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Britain and Brazil, 1900-1920 Munn, Barry Walter 1971

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BRITAIN AND BRAZIL,  1900-1920  by BARRY WALTER MUNN B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f Cambridge, 1 9 6 3 C e r t . E d . , U n i v e r s i t y o f Cambridge, 1 9 & + M.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f Cambridge, 1 9 6 7  A THESIS SUBMITTED I N PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n t h e Department of Hispanic  and I t a l i a n S t u d i e s  We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e required  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April,1971  In p r e s e n t i n g  t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l  f u l f i l m e n t o f the  requirements f o r  an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y  a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and  I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  be g r a n t e d by  thesis for financial  written  permission.  Department o f  His-panic and  gain  ftprii'21.  3,971  not  I t a l i a n Studies  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada  Date  shall  thesis  Department o r  It i s understood that copying or  of this  study.  copying of t h i s  the Head o f my  that  publication  be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t  my  BRITAIN AND  BRAZIL, 1900-1920  ABSTRACT  The a v a i l a b i l i t y o f new document s o u r c e s i n B r i t a i n and  Brazil  has made i t p o s s i b l e t o examine t h i s c r u c i a l p e r i o d i n t h e development o f r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s .  A f t e r exerting considerable  economic and p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e i n B r a z i l d u r i n g t h e n i n e t e e n t h  century,  B r i t i s h supremacy began t o be c h a l l e n g e d by German and A m e r i c a n i n t e r e s t s . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e B r a z i l i a n economy was u n d e r g o i n g f u n d a m e n t a l changes b r o u g h t a b o u t by t h e c o l l a p s e o f r u b b e r and c o f f e e and t h e development of d i v e r s i f i e d i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y .  The main e f f e c t o f t h i s p r o c e s s  t o r e d u c e B r a z i l i a n dependence on B r i t i s h c a p i t a l and f o s t e r h e r own  i m p o r t s , and  growth as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l u n i t o f some  was  to  importance.  B r i t i s h opinions regarding the s t a t e o f B r a z i l d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d were g e n e r a l l y p e s s i m i s t i c , and r a n c o u n t e r t o t h e a c c e p t e d v i e w t h a t she was p a s s i n g t h r o u g h a phase o f p r o g r e s s and p r o s p e r i t y .  British diplo-  m a t i c s o u r c e s , n o t a l w a y s w e l l - i n f o r m e d , saw l i t t l e hope f o r the and t h e s e thoughts were echoed by s e v e r a l l e a d i n g B r a z i l i a n The  intellectuals.  B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n R i o de J a n e i r o , S i r W i l l i a m Haggard, was  u n c o n v i n c e d a b o u t B r a z i l ' s f u t u r e p r o s p e c t s , and was developing f r u i t f u l r e l a t i o n s w i t h h i s counterparts.  country,  totally  unsuccessful i n The p o l i c i e s o f t h e  Bara"o do R i o Branco b r o u g h t B r a z i l c l o s e r t o expanding A m e r i c a n i n t e r e s t s . The  F i r s t World War  was  important i n t h a t i t witnessed the e c l i p s e  o f Germany f r o m the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene and produced a marked improvement i  ii in Anglo-Brazilian relations. The British Minister, Sir Arthur Peel, was more successful than his predecessor in his o f f i c i a l dealings, and the common interests of the War established closer ties between the two countries.  By the end of the War, however, Brazil had emerged as a prominent  factor in the affairs of the hemisphere, and her own national and international development signalled the end of Anglo-Brazilian relations as they had existed before the turn of the century.  TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter  Page  I. BRITAIN AND BRAZIL IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY  1  II. CHALLENGERS TO BRITISH SUPREMACY, 1900-1920  .27  H I . BRITONS IN BRAZIL: SOME REPRESENTATIVES AND ATTITUDES IV. PEACE, PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY: A BRITISH VIEW V. BRAZILIANS LOOK AT THEMSELVES  84 . 113 . . 161  VI. BRAZIL, BRITAIN, AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR  182  CONCLUSION  253  BIBLIOGRAPHY  258  iii  LIST GF FIGURES  Figure  Page  1. Imports to B r a z i l , 1900-1912, try country o f o r i g i n  2. Exports from B r a z i l , 1902-1912,  country o f destination . . . .30-31  3. Imports to B r a z i l , 1902-7-8, by percentage  iv  30-31  30-31  AC MOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my sincere thanks to the staffs of the Arquivo Historico do Itamaraty, Rio de Janeiro, and the Public Record Office, London, for their invaluable assistance in assembling document material used in the preparation of this thesis.  I would like also to  acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor H. V. Livermore for the direction he has given me during the entire length of my graduate programme.  v  CHAPTER I BRITAIN AND BRAZIL IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY The roots of Britain's commercial and p o l i t i c a l interests in Brazil during the course of the nineteenth century can be traced to the ancient alliance between Britain and Portugal, i t s e l f based on p o l i t i c a l and commercial motives. There i s no doubt that this alliance played a v i t a l part in the formation of modern Portugal and the fact that i t is s t i l l active today in various forms demonstrates that i t has been a powerful force in the affairs of that country.  Although originally a  product of medieval statecraft, the alliance took on a more modern and practical aspect at the beginning of the eighteenth century, when the Methuen Treaty established the main lines of future Anglo-Portuguese commercial contacts. The Methuen Treaty was an expression of the extent to which British interests were involved in Portugal, and i t was prompted by the desire of the British to assure commercial ties with Portugal at the expense of France.  This simple document paved the way for the permanent  entry into Portugal of British woollen goods in exchange for concessions on Portuguese wines imported into England."'" It stimulated British investments in Portugal and trade between the two countries, an activity already firmly established in the hands of the British, and although i t cannot be held responsible for a l l the i l l s of the Portuguese economy during the eighteenth century, the treaty reflected the basic policy of an organized, developing, industrial economy towards one which was less 1  2 organized, underdeveloped, and predominantly agricultural.  2  The simila-  r i t i e s between Britain's commercial relations with Portugal during the eighteenth century and with Brazil during the nineteenth are too striking to be ignored. Pombal»s remarks about commercial subordination in his Causas da ruina do come'rcio portugu§s could equally well be applied to Brazil during the following century: "Se pude"ssemos extrair por no's mesmos as manufacturas de Inglaterra, e exportar com liberdade os frutos do nosso continente, claro  esti.  que nffp padecerlamps t£o injustos en-  ganos."^ Pombal, according to A. K. Manchester, was merely expressing a desire for economic independence from foreign influence: "Pombal was not the enemy of England; he was attempting to retrieve his country from a condition of virtual vassalage to a foreign state." The European situation at the beginning of the nineteenth century did not, however, permit the development of Portuguese ideas of economic and p o l i t i c a l independence.  The war with France was to provide  England with a unique opportunity of establishing her own influence in South America, achieved as mueh by carefully planned diplomacy as by the mere fortuitous passage of events.  Portugal was placed in an untenable  position by the advance of France, was forced to evacuate the court to Rio de Janeiro with the assistance of the British fleet, and began making various trading concessions of which the British were a l l too ready to take advantage.  This period of transfer of British interest from Portu-  gal to Brazil has been examined closely elsewhere.-*  Attractive con-  cessions were obtained by Stlrangford in 1810, two years after the f l i g h t from Portugal, and the success of the British can be attributed i n large  3 measure to the fact that the Portuguese negotiated on the basis of previous agreements between Portugal and Britain rather than with the new realities of the Brazilian situation in mind. The British, whose involvement in Latin America was considerable at the time of the independence of the old Spanish colonies, obtained during the f i r s t two decades of the century trading concessions which were to assure their preeminence in Brazil for many years.^  Various negotiations between the governments led  to the agreements of 182?, establishing Britain as Brazil's main trading partner for the remainder of the century.  Britain *s involvement In the  process of independence paved the way for her v i t a l role In the future development of Brazil, and by the time the Empire became settled as a p o l i t i c a l unit Britain was well established as the main economic Influence acting upon i t from outside.  3h the words of one historian: "The transfer  of the special privileges which England had enjoyed for centuries in Portuguese commerce was completed and the continuation of Great Britain's preeminence in the economic l i f e of i t s old European a l l y was assured in Portuguese America despite the severances of the colony from the mother country.  The thread of continuity is remarkably clear, running back  through the transition years of 1810-1827 to the Anglo-Portuguese relations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The two decades after the f l i g h t of the Portuguese court were, therefore, a crucial period in the development of future Anglo-Brazilian relations.  Brazil showed a l l the signs of being a British protectorate ft  u n t i l she refused to renew the earlier commercial agreements in 1844.  4 It was during the early years of the Empire that, despite active opposition, the foundations were laid for the massive British influence which was to be f e l t throughout the rest of the century in Brazil.9  Britain  became the focal point of Brazilian foreign policy, guarding her own economic and p o l i t i c a l Interests with considerable  success:  DSste modo, nos primeiros 28 anos de nossa existSncia independente, f o i a GrS-Bretanha o centro de nossa vida internacional, dominando-nos, atentando contra nossos interdsses, ameacando-nos, obtendo eoncessffes e p r i v i l l g i o s hoje inconceblveis, mas f o i dela tamblm que dependeram em parte nossa IndependSncia e nossa soberania, embora ofendida. Se nossa primeira aspiracffo—ganhar a Independenoia--contou com a indispensavel colaboracffo britfinica, a segunda—defender os interSsses da classe agricola dominante—teve a sua mais forte oposicSo. — Creio, portanto, que nas manobras diploma'ticas com a GrS-Bretanha esteVe o elxo, o dogma, se ha" dogma, a diretriz fundamental de nossa polftica exterior ate* 1865, pel© menos.^O British interest was not limited, however, to commercial and p o l i t i c a l domination. The humanitarian aspects of slavery occupied the minds of British liberals to such an extent that they saw themselves committed to the eradication of this institution in Brazil.  In fact,  humanitarian and economic involvement went hand in hand, for the Brazilian sugar industry, dependent since early colonial days on slave labour, was a serious competitor of the British plantations of the West Indies. The British government, together with private Individuals committed to the cause of abolition, applied pressures upon Brazil which were regarded by that country as interference in i t s own internal a f f a i r s , and these pressures generated much hostility and distrust between the two nations. The various phases of the abolition movement need not be discussed here,  5  nor can i t be stated that British pressure was wholly responsible for the measures taken by the Brazilian government to transfer to a free labour system. The transition was in any case inevitable. The changing structure of Brazilian society during the nineteenth century, the development of Industrialization around the Rio-SaTo-Paulo axis, the steady movement towards urbanization and the waning of the p o l i t i c a l preeminence of the landed aristocracy 1A the face of the growing Influence of a class of capitalist entrepreneurs and industrialists--all these factors contributed towards the f i n a l decline of slavery as the basis of the economic prosperity of Brazil.  The availability of immigrant labour on a large  scale towards the end of the century provided the logical alternative to slavery, and the Abolition of 1888 was but a stage in a large process of development.  In the long run, the British stimulus visible in Brazil in  the form of Industrial machinery, railways, banking, trade and commerce was as important as the p o l i t i c a l pressures exerted by the British government.  I t can be said, however, that the British were largely  responsible for the early measures against the slave trade and against the permanent propagation of slavery within Brazil, for these were implemented before many of the fundamental changes in Brazilian society began to occur. P o l i t i c a l relations, between the two countries were determined to a large extent by the attitudes to slavery and the slave trade.  3h the  lo^l-O's and 1850»s the arrogant tone adopted by the British in this respect alienated Brazilian government-and public opinion, and British p o l i t i c a l influence suffered as a result.  The culmination of the phase of unpopu-  6 l a r l t y came in 1863» when as a result of the high-handed actions of the British Minister, W. D. Christie, and of the blockade of Rio de Janeiro by British ships, Brazil broke off diplomatic relations for a period of years.  The Christie incident, stemming from the alleged looting of a  British wreck on the southern shores of Brazil and from an alleged assault on a group of British sailors in Rio de Janeiro, i s perhaps an exaggerated example of British treatment of Brazilians.  There i s no  doubt that Christie was an extremely volatile man, and that the choice of him for a post of responsibility in Brazil was not very fortunate. His letters in the London press after the incidents and the correspondence between him and various authorities in both Brazil and England show that he was far from grasping the basic realities of the Brazilian situation and—more important—that he was prepared to make no attempt to do so.  The Christie-affair has in the past been singled out for  detailed study because of the significant place i t occupied in the development of Anglo-Brazilian relations during the century. But the attitude Christie represented was by no means untypical.  On the con-  trary, o f f i c i a l and unofficial correspondence written by Englishmen in Brazil suggests that they were frequently exasperated by government delays, by unwillingness to ©onform to British standards of behaviour and by a generally intolerable lack of consideration and organization. The Victorian gentleman, particulary one from a respectable, middle-class, protestant background and whose.money and good fortune enabled him to travel abroad, had boundless confidence i n his own system, and found adaptation to foreign standards extremely d i f f i c u l t .  In a later chapter  7 i t w i l l be shown how such a lack of understanding and appreciation, especially among the diplomatic community, s t i l l existed long after the Christie a f f a i r , and how d i f f i c u l t i t seemed for the educated Englishman to treat Brazilians with anything but an a i r of disdainful superiority. Christie's Notes on Brazilian Questions s t i l l remains, however, one of the most wild and colourful anti-Brazilian tracts of the century. ^ 1  The diplomatic pressures brought to bear by Britain were heartily resented by Brazilian officialdom.  A s t i f f answer to the railings of  the British was provided by Dunshee de Abranches, a diplomat and historian who, writing at the time of the First World War--during which he was one of the few Brazilian intellectuals openly to support the German cause—described in the following terms the diplomatic scene of the mid-nineteenth century: E* t r i s t e dizer-se que, por mais de meio seculo, enquanto os estadistas brasileiros vlviam a esforgar-se para demostrari Inglaterra a nossa amizade e as nossas.simpatias, chamando a atencffo dos seus maiores homens de Estado para os progresses da nossa cultura polltica e mental e para a honestidade e criterio da nossa alta administracffo, os Ministros da Fazenda e dos Estrangeiros viviam a perder largo tempo das suas occupacffes em dar a cada instante sfibre os mais disparatados assuntos e bagatelas, explicajSes, esclarecimentos e satisfacffes aos gabinetes de S. James, os quais jamais nos deixaram de tratar com desprezo e esca*rnio, por urn lado, e por outro com ameaccas de interven§o"es armadas, e nunca nos olharam com mais pied os os olHos do que as nacSes menos civilizadas ou semi-barbaras da Oceania ou da Africa. As notas diplosuCticas e mais documentos o f f i c i a l s , que ilustram a histAVia do Implrio, e algumas paginas mesmo de nossa vida republicana, sa"o testemunhos eloquentes de tantos vexames, afrontas e humilhacffes a nossa Pa'tria inflingidos acintosa e injustamente pelos govSrnos britSnicos diretamente ou pelos seus plenipotenclarios e agentes consulares em repetidos conflitos com as autoridades nacionais. E houve urn dia em que, diante de tantas i n i quidades e opressSes, urn ministro do Brasil acreditado em Londres, diplomata emerito e fino cultor das letras e da ciencia, o conselheiro S$rgio de Macedo, assim se exprimia corajosamente em documento  8 que ficou memoraVel em a nossa historia intemacional: "E* sempre com a ameaca nos la*bios que o govSrno ingles se dirige ao do Brasil. . . . (16 de maio de IBS*)." * 3  From these remarks, and from those of counterparts on the British side, i t i s clear that o f f i c i a l relations were far from happy during the greater part of the century. In general terms, the British impact on Brazil during the nineteenth century was, however, more economic and commercial than p o l i t i c a l . Brazil represented an enormous potential market for British manufactured goods, and at a l l times during the century exports to Brazil far outweighed in volume and value imports from that country. c i a l point of view, everything was in Britain's favour.  From the commerHer industrial  economy was developed to such an extent that she had the products available for the market; her private businessmen thought constantly in terms of material progress and expansion; her financial position was strong enough for her to be able to float loans and invest in enterprises abroad; her merchant ships were available for the transportation of British manufactured goods to Brazil; and, above a l l , Victorian England was inspired by the philosophy of success, by a dedication to hard work, and by a supreme confidence in the role of Britain throughout the world.  In short, Brazil  came to be something of a British colony during the course of the nineteenth century.  As the same Brazilian Minister stated in 185^, "the  commerce between the two countries i s carried on with English capital, on English ships,.by English companies. The profits . . . the interest on capital  . the payments for insurance, the commissions, and the d i v i -  9 dends from the business, everything goes into She pockets of Englishmen." 1  The daily reliance of Brazilians on British products was a regular feature of urban l i f e .  They wore British clothes, bought British shoes,  ate British food, kept time with British watches, played British pianos, sat on British chairs, ate from British china on tables made in England, relied on British tools and hardware, cured their ailments with British mixtures and ointments, drank British beer, read British books and played British games.^  These items represent in part a fashion in nineteenth -  century Brazil for foreign made articles, and newspaper advertisements for French, German and United States* products swelled the number of those from England, particularly in the later years of the century.^ Bat at the same time i t must be admitted that suoh articles f i l l e d a gap in a society which had not yet developed manufacturing to the extent of being able to support i t s own needs. More important from the long term point of view, however, were imports into Brazil of British industrial machinery and technical products which were to make possible the advance of Brazil and develop the obvious potential of raw materials available throughout that country. As a result of direct British involvement Brazil was able to create a communications system adapted in large measure to her basic economic needs.  Foreign development of efficient railways was a common  feature of nineteenth-century South America.  In Argentina, for example,  the British created a railway system that has remained virtually unchanged to this day.  In Peru the American engineer Henry Meiggs ran  communication lines through d i f f i c u l t terrain to tap sources of raw  10 materials in the mountainous interior.  In Brazil the railways were  connected to a considerbale extent with British endeavour and i n i t i a t i v e . Nearly a l l those constructed during the nineteenth century were either b u i l t and owned by the British or financed from London. The most successf u l venture in this f i e l d , the San [sic] Paulo (Brazilian) Railway. Company, Limited, provided an early outlet for the produce of Sffo Paulo and the communication  line along which were imported the manufactured goods  necessary for the future development of that great c i t y .  The technical  problems of running a railway up from Santos to Sffo Paulo were immens e, but the fact that they were overcome meant that the coffee production on which Brazil has built much of her subsequent economic prosperity could rely on efficient contact with the major markets of the world.  The Bri-  tish involvement i n this development was direct and of v i t a l importance: " i t was the British themselves who were chiefly responsible for providing the capital, managerial s k i l l , technical a b i l i t y , and equipment for the construction of this railway, a monument to nineteenth-century engineering."  The railway i s much the same today as i t was in i t s early days5  but much of the t r a f f i c between Santos and Sffo Paulo i s now carried on 'tlae spectacular highway which connects the two c i t i e s .  Without the San  Paulo Railway, however, and various others which were built throughout south-central Brazil, the development of the coffee trade and. the growth of@Sffo Paulo as an industrial and agricultural centre would have been much delayed.  By the turn of the century most railway enterprises in the  country were, or had been, connected with the British to some degree.  11 In a similar way, British engineers and financiers played, a part in the construction of ports in major Brazilian coastal c i t i e s , and. were involved in many studies and projects—including the original harbour works at Rio--during the second half of the century.  The most successful  example of such participation was the modernization of Rio harbour between 1904 and 1911» a project which set the seal on several decades of AngloBrazilian cooperation in this f i e l d . Britain was likewise effective in stimulating the process of early industrialization in Brazil, though in this respect failures mingled with successes. ^ 1  The growth of manufacturing industries was dependent  on coal, and as this was. not readily available in Brazil abundant British supplies were imported to meet local needs. During the course of the nineteenth century Britain sent more and more industrial machinery to Brazil, and this form of export was to be of more lasting effect than the soap, umbrellas and bone china which were so typical of the manufactured consumer goods already mentioned.  Britain provided much of the machinery  for the Brazilian textile industry and helped in the establishment of modern flour mills.^0 British businessmen entered the sugar industry, where they met with very l i t t l e success, imported equipment for coffee production, and founded companies producing foodstuffs, shoes, and various other manufactured items. Behind a l l this commercial and industrial activity there was a considerable network of financial backing provided from British sources, both private and public, to aid the development of Brazil.  This was the  12 hey-day of sterling as an international currency, and the Brazilian economy was tied to the exchange rate and the influence of sterling in a l l branches of i t s activity. took various forms.  British financial involvement in Brazil  F i r s t l y , support was given by English shareholders  to companies operating in Brazil.  There was nothing altruistic about  the motives of such people, and they demanded a return for their investment in a way typical of the dynamic and hard-headed business community of Victorian England.  But by contributing to the enterprises which have  already been mentioned they played an essential part in this aspect of Brazilian development. The idea of the limited l i a b i l i t y company was slow to take hold in Brazil, and the government insisted on exercising effective control over companies operating in that, country.  The British example was  emulated by those seeking to liberalize the national approach to company law, and detrimental government controls were eventually l i f t e d . Secondly, Britain was involved in the financial fortunes of Brazil through her connections with the banking business.^  The London and Bra-  z i l i a n Bank, founded in 1862 and dominated for most of i t s existence by John Beaton, led the way for other commercial houses, chief among which were the English Bank of Rio de Janeiro and, at a later stage, the London and River Plate Bank, Various amalgamations led. to the establishment in 1923 of the Bank-of London and South America, which s t i l l remains the principal .British banking concern throughout Central and South America.  During  the nineteenth century British banks competed with local organizations and reached a position of preeminence which was both envied and vehemently  13 attacked.  So great was Brazil's dependence on her economic«>and commercial  links with Britain that fluctuations in the exchange rate were c r i t i c a l , and British-owned banks were frequently the target of charges of manipulation and speculation. Such hostility was particularly acute during the period of economic turmoil which followed the declaration of the Republic, and accusations of unlawful fixing of the exchange rate continued in the press even after the turn of the century.  The fact that British banks  were always closely connected with the foreign elements which controlled the import-export business, and particularly the coffee trade, meant that they were always open to attacks based on nationalistic fears:  "Whenever  the exchanges f e l l the British banks were accused of driving i t [sicfj downwards. Press attacks were launched against them at various intervals from 1887 to 1897» and the chairman of the London and Brazilian Bank saw f i t to deny these accusations in his speeches. There i s no reason to doubt his denials; at various times he frankly stated that he could offer no clear explanation of the movement M  the exchanges. ^ w  It i s certain,  however, that British banks did indulge in occasional manipulation of the exchange rate, though i t is less certain whether they did so always to their own advantage. ^ That they played an essential part in the develop2  ment of Brazil in the nineteenth century i s unquestionable. The third aspect of British financial involvement, and one which caused less controversy because i t was based on Brazilian initiative and needs, was that of thenmassive o f f i c i a l loans obtained by Brazil in London, the principal money market of the world in the last century.  Through the  14 offices of the house of Rothschild, which after 1855 controlled this sector of the financial affairs of Brazil, large sums of money flowed on a f a i r l y regular basis from Britain to the Brazilian government and to municipal and state governments.^ These loans were used to finance public works and on many occasions merely to set straight some lack of balance produced by mismanagement of the Brazilian economy. In general terms, the returns for the amount of money involved seem to have been poor, mainly as a result of disorganization at the Brazilian end, and at times there was considerable opposition in that country to the whole process of borrowing money f%m  Britain.  One major controversial measure  was the Funding Loan negotiated by Campos Sales in 1898 in an attempt to stabilize the exchange rate, which had fallen in the general atmosphere of economic unrest from 27 1/2 d. to the milreis in I889 to 7 3/16 d. in 26 I898.  0  The loan was obtained after some complicated negotiations with  the Rothschilds, and although i t produced a rise in the exchange rate there followed other financial problems which suggest that the overall value of the Funding Loan scheme may be questioned.  One of the most  recent assessments of the economic policy of Campos Sales vis-a-vis British involvement reads as follows: "Sua atuagffo eeonomico-financeira, em inteira coerencia com o car£ter de classe do Govern©, esmagou a indust r i a e distribuiu ao povo os onus da contencffo financeira, criando o impSsto de consumo; submeteu-nos ainda mais aos capitals ingleses, com a pol£tiea do 'livre cambism©• que, num pals atrasado como o nosso, significava a polltica de *portas abertas'; prendeu-nos ainda mais aos bancos  15 de Londres, aos Rothschild, com a sistematizacffo dos eraprestimos  externos,  o diet)re Funding Loan. It has been pointed out elsewhere that, in general, foreign economic and commercial activity in Brazil performed a dual function.  400  F i r s t l y , i t stimulated the development of the country by providing r a i l ways, port installation and modern industrial techniques.  Secondly, i t  provided those elements which have allowed Brazil to free herself from her essentially neo-colonial situation of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.^9  Britain's contribution to the economic, industrial  and commercial progress of Brazil f a l l s mainly within this dual scheme, although this was by no means her sole influence. On the contrary, British attitudes and ideas were in many ways instrumental in effecting changes in the thinking of the Brazilian elite.. The essentially pract i c a l character of the Victorian businessman, the confidence of the private enterprise system, the value of a Protestant heaven attained through hard work and honest d e a l i n g s — a l l these elements were apparent in some measure to a minority of Brazilians, and had their repercussions on a number of individuals.3° Chief among these was Irineu Evangelista de Souza, Barffo and latef Visconde de Maua' (1813-1889), whose activities during the Brazilian Empire did much to pave the way for later economic development.  Inspired by a close contact with English methods from an  early age, Maui became involved in railways, iron foundries, shipyards and banking, f i n a l l y running into bankruptcy and ending his days in obscure poverty.  He was the main figure behind the material growth of  16 mid-century Brazil and, as one historian has put i t , "embodied the transition from the routine and traditionalism of a manorial economy to a modem, aggressive c a p i t a l i s m . I n Maui's subsequent failure, however, one can see something of the slow rate at which Brazilian society was able to absorb new influences.« "The power of the ancien regime was s t i l l too strong for the emerging bourgeoisie. In ammore restricted ideological form, British influence was apparent among many p o l i t i c a l and intellectual figures who grew up with the Empire and were active during the early years of the Republic. Ruy Barbosa (1849-1923)* the eminent jurist and politician, was perhaps the man most influenced by English l i b e r a l thought.  His turbulent career  was based on a philosophy of personal liberty, though this remained very much within the framework of nineteenth-century attitudes and expressed l i t t l e or nothing of a social conscience.  Ruy spent considerable time  In England as an exile from the Floriano government, and thought of his new home as the centre of the l i b e r a l world and the hope for a l l future progress in the f i e l d of p o l i t i c a l humanitarlanism.  "A primeira im-  pressffo do l i b e r a l , ao toear este solo, i que se acha no seio mesmo da liberdade. freedom!  Freedom, hey-day 1 hey-day!« freedom! freedomt hey-day, Essa Impressffo 6 reverencial, quase sagrada.  Eu aspirei-a  como urn efluvio, senti-a invadir-me como uma realidade envolvente."-^ The positive effects upon Brazil of Ruy's devotion to the cause of England and "liberalism" have been seriously questioned in a recent study.  In  fact, the validity of applying "liberalism" to any sector of nineteenth-  17 century Brazilian society is i t s e l f open to d o u b t . R o y ' s anglophilia seems strangely out of place in the development of the Republic i n Brazil, but nonetheless i t represents a series of p o l i t i c a l attitudes not unknown in contemporary Brazil. Joaquim Nabuco (1849-1910), champion of the abolitionist cause and later the f i r s t Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, was of the same generation as Ruy and was influenced by British thought in a way no less profound than was the fiery orator from Bahia.  As a young man.Nabuco  was intimately involved with British constitutional theories and with the atmosphere of calm and justice which England represented.  His ideas  during this formative period are set out i n Minha Formacgo, a collection of memories and thoughts f i r s t published in 1900.  In this work he ac-  knowledged his debt to Britain in the development of his attitudes to pol i t i c s and humanitarian ideals.  He regarded the British system of govern-  ment as being superior to that of the United States, and of his entry into p o l i t i c a l l i f e in Brazil on the death of his father in I878 he was able to write: "quando entro para a Cfimara, estou tffo inteiramente sob a influSncia do liberalismo ingle's, como se militasse as ordens de Gladstone; $sse 4 em substfincia o resultado de minha educacffo p o l l t i c a : sou urn l i b e r a l inglSs—com afinidades radicals, mas com aderencias whigs-no Parlamento b r a s i l e i r o . ^ ^ H  Nabuco remained a convinced monarchist most  of his l i f e , despite his success as a leading figure of the f i r s t twenty years of the Republic and his excellent relations with the United States. Others were equally aware of the value of English government, but  18 less convinced about i t s applicability to the Brazilian scene. Gilberto Amado, writing about his own upbringing in Recife during the apogee of Positivism, commented in particularly practical terms on the presence of the British in Brazil, but eould not see how Ruy could apply both French and English models to the problems of his own country.  The English  system was good for England, but not necessarily so for Brazil: "Fique amanhff a Ihglaterra pobre, e ela deixara', na rulna da fortuna pifblica, de ser o mod§lo constitucional do mundo. Voltara' a eorrupcffo, e a agitaca*o polltica se instalara" na Ihglaterra como em qualquer outro pals. A confusffo e a anarquia passarffo a ser tambem fen8menos inglSses."37 English thought wa% best represented in Brazil by the vogue of Herbert Spencer and his evolutionist ideas in the f i n a l years of the Empire and the f i r s t decade,of the Republic.  Positivism in general  appealed to the new Brazilian elite produced by the social and economic changes of the century, and. i t commanded the respect and enthusiasm of several leading intellectuals of the day.  Together with the evolutionist  theories of Darwin and Spencer, Positivism provided intellectual fuel for the educated minority both in the south and in Recife, the main centre of philosophical ideas during these years.  The growth of scienti-  f i c positivism was merely a manifestation of the changes taking place in Brazil and of the general contact of Brazilian intellectuals with the European scene.  In this process the writings of Herbert Spencer played  an important role.  "Evolutionism  . was one of the most emphatic  expressions of the naturalist and antimetaphysical attitude of the nine-  19 teenth century.  Our men of letters and *philosophizers• were affected  by i t , as were most Europeans of the time.  The surprising elementswas  the speed with which Brazilian intellectuals were caught up in the contemporary European currents, . . . We knew more of Europe than we did of events in the different parts of the Empire."38  Germanist ideas  were adopted mainly by the Recife group, including Tobias Barreto and Silvio Romero, while Spencerianism flourished chiefly in the south.39 The influence of Spencer himself was considerable: "The adaptation of the theory of evolution to human society Had a wide impact upon Brazil. Spencer was unmistakably the most imaginative nineteenth-century thinker thus to apply this theory, and Spencer was widely read and quoted in Brazil, specially [sic] after 1889, that i s , after the traditional society had been seriously shaken by the abolition of slavery and the end of the empire. The Barffo do Rio Branco, who spent several years in England as Consul General in Liverpool, remained curiously untouched by the contemporary fever among middle and upper class Brazilian intellectuals for British fashions in p o l i t i c s , law. and philosophy,  In fact, he seems  to have had l i t t l e enthusiasm for his stay i n England, preferring i n stead the congenial company he found in Paris and other continental capitals.  He was concerned, however, that Brazil should project a  favourable impression in the financial centres of London in order to be able to obtain investments and loans which eventually would assist Brazilian material progress.^-  Later, as he became more interested in the  20 development of relations with the United States, Rio Branco tended to turn even more from the influence of England.  In later l i f e the only  legacy he seemed to have inherited from his days in England was a nearperfect command of the English language.  6  The case of Rio Branco i s  interesting in that i t marks the way of the future development of Braz i l i a n foreign policy. Of the major figures of his age, he i s one of the few to become f u l l y familiar with the practical workings of the British system, to reject Britain as a model for Brazilian development, and to adopt a policy of approximation to the United. States which has become a fundamental feature of Brazilian affairs both at home and abroad. In conclusion, i t can be said that, the British played an important part in many aspects of Brazilian l i f e i n the nineteenth century. By no means was this influence totally beneficial to Brazilian interests, and recent interpretations written by Brazilians have been generally unfavourable, considering British involvement as unwarranted imperialism and trespassing on the rights of an emerging nation.  The jargon of  modern international polities has tended to obscure many of the real issues.  I t is certainly true that British entrepreneurs  sought to use  Brazil as a source of profit, intent far more on selling manufactured goods than on developing the country.  But as their activity spread, so  Brazil was more and more able, through the acquisition of machinery* communication lines, and technical know-how, to defend® herself against foreign direction of her national economy. The period of transition at  21 the beginning of the twentieth century i s one of the aspects of the present study.  The transition was two-fold—firstly, British p o l i t i c a l influence,  never really effective after the middle of the nineteenth century, was replaced by that of the United States, while her economic influence was seriously challenged by the growth of American and German interests; and secondly, Brazil herself developed the a b i l i t y to act iffiuch more as a free agent in both p o l i t i c a l and economic affairs, emerging as a respectable international force by the end of the Great War. From the cultural point of view, the hey-day of British influence was a l l but over.  Positivism had. vitually burnt i t s e l f out by the turn  of the century, remaining only in the form of the largely ineffective Igreja Positivista.  Evolutionism had now given way to a greater preoccu-  pation with sociological problems and a kind of national soul-searching suoh as was to appear in 0 Problema Naoional Braslieiro, which Alberto T6rres placed before the Brazilian public at the beginning of the Great War.  Spencer and Darwin were no longer major figures in Brazilian thought,  and Britain receded into the background of Brazilian cultural affairs. James Bryce, i n his classic account of South America written in 1912, summed up the situation at the beginning of the century as follows: Upon thought and art and taste . . . neither of these countries [ i . e . England and Germany] exerts much influence. Though a certain number of Argentines, Chileans, and Brazilian can read English and a smaller number German, and though statesmen and serious students appreciate the English p o l i t i c a l system and the German administrative system, and follow the scientific work done in both countries, books in these languages are not widely read. The members of the English and German colonies i n seaports like Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Rio, and Valpa-  22 raiso are personally liked and respected, but they have not done much to popularize the ideas and habits and tastes of their countries. The mental quality and the views of l i f e are essentially dissimilar. Between the peoples, there is l i t t l e more than reciprocal good-will and what Thomas Carlyle calls the "cash nexus". English fashions are, however, followed, in horseracing and other branches of sport.^3  23 NOTES For recent%studies of the Methuen Treaty, see Nelson Wemeok Sodre", 0 Tratado de Methuen (Rio: ISEB, 1957)» and A. D, Francis, The Methueris and Portugal 1961-1708 (Gambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 196l>), pp. 184218. Werneek Sodrl, 0 Tratado de Methuen.  2  ^MS da Coleoffo Pombalina, c<5dice 683*  Cited in Werneck Sod re, p. 20.  **A. K. Manchester, British Preeminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline: A Study in European Expansion (Chapel H i l l : Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1933)» p. 44T"^ ^Manchester, op. c i t . *%or f u l l details see Charles K. Vfebster, ed.., Britain and the Independence of Latin America. 1812-1830: Select Documents from the Foreign Office Archives, 2 vols. (London and New York: Oxford Univ. Press for the Ibero-American Institute of Great Britain, 1938). 7 'Manchester, p. 210. ^Jose" Honorlo Rodrigues, 3hteresse Nacional e Polltiea Externa (Rio: Civilizaoffo Brasileira, 1966), p. 11. "" ^For the f u l l impact of this influence, see Richard Graham, Britain and the Onset of Modernization of Brazil 1850-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 195877 I am indebted to Graham for much of the material of the present chapter. 1Q  Rodrigues, pp. 15-16*  ^See Richard Graham, "Causes for the Abolition of Negro Slavery in Brazil: An Interpretative Essay," Hispanic American Historical Review, 46, No. 2 (May 1966), 123-137, and Britain and the Onset, p. 186. l^For a f u l l account, see Richard Graham, "Os fundamentos da ruptura de relacffes diploma"ticas entre o Bras 11 e a Grff-Bretanha em 1863: 'A Ojiestffo C h r i s t i e S " Revista de Historian 24 (Jan-Jun 1962),. 117-138 , 379402. ^"The English government, in i t s relations with Brazil, had had two chief objects of attention and duty,—the slave-trade, and the interests of English merchants and residents. The latter comprises protection  24  against wrongs and extension of commerce. It i s a painful fact that one of i t s chief d i f f i c u l t i e s in dealing with the Brazilian government has always arisen from the opposing action of some Englishmen. The bulk of the English community in Brazil,—quiet, respectable men,—pursue their business and hold their tongues, knowing what they smight suffer from open expression of opinion i n support of their own government, against that of a country to which they have gone to make their fortunes. But unscrupulous, ill-conditioned Englishmen make i t their business and find i t their interest to side openly with Brazil, and curry favour with the Brazilian government by puffing i t in every conceivable way, and throwing d i r t on their own government and Ministers. This i s sometimes done for a substantial consideration." W. D. Ghristie, Notes on Brazilian Questions (London: MacMillan, 1 8 6 5 ) , pp. 1 3 3 - 4 . -^Dunshee de Abranehes, Expansffo Economica e_ Commercio Exterior do Brazil (Rio: n.p., 1 9 1 5 ) , pp. 7 4 - 5 . 15cited in Graham, Britain and the Onset, p. 7 3 . . .^See Gilbert© Freyre, Introdncffo 4 historia da sociedade patriarcal do Brasil, I I I : Ordem o progresso: Processo de desintegracffo das sociedades. patriarcal e semi-patriarcal no Brasil sob o regime de trabalho l i v r e : aspectos de um quase meio se^eulo de transicffo do trabalho escravo para o trabalho l i v r e ; e da monarquia para a republlca, 2 vols. (Rio: Josl Olympio, 1 9 5 9 ) , I . 17 'For details of foreign involvement in day-to-day l i f e , see Ereyre, op. c i t . , I, cxxix et seq. 18  Graham, Britain and the Onset, p. 6 3 . 19 'For an account of economic nationalism in Brazil and the way in which i t affected industrial growth, see Nlcia Vilela Luz, A Lata pela Industrjalizaeffo do Brasil ( 1 8 0 8 a 1 9 3 0 ) (Sffo Paulo: Difusffo EuropSia do Livro, 1 9 6 1 ) . 20  See Richard Graham, "A British Industry in Brazil: Rio Flour Mills, Business History, 8 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 3 - 3 8 .  1886-1920,"  ^Graham, Britain and the Onset, Chap. 8 . 22  For details of British banking in Brazil and in the rest of Latin America, see David Joslin, A Century of Banking in Latin America; to Commemorate the Centenary in 1 9 6 2 of the Bank of London and South America, Limited (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1 9 6 3 ) . 2 3  J o s l i n , p. 1 5 6 .  25 ^•"Graham, Britain and the Onset, p. 99. For a nationalistic view of Britain's banking involvement in Brazil, see Caio Prado Junior, Histo*r i a Eeon6mioa do Brasil (Sffo Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1967). Speaking of the agents of the London and River Plate Bank in the 1890's, he writes: "Onde quer que se apresente uma perspectiva favoravel, no setor financelro como no econSmico, la* estarffo Sles como primeiros Candidatos a oportunidade, e procurando t i r a r do pals t8da a margem de proveitos que Sle era capaz de proporoionar. E com a posicaTo dominante que ocupavam, sua seguranca era absoluta." p. 223. -*For a table illustrating the extent of British loans to Brazil, see Graham, Britain and the Onset, p. 100. 2  26 Graham, Britain and the Onset, p. 103. ^ H l s t o r i a Nova do Brasil (Sffo Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1964), IV, 156. This volume, part of a series designed to open a new phase i n Brazilian historical studies, was among those seized by the new government in 1964. For details, see Nelson Werneck Sodre", "Historia da Historia Nova," Revista Civilizacgo Brasileira. 1, No. 3 (Julho 1965), 27-40. 28  Prado Junior, pp. 280-1.  % e e the following Marxist view: A evolucffo do imperialism© no Brasil (como no resto do mundo) I assim eontraditoria, Ao mesmo tempo que e s t i mulou as atividades e energias do pals, e lhe forneceu elementos necessa*rios ao seu desenvolvimento econSmico, f o i acumulando urn passivo conslder i v e l e tornou oada vez mais perturbadora e onerosa a sua ag£o. Mas tambem, favorecendo aquSle progresso, acumulou no Brasil os elementos com que o pals contou e continua contando para sua definitiva libertagao. 0 imperialism© $ urn suicida que marcha seguramente para sua consumacffo. Prado Junior, p. 281. 2  M  H  3°See Graham, Britain and the Onset, Ghap. 7. 31 C. H. Baring, Empire in Brazil: A New World Experiment with Monarchy (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958), pp. 69-70. For a recent biography of Maui, see Anyda Marchant, Viscount Maui and the Empire of Brazil: A Biography of Irineu Evangellsta de Sousa (1813--18"89T"( Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 19^3"). J  Thomas Richard Graham, "The British Impact on Brazil, 1850-1918." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Texas, 1961, p. 266. 32  R u i Barbosa, Obras Completas (vol. XXIII, I896; rpt. Rio: Ministlrio de Educacffo e Saude, 1946),,I, x i . 3 3  3^See R. Magalhffes Junior, Rui, o homen e o mito, 2 ed., Retratos do Brasil, 27 (Rio: Civilizac*o Brasileira, I965T."" The author points out a  26 that Ruy's Cartas de Ihglaterra were written not as a result of personal experience and observation in England but on the basis of Ruy's careful reading—and paraphrasing—of the British press (p*< 204.et.seq..). Magalhffes Junior reaches the conclusion that "alem das suas limitacffes, de suas ide*ias fixas, de seus <5dios violentos e da miopia polftica, que lhe deformava a visffo, cansada de proeurar a imagem da Inglaterra no mapa do Brasil, sua inteligSncia se devotava melhor Is tarefas de obstrucffo que i s de eonstrucffo.* Prefacio. ,  35see the comments by Jose\ Honorio Rodrigues in Raymond S. Sayers, ed., Portugal and Brazil in Transition (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1968), p. 125. -^Joaquim Nabuco, Minha Formaca*o, Documentos Brasileiros, 90 (Rio: . Jose* Olympio, 1957)» p. 182. See also pp. 3 1 , 8 9 , 96, 109, 146, and 154. 3 Gilberto Aiaado, Minha Formacgo no Recife (Rio: Jose* Olympio, 1955)» p. 279* For comments on the British commercial community in Brazil, see p. 106. 7  38joffo Cruz Costa, A History of Ideas in Brazil, trans. Suzette Macedo (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1964), p. 184. 3 Ibid., p. 186. 9  ^Graham, Britain and the Onset, p. 234. ^ R i o Branoo to Ruy Barbosa, Arquivo Historico do Itamaraty, Arquivo Particular do Barffo do Rio Branco 3/1/18/8, Hereafter cited as AHI and APRB. ^ s e e his correspondence with the American jurist, John Bassett Moore, in AHI, APRB 4/1/71A. ^3James Bryee, South America: Observations and Impressions (London: MacMillan, 1912), pp. 517-518.  CHAPTER II CHALLENGERS TG BRITISH SUPREMACY, 1900-1920 The birth of the new century saw an increase i n the attention paid Brazil by various foreign communities i n an attempt to cultivate commercial and p o l i t i c a l ties with that country.  Brazil, despite occa-  sional nationalistic outbursts, was particulary open to foreign influences at this stage, and as her contacts with various nations became more d i versified, the specially privileged position of Great Britain entered a period of decline. From the point of view jof international p o l i t i c s , the role of Brazil changed fundamentally between 1900 and 1920. At the turn of the century, her significance in international affairs was s t r i e t l y limited.  She was l i t t l e more than just another nation on a  continent which had had a limited p o l i t i c a l and economic influence on the rest of the world.  By 1920 Brazil had arrived on the international  scene and aseemed assured of a position of preeminence among the nations of South America.  She had become the closest contact of the United  States on the continent, and had received the f i r s t United States Ambassador to South America i n 1905; she had played host to the Pan-American Congress i n 1906 and had gained great prestige from the v i s i t of H i h u Root in the same year; she had been awarded South America's f i r s t Cardinalate in 1905; she had attracted considerable international attention-* not always of the most favourable kind—at the Hague Conference i n 1907; she was the only Latin American nation to take an active part i n the 27  28 First World War, and was involved in the Paris Peace Conference and the subsequent negotiations for the foundation of the League of Nations. That such a transformation should have taken place in the course of two decades was a sign of the fact that Brazil had become more internationally conscious.  Other nations were becoming aware of her impor-  tance, and she of theirs.  This brought with i t a fundamental change in  Brazil's unique involvementswith Great Britain.  In diversifying her  foreign contacts, she also helped to put herself on the international map. The principal challengers to British preeminence were the United States, Germany, and France, with various other countries taking part in the expansion process to a limited degree.  Brazilian relations with  them—and the effects of diversification on Britain and British observers— w i l l be the theme of the present chapter.  Each of the countries mentioned  above had specific reasons for being interested in Brazil at the beginning of the century, and these were by no means identical.  Conversely, Bra-  z i l i a n policies towards each nation were dictated by varying motives, some p o l i t i c a l , some commercial, some strategic, some economic, some cultural. But in a l l cases the growth of such relations slowly chipped away at the British position of supremacy which was one of the basic facts of the nineteenth century in Brazil.  The points of divergence of foreign a c t i -  v i t y in the young South American republic w i l l become apparent during the course of the present chapter.  The one factor common to a l l , namely trade  and commerce, serves to put ingperspective a l l the other diverse activities  29 and provide a key to Brazil's subsequent international standing, Brazil's economy in the early years of the century was a curious mixture of high success and. desperate failure.  Although there were a l -  ready some signs of industrial activity, Brazil remained a predominantly agricultural community, dependent on two principal crops, coffee and rubber, and on the price of these in world markets. The successful exportation of these crops was essential for the well-being of the country, and there was, as yet, no obvious alternative.  There i s no doubt, however,  that the coffee industryj which has formed the basis of so much activity and wealth in Brazil, was in a state of acute c r i s i s at the beginning of the century.  Over-production had reached a disastrous level, the market  seemed saturated, and complex schemes such as the valorization of 1906 had to be invented in an attempt to prevent total collapse.1 scarcely in a better position.  Rubber was  Having enjoyed a spectacular boom in the  early years of the republic, and having opened the Amazon Basin to foreign investment and exploitation, this product collapsed on the world market after 1910 and never again recovered i t s former importance.  The exchange  rate, though more stable than in the 1890's, was s t i l l subject to considerable fluctuations, and industry was in no way equipped to stimulate the position of Brazil on the international front.  In short, the development  of foreign interests in Brazil coincided withia period of acute commercial and economic c r i s i s within the country. Against this background can be seen the general pattern of Brazilian trade with the rest of the world before the Great War.  Statistics  30 are frequently contradictory and unreliable, but a general picture i s apparent in figures 1 and 2.  From these tables the following conclusions  may be drawn. F i r s t l y , Brazil's chief customer, the United States, developed steadily as a consumer of Brazilian goods during the early years of the century, while imports from that country to Brazil made even more striking progress. Although the United States had been a major market for Brazilian produce for many years, the growth of American exports to Brazil was a new feature of international trade.  Jh 1903 the American  Minister in Rio reported that the figures for the previous decade, i.e., 1892-1902, actually showed, a decline.  2  Secondly, the tables show that  British exports to Brazil continued to climb, as they had done almost constantly since the f i r s t half of the nineteenth century, and that in 1912 Britain, though losing her virtual monopoly, was s t i l l the leading supplier of manufactured goods to Brazil.3  British sources quote the  following figures for exports to Brazil: 1895-9, ^31,004,760; 1900-4, £26,955,876; 1905-9, 141,140.,339. Imports from Brazil showed a considerable increase: 1900-4, L30,086,073; 1905-9, J45,156,310.  4  Thirdly, the  participation of other countries in trade with Brazil was becoming more marked. Germany, in particular, became at the beginning of the century the most formidable r i v a l to the British in the business of selling manufactured goods in Brazil. In relative terms, the percentage of Brazilian imports emanating from Britain f e l l considerably during the pre-war years (see f i g . 3 ) . The writing wastbn the wall even before the turn of the century. In  31 1899 the Financial Times reported on the comments of Mr. T. Worthlngton, the Special Commissioner of the Board of Trade who had been looking into Britain's position in Latin America, and came to the following conclusions: "That foreign countries, especially the United States and Belgium, have made some progress in cutting into our Brazilian trade is pretty well proved by the figures adduced.  Indeed, i t appears marvellous that  we hold our own so well as we do in view of the complaints that were poured into Mr. Wbrthington's sympathetic ears."5  The story was repeated  over a decade later, with an interesting commentary on the place of the United States in Brazilian trade: "That British trade with this country has suffered during the last eight years 1B not questionable. From 38.4 per cent, of the Brazilian import trade, the British share has fallen to 28.8 per cent.  Of the 9.6 per cent, lost by Great Britain, Germany has  appropriated only a third (3.6 per cent.) and Belgium 2,5 per cent., 3.5 per cent, being distributed amongst other countries."^ The exact dates of the swing away from Great Britain, or of the peak of her trade with, and investment i n , Brazil, are not of v i t a l importance.  There is no  doubt, however, that the First World War determined to a large extent the future of Brazil's international relations.  The War halted German pro-  gress in Brazil, drew the South American nation even more firmly into the sphere of the United States, and dealt a blow to further British monopol i e s of interest.  The f i r s t two decades of the century saw the practical  beginnings of diversification; i t was not u n t i l the 1920's that Britain lost her controlling hold on Brazilian commercial and economic affairs.7  32 Trade was, however, but one element in the development of Brazilian relations with other nations during the period under discussion. The study of the decline of British influence in Brazil can be completed only by a detailed examination of the role of the three main challengers to British supremacy—the United States, Germany and France—and an interpretation of British reactions to those who trespassed on what was largely her traditional preserve. During the f i r s t two decades of the century there developed between Brazil and the United States a relationship whose main lines have remained virtually unchanged to this day.  The establishment of a  climate of friendship can be attributed almost entirely to the work of the Barffo do Rio Branco (1845-1912), and i t was during his years as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1902-1912) that Brazil took several steps which were to mark her on the international front as a centre of American interest in Latin America.  The work of Rio Branco in this respect  has been discussed elsewhere, and he has been referred to as the author of a major diplomatic shift away from Europe in favour of the United States.  8  The basis of this assessment i s questionable, as Rio Branco  seems to have acted more on the grounds of p o l i t i c a l expediency during his term of office than with the whole future structure of Brazilian foreign policy in mind. More than anything else, Rio Branco was devoted to the principle of establishing Brazil as the leading nation of South America, and the main obstacle in the way of such a programme was Argentina, on the national level, and Estanislao Zeballos in person.  The  33 rivalry between the two nations and the two men was a fundamental feature of Brazil's foreign policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and an obvious way for Brazil to assert her supremacy was by enlisting the p o l i t i c a l sympathies of the United States.9  High-ranking  Brazilian o f f i c i a l s were clearly convinced of the value of such anf approximation, and there i s no doubt that i t occupied a fundamental position in Rio Branco's international thinking.  Two of the most eminent  Brazilian diplomats and writers of the day, Joaquim Nabuco and Graca Aranha, followed this line with as much conviction as did Rio Branco, and to them may be attributed much of the subsequent atmosphere of good w i l l between the two countries. ** 1  Diplomatic approximation was Rio Branco's aim, and this he certainly attained for Brazil, although the means to the end were sometimes rather obscure.  11  American influence was being f e l t on other levels in  the early years of the century, and i t is this influence, as well as British and Brazilian reactions to i t , which must come under consideration at this point. The period saw the establishment of features rather more fundamental in the development of modern Brazil than the mere exchange of embassies or the occasional v i s i t of a warship.  For Britain, i t was the  end of a century of economic domination; for the United States, the beginning of a long period of o f f i c i a l friendship and cooperation.  The  assumption by the United States of a role in Brazilian affairs hitherto played by Britain and, to a lesser extent, other European countries, was not as smooth as has been suggested by some observers.  The British were  34 particularly sensitive to change in this respect, and their comments reveal some points of Brazilian opposition to increasing American p a r t i cipation.  Although the f i r s t decade of the century marked the develop-  ment of a policy of approximation between the two leading countries of the hemisphere, i t also witnessed the growth of anti-American currents in Brazil,  From the long-term point of view, the latter has been virtually  as important as the former in the shaping of Brazilian national opinion and policy. The details of Brazilian^United States diplomatic relations under the hand of Rio Branco have been outlined by Prof, E. Bradford Burns. Both countries were interested in commercial expansion and stood to gain considerably from i t .  The United States was concerned with the export  to Brazil of manufactured goods and wheat (in competition with Argentina) and with the protection of American private Interests, while Brazil was anxious to assure a market for her coffee* and stimulate her own agricultural and industrial progress with the aid of American capital.  To  defend her interests, the United States chose diplomatic representatives who were generally well-liked in Brazilian government circles, and the social l i f e organized by the United States Legation (later Embassy) was among the most successful in the Brazilian capital.  During the early  years of the century, the United States diplomatic staff took their duties unusually seriously, emerging every day from the serenity of Petro'polis to remain in constant contact with the Brazilian government in Rio.^' It was not u n t i l 1915 that the British Minister, S i r Arthur Peel, reported  35 that conditions were now such that he could carry on permanent business in the capital, -' 1  The United States Minister at the turn of the century, Charles Page Bryan, appears to have adapted well to Brazilian l i f e and to have cultivated successful personal relationships with Brazilians, ^ 1  At the  time of his transfer to Switzerland, there appeared in the Brazilian press several articles which made i t clear that he had been much liked and that he would be missed, ^ Along with these, however, came the suggestion that 1  his social successes had been perhaps more noteworthy than those in the diplomatic f i e l d . ^  David E, Thompson, United States Minister, and later  Ambassador, to Brazil, worked in close cooperation with Rio Branco in the settlement of the dispute with Peru, was involved in the Brazilian recognition of Panama', and was one of the men around whom were built plans for the elevation of the diplomatic missions in Rio and Washington.  The v i s i t  of Elihu Root to the Pan-American Congress in Rio in August, 1906, was a great success among Brazilians in general, and an important factor in the process of approximation.  The line of personal successes continued with  Ambassador Morgan, who arrived in Rio in June, 1912, and who by the end of his f i r s t year in Brazil had built a reputation of friendly contact with Brazilians which was recognized even by Sir William Haggard, his British contemporary. The latter, close to the end of what was only occasionally a satisfying tour of duty in Brazil, confessed in one of his f i n a l despatches "that Mr. Morgan enjoys immense personal popularity here." ? 1  British stress on the personal prestige of American diplomats  36 attempted to show that their achievements were more apparent than real. It was agreed that events like the v i s i t of Root to Rio did much to 18  assist the image of the United States in Brazil.  The enthusiastic  welcome arranged for the Secretary of State was s t i l l in Haggard's mind when he wrote some three years later, pointing out that although the v i s i t had been a great success, Brazilians were less pleased with the whole business when Root went on to Argentina to make the same friendly 19 remarks he had been making i n Brazil.  7  Haggard was particularly scep-  t i c a l about Morgan's position, questioning the article in the Jornal do Commercio which welcomed, the Ambassador to Brazil, suggesting that united States popularity was fictitious and "engineered probably by the American Embassy with a view of covering the real dissension between the two countries on the valorized coffee question," and accusing Morgan of petty annoyance at having to take back seat while the Argentine Foreign 20 Minister, Roca, was on an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to Brazil i n 1912.  u  Haggard  thought that the American charge" d'affaires in 1912, Rives, was disliked in Brazil for his pushing methods, and partly attributed to him a cooling off on the part of Rio Branco towards the United States. ^ There are, 2  in fact, indications that between 1912 and the outbreak of the First Tiforld War, relations were at times considerably strained.  Haggard referred in  1913 to the "discredited pro-United States policy of Baron do Rio Branco," and the coffee trust question did l i t t l e to encourage smooth contacts. The British Minister was thoroughly scathing in his comments on a major diplomatic triumph shared by the United States and Brazil, namely, the  22  3? v i s i t of Lauro MBller, Minister for Foreign Affairs after the death of Rio Branco, to Washington in 1913s The Press has worked up a good deal of fictitious p o l i t i c a l enthusiasm with reference to this v i s i t to the United States, and great hopes are expressed that the result may be an increase to the credit and prestige of Brazil. This is a l l very vague} as a matter of fact i t only amounts to the fact that Brazilian vanity is tickled, with the idea that their Minister for Foreign Affairs i s going to pay a v i s i t to a big country in a big ship. . . . As I have had the honour of remarking before, these sort of Brazilian circuslike processions, advertised with the big drum and the blare and blowing of trumpets—their own—have on previous occasions not resulted in any permanent advantage in the increase of the Brazilian receipts. * It is true tbaitate that British observers in Brazil were gener a l l y unimpressed by American diplomatic activities there.  The fact  that the United States was, however, able to capture the imagination of the press and public opinion from time to time—whether in a positive or a negative form—suggests that the effects of the approximation were greater than the British were willing to admit.  There is every reason  to suggest that British diplomatic efforts made l i t t l e or no impression on Brazil between the turn of the century and the First World War.  The  representatives of the United States in Rio made few references to their British colleagues during this period, thus showing that they were in no way concerned with British rivalry.  Assessments of American represen-  tatives are more frequent in British despatches, suggesting that Haggard and his colleagues were aware of the American challenge although they frequently claimed that i t amounted to nothing.  The Brazilian Review,  commenting on the differences in approach between the United States and  38 Britain on the occasion of the departure of British Minister Dering in 1905, made the following distinction: A curious commentary on the o l d " and "new" diplomacy was lately afforded here by the Light and Power question. The "old" diplomacy is dignified but useless, the "new" is alert and generally gets what i t wants. The former is [epitomised] by the British system; the latter by the American. The . . . Rio de Janeiro Light and Power Company is a Canadian concern. But i t was the American Ambassador and not the British Minister who concerned himself for its interests. Why?24 w  Britain was indeed undergoing a fundamental change of direction in her management of affairs relating to Brazil. The main lines of American policy in the southern continent also underwent a reorientation during the early years of the century, and a brief examination of i t throws some light on developments in Britain and Brazil.  The f i r s t major expression of United States attitudes towards  Latin America was the declaration by Monroe in 1@23 that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subject for future colonization by any European p o w e r . T h e basis of the so-called Doctrine was a desire for security, both collective and individual, and during the course of the nineteenth century there was no desire on the part of the United States to interfere with the p o l i t i c a l destiny of the other nations of the hemisphere—nor was the United States in any position to take action even i f i t wanted to do so.  During the f i n a l years of the  nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, however, the United States was to play a more active role in hemispheric affairs, and  39 adopted the functions of international policeman following a series of incidents in the Caribbean and Central America.  The Venezuelan c r i s i s of  1902-3, the growing tensions between the United States and Imperial Germany, the American involvement in the financial troubles of Santo Domingo in 190445, and the expansionist tendencies of American interests throughout the hemisphere and the rest of the world, a l l contributed to bringing about the change in direction which has become known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,  In practice, this meant that "in the  Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of , . . wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an internatio26 nal police power.  n  Roosevelt later made i t quite clear, however, that  his government had no intention of abusing i t s position and intervening at w i l l in the affairs of other nations.  On the contrary, he stressed  infehis message to Congress in 1905—a speech which was to receive considerable comment and support in B r a z i l — t h a t the responsible nations of Latin America need have nothing to fear: We must recognize the fact that in some South American countries there has been much suspicion lest we should interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince a l l the other nations of this continent once and for a l l that no just and orderly Government has anything to fear from us. There are certain republics to the south of us which have already reached such a point of stability, order and prosperity that they themselves, though as yet hardly consciously, are among the guarantors of this doetrine. These republics we now meet not only on a basis of entire equality, but in a s p i r i t of frank and respectful friendship, which we hope is mutual.27  40 With reference to the present study, two points emerge from the increased involvement of the United States in the affairs of Latin American nations.  F i r s t l y , the United States government was concerned in the re-  formulation of i t s policies with the smaller countries of the hemisphere, and particularly with those close to i t s own geographical sphere of interest, i.e., the Caribbean and Central America.  The focal points of Ame-  rican activity at the turn of the century~Cuba, Venezuela, Santo Domingo— a l l l i e within this sphere, and involvement in the larger, more distant countries of the hemisphere, particularly Argentina, Brazil and Chile, was of a different nature. Secondly, the European nation to express most general support for the American role of policeman in the western hemisphere was England, and far from opposing American diplomatic activity in Latin America she actually endorsed i t and saw that here was an effective way of protecting British interests.  The British press, as  well as the government, seemed even more committed to the new line traced by Roosevelt i n the early years of the century than was American public 28 opinion i t s e l f .  The point was lost, however, on members of the British  community in Brazil and on officials concerned with Anglo-Brazilian relations.  With the exception of the period of the First World War, i t i s  hard to find any evidence of a bond of interest between Britons and Americans in Brazil.  On the contrary, the British seem to have shown  a superior disdain for their rivals, and the Americans appear to have been generally unaware of, or uninterested i n , British presence in this part of Latin America.  {  41 The various manifestations of the Monroe Doctrine met a mixed reception in Brazil during the years before the First World War.  Official  policy, frequently expressed in the columns of the Jornal do Commeroio, was quick to appreciate the new developments in the United States a t t i tude towards her southern neighbours.  Three major articles on Brazilian-  United States relations appeared in 1905 and 1906, a time of intense diplomatic activity between the two countries, praising the United States and suggesting that approximation should be the main feature of Brazil lian external policy.  Two of these articles, "A Embaixada Americana"  and "0 Congresso Pan-Americano," were written by Graca Aran ha, who maintained close contact with Rio Branco and Joaquim Nabuco, and the third, "0 Brasil, os Estados Unidos e o Monroisrao," written by J. Penn, is said 29 to be the work of the Barffo himself, publishing under a pseudonym.  7  J. C. Rodrigues, the editor of the Jornal do Commeroio, was generally sympathetic to the approximation, although he denied that his newspaper was the mouthpiece of the Rio Branco ministry.^ There is no doubt, however, that apart from o f f i c i a l policies and public statements in the Jornal do Commercio, the developments of the Monroe Doctrine met considerable and hostile opposition in Brazil. The contemporary press is f u l l of articles which draw attention to the dangers of American expansion.  The Correio da Manna* published frequent  commentaries on the Doctrine and i t s effects.  G i l Vidal, one of i t s  regular correspondents, harangued continually against American penetration of Brazilian a f f a i r s : "Sem ser dos que repellem in limine o novo  42 monroismo, nam dos que nelle enxergam gravissimos perlgos para o nosso paiz, comtudo naTo vemos a necessidade do Brasil apressar-se em adherir & doutrina do presidents Roosevelt, ou em conformar-se com a superioridade que se arroga a grande potencla sobre as nacffes sul americanas, istbJe'f. em submetter-se & suzerania, diga-se a verdade, que os Estados Unidos pretendem exercer sobre elle como sobre as demais Republicas do nosso 31 continente."  Various other newspapers took the same line of hostility  to Roosevelt*s pronouncements.3  2  W  Cartoons were frequent. One, entitled  A Doutrina de Monroe," showed a predatory Uncle Sam straddling the globe  and gripping South America with gigantic eagle-clawahands.  The caption  reads: "A America dos americanos."^ Press criticism of the expansion of the Monroe Doctrine showed a marked desire to remain free of any trouble involving the giant of the north.  Nothing of note equalled the violent tone of Eduardo Prado's A  Tllusffo Americana, f i r s t published i n 1893» seized by the government on account of i t s rabid anti-Americanism, and then re-published in the same form over twenty years later with a note on the t i t l e page designed to entice the hesitant reader: "A primeira edicffo f o i confiscada e supprimida por ordem do Governo B r a s i l e i r o . " ^  It was pointed out by some  perceptive observers that there was really l i t t l e connection between Brazil and the main interests of the United States within the terms of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary—namely the countries of the Caribbean and. Central America.  The moderate view, which stands  somewhere between the o f f i c i a l praise of Rio Branco and Nabuco and the  43 criticisms of Eduardo Prado or G i l Vidal, i s perhaps best expressed by Alberto Torres, who replied thus to a suggestion that Brazil and Argentina should support American intervention in Mexico as a demonstration of hemispheric solidarity: No que toca a* influencia e acgffo dos Estados n  Unidos, entre o Pacifico e as aguas do golpho do Mexico e do mar das Antilhas, na*o ha nenhum interesse, nem nenhum principio que justifique a cooperacaTo das Republicas sul-americanas com sua grande irma* do Norte. Os interesses geraes da America do Sul nffo attingem os factos especiaes dessa p o l i t i c a , peculiar aos Estados Unidos; as razoes e as conveniencias que as die tain, cessam, por sua vez, as margens do canal do Panama*. "35 British acceptance of the police function of the United States in the western hemisphere has already been noted.  The point was not  missed by Brazilian observers, and G i l Vidal thought that British reactions were of sufficient importance to be brought to the attention of his readers.  In an article entitled "0 Novo Monroismo e a Jjnprensa Ingleza,  w  he showed that Britain, with such massive investments in Latin America, was only too pleased that they should be protected by the United States. He said that statements by Roosevelt and Root were received with equal enthusiasm in England, but that some newspapers hads raised questions about the extent of American responsibilities throughout the hemisphere. iThe Globe, for example, had asked whether countries l i k e Argentina, Brazil and Chile would accept protection without having been asked to accept i t or without having proposed i t themselves.  The P a l l Mall Gazette, while  welcoming the terms of recent policy statements in the United States,  44 saw the dangers of s t r i c t application of the Monroe Doctrine leading to 36 a series of undesirable conflicts.  The Globe reached the conclusion at  a later stage that although the United States had p o l i t i c a l ambitions i n South America, the larger republics of that continent were quite capable of taking care of themselves.37  F. A. Kirkpatrick, the historian and  scholar, wrote in the Times South American Supplement not long before the outbreak of the First World War on the subject of Pan-Americanism,  He  saw the dangers of possible American aggression south of the Rio Grande, but said that the main element of amerlcanismo was that i t was antiEuropean: "In fact the word 'Pan-Americanism' and the motto 'America for the Americans' imply that the republican parts o f the American continents are a closed preserve.  The problem remains, 'For whom are they preserved?'"'  Evidence suggests that both Brazilian and British attitudes to American influence i n Brazil changed considerably, i f temporarily, in the period immediately following the end of the First World War. In mid-1919 the Brazilian press was particularly active i n its criticism of its northern neighbour, and the wave of unpopularity affected commercial circles in Brazil.  The British Minister did not think of the Monroe Doctrine as  being a major force in Latin America, "unless the term is used in a limited sense and intended to convey the meaning of America for the Americans." A few days later, writing about the climate of hostility in Brazil, the same observer was to put his finger on a development i n Brazilian foreign policy which has already been mentioned and which w i l l be discussed in detail i n a later chapter of the present s t u d y i &  "I am of the opinion that the  45 present phase is only temporary and largely a result of a combination of various independent circumstances which w i l l not appear again, but i t is nevertheless sufficiently marked to be placed on record, showing as i t does that the international position of Brazil has changed considerably since the war and that the importance which she has acquired in the eyes of the world and especially in the sphere of South American politics is not conducive to the smooth working of Pan-American principles, unless applied with tact and discretion.* ^ 1  Epitacio Pessoa, on a v i s i t to the  United States in the following month, referred to the Monroe Doctrine on his arrival and said that '•Brazil had always recognized i t . " ^  1  The most apparent practical result of Brazil's interest in the United States during the Rio Branco era was the creation of embassies in Rio and Washington. The prestige involved, in this diplomatic move was considerable, as i t provided Latin America with i t s f i r s t United States Ambassador and Washington with the f i r s t Latin American representative of ambassadorial rank.  It also provided the American diplomatic service  in Brazil with a position of authority rivalled by that of no other ho  power.  Rio Branco played a strange role In the whole a f f a i r , and his  attempt to distort the facts of the case underlines his opportunism and perhaps even his embarrassment at opposition from within his own country. Minister Thompson sent to Washington two despatches which reveal the attempted distortion.  In the f i r s t , dated February 1, 1905, he submitted  an article from 0 Paiz of January 26, 1905, making the following comments on i t s origin: "It w i l l be noted that i t is evident one of the intents of  46  this article is to attribute the originating of the Embassy idea to the American Government. This doubtless was done for the purpose of quieting criticism, of which there is hen?,not a l i t t l e . . . . Astonishing as i t may seem, I am compelled to say that there i s no doubt but that this article was inspired by Baron Rio Branco.  Six weeks later, reporting  on his presentation to Rodrigues Alves as the new United States Ambassador, Thompson pointed out that Rio Branco was anxious to spread the idea that the initiative for the diplomatic move had come from Washington, and that he had tried to persuade Thompson to incorporate something to this effect in the o f f i c i a l speech to the President.  Thompson thought  that the whole manoeuvre sprang from Rio Branco's determination to establish the supremacy of Brazil throughout the continent, and, in particular, to outdo the Argentines.*** ' There seems l i t t l e doubt that, 4  despite the fanfares, Rio Branco's position was not as secure as he would have wished. The criticism noted by Thompson was particularly acute in the Jornal do Brasil, which described the embassy as an unjustifiable luxury.**-' British opinions on the creation of embassies in Rio and Washington are surprisingly few.  Comments by the British diplomatic staff  contain a feeling of uneasiness rather thanaopen praise or criticism, though British representatives were perhaps more aware of rank and a l l that i t entailed than they were prepared, to admit.^  Britain realized  that Brazilian foreign policy had two main spheres of activity, and that ahe herself had taken back seat by the beginning of the century.  "Brazi-  47 lian foreign policy may in fact be said generally to revolve round the United States and the Argentine Republic. . . . The key-note i s jealousy of the Argentine Republic, the progress of which the Government here, as 47 well as the people, view with a jaundiced eye." ' The United States-Argentine axis was also one of the fundamental guide lines of Brazilian commercial policy in the years before the outbreak of the Great War.  American trade with Brazil, on the increase  despite occasional fluctuations, was heavily balanced i n favour of the latter country.  Brazil exported far more to the United States than she  imported from that source, and her principal supplier of goods i n the 48 pre-war years remained Great Britain.  The basis of the imbalance was  coffee, and the United States, anxious to safeguard her own interests, pushed for concessions on American imports to Brazil.  The matter of  t a r i f f reductions, particularly on flour, occupied officials from both countries for several years, but the positive effect of concessions, onee they were granted, seems to have been minimal.  The situation wasscompli-  cated by the competitidnsoffArgentine wheat, and the Brazilian government was well aware of the p o l i t i c a l implications of any  settlement.The  Americans themselves were unhappy with the progress they were making. In 1903 Minister Thompson reported a decline in American exports to Brazil over the previous ten years, pointed out that American wheat was losing ground in-the face of Argentine competition, and suggested that his compatriots profit margin was too high.5° In 1910 the Brazilian Review, 1  looking back over a period of eight years, reported that British trade  48 with Brazil had suffered, but stated that "the United States has not only not bettered their [sic] position at British expense, but has positively lost ground."''"*" The Brazilian Review was edited by J. P. Wileman, an Anglo-Argentine accused by a United States Minister of being "strongly CO  anti-American in sentiment".  This weekly was, however, one of the  strongest advocates of the United States taking a hard line over t a r i f f concessions, suggesting that reprisals be taken i f concessions were not forthcoming.53 Until the First World War, the commercial and financial impression made by the United States in Brazil was extremely small.  It has been  described as follows in a recent study: "The t a r i f f concessions did not measurably increase exports to Brazil. . . . North American businesses s were not prepared to export in quantity to Brazil. . . . Steamship service between Brazil and the United States remained in the hands of Europeans. . . . There was no direct telegraphic communication, and messages had to be routed either via Europe or Argentina. . . . Throughout the Rio Branco period, United States-Brazilian reciprocal trade was extremely l i m i t e d . " ^ British observers were, however, aware of the potential dangers of American competition.  British flour interests fought the principle of  t a r i f f concessions to the United States, and were accused by Minister Thompson of fomenting opposition in the Rio press: "The President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Treasury, I feel are friendly to our country and justify us in our contention that much in the way of preferential treatment is due us, but the Legislative bodies, the  49 p&pers and the people are against us from every standpoint and because of these reasons the Administration is almost powerless to do for us.  The  reasons for the opposition to us are two fold: The f i r s t is the resentment, jealousy and. fear f e l t by most South Americans toward our country, and the other i s pre^jadice created by the newspapers subsidized by the English  mills. -*5 n  British Consul Hambloch was clearly aware of the latent American  challenge, stating prophetically that "the American is essentially out for big game."-^ Haggard, went further and suggested that the European nations cooperate in an attempt to stop the rapid expansion of United States interests in South America, drawing attention to the fact that the United States was more interested in Brazil than in any other part of the conti57  nent.-" The War eaused considerable disruption in the commercial activities of Brazil^ but in the years following 1918 the British showed rather more confidence in their own a b i l i t i e s than they had in pre-war days.  Arthur  Peel, the British Minister, was kprompted to write on the dangers of competition, but added confidently that "there has perhaps never existed a time when the relations between Great Britain and Brazil were so closely united as they are at present."  He commented on the unpopularity of the  United States in Brazilian commercial circles and contrasted this with the general enthusiasm f e l t about the Brazilian delegation to the Federation of British Industries in England. The Americans suspected once more that British companies were responsible for anti-American sentiments in the press.  This was denied by Peel, who wrote that " i t seems improbable as  50 from a l l sides there is a belief that British interests are in no danger from American competition." The impression was reinforced by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, head of a British Trade Mission to South America, who reported after discussions with the President, Epitacio Pessoa, that "the Brazilians were accustomed to doing trade with us.  They placed greater confi-  dence in our commercial honesty than in that of the Americans, and they preferred the British to the American commercial and financial connection." The pessimism and bitterness of the pre-war years and of the Rio Branco era seem to be missing in this wave of euphoria which overtook AngloBrazilian commercial relations in the period following 1918.  Brazilian  policy, under the guiding hand of Epitacio Pessoa, was clearly aimed at pleasing everybody. An American whose s p i r i t typified his country's commercial and business expansion throughout the world was Percival Farquhar, a man  who  shook up other foreign interests in Brazil and had l i t t l e time for Brazilians and their "narrow-minded nationalism."59 Farquhar's Syndicate was involved in business enterprises from one end of Brazil to the other. He bought out British transportation interests on the Amazon to form the Amazon River Steam Navigation Company (1911) Limited.  He played a leading  part in the construction of the Madeira-Mamore Railway, which provided at great cost a v i t a l link for the upper Amazon basin, and founded the vast structure of the Brazil Railway Company.^  The considerable press comment  on Farquhar's activities, particularly during 1912 and 1913, suggests that foreign involvement in the development of basic services in Brazil was  51 very much of a live issue.  There appeared in print some damning c r i t i -  cismsQf Farquhar"s work, the most vehement of these being a series of articles by Alberto de Faria in the Gazeta de Notlcias.^  1  Farouhar was  a very able businessman, however, and his efficiency was never in doubt. He had, according to one observer, done a good job of employing local labour: "Ihcontestavelmente o Sr. Farquhar tern sabido reunir em torno de s i brazileiros de real merecimento, que lhe tern prestado urn grande concurso, mas estamos certos que esses, os que se deixaram arrestar animados das melhores intenedes vend© de certo mod© a obra do Sr. Farquhar ligada ao progresso do nosso paiz, serffo mais tarde, em future que talvez na*o esteja muito longe, os primeiros a se penitenciarem de seu erro."°* On the other hand, Farquhar was not without his Brazilian admirers.  Senador Alfredo E l l i s , a man well-versed in economics, referred  to Farquhar as "o Napoleao das conquistas commerciaes . . . um Cecil Rhodes." 3 6  Ja  a  novo  speech to the Senate on December 21, 1912, Antonio  Azeredo praised the work of Farquhar, "que teve a coragem de trazer para o Brasil os seus capitaes e os capitaes alheios, confiante no nosso pro64 gresso e no futuro de nossa civilizacffo."  0 Imparcial published an  article supporting Farquhar's takeovers on the Amazon, proclaiming t r i umphantly "Os Inglezes se renderffo," and the Jornal do Commercio thought the article of sufficient interest to be reprinted in i t s own columns on the following day. 5 6  This daily, which had always worked in close colla-  boration with the government, made i t s position clear by publishing in February, 1913, an article by Luiz Gomes which referred to Farquhar in  52 the following glowing terms: Este nome tem que figurar fatalmente entre M  os de Rodrigues Alves, Rio Branco, Lauro Muller, Oswaldo Cruz e Frontin, como dos mais benemeritos de entre todos os que intelligentemente tern consagrado as suas energias na obra patriotica e civilizadora do progress© do Brasil.**  66  British reactions to Farquhar were somewhat curious. S i r William Haggard, ever sensitive to American progress in a f i e l d which had always been considered the preserve of the Englishman, believed that Farquhar was doing nothing but good, but that the p o l i t i c a l implications of his activities should be emphasized.  He typified the enterprising British  attitudes of the nineteenth century when he wrote that Farquhar was "the one man who . . . would perhaps have succeeded in setting Brazil on her legs. ' '' 1  6  7  But at the same time he was aware of what this would mean for  Britain, and in a special despatch concerning the Farquhar group reached the following conclusions, which are worth quoting at length on account of the light they throw on the present chapter: I do not believe that i n i t s primary intention any p o l i t i c a l motive was behind Mr. Farquhar's vast schemes in this and in other South American countries. I imagine him to be a sort of Napoleon of finance, who, finding a great unoccupied territory, set to work to conquer i t by means of railways and other public works, a conquest which, while improving the country, should presumably bring large financial profits to himself. It i s impossible, however, not to see that great p o l i t i c a l results may also follow and depend upon these schemes; one of these must necessarily be the bringing into close neighbourhood, either for friendly or for hostile purposes, the various countries of South America, between whom in the main there hitherto existed vast uninhabited wildernesses which rendered them unapproachable to one aanother. It is hardly also impossible not to realise the fact that, whatever the primary intention may  53 have been, the eventual resultswill be to bring the United States very much to the fore, at a l l events in Brazil, and perhaps throughout the continent. As a very experienced English man of business said to me, after coming up from Montevideo to Rio by the Brazil Railway as far as San [sic] Paulo, "Brazil has passed out of English into American hands." . . . There is at this moment a recently started crusade going on here against the Farquhar group. The danger to Brazilian independence is pointed out in vivid, not say [sic] exaggerated, terms, and the Government is being called upon to put a stop to an invasion "which threatens the very existence of the country." Floods of nonsense are written and talked on the subject. Appeals, for instance, are made to prevent other countries enriching themselves with the stores of iron ore which have been lying unworked ever since the discovery of the country, and w i l l so remain unless foreign capitalists are allowed to work them, greatly to the advantage of Brazil, as they are offering to do. The days of the rubber i n dustry in the north are numbered, and that d i s t r i c t may well now be saved by the undertakings of the group in the Amazon valley from going back to the bush. Vast tracks of f e r t i l e land, which can grow a l l the products of the world, have lain for centuries desert, peopled only by the wandering Indian or prowling jaguar; these have lately been thrown open by the Farquhar group to universal advantage, specially to that of this country Itself. They would have remained in the same useless condition had i t not been for the enterprise and genius of foreigners, who are now held up to execration as public robbers who are depriving Brazil of her birthright."® Haggard, though suspicious of American plans in Brazil, was clearly 69 committed to the cause of foreign development in that country.  Robertson,  his successor in Rio, agreed in principle but was more optimistic about the function of Europe in this process: "The country must have foreign capital to develop i t for a very long time to come, and that capital can, as yet, only come from Europe."^ Farquhar*s economic and p o l i t i c a l influence in Brazil was undev  niable.  His work was of a much more lasting nature than that of the only  comparable outside group in the early years of the century, the Bolivian Syndicate, which operated in the Acre territory and caused a considerable  54 flatter in Brazilian press and government circles for a while. Such were the main lines of United States-Brazilian relations in the period preceding the First World War.  It i s easy to draw a parallel  between North American interests and those of a European country wich was busy developing i t s commercial and p o l i t i c a l ties with many parts of the world, namely, Germany. Brazilian foreign policy was never as conscious of Germany as of the United States, and any potentially friendly links were severed by the outbreak of war in 1914.  Germany was, however,  aware of Brazil for a variety of reasons, though, as we shall see, perhaps less actively involved in the aggressive furthering of her own interests than sensitive American, British and Brazilian observers tended to believe.  The facts of German-Brazilian relations at the beginning of  the century are s t i l l obscure, and. no significant study has yet been made. It seems clear, however, that as i n the case of the United States, the point de depart of German interests was commercial, that some p o l i t i c a l designs developed from this, and that Brazil was concerned with Germany before 1914 almost exclusively because she was anxious to strengthen her own hand on the international front.  Sinister motives for German expan-  sion, though long suspected, never materialized. German trade with Brazil increased significantly during the years before 1914.  In 1912 she became Brazil's next best customer after  the United States,, and the British were well aware of the fact.''  2  In  the same year she came second to Britain in the Brazilian import l i s t s , retaining a position slightly ahead of the United States. The figures  55 were good, and everybody knew i t . ^ More important, however, were the reasons why progress was so Impressive, and in this respect Britain was closely involved. It seems clear that the Germans were altogether more serious and thorough in pursuing their objectives in Brazil than were their British counterparts. The British Minister seemed to think that the pace was l i t e r a l l y k i l l i n g German o f f i c i a l representatives, and was 74 amazed at their energy and directness of purpose.  In 1909» Milne  Cheetham wrote to the Foreign Office that German methods were "more thorough than ours.  German commercial travellers are to be seen in  every State, and they come equipped with catalogues and information in Portuguese.  I have been at some pains to ascertain in what way the  Germans work to get trade, since they have to start with the disadvantage that the British article has the better reputation.  As elsewhere,  they apparently supply a cheaper and inferior one, but more at the command of the inhabitants of a poor country, and they penetrate further into the interior, give longer credit, and finance storekeepers who do the local business." Cheetham was, however, suspicious of the honesty of some German businesses: "They are said to match the Brazilians in the matter of corruption, and to have made an art of false.customs declarations."75  Cheetham had put his finger on one of the major  strengths of the Germans working in Brazil, namely, the a b i l i t y to adapt to local needs.  Britain's failure to change i t s methods and keep abreast  of the times was one of the main reasons why competitors were able to make such progress in the early years of the century.  British business-  56 men and o f f i c i a l s were slower to recognize fundamental courtesies than were their r i v a l s , and at least one enlightened Englishman pointed out an example of the lack of communication between British sellers and Braz i l i a n buyers: "The Secretary of the British Legation in Brazil suggests the employment of interpreters to commercial travellers.  This is not at  a l l a practical idea, f i r s t because of the d i f f i c u l t y of getting a suitable man, and secondly because of the great expense entailed. Again I insist 7 6  on the necessity of the traveller knowing Portuguese himself." Germans were more conscientious, and quicker to obtain orders.  The Brazilians,  meanwhile, were not insensitive to the reversals in their foreign trade, and J. C. Rodrigues, the editor of the Jornal do Commereio, pointed out to his counterpart at the Times of London that " i t is a matter of regret to us that England's share of Brazilian ;trad.e, instead of increasing, i s steadily growing less every year.""''' 7  A large amount has been written, particularly in the contemporary press, about German p o l i t i c a l expansion in Brazil in the f i r s t decade of the century.  Articles attributing sinister motives to increased German  immigration in Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Parana" were as frequent as those claiming that the Germans had no interest in territory and were working only to increase their trade and commerce with Brazil.  The  Brazilian press was particularly sensitive at the time of increased German activities in the area of Venezuela.  I t was even suggested that Britain  had agreed to support Germany in the annexation of lands in southern Brazil, in return for certain concessions in South Africa.  7ft  The Jornal  57 do Commeroio commented on an article in the Times (February 26, 1903) which examined German designs in South America, with particular emphasis on the question of debt collection.  Brazil's leading newspaper followed some  months later with a report on the publication by Putnam of a volume entitled German Ambitions as they Affect Britain and the United States, which began l i f e as a series of articles by a certain "Vigilans sed Aequus i n the M  Spectator.?  The Jornal do Brasil was aware of the fact that Brazil was  9  dangerously open to a l l kinds of colonization, while welcoming the efforts of a group called the Sociedade Colonial Allema* to temper the more militant 80  aspects of pan-Germanism. mats resident in Brazil.  Alarm was not infrequent among foreign diploIn 1900, Colonel Page Bryan, the United States  Minister, reported a climate of hostility regarding German designs in Brazil, while his successor found i t d i f f i c u l t to reconcile currents of anti-American and anti-German feeling which seemed to be growing side by side. ! 8  British observers expressed similar sentiments.  Haggard sent to  the Foreign Office several despatches which tended to substantiate the following assessment which he made in 1910: "I am firmly convinced that . . . Germany s t i l l has in view the possibility of a p o l i t i c a l shuffling of the cards some time or other giving her the opportunity of gaining a foothold in Brazil, when, perhaps, her influence or possessions could be 82  extended to other parts of South America."  The British Ambassador in  Berlin, Earl Granville, kept London informed of developments from the German end.®  3  58 Anxiety about German t e r r i t o r i a l expansion in southern Brazil was, however, unfounded, and those who wrote about the dangers frequently had to admit that they did not really exist. Haggard himself qualified his remarks of 1910 in his "Annual Report, 1912," stating that from German interest to successful German intervention was a long step, and that the United States was too strong to permit any direct action in southern Brazil.  This impression was confirmed in other pieces of correspondence  from the British legation in Brazil.  Various despatches from American  sources at the beginning of the century tended also to suggest that nothing serious was developing in this area.**-' In short, therefore, i t can be stated tentatively that German ambitions i n southern Brazil were limited in their objectives. answer l i e s , no doubt, i n the German archives.  The f i n a l  At a time when German  military power was i n a position to challenge the combined forces of the British Empire, i t is not surprising that questions should! have been raised about the build-up of German interests i n relatively unprotected areas of the world.  One incident, involving German so-called aspirations  in Brazil and British reactions to them, has received l i t t l e publicity and is perhaps worthy of detailed comment. The Spectator, on November 16, 1912, published a letter from Mr. Seymour Ormsby-Gore, a member of a well-established British family with considerable financial and p o l i t i c a l backing, on the subject of German expansion.  It; read, in part, as follows:  59 There i s a way for Germany to realise her aspirations of colonial development which can in no way clash with the susceptibilities or interests of her blood relation [i.e., England], There exists one of the richest, i f not absolutely the richest, and worst-governed countries of the world in the Western hemisphere, where l i f e in the local towns and provinces is not safe for a moment, where fighting in the streets and vicinities of the towns i s so frequent that i t attracts l i t t l e attention from anyone except the actual participants, a country of extreme disorder and corruption; and that country i s Brazil. She would find her expansion, Brazil would become safe, c i v i l i z e d , and enormously prosperous. But, someone interposes, "the Monroe Doctrine". My answer i s , the Monroe Doctrine i n modern times is the biggest possible piece of "bluff", generally trotted out for electioneering purposes before a Presidential campaign. Ormsby-Gore probably did. not know Brazil, and his game of international power play was altogether preposterous.  On the other hand, his assess-  ment of conditions in Brazil bore a striking resemblance to that of S i r William Haggard, who had lived for many years in that country and had devoted a large part of his l i f e to the affairs of South America. Public reaction to Ormsby-Gore's article was immediate.  In i t s  following issue the Spectator published two letters of protest, one from a Brazilian who signed himself "A, G." and pointed out that "your correspondent advises England to allow Germany to take Brazil as nonchalantly as he might take a cup of our good coffee."  "A. G." suggested that i t  might be a l o t more d i f f i c u l t taking over Brazil than Ormsby-Gore imagined.  The second letter was from G. T. Whitfield Hayes, who claimed  to have spent seven years in Brazil and, unusually enough for a British observer of the time, who found i t to be quite unlike Ormsby-Gore's picture: "The country as a whole i s peaceably and sensibly governed, while the people are honest, law-abiding, kind-hearjted,«sand particularly  60 friehdly to foreigners. ....  I have walked, alone, late at night, through  the poorer quarters of Rio, Pernambuco, and Bahia with greater safety than I could have done in the poorer districts of London. Sordid crimes are practically unknown in B r a z i l .  M  Meanwhile, the a f f a i r was having serious repercussions in Brazil i t s e l f , as Haggard wrote in a despatch dated December 8, 1912.  The letter,  he stated, "has given rise to a loud anti-German clamour not only in the Press but also in Congress,  Constant letters and articles have appeared  pointing out the 'German danger', as i t is called, and how Germany has been stealthily preparing for the annexation of Brazil.  The German Minis-  ter, usually the most impassive and *boutonne"' sort of man, is much perturbed, and has told me that this i s very awkward for him, as he fears that the letter may be considered as a 'ballon d'essai*, and that in fact the German Government may have put Mr. Onus by Gore up to writing i t so as to see how the idea was taken."  The Ormsby-Gore letter, together with  remarks made by James Bryce in his recent book on South America, caused the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies to erupt in an outburst of xenophobia. Haggard appeared completely unconcerned: " i t i s propably going to subside, i f not as rapidly as i t arose, at least before very long, for Brazilian public opinion is like a weather cock." The episode blew over and. was soon forgotten. It was, however, indicative of certain European attitudes regarding Brazil, and of a past age in which the major European powers could arrange the destiny of the rest of the world.  It also illustrated yet another aspect of Brazil*s  61 86 sensitivity to foreign involvements in national a f f a i r s . At the diplomatic level there was much activity between Germany and Brazil in the years preceding the War.  That the Germans supported  any signs of military government i n Brazil, and that Britain was jealous of and disturbed by the friendly atmosphere existing in respective bases in Rio and Berlin, i s clear from contemporary accounts.  The British were  anxious to keep abreast of German attempts to woo Hermes de Fonseca, m i l i t a r i s t candidate opposing Ruy Barbosa in the 1910 general election and President of Brazil between 1910 and 1914.  As soon as Hermes emerged  as a candidate, Milne Cheetham drew attention to the mood of satisfaction at the German legation in Rio. '' The Brazilian press reported at an early 8  stage that the candidacy of Ruy met with support in England, while the Times was suspicious of Hermes' pro-German sympathies.  88  Haggard  seemed  equally suspicious, but thought that there was l i t t l e to choose between the two contenders. 9 8  If anything, he inclined towards Hermes, i f only  because of the "past record of treachery and venality"@6f Ruy.^  0  The  German press was generally happy with the result of the election, and plans went ahead for Hermes to v i s i t Germany in the summer of 1910.  He  had been there before in 1908, but the v i s i t of 1910 was a much more prestigious a f f a i r on account of his recent success in Brazil.  He was  sumptuously entertained in Berlin, was shown in some detail the progress of German military achievement, and was granted the rare p r i v i l e g e — f o r a foreigner—©f examining the German fleet.  The Jornal do Commercio  played a leading part in publicizing the v i s i t in Brazil, and Haggard  62 91 went so far as to accuse i t s editor of being a "strong Germanophil.  M7  The practical issue involved in this sudden flourishing of German-Brazilian p o l i t i c a l relations was that which concerned the possible appointment of foreign instructors to the Brazilian armed forces. There was nothing new about Brazilian officers being trained by Germans on German s o i l .  9 2  It was another matter, however, for foreigners to be  invited to carry out programmes of instruction within Brazil, and opinions at high level were of a varied nature.  The Brazilian navy  was without a doubt in need of some fundamental assistance.  Even the  Jornal do Commeroio was prepared to admit that naval organization was appalling and effectiveness almost n i l , and this newspaper carried on a protracted campaign for basic reforms and the employment of German naval instructors. The massive Minas Gerais, which had. recently arrived from the shipyards of the Tyne, was already a white elephant.  93  The  army was in a similar state, and the question of foreign instruction for this branch also was raised in 1910.  Negotiations petered out towards  the end of the year, and there is evidence that the Germans, though interested in principle, were obliged, to weigh carefully the possible reactions of European powers to close German contact with the Brazilian military.^  The issues were clouded by simultaneous manoeuvres concer-  ning the possible sale of the Brazilian Dreadnoughts, which had been b u i l t in England, bought by Brazil largely to satisfy her desire to outdo Argentina, and which proved to be unusable by the Brazilian navy.  The  Germans were in the market for these ships, the most formidable men-of-war  63 afloat, but negotiations never really got off the ground.95 The issue of instructors for the navy re-opened in A p r i l ,  1911.  Eneas Martins, who was closely concerned with the day-to-day working of Itamaraty during the f i n a l months of the Rio Branco ministry, informed Haggard that the President was thinking of appointing German instructors for the Brazilian navy, but that he, Martins, thought that British officers would be more appropriate.9^  Rio Branco, according to Haggard,  looked favourably on the appointment of Germans, and the British Minister proposed, with the authorization of the Foreign Office, that Brazil consider the possibility of British officers as instructors in her navy.9  7  Once again the whole matter was dropped for a while, possibly because of a waning German interest in the deal.  In November, negotiations broke  down on the question of remuneration, the German offer was withdrawn, and the whole a f f a i r was closed.9 the British throughout.  8  The Americans had gone along with  Although they had no particular interest in the  scheme, they were anxious to avoid seeing the Germans in a position of influence,99 The instructors never arrived; the Dreadnoughts were never sold; Santa Catarina was never annexed; the German trade threat was s t i f l e d by the War.  Such is the history of German relations with Brazil during the  early years of this century.  From the British point of view Germany was  always a serious potential r i v a l , but interests were never developed nor results produced.  It is perhaps curious that the British were frequently:  disturbed by this rivalry which came to l i t t l e , while considering American  64  involvements i n Brazil at that stage to be of relatively minor importance, Germany never came out and pursued a clear policy in the early years of the century, mixing "colonial" ideas with twentieth-century practices of trade and investment.  She wooed Brazil but, apart from providing a large  number of immigrants, made l i t t l e impact on Brazil's future destiny. The third major influence to r i v a l that of Britain was France, Unlike Germany and the United States, France was important in Brazilian l i f e mainly on account of her culture, her art, her literature and her manners, e  "Gultura so a Franca a tinha e sabedoria, patriotismo e finesse  savoir-faire,  No mundo, a Europa; na Europa, a Franca; na Franca,  Paris} em Paris, Montmartre,  Decididamente, sem uma viagem a Paris nfio  se completava nenhuma formaca*o cultural digna dSsse nome."  100  Gilberto  Freyre, in his study based on questionnaires received from contributors who had been brought up in Brazil at the turn of the century, draws attention to Brazilian devotion to Paris as the centre of the intellectual world.  For the educated Brazilian, Paris was "o centro da i n t e l i -  glncia," "o cerebro do mundo civilizado," "a capital do mundo," "a pa"tria da intelectualidade," *b unico s l t i o habitavel da Terra; o resto, paisagem."-^  1  MaYio de Alencar, in a maiden speech to the Academia Brasileira  de Letras in 1905} warned of the dangers of too much imitation of French cultural models, but admittedtjthat "e da Franca que nos chega para o 102  Brasil e Portugal quasi todo o alimento do saber e das belas letras." Georges Clemenceau stressed the importance of France in Brazilian intellectual development after a v i s i t to South America: "Two features in the  65 Brazilian character w i l l to my thinking remain predominant. They are democratic idealism and a consequent innate taste for French culture." 10  On the occasion of the v i s i t to Brazil of M. Paul Doumer in 190?» the Brazilian Review stated that "the position occupied by France in the history of the development of Brazil is that of leader in science, art and literature," and M. Henri Turot, a French journalist, wrote in a similar vein just one year before: "A cultura intellectual dos Brasileiros e* inteiramente franceza.  Nffo s6 todos os Brasileiros bem educados  fallam a nossa lingua com grand© facilidade, como a maioria delles hauriram a sciencia e o saber nos nossos escriptores e nos nossos dramaturgos.  Fazem melhor do que f a l l a r francez—pensam em  francez—creando  entre elles e nds um vocabulario commum que fomenta logo grande sympathia."  1 0 4  An interesting picture of French cultural influence in Brazil at the beginning of the century is painted in Carlos Maul's book of reminiscences, 0 Rio da Be l a Epoca. Maul, a journalist and somewhat prol i f i c writer, makes frequent mention of French customs in Brazilian cultural and literary l i f e .  He describes Paris as the "centro do uni-  verso do espirito," and refers to various examples of Brazilian imitation of French models: "Jjtiitar Paris eonstituia uma das preocupacffes dominantes nas classes cultas."  The mania for literary gatherings and  lectures soon caught on in Rio when i t became known that such was the custom in Paris.  Clothes were modelled on the latest Paris fashions,  and the newspapers took over the jargon of the couturiers: "Fulana,  66 elegantlssima, na sua 'toilette'•brode'e, en tule noir'. Beltrana, tout bien, no seu eompleto en rose satinee . .  Journalists adopted French  methods; writers formed p o l i t i c a l blocs, "correntes ideoldgicas que em essencia reproduziam, com retardamento, Menticas manifestagffes deflagradas na Franga"; and literary successes in France stimulated the production of imitative works in Brazil. influences.  The theatre was particularly open to French  Alexandre de Azevedo returned from Europe with the idea of  experimenting with open-air theatre, " t a l como se fazia na Franca."  The  technique of planting spectators in the audience to lead applause on cue was imported from France, and the Teatro Brasileiro attempted to f u l f i l in Brazil the role of the Comedie Francaise in France.  In the basement  of the newly constructed Teatro Municipal in Rio, the Assfrio restaurant served Bordeaux wine with i t s meals, and one of the essentials of any reasonable meal, according to Maul, was "meia garrafa de vinho francos autentieo, de Bordeaux." ^ 10  France showed a l i v e interest in Brazil during this period, and provided several important visitors.  Georges Clemenceau was impressed  by his warm welcome in Brazil in 1909, and became involved in an unpleasant way in the general currents of Brazilian-Argentine rivalry.• ° L0  Paul Doumer, the journalist, was so pleased, with what he saw in Brazil that he founded a new Franco-Brazilian "organization on his return to France in 1907. "'' Great efforts were made to promote Brazilian culture 10  in France.  A certain Manoel Gahisto and a colleague of his named  Lebesque were particularly active in this f i e l d , publicizing information  6? about literary trends in Brazil and translating leading Brazilian works •I  of the day.  rip  Rodolphe Broda, the representative of a review called  Les Documents du Progres: Revue Internationale wrote to Brazil in 1908 t  in an attempt to obtain "des breves notes sur les progres sociaux et intellectuels accomplis au Bresil.  Elles devraient orienter nos lecteurs  sur les faits nouveaux du developpement bresilien.  Je desirais aussi des  articles assez e*tendus sur les aetualites bresiliennes en tantqu'elle [sic] peuvent inte*resser des lecteurs europeens.""^  P o l i t i c a l and literary  interest often went hand in hand. An article by Gahisto entitled "Coelho Hetto, tm ecrivain bre*sllien ami de l a France," which appeared in Le Courrier Franco-Americain in 1918, described the literary work of the writer and praised his involvement with the Ligue pour les Allies during the course of the First World War.^^ It can be said, therefore, that France was the major cultural influence on Brazil in these years, and that each of the two countries showed a considerable interest in the other. On the commercial side, however, the outlook was bleak.  France had never occupied a leading  position in Brazilian trade figures, and statistics for the pre-war years show that far from increasing her percentage of trade with Brazil, France was doing no more than holding her own.  The Brazilian Review clarified  the situation on the occasion of the v i s i t of Paul Doumer in 190?: "A glance at statistics w i l l show that France i s f a l l i n g behind other countries as a supplier of goods to Brazil."  The same articles stated  that in the 1880's there had been "from 15,000 to 20,000 Frenchmen in  68 Rio, whereas the figure for 1907 was "barely 2,000." M  m  The point was  also made by Henri Turot following his v i s i t to Rio in 1906, and the Jornal do Commereio put the blame for "essa decadencia do commeroio" on the apathy of the French governing classes, "que mais euidam da casuis112  tica politica do que da prosperidade nacional." The French government may have been unaware of the opportunities offered in Brazil, but certain individuals were ready to try their hand at making fortunes at Brazil's expense.  One particular Frenchman named  Brlzet began an enterprise in the north of Brazil which, though doomed from the start by his flamboyance and foolhardiness, raised many o f f i c i a l eyebrows in Brazil in the early years of the century. To my knowledge, no historian has made mention of the colourful Brezet and his escapades, and a brief summary of his activities i s perhaps not out of place in the present study. There had been French activity in the area north of the mouth of the Amazon for almost two centuries before Bre*zet, and pockets of Frenchspeaking population remained in the v i c i n i t y of the Brazil-French Guiana border throughout the nineteenth century. One such community, named Counani, declared i t s e l f independent in 1886, appointing a Chief of State, setting up a court, and founding a national order, 1'Etoile de Counani, which had more members than the number of individuals residing in the republic.  The experiment was shortlived, and collapsed one year after  i t s inception.  In 1900, the border between French Guiana and Brazil was  f i n a l l y established by the arbitration of the Swiss government in Berne,  69 but i t was at this stage that Bre'zet, claiming to be President of Counani^ and refusing to accept the arbitration award in favour of Brazil, appeared on the scene.  Bre'zet was of French origin, and had been in Amazonia since  18?6, apparently serving in the Brazilian armed forces and possibly even popping up in the Brazilian legation in Paris for a while.  Bre'zet claimed  that the Republic of Counani, bounded on the north by the three Guianas, on the west by the Rio Branco and Rio Negro, and on the south by the Amazon (a vast piece of territory totalling some 650,000 sq. kms.), was i n habited by 40,000 whites, 150,000-200,00 mesticos, and millions of pure Indians.  With considerable energy but l i t t l e success, he attempted to  enlist the support of France, and various other European countries, in recognizing the new republic. His motives remain obscure.  It is known that the area supported  some gold mining at the beginning of the century, and that there were other potentially lucrative mineral and vegetable riches.  Bre'zet, however, made  few references to this side of the a f f a i r , concentrating instead on the justice of his t e r r i t o r i a l claims and attempting to recruit followers a l l over Europe. Press articles in Brazil, France and England erupted from time to time to comment on Bre'zet's peregrinations. In 1905 an associate of Bre'zet *s, Sarrion de Herrera, who claimed to be the representative of Counani to the governments of Spain, Portugal, Morocco and the Vatican, was arrested in Madrid for attempting to conspire against the Brazilian government. According to press reports of the time, he had already organized a sizeable army to fight against Brazil, and had brought together  70 some four thousand followers, many of them Spanish army officers.  Offi-  cials in Europe were suitably enraged,, and Brazilians, though attempting to pass the whole thing off as a wild escapade, were clearly concerned. It was even suggested that the Americans were lurking somewhere behind Bre'zet with their eyes on the north of Brazil. Bre'zet met with l i t t l e success in his campaigns for recognition, and. after the Madrid conspiracy of 1905 blew over he disappeared from the limelight for a while.  An occasional note in the European press  depicted him as living close to starvation, f l i t t i n g from capital to capital, scarcely able to avoid, prison.  But Bre'zet was more tenacious  than was generally thought, and not long before the Great War he was s t i l l active in Europe, organizing his force of men ready to defend the independence of Counani.  By this time he had with him in London a new  Minister of Foreign Affairs, an American.  The Brazilian press s t i l l  took note of his presence, pouring scorn on him from a distance. But Bre'zet's day was over, and after 1914 nothing more was heard of him 113  nor his valiant Republic of Counani.  J  Such were the main lines of foreign challenge to the supremacy which Britain had established in Brazil during the course of the nineteenth century.  The participation of other countries in the development  of Brazil between 1900 and 1920 illustrates something of the fundamental change which was taking place in the whole structure of Brazilian foreign relations and to which reference was made at the beginning of this chapter.  Brazil was opening up and was becoming respectable on the interna-  71 tional front.  Her foreign contacts slowly diversified; massive foreign  immigration to Brazil, which had. helped, in the development of the southern states in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and which was  still  in f u l l swing, added a new dimension to Brazil's already complex ethnic make-up; overall foreign trade and investment increased; p o l i t i c a l and social structures began to modify as a result of foreign contacts (a smattering of anarchists among Italian immigrants caused the occasional alarmist note in contemporary writings); and, f i n a l l y , Brazil was becoming known throughout the world as a country which deserved, and intended to use, a voice in international a f f a i r s . * * 11  It i s something of a paradox that while Brazil was making this entry into the world of the twentieth century, she was s t i l l caught up in "colonial* enterprises of a past age. 1  German t e r r i t o r i a l ambitions,  Brazilian worries over United States expansion under the cloak of the Monroe Doctrine, the attitudes of a Seymour Ormsby-Gore and the escapades of an Adolphe Bre"zet, a l l show that Brazil was not yet, or at least was not yet regarded as, a free agent in a thoroughly modern setting.  The  transition from an essentially colonial society, exporting cheap raw materials and buying expensive manufactured goods, to a "modern'*, independent and competitive community, is a slow process which in the case of Brazil has not yet terminated.  In many ways, however, the turning  point in this process can be traced to the early years of the present century.  72 NOTES See Prado Junior, p. 229. The author shows that the people who benefitted most from the manipulations were not the coffee producers but  the financial agents (pp. 231-233).  "In 1892 our exports to Brazil amounted to #14,000,000 and in 1902 to only #10,000,000." Thompson to Hay, National Archive, Brazilian Despatches (hereafter NABD), Vol. 69, November 12, 1903. Thompson reported that over the same period German and British exports to Brazil had declined. 2  3"Ih 1835 the value of goods sent to the empire from Great Britain was a l i t t l e over two and one-half million pounds sterling; by 1854-5, exports doubled in value; by 1863-4 they were forty-one per cent, over the 1854-5 figure; by 1874-5 they were fifteen per cent, above the value of the previous decade; by 1905 a decrease occurred when the average exports from England fell to the 1854-5 period; but by 1912, just prior to the World War, British sales to Brazil not only recovered from the depression of the early years of the twentieth century but reached the highest figure ever attained. Thus Great Britain, although i t was the leading supplier of Brazil in the early period with a relative high value of exports, succeeded in increasing i t s sales six hundred per cent, between 1835 and 1912." Manchester, pp. 322-323. 4 Graham, Britain and the Onset, pp. 75, 332. •^Financial Times, February 18, 1899. Reproduced in the Brazilian Review (hereafter BR), March 14, 1899. ... ""British Trade with Brazil," BR, January 4, 1910. Cf. Jornal do Commercio (hereafter J do C), January 13, 1907, which gives the following percentages (for 1906?): Imports from Brazil Exports to Brazil United States Great Britain 41.60% 26.50% Great Britain Germany 13.25% 9.15% Germany Argentina 7.50% 11.75% France United States 7.30% 10.25 % Aus tria-Hungary France 3.30% 9.00% Argentina Portugal 3.00% 7.35% Belgium Uruguay 2.00% 5.00% Uruguay Belgium 1.60% 3.50% Italy 3.25% ?A. K. Manchester writes that "the real struggle for supremacy came after 1918" (p. 334). He quotes 1925 as a turning point, adding that  73 "by the end of 1929 the United States was successfully rivalling Great Britain in the buying and selling markets of Brazil. On the other hand, in the fields of shipping and investments, English preeminence was s t i l l virtually unchallenged.*' (p. 336). J. Fred Rippy, however, in his study British Investments in Latin America, 1822-1949: A Case Study in the Operations of Private Enterprise in Retarded Regions (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966) refers to 1930 as the peak year of British investment in Brazil, quoting the total figure of 1287.3 millions for that year. 1930, according to Rippy, was also the peak year for British profits from investments in Brazil, with income reaching 115.1 millions (pp. 150-154). ^E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and BrazilianAmerican Relations (New York and London: Columbia Univ. Press, 1966). polltica de Rio Branco atendia a objetivos transitoYios e nfio permanentes. Ela visava fazer frente i s manobras hostis dos nossos rivais e estes, e* sabido, eram os argentinos. Do auge da tensffo argentinobrasileira, da disputa Rio Branco-Zebalos [sic], t i r a o propria Rio Branco a licao de que devfamos estar prevenidos com um apoio ao Norte (Estados Unidos) e um apoio ao Sul (Chile)." Rodrigues, p. 102. The point was not missed by contemporary observers in the British Foreign Office: "The most interesting feature in Brazil's foreign policy i s the increasing subserviency which she shows to the U.S. This is however probably due principally to her desire to have the U.S. on her side in the event of d i f f i c u l t i e s arising with Argentina." G. S. S[perling?], commenting on Sir William Haggard's "Annual Report" for 1910, Public Records Office (hereafter PRO) FO 371/1052, June 6, 1911. See also Haggard to Grey, PRO FO 420/256, February 14, 1912. Zeballos thought that Rio Branco's policy was merely one of Brazilian aggrandizement. The British Minister in Buenos Aires, Townley, reported an interview with the Argentine Foreign Minister: "National vanity was, he thought, at the bottom of i t a l l , and he believed that Brazil's idea was to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the United States as soon as she had a navy that was sufficiently strong to make her a worthy a l l y for the mighty northern Power. Brazil's ambition, he continued, is to prove to the world that she is the predominant Power of the southern, as the United. States is of the northern, continent." Townley to Grey, PRO FO 371/402, March 27, 1908. See also the assessment of U.S. Ambassador Thompson: "From my early acquaintance with Baron Rio Branco i t has been clear to me that his desire is that Brazil should in a way dominate South America, and the move for the exchange of Embassies is a move, i t would seem, for a closer friendship with the Washington Government, believing i t w i l l create a greater feeling of strength of his own. From things said to me on various occasions i t is certain Baron Rio Branco has no l i t t l e i l l feeling for Argentina, Peru and Bolivia, and no liking for any of the South American countries other than his own, unless i t may be Chile. . . . During the late trouble between Brazil and Peru, he said to me 'no Spanish  74 s p e a k i n g c o u n t r y i s good, and no p e r s o n o f S p a n i s h b l o o d c a n be b e l i e v e d ' . " Thompson t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 71, January 15, 1905. lOSee B» W. Munn, "Graca A r a n h a , Nabuco.,. and B r a z i l i a n Rapprochement w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , " L u s o - B r a z i l i a n Review, 6, No. 2 ( W i n t e r 1969),  66-72.  i:L  3 e e below, p p . 45-46.  T h e B r a z i l i a n Review suggested t h a t t h e "American, P o r t u g u e s e and German M i n i s t e r s , a n d , l a t e l y , t h e Uruguayan" were t h e o n l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f f o r e i g n n a t i o n s t o f u l f i l t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s I n t h i s r e s p e c t (August 23, 1 2  1904).  ^PRO FO 371/2294, October 7, 1915. S e v e r a l months b e f o r e , he had complained about t h e arrangements a t R i o , where t h e B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r was s c a r c e l y p a i d enough t o e s t a b l i s h h i s own house: "Can y o u c o n c e i v e o f a more u n s u i t a b l e arrangement when y o u c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e c h i e f b u s i n e s s o f t h e L e g a t i o n i s n o t so much p o l i t i c a l a s i t i s c o m m e r c i a l and t h a t i t m a i n l y c o n s i s t s i n p r o m o t i n g i n t h e f a c e o f g r e a t r i v a l r y on t h e p a r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h e i m p o r t a n t f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s o f G r e a t B r i t a i n and h e r Oversea Dominions." PRO FO 371/2294, March 10, 1915. 14  . An example o f t h i s c o n t a c t can be seen i n a l e t t e r dated A u g u s t 4, 1902, i n w h i c h he a s k s Vasco de A b r e u t o c o l l e c t a G r e a t Dane puppy w h i c h t h e M i n i s t e r has been r a i s i n g f o r him. ( B i b l i o t e c a N a c i o n a l , R i o : Secgffo de M a n u s c r i t o s [ h e r e a f t e r BNMS] 1 - 5 , 1 4 , 46). ^NABD, V o l . .68, October 21, 1902. C o n t a i n s c u t t i n g s from t h e f o l l o wing newspapers: C o r r e i o d a Manhff ( h e r e a f t e r C da M), September 27, 1902; A N o t i c i a , October 6, 1902; J do C,, O c t o b e r 7, 1902; G a z e t a de N o t i c i a s Thereafter GN), October 14, 1902; 0 D i a r i o , October 14, 1902. 1  ^ER,  December 2, 1902.  ' ^ P R O FO 371/1581, September 1, 1913. See a l s o Leon F. Sensabaugh, "The C o f f e e T r u s t Q u e s t i o n i n U n i t e d S t a t e s - B r a z i l i a n R e l a t i o n s : 1912-  1913," HAHR, 26 (1946), 480-496, pp. 495-496.  ^ B a r c l a y t o Grey, PRO FO 371/13, August 8, 1906. - P R 0 FO 371/831, December 15, 1909. See a l s o D e x t e r P e r k i n s , A H i s t o r y o f t h e Monroe D o c t r i n e (Boston and T o r o n t o : L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1955)9 P. 247: "Root v i s i t e d A r g e n t i n a , Uruguay, C h i l e , P e r u , C o l o m b i a , and Panama, as w e l l as B r a z i l : and everywhere he spoke the same language o f f r i e n d s h i p . D i p l o m a t i c a d d r e s s e s a r e n o t always a c c e p t e d a t t h e i r f a c e v a l u e ; b u t Mr. Root was s i n c e r e , and ho doubt some o f h i s h e a r e r s b e l i e v e d him." 1 9  75 PR0 FO 371/1302, June 10, 1912; FO 371/1581, September 1, 1913; FO 420/256, July 7, 1912. 20  21  PR0 FO 371/1302, January 30,  1912.  22  PR0 FO 371/1580, April 21, 1913.  See also Sensabaugh, op. c i t .  3pR0 FO 371/1580, May 17, 1913. Cf. Haggard's comments on the return of Muller from the United States: "Had Dr. Lauro Muller [sic] been a conqueror returning from a successful campaign, or a general who had defeated, we w i l l say, the Argentine, or a sovereign at his coronation, he could not have had a greater welcome than did Dr. Lauro Muller on his return from a trip to the United States. Personally I am not inclined to think that a l l this means very much. Brazilians have no sense of proportion and they delight in noise and in colours." PRO FO 371/1580, August 19, 1913. 2  Thompson to Hay, NABD, Vol. 71, June 1, 1905. 25por a f u l l study, see Perkins. James D. Richardson, Messages of the Presidents 1789-1897, 2nd. supplement (Washington, I896), p. 857. Cited in Perkins, p. 240. ?The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents 1790-1966 York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1967), Hl"Tl905-1966), p. 2166. 2  (New  See Perkins, Chaps. VI, VII. "The thesis that i f the United States would not permit others to intervene i t ought to intervene i t s e l f f i r s t found general expression, not in the American, but in the British press, and in the language of British statesmen. Nor was this by any means a mere whim of c i r cumstance; on the contrary, i t may be stated with some assurance that British policy was consciously directed towards gently leading the administration at Washington in the pathway of imperialism. What could be wiser and more statesmanlike, indeed, from the standpoint of British interest than to win the goodwill of the United States by the? recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, and at the same time to persuade the American government to assume the role of an international policeman in the New World, watching faithfully over vast economic interests which Englishmen had created there." (p. 232). 28  2 9  J do C, March 16, 1905; December 11, 1905; and May 12, 1906.  J do C (Edicffo da tarde), August 29, 1910. J. C. Rodrigues spent many years in the United States and England as a result of a misdemeanour in his youth (see Magalhffes Junior, pp. 158-181). He was later to become the most influential journalist in Brazil, with a magnificent library he assembled largely from sources in Europe. The J do C did not always support U.S. policies towards Latin America. See the criticism of Knox's handling of the Nicaraguan situation, August 26, 1910—written while Rodrigues was in Germany with Hermes da Fonseca, but almost certainly with his authority (Haggard to Grey, PRO F0 371/832, September 3, 1910). 3 0  76 G i l Vidal, "0 Novo Monroismo," C da M, March 2, 1906. See also Vidal, "0 Perigo Yankee," C da M, October 31, 1901, and articles in the same newspaper dated March 30, 1903 and June 11, 1904. 3 1  3 "0 monroismo e o avassallamento da America Latina," A Noticia, September 27, 1905; A Tribuna, April 1, 1903 and March 6, 1906; 0 Dia, March 8, 1906; Tribuna de Petropolis, March 9, 1905. 2  3 3 G N , January 29, 1905. 3^Eduardo Prado was the brother of Antonio Prado, and together they were strongly influenced by British ideas and methods and. played a significant part in the history of railway development in Brazil (see Graham, Britain and the Onset, pp. 195-196). Brazil has probably never produced such a violent piece of anti-American propaganda as Eduardo Prado*s A Illusffo Americana. To quote a brief extract from his concluding remarks: "Devemos concluir de tudo quanto escrevemos: . . . Que os pretendidos lacos que se diz existirem entre o Brazil e a republica americana, sffo f i c t i c i o s , pois nffo temos com aquelle paiz a f f i h i dades de natureza alguma real e duradoura; Que a historia da politica internaclonal dos Estados Unidos nffo demons tra, por parte d'aquelle paiz, benevolencia alguma para comnosco ou para com qualquer republica Latino-americana; Que todas as vezes que tern o Brazil estado em contacto com os Estados Unidos tern tido outras occasions para se convencer de que a amisade americana (amisade unilateral e que, alias, s6 no's aprego&nos) e* nulla quando nffo 4 interesseira; Que a influencia moral d'aquelle paiz, sobre o nosso, tern sido perniciosa." A Illusffo Americana, 4 ed. rev. (Sffo Paulo: n.p., 1917), pp. 250251. a  Alberto T6rres, "Doutrinas de Monroe," 0 Imparcial, January 16, 1913. Cf. "America-Brazil," ER, March 28, 1905, in which the author shows how l i t t l e Brazil and the United States have in common, and states that "there i s . . . no reason why we should not get along very well and be very good friends so long as we do not expect too much| or imagine that fine phrases alter sentiments or that the nature of things can be altered by diplomacy." 35  3 G i l Vidal, "OSNovo Monroismo e a Imprensa Ingleza," C da M, January 27, 1905. 6  The Globe, May 24, 1906. May 25, 1906. 37  £B),  Reported in Jornal do Brasil (hereafter  F. A. Kirkpatrick, "Pan-Americanism," Times South American Supplement, November 25, 1913.  77 •5Q  ^ See below, Chapter 5. 7  ^ P e e l to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3653, May 31, 1919. ^Lindsay (Washington) to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3655, June 28, 1919. 42 For an account of the events surrounding the exchange of embassies,  see Burns, pp. 95-102.  ^NABD, Vol. 71, February l, 1905. s  ^NABD, Vol. 71, March 18, 1905. ^ J B , January 14, 1905. See also JB, January 16, 1905. ** "Sir William Haggard thought himself overshadowed by his American colleague, who besides being a very wealthy man was the only foreign diplomatist with the rank of ambassador.'" Ernest Hambloch, British Consul (London: Harrap, 1938), p. 95. 6  ^Haggard, "General Report on Brazil for the Year 1906," PRO F0 371/201, A p r i l 30, 1907, p. 27. Ministe"rio da Fazenda, Directoria de Estatistica Commercial,^Commercio Exterior do Brasil: 1910-1911-1912 (Rio: n.d.), pp. 64-65, 76-77. /f8  ** For details of the Brazilian t a r i f f concessions to the United States, see Burns, pp. 58-75. 9  NABD, Vol. 69, November 12, 1903.  5G  " B r i t i s h Trade with Brazil," BR, January 4, 1910. 52  5 1  Bryan to Hay, NABD, Vol. 68, October 1, 1902. % l ,  5  January 5, 1903  ^Burns, pp. 72-74. %ABD, Vol. 70, June 24, 1904. May 4, 1904. 5  56  See also Thompson to Hay, NABD, Vol. 70,  PR0 FO 420/254, October 23, 1911.  57 PRO F0 420/256, February 19, 1912.  78 P e e l to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3654, May 20, 1919; Peel to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3653, May 31, 1919; Barclay (Washington) to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3656, June 6, 1919; Peel to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3656, June 12, 1919; de Bunsen to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3655, June 8, 1919. 58  CO  ^Ernest Hambloch may well have been thinking of Farquhar when he wrote: "American concession-hunters had just begun to discover Brazil. They came down to Brazil like the Assyrian on the fold. By unabashed frontal attck, in which cheque-books and fountain-pens played no inconsiderable part, they overcame a l l opposition. American concerns followed, in their wake. Their arrival caused a flutter in the dovecots of the British community, whose social and commercial prestige had t i l l then been unchallenged. But in the susequent rough-and-tumble between British and Americans both sides gained. The resentful exclusiveness of the British and the noisy intrusiveness of the Americans eventually merged , into mutual understanding and good feeling." British Consul, p. 95. For a careless but heavily documented account of the most, influential American businessman ever to be involved in Brazil, .see Charles A. Gauld, The Last Titan: Percival Farquhar, American entrepreneur in Latin America "(Stanford, California: Institute of Hispanic American and Lusd-Brazilian Studies, 1964). For a nationalistic attack on Fafquhar's work, see Antero Freitas do Amaral, Syndicato Farquhar: Forca e Grandeza: Assalto e Conquista: Naoionalismo(Rio: n.p., 1915). S i r William Haggard, in a despatch to Sir Edward Grey dated, December 23, 1912 (PRO FO 420/257), made a f u l l l i s t of the activities of the Farquhar group of companies in Brazil. They include railways, port works, steamship lines, hotels and tramways. D U  January 6, 1913; January 9, 1913; January 11, 1913; January 12, 1913. Faria wrote: "Isso nffo e desenvolver-se, na*o e crescer, e entregar-se, 4 vender-se." (January 11). 61  62 ^ Amaral, p. 48. 2  63 Interview published in A Noite, November 19,  1912.  64 "A questaTo do naoionalismo," reprinted in J do C, January 3, 1913. V i r g f l i o de Sa* Pereira, 0 Imparcial, January 3, 1913. Reprinted in J do C, January 4, 1913. 6 5  J do C^ February 18,  1913.  67 'Haggard, "Annual Report, 1912," PRO FO 371/158I, June 19, 1913, p. 24. 68 Haggard to Grey, PRO FO 420/257, December 23, 1912. 0  79 H i s belief in Brazilian incapacity for almost any kind of work w i l l be discussed, i n Chapters 3 and. 4. 69  °"Annual Report, 1913, n PRO FO 371/1915, January 15, 1914, p. 8.  7  71 For details of the Acre question, see Burns, pp. 76-84. Robertson, "Annual Report, 1913," PRO FO 371/1915, January 15, 1914, p. 18. 72  ?3por figures and comments see, among others, BR, December 27, 1904; Cheetham, "Annual Report, 1908," PRO FO 371/604, February 25, 1909, pp.-9, . 29; A Tribuna, March 14, 1910, quoting recent article in Times South American Supplement; J.C. Rodrigues to editor of Times, quoted in Haggard, "Annual Report, 1909, PRO F0 371/832, March 19, 1910, p. 32; Times, February 1, 1911; Haggard, "Annual Report, 1912," PRO F0 371/1581, June 19, 1913, p. 35; Robertson, "Annual Report, 1913, PRO F0 371/1915, January 15, 1914, p. 18. M  n  7/+  Haggard, "Annual Report, 1909," PRO FO 371/832, March 19, 1910, p. 9.  Cheetham, "Annual Report, 1908," PRO FO 371/604, February 25, 1909,  75  p. 9. ^ J . C. Oakenfull, Brazil in 1912 (London: Robert Atkinson, 1913), p. 143. Italics in the original. 7  "^Cited i n Haggard, "Annual Report, 1909," PRO FO 371/832, March 19, 1910, p. 32. The Brazilian Review was equally regretful—and pessimistic— about the loss of British trade to German rivals, and elaborated on some of the reasons in an early article entitled "British Trade with Brazil": "An unusually interesting report on the trade of Santos has been issued by the Foreign Office, covering the period from 1902-04. Some of the London papers? complain that such tardy figures can be of l i t t l e value to British traders. We, however, think otherwise, and are of the opinion that Mr. Mark has done a notable service in pointing out the particular branches of imports from Great Britain that show a decline or tendency to decline and the way in which British trade may be regained or at least further decline may be prevented. Whether the British merchant w i l l pay attention is another matter. He is so wedded to routine, so contemptuous of small lines of business that something like an earthquake seems necessary to s t i r him. Only lately we heard of a case that is typical of some of the causes jbhat have led to supercession of English by German trade. Quotations for printing paper were asked for c . i . f . at Rio at 90 d/s. Prices to be quoted per ream. In almost every instance the replies quoted cash f.o.b. at British ports, per ton, and the business went to a German firm willing to meet the buyer's requirements. The business in question was, no doubt, but a small one but 'many a mickle makes a muckle,' and i t is by never  80 r e f u s i n g an o f f e r , however s m a l l , t h a t t h e Germans have b u i l t u p t h e i r s p l e n d i d t r a d e . " ( F e b r u a r y 13, 1906). 7 " 0 S u l do B r a s i l : 0 P i a n o d a A l l e m a n h a " , A T r i b u n a , December 17, 1902. C f . J B , December 17, 1 9 0 2 . ~~ 8  7  J do C, F e b r u a r y 27, 1 9 0 3 ;  J u l y 31, 1 9 0 3 .  " P e l o Mundo," J B , March 7 ,  1903.  9  8 0  B r y a n t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 65, September 25, 1900; Thompson t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 6 8 , J u l y 28, 1 9 0 3 . 8 1  H a g g a r d , "Annual R e p o r t , 1909," PRO FO 371/832, March 19, 1910, p . See a l s o FO 371/605, O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1909, i n w h i c h Haggard suggested t h a t Germany f a v o u r e d an A r g e n t i n e a t t a c k on B r a z i l i n 1907ffibecause s h e saw o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r h e r own t e r r i t o r i a l g a i n ; F 0 371/831, December 30, 1909, i n w h i c h he t a l k e d o f o f f i c i a l German a i d t o German B r a z i l i a n s i n the south;} and F 0 420/252, June 30, 1910, i n w h i c h Haggard commented on a l e t t e r i n t h e J do C w h i c h p o i n t e d o u t t h a t some German maps r e f e r r e d t o c e n t r e s o f German p o p u l a t i o n i n S a n t a C a t a r i n a a s " c o l o n i e s " . 8 2  10,  G r a n v i l l e ( B e r l i n ) t o G r e y , PRO FO 3 7 1 / 1 0 5 2 , O c t o b e r 27, 1911; FO 37I/I303, September 9 , 1912. 8 3  ^ H a g g a r d , "Annual R e p o r t , 1912," PRO FO 3 7 1 / 1 5 8 1 , June 9 , 1913, p . 9 ; O ' R e i l l y t o G r e y , PRO FO 3 7 1 / 1 3 0 2 , December 8 , 1911. ^ B r y a n t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 65, June 25, 1900; V o l . 66, M a y ? 1 7 , 1 9 0 1 ; Thompson t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 6 8 , May 9, 1 9 0 3 ; V o l . 69, December 1 0 , 1 9 0 3 . 8  86 For d o c u m e n t a t i o n o f t h e Ormsby-Gore l e t t e r , see t h e S p e c t a t o r , November 16, 1912; November 23, 1912; November 30, 1912; and. Haggard t o G r e y , PRO FO 371/1303, December 8 , 1912. ( I n the margin o f t h i s despatch, a r e a d e r i n t h e F o r e i g n O f f i c e has w r i t t e n o f Ormsby-Gore: " l o r d H a r l e c h ' s brother a p a r t i c u l a r l y f o o l i s h person"). 8  7 p R 0 FO 371/604, May 28, 1909.  op  A N o t l c i a , O c t o b e r 14, 1 9 0 9 . 89  PR0 FO 3 7 1 / 8 3 1 , J a n u a r y 7 , 1 9 1 0 .  ^ I b i d . , March 7, 1 9 1 0 .  91 For B r i t i s h comments on t h e v i s i t o f Hermes t o Germany i n 1 9 1 0 , s e e Haggard t o G r e y , PRO FO 3 7 1 / 8 3 2 , J u l y 15, 1 9 1 0 ; J u l y 2 1 , 1 9 1 0 ; J u l y 30, 1 9 1 0 ;  81 August 3, 1910; September 3, 1910; and Goschen (Berlin) to Grey, PRO FO 371/832, July 22, 1910; July 29, 1910. 92  R i o Branco to Ministro da Guerra, AHI 15/300/1/7, February 12, 1906.  See J do C, July 7, 1910; July 14, 1910. The appalling state of the Brazilian navy is confirmed by Haggard in PRO FO 371/831, July 10, 1910; July 15, 1910. 93  **See, for example, an article in the Hamburger Nachrichten, November 1, 1910. The author, a German living in Brazil, believed, that the army was beyond help. 9  ^ J , c. Rodrigues, whom Haggard described as a "strong Germanophil" in July, 1910, was reported by Haggard a few months later to favour the sale of the Dieadnoughtsgto England so that Germany would not get her hands on them (PRO FO 371/1051, December 13, 1910). 9  9 Haggard to Grey, PRO FO 371/1051, sApril 3, 1911. 6  9?  I b i d . , April 8, 1911.  0 ' R e i l l y to Grey, PRO FO 371/1051, July 28, 1911; August 22, 1911; November 20, 1911. 98  F o r American reactions, see O'Reilly -to Grey, PRO F0 371/1051, October 3, 1911; Haggard to Grey, PRO FO 371/1303, September 9, 1912; Rives to Knox, NABD (1910-1929: P o l i t i c a l ) , February 15, 1912. 99  V i a n n a Moog, Bandeirantes e Pioneiros: Paralelo entre duas culturas, 8 aed. (Rio: Civilizagffo Brasileira, 1966), p. 123. l00  a  101  F r e y r e , Ordem e Progresso, II, p. 633 et seq.  102  Cited in Humberto de Campos., Antologia da Academia Brasileira de Letras: Trinta anos de discursos academicos 1897-1927 , 2 ed. (Rio, Sffo Paulo, PSrto Alegre: W. M. Jackson, 1945), p. 88. a  Georges Clemenceau, South America To-day (London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1911), p. 235. 103  BR, Spetember 10, 1907; "A Influencia Franceza no Brasil," J do C, November~3~0, 1906. lo2+  -  C a r l o s Maul, 0 Rio da BeLa Spoca (Rio: Sffo Jose, 1967), pp. 23, 26 , 27 , 45-48 , 57 , 63, 347 79-BI7 107, 109, 115l 127, 198. 105  ;?  82 106  107  BR, May 25, 1909.  Ibid.., December 3, 1907.  108  M. Gahisto to Coelho Neto, BNMS I - 1,3,11, October 19, 1914;  BNMS I - 1,3,17, February 1, 1919.  Rodolphe Broda to Domingos Jaguaribe, BNMS I - 5,3,8, January 25, 1908. He was prepared to offer f i f t y francs an a r t i c l e , or twenty francs per page for notes breves. According to ex-president Rodrigues Alves, who returned to Brazil at the end of 1908 after one and a half years in Europe, curiosity about Brazilian progress was not confined, to France: "The general opinion is that we are a country which is now just beginning, and about our l i f e and our customs there is a great curiosity. Politicians of high standing with whom I conversed already know a good deal about Brazil, and are determined to know more. Toiday in Europe people want to know how our great industries are progressing, whilst the governing classes are seeking information with regard to a l l the branches of our activity, and. to our internal organisation. There is an intense curiosity to-day in Europe with regard to Brazil." Quoted in BR, December 1, 1908. 109  "^M. Gahisto, "Coelho Netto, un Icrivain bresilien ami de l a France," Le Courrier Franco-Americain, Ed. Frangaise, 2 Annee, No. 12 (November 21, e  1918J:  1:L1  1 1 2  BR, September 10, 1907. J do C, November 30, 1906.  113 -"There is extensive documentation of the Counani affair in the Braz i l i a n , French and English press of the day. On the Brazilian side see, among others, J do C, February 24, 1904; February 26, 1904; A p r i l 23, 1904; A p r i l 25, 1904; May 8, 1905; May 10, 1905; May 18, 1905; May 21, 1905; June 2, 1905; June 3, 1905; June 6, 1905; June 30, 1905; August 27, 1905; October 22, 1905; March 12, 1906; March 13, 1906; May 3, 1906; May :6, 1906; May 17, 1906; May 21, 1906; May 31, 1906; June 8, 1906; June 9, 1906; January 23, 1913; JB, February 29, 1904; April 21, 1904; May 7, 1905; May 8, 1905; May 9, 1905; May 12, 1905; May 23, 1905; June 2, 1905; October 7, 1905; January 11, 1906; June 6, 1906; 0 Paiz, February 25, 1904; February 27, 1904; May 8, 1905, May 15, 1905; May~287 1905; June 30, 1905; GN, May 7, 1905; May 8, 1905; May 10, 1905; May 12, 1905: May 13, 1905; May 187 1905; June 7, 1905; July 1, 1905; July 2% 1905; August 19, 1905; August 22, 1905; September 11, 1905; October 7, 1905; March 11, 1906; May 3, 1906; A Notlcia, May 12, 1905; June 29, 1905; August 18, 1905; August 19, 1905; August 26,  1905; May 5, 1906* BR, June 6, 1905; June 13, 1905; May 22, 1906; May 29,  1906; June 5, 1906; April 30, 1907; A Imprensa, May 30, 1911. See also Rio Branco to J. C. Rodrigues, BNMS I - 3,4,61, August 9, 1900(?); Sentence  83 du Conseil Federal Suisse dans l a Question des Frontieres de l a Guyane Frangaise et du B r l s i l (Berne, 1900), I, H I , 396-401; and Thompson to Hay, NABD, Vol. 71, June 14, 1905. An article entitled "The Republic of Counani" is at present being prepared by this writer. " ^ B r a z i l made considerable efforts to publicize her progress among foreign countries, Bresil, which was published in 1890, was perhaps the f i r s t example of this national publicity (see Rio Branco to Ruy Barbosa, ART APRB 3/l/l8, February 12, 1890). An attempt which backfired was the v i s i t of Guglielmo Ferrero. Ferrero, an Italian historian of some fame, was invited to Brazil in 1907 mainly because he would represent a potentially useful publicity agent after his return to Europe. The v i s i t had been suggested by Machado de Assis, and was given the enthusiastic support of Rio Branco. Ferrero, however, remained strangely silent about the progress of Brazil after returning to Italy. Instead his wife, Gina Lombroso Ferrero, published a book in which she violently attacked Brazil, suggesting, among other things, that i t was dangerous to walk down the Avenida Rio Branco because of the snakes. For a summary of the a f f a i r , see Maul, pp. 123-125.  CHAPTER i n BRITONS IN BRAZIL: SOME REPRESENTATIVES AND ATTITUDES The British community in Brazil in the f i r s t two decades of the century was quiet and generally unobtrusive, and a lack of written records makes i t d i f f i c u l t to come to any detailed conclusions about i t s composition and a c t i v i t i e s . One can only guess at the lives and attitudes of a l l but the leading members of the community, the businessmen, the bankers, and the diplomatic and consular o f f i c i a l s , but these were clearly the best informed Englishmen in Brazil, and their thoughts and actions are important in any assessment of Anglo-Brazilian relations. By contemporary standards, the community was not particularly large.  In the Federal District in 1906 there were some 1,671 Englishmen,  a number made up of more than twice as many men as women. This compared with 133,393 Portuguese,  2.5*551  Italians, 20,699 Spaniards, 2,575 Germans,  3,474 Frenchmen, and 406 "anglo-amerieanos.By 1920, the English population of Rio de Janeiro had increased to 2,057, the increase since 1906 being made up entirely of women. The corresponding figures for other foreign communities in 1920 were as follows: 172,338 Portuguese, 21,929 Italians, 18,221 Spaniards, 2,885 Germans, 3,538 Frenchmen, and 1,066 Americans.  Outside the capital, the main pockets of English population  were in the State of Sffo Paulo (2,918), the city of Sffo Paulo (1,212), Minas Gerais (1,702), the State of Rio (647) and Rio Grande do Sul (432). 84  85 The Germans and Italians far outnumbered. Englishmen in the early post-war years (in 1920 there were 11,060 Germans and 398,797 Italians in the State of Sffo Paulo, and 16,952 Germans and 49,136 Italians in Rio Grande do Sul), while American figures were s t i l l extremely small (1200 in the State of Sffo Paulo, 233 in Rio Grande do Sul, and 138 in Minas Gerais).  3  Brazilian population figures for the period under consideration show tremendous increases.  Between 1900 and 1920 the population of Sffo Paulo  virtually doubled; the Federal Distriot of Rio de Janeiro rose from a l most 700,000tto over 1,100,00; Minas Gerais was up from 3,594,471 to 5,888,174; and Rio Grande do Sul, like Sffo Paulo, had almost doubled, i t s 4 1900 population figure by  1920.  A large part of the British community in Rio de Janeiro lived away from the city, most of them across the bay in Niterd*i and some in the h i l l s at Petropolis. For this reason the population figures for the Federal District can be regarded as somewhat low, for many men resident in the State of Rio worked, ate, and met one another in the Federal District.  Those who chose to live in the city took houses in the more  fashionable and healthy suburbslr-G16*ria, Lagfia, and even as far afield as Copacabana—but for others the two hour journey down from Petrdpolis or the ferry ride from Niter<5i was readily justified by the peace and tranq u i l l i t y these two towns represented.  Most Englishmen were involved in  the import-export business, in commerce, in banking, and in c i v i l engineering projects.^ They were usually men of some education, and most of them at managerial level were responsible to some head office in London  86 which may or may not have had experience of Brazilian affairs.  Although  they were not generally quick to make contacts among the Brazilian population, neither did they belong to large formal organizations among themselves.  The Rio Cricket Club was active at the beginning of the century,  as can be attested by frequent reports in the English language newspapers of the day, but this seems to have been one of the few social organizations of importance in existence. The war years produced the British Chamber of Commerce, promoted by Ernest Hambloch in 1916 as a means of striking at German commercial interests, and this was active in the affairs of the British community u n t i l i t s demise in 1967.  The two major English  language newspapers, the Rio News, and. the Brazilian Review (later to be known as Wileman 's Brazilian Review) fought each other bitterly for readers among the British community, and J. P. Wileman, the editor of the latter weekly, became one of the best-known British residents of the Brazilian capital.  6  Apart from the diplomatic and consular staff, informed Englishmen were generally businessmen of some kind.  Two examples worthy of note  were Mr. John Gordon and the J. P. Wileman mentioned above. The former had by the beginning of the century spent some thirty years i n Brazil and had made a fortune in that country.  He was a director of the Western  Telegraph Company, of the San Paulo Railway, and of various other major enterprises in Brazil, and was considered a man of great experience in Brazilian affairs.  He seemed to be pessimistic about the future of his  adopted country, and helped fan the flames of Sir William Haggard*s discontent.?  87 Mr. J. P. Wileman, editor of the Brazilian Review and formerly director of the o f f i c i a l Commercial Statistic Service in Brazil, was another leading member of the British community.  Wileman, who had. good  connections in Argentina as well as in Brazil, ran his English newspaper with considerable success over a period of many years, and was a constant and reliable source of Information on Brazilian commercial and economic affairs.  His writing occasionally followed the o f f i c i a l Brazilian line  so closely that he was accused by foreigners of being i n the pay of the government, but after he l e f t the Commercial Statistic Servlceiin 1908 there i s no evidence to support this charge.  Wileman*s capacity for hard  work and clear, moderate thinking is apparent in the pages of his review and i n the opinions of those who knew him in Brazil.  He was in a good  position to assess the shortcomings of many of his compatriots, and was clearly unhappy to have to write, on the occasion of the death in 1906 of Frank Parish, son of Woodbine Parish, that " i n Brazil we have never had the good fortune, that I know, to have a man like Parish to serve as a conducting medium between British and Brazilians and enable them to underp  stand, each other."  If anyone filled, that gap in the f i r s t two decades  of this century, i t was J. P. Wileman himself. Men like Wileman and Gordon had had long experience of Brazil, arid were -indispensable as sources of information about that country— particularly to recent arrivals in the Diplomatic Service. They became close contacts of the representatives of the British government in Brazil, and their opinions were often quoted at length in despatches to London.  88 At the centre of the whole system were, however, the diplomats and consular staff, key men in the process of Anglo-Brazilian relations early in the century.  The present chapter i s concerned primarily with a study  of two of them, Mr. (later Sir) William Haggard and Mr. (later Sir) Arthur Peel. At a time when Brazil's foreign orientation was  undergoing  such fundamental changes, the backgrounds, attitudes and a b i l i t i e s of these men were of v i t a l importance to the future relations between the two countries. William Henry Doveton Haggard (1846-1926) was a member of a family well-known for i t s literary prowess and diplomatic connections. His brother, Rider Haggard, was a novelist and sociologist of considerable fame, and another brother, Major A. C. P. Haggard, was a writer on sport, fiction and French history.  Sir William's niece, Li lias Rider  Haggard, followed in her father's footsteps as a novelist.  A nephew,  Godfrey Haggard, was clerk to Sir William while the latter was Minister to Venezuela between 1897 and 1902, and was himself Consul General in Rio de Janeiro in the 1920's. Sir William's eldest daughter was married to Mr. Arohibald Charlton, at one time British Consul in Berlin.  The  family was prosperous, and Sir William was a product of the gracious living of the nineteenths-century gentleman.  He was educated at Ton-  bridge, Winchester, and Magdalen College, Oxford, and entered the Diplomatic Service in 1869 with an appointment to Berne.  His career was long  and varied, and after serving at minor posts in Madrid, Washington,  89 Teheran, Vienna, Stuttgart, Rio de Janeiro and Athens, he was appointed Minister Resident at Quito in 1890.  After a brief spell as Consul General  in Tunis, he returned to South America to serve as Minister to Venezuela (1897-1902), to Argentina and Paraguay (1902-1906) and to Brazil from 1906 u n t i l his retirement in 1914.  He had a considerable knowledge of  Persian, having collaborated i n the production of a book entitled The Vazir of Lenkuran, and was fond of the usual sports and pastimes of the English country gentleman (he inherited Bradenham Hall, the family seat in Norfolk, on the death of his father in 1893).  For a lifetime of  o f f i c i a l service to his country, he was knighted in 1908 on his sixtysecond birthday. His period as Minister to Brazil was the culmination of this active and eventful l i f e , though he lived many years in retirement and f i n a l l y died at Mentone i n 1926.  9  Haggard's background and education provide some key to his a t t i tudes to Brazil during a period which coincided to a large extent with the Rio Branco ministry and with the fundamental reshaping of Brazilian foreign policy to which allusion has already been made.^  A personal  assessment by Sir Godfrey Haggard, probably the only man s t i l l alive to have worked actively with Sir William in South America, f i l l s i n some of the details.  S i r Godfrey, at that stage a minor o f f i c i a l on government  service abroad, worked as Sir William's clerk in Caracas at the beginning of the century and copied out a l l that the Minister wrote in an o f f i c i a l , or private capacity!. Sir Godfrey recorded in his private diary that "he [Sir William] had the cacoethes scribendi of a l l my clan—the cacoethes  90 dictandi i t had rather be for nobody but his wife and his nephew could decipher his handwriting.  His urge to write was such that when reports  had gone home on any matter requiring a report, he would turn his attention to matters that did not.  They were intended to amuse and often  succeeded: calling in the aid of anecdote and gossip, literary allusions and a Latin tag or two in the manner of a more spacious age than h i s . They did not, I think, show much reflection, and brevity was not sought. Any topic of an economic nature would have been outside his scope, or interest, commercial matters being dealt with by Consuls or lesser f r y — or not at a l l . * *  1 1  Such.was the man chosen by Britain to represent her  interests in the crucial years before the outbreak of the First World War.  The nephew's impressions are amply confirmed by a study of the des-  patches written by S i r William Haggard during his years as Minister to Brazil. Haggard's despatches represent an indispensable source of information on Brazil between 1906 and 1914.  During these years, Monthly Re-  ports were prepared from time to time by various members of the legation staff and forwarded to London under Haggard's direction.  They dealt  with the p o l i t i c a l situation, commercial matters, and anything else deemed of interest to the Foreign Office.  They appeared somewhat spora-  dically, but were supplemented by Annual Reports, lengthy and comprehensive documents usually written by Haggard himself and f u l l of observations on the affairs of the previous year in Brazil. from 1906  to 1913  The Annual Reports ran  inclusive, with one break in 1907, and reflect a great  91 deal of painstaking work on the part of Haggard and his staff.  Haggard  freely admitted, as was suggested by his nephew's earlier experience in Caracas, that he received considerable help from his staff on the commer13 c i a l and financial aspects of his Annual Reports.  J  His training was  clearly within the limits of the nineteenth-century classical tradition, and he was in no way able to appreciate the intricacies of commerce and finance—the two subjects which were most closely connected with his country's interests in Brazil. Notes of amusement were certainly not lacking in Haggard's despatches, and these were often combined with a marked sense of superiority, indignation, and thorough impatience with the country to which he was accredited.  A typical example is his account of the funeral of Rio Branco,  a man for whom he never had any great admiration and whose f i n a l journey offended Haggard's sense of calm and order; The funeral was fixed for yesterday morning at 9 o'clock, starting from the Foreign Office, where his Excellency died, and where he was at work when he was attacked. The corps diplomatique were notified of this fact, and i t was also conveyed that we were expected to wear f u l l uniform on the occasion, a decree appearing at the same time to the effect that his Excellency's interment would be attended with the same honours as are prescribed for the chief of State. Whatever may have been intended, the actual result was disgraceful to those responsible. We were informed both by telegraph and in an o f f i c i a l note that the interment would be at one cemetery, whereas i t actually took place at another 12 miles o f f . On arriving at the Foreign Office I found the rooms already crowded, and there seemed to be a good deal of confusion. I was requested, in my capacity as doyen of the diplomatic corps, to act with the President as the leading p a l l bearers, and after a speech by an o f f i c a l orator, in which the deceased statesman was compared to Caesar and Napoleon—very much to their disadvantage, a type of the panegyrics of which the papers are l i t e r a l l y f u l l — t h e cortege, headed by the President and myself,  92 proceeded downstairs, the coffin opening during the transit. When;, we arrived on the pavement there was a long delay while the coffin was being put on to a small hand-cart, on which i t was dragged to the cemetery. There was a terrible crush, and no order was kept. The majority of my colleagues, fortunately for them, failed to find their carriages and so were spared the horrors of the further proceedings, which I, who found mine at once, had to undergo. We had to wait three-quarters of an hour in the sun, a time which my Russian colleague beguiled by addressing the surrounding crowd. Finally the procession started, and went at a foot's pace, or rather less, as there were constant stoppings owing to the dense crowds f i l l i n g the road the whole 5 miles of the way to the cemetery. The heat was very great, and we were smothered in dust and half choked by the exhausts of the neighbouring motor-cars. My car was not far behind the President's carriage, and when we got near the gate of the cemetery I saw his Excellency pass us, coming away from i t , so thinking that either he had not gone in—which was the case, as his conveyance was not able to force i t s way through the crowd—or that the ceremony of burial was over, I turned my car with some d i f f i c u l t y and returned also, having spent about four and a-half hours doing the 5 miles. I t was fortunate that I did so, for two of my colleagues, who after taking an hour or so to find their carriages, had then taken a short cut and so got into the cemetery, found themselves in the midst of a very unpleasant disturbance, brought about mainly by the brutality of the police and soldiers. In this there would appear to have been a good many casualties: Baron de Rio Branco's nephew and a nephew of the President were injured, and the Argentine charge* d'affaires is reported to have been hurt, while Baron Werther, Baron de Rio Branco's son-in-law, who, with his l i t t l e boy, had led the procession bareheaded the whole 5 miles of the route, only saved himself and his child from injury by climbing through a window. My Dutch colleague, who was near the grave, described i t as 'a scene of bloodshed,' the cavalry striking right and l e f t among the screaming men, women, and children composing the crowd. I may mention that not one of Baron de Rio Branco's staff, and of his family only his son, was present when his body was lowered into the tomb, amidst indescribable confusion and to the accompaniment of the howls of the negro mob, which had by that time taken charge of the whole proceedings. During the past week the papers have been completely f i l l e d with details of Baron de Rio Bcanco's l i f e , his death, and eulogies of his conduct and abilities as a statesman. "Dans l e pays des aveugles l e borgne est r o i , " and there is no doubt that during the last ten years his Excellency has towered above his countrymen. '* 1  The impression given by Haggard's despatches i s that he had l i t t l e  93 time for Brazil, found Brazilians to be childish and incapable of the simplest task, was appalled by what he considered discourteous treatment of foreign representatives accredited to Brazil, and despaired of the hopes of any progress in that country. no routine, and a chaos of disorder.  "There is no sense of discipline,  The same statement holds good in  a l l the relations of private l i f e ; society, tradesmen, servants etc. In fact Brazil i s , throughout, a Haiti on a larger s c a l e . " ^  Writing about  the possibility of foreign officers being used to train the armed forces, Haggard stated: "It is considered that a Brazilian requires no teaching, but by the light of genius arrives at instant perfection in anything that he undertakes."*"  Referring to the Dreadnoughts, he said that "[he! did  not believe that i t was l i k e l y that they would ever be of use to Brazil or any source of dread to an enemy, as [he] did not conceive the Brazilians capable of the cleanliness, care and attention necessary to work these extraordinarily complicated and delicate machines of volition and 17 destruction." ' Haggardls complaints over discourteous treatment by Itamaraty were constant, and he became very impatient at Brazilian delays in answering correspondence, at inefficient postal and customs service, and at an annoying informality in business a f f a i r s .  1 8  3h the f i n a l stages  of his stay in Brazil he turned his withering prose to an assessment of the general condition of that country as he saw i t , and produced a short despatch, quoted here in i t s entirety, which amply summed up the thoughts he had already expressed at length elsewhere:  94 During the seven years that i t has been my l o t to serve as His Majesty's Minister in Rio I have from time to time had the honour of submitting reports on various phases of the p o l i t i c a l and financ i a l condition of this country, and I think that i t w i l l have been clear from these that so far from there having been during that time any improvement not only in relative, as compared with i t s r i v a l Argentina for instance, but also in actual prosperity, there has been a distinct decline, t i l l on leaving the country I regret to say that Ifmust state that i t i s , as I believe, in a worse condition than i t was when I arrived here in 1906, and that I have come to the conclusion that so long as i t is governed in the pressent way, so long w i l l i t go on sinking from bad to worse. 19  An observer who had been reading Haggard's reports for some years was moved to react thus to a despatch received in 1913* l f Brazil did not M  occupy such a large space on the map i t could scarcely be treated as a civilized country for the purpose of diplomatic relations.**  20  It is tempting, in any summary of Sir William Haggard's a t t i tudes to Brazil, to establish some parallel between this diplomat and a notorious predecessor in Rio de Janeiro, W. D. Christie. is superficial, but does not entirely lack substance.  The similarity  Christie was a  hothead, a dangerous and extremely tactless man who typified the most violent anti-Brazilian, antfrslavery currents of the mid-nineteenth century. On his return to Britain after the break i n diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1863, Christie rounded off his mudslinging by defending his views in print and attempting to "throw light on the great d i f f i c u l t i e s which have always attended English Ministers with the Bra21 z i l i a n government."  Christie's vehement attacks on both Brazil and  those Englishmen who were satisfied with conditions in that country demonstrate that even i f there had been no diplomatic break in 1863,  95 relations would have been extremely unsatisfactory for the length of Christie's stay. Sir William Haggard showed marked signs of a similar discontent, although he was more discreet i n publicizing the fact than his sententious predecessor.  The similarity between the two men was certainly at the  back of Rio Branco*s mind, and there is evidence that the Baron treated Haggard to the benefit of a comparison on at least one occasion.  In a  letter to Rio Branco dated A p r i l 30, 1907, Haggard referred to the Baron's suggestion that another Christie incident was in the making as a result of British pressures to obtain compensation in the case of a certain Mr. Chalmers.  The case, in the view of the British government, had been mis-  managed by the Brazilian authorities, and Haggard had the support of an eminent Brazilian jurist, Dr. Leitffo da Cunha, in his representations. In his letter of reply to Rio Branco's remarks, Haggard attempted to show that the present incident and the Christie affair were two entirely different cases.  He began:  Your Excellency rather alarmed me yesterday with your remarks about the Chalmers case, in which you alluded to Mr. Christie's a f f a i r , but on referring to the draft of my note to you on the subject, dated 30th. January, I am greatly relieved to find that the cases can hardly be considered as really parallel as that note is thus worded I am instructed to make strong representations to the Brazilian Government with a view to obtaining the dismissal of the Public Prosecutor and the grant of pecuniary compensation to Mr. Chalmers". Your Excellency w i l l see that this i s no pOTemptory demand, but that the matter i s l e f t -bo the Brazilian Government in the hopes that they w i l l act on the representations of His Majesty's Government. M  Haggard was obviously sensitive about Rio Branco»s allusion, and quickly  96 sprang to the defensive. The personal relations between the two men were of the utmost importance during this c r i t i c a l period of change in Brazilian foreign relations.  It has been pointed out elsewhere that Rio Branco "did not  like the British minister, S i r William Haggard.  In fact, the two diplo-  mats had long periods during which they were not on speaking terms." 3 2  This view needs a certain qualification, for there were times at which the relations between the two men seemed relatively cordial.  Throughout  1908 and 1909, for example, they were frequently together at banquets and dinners.  In fact, Rio Branco invited Haggard and his wife to dinner  in November, 1909, and received in reply a telegram which suggests anything but strained relations between the two of them: "Sir William and Lady Haggard thank your Excellency for honour of invitation to dinner on Wednesday which they accept with great pleasure and desire convey their best thanks for present of magnificent pheasant." ** On another occasion, 2  during an interview with the Baron on the subject of foreign instructors for the Brazilian navy, Haggard mentioned the traditional ties of friendship between their respective countries and met with an enthusiastic and immediate response: The reference to the old friendship seemed to appeal to His Excellency and he began to t e l l me of a l l the achievements of the Brazilian Navy in days gone by, led by British officers, Cochrane, Norton, etc. Some of these gallant men, he said, had lost their arms in the service of Brazil, to which I ventured to reply that I hoped that i f British Naval Instructors came now they would not lose their arms. His Excellency added that he had written a history of these Naval exploits which he intended to publish and in which the part taken by Englishmen  97 was clearly brought out. Without committing himself, he chatted on in this way for a long time, as he does when he i s in a good humour. On the other hand, there were times when Haggard was far from complimentary about the man with whom he had to treat on a regular basis. "His mind i s a storehouse of knowledge of which he sometimes seems to have lost the key; in brief, I doubt whether he be sound," wrote Haggard in 1909.  26  Haggard referred frequently to Rio Branco's "vanity," to  delays in Brazilian answers to British representations, and to the i n accessibility of the Minister for Foreign A f f a i r s .  2 7  On one occasion he  launched into an entertaining metaphoric assessment of Rio Branco's self-glorification: When Baron do Rio Branco wants, regardless of fact, to have the honour and glory of having had a directing finger in a successf u l l y baked international pie, his crowning stroke i s to celebrate its leaving the oven by a festival in which he associates at his bidding the representatives of those countries which have been d i rectly or indirectly connected with the baking. . . . These f e s t i vities are somewhat trying, for, apart from the floods of oratory and glorification of his Excellency which they, as intended, provoke, the Baron has no cook and the dinner supplied by an indifferent Rio restaurateur i s , in the hot weather, subject to suffer "seachange" on i t s way across the Bay.2° Perhaps Haggard's most moderate and reasoned assessment of the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs was the one which he wrote on the occasion of the latter's death. After describing the confusion at the funeral, Haggard continued: I believe him to have been a man of s t r i c t personal integrity, and according to his lights, a true patriot. . . . The late American  98 Ambassador, d i s c r e e t as he was, c o u l d n o t a l w a y s c o n c e a l f r o m me t h a t the b a r o n was a " f r a u d , " and Mr. D u d l e y was a man o f sound judgment. He was n o t c a p a b l e o f d e a l i n g s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h a v a r i e t y o f subj e c t s . He had a good memory, b u t i t was i m p o s s i b l e t o a t t r a c t h i s a t t e n t i o n t o a n y t h i n g b u t what i n t e r e s t e d him f o r t h e moment, a def e c t w h i c h made him v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o d e a l w i t h i n t h e m u l t i f a r i o u s q u e s t i o n s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . He was a u t h o r i t a t i v e , and c o u l d be t r u c u l e n t and v e r y emporte when he f a n c i e d , g e n e r a l l y w r o n g l y , t h a t t h e d i g n i t y o f B r a z i l , o r h i s own, was t h r e a t e n e d . He c o u l d , on t h e o t h e r hand, be v e r y amusing. H i s whole mind was s o taken up w i t h h i s p o l i t i c a l schemes, t o t h e n e g l e c t o f h i s p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s , and even o f h i s f a m i l y . He thus a l s o d i s r e g a r d e d t h e u s u a l r u l e s o f h e a l t h , d i e t , and s l e e p . He was a born Bohemian, and e a r l y i n l i f e married a French m i s t r e s s . 9 2  I n v i e w o f S i r W i l l i a m Haggard's g e n e r a l l y p e s s i m i s t i c assessment o f a f f a i r s i n B r a z i l , a word must be s a i d about h i s s o u r c e s  o f information.  A p a r t from p r o m i n e n t members o f t h e B r i t i s h community s u c h as John Gordon and  J . P. Wileman, HaggardiSs c o n t a c t s o u t s i d e h i s own l e g a t i o n seem t o  have been r e l a t i v e l y few. The main e x c e p t i o n was J o s e C a r l o s  Rodrigues,  e d i t o r o f t h e "Jornal do Commercio, who on o c c a s i o n showed c o n s i d e r a b l e sympathy f o r B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , and m a i n t a i n e d British Minister.  c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h the  I n d e s p a t c h e s t o London, Haggard f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r r e d  t o c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h R o d r i g u e s , who i n t u r n was i n c l o s e t o u c h w i t h many high-ranking B r a z i l i a n s .  R o d r i g u e s was p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l t o Haggard  w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p o s s i b l e s a l e o f t h e B r a z i l i a n Dreadnoughts i n 1910 and 1911, k e e p i n g h i m informed Itamaraty.3°  o f c u r r e n t s o f o p i n i o n among t h e s t a f f a t  R o d r i g u e s c o n s i d e r e d h i m s e l f "a f r i e n d o f E n g l a n d , " and was  a n x i o u s t h a t t h e p o w e r f u l men-of-war s h o u l d n o t f a l l i n t o German hands. Haggard u s e d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d b y R o d r i g u e s ,  b u t sometimes t r e a t e d  t h e j o u r n a l i s t w i t h contempt i n c o n f i d e n t i a l d e s p a t c h e s t o t h e F o r e i g n  99 Office.  31  The relationship never really attained any degree of trust on  Haggard's part. After the death of Rio Branco, who, as far as the records show, never endeavoured to keep the British Minister informed of anything, Haggard was perhaps more fortunate in his contacts with Itamaraty.  He  described Lauro Mtfller, Rio Branco's successor, as being "very intelligent and pleasant to deal with personally," and thought that "he really had some idea of what would be advantageous to his country in i t s foreign policy."  A further sign of respectability was that Mttller was "absolutely  free from any taint of black blood."  32  Haggard was on much closer terms  with MGller than he had been with Rio Branco, and suggested that he was better informed of the inner working of Brazilian foreign policy after the death of the man who had contributed indirectly tbrthe waning of British influence in B r a z i l .  3 3  Further information reached Haggard via Eneas  Martins, MHller's subordinate at Itamaraty.  Martins, according to the  British Minister, was not always reliable, and had a suspect reputation on account of his weakness for bribes. An aggressive man, whose star had risen during the f i n a l years of the Rio Branco ministry, Martins became an embarrassment to Miller in the conduct of foreign affairs, and Haggard considered the r i f t between them of sufficient interest to warrant a special despatch to London. ^ 3  The paucity of Haggard's Brazilian contacts confirms his isolation from the main currents of Brazilian opinion. He listened to the members of the British community and read the newspapers, but apart from that made  100 l i t t l e impression among the people of the country to which he was accredited.  The Brazilian public, aware of British influence in many varied  f i e l d s , seemed thoroughly ignorant of his presence, and few people even bothered to notice his departure late in 1913.  During the period of  Haggard's appointment as Minister in Rio de Janeiro, Anglo-Brazilian diplomatic relations reached a point of stagnation.  Outside the usual  routine of banquets, reports, and o f f i c i a l presentations, the waters remained untroubled. Nothing significant ever happened to disturb the calm.  In these c r i t i c a l years, in which the patterns of a traditional  relationship were destroyed and the foundations of modem Brazilian foreign policy were l a i d , British diplomacy was represented in Brazil by a man who thoroughly disapproved of the country and the people who lived i n i t , and who seemed unaware of the transition between the nineteenth century, to which he belonged wholeheartedly, and the hard economic and p o l i t i c a l realities of the present day. -* 3  Haggard's successor as British Minister to Brazil, Arthur (later Sir Arthur) Peel, was altogether more successful in his relations with Brazilians and with the furtherance of British interests in that country. Peel was favoured by circumstances to a much greater degree than Haggard had been.  By the time of Peel's arrival in Brazil in March, 1915, the  European war had been raging for over six months and Brazilian sympathies were overwhelmingly in support of France and, by extension, Britain. Rio Branco had died in 1912, and his determined policy of approximation to the United States had undergone basic modifications by 1915.  Lauro  101 MHHer was more approachable than his predecessor, and Peel's relations with him—and with Ruy Barbosa, the staunchest advocate of Brazilian entry into the war on the side of Britain and France—were always cordial. Peel was able to regain much of the ground lost during the years when Haggard was Minister in Rio, and also to cultivate the kind of atmosphere which could lead to the arrival of Sir Ralph Paget as f i r s t British Ambassador to Brazil in 1919. Arthur Robert Peel (1861-1952) was, like Haggard, a member of a family with close o f f i c i a l and governmental connections.  His father was  a country vicar in Worcestershire; the diplomat's cousin, Robert Peel, , rose to be Prime Minister of England.  Arthur Peel was educated at Eton,  entered the Diplomatic Service in 1887, and after occupying minor posts in St. Petersburg and Washington, served for over two years in Buenos Aires between 1894 arid I896.  He then moved to The Hague, spent several  years on o f f i c i a l service in Lisbon, was briefly in Montevideo, and f i n a l l y became Consul General in Crete, a post of some importance and difficulty.  He was appointed Minister to Bangkok in 1909» and held his  position u n t i l his transfer to Brazil in 1915.  He spent the war years  in Rio de Janeiro, was knighted in 1917, and married a Brazilian shortly after his retirement in 1921.^ Peel was quick to appreciate one of the basic necessities of his new post, and a matter of days after his arrival in Brazil wrote a despatch in which he outlined the future of British commercial that country:  activity in  102 Great Britain owing to the maintenance of her Free Trade principles, has not the advantage Protective Countries possess in making strong representations. We cannot like France decline to admit the quotation of Brazilian Securities on the Exchange nor interfere, like Portugal, Spain or Italy, with the flow of immigration. Moreover we nave no Tariff, so that i t results that in pushing her trade, Great Britain relies more than any other country on the personal prestige and ascendancy of her Representative. It is necessary, therefore for him to. make use of every resource at his command, not only in coming into contact with Government o f f i c i a l s , and representatives of large commercial houses, but in making his influence f e l t in every way he can.37 Despite his relative lack of experience in Latin America, Peel had managed to put his finger on the essential ingredients of good o f f i c i a l relationships.  His reception in Brazil was warm and cordial—despite the fact  that his arrival coincided with the departure from Rio of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.3^ There was, in fact, nothing unfriendly about Mailer's absence, and before long Peel had developed a close relationship with him which was to be one of the most successful features of his stay in Brazil. Peel was convinced of Mflller's pro-British sympathies, and noted his lack of enthusiasm for the United States.  On the occasion of the resignation  of MSller as Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1917, Peel was able to report to London: "Personally my own relations with him were of a distinctly cord i a l character, for besides never concealing his personal preference for the British race, he had since the turn of events in favour of the Allies become immensely imprssed [sic] by our capacity to raise and equip large military forces during the time of war and lately he seemed to become habituated to the idea that the true policy of this country was to be on terms of the closest friendship with Great B r i t a i n . "  39  103 Peel's relations with Ruy Barbosa, whose anglophile tendencies were perhaps more pronounced during the war years than at any other time in his stormy career, were equally cordial.  Shortly after the end of  the war, Peel reported a long conversation with Ruy Barbosa on the subject of the p o l i t i c a l and financial position of Brazil, and i t is obvious from the topics they discussed—ranging from the dangers of international bolshevism to the composition of the new Brazilian cabinet—that the atmosphere pervading the interview was one of considerable warmth.  Ruy  feared an alliance between the working classes and the army, and lamented the way in which his country was being run by a clique from Sffo Paulo and by the sons of Rodrigues Alves (a situation which had been foreseen by Peel over a year before).^ A further source of information used by Sir Arthur Peel was  Mr.  Raoul Dunlop, editor of the newspaper Rio Jornal, which at the end of the war served as the mouthpiece of Amaro Cavalcanti, the Minister of Finance. Dunlop was an influential man who was well informed about Brazilian affairs, and Peel, in a despatch dated January 1, 1919,  stressed his importance to  the British government on account of the mission which Dunlop was about to undertake in Britain with a view to obtaining a loan for Brazil. Peel's success as British Minister to Brazil can be determined by the number of tributes he received from the press during his stay in Rio and on the occasion of his departure in 1919.  Among Brazilian newspapers,  0 Paiz was particularly ready to sing his praises, and suggested that Brazil would never have borne the restrictions imposed by Britain during  104 the First World War had i t not been for the presence of Sir Arthur Peel. Wileman's Brazilian Review confirmed the cordial relations existing between Itamaraty and the British Minister, and paid the following tribute to him when i t became known that the legation was to be elevated to the rank of embassy and that Peel himself would be transferred: Sir Arthur Peel has been amongst us just long enough to accustom himself to the idiosyncracies of the social and p o l i t i c a l environment, and was not only liked and respected by his own colleagues, but by a l l the members of the Brazilian Government with whom he came in contact and by Brazilian society at large. The experience he gained of the complicated financial, economic and commercial conditions of this country would seem to be the very best possible recommendation for a post of this kind, and, however eminent and suitable his successor may be, i t can only be a matter of regret that Sir Arthur Peel should have been called away at a moment when such grave allied interests were under negotiation. Peel had managed to turn Haggard's failure into a temporary success, arid the years immediately following the war saw a brief resurgence of British initiative in Brazil.  The contrast between the two men is therefore  v i t a l in any assessment of Anglo-Brazilian relations.  Haggard's despatches  make l i v e l y , stimulating reading, are frequently amusing, but rarely deal with the essential points of contact between the two countires. Haggard seemed ever conscious of the literary content of his reports, whereas other observers of the time—particularly the American diplomates resident in Rio de Janeiro—wrote d u l l , often disjointed, but usually objective despatches.^ Peel was less inclined to engage in verbal virtuosity than his predecessor, and this assisted him in maintaining friendly relations with everybody. Haggard seems a much more interesting character than any of his British or  105 American contemporaries, but clearly found his position uncomfortable. In view of Rio Branco's constant pro-American policy, however, i t is doubtf u l whether any other Briton would have had more success than S i r William Haggard in maintaining and increasing contacts between Britain and Brazil. In conclusion, brief mention must be made of other Englishmen who were concerned with the fortunes of Anglo-Brazilian relations in the early years of this century.  Sir Henry Dering, British Minister to Brazil from  1900 to 1905, made l i t t l e impression on Brazilian officialdom or even on the British community during his stay in Rio de Janeiro.  The Brazilian  Review, commenting on the termination of his duties, stated that "we cannot pretend that he w i l l be greatly missed by the British community, to whom he was almost unknown."**** The Brazilian press seemed equally unaware of his existence, one newspaper including a short note on s i r Krony Dernig Baronet [sic] in 1903.*^ The Jornal do Commercio was extremely flattering to Dering in i t s farewell article in 1905, and went into some detail concerning his family background.  It seems, however, that this interest was  fomented by none other than Deringfehimself in the form of a letter which he sent to Josl Carlos Rodrigues and enclosing an article on the genealogy of his family which had recently appeared in the London press.**  6  Arnold Robertson, who was commercial secretary to the British l e gation in Haggard's later years and charge* d'affaires between the time of Haggard*sa departure and Peel's arrival, showed a fine appreciation and understanding of Brazil, and was the author of a short study of foreign interests in Brazil which was by far the most objective and useful despatch  106 to reach London from Brazil during the f i r s t two decades of this century. His report of April 23, 1915, on the reaction of Brazil to the World War, is unique among British and American documents of the time, and shows that some British diplomatss were very much more i n touch with the realities of the situation than a study of Haggard's writings might suggest.^"-  7  One  of Robertsonis proposals was that there should be sent to Brazil "a commission of bankers and business men to see the country, to judge personally its potentialities and to get i n touch with the right people among i t s commercial and p o l i t i c a l representatives."  The mission materialized i n  1918 under the leadership of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, and visited various Latin American countries as well as Brazil.  Missions were very much the  fashion at the time, with various European countries and the United States striving to dicta-te the pattern of commercial and p o l i t i c a l affairs on 48 the termination of the war. very successful days in Brazil.  The group headed by de Bunsen spent a few The American Ambassador, Morgan, an ardent  Pan-Americanist, avoided a l l contact with i t , and caused Peel to suggest that Morgan would be doing his country a service i f her were recalled to Washington instead of staying in B r a z i l . ^ wrote enthusiastically  9  After leaving Brazil, de Bunsen  of the reception his mission had received in Rio de  Janeiro and in SSo Paulo, and was pleased to hear from Rodrigues Alves that the latter "was in favour of an intensified p o l i t i c a l and economic connection with Europe, and especially with the United Kingdom. He personally repeated to me these assurances. " ^ On the crest of the same wave came the announcement that the diplo-  107 matic missions in Rio de Janeiro and London would be raised to the rank of embassy, a measure implicit in Robertson's proposals of 1915.  News  reached Peel from the Foreign Office on September 9, 1918: "As a mark of our appreciation of the attitude of Brazil in the war and of our good w i l l towards that country we wish at once to raise status of Legation at Rio to that of E m b a s s y . T h e response in Brazil was immediate and favourable, mixed with regret that Sir Arthur Peel would be leaving Brazil. G[eorge] M[arr] sent from Rio de Janeiro to London a series of press cuttings commenting on the event, and in summary added  the following remarks:  "It may be said generally that the enthusiasm occasioned by this announcement surpasses in i t s unanimity and sincerity of expression anything that has been experienced in recent years in connection with British diplomacy, and forms a striking tribute not only to the inherent respect which Brazilians have always held towards our countrymen, but to the general policy and stand taken by England in the war and to the consideration, fairness and invariable sympathy shown by His Majesty's Government and their Minister here throughout the complex questions which have agitated this country cp  during the very trying period following the financial crisis of 1914.  %%J  Thus began a new chapter in Anglo-Brazilian relations, and the stagnation of the Rio Branco era was replaced by an atmosphere of euphoria at the end of the war which was to give a temporary respite to declining British interests in Brazil.  108 NOTES Recenseamento do Rio de Janeiro (Distrito Federal) realisado em 20 de Setembro de 1906 "(Rio: Officina da Estatistica, 1907). Rec ens eamento do Brasil RS'alizado em 1 de Setembro de 1920 (Rio: Typographia da Estatistica, 1926), IV, l parte (PopulacffoT. a  Ibid.  3  ^Synopse do Recenseamento Realizado em 1 de Setembro de 1920: Populaca*o do Brazil "(Rio de Janeiro: Typographia da Estatistica, 1922) p. 37. ^Englishmen did not flock to Brazil in the same way as did Portuguese, Spaniards and Italians, and few of them settled outside the major c i t i e s . L i t t l e was done to encourage the non-professional man to leave Britain and join the massive influx of agricultural and industrial workers to Brazil. In fact, the Colonial Office issued a warning to British emigrants to make them aware of hardships they might encounter: "The Emigrants' Information Office desires to warn intending Britisteemigrants that they w i l l meet in Brazil with climate, laws, language, money, and conditions of l i f e and work widely different from those to which they have been accustomed in this country. Wages which in England are ample afford but a bare subsistence in Brazil. The ordinary British emigrant is likely to meet with disappointment and hardship i f he overlooks these facts." Cited in BR, November 17, 1908. Two other newspapers, the Rio Times and the Times of Brazil, were also published in the period under consideration. 6  See Haggard to Grey, PRO FO 371/832, August 23, 1910; and F0 371/1580, January;. 29,-1913. • 7  BR, June 5, 1906.  8  9  For a short biography of Sir William Haggard, see The Times, January  23, 1926, p. 4.  above, Chapter 2. -'-•'•Private letter from S i r Godfrey Haggard, April 14, 1966. 12 A second break in Haggard's despatches came between April 29, 1908 and June 27, 1909, when he was away from Brazil convalescing from an i l l ness which had put him out of action early in 1908. Many suspected that  1 0 9  once he had l e f t Brazil in 1 9 0 8 he would never return to take up his post. See HR, A p r i l 2 1 , 1 9 0 8 ; and JB, May 8 , 1 9 0 8 . •^See, ^ example, Haggard's introductory letters to Reports for 1 9 1 0 (PRO F 0 3 7 1 / 1 0 5 2 , March 28, 1911); 1911 (PRO F 0 3 7 1 / 1 3 0 3 , July 1 , 1 9 1 2 ) ; and 1 9 1 2 (PRO FO 371/1581, June 19, 1 9 1 3 ) . o r  h a g g a r d to Grey, PRO F 0 4 2 0 / 2 5 6 , February 14, 1 9 1 2 . The details of the scene were confirmed by Ernest Hambloch in his book British Consul. The American charge", Rives, painted an entirely different picture, and leads one to believe that he was not present at the ceremony: "The funeral . . . proved a most imposing spectacle and tribute to the memory of the deceased statesman. A collective wreath from the diplomatic corps was placed on the coffin by the British Minister, S i r William Haggard, the Dean of the Corps. After a brief religious service at the Foreign Office, where the President of the Republic, members of the Cabinet, the Diplomatic Corps, and prominent Senators, Deputies, and Government o f f i c i a l s , were present, a solemn funeral procession to the cemetery of SSo Francisco Xavier took place." NABD ( 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 2 9 ) , P o l i t i c a l , February 16, 1 9 1 2 . ^Haggard to Grey, PRO l6  I b i d . , FO  3 7 1 / 8 3 2 ,  F 0  June  3 7 1 / 1 5 8 0 ,  1 1 ,  ^ I b i d . , FO 3 7 1 / 8 3 1 , May 24,  April  2 1 ,  1 9 1 3 .  1 9 1 0 .  1 9 1 0 .  18  F o r Haggard's complaints concerning discourteous treatment by the Brazilian Foreign Office, see Haggard to Rio Branco, AH! 2 8 5 / 2 / 5 , January 1 0 , 1 9 0 6 ( 1 9 0 7 ? ) ; Haggard to Rio Branco, APRB 3/4/55/1, February 26, 1 9 1 0 ; Haggard to Grey, PRO F 0 3 7 1 / 1 5 8 0 , December 2 0 , 1 9 1 2 ; and Haggard to Grey, PRO F 0 3 7 1 / 1 5 8 0 , February 2 , 1 9 1 3 . xo  Haggard to Grey, PRO F 0 3 7 1 / 1 5 8 1 , October 24, 1 9 1 3 . With characteristic diplomatic courtesy, Haggard sent his farewells to the Foreign Minister at Itamaraty in the form of the following telegram, written just four days after his biting despatch to London: "C'est avec l e plus profond regret que je quitte le brezil et conservarai souvenir eternal de tout votre bonte: Ministre Brittanic [ s i c ] . " Haggard to Miller, AHI 2 8 5 / 2 / 9 , October 2 8 , 1 9 1 3 . 19  Comment by R. S. (May 1 April 2 1 , 1 9 1 3 . 20  9 , 1 9 1 3 )  on Haggard to Grey, PRO FO  3 7 1 / 1 5 8 0 ,  21  ^W.D. Christie, Notes on Brazilian Questions, p. 183. . Reference has already been made to the Christie a f f a i r (see Chapter 1 , pp. 6 - 7 ) . For further information see The Brazil Correspondence in the cases of the "Prince  110 of .Wales" and officers of the "Forte" (Reprinted from the Papers laid before Parliament): With an introduction, telling some truth about Brazil (London;. William Ridgway, 1863); and a defense of Brazil in the form of The Relations of the British and Brazilian Governments (London: Chapman and Hall, 186577 Haggard to Rio Branco, AHI 285/2/6, April 30, 1907. Dr." Leitffo da Cunha was a useful contact for Haggard, and was presentedfxwith a silver inkwell by him in 1908 (see J do C, April 11, 1908). 22  3Burns, p. 196. By way of contrast, Minister Thompson was on extremely good terms with Rio Branco, as the former showed in asdespatch of 1904: "The relationship between the Minister and myself being most friendly, I took occasion to say to him . . . that I would be pleased i f I could come over to his house for a smoke and a friendly v i s i t with him, suggesting that he was having much trouble with unfriendly newspapers and that maybe he needed a l i t t l e comforting." Thompson to Hay, NABD, Vol. 70, May 12, 2  1904.  ^Haggard to Rio Branco, AHI 285/2/7, November 30, 1909. At a banquet given by Haggard on April 12, 1908, in Petropolis, Rio Branco's son Raul and daughter Hortensia were present (JB, April 13, 1908); on October 26, 1909, Rio Branco sat between Lady Haggard and the wife of the American Ambassador at a banquet given for the diplomatic corps at Itamaraty; on December 1, 1909, Haggard dined with Rio Branco in Petropolis, along with other members of the diplomatic corps. 25  Haggard to Grey, PRO F0 371/1051, April 18,  26  1911.  I b i d . , PRO F0 371/604, July 5, 1909.  7with regard to delayed business, Haggard wrote the following to Rio Branco on the subject of the Orange River Company claim: "I would venture to point out that besides many which are unrecorded, but o£ which Mr. Barclay has a recollection, there are actually recorded in His Majesty's Legation eighteen ineffectual representations, o f f i c i a l , semiofficial, and verbal on the subject of this international obligation about which there in [sic] no question." AHI 285/2/5, January 10, 1906 (1907?). 2  ^Haggard to Grey, PRO FO 371/831, January 17, 1910. Haggard to Grey, PRO F0 420/256, February 14, 1912. Dudley's description of Rio Branco as a "fraud" i s interesting in the light of contemporary Brazilian-United States relations. 29  1911;  3°See Haggard to Grey, PRO F0 371/1051, December 13, 1910; February 3, 1911; February 4, 1911.  January 22,  Ill  Haggard was particularly biting on the occasion of the arrival of the new American Ambassador, Morgan, in 1912. The J do C published two articles praising the new arrival and his predecessors, to which Haggard responded: "Mr. Morgan's l i t t l e sprat to catch a whale seems to have caught*. Dr. Carlos Rodrigues. . . . " According to Haggard, these two articles were wide of the mark in their assessment of American diplomatic representatives in Brazil? "Mr. Dudley, the late Ambassador, was really a fine feldow and a modest as well as an honourable Jman but these are not the qualities which appeal to a Brazilian politician, so the eulogy on him is comparatively tepid." PRO FO 371/1302, June 10, 1912. 3  3. Haggard, "Annual Report, 1911," PRO F O 371/1303» July 1, 1912, p. 17; and "Annual Report, 1912," PRO FO 371/1581, June 19, 1913, p. 51. 2  33TWO conversations, reported by Haggard in PRO FO 371/1303, September 22, 1912, and FO 371/1581, October 20, 1913, confirm the cordial atmosphere existing between the two men.  -^Haggard to Grey, PRO FO 371/1303, September 22, 1912. On Eneas Martins, see also FO 371/1051, April 3, 1911; and F0 371/1302, June 11, 1912. -^Shortly before his departure in 1913, Haggard dismissed the American challenge to British commercial and financial interests in Brazil in the following terms: "I find that the general opinion here, certainly amongst English merchants, bankers, etc., is that a l l the fuss that has lately taken place is not, as was said to me by one of their leading members, worth a 'row of pins' as far as i t injuriously affects our position here— they look upon a l l these manifestoessas froth. It is true that of late years there has been a considerable increase in American trade here but this is not larger than that of other countries and i s , I should imagine, due to natural causes rather than to the very active pressure of the United States Government and their Ambassador." PRO F0 371/1581, September 1,  1913.  3 This biographical information is taken from The Times, October 9, 1952, p. 8. 6  FO 371/2294, March 10, 1915. One senses in this despatch that Peel was by no means happy about the relations that had existed when Haggard was in Brazil. 3 PRO 7  3 I cannot but admit," wrote Peel, "that i t is somewhat unfortunate that my arrival&at Rio de Janeiro should synchronise with the departure of the Minister for Foreign A f f a i r s . . ., and that the affairs of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should in the meantime be in the hands of an Under Secretary of State [Martins?] who is anything but qualified for the position he now f i l l s . " PRO F0 371/2294, May 7, 1915; April 28, 1915. 8,,  f  112 ^^FO 371/2901, May 4, 1917. For further information regarding the cordial relations between Peel and mUller, see Peel to Grey, PRO FO 371/ 2294, June 11, 1915; FO 371/29Q0, December 7, 1916; Peel to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3653, November 28, 1918. For MHller's attitudes to the European conflict, see below, Chapter 5. ^ P e e l to Grey, PRO FO 371/2640, August 9, 1916; Peel to Balfour, FO 371/2900, October 27, 1917; Fo 371/3653, November 20, 1918. ^O  Paiz, August 19, 1919.  See also 0 Paig, September 16,  ^Wileman's Brazilian Review (hereafter WBR),  September 24,  1917. 1918.  example of execrable prose written by an American Ambassador reads as follows: "From thoughts of Baron Rio Branco's several times given l i f e to in our conversations since I came to Brazil two years ago, i t is evident President Roosevelt's policy towards South America is looked upon with some suspicion, and yet I believe he does not court this feeling and wants to feel faith in our good intentions. I have never missed ah opportunity to through some expression try to make him feel the sentiments of the American Government. . . . " Thompson to Hay, NABD, Vol. 71, January 15, 1905. ^BR,  May 30,  ^ GN,  June 6, 1903.  5  Bering  May 24,  1905.  1905.  to J. C. Rodrigues, BNMS I - 5,15,50, May 15, 1905; and J d o C ,  ^Robertson's despatch of A p r i l 23, 1915, w i l l be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. ^See  Peel to Balfour, PRO F0 371/3168, June 20,  1918.  ^ P e e l thought that the Brazilian policy of approximation to the United States was dead, and that men like Miller were much more interested in the ABC alliance. PRO F0 371/3168, May 27, 1918. 5°de Bunsen to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3168, May 29, 1918. 51  Balfour to Peel, PRO F0 371/3168, September 9, 1918.  Enclosure in Peel to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3168, September 28, 1918. See also Peel to Balfour, PRO F0 371/3168, September 26, 1918; and J do C, September 26, 27, 1918. The Foreign Office intended to have an':" Ambassador in Brazil Before the new President took office on November 15, 1918, but Sir Ralph Paget's a r r i v a l was delayed u n t i l October, 1919. 52  CHAPTER IV PEACE, PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY: A BRITISH VIEW  I t i s t h e aim o f t h e present chapter t o f u r t h e r explore  British  a t t i t u d e s towards B r a z i l between t h e t u r n o f t h e c e n t u r y and t h e p e r i o d o f t h e F i r s t World War, and t o c o n s i d e r p a r t i c u l a r l y B r i t i s h c o n c e r n i n g t h e a c t u a l s t a t e o f B r a z i l and t h e p r o s p e c t s The  opinions  for her future.  need f o r s u c h an e x a m i n a t i o n a r i s e s o u t o f t h e f a c t t h a t  British  assessments f r e q u e n t l y r u n c o n t r a r y t o t h e v i e w t h a t a f t e r i t s f i r s t t u r b u l e n t decade o f e x i s t e n c e , t h e R e p u b l i c s t a b i l i t y , c o n s o l i d a t i o n and e x p a n s i o n .  entered  i n t o a phase o f  B r i t o n s seemed g e n e r a l l y s c e p -  t i c a l o f t h e "peace, p r o g r e s s and p r o s p e r i t y " o f t h e pre-war y e a r s , and pointed  o u t t h a t beneath t h e mood o f a p p a r e n t o p t i m i s m t h e r e l u r k e d many  fundamental i n s e c u r i t i e s i n t h e B r a z i l i a n s y s t e m .  1  They f r e q u e n t l y  q u e s t i o n e d t h e economic, and f i n a n c i a l manoeuvres o f t h e B r a z i l i a n g o v e r n ment, c r i t i c i z e d e x t r a v a g a n c e and s h o w i n e s s , and were c o n s t a n t l y dismayed by what t h e y saw as o f f i c i a l  incompetence.  A t t h e same t i m e , however,  i t must be s a i d t h a t B r i t i s h i n v e s t o r s c o n s i d e r a b l y  increased t h e i r i n -  t e r e s t s i n B r a z i l d u r i n g t h e pre-war p e r i o d , and were g e n e r a l l y w e l l rewarded f o r t h e i r i n v o l v e m e n t .  2  The most v o c i f e r o u s B r i t o n t o r a i s e doubts about t h e f u t u r e o f B r a z i l a t t h i s s t a g e was S i r W i l l i a m Haggard, whose a t t i t u d e s and background have a l r e a d y been e x a m i n e d .  3  113  Haggard was c o n v i n c e d , a l o n g  with  114 other members of the legation staff, that the lack of Brazilian prospects for the future could be attributed not only to particular instances of governmental mismanagement or poor planning, but rather to the inherent f  "national characteristics of the Brazilian people. M  Haggard's inability  to adapt to these "characteristics," or even to accept them, was without a doubt a major reason why his stay in Brazil was both unhappy and unproductive.  In one of his f i n a l despatches to the Foreign Office,  Haggard elaborated upon his long experience of Brazilian "national characteristics": The l i f e of an European diplomatist here is so different to that in more civilised and better constituted countries, and his relations with the Government are rendered so d i f f i c u l t by the national propensity to delay and the indifference to a l l the usual rules which govern social and diplomatic intercourse elsewhere, that one may fancy oneself unduly biassed aginst the Government and the people. But long reflection has made me think that this is not so in my case, and that I have been able to judge them as they are. I regret to say that the verdict to which I have come is a very unfavourable one. . . . There is absolutely no dependence to be placed on the word of a Brazilian, nor is i t possible to appeal to him in any of the ordinary ways or on any of the ordinary motives. Whilst very self-seeking, he is liable to be diverted from any object on the slightest provocation, that is to say, he has no r e l i a b i l i t y and is not capable of forming a correct judgment as to his true interests, or, i f he i s , this judgment is eas i l y perverted. Brazilians are extremely ready to take offence, arid when they have done this they are d i f f i c u l t to appease. They have absolutely no sense of law or order, and no public, or indeed private, morality. In fact in this respect they are pract i c a l l y in a state of nature, but with i t a l l they attempt to disguise this condition by boasting and high-sounding phrases. They are i n capable of judging between fact and fiction to the extent that with them an undertaking—which, perhaps, i t is never intended to be carried o u t — i s the same thing as i t s performance. . . . Everyman does what is right in his own eyes, and as his racial instincts are mostly bad, and, i f not vicious, generally f u t i l e and foolish, l i t t l e good is ever done. . . . I have carefully considered whether i t is possible to find one redeeming point in the national characteristics  115 as applicable to the well-being of the country, and I have failed to do so, * 1  It is not d i f f i c u l t to find similar, though perhaps less comprehensive, comments from British observers of the day.  The Rio News, a  newspaper which employed most of i t s doubtful talents to attack Brazilian governments arid p o l i t i c s , referred to Brazilians as being "for the greater part idle, poor and apathetic."-' An unsigned despatch to London in 1907 stated that "in a l l matters of show the people are apt to be lavish and even wildly extravagant and they rejoice to hear that their Delegate at the Hague spent more money on dinners and flowers than any other Representative."6 Haggard himself spoke of "this impressionable and feather-headed people."''  7  Arnold Robertson, who ran the British legation between Haggard's departure and the arrival of Peel, was the only British diplomat of the time opently to praise Brazilians in a despatch to London.  He probably  did not realize how original were his views when he wrote in 1915» in an attempt to reorientate some fundamental British thinking about Brazil: When we think of Brazil at a l l i t i s as "the place where the nuts come from"; i t s people and institutions would form f i t subjects for comic opera, but not for serious study or attention. We conceive the Brazilian to be a cross between a monkey and a negro, the a i r that he breathes to be infested with diseases known and unknown, his Government always to be inefficient, corrupt, and grotesque, his culture to be non-existent, his country generally to be suitable for commercial and financial speculation, but for nothing else. That there is some foundation for this attitude I do not deny, but i t is mainly based on ignorance. The Braziliansitaken as a whole, are a warm-hearted, quick-witted, and intelligent people, and,  116 withal, highly sensitive. They realise their own shortcomings as well- as we do, and require sympathetic help and understanding. It i s indeed unusual to find such a favourable assessment of Brazilians written by an Englishman in the early years of the century. The British, i f disturbed by what they vaguely termed "national characterist i c s , " were regularly appalled by the quality of the leaders which emerged from such a doubtful milieu.  Haggard's views on the Barffo do Rio Branco  did not depart substantially from his original suggestion that the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs was "pompous, supercilious, and conceited,"  9  His assessment of other members of the Itamaraty staff was  equally uncomplimentary, and he expressed doubts about the abilities of both Eneas Martins and Lauro Muller.  10  The British sense of righteous  indignation was supported on occasion by their American colleagues.  Bsn|  son, at one time American charge d'affaires in the Rio embassy, included the following brief note on Sauza Dantas in a despatch welcoming the resignation of Lauro Mttller from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1917s "During his term as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, while Lauro Mttller was absent from Brazil, he [Dantas] was to be found almost nightly in the 'ASSYRIO', a 'dancing' restaurant, and later on in the night gambling clubs, and his hours of attendance at the Foreign Office were most uncertain. About three months ago, as the result of a brawl with a member of a well-known Brazilian family, he acquired a very much discolored eye, and the escapade was commented on in the local papers."  11  Estimates of other leading members of successive Brazilian govern-  117 ments p o r t r a y e d a s i m i l a r l y p e s s i m i s t i c p o i n t o f v i e w .  N i l o Peganha,  who  was  b r i e f l y P r e s i d e n t o f B r a z i l f o l l o w i n g t h e d e a t h o f Afonso Pena and  who  p l a y e d a l e a d i n g p a r t i n n a t i o n a l and  was  d e s c r i b e d by Haggard as b e i n g " c l e v e r , s u p e r f i c i a l , v e n a l , and  s t a t e p o l i t i c s f o r many y e a r s , unscru-  p u l o u s , " and t h e s e words were r e c a l l e d by Haggard's s u c c e s s o r some y e a r s later.  Hermes da Fonseca drew a l m o s t u n i v e r s a l contempt f r o m B r i t i s h  o b s e r v e r s , and I n 1910,  t h e Americans were no l e s s vehement i n t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s .  the y e a r o f h i s e l e c t i o n t o t h e P r e s i d e n c y , he was  v a r i o u s l y as "a man  described  o f no p a r t i c u l a r i n t e l l i g e n c e and no t r a i n i n g  t h a t o f arms"; as "an unknown q u a n t i t y " ; and as "a man  outside  o f mediocre a b i l i t y  . . . v e r y much l a c k i n g i n e d u c a t i o n , even i n the m i l i t a r y p r o f e s s i o n . " - ^ 1  Haggard even went so f a r as t o a c c u s e Hermes o f h a v i n g been i n v o l v e d i n some l a r g e - s c a l e s m u g g l i n g , a l t h o u g h he gave no d e t a i l s r e g a r d i n g of information. ^ 1  he was  I n t e r i m assessments o f P r e s i d e n t Hermes suggested t h a t  a " w e l l - m e a n i n g b u t weak man"  and  t h e American v i e w was  has shown l i t t l e o r no a p t i t u d e f o r t h e h i g h p o s i t i o n he now his  sources  that  "[he§  h o l d s , and  m o r a l p r e s t i g e w i t h t h e t h i n k i n g p u b l i c has been p r a c t i c a l l y  nil." -' 1  By t h e end o f t h e f o u r y e a r t e r m , Hermes had l a i d h i m s e l f open t o even more d e v a s t a t i n g a t t a c k s : " M a r s h a l  Hermes Fonseca i s a f i g u r e a t once  p a t h e t i c i n h i s p o w e r l e s s n e s s and l u d i c r o u s i n h i s a c t i o n s and the laughing s t o c k of the c o u n t r y . " ^ 1  The  t i v e l y t h a t t h e government o f Hermes was and  same o b s e r v e r added r e t r o s p e c -  " c e r t a i n t y one o f the most c o r r u p t  incompetent t h a t even B r a z i l has e v e r seen. . . .  s e l f was  the laughing-stock  utterances,  The P r e s i d e n t him-  o f h i g h and l o w , and t h e h e l p l e s s t o o l o f t h e  118 17 •boss' General Pinheiro Machado." It is doubtful, however, whether Britons would have been any more satisfied with Ruy Barbosa, who contended the 1910 election and lost to Hermes.  Though traditionally the "friend of England" and admirer of  English institutions, Ruy commanded l i t t l e support among members of the British community in Brazil.  Whereas doubts were cast about Hermes be-  cause he was largely untried and inexperienced in 1910, Ruy hail been tried and found wanting.  As one British diplomat wrote on the occasion of Ruy's  return from the Hague Conference, "he is more fitted to appear as a Comet 18 than as a fixed Constellation."  Haggard was altogether more biting:  "He i s treacherous as a man and as a politician"; and:: "Certainly no President could have been worse than would have been Dr Ruy Barbosa with his 19  past record of treachery and venality."  7  American opinion prior to the  outbreak of the First World War ran along the same lines.  Dudley stated  in 1910 that Ruy was "lacking in practical sense and personal honesty," and Ambassador Morgan echoed the same sentiments in almost identical words 20 some three years later.  Few people cast doubts on Ruy's intelligence  and erudition, although his a b i l i t y to harness them to administrative and financial tasks was frequently questioned. On the other major p o l i t i c a l figures of the time British (and American) opinion was rarely enthusiastic. to expectations better than most.  Rodrigues Alves measured up  "A man of integrity, and a capable  administrator," wrote Lowther from the British legation in 1902; "his honesty and conservatism are beyond question, and he represents the best  119 administrative tradition of this country," observed an American colleague in 1901.  21  Ambassador Thompson noted that Rodrigues Alves -was free of the  normal degree of corruption, and contrasted him in this respect with Bernardino de Campos, who looked at one stage in 1905 as though he were a 22  strong candidate for the Brazilian Presidency.  Afonso Pena even managed  to emerge from mediocrity and convince the British legation that he had performed some useful work in muffling the background rumblings of Pinheiro Machado: "He [Pena] has shown character and vigour which was not expected of him and his Government has developed into a strong one." ^ Wenceslao 2  Braz, President of Brazil during the war years, was "honest, painstaking and drudging," and appeared to be generally unfit to carry out the energetic reforms which the "extravagance and incompetence" of' Hermes da Fon24 seca's regime had made essential.  Only Joaquin Nabuco went unscathed  among the morass of mediocre and uninspiring men involved in Brazilian public affairs: "Certainly the best Brazilian I ever knewyf wrote Haggard in 1910, "was Dr. Joaquim Nabuco, a man of charming personality, whose recent death . . . has caused so much and such well-deserved regret," ^ 2  According to British observers,, the various crises through which Brazil passed in the early years of the century can be attributed as much to the Brazilian p o l i t i c a l system as to the men whom i t produced.  One of  the members of the British Consular Service, Ernest Hambloch, a man who spent many years in Brazil and who knew the country well, thought the "26 matter of sufficient interest to write an entire book on the subject. Hambloch was born in 1886, and belonged to an altogether younger generation  120 t h a n d i d S i r W i l l i a m Haggard o r S i r A r t h u r P e e l ,  His experience o f Bra-  z i l i a n a f f a i r s began i n h i s m i d - t w e n t i e s , a t a t i m e when Haggard was n e a r i n g t h e end o f h i s d i p l o m a t i c c a r e e r .  Hambloch was v e r y much o f a  b r i g h t new s t a r a t t h i s s t a g e , h a v i n g headed t h e l i s t i n t h e e n t r y examinations f o r the B r i t i s h Consular S e r v i c e .  He s e r v e d i n v a r i o u s European  c o u n t r i e s and i n t h e F o r e i g n O f f i c e i n London, and was e v e n t u a l l y a p p o i n t e d Commercial Attache* t o t h e B r i t i s h l e g a t i o n i n R i o .  He became F i r s t  Commercial S e c r e t a r y t o t h e B r i t i s h embassy i n B r a z i l , and remained i n t h i s p o s t u n t i l 1927,  As w e l l as h i s book on t h e B r a z i l i a n p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m , Hambloch produced i n 1938 h i s s e r i e s o f memoirs e n t i t l e d  British  C o n s u l , w h i c h c o n t a i n s some i n t e r e s t i n g e y e - w i t n e s s m a t e r i a l on e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y B r a z i l , as w e l l as s k e t c h e s o f Haggard, R i o B r a n c o , P i n h e i r o Machado, S i r Roger Casement, and o t h e r s . Hambloch thought t h a t " B r a z i l ' s t r o u b l e s a r e t o be s o u g h t i n t h e d e f e c t s o f h e r p o l i t i c a l regime." e a r l y r e p u b l i c a n s had m o d e l l e d  He d e p l o r e d t h e i f a c t t h a t B r a z i l ' s  t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n on t h a t o f t h e U n i t e d  S t a t e s , w i t h o u t g i v i n g any t h o u g h t t o t h e p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t i e s o f B r a z i l i a n politics.  He m a i n t a i n e d  t h a t i t was i m p o s s i b l e f o r B r a z i l i a n s t o come t o  g r i p s w i t h t h e e s s e n t i a l elements o f p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy: have f o r g o t t e n how t o t h i n k p o l i t i c a l l y . p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s t o advocate.  "Brazilians  I t n e v e r o c c u r s t o them t o f o r m  They would c o n s i d e r i t s h e e r wasfe o f t i m e ;  a n d , i f t h e n o t i o n e v e r d i d c r o s s t h e i r m i n d s , t h e y would r e j e c t i t as 29  i m p r a c t i c a b l e as w e l l as u s e l e s s . "  T h i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Hambloch, has  meant t h a t power has been c o n c e n t r a t e d t o s u c h an e x t e n t t h a t t h e b a s i c  121 tenets of a federalist system have been ignored: "presidentialist republicanism is a form of government under which each individual is perfectly 30 free to do as the government likes."  From the purely p o l i t i c a l point  of view, Hambloch, writing in the mid-1930's and under the shadow of Vargas, saw that Brazil had done l i t t l e to improve her position since the advent of the republic in 1889: "In her republican existence of nearlyhalf a century, Brazil has achieved considerable material progress and even greater p o l i t i c a l disorder. wards—rather unsteadily."-^-  P o l i t i c a l l y she has been marching back-  He went on to examine the effects of p o l i -  t i c a l mismanagement on the economic fortunes of Brazil, and attributed much of the subsequent instability to the financial reforms of Campos Salles and Murtinho, who f i l l e d the national treasury at the expense of 32 other more pressing needs. Hambloch touched on many themes which are central to any discussion of p o l i t i c a l development in the years prior to 1914.  The republic had,  by the turn of the century, emerged from i t s period of greatest instability, but i t s future was s t i l l in doubt in the minds of many observers.  Mr. La-  moureux, editor of the Rio News, condemned the f i r s t ten years of repub§ lican government, stating that they had been marked by "an almost uninterrupted succession of disquieting rumours, plots, r i o t s , revolutions, dictatorships and p o l i t i c a l murders."  He called upon the "conservative classes"  to unite and put an end to the disorders.^  Thomas Dawson, of the American  legation in Rio, while clearly not in favour of any kind of restoration in Brazil, drew attention to the considerable power of the President in terms  122 s i m i l a r t o t h o s e u s e d by Hambloch s e v e r a l decades l a t e r : " I n h i s  [i.e.,  the P r e s i d e n t ' s ] r e l a t i o n t o p a r t i e s he seems t o be more n e a r l y analogous t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarch o r t h e P r e s i d e n t o f F r a n c e t h a n t o the s i d e n t o f the United The  States.  , , 3 2 +  o l d s c h o o l o f B r i t i s h d i p l o m a t s was  t h e s u b j e c t o f the r e p u b l i c and w i t h i t , and  Haggard was  Pre-  p a r t i c u l a r l y vehement on  the p o l i t i c a l i l l s .•..which i t had  i t s most a c t i v e c r i t i c .  s a t i o n w i t h Baron de Maya M o n t e i r o , one  In 1913»  brought  a f t e r a conver-  of Brazil's leading  imperialists,  Haggard w r o t e : There i s no doubt t h a t , a p a r t f r o m a l l p a r t y p o l i t i c s o r even from l o y a l t y t o t h e l a t e d y n a s t y , t h e r e i s a s t r o n g f e e l i n g amongst d e c e n t p e o p l e o f d i s g u s t a t a regime o f l a w l e s s n e s s , p u b l i c e x t r a v a g a n c e , o v e r - t a x a t i o n , v i o l e n c e , r o b b e r y and c o r r u p t i o n w h i c h p r e v a i l s now t h r o u g h o u t the c o u n t r y , and o f h u r t p r i d e a t s e e i n g t h a t B r a z i l , i n s t e a d o f t a k i n g a p l a c e i n t h e march o f p r o g r e s s o f t h e w o r l d , i s , as y e a r s go by, s i n k i n g l o w e r i n p u b l i c m o r a l i t y , r e p u t a t i o n and g e n e r a l w e l l - b e i n g ; and t h i n k i n g men c a n n o t b u t compare the p o s i t i o n o f B r a z i l w i t h t h a t o f A r g e n t i n a — i t s n e i g h b o u r and r i v a l — d u r i n g t h e t i m e o f t h e Emperor, i t s i n f e r i o r , b u t now i t s s u p e r i o r i n e v e r y r e s p e c t , e i t h e r as r e g a r d s the p r o s p e r i t y o f t h e c o u n t r y o r the c o m f o r t and w e l l - b e i n g o f i t s i n h a b i t a n t s .  35  Haggard l e f t no doubt as t o the change t h a t had s i n c e the a d v e n t o f t h e r e p u b l i c : "my  taken place i n B r a z i l  r e c o l l e c t i o n o f the  administration  o f t h i s c o u n t r y under t h e E m p i r e , as compared w i t h what I see now, t h a t the country  has  i n many r e s p e c t s  gone back r a t h e r than  forward."  B r i t i s h v o i c e s r a i s e d i n s u p p o r t o f t h e r e p u b l i c were r a r e . s u c h was  t h a t o f J . C. O a k e n f u l l , who  i n 1909  shows 3 6  One  began p u b l i s h i n g a s e r i e s  o f almanacs f o r f r e e d i s t r i b u t i o n t o t h o s e i n t e r e s t e d i n and  trading with  123 Brazil.  O a k e n f u l l was one o f t h e few Englishmen whose e n t e r p r i s e s expan-  ded r a p i d l y d u r i n g t h e e a r l y y e a r s o f t h e c e n t u r y ( f o u r y e a r s a f t e r t h e appearance o f h i s almanac, i t s c i r c u l a t i o n had a l m o s t d o u b l e d ) , and he w a s / c l e a r l y devoted t o t h e r e p u b l i c and t h e k i n d o f p r o g r e s s he saw d u r i n g it:  " I t seems as i f t h e n a t i o n s l e p t and r e q u i r e d g i g a n t i c e f f o r t s t o be  awakened.  I f i t has done n o t h i n g e l s e , t h e R e p u b l i c has b r e a t h e d t h e  breath of l i f e into B r a z i l .  The whole c o u n t r y i s a s t i r , and i f t h e e a r l y  t r a v e l l e r s , who found so much t o d e c r y , were e n a b l e d t o s t e p f r o m t h e i r graves and r e v i s i t i t , t h e i r amazement would be g r e a t , and t h e y would 37 a d m i t t h a t t h e y themselves were q u i t e o u t o f d a t e . " Whatever may have been B r i t i s h thoughts on t h e s u b j e c t , t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e B r a z i l i a n monarchy was n e v e r a s s e r i o u s p o s s i b i l i t y a f t e r the t u r n o f the century.  The f a i l u r e o f t h e m o n a r c h i s t s t o o r g a n i z e  themselves and t o a p p e a l t o t h e younger members o f s o c i e t y became i n c r e a s i n g l y a p p a r e n t as 1889 became more and more remote.  Occasional  p l o t s and u p r i s i n g s caused o b s e r v e r s t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e m o n a r c h i s t s were a c t i v e , b u t t h e i r a c t i v i t y and s u p p o r t seem t o have stemmed more f r o m o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e management o f r e p u b l i c a n p o l i t i c s t h a n from a p o s i t i v e w i s h t o see Dom L u i z de Bourbon on t h e t h r o n e o f B r a z i l .  Even  d u r i n g t h e d e p r e s s i n g days o f 1913» when t h e Hermes a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had b r o u g h t t h e c o u n t r y t o t h e edge o f b a n k r u p t c y and p o l i t i c a l u p h e a v a l , t h e B r i t i s h c o u l d do no more t h a n r e p o r t t h a t Sthe r o o t s o f t h e R o y a l i s t f e e l i n g h e r e , however deep t h e y may b e , a r e n o t v e r y w i d e l y spread."-^ The l a c k o f c o o r d i n a t i o n among t h e m o n a r c h i s t s i s b y no means  8  124 surprising.  The p o l i t i c a l s c e n e , a c c o r d i n g t o B r i t i s h o b s e r v e r s ,  dominated by men  whose n a t i o n a l l o y a l t i e s were g e n e r a l l y s u b o r d i n a t e t o  t h e i r personal interests.  The Travassos  r e v o l t o f 1904 was  as a r e s u l t o f " t h e p e r s o n a l a m b i t i o n o f a few men and  was  fishes of o f f i c e . "  3 9  The  referred to  anxious f o r the loaves  exasperation of A r n o l d Robertson  d i s a s t r o u s l e g a c y o f t h e Hermes government was  a t the  even more v i t u p e r a t i v e :  " E v e r y t h i n g has been s u b o r d i n a t e d t o ' p o l i t i c s * w h i c h h e r e i s synonymous w i t h the p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s of the i n d i v i d u a l . " * * i n 1914  that " p o l i t i c s i n B r a z i l . . t  i n t e r e s t to the f o r e i g n e r .  little  The new M i n i s t e r s can h a r d l y be more incompeI t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t they  may  Haggard was p r o b a b l y d e l i g h t e d t o be a b l e t o r e p o r t on  t h e remarks o f R o d r i g u e s A l v e s , who B r a z i l was  R o b e r t s o n added l a t e r  . a r e p u r e l y p e r s o n a l , and o f  t e n t and d i s h o n e s t than t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s . be l e s s so."**-''  0  a t t h e time o f Haggard's r e c a l l from  P r e s i d e n t o f t h e S t a t e o f Sffo P a u l o .  In a despatch which w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d b e l o w i n more d e t a i l , Haggard r e l a y e d t h e f o l l o w i n g comments: "What has been c a l l e d , on o c c a s i o n s and f o r t r i f l i n g reasons  o f conve-  n i e n c e , ' p a r t i e s ' , have m e r e l y been g r o u p i n g s o f i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h o u t  any  s e r i o u s concern f o r i d e a s and p r i n c i p l e s and dominated e x c l u s i v e l y by t h e 42 personal feelings of t h e i r leaders." In  c o n c l u s i o n , i t may  no hope f o r t h e b e t t e r m e n t  be s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h h e l d o u t l i t t l e  of p o l i t i c a l conditions i n B r a z i l .  or  Haggard's  most comprehensive v i e w o f p o l i t i c a l d e c l i n e has been d i s c u s s e d i n an earlier chapter.^  S i m i l a r thoughts r u n t h r o u g h o u t h i s d e s p a t c h e s .  d i s c u s s i n g the p o l i t i c a l upheavals  o f 1912  i n B a h i a , Amazonas, C e a r a ,  After and  125 R i o Grande do S u l , he reached t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t " B r a z i l [was]  going  44 f u r t h e r and  f u r t h e r down h i l l . "  Even b e f o r e the Hermes government  i n t o i t s somewhat e r r a t i c s t r i d e , Haggard commented on t h e y e a r 1910  was in  t h e f o l l o w i n g t e r m s : " B r a z i l has made no p o l i t i c a l p r o g r e s s d u r i n g t h e l a s t y e a r , n o r do I , u n d e r the p r e s e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , see any hope o f h e r doing so.  She may,  i n d e e d , be s a i d t o be i n a s t a t e o f s o c i a l and p o l i -  4S t i c a l anarchy."  J  The  l o g i c a l outcome o f such d i s o r d e r , a c c o r d i n g t o  one  o f Haggard's c o l l e a g u e s i n the B r i t i s h l e g a t i o n , would be a permanent s p l i t i n t h e p o l i t i c a l u n i t known as B r a z i l . white, industrialized  E i t h e r the p r o g r e s s i v e ,  s o u t h would t a k e o v e r the c o n s e r v a t i v e , b l a c k , a g r i -  c u l t u r a l n o r t h , o r t h e r e would be a t o t a l d i v i s i o n between the two " I n t h a t e v e n t the s o u t h would d e v e l o p on i t s own  lines into a  halves:  fairly  homogenous S t a t e o f manageable s i z e , w i t h a p r o g r e s s i v e p o p u l a t i o n o f European r a c e , w h i l e t h e n o r t h would be l e f t t o w e l t e r , l i k e a South Amer i c a n M o r o c c o , i n i t s own tween t h e a m b i t i o n s  m i s r u l e f o r j u s t as l o n g as the c o n f l i c t  o f the expansive  be-  Powers m i g h t d e l a y i t s f i n a l a p p r o -  .46 priation."  So much f o r the B r i t i s h assessment o f p o l i t i c a l  progress  d u r i n g t h e f i r s t two decades o f t h e r e p u b l i c . " F i n a n c i a l and p o l i t i c a l a r e here t h e same t h i n g , " commented t h e Manager o f t h e B r i t i s h Bank o f S o u t h A m e r i c a t o Haggard i n c o n n e c t i o n was observers progress  d o u b t l e s s a s t r o n g one, a l t h o u g h t h e r e was  1913.^  The  among B r i t i s h  o f t h e day much more v a r i e t y o f o p i n i o n r e g a r d i n g economic t h a n t h e r e was  on t h e s u b j e c t o f p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s .  T h e i r com-  ments must be examined i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e main economic t r e n d s o f t h e  126  day.  B r a z i l was s t i l l b a s i c a l l y an a g r i c u l t u r a l community, and d e s p i t e  the massive i n f l u x o f p o p u l a t i o n t o t h e p r o g r e s s i v e areas o f t h e south, t h e p i c t u r e o f t h e f i n a l s t a g e s o f t h e empire remained s u b s t a n t i a l l y u n changed. and  C o f f e e and r u b b e r were t h e k e y items i n t h e B r a z i l i a n economy,  t h e i r boom p e r i o d and subsequent c o l l a p s e on w o r l d markets were a  b a s i c f e a t u r e o f t h e f i r s t two decades o f t h e c e n t u r y .  C o f f e e and r u b b e r  saw q u i c k r e t u r n s on i n v e s t m e n t , b u t t h e y were v u l n e r a b l e p r o d u c t s , to  subject  c o n s i d e r a b l e f l u c t u a t i o n s i n w o r l d p r i c e s and t o v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e e x -  change r a t e .  M a t e r i a l development was l i k e w i s e dependent on f o r e i g n i n -  f l u e n c e s ; l o a n s f o r communication s y s t e m s , p o r t w o r k s , c i t y improvements, and to  a l l t h e v a r i o u s g r a n d i o s e schemes w h i c h accompanied t h e r e p u b l i c , had be o b t a i n e d abroad and were s u b j e c t t o c o n d i t i o n s imposed b y f o r e i g n  b a n k e r s and f i n a n c i e r s . was  N a t i o n a l i n d u s t r y , though d e v e l o p i n g  steadily,  i n no p o s i t i o n t o f u l f i l t h e t o t a l needs o f a growing B r a z i l i a n popu-  lation.  I n any c a s e , a c o n s i d e r a b l e segment o f i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y r e -  mained i n f o r e i g n hands o r was f i n a n c e d f r o m f o r e i g n s o u r c e s .  Raw mate-  r i a l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y c o a l and i r o n , were i n s h o r t s u p p l y , and v a s t q u a n t i t i e s had t o be imported  t o s a t i s f y i n t e r n a l needs.  Transportation  links  were so p o o r t h a t i t was o f t e n cheaper t o i m p o r t m a t e r i a l s f r o m abroad t h a n t o d e v e l o p them w i t h i n B r a z i l . the beginning  I n s h o r t , t h e B r a z i l i a n economy a t  o f the century manifested  s e v e r a l i n h e r e n t weaknesses w h i c h  were t o p l a g u e t h e n a t i o n f o r many y e a r s and w h i c h have n o t e n t i r e l y been remedied t o t h i s day. Even t h e most t a l e n t e d a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and t h e most s t a b l e governments would have been a t a l o s s t o r e v e r s e B r a z i l ' s  virtually  12? c o l o n i a l s t a t u s and c o n t r o l t h e v a s t amount o f f o r e i g n c a p i t a l w h i c h was being invested i n her future.  The i n t e r n a l chaos o f t h e p o l i t i c a l  system  and t h e l a c k o f t r u e b a l a n c e between t h e v a r i o u s u n w i e l d y u n i t s w h i c h made up t h e f e d e r a t i o n r e n d e r e d such a t a s k d o u b l y d i f f i c u l t .  British  commentaries, n o t u n e x p e c t e d l y , demonstrate something o f a dichotomy. W h i l e d e s p a i r i n g a t t h e management o f economic a f f a i r s B r i t o n s were f r e q u e n t l y aware o f t h e tremendous economic the country o f f e r e d .  ^within  Brazil,  opportunities  I n f a c t , t h e degree o f o p t i m i s m t h e y e x p r e s s e d i s  surprising i n the l i g h t o f the general eclipse o f B r i t i s h interest a t 48 t h i s s t a g e o f B r a z i l ' s n a t i o n a l growth. Most B r i t i s h e x p r e s s i o n s o f c o n f i d e n c e and o p t i m i s m c a n be found i n t h e contemporary p r e s s .  The newspapers w h i c h t o o k a most a c t i v e  inte-  r e s t i n B r a z i l i a n a f f a i r s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d were The Times, t h e F i n a n c i a l News, t h e F i n a n c i e r , and t h e Economist.  Not a l l o f them were  complimen-  t a r y about B r a z i l , and t h e Economist and t h e F i n a n c i a l News had a p a r t i c u l a r l y strong t r a d i t i o n o f s c e p t i c i s m w i t h regard t o B r a z i l i a n "progress." I t i s , however, p o s s i b l e t o t r a c e c u r r e n t s o f o p t i m i s m i n t h e pages o f t h e s e and o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n peak y e a r s o f B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t such as  1905  and  1909-10.  That t h e y had an a p p r e c i a b l e e f f e c t on  o p i n i o n i n B r a z i l cannot s e r i o u s l y be doubted.  The pronouncements o f The  Times and o t h e r London newspapers were g e n e r a l l y r e p o r t e d i n t h e B r a z i l i a n p r e s s , and t h e B r i t i s h f i n a n c i a l h o l d on B r a z i l i a n a f f a i r s was s t i l l t h a t comments on i n v e s t m e n t p r o s p e c t s and economic were o f c o n s i d e r a b l e i m p o r t a n c e .  and p o l i t i c a l  such  stability  128 A particularly interesting example in this respect is the British reaction to the financial reforms of 1898-1902.  It is clear that British  sanction of the policies undertaken by Campos Salles and Murtinho was regarded as a useful weapon both at home and abroad.  There is evidence  that the President looked favourably upon semi-official British approval in the form of an article in The Times, and that he did his best to bring this to the attention of the most influential sections of the Brazilian public.  At the beginning of 1900 he wrote to J. C. Rodrigues, editor of  the Jornal do Commercio, in the following terms: "Parece de opportuna transcrip§a"o o artigo do Times, que me enviou o CorrSa.  Lendo-o v. vera  se elle merece ser divulgado pelas columnas do Jornal, como eu penso que 49 merece. &a sanccffo de uma parte capital de nossa politica financeira." The Brazilian Review, ever anxious to protect Brazil's image at home and abroad, sprang to the defence of the Campos Salles-Murtinho programme whenever i t appeared that i t might be dealt a blow by the big guns of the British press.  Early in 1899 i t commented on an attack in the Economist  in the following way: It is a pity that writers in jornals [sic] of such wide world importance as the Economist are not better acquainted with the p o l i t i c a l and social conditions of the countries: they are called-on to deal with. Had they any personal knowledge of the state of affairs amongst us they would be the f i r s t to admit that the work of regeneration that the present Government has undertaken and i s , to the best of i t s a b i l i t y , carrying out without having, so far, given any occasion whatever to doubt.the honesty of i t s intentions, must necessarily be slow and cautious. . . . Those who talk so a i r i l y of reducing the army and navy and of the wholesale dismissal of employees and reduction of salaries a l l round to starvation level must be either abso-  129 l u t e l y i g n o r a n t o f t h e p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , and e c o n o m i c a l medium w i t h w h i c h t h e y d e a l , o r d e l i b e r a t e fomentors o f t r o u b l e i a n d d i s t u r b a n c e . 50 I n t h e same y e a r t h e B r a z i l i a n Review b l a s t e d a n o t h e r E n g l i s h newspaper, the S t a t i s t , f o r p u b l i s h i n g e x c e s s i v e l y p e s s i m i s t i c f i g u r e s w i t h to the coffee c r o p .  5 1  regard  I t f r e q u e n t l y suggested t h a t t h e Campos S a l l e s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u l d do no wrong i n t h e f i e l d o f f i n a n c i a l and economic policy—and  e q u a l l y f r e q u e n t l y reached t h e o p p o s i t e  conclusionI  On t h e  c r e d i t s i d e , t h e f o l l o w i n g was an assessment o f t h e r e f o r m s u n d e r t a k e n d u r i n g t h e f o u r y e a r s o f t h e Campos S a l l e s p r e s i d e n c y :  "Never b e f o r e has  t h e f i n a n c i a l o u t l o o k been b e t t e r o r more s t a b l e , n o r i s t h e r e i n h i s t o r y 52 an example o f f i n a n c i a l r e c o v e r y more r a p i d , complete and l a s t i n g . " ^ The v i e w was e s s e n t i a l l y shared by American d i p l o m a t s i n B r a z i l .  By  1900  M i n i s t e r Bryan c o u l d r e p o r t t h a t " t h e f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s w h i c h has e x i s t e d f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s i s a t an end." I n May o f 1901  he n o t e d an a p p r e c i a b l e  upward t r e n d on t h e f i n a n c i a l f r o n t , and c o n f i r m e d t h e improvement a t t h e end  o f September.  I n h i s comments on R o d r i g u e s A l v e s ' s e c o n d A n n u a l  Message t o Congress i n 1904, improving s t e a d i l y s i n c e The  M i n i s t e r Thompson s t a t e d t h a t t h i n g s had been  1900.-53  r e s u l t s o f t h e Campos S a l l e s p r e s i d e n c y  v a r i o u s London newspapers.  looked  encouraging t o  The F i n a n c i a l News o f August 2 4 , 1903,  pub-  l i s h e d some c o m p l i m e n t a r y a r t i c l e s commenting on t h e r e c e n t l y - i s s u e d r e p o r t o f t h e B r i t i s h C o n s u l G e n e r a l i n B r a z i l , and t h e s e were r e l a y e d i n the B r a z i l i a n press. " 524  In 1905  t h e r e was a c o n s i d e r a b l e  outcrop o f B r i t i s h  130 p r e s s a r t i c l e s commenting on B r a z i l i a n p r o g r e s s . F e b r u a r y 25,  1905,  The  D a i l y M a i l , on  produced an a r t i c l e i n w h i c h i t s t a t e d t h a t  British  i n v e s t m e n t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e s e c t o r o f B r a z i l i a n r a i l w a y s , would s u r e o f a good r e t u r n on c a p i t a l . system and saw.  gave the i m p r e s s i o n  I t went i n d e t a i l i n t o t h e  t h a t i t was  L a t e r i n t h e y e a r (August 3)»  t o p i c and  "the D a i l y M a i l r e t u r n e d  1905  t o the same  conclusions.  In y e t  > t h e D a i l y M a i l examined  r i s i n g p r i c e s o f r u b b e r and c o f f e e , and  the  s a i d t h a t these products,  g e t h e r w i t h t h e development o f i n d u s t r y and had  railway  v e r y s a t i s f i e d w i t h what i t  reached t h e same e x t r e m e l y f a v o u r a b l e  a n o t h e r a r t i c l e , d a t e d October 19,  to-  o f t h e communications s y s t e m ,  enabled B r a z i l t o occupy a p o s i t i o n o f p r o s p e r i t y u n e q u a l l e d  South A m e r i c a n The  continent.  be  on  the  5 5  surge o f i n t e r e s t i n 1905  was  not l i m i t e d to the D a i l y M a i l .  I n A u g u s t , s e v e r a l London newspapers commented on the s a t i s f a c t o r y p o l i t i c a l and  economic s i t u a t i o n o f B r a z i l , and p r a i s e d t h e work o f  government o f R o d r i g u e s A l v e s .  the  They warned would-be i n v e s t o r s o f  the  need t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e c l e a r l y between l o a n s s o l i c i t e d by t h e c e n t r a l government and rities. t o one  t h o s e sought u n d e r t h e a u s p i c e s  of various s t a t e autho-  In September, the F i n a n c i e r produced a l o n g and,  according  B r a z i l i a n commentary, " b r i l l i a n t " a r t i c l e on t h e m a t e r i a l d e v e l o p -  ment and  s t e a d i l y increasing progress of B r a z i l , together w i t h a d e t a i l e d  s t u d y o f t h e growth o f c e r t a i n b a s i c economic a c t i v i t i e s . suggestion  I t made t h e  t h a t r e l a t i o n s between t h e B r a z i l i a n government and  i n v e s t e d c a p i t a l f r o m abroad s h o u l d  those  who  be i m p r o v e d , and l e f t no doubt t h a t  131 i t believed firmly in Brazil's economic future.  The article received  sympathetic attention in the Gazeta de Noticias, but was sharply attacked in the pages of the Brazilian Review.  The latter newspaper seemed extre-  mely sceptical about the value of opinions voiced in London, and suggested that the standard of reporting would be improved beyond recognition i f the English press took the trouble to post correspondents in foreign countries instead of l i f t i n g a l l their material out of local journals like the Brazilian Review.  The Financier, however, continued to support  Brazilian economic progress through the closing months of 1905.  It made  the point that British investors should not neglect Brazil, and that Germans and Americans were taking advantage of British conservatism to establish themselves in that country.  In October, the Financier once  more referred to the growing prosperity of Brazil, and echoed the Daily Mail in attributing this to the railway network.  The article was written  by the Financier's "correspondent in B r a z i l " — a possible reply to the earlier criticisms of the Brazilian Review.57  The P a l l Mall Gazette, in  an article dated May 18, 1906, returned to the question of the Brazilian railways, discussed the dispute between the PSrto Alegre-New- Hamburg Railway and the Brazilian government, and suggested that Brazil had a reputation for straight dealing with foreign creditors which she should endeavour to uphold. In 1908  i t was once more the turn of The Times to praise Brazilian  economic progress.  In an article in i t s June 26 issue, i t commented  favourably on both the valorization scheme and the caixa de conversgo,  132 and  expressed  confidence  i n the economic f u t u r e o f B r a z i l .  The F i n a n c i a l  T i m e s , j u s t two weeks e a r l i e r (June 1 1 ) , had appeared somewhat m y s t i f i e d by the drop i n the B r a z i l i a n market a t a t i m e when t h e s a l e s o f v a l o r i z e d c o f f e e were w o r k i n g o u t so w e l l .  The  June 26 a r t i c l e made i t c l e a r t h a t  a l t h o u g h B r i t a i n had n o t been as c l o s e l y concerned w i t h B r a z i l i a n  develop-  ment as she had w i t h t h a t o f A r g e n t i n a , n e v e r t h e l e s s she had  £100  m i l l i o n t i e d up i n B r a z i l and was  over  l i k e l y t o i n c r e a s e t h a t sum  considerably  w i t h i n the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . 1909  and 1910  saw a f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e i n B r i t i s h assessments o f  B r a z i l i a n economic p r o g r e s s .  The  Gazeta de N o t i c i a s ( A p r i l 23,  1909)  commented on an a r t i c l e i n the F i n a n c i a l Review o f Reviews i n w h i c h Lord ELcho compared the f i n a n c e s o f B r a z i l i n terms w h i c h were g e n e r a l l y f a v o u r a b l e t o the f o r m e r . month (May  5»  1909)  The same R i o newspaper mentioned t h e f o l l o w i n g  t h a t the London p r e s s had r e a c t e d e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y t o  A f o n s o Pena's Message t o C o n g r e s s , and t h a t B r i t a i n expressed i n the f i n a n c i a l s t a t e o f B r a z i l .  B o t h The Times and  confidence  the F i n a n c i a l News  devoted c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n t o B r a z i l d u r i n g the f i n a l days o f The  f o r m e r p u b l i s h e d on December 10 an a r t i c l e c o n c e r n i n g  d u s t r y , and t h e way  i t s a u t h o r concluded  of i t s continued  and t h e f a c t was  The same newspaper, i n i t s r e t r o -  r e f e r r e d t o B r a z i l ' s growing p r o s p e r i t y ,  d u l y n o t e d i n the a f t e r n o o n i s s u e of- t h e J o r n a l do  Commercio, December 31, view.  the rubber i n -  t h a t t h e r e were no s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e s i n  development.  s p e c t i v e l o o k a t t h e y e a r 1909,  1909.  1909.  The  F i n a n c i a l News t o o k t h e same b e n e v o l e n t  E a r l y i n the month (December 10)it p r a i s e d r e c e n t B r a z i l i a n  poli-  133 c i e s , and on December 21  i t p u b l i s h e d a l a r g e p a r t o f an American c o n s u l a r  r e p o r t on B r a z i l w i t h t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e B r a z i l i a n e x p o r t was  situation  very healthy. A l l t h e s e developments were r e p o r t e d i n the B r a z i l i a n p r e s s  were c l e a r l y o f c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t t o informed E a r l y i n t h e new y e a r ( J a n u a r y  13, 1910), A  and  readers i n t h a t country.  N o t i c i a p r a i s e d the F i n a n c i a l  News, a p a p e r w i t h a t r a d i t i o n o f h o s t i l i t y t o B r a z i l , f o r i t s r e c e n t comments c o n c e r n i n g i n d u s t r i a l development.  The  J o r n a l do Commercio d i d  n o t h i n g more than complete a f a m i l i a r c i r c l e when i t s t a t e d ( J a n u a r y 1910)  15,  t h a t The Times had p u b l i s h e d on the p r e v i o u s day a l e t t e r from i t s  correspondent  i n Rio to the e f f e c t t h a t the B r a z i l i a n commercial s t a t i s -  t i c s f o r the f i r s t n i n e months o f 1909 m i s t j on March 5, 1910,  were v e r y e n c o u r a g i n g .  The  Econo-  p u b l i s h e d a l e t t e r f r o m a c e r t a i n James M i t c h e l l  w h i c h c r i t i c i z e d t h e renowned w e e k l y f o r i t s p e r m a n e n t l y a n t i - B r a z i l i a n s t a n d , suggested  t h a t Ruy  Barbosa was  a b e t t e r man  f o r the  presidency  t h a n Hermes da F o n s e c a , and c i t e d v a r i o u s examples o f r e c e n t progress.  Once more, t h e f a c t was  (Gazeta de N o t i c i a s , March B r a z i l was  d u l y noted  6, 1910).  i n the B r a z i l i a n p r e s s  Not o n l y was  f a r i n g i n t h e eyes o f the B r i t i s h .  Brazilian  i t a question of  On March 29,  1910,  how  the  J o r n a l do Commercio p r i n t e d a t r a n s l a t i o n o f a r e c e n t a r t i c l e i n A n n a l e s P o l i t i q u e s e t L i t t e r a i r e s , w h i c h began i n t h e f o l l o w i n g glowing t e r m s :  "0  desenvolviraento economico do B r a s i l chama cada v e z mais a a t t e n c S b do mundo f i n a n c e i r o , p e l a a m p l i d l i o que tomou e p e l a r e g u l a r i d a d e com a q u a l p r o s e g u e . " The  F i n a n c i e r was  e q u a l l y e n t h u s i a s t i c , and  i n an a r t i c l e o f A p r i l 8,  1910  134 suggested  t h a t B r a z i l r e p r e s e n t e d one o f t h e b e s t i n v e s t m e n t a r e a s t o be  found anywhere. o f optimism  The Times l e n t i t s r e v e r e d v o i c e t o t h e g e n e r a l  chorus  i n t h e f o r m o f an a r t i c l e by Manuel Abad, London e d i t o r o f  t h e J o r n a l do B r a s i l , i n i t s S o u t h A m e r i c a n Supplement o f J u l y 30, The a r t i c l e , e n t i t l e d "Report on p r o g r e s s i n B r a z i l  1910.  1900-1910" i s perhaps  w o r t h q u o t a t i o n a t some l e n g t h : D u r i n g t h e f i r s t decade o f t h e p r e s e n t c e n t u r y such a s u c c e s s i o n o f p r o p i t i o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s o c c u r r e d , and t h e r e was such an e n t i r e harmony i n t h e e f f i c i e n t f a c t o r s o f n a t i o n a l p r o g r e s s t h a t t h e hope i s j u s t i f i e d t h a t t h e c u l m i n a t i n g epoch i n t h e p r o s p e r i t y o f t h i s f e r t i l e c o u n t r y may be reached i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e . The g r e a t advance w h i c h has been made i n t h i s s h o r t p e r i o d o f time i n t h e v a s t work on w h i c h t h e men r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e d e s t i n i e s o f B r a z i l a r e engaged, and t h e s u r p r i s i n g success w i t h w h i c h t h e i r e f f o r t s have been crowned i n a l l departments o f p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , may be regarded as a p r o o f o f t h i s f a c t . T h i s p r o g r e s s i s e v i d e n t i n t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f t h e f i n a n c e s and t h e r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e n a t i o n a l c r e d i t a b r o a d ; i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e p o p u l o u s towns o f a c a r e f u l l y t h o u g h t - o u t scheme o f hygiene,accompanied by g r e a t and e x p e n s i v e u r b a n reforms w h i c h have e m b e l l i s h e d and made h e a l t h y t h e p r i n c i p a l c e n t r e s ; i n t h e development by means o f new r a i l w a y l i n e s o f t h e communications between t h e e x t e n s i v e r e g i o n s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e t h e v a s t B r a z i l i a n t e r r i t o r y , t h e r e b y b r i n g i n g i n t o connexion t h e p r o d u c t i v e d i s t r i c t s w i t h t h e numerous p o r t s on t h e l o n g c o a s t - l i n e , and i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p a l p o r t s i n o r d e r t o a s s i s t n a v i g a t i o n as a l s o i n t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f a p o w e r f u l and modern Navy f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n and s e c u r i t y o f t h e i n d u s t r i e s o f t h e country.5°  Two months l a t e r , , t h e F i n a n c i a l Times (September 26, 1910)  dedica-  t e d a l o n g e d i t o r i a l a r t i c l e t o t h e i n d u s t r i a l development o f B r a z i l , w h i c h i t c o n s i d e r e d as t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t o f t h e p r o t e c t i o n i s t t a r i f f s w h i c h had been i n s t i t u t e d f o r some time i n t h a t c o u n t r y . t e d t h a t European m a n u f a c t u r e r s  I t sugges-  would soon f i n d t h a t t h e B r a z i l i a n m a r k e t  was p r e s e n t i n g s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e s .  The D a i l y T e l e g r a p h  (August 16,  1910)  135 echoed the general currents of enthusiasm by referring to Brazil's commerc i a l expansion and the impressive internal progress she had been making. It wondered why Hermes da Fonseca had not yet favoured England with the v i s i t which had been discussed for so long. Even the upheavals of the Hermes presidency did not shake the confidence of some British observers in the immediate prospects of the country in the field of economic and financial progress.  The Times produced an  article early in 1914 (January 10) entitled~ £flhsettled financial situation #  in Brazil," in which i t drew attention to Brazilian extravagance in schemes of public works, and criticized "the attempts of cities like Rio de Janeiro, and, to a less extent, Pernambuco and San §sic] Paulo, to live up to the sybaritical examples of the older civilisations of London and Paris." The general note of the article was, however, one of optimism for the future: "Without going so far as to say that Brazil is passing through a c r i s i s , we may certainly say that in the face of the prevalent financial pressures a l l over the world and of her own temporarily declining trade, i t is her obvious duty to husband her resources, to postpone further developments to a more convenient season, and by cautious policy to prepare the way for that recovery which is a sure and certain eventuality in a country of such immense area and untold natural wealth."  The Times published much the same  view a short while later (April 24, 1914) when i t interviewed Sir Owen Philipps, who had recently returned from a v i s i t to Brazil.  S i r Owen spoke  of "enormous improvements" in the city of Rio de Janeiro, despite the unsatisfactory financial position caused by the f a l l of rubber and coffee.  136 He stated that the population of the city of Sffo Paulo had increased from 250,000 to 450,000 in seven years, and saw a rosy future for the Statejof Sffo Paulo in the f i e l d of manufacturing industries. On the diplomatic front, British expressions of confidence and optimism were so rare that they can be effectively discounted.  Sir William  Haggard abandoned his gloomy view in 1907 to comment on President Pena*s Message to Congress, and saw some hope for the future in the details i t contained.  59  He even joined the wave of enthusiasm in 1910, summarizing  Nilo Pecanha's Message in these terms: "The Message on the whole has given great satisfaction in Brazil, not only because i t is a record of energy on the part of the Executive, but because the general situation of the country from a commercial and industrial point of view is shown to be one of prosperity unique in the annals of the Republic. . . . On the whole the situation, as depicted in the Message, is eminently satisfactory."^ Milne Cheetham, Secretary of the British legation, had recently written a report, published by the Foreign Office in October, 1909, in which he too looked over the commercial and economic features of the past year and came to the conclusion that, once a few details had been straightened out, the prospects for European capital in Brazil would be excellent.^1  Tet another  member of the British legation, Goodhart, was impressed by the measures taken during the early stages pf the Hermes presidency, and thought that Brazil was finally in a position to control the extravagance which had been  62 so characteristic of earlier years.  Finally, Arnold Robertson, in his  outstanding despatch of April 23, 1915, clearly believed in the long-term  137 economic and commercial future of Brazil and in Britain's commitment to it.  6 3  In general terms, however, British diplomats had severe doubts about Brazil's economic well-being during these years of transition. Dering's devastating assessment of the Campos Salles-Murtinho  reforms—  "Anything more hopelessly wretched than the actual economical state of 6* this country i t is hard to conceive"—set the seal for later evaluations. Some Americans were similarly disturbed by what they saw during these four years of reform.  Colonel Page Bryan, after an extended trip through  northern Brazil, referred to "business stagnation, as a result of the recent financial c r i s i s , " while holding out some hopes for a reversal in the future.  D  Bryan's successor, Thompson, was clearly upset by the  harshness of the t a r i f f regulations, and commented that the Brazilian people "[were] now taxed in different ways beyond their capacity to pay 66 without great suffering."  Charles Richardson of the American legation  referred to the oppression of the mass of the Brazilian people, and to ruthless taxation applied to luxuries and necessities alike: "This burden on the people could be diminished by the levying of taxes on real estate, which is done only in the cities and in two of the States; but as the large land owning class are practically in control this is not likely to take place."  He was unimpressed by the massive loans which had been ob-  tained abroad for the purpose of financing public works schemes.  67  The Rodrigues Alves administration, which was responsible for much of the reconstruction of Rio and the virtual elimination of major disease,  138  was also attacked on economic grounds.  From the British legation Dering  wrote of the distress caused by the fluctuations in the exchange rate, and attributed them directly to the size of foreign loans.  In 1906 he  suggested that Rodrigues Alves was abandoning a sinking ship as expertly as possible in order to avoid having the blame for a shaky financial situation laid at his own door.  Haggard, in one of his f i r s t despatches  from Rio, suggested that Dr. Passos, who had been largely responsible for the f a c e - l i f t given to the capital, was leaving an equally c r i t i c a l imbroglio behind him.  69  In the eyes of the British, the position of Brazilian economic matters did not appear to improve with time.  In 1908 the Foreign Office  received reports of scarce money, of unfavourable trade balances, of plans to raise funds for a sick economy by putting one of the Dreadnoughts up for sale, and of continuing national extravagance despite warnings 1  that Brazil was by no means doing as well as she had believed.  70  Early  in 1909 Milne Cheetham, commenting on the budget proposals for that year.| suggested that they expressed "a confidence in the prosperity of the country during the present year which is hardly warranted by the facts as known." After a few days of reflection, he came to the following conclusions:? "One is tempted to believe that t h e budget has been made out according to the necessities of expenditure and dressed up for i t s effect in London and Paris where application?for a new Federal Loan is not un71  likely."'  Haggard continued the attack on extravagance in 1910 with an  examination of Dr. Frontin's grandiose scheme for railway development,  139 and Acting Consul General Hambloch summed up the shaky situation in an extended despatch late in the year: This town [i.e., Rio] i s f u l l of examples of money recklessly spent in order to make Rio de Janeiro one:of the "world's capitals"; a gorgeous municipal theatre, a big national library, and a school of "belias artes," to quote only three instances. That a big town should have three such institutions i s no doubt a good thing, but i t is absolutely unnecessary to have planned them on such an elaborate scale, and i t would seem, moreover,.more logical to have made sure of the existence of actors, books, and some elementary foundation of education before lavishing so much money on buildings for them. . . . The country w i i l certainly have to pay one day for the recklessness and extravagance which prevail to-day, but the enormous wealth of the country, on the development of which so much of the money that is wasted on "Dreadnoughts" and other similar "white elephants" might be spent to advantage, is a factor which w i l l no doubt contribute towards avoiding a really overwhelming economic crash. The lack of real patriotic s p i r i t among politicians i s deplorable, and i t is significant that the idea of p o l i t i c a l intrigues is expressed by one word "politicagem." Until this word ceases to have a bad signification and those in authority are willing to sacrifice their own personal interests and ambitions to the good of the country the genuine progress of the nation w i l l remain stationary, and the agricultural, mineral, and pastoral wealth of the country which the hardy race of the interior are so anxious to develop w i l l be sacrificed to the vanity of the coast B r a z i l i a n . 72  Haggard's last three years in Brazil saw no improvement i n the situation as observed by his staff.  Commenting on Hermes da Fonseca's  Message to Congress of May 3, 1912—a speech which i t s e l f pointed out that expenditure was exceeding revenue and that restrictive measures should be introduced—he stated that " [ i t ] constitutes the expression of a pious wish, hardly likely to be translated into practice." -^ 7  A year  later Haggard referred back to a previous assessment of the Salarming financial condition of the country," stating that "day by day i t becomes  140 more evident that I in no way exaggerated the picture."  In the same des-  patch he examined in some detail the c r i t i c a l commercial situation in Para" and Amazonas brought about by the f a l l of rubber.  He quoted a letter  from Mr. Wileman to the Jornal do Commercio in which the editor of the English-language newspaper said that "horrified with the menace of bankruptcy and overwhelmed by the general dearness of living and the low price of rubber and coffee, we f a l l from the heights of optimism to the depths of pessimism."  Haggard's conclusions were by no means encouraging:  I have often stated that I think there i s l i t t l e hope l e f t for the rubber industry of this country. With i t s destruction, i f that takes place, w i l l go a great percentage of the revenue of this country. There must, moreover . . . now come a depreciation in the price of coffee, i f i t only be from the competition in other parts of the world which i t has excited, and a consequent large diminution in the revenue. Brazil i s loaded up to the h i l t , not to say crushed with the weight of loans, the interest of which has to be met somehow or other, i t can hardly be so out of a future decrease in the revenue. If this takes place what w i l l happen? Meanwhile at a moment when at a l l events the greatest economy in public and private expenses i s necessary, the Government and the people alike have learnt lessons of and are indulging in the wildest extravagance. These were easy to learn, but w i l l i t be so easy for them to be unlearnt? What is the prospect for this country? .Will prices go down as fast as they have gone up? Will factories fostered by protection be able_to continue to pay the heavy taxes notwithstanding which they can now make enormous profits? Or w i l l they not have to limit their output, i f not close down? What in that case w i l l happen to the crowds of workmen? How w i l l a i l classes be able to meet the increased price of living and the taxes which w i l l probably at least not be reduced? These are only a few of the questions which w i l l have to be answered in the not far distant future. ^ 7  Throughout 1913 there was much interest in the upheavals caused by the decline of rubber, and the climate was such that this one year saw the most devastatingly pessimistic comments from British observers. Haggard's  141 f i n a l assessment of his stay in Brazil, written on October 24, 1913, already been quoted in f u l l above.  75  has  It was even suggested that the very  future of Brazil as a p o l i t i c a l unit had been thrown into doubt by the ripples emanating from p o l i t i c a l and economic source^in Manaus and Belem. The government of Hermes da Fonseca was regarded as insufficiently pre1  pared to be able to deal with the serious issues involved. Arnold Robertson wrote in an early despatch that: The record of Marshall Hermes Fonseca*s Government has been one of unbridled extravagance and corruption, and even now Congress seems to have no real conception of the seriousness of the situation. Its members have but one object, viz,: to f i l l their own pockets and those of their satellites as quickly as possible, and they do not appear to take the smallest interest in the welfare of the country. The annual budget is l i t t l e more than a farce, for huge extra credits are voted after i t has been passed. Hitherto, deficits have been made up by loans, external and internal, and so long as money was easily forthcoming in that manner, none took thought for the morrow. Now, however, the shoe is pinching. With the heavy f a l l in the price of rubber and coffee the balance of trade has turned against Brazil; there has been so large an export of gold that the deposits at the "Caixa da Conversffo" have falien by over £7,000,000 in the last eleven months; imports have now begun to decline and are'llikely to continue to do so owing to the impoverished condition of purchasers; though this may help to redress the balance of trade, i t w i l l have the disadvantage of reducing the revenue from the Customs on which the Government, of the country almost entirely depends; bankruptcies have become frequent, owing, in many instances, to. firms being unable to recover debts due to them from the Government; add to a l l this the stringency of the money market in Europe and the failure of the £11,000,000 loan issued last May, most of which remained in the hands of the underwriters, and i t w i l l be seen that there is s u f f i cient cause for patriotic and serious statesmen and legislators to take grave thought. " 7  In a letter enclosed in the same despatch, Consul General Hambloch referred to the V&eling of insecurity of commerce and trade generally.  1,77  142 At the beginning of the new year (1914), Robertson elaborated on his previous assessment in similarly pessimistic terms: "The financial condition of the country i s so grave that one would have thought that Congress would have paid some heed to this warning and given a l l i t s attention to the Budget.  Far from this, the main part of the eight months  session was occupied with 'politics* pure and simple, frittered away with bombastic talk and personal maoeuvrings [sic] which earn members their 100 milreis a day and are of no possible use to the country,*''  Gloomy  reports continued to reach London from Brazil throughout the year, and observers were virtually xinanimous in their condemnation of extravagance and their advice that Brazil could survive only i f she tightened her belt and recognized that a slow but steady reconstruction of the financial and economic situation was the country's most urgent need.?  9  The  outbreak  of war did nothing to stem the mounting tide of criticism and despair. After the i n i t i a l panic and the realization that Brazil was going to have to put her house in order without the assistance of European bankers, the same fundamental lines of thought appeared in the British idiplomatic and consular despatches.  "The financial position of the Federal Government  is worse even than had been expected," wrote O'Sullivan-Beare, Consul fin  General in Rio, on March 19, 1915. was equally disturbed.  81  Arthur Peel, the new British Minister,  From Buenos Aires came news that one of Brazil's  old enemies, Estanislao Zeballos, was taking advantage of Brazil's financ i a l embarrassment by suggesting in the press that she was attempting to use the ABC alliance as a defense against her impending bankruptcy. ^ 0  143 The years 1914-1918 w i l l be discussed in more detail in a later chapter.  It is sufficient here to say that the c r i s i s of 1910-1915 did  not plunge Brazil into everlasting doom, as was suggested would happen by various contemporary observers, and in fact Brazil emerged from the war with many of the fundamental i l l s of her financial and economic system having gone some considerable way towards being remedied. Apart from diplomatic assessments, the main channel for British pessimism regarding Brazil was the press.  The opinions aired in London  newspapers were, unlike those of resident diplomats, rarely first-hand. The Times was the only paper to maintain a correspondent  in Rio, though  his identity and efficiency were brought into question in Brazil on more than one occasion.  83  The Financial News could normally be counted on to  print anything i t could find detrimental to Brazil, and the Economist, though generally respected in much the same way as was The Times, managed to produce some particularly antagonistic material during the period under consideration. Whatever the quality of British coverage of Brazil, there is no doubt that the British press was closely watched throughout that country for fluctuations in opinion and for commentaries on Brazilian progress.  Key articles, such as the one by Zeballos in the South American  Supplement of The Times, December, 1909* produced considerable comment in the Brazilian press.  English-language newspapers in Brazil tended to  despise their London counterparts and c r i t i c i z e their lack of contact with South American realities.  The Brazilian Review was highly active in this  respect, particularly in i t s early days.  In an attack on British misrepre-  144 sentations of the gloomy prospects of 1898, i t made the following comments: "London Editors are not as a class more stupid, than any other; though one might well think so to judge by the extraordinary criticisms and advice they are so found [sic] of offering on every possible subject and occasionl Despising South America, which is regarded there chiefly as an excellent dumping ground for Manchester and Brummagem superfluities, they take no trouble to investigate the social and p o l i t i c a l factors that enter so largely into our financial problems; but, jumping at conclusions, insist too often on revolutionary measures certain to provide the very cataclysm they most dread t "  8Zf  It was the same Brazilian Review which, despite i t s strong  connec-  tion with official Brazilian circles through J. PX Wileman, began i t s existence in a mood of gloomy pessimism.  In i t s very f i r s t edition, dated  March 3» 1898, i t looked at the previous year and reached the following depressing conclusion: "No year in Brazilian history has been more disastrous, p o l i t i c a l l y or economically, or more productive of events, the immediate results of which were to spread consternation and terror, and that for years to come must exercise their influence, baneful or otherwise on our community." The year 1899 was no improvement: "Whether we look abroad or at home 1899 is disappointing."  85  The financial situation was such  that only the most, idealistic could hold out some hope for.eventual recovery.  The Brazilian Review continued i t s commentary in August, 1900: It is a very long time, not since the dark days of 1897, that the state of the market has been so distinctly dangerous as at present.  145 Not only are failures of every day occurrence, but credit is destroyed, money stringent, discounts impracticable and suspicion rampant. In such a situation a single big failure would be sufficient to precipitate liquidation and swamp the market i n general insolvency. Not only has the speculative market suffered to an unheard of degree by the violent oscillations of exchange and consequent enormous differences, but some of the banks, having lost their cover, must be in an almost equally d i f f i c u l t situation. Differences are already so gigantic that jobbers have lost allbhope of retrieving, abandoned their margins to the banks and now refuse to carry out their contracts. . . . Business has become a pure gamble, and legitimate trade come almost to a stands t i l l . If only in the interests of morality something must be done. 86  It is by no means clear thatathe Campos Salles-Murtinho administration did anything to remedy such a lamentable situation.  In October, 1904,  there appeared in London a report written by C. B. Rhind, British ViceConsul in Rio, which pointed to some of the basic failures of Brazilian economic progress and which was discussed at length by British newspapers, among them the Financial News and the Economist. The former, in i t s issue of October 8, reached the conclusion, along with Vice-Consul Rhind, that Brazil would never succeed in attracting foreign capital i f the current instability and lack of financial confidence continued.  The Economist of  the same date, echoing Rhind"s opinion that information regarding Brazil's financial progress was based on false premises, suggested that the situation for British investors was by no means as rosy as had been thought. The Financial Times continued the same line into 1905, basing i t s pessimist i c assessment of Brazilian affairs on a report produced by L. H. Ayrae", 87  American Consul in Para".  The year 1906 did not seem any the more successful to many experienced observers, and respected channels of information drew attention to the  146 general mood of gloom. Yet another consular report, this time bearing the name of Consul General Chapman, was digested by the Economist and transcribed in the pages of the Brazilian Review (October 9, 1906): A report of the trade and commerce of Brazil in 1905» by Mr. ConsulGeneral Chapman . . . gives a very pessimistic account of the condition of affairs in that country. Depression in trade and commerce continued in 1905., according to the report; scarcity of money in commercial circles:, restricted credits, and numerous failures and fraudulent liquidations were experienced. "Tariffs and taxation i n creased , and the country was flooded with foreign loans, the lavish expendituresof which, whilst affording opportunities in certain branches of trade, tended to divert labour from remunerative production," Importation was restricted by high duties, while the high exchange and. increased cost of production had the effect of checking exports. Mr. Chapman points put that a f i c t i t i o u s l y favourable appearance was given to the balance of trade by the rise in exchange, which inflated the sterling value of the inconvertible paper currency. The return of imports was not published at the date of the report, but the sterling value of the exports in 1905 was £44,642,983—and: increase of £5,203,947. The currency value of these exports, however, was 91,709,107 milreis less than the currency value of the shipments of 1904. The Brazilian Review was, in general terms, unconvinced about a l l the so-called advances made during the administration of Rodrigues Alves (1902-  1906). In an article entitled "The Outgoing Administration," dated November 20, 1906,  i t reached the following conclusions: "It is with feelings  of regret and disappointment that we write these lines; regret that i t shuold [sic] be necessary and disappointment that with such tremendous opportunities as the outgoing administration enjoyed they should have been so misused.  Not that the government of Dr. Rodrigues Alves did i l l . ; but  that they did well in an e v i l manner, and sacrificed private rights to what they imagined to be the public advantage.  Immense improvements have  147 been e f f e c t e d , i t i s t r u e , o f o f [ s i c ] t h e g r e a t e s t i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e m a t e r i a l and even m o r a l w e l f a r e o f t h i s c i t y ; b u t a t what c o s t o f money and o f more t h a n m o n e y — o f t h e r i g h t s t h a t a l l r e a l l y f r e e p e o p l e s as most p r e c i o u s and i n v i o l a b l e ! "  As i t e l a b o r a t e d  regard  i n a n o t e a week  l a t e r , t h e c o s t o f m a t e r i a l improvements tended t o be submerged u n d e r t h e m a g n i f i c e n c e o f t h e improvements t h e m s e l v e s ; "The l a t e P r e f e c t , D r . P a s s o s , l e f t t h e T r e a s u r y o f t h e P r e f e c t u r e l i k e Mother Hubbard's cupb o a r d , q u i t e empty, so much so t h a t f o r t h e moment even P e t t y Cash was a QQ  minus q u a n t i t y . The  D r . P a s s o s l e a v e s , none t o o s o o n , f o r Europe tomorrow."  attacks continued  f r o m v a r i o u s q u a r t e r s f . , Throughout 1907 Mr.  P e r c y M a r t i n produced a s e r i e s o f uncomplrbnentary a r t i c l e s a b o u t B r a z i l i n t h e F i n a n c i a l News, and was s e v e r e l y censured by t h e B r a z i l i a n Review 89 regarding the r e l i a b i l i t y o f his f a c t s .  7  The F i n a n c i a l News came t o be  t h e one p l a c e t h e B r i t i s h p u b l i c c o u l d e x p e c t t o f i n d c o n s i s t e n t l y gloomy reports about B r a z i l i a n f o r t u n e s .  I t looked c l o s e l y i n t o t h e c o f f e e  v a l o r i z a t i o n scheme, and p r e d i c t e d i n 1908 t h a t i t c o u l d o n l y l e a d t o total financial disaster.  9 0  The B r a z i l i a n p r e s s grew i n c r e a s i n g l y s e n s i -  t i v e t o t h e h o s t i l i t i e s o f i t s London c o u n t e r p a r t , and i n i t s s e r i e s e n t i t l e d " C a r t a s de L o n d r e s " t h e J o r n a l do B r a s i l p u b l i s h e d a l o n g a r t i c l e ( J u l y 5, 1908) a t t a c k i n g t h e F i n a n c i a l News and p l e a d i n g f o r a more e f f e c t i v e propaganda machine t h r o u g h o u t Europe: E x i s t e a q u i uma f o l h a denominada F i n a n c i a l News, que r e v e l a sempre e s p e c i a l i n t e r e s s e p e l a s cousas dp B r a s i l , e occupa-se d e l l a s arapla e c o n s t a n t e m e n t e , enchendo columnas e columnas em t r a n s c r e v e r e s t a t i s t i c a s s o b r e as f i n a n c a s n a c i o n a e s , r e c o r t e s de o u t r o s j o r n a e s ,  148  b r a s i l e i r o s o u e s t r a n g e i r o s , o p i n i f f e s s o b r e a s i t u a c a o do p a i z e p r e v i s f f e s p a r a o s e u f u t u r o ; t u d o , ja" s e s a b e , no s e n t i d o h o s t i l combatendo os p i a n o s a d m i n i s t r a t i v o s , p r o p h e t i s a n d o o f r a c a s s o dos p r o j e e t o s economicos dos Govemos f e d e r a l e Es-tadoaes, annunciando emprestimos, p r e v e n d o - l h e s i n s u c c e s s o s , estampando dados e a l g a r i s - r mos s o b r e a d i v i d a b r a s i l e i r a , e, emfim, t r a z e n d o ao p u b l i c o tudo quanto ao s e u j u i z o p o s s a p r e j u d i c a r os c r e d i t o s do p a i z . A q u a l — q u e r que nffo e s t e j a ao p a r dos f a c t o s , c a u s a r i a grande e s t r a n h e z a o p r u r i d o d e s s a f o l h a occupando-se t a o a s s i d u a e tenazmente das cousas b r a s i l e i r a s , mas a n o s ^ q u e conhecemos as suas i n t e n g o e s e a s p i r a g f f e s , nSo nos surprehende a b s o l u t a m e n t e . Ha no mundo, espec i a l m e n t e na A m e r i c a do S u l , g o v e m o s que gastam r i o s de d i n h e i r o em s u a propaganda n a E u r o p a , pagando p i n g u e s subvengoes aos j o r n a e s , aos o r a d o r e s e a o u t r o s a g e n t e s ; p o r q u e , p o i s , o B r a s i l , p a i z enorme, r i c o e de grande f u t u r o , nSo ha de d i s p e n d e r tambem alguma cousa n a d e f e s a de seus i n t e r e s s e s ?  Commenting t h e same day on more r e c e n t news f r o m E n g l a n d , t h e C o r r e i o da Manhg showed i t s e l f t o be e q u a l l y s e n s i t i v e about t h e F i n a n c i a l News and a b o u t t h e way i n .which t h e London p a p e r had t a k e n h o l d o f t h e r e c e n t B r i t i s h C o n s u l ' s r e p o r t on t h e s i t u a t i o n i n B r a z i l .  Neither the report  i t s e l f n o r p r e s s t r e a t m e n t o f i t was p a r t i c u l a r l y f l a t t e r i n g when r e f e r r i n g to  t h e " p r o g r e s s " and " p r o s p e r i t y " o f B r a z i l i n t h e e a r l y y e a r s o f t h e  century. The Economist was a n o t h e r B r i t i s h p u b l i c a t i o n w h i c h tended t o :  make B r a z i l i a n s r e a c t v i o l e n t l y .  An a r t i c l e i t p u b l i s h e d on J u l y 1 7 ,  1908, a t t a c k i n g t h e i n o r d i n a t e growth o f B r a z i l i a n n a v a l s t r e n g t h and Commentingaon t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f any b e n e f i t s b e i n g o b t a i n e d f r o m t t h e c o f f e e v a l o r i z a t i o n scheme, was i t s e l f r e p o r t e d and c o u n t e r e d by t h e J o r n a l do Commercio ( J u l y 1 8 , 23): "na s u a q u a l i d a d e de Economista p a r e c e que so faz  economia de j u i z o . "  attacks.  An a r t i c l e  Throughout 1909, t h e Economist c o n t i n u e d i t s  f r o m Sa*o P a u l o on B r a z i l i a n p o v e r t y , d a t e d F e b r u a r y  149 27, 1909, was printed i n the London weekly and aroused indignation in the 91 Brazilian press when i t s terms became known.  7  The Brazilian Review ex-  pressed exasperation in i t s issue of April 27, 1909, and suggested that the discerning public should look up to the Economist only so long as i t retained a sense of impartiality and respect.  Financial disaster conti92  nued to be predicted in i t s columns throughout the entire year.  Even  the Brazilian Review, though ready to spring to the defense of Brazil when she became the victim of inferior journalism, dwelt on the problems facing the country and returned time and time again to an attitude of depressing gloom: '•pessimists we are and pessimists we shall be u n t i l we can see some radical change in methods and policy.  At present the policy  is to borrow a l l we can, as the Americans say, 'regardless.'  How then,  remembering how closely this country came to National bankruptcy in 1897, can we be other wise than pessimistic?" -^ 9  The economic instability of the Hermes regime received i t s share df comment in the British press. The Economist (June 4, 1910) and the Financier (October 28, 1910) suggested that the situation was by no means healthy from the very beginning. By 1914, the c r i s i s had developed to such an extent that even The Times joined many pf its contemporaries in an expression of i t s doubts and fears about Brazil's financial disaster. The Thunderer broke the Carnival atmosphere on February 23, 1914, by reporting that "the commercial situation does not show any signs of improvement. The c r i s i s is due partly to the excess of importing last year and partly to the general lack of confidence in the financial soundness of the  150 country, but also to the delay of the Government and the municipality i n meeting t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s . "  On the previous day a correspondent had  written i n a s i m i l a r vein from Rio, and his comments were published i n The Times on March 18,  1914:  B r a z i l i s passing through a c r i s i s of which i t i s not easy yet to see the outcome. The condition of a f f a i r s here, towards the end of February, i s d i r e c t l y and p r i m a r i l y due to the heavy f a l l i n rubber and to the decline i n the p r i c e of coffee. B r a z i l has depended a l most e x c l u s i v e l y upon these two products, and the.double drop was bound to a f f e c t the country severely. But i n a more provident community under more provident administrations, the c r i s i s would never have attained i t s present dimensions. There were p l a i n indications of impending trouble, and these were generally i g n o r e d . F o r a number of years B r a z i l has had money f o r the asking. In f a c t , the various public authorities have p r a c t i c a l l y been i n v i t e d to borrow. As a natural r e s u l t , money has been spent c a r e l e s s l y and wastefully. . . . Meanwhile the Government has r e a l i s e d , though l a t e i n the day, the urgent necessity f o r retrenchment. The order has gone out that a l l possible economies are to be e f f e c t e d , and there i s no doubt that the Government i s resolved to do everything i n i t s power to e s t a b l i s h the equilibrium between revenue and expenditure.  Such was  the s i t u a t i o n on the eve of the Great War.  z i l i a n economy was  How  the Bra-  affected by the changed circumstances of the period  1914-1918 w i l l be discussed below. In conclusion to the present chapter, the following may  be made.  observations  F i r s t l y , B r i t i s h observers were generally depressed both by  the B r a z i l i a n system of government and by the figures involved i n i t during the e a r l y part of t h i s century.  Secondly, B r i t i s h diplomatic opinion  de-  parted only r a r e l y from the view that B r a z i l ' s chances of organizing hers e l f and playing a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the a f f a i r s of the world were ex-r. tremely s l i m .  T h i r d l y , the B r i t i s h press followed, i n large measure, the  151 lead of the diplomats, although they were generally less informed and more prone to vicious and repetitive attacks on sensitive Brazilian individuals and institutions.  Fourthly, the degree of British pessimism stands in d i *  rect conflict with most other assessments of the state of Brazil during the period under consideration. ** 9  Finally, despite the warnings, the c l i -  mate of instability, and the frequent lack of guarantees, the British i n vestor continued to pour money into Brazil at an increasing rate, and was generally well rewarded for his attentions.  152 NOTES I have borrowed the p h r a s e from P r o f e s s o r B u r n s , who w r i t e s : " I n r e t r o s p e c t t h e e r a from t h e t u r n o f t h e c e n t u r y t o World War I emerges as one o f t h e most f r u i t f u l p e r i o d s i n B r a z i l i a n h i s t o r y . . . . P r o s p e r o u s and p e a c e f u l a t home, B r a z i l c o u l d t u r n i t s f u l l a t t e n t i o n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s arid c o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e i t s energy on the f o r m a t i o n and exec u t i o n o f a c o n s t r u c t i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y f o r t h e f i r s t time i n s e v e r a l decades." ( B u r n s , pp. 19-20). A s i m i l a r v i e w was held, b y t h e h i s t o r i a n of. t h e r e p u b l i c , Jose M a r i a B e l l o ( H i s t f o i a a da R e p u b l i c a [1889-1954]: j S l n t e s e de S e s s e n t a e C i n c o Anos de V i d a B r a s i l e i r a ] , 5 ed. [Sao P a u l o : Companhia E d i t o r a N a c i o n a l , 1964.3, pp. 209, 223, 2 6 2 ) ; and a l s o by Americo J a c o b i n a Lacombe i n B r a s i l : P e r i o d o N a c i o n a l ( M e x i c o : I n s i t u t o Panamericano de G e o g r a f i a e H i s t o r i a , 1956), p. 129. a  p '-'Between 1900 and 1913 B r i t i s h investments i n L a t i n America almost doubled i n v a l u e . B r a z i l was t h e d e s t i n a t i o n o f s l i g h t l y l e s s t h a n one q u a r t e r o f t h e s e f u n d s , t r a i l i n g some way behind A r g e n t i n a , B r i t a i n ' s p r i n c i p a l i n t e r e s t i n t h e c o n t i n e n t . By t h e end o f 1913, average r e t u r n s on B r i t i s h i n v e s t m e n t s i n B r a z i l were r u n n i n g a t t h e r a t e o f 4.8#. See R i p p y , pp. 66-67. -'See a b o v e , Chapter  3.  ^"Annual R e p o r t , 1912," PRO FO 371/1581, June 19, 1913, pp. 45, 47, 49. Haggard was n o t t h e o n l y B r i t i s h d i p l o m a t t o blame a l a r g e negro pop u l a t i o n f o r some o f t h e e v i i s a f f l i c t i n g B r a z i l i a n s o c i e t y . H i s p r e d e c e s s o r i n R i o , S i r Henry D e r i n g , devoted a d e s p a t c h t o t h e s u b j e c t i n 1906: "One o f t h e p e r i l s w h i c h hangs o v e r t h i s c o u n t r y i s u n d o u b t e d l y t h e r a p i d i n c r e a s e o f t h e negro p o p u l a t i o n w h i c h i s g o i n g on s i d e by s i d e w i t h t h e v e r y e v i d e n t d e t e r i o r a t i o n , b o t h p h y s i c a l and m o r a l , o f t h e White Race." Dering i n c l u d e d i n h i s despatch the t r a n s l a t i o n o f a l e t t e r w r i t t e n by a "well-known B r a z i l i a n D i p l o m a t i s t , " and w h i c h r e a d s , i n p a r t , as 1 f o l l o w s : "Can t h e r e be a g r e a t e r e v i l f o r t h e n a t i o n than t h i s d e g e n e r a t i o n o f t h e w h i t e r a c e , a l o n g s i d e t h e e v e r i n c r e a s i n g p r o s p e r i t y w h i c h i s shown b y t h e b l a c k p o p u l a t i o n , who f i n d i n t h i s c l i m a t e e v e r y element f a v o u r a b l e t o i t s development." ( D e r i n g t o G r e y , PRO FO 371/13, J u l y 31, 1906). See a l s o O ' R e i l l y t o G r e y , PFO FO 371/1052, December 4, 1911. ^January 2,  1900.  "Unsigned, "Monthly R e p o r t , October Haggard t o G r e y , PRO  FO  1907," PRO  371/605, September  28,  FO  371/200, 1909.  n.d.  153 R o b e r t s o n t o Grey, PRO FO 371/2294, A p r i l 23, 1915. This despatch has been mentioned above ( C h a p t e r 3) and w i l l be d i s c u s s e d a g a i n i n Chapter^. I t was prompted by Robertson's i n t e r e s t i n t h e B r i t i s h r o l e i n B r a z i l b o t h d u r i n g and a f t e r t h e F i r s t World War. 8  " G e n e r a l R e p o r t on B r a z i l f o r t h e y e a r 1 9 0 6 , " PRO FO 371/201, A p r i l 30, 1907, p . 2 0 . See above, Chapter 3. 9  S e e Haggard t o Grey, PRO FO 371/1303, September 2 2 , 1912; FO 371/ 1 0 5 1 , A p r i l 3, 1 9 H ; FO 371/1302, June 1 1 , 1912; FO 420/256, F e b r u a r y 14, 1912. F o r more d e t a i l s on Lauro M i l l e r , s e e below, Chapter 5. 1 0  B e n s o n t o B r y a n , NABD (1910-1929), P o l i t i c a l , May 1 0 , 1917. In the same d e s p a t c h Benson d e s c r i b e d M H l l e r as " s e l f i s h , s h i f t y , a n d u t t e r l y u n s c r u p u l o u s ." n  H a g g a r d , "Annual R e p o r t , 1 9 1 2 , " PRO F0 371/1581, June 19, 1913, p . 52; P e e l t o B a l f o u r , PRO FO 371/2901, May 1 0 , 1917. P e e l r e p o r t e d on t h i s o c c a s i o n , however, t h a t t h e B r i t i s h community welcomed Pecanha's a p p o i n t ment as M i n i s t e r f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . 1 2  ^ H a g g a r d t o Grey, PRO FO 371/832, August 23, 1910; Dudley t o Knox, NABD ( 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 2 9 ) , P o l i t i c a l , March 4 , 1910. • ^ " M a r s h a l Hermes used t o be r e g a r d e d as h o n e s t , b u t t h e luggage he b r o u g h t w i t h him when he r e t u r n e d from Germany l a s t . y e a r . . . opened p e o p l e ' s e y e s , and, when t h e f a c t s became known, h i s e x c u r s i o n was c h a r a c t e r i z e d as one o f t h e most d i s g r a c e f u l i f s u c c e s s f u l c a s e s o f smuggling i n t h e y e a r . (He b r o u g h t back 140 boxes and t r u n k s ) . " PRO F0 371/831, J a n u a r y 7 , 1910. ^ H a g g a r d , "Annual R e p o r t , 1 9 1 1 , " PRO F0 371/1303, J u l y 1, 1912, p . 9; R i v e s t o Knoxi NABD ( 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 2 9 ) , P o l i t i c a l , May 7 , 1912. l 6  R o b e r t s o n , "Annual R e p o r t , 1 9 1 3 , " PRO FO 371/1915, January 15,  "^Robertson t o Grey, PRO FO 371/2294, A p r i l 23,  1914.  1915.  18 Jackson t o Grey, PRO FO 371/402, n.d. ( r e c e i v e d F e b r u a r y 25, 1 9 0 8 ) . " A n n u a l R e p o r t , 1 9 0 9 , " PRO F0 371/832, March 19, 1910, p. 57; PRO FO 371/831, March 7 , 1910. 1 9  20 Dudley t o Knox, NABD (1910-1929), P o l i t i c a l , March 4, 1910; Morgan to L a n s i n g , NABD ( 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 2 9 ) , P o l i t i c a l , June 2 7 , 1913.  154 Lowther to Lansdowne, PRO FO NAED, V o l . 66, October 24, 1901. 22  13/826, July 1, 1902; Dawson to Hay,  Thompson to Root, NABD, V o l . 71, August 25,  1905.  ^Unsigned (Haggard?) to Grey, PRO FO 371/402, Junly 12, 1908. also Haggard to Grey, PRO FO 371/201, May 15, 1907.  See  **Peel to Grey, PRO FO 371/2294, October 29, 1915; Morgan to Bryan, NABD (1910-1929), P o l i t i c a l , December 3, 1914. 2  25  «Annual Report, 1909," PRO F0 371/832, March 19, 1910, p.  ?6  54. —  Ernest Hambloch, His Majesty the President: a study of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l B r a z i l (London: Methuen, 1935). 2  7 E r n e s t Hambloch, B r i t i s h Consul.  ^°Hambloch, His Majesty the President, p. 1. 2  9 l b i d . , pp.  70-71.  3°Ibid., p. 8. 31LOC. c i t .  3 See below f o r comments on economic progress. 2  33Lamoureux*s a r t i c l e enclosed i n Bryan to Hay, NABD, V o l . 65, March 27, 1900. See also Rio News, February 20, 1900. 3*Dawson to Hay, NABD, V o l . 65, January 15, 1900. Dawson added that the p o s s i b i l i t y of a monarchist u p r i s i n g was becoming more remote, and that jthe general p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n was sound. z  35  Haggard to Grey, PRO F0 420/257, January 19,  1913.  Haggard to Grey, PRO F0 420/257, August 30, 1913. Cf. Haggard's "Annual Report, 1912," PRO F0 371/1581, June 19, 1913, p. 47: " I knew these people nearly t h i r t y years ago and I have l a t e l y had s i x years' experience of them. I see no improvement i n them; on the contrary, there i s a d i s t i n c t decadence, as under the Empire there was a certain check. Now the l i b e r t y that has come with the republic has degenerated into the loosest l i c e n c e . " 36  37j. c. Oakenfull, B r a z i l i n 1912 (London: Robert Atkinson, 1913), p. 85.  155 Haggard t o Grey, PRO FO 420/257, August 30, 1913. For other B r i t i s h and American comments o f t h e day, see Dawson t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 65, January 15, 1900; Bryan t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 65, March 27, 1 9 0 0 ; R i c h a r d s o n t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 70, November 26, 1904; D e r i n g t o Lansdowne, PRO F0 13/841, November 18, 1904; Haggard t o Grey, PRO F0 420/257, J a n u a r y 19, 1913. 3  3 9  D e r i n g t o Lansdowne, PRO FO 13/841, November 18, 1904.  ^ R o b e r t s o n , "Annual R e p o r t , 1 9 1 3 , " PRO F0 371/1915, J a n u a r y 15, 1914, p. 2. ^ R o b e r t s o n t o Grey, PRO FO 371/1916, November 2 0 , 1914. ^ H a g g a r d t o Grey, PRO FO 371/1581, C h a p t e r 5. ^See  J u l y 24, 1913.  See a l s o b e l o w ,  C h a p t e r 3, p. 94.  ^ H a g g a r d t o Grey, PRO FO 371/1302, January 31, 1912. ^ " A n n u a l R e p o r t , 1 9 1 0 , " PRO F0 371/1052, March 28, 1911, p . 24. ^ O ' R e i l l y t o Grey, PRO FO 371/1052, December 4 , 1911. The i d e a was echoed b y Haggard i n a d e s p a t c h s e n t two y e a r s l a t e r : "I have always been o f t h e o p i n i o n f r o m t h e t i m e t h a t I was f i r s t h e r e , 27 y e a r s a g o , t h a t t h e e v e n t u a l f u t u r e o f t h i s c o u n t r y i s i n e v i t a b l y a b r e a k up i n t o v a r i o u s l e s s u n w i e l d y S t a t e s . " PRO FO 371/1581, October 24, 1913. R i v e s , t h e American charge" d ' a f f a i r e s , was n e a r e r t h e t r u t h when he s t a t e d t h a t t h e l o c a l o l i g a r c h i e s were b r e a k i n g up and t h a t men under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e c e n t r a l government were b e i n g i n s t a l l e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e S t a t e s : "Such a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s :;would be viewed w i t h s a t i s f a c t i o n b y most o f t h e f o r e i g n Governments r e p r e s e n t e d h e r e , a s a t l e a s t t h e y would have some chance o f o b t a i n i n g t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f c l a i m s i n t r e a t i n g w i t h a c e n t r a l i z e d Government." NABD ( 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 2 9 ) , P o l i t i c a l , F e b r u a r y 1 0 , 1912. F o r f u r t h e r comments, s e e Haggard, "Annual R e p o r t , 1 9 1 0 , " PRO FO 371/1052, March 18, 1911, p . 24; and M i t c h e l l ( C o n s u l , P a r i ) t o Grey, PRO FO 371/1581, October 24, 1913. ^ H a g g a r d t o Grey, PRO FO 371/1580, A p r i l 1 3 ,  1913.  F o r a v i e w o f B r a z i l i a n dependence on f o r e i g n c u r r e n t s , s e e Prado J u n i o r , p p . 269-281. ^ S e e Campos S a l l e s t o J . C. R o d r i g u e s , BNMS I - 3,5,2, January 4 , 9  1900. B R , F e b r u a r y 7, 1 8 9 9 . In 1898 t h e BR p o i n t e d o u t t h e t h e Economist was s o p o o r l y i n f o r m e d about events i n B r a z i l t h a t i t was n o t even aware 5 0  page 156 omitted i n page numbering  157 who o c c u p i e d t h e . p r e s i d e n c y a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e — s e e BR, March 1898, and t h e E c o n o m i s t , March 12, 1898. 5 1  B R , May 16, 1899;  S t a t i s t , A p r i l 22,  29,  1899.  52~3R, November 18, 1902. The assessment i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n t h e l i g h t o f the f o l l o w i n g comment w r i t t e n by t h e B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r , Henry D e r i n g , j u s t twowaeks a f t e r t h e BR p u b l i s h e d i t s sweeping p r a i s e : " A n y t h i n g more h o p e l e s s l y wretched t h a n t h e a c t u a l e c o n o m i c a l s t a t e o f t h e c o u n t r y i t i s h a r d t o c o n c e i v e . " (PRO FO 13/826, December 1, 1902). F o r f u r t h e r d e f e n s e o f t h e Campos S a l l e s - M u r t i n h o measures, see BR, F e b r u a r y 19, 1901 and J u l y 9, 1901. The war between t h e BR and t h e Economist b y no means came t o an end w i t h t h e c l o s e o f t h e Campos S a l l e s p r e s i d e n c y . I n 1910 t h e London w e e k l y was accused o f b e i n g t h e "funny man o f B r a z i l i a n p o l i t i c s . " ( C i t e d i n Hambloch t o G r e y , PRO FO 371/832, A p r i l 18, 1910).  53See Bryan NABD, V o l . 65, May 29, 1900; V o l . 66, J u l y V o l . 66, September 3, 1901; Thompson t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 70, May 6, t o  54see See  GN, August  3, 1901; 1904.  25, 1903.  ^The a r t i c l e s r e c e i v e d the expected a t t e n t i o n i n the B r a z i l i a n p r e s s . GN, F e b r u a r y 26, 1905; A u g u s t 4, 1904; October 20, 1905. R e p o r t e d i n R i o p r e s s ( J do C, 0 P a i z , GN, e t c . ) , A u g u s t 23, 1905.  5 For t h i s s e r i e s o f a r t i c l e s , , see t h e F i n a n c i e r , September 3, 1905. GN, September 3, 1905; BR, September 12, 1905; F i n a n c i e r , September 12, 1905; GN, September 13, 1905; F i n a n c i e r , October 28, 1905; A N o t i c i a , Oct o b e r 28, 1905. 7  '-^That S r . Abad overworked t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y f o r some g e n t l e propaganda i s o b v i o u s f r o m t h e sweeping s t y l e he a d o p t e d . T h a t The Times was p r e p a r e d t o p u b l i s h s u c h an a r t i c l e i s perhaps an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h e l a c k o f r e l i a b l e and u n i m p a s s i o n e d i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o t h e B r i t i s h p r e s s . I t seems h i g h l y d o u b t f u l , i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e , t h a t B r a z i l ' s "powerf u l and modern Navy" was e v e r i n a p o s i t i o n t o a c t f o r t h e " p r o t e c t i o n and s e c u r i t y o f t h e i n d u s t r i e s o f t h e c o u n t r y " ; t h a t t h e r e was a " s u r p r i s i n g s u c c e s s . . . i n a l l departments o f p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n " ; o r t h a t t h e r e was "an e n t i r e harmony i n t h e e f f i c i e n t f a c t o r s o f n a t i o n a l p r o g r e s s . " H a g g a r d t o Grey, PRO FO  371/201,  May  15, 1907.  °Haggard t o Grey, PRO FO  371/832,  May  20, 1910.  59  6  o l  S e e A N o t i c i a , O c t o b e r 12,  1909.  158 6 2  May  G o o d h a r t t o G r e y , PRO FO  5, 1911. 6  3 R o b e r t s o n t o G r e y , PRO FO  ^"See above, n .  6  371/2294,  2 1 , 1911; FO  April  23, 1915.  September 28, 1901.  Thompson t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 70,  J u l y 8, 1904.  7 R i c h a r d s o n t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 70, November 26, 1904.  D e r i n g t o Lansdowne, PRO F0 13/851, A p r i l 24, 1905; PRO F0 371/13, June 1 8 , 1906. 6 8  6  371/1052,  52.  B r y a n t o Hay, NABD, V o l . 66,  6 5  66  371/1051, A p r i l  9 H a g g d t o G r e y , PRO F0 371/200, J a n u a r y 5, a r  Dering t o Grey,  1907.  7°Peto t o G r e y , PRO FO 371/402, January 14, 1908; Cheetham t o G r e y ,  PRO F0 420/250, December 14, 1908.  71cheetham t o G r e y , PRO F0 371/604, J a n u a r y 4, 1909; January 17, 1909. 7 Haggard 2  t o G r e y , PRO FO 371/832, May 7, 1910; Hambloch t o G r e y , PRO  FO 420/254, December 31, 1910.  73Haggard t o G r e y , PRO FO 371/1303, May 6, 1912. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t Hermes' p r e v i o u s Message t o Congress had e l i c i t e d a s i m i l a r r e s p o n s e from D u d l e y i n t h e American embassy: " C h i e f p u b l i c i n t e r e s t c e n t e r s i n t h e p o r t i o n r e l a t i n g t o f i n a n c e , w h i c h l a y s s t r o n g emphasis on t h e i m p e r a t i v e need o f more economic a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and o f r e t r e n c h m e n t i n p u b l i c expend i t u r e s as t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e Government's a v o i d i n g most s e r i o u s f i n a n c i a l c o m p l i c a t i o n s and t i d i n g o v e r t h e p r e s e n t grave s i t u a t i o n , w h i c h i s d e s c r i b e d . " NABD,(1910-1929), P o l i t i c a l , May 3 1 , 1911. 7 4  p R 0 FO 371/1580, A p r i l 1 3 , 1913.  7 C h a p t e r 2. 5  7 Robertson 6  t o G r e y , PRO FO 420/258, December 15,  1913.  77 Hambloch was l a t e r t o e n t e r i n t o a d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n o f B r a z i l i a n f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y i n h i s book, H i s M a j e s t y t h e P r e s i d e n t . A f t e r b l a m i n g t h e Campos S a l l e s - M u r t i n h o r e f o r m s f o r much o f t h e subsequent u p h e a v a l , and c r i t i c i z i n g t h e g o l d m i l r e i s scheme as t o t a l l y u n w o r k a b l e , Hambloch came t o t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s : " I n an o f f i c i a l r e p o r t i s s u e d i n London i n 1929 i t was s t a t e d : 'The B r a z i l i a n Government has g e n e r a l l y f o l l o w e d a  159 far-seeing p o l i c y with regard to the entry of foreign c a p i t a l , r e a l i s i n g that the country i t s e l f w i l l i n e v i t a b l y be the c h i e f beneficiary i n the long run, since c a p i t a l once sunk cannot be withdrawn without leaving the country permanently enriched i n some way.• As a matter of f a c t , c a p i t a l i n B r a z i l has been so deeply sunk that i t cannot be withdrawn a t a l l today, and i t i s open t o question whether any body has been 'permanently enriched*—except the intermediaries. But the important thing about that o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h statement i s that, as i t stands, i t i s an extremely l e f t handed compliment to the B r a z i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s ; f o r i t seems that they have been unscrupulous borrowers. That i s not so, and possibly the s t a t e ment was not meant so. Where, however, the report i s r e a l l y m i s l e a d i n g — for lack o f discernment—is i n t a l k i n g about 'a far-seeing p o l i c y ' . There has been no p o l i c y a t a l l , unless borrowing as much and as often as possible can be termed a p o l i c y . There has been merely hand to mouth borrowing, either to f i l l a depleted Treasury, or to favour some pet scheme of expensive and—more often than not—unproductive public works?;*" (pp. 181-182). ^Robertson to Grey, PRO FO  371/1-915»  January  6,  1914.  °Robertson, "Annual Report, 1913," PRO FO 371/1915, January 15, 1914; Robertson to Grey, PRO FO 371/1915, February 9, 1914; O'Sullivan-Beare to Grey, PRO FO 420/258, A p r i l 25, 1914; Davy (?), Acting B r i t i s h Consul i n Sffo Paulo, to Grey, PRO FO 371/1916, May 4, 1914; O'Sullivan-Beare to Grey, PRO FO 371/1915, July 15, 1914. Cf. Morgan to Bryan, NABD (1910-1929), P o l i t i c a l , A p r i l 1, 1914. 7  ber  80  PR0 FO 371/2294.  8 l  P e e l to Grey, PRO FO 371/2294, June 2, 1915; PRO FO 371/2294, OctoPRO FO 371/2294, December 6, 1915.  29, 1915; 82  Tower (Minister, Bs. As.) to Grey, PRO FO  371/2294, May 14, 1915.  3BR, May 3, 1898; November 22, I898; June:8, 1909; Cheetham to Grey, PRO FO 371/604, May 3, 1909; Haggard to Grey, PRO FO 371/1051, December 24, 1910. 8  84  8  5lbid.,  8 6  8  BR, May 3, 1898. January 2, 1900.  I b i d . , August 28, 1900.  7 F i n a n c i a l Times, July 11, 1905.  88  E R , November 27, 1906.  160 % b i d . , July 2 3 , 1907; October 22, 19C7.  8  °Financial News, May 26, 1908.  9  9  l p i a r i o do Commercio, April 18, 1909.  2Economist, April 27, 1909; June 5 , 1909; November 2 0 , 1909; J do C April,28, 1909; June 6, 1909; November 21, 1909. Q  93  BR, September 28, 1909.  For Brazilian opinion which did not conform to common patterns of optimism, see Chapter 5 . 9t+  CHAPTER V BRAZILIANS LOOK AT THEMSELVES "The student of Brazilian history in the f i r s t three decades of the present century may at times get the impression that the whole country i s suffering from an inferiority complex." Fred P. Ellison, Brazil's Hew Novel; Four Northeastern Masters (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1954), p. 13. The present study has confined i t s e l f so far to an examination of thoughts and opinions expressed by foreign residents i n Brazil during the early years of this century.  I t i s the intention of this ehapter to show,  through the writings of several contemporary intellectuals and politicians, that the mood of pessimism pervading British commentaries was shared by some Brazilian observers.  I t is elear that the periods before, during,  and Immediately after the F i r s t World War represented a time of c r i s i s — intellectual, moral, p o l i t i c a l , economic—in the minds of many leading figures of the day.  The War i t s e l f did much to crystallize these currents  of opinion and translate into concrete action what had been mostly vague and Idealistic talk In previous years. A sense of nationalism was to accompany the growth of Brazil as an influential force i n the affairs of the world, and the maturing phase was marked by considerable s e l f examination and self-criticism.  Some .Brazilians were completely uncon-  vinced that Brazil was riding the crest of the wave and that her future as a nation could be nothing but rosy. 161  162 Paulo Prado (186911943)» a member of one of Sffo Paulo's bestknown families, was a man whose experience of his own country could hardly have been wider.  He was a leading figure in the coffee trade, had spent  many years involved in the business of foreign immigration into his home state of Sffo Paulo, and retained a close contact with the arts through his many literary and a r t i s t i c friends.  Paulo Prado, according to Mario  de Andrade, was the prime mover ot the Semana de Arte Moderna, which marked the beginning of Modernism in B r a z i l .  1  But Prado was set apart  from most of the collaborators in this literary and a r t i s t i c renaissance by the faet that he really belonged to an earlier generation. His youth had been spent in the days of the empire, and by the end of the First Warld War he was almost f i f t y .  He had seen the events of the Old Re-  public through the eyes of a mature man, and the conclusions he reached in the 1920's concerning the state of Brazil were based on impressions absorbed during the oourse of several decades.  The circumstances of the  1920's, from both the p o l i t i c a l and the a r t i s t i c point of view, provided the point de depart for Prado*s book, Retrato do Brasil, but the mood expressed in i t can well be applied to earlier years. The book, subtitled Ensaio sobre a tristeza brasileira, appeared in 1928, and was an attempt to place the sadness of Brazil as a nation in an historical context.  "Numa terra radiosa vive um povo t r i s t e $  n  he  began, showing in the f i r s t part of the book that Brazil had been colonized by people who thought almost exclusively of the satisfaction of two basic desires—greed for gold and physical lust.  Out of this doubtful  163 background has developed a sad nation, one which, on the eve of independence, could show nothing for three hundred years of colonization: "A colSnia, ao inioiar-se o seculo de sua independencia, era um corpo amorfo, de mera vida vegetativa,mantendo-se e do culto.'*  2  apenas pelos lacos tSnues da lingua  Even the romantic revolution of the nineteenth century l e f t  Brazil with nothing with which to face the demands of the modern world: "No Brasil, do desvario dos nossos poetas e da altiloqCSncia dos oradores, restou-nos o desequillbrio que separa o llrismo romfintico dai positividade da vida moderna e das fSrcas vivas e inteligentea que constituem a r e a l i dade social. . . .  0 romantismo f o i de fato um oriador de tristeza pela  preocupacffo absorvente da miseria humana, da contingSncia das coisas, e sobretudo pelo que Joubert chamava o insuportavel desejo de proourar a felicldade num mundo imaginario. Entre nos o oiroulo vleioso se fechou noma miitua correspondfincia de influencias: versos tristes, homens tristes; melancolia do povo, melanoolia dos poetas."  3  The f i n a l section of the book i s devoted to an examination of Brasil in the early part of the twentieth century.  Prado was unconvinced  by suggestions that his country, after a decade of anarchy and disorganization i n the 1890's, had made gigantic strides towards a happy and prosperous future: "O Brasil, de fato, nffo progride; vive e cresce, como cresce e vive uma crianea doente no lento desenvolvlmento de um corpo mal organizado.  Se esta terra f6sse anglo-sax8nia, em 30 anos teria 50 milhffes  de habitantes, afirmou Bryce com o seu desdera britanioo."**  Prado claimed  that the interior of Brazil was being developed by foreign i n i t i a t i v e , as  164 i t always had been, and that Brazilians were continually plagued by their desire to imitate rather than to do for themselves: Tudo 4 imitacffo  t  desde a estrutura polftiea em que procuramos encerrar e coraprirair as mais profundas tendencies da nossa natureza social, a t l o falseamento das manifestacoes espontarieas do nosso gSnlo criador. . . . importacffo.  Imitacffo quer dizer  Nesta terra, em que quase tudo da, importamos tudo: das  modas de Paris--idlias e vestidos,—ao cabo de vassoura e ao p a l i t o . "  5  He looked upon the p o l i t i c a l activity of the republic as false and unproductive, too wrapped up In i t s own verbosity to be of any positive use to the fortunes of the country, and called upon Brazil to wake up and make herself aware of the modern world: "Apesar da aparencia de c i v i lizagffo, vivemos assim isolados, cegos e imoveis, dentro da propria mediocridade em que se comprazem governantes e governados.  Neste marasmo  podre ser& neeessario fazer t£bua rasa para "depois cuidar de renovacffo t o t a l . T h e f i n a l note of the book combines a spark of hope for the future with a violent Indictment of the age in which Prado lived: "Para o revoltado o estado de coisas presente 4 intoleravel, e o esffirco de su acffo possfvel Ira" &t4 a destruicffo violenta de tudo que die condena. 0 revolucionario, por5m, como construtor de uma nova ordem 4 por sua vez um otimista que ainda acredita, pelo progresso natural do homem, numa melhoria em relacffo ao presente. S o que me faz encerrar estas paginas com um pensamento de reconfSrto: a confianza no futuro que nffo pode ser pior do que o passado.  w7  A contemporary of Paulo Prado, Alberto T6rres (1865-1917), led  165 an extremely active p o l i t i c a l and social l i f e during the formative years of the Brazilian republic, and has recently been the object of various Q  studies and articles.  Torres was born in the State of Rio and was closely  connected with i t during the years of declining coffee prosperity in the Parafba valley.  He became President of the State of Rio in 1897* occupied  various posts in the Federal Government, and served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the early years of the century.  Like Prado, Alberto  Tfirres was concerned about certain aspects of Brazil's progress during these years, and was a p r o l i f i c writer in the press of Rio and of Sao Paulo.  He  did not believe in the efficacy of the republican system, suggesting instead a kind of "non-partisan plutocracy which he believed would provide a maximum of popular sovereignty with a minimum of direct popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  n9  According to one recent assessment, Torres regarded the early years of the century as a time of sadness and disillusionment: "He saw in Brazil a sleeping giant which, independent since 1822, and a republic since 1889, showed no signs of awakening but, rather, seemed to be drifting into a national nightmare.  The bright promise of the republic he had ardently supported  against an outworn monarchy had been blighted. After more than twenty years, republican Brasil, in Torres' estimation, had a weak and inefficient national government incapable, of vigorous action and unworthy of respect at home or abroad. The dynamic republic he had envisioned had not emerged; Brazil, the state, was not yet a n a t i o n .  1,10  Tfirres thought essentially in  terms of thes> Brazilian reality and of the need to adapt p o l i t i c a l and economic policies to the good of the nation as a whole.  In some fields he was  166 distinctly wide of the nark; his conviction that Brazil's future lay on the side of agriculture rather than industry was shaky, and his experience 11 of.international affairs did not always lead him to logical conclusions. 3h his book, 0 Problema Nacibnal Brasileiro, TSrres began by examining the Brazilian situation as he saw i t on the eve of the outbreak of the First World War.  He lamented the destruction of Brazil's tremendous  potential and the p o l i t i c a l anarchy which had produced such sad results: "Com uma civilizacffo de cidades osteintosas e de roupagens, de ideas deooradas, de encadernacffo e de formas, nffo possuimos nem economia, nem opinlSo, nem consoiencia dos nossos interesses praticos, nem juizo proprio 12 sobre as cousas mais simples da vida social."  He claimed that the coun-  try was passing through a period of intense cultural and national decadence: "No nivel geral da soeiedade, e com respeito £s formas superiores do espirito, o dilettantlsmo, a superficialidade, a dialectioa, o floreio da linguagem, o gosto por phrases ornamentaes, por conceitos consagrados pela notoriedade ou pelo unico prestigio da auctoridade, substituiu a ambicffo de formar a consciencia mental para d i r i g i r a condueta.  0 applauso  e a approvacffo, as satisfaedes da vaidade e do amor proprio, fazem toda a ambicffo dos espiritos: attingir a verdade, ser capaz de uma solucffo, formar a mente e o caracter para resolver e para agir, sffo coisas alheias a nossos estimulos."  13 H e  explained that profits from the development of  Brazilian resources were going abroad, and called upon Brazilians to organize themselves, and to work together towards the formation of a national system.  He was optimistic about Brazil's future to the extent that  167 he f e l t prepared to make the appeal for consolidation and movement, but thought that Brazilians i n the past had done l i t t l e to learn from their colossal mistakes: 0s nossos eternos deficits, as nossas emissffes de N  papel-moeda, as nossas Caixas de Conversffo, as nossas valorizagffes, os nossos emprestimos i l a v o u r a , os nossos protecclonlsmos, todas as phantasias do inflacionismo, e da especulagffo, as nossas eternas luctas, aereas e estereis, de partidarismo, e nffo menos frequentes agitagffes politicas, sem objetivo, por doutrinas e ideaes sem base r e a l , sffo experiencias que nos passam pelos espiritos sem delxar a raenor impressffo eduoativa. ^ n1  Such was one informed view of Brazil in 1914. Tfirres continued his study by examining the "nationality" of Brazil, by discussing the r a c i a l characteristics of his country, and by treating the major problems of Brazilian society from both the internal and the international standpoint.  When he wrote of the p o l i t i c a l organization of his country as he  had observed i t during the years of the republic, he reached the follo.W-jarlng depressing conclusions: "A politica e", de alto a baixo, un mechanism© alheio & soeiedade, perturbador da sua ordera, eontrario a sou progresso; govemos, partidos e politicos, suecedem-se e alternam-se, levantando e combatendo desordens, creando e destruindo cousas inutels e embaragosas. Os governantes chegaram & situagffo de perder de vista os factos e os homens, envolvidos entre agitagffes e enredos p e s s o a e s . B e saw foreign investment as one of the major obstacles to real progress in Brazil, suggesting that i t helped to create a situation of economic feudalism which could only be detrimental to the fundamental interests of the nation:  168 "as novas nacionalidades americanas ficaram sujeitas ao dominio da cobica, i. pressffo do capital, ou, © que 4 mais verdadeiro, de especulacffes sem freio; e sob o impulso desses interesses imprevidentes e desapiedados, nacoes e territoribs vffo tendo o destino de terras efeudadas aos mais audazes, conforms a sua natureza.  £ aqui que o problema brasileiro apre-  senta seu aspeoto mais g r a v e . ^  With particular regard to the United  n  States, Torres l a i d down the essential rules of economic and national i n dependence: "Para manter independente a nacffo, 4 imprescindivel preservar os orgffos vitaes da nacionalidade: suas fontes: prrfcipaes de riqueza, suas Industrias de primeira necessidade e de utilidade immediata, seus instrumentos e agentes de vitalidade e de circulajffo economica; a viagffo e o commercio interno: a mais ampla liberdade de Industria e de commeroio. Nenhum monopolio, nenhum privilegio; a mais plena garantia e protecglfo ao trabalho l i v r e ; & iniciativa individual, & pequena producgSo, & d l s t r i 17  buijffo das riquezas. * ' 1  Among the private papers of the Barffo do Rio Branco there exists a l e t t e r , written by Alberto Torres and received by the BarSo only a few days before his death in February 1 12. 9  18  The letter i s the f i n a l one in  a series sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs during the years.of so-called progress and prosperity, and i s important as an indictment of policies undertaken and directions followed during the early part of the century.  It i s a long and detailed document, one to which Tdrres probably  dedicated a great deal of thought and attention. In large measure i t resumes ideas which Tdrres made public in other quarters—in the press,  169 In lectures, and in his books—but the prestige of the addressee and the c l a r i t y of the presentation of ideas show that Tfirres was thoroughly convinced of the validity of his warnings and of the possibility of some of his thoughts being adopted by the men who directed the destiny of his country. Torres began by suggesting that Rio Branco represented one of the few hopes amid the disorder through which the country was passing. He saw two major problems emerging from the agitated situation of the f i r s t years of the republic—the conflict between central and state p o l i t i c s , and the subordination of the interests of the national government to individual and party ambitions: "A sorte do Brazil tern sido ate" hoje jogada em lutas entre influencias pessoaes e grupos accidentaes de interesses partidarios e vae sendo decidida ao acaso das oombinafffes que resultam das posicSes das forcas politicas eventualmente de posse das posicSes nos estados."  Tdrres lamented the fact that the govern-  ment of Hermes da Fonseca had been unable to take the necessary lead and reach@some workable solution: Como resultado pratico, os acontecimentos mostram umalluta entre as aggremiac6"es pessoaes dos estados e a aggremiacffo pessoal do Presidente da Republica; e, comp expressffo p o l i t i c a , a luta entre a forga partidaria e armada do Poder Executivo e o "dogma da autonomia dos estados," uzando a expressffo do snr. Cons? Rodrigues Alves, isto S, a amblcffo e audacia de politico? arrastaram a situacffo para um terreno em que ambos os elementos oombatentes e ambos os principios sffo condenaveis. . . . Ninguem tentou ate" hoje, fora das formulas vagas e geraes da theoria juridica e burocratica . . . firmar os principios basicos da nossa vida social e economica; em falta d'isso e por forca do exerciclo poder [sic] dos governos estadoaes, a adminlstracffo do Brazil vaga ao acaso, segundo inspiracffes momentaneas e impulsivas.  170 Tfirres then went on to explain that In terms of real progress, Brazil had gone no distance at a l l .  The question, according to Tfirres,  was of fundamental significance: Qae importa que as nossas exportacoss augmentem, que progridam as nossas cidades, que as zonas onde as produccoes de exportacffo de grande ousto florescem ostentem um estado de apparente progress©, se a esse estado de superficial prosperidade nffo corresponder um progres so real do povo, por seu desenvolvimento, sua cultura e sua capacidade de trabalho e uma valorizacffo de nosso territorio e de nossas fontes de riqueza? 0 nosso povo, se augmenta numericamente, nSo progride em forca e capacidade; as nossas riquezas nffo estffo sendo exploradas e aperfelooadas; estffo sendo extrahIdas e desbaratadas. Isto, sem levar em conta as vastas regiffes do pale em decadencia e abandono. 9  The point led him to a discussion of one of his most pressing and recurrent themes, that of foreign control of the Brazilian economy. In fact, the entire letter seems to have been sparked o f f by news that an American trust, not content with the control i t s countrymen exercised over communications, industry, coffee and rubber in Brazil, had decided  to go into the business of cattle-raising* What Torres proposed was a more active national defense against economic pressures from overseas: "Sou profundamente optimista e tenho ti no futuro de nossa patria e no da Humanidade; estou, porem, oonvendido . . . que estamos atravessando, neste momento, uma das grandes batalhas decisivas da evoluc&o historlca; antes da crise violenta, se houver estadistas previdentes e habeis para a prevenir, ou depois d'ella, se estes falharem, o homem retomara" seu camlnho progressive; mas, durante esse process© de energica selecgffo, muitas victimas podem tombar.  0 Brazil e s t i prevenido e operando para  171 se defender?" The letter concludes with a three-point plan for the solution of Brazil's most pressing problems.  F i r s t l y , Torres proposed federal inter-  vention in the troubled states of the Union; secondly, the annulment of elections i n these states; and, f i n a l l y , the establishment of a commission to study the social and economic problems facing Brazil.  They are fami-  l i a r points, and the letter as a whole brings nothing new to our knowledge of Alberto Tdrres and his preoccupation with contemporary issues. Its value l i e s more in the assessment of the Rio Branco era and In i t s implied critique of the Barffo s dedication to foreign rather than specif  f i c a l l y Brazilian problems, than in any novelty of thought or presentation. Paulo Prado and Alberto Tdrres were not alone in expressing their disappointment at the state of Brazilian affairs at the beginning of the century.  Various other figures followed the same lines, albeit for.a  variety of reasons.  Roy Barbosa, the opposition politician par excellence,  was always inclined to attack national conditions as he saw them, particularly i f by doing so he could obtain some concrete p o l i t i c a l advantage. In an interview with S i r Arthur Peel late In 1918, Ray|; made several points which had been made by Tdrres a few years before: "The financial state of the country i s just as unsatisfactory as ever; corruption s t i l l prevails unchecked In every department of the State; education has made no progress and the great body of the people take bpt l i t t l e interest in public a f f a i r s , which continue to be l e f t In the hands of a class who are engaged in a  172 perpetual struggle for place and power."  19  He expressed fears of growing  working class influence and of the spread of bolshevik and anarchist ideas, and his remarks made i t clear that no fundamental changes had been made in the Brazilian governmental structure in the course of the three decades of the existence of the republic. In a later despatch Peel reported on a speech given by Ruy to the Associacffo Commercial of Rio: "His speech was remarkable for the fact that i t plainly indicated that there are forces at work which, i f not checked be [sic] the immediate introduction of reforms w i l l inevitably lead to the disintegration of the nation and the reign of anarchy, and he warned his audience that Brazil was at this time being governed by an oligarchy which i s doing i t s best to open i t s doors to the inroad of principles which w i l l have the same consequen-  20 ces as have been experienced both in Russia and, Germany.** Earlier assessments contained similar expressions of disappointment and despair at the direction being followed by Brazil.  Haggard must  have been positively overjoyed to be able to convey to London the details of a conversation with J. C. Rodrigues early In 1911: "Dr. Carlos Rodriguez said that the whole country was in a state of anarchy, that now he was 66 years of age, and had hoped to see his country prosperous before he died, instead of which he could only say that he was ashamed to be a  21 Brazilian." •"• A correspondent of Lima Barret© referred in 1909 to the sorry state of affairs in Brazil: "cada vez mais descreio dos homens do nosso i n f e l i z Brazil em tffo ma' hora—governado pelos politiqueiros bachareis e pelos alvitres de rotainaC?].**  22  Various o f f i c i a l and semi-official  173 sources questioned the prosperity of Brazil and the advisability of the policies she was undertaking. In a series of articles in late 1908, the Jornal do Commerolo condemned governmental extravagance, claiming that the time was not appropriate for such large-scale expenditure as had been seen of late.  The Message to Congress of President Peganha in May, 1909,  drew attention to the extremely unsatisfactory condition of the mass of city-dwellers in Brazil, and suggested that Brazilian legislation was way out of date in this particular respect.  The Jornal do Commercio onee more  returned to the pressing problems of extravagance in a series of articles in mid-1910 i n which i t took the Brazilian navy as a prime example of governmental mismanagement. The f i r s t two Messages to Congress of President Hermes, in 1911 and 1912 respectively, dwelt in detail on the d e l i cate state of the country's finances, were unusually c r i t i c a l and pessimistic about what was going on in Brazil, and put forward a series of measures which were Intended to salvage a thoroughly alarming situation. The Jornal do Commercio, in an article on August 22, 1913, admitted that the country was suffering from serious financial i l l s , but suggested that these resulted more from administrative prodigality than from a basic i n stability within the national financial make-up. A correspondent of Coelho Neto, writing from Paris, painted a gloomy picture of what he had been hearing from Brazil: "Sffo bem tristes as noticias que me d& da nossa terra; n£b obstante, agradeco-as como seu depoimento sobre a mortal apathia que nos vae consumindo a passos largos.  Pelo que publicam as gazetas, ha  rauito percebi o doentio fatalismo musulmano, que alastra por todo o Paiz,  174 relaxando-lhe a resistencia physiologica contra a invasffo das enfermidades que nos ameaeam de morte. A, nossa situacffo 4 muito parecida com a desta generosa Franca naquelle anno terrivel de 1799• ^ w  3  An interesting point of view was expressed in Wileman's Brazilian Review i n i t s issue of December 12, 1916,  The writer looked at state-  ments which had appeared recently in 0 Pale, and reached the following conclusions: "According to Brazilians themselves there i s no virtue in the country—everyone  speaks i l l of the other and even great national  achievementslike the port works, awake no enthusiasm—public men are classed as 'oanalha'or 'cavadores'—conviction of graft i s ineradicable and Brazilian diplomaoy, far from being a model for South America to follow, i s composed of parasites and idiots!  Yet when a foreigner,  perchance, ventures to endorse such opinions, he i s savagely attacked!" The most practical manifestation of Brazilian dissatisfaction with the direction the country was taking in these early years of the century was the Ilea da Defesa Nacional, founded by Olavo Bilac on September 7, 1916.  The Liga was born out of the fusion of two fundamental  elements i n the history of the period from 1889 to 1920—an atmosphere of national insecurity and increasingly aggressive nationalism, together with the shock of the First tferld War and the realization that there was a variety of fields in which Brazil's strngths had not been f u l l y developed.  The i n i t i a l awakening of the Liga and of the various movements  associated with i t took place in the University of Sffo Paulo on October  175 9, 1915,  when Olavo Bilac gave a speech outlining the horrors of the i n -  ternational situation and the lack of unity among Brazilians.  "0 que me  amedronta e* a mlngua de ideal, que nos abate. Sem ideal, nffo h i nobreza de alma, nffo b£ desinteresse; sem desinteresse, nffo ha" coesffo; sem ooesffo, nffo hi p i t r i a . " ^ 2  The key to BI lac's thought was the integration of the  army with the people, and he suggested that a system of education based on the barracks would help develop the national s p i r i t so lacking i n contemporary Brazil.  He claimed that he was not a m i l i t a r i s t , but he pro-  posed the adoption of military methods in the formation of Brazilian youth. The speech had immediate repercussions, and members of the Law Faculty at the University of Sffo Paulo went ahead with the formation of a Ceritro Nacionallsta in that Faculty.  On October 29, just three weeks  after Bilac's speech, the Estado de Sffo Paulo published an interview with five of the leading members of the Centro Nacionallsta, under the heading "0 Moviraento Nacionallsta."  The a r t i c l e , a landmark in the history of  Brazilian nationalism, has been carefully examined elsewhere.  25  The  students were clear in their reaction against the prevailing mood of their country: Ha por toda parte indifference., desanimo, abatimento moral ... Damos a impressffo de um povo que falhou ... Sim; de um povo que falhou e que coraprehende que falhou; a admiracffo fetichista pelo estrangeiro vae matando toda a originalidade nativa, todo ©spirit© de iniciativa propria, todo estimulo para o aperfeicoamento. Na nossa civilizacffo de emprestimo nem mesmo ha adaptacffo: ha simples copia. Ha peor: ha um profundo desprezo por tudo quanto £ nacional. A Idea apriorlstica de que somos um povo incapaz esta* profundamente arraigada na maioria  176 dos esplrltos cultos, e essa conviogSb erronea, product©* da feicffo lacunosa e da orientagffo estrangeira da nossa cultura, gera o desanimo, destine a confianca, oblitera o civismo. They went on to discuss the dangers of the p o l i t i c a l disintegration of Brazil, and ended with a discussion of the importance of education and of the methods they hoped to use within the educational system in order to shake the country out of i t s lethargy and moral decadence. They suggested o restabelecimento das linhas de t i r o e da instruccSo militar N  obrigatoria nas escolas secundarias e superiores; a adopgSo do eseotismo nas escolas primarias e nos primeiros annos dos gymnasios. ' n  co  The ideas of Bilae and of the Centre Nacionalista in Sffo Paulo enjoyed wide acclaim in the cities of the south.  In a despatch to London  in which he described the general feeling of depression which accompanied the November 15 celebrations, Peel bore witness totthe euphoria surrounding the Bilae campaign: A distinguished writer and poet of the name of Bilae recently d e l i vered a speecht to the students of the University at SSo Paulo i n which he strongly advocated the adoption of a system of compulsory military service as the only means to awaken that s p i r i t of devotion and self-sacrifice to the interests of the nation i f the past glory of Brazil i s to be resuscitated, and such was the force of his glowing words of patriotism and so great was the frenzied enthusiasm his language created that not only did the orator carry his youthful audience with him, but his ideas have spread far and wide and have received the warm support of the military and naval classes, and since his return to the capital the poet has been the centre of popul a r attraction and the honoured guest at banquets and many a g l i t t e ring fSte. 7 2  Less than a year after his original diagnosis of the malady and  177 suggestions for i t s cure, Bilac was present, along with Pedro Lessa and Miguel Calmon, at the founding meeting of the Liga da Defesa Naeional in Rio de Janeiro. Addressing the crowd gathered in the National Library on the anniversary of Brazilian independence, Bilac set out in his powerf u l l y oratorical style the aims of the organization: "0 Pais j£ sabe, pela rama, o que esta Liga pretende fazer: estimular o patriotismo, consciente e coesivo; propagar a instrucffo primaria, profissional, militar e cfvica; e defender: eom a disciplina, o trabalho; com a fdrca, a paz; com a consciericia, a liberdade; com o culto do herolsmo, a dignificacffo da nossa historia e a preparagSo do nosso p o r v i r . "  28  These aims were to  form the backbone of Article I of the Statutes of the Liga, presented and accepted in March, 1924, and i t is in the thirteen sections of this f i r s t article that appear the detailed means by which the ideas of Bilac and his colleagues could be implemented.  29  The f i r s t issue of the Liga's o f f i c i a l organ, the Boletim do Dlretorio Central, appeared in November, 1917, and coincided with the end of Brazilian neutrality in the F i r s t World War.  After informing i t s rea-  ders that Brazil was now in a state of war, i t appealed to them to obey the directives of the Federal Government and to intensify a l l aspects of national production.  This was the very testing ground for which the  Executive Committee of the Liga, composed of Pedro Lessa, Miguel Calmon, Olavo Bilac, Felix Pacheco, Joaquim Luis Osorio, and Affonso Vizeu, had been working so hard.  The matter of unity and national culture was fore-  most in their minds as they set about the task of publicizing their ideas  178  and bringing the message of organization and hard work before the eyes of the people.  The series of lectures sponsored by the Liga during the clo-  sing months of 1917 illustrates the fulness of their programme: "A idea de Patria," "A idea de Justica,'" "A educacffo nacional," "A importancia do sport na vida nacional,** A defesa da lingua nacional,** to mention but a n  selection. The present chapter has attempted to show that the euphoria of the belle epoque was qualified to a considerable extent by currents of national pessimism, insecurity, and self-examination.  Many renowned  Brazilians joined their foreign contemporaries i n doubting that the early years of this century were as peaceful, progressive and prosperous as has been suggested.  179 NOTES hi, de Andrade. 0 Movlmento Modernista (Rio: CiE.B., 1942), pp. 22-23. P. Prado, Retrato do Brasil: Ensaio sobre a trlsteza brasileira, 6 ed. (Rio: Jose* Olympio, 1962), p. 124^ ~~ 2  a  3lbid., pp. 148-149. *^Ibid., p. 168. Vianna Hoog, to his book Bandeirantes e Pionelros, shows that this i s not necessarily sol? and that Brazil has always had more natural obstacles in the way of progress than, for example, the United States. Sprado, pp. 173-174. 6  I b i d . , p. 182.  7lbid., p. 183. See, among others, Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, Presenca de Alberto Tdrres (Sua Vida e. Perisamento), Retratos do Brasil, No. 62 (Rio: Civilizac&b Bras i l e i r a , 1968); J. Cruz Costa, A History of Ideas in Brazil: The Development of Philosophy in Brazil and the Evolution of National History, trans. Suzette Macedo (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1964), pp. 242-246;, and W. Douglas Mclain, Jr., "Alberto Torres, Ad loo National i s t , " Iaso-Brazilian Review, 4, No. 2 (Winter 1967), 17-347 ^MoLain, p. 2 5 . The same author refers later to Tdrres* "hydra-headed government of benevolent intellectual despots." (p. 33). 1 0  I b i d * p. 18.  •^""Cruz Costa made the following comments on Tdrres: "Completely mistaken about the historical direction of his own time, i n my opinion, at the very moment when the European situation warned of the approaching horror, he referred, in 1913» to the 'pacific feelings* of WUhelm II; he declared that war had *had i t s day* and that the "visible proof of this assertion was modern l i f e * ! " (p. 243). ••^Alberto Tdrres, 0 ProbJema Nacional Brasileiro, 3 ed., Col. Brasiliana, No. l6 (Sffo Paulo, Companhia Editdra Nacional, 1938), p. 3£. a  s  1 3  I b i d . , p. 38 Ibid., pp. 5 0 - 5 1 .  180 15  I b i d . , p. 189.  l6  I b i d . , p. 204  17  I b i d . , pp. 228-229. Alberto Tdrres to Rio Branco, ART, APRB, 4/3/103, 'January 2 6 , 1912.  l8  19  P e e l to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3653, November 20, 1918.  20  P e e l to Balfour, PRO FO 371/3653, March 12, 1919.  21  Haggard to Grey, PRO FO 420/254, January 6 , 1911.  2 2  J u l i o [?] to Lima Barreto, BNMS I - 6,35,50 no. 11, March 31, 1909.  Melo Rezendo to Coelho Neto, BNMS I - 1,4,80, A p r i l 20, 1914. Ten years before, Neto had received a similar letter from Olavo Bilae, who was also spending some time in Paris: J& tenho uma pitada de saudade da minha taba de tamoyos. Quarenta annosl—como esta carga modifica as ideias da gentet Aos vinte e cinco annos, eu, quando pensava que tinha de sahir de Paris, chorava de raiva. E hoje nffo posso passar aqui quatro meses sem ter saudade da porcaria, do mijo, da estupidez, do mexerico, da safadice da Patrial o patriotismo S oomo o rheumatismo: um achaque de velhice. (Bilae to Neto, BNMS I - 1,1,52, August 6 , 1904). 23  n  M  ^ i t e d in Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, p. 388. Chapter XXVII of this work summarizes the main events surrounding the formation of the Liga, together with a commentary on the relationship between i t and the ideas of Tdrres. 25  I b i d . , pp. 399-403.  2(\  In this respect, according to Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, the Centre Nationalists was closer to the thinking of Alberto Tdrres than i t was to that of Bilae (see Presenca, pp. 393-394). Tdrres ins any case classified Bilae*s campaign as a "multidffo de palavras, de ideias e de sentimentos, eonfundidos: uma montanha de princlpios em desordem.' (Ibid., p. 393). 1  27  P e e l to Grey, PRO F0 371/2294, November 21, 1915.  28  Speech reprinted in Boletim do Dlretorlo Central da Liga da Defesa Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, Setembro de 1962. ^ A r t i c l e I of the statutes ran as follows: A Liga da Defesa Nacional, fundada no Rio de Janeiro, em 7 de setembro de 1916, independente de qualquer credo p o l i t i c o , religioso ou  181 filoso*fico, e destinada dentro das leis vigentes do Pals, a congregar os sentiroentos patri<5ticos dos Brasileiros de tfidas as classes, tern por f i n : a) raanter em todo o Brasil a ide*ia de coesffo e integridade naeional, procurando f a c i l i t a r e desenvolver as comunicac6"es morais e materials entre as unidades da Federacffo; b) propagar a educagffo popular e profissional; c) difundlr nas escolas primarias, profissionais, secundarias, superiores, c l v i s , militares e religiosas, assim como em todos os lares, ofiicinas, corporaeSes e associagffes, a educa§ffo clvica, o amor a justica e o culto do patriotismo; d) defender o trabalho naeional, a lavoura, a Industria, o comSrcio, as ciSncias e as artes, e interessar-se por tfidas as questffes que importarem a prosperidade, a. seguranca e a dignidade do Pals; e) combater o analfabetismo, o alcoolismo, a vagabundagem e a d i s solucffo dos costumes; f ) desenvolver o oivismo, o culto do herolsmo, e fundar e sustentar associaeffes de escoteiros, linhas de tiro e batalhoes patri^ticos, quando autorlzados por l e i ; g) apoiar, pela persuasa*o e pelo exemplo, a execngSo das leis de preparo e organizacko militar; h) aconselhar e f a c i l i t a r a instrucffo militar em colegios, eseolas, faculdades, academias, externatos, internatos, seminarios, orfanatos, institutds de assistencia publica e particular, assoeia96"es de comerclo, indiistria, beneficSncia, esportes e diversSes; i ) estimular e avivar o estudo e o amor da Historia do Brasil e das nossas tradic5es; j) fazer a propaganda da Liga no l a r , e em publico, por melo de conferencias, comlcios, livros, folhetos, revistas, jornais, festas pi£blieas e prdmios; 1) publicar um catecismo clvico, e livros de educagffo patri^tica, destinados & infffneia e adoslecentes [sic], para distribuigffo gratuita; m) robustecer o sentiment© de pa/tria entre os Brasileiros residentes no estrangeiro; n) promover o ensino da lingua p i t r i a nas escolas estrangeiras axistentes no Brasil, e a criaeffo de escolas primirias nos nucleos colonials. ...... (Taken from the Estatntos da Liga da Defesa Naeional, 1924. Section k) is missing in the original).  CHAPTER VI BRAZIL, BRITAIN, AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR Despite the abundance of documentation both within Brazil and in foreign archives and libraries, no detailed study has yet been made of the effects of the First World War upon Brazil, of her actions both as a neutral and as a belligerent, nor of her relations with her major international a l l i e s during this crucial period.  Certain basic studies, such  as P. A. Martin's book, Latin America and the War, may be added to a vast collection of secondary material which ranges from the good to the positively mediocre, but as yet no attempt has been made to form a composite picture based on primary sources in Brazil, the United States, Germany and elsewhere.*  The present chapter i s inteded to f i l l something of the  gap, to examine events in Brazil between 1914 and 1918 and their relation to the international currents of the day, and to consider o f f i c i a l and semi-official British material which can oast a new light on the development of Brazil as an international force. The War caught Brazil at an unfortunate moment. The bubbles of her two staple products—rubber and coffee—had burst by 1913» and reports suggested that the financial state of the country was far from satisfac2 tory.  The government of Hermes da Fonseca had lost the support and  respect of a large segment of the educated public, and the economic and p o l i t i c a l future of the country seemed extremely uncertain.  The eternal  problem of a foreign loan was onoe more being discussed by Brazilian 182  183 financiers, and in A p r i l 1914 i t was suggested that Wenceslao Braz was on his way to Europe to find the money needed for propping up the gold re3 serves once more.  When news of the outbreak of hostilities reached Bra-  z i l , the immediate reaotion was for Brazilians to become thoroughly panicstricken at the thought of what the War would do to an already shaky f i nancial position.  While Itamaraty telegraphed urgently for more informa-  tion on events in Europe, 0 Paiz commented on an article in A Hotlcia and brought the following prognostications to i t s anxious readers: "Vamos ser attingidos no proprio estomago; vamos ter o super-encarecimento da vida, exactamente no mesmo momento em que o Thesouro passa uma de suas crises mais agudas, para jugular a qual a Nagffo faz um appello supremo ao patrio4 tlsmo nunca desmentido de seus filhos." The last day of July and the early days of August, 1914, were f i l l e d with a sense of financial panic and general chaos rarely equalled in the history of Brazil.  Already on July 31 the seriousness of the  situation was having its effects on the financial markets of the country, and over that f i r s t weekend of the War (August 1-2) various organs of the Brazilian press were preoccupied with commercial and financial speculation. The exchange rate f e l l , payments were suspended because of lack of money, and stock markets rocked under the impact of shock waves from Europe.  "A  situacffo desta praca, wrote one correspondent from Sffo Paulo on August 1, n  " f o i de verdadelro panico."  5  The military were thrown into confusion by  their own lack of preparedness for any kind of major conflict, and Deputy Calogeras was among those who raised the cry of serious rearmament during  184 these early days of the War.  6  The new week began in what the Jornal do  Commerclo called "uma atmosphera oppresiva e suffoeante para as classes sociaes sen distinecffo j  n  and i t reprinted an article from 0 Diario i n  which a c a l l was made for an attempt to stop the sadden run of daily bankruptcies.  7  As the smoke gradually cleared , commentators lamented  the lack of clear information on the European situation, protesting that the only two news services available, HAVAS and AMERICANA, were excessively pro-French and pro-German respectively: "A Europa bate-se; morre-se a l i ; & o que se sabe, infelizmente, e pouco ma i s , " wrote one frustrated jouro  nalist.  L i t t l e by l i t t l e , Brazilian observers began to take sides.  Antonio Claro of 0 Paiz smugly reminded his readers that this was the conflagration he had been predicting for months, and laid the blame for o the present situation squarely on the shoulders of Germany.  The Jornal  do Commerclo, in a long a r t i c l e entitled "A ConflagracSo Europea** i n i t s issue of August 4, reached the same conclusions. I t came forward with the following seven-point plan designed to help Brazil through i t s present c r i s i s : a ) Fazer segulr ja* navios do LLOYD, comboiados por um 'dreadnought*, N  para a Europa, a fim de receber os Brasileiros: b) Diminuir a menos de metade os trans da E. F. Central do Brasil, para eeonomizar carvaTo; c) Estando paralysadas a importagffo e a exportacffo, decretar a moratoria geral pelo prazo de 90 dias* d) Fisoalizar a espeoulacffo sobre generos alimenticios• e) Suspender as armazenagens de mercadorias nas reparticffes do Governo; f) Decretar um imposto de $Q% sobre a exportacffo de ouro; g) Deeretar oito dias feriados."  0 Paiz showed continued concern about internal economic  185 measures and international communication lines, saw problems in the importation of coal from England and the export of coffee from Sffo Paulo, and hoped that the Lloyd Brasileiro could come to the rescue with i t s merchant fleet.*^ After a feverish week of activity in Europe, during which the German nation had taken on a l l comers and f i n a l l y , on August 4, involved i t s e l f in a long and bloody war with Britain, the Jornal do Commercio took sober stock of the Brazilian side of the story by enumerating the various elements of the Brazilian reaction to events across the Atlantic: Esta" patente, inquietante, no dessasocego geral, na situagffo de paniteo observada nas nossas principaes pragas de commercio, na paralyzagffo dos negocios legitimos, na queda do cambio, no augmento dos pregos dos generps de prira[sic] necessidade. Mesmo sem a repercussffo da conflagragffo europea, a nossa situagffo era bastante angustiosa, tan to no terreno economieo, como no financeiro. 0 cafe'cahira de novo. 0 mercado andava frouxo e assustado. 0 mal estar era geral, diante da retracgffo do credito bancario e da insufficiencia dos reoursos do Thesouro, para attender a compromissos urgentes. Com a guerra, tudo isso, que ja" traduzia um estado melindroso, se tornou, de um dia para o outro, gravissimo, chegando a um periodo quasi desesperador para a vida economica e financeira da nagffo. 0 Governo^esta" chamado a providanciar sobre mil e um cases, tendo suas attengoes solicitadas a cada passo e de toda a parte. In the same issues-there appeared the o f f i c i a l decree of neutrality, which established the rules which Brazil was to follow for three years.** Meanwhile, Brazil was already involved in the diplomatic activity which invariably aeopmpanies the outbreak of war.  Her main preocoupation  seems to have been with Brazilian nationals residentin Europe.  On August  3 a telegram went from Itamaraty to the embassy in Lisbon and the legations  186 in Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, Berne, Brussels and St. Petersburg, requesting information on the situation of Brazilian subjects and offering 12 to take any measures deemed necessary.  Two days later the Minister of  Foreign Affairs sent another telegram, this time to Washington, requesting that the United States send three merchant ships to Europe immediately, in 13 order to repatriate Brazilians through the ports of Lisbon and Genoa.  J  The British charge" d'affaires in Rio de Janeiro, Arnold Robertson, was; also involved in the details of diplomatic correspondence. He wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 5 — j u s t one day after his country had entered the War against Germany—stating that Britain would hold Brazil responsible i f she suffered any war losses as a result of German merchant 14 ships being fitted out with arms in Brazilian ports.  Two days later  Robertson wrote to say that the British government impressed upon Brazil the need for neutrality, and suggesting that Brazil follow the United States in her shipping regulations. At the same time a memo from the British legation stated that the export of coal from Britain would continue as before, thus attempting to allay one of Brazil's most pressing fears The message was reinforced by a further note of August 12 in which Robertson quoted information from Sir Edward Grey that the British government was optimistic about keeping trade routes open and that Britain was controlling more and more sea t r a f f i c with the passing of each day. ^ 1  legation, O'Sullivan-Beare took three weeks to sort out  In the; British  his thoughts on  the Brazilian reaction to the War, and eventually reached the unilluminatliig conclusion that events In Europe "absolutely stunned public imagination here."  187 He too reported on o f f i c i a l Brazilian declarations of neutrality, but thought that the sympathy of the nation was overwhelmingly on the side of France and Belgium,*  7  During the f i r s t week of the War, various demonstrations were held throughout Brazil to express support both for France and for Germany, From Sffo Paulo on August 5 came the report that some 500 volunteers had attempted to enlist at the French consulate, but that two hundred of these ( a l l Brazilians) were turned away. There was similar activity at the 18 German consulate.  Throughout southern Brazil there were pro-French de-  monstrations as French reservists made their way back to France to fight at the front, and an occasional voice was raised to support the actions 19 of Germany and the successes of Kaiser Wilhelm.  7  In the Chamber of De-|  putles, a speech by Irineu Maehado defending the policy of France was well received by the members present, although the subsequent pro-French motion could not be regarded as an o f f i c i a l statement on account of the previous declaration of neutrality.  Prices of staple materials began to rise alar-  mingly, and speculators soon appeared to take advantage of the unstable situation.  The Jornal do Commercio suggested that the repercussions of  the War were being f e l t throughout South America far more rapidly than anyone could have expected, and that a shortage of coal in Brazil would have far-reaching effects.  It was, however, heartened by one thought  which seemed to be universal among observers of the European scene: "Nlnguem aeredita—e Deus nos livre de t a l catastrophe—que a guerra dure mais de quatro mezes,"  The market, after several chaotic days, ground to a  188 halt amid an atmosphere of relative calm, and various measures were i n stituted which, i t was hoped, would ease the tension within the country* In the face of declining fuel supplies, the Central Railway cut i t s goods! services, the immediate effect of which was to force up the price of meat in the capital.  The government, well aware of the activities of specula-  tors, decided to f i x the price of essential foods, but i t was pointed out in some circles that the prices were fixed after the speculators had been active, and not before, with the result that merchants were selling at unrealistically high p r i c e s . * Correspondents from PSrto Alegre reported 2  that the city had decided to save gas by putting out i t s street lights earlier in the evening.  On August 7» some factories i n Sffo Paulo were  reported to have sent workers home because of a lack of raw materials. By August 9, with a l l banks and financial agencies i n Brazil s t i l l at a standstill, the Jornal do Commercio was ready to reverse the mood of panic and depression and breathe a few words of gentle encouragement into the ear of the Brazilian public. In an article entitled "A Situagffo Economic a do B r a s i l ,  w  i t reached the following conclusions: "A crise por que  estffo passando os Estados Driidos do Brasil nffo S . . . senffo uma crise de augmento, accidente passageiro de um paiz que eresceu depressa demais. Quando as finangas publicas, no memento prostradas sob o peso de novos encargos demaslado numerosos, puderam retomar o seu equilibrio, ninguem duvide de que uma era de prosperidade se abrira" para este paiz tffo rico e tffp f e r t i l .  w  Meanwhile, public interest in the fortunes of the War did  not diminish, and crowds continued to gather outside newspaper offices to  189 read the bulletins as they came from Europe, Demonstrations of sympathy continued to the point at which they were prohibited by the authorities in some c i t i e s , and economy measures included the restriction of services on the Leopoldina Railway.  French and German consulates remained clogged  with reservists on their way to Europe, and out of a l l the apprehension, excitement, and concern came the curious suggestion from 0 Paiz (August 10) that theywhole situation could have been averted i f Europeans had taken a leaf out of the South American book and agreed to l i v e in a state of peaceful toleration: "A America deve multo, deve tudo a* Europa; mas a oivilizacffo do velho mundo teria talvez licoes proveitosas a receber da nossa politiea internaoional, sempre pautada por uma nobilissima linha de rectidffo e de justice, e por uma prudencia e sabedoria que sffo o segredo da eonfraternidade que reina inalteravelmente entre todos os paizes do nossos continente,** News of the War was temporarily overshadowed on August 10 by t r i butes to the Argentine statesman, Saenz Peffa, who died on the previous day in Buenos Aires. A second Interlude was provided by the case of Bernardino de Campos, the politician from Sffo Paulo who was reported killed by some German soldiers as he attempted to cross the Swiss frontier with his wife.  The somewhat obscure details reached the Brazilian press on  August 12| but Itamaraty had already expressed doubts as to the truth of the reports on the previous day.  By August 16, MBller had telegraphed  to the appropriate authorities in Sffo Paulo that Bernardino de Campos was well and in Geneva, and the public outcry against Germany began to subside.  190 The facts of the case were not totally clear u n t i l August 22, when Itamaraty conveyed to the State of Sffo Paulo Campos*s own version of what 22 happened at the Swiss border. Despite the diversion, the situation in Brazil remained virtually unchanged. Reports from various corners of the country f i l l e d the press and suggested that the repercussions of the War were being f e l t by a l l sectors of the community. From Belem eame news of the complete paralysis of the rubber trade, and the rapid rise i n the price of foreign goods. Recife suffered from a similar rise i n prices, and the Tramways Company in Pemambueo ran out of cash to pay i t s employees.  Bakers in Rio de  Janeiro tried to get around the price fixing by selling smaller loaves of bread, while the Chamber o£ Deputies voted a 30 day moratorium as proposed by the Jornal do Commeroio several days before.  In Florianopolis  many factories were forced to close down, and in Recife the production of sugar was seriously affected.  Warships were despatched to various  parts of the country"—the Matto Grosso to Santos, the Tiradentes to Bahia, the Parana" to Pemambueo, and the Republica held i n reserve to be sent anywhere she might be needed.  In Rio de Janeiro there was proposed a  system of cozinhas economlcas to help feed the people i n times of shor§ tage, and from Bahia and Parafba came increasing reports of soaring prices.  The American Consul i n Pemambueo wrote on August 15 that the  War had already caused considerable disruptions and price rises, and that sympathies were generally with the French and the British. Restrictions ware imposed on the loading of coal i n Rio de Janeiro and on radio commu-  191 nications between ships in port. 0 Paiz reported on August 17 that prices were s t i l l rising day by day, and that wholesalers were making i t d i f f i cult for retailers to stick to the price-fixing t a r i f f arranged a few days before.  On the same day the banks and the money market reopened under the  supervision of arrangements concluded in the moratorium agreement, and soon i t was possible to find an occasional humorous article on the conduct of the War. tostffo.  As one observer put i t : "Gomprei uma gazeta.  Costou-me um  Tinha mais de cem carapetdes telegrammaticos, afora os da redac-  cffo. Nada mais barato: cada mentira por menos de um realt f a l l a da carestia da vidat" 3 2  E ainda se  Brazil, while s t i l l passing through a c r i -  s i s , was at least getting used to the fact. News of the death of Pope Pius X reached Brazil dn August 21 and supplanted the details of the War on most front pages • 3h commercial c i r c l e s , there seemed to be something of a growing confidence, while widespread economies were causing considerable problems of unemployment throughout Brazilian c i t i e s .  Reports of rising prices continued to d r i f t  into the capital from widely diversified areas, although i t was generally agreed that the moratorium had had a stabilizing effect.  By the end of  the f i r s t month of the War, Brazil seemed to have come to grips with the basic problems she was l i k e l y to face for the duration of the conflict. She had managed to avoid any violence perpetrated by or against the sizeable segment of the population which was of German extraction, and had outlined a policy of neutrality which was to be the guiding light of her international relations over the course of the next three years.  192 During the remaining part of 1914, the coffee trade proved to be one of the most pressing preoccupations of the Brazilian government.  Not  only was the State of Sffo Paulo concerned about the lack of export f a c i l i t i e s for i t s lifeblood, but there was also the matter of large stocks of valorized coffee which had been deposited in various parts of Europe and which were in danger of being appropriated by Germany and Austria. This coffee was in fact the property of the State of Sffo Paulo, although i t had been deposited in Hamburg and T r i e s t e in the name of Nauman, Gepp C.L., of Santos. On August 28, 1914, Carlos Guimarffes, Governor of Sffo Paulo, wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked a Dr. Rubiffo to consult Lauro MBller and suggest what could be done about the situa24 tion.  A few days later Guimarffes wrote directly to Mttller, asking him  to intervene with diplomatic representatives in Berlin and Vienna with a view to saving these deposits of coffee, and enclosed a l i s t of exactly how much coffee was involved.  25  MEtller followed this up late in Septem-  ber by forwarding to Guimarffes plans outlined by the Italian government to ensure the smooth distribution of Brazilian coffee through the port of Naples, thus obviating the need for Brazil to be excessively concerned about present stocks in Hamburg and Trieste.  Unfortunately, however,  the stocks of coffee owned by the State of Sffo Paulo were so considerable that Brazil was forced to keep up diplomatic pressures to avoid i t s s e i zure by Germany. The Brazilian  representatives in Berlin suggested that  the German government was being less than sympathetic to their requests concerning the valorized coffee stocks on account of the flurry of anti-  193 German sentiments In the Brazilian p r e s s .  27  Sffo Paulo saw a way out of  the problem by proposing the sale of valorized coffee stockpiled in Hamburg, Antwerp, and Trieste, and by the end of November MQller could report that the State's representative In Germany, Theodor Wille, had been selling Brazilian coffee at highly advantageous rates in Berlin, and that 28  he was on his way to Antwerp to supervise arrangements there. The selling continued Into the New Tear, and by March, 1915, some 800,000 sacks had been disposed of in Europe. The problem, as outlined in a letter from Rodrigues Alves to Mttller, was now of a different nature— the Vfer was making i t d i f f i c u l t to move the money obtained from eoffee 2 9  sales out of the hands of the bankers, S. Bleischroder and Co.  The Ger-  mans were determined to prevent the funds involved (apparently somewhere in the region of £? million) leaving either for Brazil of for Britain. Eventually, towards the end of 1915, $h© State of Sffo Paulo reeognized, after negotiations had taken place with Theodor Wills,? ^ P i a t i t would pro30 bably never get the coffee money out of Germany.  At about the same time  news reached Brazil of the decision of the French government to requisition coffee stocks held under the valorization scheme in Le Havre, and authorities both in Rio de Janeiro and Sffo Paulo remined In close contact with their Paris counterparts over the fi)&ng of prices and the terms of s a l e .  3 1  The year 1915 was f a i r l y quiet with regard to Brazil's relations with the European conflict.  The i n i t i a l panic of August 1914 was now over,  and the serious events of 1917 and 1918 were yet to be encountered. Public sympathies, however, slowly crystallized on the side of France, and i t was  194 in the early months of 1915 that the Brazilian League for the Allies began to be active (its existence dated o f f i c i a l l y from March 1 7 ) . The League was led by such figures as Ruy Barbosa, Coelho Neto, and Jos5 Verissimo, and was highly appreciated by those in Europe who had any contact with the Brazilian scene. Speaking at a r a l l y held in Rio de Janeiro to mark the birthday of King Albert I of Belgium (April 8 ) , Coelho Neto denounced the crimes of Germany and praised the courageous heroism of the Belgian people. A French correspondent of his, on receipt of the news of Neto's strong pro-Ally stand, was moved to write a long letter of thanks in which he stressed the importance of Brazilian support in the present conflict: "vous avez pris place courageusement parmi les meilleurs combattants de notre juste- Cause, et vous avez votre part dans l a grande Vieto ire que nous esperons remporter, complete. . . . Votre bon discours sur l'honneur de l a Belgique-soeur restera pour moi comme une inoubliable preuve de votre grandeur d*Hme et je veux l e conserver i e i en temoignage de profonde admiration. enne."  32  Au f a i t , je ne pouvais douter de l'fime b r e s i l i -  A l l over the country, Brazilians expressed their solidarity  with the Allied cause, to such an extent, in fact, that authorities had to be constantly on their guard to see that public manifestations cof sympathy did not violate the terms of Brazil's n e u t r a l i t y .  33  While the League  for the Allies clamoured for more concrete action in support of France and Britain, however, the Minister of Foreign Affaris steered a middle course which drew him enthusiastic praise from more than one influential source. *^ 3  195 Daring the course of 1915* MHller became involved in another piece of international diplomacy which temporarily diverted his attention from the affairs of the War.  Rio Braneo's pro-American policies of 1902-1912  underwent considerable modification during his successor's term of office, and the negotiations of A p r i l , May, and June, 1915, with the governments of Argentina and Chile were a fundamental element in this change of direction on the part of Brazilian foreign policy.  The idea of an, ABC alliance  was not new, and i t had been discussed in the early years of the century as a means of counteracting the growing influence pf the United States in the economic and financial affairs of South America.  The traditional  hostility between Argentina and Brazil, as personified in the rivalry between Zeballos and Rio Branco, effectively dampened any such attempts at concerted action. The reasons for the reopening of the matter were explained by Arnold Robertson in a despatch to the Foreign Office written just after MHller had l e f t Brazil on his mission to Buenos Aires and to Santiago: The idea is that these three States shall form a sort of international unit and act in concert with the United States of North America with the object of using every pacific means of suppressing and discouraging revolution in the more turbulent States. In their p o l i t i c a l dealings with Europe they would also act together as far as possible, and in support of the United States i f they see f i t . His Excellency [MHller] assured me that there was no question pf any commercial agreement which would in any way affect the interests of European Powers, nor any intention of discussing the various complicated questions that are arising out of the war. Should any serious agreement be arrived at, the Pan-American ideal would be at the root of i t , and i t might not impossibly have important consequences in the future.35  196 In Argentina, La Prensa fulminated against such overtures by the Brazilian government in articles either written or inspired by Estanislao Zeballos.  The former Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs saw the mo-  tive for the ABC meetings as a ••want of confidence, on the part of some one of the South American Republics, in the pacific and cordial sentiments of the Argentine Republic in view of her acquired naval superiority. **36 ijkig ttack was not enough, however, to prevent the signing of a  an Arbitration Treaty by the representatives of the three nations meeting in Baenos Aires, and Muller returned to Brazil amid considerable press activity and jubilation.  The Minister for Foreign Affairs was more  modest in his assessment of what had been achieved by the signing of the Treaty, as he explained to S i r Arthur Peel, the British Minister: " A l though there has been a tendency in the Press to exaggerate the results of his Mission, he assured me that he carried away with him the hope that he had succeeded in creating such an atmosphere of peace as would prevent the growth i n South America of a policy of militarism, and i f he had effected so much, his Mission in that event would have had the advantage of securing by means less violent than a resort to a surgical operation what in point of fact the nations in Europe were at present trying to e f f e c t . "  37  British reports on the situation in Brazil during 1915 dwelt at length on the shaky financial position of the country.  Arthur Peel, the  new British Minister (he arrived early in 1915), wrote of the "poverty and misery" of the urban centres and elaborated upon this original assess-  197 raent in several despatches during the course of the year.3® Moreover, Peel and his colleagues saw that out of the development of Brazil and the hoped-for destruction of Germany couldslcome trade and market prospects which would be extremely advantageous to the British.-'  9  The issues at  stake were most forcefully expressed by Arnold Robertson in his thoughtf u l and sensitive despatch of April 2 3 , 1915,  which has already been  discussed at some length in previous chapters of this study.^  Robertson  began by referring to the desperately poor quality of Brazilian government under Hermes da Fonseca, commented on the success of the authorities in preventing German ships from using Brazilian ports since the outbreak of war, and was f u l l of praise for the stand being taken by MHller: "The consistently friendly attitude of the Minister for Foreign Affairs i s , to my mind, largely due to the fact that he has personal p o l i t i c a l ambitions, and that he knows that the vast majority of public opinion in the country is hotly on the side of France, and, therefore, of the A l l i e s . He dare not favour the Germans as against us, or such influence would be brought to bear that he would be removed from office.  In addition to  this, I give him credit for being a Brazilian in sympathy, and having the best interests of his country at heart," He went on to discuss Brazilian attitudes to various European powers: There can be in favour of intellectual der of latin  no doubt that publie opinion in this country i s strongly the A l l i e s , The main reason for this is racial and affinity with France, which i s looked up to as the leaculture and ideals. There is great sympathy with Belgium,  198 admiration for her King, and horror at the savage treatment that she has received at the hands of a ruthless and bloodthirsty enemy, but i t i s to France that a l l eyes are turned. Great Britain i s very l i t t l e known. Our sea-power is taken for granted, but not realised, and undue Importance has been attached to the fact that we were unable to catch the Karlsruhe and "Kronprinz Wilhelm", which destroyed so many of our merchantmen off the coast of Brazil. We are recognised to have certain sterling qualities which are coldly appreciated, but rouse no enthusiasm, and do not appeal to the fiery imagination of the Latin. Commercially we are looked upon as honest and reliable, but conservative, lacking in initiative and desire to please, too lazy and too self-satisfied to study the market and compete with the German, who, after the war i s over, w i l l certainly oust us in the long run and take f i r s t place. Our art and literature are sealed books to a l l but the select few. Our language i s not understood. Our p o l i t i c a l institutions receive the tribute of lip-worship, but there is no desire of imitation. Our statesmen, both dead and l i v i n g , with two exceptions among the latter, are as l i t t l e known to Brazil as Brazil i s to them. H  ,,  After developing various related themes, Robertson summed up Brazilian attitudes to the European war: The Brazilians taken as a whole, are a warm-hearted, quick-witted, and intelligent people, and withal, highly sensitive. They realise their own shortcomings as well as we do, and require sympathetic help and understanding. They feel that they are despised by Europe and regarded as a happy hunting-ground for the financier and company promoter, but that no European Government takes the smallest interest in them except for the purpose of debt-collecting. Yet, when war breaks out, those self-same Governments, a l l of which, with the exception of the British, are represented by promoted consuls and dragomans, without any diplomatic staffs, suddenly expect Brazil to do her duty in their interest. She has done her duty, as I have endeavoured to point out in this and other despatches, partly out of sentiment, partly because her Minister for Foreign Affairs realises her interests; certainly not out of gratitude, The British diplomat then conveyed his thoughts on the relations of Brazil with various foreign powers, among them France, the United States and Germany, and reached the following conclusions with regard to sustained  199 British involvement in Brazil: As to ourselves I can only say that, though i t i s perfectly true that we have been prominent in finance and engineering works, which have helped the development of the country, we were being overhauled by the Germans in the matter of imports, and i f we are to take advantage of the moment, i f we are to establish [sic] our trade in Brazil, we must make and effort, and above a l l consider the matter of easy credit. The British colony here consists of very worthy people, but they keep mainly to themselves and are out of touch with Brazilian l i f e . They are mostly salaried representatives of London houses, to which they have to refer for instructions, and which know l i t t l e or nothing of the country. We must send out a commission of bankers and business men to see the country, to judge personally i t s potentialities and to get in touch with the right people among i t s commercial and p o l i t i c a l representatives. I f we could support such a commission with a further one consisting of a few leading men in the p o l i t i c a l , literary and scientific world, whose object i t would be to explain personally our reasons for going to war, the effort that we are making and which i s realised or appreciated and, Incidentally, to give some idea of our mentality, I feel sure that i t would flatter Brazilian vanity and bear good f r u i t . Such a mission would be very cordially received at this moment, and the newly-formed league for the Allies would be only too glad of the opportunity to organise a demonstration in honour of Great Britain, for whose aims and ideals there is now but l i t t l e sympathy, as they are not understood. In making the above suggestion I confess that my idea i s that the effort should be sustained, and that we should so lay a sure foundation for the future, rather than expect to glean immediate advantage from the somewhat discouraging present. If we are to compete with the Germans, to take part in the development of what i s , naturally, one of the most variously endowed countries in the world, we must show a living interest in i t s people, study their institutions and, i f possible, lend them an understanding and helping hand, financ i a l l y and commercially, i n recognition of the fact that they have done their best for us i n this c r i s i s . The circumstances which prompted Robertson to write such a despatch in A p r i l , 1915, were a l l the more pressing during 1916, a year which saw a considerable increase in Brazil's involvement in the affairs of the War. Not only was the coffee c r i s i s to become more acute as the result of the Allied blockade, but also individuals and groups within Brazil were more  200 ready to take sides and become caught up in the issues of the European conflict.  In short, as the War dragged on into i t s third year, Brazil  was gradually made aware of the seriousness of her own situation and of the need to take positive action on the international front. The main preoccupation of Brazilian and British authorities alike during the course of 1916 was the matter of shipping. Brazil was anxious to safeguard her neutrality and thus assure herself of an outlet for her precious coffee, while Britain wished to use her control of the seas to impose restrictions on the movement of ships in the hope of thus bringing Germany to her knees. The conflict of interests here involved provoked—as was to be expected in the circumstances—a series of misunderstandings and impassioned pleas which were to continue well into 1917.  I f the Brazilians were serious about their coffee, the British hi  showed no less interest in the shipping using Brazilian ports.  Already  at the beginning of 1916, Arthur Peel was obliged to c l a r i f y , in the press and in a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the misunderstood policies of the British government with regard to German vessels interned in neutral p o r t s . ^ The State of Sffo Paulo continued to be alarmed at the coffee situation, was dismayed at the f a l l in the German exchange rate at the beginning of the year, and proposed to send Paulo Prado to Europe to salvage what he could from what appeared to be a precarious turn of events.^  Meanwhile, the Freneh prohibition of coffee  imports came as a direct threat to Brazilian economic interests, which had been affected, according to MHller, far more than those of any other  201 neutral country The publication of the British Black List did l i t t l e to improve relations between Brazil and the various Allied nations.  This l i s t , de-  signed to include a l l those companies with which the Allies declined to trade, was taken by many to be an example of British arroganoe which Brazil would do well to ignore.  Wileman's Brazilian Review, which pub-  lished the Black List in i t s issue of April 4, 1916, defended the new formula as being flexible enough to avoid any lasting injustices, but saw a danger in the possibility of the enemy trading under the cover of neutral organisations.  It suggested that the time when German shipping interned  in Brazilian ports would have to be requisitioned and put to use, was not so very far away. Opposite reactions were by no means rare, however, and the Correio da Manna*, ever dubious about Brazilian approximation to the Allied cause, thought that Brazil should take a leaf out of Argentina's book in i t s resolute opposition to the concept of a Black L i s t : "0 que se esta* pas sand o na Argentina aceroa da l i s t a negra deve merecer a attencffo do nosso Governo, que tern talvez melhores razdes para nos defender contra as violencias da p o l i t i c a ingleza, porque temos sido tratados ainda maior arrogancia pela Grff-Bretanha.  com  Enearando desdenhosamente os direitos  e a soberania das nacoes fracas, o governo britannieo affronta as l e i s das Republioas sul-americanas com a sua boycottagem, que elle sabe prudentemente nffo estender ao territorlo dos Estado Unidos.  w  The Correio da  Manna* went on to point our that not only was the Black List an  infringement  ©father Brazilian Constitution, which guaranteed free trading rights to  202 nationals and foreigners resident in Brazil, but also that several of the companies on the l i s t were in fact owned and run by Brazilian subjects. British policy in this respect was explained and defended by Ernest Hambloch, the newly-appointed commercial attache" to the British legation. At a meeting held on August 11, 1916, Hambloch stated to the British commercial community that although His Majesty's Government wanted "to h i t German trade as hard as possible and strike at her economic welfare," the prime consideration was the development of constructive commercial relations between Britain and her various trading partners around the world. It was at this same meeting that Hambloch proposed the formation of the British Chamber of Commerce in Rio de Janeiro.**  7  The coffee situation continued to be of v i t a l concern to the Brazilian government.  In September, o f f i c i a l representations were made to  the British Minister in an attempt to have the restrictions l i f t e d so that Brazil could once more export her coffee.  Peel himself seemed to  favour the proposal, as long as certain conditions were respected, but lift  London replied with a regretful negative.  The British Foreign Minister  was in touch with Baron Rothschild over the matter, and the latter, while advising caution, suggested that his organization might be interested in buying a certain amount of coffee under the surveillance of the British government. The Foreign Office was aware of the hardships i t s policies were causing in Brazil, and realized that there were many important British interests at stake in that eountry.**  9  Meanwhile, in Brazil, Peel  was becoming increasingly impatient and c r i t i c a l of British actions:  203 "we appear to be prejudicing in a brutal fashion the agricultural industry of the country, because we are aware that Brazil has not the means to Induce us to modify our methods, and our policy seems to be a l l the more astonishing Inasmuch as the feeling thoughout the country i s strongly in favour of the cause of the Allies." ** 5  At the same time, he attempted to  s t a l l Brazilian opposition by replying to the o f f i c i a l representations of September in the following breezy but ineffective terms: "I have now much pleasure in Informing Your Excellency that I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which states that although His Majesty's Government are unable to assent to the request contained in the notes to which I have referred they are doing their best to find some means of easing the present situation." * 5  The Brazilian press was not  convinced by such inaction, and Peel reported a delicate balance of public opinion, with German interest fanning the flames of Brazilian discontent.  52  3h the f i n a l week of November, 1916, the British Foreign Office returned to the consideration of whether Britain could help Brazil out of her d i f f i c u l t situation in return for the seizure of German ships interned in Brazilian ports. The Rothschilds had apparently withdrawn from the proposed coffee-purchase scheme, and Peel thought that the new deal would be very much in order.  Meanwhile, a correspondent wrote tos the Foreign  Office that although the blockade was i r r i t a t i n g , i t was not as disruptive as Brazilians thought: "As a matter of fact their troubles are due, in a very large degree, to the cumulative effect of past sins; venal administrations, unscrupulous and reckless expenditure, misappropriation of public  204 money and material, p o l i t i c a l jobbery, and a hundred other civic offences, which had brought them to the verge of ruin before the war broke out." The same observer also pointed out that Brazil was running the risk of losing the money tied up in valorized coffee stored in Germany and Austria since the beginning of the War: "Brazil therefore has strong reasons for intimating to Germany that unless accounts are settled she w i l l take over German and Austrian ships in her harbours, and I do not see whay [sic] we should not endeavour to establish this as a condition of our finacially [sic] helping Brazil at the present time. -^ w  While the question of the seizure of ships was dropped for the time being, alarming news reached Brazil that Britain was planning to prohibit a l l coffee imports.  The State of Sffo Paulo was quick to forward  its protest through the appropriate channel, suggesting that Britain was exceeding her legal rights in pursuing restrictions thus far. **' The Bra5  zilian Ambassador in Washington attempted to use his weight with British representatives there to see that the proposals were not put into effect, despite the offers of compensation which the British government seemed prepared to make.  55  The matter was cleared up, temporarily at least, by  a note from the Board of Trade to the Foreign Office in which i t was stated that there were no immediate plans to prohibit the importation of coffee into B r i t a i n . ^ 5  The year 1916 cast a new light on two of Brazil's leading p o l i t i cal figures, Ruy Barbosa arid Lauro Mailer. Ruy, and early champion of the Allied cause during the First World War, was one of the prime movers of  205 the  Brazilian League for the A l l i e s .  His old ties with England and France  inspired him to take an active line with regard to the affairs of the War. and he was among the f i r s t to press for the revocation of Brazil*s declaration of neutrality and entry in the War on the side of the A l l i e s . the  3h  early stages of the conflict, Brazilian participation would have been  counted as an act of rash p o l i t i c a l idealism, particularly when the r e a l i ties of her own situation were examined closely.  As the struggle wore on,  however, direct Brazilian involvement became more of a realistic possibil i t y , and the debate between the Wilsonian neutralists and the pro-Ally supporters developed into a real issue. Ruy Barbosa opened the campaign with a speech delivered in Buenos Aires on July 14, 1916.  He was in Argentina as Brazil's representative  at the celebration of the centenary of Argentine independence, and for this reason was regarded as a semi-official voice of the Brazilian government. His address to the Faculty of law and Social Sciences in Buenos Aires had immense repercussions throughout Europe and North America, as well as in his own Brazil.  He based his arguments on the inviolability of interna-  tional law, such as had been agreed upon by the nations of the world at the  Hague Peace Conference, and on the fact that the War had witnessed the  destruction of any such agreements.  Considering the concept of neutrality  in such a context, Ruy Barbosa came to the following conclusions: "Neutralidade nffo quer dizer impassibilidade: quer dizer imparcialidade; e nffo imparcialidade entre o direito e a justica.  Quando entre e l l a e elle exis-  tem norraas escriptas, que os discriminam, pugnar pela observancia dessas  206 normas nffo 4 quebrar a neutralidade; 4 practical-a.  Desde que a violencia  pisa aos pis arrogantemente o codigo escripto, oruzar os bragos 4 servil-a. Os tribunaes, a oplniffo publica, a consciencia nffo sffo neutros entre a l e i e o crime.  Em presenga da insurreigffo armada contra o direito positive a  neutralidade nffo pode ser a abstengffo, nffo poae ser a indifferenga, nffo p6"de ser a insensibilidade, nSb poae ser o silencio."-'  7  In Rio de Janeiro i t was suggested that the President was embarrassed by the strong stand taken by Ruy on his o f f i c i a l v i s i t to Buenos Aires.  The members of the German community in Brazil were extremely i n -  dignant about what Ruy had said, but even such a revered organ of the press as the Jornal do Commerclo was f u l l of praise for his stand (July 18, 1916). There was great enthusiasm i n the Senate for a speech by Pedro Moacyr (July 17, 1916) made in much the same vein as Ruy's pronouncements in Buenos Aires, and i t was clear to many observers that the time had come for Brazil to think seriously about her policy of continued neutrality. ^  This did  not mean, however, that Brazilians suddenly became convinced that they should pack their bags and head for the Front.  As one source put i t : "Bra-  z i l is not in a position, financially or m i l i t a r i l y * to take an active part in the struggle nor can those who seem to be endeavouring to force this country to take sides in-the struggle have considered what the results might be.  It i s easy enough to urge the abandonment of neutrality, but  somewhat more d i f f i c u l t to explain by what i t could be substituted."-'  9  Ruy Barbosa returned to Rio de Janeiro to a triumphant welcome, while Brazil basked in the sun of favourable Allied publicity.  The eminent  207 jurist reiterated his pro-British sentiments in an interview with the British Minister early in August, while both the President and Lauro MHller looked for ways of disassociating themselves from Ruy*s pronouncements. Peel suggested in despatches to London that Wenceslao Braz was having to face considerable criticism for his stand on this i s s u e . ^ Before the commotion had. time to subside, Ruy was once more employing his persuasive and rhetorical prose to draw public opinion towards the side of the A l l i e s .  This time he addressed a special session of the Brazilian  League for the A l l i e s , held on September 17» 1916, and in the presence of noted diplomatic representatives of the A l l i e d nations. the  He repeated  arguments he had expressed in Buenos Aires about the breaking of  commitments solemnly declared at the Hague Conference, and.was more spec i f i c about the atrocities perpetrated by Germany during the two years of the lifer.  He criticized the United States for having stood by without  responding to her obligations in the case of the invasion of Belgium and the  continued state of war in Europe.  Ruy -When replied in considerable?  detail to Brazilian charges that he had exceeded his commission in Buenos Aires by making an appeal which had no o f f i c i a l backing from the Brazilian government, and f i n a l l y called upon his audience to uphold the cause of the Allies and to abandon the sham of neutrality. Once more the reaction was one of enthusiasm on the part of the Brazilian populace, and angry embarrassment from Brazilian governmental circles.  Arthur Peel was frankly delighted at this strong denunciation  of Germany, and conveyed to London the remarks Ruy had made concerning  208 the role of the United States: "no words were more enthusiastically cheered than those which he employed in impugning the policy of the United States 62 and of President Wilson.'*  Ruy's famous war speeches continued into 1917»  when the Brazilian government, in the face of an increasingly aggressive policy on the part of Germany and taking i t s cue from the United States, acceded to most of the demands Ruy had been making for many months. Lauro Mttller was an equally busy man during 1916.  Doubts about  his Germanic origins and allegiances during the V&r had been sufficiently dispelled at this stage—at least in the minds of British observers. 3 6  Both Robertson and Peel seem to have been on good terms with him, and the atmosphere of cordiality between the British legation and Itamaraty was such as had never existed during the Rio Branco era. Mttller did a great deal of travelling in 1916, and for a long period l e f t the Ministry of Foreign affairs in the hands of his deputy,  la May he requested a four-  months period of leave, and this was interpreted by some as a hint that he was interested in the Presidency.  He proposed to v i s i t the United  States, and American diplomats in Rio de Janeiro suggested that Mttller was trying to obtain financial assistance for his country and thus assure himself a bargaining position when the elections were due early in 1918.  ^  When Mflller departed from Brazil,in late June, 1916, Peel sent a telegram to London proposing that the Foreign Minister be invited to v i s i t Canada on his trip to North America. ^ 6  This v i s i t did in fact take place, and  Peel was able to report in August that i t had been most enthusiastically received in Brazil—except among the pro-German f a c t i o n .  66  When MSller  209  f i n a l l y returned to Brazil in October, he was given a great welcome by the people of Rio de Janeiro. By this stage he was clearly emerging as one of the candidates for the forthcoming elections with Ruy Barbosa being the most obvious contender for the Presidency.  Ruy's position with  regard to the War was, as has been seen, one of commitment to the Allied cause without necessarily entering the combat area. MHller was generally better-disposed towards an attitude of Wilsonian neutrality, and in a speech in Rio de Janeiro given shortly after his return to Brazil and clearly intended to respond to the arguments Ruy had been developing in his absence, he stated: "Neutrality does not in the least mean indifference.  It rather expresses the conscience of a free nation which knows  how to choose for i t s e l f the situation which is suitable for i t s interests and a d v a n c e m e n t ^ P e e l was convinced, however, that MHller was not totally tied to the policy of the United States vis-4-vis the War: "Various indications would tend to show that Dr. Lauro Muller has returned somewhat ill-disposed towards the United States," he wrote in December 1916.  He  pointed out that MHller was delighted about his recent v i s i t to Canada, and continued i n a similarly optimistic vein: "As Minister for Foreign Affairs he cannot also but be impressed by the effect of the statutory l i s t policy in Brazil in lowering German prestige and bringing home to the public mind the immense resources Great Britain possesses to i n f l i c t i n jury on her enemies." According to Peel, MHller was increasingly aware of the advantages of friendship with Britain in view of recent developments in the War.^  8  210 While Ruy Barbosa espoused the Allied cause with dedication and enthusiasm during 1916, and MHller followed a line of neutrality, a c t i v i ty on the pro-German side was extremely limited.  From the British point  of view, apart from the German commercial enterprises operating in Brazil, the only blot on the horizon was Oliveira Lima. The noted Brazilian historian and diplomat was the centre of a series of diplomatic enquiries and representations when i t became known towards the end of 1916 that he intended to v i s i t England.  Peel made i t quite clear to Souza Bantas, the  acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,, that i f Ollveira Lima had been engaged in pro-German a c t i v i t i e s — a s had been suggested—he would hardly be 6 9  welcome in England."  7  After some three months of investigation, i t was  announced that the Brazilian diplomat would not be allowed into England under any circumstances. ^ 7  The incident was of no great significance,  except that i t showed that there existed in some Brazilian circles currents of informed opinion which did not stand behind France and England. * 7  In 1917 Brazil was forced, by a series of external events which sprang principally from the German policy of taking on a l l comers and waging unrestricted warfare throughout the Atlantic, to reconsider her neutrality and to a l l y herself, by a progression of measured and deliberate steps, with the forces of France, England, and the United States. Although Brazil acted in f u l l recognition of the role played by the United States, her actions were closely related to Brazilian realities.  Her  entry into the international conflict was marked by three distinct phases: (i) the breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany following the sinking  211 of the Parana! in A p r i l , 1917; ( i i ) the revocation of Brazilian neutrality at the beginning of June, 1917; and ( i i i ) the declaration of war in October. The initiation by Germany of unrestricted submarine warfare early in 1917, the damage caused to Brazilian l i f e and property by German r a i ders, and the breaking of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany, caused Brazilians to take a rather more active interest i n the affairs of the War.  The British Minister in Rio de Janeiro reported  on January 24 that public opinion was already overwhelmingly in favour of a break with Germany, particularly i f the Allies were prepared to grant 72 concessions to Brazil i n return for Brazilian involvement/  At the same  time, however, Peel doubted whether Brazil was in any position to support the burden of a war against Germany, and suggested thatiBrazilian confidence in the Allies was shaken by the inability of the A l i i ed navies to safeguard international trade from German aggression.  73  German submarine  activity precipitated Brazilian measures in support of the A l l i e s . On April 5 the Germans sank the Brazilian steamer Parana* off the coast of France, with the loss of three Brazilian lives.  On the following day President  Wilson declared that a state of war existed between the United States and Germany, and on A p r i l 11 lauro Muller communicated to the German Minister in Brazil that his government was forced to break off diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany. '" Ruy Barbosa was delighted with the news, 72  and on the afternoon of April 14 harangued an enthusiastic crowd from a window in the Jornal dp Commerclo building overlooking the Avenida Rio  212 Branco. Prom the breaking off of diplomatic relations to the revocation of Brazilian neutrality was but a short step, achieved in a matter of weeks. On A p r i l 25 the Brazilian government issued a decree declaring its neutral status in the conflict between the United States and Germany, and the Presidential Message to Congress of May 3 did nothing to suggest that Brazilian policy was moving in a more positive d i r e c t i o n .  75  At this  stage, however, i t became clear that the various discussions and negotiations which were taking place in the back rooms of ministries and legations had produced one major casualty in the form of Lauro MHller,  who  resigned from his post as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the early days of May.  The reasons for MHller*s resignation are not at a l l clear.  His  so-called germanophile tendencies seem to have been largely an invention of his enemies, and i t is known that members of the American Embassy in Brazil had l i t t l e time for him. ^ 7  i f he had leaned even slightly towards  Germany in his international dealings, one would assume that the British legation would have noticed, but in fact i t s members had quite the oppo77 site impression." tion.  Other sources are extremely vague about the resigna-  Jose" Maria Bello, the historian of the republic, brushes the matter  aside in thoroughly unsatisfactory terms: A pequena crise, aberta no W  ministerio do Exterior com a salda do ministro Lauro MHller, suspeito de german6*filo pela sua origem alemff e por certas atitudes, era faeilmente resolvida com a indieacffo de Nilo Pecanha para seu sobstituto.?  78  It seems  l i k e l y , in the light of the evidence, that MHller was trapped by his own  213  (or his President's) policy of neutrality, and that when Brazil was  forced  to adopt tougher policies on account of new German tactics he found himself in an unpopular position, hounded by a public which demanded positive action on the side of the A l l i e s .  When i t became obvious that Brazil was  moving towards the revocation of the neutrality which he had built over the course of almost three years, he was l e f t with no alternative but to resign. Brazil was drawn further into the international imbroglio by the sinking of another Brazilian ship, the Tijuca, on May 20.  Two weeks later,  after yet another long and powerful speech by Ruy Barbosa (this time in the Senate), in which the fiery, orator from Bahia urged Brazil to follow the United States in i t s bid to contain Prussian militarism, Brazil formally revoked i t s neutrality (June 1, 1917).  Thus the great South American  nation abandoned i t s isolationism from the affairs of the rest of thei* world and entered the short limbo of non-neutrality  linked with non-1;  belligerency. Reactions to the Brazilian declaration weire varied.  The British  stated that Brazil had merely revoked her neutrality and could not techni79 cally be regarded as one of the A l l i e s .  7  The War Office was dubious  about taking Brazilian participation too seriously, as i t would be at least a year before she could play any positive role 3n the military effort of the War,  but thought that the international cable system would be greatly 80  strengthened by some Allied control of a link through Pernambuco.  The  Admiralty noted that clear Brazilian ports would be an advantage to the  214 British navy and that the Lloyd Brasileiro was generally too inefficient to be of any positive use, ending an o f f i c i a l despatch to the British Foreign Office in the following terms: "The general conclusion which Their Lordships have reached is that, i f we can count on a really friendly and helpful attitude in a l l respects olii the part of Brazil, i t would be advisable from a Naval point of view to discourage her from actually declaring war.  M  In Brazil, the dilemma of the government was well expressed by  Wileman *s Brazilian Review (August 14, 1917): "Anxious as Brazil undoubtedly is to play her part bravely and loyally, i t is impossible for this country, in the disorganised condition of i t s finances, to engage in any offensive alliance, or to even suggest- effective alliance to the Allies u n t i l the question of finances is settled, with regard to which the A l l i e s not Brazil should take the i n i t i a t i v e . " As the summer wore on in Europe, the British Admiralty was l e f t with the impression that Brazil was perhaps more interested in having her fleet refitted than in any active naval participation 82 in the War.  Brazil's demands for naval ammunition would be met, accor-  ding to the British, as long as she could hand over a l l her spare guns to the A l l i e s , for i t was in this field that the A l l i e s were feeling the greatest shortage.^ By October 1917, Brazil had gone so far along the path of commitment to the Allied cause that i t was entirely logical for her to take one more step and declare that she was at war with Germany. Once that step was taken, the British government revealed two major preoccupations Brazilian involvement.  vis-a-vis  F i r s t l y , as Peel explained in a note to Itamaraty  215  on November 3, Brazil could perform an inestimable service by closing down German banks and commercial organizations s t i l l operating in the country, thus interfering with German communications and blocking the future development of her trade.  Secondly, and of considerably more  immediate interest to the British government, negotiations regarding an arsenal concession in Brazil were speeded up and eventually brought to fruition.  The Brazilian President was extremely obliging in the matter  of arsenal concessions to Messrs. Viokers and Armstrong, and both Peel and his colleagues in London were enthusiastic about the way in which the negotiations were going.  The British and Brazilian archives contain  various notes which show an enviable s p i r i t of respect and cooperation, and negotiations continued in this friendly atmosphere into 1918.^5 Meanwhile, Brazil was invited to participate in such international agencies as the Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement, and an early suggestion was made that Brazilian aviators should be sent to Britain to train for active service. Brazil's progression from neutral to belligerent status during the course of 191? did l i t t l e to alleviate two of her most pressing problems—the lack of international shipping and the restrictions placed upon her coffee trade.  The year opened with no decision having been  reaohed as to whether Britain intended to prohibit the importation of Brazilian coffee, but the Foreign Office suggested to the British Minister in Rio de Janeiro that this could only be avoided i f Brazil was prepared to use her own tonnage for the transportation of the product—an  216 obvious reference to the German ships lying paralyzed i n Brazilian ports. ' 0  The matter of these ships remained a thorny one; Brazilians thought that seizure of them would involve a declaration of war, a step they were not 88 prepared to take in the opening weeks of 1917.  Diplomatic enquiries  continued to be made through various channels, and the British government f i n a l l y decided to go ahead with the prohibition of coffee imports from Brazil.  Prompted by this and other more general considerations, Brazil  proceeded, i n June, to seize the German ships, and Nilo Pecanha, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, pressed the British government to relax the restrictions i t had imposed. A compromise was reached by which Britain accepted the importation of a certain amount of Brazilian coffee on the understanding that i t be moved only in the holds of ex-German ships*  The  solution was not satisfactory to Nilo Pecanha.twho continued to press for the abolition of restrictions, while the government of Sffo Paulo appeared to regard the whole situation as perfectly reasonable.  It i s clear that  the incident provoked considerable friction between the British and Brazilian governments, and a long note from Peel to Pecanha, dated September 6, 1917, and reproduced here in i t s entirety, outlined a l l the various stages of the negotiations in an attempt to clarify and defend the British position: With reference to our conversation on the 4th. instant in regard to the prohibition of certain imports, including coffee and cocoa, into Great Britain i t has appeared to me advisable, before Your Excellency decides to again press for the withdrawal of these restrictions, that I should shortly refer to the steps which have already been taken in that direction, but whieh have not succeeded in causing  217 His Majesty's Government to modify their attitude, greatly though they regret the loss which is thereby caused to Brazil. It is well to remember that His Majesty's Government were obliged to resort to this measure as a consequence of the i l l e g a l German submarine policy, and I may also remind you that British subjects have thereby suffered considerable hardships, as they were deprived of the various commodities included in the measures of restriction which they had long been accustomed to use. I did not f a i l to point out to His Majesty's Government the important considerations which this matter involved for Brazil, as well as the regret and dissatisfaction the decision of His Majesty's Government has excited, and in reply to my representations I was i n structed to inform the Brazilian Government that His Majesty's Government had decided to admit some 20,000 tons of coffee, of a value of about 11,200,000, which happened to be in transit at the time the prohibition was imposed. On the f i r s t occasion I had the honour of meeting Your Excellency on assuming the direction of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, you urged me to use my best endeavours to obtain the withdrawal of the restrictions on the import of coffee, not because you thought that any material benefit would thereby accrue to the trade, owing to the shortage pf tonnage, but because you were of the opinion that this course would produce a great moral effect in this country. As I had already been informed that such a request could not be granted at that time because a l l tonnage was required for the transport of articles of v i t a l necessity, and also because there were many years supply of coffee in the United Kingdom, i t occurred to.me that the situation might be modified by the month of August, when the harvest would have been gathered i n , and I therefore suggested in a despatch I addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the prohibition should not be prolonged after July, but I was informed in reply that that concession could not be encouraged as the position of tonnage was so uncertain. I also received a communication from my Government indicating the prinicpal causes which had led up to the adoption of the prohibition of the importation into the United Kingdom of a large number of commodities and manufactured articles, the substance of which I communicated to the press, as you w i l l see from the extract I have the honour to enclose herewith. For the reasons stated in that communication i t is obvious that in endeavouring to meet the wishes expressed by the Brazilian Government His Majesty's Government bad from the f i r s t been faced with the d i f f i culty that i t was practically impossible to admit coffee from Brazil and keep out that exported from other countries. It did however appear to them that this d i f f i c u l t y might be removed i f a small proportion of normal imports of Brazilian coffee were brought to the United Kingdom and any of the ex-German ships recently taken over by the Brazilian  218 Government. I may remind your Excellency that His Majesty's Government made this concession from the mere desire to gratify the wishes of the Brazilian Government, as I was instructed to inform you that coffee was not required, there being stocks in the United Kingdom equal to 5 1/2 years normal consumption. This proposal however did not f u l l y meet with the assent of your Government, who, while being quite ready to accede to only a proportion of coffee forming part of the cargo, were not prepared to accept the stipulation that i t should be carried on ex-German ships. Correspondence on this question ends for the present with a telegram which, at your request, I sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asking that half space on a l l Brazilian vessels bringing foodstuffs to the United Kingdom might be allowed for the transport of coffee. As I informed Your Excellency in a note which I addressed to you on the 30th. July last, I did not f a i l to point out the excellent impression which would be created by a favourable decision in regard to this request. 1  Despite the very distinct differences of opinion engendered during the coffee negotiations, relations between Britain and Brazil enjoyed a markedly cordial atmosphere in 191?.  Early in the year the Brazilian Am-  bassador to the United States, Domicio da Gama, explained to S i r Cecil Spring-Rice, his British colleague in Washington, the need for Britain to adopt some bold policies .with regard to South America and to start building immediately towards the reconstruction of the post-war years.  He suggested  that some declaration of friendship on the part of the British government would be greatly appreciated in Brazil, and mentioned the possibility of the raising of the status of diplomatic representations as a step towards future unity. He thought that Britain should take more seriously the teaching of Portuguese in her universities, and stated that any lead taken by Britain in this or any other f i e l d would have as much symbolic as pract i c a l value.  90  219 Da Gama was not alone in his thoughts.  3h June i t was announced  that the Camoens Chair of Portuguese Language and Literature was to be established at King's College, London, as a parallel to the Cervantes Chair of Spanish, which had been founded i n 1916.  Nilo Pecanha consented to  serve as one of the Patrons of the Chair, along with the Portuguese Premier, Affonso Costa, and the Chairman of the San Paulo Railway Company, Lord Balfour of Borghleigh.  In the previous year a similar departure had been made  at the University of Leeds when Lord Cowdray offered a sum of £10,000 for the foundation of a Chair of Spanish Literature, with the intention that Portuguese be taught as an adjunct. In Brazil the British Minister was fast gaining a reputation for f a i r and honest dealings.  His elevation to the knighthood i n March 1917,  was a mark of the high esteem i n which he was held by his superiors, and at a banquet at Itamaraty in August—the f i r s t function of i t s kind since Nilo Pecanha took over the portfolio of Foreign A f f a i r s — t h e place of honour was occupied by S i r Arthur Peel. Wileman's Brazilian Review was moved to write in September: "Anglo-Brazilian relations here have never been more cordial than at present, and, thanks to the tact of H.B.M.»s representative and the cooperation of Dr. Nilo Pecanha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, an.atmosphere has been created that augurs well for AngloBrazilian relations in the future." (September 18).  0 Paiz published,  just two days before, a tribute to Sir Arthur Peel and to the good work he had been doing i n Brazil.  On the occasion of the f i r s t annual meeting  of the British Chamber of Commerce, the British community positively  220 crowed with self-satisfaction: The f i r s t general meeting of the Chamber since i t s incorporation is no inconsiderable event in the annals of local British commerce, accentuating as i t does the change of outlook and attitude that the war has wrought in our community. But five years ago any necessity for association for self-protection or hope of efficient assistance in trade matters from H.B.M.'s representatives would have been derided , whereas today not only has an efficient Chamber of Commerce been organized, but i t s members —mirabile dicta—though representing interests so diverse as to be sometimes almost contradictory, have worked for a whole year harmoniously and whole-heartedly for the Cause. . . . If the outlook of the traders has changed, s t i l l more remarkable is the manner in which H.B.M.'s Ministers and even consuls have been stirred into unwonted activity by the war; the truth having at last been driven deep into their inner conscience that i t is i n virtue of the immense resources accumulated by a century of unrestricted trade that the British Empire withstood the worst assault of a l l , and that by Trade alone can the future be assured. 91 On the home front, three major issues concerned the Brazilian government during 1917. precarious.  Firstly, the economic situation continued to be  Increased taxation and a rise in prices did nothing to a l l e -  viate the l o t of the common people, already hard h i t by the repercussions of the War.  The cuts in expenditure effected by Dr. Calogeras at the  Ministry of Finance represented an attempt to improve the situation, but his measures were unpopular and he was eventually forced to resign in September, 1917.  Sir Arthur Peel referred to the "notoriously dear" cost  of living in Brazil, in an appeal to London for a raise in^.his salary, and both the San Paulo Railway Company and the Leopoldina Railway Company sent representations to London throughout late 1917 and early 1918 in the hope of being able to raise their rates to keep abreast of the increased costs of the War p e r i o d .  92  221 Secondly, Brazil continued to be plagued by p o l i t i c a l upheavals. The year opened, according to one observer, in an atmosphere of discontent and disturbance, and when commenting on p o l i t i c a l troubles in Para" and Amazonas the British Minister wrote of the "unfitness of this country for representative institutions and the hopelessness under the present regime of any sound economic administration being realised. *3 As plans went M7  ahead for the election of a new President, no figure emerged who could be relied upon to provide the true leadership necessary in these troubled times.  Neither Rodrigues Alves nor Delfim Moreira, who were to represent  the Sa*o Paulo-Minas Gerais coffee axis and be elected President and VicePresident respectively, had the physical or moral strength to be able to drag Brazil out of the p o l i t i c a l doldrums.  ^  A third preoccupation i n 1917 was that of the German community resident in the southern part of Brazil.  Just as alarmist reports of  German activity in the period prior to 1914 turned out to be more imaginary than r e a l , so the demonstrations and protests of 1917 represented no continuing threat to Brazilian national s t a b i l i t y .  Reports of vio-  lence from Rio Grande do Sul were f a i r l y frequent, as was to be expected under the circumstances, and in A p r i l , after the sinking of the Parana', there were indications that an ugly situation was in fact developing in Pfirto Alegre.. German property was smashed in the c i t y , and representations were made to the Governor, Borges de Medeiros, from both sides. The Uruguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs was convinced that a serious revolution was about to break out on the other side of the border, and  222 Uruguayan troops were hurriedly moved into position to combat any possible overflow into their territory.  As was pointed out by the American Consul  in Pdrte Alegre, at no time was there any danger of street demonstrations Qi  turning into organized hostility on the part of residents of German origin. The f i n a l year of the V&r was marked in Brazil by an atmosphere of p o l i t i c a l uncertainty and social unrest.  The election of Rodrigues  Alves as President in March, 1918 took place amid much apathy on the part of the electorate. It became clear during the course of the year that ill-health would prevent the former President from successfully taking up his duties once more, and i t was suggested that various influential figures were merely waiting on the sidelines for the President-elect to falter and 96 for his corrupt and conspiratorial sons to be thwarted.  7  News of victory  in the War was mingled with a strong sense of p o l i t i c a l despair when i t was announced that Rodrigues Alves was too siek to assume office on November 15, and Ruy Barbosa complained that "public affairs . . .  continue to  be l e f t in the hands of a class who are engaged in a perpetual struggle •97 for place and power.*" ' Rodrigues Alves lingered on for another two months 7  and f i n a l l y died on January 18, 1919, thus bringing to a close a dull and unproductive year of p o l i t i e s .  9 8  Social unrest was r i f e during 1918.  The State of Bahia went through  yet another of i t s periodic convulsions in mid-year, with reckless spending aggravating what was already regarded as a condition of bankruptcy.  Local  observers suggested that p o l i t i c a l anarchy and lethal epidemics were only just around the corner.  99  Rio de Janeiro also had i t s share of troubles,  223  with labour disputes shattering the hitherto peaceful atmosphere aboard the Rio-Nitero"! ferries in August,  November saw another outburst of  strikes, demonstrations, and bomb-throwings in the streets of the capit a l , with much of the blame laid at the door of foreign agitators.  As  the year drew to a close, the cotton industry went into a state of paralysis as a result of strikes and various other disputes.  Ruy, whose  sense of social justice did not extend as far as the working classes, was positively alarmed by what he saw,  100  One of the major problems connected with labour was the rise in the price of basic commodities since the outbreak of the War.  The control  of food prices was never particularly effective, and S i r Arthur Peel noted the following price increases per kilo between 1914 and 1917 in the Braz i l i a n capital: beef rose from 12d. to l6d.; flour from 5d» to lOd.; lard from !?d. to 49d.; rice from 7d, to I4d.; beans from 5d. to l i d , ; codfish from 21d, to 63d,; and sugar from 6d, to 12d.  The average price of a suit  jumped from J>7 to t i l , and boots rose from 30/- to 42/-.  101  At the end  of 1918 the same source referred to a nationwide survey and drew attention to an "increase of about an average from 120 to 150 per cent over 1914 prices principal commodities everyday use including food supplies."*^  2  The rise i n basic prices cannot be attributed to a lack of production. 0n the contrary, by 1918 i t was clear that the War had played a v i t a l role not only i n the production of Brazilian manufactured articles, p a r t i cularly textiles, but also in stimulating various sectors of agricultural activity.  The amount of land under cultivation had increased, and rice  224 and sugar had made immense progress.  103  From the point of view of the  low-income groups, which experienced much hardship and even starvation during 1918, the blockage occurred at the level of the trader who  was  more prepared to export to Europe at high profits than to s e l l within Brazil, or who worked to produce a r t i f i c i a l erises for his own financial advantage.  3h the closing months of the year the government acted to  try to set an upper limit on food prices, but at this stage the circumstances which had made such measures necessary were no longer in effect. The enthusiastic heralding of Dr. Antonio Carlos as Minister of Finance in January, 1918 suggested that perhaps the time had come for some kind of reform in the nation's financial affairs.  During the nine  months he was i n office he showed an extremely considerate attitude to the working class and looked for serious means of cutting national expenditure.  The British Minister was sceptical about the chances of success  of the new approach: "Brazilian legislators never seem to profit by the lessons of the past but continue to pass votes for construction of r a i l way lines, ports and buildings far in excess of the amount that can be raised by the collection of national revenue." * ' The rubber market 1G  continued to be in a state of grave c r i s i s , with  4  enormous stocks on hand  and no way of competing with the efficient methods of the Far East.  Coal  remained in short supply, and special arrangements had to be made with the British in order to obtain two shiploads of this v i t a l commodity. 10  5  Coffee suffered from precisely the opposite problem, with some 6 1/2 million bags (approximately 113 million) sitting in storage in Santos  225  and Rio de Janeiro with no obvious outlet in sight.  Negotiations took  place on much the same basis as they had during the previous years of the War; Brazil could be helped with her coffee problem i f she in her turn took firm action against Gorman interests, such as the business of Theodor Wille, which continued to operate on Brazilian s o i l .  In A p r i l ,  1918,  Peel suggested that there be established an^international trust, composed of Britain, France and the United States, with a view to buying surplus coffee stocks. The British Foreign Office suspected that Brazil was unwilling to act against German enterprises as this would leave the door open for an Amrican entry into the f i e l d .  Britain did, however, come  forward with a scheme whereby Brazil could liquidate German property, hand i t over to Allied interests, and pay the money due to the Germans at the end of the War.  .In return, Brazil would be relieved of 4 million  bags of coffee and granted various other concessions.  Peel was pessi-  mistic about the scheme, suggesting that there was nothing to prevent a smart businessman like Wille working under cover and buying back his own property after i t had been liquidated.  The United States showed an inte-  rest in the deal, while Peel in Rio de Janeiro advised that the Allies should work in close collaboration.  He suggested that Pecanha was strongly  in favour of liquidation of the German firms. Communications became somewhat confused during June, with various of the Allies seemingly unsure of what the basic reasons for the arrangement really were. On the Brazilian side, Wenceslao Braz continued to press for the total abolition of the Statutory List policy, while his Minister of Finance compiled a register  226 of German firms in Brazil and gave the impression that liquidation was going ahead.  Just as formal negotiations began to get under way in  Washington at the beginning of July, in the presence of Domicio da Gama, Lord Reading and representatives of the State Department, news came through from the coffee plantations that a heavy frost had decimated the crop and that a l l previous calculations were now rendered invalid.  Plan-  ters agitated for government assistance, and the situation in Brazil was referred to as one of "widespread and national" c r i s i s . * ' 10  Negotiations  between the various governments came to a halt without any positive decisions being made, and no action was in fact taken against the German firms which had been at the centre of a l l the telegrams and diplomatic notes,  107  With regard to direct Brazilian participation in the War, year 1918 brought l i t t l e that was new.  the  Ambassador Morgan could report  to the State Department in A p r i l : "The Brazilian public is not v i t a l l y interested in the war.  They wish i t s speedy termination and the end of  the inconvenience which i t is causing.  They are not yet prepared to make  any national or personal sacrifices, and they are even less interested in the principles behind the struggle than were the people of the United States previous to the loss of the LUSITANI/l."  108  By July the situation  had changed: "The interest of the Brazilian public in the war during the last three months has increased largely on account of the active p a r t i c i pation of the United States."  Brazil was impressed, added Morgan, by  the force of American arms,"'"  09  227 On the British side, negotiations revolved around the possibility of Brazilian aviators being sent to England for training and the advisab i l i t y of Brazil sending troops to assist in the fighting.  3h January,  1918, the British government, in an atmosphere of extreme cordiality and cooperation, agreed to welcome ten Brazilian airmen on British s o i l , and arrangements were made for their journey to Europe.  110  As Sir Arthur Peel  pointed out in March, in a despatch which described In some detail the terms of the recently-published Green Book, Brazilian public opinion was impressed by the various invitations which were being issued by Allied  111  governments.  Beneath the general currents of diplomatic niceties,  however, there is evidence that o f f i c i a l British opinion tended towards 112  the exclusion of Brazil from the f i e l d of battle.  Peel played an ad-  mirable role in encouraging small-scale Brazilian participation while at the same time attempting to contain any grandiose plans which might emerge from Itamaraty.  His relations with Pecanha seem to have been extremely  friendly, as is shown^ in a note he sent the Brazilian Foreign Minister shortly before the termination of the War: "His Majesty's Government, ' he 1  explained, "desire to place on record the increasing services which Brazil has rendered to the Allied cause, not only since October 26th., 1917, but even before her active participation in the great war. . . . The prominent part played by Your Excellency in the events leading up to the rupture of relations with Germany is so well known that I need not refer to i t here, but His Majesty's Government cannot f a i l to emphasize their appreciation of the prompt and sturdy reply of Brazil to the dastardly  228 attacks of Germany on her merchant shipping and the lives of her merchant sailors.**  After outlining the various ways in which Brazil had contribu-  ted to the war effort, Peel concluded: *'I am authorized by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to allude to the excellent impression produced in England by Tour Excellency*s s k i l f u l handling of Brazil's foreign policy which has always been in complete accord with the s p i r i t of the policy of a l l the Allied Governments, and I am desired by Mr. Balfour to convey a personal message of congratulation to Tour Excellency for having so admirably voiced the sentiments of your compatriots and for having imparted to a l l the other Allied Governments that sense of satisfaction in feeling that their ideas of right and justice not only prevail within their own territories but are also echoed in vast countries 113 far removed from the actual scene of conflict."  J  While 1918 was a year in which both Britain and Brazil made positive efforts to increase their commercial and cultural contacts with each other—the British Chamber of Commerce witnessed a tremendous growth in membership, and a new Anglo-Brazilian Society was founded in London—there was preoccupation in o f f i c i a l and non-official circles about the way in which relations between the two countries would turn on the termination of the War.  The Foreign Office thought that Britain was projecting a  somewhat feeble image, and that South Americans f e l t Britain to be too weak to further her trade after the War.""*^ Peel was instructed to warn 1  the Brazilian government that commercial controls undertaken after the War would doubtless be harsh, but that they would be temporary in nature.^  229  The Economist (May 18) wrote that trading methods had been bad, and that now, with increased study and better information available, improvements could be effected, J. P. Wileman, however, who knew more than most people about Brazil's foreign trade, wrote (Wileman's Brazilian Review, July 2) that "somehow we seem to get along pretty well despite our inattention to the requirements of customers in this country at any rate, seeing that, allowing for periodic lapses, due chiefly to overtrading, imports from the United Kingdom during the 5 fat years 1909-1913 show increase compared with the previous five years 1904-1908 of £27,590,000 or 58 per cent, whereas those for Germany show increase of £10,424,000 or only 44 per cent. In fact the increase in,our case was not only relative but absolute and shows that however diligent Germans and their methods might be i n this country at least, the old fashioned policy of fairness and honesty triumphed," Two important and closely-connected moves on the part of the British government during 1918 were designed to look to the future of Anglo* Brazilian relations and to plan for the years immediately following the end of the War,  The f i r s t was the o f f i c i a l mission of S i r Maurice de  Bunsen to various countries of South America to examine the economic problems emerging from the War and the possibility of closer cooperation in the future.  Great secrecy was observed throughout the early negotia-  tions on aceount of the dangers of transporting a mission of such importance across the submarine-infested Atlantic,  Sir Arthur Peel made a l l  the necessary arrangements with Itamaraty, and the Brazilian Foreign  230 Ministry showed a marked willingness to cooperate in the affairs of the mission.  110  On his arrival i n Brazil, de Bonsen received from Pecanha a  note which stressed the closeness of relations between the two nations and proposed that the Brazilian legation in London be raised to the rank of embassy. De Bunsen replied that the British government was contemplating a similar step i n connection with i t s representation in Brazil. '' 11  The mission continued i t s work i n Rio de Janeiro and ln SSo Paulo, attempting to persuade the Brazilian government to take strong action against the firm of Theodor Wille and i t s associates. The talks held by de Bunsen were complicated by the absence from Rio de Janeiro of the American Ambassador, Morgan, who, according to Peel, hid behind a cloak of Pan-Americanism and offered poor excuses for his lack of cooperation with the special mission.  Despite this, however, the mission enjoyed a tremendous success,  among both Brazilians and members of the British community. The three weeks i t spent in Brazil were extremely busy, and although nothing concrete came out of the negotiations, de Bunsen was satisfied that matters- were being l e f t in the able hands of Sir Arthur Peel. The mission was particularly concerned with the financial implications of coffee stockpiling, as de Bunsen explained in some detail in a despatch written in Uruguay after the group had l e f t Brazil.  He was impressed by the President-elect, Rodrigues  Alves, who had assured him of his favourable attitude towards Europe in  n ft general and Britain i n particular. The commercial mission came to be something of a fashion during the f i n a l year of the War.  Peel reported in June that an Italian mission  231 was v i s i t i n g Brazil, and made the following comments regarding the effect of such v i s i t s : " I t i s not surprising that the advent of these commercial missions . . . should make the nation feel and think that they are about to enter on an era of great prosperity, but in administrative circles the increase of population and the consequences arising out of the circumstances of the War as l i k e l y to interfere with immigration are regarded with much anxiety. "** n  19  Meanwhile, the United States was planning to send  i t s own mission to Brazil towards the end of the year, and in December Sir Vincent Caillard, President of the Federation of British Industries, issued an invitation to a small group of Brazilian businessmen to v i s i t Britain and strengthen "the ties of friendship which have existed in the past and which have been rendered s t i l l closer by the cooperation of the 120  two countries in the  War."  The second major innovation on the part of the British government was the elevation of the legation in Brazil to the status of embassy. After the v i s i t of de Bunsen and the general policies of approximation pursued during the War, i t was an entirely logical step for the Foreign Office to declare, in September, 1918, that i t intended to appoint S i r Ralph Paget as the f i r s t British Ambassador to Brazil.  The British autho-  r i t i e s planned at this stage to have Paget installed before the President l e f t office on November 15, but more than a year was to pass before he in fact arrived in Brazil.  Although the general reaction to the creation of  the embassy was favourable, i t was mixed with much regret that S i r Arthur Peel, after a d i f f i c u l t but entirely successful term of office in Brazil,  232  would f i n a l l y be leaving the country. As one observer in the British legation wrote: "It may be said generally that the enthusiasm occasioned by this announcement surpasses in i t s unanimity and sincerity of expression anything that has been experienced in recent years in connection with British diplomacy, and forms a striking tribute not only to the inherent respect which Brazilians have always held towards our countrymen, but to the general policy and stand taken by England in the war and to the consideration, fairness and invariable sympathy shown by His Majesty's Government and their Minister here throughout the complex questions which have agitated this country during the very trying period following the finan-  c i a l c r i s i s of 1914."  121  The end of the War marked for Brazil the beginning of her largescale involvement in international agencies and commissions.  The Hague  Conference of 1907 and a series of Pan-American Congresses had prepared the terrain, and Brazil's role in the affairs of the War had consolidated her international status. Now i t was time for her to participate in a peace conference which was to regulate the affairs of Europe—with"some noteworthy and ominous exceptions—for the next twenty years, and to play a part in the international forum which was heralded with such idealistic fervour by those who remained to plan the reconstruction of post-war days. The nomination of Brazilian delegates to the Peace Conference produced something of a minor disturbance in the shady halls of Itamaraty, and occupied several leading Brazilians during the month of December,  1918.  Brazil's most renowned international jurist, Ruy Barbosa, refused to lead  233 the delegation on the grounds that he did not have sufficient time to prepare his case.  In fact, he was concerned about possible Brazilian  subservience to the North American point of view, and became the centre of a great deal of personal bickering and animostiy.  The controversy was  shortlived, however, and by the middle of the month Epitacio Pessoa had been named Chairman of the Brazilian Delegation, an honour which was to stand him in good stead In the presidential campaign which followed the death of Rodrigues Alves.  S i r Arthur Peel was not at a l l happy with the  appointment of Pessoa; he complained to London of Pessoa's allegedly strong pro-German sympathies and noted that the appointment had been criticised in B r a z i l .  1 2 2  Meanwhile, the preliminary discussions surrounding the creation of the League of Nations were arousing some interest in Brazilian p o l i t i cal and commercial circles.  The suggestions put forward by Sir Robert  Cecil regarding the international control of raw material production and of such -Important matters as public health and labour organization, received sympathetic consideration in B r a z i l .  1 2 3  The British Minister in  Rio de Janeiro saw distinct advantages for Britain in Brazilian acceptance of the international role of the League: I think that the general view here in regard to the creation of the League of Nations is that i t w i l l lead to the resumption of closer relations between South America and Europe and that i t w i l l terminate the conception that the South American states once they became emancipated were destined to form a world of their own on this side of the Atlantic. This line of thought is expressed in the opinion that Monroism no longer corresponds with the actual realities of the p o l i t i c a l world and, while there may be an indisposition to  234 abandon the principle of what i s called continental unity, there i s at the same time a tendency to welcome the departure from adherence to the rigid form of Monroism which w i l l be no longer necessary once the League of Nations i s created.-'-**" 2  Brazilian optimism about the future of the League was tempered by mounting criticism through the early months of 1919» when i t became clear that President Wilson was taking a stand which was not altogether favourable to minority (i.e., in this case, Brazilian) interests.  As one observer  put i t : "In his eagerness to make the world safe for democracy he abandoned international democracy and became the advocate of international  12"5 autocracy."  The Brazilian press reacted strongly to Wilson's views  on the Fiume question, and Peel once more gauged the force of informed public opinion: "The international position of Brazil .has changed considerably since the war and . . . the importance which she has acquired in the eyes of the world and especially in the sphere of South American politics is not conducive to the smooth working of Pan-American principles, 126 unless applied with tact and discretion." The internal situation of Brazil during 1919 was one of p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s , economic consolidation after the upheaval of the War, and increasing unrest on the labour front.  The p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s was provoked prima-  r i l y by the death of Rodrigues Alves in January, before he was able to occupy the presidential post to which he had been elected the previous year.  His death unleashed a particularly vehement campaign on the part  of Ruy Barbosa for the presidency of Brazil, but, as Ambassador Morgan pointed out in the early stages of the battle, the p o l i t i c a l l y influential  235 states of Sffo Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul were by no means ready to endorse his candidacy.  Altino Arantes came forward to f i l l the  gap l e f t by Rodrigues Alves in SSo Paulo, but by February 3 Peel at least was convinced that Ruy would be elected. At the end of the month, however, Epitacio Pessoa emerged as a compromise candidate—a "safe although not b r i l l i a n t selection," according to Morgan. Ruy continued to agitate throughout March and A p r i l , warning his audiences of the dangers of rule by an oligarchy at a time when international labour was becoming increasingly active, and levelling withering attacks on Domicio da Gama for allegedly supporting the United States and blocking Ruy's path to the Peace Conference table.  Even after the election of Pessoa in April, the diminutive orator  continued to rage and storm, showing that he had lost nothing of his tenac i t y through several decades of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y .  1 2 7  The financial situation and problems of labour unrest were closely linked.  The continued dissipation of revenue was aggravated by a sustained  rise i n prices.  As has been pointed out above, i t was not just a question  of increased prices of imported, manufactured articles: "The cost of living in Brazil, as in a l l other countries, has greatly augmented since the outbreak of the war.  Imported articles have increased in price more than  others, and yet articles of national production, and especially food products, have ascended to high f i g u r e s . "  128  According to the American Am-  bassador, not enough effort had been made to take advantage of a l l the resources at Brazil's disposal, and vast tracts of uncultivated but productive land could well help to l i f t Brazil out of her financial c r i s i s .  1 2 9  236 The effect of this situation was to put an additional burden on the shoulders of the common Brazilian worker, and to stimulate "maximalist" a c t i vities such as were producing such disruption throughout the countries of Europe and, to a lesser extent, in Argentina. During the election campaign both Ruy and Pessoa attempted to woo the industrial city workers, but the atmosphere was one of unrest and strikes, and positive progress was not easy.  While the great international powers tried to lay down some  basic rules for the control of labour, the Brazilian worker was showing signs that he was no longer prepared to accept the social and economic position which had been meted out to him.  Sir Arthur Peel summed up the  question in a despatch dated May 6, 1919: While i t would be a mistake to suppose that social questions in this sparsely populated republic have reached anything like the acute point to be met with in Europe, yet i t i s clear that the working classes are beginning to feel their way and are demanding an*;improvement in their industrial condition with a greater degree of insistence than they have hitherto expressed. This sign of a wider consciousness o&.'the power of collective bargaining i s probably due to the spread of propaganda at the hands of foreign agents who have been urging for some time the closer union of a l l branches of the working class on the ground that i t i s only through community of purpose and close contact that they can have any hope of seeing their aspirations for a happier and more leisured l i f e attained.130 For British interest in Brazil, the period immediately following the end of the War was of crucial importance.  The v i s i t of a group of  Brazilian businessmen to Britain had already been projected in 1918 and was carried to successful fruition in 1919.  The enthusiastic acceptance  of such a mission by the Brazilian public was welcomed by British o f f i c i a l s ,  237 and Peel seemed generally satisfied that Britain would be able to defend her interests in the face of s t i f f commercials-competition States.  from the United  "There has perhaps never existed," he wrote in May, 1919,  "a time  when the relations between Great Britain and Brazil were so closely united as they are at present,"  He f e l t that the most serious threats to future  commercial development lay in the defects of the Brazilian financial system i t s e l f , but that these defects were by no means insuperable,  Barclay, who  was closely associated with the mission organized by the Federation of British Industries, f e l t that there were immense possibilities for expansion, but criticized British banks for not giving their local managers enough free rein.  He made various suggestions to the British government,  including the proposal that a British Building be constructed in Rio de Janeiro,  In short, Britain emerged from the War in a mood of high opti-  mism with regard to future trade with Brazil,  The membership of the  British Chamber of Commerce had grown to 260 by A p r i l , 1919»  and there  was evidence that expert figures to Brazil were beginning to return to their pre-war l e v e l s , * ^  2  Contact between the two countries was further fostered by the v i s i t of Epitaeio Pessoa, Brazil's newly-elected President, to England at the beginning of June. The invitation was made through the Brazilian Minister in London, Fontoura Xavier, and the v i s i t was judged a great success in both countries. Sir Maurice de Bunsen talked with Pessoa in London in an attempt to find out what could be done about Brazilian trade agreements which gave preferential treatment to the United States, and  238 he was assured that Brazil would really rather trade with John Bull than with Uncle Sam,  Peel was satisfied with Brazilian reactions to the Pessoa  v i s i t , but was suspicious of Pessoa*s pronouncements on arrival in the United States later in June,  Peel thought that despite a l l the assurances  to the contrary, Pessoa was really turning his attention to the United States.  It is certainly true that the President did his best while in  Washington to emphasize that the current wave of anti-Americanism  sweeping  through his country was not representative of the wishes of his people. In general terms, however, the v i s i t of Pessoa to various European countries and to the United States did nothing but good for the future image of Brazil in the affairs of the world.'**  33  Relations between Brazil and  the United States were distinctly cool in mid-1919, and the Secretary of State, Polk, accused British, French and Italian companies of encouraging anti-American feeling throughout the country.  Peel was unaware of any  such activity, but officials in the Foreign Office f e l t that the contrary was true-and that somebody—possibly Ambassador Morgan—was trying to encourage animosity between British and American representatives operating in Brazil. 1919.  The atmosphere calmed down considerably towards the end of  134  The departure of S i r Arthur Peel from Brazil in September brought to a close an extremely successful and cordial phase of Anglo-Brazilian relations.  Genuine regret was expressed in o f f i c i a l and newspaper circles  that Britain was losing a representative who had enabled the two countries to maintain their contacts during the dark and restrictive days of the War  239 and who had done much to s t i f l e the resentment brought about by the Statutory List policy of the War years.•**35  £s he sent his f i n a l telegram  to announce his departure from Rio de Janeiro, news came from the King that approval had been granted for Domfeio da Gama's appointment as Braz i l i a n Ambassador in London, after a distinguished career as Ambassador 136  to the United States and as Minister for Foreign Affairs. •  ?  The moment  could scarcely have been more propitious for the arrival of Sir Ralph Paget, who steamed into Guanabara Bay to take charge of the embassy Just two days after the departure of his predecessor.  The considerable ad-  vances achieved since the days of Sir William Haggard were summed up in the courtesy note sent by Paget to the Brazilian President immediately he arrived i n Brazil: It i s now close on a century ago that the f i r s t British Ambassador to Brazil landed at Rio de Janeiro and conveyed to the Emperor Dom Pedro I the recognition by the British Government of the sovereign independence of Brazil. Since that historic date the relations between our two countries, both p o l i t i c a l and economic, have not ceased to remain on a satisfactory footing of friendly cooperation. But under the stress of war i t was f e l t in my country that a s t i l l closer understanding between us was both desirable and attainable. A special British mission was entrusted last year with the duty of expressing these desires to the Brazilian Government and people. The cordial reception accorded to i t here gave to the British Government the assurance that Brazilian sentiment was in harmony with that of Great Britain, and I may say of the British Empire as a whole. This assurance was f u l l y confirmed by the speeches exchanged on the occasion of Your Excellency's very welcome v i s i t to England a few months ago. The noble attitude assumed by Brazil in the Great War, by ranging herself as a Belligerent on the side of the A l l i e s , has only strengthened the tendency observable in both countries towards a more Intimate understanding of each other. I am charged with the task of interpreting these sentiments, as f e l t in my country, to the people of your great and enlightened nation.  240 Sir Ralph Paget*s cordial greeting was by no means a hollow expression of international cooperation.  Brazil's role in the;affairs of  the world had undergone a fundamental change during the four years of the First World War.  Building on the diplomatic successes of Rio Branco and  Joaquim Nabuco during the f i r s t decade of the century, she had now emerged as a significant factor in a wide variety of international affairs. The increased diplomatic activity brought about by the War enabled her sense of international presence to develop in a mature fashion to the extent that she could become morally and physically involved in the War i t s e l f and an actual participant in the negotiations which followed i t s termination.  Despite the lack of stability at home for most of the War years,  Brazil was able to follow a reasonably steady line on the international front, and to develop contacts at home and abroad in a way which had not been possible in the relatively placid pre-War days.  Trade missions came  and went, and there was every indication that Brazil was headed for a successful and, more significantly, diversified future. With regard to Anglo-Brazilian relations, the War years represented a major revival.  With one of the main contenders temporarily crippled,  Britain could take a closer look at the trading and investment p o s s i b i l i ties presented by such a vast market to the south.  A satisfactory line of  British representatives, among whom Sir Arthur Peel must occupy pride of place, was able to cope successfully with the various cases of internatioi nal friction produced by the War and to allow the sterile days of S i r William Haggard to fade into the background.  By the end of the War, the  241 future of relations between the two countries looked extremely optimistic. Ironically enough, however, precisely at the time when Britain was expecting a new and prosperous future i n Brazil, the latter country had succeeded in diversifying i t s perspective to such an extent that British supremacy in p o l i t i c a l and economic affairs would never again be a fundamental feature of Br