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The idea of equality 1974

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THE IDEA OF EQUALITY by ROBERT MICHAEL MACKINNON B.A., Un i v e r s i t y of Windsor, 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN THE REQUIREMENTS MASTER PARTIAL FULFIU4ENT OF FOR THE DEGREE OF OF ARTS In the Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required' standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 197̂ + In p resent ing t h i s thes is in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y sha l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t permission fo r ex tens ive copying o f t h i s thes is f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head o f my Department or by h is r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t is understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s thes is f o r f i n a n c i a l gain sha l l not be al lowed w i thout my w r i t t e n permiss ion . Department of The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date QdUm, 2, my ABSTRACT A great dea l o f con t roversy has a t tended c u r r e n t d iscuss ions o f p u b l i c p o l i c y i n the Western w o r l d ; much o f t h i s con t roversy has cen t red on the idea o f e q u a l i t y . The idea has been s t r o n g l y advocated and v i g - o r o u s l y a t t a c k e d ; u n f o r t u n a t e l y , most o f the d i scuss ion has been p o l e m i c a l i n tone r a t h e r than a n a l y t i c . Suppor ters and c r i t i c s have been more anxious t o press t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s or p re fe rences than t o come t o a reasonable a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the n o t i o n . Th is i s no t t o say t h a t the present con fus ion stems e n t i r e l y from p r e j u d i c e , i l l w i l l , or sho r t s igh tedness . L i ke a l l concepts, e q u a l i t y i s very genera l and o f t e n q u i t e vague i n i t s meaning. I t can be approached i n a number o f ways, each o f which i s l i a b l e t o y i e l d a d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y p r e s c r i p t i o n , and thus a d i f f e r e n t o p i n i o n as t o i t s v a l u e . I t i s , t h e n , a d i f f i c u l t idea t o work w i t h . Never the less , I do not f e e l t h a t i t should be done away w i t h . I t can be understood and u s e f u l l y a p p l i e d , I b e l i e v e , i f one a t tempts t o d iscover what i t does mean, r a t h e r than what one wants i t t o mean. The t h e s i s examines the n o t i o n t h a t a l l men a r e , i n f a c t , equa l , and f i n d s i t l a c k i n g . Even i f a l l men were equal i n s i g n i f i c a n t r e s p e c t s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see what s o r t o f p r e s c r i p t i o n s t h i s would e n t a i l . We must t u r n , t h e n , t o e q u a l i t y as a normat ive e x p r e s s i o n — a s an i d e a l . The idea o f value i s touched upon; the conc lus ion i s t h a t w h i l e no va lues are a b s o l u t e , t he re are some, such as human w e l f a r e , t h a t are c l e a r l y c e n t r a l t o any form o f moral d i scou rse . The idea o f m o r a l i t y i n v o l v e s the concepts o f r i g h t s , r u l e s , and j u s t i c e , a l l o f which are connected w i t h e q u a l i t y t o i i some degree. J u s t i c e i s seen as p a r t i c u l a r l y impor tan t t o the quest ion o f how men should be t r e a t e d , which i s , o f course, a t the hea r t o f the e g a l i t a - r i a n i d e a l . I t i s found t h a t j u s t i c e i n v o l v e s more than e q u a l i t y , but t h a t the l a t t e r i s s t i l l a major element o f the former . The va lue o f a l l men as men suggests t h a t a l l human needs should be a t tended t o — e v e r y o n e i s equal i n need (up t o a p o i n t ) and t h e r e f o r e has the r i g h t t o be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y (up t o a p o i n t ) . The v a l u e ' o f f a i r n e s s and the ex is tence o f r u l e s bo th suggest the n o t i o n s o f e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y and e q u a l i t y be fore the l a w — t h e s e a lso can be viewed as mat te rs o f r i g h t . F i n a l l y , the ideas o f c o r r e c t i v e j u s t i c e and reward accord ing t o e f f o r t e n t a i l a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f goods which leans towards e q u a l i t y o f r e s u l t . I n a l l o f these spheres, the p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y p lays a l e g i t i m a t e r o l e . Beyond them, i t tends t o be d i s t o r t e d and used f o r o ther purposes. Examples o f such d i s t o r t i o n can be found i n seve ra l areas o f contemporary p u b l i c p o l i c y ( e . g . , quota systems, educa t ion , open admissions t o u n i v e r - s i t i e s ) „ The r e s u l t i s t h a t many observers have been l e d t o c r i t i c i z e the p r i n c i p l e r a t h e r than those who misuse i t . Severa l c r i t i c i s m s are no ted ; wh i l e some are w e l l t aken , however, none can be s a i d t o des t roy the v a l i d i t y o f the n o t i o n o f e q u a l i t y . The idea o f e q u a l i t y , t h e n , i s d i f f i c u l t but not imposs ib le t o under- s t a n d . I t must be kept i n mind t h a t i t i s not abso lu te o r e t e r n a l , but one i d e a l among many. I f i t i s approached and a p p l i e d w i t h reason, so t h a t a t t e n t i o n i s p a i d t o the l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by the va r ious con tex ts i n which i t may occur , i t can be seen as a l e g i t i m a t e and u s e f u l concept . i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Chapter I . THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY „ The Concept o f E q u a l i t y E g a l i t a r i a n i sm L a k o f f ' s Conceptual Scheme The Formal P r i n c i p l e I I . EQUALITY AS FACT 1 The Not ion o f F a c t u a l E q u a l i t y E q u a l i t y o f I n t r i n s i c Human Worth E m p i r i c a l E q u a l i t i e s Human Values and Good Reasons I I I . EQUALITY AS NORM... 2 Human Values Right s Rules The P r i n c i p l e o f C a t e g o r i a l Consistency I V . EQUALITY AND JUSTICE 4 The R e l a t i o n Between E q u a l i t y and J u s t i c e The A r i s t o t e l i a n No t ion o f J u s t i c e D i s t r i b u t i v e J u s t i c e E q u a l i t y o f Oppor tun i t y C o r r e c t i v e J u s t i c e J u s t i c e as Procedure and J u s t i c e as Resu l t The Negat ive Approach t o E q u a l i t y The Concept o f J u s t i c e V. EQUALITY AND SOCIETY I J u s t i c e , E q u a l i t y , and P u b l i c P o l i c y Aga ins t E q u a l i t y CONCLUSION i NOTES r, BIBLIOGRAPHY £ i v INTRODUCTION The idea of equality, as i t i s used i n philosophic discourse, i s exceedingly complex. I t does not lend i t s e l f to simple and straightforward a n a l y s i s , as many t h e o r i s t s have discovered. I t shares t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c with a number of c o n c e p t s — l i b e r t y , democracy, authority, sovereignty, j u s t i c e , and r i g h t s , f o r example. Nevertheless, such concepts are often thought to comprise the core of p o l i t i c a l philosophy, and t h e i r e x p l i c a t i o n and e l u c i d a t i o n has long been one of the major concerns of students of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r d i s c i p l i n e . An examination of the notion of equ a l i t y , then, appears to be i n keeping with t r a d i t i o n a l l i n e s of i n q u i r y , while i t s m u l t i - faceted and c o n t r o v e r s i a l nature seems to o f f e r a promising f i e l d of study. The approach w i l l be a n a l y t i c , but not exhaustive. I t i s not po s s i b l e here to deal with a l l the meanings that have been attached to the idea, or a l l the uses to which i t has been put, or a l l the areas of thought with which i t has been connected. Thus a l i m i t e d , but representative, number of t r e a t - ments w i l l be considered, varying from broad to narrow i n scope, and from j u s t i f i c a t o r y to c r i t i c a l to more s t r i c t l y a n a l y t i c i n i n t e n t . Hopefully they w i l l shed l i g h t on c e r t a i n aspects of the concept which w i l l y i e l d enough information to enable us to come to some understanding of what i t means and how i t can be most f r u i t f u l l y used. Of course i t would be overly o p t i m i s t i c to expect to a r r i v e at the meaning, or the correct sense of the term; the aim here w i l l be to put forward a reasonable and coherent, rather than a d e f i n i t i v e , account of i t s meaning and a p p l i c a b i l i t y to the world of human a f f a i r s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the idea w i l l be explored both as fa c t and as norm. An attempt w i l l be made to understand the ba s i s of i t s legitimacy. The idea 1 2 w i l l then be examined i n various contexts, p a r t i c u l a r l y those of r u l e s , r i g h t s and j u s t i c e . F i n a l l y , the question of i t s s o c i a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y w i l l be considered. Each of these areas of in q u i r y could i t s e l f be the subject of a f u l l - l e n g t h paper; however, i t hardly seems possible to come to any sort of understanding of the concept without dealing with them a l l to some degree. The hope i s that more w i l l be gained by t r a c i n g i t through these various spheres of thought than w i l l be l o s t by the b r e v i t y of some of the treatments. CHAPTER 1 THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY The Concept of Equality To begin: i t should be noted firstly that "equality" can be both a normative and a descriptive concept. It describes a relation between two or more things. To say that A and B are equal is to say that they are identical or (more often) similar with regard to some respect which they have in common (e.g., colour, weight, function). How similar A and B must be before they can be said to be equal is a matter of judgment which is usually, but not always, evident from the context. The criterion is the purpose for which they are being considered equal or unequal—a diamond studded trophy and a rock from the yard might be equal as paperweights, but unequal as sources of economic value. Or a pile of coal weighing 10,000 pounds might be thought equal to one weighing 10,002 pounds—until the latter is placed on an elevator the maximum weight capacity of which is exactly 10,000 pounds. The descriptive sense of equality can also be applied to the area of human affairs—though not so easily. The main problems are the difficulty of measuring certain things, like happiness, goodness, dignity, etc., and the tendency to confuse facts and values. (Oppenheim's article, "Egalitarian- ism as a Descriptive Concept" is useful here—particularly with regard to the "is-ought" problem.) But i t is the normative sense of equality with which I am here primarily concerned—equality as a prescriptive, rather than a descriptive, concept. 3 Empirical facts are important to any extended discussion of equality, but they w i l l constitute the backdrop to, not the focus of, this study. Equality i n this sense s t i l l involves a relation—but now i t i s one which some men feel ought (or ought not) to exist, rather than one which does (or does not) exist. It seems f a i r l y obvious that there i s no such thing as equality i n human relations, i n any st r i c t sense. Each case i s different and unique. What i s equal from one point of view i s unequal from another—even though the situation and observer be unchanged. But to say that equality i s non- existent does not help us to know what people are talking about when they speak of i t i n philosophic (or p o l i t i c a l , social, religious, etc.) terms. I think, then, that i t i s important to keep from thinking i n terms of "absolute" equality. To do otherwise i s to misconstrue the nature of the principle, with the result that evaluations are based on the false assumption that the notion entails some sort of total and all-encompassing identity. For example, according to Berlin, i t would be quite logical for a "pure" 2 egalitarian to sacrifice good music for equality i n an orchestra. For him, any differences are open to criticism and should be eliminated. Now I feel that such a view should be considered fanatical, and not at a l l consistent 3 with egalitarian principles. Not only because i n real l i f e the egalitarian i s reasonable enough to recognise the limitations of the principle, but because the principle i t s e l f contains other elements besides the notion of similarity. It i s called the equality principle because the idea of similarity i s the major, or key, element; however, i t i s not the only one. This i s not an emasculation or weakening of the "true" idea. Insofar as i t i s a principle applicable to human relations, i t i s rich and manysided, and contains elements that modify, or make sensible and workable, the demand for similarity. These modifications are not just grafted on to some more "essential" concept, but 5 are p a r t o f the concept o f e q u a l i t y i t s e l f . The " s i m i l a r i t y " aspect r e v e a l s the tendency, the d i r e c t i o n i n which the p r i n c i p l e i s t o opera te , but the o t h e r s are no l e s s p a r t s o f t h a t p r i n c i p l e . A f t e r a l l , l i b e r t y i s g e n e r a l l y accepted as a d e s i r a b l e end, as i s s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y . But no one suggests t h a t advocates o f l i b e r t y or a u t h o r i t y want complete l i b e r t y o r s t a b i l i t y t o the e x c l u s i o n o f a l l e l s e . A r a d i c a l l i b e r t a r i a n or a u t h o r i t a r i a n might c a l l f o r much more o f h i s r e s p e c t i v e good than most people f e e l i s d e s i r a b l e , but no one b e l i e v e s t h a t l i b e r t a r i a n s want a t o t a l s t a t e o f n a t u r e , or t h a t a u t h o r i t a r i a n s want an a b s o l u t e l y s t a t i c , c o n t r o l l e d s o c i e t y . I do not see, t h e n , why " r a d i c a l " o r "ext reme" o r " a r d e n t " e g a l i t a r i a n s are dep ic ted as advocates o f the e l i m i n a t i o n o f a l l d i f f e r e n c e s . An e g a l i t a - r i a n , I t h i n k , i s a person who would l i k e t o see a s o c i e t y w i t h a s t rong commitment t o e q u a l i t y i n va r ious areas o f l i f e , e s p e c i a l l y p u b l i c , so t h a t e q u a l i t y o f t r e a t m e n t , f o r example, would be a norm, depar tu res from which would be j u s t i f i e d and not severe. A r a d i c a l e g a l i t a r i a n , I would say, i s one who would l i k e t o see e q u a l i t y extended t o even more areas o f l i f e , who would want i t pursued v i g o r o u s l y and w i t h g r e a t e r emphasis than would be p laced on o the r va lues , and who would make j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f depar tures more d i f f i c u l t and d i s p a r i t i e s even s m a l l e r . As w e l l , he would be l i k e l y t o support env i ronmenta l man ipu la t i on ( e . g . , i n educa t ion , p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s , l aws , moral codes, e t c . ) i n o rder t o counterac t elements o f "human n a t u r e " t h a t tend t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h the acceptance o f e g a l i t a r i a n va lues ( e . g . , egoism, compet i t i veness , i n d i v i d u a l i t y ) . But t h i s i s not t o say t h a t even a r a d i c a l e g a l i t a r i a n would wish t o c rea te a n a t i o n o f sheep or r o b o t s — t h a t would be f a n a t i c i s m , not e g a l i t a r i a n i s m . I am s t r e s s i n g t h i s p o i n t because the p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y i s o f t e n c r i t i c i z e d f o r be ing i m p r a c t i c a b l e or meaningless , or f o r be ing a subord inate 7 aspect o f j u s t i c e or reason or r u l e a p p l i c a t i o n . Nov; I f e e l t h a t i t can be p r a c t i c a b l e and meaningfu l when one t r i e s t o understand what i t means, 6 g rather than what i t c a l l s f o r when " l o g i c a l l y extended". And I think the p r i n c i p l e can stand on i t s o w n — i f not l o g i c a l l y , then (at l e a s t ) as a moral impulse—and that i t i s not " r e a l l y " a demand for j u s t i c e or reason or proper a p p l i c a t i o n of r u l e s . Of course, i n some sense equality i s an aspect of these concepts—but they are aspects of equality too. General concepts frequently incorporate other concepts, or features of other con- cepts, within them, and the l a t t e r are not thought to lose t h e i r v a l i d i t y . But Lucas has argued that E q u a l i t y i s " r e a l l y " only the p r i n c i p l e s of 9 U n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y and Common Humanity, plus envy. I would suggest instead that the f i r s t two are parts of a legitimate p o l i t i c a l concept ( e q u a l i t y ) , just as they and other notions, such as need, merit, f a i r n e s s , etc., belong to the idea of j u s t i c e without reducing i t to nothingness. In short, whether or not the e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e can be l o g i c a l l y explained away or rendered absurd, I s h a l l proceed on the assumption that something i s there that i s worth e x p l o r i n g — i f only because i t has occupied such a c e n t r a l and i n f l u e n t i a l p o l i t i o n (against much opposition) i n modern Western p o l i t i c a l thought. E g a l i t a r i a n i s m Something should be said here about the terms " e g a l i t a r i a n i s m " and " e g a l i t a r i a n " . They are a c t u a l l y more d i f f i c u l t to deal with than 'equality" i t s e l f ; i n f a c t , many problems a t t r i b u t e d to the p r i n c i p l e seem to stem from confusion over the meaning of these d e r i v a t i v e expressions. Now i f equality i s a legitimate p o l i t i c a l (or s o c i a l , philosophic, etc.) p r i n c i p l e , i t must be applicable to those spheres i n some sort of coherent way. I t must give r i s e to p o l i c i e s , or sets of p o l i c i e s , that are not s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . The r e s u l t s of one p o l i c y might c o n f l i c t with those of another, but they must be r e c o n c i l a b l e — t h e y cannot mutually exclude one another. Secondly, those p o l i c i e s cannot negate or make impossible the productive, functioning of the spheres to which i t i s applied. That i s to say, p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y cannot 7 be such as to unreasonably r e s t r i c t p o l i t i c a l discourse, s o c i a l equality cannot destroy the bases or c u r t a i l the v i t a l operations of s o c i a l e x i s - 10 tence, and so on. With t h i s i n mind, I propose: ( i ) to r e f e r to " e g a l i t a r i a n i s m " as a doctrine which consists of such sets of p o l i c i e s designed to implement the e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e ; ( i i ) to describe these p o l i c i e s or programmes, etc. as " e g a l i t a r i a n " ; and ( i i i ) to i d e n t i f y t h e i r proponents as " e g a l i t a r i a n s " . Thus "e q u a l i t y " " e g a l i t a r i a n i s m " and " e g a l i t a r i a n " w i l l be seen as c l o s e l y r e l a t e d terms. This does not mean that the connection i s t i g h t i n a formally l o g i c a l sense—the fact that e g a l i t a r i a n p o l i c i e s cannot render impossible the functioning of the areas i n which they are being used permits a f a i r degree of l a t i t u d e as to whether a p o l i c y i s a coherent a p p l i c a t i o n of the equality p r i n c i p l e . (For what const i t u t e s i m p o s s i b i l i t y of productive functioning? This i s a matter of judgment.) Nevertheless, the terms are to be seen as r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d to one another. The assumption i s that i f the p r i n c i p l e i s l e g i t i m a t e , then i t i s r a t i o n a l , and so are i t s d e r i v a t i v e s . To the extent that a purportedly " e g a l i t a r i a n " p o l i c y or programme i s i n a p p l i c - 11 able, then, i t cannot be considered e g a l i t a r i a n ( i . e . , a r a t i o n a l extension of the p r i n c i p l e , i n f a c t . These usages are s t i p u l a t i v e , rather than conven- tional.''^ This approach i s , of course, opposed to that of Oppenheim, who has 13 urged that e g a l i t a r i a n i s m be treated purely as a d e s c r i p t i v e concept. His c r i t i q u e of the use of such terms f o r normative purposes i s well-taken, up to a point: there i s much confusion over the meaning of p o l i c i e s recommen- ded because they are e g a l i t a r i a n , when t h e i r substantive content i s l e f t u n s p ecified. He f e e l s that: Value words should be used e x c l u s i v e l y to express the advocacy of some goal or p r i n c i p l e ; the advo- cated state of a f f a i r s should be characterised e x c l u s i v e l y by d e s c r i p t i v e terms. Following t h i s p r a c t i c e would make f o r much needed c l a r i t y i n our moral discourse.1k 8 I think, however, that we should recognize the f a c t that " e g a l i t a r i a n - ism*1 and " e g a l i t a r i a n " r e f e r to an i d e a l that i s often seen as comprehensive and programmatic, and against which p o l i c i e s or programmes, or even whole s o c i e t i e s , are measured. Thi s usage may be problematic, but i t i s conven- t i o n a l — i t i s how these terms are normally understood. I t does not seem proper to c a l l a p o l i c y e g a l i t a r i a n i f , f o r instance, i t reduces an i n e q u a l i t y by a very small amount, yet leaves a great d i s p a r i t y . But t h i s i s what Oppenheim c a l l s f o r i n h i s proposal "to consider a r u l e of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n e g a l i t a r i a n i f i t reduces and i n e g a l i t a r i a n i f i t increases the percentage 15 difference between the holdings of those to whom the r u l e i s being applied." One can say that such a p o l i c y i s more e g a l i t a r i a n than the previous one, but to say that i t i s e g a l i t a r i a n i s to ignore the f a c t that i f a r u l e or r e l a t i o n or set of r e l a t i o n s i s to be deemed e g a l i t a r i a n , i t must come reasonably close to an i d e a l of e q u a l i t y . Granted, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to determine the precise content of t h i s i d e a l — t h i s i s no reason to scrap i t altogether. The more sui t a b l e approach, I believe, i s to admit that i t cannot be f i n a l l y e m p i r i c a l l y concretized and t r y instead to come to some understanding of the v a r i e t y of ways i n which i t i s used and i n which i t seems to make sense. Whether or not a p o l i c y i s e g a l i t a r i a n then becomes a matter of judgment supported by reasons, rather than one of empirical c a l c u l a t i o n . ^ ^ Now, p r e s c r i p t i v e l y , e g a l i t a r i a n i s m can be viewed i n a number of ways. I t can be seen as a p a r t i c u l a r l y i r r a t i o n a l ideology, a u n i v e r s a l panacea that i s recommended f o r every s i t u a t i o n . Or, on the other hand, i t can be viewed as a d i s p o s i t i o n or value o r i e n t a t i o n — a reasoned and generally programmatic c a l l f o r more eq u a l i t y i n various contexts. Whether i t i s an ideology or one of the other "comprehensive patterns of cognitive and moral b e l i e f s about man, society and the universe i n 17 r e l a t i o n to man and society, which f l o u r i s h i n human s o c i e t i e s " , depends 9 upon how one wishes to define i d e o l o g i e s , outlooks, systems of thought, e t c . C e r t a i n l y there are f a c e t s of e g a l i t a r i a n i s m which seem i d e o l o g i c a l . For example, S h i l s notes that "ideologies are responses to i n s u f f i c i e n t regard f o r some p a r t i c u l a r element i n the dominant outlook / of an ongoing culture 7 and are attempts to place that neglected element i n a more c e n t r a l p o l i t i o n 18 and to bring i t i n t o f u l f i l l m e n t . " And Germino holds that the term should be used "to r e f e r to a set of ideas about the ordering of society claiming the prestige of (phenomenal) science, based on an immanentist, r e d u c t i o n i s t epistemology, and aiming at the transformation of the world through making i t conform to abstractions divorced from the r e a l i t i e s of human existence i n 19 s o c i e t y . " Now i f ideology i s i n t e r p r e t e d so as to include many types of b e l i e f pattern, and e g a l i t a r i a n i s m to e n t a i l the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of e q u a l i t y to the exclusion of a l l other values and i d e a l s , then e g a l i t a r i a n i s m i s an ideology. But both S h i l s and Germino have complained that ideology tends to be used too l o o s e l y , and we have already seen that e g a l i t a r i a n i s m i s not "divorced from the r e a l i t i e s of human existence", at l e a s t i n the sense i n which I am using i t . I f a person were to s t r e s s e q u a l i t y over a l l e l s e , i f h i s programme were h i g h l y e x p l i c i t , i n t e r n a l l y integrated, compre- 20 hensive, urgent, and intensely concentrated, he could be considered an ideologue—but he would no longer be an e g a l i t a r i a n . The views of most serious t h e o r e t i c i a n s would i n r e a l i t y f a l l some- where between these two p o s i t i o n s , but the important d i s t i n c t i o n i s between those who regard e g a l i t a r i a n i s m as i r r a t i o n a l and those who do not. Some write r s seem to regard a l l e g a l i t a r i a n s as members of the former group rather than the l a t t e r . Others who are more moderate f e e l that some egal- i t a r i a n s belong to one, and some to the other. I do not think that e i t h e r view i s appropriate f o r our purposes, because each allows the designation " e g a l i t a r i a n " to be adopted by (or applied to) anyone who claims (or i s claimed) to be an e g a l i t a r i a n , rather than by or to a person who a c t u a l l y 10 21 i s one. This creates problems f o r serious discussion because, as Oppenheim 22 has pointed out, when there are numerous and var i e d p o l i c y proposals i n c i r c u l a t i o n purported to be j u s t i f i e d by the p r i n c i p l e of equality, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to know what i s e g a l i t a r i a n and what i s not. There i s a tendency to lump them a l l together and conclude that they are a l l l o g i c a l extensions of the p r i n c i p l e , which i s then c r i t i c i z e d as i n a p p l i c a b l e , i r r a t i o n a l and/or dangerous. Hence I think i t preferable to use the term " e g a l i t a r i a n " to denote a r a t i o n a l proponent of the eq u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e , and not permit i t to be adopted by, or attached to, those who cannot properly formulate i t . This does not mean that there i s one correct l i n e to which an e g a l i t a r i a n must h o l d — o n l y that h i s use of the concept must be reasonable and i n t e l l i g i b l e . T his usage i s , I f e e l , i n the i n t e r e s t of, c l a r i t y and understanding. By way of summary, then: E g a l i t a r i a n i s m w i l l be treated as a b e l i e f or s o c i a l philosophy centred around the i d e a l of eq u a l i t y . An e g a l i t a r i a n i s a person who sees equality as the most important s o c i a l i d e a l , although he recognizes that others are important as w e l l . Thus under c e r t a i n circum- stances he might c a l l f o r an increased emphasis on other values, such as l i b e r t y or excellence, or even conceivably a decrease i n eq u a l i t y (where, say, incentive s were found to be necessary a f t e r they had been removed). Such a p o l i c y would be i n e g a l i t a r i a n i n the de s c r i p t i v e sense, but i t would not ne c e s s a r i l y be a n t i e g a l i t a r i a n (where e g a l i t a r i a n i s m i s seen i n terms of 23 equilibrium or harmony, instead of un i f o r m i t y ) . An e g a l i t a r i a n wants as much eq u a l i t y as possible i n human a f f a i r s . Inasmuch as he recognizes the existence of other values as legi t i m a t e , he w i l l not want to see them trampled upon i n the name of e q u a l i t y . ("As po s s i b l e " therefore r e f e r s to what i s r a t i o n a l l y and morally desirable rather than to what i s conceivable under extreme conditions.) The normal e g a l i t a r i a n stance, though, w i l l be one i n which i t i s deemed necessary to bring about more equality i n the world or, where there i s very much already, to maintain 11 a given l e v e l . An e g a l i t a r i a n could condone a decrease i n equality where there were very good reasons f o r doing so; t h i s would be h i g h l y a t y p i c a l , however, and could only occur where too much eq u a l i t y had been achieved at the expense of other values e s s e n t i a l to the "good l i f e " . Lakoff's Conceptual Scheme As previously mentioned, the o r i e n t a t i o n of t h i s study i s p r i m a r i l y conceptual; nevertheless, we might turn b r i e f l y now to a consideration of 2k Lakoff's h i s t o r i c a l treatment of the concept. He sees three d i f f e r e n t formulations of the idea i n Western p o l i t i c a l thought, each of whose roots he traces back to ancient Greece. He regards each conception as a separate " u n i t - i d e a " with i t s own h i s t o r y and r a t i o n a l e ; the proponents of each believe t h e i r version to be the " r e a l " one, and none can be proved i n c o r r e c t because they are a l l based on d i f f e r e n t ideas of human nature. Thus: In describing human nature, the L i b e r a l stresses the capacity f o r reason and the w i l l to autonomy; the S o c i a l i s t stresses common humanity, i d e n t i c a l needs, and the i n c l i n a t i o n to produce labor; the Conservative stresses the power of the a n t i s o c i a l passions. For society, the L i b e r a l advocates individualism, the S o c i a l i s t c o l l e c t i v i s m ; the Conservative poses the choice of anarchy or absolutism wherever graded hierarchy i s r u l e d out.25 The corresponding e q u a l i t i e s , i n essence, would be f o r the L i b e r a l — e q u a l i t y of opportunity; f o r the S o c i a l i s t — e q u a l i t y of need; and f o r the Conserva- t i v e — t h e equal innate depravity, h o s t i l i t y , or envy of a l l men. These formu- l a t i o n s are not quite p a r a l l e l , but they convey the general idea. L a k o f f s survey i s u s e f u l , i n that i t allows one to impose some order on the numerous and disparate treatments that have emerged over the years. The approach i s p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l to the h i s t o r i a n of ideas; however, I am not sure that i t i s well s u i t e d to s t r i c t l y conceptual a n a l y s i s . The h i s t o r i a n of ideas looks f o r broad a f f i n i t i e s rather than minute d i f f e r e n c e s — i f there i s too much overlap, he steps back further and adopts a more general perspective, or switches i t altogether. D i s t i n c t i o n s are everything to the 12 analyst, though, so that, while the three "unit-ideas" would be well to bear i n mind, I do not agree that they constitute the only framework f o r discussion. I t may well be that i t i s impossible "to i s o l a t e the pure ore of e g a l i t a r i a n - 26 ism proper", as Lakoff claims i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of B e r l i n ' s suggestion, but t h i s does not require the use of h i s p a r t i c u l a r approach. (For one example of the problems that might ensue, we have only to note the placement of the ideas of "common humanity" and " i d e n t i c a l needs" i n the S o c i a l i s t column. Today many L i b e r a l s s t r e s s humanity and need as c r i t e r i a relevant to equal treatment, while S o c i a l i s t s are c e r t a i n l y not unanimous i n the b e l i e f that men have i d e n t i c a l needs / which would presumably c a l l f o r equal s a t i s f a c - t i o n / . And the matter could be complicated even further i f one accepts the th e s i s that there are many a f f i n i t i e s between S o c i a l i s t s and Conservatives 27 v i s - a - v i s t h e i r conceptions of society, or i f one simply notes the manner i n which the three doctrines have intertwined and influenced one another as they have evolved.) Despite the overlapping and s h i f t i n g c r i t e r i a , however, Lakoff's framework provides us with c e r t a i n i n s i g h t s i n t o the connection between various notions of equality and the major b e l i e f patterns. Thus we can see that the equality p r i n c i p l e tends to become part of a complex of a t t i t u d e s and values, etc. and that i t tends to have d i f f e r e n t i mplications f o r d i f f e r e n t people. (I would think, though, that t h i s might be due as much to the complexity of the p r i n c i p l e as to any human d i s p o s i t i o n to perceive the world i n i d e o l o g i c a l terms.) In any case, awareness of these patterns can serve to order our thoughts somewhat when we t r y to take into account the r e l a t i o n s between equality and other concepts, and between the various e q u a l i t i e s themselves. The Formal P r i n c i p l e By way of introduction to the p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f , we might now look at some of the formal constructions that have been put f o r t h i n i t s behalf. A 13 l i s t might read as follows: 1. " A l l men are (created) equal." 2. " A l l men should be equal." 3. " A l l men should be treated equally." ( " A l l men to count f o r one and no one to count f o r more than one.") k. Equals should be treated equally." 28 5. "Unequals should be treated unequally." 6. " A l l persons are to be treated a l i k e , unless good reasons can be given f o r t r e a t i n g them differently."29 7. "Where two or more people are treated d i f f e r e n t l y , or s u f f e r d i f f e r e n t experiences, t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e i n experience ought to correspond to some i n i t i a l d ifference of a t t r i b u t e or condition between them, t h i s l a t t e r d i f f e r e n c e being moreover, relevant t o — a n d c o n s t i t u t i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r — t h e corresponding difference of experience."30 Many more could be added, but a l l would be a l i k e i n that they are f o r m a l — n o t one of them "of i t s e l f /can7 t e l l us how the p a r t i c u l a r members of a society 31 should be treated." Common re-formulations which are s t i l l not substantive but are somewhat more s p e c i f i c are: 1. "To each according to h i s need." (where i t i s understood that " i t i s benefits to persons, not a l l o c a t i o n of resources as such, that are meant to be made equal").32 2. "/People's/ opportunities f o r s a t i s f y i n g whatever wants they may happen to have sKould be equal."33 3. " . . . i f there are any moral r i g h t s at a l l , i t follows that there i s at l e a s t one n a t u r a l r i g h t , the equal r i g h t of a l l men to be free..."3^ ^f. "Each man has an i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t to the p r o t e c t i o n of h i s moral i n t e r e s t s , h i s person, and h i s estate...."35 5. "Equality of consideration i s the only thing to the whole of which men have a right."36 6. "The i n t e r e s t s of each person should be subject to equal considera- t i o n . "37 Although these p r i n c i p l e s are a l l formal, i t does not mean that they are i n s i g n i f i c a n t . While they do not o f f e r d e f i n i t e or p o s i t i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s on how to tr e a t i n d i v i d u a l s , they nevertheless convey a moral i m p r e s s i o n — a f e e l i n g f o r what constitutes equal treatment, and perhaps more importantly, fo r what i s unequal treatment. I CHAPTER I I EQUALITY AS FACT The Notion of Factual E q u a l i t y I t has been asserted that "nature i s the most obvious candidate to sponsor p o l i t i c a l ideas, whether e g a l i t a r i a n or a n t i - e g a l i t a r i a n . " The fact that nature i s an obvious choice f o r e i t h e r side of the issue should give us an i n d i c a t i o n of i t s a c t u a l j u s t i f i c a t o r y power. Certain d i f f i c u l - t i e s immediately present themselves. F i r s t l y , how can any sort of f a c t u a l e q u a l i t y t e l l us what we r e a l l y want to know—how men should be treated? And i f the is-ought gap can be bridged, a second question arises—Assuming that there are many s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s among men, how do we know which ones are relevant to the way men should be treated? Despite these problems, e g a l i t a r i a n s have d i r e c t e d considerable energy to proving that men are i n fact equal. T h i s i s perhaps understandable i f we r e c a l l that many people have been and are being mistreated p r e c i s e l y because they are con- sidered i n f e r i o r or unequal as human beings. Hence Williams' statement: "Such i n v e s t i g a t i o n s enable us to understand more deeply...what i t i s to be human, and of what i t i s to be human, the apparently t r i v i a l statement of 39 men's equality as men can serve as a reminder." At any rate, t h i s l i n e of i n q u i r y has played a d e f i n i t e r o l e i n e g a l i t a r i a n thought. When I s a i d e a r l i e r that I would not be so concerned with e q u a l i t y i n a d e s c r i p t i v e sense, I was r e f e r r i n g to d e s c r i p t i o n by empirical measurment. While i t i s evident that men are not equal i n every respect, i t also seems 14 15 that when they are measured very p r e c i s e l y , they are equal i n no respect. Speaking l e s s s t r i c t l y though, we can s t i l l say that A and B are equal ( i . e . , s i m i l a r ) i n c e r t a i n respects. The next problem i s that while two people, or very many people, may be equal i n c e r t a i n respects, i t i s more d i f f i c u l t to show that everyone i s equal i n c e r t a i n respects, or i n any, f o r that matter. This can be done by expanding the c r i t e r i a of judgement once again: just as A and B may d i f f e r i n height by 1/16" and yet be considered equal ( i . e . , s i m i l a r ) , so may X and Y be considered equal, though they d i f f e r i n height, weight, and sex, and skin colour, by mere v i r t u e of the fact that they have these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . However, t h i s amounts to saying that a l l human beings are equal because they are human. While t h i s may be true, i n that equality means s i m i l a r i t y , which depends on the p r e c i s i o n of one's c r i t e r i a , the statement i s meaningless—we are t o l d what we already know, that a l l men are human. We s t i l l know nothing about how to trea t them, nor do we even have any empirical e q u a l i t i e s which can suggest p o l i c y p r e s c r i p - t i o n s . The problem here i s with the word "human". I t i s a general term meant to d i s t i n g u i s h an e n t i r e species from other species of l i f e and forms of matter—but i t cannot provide us with any i n t e r n a l knowledge of that species. The e g a l i t a r i a n who i s interest e d i n t h i s approach must r e l a t e " a l l men" to an idea which possesses some meaning within the species. In f a c t , many t h e o r i s t s have attempted to do so by poi n t i n g to some important a t t r i b u t e which a l l men have i n common. ("Important" i n the sense of "morally s i g n i f i - cant".) E q u a l i t y of I n t r i n s i c Human Worth One theory stresses the equal i n t r i n s i c worth of every human being. I t should be noted that the idea of worth seems to have some sort of pre- s c r i p t i v e force. According to Ginsberg: The notion of value, excellence, or goodness c a r r i e s within i t the notion of worthwhileness, 16 passing i n t o o b l i g a t o r i n e s s . In recognizing anything as excellent we at the same time recognize i t as worth having, worth doing, worth being, or pursuing, as imposing an imperative of a c t i o n or of respect and admira- tion.40 While Ginsberg may overemphasize the necessity of the connection between r i g h t and good, i t i s c l e a r that there i s a c o r r e l a t i o n between them. One does not have to be a thoroughgoing u t i l i t a r i a n to r e a l i z e that i t i s generally r i g h t to do what i s good or what promotes goodness, and wrong to do what i s bad or what promotes badness. Thus i f men are created equal i n worth, there would seem to be a r a t i o n a l e for the type of treatment they should receive. This idea can be found i n 3 prominent areas of Western thought: the S t o i c , the C h r i s t i a n , and the Kantian. The S t o i c s believed that the "possession of the capacity to reason made men more a l i k e than d i f f e r e n t . " Their equality l a y i n the f a c t that a l l men equally had t h i s capacity, not that they had i t to the same degree. Raphael argues the stronger point that S t o i c doctrine implied that men were equal i n t h e i r p o t e n t i a l f o r moral p e r f e c t i o n : The S t o i c s s a i d that i n v i r t u e . . . . a man may equal the gods; f o r to be p e r f e c t l y moral i s to do r i g h t to the utmost of one's capacity. An i n f i n i t e being, with i n f i n i t e capacity, cannot do more good than h i s capacity allows. Hence, i f he does good i n t e n t i o n a l l y to the l i m i t s of h i s capacity, he i s p e r f e c t l y moral. In t h i s one respect a man may achieve perfec- t i o n , he may be of as much moral worth as an i n f i n i t e being.4-3 The second group, the followers of Pauline C h r i s t i a n i t y , claimed that a l l men were equal before God. Although some men were morally superior to others, the f a c t that a l l were c h i l d r e n of God gave them a l l an i r r e d u c i b l e moral i d e n t i t y . "What mattered was that every man had a soul and that i n the eyes of God a l l souls were equally worthy." F i n a l l y , Kant postulated a Kingdom of Ends i n which r a t i o n a l and autonomous men were equal i n status as moral subjects and as moral agents. The Kingdom of Ends was a purely formal world created for the purpose of 17 d e r i v i n g a set of moral r u l e s that would be r a t i o n a l ; the autonomy, r a t i o n a l i t y , and i n t r i n s i c worth of every man was assumed, rather than proved. The d i f f i c u l t y with the C h r i s t i a n and Kantian approaches i s that one must accept the premise that there i s a God or a Kingdom of Ends i f one i s to conclude that a l l men are equal i n worth. "In neither case i s i t anything 46 empirical about men that c o n s t i t u t e s the ground of equal respect." This i s not true, however, of the Stoic theory that r a t i o n a l i t y i s the basis of human equa l i t y . Although Lakoff dismisses i t as "merely a w i s t f u l invocation of paradise l o s t implying no sanction of egalitarianism i n the present," he appears to be confusing the implications of the doctrine with the use made of them. He c i t e s Plamenatz* contention that the S t o i c s and Epicureans thought that: " a l l men are by nature, capable of v i r t u e and happiness. But they never went on to say that they should therefore have equal r i g h t s and opportunities. They di d not believe i n p o l i t i c a l or l e g a l or s o c i a l equality.47 But while as a matter of h i s t o r i c a l record the Sto i c s might not have used the idea to further the i n t e r e s t s of egalitarianism, i t i s s t i l l conceptually i n t e r e s t i n g and s i g n i f i c a n t . They d i d i n fac t conclude that 48 men's r a t i o n a l i t y e n t a i l e d an equality of respect, even though they d i d not extend i t to public a f f a i r s . The notion has since been developed along various l i n e s . We have seen that Raphael f e e l s that a l l r a t i o n a l men are equal i n t h e i r p o t e n t i a l f o r moral p e r f e c t i o n . I t i s t h i s f a c t , rather than the notion of a trans- cendental Kingdom of Ends, that (according to Raphael) j u s t i f i e s the t r e a t - ment of a l l r a t i o n a l men as "ends-in-themselves"—equals i n s o f a r as they 49 are moral subjects and agents. This theory i s open to c r i t i c i s m , however. He speaks of moral " p e r f e c t i o n " — " t o be p e r f e c t l y moral i s to do r i g h t to the utmost of one's c a p a c i t y . " ^ 0 This term i s much too vague: there does not 18 seem to be any way to measure moral capacity or the degree to which one i s f u l f i l l i n g i t . I t can hardly serve as a c r i t e r i o n of moral behaviour unless i t i s r e l a t e d to s p e c i f i c actions, rather than to c a p a c i t i e s and i n t e n t i o n s . And i f i t i s only meant to be a generalized state of i d e a l being which no one can p o s s i b l y a t t a i n , the point that a l l men have an equal p o t e n t i a l to reach i t becomes meaningless. I t i s preferable, then, to speak of moral worth, which at l e a s t admits of recognition and descrip- t i o n . But not a l l men are of equal moral worth, i n the objective sense. Nor do they have equal p o t e n t i a l to become (o b j e c t i v e l y ) morally worthy. Raphael avoids t h i s problem by d e f i n i n g moral worth s u b j e c t i v e l y , so that i t i s achieved by doing the best of which one i s capable. This creates the same d i f f i c u l t y mentioned above: how can t h i s kind of moral worth be measured? Raphael might respond that i t i s not necessary that i t be measurable, so long as i t i s accepted that i t e x i s t s and that a l l men have equal p o t e n t i a l to a t t a i n i t — t o be as good as they can. Thus goodness i s defined i n terms of i n d i v i d u a l capacity, and capacity i n terms of p o t e n t i a l , so that men are equal i n t h e i r p o t e n t i a l to f u l f i l l t h e i r p o t e n t i a l s f o r goodness. This does not seem to be saying very much, though, f o r i t i s the second p o t e n t i a l , rather than the f i r s t , that would be s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the notion of equal human worth. Upon examination, Raphael's t h e s i s turns out to r e l y too h e a v i l y on s p e c i a l i z e d conceptions of goodness and e q u a l i t y , and consequently i s of l i m i t e d a p p l i c a b i l i t y . John Wilson stresses r a t i o n a l i t y as simply an important human charac- t e r i s t i c , rather than as the key to moral worth. He f e e l s that i t i s the b a s i s of human r i g h t s , but he does not t e l l us why an empirical c h a r a c t e r i s - t i c n e c e s s a r i l y gives r i s e to c e r t a i n forms of treatment. In r e a l i t y , i t seems that h i s conclusion i s based on the b e l i e f that a l l men are of i n t r i n s i c worth (but not moral worth), rather than on t h e i r reason. He states that: 19 Because each man can shape h i s own ends and can choose h i s own v a l u e s . . . . , t he re comes a p o i n t a t which i t i s imposs ib le t o say t h a t one man i s supe r io r or i n f e r i o r t o another : f o r " s u p e r i o r " and " i n f e r i o r " on ly make sense i n terms o f some r u l e or c r i t e r i o n which i s i t s e l f man-made... . . . T h i s p a r t i c u l a r s i m i l a r i t y amongst men i s p l a i n l y one o f the most i m p o r t a n t . I t w i l l be the most reasonable bas i s f o r the b e l i e f t h a t men have the equal r i g h t t o decide t h e i r own d e s t i n i e s , s ince they have an equal capac i t y t o do so: and f o r the b e l i e f they have an equal r i g h t t o make t h e i r w i l l s and purposes f e l t — t o a c t u a l i s e them i n the w o r l d — s i n c e the w i l l and purposes o f each man are u l t i m a t e l y as v a l i d as those o f h i s ne ighbour .51• Thus he says o n l y t h a t r a t i o n a l men have an equal c a p a c i t y t o decide t h e i r own va lues , ends, and d e s t i n i e s , whether these be good or bad; he does not t r y t o de r i ve the idea t h a t men are o f equal moral va lue i n t h e i r capac i t y t o choose t o be good ( o r p e r f e c t ) . I am not sure t h a t a l l men are equal i n c a p a c i t y t o decide t h e i r va lues , e t c . , even i f they can and do choose v a r i - ous goods t o pursue ( e . g . , happiness, p l e a s u r e , e x c e l l e n c e , a l t r u i s m ) . But the p o i n t i n genera l seems w e l l t aken : i t i s not as p rob lemat ic as Raphae l ' s , nor i s i t i n s i g n i f i c a n t . As ment ioned, though, Wi lson a l l o w s a concept ion o f human value t o en te r by the back door, and do much o f the j u s t i f i c a t o r y work rega rd ing the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r human conduct . When he .says t h a t men's purposes e t c . are o f equal u l t i m a t e v a l i d i t y , and t h a t t h i s e n t i t l e s them t o c e r t a i n r i g h t s , he i s c l e a r l y r e f e r r i n g t o a p r i o r e q u a l i t y o f man qua man, as he i s a b s t r a c - t e d from h i s e m p i r i c a l i d e n t i t y . Th is does not f o l l o w from the f a c t t h a t men can choose; r a t h e r i t v a l i d a t e s — g i v e s s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e t o — t h a t f a c t . I t i s as though reason were not enough t o per form the task d e s i r e d , and equal i n t r i n s i c wor th had t o be i n t roduced t o b o l s t e r i t . I n any case, I s h a l l r e t u r n t o the r o l e o f reason l a t e r ; f o r the present I s h a l l cont inue w i t h the concept o f human value as enuncia ted by Gregory V l a s t o s . V las tos contends t h a t t he re i s an e s s e n t i a l human i d e n t i t y apar t from 20 any recognizable empirical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which give man merit; t h i s s p e c i a l i d e n t i t y i s valuable i n and of i t s e l f . So i f there i s a value attaching to the person himself as an i n t e g r a l and unique i n d i v i d u a l , t h i s value w i l l not f a l l under merit or be reducible to i t . For i t i s of the essence of merit, as here defined, to be a grading concept; and there i s no way of grading i n d i v i d u a l s as such. We can only grade them with respect to t h e i r q u a l i t i e s , hence only by abstracting from t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 5 2 He goes on to argue that such a value does e x i s t , and i s recognized i n r e l a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g love, p o l i t i c s , and morality. In each of these spheres men are given i d e n t i t i e s or r i g h t s simply because they are what 53 they are--not for any status or merit or q u a l i t i e s they happen to possess. While one can sympathize with Vlastos' f e e l i n g s , i t is.more d i f f i c u l t to accept h i s reasoning. I f i t seems as though men's i n d i v i d u a l worth i s 5k recognized i n our various r e l a t i o n s , we might also note that there i s just as much evidence that such a value i s not recognized, that men only perceive and act upon each other's q u a l i t i e s , and that i t could hardly be otherwise. The p o s i t i o n cannot be supported by the way men behave—the very nature of the prop o s i t i o n renders i t incapable of proof or disproof; i t i s simply a matter of b e l i e f or f a i t h . In t h i s i t i s s i m i l a r to the t r a d i t i o n a l notions of natural law and 55 n a t u r a l r i g h t s . These concepts are quite complex and have va r i e d accord- ing to h i s t o r i c a l circumstance; nevertheless, the e s s e n t i a l idea that there i s a number of (God) given norms that are u n i v e r s a l and r a t i o n a l l y apprehen- s i b l e has remained i n t a c t . With the r i s e of rat i o n a l i s m and the development of the modern s c i e n t i f i c method, natural r i g h t s and law have had a much harder time of i t , though the modern counterpart can be seen i n the b e l i e f that c e r t a i n truths are " s e l f - e v i d e n t " . They cannot be j u s t i f i e d — t h e y are true simply because they are true. While t h i s may sound f o o l i s h , the 21 a l t e r n a t i v e to s e l f - e v i d e n t t r u t h i s no t r u t h ( i n a sense). In science there are no f i n a l t r u t h s , only hypotheses and p r o b a b i l i t i e s . The same s i t u a t i o n obtains i n normative discourse: sooner or l a t e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n comes down to one p r i n c i p l e at best, and t h i s ultimate p r i n c i p l e must be accepted as "self-evident 1'. F i n a l truths can be found only i n s e l f - contained systems of l o g i c , which are of l i t t l e value i n discussions of ends and i d e a l s . Nevertheless, i t tends to create d i f f i c u l t i e s when we speak of s e l f - evident truths, or even truths at a l l , with t h e i r a b s o l u t i s t connotations. I t might be better instead to r e f e r to propositions that are more or l e s s t r u e — t h e i r a c c e p t a b i l i t y depending upon how well they can stand up to c r i t i c i s m , how c l o s e l y they can be r e l a t e d to other widely accepted 56 p r i n c i p l e s , and how u s e f u l they are to the problems of human a f f a i r s . Statements that s a t i s f i e d these conditions could be termed prima f a c i e truths (or truths, i f t h e i r prim'a f a c i e nature were made c l e a r ) . But many r i g h t s t h e o r i s t s seem to f a l l back on the p o s i t i o n when pressed, as do e g a l i t a r i a n s , that i t i s simply s e l f - e v i d e n t that a l l men are created equal, or that each man has a natural r i g h t to l i f e , l i b e r t y , and estate. This i s a weak type of argument, and i s u s e f u l only as an i n d i c a t i o n that c e r t a i n values are strongly or widely supported. Empirical E q u a l i t i e s The approaches thus f a r considered have concentrated on the idea that men are i n t r i n s i c a l l y equal i n worth. Other wr i t e r s have tended to focus on more e m p i r i c a l l y ascertainable q u a l i t i e s i n N t h e i r attempts to j u s t i f y equal treatment. For example, i t i s often held that a l l men are equal i n that they have c e r t a i n needs. Benn and Peters speak of three classes of 57 need: b i o l o g i c a l , b a s i c , and f u n c t i o n a l . I t i s c l e a r that we are a l l equal i n our b i o l o g i c a l need of food, water, shel t e r , c l o t h i n g , and the l i k e 22 (although d i f f e r e n t people need d i f f e r e n t amounts). We also have basic needs which are indeterminate: men need pleasure, a f f e c t i o n , approval, s o c i a l intercourse, r e l a x a t i o n , e t c . They are indeterminate because there i s no f i x e d amount that can be s a i d to be proper or minimal. While men can survive without these goods, they cannot do so as s o c i a l and c i v i l i z e d beings. Bio- l o g i c a l needs are " n a t u r a l " while basic needs are "conventional", i n the sense that the l a t t e r are necessary to man's s o c i a l existence which he himself creates. Functional needs are s i m i l a r l y "conventional"—they are necessary to the operation of so c i e t y . Plumbers need t o o l s , scholars need books, farmers need trucks. And the community needs a l l these p o s i t i o n s f i l l e d . The further we get from b i o l o g i c a l needs, the l e s s need seems to be connected with e q u a l i t y . Men may be equal i n t h e i r need of food, c l o t h i n g , and she l t e r , and p o s s i b l y of s o c i a l existence, but beyond t h i s , needs seem to become more unequal, and come to r e f l e c t i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s . De Jouvenal f e e l s that the greater contributions of the upper c l a s s to society and culture e n t i t l e i t s members to greater income and wealth on the b a s i s of need—they need more because they give so much more. Thus: ...keeping a man p h y s i c a l l y f i t and keeping him f i t for diverse s o c i a l duties are not i d e n t i c a l notions. The same basic expen- diture on basic needs which keeps a labourer f i t f o r h i s job w i l l prove inadequate to keep a Treasury o f f i c i a l f i t f o r h i s spec- i f i c task. Each s p e c i f i c task c a l l s f o r " f u n c t i o n a l expenditure", which i s i n fa c t cost of production and should not enter i n t o net income.58 One might suspect that de Jouvenal would have a somewhat exaggerated notion of what a Treasury o f f i c i a l needs, despite h i s claim of popular support. Further on, he a s s e r t s that: True a r i s t o c r a c i e s have never enjoyed an a r i s t o c r a t i c status because they are strong...; true a r i s t o c r a c i e s have been w i l l i n g l y favoured by the people, who sensed that excellent types of mankind, i n any realm, needed s p e c i a l con- d i t i o n s , and they have always delighted i n 23 59 granting them such conditions. Hence, not only does the concept of f u n c t i o n a l need allow for di f f e r e n c e s : i t provides an entering wedge f o r great i n e q u a l i t i e s as w e l l . But with regard to e s s e n t i a l needs, men are equal, and t h i s f a c t by i t s e l f has come to serve as the basis f o r a strong claim to minimally, i f not f u l l y , equal treatment.^ This r a i s e s c e r t a i n questions. Benn and Peters t e l l us that "needs are not simply matters of f a c t , but presume norms as much as do d e s e r t s . " ^ They are r e f e r r i n g to the "basic" and " f u n c t i o n a l " needs, but the same point can be made about the en t i r e category. According to Barry, need i s not an independent justificatory p r i n c i p l e , but a d e r i v a t i v e one. He points out that: no statement to the e f f e c t that X i s necessary i n order to produce Y provides a reason f o r doing X. Before i t can provide such a reason, Y must be shown to be therefore a desirable end to pursue...A conclusive reason would require showing that the cost of X...does not make i t l e s s advantageous than some a l t e r - native course of a c t i o n , and that any disadvant- ageous side e f f e c t s of X are outweighed by i t s advantage i n producing Y.62 I t i s generally assumed, of course, that the end of s u r v i v a l i s as l e g i t - imate and self-evident as any end can be. T h i s i s where equality comes i n : people do not need equal amounts of food, etc. to survive, but they have equal need of s u r v i v a l . But t h i s i t s e l f i s a norm: the concept of need cannot on i t s own require equal treatment or anything e l s o . I t i s necessary to postulate some value, such as s u r v i v a l or human d i g n i t y or happiness, before one can use the fact to prescribe treatment. ;. This a p p l i e s as well to the other "em p i r i c a l " approaches. Williams has pointed out that men are equal i n that they a l l have the capacity to experience pain and s u f f e r i n g , a f f e c t i o n f or others, f e e l i n g s of s e l f - r e s p e c t , and self-consciousness. Men do not have these c a p a c i t i e s to equal degrees, LEAF 2ij-OMITTED IN PAGE NUMBERING 25 though, and i t i s conceivable that some do not have them at a l l . There are two kinds of response to t h i s d i f f i c u l t y (which, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , also cropped up i n the discussions of need and of r a t i o n a l i t y ) . F i r s t , man can be defined so that he does have the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of sentience, sympathy fo r others, self-consciousness, reason, e t c . Thus, anyone who does not have 64 them i s not human, and i s only regarded as such as a matter of "courtesy". This solves the problem but at a rather large cost: f o r one of the reasons f o r t r y i n g to prove that a l l men are equal i s that some i n d i v i d u a l s or classes or races have foeen considered sub-human, and hence undeserving of equal or f a i r treatment. Courtesies can always be withdrawn i n the "public i n t e r e s t " . The second a l t e r n a t i v e has been suggested by Benn. He f e e l s that i t i s not necessary that every person be r a t i o n a l to the same degree, or even at a l l . I t i s enough that r a t i o n a l i t y i s u n i v e r s a l l y recognized as "the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y human enterprise", so that i t co n s t i t u t e s the norm of 65 what i t i s to be human. This reasoning can be extended to the other c a p a c i t i e s of sentience e t c . as w e l l , I believe, f o r although they are not r e s t r i c t e d to human beings, they would s t i l l q u a l i f y as norms. According to Williams, these " e q u a l i t i e s " give r i s e to an "e q u a l i t y of respect", f o r to f a i l to take them in t o account would be to act i n a manner that was a r b i t r a r y , immoral, and " a l i e n to the s p i r i t of human under- s t a n d i n g " . ^ T h i s argument has a c e r t a i n weight, but t h i s weight derives from the value we choose to give these q u a l i t i e s , rather than from the q u a l i t i e s themselves. Human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are also stressed by Frankena; he states that men do not have them equally, but goes on to say that they make men " s i m i l a r " , which i s p r e c i s e l y the point that Williams, Wilson, and Benn were making. He writes: 26 ...I accepted as part of my own view the p r i n c i p l e that a l l men are to be treated as equals, not because they are equal i n any respect but simply because they are human. They are human because they have emotions and desires, and are able to think, and hence are capable of enjoying a good l i f e i n a sense i n which other animals are not...By the good l i f e i s meant not so much the morally good l i f e as the happy or s a t i s - factory l i f e . As I see i t , i t i s the fac t that a l l men are s i m i l a r l y capable of enjoy- ing a good l i f e i n t h i s sense that j u s t i f i e s the prima f a c i e requirement that they be treated as equals.67 Thus men should be treated as equals, not because they are equal, but because they are equally,men, and capable of the "good l i f e " . This i s s i m i l a r to Benn's contention that "we should give to the i n t e r e s t s of each the same consideration as claims to conditions necessary 68 f o r some standard of well-being that we can recognize and endorse." The idea i s that a l l men (equally) have an i n t e r e s t i n achieving a state of well-being, whether they r e a l i z e i t or not, and that a l l these " r e a l " i n t - 69 erests should be considered i n moral decisions. While Benn's p r i n c i p l e has more substance than those suggested by Williams and Frankena, i t does not appear to follow any more c l o s e l y from the i n i t i a l f a c t of men's equ a l i t y or s i m i l a r i t y . F i n a l l y , we might put to use a remark by Wilson: I n t r i n s i c e q u a lity r e s t s on the fac t that a l l human beings come in t o a p a r t i c u l a r category or mode of being. Their varying a b i l i t i e s to r e f l e c t and deliberate, to state the values or the r u l e s they follow and to exercise will-power or e f f o r t , do not constitute the major i s s u e . The point i s rather that no human being can escape from h i s general category (except by suicide or by being reduced to an animal l e v e l ) , and above a l l that i n c l u s i o n i n t h i s category gives a l l human beings a s i m i l a r status v i s - a - v i s t h e i r fellows.70 Men are equal because they are men. The fac t that they belong to the species 27 e n t i t l e s them to an i r r e d u c i b l e status, and presumably to have t h i s status taken i n t o account when p o l i c i e s are being formulated and decisions made. Human value i s s t i l l e n t a i l e d i n the notion of status, but t h i s statement at 71 l e a s t has. the merit of straightforwardness and s i m p l i c i t y . A point made by Benn extends the impli c a t i o n s : I f the human species i s more important to us than other species, with i n t e r e s t s worthy of s p e c i a l consideration, each man's fo r h i s own sake, t h i s i s p o s s i b l y because each of us sees i n other men the image of himself. So he recognizes i n them what he knows of h i s own experience; the poten- t i a l i t i e s f o r moral freedom, f o r making responsible choices among ways of l i f e open to him, f o r s t r i v i n g , no matter how mistakenly and unsuccessfully, to make of himself something worthy of h i s own respect.72 Thus men value others simply because they are men, l i k e themselves, rather than because they are c h i l d r e n of God, or members of a moral community, or r a t i o n a l and sentient beings (although these q u a l i t i e s are often important). Human beings have value, not " i n t r i n s i c a l l y " or e m p i r i c a l l y " , but because human beings generally believe that they do, and act accordingly. Human Values and Good Reasons Now a l l the arguments with which I have been dealing have been based on the premise that, i n some respect, a l l men are equally valuable. Some have t r i e d to prove the v a l i d i t y of t h i s proposition, assuming that having done so, the case f o r equal treatment becomes obvious. In fac t i t does not, because the notion of i n t r i n s i c worth i s so removed from r e a l i t y that i t s p r e s c r i p - t i o n s only have e f f e c t i n an abstract, metaphysical world. Others have attempted to show that men are equally men i n s i g n i f i c a n t respects that cannot be ignored. But t h i s i s not quite r i g h t e i t h e r . They should have contended that c e r t a i n f a c t s require c e r t a i n kinds of conduct i f we are to maintain a p a r t i c u l a r value structure, and hence, they must not be ignored. While t h i s value structure i s not e n t i r e l y a r b i t r a r y (as Perelman, f o r 28 73 example, claimed i n h i s e a r l i e r work), neither i s i t absolute or e t e r n a l . T h i s point might seem not worth mentioning, but I believe that i t tends to be passed over i n normative discourse, and not only at the policy-making l e v e l . In j u s t i f y i n g c e r t a i n p o l i c i e s or b e l i e f s , the appeal i s too often made on behalf of values that are considered sacred and immutable—"natural" rather than "conventional". The danger i n t h i s stance l i e s i n i t s i n i m i c - a b i l i t y to the s p i r i t of r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n : i . e . , to the "good reasons" approach. Some t h e o r i s t s shy away from t h i s sort of moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n , p o s s i b l y because perpetrators of c l e a r l y inexcusable p o l i c i e s and actions have i n v a r i a b l y o f f e r e d "reasons" f o r t h e i r behaviour. And what const i t u t e s 74 a "good" reason? Who i s to decide? Granted, t h i s presents a problem; nevertheless, i t cannot be solved by appealing to absolutes. The thought that a l l human beings are of " i n f i n i t e worth" seems to me to obfuscate, rather than to c l a r i f y , matters of pu b l i c p o l i c y . "Good reasons" seems much more suitable to a n a l y s i s of the eq u a l i t y issue than any other approach. CHAPTER I I I EQUALITY AS NORM Human Values In order to decide how people should be treated, values must be proposed. I have already mentioned that I am not c e r t a i n that r i g h t neces- s a r i l y follows from good. But the r e l a t i o n seems to be strong, e s p e c i a l l y when one i s speaking i n general terms. I am not going to attempt to con- str u c t a l i s t of a l l conceivable "goods"; however, there are several which might be put f o r t h as general g u i d e l i n e s . 7 5 The most basic would appear to be s u r v i v a l . A f t e r t h i s might come avoidance or prevention of pain and s u f f e r i n g . ^ At a t h i r d l e v e l we might 7 7 have the values of happiness, development of human p o t e n t i a l , excellence, 7 8 7 9 freedom and well-being. Harmony and j u s t i c e might be found at t h i s l e v e l as w e l l , or might be seen as more i n c l u s i v e goods, belonging to a d i f f e r e n t category. Undoubtedly more could be found, but these w i l l s u f f i c e f o r our purposes. Some overlap, and could probably be reformulated more s u i t a b l y . Or the rough c l a s s i f i c a t i o n might be debatable. But i f i t can be agreed that these goods would rank high on any general l i s t , we might be able to approach the subject of what cons t i t u t e s proper treatment, and thus the idea of equality, more adequately. I t cannot be s a i d that these values are " n a t u r a l " . They are created by men, just as human value i s created by men. But we can say that some of them, such as s u r v i v a l , avoidance of pain, well-being, are conditions of 29 30 proper s o c i a l existence. By "proper", I mean "moral". To the extent that a s o c i e t y has r u l e s , laws, customs, r i g h t s and duties, e t c . that are moral, they must be i n t e l l i g i b l e , which means that they should be conducive to 81 human welfare. I t i s possible that t h i s i s an overly narrow conception 82 of morality; I s h a l l say that i t i s s t i p u l a t i v e . According to Warnock: no one i s l o g i c a l l y obliged to accept any given feature as a c r i t e r i o n of merit; and i f we say...that c e r t a i n features must ne c e s s a r i l y be accepted as c r i t e r i a of moral merit, we can and must go on at once to concede that no one, of course, i s obliged by l o g i c to engage i n moral judg- ment or debate. That there are, as i t were, necessary c r i t e r i a of moral value does not imply that anyone, l e t alone everyone, ne c e s s a r i l y evaluates things with reference to those c r i t e r i a ; i t i s only that we must do so i f we are prepared, as we may not be, to consider the question "from the moral point of view . "83 I do not know about the necessity of t h i s view; however, I think that there are good reasons f o r saying that morality must be concerned with human welfare. I t would seem impossible to understand and accept a society as moral i f welfare were a disvalue. And while the other goods l i s t e d might not be so compelling, I think that there are good reasons f o r regarding them as v a l u - able too. Toulmin has expressed the point w e l l : I f the adoption of /"a 7 p r a c t i c e would genuinely reduce c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t , i t i s a p r a c t i c e worthy of adoption, and i f /"a 7 way of l i f e would genuinely lead to deeper and more consistent happiness, i t i s one worthy of p u r s u i t . And t h i s seems so natural and i n t e l l i g i b l e , when one bears i n mind the function of e t h i c a l judgements, that i f anyone asks me why they are "good reasons", I can only r e p l y by asking i n return, "What better kinds of reason could you want?'^ While the values of harmony and happiness might not be as f i n a l as the 85 statement suggests, they seem to have strong j u s t i f i c a t o r y power under 31 normal c i r c u m s t a n c e s . They can be e l a b o r a t e d and r e l a t e d t o o t h e r a s p e c t s o f goodness and o b l i g a t i o n v e r y e a s i l y , w h i l e s i t u a t i o n s conducive t o c o n f l i c t and unhappiness can be thought o f as good o r o b l i g a t o r y o n l y w i t h extreme d i f f i c u l t y and f o r s p e c i a l r e a s o n s . (Even t h e n , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t harmony would o n l y be s a c r i f i c e d i n the i n t e r e s t o f a g r e a t e r harmony.) Hence, I s h a l l assume t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n v a l u e s which g e n e r a l l y serve as good reasons f o r p r i n c i p l e s o f human a c t i o n , and t h a t t h i s i s the s o r t o f approach most s u i t a b l e f o r e x a m i n a t i o n o f r u l e s such as " A l l men s h o u l d be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y . " R i g h t s To determine whether o r not men s h o u l d be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y we must l o o k t o m o r a l i t y . M o r a l i t y can be s a i d t o c o n s i s t o f r u l e s g o v e r n i n g what ought and ought not t o be done. I n any s o r t o f "deve loped" o r s o p h i s t i c a t e d m o r a l i t y , these r u l e s w i l l comprise a more o r l e s s coherent system o r code. The most 86 convenient way t o l o o k a t a moral code i s i n terms o f d u t i e s and r i g h t s . Men a r e o b l i g a t e d t o do what s h o u l d be done, and not t o do what s h o u l d n o t : hence the n o t i o n o f d u t i e s . G e n e r a l l y , r i g h t s can be c o n s i d e r e d d u t i e s i n 87 r e v e r s e . I t s h o u l d be noted t h a t even a v e r y s o p h i s t i c a t e d moral code does not have t o be expressed i n terms o f r i g h t s and d u t i e s ; however, any m o r a l i t y should be understandable o r a n a l y z a b l e i n these t e r m s . I t should a l s o be mentioned t h a t j u s t as m o r a l i t y i s c o n v e n t i o n a l — c r e a t e d by men, r a t h e r t h a n g i v e n — s o a r e r i g h t s and d u t i e s . They a r e not n a t u r a l o r i n a l i e n a b l e o r a b s o l u t e . These p o i n t s have been w e l l s t a t e d by O l i v e r Wendel l Holmes: I see no a p r i o r i duty t o l i v e w i t h o t h e r s . . . but s i m p l y a statement o f what I must do i f I w i s h t o remain a l i v e . I f I do l i v e w i t h o t h e r s they t e l l me t h a t I must do and a b - s t a i n from d o i n g , v a r i o u s t h i n g s o r t h e y w i l l put the screws on me. I b e l i e v e they w i l l , and b e i n g o f the same mind as t o t h e i r c o n - duct I not o n l y accept the r u l e s but come i n 32 time to accept them with sympathy and emotional affirmation and begin to talk about duties and rights.88 Brown presents a more forceful argument on behalf of the existence of ("inalienable") rights, based on the strength of the connection between right and good. He sees this connection, I believe, i n general rather than i n absolute terms—in simple, straightforward situations we can know what i s right by discovering what promotes good. This i s a matter of moral inference. Thus, "an inalienable right i s simply the right of a man to protection i n avoiding the clearest possible cases of preventable evils and i n securing 89 the clearest possible cases of obtainable goods." This i s self-evident in the sense that: One cannot deny i t s truth and admit the validity of moral inference. Moral argu- ments about the rights and duties of men in particular circumstances presuppose the validity of reasoning from specific i n - stances of good and e v i l to specific i n - stances of rights and duties. They pre- suppose, as a principle of moral inference, that statements about goods and evils con- firm or disconfirm statements about rights and obligations. But since an inalienable right i s the minimum possible right i n respect to a class of indubitable goods, this right can be denied only by denying that statements about goods validate state- ments about rights. To deny this would be to reject the principle of moral inference.... It i s logically impossible to deny a state- ment, where this requires the denial of the principle of inference presupposed in validating any statement of that kind.90 While this principle does not have the status of immutable law, i t appears to be generally valid, or reasonable. We shall turn now to the rights them- selves. Cranston distinguishes several classes of right, the most important of which for our purposes he c a l l s a human right. According to Cranston, "human rights are a form of moral right, and they differ from other moral rights i n 91 being the rights of a l l people at a l l times in a l l situations." The 33 u n i v e r s a l r i g h t s that he has i n mind are the t r a d i t i o n a l ones to l i f e , 92 l i b e r t y , and property. Raphael agrees with the Lockean approach, adding that these are u n i v e r s a l i n the strong sense, while various p o l i t i c a l , 93 economic, and s o c i a l r i g h t s are un i v e r s a l i n a weaker sense. Vlastos r e f e r s to the "prima f a c i e equality of men's r i g h t to well-being and to freedom. " , while Brown's contention that "each man has an i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t to the prot e c t i o n of h i s moral i n t e r e s t s , h i s person, and estate" has already been mentioned. Hart maintains that " i f there are any moral r i g h t s at a l l , i t follows that there i s at l e a s t one nat u r a l r i g h t , the equal r i g h t of a l l 96 men to be fr e e . " He goes on to elaborate: ~ y l 7 n the absence of c e r t a i n s p e c i a l con- d i t i o n s which are consistent with the r i g h t being an equal r i g h t , any adult human being capable of choice (1) has the r i g h t to f o r - bearance on the part of a l l others from the use of coercion or r e s t r a i n t against him save to hinder coercion or r e s t r a i n t and (2) i s at l i b e r t y to do ( i . e . , i s under no o b l i g a t i o n to abstain from) any ac t i o n which i s not one coer- cing or r e s t r a i n i n g or designed to i n j u r e other persons.96 F i n a l l y a somewhat s i m i l a r statement, with a moral element added, by Pennock: " i f a r i g h t i s a power or a p r i v i l e g e which an i n d i v i d u a l ought to have, then everyone ought to have those powers and p r i v i l e g e s which are necessary f o r him to approach as nearly as possible to the goal of happiness or s a t i s f a c t i o n , 97 subject to h i s respect f o r the p r i n c i p l e of equal r i g h t s f o r a l l . " Now, except f o r two points r a i s e d by Hart, and one by Vlastos, a l l these conceptions are quite s i m i l a r . They str e s s the u n i v e r s a l i t y or equality of human r i g h t s , and they focus on human welfare. Men have equal r i g h t s to l i f e , or l i b e r t y , or well-being, or the protection of moral i n t e r e s t s , e t c . They are equal because morality i s concerned with human welfare, which i s to say the welfare of a l l members of the species, not just some. Since e t h i c a l systems are created which assign r i g h t s and duties to i n d i v i d u a l s (through the r u l e s emanating from the c e n t r a l norm), i t seems reasonable that i n t h e i r most general form, r i g h t s should concern the welfare of the i n d i v i d u a l s within the species, and be extended to a l l men. Insofar as men subscribe to r a t i o n a l tenets of morality, then, they w i l l allow that a l l men have equal r i g h t s . F i n a l l y , the questions r a i s e d by Hart and Vlastos should be cleared up. Hart says that human r i g h t s apply to a l l r a t i o n a l a d u l t s . This issue has been dealt with e a r l i e r by saying that r a t i o n a l i t y i s simply the species norm, but that everyone a c t u a l l y has r i g h t s (to equal treatment of some k i n d ) . But Hart apparently means t h i s i n a l i t e r a l sense. This stems, I believe, from the good to which men are supposed to have the r i g h t : i . e . , freedom. On the one hand, Hart probably thinks that to be free i n any p o s i t i v e sense, men must be able to choose, e t c . On the other hand, i f freedom i s seen negatively as absence of constraint, non-rational men and c h i l d r e n should not be permitted to have i t (he would say). He might have avoided t h i s , e i t h e r by using the notion of prima f a c i e r i g h t s (which can be withdrawn i n s p e c i a l cases of c o n f l i c t i n g goods), or by extending h i s idea of the good to include well-being. As i t stands, though, I f e e l h i s conception of human r i g h t s i s too narrow. I t w i l l be noted that Hart says " i f there are any moral r i g h t s at a l l , i t follows that..." This i s not r e a l l y a problem. As mentioned, there are no na t u r a l , unconditional r i g h t s to anything; the r i g h t s under discussion are a l l man-made. The l a t t e r e x i s t , while the former do not. The idea of prima f a c i e r i g h t s has surfaced i n several places. Rather than claim any p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t as supreme or indefeasible (whether natural or conventional), modern t h e o r i s t s tend to f e e l that any r i g h t or duty can be voided under c e r t a i n curcumstances. Where two prima f a c i e r i g h t s or duties c o n f l i c t , the one that i s recognized i s termed a r i g h t or a duty, while the other remains prima f a c i e : v a l i d i n most s i t u a t i o n s , but not a l l . 35 98 This avoids the d i f f i c u l t y . Thus Frankena modifies Brown's theory: There i s an in a l i e n a b l e prima f a c i e r i g h t to each of the high order goods..., but no inv a r i a b l e a c t u a l r i g h t to any of them, since no one of these prima f a c i e r i g h t s always takes precedence over the others. But there i s s t i l l one ac t u a l r i g h t which holds without exception, namely the r i g h t to i n s t i t u t i o n s providing "general protec- t i o n " of our high order goods. We have t h i s r i g h t because we have prima f a c i e r i g h t s to these goods and we have prima f a c i e r i g h t s to these goods because we are beings cap- able of enjoying them.99 This reformulation i s an improvement, i n that i t stresses the prima f a c i e nature of r i g h t s . However, Frankena s t i l l r e t a i n s one r i g h t which appears to be absolute. Now since r i g h t s stem d i r e c t l y from the fact that men have created i n s t i t u t i o n s (society and morality) to look a f t e r t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , i t seems odd to say that men have a r i g h t to those i n s t i t u t i o n s . The " r i g h t " i s not p r i o r to the i n s t i t u t i o n s ; the i n s t i t u t i o n s are established i n order to confer r i g h t s to human beings. I t does not make sense to say that one has the r i g h t to be conferred a r i g h t . Frankena i s t r y i n g to say, I think, that the very act of creating these i n s t i t u t i o n s and the notion of r i g h t presumes, or automatically e n t a i l s , a r i g h t to them. This would suggest the idea that men have the r i g h t to create r i g h t s simply because they have con- structed the concept, that men have conferred upon themselves the r i g h t to set up i n s t i t u t i o n s and r i g h t s , and that t h i s gives a l l men the r i g h t of access to them. This seems mistaken, as well as confusing—some r i g h t s are of a higher order than others, but they are a l l prima f a c i e , and they are a l l created by men. The idea of a " f i r s t order" r i g h t a r i s i n g from the mere fac t of speaking i n terms of, or i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g , r i g h t s at a l l i s s i m i l a r to the notion that one always has the r i g h t to j u s t i c e , or just treatment. Even t h i s r i g h t i s occ a s i o n a l l y overruled, however, on grounds of u t i l i t y . None- theless, i t i s c e r t a i n l y a high ranking r i g h t , and one that i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 36 suited to our discussion. Before dealing with the question of j u s t i c e , though, I would l i k e to turn to the concept of r u l e s . Rules B e r l i n states that: In so f a r as some minimum degree of prevalence of r u l e s i s a necessary condition f o r the existence of human s o c i e t i e s (and t h i s seems to be an almost u n i v e r s a l , but s t i l l empirical law), and i n so f a r as morality, both personal and p o l i t i c a l , i s l a r g e l y conceived of i n terms of r u l e s , the kind of equality with which obedience to r u l e s i s v i r t u a l l y ident- i c a l , i s among the deepest needs and convic- t i o n s of mankind.100 In f a c t , r u l e s are the basis of any moral code, f o r they l a y down standards by which actions can be judged r i g h t or wrong. They t e l l us what should or should not be done i n any given instance. While t h e i r most obvious a p p l i c a - t i o n i s the system of p o s i t i v e law by which s o c i e t i e s are governed, they are 101 inherent i n any form of e t h i c a l discourse. In t h i s respect they are c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to the concept of equality, for r u l e s e s t a b l i s h what should be done i n a l l cases that are a l i k e . They are i m p a r t i a l — " t h e y allow of no exceptions". "To f a l l under a r u l e i s pro tanto to be assimilated to a single pattern. To enforce a r u l e i s to 102 promote;lequalxty of behaviour or treatment." Hence the notion of " e q u a l i t y before the law" and the maxim " A l l men should be treated equally". Men are equal i n that they are a l l subject to i m p a r t i a l consideration under general r u l e s . Such p r e s c r i p t i o n s point to the l i m i t e d a p p l i c a b i l i t y of r u l e s , though, as f a r as equality i s concerned. For the p r i n c i p l e s of g e n e r a l i z a t i o n and u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y are formal: they do not t e l l us what ends the r u l e s should promote, nor how to e s t a b l i s h the categories i n t o which cases f a l l f o r impar- 103 t i a l treatment. Because they are r a t i o n a l , r u l e s should c l a s s i f y s i t u a - t i o n s according to relevant d i f f e r e n c e s , but they do not t e l l us which 37 d i f f e r e n c e s are relevant. I t should also be mentioned that r u l e s should only be seen as guides to proper conduct—they cannot a n t i c i p a t e every f a c t o r which might be s i g n i f i c a n t i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . Thus they must be subject to modification on grounds of equity. F i n a l l y , they must be interpreted, so that judges can decide which circumstances are re l a t e d to which r u l e s ; t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y problematic when r u l e s appear 105 to c o n f l i c t . The P r i n c i p l e of Catego r i a l Consistency Such d i f f i c u l t i e s are not inconsiderable; however, an i n t e r e s t i n g attempt has been made to surmount them. Alan Gewirth has t r i e d to i n j e c t some substantive content i n t o the eq u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e by providing a j u s t i f i c a - 106 t i o n of e g a l i t a r i a n j u s t i c e . His work i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g at t h i s point because i t incorporates much of what we have dealt with thus f a r . A j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s nature presumes both a moral and a r a t i o n a l approach. The question, then, i s whether there are any moral p r i n c i p l e s which are s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g . Since moral p r i n c i p l e s are advanced as basic reasons, another way to put t h i s question i s whether any moral p r i n c i p l e s are inherently r a t i o n a l . For i f a p r i n - c i p l e i s inherently r a t i o n a l , then i t needs no further reason to j u s t i f y i t and i s hence self-justifying.107 R a t i o n a l i t y , he says, has the formal requirement of freedom from s e l f - c o ntradiction, and the material requirement that i t must take account of '•the necessary features of one's subject matter." Now the subject matter of morality i s , p r i m a r i l y , human a c t i o n . When human agents act, they do not merely engage i n b o d i l y movements; t h e i r a c t i o n has c e r t a i n necessary features which may be summarized as volun- t a r i n e s s and purposiveness. For i n s o f a r as men are agents, they i n i t i a t e and co n t r o l t h e i r movements (voluntariness) i n the l i g h t of t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s and purposes (purposive- ness). This i s why human agents can be held 38 responsible both f o r t h e i r acts and for the ' consequences of the acts.108 109 These two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are c a l l e d the " c a t e g o r i a l features o f a c t i o n . " Now i n performing an ac t i o n , an agent claims that he has a r i g h t to do so. I f h i s " r i g h t - c l a i m " i s to be recognized as v a l i d , i t i s log i c a l l y - necessary (by the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y ) that i t be v a l i d f o r any s i m i l a r person i n s i m i l a r circumstances. This i s , of course, purely formal i n that the c r i t e r i o n of s i m i l a r i t y i s not s p e c i f i e d . But according to Gewirth, there i s a relevant s i m i l a r i t y that cannot be refuted and that has substantive i m p l i c a t i o n s — t h e fact that every man i s a "prospective agent 110 who has some purpose which he wants to f u l f i l l . " Hence, i n s o f a r as the agent's necessary r i g h t - c l a i m i s r e s t r i c t e d to what he i s r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d i n claiming, h i s claim that he has the r i g h t to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the transaction i n which he i s involved must r e f e r to himself qua prospective agent who wants to r e a l i z e some purpose of h i s . . . I t follows from t h i s that every agent l o g i c a l l y must accept the ge n e r a l i z a t i o n that a l l prospective agents have the r i g h t to p a r t i c i p a t e v o l u n t a r i l y and purposively i n transactions i n which they are involved.111 Insofar as men are engaged i n ac t i o n , they are e i t h e r agents or " r e c i p i e n t s " of the actions of other agents. Agents have o b l i g a t i o n s , r e c i p i e n t s have r i g h t s . The r i g h t s to act v o l u n t a r i l y and purposively (to obtain goods) are expressed as r i g h t s "to non-coercion by other persons, or 112 freedom, and to non-maleficence from other persons, or welfare. Maleficence consists i n agents thwarting t h e i r r e c i p i e n t s i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to achieve t h e i r goals. Thus Gewirth derives the P r i n c i p l e of Catego r i a l Consistency (PCC): Apply to your r e c i p i e n t the same c a t e g o r i a l features of ac t i o n that 113 you apply to y o u r s e l f . He concludes the j u s t i f i c a t i o n by a s s e r t i n g that i t i s not merely another formal p r i n c i p l e : The PCC i s a ne c e s s a r i l y v a l i d p r i n c i p l e i n two respects. I t i s formally or l o g i c a l l y necessary i n that to v i o l a t e i t i s to 39 contradict oneself. I t i s also m a t e r i a l l y necessary i n that, unlike other p r i n c i p l e s , the o b l i g a t i o n s of the PCC cannot be escaped by any agent by s h i f t i n g h i s i n c l i n a t i o n s , i n t e r e s t s , or ideas. Since the c a t e g o r i a l features of a c t i o n are involved i n the necessary structure of agency; the agent cannot r e f r a i n from applying these features to himself and from claiming the r i g h t to apply them i n h i s s p e c i f i c transaction qua prospective agent; hence he r a t i o n a l l y cannot evade the o b l i g a t i o n of applying these features to h i s r e c i p i e n t because of the l a t t e r ' s also being a prospective agent.11k L a s t l y , the PCC i s prima f a c i e rather than absolute—any a c t i o n can j u s t i f i a b l y be prevented which ( i ) contradicts i t , or ( i i ) i s incompatible 115 with a s o c i a l r u l e which i s i t s e l f j u s t i f i e d by the PCC. Gewirth's a n a l y s i s i s quite impressive i n i t s l o g i c and coherence; nevertheless, I do not f e e l that i t has as much substance as he claims. I t i s applicable only i n cases where a person's freedom or welfare i s c l e a r l y being u n j u s t l y v i o l a t e d : e.g., where there i s r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . While such instances have u s u a l l y been regarded as l o g i c a l l y j u s t i f i a b l e under the equality p r i n c i p l e , they are never thought j u s t i f i e d i n serious moral discussion. (Granted, "serious" i s a normative term—the meaning seems evident enough.) S t i l l , i t i s probably s i g n i f i c a n t that the PCC can formally d i s j u s t i f y cases of t h i s type. Most transactions i n v o l v i n g human freedom and welfare, however, are not so c l e a r c u t . I f X and Y both have equal prima f a c i e r i g h t s to freedom and welfare, there i s no way to s e t t l e any disputes that might a r i s e from possible c o n f l i c t s . In large s o c i e t i e s , one man's pursuit of h i s ends i n v a r i a b l y i n t e r f e r e s with that of another; e s p e c i a l l y where two or more men want a l i m i t e d supply of goods. Gewirth would resolve t h i s by i n s t i t u t i n g s o c i a l laws (compatible with the PCC) which would award the scarce goods to c e r t a i n men according to another p r i n c i p l e , such as u t i l i t y . "Whatever s a c r i f i c e s of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s these r u l e s may require must themselves serve to f o s t e r the freedom and ko welfare of each other i n d i v i d u a l . " But he does not t e l l us how to determine the amount that one i n d i v i d u a l i s expected to s a c r i f i c e f o r another, nor how much i s to be returned to him by way of what I take to be some kind of "general b e n e f i t s " , nor how to know just how much i s compatible with that of every other man. We can recognize v i o l a t i o n s of the PCC i n the most extreme and obvious cases, but how do we know what consti t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n i n a complex system of l e g i t i m i z e d r u l e s , a l l of which purport to'be conducive to the maximum freedom and welfare possible? The answer i s that we do not, and t h i s i s f a i r l y serious because t h i s i s where the problems generally occur. Gewirth notes that the PCC would have d i s j u s t i f i e d Nazism had i t been a p p l i e d — b u t would anyone have needed i t ? I f i t were r e a l l y u s e f u l as a substantive p r i n c i p l e , i t would be a p p l i c - able to at l e a s t some of the more hazy areas of pu b l i c p o l i c y with which men are most often concerned. Again, t h i s i s not to say that i t i s useless, or t o t a l l y f o r m a l — o n l y that i t i s not as e f f e c t i v e as one might have been 117 l e d to believe by Gewirth*s o p t i m i s t i c claims. Rules do not take us as f a r as might be thought desirable i n j u s t i f y - ing equal treatment; what they do i s give men an area of l i f e that admits of equality i n a c e r t a i n l i m i t e d sense. I t seems that they lead us to the same sphere that we found e a r l i e r i n the examination of r i g h t s — t h a t of j u s t i c e . CHAPTER IV EQUALITY AND JUSTICE The Relation Between Eq u a l i t y and J u s t i c e The idea of j u s t i c e has underlain much of the discussion thus f a r . This i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g , for while j u s t i c e might not be coterminous with morality, the two are s t i l l i n timately associated. Inasmuch as e g a l i t a r i a n s are i n t e r e s t e d i n p r e s c r i b i n g proper or r i g h t r e l a t i o n s between men and s o c i a l groups, i t i s reasonable to assume that they are seeking j u s t i c e , or a just order. I f they are not proposing t o t a l e q u a lity or anything l i k e i t (as I have maintained), then they would appear to be pursuing equality 118 because they believe i t i s f a i r or equitable. They might wish to argue that more equality would have u t i l i t a r i a n value because i t would (say) eliminate c l a s s c o n f l i c t or increase p r o d u c t i v i t y , but I think that equity i s the primary concern. I f t h i s i s so, the question a r i s e s : I s there any point at a l l i n r e f e r r i n g to a p r i n c i p l e of equality? I f complete e q u a l i t y i s not even f e l t to be desirable, and i f i t i s equity or f a i r n e s s that i s sought, why do e g a l i t a r i a n s not speak s o l e l y i n terms of j u s t i c e and equity? The proper response i s that there are many view of what i s j u s t . To the extent that j u s t i c e includes p r i n c i p l e s that tend to c o l l i d e with one another, proponents of one sort of j u s t i c e w i l l s t r e s s the p r i n c i p l e that i s most i n l i n e with t h e i r o v e r a l l conception. E g a l i t a r i a n s and merit- orians, f o r instance, are both i n t e r e s t e d i n j u s t i c e ; to pursue t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , they must work with t h e i r own p r i n c i p l e s ( i . e . , e q u a l i t y and merit, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . Thus, even i f the concept of j u s t i c e can embrace a l l 41 42 of equality, i t does not mean that the l a t t e r cannot be treated as a d i s t i n c t p r i n c i p l e i n i t s own r i g h t . The foregoing suggests a p o t e n t i a l l y f r u i t f u l approach to our t o p i c . I f i t i s p o s s i b l e to analyze j u s t i c e and then subtract a l l the parts that do not involve equality, we should be l e f t with something that would con- t r i b u t e to our understanding of the equality p r i n c i p l e . The A r i s t o t e l i a n Notion of J u s t i c e A r i s t o t l e drew the c l a s s i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s i n the a n a l y s i s of j u s t i c e : 119 ( i ) between j u s t i c e as law and j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s , and ( i i ) between 120 c o r r e c t i v e j u s t i c e and d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . J u s t i c e as law seems f a i r l y straightforward—he who obeys the law acts l a w f u l l y , and hence j u s t l y . . P a r t i c u l a r j u s t i c e , or f a i r n e s s , i s more relevant to our concerns. Eq u a l i t y i s the key f a c t o r i n c o r r e c t i v e j u s t i c e . (Also known as compensatory, r e c t i f i c a t o r y , emendatory, or r e t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e ) . The idea i s that a man should be compensated for no more and no l e s s than what he l o s e s at the hands of another man. The r e l a t i o n i s arithmetic: One of a d d i t i o n and subtraction: take from A and give to B. D i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e , on the other hand, i s geometric, or propor- t i o n a l . The idea here i s that a man should get what he deserves. Desert, however, can be c a l c u l a t e d i n a number of ways. McKeon notes A r i s t o t l e ' s point that "the determination of merit i n a c t u a l states takes the form of 121 recognizing external signs l i k e wealth, p o s i t i o n , b i r t h and power." As f a r as i d e a l states are concerned, though, d i f f e r e n t men have d i f f e r e n t conceptions of merit. Thus: The o l i g a r c h s think that s u p e r i o r i t y on one p o i n t — i n t h e i r case wealth—means s u p e r i o r i t y on a l l ; the democrats believe that equality i n one r e s p e c t — f o r instance, that of free birth—means equality a l l round.122 A r i s t o t l e f e l t that these views di d not take i n t o account the end for which 43 the state e x i s t s , i . e . , v i r t u e or "good a c t i o n " . The best c r i t e r i o n i s excellence, or capacity suited to the task at hand. So that with regard to the state he held that: Those who contribute most to an a s s o c i a t i o n of t h i s character / i . e . , who contribute most to good a c t i o n 7 have a greater share i n the p o l i s / and should, therefore, i n j u s t i c e , receive a l a r g e r recognition from i t 7 than those who are equal to them (or even greater) i n free b i r t h and descent, but unequal i n c i v i c excellence, or than those who surpass them i n wealth but are surpassed by them i n excellence.123 The important points seem to be that ( i ) d i s t r i b u t i o n s should be made accord- ing to merit; ( i i ) merit should be determined according to relevant charac- t e r i s t i c s ; and ( i i i ) relevance should be based on the end of the a c t i v i t y r e l a t e d to the d i s t r i b u t i o n . This i s f a i r l y straightforward; but while merit i s no longer seen by most people to consist i n wealth or free b i r t h , the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that are relevant to p a r t i c u l a r tasks or functions are often the subject of serious dispute. Thus the c r i t e r i a of desert generally comprise the centre around which arguments about j u s t i c e revolve today. In f a c t , i t has r e c e n t l y been asserted that a l l j u s t i c e i s meritorian ( i n the "broad" sense) and that equality i s 124 merely a "component" with very l i t t l e status of i t s own. Much of t h i s sort of issue turns on the p o s i t i o n from which one i s viewing the question. For example, d i s t r i b u t i o n according to need can be e i t h e r e g a l i t a r i a n or meritorian, and an aspect of e i t h e r c o r r e c t i v e or d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e , depending upon the d e f i n i t i o n s one i s using and the point one i s t r y i n g to make. D i s t r i b u t i v e J u s t i c e At any rate, the four major f a c t o r s that are thought to enter into questions of d i s t r i b u t i o n are need, merit (or desert), natural capacity kk (or a b i l i t y ) , and u t i l i t y . Each, constitutes a claim with i t s own r a t i o n a l e and legitimacy; each i s generally recognized as relevant to considerations of d i s t r i b u t i o n . However, the claim that i s a c t u a l l y f e l t to be the strong- est w i l l vary from case to case and from society to society, with the f i n a l r e s u l t often incorporating several or a l l of the f a c t o r s , s t r e s s i n g them according to t h e i r r e l a t i v e weights. Eq u a l i t y can be seen as the norm from which departures must be j u s t i f i e d . The assumption i s that e q u a l i t y needs no reasons, only i n e q u a l i t y does so; that uniformity, r e g u l a r i t y , s i m i l a r i t y , sym- metry...need not be s p e c i a l l y accounted f o r , whereas di f f e r e n c e s , unsystematic behaviour, change i n conduct, need explanation and, as a r u l e , j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I f I have a cake and there are ten persons among whom I wish to divide i t , then i f I give exactly one tenth to each, t h i s w i l l not, at any rate auto- m a t i c a l l y , c a l l f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; whereas i f I depart from t h i s p r i n c i p l e of equal d i v i s i o n I am expected to produce a s p e c i a l reason. I t i s some sense of t h i s , however l a t e n t , that makes equality an i d e a l which has never seemed i n t r i n s i c a l l y eccentric.. . 1 2 5 This assumption has been c r i t i c i z e d on the ground that any d i s t r i b u t i o n requires j u s t i f i c a t i o n : equal treatment i s just as l i a b l e to be u n f a i r as unequal treatment, and i n many cases a form of treatment can be described as both equal and unequal (depending upon the point of view). Lyons claims that what i s needed i s a "doctrine of natural kinds", a s s e r t i n g that h i s argument "has not been against such a postulate but against attempts to do without i t — b y s u b s t i t u t i n g a presumption of equal entitlement supposedly derivable s o l e l y from the reasonableness of t r e a t i n g s i m i l a r cases s i m i l a r l y . 126 T h i s i s not enough," he concludes. Stone has expressed the case f o r presuming equality i n more q u a l i f i e d terms. He has formulated a number of "quasi-absolute precepts of j u s t i c e " , the f i f t h of which i s the formal equality p r i n c i p l e . He says that while i t cannot be considered absolute, "e q u a l i t y remains a general guiding p r i n c i p l e , h5 properly to be departed from where obviously inappropriate or i n c o n f l i c t with other values to which j u s t i c e must give p r i o r i t y i n the given s i t u a t i o n . " This i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y weaker than B e r l i n ' s statement, and suggests another reason f o r the presumption of equality: i t s convenience. I f i t i s postulated as a standard, not n e c e s s a r i l y f or attainment but simply f o r reference, i t can be used to appreciate the r e l a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e of the various treatments p o s s i b l e . I t i s the most convenient across-the-board norm, s i m i l a r to the s t i p u l a t i o n " a l l other things equal" that i s so frequently used i n the reasoning process. In any case, the c r i t e r i a of need, merit, natural a b i l i t y and u t i l i t y might be more n a t u r a l l y regarded as r e l a t e d to i n e q u a l i t y rather than to equ a l i t y . There are obvious di f f e r e n c e s among men regarding the f i r s t three to j u s t i f y countless departures from the norm, and a l l four enter i n t o every phase of d a i l y l i f e . There are c e r t a i n respects, however, i n which they are open to considerations of e q u a l i t y . We have already seen that, although needs can vary widely from person to person (even i f one speaks only of " l e g i t i m a t e " needs, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g them from wants), they are connected with equality i n s o f a r as they are basic or b i o l o g i c a l . A l l persons have equal needs up to a point; and these are recognized when s o c i e t i e s take a c t i o n to ensure that everyone enjoys a c e r t a i n minimum standard of l i v i n g . A f t e r t h i s , apparently, needs become desires; i . e . , once one i s fed and clothed, etc., one can no longer speak of needing various commodities, such as new cars, but can only say that one wants them. Nevertheless, an unequal need from one viewpoint can be equal from another. Vlastos* example of the man being hunted by the New York crime syndicate i s relevant: although the man required a greater number of p o l i c e - men to protect him that the average c i t i z e n , the amount of pr o t e c t i o n that k6 they both enjoyed was roughly s i m i l a r . Both needed t h e i r l i v e s protected; 128 both received that p r o t e c t i o n . Raphael pursues a s i m i l a r l i n e of argument with regard to the handicapped, the aged, et a l . Our unequal (greater) p r o v i s i o n of care f o r them i s an attempt to reduce the e x i s t i n g i n e q u a l i t y ; we want, so f a r as we can, to bring them to a l e v e l of equ a l i t y with others i n capacity to enjoy t h e i r l i v e s . Thus the basi s of the claim of s p e c i a l need i s r e a l l y a recognition of the claim to equality.129 Thus when need i s r e l a t e d to a state of well-being, i n e q u a l i t i e s can a c t u a l l y become e q u a l i t i e s . At f i r s t glance i t might appear that the same kind of reasoning could make d i s t r i b u t i o n according to merit e g a l i t a r i a n , i n that everyone would equally get what he deserves. But t h i s type of equality i s d i f f e r e n t from the previous, because i n the case of need, there was a f i n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of a good (well-being) which could be sa i d to be equal. There i s no such equality i n the case of merit. The only sort of equality found here occurs under conditions of co r r e c t i v e j u s t i c e , where in j u r e d persons are compen- 130 sated f o r losses they have sustained at the hands of other persons. Concerning natural capacity, the usual emphasis i s on di f f e r e n c e s which, i f encouraged, lead to i n e q u a l i t i e s . Raphael argues, however, that d i s - t r i b u t i n g goods according to tal e n t i s i n keeping with e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s i n s o f a r as people receive the means to a present enjoyment, i . e . , to the p o t e n t i a l exercise of t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s . There are diff e r e n c e s , but not i n e q u a l i t i e s , both i n the early t r a i n i n g and i n the careers for which people become q u a l i f i e d . Thus a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d d i s t r i b u t i o n once again turns out to be an equality i n disguise, as men obtain equal amounts of pleasure from 131 being allowed to develop and use t h e i r natural a b i l i t i e s . ^ The problems here are ( i ) that not everyone i s permitted to exercise h i s t a l e n t s , and ( i i ) that not everyone i s happy with the t a l e n t s that he has, or at l e a s t with those that have been chosen to be developed and applied to a career. 47 The connection between equality and natural capacity, then i s rather tenuous with respect to d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . The fourth f a c t o r , u t i l i t y , can also be l i n k e d with equality i n a s - much as i t c a l l s f o r maximization of t o t a l welfare. The formula "the greatest good f or the greatest number" has e g a l i t a r i a n i m p l i c a t i o n s , and i f the goods produced are public b e n e f i t s , such as increased supplies of food or advances i n medicine, every person w i l l b e n e f i t . These be n e f i t s , however, are i n d i r e c t ; the p r i n c i p l e of u t i l i t y i s centred on maximizing 1 3 2 welfare rather than on apportioning i t f a i r l y (or any way at a l l ) . These four considerations a l l serve as c r i t e r i a of d i s t r i b u t i o n i n various notions of j u s t i c e . Given the value of human well-being and the capacity of men to choose between r i g h t and wrong, d i v i s i o n of s o c i a l goods according to need, merit, and/or a b i l i t y can reasonably be seen as manifes- t a t i o n s of justicew A just s o c i a l order w i l l f u l f i l l the needs of i t s members (up to a c e r t a i n minimum, at l e a s t ) ; i t w i l l reward i t s members for choosing to behave w e l l , rather than poorly; i t w i l l give i t s members what they need to develop t h e i r p o t e n t i a l i t i e s and pursue t h e i r goals (as far as t h i s i s p o s s i b l e ) . Although u t i l i t y i s concerned with welfare, i t i s so only i n an aggregative sense, and i s therefore not a part of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . A l l of these f a c t o r s allow f o r the recognition of human d i f f e r e n c e s . E q u a l i t y of Opportunity There i s one good, however, which i s widely thought to be subject to equal d i s t r i b u t i o n , and that i s opportunity. Everyone should have an equal chance to become what he might, f o r better or worse. No one should have an u n f a i r advantage, that i s , an advantage unrelated to what i s required for the r o l e one i s attempting to f i l l . I f a prospective teacher has a higher I.Q. than another, i t i s a f a i r advantage, but i f he has a r e l a t i v e 48 on the s e l e c t i o n committee who w i l l use h i s influence, i t i s an u n f a i r advantage. The common metaphor i s that of a r a c e — i t i s only f a i r that everyone s t a r t at the same place. Everyone w i l l f i n i s h according to h i s desert, which i s based on the q u a l i t y ( a t h l e t i c prowess) relevant to the a c t i v i t y (the r a c e ) . This has generally been considered the basis of the l i b e r a l conception of j u s t i c e — e q u a l opportunity plus d e s e r t — a n d i s the usual a l t e r n a t i v e to the s o c i a l i s t i d e a l of e q u a l i t y of r e s u l t . E q u a lity of opportunity has been attacked on two grounds. The f i r s t centres on i t s i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y . I t i s impossible f o r everyone to s t a r t o f f equally, i f only because people are d i f f e r e n t . Much i s made of the f a c t s that c h i l d r e n are bound to be r a i s e d unequally as long as they have parents who can give them varying amounts of t r a i n i n g , a f f e c t i o n , goods, etc., and that they w i l l obtain further advantages when these parents use t h e i r influence on t h e i r children's behalf l a t e r i n l i f e . Even i f a l l c h i l d r e n were taken from t h e i r parents at b i r t h , they would s t i l l have d i f f e r e n t 134 experiences. The argument can be taken further, but t h i s seems s u f f i c i e n t . The problem with t h i s type of reasoning i s that i t assumes that there are people who demand absolute equality, whereas i n fact they only want some- thing w i t h i n reason. The idea i s to have people obtain jobs, e t c . because they have the relevant q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , because they are better suited than anyone e l s e — n o t to seize i n f a n t s at b i r t h or manufacture new generations from t e s t tubes. Charvet takes a s o c i o p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e to i t s " l o g i c a l conclusion" and c r i t i c i z e s i t as incoherent—thereby missing the whole point. His c r i t i c i s m does show, however, that there are d i f f i c u l t i e s i n implementing the notion, mainly because there i s no such thing as s t r i c t e q u a l i t y of opportunity. This means that one cannot use i t i n any s t r i c t , r e gulative sense—the s p i r i t cannot be s a c r i f i c e d to r i g i d l e g i s l a t i v e decree without undermining i t and u l t i m a t e l y reducing i t to absurdity. The second attack focuses more properly on the p r i n c i p l e ' s a n t i - e g a l i t a r i a n nature; i t gives men the equal opportunity to become as unequal 49 as they can. I t r e i n f o r c e s competitiveness and hierarchy, and feeds on men's baser impulses, such as ambition and s e l f i s h n e s s ; instead of demonstrating to men how a l i k e they are and how much they have i n common, 135 the p r i n c i p l e emphasizes t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s and f o s t e r s dissensus. Many of these c r i t i c i s m s appear v a l i d . However, i t might be going a l i t t l e too f a r to deny the connection between the equal opportunity p r i n c i p l e and the i d e a l of eq u a l i t y . Inconsistency i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of most concepts; i t i s mistaken, I think, to condem equal opportunity as contrary to the s p i r i t of egalitarianism merely because i t does not equalize conditions. I t i s a legitimate a p p l i c a t i o n of the equality p r i n c i p l e to a p a r t i c u l a r , 136 delimited area of l i f e and should be recognized as such. Corrective J u s t i c e F i n a l l y , I have already r e f e r r e d to the r e l a t i o n between equality and co r r e c t i v e j u s t i c e ; the o r i g i n a l idea was to compensate i n j u r e d people f o r losses they had sustained at the hands o f persons (thus: l e g a l damages) or of fate (thus: programmes for the handicapped). The notion has had an e f f e c t on modern s o c i a l thought; l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s have combined i t with ^the idea of equality of opportunity, so that a l l sorts of handicaps, particu- 137 l a r l y environmental, are to be compensated f o r . Another, but not neces- s a r i l y more recent, version c a l l s f o r compensation f o r the fa c t that some people are simply not as talented as others, and so are unable to acquire 138 the good things of l i f e . The l a t t e r can be regarded as complementary to the idea of maximal equal s a t i s f a c t i o n of need: where i t i s assumed that people's needs should be s a t i s f i e d , the imbalance created by the workings of society must be corrected, as a matter of j u s t i c e . J u s t i c e as Procedure and J u s t i c e as Result The second major element of j u s t i c e that i s relevant to the equality p r i n c i p l e has been discussed, i . e . , r u l e s . The focus here i s on procedure, 50 rather than on the resultant d i s t r i b u t i o n . Thus i t i s held that every e f f o r t should be made to make good laws, but that the important thing i s that they be i m p a r t i a l l y applied. "Indeed, i t might be s a i d that to apply a law j u s t l y to d i f f e r e n t cases i s simply to take s e r i o u s l y the a s s e r t i o n that what i s to be applied i n d i f f e r e n t cases i s the same general r u l e , 139 without prejudice, or caprice." This i s what i s meant by "eq u a l i t y before the law." The maxim i s formal, i n that i t does not t e l l us which cases are d i f f e r e n t and which are a l i k e ; yet, as Beardsley has pointed out, t h i s does not render the i n j u n c t i o n n u l l . He goes on to say with B e r l i n that equal treatment i s a basic assumption i n every a c t i v i t y i n v o l v i n g r u l e s : "There i s , s t r i c t l y speaking, no (moral) o b l i g a t i o n to tr e a t people equally, but only a ( l o g i c a l ) requirement to supply a good reason for 140 t r e a t i n g people unequally." To say that i t i s a " l o g i c a l requirement" i s to overstate the case; however, i f there i s to be a r u l e f o r making r u l e s , i t makes sense to place the burden of proof on those who c a l l f o r unequal treatment. The presumption of equality and the notion of i m p a r t i a l i t y are not meaningless, but they are not strong and demanding e i t h e r . The same can be sa i d of other procedural r u l e s . Benn's proposal of the equal consideration of i n t e r e s t s and Barry's advocacy of equal opportunity, f o r example, are open to c r i t i c i s m f o r t h e i r formality: they are not incompatible with great i n e q u a l i t i e s . L i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s have always been subject to t h i s kind of attack: Rawls' idea of j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s has s i m i l a r l y been c r i t i c i z e d f o r i t s f a i l u r e to take need i n t o account. I am not c e r t a i n that U t i l i t a r i a n ." thinkers were as instrumental as Chapman believes i n bringing considerations of need i n t o the concept of j u s t i c e ; however, he i s correct i n s t r e s s i n g 141 t h e i r concern with the f i n a l r e s u l t rather than the s o c i a l process i t s e l f . In any case, Rawls now emphasizes both procedure and f i n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n i n h i s theory of j u s t i c e — t h e l a t t e r as a c o r r e c t i v e or a check. This 51 involves a sort of "double eq u a l i t y " which has been c r i t i c i z e d from a l l sides, but which can be commended at l e a s t f o r i t s r e l a t i v e moderation. The two p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e are: 1. "Each person i s to have an equal r i g h t to the most extensive t o t a l system of equal basic l i b e r t i e s compatible with a s i m i l a r system o f l i b e r t y f o r a l l . " 2. " S o c i a l and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the l e a s t advantaged, consistent with the just savings p r i n c i p l e , and (b) attached to o f f i c e s and p o s i t i o n s open to a l l under conditions of f a i r e q u a l ity of opportunity. 1 h-2 Thus Rawls attempts to combine the values of l i b e r t y , equality, and p u b l i c welfare i n a single conception. He elaborates the two p r i n c i p l e s and establishes p r i o r i t i e s , but for our purposes i t w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to state h i s "general conception" of j u s t i c e : A l l s o c i a l primary g o o d s — l i b e r t y and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of s e l f - r e s p e c t — are to be d i s t r i b u t e d equally unless an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of any or a l l of those goods i s to the advantage of the l e a s t favored.1^3 I t can be seen that Rawls 1 "check" i s more than the usual p r o v i s i o n f o r equity, i n that i t a c t u a l l y governs the d i s t r i b u t i o n of goods. Hence eq u a l i t y i s a f a c t o r at both the beginning (equal r i g h t s to l i b e r t y ) and the end (the l e a s t w ell o f f must benefit from any i n e q u a l i t i e s . ) I t w i l l be noted that he does not s t i p u l a t e the amount of benefit that i s to accrue to the l e a s t favoured v i s - a - v i s the most favoured. By ."advantage" Rawls simply means, I believe, that the l e a s t favoured receive more than he would have i f the i n e q u a l i t y had not been introduced. There i s no notion of r e l a t i v e advantage by which one might i n s i s t that the l e a s t favoured receive an equal share of any b e n e f i t s a r i s i n g from an i n e q u a l i t y , or even a s i g n i f i c a n t share. 52 For example, suppose there are 100 u n i t s to be divided among f i v e men: the equal d i s t r i b u t i o n i s 20 apiece. But suppose more u n i t s could be created i f the d i v i s i o n s were unequal, so that 200 u n i t s were produced. Rawls' p r i n c i p l e would j u s t i f y a d i s t r i b u t i o n of 80 u n i t s for one man, 33 u n i t s for three others, and 21 f o r the l e a s t advantaged. Assuming that they a l l contributed to the increase through t h e i r (roughly equal) e f f o r t s , i t does not seem just that one man's good increases hO0 per cent while another's increases only 5 per cent, even i f i t was the t a l e n t of the former that was p r i m a r i l y responsible. The l a t t e r gains i n absolute terms, but h i s r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n has slipped, and so i n a sense the i n e q u a l i t y was to h i s disadvantage. This i s not to say that a l l d i s t r i b u t i o n s should be e q u a l — o n l y that the formula can j u s t i f y greater i n e q u a l i t i e s than i t might at f i r s t seem. Nonetheless, Rawls' approach i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n that i t i s one of the few attempts to combine the l i b e r a l and s o c i a l i s t concep- t i o n s of equality i n one theory of j u s t i c e . The Negative Approach to E q u a l i t y Up to t h i s point I have dealt \tfith j u s t i c e and e q u a l i t y i n t h e i r p o s i t i v e senses. I t has been suggested, however, that these t o p i c s are more f r u i t f u l l y approached from a negative point of view. Thus j u s t i c e i s seen to consist i n the c o r r e c t i o n of i n j u s t i c e : one " i s not dealing with any general and p o s i t i v e i d e a l , but with the law, e i t h e r as i t i s or as i t might 1¥+ be i f some rather s p e c i f i c i n j u s t i c e were removed or a l l e v i a t e d . " Benn and Peters have urged the adoption of a s i m i l a r approach to equality: E g a l i t a r i a n s have always been concerned to deny the legitimacy of c e r t a i n sorts of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n r e s t i n g on some given d i f f e r e n c e s , i . e . , they have challenged established c r i t e r i a as unreasonable, and i r r e l e v a n t to the purposes f o r which they were employed. Claims to e q u a l i t y are thus, i n a sense, always negative, deny- ing the p r o p r i e t y of c e r t a i n e x i s t i n g inequalities. 1 ^ 5 53 S a r t o r i makes the same p o i n t : the p r i n c i p l e o f " t h e r i g h t man i n the r i g h t p l a c e " , he says, i s an i d e a l t h a t i s never r e a l i z e d , s ince i n i t s s tead what we f i n d o n l y too o f t e n i s the p r i v i l e g e d man i n a p r i v i l e g e d p l a c e . And t h i s i s where the demand f o r e q u a l i t y a c t u a l l y and r i g h t l y s t a r t s . The c la im f o r e q u a l i t y i s a p r o t e s t aga ins t u n j u s t , undeserved, and u n j u s t i f i e d i n e q u a l i t i e s . For h i e r a r c h i e s o f wor th and a b i l i t y never s a t i s f a c t o r i l y correspond t o e f f e c t i v e . h i e r a r c h i e s o f p o w e r . . . . E q u a l i t y i s thus a p r o t e s t - i d e a l , a symbol o f man's r e v o l t aga ins t chance f o r t u i t o u s d i s p a r i t y , u n j u s t power, c r y s t a l l i z e d p r i v i l e g e . 1 4 6 There are advantages i n t h i s " c o r r e c t i v e j u s t i c e " type o f approach. I t i s eas ie r t o c r i t i c i z e e x i s t i n g p o l i c i e s and programmes than i t i s t o devise new ones i n accordance w i t h a genera l i d e a l . And one i s spared the d i f f i c u l t y o f defending newly c rea ted p o l i c i e s , which are o f t e n sub jec t t o c r i t i c i s m as severe as t h a t o f the o l d ones. T h i r d l y , the negat ive approach has immediate p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s : i t can be a p p l i e d t o any s i t u a t i o n s imply by demanding t h a t i n e q u a l i t i e s be j u s t i f i e d . I f they cannot , they are u n j u s t and ought t o be e l i m i n a t e d . F i n a l l y , the nega t i ve approach i s the one t h a t i s a c t u a l l y used i n the everyday w o r l d . People do not u s u a l l y propose e q u a l i t i e s , but c a l l f o r the removal o f i n e q u a l i t i e s . The advantages are not s u r p r i s i n g i f one bears i n mind t h a t i n e q u a l i t y " i s not conven t iona l but n a t u r a l : i t accords w i t h the na tu re o f men, who d i f f e r p ro found ly i n i n t e l l i g e n c e , t a l e n t , and v i r t u e ; and i t accords w i t h 147 the na tu re o f t h i n g s , which r e q u i r e h i e r a r c h y and degree . " D i v e r s i t y i s a c o n d i t i o n o f l i f e , and whatever e q u a l i t y can be found i s almost always l i a b l e t o be an i n e q u a l i t y when looked a t f rom a d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e . Thus Benn and Pe te rs conclude t h a t : as f a s t as we e l i m i n a t e d i s t i n c t i o n s we crea te new o n e s — t h e d i f f e r e n c e be ing t h a t the one we d i s c a r d we cons ider u n j u s t i f i a b l e , w h i l e the ones we c rea te seem reasonab le . 5 4 I f we can be sa i d to make progress i n t h i s matter, i t i s by c r i t i c i z i n g e x i s t i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s , by creating new ones that conditions seem to j u s t i f y , as well as eliminating the ones they do not; and t h i s i s rather d i f f e r e n t from aiming at a theor- e t i c a l and u n i v e r s a l i d e a l equality, within which a l l the diff e r e n c e s i n treatment we should wish to preserve are somehow recon- c i l e d . 1 4 8 There i s a good deal of t r u t h i n what they say; the idea of eliminating i n e q u a l i t i e s has c e r t a i n l y played a c e n t r a l r o l e i n e g a l i t a r i a n thought and p r a c t i c e . But t h i s does not mean that the equality p r i n c i p l e has no p o s i t i v e content. S a r t o r i contends that "As an i d e a l expressing a protest, equality i s i n t e l l i g i b l e and appealing; as an i d e a l expressing p r o p o s a l s — a s a con- 1 4 9 s t r u c t i v e i d e a l — i t i s not." I would say that the idea has two legitimate aspects, one of which i s more complex than the other. Complexity, however, does not seem to constitute s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r scrapping or ignoring an important element. The pursuit of j u s t i c e and of equality as d e f i n i t e i d e a l s may be open to c r i t i c i s m , but one can hardly say that they do not ex i s t i n any i n t e l l i g i b l e form. Raphael has stated t h e i r case w e l l : I t i s not true that the claim of j u s t i c e f o r equal treatment ( i n the absence of relevant reasons f o r discrimination) i s a purely formal claim of r a t i o n a l i t y or consistency, nor that i t i s a purely negative claim f o r the removal of a r b i t - rary i n e q u a l i t i e s . I t does include both of these, but i n a d d i t i o n i t i s substan- t i v e and p o s i t i v e , r e l a t i n g to a combina- t i o n of q u a l i t i e s possessed by a l l human beings and to a measure of equal s a t i s - f a c t i o n s that are considered due to them i n the l i g h t of t h e i r possession of common human q u a l i t i e s . 1 5 0 Men should be treated equally on c e r t a i n occasions, then, as a matter of j u s t i c e , which "presupposes a p a r t i c u l a r kind of evaluation of human beings as persons, and... has regard to what they themselves value and disvalue as 1 5 1 b e n e f i t s and burdens." 55 The Concept of J u s t i c e J u s t i c e i s concerned with human well-being and the manner i n which goods are apportioned. We have seen that a number of c r i t e r i a present themselves when these kinds of questions a r i s e , and that there i s no easy way to determine which i s to be brought to bear i n concrete s i t u a t i o n s , much l e s s which one comprises the essence of j u s t i c e . Considerations of equality, merit, need, a b i l i t y , i m p a r t i a l i t y , p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y , and f a i r n e s s (as r e c i p - r o c i t y ) run a l l through the concept and through each other as w e l l . I f i n d Raphael's s t a t e m e n t — " i f the s p e c i a l case of desert i s subtracted, f a i r n e s s — *152 / " i . e . , d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e / means equality " — a s o v e r s i m p l i f i e d as the opposite notion that j u s t i c e means desert. I t i s impossible to i s o l a t e a coherent conception of e g a l i t a r i a n j u s t i c e , i f by that term one hopes to include a l l the e q u a l i t i e s that inhere i n the concept. I t i s more than a matter of addi t i o n and subtraction; nevertheless, we can say that the p r i n c i p l e of equality i s a legitimate constituent element of the idea of j u s t i c e . CHAPTER V EQUALITY AND SOCIETY J u s t i c e , E q u a l i t y and P u b l i c P o l i c y I t i s apparent that j u s t i c e i s a complex a f f a i r ; nonetheless, i t stands as the most promising l i n e of in q u i r y with regard to matters of equality. J u s t i c e regulates human conduct i n a wide v a r i e t y of p a r t i c u l a r circumstances. For our purposes, i t can be sa i d to consist of a system of ru l e s , both general and s p e c i f i c , e x p l i c i t and i m p l i c i t , which inform and modify one another i n concrete s i t u a t i o n s of procedure or d i s t r i b u t i o n , according to what i s f a i r or u n f a i r (and to a l e s s e r extent, according to what i s r i g h t or wrong, good or bad). The question of when to t r e a t people equally or unequally must be answered i n terms of j u s t i c e . I t lends substance to the p r i n c i p l e of equality, and the idea of e q u a l i t y — t h a t which i s espoused by e g a l i t a r i a n s — i s , i n f a c t , some form or other of e g a l i t a r i a n j u s t i c e : that i s to say, a conception of j u s t i c e that stresses more, rather than l e s s , e q u a lity of treatment. Thus when we turn to the r o l e that equality does and should play i n society, i n pu b l i c a f f a i r s , we must determine what i s j u s t . We have seen that various formulae have been advanced on behalf of equality that deal, d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , with what i s j u s t . Hartvproposes an equal r i g h t to freedom, and Brown an equal r i g h t to protection of one's moral i n t e r e s t s , person, and estate. Gewirth has formulated a P r i n c i p l e of Categorial Consistency which gives r i s e to equal r i g h t s to freedom and w e l l - being, while Rawls suggests two p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , complete with p r i o r i t i e s , 56 57 that combine the notions of equal freedom, equal opportunity, and r e d i s - t r i b u t i o n to the l e a s t advantaged. Even Mortimore's r u l e of ega l i t a r i a n i s m that any i n e q u a l i t y should be permissible only to the extent that i t leads to some greater equality of o v e r a l l good, i s presumably based on some sort of j u s t i c e . Not a l l of these formulae pretend to embrace a l l of the e g a l i t a r i a n i d e a l or a l l of j u s t i c e . But i t should be stressed that no simple r u l e can do so. The concepts of r i g h t s , j u s t i c e , and equality a l l demand a 153 balancing of s h i f t i n g c r i t e r i a and circumstances. A l l r i g h t s are prima f a c i e ; a l l j u s t i c e i s a matter of weighing competing claims and deciding which are relevant; every equality i s subject to displacement by another equality or a more important i n e q u a l i t y , and i s i t s e l f an i n - equality from a d i f f e r e n t perspective. When dealing with the concept or the i d e a l of equality, then, we are nec e s s a r i l y concerned with e q u a l i t i e s . I t i s much too vague to r e f e r to equal treatment; instead we must speak of equality before the law, equality of opportunity, and equality of d i s t r i b u t i o n , or r e s u l t . Each i s a v a l i d and d i s t i n c t p r i n c i p l e with i t s own s p e c i a l sense of the term "e q u a l i t y " . The three are not ne c e s s a r i l y incompatible, i n that they can a l l operate simultaneously within a given society, but they c e r t a i n l y do not e n t a i l or imply one another. In f a c t , as we have seen, equality of d i s t r i b u t i o n , or r e s u l t , can generally be viewed as a modification of the others, when they are being applied to the same good. For instance, equality before the law might seem to d i c t a t e that X and Y pay the same income tax, or at l e a s t pay at the same rate, even though X makes ten times the amount that Y makes. These sorts of eq u a l i t y are modified by the idea of equal d i s t r i b u t i o n , so that a progressive tax i s i n s t i t u t e d which y i e l d s unequal r e s u l t s . (X pays much more than Y, absolutely and p r o p o r t i o n a l l y ) . Nevertheless, the p r i n c i p l e of equality 58 before the law i s not done away with, f o r X and Y are s t i l l equally subject to the tax law which assigns them t h e i r categories, and equally subject to punishment f o r f a i l u r e to comply with i t . In a d d i t i o n i t can be pointed out that they are being treated equally i n that they are both being taxed according to t h e i r (unequal) c a p a c i t i e s to pay. Thus the p r i n c i p l e s of equality before the law and equal d i s t r i b u t i o n do not ne c e s s a r i l y cancel one another out, although t h i s appears to be the case i f one looks at a c e r t a i n set of r e s u l t s . Another kind of d i f f i c u l t y i s found when e q u a l i t i e s appear to c o n f l i c t over a p a r t i c u l a r good, when a c t u a l l y two d i s t i n c t goods are involved. For example, there can be equal opportunity to f i l l c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n s , i . e . , to r i s e i n a s o c i a l hierarchy, and at the same time be equality of r e s u l t i n the sense that, say, the s a l a r i e s belonging to those p o s i t i o n s might be approximately equal. The problem a r i s e s i n the confusion of job and salary; when they are i n c o r r e c t l y treated as a single good, equal opportunity seems to be (and i s ) incompatible with equal r e s u l t . This i s not to say that a l l e q u a l i t i e s are ul t i m a t e l y resolvable. In many cases we simply must choose the one which i s appropriate to the c o n t e x t — i . e . , most i n l i n e with other values. There are s i t u a t i o n s i n which equality of any type i s unsuitable; t h i s f a c t should be recognized. Often i t i s not. Michael Young, f o r instance, believes that egalitarianism i s a c t u a l l y concerned with human uniqueness, so that i n a world with a p l u r a l i s t i c value system, "the a n t i - t h e s i s of i n e q u a l i t y would not be equality but d i f f e r e n c e . " Statements of t h i s nature, I am sure, are what prompts Oppenheim to advocate that equality be used only as a de s c r i p t i v e concept. I t i s one thing to r e a l i z e that equality i s a moral impulse; i t i s quite another to i n s i s t that i t i s the only one i n town, that i t i s i n keeping with a l l that i s good and proper. I t i s , a f t e r a l l , a s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , and philosophic concept, subject to approximately the same l i m i t a t i o n s as a l l the others. When applying i t to 59 s o c i a l issues, then, i t must be kept i n mind that i t i s varied and does not always work i n the same manner i n each s i t u a t i o n . Daniel B e l l expresses s i m i l a r f e e l i n g s with regard to i n e q u a l i t y : h i s statement i s well suited to the present t o p i c : The d i f f i c u l t y with much of t h i s discussion i s that i n e q u a l i t y has been considered as a unitary circumstance, and a single p r i n c i p l e the measure of i t s redress / i . e . , fairness7, whereas i n s o c i o l o g i c a l f a c t there are d i f f - erent kinds of i n e q u a l i t y . The problem i s n o ^ e i t h e r / o r but what kinds of i n e q u a l i t y lead to what kinds of s o c i a l and moral d i f f - erences. There are, we know, d i f f e r e n t kinds of i n e q u a l i t y — d i f f e r e n c e s i n income and wealth, i n status, power, opportunity (occupational or s o c i a l ) , education, serv- i c e s , and the l i k e . There i s not one scale but many and the i n e q u a l i t i e s i n one scale are not coupled completely with i n e q u a l i t y i n every other.155 We have only to substitute the word " e q u a l i t y " to understand the e g a l i t a r i a n approach to soci e t y . There are, of course, those who purport to be e g a l i t a r i a n s and cause no end of d i f f i c u l t y through t h e i r misunderstanding and misuse of the equality p r i n c i p l e . Thus the "a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n " programmes of the United States have been used i n many instances to i n s t i t u t e not only p r e f e r e n t i a l 156 treatment but quotas on behalf of m i n o r i t i e s . Seabury has noted that " i n the current view, equality of opportunity can only be deemed t r u l y equal i f i n i t s r e s u l t s i t places a proportional representation of each b i o l o g i c a l category / i . e . , race, sex, and age7 i n the p o s i t i o n s of e f f e c t i v e status 157 within every major i n s t i t u t i o n . " Now i t i s obvious that such an outlook i s a misuse of the equal opportunity p r i n c i p l e ; however, a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n might not ne c e s s a r i l y be incompatible with the idea of equal r e s u l t . I t might be j u s t i f i e d under the notion of compensatory j u s t i c e — c e r t a i n groups are thought to be undeservedly disadvantaged or "needy", so temporary a c t i o n should be taken to bring them up to an equal l e v e l of well-being with other 60 Americans. At f i r s t glance, t h i s i s a p l a u s i b l e case; further i n q u i r y , however, uncovers problems. F i r s t l y , i t i s pointed out that "quotas, once estab- l i s h e d as i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r a c t i c e , prove as vigorously able to perpetuate themselves as do Texas o i l - d e p l e t i o n allowances, and for the very same 158 reason." I t i s not a matter of introducing a temporary i n e q u a l i t y i n the i n t e r e s t of a greater equality; there i s no guarantee that the i n - equality could be phased out. Secondly, qixotas are u n f a i r to those who are s l i g h t l y more q u a l i f i e d f o r p o s i t i o n s than are the persons who receive them because of race, etc. I t can be said that the i n j u s t i c e i s temporary, etc., but again, t h i s i s probably not true. F i n a l l y , and most important, quotas are i n e g a l i t a r i a n . Theyselect c e r t a i n groups f o r ben e f i t s and not others. There does not seem to be any cle a r reason why a poor black person who has been systematically denied opportunities should be preferred to a poor white person who has been denied them.-. The i n j u s t i c e i s experienced by both; j u s t i c e should consist i n both being given opportunities, or whatever good i s being d i s t r i b u t e d . The c r i t e r i a of race, sex, and age are not a r b i t r a r y , and compensation i s not unreasonable to a degree. But equality of r e s u l t or of condition does not consist i n s e l e c t i n g some disadvantaged persons over others, on a group basis, f o r compensation. Such p o l i c i e s instead conduce to the establishment of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t groups who w i l l pursue t h e i r i n t e r e s t s at the expense of 159 the common good which i s c e n t r a l to the e g a l i t a r i a n t h e s i s . When benefits are extended to a l l who need them i n the form of education, medical treatment, etc., i t i s true that " e q u a l i z a t i o n of r e s u l t s provides the con- d i t i o n s that make possible a greater measure of equality o f opportunity", so that they "come together as a l t e r n a t i v e or complementary means to the 160 same end—the achievement of j u s t i c e i n determining f i t n e s s and place." 61 But a s e l e c t i v e quota system does not do t h i s ; i t denies, or at l e a s t ignores, the e g a l i t a r i a n e t h i c . Such p o l i c i e s can be c r i t i c i z e d , then, 161 on grounds of u t i l i t y , f a i r n e s s , and equa l i t y . Another area of contemporary concern i s education. Insofar as educa- t i o n i s a means to some future goal, i t should be equal i n the sense that each person should be enabled to develop h i s p o t e n t i a l . We have already seen that there are p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s here (p. 46); nevertheless, some type of equal treatment i s c l e a r l y c a l l e d f o r . Students have an equal claim to the books, f a c i l i t i e s , and teacher a t t e n t i o n that w i l l enable them to r e a l i z e t h e i r p o t e n t i a l . This claim does not have to be e x e r c i s e d — some students do not want the b e n e f i t s of education. Nor does i t always have to be recognized—there are competing claims, such as those of u t i l i t y : i n a poor society, there might be a s c a r c i t y of resources, so that only some students can receive the type of education they d e s i r e . The claim to educa- t i o n i s a strong one, however, and i s generally recognized under the p r i n c i p l e of equal opportunity. Raphael has also pointed out that education can be an end i n i t s e l f — i t i s a source of enjoyment and s a t i s f a c t i o n , and i s a condition under 162 which people l i v e s i g n i f i c a n t parts of t h e i r l i v e s . Consequently, there i s a claim to equal treatment on grounds of fa i r n e s s ; the relevant equality-/ here i s one of r e s u l t . The idea i s that students i n p u b l i c l y supported schools should be educated under approximately equal conditions. I t i s wrong that one high school should have, say, double the per ca p i t a expen- ditures of another i n the same c i t y ; I think t h i s can also be extended beyond municipal boundaries to a whole country. This i s presently a matter of controversy i n the U.S., not only because of the equaliz a t i o n aspects but because of the c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l that would be necessary to implement 163 such a scheme. Inasmuch as education i s an obvious good that i s supplied 62 by the state, though, there i s a strong claim to equal access to i t . A t h i r d claim has recently been made on behalf of "open admissions" 164 to u n i v e r s i t i e s . U n i v e r s i t y degrees are seen as t i c k e t s to careers and economic well-being, and so the equal opportunity p r i n c i p l e i s said to j u s t i f y the elimination of entrance q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . This question alone i s d i f f i c u l t enough: the issue at hand, however, i s even more complicated. The emphasis apparently i s on the degree more than on the education i t s e l f , so that what i s desired i s a r e s u l t rather than an opportunity. Granted, the degree gives one further opportunities. But within the context of education, i t i s an equal r e s u l t that i s sought. I s h a l l deal f i r s t l y with the more straightforward matter of open admissions as equal opportunity. The p r i n c i p l e j u s t i f i e s them and, i n f a c t , many American state u n i v e r s i t i e s have a p o l i c y of r e l a t i v e l y open admissions ( i . e . , they admit anyone who has a high school degree). Many students who would not have been accepted by schools with more stringent requirements f a i l during t h e i r f i r s t or second years. They are given the opportunity, and are unable to take advantage of i t . This i s simple enough. Some states, however, cannot a f f o r d to o f f e r education to thousands of students who are destined to f a i l . This i s e s p e c i a l l y problematic when high school standards within those states are uneven, so that some students are not prepared at a l l for formal education beyond what i s b a s i c . Thus there are good reasons to l i m i t admissions i n many states on grounds of u t i l i t y . In e f f e c t what they do i s give everyone equal access to education, but e s t a b l i s h a c u t o f f point before students get to the u n i v e r s i t y l e v e l . This seems legi t i m a t e , f o r although t e r t i a r y education i s an opportunity, i t i s so only i n the sense that a p a r t i c u l a r job constitutes an opportunity for a s i m i l a r but higher ranking one. Jobs are not given out to everyone who wants them merely because they a f f o r d opportunities for future goods. I t i s the same with higher education: the opportunity consists i n the equal chance to compete 63 f o r p o s i t i o n s based on c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a relevant to the nature of the function involved. Where the number of p o s i t i o n s i s unlimited, and there are no other reasons for l i m i t i n g enrolment, the equal opportunity p r i n - c i p l e requires open admissions; otherwise i t only means that a reasonable cu t o f f point and t e s t i n g procedure be used i n determining who i s to receive higher education and who i s not. Now I have mentioned that frequently i t i s the degree, rather than admittance to the u n i v e r s i t y , that i s desired. The object of p u r s u i t , then, i s a matter of equal r e s u l t , not opportunity. Since most u n q u a l i f i e d stu- dents cannot handle the curriculum, s p e c i a l remedial programmes have been i n s t i t u t e d to give students the necessary s k i l l s f o r higher education. This does not seem unreasonable i n p r i n c i p l e — a s we have noted, compensation i s often the better part of j u s t i c e . In a c t u a l p r a c t i c e , though, there are objectionable features to such p o l i c i e s . F i r s t l y , the u n i v e r s i t i e s themselves have been assigned the task of remedying the d e f i c i e n c i e s (at C i t y U n i v e r s i t y of New York, at any r a t e ) . Thus, not only i s the u n i v e r s i t y expected to provide education; i t now must prepare students to be educated as w e l l . Not only i s i t to give everyone the opportunity to be educated; i t must go beyond t h i s and make students "equal", so that they can succeed, rather than so they can t r y to succeed. Thus the u n i v e r s i t y i s being p r e v a i l e d upon to take on the s o c i a l function of equalization i n a d d i t i o n to that of education. I t i s one thing to make the u n i v e r s i t y accessible to everyone who can use i t ; i t i s another matter to i n s i s t that i t ensure that everyone a c t u a l l y is_ able to use i t . The point might seem i n s i g n i f i c a n t , but i t seems dangerous to give the u n i v e r s i t y a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t a l l y divorced from i t s valuable proper function of educa- t i o n . The more i t i s used as an instrument of s o c i a l p o l i c y , the l e s s l i k e l y i t i s to be able to carry on i t s own p o l i c i e s and programmes e f f e c t i v e l y . (This does not appear u n r e a l i s t i c when i t i s noted that various schools of 64 CUNY have been g i v i n g degree c r e d i t s f or remedial course work.''^ This does not s i g n a l the collapse of the American u n i v e r s i t y system, but i t c e r t a i n l y constitutes a change i n educational p o l i c y brought on by i t s new "non-educational" r o l e , and a devaluation of i t s standards.) I should probably mention here that the objection i s not to remedial courses, but to the u n i v e r s i t y g i v i n g them. They should be provided by the state i n l i n e with the idea of equal opportunity, but i n separate i n s t i t u t i o n s designed for the purpose. Or better yet, primary and second- ary education should be made more thorough and e f f e c t i v e so that compensa- tory education i s not necessary a f t e r high school. This might be u n r e a l i s t i c ; i n any event, the preparation should occur before admission to u n i v e r s i t y rather than a f t e r . Against E q u a l i t y The foregoing problems seem to a r i s e n a t u r a l l y from general p o l i t i c a l concepts such as e q u a l i t y . My point i s that the d i f f i c u l t y i s caused by the person who misinterprets or misuses the c o n c e p t — o f t e n f o r the sake of h i s own p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s f o r which he i s seeking j u s t i f i c a t i o n — r a t h e r than by the concept i t s e l f . I t is" he who i s responsible for c r i t i c i s m of 167 egalitarianism on the ground that i t i s rooted i n envy: the equality p r i n c i p l e i s no more based on envy than i s any other. Envy i s a human weakness, and c e r t a i n l y not p e c u l i a r to e g a l i t a r i a n s . A second l i n e of attack i s based on the idea that e g a l i t a r i a n i s m i s propounded by a small minority of the population, p r i m a r i l y " i n t e l l e c t u a l s " , who are d i s s a t i s f i e d with bourgeois c i v i l i z a t i o n and t h e i r r o l e i n i t . The majority of the people are p e r f e c t l y s a t i s f i e d with s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t i e s , provided there i s f a i r access to them (equality of opportunity) and equality 168 before the law. This i s a persuasive argument i n favour of l i m i t i n g the extent of e q u a l i t y when one i s considering questions of more or l e s s ; 65 however, one should bear i n mind that the majority i s not always r i g h t . I f ••the people" were to support the i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery (as they have been known to do), i t would s t i l l be morally u n j u s t i f i a b l e . E q u a l i t y of r e s u l t has also been c r i t i c i z e d on the ground that i t would take away incentives necessary to the operation of society. The need fo r incentives has generally been recognized by e g a l i t a r i a n s ; differences of opinion have a r i s e n over the nature and the extent of those a c t u a l l y required to maintain the s o c i a l process^ S o c i a l i s t t h e o r i s t s i n the Soviet Union seem to have modified t h e i r o r i g i n a l a t t i t u d e s tov/ards incentives, and 169 have come to use them more and more. This i n d i c a t e s that past e g a l i t a - r i a n s were somewhat overly o p t i m i s t i c i n t h e i r views, but does not prove that i n e q u a l i t i e s of wealth and income cur r e n t l y found i n Western indus- t r i a l i z e d s o c i e t i e s are at a minimum l e v e l or anywhere near i t . Further reasons for i n e q u a l i t i e s have been o f f e r e d by Nisbet within the context of the American experience: There i s something, a f t e r a l l , that appeals to the imagination, to the r i s k - t a k i n g s e n s i b i l i t y , to the ever present hope of " h i t t i n g i t b i g " , i n a non-equalitarian society, where channels of m o b i l i t y are at l e a s t reasonably open. Beyond t h i s , hierarchy and i n e q u a l i t y are key elements of the s o c i a l bond...And there i s , f i n a l l y , the seemingly ineradicable American respect for merit, and for goods and statuses a r r i v e d at (or which appear to have been a r r i v e d at) through merit.170 The opportunities to " h i t i t b i g " and to take r i s k s can be adequately provided through the introduction of l o t t e r i e s and Grand P r i x - s t y l e road racing. Functional hierarchy and s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n are not incom- p a t i b l e with e g a l i t a r i a n i s m . But merit i s a legitimate r i v a l of equality as a c r i t e r i o n of just d i s t r i b u t i o n . Once basic needs have been attended to, i t a f f o r d s the b a s i s of a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d d i s t r i b u t i o n of various goods. This i s quite proper. I t should be kept i n mind, however, that the notion 6 6 of desert does not n e c e s s a r i l y j u s t i f y an i n e g a l i t a r i a n s o c i e t y . This i s so because ( i ) people are s p e c i f i c a l l y , not generally, deserving. No one deserves more of everything. X might deserve a higher salary than Y because of the nature of h i s occupation, but Y might merit greater respect than X because of h i s moral q u a l i t i e s . I t i s conceivable that each person could get \tfhat he deserves, with the t o t a l good of each being roughly equal, ( i i ) Furthermore, not a l l differences are i n e q u a l i t i e s . Two people can have d i f f e r e n t occupations or homes or preferences, but t h i s does not. mean that they are unequal. They might be unequal according to some standard of value, but i t i s not always c l e a r which standard i s relevant. In many s i t u a t i o n s i t does not make sense to speak of i n e q u a l i t y , ( i i i ) F i n a l l y , even when d i s t r i b u t i o n according to merit does create i n e q u a l i t i e s , there i s no ru l e to di c t a t e t h e i r s i z e . X might be much more deserving than Y, but we do not know how much more of which p a r t i c u l a r good he ought to receive. There does not seem to be any reason to believe that a lawyer deserves ten times the income of a manual labourer (unless, perhaps, one i s a lawyer). To the extent that merit i s thought to be a component of j u s t i c e , then, d i s t r i b u t i o n s w i l l tend away from absolute e q u a l i t y . This i s acceptable to the e g a l i t a r i a n ; he i s opposed to unreasonable, not a l l , i n e q u a l i t i e s . The l a s t c r i t i c i s m that warrants examination holds that the equality p r i n c i p l e i s unworkable i n any or a l l of i t s manifestations. I t i s incoher- ent and ina p p l i c a b l e as an instrument of s o c i a l p o l i c y , and i s therefore meaningless. There i s some substance to t h i s argument. The e g a l i t a r i a n might say that he i s int e r e s t e d i n an i d e a l , not a ru l e to cover every circumstance. The i d e a l of l i b e r t y , f o r example, i s also d i f f i c u l t to implement. Of course, men know when they are free ( i . e . , not being coerced), but men also know when they are being treated equally. At t h i s point the c r i t i c might respond with the question: "Do they? 67 I f X works kO hours and produces 100 u n i t s while Y works 40 hours and produces 80 u n i t s , does the p r i n c i p l e of equality require that they receive equal or unequal pay cheques? There i s no way to d e c i d e — t h e same t r e a t - ment can be equal from one point of view and unequal from another. The problem with equal treatment i s that one needs an external standard to determine whether or not men are being treated e q u a l l y — b u t the standards are constantly s h i f t i n g from case to case. This looks more l i k e a matter of fa i r n e s s or j u s t i c e than of eq u a l i t y . " As I see i t , the e g a l i t a r i a n response cannot be t o t a l l y convincing, but i t i s not meaningless e i t h e r . For even i f equal treatment presumes standards of j u s t i c e , i t remains a kind of equality: one might say that i t i s only j u s t i c e , but then one might also say that j u s t i c e i s only equality i n accordance with the relevant standards. And i t i s not true that standards constantly s h i f t from case to c a s e — t h e y might not be absolute, eter n a l , or sel f - e v i d e n t , but at any given time there w i l l be a general consensus on which standards are relevant. They can be defended with good reasons, and replaced with better reasons, but there i s a l i m i t on the number of reasons which can be considered good. Thus i n some s i t u a t i o n s equal treatment w i l l consist i n an equal rate of pay per hour, and i n others an equal rate per unit produced. There i s no a p r i o r i r u l e but, on the other hand, standards are not a r b i t r a r y . The workers i n the example w i l l know whether or not they are being treated equally, and i f t h i s does not constitute a l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i t does bring out the fact that the p r i n c i p l e , i d e a l or impulse of eq u a l i t y e x i s t s . CONCLUSION We have seen that despite great e f f o r t s to demonstrate the contrary, there are no compelling s i m i l a r i t i e s that a l l men share, save the fac t that they are men. This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c does not give r i s e to any absolute r i g h t s . Nevertheless, men, being men, have joined together and formed s o c i e t i e s . Out of s o c i a l existence, c e r t a i n values have been created with human welfare at t h e i r centre. As men's s o c i a l systems have become more complex, so have t h e i r r u l e s f o r r e g u l a t i o n of conduct. Insofar as these systems focus on the c e n t r a l values, they manifest themselves as systems of morality, l e g a l i t y , and j u s t i c e , both formally and inf o r m a l l y . The idea of equality has been found to be a basic, i f not nec e s s a r i l y the dominant, element i n these spheres. This idea i s complex and multi- faceted. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to apply c o n s i s t e n t l y to human concerns. Some of these d i f f i c u l t i e s can be avoided i n c e r t a i n circumstances by adopting Oppenheim's common sense d e s c r i p t i v e approach. This approach, however, i s l i m i t e d to the world of f a c t . Where value choices are involved, equality should simply be thought of as one value among many, each with i t s own v a l i d i t y . The substance or implied consequences of the equality p r i n c i p l e can then be compared with those of the others; s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and p o l i c i e s , etc. w i l l emerge from t h e i r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . T h i s does not mean that e q u a l i t y or any of the others, such as l i b e r t y or authority, are to be emasculated. I t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of such broad concepts that they cannot be applied i n wholesale fashion: they must take other values into account. Nor does i t mean that supporters of various p r i n c i p l e s w i l l a l l . agree on some grand compromise—it i s only that awareness of many values, 68 69 such as merit, u t i l i t y , authority, l i b e r t y , and equality, and recognition of t h e i r legitimacy, i s i n the i n t e r e s t of sound policy-making. Oppenheim i s correct i n i n s i s t i n g that equality should not be used as a laudatory term. Nor should i t be a pejorative term. The f a c t that a p o l i c y i s e g a l i t a r i a n or i n e g a l i t a r i a n should not automatically provoke reactions of praise or condemnation. But t h i s i s not to say that the normative content should or can be removed. Eq u a l i t y i s a normative expression—people do f e e l one way or the other about i t . The idea of equality, then, i s not unlike other t h e o r e t i c a l concepts. I t might be d i f f i c u l t to understand and to use, but i t i s mistaken to conclude that i t should be a l t e r e d or eliminated. I t has a place when reasonably and thoughtfully applied to p u b l i c a f f a i r s . I t i s a constant, i f not i n t e r n a l l y consistent, moral impulse, and must be recognized as such. NOTES F e l i x E. Oppenheim, "Egali t a r i a n i s m As A Descriptive Concept", American P h i l o s o p h i c a l Quarterly, 7 ( A p r i l , 1970), pp. 143-52. 2 Isaiah B e r l i n , "Equality", Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, New Series, 56 (1955-56), pp. 313-14. ^The connection between ega l i t a r i a n i s m and the p r i n c i p l e of equ a l i t y i s discussed below, pp. 6-11. if For example, see B e r l i n , "Equality", pp. 311-19, 326; Hugo Adam Bedau, "Egali t a r i a n i s m and the Idea of Equal i t y " , i n E q u a l i t y , Nomos IX, eds. J . Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), pp. 13-27; H. J . McCloskey, "Egalitarianism, E q u a l i t y and Justice",. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 44 (May, 1966), p. 57; J . R. Lucas, "Against Eq u a l i t y " , i n J u s t i c e and Equ a l i t y , ed. H. A. Bedau (Englewood C l i f f s , N. J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1971), pp. 1?7-51; J . Charvet, "The Idea of Equality as a Substantive P r i n c i p l e of Society", i n Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Theory, eds. Anthony de Crespigny and Alan Wertheimer (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 157-68; Robert Nisbet, "The Pursuit of Eq u a l i t y " , P u b l i c Interest, No. 35 (Spring, 1974), pp. 115-16; Arnold Brecht, P o l i t i c a l Theory, (Princeton, N. J . : Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1959), pp. 151, 411-12; and Giovanni S a r t o r i , Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1962), pp. 328-34. Benn's comment i s pertinent: "A f a v o r i t e way of d i s c r e d i t i n g the e g a l i t a r i a n , however, i s to make i t appear that he seeks to remove forms of discr i m i n a t i o n that neither he nor anyone e l s e , would f o r a moment question." "Egalitarianism and the Equal Consideration of Interests,", i n E q u a l i t y , Nomos IX. p. 65, n . 2 . Not a l l of these writers are opposed to the equality p r i n c i p l e : e.g., Bedau uses the notion of " r a d i c a l e g a l i t a r i a n i s m " as a straw man to show that egalitarianism proper i s not x^hat i t s c r i t i c s claim. Nevertheless, the terminology i s s t i l l unfortunate. 5 See also S. I . Benn and R. S. Peters, The P r i n c i p l e s of P o l i t i c a l Thought, (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 131, 4~4"8,' n. '8; David Thomson, Equality, (Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1949), p. 5«; Michael Walzer, "In Defense of Equal i t y " , Dissent, 20 ( F a l l , 1973), pp. 401-3; and David S p i t z , "A Grammar of Equal i t y " , Dissent, 21 (Winter, 1974), pp. 63-6; as well as Benn, "Eg a l i t a r i a n i s m " . 6 Charvet, "Idea"; pp. 157-68; Lucas, "Against Eq u a l i t y " , pp. 138-51. 7 Lucas, "Against Eq u a l i t y " , pp. 139-42. 8 As S p i t z has observed, such c r i t i c s , "contest not equality but a. caricature of equ a l i t y . " "Grammar", p. 78. g Lucas, "Against Equality", pp. 141-51. 70 71 10 Bedau has noted that " i t i s i n f a c t not possible to eliminate a l l i n e q u a l i t i e s , e i t h e r because r o l e - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s necessary to the existence of any s o c i a l system and r o l e - s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i s equally necessary (as the cause or consequence) to r o l e - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , or f o r other l e s s sophisticated reasons, e.g., because some i n e q u a l i t i e s can be removed only by introducing others, or because s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t i e s are an inescapable consequence of natural ( i n d i v i d u a l ) i n e q u a l i t i e s . . . . / Hence:/ The question... f o r those with e g a l i t a r i a n sentiments i s t h i s : What are the~minimura i n e q u a l i t i e s required to maintain a given s o c i a l system and what i s the cost, i n terms of e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s that would need to be changed and of the f r u s t r a t i o n of other values, to achieve t h i s minimum?" See "Egalitarianism", p . 2 1 . 11 That i s , i f i t does not allow f o r necessary or unavoidable i n e q u a l i t i e s of the type mentioned i n n . 1 0 . 12 I t i s possible that the p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f i s not legitimate--that i t i s i l l - f o u n d e d and i n a p p l i c a b l e to human a f f a i r s . This would make i t s d e r i v a t i v e notions i r r a t i o n a l as w e l l . This question w i l l be considered throughout the paper; the point that I wish to make here i s that what i s true of " e q u a l i t y " i s also true of " e g a l i t a r i a n i s m " and " e g a l i t a r i a n " . 13 Oppenheim, "Egalitarianism"; see also h i s a r t i c l e " Equality: The Concept of E q u a l i t y " , International Encyclopedia of the S o c i a l Sciences ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 5 , PP. 1 0 2 - 8 . 14 "Egalitarianism", p. 152. 15 I b i d . , p. 1 5 0 . (Emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l . A l l emphases i n subsequent quotations are from the o r i g i n a l statements, unless otherwise noted). For example, i f A has 99 u n i t s and B has 1 u n i t , and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n p o l i c y takes 1 unit from A and gives i t to B, A!s percentage of the t o t a l w i l l be reduced to 98 per cent and B's increased to 2 per cent. The percentage difference i s now "only" 96 per cent, rather than 98 per cent. According to Oppenheim, t h i s p o l i c y would be e g a l i t a r i a n . The d i f f i c u l t y i s even more pronounced when one i s dealing with broad programmes or with whole s o c i e t i e s : how can they be defined as e g a l i t a r i a n or i n e g a l i t a r i a n without reference to some i d e a l standard? This, of course, i s the point that Oppenheim i s t r y i n g to make—they cannot be so defined under any circumstances, so why try? He f e e l s that i t i s a mistake to pursue s o c i a l equality as an i d e a l , anyway (I b e l i e v e ) ; instead, s o c i e t i e s should t r y to achieve j u s t i c e , or perhaps maximum u t i l i t y , which would include whatever degrees of equality were f e l t to be d e s i r a b l e . The argu- ment i s quite reasonable, but cannot be v a l i d a t e d merely by s t r e s s i n g the d e s c r i p t i v e sense of the term and brushing aside the normative. ^ T h i s i s not to say that Oppenheim*s approach i s not i n s t r u c t i v e . In c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s h i s d e s c r i p t i v e method would be very u s e f u l . But I do not f e e l that i t does a l l that he wants i t to do, nor do I agree with the way he handles the normative side of the problem by ignoring i t . 17 Edward S h i l s , "Ideology: The Concept and Function of Ideology", International Encyclopedia of the S o c i a l Services, 7» p. 6 6 . ^ I b i d _ . , p. 6 7 . 72 19 Dante Gerraino, Beyond Ideology: The Revival of P o l i t i c a l Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 5 1 . 20 See S h i l s , "Ideology", p. 6 6 - 8 . 21 This a p p l i e s to r u l e s , r e l a t i o n s , i n s t i t u t i o n s , etc. as w e l l , when "e g a l i t a r i a n i s m " i s used as an a d j e c t i v e . 22 "Egalitarianism", p. 14-3. 23 I am not saying that i n e q u a l i t i e s are a c t u a l l y e q u a l i t i e s , but that they are compatible with e g a l i t a r i a n i s m . On the former point, see Brian Barry's c r i t i c i s m of S a r t o r i i n P o l i t i c a l Argument (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 1 2 0 , n . l , and Bedau's remark that "Philosophers have assumed, or come close to assuming, that because an i n e q u a l i t y may be just or j u s t i f i e d , i t i s r e a l l y an equality a f t e r a l l , as though the j u s t i c e or j u s t i f i a b i l i t y of c e r t a i n arrangements could only be expressed by pronouncing the arrangement 'equal', as though the most important thing to say on behalf of the morality of an arrangement i s that i t i s equal." ("Egalitarianism"*, p. 1 3 ) • ? 4 , Sanford A. Lakoff, E q u a l i t y i n P o l i t i c a l Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 o 4 ) . 2 ^ I b i d . , p. 2 3 8 . ^ I b i d . , p. 5 - 6 . 2^See Louis Hartz, The Founding of New S o c i e t i e s (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1 9 6 4 ) , Chapters, 1 , 2 , and G. Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liber a l i s m , and Socialism i n Canada: An Interpretation", Canadian Journal of Economics and P o l i t i c a l Science, 32 (May, 1 9 6 6 ) , pp. 14 3 - 7 1 ^ I t has been pointed out that numbers 4 and 5 are two d i s t i n c t p r i n c i p l e s . See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 9 6 1 ) , p. 1 5 5 , and James I . MacAdam, "The Precepts of J u s t i c e " , Mind, 77 (July, 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 3 6 0 - 7 1 . 29 Monroe C. Beardsley, "Equ a l i t y and Obedience to Law", i n Law and Philosophy ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 6 4 ) , P. 3 6 . 3°J. G. H. Newfield, "Eqtiality i n Society", Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, New Series, 66 ( 1 9 6 5 - 6 6 ) , pp. 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 . 3 1 C h a r v e t , "Idea", p. 1 5 4 . 32 Gregory Vlastos, " J u s t i c e and Equ a l i t y " , i n S o c i a l J u s t i c e , ed. Richard B. Brandt (Englewood C l i f f s , N. J . : P r e n t i c e - H a i l , 1 9 6 2 ) , p. 42. 33 Barry, P o l i t i c a l Argument, p. 1 2 0 . Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?", P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 64 ( A p r i l , 1 9 5 5 ) , P. 1 7 5 . •^Stuart M. Brown, J r . , "Inalienable Rights", P h i l i s o p h i c a l Review, 64 ( A p r i l , 1 9 5 5 ) , P. 1 9 2 . 73 •^E. F. C a r r i t t , c i t e d i n Benn and Peters, P r i n c i p l e s , p. 448, n . 5 . 37 See Benn, "Egalitarianism", passim. 38 John V/ilson, E q u a l i t y (London: Hutchinson, 1966), p. 33« 39 Bernard A. 0. Williams, "The Idea of Equal i t y " , i n J u s t i c e and Equalit y , p. 122. See also Lucas, "Against Eq u a l i t y " , pp. l47£4l. 40 Morris Ginsberg, On J u s t i c e i n Society (Ithaca, N. Y.: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965)» P« 20. 41 See W. T. Blackstone, "On the Meaning and J u s t i f i c a t i o n of the Equa l i t y P r i n c i p l e " , E t h i c s , 77 (July, 1967)1 pp. 245-47. He believes that t h i s simply replaces the problem of "is-ought" with one of "good- ought", and that there i s s t i l l an unwarranted l o g i c a l jump. I t might also be mentioned that the human worth approach does not avoid the o r i g i n a l fact-value d i f f i c u l t y , f o r we would s t i l l need to know how to get from the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that a l l men share to the question of t h e i r goodness. The problem then becomes one of how to get from men's equal i n t r i n s i c value to how they should be treated. This w i l l be discussed below. 42 Lakoff, " C h r i s t i a n i t y and Equ a l i t y " , i n Equ a l i t y , Nomos. IX, p. 118. 43 D. Daiches Raphael, Moral Judgements (London: George A l l e n & Unwin, 1955), p. 132. 44. 45 See Raphael, Moral Judgement, pp. 130-34, and Williams, "Idea", pp. 121-24. 46 Williams, "Idea", p. 122. 47 Lakoff, E q u a l i t y , p. 244, n . 2 . The a r t i c l e only r e f e r s to Plamenatz' comment by page number. The quotation i s included i n the book, however, where he makes the same poin t . In both cases the page number c i t e d i s the same. 48 See Benn and Peters, P r i n c i p l e s , p. 39- 49 Raphael, Moral Judgement, pp. 132-34. 5°Ibid., p. 132. 51 Wilson, E q u a l i t y , pp. 98-9. ^ V l a s t o s , " J u s t i c e " , p. 43. 5 5 I b i d . , pp. 44-8. 54 Joseph Margolis adopts a s i m i l a r stance, f i n d i n g men's Vhidden equality" assumed i n the areas of science, r e l i g i o n , tragedy, and comedy. See "That A l l Men are Created Equal", Journal of Philosophy, 52 (June, 1955), 337-46. 44 Lakoff, " C h r i s t i a n i t y " , p. 118. 74 55 See A. P. d'Entreves, Natural Law; An H i s t o r i c a l Survey (new York: Harper Torchbooks, 1951)i esp. pp. 21-2, and 48-62. 56 Many propositions are, of course, self- e v i d e n t enough i n ordinary circumstances, (e.g., "This i s a t r e e " or "Happiness i s good".) My point a p p l i e s to statements that tend to generate dispute, e i t h e r because of t h e i r context or t h e i r normative character. Much of t h i s section r e l i e s on my understanding of Brecht, P o l i t i c a l Theory, Part One. 57 Benn and Peters, P r i n c i p l e s , pp. 162-70. 58 Bertrand de Jouvenal, The E t h i c s of R e d i s t r i b u t i o n (Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1952), pp. 55-6T 5 9 I b i d . , p. 80. ^ S e e L. T. Hobhouse, The Elements of S o c i a l J u s t i c e (London: George A l l e n & Unwin, 1922). He holds that everyone should have enough to e x i s t , with extra b e n e f i t s f o r c h i l d r e n , the aged, etc. (p. 133). Beyond t h i s , d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e c o n s i s t s i n "equal s a t i s f a c t i o n of equal needs, subject to the adequate maintenance of u s e f u l functions... / i.e .7 to a condition prescribed by the needs themselves. Th i s condition i s the maintenance of the functions upon which the common good depends, and t h i s involves d i f f e r e n t i a l treatment of i n d i v i d u a l s i n accordance with the nature of t h e i r services to the community." (p. 111). Thus, "need simply as need i s a claim, but not a completely validated.claim t i l l i t s bearing on function has been considered." (p. 133). ^Benn and Peters, P r i n c i p l e s , p. 164. 62 Barry, P o l i t i c a l Argument, p. 48. 6 3 W i l l i a m s , "Idea", pp. 118-26. 64 • See Wilson, Equality, p. 99" 65 Benn, "Egalitarianism", pp. 70-1. cc Williams, "Idea", p. 126. ^ W i l l i a m K. Frankena, "The Concept of S o c i a l J u s t i c e " , i n S o c i a l J u s t i c e , p. 19. 68 Benn, "Egalitarianism", p. ,76. 69 See also S. I . Benn, "' I n t e r e s t s ' i n P o l i t i c s " , Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, New Series, 60 (1959-60), pp. 123-40. 70 Wilson, E q u a l i t y , p. 103. 71 Wilson's p o s i t i o n , however, i s not as cl e a r as the statement would seem to i n d i c a t e . For he appears to believe that man by d e f i n i t i o n has the capacity of choice. But while the a b i l i t y to reason i s important, Wilson f e e l s (I think) that man's "human-ness", rather than the major def i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , j u s t i f i e s a kind of eq u a l i t y . Benn, "Egalitarianism", p. 70. 75 73 See Ch. Perelman, "Concerning Justice" (c. 1945), Chapter 1 i s his The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, trans. John Petrie (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), PP= 45-60. His view has been modified i n more recent a r t i c l e s printed i n the same book. 74 ' See John Rees, Equality (New Yorks Praeger, 1971), pp. 130-33. 7 5 I b i d . , p. 134-37; see also Hart, Law, pp. 187-89= 76 For example, see Stephen Edelston Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason i n Ethics (Cambridge: University Press, 1950), pp. 160, 223. 77 For example, see de Jouvenal, Ethics, esp. Lecture I I ; see also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 325-32. ^See Vlastos, "Justice", pp. 4i9-63. 79 See Hobhouse, Elements, Chapters 1-6; see also Toulmin, Reason, pp. 166-71, 223-24. 80 Hart's comment (Law, p. 167) on the requisites of any s o c i a l exis- tence at a l l i s relevant here: "....the s o c i a l morality of societies which have reached the stage where t h i s can be distinguished from i t s lav/, always includes certain obligations and duties, reqiiiring the s a c r i f i c e of private i n c l i n a t i o n s or interest which i s essential to the survival of any society, so long as men and the world i n which they l i v e r e t a i n some of t h e i r most f a m i l i a r and obvious ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Among such rules obviously required for s o c i a l l i f e are those forbidding, or at least r e s t r i c t i n g , the free use of violence, rules requiring certain forms of honesty and truthfulness i n dealing with others, and rules forbidding the destruction of tangible things or t h e i r seizure from others. I f conformity with these most elementary rules were not thought a matter of course among any group of indi v i d u a l s , l i v i n g i n close proximity to each other, we should be doubtful of the description of the group as a society, and certain that i t could not endure for long." 81 See G. J . Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 67-71. He says that morality i s concerned with human welfare, but he i s c l e a r l y speaking i n a p o s i t i v e , rather than neutral, sense. S i m i l a r l y , D. S. Shwayder asserts: "that there should be such ways of c l a s s i f y i n g human actions as morally interesting hangs ultimately on the fact that moralities, however much they vary, must be adequate to the regu- l a t i o n of certain kinds of behaviour, such as bringing physical damage or death to one's fellows." "Moral Rules and Moral Maxims", Ethics, 67 (July, 1957), p. 284. 82 I t has been asserted (with reference to Toulmin) .that "any attempt to claim one function or rationale of morality as the function or the purpose of morality so circumscribes what can count as moral considerations that i t s effect i s unwittingly to advocate one li m i t e d moral outlook as the moral point of view." Kai Neilson, "Ethics, History of (Twentieth Century), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 3, p. 111. Warnock, Philosophy, p. 68. 76 84 T o u l m i n , p . 224. 85 Toi i lmin has been c r i t i c i z e d on t h i s p o i n t . See, f o r example, N e i l s o n , " E t h i c s " , p . 111; and George C. K e r n e r , The R e v o l u t i o n i n E t h i c a l Theory ( O x f o r d : C larendon P r e s s , 1966), p p . 136-37. 86 See Hobhouse, E l e m e n t s , Chapter 2, esp . t h e l a s t few l i n e s o f n . l , p . 35- 8 7 "We can say, r o u g h l y , t h a t t o have a moral r i g h t t o something i s f o r someone e l s e to be m o r a l l y o b l i g a t e d ( i n the o b j e c t i v e sense) t o act- o r r e f r a i n from a c t i n g i n some way i n r e s p e c t t o the t h i n g t o which I am s a i d t o have the r i g h t , i f I want him t o . " R i c h a r d B . B r a n d t , E t h i c a l Theory (Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1959) p . 436. See p p . 434-54 f o r f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n . See a l s o D. D. R a p h a e l , Human R i g h t s , O l d and New", i n P o l i t i c a l Theory and the R i g h t s o f Man , e d . D. D. Raphael (Bloomington: I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967)» p p . 54-6*7; Ber nar d Mayo, "What a r e Human R i g h t s ? " , i b i d . , p p . 72-80; and Benn and P e t e r s , P r i n c i p l e s , p p . 101-07. 88 C i t e d i n B r e c h t , P o l i t i c a l Theory , p . 284. 89 Brown, " R i g h t s " , p . 199. The goods t o which he r e f e r s are a man's " m o r a l i n t e r e s t s , h i s p e r s o n , and e s t a t e . " (192). 9 ° I b i d . , p . 199. 91 Maurice C r a n s t o n , "Human R i g h t s , R e a l and Supposed", i n R i g h t s o f Man, p . 49. 9 2 I b i d . , p . 49. ^ R a p h a e l , "Human R i g h t s " , p p . 61, 65. 94 V l a s t o s , " J u s t i c e " , p . 52. 9 5 H a r t , " R i g h t s " , p . 175. 96 y I b i d . , p . 175. 97 J . Roland Pennock, L i b e r a l Democracy: I t s M e r i t s and P r o s p e c t s (New Y o r k : R i n e h a r t and Company, 1950), p . 102. 98 See G i n s b e r g , J u s t i c e , chapter 3» esp . p . 77; B r a n d t , E t h i c a l Theory, p p . 438-40; and Hobhouse, E lements , p p . 41-6 99 W i l l i a m K. Frankena, " N a t u r a l and I n a l i e n a b l e R i g h t s " , P h i l o - s o p h i c a l Review, 64 ( A p r i l , 1955), p . 231. ' " ^ B e r l i n , " E q u a l i t y " , p . 306. 101 Perelman a s s e r t s t h a t " J u s t i c e . . . i s i n c o n c e i v a b l e w i t h o u t r u l e s " . Idea o f J u s t i c e , p. 41. 102 B e r l i n , " E q u a l i t y " , p p . 306, 305. 77 103 See Richard E. F lathman, " E q u a l i t y and G e n e r a l i z a t i o n , A Formal A n a l y s i s " , i n E q u a l i t y , Nomos I X , pp . 38-60. 104 As Benn and Peters put i t : " r u l e s do not c l a s s i f y themselves" . See P r i n c i p l e s , pp . 82-5. 105 The r e l a t i o n between r u l e s and j u s t i c e i s d e a l t w i t h i n Perelman, Idea o f J u s t i c e , esp. pp . 29-60, 61-7, 98-108, 154-58; Perelman, J u s t i c e (New York: Random House, 1967), pp . 20-34; and J u l i u s Stone, Human Law and Human J u s t i c e ( S t a n f o r d , C a l i f o r n i a : S tan fo rd U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1965), pp. 326-30. ^ ^ S e e h i s a r t i c l e s , "The J u s t i f i c a t i o n o f E g a l i t a r i a n J u s t i c e " , American P h i l o s o p h i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 8 (October , 1971), pp . 331-̂ 1; " O b l i g a t i o n : P o l i t i c a l , L e g a l , M o r a l " , i n P o l i t i c a l and Lega l O b l i g a t i o n , Nomos X I I , ed . J . Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York : A t h e r t o n Press , 1970), pp . 55-88; and " C a t e g o r i a l Consistency i n E t h i c s " , P h i l o s o p h i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 17 (October, 1967), p p . 289-99. 107 Gewi r th , " O b l i g a t i o n " , p. 66. ' ' ^ I b i d . , p. 67. See a l so Shwayder, The S t r a t i f i c a t i o n o f Behaviour (London: "Routledge & Kegah P a u l , 1965), pp . 51, 173« "An ac t e x i s t s i f and on ly i f an animal behaves w i t h pu rpose . " ( p . 173) 109 ^See " J u s t i f i c a t i o n " , pp . 332-33. 110 I b i d . , pp . 333-36. 111 I b i d . , pp . 336, 338. 112 I b i d . , p . 339- 113 l l b i d . , p . 339. 1 l / f I b i d . , p . 339. See a lso " C o n s i s t e n c y " , pp . 294-97. 115 See " J u s t i f i c a t i o n " , p . 341. 116 I b i d . , p . 3 4 1 . 117 See Norman E. Bowie, " E q u a l i t y and D i s t r i b u t i v e J u s t i c e " , Ph i losophy, 45 ( A p r i l , 1970), p p . 140-48, f o r s i m i l a r c r i t i c i s m o f e g a l i t a r i a n formulae o f j u s t i c e . 118 John Rawls uses " f a i r n e s s " i n a narrow sense t o mean compliance w i t h r u l e s t o which one has p r e v i o u s l y agreed, e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y o r i m p l i c i t l y . T h u s r i t i s " r e c i p r o c i t y i n t r e a t m e n t " , i n Chapman's phrase . Raphael, on the o the r hand, has a broader concept ion i n mind; a s s e r t i n g t h a t f a i r n e s s ( o r e q u i t y ) " i s i n f a c t the same as d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e " . Perelman a lso uses the terms i n t h i s wider f a s h i o n . Both s ides equate j u s t i c e and f a i r n e s s , but the i m p l i c a t i o n s are q u i t e d i f f e r e n t between the two, as Chapman has shown. My usage here f o l l o w s t h a t o f Raphael and Perelman. 78 See Rawls, " J u s t i c e as Fairness", i n Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Theory, pp. 202-06, and J u s t i c e , pp. 111-14, 342-50; John W. Chapman, "Ju s t i c e and Fairness", i n J u s t i c e , Nomos VI, eds. C a r l J . F r i e d r i c h and John W. Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 147-69; Raphael, "Equa l i t y and Equity", Philosophy, 21 (July, 1946), p. 132 and passim.; and Perelman, J u s t i c e , chapter 2. 119 - -y See The E t h i c s of A r i s t o t l e / The Nicomachean E t h i c s / , trans. J . A. K. Thomson (London: George A l l e n & Unwin, 1953), Book 5» chapters 1, 2, pp. 121-25. See also Richard McKeon, "Ju s t i c e and Equal i t y " , i n J u s t i c e , Nomos VI, pp. 54-7. 1.20 E t h i c s , Book 5> chapters 2-5, pp. 125-35. 121 McKeon, " J u s t i c e " , p. 56. 122 A r i s t o t l e , The P o l i t i c s of A r i s t o t l e , trans. Ernest Barker (New York: Galaxy Books, 1962), p. 118. 123 I b i d . , p. 120. A d d i t i o n a l material supplied by Barker. See also Rees, Equal i t y , pp. 92-6. 124 Roger Hancock, "Meritorian and E q u a l i t a r i a n J u s t i c e " , E t h i c s , 80 (January, 1970), pp. 165-69. By "meritorian",, Hancock means proportional, or f a i r , which i s to say, " j u s t " . A c t u a l l y he i s speaking of " j u s t j u s t i c e " versus e g a l i t a r i a n j u s t i c e , so that i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that he fi n d s the l a t t e r somewhat l a c k i n g . 1 2 5 B e r l i n , "Equality", p. 305. 126 Daniel Lyons, "The Weakness of Formal E q u a l i t y " , E t h i c s , 76 (January, 1966), p. 148. See al s o Newfield, "Equality", pp. 200-02; and Charles Frankel, "Equality of Opportunity", E t h i c s , 81 ( A p r i l , 1971), pp. 196- 127 Stone, Human Law, p. 344. 128 Vlastos, " J u s t i c e " , pp. 40-3. 129 Raphael, Moral Judgement, pp. 86-7. See also Raphael, "Equity", pp. 125-26. 130 See J o e l Feinberg, " J u s t i c e and Personal Desert", i n J u s t i c e , Nomos VT, pp. 85-7. Benn and Peters* treatment of the concept i s also u s e f u l . See P r i n c i p l e s , pp. 157-62. Barry's remarks are i n t e r e s t i n g : "'Desert* f l o u r i s h e s i n a l i b e r a l society where people are regarded as r a t i o n a l • independent atoms held together i n a society by a ' s o c i a l contract' from which a l l must b e n e f i t . Each person's worth (desert) can be p r e c i s e l y a s c e r t a i n e d — i t i s h i s net marginal product and under c e r t a i n postulated conditions (which i t i s conveniently assumed the e x i s t i n g economy approximates) market p r i c e s give 79 each f a c t o r o f p r o d u c t i o n i t s net marg ina l p r o d u c t . L i f e i s an obs tac le race w i t h no s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n f o r the lame but i f one compet i to r t r i p s up ano ther , the s t a t e takes cognizance o f t h i s f a c t ; thus comp- ensa t ion i s g i ven o n l y when t h e r e i s neg- l i g e n c e on one s ide but not the o t h e r . " P o l i t i c a l Argument, pp . 112-13. See a lso F r i e d r i c h A von Hayek, The C o n s t i t u t i o n o f L i b e r t y (London: Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1960) f o r a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t c r i t i q u e o f m e r i t . 1 5 1 R a p h a e l , " E q u i t y " , pp . 128-30. 132 Brandt argues t h a t the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f u t i l i t a r i a n i s m are e g a l i t a r i a n i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s : "The c o n s i s t e n t u t i l i t a r i a n , e v e r y t h i n g cons idered , w i l l conclude t h a t approximate e q u a l i t y o f income should be a s u b s t a n t i a l aim o f p o l i c y , t o be dev ia ted from on ly where the b e n e f i t s o f i n e q u a l i t y are shown t o be c o n s i d e r a b l e . " E t h i c a l Theory, p. 420; see a lso pp . 415-20. Never the less , u t i l i t a r i a n i s m has been e f f e c t i v e l y c r i t i c i z e d as inadequate t o quest ions o f j u s t i c e . See, f o r example, Rawls, J u s t i c e , pp . 150-92, and " J u s t i c e as F a i r n e s s " , p p . 209-13; Raphael, Problems o f P o l i t i c a l Phi losophy (London: P a l l M a l l Press , 1970), pp . 194-200, and Conservat ive and P r o s t h e t i c J u s t i c e " , i n Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Theory, pp . 184-89; and Bedau, " J u s t i c e and C l a s s i c a l U t i l i t a - r i a n i s m " , i n J u s t i c e Nomos V I , pp . 284-305. 133 The s o c i a l i s t i d e a l i s o f t e n fo rmu la ted as "From each accord ing t o h i s a b i l i t y , t o each accord ing t o h i s need" ; e q u a l i t y o f r e s u l t i n t h i s contex t i s u s u a l l y seen as a combinat ion o f need s a t i s f a c t i o n and e q u a l i t y o f c o n d i t i o n . For b r i e f d iscuss ions o f l i b e r a l and s o c i a l i s t v iews o f j u s t i c e and e q u a l i t y , see W. B. G a l l i e , " L i b e r a l M o r a l i t y and S o c i a l i s t M o r a l i t y " , i n Ph i losophy , P o l i t i c s , and S o c i e t y , ed . Peter L a s l e t t (Ox fo rd : B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1956), pp . 120-28; and Raphael, P o l i t i c a l Ph i losophy , pp . 186-94. Note a l so the statement o f G. W. Mor t imore , "An I d e a l o f E q u a l i t y " , Mind, 77 (January, 1968), p. 229: " / A / t the back o f a good many e g a l i t a r i a n c l a i m s , t h e r e l i e s the idea t h a t the i d e a l s o c i e t y i s one where everyone i s e q u a l l y happy, enjoys equal l e v e l s o f w e l f a r e and good. The e g a l i t a r i a n i s i n favour o f any i n e q u a l i t y o f t rea tment which w i l l conduce t o t h i s end. . .The e g a l i t a r i a n does not aim a t e q u a l i t y o f t r e a t m e n t , i n any r e s p e c t : he aims a t e q u a l i t y i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f what r e s u l t s from the t r e a t m e n t , equal and unequa l , meted out t o men." 1 3 / f S e e Charvet , " I d e a " , esp. pp . 157-58. 135 See John H. Schaar, " E q u a l i t y o f O p p o r t u n i t y , and Beyond", i n Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Theory, pp . 135-53.. As w e l l , see Michael Young, The Rise o f the M e r i t o c r a c y : 1870-2033 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1958). 80 See Char les F r a n k e l , " E q u a l i t y o f O p p o r t u n i t y " , E t h i c s , 81 ( A p r i l , 1 9 7 1 ) i p p . 1 9 9 - 2 1 1 , f o r a balanced a p p r a i s a l . Bar ry d iscusses the n o t i o n i n terms o f f a i r n e s s . P o l i t i c a l Argument, pp . 1 0 2 - 0 6 ; 1 2 0 - 2 1 . 137 J See H. J . Sp iege lberg , "A Defense o f Human E q u a l i t y " , P h i l o - soph ica l Review, 53 (March, 19"+4); G insberg , J u s t i c e , p. 1 0 6 ; and Benn and P e t e r s , P r i n c i p l e s , p p . 1 3 6 - 3 7 . 138 For example, see Chr is topher Jencks e t a l . , I n e q u a l i t y (New York: Basic Books, 1 9 7 2 ) , chapters 1 , 9. 139 H a r t , Law, p p . 1 5 6 - 5 7 * See a l so Perelman, J u s t i c e , p. 2 0 : " . . . j u s t i c e concerns i t s e l f w i t h be ing i m p a r t i a l . . . J u s t behaviour i s r e g u l a r . I t conforms t o r u l e s , t o s t a n d a r d s . " 140 Beards ley , " E q u a l i t y " , p . 3 7 . 141 / See Rawls, " J u s t i c e as F a i r n e s s " , and Chapman, " J u s t i c e and F a i r - ness " , pass im. 142 Rawls, J u s t i c e , p . 302 143 I b i d . , p . 3 0 3 . 144 Frank H. K n i g h t , "On the Meaning o f J u s t i c e " , J u s t i c e , Nomos V I , p. 2 3 . 145 Benn and P e t e r s , P r i n c i p l e s , pp . 1 3 1 - 3 2 . 146 Giovanni S a r t o r i , Democratic Theory (New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1 9 6 2 ) , p . 3 2 7 . 147 S p i t z , "Grammar", p. 6 6 . 148 Benn and P e t e r s , P r i n c i p l e s , p p . 1 3 2 - 3 3 - 149 o S a r t o r i , Democratic Theory, p . 3 2 o . 150 Raphael, P o l i t i c a l Ph i losophy , p. 1 9 + . 1 5 1 I b i d . , p . 1 7 8 . 1 5 2 R a p h a e l , " E q u i t y " , p . 1 3 2 . 153 See, f o r example, Ginsberg, pp . 6 6 , 7 7 ; and Radoslav A. Tsanof f , " S o c i a l M o r a l i t y and the P r i n c i p l e o f J u s t i c e " , E t h i c s , 67 (October, 1 9 5 6 ) , p. 1 6 . ^ M i c h a e l Young, " I s E q u a l i t y a Dream?", D i s s e n t , 20 ( F a l l , 1973)» p. 420. 155 Dan ie l B e l l , " M e r i t o c r a c y and E q u a l i t y " , i n The Coming o f Pos t - I n d u s t r i a l Soc ie ty (New York: Basic Books, 1 9 7 3 ) , pp . 4 5 1 - 5 2 . 81 156 See E l l i o t t Abrams, "The Quota Commission", Commentary, 5^ (October, 1972), pp. 54-7. 157 -"Paul Seabury, "The Idea of Merit", Commentary, 54 (December, 1972), JO o ^f^f o 1 5 8 I b i d . , p. 44. 159 I have drawn on B e l l , "Meritocracy", pp. 4l6-19, 438-39; and Seabury, "Merit", pp. 44-5, for several of these points. 1 60 S p i t z , "Grammar", p. 74. 161 Michael Walzer states that quotas are wrong, but no worse than a host of other i n e q u a l i t i e s i n American society, and hence excusable. This seems to be a rather poor j u s t i f i c a t i o n . See "Equality", p. 407-08. This i s not to say that no case at a l l can be made f o r them. I f they were c o n t r o l l a b l e , temporary, and kept within reasonable l i m i t s , so that the presumably l e s s q u a l i f i e d b e n e f i c i a r i e s of p r e f e r e n t i a l treatment could s t i l l be considered q u a l i f i e d i n an absolute sense (e.g., job applicant X could have (say) an I.Q. of 118 to job candidate T's 120, and s t i l l be q u a l i f i e d f o r the p o s i t i o n ) ; and i f i t were c l e a r that a society such as the U. S. was not going to become f u l l y e g a l i t a r i a n i n the f o r - seeable future, then I would say that, on balance, some type of quota system would be j u s t i f i a b l e and d e s i r a b l e . 16? Raphael, "Equity", pp. 128, 130. ''^See Daniel P. Moynihan, "Equalizing E d u c a t i o n — I n Whose Benefit?", Public Interest, Number 29 ( F a l l , 1972) pp. 69-89, for relevant commentary. 164 Much of t h i s i s based on points r a i s e d by B e l l , "Meritocracy", pp. 414-23; and by Martin Mayer, "Higher Education f o r A l l ? " , Commentary, 55 (February, 1973)? PP. 37-47- See also Seymour Martin L i p s e t , " S o c i a l M o b i l i t y and Economic Opportunity", Public Interest, Number 29 ( F a l l , 1972), pp. 103-06; Lester C. Thurow, "Education and Economic Equa l i t y " , Public Interest, Number 28 (Summer, -1972), pp. 66-81; and Hannah Arendt, "The C r i s i s i n Education", i n Between Past and Future: Six Exercises i n P o l i t i c a l Thought (New York: Viking Press, 1961), pp. 179-80. 165 vSee Mayer, "Higher Education", pp. 39-47. ^ ^ I b i d . , p. 41. 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