may hope, however, that the work we have just done on the previous pages has improved our knowledge of the KP/KA distinction at least to the point where we w i l l not say anything too foolish in our own evaluation of Plato. We shall conclude this Introduction by noting a 2i i few m i s c e l l a n e o u s p o i n t s r e l e v a n t t o t h e p r o v i n g o f my t h e s i s t h a t P l a t o d i d make p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s t h e d i s c o v e r y o f t h e KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n , and by t h e t i m e he h a d c o m p l e t e d t h e R e p u b l i c . F i r s t we must be c l e a r t h a t i n f a c t t h e KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n h a d n o t b e e n made when P l a t o b e g an t o do p h i l o s o p h y . The f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r shows t h a t i n d e e d t h e a n c i e n t G r e e k s d i d p r e s u p p o s e t h a t a l l knowledge was KA. S e c o n d we n e e d n o t e x p e c t o r r e q u i r e t h a t P l a t o have a word f o r " p r o p o s i t i o n " as c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o -s o p h e r s now mean t h e t e r m . One n e e d n o t h a v e a name f o r a c o n c e p t i n o r d e r t o be m a k i n g p r o g r e s s i n s e a r c h i n g f o r t h a t c o n c e p t . T h i r d t h e KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n h a s c e r t a i n r e p e r c u s -s i o n s i n l a n g u a g e and t h o u g h t . F o r example, i n a s c r i b i n g KP t o someone, one c a n a l w a y s u s e t h e "know t h a t " c o n s t r u c t i o n whereas i n a s c r i b i n g KA t o someone, one c a n n o t . The p o i n t t o n o t e i s t h a t someone c a n be f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e r e p e r c u s s i o n s o f a d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h o u t r e a l i z i n g what i t i s t h a t g i v e s r i s e t o t h e s e r e p e r c u s s i o n s . F o r example, P l a t o may c o r r e c t l y u s e d o z e n s o f "know t h a t " - 1 7 ' c o n s t r u c t i o n s and y e t s t i l l be u n a b l e t o f o r m u l a t e t h e C f . I o n 537e 25 KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n . F o u r t h t h e t h e s i s t h a t P l a t o made p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s t h e d i s c o v e r y o f t h e KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i s n o t shown t o be f a l s e i f e v e n t h r o u g h o u t h i s l i f e P l a t o h e l d t h a t KA was t h e b a s i c s o r t o f k n o w l e d g e . I f , f o r example, P l a t o was c o n s c i o u s l y t r y i n g t o e x p l i c a t e o r c h a r a c t e r i z e a n o t h e r s o r t o f knowledge t h a t was l i k e KP i n terms o f KA, t h e n t h e t h e s i s i s shown t o be t r u e . F o r i f P l a t o was c o n s c i o u s l y t r y i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d a s e c o n d s o r t o f knowledge i n terms o f KA, t h e n he must have s e e n t h a t t h i s s e c o n d s o r t o f knowledge was d i f f e r e n t f r o m KA, and i f i t was m o r e o v e r somewhat l i k e a KP, t h e n P l a t o h a d n o t o n l y made p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s d i s c o v e r i n g t h e KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n he h a d a l s o done some work i n c o m p a r i n g t h e two s o r t s o f knowledge and p r o b i n g t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s . F i f t h i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t P l a t o show any s i g n s o f m a k i n g a KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o c a s e s o f knowledge a b o u t s e n s i b l e p a r t i c u l a r s . I n o r d e r t h a t P l a t o be m a k i n g p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i t i s enough i f he makes i t w i t h r e g a r d t o c a s e s o f knowledge a b o u t Forms o r c l a s s e s . To make some v e r s i o n o f t h e KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h Forms o r c l a s s e s i s n o n e t h e l e s s p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s m a k i n g i t i n a l l i t s p r o p e r g e n e r a l i t y . 26 Lastly, my thesis about Plato's progress i s of course validated i f Plato, having in his earlier dialogue characterized knowledge as KA, then decides in his late dialogues to characterize i t as some sort of KP but given that Plato understands that he has characterized f i r s t one, then another sort of knowledge. 27 THE SOVEREIGHNTY OP KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE In order to understand Plato's epistemology, we must f i r s t be aware that the ancient Greeks presupposed that a l l knowledge was KA. Ask one of Plato's contemporaries what knowledge i s and he w i l l answer that i t i s acquaintance with the object of knowledge, i ft immediate apprehension or perception of i t . This chapter does not give a complete proof f o r this assertion. What i t does do i s to c i t e some references and authorities and to sketch t h e i r opinions on the matter, A f u l l presentation of evidence to sup-port the claim would require a thesis of i t s own. For our purposes, however, what mainly matters i s that of a l l the ancient Greeks at l e a s t the early Plato presupposed that a l l knowledge was KA and thi s f a c t i s proved not only by the indications i n the present chapter but i n the remainder of this work as well. In his paper, "Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naive Metaphysics of Things," Alexander Mourelatos offers as an explanatory backdrop to ancient Greek thought his "Naive Metaphysics of Things (NMT)". He proves that regardless of the h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y of NMT, i t i s Cf. Theaetetus l 5 l e . 28 c e r t a i n l y h e l p f u l to assume that ancient Greek philosophers had i t somewhere i n the back of t h e i r minds as they wrote whatever they did. Using t h i s assumption we can better understand much of what they said. One tenant of NMT i s that a l l knowledge i s d i r e c t acquaintance (or else memory of d i r e c t acquaintance) with things. These things, moreover, are paradig-matically persons, places, massive bodies or homogeneous substances. Hence someone whose l i f e i s l i v e d i n terms of NMT can know you and your cousin and your family but he cannot know the proposition that you and your cousin are related by way of having the same grandfather. Furthermore, i f someone knows of faraway places or awe-i n s p i r i n g gods, i t i s only because he has v i s i t e d them and had d i r e c t contact with them. This implies of course that they exist and, indeetd, i t i s a c o r o l l a r y of NMT's view of knowledge that nothing can be known 19 except exi s t i n g things. I f Mourelatos i s r i g h t , we should expect t h i s KA to turn up i n the Greek philosophers as the only major A. P. D. Mourelatos, "Heraclitus, Parmenides and the Naive Metaphysics of Things" (In Exegesis and  Argument. ed. E. N. Lee; A. P. D. Mourelatos; and R. M. Rorty. Assen, the Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Comp., 1973) PP. 17-33. 29 sort of "true" knowledge not that they l i v e d t h e i r l i v e s i n terms of NMT but that i n r e f l e c t i n g f o r the f i r s t time on the nature of knowledge, NMT would be the metaphysics with which they would s t a r t . In any case the early Greek philosophers do react just as Mourelatos' theory about NMT predicts: they do regard KA as the only true sort of knowledge. Hermann Frankel has shown of Xenophanes, f o r example, that he "characterizes as c e r t a i n and exhaustive only that knowledge that i s empirically grounded. He holds only opsis, 'vision', and 20 h i s t o r i e , 'direct acquaintance*, as r e l i a b l e . " Another scholar who has recognized t h i s "tendency to think of knowledge i n terms of some sort of d i r e c t acquaintance with the objects of knowledge, e.g. i n terms 21 of seeing them or of witnessing them" i s Jaakko Hintikka. Hintikka concludes that for the Greeks only an eyewitness's knowledge counted as genuine knowledge, and he then uses t h i s f a c t i n showing how i t was that they thought that the objects of knowledge must be changeless. ^ u H. Prankel, "Xenophanes' Empiricism and His Critique of Knowledge (B3IL)" (In The Pre-Socrates, ed. A. P. D. Mourelatos. Garden City, New York: DouDleday and Co., 1971+) p. 1 3 0 . 2 1 J . Hintikka, Time and Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) p. 72 f f . 30 The corollary to a l l this, that a l l objects of knowledge are existing things, likewise shows up in the early Greek philosophers. In particular i t shows up in the curious fact that the Greeks treated properties as i f they were substances in their own right. This of course they would have to do i f they wanted to claim knowledge of properties within the limitations of the given corollary. Thus evidence that they held that properties were things constitutes evidence that they did indeed construe knowledge as acquaintance. At any rate Parmenides, for example, did think of properties as things and for him predicates were rather like proper names. J Plato himself held a similar view in his earlier dialogues. At Charmides I58e-l59a, for example, Socrates insists that i f Charmides is really temperate (as his admirers claim) then he w i l l have some "temperance inside him as a perceptible substance: i f you have temperance with you, you can hold an opinion Cdoxa] about i t . For being in you, I presume i t must, in that Case, afford some per-ception from which you can form some opinion of what temperance i s , and what kind of thing i t i s .... And since you understand the Greek tongue... you can t e l l me, I suppose, your view of this particular thought of yours.... Then in order A. P. D. Mourelatos, op. c i t . , pp. 18-22. Ibid., p. I4.3. 31 that we may make a guess whether i t i s i n you or not, t e l l me... what you say of temperance according to your opinion. ^ A l i t t l e later Socrates persists: Charmides, attend more closely and look into yourself; reflect on the quality that i s given you by the presence of temperance, and what quality i t must have to work this effect on you. Take stock of a l l this and t e l l me like a good, brave fellow, what i t appears to 2^ you to be. ^ Further evidence that Plato thought of properties as things i s found at Lysis 217c-e where "white" i s sub-stantialized and at Phaedo 102-106 where, among other properties, "being t a l l e r " is said to be an ingredient of ta l l e r persons, one that either "withdraws or perishes" when the t a l l e r persons are compared with things yet t a l l e r than they. It should not be surprising that Plato r e i f i e d properties once i t i s realized that this follows from the belief that a l l knowledge is KA of things, for certainly i t i s not an unknown fact that the early Plato did hold this belief. Of a l l the texts that might be quoted to support this fact, however, one of the most 2 ^ Charmides lf>8e-l59a, trans, by Lamb. per Charmides l60d-e, trans, by Lamb. 32 interesting sees Plato brush right up against the KP/KA distinction only to reject i t in favour of NMT's "KA only" view of knowledge. About half way through Charmides, Critias decides that temperance i s the knowledge or science whose sub-26 ject matter i s sciences. Socrates then proceeds to commit him to the view that the temperate man qua temperate man i s a scientist of sciences who knows only whether or not a given thing i s a science. The science of sciences s t r i c t l y speaking does not give i t s possessor any knowledge of the subject matter of any other science but only the knowledge of science per se. In other words, the scientist of sciences qua scientist of sciences w i l l know that chemistry is a science whereas astrology is not (170a) but he w i l l not know any chemicals nor anything about chemistry nor any zodical signs nor:anything about astrology. He w i l l know medicine (qua medicine) regardless of whether or not he as an individual knows anything of health and disease. Socrates quite properly finds this paradoxical and points out that he who would inquire into the nature of medicine must test i t in health and disease, which are Cf. Charmides 166c. 33 the sphere of medicine, and not in what i s 27 extraneous and i s not i t s sphere. Later on, in referring back to this puzzling result, Socrates notes the impossibility of a man knowing in a sort of way that which he does not know at a l l . Accord-ing to our admission, he knows that which he does not know --- than which nothing, as I think, can be more irr a t i o n a l . Now to express precisely this paradox, Socrates says at 170c that the scientist of sciences, "will not know what he knows, but only that he knows," this point being immediately elaborated: Then being temperate, or temperance, w i l l not be this knowledge of what one knows or does not know, but, i t would seem merely knowing that 29 one knows or does not know. The point i s this: qua scientist of sciences, the scientist of sciences i s not acquainted with the objects of any science: he merely knows whether or not he or someone else possesses what can properly be called a science. Hence he knows that he or someone else knows something, but something with which he i s not acquainted. Here notably seems to be a case of KP which i s very 27 28 29 Charmides 171a-b, trans, by Jowett. Charmides 1 7 5 c , trans, by Jowett. Charmides 1 7 0 c , trans, by Lamb. 314-d e f i n i t e l y not a case of KA. However, i t i s not as i f Plato were saying: "lookj here we have two sorts of knowledge." On the contrary, he i s pointing to this s i t u a t i o n as the absurdum to which C r i t i a s 1 p o s i t i o n leads. I t i s as i f he were saying: "stupid C r i t i a s ] look at the s i l l y d i s t i n c t i o n to which your science of sciences gives r i s e . This d i s t i n c t i o n i s absurd and thus your science of sciences i s absurd too." In Charmides, then, Plato i s seen s t i l l very much c l i n g i n g to the presupposition that a l l knowledge i s KA, and, on the basis of thi s presupposition, r e j e c t i n g an assertion that suggests that there i s some kind of knowledge that i s not KA. Let us c a l l the early Plato's epistemological presupposition the " a l l K i s KA" presupposition. 35 THE PICTURE WINDOW THEORY OF LANGUAGE One of the ways i n which the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n can be made i s i n terms of r e f e r e n t i a l opacity. As we noted above, i n cases of KA the knower may be said to know the object of knowledge regardless of how i t i s described whereas i n cases of KP t h i s i s not so. To know that a i s c i s not: .necessarily to know that b i s c, even though, i n f a c t , a = b. Given this way of making the d i s t i n c t i o n , however, i t w i l l follow that anyone who presupposed that a l l K i s KA w i l l be committed to the view that a l l knowledge i s transparent. For such a person the two statements, "Tom knows 12 i s 12" and "Toms knows 5 + 7 i s 12" w i l l either both be true or both be f a l s e . What thi s present chapter attempts to do i s to uncover the more general phenomenon which underlies t h i s paradoxical p o s i t i o n , to uncover the "transparency of language" required by Mourelatos' NMT. Let us begin by looking at a few texts. At Euthy-demus 279a-c we f i n d Socrates making a l i s t of "good things". Having mentioned that wisdom and good fortune are among the good things (279c), Socrates reconsiders what he has said and r e a l i z e s that: A. P. D. Mourelatos, op. c i t . , p. 32 36 We have a l m o s t made o u r s e l v e s l a u g h i n g - s t o c k s . • Why a f t e r p u t t i n g good f o r t u n e i n o u r f o r m e r l i s t , we have j u s t b e e n d i s c u s s i n g t h e same t h i n g a g a i n . . . . S u r e l y i t i s r i d i c u l o u s , when a t h i n g h a s b e e n b e f o r e u s a l l t h e t i m e , t o s e t i t f o r t h a g a i n and go o v e r t h e same g r o u n d t w i c e . . . . Wisdom.... i s p r e s u m a b l y [_ a c a u s e o r p a r t o f ] good f o r t u n e . 3 1 I t i s as i f S o c r a t e s were t r y i n g t o l i s t e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t s e t s o f n a t u r a l numbers and h a v i n g m e n t i o n e d "numbers t h a t end i n 0" and "numbers t h a t a r e d i v i s i b l e by 5" s u d d e n l y r e a l i z e s t h a t numbers t h a t end i n 0 a r e numbers t h a t a r e d i v i s i b l e by 5. "How s t u p i d ! " he w o u l d t h i n k , " s u r e l y i t i s r i d i c u l o u s , when a t h i n g h a s b e e n b e f o r e u s a l l t h e t i m e , t o s e t i t f o r t h a g a i n and go o v e r t h e same g r o u n d t w i c e . " B u t why does S o c r a t e s f i n d i t r i d i c u l o u s ? E v e n i f wisdom i s p r i m a f a c i e t h e same as good f o r t u n e , why s h o u l d i t be t r u e g e n e r a l l y t h a t i f s o m e t h i n g goes u n d e r two names o r d e s c r i p t i o n s , t h e n i t i s r i d i c u l o u s t o l i s t t h e two names o r d e s c r i p t i o n s and y e t n o t r e a l i z e t h a t t h e y r e f e r t o o r d e n o t e t h e same t h i n g ? S o c r a t e s makes a s i m i l a r r e m a r k a t R e p u b l i c L|.32d-e. He and G l a u c o n h a v e b e e n " h u n t i n g " f o r j u s t i c e when s u d d e n l y S o c r a t e s r e a l i z e s t h a t t h e y h a v e Euthydemus 2 7 9 d , t r a n s , by Lamb. 37 unknowingly been speaking of i t a l l the time: i t i s just the principle that each citizen should "do his own business". Once again Socrates finds i t most puzzling that they did not realize that "justice" and "doing one's own business" referred to the same thing. Socrates says: the thing app arently was tumbling about our feet from the start and yet we couldn't see i t , but were most ludicrous, like people who 3 2 sometimes hunt for what they hold in their'hands. Finally, Theaetetus 195d-200c provides us with yet another case of Socrates' being incredulous in the face of the fact that a man can know two names or descriptions of the same thing without knowing that both these names or descriptions refer to the same thing. How i s i t , he wonders, that a man can know "5 + 7" and "12" and yet not know that these are just two designations for the same number? How can he think that 5" + 7 i s other than 12, given that he knows both 5+7 and 12? An adherent to the KA only view can give no satisfactory answer to this question. He i s not in a position to point out that one can know 5> 7* and 12 without neces-Republic k.32d-e, trans, by Shorey, with my emphasis. Note the KA imagry of "holding". 38 s a r i l y knowing that they are i n t e r r e l a t e d i n c e r t a i n ways. In each of these three cases, then, Socrates i s presupposing (either i n Plato's behalf or at least on behalf of those who hold that a l l K i s KA) that: Someone who i s i n possession of two names or descriptions both of which he knows how to use i n ordinary language and both of which refer to or denote the same thing w i l l not only know these two things under two names or descriptions but w i l l also necessarily know that the two names or descriptions r e f e r to the same thing. In other words, someone who i s acquainted with a thing under two names or descriptions (e.g., "wisdom" and "good fortune") i n the sense that he at lea s t knows how to use or to understand the two names or descriptions w i l l moreover necessarily have what we would c a l l KP that the two names or descriptions refer to the same thing. Thus, for example, he who has met Clark Kent and who has also met Superman and who therefore knows how to use these two names w i l l necessarily know that Clark Kent i s Superman. Having met the man i n his secret i d e n t i t y as Clark Kent and having met the man i n his uniform as Superman, one w i l l necessarily know that the two men are the same man. Let us c a l l this presupposition the 39 "Ka & Kb & a = b s=^ K(a = b)" presupposition or "PKab" for short. Needless to say, PKab i s as.powerful as i t i s curious. It implies, for example, that i f I know some x, then given any y such that I understand how to use "y" in ordinary language, i f x = y, then I shall know that x = y, and furthermore only i f x 4 y shall I not know that x = y. However, i f in the latter case I reflect that (assuming PKab) my ignorance of x = y can only be due to the fact that they are not identical, I shall come to the knowledge that x # y. The converse is also true: i f to know x i s to know for a l l known y o whether y = x, then i t follows that PKab. 1 Let us consider some of the repercussions of presupposing PKab. F i r s t l y , i f any two (known) things such as courage and virtue are really the same'thing, then one may easily ascertain this fact simply by know-ing courage and virtue in a way that i s sufficient for being able to talk about them i n a given language. Secondly there w i l l be no problem in deciding whether or not a given definition actually defines the term i t i s meant to define: for example, the principle that each citizen should "do his own business" w i l l immediately be seen to be the same thing as justice. Thirdly, given ko any description of a given thing, one w i l l know that that description does describe that thing. This e n t a i l s , for example, that young children who have just learnt the alphabet w i l l have marvelous s p e l l i n g a b i l i t i e s . Sup-pose such a c h i l d wishes to s p e l l "mouse". Knowing m and also knowing the f i r s t l e t t e r i n theefword "mouse", the c h i l d w i l l necessarily know that the two names or descriptions "m" and "the f i r s t l e t t e r i n the word 'mouse'" r e f e r to the same thing. This w i l l enable him to write down the f i r s t l e t t e r c o r r e c t l y . S i m i l a r l y he w i l l know what to write down f o r the second l e t t e r , and so on. Another way of looking at this i s as follows: i f to know x i s to know for a l l known y, whether y = x, then to know m i s to know whether the f i r s t l e t t e r in,r the word "mouse" = m. Hence, i f only by methodically going through the alphabet, the c h i l d w i l l e a s i l y enough come to know which l e t t e r to write down f i r s t , which to write down second, and so on. In this manner he w i l l be able to s p e l l not only "mouse" but any word written i n Roman l e t t e r s . Needless to say, PKab holds great promise fo r adults as well. Methodical application of a th description such as "the n l e t t e r or punctuation mark i n the English paragraph which best summarizes the con-tents of thi s book" w i l l enable one to learn the contents of any book ( i n any language) without having to read i t . I t should besnoted that, once again, Socrates i s very puzzled that such marvelous p o s s i b i l i t i e s are not exploited i n everyday l i f e . Why should someone set about reading, he wonders at Theatetus 1 9 8 e - 1 9 9 a » when they already know a l l the l e t t e r s ? f Having seen just how curious the presupposition PKab r e a l l y i s , we are rather l e f t wondering how i t was that Plato could ever have allowed i t to influence his thinking. Why did Plato allow h i s Socrates to assume the truth of PKab even fo r a moment? One answer to this question i s that Plato was strongly influenced by a view that language somehow mirrors or pictures r e a l i t y , by a presupposition that: Names, descriptions or statements picture or display what they name, describe or state. We s h a l l c a l l t h i s presupposition the "Picture Window Theory of Language" or "PWTL" f o r short. I want to say not that Plato held t h i s view but simply that he was influenced by i t . At Cratylus IjJOb, f o r example, i t i s agreed that "the name i s an imitation of the thing." Hence one might ea s i l y take the view that "as the name i s so..also i s the thing, and... he who knows the one w i l l also know the other (lt3i?d)." S i m i l a r l y i n the Phaedo, there i s the k2 passage 99d-100a where Socrates compares ( a l b e i t temporarily) the words that make up a theory (logos) to water i n which i s r e f l e c t e d the r e a l i t i e s that the theory studies. At Theaetetus 206d, moreover, Socrates describes speech (logos) as a "stream that flows through the l i p s " and i n which one sees an image of the speaker's thought " l i k e a r e f l e c t i o n i n a mirror or i n water." Again at Sophist 221d, i t i s i n s i s t e d that someone's name "must surely express his nature." F i n a l l y , along similar l i n e s we are to l d i n Timaeus 29b that we may assume that words f logos i are akin to the matter which they describe; when they relate to the l a s t i n g and permanent and i n t e l l i g i b l e , they ought to be l a s t i n g and unalterable, and, as f a r as th e i r nature allows, i r r e f u t a b l e and i n v i n c i b l e nothing l e s s . ^ On this view, therefore, he who knows the name or description of a thing knows the thing just as he who sees a good, genuine, front-view photograph of some-thing sees what i t portrays. Of course, i f names or descriptions actually display t h e i r objects, then i n l i n e with PKab i t w i l l be obvious when two such names or descriptions r e f e r to or denote the same thing — -just as i t i s obvious when two good front-view photographs Timaeus 29b, trans, by Jowett. 1+3 picture the same thing. PWTL implies PKab. One knows that Clark Kent i s Superman because he sees that each name pictures the one and same man. Each name i s l i k e a completely transparent window overlooking the r e a l i t y that i s i t s referent. I t w i l l be worthwhile at this point to look even more clos e l y at the influence exerted on Plato by PWTL. For insofar as this presupposition i n s i s t s on a r a d i c a l transparency of language, i t bars the way to the notion of KP, given the l a t t e r ' s implied opacity. One of the ways i n which Plato might make progress towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n , then, would be to r e j e c t t h i s presupposition and f o r that matter to r e j e c t i t s s i m i l a r l y r e s t r i c t i n g o f fspring, PKab. Indeed I hope to show that, p r e c i s e l y , Plato does make progress towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i n exactly this way. F i r s t , however, we must try to f i n d out exactly how Plato understood PWTL and exactly how he f e l t i t s influence. Throughout the Cratylus Socrates i s arguing that names ( i . e . , nouns, proper names, adjectives, and verbs) are not mere products of convention. A "good" name, at l e a s t , i s an expression of the nature of the thing to which i t r e f e r s , $ust as a good shuttle i s an expression of the "true or i d e a l shuttle" to which the carpenter Uk looks as he makes the good shuttle (383-390). Sometimes, indeed, the very letters that make up a word can be likened to colours which are used to paint a true-life picture of the referent of that word (k2kd-k25a, k j l c ) . For example, the of " ^ o ^ " (stream) depicts the motion of streams, the tongue being "least at rest in the pronunciation of this l e t t e r " (k26-e, k3kb-c). Always, however, there i s some way in which "the correct name indicates the nature of the thing (k28e))", in which "the name i s an imitation of the thing (k30b)." Up un t i l Cratylus k28e, we find Socrates and Cratylus in basic agreement about a l l this, as indeed throughout the dialogue they are in agreement against those who argue that names are arbitrary conventions. However, at k29 there errupts a dispute in which Socrates claims that some names are bad imitations of their referents and Cratylus claims that a l l names (that really name anything) are good imitations of their referents. Both agree that names are like "pictures" of their referents (k/JOb), only Socrates allows that names may sometimes be bad pictures (k31c-e) whereas Cratylus does not (k31e-ii32a). In fact i t i s Cratylus, not Socrates, who takes the position of complete transparency of language that supports PKab. For Socrates' position allows that in some cases PKab w i l l be false for just as i t sometimes happens that a man who sees two bad photographs of the same thing does not recognize that they are photographs of the same thing, so i t may sometimes happen that a man who knows a thing under two bad names or descriptions does not know that these two names or descriptions refer to the same thing. Prom Cratylus, then, we can conclude that whenever Plato wrote that dialogue, ^ he was already beginning to reject the influence of PWTL and also that of PKab and hence also that of a l l K is KA. On the other hand, he s t i l l took them seriously enough to give long and care-fu l arguments against Cratylus* position. J J Another area in which we can examine the influence of PWTL on Plato i s the area of non-being and falsehood. Here we find Plato greatly troubled by a certain paradox that led to the conclusion that no statements are false. Roughly, this paradox argued that to speak falsely was to say something that did not exist and hence to say nothing, Cratylus is not a late dialogue. Cf. David Ross, Platonic Theory of Ideas (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1953) pp. 1-10.. 35 Cf. Charles H. Kahn, "Language and Ontology in the Cratylus" (In Exegesis and Argument) pp. 157-Ii6 i . e . , n o t t o u t t e r a m e a n i n g f u l s e n t e n c e . P l a t o b r i n g s up t h i s p a r a d o x a t no l e s s t h a n f o u r p l a c e s : Euthydemus 283e-28iic, C r a t y l u s k.29d-lL30a, T h e a e t e t u s l88c-l89b and S o p h i s t 236e-2iilc. I t i s o s t e n s i b l y t h e m a j o r p r o b l e m o f t h e S o p h i s t . However, what l i e s b e n e a t h t h i s p a r a d o x and why d i d P l a t o t a k e i t so t o h e a r t ? As D a v i d W i g g i n s h a s shown i n t h e f i r s t s e c t i o n o f h i s e x c e l l e n t a r t i c l e " S e n t e n c e M e a n i n g , N e g a t i o n , and P l a t o ' s P r o b l e m o f N o n - B e i n g , " J one o f t h e r e a s o n s t h a t P l a t o was so e n c h a n t e d by t h e p a r a d o x was t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h a t anyone who makes a s t a t e m e n t must be s a y -i n g " s o m e t h i n g " , t h i s " s o m e t h i n g " b e i n g a s i t u a t i o n o r s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . 3 7 I t seems t h a t j u s t as an onoma (name) i n t h e C r a t y l u s i s an i n s t r u m e n t o f t e a c h i n g and s o r t -i n g o u t R e a l i t y (... 388 A - C ) , whose c o r r e c t n e s s l i e s i n t h e p u r p o s e o f showing how t h i n g s a r e . . . , so on t h e v i e w o f s e n t e n c e s w h i c h g i v e s t h e p a r a d o x a s e n t e n c e may be s e e n as showing, o r d r a w i n g t h e h e a r e r ' s a t t e n t i o n t o , o r d i s p l a y -i n g f o r h im... some s i t u a t i o n i n R e a l i t y a s i t u a t i o n i n t h e w o r l d o f whose e x i s t e n c e he w i l l as a r e s u l t o f t h i s a c t become i n f o r m e d . D a v i d W i g g i n s , " S e n t e n c e M e a n i n g , N e g a t i o n , and P l a t o ' s P r o b l e m o f N o n - B e i n g " ( I n P l a t o I , ed. G r e g o r y V l a s t o s , G a r d e n C i t y , New Y o r k : . D o u b l e d a y and Co., 1971) pp. 268-280. 3 7 I b i d . , pp. 270, 278 & 280; c f . T h e a e t e t u s 189a a n d S o p h i s t 237d-e. 3 8 I b i d . , p . 278. 47 Of course, i f i t i s always the case that the s i t u a t i o n d i s p l a y e d by a sentence e x i s t s i n the world, i n R e a l i t y , then i t i s always the case that a sentence i s t r u e ! To put t h i s i n terms of what we s a i d before, since PWTL i m p l i e s that statements are l i k e good, genuine photographs of what they s t a t e ( i . e . , t h e i r r e f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s ) ; and since a l l good, genuine photographs are photographs of e x i s t i n g t h i n g s ; t h e r e f o r e a l l statements state e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n s as r e f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , and hence a l l statements stat e what i s t r u e . Indeed, i f there were any f a l s e statements they would be l i k e photo-graphs of things t h a t do not e x i s t , and j u s t as photo-graphs of things that do not e x i s t are not, p r o p e r l y speaking, photographs, so i n the same way f a l s e s t a t e -ments would not, p r o p e r l y speaking, be statements. Hence i f anything i s a statement, then i t must be a true s t a t e -ment. In t h i s way, then, we see that P l a t o ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h i s paradox were caused l a r g e l y by h i s sympathies w i t h PWTL. Furthermore h i s r e s o l v i n g t h i s paradox w i l l show that he has already completely thrown o f f these sympathies. I b i d . , pp.,"270-271 and c f . Parmenides l 6 l e . 1+8 Exactly what point have we now reached i n our attempt to show that Plato made progress towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n ? At this point we are now aware of three NMT presuppositions that did influence Plato and that did stand i n the way of h i s making the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n . These three presuppositions were that a l l K i s KA, PKab, and PWTL. In what follows, we s h a l l see that Plato rejected the influence of each of these, thereby already making some headway towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n , and that, moreover, as early as the Republic he had rejected t h e i r influence to the point where he was w i l l i n g and able to accomodate certa i n cases of what we would c a l l KP. 49 KNOWLEDGE IN THE REPUBLIC In order to understand the epistemology of the Republic, i t is essential to understand what Plato meant by the "hypotheses" of the Divided Line texts and to understand the way in which he thought they could be known. If he thought that they were simply concepts and that they were known merely by acquaintance, merely by being "seen" with the "eye of the soul", then there i s no reason to think that Plato had advanced from his position in the Charmides. If, however, he thought that the hypotheses were propositions and that they were known by means of interrelating various concepts and deducing various conclusions, then there i s every reason to think that Plato had gone very far indeed not only in discover-ing the KP/KA distinction but in establishing i t . What I claim i s that Plato thought of the ^ 'hypotheses" in neither of these ways but in a way that straddled these two ways. I claim that he thought of the hypotheses under a dis-junctive concept allowed them to be either concepts or propositions. By a "disjunctive concept" i s meant a con-cept such as "Easter coloured" yiwhich covers two or more "ordinary" concepts, e.g. "yellow" and "mauve". Arguments about objects f a l l i n g under such concepts do not have to make the relevant distinction between the two disjunctss 50 e.g. an argument showing that Easter coloured objects need not be red does not have to s p l i t the Easter coloured objects into two classes. I also claim that Plato thought that the hypotheses could be known by means of a process that involved both becoming acquainted with cert a i n things and also involved establishing i n t e r r e l a t i o n s , coming to what we would c a l l KP of certain concepts. Thus I do not claim that Plato advanced so f a r that he thought i n terms of a purely propositional model with respect to the hypo-theses but, on the other hand, I claim that he was no longer f o r c i n g a l l knowledge into a KA only mould, that he thought of the hypotheses and of knowing the hypo-theses i n a way not appropriate to mere KA but i n a way that could accomodate KP. I do not think that Plato was completely clear about what he was doing i n every respect but I do think he was quite clear that he was no longer handling knowledge i n a way that was appropriate to the KA only model. I claim that he had consciously abandoned his view that a l l knowledge was simply some sort of "mental seeing or touching" and that he was reformulating his ideas on knowledge i n such a way that they could accomodate what we (but not Plato, of course) would c a l l "KP". In p a r t i c u l a r the Divided Line texts see him arguing to the ef f e c t that i n some cases a knowledge of 51 c e r t a i n i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s among Forms i s necessary f o r knowing some given hypothesis and t h i s , of course,•is d i s t i n c t l y not i n the s p i r i t of a KA only model of knowledge. Indeed, to say that Plato was here handling knowledge i n a way appropriate to a KA only model of know-ledge would be to say that a KA only model of knowledge should embrace a feature that properly belongs only to KP namely, the feature of i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . How-ever, as we saw i n the f i r s t chapter, KA involves nothing more i n t r i c a t e than an "immediate apprehension" of the single object of knowledge. Let us now try to prove the assertions I have just made. To begin with l e t us r e c a l l from the Divided Line texts that at 5l0c Socrates complains about the students of mathematics that they f i r s t postulate the odd and the even and the various figures [e.g., the square] and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these i n each branch of science, regard then as known, and treating them as absolute assumptions ^hypothesis!, do not deign to render any further account LlogosH of them to themselves or others, taking i t f o r granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take t h e i r s t a r t from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that f o r the investig a t i o n of which they set out. ^° Republic 5l0c-d, trans, by Shorey. Cf. Republic 5 3 3 c 52 The complaint against the students of mathematics i s not that their "hypotheses" are false, non-existent or in some other way incapable of being properly known but that the students too easily take them for granted and f a i l to investigate them. As Socrates admits, these students could avoid this defect i f only they went "back to the beginning" in their studies --- for the things themselves that these students study "are in t e l l i g i b l e s when apprehended in conjunction with a f i r s t prin-ciple." Unfortunately the "mental habit" of these students is such that they do not go "back to the beginning" but persist in relying on what they feel i s obvious. What, then, should these students do? As i s revealed especially at Republic 533» they must be taught to make use of the faculty of dialectic. For dialectic is the only process of inquiry that advances i n this manner, doing away with hypotheses [.qua hypotheses], up to the f i r s t principle i t s e l f [ i . e . the Good cf. 532a-b] in order to find confirmation there. ^ Thus i t i s with the help of dialectic that they could ^ Republic 5l l d . ^ Republic 533c-d, trans, by Shorey. 53 indeed "go back to the beginning" as required and f o r the f i r s t time apprehend t h e i r hypotheses " i n conjunction with a f i r s t p r i n c i p l e " . D i a l e c t i c w i l l enable them to r i s e to that which requires no assumption fhypothesis] and i s the s t a r t i n g point of a l l , and af t e r attaining to that again taking hold of the f i r s t dependencies from i t , so to pro-ceed downward to the conclusion [ i . e . the hypo-thesis or else something based on the hypothesis], making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas fForms] moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas. ^ Once they have gone through t h i s "progress of thought" they w i l l at l a s t be able to give a logos f o r the hypo-thesis and thus th e i r "understanding" w i l l be "converted into true knowledge of science." ^ They w i l l no longer f a l l under the complaint that they "do not deign to render any further logos" ^ f o r th e i r hypotheses. It should be emphasized i n this connection that the reason here that Plato complained that the students of mathematics did not have the "true knowledge or science" which belongs only to the highest section of the ^ Republic 5 l l h - c , trans, by Shorey. ^ Republic 533c and c f . also 5 3 k b . ^ Republic 5 l 0 c-d. Divided Line ^ was that they did not bother to give a logos for their hypotheses. At the time he was writing the Divided Line texts of the Republic, Plato had come to hold that being able to give a logos was a necessary condition for knowing. The man who cannot give a logos, "in so far as he i s incapable of giving a logos to him-self and others, does not possess f u l l reason and i n t e l -ligence about the matter." ^ The problem with the "understanding" of the students of mathematics, then, was that i t did not require the capacity to give such a logos. ^ This much having been said, we can at last begin to answer the questions, "what did Plato think his "hypo-theses" were?" and, "how did he think they could be known rather than merely taken for granted?" We should want to know, of course, whether he thought of them as objects (e.g. Forms) or propositions or both, and, correspondingly, whether he thought of the logoi necessary ^ Republic 5l0c-d. ^ 7 Republic 53i|-t>. Cf. also Republic 5l0c, 531e-532a, 533b-d. Evidence of Plato's view that knowledge requires a logos can also be found at Phaedo 76b-c and Symposium 202a. 1 + 8 Cf. Republic 5l0c & 533b-d. 55 to t h e i r being known as being d e f i n i t i o n s or proofs or accounts or a l l these things together. In chapter X of his Plato's E a r l i e r D i a l e c t i c Robinson claimed that "Plato here treats as hypotheses certain propositions which the mathematicians think they know, which they consider 'plain to a l l . ' " ^ Without at a l l arguing f o r this p o s i t i o n he goes on to say that " d i a l e c t i c , i n contrast to mathematics, does not take for granted cer t a i n propositions that ought 50 to be merely hypothesized." ^ For Robinson the "hypo-thesis" i s a conclusion that must be deduced from other propositions and ultimately from the Good". "Plato surely [??3 conceives of the downward path as a proof, a deduction, a demonstration, i n which conclusions are drawn from the anhypotheton £ the GoodJ as from an axiom." This leads him so f a r as to have Plato think-ing not only of the hypotheses but also of the Good as 52 being a proposition or perhaps a set of propositions. k9 ^ R. Robinson, "Hypothesis i n the Republic" (Reprinted i n Plato I, ed.. Vlastos. New York; Doubleday and Co., 1971). p. lOlx with my emphasis. 5 0 Ibid., p. 1 0 8 . Ibid., p. 116. ^ 2 Ibid., pp. 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 . 56 For Robinson, then, the hypotheses are propositions and the way i n which they come to be known i s by deducing them from the Good. Hence the logos necessary f o r t h i s knowledge would be a deduction or proof. Of course i f Robinson were r i g h t this would more than prove my point that Plato had consciously abandoned the KA only model of knowledge by the time he wrote Republic. Unfortunately there are a number of d i f f i c u l t i with Robinson's int e r p r e t a t i o n , some of which are brought out by R. M. Hare i n his "Plato and the Mathematicians." F i r s t there i s the fact that the examples of hypo-theses that Plato gives at Republic 5l0c are not examples of propositions but of concepts or, perhaps, Forms. They are "the odd and the even and the various figures £e.g., the squareJ and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these." Second there i s the f a c t that the f a c u l t y of d i a l e c t i c i s said by Plato to make use not of proposition! "but only of pure ideas ["FormsJ moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas." ^ Now presumably R. M. Hare, "Plato and the Mathematicians" (In New Essays on Plato and A r i s t o t l e , ed. R. Bambrough. London; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). ^ Republic 5 l l c . 57 somewhere a l o n g i t s d i a l e c t i c j o u r n e y ( p e r h a p s a t t h e e n d ) , m i n d e n c o u n t e r s t h e h y p o t h e s i s f r o m w h i c h i t s e t o u t . However, x f as P l a t o s a y s , t h e j o u r n e y i n v o l v e s movement o n l y among i d e a s o r Forms, t h e n when mind e n c o u n t e r s t h e h y p o t h e s i s , i t must e n c o u n t e r n o t a p r o p o s i t i o n b u t an i d e a o r Form ( e . g . , t h e s q u a r e i t s e l f ) . T h i r d and t h i s i s H a r e ' s p o i n t t h e l o g o s t h a t i s r e q u i r e d f o r knowledge o f t h e h y p o t h e s i s i s g i v e n t o be t h e l o g o s o f t h e e s s e n c e ( o u s i a ) o f a t h i n g . P r o p o s i t i o n s , however, a r e n o t and do n o t have e s s e n c e s . O n l y t h i n g s have e s s e n c e s . G i v e n t h i s , t h e n , t h e h y p o t h e s e s w o u l d be t h i n g s h a v i n g ( o r p e r h a p s b e i n g ) e s s e n c e s and t h e l o g o i w o u l d be n o t p r o o f s b u t d e f i n i t i o n s d i s p l a y i n g t h e s e e s s e n c e s . F i n a l l y t h e r e i s t h e p o i n t t h a t i t s i m p l y seems r i d i c u l o u s t o h o l d t h a t P l a t o ' s i m a g r y was f a r d i v o r c e d f r o m h i s r e a l o p i n i o n s on the: m a t t e r t h a t a l t h o u g h he c o n s i s t e n t l y and f o r c e f u l l y d e s c r i b e d t h e Good as an o b j e c t t o be " s e e n " t h a t he n o n e t h e l e s s r e a l l y h e l d t h a t i t was an a x i o m o r s e t o f a x i o m s . On R o b i n s o n J s v i e w i t 55 C f . R e p u b l i c 5llb. 56 57 H a r e , op. c i t . , p . 22 and c f . R e p u b l i c 53l+b, Note t h a t " l o g o s " c a n be t r a n s l a t e d as e i t h e r " d e f i n i t i o n " o r " p r o o f " d e p e n d i n g on t h e c o n t e x t . 58 seems t h a t i n d e s c r i b i n g t h e Good i n t h e way i n w h i c h he d i d P l a t o was b e i n g d e l i b e r a t e l y m i s l e a d i n g . I f P l a t o h a d h e l d t h a t t h e Good was an ax i o m o r s e t o f axioms, s u r e l y he wo u l d have a t l e a s t d r o p p e d a h i n t t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t h i s r e a d e r s h o u l d be c a u t i o u s o f t h e o p p o s i t e c o n -n o t a t i o n s o f t h e i m a g r y . F o r t h e s e f o u r r e a s o n s we must c o n c l u d e t h a t R o b i n s o n h a s a s c r i b e d t o P l a t o a s o p h i s t i c a t i o n n o t f o u n d i n t h e t e x t . I t i s s i m p l y t o o much t o assume t h a t " P l a t o h e r e t r e a t s as h y p o t h e s e s c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s . " However, what does he t r e a t as h y p o t h e s e s ? A g a i n s t R o b i n s o n , R. M. Hare h a s a r g u e d t h a t t h e " h y p o t h e s e s " o f t h e D i v i d e d L i n e t e x t s were f o r P l a t o j u s t what he s a y s t h e y were a t 5l0c m a t h e m a t i c a l e n t i t i e s o f some s o r t ( w h i c h a r e c a p a b l e o f b e i n g p r o p e r l y d e f i n e d and w h i c h a c t u a l l y e x i s t ) . On t h i s v i e w , as Hare r e a l i z e s , " i t r e q u i r e s e x p l a i n i n g how P l a t o c a n h e r e speak o f h y p o t h e s e s as t h i n g s , whereas e l s e w h e r e , ^ and i n d e e d p e r h a p s e l s e w h e r e i n t h e R e p u b l i c , he seems t o speak o f them as p r o p o s i t i o n s . " To answer t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t H a r e s t a t e s t h a t P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n 58 H a r e , op. c i t . , pp. 2 2 - 2 3 , 59 ' E . g . , a t Phaedo 99d f f . 6 0 H a r e , op. c i t . , p . 2 3 . 59 o f knowledge was i n a s t a t e o f t r a n s i t i o n . I n f a c t he was g r a d u a l l y m o v i n g f r o m a KA model o f knowledge t o a KP model o f k n o w l e d g e . Hence f o r P l a t o t h e o b j e c t o f knowledge was g r a d u a l l y c h a n g i n g f r o m a t h i n g t o p r o p o s i t i o n . B e c a u s e t h e change h a d n o t b e e n c o m p l e t e d , he t h o u g h t o f t h e o b j e c t o f knowledge sometimes i n one way, sometimes i n a n o t h e r . T h i s t h e n i s H a r e ' s e x p l a n a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , as t h e r e a d e r w i l l have n o t e d , i t i s an e x p l a n a t i o n i n harmony w i t h my own v i e w s on t h e m a t t e r . However, whereas Hare m e r e l y s t a t e s t h a t P l a t o ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f knowledge i s i n a p r o c e s s o f t r a n s i t i o n , t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what most n e e d s t o be p r o v e d , and whereas Hare i s vague a b o u t t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o show t h a t i t was i n d e e d sometime b e f o r e he h a d c o m p l e t e d t h e R e p u b l i c t h a t P l a t o h a d l e f t t h e KA o n l y model and a c t u a l l y embarked on t h i s t r a n s i t i o n . Thus as i t s t a n d s H a r e ' s e x p l a n a t i o n i s weak. S i t t i n g judgement on H a r e ' s a r t i c l e i s C. C. W. T a y l o r ' s " P l a t o and t h e M a t h e m a t i c i a n s : An E x a m i n a t i o n o f P r o f e s s o r H a r e ' s V i e w s . " T a y l o r t a k e s e x c e p t i o n t o H a r e ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e h y p o t h e s e s a r e n o t p r o p o s i t i o n s and e n d e a v o r s t o show t h a t t h e y a r e . I n f a c t , T a y l o r i s d e f e n d i n g R o b i n s o n ' s p o s i t i o n . C. C. W. T a y l o r , " P l a t o and t h e M a t h e m a t i c i a n s : An E x a m i n a t i o n o f P r o f e s s o r . H a r e ' s V i e w s " ( I n P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Q u a r t e r l y 17 (1967) pp. 193-203. 60 O p e n i n g T a y l o r ' s p a p e r i s a v a l u a b l e s e c t i o n on t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e G r e e k word f o r " h y p o t h e s i s " . T a y l o r a r g u e s v i g o r o u s l y t h a t most o f t h e t i m e t h e word r e f e r s t o some s o r t o f p r o p o s i t i o n . However, he a d m i t s on H a r e ' s b e h a l f t h a t i t c a n sometimes mean " p o s t u l a t e d e n t i t y " ( i . e . e n t i t y p o s t u l a t e d as e x i s t i n g ) . F u r t h e r -more he q u o t e s a p a s s a g e f r o m a t r e a t i s e On A n c i e n t  M e d i c i n e i n w h i c h , as he a r g u e s , t h e word i s u s e d i n b o t h s e n s e s u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d l y . I n o t h e r words, t h e a u t h o r o f t h e p a s s a g e f r o m On A n c i e n t M e d i c i n e i s t r e a t -i n g as c a p a b l e o f b e i n g " h y p o t h e s e s " b o t h p r o p o s i t i o n s and p o s t u l a t e d e n t i t i e s . W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e examples o f h y p o t h e s e s t h a t P l a t o g i v e s a t 5 l 0 c , t h e n , T a y l o r c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e u s e o f t h e word " h y p o t h e s e s " i n t h a t p a s s a g e " s h o u l d be r e g a r d e d as an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d u s e 6? s i m i l i a r t o t h a t i n On A n c i e n t M e d i c i n e . " Thus T a y l o r i s i n e f f e c t a r g u i n g on what i s i n f a c t my own b e h a l f t h a t ( a t l e a s t i n t h i s p a s s a g e ) P l a t o t h o u g h t o f t h e h y p o t h e s e s u n d e r a d i s j u n c t i v e c o n c e p t t h a t i n c l u d e d b o t h " p r o p o s i t i o n s assumed" and " e n t i t i e s p o s t u l a t e d " . The n e x t s e c t i o n o f T a y l o r ' s p a p e r i s d e v o t e d t o u n d e r m i n i n g H a r e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f R e p u b l i c 533b-c. I I b i d . , p . 196 61 have not mentioned this interpretation and (especially i f Taylor i s right) there i s no need to. However, to get to the crux of Taylor's paper, we turn to page 198 where he asks, "on the traditional assumption that the hypotheses of the Republic are propositions, what prop-ositions are they?" ^3 He proceeds to argue that they are propositions of the form: "the square exists"; "the three kinds of angles exist"; etc. and also propositions defining the square, the three kinds of angles, etc. On this view, then, the mathematicians are being accused by Plato of not proving the existence of their objectsv,and, curiously, of not proving the truth of their definitions. However, a l l this i s on the assumption that the hypo-theses of the Republic are propositions. And although Taylor has argued that these hypotheses are not simply things, he nowhere argues against the possibility that they were in Plato's mind either things (of a special sort) or propositions (of some kind). This possibility i s l e f t wide open. Where then does the Robinson^Hare-Taylor debate leave us? F i r s t l y we s t i l l cannot, as Robinson and Taylo D J 5 Ibid., p. 198 6ij- Ibid., p. 199 62 do, merely assume that the hypotheses are nothing other than propositions. Besides the four as yet unanswered d i f f i c u l t i e s with t h i s assumption given above (pp. 5 6 - 5 8 ) there i s now the additional consideration that the Greek word for "hypothesis" could be used undifferentiatedly. Secondly we would f i n d i t very d i f f i c u l t to hold, as Hare does, that the hypotheses are simply objects. Besides the fact that the word "hypothesis" has strong con-notations to the contrary there i s also another fact that f o r Plato the knowledge of these hypotheses required knowledge about th e i r r elationship with the Good. How-ever, knowledge about t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p with the Good i s not simple acquaintance: i t i s propositional. Yet, i f as Hare says, the hypotheses were for Plato simply objects, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see why he introduced such new and elaborate methods for knowing them rather than simply saying that they could be "seen" or " r e c o l l e c t e d " . Why, for instance, does Plato exult that the philosopher does / not merely "see" the objects of knowledge but "views things i n their connection"? ^ Why does Plato take such enthusiasm i n the f a c t that the d i a l e c t i c journey teaches the philosopher about the hypotheses t h e i r Republic 5 3 7 c . 63 "relation and reference to the Good"? ^6 answer to these questions must be to the effect that Plato is now handling the objects of knowledge in a way that is suited at least as much to propositions as to things. In the end, then, we find ourselves uneasy about agree-ing with Robinson and Taylor and we also find ourselves uneasy about agreeing with Hare. A l l uneasiness could be dispelled, however, and a l l d i f f i c u l t i e s met i f only we held that Plato thought of his hypotheses under a disjunctive concept and that, in harmony with this, he described the epistemology of the Divided Line generally in such a way as could accomodate both things and propositions as objects of knowledge, in other words, as could accomodate both KA and KP. Under this interpretation, for example, the logos necessary for knowledge of the hypothesis could sometimes be a definition as required by the fact that at Republic 534-° i t i s said to be the logos of an essence or i t could also be a proof of some sort as seems to be required by the fact that the dialectic journey involves various interconnections and i s thus deductive in nature. To make this move, moreover, we Republic 5 0 6 a . 64 w o u l d n o t have t o h o l d t h a t P l a t o was h i m s e l f e n t i r e l y c l e a r a b o u t t h i s m a t t e r i n t h e way t h a t we a r e b u t s i m p l y t h a t he was now h a n d l i n g knowledge i n a way t h a t p r e s u p p o s e d i t . We c o u l d h o l d t h a t whereas i n t h e C h a r m i d e s he h a d b e e n f o r c i n g a l l knowledge i n t o a KA o n l y mould, t h a t h e r e i n t h e R e p u b l i c P l a t o was a d v a n c i n g what we ( b u t n o t P l a t o ) w o u l d c a l l a " d i s j u n c t i v e a n a l y s i s o f k n o w l e d g e " , one c a p a b l e o f a c c o m o d a t i n g e i t h e r KA o r KP. T h i s t h e n w i l l be my own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s u p p o r t f o r w h i c h c a n come n o t o n l y f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i t r e s o l v e s t h e R o b i n s o n - H a r e - T a y l o r d e b a t e b u t a l s o f r o m an a r t i c l e by Montgomery F u r t h 7^ j . n w h i c h he g i v e s a s i m i l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o R e p u b l i c 476e-480a. We s h a l l t u r n t o t h i s a r t i c l e f o r j u s t a moment. R e p u b l i c 476e-480a i s t h e p a s s a g e i n w h i c h P l a t o d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e o b j e c t s o f knowledge f r o m t h e o b j e c t s o f b e l i e f on t h e b a s i s o f t h e f a c t t h a t knowledge and b e l i e f a r e d i f f e r e n t " f a c u l t i e s " o r " a b i l i t i e s " . What we, o f c o u r s e , w o u l d want t o know i s w h e t h e r P l a t o c o n -c e i v e s o f t h e o b j e c t s o f knowledge as b e i n g o n l y t h i n g s , o n l y p r o p o s i t i o n s , o r as b e i n g e i t h e r t h i n g s o r p r o p -o s i t i o n s . F o r w h a t e v e r he h o l d s them t o be h e r e he w i l l 6 7 Montgomery F u r t h , " E l e m e n t s o f E l e a t i c O n t o l o g y " ( I n The P r e - S o c r a t i c s ) pp. 2kl-2k7, e s p e c i a l l y p . 245. 65 p r o b a b l y h o l d them t o be i n t h e D i v i d e d L i n e p a s s a g e s n o t t o o f a r away. Now p r e c i s e l y what F u r t h a r g u e s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s p a s s a g e i s t h a t t h e y a r e i n f a c t e i t h e r t h i n g s o r p r o p o s i t i o n s , t h a t f o r P l a t o t h e y f e l l u n d e r what F u r t h c a l l s a " f u s e d " n o t i o n e m b r a c i n g t h i n g s and p r o p o s i t i o n s d i s j u n c t i v e l y . When a t i i76e S o c r a t e s a s k s o f t h e o b j e c t o f k n owledge, " i s i t s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s o r i s n o t ? " and G l a u c o n r e p l i e s , " t h a t i s " , F u r t h comments: G l a u c o n ' s a s s e n t i s e n t i r e l y r e a s o n a b l e ; f o r t h e p r i n c i p l e i s none o t h e r t h a n t h e f u s e d f o r m o f t h e two t h e s e s , a x i o m a t i c f o r know-l e d g e [ KA.] and knowledge [ K P ] on any a c c o u n t , a p t h a t n e c e s s a r i l y i f s o m e t h i n g i s known , t h e n i t e x i s t s , and t h a t n e c e s s a r i l y i f s o m e t h i n g i s known , t h e n i t i s t h e c a s e o r o b t a i n s . Thus t h e t r u i s m w h i c h G l a u c o n a c c e p t s c a n be s p l i t t h u s : (6a) N e c e s s a r i l y , what (6b) N e c e s s a r i l y , what i s known, i s (= i s i s k n o w n , . i s t h e c a s e > > (= e x i s t s ) . 6 8 Hence, j u s t as I want t o m a i n t a i n w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e " h y p o t h e s e s " t h a t a r e o b j e c t s o f knowledge i n t h e D i v i d e d L i n e t e x t s , so F u r t h m a i n t a i n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e o b j e c t s o f knowledge a t t h e end o f Book V, t h a t t h e s e o b j e c t s o f knowledge a r e e i t h e r t h i n g s o r p r o p o s i t i o n s I b i d . , p . 2 i | 5 . 66 and the knowledge of them i s either KA or KP. Of course i t i s not true that Plato would have seen i t just t h i s way he would have considered himself to be dealing with knowledge generally and would not have thought that he was either including or omitting a d i s t i n c t i o n bet-ween two sorts of knowledge but i n eff e c t this i s what was going on. On Furth's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Plato has what at lea s t we would c a l l a "fused" or disjunctive 69 analysis of knowledge. And this i s exactly what I want to maintain with respect to the Divided Line texts. My pos i t i o n , f i n a l l y , i s t h i s : f i r s t l y that Plato thought of the Divided Line hypotheses under a disjunctive concept including both objects and prop-o s i t i o n s . This part of my p o s i t i o n i s vindicated i n the following ways: (1) i t can accept the examples of "hypo-theses" at 5 l 0 c at face value; (2) i t can allow f o r the fact that mind i s described as moving on i t s d i a l e c t i c journey from idea [FormJ to idea and not from, say, statement to statement; (3) i t allows the hypotheses sometimes to have (or be) definable essences as required by Republic 5 3 4 b ; (ix) i t allows the Good to be a Form rather than a set of axioms ( a l b e i t a Form i n virtue of The same conclusion i s reached by Gosling. Cf. J. C. B. Gosling, Plato (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973) PP. 1 2 9 - 1 3 2 . 67 which not just Forms but also propositions can be known); (5) i t accords perfectly with the fact of the undif-ferentiated use of the word "hypothesis"; (6) i t explains why Plato develops a quasi-deductive "dialectic journey" rather than sticking to the simple model of knowing as "seeing"; (7) i t explains why Plato s t i l l uses visual imagry for knowing even though on i t s own this visual imagry i s not sufficient for what he wants to say; (8) i t accords with Furth 1s interpretation of another related passage also in the Republic; (9) in doing a l l the above i t makes a definite advance over the Robinson-Hare-Taylor debate. From this i t i s clear that the hypotheses are indeed either things (e.g. Forms) or propositions (e.g. definitions). The second part of my position follows immediately from the f i r s t part. Insofar as the hypotheses were for Plato objects, the logos necessary to their being known was for Plato a definition of some kind; insofar as the hypotheses were for Plato propositions, the logos neces-sary to their being known was'?for Plato a deduction of some kind. Thus just as he viewed the hypotheses under a disjunctive concept so he viewed the logoi under a dis-junctive concept. Similarly, of course, he conceived of knowledge under a disjunctive concept: insofar as the 68 hypotheses were things and the logoi were definitions the knowledge of these hypotheses was by KA; insofar as the hypotheses were propositions and the logoi were deductions the knowledge of these hypotheses was KP. To put i t in other words Plato was handling what he thought was a single thing called "knowledge" but in a way that was appropriate to the fact that, as we know, this "knowledge" consists of two disjuncts, KA and KP. Thus just as the Divided Line model of knowledge was able to accomodate both things and propositions as objects of knowledge so i t was able to accomodate both KA and KP. Hence whereas before Plato had been entirely closed to the possibility of KP and he had tried to subject a l l cases of knowing to his a l l K i s KA presupposition, forcing them into a KA mould, now Plato has loosened up and is allowing into his epistemology the propositions, interrelations, etc. that are characteristic of KP. He is no longer thinking about knowledge solely in visual terms: he has now added to his account and imagry of knowledge a dialectic journey that involves mapping out "dependencies", "connections" and "relations". Indeed as Runciman would want to say only about the philosopher described in the Sophist, we would say of the philosopher described in the Republic, that "the 69 philosopher i s now concerned l e s s w i t h contemplation than c o r r e l a t i o n " . ^ We can a l s o see the t r u t h of t h i s i n some other ways as w e l l . For one t h i n g , r e g a r d l e s s of the status of the hypotheses i t seems that the logos which the students of mathematics are l a c k i n g i s some account or expression of the r e l a t i o n s h i p ("R") of the hypotheses and the Good whereby the former i s known. Indeed even i f the logos were a mere d e f i n i t i o n of some e n t i t y i t would seem that i t would have to co n t a i n a reference to the Good. Thus i n knowing the hypothesis one w i l l know i t ajj i t i s r e l a t e d i n some way R to the Good. Now as we noted i n the f i r s t chapter, "knowledge as" i s a s o r t of knowledge not yet p r o p e r l y understood. Thus i n a case l i k e t h i s i t might turn out to i n v o l v e nothing more than KA of, say, the set whose three members are the hypothesis, the Good and R. However, i t at l e a s t seems much more p l a u s i b l e to h o l d that knowing an hypothesis _as i t i s r e l a t e d i n way R to the Good i s j u s t knowing that the hypothesis i s r e l a t e d i n way R to the Good. And i f so, P l a t o has c e r t a i n l y accomodated KP i n the D i v i d e d Line epistemology. Unfortunately, of course, we do not ourselves have a c l e a r Runciman, op. c i t . , p. 129 (my emphasis). 70 idea of what i s going on i n cases of "knowledge as". However, as another point, this time c l e a r l y i n our favour, there i s the fact that i n the Divided Line texts Plato has i m p l i c i t l y rejected PKab and, a f o r t i o r i , PWTL. As we saw i n the previous chapter the influence of these two presuppositions was a b a r r i e r to Plato's making any progress towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n . The f a c t , then, that they do not exert t h e i r influence i n the Divided Line texts provides some corroboration for our conclusion just above that here i n the Republic Plato has already made some progress towards that d i s t i n c t i o n . Suppose then that the Good can be characterized as "that which i s related i n way R' to the square (or to "the square e x i s t s " ) " . Then someone can know how to use the words "that which i s related i n way R' to the square" and he can also know how to use the word "good" but as i s very clear from the Divided Line passages, unless he has t r a v e l l e d the d i a l e c t i c journey he w i l l by no means know that these two things are one and the same. We have, therefore, a counterexample to PKab and one that no doubt i n some way impressed i t s e l f on Plato. Indeed i t i s quite an outstanding and general feature of the Divided Line epistemology that interrelationships•among things are hard to learn about, that i n fact knowledge i s 71 not easily acquired as PKab would imply i t was easily acquired. It i s not at a l l enough simply to look at the word "good" in order to "see" the Good i t s e l f . The Divided Line passages, on the contrary, open the doors to the fact of the "referential opacity" of knowledge. The all-embracing transparency implied by PKab and, ultimately, by PV/TL is virtually dead: i f we see any further traces of these presuppositions we shall see Plato not wrestling with l i v i n g creatures so much as digging out f o s s i l s . 72 CONCLUSION In a sense th i s thesis has already been concluded. Our analysis of the hypotheses i n the Divided Line texts has made i t quite clear that even i n Republic Plato had progressed beyond the KA only model of knowledge. Furthermore i t could e a s i l y be shown that from then on Plato's epistemology consistently accounted for the fac t that knowledge sometimes involves propositional elements such as i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . For as the reader i s no doubt aware propositional factors such as i n t e r r e l a t i o n -ships are essential to the d i a i r e s i s hierarchies that are introduced i n the Phaedrus, and these d i a i r e s i s hierarchies occupy the centre of the l a t e r Plato's think-ing on knowledge. Indeed, i f space permitted i t could even be shown that Plato regarded the making of d i a i r e s i s hierarchies as a d i a l e c t i c a l a c t i v i t y and one that was i n many ways foreshadowed by the d i a l e c t i c a l a c t i v i t y 71 i n the Divided Line passages. Now while the reader w i l l hopefully accept a l l t h i s , I can eas i l y imagine that before he gives h i s This claim i s adopted and defended by Juli u s Stenzel i n . h i s Plato's Method of D i a l e c t i c , trans, and ed. by D. J. Al l a n (New. York: Arno Press, 1973). Cf. also J. M. E..Moravcsik, "The Anatomy of Plato!s Div i s i o n s " (In Exegesis and Argument). 73 wholehearted assent to my conclusions, that he would l i k e to know what i t was that induced Runciman to claim otherwise. In p a r t i c u l a r , what i n the Theaetetus l e d Runciman to say that "the general impression l e f t by the Theaetetus i s that Plato continued to think of know-72 ledge as a sort of mental seeing or touching"? Of . course the reader w i l l also want to know some good reasons why I think that Runciman1 s impression was" -unfounded, why I think that he should therefore have concluded that Plato broke with the KA only model not after writing the Theaetetus but before. The Theaetetus contains three unsuccessful attempts to define knowledge. The f i r s t of these attempts i s an attempt to define knowledge as perception. However, as i s clear from our f i r s t chapter, perception i s simply what we c a l l e d "immediate apprehension" of the thing perceived and as such i t i s aaspecial sort of KA. Thus i n r e j e c t i n g as he does the view that knowledge i s per-ception, Plato i s r e j e c t i n g a certain KA only modeil of knowledge. Thus i n that part of the Theaetetus where th i s p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n of knowledge i s being discussed, i t would be a l i t t l e s urprising i f we could ' Runciman, Plato's Later Epistemology, op. c i t . , p. 5 2 . 7i| f i n d evidence there that Plato was s t i l l presupposing that a l l K i s KA. We should rather expect to f i n d evidence that he was prepared to say that some knowledge was not KA. I t i s most i n t r i g u i n g , therefore, that the f i r s t passage that Runciman c i t e s i n support of h i s asc r i p t i o n of a KA onlyonodel to Plato comes from pre-c i s e l y t h i s section of the Theaetetus. In fac t i t i s the very climax of Plato's argument against the knowledge i s perception thesis ( t h i s at l 8 l i b - l 8 7 a ) that Runciman says "offers clear evidence that Plato does not d i s t i n g u i s h between i n t e l l e c t u a l knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance." 7 3 Of course to say that Plato does not "distinguish" KP from KA might just mean that Plato did not e x p l i c i t l y formulate just that d i s t i n c t i o n i n just those words, and i n that case I would agree. However, i t seems f a i r l y l i k e l y that Runciman's conclusion that Plato did not "di s t i n g u i s h " between KP and KA was i n f l u e n t i a l i n giving r i s e to his "general impression" that Plato did not even allow f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a d i s t i n c t i o n . In any case, i f we could, i t would be good to show on our own behalf that the passage i n question should by a l l rights give r i s e to the contrary "general Ibid., pp. 15-16. 75 impression" that Plato was allowing for a KP/KA distinction. The passage in question ( l 8 k b - l 8 7 a ) is the passage in which Socrates claims that we must have a mind over and above our senses. This i s for two reasons: f i r s t because we do make judgements which relate sense data peculiar to two or more senses and which therefore could not be made by just one of these senses but only by some faculty which serves as a meeting point for their sense data, this faculty being the mind ( l 8 5 a-b)j and second because we do "contemplate" certain "common terms" such as existence and difference that, being intangible, cannot be "contemplated" through the senses and which must therefore be "contemplated" through some other faculty, namely, as i t turns out, the mind ( l 8 5 b-e). (Note that the mind does not merely "contemplate" these intangibles but as in the case of the sense data, i t makes judgements relating them ( l 8 6 a-b, 187a) 1 .) Granted his claim that we do have minds answering these descriptions, Socrates then points out that for corresponding reasons, knowledge cannot be perception: f i r s t because "knowledge is not in the sensations but in the process of reasoning about them ( l 8 6 d ) " ; and second because we cani have know-ledge of the intangibles although we cannot perceive them 76 ( l 8 6 e ) . I n o t h e r words knowledge c a n n o t be p e r c e p t i o n b e c a u s e (1) p e r c e p t i o n s do n o t i n c l u d e judgements a b o u t s e n s a t i o n s whereas knowledge d o e s j and (2) p e r c e p t i o n s do n o t e x t e n d t o i n t a n g i b l e s whereas knowledge d o e s . Runciman's c o n c l u s i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o l i t h i s p a s s a g e r e s t s s o l e l y on t h e f a c t t h a t P l a t o t a l k s a b o u t t h e m i n d " c o n t e m p l a t i n g " t h e "common t e r m s " . ^ A c c o r d i n g t o Runciman t h i s " c o n t e m p l a t i n g " i s t h e c r u x o f t h e whole argument and t h e r e f o r e t h e whole argument i s d o m i n a t e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h KA. W i t h r e s p e c t t o P l a t o ' s s t a t e m e n t t h a t "knowledge i s n o t i n t h e s e n s a t i o n s b u t i n t h e p r o c e s s o f r e a s o n i n g a b o u t them" Runciman comments t h i s i s , o f c o u r s e , t r u e ; and i t amounts t o a v i r t u a l s t a t e m e n t t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l knowledge i s p r o p o s i t i o n a l . But t h i s i s n o t , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e p o i n t t h a t P l a t o w i s h e s t o make. ^ Bu t why i s t h i s n o t " t h e p o i n t t h a t P l a t o w i s h e s t o make"? F o r P l a t o c e r t a i n l y t a k e s g r e a t c a r e t o make i t and n o t j u s t once b u t s e v e r a l t i m e s he t a l k s a b o u t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e a r e knowledge .judgements. I n d e e d when i n t h e f a c e o f t h i s r e f u t a t i o n T h e a e t e t u s w i t h d r a w s h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t knowledge i s p e r c e p t i o n , t h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n o f ^ I b i d . 7 ^ I b i d . 77 h i s t r y i n g out the thesis that knowledge i s < "contemplation" - — rather he goes straight on into defending the thesis that i t i s true judgement and t h i s l a t t e r thesis implies that i t i s p r o p o s i t i o n a l . Further-more even i f the f a c t that " i n t e l l e c t u a l knowledge i s pr o p o s i t i o n a l " was not the point that Plato wished to make, s t i l l he did actually make i t and thus on Runciman 1s own admission, the truth of i t must therefore have crossed Plato's mind and i f that were so Plato c e r t a i n l y r e a l i z e d that some cases of knowledge were not cases of acquaintance. Thus, regardless of whether Plato "distinguished" KP and KA here, he was c e r t a i n l y not, as even Runciman i n the end would have to agree, continuing "to think of knowledge as a sort of mental seeing or touching." 7 ^ Thus even fo r Runciman the "general impression" l e f t by t h i s passage ought to be that Plato had abandoned any view that a l l K i s KA. We have just seen that the f i r s t passage that Runciman c i t e s i n connection with his contention that "Plato continued to think of knowledge as a sort of mental seeing or touching" does not i n f a c t support t h i s con-tention. What other passages, then, does Runciman o f f e r Ibid., p. 52 78 i n support of h i s p o s i t i o n ? As a ba s i s f o r f u r t h e r evidence Runciman p o i n t s f i r s t to the argument at l 8 8 a-c 77 which opens the d i s c u s s i o n of f a l s e judgement 1 and then to the whole s e c t i o n (from 188 to 200) i n which the problem of f a l s e judgement i s discussed. 7 8 According to Runciman t h i s whole s e c t i o n presupposes what he would c a l l the " a s s i m i l a t i o n of a l l types of knowledge to know-79 ledge by acquaintance." 1 7 Furthermore, i f we except a very b r i e f and completely unsubstantiated remark i n con-n e c t i o n w i t h the famous "Dream", the s e c t i o n on f a l s e judgement i s the only passage other than l8 l j.b - l87a that Runciman c i t e s as evidence f o r h i s view. (The remark i n connection w i t h the Dream occurs i n a paragraph where Runciman p o i n t s out that knowing by acquaintance l e t t e r s or notes i s very d i f f e r e n t from knowing "whether some-t h i n g i s true or f a l s e " . Runciman makes the u n j u s t i f i e d comment: "but P l a t o ' s d i s c u s s i o n of the 'dream' makes 8o c l e a r h i s unawareness of the d i f f e r e n c e " . Then, with -out f u r t h e r comment, Runciman proceeds to discuss a 7 7 I b i d . , p. 2 9 . 7 8 I b i d . , p. 3iV 7 9 I b i d . , p. 52. 8 0 I b i d . , p. Ir5» 79 passage i n the Sophist.) Thus i f we can show that the section on f a l s e judgement does not i n fact imply that Plato was maintaining the "assimilation" of which he i s accused, then we w i l l have undermined the only support l e f t for Runciman's making this accusation. We w i l l have shown that there i s nothing from Runciman that should stop us from accepting the conclusions that were reached i n the l a s t chapter. Let us f i r s t look at the argument at l88a-c which Runciman s p e c i f i c a l l y c i t e s i n his favour. Does i t r e a l l y depend on a "confusion of knowledge that and knowledge by • AT acquaintance" as Runciman says or does i t , on the contrary, allow f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y that some cases of knowledge are not cases of KA? The argument, as the reader w i l l r e c a l l , i s designed to prove that given cert a i n assumptions, fal s e judgement i s impossible. These assumptions are quite e x p l i c i t l y l a i d out: (1) f a l s e judge-ment i s nothing more or less than the m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of two things both of which can be known by KA; and (2) cases of becoming acquainted with these things or forgetting them are to be discounted. Given these assumptions there are four possible cases i n which a f a l s e judgement might be made: the case i n which the judger knows by KA Ibid., p. 29 80 each of the things he m i s i d e n t i f i e s ; the case'in which he knows by KA neither of these things; the case i n which he knows the f i r s t thing by KA but not the second; and the case i n which he knows the second thing by KA but not the f i r s t . The main part of the argument at l88a-c simply sees Socrates and Theaetetus look at each of these four p o s s i b i l i t i e s and discount i t . They con-clude therefore that there are no p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r making a f a l s e judgement. Of course, as the reader i s also aware, Socrates and Theaetetus were wrong i n every case: someone could e a s i l y make the mistake of i d e n t i f y -ing, say, the Russian spy and the Mathematics professor and regardless of whether he was acquainted with both, neither, or $ust one of them. How, then, did Socrates and Theaetetus come to be wrong? With respect to the f i r s t p o s s i b i l i t y for f a l s e judgement, where the judger knows both things by KA, the text makes i t quite clear that they discount t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y on the basis of an assumption to the ef f e c t that a l l knowledge i s r e f e r e n t i a l l y transparent. Socrates asks, " i s the man who thinks what i s f a l s e supposing that things he knows are not those things but other things he knows, so that, while he knows both, he f a i l s to recognize either? 1 1 Theaetetus r e p l i e s , "no, that i s impossible, Socrates". 81 Clearly Socrates' question contains an i m p l i c i t r e j e c t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y that knowledge be opaque and c l e a r l y i t i s i n accepting this i m p l i c i t r e j e c t i o n that Theaetetus agrees with Socrates. With respect to the other p o s s i b i l i t i e s for f a l s e judgement, the text makes i t equally clear that these are discounted on the basis of an assumption that one cannot make any judgements about things with which one i s not acquainted. This then i s the argument from l88a-c. Does i t support Runciman's Op conclusions? I t c e r t a i n l y presupposes that we cannot have KP that one thing i s the same as another thing unless we are acquainted with both things and i t also presupposes that t h i s KP i s r e f e r e n t i a l l y transparent. Presuming furthermore that l i k e f a l s e judgement, true judgement (which either i s or goes into knowledge) i s simply an attempt to i d e n t i f y two things, the argument at l88a-c i s i n ef f e c t also presupposing that a l l KP reduces to knowledge of the sort that a i s a, where a i s known by KA. Needless to say, KA i s here making heavy incursions into the t e r r i t o r y of KP. However, as Runciman seems A. E."".Taylor studied the argument at l88a-c i n the l i g h t of.the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i n his Plato; the  Man and His Work (Frome. and London: Methuen & Co., 1926) pp. 339-34-1 a r*d 347-348. Taylor's conclusions agree with mine. 82 t o have f o r g o t t e n , t h e f a c t s t i l l r e m a i n s t h a t t h e a r g u -ment i s n o t s i m p l y d e a l i n g w i t h a c q u a i n t a n c e b u t w i t h a judgement, and a judgement w h i c h a t t e m p t s t o a s s e r t t h e t r u t h o f a r e l a t i o n , i f o n l y t h e r e l a t i o n o f i d e n t i t y . But judgements and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s , p r e c i s e l y , h a v e no p l a c e w h a t s o e v e r i n a KA o n l y m o d e l . Hence i f t h i s argument p r e s u p p o s e s an " a s s i m i l a t i o n o f a l l t y p e s o f knowledge t o knowledge by a c q u a i n t a n c e " , i t must be p r e -s u p p o s i n g what c a n o n l y be c a l l e d a v e r y b ad a s s i m i l a t i o n o f a l l t y p e s o f knowledge t o KA: t h e a s s i m i l a t i o n was a f a i l u r e . The argument i n q u e s t i o n s i m p l y does accomodate t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c e r t a i n t y p e o f KP. As much as i t t a l k s a b o u t k n o w i n g t h e c o n s t i t u e n t s o f t h e judgement by KA, i t nowhere i n s i s t s t h a t t h e judgement i t s e l f be n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n an " i m m e d i a t e a p p r e h e n s i o n " o f some s i n g l e t h i n g . The " i m m e d i a t e a p p r e h e n s i o n " o f some s i n g l e t h i n g i s c e r t a i n l y i n v o l v e d and i n t h e g i v e n judgement t h a t t h i n g i s r e l a t e d t o n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n i t s e l f , b u t n o n e t h e l e s s t h e r e i s a judgement t h a t d o e s a s s e r t a r e l a t i o n and t h i s i s a f e a t u r e o n l y o f KP. Thus t h e argument d o e s n o t s u p p o r t Runciman's c o n t e n t i o n . As f a r as t h e s e c t i o n on f a l s e h o o d g e n e r a l l y i s c o n c e r n e d , we f i n d i t e v e n l e s s c o m m i t t e d t o a KA o n l y model t h a n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r argument i n i t . F o r example 83 at 192c-d Socrates has retracted his assertion that one cannot misidentify two things with both of which one i s acquainted, and he now says: "Take things you know. You can suppose them to be other things which you ... know". He thus correctly denies what i s in effect the referential transparency earlier ascribed to judgement making. Hence insofar as he understand that judgement making i s essential to some cases of knowledge (i.e. cases of KP), Socrates understands that these cases of knowledge preclude the feature of the substitutivity of identicals, the feature in other words, of transparency. We can come to the same conclusion i f we consider for a moment Socrates' treatment of the example of mis-identifying 5 + 7 and 11. 8 3 For although he f a i l s to give a good explanation of this misidentification, he i s nonetheless quite aware that i t i s possible and he i s furthermore aware that this means that i t i s possible to misidentify two things both of which are known by KA (cf. 196b-c), and hence he must be aware that some sorts of knowing, such as knowing that one number equals another, are not transparent. On a KA only model of knowledge, however, a l l knowledge i s transparent. Precisely, then, Cf. Theaetetus 195e f f 84 Socrates i s not working with a KA only model of know-ledge. Hence, on the whole, the passage on f a l s e judge-ment does not seem to presuppose that a l l K i s KA. I t cannot simply be described as "confusing" KP with KA or "assimilating" KP with KA. Rather i t seems to be throw-ing o f f just this confusion and just t h i s a ssimilation. Indeed we f i n d d i s t i n c t features of a view that allows knowledge to be propositional and, moreover, we f i n d that these l a t t e r features are asserted and explored at the expense of a KA only model. At this stage what can Runciman say? A l l that there i s l e f t to him from h i s book are a few remarks ^ to the e f f e c t that Plato uses certain terms i n a way compatible with either a KA or a KP model of knowledge. Of course, rather than establishing that Plato therefore confused KA and KP, t h i s usage may simply confirm our own opinion that Plato was working with a disjunctive analysis of knowledge. In f a c t , then, there i s r e a l l y nothing l e f t f o r Runciman to say. Theaetetus- 188-200 simply i s not a show of Plato's allegiance to the a l l K i s KA presupposition. Runciman, op. c i t . , p. 34* 85 Runciman out of the way, l e t us conclude this account by suggesting our own interpretation of the section on false judgement. As the reader w i l l recall from our third chapter, Plato was influenced by two NMT presuppositions, PKab and PWTL. As we proved in that chapter, the second of these implies the f i r s t , and either of them implies the presupposition that a l l know-ledge is transparent. Hence either of them rules out the possibility of KP for KP i s opaque. Therefore, as we noted at the time, any progress Platoremight make towards the KP/KA distinction would have to go hand in hand with a rejection of these presuppositions. Of course, as we saw in the previous chapter, Plato did make progress towards the KP/KA distinction and, indeed, he did reject PKab and PWTL. However, as we also saw, he rejected PKab and PWTL only indirectly, only implicitly. Nowhere in the Republic did he meet them face on. Now what I claim Plato i s doing in the section on false judgement in Theaetetus i s trying for the f i r s t time to deal directly with these presuppositions, to attack them not implicitly but as explicitly as possible. 1 And> of course, i f this i s true, Plato i s bysno means assimilating a l l knowledge to KA - — rather he i s making more secure the progress towards the KP/KA distinction achieved in the Republic. 86 That PKab i s present in Theatetus 188-200 should be perfectly obvious from the fact that one of the three main passages in Plato that led us to discover PKab in the f i r s t place was the passage on the Aviary and the d i f f i c u l t i e s with the misidentification of 5 + 7 and 11. Given PKab, of course, such misidentifications would never occur. The point to make, of course, i s that Plato knew perfectly well that such misidentifications do occur. Furthermore, as Plato also realized, such mis-identifications constitute knockdown counterexamples to any view that implies otherwise. It i s true that Plato did not with his Aviary provide a model adequate for explaining how the misidentifications occur but there i s no doubt that he knew that they did occur. Thus although Plato was apparently not in a position to explain the how's and why's of the matter, he was s t i l l i n a position to refute PKab. Thus regardless of the failure of the Aviary model, we s t i l l find in Theaetetus 188-200 an almost completely explicit statement of PKab together with a fatal counterexample to i t . Since PKab i s a consequence of PWTL we therefore also find a fatal counterexample to PWTL. As further evidence that Plato was attacking PKab and PWTL in this section, recall from the third chapter 87 of this thesis that Plato was greatly troubled by a certain paradox which stated that to speak f a l s e l y was to say something that did not exist and hence to say nothing, i . e., not to utter a meaningful sentence. As we saw i n that chapter the reason Plato was troubled by this paradox was that he was influenced by a view that a statement was l i k e a photograph of a single, e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n , this being a c o r o l l a r y of PWTL. At Theaetetus l88c-l89b we f i n d a paradox exactly l i k e this paradox except that opining f a l s e l y i s substituted fo r speaking f a l s e l y . This difference, however, i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t from Plato's point of view since for Plato an opinion i s just a certain sort of statement "pronounced, not aloud to someone else, but s i l e n t l y to oneself". 8 ^ Thus the only difference between opining f a l s e l y and uttering a f a l s e statement expressing one's opinion (or "judgement") i s the absence or presence of sound. Thus Plato i s i n fac t discussing the very same paradox as before and this paradox i s a manifestation of PWTL. Furthermore, Plato i s not discussing this manifestation of PWTL i n order to pay tribute to i t but 5 Theaetetus l89e-190a and cf . Sophist 263d-26kb. 88 r a t h e r t o a t t a c k i t . He r e j e c t s t h e p r e m i s s o f t h e p a r a d o x t h a t t o o p i n e f a l s e l y i s t o o p i n e s o m e t h i n g t h a t does n o t e x i s t . He c o n c l u d e s , " t h i n k i n g £ o p i n i n g ] f a l s e l y must be s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h i n k i n g what i s n o t . " He t h e n p r o c e e d s t o o f f e r a new s u g g e s t i o n , t h a t t o o p i n e f a l s e l y i s t o m i s m a t c h two e x i s t e n t o b j e c t s . He s u g g e s t s t h a t a f a l s e judgement i s an " i n n e r " s t a t e m e n t w h i c h a f f i r m s o f two, d i f f e r e n t , e x i s t i n g t h i n g s t h a t t h e y a r e t h e same. We do r e c o g n i z e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f f a l s e judgement as a s o r t o f m i s j u d g e m e n t [ a l l o d o x i a ] t h a t o c c u r s when a p e r s o n i n t e r c h a n g e s i n h i s m i n d two t h i n g s , b o t h o f w h i c h a r e , and a s s e r t s t h a t t h e one i s t h e o t h e r . ^ I t i s t r u e t h a t t h i s i s m e r e l y g i v e n as a s u g g e s t i o n and t h a t i t i s a t f i r s t d i s c a r d e d as b e i n g u n h e l p f u l (190e) b u t i t i s a l s o t r u e t h a t i t l i e s b e h i n d t h e "wax t a b l e t " t h e o r y t h a t o c c u p i e s a b o u t h a l f o f t h e s e c t i o n on f a l s e judgement ( c f . e s p e c i a l l y 1930-191x0) and, u l t i m a t e l y , as we s h a l l s e e , b e h i n d t h e d e f i n i t i v e t r e a t m e n t o f f a l s e h o o d i n t h e S o p h i s t . Thus t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t a f a l s e h o o d i s a m i s m a t c h i s no mere s u g g e s t i o n b u t a p o s i t i o n t h a t P l a t o a c t u a l l y came t o h o l d . P r e c i s e l y , however, t h i s p o s i t i o n T h e a e t e t u s 189b. T h e a e t e t u s l 8 9 b - c , t r a n s , by C o r n f o r d . 89 i s i n d i r e c t opposition to the PWTL po s i t i o n that a statement i s simply a pointer to a single e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n . For Plato to hold that a certa i n sort of judgement isomismatch i s f o r Plato to hold that a state-ment expressing that judgement i s a statement r e l a t i n g the two things that are thereby mismatched. Such a statement i s not at a l l a pointer to a single e x i s t i n g thing but, i f anything, a pointer to two exis t i n g things which, moreover, rel a t e s those two things. Thus i n hold-ing as he did the theory that a judgement can be a mismatch, Plato was holding a theory which contradicts PWTL. Having discounted a paradox that has i t s basis i n PWTL, Plato has postulated a theory that i s i n opposition to PWTL. He i s r e j e c t i n g a presupposition that challenges the progress he had made towards the KP/KA d i s t i n c t i o n i n the Republic. F i n a l l y , l e t us look at the analysis of falsehood i n the Sophist. There we s h a l l see that Plato i s i n fact applying a more sophisticated version of the theory that f a l s e opinions or statements are mismatches. There we sh a l l see PWTL not only put i n a museum but boarded up as well . At Sophist 261-263 Plato characterizes a state-ment as a s t r i n g of words, roughly speaking, that " f i t together" i n such a way as to be meaningful. In p a r t i c u l a r , 90 the simplest statement i s a combination of one "name" ronomal and one "verb" or "predicate" fremal . Such a statement gives information, i t "get you somewhere by 88 weaving together verbs with names". (Plato apparently failed to think about sentence like Crombie's "Tuesday walks".) Against PWTL which construes a statement as a mere pointer to one single existing entity, Sophist 261-262 construes a statement as a complex combination, i t s two parts pointing each of them to a single existing entity. The statement as a whole relates these parts and this somehow in accordance with the relations among forms that make discourse possible in the f i r s t place (cf. 260a). As i s emphasized at Sophist 263&, then, a statement involves two components each of which refers 89 to "things that exist". Ontologically, the statement (and hence also i t s mental equivalent the judgement) i s no longer supported by a single p i l l a r , viz. the situation i t describes, but by twin p i l l a r s , one supporting the name, the other the verb. To inquire into the f a l s i t y of a statement, we no longer have to smash down the one supporting p i l -Sophist 262d. Cf. Theaetetus 189c. 91 lar thereby destroying the statement i t s e l f : we need now only look to see i f , as i t were, the p i l l a r s are properly matched for length so that the statement " l i e s true" or whether they are not in which case the statement " l i e s false" without thereby toppling over. L i t e r a l l y speaking, Plato has explicated the notion of statement in such a way that i t s truth or falsehood depends not on the existence of the (meaningful) statement but on the existence of the asserted relationship between an exist-ing name and an existing verb. To get a statement right is not (only) to refer to existing things but to get the relation between them right. The relevant question i s : does the existing subject of the statement actually relate to the existing verb in the way the statement asserts? To make a false statement, then, i s basically to relate two existent objects that are not related i n the manner asserted. It i s to "mismatch" a name and a verb. At Theaetetus l89b-c a false judgement was said to be a sort of misjudgement C allodoxial that occurs when a person interchanges in his mind two things, both of which are, and asserts that the one i s the other. In this way he i s always thinking of [ doxa] something which i s , but of one thing in place of [ eteronl another, and since he misses the mark he may f a i r l y be said 92 90 to be judging f a l s e l y . 91 A t Sophist 2 6 3 b , (to use Moravcsik's t r a n s l a t i o n ), a f a l s e statement i s s a i d to be one that expresses things other than [ eteron"] those that are r e l a t e d to you. (The f a l s e one) expresses things which are not as i f . t h e y were. Namely, i t expresses things that are, but are other than £ eteron ] those things which are r e l a t e d to you. For, as we have s a i d before £at 2 5 l a , 2 5 6 e , 259a-b, i n d i s c u s s i n g p r e d i c a t i o n ] , i n r e l a t i o n to each t h i n g much i s and much i s not. C e r t a i n l y by Sophist 2 6 3 b , the mismatched p a i r are not any mis-equated p a i r of simple objects, but a c a r e f u l l y defined "name" and a c a r e f u l l y defined "verb" whose existence and whose purported i n t e r r e l a t i o n (e.g. p r e d i -c a t i o n ) i s backed by an elaborate metaphysics. Nonetheless the idea of mismatching i s s t i l l present. Given the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of the passage, we do .not know j u s t e x a c t l y what P l a t o had i n mind by t h i s mismatching or miscon-n e c t i o n — we cannot be sure what h i s e x p l i c a t i o n of a true statement was. In s p i t e of t h i s , however, we can say that f o r P l a t o a statement or judgement i n v o l v e d some ( a l b e i t unknown to us) r e l a t i o n between name and verb which i f a c t u a l l y h o l d i n g gives us a statement that s t a t e s Theaetetus l89b-c, t r a n s , by Cornford. 91 J . Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning i n the Sophist" (Acta P h i l o s o p h i c a Fennica Fasc. XIV, 1962), p. 77 and see also the context. 93 about the named subject "the things that are [exist} as they are" concerning the subject, and i f not holding, gives us a statement that states about the subject things that exist but which are somehow "different" feteronj from the things that are in the case of the subject. For our purposes, however, i t i s enough to note that true or false, a statement or judgement is no longer understood as naming a single, existing situation. PWTL 9 2 has been thrown off. ' 7 £ : If i t i s suggested that in the Sophist Plato thought that knowing, say, that Theaetetus is sitting was just the same as being acquainted with the situation of Theaetetus1 sitting, then whoever suggests this w i l l have to account for the fact that Plato to some extent understood, as we have seen, that knowledge can be opaque. For having this understanding, Plato was i n a position to make the distinction that we made in the f i r s t chapter between knowing a situation (e.g. the cat's being on the mat) and knowing a proposition that describes that situation. Indeed, Plato might have made the distinction just in the ways in which we did] 94 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books A l l e n , R. E., ed. Studies i n Plato's Metaphysics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965* Bambrough, Renford, ed. New Essays on Plato and A r i s t o t l e . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965. Cornford, Francis MacDonald. P l a t o 1 s Theory of Know-ledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato  translated with a running commentary. Reprint* New York: L i b e r a l Arts Press, 1957. Grombie, I. M. An Examination of Plato's Doctrines. Vol. I I : Plato on Knowledge and R e a l i t y . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. Gosling, J. C. B. Plato. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. Gould, John. The Development of Plato's E t h i c s . Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1955. Hintikka, Jaakko. Knowledge and B e l i e f . Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962. Hintikka, Jaakko. Knowledge and the Known. Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 197*+. Hintikka, Jaakko. Time and Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. Joseph, H. W. B. Knowledge and the Good i n Plato's Republic. London: Oxford University Press, 19l|-8. K l e i n , Jacob. A Commentary on Plato's Meno. Chapel H i l l : University of North Carolina Press, 1965. Lee, E. N.; Mourelatos, A. P. D.j and Rorty, R. M., ed. Exegesis and Argument. Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V., 1973., Moravcsik,"j. M. E., ed. Patterns i n Plato's Thought. Synthese H i s t o r i c a l Library, edited by N. Kretzmann et a l . Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1973. 95 Mourelatos, Alexander P. D., ed. The Pre-Socratics. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 197lt. P l a t o i The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Edited by Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Bollingen Series LXXI. New York: Random House, 1961. Plato. Plato. With an English t r a n s l a t i o n . Translated by Harold North Fowler et a l . 9 vols, i n 11. The Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library, edited by T. E. Page et a l . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1921-53. Quine, W. V. 0. Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, I960. Robinson, Richard. Plato's E a r l i e r D i a l e c t i c . 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953. Ross, W. D. Plato's Theory of Ideas. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953. Runciman, W. G. Plato's Later Epistemology. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1962. Russell, Bertrand. Mysticism and Logic. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1925. Russell, Bertrand. Problems of Philosophy. Paperback e d i t i o n . New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. Ryle, G i l b e r t . Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson and Co., 1949. Ryle, G i l b e r t . Plato's Progress. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1966. Sayre, Kenneth M. Plato's Analytic Method. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Shorey, Paul. The Unity of Plato's Thought. 1903. Reprint. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I960. Sprague, Rosamond Kent. Plato's Use of Fallacy: A Study  of the Euthydemus and Some Other Dialogues. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962. 96 Stenzel, J u l i u s , Plato*s Method of D i a l e c t i c . Trans-lated and edited by D. J . A l l a n . 19ii0. Reprint. New York: Arno Press, 1973• Taylor, A. E. Plato: the Man and His Work. Prome and London: Methuen & Co., 1925. t Vlastos, Gregory, ed. Plato: A C o l l e c t i o n of C r i t i c a l  Essays. Vol. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Modern Studies.in Philosophy, edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty. Garden City, New York: Double-day and Co., 1971. Vlastos, Gregory. Platonic Studies. Princeton: Prince-ton University Press, 1973* 97 A r t i c l e s A c k r i l l , J . L. "In Defense of Plato's D i v i s i o n . " In Ryle, edited by G. Pitcher and 0. Wood. London: MacMillan, 1971. Hayner, Paul. "Knowledge by Acquaintance." Philosophy  and Phenomenological Research 29 (1968-1969) :ii23-Hintikka, Jaakko. "Time, Truth, and Knowledge i n Ancient Greek.Philosophy." American Philosophical  Quarterly k (1967):l-lk. . Holland. A. J . "An Argument i n Plato's Theaetetus: l8k-6." Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1973):97-116. Lee, Edward N. "Plato on Negation and Not-Being i n the Sophist." Philosophical Review 8l (1972) :267-30li. Moravcsik, J. "Being and Meaning i n the Sophist." Acta Philosophica Fennica l k (1962):23-7rJ. Russell, Bertrand. "On Denoting." Mind l k (1905):479-493. Taylor, C.C.W. "Plato and the Mathematicians: An Examination of Professor Hare's Views." Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1967):193-203. Thornton, M. T. "Knowledge and Flux i n Plato's Cratylus." Dialogue 8 (1970):581-591. Vlastos, Gregory. "Anamnesis i n the Meno." Dialogue k (1965):Ik3-167: . 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0093390/manifest

Comment

Related Items