Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Bargaining strategies of white-collar workers in British Columbia Marchak, Maureen Patricia 1970

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1970_A1 M37.pdf [ 13.09MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0093333.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0093333-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0093333-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0093333-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0093333-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0093333-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0093333-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0093333-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0093333.ris

Full Text

BARGAINING STRATEGIES OF WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA by MAUREEN PATRICIA MARCHAK B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1958 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n the Department of Anthropology and Sociology We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1970 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumb i a , I a g ree tha t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s tudy . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia Vancouver 8, Canada i ABSTRACT The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the rela-tionship between job control — that i s , the amount of discretion a worker exercises at his job — and bargaining strategies. The rela-tionship between income and bargaining strategies is also examined, and the joint effects of income and job control are analysed. In ad-dition, attention is given to the association between social interac-tion rates among workers with job control levels held constant, and bargaining strategies. The main argument associates job control with replaceability and with marketability of s k i l l s ; these with bargaining strategies; and, consequently, job control with bargaining strategies. Hypotheses are stated which link low job control to the low incidence of individual bargaining, low income, willingness to join unions, and union membership. An argument then links low job control to passive behavior, and conse-quently to low individual bargaining, and low rates of participation in union a c t i v i t i e s . Survey research, involving interviews with white-collar wor-kers i n 43 commercial firms i n British Columbia, was undertaken to test the arguments. Tests consisted of percentage comparisons between workers with differing levels of job control, with respect to specific questions and responses. Data was examined separately for men and women. Support was found for the predicted associations between job control and individual bargaining, and job control and Income. For wo-men, but not for men, support was found for the predicted associations between job control and willingness to join unions, and job control and union membership. For men, but not for women, limited support was found i i for the predicted relationship between job control and participation rates i n union a c t i v i t i e s . An analysis of the relationship between income and strategies revealed that low incomes are associated with willingness to join unions. When job control levels are held constant, income continues to be inversely associated with pro-union responses. Similarly, when income levels are held constant, an inverse relationship is maintained between job control and pro-union responses. High income tends to decrease the effects of low control, and high control tends to decrease the effects of low Income. The two variables also interact, such that a combination of low control and low income is strongly associated with pro-union responses. It is suggested that the evidence j u s t i f i e s further examination of relationships between job control and bargaining strategies, but that this examination should take into consideration more detailed information regarding specific populations engaged i n given s k i l l areas, and the employment opportunities available to them. An additional argument associates low interaction rates of wor-kers and management personnel with pro-union responses and union member-ship, and high interaction rates of workers and co-workers with pro-union responses and membership. The argument is stated with respect to the opportunity workers have for engaging In discussion of bargaining positions, defining the employer as an opponent, and organizing collective energies. This section of the theory was generally unsubstantiated. It i s suggested that white-collar workers have higher interaction rates than manual wor-kers, and differences in rates do not have a substantial influence on organization potential. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT i TABLE OF CONTENTS i i i LIST OF TABLES v ACKNOWLEDGMENT ix Chapter I INTRODUCTION AND THEORY 1 Synopsis 1 Organization of Thesis 3 1. Definitions 6 2. Replaceability/Marketability and Bargaining 11 3. Interaction and Bargaining 24 4. Predispositions and Bargaining 35 5. Summary 40 II METHODOLOGY 41 .1. The Sample .42 2. Operational Definitions 45 3. Organization of Data 59 III JOB CONTROL AND BARGAINING: THE LABOUR MARKET 63 1. Restatement of Theory 64 2. Presentation of Data 68 3. Summary 96 IV INTERACTION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 104 1. Restatement of Theory 105 2. Presentation of Data 109 3. Summary 125 V JOB CONTROL AND ACTIVE BARGAINING 130 1. Restatement of Theory 131 2. Presentation of Data 134 3. Summary 150 i v Chapter Page VI INCOME AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 154 1. Introduction 154 2. Income and Attitudes Toward Union f or Non-Union Workers 157 i . Rationale 157 i i . Presentation of Data 195 i i i . Independent and Interaction E f f e c t s of Income and Job Control 169 3. Income D i s t r i b u t i o n s 178 4. Income and P a r t i c i p a t i o n for Union Members 183 i . Income and Favorable Attitudes Toward Union 183 i i . Income and Union P a r t i c i p a t i o n 184 i i i . Presentation of Data 187 5. Summary 194 VII SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 199 1. Replaceability and Marketability 200 2. Interaction Patterns and C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining 220 3. Active Strategies 222 4. Suggestions f o r Further Research 226 BIBLIOGRAPHY 231 APPENDICES 238 A Interviextf Sechedule f or Employees 238 B Management Questionnaire 252 C L i s t of White-Collar Occupations 256 D Occupational D i s t r i b u t i o n of Sample 258 E Reasons f o r Refusals and Rejections of P o t e n t i a l P a r t i c i p a n t s 261 F Total D i s t r i b u t i o n f o r Job Control Measures 262 G Total D i s t r i b u t i o n f o r Income 263 H Total D i s t r i b u t i o n : Years of Schooling 264 I Report f or P a r t i c i p a n t s 265 V LIST OF TABLES CHAPTER I I I Table Page 1 Job Control and Income f o r Non-Union Workers, Percentage with Incomes Over $450 Per Month 69 2 Job Control and S a t i s f a c t i o n With Income f o r Non-Union Workers Who Did Not Bargain I n d i v i d u a l l y , Percentage Who Expressed S a t i s f a c t i o n 71 3 Job Control and S a t i s f a c t i o n With Wage Offer f o r Non-Union Workers Who Did Not Bargain I n d i v i d u a l l y , Percentage Who Expressed S a t i s f a c t i o n 73 4 Job Control and P o s s i b i l i t y of In d i v i d u a l Bargaining f o r Non-Union Workers, Percentage Who Say I t Is Possible to Bargain ' 75 5 Job Control and Individual Bargaining f o r Non-Union Workers, Percentage Who Have Bargained 77 6 Job Control and Bargaining When Applying f o r Job for Non-Union Workers, Percentage Who Bargained 79 7 Job Control and Attitude Favoring Union Membership f o r Non-Union Workers, Percentage Favoring Union Membership 81 8 Job Control and Willingness to J o i n a Union f o r Non-Union Workers, Percentage W i l l i n g to J o i n 83 9 Job Control and Union Membership, Percentage Who Are Members 85 10 Job Control and Attitude Favoring Union Membership for Union Workers, Percentage Favoring Union Member-ship 87 11 Job Control and Income f o r Union Workers, Per-centage With Incomes Over $450 Per Month 89 12 Job Control and S a t i s f a c t i o n With Income f o r Union Workers Who Did Not Bargain I n d i v i d u a l l y , Percentage Who Expressed S a t i s f a c t i o n 9 1 v i Table Page 13 Job Control and Possibility of Individual Bargaining for Union Workers, Percentage Who Say It Is Possible to Bargain 93 14 Job Control and Individual Bargaining for Union Workers, Percentage Who Have Bargained 95 15 Summary of Results for Hypotheses Relating Labour Market Conditions to Job Control and Bargaining Strategies 100 CHAPTER IV 16 Interaction With Management and Favorable Attitude Toward Union for Non-Union Workers, Percentage Favorable With Job Control Levels Held Constant 110 17 Interaction With Management and Willingness to Join Union for Non-Union Workers, Percentage Favorable With Job Control Levels Held Constant 112 18 Interaction With Management and Union Membership, Percentage Membership With Job Control Levels Held Constant 114 19 Interaction With Management and Favorable A.ttitude Toward Union for Union Workers, Percentage Favorable With Job Control Levels Held Constant 116 20 Interaction With Co-Workers and Favorable Attitude Toward Union for Non-Union Workers, Percentage Favorable for Low Control Level Only 118 21 Interaction With Co-Workers and Willingness to Join Union for Non-Union Workers, Tercentage Willing to Join for Low Control Level Only 120 22 Interaction With Co-Workers and Union Membership for Low Control Workers 122 23 Interaction With Co-Workers and Favorable Attitude Toward Union for Low Control Union Workers, Percentage Favorable 124 24 Summary of Results for Hypotheses Relating Interaction Patterns With Attitudes Toward Union, and Union Membership, With Job Control Levels Held Constant 126 v i i Table CHAPTER V 25 Job Control and Information Level f o r Union Members, Percentage Who Can Name Union Cor r e c t l y 26 Job Control and Information Level f o r Union Members, Percentage Who Can T e l l Date of C e r t i f i c a t i o n 27 Job Control and Information Level f o r Union Members, Percentage Who Can Say How Many Meetings i n Year 28 Job Control and Information Level f o r Union Members, Percentage Who Can Say How Many Members i n Union 29 Job Control and Information Level f o r Union Members, Percentage Who Can Name Agent or Union O f f i c e r 30 Job Control and P a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r Union Members, Percentage Who Attended Four or More Meetings i n Past Year 31 Job Control and P a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r Union Members, Percentage Who are W i l l i n g to Stand f o r O f f i c e 32 Job Control and P a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r Union Members, Percentage Who Have Held or Now Hold O f f i c e 33 Summary of Results f o r Hypotheses Relating Active Involvement ,in Unions to Job Control Levels CHAPTER VI 34 Income and Favorable A t t i t u d e Toward Union f o r Non-Union Workers, Percentage Favorable to Union Membership 35 Income and. Willingness to Joi n Union f o r Non-Union Workers, Percentage W i l l i n g to J o i n 36 Income and Favorable Attitude Toward Union f o r Non-Union Workers with Low Control, Percentage Who Favor Union Membership 37 Income and Favorable A t t i t u d e Toward Union f o r Non-Union Workers With High Control, Percentage Who Favor Union Membership v i i i Table Page 38 Income and Willingness to Join Union for Non-Union Workers With Low Control, Percentage Who are Willing to Join a Union 166 39 Income and Willingness to Join Union for Non-Union Workers With High Control, Percentage Who Are Willing to Join a Union 168 40 Interaction Effects, Job Control and Income for Non-Union Workers, Percentage Favorable to Union Member-ship 170 41 Independent Effects of Income and Job Control, Percentage Favorable to Union Membership 171 42 Interaction Effects, Job Control and Income for Non-Union Workers, Percentage Willing to Join Union 174 43 Independent Effects of Income and Job Control, Percentage Willing to Join Union 175 44 Income for Union and Non-Union Workers, Percentage Earning Over $450 Per Month 178 45 Union Status and Income of High Control Workers, Percentage Earning Over $450 Per Month 18d 46 Union Status and Income of Low Control Workers, Percentage Earning Over $450 Per Month 181 47 Income and Favorable Attitude Toward Union for Union Workers, Percentage Favorable 187 48 Income and Favorable Attitude Toward Union for Union Workers With Low Control, Percentage Favorable 189 49 Income and Information Levels for Union Workers, Percentage Giving Information 191 50 Income and Participation for Union Workers, Percentage Participating 193 51 Summary of Generalizations Regarding Income and Job Control for Non-Union Workers 195 52 Summary of Results for Hypotheses Relating Income to Union Attitudes and Participation 196 i x ACKNOWLEDGMENT It goes without saying that a research work of this sort i n -volves the help and cooperation of many associates. What does not go without saying i s that I am grateful for that help. I am indebted to Martin Meissner and George Gray, Thesis Ad-visors who encouraged, chaffed, and c r i t i c i s e d in a sufficiently good mixture to produce the desired result. Also to Dorothy Smith, Robert Ratner, and Stuart Jamieson, members of the Advisory Committee, who pro-vided thoughtful comments on drafts and ideas at varying stages of the work. At a l l stages of the research and writing, I leaned .heavily on a "white-collar labour force" consisting of the secretaries i n the Anthropology and Sociology Department at the University of British Columbia; a team of student interviewers, a research and a coding as-sistant, and members of the St a t i s t i c a l Centre and the Computing Centre at U.B.C. I offer my sincere thanks to the secretarial staff: Gale LePitre, Margaret Lambert, and Madeleine Robertson; to the interviewing teams Susan Clark, Dick Darville, Margaret Starkey, Tony Williams, and Bob Stewart; and to the assistants, Hervey Thomas and Joy Watkins. From start to finish, I have had the support and understanding of my family. To my mother, Wilhelmina Russell; to my husband, William; to our sons, Geordon and Lauren: my deepest thanks. I wish to thank again the Institute of Industrial Relations at U.B.C. for the financial aid which made the project possible, and the H.R. MacMillan Family for the continuing support which allowed me to proceed with graduate studies over the past three years. X Finally, I express again my appreciation to a l l who p a r t i c i -pated in the research: the union organizers and representatives; the company executives and managers; and, especially, the many employees who so kindly granted interviews. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION AND THEORY The o b j e c t i v e of t h i s study i s to examine the a s s o c i a t i o n between job c o n t r o l and ba r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s of w h i t e - c o l l a r wor-ke r s . Levels of job c o n t r o l are degrees of personal choice and s e l f - d i r e c t i o n a worker has at h i s j o b . Varying l e v e l s of c o n t r o l adhere to d i f f e r e n t s k i l l s and experience possessed by workers. Job c o n t r o l i s t r e a t e d as an index of r e p l a c e a b i l i t y of workers and m a r k e t a b i l i t y of t h e i r s k i l l s . An argument i s given which a s s o c i a t e s d i f f e r e n t i a l r e p l a c e a b i l i t y and m a r k e t a b i l i t y w i t h b a r g a i n i n g s t r a -tegies . P r e d i c t i o n s about b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y about trends i n union membership and the p r o b a b i l i t y of i n c r e a s i n g membership among w h i t e - c o l l a r workers, have been of two k i n d s . One group c o n s i s t s of e n t i r e l y s p e c u l a t i v e debates i n which p r e d i c -t i o n s are based on c r i t e r i a ranging from economic d e p r i v a t i o n to 1 problems of bureaucracy. The other group c o n s i s t s of arguments regarding the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between economic co n d i t i o n s and c o l l e c -2 t i v e a c t i o n . The sp e c u l a t i o n s are not s t a t e d i n such a way that they can be t e s t e d . The arguments could be te s t e d i f l a r g e amounts of economic data were a v a i l a b l e , and a l o n g i t u d i n a l research design were adopted. Such t e s t s are time-consuming and expensive even where data i s a v a i l a b l e . Where h i s t o r i c a l data i s used, the t e s t s 3 are i n c o n c l u s i v e and su b j e c t to continued controversy. 2 The r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e p l a c e a b i l i t y or m a r k e t a b i l i t y 4 5 of labour and union membership has been argued by Marx, the Webbs, 6 7 8 Commons, Perlman, and Estey. Measurements of r e p l a c e a b i l i t y or m a r k e t a b i l i t y are of the k i n d that r e q u i r e l a r g e amounts of economic data, and di v e r s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the same data are common. The concept, job c o n t r o l , i n c l u d e s s e v e r a l of the main job components which i n f l u e n c e m a r k e t a b i l i t y . C o n t r o l l e v e l s can be measured w i t h r e l a t i v e s i m p l i c i t y . I f i t can be l o g i c a l l y demonstrated that there i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between job c o n t r o l and m a r k e t a b i l i t y , then the r e l a t i o n s h i p between job c o n t r o l and b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s — among which are union membership — can be explored without extensive review of the labour market and economic c y c l e s . By arguing that the r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s , and then t e s t i n g outcomes of s p e c i f i c hypotheses which a s s o c i a t e c o n t r o l and ba r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s , the p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of membership may be improved. Such i s the i n t e n t of t h i s research. The p o p u l a t i o n o f ' i n t e r e s t c o n s i s t s of w h i t e - c o l l a r workers — s a l e s , c l e r i c a l , p r o f e s s i o n a l , t e c h n i c a l , and c e r t a i n s e r v i c e workers — who are employed by commercial firms i n non-managerial p o s i t i o n s . I t in c l u d e s both union and non-union workers. These workers o b t a i n jobs i n a competitive labour market w i t h i n a c a p i -t a l i s t economy. While b l u e - c o l l a r unions are w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d i n that economy, w h i t e - c o l l a r unions are not strong and a low percentage of such workers support labour unions. I t i s hoped that t h i s study may suggest reasons f o r the present low support, and i n d i c a t e the c r i t e r i a by which f u t u r e support may be estimated. I t should be 3 understood that the study i s r e l e v a n t only to t h i s p a r t i c u l a r labour f o r c e and t h i s p a r t i c u l a r economy. A sample of these workers has been in t e r v i e w e d . The sur-vey data c o l l e c t e d through the i n t e r v i e w s i s used to t e s t a s e r i e s of hypotheses regarding the a s s o c i a t i o n between job c o n t r o l and bargaining s t r a t e g i e s . O r ganization of Thesis The f i r s t chapter f o l l o w i n g t h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n develops the t h e o r e t i c a l e x p o s i t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between job c o n t r o l and bar g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s . This argument i s d i v i d e d i n t o three s e c t i o n s . In the f i r s t s e c t i o n , job c o n t r o l i s de f i n e d , and a des-c r i p t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s i s given. Then the main argument i s s t a t e d . I t i s contended that d i f f e r e n t i a l r e -p l a c e a b i l i t y and m a r k e t a b i l i t y are r e l a t e d to bargaining s t r a t e g i e s ; that these v a r i a b l e s are a l s o r e l a t e d to job c o n t r o l ; and that there-f o r e job c o n t r o l and b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s are r e l a t e d . In the second s e c t i o n , an argument i s given which r e l a t e s d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n t e r a c t i o n rates among workers, and between workers and management personnel, w i t h b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s and w i t h job c o n t r o l . In the t h i r d s e c t i o n , job c o n t r o l i s s a i d to be r e l a t e d to va r y i n g amounts of a c t i v i t y i n bargaining s i t u a t i o n s . 4 The c e n t r a l concepts of job c o n t r o l and bargaining strategies are given operational meanings i n the second chapter. A short d e s c r i p t i o n of the sample and the interview schedules i s also provided. Other methodological material i s given i n the appendices which include information on t o t a l income d i s t r i b u -tions by $100 i n t e r v a l s , complete job c o n t r o l d i s t r i b u t i o n s on a four-point o r d i n a l scale, comparisons of education levels, and the Report for P a r t i c i p a n t s which describes thesis data and other information obtained i n the interviews. The Report was d i s -tributed i n March, 1970. The hypotheses set out i n Chapter I have been tested. The tests are described, and the data are presented and analysed i n Chapters III,IV, and V. These chapters correspond to the three main sections of the theory. Summaries to these chapters are i n -tended to draw the material together, and are not intended as extensive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the r e s u l t s . I nterpretation i s reserved for the f i n a l chapter where an overview of data from a l l sources i s reviewed and analyzed. In Chapter VI, the a s s o c i a t i o n between income and c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i s examined. This chapter presents material which was not a n t i c i p a t e d i n the o r i g i n a l theory. This a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r -mation provides possible explanations for c e r t a i n discrepant 5 r e s u l t s i n the main body of the t h e s i s , and i s discussed i n de-t a i l throughout Chapter VII. Chapter VII provides a review of the thesis and the r e s u l t s of tests , and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the data. Those r e s u l t s which do not support hypotheses are given p a r t i c u l a r attention, and i n -formation from Chapter VI and the Appendices i s examined f o r addi-t i o n a l i n s i g h t . A formal review of the h i s t o r y of trade unions and of l i t e r a t u r e about trade union development w i l l not be included i n t h i s t h e s i s . This omission i s occasioned by two considerations. One, the h i s t o r i c a l material relates to a b l u e - c o l l a r labour force i n the i n i t i a l phases of organization, whereas the thesis relates to a white-collar labour force which has h i s t o r i c a l pre-cedents and a contemporary l e g a l framework for organization. Two, the t h e o r e t i c a l material consists of discussions of market cycles and speculation on the nature of w h i t e - c o l l a r work. I t i s not d i r e c t l y relevant to the p a r t i c u l a r kind of research under-taken i n this work, although general theses — f o r example, the l i n k i n g of collective, bargaining to r e p l a c e a b i l i t y — are fundamental to t h i s theory as w e l l as to other theories of labour union development. 6 1. Definitions Definitions are given below for job control and bargaining strategies. Operational definitions of these and other concepts are given i n Chapter I I . i . Job Control Job control may be defined as: the amount of choice and  self direction that a worker may exercise during task performance. Some jobs allow for few or no choices. Decisions are made by supervisors, or they are avoided by the establishment of work rou-tines which allow for no alternatives. In such jobs, the worker does not have any control over the content of his job. He does not have opportunities to choose the sequence and pace of his tasks. He works to given standards and has l i t t l e or no control over the quantity or the quality of his output. He i s subject to such temporal and spatial constraints as the employer deems necessary, and he cannot choose to alter these conditions. Other jobs require the worker to make choices. Decisions about work processes, products, and resource allocations are neces-sary. In such jobs, the worker must exercise control over the task content of his job. He controls the sequence and pace of work. He determines the quantity of output and exercises judgment about i t s quality. He chooses the conditions of time and space most appropriate to the effective performance of his tasks. Those jobs which allow for few or no choices provide the worker with low amounts of control over his work. Those jobs which require choices provide the worker with higher amounts of control. 7 Eight dimensions of job control are identified. These are: 1) control over task content: choice of tasks; 2) control over task sequencing: choice over the sequence of tasks; 3) control over task pace: choice over amount of time spent on tasks; 4 ) supervision: self direction versus direction from others; 5) control over quantity of output: choice over amount of daily production; 6) control over quality of work: the exercise of judgment about pro-duct quality; 7) temporal control: choice over starting, stopping and break times and the duration of work; 8) spatial control: freedom to choose and change location of work. Relative to each of these dimensions, a worker may exercise a high or a low amount of control. Jobs are embedded in organizational frameworks and various alternative actions have differing costs and consequences for others and for the organization. Workers who exercise choice are expected by others to consider the differing costs and consequences, and to make rational decisions. A rational decision is a choice between alternative actions which i s most l i k e l y to obtain maximum benefits or desired outcomes. Decisions on behalf of or in the context of organizations are rational where they are most lik e l y to obtain outcomes favorable to the organization. A rational choice between actions i s based on knowledge of the possible alternatives and of their consequences and costs. 8 Knowledge of alternatives i s based on familiarity with work products and processes, and i s achieved through the acquisition of s k i l l s and experience. Awareness that rational decisions are based on knowledge of alternatives i s achieved through experience at de-cision-making. Consequently, the a b i l i t y to make rational decisions is a s k i l l achieved through the exercise of other s k i l l s and the ac-quisition of experience. Workers possess different s k i l l s and different amounts of experience with production processes. One of the s k i l l s which is not equally distributed i s the a b i l i t y to make rational decisions. Wor-kers without decision-making s k i l l s may be employed in jobs which i n -volve no choices. In these positions they have low job control. Workers with decision-making s k i l l s may be employed i n either low or high control jobs. If they accept low control jobs they do not have the opportunity to exercise their s k i l l s . If they have high control jobs they must exercise their s k i l l s . A worker trades his s k i l l s and experience with an employer for income. A worker who has, and a worker who i s qualified to seek, high control jobs has more s k i l l s and experience with which to trade than one who has, or seeks, low control jobs. i i . Individual Bargaining Strategies Workers who choose not to bargain individually are those who  do not inform employers of their expectations or wishes regarding; wages. Negotiation i s not entered i f one party to wage setting does not participate. Wage-setting always involves the employer's p a r t i c i -pation. 9 Workers who do bargain individually are those who inform  employers of their expectations or wishes regarding wages. The provision of this information engages the worker in wage-setting. The information may be met by rejection, compromise, agreement, or indifference by the employer. The definition refers to the employee's actions, and not to the response. Since wage-setting always involves the employer's participation, the entry into that s i t -uation by the employee i s an active bargaining strategy. When workers refrain from bargaining they avoid confronta-tion with employers and active risk-taking. When they engage i n bar-gaining, they attempt to exercise personal control over the outcome. i i i . Collective Bargaining Strategies Workers employ a collective bargaining strategy when they join a union, and that union states their expectations or wishes re-garding wages to an employer. Workers in a firm can ordinarily exercise this option ef-fectively only i f a majority of them have voted to join a union. Workers who take a passive collective bargaining strategy  are inactive members of unions. That i s , they have union membership, but they do not attend meetings, take office, or engage in union ac-t i v i t i e s other than strikes. Workers who take an active collective, bargaining strategy  are active participants in unions. That i s , they have union member-ship, attend meetings regularly, are willing to take office or presently hold office, and they engage in union activities other than strikes. 10 i v . Individual Bargaining Strategies Combined with Collective Stra-l e v i e s A combination of individual bargaining with collective bar-gaining i s possible for white-collar workers. The proportion of union shops i s low. Union firms compete in the labour market with non-union firms. Individual workers may leave a union shop and enter em-ployment in non-union firms: their union a f f i l i a t i o n at one company does not affect their work status elsewhere. Workers may therefore become union members in a union shop, but take advantage of the com-petitive labour market to engage in individual bargaining for wages higher than those negotiated by unions. Union workers who engage in active individual bargaining  are those who inform employers of their expectations or wishes re-garding wages through individual as well as, or instead of. through  collective encounters. 11 2. Replaceability/Marketability and Bargaining A worker's bargaining strategy i s related to the ease with which he may be replaced, and the ease with which he can get alter-native jobs. Each of these is associated with job control. The f i r s t section of the theory sets out the relationships between replaceability and individual bargaining for non-union wor-kers, and between replaceability and job control. The same argument is b r i e f l y restated with respect to the relationships between market-ab i l i t y and individual bargaining for non-union workers, and between marketability and job control. Propositions are then stated regarding the relationship between job control and individual bargaining stra-tegies for non-union workers. The argument is extended to the relationship between job control and collective bargaining, and f i n a l l y to the relationship between job control and individual bargaining strategies for union members. The relationship between sex differences and bargaining strategies i s considered, and an argument i s given for examining the data separately for the sexes in tests of the hypotheses. t» Replaceability The objective of an employer is to maintain production at as low a labour cost as possible. The objective of an employee i s to maintain employment appropriate to his s k i l l s and experience at as high a wage as possible. 12 In a competitive labour market, an employer i s free to offer any amount in wages to an employee, but there are limits on how much the s k i l l s or experience of a given worker are worth to him, and l i -mits on how l i t t l e the worker i s willing to accept. If the supply of equivalent alternative labour i s ple n t i f u l , an employer does not incur as high a cost in recruitment of new em-ployees, and does not ri s k the loss of continuous labour supplies for the job i f he loses an employee. Consequently, the difference to an employer between one employee and another i s the difference In their labour costs. Under these circumstances, he may incur the risk of losing an employee by offering a low wage, without incurring any risk to the production of goods and services of his firm. If the supply of equivalent alternative labour i s pl e n t i f u l , an employee competes for his job. Since the difference between him-self and another worker i s their respective costs of labour, he risks his job i f he tries to bargain individually for a higher wage. If the supply of equivalent labour i s scarce, an employer may incur high costs in recruitment of alternative employees. The costs include the risk of time and production losses due to lack of qualified personnel. The offer of a high wage provides a better l i k e -lihood of maintaining continuous production. I f the supply of equivalent labour i s scarce, an employee need not compete for his job. He i s less l i k e l y to risk his job i f he bargains for a higher wage. The positions of the employer and the employee may be stated in two generalizations: 13 1. The more d i f f i c u l t i t i s to replace workers without risking production losses, the more l i k e l y an employer i s to offer a high wage to employees. 2. The more d i f f i c u l t i t i s to replace workers without risking production losses, the more lik e l y an employee i s to engage in individual bargaining for a higher income. i i . Job Control and Replaceability S k i l l s and experience are not equally distributed among wor-kers. Thus the a b i l i t y to engage i n high control jobs i s not a uni-versal attribute of workers. Among workers capable of performing high control jobs i n general, the number whose particular s k i l l s and experience are rele-vant to a particular industry i s a small proportion of the labour force. Of those whose s k i l l s and experience are relevant to a parti-cular industry, those who are familiar with the specific business, corporation, or market in which an employer is situated are yet again a smaller fraction of the labour force. The workers most l i k e l y to be qualified for any given high control job are those who are doing the job satisfactorily. An employer has an investment in such wor-kers which he loses i f they must be replaced. As the s k i l l s and experience required for a job decrease, the supply of equivalent labour increases. The total number of wor-kers able to do unskilled and low control jobs approaches the size of the total labour force. An employer does not have an investment 14 in such workers which involves any risk to production i f i t i s lost, and such workers may be easily replaced. A third generalization may be given: 3. The more job control a worker has, the less easily he may be replaced. i i i . Marketability In a competitive labour market, an employee i s free to de-mand any amount in wages from an employer, but there are limits on how much an employer w i l l pay for his s k i l l s and experience, and lim-i t s on how l i t t l e he w i l l accept. If the supply of equivalent jobs i s pl e n t i f u l , an employee does not incur high risk of unemployment i n seeking a new job. He does not risk continued employment i f he tries to bargain, individu-a l l y , for a higher wage. If the supply of.equivalent jobs i s ple n t i f u l , an employer competes for workers. He incurs a risk to production through loss of labour i f he offers a low wage. If the supply of equivalent jobs i s scarce, an employee does incur the risk of unemployment i f he tries to bargain. An employer incurs a lower ri s k to production through loss of labour i f he offers a low wage. The positions of the employer and the employee may be stated in two generalizations: 4. The easier i t is for an employee to obtain equivalent employment, the more lik e l y an employer is to offer a high wage. 15 5. The easier i t i s for an employee to obtain equivalent employment, the more li k e l y an employee i s to engage in individual bargaining for a higher income. iv. Job Control and Marketability Workers with l i t t l e s k i l l and experience have no control over their own marketability. The supply of jobs i s arbi t r a r i l y de-termined by the business cycles and industrial outputs of a region. The risk of unemployment i s ever present. As s k i l l s and experience increase, the general a b i l i t y to make rational decisions and exercise job control provide for market-a b i l i t y . Workers in high control jobs have alternatives in both low and high control areas; in their own s k i l l area and in other decision-making capacities. A sixth generalization i s stated i n this connection: 6. The more job control a worker has, the more easily he may find alternative employment. v. Job Control and Individual Bargaining Strategies for Non-Union  Workers The six.generalizations may be joined for a statement of two propositions. These propositions are stated with respect to non-union workers for whom collective bargaining i s not an alternative strategy. Proposition 1; The more job control a worker has, the more l i k e l y he i s to receive a high wage offer. 16 Proposition 2: The more job control a worker has, the more li k e l y he is to engage i n individual bargaining with an em-ployer for a higher income. These two propositions have four derivations: Hypothesis 1: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with high control than with low control w i l l receive high incomes. Hypothesis 2: Among non-union workers who do not bargain over income individually, a higher proportion with high control than with low control w i l l attribute their non-bar-gaining strategy to satisfactory wage offers. Hypothesis 3: Whether or not they engage in overt bargaining, a high-er proportion of non-union workers with high control than with low control w i l l say i t i s possible to bargain individually. Hypothesis 4: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with high control than with low control w i l l engage in individual bargaining. y i . Collective Bargaining The bargaining options available to non-union workers are individual bargaining or no bargaining. The argument so far has dealt with the relationship between job control and these two options. The legal bargaining options of employees in any firm include collective bargaining, but the option can be taken only i f a majority of the firm's employees vote to join a union. When employees join a union and exercise this option, they reduce their replaceability. 17 I t i s the function of unions to control replacement and to obtain higher wages for members. This function i s performed through the threat of strikes. The withdrawal of services by many employees together with sanctions against replacement during a strike, has an effect on an employer similar to the withdrawal of services by an employee who i s d i f f i c u l t to replace. The employer, in offering low wages to such employees, risks the continuity of production. I f an employee is protected from losing his job when he asks for higher wages, then the supply of equivalent labour i s not a problem, and he i s not competing for his job regardless of the number of other workers available. In return for control of replacement, there are costs i n -volved for workers in union membership. The routinizatiou of bargain-ing may prevent private arrangements between employees and employer and i s one cost which affects those workers who otherwise might bar-gain individually. The second cost i s the risk of lost wages in the event of strikes. Since uniops have no control over the sources of alternative employment, and since strikes can lead to long periods of unemployment, a union worker risks prolonged wage loss in the use of the collective bargaining strategy. v i i . Job Control and Collective Bargaining The best bargaining strategy of a worker i s that which is most l i k e l y to obtain a high wage at a low r i s k of unemployment or other cost. 18 The more job c o n t r o l an i n d i v i d u a l worker has, the l e s s e a s i l y he may be replaced ( G e n e r a l i z a t i o n 3). The more job c o n t r o l he has, the more l i k e l y he i s to r e c e i v e a high wage o f f e r (Propo-s i t i o n 1 ) . The more job c o n t r o l he has, the more l i k e l y he i s to engage i n i n d i v i d u a l b a r g a i n i n g ( P r o p o s i t i o n 2)» Since unions are means of c o n t r o l l i n g replacement and ob-t a i n i n g a higher income f o r members, they provide the high c o n t r o l worker w i t h advantages which he already has. However, they impose r i s k s and c o n s t r a i n t s which are greater than those which he already has. As job c o n t r o l decreases, r e p l a c e a b i l i t y i n c r e a s e s , income d e c l i n e s , and the r i s k s of i n d i v i d u a l b a rgaining i n c r e a s e s . Unions provide the low c o n t r o l worker w i t h advantages he does not have as an i n d i v i d u a l . The r i s k s they impose are comparable to r i s k s already i n c u r r e d . Another g e n e r a l i z a t i o n i s given: 7. As job c o n t r o l decreases, the advantages of a c o l l e c t i v e b a r gaining s t r a t e g y i n c r e a s e . A p r o p o s i t i o n may be s t a t e d : P r o p o s i t i o n 3: The more job c o n t r o l a worker has, the l e s s l i k e l y he i s to favor c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . I n d i v i d u a l workers may not choose to engage i n c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . A m a j o r i t y vote i n a f i r m i s r e q u i r e d f o r l e g a l c e r t i -f i c a t i o n of a union. A m a j o r i t y of high c o n t r o l workers i n a f i r m means a m a j o r i t y whose best bargaining s t r a t e g y i s i n d i v i d u a l bar-g a i n i n g . Consequently, we would expect that unions are more l i k e l y 19 to be chosen as bargaining instruments by low control workers where they form a majority. This i s stated as a proposition: Proposition 4: The more job control a majority of employees have, the less l i k e l y they are to join a union. Workers become union members by a majority vote. Refusal to join i s either not possible (closed shop) or i s discouraged by other workers. Since a minority may vote against membership and be obliged to join, not a l l union members need be in favor of the union. Hypothesis 8 derives from this consideration. These propositions lead to four hypotheses: Hypothesis 5 : Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with low control than with high control w i l l favor union mem-bership. Hypothesis 6: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with low control than with high control w i l l be willin g to join a union. Hypothesis 7: Among a l l workers, a higher proportion with low control than with high control w i l l be union members. Hypothesis 8: Among union workers, a higher proportion with low con-trol than with high control w i l l favor union membership. It should be noted that the f i f t h and sixth hypotheses d i f -fer In generality. The f i f t h refers to an attitude favoring union membership in general for white-collar workers. The sixth refers to the willingness to personally join a union. 20 v i i i . Job Control and Individual Bargaining for Union Members The number of union firms i s small compared to the number of non-union firms with respect to the white-collar labour force. An employer who meets union demands must s t i l l compete for his work-ers with employers in non-union firms. Regardless of the agreements negotiated by unions, employees whose wages are lower than they may obtain elsewhere are free to seek other employment. They are not bound to their union, and the union does not control their mar-ketability. The argument so far presented may be applied to union work-ers as well as to non-union workers. Differential replaceability and marketability are characteristics of workers in or out of unions. The sanctions against individual bargaining among union workers consist of dissuasion by union o f f i c i a l s , employers and other union workers. There are no legal sanctions. Employers may refuse to participate in private arrangements with employees, but employees may, nonetheless, state their expectations and wishes regarding in-come without using the collective bargaining strategy. A smaller proportion of union workers than non-union work-ers would be expected to use the individual bargaining strategy. Of those who do use i t , a higher proportion would be high control workers since they are less easily replaced and have greater market-a b i l i t y . N Where they do not use the individual bargaining strategy, they s t i l l retain a better bargaining position on the competitive 21 labour market than low c o n t r o l workers. Consequently, whichever stra t e g y they use, and they may use both, high c o n t r o l workers would be expected to rec e i v e higher wages than low c o n t r o l workers. The hypotheses stated f o r non-union workers may be r e -stated f o r the union workers: Hypothesis 9: Among union workers, a higher p r o p o r t i o n w i t h high c o n t r o l than w i t h low c o n t r o l w i l l r e c e i v e high incomes. Hypothesis lOzAmong union workers who do not bargain over income i n -d i v i d u a l l y , a higher p r o p o r t i o n w i t h high c o n t r o l than w i t h low c o n t r o l w i l l a t t r i b u t e t h e i r non-bargaining s t r a t e g y to s a t i s f a c t o r y wage o f f e r s . Hypothesis ll:Whether or not they engage i n overt b a r g a i n i n g , a higher p r o p o r t i o n of union workers w i t h high con-t r o l than w i t h low c o n t r o l w i l l say i t i s p o s s i b l e to bargain i n d i v i d u a l l y . Hypothesis 12:Among union workers, a higher p r o p o r t i o n w i t h high c o n t r o l than w i t h low c o n t r o l w i l l engage i n i n d i v i -dual b a r g a i n i n g . i x . Sex and Job Cont r o l I n the preceding argument, l i m i t s on the competitive pos-i t i o n of workers v i s - a - v i s other workers have been associated w i t h r e p l a c e a b i l i t y . One worker could replace another i f he possessed the r e q u i s i t e s k i l l s and experience. The source of a f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n of competition i s sex. 22 Women are channeled into those c l e r i c a l jobs which offer the lower amounts of job control, regardless of their experience and s k i l l s . In almost every line of work, their labour i s evalua-ted separately from that of men, and their pay scales begin at a lower level and end at a much lower level regardless of the tasks they perform. In addition to the objective restrictions imposed on women in the labour market, there are subtle constraints on their action. Among these are social disapproval of aggressive behavior. I f overt bargaining action i s construed as aggressive behavior, then their bargaining behavior is associated not only with job control — as i t i s for men -- but also with their sex. Because the income differences are endemic, and because action to overcome the restrictions involves potential disapproval, being a woman modifies the relationship between job control and in-come. A high control job for women i s worth less than a high con-trol job for men. The difference between the sexes can be partially associ-ated with replaceability. As long as women are crowded into low control jobs, they are subject to high replaceability. Each can replace many others. However, differences between men and women at the same control levels are not so simply handled. The two sexes are not regarded by employers as interchangeable for jobs. Employers advertise jobs separately for men and women, and specify separate job classifications and wage scales for the two sexes. In effect there are two labour markets. 23 In addition, women are more l i k e l y than men to be tempor-ary workers. Their domestic roles more often r e s t r i c t their oppor-tunities for long-term employment; childbearing interrupts their careers. One of the potential effects of this restriction i s a lower commitment to work, and a lower interest in improving working conditions. Their willingness to bargain, and their willingness to join unions or actively participate in union affairs may, conse-quently, be lower than that of men. The arguments presented i n this and in the fourth section are not altered by this division of the labour force. However, tests of the hypotheses require controls to be placed on sex. 24 3. Interaction and Bargaining Collective bargaining is an option which a group may choose when the group members are conscious of common opinions about com-mon bargaining handicaps. The problem to be considered in this section i s the opportunity workers have to recognize common bargain-ing handicaps and to develop common opinions about them. These opportunities are associated with the amount and range of interaction that workers have with one another and with employers or other workers whose bargaining positions are dissimilar. Inter-action patterns are associated with the kinds of jobs people do, and consequently with the amount of job control they have. However, interaction patterns vary within job control l e -vels as well as between them. In this section, the relationship be-tween interaction patterns and bargaining is f i r s t examined; then the relationship between job control and interaction patterns. These arguments lead to the same propositions as those stated i n Section 2. Then the association between bargaining strategies and interac-tion patterns within job control levels i s considered. These argu-ments lead to hypotheses which relate bargaining differences within control levels to interaction patterns. i . Interaction and Collective Bargaining Interaction involves the exchange of information and opin-ion between people. The frequent exchange of information and opinion 25 between persons permits the growth of a common pool of i n f o r m a t i o n and o p i n i o n . Organized c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n toward a c o l l e c t i v e goal i s undertaken by people who have common i n f o r m a t i o n and op i n i o n s . C o l -l e c t i v e a c t i o n cannot be undertaken by i n d i v i d u a l s . C o l l e c t i v e bar-gaining i s undertaken by workers whose c o l l e c t i v e goal i s increased wages and who share the o p i n i o n that they w i l l o b t a i n t h i s end at lower r i s k through group a c t i o n . I n t e r a c t i o n between workers permits the growth of i n f o r -mation and opi n i o n about common bar g a i n i n g handicaps and a l t e r n a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s . Therefore, the o p p o r t u n i t i e s workers w i t h common handicaps and goals have f o r o r g a n i z i n g a c o l l e c t i v i t y are greater among those who i n t e r a c t w i t h one another than among those who don 11. I n t e r a c t i o n between persons whose ba r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s are opposed provides the.opportunity to l e a r n of a l t e r n a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s , and to gain a l t e r n a t i v e viewpoints on an income d i s t r i -b u t i o n . The frequent exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n and o p i n i o n between persons whose p o s i t i o n s are d i f f e r e n t provides f o r the growth of a common pool of knowledge which takes both p o s i t i o n s i n t o account, and a common body of o p i n i o n which i n v o l v e s compromises. Such com-promises may be concluded between i n t e r a c t i n g employers and employees without the use of c o l l e c t i v e b a rgaining by employees. Therefore low amounts of i n t e r a c t i o n between employers and employees are more l i k e l y to be as s o c i a t e d w i t h c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , than high amounts of such i n t e r a c t i o n . 26 Two generalizations are stated: 8. The collective bargaining strategy i s more l i k e l y to be used by workers with common bargaining handicaps who inter-act with one another, than by those who do not interact. 9. The collective bargaining strategy i s more lik e l y to be used by workers with common bargaining handicaps who do not interact with employers than by those who do interact with employers. i i . Job Control and Interaction The amount of choice available regarding work content, pacing, sequencing, output quantity and quality, time and space, de-termine the amount of choice a worker has with respect to his physi-cal mobility within an organization, and those with whom he communi-cates. Tasks are done in given areas and times. Work breaks also occur i n given areas at given times. Opportunities for interaction during work and breaks arc limited to those who share space and time. Opportunities for interaction during the performance of routines are limited to those whose routines intersect one another. Low control workers do not choose their areas or times, and are not free to alter these or to change their routines. They are restricted in interaction opportunities to other workers whose daily tasks occur i n the same areas and times and whose routines bring them into contact. 27 High control workers may choose their work areas, their times, and may change their task routines. They are free to i n i t i a t e interaction with others whose tasks are regularly done in various areas and times, and to establish routines which bring them into contact with others of their choice. They have a greater range of interaction opportunities. Low control workers do not make decisions. They receive directions from supervisors which obviates the need for personal choices. They work according to an established pacing and sequencing routine which does not allow them the freedom to i n i t i a t e interaction with employers. High control workers do make decisions,, Decisional made "by one J&esaber of an organization may have repercussions elsewhere in the structure. In order to ensure coordination of ac t i v i t i e s and to safeguard against unexpected consequences, those who make deci-sions communicate their actions to other decision-makers. The de-cision-making function provides opportunities for interaction between non-management employees in high control jobs and employers or other management personnel. While low control i s not necessarily associated with a specific interaction pattern, i t i s associated with a restricted range of interaction, and consequently with a restricted opportunity for receiving diverse information and opinion. I t i s also associated with the absence of opportunities to interact with employers, and consequently with a restricted opportunity for gaining information on the employer's position and establishing compromises with employers. 28 Each of these r e s t r i c t i o n s increases the l i k e l i h o o d that low control workers w i l l i n t e r a c t very l i t t l e with employers. One genera l i z a t i o n i s stated: 10. The lower the job co n t r o l , the less frequent w i l l be a worker's i n t e r a c t i o n with employers. i i i . Job Cantrol and C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining Workers with low control are more e a s i l y replaced than workers with high c o n t r o l (generalization 3). They may not f i n d a l -ternative employment as e a s i l y (generalization 6). They are less l i k e l y to receive high wage of f e r s (proposition 1). They are less able to engage i n i n d i v i d u a l bargaining (proposition 2). When low control workers i n t e r a c t with another, they have common bargaining handicaps to share. This i s less l i k e l y to be true of high control workers who i n t e r a c t e i t h e r with one another or with low control workers. Since the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining strategy i s more l i k e l y to be used by workers with common bargaining handi-caps who i n t e r a c t with one another (generalization 8), and more l i k e l y to be used by workers who do not i n t e r a c t with employers (generalization 9), the following propositions may be stated: Proposition 5: The lower the job control a worker has, the more l i k e l y he i s to favor c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. 29 Proposition 6; The lower the job control a majority of employees have, the more li k e l y they are to join a union. These are restatements of the same two propositions stated in the f i r s t section. They lead to the same four hypotheses. How-ever, they may be extended. The next part of the theory examines the extensions. i v . Interaction Patterns Within Job Control Levels and Collective Bargaining Collective bargaining i s a form of institutionalized con-f l i c t . The employer or employers are on one team; the union on the other. The objectives of the teams are those of individuals: the employer to obtain employees at the lowest possible cost; the employ-ees, to maintain employment at the highest possible wage. The competition clearly defines the players and their ob-jectives, whereas individual bargaining involves only implicit recog-nition of differing objectives. The explicit definition of member-ship allows for definition of the opponent as an outsider: a "we-they" dichotomy i s established. Frequent interaction between workers and employers modifies respective claims and provides for compromises between conflicting objectives. Because workers with low job control are l i k e l y to have infrequent interaction with employers, this modification i s less li k e l y to pccur for them than for high control workers. Collective bargaining for low control workers expli c i t l y defines, or ins t i t u -30 tionalizes, a conflictual "we-they" situation which isnot modified by individual contact between members of the opposing teams. However, there are pos s i b i l i t i e s for diverse patterns of interaction within the control levels. For example, employees of small companies may have more access to management personnel than employees of large companies because they share a working area. Em* ployees whose job requires high concentration or steady attendance of machines may have fewer conversational opportunities with one another than employees whose jobs involve constant exchange of i n -formation. These differences affect workers at both control levels. Low control workers who do not have a strong market position but who do have easy access to employers have the opportunity to ex-press their viewpoints and describe their situations. The inter-change of opinion deprives such employees of an explicit definition of management as a competitor, and provides for the possibility that such employers w i l l modify their positions and act as a l l i e s . Con-sequently, within the low job control level, favorable views of col-lective bargaining and the willingness to join unions should be less common among those who interact frequently with employers than among those who seldom interact with employers. High control workers who do have a strong market position but who do not have easy access to employers have restrictions on their opportunities for impressing employers with their bargaining position. Although they retain the alternative of seeking work else-where or aggressively seeking interviews for bargaining purposes, they are not able to express their viewpoints and market their a b i l i t i e s 31 in daily and informal contact. Although they do not share a bargain-ing handicap with low control workers, the use of the collective bar-gaining strategy provides them with opportunities for contacting em-ployers and defining their objectives and bargaining positions. While high control workers are less l i k e l y to favor or to employ the collective bargaining strategy, those whose interaction with employers i s limited are more lik e l y to consider or to take this strategy than are those whose interaction with employers i s frequent. A proposition i s advanced: Proposition 9; Favorable views of collective bargaining and union membership are more lik e l y to be associated with i n -frequent interaction than with frequent interaction between an employee and employers. The following hypotheses are derived: Hypothesis 13; Among non-union workers at the same level of job con-t r o l , a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l favor union membership. Hypothesis 14: Among non-union workers at the same level of job con-t r o l , a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l be w i l l -ing to join unions. Hypothesis 15: Among a l l workers at the same level of job control, a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l be union members. 32 Hypothesis 16: Among union members at the same level of job control, a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l favor union mem-bership. Interaction with employers modifies the differences in viewpoints between workers and employers. Interaction with other workers should encourage the development of a common pool of infor-mation and opinion. The establishment of a "we-they" conflict i n -volves the definition of the opponent as "they", but i t also involves the definition of membership in the "we" group. Those workers who frequently interact with one another have more opportunity for dev-eloping such a group definition, than workers who rarely interact with one another. Low control workers who interact frequently with one ano-ther share their bargaining information. Those who do not engage i n interaction with others whose bargaining position i s similar are less able to establish themselves as members of a group, and are therefore less l i k e l y to consider collective strategies as means of dealing with their private handicaps. High control workers who interact frequently with one ano-ther do not have bargaining handicaps to share. Those workers are more l i k e l y to compete.with one another. They also have no shared bargaining handicaps with low control workers. Since their objec-tive in using a collective bargaining strategy i s to gain guaranteed access to employers where that interaction pattern i s limited, fre-33 quent interaction with other members of a potential c o l l e c t i v i t y i s less l i k e l y to be a condition of union membership. In addition, fre-quent interaction between workers at different control levels may Involve authority distinctions: high control workers may supervise, instruct, or have responsibility for low control workers. While the exchange of information should provide for common opinions and com-promises, the authority distinctions may inhibit collective bargain-ing by both groups of workers vis-a-vis common employers. Conse-quently, the interaction rates of high control workers with one another or with low control workers are not l i k e l y to affect their bargaining strategies. A proposition i s advanced with respect to low control workers: Proposition 10: Favorable views of collective bargaining and union membership are more lik e l y to be associated with frequent interaction than with infrequent interac-tion between workers with low control. The hypotheses derived from this are: Hypothesis 17: Among non-union workers with low control, a higher proportion with high than with low co-worker inter-action frequency w i l l favor union membership. Hypothesis 18: Among non-union workers with low control, a higher proportion with high than with low co-worker inter-action frequency w i l l be willing to join a union. 34 Hypothesis 19; Among workers with low control, a higher proportion with high than with low co-worker interaction fre-quency w i l l be union members. Hypothesis 20: Among union workers with low control, a higher pro-portion with high than with low co-worker interac-tion frequency w i l l favor union membership. 35 4. Predispositions and Bargaining Individual bargaining i s a means of exercising personal control over events. Active involvement in collective bargaining i s also a means of exercising personal control. "No bargaining" and "passive union membership" are both means of avoiding confron-tation with employers or active risk-talcing. In this section,it i s contended that jobs train workers to adopt characteristic behavioral responses. Jobs which require decision-making "train workers to make decisions and to become actively involved i n areas beyond their task performance. Jobs which discour-age the exercise of choice predispose workers to accept the direction of others. Whether as individuals or as union members, the high-control workers should take more active bargaining roles than the low con-tr o l workers. i . Bargaining Action When a worker confronts an employer with a request for a higher income, he takes the risk of outpricing his worth to the em-ployer and thus losing his job. Even i f this i s not a li k e l y out-come, he risks the humiliation of refusal or of unsuccessfully de-fending his claim. Successful individual bargaining i s based on the confidence the worker has that his claim i s reasonable, and on his a b i l i t y to articulate the demand and support i t with evidence or argument. 36 Articulation Involves the a b i l i t y to clearly state a case. Confidence in the merits of a claim involves knowledge of one's own marketability, wage scales elsewhere, and the capacity of the employer to meet a claim. In addition, confidence i n oneself during a con-frontation with an employer involves suspension of emotional reac-tions such as awe or fear of authority. Active participation i n union act i v i t i e s also involves confidence in and articulation of demands. I t requires knowledge of wage scales elsewhere, the employer's position, and the state of the labour market. I t , too, requires the suspension of awe or fear of the employer's authority. Passive acceptance of conditions involves a willingness to a l i a ; others to establish the conditions of work. I t involves the tacit assumption that those in authority have the right to set work-ing conditions* The authority may be either employers or union of-f i c i a l s . The a b i l i t i e s to articulate demands, to obtain relevant information, and to generate self-confidence while facing authorities are not equally distributed among workers. These characteristics are associated with experience in articulation, decision-making, and interaction with authorities. Where such s k i l l s are required for the successful manipulation of a situation, those who do not possess them risk failure or humiliation i f they take the i n i t i a t i v e . They must weigh the r i s k against the urgency of their claims. The grea-ter the risk, the less l i k e l y they are to i n i t i a t e action. Those 37 who possess the s k i l l s have a lower r i s k of h u m i l i a t i o n , and a bet-t e r chance of success. The more s k i l l e d they are, the more l i k e l y they are to i n i t i a t e a c t i o n . T his i s stat e d as a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n : 11. The more experience a worker hes i n a r t i c u l a t i n g a case, making d e c i s i o n s , and i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h a u t h o r i t i e s , the more l i k e l y he i s to adopt a c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s . i i . Job Co n t r o l By d e f i n i t i o n , the more job c o n t r o l one has, the more de-c i s i o n s one must make. De c i s i o n s are based on f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h a l -t e r n a t i v e s and t h e i r consequences, so that the more job c o n t r o l one has, the more knowledge one has of r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n and the process of o b t a i n i n g i t . The more job c o n t r o l one has, the more f r e q u e n t l y he i s re q u i r e d to a r t i c u l a t e h i s p o s i t i o n . D e c i s i o n s must be t r a n s l a t e d to o t h e r s , and the process of t r a n s l a t i o n i n v o l v e s a r t i c u l a t e ex-p r e s s i o n . The more job c o n t r o l one has, the more one i n t e r a c t s w i t h employers ( g e n e r a l i z a t i o n 10). Employers are a u t h o r i t i e s i n the work s i t u a t i o n . A g e n e r a l i z a t i o n may be s t a t e d : c ' The more job c o n t r o l one has, the more experience he has i n a r t i c u l a t i n g a case, making d e c i s i o n s , and i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h a u t h o r i t i e s . 38 i i i . Job Control and Bargaining A proposition may be stated: Proposition 11: The more job control one has, the more li k e l y one is to adopt active bargaining strategies. There are two bargaining situations to be considered. One i s the non-union shop where the worker may bargain individually or refrain from bargaining. The collective bargaining option i s not available. The derivation from the proposition for this situation i s : Hypothesis 21: A higher proportion of workers with high than with low control w i l l engage in individual bargaining. This hypothesis repeats the fourth hypothesis stated in Section 2. The second situation i s the union shop where workers bar-gain collectively. Here, the individual worker has two options: to participate i n union a c t i v i t i e s and thereby influence the course of collective bargaining, or to refrain from participation and accept the conditions negotiated by representatives. A third option may be combined with either of these two: to engage in individual bargain-ing. This third option has been discussed in an earlier section and i s tested by Hypothesis 13. The f i r s t two options are dealt with i n the following hy-potheses: Hypothesis 22: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l possess information about union a c t i v i t i e s . 39 Hypothesis 23: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l attend union meetings* Hypothesis 24: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l be willing to take union offices. Hypothesis 25: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l hold union off i c e . i v . Sex and Active Bargaining It was stated in Section 2 that women are restricted i n bargaining opportunities because of social attitudes about aggres-sive behavior, and because of lower commitments to the labour force. Active bargaining strategies either as individuals or as union members involve the predisposition to make decisions and con-tr o l events. I f women are restrained from exerting control, then their bargaining behavior w i l l be relatively passive. Those with more job control should take more active bargaining strategies than those with less job control, but at both levels, they may be expected to take less active bargaining strategies than men. Also, women are more predominantly assigned to low control positions, and for that reason would be expected to be less active. The sexes arc therefore separated i n tests of hypotheses dealing with active bargaining strategies. 40 Footnotes 1. For example, the d i s c u s s i o n s i n A d o l f Sturmthal (ed.), White- C o l i a r Trade-Unions (Urbana: U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s P r e s s , 1967); I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Counselors, Inc., Irconcepts , I , No. 2 (May, 1969); R.F. Hoxie, Trade Unionism i n the United States (New York: D . Appleton and Co., 1928), 60; F. Tannenbaum, The Labour Move- ment (New York: C P . Putnam's Sons, 1921); Jack Barbash, Labour  Unions i n A c t i o n (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948). 2. In p a r t i c u l a r , K a r l Marx, C a p i t a l , t r a n s . Cedar and Eden P a u l (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1933); Sydney and B e a t r i c e Webb, H i s t o r y of Trade Unionism (New York: A.M. K e l l e y , 1965); John Commons et a l . (eds.), Documentary H i s t o r y of American I n d u s t r i a l  Society (Ten v o l s . ; New York: R u s s e l l and R u s s e l l , 1958); S e l i g Perlman, H i s t o r y of Trade Unionism i n the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1928); Marten Estey, The Unions (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1967); B. Solomon and R.K Burns, " U n i o n i z a t i o n of White-C o l l a r Employees, Extent, P o t e n t i a l , and I m p l i c a t i o n s " , J o u r n a l  of Business of the U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago, XXXVI, 2 ( A p r i l , 1963), 140-159. 3. See, f o r example, I r v i n g B e r n s t e i n , "Union Growth and S t r u c t u r a l C y c les" w i t h r e p l i e s by Lloyd Ulman, D a n i e l B e l l , and R u s s e l l A l l e n , Labor and Trade Unionism, ed., Walter Galenson and S.M. L i p s e t (New York: Wiley, 1960), 73-101. 4. Marx, op. c i t . 5. Webb, op. c i t . 6. Commons, op. c i t . 7. Perlman, op. c i t . 8. Estey, op. c i t . These arguments have not s t a t e d the same case, although a l l have been concerned w i t h the e f f e c t s of r e p l a c e -a b i l i t y and m a r k e t a b i l i t y on union developments. The c o i n c i -dence of formation and growth w i t h expanding economies, and the i n i t i a t i v e s taken by s k i l l e d workers i n the nineteenth century may be v a r i o u s l y i n t e r p r e t e d . The argument developed i n t h i s t h e s i s allows f o r the systematic examination of one i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e p l a c e a b i l i t y and Union membership. 41 CHAPTER II METHODOLOGY Information regarding the sample i s given i n this chapter so far as i s necessary for a reading of the data tables. More de-tailed information on the research design and sampling procedures i s contained in the Appendices. The concepts introduced in Chapter I are given operational meanings here. These include both the key terms — job control, and bargaining strategies — and the terms of their relationship. With the exception of the concepts: job control, employer, employee, income, and union membership, operational definitions consist of coding decisions about the responses to specific questions on the Interview schedule. These questions and the decision rules are given In this chapter. Interview schedules are included in the Appendices. 42 1. The Sample The Instrument for testing hypotheses set out i n the f i r s t chapter was a survey of white-collar employees in British Columbia. Employees were interviewed at their places of work or i n their homes. Employers were also interviewed during the survey. The interviews were conducted between June and October of 1969. Six graduate stu-dents i n the social sciences, and the author, conducted the inter-views. i . White-Collar Workers The term 'white-collar' refers to work involving mainly 1 mental s k i l l s as contrasted with work involving mainly manual s k i l l s . With the aid of occupational listin g s by government agencies, a l i s t 2 of jobs characterised by mental work was compiled. The l i s t s excluded occupations which were clearly manager-i a l , although these are white-collar jobs. They included a few occupations which were considered to be "borderline" between mental and manual work. The main categories lis t e d were: administrative, professional and technical, c l e r i c a l , sales, and borderline service. Examples of the occupations are given i n Appendix C. ii» Selection of Respondents Since the theory is about collective and individual bar-gaining, i t was necessary to select a sample consisting of union as well as non-union workers. The percentage of union workers i n the 43 3 white-collar labour force i s estimated at between 4 and 7 per cent. The likelihood of obtaining an adequate number of union workers by random selection was therefore very small. A l l union locals whose membership included any workers on the l i s t of white-collar occupations were approached for breakdowns of membership occupations and l i s t s of commercial firms with which they held contracts. Each firm under contract with white-collar workers was l i s t e d . Industrial and area directories were used to compile a second l i s t of non-union firms which were comparable to the f i r s t l i s t i n size of company, product area, and geographical location. Companies on the union l i s t were invited to participate in a "survey of the white-collar labour force" by letter, and, sub-sequently, by telephone and personal interview with executive mana-gers. Those companies employing five or fewer white-collar workers and those which were currently undergoing strikes, lock-outs, or i n i -t i a l negotiations were excluded. (Numerical counts of exclusions for these reasons, or for refusals after contact are given in Ap-pendix E.) Companies on the non-union l i s t were chosen at random from each of the size-product-area groupings. They were approached in the same way. Where refusals were encountered, replacements were taken from the l i s t . In this way, i t was intended that the effects of size, product and geography would be controlled, and comparable union and 4 non-union samples would be selected. 44 In each firm where participation was agreed to, a l i s t of potential respondents was drawn up or obtained from management of-f i c i a l s . This l i s t included persons whose occupations were noted by the earlier definition as white-collar workers* The Canadian Census classifications of 1961 were taken as a rough guide i n selecting the proportions of workers in each cate-gory. (See Appendix D) The objective was to obtain a sample which reflected the composition of the labour force. I t was not necessary to have exact proportions, but i t was desirable to have a distribu-tion which did not grossly over-represent any one sector. The f i n a l distribution of the sample is given in Appendix D. An overrepresentation of c l e r i c a l workers and under-representa-tion of salesworkers existed. This was due to a series of strikes among salesworkers throughout the summer of interviews. To offset this unintended bias, the sample was weighted and the desired pro-portions were more closely obtained. The waighting procedure did not alter the ratios of union to non-union respondents. The weighted distribution of the sample i s also given in Appendix D. i i i . Sample ratios The ratios i n the weighted sample are: 1) Union to non-union respondents: 47:53. 2) Male to Female respondents: 51:49. 3) Clerical-Administrative-Professional-Sales-Service Workers: 38:07:30:20:5. 4 5 2 . Operational Definitions Concepts introduced in Chapter I and necessary to the testing of the hypotheses are here given operational definitions. 1. Job Control Jobs vary i n the amount of control l e f t to the discretion of the worker. Those jobs which allow for few or no choices about task content, pacing, sequencing, production quotas, product qual-i t y , or the time and space in which work i s done are low control jobs. Those which require the worker to make his own decisions in these respects are high control jobs. Measurements of job control were constructed i n the f o l -lowing way: Each respondent was asked to describe his tasks on a nor-mal working day from the time he arrived i n his work station. In addition, he was asked several direct questions regarding his work load, how he decided which tasks to perform, the amount of super-vision to which he was subject, how much and with whom he had to coordinate his task performance, how he determined his pacing and sequencing of tasks, how regular his time schedule was, and where and with whom he worked. Management respondents were also asked questions regarding the supervision of the employees whom we interviewed, and regarding the nature of the employees' jobs. In many cases, written job evaluations were provided by management o f f i c i a l s . 46 Codes were constructed on the basis of this descriptive information. Eight dimensions of job control are identified: 1) task content; 2) task sequencing; 3) pacing; 4) amount of supervision; 5) quantity of output; 6) quality of product; 7) time duration (stop, start, and breaks); 8) spatial constraints* Along each of these dimensions, there are positions of no control: the respondent has no choices open to him. The choices may be b u i l t into the job such that anyone doing i t follows exactly the same procedure; or they may be made by supervisors. At the other end of the dimension scale, there are positions of high control: the respondent may choose his conditions and may alter the range of choice i f he deems that useful to his performance. Between these two extremes, there are gradations of control. Two points of these were identified in the original codes: minimal control over peripheral tasks or in ways not central to the main task; and control over main tasks but not over the range of tasks. In the third position — control over main tasks — the worker may choose to work on one or another project, but may not choose to i g -nore either or to create a third one. Each job description was examined for each of the eight control dimensions separately. One of the four stages of control was assigned, according to the author's judgment of the amount of control the respondent apparently had along that dimension. For purposes of concise and clear presentation, the four stages have been divided. The lower two liave been combined on a l l 47 but the temporal dimension. The higher two have similarly been combined on a l l but the temporal dimension. Along that dimension, the frequency of the highest rating was very low, and the frequency of the lowest rating, very high for the total sample. A decision was made, therefore, to divide this dimension such that the lowest rating included only those rated as having no control; the other rating included a l l others with some as well as with high amounts of control. The dichotomized measures are defined as "low" and "high" control levels respectively. The tables presented i n the text show control for each dimension in this dichotomized form. Total distributions are given i n Appendix F. i i , Non-management Employee A worker who receives a regular income from a firm and who does not make policy decisions or decisions about the incomes of other workers in that firm, i s a non-management employee, i i i . Employer and Management A person, agency, or group of persons who provide an i n -come to workers in exchange for their services, and who make policy decisions or decisions about the incomes of workers i n that firm, are employers, or management. Workers i n union firms who engage i n negotiations over sal -aries but who do not make decisions on behalf of the employer regard-ing them are not employers. 48 iv. Union Membership Respondents who said they belonged to a union are union members. v. Income The salary range of each respondent in the survey was ob-tained from management o f f i c i a l s during an i n i t i a l interview at each company. Where possible, the exact amount of gross earnings was obtained. Otherwise, the wage range for persons i n given jobs was taken and the mid-point of the range was coded as the income of the respondent. When the total array of incomes had been examined, the total sample was divided into those who received $450 or less, and those who received $451 or more per month. The division cut the total sample in two. (Information for thirteen respondents was not obtained. Of these, twelve were non-union respondents. Where i n -come i s used as a variable or i s controlled for, these thirteen persons are omitted from consideration). Those receiving $450 or less are defined as "low income" workers. Those receiving $451 or more are defined as "high income" workers. The terms are relative, and the dividing line i s the med-ian of the actual data array rather than one associated with a the-oretical concern. The actual distribution of incomes by $100 intervals i s shown i n Appendix G. 49 v i . Individual Bargaining Respondents were asked: "Would i t be possible for you to go alone to management and bargain for a raise i n your salary?" This question followed several other questions regarding income. Those who replied: "Yes" are coded as reporting the possibility of individual bargaining. This includes those who said that i t was possible, but that they would not, themselves, engage in the practice. Respondents were then asked, "Have you ever done this?" The question was asked of a l l respondents, regardless of their pre-vious answer. Those who said they had done this were coded as hav-ing bargained individually at some time during the course of employ-ment. Those who said they had not done this were asked, "Why not?" Responses were divided into those which indicated satisfaction with current wages and responses which indicated any of the follow-ing: resignation, nervousness, view of wage-setting as a management prerogative, and unawareness of the possibility* Where responses were none of these, the respondent was coded as having an ambiguous answer. Respondents were later asked, "When you applied for this if- -job, did you bargain over your starting wage?" Those who replied "yes" were coded as having engaged in individual bargaining on apply-ing for a job. Again, those who said they had not bargained were asked why not. The responses were coded i n the same way as for the pre-50 vious question. Those who indicated that they had received a satis-factory wage offer were coded as "satisfied" at time of applying for a job, and others were coded as "nervous reactions or unaware-ness", except where responses were ambiguous* These questions were asked of both union and non-union res-pondents. For union respondents, the code included "union contract" as an alternative explanation for not bargaining. v i i . Attitudes Toward Union Non-union respondents were asked: "In general, do you think i t i s better for workers like yourself to belong to unions or not?" Those who said i t i s better and those who said that, i n gen-eral i t i s better but that there are some occasions or circumstances (possibly including their own) i n which i t would not be better, were coded as having favorable attitudes toward union membership. Those who said i t i s not better, or who said that in some circumstances (possibly including their own) i t might be better but i n general i t i s not, were coded as having unfavorable attitudes toward union membership. Those who had no opinion are Included i n the total count, since the hypothesis states a direction only for those who hold fav-orable opinions. Non-union respondents were asked, "If a union came here and tried to organise workers like yourself, .would you join?" Those who said they would join, and those who said they would seriously consider joining or who said they would j o i n provided the union was a particular union of their choice,were coded as "willing to jo i n 51 union". Those who said they would not join, and those who said they would join only i f a majority vote obliged them to j o i n , were coded as "unwilling to j o i n " . Again, those with no opinion were inclu-ded i n the f i n a l count, since the hypothesis states a direction only for those who would j o i n . Those who hold no opinion might j o i n , but their answer would not permit one to make any assumption about them. Union respondents were asked, "In general, do you think i t i s better for workers like yourself to belong to unions or not?" This was coded in the same way as the similar question for non-union respondents. Union membership was determined from a question, "Do you belong to a union?" This question precceded the sections of ques-tions regarding unions*• v i i i . Interaction Interaction with other workers i s defined as reported ver-bal interaction during work with workers at the same or at lower levels of authority. Interaction with management i s defined as reported verbal interaction during work with a respondent's immediate boss or with other management personnel named by him. The procedure by which this information was obtained and coded i s as follows: (1) The authority structure of the organization was des-cribed to the interviewer by management personnel, with the positions named for persons having authority over the respondents. 52 (2) Each respondent was asked to describe his job at .the beginning of the interview. The description included information re-garding task coordination, supervision, and spatial arrangements. Then the respondent was asked to name which other jobs in the company he would deem to be "similar" to his own in s k i l l s , and, separately, in authority, and in status or importance. lie was also asked to name other jobs which he considered to carry more authority than his own, and those which he considered to carry less authority than his own. Respondents were encouraged to name jobs i n detail, and the ques-tioning stopped only when the interviewer sensed that the respondent had named as many jobs as he could r e c a l l or assess i n these terms. (3) Mid-way through the interview, the respondent was asked to assess the frequency of his contacts with others while he was working. The question was phrased: "With which other persons do you talk or work in the course of doing your job?" He was then instructed to provide his answer, i f possible, in terms of: "fre-quently", "occasionally", or "rarely or never". The l i s t of potential others was: (1) persons in similar jobs to your own; (2) your boss; (3) other management personnel; (4) persons in jobs which are not like your own; (5) clients, cus-tomers; and (6) persons outside the company other than clients. The interviewer provided the general c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , noted the answers, and then provided examples of other jobs which existed i n the company. These examples were derived from the information obtained earlier in the interview and from the management interview. For instance; the interviewer would say, "persons in similar jobs to 53 your own?"; the respondent would say, " I t a l k f r e q u e n t l y w i t h x, and once i n a while ( o c c a s i o n a l l y ) w i t h y l ;; the i n t e r v i e w e r would then ask, "and what about zt do you have much contact w i t h z ? " This procedure would continue w i t h each of the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . (4) I f the respondent assessed h i s i n t e r a c t i o n as frequent w i t h respect to two jobs which he regarded as s i m i l a r to h i s own, or which were rated by the coder, on the b a s i s of the e a r l i e r informa-t i o n , as having equivalent or lower a u t h o r i t y to h i s own, he was coded as having frequent i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h co-workers. (5) I f the respondent assessed h i s i n t e r a c t i o n as frequent w i t h one job i n t h i s group and o c c a s i o n a l to r a r e f o r the o t h e r s , or i f he assessed h i s i n t e r a c t i o n as " o c c a s i o n a l to r a r e " f o r a l l jobs i n t h i s group, or i f he was unable to name any jobs f a l l i n g w i t h i n t h i s group, he was coded as having infrequent i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h co-workers. (6) A few persons had jobs or described i n t e r a c t i o n pat-terns which brought them i n t o frequent contact w i t h co-workers p e r i o d -i c a l l y , but which kept them out of contact between these p e r i o d s . These were coded as ambiguous p a t t e r n s , and were not included i n the comparisons. (7) The two sets of answers f o r "immediate boss" and "other i . management personnel" were combined. I f the respondent had frequent i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h e i t h e r h i s immediate boss or any other member of management he was coded as having frequent i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h manage-ment. I f he had o c c a s i o n a l to r a r e i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h both groups, he was coded as having i n f r e q u e n t i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h management. 54 The immediate boss of any respondent i s not necessarily a member of management as management has been defined for purposes of this research. The decision to include the boss as management for the interaction codes was made on the assumption that the boss, while interacting during work, acted on behalf of management, and was therefore management as far as the respondent was concerned. Workers in positions of authority over the respondent but not representing management were not included in either of these i n -teraction codes. While such workers are co-workers, their authority may, from the respondent's point of view, give them quasi-management status. ix. Information and Participation; Union Support There are differences between union members in the amount of support they give to union a c t i v i t i e s . While detailed histories could not be obtained in an interview period, indicators of union support could be obtained. Two sets of such indicators were included. The f i r s t set refers to the amount of information the res-pondent has about the union. I t i s assumed that members of an or-ganization who have low levels of information are not strong p a r t i c i -pants and are not very much involved In the a c t i v i t i e s of the organ-ization. Those who have information are more lik e l y to be participa-ting members. The second set refers to attendance at meetings, wil l i n g -ness to hold off i c e , and actual history of office holding. While 55 holding office indicates other factors than those of interest here — for example, leadership characteristics — i t does distinguish the active from the less active members. The willingness to hold office provides a second indication of activity, or support. Atten-dance at meetings i s a good indicator of Involvement i n union a c t i -v i t i e s : those who attend are more l i k e l y to support union membership (even i f they do not support particular policies) than persons who do not attend. This information was obtained directly from responses to questions. Information indices: 1. Respondents were asked to name their union. Those who could accurately name either the union or the local, or who could pa r t i a l l y name the union and could name the lo c a l , were rated as having this information. Those who said they did not know, or who named a union other than that in which the firm's workers were mem-bers, or who were unable to provide a name other than a generic term for members (for example, "office people" or "store workers") were rated as not having this knowledge. 2„ Respondents were asked, "Do you know how long the union lias been ce r t i f i e d at the firm?" Interviewers were instructed to obtain dates where possible. Those workers who could give an accur-ate date, or who could give an accurate number of years or months, and those who gave an estimate within one year of the correct date were rated as having the information. Those who said they did not know, and those who guessed at a date more than one year distant from the correct date were rated as not having this knowledge. 56 The date of certification was obtained from the union, the management interview, and was checked against Department of Labour data. 3. Respondents were asked "How often does your union local have meetings (per year)?" This question was problematic, because the number of meetings which any one member could attend depended on the stage of negotiations by the union, and the role played by the member. Workers assigned to committees had more meetings to attend than inactive members, and were consequently aware of more meetings. An accurate estimate of meetings was therefore not obtainable in a l l cases. The decision was made to divide the responses according to the respondent's indication that he know of meetings. Those who said they did not know, or who gave no reply, were rated as not hav-ing the information. A l l who gave an answer indicating a certain number of meetings were rated as having information. This division gives the respondent who guessed, the benefit of the doubt, but since a f a i r number of respondents admitted that they did not know, the code did divide the population with some ju s t i f i c a t i o n . 4. Respondents were asked, "How many workers does your union represent?" Workers who gave no answer, said they did not know, or who gave an answer which was over one-third larger or smaller than the figure quoted by the Department of Labour handbook or by the un-ion agent, were rated as not having the knowledge. A l l others were rated as having the knowledge, and this included those who provided a number less than one-third distant from other estimates. 57 The reason for accepting a wide latitude of response for this question i s that membership figures fluctuate greatly over a year, and government publications admit that their figures (obtained from the unions) are possibly inflated, 5, Respondents were asked, "Who i s your local representative now?" Any of the following persons' names were accepted: a member of the executive of the local, the bargaining agent for the union, or the shop steward* Names were checked with management and/or union representatives, including the persons f i l l i n g those posts where they could be contacted. In the case of shop stewards, there is a high turnover in some shops. Names of persons who f i l l e d the post within a year prior to the interviews, where these names could be obtained from any of the above sources, were also accepted. In a l l cases, the respondent was given the benefit of any doubt. If the name given matched one of the above persons, the respondent was rated as having this information. I f no name was given, or i f the name given was definitely not that of a union rep-resentative (as defined above), the respondent was rated as not hav-ing the information. Participation indices: i« Respondents were asked, "How many meetings have you atten-ded i n the past year?" Since the total number of possible meetings was indefinite, an arbitrary division between the active and passive participants had to be made. This was established at a frequency of four or more 58 meetings. Those who attended four or more meetings were rated as active participants. Those who attended three, two, one, or no meet-ings were rated as passive participants. 2, Respondents were asked, "Have you ever held office i n the union?" Those who said they had held an office, of any kind, were rated as active members. This included those who presently held union offices. Those who said they had not held an office, and those who said they did not know, were rated as passive members. 3 . Respondents were asked, "Would you stand for office in the union i f you had the chance?" Those who said yes, and those who indicated that they probably would do so were rated as willing to actively participate. Those who said no, and those who Indicated that they probably would not do so were rated as passive p a r t i c i -pants. 59 3o Organization of Data A standard format i s used in presenting the data. Each hypothesis i s stated on the left-hand page facing the table i n which It i s tested. The source of information for testing the hypo-thesis i s briefly described, and the coding rules are restated. Where more than one question i s used i n connection with one hypothe-sis , the separate tests are given on subsequent pages. The decision is made, and a single sentence summarizes the results shown i n the table. the table giving the data distribution provides the per** centage of worleers giving a specific reply, by the levels of the i n -dependent variable. Where the independent variable i s job control, the percentage of workers at each control level i s given. Where the variable i s interaction frequency, the percentage of workers with specific frequencies i s given. Since there are eight job control levels, there are eight measures of the association between job control and the dependent variables. With respect to the interac-tion tests, there are eight measures of job control to be held con-stant for the testing of each hypothesis. In the sixth chapter, the independent variable i s income or income with job control levels held constant. Where I t i s i n -come, there arc only two levels to be considered: low income and high income. Where the variable is. income with job control levels held constant, there are eight measures of job control for the testing of each hypothesis. Two tables are presented i n the sixth 60 chapter which give union membership as the independent variable. In these, job control i s held constant and again, there are eight mea-sures of control involved in the statements. (These tables are not provided for hypothesis testing). Tables also provide the frequencies of response for each row, on which the percentages are based. Frequencies corresponding to the percentages are not given but they can be computed from these two figures. The tables then provide the percentage differences between the rows. The absolute percentage shows the amount of difference between the levels of the independent variable. The directional sign (plus or minus) i s shown with respect to support for the hypothesis. If the difference i s i n the direction predicted, the sign i s positive. If i t i s not in the predicted direction i t i s negative. An association between variables i s deemed to exist when six of the eight measures provide percentage differences in a con-sistent direction unless otherwise stated in the text. This associa-tion i s deemed to be weak when four of these consistent differences are ten percent or lower. The hypothesis in each case i s deemed to be supported where there i s a positive association between the variables ( a l l percen-tage differences on at least six of the eight measures are in the predicted direction). The association i s said to be not supported otherwise. 61 In most cases, the alternative hypothesis states the same result for the opposite population. For example, where the hypo-thesis states a direct relationship between job control and i n d i v i -dual bargaining, the alternative hypothesis states an inverse rela-tionship. When the association i s negative (percentage differences on at least six of the eight measures are in the direction opposite to that predicted), the alternative hypothesis i s said to be suppor-ted. In summaries of the tables, this w i l l be indicated as: 11^ supported. I f four of the consistent percentage differences are below ten percent, the alternative hypothesis i s deemed to be weakly supported. I f fewer than six measures provide consistent associations, the null hypothesis i s invoked: there i s no association between the variables. In summaries this i s stated as: H Q. Any variations i n these decision rules w i l l be stated i n the text. Where a decision rule i s not stated, these rules are operative. The summary at the end of each data chapter provides a tabular synopsis of the results for a l l of the hypotheses tested i n that section of the theory. 62 Footnotes 1. Canada, Department of Labour, Occupational Trends i n Canada 1931  to 1961, Report No. 11 (Ottawa: Queen's P r i n t e r , September, 1963) 3. 2. Trends, Appendix 1. S y l v i a O s try, The Occupational Composition of the Canadian La- bour Force, 1961 Census Monograph, Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s (Ottawa: Queen's P r i n t e r , 1967). Canada, Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s , Decennial Census 1961, The Labour Force (Ottawa: Queen's P r i n t e r , v o l . I l l , No. 1). 3. Canada, Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations i n Canada' Fifty-Seventh E d i t i o n 1968 (Ottawa: Queen's P r i n t e r , 1969). B r i t i s h Columbia, Department of Labour, Annual Report 1968 ( V i c t o r i a : Queen's P r i n t e r , 1968). 4. Firms North and East of Kelowna and P e n t i c t o n were excluded be-cause of the s c a r c i t y of union f i r m s i n these areas, and the cost of t r a v e l . 63 CHAPTER III JOB CONTROL AID BARGAINING: THE LABOUR MARKET The individual bargaining strategies of non-union and union respondents are examined in this chapter. Union membership, and favorable attitudes toward unions are also examined. Hypotheses re-lating these to levels of job control along eight dimensions have been stated i n Chapter I, and these are restated here. 64 1. Restatement of Theory The theory rests on the assumptions: (1) that the objec-tive of an employer i s to maintain production at as low a labour cost as possible. And; (2) that the objective of an employee i s to obtain employment appropriate to his s k i l l s and experience at as high a wage as possible. Six generalizations are stated regarding the positions of the employer and the employee with respect to the competitive labour market. These generalizations are: 1. The more d i f f i c u l t i t i s to replace workers without risk-ing production losses, the more l i k e l y an employer i s to offer a high wage to employees. 2. The more d i f f i c u l t i t i s to replace worIters without risk-ing production losses, the more l i k e l y an employee i s to engage i n individual bargaining for a higher income. 3* The more job control a worker has, the less easily he may be replaced, 4. The easier i t i s for an employee to obtain equivalent em-ployment, the more l i k e l y an employer i s to offer a high wage. 5. The easier i t i s for an employee to obtain equivalent em-ployment, the more l i k e l y an employee i s to engage i n indi-vidual bargaining for a higher income. 65 6 C The more job control a worker has, the more easily he may find alternative employment. These generalizations are joined to provide two propositions about workers in general. These are: 1. The more job control a worker has, the more l i k e l y he i s to receive a high wage offer. 2. The more job control a worker has, the more l i k e l y he i s to engage in individual bargaining with an employer for a higher income. These two propositions lead to four hypotheses about non-union workers: Hypothesis 1: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with high control than with low control w i l l receive high incomes. Hypothesis 2: Among non-union workers who do not bargain over i n -come individually, a higher proportion with high con-t r o l than with low control w i l l attribute their non-bargaining strategy to satisfactory wage offers. Hypothesis 3: Whether or not they engage i n overt bargaining, a higher proportion of non-union workers with high con-t r o l than with low control w i l l say i t i s possible to bargain individually. Hypothesis 4: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with high control than with low control w i l l engage in individual bargaining. 66 With respect to the white-collar labour force, the number of unionized firms i s small. As a consequence, the contracts cov-ering employees may be less binding than those covering skilled or unskilled workers. Individual bargaining in addition to union mem-bership i s a possible bargaining strategy. The same four hypothe-ses are therefore stated with respect to the union population. These are numbered 9 to 12. The second part of the argument on the labour market i n -volves a third assumption: (3) The function of a union i s to control replacement and to obtain higher wages for members. A seventh generalization i s stated: 7* As job control decreases, the advantages of a collective bargaining strategy increase. Two propositions are added: 3. The more job control a worker has, the less l i k e l y he i s to favor collective bargaining. 4. The more job control a majority of employees have, the less l i k e l y they are to join a union. Bive hypotheses regarding specific workers are derived from the generalizations and propositions* Two of these also depend on a factual statement: a majority vote i n a firm i s required for the ce r t i f i c a t i o n of a union. Hypothesis 5: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with low than with high job control w i l l favor union membership. 67 Hypothesis 6: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with low than with high job control w i l l be willing to join a union. Hypothesis 7; Among a l l workers, a higher proportion with low than with high job control w i l l be union members. Hypothesis 8: Among union workers, a higher proportion with low than with high job control w i l l favor union member-ship. Because men and women are not freely interchangeable in jobs, there are two labour markets rather than one. Since women receive lower incomes and are subject to more restrictive social norms about aggressive behavior, i t i s expected that their incomes and bargaining strategies w i l l d i f f e r from those of men. Consequent-ly , in tests of these hypotheses, the sexes are separated. These hypotheses are tested in the following tables. Hy-potheses and decisions are given on the l e f t side of the page, facing the tables. 68 2. Presentation of Data Hypothesis 1: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low Job control w i l l receive high income. Source of Data: Income information obtained from management o f f i c i a l s . (No infor-mation was obtained for twelve respondents. They are omitted from a l l tables dealing with income.) Codes Total sample divided equally between those earning $450 or less per month, and those earning $451 or more per month. The percentage at each control level earning $451 or more per month i s given i n Table 1. Decision: Hypothesis 1 i s supported for both men and women. For both subsamples, there is a positive association between job control and income in eight out of eight cases. 69 TABLE 1 Job Control and Income for Non-Union Workers (Percentage With Incomes Over $450 Per Month) Job Control Men Women  Per Per Area Level Difference Cent (N=100%) Difference Cent (N=100%) Content low high +13 67 80 (39) (56) +27 14 41 (68) (31) Sequence low high +29 65 94 (43) (52) +28 13 41 (65) (34) Pace low high +27 64 91 (39) (56) +21 18 39 (68) (31) Supervision low high +18 67 85 (30) (65) +26 11 37 (53) (46) Quantity low high +14 75 89 (61) (34) +46 14 60 (81) (20) Quality low high +20 68 88 (47) (48) +49 14 63 (80) (19) Time low high +51 42 93 (26) (69) +18 14 32 (49) (50) Space low high 69 97 (59) (36) +32 19 50 (85) (14) Income not reported (06) (06) Total 79 (101) 23 (105) 70 Hypothesis 2 (a): Among non-union workers who do not bargain over income individually, a higher proportion with high control than with low control w i l l attribute their non-bargaining strategy to satisfactory wage offers. Source of Data: Question directed to respondents who said they had not bargained: "Why not?" (Why did you not bargain during the course of employment?) Code: Responses were divided between those who indicated that incomes were satisfactory, and those who indicated a hesitation or nervousness about bargaining. Ambiguous responses are not included i n the per-centages. Table 2 shows the percentage who indicated that incomes were satisfactory. Decision: Hypothesis 2 i s supported for men. Six out of eight associations are in the predicted direction. Hypothesis 2 i s not supported for women. The alternative hypothesis is weakly supported. Eight of the job control items are i n the negative direction, and four of these are below 10 per cent. 71 TABLE 2 Job Control and Satisfaction With Income for Non-Union Workers Who Did Not Bargain Individually (Percentage Who Expressed Satisfaction)  Job Control Men Women  Per Per Area Level Difference Cent (N»100%) Difference Cent (N=100%) Content low high -04 30 26 (23) (23) -11 33 22 (43) (18) Sequence low high -02 32 30 (22) (24) -05 31 26 (42) (19) Pace low high +04 22 26 (23) (23) -12 33 21 (42) (19) Supervision low high +15 20 35 (20) (26) -01 30 29 (33) (28) Quantity low high +15 24 39 (33) (13) -01 30 29 (33) (28) Quality lov; high +06 10 16 (27) (19) -19 32 13 (53) (08) Time low high. +09 22 31 (14) (32) -05 32 27 (31) (30) Space low high +11 25 36 (32) (14) -22 33 11 (52) (09) Ambiguous Response (not included) (01) (02) Total 13 (47) 17 (63) 72 Hypothesis 2 (b): Among non-union workers who do not bargain over income individually, a higher proportion with high control than with low control w i l l attribute their non-bargaining strategy to satisfactory wage offers. Source of Data; Question directed to respondents who said they had not bargained at the time of applying for a job. "Why not?" (Why did you not bargain when applying for this job?) Code; Responses divided between those who indicated that incomes were satisfactory, and those who indicated a hesitation to bargain. Ambiguous responses are not included i n the percentages. Table 3 shows the percentage who indicated that incomes were satisfactory. Decision: Hypothesis 2 (b) with respect to bargaining at the time of applying for a job is supported by both men and women. For both subsamples, there i s a positive association between job control and the attribu-tion of non-bargaining behavior to satisfactory wage offers. 73 TABLE 3 Job Control and Satisfaction With Wage Offer for Non-Union Workers Who Did Not Bargain Individually (Percentage Who Expressed Satisfaction) Job Control Men Women Area Level Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Content low high +08 57 65 (30) (48) +28 41 69 (61) (26) Sequence low high +13 53 66 (34) (44) +38 39 77 (59) (26) Pace low high +10 53 63 (32) (46) +36 38 74 (60) (27) Supervision low high +12 52 64 (23) (55) +13 45 58 (47) (40) Quantity low high +10 57 67 (51) (27) +26 45 71 (73) (14) Quality low high +15 53 68 (40) (38) +20 47 67 (75) (12) Time low high +18 47 65 (21) (57) +42 29 71 (45) (42) Space low high +01 60 61 (47) (31) +17 47 64 (76) (11) Ambiguous Response (not included) (04) Totals 47 (82) 41 (87) 74 Hypothesis 3; Whether or not they engage in overt bargaining, a higher proportion of non-union workers with high con-t r o l than with low control w i l l say i t is possible to bargain individually. Source of Data: Question: "Would i t be possible for you to go alone to management and bargain for a raise in your salary?" Code: Responses indicating that i t would be possible to do this are shown i n Table 4. These include responses indicating that while It would be possible, the respondent has not or would not do so. The percentage of a l l respondents giving this answer i s shown. Decision: Hypothesis 3 is supported for men. Eight of the eight measures show positive associations between job control and the possibility of bargaining. Hypothesis 3 i s also supported for women. Seven of the eight mea-sures show positive associations between job control and the pos-s i b i l i t y of bargaining. 75 TABLE 4 Job Control and Possibility of Individual Bargaining for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Who Say It Is Possible To Bargain) Job Control Men Women Area Level Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Content low high +12 71 83 (42) (59) +16 70 86 (70) (35) Sequence low high +08 74 82 (46) (55) +13 71 84 (68) (37) Pace low high +19 67 86 (42) (59) +12 71 83 (69) (36) Supervision low high +21 64 85 (33) (68) +15 68 83 (53) (52) Quantity low high +09 75 84 (64) (37) +18 72 90 (85) (20) Quality low high +12 72 84 (50) (51) +24 71 95 (86) (19) Time low high +12 69 81 (26) (75) +23 63 86 (49) (56) Space low high +06 76 82 (62) (39) -05 76 71 (91) (14) Total 78 (101) 75 (105) 76 Hypothesis 4 (a): Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l engage.in individual bargaining. Source of Data (a): Question following previous question on the possibility of bargain-ing, "Have you ever done this?" Code: Responses indicating that respondent had engaged i n bargaining ac-tion at some time during the course of employment are coded as individual bargaining action. The percentage giving such responses i s shown in Table 5. Decision: Hypothesis 4 (a) i s supported for men. A l l eight associations be-tween job control and individual bargaining are positive. Hypo-thesis 4 (a) is supported for women. The associations are posi-tive on seven of the eight job control items. However, for women this association is weak. When the absolute percentages are re-garded, one can see that a smaller proportion of the women bargain individually at either job control level. 77 TABLE 5 Job Control and Individual Bargaining for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Who Have Bargained) Job Control Men Women Area Level Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Content low high +16 43 59 (42) (59) +10 36 46 (70) (35) Sequence low high +05 50 55 (46) (55) +06 37 43 (68) (37) Pace low high +16 43 59 (42) (59) +08 36 44 (69) (36) Supervision low high +14 36 60 (33) (68) +06 36 42 (53) (52) Quantity low high +20 45 65 (64) (37) +07 38 45 (85) (20) Quality low high +21 42 63 (50) (51) +10 37 47 (86) (19) Time low high +09 46 55 (26) (75) +08 35 43 (49) (56) Space low high +15 47 62 (62) (39) -04 40 36 (91) (14) Total 53 (101) 39 (105) 78 Hypothesis 4 (b); Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l engage i n individual bargaining. Source of Data (b): Question; "When you applied for this job, did you bargain over your starting wage?" Code; Responses indicating that respondents had bargained at the time of applying for the job are coded as positive responses. The percen-tage of these i s shown i n Table 6. Decision; Hypothesis 4 (b) with respect to bargaining at the time of applying for a job i s not supported for men. The alternative hypothesis i s supported, although the associations are weak. The negative asso-ciations are consistent for a l l eight measures. Hypothesis 4 (b) i s supported for women. Positive associations are found for a l l eight job control items. 79 TABLE 6 Job Control and Bargaining When Applying For Job for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Who Bargained) Job Control Men Women Area Level Difference Per Cent (N-100%) Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Content low high -12 26 14 (42) <59) +07 16 23 (70) (35) Sequence low high -09 24' 15 (46) (55) +18 12 30 (68) (37) Pace low high -04 21 17 (42) (59) +11 14 25 (69) (36) Supervision low high -12 27 15 (33) (68) +10 13 23 (53) (52) Quantity low high -04 20 16 (64) (37) +21 14 35 (85) (20) Quality low high -02 20 18 (50) (51) +35 12 47 (86) (19) Time low high -06 23 17 (26) (75) +19 08 27 (49) (56) Space low high -14 24 10 (62) (39) +21 15 36 (91) (14) Total 19 (101) 18 (105) 80 Hypothesis 5: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with low job control than with high job control w i l l favor union membership. Source of Data: Question: "In general, do you think i t is better for workers l i k e yourself to belong to unions or not?" Code: Respondents who replied that i t i s better in general to belong to unions are coded as having favorable attitudes toward union member-ship. Decision: Hypothesis 5 i s supported for men and for women. For both subsamples, the positive association occurs on a l l eight of the job control items. However, for men, the association i s weak. Six of the eight measures show percentage differences of 10 per cent or less. The pattern for men and for women differs with respect to absolute percen-tages who hold favorable views. At both job control levels, women are more favourable than men to unions. 81 TABLE 7 Job Control and Attitude Favoring Union Membership for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Favoring Union Membership) Job Control Men Women Area Level Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Content low high +02 29 27 (42) (59) +13 43 31 (70) (35) Sequence low high +23 35 12 (46) (55) +14 44 30 (68) (37) Pace low high +14 36 22 (42) (59) +12 43 31 (69) (36) Supervision low high +03 30 27 (33) (68) +32 55 23 (53) (52) Quantity low high +09 31 22 (64) (37) +11 41 30 (85) (20) Quality low high +08 32 24 (50) (51) +09 41 32 (86) (19) Time low high +10 35 25 (26) (75) +19 49 30 (49) (56) Space low high +08 31 23 (62) (39) +12 41 29 (91) (14) Total 28 (101) 39 (105) 82 Hypothesis 6 : Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with low job control than with high job control w i l l be willing to join a union. Source of Data; Question: "If a union came here (to your place of work) and tried to organize workers like yourself, would you join? Code: Responses indicating a willingness to join, and those indicating that the respondent would seriously consider joining a union, or would be willing to join a particular union, are coded as affirma-tive responses. These are shown i n Table 8. Decision: Hypothesis 6 i s supported for men. Seven of the eight items pro-vide aasociations i n the predicted direction. Hypothesis 6 i s also supported for women. A l l of the associations are i n the predicted direction. However, for men, the association i s weak. Four o.f the seven items provide differences of 10 per cent or less. 83 TABLE 8 Job Control and Willingness to Join a Union for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Willing to Join) Job Control Men Women Area Level Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Content low high -03 24 27 (42) (59) +14 44 20 (70) (35) Sequence low high +04 28 24 (46) (55) +28 46 19 (68) (37) Pace low high +17 36 19 (42) (59) +26 45 19 (69) (36) Supervision low high +11 33 22 (33) (68) +26 49 23 (53) (52) Quantity- low high +06 28 22 (64) (37) +20 AO 20 (85) (20) Quality low high +08 30 22 (50) (51) +19 40 21 (86) (19) Time low high +17 38 21 (26) (75) +28 51 23 (49) (56) Space low high +08 29 21 (62) (39) +26 40 14 (91) (14) Total 26 (101) 36 (105) 84 Hypothesis 7: Among a l l workers, a higher proportion with low job control than with high job control w i l l be union mem-bers . Source of Data: Question: "Do you belong to a union?" Code: Union members are those who replied "yes". Decision: Hypothesis 7 i s not supported for men- The associations are inconsistent, and the null hypothesis i s invoked. Hypothesis 7 i s supported for women. Positive associations are indicated for a l l eight of the job control items. TABLE 9 Job Control and Union Membership (Percentage Who Are Meinbe rs) Job Control Men Women Area Level Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Content low high +03 51 48 (86) (113) +16 50 34 (139) (53) Sequence low high 00 49 49 (91) (108) +30 53 23 (144) (48) Pace low high 00 49 49 (83) (116) +22 51 29 (141) (51) Supervision low high +06 58 44 (78) (121) +22 54 32 (116) (32) Quantity low high +02 50 48 (128) (71) +22 48 26 (165) (27) Quality low high +10 54 44 (108) (91) +18 48 30 (165) (27) Time low high +29 67 38 (79) (120) +42 60 18 (124) (42) Space low high -03 48 51 (120) (79) +10 46 36 (170) (22) Total 49 (199) 45 (192) 86 Hypothesis 8: Among union workers, a higher proportion with low than with high job control w i l l favor union member-ship . Source; Question: "In general, do you think i t i s better for workers like yourself to belong to unions, or not?" Code; Respondents who replied that i t i s better in general to belong to unions are coded as having favorable attitudes toward union mem-bership . The percentage of these i s shown i n Table 10. Decision: Hypothesis 8 i s not supported for men. Weak negative associations are indicated for eight job control items indicating that the a l -ternative hypothesis has support. Hypothesis 8 is supported for women. Positive associations are shown for a l l eight job control items. 87 TABLE 10 Job Control and Attitude Favoring Union Membership for Union Workers (Percentage Favoring Union Membership) Job Control Men Women Area Level Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Content low high -10 75 85 (44) (54) +11 67 56 (69) (18) Sequence low high -01 80 81 (45) (53) +11 66 55 (76) (ID Pace low high -08 76 84 (41) (57) +06 66 60 (72) (15) Supervision low high -09 76 85 (45) (53) +14 68 54 (63) (24) Quantity low high -11 77 88 (64) (34) +36 67 29 (80) (07) Quality low high -07 78 85 (58) (40) +16 " 66 50 (79) (08) Time low high -03 79 82 (53) (45) +07 65 58 (75) (12) Space low high -04 79 83 (58) (40) +02 65 63 (79) (08) Total 81 (98) 64 (87) 88 Hypothesis 9: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l receive high incomes. Source of Data; Income information obtained from management personnel. No infor-mation is available about the income of one respondent. This respondent is omitted from tables dealing with income. Code: The array of incomes was divided at the median. High incomes are greater than $450, and low incomes $450 or less. Figures i n Table 11 indicate at each control level the per cent with high income. Decision: Hypothesis 9 i s supported for both the men and the women. In both cases, there are positive associations for a l l eight of the job control items. 89 TABLE 11 Job Control for Union and Income Workers (Percentage With Incomes Over $450 Per Month) Job Control Men Women Area Level Per Difference Cent (N=100%) Difference Per Cent (N-100%) Content low high +51 45 96 (44) (54) +43 13 56 (68) (18) Sequence low high +58 44 98 (45) (53) +58 15 73 (75) (ID Pace low high +51 44 95 (41) (57) +62 11 73 (71) (15) Supervision low high +25 60 85 (45) (53) +29 14 43 (63) (23) Quantity low high +36 61 97 (64) (34) +53 18 71 (79) (07) Quality low high +41 57 98 (58) (40) +73 15 88 (78) (08) Time low high +49 51 100 (53) (45) +71 11 92 (74) (12) Space low high +41 57 98 (58) (40) +58 17 75 (78) (08) Income not reported • (01) Total 73 (98) 22 (87) 90 Hypothesis 10: Among union workers who do not bargain over income individually, a higher proportion with high control than with low control w i l l attribute their non-bargaining strategy to satisfactory wage offers. (a) This hypothesis i s not tested for the general question of bar-gaining during the course of employment. Eight respondents gave "satisfaction" as their reason for restraint, and this i s not a sufficient number for adequate testing. (b) The hypothesis is tested with respect to men for the more specific question of bargaining at the time of applying for a job. The percentages are shown for women, but i t should be noted that the row totals for three of the items are six and below. Source of Data (b): Question directed to respondents who said they had not bargained at the time of applying for a job: "Why not?" (Why did you not bargain when applying for this job?) Code: Responses divided between those who indicated that incomes were sat-isfactory, and those who indicated a hesitation to bargain, or who gave union contracts as the reason for restraint. Those who gave "satisfaction with wage offers" as their reason are shown i n Table 12. Decision: Hypothesis 10 (b) is supported for men. Seven of eight measures show positive associations. Hypothesis 10 (b) i s also supported for woaen. Eight of the eight measures are in the predicted direction. However, three of these have low row totals. 91 TABLE 12 Job Control and Satisfaction With Wage Offers for Union Workers Who Did Not Bargain Individually (Percentage Who Expressed Satisfaction) Job Control Men Women Area Level Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Content low high +17 13 30 (40) (47) +28 28 56 (64) (16) Sequence low high +09 17 26 (41) (46) +45 22 67 (71) (09) Pace low high +09 17 26 (37) (50) +24 30 54 (67) (13) Supervision low high +19 12 31 (42) (45) +16 29 45 (58) (22) Quantity low high +08 20 28 (58) (29) +71 29 100 (75) (05) Quality low high +05 20 25 (51) (36) +53 30 83 (74) (06) Time low high +02 21 23 (47) (40) +30 30 60 (70) (10) Space low high -06 25 17 (52) (35) +53 30 83 (74) (06) Total 22 (87) 34 (80) 92 Hypothesis 11: Whether or not they engage i n overt b a r g a i n i n g , a higher p r o p o r t i o n of union workers w i t h high c o n t r o l than wit h low c o n t r o l w i l l say i t i s pos-s i b l e to bargain i n d i v i d u a l l y . Source of Data: Question: ''Would i t be p o s s i b l e f o r you to go alone to management and bargain f o r a r a i s e i n your s a l a r y ? " Code: Responses i n d i c a t i n g that t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s are coded as a f f i r m a t i v e responses. These i n c l u d e responses to the e f f e c t that w h i l e the p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s s the respondent has not or would not engage i n ba r g a i n i n g . The percentage i n d i c a t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y i s shown i n Table 13. De c i s i o n : Hypothesis 11 i s supported f o r both the men and women. P o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s are found f o r both subsamples along a l l e i g h t of the job c o n t r o l items. 93 TABLE 13 Job Control and Possibility of Individual Bargaining for Union Workers (Percentage Who Say It Is Possible To Bargain) Job Control Men Women Area Level Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Difference Per Cent (N=100%) Content low high +34 23 57 (44) (54) +38 22 50 (69) (18) Sequence low high +14 29 53 (45) (53) +31 24 55 (76) (ID Pace low high +26 27 53 (41) (57) +15 25 40 (72) (15) Supervision low high +24 29 53 (45) (53) +25 21 46 (63) (24) Quantity low high +12 38 50 (64) (34) +17 26 43 (80) (07) Quality low high +22 33 55 (58) (40) +39 24 63 (79) (08) Time low high +30 28 58 (53) (45) +26 24 50 (75) (12) Space low high +22 33 55 (58) (40) +49 24 63 (79) (08) Total 41 (98) 28 (87) 94 Hypothesis 12 (a): Among union workers, a higher proportion with high control than with low control w i l l engage in individual bargaining. Source of Data; Question: "Have you ever done this?" (Gone to management and bar-gained individually for a raise i n salary). Code: Responses indicating that the respondent had at some time engaged in bargaining action are coded as positive responses. These are shown in Table 14. Decision: Hypothesis 12 is supported for the men. Eight measures are i n the predicted direction. Hypothesis 12 is also supported for the women. Seven measures are in the predicted direction. Hypothesis 12 (b) with respect to bargaining action at the time of applying for a job cannot be tested. Eleven men and seven women said they had engaged i n this action, and this i s deemed inadequate for a test of the hypothesis. 95 TABLE 14 Job Control and Individual Bargaining for Union Workers (Percentage Who Have Bargained) Job Control Area i-ien Women Per Per Level Difference Cent (N=100%) Difference Cent (N=100%) Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high +30 +23 +28 +31 +09 +24 +27 +19 07 (44) 37 (54) 11 (45) 34 (53) 07 (41) 35 (57) 07 (45) 38 (53) 20 (64) 29 (34) 14 (58) 38 (40) 11 (53) 33 (45) 16 (58) 35 (40) +16 +24 +14 +25 -01 +25 +21 +25 12 (69) 28 (18) 13 (76) 27 (11) 13 (72) 27 (15) 08 (63) 33 (24) 15 (80) 14 (07) 13 (79) 38 (08) 12 (75) 33 (12) 13 (79) 38 (08) Total 23 (98) 15 (87) 96 3. Summary The argument developed i n this chapter linked replaceabil-i t y and marketability directly to job control levels. The objective of such an argument i s to examine one area at a time. This method of looking at social phenomena inevitably involves some neglect of the total context of events. Its merit l i e s in the systematic elim-ination of unsubstantiated theory, and the development of new theory which takes the empirical evidence into account. The testing of hy-potheses allows for clear decisions about the u t i l i t y of the argu-ments. Table 15 shows a summary of the results of tests for the arguments presented in this section. Further discussion of the ideas i s given, below. For men, eleven of the fourteen tests showed positive asso-ciations in the predicted direction. For women, a l l but one of the tests provided positive associations i n the predicted direction. Hypotheses relating individual bargaining action and i n -come with control were well supported. Although bargaining at the time of applying for a job was not associated with high control for men, bargaining in general was associated with high control as pre-dicted. The relationship between control and income i s strong for both men and women, and for both union and non-union workers. I t was argued that this result would be found because high control levels provide workers with strong individual bargaining positions by re-97 ducing their replaceability. Workers with high control may bargain individually for higher incomes without a high risk of job loss. They are also more lik e l y to receive high wage offers as tacit recog-nition of their strong bargaining positions. The associations between individual bargaining action and control provided support for this argument. However, for men, the predictions regarding control and un-ion membership were not well supported. No association was found between control and membership. Weak positive associations were found between control and favorable attitudes for non-union workers. A weak negative association was found between control and favorable attitudes for union members. For women, the predictions relating control and union mem-bership were a l l supported. In addition, the proportion of women fav-orable to unions and willing to join unions was larger than that of men. On the other hand, the proportion of women at either level of control who engaged i n individual bargaining was smaller than that of men. These findings suggest that collective bargaining, espe-c i a l l y for men, is not a clear alternative to individual bargaining. They suggest that there are distinct differences between the sexes in their experience of, and reactions to, work. And they suggest that factors other than job control must be examined for their effects on replaceability and bargaining strategies. Among the contingencies affecting replaceability, particu-lar s k i l l s and the available markets for them are factors that require 98 further attention. Some s k i l l s , while associated with high control, are marketable in a very restricted f i e l d , with the result that the worker i s dependent on specific employers. The differences in attitudes toward union membership for men and women may be associated with differences i n particular s k i l l s marketed by the two sexes. Men market s k i l l s which are possibly more specific to particular industrial or professional areas. Such speci-f i c s k i l l s may involve greater dependency on an employer, and con-sequently more serious risk of unemployment i f either the firm ceases operation or individual bargaining incurs job loss. In a position of dependency on a single employer, men with high job con-t r o l may receive the same benefits of union membership as men with low control. That i s , the union may protect their employment while bargaining i s undertaken. Differences in attitudes toward union membership by control levels may therefore be decreased while both low and high control workers have limited alternatives for equivalent employment. The reversal of results for union men may be due to the actual advantages that unions confer on workers with high control. These advantages include explicit job ratings which are of greater benefit to high control workers than to low control workers. This argument i s taken up again in the sixth chapter, and tests of i t are shown there. Most women, as these tables have shavn, have low control jobs. They are, therefore, easily replaced. Although their c l e r i c a l s k i l l s are currently marketable in a wide f i e l d so that replacement 99 does not necessarily incur prolonged unemployment, new jobs do not provide better incomes. As the tables indicate, women's income l e -vels are very low compared to those of men. The threat of replacement for low control workers i s high, and, as predicted, these workers are prepared to join unions in order to control replaceability while seeking higher incomes. Those few women who enjoy high control jobs are less in need of collective bargaining strength. In addition to the argu-ments regarding replaceability and high job control, i t might be noted that such women are l i k e l y to prefer their present jobs to alternative employment,, Judging from the data in these tables, few high control jobs are available for women. Women who have such jobs may prefer a lower income to the potentially disruptive process of collective bargaining for wage increases. They may resist unionization in order to protect their present job control levels. This possibility i s again suggested when the same attitude data i s examined for i t s relation-ship to income levels for women, in Chapter VI. A second factor affecting replaceability i s the total pop-ulation seeking specific jobs. I t has been argued that more workers are able to work at low control jobs, and that the competition for such jobs is therefore greater. While in general this i s a reason-able assertion, the number of trained workers in any given area fluc-tuates, and such fluctuations affect skilled workers seeking high control jobs. 100 TABLE 15 Summary of Results for Hypotheses Relating Labour Market Conditions to Job Control and Bargaining Strategies Hypothesis Table Page Dependent Variable Men Women 1 2a 2b 3 4a 4b 5 6 8 9 10b 11 12a 1 69 Income (NU) 2 71 Satisfaction (NU) (general) 3 73 Satisfaction (NU) (application) 4 75 Possible to Bargain (NU) 5 77 Indiv. bargaining (general) (NU) 6 79 Indiv. Bargaining (application) (NU) 7 81 Favor Union (NU) 8 83 Willing Join Union (NU) 9 85 Union membership 10 87 Favor Union (U) 11 89 Income (U) 12 91 Satisfaction (U) (application) 13 93 Possible to Bargain (U) 14 95 Indiv. Bargaining (general) supported supported supported supported supported not supported (H weak) supported (weak) supported (weak) not supported (H G) not supported (H^ weak) supported supported (weak) supported supported supported not supported (H^ weak) supported supported supported (weak) supported (weak) supported supported supported supported supported supported supported supported 101 For example, the paucity of trained professionals i n the Br i t i s h Columbia region provided high control workers in the pro* fessional market with bargaining advantages throughout the 1950-1960 decade. A steady increase in trained personnel throughout the next decade reduced these advantages by creating a pool of alterna-tive labour resources. Where high control workers had previously en-joyed a "seller's market", they began to compete for jobs with re-cently trained recruits. In addition, the upgrading of the basic training in many professional fields provided the recruits with s k i l l s not always possessed by more experienced workers. Where these re-cruits were employable at lower wages, the advantages to an employer of maintaining an expensive labour force of experienced personnel decreased. Consequently, high control workers developed bargaining handicaps, and we would expect such handicaps to affect their bar-gaining strategies. In general, more men than women have professional qualif-ications and seek work in professional f i e l d s . In this particular survey, a slightly higher proportion of men have university educa-tions or equivalent periods of post-high school training. (Ap-pendix H shows the distribution of education for the sample). The increases i n population with>equivalent training of high control workers may, therefore, diff e r e n t i a l l y affect men. The automation of offices may have a similar effect on c l e r i c a l workers during the 1970 decade. However, these suggestions are speculative. A review of stat i s t i c s on population changes, and changes in levels of training of recruits to white-collar work, Is well beyond the scope of this study. 102 With respect to the division of the sample by sex, the data provides clear evidence of two different labour populations. Women are crowded together at the bottom end of both the income and the job control scales. Since they are not similarly distributed on an education scale — the differences between women and men being slight — their low work status does appear to be associated simply with di f f e r e n t i a l employment opportunities. The attitude data suggests that women, provided with less job control and lower incomes than men whose qualifications are similar, are prepared to join unions to improve their bargaining positions. However, they are less willing to ignore social sanc-tions against the aggressive behavior that individual bargaining involves. The income and job control distributions of women in un-ions and those of women not in unions are similar. (Tables 1 and 11) In both cases, the proportion of women at the lower end of the scale exceeds the corresponding proportion of men. In fact, d i f -ferent wage scales for women are written into several of the union contracts applying to these workers. I t would seem, then, that in spite of their willingness to join unions and their favorable a t t i -tudes toward unions once they become members, women do not actually improve their income or job control positions through membership. The division of the job control items was made relative to the total distribution i n the sample. The influence of sex on these distributions was not recognized when this v/as done. I t now seems 103 l i k e l y that two different divisions would have been more appropriate. There can be l i t t l e doubt, in view of these tables, that the two sexes form two separate labour forces, and the high and low positions in each should be distinguished with reference only to other mem-bers of the same sex rather than to the total distribution. 104 CHAPTER IV JOB CONTROL, INTERACTION AND UNION BARGAINING This chapter w i l l examine the influence of interaction patterns at work on union membership and attitudes toward unions. Union membership and attitudes toward unions have been shown i n Chapter 3 to be affected by job control. In this chapter, job control w i l l be held constant while differences i n interaction frequencies between workers are examined. 105 1. Restatement of Theory I t i s assumed that i n t e r a c t i o n between persons encourages the growth of a common pool of information and opinion. An asser-t i o n i s stated: (4) C o l l e c t i v e bargaining i s undertaken by workers whose c o l l e c t i v e goal i s increased wages and who share the opin-ion that they w i l l obtain t h i s end at lower r i s k through group action. Three generalizations are stated: 8. The c o l l e c t i v e bargaining strategy i s more l i k e l y to be used by workers with common bargaining handicaps who i n t e r -act with one another, than by those who do not i n t e r a c t . 9. The c o l l e c t i v e bargaining strategy i s more l i k e l y to be used by workers with common bargaining handicaps who do not i n t e r a c t with employers than by those who do i n t e r a c t with employers. 10. The lower the job con t r o l , the less frequent w i l l be wor-kers' i n t e r a c t i o n with employers. The f i r s t s e c tion of the t o t a l theory established an asso-c i a t i o n between low job control and bargaining handicaps (generaliza-tions 3 and 6; propositions 1 and 2). Given the assertion and the four new generalizations, two propositions may be stated regarding the 106 link between low job control and collective bargaining, where the i n -tervening variables are low interaction frequencies between employers and workers, and high interaction frequencies between co-workers. Proposition 5: The lower the job control a worker has, the more likely he i s to favor collective bargaining. Proposition 6: The lower the job control a majority of employees have, the more lik e l y they are to join a union. The derivations of these propositions refer to the specific associations between low job control and favorable attitudes toward unions, willingness to join unions, and union membership. They are not restated. The theory proceeds to propositions b u i l t on the generalizations and directed toward the relationship between inter-action i t s e l f and bargaining behavior. These propositions are: 9. Favorable views of collective bargaining and union member-ship are more lik e l y to be associated with infrequent inter-action than with frequent interaction between an employee and employers. 10. Favorable views of collective bargaining and union member-ship are more lik e l y to be associated with frequent inter-action than with infrequent interaction between workers with low control. Proposition 10 i s restricted to low control workers, which is in line with the assertion at the beginning of this section. Low control workers have common bargaining handicaps, and may collectively lower the risks of bargaining through collective action. High control 107 workers do not have common bargaining handicaps, and do not have handicaps in common with low control workers. Proposition 9 refers to a l l workers. While high control workers are less likely to favor or to employ the collective bar-gaining strategy, those whose interaction with employers i s limited are more lik e l y to consider or to take this strategy than are those whose interaction with employers i s frequent. Eight hypotheses are derived from these propositions. Four refer to interaction with employers for employees at given levels of job control. Four refer to interaction between co-workers at low levels of job control. Hypothesis 13: Among non-union workers at the same level of job con-t r o l , a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l favor union membership. Hypothesis 14: Among non-union workers at the same level of job control, a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l be willing to join a union. Hypothesis 15: Among a l l workers at the same level of job control a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l be union members. Hypothesis 16: Among union workers at the same level of job control, a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l favor union mem-bership . 108 Hypothesis 17; Among non-union workers with low control, a higher proportion with high than with low co-worker inter-action frequency w i l l favor union membership. Hypothesis 18: Among non-union workers with low control, a higher proportion with high than with low co-worker interac-tion frequency w i l l be willing to join a union. Hypothesis 19: Among workers with low control, a higher proportion with high than with low co-worker interaction fre-quency w i l l be union members. Hypothesis 20: Among union members with low control, a higher proportion with high than with low co-worker inter-action frequency w i l l favor union membership. The decision rules for determining the support of the hypo-thesis are the same as those used in the previous tests, and are stated in Chapter II. An association i s measured by consistency i n the percentage differences between interaction rates with job con-t r o l held constant. The term "employer" refers to a l l management personnel whose decisions may affect the job control and income of workers. (The formal definition i s given i n Chapter II). 109 2. Presentation of Data Hypothesis 13: Among non-union workers at the same level of job con-t r o l , a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l favor union membership. Source of Data: Question: ! ,In general, do you think i t i s better for workers like yourself to belong to unions or not?" Code: Respondents who replied that i t i s better i n general to belong to unions are coded as having favorable attitudes toward union member-ship. The f i r s t column i n Table 16 shows the percentage of favorable re-plies among workers with low control. The second column i n Table 16 shows the percentage of favorable replies among workers with high control. Decision: Hypothesis 13 i s not supported for workers with low control. There is no consistent association between interaction with employers and favorable attitudes toward union membership. Hypothesis 13 i s supported for workers with high levels of job control. Those with low interaction frequencies with employers are more favor-able to union membership. However, the association i s weak for five of the seven measures which are i n the predicted direction. 110 TABLE 16 Interaction With Management and Favorable Attitudes Toward Union for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Favorable With Job Control Levels Held Constant)* Job Control Low Control High Control Area Interaction Frequency Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N=100%) Content high low -01 38 37 (50) (62) +09 25 34 (59) (35) Sequence high low 00 40 40 (55) (59) +07 22 29 (54) (38) Pace high low -02 42 40 (53) (58) +10 21 31 (56) (39) Supervision high low +10 40 50 (42) (44) 00 25 25 (67) (53) Quantity high low -03 38 35 (73) (76) +23 17 40 (36) (21) Quality high low -01 38 37 (74) (62) +10 10 20 (58) (60) Time high low -02 45 43 (31) (44) +04 26 30 (78) (53) Space high low +01 37 36 (67) (77) +17 18 35 (33) (20) * Totals dif f e r because the number of high and low control workers vary with areas of job control. I l l Hypothesis 14; Among non-union workers at the same level of job con-t r o l , a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l be w i l l -ing to join a union. Source of Data; Question: "If a union came here (to your place of work) and tried to organize workers like yourself, would you join?" Code: Responses indicating a willingness to join, and those indicating that the respondent would seriously consider joining a union, or would be willing to join a particular union, are coded as affirmative respon-ses. These are shown in Table 17. Column one includes low control workers. Column two includes high control workers. Decision: Hypothesis 14 i s supported for low control workers, but the associa-tion for a l l seven of the positive associations are weak. Hypothesis 14 i s supported for high control workers. Eight positive associations are found. However, four of these are weak. The association between interaction frequency with management and favorable views of union membership is not strong. Three associations out of four tests are weak, and the fourth test shows no association at a l l . In particular, interaction with employers seems to have l i t t l e effect on low control workers' attitudes toward unions. 112 TABLE 17 Interaction With Management and Willingness to Join Union for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Favorable with Job Control Levels Held Constant)  Job Control Low Control High Control  Interaction Area Frequency Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N-100%) Content high low Sequence high low Pace high low Supervision high low Quantity high low Quality high low Time high low Space high low ™ £ (62) +05 g < » > -Ofi 4 6 ( 5 3 ) +1S 0 6 40 (58) + 1 5 +10 £ <42> +01 34 (50) 39 36 (55) 41 (59) 46 (53) 40 (58) 40 (42) 50 (44) 38 (73) 39 (76) 35 (74) 37 (62) 45 (31) 48 (44) 34 (76) 36 (77) +oi +29 +02 „ )'Zt +11 +03 To +04 +02 t: yji{ + i i 22 (59) 29 (35) 19 (54) 26 (38) 13 (56) 28 (39) 22 (67) 23 (53) 11 (36) 40 (21) 07 (58) 18 (60) 21 (78) 25 (53) 18 (33) 29 (20) 113 Hypothesis 15: Among a l l workers at the same level of job control a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l be union members. Source of Data: Question: "Do you belong to a union?" Code: Those who replied 'yes' are union members. Table 18 shows the dis-tribution of membership by interaction frequency with management. The f i r s t column shows this for low control workers. The second shows this for high control workers. Decision: Hypothesis 15 is supported for low control workers. Seven of the eight job control items provide positive associations between low interaction with management and union membership. However, the associations are weak. Hypothesis 15 is supported also for high control workers. Positive associations appear for a l l eight measures. 114 TABLE 18 Interaction With Management and Union Membership (Percentage Membership With Job Control Levels Held Constant) Job Control Area Low Control Interaction Frequency High Control Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N-100%) Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low +04 +06 +03 +10 +03 +14 -03 +07 48 (97) 52 (128) 48 (106) 54 (129) 49 (103) 52 (121) 50 (84) 60 (110) 44 (130) 47 (163) 43 (129) 57 (144) 65 (88) 62 (115) 43 (133) 51 (157) +20 +16 +20 +09 +11 +02 +19 +16 34 (90) 54 (76) 33 (81) 49 (75) 33 (84) 53 (83) 35 (103) 44 (94) 37 (57) 49 (41) 40 (58) 42 (60) 21 (99) 40 (89) 39 (54) 57 (47) 9 115 Hypothesis 16: Among union workers at the same level of job control, a higher proportion with low than with high employee-employer interaction frequency w i l l favor union mem-bership . Source of Data: Question: "In general, do you think i t i s better for workers like yourself to belong to unions or not?" Code: Responses indicating that generally workers should belong to unions are coded as being favorable. The f i r s t column i n Table 19 shows the percentages of favorable res-ponses for low control workers. The second column shows those for high control workers. Decisions: Hypothesis 16 i s supported for workers with low control. Positive associations are found for a l l eight job control items between low interaction frequency with management and favorable attitudes toward the union. Hypothesis 16 i s also supported for workers with high control. Positive associations are found for a l l eight job control items between low interaction frequency with management and favorable attitudes toward the union. 116 TABLE 19 Interaction With Management and Favorable View of Union for Union Workers (Percentage Favorable With Job Control Levels Held Constant)  Job Control Low Control High Control  Interaction Area Frequency Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N-100%) Content high low Sequence high low Pace high low Supervision high low Quantity high + 1 61 (57) + 1 4 low " n + " °76 (66) +21 5 9 ( 5 1 ) +04 1 1 80 (70) U * +11 6 2 ( 5 0 ) +18 + 1 3 75 (63) + 1 8 +15 £ W\ +16 Quality high low Time high low Space high low 62 (47) 76 59 (51)  62 (50)  62 (42) 77 (66) 61 (57) 78 (87) 60 (55) 78 (82) 63 (57) 79 (71) 60 (57) 79 (80) +18 :X yjii +io +i6 xx )-.:( +2i +19 "X +06 68 (31) 85 (41) 74 (27) 78 (37) 68 (28) 86 (44) 67 (36) 83 (41) 71 (21) 85 (20) 74 (23) 84 (25) 67 (21) 88 (34) 76 (21) 82 (27) 1 1 7 Hypothesis 17; Among non-union workers with low control, a higher proportion with high than with low co-worker interac-tion frequency w i l l favor union membership. Source of Data; Question: "In general, do you think i t is better for workers like yourself to belong to unions or not?" Code: As stated for Hypothesis 16, Table 20 shows the percentage of low control workers who favor union membership. Decision: Hypothesis 17 i s not supported. There are negative associations for eight of the job control items. The alternative hypothesis is weakly supported. 118 TABLE 20 Interaction With Co-Workers and Favorable Attitude Toward Union for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Favorable for Low Control Level Only) Job Control Area Low Control Workers Interaction Frequency Difference % (N=100%) 34 (67) 44 (45) 37 (71) 46 (43) 38 (66) 44 (45) 43 (49) 49 (37) 33 (93) 43 (56) 36 (83) 40 (53) 40 (48) 59 (27) 34 (97) 46 (56) Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low -10 -09 -06 -06 -10 -04 -09 -07 119 Hypothesis 18: Among non-union workers with low control, a higher proportion with high than with low co-worker interac-tion frequency w i l l be willing to join a union. Source of Data: Question: "If a union came here (to place of work) and tried to or-ganize workers like yourself, would you join?" Code: Those who indicated willingness to join a union or a particular union, and those who said they would give i t serious consideration are coded as willing to join. Table 21 shows the percentage of low control workers who would join a union. Decision: Hypothesis 18 i s not supported. There are negative associations for a l l eight of the job control items between frequent interaction between co-workers and willingness to join a union. The negative associations are weak. These two measures indicate that interaction with co-workers i s not associated with attitudes toward unions. The interaction frequencies are, however, relative measures. The context of most white-collar jobs includes interaction opportunities. There are few jobs which impose severe restrictions on conversation between co-workers. Since most workers can interact, differences i n reported frequency of such inter-action may have less effect than they would for a labour force which is subject to more severe restrictions. 120 TABLE 21 Interaction With Co-Workers and Willingness to Join Union for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Willing to Join for Low Control Level Only) Job Control Area Low Control Workers Interaction Frequency Difference % (N=100%) 34 (67) 44 (45) 35 (71) 44 (43) 39 (66) 44 (45) 39 (49) 49 (37) 33 (93) 38 (56) 35 (83) 38 (53) 42 (48) 56 (27) 34 (97) 38 (56) Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low -10 -09 -05 -10 -05 -03 -14 -04 121 Hypothesis 19: Among workers with low control, a higher proportion with high than with low co-worker interaction fre-quency w i l l be union members. Source of Data: Question: "Do you belong to a union?" Code: Those who answered 'yes' are union members. Table 22 shows the percentage of low control workers who are union members by interaction rates with co-workers. Decision: Hypothesis 19 i s supported. A l l of the eight measures are i n the predicted direction. However,seven of these are 10 percent di f f e r -ences or less, so the support is weak. 122 TABLE 22 Interaction With Co-workers and Union Membership for Low Control Workers (Percentage Membership) Low Control Union Membership Area Interaction Frequency Difference % (N-100%) Content high low +11 54 43 (145) (79) Sequence high low +03 52 49 (149) (85) Pace high low +10 54 44 (142) (81) Supervision high low +10 59 49 (120) (73) Quantity high low +06 51 45 (190) (102) Quality high low +04 52 48 (174) (98) Time high low +07 65 58 (136) (66) Space high low +02 48 46 (186) (103) Interaction Pattern Unclear (1) 123 Hypothesis 20; Among union members with low control* a higher pro-portion with high than with low co-worker interac-tion frequency w i l l favor union membership. Source of Data: Question: "In general, do you think i t i s better for workers l i k e yourself to belong to unions or not?" Code: Respondents who replied that i t i s better i n general to belong to unions are coded as having favorable attitude toward union member-ship. Table 23 shows the percentage of low control workers i n unions who hold favorable attitudes toward the unions by the amount of inter-action they have with co-workers. Decision: Hypothesis 20 i s supported. Seven of the eight measures provide positive associations between high interaction with co-workers and favorable views of the unions. However, a l l of these percentage differences are weak. 124 TABLE 23 Interaction With Co-Workers and Favorable Attitude Toward Union Membership for Low Control Union Workers (Percentage Favorable)  Low Control Area Low Control Workers Interaction Frequency Difference % (N=100%) 72 (78) 65 (34) 74 (78) 64 (42) 71 (76) 65 (36) 73 (71) 67 (36) 71 (97) 72 (46) 71 (91) 69 (45) 73 (88) 67 (39) 73 (111) 71 (55) Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low +07 +10 +06 +06 -01 +02 +06 +02 125 3. Summary In the i n i t i a l section of the theory, differential motiva-tion for union bargaining was explored. This motivation was said to be related to job control levels which differentially affect a worker's market position. In this second section of theory, di f f e r e n t i a l opportunity for membership was examined. Here i t was argued that the opportunity to form or join a collective bargaining unit i s related to opportun-i t i e s for frequent interaction with other , similarly-positioned, workers. It was also argued that a "we-they" dichotomy between workers and management would be more easily developed where inter-action between the two groups is minimal. Among non-union workers, a weak negative relationship was found between co-worker interaction and favorable views of union membership. Membership i t s e l f , and favorable views held by union members were related to low control positions as predicted, but the associations were weak. A l l but one of the predictions regarding interaction with management and attitudes toward union membership were supported, although weak associations were found for four of the seven positive results. A summary of the results i s shovm in Table 24. These findings throw doubt on the thesis that co-worker interaction provides more opportunities for the development of a t t i -tudes favorable to collective bargaining. Since the associations are weak and inconsistent, i t would appear that co-worker interaction 126 TABLE 24 Summary of Results for Hypotheses Relating Interaction Patterns With Attitudes Toward Union, and Union Membership With Job Control Levels Held Constant Interaction with Management Hypothesis Table Page Dependent Variable Low Control High Control 13 16 110 Favor Union (NU) not supported (HQ) supported 14 17 112 Willing to Join Union (NU) supported (weak) supported (weak) 15 18 114 Union Membership supported (weak) supported 16 19 116 Favor Union (U) supported supported Interaction with Co-workers 17 20 118 Favor Union (NU) not supported (H 1 weak) 18 21 120 Willing to Join Union (NU) not supported (H weak) 19 22 122 Union Membership (NU) supported (weak) 20 23 124 Favor Union (U) supported (weak) 127 rates among low control workers have no bearing on attitudes toward union membership. The argument that employer-employee interaction rates d i f -ferentially predispose workers to join or favor unions has some lim-ited support. Those workers whose interaction with management i s most restricted do favor union membership as predicted, and more union than non-union workers have low interaction rates with manage-ment. Several considerations should be noted with respect to this data. One is that interaction between most workers In white-collar jobs i s possible. Relative to many work situations for manual wor-kers, office, sales, and technical jobs involve discussion, exchange of views, and frequent social contacts between xvorkers. The degrees of interaction may therefore make very l i t t l e difference to these workers. Although a worker may interact infrequently with some wor-kers as compared to others, some interaction nevertheless occurs. Interaction with management personnel may also be more fre-quent generally than i t i s for manual workers. Management personnel generally work i n office situations, and they therefore interact more with office personnel than with workers in other parts of a plant. Promotion into management ranks i s li k e l y to occur for many white-collar workers, and some management o f f i c i a l s i n most business concerns have moved into their present positions from non-management jobs i n the same firms. Consequently, a "group consciousness" among workers which divides the work force into "workers" and "management" is less l i k e l y to develop among white-collar workers than among man-ual workers. 128 For these reasons, interaction rates may have minimal im-pact on the willingness of workers to join unions. If the social context of white-collar work undergoes changes, such as increased automation i n the office, the development of shift-work, or data pro-cessing methods whiGh decrease general interaction rates, this argu-ment regarding interaction rates and union formation may be worth further consideration. Given the social context of the workers i n this sample, however, further examination of the relationship i s not ju s t i f i e d . It should be noted that the measurement of interaction rates used here was based on interview questions regarding the frequency of contacts during work with specific others. The terms i n which respondents were directed to assess these contacts were qualitative: frequently, occasionally, or rarely to never. What constituted fre-quent contact for one worker was deemed to be rare contact for another. The nature of the contact was not assessed, and non-verbal forms of communication were not examined at a l l . A second measure was taken, this one based on the coder's assessment of interaction frequencies from a reading of the job descrip-tion. This was run against the dependent variables, and the results were similar to those given in the chapter. At best, they were i n -conclusive, and for the low control workers no consistent pattern was found. This measure was not used i n the text as i t seems to add no-thing to the existing information. 129 Either of these codes lacks precision. Both are based on information i n interview data, and this does not appear to be the best means of obtaining this type of information. Observational data would probably be more useful for the testing of these hypotheses. Despite these inadequacies, these tests do allow for a re-duction in the number of potential explanations for variation. In particular, they show that further exploration of interaction data with respect to union membership i s less likely to be f r u i t f u l than examinations of job control, income, and s k i l l data. 130 CHAPTER V JOB CONTROL AND ACTIVE STRATEGIES Individual bargaining and active involvement i n trade union activity are both means of exercising personal control over income from work. Not bargaining and taking a passive role i n union affairs are both means of avoiding confrontation with employers or active risk-taking. In this chapter, the differences between active union mem-bers and passive members are examined. Hypotheses relating knowledge about and participation i n union activities among union members to job control levels are tested. 131 1. Restatement of Theory These generalizations are given: 11. The more experience a worker has i n a r t i c u l a t i n g a case, making decisions, and i n t e r a c t i n g with a u t h o r i t i e s , the more, l i k e l y he i s to adopt a c t i v e bargaining s t r a t e g i e s . 12. The more job control one has, the more experience he has i n a r t i c u l a t i n g a case, making d e c i s i o n s a and i n t e r a c t i n g with a u t h o r i t i e s . One proposition i s stated: 11. The more job control one has, the more l i k e l y one i s to adopt active bargaining s t r a t e g i e s . The hypotheses are as follows; Hypothesis 21: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion of wor-kers with high than with low control w i l l engage i n i n d i v i d u a l bargaining. This hypothesis has already been tested, i n Chapter I I I . I t w i l l not be retested here. Hypothesis 22: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job cont r o l w i l l possess information about union a c t i v i t i e s . Four indices of information are used for tests of th i s hy-pothesis. They are (1) knowledge of name of union; (2) knowledge of how many meetings the union has i n a year; (3) knowledge of the t o t a l union or t o t a l l o c a l membership numbers; (4) knowledge of names of agents, executive'members or shop stewards. 132 These indices tap the general awareness members have of their union a f f i l i a t i o n and a c t i v i t i e s . Those who are least involved i n such activities should be least well informed. Those who attend meetings or pay attention to union affairs, and i n this way take an active participating role, are li k e l y to possess such Information. The three remaining hypotheses deal more directly with par-ticipation. Hypothesis 23: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l attend union meetings. Hypothesis 24: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l be willing to take union offices. Hypothesis 25: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l hold union offices. The two f i n a l hypotheses are separated because other factors — such as the personalities of different people, and their s k i l l s i n conducting meetings — a f f e c t their chances of holding union offices. Hypothesis 24 refers to the willingness to take office, and Hypothe-sis 25 to actual office holding. This last hypothesis i s tested so that those who have i n the past held offices as well as those who now hold offices are counted as office holders. In the tests of these hypotheses, the sexes have again been treated separately. With regard to the three participation measures, the reasons for separation are the same as those stated i n the f i r s t chapter. Social disapproval of aggressive behavior, lower career commitments, and the widespread assumption that men should hold more 133 authority than women in work situations may lower the opportunities women have for participating in union a f f a i r s . The unequal distribution of job control accounts for the division of the sexes with respect to the information tests. Those workers whose control levels are higher w i l l be i n positions that provide easier access to information. Since the balance of the sexes i s weighted heavily in favor of men i n high control jobs, the effects of control may be confounded with the effects of sex differences i f the two labour forces are combined. 134 2. Presentation of Data Hypothesis 22: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l possess information about union a c t i v i t i e s . Index (1): Knowledge of Union name. Source of Data: Respondents were asked to name their union. Code: Those workers who could accurately name their union, or who could name their local and at least partially name the union, were rated as hav-ing this knowledge. Those who said they did not know, or who named a union other than that i n which the firm's workers were members, or who were unable to provide a name other than a generic term for mem-bers (e.g., "Office people") were rated as not having this knowledge. Table 25 shows the percentage of union workers who could provide this information, by job control levels. Decision: Hypothesis 22, Index 1, i s supported for the men. A l l eight measures are i n the predicted direction. However, six of the eight measures provide weak associations. Hypothesis 22 i s not supported for the women. There is no associa-tion between information levels and control for women. 135 TABLE 25 Job Control and Information Level for Union Members (Percentage Who Can Name Union Correctly) Job Control Area  Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space Men Women Level Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N-100%) low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high +05 +08 +10 +04 +07 +11 +04 +11 86 (44) 91 (54) 84 (45) 92 (53) 83 (41) 93 (57) 87 (45) 91 (53) 86 (64) 94 (34) 84 (58) 95 (40) 87 (53) 91 (45) 84 (58) 95 (40) +12 +10 +10 +09 -12 +07 -08 -07 84 (69) 72 (18) 83 (76) 73 (ID 83 (72) 73 (15) 79 (63) 88 (24) 83 (80) 71 (07) 81 (79) 88 (08) 83 (75) 75 (12) 82 (79) 75 (08) 136 Hypothesis 22: (As previously stated) Index (2): Knowledge of how long the union has been certi f i e d at the firm. Source of Data: Respondents were asked: "Do you know how long the union has been certif i e d here?" Interviewers were Instructed to obtain dates i f possible. Code: Those workers who could give an accurate date or who could give an accurate number of years or months, and those who could give an estimate within one year of the correct date were rated as hav-ing this knowledge. Those who said they did not know, those who guessed at a date more than one year distant from the correct date were rated as not having the knowledge. Table 26 shows the percentage of union workers who could provide this information, by job control levels. Decision: Hypothesis 22 (index 2) is not supported by either of the popula-tion distributions. The null hypothesis applies to the male sample. The alternative hypothesis is weakly supported for the women. 137 TABLE 26 Job Control and Information Level for Union Members (Percentage Who Can T e l l Date of Certification) Men Job Control Area Level Difference % Women (N°100%) Difference % (N«100%) Content Sequence Pace Quantity Quality Time Space low high low high low high Supervision low high low high low high low high low high -01 +04 +08 -08 -10 +01 +25 -03 25 (44) 24 (54) 22 (45) 26 (53) 20 (41) 28 (57) 29 (45) 21 (53) 28 (64) IS (34) 24 (58) 25 (40) 13 (53) 38 (45) 16 (58) 13 (40) -02 -03 -07 -12 +01 -18 -05 00 13 (69) 11 (18) 13 (76) 09 (ID 14 (72) 07 (15) 16 (63) 04 (24) 13 (80) 14 (07) 18 (79) 00 (08) 13 (75) 08 (12) 13 (79) 13 (08) 138 Hypothesis 22: (as previously stated) Index (3); Knowledge of how many meetings the local has i n a year. Source of Data: Respondents were asked, "How often does your union local have meet-ings (per year)?" Code: Because of the d i f f i c u l t y of numbering meetings (see Chapter II), the code divides the population into those who said they did not know, or who gave no reply, and those who indicated that they did know by providing an answer. Table 27 shows the proportions of union workers who gave an answer to this question, by job control levels. Decision: Hypothesis 22 (Index 3) i s not supported by the male population. There i s no association between information and control. The hypothesis i s supported by the women. 139 TABLE 27 Job Control and Information Level for Union Members (Percentage Who Can Say How Many Meetings i n Year) Men Women Job Control Area Level Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N=100%) Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high +01 +08 +01 -17 -02 -02 +13 +02 66 (44) 67 (54) 62 (45) 70 (53) 66 (41) 67 (57) 76 (45) 59 (53) 67 (64) 65 (34) 67 (58) 65 (40) 60 (53) 73 (45) 66 (58) 68 (40) +29 +16 -01 +21 -12 +08 +15 +08 38 (69) 67 (18) 66 (76) 82 (ID 68 (72) 67 (15) 62 (63) 83 (24) 69 (80) 57 (07) 67 (79) 75 (08) 35 (75) 50 (12) 67 (79) 75 (08) 140 Hypothesis 22: (As previously stated) Index (4): Knowledge of union membership figures. Source of Data: Respondents were asked, "How many workers does your union represent?" Code: Workers who provided a number within one-third of the total given by the Department of Labour or the Union for the total union mem-bership, or for the local union membership were rated as having this information. Those who provided a number more than one-third distant from one or other of those totals, or who said they did not know, were rated as having no infcrmation. Table 28 shows the percentages of union workers who gave this i n -formation, by job control levels. Decision: The hypothesis is supported for the men. It i s not supported for the women. For the women, the alternative hypothesis i s supported. 141 TABLE 28 Job Control and Information Level for Union Members (Percentage Who Can Say How Many Members i n Union)  Job Control Men Women  Area Level Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N°100%) Content low high Sequence low high Pace low high Supervision low high Quantity low high + 1 4 41 (54) " 2 1 +11 2? <?5 -11 Quality low ^ 67 (58) _ w high """ " " v Time low high Space low high 27 (44)  27 (45) 42 (53) 24 (41) 42 (57) 29 (45) 40 (53) 67 (64) 65 (34)  75 (40) 30 (53) 40 (45) 66 (58) 68 (40) -02 }:;< -19 +10 J U V J-" -20 i U 40 (45) ^ +02 9*1 -18 21 (69) 00 (18) 20 (76) 00 (11) 21 (72) 00 (15) 21 (63) 08 (24) 19 (80) 00 (07) 19 (79) 00 (08) 20 (75) 00 (12) 18 (79) 00 (08) 142 Hypothesis 22: (As previously stated) Index (5): Knowledge of name of union bargaining agent, shop steward, or member of executive. Source of Data: Respondent was asked, "Who is your local representative now?" Code: Respondents who could name the bargaining agent, a shop steward, or a member of the executive were rated as having this information. Those who said they did not know, who were unable to provide any of these names, or who provided the name of a person whom the ste-ward, or a member of the executive could not identify as having the assigned office, were rated as not possessing this information. Table 29 provides the percentages who had this information, by job control levels. Decision: The hypothesis (index 5) i s supported by the male population. The hypothesis i s not supported by the female population; for them, the alternative hypothesis i s supported, and the association i s not weak. 143 TABLE 29 Job Control and Information Level for Union Members (Percentage Who Can Name Agents or Union Officer) Job Control Men Women Area Level Difference Z (N=100%) Difference % (N=100%) Content low high +05 55 60 (44) (54) -15 71 56 (69) (18) Sequence low high +21 49 70 (45) (53) -15 70 55 (76) (ID Pace low high +16 51 67 (41) (57) -25 72 47 (72) (15) Supervision low high 00 60 60 (45) (53) -30 76 46 (63) . (24) Quantity low high +16 55 71 (64) (34) -42 71 29 (80) (07) Quality low high +13 55 68 (58) (40) -13 71 38 (79) (08) Time low high +20 51 71 (53) (45) -21 71 50 (75) (12) Space low high +16 53 69 (58) (40) -05 68 63 (79) (08) 144 Hypothesis 23: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l attend union meet-ings. Source of Data: Respondents were asked, "How many meetings have you attended i n the past year?" Code: Since the number of possible meetings varied greatly both between unions and between committee members and non-members, an arbitrary division was established at four meetings. Those who attended four or more meetings were rated as high participants. Those who atten-ded three, two, one, or no meetings were rated as low participants. Table 30 shows the percentage of union respondents who attended four- or more meetings i n the past year, by job control levels. Decision: The hypothesis i s weakly supported for men. A l l eight measures show positive associations between control and attendance, but the percentage differences are a l l below 10 percent. Hypothesis 23 i s not supported for women. There i s no association between attendance and control for women. 145 TABLE 30 Job Control and Participation for Union Members (Percentage Who Attended Four or More Meetings in Past Year) Job Control Area Level Men Women Content Sequence Pace Quantity Quality Time Space Difference % (N=-100%) Difference % (N=100%) low high low high low high Supervision low high low high low high low high low high +04 +05 +09 +05 +06 +09 +08 +01 20 (44) 24 (54) 20 (45) 25 (53) 17 (41) 26 (57) 20 (45) 24 (53) 20 (64) 26 (34) 19 (58) 28 (40) 19 (53) 27 (45) 22 (58) 23 (40) +01 -02 -04 +09 +04 +03 -03 +03 10 (69) 11 (18) 11 (76) 09 (ID 11 (72) 07 (15) 08 (63) 17 (24) 10 (80) 14 (07) 10 (79) 13 (08) 11 (75) 08 (12) 10 (79) 13 (08) 146 Hypothesis 24: Among union wcrkers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l be willing to take union office. Source of Data: Respondents were asked, "Would you stand for office i f you had the chance?" Code: Respondents who said "yes" or who said they would probably do so were rated as being willing to stand for office. Those who said "no", and who gave no answer or who.said they probably would not do so, were rated as being unwilling to stand for office. Table 31 shows the percentage of union wcrkers who said they would be willing to stand for office, by job control levels. Decision: The hypothesis is supported for the men. Positive associations ate found for eight job control items. It i s not supported for the women. There is no consistent associa-tion between willingness to stand for office and control levels for the women. 147 TABLE 31 Job Control and Participation for Union Members (Percentage Who Are Willing to Stand for Office) Men Women Job Control Area Level Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N-100%) Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space low high low high low high low high lew high low high low high low high' +10 +07 +15 +23 +22 +17 +10 +04 27 (44) 37 (54) 29 (45) 36 (53) 24 (41) 39 (57) 20 (45) 43 (53) 25 (64) 47 (34) 26 (58) 43 (40) 28 (53) 38 (45) 31 (58) 25 (40) 00 +01 -05 00 -19 -19 00 •19 17 (69) 17 (18) 17 (76) 18 (11) 18 (72) 13 (15) 17 (63) 17 (24) 19 (80) 00 (07) 19 (79) 00 (08) 17 (75) 17 (12) 19 (79) 00 (08) 148 Hypothesis 25: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low job control w i l l hold union office. Source of Data: Respondents were asked, "Have you ever held an office i n the union?" Code: Those who said they had held an office (of any kind) were rated as active participants; others were rated as inactive. Table 32 provides the percentage of union respondents who have held office or who now hold office i n their union, by job control levels. Decision: Hypothesis 25 is supported for men. Eight of the eight measures provide positive associations between job control and office hold-ing. Hypothesis 25 i s not supported for women. There i s no association between the two variables. 149 TABLE 32 Job Control and Participation for Union Members (Percentage Who Have Held or Now Hold Office) Men Women Job Control Area Level Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N=100%) Content Sequence Pace Quantity Quality Time Space low high low high low high Supervision low high low high low high low high low high +12 +12 +22 +21 +19 +21 +20 +09 16 (44) 28 (54) 16 (45) 28 (53) 10 (41) 22 (57) 11 (45) 32 (53) 16 (64) 35 (34) 14 (58) 35 (40) 20 (53) 33 (45) 19 (58) 28 (40) +04 -09 -10 +07 -09 -09 00 -08 07 (69) 11 (18) 09 (76) 00 (11) 10 (72) 00 (15) 06 (63) 13 (24) 09 (80) 00 (07) 09 (79) 00 (08) 08 (75) 08 (75) 08 (79) 00 (08) 150 3. Summary In this section of the theory, the elements of job control were examined for their relationship to active involvement i n union activities for union members. It was argued that the same elements which are associated with di f f e r e n t i a l bargaining power are associa-ted with differential union activity. These are the elements of high job control: decision making s k i l l s , access to authorities, and ver-bal s k i l l s for presenting bargaining demands. These factors predispose workers to adopt active strategies. Where workers are union members, active strategies include the seeking of information about and participation in union affa i r s . The argument was not upheld by the data. A summary ©f the results i s given i n Table 33. i . Information For men, two hypotheses relating information levels to high job control are clearly supported, a third i s weakly supported. An additional two are not supported, and there i s no relationship ind i -cated between control level and information. For women, one hypothesis relating information levels to high job control i s clearly supported, a second i s weakly supported. In three tests, the alternative hypothesis i s supported, indicating a negative association between job control and information levels. With respect to information levels, then, there are no con-sistent differences associated with job control. There are differences 151 TABLE 33 Summary of Results for Hypotheses Relating Active Involvement i n Unions to Job Control Levels Hypo-thesis Table page Index Men Women 22 25 135 Name Union Supported (weak) Not supported <v 22 26 137 Date Certifica-tion Not supported Not supported (H^ weak) 22 27 139 No. Meetings Not supported <V Supported 22 28 141 No. Members Supported Not supported (Hx) 22 29 143 Name Rep. Supported Not supported (Hx) 23 30 145 Attendance Supported (weak) Not supported <Ho> 24 31 147 Willing/office Supported Not supported <V 25 32 149 Office Holding Supported Not supported <Ho> 152 associated with sex: men. are better informed than women. Since women are situated mainly at low control jobs and men, at high control jobs, the hypotheses would gain better support for the combined popu-lation. In most cases, the number of women in the high job control levels i s email, and the percentages are therefore less reliable than those for men. i i . Participation For men, three hypotheses relating control to participation in union activities are supported. One is a weak association, but the other two are strong. For women, a l l three hypotheses are not supported. No association was found between control and participation. Again, the percentage differences between the sexes are large. It would appear that women have low job control at work, and low par-ticipation rates i n unions. Men appear to have higher job control and higher participation rates. As with the interaction data, measurement of participation on the basis of interview material i s not ideal. Nonetheless, the tests do show that the general argument is not supported. Factors other than job control must be examined for an explanation of di f f e r -ential rates of participation i n union a c t i v i t i e s . One of these other factors i s the economic benefits that actually accrue to members of unions. Where union bargaining i s highly beneficial to members, we would expect them to be more involved In their union a f f a i r s . Where the union provides l i t t l e economic advantage 153 to them, their investment of time and energy i s likely to be minimal. This alternative explanation of differences i s explored i n the next chapter. 154 CHAPTER VI INCOME AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1. Introduction A series of hypotheses have been tested regarding the as-sociation between job control and individual bargaining. These were supported by the data. As job control increases, both income and Individual bargaining for income increase. It was argued that workers who can bargain individually, and who can obtain higher incomes either through direct bargaining or through wage-offers which reflect bargaining potential, are less li k e l y to seek collective support. They are not as threatened by competition for their jobs. They are not easily replaced, and they have alternative sources of employment available to them. A series of hypotheses were then tested regarding the associa-tion between job control and collective bargaining, where collective bargaining is defined as union membership. It was expected that wor-kers with low job control would be more favorable to union membership, and that more low than high control workers would be union members. For men, the association between job control and union membership was not supported. The association between job control and favorable attitudes toward union membership was weakly supported. The association was, however, clearly evident for women. The argument relating marketability to job control notwith-standing ,additional variables influence the bargaining position of i n -dividual workers. Geographic region and regional disparities i n economic 155 development, the location of particular industries employing specific workers, and, as has been demonstrated, the sex of a worker, may modify the relationship between control and replaceability. These additional variables influence income levels. While the association between control and income i s very high, there re-mains some variation attributable to factors other than job control. Since the objective of bargaining is to increase income, those wor-kers with low control who receive a high income are less likely to benefit from collective bargaining than other low control workers who receive a low income. Conversely, high control workers who receive a low income are more likely to benefit from union membership than other high control workers who receive a high income. Therefore, we might expect that income would have an effect on bargaining strategies which i s independent of job control levels. It must also be noted that because the association between income and job control i s high, the effects attributed to job con-t r o l may i n fact be attributable to income differences. Throughout this study, income has been treated as a depen-dent variable. Its relationship to ^ ob control has been shown, but it s relationship to bargaining strategies has not been examined. In this chapter, the association between income and bargaining stra-tegies w i l l be considered. The chapter i s organized as follows: The f i r s t section includes hypotheses and data relating attitudes toward union membership to income for non-union workers. The f i r s t set of hypotheses refers to the relationship when job control 156 is not held constant. The second set refers to i t when control l e -vels are held constant. Then the independent and joint effects of income and job control are examined for non-union workers. The second section is a review of the differences between i n -come distributions for union and non-union workers. An explanation of the differences i s suggested, and the effects of such differences on attitudes toward unions and on participation i n union activities are discussed. The third section examines the relationship between income and participation i n union activities for union members. The independent and interaction effects of income and job control for union workers are not examined. This i s because the con-gruence between income and control for high control workers i s high, and there are not enough workers with high control and low incomes for analyses of differences between the various combinations. Where hypotheses are tested, i n the f i r s t and third sections, the format i s the same as i n previous chapters. An explanation for expected differences i s given, and hypotheses are stated. The tests are provided with a restatement of the hypotheses facing the tables. No hypotheses are stated regarding the independent and i n -teraction effects of the variables, nor regarding the income d i s t r i -butions of the two sub-samples. 157 2. Income and Attitudes Toward Union for Non-Union Workers i . Rationale The objective of bargaining for workers i s to obtain a higher income. Variables beyond the scope of this study may affect the market positions of workers, and consequently, their replaceability. Where these variables provide good market positions for workers, their income i s lik e l y to increase. If workers obtain a high income without joining a union, then union membership has less advantage for them. Consequently, we might expect that workers who have high incomes w i l l be less favorable to union membership than workers who have low incomes. Two hypotheses are stated with respect to a l l non-union workers. Hypothesis 26: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with low than with high incomes w i l l favor union membership. Hypothesis 27: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with low than with high incomes w i l l be willing to join a union. Workers with low control are, i n general, expected to be more favorable to union membership than high control workers. Wor-kers with high control are, i n general, not lik e l y to favor union membership. Two hypotheses are therefore stated which hold constant the effects of job control i n order to observe the effects of income on favorable attitudes: Hypothesis 28: Among non-union workers at a given level of job con-t r o l , a higher proportion with low than with high i n -comes w i l l favor union membership. 158 Hypothesis 29: Among non-union workers at a given level of job con-t r o l , a higher proportion with low than with high i n -comes w i l l be willing to join a union. These hypotheses are tested i n the following tables. In order to maintain comparable data with that presented i n Chapter III, the tables provide for separate reviews of income effects by sex. Two tables are given for each hypothesis where job control levels are held constant, since a single table would be too crowded to read easily. 159 11. Presentation of Data Hypothesis 26: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with low than with high incomes w i l l favor union membership. Source and Code: As previously stated. Table 34 shows the percentage of non-union workers who reported fav-orable attitudes toward union membership, by income levels. Decision Rules: Since there i s only one measure, a positive association must be shown for that measure to indicate support of the hypothesis. Decision: Hypothesis 26 i s supported. A 15 percent difference i n the predicted direction i s found for both men and women. Hypothesis 27: Among non-union workers, a higher proportion with low than with high incomes w i l l be willing to join a union. Source and Code: As previously stated. Results are shown in Table 35. Decision Rule: A percentage difference i n the predicted direction i s required for support. Decision: Hypothesis 27 is supported. A 43 percent difference i n the predicted direction i s shown for men. A 26 percent difference i s shown for wo-men. It should be noted that the percentage of high income workers actually willing to join unions is between 8 and 13 percent lower than the percentage who express favorable attitudes i n general. Also to be noted i s , that the percentage difference shown in Table 35 i s higher than the mean difference found between job control levels for the same question. 160 TABLE 34 Income and Favorable Attitude Toward Union for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Favorable to Union Membership)  Income Men Women  (Per Month) Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N=100%) Low ($450 or less) +15 40 (20) +15 45 (76) High ($451 or more) 25 (75) 30 (23) Income Not Reported (06) (06) Total 28 (101) 41 (105) TABLE 35 Income and Willingness to Join Union for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Willing to Join) Income Men Women (Per Month) Difference % (N=»100%) Difference % (N-100%) Low ($450 or less) +43 60 (20) +26 43 (76) High ($451 or more) 17 (75) 17 (23) Income Not Reported (06) 37 (06) Total 26 (101) (105) 161 Hypothesis 28: Among non-union workers at a given level of job control, a higher proportion with low than with high incomes w i l l favor union membership. Source and Code: As previously stated. Table 36 shows the percentage of low control workers who favor union membership. Decision Rule: Six of eight measures must be i n the predicted direction of per-centage difference for support. Decision: (a. For Low Control Workers) Hypothesis 28 for low control workers is supported for men. Seven of eight measures show percentage differences i n the predicted direction. Hypothesis 28 for low control workers is also supported for women. Percentage differences are i n the predicted direction for seven of the eight measures. 162 TABLE 36 Income and Favorable Attitude Toward Union for Non-Union Workers With Low Control (Percentage Who Favor Union Membership) Low Control Area  Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space Men Women Income Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N=100%) low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high +14 +11 +14 -05 +17 +16 +20 +12 44 (09) 30 (30) 47 (15) 36 (28) 50 (14) 36 (25) 30 (10) 35 (20) 47 (15) 30 (46) 47 (15) 31 (32) 47 (15) 27 (ID 42 (19) 30 (40) +17 +15 +20 +05 +20 +11 -09 +23 47 (58) 30 (10) 48 (56) 33 (09) 47 (57) 27 (ID 55 (47) 50 (06) 47 (68) 27 (11) 45 (69) 36 (11) 48 (42) 57 (07) 48 (69) 25 (16) 163 Hypothesis 28: Among non-union workers at a given level of job control, a higher proportion with low than with high incomes w i l l favor union membership. Source and Code: As previously stated. Table 37 shows the percentage of high control workers who favor union membership. Decision: (b. For High Control Workers) Hypothesis 28 for high control workers Is not supported for men. There i s no consistent association between income and attitude for male workers with high control. Hypothesis 28 is supported for women, but the association i s weak. Six of eight measures show percentage differences in the predicted direction, but four of these are 10 percent or lower. For the job control dimension of space, only one man with high control has low income. This measure must therefore be omitted from consideration. 164 TABLE 37 Income and Favorable A t t i t u d e Toward Union f o r Non-Union Workers With High C o n t r o l (Percentage Who Favor Union Membership) High C o n t r o l Area Men Women Income D i f f e r e n c e % (N-100%) D i f f e r e n c e % (N=1Q0%) Content Sequence Pace Su p e r v i s i o n Quantity Q u a l i t y Time Space low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high +14 +01 -03 +28 +03 -01 -05 (Omit) 36 ( I D 22 (45) 20 (05) 19 (47) 17 (06) 20 (50) 50 (10) 22 (55) 20 (05) 17 (29) 20 (05) 21 (43) 20 (05) 25 (64) 100 (01) 20 (35) +08 +06 +04 +04 -12 +18 +22 -29 39 (18) 31 (13) 35 (20) 29 (14) 37 (19) 33 (12) 28 (29) 24 (17) 25 (08) 33 (12) 43 (07) 25 (12) 41 (34) 19 (16) 14 (07) 43 (07) 165 Hypothesis 29; Among non-union workers at a given level of job control a higher proportion with low than with high incomes w i l l be willing to join a union. Source and Code: As previously stated. Table 38 shows the percentage of low control workers who are willing to join unions. Decision: (a. Low Control Workers) Hypothesis 29 i s supported for both men and women. In both cases, the percentage differences for eight job control items are positive. 166 TABLE 38 Income and Willingness to Join Union for Non-Union Workers With Low Control (Percentage Who Are Willing to Join a Union) Low Control Area  Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space Men Women Income Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N=100%) low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high +36 +32 +47 +35 +47 +48 +26 +38 56 (09) 20 (30) 53 (15) 21 (28) 71 (14) 24 (25) 60 (10) 25 (20) 67 (15) 20 (46) 67 (15) 19 (32) 53 (15) 27 (11) 58 (19) 20 (40) +28 +28 +31 +36 +28 +27 +26 +35 48 (58) 20 (10) 50 (56) 22 (09) 49 (57) 18 (11) 53 (47) 17 (06) 46 (68) 18 (11) 45 (69) 18 (11) 55 (42) 29 (07) 48 (69) 13 (16) 167 Hypothesis 29: Among non-union workers at a given level of job control, a higher proportion with low than with high incomes w i l l be willing to join a union. Source and Code: As previously stated. Table 39 shows the percentage of high control workers who are wi l -ling to join unions. Decision: (b. High Control Workers) Hypothesis 29 i s supported for men. Percentage differences are positive for seven out of seven job control items. The eighth item i s omitted because the total number for the row Is 1. It should be noted that a l l of these measures for men have low row totals for low income. Hypothesis 29 i s supported for women. Seven of the eight measures have percentage differences i n the predicted direction. Three of these measures also have low row totals. 168 TABLE 39 Income and Willingness to Join Union for Non-Union Workers With High Control (Percentage Who Are willing to Join a Union) Men Women Low Control c  Area Income Difference % (N=100%) Difference % Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high +49 +65 +19 +45 +26 +24 +64 (Omit) 65 (ID 16 (45) 80 (05) 15 (47) 33 (06) 14 (50) 60 (10) 15 (55) 40 (05) 14 (29) 40 (05) 16 (43) 80 (05) 16 (64) 100 (01) 14 (35) +13 +11 +09 +10 +08 +12 +16 -29 (N=100%) 28 (18) 15 (13) 25 (20) 14 (14) 26 (19) 17 (12) 28 (29) 18 (17) 25 (08) 17 (12) 29 (07) 17 (12) 29 (34) 13 (16) 00 (07) 29 (07) 169 I i i . Independent and Interaction Effects of Income and Job Control for Non-Union Workers The objective of this section i s to examine the indepen-dent effects of income for workers with low control and for workers with high control, and to then study the interaction effects of con-tr o l and income combined. The percentage differences between low and high income wor-kers at low and high levels of job control have been computed. These are given in Table 40 for favorable attitudes toward union membership, and i n Table 42 for willingness to join unions. These should be read as follows: Job Control Low High Percent difference: Income Low High a-c»difference made by control for low income workers Percentage Difference a-b="dif ference made by income for low con-t r o l workers c-d=difference made by income for high con-t r o l workers b-d adifference made by control for high income workers (a+d)-(b+c) Interaction Effect 170 TABLE 40 Interaction Effects, Job Control and Income for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Favorable to Union Membership)  Men Women Combined Job Control Income Income Income Area Low High % Dif-ference Low High % Dif-ference Low High % Dif-ferenc Content low 44 30 +14 47 30 +17 45 30 +15 high 36 22 +14 39 31 +08 38 24 +14 % d i f -ference +08 +08 0 +08 -01 +09 +07 +06 +01 Sequence low 47 36 +11 48 33 +15 46 35 +11 high 20 19 +01 35 29 +06 32 21 +11 % d i f -ference +17 +27 +10 +13 +04 +09 +14 +14 0 Pace low 50 36 +14 47 27 +20 46 33 +13 high 17 20 -03 37 33 +04 32 22 +10 % di f -ference +33 +16 +17 +10 -06 +16 +14 +11 +03 Supervision low 30 35 -5 55 50 +05 51 38 +13 high 50 22 +28 28 24 +04 31 22 +09 % d i f -ference -20 +13 -33 +27 +26 +01 +20 +16 +04 Quantity low 47 30 +17 47 27 +20 46 30 +16 high 20 17 +03 25 33 -03 23 22 +01 % di f -ference +27 +13 +14 +22 -06 +28 +23 +08 +15 Quality low 47 31 +16 45 36 +09 44 33 +11 high 20 21 -01 43 25 +18 33 15 +18 % d i f -ference +27 +10 +17 +02 +11 -09 +11 +18 -07 Time low 47 27 +20 48 57 -09 46 39 +07 high 20 25 -05 41 19 +22 38 24 +14 % di f -ference +27 +02 +25 +09 +38 -31 +08 +15 -07 Space low Omit 48 25 +23 45 10 +33 high 14 43 -39 29 24 +05 % d i f -ference +34 +18 +52 +18 -12 +28 171 TABLE Al Independent Effects of Income and Job Control (Percentage Favorable to Union Membership) Men Women Control Percentage Difference Percentage Difference By Control By Income By Control By Income Area Income Control Income Control Low High Low High Low High Low High Content +08 +08 +14 +14 +08 -01 +17 +09 Sequence +17 +27 +11 +01 +13 +04 +15 +06 Pace +33 +16 +14 -03 +10 -06 +20 +04 Supervision -20 +13 -05 +28 +27 +26 +05 +04 Quantity +27 +13 +17 +03 +22 -06 +20 -08 Quality +27 +10 +16 -01 +02 +11 +09 +18 Time +27 +02 +20 -05 +09 +38 -09 +22 Space +27 +10 +34 +18 +23 -39 Table 41 shows an abstract of the information given i n Table 40. Here, the independent effects of income and job control are shown, as measured by the differences i n the percentages at low and high levels in each of the independent variables for the depen-dent variable: favorable attitude toward union membership. Summaries of these tables are given below. Each summary describes the association between one independent variable and the dependent variable when the second independent variable i s held con-stant. The rule for establishing that an association exists i s that used throughout the text: the associations must be consistent for six of eight, or for five of seven of the job control items, where four of these are at ten percent or less, the association i s regarded as weak. 172 a. Favorable attitudes toward Union Membership Effect of income at low levels of job control: For men: positive in six of seven cases. For women: positive in seven of eight cases. For combined population: positive i n eight of eight cases. Generalization: A higher proportion of workers earning low incomes than of workers earning high incomes at low control levels are i n favor of union mem-bership . Effect of income at high levels of job control; For men: inconsistent. For women: positive association i n six of eight cases: weak. For combined population: positive association in eight of eight cases: weak. Generalization: Income has a weak effect for workers at high levels of job control. Effect of job control at low level of income: For men: positive association i n six of seven cases. For women: positive association in eight of eight cases: weak. For combined population: positive association i n eight of eight cases. Generalization: A higher proportion of workers with low job control than with high job control who earn low incomes are i n favor of union membership. The association is weaker for women than for men. 1 7 3 Effect of .job control at high level of income: For men: positive association for eight of eight cases: weak. For women: inconsistent. For combined population: positive association i n seven out of eight cases. Generalization: Job control has a weak effect for workers at high levels of income. Interaction Effects; Favorable to Union Membership For men: five of seven measures show positive interaction effects. For women: six of eight measures show positive interaction effects. For combined population: five of eight measures show positive inter-action effects. Generalization: When men and women are considered separately, there are consistent positive associations for each sub-sample between the combination of low control and low income and favorable attitudes toward union mem-bership. When the total population i s considered, the interaction effects are not consistent. 174 TABLE 42 Interaction Effects, Job Control and Income for Non-Union Workers (Percentage Willing to Join Union) Men Women Combined Job Control Income Income Income Area Level Low High % Dif-ference Low High % Dif-ference Low High % Dif-ferenc Content low 56 20 +36 48 20 +28 48 20 +28 high 65 16 +49 28 15 +13 41 16 +25 % d i f -ference -09 +04 -13 +20 +05 +15 +07 +04 +03 Sequence low 53 21 +32 50 22 +28 49 22 +27 high 08 15 -07 25 14 +11 36 15 +21 % d i f -ference +45 +06 +39 +25 +08 +17 +13 +07 +06 Pace low 71 24 +47 49 18 +31 52 22 +30 high 33 14 +19 26 17 +09 28 15 +13 % dif-ference +38 +10 +28 +23 +01 +22 +24 +07 +17 Supervision low 60 25 +35 53 17 +36 54 23 +31 high 60 15 +45 28 18 +10 33 15 +18 % d i f -ference 0 +10 -10 +25 -01 +26 +21 +08 +13 Quantity low 67 20 +47 46 18 +28 48 19 +29 high 40 14 +26 25 17 +08 31 15 +16 % d i f -ference +27 +06 +21 +21 +01 +20 +17 +04 +13 Quality low 67 19 +46 45 18 +27 48 19 +29 high 40 16 +24 29 17 +12 25 16 +09 % di f -ference +27 +03 +22 +16 +01 +15 +23 +03 +20 Time low 53 27 +26 55 29 +26 53 28 +25 high 80 16 +64 29 13 +16 36 15 +21 % d i f -ference -27 +11 -38 +26 +16 +10 +17 +13 +04 Space low Omit 48 13 +35 49 28 +21 high 00 29 -29 13 15 -02 % d i f -ference +48 -16 +64 +36 +13 +23 175 TABLE 43 Independent Effects of Income and Job Control (Percentage Willing to Join Union) Men Women Control Percentage Difference Percentage Difference By Control By Income By Control By Income Area Income Control Income Control Low High Low High Low High Low High Content -09 +04 +36 +49 +20 +05 +28 +13 Sequence +45 +06 +32 -07 +25 +08 +28 +11 Pace +38 +10 +47 +19 +23 +01 +31 +09 Supervision 0 +10 +35 +45 +25 -01 +36 +10 Quantity +27 +06 +47 +26 +21 +01 +28 +08 Quality +27 +03 +46 +24 +16 +01 +27 +12 Time -27 +11 +26 +64 +26 +16 +26 +16 Space +38 +48 -16 +35 -29 Table 43 provides an abstract of the information given i n Table 42. Here, the independent effects of income and job control are shown, as measured by the differences i n the percentages at low and high levels of each of the independent variables for the dependent variable: willingness to jt>in unions. b. Willingness to Join Unions Effect of Income at low levels of job control: For men: positive in eight of eight cases. For women: positive i n eight of eight cases. For combined population: positive i n eight of eight cases. 176 Generalization: A higher proportion of workers with low income than with high income who have low levels of job control are willing to join unions. Effect of Income at high levels of job control: For men: positive in six of seven cases. For women: positive i n seven of eight cases. For combined population: positive in seven of eight cases. General!zation: A higher proportion of workers with low income than with high income who have high levels of job control are willing to join unions. Effect of Job Control at low level of income: For men: inconsistent. For women: positive association in eight of eight cases. For combined population: positive associations i n eight of eight cases. Generalization: A higher proportion of workers with low job control than with high job control who have low incomes are willing to join unions. How-ever, for men only, there i s no difference by job control level. Effect of Job Control for high level of income: For men: positive association i n seven of seven cases: weak. For women: positive association in six of eight cases: weak. For combined population: positive association i n eight of eight cases: weak. 177 Generalization: A higher proportion of workers with low job control than with high job control who have high incomes are willing to join unions. The association i s weak. Interaction Effects: Willingness to join unions For men: there i s no consistent interaction effect. For women: eight of eight measures show positive interaction effects. For combined population: eight of eight measures show positive inter-action effects. Generali zation: For women, the combination of low control and low income i s associa-ted with willingness to join unions. This i s also true for the total population, but i t i s not true when men are considered separately. For men, the interaction effects of control and income are not con-sistent. 178 3- Income Distributions Before an argument is suggested which relates participation rates in unions and attitudes of union workers to income, the d i s t r i -bution of income for union and non-union workers w i l l be considered. Workers join unions i n order to increase their incomes. The relative income positions of union and non-union workers would reflect the degree of success enjoyed by those who engage in collective bar-gaining, but i t would not explain differential union membership. In fact, the percentage differences between members and non-members at each income level are similar. The distribution i s shown in Table 44. This table i s given so that the differences shown on subsequent pages where job control levels are taken into account may be given an overall context. TABLE 44 Income for Union and Non-Union Workers* (Percentage Earning Over $450 Per Month)  Income $451 or Men Women More Per Month Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N=100%) Union members .06 73 (72) .01 22 (08) Non-Union 79 (75) 23 (37) * A total distribution is given in Appendix G. The variable has been dichotomized here for clearer and briefer presentation. The pattern i s not thereby altered. 179 When the distribution of incomes by job control levels i s observed, some differences become apparent. There is more congru-ence between income and control levels for union than for non-union workers. This congruence is especially marked for those with high control. Among workers with high control, a greater proportion of union than of non-union workers receive high incomes. Table 45 shows the distribution of high incomes for high control workers by union status. The direction of difference has been inserted rela-tive to the conclusion stated above (no hypothesis has been stated). That i s , where a higher proportion of union workers receive high income, the directional . sign i s positive. Table 46 shows the distribution of high incomes for low control workers by union status. Here, the directional sign is posi-tive where a smaller proportion of union than of non-union workers receive high incomes. It i s consistency that i s being considered in these tables, not real income differences. To be consistent, low control workers should have low incomes. Again, for men, the union workers have more consistency. For women, there are no con-sistent differences between the union and non-union workers at low control levels. It is suggested that the relatively formal procedures by which collective bargaining is undertaken involve comparisons between workers along control dimensions. These comparisons occur in the form of job evaluations, and such job evaluations are given monetary 180 TABLE 45 Union Status and Income for High Control Workers (Percentage With Income Over $450 Per Month) High Job Control Area Men Women Union Status Difference % (N=»100%) Difference % (N-100%) Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space union non-union union non-union union non-union union non-union union non-union union non-union union non-union union non-union +16 +04 +04 00 +12 +10 +07 +01 96 (54) 80 (56) 98 (53) 94 (52) 95 (57) 91 (39) 85 (53) 85 (65) 97 (34) 89 (34) 98 (40) 88 (48) 100 (45) 93 (69) 98 (40) 97 (36) +15 +32 +24 +06 +11 +25 +60 +25 56 (18) 41 (31) 73 (11) 41 (34) 73 (15) 39 (31) 43 (23) 37 (46) 71 (07) 60 (20) 88 (08) 63 (19) 92 (12) 32 (50) 75 (08) 50 (14) 181 TABLE 46 Union Status and Income for Low Control Workers (Percentage With Income Over $450 Per Month) Low Job Control Area Content Sequence Men Women Pace Union Status union non-union union non-union union non-union Supervision union non-union Quantity Quality Time Space union non-union union non-union union non-union union non-union Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N=100%) +32 +11 +10 +07 +14 +11 -09 +12 45 (44) 77 (39) 54 (45) 65 (43) 54 (41) 64 (18) 60 (45) 67 (30) 61 (64) 75 (61) 57 (58) 68 (47) 51 (53) 42 (26) 57 (58) 69 (59) +01 -02 +07 -03 -04 -01 +03 +02 13 (68) 14 (68) 15 (75) 13 (65) 11 (71) 18 (68) 14 (63) 11 (53) 18 (79) 14 (81) 15 (78) 14 (80) 11 (74) 14 (49) 17 (78) 19 (85) 182 values relative to one another. On the basis of this consistent c r i -teria, agreed upon by management and union representatives and writ-ten into contracts, an income distribution for union members i s de-vised such that high control workers consistently receive more money than low control workers. The informal procedures by which individual bargaining i s generally conducted involve ad hoc comparisons between workers. The c r i t e r i a by which incomes are set may vary with personal charac-teristics of workers or personal predilections of management wage-setters. In some non-union firms, particularly i n large firms, job evaluations are established unilaterally by management and may serve to establish consistent c r i t e r i a similar to those negotiated by unions. However, this would vary between companies, whereas, among union firms, job evaluations invariably occur. In a cross-section of employees, one would find a l l union members subject to the job ev-aluation c r i t e r i a , and would find some non-union workers subject to similar c r i t e r i a . The total result would provide greater consistency for the union workers — which i s the result shown i n Tables 45 and 46. 183 4. Income and Participation for Union Members: Rationale i . _Income and Favorable Attitudes Toward Union The use of consistent evaluation c r i t e r i a i n establishing the incomes of union workers i s to the advantage of high control, rather than to that of low control workers. Although they may be less favorable to unions prior to unionization, the advantages gained i n subsequent bargaining should increase the favor with which high control workers regard union membership. However, the un-changing income position of low control workers would tend to lower their enthusiasm for union membership. While they may bargain at lower risk of replacement, the bargaining does not increase their income relative to non-union workers in the same positions of con-t r o l . In Chapter III i t was found that the majority of union workers favored union membership, and that this attitude was weakly associated with job control for men but the association was negative. The association was stronger and was positive for women (Table 10). The slightly higher proportion of men at high control levels who fa-vored the union may be explained as a consequence of collective bar-gaining which has brought incomes into line with job control. The difference in consistency between income and job con-t r o l for union members is less marked for women. A higher proportion of union than non-union workers with high control receive high incomes, but there are no consistent differences for workers with low control. For women who receive high incomes, union membership i s an advantage. 184 We would expect such woman to favor membership. Since union bar-gaining for women with low control does not incur disadvantageous income distributions and involves lower risk of replacement, we would expect women with low control to favor union membership. Those women for whom the union offers no advantage are the ones with high control and low Incomes. Two hypotheses are stated regarding the effects of income for union workers. The f i r s t refers to income without regard to job control levels. This one provides for comparable data to that found i n Chapter III where job control i s the independent variable. The second refers to income for workers with given levels of job control. Hypothesis 30; Among union workers, a higher proportion with high incomes than with low incomes w i l l favor union mem-bership . Hypothesis 31: Among union workers at given levels of job control, a higher proportion with high incomes than with low incomes w i l l favor union membership. i i . Income and Union Participation Job evaluations are created by workers and management. Since neither a manager nor a committee of workers does a l l jobs, judgment about job responsibilities must be made. Union workers who evaluate jobs are i n a better position to control their own i n -come than those who do not become Involved in this procedure, and are in a better position to establish that their job is worth a given income. 185 It has been shown that union men i n high control jobs are more active office-holders than men i n low control jobs. In other respects, however, the relationship between control and active i n -volvement in unions is not strong (Tables 34 and 35, Chapter V). If participation i s a means by which a worker can best establish that his job merits a higher income, then there should be a positive association between income and union participation. An alternative argument for the same conclusion is also suggested. Where workers obtain an income higher than that pre-viously obtained, or higher than that of workers at similar jobs elsewhere, they might be expected to take active measures to maintain the advantage. If union bargaining provides them with a high income, then they can best maintain the advantage by maintaining a high level of information about and by participation i n union a c t i v i t i e s . Those with low incomes gain less from union bargaining, and therefore have a lower incentive to keep informed or to participate. Whether participation would be a function of income or vice-versa cannot be established since no information was obtained regard-ing the incomes of individual workers prior to their union member-ship. However, for either of the reasons suggested, we would expect that workers with high incomes would be more informed about and more active i n union a c t i v i t i e s . These hypotheses are stated: Hypothesis 32: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low incomes w i l l possess information about union a c t i v i t i e s . 186 Hypothesis 33: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low incomes w i l l attend union meetings. Hypothesis 34: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low incomes w i l l be willing to take office. Hypothesis 35: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low incomes w i l l hold union office. Again, as with previous hypotheses, the effects of income should be regarded while job control levels are held constant. How-ever, the actual data shows that there are not enough workers with high job control and low income to provide for adequate tests of these hypotheses. In only three cases are there more than 5 persons with this combination. Among men, area of supervision i s the exception: here there are 8 workers with high control and low income. Among women, the areas of content and supervision are exceptions, but again the numbers are small. The relationship between income and attitudes w i l l be tested for low control workers. It w i l l not be tested for high control workers. The other relationships — between income and participa-tion — w i l l not be reviewed for either sub-sample. The number of participants i n union activities i s small, and when the population i s divided by control as well as by sex the percentages become unreli-able. 187 i i i . Presentation of Data Hypothesis 30: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low incomes w i l l favor union membership. Source and Code: As previously stated. Table 47 shows the distributions of favorable attitudes and income of union workers. Decision: Hypothesis 30 i s supported for men. The percentage difference i s in the predicted direction. Hypothesis 30 i s not supported for women. A higher proportion of those with low incomes favor union membership. The association i s weak: the difference i s only 3 per cent. TABLE 47 Income and Favorable Attitude Toward Union for Union Workers (Percentage Favorable)  Men Women  Income Per Month Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N=100%) Low ($450 or less) +16 69 (26) -03 66 (67) High( $451 or more) 85 (72) 63 (19) Income Not Reported Total 81 (98) (01) 64 (87) 188 Hypothesis 31s Among union workers at given levels of job control, a higher proportion with high than with low incomes w i l l favor union membership. Source and Code: As previously stated. Table 48 shows the percentage of favorable attitudes for workers with low control. Decision: a. For Low Control Workers Hypothesis 31 is supported for men. Eight of the eight measures provide positive associations between income and favorable a t t i -tudes for low control male workers. Hypothesis 31 is also supported for women. Percentage differences in the predicted direction occur for six of the eight job control items. Hypothesis 31 (b) for High Control Workers i s not tested. 189 TABLE 48 Income and Favorable Attitude Toward Union for Union Workers With Low Control (Percentage Favorable) Job Control Area  Content Sequence Pace Supervision Quantity Quality Time Space Income Per Month low high low high low high low high low high low high low high low high Men Women Difference % (N=100%) Difference % (N°100%) +18 +17 +13 +14 +12 +17 +19 +21 67 (24) 85 (20) 68 (25) 95 (20) 70 (23) 83 (18) 67 (18) 81 (27) 68 (25) 81 (39) 68 (25) 85 (33) 69 (26) 88 (27) 68 (25) 89 (33) +12 -03 +10 +12 +12 +10 +10 -04 66 (59) 78 (09) 67 (64) 64 (11) 65 (63) 75 (08) 66 (54) 78 (09) 66 (65) 78 (14) 65 (66) 75 (12) 65 (66) 75 (08) 66 (65) 62 (13) 190 Hypothesis 32: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low incomes w i l l possess information about union a c t i v i t i e s . Source and Code: This information has been extensively described i n Chapters II and V. It w i l l not be repeated here. The five indices of information are shown in the legend which accompanies Table 49. Decision Rule: Four of the five indices must show positive associations for support of the hypothesis. Decision: Hypothesis 32 is supported for men. Positive associations occur on a l l five indices of information. Four of these are higher than 10 percent. Hypothesis 32 is not supported for women. There i s no consistent association between income and information levels. 191 TABLE 49 Income and Information Levels for Union Workers (Percentage Giving Information) Indices Income 1 2 3 4 5 % % % % % (f) Men Low 88 15 54 12 50 (26) High 89 28 71 43 64 (72) % Difference +01 +13 +17 +31 +14 Women Low 81 15 66 16 72 (67) High 84 05 74 16 53 (19) (Not reported) (01) % Difference +03 -10 +08 00 -19 Legend Index 1: Can Accurately Name Union Index 2: Can Give Date of Certification Index 3: Can Give Number of Meetings Index 4: Can Give Approximate Number of Members Index 5: Can Name Union Representative 192 Hypothesis 33: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low incomes w i l l attend union meetings. Hypothesis 34: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low incomes w i l l be willing to take office. Hypothesis 35: Among union workers, a higher proportion with high than with low incomes w i l l hold union office. Source and Codes: As previously stated. Decision Rule: A positive association w i l l be taken as support. Decisioa: Hypothesis 33 i s supported for men. However, the association i s weak. It is not supported for women. Hypothesis 34 is supported for men. However, there i s no associa-tion between income and willingness to hold office for women. Hypothesis 35 i s supported for men. However, i t i s not supported for women, and the negative association between income and office holding for women is higher than a l l other associations between income and participation rates. 193 TABLE 50 Income and Participation for Union Workers (Percentage Participating) Income High Attendance % Would Hold Office % Have Held/ Now Hold Office % (f) Men Low 19 23 04 (26) High 24 36 29 (72) % Difference +05 +13 +25 Women Low 10 16 71 (67) High 05 16 29 (19) (Not Reported) (01) % Difference -05 00 -42 194 5. Summary The associations between income and attitudes toward union bargaining, and between income and participation i n union activities are examined i n this chapter. Nine hypotheses were stated regarding the associations. In addition, the independent and interaction effects of job control and income on attitudes of non-union workers were ex-amined, and the income distributions of union and non-union workers were compared. The results of tests of hypotheses are shown i n Table 52. i . Non-Union Workers For the non-union workers, a l l but one of the hypotheses were supported. Low income i s associated with favorable attitudes toward unions, and with the willingness to join unions. The excep-tion i s with respect to high control non-union workers. Although i n -come and the willingness to join unions for high control workers are positively associated, income and favorable attitudes i n general to-ward unions are not associated for men, and the association i s weak for women. It would appear that although high control workers are not, i n general, i n favor of union membership, they are willing to join unions themselves when their income i s low. When income i s held constant, a similar result i s found for the association between job control and attitudes. In general, workers, particularly women, do not favor union membership when they have high incomes. However, they are slightly more willing to join unions when their high incomes are attached to low control jobs. 195 TABLE 51 Summary of Generalizations Regarding Income and Job Control for Non-Union Workers Indep. Population Men Women Combined Variable Character-i s t i c Favorable Attitudes Would Join Favorable Attitudes Would Join Favorable Attitudes Would Join income low control + + + + + + income high control 0 + + (weak) + + (weak) + (weak) control low income + 0 (weak) + + + control high income + (weak) + (weak) + (weak) + (weak) + + (weak) joint effect, income and control + 0 + + 0 + As shown in the summary in Table 51, the positive associa-tions between low job control and both favorable attitudes and wil-lingness to join unions are weak when workers have high incomes. The positive associations between low incomes and these dependent variables are weak i n two cases and inconsistent i n the third when workers have high job control. In general, i t would appear that high job control can com-pensate for'low income and w i l l discourage union membership. Like-wise, high income can compensate for low job control and w i l l discour-age union membership. Where both job control and income are low, each factor appears to encourage membership, and the two factors interact to increase interest i n unions. 196 TABLE 52 Summary of Results for Hypotheses Relating Income to Union Attitudes and Participation Hyp. Table Page Population Dependent Variable Men Women 26 34 160 NU Fav. Att. supported supported 27 35 160 NU Would j o i n supported supported 28a 36 162 NU,Low C. Fav. Att. supported supported 28b 37 164 NU,HighC. Fav. Att. not supported (H ) o supported (weak) 29a 38 166 NU.Low C. Would Join supported supported 29b 39 168 NU,High C. Would Join supported supported 30 47 187 Union Fav. Att. Supported not supported 31 48 189 Union,Low C. Fav. Att. supported supported (weak) 32 49 191 Union Inform. supported not supported <V 33 50 193 Union Attendance supported (weak) not supported (H^ weak) 34 50 193 Union Would hold office supported not supported <v 35 50 193 Union Holds Office supported not supported (Hx) 197 There Is one exception to this generalization: men with low incomes. For them, job control makes no consistent difference on attitudes and there is no interaction effect of income and con-t r o l . i i . Union Workers For the union population, high income and high rates of information and participation in union act i v i t i e s are associated with respect to men. Four of the four hypotheses were supported, although one was weakly supported. Among women, there i s no con-sistent association between income and information or participation rates. In addition to the testing of these hypotheses, an examina-tion of income distributions of union and non-union workers was un-dertaken. Since comparisons between incomes of union and non-union workers cannot test differences of interest between the populations, no hypotheses were stated. The differences i n percentages of respondents at low and high income levels for the union and the non-union populations are small. A slightly higher percentage of the respondents i n unions have low incomes. However there are larger differences i n income distribution when job control levels are taken into account. A higher propor-tion of union workers at high levels of job control receive high i n -comes. This i s true for both the men and the women. A higher pro-portion of male union workers at low levels of job control receive low incomes, but the differences are not consistent for women. 198 This finding suggests that an advantage of union membership to workers with high control i s the bringing of income into line with job control. The resulting congruence between the two may provide an explanation for the higher information and participation rates i n unions among male workers with high incomes, than among male workers with low incomes. Differences in the information and parti -cipation rates among union women are not associated with income and are also not associated with job control. 199 CHAPTER VII REVIEW AND INTERPRETATION Within the limits of a survey design, an examination has been conducted of the relationships between one factor affecting a worker's market position and his bargaining actions. This factor was job control, or the degree to which a worker could determine his own task performance. It was argued that bargaining strategies are as-sociated with the replaceability of workers and the marketability of their s k i l l s ; these with job control; hence, bargaining strategies with job control. Two additional arguments were stated. One of these linked certain interaction patterns among workers with d i f f e r -ential opportunity to create collective bargaining units, and i t was contended that these interaction patterns are associated with job control. The other argument held that there is a direct rela-tionship between job control and propensity to engage in active bar-gaining. In addition to these arguments the independent associations between income and attitudes toward unions were explored. In this f i n a l chapter, the theory i s briefly reviewed and the results are discussed. Particular attention i s given to those hypotheses which are not supported or which are weakly supported. Where the overall results, or additional information not used in the teats but contained i n Appendices, provide a plausible explanation for discrepant findings, these are brought to the reader's attention. Certain conclusions are advanced. 200 1. Job Control and Bargaining Strategies i . Replaceability, Marketability and Bargaining Strategies It was argued that individual and collective bargaining stra-tegies are related to differential replaceability "of workers and differential marketability of their s k i l l s . Those workers who can be easily replaced, and those who cannot easily find alternative employment are least likely to undertake the risks of individual bargaining. They are also least likely to receive high incomes. Unions function as means of controlling replacement while bargain-ing for higher wages. Therefore, workers who are most easily re-placed should be most willing to join unions and should, in general, have more favorable attitudes toward" union membership. Since major-ity votes i n firms are required for certification of a union, a higher proportion of easily replaced workers than of less easily replaced workers should be union members. i i . Job Control, Replaceability, and Marketability It was argued that the amount of job control a worker has i s a major influence on his replaceability and on the marketability of his s k i l l s . Employers have a large investment in high control workers which they lose i f they dismiss such workers or i f such workers seek alternative employment. As job control decreases, the supply of equivalent labour increases, and the investment required for new workers decreases. As job control decreases, the supplies of 201 competitive labour f o r jobs i n c r e a s e . Consequently, workers w i t h low c o n t r o l are more e a s i l y replaced and have more d i f f i c u l t y f i n d -i n g a l t e r n a t i v e jobs than workers w i t h high control.. i i i . Job C o n t r o l and Bargaining S t r a t e g i e s Since job c o n t r o l i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d i f f e r e n t i a l r e p l a c e -a b i l i t y and m a r k e t a b i l i t y , and s i n c e these are a s s o c i a t e d w i t h bar-ga i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s , i t ; was argued that job c o n t r o l would be a s s o c i a -ted w i t h bargaining s t r a t e g i e s . Job c o n t r o l was used as an index of a worker's p o s i t i o n i n the labour market. The a s s o c i a t i o n between job c o n t r o l and ba r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s was t e s t e d . The hypotheses, t e s t s , and r e s u l t s are discussed below. The a s s o c i a t i o n between a p o s i t i o n on the labour market and job con-t r o l was not d i r e c t l y t e s t e d , nor was the a s s o c i a t i o n between r e p l a c e -a b i l i t y or m a r k e t a b i l i t y and ba r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s . Support f o r these a s s o c i a t i o n s could t h e r e f o r e only be i n f e r r e d from r e s u l t s of t e s t s of the job c o n t r o l t h e s i s . Two arguments underlay the use of job c o n t r o l as an index of r e p l a c e a b i l i t y and m a r k e t a b i l i t y . One was the t h e o r e t i c a l argu-ment r e f e r r e d to above. The other was a methodological c o n s i d e r a t i o n , namely, that i t i s p o s s i b l e to measure job c o n t r o l through a 'one-shot' i n t e r v i e w and to assess the v a l i d i t y of the argument through the t e s t i n g of s p e c i f i c hypotheses. A l t e r n a t i v e methods, i n c l u d i n g extensive reviews of market c o n d i t i o n s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of h i s t o r -i c a l trends, are time consuming, expensive, and r e s i s t a n t to t e s t s . 202 I n a d d i t i o n to the arguments s p e c i f i c to t h i s t h e s i s , the general r e l a t i o n s h i p of job c o n t r o l to the a t t i t u d e s and r e a c t i o n s of workers i s a concern of the s o c i o l o g i s t who wishes to understand contemporary work s i t u a t i o n , i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t , and the connec-t i o n s between work and other a c t i v i t i e s . The t h e s i s was i n v o l v e d w i t h a s m a l l area of that general concern. i v . D e f i n i t i o n and Measurement of Job C o n t r o l Job c o n t r o l was defined as the amount of c o n t r o l and s e l f -d i r e c t i o n that a worker may e x e r c i s e during h i s task performance. C o n t r o l i s an a t t r i b u t e of j o b s , but workers are given d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of c o n t r o l on the b a s i s of t h e i r t r a i n i n g , decision-making s k i l l s , and experience . Those w i t h high c o n t r o l have more exper-ience and t r a i n i n g than those w i t h low c o n t r o l . Eight dimensions of job c o n t r o l were i d e n t i f i e d : 1) task content; 2) task sequencing; 3) pacing; 4) amount of s u p e r v i s i o n ; 5) q u a n t i t y of output; 6) q u a l i t y of product; 7) time d u r a t i o n (stop, s t a r t , and br e a k s ) ; 8) s p a t i a l c o n s t r a i n t s . Task d e s c r i p t i o n s were coded f o r amounts of c o n t r o l along an o r d i n a l s c a l e . For c l e a r p r e s e n t a t i o n , these codes were c o l -lapsed so that c o n t r o l was dichotomized, and workers were assigned to one of two p o s i t i o n s : low or high c o n t r o l f o r each dimension. v. Job C o n t r o l and Income I t was p r e d i c t e d that more high than low c o n t r o l workers would r e c e i v e high incomes. I t was expected that t h i s would be true 203 of both non-union and union workers, since both groups have ranges of job control associated with differences in replaceability and marketability of individual workers. This prediction was confirmed. Differences were found in the income distributions of men and women, and in the degree of correspondence between control and income for non-union and union workers. These differences were important clues for interpretation of other results. Their descrip-tion here includes the data shown in Tables 1 and 11, Appendix G, and throughout Chapter VI. Non-union men had much higher base incomes and top incomes than non-union women. Among non-union workers, 79 per cent of the men and 23 per cent of the women earned over $450 per month. Thirty-five per cent of the men and 3 per cent of the women earned over $650 per month. Three per cent of the men and 34 per cent of the women earned less than $351 per fconth. Non-union men with high control had higher incomes than non-union women with high control. Among non-union workers with high control,between 80 and 97 per cent of men, and between 32 and 63 per cent of women earned over $450 per month. (The ranges given here and below refer to the lowest and highest percentages along the eight dimensions of control.) Non-union men with low control had higher incomes than non-union women with high control. Among non-union workers with low control, between 42 and 75 per cent ot men and between 11 and 19 per cent of women earned over S4J50 par month. 204 In addition to low incomes regardless of job control, a majority of women had low control jobs. Among non-union women, between 51 and 88 per cent had low control jobs, compared to be-tween 42 and 61 per cent of non-union men. Similar differences were found for union workers. Among them, 73 per cent of the men and 22 per cent of the women earned over $450 per month. Twenty-five per cent of the union men and no union women earned over $650 per month. One per cent of union men and 39 per cent of union women earned less than $351 per month. Union men with high job control had higher incomes than union women with high job control. Between 85 and 100 per cent of the men and between 43 and 92 per cent of the women with high control earned over $450 per month. Union men with low job control had higher incomes than union women with low job control. Between 44 and 61 per cent of the union men and between 11 and 18 per cent of the union women with low control earned over $450 per month. A majority of union women had low control jobs. Among union women, between 72 and 98 per cent had low control jobs, com-pared to between 42 and 84 per cent of union men. 205 Comparisons of non-union and union workers' incomes f o r the t o t a l sample showed no d i f f e r e n c e s of consequence, but compari-sons of incomes when l e v e l s of job c o n t r o l were h e l d constant showed c o n s i s t e n t d i f f e r e n c e s . Income was more o f t e n congruent w i t h c o n t r o l l e v e l s f o r union workers. Incomes i n seven of e i g h t job c o n t r o l areas were higher f o r union than f o r non-union men w i t h high c o n t r o l . Incomes i n a l l job c o n t r o l areas were higher f o r union than f o r non-union women w i t h high c o n t r o l . Incomes i n seven of eig h t job c o n t r o l areas were lower f o r union than f o r non-union men wit h low c o n t r o l . Incomes f o r women w i t h low c o n t r o l were not r e -l a t e d to union s t a t u s , and a l l d i f f e r e n c e s by st a t u s were lower than 10 per cent. v i . Job C o n t r o l and I n d i v i d u a l Bargaining Five hypotheses r e l a t i n g job c o n t r o l to i n d i v i d u a l bar-ga i n i n g were t e s t e d . These were a p p l i e d to both non-union and union workers. For non-union men, four were s t r o n g l y supported, one was not supported. For non-union women, two were s t r o n g l y sup-ported, two were weakly supported, and one was r e j e c t e d . Among union workers, the hypotheses were a l l supported although the percen-tage d i f f e r e n c e s were weak i n one case f o r men. The one unexpected r e s u l t f o r non-union men r e f e r r e d to barg a i n i n g at the time of a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a j o b . Since more high than low c o n t r o l men d i d bargain a t some time during employment, 206 the e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the r e s u l t seems to be that men gain c o n t r o l through promotions w i t h i n the same f i r m . They need not have that c o n t r o l when they apply f o r j o b s ; thus present c o n t r o l l e v e l s are not r e l a t e d to i n i t i a l b a r g a i n i n g . This e x p l a n a t i o n should be tested against i n f o r m a t i o n on the m o b i l i t y p a t t e r n s of non-union men, and length of employment at the same f i r m . The weak support f o r non-union women may be i n t e r p r e t e d by reference to the income and job c o n t r o l d i s t r i b u t i o n s shown above. Women were p a i d l e s s than men at the same l e v e l s of job c o n t r o l . Since these women a l l sought jobs i n the same w h i t e - c o l l a r areas of work, i t may be assumed that the a l t e r n a t i v e s to present low-paid jobs were e q u a l l y low p a i d . For women w i t h high job c o n t r o l , the d i f f e r e n c e between present jobs and a l t e r n a t i v e s i s l i k e l y to be c o n t r o l i t s e l f . Given a choice between high c o n t r o l and low pay, or low c o n t r o l and low pay, a woman w i l l h e s i t a t e to demand higher wages and r i s k the l o s s of a high c o n t r o l job. A woman w i t h high c o n t r o l who i s not pr o t e c t e d by union coverage of r e p l a c e a b i l i t y encounters higher r i s k s i n i n d i v i d u a l b a r g a i n i n g than those en-countered by a non-union man w i t h high c o n t r o l . In a d d i t i o n to the small d i f f e r e n c e s between high and low c o n t r o l women workers, the o v e r a l l p r o p o r t i o n who bargained at some time was low. F i f t y - t h r e e per cent of non-union men and 39 per cent of non-union women had bargained i n d i v i d u a l l y . This i s i n t e r p r e t e d as evidence that women encounter higher r i s k s i f they 207 have high c o n t r o l , and low chances of success a t e i t h e r l e v e l of c o n t r o l , i f they enter b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n s . Being a woman i n t e r -venes between job c o n t r o l and bar g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s , and i t i s suggested that t h i s i s brought about by the i n a b i l i t y of women to b e n e f i t from high m a r k e t a b i l i t y . An e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the i n t e r v e n t i o n of sex seems to l i e w i t h ubiquitous norms which disadvantage most women workers. Most women are assigned to low c o n t r o l jobs r e g a r d l e s s of education, a b i l i t i e s , s k i l l s , or experience. This i s evident i n the informa-t i o n i n Appendix H on education of respondents. A lower percentage of non-union women than men had l e s s than high school education, y e t , as shown above, the base incomes f o r the two sexes s t r o n g l y favored men. Sixty-one per cent of the women had completed high s c h o o l , 19 per cent had a d d i t i o n a l t r a i n i n g , and 4 per cent had u n i -v e r s i t y degrees. Forty-one per cent of the men had completed high s c h o o l , 22 per cent had a d d i t i o n a l t r a i n i n g , and 15 per cent had u n i v e r s i t y degrees. While t h i s does show that 11 per cent more men were at top l e v e l s of education f o r the p o p u l a t i o n , the d i f -ference i s not comparable to those between the sexes a t top l e v e l s of c o n t r o l or income. In both p o p u l a t i o n s , high school graduation was the norm, but common norms w i t h respect to c o n t r o l and income were not found, and the d i f f e r e n c e s i n c o n t r o l and income a p p l i e d to the ma j o r i t y of workers r a t h e r than to a sm a l l percentage. 208 Education i s one of the v a r i a b l e s that d i f f e r e n t i a t e workers i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to take on high c o n t r o l j o b s . Where t h i s f a c t o r makes l i t t l e a ppreciable d i f f e r e n c e i n job c o n t r o l or income, and l e s s d i f f e r e n c e f o r one than f o r another group of workers, then the r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n t r o l and m a r k e t a b i l i t y i s a l t e r e d . A r e l a t i o n s h i p between sex and m a r k e t a b i l i t y i s maintained a r t i f i -c i a l l y through the conformity of employers to the norms of low pay and low promotion o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r women and through the t r a d i t i o n a l acquiescence of both men and women employees i n t h i s arrangement. In f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s of t h i s m a t e r i a l , the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between education and other kinds of t r a i n i n g to job c o n t r o l should be c l o s e l y examined, to see whether t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s upheld. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e a s s o c i a t i o n s between education and i n d i v i d u a l bar-gaining s t r a t e g i e s should be i n v e s t i g a t e d . The b a s i c theory must be re-examined i n the l i g h t of t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n . Norms that d i s c r i m i n a t e d against women i n 1969 are comparable to those which d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t s k i l l e d and un-s k i l l e d workers i n 1869. I n both i n s t a n c e s , workers could not trade t h e i r s k i l l s on a competitive job market. The employees des-1 2 3 cr i b e d by Marx, the Webbs, and ot h e r s , were competing f o r e q u a l l y low p a i d and low c o n t r o l j o b s , but the employers were not competing f o r labour. I t was i n t h i s job market that workers formed the f i r s t 4 trade unions. Given a s i m i l a r circumstance today f o r a subpopulation of the labour f o r c e , plus t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n on i n d i v i d u a l b a r g a i n i n g 209 f o r that p o p u l a t i o n , a r e v i s e d theory might a n t i c i p a t e high i n t e r -e s t i n c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g f o r the c o l l e c t i v e l y deprived sub-pop u l a t i o n . H i s t o r i c a l evidence shows that the e a r l y unions were i n i -5 t i a t e d by the more s k i l l e d workers. I f the p a r a l l e l holds t r u e , the high c o n t r o l women i n t h i s sample should be more w i l l i n g to j o i n unions than the low c o n t r o l sample. However, explanations f o r the h i s t o r i c a l data are v a r i e d and r e l a t e to a labour f o r c e which had undergone a r e d u c t i o n i n st a t u s and c o n t r o l from an e a r l i e r stage 6 of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . Automated o f f i c e s may decrease the number of s k i l l e d workers among women, but given the number of women wor-kers i n Canada over the past t h i r t y years and t h e i r p a t t e r n of jobs i n that time, i t would be d i f f i c u l t to argue that a s i m i l a r down-7 grading on any l a r g e s c a l e i s o c c u r r i n g f o r them. In the Canadian census of 1961, 29.5 per cent of Canadian women were members of the labour f o r c e , and 27.3 per cent of the t o t a l labour f o r c e were women. The corresponding percentages f o r 8 1931 were 17 and 17. Over a t h i r t y - y e a r p eriod the p r o p o r t i o n of working women has s t e a d i l y increased both w i t h respect to a l l women, and w i t h respect to the t o t a l labour f o r c e . In B r i t i s h Columbia, where t h i s survey was conducted, wo-men represented 31.7 per cent of the estimated labour f o r c e i n 1968. Between 1959 and 1968, an increase of 83.9 per cent i n the number of women i n the labour f o r c e was reported. This may be 210 compared to an increase over the same period f o r men of 29.8 per 9 cent. Eighteen per cent of c l e r i c a l workers i n Canada i n 1931 were women compared to 29 per cent i n 1961. Seventeen per cent of manual workers i n 1931 were women compared to 13 per cent i n 1961. Thirty-one per cent of the x^hite-collar workers i n Canada i n 1931 10 were women compared to 41 per cent i n 1961. These trends over a thirty- y e a r period show a general upgrading from manual to white-c o l l a r work for women. On this b a s i s , comparisons with the blue-c o l l a r labour force of an e a r l i e r century are not v a l i d . Nonetheless, the increases i n population of working women mean that the number of women and the proportion of the t o t a l labour force affected by low wages and severe r e s t r i c t i o n s on mo-b i l i t y and job cont r o l has s t e a d i l y increased. The p u b l i c de-bate on the ri g h t s of women to work, and to earn equal pay f o r equal work, has been accelerated by these demographic changes. In view of the demographic changes and the b a r r i e r s women encounter, one would expect a higher proportion of women than of men i n the wh i t e - c o l l a r labour force to be interest e d i n unions as means of overcoming c o l l e c t i v e obstacles. This expectation i s discussed below. In a d d i t i o n , reconsideration i s ind i c a t e d of the basic assumption about the function of unions. I f a portion of the labour force seeks union support for the removal of c o l l e c t i v e 2 1 1 o b s t a c l e s to job c o n t r o l , income., and promotion, than to the f i r s t r o l e of unions — c o n t r o l of r e p l a c e a b i l i t y — must be added a sec-ond: removal of b a r g a i n i n g b a r r i e r s not a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i n d i v i d u a l a t t r i b u t e s . The extent to which unions f o r these w h i t e - c o l l a r wor-kers perform t h i s second f u n c t i o n i s discussed below. v i i . Job C o n t r o l and C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining I t was p r e d i c t e d that more low than high c o n t r o l workers would favor union membership i n general, would be w i l l i n g to j o i n unions themselves, and would be union members. A l l three p r e d i c -t i o n s were confirmed by strong a s s o c i a t i o n s f o r women on a t o t a l of four measures. The p r e d i c t i o n s f o r non-union men were weakly sup-ported. The p r e d i c t i o n f o r union men was not supported: a s l i g h t l y higher percentage of high than of low c o n t r o l members favored union membership. For men, membership i t s e l f was not asso-c i a t e d w i t h job c o n t r o l . An e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the weak support of the hypotheses among non-union men i s r e l a t e d to the preceding d i s c u s s i o n . In general, male w h i t e - c o l l a r workers have o p p o r t u n i t i e s to a l t e r t h e i r low bargaining p o s i t i o n s . Fewer.low c o n t r o l workers have permanent and immovable b a r r i e r s to m o b i l i t y . While t h e i r present s k i l l s may subje c t them to easy r e p l a c e a b i l i t y and low incomes, and while t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l b a r g a i n i n g behavior i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h i s r e -p l a c e a b i l i t y , they have a l t e r n a t i v e means of removing t h e i r handicaps. 212 Union membership i s one a l t e r n a t i v e , but i t s a t t r a c t i v e n e s s i s modi-f i e d by the existence of i n c e n t i v e s , t r a i n i n g , r e t r a i n i n g , and pro-motion o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Income increments f o r a d d i t i o n a l experience or s k i l l lower the need f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g which has the same aim. Nonetheless, 28 per cent of the non-union men favored union membership. Twenty-six per cent were prepared to j o i n unions. The weak support f o r the hypotheses i s occasioned by higher percentages of high c o n t r o l workers f a v o r i n g and w i l l i n g to j o i n unions than was a n t i c i p a t e d . Between 12 and 27 per cent of the high c o n t r o l workers favored membership i n gene r a l , and between 19 and 27 per cent were w i l l i n g to j o i n unions. Job con-t r o l was more s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d than income w i t h f a v o r a b l e a t -t i t u d e s , but income was more s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h w i l l i n g n e s s to j o i n . This suggests that the d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between job c o n t r o l and r e p l a c e a b i l i t y or m a r k e t a b i l i t y as w e l l as that between c o n t r o l and pro-union a t t i t u d e s should be re-examined. I f r e -p l a c e a b i l i t y i s the c r i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n f o r these a t t i t u d e s , as argued, then some a d d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s i n the labour market must a f f e c t the r e p l a c e a b i l i t y or m a r k e t a b i l i t y of high c o n t r o l workers and reduce the d i f f e r e n c e s between them and low c o n t r o l workers, es-p e c i a l l y w i t h respect to income. These v a r i a b l e s apparently a f -f e c t men with high c o n t r o l more than they a f f e c t women i n the same p o s i t i o n . 213 Two such v a r i a b l e s may be i d e n t i f i e d . One of these i s the r e s t r i c t i o n imposed by high s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of work s k i l l s on m a r k e t a b i l i t y . Although a worker w i t h high c o n t r o l and h i g h l y s p e c i a l i z e d s k i l l s may o b t a i n a l t e r n a t i v e employment e a s i l y , he may not o b t a i n e q u i v a l e n t employment i n h i s own v o c a t i o n a l f i e l d unless there are i n d u s t r i e s i n h i s geographical area which r e q u i r e those p a r t i c u l a r s k i l l s . Highly s p e c i a l i z e d s k i l l s are f r e q u e n t l y s p e c i f i c to p a r t i c u l a r businesses, and the number of e x a c t l y e q u i -v a l e n t jobs may be r e s t r i c t e d . I f workers w i t h s p e c i a l s k i l l s have a strong preference f o r work i n t h e i r own v o c a t i o n a l f i e l d , then they are more dependent on t h e i r present employer. Where low i n -comes are o f f e r e d by that employer, they cannot e a s i l y be avoided through seeking a l t e r n a t i v e employment. D i f f e r e n c e s i n a t t i t u d e s toward union membership by c o n t r o l l e v e l s may t h e r e f o r e be decreased w h i l e both low and high c o n t r o l workers experience l i m i t e d a l t e r n a -t i v e s f o r equivalent employment. D i f f e r e n c e s toward membership by income may be increased w h i l e high c o n t r o l workers experience l i m i t a t i o n s on b a r g a i n i n g power i n order to maintain s p e c i a l i z e d jobs. The second v a r i a b l e i s p o p u l a t i o n increases i n high con-t r o l work, which a f f e c t the r e p l a c e a b i l i t y of present employees. I t was argued that because more workers are able to work at low c o n t r o l j o b s , the competition f o r such jobs would be g r e a t e r . 214 While t h i s i s a reasonable a s s e r t i o n , i t i s l i m i t e d by the ex i s t e n c e of schools and t r a i n i n g programmes which supply uneven q u a n t i t i e s of t r a i n e d personnel. In a d d i t i o n , the upgrading of b a s i c t r a i n -i n g i n many p r o f e s s i o n a l and t e c h n i c a l f i e l d s may provide r e c r u i t s w i t h s k i l l s that experienced workers do not possess. Where these r e c r u i t s are employable a t lower wages, the advantages to an em-ployer of maintaining an expensive labour f o r c e of experienced per-sonnel decrease. Since high c o n t r o l workers are by d e f i n i t i o n t r a i n e d and experienced personnel, f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the number of s k i l l e d r e c r u i t s to the labour force from u n i v e r s i t i e s and voca-t i o n a l schools i n f l u e n c e t h e i r r e p l a c e a b i l i t y , and reduce the d i f -ferences between them and low c o n t r o l workers. Because men are assigned high c o n t r o l jobs and can gain c o n t r o l increments through experience, they are more l i k e l y to be a f f e c t e d by the reduced m a r k e t a b i l i t y for s p e c i a l i z e d s k i l l s than are women. Because they have hig h c o n t r o l , they are more l i k e l y to be a f f e c t e d by uneven recruitment of s k i l l e d workers from t r a i n -i n g s chools. Thus these v a r i a b l e s would tend to a f f e c t the market-a b i l i t y arid r e p l a c e a b i l i t y of high c o n t r o l men more than of high c o n t r o l women, and they would a f f e c t high r a t h e r than low c o n t r o l men. While job c o n t r o l may be a s u f f i c i e n t index of r e p l a c e a b i l i t y and m a r k e t a b i l i t y where schools do not graduate p o t e n t i a l compe-t i t o r s and i n d u s t r i e s i n a given area do not encourage high spe-215 c i a l i z a t i o n , where these c o n d i t i o n s do e x i s t these other v a r i a b l e s should be considered. Some of t h i s a d d i t i o n a l v a r i a t i o n could be d e a l t w i t h by comparing the ba r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s f o r workers at various l e v e l s of job c o n t r o l w i t h i n the same i n d u s t r i e s , or w i t h i n spe-c i f i c s k i l l areas and t e c h n i c a l or p r o f e s s i o n a l f i e l d s . In t h i s way, v a r i a t i o n due to s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and f l u c t u a t i o n s i n labour s u p p l i e s i s h e l d constant, and recourse to extensive economic s u r -veys i s avoided. In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r sample, t h i s could be done e a s i l y f o r the women sinpe the vast m a j o r i t y were engaged i n two occupations: c l e r i c a l work and saleswork. The men i n t h i s sam-pl e were engaged i n many occupations. Except i n the f i e l d of d r a f t i n g and d e s i g n i n g , there are not enough men i n any one area f o r such comparisons to be undertaken. However, where the o b j e c t i v e i s to determine the respec-t i v e amounts of v a r i a b i l i t y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h job c o n t r o l , s p e c i a l -i z a t i o n , and labour s u p p l i e s i n s p e c i f i c f i e l d s , data on the l o -c a t i o n of i n d u s t r i e s and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of s p e c i f i c j o b s , and data on the p o p u l a t i o n of workers i n p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d s would have to be gathered. These v a r i a b l e s a l l r e l a t e again to the r e p l a c e a b i l i t y and m a r k e t a b i l i t y t h e s i s . This t h e s i s i s addressed to d i f f e r e n c e s between i n d i v i d u a l workers and not to t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e problems. 216 Individual non-union women are affected by differential marketa-b i l i t y as shown by the support of these hypotheses. They are also affected by collective barriers described above. The overall per-centage of women interested in unions reflects this added incen-tive to collective action. In the non-union sample, 39 per cent of the women favored union membership, and 36 per cent were willing to join unions. Since the interest in unions displayed by non-union women indicates a second function for unions, the performance of unions in this regard should be examined. Some information given i n this thesis allows for a limited examination. A higher proportion of high control woman in unions than not i n unions earned high incomes (Table 45). While this repre-sents a benefit of membership, an assessment of the benefit involves three modifying considerations. One i s , that the proportion of high control women in unions was much lower than that of non-union women (percentages were given i n section v). Both groups were nu-merically small, so comparisons are more reliable for low control women, who represented a majority in both cases. Secondly, women union workers were as disadvantaged as women non-union workers relative to men, in the distribution of job control. Third, women union workers were as disadvantaged as woiren non-union workers relative to men, in the distribution of 217 incomes. Union men enjoyed greater control and income as shown i n section v above. There are greater differences in levels of education among union than among non-union workers. Sixteen per cent of the union men and 34 per cent of the union women had not completed high school. This is a significant difference, and when the per-centages for non-union workers are contrasted with these (Appen-dix H and section v i above), there i s more reason to judge that the low baseline incomes for union women are attached to low edu-cational levels as well as to low job control levels. Forty-nine per cent of the union men and 41 per cent of the union women had completed high school; 25 per cent of the union men and 20 per cent of the union women had additional train-ing; 9 per cent of the union men and 5 per cent of the union women had a university degree. These differences provide a reason for some of the variability in upper limits of income and control for union workers. While unequal distributions of control and income may be attached to lower education for union women than for non-union women, the differences between the sexes were gross, and should have further examination in subsequent analyses. One further item relates to the performance of unions relative to collective barriers for women. Union contracts nego-218 t i a t e d i n the Province over the past two years include discrimina-tory clauses which are applied to the workers i n this study. These contracts cannot be given as evidence i n Appendices because the clauses would i d e n t i f y the workers, the firms, and the unions whose anonymity should be preserved. I t i s not the author's i n t e n t i o n to point out offending unions or firms, but i t should be c l e a r l y stated that the contracts include separate wage scales f o r men and women. At given grade l e v e l s , the s t a r t i n g wage f o r men i s higher than that f o r women. In some contracts, the number of grade lev e l s i s greater for men than for women. A few contracts do not e x p l i c i t l y d ivide the sexes, but have the same e f f e c t by attaching low grade l e v e l s to a l l women's jobs and high grade l e v e l s to a l l men's jobs. Incomes are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to these grade l e v e l s . I t may be of some i n t e r e s t that bargaining agents of the main white-collar l o c a l s i n B r i t i s h Columbia i n 1969 were men. In view of the data and the contracts, unions as they now function i n B r i t i s h Columbia have l i m i t e d success i n overcom-ing or even r e s i s t i n g the c o l l e c t i v e b a r r i e r s to women workers. While they are of somewhat greater b e n e f i t to high control than to low control women, th e i r greatest benefits are conferred on men. The comparisons of the income d i s t r i b u t i o n s of union and non-union workers with job control l e v e l s held constant i n d i -219 cated greater consistency between the two variables for the union population. High control union workers more often had high incomes, and low control union workers more often had low incomes, than the corresponding non-union populations. While this i s readily under-stood as a function of union negotiating procedures which involve formal assessments of control attributes, the effect on high control male workers was not anticipated i n the original theory. The weak but consistent relationship between high control and favorable views of union membership among union men may now be explained as a consequence of benefits derived from the job evaluation proce-dures. Since the benefit affects few women, and does not affect even them as clearly as i t does men, a corresponding increase i n enthusiasm was not found for union women with high control. 220 2. Interaction and C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining Two sets of hypotheses were stated regarding expected re l a t i o n s h i p s between i n t e r a c t i o n frequencies of workers at given l e v e l s of job controls and c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. The i n t e r a c t i o n rates of low control workers with one another were expected to a f f e c t c o l l e c t i v e bargaining s t r a t e g i e s . Tests of four hypothe-ses gave inconsistent and weak r e s u l t s . The theory was rejected. The i n t e r a c t i o n rates of workers with management person-nel were also expected tc a f f e c t c o l l e c t i v e bargaining s t r a t e g i e s . Among low control workers, three of the four predicted associations were found, but two of these were weak. Among high control wor-kers, the hypotheses were supported, and the support for one of these was weak. On the basis of these r e s u l t s , the o v e r a l l theory was rejected. The r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n t e r a c t i o n rates with man-agement and c o l l e c t i v e bargaining f o r high control workers might be reconsidered i n subsequent research, but the other r e s u l t s do not j u s t i f y further examination. I t i s f e l t that the measurements of these i n t e r a c t i o n rates were extremely crude. More f r u i t f u l information could pro-bably be gained from observation of workers than from interview data. If further examination i s undertaken of associations be-tween i n t e r a c t i o n rates and i n t e r e s t i n unions, the data f o r men 2 2 1 and women should be treated separately, and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n t e r a c t i o n rates of the two populations should be compared. Res-t r i c t i o n s on women at work may include r e s t r i c t i o n s on i n t e r a c t i o n with management personnel. Since lower i n t e r a c t i o n rates with management personnel were expected and were found for workers with low c o n t r o l , and since women were found mainly at low control l e v e l s , the e f f e c t s of sex and those of i n t e r a c t i o n rates were probably confounded i n the r e s u l t s . An analysis which was not undertaken but which should be performed i n future studies, i s one of the rela t i o n s h i p s between i n t e r a c t i o n rates and active s t r a t e g i e s . The relationships be-tween job control and active strategies are discussed below. The lack of difference between con t r o l l e v e l s with respect to i n f o r -mation may be explained i n terms of i n t e r a c t i o n opportunities. The higher o v e r a l l frequencies of men who possessed information about union a c t i v i t i e s may be associated with d i f f e r e n t i n t e r a c t i o n pat-terns between men and women, as well as with d i f f e r e n t rewards for men and women from union p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 222 3. Active Strategies i . Job Control and Active Strategies It was argued that the amount of control workers exer-cise over t h e i r jobs d i f f e r e n t i a l l y predisposes them to a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n the establishment of t h e i r own working conditions. The t r a i n i n g consists of decision-making, and i n t e r a c t i o n with a u t h o r i t i e s . These variables are associated with job c o n t r o l . Those with high control have more t r a i n i n g of this kind than those with low c o n t r o l . Hypotheses were stated which linked control to active i n -d i v i d u a l bargaining, l e v e l s of information about union a c t i v i t i e s for union members, and l e v e l s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n union a c t i v i t i e s f o r union members. These hypotheses reversed the d i r e c t i o n of ex-pected r e l a t i o n s h i p s between job control and action from that pre-dicted i n the i n i t i a l argument. There, control was used as an i n -dex of a t h i r d v a r i a b l e . Here, control was used as a source of independent v a r i a t i o n . The p r e d i c t i o n regarding i n d i v i d u a l bargaining was sup-ported. Predictions r e l a t i n g union information on f i v e items to job control were not confirmed. The associations between the two variables were inconsistent and weak. Differences between men 223 and women were greater than those within e i t h e r population. Had the t o t a l population been combined f o r these measures, the hypothe-ses would probably have been supported simply because the men occu-pied the majority of high control jobs, and the women, the majority of low control jobs. Predictions regarding p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n three areas of union a c t i v i t y were confirmed f o r men, net f o r women. For women there was no association between con t r o l and attendance at meet-ings, willingness to hold o f f i c e , or actual record of o f f i c e hold-ing. Again, the differences between the sexes were greater than those between control l e v e l s . Between 17 and 22 per cent of low control men, and between 23 and 28 per cent of high control men attended meetings r e g u l a r l y , compared to between 7 and 17 per cent of women at eit h e r l e v e l of control (Table 30). S i m i l a r l y , between 20 and 47 per cent of a l l men but between 0 and 19 per cent of a l l women were w i l l i n g to take o f f i c e (Table 31). Between 10 and 35 per cent of a l l men had held o f f i c e s , but between 0 and 13 per cent of the women had done so (Table 32). There can be l i t t l e doubt that sex-norms a f f e c t these d i s -t r i b u t i o n s . Individual women are restrained from taking active roles i n male-dominated unions as we l l as i n work organizations. The low frequency of high c o n t r o l among women means that few of 224 them are i n the positi o n s that t r a i n them to a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e . Spread over the twelve unions whose members are included i n this survey, there are not enough women i n action-disposing p o s i t i o n s i n any one union to modify the normative r e s t r a i n t s . i i . Income and Active Strategies The same indices of union information and p a r t i c i p a t i o n were examined for re l a t i o n s h i p s to income l e v e l s . P o s i t i v e associa-tions be'tween income and information were found on a l l f i v e indices for men. The associations were inconsistent and weak for women. Po s i t i v e associations were also found f or a l l three indices of p a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r men. Again they were inconsistent f o r women. Because income and cont r o l were clustered f o r union wor-kers, t h i s data could not be examined f o r the independent e f f e c t s of the two v a r i a b l e s . The differences i n absolute percentages between the sexes are shown i n these d i s t r i b u t i o n s again. I t i s suggested that the d i s t r i b u t i o n of income shown e a r l i e r provides an incen-t i v e for men with high control to become a c t i v e l y involved i n union work. Union evaluation procedures b e n e f i t men with high control by increasing t h e i r income r e l a t i v e to that of non-union men i n the same p o s i t i o n s . Those men who are not benefitted i n th i s way have a lower incentive to contribute t h e i r energies to union a c t i v i t i e s , and thus p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s r e l a t e d to income as wel l as to co n t r o l . 225 Union membership has few economic advantages f o r women. Where they do e x i s t , they a f f e c t few i n d i v i d u a l s . Consequently, neither control nor income provides an incentive f o r active p a r t i -c i p a t i o n . The f a i l u r e of unions to take strong measures against discrimination and to encourage union o f f i c e - h o l d i n g among women maintains a low l e v e l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n among t h e i r female members. In view of the high proportion of non-union women who were w i l l i n g to become members, and the increasing proportion of women i n white-c o l l a r occupations, this f a i l u r e reduces the effectiveness of unions. 2 2 6 4. Suggestions for Further Research Two arguments were involved i n the main the s i s : (1) d i f f e r e n t i a l r e p l a c e a b i l i t y and marketability w i l l explain varying bargaining patterns; and (2) job c o n t r o l l e v e l s , as indices of d i f -f e r e n t i a l r e p l a c e a b i l i t y and marketability, w i l l be r e l a t e d to varying bargaining patterns. The f i r s t of these arguments was not d i r e c t l y tested. Its support was dependent on the confirmation of hypotheses r e l a t i n g job c o n t r o l to bargaining s t r a t e g i e s . The patterns of bargaining which were found provided i n d i r e c t assessment of the t h e s i s . Fac-tors a f f e c t i n g r e p l a c e a b i l i t y and marketability were discussed which were not included i n the job c o n t r o l measures. I t i s sug-gested that a more thorough examination of the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l require attention to these other f a c t o r s . In p a r t i c u l a r , they i n -clude promotion opportunities, income d i s t r i b u t i o n s , population of trained workers, and l o c a t i o n of i n d u s t r i e s employing workers i n spe-c i f i c f i e l d s , as these are relevant to the s p e c i f i c sample of wor-kers under consideration. Special a t t e n t i o n should be given to marked differences i n these variables between subpopulations i n the labour force. These differences are not r e l a t e d to job con-t r o l , and are therefore not taken into account i n studies of the r e l a t i o n ships between job control and bargaining. 2 2 7 There was s u f f i c i e n t support f o r the second argument. Job c o n t r o l was found to be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e l a t e d to b a r g a i n i n g s t r a -t e g i e s . However, p r e d i c t i o n s based on t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p should i n f u t u r e s t a t e the l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n s under which they are v a l i d . This i n v o l v e s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the c o n d i t i o n s p e c u l i a r to p o r t i o n s of the labour f o r c e which in t e r v e n e between c o n t r o l and s t r a t e g i e s and a l t e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s given here would have been strengthened Lad questions been posed about reasons f o r low i n f o r m a t i o n and par-t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s i n unions. They would a l s o be aided by i n f o r m a t i o n on the income d i s t r i b u t i o n s of union wcrkers p r i o r to u n i o n i z a -t i o n . With the present data, i t was not p o s s i b l e to determine whe-ther the non-union and union samples were s t r i c t l y comparable apart from, union membership, although the t y i n g of a l l income d i f f e r e n c e s to job c o n t r o l measures provided a comparable base f o r i n f e r e n c e . One f u n c t i o n of unions was assumed throughout the the-s i s . This was the c o n t r o l of r e p l a c e a b i l i t y . A second f u n c t i o n has been i n d i c a t e d , but the data d i d not s u b s t a n t i a t e a c l a i m that t h i s f u n c t i o n was being e f f e c t i v e l y served by present unions i n B r i t i s h Columbia. This second f u n c t i o n i s to remove c o l l e c t i v e b a r r i e r s to m o b i l i t y and e q u a l i t y of workers. With respect to the w h i t e - c o l l a r labour f o r c e , t h i s func-t i o n could be served by union r e j e c t i o n s of d i s c r i m i n a t o r y working 228 conditions and income for women. While the data obtained for non-union women's i n t e r e s t i n unions can be associated with the need for c o l l e c t i v e resistance to b a r r i e r s , the data on co n t r o l , i n -come, and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n unions of union women did not in d i c a t e that present unions were s u c c e s s f u l l y performing this task. In addition to these substantive concerns, attention should be given i n future work to the development of better measur-ing devices. The measurements of cont r o l and income suffered by dichotomization. Analysis of o r d i n a l and i n t e r v a l scale data f o r this quantity of information i s complex, but where these extreme var i a t i o n s occur i n d i s t r i b u t i o n s by sex (or any other intervening v a r i a b l e ) , the extended analysis should provide greater i n s i g h t into the r e l a t i v e e f f e c t s of the v a r i a b l e s . While the observations stated above show where the present research i s weak, they have been developed as a r e s u l t of the present research. The weaknesses have been located because data has been gathered to test s p e c i f i c hypotheses. Moreover, the suggestions f o r a d d i t i o n a l research are themselves s p e c i f i c . They do not involve extensive and unfocussed data c o l l e c t i o n . 229 Footnotes 1. K a r l Marx, C a p i t a l , trans. Cedar and Eden Paul (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1933), I, e s p e c i a l l y Parts 3, 4, and 7. 2. Sydney and Beatrice Webb, History of Trade Unionism (New York: A.M. Keliey, 1965). 3. John Commons et a l . (eds.), Documentary History of American  I n d u s t r i a l Society (Ten v o l s . ; New York: Russell and Ru s s e l l , 1958); S e l i g Perlman, History of Trade Unionism i n the United  States (New York: Macmillan, 1928). 4. G.D.H. Cole, A Short History of the B r i t i s h Working Class  Movement, 1789-1848 (London: G. A l l e n , 1925); H.A. Clegg, A. Fox, and A. Thompson, A History of B r i t i s h Trade Unions  Since 1889 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); C. Lipton, The Trade Union Movement i n Canada, 1827-1959 (Montreal: Canadian S o c i a l Publications Ltd., 1966); L.G. Churchward (ed.), The Aus t r a l i a n Labor Movement, 1850-1907 (Melbourne: Cheshire-Lansdowne, 1960). 5. The f i r s t unions i n B r i t a i n and Canada were formed by p r i n -t e r s , carpenters, t a i l o r s , hatters, masons, iron-moulders and other s k i l l e d workers. Within each trade, a f a i r l y con-s i s t e n t pattern was maintained. The most s k i l l e d formed unions to which membership was l a t e r extended to less s k i l l e d workers. 6. The e f f e c t s of s k i l l downgrading on the development of unions has been discussed i n the context of a case h i s t o r y by W.L. Warner and J.O. Low, The S o c i a l System of the  Modern Factory (New Havens Yale University Press, 1947). 7. The argument has been stated f o r women i n other countries by contributors to White-Collar Trade-Unions, Contemporary  Developments i n I n d u s t r i a l i z e d S o c i e t i e s , ed. Adolf Sturmthal (Urbana: University of I l l i n o i s Press, 1967). 8. Canada, Department of Labour, Research Program on the Train-ing of S k i l l e d Manpower, Occupational Trends i n Canada 1931 to 1961 (Ottawa: Queen's P r i n t e r , Sept., 1963) Report No. 11, tables 5 and 6. I 230 9. B r i t i s h Columbia, Department of Labour, Annual Report f o r the Year Ended December 31, 1968 ( V i c t o r i a , 1969), V 35. 10.• Canada, Occupational Trends, tables 5 and 6. 231 BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahem, E. Collective Bargaining In the Office. New York: American Management Association Report No. 12, 1948. • Study of Personnel Practices in Unionized Offices. New York: American Management Association Report No. 13, 1948. Blauner, Robert. Alienation and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Bakke, E.W. "Why Workers Join Unions", Personnel, XXII (July, 1945) 37-46. and Clark Kerr. Unions, Management and the Public. New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1948. Barbash, Jack. Labor Unions i n Action. New York: Harper and Bros. 1948. Baudek, Russell. "Three Interpretations of the American Labour Move-ment", Social Forces, XXII (December, 1943), 215-224. Bernstein, Irving. "Union Growth and Structural Cycles", Labor and  Trade Unionism, ed. W. Galenaon and S.M. Lipset. New York: Wiley, 1960, 73-101. Blum, A.D. Management and the White-Collar Unions. New York: Amer-ican Management Association, Inc., Research Monograph 63, 1964. British Columbia, Department of Labour. Annual Report for the Year  Ended December 31, 1968. Victoria: 1969. Burns, J.H. "The Professional Employee Dilemma and the Appropriate Bargaining Unit", Labor Law Journal, 12 (1961), 303-307. Brofenbrenner, M. "The Incidence of Collective Bargaining Once More," Labor and Trade Unionism, ed. W. Galenson and S.M. Lipset. New York: Wiley, 1960, 170-177. Canada, Bureau of Statistics. Census 1961, The Labour Force. Ottawa: Queen's Printer. Vol. III-I. . Occupational Classification Manual, 1961. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961. . Census and Other Data for Vocational Counsellors, 1961 Census"!! Ottawa: Queen*s Printer, 1968. 232 Canada, Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch. Labour  Organizations i n Canada, Fifty-seventh edition. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968. . Research Program on the Training of Skilled Manpower, Oc-cupational Trends i n Canada, 1931 to 1961, Report 11. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965. . Report on Organization in Industry, Commerce, and the Pro- fessions i n Canada, 1921-1947. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968. . Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1966. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968. Cole, G.D.H. A Short History of the British Working Class Movement, 1789-1848. London: G. Allen, 1925. Carrothers, A.W.R. "The British Columbia Trade Unions Act 1959", Canadian Bar Review, 38 (1960), 295-345. Churchward, L.G. (ed.). The Australian Labor Movement, 1850-1907. Melbourne: Cheshire-Lansdowne, 1960. Clegg, H.A., Fox, A., and Thompson, A. A History of British Trade  Unions Since 1889. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. Commons, John R., et a l . (eds.). A Documentary History of American  Industrial Society. New York: Russell and Russell, 1958. Croner, F r i t z . "Salaried Employees i n Modern Industry", International  Labor Review, LXIX (Feb. 1954), 97-110. Davis, Horace B. "The Theory of Union Growth", Quarterly Journal of  Economics, LV (August, 1941), 611-637. Douty, H.M., "Prospects for White-ColIar Unionism", Monthly Labor  Review, U.S. Department of Labor (January, 1969). Dubin, R. "A Theory of Conflict and Power i n Union-Management Rela-tions", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XIII, No. 4 (July, i960), 501-518. Dunlop, J.T., "The Development of Labor Organizations: A Theoretical Framework", Insights Into Labor Issues, ed. R.A. Lester and J. Shister. New York: MacMillan Co., 1948, 163-193. and W.F. Whyte. "Framework for the Analysis of Industrial Relations: Two Views", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, III, No. 2 (April, 1950), 385-412. 233 Estey, Marten S. "Trends in Concentration of Union Membership, 1897-1962", Quarterly Journal of Economics, v o l . LXXX, (Aug. 1966), 354-355. . "The Strategic Alliance as a Factor i n Union Growth", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, IX, No. 1, (October, 1955). . "Patterns and Union Membership in the Retail Trades", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, VIII, No. 4 (July, 1955). . "Unionism i n the Retail Trades", Business Topics, III, No. 6, (May, 1956). . The Unions. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1967. Form, William H. and H.K. Dansereau. "Union Member Orientations and Patterns of Social Integration", Industrial and Labor Relations Review XI, No. 1 (Oct. 1957), 3-12. Forsey, Eugene. "History of the Labour Movement i n Canada", The  Canada Year Book, 1957. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 795-802. Galenson, Walter. The CIO Challenge to the AFL, A History of the  American Labor Movement, 1935-1941. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-versity Press, 1960. (ed.). Comparative Labor Movements. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. Golden, C.S. and H.J. Ruttenberg. "Motives for Union Membership", Unions Management and the Public, ed. E.W. Bakke and Clark Kerr. New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1948, 49-52. Goldstein, B. "Some Aspects of the Nature of Unionism Among Salaried Professionals i n Industry", Labor and Trade Unionism, eds. W. Galenson and S.M. Lipset^ New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960, 329-336. Harrington, M. The Retail Clerks. New York: Wiley and Sons, 1962. Hartfiel, Gunter. "Germany", White-Collar Trade-Unions, ed. A. Sturm-thai. Urbana: University of I l l i n o i s Press, 1967. Herman, Edward E. Determination of the Appropriate Bargaining Unit. Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Oc-casional Paper No. 5. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, November, 1960. Hoos, Ida Russakoff. Automation i n the Office. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961. 234 Hoos, Ida Russakoff. "When the Computer Takes Over the Office", Harvard Business Review (July-August, 1960), 102-112. Hoxie, R.F. Trade Unionism i n the United States. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1928. Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., "Unions: Possibilities for Future Growth", Irconcepts. New York, I, No. 2 (May, 1969). Jamieson, Stuart. Industrial Relations i n Canada. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957. Kassalow, E.W. "White-Collar Unionism i n the United States", White- Collar Unionism i n the United States, ed. A. Sturmthal. Urbana: University of I l l i n o i s Press, 1967. Kerr, Clark and Abraham Siegel. "The Structuring of the Labor Force in Industrial Society: New Dimensions and New Questions", International Labor Relations Review, VIII (Jan. 1955), 151-168. . "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike — An International Comparison", Industrisl Conflict, eds. A. Kornhauser et a l . New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954, 189-212. Kirstein, G.G. Stores and Unions. New York: Fairchild Publishers, 1950. Kornhauser, A., Robert Dubin, and A.M. Ross (eds.). Industrial Con- f l i c t . New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954. Kruger, Daniel H. "Bargaining and the Nursing Profession", Monthly  Labor Review. U.S. Department of Labour, (July, 1961). Labour Gazette, "Industrial and Geographical Distribution of Union Membership in Canada, 1961", Ottawa: Queen's Printer, LXII, (1962), 292-293. Labour Law Journal, "Behavioral Science Analysis and Collective Bar-gaining Research", 16 (August 1965), 500-508. Lipset, S.M. The Future of Nonmanual Unionism. Berkeley, California: Institute of Industrial Relations, 1961. , Martin Trow, and James Coleman. Union Democracy. Garden City: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956. Lipton, C. The Trade Union Movement in Canada, 1827-1959. Montreal: Canadian Social Pu-lications Ltd., 1966. Logan, H.A. Trade Unions i n Canada. Toronto: MacMillan Co., 1948. 235 Marx, Karl. Capital, trans. Cedar and Eden Paul. London: 3.M. Dent and Sons, 1933. . Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961. . Selected Works, prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Insti-tute, Moscow, ed. V. Adoratsky. New York: International Pub-lishers, 1936. Montague, J.T. "The Growth of Labour Organizations i n Canada — 1900-1950", Labour Gazette 50th Anniversary Edition, Canada Depart-ment of Labour. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, September, 1950. Ostry, Sylvia. The Occupational Composition of the Canadian Labour  Force. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967. Pelling, H. A History of British Trade Unionism. London: St. Mar-tin's Press, 1963. Perlman, Mark. Labor Union Theories in America. Evanston, I l l i n o i s : Row, Peterson and Company, 1958. Perlman, Selig. History of Trade Unionism i n the United States. New York: Macmillan, 1928. Rayback, Joseph G. A History of American Labor. New York: Free Press, 1966. Rose, A.M. "The Changing Face of Collective Bargaining". Labor  Law Journal, IX (1958), 747-752. . Union Solidarity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952. Ross, A.M. and Donald Irwin. "Strike Experience i n Five Countries 1927-1947: An Interpretation", Industrial and Labor Relations  Review- , IV (April,.1951). Sayles, Leonard and George Strauss. The Local Union. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967. Schneider, B.V. "Collective Bargaining and the Federal C i v i l Service", Industrial Relations, III, No. 3, (May, 1964), 97-120. Scott, W.H. Office Automation, Administrative and Human Problems. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1965. Scoville, J.G. The Job Content of the Canadian Economy, 1941, 1951,  1961. Canada Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Special Labour Force Studies, No. 3. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, A p r i l , 1967. 236 Seidman, J., J. London and B. Karsh. "Leadership i n a Local Union", American Journal of Sociology, LVI, (Nov. 1950), 229-237. . "Why Workers Join Unions", Annals of American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and Social Science (March, 1951). Shostak, A.B. America's Forgotten Labor Organization: A Survey of  the Role of the Single-Firm Independent Union in American In- dustry. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. Solomon, B. and R.K. Burns, "Unionization of White-Collar Employees, Extent, Potential, and Implications", Journal of Business of the  University of Chicago, XXVI, 2 (April, 1963), 140-159. Stieber, Jack, "Automation and the White-Collar Worker", Personnel, XXXIV, No. 3 (November-December, 1957), 8-17. . "Non-Wage Aspects of Collective Bargaining", Business To- pics (Spring, 1960). Strauss, George, "Professional and Occupational Associations'", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, II, 3 (May, 1963). Sturmthal, Adolf. White-Collar Trade-Unions? Contemporary Develop- ments in Industrialized Societies. Urbana: University of I l l i n o i s Press, 1967. Tannenbaum, A. and R. Kahn. Participation i n Union Locals. Evanston: Row Peterson, 1958. . The Labor Movement. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1921. Urquhart, M.D. (ed.) Historical Statistics of Canada, Toronto: Mac-millan, 1965. Walker, K.F., "White-Collar Unionism in Australia", White-Collar Trade- Unions, ed. A. Sturmthal. Urbana: University of I l l i n o i s , 1967. Walton, R.E. The Impact of the Professional Engineering Union: A  Study of Collective Bargaining Among Engineers and Scientists  and Its Significance for Management. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-versity Press, 1961. Ware, Norman J. "Trade Unions In the United States and Canada", Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, XV, 40-45. Warner, W.L. and J.O. Low. The Social System of the Modern Factory. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947. 237 Webb, Sydney and B e a t r i c e . H i s t o r y of Trade Unionism. New York: A.M. K e l l e y , 1965. Wildman, W.A. " C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n by P u b l i c School Teachers", I n d u s t r i a l and Labor R e l a t i o n s Review, XVIII, No. 1 (October, 1964), 3-19. ••- ** Wolman, Leo. The Growth of American Trade Unions, 1880-1923 . New York: N a t i o n a l Bureau of Economic Research, InCi, 1924. . Ebb and Flow i n Trade Unionism. New York: N a t i o n a l Bureau of Economic Research Inc., 1936. i 238 APPENDIX A INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR EMPLOYEES UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY DATE INTERVIEWER PREAMBLE: "This interview i s part of a f a i r l y large study of certain occupations in modern industries, entertainment places, and stores. A l l information that you give me w i l l be confidential. It w i l l be put together with information from interviews with about 300 other persons i n this and several other companies i n British Columbia. I w i l l not take note of your name or any other specific information which could identify you personally. A l l of the information w i l l eventually be coded and the f i n a l report w i l l show only percentages and s t a t i s t i c a l data. "Most of my questions have to do with your job. Some have to do with your background — your education, s k i l l s , and so on. There are a few questions as well about your opinions and attitudes. "I very much appreciate your cooperation." QUESTIONS: 1. Company employing respondent: (Preassigned number) 2. Product or service of company: 3. Are you permanently employed here? Yes No (If not) What i s your employment status? 4. How long have you worked in this company? 239 5. Have you had the same job a l l of that time? Yes No (If not) What job did you have before this one? (Continue back to f i r s t job with company) 6. What i s the most accurate t i t l e for your job? 7. Would you describe how you go about doing your job? (Question may be rephrased at the discretion of the interviewer. Probe for: main s k i l l used, complexity of task routine, amount of coordina-tion or interdependence with others, ralationship to machines; additional tasks. Continue with questions u n t i l daily routine is obtained.) 8. Which s k i l l s would you say are the most important ones for your job? 9. In some kinds of work, people have to coordinate their tasks, for example, musicians must work together i n order to give a concert. Waitresses cannot give service any faster than the cook can pre-pare the food in a restaurant. In your work, do you ever have to coordinate your work pace with that of other persons? (If Yes) Which other jobs are coordinated with yours? (name jobs) (probe for direction of dependency) 10. Do you supervise other employees? Yes No (If yes) How many do you supervise? 11. Besides supervisory duties, would you say that this job Involves responsibility for others? Yes No (If yes) What i s the nature of this responsibility? (Examples: instructing others, taking responsibility for safety, etc.) 12. Would you say that this job involves responsibility for property, such as machinery, books or letters, tools, etc. Yes No (If yes) What is the nature of this responsibility? 13. Do you ever work with confidential information? Yes No 14. Most jobs have a certain amount of routine work. Would you say that your job has: 1) a high amount of routine work 2) some routine work, but not too much 3) very l i t t l e routine (encourage respondent to describe any further aspects of job) 240 15. How do you decide which tasks you should perform at a given time? (Probe for whether respondent makes the decision himself, whe-ther i t is machine paced, or whether others make i t for him) 16. Is there a certain amount of work that you must complete each day? Yes No (Probe) 17. Do you feel that you have much control over the amount of work you do i n a day? Yes No Please Explain: 18. What do you think is the main difference between a management job and a non-management job? 19. Are some of the tasks you do management tasks? Yes No (If yes) Which tasks are these? . 20. If you were offered the job at the lowest level of management, would you take It? Yes No (If not) Why not? 21. Is i t possible that you might ever be offered that job? Yes No (If not) Why not? 22. Which other jobs i n this company are similar to yours i n the kinds of s k i l l s used? 23. Which other jobs i n this company are at about the same level of authority as yours? 24. Which other jobs in this company would you say are of about the same status level (...are ranked about equally i n terms of im-portance? ) __________ 25. Which other jobs in this company would you say carry more author-ity than yours? (Probe for l i s t i n g of jobs and awareness of rank-ings ) 26. Which other jobs i n this company would you say carry less auth-ority than yours? 241 27. (Show separate paper) Which of these jobs would you say are simi-lar to yours i n status? (...are ranked about the same in terms of importance?) (Have respondent check the l i s t and return i t to you.) Lis t dentist bookkeeper postman painter(house decorator) social welfare worker teacher dietician air p i l o t optician farm manager photographer journalist radio operator barber bus driver janitor nurse milliner shoemaker dress-maker/tailor policeman architect telephone operator cook 28. a) Would you describe your work as white-collar or blue-collar work? b) What do you think of as the difference between white-collar and blue-collar work (Probe for perception of relative impor-tance, status distinctions, s k i l l differences.) 29. Do you feel that you are usually adequately informed about the reasons for your various tasks? 30. Do you feel that you would be better able to do your job i f you received more information? (Probe for type of information the respondent might like to know.) 31. Do you feel that you should have more say i n how your job i s to be done than you now have? (Probe for amount of supervision). 32. Do you feel that you know what the objectives of the company are? (If yes) Could you describe them, briefly? 33. Are you generally in agreement with those objectives? 34. Do you generally agree with the ways in which the company handles i t s personal policies? „ (Probe for awareness of policies) 35. Do you ever feel there are too many unnecessary regulations or too many unnecessary forms to f i l l out at this company? (If yes) Could you give me an example? 36. If you were in charge of your division (office, etc.) do you think you would change anything? (If yes) What would you want to change? 242 37. Do you think you would ask for employee opinions more? 38. Do you think you receive a f a i r income, or is i t higher or lower than i t should be? Fair Higher Lower 39. From what you know about people doing similar jobs at other com-panies, do they receive about the same as you do, or more, or less? about same more Less DK 40. In general, do you think that persons doing jobs like yours should receive higher salaries? Yes No Other (explain) 41. Do you feel that you have any control over how much money you earn at your job? Yes No 42. Would i t be possible for you to go alone to management and bar-gain for a raise i n your salary? Yes No Other 43. Have you ever done this? Yes__ No 44. (If yes) What happened? 45. (If no) WHY NOT? 46. Do you think i t i s better, i n general, for employees to a l l have the same salary for the same type of jobs, or for them to receive different salaries according to their individual merits? Equal salaries Indiv. salaries Other (explain) 47. Do you usually work the same hours each day? Yes No (s chedule ) 48. If you wanted to take a day off, could you just take i t or would you have to explain why or ask for the time? 49. Do the other workers who do jobs similar to yours work about the same hours (schedule) as you do? ' (If not) How do they differ? 50. Do the managers of this plant(company, division,etc.) work about the same hours as you do? (If not) What schedule do they work on? 243 51. Could you change your time schedule i f you wanted to? Yes No DK 52. (If not) Why Hotf 53. (If yes) How would you go about doing this? Would you need permission from others? 54. Do you ever work overtime? Yes No (If yes) Who decides when you w i l l work overtime? (Name position) 55. Are you paid extra for overtime work? Yes i No (If yes) Is this by the hour? Yes Mo 56. In what particular area of the plant (building, office, etc.) do you usually work? (Probe for total area space, e.g., small private office or entire floor of a department store; for d i -vision of the area, e.g., by counters or desks; and for the area where the respondent actually works, e.g., a counter area approximately 3 f t . by 6 ft.) 57. Which other persons also work in this same area? (Name other jobs) 58. Where are management offices located? (Note: interviewer may insert this answer through observation. Show amount of physi-cal separation between the respondent's usual working location and management usual working location: e.g., different offices, same floor; or mixed together, etc. Sketch area, divisions, and locations from observation or through questions) (HALF PAGE SPACE) 59* If you are ever away i l l from work, are there others here who can do your work? 60. When you go on holiday, do others take over your work or i s i t s t i l l waiting for you when you return? 61. What i s the t i t l e of your immediate boss? To whom do he (she) report? (name job) Is your boss usually a person who has once done a job similar to yours? Your present boss ->- did he (she) once do a job l i k e yours? 244 62. In the course of your work: Which of the following persons do you usually talk to? (Ask after each): About how often during a normal day? (Encourage respon-dent to name jobs and types of contacts) Rarely/ frequently occasionally never 1. Persons in similar jobs 2. Your immediate boss 3. Other management personnel (for example:........) 4. Persons i n Non-similar jobs (such as........) 5. Customers, clients 6. Persons outside the company (such as...,....) 63. With which other workers do you usually spend your coffee breaks? (name jobs) ( i f persons are named, ask "What i s his job?") 64. And what about lunch hours. Do you usually eat with others?... What Jobs do jthey have? 65. Do you ever spend some of your time when you are not at work with others who work here? Yes No (If yes) What jobs do they have? 66. Are any of your closest personal friends working here? Yes No^ What jobs do they have? 67. Would you say that most of your personal friends do work similar to yours? What jobs do they have? NOW I WANT TO ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR PERSONAL HISTORY: 68. Sex of Respondent: Male Female Marital Status? Have you any dependents? (Note i f women have children who are not dependent) How many? 69. What i s your age: 25 or under 36-45 years_ 56 or over 26-35 years_ 46-55 years 245 70. EDUCATION: Check highest level: Grade 8 or less Some high school Completed high school. Some university University degree Other:(explain) 71. In addition to general schooling, did you ever taken any special vocational training? Yes No How long did this training take? Did this training help you to obtain your present job? Yes [ No_ Have you ever undertaken an apprenticeship program? Yes j r No_ (If now on program) Please state at what stage you are now? (If yes) How long did this program take? Did you complete the program? 72. How long have you been in the labour force altogether? (How many years have you worked?) 73. Have you been working continuously since you entered the labour force? Yes No (If no: probe for reasons of absence). 74. What qualifications did you have to have in order to get this job? 1. education: 2. s k i l l s : . 3. experience: 4. other: 75. When you applied for the job, did you feel that you had a l l of the necessary qualifications? Yes No 76. Did you bargain over your starting wage? Yes No i (If yes) How did you do this? (If no) Why not? , 77. Did you bargain over the nature of your tasks? Yes No_ (If yes) How did you do this? (If no) Why not? . 246 78. Are the other people here who do similar jobs about as qualified as you are? (If less or more:) In what ways? 79. Do you think there i s much likelihood that you would lose this job i f you made any mistakes? (Probe for what would cause dismis-sal) 80. I f you lost your present job, do you think you would have trouble obtaining another job? (Why?) (Loss of present job due to causes other than being fired) 81. Do you have any plans for changing your type of work in the for-seeable future? Yes No (If yes) Probe for plans 82. What are your chances for promotion i f you do your job well? Would you say they are: good? fair? Not very good?_ no chance? (If not good) Why? 83. To what position would you most l i k e l y be promoted? 84. Do you know anyone who has been promoted from a job similar to yours to a position like that in the past year? Yes No 85. Can you ask for a promotion i f you want one? Yes No DK (If yes) Eow would you go £b out asking for one? (Probe for how many persons would, be consulted) (If no) Why not? 86. a) How i s your work evaluated? (Who judges whether you do a good job? How do you know when you do a good Job?) b) What do you think i s important for getting ahead i n this firm? 87. Do you think that being a man (a woman) helps or hinders your chances of promotion in this firm? (Explain) 88. Do you think that your age would have any influence on whether or not you are promoted? t I f you were not promoted within the next two years, do you think you would look for another job? Yes No Maybe (If no or maybe) Within the next five years? Yes No Maybe 247 90. I f you were offered another job elsewhere, would you t e l l your present employers and try to bargain on the strength of that offer? Yes No Other _________ (If yes) What do you think your employers would do then? (If not) Why not? ______________________^^ 91. I f you l e f t this job, do you think your employers would have a hard time finding a replacement for you? Yes No 92. What do you think would be the highest job you could obtain in this Company, given your present education and skills? (Unless i t i s the highest job in the company, probe for why the limit) 93. If you have a complaint about working conditions here, to whom would you be most l i k e l y to take it? Then what happens? What i s the normal procedure for complaints? (Probe for whether there i s an established routine and the res- . pondent i s sure of i t ) 94. Have you ever taken a complaint through this process? Yes No (If yes) What happened? t 95. Nowadays we hear a great deal about "The establishment". To whom do you think this term applies? (Probe for whether the respondent thinks the term applies to himself, labor leads, professionals or management; whether he uses the term himself and whether he thinks i t i s derogatory. Give answer verbatim where possible.) 96. In general, do you consider yourself to be more like the managers* of this company or more like industrial workers? : Managers Workers Neither^ Both _____ DK (Explanation) 97. In general, do you lik e your job? Yes No Other . 98. I f you had the s k i l l s , i s there any other job you would rather have? (If yes) Which Job? 100. Do you belong to a union? Yes No _____ 248 QUESTIONS FOR UNION RESPONDENTS ONLY: 1. Which union is that? (Write down exactly What respondent says) 2. How long have you belonged to the union? (Years, months)_ 3. Have you ever belonged to any other unions? (If yes) Which ones? _____________ 4. Do you know how long the union has been ce r t i f i e d here? Yes, (gives date:) No 5. Does your union represent mainly people In jobs similar to yours? Yes No (If no) Which other workers does i t represent? 6. Do you prefer a union which represents mainly people i n jobs simi-lar to yours, or a union which includes other workers at different jobs? ( . 7. In general, do you think i t is better for workers like yourself to belong to unions or not? 8. Do you think the conditions under which you work would be d i f f e r -ent today i f there were no unions? (If yes) In what way? 9. Do you think the union has helped you to obtain better wages?_ 10. How often does your union local have meetings (per year)? 11. In the past year, how many union meetings have you attended?_ 12. Have you ever held an office in the union? 13. Would you stand for office i f you had the chance?_ 14. Do you think your union makes reasonable demands on your employers? (Explain) _________________ 15. Do you think your union could do more for you? (If yes) In which way? 16. Have you ever gone on strike with other union members?_ (If yes) How did you feel about this? 249 17. How many workers does your union represent? 18. Have you ever taken a grievance to your union representative? Yes No (If yes) Were you satisfied with the handling of the grievance? 19. Who is your local representative now? 20. Of your five closest friends, how many belong to unions? 21. What do you think is the main benefit of unions for workers like yourself? 22. Why did you join this union? 250 FOR NON-UNION WORKERS ONLY 1. Have you ever belonged to any unions? Yes No (If yes) Which unions? 2. In general, do you think i t is better for workers like yourself to belong to unions or not? Why? 3. What do you think would be the main benefits of unions for work-ers like yourself? 4. What would be the main disadvantages? 5. How do you think the management of this company would react i f the employees like yourself joined a union? 6. Do you think your wages would be better i f you had a union? Yes No Other: 7. If a union came here and tried to organize workers like yourself, would you join? Yes No Other: (If not) Is there any particular union you would consider join-ing? Why? (Why not?) 8. Has any union ever tried to organize workers like yourself at this plant (office, company, etc.)? (If yes) What happened? 9. In general, do you think unions have helped other workers or not? 10. In general, do you think that other workers who are organized i n unions have taken advantage of their positions and asked for too much, or do you think their demands have been reasonable? 251 Place-of Interview: Time of Interview: Duration: Sequence of Interview for Interviewer: Interviewer's Assessment of Employee Cooperation: Note: Sufficient space was provided on a l l interview schedules for replies. This has been omitted from the copy given above. 252 APPENDIX B (An interview schedule for management personnel was drawn up but was used as a guide rather than as a formal schedule. The best means of obtaining information in each company depended on the amount of time available for an interview, the amount of access to personnel f i l e s which was permitted, the size of the company and the positions of persons interviewed. Some questions were not asked, i f ready ac-cess to f i l e s was given. The schedule appears below.) MANAGEMENT SCHEDULE 1. Is the entire firm i n the same location? Yes No 2. If the entire firm i s i n the same location: how many full-time employees altogether are employed by this firm? 3. a) If the firm has separate branches: how many branches are there (not counting autonomous firms a f f i l i a t e d with this one)? b) Would you estimate how many persons altogether are employed by the firm? c) How many are employed at this location? 4. We would like to know how the firm i s structured, and how many employees there are i n the various managerial positions. (If this i s a branch, indicate how the branch is f i t t e d into the or-ganizational structure of the company). N.B.: Space provided for l i s t s of management positions and population; and a sketch of organizational structures. 5. Most firms classify their employees into different s k i l l or func-tion categories for administration purposes. Which c l a s s i f i c a -tions are i n use i n this firm? (Excluding Management) Name job classification Approximately how many workers in each category at present time (as of June 30, 1969)? 253 67 Does your company have any definite channels for grievance pro-cessing? (If yes) Could you please describe them? (If not) To whom would employees go i f they had any serious com-plaints about working conditions, and what procedure would f o l -low? 7. Does this company have any definite policy about consulting em-ployees regarding company objectives? (If yes) Could you please describe them? 8. Does this company have any policy regarding* employee participa-tion i n decision making? (If yes) How is this implemented, and in which decisions are em-ployees likely to participate? 9. Do any employees belong to a union? a) (If yes) Which employees belong to unions, and which unions do they belong to? When were the unions certified? Employees Union Date of Certification b) Have any employees ever called a strike here? (If yes) Which employees were involved? When did this occur? How many days were lost? c) Has the company ever locked out employees? (If yes) Which employees were involved? When did this occur? How many days were lost? 10. a) If there are employees who are not union members: has any union attempted to organize these employees? (If yes) When was this? Which union? In your opinion why did this move not succeed? 254 10. b) Do you think these employees are likely to join a union i n the future? Please explain why or why not? 11. Does ".be company have a policy regarding white collar unions? Have any steps been taken to prevent these workers from wanting to join unions? MOTE: Where more than one general category of jobs are included i n a single-firm study, the questions from #12 to #27 are repeated with references to each separate group under study. THE NEXT QUESTIONS REFER TO 12. How many altogether were employed here as of June 30, 1969? 13. How many of these were females? 14. Can you t e l l us how many of these are i n each of the following age brackets? (Estimate as well as possible i f exact figures are unavailable.) 1. Twenty-five years or under 2. Twenty-six years to thirty-five years 3. Thirty-six years to forty-five years 4. Forty-six to f i f t y - f i v e years 5. Fifty-six years and over (Is this an estimate? ) 15. We would like to know how many different jobs are included i n this general category, how many persons are employed at each of the different jobs, and what wage ranges are associated with each job level. If wages vary with commissions or other special arrangements, please note. Job t i t l e or description Number of Persons Wage Range Would you please insert an asterisk (*) to the l e f t of any job level i n which there are only male employees. 16. Do a l l persons doing the same work receive about the same salary? (If not) On what basis are different salaries given? 17. How many employees were there in this category in January, 1969? 18. How many new employees in this category have been hired for these jobs between January and June of this year? 255 19. How many employees i n this category have l e f t the company between January and June of this year? 20. In your opinion, i s there a high turnover among employees i n this type of work? (If yes) What do you think i s the reason for this? 21. Do you generally recruit persons for these jobs from other areas of work i n the company, from other companies, or from schools? (Name main source of recruits). 22. What ere the minimum qualifications for persons employed at the lowest level of this general work category? 23. What are the minimum qualifications for persons employed at the highest level of this category? 24. For a person with the minimum qualifications at the lowest level job, what is the highest job he can eventually obtain? 25. What is the company policy with respect to promotion of these employees? Is there a regular review of each person's work? Are there regular or automatic wage increases? Is promotion associated with seniority? Which c r i t e r i a do you use for promoting these workers? 26. Is i t possible for persons i n this group to move into management positions? (If yes) Which management positions? (If yes) Have any moved into management positions i n the past year? (Since July 1, 1968 - State how many) 27. What are the most common reasons given when employees i n this cate-gory quit their jobs? DATE: COMPANY NUMBER: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWS: POSITION(S) OF MANAGEMENT INTERVIEWEE(S): INTERVIEWERS: DURATION OF INTERVIEW WITH MANAGEMENT: INTERVIEWER COMMENTS: 256 APPENDIX C LIST OF WHITE-COLLAR OCCUPATIONS The following l i s t of occupations was compiled from census l i s t s of occupations characterized by mental work, exclusive of manageral occupations. In addition, selected service occupations are included which were considered to be 'borderline' between white- and blue-collar jobs. The l i s t s were amended, modified, and enlarged through l i s t s of job t i t l e s included on union contracts and i n government publications (listed i n bibliography). Clerical bookkeepers and payroll clerks cashiers office appliance operators stenographers, secretaries typists office clerks: general accounts clerks, b i l l i n g clerks pricers purchasing clerks coders keypunch operators t r a f f i c and rate clerks teletype operators switchboard operators t r a f f i c agents Professional and Technical ticket strippers, clerks reservations agents, clerks stock clerks shipping clerks receiving clerks inventory clerks baggagemen and expressmen, transport station agents, transport advertising clerks proof-readers invoice computing clerks cardex operators comptometer operators laboratory technicians research technicians (other than laboratory) estimators: technical claims adjustment estimators design estimators dispatchers architects draughtsmen and designers surveyors actuaries and statisticians computer programmers computer technicians, non-clerical librarians designers: home furnishing consultants (various fields) journalists, authors broadcasters, announcers other specialists: journalism/ broadcasting projectionists film editors, photographers photogramatris ts engineering technologists a r t i s t s , musicians (employed by commercial firms) 257 Admlnis trative purchasing agents buyers coordinators (office or other) office managers producers (media) supervisors (coordinators) Sales salesclerks commission sales: automobile, real estate, insurance commercial travellers, representatives, agents ticket sales vendors, countersales Service s tewards, s tewardesses attendants, recreation and amusement laundry and dry cleaning clerks cocktail and lounge attendants 258 APPENDIX D OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE i) Census Classifications: Proportions Canadian Government publications l i s t e d the following population sta-t i s t i c s for the 1961 census: Total White-Collar population 2,409,337 managerial occupations ., 538,131 professional, technical 627,624 cl e r i c a l 833,173 sales 410,409 On the basis of this information, i t was decided, to seek an oc-cupational distribution for the sample with roughly the following proportions: For every two c l e r i c a l workers, one salesworker and one plus one-half professional or technical worker. Since not a l l managerial occupations are li s t e d i n the census, an estimate of pro-per balance of administrative positions had to be made by deducting from the managerial classification the number of workers apparently engaged in work which we had li s t e d as administrative. The decision was to make this figure half that of the sales figure. Service work-ers are not included i n the ratios. The distribution of occupations obtained i n the original sample is shown below. 259 i i ) Occupational Distribution of Original Sample Occupational Classification Non % Union Number % Union Number % Total Number Clerical 51 (85) 46 (66) 49 (151) Professional/ Technical 28 (44) 29 (42) 28 (86) Adminis trative 06 (10) 04 (06) 05 (16) Sales 14 (22) 9 (12) 12 (35) Service 01 (02) 12 (17) 06 (19) Total: Ratio: 100 53 (164) 100 47 (143) 100 (307) A prolonged strike and lockout i n the r e t a i l stores prevented adequate interviewing of salesclerks i n the Vancouver area. Consequent-ly, the number of salesworkers i s smaller than that desired. The res-ponses of salesworkers were weighted in order to provide a more repre-sentative sample of white-collar workers. At the same time, the res-ponses of other groups were weighted slightly i n order to maintain the desired over-all ratios. The weighted distribution i s shown below. 260 i i i ) Occupational Distribution of Weighted Sample Occupational Classification Non % Union Number % Union Number % Total Number Clerical 51 (85) 46 (66) 39 (151) Professional/ Technical 29 (60) 30 (56) 30 (116) Administrative 07 (14) 06 (12) 07 (26) Sales 21 (45) 19 (34) 20 (79) Service 01 (02) 09 (17) 05 (19) Total: Ratios: 100 53 (206) 100 47 (185) 100 (391) 261 APPENDIX E PvEASONS FOR REFUSALS AND REJECTIONS OF POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS Non Union Union Total Reasons frequency frequency frequency Other surveys conducted recently "Too busy" and "holidays" Hostile reaction (distrust surveys or academics, etc.) "Would harm employee relations" "Touchy situation" involving pending strikes, or other employees on strike Negotiations in progress No reason given No reply, dead end after repeated contacts 19 4 23 Contact made but firm employed too few i n desired occupations 11 3 14 Partial completion (management interviewed but refusal for employee interviews; one case the reverse) 4 1 5 6 2 8 9 2 11 3 2 5 3 1 4 6 6 12 8 10 18 7 4 11 Totals 76 35 111 262 APPENDIX F TOTAL DISTRIBUTION FOR JOB CONTROL MEASURES Control Men Women Total Area Level Non-Union Union Non-•Union Union % (f) % (f) Si; (f) % (f) % (f) Content 1 17 (17) 25 (24) 39 (41) 59 (51) 34 (133) 2 25 (25) 20 (20) 28 (29) 21 (18) 24 (92) 3 43 (44) 43 (42) 29 (31) 18 (16) 34 (133) 4 15 (15) 12 (12) 04 (04) 02 (02) 08 (33) Sequence 1 16 (16) 24 (23) 33 (35) 56 (49) 31 (123) 2 30 (30) 22 (22) 32 (33) 31 (27) 29 (112) 3 40 (41) 48 (47) 32 (34) 13 (11) 34 (133) 4 14 (14) 06 (06) 03 (03) — —— 06 (23) Pace 1 26 (26) 28 (27) 42 (44) 64 (56) 39 (153) 2 16 (16) 14 (14) 24 (25) 19 (16) 18 (71) 3 43 (43) 52 (51) 32 (34) 17 (15) 37 (143) 4 16 (16) 06 (06) 02 (02) — —— 06 (24) Superv. 1 15 (15) 14 (14) 24 (25) 37 (32) 22 (86) 2 18 (18) 32 (31) 27 (28) 35 (31) 28 (108) 3 31 (31) 23 (23) 31 (33) 21 (18) 27 (105) 4 37 (37) 31 (30) 18 (19) 07 (06) 23 (92) Quantity 1 19 (19) 31 (31) 47 (49) 75 (65) 42 (164) 2 44 (45) 34 (33) 34 (36) 17 (15) 33 (129) 3 25 (25) 34 (33) 17 (18) 08 (07) 21 (83) 4 12 (12) 01 (01) 02 (02) — — 04 (15) Quality 1 17 (19) 31 (30) 43 (45) 71 (62) 39 (154) 2 33 (45) 28 (28) 39 (41) 20 (17) 30 (119) 3 44 (25) 38 (37) 17 (18) 09 (08) 28 (108) 4 06 (12) 03 (03) 01 (01) — — 03 (10) Time 1 26 (26) 54 (53) 47 (49) 86 (75) 52 (203) 2 33 (34) 30 (29) 41 (43) 12 (10) 30 (116) 3 31 (31) 16 (16) 11 (12) 02 (02) 15 (61) 4 10 (10) — -— 01 (01) — — 03 (11) Space 1 20 (20) 37 (36) 40 (42) 85 (74) 44 (172) 2 41 (42) 22 (22) 47 (49) 06 (05) 30 (118) 3 25 (25) 36 (35) 10 (11) 09 (08) 20 (79) 4 14 (14) 05 (05) 03 (03) — — 06 (22) Total: 100 (101) 100 (98) 100 (105) 100 (87) 100 (391) 263 APPENDIX G TOTAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME Income Men Women Total Per Month Non-Union Union Non-Union Union % (f) % (f) % (f) % (f) % (f) less than $250 — — 1 (01) — 4 (03) 01 (04) $250-300 24 (24) 1 (01) 07 (25) $301-350 3 (03) — — 10 (10) 34 (29) 11 (42) $351-400 6 (06) 13 (13) 30 (30) 34 (29) 21 (78) $401-450 12 (ID 12 (12) 12 (12) 6 (05) 10 (40) $451-500 6 (06) 7 (07) 11 (11) 7 (06) 08 (30) $501-550 18 (17) 24 (23) 5 (05) 9 (08) 14 (53) $551-600 15 (15) 2 (02) 2 (02) 2 (02) 05 (20) $601-650 5 (05) 14 (14) 2 (02) 2 (02) 06 (23) $651-700 4 (04) 8 (08) 2 (02) — 04 (14) $701-750 6 (06) 4 (04) — — 03 (10) $751-800 8 (07) — — — — 02 (07) $801-850 6 (06) 1 (01) — — 02 (07) $851-900 — — 8 (08) — — 02 (08) $901-950 — — 3 (03) — 1 (01) 01 (04) $951-1000 3 (03) 2 (02) 1 (01) — 01 (05) over $1000 8 (07) — — — 02 (08) Not Reported — (06) (06) (01) (13) Total 100 (101) 100 (98) 100 (105) 100 (87) 100 (391) 264 APPENDIX H TOTAL DISTRIBUTION: YEARS OF SCHOOLING Men Women Highest School Non-Union Union Non-Union Union Level • % (f) % (f) % (f) % (f) Total i Gr. 8 or less Some high school Completed high school Some uni-versity, or addit. training University degree or equivalent training Other formal schooling/ cannot code above 2 15 (02) 4 (04) (15) 12 (12) 16 (27) 34 (30) 41 (42) 49 (48) 61 (64) 41 (36) 02 (06) 21 (84) 49 (190) 22 (22) 25 (24) 19 (10) 20 (17) 19 (73) 15 (15) 09 (09) 04 (04) 05 (04) 08 (32) 05 (05) 01 (01) 01 (06) Total 100 (101) 100 (98) 100 (105) 100 (87) 100 (391) 265 APPENDIX I REPORT FOR PARTICIPANTS IN "WHITE-COLLAR LABOUR FORCE" SURVEY, SUMMER, 1969 1 The objective of this survey, conducted among employees in 43 commercial firms i n British Columbia, was to obtain a broad picture of work roles and work-related attitudes of persons i n c l e r i c a l , pro-fessional, technical, sales, and selected service occupations. Employment in these occupations has steadily increased. Since the mid-1950's, more members of the Canadian labour force have been employed i n these and in managerial occupations (which, together, are frequently called the 'white-collar' jobs) than in manual work. The greatest increases in population have occurred i n the c l e r i c a l and the professional-technical occupations. At the same time, the technology and work environment of white-collar work has been undergoing rapid change. The number of machine-paced and pre-programmed tasks in offices has increased. Tra-ditional hierarchies of authority and ladders or promotion have under-gone considerable changes as the new s k i l l s of "the computer age" a l -ter the content of work. The general level of education has increased: a high school diploma, literacy, and basic accounting s k i l l s are com-mon possessions and their market value has decreased. With these changes, the status that white-collar work has traditionally enjoyed relative to manual work has undergone some erosion. Although the changes of the past decade affect so many work-ers, the industrial community and students of industrial society have very l i t t l e 'hard data' on which to base personnel policies, manpower 266 development and theories of industrial man. A few large individual firms have conducted studies among their own employees, the results of which are a l l too seldom made available to outsiders. There i s very l i t t l e survey data anywhere on the labour force most affected by these changes, and there is no data available on that labour force here i n British Columbia. This survey i s a very small contribution to our knowledge. With limited resources, we strove to contact a small but representative sample of the white-collar labour force. The sample was s t r a t i f i e d by size of companies, product areas, and job classifications i n ratios found i n the labour force. It was equally divided between union and non-union respondents to allow for comparisons by union status. Sex and education were not controlled for in the sampling. The distribu-tion of the f i n a l sample i s such that 51 percent of the respondents are male. Twenty-three percent have less than a high-school education, 68 percent are high-school graduates or have a high-school diploma plus one year of university or equivalent education, and 9 percent have two or more years of university education. We were not entirely successful i n obtaining a f a i r sample. Strikes, lockouts, and union negotiations i n progress prevented us from contacting some workers. Suspicion of our aims prevented some management representatives from permitting us to interview employees. The summer holiday season and similar factors created other obstacles. We did not encounter a high incidence of refusal from employees when we did contact them, however, and I believe i t i s f a i r to say that the vast majority of the respondents enjoyed the interview. Several told 267 us that they thought i t "high-time" somebody took an interest i n the problems and tasks of people like themselves, and many said they found It refreshing to discuss their work with us. The f i n a l distribution of the respondents by job c l a s s i f i c a -tion and union status is shown in Table 1. I would like to thank these employees, their employers, and, in union firms, the union representatives, for their participation and co-operation. It i s our hope that this i n i t i a l survey w i l l be followed up by more intensive case studies, and I hope that the accumulated knowledge from these studies w i l l be of benefit to the industrial com-munity. I would also like to thank the Institute of Industrial Re-lations for i t s financial support of the project, the interviewers and assistants who performed some very d i f f i c u l t assignments during the "summer of strikes", and the secretarial staff of the Sociology Depart-ment at U.B.C. for stenographic services and summer cheer. The report which follows is a condensed and non-technical presentation of our findings. It includes, I hope, that information of most immediate interest to participants. Descriptions of the data rather than tables are given whenever the results can be simply stated. (Percentage distributions are provided i n tables, with frequencies given i n brackets.) 268 TABLE 1 Sample by Job Classification and Union Status Job Classification Non-Union Union Total % f % f % f CLERICAL 51 (85) 46 (66) 39 (151) Office c l e r i c a l 33 (67) 28 (52) 30 (119) Other c l e r i c a l 2 (4) 7 (13) 4 (17) Accountants 2 (4) 1 (1) 1 (5) Confidential staff 5 (10) 0 (0) 3 (10) PROFES SIONAL-TECHNICAL 29 (60) 30 (56) 30 (116) Professional (degree) 3 (6) 3 (6) 3 (12) Semi-professional 15 (32) 12 (22) 14 (54) Technical 3 (6) 7 (13) 5 (19) Draftsmen 8 (16) 8 (15) 8 (31) ADMINISTRATIVE 7 (14) 6 (12) 7 (26) Supervisory 3 (6) 0 (0) 2 (6) Administrative 4 (8) 6 (12) 5 (20) SALES 21 (45) 19 (34) 20 (79) Commission/custom sales 6 (12) 1 (1) 3 (13) Countersales 15 (33) 18 (33) 17 (66) SERVICE 1 (2) 9 (17) 5 (19) TOTALS RATIOS 100 (206) 100 (185) 100 (3$1) 53 47 269 Union Membership The white-collar sector of the labour force has never been strongly unionized. Some observers argue that the downgrading of cler-i c a l s k i l l s , the increasing size of the white-collar labour force, the inevitable anonymity and bureaucracy in large companies, and the increasing standard of livi n g among unionized industrial workers re-lative to non-union c l e r i c a l workers w i l l lead to increased union activity. Others argue that these employees s t i l l identify with man-agement, continue to be upwardly mobile, are sensitive about their higher status relative to industrial workers, and continue to have alternatives and bargaining power as individuals, and for these rea-sons w i l l not join unions. In this analysis, we compared union and non-union workers along three dimensions: income, job control, and frequency of inter-action with management personnel. Income For the total sample, the distribution of incomes was simi-lar for the union and non-union respondents (Table 2). It was also similar by job classification (Table not shown because the minute breakdown could reveal the identify of some of the respondents). The only outstanding differences by job classification are for service personnel and commission sales personnel. Service members of unions are more highly paid; commission sales personnel who are not members are more highly paid. However for each of these groups, the total frequencies i n the low-paid categories are too small to allow us to generalize from the data. 270 Information on income was obtained from management person-nel for a l l but 13 respondents. Respondents are grouped by an income range. Individual comparisons, using smaller income ranges, might reveal more differences, but our interest in this study is i n general trends associated with relative income positions. TABLE 2 Distribution of Incomes for Union and Non-Union Respondents Reported Income Per Month (Info. obtained from Management Interview) Union % (Fi Members requencies) % Non-Union (Frequencies) Total Frequencies $350 or less 18 (34) 19 (37) (71) $351-$450 32 (59) 30 (59) (118) $451-$550 24 (44) 20 (39) (83) $551-$650 11 (20) 12 (23) (43) $651 or more 15 (27) 19 (36) (63) Incomes Not Given (13) 100 (184) 100 (194) (391) Although the total distribution of incomes i s similar, en-thusiasm for union membership among non-union respondents varied d i -rectly and clearly with income. Thirty-two percent of these respondents said they would join a union or would seriously consider joining a union i f union or-ganizers approached them and their fellow workers. Of these, 43 per-cent earned less than $350 per month; 14 percent earned more than $650 per month. 271 A second question to non-union respondents e l i c i t e d a simi-lar pattern of responses. Asked whether they thought that, i n general, i t would be better for workers like themselves to belong to unions or not, 45 percent of those earning $350 or less thought i t would be bet-ter; 11 percent of those earning $650 or more thought likewise. Answers to a series of attitude questions regarding unions followed the same pattern. No other factors were as strongly corre-lated with opinions regarding unions for the non-union respondents as was income. Income differences were not strongly correlated with d i f f e r -ences in opinions about unions among union members. Seventy-four per-cent of the total union sample said they thought i t was better for workers like themselves to belong to unions, and another 7 percent were generally i n favor of union membership but had some reservations. Eighty percent were of the opinion that the union had helped them to obtain better wages. A series of attitude questions indicated that between 70 and 80 percent of union members held favorable opinions of their unions. Income differences, however, were associated with p a r t i c i -pation in union affairs for union members. The most active p a r t i c i -pants were those with the higher incomes. They attended more meetings, held office more frequently, were more willing to hold office i n the future, and were better informed about union affairs than low-income members. 2 7 2 Job Control Job t i t l e s or classifications are of limited u t i l i t y i n com-paring the real work roles of personnel in different groups.' A secre-tary i n one company runs a large office and carries on a large amount of s e l f - i n i t i a t e d correspondence. A secretary in another company spends most of her time f i l i n g or dictaphone-typing. The t i t l e s are the same, but the jobs are very different. We gathered a great deal of detailed descriptive information about the daily routines of each respondent: exactly what jobs they performed, how they coordinated their work with that of others, how much supervision they had, how they paced their work, and the kinds of decisions they were expected to make. Where possible we supplemen-ted this information — obtained from the respondents — with job evaluation data obtained from management, from personnel f i l e s , and from union contracts. In addition, the interviewers watched persons at work ttfierever they could do so unobtrusively, and took notes on the routine they observed. On the basis of this information, we constructed eight i n -dependent measures of job control. These included: content control (choice of tasks available); pacing control; supervision; quantity of output control; quality of work evaluation; task order control; tem-poral freedom (control over duration or start-stop times); and spatial freedom (opportunities to move out of confined area during work period). Union membership was more frequent for workers with low amount of control along these dimensions. Four examples are given i n Table 3. 273 TABLE 3 Distribution of Job Control for Union and Non-Union Respondents Control Levels Union Non-Union Total % % f CONTENT CONTROL No control 41 (75) 28 (58) (133) Low control 21 (38) 26 (54) (92) Fair amount of control 31 (58) 37 (75) (133) High amount of control 7 (14) 9 (19) (33) C^ING CONTROL No control 45 (83) 34 (70) (153) Low control 16 (30) 20 (91) (71) Fair amount of control 36 (66) 37 (77) (143) Self-paced 3 (6) 9 (18) (24) SUPERVISION Steady supervision 25 (46) 20 (40) (86) Regular supervision 34 (62) 22 (46) (108) Occasional supervision 22 (41) 31 (64) (105) No supervision 19 (36) 27 (56) (92) QUANTITY OF OUTPUT CONTROL No control 52 (96) 33 (68) (164) Low control 26 (48) 39 (81) (129) Fair amount of control 22 (40) 21 (43) (83) High control over output — (1) 7 (14) (15) TOTALS 100 (185) 100 (206) 391 Among non-union respondents, willingness to join unions and favorable opinions about unions varied with job control: those with lower control favored unions more frequently than those with more con-t r o l . These differences were not as great as those found for income, but they were consistent and s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant. 274 Among union respondents, control levels did not affect op-inions significantly. Slightly higher percentages of the high control workers favored the union. Those respondents with higher control le-vels were more frequently better informed about and were more active participants in union a c t i v i t i e s . The Relationship Between Income and Job Control Income was associated with control i n about 80 percent of the cases for the total sample. That Is, low control and low income were found together, and high control and high income were found to-gether. However, there were significant differences between the union and the non-union samples in the frequency with which high i n -come and high job control occurred simultaneously. Union respondents enjoyed more equity i n this respect. Where they had low control, they more often had low income; and vice versa. Among non-union respondents, a consistently higher propor-tion of those with high job control had low incomes. At the same time a somewhat smaller proportion had low job control and high incomes. With respect to the dimension of "content control", for example, the following pattern was found (In percentage of total sample having these combinations): Union membership for respondents with both low income and low job control: 55% Union membership for respondents with both high income and high con-t r o l : 52% Union membership for respondents with low income but high control: 26% Union membership for respondents with high incomes but low control: 42% 275 It would appear, then, that while the income of respondents did not vary for union members by job classification, i t did vary by job control levels. A higher percentage of members than non-members with high control levels had high incomes. A higher percentage of members than non-members with low control levels had low Incomes. Non-members who said they would be interested i n joining a union were most frequently those with both low income and low control, but this group was closely followed by those respondents with low i n -come and high control. Neither of the remaining groups — high i n -come with low control, or high income with high control — sponsored a high proportion of potential members. Opinions of unions along the various attitude dimensions provided a supporting pattern; non-members with pro-union sentiments were more frequently those with low incomes and low control, or low income and high control (in that order of frequency). Among union respondents, the pattern of union support was almost the reverse of that found among non-union respondents, although here the differences in opinion were not as pronounced. The least en-thusiastic union members were those with low incomes and low control. The participation pattern that emerged for union mem-bers was most revealing: the strongest participants were those with high incomes and low control, followed by those with high incomes and high control. Those with neither high control nor high income were least involved i n union a c t i v i t i e s . 276 Interaction Patterns Respondents were asked to describe the frequency of contact between themselves and coworkers, between themselves and their immed-iate supervisors or management personnel, and between themselves and clients or customers. In addition, interviewers sketched the space arrangements for each respondent's work station. Interaction patterns based on these descriptions were found to vary with union a f f i l i a t i o n . Non-union respondents were more fre-quently i n daily contact during working hours with their immediate bosses and with other management personnel than were union respondents. Non-union respondents more frequently worked i n close contact with others i n more authoritative positions, and they also worked i n close contact with others doing similar jobs. Union respondents more fre-quently worked alone or "parallel" to other workers but not interde-pendently with them. Non-union respondents also -had more frequent Informal con-tact with management personnel^ at lunch, or coffee, or during non-work hours. Within the non-union sample, those who indicated a w i l l -ingness to join unions were frequently the respondents whose contact with management personnel was restricted. Career Plans T Promotion Expectations,  and Identification with Management In this section of our study, we sought information on the mobility patterns pertaining to the white-collar labour force. We asked questions regarding career plans, the likelihood of promotion, 277 and the opportunities respondents had for entering management positions. We also asked questions that indirectly tapped the extent to which these workers identified with management. Again we explored the re-lationships between the responses and income, job control, and union a f f i l i a t i o n . Table 4 shows the association between incomes and career ex-pectations. It i s clear that a very strong relationship exists. The high income respondents most frequently expected to stay i n the same job or i n the same company. The low income respondents planned more frequently to look elsewhere for work or to leave the labour force. TABLE 4 Career Plans of Respondents* by Income Reported Income per month Plans to stay in same job % Expects new job, same company % Plans to seek work elsewhere % Plans to leave the labour force % $350 or less 52 3 30 15 $351-$450 59 11 18 12 $451-$550 65 7 18 10 $551-$650 62 2 26 10 $651 or more 70 10 13 7 * Responses to Question: "Do you have any plans for changing your type of work i n the foreseeable future?" When asked what they thought were their chances of promotion i n their company, 42 percent of the total sample said these were "good" 278 or " f a i r " , Forty-three percent thought i t li k e l y that at some time they would be offered a management position higher than at the super-visory level. These percentages suggest a somewhat lower expectation of upward mobility than i s generally attributed to white-collar work-ers. More optimism about promotion was expressed by union res-pondents who, at the time of interview, had high levels of job con-tr o l than by the non-union respondents i n the same position. Percen-tages were equal for the low-control respondents. For a range of separate job control measures, we found that between 52 and 57 percent of the non-union respndents with high control expected promotions into management, but between 61 and 69 percent of the union respondents in similar positions had such expectations. This finding i s supported by other results, one of which i s that 39 percent of a l l non-union respondents, and 49 percent of the high control non-union respondents said they could go no further than their present jobs, given their present level of education and s k i l l s . But similar thoughts'were expressed by only 27 percent of a l l union workers, and by 32 percent of those with high levels of control at present tasks. In other words, the union respondents said they had more up-ward mobility and better opportunities to enter management ranks than the non-union respondents. (Note that the inconsistency In response for the non-union sample is due to the difference i n these questions. The f i r s t was with regard to chances of entering management at some future date, 279 and the second was with regard to promotion given present education and s k i l l s . The non-union sample was slightly more concerned with upgrading present s k i l l or education levels.) Fifty-nine percent of the non-union, and 41 percent of the union respondents said that the criterion for promotion in their firm was s t r i c t l y competence. Another 10 percent of the non-union and 19 percent of the union respondents said i t was education or training. None of the non-union respondents cited seniority as the main avenue for promotion, but 4 percent did feel that seniority was an impor-tant factor along with competence. Five percent of the union respon-dents cited seniority as the main criterion, and another 5 percent said that seniority and merit were equally important. Three percent of the non-union respondents said that connec-tions or "apple-polishing" were important factors for promotion. Six percent of the union respondents expressed this opinion. These replies did not vary by income. They did vary with job control: the higher the control level, the more frequently com-petence was cited as the criterion. Forty-five percent of those with low control over the pacing of their tasks and 57 percent of those who paced themselves said that competence was most important. Simi-lar percentages were found for the other control measures. Promotion may be less important to these employees than is generally believed. We asked respondents whether, i f they were not promoted within two years, they would seek work elsewhere. Thirty-five percent said 'yes'. We then asked whether, i f they were not pro-moted within five years, they would seek work elsewhere. An additional 280 9 percent said 'yes'. Thirty-five percent said 'no' to both questions. (The remainder were unsure or said i t depended on factors other than promotion.) One respondent said "Why do you keep asking these questions about promotion? I don't want a promotion. I like what I'm doing now, and i f I didn't lik e i t , I'd quit — regardless of the pay or how they treated me." In one way or another, many respondents echoed this sentiment. They were concerned with meaningful work, and enjoy-ment of their tasks more than with "getting ahead". The experience of one secretary deserves attention. She said that for the f i r s t year of her employment as stenographer to sev-eral engineers, she had typed everything without any comprehension of the material. She was on the verge of quitting, because there was no pleasure i n working blindly like this, and none of the engineers showed any inclination to explain the work to her. On her holidays, she paid her own way to the sites where her company had projects underway, and she poked about, watching and listening to the scene. She managed to discover the meaning of several terms, and to obtain a mental image of some of the machinery. When she returned to her job, she found that the experience had vastly increased her enjoyment of her work. "Why", she asked, "couldn't they have told me, or given me a short tour of the sites? My own experience made me a much better employee." Identification Closely related to the importance of mobility to white-collar workers is the question of how closely these workers identify with man-agement . 281 We asked respondents whether, i n general, they thought they were "more l i k e " the management of their company, or more like indus-t r i a l workers. Forty-five percent chose management; 38 percent chose industrial workers; 17 percent chose neither. These responses did not vary systematically with union sta-tus, promotion expectations, or with income. They did vary with job control. For each of our measures, those respondents with higher l e -vels of control identified with management more frequently. For ex-ample, of those respondents who were constantly supervised, 37 percent said they were more like management and 48 percent said they were more like industrial workers. Of those respondents who supervised themselves or had very l i t t l e supervision imposed on them, 53 percent said they were more like management and 28 percent chose industrial workers. Although the correspondence between job control and i d e n t i f i -cation i s illuminating, these percentages do indicate that up to half of the total sample identifies either with industrial workers or with neither of these groups. We also asked respondents several indirect questions related both to general identity and to general awareness of their positions in the labour force. One series of these were designed to find out whether the respondents used the phrase, "the establishment", current in the mass media and frequently used as a derogatory term for busi-ness, academic, and p o l i t i c a l leaders. Thirty-four percent of the respondents indicated that they had never heard the term before, or took i t to mean the physical plant i n which they worked. Of those who had heard the term and recognized a symbolic meaning for i t , a 282 considerably higher proportion were those with high levels of job con-t r o l . Similarly, more of the high control respondents used the term themselves in reference to e l i t e s . Forty-five percent of the respon-dents with low levels of control over task content, for example, said they knew what the term meant and could supply a symbolic meaning for i t ; 58 percent of the respondents with high levels of control over task content could do likewise. Ten percent of those with low levels of content control said they used the term; 20 percent of those with high levels of content control said they used i t . Considering that the term was used throughout the summer of interviews, as a rallying cry for the "underprivileged" against the "big bosses", these distributions are of interest. If lack of job control i s a form of underprivileged status, then the rallying cry would seem to have missed i t s target. Job Security By their own estimates, 77 percent of these respondents would have "no trouble" getting another job i f they lost their present posi-tion. Eighty-three percent said they thought i t unlikely that they would lose their present jobs for any reasons other than gross miscon-duct or complete incompetence. There was no systematic variance i n these responses by income, job control, or union a f f i l i a t i o n . The majority of these respondents not only f e l t secure i n their jobs, they also f e l t that the arrangement i s reciprocal. Seventy-three percent said they thought their employers would not have a hard time finding a replacement for them i f they quit. 283 Criticisms, Problems, and Satisfactions We asked one direct question regarding job satisfaction: "In general, do you like your job?" An overwhelming 86 percent said "yes" without hestiation. Direct questions are seldom good indicators of attitudes, and this one is not lik e l y to be an exception, but the percentage i s so high that we are probably safe i n assuming that job satisfaction i s , i n fact, quite widespread among white-collar workers. Communication Problems A substantial proportion of the sample said, however, i n reply to several questions and also during less formal discussions, that they would like to be given more information about company p o l i -cies and organization, and about their own jobs, and routines associated with those jobs. Forty-three percent of the total sample expressed a complaint about communication or information. Twenty-six percent com-plained that they were not adequately informed by their supervisors or bosses about their tasks. Sixteen percent expressed complaints about the lack of information on company structure or policy. These responses varied with job control: those with higher levels of control more frequently sought information on structure and policy; those with lower levels of control were more frequently con-cerned with job-specific information. A higher percentage of the low-control respondents sought no information. There was also a slight variation by union a f f i l i a t i o n : union respondents more frequently complained about poor communication of policy matters. 284 Changes Desired Respondents were asked whether they f e l t they knew what the objectives of their company wore, whether they could bri e f l y describe these objectives, and whether they were, generally, i n agreement with them. Although 78 percent said they knew what the objectives were, and 67 percent said they were generally i n agreement with them, only  14 percent of the total sample were able to state at least one def-ini t e policy of the company. The remainder could say only that the objective was "to make money" or some other similar generalization. Respondents were asked whether they would enact changes i f they were in charge of their office (or department, etc.). F i f t y - s i x percent said 'yes* and could describe the changes they desired. Again, the higher level control respondents were most concerned with changing aspects of the organizational structure or decision-making process. Respondents with less job control were more concerned with changing their own work-load or routines and were generally more content to maintain the present system and authority structure intact. Respondents with high control among the union population dis-played considerably more interest i n , and criticism of, the present or-ganizational structure and policies of their companies than the non-union respondents i n the same positions. On the other hand, respondents with less control i n the union population were the least interested i n this aspect of their jobs, and provided the highest per-centage of the 'no opinion' responses for attitude questions. In response to another question, 62 percent of the total sample said that they would, i f they were i n charge of their department, 285 ask for employee opinions more frequently than was presently done. Again, this varied with job control and present levels of responsi-b i l i t y , but not with union status. Personnel Policies One of the most persistent criticisms voiced by respondents was of company personnel policies. F i f t y - s i x percent of the total sample said they did not agree with the way in which the company han-dled i t s personnel. Their specific criticisms were,in this order of frequency: relationships between management and employees — part i -cularly distance and status maintenance; hiring and f i r i n g practices in which the employee was, i n the opinion of respondents, treated as a pawn; discrimination against females for income and promotion purposes; and, at the bottom of the l i s t , wages. One criticism which was not anticipated was of the incompe-tence of coworkers. We did not ask a direct question on this, and cannot say how widespread such criticism i s , but the interviewers did note such criticisms in a f a i r amount of interviews. Non-union respondents occasionally said that one potential benefit of unions would be that management personnel would exert more care i n selecting employees. But union respondents said that one of the disadvantages of unions was that the "freeloaders" were kept on whereas "without the union, no management would be willing to put up with them", as one respondent expressed i t . Occasional criticisms were expressed by workers in particular companies regarding a policy peculiar to that company. In a few com-panies, such criticisms were levelled at the "no v i s i t i n g " rule for 286 coffee breaks. Employees said they were required to have their coffee alone at their work stations. This requirement clearly caused more dissatisfaction among these employees than any of the income issues. Criticisms were also expressed of personnel managers or supervisors who were, as one employee put i t , "more concerned with the damned budget than with people". These criticisms were not connected to income complaints. The apparent lack of concern with people was typified, according to the descriptions given the interviewers, by un-willingness to l i s t e n to employee complaints, and failure to transfer people out of departments where they were unhappy. Because these criticisms were specific to particular com-panies, and we do wish to maintain the anonymity of the companies and the employees, breakdowns on such companies cannot be provided. How-ever, i t can be noted that unions came i n for considerable criticism from employees in several companies because, as one employee phrased i t , "Ever since the union took over, the management feels, what the heck, let them carry the problems. But a l l the union seems to care about is money." Another opinion in a similar vein was given by one percep-tive respondent, who said, "Management and the union argue over each dollar. If either of them would offer us a lower salary and a longer summer holiday instead, we'd a l l be a lot happier." Sex Discrimination With regard to complaints about discrimination against fe-male workers, there can be l i t t l e doubt that these reflected some ser-ious injustices. On the basis of information given us by management 287 (which was, generally, more favorable to the company than that given by employees), we found that female workers i n most companies were employed at the more mechanical and less interesting jobs — regard-less of education or training comparisons with males. We found, too, that their chances of promotion were much more limited than those of male co-workers. With regard to their salary ranges, the following data is self-explanatory: of a l l male respondents, 2% earned $350 a month or less; 23% earned $450 a month or less. Of a l l female res-pondents 34% earned $350 a month or less and 75% earned $450 or less. At the other end of the scale, 45% of a l l male respondents earned $550 a month or more and 30% earned $650 a month or more. The education profile for the two sexes showed no s i g n i f i -cant differences. These distributions did not vary with union mem-bership. In fact, the discriminatory wage ranges were b u i l t into several of the union contracts covering these employees. Income Satisfaction Sixty-six percent of the total sample said they f e l t that 1 P their income was " f a i r " and another 5 percent said i t was "higher than i t should be". Twenty-eight percent said i t was "lower than i t should be". Not surprisingly, this varied with present income. Forty-one percent of those earning $350 or less per month f e l t their income was lower than i t should be; 19 percent of those earning $650 or more thought their income was lower than i t should be. When asked to compare their incomes to those of persons doing similar jobs at other companies, 39 percent said the pay was about the same elsewhere; 27 percent thought i t was less elsewhere; 17 percent 288 thought i t was higher elsewhere. The remainder had no opinion or said i t compared favorably with some,unfavorably with others. These replies did not vary systematically with real income levels or with job classification. There were no systematic variations to these questions by union status, and union respondents did not feel they had any more control over their income than did non-union respondents. Sixty-eight percent of the sample said they did not feel that they had any control over their income. Bargaining over Income Fifty - s i x percent of the total sample said i t was possible to "go to management and bargain for a raise in salary". This res-ponse varied with union status and with income levels. Seventy-five percent of the non-union, and 35 percent of the union personnel said they could bargain individually. Eighteen percent of the union mem-bers earning $350 or less, contrasted with 68 percent of the non-union members i n the same income bracket could bargain, according to their own estimates. Fifty-two percent of the union members earning $651 or more as contrasted with 86 percent of the non-union members earning $651 or more said they could bargain. We also asked respondents whether they had actually bargained at some time over their salary. Again the affirmative response varied directly with both union a f f i l i a t i o n and income,. Twenty percent of the union respondents, and 44 percent of the non-union respondents re-ported at least one instance of bargaining. Six percent of the low income union respondents as contrasted with 43 percent of the low income 289 non-union respondents had done so. Thirty-seven percent of the high income union respondents as compared to 69 percent of the high income non-union respondents had done so. Finally, we asked respondents who had not bargained but who said they thought they could do so, why they had not engaged i n this behavior. Twenty-seven percent of the union members gave "satisfac-tion with ineome offered" as their reason but 56 percent of the non-union members expressed similar satisfaction. Again this varied with income levels, greater satisfaction being expressed by those with higher incomes. The remainder i n each case gave an answer indicating that they had never thought of doing such a thing, or they f e l t that income determination was a management prerogative over which they had no control. Organizational Environment We examined the opinion data for comparisons by size of firm, complexity of the authority structure, number of management personnel in positions of authority above respondents, product area, stated per-sonnel policies, and promotion channels as described by management personnel. We found no systematic variations for any of these factors. It seems highly doubtful that such factors have no systematic effect on employee opinions, and we are inclined to attribute the results to the brevity and inadequacy of the management interviews. Observation and detailed notes of actual events i n a company over a period of time would provide much better understanding of the various policies as they really work. One or two studies of this sort have been done most sue-290 cessfully elsewhere, and i t is hoped that case studies at future times may provide more insight into the effects of these factors i n British Columbia firms. Meanwhile I can only offer my regrets that I am un-able to provide more information to the participants i n this respect. SUMMARY The information provided by this survey indicates that: 1. White-collar workers do not identify with management as strongly as some observers have suggested. 2. White-collar workers are not as much concerned with promotion and upward mobility as is generally expected. 3. Without regard to size of company or stated personnel policies, there i s considerable criticism of the information and communica-tion policies of employers. 4. Those workers who are most c r i t i c a l of company policies and of inadequate communication systems are those with most job control. (Job control refers to the amount of choice or personal respon-s i b i l i t y that a worker has over his daily tasks, his daily output and i t s quality, and the way he does the job). 5 . White-collar workers enjoy high job security and have employment alternatives. 6. They are, nonetheless, committed to their jobs. The majority of respondents plan to stay i n their present companies. Of those who plan to seek work elsewhere or leave the labour force, the majority receive low incomes. 291 7. These employees have numerous complaints about company personnel policies, particularly of the hiring and f i r i n g practices of management. 8. The income distribution for female workers is very much lower than for male workers, and this holds true when education and union a f f i l i a t i o n s are held constant. 9 . The majority of respondents i n both union and non-union firms are satisfied with their incomes. Non-union respondents do enjoy greater freedom i n bargaining individually over incomes than union respondents, but neither union nor non-union respondents think they have much control over income. 10. There i s no s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant difference between the i n -come distributions for union and non-union respondents. There is also no difference i n income distribution by job classification (such as "secretary" or "draughtsman"). 11. However, more union members than non-union respondents have low amounts of job control; that i s , they have a smaller range of choice about their tasks, they are more constantly supervised, they more often work at a pace set by machines or by other per-sons , and they have less freedom to move about or alter their time schedules. 12. Within the non-union sample, workers with low income and low job control are the most likely candidates for union membership. 13. Union members are more likely than non-union members to have low incomes when they have low job control. They are more li k e l y to have high incomes when they have high job control. They are less 292 likely to have low job control and high incomes, or high job con-tr o l and low incomes. In other words, the association between job control and income i s somewhat more consistent for union than for non-union workers. 14. There appear to be some consistent and marked differences in the amount of interaction both at work and during breaks or free time between union and non-union workers and their managers or persons i n positions of higher authority. Non-union workers more frequently work in close contact with managerial personnel, and they also more frequently spend time with managerial personnel dur-ing work breaks or after work. These descriptions of differences between the union and non-union samples do not imply a cause-effect sequence. We have no way of knowing whether union a f f i l i a t i o n i s the result of income and job control distributions and of restricted interaction with manage-ment, or is the cause of these factors. 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0093333/manifest

Comment

Related Items