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UBC Theses and Dissertations

The idea of equality MacKinnon, Robert Michael 1974

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THE IDEA OF EQUALITY by ROBERT MICHAEL MACKINNON B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f Windsor, 1968  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL  FULFIU4ENT  OF  THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  I n the Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE  We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s conforming  t o the  required' standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 197^+  In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s  in p a r t i a l  f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements  an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t  freely available for  I agree  for  that  reference and study.  I f u r t h e r agree t h a t permission f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s  thesis  f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  It  of t h i s thesis f o r financial written  i s understood t h a t copying or  g a i n s h a l l not be allowed w i t h o u t my  permission.  Department o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Vancouver 8, Canada  Date  QdUm,  2, my  publication  Columbia  ABSTRACT A g r e a t d e a l o f c o n t r o v e r s y has a t t e n d e d c u r r e n t d i s c u s s i o n s o f p u b l i c p o l i c y i n t h e Western w o r l d ; much o f t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y has c e n t r e d on t h e i d e a o f e q u a l i t y .  The i d e a has been s t r o n g l y advocated and v i g -  o r o u s l y a t t a c k e d ; u n f o r t u n a t e l y , most o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n has been p o l e m i c a l i n tone r a t h e r t h a n a n a l y t i c .  S u p p o r t e r s and c r i t i c s have been more a n x i o u s  t o p r e s s t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s o r p r e f e r e n c e s t h a n t o come t o a reasonable a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the n o t i o n . T h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t t h e p r e s e n t c o n f u s i o n stems e n t i r e l y prejudice, i l l w i l l ,  or shortsightedness.  Like a l l concepts, e q u a l i t y  v e r y g e n e r a l and o f t e n q u i t e vague i n i t s meaning.  It  p r e s c r i p t i o n , and t h u s a d i f f e r e n t o p i n i o n as t o i t s v a l u e . i d e a t o work w i t h .  be done away w i t h .  It  it  It  policy  is,  then,  N e v e r t h e l e s s , I do n o t f e e l t h a t i t  can be u n d e r s t o o d and u s e f u l l y a p p l i e d , I  i f one a t t e m p t s t o d i s c o v e r what i t  is  can be approached  i n a number o f ways, each o f which i s l i a b l e t o y i e l d a d i f f e r e n t  a difficult  from  should  believe,  does mean, r a t h e r t h a n what one wants  t o mean. The t h e s i s examines t h e n o t i o n t h a t a l l men a r e , i n f a c t , e q u a l , and  finds i t lacking. is difficult  Even i f a l l men were e q u a l i n s i g n i f i c a n t r e s p e c t s ,  t o see what s o r t o f p r e s c r i p t i o n s t h i s would e n t a i l .  t u r n , t h e n , t o e q u a l i t y as a n o r m a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n — a s an i d e a l .  it  We must The i d e a  o f v a l u e i s touched upon; t h e c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t w h i l e no v a l u e s a r e a b s o l u t e , t h e r e a r e some, such as human w e l f a r e , t h a t a r e c l e a r l y t o any form o f m o r a l d i s c o u r s e .  central  The i d e a o f m o r a l i t y i n v o l v e s t h e concepts  o f r i g h t s , r u l e s , and j u s t i c e , a l l o f w h i c h a r e connected w i t h e q u a l i t y t o  ii  some degree.  J u s t i c e i s seen as p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f  how men s h o u l d be t r e a t e d , which i s , o f c o u r s e , a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e e g a l i t a rian ideal.  It  i s found t h a t j u s t i c e i n v o l v e s more t h a n e q u a l i t y , b u t t h a t  t h e l a t t e r i s s t i l l a major element o f t h e  former.  The v a l u e o f a l l men as men suggests t h a t a l l human needs should be a t t e n d e d t o — e v e r y o n e i s equal i n need (up t o a p o i n t ) and t h e r e f o r e has t h e r i g h t t o be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y (up t o a p o i n t ) .  The v a l u e ' o f f a i r n e s s and the  e x i s t e n c e o f r u l e s b o t h suggest t h e n o t i o n s o f e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y and e q u a l i t y b e f o r e t h e l a w — t h e s e a l s o can be viewed as m a t t e r s o f  right.  F i n a l l y , t h e i d e a s o f c o r r e c t i v e j u s t i c e and reward a c c o r d i n g t o  effort  e n t a i l a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f goods which l e a n s towards e q u a l i t y o f  result.  I n a l l o f these spheres, t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y p l a y s a l e g i t i m a t e role.  Beyond them, i t t e n d s t o be d i s t o r t e d and used f o r o t h e r p u r p o s e s .  Examples o f such d i s t o r t i o n can be found i n s e v e r a l areas o f  contemporary  p u b l i c p o l i c y ( e . g . , quota systems, e d u c a t i o n , open admissions t o u n i v e r sities) „  The r e s u l t i s t h a t many o b s e r v e r s have been l e d t o c r i t i c i z e  p r i n c i p l e r a t h e r t h a n those who misuse i t .  S e v e r a l c r i t i c i s m s are n o t e d ;  w h i l e some a r e w e l l t a k e n , however, none can be s a i d t o d e s t r o y t h e o f the n o t i o n of  the  validity  equality.  The i d e a o f e q u a l i t y , t h e n , i s d i f f i c u l t b u t n o t i m p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r stand.  I t must be k e p t i n mind t h a t i t  i d e a l among many.  If it  i s n o t a b s o l u t e o r e t e r n a l , b u t one  i s approached and a p p l i e d w i t h r e a s o n , so t h a t  a t t e n t i o n i s p a i d t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by t h e v a r i o u s c o n t e x t s which i t may o c c u r , i t  in  can be seen as a l e g i t i m a t e and u s e f u l c o n c e p t .  iii  TABLE OF CONTENTS  INTRODUCTION Chapter I.  THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY  „  The Concept o f E q u a l i t y E g a l i t a r i a n i sm L a k o f f ' s Conceptual Scheme The Formal P r i n c i p l e II.  1  EQUALITY AS FACT The N o t i o n o f F a c t u a l E q u a l i t y E q u a l i t y o f I n t r i n s i c Human Worth Empirical Equalities Human Values and Good Reasons  III.  EQUALITY AS NORM...  2  Human Values Right s Rules The P r i n c i p l e o f C a t e g o r i a l C o n s i s t e n c y IV.  EQUALITY AND JUSTICE  4  The R e l a t i o n Between E q u a l i t y and J u s t i c e The A r i s t o t e l i a n N o t i o n o f J u s t i c e Distributive Justice Equality of Opportunity Corrective Justice J u s t i c e as Procedure and J u s t i c e as R e s u l t The N e g a t i v e Approach t o E q u a l i t y The Concept o f J u s t i c e V.  EQUALITY AND SOCIETY  I  J u s t i c e , E q u a l i t y , and P u b l i c Against Equality  Policy  CONCLUSION  i  NOTES  r  BIBLIOGRAPHY  £ iv  ,  INTRODUCTION  The i d e a o f e q u a l i t y , a s i t i s used i n p h i l o s o p h i c d i s c o u r s e , i s e x c e e d i n g l y complex.  I t does not l e n d i t s e l f t o simple and  a n a l y s i s , as many t h e o r i s t s have d i s c o v e r e d .  I t shares t h i s  straightforward characteristic  w i t h a number o f c o n c e p t s — l i b e r t y , democracy, a u t h o r i t y , s o v e r e i g n t y , j u s t i c e , and r i g h t s , f o r example.  N e v e r t h e l e s s , such c o n c e p t s a r e o f t e n  thought t o comprise the c o r e o f p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , and t h e i r  explication  and e l u c i d a t i o n has l o n g been one o f the major concerns o f s t u d e n t s o f t h i s particular discipline.  An examination o f the n o t i o n o f e q u a l i t y , t h e n ,  appears t o be i n k e e p i n g w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l l i n e s o f i n q u i r y , w h i l e i t s m u l t i f a c e t e d and c o n t r o v e r s i a l n a t u r e seems t o o f f e r a p r o m i s i n g f i e l d o f s t u d y . The approach w i l l be a n a l y t i c , but n o t e x h a u s t i v e .  I t i s not p o s s i b l e  here t o d e a l w i t h a l l the meanings t h a t have been a t t a c h e d t o the i d e a , o r a l l the u s e s t o which i t has been p u t , o r a l l the a r e a s o f thought w i t h which i t has been connected.  Thus a l i m i t e d , but r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , number o f t r e a t -  ments w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d , v a r y i n g from b r o a d t o narrow i n scope, and j u s t i f i c a t o r y t o c r i t i c a l t o more s t r i c t l y a n a l y t i c i n i n t e n t .  from  Hopefully  t h e y w i l l shed l i g h t on c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f the concept which w i l l  yield  enough i n f o r m a t i o n t o enable u s t o come t o some u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f what i t means and how  i t can be most f r u i t f u l l y used.  Of course i t would be  overly  o p t i m i s t i c t o expect t o a r r i v e a t the meaning, o r the c o r r e c t sense o f the term; the aim here w i l l be t o put forward a r e a s o n a b l e and c o h e r e n t , r a t h e r t h a n a d e f i n i t i v e , account o f i t s meaning and a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o the w o r l d o f human a f f a i r s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the i d e a w i l l be e x p l o r e d both as f a c t and as norm. An attempt w i l l be made t o u n d e r s t a n d the b a s i s o f i t s l e g i t i m a c y .  1  The  idea  2 w i l l t h e n be examined i n v a r i o u s c o n t e x t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those o f r u l e s , r i g h t s and j u s t i c e . be c o n s i d e r e d .  F i n a l l y , the question o f i t s s o c i a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y  will  Each o f these a r e a s o f i n q u i r y c o u l d i t s e l f be t h e s u b j e c t  o f a f u l l - l e n g t h paper; however, i t h a r d l y seems p o s s i b l e t o come t o any s o r t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e concept without d e a l i n g w i t h them a l l t o some degree. The hope i s t h a t more w i l l be g a i n e d by t r a c i n g i t through t h e s e v a r i o u s spheres o f thought t h a n w i l l be l o s t by t h e b r e v i t y o f some o f t h e t r e a t m e n t s .  CHAPTER 1 THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY The Concept of Equality To begin: i t should be noted f i r s t l y that "equality" can be both a normative and a descriptive concept.  It describes a relation between two  or more things. To say that A and B are equal i s to say that they are identical or (more often) similar with regard to some respect which they have i n common (e.g., colour, weight, function).  How similar A and B must  be before they can be said to be equal i s a matter of judgment which i s usually, but not always, evident from the context. The criterion i s the purpose for which they are being considered equal or unequal—a diamond studded trophy and a rock from the yard might be equal as paperweights, but unequal as sources of economic value. Or a pile of coal weighing pounds might be thought equal to one weighing  10,002  10,000  pounds—until the latter  i s placed on an elevator the maximum weight capacity of which i s exactly  10,000  pounds.  The descriptive sense of equality can also be applied to the area of human affairs—though not so easily.  The main problems are the difficulty  of measuring certain things, like happiness, goodness, dignity, etc., and the tendency to confuse facts and values.  (Oppenheim's article, "Egalitarian-  ism as a Descriptive Concept" i s useful here—particularly with regard to the "is-ought" problem.) But i t i s the normative sense of equality with which I am here primarily concerned—equality as a prescriptive, rather than a descriptive, concept. 3  Empirical f a c t s are important to any extended discussion of equality, but they w i l l constitute the backdrop to, not the focus of, t h i s study.  Equality  i n t h i s sense s t i l l involves a r e l a t i o n — b u t now i t i s one which some men f e e l ought (or ought not) to e x i s t , rather than one which does (or does not) exist. I t seems f a i r l y obvious that there i s no such thing as equality i n human r e l a t i o n s , i n any s t r i c t sense.  Each case i s d i f f e r e n t and unique.  What i s equal from one point of view i s unequal from another—even though the s i t u a t i o n and observer be unchanged.  But to say that equality i s non-  existent does not help us to know what people are t a l k i n g about when they speak o f i t i n philosophic (or p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , r e l i g i o u s , etc.) terms.  I  think, then, that i t i s important to keep from thinking i n terms of "absolute" equality.  To do otherwise i s to misconstrue the nature of the p r i n c i p l e ,  with the r e s u l t that evaluations are based on the f a l s e assumption that the notion e n t a i l s some sort of t o t a l and all-encompassing i d e n t i t y . For example, according to B e r l i n , i t would be quite l o g i c a l for a "pure"  2 e g a l i t a r i a n to s a c r i f i c e good music f o r equality i n an orchestra. any differences are open to c r i t i c i s m and should be eliminated. that such a view should be considered  For him, Now I f e e l  f a n a t i c a l , and not at a l l consistent  3 with e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s .  Not only because i n r e a l l i f e the e g a l i t a r i a n  i s reasonable enough to recognise the l i m i t a t i o n s of the p r i n c i p l e , but because the p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f contains other elements besides the notion of s i m i l a r i t y . I t i s c a l l e d the equality p r i n c i p l e because the idea of s i m i l a r i t y i s the major, or key, element; however, i t i s not the only one. emasculation or weakening of the "true" idea.  This i s not an  Insofar as i t i s a p r i n c i p l e  applicable to human r e l a t i o n s , i t i s r i c h and manysided, and contains elements that modify, or make sensible and workable, the demand for s i m i l a r i t y .  These  modifications are not just grafted on to some more " e s s e n t i a l " concept, but  5 a r e p a r t o f t h e concept o f e q u a l i t y i t s e l f .  The " s i m i l a r i t y " aspect  reveals  t h e t e n d e n c y , t h e d i r e c t i o n i n which t h e p r i n c i p l e i s t o o p e r a t e , b u t t h e o t h e r s are no l e s s p a r t s o f t h a t p r i n c i p l e .  After a l l , liberty is  accepted as a d e s i r a b l e end, as i s s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y .  generally  But no one suggests  t h a t advocates o f l i b e r t y o r a u t h o r i t y want complete l i b e r t y o r s t a b i l i t y the exclusion of a l l else.  A r a d i c a l l i b e r t a r i a n o r a u t h o r i t a r i a n might  c a l l f o r much more o f h i s r e s p e c t i v e good t h a n most people f e e l i s  desirable,  b u t no one b e l i e v e s t h a t l i b e r t a r i a n s want a t o t a l s t a t e o f n a t u r e , o r a u t h o r i t a r i a n s want an a b s o l u t e l y s t a t i c , I  to  controlled  that  society.  do n o t see, t h e n , why " r a d i c a l " o r " e x t r e m e " o r " a r d e n t "  egalitarians  a r e d e p i c t e d as advocates o f t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f a l l d i f f e r e n c e s .  An e g a l i t a -  r i a n , I t h i n k , i s a person who would l i k e t o see a s o c i e t y w i t h a s t r o n g commitment t o e q u a l i t y i n v a r i o u s areas o f l i f e , equality of treatment,  especially public,  so t h a t  f o r example, would be a norm, d e p a r t u r e s from which  would be j u s t i f i e d and n o t s e v e r e .  A r a d i c a l e g a l i t a r i a n , I would say,  is  one who would l i k e t o see e q u a l i t y extended t o even more areas o f l i f e , who would want i t pursued v i g o r o u s l y and w i t h g r e a t e r emphasis t h a n would be p l a c e d on o t h e r v a l u e s , and who would make j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f d e p a r t u r e s more difficult  and d i s p a r i t i e s even s m a l l e r .  As w e l l , he would be l i k e l y  support e n v i r o n m e n t a l m a n i p u l a t i o n ( e . g . , i n e d u c a t i o n , p u b l i c  to  institutions,  l a w s , moral codes, e t c . ) i n o r d e r t o c o u n t e r a c t elements o f "human n a t u r e " t h a t t e n d t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e acceptance o f e g a l i t a r i a n v a l u e s egoism, c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , i n d i v i d u a l i t y ) .  But t h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t  a r a d i c a l e g a l i t a r i a n would w i s h t o c r e a t e a n a t i o n o f sheep o r would be f a n a t i c i s m , n o t  (e.g., even  robots—that  egalitarianism.  I am s t r e s s i n g t h i s p o i n t because t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y i s  often  c r i t i c i z e d f o r b e i n g i m p r a c t i c a b l e o r meaningless , o r f o r b e i n g a s u b o r d i n a t e  7 aspect o f j u s t i c e o r reason o r r u l e a p p l i c a t i o n .  Nov; I f e e l t h a t i t  p r a c t i c a b l e and m e a n i n g f u l when one t r i e s t o u n d e r s t a n d what i t  means,  can be  6  r a t h e r than what i t c a l l s f o r when " l o g i c a l l y extended". p r i n c i p l e can s t a n d on i t s o w n — i f moral i m p u l s e — a n d or  g  And I t h i n k the  not l o g i c a l l y , t h e n ( a t l e a s t ) as a  t h a t i t i s not " r e a l l y " a demand f o r j u s t i c e o r r e a s o n  proper a p p l i c a t i o n of r u l e s .  aspect of these c o n c e p t s — b u t  Of c o u r s e , i n some sense e q u a l i t y i s an  they a r e a s p e c t s o f e q u a l i t y t o o .  General  c o n c e p t s f r e q u e n t l y i n c o r p o r a t e o t h e r c o n c e p t s , o r f e a t u r e s o f o t h e r conc e p t s , w i t h i n them, and the l a t t e r a r e not thought t o l o s e t h e i r  validity.  But L u c a s has argued t h a t E q u a l i t y i s " r e a l l y " o n l y the p r i n c i p l e s o f  9 U n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y and Common Humanity, p l u s envy.  I would suggest  t h a t the f i r s t two a r e p a r t s o f a l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l  concept  instead  (equality),  j u s t as they and o t h e r n o t i o n s , such as need, m e r i t , f a i r n e s s , e t c . , b e l o n g to  the i d e a o f j u s t i c e without r e d u c i n g i t t o n o t h i n g n e s s . In  s h o r t , whether o r not the e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e can be  logically  e x p l a i n e d away o r r e n d e r e d a b s u r d , I s h a l l p r o c e e d on the assumption something  i s t h e r e t h a t i s worth e x p l o r i n g — i f o n l y because  that  i t has o c c u p i e d  such a c e n t r a l and i n f l u e n t i a l p o l i t i o n ( a g a i n s t much o p p o s i t i o n ) i n modern Western p o l i t i c a l  thought. Egalitarianism  Something s h o u l d be s a i d here about the terms " e g a l i t a r i a n i s m " "egalitarian". itself;  and  They a r e a c t u a l l y more d i f f i c u l t t o d e a l w i t h t h a n ' e q u a l i t y "  i n f a c t , many problems a t t r i b u t e d t o the p r i n c i p l e seem t o stem from  c o n f u s i o n over t h e meaning o f t h e s e d e r i v a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s . i s a legitimate p o l i t i c a l  Now  i f equality  ( o r s o c i a l , p h i l o s o p h i c , e t c . ) p r i n c i p l e , i t must  be a p p l i c a b l e t o those spheres i n some s o r t o f coherent way.  I t must g i v e  r i s e t o p o l i c i e s , o r s e t s o f p o l i c i e s , t h a t a r e not s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . r e s u l t s o f one p o l i c y might  The  c o n f l i c t w i t h those o f a n o t h e r , but t h e y must be  r e c o n c i l a b l e — t h e y cannot m u t u a l l y e x c l u d e one a n o t h e r .  Secondly, those  p o l i c i e s cannot negate o r make i m p o s s i b l e the productive, f u n c t i o n i n g o f the spheres t o which i t i s a p p l i e d .  That i s t o say, p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y  cannot  7 be  such as t o u n r e a s o n a b l y r e s t r i c t p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e , s o c i a l  cannot d e s t r o y the  bases o r c u r t a i l the  equality  v i t a l operations of s o c i a l  exis-  10 t e n c e , and  so  on.  With t h i s i n mind, I propose: ( i ) to r e f e r to " e g a l i t a r i a n i s m " d o c t r i n e which c o n s i s t s equality  principle;  "egalitarian";  and  o f such s e t s o f p o l i c i e s d e s i g n e d to implement  a the  ( i i ) to d e s c r i b e t h e s e p o l i c i e s o r programmes, e t c . ( i i i ) t o i d e n t i f y t h e i r proponents as  Thus " e q u a l i t y "  "egalitarianism"  related  T h i s does not  terms.  as  and  "egalitarians".  " e g a l i t a r i a n " w i l l be  mean t h a t the  as  seen as  closely  connection i s t i g h t i n a  formally  l o g i c a l s e n s e — t h e f a c t t h a t e g a l i t a r i a n p o l i c i e s cannot r e n d e r i m p o s s i b l e the  f u n c t i o n i n g o f the  a r e a s i n which t h e y are  b e i n g used p e r m i t s a  degree o f l a t i t u d e as t o whether a p o l i c y i s a coherent a p p l i c a t i o n equality  principle.  (For what c o n s t i t u t e s i m p o s s i b i l i t y  f u n c t i o n i n g ? T h i s i s a matter o f judgment.) be  seen as r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d  principle i s legitimate, the  t o one  The  t h e n i t i s r a t i o n a l , and  of  the  of productive  N e v e r t h e l e s s , the  another.  fair  terms are  to  assumption i s t h a t i f the so are  i t s derivatives.  extent t h a t a p u r p o r t e d l y " e g a l i t a r i a n " p o l i c y o r programme i s  To  inapplic-  11 able,  t h e n , i t cannot be  o f the  principle, i n fact.  considered e g a l i t a r i a n These usages are  (i.e., a rational  extension  s t i p u l a t i v e , r a t h e r t h a n conven-  tional.''^ T h i s approach i s , o f c o u r s e , opposed t o t h a t o f Oppenheim, who  urged t h a t e g a l i t a r i a n i s m His up ded  c r i t i q u e o f the  use  be  t r e a t e d p u r e l y as a d e s c r i p t i v e  unspecified.  He  concept.  o f such terms f o r normative purposes i s w e l l - t a k e n ,  to a p o i n t : t h e r e i s much c o n f u s i o n o v e r the because t h e y are  has 13  meaning o f p o l i c i e s recommen-  e g a l i t a r i a n , when t h e i r s u b s t a n t i v e content i s l e f t  feels  that:  Value words s h o u l d be used e x c l u s i v e l y t o e x p r e s s the advocacy o f some g o a l o r p r i n c i p l e ; the advoc a t e d s t a t e o f a f f a i r s s h o u l d be c h a r a c t e r i s e d e x c l u s i v e l y by d e s c r i p t i v e terms. F o l l o w i n g t h i s p r a c t i c e would make f o r much needed c l a r i t y i n our moral d i s c o u r s e . 1 k  8  I t h i n k , however, t h a t ism* and  s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e the  " e g a l i t a r i a n " r e f e r t o an  1  and  we  programmatic, and  i s how  "egalitarian-  i s o f t e n seen as  comprehensive  a g a i n s t which p o l i c i e s o r programmes, o r even whole  s o c i e t i e s , a r e measured. tional—it  i d e a l that  f a c t that  T h i s usage may  be  p r o b l e m a t i c , but  these terms a r e n o r m a l l y u n d e r s t o o d .  i t i s conven-  I t does not  seem  p r o p e r t o c a l l a p o l i c y e g a l i t a r i a n i f , f o r i n s t a n c e , i t r e d u c e s an by a v e r y s m a l l amount, y e t  leaves a great d i s p a r i t y .  But  t h i s i s what  Oppenheim c a l l s f o r i n h i s p r o p o s a l " t o c o n s i d e r a r u l e o f e g a l i t a r i a n i f i t r e d u c e s and  inequality  redistribution  i n e g a l i t a r i a n i f i t i n c r e a s e s the  percentage  15 difference  between the  One  can  say  that  but  t o say t h a t  h o l d i n g s o f those t o whom the  such a p o l i c y i s more e g a l i t a r i a n t h a n the i t i s e g a l i t a r i a n i s t o i g n o r e the  r e l a t i o n or s e t o f r e l a t i o n s i s t o be reasonably close determine the altogether. cannot be  f i n a l l y empirically  u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the seems t o make sense.  previous  fact that  approach, I b e l i e v e , c o n c r e t i z e d and  a matter o f judgment s u p p o r t e d by  or  to  reason to scrap i t  i s t o admit t h a t i t  t r y instead  t o come t o some  v a r i e t y o f ways i n which i t i s used and Whether o r not  one,  i f a rule  Granted, i t i s d i f f i c u l t  content o f t h i s i d e a l — t h i s i s no  more s u i t a b l e  applied."  deemed e g a l i t a r i a n , i t must come  t o an i d e a l o f e q u a l i t y .  precise The  rule i s being  i n which i t  a p o l i c y i s e g a l i t a r i a n t h e n becomes  r e a s o n s , r a t h e r t h a n one  of  empirical  calculation.^ ^ Now, I t can that  be  prescriptively, egalitarianism  can  be  viewed i n a number o f ways.  seen as a p a r t i c u l a r l y i r r a t i o n a l i d e o l o g y , a u n i v e r s a l  i s recommended f o r e v e r y s i t u a t i o n .  Or,  viewed as a d i s p o s i t i o n o r v a l u e o r i e n t a t i o n — a  on the  panacea  o t h e r hand, i t can  reasoned and  be  generally  programmatic c a l l f o r more e q u a l i t y i n v a r i o u s c o n t e x t s . Whether i t i s an i d e o l o g y o r one o f the o t h e r "comprehensive p a t t e r n s of cognitive  and  moral b e l i e f s about man,  s o c i e t y and  the u n i v e r s e i n  17 r e l a t i o n t o man  and  society,  which f l o u r i s h i n human s o c i e t i e s " ,  depends  9  upon how  one  wishes t o  define i d e o l o g i e s , o u t l o o k s , systems o f thought, e t c .  C e r t a i n l y t h e r e a r e f a c e t s o f e g a l i t a r i a n i s m which seem i d e o l o g i c a l . example, S h i l s n o t e s t h a t " i d e o l o g i e s are r e s p o n s e s t o i n s u f f i c i e n t  For regard  f o r some p a r t i c u l a r element i n the dominant o u t l o o k / o f an ongoing c u l t u r e and  a r e attempts t o p l a c e t h a t n e g l e c t e d  7  element i n a more c e n t r a l p o l i t i o n  18 and  to b r i n g i t i n t o f u l f i l l m e n t . "  And  Germino h o l d s t h a t the term  be u s e d " t o r e f e r t o a s e t o f i d e a s about the o r d e r i n g o f s o c i e t y  should  claiming  the p r e s t i g e o f (phenomenal) s c i e n c e , based on an immanentist, r e d u c t i o n i s t epistemology, and  a i m i n g a t the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  conform t o a b s t r a c t i o n s d i v o r c e d  o f the w o r l d through making i t  from the r e a l i t i e s o f human e x i s t e n c e  in  19 society."  Now  i f i d e o l o g y i s i n t e r p r e t e d so as to i n c l u d e many t y p e s o f  b e l i e f p a t t e r n , and  e g a l i t a r i a n i s m t o e n t a i l the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  e q u a l i t y to the e x c l u s i o n o f a l l o t h e r v a l u e s and i s an i d e o l o g y .  But  i s not  "divorced  i d e a l s , then e g a l i t a r i a n i s m  both S h i l s and Germino have complained t h a t  t e n d s t o be u s e d too l o o s e l y , and  we  have a l r e a d y  of  ideology  seen t h a t e g a l i t a r i a n i s m  from the r e a l i t i e s o f human e x i s t e n c e " , a t l e a s t i n the  sense i n which I am  using i t .  I f a p e r s o n were t o s t r e s s e q u a l i t y o v e r a l l  e l s e , i f h i s programme were h i g h l y e x p l i c i t , i n t e r n a l l y i n t e g r a t e d ,  compre-  20 hensive,  u r g e n t , and  i n t e n s e l y concentrated,  he  c o u l d be  considered  an  i d e o l o g u e — b u t he would no l o n g e r be an e g a l i t a r i a n . The  views o f most s e r i o u s t h e o r e t i c i a n s would i n r e a l i t y f a l l some-  where between t h e s e two those who  regard  p o s i t i o n s , but  the important d i s t i n c t i o n i s between  e g a l i t a r i a n i s m a s i r r a t i o n a l and  those who  w r i t e r s seem t o r e g a r d a l l e g a l i t a r i a n s as members o f the r a t h e r t h a n the l a t t e r . i t a r i a n s b e l o n g t o one, view i s a p p r o p r i a t e  O t h e r s who and  do n o t .  former group  are more moderate f e e l t h a t some e g a l -  some t o the o t h e r .  I do not  think that e i t h e r  f o r our p u r p o s e s , because each a l l o w s the  " e g a l i t a r i a n " t o be adopted by  Some  ( o r a p p l i e d t o ) anyone who  designation  claims  claimed) t o be an e g a l i t a r i a n , r a t h e r than by o r t o a p e r s o n who  (or i s actually  10 21 i s one.  T h i s c r e a t e s problems f o r s e r i o u s d i s c u s s i o n because, a s Oppenheim 22  has p o i n t e d o u t ,  when t h e r e a r e numerous and v a r i e d p o l i c y p r o p o s a l s i n  c i r c u l a t i o n p u r p o r t e d t o be j u s t i f i e d by t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o know what i s e g a l i t a r i a n and what i s n o t . t o lump them a l l t o g e t h e r and conclude  There i s a tendency  that they a r e a l l l o g i c a l  extensions  o f t h e p r i n c i p l e , which i s then c r i t i c i z e d a s i n a p p l i c a b l e , i r r a t i o n a l and/or dangerous.  Hence I t h i n k i t p r e f e r a b l e t o use t h e term " e g a l i t a r i a n " t o  denote a r a t i o n a l proponent o f t h e e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e , and n o t p e r m i t  i t to  be adopted by, o r a t t a c h e d t o , those who cannot p r o p e r l y f o r m u l a t e i t .  This  does n o t mean t h a t t h e r e i s one c o r r e c t l i n e t o which a n e g a l i t a r i a n must h o l d — o n l y t h a t h i s use o f t h e concept  must be r e a s o n a b l e and i n t e l l i g i b l e .  T h i s usage i s , I f e e l , i n t h e i n t e r e s t of, c l a r i t y and u n d e r s t a n d i n g . By way o f summary, then: E g a l i t a r i a n i s m w i l l be t r e a t e d a s a b e l i e f o r s o c i a l p h i l o s o p h y c e n t r e d around t h e i d e a l o f e q u a l i t y .  An e g a l i t a r i a n i s a  person who sees e q u a l i t y a s t h e most important  s o c i a l i d e a l , a l t h o u g h he  r e c o g n i z e s t h a t o t h e r s a r e important  Thus under c e r t a i n  as well.  circum-  s t a n c e s he might c a l l f o r an i n c r e a s e d emphasis on o t h e r v a l u e s , such a s l i b e r t y o r e x c e l l e n c e , o r even c o n c e i v a b l y a decrease  i n e q u a l i t y (where, say,  i n c e n t i v e s were found t o be n e c e s s a r y a f t e r t h e y had been removed).  Such a  p o l i c y would be i n e g a l i t a r i a n i n t h e d e s c r i p t i v e sense, but i t would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be a n t i e g a l i t a r i a n (where e g a l i t a r i a n i s m i s seen i n terms o f 23 e q u i l i b r i u m o r harmony, i n s t e a d o f u n i f o r m i t y ) . An e g a l i t a r i a n wants a s much e q u a l i t y a s p o s s i b l e i n human a f f a i r s . Inasmuch a s he r e c o g n i z e s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f o t h e r v a l u e s a s l e g i t i m a t e , he w i l l not want t o see them trampled upon i n t h e name o f e q u a l i t y .  ("As p o s s i b l e "  t h e r e f o r e r e f e r s t o what i s r a t i o n a l l y and m o r a l l y d e s i r a b l e r a t h e r than t o what i s c o n c e i v a b l e under extreme c o n d i t i o n s . )  The normal e g a l i t a r i a n  s t a n c e , though, w i l l be one i n which i t i s deemed n e c e s s a r y t o b r i n g about more e q u a l i t y i n t h e w o r l d o r , where t h e r e i s v e r y much a l r e a d y , t o m a i n t a i n  11  a given l e v e l .  An e g a l i t a r i a n c o u l d condone a decrease  t h e r e were v e r y good reasons however, and  i n e q u a l i t y where  f o r d o i n g so; t h i s would be h i g h l y a t y p i c a l ,  c o u l d o n l y o c c u r where too much e q u a l i t y had been a c h i e v e d  the expense o f o t h e r v a l u e s e s s e n t i a l t o the "good  L a k o f f ' s Conceptual  at  life".  Scheme  As p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, the o r i e n t a t i o n o f t h i s study i s p r i m a r i l y c o n c e p t u a l ; n e v e r t h e l e s s , we  might t u r n b r i e f l y now  to a consideration of  2k L a k o f f ' s h i s t o r i c a l treatment  o f the concept.  He  sees t h r e e  different  f o r m u l a t i o n s o f the i d e a i n Western p o l i t i c a l thought, each o f whose r o o t s he t r a c e s back t o a n c i e n t G r e e c e . " u n i t - i d e a " w i t h i t s own  He  r e g a r d s each c o n c e p t i o n as a  separate  h i s t o r y and r a t i o n a l e ; the proponents o f each b e l i e v e  t h e i r v e r s i o n t o be the " r e a l " one,  and none can be p r o v e d i n c o r r e c t because  they a r e a l l based on d i f f e r e n t i d e a s o f human n a t u r e .  Thus:  I n d e s c r i b i n g human n a t u r e , the L i b e r a l s t r e s s e s the c a p a c i t y f o r r e a s o n and the w i l l t o autonomy; the S o c i a l i s t s t r e s s e s common humanity, i d e n t i c a l needs, and the i n c l i n a t i o n t o produce l a b o r ; the C o n s e r v a t i v e s t r e s s e s the power o f the a n t i s o c i a l p a s s i o n s . For s o c i e t y , the L i b e r a l advocates i n d i v i d u a l i s m , the S o c i a l i s t c o l l e c t i v i s m ; the C o n s e r v a t i v e poses the c h o i c e o f anarchy o r a b s o l u t i s m wherever graded h i e r a r c h y i s r u l e d out.25 The  corresponding  e q u a l i t i e s , i n essence,  would be f o r the  o f o p p o r t u n i t y ; f o r the S o c i a l i s t — e q u a l i t y o f need; and  Liberal—equality  f o r the C o n s e r v a -  t i v e — t h e e q u a l i n n a t e d e p r a v i t y , h o s t i l i t y , o r envy o f a l l men.  These formu-  l a t i o n s a r e not q u i t e p a r a l l e l , but they convey the g e n e r a l i d e a . L a k o f f s survey i s u s e f u l , i n t h a t i t a l l o w s one on the numerous and The  d i s p a r a t e treatments  t o impose some o r d e r  t h a t have emerged over the  years.  approach i s p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l t o the h i s t o r i a n o f i d e a s ; however, I  am not  sure t h a t i t i s w e l l s u i t e d t o s t r i c t l y c o n c e p t u a l a n a l y s i s .  The  h i s t o r i a n o f i d e a s l o o k s f o r broad a f f i n i t i e s r a t h e r t h a n minute d i f f e r e n c e s — i f t h e r e i s too much o v e r l a p , he s t e p s back f u r t h e r and adopts a more g e n e r a l p e r s p e c t i v e , or switches i t a l t o g e t h e r .  D i s t i n c t i o n s a r e e v e r y t h i n g t o the  12  a n a l y s t , though, so t h a t , w h i l e t h e t h r e e " u n i t - i d e a s " would be w e l l t o bear i n mind, I do n o t agree t h a t they c o n s t i t u t e t h e o n l y framework f o r d i s c u s s i o n . I t may w e l l be t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e " t o i s o l a t e t h e pure o r e o f e g a l i t a r i a n -  26 ism p r o p e r " , a s L a k o f f c l a i m s i n h i s c r i t i c i s m o f B e r l i n ' s s u g g e s t i o n , t h i s does not r e q u i r e t h e use o f h i s p a r t i c u l a r approach.  but  ( F o r one example  o f t h e problems t h a t might ensue, we have o n l y t o note the placement o f t h e i d e a s o f "common humanity" and " i d e n t i c a l needs" i n t h e S o c i a l i s t  column.  Today many L i b e r a l s s t r e s s humanity and need a s c r i t e r i a r e l e v a n t t o e q u a l treatment,  w h i l e S o c i a l i s t s a r e c e r t a i n l y not unanimous i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t  men have i d e n t i c a l needs / which would presumably c a l l tion/.  f o r equal  satisfac-  And t h e matter c o u l d be c o m p l i c a t e d even f u r t h e r i f one a c c e p t s t h e  t h e s i s t h a t t h e r e a r e many a f f i n i t i e s between S o c i a l i s t s and C o n s e r v a t i v e s  27 v i s - a - v i s t h e i r conceptions o f s o c i e t y ,  o r i f one simply n o t e s t h e manner  i n which the t h r e e d o c t r i n e s have i n t e r t w i n e d and i n f l u e n c e d one another a s they have  evolved.) D e s p i t e t h e o v e r l a p p i n g and s h i f t i n g c r i t e r i a , however, L a k o f f ' s  framework p r o v i d e s u s w i t h c e r t a i n i n s i g h t s i n t o the c o n n e c t i o n between v a r i o u s n o t i o n s o f e q u a l i t y and t h e major b e l i e f p a t t e r n s .  Thus we can see  t h a t t h e e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e t e n d s t o become p a r t o f a complex o f a t t i t u d e s and v a l u e s , e t c . and t h a t i t tends t o have d i f f e r e n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r d i f f e r e n t people.  ( I would t h i n k , though, t h a t t h i s might be due a s much  to t h e c o m p l e x i t y  o f the p r i n c i p l e a s t o any human d i s p o s i t i o n t o p e r c e i v e  the w o r l d i n i d e o l o g i c a l terms.) can serve t o o r d e r our thoughts  I n any case, awareness o f these p a t t e r n s somewhat when we t r y t o take i n t o  account  the r e l a t i o n s between e q u a l i t y and o t h e r c o n c e p t s , and between the v a r i o u s equalities  themselves. The Formal P r i n c i p l e By way o f i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f , we might now l o o k a t  some o f the f o r m a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t have been put f o r t h i n i t s b e h a l f .  A  13 l i s t might r e a d as f o l l o w s : 1.  " A l l men  are (created) equal."  2.  " A l l men  s h o u l d be  3.  " A l l men s h o u l d be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y . " no one t o count f o r more than one.")  k.  E q u a l s s h o u l d be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y . "  5. 6.  "Unequals s h o u l d be t r e a t e d u n e q u a l l y . " " A l l p e r s o n s a r e t o be t r e a t e d a l i k e , u n l e s s good reasons can be f o r t r e a t i n g them differently."29  7.  "Where two o r more people a r e t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y , o r s u f f e r d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e s , t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e i n e x p e r i e n c e ought t o c o r r e s p o n d t o some i n i t i a l d i f f e r e n c e o f a t t r i b u t e o r c o n d i t i o n between them, t h i s l a t t e r d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g moreover, r e l e v a n t t o — a n d c o n s t i t u t i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r — t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g d i f f e r e n c e o f experience."30  equal." ( " A l l men  t o count  f o r one  and  28  Many more c o u l d be added, but a l l would be a l i k e i n t h a t t h e y a r e one o f them " o f i t s e l f  /can7  t e l l us how  given  formal—not  the p a r t i c u l a r members o f a s o c i e t y  31 s h o u l d be t r e a t e d . "  Common r e - f o r m u l a t i o n s which a r e s t i l l not  but a r e somewhat more s p e c i f i c  substantive  are:  1.  "To each a c c o r d i n g t o h i s need." (where i t i s understood t h a t " i t i s b e n e f i t s t o p e r s o n s , not a l l o c a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s as such, t h a t a r e meant t o be made equal").32  2.  " / P e o p l e ' s / o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r s a t i s f y i n g whatever wants t h e y may to have sKould be equal."33  3.  " . . . i f t h e r e a r e any moral r i g h t s a t a l l , i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e r e i s a t l e a s t one n a t u r a l r i g h t , the e q u a l r i g h t o f a l l men to be free..."3^  ^f.  "Each man has an i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t t o the p r o t e c t i o n o f h i s moral i n t e r e s t s , h i s person, and h i s estate...."35  5.  " E q u a l i t y o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s the o n l y t h i n g t o the whole o f which  happen  men  have a right."36 6.  "The i n t e r e s t s o f each p e r s o n t i o n . "37 Although  insignificant. how  s h o u l d be s u b j e c t t o e q u a l c o n s i d e r a -  these p r i n c i p l e s a r e a l l f o r m a l , i t does not mean t h a t t h e y While t h e y do not o f f e r d e f i n i t e o r p o s i t i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s  to t r e a t i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e y n e v e r t h e l e s s convey a moral i m p r e s s i o n —  f e e l i n g f o r what c o n s t i t u t e s e q u a l treatment, for  what i s unequal  treatment.  are on  a  and perhaps more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  I  CHAPTER I I  EQUALITY AS FACT  The N o t i o n o f F a c t u a l E q u a l i t y I t has been a s s e r t e d t h a t " n a t u r e i s t h e most o b v i o u s c a n d i d a t e t o sponsor p o l i t i c a l i d e a s , whether e g a l i t a r i a n o r a n t i - e g a l i t a r i a n . "  The  f a c t t h a t n a t u r e i s an o b v i o u s c h o i c e f o r e i t h e r s i d e o f t h e i s s u e s h o u l d g i v e u s an i n d i c a t i o n o f i t s a c t u a l j u s t i f i c a t o r y power. t i e s immediately  p r e s e n t themselves.  Certain d i f f i c u l -  F i r s t l y , how can any s o r t o f f a c t u a l  e q u a l i t y t e l l u s what we r e a l l y want t o know—how men s h o u l d be t r e a t e d ? And  i f t h e i s - o u g h t gap can be b r i d g e d , a second q u e s t i o n  arises—Assuming  t h a t t h e r e a r e many s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s among men, how do we know which ones a r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e way men s h o u l d be t r e a t e d ?  Despite  these  problems, e g a l i t a r i a n s have d i r e c t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e energy t o p r o v i n g t h a t men are i n fact equal.  T h i s i s perhaps u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  i f we r e c a l l t h a t many  p e o p l e have been and a r e b e i n g m i s t r e a t e d p r e c i s e l y because t h e y a r e cons i d e r e d i n f e r i o r o r unequal  a s human b e i n g s .  Hence W i l l i a m s '  statement:  "Such i n v e s t i g a t i o n s enable u s t o understand more deeply...what i t i s t o be human, and o f what i t i s t o be human, t h e a p p a r e n t l y t r i v i a l statement o f  39 men's e q u a l i t y a s men can serve a s a reminder."  A t any r a t e , t h i s  o f i n q u i r y has played a d e f i n i t e r o l e i n e g a l i t a r i a n  line  thought.  When I s a i d e a r l i e r t h a t I would n o t be so concerned  with e q u a l i t y i n  a d e s c r i p t i v e sense, I was r e f e r r i n g t o d e s c r i p t i o n by e m p i r i c a l measurment. While  i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t men a r e n o t e q u a l i n every r e s p e c t , i t a l s o seems  14  15 t h a t when t h e y a r e measured v e r y p r e c i s e l y , they a r e e q u a l i n no r e s p e c t . Speaking l e s s s t r i c t l y though, we can s t i l l (i.e.,  similar) i n certain respects.  s a y t h a t A and B a r e e q u a l  The next problem  i s t h a t w h i l e two  p e o p l e , o r v e r y many p e o p l e , may be e q u a l i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s , i t i s more d i f f i c u l t t o show t h a t everyone t h a t matter.  i s e q u a l i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s , o r i n any, f o r  T h i s can be done by expanding  t h e c r i t e r i a o f judgement once  a g a i n : j u s t a s A and B may d i f f e r i n h e i g h t by 1/16" equal ( i . e . ,  and y e t be c o n s i d e r e d  s i m i l a r ) , so may X and Y be c o n s i d e r e d e q u a l , though t h e y  d i f f e r i n h e i g h t , weight, and sex, and s k i n c o l o u r , by mere v i r t u e o f t h e f a c t t h a t they have t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  However, t h i s amounts t o s a y i n g  t h a t a l l human b e i n g s a r e e q u a l because t h e y a r e human.  While t h i s may be  t r u e , i n t h a t e q u a l i t y means s i m i l a r i t y , which depends on t h e p r e c i s i o n o f one's c r i t e r i a , t h e statement know, t h a t a l l men a r e human.  i s m e a n i n g l e s s — w e a r e t o l d what we a l r e a d y We s t i l l know n o t h i n g about how t o t r e a t them,  nor do we even have any e m p i r i c a l e q u a l i t i e s which can suggest p o l i c y tions. to  The problem  I t i s a g e n e r a l term meant  d i s t i n g u i s h an e n t i r e s p e c i e s from o t h e r s p e c i e s o f l i f e and forms o f  matter—but The  here i s w i t h t h e word "human".  prescrip-  i t cannot p r o v i d e u s w i t h any i n t e r n a l knowledge o f t h a t s p e c i e s .  e g a l i t a r i a n who i s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s approach must r e l a t e " a l l  an i d e a which p o s s e s s e s some meaning w i t h i n t h e s p e c i e s . t h e o r i s t s have attempted  I n f a c t , many  t o do so by p o i n t i n g t o some important  which a l l men have i n common.  men" t o  attribute  ("Important" i n t h e sense o f " m o r a l l y s i g n i f i -  cant".)  E q u a l i t y o f I n t r i n s i c Human Worth One t h e o r y s t r e s s e s t h e e q u a l i n t r i n s i c worth o f every human b e i n g . It  s h o u l d be noted t h a t t h e i d e a o f worth seems t o have some s o r t o f p r e -  scriptive force.  According to Ginsberg:  The n o t i o n o f v a l u e , e x c e l l e n c e , o r goodness c a r r i e s w i t h i n i t t h e n o t i o n o f worthwhileness,  16 passing i n t o o b l i g a t o r i n e s s . In recognizing a n y t h i n g as e x c e l l e n t we a t the same time r e c o g n i z e i t as worth h a v i n g , worth d o i n g , worth b e i n g , o r p u r s u i n g , as imposing an i m p e r a t i v e o f a c t i o n o r o f r e s p e c t and admiration.40 While G i n s b e r g may r i g h t and  overemphasize the n e c e s s i t y o f the c o n n e c t i o n  between  good, i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s a c o r r e l a t i o n between them.  One  does not have t o be a thoroughgoing u t i l i t a r i a n t o r e a l i z e t h a t i t i s g e n e r a l l y r i g h t t o do what i s good o r what promotes goodness, and wrong t o do what i s bad  o r what promotes badness.  Thus i f men  a r e c r e a t e d e q u a l i n worth,  would seem t o be a r a t i o n a l e f o r the type o f treatment they should T h i s i d e a can be the C h r i s t i a n , and  the K a n t i a n .  i n the f a c t t h a t a l l men  t o the same degree. i m p l i e d t h a t men  receive.  found i n 3 prominent a r e a s o f Western thought: the S t o i c ,  the c a p a c i t y t o r e a s o n made men lay  there  The  S t o i c s b e l i e v e d t h a t the " p o s s e s s i o n  more a l i k e than d i f f e r e n t . "  e q u a l l y had  of  Their equality  t h i s c a p a c i t y , not t h a t they had i t  Raphael argues the s t r o n g e r p o i n t t h a t S t o i c  doctrine  were e q u a l i n t h e i r p o t e n t i a l f o r moral p e r f e c t i o n :  The S t o i c s s a i d t h a t i n v i r t u e . . . . a man may e q u a l the gods; f o r t o be p e r f e c t l y moral i s t o do r i g h t t o the utmost o f one's c a p a c i t y . An i n f i n i t e b e i n g , w i t h i n f i n i t e c a p a c i t y , cannot do more good than h i s c a p a c i t y a l l o w s . Hence, i f he does good i n t e n t i o n a l l y t o the l i m i t s o f h i s c a p a c i t y , he i s p e r f e c t l y m o r a l . I n t h i s one r e s p e c t a man may a c h i e v e p e r f e c t i o n , he may be o f as much moral worth as an i n f i n i t e being.4-3 The a l l men  second group, the f o l l o w e r s o f P a u l i n e  were e q u a l b e f o r e God.  A l t h o u g h some men  o t h e r s , the f a c t t h a t a l l were c h i l d r e n o f God moral i d e n t i t y . eyes o f God  C h r i s t i a n i t y , claimed  "What mattered was  were m o r a l l y  that  superior  to  gave them a l l an i r r e d u c i b l e  t h a t e v e r y man  had a s o u l and  t h a t i n the  a l l s o u l s were e q u a l l y worthy."  F i n a l l y , Kant p o s t u l a t e d a Kingdom o f Ends i n which r a t i o n a l and autonomous men The  were e q u a l i n s t a t u s a s moral s u b j e c t s and a s moral a g e n t s .  Kingdom o f Ends was  a p u r e l y formal w o r l d c r e a t e d  f o r the purpose o f  17 d e r i v i n g a s e t o f moral r u l e s t h a t would be r a t i o n a l ; t h e autonomy, r a t i o n a l i t y , and i n t r i n s i c worth o f every man was assumed, r a t h e r than proved. The  d i f f i c u l t y w i t h the C h r i s t i a n and K a n t i a n approaches i s t h a t one  must accept t h e premise t h a t t h e r e i s a God o r a Kingdom o f Ends i f one i s t o conclude t h a t a l l men a r e e q u a l i n worth.  " I n n e i t h e r case i s i t a n y t h i n g  46 e m p i r i c a l about men t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e ground o f e q u a l  respect."  T h i s i s not t r u e , however, o f the S t o i c t h e o r y t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y i s t h e b a s i s o f human e q u a l i t y . invocation o f paradise present,"  Although Lakoff dismisses  l o s t i m p l y i n g no s a n c t i o n o f e g a l i t a r i a n i s m i n the  he appears t o be c o n f u s i n g  the use made o f them.  i t a s "merely a w i s t f u l  the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the doctrine with  He c i t e s Plamenatz* c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t the S t o i c s and  E p i c u r e a n s thought t h a t : " a l l men a r e by nature, capable o f v i r t u e and h a p p i n e s s . But t h e y never went on t o say t h a t they should t h e r e f o r e have e q u a l r i g h t s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s . They d i d not b e l i e v e i n p o l i t i c a l o r l e g a l o r s o c i a l equality.47 But w h i l e a s a matter o f h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d t h e S t o i c s might not have used t h e i d e a t o f u r t h e r t h e i n t e r e s t s o f e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , i t i s s t i l l conceptually  i n t e r e s t i n g and s i g n i f i c a n t .  They d i d i n f a c t conclude t h a t  48 men's r a t i o n a l i t y e n t a i l e d an e q u a l i t y o f r e s p e c t , not  even though they d i d  extend i t t o p u b l i c a f f a i r s . The  n o t i o n h a s s i n c e been developed a l o n g v a r i o u s l i n e s .  We have  seen t h a t Raphael f e e l s t h a t a l l r a t i o n a l men a r e e q u a l i n t h e i r p o t e n t i a l f o r moral p e r f e c t i o n . cendental  I t i s t h i s f a c t , r a t h e r than t h e n o t i o n o f a t r a n s -  Kingdom o f Ends, t h a t ( a c c o r d i n g t o Raphael) j u s t i f i e s t h e t r e a t -  ment o f a l l r a t i o n a l men a s " e n d s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s " — e q u a l s i n s o f a r a s they  49 a r e moral s u b j e c t s and a g e n t s .  T h i s theory  i s open t o c r i t i c i s m , however.  He speaks o f moral " p e r f e c t i o n " — " t o be p e r f e c t l y moral i s t o do r i g h t t o t h e utmost o f one's c a p a c i t y . " ^  0  T h i s term i s much t o o vague: t h e r e does not  18  seem t o be any way  t o measure moral c a p a c i t y o r the degree t o which  one  is fulfilling i t .  I t can h a r d l y s e r v e a s a c r i t e r i o n o f m o r a l b e h a v i o u r  u n l e s s i t i s r e l a t e d t o s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s , r a t h e r t h a n t o c a p a c i t i e s and intentions.  And  b e i n g which no  i f i t i s o n l y meant t o be a g e n e r a l i z e d  one  state of  can p o s s i b l y a t t a i n , the p o i n t t h a t a l l men  e q u a l p o t e n t i a l t o r e a c h i t becomes m e a n i n g l e s s .  ideal  have an  It i s preferable,  t o speak o f m o r a l worth, which a t l e a s t admits o f r e c o g n i t i o n and  then,  descrip-  tion. But Nor  not a l l men  a r e o f e q u a l moral worth, i n the o b j e c t i v e  do they have e q u a l p o t e n t i a l t o become ( o b j e c t i v e l y ) m o r a l l y  sense. worthy.  Raphael a v o i d s  t h i s problem by d e f i n i n g moral worth s u b j e c t i v e l y , so  it  by d o i n g the best  i s achieved  o f which one  same d i f f i c u l t y mentioned above: how measured?  i s capable.  the  Raphael might respond t h a t i t i s not n e c e s s a r y t h a t i t be  equal p o t e n t i a l to a t t a i n i t — t o  be a s good as t h e y can.  d e f i n e d i n terms o f i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y , and  goodness.  This creates  can t h i s k i n d o f moral worth be  measurable, so l o n g a s i t i s a c c e p t e d t h a t i t e x i s t s and  so t h a t men  that  t h a t a l l men  have  Thus goodness i s  c a p a c i t y i n terms o f p o t e n t i a l ,  are equal i n t h e i r p o t e n t i a l to f u l f i l l t h e i r p o t e n t i a l s f o r T h i s does not  seem t o be  second p o t e n t i a l , r a t h e r than the n o t i o n o f e q u a l human worth.  s a y i n g v e r y much, though, f o r i t i s the  first,  t h a t would be  significant  f o r the  Upon examination, Raphael's t h e s i s t u r n s  t o r e l y too h e a v i l y on s p e c i a l i z e d c o n c e p t i o n s o f goodness and  out  equality,  and  consequently i s of l i m i t e d a p p l i c a b i l i t y . John W i l s o n s t r e s s e s r a t i o n a l i t y as simply t e r i s t i c , r a t h e r t h a n a s the key b a s i s o f human r i g h t s , but he  an important human c h a r a c -  t o moral worth.  does not  t e l l us why  He  f e e l s t h a t i t i s the  an e m p i r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s -  t i c n e c e s s a r i l y g i v e s r i s e t o c e r t a i n forms o f t r e a t m e n t .  In r e a l i t y , i t  seems t h a t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s based on the b e l i e f t h a t a l l men  are of  worth (but not moral worth), r a t h e r t h a n on t h e i r r e a s o n .  states that:  He  intrinsic  19  Because each man can shape h i s own ends and can choose h i s own v a l u e s . . . . , t h e r e comes a p o i n t a t which i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o say t h a t one man i s s u p e r i o r o r i n f e r i o r t o a n o t h e r : f o r " s u p e r i o r " and " i n f e r i o r " o n l y make sense i n terms o f some r u l e o r c r i t e r i o n which i s i t s e l f man-made... . . . T h i s p a r t i c u l a r s i m i l a r i t y amongst men i s p l a i n l y one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t . It will be t h e most reasonable b a s i s f o r t h e b e l i e f t h a t men have t h e equal r i g h t t o decide t h e i r own d e s t i n i e s , s i n c e t h e y have an equal c a p a c i t y t o do so: and f o r t h e b e l i e f t h e y have an e q u a l r i g h t t o make t h e i r w i l l s and purposes f e l t — t o a c t u a l i s e them i n t h e w o r l d — s i n c e t h e w i l l and purposes o f each man a r e u l t i m a t e l y as v a l i d as those o f h i s neighbour.51• Thus he says o n l y t h a t r a t i o n a l men have an equal c a p a c i t y t o decide  their  own v a l u e s , ends, and d e s t i n i e s , whether these be good o r b a d ; he does n o t t r y t o d e r i v e t h e i d e a t h a t men a r e o f equal m o r a l v a l u e i n t h e i r t o choose t o be good ( o r p e r f e c t ) .  capacity  I am n o t sure t h a t a l l men a r e equal  c a p a c i t y t o decide t h e i r v a l u e s , e t c . , even i f  t h e y can and do choose v a r i -  ous goods t o pursue ( e . g . , h a p p i n e s s , p l e a s u r e , e x c e l l e n c e , a l t r u i s m ) . t h e p o i n t i n g e n e r a l seems w e l l t a k e n : i t nor i s i t  in  But  i s n o t as p r o b l e m a t i c as R a p h a e l ' s ,  insignificant.  As m e n t i o n e d , t h o u g h , W i l s o n a l l o w s a c o n c e p t i o n o f human v a l u e t o e n t e r by t h e back d o o r , and do much o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y work r e g a r d i n g t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r human c o n d u c t .  When he .says t h a t men's purposes e t c . a r e  o f equal u l t i m a t e v a l i d i t y , and t h a t t h i s e n t i t l e s them t o c e r t a i n r i g h t s , he i s c l e a r l y r e f e r r i n g t o a p r i o r e q u a l i t y o f man qua man, as he i s  abstrac-  t e d from h i s e m p i r i c a l i d e n t i t y .  that  T h i s does n o t f o l l o w from t h e f a c t  men can choose; r a t h e r i t v a l i d a t e s — g i v e s s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e fact.  I t i s a s though reason were n o t enough t o p e r f o r m t h e t a s k d e s i r e d ,  and equal i n t r i n s i c w o r t h had t o be i n t r o d u c e d t o b o l s t e r i t . I  to—that  s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h e r o l e o f reason l a t e r ;  I n any case,  f o r the present I s h a l l  continue  w i t h t h e concept o f human v a l u e as e n u n c i a t e d by Gregory V l a s t o s . V l a s t o s contends t h a t t h e r e i s an e s s e n t i a l human i d e n t i t y a p a r t  from  20  any r e c o g n i z a b l e e m p i r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which g i v e man m e r i t ;  this  s p e c i a l i d e n t i t y i s v a l u a b l e i n and o f i t s e l f . So i f t h e r e i s a v a l u e a t t a c h i n g t o t h e p e r s o n h i m s e l f a s a n i n t e g r a l and unique i n d i v i d u a l , t h i s v a l u e w i l l n o t f a l l under m e r i t o r be r e d u c i b l e t o i t . For i t i s of the essence o f m e r i t , a s here d e f i n e d , t o be a g r a d i n g concept; and t h e r e i s no way o f g r a d i n g i n d i v i d u a l s a s such. We can o n l y grade them w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r q u a l i t i e s , hence o n l y by a b s t r a c t i n g from their individuality.52 He goes on t o argue t h a t such a v a l u e does e x i s t , and i s r e c o g n i z e d i n r e l a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g l o v e , p o l i t i c s , and m o r a l i t y .  I n each o f these  spheres men a r e g i v e n i d e n t i t i e s o r r i g h t s s i m p l y because t h e y a r e what 53 they are--not  f o r any s t a t u s o r m e r i t o r q u a l i t i e s t h e y happen t o p o s s e s s .  While one can sympathize w i t h V l a s t o s ' f e e l i n g s , i t is.more to accept h i s reasoning.  difficult  I f i t seems a s though men's i n d i v i d u a l worth i s 5k  recognized i n our v a r i o u s r e l a t i o n s ,  we might a l s o note t h a t t h e r e i s j u s t  as much evidence t h a t such a v a l u e i s n o t r e c o g n i z e d , t h a t men o n l y p e r c e i v e and a c t upon each o t h e r ' s q u a l i t i e s , and t h a t i t c o u l d h a r d l y be o t h e r w i s e . The p o s i t i o n cannot be supported by t h e way men b e h a v e — t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f the p r o p o s i t i o n r e n d e r s i t i n c a p a b l e o f p r o o f o r d i s p r o o f ; i t i s s i m p l y a matter o f b e l i e f o r f a i t h . I n t h i s i t i s s i m i l a r t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s o f n a t u r a l law and  55 natural rights.  These concepts a r e q u i t e complex and have v a r i e d a c c o r d -  i n g t o h i s t o r i c a l circumstance;  nevertheless, the e s s e n t i a l idea that there  i s a number o f (God) g i v e n norms t h a t a r e u n i v e r s a l and r a t i o n a l l y apprehens i b l e h a s remained i n t a c t .  With t h e r i s e o f r a t i o n a l i s m and t h e development  o f t h e modern s c i e n t i f i c method, n a t u r a l r i g h t s and law have had a much h a r d e r time o f i t ,  though t h e modern c o u n t e r p a r t can be seen i n t h e b e l i e f  that c e r t a i n truths are " s e l f - e v i d e n t " . t r u e simply because they a r e t r u e .  They cannot be j u s t i f i e d — t h e y a r e  While t h i s may sound f o o l i s h , t h e  21 a l t e r n a t i v e t o s e l f - e v i d e n t t r u t h i s no t r u t h ( i n a s e n s e ) . t h e r e a r e no  f i n a l t r u t h s , o n l y hypotheses and p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  s i t u a t i o n obtains  i n normative d i s c o u r s e :  comes down t o one  p r i n c i p l e a t b e s t , and  a c c e p t e d as " s e l f - e v i d e n t ' . 1  contained  In  sooner o r l a t e r  science The  same  justification  t h i s u l t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e must  F i n a l t r u t h s can be  systems o f l o g i c , which a r e o f l i t t l e  be  found o n l y i n s e l f value  i n discussions  of  ends and i d e a l s . Nevertheless, evident It  i t t e n d s t o c r e a t e d i f f i c u l t i e s when we  speak o f  t r u t h s , o r even t r u t h s a t a l l , w i t h t h e i r a b s o l u t i s t  self-  connotations.  might be b e t t e r i n s t e a d t o r e f e r t o p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t a r e more o r l e s s  t r u e — t h e i r a c c e p t a b i l i t y depending upon how c r i t i c i s m , how  w e l l they can  s t a n d up  to  c l o s e l y t h e y can be r e l a t e d t o o t h e r w i d e l y a c c e p t e d  56 p r i n c i p l e s , and how  u s e f u l t h e y a r e t o the problems o f human a f f a i r s .  Statements t h a t s a t i s f i e d these c o n d i t i o n s c o u l d be termed prima f a c i e t r u t h s ( o r t r u t h s , i f t h e i r prim'a f a c i e n a t u r e were made c l e a r ) .  But many  r i g h t s t h e o r i s t s seem t o f a l l back on the p o s i t i o n when p r e s s e d , as e g a l i t a r i a n s , t h a t i t i s simply o r t h a t each man  has  s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t a l l men  a n a t u r a l r i g h t to l i f e ,  a weak type o f argument, and  l i b e r t y , and  do  are c r e a t e d estate.  equal,  This i s  i s u s e f u l o n l y as an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t c e r t a i n  values are s t r o n g l y or widely supported. Empirical Equalities The men  approaches t h u s f a r c o n s i d e r e d  a r e i n t r i n s i c a l l y e q u a l i n worth.  have c o n c e n t r a t e d  on the i d e a t h a t  Other w r i t e r s have tended to  on more e m p i r i c a l l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e q u a l i t i e s i n t h e i r attempts t o N  equal treatment.  F o r example, i t i s o f t e n h e l d t h a t a l l men  t h a t t h e y have c e r t a i n needs.  Benn and P e t e r s  speak o f t h r e e  focus  justify  are equal i n classes of  57 need: b i o l o g i c a l , b a s i c , and  functional.  I t i s c l e a r t h a t we  are a l l  e q u a l i n our b i o l o g i c a l need o f food, water, s h e l t e r , c l o t h i n g , and  the  like  22  ( a l t h o u g h d i f f e r e n t people need d i f f e r e n t amounts). needs which a r e i n d e t e r m i n a t e : men intercourse, relaxation, etc.  We  a l s o have b a s i c  need p l e a s u r e , a f f e c t i o n , a p p r o v a l , s o c i a l  They a r e i n d e t e r m i n a t e because t h e r e i s no  f i x e d amount t h a t can be s a i d t o be p r o p e r o r m i n i m a l . without these goods, t h e y cannot  While men  can s u r v i v e  do so as s o c i a l and c i v i l i z e d b e i n g s .  Bio-  l o g i c a l needs a r e " n a t u r a l " w h i l e b a s i c needs a r e " c o n v e n t i o n a l " , i n the  sense  t h a t the l a t t e r a r e n e c e s s a r y t o man's s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e which he h i m s e l f creates. to  F u n c t i o n a l needs a r e s i m i l a r l y " c o n v e n t i o n a l " — t h e y a r e n e c e s s a r y  the o p e r a t i o n o f s o c i e t y .  farmers need t r u c k s . The  f u r t h e r we  Plumbers need t o o l s , s c h o l a r s need books,  And the community needs a l l these p o s i t i o n s f i l l e d . get from b i o l o g i c a l needs, the l e s s need seems t o be  connected w i t h e q u a l i t y .  Men  may  be e q u a l i n t h e i r need o f food, c l o t h i n g ,  and s h e l t e r , and p o s s i b l y o f s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e , but beyond t h i s , needs seem to  become more unequal, and come t o r e f l e c t  individual differences.  De  J o u v e n a l f e e l s t h a t the g r e a t e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f the upper c l a s s t o s o c i e t y and c u l t u r e e n t i t l e i t s members t o g r e a t e r income and w e a l t h on the b a s i s of  n e e d — t h e y need more because t h e y g i v e so much more.  Thus:  ...keeping a man p h y s i c a l l y f i t and k e e p i n g him f i t f o r d i v e r s e s o c i a l d u t i e s a r e not i d e n t i c a l n o t i o n s . The same b a s i c expend i t u r e on b a s i c needs which keeps a l a b o u r e r f i t f o r h i s job w i l l prove inadequate t o keep a T r e a s u r y o f f i c i a l f i t f o r h i s speci f i c t a s k . Each s p e c i f i c t a s k c a l l s f o r " f u n c t i o n a l e x p e n d i t u r e " , which i s i n f a c t c o s t o f p r o d u c t i o n and s h o u l d not e n t e r i n t o n e t income.58 One  might s u s p e c t t h a t de J o u v e n a l would have a somewhat exaggerated n o t i o n  o f what a T r e a s u r y o f f i c i a l needs, d e s p i t e h i s c l a i m o f p o p u l a r F u r t h e r on, he a s s e r t s t h a t : True a r i s t o c r a c i e s have never enjoyed an a r i s t o c r a t i c s t a t u s because t h e y a r e s t r o n g . . . ; t r u e a r i s t o c r a c i e s have been w i l l i n g l y f a v o u r e d by the p e o p l e , who sensed t h a t e x c e l l e n t t y p e s o f mankind, i n any realm, needed s p e c i a l cond i t i o n s , and t h e y have always d e l i g h t e d i n  support.  23 g r a n t i n g them such c o n d i t i o n s . Hence, not o n l y does the concept  59  o f f u n c t i o n a l need a l l o w f o r d i f f e r e n c e s :  i t p r o v i d e s an e n t e r i n g wedge f o r g r e a t i n e q u a l i t i e s as w e l l . r e g a r d t o e s s e n t i a l needs, men to  But  with  a r e e q u a l , and t h i s f a c t by i t s e l f has come  s e r v e as the b a s i s f o r a s t r o n g c l a i m t o m i n i m a l l y , i f not f u l l y ,  equal  treatment.^ This r a i s e s c e r t a i n questions.  Benn and P e t e r s t e l l us t h a t "needs  a r e not simply m a t t e r s o f f a c t , but presume norms a s much as do d e s e r t s . " ^ They a r e r e f e r r i n g t o the " b a s i c " and " f u n c t i o n a l " needs, but the same p o i n t can be made about the e n t i r e c a t e g o r y . not an independent  A c c o r d i n g t o B a r r y , need i s  j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e , but a d e r i v a t i v e one.  He p o i n t s  out t h a t : no statement t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t X i s n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r t o produce Y p r o v i d e s a reason f o r doing X. B e f o r e i t can p r o v i d e such a r e a s o n , Y must be shown t o be t h e r e f o r e a d e s i r a b l e end t o pursue...A c o n c l u s i v e r e a s o n would r e q u i r e showing t h a t the c o s t o f X...does not make i t l e s s advantageous than some a l t e r n a t i v e course o f a c t i o n , and t h a t any d i s a d v a n t ageous s i d e e f f e c t s o f X a r e outweighed by i t s advantage i n p r o d u c i n g Y.62 It  i s g e n e r a l l y assumed, o f c o u r s e , t h a t the end o f s u r v i v a l i s as  imate and s e l f - e v i d e n t as any end can be.  legit-  T h i s i s where e q u a l i t y comes i n :  p e o p l e do not need e q u a l amounts o f f o o d , e t c . t o s u r v i v e , but t h e y have e q u a l need o f s u r v i v a l . cannot to  on i t s own  But t h i s i t s e l f i s a norm: the concept  r e q u i r e e q u a l treatment  or anything e l s o .  p o s t u l a t e some v a l u e , such as s u r v i v a l o r human d i g n i t y o r  o f need  I t i s necessary happiness,  b e f o r e one can use the f a c t t o p r e s c r i b e t r e a t m e n t .  .  ;  T h i s a p p l i e s as w e l l t o the o t h e r " e m p i r i c a l " approaches.  has p o i n t e d out t h a t men e x p e r i e n c e p a i n and and  Williams  a r e e q u a l i n t h a t t h e y a l l have the c a p a c i t y t o  suffering, a f f e c t i o n for others, feelings of self-respect,  self-consciousness.  Men  do not have t h e s e c a p a c i t i e s t o e q u a l  degrees,  LEAF 2ij-OMITTED IN PAGE NUMBERING  25 though, and i t i s c o n c e i v a b l e two  t h a t some do n o t have them a t a l l .  k i n d s o f response t o t h i s d i f f i c u l t y  (which, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , a l s o  cropped up i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o f need and o f r a t i o n a l i t y ) .  F i r s t , man can  be d e f i n e d so t h a t he does have t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f s e n t i e n c e , for others,  self-consciousness,  There a r e  reason, e t c .  sympathy  Thus, anyone who does n o t have  64 them i s not human, and i s o n l y r e g a r d e d a s such a s a matter o f " c o u r t e s y " . T h i s s o l v e s t h e problem but a t a r a t h e r l a r g e c o s t : f o r one o f t h e r e a s o n s f o r t r y i n g t o prove t h a t a l l men a r e e q u a l i s t h a t some i n d i v i d u a l s o r c l a s s e s o r r a c e s have foeen c o n s i d e r e d equal o r f a i r treatment.  Courtesies  sub-human, and hence u n d e s e r v i n g o f can always be withdrawn i n t h e " p u b l i c  interest". The  second a l t e r n a t i v e has been suggested by Benn.  He f e e l s t h a t i t  i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t e v e r y p e r s o n be r a t i o n a l t o t h e same degree, o r even at a l l .  I t i s enough t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y i s u n i v e r s a l l y r e c o g n i z e d  as "the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y human e n t e r p r i s e " , so t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e norm o f  65 what i t i s t o be human. c a p a c i t i e s o f sentience  T h i s reasoning  can be extended t o t h e o t h e r  e t c . as w e l l , I b e l i e v e , f o r although they are not  r e s t r i c t e d t o human b e i n g s , they would s t i l l q u a l i f y a s norms. According respect",  to Williams,  these " e q u a l i t i e s " g i v e r i s e t o an " e q u a l i t y o f  f o r t o f a i l t o take them i n t o account would be t o a c t i n a manner  t h a t was a r b i t r a r y , immoral, and " a l i e n t o t h e s p i r i t o f human understanding".^  T h i s argument has a c e r t a i n weight, but t h i s weight  derives  from t h e v a l u e we choose t o g i v e these q u a l i t i e s , r a t h e r than from t h e q u a l i t i e s themselves. Human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e a l s o s t r e s s e d by Frankena; he s t a t e s t h a t men do n o t have them e q u a l l y , but goes on t o say t h a t they make men " s i m i l a r " , which i s p r e c i s e l y t h e p o i n t t h a t W i l l i a m s , writes:  W i l s o n , and Benn were making.  He  26 ...I a c c e p t e d a s p a r t o f my own view t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t a l l men a r e t o be t r e a t e d as e q u a l s , not because t h e y a r e e q u a l i n any r e s p e c t but simply because t h e y a r e human. They a r e human because t h e y have emotions and d e s i r e s , and a r e a b l e t o t h i n k , and hence a r e capable o f e n j o y i n g a good l i f e i n a sense i n which o t h e r a n i m a l s a r e not...By t h e good l i f e i s meant not so much the m o r a l l y good l i f e a s t h e happy o r s a t i s factory l i f e . As I see i t , i t i s t h e f a c t t h a t a l l men a r e s i m i l a r l y capable o f e n j o y i n g a good l i f e i n t h i s sense t h a t j u s t i f i e s the prima f a c i e requirement t h a t they be t r e a t e d a s equals.67 Thus men s h o u l d be t r e a t e d a s e q u a l s , n o t because they a r e e q u a l , but because they a r e equally,men,  and capable o f t h e "good l i f e " .  T h i s i s s i m i l a r t o Benn's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t "we s h o u l d g i v e t o t h e i n t e r e s t s o f each t h e same c o n s i d e r a t i o n a s c l a i m s t o c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y  68 for  some s t a n d a r d o f w e l l - b e i n g t h a t we can r e c o g n i z e and endorse."  The  i d e a i s t h a t a l l men ( e q u a l l y ) have an i n t e r e s t i n a c h i e v i n g a s t a t e o f w e l l - b e i n g , whether t h e y r e a l i z e i t o r n o t , and t h a t a l l t h e s e " r e a l " i n t -  69 e r e s t s s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d i n moral d e c i s i o n s .  While Benn's p r i n c i p l e  has more substance than those suggested by W i l l i a m s and Frankena, not appear t o f o l l o w any more c l o s e l y from t h e i n i t i a l or  i t does  f a c t o f men's e q u a l i t y  similarity. F i n a l l y , we might p u t t o use a remark by W i l s o n : I n t r i n s i c e q u a l i t y r e s t s on t h e f a c t t h a t a l l human b e i n g s come i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r c a t e g o r y o r mode o f b e i n g . T h e i r v a r y i n g a b i l i t i e s t o r e f l e c t and d e l i b e r a t e , t o s t a t e the values o r the r u l e s they f o l l o w and t o e x e r c i s e w i l l - p o w e r o r e f f o r t , do not c o n s t i t u t e t h e major i s s u e . The p o i n t i s r a t h e r t h a t no human b e i n g can escape from h i s g e n e r a l c a t e g o r y (except by s u i c i d e o r by b e i n g reduced t o an a n i m a l l e v e l ) , and above a l l t h a t i n c l u s i o n i n t h i s c a t e g o r y g i v e s a l l human b e i n g s a s i m i l a r s t a t u s v i s - a - v i s t h e i r fellows.70  Men a r e e q u a l because t h e y a r e men.  The f a c t t h a t t h e y b e l o n g t o the s p e c i e s  27 e n t i t l e s them t o an i r r e d u c i b l e s t a t u s , and presumably t o have t h i s t a k e n i n t o account when p o l i c i e s a r e b e i n g  formulated  status  and d e c i s i o n s made.  Human v a l u e i s s t i l l e n t a i l e d i n t h e n o t i o n o f s t a t u s , but t h i s statement a t l e a s t has. t h e m e r i t  o f straightforwardness  71  and s i m p l i c i t y .  A p o i n t made  by Benn extends t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s : I f t h e human s p e c i e s i s more important to u s than o t h e r s p e c i e s , w i t h i n t e r e s t s worthy o f s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , each man's f o r h i s own sake, t h i s i s p o s s i b l y because each o f us sees i n o t h e r men t h e image o f himself. So he r e c o g n i z e s i n them what he knows o f h i s own e x p e r i e n c e ; t h e p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r moral freedom, f o r making r e s p o n s i b l e c h o i c e s among ways o f l i f e open t o him, f o r s t r i v i n g , no matter how m i s t a k e n l y and u n s u c c e s s f u l l y , t o make o f h i m s e l f something worthy o f h i s own respect.72 Thus men v a l u e o t h e r s simply  because t h e y a r e men, l i k e themselves, r a t h e r  than because t h e y a r e c h i l d r e n o f God, o r members o f a moral community, o r r a t i o n a l and s e n t i e n t b e i n g s ( a l t h o u g h  these q u a l i t i e s a r e o f t e n  important).  Human b e i n g s have v a l u e , not " i n t r i n s i c a l l y " o r e m p i r i c a l l y " , but because human b e i n g s g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y do, and a c t a c c o r d i n g l y .  Human V a l u e s and Good Reasons Now a l l t h e arguments w i t h which I have been d e a l i n g have been based on the premise t h a t , i n some r e s p e c t , a l l men a r e e q u a l l y v a l u a b l e .  Some have  t r i e d t o prove t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n , assuming t h a t h a v i n g done so, the case f o r e q u a l treatment becomes o b v i o u s .  I n f a c t i t does not,  because  the n o t i o n o f i n t r i n s i c worth i s so removed from r e a l i t y t h a t i t s p r e s c r i p t i o n s o n l y have e f f e c t i n an a b s t r a c t , m e t a p h y s i c a l w o r l d .  O t h e r s have  attempted t o show t h a t men a r e e q u a l l y men i n s i g n i f i c a n t r e s p e c t s cannot be i g n o r e d .  But t h i s i s not q u i t e r i g h t e i t h e r .  that  They s h o u l d  have  contended t h a t c e r t a i n f a c t s r e q u i r e c e r t a i n k i n d s o f conduct i f we a r e t o maintain a p a r t i c u l a r value While t h i s v a l u e  s t r u c t u r e , and hence, t h e y must n o t be i g n o r e d .  s t r u c t u r e i s not e n t i r e l y a r b i t r a r y ( a s Perelman, f o r  28 example, c l a i m e d i n h i s e a r l i e r work), T h i s p o i n t might  73  neither i s i t absolute or eternal.  seem not worth mentioning, but I b e l i e v e t h a t i t tends t o  be p a s s e d over i n normative d i s c o u r s e , and n o t o n l y a t t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g level.  I n j u s t i f y i n g c e r t a i n p o l i c i e s o r b e l i e f s , the appeal i s too often  made on b e h a l f o f v a l u e s t h a t a r e c o n s i d e r e d s a c r e d and i m m u t a b l e — " n a t u r a l " r a t h e r than " c o n v e n t i o n a l " . The danger i n t h i s s t a n c e l i e s i n i t s i n i m i c a b i l i t y t o t h e s p i r i t o f r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n : i . e . , t o t h e "good r e a s o n s " approach.  Some t h e o r i s t s shy away from t h i s s o r t o f moral  p o s s i b l y because  justification,  p e r p e t r a t o r s o f c l e a r l y i n e x c u s a b l e p o l i c i e s and a c t i o n s  have i n v a r i a b l y o f f e r e d " r e a s o n s " f o r t h e i r b e h a v i o u r .  And what c o n s t i t u t e s  74 a "good" reason?  Who i s t o d e c i d e ?  Granted, t h i s p r e s e n t s a problem;  n e v e r t h e l e s s , i t cannot be s o l v e d by a p p e a l i n g t o a b s o l u t e s .  The thought  t h a t a l l human b e i n g s a r e o f " i n f i n i t e worth" seems t o me t o o b f u s c a t e , r a t h e r than t o c l a r i f y , m a t t e r s o f p u b l i c p o l i c y .  "Good r e a s o n s " seems much  more s u i t a b l e t o a n a l y s i s o f the e q u a l i t y i s s u e than any o t h e r approach.  CHAPTER I I I  EQUALITY AS NORM  Human V a l u e s I n o r d e r t o d e c i d e how proposed.  s h o u l d be t r e a t e d , v a l u e s must be  I have a l r e a d y mentioned t h a t I am not c e r t a i n t h a t r i g h t  s a r i l y f o l l o w s from good. when one  people  But the r e l a t i o n seems t o be s t r o n g , e s p e c i a l l y  i s s p e a k i n g i n g e n e r a l terms.  struct a l i s t  neces-  I am not g o i n g t o attempt t o con-  o f a l l c o n c e i v a b l e "goods"; however, t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l which  might be put f o r t h a s g e n e r a l g u i d e l i n e s . The most b a s i c would appear t o be s u r v i v a l . avoidance  o r p r e v e n t i o n o f p a i n and  have the v a l u e s o f h a p p i n e s s ,  A f t e r t h i s might come  At a t h i r d l e v e l we  might  development o f human p o t e n t i a l , e x c e l l e n c e ,  78  freedom and w e l l - b e i n g .  suffering.^  75  77  79  Harmony  and  j u s t i c e might be found a t t h i s  a s w e l l , o r might be seen a s more i n c l u s i v e goods, b e l o n g i n g t o a  level  different  category.  Undoubtedly more c o u l d be found, but t h e s e w i l l s u f f i c e f o r our  purposes.  Some o v e r l a p , and c o u l d p r o b a b l y be r e f o r m u l a t e d more s u i t a b l y .  Or the rough c l a s s i f i c a t i o n might be d e b a t a b l e .  But i f i t can be agreed  t h e s e goods would rank h i g h on any g e n e r a l l i s t ,  we might be a b l e t o approach  the s u b j e c t o f what c o n s t i t u t e s p r o p e r treatment, e q u a l i t y , more It by men,  that  and thus the i d e a o f  adequately.  cannot be s a i d t h a t t h e s e v a l u e s a r e " n a t u r a l " . j u s t a s human v a l u e i s c r e a t e d by men.  them, such a s s u r v i v a l , avoidance  But we  They a r e c r e a t e d  can say t h a t some o f  of pain, well-being, are c o n d i t i o n s of  29  30 proper  s o c i a l existence.  By " p r o p e r " ,  I mean "moral".  To t h e e x t e n t t h a t  a s o c i e t y has r u l e s , laws, customs, r i g h t s and d u t i e s , e t c . t h a t a r e moral, they must be i n t e l l i g i b l e , which means t h a t t h e y s h o u l d be conducive t o  81 human w e l f a r e .  I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s i s an o v e r l y narrow c o n c e p t i o n  82 of morality; I s h a l l say t h a t i t i s s t i p u l a t i v e . A c c o r d i n g t o Warnock: no one i s l o g i c a l l y o b l i g e d t o a c c e p t any g i v e n f e a t u r e a s a c r i t e r i o n o f m e r i t ; and i f we s a y . . . t h a t c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s must n e c e s s a r i l y be a c c e p t e d a s c r i t e r i a o f moral m e r i t , we can and must go on a t once to concede t h a t no one, o f c o u r s e , i s o b l i g e d by l o g i c t o engage i n moral j u d g ment o r debate. That t h e r e a r e , a s i t were, n e c e s s a r y c r i t e r i a o f moral v a l u e does n o t imply t h a t anyone, l e t a l o n e everyone, n e c e s s a r i l y evaluates things with reference to those c r i t e r i a ; i t i s o n l y t h a t we must do so i f we a r e p r e p a r e d , a s we may n o t be, t o c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n "from t h e moral point o f view."83 I do n o t know about t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h i s view; however, I t h i n k t h a t t h e r e a r e good reasons  f o r s a y i n g t h a t m o r a l i t y must be concerned  I t would seem i m p o s s i b l e t o understand w e l f a r e were a d i s v a l u e .  and a c c e p t a s o c i e t y a s moral i f  And w h i l e t h e o t h e r goods l i s t e d might n o t be so  c o m p e l l i n g , I t h i n k t h a t t h e r e a r e good reasons able too.  w i t h human w e l f a r e .  Toulmin h a s expressed  f o r r e g a r d i n g them a s v a l u -  the point w e l l :  I f t h e a d o p t i o n o f / " a 7 p r a c t i c e would g e n u i n e l y reduce c o n f l i c t s o f i n t e r e s t , i t i s a p r a c t i c e worthy o f a d o p t i o n , and i f / " a 7 way o f l i f e would g e n u i n e l y l e a d t o deeper and more c o n s i s t e n t h a p p i n e s s , i t i s one worthy o f p u r s u i t . And t h i s seems so n a t u r a l and i n t e l l i g i b l e , when one b e a r s i n mind t h e f u n c t i o n o f e t h i c a l judgements, t h a t i f anyone a s k s me why t h e y a r e "good r e a s o n s " , I can o n l y r e p l y by a s k i n g i n r e t u r n , "What b e t t e r k i n d s o f r e a s o n c o u l d you w a n t ? ' ^ While t h e v a l u e s o f harmony and h a p p i n e s s statement  suggests,  85  might n o t be a s f i n a l a s t h e  t h e y seem t o have s t r o n g j u s t i f i c a t o r y power under  31 normal c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  They can be e l a b o r a t e d and r e l a t e d t o o t h e r a s p e c t s  o f goodness and o b l i g a t i o n v e r y e a s i l y , w h i l e s i t u a t i o n s c o n d u c i v e t o c o n f l i c t and u n h a p p i n e s s can be thought o f a s good o r o b l i g a t o r y o n l y w i t h extreme d i f f i c u l t y and f o r s p e c i a l r e a s o n s .  (Even t h e n , i t i s l i k e l y  that  harmony w o u l d o n l y be s a c r i f i c e d i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f a g r e a t e r harmony.) Hence, I s h a l l assume t h a t t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n v a l u e s w h i c h g e n e r a l l y  serve  a s good r e a s o n s f o r p r i n c i p l e s o f human a c t i o n , and t h a t t h i s i s the s o r t o f approach most s u i t a b l e f o r e x a m i n a t i o n o f r u l e s such a s " A l l men s h o u l d be treated  equally."  Rights To determine whether o r not men s h o u l d be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y we must l o o k to morality.  M o r a l i t y c a n be s a i d t o c o n s i s t o f r u l e s g o v e r n i n g what ought  and ought not t o be done.  I n any s o r t o f " d e v e l o p e d " o r s o p h i s t i c a t e d m o r a l i t y ,  t h e s e r u l e s w i l l comprise a more o r l e s s coherent system o r c o d e .  The most 86  c o n v e n i e n t way t o l o o k a t a m o r a l code i s i n terms o f d u t i e s and r i g h t s . Men a r e o b l i g a t e d t o do what s h o u l d be done, and not t o do what s h o u l d n o t : hence t h e n o t i o n o f d u t i e s .  G e n e r a l l y , r i g h t s c a n be c o n s i d e r e d d u t i e s i n  87 reverse.  I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t even a v e r y s o p h i s t i c a t e d m o r a l code  does not have t o be e x p r e s s e d i n terms o f r i g h t s and d u t i e s ; however, m o r a l i t y s h o u l d be u n d e r s t a n d a b l e o r a n a l y z a b l e i n t h e s e t e r m s .  any  I t should  a l s o be mentioned t h a t j u s t a s m o r a l i t y i s c o n v e n t i o n a l — c r e a t e d by men, r a t h e r t h a n g i v e n — s o a r e r i g h t s and d u t i e s . inalienable or absolute.  They a r e n o t n a t u r a l o r  These p o i n t s have been w e l l s t a t e d by O l i v e r W e n d e l l  Holmes: I see no a p r i o r i d u t y t o l i v e w i t h o t h e r s . . . but s i m p l y a statement o f what I must do i f I wish to remain a l i v e . I f I do l i v e w i t h o t h e r s t h e y t e l l me t h a t I must do and a b s t a i n from d o i n g , v a r i o u s t h i n g s o r t h e y w i l l p u t t h e screws on me. I b e l i e v e t h e y w i l l , and b e i n g o f t h e same mind a s t o t h e i r c o n duct I not o n l y a c c e p t t h e r u l e s but come i n  32  time to accept them with sympathy and emotional affirmation and begin to t a l k about duties and rights.88 Brown presents a more f o r c e f u l argument on behalf of the existence of ("inalienable") r i g h t s , based on the strength of the connection between r i g h t and good.  He sees t h i s connection,  absolute t e r m s — i n  I believe, i n general rather than i n  simple, straightforward s i t u a t i o n s we can know what i s  right by discovering what promotes good.  This i s a matter of moral inference.  Thus, "an inalienable r i g h t i s simply the r i g h t of a man avoiding the clearest possible cases of preventable  to protection i n  e v i l s and i n securing  89 the clearest possible cases of obtainable goods."  This i s self-evident i n  the sense that: One cannot deny i t s truth and admit the v a l i d i t y of moral inference. Moral arguments about the r i g h t s and duties of men i n p a r t i c u l a r circumstances presuppose the v a l i d i t y of reasoning from s p e c i f i c i n stances of good and e v i l to s p e c i f i c i n stances of r i g h t s and duties. They presuppose, as a p r i n c i p l e of moral inference, that statements about goods and e v i l s confirm or disconfirm statements about r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s . But since an inalienable right i s the minimum possible r i g h t i n respect to a c l a s s of indubitable goods, t h i s r i g h t can be denied only by denying that statements about goods validate statements about r i g h t s . To deny t h i s would be to r e j e c t the p r i n c i p l e of moral inference.... It i s l o g i c a l l y impossible to deny a statement, where t h i s requires the denial of the p r i n c i p l e of inference presupposed i n v a l i d a t i n g any statement of that kind.90 While t h i s p r i n c i p l e does not have the status of immutable law, i t appears to be generally v a l i d , or reasonable.  We s h a l l turn now  to the r i g h t s them-  selves. Cranston distinguishes several classes of r i g h t , the most important of which for our purposes he c a l l s a human r i g h t .  According  to Cranston, "human  r i g h t s are a form of moral r i g h t , and they d i f f e r from other moral r i g h t s i n 91 being the r i g h t s of a l l people at a l l times i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s . "  The  33 universal  r i g h t s t h a t he h a s i n mind a r e t h e t r a d i t i o n a l ones t o l i f e ,  l i b e r t y , and p r o p e r t y .  92  that these are u n i v e r s a l  Raphael a g r e e s w i t h t h e Lockean approach, a d d i n g i n t h e s t r o n g sense, w h i l e v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l ,  93 economic, and s o c i a l r i g h t s a r e u n i v e r s a l r e f e r s t o the "prima f a c i e e q u a l i t y  i n a weaker sense.  Vlastos  o f men's r i g h t t o w e l l - b e i n g and t o  freedom. " , w h i l e Brown's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t "each man has an i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t to t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f h i s moral i n t e r e s t s , h i s p e r s o n , and e s t a t e " has a l r e a d y been mentioned. it  Hart m a i n t a i n s t h a t " i f t h e r e a r e any moral r i g h t s a t a l l ,  f o l l o w s t h a t t h e r e i s a t l e a s t one n a t u r a l  r i g h t , the e q u a l r i g h t o f a l l  96 men t o be f r e e . "  He goes on t o e l a b o r a t e :  ~ y l 7 n t h e absence o f c e r t a i n s p e c i a l cond i t i o n s which a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r i g h t b e i n g an e q u a l r i g h t , any a d u l t human b e i n g capable o f c h o i c e (1) h a s t h e r i g h t t o f o r bearance on t h e p a r t o f a l l o t h e r s from t h e use o f c o e r c i o n o r r e s t r a i n t a g a i n s t him save to h i n d e r c o e r c i o n o r r e s t r a i n t and (2) i s a t l i b e r t y t o do ( i . e . , i s under no o b l i g a t i o n t o a b s t a i n from) any a c t i o n which i s not one c o e r c i n g o r r e s t r a i n i n g o r designed t o i n j u r e o t h e r persons.96 F i n a l l y a somewhat s i m i l a r statement, w i t h a moral element added, by Pennock: " i f a r i g h t i s a power o r a p r i v i l e g e which an i n d i v i d u a l ought t o have, t h e n everyone ought t o have those powers and p r i v i l e g e s which a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r him  t o approach a s n e a r l y a s p o s s i b l e  t o the goal o f happiness o r s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  subject to h i s respect f o r the p r i n c i p l e o f equal r i g h t s f o r a l l . "  97  Now, except f o r two p o i n t s r a i s e d by H a r t , and one by V l a s t o s , these c o n c e p t i o n s a r e q u i t e s i m i l a r .  all  They s t r e s s t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o r e q u a l i t y  o f human r i g h t s , and t h e y f o c u s on human w e l f a r e .  Men have e q u a l r i g h t s t o  l i f e , o r l i b e r t y , o r well-being, o r the p r o t e c t i o n  o f moral i n t e r e s t s , e t c .  They a r e e q u a l because m o r a l i t y i s concerned w i t h human w e l f a r e , which i s t o say  the w e l f a r e o f a l l members o f t h e s p e c i e s , n o t j u s t some.  Since e t h i c a l  systems a r e c r e a t e d which a s s i g n r i g h t s and d u t i e s t o i n d i v i d u a l s  (through t h e  r u l e s emanating from the c e n t r a l norm), i t seems r e a s o n a b l e t h a t i n t h e i r most g e n e r a l form, r i g h t s s h o u l d concern t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n t h e s p e c i e s , and be extended  t o a l l men.  I n s o f a r a s men s u b s c r i b e  t o r a t i o n a l t e n e t s o f m o r a l i t y , then, t h e y w i l l a l l o w t h a t a l l men have equal r i g h t s . F i n a l l y , t h e q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by H a r t and V l a s t o s s h o u l d be c l e a r e d up.  H a r t says t h a t human r i g h t s a p p l y t o a l l r a t i o n a l a d u l t s .  This issue  has been d e a l t w i t h e a r l i e r by s a y i n g t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y i s s i m p l y t h e s p e c i e s norm, but t h a t everyone a c t u a l l y h a s r i g h t s ( t o e q u a l treatment But Hart a p p a r e n t l y means t h i s i n a l i t e r a l  sense.  o f some k i n d ) .  T h i s stems, I b e l i e v e ,  from t h e good t o which men a r e supposed t o have t h e r i g h t : i . e . , freedom. On t h e one hand, Hart p r o b a b l y t h i n k s t h a t t o be f r e e i n any p o s i t i v e men must be a b l e t o choose, e t c .  sense,  On t h e o t h e r hand, i f freedom i s seen  n e g a t i v e l y a s absence o f c o n s t r a i n t , n o n - r a t i o n a l men and c h i l d r e n s h o u l d not be p e r m i t t e d t o have i t (he would s a y ) .  He might have a v o i d e d t h i s ,  either  by u s i n g the n o t i o n o f p r i m a f a c i e r i g h t s (which can be withdrawn i n s p e c i a l c a s e s o f c o n f l i c t i n g goods), o r by e x t e n d i n g h i s i d e a o f t h e good t o i n c l u d e well-being.  A s i t stands, though, I f e e l h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f human r i g h t s i s  too narrow. I t w i l l be noted t h a t Hart says " i f t h e r e a r e any moral r i g h t s a t a l l , it  follows that..."  T h i s i s n o t r e a l l y a problem.  As mentioned, t h e r e a r e  no n a t u r a l , u n c o n d i t i o n a l r i g h t s t o a n y t h i n g ; t h e r i g h t s under d i s c u s s i o n a r e a l l man-made. The  The l a t t e r e x i s t , w h i l e t h e former do n o t .  i d e a o f prima  f a c i e r i g h t s has s u r f a c e d i n s e v e r a l p l a c e s .  Rather  than c l a i m any p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t a s supreme o r i n d e f e a s i b l e (whether n a t u r a l o r c o n v e n t i o n a l ) , modern t h e o r i s t s tend t o f e e l t h a t any r i g h t o r duty can be v o i d e d under c e r t a i n curcumstances.  Where two prima  facie rights or  d u t i e s c o n f l i c t , t h e one t h a t i s r e c o g n i z e d i s termed a r i g h t o r a duty, w h i l e t h e o t h e r remains prima f a c i e : v a l i d i n most s i t u a t i o n s , but not a l l .  35  T h i s a v o i d s the d i f f i c u l t y .  98  Thus Frankena m o d i f i e s Brown's t h e o r y :  There i s an i n a l i e n a b l e prima f a c i e r i g h t t o each o f t h e h i g h o r d e r goods..., but no i n v a r i a b l e a c t u a l r i g h t t o any o f them, s i n c e no one o f t h e s e prima f a c i e r i g h t s always t a k e s precedence over t h e o t h e r s . But t h e r e i s s t i l l one a c t u a l r i g h t which h o l d s without e x c e p t i o n , namely t h e r i g h t to i n s t i t u t i o n s p r o v i d i n g "general p r o t e c t i o n " o f o u r h i g h o r d e r goods. We have t h i s r i g h t because we have p r i m a f a c i e r i g h t s t o t h e s e goods and we have prima f a c i e r i g h t s t o these goods because we a r e b e i n g s capa b l e o f e n j o y i n g them.99 T h i s r e f o r m u l a t i o n i s an improvement, i n t h a t i t s t r e s s e s t h e p r i m a nature o f r i g h t s . t o be a b s o l u t e .  However, Frankena s t i l l  one r i g h t which appears  Now s i n c e r i g h t s stem d i r e c t l y from t h e f a c t t h a t men have  created i n s t i t u t i o n s (society it  retains  facie  and m o r a l i t y ) t o l o o k a f t e r t h e i r  seems odd t o say t h a t men have a r i g h t t o those i n s t i t u t i o n s .  interests, The " r i g h t "  i s not p r i o r t o the i n s t i t u t i o n s ; t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e e s t a b l i s h e d i n o r d e r t o c o n f e r r i g h t s t o human b e i n g s . has  I t does n o t make sense t o say t h a t one  t h e r i g h t t o be c o n f e r r e d a r i g h t .  that the very a c t o f creating  Frankena i s t r y i n g t o say, I t h i n k ,  t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e n o t i o n o f r i g h t  presumes, o r a u t o m a t i c a l l y e n t a i l s , a r i g h t t o them.  T h i s would suggest t h e  i d e a t h a t men have t h e r i g h t t o c r e a t e r i g h t s s i m p l y because t h e y have constructed  the concept, t h a t men have c o n f e r r e d upon themselves t h e r i g h t t o  s e t up i n s t i t u t i o n s and r i g h t s , and t h a t t h i s g i v e s a l l men t h e r i g h t o f a c c e s s t o them.  T h i s seems mistaken, a s w e l l a s c o n f u s i n g — s o m e r i g h t s a r e  o f a h i g h e r o r d e r than o t h e r s , but they a r e a l l prima f a c i e , and they a r e all  c r e a t e d by men. The  idea o f a " f i r s t  speaking i n terms o f , the  o r d e r " r i g h t a r i s i n g from t h e mere f a c t o f  or i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g , rights at a l l i s similar to  n o t i o n t h a t one always has the r i g h t t o j u s t i c e , o r j u s t t r e a t m e n t .  this right i s occasionally theless,  o v e r r u l e d , however, on grounds o f u t i l i t y .  Even None-  i t i s c e r t a i n l y a h i g h r a n k i n g r i g h t , and one t h a t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y  36  s u i t e d t o our d i s c u s s i o n .  B e f o r e d e a l i n g w i t h the q u e s t i o n  of  justice,  though, I would l i k e t o t u r n t o the concept o f r u l e s .  Rules B e r l i n states that: I n so f a r as some minimum degree o f p r e v a l e n c e o f r u l e s i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r the e x i s t e n c e o f human s o c i e t i e s (and t h i s seems t o be an almost u n i v e r s a l , but s t i l l e m p i r i c a l l a w ) , and i n so f a r as m o r a l i t y , both p e r s o n a l and p o l i t i c a l , i s l a r g e l y c o n c e i v e d o f i n terms o f r u l e s , the k i n d o f e q u a l i t y w i t h which obedience t o r u l e s i s v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l , i s among the deepest needs and c o n v i c t i o n s o f mankind.100 I n f a c t , r u l e s a r e the b a s i s o f any by which a c t i o n s can be  moral code, f o r they l a y down s t a n d a r d s  judged r i g h t o r wrong.  should not be done i n any  given instance.  They t e l l us what s h o u l d  or  While t h e i r most o b v i o u s a p p l i c a -  t i o n i s the system o f p o s i t i v e law by which s o c i e t i e s a r e governed, they  are  101 inherent  i n any  form o f e t h i c a l  In t h i s respect for  discourse.  t h e y are c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o the concept o f e q u a l i t y ,  r u l e s e s t a b l i s h what s h o u l d be  a r e i m p a r t i a l — " t h e y a l l o w o f no  done i n a l l c a s e s t h a t a r e a l i k e .  exceptions".  "To  pro t a n t o to be a s s i m i l a t e d to a s i n g l e p a t t e r n .  They  f a l l under a r u l e i s To  enforce  a r u l e i s to  102 promote;lequalxty o f b e h a v i o u r o r t r e a t m e n t . " Hence the n o t i o n o f " e q u a l i t y b e f o r e s h o u l d be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y " .  Men  the law"  and  the maxim " A l l men  a r e e q u a l i n t h a t they a r e a l l s u b j e c t  to  i m p a r t i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n under g e n e r a l r u l e s . Such p r e s c r i p t i o n s p o i n t t o the l i m i t e d a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f r u l e s , though, a s f a r as e q u a l i t y i s concerned.  F o r the p r i n c i p l e s o f g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y are f o r m a l : t h e y do not promote, nor how  t e l l us what ends the r u l e s  and should  to e s t a b l i s h the c a t e g o r i e s i n t o which c a s e s f a l l f o r impar-  103 t i a l treatment. t i o n s according  Because t h e y a r e r a t i o n a l , r u l e s s h o u l d t o r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s , but  t h e y do not  classify  situa-  t e l l us which  37 differences are relevant.  I t s h o u l d a l s o be mentioned  that  s h o u l d o n l y be seen a s g u i d e s t o p r o p e r c o n d u c t — t h e y cannot  rules  anticipate  every f a c t o r which might be s i g n i f i c a n t i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . they must be s u b j e c t t o m o d i f i c a t i o n on grounds o f e q u i t y .  Thus  Finally,  they  must be i n t e r p r e t e d , so t h a t judges can d e c i d e which c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e r e l a t e d t o which r u l e s ; t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o b l e m a t i c when r u l e s  appear  105 to  conflict. The P r i n c i p l e o f C a t e g o r i a l C o n s i s t e n c y Such d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e not i n c o n s i d e r a b l e ; however, an i n t e r e s t i n g  attempt h a s been made t o surmount them.  A l a n Gewirth has t r i e d t o i n j e c t  some s u b s t a n t i v e content i n t o the e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e by p r o v i d i n g a j u s t i f i c a -  106 tion of egalitarian justice. p o i n t because  H i s work i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g a t t h i s  i t i n c o r p o r a t e s much o f what we have d e a l t w i t h t h u s f a r .  A j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s n a t u r e presumes both a moral and a r a t i o n a l approach. The q u e s t i o n , then, i s whether t h e r e a r e any moral p r i n c i p l e s which a r e s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g . S i n c e moral p r i n c i p l e s a r e advanced a s b a s i c r e a s o n s , another way t o p u t t h i s q u e s t i o n i s whether any moral p r i n c i p l e s are inherently r a t i o n a l . For i f a p r i n c i p l e i s i n h e r e n t l y r a t i o n a l , then i t needs no f u r t h e r r e a s o n t o j u s t i f y i t and i s hence self-justifying.107 R a t i o n a l i t y , he s a y s , has t h e f o r m a l requirement o f freedom  from  self-  c o n t r a d i c t i o n , and t h e m a t e r i a l requirement t h a t i t must take account o f '•the n e c e s s a r y f e a t u r e s o f one's s u b j e c t matter." Now t h e s u b j e c t matter o f m o r a l i t y i s , p r i m a r i l y , human a c t i o n . When human agents a c t , they do not merely engage i n b o d i l y movements; t h e i r a c t i o n has c e r t a i n n e c e s s a r y f e a t u r e s which may be summarized a s v o l u n t a r i n e s s and p u r p o s i v e n e s s . F o r i n s o f a r a s men a r e agents, they i n i t i a t e and c o n t r o l t h e i r movements ( v o l u n t a r i n e s s ) i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s and purposes ( p u r p o s i v e n e s s ) . T h i s i s why human agents can be h e l d  38 r e s p o n s i b l e both f o r t h e i r a c t s and f o r t h e ' consequences o f t h e acts.108 These two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e c a l l e d t h e " c a t e g o r i a l f e a t u r e s o f a c t i o n . "  109  Now i n p e r f o r m i n g an a c t i o n , an agent c l a i m s t h a t he has a r i g h t t o do  so.  I f h i s " r i g h t - c l a i m " i s t o be r e c o g n i z e d  as v a l i d , i t i s logically-  n e c e s s a r y (by t h e p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y ) t h a t i t be v a l i d f o r any s i m i l a r person i n s i m i l a r circumstances.  T h i s i s , o f course, p u r e l y  i n that the c r i t e r i o n o f s i m i l a r i t y i s not s p e c i f i e d . Gewirth, t h e r e substantive  formal  But a c c o r d i n g t o  i s a r e l e v a n t s i m i l a r i t y t h a t cannot be r e f u t e d and t h a t h a s  implications—the  f a c t t h a t e v e r y man i s a " p r o s p e c t i v e  who has some purpose which he wants t o f u l f i l l . "  agent  110  Hence, i n s o f a r a s t h e agent's n e c e s s a r y r i g h t - c l a i m i s r e s t r i c t e d t o what he i s r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d i n claiming, h i s claim t h a t he has t h e r i g h t t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e t r a n s a c t i o n i n which he i s i n v o l v e d must r e f e r t o h i m s e l f qua p r o s p e c t i v e agent who wants t o r e a l i z e some purpose o f h i s . . . I t f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t e v e r y agent l o g i c a l l y must a c c e p t t h e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n t h a t a l l p r o s p e c t i v e agents have t h e r i g h t t o p a r t i c i p a t e v o l u n t a r i l y and p u r p o s i v e l y i n t r a n s a c t i o n s i n which t h e y a r e involved.111 I n s o f a r a s men a r e engaged i n a c t i o n , they a r e e i t h e r agents o r " r e c i p i e n t s " o f the a c t i o n s o f other agents. r e c i p i e n t s have r i g h t s .  Agents have o b l i g a t i o n s ,  The r i g h t s t o a c t v o l u n t a r i l y and p u r p o s i v e l y ( t o  o b t a i n goods) a r e e x p r e s s e d a s r i g h t s " t o n o n - c o e r c i o n by o t h e r p e r s o n s , o r 112 freedom, and t o non-maleficence from o t h e r p e r s o n s , o r w e l f a r e . c o n s i s t s i n agents thwarting t h e i r goals.  Maleficence  t h e i r r e c i p i e n t s i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to achieve  Thus G e w i r t h d e r i v e s t h e P r i n c i p l e o f C a t e g o r i a l  Consistency  (PCC): Apply t o your r e c i p i e n t t h e same c a t e g o r i a l f e a t u r e s o f a c t i o n t h a t 113 you a p p l y t o y o u r s e l f . He c o n c l u d e s t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n by a s s e r t i n g t h a t i t i s n o t merely another f o r m a l p r i n c i p l e : The PCC i s a n e c e s s a r i l y v a l i d p r i n c i p l e i n two r e s p e c t s . I t i s formally or l o g i c a l l y necessary i n that to v i o l a t e i t i s to  39 contradict oneself. It i s also materially necessary i n that, unlike other p r i n c i p l e s , the o b l i g a t i o n s o f the PCC cannot be escaped by any agent by s h i f t i n g h i s i n c l i n a t i o n s , i n t e r e s t s , or i d e a s . S i n c e the c a t e g o r i a l f e a t u r e s o f a c t i o n are i n v o l v e d i n the n e c e s s a r y s t r u c t u r e o f agency; the agent cannot r e f r a i n from a p p l y i n g t h e s e f e a t u r e s to h i m s e l f and from c l a i m i n g the r i g h t t o a p p l y them i n h i s s p e c i f i c t r a n s a c t i o n qua p r o s p e c t i v e agent; hence he r a t i o n a l l y cannot evade the o b l i g a t i o n o f a p p l y i n g these f e a t u r e s t o h i s r e c i p i e n t because o f the l a t t e r ' s a l s o b e i n g a p r o s p e c t i v e agent.11k L a s t l y , the PCC  i s prima f a c i e r a t h e r than a b s o l u t e — a n y a c t i o n  can  j u s t i f i a b l y be p r e v e n t e d which ( i ) c o n t r a d i c t s i t , o r ( i i ) i s i n c o m p a t i b l e 115 w i t h a s o c i a l r u l e which i s i t s e l f  j u s t i f i e d by the  PCC.  Gewirth's a n a l y s i s i s q u i t e i m p r e s s i v e i n i t s l o g i c and nevertheless,  I do not  f e e l t h a t i t has  coherence;  as much substance as he  claims.  It  i s a p p l i c a b l e o n l y i n c a s e s where a p e r s o n ' s freedom o r w e l f a r e i s c l e a r l y b e i n g u n j u s t l y v i o l a t e d : e.g., such i n s t a n c e s  where t h e r e  i s r a c i a l discrimination.  While  have u s u a l l y been r e g a r d e d as l o g i c a l l y j u s t i f i a b l e under  the e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e , t h e y are never thought j u s t i f i e d i n s e r i o u s moral discussion. evident  (Granted, " s e r i o u s " i s a normative t e r m — t h e meaning seems  enough.)  Still,  i t i s p r o b a b l y s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the PCC  d i s j u s t i f y cases of t h i s type. and  welfare,  however, are not  Most t r a n s a c t i o n s so c l e a r c u t .  prima f a c i e r i g h t s t o freedom and disputes one  welfare,  can  formally  i n v o l v i n g human freedom  I f X and Y b o t h have e q u a l there  i s no way  t h a t might a r i s e from p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t s .  to s e t t l e  any  In l a r g e s o c i e t i e s ,  man's p u r s u i t o f h i s ends i n v a r i a b l y i n t e r f e r e s w i t h t h a t o f a n o t h e r ;  e s p e c i a l l y where two  o r more men  want a l i m i t e d supply o f goods.  Gewirth  would r e s o l v e t h i s by i n s t i t u t i n g s o c i a l laws (compatible w i t h the which would award the  scarce  p r i n c i p l e , such a s u t i l i t y . these r u l e s may  goods t o c e r t a i n men  according  PCC)  to another  "Whatever s a c r i f i c e s o f i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s  r e q u i r e must themselves s e r v e to f o s t e r the  freedom  and  ko  w e l f a r e o f each o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l . "  But he does n o t t e l l u s how t o  determine t h e amount t h a t one i n d i v i d u a l i s expected t o s a c r i f i c e f o r another, n o r how much i s t o be r e t u r n e d t o him by way o f what I take t o be some k i n d o f " g e n e r a l b e n e f i t s " , n o r how t o know j u s t how much i s compatible w i t h t h a t o f every o t h e r man.  We can r e c o g n i z e v i o l a t i o n s o f  the PCC i n t h e most extreme and o b v i o u s c a s e s , but how do we know what c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n i n a complex system o f l e g i t i m i z e d r u l e s , a l l o f which p u r p o r t to'be conducive t o t h e maximum freedom and w e l f a r e p o s s i b l e ? The answer i s t h a t we do n o t , and t h i s i s f a i r l y s e r i o u s because where t h e problems g e n e r a l l y o c c u r .  this i s  Gewirth n o t e s t h a t t h e PCC would have  d i s j u s t i f i e d Nazism had i t been a p p l i e d — b u t would anyone have needed i t ? If  i t were r e a l l y u s e f u l a s a s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e , i t would be a p p l i c -  able to a t least  some o f t h e more hazy a r e a s o f p u b l i c p o l i c y w i t h which  men a r e most o f t e n concerned. or  A g a i n , t h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t i t i s u s e l e s s ,  t o t a l l y f o r m a l — o n l y t h a t i t i s not a s e f f e c t i v e a s one might have been  117 led  t o b e l i e v e by Gewirth*s o p t i m i s t i c c l a i m s . R u l e s do n o t take u s a s f a r a s might be thought  ing of  desirable i n j u s t i f y -  e q u a l treatment; what t h e y do i s g i v e men an a r e a o f l i f e e q u a l i t y i n a c e r t a i n l i m i t e d sense.  that  admits  I t seems t h a t t h e y l e a d u s t o t h e  same sphere t h a t we found e a r l i e r i n t h e examination o f r i g h t s — t h a t o f justice.  CHAPTER IV  EQUALITY AND  The The  morality, are  R e l a t i o n Between E q u a l i t y and  i d e a o f j u s t i c e has  This i s hardly  JUSTICE  underlain  Justice  much o f the  d i s c u s s i o n thus f a r .  s u r p r i s i n g , f o r w h i l e j u s t i c e might not be  the two  are  s t i l l intimately associated.  Inasmuch as  egalitarians  i n t e r e s t e d i n p r e s c r i b i n g p r o p e r o r r i g h t r e l a t i o n s between men  s o c i a l groups, i t i s r e a s o n a b l e t o assume t h a t t h e y are a just order. it  coterminous w i t h  I f t h e y a r e not  and  seeking j u s t i c e , or  proposing t o t a l equality or anything  (as I have m a i n t a i n e d ) , then they would appear to be p u r s u i n g  like  equality  118 because they b e l i e v e  i t i s f a i r or equitable.  They might wish t o argue  t h a t more e q u a l i t y would have u t i l i t a r i a n v a l u e because i t would eliminate  c l a s s c o n f l i c t or i n c r e a s e  p r o d u c t i v i t y , but  (say)  I think that  equity  i s the p r i m a r y c o n c e r n . I f t h i s i s so, the  question a r i s e s :  r e f e r r i n g to a p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y ? f e l t to be d e s i r a b l e , and do  e g a l i t a r i a n s not The  the  I s t h e r e any  at a l l i n  I f complete e q u a l i t y i s not  even  i f i t i s e q u i t y o r f a i r n e s s t h a t i s sought,  speak s o l e l y i n terms o f j u s t i c e and  why  equity?  p r o p e r response i s t h a t t h e r e are many view o f what i s j u s t .  extent that  j u s t i c e i n c l u d e s p r i n c i p l e s t h a t tend to c o l l i d e w i t h  a n o t h e r , proponents o f one  f o r instance,  To one  s o r t o f j u s t i c e w i l l s t r e s s the p r i n c i p l e t h a t  i s most i n l i n e w i t h t h e i r o v e r a l l c o n c e p t i o n . orians,  point  E g a l i t a r i a n s and  merit-  are both i n t e r e s t e d i n j u s t i c e ; t o pursue t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s , they must work w i t h t h e i r own  principles (i.e., equality  merit, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) .  concept o f j u s t i c e can  Thus, even i f the  41  and  embrace a l l  42  o f e q u a l i t y , i t does not mean t h a t the l a t t e r cannot be t r e a t e d as d i s t i n c t p r i n c i p l e i n i t s own The If  foregoing  right.  suggests a p o t e n t i a l l y f r u i t f u l  i t i s p o s s i b l e t o a n a l y z e j u s t i c e and  do not  i n v o l v e e q u a l i t y , we  a  should  approach t o our t o p i c .  t h e n s u b t r a c t a l l the p a r t s  that  be l e f t w i t h something t h a t would con-  t r i b u t e t o our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e .  The  A r i s t o t e l i a n Notion of J u s t i c e  A r i s t o t l e drew the c l a s s i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s i n the a n a l y s i s o f ( i ) between j u s t i c e as law and  j u s t i c e as f a i r n e s s ,  119  and  justice:  ( i i ) between  120 c o r r e c t i v e j u s t i c e and straightforward—he  who  distributive justice.  J u s t i c e a s law  obeys the law a c t s l a w f u l l y , and hence  P a r t i c u l a r j u s t i c e , o r f a i r n e s s , i s more r e l e v a n t to our E q u a l i t y i s the key  factor i n corrective justice.  seems  justly..  concerns. ( A l s o known as  compensatory, r e c t i f i c a t o r y , emendatory, o r r e t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e ) . i s t h a t a man  should  be  compensated f o r no more and  l o s e s a t the hands o f another man. a d d i t i o n and  The  give to  The  no l e s s t h a n what  relation i s arithmetic:  s u b t r a c t i o n : take from A and  fairly  One  idea he  of  B.  D i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e , on the o t h e r hand, i s geometric, o r p r o p o r tional.  The  i d e a here i s t h a t a man  however, can be  should  get what he  c a l c u l a t e d i n a number o f ways.  p o i n t t h a t "the d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of merit  deserves.  Desert,  McKeon n o t e s A r i s t o t l e ' s  i n a c t u a l s t a t e s t a k e s the form o f 121  r e c o g n i z i n g e x t e r n a l s i g n s l i k e w e a l t h , p o s i t i o n , b i r t h and power." far  as i d e a l s t a t e s a r e concerned, though, d i f f e r e n t men  conceptions of merit.  Aristotle  felt  As  have d i f f e r e n t  Thus:  The o l i g a r c h s t h i n k t h a t s u p e r i o r i t y on one p o i n t — i n t h e i r case w e a l t h — m e a n s s u p e r i o r i t y on a l l ; the democrats b e l i e v e t h a t e q u a l i t y i n one r e s p e c t — f o r i n s t a n c e , that of free birth—means e q u a l i t y a l l round.122 t h a t these views d i d not take i n t o account the end  f o r which  43 the s t a t e e x i s t s , i . e . , v i r t u e o r "good a c t i o n " .  The  e x c e l l e n c e , or c a p a c i t y s u i t e d t o the t a s k a t hand.  best c r i t e r i o n i s So t h a t w i t h r e g a r d  to  the s t a t e he h e l d t h a t : Those who c o n t r i b u t e most t o an a s s o c i a t i o n o f t h i s c h a r a c t e r / i . e . , who c o n t r i b u t e most t o good a c t i o n 7 have a g r e a t e r share i n the p o l i s / and should, t h e r e f o r e , i n j u s t i c e , r e c e i v e a l a r g e r r e c o g n i t i o n from i t 7 than those who a r e equal t o them ( o r even g r e a t e r ) i n f r e e b i r t h and descent, but unequal i n c i v i c e x c e l l e n c e , o r t h a n those who s u r p a s s them i n w e a l t h but a r e surpassed by them i n e x c e l l e n c e . 1 2 3 The  important p o i n t s seem t o be t h a t ( i ) d i s t r i b u t i o n s s h o u l d be made a c c o r d -  ing  to merit;  teristics;  ( i i ) merit  and  s h o u l d be determined a c c o r d i n g t o r e l e v a n t  ( i i i ) relevance  r e l a t e d t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n .  s h o u l d be based on the end o f the  charac-  activity  T h i s i s f a i r l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ; but w h i l e  i s no l o n g e r seen by most people t o c o n s i s t i n w e a l t h o r f r e e b i r t h ,  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t are r e l e v a n t t o p a r t i c u l a r t a s k s o r f u n c t i o n s a r e the s u b j e c t o f s e r i o u s  merit  often  dispute.  Thus the c r i t e r i a o f d e s e r t g e n e r a l l y comprise the c e n t r e around which arguments about j u s t i c e r e v o l v e t o d a y .  I n f a c t , i t has r e c e n t l y been a s s e r t e d  t h a t a l l j u s t i c e i s m e r i t o r i a n ( i n the "broad" sense) and  that e q u a l i t y i s  124 merely a "component" w i t h v e r y l i t t l e  s t a t u s o f i t s own.  s o r t o f i s s u e t u r n s on the p o s i t i o n from which one  Much o f t h i s  i s viewing  the  question.  F o r example, d i s t r i b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o need can be e i t h e r e g a l i t a r i a n o r m e r i t o r i a n , and an aspect  o f e i t h e r c o r r e c t i v e or d i s t r i b u t i v e  depending upon the d e f i n i t i o n s one  i s u s i n g and  the p o i n t one  justice, i s t r y i n g to  make. Distributive Justice At any questions  r a t e , the f o u r major f a c t o r s t h a t a r e thought t o e n t e r i n t o  o f d i s t r i b u t i o n are need, m e r i t  (or desert), n a t u r a l capacity  kk ( o r a b i l i t y ) , and u t i l i t y .  Each, c o n s t i t u t e s a c l a i m w i t h i t s own  rationale  and l e g i t i m a c y ; each i s g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d a s r e l e v a n t t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of distribution.  However, the c l a i m t h a t i s a c t u a l l y f e l t t o be the s t r o n g -  e s t w i l l v a r y from case t o case and from s o c i e t y t o s o c i e t y , w i t h the  final  r e s u l t o f t e n i n c o r p o r a t i n g s e v e r a l o r a l l o f the f a c t o r s , s t r e s s i n g them according to t h e i r r e l a t i v e weights. E q u a l i t y can be seen a s the norm from which d e p a r t u r e s must be justified. The assumption i s t h a t e q u a l i t y needs no r e a s o n s , o n l y i n e q u a l i t y does so; t h a t u n i f o r m i t y , r e g u l a r i t y , s i m i l a r i t y , symmetry...need not be s p e c i a l l y accounted f o r , whereas d i f f e r e n c e s , u n s y s t e m a t i c b e h a v i o u r , change i n conduct, need e x p l a n a t i o n and, as a rule, justification. I f I have a cake and t h e r e a r e t e n p e r s o n s among whom I wish t o d i v i d e i t , then i f I g i v e e x a c t l y one t e n t h t o each, t h i s w i l l n o t , a t any r a t e a u t o m a t i c a l l y , c a l l f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; whereas i f I d e p a r t from t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l d i v i s i o n I am expected t o produce a s p e c i a l r e a s o n . I t i s some sense o f t h i s , however l a t e n t , t h a t makes e q u a l i t y an i d e a l which h a s never seemed i n t r i n s i c a l l y e c c e n t r i c . . . 1 2 5 T h i s assumption has been c r i t i c i z e d on the ground t h a t any  distribution  r e q u i r e s j u s t i f i c a t i o n : e q u a l treatment i s j u s t a s l i a b l e t o be u n f a i r as unequal treatment, and i n many c a s e s a form o f treatment can be a s both e q u a l and unequal (depending upon the p o i n t o f v i e w ) .  described Lyons c l a i m s  t h a t what i s needed i s a " d o c t r i n e o f n a t u r a l k i n d s " , a s s e r t i n g t h a t h i s argument "has not been a g a i n s t such a p o s t u l a t e but a g a i n s t attempts t o do without i t — b y  s u b s t i t u t i n g a presumption o f e q u a l e n t i t l e m e n t supposedly  d e r i v a b l e s o l e l y from the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t r e a t i n g s i m i l a r c a s e s s i m i l a r l y . T h i s i s not enough," he c o n c l u d e s .  126  Stone has e x p r e s s e d the case f o r presuming e q u a l i t y i n more q u a l i f i e d terms.  He has f o r m u l a t e d a number o f " q u a s i - a b s o l u t e p r e c e p t s o f j u s t i c e " ,  the f i f t h o f which i s the f o r m a l e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e .  He says t h a t w h i l e i t  cannot be c o n s i d e r e d a b s o l u t e , " e q u a l i t y remains a g e n e r a l g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e ,  h5 p r o p e r l y t o be d e p a r t e d from where o b v i o u s l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e o r i n c o n f l i c t w i t h o t h e r v a l u e s t o which j u s t i c e must g i v e p r i o r i t y i n the g i v e n s i t u a t i o n . " T h i s i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y weaker than B e r l i n ' s statement, and suggests a n o t h e r r e a s o n f o r the presumption  o f e q u a l i t y : i t s convenience.  I f i t i s postulated  as a s t a n d a r d , not n e c e s s a r i l y f o r a t t a i n m e n t but s i m p l y f o r r e f e r e n c e , i t can be used t o a p p r e c i a t e the r e l a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the v a r i o u s t r e a t m e n t s possible.  I t i s the most convenient a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d norm, s i m i l a r t o the  s t i p u l a t i o n " a l l o t h e r t h i n g s e q u a l " t h a t i s so f r e q u e n t l y used i n the reasoning process.  In  any case, the c r i t e r i a o f need, m e r i t , n a t u r a l a b i l i t y and  utility  might be more n a t u r a l l y r e g a r d e d a s r e l a t e d t o i n e q u a l i t y r a t h e r t h a n t o equality. to  There a r e o b v i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s among men  r e g a r d i n g the f i r s t  three  j u s t i f y c o u n t l e s s d e p a r t u r e s from the norm, and a l l f o u r e n t e r i n t o e v e r y  phase o f d a i l y l i f e .  There a r e c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s , however, i n which they a r e  open t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f e q u a l i t y . We have a l r e a d y seen t h a t , a l t h o u g h needs can v a r y w i d e l y from p e r s o n to  p e r s o n (even i f one  speaks o n l y o f " l e g i t i m a t e " needs, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g them  from wants), t h e y a r e connected w i t h e q u a l i t y i n s o f a r a s t h e y a r e b a s i c o r biological.  A l l p e r s o n s have e q u a l needs up t o a p o i n t ; and these a r e  r e c o g n i z e d when s o c i e t i e s take a c t i o n t o ensure t h a t everyone c e r t a i n minimum s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g .  enjoys a  A f t e r t h i s , a p p a r e n t l y , needs become  d e s i r e s ; i . e . , once one i s f e d and c l o t h e d , e t c . , one can no l o n g e r speak o f needing v a r i o u s commodities,  such as new  c a r s , but can o n l y say t h a t one wants  them. N e v e r t h e l e s s , an unequal need from one v i e w p o i n t can be e q u a l from another.  Vlastos*  example o f the man  b e i n g hunted by the New  s y n d i c a t e i s r e l e v a n t : a l t h o u g h the man men  t o p r o t e c t him t h a t the average  York  crime  r e q u i r e d a g r e a t e r number o f p o l i c e -  c i t i z e n , the amount o f p r o t e c t i o n t h a t  k6  they b o t h enjoyed was r o u g h l y both r e c e i v e d t h a t p r o t e c t i o n .  similar.  128  Both needed t h e i r l i v e s  protected;  Raphael p u r s u e s a s i m i l a r l i n e o f  argument w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e handicapped, t h e aged, e t a l . Our unequal ( g r e a t e r ) p r o v i s i o n o f care f o r them i s an attempt t o reduce t h e e x i s t i n g i n e q u a l i t y ; we want, so f a r a s we can, t o b r i n g them t o a l e v e l o f equality with others i n capacity to e n j o y t h e i r l i v e s . Thus t h e b a s i s o f the c l a i m o f s p e c i a l need i s r e a l l y a r e c o g n i t i o n o f the claim t o equality.129 Thus when need i s r e l a t e d t o a s t a t e o f w e l l - b e i n g ,  i n e q u a l i t i e s can a c t u a l l y  become e q u a l i t i e s . At  f i r s t g l a n c e i t might appear t h a t t h e same k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g  make d i s t r i b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g  t o merit  e q u a l l y g e t what he d e s e r v e s . the p r e v i o u s ,  could  e g a l i t a r i a n , i n t h a t everyone would  But t h i s type o f e q u a l i t y i s d i f f e r e n t from  because i n t h e case o f need, t h e r e was a f i n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f  a good ( w e l l - b e i n g )  which c o u l d be s a i d t o be e q u a l .  e q u a l i t y i n t h e case o f m e r i t .  There i s no such  The o n l y s o r t o f e q u a l i t y found here o c c u r s  under c o n d i t i o n s o f c o r r e c t i v e j u s t i c e , where i n j u r e d p e r s o n s a r e compen-  130 s a t e d f o r l o s s e s t h e y have s u s t a i n e d a t the hands o f o t h e r  persons.  C o n c e r n i n g n a t u r a l c a p a c i t y , t h e u s u a l emphasis i s on d i f f e r e n c e s which, i f encouraged, l e a d t o i n e q u a l i t i e s . Raphael argues, however, t h a t t r i b u t i n g goods a c c o r d i n g  dis-  to t a l e n t i s i n keeping with e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s  i n s o f a r a s p e o p l e r e c e i v e t h e means t o a p r e s e n t potential exercise o f t h e i r capacities.  enjoyment, i . e . , t o t h e  There a r e d i f f e r e n c e s , but not  i n e q u a l i t i e s , both i n t h e e a r l y t r a i n i n g and i n t h e c a r e e r s f o r which p e o p l e become q u a l i f i e d .  Thus a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d d i s t r i b u t i o n once a g a i n t u r n s out  t o be an e q u a l i t y i n d i s g u i s e , a s men o b t a i n e q u a l amounts o f p l e a s u r e 131 b e i n g a l l o w e d t o develop and use t h e i r n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s . ^ h e r e a r e ( i ) t h a t n o t everyone i s p e r m i t t e d  from  The problems  t o e x e r c i s e h i s t a l e n t s , and  ( i i ) t h a t not everyone i s happy w i t h t h e t a l e n t s t h a t he has, o r a t l e a s t w i t h those t h a t have been chosen t o be developed and a p p l i e d t o a c a r e e r .  47  The  c o n n e c t i o n between e q u a l i t y and n a t u r a l c a p a c i t y , then i s r a t h e r  tenuous w i t h r e s p e c t t o d i s t r i b u t i v e The  justice.  f o u r t h f a c t o r , u t i l i t y , can a l s o be l i n k e d w i t h e q u a l i t y i n a s -  much a s i t c a l l s  f o r maximization  o f t o t a l welfare.  The formula " t h e  g r e a t e s t good f o r t h e g r e a t e s t number" has e g a l i t a r i a n i m p l i c a t i o n s , and i f t h e goods produced a r e p u b l i c b e n e f i t s , such a s i n c r e a s e d s u p p l i e s o f f o o d o r advances i n medicine,  every p e r s o n w i l l b e n e f i t .  These b e n e f i t s ,  however, a r e i n d i r e c t ; t h e p r i n c i p l e o f u t i l i t y i s c e n t r e d on maximizing 132  w e l f a r e r a t h e r than on a p p o r t i o n i n g i t f a i r l y ( o r any way a t a l l ) . These f o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a l l serve a s c r i t e r i a o f d i s t r i b u t i o n i n various notions o f j u s t i c e .  G i v e n t h e v a l u e o f human w e l l - b e i n g and t h e  c a p a c i t y o f men t o choose between r i g h t and wrong, d i v i s i o n o f s o c i a l goods a c c o r d i n g t o need, m e r i t , and/or a b i l i t y can r e a s o n a b l y be seen a s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f justicew  A j u s t s o c i a l o r d e r w i l l f u l f i l l t h e needs o f i t s  members (up t o a c e r t a i n minimum, a t l e a s t ) ; i t w i l l reward i t s members for  choosing  t o behave w e l l , r a t h e r than p o o r l y ; i t w i l l g i v e i t s members  what they need t o develop far as t h i s i s p o s s i b l e ) .  t h e i r p o t e n t i a l i t i e s and pursue t h e i r g o a l s ( a s Although  i s so o n l y i n an a g g r e g a t i v e distributive justice.  u t i l i t y i s concerned w i t h w e l f a r e , i t  sense, and i s t h e r e f o r e n o t a p a r t o f  A l l o f these  f a c t o r s allow f o r the r e c o g n i t i o n o f  human d i f f e r e n c e s . E q u a l i t y o f Opportunity There i s one good, however, which i s w i d e l y thought t o be s u b j e c t t o e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n , and t h a t i s o p p o r t u n i t y .  Everyone s h o u l d have an e q u a l  chance t o become what he might, f o r b e t t e r o r worse.  No one s h o u l d have  an u n f a i r advantage, t h a t i s , an advantage u n r e l a t e d t o what i s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e r o l e one i s a t t e m p t i n g h i g h e r I.Q. than another,  to f i l l .  I f a p r o s p e c t i v e t e a c h e r has a  i t i s a f a i r advantage, but i f he h a s a r e l a t i v e  48 on the s e l e c t i o n committee who advantage.  The  w i l l use h i s i n f l u e n c e , i t i s an  common metaphor i s t h a t o f a r a c e — i t  everyone s t a r t a t the same p l a c e .  unfair  i s only f a i r that  Everyone w i l l f i n i s h a c c o r d i n g to h i s  d e s e r t , which i s based on the q u a l i t y ( a t h l e t i c prowess) r e l e v a n t t o the a c t i v i t y (the r a c e ) .  T h i s has g e n e r a l l y been c o n s i d e r e d the b a s i s o f the  l i b e r a l conception of j u s t i c e — e q u a l opportunity p l u s d e s e r t — a n d u s u a l a l t e r n a t i v e to the s o c i a l i s t  i d e a l of e q u a l i t y of r e s u l t .  E q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y has been a t t a c k e d on two c e n t r e s on i t s i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y .  i s the  grounds.  The  first  I t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r everyone t o s t a r t o f f  e q u a l l y , i f o n l y because p e o p l e a r e d i f f e r e n t .  Much i s made o f the  facts  t h a t c h i l d r e n a r e bound to be r a i s e d u n e q u a l l y as l o n g as t h e y have p a r e n t s who  can g i v e them v a r y i n g amounts o f t r a i n i n g , a f f e c t i o n , goods, e t c . , and  t h a t they w i l l o b t a i n f u r t h e r advantages when these p a r e n t s use i n f l u e n c e on t h e i r c h i l d r e n ' s b e h a l f l a t e r i n l i f e .  their  Even i f a l l c h i l d r e n  were taken from t h e i r p a r e n t s a t b i r t h , they would s t i l l have d i f f e r e n t 134 experiences.  The argument can be taken f u r t h e r , but t h i s seems s u f f i c i e n t .  The problem w i t h t h i s type o f r e a s o n i n g i s t h a t i t assumes t h a t t h e r e a r e p e o p l e who  demand a b s o l u t e e q u a l i t y , whereas i n f a c t t h e y o n l y want some-  t h i n g w i t h i n reason.  The  i d e a i s t o have p e o p l e o b t a i n j o b s , e t c . because  t h e y have the r e l e v a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , because t h e y a r e b e t t e r s u i t e d anyone e l s e — n o t t o s e i z e i n f a n t s a t b i r t h o r manufacture new from t e s t t u b e s . c o n c l u s i o n " and  Charvet  than  generations  takes a s o c i o p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e to i t s " l o g i c a l  c r i t i c i z e s i t as i n c o h e r e n t — t h e r e b y m i s s i n g the whole p o i n t .  H i s c r i t i c i s m does show, however, t h a t t h e r e a r e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n implementing the n o t i o n , m a i n l y because t h e r e i s no such t h i n g as s t r i c t e q u a l i t y o f opportunity. sense—the  T h i s means t h a t one  spirit  cannot use i t i n any  s t r i c t , regulative  cannot be s a c r i f i c e d t o r i g i d l e g i s l a t i v e decree  without  undermining i t and u l t i m a t e l y r e d u c i n g i t to a b s u r d i t y . The  second a t t a c k f o c u s e s more p r o p e r l y on the p r i n c i p l e ' s a n t i -  e g a l i t a r i a n n a t u r e ; i t g i v e s men  the e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o become as unequal  49 as they can.  I t r e i n f o r c e s c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s and h i e r a r c h y , and f e e d s on  men's b a s e r i m p u l s e s , such as a m b i t i o n and s e l f i s h n e s s ; i n s t e a d o f demonstrating t o men  how  a l i k e t h e y a r e and how  much they have i n common,  135 the p r i n c i p l e emphasizes t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s and f o s t e r s d i s s e n s u s . Many o f these c r i t i c i s m s appear v a l i d .  However, i t might be g o i n g a  little  too f a r t o deny the c o n n e c t i o n between the e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e the i d e a l o f e q u a l i t y . it  and  I n c o n s i s t e n c y i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f most concepts;  i s mistaken, I t h i n k , t o condem e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y as c o n t r a r y t o the  s p i r i t o f e g a l i t a r i a n i s m merely because i t does not e q u a l i z e c o n d i t i o n s . It  i s a l e g i t i m a t e a p p l i c a t i o n o f the e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e t o a p a r t i c u l a r ,  delimited area of l i f e  and s h o u l d be r e c o g n i z e d a s Corrective  such.  136  Justice  F i n a l l y , I have a l r e a d y r e f e r r e d t o the r e l a t i o n between e q u a l i t y c o r r e c t i v e j u s t i c e ; the o r i g i n a l i d e a was  and  t o compensate i n j u r e d people f o r  l o s s e s t h e y had s u s t a i n e d a t the hands o f p e r s o n s ( t h u s : l e g a l damages) o r of  f a t e ( t h u s : programmes f o r the h a n d i c a p p e d ) .  The n o t i o n has had  an  e f f e c t on modern s o c i a l thought; l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s have combined i t w i t h ^the i d e a o f e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y , so t h a t a l l s o r t s o f h a n d i c a p s ,  particu-  137 l a r l y e n v i r o n m e n t a l , a r e t o be compensated f o r .  Another, but not  s a r i l y more r e c e n t , v e r s i o n c a l l s f o r compensation  neces-  f o r the f a c t t h a t some  people a r e simply not as t a l e n t e d as o t h e r s , and so a r e unable t o a c q u i r e  138 the good t h i n g s o f l i f e . to  The l a t t e r can be regarded as complementary  the i d e a o f maximal e q u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n o f need: where i t i s assumed t h a t  p e o p l e ' s needs s h o u l d be s a t i s f i e d , the imbalance of  s o c i e t y must be c o r r e c t e d , as a matter o f J u s t i c e as Procedure The  c r e a t e d by the workings  justice.  and J u s t i c e as R e s u l t  second major element o f j u s t i c e t h a t i s r e l e v a n t t o the  p r i n c i p l e has been d i s c u s s e d , i . e . , r u l e s .  The  f o c u s here i s on  equality procedure,  50 r a t h e r than on the r e s u l t a n t d i s t r i b u t i o n .  Thus i t i s h e l d t h a t  every  e f f o r t s h o u l d be made t o make good laws, but t h a t the important t h i n g i s t h a t they be i m p a r t i a l l y a p p l i e d .  "Indeed,  i t might be s a i d t h a t t o a p p l y  a law j u s t l y t o d i f f e r e n t c a s e s i s s i m p l y t o take s e r i o u s l y the a s s e r t i o n t h a t what i s t o be a p p l i e d i n d i f f e r e n t c a s e s i s t h e same g e n e r a l r u l e ,  139 without p r e j u d i c e , o r c a p r i c e . " b e f o r e the law."  T h i s i s what i s meant by  "equality  The maxim i s f o r m a l , i n t h a t i t does not t e l l us which  c a s e s a r e d i f f e r e n t and which a r e a l i k e ; y e t , as B e a r d s l e y has p o i n t e d o u t , t h i s does not r e n d e r the i n j u n c t i o n n u l l .  He goes on t o say w i t h B e r l i n  t h a t e q u a l treatment  i n every a c t i v i t y  i s a b a s i c assumption  involving  r u l e s : "There i s , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , no (moral) o b l i g a t i o n t o t r e a t e q u a l l y , but o n l y a ( l o g i c a l ) requirement  people  t o s u p p l y a good r e a s o n f o r  140 t r e a t i n g people u n e q u a l l y . "  To say t h a t i t i s a " l o g i c a l  requirement"  i s t o o v e r s t a t e the case; however, i f t h e r e i s t o be a r u l e f o r making r u l e s , i t makes sense t o p l a c e the burden o f p r o o f on those who unequal  call for  treatment.  The presumption meaningless,  o f e q u a l i t y and the n o t i o n o f i m p a r t i a l i t y a r e not  but they a r e not s t r o n g and demanding e i t h e r .  s a i d of other procedural r u l e s . o f i n t e r e s t s and B a r r y ' s advocacy open t o c r i t i c i s m inequalities.  The  same can  be  Benn's p r o p o s a l o f the e q u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y , f o r example, a r e  f o r t h e i r f o r m a l i t y : t h e y a r e not i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h g r e a t  L i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s have always been s u b j e c t t o t h i s k i n d o f  a t t a c k : Rawls' i d e a o f j u s t i c e a s f a i r n e s s has s i m i l a r l y been c r i t i c i z e d f o r i t s f a i l u r e t o take need i n t o a c c o u n t .  I am not c e r t a i n t h a t U t i l i t a r i a n ."  t h i n k e r s were as i n s t r u m e n t a l as Chapman b e l i e v e s i n b r i n g i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f need i n t o the concept o f j u s t i c e ; however, he i s c o r r e c t i n s t r e s s i n g  141 t h e i r concern w i t h the f i n a l r e s u l t r a t h e r than the s o c i a l p r o c e s s I n any case, Rawls now  emphasizes b o t h procedure and f i n a l  i n h i s t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e — t h e l a t t e r as a c o r r e c t i v e o r a check.  itself.  distribution This  51 i n v o l v e s a s o r t o f "double  e q u a l i t y " which has been c r i t i c i z e d from a l l  s i d e s , but which can be commended a t l e a s t f o r i t s r e l a t i v e moderation. two  The  p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e are: 1.  "Each p e r s o n i s t o have an e q u a l r i g h t t o the most e x t e n s i v e t o t a l system o f e q u a l b a s i c l i b e r t i e s compatible w i t h a s i m i l a r system o f l i b e r t y f o r a l l . "  2.  " S o c i a l and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e t o be a r r a n g e d so t h a t they a r e b o t h : (a) t o the g r e a t e s t b e n e f i t o f the l e a s t advantaged, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the j u s t s a v i n g s p r i n c i p l e , and (b) a t t a c h e d t o o f f i c e s and p o s i t i o n s open t o a l l under c o n d i t i o n s o f f a i r e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y . 1 h-2  Thus Rawls attempts  t o combine the v a l u e s o f l i b e r t y , e q u a l i t y , and  welfare i n a single conception.  He  e l a b o r a t e s the two  e s t a b l i s h e s p r i o r i t i e s , but f o r our purposes h i s "general conception" of  principles  public  and  i t w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a t e  justice:  A l l s o c i a l p r i m a r y g o o d s — l i b e r t y and o p p o r t u n i t y , income and wealth, and the bases o f s e l f - r e s p e c t — a r e t o be d i s t r i b u t e d e q u a l l y u n l e s s an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n o f any o r a l l o f those goods i s t o the advantage o f the l e a s t favored.1^3 I t can be seen t h a t R a w l s  1  "check" i s more t h a n the u s u a l p r o v i s i o n f o r  e q u i t y , i n t h a t i t a c t u a l l y governs the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f goods.  Hence  e q u a l i t y i s a f a c t o r a t both the b e g i n n i n g ( e q u a l r i g h t s t o l i b e r t y ) and end  (the l e a s t w e l l o f f must b e n e f i t from any  the  inequalities.)  I t w i l l be noted t h a t he does not s t i p u l a t e the amount o f b e n e f i t t h a t i s t o a c c r u e t o the l e a s t  f a v o u r e d v i s - a - v i s the most f a v o u r e d .  Rawls s i m p l y means, I b e l i e v e , t h a t the l e a s t  By ."advantage"  f a v o u r e d r e c e i v e more than  would have i f the i n e q u a l i t y had not been i n t r o d u c e d .  There i s no n o t i o n o f  r e l a t i v e advantage by which one might i n s i s t t h a t the l e a s t  favoured r e c e i v e  an e q u a l share o f any b e n e f i t s a r i s i n g from an i n e q u a l i t y , o r even a significant  share.  he  52 For men: be  the  100  example, suppose t h e r e are equal d i s t r i b u t i o n i s 20  created  i f the  u n i t s t o be d i v i d e d among f i v e  apiece.  But  suppose more u n i t s  d i v i s i o n s were unequal, so t h a t 200  could  u n i t s were produced.  Rawls' p r i n c i p l e would j u s t i f y a d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 80 u n i t s f o r one u n i t s f o r three others, a l l contributed does not  and  21  t o the i n c r e a s e  seem j u s t t h a t one  former t h a t was  but h i s r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n has  be e q u a l — o n l y t h a t the might a t f i r s t it  i s one  seem.  o f the  few  hO0  c e n t , even i f i t was The  s l i p p e d , and  T h i s i s not formula can  p e r cent w h i l e the t a l e n t o f  so i n a sense the  j u s t i f y greater  i n e q u a l i t i e s than i t  seen to c o n s i s t i n the  concep-  theory of j u s t i c e .  N e g a t i v e Approach t o  I t has  socialist  Equality equality i n their  been suggested, however, t h a t t h e s e t o p i c s  more f r u i t f u l l y approached from a n e g a t i v e p o i n t o f view. c o r r e c t i o n o f i n j u s t i c e : one  g e n e r a l and p o s i t i v e i d e a l , but w i t h the law,  and  inequality  t o say t h a t a l l d i s t r i b u t i o n s s h o u l d  t o t h i s p o i n t I have d e a l t \tfith j u s t i c e and  be i f some r a t h e r  the  l a t t e r g a i n s i n a b s o l u t e terms,  attempts t o combine the l i b e r a l and  The  p o s i t i v e senses.  they  N o n e t h e l e s s , Rawls' approach i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n t h a t  t i o n s o f e q u a l i t y i n one  Up  Assuming t h a t  through t h e i r ( r o u g h l y e q u a l ) e f f o r t s , i t  primarily responsible.  to h i s d i s a d v a n t a g e .  l e a s t advantaged.  man's good i n c r e a s e s  only 5 per  another's increases  was  f o r the  33  man,  " i s not  are  Thus j u s t i c e i s dealing with  any  e i t h e r as i t i s o r as i t might  1¥+  s p e c i f i c i n j u s t i c e were removed o r a l l e v i a t e d . "  P e t e r s have urged the a d o p t i o n o f a s i m i l a r approach t o E g a l i t a r i a n s have always been concerned t o deny the l e g i t i m a c y o f c e r t a i n s o r t s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n r e s t i n g on some g i v e n d i f f e r e n c e s , i . e . , t h e y have c h a l l e n g e d e s t a b l i s h e d c r i t e r i a as unreasonable, and i r r e l e v a n t t o the purposes f o r which t h e y were employed. C l a i m s t o e q u a l i t y a r e t h u s , i n a sense, always n e g a t i v e , denyi n g the p r o p r i e t y o f c e r t a i n e x i s t i n g inequalities.1^5  equality:  Benn  53 S a r t o r i makes t h e same p o i n t : t h e p r i n c i p l e o f " t h e r i g h t man i n t h e r i g h t p l a c e " , he s a y s , i s an i d e a l t h a t i s never r e a l i z e d , s i n c e i n i t s s t e a d what we f i n d o n l y t o o o f t e n i s t h e p r i v i l e g e d man i n a p r i v i l e g e d p l a c e . And t h i s i s where t h e demand f o r e q u a l i t y a c t u a l l y and r i g h t l y s t a r t s . The c l a i m f o r equality i s a protest against unjust, undeserved, and u n j u s t i f i e d i n e q u a l i t i e s . For h i e r a r c h i e s o f w o r t h and a b i l i t y never s a t i s f a c t o r i l y correspond t o e f f e c t i v e . h i e r a r c h i e s of p o w e r . . . . E q u a l i t y i s thus a p r o t e s t - i d e a l , a symbol o f man's r e v o l t a g a i n s t chance f o r t u i t o u s d i s p a r i t y , u n j u s t power, c r y s t a l l i z e d p r i v i l e g e . 1 4 6 There a r e advantages i n t h i s " c o r r e c t i v e j u s t i c e " t y p e o f a p p r o a c h . I t i s e a s i e r t o c r i t i c i z e e x i s t i n g p o l i c i e s and programmes t h a n i t d e v i s e new ones i n accordance w i t h a g e n e r a l i d e a l .  i s to  And one i s spared t h e  d i f f i c u l t y o f d e f e n d i n g newly c r e a t e d p o l i c i e s , which a r e o f t e n s u b j e c t  to  c r i t i c i s m as severe as t h a t o f t h e o l d ones. T h i r d l y , t h e n e g a t i v e approach has immediate p r a c t i c a l it  can be a p p l i e d t o any s i t u a t i o n s i m p l y by demanding t h a t  be j u s t i f i e d .  implications: inequalities  I f t h e y c a n n o t , t h e y a r e u n j u s t and ought t o be e l i m i n a t e d .  F i n a l l y , t h e n e g a t i v e approach i s t h e one t h a t i s a c t u a l l y used i n t h e everyday w o r l d . removal o f  People do n o t u s u a l l y propose e q u a l i t i e s , b u t c a l l f o r t h e  inequalities.  The advantages a r e n o t s u r p r i s i n g i f one b e a r s i n mind t h a t  inequality  " i s n o t c o n v e n t i o n a l b u t n a t u r a l : i t a c c o r d s w i t h t h e n a t u r e o f men, who d i f f e r p r o f o u n d l y i n i n t e l l i g e n c e , t a l e n t , and v i r t u e ; and i t a c c o r d s w i t h 147 t h e n a t u r e o f t h i n g s , which r e q u i r e h i e r a r c h y and d e g r e e . "  Diversity  a c o n d i t i o n o f l i f e , and whatever e q u a l i t y can be found i s almost always l i a b l e t o be an i n e q u a l i t y when l o o k e d a t from a d i f f e r e n t  perspective.  Thus Benn and P e t e r s conclude t h a t : as f a s t as we e l i m i n a t e d i s t i n c t i o n s we c r e a t e new o n e s — t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g t h a t t h e one we d i s c a r d we c o n s i d e r u n j u s t i f i a b l e , w h i l e t h e ones we c r e a t e seem r e a s o n a b l e .  is  54  I f we c a n be s a i d t o make p r o g r e s s i n t h i s m a t t e r , i t i s by c r i t i c i z i n g e x i s t i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s , by c r e a t i n g new ones t h a t c o n d i t i o n s seem t o j u s t i f y , a s w e l l a s e l i m i n a t i n g t h e ones t h e y do not; and t h i s i s r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t from a i m i n g a t a t h e o r e t i c a l and u n i v e r s a l i d e a l e q u a l i t y , w i t h i n which a l l t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n treatment we s h o u l d wish t o p r e s e r v e a r e somehow r e c o n ciled.148  There i s a good d e a l o f t r u t h i n what they say; i n e q u a l i t i e s has c e r t a i n l y p l a y e d practice.  the i d e a o f e l i m i n a t i n g  a c e n t r a l r o l e i n e g a l i t a r i a n thought and  But t h i s does n o t mean t h a t t h e e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e h a s no p o s i t i v e  content.  S a r t o r i contends t h a t "As an i d e a l e x p r e s s i n g  i s i n t e l l i g i b l e and a p p e a l i n g ;  a s an i d e a l e x p r e s s i n g  a protest,  proposals—as  equality a con-  149  structive i d e a l — i t aspects,  i s not."  I would say t h a t t h e i d e a h a s two l e g i t i m a t e  one o f which i s more complex t h a n t h e o t h e r .  does n o t seem t o c o n s t i t u t e s u f f i c i e n t important element.  Complexity, however,  reason f o r scrapping  o r i g n o r i n g an  The p u r s u i t o f j u s t i c e and o f e q u a l i t y a s d e f i n i t e  i d e a l s may be open t o c r i t i c i s m , but one c a n h a r d l y e x i s t i n any i n t e l l i g i b l e  form.  say t h a t t h e y do n o t  Raphael h a s s t a t e d t h e i r case w e l l :  I t i s not true that the claim o f j u s t i c e f o r e q u a l treatment ( i n t h e absence o f r e l e v a n t reasons f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ) i s a purely formal claim o f r a t i o n a l i t y o r consistency, nor that i t i s a p u r e l y n e g a t i v e c l a i m f o r t h e removal o f a r b i t r a r y i n e q u a l i t i e s . I t does i n c l u d e b o t h o f t h e s e , but i n a d d i t i o n i t i s s u b s t a n t i v e and p o s i t i v e , r e l a t i n g t o a combinat i o n o f q u a l i t i e s p o s s e s s e d by a l l human b e i n g s and t o a measure o f e q u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n s t h a t a r e c o n s i d e r e d due t o them i n the l i g h t o f t h e i r possession o f common human q u a l i t i e s . 1 5 0 Men s h o u l d  be t r e a t e d e q u a l l y on c e r t a i n o c c a s i o n s ,  t h e n , a s a matter o f  j u s t i c e , which "presupposes a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f e v a l u a t i o n o f human b e i n g s as p e r s o n s , and... h a s r e g a r d b e n e f i t s and burdens."  151  t o what t h e y themselves v a l u e  and d i s v a l u e a s  55 The  Concept o f J u s t i c e  J u s t i c e i s concerned w i t h human w e l l - b e i n g and t h e manner i n which goods a r e a p p o r t i o n e d .  We have seen t h a t a number o f c r i t e r i a  present  themselves when these k i n d s o f q u e s t i o n s a r i s e , and t h a t t h e r e i s no easy way t o determine which i s t o be brought t o bear i n c o n c r e t e l e s s which one comprises the essence o f j u s t i c e . m e r i t , need, a b i l i t y ,  s i t u a t i o n s , much  Considerations o f equality,  i m p a r t i a l i t y , p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y , and f a i r n e s s ( a s r e c i p -  r o c i t y ) r u n a l l through t h e concept and through each o t h e r a s w e l l . Raphael's s t a t e m e n t — " i f  —  /"i.e.,  t h e s p e c i a l case o f d e s e r t i s s u b t r a c t e d , f a i r n e s s  *152  d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e / means e q u a l i t y "  o p p o s i t e n o t i o n t h a t j u s t i c e means d e s e r t . coherent  I find  conception  — a s o v e r s i m p l i f i e d as the  I t i s impossible t o i s o l a t e a  o f e g a l i t a r i a n j u s t i c e , i f by t h a t term one hopes t o  i n c l u d e a l l the e q u a l i t i e s t h a t i n h e r e i n t h e concept.  I t i s more t h a n a  matter o f a d d i t i o n and s u b t r a c t i o n ; n e v e r t h e l e s s , we can say t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y i s a l e g i t i m a t e c o n s t i t u e n t element o f t h e i d e a o f justice.  CHAPTER V  EQUALITY AND SOCIETY  J u s t i c e , E q u a l i t y and P u b l i c I t i s apparent  Policy  t h a t j u s t i c e i s a complex a f f a i r ; n o n e t h e l e s s , i t  stands a s t h e most p r o m i s i n g l i n e o f i n q u i r y w i t h r e g a r d t o m a t t e r s o f equality.  J u s t i c e r e g u l a t e s human conduct  circumstances.  F o r o u r purposes,  i n a wide v a r i e t y o f p a r t i c u l a r  i t can be s a i d t o c o n s i s t o f a system o f  r u l e s , both g e n e r a l and s p e c i f i c , e x p l i c i t and i m p l i c i t , which i n f o r m and modify  one another i n c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n s o f procedure  or distribution,  a c c o r d i n g t o what i s f a i r o r u n f a i r (and t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t , a c c o r d i n g t o what i s r i g h t o r wrong, good o r b a d ) .  The q u e s t i o n o f when t o t r e a t  e q u a l l y o r u n e q u a l l y must be answered i n terms o f j u s t i c e . substance  people  I t lends  t o the p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y , and t h e i d e a o f e q u a l i t y — t h a t  which  i s espoused by e g a l i t a r i a n s — i s , i n f a c t , some form o r o t h e r o f e g a l i t a r i a n j u s t i c e : t h a t i s t o say, a c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e t h a t s t r e s s e s more, r a t h e r than l e s s , e q u a l i t y o f treatment.  Thus when we t u r n t o t h e r o l e t h a t  e q u a l i t y does and s h o u l d p l a y i n s o c i e t y , i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s , we must  determine  what i s j u s t . We have seen t h a t v a r i o u s formulae have been advanced on b e h a l f o f e q u a l i t y t h a t d e a l , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , w i t h what i s j u s t .  Hartvproposes  an equal r i g h t t o freedom, and Brown an e q u a l r i g h t t o p r o t e c t i o n o f one's moral i n t e r e s t s , p e r s o n , and e s t a t e .  Gewirth has f o r m u l a t e d a P r i n c i p l e o f  C a t e g o r i a l C o n s i s t e n c y which g i v e s r i s e t o e q u a l r i g h t s t o freedom and w e l l b e i n g , w h i l e Rawls suggests two p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e , complete w i t h p r i o r i t i e s ,  56  57 that  combine t h e n o t i o n s o f e q u a l freedom, e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y , and r e d i s -  t r i b u t i o n t o t h e l e a s t advantaged.  Even Mortimore's r u l e o f e g a l i t a r i a n i s m  t h a t any i n e q u a l i t y s h o u l d be p e r m i s s i b l e to some g r e a t e r  o n l y t o t h e extent t h a t i t l e a d s  e q u a l i t y o f o v e r a l l good, i s presumably based on some s o r t  of j u s t i c e . Not  a l l o f t h e s e formulae p r e t e n d t o embrace a l l o f t h e e g a l i t a r i a n  ideal or a l l of j u s t i c e . can  But i t s h o u l d be s t r e s s e d t h a t no simple r u l e  do s o . The c o n c e p t s o f r i g h t s , j u s t i c e , and e q u a l i t y a l l demand a  153 balancing  o f s h i f t i n g c r i t e r i a and c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  A l l rights are  prima f a c i e ; a l l j u s t i c e i s a matter o f weighing competing c l a i m s and d e c i d i n g which a r e r e l e v a n t ;  every e q u a l i t y i s subject  t o displacement by  another e q u a l i t y o r a more important i n e q u a l i t y , and i s i t s e l f an i n e q u a l i t y from a d i f f e r e n t  perspective.  When d e a l i n g w i t h t h e concept o r t h e i d e a l o f e q u a l i t y , then, we a r e n e c e s s a r i l y concerned w i t h e q u a l i t i e s .  I t i s much t o o vague t o r e f e r t o  equal treatment; i n s t e a d we must speak o f e q u a l i t y b e f o r e t h e law, e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y , and e q u a l i t y o f d i s t r i b u t i o n , o r r e s u l t .  Each i s a v a l i d  and  d i s t i n c t p r i n c i p l e w i t h i t s own s p e c i a l sense o f t h e term  "equality".  The  t h r e e a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y i n c o m p a t i b l e , i n t h a t they can a l l operate  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h i n a g i v e n s o c i e t y , but t h e y c e r t a i n l y do n o t e n t a i l o r imply one a n o t h e r .  I n f a c t , a s we have seen, e q u a l i t y o f d i s t r i b u t i o n , o r  r e s u l t , can g e n e r a l l y  be viewed a s a m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f the others,  when t h e y  a r e b e i n g a p p l i e d t o t h e same good. For and  instance,  e q u a l i t y b e f o r e t h e law might seem t o d i c t a t e t h a t X  Y pay t h e same income tax,  o r a t l e a s t pay a t the same r a t e , even  though X makes t e n t i m e s t h e amount t h a t Y makes.  These s o r t s o f e q u a l i t y  are m o d i f i e d by t h e i d e a o f e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n , so t h a t a p r o g r e s s i v e t a x i s i n s t i t u t e d which y i e l d s unequal r e s u l t s . absolutely  and p r o p o r t i o n a l l y ) .  (X pays much more t h a n Y,  Nevertheless, the p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y  58  b e f o r e t h e law i s n o t done away w i t h , f o r X and Y a r e s t i l l  equally subject  to t h e t a x law which a s s i g n s them t h e i r c a t e g o r i e s , and e q u a l l y s u b j e c t t o punishment f o r f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h i t .  I n a d d i t i o n i t c a n be p o i n t e d  out t h a t they a r e b e i n g t r e a t e d e q u a l l y i n t h a t they a r e both b e i n g t a x e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r (unequal)  c a p a c i t i e s t o pay.  Thus t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f  e q u a l i t y b e f o r e t h e law and e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n do not n e c e s s a r i l y c a n c e l one another out, a l t h o u g h t h i s appears  t o be t h e case i f one l o o k s a t a  certain set of results. Another k i n d o f d i f f i c u l t y i s found when e q u a l i t i e s appear t o c o n f l i c t over a p a r t i c u l a r good, when a c t u a l l y two d i s t i n c t goods a r e i n v o l v e d . F o r example, t h e r e can be e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o f i l l  certain positions, i . e . ,to  r i s e i n a s o c i a l h i e r a r c h y , and a t t h e same time be e q u a l i t y o f r e s u l t i n the sense t h a t , say, t h e s a l a r i e s b e l o n g i n g t o those p o s i t i o n s might be approximately  equal.  The problem a r i s e s i n t h e c o n f u s i o n o f j o b and s a l a r y ;  when t h e y a r e i n c o r r e c t l y t r e a t e d a s a s i n g l e good, e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y seems to be (and i s ) i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e q u a l r e s u l t . e q u a l i t i e s are ultimately resolvable.  T h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t a l l  I n many cases we simply must choose  the one which i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e c o n t e x t — i . e . , most i n l i n e w i t h o t h e r values.  There a r e s i t u a t i o n s i n which e q u a l i t y o f any type i s u n s u i t a b l e ;  t h i s f a c t s h o u l d be r e c o g n i z e d .  Often i t i s not.  M i c h a e l Young, f o r  i n s t a n c e , b e l i e v e s t h a t e g a l i t a r i a n i s m i s a c t u a l l y concerned uniqueness,  w i t h human  so t h a t i n a w o r l d w i t h a p l u r a l i s t i c v a l u e system, " t h e a n t i -  t h e s i s o f i n e q u a l i t y would not be e q u a l i t y but d i f f e r e n c e . "  Statements  o f t h i s n a t u r e , I am s u r e , a r e what prompts Oppenheim t o advocate e q u a l i t y be used o n l y a s a d e s c r i p t i v e concept. t h a t e q u a l i t y i s a moral impulse;  that  I t i s one t h i n g t o r e a l i z e  i t i s q u i t e another t o i n s i s t t h a t i t i s  the o n l y one i n town, t h a t i t i s i n k e e p i n g w i t h a l l t h a t i s good and p r o p e r . It i s , after a l l , approximately  a s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , and p h i l o s o p h i c concept,  the same l i m i t a t i o n s a s a l l t h e o t h e r s .  subject to  When a p p l y i n g i t t o  59 s o c i a l i s s u e s , then, i t must be kept i n mind t h a t i t i s v a r i e d and does not always work i n t h e same manner i n each  situation.  D a n i e l B e l l expresses s i m i l a r f e e l i n g s with regard to i n e q u a l i t y : h i s statement  i s w e l l s u i t e d t o the p r e s e n t  topic:  The d i f f i c u l t y w i t h much o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i s t h a t i n e q u a l i t y has been c o n s i d e r e d a s a u n i t a r y c i r c u m s t a n c e , and a s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e the measure o f i t s r e d r e s s / i . e . , fairness7, whereas i n s o c i o l o g i c a l f a c t t h e r e a r e d i f f erent k i n d s o f i n e q u a l i t y . The problem i s ^ e i t h e r / o r but what k i n d s o f i n e q u a l i t y l e a d t o what k i n d s o f s o c i a l and moral d i f f e r e n c e s . There a r e , we know, d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f i n e q u a l i t y — d i f f e r e n c e s i n income and w e a l t h , i n s t a t u s , power, o p p o r t u n i t y (occupational or s o c i a l ) , education, servi c e s , and t h e l i k e . There i s n o t one s c a l e but many and t h e i n e q u a l i t i e s i n one s c a l e are not coupled completely with i n e q u a l i t y n o  i n every other.155 We have o n l y t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e word " e q u a l i t y " t o understand  the e g a l i t a r i a n  approach t o s o c i e t y . There a r e , o f c o u r s e , those who p u r p o r t t o be e g a l i t a r i a n s and cause no end o f d i f f i c u l t y through t h e i r m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g equality principle.  and misuse o f t h e  Thus t h e " a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n " programmes o f t h e U n i t e d  S t a t e s have been used i n many i n s t a n c e s t o i n s t i t u t e n o t o n l y p r e f e r e n t i a l  156 treatment  but quotas on b e h a l f o f m i n o r i t i e s .  Seabury h a s noted t h a t " i n  the c u r r e n t view, e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y can o n l y be deemed t r u l y e q u a l i f i n i t s r e s u l t s i t p l a c e s a p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f each b i o l o g i c a l c a t e g o r y / i . e . , r a c e , sex, and  age7 i n t h e p o s i t i o n s  of effective status  157  w i t h i n every major i n s t i t u t i o n . "  Now i t i s o b v i o u s t h a t such an o u t l o o k  i s a misuse o f t h e e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e ; however, a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n might n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e i d e a o f e q u a l r e s u l t .  It  might be j u s t i f i e d under t h e n o t i o n o f compensatory j u s t i c e — c e r t a i n groups a r e thought  t o be u n d e s e r v e d l y  disadvantaged  o r "needy", so temporary a c t i o n  s h o u l d be taken t o b r i n g them up t o an e q u a l l e v e l o f w e l l - b e i n g w i t h o t h e r  60  Americans. A t f i r s t g l a n c e , t h i s i s a p l a u s i b l e case; f u r t h e r i n q u i r y , however, uncovers problems.  F i r s t l y , i t i s p o i n t e d out t h a t "quotas, once e s t a b -  l i s h e d a s i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r a c t i c e , prove a s v i g o r o u s l y a b l e t o p e r p e t u a t e themselves a s do Texas o i l - d e p l e t i o n a l l o w a n c e s , and f o r t h e v e r y same  158 reason."  I t i s n o t a matter o f i n t r o d u c i n g a temporary  inequality i n  the i n t e r e s t o f a g r e a t e r e q u a l i t y ; t h e r e i s no guarantee t h a t t h e i n e q u a l i t y c o u l d be phased o u t .  Secondly, qixotas a r e u n f a i r t o those who  a r e s l i g h t l y more q u a l i f i e d f o r p o s i t i o n s t h a n a r e t h e p e r s o n s who r e c e i v e them because  of race, etc.  I t can be s a i d t h a t t h e i n j u s t i c e i s temporary,  e t c . , but a g a i n , t h i s i s p r o b a b l y n o t t r u e . F i n a l l y , and most important, quotas a r e i n e g a l i t a r i a n . c e r t a i n groups  f o r b e n e f i t s and not o t h e r s .  Theyselect  There does not seem t o be any  c l e a r r e a s o n why a poor b l a c k p e r s o n who has been s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d e n i e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s s h o u l d be p r e f e r r e d t o a poor white p e r s o n who has been d e n i e d them.-. The i n j u s t i c e i s e x p e r i e n c e d by b o t h ; j u s t i c e s h o u l d c o n s i s t i n b o t h b e i n g g i v e n o p p o r t u n i t i e s , o r whatever good i s b e i n g d i s t r i b u t e d .  The  c r i t e r i a o f r a c e , sex, and age a r e n o t a r b i t r a r y , and compensation  i s not  unreasonable t o a degree.  But e q u a l i t y o f r e s u l t o r o f c o n d i t i o n does n o t  c o n s i s t i n s e l e c t i n g some d i s a d v a n t a g e d p e r s o n s over o t h e r s , on a group f o r compensation.  basis,  Such p o l i c i e s i n s t e a d conduce t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f  s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t groups who w i l l pursue t h e i r i n t e r e s t s a t t h e expense o f  159 the common good which i s c e n t r a l t o t h e e g a l i t a r i a n t h e s i s .  When  b e n e f i t s a r e extended t o a l l who need them i n t h e form o f e d u c a t i o n , m e d i c a l treatment, e t c . , i t i s t r u e t h a t " e q u a l i z a t i o n o f r e s u l t s p r o v i d e s t h e cond i t i o n s t h a t make p o s s i b l e a g r e a t e r measure o f e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y " , so t h a t t h e y "come t o g e t h e r a s a l t e r n a t i v e o r complementary means t o t h e  160 same e n d — t h e  achievement  o f j u s t i c e i n d e t e r m i n i n g f i t n e s s and p l a c e . "  61  But a s e l e c t i v e quota system does n o t do t h i s ; i t d e n i e s , o r a t l e a s t ignores, the e g a l i t a r i a n e t h i c .  Such p o l i c i e s can be c r i t i c i z e d ,  then,  161 on grounds o f u t i l i t y ,  f a i r n e s s , and e q u a l i t y .  Another a r e a o f contemporary concern i s e d u c a t i o n .  I n s o f a r a s educa-  t i o n i s a means t o some f u t u r e g o a l , i t s h o u l d be e q u a l i n t h e sense t h a t each p e r s o n s h o u l d be enabled t o develop h i s p o t e n t i a l . seen t h a t t h e r e a r e p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s here some type o f e q u a l treatment  to  realize their potential.  ( p . 46); n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i s clearly called for.  c l a i m t o t h e books, f a c i l i t i e s ,  We have a l r e a d y  S t u d e n t s have an e q u a l  and t e a c h e r a t t e n t i o n t h a t w i l l enable them  T h i s c l a i m does not have t o be e x e r c i s e d —  some s t u d e n t s do not want t h e b e n e f i t s o f e d u c a t i o n .  Nor does i t always  have t o be r e c o g n i z e d — t h e r e a r e competing c l a i m s , such a s those o f u t i l i t y : i n a poor s o c i e t y , t h e r e might be a s c a r c i t y o f r e s o u r c e s , so t h a t o n l y some s t u d e n t s can r e c e i v e t h e type o f e d u c a t i o n t h e y d e s i r e .  The c l a i m t o educa-  t i o n i s a s t r o n g one, however, and i s g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d under t h e p r i n c i p l e of  equal opportunity. Raphael has a l s o p o i n t e d out t h a t e d u c a t i o n can be an end i n i t s e l f —  it  i s a source o f enjoyment and s a t i s f a c t i o n , and i s a c o n d i t i o n under 162  which p e o p l e l i v e s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t s o f t h e i r l i v e s . i s a c l a i m t o e q u a l treatment here i s one o f r e s u l t .  Consequently,  there  on grounds o f f a i r n e s s ; t h e r e l e v a n t e q u a l i t y - /  The i d e a i s t h a t s t u d e n t s i n p u b l i c l y  s c h o o l s s h o u l d be educated under a p p r o x i m a t e l y  supported  equal c o n d i t i o n s .  It i s  wrong t h a t one h i g h s c h o o l s h o u l d have, say, double t h e p e r c a p i t a expend i t u r e s o f another i n t h e same c i t y ; I t h i n k t h i s can a l s o be extended m u n i c i p a l b o u n d a r i e s t o a whole c o u n t r y .  beyond  T h i s i s p r e s e n t l y a matter o f  c o n t r o v e r s y i n t h e U.S., n o t o n l y because o f t h e e q u a l i z a t i o n a s p e c t s but because o f t h e c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l t h a t would be n e c e s s a r y t o implement 163 such a scheme.  Inasmuch a s e d u c a t i o n i s an o b v i o u s good t h a t i s s u p p l i e d  62 by the s t a t e , though, t h e r e i s a s t r o n g c l a i m t o e q u a l a c c e s s to i t . A t h i r d c l a i m has r e c e n t l y been made on b e h a l f o f "open  admissions"  164 to  universities.  U n i v e r s i t y degrees a r e seen as t i c k e t s t o c a r e e r s and  economic w e l l - b e i n g , and  so the e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e i s s a i d to  j u s t i f y t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f entrance q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . is difficult The  T h i s question alone  enough: the i s s u e a t hand, however, i s even more  complicated.  emphasis a p p a r e n t l y i s on the degree more than on the e d u c a t i o n  so t h a t what i s d e s i r e d i s a r e s u l t r a t h e r than an o p p o r t u n i t y . the degree g i v e s one  further opportunities.  itself,  Granted,  But w i t h i n the c o n t e x t  of  e d u c a t i o n , i t i s an e q u a l r e s u l t t h a t i s sought. I s h a l l d e a l f i r s t l y w i t h the more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d m a t t e r o f open admissions  as e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y .  The p r i n c i p l e j u s t i f i e s them and,  many American s t a t e u n i v e r s i t i e s have a p o l i c y o f r e l a t i v e l y open (i.e.,  t h e y admit anyone who  has a h i g h s c h o o l d e g r e e ) .  and a r e unable  to take advantage o f i t .  admissions  Many s t u d e n t s  would not have been a c c e p t e d by s c h o o l s w i t h more s t r i n g e n t f a i l d u r i n g t h e i r f i r s t o r second y e a r s .  i n fact,  requirements  They a r e g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y , T h i s i s simple enough.  Some s t a t e s ,  however, cannot a f f o r d t o o f f e r e d u c a t i o n t o thousands o f s t u d e n t s who destined to f a i l .  who  T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y p r o b l e m a t i c when h i g h s c h o o l  are  standards  w i t h i n those s t a t e s a r e uneven, so t h a t some s t u d e n t s a r e not p r e p a r e d a t a l l for  f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n beyond what i s b a s i c .  l i m i t admissions  Thus t h e r e a r e good r e a s o n s  i n many s t a t e s on grounds o f u t i l i t y .  to  I n e f f e c t what t h e y  do i s g i v e everyone e q u a l a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n , but e s t a b l i s h a c u t o f f p o i n t b e f o r e s t u d e n t s get t o the u n i v e r s i t y l e v e l .  T h i s seems l e g i t i m a t e , f o r  a l t h o u g h t e r t i a r y e d u c a t i o n i s an o p p o r t u n i t y , i t i s so o n l y i n the t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r job c o n s t i t u t e s an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a s i m i l a r but r a n k i n g one.  Jobs a r e not g i v e n out t o everyone who  because they a f f o r d o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r f u t u r e goods.  sense higher  wants them merely I t i s the same w i t h  h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n : the o p p o r t u n i t y c o n s i s t s i n the e q u a l chance t o compete  6  3  f o r p o s i t i o n s based on c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a r e l e v a n t t o the n a t u r e o f function involved.  the  Where the number o f p o s i t i o n s i s u n l i m i t e d , and  are no o t h e r r e a s o n s f o r l i m i t i n g enrolment, the  equal opportunity  there prin-  c i p l e r e q u i r e s open a d m i s s i o n s ; o t h e r w i s e i t o n l y means t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e c u t o f f p o i n t and  t e s t i n g procedure be used i n d e t e r m i n i n g who  higher  and  education Now  who  I have mentioned t h a t f r e q u e n t l y i t i s the degree, r a t h e r  i s a matter o f e q u a l r e s u l t , not  opportunity.  d e n t s cannot handle the c u r r i c u l u m ,  The  S i n c e most u n q u a l i f i e d s t u -  s p e c i a l r e m e d i a l programmes have been  seem unreasonable i n p r i n c i p l e — a s we  o f t e n the b e t t e r p a r t o f j u s t i c e . objectionable  education.  I n a c t u a l p r a c t i c e , though, t h e r e  o n l y i s the u n i v e r s i t y expected to p r o v i d e  p r e p a r e s t u d e n t s t o be the o p p o r t u n i t y  t o be  educated as w e l l .  Not  York, a t any education;  educated; i t must go beyond t h i s and  of e q u a l i z a t i o n i n a d d i t i o n to that of education. u n i v e r s i t y a c c e s s i b l e t o everyone who  can use  must  everyone  make s t u d e n t s  social  I t i s one  succeed. function  t h i n g t o make the  i t ; i t i s a n o t h e r matter t o  i n s i s t t h a t i t ensure t h a t everyone a c t u a l l y is_ a b l e t o use might seem i n s i g n i f i c a n t , but  of  rate).  i t now  only i s i t to give  Thus the u n i v e r s i t y i s b e i n g p r e v a i l e d upon to take on the  i t . The  point  i t seems dangerous to g i v e the u n i v e r s i t y a  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t a l l y divorced  it  the t a s k  so t h a t t h e y can succeed, r a t h e r t h a n so t h e y can t r y to  The  are  f e a t u r e s to such p o l i c i e s .  remedying the d e f i c i e n c i e s ( a t C i t y U n i v e r s i t y o f New  tion.  This  have noted, compensation i s  F i r s t l y , the u n i v e r s i t i e s themselves have been a s s i g n e d  Thus, not  than  o b j e c t o f p u r s u i t , then,  i n s t i t u t e d to g i v e s t u d e n t s the n e c e s s a r y s k i l l s f o r h i g h e r  "equal",  receive  i s not.  admittance t o the u n i v e r s i t y , t h a t i s d e s i r e d .  does not  i s to  from i t s v a l u a b l e  p r o p e r f u n c t i o n o f educa-  more i t i s used a s an instrument o f s o c i a l p o l i c y , the l e s s l i k e l y  i s to be a b l e t o c a r r y on i t s own  p o l i c i e s and  programmes e f f e c t i v e l y .  ( T h i s does not appear u n r e a l i s t i c when i t i s noted t h a t v a r i o u s s c h o o l s  of  64 CUNY have been g i v i n g degree c r e d i t s f o r r e m e d i a l course work.''^  This  does not s i g n a l the c o l l a p s e o f the American u n i v e r s i t y system, but i t c e r t a i n l y c o n s t i t u t e s a change i n e d u c a t i o n a l p o l i c y brought on by i t s new  " n o n - e d u c a t i o n a l " r o l e , and a d e v a l u a t i o n o f i t s s t a n d a r d s . ) I s h o u l d p r o b a b l y mention here t h a t the o b j e c t i o n i s not t o  c o u r s e s , but t o the u n i v e r s i t y g i v i n g them.  remedial  They s h o u l d be p r o v i d e d  by  the s t a t e i n l i n e w i t h the i d e a o f e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y , but i n s e p a r a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s designed  f o r the p u r p o s e .  Or b e t t e r y e t , p r i m a r y and  second-  a r y e d u c a t i o n s h o u l d be made more thorough and e f f e c t i v e so t h a t compensat o r y e d u c a t i o n i s not n e c e s s a r y a f t e r h i g h s c h o o l .  T h i s might be  i n any event, the p r e p a r a t i o n s h o u l d occur b e f o r e a d m i s s i o n rather than  unrealistic;  to u n i v e r s i t y  after.  Against E q u a l i t y The concepts  f o r e g o i n g problems seem t o a r i s e n a t u r a l l y from g e n e r a l such as e q u a l i t y .  the p e r s o n who h i s own  My p o i n t i s t h a t the d i f f i c u l t y i s caused  m i s i n t e r p r e t s o r misuses the c o n c e p t — o f t e n  p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s f o r which he i s s e e k i n g  than by the concept  itself.  political  I t i s " he who  by  f o r the sake o f  justification—rather  i s responsible for c r i t i c i s m  of  167 e g a l i t a r i a n i s m on the ground t h a t i t i s r o o t e d i n envy: p r i n c i p l e i s no more based on envy than i s any o t h e r . weakness, and c e r t a i n l y not p e c u l i a r t o  the e q u a l i t y Envy i s a human  egalitarians.  A second l i n e o f a t t a c k i s based on the i d e a t h a t e g a l i t a r i a n i s m i s propounded by a s m a l l m i n o r i t y o f the p o p u l a t i o n , p r i m a r i l y who  are d i s s a t i s f i e d with bourgeois  "intellectuals",  c i v i l i z a t i o n and t h e i r r o l e i n i t .  m a j o r i t y o f the p e o p l e a r e p e r f e c t l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h s o c i a l  The  inequalities,  p r o v i d e d t h e r e i s f a i r a c c e s s to them ( e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y ) and e q u a l i t y  168 b e f o r e the law.  T h i s i s a p e r s u a s i v e argument i n f a v o u r o f l i m i t i n g  the e x t e n t o f e q u a l i t y when one  i s c o n s i d e r i n g q u e s t i o n s o f more o r l e s s ;  65 however, one  should bear i n mind t h a t the m a j o r i t y  i s not always r i g h t .  If  ••the p e o p l e " were t o support the i n s t i t u t i o n o f s l a v e r y (as t h e y have been known t o do), i t would s t i l l be m o r a l l y u n j u s t i f i a b l e . E q u a l i t y o f r e s u l t has a l s o been c r i t i c i z e d on the ground t h a t i t would take away i n c e n t i v e s n e c e s s a r y to the o p e r a t i o n f o r i n c e n t i v e s has  g e n e r a l l y been r e c o g n i z e d  o p i n i o n have a r i s e n over the n a t u r e and t o m a i n t a i n the s o c i a l p r o c e s s ^ seem t o have m o d i f i e d  of society.  The  need  by e g a l i t a r i a n s ; d i f f e r e n c e s o f  the extent  o f those a c t u a l l y r e q u i r e d  S o c i a l i s t t h e o r i s t s i n the S o v i e t U n i o n  t h e i r o r i g i n a l a t t i t u d e s tov/ards i n c e n t i v e s ,  and  169 have come t o use  them more and more.  T h i s i n d i c a t e s that past e g a l i t a -  r i a n s were somewhat o v e r l y o p t i m i s t i c i n t h e i r views, but t h a t i n e q u a l i t i e s o f wealth and  does not  income c u r r e n t l y found i n Western  prove indus-  t r i a l i z e d s o c i e t i e s a r e a t a minimum l e v e l o r anywhere near i t . Further the context  r e a s o n s f o r i n e q u a l i t i e s have been o f f e r e d by N i s b e t  within  o f the American e x p e r i e n c e : There i s something, a f t e r a l l , t h a t a p p e a l s to the i m a g i n a t i o n , to the r i s k - t a k i n g s e n s i b i l i t y , t o the ever p r e s e n t hope o f " h i t t i n g i t big", i n a non-equalitarian s o c i e t y , where channels o f m o b i l i t y are a t l e a s t r e a s o n a b l y open. Beyond t h i s , h i e r a r c h y and i n e q u a l i t y are key elements o f the s o c i a l bond...And t h e r e i s , f i n a l l y , the seemingly i n e r a d i c a b l e American r e s p e c t f o r m e r i t , and f o r goods and s t a t u s e s a r r i v e d a t ( o r which appear t o have been a r r i v e d a t ) through merit.170  The  o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o " h i t i t b i g " and  t o take r i s k s can be  adequately  provided  through the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f l o t t e r i e s and Grand P r i x - s t y l e r o a d  racing.  F u n c t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y and  patible with egalitarianism.  But  s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n are not merit  incom-  i s a legitimate r i v a l of equality  as a c r i t e r i o n o f j u s t d i s t r i b u t i o n . Once b a s i c needs have been a t t e n d e d t o , i t a f f o r d s the b a s i s o f a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d d i s t r i b u t i o n o f v a r i o u s goods. This i s quite proper.  I t should be kept i n mind, however, t h a t the  notion  66  o f d e s e r t does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y j u s t i f y an i n e g a l i t a r i a n s o c i e t y .  This i s  so because ( i ) people a r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , not g e n e r a l l y , d e s e r v i n g . deserves more o f e v e r y t h i n g .  No one  X might deserve a h i g h e r s a l a r y than Y  because o f the n a t u r e o f h i s o c c u p a t i o n , but Y might m e r i t g r e a t e r r e s p e c t than X because o f h i s moral q u a l i t i e s .  I t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t each p e r s o n  c o u l d g e t \tfhat he deserves, w i t h t h e t o t a l good o f each b e i n g equal,  roughly  ( i i ) Furthermore, not a l l d i f f e r e n c e s a r e i n e q u a l i t i e s .  Two  people can have d i f f e r e n t o c c u p a t i o n s o r homes o r p r e f e r e n c e s , but t h i s does not. mean t h a t they a r e unequal.  They might be unequal a c c o r d i n g t o  some s t a n d a r d o f v a l u e , but i t i s not always c l e a r which s t a n d a r d i s r e l e v a n t . I n many s i t u a t i o n s i t does not make sense t o speak o f i n e q u a l i t y ,  (iii)  even when d i s t r i b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o m e r i t does c r e a t e i n e q u a l i t i e s , i s no r u l e t o d i c t a t e t h e i r s i z e .  Finally,  there  X might be much more d e s e r v i n g than Y,  but we do not know how much more o f which p a r t i c u l a r good he ought t o receive.  There does n o t seem t o be any r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t a lawyer  deserves t e n times the income o f a manual l a b o u r e r ( u n l e s s , perhaps, one i s a  lawyer). To t h e e x t e n t t h a t m e r i t i s thought  t o be a component o f j u s t i c e ,  d i s t r i b u t i o n s w i l l t e n d away from a b s o l u t e e q u a l i t y . the e g a l i t a r i a n ; he i s opposed t o unreasonable, The  l a s t c r i t i c i s m t h a t warrants  This i s acceptable t o  not a l l ,  examination  inequalities.  holds that the e q u a l i t y  p r i n c i p l e i s unworkable i n any o r a l l o f i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s .  I t i s incoher-  ent and i n a p p l i c a b l e a s an instrument  o f s o c i a l p o l i c y , and i s t h e r e f o r e  meaningless.  t o t h i s argument.  There i s some substance  The e g a l i t a r i a n  might say t h a t he i s i n t e r e s t e d i n an i d e a l , not a r u l e t o cover circumstance. implement.  then,  every  The i d e a l o f l i b e r t y , f o r example, i s a l s o d i f f i c u l t t o  Of c o u r s e , men know when they a r e f r e e ( i . e . , not b e i n g  c o e r c e d ) , but men a l s o know when they a r e b e i n g t r e a t e d e q u a l l y . At t h i s p o i n t t h e c r i t i c might respond w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n : "Do they?  67  I f X works kO hours and produces  100 u n i t s w h i l e Y works 40 hours and  produces 80 u n i t s , does t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y r e q u i r e t h a t t h e y r e c e i v e e q u a l o r unequal pay cheques?  There i s no way t o d e c i d e — t h e same t r e a t -  ment can be e q u a l from one p o i n t o f view and unequal problem  w i t h e q u a l treatment  determine  from a n o t h e r .  The  i s t h a t one needs an e x t e r n a l s t a n d a r d t o  whether o r not men a r e b e i n g t r e a t e d e q u a l l y — b u t t h e s t a n d a r d s  a r e c o n s t a n t l y s h i f t i n g from case t o c a s e .  T h i s l o o k s more l i k e a matter o f  f a i r n e s s o r j u s t i c e than o f e q u a l i t y . " As I see i t ,  t h e e g a l i t a r i a n response  but i t i s n o t meaningless  either.  cannot be t o t a l l y c o n v i n c i n g ,  F o r even i f e q u a l treatment  presumes  s t a n d a r d s o f j u s t i c e , i t remains a k i n d o f e q u a l i t y : one might say t h a t i t i s o n l y j u s t i c e , but t h e n one might a l s o say t h a t j u s t i c e i s o n l y e q u a l i t y i n accordance w i t h t h e r e l e v a n t s t a n d a r d s . standards c o n s t a n t l y s h i f t  And i t i s not t r u e t h a t  from case t o c a s e — t h e y might not be a b s o l u t e ,  e t e r n a l , o r s e l f - e v i d e n t , but a t any g i v e n time t h e r e w i l l be a g e n e r a l consensus  on which s t a n d a r d s a r e r e l e v a n t .  They can be defended w i t h good  r e a s o n s , and r e p l a c e d w i t h b e t t e r r e a s o n s , but t h e r e i s a l i m i t on t h e number o f reasons which can be c o n s i d e r e d good.  Thus i n some  situations  e q u a l treatment w i l l c o n s i s t i n an e q u a l r a t e o f pay p e r hour, and i n o t h e r s an e q u a l r a t e p e r u n i t produced.  There  on t h e o t h e r hand, s t a n d a r d s a r e not a r b i t r a r y .  i s no a p r i o r i r u l e b u t , The workers i n t h e  example w i l l know whether o r not t h e y a r e b e i n g t r e a t e d e q u a l l y , and i f t h i s does not c o n s t i t u t e a l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i t does b r i n g out t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e , i d e a l o r impulse o f e q u a l i t y  exists.  CONCLUSION  We have seen t h a t d e s p i t e g r e a t e f f o r t s t o demonstrate  the contrary,  t h e r e a r e no c o m p e l l i n g s i m i l a r i t i e s t h a t a l l men s h a r e , save t h e f a c t they a r e men. rights.  that  T h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c does n o t g i v e r i s e t o any a b s o l u t e  N e v e r t h e l e s s , men, b e i n g men, have j o i n e d t o g e t h e r and formed  societies.  Out o f s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e , c e r t a i n v a l u e s have been c r e a t e d w i t h  human w e l f a r e a t t h e i r c e n t r e .  As men's s o c i a l systems have become more  complex, so have t h e i r r u l e s f o r r e g u l a t i o n o f conduct.  I n s o f a r a s these  systems f o c u s on t h e c e n t r a l v a l u e s , t h e y m a n i f e s t themselves a s systems o f m o r a l i t y , l e g a l i t y , and j u s t i c e , both f o r m a l l y and i n f o r m a l l y . The  i d e a o f e q u a l i t y h a s been found t o be a b a s i c , i f n o t n e c e s s a r i l y  the dominant, element faceted.  i n these spheres.  It i sdifficult  T h i s i d e a i s complex and m u l t i -  t o a p p l y c o n s i s t e n t l y t o human c o n c e r n s .  Some o f  t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s can be a v o i d e d i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s by a d o p t i n g Oppenheim's common sense d e s c r i p t i v e approach. l i m i t e d t o the world o f f a c t .  T h i s approach, however, i s  Where v a l u e c h o i c e s a r e i n v o l v e d ,  equality  s h o u l d simply be thought o f a s one v a l u e among many, each w i t h i t s own validity.  The substance o r i m p l i e d consequences  o f the e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e  can t h e n be compared w i t h those o f t h e o t h e r s ; s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and p o l i c i e s , e t c . w i l l emerge from t h e i r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n .  T h i s does n o t mean  t h a t e q u a l i t y o r any o f t h e o t h e r s , such a s l i b e r t y o r a u t h o r i t y , a r e t o be emasculated.  I t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f such broad c o n c e p t s t h a t t h e y  cannot be a p p l i e d i n w h o l e s a l e f a s h i o n : t h e y must take o t h e r v a l u e s i n t o account.  Nor does i t mean t h a t s u p p o r t e r s o f v a r i o u s p r i n c i p l e s w i l l  agree on some grand c o m p r o m i s e — i t  all.  i s o n l y t h a t awareness o f many v a l u e s ,  68  69  such as m e r i t , u t i l i t y ,  a u t h o r i t y , l i b e r t y , and  e q u a l i t y , and  recognition  o f t h e i r l e g i t i m a c y , i s i n the i n t e r e s t o f sound p o l i c y - m a k i n g . Oppenheim i s c o r r e c t i n i n s i s t i n g t h a t e q u a l i t y should not be used a laudatory  term.  Nor  should  i t be a p e j o r a t i v e term.  p o l i c y i s e g a l i t a r i a n or i n e g a l i t a r i a n should r e a c t i o n s o f p r a i s e o r condemnation. normative content s h o u l d e x p r e s s i o n — p e o p l e do The  But  f e e l one  way  a  provoke  t o say t h a t  the  E q u a l i t y i s a normative  o r the o t h e r about i t .  i d e a o f e q u a l i t y , then, i s not u n l i k e o t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t s .  I t might be  difficult  t o understand and  t o use,  but  conclude t h a t i t s h o u l d be a l t e r e d o r e l i m i n a t e d . r e a s o n a b l y and i f not  fact that  not a u t o m a t i c a l l y  t h i s i s not  o r can be removed.  The  as  i t i s mistaken to I t has  t h o u g h t f u l l y a p p l i e d to p u b l i c a f f a i r s .  i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t , moral impulse, and  a p l a c e when  It i s a  constant,  must be r e c o g n i z e d  as  such.  NOTES  F e l i x E . Oppenheim, " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m A s A D e s c r i p t i v e Concept", American P h i l o s o p h i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 7 ( A p r i l , 1970), pp. 143-52.  2 New  I s a i a h B e r l i n , " E q u a l i t y " , P r o c e e d i n g s o f the A r i s t o t e l i a n S e r i e s , 56 (1955-56), pp. 313-14.  ^The i s discussed  Society,  c o n n e c t i o n between e g a l i t a r i a n i s m and the p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y below, p p . 6-11.  if  F o r example, see B e r l i n , " E q u a l i t y " , p p . 311-19, 326; Hugo Adam Bedau, " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m and the Idea o f E q u a l i t y " , i n E q u a l i t y , Nomos IX, e d s . J . Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: A t h e r t o n P r e s s , 1967), pp. 13-27; H. J . McCloskey, " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m , E q u a l i t y and J u s t i c e " , . A u s t r a l a s i a n J o u r n a l o f P h i l o s o p h y , 44 (May, 1966), p . 57; J . R. Lucas, " A g a i n s t E q u a l i t y " , i n J u s t i c e and E q u a l i t y , ed. H. A. Bedau (Englewood C l i f f s , N. J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1971), pp. 1?7-51; J . C h a r v e t , "The Idea o f E q u a l i t y a s a S u b s t a n t i v e P r i n c i p l e o f S o c i e t y " , i n Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Theory, eds. Anthony de C r e s p i g n y and A l a n Wertheimer (New York: A t h e r t o n P r e s s , 1970), pp. 157-68; Robert N i s b e t , "The P u r s u i t o f E q u a l i t y " , P u b l i c I n t e r e s t , No. 35 ( S p r i n g , 1974), pp. 115-16; A r n o l d B r e c h t , P o l i t i c a l Theory, ( P r i n c e t o n , N. J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1959), pp. 151, 411-12; and G i o v a n n i S a r t o r i , Democratic Theory (New York: F r e d e r i c k A. P r a e g e r  1962), pp. 328-34.  Benn's comment i s p e r t i n e n t : "A f a v o r i t e way o f d i s c r e d i t i n g t h e e g a l i t a r i a n , however, i s t o make i t appear t h a t he seeks t o remove forms o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n t h a t n e i t h e r he nor anyone e l s e , would f o r a moment q u e s t i o n . " " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m and the E q u a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f I n t e r e s t s , " , i n E q u a l i t y , Nomos IX. p . 65, n . 2 . Not a l l o f these w r i t e r s a r e opposed t o t h e e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e : e.g., Bedau uses the n o t i o n o f " r a d i c a l e g a l i t a r i a n i s m " a s a straw man t o show t h a t e g a l i t a r i a n i s m p r o p e r i s not x^hat i t s c r i t i c s c l a i m . Nevertheless, the t e r m i n o l o g y i s s t i l l u n f o r t u n a t e .  5 See a l s o S. I . Benn and R. S. P e t e r s , The P r i n c i p l e s o f P o l i t i c a l Thought, (New York: The F r e e P r e s s , 1959), pp. 131, 4~4"8,' n. '8; D a v i d Thomson, E q u a l i t y , (Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1949), p . 5«; M i c h a e l Walzer, " I n Defense o f E q u a l i t y " , D i s s e n t , 20 ( F a l l , 1973), pp. 401-3; and D a v i d S p i t z , "A Grammar o f E q u a l i t y " , D i s s e n t , 21 (Winter, 1974), pp. 63-6; a s w e l l a s Benn, " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m " .  6 C h a r v e t , "Idea"; pp. 157-68; L u c a s , " A g a i n s t E q u a l i t y " , p p . 138-51.  7 Lucas, " A g a i n s t E q u a l i t y " , p p . 139-42.  8 As S p i t z h a s observed, such c r i t i c s , " c o n t e s t caricature of equality." "Grammar", p . 7 8 . g Lucas, " A g a i n s t E q u a l i t y " , pp. 141-51.  70  n o t e q u a l i t y but a.  71 10  Bedau has n o t e d t h a t " i t i s i n f a c t not p o s s i b l e t o e l i m i n a t e a l l i n e q u a l i t i e s , e i t h e r because r o l e - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y t o the e x i s t e n c e o f any s o c i a l system and r o l e - s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i s e q u a l l y n e c e s s a r y (as the cause o r consequence) t o r o l e - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , o r f o r o t h e r l e s s s o p h i s t i c a t e d r e a s o n s , e.g., because some i n e q u a l i t i e s can be removed o n l y by i n t r o d u c i n g o t h e r s , o r because s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e an i n e s c a p a b l e consequence o f n a t u r a l ( i n d i v i d u a l ) i n e q u a l i t i e s . . . . / Hence:/ The question... f o r those w i t h e g a l i t a r i a n sentiments i s t h i s : What a r e the~minimura i n e q u a l i t i e s r e q u i r e d t o m a i n t a i n a g i v e n s o c i a l system and what i s the c o s t , i n terms o f e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t would need t o be changed and o f the f r u s t r a t i o n o f o t h e r v a l u e s , to a c h i e v e t h i s minimum?" See "Egalitarianism", p.21. 11 That i s , i f i t does not a l l o w f o r n e c e s s a r y or u n a v o i d a b l e i n e q u a l i t i e s o f the type mentioned i n n . 1 0 . 12 I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f i s not l e g i t i m a t e - - t h a t i t i s i l l - f o u n d e d and i n a p p l i c a b l e t o human a f f a i r s . T h i s would make i t s d e r i v a t i v e n o t i o n s i r r a t i o n a l as w e l l . T h i s q u e s t i o n w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d throughout the paper; the p o i n t t h a t I wish to make here i s t h a t what i s t r u e o f " e q u a l i t y " i s a l s o t r u e o f " e g a l i t a r i a n i s m " and " e g a l i t a r i a n " . 13 Oppenheim, " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m " ; see a l s o h i s a r t i c l e " E q u a l i t y : The Concept o f E q u a l i t y " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n c y c l o p e d i a o f the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 5 , PP. 1 0 2 - 8 . 14 " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m " , p. 152. 15 I b i d . , p. 1 5 0 . (Emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l . A l l emphases i n subsequent q u o t a t i o n s are from the o r i g i n a l statements, u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e n o t e d ) . For example, i f A has 99 u n i t s and B has 1 u n i t , and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n p o l i c y t a k e s 1 u n i t from A and g i v e s i t to B, A!s percentage o f the t o t a l w i l l be reduced to 98 per cent and B's i n c r e a s e d t o 2 per c e n t . The percentage d i f f e r e n c e i s now " o n l y " 96 p e r c e n t , r a t h e r than 98 p e r c e n t . A c c o r d i n g to Oppenheim, t h i s p o l i c y would be e g a l i t a r i a n . The d i f f i c u l t y i s even more pronounced when one i s d e a l i n g w i t h broad programmes o r w i t h whole s o c i e t i e s : how can t h e y be d e f i n e d as e g a l i t a r i a n o r i n e g a l i t a r i a n without r e f e r e n c e to some i d e a l standard? T h i s , o f c o u r s e , i s the p o i n t t h a t Oppenheim i s t r y i n g t o m a k e — t h e y cannot be so d e f i n e d under any c i r c u m s t a n c e s , so why t r y ? He f e e l s t h a t i t i s a mistake t o pursue s o c i a l e q u a l i t y as an i d e a l , anyway ( I b e l i e v e ) ; i n s t e a d , s o c i e t i e s s h o u l d t r y t o a c h i e v e j u s t i c e , o r perhaps maximum u t i l i t y , which would i n c l u d e whatever degrees o f e q u a l i t y were f e l t t o be d e s i r a b l e . The a r g u ment i s q u i t e r e a s o n a b l e , but cannot be v a l i d a t e d merely by s t r e s s i n g the d e s c r i p t i v e sense o f the term and b r u s h i n g a s i d e the n o r m a t i v e . ^ T h i s i s not t o say t h a t Oppenheim*s approach i s not i n s t r u c t i v e . I n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s h i s d e s c r i p t i v e method would be v e r y u s e f u l . But I do not f e e l t h a t i t does a l l t h a t he wants i t t o do, nor do I agree w i t h the way he h a n d l e s the normative s i d e o f the problem by i g n o r i n g i t .  17 Edward S h i l s , " I d e o l o g y : The Concept and F u n c t i o n o f I d e o l o g y " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n c y c l o p e d i a o f the S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 7» p. 6 6 . ^ I b i d _ . , p.  67.  72 19  Dante Gerraino, Beyond I d e o l o g y : The R e v i v a l o f P o l i t i c a l Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 5 1 . 20 See S h i l s , " I d e o l o g y " , p . 6 6 - 8 . 21 T h i s a p p l i e s to r u l e s , r e l a t i o n s , i n s t i t u t i o n s , e t c . as w e l l , when " e g a l i t a r i a n i s m " i s used a s an a d j e c t i v e . 22 " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m " , p . 14-3. 23 I am not s a y i n g t h a t i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e a c t u a l l y e q u a l i t i e s , but t h a t t h e y a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e g a l i t a r i a n i s m . On t h e former p o i n t , see B r i a n B a r r y ' s c r i t i c i s m o f S a r t o r i i n P o l i t i c a l Argument (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1 9 6 5 ) , p . 1 2 0 , n . l , and Bedau's remark t h a t " P h i l o s o p h e r s have assumed, o r come c l o s e t o assuming, t h a t because an i n e q u a l i t y may be j u s t o r j u s t i f i e d , i t i s r e a l l y an e q u a l i t y a f t e r a l l , as though the j u s t i c e o r j u s t i f i a b i l i t y o f c e r t a i n arrangements c o u l d o n l y be e x p r e s s e d by p r o n o u n c i n g the arrangement 'equal', a s though the most i m p o r t a n t t h i n g t o say on b e h a l f o f the m o r a l i t y o f an arrangement i s t h a t i t i s e q u a l . " ("Egalitarianism"*, p. 1 3 ) • ?4 , S a n f o r d A. L a k o f f , E q u a l i t y i n P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press,  19o4).  ^ I b i d . , p. 2 3 8 .  2  ^ I b i d . , p.  5-6.  ^ S e e L o u i s H a r t z , The Founding o f New S o c i e t i e s (New York: H a r c o u r t , Brace & World, 1 9 6 4 ) , C h a p t e r s , 1 , 2 , and G. H o r o w i t z , " C o n s e r v a t i s m , L i b e r a l i s m , and S o c i a l i s m i n Canada: An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , Canadian J o u r n a l o f Economics and P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , 32 (May, 1 9 6 6 ) , pp. 1 4 3 - 7 1 ^ 2  I t has been p o i n t e d out t h a t numbers 4 and 5 a r e two d i s t i n c t principles. See H. L . A. H a r t , The Concept o f Law ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 9 6 1 ) , p . 1 5 5 , and James I . MacAdam, "The P r e c e p t s o f J u s t i c e " , Mind, 77 ( J u l y , 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 3 6 0 - 7 1 . 29 Monroe C. B e a r d s l e y , " E q u a l i t y and Obedience t o Law", i n Law and P h i l o s o p h y ed. S i d n e y Hook (New York: New York U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 4 ) , P. 3 6 . ° J . G. H. N e w f i e l d , " E q t i a l i t y i n S o c i e t y " , P r o c e e d i n g s o f the A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , New S e r i e s , 66 ( 1 9 6 5 - 6 6 ) , pp. 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 . 3  3 1  C h a r v e t , "Idea", p. 1 5 4 .  32 Gregory V l a s t o s , " J u s t i c e and E q u a l i t y " , i n S o c i a l J u s t i c e , ed. R i c h a r d B. Brandt (Englewood C l i f f s , N. J . : P r e n t i c e - H a i l , 1 9 6 2 ) , p . 42. 33 B a r r y , P o l i t i c a l Argument, p . 1 2 0 . H a r t , "Are There Any N a t u r a l R i g h t s ? " , P h i l o s o p h i c a l 64 ( A p r i l , 1 9 5 5 ) , P. 1 7 5 .  Review,  • ^ S t u a r t M. Brown, J r . , " I n a l i e n a b l e R i g h t s " , P h i l i s o p h i c a l 64 ( A p r i l , 1 9 5 5 ) , P. 1 9 2 .  Review,  73 •^E. F . C a r r i t t , c i t e d i n Benn and P e t e r s ,  P r i n c i p l e s , p . 448, n . 5 .  37 See  38  Benn, " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m " ,  John V/ilson, E q u a l i t y  passim.  (London: H u t c h i n s o n ,  1966), p . 33«  39 B e r n a r d A. 0. W i l l i a m s , "The Idea o f E q u a l i t y " , i n J u s t i c e and E q u a l i t y , p . 122. See a l s o Lucas, " A g a i n s t E q u a l i t y " , pp. l 4 7 £ 4 l .  40 M o r r i s G i n s b e r g , On J u s t i c e i n S o c i e t y U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965)» P« 2 0 .  ( I t h a c a , N. Y.: C o r n e l l  41 See W. T. B l a c k s t o n e , "On t h e Meaning and J u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e E q u a l i t y P r i n c i p l e " , E t h i c s , 77 ( J u l y , 1967)1 pp. 245-47. He b e l i e v e s t h a t t h i s simply r e p l a c e s t h e problem o f " i s - o u g h t " w i t h one o f "goodought", and t h a t t h e r e i s s t i l l an unwarranted l o g i c a l jump. I t might a l s o be mentioned t h a t t h e human worth approach does not a v o i d t h e o r i g i n a l f a c t - v a l u e d i f f i c u l t y , f o r we would s t i l l need t o know how t o g e t from t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t a l l men share t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e i r goodness. The problem t h e n becomes one o f how t o g e t from men's e q u a l i n t r i n s i c v a l u e t o how they s h o u l d be t r e a t e d . T h i s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d below.  42 43  Lakoff,  " C h r i s t i a n i t y and E q u a l i t y " , i n E q u a l i t y , Nomos. IX, p . 118.  D. D a i c h e s Raphael, M o r a l Judgements  1955), 44p. 132.  Lakoff,  44.  (London: George A l l e n & Unwin,  " C h r i s t i a n i t y " , p . 118.  45 See  pp. 121-24. 46 47  Raphael, M o r a l Judgement, pp. 130-34, and W i l l i a m s ,  Williams,  "Idea",  "Idea", p . 122.  L a k o f f , E q u a l i t y , p . 244, n . 2 . The a r t i c l e o n l y r e f e r s t o Plamenatz' comment by page number. The q u o t a t i o n i s i n c l u d e d i n t h e book, however, where he makes t h e same p o i n t . I n b o t h c a s e s t h e page number c i t e d i s t h e same.  48 49  See  Benn and P e t e r s ,  P r i n c i p l e s , p . 39-  Raphael, M o r a l Judgement, pp. 132-34. 5  ° I b i d . , p . 132.  51 W i l s o n , E q u a l i t y , pp. 9 8 - 9 . ^Vlastos, 5 5  " J u s t i c e " , p. 43.  I b i d . , pp. 4 4 - 8 .  54 Joseph M a r g o l i s adopts a s i m i l a r s t a n c e , f i n d i n g men's Vhidden e q u a l i t y " assumed i n t h e a r e a s o f s c i e n c e , r e l i g i o n , t r a g e d y , and comedy. See "That A l l Men a r e C r e a t e d E q u a l " , J o u r n a l o f P h i l o s o p h y , 52 (June,  1955), 337-46.  74 55 See A. P. d'Entreves, N a t u r a l Law; An H i s t o r i c a l Survey (new York: Harper Torchbooks, 1951)i e s p . pp. 21-2, and 48-62. 56 Many p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e , o f c o u r s e , s e l f - e v i d e n t enough i n o r d i n a r y circumstances, (e.g., " T h i s i s a t r e e " o r "Happiness i s good".) My p o i n t a p p l i e s t o statements t h a t t e n d t o g e n e r a t e d i s p u t e , e i t h e r because o f t h e i r c o n t e x t o r t h e i r normative c h a r a c t e r . Much o f t h i s s e c t i o n r e l i e s on my u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f B r e c h t , P o l i t i c a l Theory, P a r t One.  57 Benn and P e t e r s ,  58  P r i n c i p l e s , pp. 162-70.  B e r t r a n d de J o u v e n a l , The E t h i c s o f R e d i s t r i b u t i o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1952), pp. 55-6T 5 9  (Cambridge:  I b i d . , p. 80.  ^ S e e L . T. Hobhouse, The Elements o f S o c i a l J u s t i c e (London: George A l l e n & Unwin, 1922). He h o l d s t h a t everyone s h o u l d have enough t o e x i s t , w i t h e x t r a b e n e f i t s f o r c h i l d r e n , t h e aged, e t c . ( p . 133). Beyond t h i s , d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e c o n s i s t s i n " e q u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n o f e q u a l needs, s u b j e c t t o t h e adequate maintenance o f u s e f u l f u n c t i o n s . . . / i . e . 7 t o a c o n d i t i o n p r e s c r i b e d by t h e needs t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s c o n d i t i o n i s the maintenance o f t h e f u n c t i o n s upon which t h e common good depends, and t h i s i n v o l v e s d i f f e r e n t i a l treatment o f i n d i v i d u a l s i n accordance w i t h the nature o f t h e i r s e r v i c e s t o t h e community." ( p . 111). Thus, "need simply a s need i s a c l a i m , but n o t a c o m p l e t e l y v a l i d a t e d . c l a i m t i l l i t s b e a r i n g on f u n c t i o n has been c o n s i d e r e d . " ( p . 133). ^ B e n n and P e t e r s ,  P r i n c i p l e s , p . 164.  62 B a r r y , P o l i t i c a l Argument, p . 48. 6 3  W i l l i a m s , "Idea", pp. 118-26.  64 •  See W i l s o n , E q u a l i t y , p . 99"  65 cc  Benn, " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m " , pp. 70-1.  W i l l i a m s , "Idea", p . 126. ^ W i l l i a m K. Frankena, "The Concept o f S o c i a l J u s t i c e " , i n S o c i a l J u s t i c e , p . 19.  68 69  Benn, " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m " , p .  ,76.  See a l s o S. I . Benn, " ' I n t e r e s t s ' i n P o l i t i c s " , P r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , New S e r i e s , 60 (1959-60), pp. 123-40.  70  71  W i l s o n , E q u a l i t y , p . 103.  W i l s o n ' s p o s i t i o n , however, i s n o t a s c l e a r a s t h e statement would seem t o i n d i c a t e . F o r he appears t o b e l i e v e t h a t man by d e f i n i t i o n has t h e capacity o f choice. But w h i l e t h e a b i l i t y t o r e a s o n i s i m p o r t a n t , W i l s o n f e e l s ( I t h i n k ) t h a t man's "human-ness", r a t h e r t h a n t h e major d e f i n i n g characteristic, j u s t i f i e s a kind of equality. Benn, " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m " , p . 70.  75  73 See Ch. Perelman, "Concerning J u s t i c e " ( c . 1945), Chapter 1 i s  h i s The Idea of J u s t i c e and the Problem o f Argument, t r a n s . John P e t r i e (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1963), PP= 45-60. H i s view has been modified i n more recent a r t i c l e s p r i n t e d i n the same book. 74 ' See John Rees, E q u a l i t y (New Yorks Praeger, 1971), pp. 130-33. 7 5  I b i d . , p. 134-37; see also Hart, Law, pp. 187-89=  76 For example, see Stephen Edelston Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason i n E t h i c s (Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1950), pp. 160, 223. 77 For example, see de Jouvenal, E t h i c s , esp. Lecture I I ; see also John Rawls, A Theory of J u s t i c e , pp. 325-32. ^See  V l a s t o s , " J u s t i c e " , pp. 4i9-63.  79  See Hobhouse, Elements, Chapters 1-6; see also Toulmin, Reason, pp. 166-71, 223-24. 80 Hart's comment (Law, p. 167) on the r e q u i s i t e s o f any s o c i a l e x i s tence at a l l i s relevant here: "....the s o c i a l m o r a l i t y of s o c i e t i e s which have reached the stage where t h i s can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from i t s lav/, always includes c e r t a i n o b l i g a t i o n s and d u t i e s , r e q i i i r i n g the s a c r i f i c e of p r i v a t e i n c l i n a t i o n s or i n t e r e s t which i s e s s e n t i a l to the s u r v i v a l of any s o c i e t y , so long as men and the world i n which they l i v e r e t a i n some of t h e i r most f a m i l i a r and obvious c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Among such r u l e s obviously required f o r s o c i a l l i f e are those f o r b i d d i n g , or at l e a s t r e s t r i c t i n g , the free use o f v i o l e n c e , r u l e s r e q u i r i n g c e r t a i n forms of honesty and t r u t h f u l n e s s i n dealing with others, and r u l e s forbidding the d e s t r u c t i o n of tangible things or t h e i r seizure from others. I f conformity with these most elementary r u l e s were not thought a matter o f course among any group o f i n d i v i d u a l s , l i v i n g i n close proximity to each other, we should be doubtful of the d e s c r i p t i o n o f the group as a s o c i e t y , and c e r t a i n that i t could not endure f o r long." 81 See G. J . Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 67-71. He says that m o r a l i t y i s concerned with human welfare, but he i s c l e a r l y speaking i n a p o s i t i v e , rather than n e u t r a l , sense. S i m i l a r l y , D. S. Shwayder asserts: "that there should be such ways of c l a s s i f y i n g human actions as morally i n t e r e s t i n g hangs u l t i m a t e l y on the f a c t that m o r a l i t i e s , however much they vary, must be adequate t o the regul a t i o n of c e r t a i n kinds of behaviour, such as b r i n g i n g p h y s i c a l damage or death to one's f e l l o w s . " "Moral Rules and Moral Maxims", E t h i c s , 67 ( J u l y , 1957), p. 284. 82 I t has been asserted (with reference t o Toulmin) .that "any attempt to claim one function or r a t i o n a l e of morality as the f u n c t i o n or the purpose o f morality so circumscribes what can count as moral considerations that i t s e f f e c t i s u n w i t t i n g l y to advocate one l i m i t e d moral outlook as the moral point of view." Kai Neilson, " E t h i c s , H i s t o r y of (Twentieth Century), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 3, p. 111. Warnock, Philosophy,  p. 68.  76  84 T o u l m i n , p . 224.  85 Toiilmin h a s been c r i t i c i z e d on t h i s p o i n t . S e e , f o r example, N e i l s o n , " E t h i c s " , p . 111; and George C . K e r n e r , The R e v o l u t i o n i n E t h i c a l Theory ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1966), p p . 136-37.  86 See Hobhouse, E l e m e n t s , C h a p t e r 2, e s p . t h e l a s t few l i n e s o f n . l , p . 3587  "We can s a y , r o u g h l y , t h a t t o have a m o r a l r i g h t t o something i s f o r someone e l s e t o be m o r a l l y o b l i g a t e d ( i n t h e o b j e c t i v e sense) t o acto r r e f r a i n from a c t i n g i n some way i n r e s p e c t t o t h e t h i n g t o w h i c h I am s a i d t o have t h e r i g h t , i f I want him t o . " R i c h a r d B . B r a n d t , E t h i c a l Theory (Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1959) p . 436. See p p . 434-54 f o r f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n . See a l s o D. D. R a p h a e l , Human R i g h t s , O l d and New", i n P o l i t i c a l Theory and t h e R i g h t s o f Man , e d . D . D . Raphael ( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967)» p p . 54-6*7; B e r n a r d Mayo, "What a r e Human R i g h t s ? " , i b i d . , p p . 72-80; and Benn and P e t e r s , P r i n c i p l e s ,  p p . 101-07. 88  C i t e d i n B r e c h t , P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y , p . 284.  89  Brown, " R i g h t s " , p . 199. The goods t o w h i c h he r e f e r s a r e a man's " m o r a l i n t e r e s t s , h i s p e r s o n , and e s t a t e . " (192). 9  °Ibid.,  p . 199.  91  M a u r i c e C r a n s t o n , "Human R i g h t s , R e a l and Supposed", Man, p . 49. 9 2  Ibid.,  i n Rights of  p . 49.  ^ R a p h a e l , "Human R i g h t s " , p p . 61, 65.  94 Vlastos, 9 5  " J u s t i c e " , p . 52.  H a r t , " R i g h t s " , p . 175.  96 y  I b i d . , p . 175.  97 J . R o l a n d Pennock, L i b e r a l Democracy: I t s M e r i t s and P r o s p e c t s (New Y o r k : R i n e h a r t and Company, 1950), p . 102.  98  See G i n s b e r g , J u s t i c e , c h a p t e r 3» e s p . p . 77; B r a n d t , E t h i c a l Theory, p p . 438-40; and Hobhouse, E l e m e n t s , p p . 41-6  99  W i l l i a m K . F r a n k e n a , " N a t u r a l and I n a l i e n a b l e R i g h t s " , s o p h i c a l Review, 64 ( A p r i l , 1955), p . 231.  Philo-  ' " ^ B e r l i n , " E q u a l i t y " , p . 306.  101 Perelman a s s e r t s t h a t " J u s t i c e . . . i s i n c o n c e i v a b l e w i t h o u t I d e a o 102 f J u s t i c e , p . 41. B e r l i n , " E q u a l i t y " , p p . 306, 305.  rules".  77 103  See R i c h a r d E. F l a t h m a n , " E q u a l i t y and G e n e r a l i z a t i o n , A Formal A n a l y s i s " , i n E q u a l i t y , Nomos I X , p p .  38-60.  104  As Benn and P e t e r s p u t i t : " r u l e s do n o t c l a s s i f y t h e m s e l v e s " . See P r i n c i p l e s , p p . 82-5. 105 The r e l a t i o n between r u l e s and j u s t i c e i s d e a l t w i t h i n Perelman, Idea o f J u s t i c e , esp. pp. 98-108, Perelman, J u s t i c e (New Y o r k : Random House, pp. and J u l i u s S t o n e , Human Law and Human J u s t i c e ( S t a n f o r d , C a l i f o r n i a : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,  29-60, 61-7, 1967), 20-34;  154-58;  1965),  pp. 326-30.  ^ ^ S e e h i s a r t i c l e s , "The J u s t i f i c a t i o n o f E g a l i t a r i a n J u s t i c e " , American P h i l o s o p h i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , (October, pp. " O b l i g a t i o n : P o l i t i c a l , L e g a l , M o r a l " , i n P o l i t i c a l and L e g a l O b l i g a t i o n , Nomos X I I , e d . J . Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New Y o r k : A t h e r t o n Press, pp. and " C a t e g o r i a l C o n s i s t e n c y i n E t h i c s " , Philosophical Quarterly, (October, pp.  8  1970),  55-88;  1971),  17  1967),  331-^1;  289-99.  107 Gewirth, " O b l i g a t i o n " , p.  66.  ' ' ^ I b i d . , p. 67. See a l s o Shwayder, The S t r a t i f i c a t i o n o f Behaviour (London: "Routledge & Kegah P a u l , pp. "An a c t e x i s t s i f and o n l y i f an a n i m a l behaves w i t h p u r p o s e . " ( p . 173)  1965),  109 ^See " J u s t i f i c a t i o n " , p p .  110  I b i d . , pp.  111  51, 173«  332-33.  333-36.  I b i d . , p p . 336,  338.  112 I b i d . , p.  339-  l l b i d . , p.  339.  113  1 l / f  I b i d . , p.  339.  See a l s o " C o n s i s t e n c y " , p p .  294-97.  115 See " J u s t i f i c a t i o n " , p .  341.  116 117  I b i d . , p. 3 4 1 .  See Norman E. Bowie, " E q u a l i t y and D i s t r i b u t i v e J u s t i c e " , P h i l o s o p h y , 140-48, f o r s i m i l a r c r i t i c i s m o f e g a l i t a r i a n formulae justice.  45 ( A p r i l , 1970), p p . of  118  John Rawls uses " f a i r n e s s " i n a narrow sense t o mean compliance w i t h r u l e s t o which one has p r e v i o u s l y a g r e e d , e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y o r implicitly. T h u s r i t i s " r e c i p r o c i t y i n t r e a t m e n t " , i n Chapman's p h r a s e . Raphael, on t h e o t h e r hand, has a broader c o n c e p t i o n i n m i n d ; a s s e r t i n g t h a t f a i r n e s s ( o r e q u i t y ) " i s i n f a c t t h e same as d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e " . Perelman a l s o uses t h e terms i n t h i s w i d e r f a s h i o n . Both s i d e s equate j u s t i c e and f a i r n e s s , but t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s are q u i t e d i f f e r e n t between t h e t w o , as Chapman has shown. My usage here f o l l o w s t h a t o f Raphael and Perelman.  78 See Rawls, " J u s t i c e a s F a i r n e s s " , i n Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Theory, pp. 202-06, and J u s t i c e , pp. 111-14, 342-50; John W. Chapman, " J u s t i c e and F a i r n e s s " , i n J u s t i c e , Nomos V I , eds. C a r l J . F r i e d r i c h and J o h n W. Chapman (New York: A t h e r t o n P r e s s , 1963), pp. 147-69; Raphael, " E q u a l i t y and E q u i t y " , P h i l o s o p h y , 21 ( J u l y , 1946), p . 132 and passim.; and Perelman, J u s t i c e , c h a p t e r 2. 119  -y See The E t h i c s o f A r i s t o t l e / The Nicomachean E t h i c s / , t r a n s . J . A. K. Thomson (London: George A l l e n & Unwin, 1953), Book 5» c h a p t e r s 2, pp. 121-25. See a l s o R i c h a r d McKeon, " J u s t i c e and E q u a l i t y " , i n J u s t i c e , Nomos VI, pp. 54-7.  1,  1.20  121 122  E t h i c s , Book 5> c h a p t e r s 2-5, pp. 125-35. McKeon, " J u s t i c e " , p . 56.  A r i s t o t l e , The P o l i t i c s o f A r i s t o t l e , t r a n s . E r n e s t York: G a l a x y Books, 1962), p . 118.  B a r k e r (New  123  I b i d . , p . 120. Additional material Rees, E q u a l i t y , pp. 92-6.  s u p p l i e d by B a r k e r .  See a l s o  124  Roger Hancock, " M e r i t o r i a n and E q u a l i t a r i a n J u s t i c e " , E t h i c s , 80 (January, 1970), pp. 165-69. By "meritorian",, Hancock means p r o p o r t i o n a l , o r f a i r , which i s t o say, " j u s t " . A c t u a l l y he i s s p e a k i n g o f " j u s t j u s t i c e " v e r s u s e g a l i t a r i a n j u s t i c e , so t h a t i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t he f i n d s t h e l a t t e r somewhat l a c k i n g . 1 2 5  Berlin,  " E q u a l i t y " , p . 305.  126 D a n i e l Lyons, "The Weakness o f Formal E q u a l i t y " , E t h i c s , 76 (January, 1966), p . 148. See a l s o N e w f i e l d , " E q u a l i t y " , pp. 200-02; and C h a r l e s F r a n k e l , " E q u a l i t y o f O p p o r t u n i t y " , E t h i c s , 81 ( A p r i l , 1971), pp. 127 Stone, Human Law, p . 344.  128  Vlastos,  " J u s t i c e " , pp. 4 0 - 3 .  129 Raphael, M o r a l Judgement, pp. 8 6 - 7 .  pp. 125-26.  See a l s o Raphael,  "Equity",  130 See J o e l F e i n b e r g , " J u s t i c e and P e r s o n a l D e s e r t " , i n J u s t i c e , Nomos VT, pp. 85-7. Benn and P e t e r s * treatment o f t h e concept i s a l s o u s e f u l . See P r i n c i p l e s , pp. 157-62. B a r r y ' s remarks a r e i n t e r e s t i n g : "'Desert* f l o u r i s h e s i n a l i b e r a l s o c i e t y where p e o p l e a r e r e g a r d e d a s r a t i o n a l • independent atoms h e l d t o g e t h e r i n a s o c i e t y by a ' s o c i a l c o n t r a c t ' from which a l l must b e n e f i t . Each p e r s o n ' s worth ( d e s e r t ) can be p r e c i s e l y a s c e r t a i n e d — i t i s h i s n e t m a r g i n a l p r o d u c t and under c e r t a i n p o s t u l a t e d c o n d i t i o n s (which i t i s c o n v e n i e n t l y assumed t h e e x i s t i n g economy approximates) market p r i c e s g i v e  196-  79 each f a c t o r o f p r o d u c t i o n i t s n e t m a r g i n a l p r o d u c t . L i f e i s an o b s t a c l e race w i t h no s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e lame b u t i f one c o m p e t i t o r t r i p s up a n o t h e r , t h e s t a t e t a k e s cognizance o f t h i s f a c t ; t h u s compe n s a t i o n i s g i v e n o n l y when t h e r e i s n e g l i g e n c e on one s i d e b u t n o t t h e o t h e r . "  112-13.  P o l i t i c a l Argument, p p . See a l s o F r i e d r i c h A von Hayek, The C o n s t i t u t i o n o f L i b e r t y (London: Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1960) for a s l i g h t l y different critique of merit. 1 5 1  R a p h a e l , " E q u i t y " , pp.  128-30.  132 Brandt argues t h a t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f u t i l i t a r i a n i s m a r e e g a l i t a r i a n i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s : "The c o n s i s t e n t u t i l i t a r i a n , e v e r y t h i n g c o n s i d e r e d , w i l l conclude t h a t approximate e q u a l i t y o f income should be a s u b s t a n t i a l aim o f p o l i c y , t o be d e v i a t e d from o n l y where t h e b e n e f i t s o f i n e q u a l i t y a r e shown t o be c o n s i d e r a b l e . " E t h i c a l T h e o r y , p . 420; see a l s o p p . N e v e r t h e l e s s , u t i l i t a r i a n i s m has been e f f e c t i v e l y c r i t i c i z e d as inadequate t o q u e s t i o n s o f j u s t i c e . See, f o r example, Rawls, J u s t i c e , p p . and " J u s t i c e as F a i r n e s s " , p p . Raphael, Problems o f P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y (London: P a l l M a l l P r e s s , pp. and C o n s e r v a t i v e and P r o s t h e t i c J u s t i c e " , i n Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Theory, pp. and Bedau, " J u s t i c e and C l a s s i c a l U t i l i t a r i a n i s m " , i n J u s t i c e Nomos V I , p p . 133 The s o c i a l i s t i d e a l i s o f t e n f o r m u l a t e d as "From each a c c o r d i n g t o h i s a b i l i t y , t o each a c c o r d i n g t o h i s n e e d " ; e q u a l i t y o f r e s u l t i n t h i s c o n t e x t i s u s u a l l y seen as a c o m b i n a t i o n o f need s a t i s f a c t i o n and e q u a l i t y o f c o n d i t i o n . For b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n s o f l i b e r a l and s o c i a l i s t views o f j u s t i c e and e q u a l i t y , see W. B. G a l l i e , " L i b e r a l M o r a l i t y and S o c i a l i s t M o r a l i t y " , i n P h i l o s o p h y , P o l i t i c s , and S o c i e t y , e d . P e t e r L a s l e t t ( O x f o r d : Basil Blackwell, pp. and Raphael, P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y , pp. Note a l s o t h e statement o f G. W. M o r t i m o r e , "An I d e a l o f E q u a l i t y " , Mind, (January, p.  415-20. 150-92,  194-200,  186-94.  209-13;  184-89;  1956), 77  1970),  284-305.  120-28; 1968),  229:  " / A / t t h e back o f a good many e g a l i t a r i a n claims, there l i e s the idea t h a t the i d e a l s o c i e t y i s one where everyone i s e q u a l l y happy, e n j o y s equal l e v e l s o f w e l f a r e and good. The e g a l i t a r i a n i s i n f a v o u r o f any i n e q u a l i t y o f t r e a t m e n t which w i l l conduce t o t h i s e n d . . . T h e e g a l i t a r i a n does n o t aim a t e q u a l i t y o f t r e a t m e n t , i n any r e s p e c t : he aims a t e q u a l i t y i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f what r e s u l t s from t h e t r e a t m e n t , equal and u n e q u a l , meted out t o men." 1 3 / f  S e e Charvet, " I d e a " , esp. pp.  157-58.  135 See John H. Schaar, " E q u a l i t y o f O p p o r t u n i t y , and Beyond", i n Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Theory, p p . As w e l l , see M i c h a e l Young, The Rise o f t h e M e r i t o c r a c y : (London: Thames and Hudson,  135-53.. 1870-2033  1958).  80  See C h a r l e s F r a n k e l , " E q u a l i t y o f O p p o r t u n i t y " , E t h i c s , 81 ( A p r i l , 1 9 7 1 ) i p p . 1 9 9 - 2 1 1 , f o r a balanced a p p r a i s a l . B a r r y d i s c u s s e s t h e n o t i o n i n terms o f f a i r n e s s . P o l i t i c a l Argument, p p . 1 0 2 - 0 6 ; 120-21.  137 See H. J . S p i e g e l b e r g , "A Defense o f Human E q u a l i t y " , P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 5 3 (March, 19"+4); G i n s b e r g , J u s t i c e , p. 1 0 6 ; and Benn and P e t e r s , P r i n c i p l e s , p p . 1 3 6 - 3 7 . J  138 For example, see C h r i s t o p h e r Jencks e t a l . , I n e q u a l i t y (New Y o r k : Basic Books, 1 9 7 2 ) , c h a p t e r s 1 , 9.  139 H a r t , Law, p p . 1 5 6 - 5 7 * See a l s o Perelman, J u s t i c e , p . 2 0 : " . . . j u s t i c e concerns i t s e l f w i t h b e i n g i m p a r t i a l . . . J u s t b e h a v i o u r i s regular. I t conforms t o r u l e s , t o s t a n d a r d s . "  140 Beardsley, " E q u a l i t y " , p. 3 7 . 141 /  See Rawls, " J u s t i c e as F a i r n e s s " , and Chapman, " J u s t i c e and F a i r ness", passim. 142 Rawls, J u s t i c e , p . 302 143  I b i d . , p. 3 0 3 .  144 Frank H. K n i g h t , "On t h e Meaning o f J u s t i c e " , J u s t i c e , Nomos V I , p. 2 3 .  145 Benn and P e t e r s , P r i n c i p l e s , p p .  131-32.  146 G i o v a n n i S a r t o r i , Democratic Theory (New Y o r k : F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1 9 6 2 ) , p. 3 2 7 .  147 S p i t z , "Grammar", p . 6 6 . 148  Benn and P e t e r s , P r i n c i p l e s , p p .  149  132-33-  o  S a r t o r i , Democratic T h e o r y , p . 3 2 o .  150 Raphael, P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y , p . 1 9 + . 1 5 1  1 5 2  Ibid.,  p. 1 7 8 .  R a p h a e l , " E q u i t y " , p. 1 3 2 .  153 See, f o r example, G i n s b e r g , p p . 6 6 , 7 7 ; and Radoslav A. T s a n o f f , " S o c i a l M o r a l i t y and t h e P r i n c i p l e o f J u s t i c e " , E t h i c s , 67 ( O c t o b e r , 1 9 5 6 ) , p. 1 6 . ^ M i c h a e l Young, " I s E q u a l i t y a Dream?", D i s s e n t , 2 0 ( F a l l , 1973)» p . 420. 155 D a n i e l B e l l , " M e r i t o c r a c y and E q u a l i t y " , i n The Coming o f P o s t I n d u s t r i a l S o c i e t y (New Y o r k : B a s i c Books, 1 9 7 3 ) , p p . 4 5 1 - 5 2 .  81 156  See  E l l i o t t Abrams, "The  1972), pp.  (October,  Quota Commission", Commentary,  54-7.  5^  157 JO o ^f^f o  - " P a u l Seabury, "The 1 5 8  I b i d . , p.  Idea o f M e r i t " ,  Commentary,  54 (December, 1972),  44.  159 I have drawn on B e l l , " M e r i t o c r a c y " , pp. " M e r i t " , pp. 44-5, f o r s e v e r a l o f these p o i n t s .  4 l 6 - 1 9 , 438-39; and  Seabury,  1 60  S p i t z , "Grammar", p.  74.  161 M i c h a e l Walzer s t a t e s t h a t quotas are wrong, but no worse than a h o s t o f o t h e r i n e q u a l i t i e s i n American s o c i e t y , and hence e x c u s a b l e . This seems t o be a r a t h e r poor j u s t i f i c a t i o n . See " E q u a l i t y " , p. 407-08. T h i s i s not t o say t h a t no case a t a l l can be made f o r them. I f they were c o n t r o l l a b l e , temporary, and kept w i t h i n r e a s o n a b l e l i m i t s , so t h a t the presumably l e s s q u a l i f i e d b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f p r e f e r e n t i a l treatment c o u l d s t i l l be c o n s i d e r e d q u a l i f i e d i n an a b s o l u t e sense ( e . g . , job a p p l i c a n t X c o u l d have (say) an I.Q. o f 118 t o job c a n d i d a t e T's 120, and s t i l l be q u a l i f i e d f o r the p o s i t i o n ) ; and i f i t were c l e a r t h a t a s o c i e t y such as the U. S. was not g o i n g t o become f u l l y e g a l i t a r i a n i n the f o r seeable f u t u r e , t h e n I would say t h a t , on b a l a n c e , some type o f quota system would be j u s t i f i a b l e and d e s i r a b l e .  16?  Raphael, " E q u i t y " ,  pp.  128,  130.  ''^See D a n i e l P. Moynihan, " E q u a l i z i n g E d u c a t i o n — I n Whose B e n e f i t ? " , P u b l i c I n t e r e s t , Number 29 ( F a l l , 1972) pp. 69-89, f o r r e l e v a n t commentary.  164 Much o f t h i s i s based on p o i n t s r a i s e d by B e l l , "Meritocracy", 414-23; and by M a r t i n Mayer, "Higher E d u c a t i o n f o r A l l ? " , Commentary, 55 (February, 1973)? PP. 37-47- See a l s o Seymour M a r t i n L i p s e t , " S o c i a l M o b i l i t y and Economic O p p o r t u n i t y " , P u b l i c I n t e r e s t , Number 29 ( F a l l , 1972), pp. 103-06; L e s t e r C. Thurow, " E d u c a t i o n and Economic E q u a l i t y " , P u b l i c I n t e r e s t , Number 28 (Summer, -1972), pp. 66-81; and Hannah A r e n d t , "The C r i s i s i n E d u c a t i o n " , i n Between P a s t and F u t u r e : S i x E x e r c i s e s i n P o l i t i c a l Thought (New York: V i k i n g P r e s s , 1961), pp. 179-80. pp.  165 v  S e e Mayer, "Higher E d u c a t i o n " , pp.  ^ ^ I b i d . , p.  p.  39-47.  41.  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