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Left-wing splinter parties in the Weimar Republic Miller, Frederick Alfred 1974

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LEFT-WING SPLINTER PARTIES IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC by FREDERICK ALFRED MILLER B. A., Un i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbis, 1970 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of History WE ACCEPT THIS THESIS AS CONFORMING TO THE REQUIRED STANDARD THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January, 197^ In p resen t ing t h i s thes is in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y sha l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t permission fo r ex tens ive copying o f t h i s thes is f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head o f my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood tha t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s thes is f o r f i n a n c i a l gain sha l l not be al lowed wi thout my w r i t t e n permiss ion . Depa rtment The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada ABSTRACT This study deals w i t h l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s -> whi'ch were i n existence i n Germany between jtg&8 and 1933. In 1918 the Second Empire c o l l a p s e d , the K a i s e r abdicated, and the i m p e r i a l government resi g n e d . Only the s o c i a l i s t s were r e l a t i v e l y strong enough and, i n the eyes of the p u b l i c and the v i c t o r i o u s A l l i e s , unblemished enough to take com-mand of the s t a t e . At t h i s h i s t o r i c a l moment, however, the s o c i a l i s t s were d i v i d e d . The chance to ih's$»3Q,Isocialism i n Germany was l o s t due t o the b i t t e r f i g h t i n g among the three p r i n c i p a l l e f t - w i n g p a r t i e s . The d i v i s i o n s i n the s o c i a l i s t camp, which had s t a r t e d e a r l i e r , but which broke i n t o open warfare a t the end of the Great War, were i n t e n s i f i e d by the c r i s e s the Weimar Republic faced and l e d to a great number of s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . Chapter One provides the background. I t concentrates on some of the problems t h a t the SPD and the KPD faced be-f o r e HitELer's take-over. Chapter Two discusses the emergence of s p l i n t e r groups. I t t r a c e s each s p l i n t e r group from i t s o r i g i n i n s i d e a l a r g e r p a r t y , i t s evolution,aand i t s d e c l i n e . The T h i r d Chapter examines the programs, platforms, and i d e o l o g i e s of the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . I t concentrates on t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and economic demands. I t a l s o deals with _ t h e i r views on fascism and the^" methods they adopted to cppe w i t h the menace presented by the r i s e of H i t l e r ' s NSDAP. | i i i i The Fourth Chapter i s devoted to structure and orga-n i z a t i o n . The parliamentary as well as the non parliamentary a c t i v i t i e s of the s p l i n t e r parties are discussed. It examines t h e i r involvement i n organizations l i k e the trade unions and a f f i l i a t e d youth groups. Some of the major publications of the s p l i n t e r parties are l i s t e d here. The Conclusion assesses the reasons for the f a i l u r e of the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . S p l i n t e r parties were both, symp-toms and victims of the turbulent times of the Weimar Republic. They were not the cause of H i t l e r ' s v i c t o r y . Their importance l i e s not i n the Impact they had on Weimar, but i n what they shoxtf about Weimar Germany. They r e f l e c t e d i n a microscopic way the insecurity, the mistrust, the s o c i a l decay, the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l mobility and unrest, the countless cri s e s , and the b l i n d and desperate search for something better. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT i i TABLE OF CONTENTS "liv LIST OF TABLES v i i LIST OF MAPS v i i i ABBREVIATIONS i * INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL SETTING 4 2. THE HISTORY OF THE LEFT-WING SPLINTER PARTIES IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 16 EARLY HISTORY OF THE KPD l 6 THE KAPD 20 THE REVOLUTIONARY SHOP STEWARDS 26 THE LEVITES 30 FROM THE MARCH ACTION TO THE OCTOBER DISTURBANCES 34 THE SECOND WAVE OF LEFT-WING COMMUNISM 39 THE KPO 43 RECONCILIATION OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 46 THE ASPS-ASPD 49 LEFT GROUPS WITHIN THE SPD DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC . 50 THE SAP 57 CONCLUSION 60 iv V Chapter P a S e 3. PROGRAMS AND POLICIES .. 6l INTRODUCTION 6l THE USPD .63 THE KAPD AND ITS AFFILIATES 65 THE LEVITES 70 THE LEFT OPPOSITION 73 THE KPO 76 THE ROTE K&MPFER .. 81 THE SAP 82 STRUGGLE AGAINST FASCISM 8k k. STRUCTURES AND ORGANIZATION 92 BASIC STRUCTURES 92 MEMBERSHIP . 95 ELECTION RESULTS, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL 107 EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITIES 118 INVOLVEMENT IN TRADE UNIONS 123 YOUTH 126 PUBLICATIONS 127 CONCLUSION 132 FOOTNOTES 151 A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 169 Appendix 1. AGE AND OCCUPATION OF k2 SAP MEMBERS ARRESTED BY THE NAZIS 17^ 2. HAP 1, ELECTORIAL DISTRICTS IN GERMANY ... 175 3. MAP 2, GERMAN STATES AND PRUSSIAN PROVINCES 176 4. MAP 3. INDUSTRIAL AND RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION I T ? OF THE POPULATION 1 *" v i Appendix Page 5. SOCIALIST VOTES IN PROTESTANT FARMING AREAS 1?8 6. LEFT-WING ELECTION RESULTS IN SELECTED PRUSSIAN DISTRICTS IN 1919 AND IN 1921 . 179 7. LEFT-WING VOTES AT THE REICHSTAG AND LANDTAG ELECTIONS OF 1924/25 180 8. LEFT-WING VOTES AT THE REICHSTAG ELECTION OF MAY 20, 1928 181 9. MAP 4, LEFT-WING STRONGHOLDS IN THE MID-TWENTIES ?182 10. MAP 5, STRONGHOLDS, OF THE KPO, SAP, AND . THE RK 183 11. MAP 6, PATTERNS OF SOCIALIST VOTES IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 184 4 12. NUMBER OF ELECTED DEPUTIES TO THE REICHS-TAG BY PARTY AFFILIATION 7. 185 13. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 186 14. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, 191 LIST OF TABLES Pagg BACKGROUND OF OPPOSITIONAL FUNCTIONARIES 103 OCCUPATION AND AGE OF 115 RK MEMBERS 10? LEFT-WING ELECTION RESULTS IN 1928 I l l LANDTAG AND BURGERSCHAFT ELECTION RESULTS IN 1932 11^ ELECTION RESULTS IN MORGENTHAL AND BRUNDOBRA IN 1932 116 SELECTIVE COMPARISION OF SPD AND KPD ELECTION RESULTS 167 AGE AND OCCUPATION OF .42 SAP MEMBERS ARRESTED BY T THE NAZIS 17^ SOCIALIST VOTES IN PROTESTANT FARMING AREAS 178 LEFT-WING ELECTION RESULTS IN SELECTED PRUSSIAN DISTRICTS IN 1919 AND IN 1921 179 LEFT-WING VOTES IN THE REICHSTAG AND LANDTAG ELECTIONS OF 1 9 2 V 2 5 180 LEFT-WING VOTES AT THE REICHSTAG ELECTION ON MAY 2 0 , lg38o 181 NUMBER OF ELECTED DEPUTIES TO THE REICHSTAG BY PARTY AFFILIATION 185 v l l v i i i LIST OP MAPS Map Page 1. ELECTOHIAL DISTRICTS IN GERMANY . 175 2 . GERMAN STATES AND PRUSSIAN PROVINCES 1 7 6 3. INDUSTRIAL AND RELIGIOUSS DISTRIBUTION OP THE POPULATION 177 0 . 4 . LEFT-WING STRONGHOLDS IN THE MID-TWENTIES ..... 1 8 2 5. STRONGHOLDS OF THE KPO, SAP, AND RK I 8 3 6 . PATTERNS OF SOCIALIST VOTES IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 1 8 4 ABBREVIATIONS AA, AAU, AAUD AAUE, AAUED ADGB AG AKP, AKPD ASP, ASPD ASP, ASPS BL BVP CI, Comintern CP CPofSU DDP DGB DMV DNP, DNVP DVP EC, ECCI EECCI EK, EKKI EEKKI Allgemeine Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands Allgemeine Arbeiter Union, Einheltsorgan, Deutschlands Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Arbe i t s geme ins chaf t A l t e Kommunistische Partel Deutschlands A l t e Sozialdemokratische Partei deutschlands A l t e Sozialdemokratische Part e i Sachsens Bezlrksleitung Bayerische Volkspartei Communist International Communist Party Communist Party of the Soviet Union Deutsche Demokratische Parte i Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Deutscher Metallarbeiter-Verband Deutschnationale Volkspartei Deutsche Volkspartei Executive Committee of the Communist International Extended Executive Committee of the Communist International Exekutiv-Komltee der Kommunistischen Internationale Erweitertes Exskutiv-Komitee der Kommuni-stischen Internationale i x X F D 3 B IHA IJB IKD INKOPP INPREKGR, INPREKORR IRH ISK, isk IVKO, IVKOPP KAI KAG KAP, KAPD K l , Komintern L KJ, KJV, KJVD KJI KJG, KJVO, KJVDO KO KOPP KP, KPD KPdSU(B;>;} ,18981*", KPDSU KPO, KPD-O, KPD(O), KPDO LB F r e l e r Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Internationale A r b e l t e r - H i l f e Internationaler Jugend-Bund Internationale Kommunlsten Deutschlands Internationale Nachrichten der Kommu-nistisch e n Opposition Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz Internationale Rote H i l f e Internationaler Kampf-Bund Internationale Vereinigung der Kommunistischen Opposition Kommunistische Arbelter Internationale Kommunistische Arbeits Gemeinschaft Kommunistisohe Arbelter P a r t e i Deutsch-lands Kommunistische Internationale Kommunistlscher Jugendverband Deutsch-lands Kommunistische Jugend-Internationale Kommunistischer Jugendverband Deutsch-lands (Opposition) Kampf Organisation Kommunistische Opposition Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands Kommunistische Partei der Soviet Union (Bolschewiki) Kommunistische Parte i Deutschlands (Opposition) Lenin Bund x i LO Linke Opposition or Left Opposition NSDAP National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei PV Parteivorstand RGI Rote Gewerkschafts-Internationale RGO Revolutionftre Gewerkschafts-Oppositlon Revolut ionare Gewerkschaf ts-Organisation RH, RHD Rote Hilfe Deutschland RK Reichskonferenz RK Rote Kampfer SA Sturmabteilung SAI Sozialistische Arbeiter-Internationale SAJ Sozialistische Arbeiter-Jugend SAP.SAPD Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutsch£%w< lands SAZ Sozialistische Arbeiter Zeltung SB Sozialistischer Bund SEE Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch-lands SJV, SJVD Sozialistischer Jugendverband Deutsch-lands SP, SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands SPW Sozialistische Politik und Wissenschaft SSB Sozialistischer Schutzbund SU Soviet Union SWV Sozlalwissenschaftllche Vereinigung SWZ Soclalistische Wochenzeitung USP, USPD Unabhangige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands USSR, UdSSR Union der Soziallstischen Sowjet Republiken Vereinigte Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands Vereinigte Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Zentralkomitee INTRODUCTION The purpose of this study is to examine left-wing splinter parties which existed in the Weimar Republic, A l -though splinter parties were a regular feature of German p o l i t i c a l l i f e between 1918 and 1933» very l i t t l e has been written about them and nothing on a comparative base. To deal with a l l of the various left-wing parties and groups which appeared within the l i f e span of the Weimar Republic i s , i f not Impossible, too big an undertaking from Vancouver. Even for a historian l i v i n g i n Germany i t would have been a colossal task to stay informed of a l l the kaleido-scopic changes and patterns which took place. Thus, some qualifications and guidelines to assist i n the selection of parties for this paper had to be set. The parties studied here were chosen for various reasons^ Consideration had to be given to available material. It can be assumed with certainty that much material was destroyed by the members of splinter groups themselves during the Nazi era. Other material would be scattered in countries l i k e Prance, Russia, Czechoslovakia, the United States, Mexico, and ither plaees in which they spent their years in exile. Many docu-ments might s t i l l be stored in some attics in Germany, A f a i r amount has been gathered by authors and scholars miehaas Hermann Weber, Karl Otto Paetel, Beradt, and the contributors to the Marburger Abhandlungen zur Polltlschen Wlssenschaft. 1 2 namely Bock, D r e c h s l e r , I h l a u , L i n k , and Tjaden. Some of t h e i r works c o n t a i n s e c t i o n s of primary m a t e r i a l s , others a r e c o l l e c t i o n s o f documents. SPD and Comintern p u b l i c a t i o n s m mention the s p l i n t e r groups i n p a s s i n g . What they do r e p o r t i s o f t e n s p i c e d with t h e i r own b i a s e s and d i s l i k e s . The S S t a t l s t l k des deutschen Helens was I n v a l u a b l e f o r i t s d e t a i l e d e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s , but a l s o f o r the ca n d i d a t e s ' g e o g r a p h i c a l , o c c u p a t i o n a l , and p o l i t i c a l background. Gfioups i n c l u d e d i n t h i s study were Involved i n day-to-day p o l i t i c s . i n T h i s e l i m i n a t e d the F r e i d e n k e r and the Feuer- b e s t a t t u n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s , the A r b e l t e r s p o r t s c l u b s , the pa p a c i f i s t s , as w e l l as the i n t e l l e c t u a l groups a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the Weltbuhne. Only groups which were or claimed to be M a r x i s t a re i n c l u d e d i n t h i s study. T h i s excluded the Nelson Bund from c o n s i d e r a t i o n , although i t was an a c t i v e l e f t - w i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n and there i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of m a t e r i a l a v a i l a b l e . On the otherslhgnd®cIulB©3.ud6d@z,aiPi>BB' feemBthesiiibatibQ.A.IsSe ASP, a l t h o u g h i t s M a r x i s t a n c e s t r y Is b a r e l y v i s i b l e and m a t e r i a l on i t i s s c a r c e . A n a r c h i s t s and s y n d i c a l i s t s were a l s o d i s -regarded except where they were i n the same o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h M a r x i s t s as i n the KAPD, the AAU, and the AAUE. Laufenberg and Wolffheims's Nat1onalkommunlsten and the group around N i e k i s c h were a t f i r s t c o n s i d e r e d , but then omMted, as they operated i n the p o l i t i c a l t w i l i g h t zone be-tween the f a r L e f t and the extreme R i g h t and thus could not r e a l l y be c a l l e d l e f t - w i n g . 3 The study of left-wing splinter groups was compli-cated by the ephemeral nature of these groups. Every election, every p o l i t i c a l action, every dispute brought different groups into the f i e l d and created different combinations. Statistics refeaa&ng to splinter groups are often unclear in identifying the particular group. References giving a certain amount of votes to Communist Opposition could mean the KPO, the Left Opposition, or a group connected with neither. It is hoped that this study w i l l give some Insight into a neglected aspect of the Weimar Republic. Much hss been written, much has been said about the rise of fascism, the breakdown of parliamentary democracy, the failure of the middle-of-the-road parties, the role of the Reichswehr, and countless other aspects of Weimar. Yet the splinter parties were as much a characteristic of Weimar Germany as these other phenomena. They too were the results of the same circumstances which made Weimar unique, although they existed i n the shadow of parties which seemed more important, but which, In the end, fai l e d just as dismally as the splinter parties did. CHAPTER I HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND  POLITICAL SETTING The history of the left-wing movement during the Weimar Republic is partly a history of s p l i t s , caused by t i a r . Ideological, tac t i c a l , and personal disagreements. During these fourteen years the Left was divided into two, sometimes three, mass parties and scores of sects and mio±o sects. Before World War I the Sozialdemokratische Partei  Deutschlands (SPD) (Socialdemocratic Party of Germany) was the only socialist party in Germany. Of a l l the socialist parties i n the world, the SPD was THE party everyone assumed to be most l i k e l y to succeed in establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. A l l socialist parties looked to the SPD for guidance? the SPD was the leader i n world socialism. However, the outbreak of World War I showed that the SPDTfiaKO-otiiiaife'aBive up to fchaialist expectations;1 The SPD had changed. By 19&4 i t had been legal for 24 years. Although not quite salonfffhig. the SPD had become more"respectable" and "trustworthy" than i t had been in the time of Bismarck's Sozialisten Gesetz of the l880s. Below the revolutionary shell there was a revisionist core. The revolutionaries had turned into parliamentarians, party bureaucrats, and trade union o f f i c i a l s (Bonzen). These people had a stake in society and i n their party; A revolution would endanger their positions. A refusal to support the war, "by voting against the War Credits, would have threatened the very existence of the party and the positions of the party and trade union leaders 1. They would not risk this in order to exchange German, or, to be more specific, Prussian autocracy for Russian autocfcacy, German Imperialism for French or British imperialism. They justifi e d their stand by quoting Karl Marx, who allowed socialists to defend their country, who declared that i n a war between imperial Germany and Tsarist Russia the inter-national proletariat should support Germany as the lesser e v i l . "The one fact which eclipsed everything else was that Russians were on the s o i l of the Vaterland, Tsardom, according to the traditions i n Social Democratic circles, was the darkest of horrors.'"' With Russia poised against Germany i t seemed no contradiction for socialists to be patriotic and loyal to an imperialistic Germany. The vaterlandslosen  Gesellen had now a Vaterland. a Vaterland that they were willing to defend. But not a l l Social Democrats f e l t that way. The party s t i l l managed to draw the dissatisfied, the persefefcfedd, the radicals, and the revolutionaries to i t s ranks. Some of them were members of the Reichstag. They b i t t e r l y opposed the patriotic jingoism that the party, along with the rest of Germans f e l l victim to£> Grudgingly, the radical minority in the Reichstagsfraktion followed party discipline and voted for the War Credits in August 1914. However, on December 2, 1914, Karl Liebknecht voted against the War 6 Credits. On March 20, 1915, Liebknecht and Otto Rtlhle, voted against them. In August 1915 Liebknecht alone voted against the War Credits, t h i r t y other SPD deputies l e f t the House, and Otto Rtthle was absent. Then on December 14, 1915. twenty SPD Reichstag members voted against the War Credits, s i x t y - f i v e voted f o r them, and twenty l e f t the House.3 The differences caused by the War i n addition to the e x i s t i n g differences caused the party to develop f i s s u r e s along p o l i t i c a l , organizational, and t a c t i c a l l i n e s . These l i n e s were not just s t r i c t l y Right, L e f t , Centre, Ultra,Right, and U l t r a L e f t . The r i g h t - l e f t d i v i s i o n s had l i t t l e to do with the d i v i s i o n s caused by the war. Other issues created d i f f e r e n t a l l i a n c e s and realignments. Some of these cracks were deep, others barely scratched the surface. The intense emotionalism c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of war time sentiments deepened the new schism which had developed out of the d i f f e r e n t a t t i -tudes towards the war and towards the war aims expressed by some SPD leaders. The War Credit issue was the wedge which was driven into t h i s new f i s s u r e and which eventually s p l i t the party, A student of German 8 o c i a l i d f i m o c r a c y , Bevan, argued that there were f i v e groups i n the pre war SPDi He c a l l e d the ones farthest to the l e f t the Extremists. This group was l e d by Liebknecht, Paul Lensch, Stadthagen, Mehrlng, Rosa Luxemburg, and Klara Zetkin. The l e f t Centre contained Kautsky (the editor of Die Heue Z e l t ) . Cunow, Haase, and Ledebour. There was also a Bight Centre, with Scheidemann 7 and Richard Fischer, This group was in control of the party's main organ, the Vorwarts, Together, the Left Centre and >the Right Centre were the bulk of the party. Further to the right were the Moderate Hevisionlsts, with Bernstein, Dr. David, and Ludwig Frank. Finally, on the extreme right were the Imperial Socialists, with Kolb, Dr. Quessel, Edmund Fischer, and Wolfgang Heine. This group was small i n numbers and supported the m i l i t a r i s t and expansionist policy of the Reich. As stated before, the war changed the pattern of alignments considerably. Three SPD newspapers, which are quoted by Bevan, enumerated six groups on the l e f t and nine on the right during 1915 and 19l6-\ These classifications Illustrate that there was more than one s p l i t taking place and that the dividing lines were continously shifting. Bernstein, for example, was in the pre war classification considered to be to the right of Scheidemann. Lensch, a former Left Extremist and Cunow from the Left"©entaKe Shad during the early war years moved to the right. The most signifleant!;.dilyision, the one which later s p l i t the party and thus initiated the appearance of the Indepe®d©ntseSsLCiial Democratic Party (USPD), was not a clear cut r i g h t - l e f t division. Membership in this group was not based on pre-war issues. Thus, the groups which emerged during the war were different from the preewar groups. In 1917 the pattern had changed again. On the far l e f t of the SPD were the Left Radicals, an anti parliamentarian wing, which, when the big s p l i t came in 1917, refused to 8 j o i n e i t h e r one o f t$ie-two s o c i a l democratic gartSes, but t r i e d t o form i t s own p a r t y . F a i l i n g t o do so, they remained as r a t h e r l o o s e l y o r g a n i z e d s e c t i o n s i n major c l t i e . B est known of these were the Bremer L i n k e n . l e d by K n i e f , the Hamburger Lin k e n , l e d by Laufenberg and Wolffheim, and the BArchard group i n B e r l i n . They were the f i r s t t o break away from the SPD. T h e i r break-away was not a concerted a c t i o n , but was undertaken i n d i v i d u a l l y by each jLocai group a t d i f f e r e n t dates d u r i n g the l a t e r p a r t o f 1916 and the b e g i n n i n g o f 1917. On December 2, / T 9 1 o 7 a meeting of the M i n o r i t y S o c i a l Democrats of B e r l i n T . . d e c i d e d 210i20 to stop payments to the p a r t y chest. T h i s meant t h a t they .Vi' now formed a wholly d i s t i n c t o r g a n i z a t i o n . A few days l a t e r the , Brunswick S o c i a l Democrats f o l l o w e d s u i t . On February 28, 1917 t b Hamburger L e f t R a d i c a l s under Laufenberg and Wolffheim l e f t the SPD. On March 5 the L e f t R a d i c a l s of Bremen, Hamburg,fHannover and R f l s t r i n g e n c a l l e d f o r a new p a r t y . Borchard j o i n e d i n t h i s c a l l . 7 A second group, the Gruppe I n t e r n a t i o n a l e , o r g a n i z e d i t s e l f around K a r l Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. They were i n v o l v e d i n the p u b l i c a t i o n of the S p a r t a k u s b r l e f e , which c o n s i s t e d of polemics a g a i n s t themmc. To the r i g h t o f them was the c e n t r e group. I t contained people who l a t e r , i n the Communist P a r t y , showed themselves f u r t h e r t o the l e f t than the S p a r t a c i s t s , as w e l l as c e n t r i s t s and r e f o r m i s t s such as Dittmann, Haase, and Kautsky, and the r e v i s i o n i s t B e r n s t e i n . T h e i r p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e from the main body was the War C r e d i t i s s u e . The l a r g e s t group w i t h i n the SPD supported the war. I t c o n t a i n e d the b u l k o f the membership and was thus : a b l e t o dominate the p a r t y . A t i t s extreme r i g h t were the t r a d e 9 union bureaucrats and a group of th i r t y - t h r e e (out of 110) members of the Reichstag, The th i r t y - t h r e e deputies met r e g u l a r i n the hotel "Heldelberger". Their leaders were Eduard David and Wels, This group considered breaking away and forming a new,, t r u l y reformist trade union based party, ^  The Reichstag deputies who were opposed to the war formed on March 24, 1910 a parliamentary Arbeitsgemelnschaft (AG) of 18 members (this did not Include Liebknecht and Ruhle)^ who stayed i n the party, but worked as an independent caucus. In February 1917 a large section from the centre, including the AG, and from the l e f t of the SPD formed a new party, the Independent S o c i a l Democratic Party of Germany or, i n German, the Unabhanglge Socialdemokratlsohe Partei  Deutschlands (USPD). Most of the Gruppe Internationale, also known as the Spartakusbund, joined the USPD. Ruhle and some others went to the L e f t Radicals, who now call e d themselves Internationale Kommunlsten Deutschlands (IKD). The IKD attempted to form a national party. They f a i l e d to do t h i s because the p o l i c e closed down t h e i r founding con-vention i n August 1917. 1 0 At the time of the November Revolution i n 1918 the s o c i a l i s t s were badly divided and not well prepared for the seizure of power. Their leaders, being at the helm of the state, t r i e d to emasculate the revolution. The USPD p a r t i c i -pated i n the government, but i t s r a d i c a l l e f t wing, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, started an armed u p r i s i n g In January 1919. The Communist Party (Kommunistische Parte i  Deutschlands or KPD), which was formed only days before by 10 the Spartacists, the IKD, and various other l e f t r a d i c a l s , was also involved i n t h i s . Thus, at the beginning of 1919t there were three working class parties i n Germany which represented a curious pattern. The USPD, being pulled by i t s wings into d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s , withdrew from the government. This forced the SPD to depend on i t s t r a d i t i o n a l enemies, the army and the toM:rgeois&8;|i f o r law and order. The KPD was involved i n an attempt to overthrow the s o c i a l i s t government for the benefit of the p r o l e t a r i a t , which, i n i t s majority, proved highly unappreciative of these e f f o r t s . Rosa Luxemburg, who was against t h i s i l l advised Putsch and whose p o l i t i c a l maturity and visionary idealism could have led the KPD to great hJeagfftts, was murdered, together--wi;th Karl Liebknecht, by the ftseos&xk soldateska. Instead of working together, the three d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l i s t groups fought each other. A unique opportunity to transform German society was l o s t mainly through the d i s u n i t y i n the s o c i a l i s t camp. This d i s u n i t y did not stop a f t e r t h i s t r a g i c experience. From each of the three p r o l e t a r i a n parties several groups broke away within the next thirteen years. D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and f r u s t r a t i o n were some of the causes. D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the party leaders who were too slow, too f a s t , too f a r l e f t , too f a r r i g h t , d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with fche party's per-formance i n the past, the present, or with i t s plans for the future drove many out of t h e i r respective p a r t i e s . Frustration with the party bureaucracy, the f e e l i n g that the party was standing s t i l l , stagnating, or even decaying accounted for many s p l i t s . Disunity i s an inherent ingredient i n ideo=o 11 l o g i c a l p a r t i e s , as I d e a l i s t s often f i n d i t nearly impossible to compromise. The appearance of s p l i n t e r groups was not only a left-wing phenomenon; there were a number of bourgeois parties, scores of reactionary Blinde. and several f a s c i s t organizations. The unique s i t u a t i o n Weimar Germany found i t s e l f i n was condu-cive torthe formation of s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . Germany had just been defeated i n a major war. The defeat was of such a nature that many Germans did not recognize i t as such. Whereas i n 19^5 Germany was t o t a l l y defeated, i t s army completely annihilated, and i t s t e r r i t o r i e s occupied by the enemy, t.in 1918 the enemy had not overrun the country, the c i t i e s were not destroyed, and the army was s t i l l very much i n existence. A party, which was t r a d i t i o n a l l y an opposition party, with an opposition mentality, which was often treated as Staatsfelnd, and which was weakened by i n t e r n a l dissention, formed the "revolutionary" government. The v i c t o r i o u s A l l i e s pressed the German government to sign the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . The SPD leaders knew that whichever party signed t h i s treaty would become a pariah i n German p o l i t i c a l l i f e . They had to maneuver the other parties into sharing the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . They also f e l t , i n order to stay i n power,thtey needed the Go-operation of the m i l i -tary, the bourgeoisie, and the c i v i l service. They would not put t h e i r t r u s t i n the revolutionary p o t e n t i a l of the working c l a s s . In t h e i r eagerness to show how trustworthy and responsible they were, they l o s t the l a s t revolutionary traces. Thereby they f o r f e i t e d the l o y a l t y of man* prole-tarians, but f a i l e d to gain appreciable support from the 12 middle classes and were blamed by the reactionaries and monarchists f o r a l l the r e a l and imaginary i l l s that came out of Germany's defeat i n World War I. These were times of stress and times of crises for the f l e d g l i n g republic as well as for the s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s . And c r i s e s breed dissent, and dissent leads to s p l i t s . The Peace Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s did not bring p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . In the east Frelkorps fought P o l i s h troops over the possession of Upper S i l e s i a . The government was ordered by the A l l i e s to disband the Frelkorps., British/-.. French, and I t a l i a n troops were sent to S i l e s i a to restore order. On March 13. 1920 a section of the German army under Ltittwitz and Erhard occupied B e r l i n and a few other matJoBscitles, staging the Kapp Putsch. This triggered a new c i v i l war i n which a German Red Army fought against the Relchswehr. Freikorps roamed the Reich, f i g h t i n g workers, executing " t r a i t o r s " , and assassinating p o l i t i c i a n s . F a i l u r e to pay the Separation installments on time brought about the French-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr d i s t r i c t , s t r i k e s , passive and a c t i v e resistance, r e p r i s a l s and executions, government laiil:: bankruptcy and a gallop|n)go i n f l a t i o n i n 1923* From 1924 t i l l 1929 Germany experienced r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y . Neither the S o c i a l Democratic Party nor the Weimar Republic encountered any major c r i s i s . There was some d i s -s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the ranks over the fact that the SPD went into c o a l i t i o n with bourgeois parties, or, when not i n the government, that i t was a tolerant, l o y a l opposition. But f o r the most part, the members and the a c t i v i s t s were s a t i s f i e d . 13 I t was d i f f e r e n t with the KPD, which was part of the Communist International (Comintern or CI) and was thus i n -fluenced by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In compliance with orders issued i n Moscow, the KPD staged two uprisings, one i n 1921 and another i n 1923* The f i r s t one led to the departure of two able leaders, Levi and Daumig, and the temporary outlawing of the party. The f a i l u r e of the second u p r i s i n g brought a group of l e f t leaders to the top who thwarted any attempt by the Right or the Centre f o r a genuine United Front with the SPD. The various power struggles i n Moscow - Trotsky versus S t a l i n , Bucharin, and Zinoviev; Trotsky and Ziinoviev versus S t a l i n and Bucharin; and S t a l i n versus Bucharin - took t h e i r t o l l i n Germany. As the KPD became a t o o l of the Soviet foreign p o l i c y l l , i t s structure, functions, and short term objectives changed d r a s t i c a l l y . In the la t e 1920s?; Its main objective was to destroy the SPD. It raided the SPD's membership, disrupted i t s meetings, discredited i t s leaders, and ':•relabelled them "Soci a l Fascists"(between 1928 and 1933). The s t r u c t u r a l changes involved the substitution of factory c e l l s f o r street c e l l s . V i a factory c e l l s the members were easier to control. Functionaries were selected by t h e i r l o y a l t y j to Moscow. A good method of keeping a c t i v i s t s l o y a l was by giving them employment i n the party and i t s a u x i l i a r y organizations, at 1 2 the Soviet embassy or at Soviet trade missions . These jobs were usually well paid; i t s fringe benefits included holidays at the Black Sea. Known KPD functionaries found i t impossible to f i n d employment with private enterprise. 14 Bureaucrats, paid with money from Moscow, took t h e i r orders from Moscow and conducted the a f f a i r s of the German party according to the needs of Moscow. This process was harmful for the KPD. The party l o s t some of i t s c r e d i b i l i t y . Outwardly the KPD had to maintain a pretence of independence, yet i t was easy to see through the feeble attempts of Thalmann and Genossen. There was l i t t l e room fo r maneuverability. The leaders never knew i f Moscow would l e t them follow through with t a c t i c a l agreements with other groups. Any leader who f e l l f o u l of Moscow had been driven away. Thus, the KPD's effectiveness was seri o u s l y handi-capped. I t was successful i n preventing the SPD from ever winning a clear majority and thus helped to bring about H i t l e r ' s v i c t o r y . F r u s t r a t i o n over t h i s process drove many away. Attempts were made to reform the KPD from within. When these attempts f a i l e d new communist parties were created whose goals were to reform the KPD from the outside. Such parties were the Lenin Bund, the L e f t Opposition, and the KPO among others. In 1929 the New York Stock Market Crash triggered o f f a new werld c r i s i s which affected the Weimar Republic also . Unemployment and Depression i n t e n s i f i e d the class struggles between labour and management. With lock-outs the employers t r i e d to break down the workers' resistance; with s t r i k e s the workers fought back. BiftnkrwptcSes, loss of markets, and shut-downs defeated both. In l e g i s l a t u r e s the l e f t parties t r i e d to uphold progressive labour laws, which were under the !5 combined attack by the parties of the r i g h t . In the Harzburg  Front the I n d u s t r i a l i s t s , the Junkers, and Hugenberg agreed to finance H i t l e r to enable him to f i g h t t h e i r b a t t l e s f o r them. With the help of the dispossessed petty bourgeoisie and some unemployed proletarians the Nazis launched large scale physical attacks on the working class p a r t i e s . Nazis and communists were k i l l i n g each other, both fought the SPD. More groups separated from the SPD and the KPD. They formed s p l i n t e r parties which were dedicated to the u n i f i c a t i o n of the working class into a mass movement. But by t r y i n g to unite they caused more s p l i t s . Over the broken bodies of s o c i a l i s t s and communists, f e l l e d In t h e i r internecine s t r i f e , H i t l e r marched into power. And those., who could not f i n d unity i n the Weimar Republic, found the unity of the Concen-t r a t i o n Camp. CHAPTER I I THE HISTORY OF THE LEFT-WING SPLINTER PARTIES  IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC On January 1 ,1919» t h e r e were t h r e e major working c l a s s p a r t i e s i n Germany, the SPD, the USPD, and the KPD. Of these, the SPD was the most homogeneous p a r t y , c o n s i s t i n g o f a r e v i s i o n i s t l e a d e r s h i p , a r e f o r m i s t membership and p o s s e s s i n g the l o y a l i t y o f the m a j o r i t y o f the working c l a s s . The USPD covered a g r e a t e r range of the p o l i t i c a l spectrum. The p a r t y was supported by t h a t p a r t o f the working c l a s s which was s t i l l b a s i c a l l y s o c i a l democratic i n outlook, but became d i s i l l u s i o n e d by the p o l i c i e s o f the SPD. Support f o r the USPD grew s t e a d i l y . Were i t not f o r the i n t e r v e n t i o n o f the Comintern i n October 1921, the USPD might have over-taken the SPD and and become the o n l y s u b s t a n t i a l mass p a r t y of the l e f t . The KPD i n c l u d e d , b e s i d e s the e l i t i s t S p a r t a c i s t s , most of the non conformist;: r e v o l u t i o n a r y elements of the p o l i t i c a l l e f t . EARLY HISTORY OF THE KPD The KPD was founded a t a convention from December 30, 1918 to January 1, 1919. One hundred and twenty-seven d e l e -gates gathered i n B e r l i n f o r t h i s purpose. The m a j o r i t y o f these d e l e g a t e s belonged t o the Spartakus Bund, a f a i r number to the I n t e r n a t l o n a l e n Kommunisten Deutschlands (IKD), 16 17 three to Roter Soldatenbund,<.. one;was c l a s s i f i e d Jugend (Youth), one as Weltere D e l e g i e r t e n . AAmanjg^beggiaesfes were r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the USSR, 1 Delegates from the S p a r t a c i s t s i n c l u d e d Rosa Luxemburg, K a r l L iebknecht, Hugo E b e r l e i n , Leo J o g i c h e s , P a u l L e v i , ErnstMMeyer, Wilhelm P i e c k , Thalheimer, L e v i n e , and LeviBB, P a u l P r o l i c h from Hamburg and Otto Ruhle from P i m a were perhaps the b e s t known d e l e g a t e s from the IKD. The daebate on the q u e s t i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the e l e c t i o n f o r the N a t i o n a l Versammlung ( N a t i o n a l Assembly) showed b e s t the deep ro o t e d d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the new p a r t y . T h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s were l e s s I d e o l o g i c a l than t a c t i c a l . They a l l p r e f e r r e d Rflte democracy to p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy. A l l shared an open a d m i r a t i o n of the October R e v o l u t i o n i n R u s s i a and the boundless optimism t h a t the German p r o l e -t a r i a t would soon f o l l o w the example s e t by t h e i r R u s s i a n b r o t h e r s . Rosa Luxemburg spoke f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the e l e c -t i o n s , not because she had f a i t h i n the p a r l i a m e n t a r y system, but because she wanted to use the campaign and, i f e l e c t e d , the p a r l i a m e n t as her b a t t l e ground. The bourgeois p a r l i a m e n t , she argued, can be destroyed from the i n s i d e as w e l l as from the o u t s i d e . Only about h a l f o f the Spartacus d e l e g a t e s endorsed t h i s view. The others c o n s i d e r e d themselves to be more r e v o l u t i o n a r y . They d i d not want to d i v e r t t h e i r e f f o r t s from the r e v o l u t i o n i n order to win s e a t s i n a body t h a t they c o n s i d e r e d o b s o l e t e and counter r e v o l u t i o n a r y , i n which t h e i r v o i c e s would not be heard, and which, i n t h e i r o p i n i o n , would 18 soon be abolished. The IKD delegates considered p a r t i c i -pation i n parliaments.outright opportunistic. The majority of the delegates subsequently voted against involvements i n elections. The Congress accepted overwhelmingly the draft pro-gram written by Rosa Luxemburg. Presumably most of the de-legates voted f o r i t because Rosa Luxemburg wrote i t , without reading i t too deeply. This would explain the f a c t that, although most delegates had putschlst tendencies, they accepted a program that "abhorred" violence", which stated that "Spartacus would only assume power when the majority of the p r o l e t a r i a t wanted i t to do so " 3 . Subsequently, the KPD was handicapped at i t s beginning by a program which contained parts that were unacceptable to most of i t s members. Moreover, the Pounding Congress revealed another important source of disagreement. Some of the delegates wanted to shape the KPD into an e l i t e party that would be the vanguard of the revolution. Its objective would be to gain power by p u l l i n g the masses into revolutionary action. Rosa Luxemburg and her supporters, on the other hand, pre-ferred a mass party that would only p a r t i c i p a t e i n revolutions or gain power i f i t was the expressed wish of the masses. According to t h i s concept the party would be the servant, not the master of the p r o l e t a r i a t . But before the party had time to solve i t s many problems, i t became involved i n what was l a t e r c a l l e d the Spartakus Putsch. Locked i n a rmdrtaiLcBteuggle with the s o c i a l democratic republic, defeated by the m i l i t a r y , r e -19 j e c t e d by the p r o l e t a r i a t , robbed of the two l e a d e r s who were needed now more than ever, the p a r t y b a r e l y s u r v i v e d . Leo J o g i c h e s l e d the KPD u n t i l he too was shot to death on March 10, 1919 d u r i n g a g e n e r a l s t r i k e , which i n v o l v e d new f i g h t i n g , new l o o t i n g , and new r e p r e s s i o n . P a u l L e v i , a lawyer and a d i s c i p l e of Rosa Luxemburg, succeeded J o g i c h e s as l e a d e r . L e v i r e a l i z e d t h a t any f u r t h e r involvements i n s t r e e t f i g h t i n g would l e a d to d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . He wanted t o i n v o l v e the KPD i n Mass a c t i o n s . A l l i t s p a s t achievements were a s e r i e s of p o o r l y organized, u n d i s c i p l i n e d , a i m l e s s s t r e e t brawls i n which the communists were always the losers© and which turned the masses a g a i n s t them. L e v i f e l t t h a t he had to purge the p a r t y of l t d u n r u l y elements. To him and Radek, the Comintern r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , the immediate t a s k was to win over the m a j o r i t y of the p r o l e t a r i a t . T h i s t a s k Included p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n trade u n i o n work and i n p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s . I t was c l e a r to L e v i t h a t the l e f t wing would c o n s i d e r t h i s a b e t r a y a l of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y alms. A t the second convention of the KPD, which took p l a c e a t H e i d e l b e r g i n A p r i l 1920, L e v i presented e i g h t theses o u t l i n i n g h i s views on immediate t a c t i c s and alms. H i s theses s t r e s s e d the p r i n c i p l e o f c e n t r a l i s m and opposed anarcho-s y n d i c a l i s t t e n d e n c i e s . He maintained t h a t the p a r t y c o u l d not a f f o r d t o n e g l e c t any means to win the p r o l e t a r i a t . I t had t o i n v o l v e i t s e l f w i t h t r a d e unions and l e g i s l a t i v e e l e c t i o n s i n o r d e r to s u r v i v e as a p a r t y . The c r u c i a l p o i n t was t h e s i s # 8, which s t a t e d t h a t members who d i d not a c c e p t 20 p a r t y p o l i c y must l e a v e the KPD. The convention adopted t h i s p a r t i c u l a r t h e s i s 29:20.^ T h i s r e s u l t e d i n anAlmmediate r e d u c t i o n o f the membership, which f e l l from 107.000 to 50,000. Of those who l e f t , more than 30,000 j o i n e d the Kpmmunlst-Ische  A r b e l t e r P a r t e i Deutschlands (KAPD). L e v i ' s s u r g e r y c l e a r e d the road f o r e l e c t o r i a l work, f o r r e c r u i t i n g members i n t r a d e unions, and f o r u n i f i c a t i o n w i t h the l e f t wing o f the USPD. THE KAPD T h i r t y - f i v e d e l e g a t e s from the KPD d i s t r i c t o r g a n i -z a t i o n s o f B e r l i n , Brandenburg, North, Northwest, T h u r l n g i a , E a s t Saxony, lestWSaxohy^and other p l a c e s , c l a i m i n g t o r e p r e s e n t 38,000 members of the KPD, met a t B e r l i n on A p r i l 4. and 5., 1920 and formed the KAPD-'. The founding o f the KAPD was a r e a c t i o n t o the d e l i b e r a t e s p l i t t i n g maneuver executed by L e v i . The KAPD was composed of d i f f e r e n t groups whose common denominator was mainly t h e i r resentment o f the treatment they r e c e i v e d from the KPD. T h e i r program was a conglomeration o f d i f f e r e n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y t r e n d s . ^ Among the l e a d e r s o f the KAPD were Pannekoek, Laufen-berg, Wolffheim, and Pfemfert. They were a l l l e f t r a d i c a l s } they had a l l once been members o f the SPD, some a l s o of the USPD, and they were a l l e x p e l l e d from o r l e f t on t h e i r own the KPD. Most o f the e a r l y l e a d e r s l e f t the KAPD s h o r t l y a f t e r and founded or p a r t i c i p a t e d i n oth e r r a d i c a l s p l i n t e r groups. The convention d e l e g a t e s c"d»eided t o remain, i f 7 p o s s i b l e , w i t h the T h i r d I n t e r n a t i o n a l ' . Two d e l e g a t e s , 21 J a n Appel, and Franz Jung, were sent t o Moscow where they o met w i t h the Comintern l e a d e r s . They were t r e a t e d t h e r e w i t h r i d i c u l e , sarcasm, and other i n d i g n i t i e s ^ . S t i l l , the E A P t r i e d t o remain on good terms w i t h the Comintern, As the KAPD d i d not hear from t h e i r f i r s t two d e l e -gates, two more, Ruhle and Merges, were sent t o take p a r t i n the Second Congress of the Comintern. The c o n d i t i o n s t h a t the Comintern presented to the KAPD f o r membership, would have d e s t r o y e d the independence o f the p a r t y . Thus, Ruhle and Merges withdrew from the C o n g r e s s 1 0 . The E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l o f the Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l (ECCI) then sent an "Open L e t t e r t o the members of the KAPD" which declafedi*he;t tui') KAPD a d e v i a t i o n from communism, a t t a c k e d t h e i r program, t h e i r l e a d e r s , t h e i r a n t i p a r l i a m e n t a r y t a c t i c s , and urged the r a n k - a n d - f i l e members to j o i n the KPD. L e n i n ' s pamphlet, "Left-wing Communism, an I n f a n t i l e D i s o r d e r " , c r e a t e d a s t r o n g a n t i Comintern f e e l i n g w i t h i n the KAPD, l:;Hessfetacked by name Laufenberg, Wolffheim, Ruhle, and other KAPD l e a d e r s 1 1 and c r i t i c i z e d the t a c t i c s o f the KAPD, i n s i s t i n g t h a t "... the German ' L e f t s * may be convinced o f the r e v o l u t i o n a r i s m $f such t a c t i c s , these t a c t i o s a r e fundamentally wrong, and 1 2 amount t o no moo-more than empty phrasemongering. L e n i n examined and r i d i c u l e d every p o i n t i n the KAPD program, n e a r l y every statement o f the KAPD w r i t e r s , even statements which p r a i s e d him and the B o l s h e v i k s , A t thellBPlrfeeMfeg^ the KAPD d e l e g a t e s unanimously r e j e c t e d the Open L e t t e r and the Comintern's i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t o t h e i r own i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . The c o n v e n t i o n expressed i t s s o l i t a r i t y w i t h Rui&le, but 22 e x p e l l e d Laufenberg and W o l f f h e i m 1 ^ . Gor t e r answered L e n i n w i t h h i s "Open L e t t e r to Comrade L e n i n " . In i t he agreed i n p a r t w i t h L e n i n ' s c r i t i c i s m , but r e j e c t e d i t i n g e n e r a l , stat£&g:^ t h a t L e n i n ' s arguments were based on f a l s e premises. He claimed t h a t c o n d i t i o n s i n Germany-were d i f f e r e n t from those i n R u s s i a ; t h a t the Communist p a r t i e s were b e i n g corroded by opportunism; and t h a t the T h i r d I n t e r -n a t i o n a l would f o l l o w the p a t t e r n s e t by the Second. He took s t r o n g e x c e p t i o n fcof t h e Comintern's attempt to order the KAPD 1 4 to purge Wolffheim and L a u f e n b e r g . x He c l o s e d w i t h the w!sh%. t h a t the Comintern would a c c e p t the t a c t i c s o f the L e f t , which r e a l l y were the o r i g i n a l B o l s h e v i k or L e n i n i s t t a c t i c s a d j u s t e d t o the c o n d i t i o n s i n Western Europe 1-'. Two tendencies emerged i n the KAPD. There was an a n t i Moscow wing, l e d by Rtthle, Pfemfert, and Broh, which had anarcho-communist t e n d e n c i e s . Opposed to i t was a c e n t r a l i s t wing under Schrfider, G o l d s t e i n , Schwab^ and Reichenbach, which, i n s p i t e of the treatment received, sympathized, i n the i n t e r e s t of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o l i d a r i t y , i n word and deed w i t h the Comintern 1^, Both wings, however, r e j e c t e d e m p h a t i c a l l y L e n i n ' s pamphlet ,KLef£*»wing Communism, an I n f a n t i l e Disorder" 1''. Another l e t t e r o f the ECCI c a l l e d a g a i n on the members of the KAPD t o j o i n the KPD. The KAPD d i d send a t h i r d d e l e g a t i o n i n November 1920 to Moscow, which i n c l u d e d G o r t e r , Rasch, and SchroiJer. T h i s r e s u l t e d i n the KAPD r e c e i v i n g a s s o c i a t e membership i n the Comintern on November 26, 1920, as a sympathizing o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h conference p r i v i l e g e s , but without v o t e . The KAPD was o b l i g a t e d under t h i s agreement t o r e p r i n t on request a l l the m a t e r i a l the Comintern wanted to have published and support a l l r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i o n s of the KPD. 1 8 The t h i r d KAPD P a r t e l t a g a t Gotha, on February 15, to February 18, 1921, supported overwhelmingly thesttimd and 19 the a c t i o n of the c e n t r a l i s t s . The non c e n t r a l i s t wing, taken by s u r p r i s e , considered themselves e x p e l l e d . Pfemfert, Ruhle, and Broh confined t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s to the Allgemelne A r b e l t e r - U n l o n (AAU), reshaping one p a r t of t h i s s y n d i c a l i s t union and KAPD a f f i l i a t e i n t o the Allgemelne A r b e l t e r - U n l o n , E l n h e l t s o r g a n (AAUE). They considered the AAUE to be the only j o i n t p o l i t i c a l and economic f i g h t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n of the p r o l e t a r i a t and r e j e c t e d any other form 20 of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . In March 1921 the KAPD and the KPD became inv o l v e d i n the Marzaktlon (March A c t i o n ) . At the same time the KAPD t r i e d to form an i n t e r n a t i o n a l a l l i a n c e of l e f t com-munist o r g a n i z a t i o n s to f i g h t the "Opportunism and p a s s i v e -ness" of the T h i r d I n t e r n a t i o n a l , t o r e v i s e the Twenty-one Conditions of Admittance to the Cominten, and to advance a l e f t - w i n g p l a t f o r m . Among the groups contacted were the "Glasgow Communists" and the S y l v i a Pankhurst group i n Eng-la n d , the Pannekoek, Gorter, Roland H o i s t and Luteraan groups i n the Netherlands, the V a r l a n Martinet movement i n France, . ;. the B e l g i a n group centred around the L ' o u v r l e r Communlste, the communist l e f t around the I s k r a i n B u l g a r i a , the IWW i n the USA, the s e c t i o n around Ignatov i n the USSR, as w e l l as s m a l l a n t i - p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n groups i n the Scandinavian c'SG&eMes < 24 and i n South A f r l c a 2 2 # Some of these o r g a n i z a t i o n s p a r t i c i -pated w i t h the KAPD i n the fo r m a t i o n of a Kommun1s11sche  A r b e l t e r - I n t e r n a t l o n a l e (KAI) (Communist Workers' I n t e r n a t i o n a l ) A t i t s T h i r d Congress the Comintern l e a d e r s h i p made i t c l e a r t o the de l e g a t e s o f the KAPD t h a t they would r e c o g -n i z e o n l y one communist p a r t y i n Germany. An ultimatum was i s s u e d to the KAPD, g i v i n g i t t h r e e ffiMrfclis t o e i t h e r u n i t e w i t h the KPD or withdraw from the Comintern. Z i n o v i e v s t a t e d , "There a r e two p o s s i b i l i t i e s / f o r the KAPD7. I t i s im p o s s i b l e t o have two p a r t i e s i n one country, e i t h e r j o i n the KPD or get out of the Comintern." 2** The KAPD d i d . t h e l a t t e r 2 5 . The KAPD found I t s e l f i d e o l o g i c a l l y i n a p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n . S t was branded a n a r c h i s t by the KPD, y e t a t e t h e same time iine i t was r e j e c t e d by the r e a l a n a r c h i s t s , i n f a c t , i t wgs shedding i t s e l f o f a n y t h i n g t h a t seemed anarch-i s t i c . In r e a l i t y t h e r e was not much d i f f e r e n c e i n i d e o l o g y between the KPD and the KAPD. Had i t p a r t i c i p a t e d i n e l e c -t i o n s , i t might have succeeded i n winning d i s g r u n t l e d s u p p o r t e r s and members away from the KPD. The p a r t y took p a r t i n many u p r i s i n g s , s t r i k e s , and other p o l i t i c a l n o n - p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n p r o l e t a r i a n mass a c t i o n s ; but t h i s d i d not win i t many f r i e n d s . A f t e r L e v i was e x p e l l e d from the KPD many KAPD members r e -turned t o the KPD. Others l e f t the KAPD to j o i n o t h e r p a r t i e s or t o r e t i r e from p o l i t i c s . In summer 1921 the KAPD membership (propped c o n s i d e r -a b l y . A t the same time the o p p o s i t i o n t o the c e n t r a l i s t l e a d e r s h i p grew. T h i s developed i n t o a w i t c h hunt a g a i n s t 25 the i n t e l l e c t u a l s . Schroder, G o l d s t e i n , Reichenbach, and oth e r s were e x p e l l e d by the B e r l i n o r g a n i z a t i o n i n March 1 9 2 2 j Schwab l e f t on h i s ox«i a c c o r d and withdrew from p o l i t i c s . Schroder and a few others would not . a c c e p t t h e i r e x p u l s i o n , but e x p e l l e d i n t u r n the B e r l i n o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r ^ Reformism". They s t a r t e d a new Kommunistische A r b e l t e r z e l t u n g . ° The Schroder-Reichenbach group became known a s s t h e Essener, Rlchtung. I t managed to a t t r a c t a few i n s i g n i f i c a n t l o c a l s and c o u l d boast of a membership of approximately 1 , 0 0 0 . The B e r l i n e r Richtung, a t the F i f t h Reichskonferenz, found t h a t i t s membership had shrunk t o 2 , 0 0 0 , As the Essen group became s m a l l e r and s m a l l e r , Schroder l e f t i t . In J u l y 1922 Schroder, Reichenbach, and G o l d s t e i n j o i n e d L e v i i n p u b l i s h i n g h i s 27 j o u r n a l Unser Weg and f o l l o w e d him i n t o the SPD. ' The Essen group disappeared completely In 1 9 2 5 , The B e r l i n group became I n s i g n i f i c a n t , Most of the members o f both turned towards the P f e m f e r t - l e d AAUE. In 1 9 2 6 the KAPD took p a r t i n an attempt t o c r e a t e a u n i t e d f r o n t o f a l l u l t r a l e f t groups. B e f o r e t h a t a L e l p z l g e r Rlchtung had broken away and c a l l e d i t s e l f Kommunlstlscher Ratebund which pub-l i s h e d Die Epoohe and Die P e r s p e k t l v e . 2 8 A t the end of 1 9 2 5 the AAUE and the KAPD attempted t o form the Spartakusbund llnkskommunlstlscher O r g a n i s a t i o n e n . ' T h i s Spartakusbund number two was f i n a l l y c r e a t e d on June 2 8 , 1 9 2 6 , by the AAUE, the I n d u s t r l e v e r b a n d f u r das Verkehrs- gewerbe ( B e r l i n ) , and the L l n k e O p p o s i t i o n der KPD (group K a t z J as,a K a m p f k a r t e l l a g a i n s t l e a d e r s h i p c l i q u i s m , p a r t y d i c t a t o r s h i p , p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m , the s o c i a l i s t - l e d t r a d e unions, 26 and the Moscow-oriented p o l i c i e s of the KPD. I t soon s p l i t again into three parts; respectively under Pfemfert, Katz, and F l t t k o and ceased to exist at the beginning of 1927.3° In order to replenish t h e i r membership the KAPD contacted the Korsch-Schwarz group which was expelled from the KPD i n 1925* When thi s group broke apart, the leaders of the KAPD and Schwarz formed an Unverblndllche Kampfgemein-31 sch£ft. In June 1927 Schwarz*s Entschledene Llnke formally joined the KAPD. This increased the membership of the KAPD from between 1,500 and 2,000 to about 6,000. In the Ruhr area, for example, the KAPD had i n 1926 l o c a l s only i n Essen and Dusseldorf with 300 members each^ 2. The admission of Schwarz's group into the KAPD led to the departure of several KAPD l o c a l s . A f t e r 1928 the t o t a l membership of the many independent KAPD s p l i n t e r groups amounted to only a few hundred. Even so, the KAPD existed as an i l l e g a l organization a f t e r 1 9 3 3 . THE REVOLUTIONARY SHOP STEWARDS Aft e r the Spartacus League had founded i t s own party, there s t i l l remained a l e f t wing i n the USPD. Part of that wing consisted of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, located almost e n t i r e l y i n B e r l i n . This group was an offshoot of the l e f t opposition within the Metallarbelterverband (the metal workers' union). The Shop Stewards were opposed to the Burgfrleden practised by the SPD and the trade union leadership. O r i g i n a l l y i t s main objective was to stop the war by revolutionary means i f neccessary. 27 During a s t r i k e of the metal workers i n the early stages of the war a group of shop stewards combined and coll e c t e d money. This money was used for the f i n a n c i a l support of families whose bread winner was j a i l e d or drafted f o r f r o n t l i n e duty f o r p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the s t r i k e . Out of th i s s elf-help welfare organization developed the secret society of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, which c o n s i s M s i s t e d nearly e n t i r e l y of metal worker trade unionists. By 1916 i t could muster about 2 , 0 0 0 supporters i n B e r l i n . ' fU They used the SPD and listtcer the USPD as a cover and a base. Most of t h e i r war time a c t i v i t i e s were inside the trade unions. Their leaderIwasmt f i r s t Richard jMID-ler, then Emil Barth, and l a t e r Ernst D&umig.^ Of the USPD leaders they only trusted Georg Ledebour, who, although not a metal worker, was accepted as one of them^. P o l i t i c a l l y , the Revolution-ary Shop Stewards were influenced by the ideological, d i s -courses o:f the Spar.tacists .37 During the Founding Convention of the KPD represen-tatives of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards contacted the convention with the intention of j o i n i n g with the new party. They met and negotiated with Liebknecht. Of the Shop Stewards Daumig was i n favour of the convention's decision opposing p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n parliamentary elections, but Ledebour was not. Muller objected to the Putsch a c t i v i t i e s of the Sparta- kus Bund^ 8. The Revolutionary Shop Stewards presented f i v e conditions to the KPD. They wanted the KPD to reverse i t s decision iniregards to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n elections. The Shop Stewards demanded p a r i t y i n the organization, the executive, a l l commissions and committees. The KPD wass to consult with the Shop Stewards about a l l p o l i t i c a l actions. They demanded the r i g h t of veto over a l l publications. The word Spartakus was to be deleted from the name of the party /the 28 f u l l name the convention adopted for the new party was 39 Kommunlstisohe P a r t e i Deutschlands (Spartakus) ^ 7 . The Revolutionary Shop Stewards movement was mostly a one c i t y based (Berlin) organization; the KPD, on the other hand, was a national party. Thus, the convention delegates were not w i l l i n g to give f u l l p a r i t y to the Shop Stewards. This was perhaps the main reason that the two organizations did not unite at that time. DEFECTION OF THE LEFT USPD The USPD was led by Haase, Dittmann, and H i l f e r d l n g . During 1919 t h i s party experienced a tremendous rate of growth. The a t r o c i t i e s committed by the army In suppressingtlthe Janu-ary disturbances, the deaths of Liebknecht and Luxemburg, were blamed on the SPD. Rosenberg claims that Those workers who indignantly turned t h e i r back on S o c i a l Democracy either wanted to have nothing to do with p o l i t i c s or they joined the Independent Party. This renaissance of the USPD i n 1919 was completely a r t i f i c i a l . For the party was a chance product, convulsed with the severest i n t e r n a l s t r i f e and, i n truth, long since ready for d i s s o l u t i o n . On January 19, 1919, the USPD, with more than 2,3 m i l l i o n votes elected 22 deputies to the Nat1onalversammlung, while the SPD received 11,5 m i l l i o n votes and elected 163 deputies. In the Reichstag e l e c t i o n of June 6, 1920, the USPD received 5,046,800 votes and elected 84 deputies, while the SPD, with 6.1 m i l l i o n votes, elected 102 d e p u t i e s . ^ Before long, the Bolsheviks displayed great i n t e r e s t i n the USPD. To the Second Congress of the Comintern i n 1920, three German parties were invited* the KPD with f u l l r i g h t s and the KAPD and the USPD without voting r i g h t s . The objective 29 of these Invitations was to raid the membership for the benefit of the KPD. Lenin wanted a mass party in Germany. The USPD fi t t e d this description. But the USPD leaders were unacceptable to the Comintern. The Comintern wanted the USPD, but not i t s leadership. The USPD at large, including some of i t s leaders, were not adverse to joining a new International. They had broken away from the Second International without abandoning their belief in International socialism. Thus, i t would have been ancseasy. mat^eriitoe^ol©ofhefiUSBDSwa);tR ibne&KBD^ &lf; Moscow, however, in order to keep the USPD leadership out, errected a stumbling block in the form of the TTwaiity-one Conditions of Admission to the Comintern"^2. Consequently, a l l through the summer of 1920 the USPD locals argued, discussed, and voted on the Twenty-one Conditions. A special convention to decide the future fate of the USPD was called for Octo-ber 12, 1920 at Halle. Of the delegates present, 236 voted for joining the KPD, 156 against i t . However, only 300,000 of the 890,000 members of the USPD went over to the KPD.^3 Unification took place in December 1920 in Berlin. The addition of so many membersoSfaanditherppartywwMbhhhad i t s own outlook, tradition, and tactics changed the structure and content of the KPD drastically. The Independent Socialists tolerated the Spartacists as anmost disagreeable, but unavoidable appendage of the Comintern. The Spartacist intellectuals accepted the welcome but very rough raw material, which needed much polishing before i t could be brought to their high-class brand of Marxism. Thus, the two groups entered the new party from different premises; the l i f e of the German 30 Communist P a r t y was f i l l e d w ith c l a s h e s between these c u r r e n t s . The S p a r t a c l s t l e a d e r s were j u b i l a n t over the l o n g d e s i r e d p o s s i b i l i t y of b u i l d i n g a mass o r g a n i z a t i o n .... The Independent S o c i a l i s t workers, coming from a mass o r g a n i z a t i o n ... s t r o v e • • • f o r the f o r m a t i o n o f an ,../>. e l i t e parity .... ^ THE LEVTTES L e v i from Spartacus and Daumig from the USPD became j o i n t chairmen of the U n i t e d Communist P a r t y ' s C e n t r a l Com-m i t t e e . L e v i was i n f a v o u r of a working c l a s s a l l i a n c e o f KPD, SPD, USPD, the t r a d e unions, and l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r groups. T h i s brought him i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h the l e f t wing of h i s own p a r t y . L e v i a l s o fought a g a i n s t the Comintern's constant i n t e r f e r e n c e . He blamed t h i s i n t e r f e r e n c e f o r the s p l i t t i n g of the I t a l i a n S o c i a l i s t P a r t y . A t a C e n t r a l Committee meeting of the KPD i n February 1921, the Comintern r e p r e s e n t a t i v e Rakosi a t t a c k e d L e v i f o r h i s stand on the I t a l i a n c o n t r o v e r s y . The C e n t r a l Committee supported Rakosi 28:23. L e v i , Daumig, and f o u r others r e s i g n e d from the C e n t r a l Committee. J "The r e s i g n a t i o n of L e v i and h i s f r i e n d s was a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n the h i s t o r y of the KPD"^. The lawyer Paul L e v i , who s u c c e s s f u l l y engineered the e x p u l s i o n of the KPD's l e f t wing, d i d not succeed i n s t e e r i n g the p a r t y a l o n g a Luxemburgist l i n e . The new majo-r i t y which came from the USPD had l i t t l e p a t i e n c e with the i d e a l i s m d i s p l a y e d by the i n t e l l e c t u a l s from Spartakus. ° As the i n f l u e n c e o f Moscow i n c r e a s e d i n the KPD, L e v i be-came more and more d i s s a t i s f i e d . H i s g e n e r a l d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n Seijgfetbenelil when he d i s c o v e r e d t h a t Radek, glnov'l^v* a n d Bukharln had, d u r i n g the Second World Congress, t r i e d t o pBrBua&e"::Ms 31 collegue Ernst Meyer to form a "left-wing:opposition" against him within the KPD1*7. Levi's successor, "Heinrich Brandler, was a simple pedestrian man whose i n t e l l e c t u a l q u a l i t i e s were Over-d o shadowed by most of his ... collegues . ,.."H'0 He became leader of the KPD a t a time when Germany was faced with i n t e r n a l and external troubles. Freikorps and Poles were f i g h t i n g i n S i l e s i a ' s disputed border regions. Bavaria defied the central government's order to disband her c i v i l guards. The A l l i e s threatened sanctions against the Republic. Thus, the p o l i t i c a l climate was conducive f o r a successful revo-l u t i o n . The l e f t i s t s i n the party urged Brandler to take ad-vantage of t h i s s i t u a t i o n . So did the Comintern leaders, who wanted to d i v e r t world attention from t h e i r own i n t e r n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . In the month preceeding the Kronstadt Revolt, March 1921, an action i n Germany to dtearifc the Russian workers from t h e i r own troubles had been concocted by a caucus^of t h e ^ Q Russian party, centering around ZinovieVt,and BelaKKun. " Thus, the March Action, a series of random r i o t s , bomb ex-plosions, s t r i k e s , and uprisings at several d i f f e r e n t places i n Germany, planned by people who did not understand the German p r o l e t a r i a t and launched by a leader who himself did not believe i n i t s success, had to f a i l . Although several Soviet advisers considered the p o l i t i c a l climate to be r i p e f o r a revolution, the German p r o l e t a r i a t at large was not ready for insurrection. Revolutions can not be planned i n a meeting room of a p o l i t i c a l party nor can t h e i r chances of success be c a l -32 c u l a t e d by adding p a r t y membership, e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s , and p o s s i b l e supporters t o g e t h e r . R e v o l u t i o n s are d i f f r e n t from wars. In a war a l e a d e r can count on a c e r t a i n number of d i s c i p l i n e d s o l d i e r s , a number, t h a t can be Increased by r e c r u i t m e n t s . These s o l d i e r s have no o p t i o n , but to obey. In~>a r e v o l u t i o n o n l y those who a r e s t r o n g l y committed and who a r e u n a f r a i d w i l l f i g h t and obey p a r t y y d i s c i p l i n e . While many members and s u p p o r t e r s ^ r e f u s e to cooperate, some o t h e r s , c r i m i n a l elements, or a n a r c h i s t i c groups, may come forward t o support i t . These groups a r e harder to control., as they a r e n e i t h e r bound by law nor by p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e . In March 1921 Most of the a c t u a l f i g h t i n g took p l a c e i n the M a n s f i e l d d i s t r i c t , ... where Max Hoelz /a German Robin HooH7 and h i s g u e r r i l l a bands ... s t o l e the Communists' thunder. Supported by ... the KAPD, hordes of unemployed, and the i n e v i t a b l e s p r i n k l i n g o f u n d e f i n e a b l e d r i f t e r s ...,/Hoelz7 b a t t l e d p o l i c e and ransacked the country s i d e , a l l , i n the name of j u s t i c e . 50 R e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t i e s took p l a c e i n t h r e e separate l g c a l i t i e s , i n Hamburg, i n the Rhineland, and i n P r u s s i a n Saxony. On March 21 the e x e c u t i v e of the KPD i n Hamburg c a l l e d on the working c l a s s to demand the disbandening of the Orgesch ( O r g a n i s a t i o n Escherlch), ?a-;.coianterrevolutlonary p a r a m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t a l s o proposed t h a t the unemployed take over the f a c t o r i e s . These demands were were to be enforced by the t h r e a t of a g e n e r a l s t r i k e . On March 22 the Lena works i n Saxony were occupied by the r e b e l s . On March 23 the Blohm & Voss docks i n Hamburg and i n Bt, P a u l ! were " l i b e r a t e d ? . The Ruhr Echo and the Neue Z e l t u n g . o f Munich c a l l e d f o r the r e v o l u t i o n . The c i t i e s of Gevelsburg and V e l b e r t i n the 51 Rhineland were occupied by the ;fommunists on March 28. 33 The message for the KPD was c l e a r l y spelled out. A large number of desperate German workers, whose f a i t h i n the a b i l i t y and integrety of the communist leadership was mis-placed, were induced to f i g h t . But the large mass of the German working class had no sympathy f o r the a l i e n sounding translations of Russian revolutionary slogans, nor f o r the mediocre German imitations of Lenin and Trotsky. As soon as the insurrection /March Action7 had collapsed, the Communist Party underwenT"a grave i n t e r n a l c r i s i s , set o f f by Paul Levi .... On March 29 he sent a summary to Lenin /on the March Action7 .... /Klara Zetkin7 c r i t i c i z e d the use of extreme and u n r e a l i s t i c p o l i t i c p o l i t i c a l slogans, which turned the msses against the KPD. Levi was expelled for publiclyAcrlticizingutheiMarch Action i n h i s pamphlet Unser Weg^ . "The Zentrale was outraged ... /Tie7 washed the party's d i r t y linen, i n public ... he revealed secrets ...."^ The Bolshevik leadership!was divided over the a d v i s a b i l i t y of the March Action; Lenini Trotsky, and Kamenev condemned i t ; Zinovlev, Bukharin, and Radek defended i t . Lenin's view prevailed and the March Actln. was condemned. The German aut h o r i t i e s temporarily outlawed the KPD. Brandler was j a i l e d , but escaped to Russia, Ernst Meyer replaced him as party:?leader. On A p r i l 20, the Central Committee of the KPD ordered eight L e vi supporters (Levites) to resign t h e i r Reichstag mandates. They refused.5$ Ten Reichstag delegates protested i n the Rote Fahne against the Central Committee's demands to surrender t h e i r mandates. Eichhom joined as an eleventh deputy i n t h i s protest.5 6 K u r t G e y e r > F r l t z j ^ e l l , and Waldemar were expelled for writing a r t i c l e s i n Levi's Unser 34 Weg~*7. They j o i n e d L e v i to form t h e Kommunistische A r b e l t s - g erne i n s c h a f t (KAG) ? ( l i t e r a l l y ^ - .Communist Working C o o p e r a t i v e ) , a new caucus i n the R e i c h s t a g ^ 8 . Although t h i s group was n e a r l y as s t r o n g as the KPD i n the Re i c h s t a g , i t d i d not have a l a r g e r a n k - a n d - f i l e membership; i t resembled generals, w i t h -out an army. Even so, L e v i and h i s c o l l e g u e s proved to be a source o f embarrassment f o r the KPD. To win them back, Otto B r a s s , a f r i e n d o f L e v i , but s t i l l a KPD deputy, attended the Ltevltes' Relchs convention of November 2 0 , 1921. The KAG members s t i p u l a t e d f i v e c o n d i t i o n s under which they would r e t u r n to the KPD. These c o n d i t i o n s would, i n t h e i r o p i n i o n , r e s t o r e a r e l a t i v e independence of a c t i o n t o the KPD. They r e j e c t e d the i d e a of c r e a t i n g a new p a r t y . The KPD d i d not ac c e p t these terms but e x p e l l e d a number of p a r t y members suspected <o o f sympathizing with L e v i , among them B r a s s . I n January 1922 163 KPD members were e x p e l l e d f o r the same reason. Most fo of the e x p e l l e d j o i n e d the KAG. The KPD had s t a r t e d i t s p a r l i a m e n t a r y career, w i t h f o u r s e a t s i n the R e i c h s t a g . Through the merger w i t h the l e f t wing o f the USPD i t had i n 1921 2 6 ' s e a t s . A f t e r the departure o f the L e v i t e s the KPD had o n l y 15 R e i c h s t a g d e p u t i e s , which i n d i c a t e s t h a t the KAG had ... . 6 2 . . , , 11 s e a t s . ..• C - . ^ ; - ^ ; ^ < H = : PROM THE MARCH ACTION TO THE OCTOBER DISTURBANCES A f t e r the f a i l u r e o f the March A c t i o n the Comintern l e a d e r s Informed the KPD d e l e g a t e s a t the T h i r d World Congress 35 of the Comintern that t h e i r l i n e had changed. Russia was embsrging on the. New Economic Pol i c y (NEP) which involved concessions to the kulaks and the petty bourgeoisie. Abroad, Soviet Russia needed friends. The German section of the Comintern was thus instructed to cooperate with the SPD. .. i n 1922-23 Varga, Bukharin. and Radek were discovering a new r o l e f o r the German bourgeoisie, which they changed from a class enemy to a victim suffering almost as much as the German worker . . . . A theory of the revolutionary character of the German bourgeoisie substituted f o r t h i s concept a communist foreign p o l i c y based e n t i r e l y on power p o l i t i c s . The a l l i a n c e between Russia and the German bourgeoisie was urged as necessary for the defence of Russia ... / a n d 7 was considered more r e a l i s t i c than one between the Russian and German workers. 63 In 1923 the French occupied the Ruhr. The Cuno ad-m i n i s t r a t i o n proclaimed a general s t r i k e against the French. An international conference of communist parties met a*bEssen to discuss t h e i r strategy. Many of the delegates f e l t that t h i s would be an opportune time to .overthrow the German bourgeoisie. The occupation of the Ruhr and the ensuing i n f l a t i o n created a revolutionary s i t u a t i o n . With Soviet Russia's support a Soviet Germany could have repudiated the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty. But there was a lack of cohesion, co-ordination, and d i r e c t i o n . The'cZentrale and the opposition i n the KPD disagreed on t a c t i c s and worked at cross purposes. 64 Orders from Moscow were unclear; Lenin was dying. At the Essen conference the communists of the Ruhr spoke of immediate action. Klara Zetkin, the Comintern's representative, t r i e d unsuccessfully to sway the meeting towards a p o l i c y of support fo r Cuno. Moscow then intervened d i r e c t l y t an u p r i s i n g against the German government would be p u b l i c l y disavowed by the Comintern.^ 36 This p o l i c y of support for Cuno was confusing f o r the rank-and-file members of the KPD. There was no working class representation i n the Cuno government. Neither was t h i s government noted f o r i t s outstanding b r i l l i a n c e nor for i t s progressive actions. Yet the communists for quite a while did nothing to defeat i t . Cuno "... was much too use f u l as a whipping boy, and h i s bungling ... drove the country closer to that stage of chaos which the KPD so eagerly awaited. If the German bourgeoisie surrendered to the French, the French c a p i t a l i s t s would gain control over the German c a p i t a l i s t s and Russia would be completely i s o l a t e d and i n grave danger. By supporting the German bourgeoisie the Soviets hoped to make Germany an a l l y . The two outcast nations would be bound together not by mutual friendship, but by mutual need. These considerations explain the secret arrangements between the Red Army and the Relchswehr, the RapallcK? Treaty, the cooperation wlth.®Mio,B and the Schlageter course. Thalhelmer j u s t i f i e d the KPD's stand towards the bourgeoisie i n a rather peculiar manner. He claimed that In the present struggle the German bourgeoisie played at times an "objectively revolutionary r o l e " ... "the defeat of French imperialism ... i n the Ruhr i s a com-munist aim," he implied that t h i s aim happened to co-incide at the moment with the objectives of the German r u l i n g c l a s s i /Later the p r o l e t a r i a t would7 overthrow the government. D , r ~ I r o n i c a l l y , i n 1920, the KPD had expelled the Laufen-berg-Molffheim group on account of National Bolshevism. Now, three years l a t e r , i n 1923, National Bolshevism was revived by the communists. The German communists r i v a l l e d Nazis i n 37 shouting p a t r i o t i c slogans, Albert Leo Schlageter, a man trained to be a Catholic p r i e s t , an anti-semite, a Frelkorps leader, who had fought i n the B a l t i c states against the Red Army, i n Upper S i l e s i a against P o l i s h n a t i o n a l i s t s , and 'j:7^wy;. throughout Germany for the counter revolution, was honored by the communist Radek for sabotaging the French. On August 12, B r i t a i n sent the Curzon Note to France and Belgium, taking a&d&nA against the occupation of the Ruhr. Stresemann, who meanwhile had replaced Cuno as Chan-c e l l o r , discontinued the passive resistance on September 26. The Poincare administration i n Prance was replaced by the more c o n c i l i a t o r y Herriot and Briand government. Western Europe was showing signs of rappppsj^GJh&ment• The chance to make Germany depend on Soviet Russia's support suddenly seemed f a r removed. At the same time, the i n t e r n a l picture i n Germany looked gloomy. I n f l a t i o n and s t r i k e s had weakened the economy; r i g h t wing extremists were r u l i n g i n Bavaria, l e f t wing extremists i n Saxony and Thuringia. i f Stresemann was allowed to solve Germany's Internal d i f f i c u l t i e s , chances for a communist v i c t o r y would be small. The s t r a t e g i s t s at the Kremlin summoned. Brandler, who had returned to Germany under an amnesty and had become the KPD c h i e f t a i n again, to Moscow and presented him with a set revolution date. Experts were sent to Germany to help him. Against his better knowledge, Brandler was persuaded to agree. Again, the revolution was well calculated i n advance. 38 Skoblevski had calculated that ... I t would be necessary to confront each un l t _ . • . with communist forces three times as strong ... /whloh"7 would have required ... 750,000 well-armed Communist f i g h t e r s . /There was a force of 100,000 Reichswehr and 150,000 po l i c e / .... F i n a l l y , the plan l e f t out of account the para-military Right-wing organizations .... To t a l membership of the KPD amounted^ to ... 296,230, including women .... : 6 a As the f i r s t step towards the revolution the KPD became a c o a l i t i o n partner of the SPD i n the Thuringian and Saxpny state governments. In Saxony, Brandler, Heckert, and Bottcher accepted cabinet positions under Zeigner, a left-wing S o c i a l Democrat, on October 10, 1923* The communi sits-tried to use t h e i r positions to arm the p r o l e t a r i a t and thus challenge and provoke the Relcha? government and the m i l i t a r y . I t was hoped that repressive actions by the government would arouse the working class i n a l l of Germany. The f i r s t part of the plan worked. The Reich? government reacted i n the expected manner. The m i l i t a r y , under General Muller, marched into Saxony and deposed the Zeigner government. The communists, however, c a l l e d o f f the revolution. There were some st r i k e s and a few r i o t s i n Saxony and street f i g h t i n g i n Hamburg. Hermann Remmele j u s t i f i e d the KPD leadership's actions. Every•Itg&itjft-g; was prepared f o r the beginning of November /l9237« But i n the l a s t minute i t was decided not to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the_struggle, as the balance of strength was unfavourable / f o r the KPD7. P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the government of Saxony was not i n order to l e g i s l a t e com-munist programs, or to embarrass the SPD, but to a t t r a c t the a n t i bourgeoise resentments and revolutionary po-t e n t i a l of a l l Germany to defend the workers of Saxony and thus s t a r t a revolution. In other words, to challenge the Relchs government to move against Saxony and thusgg get a l l German workers "up i n arms" so to speak. Thus, the revolutionary attempt f a i l e d completely. The KPD's leaders were either imprisoned or i n f l i g h t . 39 Brandler and Thalheimer, who ssoaped to Russia, were expend-' able and served as scapegoats^ or the f a i l u r e . A new, l e f t -wing ff leadership emerged and took control of the KPD. THE SECOND WAVE OF LEFT-WING COMMUNISM The f a i l u r e of the upr i s i n g of 1923 led to Brandler's downfall. The new leadership was a l e f t i s t one, but included former supporters of Brandler. At that time three groups emerged_in the KPD. There were those who were responsible /or blamed7 •for the October happenings, a minority i n the Zentrale /the Brandler-Thalheimer grouji>7. In the middle there was a strong newsgroup who broke with the r i g h t because of the October happenings. This group r e a l i z e d the mistakes, r e a l i z e d that i t was wrong i n i t s predictions, and practised now a strong c r i t i c i s m of the Zentrale and of i t s functionaries. There was also the old B e r l i n opposition, i n c o a l i t i o n with the opposition i n Hamburg and i n the Ruhr d i s t r i c t . This group maintained that the defeat was a r e s u l t of the United Front p o l i c y . 70 By the end of 1923 the ri g h t wing Brandler group had l o s t a l l i t s influence i n the KPD. The centre group took on the leadership, but the power lay with the l e f t . Moscow supported the centre, but seeing that the l e f t could not be stopped, switched i t s support to the l e f t . At the F i f t h World Congress of the Comintern, i n J u l y 1924, a l l communist parties were ordered to restructure themselves. This process became known as the Bolshevization of the communist pa r t i e s . Bolshevization was to prepare the party to meet more successfully the revolutionary situations that were believed to exist i n Germany. This new left-wing leadership of the KPD was an a l l i a n c e of young petty bourgeois i n t e l l e c t u a l s of the Ruth '•. J Fischer, Maslow, and Scholem variety i n B e r l i n and the 40 Sohwlelige Faust (calloused f i s t ) , consisting of u n s k i l l e d workers led by Ernst Th&lmann i n Hamburg. The beginning of t h i s left-wing group within the KPD goes back to 1921. In A l f r e d Rosenberg's home members of the German l e f t met s e c r e t l y with spokesmen of the Russian Workers' Opposition. The object of t h e i r discussions was to organize the German revolution and to oppose the United Front p o l i c i e s practised by the right-wing KPD l e a d e r s h i p . 7 1 A f t e r the l e f t had taken over the party apparatus, the Comintern l i n e made a sudden turn to the r i g h t . This was too much for some of the l e f t communists. Some leaders and i n t e l l e c t u a l s expressed t h e i r disagreements with t h i s new l i n e . Before long, several groups of l e f t dissenters were expelled. The f i r s t r t o go were Schumacher, Weyer, and Kayser, who were expelled on September 15, 1924, f o r forming indepen-dent trade unions, an action, which was suddenly i n contra-d i c t i o n to the current p o l i c y of the Comintern. They published a paper, the Korrespondenzblatt der selbstandigen L l n k e r i 7 2 . The group Arbelterlinken, led by Ketty Gutmann, was also expelled i n 1924 7 3. In 1925 there were several l e f t and u l t r a l e f t groups i n the KPD. The farthest to the l e f t was the Katz group. S l i g h t l y to the r i g h t of i t was the Korsch-Schwarz group. More to the r i g h t were Rosenberg, Scholem, and t h e i r suporters. Next to them was the Fischer-Maslow group. In addition there was the Weddlnger Opposition, which was strong i n Berlin-Wedding, the Palatinate, and a few other centres. F i n a l l y , there was the Thalmann group. 41 The question of T-hfllmann's candidacy f o r President of Germany led to a s p l i t among these l e f t groups. The Fischer-Mas low group proposed that the KPD should support a left-wing bourgeois candidate. Scholem, Rosenberg, and others, the new 74 u l t r a l e f t , wanted a communist candidate.' A f t e r the e l e c t i o n of Hlndenburg i n May 1925. an elec-t i o n , i n which the communists l o s t more than h a l f of t h e i r 1924 vote, the Fischer-Thalmann Zentrale pursued a less r a d i c a l line.?Th'ldf:ihe.lghtened the discontent of the u l t r a l e f t s . Fischer and Maslow became embroiled i n the struggle between Zinoviev and S t a l i n . At the Tenth KPD Convention, i n J u l y 1925, the Comintern representative Manuilski attacked Fischer, the protegee of Zinoviev. By^JDaJking-*peac'e';with^the u l t r a l e f t , represented by Scholem, the Fischer group could maintain i t s p o s i t i o n of leadership. However, on September 1, 1925, the Comintern published an "Open Letter". This l e t t e r accused the Fischer-Maslow leadershiip of unbolshevistik attitudes,,of h o s t i l i t i e s towards Moscow, of having a n t i -Leninisto.tendencies, of sabotagezand incompetence i n trade union work, of p o l i t i c a l opportunism, and of establishing a clique dictatorship.75 with t h i s coup from above, the German leaders were deposed two maaatftts a f t e r they had been elected. The Thalmann era had begun. During 1926 most of the l e f t and u l t r a l e f t groups were pushed out of the KPD. In January 1926 i n Hannover supporters of the u l t r a l e f t Katz fought with Comintern supporters over the possession of the l o c a l party organ. With the help of? the p o l i c e the Comintern supporters won 42 t h i s b a t t l e . In May the KPD e x p e l l e d the Korsch-Schwarz group; the ECCI upheld t h i s d e c i s i o n i n J u l y . This group broke l a t e r i n t o two. K a r l Korsch and h i s supporters pub-l i s h e d Kommunistlsche P o l l t I k and the Schwarz s e c t i o n issued the paper Entsohiedene L i n k e . * ^ The r e s t - o f the l e f t and u l t r a l e f t s closed ranks. F i s c h e r and Maslow were e x p e l l e d by the Comintern i n August 1926. The KPD e x p e l l e d Urbahn, Schwan, and Scholem on November 5, 1926. They formed a B e l o h s t a g s f r a k t i o n L i n k e r  Kommunlsten, ..In which they were l a t e r j o i n e d by F i s c h e r , Schlagewerth, Korsch, Katz, Schiltz, and T i e d t . ^ On A p r i l 8 and 9, 1928, a t the i n i t i a t i v e of the ex-p e l l e d l e f t and u l t r a l e f t a c t i v i s t s 153 delegates and 100 guests met at B e r l i n and founded the L e n i n Bund (LB). This league was not meant to be a new communist p a r t y , but a common fron£ of a n t i S t a l i n i s t communists. I t s membership ranged between 5.000 and 6,000. The LB a p p l i e d f o r member-:, ship i n the Comintern w i t h p r e d i c t a b l e r e s u l t s . On May 9, the KPD announced i t s w i l l i n g n e s s i t o readmit e x p e l l e d members a f t e r s i x mbatS&e i f they broke w i t h the LB. F i s c h e r , Maslow, and a few others d i d so a t the same day; Scholem d i d a short time l a t e r . The strongest f a c t i o n i n the LB, the group from Suhl, under Heym, j o i n e d the SPD, t a k i n g along i t s organ V o l k s w l l l e . At the Reichstag e l e c t i o n the LB, which entered s l a t e s under the names of L l n k e Kommunisten (LK) and A l t e Kommunlstfrache P a r t e i Deutschlands (AKPD) , r e c e i v e d only 80,000 votes and f a i l e d to r e e l e c t any of i t s s i t t i n g Reichs-t a g members. 43 In 1930 Urbahn wrote the a r t i c l e "The Soviet Union is not a worker state?" This led to a s p l i t in the LB, the Trotskyistes, who were led by Grylewicz, and the Palatinate 78 locals formed the Verelnlgte Llnke Opposition (LO). Soon after this the ultra l e f t and l e f t communist groups disinte-grated. Their leaders lost most of their supporters who drifted back into the KPD. However, some of them were s t i l l active at the time of the Nazis' r i s e to power. According to Bahne, the defeat of the l e f t communists " i . . i s due to the s k i l l f u l , but unscrupulous, tactics of the Stalinists, their own, typically sectarian, splintering . . . . " 7 9 . THE KPO In July 1928 the Comintern launched a campaign against the right wing i n world communism. This sudden l e f t turn coincided with the power struggle between Stalin and Bucharin, the leader of the right wing in the bolshevik party. At the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern Ulbricht attacked Ewert, Brandler, and Thalheimer. The German right wing communists were classified into two groups, the Rechte, with Brandler and Thalheimer, and the VersShnler 8 0. with Hausen, Ewert, Meyer, and others. At a KPD Belchskonferenz on November 3 and 4, 1928, there were 19 VersShnler and l4 Rechte out of a total of 225 delegates 8 1. In contrast to the Rechte, the Versohnler were not an organized group. Most of them did not even know that they were Versohnler u n t i l they were denounced as such by their party r i v a l s . Unlike the Rechte. the Versohnler never dls-puted Stalin's claim to the leadership of the Comintern. It was relatively easier for them to bow to party discipline than i t was for the Rechte. They were mostly intellectuals, professional revolutionaries, and party employees (Bonzen). Versohnler were mainly discovered in the districteof Halle-Merseburg, in Western Saxony, and in Hamburg. After a few were driven out of the party, the majority of them remained in the KPD. Towards the end of 1928 the struggle between the Brandlerltes and the Th&lmann majority led to a new s p l i t . In December 1928 the Right entered the municipal election in Stuttgart with i t s own slate under the name of Kommunlstlsohe  Partei. In Offenbach the rightists, by issuing their own membership fee stamps, collected their own membership fees which they did not forward to the party headquarters. Both these actions indicate that at least some of the rightists considered themselves a separate party. r On December 21, 1928, the KPD expelled Walcher, Prolloh, Schreiner, Enderle, Tlfctel, Schmidt, and Rehbein. Brandler and Thalheimer were expelled by the ECCI on January 19, 1929« The Right held a Relchskonferenz der Opposition on December Z$, 1928, in Berlin, which was attended by 7^ delegates, of which 17 were ex-members of the KPD. At that convention the Kommunlstlsohe Partei Deutsohland (Opposition) (KPO) was founded. The aim of the KPO was to reform the KPD. It did not consider i t s e l f a new communist party, but only a d i f -ferent communist trend (Rlchtung)• It refused to take sides in any of the factional power struggles inside the Soviet 5^ Union. The KPO did not consider the SPD as Sooial Fascists, but as fellow Marxists who had taken the wrong road and must be shown the way.^3 By the end of 1929 i t became obvious that the KPO's ac t i v i t i e s would not lead to an overthrow of the Thalmann . Zentralepln the KPD. The KPO leadership concentrated on building i t s organization Into a mass party. However, by that time stagnation had already started. The appearance in October 1931 of a new splinter party, the Sozlallstlsche Arbelter Partei (SAP), oft the: p o l i t i c a l scene caused a major s p l i t in the KPO. The majori-ty under Brandler and Thalheimer urged the destruction of the SAP, hoping that i t s members would either join the KPO or the KPD. They maintained that in view of % e pending fascist take-over the .$EPO must be preserved as an underground com-munist cadre organization. It was clear to them that, in case of a Hitler victory, the KPD would be destroyed. The KPD, they believed, did not have the revolutionary potential to survive as an effioient underground organization. It would be the role of the KPO to provide ef^eetifeesleader^hlp for a l l revolutionary proletarians. Thus, after Hitler's f i n a l overthrow, the KPO would rise l i k e a phoenix out of the ashes and beoome the new KPD. Frolich, the spokesman for the minority in the KPO, argued that i t was essential to build the SAP into a strong working class party that rejected both, the opportunism of the SPD and the dependency on Moscow of the KPD.8/f 46 i The question whether to remain as the KPO or whether to Join the SAP dominated the KPO Relohskonferenz in Marfeh 1932. Thirty-seven delegates, representing 880 members, decided to join the SAP 8 5. On April 13, 1932, the Ortsgruppe (local organization) Offenbach, with 300 members, 10 city councilors, and one Hessian Landtag deputy (Heinrich Galm) defected to the SAP. In a l l , the KPO lost more than 1,000 members to the SAP, or one third of i t s total membership. RECONCILIATION OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS As stated before, in 192G the USPD lost the larger part of i t s l e f t wing to the KPD. Soon after this the ultra right leadership of the SPD, especially the leaders who were the least popular in USPD circles, lost their influence in the SPD. Ebert, being President of Germany, was removed from party p o l i t i c s . Scheidemann, Landsberg, and Noske held posts of minor importance i n the SPD. Moreover, the end of the war removed the biggest obstacle which held the two sister parties apart. In 1920 the SPD l e f t the government and became an opposition party. This brought the two parties even closer. Germany now had two social democratic parties who had the same goals, who voiced the same criticism ©ft the bourgeois government, and who covered the same p o l i t i c a l scale in terms of right and l e f t . Furthermore, the socialist-led free trade unions had for a long time urgedcithettwo parties to reunite. Twice in 1921 the SPD had approached the USPD to participate in a workers.* government consisting of afeSPD-USPD coalition. In Brunswick, before October 1920, the USPD was 4? the senior partner in a USPD-SPD government. After October 1920 the USPD participated In SPD-led minority governments 87 in Saxony and Thuringia. After the assassination of Rathenau, the USPD Reichs- tag caucus, which included the Levltes, who had given up their separate existence, met on June 24, 1922, to discuss parti-cipation in the Wirth (Centre) government. Three different opinions were presented. Hilferding, Breitscheid, Brandes, Ludwlg, Mehrhoff, and Duwell,(who came from the KAG, favoured the idea to join the Wirth cabinet immediately. This would show the masses the USPD's willingness to cooperate in con-structive policies and i t s concern for the safety of the re-public. Another group took a diametrlcaillypppptosltelview. Dissmann, Rosenfeld, Sender, Brass, Levi, and Ledebour be-longed to this group. In entering the Wirth government the USPD would be hanging on the coat t a i l s of the SPD. This would lead to the elimination of their own party. The third group took a stand in the middle. Dittmann, Lowenstein, Soldmann, and others wanted to make participation in the cabinet subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions. They wanted a socialist majority in the cabinet which'was,! in direct proportion to the strength of the participating parties in the Reichstag, Energetic action for the protection of the republic, and economic-political changes. 8 8 The bourgeois parties in the Wirth government, on the other hand, feared the resulting shift in power i f the 1. USPD were to Join the coalition. In order t;o balanoe the possible increased strength of the socialist parties, the 48 Centre wanted to involve the Deutsche,Volkspartei (DVP) in the government. This met with the combined opposition of both social democratic parties. As a result, no changes were made in the Wirth cabinet. The SPD and the USPD Reichs- tag members formed on July 14, 1922, an Arbeltsgemelnsohaft 89 Sozlallstlscher Partelen. In response to this, the two li b e r a l parties and the Centre party formed an alliance of the middle. The Arbeltsgemelnsohaft was a big step towards re-unification. Both social democratic parties took i t under serious consideration. In Gera, from September 20 to 23, 1922, at a USPD Reich convention, a great majority of the delegates voted for reunification. The SPD held a convention at the same time in Augsburg. The delegates discussed the same topic as the USPD did in Gera andjfeey reached the same decision. Consequently reunification took place at a Joint convention at Nuremberg i n September 1922. But only f i f t y -seven of the USPD Reichstag deputies joined the SPD. About 90 one dozen went to the KPD. Beorg Ledebour, Theodor Lieb-knecht (the brother of Karl), and a few others decided to keep the USPD alive. This rump party s t i l l had many diver-gent tendencies. A new sp l i t occured at their convention from March 30, to April 2, 1923. Ledebour supported the passive resistance policy i n the Ruhr. Liebknecht called the Ruhrkampf "Eln Ablenkungsman&ver d e B deutsohen Kapltal-lsmus". (An attempt by the German capitalists to divert .*v the attention of the proletariat away from the real issues.)9* Ledebour*s section called i t s e l f the Sozlallstlscher Bund (SB). THE ASPS-ASPD A f t e r the o c c u p a t i o n o f the Ruhr and the end o f the i n f l a t i o n no major c r i s i s occured i n Germany f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s . The SPD experienced o n l y a few minor s p l i t s d u r i n g these y e a r s . The Nelson Bund, o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l e r Jugend Bund ( I J B ) , which had j o i n e d the SPD i n 1923t was e x p e l l e d In 1925 f o r breaches o f p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e . Among other i n s t a n c e s , the IJB had openly supported Thalmann r a t h e r than Marx f o r P r e s i d e n t . The IJB then founded i t s own p o l i t i c a l p arty* .the I n t e r n a t i o n a l e r  S o z i a l i s t i s c h e r Kampfbund (ISK). . T h i s , s p l i t d i d not a f f e c t the SPD too much, as the IJB had -Xi&ittflSfefS \ ^ i^amiS^» '*"-3-membership. A more s e r i o u s s p l i t occured i n Saxony. A f t e r the SPD-KPD Zeigner government was deposed by the f e d e r a l govern-ment, another S o c i a l Democrat, H e l d t , formed a c o a l i t i o n government w i t h the Democrats and the DVP on January 4, 1924. The SPD s t a t e convention o f Saxony i n January m a i n l y o b j e c t e d t o the i n c l u s i o n o f the f a r r i g h t DVP i n the government. The c o n v e n t i o n d e c i d e d t h a t the Landtag should be d i s s o l v e d . Twenty-three SPD d e p u t i e s , among them the SPD c a b i n e t ia&j&paSSf® m i n i s t e r s , d e f i e d t h i s o r d e r ^ . A l r e a d y b e f o r e the con-v e n t i o n the SPD Landtag d e p u t i e s had d i v i d e d i n t o two groups which h e l d t h e i r caucus meetings sep&z;ately93. ... the twenty-three d e f i e d , r i d i c u l e d , and ignored the 150,000 members o f Saxonyi"""At! a second convention, on October 26, 1924, they a g a i n d e f i e d the orders o f t h e i r membership. Duri n g January and February o f 1925 t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e d i s t r i c t s expelled! 1 therf but the e x e c u t i v e o f Saxony readmitted them w i t h the e x p l i c i t order t o dissolve-,, the c o a l i t i o n . 9' Thlsflord#r^was.s:also iC>de ,f led>sU . 50 D u r i n g the f i r s t year o f t h i s r i g h t - w i n g SPD-led government s e v e r a l popular p i e c e s o f l e g i s l a t i o n which had been i n t r o d u c e d by the p r e v i o u s l e f t - w i n g SPD-led governments were r e p e a l e d , w i t h 23 or 24 SPD d e p u t i e s v o t i n g with the bourgeois p a r t i e s and 16 SPD d e p u t i e s v o t i n g a g a i n s t them^ 5. F i n a l l y , i n J u l y 1926, the f e d e r a l SPD e x e c u t i v e e x p e l l e d the d e f i a n t r i g h t - w i n g d e p u t i e s . Led by Wilhelm Buck and K a r l Bethke they formed the A l t e S o z i a l d e m o k r a t i s c h e P a r t e i . Saohsens (ASPS). They oould o n l y r e e l e c t f o u r d e p u t i e s a t the next e l e c t i o n . But they h e l d the balance o f power i n the House and were thus a b l e to r e t a i n t h e i r l e a d i n g p o s i t i o n i n a r i g h t - w i n g c o a l i t i o n government. , In 1928 they unsuccess-f u l l y c o n tested the f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n under the name of A l t e S o z i a l d e m o k r a t i s c h e P a r t e i Deutschlands (ASPD). LEFT GROUPS WITHIN THE SPD DURING THE In 1928, a t the R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n , the SPD Increased i t s s t r e n g t h from 131 to 153 s e a t s . I t was i m p o s s i b l e t o form a government without SPD p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The SPD members Hermann M i i l l e r l e d a c o a l i t i o n government which i n v o l v e d f i v e p a r t i e s and i n c l u d e d the r i g h t - w i n g DVP. The SPD L e f t accused the government o f g i v i n g too many concessions t o the DVP, an a c c u s a t i o n , which seemed w e l l j u s t i f i e d . On August 11, 1928 the M u l l e r government announced i t s d e c i s i o n t o s t a r t c o n s t r u c t i o n o f Panzerkreuzer, A a g a i n s t which the SPD had campaigned d u r i n g the pre c e e d i n g e l e c t i o n . The government t r i e d t o j u s t i f y t h i s breach o f p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e 51 by claiming that the government had to f u l f i l l the policies of i t s predecessor. However, the Left managed to force the SPD government members to vote against the government's recommendation, that i s , against the Panzerkreuzer. Never-theless, the B i l l did pass. In October 1929 the world experienced an economic c r i s i s par excellence. Foreign nations cancelled their loans; foreign capitalists withdrew their investments, and German export declined drastically. This led to closures of ;\ industries, reduction of working hours, increase of unem-ployment, and an a l l over distrust in financial institutions. "The German capitalists attempted: to make the working class carry the entire burden of this c r i s i s . B i g Business attacked a l l socalled "socialist roadblocks" such as union wage agreements, collective bargaining, arbitration, unem-ployment Insurance, etc. The cabinet was divided over these issues, the DVP fought for the demands of the employers, the SPD defended the rights of the employees. But at the same time the SPD tried to support a B i l l which proposed to increase the dues on unemployment insurance. This pro-voked the l e f t opposition within the SPD as well as the trade union wing of the party. Twenty-eight deputies ab-sented themselves during a confidence ¥ote©for the govern-ment's financial program. On March 27, 1930, the whole SPD caucus, under pressure by the Left!and the trade union wing of the party, voted against an increase in unemploy-ment insurance rates. This action brought down the fth* 97 last pre-Hitler SPD government. 52 I t can "be seen from t h i s f t h a t the L e f t was s t i l l a c o n s i d e r a b l e f o r c e i n the SPD. However, t h i s L e f t was not u n i f i e d , but c o n s i s t e d o f s e v e r a l groups. The L e v i t e s , who had come w i t h the USPD i n t o the SPD were the most i n f l u e n t i a l s e c t i o n . Then there was the former USPD l e f t wing l e d by Dissmann, S t r o b e l , Lore Agnes, S i e g f r i e d Aufhauser, Hermann P l e i s s n e r , Bernhard Kuhnt, Dr. K u r t Lowenstein, Tony Sender, and H a t h i l d e Wurm. The m a j o r i t y s o c i a l i s t l e f t wing was centered around Seydewitz. B e s i d e s these t h r e e r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g groups, there were s e v e r a l s m a l l e r groups. The o n l y t h i n g which u n i t e d these Luxemburglsts, Kauts-k y i t e s , R e v i s i o n i s t s , and S o c i a l P a c i f i s t s , was t h e i r \ n e g a t i o n o f the do-nothing, l i n g e r i n g p o l i t i c s o f the SPD d u r i n g the I n f l a t i o n and towards the Cabinet of Cuno, while the counter r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o n s e r v a t i v e - p o p u l i s t powers i n B a v a r i a threatened tb.feliquidate the l a s t go remnants o f the Weimar Democracy. y T h i s new l e f t had i t s main support i n Saxony, the "r,...,.a%adle of the s o c i a l i s t workers' movement . . . " ^ The R e l o h s a k t l o n a g a i n s t Saxony i n October 1923 was i n i t i a t e d by the Stresemann government which contained t h r e e SPD m i n i s t e r s . . The c a b i n e t order a u t h o r i z i n g t h i s a c t i o n was signed by P r e s i d e n t E b e r t , a S o c i a l Democrat. The f a c t t h a t I t took t k e f e d e r a l SPD more than two y ears t o e x p e l l the twenty-t h r e e r i g h t - w i n g Landtag d e p u t i e s f o r t h e i r b l a t a n t breach o f p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e aroused the s u s p i c i o n i n Saxony t h a t the R e i c h l e a d e r s h i p o f the SPD sympathized w i t h Saxony's r i g h t wing, AalXthese events c r e a t e d much i l l f e e l i n g i n Saxony and moved the b u l k of the membership f u r t h e r to the l e f t . ; In 1923 P a u l L e v i , A r t h u r G o l d s t e i n , and o t h e r s i s s u e d the Journal g o z l a l l s t l s o h e P o l l t l k und Wlssensohaft. They a l s o 53 i n i t i a t e d n i g h t s c h o o l courses f o r young s o c i a l i s t s . Out of t h i s grew the S o z l a l w l s s e n s c h a f t l l o h e V e r e l n l g u n g (SWV). By 1928 the SWV had about 800 members i n B e r l i n . Membership was open to a l l who were i n t e r e s t e d i n s o c i a l i s m and were recamiaeR-ded by a member. There were communists, s o c i a l democrats, and members o f s p l i n t e r groups p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the SWV. Schroder, who had l e f t the KAPD, Schwab, L e v i , and G o l d s t e i n were the l e a d e r s o f the SWV. Speakers i n c l u d e d Laufenberg, P r i e s l a n d (Reuter), Daumig, Ruhle, Pfemfert, Urbahn, and o t h e r s . 1 0 0 In 1929 some of the l e a d e r s o f the SWV around; Schroder and Schwab r e c o g n i z e d the f a c t t h a t a f a s c i s t d i c t a t o r s h i p would soon be I n s t a l l e d i n Germany and would f o r c e them i n t o i l l e g a l i t y . They thus used the SWV as a framework to b u i l d up s m a l l cadre o r g a n i z a t i o n s which were to become the core o f a n a t i o n wide r e s i s t a n c e movement. As o r g a n i z e r f o r t h i s u n d e r t a k i n g they p i c k e d Franz P e t e r Utzelmann, who came from the KAPD. He had been d e e p l y i n v o l v e d i n the March A c t i o n f o r which he was sentenced to l i f e imprisonment. The g e n e r a l amnesty f o r p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s a f t e r the Rathenau 101 a s s a s s i n a t i o n f r e e d him. The cadre o r g a n i z a t i o n s which were aiD©nsere<d by the SWV were c a l l e d the Rote K&mpfer. Although these groups appeare# j i n the e a r l y 1930s, t h e i r r o o t s go back t o many d i f f e r e n t l e f t - w i n g trends both w i t h i n and without the SPD throughout the p a s t twelve y e a r s . In November 1930 Der -Rote K a l p f er, a s m a l l j o u r n a l , appeared suddenly i n the Ruhr d i s t r i c t . I t was a l s o c a l l e d a Z e l t u n g b e l Sozlaldemokraten f u r Sozlaldemokraten. In i t 5^ the SPD came under attack for underestimating the fascist danger and thereby helping fascism to gain power. It c r i t i -cized the KPD foi? calling the SPD Sozlalfaschlsten. 1 0 2 The leadership of the SPD insisted that the communists were behind Der Rote Kampfer and proposed sharpest actions against i t s anonymous editors. The historian Ihlau suspects that behind Der Rote Kampfer was the intellectual influence of the by-weekly Der Klassenkampf - Marxlstlsohe B l a t t e r . l Q 3 At Boohum, in the Ruhr area, Karl Garbe and Heinz Hose became the ^ okesmsn for the Left in the Soziallstlsohe Arbetter  Jugend (SAJ), the SPD's youth organization. It i s assumed that their group was responsible for some of the f i r s t issues of Der Rote Kampfer, since they distributed i t . They were sub-jected to the strongest attacks by the party bureaucracy.10** Another group came from Cologne. Students and workers in 1929 initiated discussion groups. The party leadership came under severe criticism. The Cologne group was led by Hans Mayer and Albert Jogishoff. Regular speakers at their meetings were at f i r s t Reichenbach.and later Dr. F r i t z Stern-berg. The alarming electorial success of the Nazis in Sep-tember 1930 motivated them to more concrete steps in their attempts to change the p o l i t i c a l direction of the SPD. In order to hide their a c t i v i t i e s from the local party leaders, the group s p l i t into two smaller units. Some of them, through the help of Reichenbach, contacted the Bochum group and soon a^gsftred control of Der Rote Kampfer. They then reunited with the other Cologne group. 1 0 5 55 Bernhard Reichenbach, a founding member o f the KAPD, came to the SPD i n 1925. He had moved from B e r l i n to K r e f e l d . At the end of 1929 he p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the forming o f •geese*©'-:; l e f t o p p o s i t i o n groups i n the Ruhr d i s t r i c t . As a speaker, he t r a v e l l e d to many towns, where he r e c r u i t e d many former KAPD sup p o r t e r s and members f o r the SPD. Most o f them were not s o c i a l democrats, but communists who r e j e c t e d the KPD and weue w i l l i n g t o work i n s i d e the SPD. 1 0^ A f t e r the September e l e c t i o n o f 1930 the L e f t i n the SPD Increased i n s t r e n g t h . The SPD s u f f e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l e l o s s e s i n votes, while the Nazis and the vc^mmunists made g a i n s . The L e f t i n the SPD became q u i t e a c t i v e and managed through forums and open meetings t o win many o f the SPD youth, mainly from the SAJ, to i t s s i d e . I n d i r e c t l y the p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p i t s e l f promoted t h i s l e f t w a r d t rend, as any youth member who became o s r e r l y i i c r l t i c a l was Severely a t t a c k e d by them. The economic worlds c r i s i s q u i t e n a t u r a l l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o the l e f t -ward move i n s i d e the p a r t y . The L e f t i n s i d e the SPD opposed the grudging support t h a t the SPD R e i c h s t a g d e l e g a t e s gave t o B r i i n i n g . In o r d e r tS uphold B r u n i n g and prevent H i t l e r o r any o t h e r r e a c t i o n a r y l e a d e r from g a i n i n g power, the SPD caucus d e c i d e d not t o oppose government M i l s i f the d e f e a t o f these b i l l s would b r i n g down the government. In March 1931 the proposed budget c o n t a i n e d the f o u r t h i n s t a l l m e n t f o r Panzerkreuzer A and the f i r s t one f o r Panzerkreuzer B. C h a n c e l l o r Bruning and M i n i s t e r o f Defence Groener, who were w e l l aware o f the SPD's o p p o s i t i o n to these items, but who a l s o c o r r e c t l y assumed t h a t the SPD 56 would not dare to force the government out of office, made the approval of the budget a matter of confidence in the government. The SPD caucus decided 60 to 40 to withold i t s vote, since voting tnnttTtg:against i t would have defeated i t and thus would have toppled the government. But nine SPD deputies broke discipline and voted against i t . "In retro-spect, this seems the f i r s t , although involuntary, step to-wards the new s p l i t t i n g of the p a r t y . " 1 0 7 Der Rote K&mpfer supported the stand taken by the nine SPD Reichstag deputies, the Seydewitz group, who broke ranks. However, when the total budget was passed and also an Ermachtlgungsgesetz for Bruning, the nine only refused to vote. Der Rote K&mpfer declared this a retreat of the _ • « . 108 Seydewitz group. The SPD Parteitag at Leipzig from May 31 to June 5, 1931, took a strong stand against the Left. Der Rote Kampfer was severely attacked. Publishers, writers, and distributors were threatened with expulsion. But a l l over Germany the p o l i t i c a l supporters of the paper advocated the formation of their own organization. The SWV underwrote a major part of the paper's expenses and gained thereby some control over i t . which was exercised by Schroder. Thanks to Schroder Reichen-bach 's influence grew-:and Dr. Sternberg's influence waned. This resulted in a difference of opinions / between the Rote  Kampfer group and the Seydewitz-Rosenfeld group. It also divided the Cologne group. Hans Mayer and his friends with-drew from Der Rote Kampfer and joined the Seydewitz group. 57 S t a r t i n g i n September 1932 the paper was i s s u e d i n B e r l i n under the d i r e c t i o n o f U t z e l m a n n . 1 0 ^ Soon the cadre o r g a n i -z a t i o n s sponsored by the SWV were c a l l e d Bote Kampfer (RK). THE SAP T r a d i t i o n a l l y Saxony deserves a s p e c i a l p l a c e i n the h i s t o r y of l e f t - w i n g s o c i a l i s m . The conf i d e n c e o f the p r o l e -t a r i a t o f Saxony i n the f e d e r a l l e a d e r s h i p o f the SPD was b a d l y undermined. Dresden possessed an e s p e c i a l l y l a r g e o r g a n i z e d l e f t - w i n g SPD o p p o s i t i o n . The l e a d e r s o f these groups i n 1929 were Walter Fabian, Helmut Wagner, Kurt L i e b e r -1 1 0 mann, and Franz B l a z e i z a k , who were mostly Young S o c i a l i s t s A . In response to the p r e s s u r e from the p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p the L e f t considered the fo r m a t i o n o f a new p a r t y . Wagner and B l a z e i z k , i n f l u e n c e d by Schroder, proposed democratic c e n t r a l i s m as a s t r u c t u r a l base f o r the new p a r t y . F a b i a n and Liebermann opposed t h i s . The Dresden group, under the name of Gruppe r e v o l u t i o n -flare S o z l a l l s t e n , i s s u e d a f l y e r w i t h a d r a f t program f o r a new p a r t y . One o f these l e a f l e t s f e l l i n t o the hands o f the Ea s t Saxony d i s t r i c t e x e c u t i v e , from where i t was r e p o r t e d to B e r l i n . D u r i n g 1931 the f r i c t i o n s w i t h i n the SPD i n c r e a s e d . R o s e n f e l d , Seydewitz, Fabian, Helmut Wagner, and B l a z e i z a k were e x p e l l e d i n September. Seydewitz and Rosenrel<| c a l l e d a Relchskonferenz o f the L e f t f o r October 4 , 1931. At t h a t c o n t e n t i o n the S o z l a l l s t l s c h e A r b e l t e r p a r t e l (SAP) was founded. I t was supposed to be a democratic s o c i a l i s t p a r t y , t a k i n g the middle p l a c e between the SPD and the KPD. Thus, i t was 58 hoped, It would draw a l l those who disagreed with the re^mm:, formlst, Msupport-of-the-lesser-evil" policy of the SPD leadership as well as the communists who rebelled against the stern discipline of the Moscow dominated Zentrale and a l l the tiay. socialist splinter groups which drifted i n the p o l i t i c a l back waters. The f i r s t two expectations were not fulfilled} but i n their third wish, they were only too successful. The SAP attracted to i t s ranks several of the l e f t -wing gSBUht&rfgroups which existed in the p o l i t i c a l twilight zone between the SPD and the KPD. Old man Ledebour and his Sozialisten Bund were among the f i r s t . Theodor Liebknecht brought the s t i l l surviving rump-USPD into the new Party. In March 1932 the minority fraction of the KPO under Frfilich and Walcher Joined the SAP. The Arbeltsgemejnsohaft fur 111 112 llnkssozlallstlsohe P o l l t i k (AG) A A came also into the SAP , On the other hand, the Nelson Bund, the Lenin Bund, and other ult r a l e f t and l e f t communists, the Trotskyists, most of the Rote Kampfer cel l s , the majority of the KPO, the various remnants of the KAPD stayed away. Most of the Rote Kampfer groups were very c r i t i c a l of the SAP, even though their objective was to work i n as many workingsclass organizations as possible,in order to win them to their version of the class struggle. Only one group, the one led by Reichenbach, consisting mainly of expelled former SPD members, Joined the SAP. The.Dresden group refused to Join. Being staunch anti-parliamentarians, the Reichenbach faction soon found i t s e l f in opposition to 59 the SAP l e a d e r s h i p . They not o n l y d e c l i n e d to take p a r t i n the seoond R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n o f 1932, but a l s o „: i s s u e d a pamphlet a g a i n s t the SAP's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h a t e l e c t i o n ^ 1 3 . The SAP e x p e l l e d the author o f t h i s l e a f l e t , K u rt S t e c h e r t , on June 20. Reichenbach l e f t the SAP. T h i s ended the open p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f a Rote Kampfer group i n any working c l a s s o r g a n i z a t i o n other than t h e i r own. As can be seen, the composition of the SAP c o n s i s t e d o f a conglomeration o f l e f t s o c i a l democrats, r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , communists, p a c i f i s t s , and s y n d i c a l i s t s . Only b l i n d o p t i -mism or sheer d e s p a i r c o u l d hope to shape t h i s assortment i n t o an e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y . L a c k i n g e l e c t o r i a l success, the p a r t y soon f e l l a p a r t . Many groups l e f t on t h e i r own or were e x p e l l e d d u r i n g the l a s t year o f the Weimar R e p u b l i c . The SAP members came d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y e i t h e r from the SPD o r the KPD. They remained Sozialdemokraten, although l e f t ones, o r Kommunlsten. but not S t a l i n i s t s . The same chasm t h a t d i v i d e d the German workers' movement on a l a r g e s c a l e made i t s appearance i n m i n i a t u r e i n the SAP. The exponents of each d i r e c t i o n o r i g i n a t e d - with a few e x ceptions - from those two i d e o l o g i c a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l streams o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l workers' movement which a r e r e p r e s e n t e d i n Germany by the SPD and the KPD. .... They ^ were never a b l e to break t o t a l l y w i t h t h e i r p a s t . CONCLUSION T h i s b e w i l d e r i n g v a r i e t y o f c o a l i t i o n s and s p l i t s , due t o i n t e r n a l as w e l l as e x t e r n a l c r i s e s , l e a d e r s h i p s t r u g g l e s , extreme dogmatism, b l a t a n t opportunism, and p o l i t i c a l immaturity 60 r e f l e c t s a p t l y the p o l i t i c s o f Weimar Germany. F o r t h e ' f i r s t time i n t h e i r h i s t o r y the German people were without an auto-c r a t i o form o f government. T h i s new p o l i t i c a l freedom c o i n -c i d e d w i t h some o f the s e v e r e s t economic c r i s e s . A t the same time the s t a t e was exposed to economic and p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s from abroad. As the d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s t r i e d i n s u c c e s s i o n t h e i r own p a r t i c u l a r s o l u t i o n s to Germany's prob-lems, people l o s t t h e i r c onfidence i n them. As f a s t as some id e a s l o s t t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y , o t h e r ideas f a u l t e d t o the foreground. The German people o f the twenties and e a r l y t h i r t i e s seemed unable to formulate t h e i r p o l i t i c a l i d e a s i n such a way t h a t three or f o u r p a r t i e s could r e p r e s e n t most o f them. As I t i s I l l u s t r a t e d here i n the case o f the l e f t - w i n g p a r t i e s , the d i f f e r e n c e s were o f t e n minute, but n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e were d i f f e r e n c e s . And as l o n g as the Germans had the r i g h t to choose,, they d i d choose* u n t i l the r i g h t to choose became a c a l a m i t y . Only the s t r o n g arm o f a d i c t a t o r .could put an end to these c h a o t i c c o n d i t i o n s . Thus, the one p a r t y a u t o c r a c y was the l o g i c a l , but t r a g i c , c o n c l u s i o n o f the multlt p a r t y c o n f u s i o n . CHAPTER THREE PROGRAMS AND POLICIES INTRODUCTION The avowed goal of a l l these splinter groups which were to the l e f t of the SPD was to convert Germany Into a Rate lepublic. They differed, however, on the questions of what power, function, or shape the Rate system should have. In addition to this, they could not agree on how to establish such a Rate republic. The communist?, groups wanted to abolish parliaments completely. The strongest stand on this was taken by the amec&o-^©mmunist:5KAPD organizations, the AAU and the AAUE, ftk wh© refused to participate in any parliamentary a c t i v i t i e s and electioneering. The l e f t and ultra l e f t communist groups of Korsch, Scholem-Urbahn, Fischer-Maslow, etc. participated in parliamentary a c t i v i t i e s in the same way as the KPD did, in order to sabotage and destroy the system from within. EJfeQt^ c^M campaigns were welcome opportunities to agitate among the electorate. The Brandlerites, however, were willing to work constructively within the legislatures in order to help to Implement some progressive legislation. They were of the opinion that the revolution and the subsequent installation of a R&jfos - republic lay far in the future .<and that one must make the best use of existing institutions to achieve practical gains for the working class. 61 62 The s o c i a l democratic s p l i n t e r groups as a r u l e ad-advocated a d u a l system o f p a r l i a m e n t s and Bate, o p e r a t i n g s i d e by s i d e , w i t h each having the power of veto over the o t h e r . However, as had been the case w i t h the USPD, the f i r s t s o c i a l democratic break-away par£y, t h e r e were many d i f f e r e n t o p i n i o n s and p o l i c i e s i n the SAP, which, i n the e a r l y t h i r t i e s , encompassed a l l the s o c i a l democratic s p l i n t e r groups as w e l l as some communis^, a n a r c h i s t , and p a c i f i s t groups. Thus, there were i n the SAP as w e l l as i n the USPD elements which com-p l e t e l y r e j e c t e d the p a r l i a m e n t a r y system. The a t t i t u d e s o f the l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r groups t o -wards the s o c i a l i s t - l e d t r a d e unions, most o f which belonged t o the A l l g e m e l n e r Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB), r e -f l e c t e d t h e i r a t t i t u d e s towards p a r l i a m e n t ! Some were i n favour o f working w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g t r a d e u n i o n s t r u c t u r e , o t h e r s , as we s h a l l see l a t e r , were not. Each o f the s p l i n t e r groups d i f f e r e d i n i t s a t t i t u d e towards Moscow and the Comintern. Most of them agreed t h a t , i n case o f an i m p e r i a l i s t war a g a i n s t R u s s i a , i t was t h e i r d uty t o defend the "only workers* s t a t e " i n the world. How-ever, there were those, mainly former&KPD l e a d e r s , who spoke o f "red i m p e r i a l i s m " , Kulaken d i c t a t o r s h i p , and o f the need o f a second r e v o l u t i o n i n the S o v i e t Union. To i l l u s t r a t e the d i f f e r e n c e s as w e l l as the s i m i l a r i -t i e s o f the v a r i o u s groups' aims, the main p o i n t s o f s e v e r a l p a r t y programs a r e here d i s c u s s e d . The s e l e c t e d p a r t s r e -p r e s e n t a c r o s s s e c t i o n o f the l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r groups. The KAPD and i t s r e l a t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t the b o r d e r -63 l i n e between anarchism and communism, while the L e v i t e s were t r y i n g t o continue the i d e a l i s m o f the Luxemburg t r a d i t i o n . P e t t y bourgeois r a d i c a l i s m can be d i s c e r n e d i n the aims o f the u l t r a l e f t and l e f t communists of the mid twenties, w h i l e the B r a n d l e r i t e s t r i e d t o pre s e r v e an independent, western European,©communism. The l e f t - w i n g s o c i a l democratic view-p o i n t s a r e rep r e s e n t e d by the USPD and the SAP, separated from each o t h e r by ten years o f t u r b u l e n t h i s t o r y . R e v o l u t i o n a r y and c o n s p i r a t o r i a l s o c i a l i s m was found i n the dogmas of the Rote Kampfer. The d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s appear here i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l order, a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r appearance on the p o l i t i c a l scene i n Germany. Overlaps i n time can not be avoided, as the USPD, the KAG, and the KAPD e x i s t e d a t the same time i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s , the LO and the KPO i n the l a t e t w e n t i e s , and the KPO, the RK, and the SAP overlapped i n the e a r l y t h i r t i e s . THE USPD In 1917 the newly formed USPD presented a manifesto t o the Stockholm Conference. The Independents proposed immediate peace, g e n e r a l disarmament and d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , removal o f a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a r r i e r s t o tr a d e and communication. In the eco-nomic f i e l d t h e r e should be f r i e n d l y c o o p e r a t i o n r a t h e r than v i c i o u s c o m p e t i t i o n between the n a t i o n s . Economic peace would reduce the danger of war. Tfie USPD c a l l e d f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t i e s f o r the p r o t e c t i o n o f workers, women, and c h i l d r e n . The Independents opposed s e c r e t t r e a t i e s between n a t i o n s and wanted a l l t r e a t i e s t o be approved by the i n v o l v e d n a t i o n s ' 64 representative assemblies. 1 In 1919 the USPD demanded that the dictatorship of the proletariat be established in the form of Workers* and Soldiers* Councils. The provision for the Rate system was to be included in the new postwar con-stitution. The party also wanted to dissolve the regular army and establish a Volkswehr (people's army) with elected officers. It demanded the immediate socialization of the capitalist enterprises and of a l l large privately owned land and forest holdings. Municipal governments in ci t i e s were to seize a l l land and houses and assume the responsibility for sufficient housing. C i v i l servants and judges were to be elected. War profits were to be taxed away and war debentures cancelled.^ At i t s extraordinary convention of March 2 to March 6, 1919 in Berlin, the USPD issued a program which reiterated (:^: some of the earlier points, but also contained the following new demands: 1. .... Decisive participation of the Rate in the law making proceedure at the state and the municipal levels of governments and in the shops. 2. .... Immediate abolishment of the voluntary mercenary army. Disarmament of the bourgeoisie. Establishment of a proletarian army. 3. Socialization of ... mines, power plants, iron and steel production, banks and Insurance companies, large land and forest holdings. • •. • 7. Separation of Church and School .... Each child has the right to an education according to i t s a b i l i t i e s . .... 9. Restoration of friendly relations with a l l other nations 65 of the world .... R e s t o r a t i o n o f the Workers' I n t e r - _ n a t i o n a l .• i n the s p i r i t o f Zimmerwald and K l e n t h a l . * A t another P a r t e i t a g , from November 30, to December 6, 1920, i n L e i p z i g , the USPD demanded the dlsbandment of a l l c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s , the d i s a r m i n g o f the b o u r g e o i s i e and of the Junkers, p r o g r e s s i v e t a x a t i o n and f u l l e q u a l i t y f o r women . THE KAPD AND ITS AFFILIATES The program o f the KAPD was mainly composed by i t s f e d e r a l i s t wing. T h i s wing, which i n c l u d e d G o r t e r , Riihle, P femfert, and, to some extent, Laufenberg and Wolffheim, had a n a r c h i s t and s y n d i c a l i s t l e a n i n g s , as opposed to the centra-? l i s t wing, which promoted s t a t e communism. The f e d e r a l i s t s were the f i r s t ones to be e x p e l l e d , but not b e f o r e they had l e f t t h e i r stamp on the p o l i c i e s o f the KAPD. Gorter proposed t h a t the p r o l e t a r i a t take over the e n t i r e machinery of the s t a t e . A guaranteed minimum income f o r a l l workers was h i g h on h i e l i s t o f p r i o r i t i e s . The workers were to c o n t r o l p r o d u c t i o n , t r a d e , and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . Everyone would be o b l i g a t e d to work. St a t e o r . p u b l i c debts were to be c a n c e l l e d , war p r o f i t s c o n f i s c a t e d , and banks, l a r g e b u s i n e s s e s , and a l l l a n d e x p r o p r i a t e d . An armed p r o l e t a r i a t should r e p l a c e the r e g u l a r army. A l l t a r i f f s and custom d u t i e s would be removed and o n l y c a p i t a l income was to be taxed. Taxes on c a p i t a l would r i s e p r o g r e s s i v e l y u n t i l p r i v a t e c a p i t a l had completely d i s a p p e a r e d . 5 G o r t e r d i s a g r e e d w i t h the B o l s h e v i k p o l i c y of a p p l y -66 i n g the r e v o l u t i o n a r y experiences i n R u s s i a to the r e s t of the world. In pre r e v o l u t i o n a r y R u s s i a the p r o l e t a r i a t was outnumbered by a': poor and uneducated peasantry. Peasants s u f f e r e d the same o p p r e s s i o n under the C z a r i s t regime as d i d the p r o l e t a r i a n s . Thus, the peasantry became a w i l l i n g and needed p a r t n e r o f the p r o l e t a r i a t d u r i n g the r e v o l u t i o n . On the other hand, western European farmers were p e t t y bourgeols&and o f t e n h o s t i l e towards the working c l a s s . In Germany the p r o l e t a r i a t stood alone a g a i n s t a l l other c l a s s e s . ^ In A p r i l 1920 the KAPD i s s u e d a c a l l t o the l e f t o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the KPD, announcing the b i r t h o f t h e i r p a r t y . T h i s c a l l s t a t e d t h a t the ?!:%&. KAPD i s not a p a r t y i n the t r a d i t i o n a l sense. I t i s not a l e a d e r s h i p o r i e n t e d p a r t y . I t s main g o a l i s t o a s s i s t the German p r o l e t a r i a t i n f r e e i n g i t s e l f from any l e a d e r s h i p c u l t . Freedom from the treacherous, counter-r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a d e r s h i p p o l i t l o s i s the most e f f e c t i v e way to u n i t e the p r o l e t a r i a t . T h i s u n i o n must be con-ducted i n the s p i r i t o f the R&te system; t h i s i s the o n l y g o a l of the r e v o l u t i o n . 7 In a s i x t e e n p o i n t program, the KAPD promised t o f r e e the economy from a l l p o l i t i c a l f e t t e r s . I t proposed t o r e -move a l l p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and a b o l i s h c l a s s d i s t i n c t i o n s . The p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n was to Include p o l i t i c a l and eco-nomic changes. I t would achieve a ,•"^ wQrl3i^ .^ctommune', under the d i c t a t o r s h i p o f the p r o l e t a r i a t . Ttes o r g a n i z a t i o n a l form o f p r o l e t a r i a n c o n t r o l would be workers' Soviets. A p a r t y must d r i v e the masses forward. I t should never l o s e s i g h t o f i t s main g o a l s . I f p a r t i a l demands ( T e l l f o r d e r u n g e n . Bread-and-butter Issues) were supported i t should not be f o r o p p o r t u n i s t i c reasons. Complete workers' c o n t r o l of f a c t o r i e s c o u l d be achieved through i n d u s t r i a l unions. Tjje p a r t y must 67 never be more than an Instrument or a vehicle of the working cla s s . As fast as the pr o l e t a r i a n d i c t a t o r s h i p becomes estab-l i s h e d just as f a s t must the party lose i t s influence i n favour of the Soviets. As the communist society appears, the p par tty disappears. The KAPD was against the p o l i c y of supporting the less e r e v i l , which i t considered to be the whip that the bourgeoisie uses to drive the p r o l e t a r i a t into slavery^. The bourgeoisie, i n order to accomplish i t s anti-labour objectives, usually presents a choice of two repressive ob-je c t i v e s . Working class parties would thus be duped into supporting the l e s s e r e v i l . The winner i n those cases Is 10 always the bourgeoisie. In May 1,920 the KAPD published another program which centered around the following points: The highest p r i n c i p l e of a pr o l e t a r i a n party i s the autonomy of i t s members .... The World War gave b i r t h to an economic c r i s i s which, i n e f f e c t , i s the Gfttter- d&mmerung of the bourgeois-capitalist world order. I t Is not one of the many c r i s e s which were caused by the f a u l t y method of production, but i t i s the f i n a l c r i s i s of capitalism. The ef f e c t of t h i s i s the shattering of the t o t a l s o c i a l organism, the clashing of classes i n an unprecedented int e n s i t y , which r e s u l t s i n the mass pauper-i z a t i o n of the population. Capitalism has reached i t s t o t a l f i a s c o . We are faced now with the alternatives return to barbarism or the bu i l d i n g of the s o c i a l i s t world order .... The fate of the Russian Revolution depends upon a p r o l e t a r i a n revolution i n Germany. A revolutionary v i c t o r y In Germany w i l l create a s e l f s u f f i c i e n t s o c i a l i s t economic block which can exchange i n d u s t r i a l products for a g r i c u l t u r a l products within i t s e l f . I t needs to make no concession to the western powers. Germany i s the key to the world revolution .... In a s o c l a l s i t Germany there w i l l be no p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s f o r the bourgeoisie .... P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n parliamentary elections creates danger-ous i l l u s i o n s within the p r o l e t a r i a t , i t i s sabotage of the Rate idea** 68 About a year l a t e r the KAPD i s s u e d a b e t t e r formulated and more comprehensive program. T h i s c a l l e d f o r the immediate p o l i t i c a l and economic union o f a l l p r o l e t a r i a n - r u l e d count-r i e s f o r the j o i n t defences a g a i n s t the a g g r e s s i v e t e n d e n c i e s o f world c a p i t a l i s m . It argued t h a t the c l a s s , s t r u g g l e was i n t e r n a t i o n a l . At t h a t time, however, R u s s i a was the o n l y country t h a t c o u l d q u a l i f y . The document proposed the arming of the p o l i t i c a l o r ganized workers and the d i s a r m i n g o f the b o u r g e o i s i e , p o l i c e , army o f f i c e r s , and home m i l i t i a s . A l l p a r l i a m e n t s , l e g i s l a t u r e s , and town c o u n c i l s were to be d i s -s o l v e d and the Soviets were to be the o n l y ^ l a w g i v i n g and ex e c u t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s . The congress of S o v i e t s , made up of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the workers* S o v i e t s would be the h i g h e s t body. I t s f i r s t Job would be the d r a f t i n g o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n . The p r e s s was to be under the a u t h o r l t y s o f the l o c a l s o v l e t s . R e v o l u t i o n a r y c o u r t s were to r e p l a c e the bourgeois jtU&teAal a p p a r a t u s . 1 2 I t c a l l e d f o r the c a n c e l l a t i o n o f a l l p u b l i c debts, f o r the s o c i a l i z a t i o n o f a111 mines, banks, and o t h e r l a r g e con-cerns and f o r the c o n f i s c a t i o n o f p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y above a c e r t a i n l i m i t . Land was to be p u b l i c l y owned. P u b l i c t r a n s i t should be n a t i o n a l i z e d . P r o d u c t i o n was to be planned and -should o n l y serve the c a r e f u l c a l c u l a t e d needs o f s o c i e t y . I t would be everyone^s duty to work, a p o i n t which was to be s t r i n g e n t l y enforced. Everyone was to have f u l l s e c u r i t y o f an e x i s t e n c e f r e e from want i n regards to food, s h e l t e r , c l o t h i n g , o l d age, I l l n e s s , d i s a b i l i t y , e t c . T i t l e s would be a b o l i s h e d . An u n r e l e n t i n g war would be waged a g a i n s t the 69 c a p i t a l i s t economy and the b o u r g e o i s i d e o l o g y . The p a r t y was to be the vanguard of a p r o l e t a r i a n - r e v o l u t i o n a r y i d e o l o g y . Any r e v o l u t i o n a r y tendencies i n the a r t s and s c i e n c e s would 13 be f u l l y supported. J The KAPD con s i d e r e d Involvement i n p a r l i a m e n t a r y a c t i v i t i e s o p p o r t u n i s t i c and r e f o r m i s t . The d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t i s the d i c t a t o r s h i p o f the c l a s s , not the p a r t y , l e t alone o f the p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p . . Ruhle and P f e a f e r t went one step f u r t h e r , they were a g a i n s t any p a r t y concept, as t h i s would l e a d t o opportunism, bureaucracy, and a l e a d e r s h i p c u l t . Tltey c o n s i d e r e d the t r a d i t i o n a l o r g a n i -z a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s of the working c l a s s i n t o partyeand t r a d e unions h a r m f u l . 1 ^ A f t e r they had l e f t the KAPD and i t s a f -f i l i a t e , the AAU, they formed the Allgemeine A r b e l t e r Union. E l n h e l t s o r g a n (AAUE), a combination of a t r a d e u n i o n and p o l i t i c a l p a r t y . A c c o r d i n g to the AAU, the c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e i s the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the r u l i n g o l a s s , the p r o t e c t o r o f p r i v s t e 16 p r o p e r t y , and the hangman o f the e x p l o i t e d . An i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h i s s t a t e i s p a r l i a m e n t and i t s p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . The t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s c o n s i s t of l e a d e r s and masses. They have t h e i r p a r a l l e l s i n the c a p i t a l i s t economic s t r u c t u r e . The l e a d e r o f a p a r t y compares to the boss i n a company, the members to the employees, and the p a r t y to the company i t s e l f . J u s t as companies compete w i t h each o t h e r f o r domination i n the economic f i e l d , so do p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s compete f o r domination i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d . 1 ' ' 70 The KAPD committed i t s e l f to the d e s t r u c t i o n of the o l d t r a d e unions and t h e i r u n p r o l e t a r i a n i d e o l o g y 1 8 . In the same way as the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , so are the t r a d e unions v i t a l p a r t s of the c a p i t a l i s t system. The r o l e of the t r a d e unions i n the c a p i t a l i s t statei&twsEbw down the p a u p e r i z a t i o n o f the working c l a s s . They a c t as smlfety v a l v e s and thus i n -h i b i t r e v o l u t i o n a r y attempts. T h e i r b u r e a u c r a c i e s , which once were the se r v a n t s o f the membership, became the masters. Imi-t a t i n g the c a p i t a l i s t h a b i t o f competition, t r a d e unions a r e more a d i v i s i v e f a c t o r than a u n i f y i n g f o r c e . They c r e a t e d and f u r t h e r e d the s p i r i t of c o m p e t i t i o n between the d i f f e r e n t t r a d e s . Trade unions separate the employed from the unem-ployed, the s k i l l e d from the u n s k i l l e d , men from women, and the o l d from the young. 7 THE LEVITES The second group t h a t broke away from the KPD was the group around L e v i , known as the L e v l t e n ( L e v i t e s ) o r as the Kommunistische A r b e l t s g e m e i n s c h a f t (KAG). A f t e r the March a c t i o n i n 1921 P a u l L e v i s t a r t e d p u b l i s h i n g a p e r i o d i c a l , Unser Weg. In Wider, den Putschlsmus, a c r i t i c a l review o f the March A c t i o n , the KPD, and the Comintern, which was pub-l i s h e d i n Unser Weg, L e v i s t a t e d t h a t i t was a f a c t t h a t , i n s p i t e o f the p r o g r e s s i n g economic decay, the German b o u r g e o i s i e had managed to c o n s o l i d a t e i t s e l f . In s p i t e o f the d e v a s t a t i n g d e f e a t , the b o u r g e o i s i e was the f i r s t power t h a t r e c u p e r a t e d ; i t was / I n 192l7 master o f Germany. But t h i s v i c t o r y of the b o u r g e o i s i e was o n l y r e l a t i v e . The p r o l e t a r i a t could d e f e a t 71 the b o u r g e o i s i e , which was d e c a y i n g and had l o s t a l l hope. The p h y s i c a l and the moral f a c t o r s favoured a p r o l e t a r i a n v i c t o r y . L e v i maintained t h a t the ccioramunists were wrong i n d i s r e g a r d i n g the ot h e r lower c l a s s e s as p o t e n t i a l a l l i e s 21' and i n c l a s s i f y i n g them as one r e a c t i o n a r y Mass •. The a g r i c u l t u r a l workers, the s m a l l independent tradesmen, the c i v i l s e r v a n t s , the impoverished i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , they a l l experience the r e v o l u t i o n , they are a l l a n t i - b o u r g e d i i s . As l o n g as the b o u r g e o i s i e uses them, they w i l l be the hands t h a t d e f e a t the working c l a s s . I f they a r e n e u t r a l , they a r e a t l e a s t an o b s t a c l e t o a communist v i c t o r y , but i f they a r e a l l i e d w i t h the p r o l e t a r i a t , they may w e l l ensure i t s v i c t o r y . One must not wait u n t i l they a r e communists. I t i s the duty o f communists to i n f l u e n c e these c l a s s e s . But 22 the German Communists had not found the way to them y e t . The r e v o l u t i o n i s not J u s t a communist a f f a i r . The communists do not h o l d a monopoly on b e i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . A c c o r d i n g t o Marx a l l workers a r e e x p l o i t e d and a r e i n oppo-s i t i o n to the ..exploiters, i t was the duty of the communists to gather a M s t h e s e f o r c e s f o r the one and o n l y g o a l , the overthrow o f the e x p l o i t e r s . The communists must be the b e s t l e a d e r s and a t the same time the be s t s e r v a n t s of the r e v o l u t i o n . Rosa Luxemburg s t a t e d t h a t communism i s not a t the beginning, but a t the end (am Bndefl o f the r e v o l u t i o n . A communist does not r e v e r s e t h i s ord;er, but c a r r i e s the be-g i n n i n g to i t s v i c t o r i o u s c o n c l u s i o n . Only then can communism be e s t a b l i s h e d . 2 3 72 D u r i n g i t s b r i e f e x i s t e n c e the KAG was approached by the KPD f o r the purpose of r e u n i f i c a t i o n . The L e v i t e s r e p l i e d to t h i s i n v i t a t i o n as f o l l o w s J The KAG does not a s p i r e t3»„ the format i o n of-its..own p a r t y . A communist mass movement cannot be achieved by s p l i t t i n g , but by g a t h e r i n g t o g e t h e r . I f the KPD i s t o become the g r e a t mass p a r t y of the German p r o l e t a r i a t , then there w i l l be no room f o r the USPD; even the honest members of the SPD w i l l j o i n i t . But f i r s t the KPD must f u l f i l l the f o l l o w i n g p r e c o n d i t i o n s i n order to r e g a i n the c o n f i d e n c e o f the working c l a s s * 1. Achieve c o m p l e t e i , f i n a n c i a l independence from the _~ Comintern. 2. Share i n the c o n t r o l of a l l ' l i t e r a t u r e c M i s t r i b u t e d i n Germany by other ^Comintern o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as the Rote G e w e r k s o h a f t s I n t e r n a t i o n a l e e t c . 3. Gain immunity from a l l open or hidden o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e by the ECCI i n the a f f a i r s o f the German p a r t y . 4 . E s t a b l i s h a p o l i t i c a l program which can be supported by a l l r e v o l u t i o n a r y workers i n Germany, wit h a d e f i n i t e abandonment o f a l l p u t s c h l s t a c t i v i t i e s . 5. E s t a b l i s h a trade u n i o n p o l i c y which w i l l uphold un- . damaged the aims and the u n i t y of the German un i o n s . z ^ In s p r i n g of 1922 the KAG Joined the USPD. L e v i , i n Unser Weg, e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h i s ... i s one o f the manyssteps which have t o be taken t o r e o r g a n i z e the p r o l e t a r i a t . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y , the p r o -l e t a r i a t i s a t a low p o i n t . I t w i l l take decades to b r i n g the movement back t o the h e i g h t i t once had reached. Soon the USPD and the SPD w i l l have to r e u n i t e . T h i s can not J u s t be an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l step, i t must be a p o l i t i c a l step a l s o . Only one r e a l i z a t i o n can h e a l the s p l i t ; the r e a l i s t z a t i o n t h a t a l l workers, the ones from the c o u n t r i e s t h a t were ' w v i c t o r i o u s " i n the war, as w e l l as t i l e ones who were "defeated" i n the war, the i n the r e v o l u t i o n " v i c t o r i o u s " S o c i a l Democratic a s j w e l l as the "defeated" Communist wor-ker s i n r e a l i t y had been defeated and f a c e a greedy,, ex-p l o i t a t i v e c a p i t a l i s m which e x p l o i t s them a l l howfmotre 25 than i t d i d b e f o r e the war. 73 THE LEFT OPPOSITION Most of the i n f o r m a t i o n on the v a r i o u s l e f t and u l t r a l e f t groups d i s c u s s e d here was taken from v $ u b l i c a t 4 o r i s i ' i s s u e d by t h e i r opponents, the KPD and the Comintern. Thus, i t i s n e a r l y i m p o s s i b l e to get a t r u e , unbiased p i c t u r e o f t h e i r programs®®,i?Ihegeneral, t h e i r i d e a s d i f f e r e d not much from KPD programs d u r i n g a l e f t course of the Comintern. A l i p \though t h e r e were many I n d i v i d u a l l e f t groups, they can be d e a l t w i t h here as one group, as t h e i r programs were o f t e n i d e n t i c a l . Perhaps the most c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e between the KPD and i t s o p p o s i t i o n groups was the approach towards a U n i t e d F r o n t w i t h the KPD, There were two ways t o the U n i t e d F r o n t . When the l e a d e r s o f the p a r t i e s which were c o n s i d e r i n g a U n i t e d F r o n t met and ipoft d i s c u s s e d common s t r a t e g y , the r e -s u l t i n g U n i t e d F£ont was c o n s i d e r e d a U n i t e d F r o n t from above. In the approach f o r a U n i t e d F r o n t from belo?w: the l e a d e r s h i p o f one p a r t y c a l l e d on the membership o f another p a r t y f o r u n i t e d a c t i o n , d i s r e g a r d i n g o r a t t a c k i n g the l e a d e r s o f the o t h e r p a r t y i n the p r o c e s s . T h i s approach was o f t e n used i n o r d e r to r a i d the membership o f the o t h e r p a r t y . D u r i n g the l i f e o f the Weimar R e p u b l i c both types o f U n i t e d F r o n t s were used s e v e r a l times w i t h v a r y i n g s u c c e s s . I t was u s u a l l y the R i g h t i n the KPD which favoured the approach from above, w h i l e the L e f t opted f o r the approach from below o r r e j e c t e d a U n i t e d F r o n t e n t i r e l y . R&fch F i s c h e r was quoted to have favoured a U n i t e d F r o n t i n 1922. She suggested t h a t the KPD e x e r t p r e s s u r e 7^ i n the trade unions and i n the press to force the SPD towards a United Front. But i f t h i s pressure i s I n s u f f i c i e n t then i t i s the duty , of the KPD to lead the workers by i t s e l f into the s t r u g g l e . This move (for a United Front, I. S.) i s s t i l l too weak and underdeveloped. We must consolidate It and strengthen i t , but 'from below', not through negotiations with the o f f i c i a l s . This i s at the present the main objective of the KPD. The surmounting of the party walls, the d i s r e -gard towards t h e i r o f f i c i a l ^ bodies, the replacement of counterrevolutionary organizations by workers' organiza-tions which grew i n the struggle and assumed the leader-ship of the United Front must be the reason and goal of f t h i s t a c t i c ....r7 In 1925 she was quoted as saying "... we must succeed to un-mask the whole S o c i a l Democratic Party, not Just a few i n d i -p ft v i d u a l leaders, as counterrevolutionaries." The Fischer-Maslow group showed the same tendencies regarding the United Front from below which the Thalmann leadership displayed, yet they were condemned for i t . At a meeting i n Diisseldorf Fischer said "I am against any form of United Front, be i t from the front, from the back, from above or below" 2^. At the EECCI session of March 19, 1926, Urbahn, speaking f o r Maslowski, Gramkows, Ruth Fischer, and himself, statedt It i s possible to carry through advantageously a United ^wEron'Js&s The@effectstbf SJhe@Dawes^Plaji@intehS'ified the*;; class struggle because i t i s conducive the growth of class consciousness, e s p e c i a l l y amongst the SPD workers. There i s a wave of sympathy fo r the Soviet Union, anti= monarchial movements are conducive f o r the winning of the broad.'/masses for communism. In the centre of a c t i v i t i e s must be the f i g h t f o r the bread-and-butter issues while at the same i t Is emphasized that only the p r o l e t a r i a n revolution can solve the German c r i s i s . Make use of the l e f t d r i f t among the s o c i a l democratic wftrkers against t h e i r opportunistic leaders without repeating the Brand-l e r i t e mistakes. Connect the parliamentary a c t i v i t i e s with the work among the masses, educate the masses to the f a c t that the c o a l i t i o n p o l i t i c s must be stopped, use United Fronfc t a c t i c s to win workers away from Zentrum, 75 also use United Front t a c t i c s towards the middle classes, b u i l d a broad l e f t wing i n unions, use the development of the Fiirstenabflndungskampagne f o r a general mass movement.... Scholem, at the same session, repeated i n essence what Urbahn had said-^ 1. Aft e r the l e f t i s t s were expelled and formed t h e i r own party, they issued a booklet Per Kampf um:dle Kommunlstlsohe P a r t e i . Platform der Llnken Opposition i n der KPD. In the Kommunistische Internationale an author, i d e n t i f i e d by the i n i t i a l s T. I., quoted selected excerpts from t h i s document. Since 1922 i t has been proven that the KPD suffered damages whenever i t participated i n a United Front. The reformers, on the other hand, always came out of i t strengthened. It was the communists who were exploited, who were the t a i l _ of the actions, and who received a kick i n the rear.... 3 It has been the theory that we could decrease the influence of the reformists on the workers by imitating them during a United Front action.... This i s a c a p i t u l a t i o n and l i q u i -dation ideology.3 3 In domestic a f f a i r s the program of the l e f t communists often d i f f e r e d from the o f f i c i a l KPD l i n e . The L e f t Oppo-s i t i o n was against cooperation with the leadership of the ADGB. In 1924 Ruth Fischer said Considering the mass unemployment and the starvation wages, one can not expect that the German revolutionary workers remain i n these corrupted trade unions unless one allows them.to take over the apparatus by force, i f necessary.3^ A f t e r a successful revolution, one of the f i r s t steps of a communist government, according to Korsch, must be to insure that The trade unions, the factory councils, and the newly elected p r o l e t a r i a n workers' Soviets must stop any attempts of sabotage by the employers, any shortening of the working hours* any c l o s i n g of f a c t o r i e s , any w i l f u l destruction 76 of raw m a t e r i a l s , and any attempt a t m i s s i n g work oppor-t u n i t i e s . T h i s must be done by e x e r c i s i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o n t r o l and by s h a r i n g i n the d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s . The saboteurs must be d i s p o s s e s s e d and t h e i r b u s i n e s s must be continued by the workers.35 Korsch d i f f e r e d i n t h i s w i t h the o f f i c i a l KPD l i n e , which c o n s i d e r e d these t a s k s , which were o r d i n a r y "house keeping" t a s k s , to be below the d i g n i t y of the workers* Soviets. In p a r t i c u l a r the phrase " s h a r i n g i n the d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s " was found o b j e c t i o n a b l e , as t h i s i m p l i e d t h a t the employers would s t i l l have a say i n the o p e r a t i o n of t h e i r b u s i n e s s e s . Korsch, Schwarz, and Katz r e j e c t e d the concept of a worker and peasant government. They considered the peasants c o u n t e r E e v o l u t i o n a r y . A l l o f the l e f t groups r e j e c t e d the NEP In R u s s i a and f e l t t h a t S o v i e t R u s s i a was l e a v i n g the paths o f s o c i a l i s m . Korsch claimed t h a t the S o v i e t Union was not a d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t , but a d i c t a t o r -s h i p a g a i n s t the p r o l e t a r i a t , a " K u l a k e n d l k t a t u r " . The R u s s i a n r e v o l u t i o n was, a c c o r d i n g to him, a r a d i c a l - b o u r g e o i s r e v o l u t i o n . ^ Katz d e s c r i b e d the S o v i e t Union as £the l a s t stand of the b o u r g e o i s i e " , r u l e d by the "peasant k i n g " or "peasant Napoleon" S t a l i n , i n which the workers were s t i l l exploited37, "The t h e o r y o f the ' n a t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n * , t h a t i s , the theory of S o c i a l i s m i n R u s s i a o n l y , i s i n e f f e c t the c a n c e l l a t i o n of the p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n i n the advanced i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s , which w i l l l e a d to the l i q u i d a t i o n of communism as an i d e a l and o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n . The KPO The KPD's r i g h t o p p o s i t i o n ' s disagreement w i t h the c e n t r i s t and l e f t l e a d e r s h i p of the KPD was mainly on t a c t i c s . 77 Even when they were expelled and had formed the KPO, they s t i l l i n s i s t e d that they were not a separate party, but only the proponents of a d i f f e r e n t tendency i n the communist move-ment. They maintained that the KPD had abandoned Rosa Luxem-burg's theories, which were more appropriate f o r Germany than the Bolshevik's. The Bight claimed that the German prole-t a r i a t was more advanced than the Russian. Socialism, once the revolution had succeeded, could be b u i l t much fa s t e r than i n Russia. The KPO rejected the mechanical transfer of ideas and actions from RussiaitoSGermSny since conditions were d i f -ferent. Communism, according to the KPO, would bring about a stateless society i n which the p r o l e t a r i a t would be i n charge of administration. In Russia, since the p r o l e t a r i a t was not ready to enter t h i s 3tage, the party acted as a trustee and governed f o r the people. /By declaring the p r o l e t a r i a t "not ready", the CP of the SU can j u s t i f y i t s perpetual r i g h t to r u l e 7 7 The German p r o l e t a r i a t would be ready to govern I t s e l f once the revolution had succeeded. The Comintern and the KPD wanted to apply the same measures everywhere, assuming that experiences gathered In Russia would be of value i n Germany. Since, according to Brandler, the German p r o l e t a r i a t was further advanced, i t would be harder to convince that there was a need for a revolution. 3 9 The KPO accused the KPD of having exchanged demo-.v c r a t l c centralism with bureaucratic centralism*'' 0. I t seemed cl e a r that the KPD, by p e r s i s t i n g i n i t s wrong course, would soon abandon i t s communist Ideals. Therefore, the KPO saw as i t s function the creation of a revolutionary mass party. 78 T h i s p a r t y would have to be a r e c r e a t i o n o f the KPD o f the y e a r s 1921 to 1923* T h i s c o u l d e i t h e r be done by r e f o r m i n g the KPD o r by s t a r t i n g a new p a r t y . The KPO l e a d e r s f i r s t d e c i d e d to c r e a t e a new o r g a n i z a t i o n with the g o a l of working from without f o r the r e f o r m a t i o n of the KPD. They had hoped t h a t theytiwould f i n d people who c o u l d work from w i t h i n the KPD f o r the same g o a l and who would cooperate w i t h them. I f t h i s p l a n would not succeed, they would procceed*one.step f u r t h e r . T h i s i s why they took g r e a t p a i n s to d e c l a r e t h a t the KPO was not a new p a r t y . I t s goals were mainly to win the KPD and the Comintern to the c o r r e c t communist t a c t i c s . As l o n g as the KPD and the Comintern p e r s i s t e d w i t h the wrong t a c t i c s , the KPO would assume the independent l e a d e r s h i p o f the working c l a s s s t r u g g l e . I t would a l s o take the l e a d i n winning the working c l a s s to communist p r i n c i p l e s . A t the moment the KPD had o n l y abandoned the c o r r e c t communist t a c -t i c s . I f i t a l s o abandoned communist p r i n c i p l e s , then i t would d e s t r o y i t s c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the working c l a s s and be-come a hi n d r a n c e to the c l a s s s t r u g g l e . Then the KPO would become the Communist P a r t y o f Germany. The KPO r e a l i z e d w e l l , t h a t t h e r e c o u l d o n l y be one Communist P a r t y of Ger-many. The o f f i c i a l s and the i n s t i t u t i o n s o f the KPD and o f the Comintern were h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s p l i t t i n g the com-i L l munist movement. The KPO's g o a l was to s t r e n g t h e n the KPD. One of the most c o n t e n t i o u s disagreementsfi^aetwejen the KPD and the KPO was over the a t t i t u d e towards the SPD, es-p e c i a l l y i t s l e f t wing. Walcher, a spokesman o f the KPO, r e c o g n i z e d the p o l i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the SPD. He 79 d i s a g r e e d w i t h the C e n t r a l Committee o f the KPD's formula t h a t the Jbeft o f the SPD was more dangerous to the KPD than the S i g h t . He maintained t h a t the KPD should s t r e n g t h e n the SPD L e f t , even i f t h i s f o r t i f i e d the SPD, because i t would h? h e l p the U n i t e d F r o n t and thus be o f advantage to the KPD. The KPO d e t e s t e d the KPD's h a b i t o f c a l l i n g the SPD members " s o c i a l i s t f a s c i s t s " . A c c o r d i n g to Tfaalhelmer, n e i t h e r the SPD nor the bourgeois p a r t i e s were f a s c i s t . But they un-c o n s c i o u s l y advanced f a s c i s m by d i s c r e d i t i n g the parliamen-t a r y .^ypro&ess and thereby c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s which were conducive to the growth of f a s c i s m . ^ The KPO argued t h a t the time of " r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y " o f c a p i t a l i s m was i n 1927, 1928, and i n the b e g i n n i n g o f 1929. T h i s presented f o r the p r o l e t a r i a t a p r e - r e v o l u t i o -nary s i t u a t i o n . The KPO wanted to use t h i s p e r i o d to f i g h t f o r Mie day-to-day demands o f the working c l a s s o n l y . By d o i n g t h i s , the p a r t y would g a i n the l o y a l t y ' 1 o f the working c l a s s . When the periodcrofsthe "armed s t r u g g l e " came, the workers would f o l l o w those l e a d e r s who had a c q u i r e d t h e i r l o y a l i t y . A f t e r t h a t would come the p e r i o d o f " c o n s o l i d a -t i n g and d e f e n d i n g the r e v o l u t i o n " , f o l l o w e d by the p e r i o d o f " s o c i a l i s t r e b u i l d i n g " . The m a j o r i t y o f the masses must l e a r n to i d e n t i f y with communist aims and p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s was i n the s p i r i t o f Rosa Luxemburg, who had s a i d j "The Spartacus League ... w i l l never assume power o f government, u n l e s s i t t-s through the c l e a r and unambigous w i l l of the l a r g e m a j o r i t y o f the p r o l e t a r i a n masses of Germany".^ 80 By f i g h t i n g f o r the immediate demands o f the workers the communists had an o p p o r t u n i t y to educate the masses. They cou l d show the co n n e c t i o n between the day-to-day i s s u e s f a c e d by the peSple and the l o n g range p o l i t i c a l aims o f the commu-n i s t s . In s h o r t , the r i g h t o p p o s i t i o n proposed a p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n program t h a t r e l a t e d d i r e c t l y to the people. I t s po-l i t i c a l aim was the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a "worker and peasant government", i t s economic aim, h i g h e r wages, lower p r i c e s , v : b e t t e r working c o n d i t i o n s , and workers* c o n t r o l o f p r o d u c t i o n . The B r a n d l e r l t e s b e l i e v e d t h a t economic c r i s e s a r e caused by the d l s p r o p o r t i o n a l ratiocbetween p r o d u c t i o n and market c a p a c i t y . Under c a p i t a l i s m t h e r e would always be o v e r p r o d u c t i o n and underconsumption. The s t a b i l i z a t i o n of the economy i n 1927/28 was a r t i f i c i a l and depended on p r e p a r a -t i o n f o r an i m p e r i a l i s t i c war. In the absence o f such a war, a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n would a r i s e a t the moment when the i n e v i t a b l e slump would f o l l o w the c u r r e n t boom. The d u t y of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y p a r t y i n t h i s p r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y era was t o prepare the working c l a s s and the p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e f o r the r e v o l u t i o n a r y aims and g o a l s . The KPD had noaplan ready and had f a i l e d t o win the c o n f i d e n c e o f the working c l a s s . Thus, i t was the duty of the KPO to succeed where the KPD .v. had f a i l e d . In 1930 the KPO i s s u e d an amended d r a f t p o l i c y Was  w i l l d i e Kommunistische P a r t e i Deutschlands - O p p o s i t i o n ? ? T h i s r e i t e r a t e d i n the form o f questions and answers the p o l l c i e s l a n d i d e o l o g i e s of the KPO. The main p o i n t s were as f o l l o w s t 81 The KPO does not d i f f e r from the KPD i n i d e o l o g y and aims, but i n t a c t i c s . Only the. use of the r i g h t methods i s the t r u e t e s t o f l o y a l l t i e s to p r i n c i p l e s . The goals o f com-munism a r e i 1. To overthrow the bourgeois s t a t e and the c a p i t a l i s t economy and the achievement of the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t . 2. The o n l y form o f government by the d i c t a t o r s h i p o f the p r o l e t a r i a t i s the Rate r e p u b l i c . The govern-ment must remove the a n a r c h i s t - c a p i t a l i s t economy,, p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y , and the c l a s s s t r u c t u r e . ^ The Rote Kampfer The Rote Kampfer co n s i d e r e d p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy a t o o l o f the r u l i n g c l a s s to l e g a l i z e I t s power. To them, the bourgeois s t a t e was the product and e x p r e s s i o n of the i r r e c o n c i l a b i l i t y of the c l a s s d i f f e r e n c e s . In the Weimar R e p u b l i c the r u l i n g c l a s s h e l d a l l the top p o s i t i o n s , w h i l e the o t h e r p o s i t i o n s were h e l d by t h e i r p e t t y bourgeois hanger-ons. They gave a p i e c e of democracy to t h e i l o w e r t c l i a s s e s c i n J <WrSmrrto dupe them i n t o b e l i e v i n g t h a t i t r e p r e s e n t e d a p i e c e o f power. The e f f e c t o f t h i s was t h a t i t s e t the workers a g a i n s t each o t h e r so t h a t they c o u l d be r u l e d more e a s i l y . In cases o f workers' u n r e s t , the p i e c e o f democracy would be taken away. The same would happen d u r i n g economic c r i s e s . In order to f i n d a way out of the economic c r i s e s , the c a p i -t a l i s t s transformed the p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s t a t e i n t o an eco-nomic s t a t e ( W l r t s c h a f t s s t a a a t ) , whose powers were mainly used to reduce the sstfc« l i v i n g standard o f the working c l a s s by u p h o l d i n g the r a t e o f p r o f i t , thereby r o b b i n g the workers o f t h e i r share o f the products. 82 They saw In the c a b i n e t s o f Bruning and Papen the f a s -c i s t d i c t a t o r s h i p . The h i s t o r i a n of the Rote Kampfer, I h l a u , c o n s i d e r e d t h i s a misconcept, which he blamed f o r t h e i r a n t i -p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m . T h i s a n t i p a r l i a m e n t a r i s m caused them i n 1931 to a d v i s e t h e i r members to b o y c o t t the e l e c t i o n s . THE SAP The SAP was a motley o f d i v e r g e n t groups whose main denominator was t h e i r d i s t r u s t o f the KPD and the SPD. Each group c o n t r i b u t e d i t s own ideas to the SAP's program which then r e f l e c t e d the heterogeneous c h a r a c t e r of the p a r t y . In the economic sphere S t e r n b e r g became the unchallenged e x p e r t o f the p a r t y . He argued t h a t c a p i t a l i s m was d e c a y i n g and c o u l d o n l y s u r v i v e by going towards f a s c i s m and war. S i n c e 1900, e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e the F i r s t World War, c a p i t a l i s m found i t harder to a c q u i r e and e x p l o i t non c a p i t a l i s t t e r r i t o r y . C a p i t a l i s m can o n l y d e l a y i t s f i n a l c o l l a p s e and m a i n t a i n i t s predominance by c r e a t i n g c r i s i s a f t e r c r i s i s . But the s i z e o f the c r i s i s i n c r e a s e d i n g e o m e t r i c a l p r o p o r t i o n s . By now they had reached a stage where they became s e l f p e r p e t u -a t i n g . T&e f a c t o r s which had helped c a p i t a l i s m i n i t s as*?- . cent - t o f i n d s h o r t term s o l u t i o n s f o r c r i s e s - were now I n e f f e c t i v e . T h i s was e s p e c i a l l y t r u e o f German c a p i t a l i s m . Even a war, which i n v o l v e d the d e s t r u c t i o n of huge amounts o f goods, means o f p r o d u c t i o n , and human l i v e s , c o u l d o n l y b r i n g t e m p o r a r y a r e l i e f . I t would s e t the eondjltlohs f o r a r e p e a t o f the c r i s e s , o n l y i n l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n s . Only s o c i a l i s m could s o l v e the problem. Humanity faced now the 83 c h o i c e between a c c e p t i n g s o c i a l i s m or r e t u r n i n g to barbarism.-Sternberg's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s m i n f l u e n c e d a l s o the f o r e i g n p o l i c y program of the SAP. There were two sources o f war danger t the enorn,iB)UBgintensification of the i m p e r i a l i s t i c c o m p e t i t i o n and the d i s c r e p a n c y between the c a p i t a l i s t world and the S o v i e t Union. C a p i t a l i s m and Im-p e r i a l i s m go hand i n hand as much as i m p e r i a l i s m and war. Thus, bourgeois i n s t i t u t i o n s , such as the League of Nations or i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t i e s , can not prevent wars i n a c a p i -t a l i s t world. They on l y served to mutually safeguard the r e s p e c t i v e spheres of e x p l o i t a t i o n . - ' In 1932 the SAP i s s u e d a summary of i t s r e v i s e d program. T h i s document, more than any other, expressed c l e a r l y and unambiguously the Weitanschauung o f d i s s i d e n t s o c i a l democrats and communists. The SAP a s p i r e s to a, c l a s s l e s s s o c i e t y - in. which the means of p r o d u c t i o n a r e not p r i v a t e l y owned, i n which t h e r e w i l l be no more e x p l o i t a t i o n o f peopleGpyepeople, and i n which the s t a t e as an o r g a n i z a t i o n i n the hand o f the r u l i n g c l a s s i s removed. S o c i a l i s m can o n l y be achieved by d i s p o s s e s s i n g the Cjapi'tftllsts and through thereonquest o f p o l i t i c a l power by the working c l a s s . Short term goals a r e secondary to t h i s aim. The r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e Is o n l y p o s s i b l e I f t h e r e e x i s t s a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , which can be r e c o g n i z e d by a deepgoing d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the bourgeois s o c i e t y and the r e a d i n e s s o f the p r o l e t a r i a t t o use a l l methods o f o r g a n i z e d s t r u g g l e , from mass s t r i k e to open war f a r e a g a i n s t the b o u r g e o i s i e . The s t a t e i s always a t o o l o f one c l a s s to r u l e over another. .... The v i c t o r i o u s working c l a s s can n©Jt®take over the g i g a n t i c m i l i t a r y and b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f the bourgeois s t a t e . The p r o l e t a r i a t must t h e r e f o r e de-s t r o y the bourgeois democratic s t a t e and r e p l a c e i t w i t h a Rate r e p u b l i c o f the working masses, l e d by the revo-l u t i o n a r y p a r t y . 84 The SPD i s a t o o l of the b o u r g e o i s i e ; i t s r e t u r n to c l a s s s t r u g g l e i s i m p o s s i b l e . The SAP i s unbiridgeably opposed to the SPD and the Second I n t e r n a t i o n a l . One o f the most urgent d u t i e s of the SAP i s to win the s o c i a l democratic workers f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o l i t i c s . The KPD and the Comintern have f a i l e d i n t h i s t a s k . They were unable to p r o v i d e l e a d e r s h i p f o r the p r o l e t a r i a n masses d u r i n g p a s t r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s . In s p i t e o f t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s and i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n to the t e a c h i n g s of L e n i n they conducted p o l i t i c s which confused the working c l a s s , which slowed i t down, and which f u r t h e r e d s p l i t t i n g . T h e i r b i g g e s t mistakes were the abandonment of the U n i t e d F r o n t , the " S o c i a l F a s c i s t " theory, the RGO course, and the p r a c t i c i n g of p e t t y bourgeois n a t i o n a l i s m . The SAP, by the c o r r e c t use of r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o l i t i c s , wants to show the communist workers the mistakes and the achieved damage by the KPD and the Comintern. In s p i t e of the Comintern's mistakes, and i n s p i t e of the c r i t i c i s m d i r e c t e d a t the Comintern by the SAP, the SAP w i l l defend the S o v i e t Union as the o n l y workers' s t a t e a g a i n s t any a t t a c k by the c a p i t a l i s t counter r e v o l u t i o n . The SAP i s a g a i n s t any i m p e r i a l i s t war, be i t a de-f e n s i v e war or be i t d i s g u i s e d as a war to defend one,'s n e u t r a l i t y . I t w i l l use a l l energy and msansfetovprevjeht such a war. I t w i l l use the o p p o r t u n i t y such a war pro-v i d e s to d e s t r o y the c a p i t a l i s t system. The SAP supports the r e v o l u t i o n of the c o l o n i a l sub-The emancipation o f the working c l a s s can o n l y be ^©Machievedfeby thefeworjklhgsclas^fia^ p a r t y to prepare and o r g a n i z e i t . The p a r t y must g i v e I t d i r e c t i o n and aim, i t must work out the t a c t i c s , I t must be the l e a d i n g vanguard. The p a r t y must p r a c t i s e democratic c e n t r a l i s m and the l e a d e r s must be i n f l u e n c e d by the members. 52 T h i s SAP program was o f f e r e d when the Nazi menace was v e r y obvious. No p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , l e t alone a l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r p a r t y , c o u l d i g n o r e the f a s c i s t pheno-menon i n Germany and abroad. STRUGGLE AGAINST FASCISM In the n i n e t e e n twenties n a t i o n a l i s t i c movements appeared i n a number of European c o u n t r i e s . Although they possessed no common i d e o l o g y , they shared c e r t a i n t r a i t s . These movements were a u t h o r i t a r i a n and a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c i n concept and s t r e s s e d as t h e i r main p o i n t the advancement and s u p e r i o r i t y o f t h e i r own n a t i o n or r a c e . They opposed i n t e r -n a t i o n a l s o c i a l i s m as w e l l as i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l i s m , yet they were supported by a l a r g e number of l o c a l c a p i t a l i s t s . They u s u a l l y had a m i l i t a n t l e f t wing which p r o f e s s e d to be s o c i a l i s t . The assumption o f power i n I t a l y by M u s s o l i n i ' s F a s c i s t P a r t y provided a c o l l e c t i v e name f o r these movements; t h e i r enemies c a l l e d them " f a s c i s t " . S o c i a l i s t s soon r e c o g n i z e d the danger which the spread o f f a s c i s m r e p r e s e n t e d f o r them. A c o n s e r v a t i v e government would s t i l l a l l o w a s o c i a l i s t p a r t y to e x i s t . But an a u t h o r i -t a r i a n f a s c i s t s t a t e would outlaw s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s , t e r r o r i z e t h e i r members,*and persecute t h e i r l e a d e r s , Thus, the d i f - ; f e r e n t s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s t r i e d to study t h i s new phenomenon and they a l l drew c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s . A l l German s o c i a l i s t s agreed t h a t f a s c i s m was the p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e ' s r e a c t i o n to i t s own p a u p e r i z a t i o n . The s m a l l b u s i n e s s men, the farmers, and the independent a r t i s a n s - i n s h o r t , the s m a l l employers - were caught i n a t h r e e s i d e d squeeze, c o n s i s t i n g o f hi g h p r i c e s and I n t e r e s t r a t e s , h i g h taxes, and h i g h wages. Thus, the p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e c o n s i -dered b i g b u s i n e s s and banks, the government, and organized l a b o u r as t h e i r n a t u r a l enemies. As B i g Business was too I n t a n g i b l e and too powerful t o come to g r i p s with, the p e t t y bourgeois s m a l l b u s i n e s s men l a s h e d out i n d e s p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t the parliamentary* r e p u b l i c which they h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the h i g h taxes and ;bhe economic c r i s e s . They a l s o a t t a c k e d 86 the s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s because the l a t t e r advocated h i g h wages and s o c i a l b e n e f i t s f o r the working c l a s s . A c c o r d i n g to German M a r x i s t s the upper b o u r g e o i s i e used the f a s c i s t movement to prevent or d e l a y i t s u l t i m a t e c o l l a p s e . Bourgeois l i b e r a l democracy was a c c e p t a b l e to the r u l i n g c l a s s e s d u r i n g normal times. By extending p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y to the working c l a s s , the l a t t e r i s l e d to b e l i e v e t h a t i t could f i n d r e d r e s s f o r the s o c i a l i l l s through the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . However, the r u l i n g c l a s s e s were a l l too w i l l i n g to abandon democracy when the lower c l a s s e s t r i e d to a l l e v i a t e t h e i r s u f f e r i n g by u s i n g t h e i r p o l i t i c a l power to get an equal share o f the n a t i o n ' s wealth. The p r o c e s s used by the upper b o u r g e o i s i e t o suspend democracy i s e i t h e r Bonapartism or f a s c i s m . In both cases the upper b o u r g e o i s i e manages to manipulate the c l a s s e s which s u f f e r the most: the p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e , the farmers, the L u m p e n p r o l e t a r i a t , the l a b o u r a r i s t o c r a c y , and the d e c l a s s e e s o f a l l c l a s s e s . They f i g h t the b a t t l e s of the upper bourge-o i s i e . Bonapartism occured under c a p i t a l i s m i n i t s ascen-dency, when the working c l a s s , t h a t had fought shoulder to shoulder w i t h the b o u r g e o i s i e to overthrow the a r i s t o c r a c y , demanded andequal share o f power. Fascism, on the o t h e r hand, happens d u r i n g the d e c a y i n g stage o f c a p i t a l i s m , when the working c l a s s i s i n the process o f overthrowing the c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e . Thus, i n e f f e c t , f a s c i s m i s more dangerous than Bonapartism s i n c e i t r e p r e s e n t s the l a s t stand of c a p i t a l i s m . Thalheimer, the t h e o r e t i c i a n of the KPO, c o n s i d e r e d the c u l t o f the g r e a t l e a d e r as one o f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f 87 f a s c i s m . I d e a l l y t h i s l e a d e r * comes^from the lower c l a s s e s ; he i s a man who had.-suffered, "but worked h i m s e l f up, a s o c i a l c l i m b e r or a self-made man. T h i s makes him " F l e l s c h von lhrem F l e l s c h ' . ' . ^ German f a s c i s m i s the attempt o f the p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e and i t s a l l i e d p a r t s from the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a to f i n d i n t h e i r own p a r t i c u l a r way a d e l i v e r a n c e a f t e r the t r i e d d e m o c r a t i c - s o c i a l i s t way had l e d i n t o a d e s e r t s I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s a s s h o p e l e s s and f u l l o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n s as i s the s i t u a t i o n o f the p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e . As L o u i s Bonaparte t r i e d i n France so does the p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e attempt i n Germany to become the middle man between the c l a s s e s . Bonaparte usedtthe Dezemberbande, the p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e uses the d e c l a s s e e s from the war and from the economic decay .... The heads o f t h i s areaGerman Napoleons, who have l o s t the b a t t l e on the Marne, but won the b a t t l e i n the s t r e e t s o f B e r l i n / a g a i n s t the German workers/. 5 Sternberg, whose w r i t i n g s I n f l u e n c e d the KAPD, the Rote Kampfer groups, and the SAP, a l s o blamed the economic c o n d i t i o n s f o r the r i s e o f f a s c i s m . Due to t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the process of p r o d u c t i o n as s m a l l producers the middle c l a s s e s a r e unable to conduct t h e i r own p o l i t i c s . They never i n t e r f e r r e d independently i n h i s t o r y , they have always been p u l l e d a l o n g , i l n l t h e c a p i t a l i s t society,t^byt&he d e c i s i v e c l a s s e s , the bourge-o i s i e or the p r o l e t a r i a t . The s t r o n g e r the c r i s i s , the more dangerous the s i t u a t i o n f o r the b o u r g e o i s i e became, the more important was i t f o r the b o u r g e o i s i e to d i v i d e the e x p l o i t e d c l a s s e s .... There i s l i t t l e economic d i f f e r e n c e between the workers and the middle c l a s s . I f £hey /the middle classes7wwou!d a l l y themselves w i t h the p r o l e t a r i a t , they c o u l d a b o l i s h c a p i t a l i s m . 5 5 Where Thalheimer saw the middle c l a s s e s as the prime movers o f the f a s c i s t phenomenon, S t e r n b e r g saw them as ob-j e c t s manipulated by the l a r g e r and more powerful c l a s s e s , i n the case o f f a s c i s m , by the upper b o u r g e o i s i e . A f t e r b e i n g l u r e d Into the f a s c i s t camp, the middle c l a s s e s turned a g a i n s t the working c l a s s , 88 they fought a g a i n s t the growing burden of t a x a t i o n , wage r a t e s , and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y dues on b e h a l f o f t h e i r em-p l o y e e s . In t h i s they saw o n l y the symptoms o f t h e i r d i s t r e s s , not the causes .... I t i s the s m a l l e n t r e p r e -neers who have to pay the l a r g e s t p a r t of the s o c i a l burdens /as they c o n s i d e r e d i t 7 s i n c e they needed more manpower per c a p i t a l than the l a r g e companies,5° The SAP saw i n f a s c i s m the product o f the p r o g r e s s i n g decay o f c a p i t a l i s m . The b o u r g e o i s i e e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t the on-going p a u p e r i z a t i o n of the working c l a s s presented a r e v o l u -t i o n a r y danger to i t s r u l e . D i v i d e d i n t o d i f f e r e n t competing i n t e r e s t groups, the b o u r g e o i s i e needed the s t a t e to r e p r e s e n t i t s common I n t e r e s t s . I f the democratic s t a t e Is unable to do t h i s , a more a u t o c r a t i c form o f government i s needed. A faaaisjlfc s t a t e would f o r c e the d i f f e r e n t economic power groups t o put a s i d e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l I n t e r e s t s and work t o g e t h e r a g a i n s t the working c l a s s f o r t h e i r common I n t e r e s t s . The t e r r o r i s t d i c t a t o r s h i p i s the o n l y form o f government pos-s i b l e when the bourgeois democracy i s unable to do the job and the working c l a s s i s not ready to wrest c o n t r o l from & the b o u r g e o i s i e . Seydewitz saw i n f a s c i s m the arm of the r u l i n g c l a s s . The c a p i t a l i s t s , on the o t h e r hand, were the head and the body.^ 7 Thus, the SAP a l s o c o n s i d e r e d the f a s c i s t f o r c e s t o be n o t h i n g but t o o l s o f the upper c l a s s . The Rote Kampfer c o n s i d e r e d f a s c i s m , or, t o be more s p e c i f i c , the NSDAP, to be one of the t h r e e p i l l a r s which t upheld monopoly c a p i t a l i s m , the o t h e r two b e i n g the SPD and the Centre p a r t y . The SPD had as i t s mass b a s i s the r e f o r -m i s t l a b o u r unions, the Centre p a r t y had the C h r i s t i a n t r a de unions, and the NSDAP had the pauperized p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e . By constantlyjpjfcaying these three p a r t i e s a g a i n s t each o t h e r . 89 the c a p i t a l i s t s managed to remain i n c o n t r o l o f Germany.^ The RK groups r e c o g n i z e d the f a c t t h a t the Nazis, a l t h o u g h s e r v i n g to some extent the i n t e r e s t s of c a p i t a l i s m , were not p a r t of the r u l i n g c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s i n Germany. Although none o f the s p l i n t e r groups went as f a r as t h e KPD d i d i n c a l l i n g the SPD the l e f t wing o f f a s c i s m , some d i d c l a i m to see ^omeifasclstetehdencilesh'inStheiiaPD and n e a r l y a l l agreed t h a t the SPD prepared the way f o r a f a s c i s t v i c -t o r y . A c c o r d i n g to the SAP the f a s c i s t f r o n t reached from H i t l e r v i a Groener to Bruning. The SAP considered the " c o l d " f a s c i s m o i Bruning no l e s s dangerous than the open f a s c i s m o f H i t l e r . The Rote Kampfer a l s o spoke o f a h s i n d i r e c t or " " c o l d " f a s c i s m under Brttning and a d i r e c t f a s c i s m as p r a c -t i z e d by the NSDAP.^ T h i s a n a l y s i s of f a s c i s m must have had some u n d e s i r a b l e e f f e c t s , as I t l e d to an u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n o f H i t l e r and o f the d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s o f the Nazi d o c t r i n e . Having r e c o g n i z e d H i t l e r and h i s p a r t y as the l e a d i n g f a s c i s t movement i n Germany, the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s t r i e d t o e v a l u a t e H i t l e r ' s e f f e c t i v e n e s s on the p o l i t i c a l scene. To the Rote Kampfer H i t l e r was n o t h i n g but the r u n n i n g dog (Ke11enhund)co'f na11 onalism whose c h a i n i s h e l d f i r m l y by monopoly c a p i t a l i s m . H i t l e r would not be another M u s s o l i n i , as German c a p i t a l i s m was t e n times as s t r o n g as the I t a l i a n ; H i t l e r would always p l a y second f iddai&etaaph^acapitall'its'. TbeMeoldS.gMsC'iasr:rGr©©lier and B r i i n i n g had succeeded i n making H i t l e r and the Nazi movement f o r the time b e i n g a p r i s o n e r o f the p a r l i a m e n t a r y system. They p r e d i c t e d t h a t H i t l e r would soon® come 90 to power l e g a l l y and t h a t he would outlaw l a b o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . H i s d e f e a t i n the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s i n 1932 was symbolic o f the s u b j u g a t i o n o f the Na z i movement and i t s acceptance o f the l e g a l f a s c i s i a t l o n o f Germany by monopoly c a p i t a l i s m . The c a p i t a l i s t s would have no t r o u b l e i n c o n t r o l l i n g the l a r g e s t p a r t o f the NSDAP apparatus, w h i l e the p u t s c h l s t wing o f the p a r t y , the SA, would be harder t o control.^° In o r d e r to prevent a f a s c i s t v i c t o r y s e v e r a l o f the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s advocated U n i t e d F r o n t s o f a l l l a b o u r o r -g a n i z a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the, SPD and the KPD. The SAP even went so f a r as to propose t h a t i n the event o f an a t t a c k by the R i g h t upon the democratic f o u n d a t i o n s o f the Weimar Re-p u b l i c , the p r o l e t a r i a t s e i z e power and e s t a b l i s h a tempo-r a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p . ^ 1 N e v e r t h e l e s s , the SAP r e a l i z e d t h a t H i t l e r ' s v i c t o r y was imminent. As a c a p i t a l i s t s o l u t i o n f o r t h e world c r i s i s was c o n s i d e r e d t o be i m p o s s i b l e , the SAP was c e r t a i n t h a t H i t l e r would f a l l a l s o . Thus, the T h i r d Reich would o n l y be a ^phantasy" which would l a s t as l o n g as i t had the necessary,? number of bayonets a v a i l a b l e t o h o l d the working c l a s s down.62 The KPO seemed t o have the most r e a l i s t i c t h e o r y i f not about f a s c i s m then about i t s German v a r i a n t , Nazism. Thalheimer p r e d i c t e d i n 1928 t h a t H i t l e r , o r German f a s c i s m , onoe i n power, would be worse than I t a l i a n f a s c i s m . He main-t a i n e d t h a t , i f i t i s not s e r i o u s l y opposed by the workers, i t would not d e s t r o y i t s e l f as others, had h o p e d . ^ None o f the s p l i n t e r groups foresaw the b e s t i a l i t y o f Nazism, i t s s t r e n g t h and mass ap p e a l ; a l t h o u g h a l l these 91 groups devoted more a t t e n t i o n p e r c a p i t a to the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t f a s c i s m than the SPD and the KPD d i d . They r e p e a t e d l y c a l l e d f o r U n i t e d F r o n t s o f a l l working c l a s s o r g a n i z a t i o n s . They managed t o o r g a n i z e j o i n t p u b l i c meetings which were u s u a l l y ignored by the two s e n i o r p a r t i e s . They were p a r t l y s u c c e s s f u l i n o r g a n i z i n g p r o l e t a r i a n defence o r g a n i z a t i o n s whose members attended meetings o f l e f t - w i n g p a r t i e s to p r o -t e c t the speakers. But most o f t h e i r e f f o r t s were thwarted'* by the two b i g p r o l e t a r i a n p a r t i e s . Even a f t e r the assumption o f power by the Nazis the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s continued t h e i r s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t f a s c i s m as the e n t r i e s i n the Gestapo r e -cords p r o v e ^ . CHAPTER FOUR STRUCTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS BASIC STRUCTURES The b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s r e f l e c t e d t o some extent the s t r u c t u r e s o f the p a r t i e s from which they o r i g i n a t e d . The s o c i a l d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i e s p a t t e r n e d them-s e l v e s a f t e r the SPD? the communist p a r t i e s a f t e r the KPD. In the SPD the B e z i r k s v e r e i n ( d i s t r i c t a s s o c i a t i o n ) was the b a s i c u n i t . T h i s gave c o n s i d e r a b l e power to the p a r t y b u r e a u c r a t s , e x e c u t i v e members, and the e l e c t e d p u b l i c f i g u r e s . When the USPD broke away from the SPD, i t took with i t p a r t s o f the p a r t y apparatus. There seemed to be no need t o r e s t r u c t u r e the a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g u n i t s . Thus, as i n t h e SPD, the p r o f e s s i o n a l p o l i t i c i a n s and the bu r e a u c r a t s h e l d the power i n the USPD. The SAP, however, wanted to change t h i s and gi v e c o n t r o l o f the p a r t y t o the grass r o o t member-s h i p . I t s b a s i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e was the O r t s y e r e l n ( l o c a l a s s o c i a t i o n ) . O r t s v e r e i n e were e n t i t l e d to send d e l e g a t e s to the conventions. But o n l y those persons who were e l e c t e d as d e l e g a t e s c o u l d vote a t conventions. Members of the d i s t r i c t o r n a t i o n a l e x e c u t i v e , d e p u t i e s o f the Re i c h s - t a g o r a L a n d t a g , D u n l e s s they were d u l y e l e c t e d convention 1 d e l e g a t e s , c o u l d speak a t conventions, but co u l d not v o t e . The b a s i c s t r u c t u r e o f the KAPD was the B e t r i e b s - o r g a n l s a t l o n (shop o r g a n i z a t i o n ) . The B e t r i e b s o r g a n i s a t l o n 92 93 had two main g o a l s , the d e s t r u c t i o n o f the s o c i a l i s t - l e d t r a d i t i o n a l Free Trade Unions, t h e i r bases, and t h e i r "non-p r o l e t a r i a n " Ideology, the ^bou^geois" SPD and USPD and, secondly, the b u i l d i n g of a communist s o c i e t y . Every worker who accepted the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t could become a member of the B e t r l e b s o r g a n l s a t i o n . Members d i d not nece-s a r i l y have to a ccept the program o f the KAPD. As l o n g as they accepted the KAPD's method of the c l a s s s t r u g g l e , they were welcome. As the KAPD d i s i n t e g r a t e d d u r i n g the middle ft920$fcvmanyr.6ftheir o r g a n l z a t i o n s and i n d i v i d u a l s found t h e i r way i n t o the ranks o f the Rote Kampfer (RK) groups. In June 1931, due to the i n i t i a t i v e of the SWV, the d i f f e r e n t RK groups throughout Germany j o i n e d t o g e t h e r . ^ A t the b e g i n n i n g of 1931 the l e a d e r s of the SWV :C'^S.,-J?-P. r e a l i z e d t h a t i t was Impossible to stop H i t l e r from coming i n t o power. The p o l i t i c a l working c l a s s o r g a n i z a t i o n s were too d i s u n i t e d . New t a c t i c s were needed f o r the f u t u r e . The o v e r a l l o b j e c t i v e had to be to b u i l d a p r o l e t a r i a n mass o r -g a n i z a t i o n composed of c l a s s conscious elements. In order t o a c h i e v e t h i s , s m a l l and s e c r e t cadre o r g a n i z a t i o n s were needed, P e t e r Utzelmann, commissioned by the SWV, succeeded i n b u i l d i n g a network o f RK groups around B e r l i n and o t h e r important German cen t r e s . These groups operated i n a h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d manner. T h e i r l e a d e r s were not e l e c t e d , but a ppointed. The RK movement d i d not propose to become a new s o c i a l i s t p a r t y , but a group of c e l l s f o r the purpose o f propaganda, d i s c u s s i o n s , and the establishment o f a r e v o l u t -i o n a r y core a t the p l a c e o f work and i n the l o c a l neighbour-94 hoods. On the l o c a l l e v e l , the f o r m a t i o n o f "revolutionary-unemployment a c t i o n groups" was advocated. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the l o c a l groups made up the d i s t r i c t groups. More impor-t a n t , however, was the attempt to form groups o f employed workers i n f a c t o r i e s . To the RK the employed workers were p o t e n t i a l l y more e f f e c t i v e ih&torlnglng about the r e v o l u t i o n as they were a b l e to h u r t c a p i t a l i s m a t i t s most v i t a l p o i n t . 5 The main o b j e c t i v e of the RK was to p r e s e r v e the s o c i a l i s t i d e o l o g y through the p e r i o d o f s u p p r e s s i o n and to become the s t a r t o f f u t u r e s o c i a l i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s . ^ Although each RK group was r e l a t i v e l y independent, they a l l r e c o g n i z e d the o v e r a l l l e a d e r s h i p of the SWV. In the summer of 1932 Schroder, Schwab, Utzelmann, G o l d s t e i n , S t e c h e r t , L i n d n e r , and R i e l l c o n s t i t u t e d themselves as the R e l c h s l e l t u n g o f the RK?, They d i v i d e d the groups i n t o se-v e r a l g e o g r a p h i c a l r e g i o n s . A t i t s one and o n l y Relohs-konferenz. oh December 25 and 2 6 , , 1 9 3 2 , i n B e r l i n , the RK r e o r g a n i z e d i t s e l f Into five-m embers geliliss i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e i r f u t u r e i l l e g a l o p e r a t i o n s . 8 No i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e on the s t r u c t u r a l bases o f the Theodor L i e b k n e c h t - l e d rump-USPD, the SB, the KAG, and the v a r i o u s u l t r a l e f t and l e f t - w i n g communist break-away groups. I t can be assumed t h a t they had l o c a l o r g a n i -z a t i o n s i n some o f the l a r g e r c i t i e s and i n d i v i d u a l s u p p o r t e r s i n s m a l l e r communities. The KPO was, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y , c o n s t r u c t e d the same way as the KPD. The s m a l l e s t u n i t was the l o c a l group; however, i n some p l a c e s t h e r e w e r e ^ s t r e e t and shop c e l l s . 95 There were about 60 t® 70 l o c a l groups i n 1929« D u r i n g 1930 and 1931 between 20 and 30 new l o c a l s were founded. L o c a l groups were Joined t o g e t h e r i n d i s t r i c t o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The s t r o n g e s t o f them were i n 1929 Halle-Merseburg, Hesse-Frank-f u r t , Middle Rhine, Lower Rhine, T h u r i n g i a , Wurttemberg, and the t h r e e Saxon e l e c t o r i a l d i s t r i c t s . ^ MEMBERSHIP Information about the membership i n the s p l i n t e r groups i s not e a s i l y a v a i l a b l e . There was q u i t e a mobile membership, w i t h many members d r i f t i n g from group to group o r r e t u r n i n g tjo the mass p a r t y they o r i g i n a l l y came from. Some, a f t e r a few d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s , abandoned p o l i t i c s com-p l e t e l y . Thus, any s t a t i s t i c t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e about a c t u a l membership counts would o n l y be c o r r e c t f o r a l i m i t e d p e r i o d o f time. Two o f the p a r t i e s , the USPD and the KAPD, f o r a s h o r t time only, c o u l d q u a l i f y as mass p a r t i e s . The USPD, a t the time o f i t s convention i n H a l l e , i n 1921, had 892,923 members, 55 d a i l y newspapers, 84 R e i c h s t a g d e p u t i e s and a c o n s i d e r a b l e number o f Landtag d e p u t i e s and e l e c t e d m u n i c i p a l o f f i c i a l s . Even a f t e r the H a l l e Convention the USPD r e t a i n e d , u n t i l 1922, a l l o f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a mass p a r t y . Although 237 d e l e g a t e s voted f o r u n i f i c a t i o n with the KPD and o n l y 156 voted a g a i n s t i t , a t the most 300,000 members t r a n s f e r r e d t h e i r membership to the KPD. Most of the d e p u t i e s , the most important p a r t y organs, and the l a r g e s t p a r t o f the p a r t y apparatus stayed w i t h the USPD. 1 0 96 Like the USPD, the KAPD had a promising beginning. The revolutionary L e f t within the KPD;of 1920 comprised the biggest part of the membership. When the L e f t broke from the KPD and became the KAPD, i t took along 38,000 of the KPD's 68,000 members. The KAPD's a f f i l i a t e , the AAU, had 70,000 members.^"1 Thus, i t had a l l the basic requirements to become a mass party. However, a f t e r the March Action, the fortunes of the KAPD declined. I t broke into several small groups, the biggest of which were the B e r l i n group with 2,000 members and the Essen (Ruhr) group with 706 members at the end of 1924. Membership counts of the KAG, the rump-USPD, and the SB are not avai l a b l e , but could not have been high. Although the actual numbers of individuals involved i n the s p l i n t e r groups shrunk, the number of Independent groups or groupiets grew during the mid twenties, mainly due to the process of rapid d i s i n t e g r a t i o n which divided and subdivided the KAPD. The number^of s p l i n t e r groups increased during 1926 and 1927, as the expelled u l t r a l e f t and l e f t communists t r i e d to avoid p o l i t i c a l o b l i v i o n by maintaining t h e i r independence. By 1927 the 13 ,000 KPD expellees had created countless s p l i n t e r groups. 1^ A report by the p o l i c e of the province Westfalia i n 1926, which i s perhaps exaggerated, claims that there were 30,000 to 35,000 members i n the groups l e f t of the KPD and c l a s s i f i e d them as follows: KAPD/AAU 2,000 Sohwarz-Gruppe 4 ,000 Spartakusbund /new7 6,000 Korsoh-Gruppe 3,000 Flscher-Maslow Gruppe. 6-7 ,000 Urbahn Gruppe 5,000 Wedding-Opposition 3,000 a l l others „ 3-4,000 14 97 A new purge, t h i s time a g a i n s t the r i g h t communists, took p l a c e i n 1927 and 1928. About 6,000 members were a f f e c t e d by t h i s w i t c h hunt i n the KPD. But not a l l o f them j o i n e d the KPO. The B r a n d l e r i t e s managed to a t t r a c t a t the most h a l f o f the e x p e l l e d r i g h t o p p o s i t i o n . The KPO's membership grew i n 1928, but l e v e l l e d out i n 1930. The h i g h e s t membership claimed by some of the KPO l e a d e r s was 6,000. Branftler, however, e s t i -mated 3 ,500 as the h i g h e s t . The t r u e number l i e s somewhere i n the middle. The KPO had between 700 and 1 , 500 members i n Thu-r i n g i a , about 500 i n H e s s e - F r a n k f u r t , 2 -300 i n .Wurttemberg, 2 -300 i n L e i p z i g , 4 -500 i n E r z g e b l r g e - V o g t l a n d , a few hundred i n S i l e s i a , about 1,000 i n Lower Saxony, and between 100 and 150 i n Hamburg1**. 29% o f the members l i v e d i n , T h u r i n g l a 19% " " " " " West and East Saxony, E r z g e b l r a ge-Vogtland 6% " 6% " 6% " 5% " 5% " 3% " 2% " ,,. ,,.,, .ilHesae-Frankfurt •••.••.•.•• Berlin-Brandenburg .SftfettBmberg Middle-Rhine,Lower Rhine, Ruhr Halle-Merseburg, Magdeburg-An-h a l t , Lower Saxony Wasserkante, iiN©i?thwest S i l e s i a Saar, Hesse-Waldeck Northern and Southern B a v a r i a East Prussia,Danzig,Pommerania The SAP was the s t r o n g e s t l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r group d u r i n g the l a s t stages of the Weimar R e p u b l i c , having more members than a l l i t s contemporaries together. Thus, i t be-came a p o l a r i z a t i o n p o i n t f o r those groups whoi> c o u l d see no f u t u r e i n t h e i r own separate e x i s t e n c e . Many f e l t t h a t t h e r e was a need f o r another l e f t - w i n g mass p a r t y which would r e p l a c e both the SPD and the KPD. The SAP c o u l d f i l l t h i s need. I t c o u l d become the p a r t y which would a t t r a c t a l l those 98 s o c i a l democrats who were d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the SPD's tole*-r a t i o n o f the bourgeois government and a l l those communists who f e l t t h a t the KPD had degenerated. I f / i t f a i l e d to become a mass p a r t y , the SAP would o n l y aggravate a bad s i t u a t i o n ? i t would d i v i d e the a l r e a d y d i v i d e d working c l a s s even more. Thus, the SAP l e a d e r s knew, t h a t i t was not good enough to gather a few s o c i a l i s t and communist s e c t s i n t o t h e i r f o l d , but t h a t they must b u i l d a s t r o n g membership base. In o r d e r to g a i n more members, many SAP members, d u r i n g the f i r s t weeks o f the p a r t y ' s e x i s t e n c e , c h a i r e d and attended meetings every day. They managed t o draw members °f t n e Relchsbanner to t h e i r own p a r a - m i l i t a r y p r o t e c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n , the S o z i a l i s t l s o h e Sohutzbund (SSB), and they won s e v e r a l SAJ members to t h e i r own youth o r g a n i z a t i o n , the S o z i a l i s t l s o h e Jugendverband (SJV). But i n s p i t e o f a l l t h i s , t h e SAP d i d not succeed i a b e c o p i i r g a .mssfflpart& A lthough the p a r t y p r e s s , the F a c k e l , r e p o r t e d on October 23, 1931. t h a t the SAP had, without c o u n t i n g the SJV, 50 ,000 members, and a l t h o u g h the p a r t y e x e c u t i v e claimed i n February 1932 57 ,000 members, D r e c h s l e r maintains, t h a t the SAP had a t i t s peak, i n c l u d i n g the SJV, never more than 27,000 members, which was 2%% of the SPD membership and 8% o f the KPD's. 1 6 The Rote Kampfer o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r i e d to operate i n s e c r e c y . I t i s unreasonable to assume t h a t they would have kept a c c u r a t e membership r e c o r d s . The estimated membership o f the RK was about 4-5 ,000 d u r i n g 1931 and 1932, but o n l y about 400 a t the time of the Nazi take-over 1* 7. A c c o r d i n g to a study i n the V l e r t e l j a h r e s h e f t e f u r Z e l t g e s c h l o h t e , 99 t h e r e were twelve RK groups In B e r l i n w i t h about f i f t e e n mem-ber s each i n a d d i t i o n to groups i n Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, S t e t t i n , Dresden, L e i p z i g , H a l l e , Z e i t z , and in: some south German c i t i e s , , w i t h a t o t a l membership of between 4 ,000 and 5v000 members. However, each group had a l a r g e p e r i p h e r y ^ o f sup-p o r t e r s so t h a t t h e i r i n f l u e n c e ranged f a r beyond the s m a l l RK membership. 1 8 There i s no i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e onmtheismale-female r a t i o o f the membership o f the l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . As i n the case o f the KPD and SPD, theimemb:ersrof^splinter groups r e s i d e d mostly i n c i t i e s . The urban working c l a s s i n Germany supported l e f t - w i n g p a r t i e s w h i l e the farmers were drawn to the V o l k l s o h e p a r t i e s . The o r i g i n a l USPD was s t r o n g i n t h e h i g h l y i n d u s t r i -a l i z e d a reas of c e n t r a l Germany, B e r l i n , and the Ruhr. I t s members were mostly low p a i d , semi s k i l l e d and u n s k i l l e d workers. The membership o f the KAPD was composed o f the same socio-economic l a y e r s as t h a t o f the USPD, i t was p a r t o f the p r o l e t a r i a t i n B e r l i n , Hamburg, Bremen, Hannover, Dresden, and the Ruhr 1^. Not much data i s a v a i l a b l e about the members of the rump-USPD and the SB. But Judging by the s l a t e s they presented, i t can be assumed, t h a t both p a r t i e s had a s t r o n g percentage of p r o l e t a r i a n s . S o c i o l o g i c a l l y , §he s l a t e s of the rump-USPD and the SB were mostly p r o l e t a r i a n . In May 1924 of the n i n e t y - f i v e c a n d i d a t e s entered by the USPD f o r t y were a r t i s a n s and twenty-two were u n s k i l l e d workers, f o r a t o t a l o f s i x t y - t w o working c l a s s c a n d i d a t e s . There were o n l y seven p r o f e s s i o n a l s , such 100 as lawyers, p h y s i c i a n s , and s o c i a l workers, and seven t r a d e u n i o n o f f i c i a l s on the s l a t e . Only s i x candidates were wo-men. Ifflm.&$rgS t h e r e was a s l i g h t s h i f t . Of t h e f o r t y -n i n e candidates twelve were u n s k i l l e d workers and t h i r t y were a r t i s a n s , f o r a t o t a l o f 85$ working c l a s s c a n d i d a t e s . The r e s t i n c l u d e d one lawyer (Theodor L i e b k n e c h t ) , and one s o c i a l worker ( E l s a Wlegmann). There were no t r a d e u n i o n o f f i c i a l s . Three candidates were women. In 1928 the USPD entered o n l y twenty-two candidates, two of which were women. The l i s t I ncluded s i x u n s k i l l e d workers, t e n a r t i s a n s , and two p r o -f e s s i o n a l s , L i e b k n e c h t and Wiegmann. In a l l t h r e e e l e c t i o n s the USPD entered 166 candidates ( c o u n t i n g those who r a h more than once each time s e p a r a t e l y ) . F o r t y , o r 24$, were u n s k i l l e d workers, e i g h t y were a r t i s a n s , seven were t r a d e u n i o n o f f i c i a l s , and eleven were p r o f e s s i o n a l s (However, Li e b k n e c h t and Wieg-mann were each counted t h r e e times, thus t h e r e were a n i u a l l y o n l y seven proifessJOBais). A t l e a s t one o f these candidates, , Liebknecht, was a l s o a candidate i n 1930* Most of these candidates entered on s e v e r a l l i s t s . The twenty SB candidates I n May 1924 had a s i m i l a r background. They co n t a i n e d f i v e u n s k i l l e d workers, n i n e tradesmen, one t r a d e u n i o n o f f i c i a l , 20 and f i v e o t h e r s . Only one candidate was a woman. The s l a t e s o f both, the USPD and the SB, contained a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f metal workers. In May 1924 the USPD r a n one Dreherliburner, s k i l l e d metal worker) from B e r l i n and two from o t h e r p l a c e s , f o u r metal workers and t h i r t e e n other c a n d i d a t e s who were connect"©^ w i t h metal work. The SB r a n one Dreher and two metal workers tftom B e r l i n , one Dreher and 101 21 two S c h l o s s e r ( a l s o s k i l l e d metal workers) from o t h e r p l a c e s , ' C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t both.. L i e b k n e c h t and Ledebour were c l o s e l y connected w i t h the former R e v o l u t i o n a r y Shop Stewards-movement, and t h a t t h i s movement w a s r s t a r t e d by the metal worker t r a d e union, e s p e c i a l l y by the B e r l i n l o c a l s o f the Dreher s e c t i o n , one can assume^, t h a t both p a r t i e s had a h i g h composition of remnants from the former R e v o l u t i o n a r y Shop Stewards. In comparison with t h i s , the SPD nominated and r a n i n the 1928 R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n more than 350 c a n d i d a t e s . Of these, 162, or 48$ were working c l a s s and 52, or 15$ were women. The KPD entered over 450 can d i d a t e s , 407, or 8$% o f which were working c l a s s and 8^% were women. To conclude from t h i s t h a t the SPD p o l i t i c i a n s were as p r o l e t a r i a n o r i e n t e d as the USPD and the SB and t h a t the KPD was even more so, i s a f a l l a c y . Both, the SPD and the KPD; r a n h i g h l y I n f l a t e d s l a t e s . I t can be assumed t h a t many names were put on the s l a t e s f o r tokenism o r I n o r d e r t o reward some o l d p a r t y f a i t h f u l . As o n l y a f r a c t i o n o f the candidates could r e a s o n a b l y hope to get e l e c t e d , i t would be more v a l i d d t o examine the a c t u a l p o s i t i o n s p r o l e t a r i a n and women candidates had on t h e y s l a t e s , o r how many o f them were a c t u a l l y e l e c t e d . By the a l l o t m e n t o f s e a t s , the p a r t i e s appointed the top names on t h e i r s l a t e s t o become d e p u t i e s . In the SPD 133 o f the 162 working c l a s s c a n d idates d i d not get e l e c t e d . Thus, o f the e l e c t e d can-d i d a t e s , a p p roximately 20# were working c l a s s . N e a r l y a l l o f the lawyers, p h y s i c i a n s , s o c i a l workers, p r o f e s s i o n a l p o l i t i c i a n s , p a r t y and t r a d e u n i o n o f f i c i a l s (Bonzen) were e l e c t e d . T h i r t e e n o f the s u c c e s s f u l candidates were women. 102 Over 50$ o f the e l e c t e d KPD candidates were working c l a s s . However, many o f them, l i k e Thalmann f o r example, were by t h a t time p r o f e s s i o n a l p o l i t i c i a n s , so t h a t the a c t u a l per-centage o f working c l a s s d e p u t i e s was much l o w e r . 2 2 Most o f the f o l l o w e r s o f the u l t r a l e f t and l e f t ex-KPD members were f a c t o r y workers i n the l a r g e c i t i e s . Katz, who had a r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g group i n Hannover, claimed to have f i f t e e n l o c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s around t h a t c i t y , w h i l e ;thesKbrsch-Schwarz group found i t s support i n the Ruhr d i s -t r i c t , i n N l e d e r r h e l n , i n fialle-Merseburg, i n the P a l a t i n a t e , 23 i n H e s s e - F r a n k f u r t , and i n B e r l i n . ^ In the R e i c h s t a g e l e c -t i o n of 1928 t h e s l a t e o f the l e f t communists r e c e i v e d most of i t s votes i n B e r l i n , some Saxon c i t i e s , and i n Ludwlgs-hafen, i n the P a l a t i n a t e . Approximately two t h i r d s o f the l e f t communist can-d i d a t e s entered i n t o the 1928 R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n c o u l d be c a l l e d p r o l e t a r i a n . The o t h e r t h i r d were i n t e l l e c t u a l s and former KPD b u r e a u c r a t s . However, the i n t e l l e c t u a l s were the . 25 ones who appeared on thestop of the l i s t s . Whereas communists w i t h S p a r t a c l s t background as a r u l e leaned to the r i g h t , the ones who came from the USPD swerved t o the l e f t . The t a b l e below shows the c o n n e c t i o n between p o l i t i c a l l e a n i n g and p o l i t i c a l background w i t h i n the KPD. I t i s to be understood t h a t among the f u n c t i o n a r y ?- ~ l a s the L e f t and the U l t r a L e f t were the ones who l a t e r be-came the groups r e f e r r e d to as the l e f t and the u l t r a l e f t communists, the R i g h t became the KPO, w h i l e the V e r s o h n l e r , w i t h the e x e p t i o n of a few o f t h e i r l e a d e r s , stayed i n the 103 KPD. Most of the g e n e r a l membership stayed In the KPD. The t a b l e r e f e r s to the time s h o r t l y b e f o r e the o p p o s i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n a r i e s were purged. Background c n a r i e s >f oppo USPD s i t i o n a l fun S p a r t a c i s t BtiO-new Genera USPD 1 membership S p a r t a c i s t L e f t 13 3 20X~ 4# U l t r a L e f t 23 9 3 9% 7% R i g h t 20'""' 46 ~ - ""' 8% - 2 1 % -V e r s o h n l © 2 10 22 J 6 h% 13% P a r t y l i n e 4 l # . , .._ 36% Of 74 d e l e g a t e s who attended the f i r s t KPO c o n v e n t i o n i o n on December 29, 1928, i n B e r l i n , 43 were from the pre 1919 Spartacus, 17 from the pre 1920 l e f t USPD, and 53 from the pre 1918 SPD 2^. The l e a d e r s o f the KPO were- mostly trade u n i o n i s t s and i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The r i g h t i s t s favoured the U n i t e d F r o n t w i t h the SPD. They were a c t i v e i n the t r a d e unions and were l e s s o b s t r u c t i v e i n the p a r l i a m e n t s than the l e f t i s t s . Many, b e f o r e t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n from the KPD, were Involved i n the Rote H l l f e . They took no p a r t i n the i n t e r n a l squ'abbl®s; Of the R u s s i a n Communist Party, but accepted S t a l i n ' s c l a i m t o l e a d e r s h i p o f the CPSU: on the other hand, they denied h i s 2 8 r i g h t to c l a i m world l e a d e r s h i p of the Comintern. The p r o l e t a r i a n elements dominated i n the KPO. In southern Germany i t was mainly s k i l l e d and semi s k i l l e d workers who were members o f the KPO. In Offenbach and S t u t t -g a r t t h e r e were many l e a t h e r workers who belonged to the KPO. In L e i p z i g the KPO membership was mainly composed of the 1 0 4 p r i n t i n g and the f u r r i e r t r a d e s . However, i n the r e s t of Saxony i t was mainly u n s k i l l e d workers. In the mountains of T h u r i n g i a the members of the KPO were employed i n the c o t t a g e i n d u s t r i e s , such as basket weaving and g l a s s b l o w i n g . 2 Whereas the T h u r l n g i a n cottage i n d u s t r i a l workers had a tendency to support the KPO, t h e i r c o l l e g u e s i n the n e i g h b o u r i n g s t a t e of Saxony supported the SAP. The d i s t r i c t o f Vogtland i n Saxony, one of the poorest, i f not the p o o r e s t , areas i n Germany, contained the b e s t o r g a n i z e d SAP groups. I t was the o n l y a r e a where complete SPD l o c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s j o i n e d the SAP.3° Both, the SAP and the KPO, were p r o t e s t p a r t i e s p o l i t i c a l l y to the r i g h t o f the KPD and t o the l e f t o f the SPD. Thus, they would a t t r a c t those elements o f the p r o l e t a r i a t who had no economic s e c u r i t y , whose income was a f f e c t e d by the f l u c t u a t i o n s of the world market, and who were e i t h e r t£b© downtrodden or too i s o l a t e d from each other t o contemplate r e v o l u t i o n . The cottage i n d u s t r y i n T h u r i n g i a and saxony, depending mainly on export, was s u s c e p t i b l e to a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s e s . The weavers (o f c l o t h ) , the bas-k e t weavers, and the g l a s s blowers of c e n t r a l Germany have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been the p o o r e s t people i n Germany. They l i v e i n v i l l a g e s and s m a l l towns, separated by mountains, and they l a c k the s t r o n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s the workers i n the l a r g e r c i t i e s have. The s t r e n g t h of the SAP was concentrated i n the f i v e g e o g r a p h i c a l a r e a s , corresponding mainly to the home bases o f the more prominent founders o f the p a r t y . Max Seydewitz, a member of the R e i c h s t a g , had been p r e s i d e n t of the SPD i n 105 the e l e c t o r l a l d i s t r i c t of Chemnitz-Zwickau, or southwest Saxony. He was a l s o the e d i t o r of the S a c h s l s c h e s V o l k s b l a t t . H e i n r i c h S t r o B e l , a l s o a member o f the R e i c h s t a g , came from the same d i s t r i c t . A second SAP s t r o n g h o l d was B r e s l a u , where the l o c a l SPD p r e s i d e n t , E r n e s t E c k s t e i n , the s e c r e t -t a r y Max Rausch, one member of the R e i c h s t a g , Hans Z i e g l e r , and s i x t e e n o f the t h i r t y - f o u r c i t y c o u n c e l l o r s j o i n e d the SAP. In E a s t Saxony, around Dresden, a s t r o n g SAP group was l e d by F a b i a n and Llebermann, The SAP was f a i r l y s t r o n g i n Offenbach, where Andreas Portune was i t s member o f the R e i c h s - t a g . T h i s group was strengthened i n March 1932, when Galm, a member of the Landtag, l%3itB$ee3h^n(d-^eja.<©B>emfegi:8ta&d©ten c i t y c o u n c e l l o r s from the KPO i n t o the SAP, which gave the SAP a^secondamember i n the H e s s i a n Landtag. The f i f t h SAP s t r o n g -h o l d was T h u r i n g i a , where i t had two R e i c h s t a g members, Rosen-31 f e l d and Slemon. S t r a n g e l y , Saxony was not o n l y a s t r o n g h o l d of the', l e f t s o c i a l d e m o c r a t i c SAP, but a l s o o f the r i g h t - w i n g A l t e  S o o l a l d e m o k r a t l s c h e P a r t e i (ASP$J; i t was indeed l i s o n l y s t r o n g h o l d . I t s attempt t o become a n a t i o n a l p a r t y f a i l e d d i s m a l l y . In 1928 i t entered s l a t e s i n 21 e l e c t o r l a l d i s t r i c t s f o r the R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n , a n d h p a r t i c i p a t e d i i l h ^ t h e a i P r u s s l a n Landtag e l e c t i o n . The l e a d i n g candidates on these s l a t e s were p r o f e s s i o n a l p o l i t i c i a n s (such as Saxon c a b i n e t m i n i s t e r s ) , s e n i o r c i v i l s e r v a n t s , and a few s k i l l e d and u n s k i l l e d wor-k e r s . N a t i o n a l l y , the ASP r e c e i v e d ,2% of the vote, w i t h more than h a l f of the t o t a l coming from the t h r e e e l e c t o r l a l districts!®., 29 , and 30, which comprised the s t a t e o f Saxony.3 2 106 The l e a d e r s o f the KAPD were mostly i n t e l l e c t u a l s . Most of the f o l l o w e r s were f a c t o r y workers, ; w i t h - l i t t l e forr-„ mai education, from the I n d u s t r i a l c e n t r e s o f B e r l i n , C e n t r a l Germany, and the Ruhr...; A f t e r the f a i l u r e o f many o f t h e i r a c t i o n s and a c o n s i d e r a b l e l o s s o f members, the i n t e l l e c t u a l s were purged. . The f i r s t t o be purged were the N a t i o n a l B o l -s h e v i k s Laufenberg and W-olffheim. They were f o l l o w e d by Otto Ruhle, a l s o known ( l a t e r i n Mexico) as the p a i n t e r C a r l o s Timero, P f e m f e i t , an author w i t h a p e t t y bourgeois background, andlBroh, a lawyer. They became the founders o f the AAUE, The o u s t i n g o f Ruhle, Pfemfert, and Broh was executed by the Schroder, G o l d s t e i n , Reichenbach, G o r t e r s e c t i o n , a group o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s and j o u r n a l i s t s . T h i s group, i n t u r n , was ex-p e l l e d i n 1922, when the B e r l i n s e c t i o n q u a r r e l l e d with the Ruhr s e c t i o n , which supported t h i s group.:, The l a s t i n t e l l e c -t u a l l e a d e r s , Schwab and Jung, l e f t soon a f t e r t h i s purge. Among o t h e r l e a d e r s were the t e r r o r i s t Max Holz, a modern-day Robin Hood; the s a i l o r and c a r p e n t e r Utzelmann, a t e r r o r i s t ; the dockworkeriAppel, a p r o f e s s i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y and one time p i r a t e . But none of these t h r e e remained l o n g with the KAPD, Ap p e l went to H o l l a n d , Holz to the S o v i e t Union, and Utzelmann t o a maximum s e c u r i t y prison.-' The S c h r o d e r s e c t i o n , a f t e r b e i n g pushed out of the KAPD, j o i n e d the SPD. There they worked i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h L e v i , a f t e r whose death they took over the SWV. Thus, they became the Leaders o f the RK. T h e i r f o l l o w e r s were mostly young workers. I h l a u d i d a study on 115 RK members, l e a d e r s and f o l l o w e r s . As the t a b l e w i l l show, 96 of these vrere 107 s t r i c t l y working c l a s s . 'Occupation of 115 RK members Age o f 103 out o f these Workers 49 Selow 25 28 A r t i s a n s _19 | Between 26 and 30 3 6 — ' Other employees 17 Between 31 and 40 30 C i v i l Servants 9 Between hi and 50 8 I n t e l l e c t u a l s 10 Over 50 : . 1 3^ The percentage o f u n s k i l l e d workers and unemployed seemed minimal. Metal workers were the s t r o n g e s t represented, type 35 s e t t e r s were second. The RK members '»'.. were'1 all:communist by c o n v i c t i o n , but most of them were members i n the SPD as the SPD d i d g i v e them more of a chance to express themselves, had a l a r g e r scope, and a more steady membership /than the KPD, whicH/ .... had too l a r g e a t u r n o v e r T i n some years 50^ /)--tb b u i l d c o n s i s t e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 36 ELECTION RESULTS, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL The e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s the l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r groups r e c e i v e d r e f l e c t e d t h e i r membership. In r e g i o n s where a p a r t y had a l a r g e membership, i t r e c e i v e d a l a r g e vote. The s o c i o -economic p a t t e r n of the members was a l s o r e f l e c t e d , although i n a g r e a t e r s c a l e , by the v o t e r s . There i s no data a v a i l a b l e i n regards t o how many male and how many female v o t e r s voted f o r the s p l i n t e r groups. The o r i g i n a l USPD p a r t i c i p a t e d i n two n a t i o n a l and i n s e v e r a l r e g i o n a l e l e c t i o n s . On January 19, 1919, i t r e c e i v e d 2,317,300 votes as compared to the SPD's 11,509,100 of the 39,400,300 votes c a s t . The USPD sent 22 d e p u t i e s to the N a t i o n a l Assembly, the SPD 165. In the June 6, 1920 R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n the USPD r e c e i v e d 5 ,046,800 votes out of 28,196,300 108 cast and came second only to the SPD, which netted 6,104,800 votes. The two soclaidemocratic parties had respectively 84 and 102 elected deputies. , This e l e c t i o n was the f i r s t attempt of the KPD, which, withft589,,500 votes, elected four deputies.3 7 The USPD came f i r s t i n the e l e c t o r i a l d i s t r i c t s of B e r l i n , Potsdam II, Potsdam I, Merseburg (the Prussian pro-vince of Saxony), L e i p z i g (part of the Free State of Saxony), Thuringia, and Dusseldorf East (part of the Ruhr a r e a ) 3 8 . jn a few other d i s t r i c t s the USPD, although not coming f i r s t , d i d better than the SPD. In d i s t r i c t s which contained many medium sized c i t i e s , with independent tradesmen and s k i l l e d workers, employed i n l i g h t industry, the USPD received fewer votes than the SPD39. In the cath o l i c farming areas of southern and eastemGGBEmany 40 none of the s o c i a l i s t parties had much success • In the pro-testant farming areas the SPD and the KPD did f a i r , while the USPD and the left-wing splintte]pa;;r£3es received only a few votes (see Appendices 4 and 5 ) ^ » In Prussia the USPD participated i n two Esndgsg elec-tions, on January 26, 1919 f o r the State Assembly (Verfassungs- gebende Landesversammlung) and on February 20, 1921 (afte r the l e f t wing of the USPD had joined the KPD and before the r i g h t wing had joined the SPD) f o r the Landtag, the state l e g i s l a t u r e . The table i n Appendix 6 gives the t o t a l r e s u l t s of the three left-wing parties as well as the re s u l t s i n d i s t r i c t s where the USPD did exceptionally well and extremely poor. In 1924 the two remnants of the USPD, the rump-USPD and the SB, entered the contest for Sbhe Reichstag e l e c t i o n 109 In May. Of the two, only the USPD par t i c i p a t e d i n the Des® cember Reichstag e l e c t i o n . Both parties took part i n some of the elections for the state l e g i s l a t i v e assemblies. Neither party was able to elect any deputies. The table i n Appendix 7 gives the comparative r e s u l t s . In seven months the USPD l o s t two thirds of i t s elec-t o r l a l support. At the same time, the SPD increased i t s vote from 20.5$ to 26$, while the KPD f e l l from 12.6$ to 9 $ . ^ 2 The fact that three\°,USPD&oand4idates i n May 1924 were l i s t e d as aldermen, Indicates that the rump-USPD par t i c i p a t e d with some success i n municipal elections. Haase, Stadtverord- neter. Zwifcfcau, was on the slafce@fte3.the e l e c t o r l a l d i s t r i c t 28 (Dresden-Bautzen); Rennelsen, Konrad, Belgeordneter, Hildes-heim, was on the slat e for the e l e c t o r l a l d i s t r i c t 22 (Diissel-dorf-East) i and Schneider, Konrad, Stadtrat, Pirmasenz, ^as on the sla t e for the e l e c t o r l a l d i s t r i c t 27 (Palatinate)^ 3 , The ASP appeared f o r the f i r s t tdime as an independent party at the Landtag e l e c t i o n i n Saxony on October 31, 1926, It received 4 .2$ of the vote and reelected, with 91 ,885 votes, four of i t s deputies. The SPD, with 31 deputies, remained the largest fraction**'24'. The four ASP deputies succeeded, with the help of bourgeois c o a l i t i o n partners, to remain i n power. In 1928 the ASP received i n the state of Saxony 34,569 votes du-r i n g the Reichstag election, a loss of over 57,000 votes i n 19 months. A year l a t e r , on May 12, I f 2 9 , the ASP l o s t two of i t s four Landtag seats i n Saxony, when i t received, with 39 ,568 votes, l|-$ of the popular vote.**'5 The party was com-p l e t e l y eliminated on June 22 , 1930, when i t f a i l e d to elect 110 anyone to the Saxon D i e t , as i t s support a t the p o l l s shrank w i t h 19 , 2 2 6 votes to 0.7%» The KPO i n the same e l e c t i o n , r e c e i v e d wirth 14 , 6 8 8 votes, 0 . 6 $ popular s u p p o r t . ^ On January 3 0 , 1 9 2 7 , a u l t r a l e f t Kommunistische  A r b e i t s g e m e l n s c h a f t entered a s l a t e i n t o the Landtag e l e c t i o n o f T h u r i n g i a . T h i s group should not be mistaken for. L e v i ' s KAG;., which had been out o f e x i s t e n c e f o r n e a r l y f&vesjyeaiEss I t captured 3 , 7 3 2 v o t e s , which was \ % % as compared to the y 31.6% of the SPD and the 14 . 1 $ of the KPD.^ 7 F i v e working c l a s s p a r t i e s c ontested the R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n o f May 1 9 2 8 . As u s u a l , the SPD and the KPD entered s l a t e s i n every e l e c t o r i a l d i s t r i c t . The L e f t O p p o s i t i o n under Urbahn and Scholem entered s l a t e s i n twenty-three d i s -t r i c t s under the name of L l n k e Kommunlsten (LK). They had a working arrangement (Llstenverblndung) with the P a l a t i n a t e group, which c a l l e d I t s e l f A l t e Kommunistische P a r t e i (AKP). The ASP competed i n twenty d i s t r i c t s and Theodor L i e b k n e c h t ' s USPD i n s i x t e e n . Again, none of the l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s e l e c t e d any d e p u t i e s . The t a b l e i n Appendix 8 shows the e l e c -t i o n r e s u l t s of a l l f i v e p a r t i e s . In 1928 there were s e v e r a l e l e c t i o n s f o r the v a r i o u s s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s . Some of them, f o r example the P r u s s i a n and the Ba v a r i a n , took p l a c e a t the same time as the R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n . The t a b l e s below g i v e the r e s u l t s f o r the l e f t -wing p a r t i e s i n the Landtag e l e c t i o n s and compares i t t o the R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . ^ 8 I l l P r u s s i a R e i c h s t a g Landtag Mand. Stage! SPD 6,600 ,000 80 1 # 29 . 0 KPD 2.200 ,000 25 2.236,207 56 11.9 USPD 13 ,000 12,118 0.1 LK 52 .000 - 55.408 - 0 . 3 ASPD 15 .000 - 18,824 - 0.1 B a v a r i a (total) ( P a l a t i n a t e ) . . . . . . . . . ..«, SPD ; 826*359 (119.548) 11 ( i ) &'JS0?,727 34 24 . 2 KPD 129,948) ( 29.208) i[ _ (-) 125.738 5 3.8 USPD 1,424) 402) Ld. 359 iJLK ( i n # 26) fcKP (in;£#227) T o t a l LO 1,781 ( 3,772 5.553 $ 3,132) 3.132 - ap.0 .9 0 . 1 A n h a l t SPD -84,507 15 42.4 KPD 15.0j>7 T.K - 0.4 Hamburg, SPD 255.133 4 60* KPD 116.128 1 114.257* 27* 16,6* LK 2.415 - -USPD - 7061 0 . 1 * I n t e r n a t i o n a l e Kommunisten ( A r b e l t e r 738* OoDosition) (Group Korsch) mm 0 . 1 * J On September 14, 1930, the l a s t R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n the USPD conte s t e d , i t r e c e i v e d o n l y 11,690 v o t e s . There i s no evidence t h a t the ASP or the LK p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h i s e l e c t i o n . ^ Although the s p l i n t e r groups f a i l e d to e l e c t any de-p u t i e s t o the R e i c h s t a g and to some s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s , they d i d have some r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n these p a r l i a m e n t s . Those who had been e l e c t e d through one of the major p a r t i e s as a r u l e kept t h e i r mandates a f t e r they broke with t h a t p a r t y u n t i l they were d e f e a t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g e l e c t i o n . The l e f t communist R e i c h s t a g d e p u t i e s formed an Informal " R e l c h s t a g f r a k t l o n l i n - k e r Kommunisten", c o n s i s t i n g of F i s c h e r , Katz, Korsch, Scholem, Schwarz, Schlagewerth, Schwan, Urbahn, Schutz, and T i e d t . They * B u r g e r s c h a f t e l e c t i o n , February 19, 1928. 112 h e l d s e v e r a l Landtag s e a t s , f i v e i n Saxony, three i n T h u r i n g i a , two i n B a v a r i a , two i n Brunswick, two i n P r u s s i a , and one i n Baden. The f o r e r u n n e r s of the KPO, the r i g h t o p p o s i t i o n i n the KPD, entered a s l a t e i n the M u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n of 1927 i n S t u t t g a r t . To c a p i t a l i z e on the v o t i n g h a b i t of the KPD v o t e r s they c a l l e d t h e i r s l a t e Kommunistisohe P a r t e i . As the KPD's f u l l name was Kommunistische P a r t e i Deutschland, c a r e l e s s KPD v o t e r s c o u l d e a s i l y have voted f o r them. Data on how w e l l t h e i r d e c e p t i o n worked i s not a v a i l a b l e . The KPO d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n s . The one mandate t h i s group h e l d i n the R e i c h s t a g (Paul F r o l i c h ) e x p i r e d a f t e r the e l e c t i o n of 1930. I t d i d , however, conteat Landtag e l e c t i o n s . The o n l y seat the p a r t y h e l d came to i t through d e f e c t i o n s of former KPD d e p u t i e s . Seats gained i n t h i s f a s h i o n were, w i t h one exception, i n v a r i a b l y l o s t i n the next e l e c t i o n . One of t h e i r d e p u t i e s , Galm, i n the s t a t e assembly of Hesse, was r e e l e c t e d i n 1931 a n d i n 1932; however, p r i o r to the 1932 e l e c t i o n he had d e f e c t e d to the SAP. In P r u s s i a the KPO h e l d one s e a t u n t i l A p r i l 1932, i n Saxony f i v e u n t i l March 1929, i n T h u r i n g i a s i x u n t i l December 1929, i n ¥ Wiirttemberg two u n t i l A p r i l 1932, i n Hesse two u n t i l March 1932 and one u n t i l January 1932.^2 A t the Landtag e l e c t i o n of the s t a t e of Saxony on May 12, 1929, the KPO r e c e i v e d 22,594 v o t e s , or ,8% of the t o t a l v o t e . In the m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s h o r t l y a f t e r , the KPO doubled i t s vote i n 37 communities throughout Saxony, winning 25 s e a t s . In the P r u s s i a n m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s the KPO won f i v e s e a t s i n the p r o v i n c e o f Saxony, seven i n the Rhineland, and f o u r t e e n i n the Saar d i s t r i c t . A l t o g e t h e r the KPO won 70 mandates i n 64 P r u s s i a n communities. In Offenbach, i n the s t a t e o f Hesse, the KPO won e l e v e n seats on c i t y c o u n c i l , r e c e i v i n g f o u r times as many votes as the KPD d i d . On December 8, 1929, the KPO r e c e i v e d 12,222 votes i n T h u r i n g i a . T h i s was l|# of the votes c a s t , but s t i l l a few hundred s h o r t o f winning a se a t . There too, i t d i d b e t t e r i n the m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s o f 1930. In some'areas i t r e c e i v e d f o u r times as many votes as the KPD did} i n Ruhla the KPO gained h% of the vote. In December 1929 the KPO r e c e i v e d 0.4$ of the vote i n the B i i r g e r s c h a f t e l e c t i o n i n Bremen. On June 22, 1930, the B r a n d l e r i t e s ' vote i n Saxony shrank to 14 ,719 , or 0.4$, In Hesse, the KPO r e e l e c t e d Galm w i t h 1 4 , ^ 8 vo t e s , o r 1 .9$ of the vote, on November 15, 1 9 3 1 . ^ The KPO h e l d s e a t s i n v i l l a g e , town, and c i t y c o u n c i l s i n and around S t u t t g a r t , Jena, L e i p z i g , Zwickau, Offenbach, E r f u r t , Augsburg, and i n the Saar t e r r i t o r y . Some s m a l l communities even e l e c t e d KPO mayors.5^ I n T h u r i n g i a , however, the KPO mayors were r e l i e v e d o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n s by the Nazi M i n i s t e r o f the I n t e r i o r P r i c k . In other p l a c e s the KPO needed the support o f the SPD and the KPD i n order to make f u l l use o f i t s mandates. In r a r e cases i t d i d r e c e i v e SPD support, but never KPD support.5 5 In between the e l e c t i o n s the KPO gained seats from the KPD by more d e f e c t i o n s . By A p r i l 1930 the KPDthad l o s t 114 t h r e e d e p u t i e s i n P r u s s i a , a t l e a s t one of them to the KPO, two i n B a v a r i a presumably to the KPO, three i n Hamburg of which two went to the KPO and one to the SPD, two i n Wurttemberg to the KPO, and two i n Brunswick presumably to the KPO. In May 1931 the KPD a g a i n l o s t f o u r d e p u t i e s i n P r u s s i a , one to the LK, two to the KPO, and one s a t as an Independent. In B a v a r i a the KPD l o s t a l l f i v e o f i t s d e p u t i e s , one to the SPD and f o u r presumably to the KPO.-^ The SAP f a r e d no b e t t e r i n e l e c t i o n s than the other l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . I t managed o n l y i n Hesse t o e l e c t one deputy i n 1931. R i g h t a f t e r th&s a\sfcrong s e c t i o n of the KB© i n Offenbach j o i n e d the SAP, b r i n g i n g w i t h i t one Landtag deputy, Galm, which gave the SAP tw<!> d e p u t i e s t h e r e . In 1932 o n l y one of them was r e e l e c t e d . In 1931 the SAP and the KPO together won 23,108 v o t e s , or 2.9$ of the votesss The bes t r e s u l t s f o r both, the KPO and the SAP, were ac h i e v e d i n the c i t y o f Offenbach. In 1931 the SAP there r e c e i v e d 1.9$ and the KPO 1$%, f o r a t o t a l o f 19.9$. In 1932 the SAP, h a v i n g i n h e r i t e d the KPO apparatus, s t i l l r e c e i v e d 9.4$ of the O f f e n -bach vote.5 7 Other Landtag and B u r g e r s c h a f t e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s which a f f e c t e d the SAP a r e g i v e n b e l o w . ^ (d=deputies e l e c t e d ) S t a t e or c i t y and date S pi votes % 1 ¥. %$ ? D K. PD a S i votes VA. I % > • d P r u s s i a , Ap. 24/32 ^.675,173 21 94 12 57 80,392 TT B#ft). Ap. 24/32 003.693 16 20 7 8 13,437 .3 T h u r . . J u l y 31/32 -225.791 24 U5 16 10 2,067 .2 Hesse.June 19/32 172,552 23 17 12 7 11,689 i i 1 Hamburg,Ap.24/32 '2^6,242 30 49 16 26 2,305 .3 Meckl. -S chw^un<e$/°fl ^ 2108,361 30 18 7i 4 957 .2 Anhalt. A D . - 2 4 / 3 2 75.137 35 12 3 — m .4 Oldenb.. May 29/32 50.994 19 9 k 2 1,469 .5 -115 In the R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n of J u l y 3 1 , 1932, the SAP en-entered s l a t e s i n t h i r t y - o n e of the. t h i r t y - f i v e d i s t r i c t s . The S t a t i s t l k des deutschen Relchs, o f 1^ 3»t Published: under H i t l e r , g i v e s o n l y names and p r o f e s s i o n s o f those e l e c t e d and those l i s t e d on the top of the s l a t e s who f a i l e d to e l e c t anyone. Seventeen of these s l a t e s were l e d by Seydewitz, e i g h t by Ledebour, two by Portune, and one each by Rosenfeld, Zwei-l i n g , Fabian, and Hurm. The p a r t y r e c e i v e d 72,630 Srofces,.. o r 0.2$ of the votes c a s t and f a i l e d to e l e c t any d e p u t i e s to the R e i c h s t a g . In accordance with the s t a t e d wishes of the SAP ex e c u t i v e , the SAP votes were c r e d i t e d to the KPD 5^ g i v i n g the 60 KPD one e x t r a seat . In t h i s e l e c t i o n the SAP came f o u r t e e n t h out of s i x t y - t h r e e p a r t i e s . T h i r t e e n p a r t i e s r e c e i v e d mandates d a t e s . 6 1 On November 6, 1932, the SAP entered s l a t e s i n t h i r t y -two d i s t r i c t s . S i x t e e n s l a t e s were headed by Seydewitz, e i g h t by Ledebour, two each by Rosenfeld, Walcher, and Portune, one each by Zweiling*and F a b i a n . I f the r e s u l t s o S f t i b h e J u l y e l e c -t i o n were d i s a p p o i n t i n g , the November r e s u l t s were o u t r i g h t d i s a s t r o u s . * The SAP r e c e i v e d 45,201 v o t e s . T h i s time the 62 SAP d i d not decree i t s votes t o the KPD . The SAP d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the 1933 R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n . One week a f t e r the R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n the SAP entered i n t o the m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s i n the s t a t e of Saxony. Where i n the p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s the w.ork&n'gagl^^ it.wou:blg©paribIes, i n the m u n i c i p a l s e l e c t i o n s the SAP managed to get a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of vot e s , a t l e a s t i n the medium s i z e d and s m a l l working c l a s s communities. In one v i l l a g e , Morgenrothe-Rautenkranz, the SAP achieved a f u l l majority, winning eight out of thirteen seats. The other f i v e seats w were won by a united s l a t e of NSDAP and bourgeois p a r t i e s . A comparative study of thirteen medium sized towns i n thet-Mogtland s u b d i s t r i c t shows the r e s u l t s of the airlymand' November Reichstag electionsffor the SAP as approximately 1,800 and 1,230 votes and the municipal e l e c t i o n r e s u l t for the SAP as appro-ximately 3.00° votes. The SAP made the largest gains i n places where the Nazi influence was strong. It was there, where the class conscious workers saw c l e a r l y that neither the SPD nor the KPD could avert the Nazi danger. Thus they turned to that party which campaigned under the theme of stopping the Nazis. Two examples w i l l demonstrate t h i s voting p a t t e r n . ^ ( a ) Parties SAP July 31. 1932 Nov. 6, 1932 Nov. 13, (mu 1932, n i c i p a l ) mandates SA'B §9§ 245 93? 5 SPD hi 5 467 222 1 KPDAP 536 594 367 2 i mw&sm t bboKSBB* 1 s 2, 444 2,176 11899 9 '.Oithsrs, bourgeois 292-93 330 380 2 Total 4,081 3. §42 3.807 19 Brundobra SAP 393 20Q3 787 - 6 SPD 202 282 - -KPD 452 463 262 1 NSDAP 1.194 1,119 897 6 Others, bourgeois 129 189 335 2 Total 2,307 2,256 2,281 15 In large c i t i e s , however, the SSE had to compete against the e f f i c i e n t e lection machines of the SPD and the KPD. It f a i l e d to win any mandates i n Leipzig, Plauen, and Zwickau, i t l o s t votes i n Zwickau and i t entered no s l a t e i n Dresden. In eastern Saxony the SAP and the SPD ran j o i n t slates i n some 117 communities. The KPD turned down a l l SPD and SAP o f f e r s o f j o i n t s l a t e s . 6 3 ( b ) Prom the e l e c t i o n s t a t i s t i c s we can see t h a t the sup-p o r t f o r l e f t - w i n g p a r t i e s s t r e t c h e d through c e n t r a l Germany from n o r t h - e a s t to south-west. With the e x c e p t i o n of Saxony, one of the S i l e s i a n d i s t r i c t s ( B r e s l a u , which i s an i n d u s t r i a l r e g i o n ) , t o some extent S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n and the Rhineland, the border r e g i o n s voted s p a r s e l y s o c i a l i s t . Appendix 9, map 4, shows the fceedons of s o c i a l i s t support of the mid t w e n t i e s . With some minor v a r i a t i o n s , t h i s p a t t e r n was t r u e f o r the dura-t i o n o f the Weimar R e p u b l i c . I t shows t h a t the southern moun-taineous areas of Germany, e s p e c i a l l y B a v a r i a , r e j e c t e d the s o c i a l i s t s . In Baden, Wiirttemberg, Frankonia, and i n the Pa-l a t i n a t e t h e r e was a f a i r , but not s u b s t a n t i a l , s o c i a l i s t l a y e r . I t can be assumed t h a t the s o c i a l i s t vote i n these r e g i o n s came from the a r e a between and i n c l u d i n g K a r l s r u h e , S t u t t g a r t , Nurem-berg, Hesse, and the mountain range c u t t i n g through the P a l a t i n a t e . T h i s i s a predominantly p r o t e s t a n t (farming a r e a , i n t e r s p e r s e d w i t h i n d u s t r i a l r e g i o n s . The a r e a south of t h i s i s i s a p r e -dominantly c a t h o l i c f a r m i n g a r e a , so i s a l s o the western h a l f , o f the P a l a t i n a t e , the gftar, and the southern p a r t of the Rhineland. ThessaaaGmap^shows t h a t the SB tfound i t s support o n l y i n and around B e r l i n . The rump-USPD's support was i n a V-shape, s t a r t i n g i n B e r l i n , w i t h i t s vertfcx i n Baden, and ending a t the Dutch border, with h i g h , s p o t s i n B e r l i n , the two Saxonies, the P a l a t i n a t e , and the Ruhc a r e a . There was a l s o a s p r i n k l i n g o f support i n S c h l e s w i g — H o l s t e i n . The u l t r a l e f t and l e f t communists' support was s p r i n k l e d out i n l i t t l e 1 1 8 patches throughout c e n t r a l and jiorthwesternvrGermany, c o i n -c i d i n g p e r f e c t l y w i t h m.©.dt%of the i n d u s t r i a l centres. The ASP made l i t t l e impact outside Saxony. I t hadt.hardly any sup-p o r t i n B e r l i n , a~fairSamount i n East P r u s s i a , Potsdam I (west of B e r l i n ) , the Ruhr, and i n Southwest Germany. Map If, i n Appendix 2L© , , shows the r e g i o n a l support of theeKPO and of the SAP and the main centres of the RK. Uoth, the KPO and the SAP, had a f a i r amount of support i n S t u t t g a r t , T h u r i n g i a , Saxony, and Hesse. The SAP made some inroads i n the c o a l mining regions of c e n t r a l S i l e s i a and the KPO i n the c o a l mining regions of the Saar and around Dusseldorf. Both p a r t i e s seemed to a t t r a c t the same socio-economic s u b c l a s s e s . EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITIES I t was not only i n the e l e c t o r l a l sphere that the l e f t -wing s p l i n t e r groups t r i e d to leave t h e i r i mprint on Germany's p o l i t i c a l scenery. Most of the grouplets r e j e c t e d the thought t h a t they should be only e l e c t o r a l , machines. Their sole r e a -son of existence was based on t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t they were very d i f f e r e n t from a l l the other p a r t i e s . Thus i t was of utmost importance to them to spread t h e i r messages as o f t e n as p o s s i b l e . E l e c t i o n campaigns were only one of the methods and, i n many cases, not the most Important one. The extra-parliamentary impact o f the rump-USPD and of the SB was not any l a r g e r than t h e i r parliamentary impact. During 1 9 2 5 and 1 9 2 6 , i n the Furstenabfjadungskampagne, Lede-bour's SB had a working agreement with the Gruppe Revolutionarer  P a z i f i s t e n and the I n t e r n a t l o n a l e r S o z l a l l s t l s c h e r Kampfbund (ISK) b t*. In 1928 the SB a g i t a t e d together w i t h the Communists f o r a p l e b i s c i t e a g a i n s t the Panzerkreuzerbau^ 5. The KAPD d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n e l e c t i o n s . I t saw as i t s main f u n c t i o n the task to prepare the p r o l e t a r i a t f o r an armed r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e . Meanwhile, before the revo-l u t i o n could take p l a c e , the KAPS emphasized the economic as-pect of the .class s t r u g g l e . For t h i s purpose i t a f f i l i a t e d w i t h and organized the AAU. For the p r e p a r a t i o n and waging of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e , the KAPD i n s t i t u t e d the secret Kampforganisation (KO). The s t a t u t e s of the KO stated* 1. Knowing th a t only the armed r e b e l l i o n can emancipate the working c l a s s , and that i n any case the r e a c t i o n a r -r a © w i l l fo r c e the p r o l e t a r i a t to f i g h t ... a f i g h t i n g f o r c e i s needed ... to be ready a t the r i g h t moment.... 2. The KO e l e c t s i t s leaders .... 3 . There w i l l be absolute secrecy about i t s operations. Unnecessary t a l k among themselves about the i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s i s p r o h i b i t e d ,..; the KO has i t s own t r i -bunal which can mete out punishment; no member can q u i t the KO .... Under g u i d e l i n e s f o r the KO i t stated that 1. Each group must know the m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n of the enemy /the army and the p o l i c e 7 nearby. The group m, must have maps which show barracks, m i l i t a r y i n s t a l -l a t i o n s , schools, etc I t must know the st r e n g t h and the movement of troops .... °o In August 1920, i n connection w i t h the s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the d e l i v e r y of German arms to Poland, the KAPD occupied the c i t y of V e l b e r t i n the Ruhr d i s t r i c t and the c i t y of Kothen i n c e n t r a l Germany and proclaimed RateR-repufo'Mosx 1.g On March 16, 1921, the p r e s i d e n t of the P r u s s i a n province of Saxony, H o r s i g , requested from B e r l i n the a s s i s t a n c e of the S e c u r i t y P o l i c e Force to q u e l l a workers' r e b e l l i o n . Subsequently, i n 120 the night of March 19 to March 20, the KPD called f o r the Ge General S t r i k e . Fighting started on March 23. Near the c i t y of Merseburg the buildings of the Leuna company were occupied by s t r i k i n g workers. Ebert, on March 2 4 , "erklarte den n i c h t - m l l i t a r i s c h e n Ausnahmezustand" ( A r t i c l e 48 of the Weimar Constitution, vaguely comparable to the War Measures Act i n Canada) for the province of Saxony. Both, the KPD and the KAPD, were deeply involved i n the disturbances. Spokesmen fo r the KAPD claimed that the AAU had 10,000 members i n the Leuna Werke. Between 200,000 and 3000000 people were i n -volved i n the s t r i k e . Forty thousand workers fought with 68 weapons against 17,000 pol i c e men. As the KPO did not have much opportunity to engage i n parliamentary work, much of i t s a c t i v i t i y „ took place outside parliaments. Attempts were made with and without success to form United Fronts, to bui l d a n t i f a s c i s t c o a l i -tions, and to hold public meetings i n conjunction with other working class organizations. A n t i f a s c i s t c o a l i t i o n s sprang up i n Liebau ( S i l e s i a ) , Ruhlau (Thuringia), Erf u r t , Offenbach, and B e r l i n . There was no cooperation from the KPD and very l i t t l e from the SPD. In order to protect working class meetings and speakers from Nazi terror, the KPO and other groups formed "Proletarisohe Klassenwehren gegen Faschlsmus" and. "Arbeiterwehren". But withoujs the support of the SPD and the KPD these attempts were bound to f a i l . 6 ^ .p^ g K p 0 founded the Internationale Hllfs-Verelnigung (IHV). The IHV's organs S o l i d a r i t a t , published by A r b e i t e r p o l i t l k and Mittellungsbatter 121 der I n t e r n a t l o n a l e n H l l f s v e r e l n l g u n g . The IHV's main purpose was t o g i v e l e g a l a i d and l i m i t e d f i n a n c i a l support t o p o l i t i -c a l p ersecuted and i n j u r e d workers, e s p e c i a l l y to v i c t i m s o f the Nazi t e r r o r . The i n f l u e n c e the KPO had on the working c l a s s was much g r e a t e r than one should assume Judging by the s m a l l s i z e of the o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s meagre e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . T h i s i s mainly due to the p o l i t i c a l c a l i b r e of i t s l e a d e r s . Although none o f them c o u l d be compared to a Rosa Luxemburg or a K a r l L i e b k n e c h t , they were of a h i g h e r q u a l i t y than the P a r t e l - bonzen who were In c o n t r o l l of the SPD and the KPD. They had a c q u i r e d t h e i r p o l i t i c a l t r a i n i n g i n tthe same s c h o o l as Luxem-burg and L i e b k n e c h t d i d , namely W i l h e l m i n i a n Germany and they had been o p p o s i t i o n a l members i n the World War I SPD. The double hazard of c o n s p i r i n g a g a i n s t the government and a g a i n s t the h i e r a r c h y i n t h e i r own p a r t y gave them the experience ne-c e s s a r y to do t h e i r work. They were the " o l d guard of the KPD". They aijoasedGa f a i r amount o f i n t e r e s t . O f t e n t h e i r meetings were attended by three times as many people as they had members i n the p a r t i c u l a r a r e a . In order to h o l d those supporters and to a t t r a c t more, the KPO had a l a r g e and v a r i e d e d u c a t i o n a l program. The c o n t a c t between the R e l e n s l e i t u n g (RL) and the members and s u p p o r t e r s was extremely c l o s e , as speakers o f the RL spoke a t many of the "Information Evenings" conducted by the l o c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s a l l over Germany, In the l a r g e c i t i e s the KPO h e l d s e r i e s of e d u c a t i o n a l meetings d u r i n g the winter month. For example, 122 i n the winter of 1929/30 the KPO of B e r l i n conducted a s e r i e s of 24 regulagsmeetings on such t o p i c s as "Glass s t r u c t u r e i n Germany", "problems of the Trade union Movement", etc. The year a f t e r a s i m i l a r l y s t r u c t u r e d s e r i e s was o f f e r e d , t h i s time the theme was "Fascism". But not a l l the l o c a l s went to these lengibhs; some o f f e r e d weekend courses, others con^u ducted i n d i v i d u a l e d u cational evenings, d i s c u s s i n g t o p i c s such as the h i s t o r y of the KPD, t a c t i c s and p l a t f o r m of l e f t - w i n g 71 p a r t i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e i r own. For those of the younger gen-BE&fetQn who wanted to l e a r n , the KPO had more to o f f e r than i t s r i v a l s . Whereas the KAPD was prepared f o r an immediate revo-l u t i o n , the RK groups, o p e r a t i n g ten years l a t e r , were pre-p a r i n g themselves f o r long term underground work under a fas f a s c i s t d i c t a t o r s h i p . They, considered the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n of the Weimar Republic i n the middle of 1932 pre r e v o l u t i o n a r y . Thus, they were mainly concerned, as the only remaining revo-l u t i o n a r y nucleus, to l a y the foundation f o r the r e u n i f i c a t i o n and r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the c l a s s conscious p r o l e t a r i a t . The f feuds and the opportunism d i s p l a y e d by the two major working c l a s s p a r t i e s made both of them u n f i t to assume the l e a d e r s h i p 72 of a reorganized working c l a s s movement. The SAP was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n o r g a n i z i n g United Front committees which were mostly boycotted by the SPD and the KPD, but i n which many of the other s p l i n t e r groups p a r t i c i p a t e d . But i n December 1931 the SAP decided to change these t a c t i c s . I t gave up bu«i>l&'&ngdun'£ty committees with other o r g a n i z a t i o n s as too time consuming; however, i t s t i l l p a r t i c i p a t e d i n spon-123 soring j o i n t public meetings. 7 3 During the p r e s i d e n t i a l elec-t i o n campaigns of 1932 the SAP, a f t e r i n i t i a l l y toying with the idea of running Ledebour, came out i n support of Th&lmann from the KPD as the only working class candidate. INVOLVEMENT IN TRADE UNIONS The USPD, when i t was a mass party, was deeply i n v o l -ved i n the ADGB. Just as i t was the case i n the SPD and, for that matter, s t i l l i s the case i n a l l socialdemocratic and 1 labour based parties throughout the world, the leaders of the USPD were often also leading trade unionists. A strong compo-nent of the USPD's l e f t wing was the Revolutionary Shop Ste-ward movement. Remnants of thi s movement were s t i l l i n evidence i n the two successor parties of the USPD. The story of the leader of one of these parties, Georg Ledebour, i s as much part of the German trade union movement as i t i s part of so-cia l i s m . The KAPD and i t s a f f i l i a t e d and related groups rejected the s o c i a l i s t - l e d free trade unions as counterrevolutionary organizations. S o c i a l improvements achieved by the ADGB would only smother the flames of discontent and thus benefit and perpetuate the c a p i t a l i s t system. This made them tools of the reactionary forces. The KAPD members rejected the divisiveness of the c r a f t unions and favoured the all-embracing concept of i n d u s t r i a l unionism. A s t r i k e by a specialized union would only a f f e c t one p a r t i c u l a r part of the economy, while a s t r i k e by a s y n d i c a l i s t union could, i f t h i s union was b i g enough, 124 paralyze the whole economy of a geographical r e g i o n . They thus organized the Allgemeine A r b e l t e r Union (AAU), which, however, d i d not a t t r a c t many workers. S i m i l a r i l y , the l e f t and u l t r a l e f t groups, Iwlaich Gamej-putyofnthelKBDuinsthehmi-d-twentles, and which was l e d mainly by i n t e l l e c t u a l s , a l s o r e j e c t e d c o n s t r u c t i v e p a r t i c i -p a t i o n i n the f r e e trade unions. They considered the work i n the ADGB unions as a waste of e f f o r t and the leaders of t these unions t r a i t o r s to the working c l a s s . While they were s t i l l members of the KPD, they were proponents of the Rote  Gewerkschafts Opposition (RGO), the Comintern's c o n t r i b u t i o n to the trade union movement. Many of t h e i r disagreements witih Moscow stemmed from the f a c t , t h a t whenever the Comintern l i n e swerved to the r i g h t , the KPD was supposed to take a favourable a t t i t u d e towards the ADGB. On the other hand, the KPO remained a t a l l times ac-t i v e i n the ADGB a f f i l i a t e d unions, Brandler being a t r a d i t i -o n a l Gewerkschaftsbonze. This was i n accordance w i t h K 1 B p o l i c i e s e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1920. Although most of the unions were l e d by r e f o r m i s t s , involvement i n them provided an oppor-t u n i t y to i n d o c t r i n a t e f e l l o w workers. I t was thexduty of '! l o c a l KPO leaders to see t b a i t a t h a t a l l the members engaged i n trade union work. The KPOSs main reason f o r working i n the unions was not to conquer key p o s i t i o n s , but to win the confidence of the workers. T h e i r goal was to prepare the unions f o r the day when the f a s c i s t s would make t h e i r b i d f o r power, so tha t the r a n k - a n d - f i l e union members would f o l l o w 125 the KPO i n r e s i s t i n g the fascists rather than following the reformist leaders into passive acceptance of the f a s c i s t r u l e . The KPO held leading positions i n the Gewerkschafts- k a r t e l l '(similar to a l o c a l Trades and Labour Council) and i n the Schuhmacherverband i n and around' Stuttgart and i n some unions i n the Thuringian c i t i e s of Weimar, Erfur t , and Suhl. I t was strong i n the Holzarbelteryerband, the Buchdruckerver- band, and the Schuhmacherverband i n B e r l i n , Breslau, Offenbach, L e i p z i g and Hamburg. I t was represented i n shop committees i n Stuttgart ( S l e c t r i c i a n s and i n the shoe industry), Nurem-berg, Chemnitz, L e i p z i g ( t r a f f i c ) , Hamburg, Er f u r t , and Witten-berg (chemical industry). Some l o c a l s were completely con^ro t r o l l e d by the KPO, e s p e c i a l l y i n the DeutscheKMe.tal'Iarbeiter- verband (DMV) around Stuttgart. At the Annual Convention of the Stuttgart DMV i n 1930 <?3vQ£*'.$he*r©9« d f i l e f e & t f t f c m e u ^ ^ f KPO members... S l m i l a r i l y , the Feuerbach (a c i t y near Stuttgart) DMV, when.cho.osing delegates to the l o c a l Gewerkschaftskartell, voted as follows: KPO 364, SPD 283, KPD 114. The same pattern of strength by the KPO i n certain unions i s notice-able i n Th u r i n g i a . 7 ^ No evidence i s avail a b l e that the SAP i n i t s b r i e f e existence had any influence on the German trade unions. In general, i t s members, being left-wing socialdemocrats, were i n favour of trade union a c t i v i t i e s , but were opposed to the bureaucratic leadership of the t r a d i t i o n a l unions. 1 2 6 YOUTH Both, the KPO and the SAP v>hadastr6ngnandnac&&-v^vyouth o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The SAP's youth group, the S o z i a l i s t i s c h e r  Jugendverband (SJV), with 8-10,000 members, was about one s i x t h s i x t h of the s i z e of the SPD's SBS, and one f i f t h of the s i z e of the KPD's KJV; however, i t was a t l e a s t as a c t i v e , i n some areas even more a c t i v e , than i t s s o c i a l d e m o c r a t i c and communist r i v a l s . The leaders of SJV were ©nee?:the most a c t i v e members of the SAJ. One of the members was a c e r t a i n Herbert Frahm, who i s known today as W i l l y Brandt. The KPO's youth o r g a n i z a t i o n , the Kommunistischer Ju- gendverband (Opposition) (KJV/0/), had a membership of a p p r o x i -mately 1,000. I t was r e l a t i v e l y strong i n Saxony and i n Thus? r i n g i a ; i t had some streng t h i n Wurttemberg, IJerlin-Brandenfe burg, Wasserkante, S i l e s i a , and i n the two Hesse. I t main-t a i n e d a Reichsschule which could accomodate 35 persons a t a time. Courses were u s u a l l y of two weeks d u r a t i o n w i t h seven hours per day and were on the h i s t o r y of the working c l a s s movements, trade union problems, and on questions a f f e c t i n g young people. The KJV(0) worked with other o r g a n i z a t i o n s as members and a l l i e s . These included the Nafcurfreunde-Jugend, the F r e i e S o z i a l i s t i s c h e Jugend, the F r e i e n V e r e i n i g t e n S o z i - a l i s t i s c h e n Studenten, the I n t e r n a t i o n a l e r S o z i a l i s t i s c h e r K Kampfbund (ISK), and the A n a r c h l s t l s c h e Jugend. Together they aimed to form a P r o l e t a r i s c h e s J u g e n d k a r t e l l . 12? PUBLICATIONS^ Nearly a l l of the left-wing s p l i n t e r parties pub-lished extensively. However, as theyrhad a continuous-turn-over of members and supporters, any figures given i n regards to c i r c u l a t i o n ....of certain p e r i o d i c a l s would only be true for limited periods Q£ time. Furthermore, the periodic appearance of many of these s e r i a l s was highly i r r e g u l a r . Most of t h e i r publications reached only a small segment of the population 77 and are thus l i t t l e known, . As stated before, the USPD, at i t s convention i n Halle could report that i t had 55 d a i l y newspapers. The best known of them i s Die F r e i h e i t , which appeared from 1917 on u n t i l 1931, when the Liebknecht-led rump-USPD entered the SAP. The KAPD's most popular organ was the Kommunistlsche  Arbelter Zeltung. This was published1 i n several c i t i e s , i n -cluding B e r l i n . The l o c a l group of the KAPD and the AAU of Hamburg's editor Karl Kopp continued to publish i t under that t i t l e even a f t e r his group had broken with the KAPD and had become national communists. In the same way, the Essen group too kept the tittle for i t s Kommunistlsche Arbeiter Zeltung, organ der Arbelter Internationale a f t e r i t s break with the B e r l i n group. The B e r l i n KAPD between 1921 and 1928 published Pro-l e t a r i e s a monthly. Its s u b t i t l e i n 1921 and 1922 was Kom-munistische Arbelter Internationale and a f t e r 1924 Z e t t s c h r l f t 128 f u r r e v o l u t i o n a l en Klassenkampf. The Rev^\rteil»t^Jjei^it£!^|it|* . in ,:.. o r g a n i s a t i o n of the AAU B e r l i n issued between 1920 and 1932 Der Kampfruf, A f t e r 1932 i t was published by the Kdmmunlstl-sche A r b e l t e r Union. Der Klassenkampf, # 1-13. known as Per  Kampfruf from # 14 on ( i n 1924), appeared i n P i i s s e l d o r f under the auspices of the Revolutlonare B e t r l e b s o r g a n l s a t l o n Rhein-l a n d - W e s t f a l i e n . Franz Pfemfert was the e d i t o r axid p u b l i s h e r of P i e A k t i o n , a p e r i o d i c a l which s t a r t e d i n B e r l i n around 1910 and was s t i l l i n evidence i n 1932. I t was mostly devoted to pro-l e t a r i a n a r t , but d i d have, with the exception of the war years, a considerable amount of p o l i t i c a l content. From 1926 on the organ of the AAU was P i e P r o l e t a r l s c h e R e v o l u t i o n , published i n F r a n k f u r t am Main. The independent L e i p z i g s e c t i o n of the KAPP, known as the Kommunlstlscher Ratebund, issued P i e Epoche and P i e P e r s p e k t i v e . The best known p u b l i c a t i o n of L e v i t e s i s Unser Weg, 1919 to 1922, formerly known as Sowjet, edi t e d by Paul L e v i . Daumig and Hoffmann issued i n B e r l i n i n 1922 a M l t t e l l u n g s M t a t t  der KAG. A f t e r the KAG became i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the SPD, L e v i and others published i n B e r l i n from 1923 on S o z i a l i s t i s c h e  P o l l t i k und Wissenschaft, which, i n 1928, merged wi t h Per Klassenkampf of the l e f t SPD and l a t e r the SAP (not to be mistaken with Der Klassenkampf mentioned e a r l i e r ) . The Korrespondenzblatt der selbstandlgen Linken appeared i n 1924, r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t was a group of. e x p e l l e d former KPD members l e d by Schumacher, Weyer, and Kayser. The group around Schwarz issued Entschiedene Linke, while Korsch i n B e r l i n and Schlagewerth i n Miinchen-Gladbach, Ruhr, published Kommunistische P o l i t l k . The Reichsorgan of the tfjrbahn-led ), Lenin-Bund was Volkswllle, which appeared from B e r l i n between 1927 and 1933. In 1927 Urbahn issued for his. group a mimeo-graphed Mltteilungsblatt , which, a f t e r 1927, was continued i n regular p r i n t as Fahne des Kommunlsmus. Per Pionler, organ of the Communist Opposition i n Berlin-Wedding and i n Ludwigs-hafen, Palatinate, and Per Kommunist, p e r i o d i c a l of the united L e f t Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninist), appeared i n 1930. Both can be considered to be forerunners of German'SSIotskylst p u b l i -cations. Permanente Revolution, Z e l t s c h r l f t der L. 0. (Bolshe- v i s t - L e n i n i s t ) . B e r l i n 1931-1933, a f t e r 1932 also known as Wochenblatt der Llnken Opposition (Sektlon der Internationalen  Linken Opposition), was the central organ of the German Trots-k y i s t s . They also issued a Mltteilungsblatt der llnken Oppo- s i t i o n which was for members only. S t a r t i n g i n 1925, the Kommunistische Stadtverordneten- fr a k t i o n of Offenbach published Pas ¥olksrecht. When the majority of the Offenbach KPP sided with Brandler i n 1928, Pas Volksrecht became the o f f i c i a l organ for KPO i n Hesse-Parmstadt. Then, i n 1931, when this group defected to the SAP, the paper went with i t . The i d e o l o g i c a l organ of the KPO was Gegen den Strom, B e r l i n , which was edited by Thalhei-mer, Brandler, Walcher, and Hauser, Before the s p l i t with the KPP i t was only a Mltteilungsblatt, published i n Breslau. Gegen den Strom was kept a l i v e i n e x i l e u n t i l 1935» The Arbelter Tribune was the organ of the KPO Stuttgart between 130 1929 and 1 9 3 3 . Rote E i n h e l t appeared from 1929 on as a M l t t e i l u n g s b l a t t f o r the KPO and the R e v o l u t i o n i s e Gewerk-schafts Opposition of the d i s t r i c t of Wurttemberg, A r b e l t e r - p o l i t i k , L e i p z i g , a n d B e r l i n , 1929-1933. was the main organ of the KPO. I t s s u b t i t l e s were Kommunistlsche Tageszeitung (1930-1932) and a f t e r 1932 Woohenzeltung der kommunistischen  L a n d t a g s f r a k t i o n Sachsens*. The KPO youth o r g a n i z a t i o n , the ; KJVD(O), published from 1929 on Junge Kampfer. N. Roy and A A. Thalheimer were the e d i t o r s of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l e Naohs-loe r l c h t e n der Kommunistischen Opposition (INKOPP), which, from 1930 on, was published by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l e Vereinigung der  Kommunistischen Opposition ( I ¥ K 0 P ) . In 1930 the SWV issued G r u n d l i n i e n f u r Gruppenarbelt, a p u b l i c a t i o n of g u i d e l i n e s f o r i t s work. Der Rote Kampfer,  M a r x i s t l s c h e ArbeiterKEeltuntg appeared f i r s t i n 1930 i n Bochum. Between February 1931 and J u l y 1931 i t was published i n Coloo:.:o Cologne. When the SWV took over Der Rote Kampfer i t was published i n Cologne and B e r l i n u n t i l the end of 1931, a f t e r which i t was published i n B e r l i n and Dresden. As an a i d to p o l i t i c a l speakers and a g i t a t o r s the SWV and the RK j o i n t l y p u blished i n 1931 and 1932 Referenten M a t e r i a l . A*; weekly c i r c u l a r of the RK, produced i n B e r l i n i n 1932, was P o l i t i s c h e  Information. A l s o weekly appeared RK-Korrespondenz, pu b l i s h e d i n 1932 and 1 9 3 3 i n F r e i t a l , G i t t e r s e e . The RK issued i n 1932 Thesen liber den Bolschevlsmus and Kann der Trotzkyismus wlr k - l i c h slegen? In 1928 the group around L e v i j o i n e d f o r c e s w i t h Sey-dewitz, Rosenfeld, and S t r o b e l who, i n 192?, had s t a r t e d i n 131 B e r l i n with the p u b l i c a t i o n of Per Klassenkampf. The t i t l e of L e v i ' s p u b l i c a t i o n , S o z i a l l s t i s c h e P o l i t i k und Wissenschaft, became i n 1928 the s u b t i t l e o f Der Klassenkampf. A f t e r 1921 i t became the t h e o r e t i c a l organ of the SAP. The main organ o f the SAP was the S o z i a l i s t l s o h e A r b e i t e r z e l t u n g (SAZ), pub-l i s h e d d a l l y i n B r e s l a u and B e r l i n between 1931 and 1933. A s e r i e s of r e g i o n a l weeklies i n 1931 a n d 1932 was known as SWZ - Die F a c k e l , S o z i a l l s t i s c h e Woohenzeltung gegen Natlona-lismus und K u l t u r r e a k t i o n . O f f t h i s s e r i e s , the Weser-Ems F a c k e l was p u b l i s h e d i n Bremen and served Bremen, Osnabriick, Oldenburg, and other p l a c e s i n the Northwest. Die Saar F a c k e l . p u b l i s h e d i n Saarbriicken, served the Saar d i s t r i c t . The Bhein-Ruhr F a c k e l was p u b l i s h e d i n Essen. The Kampfsignal was the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the SWZ - Die F a c k e l s s e r y i n 1932 and 1933. Another weekly, S o z i a l l s ^ W was i s s u e d i n 1932 i n K o s l i n , The organ f o r the SAP i n Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Nassau was the Sudwestdeutsche  A r b e l t e r T r i b u n e , which appeared i n F r a n k f u r t on the Main. Another r e g i o n a l SAP paper was the K u r i e r f u r Vogtland, E r z - gebirge, und Elauen. F i n a l l y , t h e r e was a l s o a mimeographed M l t t e i l u n g s b l a t t der SAP, which appeared i n Geeshacht. Among other groups, the Nelson Bund p u b l i s h e d i s k , M l t - t e i l u n g s b l a t t des S o z l a l i s t i s c h e n Kampf-Bundes i n B e r l i n be* tween 1926 and 1933. In 1930, a l s o i n B e r l i n , appeared the M l t t e i l u n g s b l a t t der Gruppe Unabhanglger Kommunisten, (60 Aus- geschlossene-)-. CONCLUSION The history of the left-wing s p l i n t e r parties i n the Weimar Republic i s a history of f a i l u r e . It reveals the f a i -l ure of the major s o c i a l i s t parties to avoid Internal s p l i t s . Secondly, i t shows the f a i l u r e of the s p l i n t e r parties to be-come mass parties or at least to influence the mass parties to any v i s i b l e extent. Thi r d l y , It discloses the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s ' f a i l u r e to influence the German public opinion and prevent, or at least help to prevent, H i t l e r ' s coming into power. Sp l i n t e r parties would not have emerged but f o r the f a i l u r e of German socialdemocracy to cope with a series of problems that followed one another i n qul'bkreufee^Ss&on,p$#ob-TLJemss that required immediate action, problems that attracted the attention of m i l l i o n s , and problems to which Marx and Bebel had provided no guidelines and no solutions. Each of these problems and the f a i l u r e to solve i t caused more s p l i t s i n the party of August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht. The Great War was one of the issues which caused d i s -content i n the s o c i a l i s t ranks. It led to the formation of the USPD. But once the war had ended the main issue which K had divided the two socialdemocratic parties and which was \; the bond that united the d i f f e r e n t factions encompassed i n the USPD was removed. It was only a matter of time before new d i v i s i o n s and realignments took place. 132 133 The German R e v o l u t i o n caused another s e r i e s of d i s -a s t e r s f o r the s o c i a l i s t s . ^ The d o w n f a l l of the Second Reich brought the s o c i a l i s t s i n t o power with a suddeness t h a t caught them unprepared. The l e a d e r s , a f t e r g e n e r a t i o n s i n o p p o s i t i o n , had developed an o p p o s i t i o n m e n t a l i t y . They needed time to r e a d j u s t , time which they d i d not have, as events moved too f a s t . The i d e a t h a t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s c o u l d be In c o n t r o l of the government was new i n Germany. In the p a s t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and not j u s t the SPD, had been i n o p p o s i t i o n to the government. The government was composed of appointees by, n o m i n a l l y the K a i s e r , i n r e a l i t y by the s t r o n g e s t group around the K a i s e r . The R e i c h s t a g f u n c t i o n e d o n l y as a p u b l i c forum. The German d e f e a t i n the F i r s t World War was a d i r e c t d e f e a t of the r u l i n g c a s t e i n Germany, I t l e f t the 1 s o c i a l i s t s i n c o n t r o l of the s t a t e apparatus as they were the o n l y p o l i -t i c a l power s t r o n g enough to assume l e a d e r s h i p and a t the same time r e l a t i v e l y unblemished enough to h o l d the confidence of the masses. The d i s s o l u t i o n o f the m i d d l e - c l a s s p a r t i e s of the r i g h t and the temporary impotence of the m i d d l e - c l a s s Centre l e f t the S o c i a l Democrats_as masters o f the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d , supported by the /temporary/ "Red" s o l d i e r s and workmen, t h e i r t a s k was to be t h e c r e a t i o n and organ!-a, t z a t i o n of the German Rep u b l i c - a task, which took them completely unprepared .... 1 The SPD l e a d e r s were overwhelmed by the m u l t i t u d e of problems f o r whose s o l u t i o n they l a c k e d both, experience and theory. A n a t i o n which, a f t e r f o u r years o f war, was e x p e r i e n c i n g the c o l l a p s e o f not o n l y a l l i t s hopes but a l s o of i t s e n t i r e p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e , c o u l d h a r d l y f i n d a new e q u i -l i b r i u m w i t h i n attfew days. T h i s c o n d i t i o n of u n c e r t a i n t y was i n c r e a s e d ? b y the ... s o l d i e r s , r e t u r n i n g i n m i l l i o n s from the war. 1 3 4 In v a i n d i d the s o c i a l i s t l e a d e r s l o o k i n t o t h e i r u -textbooks to f i n d the formula to s o l v e the many problems with which they suddenly were co n f r o n t e d . Many looked to Marx f o r the s o l u t i o n . But Marx's w r i t i n g lends i t s e l f to d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ; Marx s u p p l i e d a great amount of ideas and i t remained f o r h i s suc c e s s o r s to c o o r d i n a t e them. As he was w r i t i n g over a p e r i o d of many years d u r i n g which imnyiof (his ideas evolved to a c e r t a i n extent, some of h i s w r i t i n g s con-t r a d i c t each other. A t times he had advocated democratic e v o l u t i o n towards s o c i a l i s m and a t times he had preached the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the c l a s s s t r u g g l e and the a r r i v a l of the d i c t a t o r s h i p o f the p r o l e t a r i a t v i a the r e v o l u t i o n . Out of t h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y stemmed the l a r g e s t d i v i s i o n , the d i v i s i o n between democratic s o c i a l i s m and communism. By the end of World War One Marx's w r i t i n g had been i n t e r p r e t e d by many of h i s d i s c i p l e s i n many d i f f e r e n t ways and had become inte r m i x e d w i t h the p h i l o s o p h i e s put forward by o t h e r s o c i a l i s t and some a n a r c h i s t prophets. Thus, Marxism became the p h i l o s o p h i c a l base f o r many competing l e f t - w i n g p a r t i e s . The October R e v o l u t i o n i n R u s s i a aroused the more r a d i -c a l among the s o c i a l i s t s i n Germany, who hoped to c a r r y out a s i m i l a r r e v o l u t i o n i n Germany. Many of them saw i n Ebe r t a German K e r e n s k i , whoseeoverthrow would be the f i n a l step o f a s u c c e s s f u l r e v o l u t i o n . Thus, w h i l e the SPD l e a d e r s ' and the r i g h t - w i n g USPD l e a d e r s ' i d e a o f an i d e a l r e v o l u t i o n was a b l o o d l e s s t r a n s f e r o f power, the l e f t - w i n g USPD l e a d e r s and some S p a r t a c i s t s urged p r o l e t a r i a n s to take to the s t r e e t s . 135 The government, i n d e s p e r a t i o n , b e l i e v e d t h a t i t had t o r e l y on the army to r e s t o r e o r d e r . T h i s s t e p was the d e a t h - k n e l l f o r the r e v o l u t i o n . U n t i l then, the army as w e l l as the b o u r g e o i s i e , had con s i d e r e d themselves d e f e a t e d and were p r e -pared to accept the working c l a s s as the new r u l e r s o f Germany. With the working c l a s s n o p e l e s s l y d i v i d e d , the counter revolt l u t i o n made r a p i d g a i n s . The new SPD government's r e l i a n c e on i t s t r a d i t i o n a l enemies to p r o t e c t i t from what should have been i t s f r i e n d s can be a t t r i b u t e d to three f a c t o r s . A f t e r l o s i n g the Great War on such a s c a l e , the country needed a l l i t s s t r e n g t h to recup.e£a\tee A c i v i l war would on l y have thrown Germany deeper i n t o the abyss. The A l l i e d Bowers, unable to prevent the si>-success of the b o l s h e v i k r e v o l u t i o n i n Rus s i a , would not have t o l e r a t e d a r e p e t i t i o n o f i t i n Germany. The government d i d not want to givetthem an excuse to send o c c u p a t i o n troops i n t o Germany. In a d d i t i o n , a s u c c e s s f u l Liebknecht-Ledebour-led r e v o l u t i o n would not have d e a l t l e n i e n t l y with the SPD l e a d e r s . The a b o r t i v e Kapp-Putsch gave the s o c i a l i s t government the l a s t chance to emasculate, w i t h the h e l p o f the workers, the m i l i t a r y . In the words of E r n e s t N i e k i s c h , " A f t e r the Kapp-Putsch, as the b o u r g e o i s i e , whipped by the workers, ex-tended i t s hand to the SBQ, the SPD s o l d out the workers, broke t h e i r u n i t y , and l e t the s o l d i e r s l o P s e u a t t fcliemv3'3 AlthoughPfcto&SQstatement was somewhat exaggerated, i t does d e s c r i b e the f e e l i n g o f many d i s i l l u s i o n e d SPD s u p p o r t e r s . Foremost of a l l d i v i s i v e i s s u e s i n the s o c l a l s i t ,':.*£•. camp was the c o n t r o v e r s y over Weimar or Rate R e p u b l i c . Othe^: 136 f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g to the d i v i s i o n s were Comintern d l r e c & i t i v e s , the i n f l a t i o n o f 1923. the Depression, and the r i s e o f Nazism. The economic c r i s i s o f 1929 l e d to an i n c r e a s e i n extreme r i g h t - w i n g elements. The SPD, i n order to prevent a r i g h t - w i n g power-grab, f a i l e d i n the eyes o f the r a d i c a l s to take a p r i n c i p l e d stand on impafotant d e c i s i o n s by the Rei c h s - tag, such as armament spending and changes i n s o c i a l l e g i s -l a t i o n . Thus, throughout the d u r a t i o n of the Weimar R e p u b l i c , the SPD found i t s e l f many times i n p o s i t i o n s where, i f i t a c t e d s t r i c t l y ancordingetoedogmas, or " p r i n c i p l e s " , i t would have endangered the democratic system and c l e a r e d the way f o r , a t f i r s t l e f t - w i n g , l a t e r r i g h t - w i n g a u t o c r a c i e s . Exposed to the c r i t i c i s m o f f o l l o w e r s who expected too much too f a s t , the SPD l e a d e r s had to contend w i t h the o p p o s i t i o n o f the Junkers, the f i n a n c i e r s , the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , the m i l i t a r i s t s , and became o f t e n the victimsoeJf r i g h t - w i n g t e r r o r i s t s . In t r y i n g t o cooperate with the A l l i e d , P o w e r s , they made enemies out of many p a t r i o t s without g a i n i n g any v i s i b l e encouragement from abroad. Although i t was re a s o n a b l e t o assume t h a t r i g h t a f t e r the War the A l l i e s would have t o -l e r a t e d n e i t h e r a r i g h t - w i n g nor a l e f t - w i n g e x t r e m i s t regime to r e p l a c e the monarchy i n Germany, the v i c t o r i o u s powers -A d i s p l a y e d l i t t l e support f o r the moderate p o l i c i e s o f the SPD and i t s m i d d l e - o f - t h e - r o a d c o a l i t i o n ..partners. I t was o n l y n a t u r a l t h a t the ©ifflteial s&and oft the: ; SPD as w e l l as o f any other p a r t y d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d would produce t e n s i o n s w i t h i n these p a r t i e s . However, the s t r o n g bureaucracy of the SPD and the r i g i d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e 137 of the KPD allowed l i t t l e or no I n t e r n a l d i s s e n t . Thus, d i s -senters were e i t h e r forced to r e t r a c t or to leave the p a r t y . I t can be considered a major f a i l u r e of both p a r t i e s t h a t they could not cope i n a c o n s t r u c t i v e way w i t h t h e i r i n t e r n a l c r i t i c s . The SPD and the KPD could not prevent s p l i t s , but they could ensure t h a t the s p l i n t e r groupseremained s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . This was due p a r t l y to t r a d i t i o n and p a r t l y to t h e i r o r g a n i -z a t i o n a l setup. I t l a y a l s o i n the l a c k of a t t r a c t i v e a l t e r -n a t i v e s o f f e r e d by the s p l i n t e r groups. The f a c t remains that i n Germany the SPD voter i s the most f a i t h f u l v o t e r . There had been occasions when German workers had t h e i r doubt about the SPD, when they agreed w i t h communist and other left=wing a g i t a t o r s that the SPD leaders were unworthy of t h e i r support. There were even instances when the German p r o l e t a r i a t was d i s -gusted over the SPD's shameless wooing of the m i d d l e - c l a s s vote and i t s b l a t a n t support and t o l e r a t i o n of bourgeois go-vernments. There were e l e c t i o n s when the SPD voters turned away from the SPD, The most outstanding example of t h i s was the Reichstag e l e c t i o n i n 1920, when the SPD, i n l e s s than 18 months, l o s t over f i v e m i l l i o n votes, three m i l l i o n of these to the USPD. I t i s a l s o t r u e , t h a t the KPD, over the years, g r a d u a l l y but s u r e l y , overtook the SPD i n B e r l i n and a few other h i g h l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d places**". But most of the SPD v o t e r s , who gave t h e i r vote once or twice to other p a r t i e s , returned to the SPD. The German working c l a s s , i n s p i t e of the SPD's imperf e c t i o n s , voted SPD. 138 The German worker phrased the word P a r t e i b o n z e n f o r the p r o f e s s i o n a l p o l i t i c i a n s , p a r t y and u n i o n b u r e a u c r a t s who l e d and s t i l l l e a d h i s p a r t y . T h i s term i s both, dero-g a t o r y and a f f e c t i o n a t e . I t i m p l i e s a bureaucrat, a rogue, and a benevolent a u t o c r a t . I t i m p l i e s t h a t the person so c c a l l e d i s an experienced f i g h t e r f o r the workers' demands. The worker knows t h a t the Bonze has a cushioned job, t h a t he i s a t times arrogant, but t h a t he, out of s e l f i n t e r e s t i f f o r no other reason, w i l l l o o k a f t e r the workers' w e l f a r e . Only the USPD and the KPD, and, to some extent, the N a z i s , succeeded i n p u t t i n g a n o t i c e a b l e dent i n t h i s mass f o l l o w i n g and, s t r a n g e l y , the word Bonzen was a p p l i e d a l s o to the l e a d e r s o f these p a r t i e s , but o f no other. T h i s f a i t h i n the SPD i s not a b l i n d f a i t h . I t o f t e n was based on t r a d i t i o n . However, i t was a l s o based on a c h i e v e -ments. I t was the SPD t h a t had fought f o r the workers and had grown, i n s p i t e of Bismarck's r e p r e s s i v e S o z i a l i s t e n Ge- s e t z e , i n s p i t e o f the I m p e r i a l government's p e r s e c u t i o n s , to become the b i g g e s t p a r t y i n Germany. The SPD had o r g a n i z e d the t r a d e unions which managed ..to s h o r t e n the working hours and i n c r e a s e the workers' wages. In the p a r l i a m e n t s the SPD sponsored l e g i s l a t i o n s the unions were I n t e r e s t e d i n . I t was a l s o the SPD t h a t r e s t o r e d law and order i n Germany a f t e r the c o l l a p s e of the Second Rei c h . Now, when the p a r t y e x p e r i e n -ced d i f f i c u l t i e s and had to accept set-backs i n s o c i a l l e g i s -l a t i o n , the workers were u n w i l l i n g to abandon i t . They l i s -tened to a Seydewitz; they agreed with a Seydewitz; but they would not f o l l o w a Seydewitz i n t o a new, unproven, p a r t y . 139 Perhaps i f t h i s f a i t h i n the SPD had been b l i n d f a i t h i t would have been e a s i e r to shake. I f a person f o l l o w e s a p a r t y without s e e i n g i t s f a u l t s , t h i s person, once h i s eyes a r e opened, can be swayed to f o l l o w another p a r t y . But a person who f o l l o w s a p a r t y , conscious o f the f a u l t s and s h o r t -comings of the p a r t y , cannot as e a s i l y be swayed. He knows a l l the arguments a g a i n s t h i s p a r t y . The o n l y way he can be made to change p a r t i e s i s by m o t i v a t i n g him. The argument "you should jjein us because your p a r t y i s wrong" must be r e -p l a c e d w i t h the proof t h a t he should ijein the new p a r t y be-, cause the new p a r t y i s b e t t e r . The s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s f a i l e d t o supply t h i s k i n d o f pr o o f and m o t i v a t i o n . A l r e a d y i n 1919 Paul Lensch, i n D i e N e u e Rundschau, claimed "... t h a t i n the Bpartakus Bund and among the Inde-pendents / t h e USPD7 b a s i c a l l y n o t h i n g d i f f e r e n t i s expressed as i n the o l d i d e o l o g y o f the Socialdemocracy from the Vor- august / b e f o r e the F i r s t World War7,"5 He saw no economic and s o c i a l d i f f e r e n c e among the members o f the t h r e e p a r t i e s ; t h e y were a l l workers^. One of the most prominent p e c u l i a r i t i e s we can observe i n the r e c e n t s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements i s the ex-treme p o v e r t y on new ideas and p o i n t s o f view. One should thin k , t h a t such tremendous upheavals ... would.bring a m u l t i t u d e of new s o c i a l ideas and reform plans .... In t h i s r e s p e c t n o t h i n g new came to the foreground .... The newer s o c i a l i s t movements a r e a l l based on the o l d e r systems .... The l e a d e r s o f the i n d i v i d u a l groups are most eager to prove t h a t p r e c i s e l y t h e i r p r o -gram i s the onl y t r u e f u l f i l m e n t o f the ideas o f K a r l M a r x . /Emphasized i n the o r i g i n a l / 7 None o f the p a r t i e s had a u s e f u l o v e r a l l program. They clamoured f o r a Rate system, yet none co u l d g i v e a c l e a r and unambigous d e f i n i t i o n o f the type, f u n c t i o n , and r o l e o f 1 4 0 these Rate. Some of them, l i k e the USPD, even c a l l e d f o r a d u a l system of Rate and p a r l i a m e n t s . Yet a t t h a t time t h e r e had been more.than one c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the German people d i d not want a Rate r e p u b l i c . They a l l c a l l e d f o r the d i s -arming of the b o u r g e o i s i e and the m i l i t a r y , the arming of the p r o l e t a r i a t , c a n c e l l a t i o n o f war bonds h e l d by i n d i v i d u a l s , e x p r o p r i a t i o n of l a r g e l a n d h o l d i n g s , b i g b u s i n e s s e s , and K banks. Most of t h e i r program was h i g h l y t h e o r e t i c a l , o f t e n d u l l and f u l l of me-tooism and jargon. Although i t had some u s e f u l p o i n t s , such as t h e i r p r o p o s a l s f o r U n i t e d F r o n t s and t h e i r demands f o r the involvement of employees i n the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s , t h e i r programs were not v e r y i n s p i r i n g . B a s i c a l l y , there was not much d i f f e r e n c e between the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . They d i s a g r e e d on some o b j e c t i v e s , m a i n l y because o f t h e i r d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the p o l i t i c a l and economic s i t u a t i o n . What appeared to one group as a p e r i o d of r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i z a t i o n r s o f . : c a p i t a l i s m tand thus-unfavourable to r e v o l u t i o n , another group might d e s c r i b e as a r e v o l u t i o n a r y p e r i o d . While some, mostly those too the r i g h t o f the KPD, wanted to work under the p r e s e n t system i n order to a l l e v i a t e the worst i l l s , o thers f e l t i t was b e t t e r to aggravate the i l l s i n order to hasten the a r r i v a l of the r e v o l u t i o n which a l l f e l t would happen some day. Again, the ones to the r i g h t o f the KPD wanted to draw what they c o n s i d e r e d tbsbe other po-t e n t i a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y c l a s s e s , such as the p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e , the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , the p r o f e s s i o n a l s , the farmers, e t c . i n t o the s o c i a l i s t movement. The ones to the f a r l e f t , on the other hand, r e j e c t e d a l l those c l a s s e s as r e a c t i o n a r y . However s m a l l 141 t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s were, each group claimed to have an i n d e -pendent program'-wMbGhLwas b a s i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of a l l o t h e r s . Yet, the s m a l l e r t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s were, the more were they emphasized by the members of the r e s p e c t i v e groups i n order to j u s t i f y t h e i r separate e x i s t e n c e . The s p l i n t e r groups f a i l e d to a t t r a c t a mass f o l l o w i n g . Two of them, the USPD and the KAPD, had p r o m i s i n g s t a r t s . They c o u l d both, a t t h e i r beginning, be c l a s s i f i e d as mass p a r t i e s . The USPD managed to keep i t s mass f o l l o w i n g f o r f o u r to f i v e y e a r s . The KAPD l o s t i t soon a f t e r I t s I n c e p t i o n . T h i s p a r t y , i g n o r i n g p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s and opposing the s o c i a l i s t f r e e trade unions, could o n l y hope to f l o u r i s h d u r i n g p e r i o d s of c r i s i s . Once the Weimar Republic moved i n t o the f i r s t s t a b i l i z a t i o n p e r i o d and people f e l t secure, r e v o l u t i o n -ary" p a r t i e s had no a p p e a l to the masses. The employed workers had too much to l o s e to get i n v o l v e d i n mass s t r i k e s and revo-l u t i o n s . They were not l o o k i n g f o r r a d i c a l changes, but o n l y f o r day-to-day improvements. Improvements co u l d be found by e l e c t i n g a sympathetic government and by s t r e n g t h e n i n g the t r a d e unions. The b a l l o t box was the means f o r p o l i t i c a l changes, the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e s f o r economic changes. The b a r r i c a d e s could o n l y l e a d to d i s a s t e r . Some of the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s (e. a. the L e v i t e s ) never intended to become a mass p a r t y . The L e v i t e s were l o o k i n g f o r a p o l i t i c a l realignment. We r e f u s e d , from the f i r s t day of our e x i s t e n c e , to form our own p a r t y ; we b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e a r e too many p r o l e -t a r i a n p a r t i e s . We s t a t e d from the f i r s t day on t h a t our 142 duty can o n l y be the t a s k to do our share i n a c c o m p l i s h i n g the r e u n i f i c a t i o n of a l l the f i g h t i n g p r o l e t a r i a n s of Germany,° The l e f t and u l t r a l e f t communist groups of the mid twenties could never hope to develop i n t o mass p a r t i e s . T h e i r programs and^tae<tics were not much d i f f e r e n t from the KPD's, o f f e r i n g the v o t e r s no v a l i d reason to s w i t c h from the KPD too them. Once they had p a r t e d from the KPD t h e i r supporters l e f t them. The same h e l d t r u e f o r the KPO. Most p r o l e t a r i a n s saw no f u t u r e i n attempting to c r e a t e y e t another working c l a s s p a r t y . Some of the s p l i n t e r groups.,- the RK f o r example, were d e l i b e r a t e l y designed to be cadre o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A mass fbDJbw-laig. was not d e s i r e d . Not even the SAP, which u n i t e d many of the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s under i t s banner, c o u l d a t t a i n the s t a t u s o f a mass p a r t y . One of the s t r o n g e s t motives of s o B l a l d i s t s p a r t i e s i s to change s o c i e t y . T h i s can best be accomplished by becoming the government or by b e i n g a b l e to- i n f l u e n c e the government. I t can a l s o be e f f e c t e d by educating the masses. In t h i s aim the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s a l s o f a i l e d . T h e i r e f f e c t on the Weimar Re p u b l i c was s m a l l . At the b e s t i t can be argued t h a t they i n f l u e n c e d the Weimar R e p u b l i c through the SPD. By l e a v i n g the SPD and e x i s t i n g s e p a r a t e l y they weakened the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h of the l e f t wing w i t h i n the SPD, thus a l l o w i n g t h a t p a r t y ' s course to sway towards the r i g h t . But i t i s debatable whether t h e i r presence In the SPD would have a l t e r e d t h a t p a r t y ' s course c o n s i d e r a b l y , s i n c e most of those who abandoned the SPD d i d so when they r e a l i z e d t h a t a l l t h e i r e f f o r t s to 143 s t e e r the p a r t y were f r u s t r a t e d . The same holds true f o r tf those who came from other p a r t i e s . B e f o r e l e a v i n g a p a r t y , the founders o f s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s t r i e d to move the mother p a r t y towards t h e i r way of t h i n k i n g . B r e a k i n g away, from a p a r t y s i g n i f i e d the f a i l u r e o f these i n d i v i d u a l s to convince others of t h e v a l u e of t h e i r i d e a s . L e a v i n g the p a r t y d i d not always end t h e i r e f f o r t s t o reform i t . The u l t r a l e f t s o f the mid twenties, the T r o t s -k y i s t s , and the KPO djd not cease a f t e r t h e i r e x p u l s i o n to c o n s i d e r the KPD t h e i r p a r t y . T h e i r o b j e c t i v e s were not to c r e a t e new p a r t i e s , although t h i s i s what i n e f f e c t they d i d , but to s t e e r the KPD from without i n t o what they c o n s i d e r e d the c o r r e c t course. None of them succeeded. One of t h e b i g g e s t reasons f o r the f a i l u r e o f the  r.i s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s was t h e i r l a c k o f r e s o u r c e s . While o t h e r p a r t i e s r e c e i v e d f i n a n c i a l support from i n d u s t r y , churches, t r a d e unions, and the Comintern, l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s had to r e l y s o l e l y on donations by i n d i v i d u a l s . I t was e a s i e r to book a few modest successes i n s m a l l l o c a l i t i e s where t h e i r c a n d idates were known p e r s o n a l l y . In the impersonal atmosphere of the l a r g e r c i t i e s they had to compete a g a i n s t the e f f i c i e n t , w e l l f i n a n c e d apparatus of the b i g g e r p a r t i e s . S p l i n t e r p a r t i e s had not o n l y to f i g h t the Establishment, but a l s o the l e f t -wing mass p a r t i e s . Boxed i n by the b i g g e r p a r t i e s , w i t h not enough money to use the mass media, they remained i s o l a t e d from the masses and were doomed to impotence. T h e i r a c t i v i t i e s took p l a c e o u t s i d e the mainstream of German p o l i t i c s . 144 The uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n of members and suppo r t e r s a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d to the f a i l u r e of the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . Most o f the s p l i n t e r groups had a few c l u s t e r - l i k e c e n t r e s of support and a t h i n s p r i n k l i n g o f members i n the r e s t of Germany. A l -though a l l of them claimed to be n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s or o r g a n i -z a t i o n s , o n l y a few deserve to be c a l l e d t h i s . There are many r e g i o n s i n Germany where v o t e r s never have heard of most of the s p l i n t e r Bsanfejbes. Moreover, s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s were the r e s u l t and the v i c t i m s of the Weimar C o n s t i t u t i o n . The e l e c t o r l a l system both, encouraged and f r u s t r a t e d s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . Under t h i s system a p a r t y was a l l o t t e d . o n e s e a t f o r each 60,000 v o t e s . Thus, i t was t h e o r ^ c a l l y p o s s i b l e f o r s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s to ^ e l e c t some d e p u t i e s i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t the b i g p a r t i e s r e c e i v e d more votes i n each d i s t r i c t . However, a p a r t y could not r e c e i v e more seats on i t s R e l c h s l l s t e than i t r e c e i v e d i n the d i s t r i c t s . Thus, i n order to e l e c t anyone, a p a r t y would have to r e c e i v e a minimum of 60,000 votes i n one group-of-d i s t r i c t s , o f which a t l e a s t 30,000 had to come from one d i s -t r i c t . As t h i s system encouraged v o t e r s to vote f o r p a r t i e s r a t h e r than i n d i v i d u a l s , incumbents w e r e ^ u s u a l l y d e f e a t e d i f 9 they switched po a s m a l l e r p a r t y . The l a c k of success o f the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s l e d to i n - f i g h t i n g . A f t e r each f a i l u r e a scapegoat had to be found. As t h e i r o r g a M i a a t i o n shrank, t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l b a s i s narrowed and t h e i r t o l e r a t i o n l e v e l of d i v e r g e n t views d e c l i n e d . T h i s , as a r u l e , l e d to the f o r m a t i o n of new s p l i n t e r groups. 145 There i s , however, evidence t h a t some s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s were moderately s u c c e s s f u l i n v a r i o u s m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s . In s m a l l m u n i c i p a l i t i e s the v o t e r s a r e more f a m i l i a r w i t h the c a ndidates, candidates r e q u i r e fewer votes to be e l e c t e d than i n other e l e c t i o n s . The major p a r t i e s ' o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c -t u r e i n s m a l l towns was as s m a l l , i n cases even s m a l l e r , than t h a t of the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . Moreover, the v o t e r c o n s i d e r e d i t a s m a l l r i s k to t e s t the candidates of minor p a r t i e s a t the m u n i c i p a l l e v e l , something he h e s i t a t e d to do on the f e d e r a l or s t a t e l e v e l , as he d i d not want to waste h i s v o t e . Thus, the same v o t e r who had shown h i s confidence i n the SAP or the KPO, f o r example, would vote d i f f e r e n t l y i n the s t a t e or the f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . The e x i s t e n c e of s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s has o f t e n been b l blamed f o r the break-down of democracy and the v i c t o r y of the N a z i s . There i s no doubt t h a t the d i s u n i t y o f the L e f t was a s t r o n g f a c t o r i n h e l p i n g H i t l e r to g a i n power. T h i s d i s u n i t y not o n l y prevented any s o c i a l i s t p a r t y from g a i n i n g an a b s o l u t e m a j o r i t y through the b a l l o t box, i t a l s o d i s c r e -d i t e d the s o c i a l i s t s i n the eyes of many Germans who, subse-quently, s e t * t h e l r hopes i o n H i t l e r . I t can a l s o be argued t h a t the presence of s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s a f f e c t e d the votes the two major l e f t - w i n g p a r t i e s r e c e i v e d to aamuwh g r e a t e r extent than the s t a t i s t i c s i n d i c a t e . Many a c t i v e and v o c a l fexleaders of the SPD were members of s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . Had they remained i n the SPD, they would have strengthened t h a t p a r t y ' s l e f t wing. Without an a c t i v e L e f t , the d i f f e r e n c e between the 146 SPD and the m i d dle-of-the-road p a r t i e s , such as the Centre and the Deutsche Demokratische P a r t e i (DDP) seemed a t times v e r y s l i m . T h i s q f a c t might w e l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the growth o f the KPD (although the communists claimed t h a t the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s were an o b s t a c l e to t h e i r groi>rth, as they o f f e r e d the d i s s a t i s f i e d SPD v o t e r s an imaginary s o c l a i d e m o c r a t i c a l t e r -n a t i v e ) . On the other hand, to overemphasize the e f f e c t s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s had on the f a i l u r e of Weimar i s to exaggerate t h e i r I n f l u e n c e on the p o l i t i c a l scene i n Germany. The s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s ' share of the vote d i d not s e r i o u s l y hamper the SPD's chance to g a i n an a b s o l u t e m a j o r i t y . The feud between the SPD and the KPD was more damaging to the u n i t y of the L e f t than the emergence of c o u n t l e s s t i n y s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . B e i n g s m a l l and i s o l a t e d , the s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s ' o utlook became q u i t e narrow. T h i s enabled them to c o n c e n t r a t e more I n t e n s i v e l y on i n d i v i d u a l problems, e s p e c i a l l y on the Nazi phenomenon. S p l i n t e r p a r t i e s , as a r u l e , f o u g h t the Nazis harder than t h e i r b r o t h e r s i n the SPD and the KPD d i d . As a consequence, they s u f f e r e d more under Nazism too. Thus i t i s wrong to blame the l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r par-t i e s f o r the d i f f i c u l t i e s of Weimar and the v i c t o r y of the extreme R i g h t . S p l i n t e r p a r t i e s were not f a c t o r s , but symp-toms o f the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s o f the.••Weimar R e p u b l i c . The v i c t o r y of Fascism was the r e s u l t of a s e r i e s o f events which had a l s o produced s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . Both ar e the products of the same causes. The same h i s t o r i c a l 147 developments, the same s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , the same economic d i f f i c u l t i e s which l e d to f a s c i s m , caused l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . I t produced d i s u n i t y on t h e l e f t as w e l l as on the r i g h t . The f a i l u r e of both, r i g h t - w i n g and l e f t - w i n g p o l i -t i c i a n s to cope w i t h the problems l e d to the f o r m a t i o n of s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . The NSUP was once j u s t another one of the c o u n t l e s s f a s c i s t and semi f a s c i s t s m a l l p a r t i e s . The d i f f e r -ence', was t h a t the NSDAP had, b e s i d e s i t s e f f i c i e n t o r g a n i -z a t i o n , o u t s t a n d i n g l e a d e r s who could arouse the masses, po-l a r i z e the r i g h t , and win the confidence of those who could supply the r e s o u r c e s needed i n order to change i t i n t o a mass p a r t y . The l e f t l a c k e d the dynamic l e a d e r s h i p to do the same. Thus, the pauperized p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e , the impoverished i n -t e l l i g e n t s i a , the over mortgaged farmers, and the p o v e r t y -s t r i k e n "Lumpenpro1etar i a t " r a l l i e d around the swastika. S p l i n t e r p a r t i e s r e f l e c t e d the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l n a t u r e of Weimar Germany. A f t e r the a u t h o r i t a r i a n B i s m a r c k i a n type of government the Germans found themselves suddenly i n p o s s e s s i o n of p o l i t i c a l freedom, while many of them had l o s t t h e i r economic base through the Great War and i t s a f t e r e f f e c t s . Whereas i n England the C d n s t i t u t i o n a l Monarchy encouraged p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy, the German Monarchy d i s c o u r a g e d i t . Thus, the Germans were not prepared f o r democracy. A l s o , • u n l i k e i n Russia, there was no r e v o l u t i o n a r y a u t o c r a t i c group which succeeded i n r e p l a c i n g the monarchy as the p o l i t i c a l r u l i n g body. Thus, f o r f o u r t e e n years Germany experienced ^ with the newly won p o l i t i c a l freedoms. During these years Germany experienced severe economic changes, ^ne s o c i a l mo-148 b i l l t y , the break-down of the o l d S p l e s s b u r g e r m o r a l i t y , a t l e a s t i n the l a r g e c i t i e s , the u n c e a s i n g economic warfare between employers and employees, the p o l i t i c a l rowdyism, the r e o c e u r i n g i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l economic c r i s e s c r e a t e d an atmosphere which d i s p l a y e d the symptoms of " C a p i t a l i s m i n i t s stage of decay" as p r e d i c t e d and d e s c r i b e d by K a r l Marx. "But t h i s / p o l i t i c a l / s p l i n t e r i n g r e v e a l s the profound s o c i a l decay o f the German society".1° Thus, s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s wer§ a l s o symptoms of the s o c i a l and moral decay o f Weimar. In the same way as. s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s i n g e n e r a l were symptoms of the crfelsLtidden Weimar Rep u b l i c , so, i n p a r t i -c u l a r , were l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r groups symptoms o f the c r i s i s i n German s o c i a l s i s m and communism and i n the Comintern. Ger-man socialismswas i n a t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d ; the SPD was chan-g i n g from a c l a s s p a r t y to a people's p a r t y . The F i r s t World War had de s t r o y e d the myth t h a t the SPD was a r e v o l u t i o n a r y p a r t y . The R e v o l u t i o n , which brought the SPD i n t o power, showed the SPD as a law-and-order p a r t y . When t h i s became c l e a r to the r a n k - a n d - f i l e membership, many had to r e e v a l u a t e t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n regards to the SPD. In p a r t i c u l a r towards the end o f the Weimar Republic the appearance of s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s can be seen as the attemptstfc'OWSiEdst&heu'Eekhap&n-gocif the s o c i a l i s t movement, the search f o r THE ONE s o c i a l i s t p a r t y . Thus, the time between the end of the Great War and the a s -sumption of power by Hltflter had been a time of p o l i t i c a l Darwinism i n Germany. During t h a t p e r i o d World Communism s t i l l s u f f e r e d 1' from i t s c h i l d h o o d a i i m e t s i The p o l i c y of the Comintern, e s p e c i a l l y from the mid twenties on, could be compared to 149 a journey taken by a group of people while s i t t i n g on a f l a t c a r , p u l l e d by an engine a t an e x c e s s i v e speed over a curvy road. A t every t u r n a few o f the passengers f e l l o f f , mostly those s i t t i n g on the o u t s i d e , on the f r i n g e s . The ones i n the middle, a l s o the ones who could see ahead and thus a n t i c i p a t e the next curve and a d j u s t t h e i r p o s i t i o n remained. As v e r y few who f e l l o f f succeeded i n c l i m b i n g back on again, and as most of them wanted to continue t h e i r journey, t h e r e appeared a t every t u r n l i t t l e groups o f t r a -v e l l e r s . The KPD, as w e l l as the communist p a r t i e s i n other c o u n t r i e s , g o ing through the process of b o l s h e v i z a t i o n and S t a l i n i z a t i o n , g r a d u a l l y succumbed to the domination of the Comintern. Those I n d i v i d u a l s who wanted an independent German communist p o l i c y found themselves i s o l a t e d and removed from r e s p o n s i b l e p o s i t i o n s . The f a i l u r e o f the l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t t h e i r p o l i c i e s and e f f o r t s were w o r t h l e s s . The study of t h e i r h i s t o r y i s not o n l y a study o f f a i l u r e , but a l s o a study of courage and i n t e g r e t y . There were s o c i a l s i t s who were prepared to f o r s a k e the r e l a t i v e .. s e c u r i t y , the p r e s t i g e , and the p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e t h a t mass p a r t i e s i n a democratic s o c i e t y o f f e r t b o f c h e l r , l e a d e r s . They went out i n t o the p o l i t i c a l w i l d e r n e s s to probe and t<t6 se a r c h f o r new ways of e s t a b l i s h i n g a b e t t e r s o c i e t y . T h e i r ideas were not a l l of a world s a v i n g n a t u r e . As shown, many were of l i t t l e v a l u e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , they had i d e a s . I t was a tragedy t h a t the two l a r g e working c l a s s 150 parties were too deeply engaged i n t h e i r f r a t i c i d a l struggle to pay attention to proposals coming from some obscure l i t t l e group. Given a larger audience and the cooperation of a l l s o c i a l i s t s , there i s an outside chance that one of the pro-posals put forward by a s p l i n t e r group might have stopped H i t l e r . As G. K. Chesterton said i n "Whafcls wrong with the world", ... modern i d e a l i s t s ... always thought that i f a thing has been defeated i t has been disproved. L o g i c a l l y , the case i s quite c l e a r l y the other way. The l o s t causes are exactly those which might have saved the world.13 151 FOOTNOTES CHAPTER ONE 1Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution (Princeton: University Press, 1963), P» 11» 2Edwyn Bevan, German Social Democracy During the War (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1918), p. 16. 3 I b i d . ( pp. 42-72. ^Ibid., p. 2. ^Tbid., pp. 83-86, cltflmg Volksstlmme (Chemnitz; March 1916), which enumerates six sections of the l e f t as follows; 1. Spartacus, with Liebknecht and Ruhle; 2. She International Socialists, with Radek and Borchardj 3. Ledebour and Adolf Hoffmann; 4. Kautsky; 5. Bernstein; 6. the bulk of the minority, Volkswahl (Breslau: June 1915) names two divisions of the ma-jority, the malnbody and the Annexists, Lelpzlger Volkszeltung (April 19l6) l i s t s nine groups of the right, which were 1. Kolb, Feuerstein, and Heymann; 2. the Nationalists, with Cohen, Hell-mann, Landsberg, David, ... Noske, Haenisch, ...; 3» the Im-perialist-Nationalists, with Lensch, Cunow, Schulz, Quessel; 4. the fradeiU&ionSJonists, with Legien, Bauer, Schmidt; 5. the plain practical; 6 . the Right Centre, with Molkenbuhr,Wels, Ebert, ...; 7. the KarakterkSpfe around Scheidemann; 8. the Centre; and 9 . the Individualists. 6Ibid., p. 142. 7Hermanh Weber (ed ] j ) . Per Grundungsparteltag der KPD  - Protokoll und Materlallen (Frankfurt a. M.: Europlisohe Verlagsanstalt, 1969), p. 24. 8Hans J . L. Adolph, Otto Wels und die Polltlk der  deutsohen Sozlaldemokratle - 1P94-1939 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1971), p. 24. ^Eugen Prager, GeschlohteS? der USPD (Berlin: Verlags-genossenschaft "Freiheit" eGmbH., 1921), p. 96. The 'founders p:f2 thgr?mG were .Be'rhste^h;-Bock,. Buchner^ - Dri- J Otto C-Cohn^ ' > Dittmann, Geyer, Haase, Henke, Dr. Herzfeld, Horn, Kunert, Ledebour, Schwarz (Liibeck), Stadthagen, Stolle, Vogtherr, Wurm, and Zubeil. 10Weber, Per Grundungsparteltag der KPD. op. c i t . , p. 26. 1 1 S i e g f r i e d Bahne, "Zwischen 'Luxemburg!smus* und SSfcaiam-ismus'. m& ©SifeEalmnke'iin der KPD", pp. 359-383, Vlerteljahres- hefte fur°Zeltgesohiohte. IV, 9. year (October 196l, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt) f p. 360 and "Die Roten Kampfer?-. Zur Geschlchte einer llnken Widerstandsgruppe", pp. 438-460, Vie r t e l - jahreshefte fur Zeltgesohlchte. IV, 7. year (October 1959), p. 451. 152 1 2 R u t h F i s c h e r , S t a l i n and German Communism (Cambridge i H a r v a r d i U n i y e r s i t y P r e s s , 1948), pp. 503-505. ; rAnother demo-c r a t i c b i r t h r i g h t was the e l e c t i o n of p a i d and unpaid p a r t y f u n c t i o n a r i e s .... From now on, p a i d f u n c t i o n a r i e s were no-minated by the C e n t r a l Committee, whith the p r i o r approval~by the Moscow c o n t r o l men. There were hundreds of German p a r t y members who became p a i d employees o f the v a r i o u s S o v i e t a g e n c i e s i n Germany. A job with one o f these was a haven, e a g e r l y sought by many Ger-man Communists. S a l a r i e s were c o n s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r than i n comparable German i n s t i t u t i o n s , working hours were s h o r t e r , and t h e r e were other p r i v i l e g e s . Employees of the S o v i e t Trade L e g a t i o n i n B e r l i n ... c o u l d buy motorcycles, f u r j a c k e t s , and s i m i l a r l u x u r i e s a t a l a r g e d i s c o u n t , and w i t h t h e i r f a m i l i e s c o u l d enjoy cheap h o l i d a y s i n R u s s i a or sojourns t o Russian s a -natoriums .... Many r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , w i t h c a r e e r s i n the Weimar R e p u b l i c c l o s e d to them by t h e i r Communist a c t i v i t y ... found oJampeHsation i n the s e r v i c e o f the R ussian s t a t e .... During these years the German p a r t y numbered between 125,000 and 135,000 members .... The apparatus c o n s i s t e d o f the f o l l o w i n g The C e n t r a l Committee, i t s s e c r e t a r i e s , e d i t o r s , ©a& t e c h n i c a l employees 8000 Newspaper and p r i n t i n g p l a n t s , i n c l u d i n g a d v e r t i s i n g s t a f f 800 Book shops, with a s s o c i a t e d a g i t - p r o p groups 200 Trade-union employees .... 200 S i c k - b e n e f i t s o c i e t i e s 150 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Workers' A i d w i t h a f f i l i a t e d wssBpggBjm?® 50 Red A i d , i n c l u d i n g C h i l d r e n ' s Home i n T h u r i n g i a ..... 50 German ejmjlsj^yeejs o f S o v i e t i n s t i t u t i o n s ( S o v i e t Em-bassy, t r a d e l e g a t i o n s i n B e r l i n , L e i p z i g , and Hamtem^g burg, the Ostbank, v a r i o u s German-Russian• ' c o r p o r a t i o n s .1000 T o t a l ....9300 In a d d i t i o n , the i n v i s i b l e undercover agents must be estimated a t l e a s t the same f i g u r e . Hence, almost one t w e l f t h o f the p a r t y membership was i n d i r e c t R u ssian pay; and t h i s was the most a c t i v e element of the p a r t y , those who c o u l d be o r dered to do any k i n d o f p a r t y work, who c o u l d not r e f u s e to p a r t i c i p a t e i n even the most I n s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r y meeting. & 153 CHAPTER TWO . . . . ^ ' j 1Weber, Per Griindungsparteltag der KPD op. c i t . , pp. 310-312, i t contains an extehsive, though incomplete, l i s t of delegates. 2 I b i d . , p. 311. ^Ibid., P« 301. ^Osslp K. Flechthelm, Die KPD In der Weimar Republlk (Frankfurt a. M. i Europaische VerlagsgBseilschaft, 1969)[?pp. 144-145. ->0laf Ihlau, Die Roten Kampfer, Marburger Abhandlung zur p o l i t i s c h e n Wissenschaft, XlVd^isenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1969), p. 3. 6 I b l d . , p. 5. 7 I b i d . , p. 6. 8Ibid t,;.)p. .7. 9 I b i d . , p. §i 0 1 0 I b i d . , p. 11. 1 1 L e n l n , "c*Left-Wing Communism't an i n f a n t i l e disorder", Collected Works0(Moscow; Progress Publischers, 1966, London, Lawrence & Wisshart), XXXI, p. 43. 1 2 Lenin,"'Left-Wing Communism't an i n f a n t i l e disorder", Collected Works, Marxist Library, !Works of Marxism-Leninism, XVI, 5 (New York: International Publishers, 193 ,^ revised t r a n s l a t i o n A p r i l 1970), p. 370. ^ I h l a u , op. c i t . , p. 10. i 4 The KAPD did expell Laufenberg and Wolffheim, but for d i s c i p l i n a r y reasons, NOT because Moscow demanded i t . Among other charges, the ECCI attacked the KAPD f o r National Bol-shevism, knowing very well that the KAPD had rejected i t . ^Hermann Gorter, "Offener B r i e f an Genossen Lenin", F r i t s Kool (ed.), Die Llnke gegen die Partelherrschaft (Oltent Walter-Verlag, 1970), Dokumente der Weltrlvolutlon, I I I , p. 481. 1 6 I h l a u , op. , c i t . , p. 13- 1 7 I b i d . , p. 15. l 8 I b i d . , P. 17. 1 9 I b i d . , p. 18. 2 0 I b i d . , P. 19. 2 1 I b i d . 22 ^ I b i d . , P. 22. 2 3 I b l d . , p. 24. 154 24 P r o t o k o l l des I I I . Kongress der Kommunlstlsohen  I n t e r n a t i o n a l e ( V e r l a g d e r Kommunlstlschen I n t e r n a t i o n a l e , A u s l i e f e r u n g ; Hamburg: V e r l a g C a r l Hoym, I92l), p. 186. 25ihlau, op. c i t . , pp. 23-24. 2 6 I b i d . , .p. 2?. 2 ? I b i d . , p. 28. 2 8 I b l d . , p. 29, n. 121, c i t i n g Die A k t l o n , #17, srMST 0year, June 30, 1924, pp. 344-347. 2 ^ I h l a u , op. c i t . , p. 29. 3°Ibld, p. 29, n. 123, Franz Pfemfert, "Vom Werden des •Spartakusbundes linkskommunistischer O r g a n i s a t l o n e n * " , Die  A k t l o n , #7, XVI year, J u l y 1926, pp. 144-148, a l s o , "Program des Spartakusbundes linkskommunistischer O r g a n i s a t i n n e n " , same i s s u e , p. 139f; see a l s o Bahne, op. c i t . , p. 367. 3 1 I h l a u , op. c i t . , p. 31 3 2 I b i d . , p. 32. 3 3 I b l d . , p. 33-34. •^Vllhelm Pieck, "Der Novemberumsturz i n Deutschland", D i e Kommunistische I n t e r n a t i o n a l e , XIX ( I I . year, n.d.g.), pp.71-82, (Petrograd: Smolny, S l n o v i e v , e t . a l . , 1921), pp. 73-74. ^E. waldmann, The S p a r t a c i s t U p r i s i n g o f 1919 (Milwaukee: The Marquette Pressi, 1958, pp. 47-48. 3 6 U r s u l a Ratz, Georg Ledebour - 1850-1947. V e r S f f e n t M l i c h u n g der H i s t o r i s c h e n Kommission B e r l i n , X X X I 0 ( B e r l i n ; Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1969), p. 176. ^ 7 P i e c k , I®]©, c i t . p 3®Weber, Der Grundungsparteltag der KPD. op. c i t . , pp. 270-271. 3 9 I b i d , p. 273. 40 A r t h u r Rosenberg, A H i s t o r y o f the German R e p u b l i c (New York: R u s s e l & R u s s e l Inc., 1965), P. 90. 4l »» S t a t l s t l s c h e s Jahrbuch f u r das deutsche Reich ( B e r l i n : V e r l a g von Reimar Hobbing, 1933 / e t p. 539. 42 L e n i n , "The C o n d i t i o n s o f A f f i l i a t i o n t o the Communist International",, S e l e c t e d Works, X, pp. 200-206, 'The Communist In t e r n a t i o n a l ! ' (Moscow; Co-operative P u b l i s h i n g S o c i e t y o f F o r e i g n Workers i n the USSR, 1938), p. 200 "Under c e r t a i n c i r -cumstances, the Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l may be faced w i t h the danger o f becoming d i l u t e d w i t h wavering and h a l f h e a r t e d groups 155 which have not yet abandoned the ideology of the Second Inter-national", pp. 201-202 "2. Every organization that wishes to a f f i l i a t e to the Communist International must i n a planned and systematic manner remove from a l l positions ... reformists and adherents of the 'Centre* ...." pg»o203 "7. Parties d e s i r i n g to a f f i l i a t e to the Communist International must recognize the necessity of a complete and absolute rupture with ... p o l i c i e s of the 'Centre' ... The Communist International imperatively, and as an ultimatum, demands that t h i s rupture be brought about a t the e a r l i e s t date...." p. 204 "11. The parties which desire to a f f i l i a t e to the Third International must overhaul the per-sonnel of t h e i r parliamentary f r a c t i o n s , remove the u n r e l i a b l e elements from them ...." p. 204 2&4. The Communist Parties ... must periodically purge j (re-register) the membership ...." The above i s also quoted i n Hermann Weber, Die Kommunistlsche Inter- nationale, pp. 55-62, "Die *21 Bedingungen' fur die Aufnahme i n die Komintern (1^20)" (Hannover» Verlag J , H. W. Dietz Nachf. GfllbH., 1966). Giinther Nollau, International Communism and. World  Revolution (London« H o l l i e s & Carter, 196l), p. 52 "Zinoviev ex-poundgd the Conditions to the Congress /the Second World Conga?© gress of the C X f I t was necessary, he said, to lay down cer-t a i n conditions for entry into the International i n order to prevent undesirable parties and groups getting into i t .... These rules were directed against the groups represented by ... Kautsky, H l l f e r d i n g , which were both members and leaders of the USPD. 43 -\Angress, op. c i t . , pp. 71-72. hkk, . , . Ett6tett«R5'.9..op. c i t . , pp. 146-147. ngress, op. c i t . , pp. 90 - 9 9 . ^ 6Ibid r,pp. 100 ^ I b i d , p. 71. ^ I b l d ^ p p . I l l ^ F i s c h e r , fcpc.©c*t. ^°Angress, op. c i t . , pp. 149 - 1 5 0 . "Holz achieved fame as a peasant leader f i r s t during the Kapp°Putsch. After the March Action he was j a i l e d and thus became a hero for the 60m-munists. A f t e r h i s release, he proved to be too hard to con-t r o l 1 revolutionaries were^not needed anymore by the KPD. He was transferred to Russia, where he drowned under mysterious circumstances i n the early 1930s." Ihlau, op. c i t . , p. 19. 52 Angress, op. c i t . , p. 168. ^ 3Ibid,,pp. 171. 5 Z*Ibid. 0 5 5 l b i d . , p. 174. D "Monatsschau der Kommunistischen Internationale, Massz - May 1921", Die Kommunistlsche Internationale,pp|, 369-39I , XIII ( A p r i l 22 , 1921), op. c i t . , p, 385. " 156 57p. H. / F r i t z H e c k e r t ? 7 , "Der P a r t e i t a g der Kommunis-t i s c h e n P a r t e i Deutschlands", pp. 91-95» Die Kommunistlsche  I n t e r n a t i o n a l e , XVII ( I I . year, 1921), op. c i t . , p. 92. 5°ibid., pp. 211-219, among the e x p e l l e d was Reuter-F r i e s l a n d , who l a t e r , between 1945 and 1953. was the S o c i a l -demoPratic mayor of West B e r l i n . 6 0 F l e c h t h e i m , op. c i t . , p. 163. 6 1 I b i d . , p. 212. 6 2Some sources c l a i m t h a t the KAG had 13 s e a t s i n the R e i c h s t a g . ^ F i s c h e r , op. c i t . , p. 199. 6 i*Angress, op. c i t . , p. 288. ^ F i s c h e r , op. c i t . , pp. 25^-257. ^^Angress, op. c i t . , p. $29. 6 7 M a r g a r e t Buber-Neumann, K r l e g s s c h a u p l a t z e der Welt- r e v o l u t i o n ( S t u t t g a r t 1 Seewald V e r l a g , 1967), pp. 303-304, n. Carr, p. 159; see a l s o F i s c h e r , op. c i t . , pp. 281-282. 6 8 A n g r e s s , op. c i t . , . p . 421. 69fiermann Remmele, "Urn den p o l i t l s c h e n Maohtkampf i n Deutschland", pp. 143-185, Die Kommunistlsche I n t e r n a t i o n a l e . XXXI-XXXII (V. year,) op. c i t . , p. 151. 7 0 I b l d . , pp. 178-179. 7 l H e l m u t Schachenmayer, A r t h u r Rosenberg a l s V e r t r e t e r  des h l s t o r l s c h e n M a t e r l a l l s m u s (Wiesbaden* Otto H a r r a s o w i t z , 1 9 2 4 ) , p. 24. 7 2Hermann Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunlsmus, I, ( F r a n k f u r t a. M.i Europflische V e r l a g s a n s t a l t , 1969), p. 99. 7 3 i b l d . , p. 1000 ^Schachenmayer, op. c i t . , p. 25. 7 5 p i e c h t h e i m , op. c i t . , p. 229. 7 6weber, D i e Wandlung des deutschen Kommunlsmus. I, op. c i t . , pp. 140-155. 7 7 i b i d . , p. 164. T h i s was o n l y a f o r m a l i t y or a t a c t i c a l arrangement. The v a r i o u s groups s t i l l maintained t h e i r dif;?©^ f e r e n c e s . 1*57 7 8 I b i d . , pp. 183-184. There i s l i t t l e information on the organization and a c t i v i t i e s of the German Trotskyists i n the early 1930s. For Trotsky's views on developments i n Ger-many see Leon Trotsky, Germany 1931-1932 (London» New Park Publications, 1970) and The Struggle against Fascism In Germany (New York, Pathfinder Press, 197l7. 79Bahne, op. c i t . , p. 382. 8 o A f t e r 1923 the largest part of Brandler's supporters broke with Brandler and supported the new, l e f t leadership. They "confessed" t h e i r "opportunistic right-wing deviations" (e. g. Brandler1sm). Later, a f t e r the expulsion of the u l t r a l e f t s , some of th i s group, including Ernst Meyer and Ewert, f e l t that the time was r i g h t to reinstate Brandler and Thal-he&mer i n the party's hierarchy. S t a l i n , however, did not want t h i s and he used t h e i r e f f o r t s on behalf of the former leaders to d i s c r e d i t them. He c a l l e d them derogatorlly "Ver- sohnler", meaning "reconcilers". 81 1Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunlsmus, I, op. c i t . , p. 211. ^ I n t e r n a t i o n a l e Presse Korrespondenz (Inprekor),GCXLI, (Beupsil^^Ds^ember l o \ 1928), p. 2808. 8 3K. H. Tjaden, Struktur und Funktlon der "KPD-Opposl- t i o n " (KPO), Marburger Abhandlung@zur p o l i t i s c h e n Wissenschaft, (Meisenheim am Giant Verlag Anton Hain, 1965), I, p. 2D0. 8 Z f I b i d , I, pp. 254-293. 85Hanno Drechsler, Die S o z i a l l s t i s c h e A r b e l t e r p a r t e l  Deutschlands. Marburger Abhandlung zur p o l i t i s c h e n Wissenschaft (Meisenheim am Glans Verlag Anton Hain, 1965), p. 201. 8 6 I b i d . , p. 202. 87 'Alfred Kastning, Die Deutsche Sozlaldemokratle zwlschen  K o a l l t l o n und Opposition.*1919-1923 (Paderbofen; Ferdinand Schoningh, 1970), p. 89 . 8 8 I b l d . , pp. 96-9 8« 8 9 R a t z , op. c i t . . , p. 214. 9 0HeinrMh Bennecke, Wirtschaftllche Depression und  p o l l t i s c h e r Radlkallsmus - 1916-1930 (Munchent Gunter Olzog Verlag, 1970). p. 5701 9!Ratz, op. c i t . , p. 2 l 6 . ^Drechsieir, op, c i t . , p. 9. 158 93Aifred Felllch, ©Die politischen Vorgange in Sachsen", Die Glocke, XLIV, pp. 1099-1105 (Berlin-Neukollm Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaft, January 30, 1924, IX year, II), p. 1099. "... a caucus meeting of the Saxon SPD Landtagsf rakt1on inter-rupted^ the Right moved into one room, the Left into another". 94pritz Bieligk, "Dem Ende zu?", Sozialistische Po lltlk  und Wlssenschaft, XXVII (III year, July 9. 1925) no place of publication given, no page number given, also Oskar Edel,"Nach dem Sieg der Reaktion in sachsen'V, ^ lMd^..(gtop4^XIII (III. year, June 11, 1925), According to Edel even right-wing SPD papers demanded disciplinary action against the discipline breakers in Saxony, as discipline is not a matter of right or l e f t . 95»Ein politisches Trauerspiel in Sachsen", Ibid., CXXII,, (III. year, June £4, 1925) ^n7. fpe TB® SPD had introduced in 1924 certain legislations regarding municipalities which were considered to be quite progressive by left-wing politicians. At a vote, i n which 24 SPD deputies voted with the bourgeois parties against 16 SPD deputies and the Communists, this legis-lation was repealed and replaced with new, supplosedly repres-sive, legislation. ^Drechsler, op. c i t . , p. 52. 9 7 I b i d , pp. 51-53. 9 8Ibid, pp. 2-3. 99ibid, p. 6. 1 0 0 I h l a u , op. c i t . , pp. 35-36. 1 0 1 I b i d . t p. 36. 1 0 * I b i d . , p, 39. 103 Ihlau, p. 4l, states that Per Klassenkampf was pub?; lisched by Adler, Rosenfeld, Strobel and Seyctewitz. Prechsler, op. c i t . , pp. 21-24, reports that Per Klassenkampf united with and took the place of Sozialistische Polltlk und Wlssenschaft. A reproduction of a frontpage of Per Klassenkampf in Prechsler, p. 31, l i s t s among the authors Levi and Adler, but neither Rosenfeld nor Seydewitz. It also shows the subtitM, which reads Sozialistische Polltlk und_Wlssenschaft. 1 0 i*Ihlau, op. c i t . , pp. 43-44. 1 05ibid, pp. 44-45. l o 6 I b i d , pp. 42-43. 1 0?Drechsler t o p # c i t . , p. 63. l°8Ihlau, op. c i t . , pp. 46-48. 1 0 9 I b i d . , p. 56. 1 1 0 I b i d . , pp. 56-57. li^-Drechsler, op. c i t . , pp. 137-138, n. 93» The Gruppe  Revolutlonare Pazlflsten. with H i l l e r , Mehring, Toller and i t s organ WeltBtthne did not .join the SAP®. H i l l e r , who had always wanted a strong poMfie&l organization between the SPD and the 159 KPD, blamed a r i v a l p a c i f i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r t h i s . He c l a i -med t h a t Seydewitz had promised him t h a t i f a new p a r t y would be formed, he would l e t him p a r t i c i p a t e , K i i s t e r , the l e a d e r o f the F o e r s t e r p a z l f l s t e n , who d i d h e l p i n the founding o f the SAP, must have persuaded Seydewitz to l e a v e H i l l e r ' s group out. jFrom a l e t t e r by Dr. Kurt H i l l e r to Hanno D r e c h s l e r ) . The F o e r s t e r p a z l f i s t e n , to which H i l l e r r e f e r r e d , c a l l e d them-s e l v e s " A r b e l t s g e m e l n s c h a f t filtr l l n k s s o z l a l l s t l s c h e P o l l t l k " (AG), D r e c h s l e r , p. 13& ( t e x t ) . 1 1 2 I b i d . , pp. 137-139. 1 1 3 I b l d , pp. 292-293, a l s o I h l a u , op. c i t . . , p. 73. NO ELECTION PABTICIPATION, because today i t does not develop / o l a s s 7 consciousness, but supports the $B©ud perpe-t r a t e d by monopoly c a p i t a l i s m , i t i s counter r e v o l u t i o n a r y . The e l e c t i o n i s a p r o v o c a t i o n o f the working c l a s s .... NO ELECTION PARTICIPATION, because i t i s today and here a p o l i t i c a l crime. One can not prove the impotence of parliamentarism.by t a k i n g p a r t i n i t .•.. NO ELECTION PARTICIPATION, f o r the reason "to get & known".because ... a p r o l e t a r i a n p a r t y i s not a n e w s h o p i n menacing p r o x i m i t y o f the o l d e r competition, witk\*hich.<one has to compete by u s i n g n o i s y a d v e r t i s i n g , h a n d b i l l d i s t r i b u t i o n , and s t a i r c a s e b a r k i n g to b a r g a i n f o r mass attendance T h e r e f o r e o u r o a l o g a n o l s : NOT: ELECTION STRUGGLE... BUT: CLASS STRUGGLE! M M 'Drechsler, op. c i t , , p. 3 0 6 , 160 CHAPTER THREE Iprager, op. c i t . pp. 157-158. 2Ibid., pp. 193-158. -"Programmatische Kundgebung des ausserordentllchen Parteltages der USPD vom 2. bis zum 6. Marz 1919 in Berlin", Dokumente und Materlallen z y i r Geschlchte der deutschen Ar-beit erbewegung, B§lhe2II, Volume III, Institute fur Marxlsmus-Leninismus, Zentraikommittee, SED (Berlim Dietz Verlag, 1958) pp. 278-279. ^Prager, op. c i t . , pp. 207-210. %ans Martin Bock, Syndlcallsmus und Llnksradlkallsmus  von 1919 - 1923. Marburger Abhandlung zur politischen Wissen-schaft (Meisenheim am Giant Verlag Anton Hain, 1969). p. 267. ^Ibld., pp. 207-210, ^Hermann Weber (ed.), Der deutsche Kommunlsmus, Doku-mehte (Kolm Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1963). p. 273. ^Gunther Hillmann (ed.) Selbstkrltlk des Kommunlsmus (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH., 1967). PP. 51-5^. 1 0Kool, op. c i t . , p. 158. 1 1Bock, op. c i t . , pp. 407-410. l 2 I b i d . , pp. 4l4-4l6. 1 3 i b i d . 1 / +Ibid., p. 225. 1 5 I b i d . , pp. 281-284. l 6 I b i d . , p. 382. 1 7 I b i d p. 383. ^§Eool, op. c i t . , p. 323. 1 9Bock, op. c i t . , pp. 385-386. 20 **wPaul Levi, [(Zwischen Spartakus und Sozlaldemokratle. Schriften und Aufsatze, Reden und Briefe, Charlotte Beradt (ed.) (Frankfurt a, M.» Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1969), pp. 46-47. 21 The concept that the other lower classes, e. g. the lower middle class, the peasantry, the pauperized intelligentsia, etc. are unable to become revolutionaries, but are "one reac-tionary mass" was a Lasa&lean concept. 2 2 L e v l , op. c i t . , pp. 48-51. 2 3 i b i d ., pp. 53-54. 161 ok Weber, Per deutsohe Kommunlsmus, op. c i t . , pp. 277-278, c i t e d fromWnsere&egT XV, (December 1921), a l s o r e p r i n t e d i n L e v i , op. c i t . , pp. l b l - 1 6 3 , "Forderungen d e r KAG". 2 5 p a u l L e v i , "Die Not der Stunde", Unser Weg, XVII (IV. year, 1922), c i t e d i n Levi. Zwischen Spartakus und Sozlaldemo- k r a t l e , op. c i t . , pp. l63-l&"9T ' 2 6 I . Sorge, "Die S t e l l u n g der KPD zur E l n h e l t s f r o n t t a k t l k " , ©le Kommunlstlsohe. I n t e r n a t i o n a l e , I, pp. 5^-78 (Hamburg? Kar'JT" Hoym, Nachf., V I I , year, January 1, 1926), p. 6 8 . 2 7 I b i d . , p. 71. 2 8 I b i d . , p. 75. 29**/a U thor7 , "Die L&quidierung der U l t r a l i n k e n i n d e r KPD", I b i d . , ~ I I I . pp. 237-245 ( V I I . year, 1926), p. 24l. 3°Hate 'SEagung des E r w e i t e r t e n EKKI, Neunzehnte S i t z u n g " , "Report o f the German Committee", jEpprekor, op. c i t . , XLV,g> pp. 628-632 (VIIc year, March 19, 1626), p. 629. 31 i b i d . , ( A p r i l 9, 1926),0 pp. 7^*755* 32 Maslow, Per Kampf urn d i e Kommunistische P a r t e i . P l a t - form d e r Ll n k e n O p p o s i t i o n i n der KPD., p. 34, c i t e d i n T. I., "Das neueste MachwerJtMaslows", D i e Kommunistische I n t e r n a t i o n a l e , V, pp. 225-232, op. c i t . , ( F e b r u a r y 1, 1927), P. 230. 33ibid, p. 45, c i t e d i n T. I . , I b i d , pp c g 3 0 . 3^Sorge, op. c i t . , p. 72. 3^Karl Schmidt^ "Kommunisten, Sozlaldemokraten,SSyndi-k a l i s t e n - und wildgewordene S p i e s s b i i r g e r " , D i e I n t e r n a t i o n a l e , IX, pp.2264-276 ( B e r l i n : H e r « | k | B ^ g ^ ^ ^ t e i i n & i 5 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ d e e v e r l a g e GmbH., February 1, 1927), PP, 265-266, c i t i n g K a r l Korsch, R e s o l u t l o n e n zur T a k t l k der KPD. 3 f e a h n e , op. c i t . , p. 375. 3 7 I b i d . , p. 369. 3 8Weber, Der deutsohe Kommunlsmus, op. c i t . , p. 287, from " P l a t f o r m der l l n k e n Opposition!?, pp.285-288. • J J o g M ^ n ^ p . e i t b * B i , PP. 150-151. 4 0 I b i d * ! p.. 369. ^ I b l d . , ^ PPP. 191-194, from the p l a t f o r m o f the KPO and from T3adenth©Bdnveraati5on wi t h B r a n d l e r . ^ 2 I b i d . , I, pp. 68-69. 4 3 I b i d . , I, p. 174. ^ I b i d . , I, p. 155. ^ I b l d # > p p # 72-73. 162 w I b l d . f I, pp. 70-72. 'Weber, Der deutsche Kommunlsmus, op. c i t . , p. 297. l 8 I h l a u , op. c i t . , p. 85. 4 9 I b i d . , p. 84. 5°Drechsler, op. c i t . , pp. 205-207. 51ibid., p. 208. J Weber, Der deutsche Kommunlsmus, op. c i t . , pp. 307-311. -'^Tjaden, op. c i t . , I I , p. 56. as quoted from Gegen den Strom, 1930. ^ I b i d . , I, p. 274. 55pritz Sternberg, BfezFaschlsmus an der Macht (Amster-dam! V e r l a g Contact, 1935). P. 28. ^ 6 I b i d . , p. 33. 57D rechsler, op, cit*pp2289-230. 5 8 I h l a u , op. c i t . , pp. 118-119. ^ 3 [ b l d . , p. 116. 6 o I b i d . , 116-119. 6 1 R i c h a r d N. Hunt, German S o c i a l Democracy - 1918 - 1933 (New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1964), p. 234. 6 2 D r e c h s l e r , op. c i t . , p. 176. 63<rhalheimer, " F a s c h i s t i s c h e D i k t a t u r uber Deutschland"' Gegen den Strom, V, (1933). c i t e d i n Tjaden, op. c i t . , I I , p. 281. 6 4 Records of the Relchs Leader o f the SS and C h i e f of  the German P o l i c e ( R e i c h s f i i h r e r SS und Chef der deutschen P o l l z e D c The American H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n and General if S e r v i c e s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (Washington: Nationaliitfgehlves, 1 #58), Mc?pcppy :e m^l :7^,^Rp^a ( 4«2:,,Fjrame m9$9,8lf?<±2,?949',?48^ ^Jee:S , a l s o Appendix One. 163 CHAB5DER2E0UR .^ l'/? IV. Y;V'it/'':J~:i!"; -i Drechsler, op. c i t . , p. Il6. 2Bock, op. c i t . , pp. 413-414. 3Ihlau, op. c i t . , p. 56. ^Ibid., p. 75. 5lbid., pp. 87-88. ^ I b i d . , p p . 76. 7Ibid. 8Ibid., p. 80. 9TJaden, op. c i t . , I, pp. 113-115. 1 0Pieohthelm, op. c i t . , pp. 156-157. H-Offenes schreiben an die Mitglieder der Kommunisti-schen Arbeiterpartei", Die Kommunistische Internationale, XI, pp. 192-213 (Petrograd 1 $£el&Bar, 1920), p. 192 and p. 196, i n comparision, the ADGB had, at that time, approximately 8 million members, Ibid, p, 195; see also Weber, Die Wandlung  des deutchen Kommunlsmus, op. celt., p. 39* l 2Ihlau, op. c i t . , p. 29. 13Schachenmayer, op. c i t . , p. 26. 1 4 1 Ihlau, op. c i t . , pp. 32-33. ^Tjaden, op, c i t . , I, pp. 119-120. -•J^Ibid., I, p. 121. l 6Drechsler, op.ca*a,&*p,l#8-l60. ^Ihlau., op.cit., pp. 78-80. 1 8 "Die Roten Kampfer. zur Geschichte elner Widerstands-gruppe", VIerteljahiBeshefte fur Zeltgeschlchte, op. c i t . , p. 440. 19Weber, Die_Wandlung des deutschen Kommunlsmus, ip op. c i t . , p. 39. 20 "Statlstlk des deutschen Reichs, CCCXV, i - i v , "Die'Wahlen zum RetiichG&ag am 4. Mai und am 7t Dezember, 1924", i , pp. 23-88, v i , pp. 26-120, "Die Wahlen zum Reichstag am 20. Mai, 1928", CCCLXXII, 1 - i i i , 1, pp. 150-163, Statistisches Reichsamt (Berlint Reimar Robbing Verlag). 2 1 !kai<$ C ) cecWoiioPPP23g88l8 2 2ibid., CCCLII, i , PP.150-163. 23Bahne, op. c i t . , p. 366, pp. 370-371. 164 24 The sup p o r t e r s of the AKP'Ss&at.eMihsthe P a l a t i n a t e were mostly from Ludwigshafen, employed i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y i n the Badlsche A n l l l n Werke, as the workers i n t h i s f a c t o r y have always had a s t r o n g and independent l e f t communist t r a d i t i o n . 25 S t a t l s t l k des deutschen Relchs . op. c i t . , CCCLXXIII.fi, pp. 150-163. " c o C o m p i l e d from two t a b l e s i n Weber, Wandlung des deut- schen Kommunlsmus, I, op. c i t . , p. 33 and p. 34. Tjaden, op. c i t . , I, p. 112. c i t . 27 2 8 Weber, D i e Wandlung des deutschen Kommunlsmus, I, op, p. 17. 2^TJa3en, pp.. c i t . , I, p.. 122. ^fkraihiajer, op. c i t . p. 162. 3 l 3 1 M d l ^ p | i . 159-162. 3 2 s t a t l s t l k des deutschen Relchs , op. c i t . , 1928, CCCLXXII, 1, pp. iTttSl 3 3 B o c k , op. c i t . , 427-444, a l s o D r e c h s l e r , op. c i t . , pp. 168-183. 3 ^ l h l a u , op. c i t . , pp. 81-82. 3 5 I b l d > 36»Di e Roten K a i p f e r . Zur Geschichte e i n e r l l n k e n Wider-stands gruppe", op. c i t . , p, 440. 3 7 s t a t i s t i s o h e s Jahrbuch f u r das deutsohe Reich ( B e r l i n : V e r l a g von Reimar Hobbing, 1933), P. 539. 3 8 l b i d , 1920, pp. 178-179. The s o c i a l i s t ! J vote i n these seven d i s t r i c t s was as f o l l o w s : USPD 456,667 42.75? SPD 187,473 17.556 KPD 13,942 1.; Berlin Potsdam II Potsdam I Merseburg Thuringia Dilsseldorf-East Leipzig 2:51?&48 28.75? 258,029 30.25? 310,953 45.2$ 324,527 30.65? 319,911 32.8$ 267,520 42.15? 146,846 17.45? 176,029 20.6$ 60,864 8.8$ 162,567 15.4$ 97,177 10.05? 57,749 9.15? 10,872 1.3$ 10,623 1.3% 10,681 1.656 220,289 1.956 12,229 1.256 12,859 2.0# 3 9 i b i d , USPD 9.75? SPD 37.056 F0?D 1-.06 " 6.652 » 36,152 » -8 8.056 " 2I19$5? " 1.556 (Centre ap. 385?) Cologna-Aix l a Chapelle " 8.3% » 220.($ " _ (Centre ap. 52%) Mecklenburg Breslau Westfalia-North 165 ^°lbid., pp. 178-179, C o b l e n z - T r i e r . USPD 5.6$, SPD £2.0$, KPD 7*2£ Lower Bavaria-Upper Prankonia .. " 9.0$, " 10.2$, " 2.1$ 4 1 l b i d . , E a s t pMssii, USPD i !^5$^SPil^3$3^K!PD,^,2$, S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n USPD J%, SPD 37^ 3$, KPD 2.1$, the respec-t i v e percentage vote f o r the thr e e s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s i n l l % 2 0 was 18.8$, 21.6$, and 1.7$, see a l s o (Appendix 5* S S p c i a l l g t e i a -v.6feesM>hQpr6teptahtgfarmifi8s>arags&g3sndGmap03» Appendix 4. ^ I b i d . , 1924/5, PP. 391-392 and 1927, pp. 498-499. ^ S t a t l s t l k des deutschen Relchs, op. c i t . , ECCLXXII, i , pp. 23-85T 44, S t a t i s t i s c h e s Jahrbuch, 1927, pp. 500-501. J 4$. ^5Ibidwal929, pp. 486-487. **6lbld., 1^ 28, pg2082g#83. 'Ibid*, 1927, PP. 500-501. F o r R e i c h s t a g r e s u l t s S t a t l s t l k des deutschen R e l c h s , op. c i t . , CCCLXXII, i , pp. 10-25. f o r Landtag and B f l r g e r s c h a f t r e s u l t s , S t a t i s t i s c h e s Jahrbuch, op. c i t . , 1928, pp. 582-583. The R e i c h s t a g e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s f o r P r u s s i a can o n l y be g i v e n approximately, as s e v e r a l o f the s m a l l e r s t a t e s , such as An h a l t , L i p p e , Oldenburg, Brunswick, Schaumburg-Lippe, were, f o r R e i c h s - t a g e l e c t i o n s p u r p o s e s , combined wi t h p a r t s o f P r u s s i a i n c e r t a i n e l e c t o r i a l d i s t r i c t s . ^ S t a t i s t i s c h e s Jahrbuch, op. c i t . , 1931, PP. 5^6-547. 5°lbid, 1929, PP. 5163-549, a l s o Weber, Die Wandlung des  deutschen Kommunlsmus, I, op. c i t . , p. 146. A c c o r d i n g t o B Bahne, op. c i t . , p. 371, the L e f t had 13 R e i c h s t a g s e a t s (out o f a t o t a l o f 45 e l e c t e d f o r the KPD) and s i x P r u s s i a n Landtag s e a t s . op. c i t . , December 18, 1928, p. 2808. 5 2Tjaden, I, op. c i t . , pp. 230-231. 53ibid. ( I, pp. 231-233 a n d B S t a t l s t l s c h e s Jahrbuch, op. c i t . , 1929, PP. 486-487, 1030, pp. 564-566, and 1931. PP. 548-549. ^ T j a d e n , I, op. c i t . , pp. 230-231. 5 ^ l b i d . , pp. 235-237. ^ S t a t i s t i s c h e s Jahrbuch. op. c i t . , 1929, pp. &§g-487, 1930, pp. 564-566, and 1931. 548-549. The Yearbooks s t a t e on c e r t a i n dates, between e l e c t i o n s , the r e s p e c t i v e s t r e n g t h o f 166 the p a r t i e s r e p r e s e n t e d In the i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s . O f t e n the number g i v e n f o r the KPD (or any o t h e r p a r t y ) was l e s s (or more) than the a c t u a l s e a t s t h a t p a r t y had won i n the p r e c e e d i n g e l e c t i o n . In some cases the m i s s i n g KPD s e a t s showed up as e i t h e r KPO or as " f r a k t l o n s l o s " . 57 D r e c h s l e r , op. c i t . , p. 268. 5 8 s t a t l s t l s c h e s Jahrbuch, op. c i t . , $>932, pp. 544-545. 5 9 P a r t i e s , which d i d not have a R e l o h s l l s t e B o r @ w M c n @ " f a i l e d to e l e c t any d e p u t i e s , could r e q u e s t t h a t t h e i r unused v o t e s be g i v e n t o another p a r t y , f co < "x^ C; / e r f •:. ^ S t a t i s t l k des deutschen Helens, "Die Wahlen zum R e i c h s -t a g am 31. J u l i und am 6. November, 1932", op. c i t . , CDXXXIV, pp. 11-42. 61 D r e c h s l e r , op. c i t . , pp. 283-287. 6 z S t a t i s t l f c des deutschen Relchs, op. c i t . , CDXXXIV, pp. 72-10BT Drechsler, l o c . c i t . ..-Sibid. 6 \ & t z , op. c i t . , p. 218. 6 5 I b i d . , p. 219. 6 6 B o c k , op. c i t . , pp. 419-420, c i t i n g "Rote Armee", P o l l t i s c h e AktenEder Reglerung. I, 15785, B l a t t 7, D u s s e l d o r f . 6 7 B o c k , op. c i t . , p. 296. 6 8 I b i d . , pp. 298-303. 6 9 T J a d e n , I, op. c i t . , pp. 235-237. 7°IblcU, I, p. 148. 7 1 I b i d . , I . pp. 123-128. 7 2 I h l a u , op. c i t . , pp. 87-88. 73 ^ D r e c h s l e r , op. c i t . , p. 178. 7 / 4 T j a d e n , I, op. c i t . , pp. 224-227. 75] 76, 7 5 D r e c h s l e r , op. c i t . , pp. 164-169. JTJaden, I, op. c i t . , pp. 145-147. 7 7 T h e m a t e r i a l on l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r groups p u b l i c a t i o n s i s based on d a t a i n D r e c h s l e r , op. c i t . , pp. 37^-377, I h l a u , op. c i t . , pp. 192-197, Tjaden, I I , op. c i t . , pp. 222 - 2 2 5 , and Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunlsmus, I I , ( p p . 364-365. 167 CONCLUSION Rosenberg, op. c i t . , p. 11. 2 E r i c h Eyck, A H i s t o r y of the Weimar Rep u b l i c , I, "Prom the C o l l a p s e o f the Empire to Hindenburg's E l e c t i o n " (Cambridge, Masschusets: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962), p. 50. 3 E r n s t N i e k i s c h , Die Legende von der Weimarer Republlk Koln: V e r l a g Wissenschaft und P o l i t i k , 1968), p. 75. The KPD overtook the SPD o c c a s i o n a l l y or c o n s t a n t l y i n a t l e a s t s i x d i s t r i c t s . S t a t 1 s t l s c h e s Jahrbuch, op. c i t . Berlin SPD? % KPDj % Westfalia-South SPD. % KPD, % May 4, 1924 2118cj 20.6 May 4, 1924 16.1 21.9 Dec. 7. 1924 32.1 19.1 Dec. 7. 1924 24.7 12.1 May' 220, 1928 34 29.4 May 20. 1928 29.6 11.8 Sep. 14, 1930 28 33 Sep. 14. 1930 21.3 17 .July 31, 1932 27.9 33.4 July 31. 1932 18.7 20.6 MMarch 5, 1933 22.5 30.1 March 5. 1933 16.6 16.8 Golog;ne-A.la Ch, SPD, % KPD. % Dtlsseld.-West SPD, % KPD, % May 4, 1924 10.1 14.2 May 4. 1924 9.7 18.9 Dec. 7, 1924 15.1 8.8 May 20. 1928 17.2 1477 Sep. 14, 1930 14.5 14.5 March 5, 1933 9.1 15.5 Oppeln SPD, % KPD, % Dusseld.-East fSPD. % KPD, % May 4, 1924 4.2 16.7 May 4. 1924 11.4 24.9 (The same pattern held true in a l l elections). * 5paul Lensch, "Am Ausgang der deutschen S o z i a l d e m o k r a t i e " , D i e Neue Rundschau, pp. 385-404, XXX. ffahrgang Ser F r e l e n Bxihne l O B e r l M : S. F i s c h e r V e r l a g , 1919). p. 401. °Ibid., p. 402. 7 K a r l D i e h l , D i e D i k t a t u r des P r o l e t a r i a t s und das  Ratesystem (Jena: V e r l a g von Gustav F i s c h e r , 1924), Second E d i t i o n , pp. 2 - 3 . 8 B r a s s , Daumig, F r l e s l a n d , Geyer, Hoffmann, L e v i , "An d i e r e v o l u t i o n a r e n A r b e l t e r Deutschlands", Die F r e i h e l t , CXLI (March 24, 1922, V. y e a r ) , p. 1, on the o c c a s s i o n o f t h e i r j o i n i n g the USPD. ^ o r the purpose o f f e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s i n the tf.eiiBBS* Weimar R e p u b l i c Germany was d i v i d e d i n t o 35 e l e c t o r l a l d i s t r i c t s . These d i s t r i c t s were j o i n e d t o g e t h e r i n groups of two or t h r e e G r o u p s - o f - D i s t r i c t s . In each e l e c t o r l a l d i s t r i c t s p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s c o u l d nominate a l i s t o f c a n d i d a t e s . I t was q u i t e 168 common t h a t the same l i s t was used i n s e v e r a l d i s t r i c t s o r t h a t some candidates appeared on s e v e r a l l i s t s o f the same p a r t y but i n d i f f e r e n t d i s t r i c t s . The v o t e r s then voted f o r the whole l i s t , i n p r a c t i c e , f o r the p a r t y . For each 60,000 v o t e s a p a r t y r e c e i v e d w i t h i n a d i s t r i c t the p a r t y was a l o t -t e d one deputy o f i t s c h o i c e . Unused p o r t i o n s o f the votes c o u l d be t r a n s f e r r e d and added to another d i s t r i c t w i t h i n the same G r o u p - o f - D i s t r i c t s , w p r h M d e d t h a t i n the o t h e r d i s t r i c t the p a r t y r e c e i v e d a t l e a s t 30,000 votes, t h a t i s , h a l f o f what i s r e q u i r e d to e l e c t one deputy. I f t h e r e were s t i l l unused votes a v a i l a b l e they then were t r a n s f e r r e d to the R e i c h j l i s t e . The p a r t y c o u l d then use the accumulated unused votes t o a ppoint a deputy f o r each 60,000 v o t e s . However, a p a r t y c o u l d not r e c e i v e more d e p u t i e s from i t s R e l c h s l i s t e than i t e l e c t e d i n d i s t r i c t s . Thus, i t was p o s s i b l e f o r s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s to r e c e i v e more than 60,000 votes throughout Germany without e l e c t i n g a s i n g l e deputy. P a r t i e s , which d i d not have a R e l c h s l i s t e , c o u l d request t h a t t h e i r unused votes be g i v e n t o another p a r t y . *°Paul F r o l i c h , "Die deutschen Reichstagswahlen", Die  Kommunistlsche I n t e r n a t i o n a l e , XXXIV-XXXV£ (Mpy 1924) {I<2pp. op£ 0cit., p. 79, 1 3-G. K. Chesterton, "The u n f i n i s h e d Temple", Whats wrong with the World (London* C a s s e l & Co., LTD., 1912), p. 36, A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY A. PRIMARY SOURCES 1» Unpublished Dokuments Records of the R e i c h s l e a d e r o f the SS and C h i e f o f the German  P Q l l c e ( R e l c h s f t i h r e r SS und Chef der deutschen P o l l z e l ) , The American H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n and General S e r v i c e s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Washingtont N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s , 1958. Microcopy T-175, R o l l 422, Frames 2,949,817-2,949,848. 2. Reference Wofcksial Dittmann, Wilhelm, Das p o l l t l s c h e Deutschland vor H i t l e r . Z u r i c h : Europaverlag, 1945. ~ ~~ S t a t l s t l k des deutschen Relchs. Die Wahlen zum R e i c h s t a g  am 4. May und 7. Dezember, 1924. CCCXV. 1-frfr. 1Q24. D I P Wahlen zum R e i c h s t a g am 20. May 1928. CCCDXXII, i - i l i 7 ~ 1 9 2 8 , D i e Wahlen zum R e i c h s t a g am 14. September 1930. CCCBXXXII, i - i i i , 1932, Die Wahlen zum R e i c h s t a g am 31. J u l l und  6. November 1932 und am 5. Marz. 1933. CDXXXIV. 1935. B e r l i n : V e r l a g von Reimar Hobbing. S t a t i s t i s c h e s Jahrbuch f u r das deutsohe R e i c h . XXXIX-DII, B e r l i n : V e r l a g von Reimar Hobbing, 1920-1933. S t a t i s t i s c h e s Jahrbuch f i i r den P r e u s s l s c h e n S t a a t . XVI and XVII, B e r l i n : P r e u s s i s c h e s S t a a t l i c h e s Landamt, 1920 and 1921. 3 . P u b l i s h e d Documents Brunet, Ren£. The New German C o n s t i t u t i o n . T r a n s l a t e d from French by Joseph Gollomp. New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1922. Dokumente und M a t e r l a l l e n zur Geschlchte d e r Deutschen A r - belterbewegung. January 1919 - May 1919. I n s t i t u t e f u r Marxismus-Leninlsmus beim Zentralkomitee der S o z i a l i s t i s c h e n E i n h e i t s p a r t e i Deutschlands. B e r l i n ; D i e t z V e r l a g , 1958. F r i e d e n s b u r g , Ferdinand. Die Welmarer Republlk. Hannover: Norddeutsche V e r l a g s a n s t a l t , 1957. 169 170 Hlllmann, Giinther ( e d . J . S e l b s t k r l t l k des Kommunlsmus. Rein-beck b e i Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch V e r l a g , GmbH, 196?, Der E r s t e und Zwelte Kongress der Kommunistischen I n t e r n a t l o -;."?4*nale. Herausgegeben vom Zentralkomiteegder SED, B e r l i n : D i e t z V e r l a g , 1959. K o o l , F r i t s ( e d . ) . Die L l n k e gegen d i e P a r t e l - H e r r s c h a f t . Dokumente der Welt R e v o l u t i o n , Volume I I I . 01tent W a l t er V e r l a g , 1970. L e n i n , V. I. C o l l e c t e d VJorks. M a r x i s t L i b r a r y XI, v, Works  o f Marxism-Leninism r e v i s e d t r a n s l a t i o n A p r i l 1970. New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1934. . C o l l e c t e d Works. Volume XXXI, Apr11-December 1920. London: Lawrence & Wlshart, Moscow: Progress P u b l i s h e r s , 1966. . S e l e c t e d Works, Volume X, Moscow: Co-operative P u b l i s h i n g S o c i e t y o f f o r e i g n workers i n the USSR, 1937. L e v i , P a u l . Zwischen Spartakus und S o z l a l d e m o k r a t l e , e d i t e d by C h a r l o t t e Beradt. P o l l t l s c h e Texte, W. Abendroth, ed. F r a n k f u r t : Europaische V e r l a g s a n s t a l t , 1969. P r o t o k o l l des I I I . Kongress der Kommunistischen I n t e r n a t i o n a l e . Moscow: V e r l a g der Kommunistischen I n t e r n a t i o n a l e , 1921. Tjaden, K. H. S t r u k t u r und Fun k t l o n der "KPD-Opposltlon"(KPO), jfeaSjgil, Volume IV, Marburger Abhandlung zur p o l i t i s c h e n W issenschaft. Meisenheim am Glan: V e r l a g Anton Hain, 1964. Weber. Hermann (ed.) Per deutsche Kommunlsmus - Dokumente. Kolnt Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1963. ( e d . ) . Der Grundungsparteltag der KPD - P r o t o k o l l und M a t e r l a l i e n . F r a n k f u r t a. M.: Europaische V e r l a g s -a n s t a l t , 1969. . p i e Wandlung des deutschen Kommunlsmus, Volume IJ Die S t a l l n l s l e r u n g d e r KPD In der Welmarer Republlk, F r a n k f u r t a. M.: Europa|sche V e r l a g s a n s t a l t , 1969. 4. P e r i o d i c a l s D i e F r e l h e l t . C e n t r a l Organ of the USPD. V. year, CXI2I, B e r l i n : March 24, 1922. Die Glocke. XLIV, Berl&g-Neukollnt V e r l a g f u r S o z i a l w i s s e n -s c h a f t , January 30, 1924. 171 Die I n t e r n a t i o n a l e . Z e i t s c h r i f t f u r P r a x i s und Theory des Marxlsmus. B e r l i m Herausgegeben vom Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen P a r t e i Deutschlands ( S e k t l o n d e r Kommunistlschen I n t e r n a t i o n a l e ) , Z e n t r a l e f u r Z e i t u n g s -v e r l a g e , February 1, 19 27. I n t e r n a t i o n a l e Presse Korrespondenz (INPREKOR). German e d i t i o n . XLV, (VI. year, March 19. 1926) LIV. (VI. year, A p r i l 9, 1926), CXLI, ( V I I I . year, December 18, 1928), B e r l i n . D i e Kommunistische I n t e r n a t i o n a l e . X I , #IX. ^ Ms 3 0ye#^»)1920), XVII. ( I l l . y y e a r , A p r i l 22, 1921), P e t r o g r a d ; Smolny, S i n o v i e v , e t al.XXXI-XXXII, (V.year), I , ( V I I . year, Janu-a r y 1, 1926), I I I . ( V I I . y e a r ) , V. <CVIII. year, February 1, 1927), B e r l i n i Westeuropaisches S e k r e t a r i a t c a e ^ Komintern. BR6fce Fahne" V e r l a g . D i e Neue Rundschau. (XXX. year o f the F r e l e n Btihne), B e r l i m S. F i s c h e r V e r l a g , 1919. S o z i a l i s t i s c h e P o l i t i k und Wlssenschaft. P a u l L e v i , e d i t o r . I I I . y e a r ) , XXII, (June 4, 1925), XXIII, (June 11, 1925), XXVII, ( J u l y 9, 1925). B e r l i m I n t e r n a t i o n a l e V e r l a g s -a n s t a l t GmbH. V l e r t e l j a h r e s h e f t e f u r Z e l t g e s c h l c h t e , IV, ( I I I . year, Oc-tober 1959), IV, (IX. year, October l f 6 l ^ n ; ; S t u t t g a r t l Deutsche V e r l a g s a n s t a l t . Munchem I n s t i t u t e f u r Z e l t -g e s c h l c h t e . H2 SECONDARY S60SBGES g. Memoirs Adolph, Hans J . L. Otto Wels und d i e P o l i t i k d e r deutschen S o z l a l d e m o k r a t l e - 1194-1939. V e r o f f e n t l l c h u n g der h i s -t o r i s c h e n Kommlssion zu B e r l i n , Volume XXXIII, B e r l i m Walter de Gru y t e r & Co., 1971. Beradt, C h a r l o t t e . Paul L e v i . F r a n k f u r t a, M.t Europaische V e r l a g s a n s t a l t , 1969. Buber-Neumann, Margaret. K r l e g s s c h a u p l a t z e d e r Weltrevo-I f l t l o n . S t u t t g a r t 1 Seewald V e r l a g , 1967. Ratz, U r s u l a . Georg Ledebour - 1850-194?. V e r o f f e n t l i c h u n g der H i s t o r l s c h e n Kommlssion zu B e r l i n , Volume XXXI, B e r l i m Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1969. 172 2. Monographs Angress, Walter T. S S t l l l b o r n Revolution. The Communist Bid  for Power i n Germany. 1921-1923. Princeton, New Jerseyt University Press, 1963. Bennecke, Heinrich. Wlrtschaftliche Depression und P o l l t l - §6her Radlkallsmus - 1918-1938. Mftnchen: Gunter EQtzog Verlag, 1970. Bevan, Edwyn. German S o c i a l Democracy during the War. New Yorkj E. P. Dutton & Company, 1918. .., Bock, Hans Manfred. Syndikallsmus und Llnkjaisommunlsmus von  1918-1923. Marburger Abhandlung zu* P o l l t i s c h e n Wlssen-schaft, Volume XIII. Meisenheim am Glan» Verlag Anton Hain, 1969. Chesterton, G. K. what's wrong with the World. Londoni Cassel & Cocsfitd., 1912. Diehl, K a r l . Die Dlktatur des P r o l e t a r i a t s und das Ratesystem. Second ed i t i o n . Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1924. Drechsler, Hanno. Die S o z i a l i s t i s c h e A r b e l t e r p a r t e l Deutsch- ILands (SAPD). Marburger Abhandlung zur P o l l t i s c h e n Wls-senschaft, Volume I I . Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1965. Eyck, Er i c h . A History,, of the Weimar Republic, Volume I, From  the Collapse of the Empire to Hlndenburg's E l e c t i o n . Cam-bridge, MassachusetfesEu Harvard University Press, 1962. Fischer,IRuth. S t a l i n and German Communism. Cambridge: Har-vard University Press, 19kW, Flechtheim, Ossip K. Die KPD In der Welmarer Republlk. Frank-f u r t a. M., Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1969. Hunt, Richard N. German Soc i a l Democracy - 1918-1933. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. Ihlau, Olaf. Die Roten K&ffipfer. Marburger Abhandlung zur P o l l t i s c h e n Wlssenschaft, Volume 14. Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1969. Kastning, A l f r e d . Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratle zwlschen  K o a l l t l o n und Opposition - 1919-1923. Paderborn: F e r d i -nand Schoningh, 1970. Niekisch, Ernst. Die Legende von der Welmarer Republlk. Kolm Verlag Wlssenschaft und P o l i t i k , 1968. 173 Prager, Eugen. Geschlchte der USPD. B e r l i n t V e r l a g s g e -n o s s e n s c h a f t " F r e l h e i t " eGmbH. 1921. Rosenberg, M&ibhur. A H i s t o r y of the German R e p u b l i c . New York: R u s s e l & R u s s e l Inc., 1965. rMiMyi, <i,M(i [ll1>l?iP:!i>UV,|!| Schachenmayer, Helmut. A r t h u r Rosenberg a l s V e r t r e t e r des H i s t o r i s c h e n M a t e r l a l l s m u s . Wiesbadeni Otto Harraso-w i t z , 1964. Sternberg, F r i t z . Per Pasohismus an d e r Macht. Amsterdam! V e r l a g Contact, 1935* Tjaden. K. H. S t r u k t u r und Punktlon d e r "KPD-Opposlfclon"  (KPO). B a r t I. Marburger Abhandlung zur P o l i t i s c h e n Wissenschaft, Volume &V. Meisenheim am Glan: V e r l a g Anton Hain, 1964. Waldmann, E. The S p a r t a c l s t U p r i s i n g of 1919* Milwaukee: The Marquette Press, 1958* Weber, Hermann. Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunlsmus, Two Volumes. Die S t a l l n l s l e r u n g d e r KPD i n d e r Welmarer  Republlk. F r a n k f u r t a. M.: Europaische V e r l a g s a n s t a l t , 1969: 174 APPENDIX 1 AGE AND OCCUPATION OP 42 SAP MEMBERS ARRESTED BY THE NAZIS Age of 42 a&i| members arrested In B e r l i n between 1933 and 1937? Born before 1880 1 Born between 1880 and 1890 .. 6 Born between 1890 and 1900 .. 4 Born between 1900 and 1910 ..19 Born a f t e r 1910 9 No age given • 3 Occupation of 42 SAP i mem* bers arrested i n B e r l i n befeweems 1933 and 1937* Workers, white c o l l a r .. 8 Workers, blue c o l l a r .. 2 Artisans 3 Professionals 4 C i v i l servants 1 Merchants 2 Students 4 Not given 16 Records of the Relohs Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police (Relohsfflhrer SS und Chef der deutschen P o l l z e l ) , She American H i s t o r i c a l Association and General Services Ad-ministration (Washington* National Archives, 1958), R 613, Microcopy T-175, ^22, R o l l 283, Frames 2 ,949,8l?-2,949,848. V Ostpreussen $$ast Prussia),. 1 Berlin ... 2 Potsdam II 3 Potsdam I ,,,, 4 Frankfurt a. 0 5 Pommem (Pommerania) 6 Breslau 7 Liegnitz 8 Wilrttemberg Schleswig-Holstein 13 Weser-Ems 14 Osthannover 15 Sudhannover-Braunschweig..16 Vestfalen Nord 17 Westfalen Su"d 18 Hessen-Nassau 19 Koln-Aachen 20 Koblenz-Trier ,,,,, 21 Dilsseldorf Ost 22 Diisseldorf West 23 Oberbayem-Schwaben 24 Nlederbayernr. 25 Frahken 26 Pfalz (Palatinate) 27 Dresden-Bautzen 28 Leipzig 29 Chemnitz-Zwickau 30 31 */sic"~/ There is no Oppeln 9 Magdeburg 10 Merseburg 11 Thflringen (Thuringia) 12 Baden 32 Hessen-Darmstadt 33 Hamburg 34 Mecklenburg 35 line in the original to indicate the boundary between districts 22 and 23. Wilhelnv Dittmann, Das politische Deutschland vor Hitler (Zilrich: Europaverlag, 1945). GERMAN STATES AND PRUSSIAN PROVINCES Superimposed upon slectorial districts. W-Waldeck H-State of Hesse A-Anhalt Z-Hohenzollern (Prussia) J C  1 ^2) D-Lippe (Detmoldj L-Sch aumburg-Lippe M-Mec klenburg-Strelitz S-Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1- Bremen 2- Hamburg 3- Ltfbeck w to — • 17$ APPENDIX 5 SOCIALIST VOTES IN PROTESTANT FARMING AREAS In the Reichstag election of June 6, 1920, the SPD exceeded its national average in Schleswig Holstein, heavily in Mecklenburg, Hesse-Darm-stadt, East-Hannover, and South Hannover-Brunswick. The USPD exceeded its national average in South Hannover-Brunswick. ,i;The KPD exceeded its national average in wUrttemberg. Together the left-wing parties exceeded their na-tional average in Mecklenburg, Hesse-Darmstadt, and heavily in South Hannover-Brunswick. (SPD 21.6%, USPD 18.9$, and KPD 1.755, for a total of 42.25?) In the Reichstag election of May 1924 the SPD exceeded its national average of..20.5% in Schleswig-Holstein, Weser-Ems, East Hannover, South Han-nover-Brunswick, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Mecklenburg; The KPD exceeded it s 12.6$ in none of the protest ant farming areas. For the following Reichstag elections see the table below. / 1 Electorial District Dec. 1924 May 1928 Sep. 1930 July 1932 Nov. 1932 March 1933 . Schleswig-Hol stein SPD KPD tog. 30.3% 6.75? 37.0$ 35.3$ 7.9$ •43.2$ 29.8$ 10.6$ 40; 4$ 26.7$ 10.7$ 37.4$ 24.7$ 13.3$ 38.05? 22.2% 10.7$ 32.9$ P canine m SPD KPD tog. 24.65? 5.85? 30.4?? 30.25? 6.1$ 36.4$ 24.7$ 8.8$ 33.3$ 20.9$ 10.7$ 31.6$ 19.8$ 12.1$ 31.9$ 16.2$ 7.6$ 23.8$ Veser-Ems SPD KPD tog. 25.4)? 4.65? 30.05? 29.3$ 5.1$ 34.4$ 24.3$ 6.3$ 30.6$ 22.4$ 7.9$ 30.3$ 21.3$ 10.3$ n f& 19.6$ 7.9$ 27.5$ East Hannover SPD KPD tog. 28.15? 4.55? 32.65? 32.8$ 5.8$ 38.6$ 28.1$ 7.5$ 35.6$ 24.5$ 8.2$ 32.7$ 23.3$ 10.3$ 33.6$ 19.7$ 7.5$ 27.2$ South Hannover-Brunswick SPD KPD tog. 35.7/? 4.65? 40.35? 45.6$ 3.5$ 49.1$ 39.4$ 5.S$ 44.9$ 31.5$ 8.2$ 39.7$ 31.0$ 8.2$ 39.2$ 27.9$ 7.5$ 35.4$ Hesse-Darmstadt SPD KPD tog. 35.65? 5.45? 41.0$ 32.3$ 8.7$ 41.0$ 28.9$ 11.3$ 40.2$ 26.2$ 10.2$ 36.4$ 23.3$ 13.7$ 37.0$ 21.7$ 10.9$ 32.6$ Mecklen-burg SPD KPD tog. 34.25? 6.0$ 40.25? 41.7$ 5.6$ 47.3$ 35.2$ 8.6$ 43.8$ 31.3$ 9.4$ 40.7$ 30.5$ 11.7$ 42.2$ 26.5% 7.4$ 33.9$ National Average SPD KPD tog. 26.056 9.0$ 35.0$ 29.8% 10.6$ 40.4$ 24.5$ 13.1$ 37.6$ 21.6$ 14.3$ 35.9$ 20.4$ 16.9$ 37.3$ 18,3$ 12.3$ 30.6$ In. East Prussia, nearly entirely Protestant with large estates, in Wflrttemberg (mostly Protestant, mostly farmer), and in Baden (half Protestant, half 'jatholic; half farming and half industrialized) the SPD remained on the average between 3 and 8 points below its national average, the KPD, between 1 and 4 points below. In elections to state assemblies in Protestant areas the left-wing parties received: in Mecklenburg-Schwerin, on May\22> 1927, SPD 40.7$; in Hesse, on November 11, 1927, SPD 32.6$, KPD 8.5$; in Lippe, on January 18, 1925, SPD 34.6$; in Mecklenburg-Strelitz, on January 29, 1928, SPD 37.9%; and in Schaumburg-Lippe, on April 29, 1928, SPD 49.2$ and KPD 3.7$. -Statistik des deutschen Reichs. Statistisches Jahrbuch, and Dittmann, op.citw Region U S 1919 P D 1921 S 19199 P D 1921 KPD 1921 T o vo 1919 t a i te 1921 Berlin, votes $ elected deputies 275,255 28.15 6 197,277 20.30 4 343,475 35.13 8 220,855 22.73 5 112,299 11.56 2 982,481 21. 974,048 20 Potsdam (1-9) & (10) in 1919 and I and II in 1921 *-elected deputies 233,634 14.75 2/2 -4-4 201,597 13.70 2/2 - 4 603,865 39.00 6/5 - 13 385,404 25.00 4/5 - 9 121,733 L 8 1/1 - 2 1,584,39! 15/13 -21 1,576,;328 14/16 -30 Merseburg and Erfurt (in 1919 together) votes $ elected deputies 350,656 39.49 8 M 74,754 M 11.31$ E 51,001 E 17.7$ 1 7 l 144,552 16.28 3 M 70,340 M 10.64$ E 31,608 E 11003% 1(M).0 rM19f,113 M 29.82$ E 31,917 E 11.13$ 4(M).0 890,662 19 M66?,109 E289,244 12(M). 3 . Frankfurt a. 0, % elected deputies >3,869 0.7 0 447,548 5.88 0 287,088 51.84 6 242,973 31.85 6 21,270 2.79 0 557,518 12 772,306 17 Breslau, votes (Silesia) - % elected deputies 837 0.1 0 8,062 '0.9 00 391,758 47.00 9 354,560 39.86 8 22,540 2.53 0 836,343 18 892,675 18 Cologne-Aix l a Chapelle, votes % elected deputies 32 0.004 0 8,588 1.01 0 222,900 24.96 5 164,489 19.36 4 45,802 5.39 1 896,330 19 856,052 18 Goblence-Treves '% elected deputies no slate; entered. 2,803 0.53 0 160,064 21.32 4 61,433 11.55 1 11.998 2.25 0 754,392 18 543,111 10 Total, Prussia % elected deputies allotted deputies 1,280,803 7.42 34 1,076,49J 6.58 18 \ 6,278,291 ,36.36 145 4,295,305 26.26 97 1 i f . » 1,2M,74S 7.41 19 12 1 1^ 669,541 402 18,5f0,742 333 85 Statistisches Jahrbuch fur den Preussischen Staat (Berlin: Preussisches Staatisches Landamt), XVI, 1920, pp. 422-424, XVII, 1921, pp. 430-433. 18-0 APPENDIX 7 LEFT-WING VOTES IN THE REICHSTAG AND LANDTAG ELECTIONS OF 1924/25 Electorial Disrict, Reichstag May 4, SPD % 1924 RPD % May 4, votes U S 1924 % P D Dec.7, 1 votes 924 4 at 1° S B votes 234 % East Prussia 15.3 11.7 " 4 9 4 0.6 1.991 0.2 — -Berlin 21.8 20.6 33,588 3.1 7.905 0.7 8.306 5.8 Potsdam II 18.8 13.1 15i$94< 1.8 4.366 0.5 3t947 3.4 Potsdam I 20.7 14;8 15?82&- 1.8 S.i87 0.6 3.999 3.5 Frankfurt a. 0. 20.1 6.8 6,441 0.8 2.404 0.3 - -Liegnitz 27.5 6.0 - 1.003 0.2 - -Merseburg lS.5" 25.7 12^ 109:- LL.7 3.922 0.5 - -Magdeburg l2'0 10.1 - - - - 3.606 3.4 Schlesw.-Hoist. . 24.9 10.2 7.959 L.l 3,499 0.5 - -East Hanover 21.3 7.9 - - 1.369 0.3 - -S. Han.-Brunswic 30.0 8.2 10.036 L.O 2.915 0.3 - -Westfalia North 17.8 9.7 8.352 3.8 1.995 0.2 - -Westfalia South MA 2129 21.075 ..6 10,710 0.8 - -Cologne-, Aix l a Ch] ",0.1 14.2 6.238 ).7 3.141 0.4 - -Diisseldorf East Jl.4 24.9 9.809 L.O 4.970 005 - -Dusseldorf West 9.7 18.9 6,283 3.8 3.387 0.4 - -Approximated tota! for Prussia 1 511.000 L.O 60.000 0.3 20.000 3.1 Prussian State el, Bee.7. 1924 24.9 9.6 67.871 0.3 Brunswik State el, Dec. 7. 1924 37.4 4.5 - 1.719 0.6 Oldenb. State el. May 5. 1925 b.5 2.1 403 ).2 Thuringian State el. Feb. 2..1924 23.1 13.4 i 6.709 0.8 Electorial District, Reichstag Jiay 4, SPD 1924 KPD % May 4, votes ; U,^S 1924 % t»P\D Dec. 7, votes 1924 : %: 1 S B May 4, 1 votes 924 % Thuringia 22.4 15.6 12:221 1.1 — -., — p.2 8.6 5.536 0.6 2.977 0Q2:"'. Lower Bavaria 9.2 7.1 1.883 0.4 1.398 0:3:: — -Frankonia t 13.3 6.1 6.094 0.6 6.211 0.5 Palatinate 23.3 13.5 1.282 0.4 3.206 0.8 - — Total Bavaria (4 Districts) i14.705 13.792 Dresden-Bautzen 34.6 8.4 7.239 0.7 3.289 o;=3 — — Leipzig 30.2 15.7 11,676 1.7 6.098 0.8 11.597 0.2 Chemnit z-Z wic kau 27.2 19.8 - 2,049 0.2 4.963 0C4-* Total Saxony (3 Districts) 18.915 11.436 6.560 Baden 15.2 10.1 6.153 0.7 6.703 0.7 - -Hesse-Darmstadt* 9.3 4.038 0.6 932' 0.2* - -Hamburg 18.3 3 3,21)6 0.5 1.569 0.3 - -Mecklenburg «, 26.5 10.9 2,059 0.5 986 0.3* - -Total Germany.{.. (28 out of 35 districts^ 40.5 12.6 235,141 0.8 99,183 0.3 26,418 0.1 *Sic, the: .respective tpercejitages?aret^graded team 0.14555 and 0.215%. Compiled from Statistiscb.es Jahrbuch, op. c i t , , 1924/25,pp. 390-391 1926, pp 454-403, 1927, pp. 498-499. 1 8 1 A P P E N D I X 8 L E F T - W I N G V O T E S A T T H E R E I C H S T A G E L E C T I O N ON MAY 20, fc988 El. S P D K P D USPD L K ASPD Valid votes Dist. votes dep. vote iep. votes Vbtes votes cast 1 268,007 4 94,949 1 - ,2*93:9 2.863 998,807 2 404.786 6 352.086 5 1.951 3.975 1,021 1.189.807 3 301,766 5 172,316 2 1.071 3.373 1.180 986.512 4 342.664 5 169,034 2 1.617 4,087 2.102 989.177 5 271.145 4 49,148 — 1,228 2.264 762 819.177 6 271.577 4 54.795 - - 2,063 1.591 898.542 7 367,232 6 43,771 — - - - 972.305 8 229.518 3 25^ 587 — - 3,165 1.191 606.891 9 70.960 1 71.626 1 - - - 563.952 10 391,014 6 65,850 1 - 2.392 - 909.377 11 171.967 2 176,113 2 1.563 3.409 - 720,535 12 367;904 6 137,169 2 - 4,386 - 1.107.246 13 278.801 4 62.106 1 - 3.777 - 788.654 14 206.112 3 35.637 — - 1,738 - 701.760 15 168.620 2 29.847 — - - - - 514.377 16 477,346 7 36,216 — 669 - - 1.046.762 17 293,541 4 107,002 1 - 3,391 - 1.202.161 18 363^379 6 145,700 2 1,366 5,555 2,056 1.228.803 19 377.205 6 93,093 1 3.037 4.590 - 1.171.262 20 172,930 2 97,391 1 1,154 3,986 - 934.496 21 68,875 1 27,483 - - - - 557.368 22 202,503 3 238,725 3 - 3,080 2,144 1.067,029 23 143,347 2 122,108 2 - - 832.539 24 265,114 4 50j602 - 566 - - 1,168,395 . 25 86,398 1 12,496 — - - 1.709 564.174 26 355.308 5 .37,645 - 456 1 ' 7 8 1 ± 1,889 1.246,251 27 119,548 1 27.645 — 402 3,122* 718 412.065 ' 28 400.502 6 105,874 1 1.269 - 17,260 1.024,688 29 278,934 4 121,331 2 1.629 - 7.559 754.225 30 319,998 5 154,362 2 - 3,772 10,008 953.866 31 272,018 4 83,126 1 - - 2^730^ 1.152.387 32 204,306 3 667808 1 2,102 4,886 3.860 909,378 33 192.376 3 - • - 3,904 2,159 596,053 34 255,133 4 L16.128 1 - 2.415 1,106 692,745 35 189.668 3 25,498 - 579 2,227 1,661 454,825 * AKPD Compiled from S t a t i s t i k des deutschen Relchs, op. c i t . , CCCLII, pp. i n-?5 awf* ( f n r ~ t h e l a s t column) S t a t l s t l s c h e s  Jahrbuch. op. c i t . , 1 9 2 8 , p. 580. K - KPD was strong S - SPD was far above its national average A - ASPfl was relatively strong B - SB was relatively strong U - Rump-USPD was relatively strong L - LK was relatively strong. Underlined indicates that local strength was far above the national average of the respective party. 183 APPENDIX 10 . MAP 5 185 APPENDIX 12, Number of elected deputies to the Reichstag by party affiliation. Party National Assembly 1919 July 1920 May 1924 Dec. 1924 May 1928 Sep. 1930 July 1932 Nov. 1932 March 1933 Deutschnatio-n'aCionale Volkspartei 44 71 95 103 73 41 37 52 52 Deutsche Volkspartei 19 65 45 51 45 30 7 11 2 Zentrum (Centre) 91 69 65 69 61 68 75 70 74 DDP (Ulemocrats) 75 40 28 32 25 -Deutsche Siaatspartei (Democrats) 20 4 2 5 Sozialdemokra-tische Partei (SPD) 163 108 100 131 153 143 133 121 120 UnabhSngige (Independent) (USPD) 22 88 NSDAP (Nazis) 32 14 12 107 230 196 288 Wirtschafts-partei 17 23 23 2 1 Bavarian Volkspartei 21 16 19 16 19 22 20 18 KPD (Communists) 4 62 45 54 77 89 100 81 Others 8 7 29 12 29 49 9 11 7 Total 422 469 472 493 491 577 608 584 647 Compiled from Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das deutsche Reich, op, c i t . , 1920-1933 and from Ferdinand Friedensburg, Die Weimarer Republik, (Hannover: Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt 0. Goedel, 1957). APPENDIX 13 186 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE Given the l i m i t e d r o l e o f s s p l i n t e r groups 7 few of the c l a s s i c a l h i s t o r i e s of the Weimar R e p u b l i c mention them, l e t alone d i s c u s s them a t l e n g t h . What m a t e r i a l t h e r e i s on-the? 1 •<> s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s i s w i d e l y s c a t t e r e d . Very o f t e n the o n l y r e f e r e n c e s to them are i n h i s t o r i e s of the two major l e f t -wing p a r t i e s , the SPD and the KPD. The h i s t o r y of the USPD, however, p r o v i d e s an excep-t i o n . Eugen Prager's Geschichte der USPD (1921) t r a c e s the USPD from i t s b e g i n n i n g to the H a l l e Convention. The author, a member of t h a t p a r t y , t r i e d to j u s t i f y the s p l i t from the SPD. He b i t t e r l y denounced the Comintern, the KPD, and the l e f t USPD members f o r d e s t r o y i n g a f l o u r i s h i n g p a r t y . A s i d e from t h i s , n e a r l y every book on l e f t - w i n g s p l i n t e r or mass p a r t i e s mentions the USPD. Books on the SPD g i v e some i n f o r m a t i o n on s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . Edwyn Bevan's German Soclaldemocracy d u r i n g the ¥ War (1918) i s a thorough account of the s p l i t s w i t h i n the pre r e v p l u t i o n a r y SPD and c o n t a i n s p a r l i a m e n t a r y debates and l o c a l newspaper sources, R i c h a r d Hunt's German S o c i a l Demo-mocracy 1918-1933 (1964) i s v e r y g e n e r a l , somewhat s u p e r f i -c i a l , and c o n t a i n s some e r r o r s . A l f r e d K a s t n i n g r e l a t e s the anguish of the S o c i a l Democratic P a r t y i n Die deutsohe  S o z l a l d e m o k r a t l e zwlschen K o a l i t i o n und O p p o s i t i o n , 1919-1923 (1970). 18? Undoubtedly one of the best general works on German 6'ommunism In Weimar Is Ossip Pleohtheim's Die KPD In der Weimar  Republlk (196%). E. Waldmann, The Spartaous Uprising of £919 (1958) deals with the planning, execution, and defeat o f 0 t h e , f a l s e l y named, Spartacus uprising. Werner Angress, i n S t i l l - Born Revolution (1963), gives a good account of the communists involvement i n the unrests and r i o t s between 1919 and 1923 i n Germany. S t a l l n i z a t i o n of the German Communist Party i s de-scribed i n Ruth Fischer's S t a l i n and German Communism (1948) (a tirade against Thahlmann and S t a l i n ) . In Margaret Buber-Neumann's Krlegssohauplatze der Weitrevolution (1967), and i n Hermann Weber's Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunlsmus (1969)• The l a t t e r , a two volume work, contains short biographies of ^communist leaders and documents on the communist movements i n general. Information on the K1PD can be found together with data on on other p a r t i e s . G. Hillmann, i n S e l b s t k r l t l k des  Kommunlsmus (1967), gives, among other data, extracts of the KAPD program. F. Kool's Die Llnke gegen die Parteiherrschaft (1970) contains many documents and writings by KAPD founders and theoreticians such as Pannekoek, Wolffheim, Gorter, Ruhle, and Holz. Versuchunpf oder Chance? (1965). hy K a r l Otto Paetel, r e l a t e s the his t o r y of some national-communist organizations between 1918 and 19^5. Outstanding i n the f i e l d of s p l i n t e r parties are the contributions to the Marburger Abhandlungen zur p o l i t i s c h e n  Wissenschaft by H. M. Bock, Hanno Drechsler, Olaf Ihlau, Werner Link, and K. H. Tjaden. In Syndlkallsmus und Linkskommunlsmus 188 ( 1 9 ^ 9 ) . H. M. Bock t r a c e d the a n a r c h i s t and s y n d i c a l i s t r o o t s i n the German workers* movement. He d e a l s e x t e n s i v e l y with the FAUD, the KAPD, the AAU, and the AAUE. In Die S o z i a l i s -t l s o h e A r b e i t e r P a r t e i f S l P ) (1961) H* D r e c h s l e r wrote the h i s t o r y of the SAP. He t r a c e d t h a t p a r t y ' s r o o t s back to the USPD, the L e v i t e s , the KAPD, the Rote Kampfer, and the KPO. Werner L i n k , i n Gesohiohte des I n t e r n a t l o n a l e n Jugend- bundes (jJB)B und des I n t e r n a t i o n a l e n S o z i a l l s t l s c h e n Kampf-bundes (ISK) (1964) r e l a t e s the h i s t o r y and i d e o l o g y of the K e l s o n Bund. Die Roten Kampfer (1965). "by O l a f I h l a u , d e a l s with the KAPD, the SPD, and w i t h the RK groups. The s t o r y of the KPO i s t o l d by K. H. T j a den i n S t r u k t u r und F u n k t i o n  der "KPD-Oppositlon" (KPO) (1964). The l a t t e r work's second p a r t i s e n t i r e l y comprised o f primary m a t e r i a l ^ A l l these books c o n t a i n s h o r t b i o g r a p h i e s of the p r i n c i p a l persons i n v o l v e d i n the v a r i o u s movements. For a d e t a i l e d account on* Weimar Germany E r i c h Eyck's A H i s t o r y of the Weimar R e p u b l i c (Volume I, 1962 and Volume I I , 1963) i s i n v a l u a b l e . A r t h u r Rosenberg's A H i s t o r y o f the German R e p u b l i c (1965) i s a p r e c i s e , c h r o n o l o g i c a l account of the Weimar Rep u b l i c , w r i t t e n by a l o n g time communist member o f the R e i c h s t a g . Ferdinand Friedfensfeurg, who was f o r a w h i l e c h i e f of the p o l i c e i n B e r l i n d u r i n g the Weimar R e p u b l i c , kept h i s notes hidden d u r i n g the H i t l e r p e r i o d . H i s work, Die Weimarer Republlk (19<|2) showsc.tHieipa?oblems of h i s p e r i o d from a c i v i l servant&s p o i n t of view. ErHs* N i e k i s c h ' s p i e Legende von der Weimarer R e p u b l i c (1965) i s a c r i t i c a l account by a former Marxist, l a t e r a n t i f a s c i s t r e v o l u t i o n a r y conser-189 t i v e . Jon Jacobson's Locarno Diplomacy (1972) shows the i n -ternational influence and Heinrich Bennecke's Wlrtschaftllohe  Depression und p o l i t i s c h e r Radikalismus (1970) elaborates on the economic influence on Weimar Germany. Wilhelm Dittmann, i n Das p o l i t i s c h e Deutschland frer H i t l e r (19^5) provided st s t a t i s t i c s , graphs on ele c t i o n r e s u l t s , and maps ofi each of the t h i r t y - f i v e e l e c t o r i a l d i s t r i c t s , f or each federal elec-t i o n . Rene'Brunet's The new German Constitution (1922) and Heinrich Oppenheimer's The Constitution of the German Republic (1923) give not only the text of the Weimar Constitution, but also elaborate on i t . An excellent biography on Paul Levi was written, under the t i t l e Paul Levi (1969). by Charlotte Beradt. Ursula Ratz published jleorg Ledebour (19&9). a rather u n p o l i t i c a l biography of a highly p o l i t i c a l figure. Hans Adolph deals with a pro-minent s o c i a l democrat i n Otto Wels und die P o l i t i k der..deut- schen Sozialdemokratie 1894-1939 (1971). F r i t z Sternberg's Der Faschismus an der Macht (19350' i s valuable. Sternberg was not only the chief theoretician of the SAP but also influenced e a r l i e r on the program of the KAPD and the ideology of the Rote Kampfer. Die Diktatur des P r o l e t a r i a t s und das Ratesystem (1924) by Karl Diehl attempts to -explain the d i f f e r e n t concepts of these two terms as held by the various r a d i c a l organizations. E l e c t i o n s t a t i s t i c s are presented i n S t a t i s t i s c h e s ,,1 -Jahrbuch and gStaHsJa&des deu%scheh .Relchs., The l a t t e r gives a d i s t r i c t f or d i s t r i c t account of the slates presented, the names, occupation, and hometown of each candidate, and the 190 votes received. The various Protocolls, Progress Reports, and Resolutions of the Comintern meetings and sessions of the ECCI and EECCI, published by the Comintern, provide an immense amount of material on various communist parties and contain some references to s p l i n t e r groups. Paul Levi's Zwischen Spartakus und Sozlaldemokratle (1969). edited by Charlotte Beradt, i s a c o l l e c t i o n of l e t t e r s , essays, and s speeches by Levi from the time he became a communist member of the Reichstag u n t i l h&s death. Der Grundungsparteitag  der KPD (1969), edited by H. Weber, provides material on the founding o6nvention of the KPD. Not much reference to s p l i n t e r parties i s contained i n contemporary SPD journals such as Die Gesellschaft, Sozi-a l l s t i s c h e Monatshefte, and Die Glocke. Levi's S o z i a l i s t l s o h e  P o l i t i k und Wissenschaft i s , i n t h i s respect, better. Die Kommunistlsche Internationale, Die Internationale, and the Internationale Presse Korrespondenz give more information on s p l i n t e r groups, however, i t i s highly biased and venomous. Dokumente. und Materiallen zur Geschlchte der deutschen Arbelter- bewegung, and Geschlchte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegugung, both commissioned by Walter Ulb r i c h t and the SED, border on f i c t i o n . Die Neue Rundschau, an independent review, has some a r t i c l e s r e f e r i n g to the p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . A r c h i e fur S o z l a l -geschichte and V i e r t e l j a h r e s h e f t e fur Zeltgeschichte have a number of a r t i c l e s on Marxist parties under Weimar, 191 APPENDIX 14 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 1918 October November December 30 7 8 10 11 28 16 25 27 Mutiny of the German Navy. Revolution in Munich. Flight of the Kaiser. Ebert and the Volksbeauftragte assume $He office of state. Meeting of the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Councils in the Circus Busch. Armistice. Formal Abdication of Wilhelm II. Congress of Workers' and Soldiers,', Council meets. Government uses troops against Berlin „'....: insurgents. The USPD leaders withdraw from the provisional government. 1919 January February 1 5 12 15 19 6 11 16 1920 Founding of the KPD (Spartakusbund) 4n Berlin. Founding of the NSDAP in Munich. Insurrection in Berlin (Spafctafeus week). Troops defeat insurgents. Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg murdered. Election for the National Assembly. The National Assembly meets at Weimar. Ebert elected President of Germany by the National Assembly. F i r s t post War government appointed under Scheidemann. March (beginning) Unrest in Berlin, suppressed by troops. Unrest in the Ruhr atsa, suppressed by Frelkorps. Cabinet Scheidemann resigns, Bauer forms new cabinet. Acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles. Polish insurrection in Upper Silesia. Haase, leader of the USPD assassinated. (end) June ZO 20 August October 22 18 8 March April 13-17 5 June 6 25 Kapp-Putsch. Mas3T<l?e3ection at the KPD convention at Heidelberg leads to formation of the KAPD. Reichstag election. _^ Fehrenbach (Centre) chancellor. August 17-28 Polish insurrection in Upper Silesia. October 16 USPD split*. 26 KAPD receives associate membership in the Comintern. The Left-USPD Joins the KPD. November December 1 9 2 1921 February 18 March 1 6 - 2 9 A p r i l May June August November 1 9 2 2 March A p r i l June J u l y 20 2 5 10 27 26 20 7 16 4 24 24 September 2 0 - 2 3 1 9 2 3 January 11 A p r i l May August 2 26 12 1 3 September 30 October 1 10 16 22-24 November 9 15 Levi resigfis^as ffch&t-iananstff v f e h e ^ P D . Pfemfert, Ruhle, and Broh leave the KAPD, form AAUE. March Action i n central Germany, Hamburg, and i n the Ruhr area. P l e b i s c i t e i n Upper S i l e s i a ( 6 0 $ f o r Germany). Levi and others expelled from the KPD. Poli s h troops invade Upper S i l e s i a , London Ultimatum issued to German government. Freikorps defeat Poles on the Annaberg. B r i t i s h , French, and I t a l i a n troops restore order i n Upper S i l e s i a . Bavarian USPD member Gareis assassinated. Erzberger assassinated. F i r s t KAG Relohskonferenz. KAPD s p l i t s into a B e r l i n and an Essen section. Occupation of the r i g h t side of the Rhine by A l l i e s . Treaty of Rappollo signed by Germany and the USSR. Attempted assassination of Scheidemann. Rathenau. assassinated. SPD and USPD Reichstag deputies, for®\an Arbeltsgemelnsohaft s o z l a l l s t l s c h e r Partelen. USPD convention at Gera and SPD convention® at Augsburg leads t\© r e u n i f i c a t i o n at Nuremberg. Occupation of the Ruhr by Efcench and Belgian forces. Rump-USPD s p l i t s over the Ruhr issue. Albert Leo Schlageter executed by the French. Curzon Note an France and Belgium. Stresemann replaces Cuno as chancellor. ^ U i r r e - O i l t t o t t by Separatists i n Dfisseldorf. Buchrucker Putsch attempt i n Kustrin. Socialist-Communist government i n Saxony. Socialist-Communist government i n Thuringia. Separatist u p r i s i n g i n the Rhineland. Communist u p r i s i n g i n Hamburg. Strikes and r i o t s i n Saxony (October Dis-turbances) , Reichsaktlon against Saxony. H i t l e r Putsch i n Munich. End of I n f l a t i o n . 1 9 2 4 May August December 4 RRelchstag e l e c t i o n . 2 9 German acceptance of the Dawes Plan. 7 Reichstag e l e c t i o n . 193 1925 January . 9 February 28 A p r i l 26 J u l y 21 September 1 October 5 - l 6 1926 January 8 May 3 17-18 August September 3 28 November 5 Barmat-scandal i n B e r l i n . Death of Ebeft. ^ Hindenburg elected President of Germany. ASPD founded Ruhr Occupation ended. Open Let t e r by the Comintern against the German l e f t Communists (Fischer-Maslow e.g.). Locarno Treaties. KPD expelled Katz group. KPD expelled Korsch-Schaarz group. Conspiracy of a Putsch by Class discovered, KPD expells Fischer-Maslow group. 1 League of Nations admitts Germany. K^freB^8'e»«i^i^Kroup s p l i t s i n two. KPD expells Urbahn, Scholem, and o thers• 1927 May 1928 March A p r i l May June Summer August December 13 "Black Friday" at the B e r l i n Stock Market. 15 Panzerkreuzer A budget approved. 9 Lenin Bund founded. 20 Reichstag e l e c t i o n . Kampfkartell Spartakusbund llnkskommunlstl- tlsc h e r Organlsatlonetk founded. Comintern makes,..left turn. 27 Kellogg-Pact. llghRlghteGJ3mmuBisi;8£piie86n£epnMBAepeMeBtf9iate f o r the municipal e l e c t i o n i n Stuttgart. 21 KPD expells Walcher, F r o l l c h , and others. 29 Relohskonferenz of the (right) Opposition i n the KPD at B e r l i n . 1929 January 18 Comintern expells Brandler and Thalheimer. September 2k New York Stock Market Crash. 26s SkJLarek scandal. 1930 March 13 A p r i l 1 September lk November 1931 J u l y October 1932 A p r i l June J u l y September December 7 13 11 10 1 20 31 6 3 Germany accepts Young Plan. Bruning becomes chancellor. Reichstag e l e c t i o n . NSDAP wins 107 mandates. Der Rote Kampfer f i r s t published. Hoover Moratorium on War Debts. Closure of a l l , banks,. Credit Unions, and stock exchanges. Relchskonferena Qf the l e f t SPD at Leipzig, SAP formed. Formation of theHHsitefattiEggr Front. Reefi&eci&on of Hindenburg. Cabinet Papen takes o f f i c e . Staatsatrelch By Papen i n Prussia. Reichstag el e c t i o n , NSDAP wins 230'mandates. Reichstag e l e c t i o n . Cabinet Schleichefc takes o f f i c e . 194 1933 January 30 H i t l e r becomes chancellor. February 27 Reichstag f i r e . March 5 Reichstag ele c t i o n , NSDAP wins2288 mandates. 24 Erm&chtigungsgesetz accepted. 

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