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The Politics of opposition in Republican China : Chiang K’ai-Shek and the extraordinary conference of… Jenks, Robert D. 1974

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THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION IN REPUBLICAN CHINA: CHIANG K'AI-SHEK AND THE EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE OF 1931 by ROBERT D. JENKS B.A., Yale College, New Haven, Connecticut, 1968 THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED AS PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of HISTORY We accept this thesi's as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA July 1974 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make i t freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that publication, in part or in whole, or the copying of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Robert D. Jenks Department of History The University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada i i ABSTRACT This study examines the Extraordinary Conference, a po l i t i c a l opposition movement launched in 1931 to loosen Chiang K'ai-shek's grip on the central government and Kuomintang apparatus. An effort is made not only to reconstruct the background, course, and aftermath of the Extraordinary Conference i t s e l f , but to examine the motivations of the participants and to apply the perspectives thus acquired to an analysis of the nature of po l i t i c a l opposition during the Republic up to the outbreak of war with Japan. Participants in movements of this type have often been severely castigated for the part they played in perpetuating the general turmoil and fragmentation of the early Republic. However, one of the conclusions of this study is that while such men must inevitably share some of the blame for the chaos that prevailed, i t is impossible to assign responsibility for i t to any particular person or group. The situation was much too complex for any such simplistic explanation. The leading players in the republican drama were a l l members of a transitional generation, struggling to create a new synthesis for China following a revolution that had overthrown the formal structure of a centuries-old pol i t i c a l system. They were products of their times, torn between the new and the old and unable, as yet, to find a formula that would bring s t a b i l i t y to China and restore the country to i t s former glory. As an examination of the Extraordinary Conference indicates, regionalism, factionalism, patronage, and various less than a l t r u i s t i c i i i forms of self-interest influenced the behavior of p o l i t i c a l and military leaders to varying degrees, particularly at the local level. However, analysis of the Extraordinary Conference also supports the view that the most important factor governing the activities of these leaders, especially at the national level, was a sincere concern for the welfare of the country. A major problem was that the leader of each faction regarded himself as, and was acknowledged by his followers to be, the only person capable of bringing unity, s t a b i l i t y , and progress to China. When such uncompromising self-images were combined with extremely weak po l i t i c a l institutions and the overwhelming predominance of military might, the result was continuous turmoil and confusion. The predominance of violence, furthermore, conditioned the patterns of p o l i t i c a l opposition throughout the early Republic. Although the intellectual, commercial, and p o l i t i c a l elites each had their own peculiar weapons for p o l i t i c a l opposition, none of them possessed enough power to exert a decisive influence on the government. They could not be ignored, but the changes they wrought and the concessions they won in the po l i t i c a l arena tended to be of minor significance. They simply did not have the resources at their disposal to compete against the raw coercive power wielded by those who controlled the government. Unarmed dissidents were often obliged to compromise their ideals and accept the dictates of a po l i t i c a l world in which force reigned supreme. A formula for po l i t i c a l opposition emerged which, in i t s simplest out-lines, was to procure military support, establish a t e r r i t o r i a l base, and declare independence or found a rival "national" government to challenge the one then in operation. Opposition movements achieved a iv quasi-institutionalized status and might be described as primitive votes of no confidence through which the opposition hoped to replace, or at least reach a new accommodation with, the government in power. The Extraordinary Conference represented a high-water mark for large-scale p o l i t i c a l opposition movements during the Nanking decade. At i t s conclusion, the central government absorbed many of i t s c r i t i c s and i t s remaining opponents found themselves scattered and unable to coalesce. The raw material for an opposition movement with any hope of success was no longer at hand, and the power of the central govern-ment expanded steadily until the outbreak of war with Japan. V TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT i'i TABLE OF CONTENTS v PREFACE vi i INTRODUCTION 1 SECTION I - THE BACKGROUND AND COURSE OF THE 1931 OPPOSITION MOVEMENT 15 CHAPTER I. PRELUDE TO THE CANTON GOVERNMENT, 1928-1931 16 II. THE EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE AND ITS AFTERMATH 58 The Southern Government is Formed 61 Nanking: The National People's Convention and The Fifth Plenum 71 Canton: The Extraordinary Conference 73 The Military Dimension 77 Foreign Relations: Canton and Japan . . . . . 87 The Peace Conference and the Fourth Kuomintang Congress 94 Chiang K'ai-shek's Resignation and the Short-lived Sun Fo Government 108 SECTION II - PERSPECTIVES ON THE 1931 OPPOSITION MOVEMENT . . . 121 CHAPTER III. MOTIVATIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS 122 Regionalism 123 vi Chapter Page Hatred 141 Self-interest Versus Selflessness 145 IV. CONCLUSION 169 FOOTNOTES 192 Abbreviations Used In The Footnotes . . . . . . . . . 192 Introduction 193 Chapter I 195 Chapter II . . . . . . . . . . 204 Chapter III 212 Chapter IV 218 BIBLIOGRAPHY .' 220 Sources in Western Languages 220 Sources in Asian Languages 227 APPENDICES 231 Appendix I - The Circular Telegram Impeaching Chiang K'ai-shek 231 Appendix II - The Nanking Government as of 16 February, 1931 . . . 242 Appendix III - The Nanking Government as of 8 January, 1932 245 Appendix IV - The Nanking Government as of 1 May, 1932 248 Appendix V - The Highest Councils of the Kuomintang in February, 1931 251 Appendix VI - The Highest Councils of the Kuomintang in January, 1932 257 GLOSSARY 264 vi i PREFACE The Extraordinary Conference of 1931 is one of the many events in the history of republican China that has suffered from scholarly neglect. Up to now, i t has merited l i t t l e more than an occasional, passing reference in the pages of textbooks. Perhaps i t s importance was dwarfed, in the eyes of scholars, by other contemporary events like the Japanese invasion of Manchuria; perhaps i t simply, did not seem remarkable in an era f i l l e d with revolt and s t r i f e ; perhaps i t s neglect is nothing more than a reflection of the general inadequacy of our knowl-edge of the republican period. Yet the Extraordinary Conference was a notable event in the poli t i c a l history of the Nanking decade and is worthy of detailed examination. It represented a high-point of opposition to Chiang K'ai-shek's domination of the Kuomintang and the central government. Chiang's various opponents achieved a greater degree of unity than they had ever mustered before, and they actually succeeded in forcing him to retire temporarily. The Extraordinary Conference also resulted in the creation of a new government coalition that included a number of perennial dissidents, most notably Wang Ching-wei and his Reorganizationist faction, who had for years been denied any role in ruling the country. The new coalition strengthened the government considerably, the po l i t i c a l turmoil of the preceding years was reduced, and a period of relative s t a b i l i t y emerged. Moreover, the Extraordinary Conference exemplified most of the typical features of republican p o l i t i c a l opposition. A vi i i detailed examination of i t w i l l not only provide us with a better understanding of i t s immediate impact on the Chinese po l i t i c a l scene, but w i l l help us to achieve a better perspective on p o l i t i c s , and particularly opposition p o l i t i c s , during the republican period as a whole. This essay represents an attempt to analyze the Extraordinary Conference at some length and to apply the knowledge thus gained to an inquiry into the nature of po l i t i c a l opposition in the Republic prior to the outbreak of all-out war with Japan in 1937. The intro-duction sketches in the basic historical background of modern China from the late Ch'ing to the completion of the Northern Expedition in 1928. The emphasis is on the rise of regional fragmentation that started under the Manchus and reached i t s zenith during the so-called warlord period (1916-1928). Chapter I outlines p o l i t i c a l developments from the end of the Northern Expedition to the arrest of Hu Han-min in February, 1931, that are c r i t i c a l to an understanding of the Extraordinary Conference. Chapter II details the course and aftermath of the Extraordinary Conference. Chapter III attempts to come to grips with the elusive motivations of the participants. The roles played by regionalism, hatred, and self-interest are examined because they have so often been cited as root causes of po l i t i c a l s t r i f e in the Republic. The Conclusion (Chapter IV) discusses the nature of pol i t i c a l opposition in the Republic, using the insights gained from the Extraordinary Conference as a guide. 1 INTRODUCTION "Empires wax and wane; states cleave asunder and coalesce." So runs the f i r s t line of a famous Chinese novel ascribed to an author of the .14th c e n t u r y J Centrifugal f o r ces have played a r e c u r r i n g role in Chinese history. In times of dynastic strength, the central government was equal to the task of holding the vast empire together, despite geographical barriers and poor communications. Indeed, Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n and administration are renowned for their continuity under the rubric of Confucian orthodoxy. But in times of dynastic c r i s i s , administration broke down, and the ties linking the provinces to the central government were weakened or temporarily severed. If the central authorities were unable to reassert themselves, they were eventually overthrown, and the mandate of heaven passed to a new dynasty. In 1911, the hsin-hai revolution overthrew the Ch'ing dynasty, but this time the mandate of heaven did not pass on to a new dynasty as i t had in the past. The dynastic system i t s e l f was swept away, and with i t went the traditional Confucian order. Traditional views, of course, were not purged from Chinese consciousness overnight. They lingered on to influence succeeding generations to varying degrees, but they had become discredited. China sought to reassert i t s e l f within the framework of modern, Western ideas, and the transition proved to be d i f f i c u l t and traumatic. The old concepts had been shattered, but new ones did not immediately take root to replace them. 2 The Chinese Republic (1911-1949) was an era of prolonged turmoil and regional fragmentation. Its earlier years were particularly chaotic, and witnessed the rise of the regional m i l i t a r i s t s known to posterity as warlords. Even after the country was o f f i c i a l l y "unified" by the Northern Expedition, fragmentation persisted. The government had neither the power nor the authority necessary to bring about genuine national unity. The division of the country into regional satrapies came about partly as a result of late Ch'ing regionalism; but i t was also a result of the c r i s i s in values- precipitated by the destruction of the old order. Extreme regional fragmentation might have been avoided i f the new republican government had been able to provide a strong focus of loyalty for China to replace the one that had been destroyed. Perhaps that was too much to expect in the wake of a cataclysm of the magnitude of the 1911 revolution. The warlords who emerged during the teens "were neither Confucian generals {ju-chiang) owing their allegiance to the throne nor officers of a national army pledged to defend the country's honor and interests." They represented an understandable, i f tragic, stage in the transition from old to new. To gain a better understanding of republican fragmentation, we must examine the regionalism that developed in the late Ch'ing dynasty. Franz Michael has defined regionalism as "the emergence in key areas of China of military and p o l i t i c a l centers that assumed some of the important functions of the state but s t i l l remained within i t s 3 framework." The erosion of central authority that enabled this regionalism to emerge was a prolonged process, spanning the last 3 century of ever-weakening Ch'ing rule. It accelerated markedly in the mid-nineteenth century, when the Manchus were simultaneously faced with unprecedented internal and external threats. The external danger came from the Western powers, who were armed with a double edged sword: with their advanced military technology they easily defeated the enfeebled Manchu army, and with the new ideas they introduced they posed a threat to the very foundations of the traditional order in China. At almost the same time, the massive Taiping, Nien, and Hui rebellions erupted to challenge the Ch'ing dynasty from within. The Manchu forces soon proved themselves equally incapable of dealing with the internal rebellions, and the dynasty, faced with extinction, was forced to turn elsewhere for assistance. The support that was required came from the traditional Confucian l i t e r a t i , who gave the Ch'ing a new lease on l i f e that lasted almost sixty years. They r a l l i e d to the throne not because of any peculiar attachment to the foreign dynasty, but because the external incursions and internal disorders threatened the very basis of the Confucian society of which they were wel1-indoctrinated products. In 1853, Tseng Kuo-fan was ordered by the court to proceed to his native province of Hunan to raise and train a new military force for use against the Taiping rebels. The Hunan Army which he recruited and successfully led in battle became the prototype for several other armies which the Manchus commissioned to face the c r i s i s , the most notable of which was the Anhwei Army of Li Hung-chang. While a l l of these new armed forces did help prolong the l i f e of the dynasty and the Confucian order for a time, they were more noteworthy for 4 the characteristics they shared which tended to erode central authority. To create the new armies, the Ch'ing court was forced to delegate authority that had previously been the exclusive realm of the central government. Tseng Kuo-fan and those who followed him i n i t i a l l y recruited their troops from their native provinces, and they cultivated bonds of personal loyalty among officers and men. The networks of personal bonds made i t impossible to transfer or replace officers at w i l l , since orders would not be obeyed unless they came from the proper person. . The armies thus created tended to become personal instruments, owing loyalty to no authority higher than their commanders. In order to insure the success of their military campaigns, these commanders were given administrative and financial authority over the areas in which they operated. It was not complete, to be sure, but i t constituted a distinct devolution of power that would never have been allowed iri times of dynastic strength. The laws of avoidance, which were specifically designed to prevent the development of regional centers of power that might challenge, either implicitly or e x p l i c i t l y , the authority of the Center, were also relaxed. Leaders of the regional armies were permitted to become governors of their native provinces, and their terms of office, wherever they served, were often extended beyond the normal limit of three years. The Manchus considered such concessions of central, authority a temporary expedient, necessary to insure their own survival and the survival of the traditional order. 5 Nevertheless, when the rebellions were f i n a l l y quelled, the gentral government was unable to regain the authority i t had conceded in the face of national c r i s i s . Tseng Kuo-fan's Hunan Army may have been disbanded as a gesture of loyalty to the Manchus after the defeat of the Taiping, but Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army became the de facto national army even though i t was not directly controlled by the central government. When Li moved to Chihli, where he served as Governor-General and represented China in i t s foreign relations for almost a quarter of a century, his army moved with him. A British intelligence officer, Captain G i l l , remarked, "It is a strange i l l u s t r a t i o n of the anomalous state of things that exists in the Chinese army that we find the Governor-General of the province in which the imperial capital is situated, in possession of a large army which is the only force worthy 4 of the name in this huge empire." Li and other regional leaders constructed arsenals, established military academies, launched industrial ventures, hired foreign advisors, and sent their followers abroad to gain a modern education. They sought to strengthen the country, but since the Manchus had been reduced to impotence, they were obliged to undertake their programs largely on their own i n i t i a t i v e , and in so doing they exercised powers that were normally the sole preserve of the central government. Ironically, their self-strengthen-ing efforts were counter-productive to the extent that they undermined the authority of the central government. The regional armies were originally recruited in the native provinces of their commanders, and they maintained a high degree of provincial homogeneity. But the mu-fu ( l i t e r a l l y , tent government), 6 the experts and administrators surrounding men like Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, were recruited far and wide.^ The main criterion for their selection was talent, not provincial origin. What the entire organization, both military and c i v i l i a n , had in common was loyalty to their leader. The centers that assumed some of the important functions of the state in Michael's definition were thus not stationary, geo-graphic ones; they were mobile centers that revolved around their leaders, wherever they might be. When a regional leader moved, his organization moved with him, and he maintained his power intact. The fact that this was tolerated by the central government was a measure of i t s declining power. As long as the regional leaders were committed to the old order and to the Ch'ing court as i t s exemplar, the potential they re-presented for fragmentation of the country remained latent. However, new leaders began to emerge who were heirs not only to the erosion of central authority, but to the erosion of old values. Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and others were primarily c i v i l o f f i c i a l s who served as military leaders in an adjunct capacity which they were considered capable of f u l f i l l i n g under the theory of the universal Confucian man of virtue. Their successors were often primarily, even exclusively, military men who had l i t t l e experience outside of their speciality. Their indoctrination in the Confucian values that had served as the p i l l a r of the state for centuries was rudimentary at best. As a result of a number of factors, the sharp edge of the stigma attached to a military career was gradually being blunted. The Manchus had suffered one humiliating military defeat after another 7 at the hands of Western powers, and i t became increasingly apparent that a modern, efficient army was a prime requirement i f China was to stand up and be counted in the world. The lesson was forcefully brought home when China was abjectly defeated by Japan, another Asian country, in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The central government was f i n a l l y stimulated to action, and the New Armies that were created as a result helped to ameliorate the image of the military. In addition to possessing modern weapons, these armies were more carefully recruited and trained than they ever had been in the past. Their discipline el i c i t e d favorable reactions from the c i v i l i a n population that had suffered so heavily from the rapaciousness of Chinese armies in the past. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), in which an Asian country defeated a European one for the f i r s t time in recent history, enhanced the image of the army as an instrument for making the nation strong. The rising tide of nationalism led many Chinese, including a significant number of lower l i t e r a t i , ^ to join the army. Some of these new recruits were revolutionaries who sought to i n f i l t r a t e the military in order to speed the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty. Others, who were not in the revolutionary camp, joined as a token of their aroused patriotism. The army was also becoming more attractive as a road to power, success, and even social mobility. The abolition of the examina-tion system in 1905 closed the route by which aspiring Chinese had for centuries advanced in the world. The closure of this traditional avenue for advancement, combined with growing nationalism and changing attitudes toward the army, led many young men to choose military 8 careers. To cite a well known example with which we shall later concern ourselves in more deta i l , Chiang K'ai-shek forsook the traditional education he had been receiving and l e f t for Japan in 1906 to embark on a military career. Of more immediate relevance to the fragmentation of China is the example of Yuan Shih-k'ai. In 1895, Yuan was appointed to train and command one of the New Armies. Within a few years he had transformed this unit, which later became known as the Peiyang Army, into the most powerful fighting force in China. Most of the senior officers of the Peiyang Army appear to have been personally loyal to Yuan, but the personal loyalty of o many of the junior officers was probably minimal. Yuan tried to stock his officer corps from the military academies he founded in Chi h i i , to insure both their loyalty and their professional competence. However, the rapid growth of the Peiyang Army outstripped the a b i l i t y of the academies to produce officers. To maintain professional standards, Yuan was forced to recruit junior officers from outside his own organization. Many of them were trained in Japan and South China, and their bonds with their commander were limited. Yuan relied on frequent transfers to prevent the growth of potentially dangerous vested interests and to make his subordinates wholly dependent on and loyal to himself. He must have enjoyed some success in his efforts to inculcate allegiance, for though he had fallen from favor and was living in retirement when the 1911 revolution broke out, he maintained a basic degree of control over the army he had created. His domination of i t when he was recalled to service in 1911 may not have been as firm as i t had been before his enforced retirement in 1908 -- as the 9 rebellions of Wu Lu-chen and Chang Shao-tseng demonstrated -- but i t was g s t i l l essentially intact. Yuan had also achieved something of a reputation as a p o l i t i c -ian and reformer, and he was widely considered to be "the one man who could achieve the dynasty's abdication and at the same time retain national unity and keep the foreign powers at bay."^ He became the f i r s t President of the Republic after Sun Yat-sen resigned as Provisional President to make way for him. Although Yuan and others l i k e him had no profound commitment to the Confucian order, neither did they share the enthusiasm of the revolutionaries for republicanism and other new concepts. The overthrow of the monarchy removed the last focus of higher authority and loyalty they either accepted or understood.^ They were unable to transfer their loyalties smoothly to the nation-state, as many of the more ardent modernists had done. In the traumatic and d i f f i c u l t transition from old to new, a vacuum of authority was created for them. Yuan Shih-k'ai, availing himself of his position as President of the Republic and as the most powerful military commander in China, maintained a basic degree of unity in the country for several years. Opposition to his rule crystallized briefly in 1913 with the so-called Second Revolution, in which seven provinces (Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kwangtung, Fukien, Hunan, Szechwan) declared their independence. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, this mode of opposition became standard practice for dissidents in republican China. Yuan was able to quell the out-break within a matter of weeks, and he emerged from the struggle in a stronger position than before. However, his attempt to restore 10 the monarchy two years later, with himself as emperor, provoked a massive outburst of opposition, complete with another flurry of indepen-dence declarations from the provinces. The monarchical dispute was resolved by Yuan's sudden death in 1916, but his demise also removed the last tenuous focus of central authority. Yuan's imperial aspirations and his dishonesty about them with some of his closest supporters had led to serious strains in his relations with his subordinates even before 12 his death. Trusted lieutenants like Feng Kuo-chang and Ch'en I were already speaking openly against their master in April and May of 1916. The writing was on the wall and when Yuan succumbed to uremia and nervous exhaustion on June 6th, what remained of a centralized structure of power swiftly crumbled. The chaos of the warlord period was ushered in. The Peiyang Army rapidly broke down into i t s component parts. Subordinate officers, shorn of the commander who had held them together as a single unit, vied among themselves for supremacy. Other regional and provincial armies, which had previously been too weak to compete with the unified power of the Peiyang Army and which now f e l t relieved of any bonds of allegiance that may have tied them to the central government before Yuan's death, also joined the fray. In the free-for-a l l that followed, satrapies were carved out, with no single military force able to muster the strength needed to dominate the national scene. Peking, as the internationally recognized capital of China, was the prize for which a l l warlords who had aspirations of national scope contended. Armies swept back and forth across the northern plain, and one government succeeded another in the capital. 11 In 1917, Sun Yat-sen and his devoted band of revolutionaries established a military government in Canton to compete with what they considered to be an illegitimate regime in Peking. They hoped to use Kwangtung as a base from which they could launch an expedition that would unify the entire country. But Sun and his Kuomintang colleagues encountered a host of d i f f i c u l t i e s and were unable to consolidate their control in the south for several years. Sun's national goals clashed with the provincial loyalties of the local population. The provincialism with which Sun came into conflict was another aspect of the broader phenomenon of regionalism. But this was a more abstract kind of regionalism than that defined by Michael: i t consisted of a consciousness of and a loyalty to a distinct region, in this case the province. Provincialism of this type had long been present in China, nourished by poor communications and differences in language, social customs, diet, and the l i k e . To gain a better understanding of i t s development in the early Republic, we must return briefly to the end of the Ch'ing dynasty. The establishment in October, 1909 of provincial assemblies gave tremendous impetus to feelings of provincial solidarity. The creation of these bodies provided an institutional framework for, and bestowed legitimacy upon, provincial sentiments that had previously manifested themselves largely through informal channels. Provincialism has often been viewed in a purely negative light -- as one more contributor to the fragmentation of the country. However, i t s positive potential must not be ignored. As John Fincher has pointed out, provincialism with an institutional and p o l i t i c a l focal point like the provincial assemblies facilitated 12 13 the rise of nationalism. It provided an intermediate stage that eased and made more understandable the transition from traditional, parochial loyalties to modern, national ones. Unfortunately, the process was halted before i t was completed, and regional fragmentation and militarism rather than national unity prevailed. Sun Yat-sen's encounters with provincialism in Kwangtung exemplified the problems involved in reanimating the prematurely arrested process of transition to feelings of national loyalty and solidarity. Sun's f a l l i n g out with Ch'en Chiung-ming, popularizer of the slogan "Kwangtung for the Kwangtungese," is representative of the clashes of purpose that occurred. Virtually everyone acknowledged the ultimate goal of national unification, but the terms on which i t was to be achieved were in dispute. Some, like Ch'en Chiung-ming, believed in the virtue of "cultivating one's own garden,"^ of setting one's house in order on a local scale before attempting anything nationally; others were unwilling to give up their vested interests in order to achieve the national unification which they agreed, at least in theory, was desirable. Concepts of federalism that would give the provinces 15 a considerable amount of autonomy enjoyed a period of popularity. However, the central fact remained that no single ideology or po l i t i c a l group was able to muster the support necessary to unite the country under a government backed by solid consensus. The vacuum created by the destruction of the. old order persisted, and regional fragmentation accompanied i t while China continued i t s search for a po l i t i c a l form. In 1923, the Kuomintang f i n a l l y achieved permanent, i f some-times tenuous, control of Canton. By the next year, the Party had been reorganized for greater efficiency and control, the alliance with the Chineses Communist Party (CCP) had been inaugurated, and Russian advisors and material aid had started to flow into the city. These apparently fortuitous developments, however, also had their negative side. The Kuomintang in i t s various manifestations (Hsing-Chung hui, T'ung-meng hui, etc.) had constantly been plagued by factionalism and internal dissension. The alliance with the Communists was an explosive issue, and i t was not long before i t caused major splits in the Kuomintang ranks. Conservatives, or the so-called "Right" Kuomintang, opposed the alliance, and radicals, or the so-called "Left" Kuomintang, favored i t . Sun Yat-sen managed to control the growing dissension within the Party until his death in 1925, but i t rapidly burst to the surface thereafter. The radical Liao Chung-k'ai was assassinated in August, 1925, and Hu Han-min, a leader of the conservative faction, was indirectly implicated in the crime. Hu was hastily dispatched on a tour of the Soviet Union as a form of expiation. Later in the f a l l , a group of conservative Kuomintang members (known subsequently as the Western H i l l s faction) l e f t Canton and held a meeting before Sun Yat-sen's coffin in the Western H i l l s area outside of Peking. They resolved to expel the Communists from the Kumonintang and to dismiss Borodin as chief Soviet advisor. The radicals, who were in control at Canton, paid l i t t l e attention to the resolution outside of voting to censure the Western H i l l s faction for it s unauthorized a c t i v i t i e s . In 1926, as preparations for the unification of the country proceeded, i t became apparent that the radicals were themselves by no 14 . means united. In March, Chiang K'ai-shek, who was then s t i l l considered a member of the l e f t i s t camp, carried out a coup which forced Wang Ching-wei, then chairman of the Party and the government, into temporary e x i l e . ^ In this atmosphere of factional s t r i f e and intrigue, the Northern Expedition was launched in July, with Chiang K'ai-shek, whose star was rapidly rising, as i t s Commander-in-Chief. It swept north with unexpected rapidity, reaching the Yangtze valley early the following year. There i t halted temporarily as the revolutionary forces were torn by further dissension and s t r i f e . ^ Chiang aligned himself with the conservatives and initiated a massacre of Communists in Shanghai on April 12, 1927. From their headquarters in Wuhan the radicals, who s t i l l supported the Communist alliance, denounced Chiang and dismissed him from his post as Commander-in-Chief. Chiang replied by establishing his own Nationalist government in Nanking. By August, however, the Left Kuomintang in Wuhan had also turned against the Communists and Chiang had retired so he would not be an obstacle in the path of Party unity. A modus vivendi was eventually reached, though factional s t r i f e continued to r o i l beneath the surface. Chiang's presence was considered imperative i f the Northern Expedition was to continue, so he was summoned from retirement in December, and was reappointed Commander-in-Chief in the spring of 1928. The Northern Expedition resumed shortly thereafter and reached i t s objective, the national capital of Peking, in June. SECTION I THE BACKGROUND AND COURSE OF THE 1931 OPPOSITION MOVEMENT 16 CHAPTER I PRELUDE TO THE CANTON GOVERNMENT, 1928-1931 A wave of high hopes and expectations attended the completion of the Northern Expedition in 1928. Chiang K'ai-shek and other Party notables solemnly reported on the success of their struggle against the northern mil i t a r i s t s before the bier of Sun Yat-sen outside of Peking. The unification of China was o f f i c i a l l y announced, and i t seemed to many that the Kuomintang was riding the crest of a wave that promised to sweep a l l obstacles from i t s path. Even the optimists acknowledged that many problems remained, but in the atmosphere of enthusiasm and euphoria prevailing at the time, nothing seemed too challenging to be overcome. Unfortunately, i t soon became apparent that the rejoicing had been premature. After the completion of the Northern Expedition the new central government in Nanking was only in control of the middle and lower Yangtze valley provinces. The fic t i o n of a united China had been put forward for i t s public relations value and in the hope that i t could soon be transformed into reality. However, though the govern-ment was able to extend i t s authority somewhat in succeeding years, its control over the new areas i t brought under i t s domination was often nominal at best. The Kuomintang government did not live up to it s advance b i l l i n g , and the security, s t a b i l i t y , and reconstruction i t had promised did not materialize. Instead, recurrent c i v i l wars 17 . and chronic i n s t a b i l i t y devastated the country. Ultimately, government efforts to extend i t s authority were cut short by full-scale war with Japan, a cataclysm from which i t never really recovered. Well before the Japanese invasion, internal division had severely weakened the new government. Indeed, i t was only a matter of weeks after the formal establishment of the Nanking government in October, 1928 that the f i r s t of a series of armed challenges to i t s authority erupted. On February 19, 1929, the Wuhan Branch P o l i t i c a l Council, which was controlled by the Kwangsi Clique, dismissed General Lu T'i-p'ing as Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government. Lu was a supporter of the central government, and Nanking issued an order reversing the dismissal, which i t viewed as a challenge to i t s authority. Hostilities resulted on March 30th, and by the middle of April government forces had recaptured the whole province of Hupeh. The Kwangsi armies retreated to the south and tried to occupy Kwangtung Province in May, but this effort, too, resulted in defeat. The Kwangsiites were forced to retreat within the confines of their own province, which was i t s e l f threatened when government reinforcements arrived in Canton toward the end of May. Throughout the remainder of the year, various other military leaders extended armed challenges to central government authority. Feng Yii-hsiang's attempts to gain control of Shantung had embroiled him in a campaign against Nanking in February. The government induced two of Feng's trusted subordinates, Han Fu-chu and Shih Yu-san, to defect, thus dealing him a tel l i n g blow. Field command of Feng's army passed to another of his subordinates, Sung Che-yuan, who 18 continued operations against the government. Chiang K'ai-shek assumed personal command of Nanking's forces, but i t wasn't until the end of November that he succeeded in clearing Honan of rebel troops. In September, Chang Fa-k'uei was ordered to move his Fourth Division from Ichang in Hupeh to the Lung-Hai Railway. Instead of complying with the order, Chang issued a circular telegram in support of Wang Ching-wei, the ousted leader of the Reorganization Clique, and began a march to the south, disarming a l l troops he met on the way. He arrived in Kwangsi in November with his forces intact and immediately began an advance on Canton. Government reinforcements under the command of Ho Ying-ch'in, a loyal follower of Chiang K'ai-shek, soon relieved the immediate danger to Canton. Eventually, Chang's troops were driven back into Kwangsi, and in early January, 1930, the campaign against him was concluded. The final revolt of the year involved T'ang Sheng-chih, who had been recalled from retirement by the central govern-ment only in March to help cope with the Kwangsi Clique. On December 3rd, T'ang issued a circular telegram from his headquarters in Chengchow declaring his support for Wang Ching-wei and Chang Fa-k'uei. The government responded by dismissing him from his posts and ordering his arrest. An expedition was mounted against T'ang in mid-December. It soon surrounded his troops in western Honan, and T'ang decided to retire on January 6th, 1930. Despite the success of Nanking's military operations against it s opponents during 1929, the outlook at the start of 1930 was anything but auspicious. Wang Ching-wei had returned to China after another of his trips to Europe, and his Reorganizationist Clique not 19 only remained bitterly opposed to those who held power in Nanking, but began to achieve better results than before in i t s efforts to r a l l y and unify opposition to the government. The group's labors were, no doubt, considerably bolstered by the return of their leader, for in addition to possessing great prestige as a revolutionary leader and close colleague of Sun Yat-sen, Wang was an accomplished speaker and had broad contacts in Chinese po l i t i c a l circles. The term Reorganization Clique, or Reorganizationsts, by which Wang and his followers were generally known at this time, was short for the Society of Comrades for the Reorganization of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang kai-tsu t'ung-chih hui), an organization they founded in early 1929 to serve a vehicle through which they could promote their views more systematically.^ The Reorganization!'sts opposed the Nanking government on the ground that i t had betrayed the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, a catchall accusation under which many more specific grievances could be subsumed. They denounced the regime as corrupt and called for a thorough housecleaning so that the Party and government could be brought back in tune with the s p i r i t of the 1924 reorganization effected by Sun Yat-sen. They also called for democracy and attacked Chiang K'ai-shek for having transformed China into his personal dictatorship. The Reorganizationists refused to recognize the authority of the Third National Congress of the Kuomintang, held in March, 1929. It had been packed by Chiang K'ai-shek and had accordingly backed his policies while removing many of his opponents from the highest councils of the Party. Some of Wang's followers had been expelled from the Kuomintang, and Wang 20 himself had been formally warned by the Third Congress. The Reorganiz-ationists claimed that the last legally constituted Congress had been the Second, held in January, 1926, which they had dominated. Wang Ching-wei had presided over the Second Congress, which had confirmed him as leader of the Party and government, and as c i v i l i a n chairman of the Military Council. Chiang was looked upon as a usurper of authority which rightly belonged to Wang, and the Second Congress served as the mantle of legitimacy for the Reorganizationists. The f i r s t intimation of the bloody clashes that were to take place in the summer of 1930 came in the form of a telegraphic battle that raged between Yen Hsi-shan and Chiang K'ai-shek during February and March. On February 10th Yen fired the opening salvo in the form of a telegram to Chiang calling upon him to retire in view of the 2 impossibility of uniting the country by military means. Yen deplored the internecine s t r i f e that prevailed in China, reminded Chiang of past promises to retire, and advised him to "abdicate his seat" and go abroad with him. It is to be doubted that Yen had any intention of going abroad, and his telegram was regarded as a challenge by the Nanking government, which answered i t a few days later. Telegraphic exchanges continued throughout the remainder of February and on into the beginning of March, maintaining a rather decorous level of polite rebuke. Meanwhile both sides prepared for hostilies. Yen Hsi-shan's decision to oppose the central government was compounded of several ingredients. When Feng Yu-hsiang had been forced out of Shantung in 1929, Yen had intervened on his behalf by announcing publicly that i f Feng was forced to retire and to leave 21 China, he would accompany him abroad. His purpose was to warn Chiang K'ai-shek obliquely that i f he decided to destroy Feng's army, he 3 would also have to destroy Yen's. Chiang went to Peiping to confer with Yen, with the result that the government, showing i t s "leniency and magnanimity" and "recalling his former meritorious services,"^ re-scinded the order for Feng's arrest. Feng remained in Shansi under Yen's protection while he allowed Sung Che-yuan, one of his subordinates in the Kuominchiin, to resume operations against the government later in the year. In an effort to tie Yen to the Nanking government, Chiang appointed him Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Naval, and Air Forces. Yen accepted the post, but his attitude remained unchanged. He had gone to the aid of Feng because he feared that i f the latter were decisively defeated by the central authorities, his position in North China would be in jeopardy. He acted to forestall the possibility 5 that he might have to share his authority in North China with Nanking. Yen was in dire need of the new territory he had acquired by his judic-ious intervention in North China on behalf of the Kuomintang when the armies of the Northern Expedition neared Peking in 1928: he required additional revenue to support his swollen army, and he needed to find jobs for the many graduates of his new schools in Shansi who remained unemployed.^ The aid he extended to Feng was part of his plan to safeguard the position he had so recently fashioned for himself in the north. On March 18th, 1930, Yen took over a l l government institutions in Peiping and disarmed a l l government troops remaining in the area. Serious fighting between Feng Yu-hsiang's Kuominchiin and Nanking 22 forces began in Honan, while Yen's men advanced almost unopposed into Shantung. At the same time, Chang Fa-k'uei and Pai Ch'ung-hsi attacked Hunan from their base in Kwangsi, rapidly occupying Ch'angsha and moving on toward Wuhan. They posed a grave threat to Chiang K'ai-shek's rear, while Yen's progress into Shantung threatened his flank. Yen took over the Maritime Customs in Tientsin in June, hoping thereby to gain a lucrative source of additional revenue, but Nanking responded by closing the Tientsin Customs House and ordering a l l duties on goods destined for Tientsin to be collected elsewhere. In the meantime, Yen intensified his negotiations with various dissident p o l i t i c a l leaders, seeking their support in the formation of a new government at Peiping. Their p o l i t i c a l hue mattered l i t t l e to Yen, who was simply trying to unite a l l factions that shared a common antipathy to Chiang K'ai-shek. Thus, he dispatched emissaries to both the Western H i l l s faction and the Reorganizationists, who had been mutually opposed in the past. Yen expected their presence in his proposed new regime to enhance i t s legitimacy. The negotiations proved to be unusually protracted, though eventually dissatisfaction with Chiang prevailed over po l i t i c a l differences and brought members of the so-called Left together with members of the so-called Right in the Enlarged Conference of the Central Party Headquarters (Chung-yang tang-pu k'uo-ta h u i - i ) , commonly referred to as the Enlarged Conference or Enlarged Plenum. Apparently the Western H i l l s faction and the Reorganizationists had already initiated discussions on the possibility of uniting in 1929, well before Yen issued his invitation to them to participate in his new government.^ It was for this reason that Nanking had ordered the arrest of several Western H i l l s leaders on December 20, 1929, and this fact may also explain the timing of Wang Ching-wei's expulsion from the Party earlier in the same month. When the two groups began discussing Yen's invitation, the Reorganizationists insisted that the Enlarged Session be based on a recognition of the supremacy of the Second Congress of the Kuomintangs from which they derived their authority. The Western Q H i l l s group balked, demanding equality of status for themselves. Their attitude was hardly surprising since the Second Congress, under Wang's leadership, had denounced them and expelled several of their number from the Party. The negotiations were deadlocked and the new coalition hung in the balance for three months, until a compromise was fi n a l l y worked out. The Conference would be convened by members of the Central Executive Committee of the Second Congress, to include military leaders in the north and their accredited representatives, while the Western H i l l s group would issue a separate manifesto expres-sing agreement with the objects of the Enlarged Conference and giving 9 assurances of their support for i t . In addition, a joint statement was issued on July 13th announcing the formation of the Enlarged Conference in Peiping. Differences among the dissidents, however, were by no means solved yet, and meetings of the Conference could not even take place since many of the Reorganiationist leaders had not arrived in Peiping. Wang Ching-wei, his wife, Ku Meng-yu, Tseng Chung-ming and others reached the city on the 23rd of July and informal deliberations began forthwith. 24 By the end of the month they had approved a set of seven basic articles which they planned to use as a starting point for a l l subsequent Party and p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s . ^ (1) Prepare to convene the National People's Convention,^ which w i l l be composed of members of a l l occupa-tional groups. (2) Institute a fundamental law according to the 12 Outline of National Reconstruction; determine the makeup of government organizations and safeguards for the public and private rights of the people. This fundamental law must be openly decided upon by the National People's Convention. If time is pressing, i t may alternatively be proclaimed by the Enlarged Conference, to await future rat i f i c a t i o n by the National People's Convention. (3) The mass movement and mass organizations must be set up by local self-government according to the Outline of National Reconstruction, and they must be carefully protected from the calamity of class struggle stirred up by the Communist Party. (4) A l l levels of Party Headquarters occupy a guiding and supervisory position with regard to government and administration and do not interfere directly in p o l i t i c a l affairs. (5) Party Head-quarters do not substitute for people's organizations. (6) The so-called Party rule of the country in Tsung-li's bequeathed teachings means to rule the country with Party principles; men of a b i l i t y must be gathered together to achieve the result of pooling their talents and strengths. (7) With regard to the relation between central and local government, an equal-powers system w i l l be adopted according to the Outline of National Reconstruction; i t w i l l incline neither toward centralization nor toward decentralization. Another lapse followed the publication of these seven basic a r t i c l e s , and the f i r s t formal session of the 25 Enlarged Conference was not held until August 7th, while these formal deliberations did not produce a government until September. While the politicians were thus in conclave, the situation on the battlefield underwent a drastic change. Chiang K'ai-shek attacked and virtually annihilated Yen's troops in Shantung that had been threatening his flank. The remainder fled in terror toward Shansi. Chiang then addressed himself to Feng's troops in Honan and gradually drove them northward toward Shansi. The dangerous situation in Hunan had already been reversed in June and July when the Kwangsi forces were cut off from the rear. A Cantonese army moved into Hunan and Kwangsi while the Ylinnanese took advantage of the situation to attack Kwangsi from the west. Finding themselves thus cut off and their home province imperilled, the Kwangsi leaders had no choice but to withdraw their expeditionary forces in Hunan immediately, freeing several of Chiang's divisions for action against Yen and Feng. One of the main stumbling blocks in the establishment of a dissident government in Peiping was the question of who should head i t . Yen Hsi-shan and Wang Ching-wei each suggested that the other take the position. In the words of one of his followers, "Wang didn't care for direct exercise of po l i t i c a l power, realising that without adequate military backing of his own and without a genuine Party Army, he could only be a figure-head, without any power to f u l f i l l the tasks for which the public would hold him responsible. Hence his persistent refusal of Generalissimo Yen's offer of the Chairmanship of the proposed 13 new National Government." Yen no doubt had similar reasons for not wanting to become chairman of the new government. In the end, Yen agreed to accept the job, and at 9:00 A.M. on the 9th of September 26 14 (i.e. the ninth month) the new government o f f i c i a l l y took office. The date was allegedly chosen for i t s numerological auspiciousness, but this appeal to occult powers had no apparent effect on the situation. Chang Hsueh-liang, the Young Marshal, who had inherited his father's satrapy°of Manchuria, held the key to the success or failure of the Enlarged Conference. Both Nanking and the Northern Coalition had been zealously courting Chang from the outset. A steady stream of emissaries came and went from the Manchurian capital throughout the summer. After a lengthy period of neutrality, the Young Marshal decided that his interests lay with the central government. Chiang K'ai-shek offered 15 him several government portfolios, and there is reason to believe that he was promised a free hand in ruling a l l of North China above the Yellow River in return for his help.^ Japanese sources indicate that Chiang also gave him 10 million yuan as an incentive.^ Chang may in addition have been wary of joining the Northern Coalition because he distrusted Feng Yu-hsiang, who was an old antagonist of his father's, and because he wanted Nanking's support against Soviet and 1 g Japanese pressures in Manchuria. Yen Hsi-shan could offer nothing comparable. On the 18th of September, 1930, a year to the day before the Japanese began their onslaught against Manchuria, Chang Hsueh-liang issued a circular telegram calling for peace and unity in the country. His soldiers poured into North China, and Yen's men were ordered to retreat to Shansi. Yen himself announced his retirement, and the members of the Enlarged Conference fled variously to the foreign concession in Tientsin and to Shansi. Peiping and Tientsin were in the hands of 27 the Manchurians by the end of the month, and Lanfeng, K'aifeng, and Chengchow in Honan were rapidly captured by Nanking forces. The cam-paign against the Northern Coalition was essentially at an end. It had been one of the bloodiest wars of the Republic, lasting over six months and costing both sides somewhere in the neighborhood of 250,000 men 19 kill e d and wounded. The Enlarged Conference, while these events were overtaking i t , had been in the process of creating i t s magnum opus: a provisional 20 constitution (yueh-fa) for the tutelage period. The yueh-fa was to serve as the fundamental law stipulated in the second of the seven basic articles announced at the end of July as the guiding principles of the Conference. Wang Ching-wei was chairman of the constitutional drafting committee, and Tsou Lu was one of i t s most active members to the very end. When the military situation deteriorated, the Enlarged Conference, including the drafting committee, removed i t s e l f to T'aiyuan, the capital of Shansi. Its numbers had already dwindled and as the 21 meetings wore on, fewer and fewer members remained. Nevertheless, the drafting committee proceeded doggedly with i t s work and after a number of revisions, the draft constitution i t produced was approved 22 by what remained of the Enlarged Conference on October 27th. It was further resolved that the draft, which was generally known as the T'aiyuan Constitution after the locality at which i t was proclaimed, would circulate throughout the country for a period of three months to enable the people to make their criticisms of i t . It was then to be revised for final promulgation in accordance with their wishes, though circumstances prevented this eventuality. The Enlarged Confer-28 ence then adjourned, and Wang Ching-wei and the remaining leaders l e f t T'aiyuan on the following day for safer environs. The dissidents placed such great emphasis on the T'aiyuan Constitution because i t acted as an earnest of their intentions. They wanted to show that despite the bloody c i v i l war with which they had largely been involved, their aspirations were not directed toward creat-ing chaos. What they really sought was peace, reconstruction, and freedom for one and a l l -- goals which could not be achieved under the repressive and retrogressive Nanking regime. Chiang K'ai-shek's government, they f e l t , was illegitimate and had strayed from the revolutionary path. It had made l i t t l e or no progress in the f i e l d of reconstruction, and i t had made no effort whatsoever to move the country toward democratic rule. Both were goals to which i t was committed by pledge as well as by virtue of i t s stated adherence to 23 the precepts of Sun Yat-sen. Instead, the government was coming increasingly under the sway of one man with dictatorial ambitions, and i t denied the population at large the most basic c i v i l rights. Its insistence on unifying China by force plunged the country into one devastating c i v i l war after another and led to crippling military expenditures at a time when funds were desperately needed for reconstruc-tion. In short, the Nanking government was bankrupt in every sense of the word. The dissidents laid the responsibility for this situation almost entirely at the door of Chiang K'ai-shek. He had led the government since i t s inception in 1928 and i t s policies could be taken as his policies, especially since he had arrogated increasing 29 powers to himself in the intervening years. He had packed the Third National Kuomintang Congress to insure that i t would adopt his policies and appoint his followers to key positions in the Party. He would tolerate no opposition to his views and used i l l e g a l methods to suppress heterodoxy. He arranged for his opponents to be expelled from the 24 Party as a f i r s t step, and i f that seemed insufficient he was not above i l l e g a l arrests and even murder. For example, Li Chi-shen of the Kwangsi Clique was arrested in Nanking on March 21, 1929, after being guaranteed safe conduct to 25 the Third Kuomintang Congress; Chii Cheng, a prominent Western H i l l s leader, was arrested in Shanghai on December 23, 1929, when his car strayed from the safe haven of the International Settlement during a 26 snowstorm; Fang Chen-wu, Chairman of the Anhwei Provincial Government, was f i r s t placed under surveillance for his dealings with Chang Fa-k'uei 27 in September, 1929, and was subsequently arrested. A l l three were prominent Kuomintang members, and a l l three remained under detention until late 1931. In addition, Wang Le-p'ing, P'an Hsing-chien, and K'ang Jui-chai, a l l members of the Reorganization!'st Clique, were shot to death at the Shanghai headquarters of the Reorganizationists on February 28 18, 1930. The murder was never solved, but i t was widely attributed 29 to Chiang K'ai-shek at the time. Certainly there was no doubt in the mind of Wang Ching-wei as to who was responsible, for he issued 30 a statement accusing the Nanking regime of the murder. If prominent Party and government o f f i c i a l s could be thus treated, so the argument went, what hope could the man in the street have of being treated with dignity and justice? 30 The T'aiyuan Constitution placed on record in black and white a proposal for an alternative to the current situation as the dissidents saw i t . As such, i t lent legitimacy to the members of the Enlarged Conference, and they hoped that i t would serve not only as a blueprint for reform, but as a rallying point for a l l those who were dissatisfied with the Nanking government. In intellectual circles at the time, there was no dearth of men who were disenchanted with Kuomintang rule. The Party had commenced it s rule in 1928 with few advantages outside of the general optimism that accompanied the conclusion of the Northern Expedition. The Nanking government was founded at a time when capable and dedicated men were at a premium. The move north had swollen the Party and the army with new recruits, many of whom were unreliable at best. Just when the Kuomintang assumed responsibility for administering vast new areas --indeed, the entire country was nominally under i t s control for the f i r s t time -- i t s army was faced with the task of absorbing huge numbers of defeated troops, a considerable proportion of which were l i t t l e more than brigands, while the Party had to accommodate many bureau-crats and m i l i t a r i s t s who had been associated with the old regime in North China. Po l i t i c a l reconstruction was unable to keep pace with military expansion, and the Kuomintang had l i t t l e alternative but to use the antediluvian bureaucrats who had often been working with the 31 successive Peking governments since the 1911 revolution. People at the time coined the phrase "military northern expedition, po l i t i c a l southern expedition: (chun-shih pei-fa, cheng-chih nan-fa) to describe 32 the situation. 31 Even the old Party faithfuls were not united among themselves, for each faction held i t s own views on how the Kuomintang should rule. In addition, the party purification movement may well have had a seriously 33 negative effect on the Kuomintang. After the break with the Communists in 1927, i t had not taken long for the purge to extend from those who were proven threats to the Party to those who were suspected or potential threats. It is l i k e l y that many dedicated and capable workers f e l l victim to the hysteria, depriving the Kuomintang of men i t could i l l afford to lose. Under the circumstances, i t is not surprising that the new government was inefficient and corruption widespread. The leadership 34 was perfectly well aware of the abuses that went on daily, yet seemed powerless to correct them. As the regime sank deeper into the morass of ineptitude and peculation, i t resorted increasingly to arbitrary arrests and other repressive measures to control growing popular resent-ment. The results were, perhaps predictably, the opposite of what was intended: distrust of Party rule spread a l l the faster and there was a rising crescendo of voices calling for some sort of basic law to act as a check on the arbitrary exercise of power by the Kuomintang. The Reorganizationist and Western H i l l s groups were not alone in their desire to establish a clear definition of the rights and duties of both the government and the people in the period prior to full-fledged constitutional government. The liberal community, under the leadership of Hu Shih and including such men as Lo Lung-chi, 35 Liang Shih-ch'iu, and P'an Kuang-tan (Quentin Pan) joined the fray. In mid 1929, Hu Shih wrote: 32 Government conduct in China today has fundamentally not had the limits of i t s power stipulated by law, nor do the rights and liberties of the people have any legally stipulated safeguards. Under these conditions, how can we speak of safeguarding human rights! How can we speak of firmly establishing a foundation for the rule of law! Today, if we really want to safeguard human rights, if we really want to firmly establish a foundation for the rule of law, the first thing we must do is to enact a constitu-tion for the Republic of China. At the very least we must have a provisional constitution for the so-called period of political tutelage. 36 The li b e r a l s , and especially Hu Shih, soon came under attack for their outspoken criticism. Ch'en Te-cheng, the director of the special Kuomintang headquarters in Shanghai and a man of "unswervingly 37 dogmatic ideological loyalties," even demanded Hu's arrest for sub-version. This suggestion was rejected by the government, but Hu did receive an o f f i c i a l reprimand from the Ministry of Education, and he was also beleaguered with o f f i c i a l refutations of his views. Thus we find Sun Fo(K'o), then Minister of Railways, saying at a weekly memorial 38 meeting in September, 1929, "If the masses in China have not been properly trained to exercise their p o l i t i c a l rights, a constitution for the Chinese Government w i l l mean no more than merely a piece of paper. 39 Such views are academic and not practical." As we shall see later, i t was not long before Sun Fo changed his tune, though there is some dispute over his motives. Hu Shih was probably saved from a more 40 drastic punishment by his influential friends in the government. In the prevailing mood of alienation from the government, the labors of the Enlarged Conference with respect to a provisional constitution were looked upon with favor by a significant number of China's intellectuals. The preamble of the T'aiyuan Constitution, 33 • in the fashion of contemporary standards of po l i t i c a l respectability, stated that the document was based on Sun Yat-sen's Outline of National Reconstruction, and the f i r s t a r t i c l e further specified that the National Government would reconstruct China on the revolutionary basis of the Three People's Principles and the Five Power Constitution. It devoted chapters to the Outline of National Reconstruction (articles 1-25, 12%); the l i b e r t i e s , rights, and obligations of the people (articles 26-53, 13%); authority — of the central versus the local government (articles 54-71, 8.5%); the central p o l i t i c a l system (articles 72-140, 33%); the local p o l i t i c a l system (articles 141-179, 18.5%); education (articles 180-192, 6%); livelihood -- of the people (articles 193-206, 7%); and additional articles such as the powers of interpretation and amendment of the constitution (articles 207-211, 2%).^ When the T'aiyuan Constitution was published in October, 1930, i t was 42 generally well received. Even Ta-kung pao, an organ of the pro-43 Chiang K'ai-shek Po l i t i c a l Studies Clique, published a rather favourable editorial on i t , saying i t was worthy of examination and l i s t i n g five 44 major strengths as well as several weak points. It was the po l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of the Enlarged Conference which had the greatest effect on the Nanking government. M i l i t a r i l y the dissidents were beaten, though their defeat by no-means unified the country even t e r r i t o r i a l l y . The power of Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang was now replaced in North China by the hegemony of Chang Hsueh-liang, who also controlled Manchuria; the Kwangsi Clique retired within i t s own provincial boundaries to lick i t s wounds and prepare for the next round; and provinces at some distance from Nanking -- like 34 • Kwangtung, Yunnan, and Szechwan -- remained only nominally in the Government fold. Nanking's control was s t i l l confined to the middle and lower Yangtze valley provinces. Yen, Feng, Wang, and their associates had only suffered a military setback. They were forced into temporary "retirement," but they lived on to continue the struggle another day. Shorn of i t s melodrama, the statement of one of Wang's followers was very much to the point: "For the Left under Wang's leadership, being conscious of i t s revolutionary mission, w i l l never accept defeat, but, in the true s p i r i t of Dr. Sun, is bound to take 45 the f i r s t opportunity to strike again." Chiang's victory did not strike at the root of the problems that beset the country, and dissatisfaction s t i l l seethed beneath the apparently placid surface. The conflict, however, had been educational for Chiang, and he realized that something more than a military campaign was necessary to take care of his Hydra-like opponents. As his armies swept forward and i t became apparent that h o s t i l i t i e s were rapidly drawing to a close, he sent two telegrams to Nanking from his f i e l d headquarters at the 46 front. In one he recommended that a general amnesty be proclaimed for p o l i t i c a l and military offenders, with the exception of Yen Hsi-shan, Ch'en Chiung-ming, and the Communists, whose crimes were too heinous to be pardoned. Ch'en was considered beyond the pale because he had "revolted against and threatened the very l i f e of the late Party Leader" (i.e. Sun Yat-sen) in the early 1920's. As the cult of Sun Yat-sen gained momentum, anyone who had had the temerity to oppose him was viewed with extreme disfavor, and Ch'en Chiung-ming was used as a symbol of evil to stand in Manichaean contrast with him. 35 In the second telegram, Chiang suggested that the Fourth National Kuomintang Congress, or at least the Fourth Plenary Session of the Third Central Executive and Supervisory Committees (CEC and CSC), be convened as soon as possible to decide when to call together a National People's Convention (Kuo-min hui-i). The People's Convention was to be entrusted with the task of adopting a provisional constitution {yueh-fa) that would act as the basic law of the land until a permanent constitution {hsien-fa) was promulgated. It was also to re-examine the question of when the period of constitutional government should begin. Chiang K'ai-shek was clearly trying to conciliate his opponents with the suggestions contained in the two telegrams. The measures he proposed coincided almost exactly with the major demands of the Enlarged Conference. The lone exception was really only a difference in terminology: Chiang sought the convocation of the Fourth Kuomintang Congress, while his antagonists sought the convocation of the Third Congress since they did not recognize the Third Congress that had been held in Nanking in 1929. There can be l i t t l e doubt that Chiang's call for a People's Convention and a provisional constitution came as a direct response to the po l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of the Enlarged 47 -Conference. Chiang expected to k i l l several birds with one stone. F i r s t , he hoped through appeasement to relieve some of the pressure his most militant p o l i t i c a l foes were bringing to bear on the Nanking Government; second, he hoped to silence criticism from intellectual circles by making what seemed to be a major concession to their demand that the government be circumscribed by constitutional checks that would prevent 36 • the arbitrary exercise of power; and third, he knew that he could control any People's Convention that was held in Nanking under Kuomintang auspices. In short, Chiang hoped to get the best of both worlds: he would appease his c r i t i c s on the one hand; and when the time for the People's Convention actually arrived, he might, on the other hand, manipulate i t in such a way that, far from circumscribing his and the government's power, i t would enhance and legitimize their authority. Such, at any rate, was the charge that was soon levelled against him. I n i t i a l l y , however, Chiang's gambit achieved at least some measure of success. Wang Ching-wei at f i r s t greeted i t with cautions approbation, saying that he endorsed Chiang's suggestion that a National People's Convention and the Kuomintang Congress be convoked, whether or not Chiang was sincere in advocating i t . He added, "I feel that i f only 48 our proposals can be accepted, then a l l the rest doesn't matter." Not long afterward, Wang issued a circular telegram expressing satis-faction at the turn of events in the north and stating that while the Northern Coalition had met military defeat, i t s p o l i t i c a l goals 49 had been adopted. Paradoxically, i t was from within the highest councils of the Nanking government that the f i r s t and fiercest criticism of Chiang's proposals erupted. Hu Han-min, the venerable and stubborn head of the Legislative Yuan, was implacably opposed to both the amnesty and the proclamation of a provisional constitution. His outspoken public criticism led to his arrest within five months, an event that r a l l i e d p o l i t i c a l discontent and became the mortar from which an opposition movement was built in Canton in May, 1931. 37 • To gain a better understanding of Hu's strained relations with Chiang K'ai-shek in 1930 and 1931, we must turn back to the situation that existed in Canton in 1925. Hu was at that time at the pinnacle of his power, and the history of his subsequent career is the history of the erosion of his power. When Sun Yat-sen went to Peking at the end of 1924 to confer with the northern m i l i t a r i s t s on a pol i t i c a l settlement for China, he appointed Hu acting Generalissimo, or Grand Marshal (Ta yuan-shuai), to manage affairs in Canton. Sun died in Peking a few months later and Hu f u l l y expected to succeed him as leader of the revolutionary movement in the south. Indeed, he continued to run the Party and the government for a time. A coalition of Party leaders, however, including Wang Ching-wei, Hsu Ch'ung-chih, Liao Chung-k'ai, and Chiang K'ai-shek, combined 50 to f o i l Hu's ambitions. Working together, they were able to control the P o l i t i c a l Council and to dominate the Party military forces. In June, 1925, the Kuomintang in Canton, acting under their guidance, resolved most of the problems confronting i t in the vacuum created by Sun's death. There was to be no successor to the late leader as Generalissimo. The Revolutionary government was replaced by a new national government. Wang Ching-wei became the chairman of the National Government Council, i t s standing committee, and the Military Council; Hu was replaced by Liao as governor of Kwangtung province and was relegated to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in a regime that was not recognized by any foreign countries. Nor did the matter rest there. As we have already mentioned in the introduction, Hu was indirectly implicated in the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai in 38 August, and as a result he was sent on what was euphemistically termed a "tour of investigation" of Soviet Russia. His f a l l from power was thus rapid and complete. Most accounts agree that Hu deeply resented his eclipse, feeling that as a leading Party member and confidant of 51 Sun Yat-sen he had been unjustly shunted aside. His twenty year friendship with Wang Ching-wei abruptly deteriorated, to be replaced by bitterness and distrust. Some of Hu's associates like Hsu Ch'ung-chih soon followed him in decline. Several of Hsu's subordinates had been implicated in the Liao assassination, and in September, 1925, Chiang K'ai-shek dis-armed Hsu's troops, reorganized them, and incorporated them into his own First Army. An embittered Hsu l e f t for Shanghai, never again to regain his former prominence. In contrast, Chiang K'ai-shek's star rose rapidly after 1925, and though his fortunes fluctuated somewhat over the next few years, he had firmly established his predominance by the time the Nationalist regime was installed in Nanking in 1928. Chiang's swift rise was resented by many of the older and more distinguished members of the Kuomintang, including Hu Han-min, who f e l t their own revolutionary records entitled them to precedence over a man so junior to them in Party status. Hu nevertheless cooperated with Chiang in establishing a conservative regime in Nanking in 1927 to counteract the influence of the radical Wuhan government headed by Wang Ching-wei. Hu was even elected chairman of the government, the p o l i t i c a l council, and the military council. The positions, however, were purely nominal, and while they may have soothed his feelings of resentment, they did 39 l i t t l e to increase his actual power. By the end of the year, Hu had become disappointed with both the continued conflict between the Left and Right segments of the Party and his own in a b i l i t y to regain his former power. The pol i t i c a l atmosphere not being to his l i k i n g , he l e f t with Sun Fo, Hu Ch'ao-shu, and others in January, 1928, on a tour to investigate methods of government in the United States, the Middle 52 East, and Europe. As the Northern Expedition drew to a close in the spring of that year, Chiang K'ai-shek was faced with the imminent need to establish a new national government to replace the Peking regime of the northern m i l i t a r i s t s . The Kuomintang was s t i l l in disarray after the bitter factional struggles of the previous year, and there was an urgent need to close ranks in preparation for the task ahead. Chiang was well aware that the Kuomintang would need a l l the unity and support i t could muster i f the new government i t was about to launch was to get off on the right foot. He wired Hu Han-min to s o l i c i t his cooperation and assistance. Hu s t i l l commanded a great deal of respect in the Party and country, and his active participation in the new regime would add considerably to i t s s t a b i l i t y . The fact that his effective political' power had been so drastically reduced since the death of Sun Yat-sen probably made him a l l the more attractive to Chiang as a prospective colleague in the new government: Hu would lend i t his prestige while he would not pose a serious challenge to Chiang's predominance. Wang Ching-wei, the only other Party leader of a stature equal to Hu's, offered Chiang a much less attractive alternative as 40 a collaborator in the new regime. Wang's politics were a bit too radical for Chiang and other predominantly conservative Party leaders in Nanking. Furthermore, many conservatives blamed Wang for the out-break of the bloody Canton Commune in December, 1927. In other words, his presence in the government might create more dissension than unity. Wang might also pose a threat to Chiang K'ai-shek's ambitions. His power base in China, though diminished, was s t i l l much stronger than that of Hu Han-min. Wang counted several military commanders like Chang Fa-k'uei and T'ang Sheng-chih among his supporters and he might avail himself of their armed strength to gain leverage in any contest of w i l l s with Chiang K'ai-shek. Hu Han-min responded to Chiang's request for assistance with a telegram from Paris, j o i n t l y signed by Sun Fo, advocating the 53 immediate adoption of a five-yuan system of government. The i n s t i t u -tion of this system at the outset of the period of p o l i t i c a l tutelage 54 was contrary to the timetable laid down by Sun Yat-sen, and at f i r s t glance i t might seem strange that a man regarded as a Kuomintang ideologue and faithful follower of the late leader should w i l l f u l l y advocate such a departure from the Grand Plan for the revolution. Hu's motives, however, were carefully calculated: he wanted the government to be collegiate in order to prevent the emergence of a 55 dictatorship. His fear of a dictatorship was, no doubt, based partially on principle, but i t was probably also based partially on a more personal desire to prevent Chiang K'ai-shek from gaining absolute power and thus precluding his own return to a top leadership position. The fact that Sun Fo, son of the founding father, was a 41 co-signer of Hu's plan to alter the schedule for the establishment of government organs was significant. It lent weight and legitimacy to the proposal and made i t d i f f i c u l t to ignore or reject. Hu was s t i l l abroad in August, so he missed the Fifth Plenum of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees at which the course the new government should take was discussed. His representatives were present, however, for a resolution advocating the five-power system 56 was proposed in Hu's name, and i t passed after some discussion. At the same time another resolution, proposed by the Law Codification Bureau headed by Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, sought the early promulgation of a provisional constitution (yueh-fa) to delineate the rights and 57 obligations of both the people and the government in detail. It recommended that a drafting committee be appointed immediately and a date be set for the completion of a draft; that the draft be considered by the CEC and then sent to the Third Kuomintang Congress for final approval; and that i t then be promulgated as the highest law of the land during the tutelage period. The provisional constitution resolution must have had some support in pol i t i c a l and intellectual c i r c l e s , for i t was passed by the plenum and was also singled out by 58 the newspapers as worthy of attention. When Hu Han-min returned to China in September, he was immediately closeted in an interminable series of conferences and discussions with other Kuomintang o f f i c i a l s . Apparently, he had not yet reached a firm decision as to whether he would go to Nanking and place his talent and great prestige at the disposal of the embryonic government. He distrusted Chiang K'ai-shek, and several of his old comrades like Hsu Ch'ung-chih, Hsieh Ch'ih, and Chu Cheng 59 urged him not to enter the capital. Hu decided, after only brief hesitation that he could not but go to Nanking to offer his services. He gave two major reasons for his decision:^ f i r s t , he and other comrades had inherited Sun Yat-sen's unfulfilled revolutionary aims and had an obligation to carry on; moreover, at a time when Chiang K'ai-shek had not yet made his rebel traces evident {tsai oh'i p'an-ohi wei-chang ch'ien), comrades should help him as much as possible and hope that he was thoroughly revolutionary. In other words, he should be given the benefit of the doubt. Second, the Party must not have any more internal s t r i f e -- the general situation had stabilized and though there were a few warlord remnants to be eliminated, the main task was now reconstruction. Hu added that one should address oneself to a f f a i r s , not to people. He hoped that Chiang was a Kemal (i.e. a revolutionary) and not a Yuan Shih-k'ai (i.e. a rebel). If he turned out to be the lat t e r , Hu would be the f i r s t to oppose him and no sacrifice would be too great. Hu's followers f e l t that he was undertaking the task of "entering the tiger's l a i r to oppose the tiger." When Hu arrived in Nanking, he seems to have brought a l l the prestige and influence he could muster to bear on the question of a provisional constitution, for no action was taken on the resolution passed by the Fifth Plenary Session. Originally, the Party had decided that the final decision on the question would be made at the Third National Kuomintang Congress which was tentatively scheduled for the f i r s t of January, 1929. The Congress was postponed, and when i t f i n a l l y did take place in March, 1929, there was no mention of a provisional constitution. Instead, a resolution was passed that recognized Sun Yat-sen's principal bequeathed teachings as the highest basic law of the Republic of China during the tutelage period.^ As one would expect, Hu Han-min delivered a keynote speech explaining the resolution when i t was introduced. It is quite possible that recognition of Sun's teachings as a fundamental law and i t s corollary that no provisional constitution was necessary for the tutelage period formed the basis of the agreement between Hu and Chiang that 62 enabled them to join forces in September, 1928. It only remained for the Third Kuomintang Congress to formally r a t i f y the agreement. In addition, the sequence of events suggests that acceptance of the premature establishment of a five-power system of government was also an important element in their cooperation. It is not entirely clear why Hu was so consistently opposed to a provisional constitution. One might suppose that i f he was apprehensive of a dictatorship, he would have supported a constitution as added protection against such an eventuality. It could easily have provided for the five-power system, as the provisional constitution of 1931 was to do. It is sometimes asserted that Hu opposed a yueh-fa because he believed i t was against the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, which he considered the only source from which China's salvation could flow. As this explanation would have i t , Hu was given to extremely narrow interpretations of Sun's works, and in the Outline of National Reconstruction, which had become canonized as the main blueprint for the revolution, there was no mention of a provisional constitution. 44 During the tutelage period, the people were to be educated in the exercise of their p o l i t i c a l rights and obligations under the benevolent despotism of Party rule. According to Sun's timetable, constitutional government would be ushered in when the majority of the people were properly trained and certain other requirements, like the completion of a census and a land survey and the organization of an efficient police force, had been met. A provisional constitution did not enter into the scheme at a l l , for China was to pass directly from Party rule to f u l l constitutionalism. This explanation of Hu's opposition to a yueh-fa is unsatisfactory for several reasons. F i r s t , Hu had shown himself perfectly capable of deliberately flying in the face of Sun's teachings when he recommended that a five-power system of government be implemented during the tutelage period. Second, the vague and often contradictory body of Sun's writings could equally well be used to ju s t i f y the pro-mulgation of a provisional constitution during the tutelage period. Proponents of a yueh-fa pointed to the Plan for the Revolution (Ko-mi ng fang-lueh), written by Sun in 1906, which specifically called for one. Third, Hu himself wrote in a later account of his opposition to the 1931 provisional constitution that he was definitely 65 not against either a provisional or a permanent constitution. The implication was that they must come at the right time. Hu recalled his past efforts that had been directed toward establishing democracy and achieving people's rights. He said that as Legislative Yuan head he could easily have thrust himself into the spotlight by calling for and then drafting a constitution. But simply declaring a constitution 45 would not achieve democracy. Military power reigned supreme and there was no way to make laws effective, so i t would be useless to declare a basic law i f i t couldn't be put into effect. Even worse, to proclaim such a law and then to disregard i t would destroy people's faith in the Party and cause the law i t s e l f to lose i t s meaning. Moreover, a hollow yueh-fa would not provide the people with clothes i f they were cold and food i f they were hungry. What they wanted was reconstruction, and reconstruction was the main responsibility of the Kuomintang for the present. The above analysis, though i t was used by Hu to explain his position in 1931, applies by extension to the situation in 1928. At that time, Hu wanted the new government to be based on laws that had some hope of being carried out. Thus the Organic Law of October, 1928, for which he was largely responsible, confined i t s e l f to stipu-lating the organization of the Kuomintang regime. It contained no high sounding guarantees of l i f e , liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The closest i t came was to say in the preamble that the Kuomintang deemed i t necessary to "construct a framework for the Constitution of Five Powers with a view to developing the a b i l i t y of the people to exercise p o l i t i c a l power, so that constitutional government may soon come into existence and po l i t i c a l power be restored to the people; cc . . . ." It should be noted that preambles do not have the force of law. It seems most l i k e l y that Hu opposed a provisional constitu-tion on the pragmatic ground that i t would be meaningless. It would neither guarantee c i v i l l i b e r t i e s , nor prevent a dictatorship from being instituted, nor help Hu to regain some measure of his former 46 p o l i t i c a l power. If he couched his opposition in terms of Sun Yat-senist orthodoxy, i t was largely for i t s legitimizing value. Hu was content to work within what he considered to be the realm of the possible, or perhaps the probable. Chiang K'ai-shek valued Hu's cooperation in the government, so he acquiesced in the shelving of the yueh-fa. It was probably also in his own interests to do so, for at the time his position was not strong enough to allow him to make a constitutional bid for absolute power. Although laws were notoriously ineffective during the Nanking period, limits imposed by a provisional constitution might well have been a hindrance to Chiang. His power was rooted in financial, factional, and military resources that were l i t t l e affected by the niceties of law in a country that had no solid institutional framework; but even so, i t was to be a decade before he secured legal recognition of his preeminent position in the Party and in the government. Only in 1938, under the pressure of an all-out Japanese attack, was he elected to the specially created post of Tsung-ts'ai (Director-general or Leader) of the Party. As i t was, in 1928 Chiang K'ai-shek outmaneuvered Hu Han-min at every turn when the latter attempted to create a collegiate form of government that would prevent any single individual from gaining too much power. Hu's draft of the Organic Law outlining the five-yuan system underwent three revisions and i t s final form bore only a pale resemblance to what he had originally envisioned. A great deal of power was centralized in the post of Chairman of the National Government. Perhaps most significantly, the Chairman was ex officio Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Naval, and Air Forces of the Republic of China. The post, of course, was occupied by Chiang K'ai-shek, the man Hu most distrusted. With the foregoing sketch of Hu Han-min's recent po l i t i c a l history as background, we can return to our examination of the after-math of the Enlarged Conference in 1930. The tension and distrust that had characterized the relationship between Chiang K'ai-shek and Hu Han-min in 1928 had not decreased in the two intervening years, and Hu had not been able to improve his position vis-a-vis his rival in any meaningful way. Chiang's response to the acti v i t i e s of the Enlarged Conference, as outlined in his two previously described telegrams from the front in October, 1930, was enough to shatter the delicate balance of his collaboration with Hu Han-min. He had not consulted Hu when he made his decision to call for an amnesty and a provisional constitution, and i t came as a complete surprise. Hu was immediately placed in an embarrassing position, for while he was in Nanking cranking out propaganda denouncing the dis-sidents and calling for their liquidation, a l l with his customary 68 thoroughness, Chiang suddenly took the reverse approach. Hu refused to allow the telegrams to be made public, but Chiang learned of his efforts and sent copies to the major Shanghai newspapers for 69 publication. Hu based his disapproval of making the telegrams public on three points:^ .(1) To publicize such an important matter throughout the nation in the Party's name, and abroad in one's own name, before i t had f i r s t been approved by the central Kuomintang headquarters was a serious breach of the s p i r i t of Party rule. 48 (2) Chiang was only an individual member of the Central Executive Committee, and i f he freely published his views on such an important pol i t i c a l matter without f i r s t obtaining permission from the Party authorities, i t was a dictatorial and arbitrary action that placed the Party in a d i f f i c u l t position and was hard to rectify. (3) There was, at present, no need to promulgate a yueh-fa, and there certainly was no basis in Sun's teachings for the National People's Convention to promulgate such a document. Hu obviously f e l t that Chiang was guilty of a serious breach of faith in repudiating the decision that Sun's major writings would serve as a constitution during the tutelage period. A l l of his fears of a dictatorship were redoubled. On November 1st, Hu wrote an essay in which he opposed making peace with those who had been defeated in ba t t l e . 7 1 He argued that they only sought peace because they had no choice. If they had their way, they would bide their time, build up their strength, and then rise again as soon as they had the chance. He attacked Wang Ching-wei specifically as one who had committed repeated "breaches of virtue" with regard to the Party. The lines were drawn when the Fourth Plenary Session convened from the 12th through the 18th of November to consider the situation. Hu delivered the opening address, in which he notably failed to make any mention of the National People's Convention and the provisional 17 constitution. Instead, he repeated that Sun's teachings were the basic law of the land and that a l l rebels should be punished. Apparently, Hu's viewpoint scored some early successes. As a result of his stubborn opposition, the resolutions before the plenum proposing 49 amnesty, the convocation of the People's Convention, and the drafting 73 of a yueh-fa were modified considerably. Ironically, the People's Convention/yueh-fa resolution was introduced by the Presidium, of which Hu was a member. Presumably, unanimity was not required among the members of the Presidium when i t proposed a resolution. On the 15th, however, the whole matter was reopened when a group of late arrivals brought forward another resolution calling for the early convocation of the National People's 74 Convention and the promulgation of a provisional constitution. Heated words were exchanged by.Hu Han-min and other delegates. Eventually the Plenum decided to combine the new resolution with the old one proposed by the Presidium. The date of the People's Convention was set for May 5th, 1931, with the method of convening i t to be determined by the standing committee of the CEC. Hu was later elected to the committee of fourteen that was charged with the responsibility of drafting a plan for the Convention. On the question of amnesty, Hu was a bit more successful. The amnesty b i l l in i t s final form proclaimed a general amnesty for January 1, 1931, but Communists and ringleaders of revolts were excepted. This revision enabled the Plenum to strike some 20 people from the Party r o l l s (Yen His-shan and Wang Ching-wei among them) for their participation in the Enlarged Conference, while at the same time proclaiming a "general." amnesty. Since T'an Yen-k'ai, the respected head of the Executive Yuan, had recently died, the Fourth Plenary Session appointed Chiang K'ai-shek to replace him. Not long afterward, he was also appointed 50 acting Minister of Education. The increasing centralization of power in his hands caused anxiety in others besides Hu Han-min. Lo Lung-chi, for example, later wrote a sarcastic ar t i c l e on the subject in 75 the magazine Hsin-yueh {Crescent Moon). He pointed out that Chiang as Education Minister was his own boss as head of the Executive Yuan; as head of the Executive Yuan was his own boss as a member of the Pol i t i c a l Council; as a member of the P o l i t i c a l Council was his own boss as a member of the Central Executive Committee; and as a member of the CEC was his own boss as a Party member -- that ultimate in authority. Lo wrote that what this amounted to was Chiang K'ai-shek issuing orders for Chiang K'ai-shek to follow. He might have added that Chiang was also chairman of the National Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Naval, and Air Forces. At one point he held 25 concurrent positions, any one of which might have been looked upon 7fi as a full-time job. The Fourth Plenum also amended the Organic Law of 1928 to make the government s t i l l less collegiate in character. Previously, Article 19 of the Law stated that a l l laws promulgated and a l l mandates issued by the government had to be signed by the chairman of the National Government and the heads of a l l five Yuan. In i t s revised form, the ar t i c l e said that a l l laws promulgated required the signatures of only the chairman of the government and the head of the Legislative Yuan, while a l l mandates issued required the signatures of only the chairman and the head of the Yuan concerned. 7 7 The dispute between Chiang and Hu simmered for several months before i t came to a head. Chiang certainly did not anticipate the opposition that his October proposals were ultimately 51 to receive. It is ironic that he probably viewed them as a way of appeasing his enemies while at the same time offering an avenue through which to increase his own power; but in the end they made his enemies more intransigent, added new recruits to their ranks, and were an im-portant element in eventually bringing about his own resignation. Hu did not oppose the People's Convention per se -- he simply recognized that Chiang would control i t . Hu did not want i t to pass a yueh-fa that might increase or legitimize what he considered to be Chiang's already excessive power, and, as a corollary, damage his own chances of regaining the pol i t i c a l power he had been deprived of in 1925. Hu continued his vociferous attacks in early 1931. He seemed to realize that he couldn't stop the People's Convention from taking place, so he modified his tactics somewhat and began emphasizing that i t had no authority to include a provisional constitution within the scope of i t s deliberations. Chiang had committed himself publicly to the yueh-fa and he doggedly defended i t from i t s c r i t i c s . The dispute had gone far beyond detached disagreement on the question of whether or not a provisional constitution was in the best interests of China. The atmosphere was charged with emotion. Prestige and cr e d i b i l i t y were involved, and neither side was willing to lose face by comprom-78 ising in i t s stand. On February 25th, Hu made a particularly firm statement of his views on the Convention, making the most of his prestige within the Kuomintang as one of Sun Yat-sen's closest associ-ates for over twenty years. He said he had never once heard Sun say that the People's Convention should discuss a yueh-fa. There were, in fact, only three matters that i t should discuss: national unity 52 national reconstruction, and the abolition of unequal treaties. A l l 79 other attitudes toward the Convention were mistaken. The statement was a thinly veiled attack on Chiang, who by this time had decided that Hu's open opposition, combined with the great prestige he s t i l l commanded, would threaten the realization of a yueh-fa. Hu had recently been challenging Chiang in other ways as well. He had been firmly opposed both to the appointment of Chang Hsueh-liang as Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Naval and Air Forces and to the allocation of several government portfolios to followers of 80 Chang. Hu compared i t with the actions of Cheng Chuang-kung, a figure in the Tso-chuan who appointed his brother to rule a city within his realm. The brother took the opportunity to plot the overthrow of Cheng, though he was foiled in the end. Chang nevertheless took office as Vice Commander-in-Chief in October, 1930, and one of his followers, Liu Shang-ch'ing, became Minister of the Interior. Hu had publicly supported a massive silver loan of one b i l l i o n ounces from the United States, a loan which T.V. Soong, the Minister of Finance, had already rejected because of the depressed state of the world silver market. Hu had apparently encouraged Judge Paul Linebarger to act as a lobbyist for the loan in Washington. Linebarger announced that he had received telegrams from Hu approving the loan and saying that Nanking had appointed commissioners to proceed to Washington to negotiate i t . The issue was obscured when Hu released a denial stating that he had never sent any such telegram because he had no authority to approve or disapprove government financial trans-actions, It is unclear just how deeply Hu was involved in the silver 53 ' loan, but i t is clear that his act i v i t i e s in that f i e l d , however limited, 81 acted as another i r r i t a n t between him and Chiang K'ai-shek. On the 28th of February, Chiang gave a dinner at his residence for a l l the major po l i t i c a l leaders in Nanking. Hu Han-min was arrested upon arrival and placed under guard in a room adjoining 82 the h a l l . He was presented with a letter signed by Chiang accusing him of various obstructive a c t i v i t i e s . Later in the evening, Chiang announced to his guests that he had detained Hu. He gave his reasons and sought their opinions, only to be greeted by apprehensive silence. After the guests l e f t , Chiang went to talk with Hu, and they argued into the small hours of the morning. Hu remained adamant and eventually accepted Chiang's suggestion that he resign from the government. He said he had decided to pursue the composition of poetry since he f e l t he was not very competent as a p o l i t i c a l middle-man. In the morning, Hu said his room was very small and he would prefer to go to T'angshan, whence he was escorted by military police at 9:00 A.M. Chiang moved rapidly after he had removed Hu from the scene. On the 2nd of March, the standing committee of the CEC met and formally resolved to include the question of adopting a yueh-fa among the urgent measures to be discussed by the National People's Convention. A committee was appointed to draw up a draft of the provisional constitution for presentation to the Convention, and Hu's resignation 83 from his substantive and concurrent posts was accepted. The obscene speed with which i t was accepted was in i t s e l f an indication of Chiang's determination to deal expeditiously with Hu's opposition, for i t was customary to reject the resignations of important o f f i c i a l s at least once before accepting them. At f i r s t the news of Hu's arrest was taken with "ominous calmness." As one reporter who was present in Nanking on March 1st described the scene: "Every minister of the government went about his business as though nothing had happened. Each one was afraid that he 84 too might be arrested." Criticism was at f i r s t muted, at least on the part of those who were within Chiang's easy reach. Others, who f e l t they were at a safe distance, protested immediately. Ku Ying-fen, the conservative head of the C i v i l Affairs Department, l e f t for Canton and later telegraphed his resignation to Nanking. Kuomintang branches abroad were especially prompt and active in their protests. Demands for Hu's freedom soon flowed in from Party branches in the 85 United States, Canada, Europe, Cuba, and Southeast Asia. By the 4th of March, the San Francisco branch of the Kuomintang had already sent a telegram to Nanking that not only expressed concern for Hu, 86 but questioned the legality of the proposed yueh-fa. Before long, i t became apparent that Chiang had grossly miscalculated the opposition that Hu's arrest would arouse. It acted as a catalyst that eventually transformed the discontent with Chiang and the Nanking government into yet another active opposition movement. Some of the supporters of the nascent movement agreed in principle with Hu's stand on the provisional constitution, some were perpetual mal-contents, and some were simply shocked by the arrest, which they saw as further proof of Chiang's arbitrary use of power. Everyone was acutely aware of the other major po l i t i c a l figures, in addition to the countless "small f i s h , " who had already been detained or worse. Hu was by far the highest ranking person yet to be arrested. He was one of the leading members of the Party and the government, and i f a man of his influence and position could be so roughly treated, to what depths might Chiang descend when dealing with ordinary citizens? The uncertainty reigning in pol i t i c a l circles was increased shortly after Hu's arrest when reports that he was seriously i l l f i l t e r e d back from T'angshan. On March 4th, Hu's personal physician, Teng Chen-te, reported that his patient was unable to eat, was suffering from dizzy spells, was running a fever, etc. The next day, Dr. Teng dryly remarked that the climate was not suitable in T'angshan, 87 and Hu might not recover i f he did not return to Nanking. Nonetheless, the rumor spread quickly that Hu was near death and Chiang was prevent-ing him from obtaining the medicine he needed to recover. Faced with this flurry of rumors and criticism, Chiang at f i r s t denied that Hu was either sick or under constraint. He gave a dinner for members of the Legislative Yuan to explain his side of 88 the story. He informed them, among other things, that Hu had made the decision to go to T'angshan himself, and he was free to return to his residence in Nanking i f he so desired. Chiang added that he would personally urge Hu to resume his posts after the National People's Convention was over. In the days that followed, Chiang denounced the newspapers and "certain people" as rumormongers bent on destroying the nation. On the 8th, Hu was permitted to return to his house in Nanking under heavy guard. A detachment of troops was maintained at his residence thereafter, the telephone was disconnected, and visitors 89 could see Hu only by personal order of Chiang K'ai-shek. 56 In a speech at the weekly memorial meeting on the 9th of 90 March, Chiang modified his previous statements about Hu. He implicitly acknowledged that Hu was under detention, and he stated unequivocably that Hu had gone to T'angshan to recover from illness. He emphasized that rumors about Hu being gravely i l l were incorrect and quoted from a doctor's report to prove i t . He insisted that Hu's indisposition was not of recent origin, but was only a recurrence of neuritis of the posterior cranium which he had contracted over a year before. Chiang said that many people were concerned as to whether or not Hu was free. He emphasized that no one is entirely free -- not even himself. Sun Yat-sen sought freedom for the nation and for the Chinese race, not for individuals. Individuals must submit to Party discipline or the nation would never be free. Revolu-tionary requirements always exacted great sacrifice, which might frequently extend to the loss of one's personal freedom or even to death. Thus, the question of whether Hu was free or not was unim-portant when placed within the proper revolutionary perspective. Chiang c r i t i c i z e d Hu for acting out of selfish motives. Hu should remain in Nanking, he said, and a l l comrades hoped that he would so that he could maintain his past revolutionary record unblemished. It was, regrettably, a l l too common for government o f f i c i a l s to resign, move to the foreign concessions, and s t i r up trouble. Chiang then made i t clear that Hu would definitely remain in Nanking, "because a l l comrades think i t is right, and so does Mr. Hu." He concluded by saying that the whole matter was a paltry affair and certainly not worthy of any fuss at a l l . 57 Chiang's explanations hardly allayed the fears of his c r i t i c s . To them, he seemed to be giving weak rationalizations of an arbitrary arid i l l e g a l act. It is l i k e l y , however, that Chiang was perfectly sincere and deeply believed what he said, as we shall see later when we consider his motivations in more detail. 58 CHAPTER II THE EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE AND ITS AFTERMATH In the two months following Hu's arrest, Chiang K'ai-shek proceeded with his plans for the National People's Convention. The atmosphere was tense and rumors were r i f e . Suspicion about Chiang's intentions increased, perhaps as a result of the accusations of his c r i t i c s . Wang Ching-wei had certainly revised his earlier, optimistic assessment of Chiang's decision to convene a People's Convention and promulgate a yueh-fa, and his suspicions were shared by many who were less partisan. Chiang and other Nanking leaders f e l t obliged to issue a steady stream of statements defending both the Convention and the yueh-fa, and rejecting suggestions that they might be used to legitimize dictatorship in China. While this overt disputation continued, covert negotiations were underway in Canton for the formation of an anti-Nanking movement in the south. Ku Ying-fen, who was a close friend of Hu Han-min, had l e f t the capital for Canton in early March. He is generally credited with responsibility for secretly gathering the support necessary for the eventual establishment of a southern government.^ Ku held a series of conferences with Ch'en Chi-t'ang, the commander of the Eighth Route Army in Kwangtung, and his subordinate generals in an effort to enlist their support for a movement directed against Chiang K'ai-shek and the Nanking government. Ch'en Chi-t'ang was probably approached because of his provincial outlook and becaus^Jie held the balance of military power in Kwangtung at that time. His motives for joining the movement wil l be discussed in detail in Chapter III. Ch'en Ming-shu, the chairman of the provincial government, commanded the crack 19th Route Army which later gained such fame for i t s effective resistance to the Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932. However, this unit was stationed in Kiangsi to participate in the anti-Communist campaigns, and the only military forces that remained at Ch'en Ming-shu's disposal were a few thousand undisciplined troops of the Peace Preservation Corps. Ch'en Ming-shu must have been aware of the intrigues going on around him, but f r i c t i o n with Ch'en Chi-t'ang pre-vented his from joining, and military weakness prevented him from interfering. The two Ch'ens had been at odds ever since Ch'en Chi-t'ang had assumed command of the Eighth Route Army when Li Chi-shen was arrested in 1929. He had by-passed Ch'en Ming-shu, who, as his former superior officer and as chairman of the Kwangtung provincial government, f e l t that the position should have been his. Discussions were also begun with the leaders of the Kwangsi Clique -- perhaps as early as mid-March, and certainly by mid-April. Kwangsi and Kwangtung had been engaged in a desultory war for over two years, and an alliance which would end h o s t i l i t i e s held advantages for both. Canton was eager to gain more support for i t s projected opposition movement against Nanking, and the benefits of a coalition with Kwangsi were obvious. Kwangsi stood to gain from such an arrangement because continued fighting with i t s neighbor was seriously affecting i t s communications with the outside world and depressing 60 2 i t s economy. In fact, the province was on the brink of complete economic collapse. Kwangsi leaders wanted to protect their province from attack so that they could carry out plans for much-needed reform and economic reconstruction. Ultimately, their decision to join the nascent opposition movement was rendered easier by their long-standing antagonism to Chiang K'ai-shek. As a motivation, however, opposition to Chiang appears to have been of only secondary importance to their over-riding economic preoccupations. Because each of the two provinces was bent primarily on furthering i t s own interests in the matter and because a substantial residue of mutual distrust remained as a legacy of their previous conflicts, i t took some time before an agreement satisfactory to both sides could be worked out. The Reorganizationists, who comprised the most persistent opposition group within the Kuomintang, were kept abreast of develop-ments as the new movement took shape. T'ang Sheng-chih, an a f f i l i a t e of the Reorganizationists who had been Hong Kong for several months, assisted Ku Ying-fen in his secret i n i t i a t i v e s . However, during the negotiating stage the Reorganizationists as a group were not formally invited to join the prospective movement because there was s t i l l opposition to their participation among conservatives. Only after the dye was cast and open declarations had been made against Chiang K'ai-shek were the Reorganizationists asked to come to Canton. Secret envoys were, no doubt, sent to numerous other disgruntled p o l i t i c a l and military leaders to r a l l y further support for the movement and to gain some measure of i t s chances for success. No one, including the originators of the opposition scheme, wanted to 61 commit himself unless there was a reasonable likelihood of a favorable outcome. By the end of A p r i l , enough backers had been found for the movement to bring i t into the open. The Southern Government is Formed On April 26th, at a conference of important functionaries in Canton, Ch'en Chi-t'ang denounced Chiang K'ai-shek and thereby precipi-3 tated a break with Ch'en Ming-shu. Ch'en Ming-shu apparently saw that the opposition movement was about to take concrete form, so he announced his resignation and l e f t for Hong Kong the next day with a number of his closest supporters. His position in Kwangtung was no longer tenable. Ch'en eventually made his way to the headquarters of the 19th Route Army in Kiangsi, and on the way he was rewarded with high positions in the Nanking government by Chiang K'ai-shek, who mistakenly took his departure from Kwangtung as a gesture of loyalty. The uncertain situation caused a run on the Central Bank of Kwangtung.^ Runs on the bank were not uncommon, and they were often instigated by money shop owners who stood to gain by fluctuations in the exchange rate. The seriousness of the situation was reflected by the fact that this time i t was the money shop owners themselves who were withdrawing their money and rushing to convert i t and deposit i t in foreign banks on Shameen island. On the 30th, four members of the Central Supervisory Committee -- Lin Sen, Ku Ying-fen, Teng Tse-ju, and Hsiao Fo-ch'eng -- issued a lengthy circular telegram impeach-5 ing Chiang K'ai-shek. On the same day, Ch'en Chi-t'ang announced 62 that he was forming an opposition government in Canton. The launching of the new opposition movement was timed to disrupt the National People's Convention, which was scheduled to begin on May 5th. The telegram of impeachment must have been composed consider-ably in advance of i t s issuance, for only one of i t s signatories, Ku Ying-fen, was definitely in Canton at the time. Teng Tse-ju didn't reach Canton until the third of May,^ while Hsiao Fo-ch'eng only arrived from Siam on June 15th.^ Lin Sen's signature on the telegram is some-what problematic. He was abroad on an inspection tour of foreign Kuomintang branches when i t was issued, and he did not return to China until October. He stopped briefly in Hong Kong on the 8th, conferred o with southern leaders, and then proceeded to Shanghai. In other words, he took no active part in the movement after he signed the telegram that launched i t . It is possible that he acted as a liaison between the Canton government and overseas Chinese, but there is no documentation to substantiate this hypothesis. Moreover, Lin was never the object of propaganda attacks by Nanking, while the other southern leaders were. He seems to have maintained good relations with both sides throughout. In any case, with the signatories so dispersed, i t is clear that the telegram was drafted and approved well ahead of April 30th. The central government did not make the impeachment telegram public for several days because i t wanted to have some time to pre-pare i t s response. On the 3rd of May, i t released a number of documents, including the original impeachment telegram, a letter addressed by Chiang K'ai-shek to the Central Supervisory Committee, and the CSC's 63 answer to Chiang's letter. In his letter, Chiang requested the CSC to investigate the charges against him and pledged to abide by their decision. The CSC, as one might expect, replied that i t would not even consider the charges since the writers of the impeachment telegram had misjudged the facts, were misled by sentiment, and had adopted g extremely improper procedure. Nanking authorities denounced the perpetrators of recent events in Canton, but played down the seriousness of the situation. They said that the matter would be solved without d i f f i c u l t y and would have no effect whatsoever on the National People's Convention. Nevertheless, Nanking was a hive of activity as the government formulated i t s plans to counter the nascent opposition movement. On May 3rd, Sun Fo, Minister of Railways, Wang Ch'ung-hui, head of the Judicial Yuan, and Wang Po-ch'un, Minister of Communications, l e f t Nanking for the foreign concessions of Shanghai to seek "medical treatment." Wang Po-ch'un was the only one of the three who eventually returned to the capital. Wang Ch'ung-hui did not find the pol i t i c a l atmosphere in Nanking congenial. He resigned from his posts on the 12th, saying there was too much disagreement among government o f f i c i a l s , so that whenever he raised a point i t met with opposition and nothing was accomplished.1^ He said he would feel more useful i f he took up his long-deferred appointment to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. . The government could hardly argue with his decision, for the position reflected great honor on China. Sun Fo later alleged that the crowning reason for Wang's departure was an attempt by Chiang to bribe him, supposedly to be more pliable in his 64 capacity as a member of the drafting committee for the provisional constitution.^ The figure mentioned, 10,000 yuan, seems too small to make the incident credible, particularly in view of the vast sums Chiang used to bribe others. Sun Fo's charge is nonetheless worth considering, even i f i t serves only as an indication of the atmosphere of suspicion that reigned at the time. Immediately after Sun and Wang Ch'ung-hui l e f t Nanking, Chiang K'ai-shek sent a committee of Party dignitaries to Shanghai to urge them to return. This i n i t i a t i v e was to no avail, and Sun sent a telegram to Chiang on the 5th urging him to restore Hu Han-min's freedom. Chiang responded by dispatching Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, an old friend of Sun's, to Shanghai as a personal emissary. He urged that Sun use his good offices to mediate in the dispute with the south. Sun f e l t that he could not refuse and accordingly sent a wire to Canton offering to mediate. He s t i l l insisted that the precondition for settlement was 12 the release of Hu Han-min. Sun's mediation offer caused endless confusion about his intentions in the days that followed. He seems to have used the telegram as a ploy to throw Nanking off the track, for he had apparently already made his decision to join the Canton government. Chiang wanted to insure by a l l means that Sun, with his prestige as the only son of the founding father, remained in Nanking. In addition to the formal delegations he sent to Shanghai to urge Sun to return, he sent an assortment of plainclothesmen and strong-arm squads there 13 to be used i f other methods failed. A l l docks and maritime booking agents were watched to prevent him from departing by ship. After almost three weeks of surveillance, Sun had Morris (Two-gun) Cohen buy him a 65 ticket in someone else's name, and with the help of friends he f i n a l l y slipped aboard a ship undetected. Ch'en Yu-jen, the flamboyant Foreign Minister of the Kuomintang regime at Wuhan in 1927, was aboard the same ship. They reached Hong Kong on the 24th of May and proceeded to Wang Ching-wei's house for a conference with other dissidents. Later in the day, Sun, Ch'en, Wang, Tsou Lu, Hsu Ch'ung-chih, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, T'ang Shao-i, and other l e f t for Canton on a special train. Upon arrival they repaired to Ch'en Chi-t'ang's house for a meeting to iron out the final details of the opposition government that was soon to be established. When reporters in Hong Kong had asked Sun Fo i f he had come as a mediator of peace, he had replied in the affirmative. Yet when reporters in Canton asked him i f he had come to join the anti-Chiang K'ai-shek movement, he also gave an affirmative answer. In a speech on the 25th, Sun said that there really was no contradiction between his two answers, for under the dictator-14 ship of Chiang K'ai-shek a l l thought of peace was empty. He explained that his reply in Hong Kong had represented the goal, peace, while his reply in Canton had represented the method of achieving i t , the over-throw of Chiang K'ai-shek. Even so, confusion as to his real intentions remained. Chiang said in a speech on the same day that he believed Sun had gone to Canton to join the dissidents, but Nanking government spokesmen continued to affirm that he had been sent on an o f f i c i a l peace 15 mission. Nanking may have perpetuated the peace mission explanation because i t did not want to shake the faith of i t s more tenuous a l l i e s by admitting that Sun had gone over to the other side, but the tenor of i t s statements seemed to indicate genuine confusion. 66 The ranks of the dissidents continued to be swelled by de-fectors from Nanking like Chang Hui-ch'ang, head o f the Aviation Administration, and Liu Chi-wen, former Mayor o f Nanking and more recently Superintendent of the Customs Administration. In June, Canton gained a prestigious supporter in the person of WuCh'ao-shu Chinese Minister to the United States. Wu's resignation to join the opposition movement caused quite a s t i r in both China and the United States. Many of those who came to Canton had participated in the Enlarged Conference, and Wang Ching-wei and Tsou Lu headed this l i s t . They had learned a great deal from their previous experiences, one of the chief lessons being that an opposition movement could not function effectively i f i t did not immediately establish Party and government organs to lead i t . Factional discord had delayed the creation of such organs for months in Peiping, and the spectacle of disunity thus presented had done l i t t l e to attract further support for the Enlarged Conference. The mistake of delaying the establishment of leadership organs was not to be repeated in Canton. On May 25th a highly c r i t i c a l telegram was sent to Chiang, and i t called on him to resign within 48 hours or face the consequences. When he did not resign by the 27th, Canton convened what i t called the Extraordinary Conference of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang (Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang chung-yang chih-chien wei-yuah fei-ch'ang h u i - i ) , which approved a set of organizational 1 r articles for a new "national" government. They provided for a s t r i c t committee system t h a t would a l l o w no i n d i v i d u a l to gain too much power. Sixteen people were elected to the State Council, wh i ch , in turn, elected a standing committee o f f i v e J ' 7 The State Council did 67 not have a permanent chairman, but was to be presided over by the members of the standing committee in rotation. A l l laws and mandates had to be signed by every member of the standing committee before they could be promulgated. Directly under the national government there were to be a Military Affairs Committee, a Po l i t i c a l Council, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (headed by Ch'en Yu-jen), and a Ministry of Finance (headed by Teng Chao-yin). Members of the national government formally took office on May 28th, and the rest of the councils and committees followed suit soon afterward. Despite i t s quick and decisive action in forming leadership organs in Canton, the Extraordinary Conference was far from being united. Promptness in this sphere was made possible by exhaustive discussions beforehand, and the establishment of a government was, after a l l , a f a i r l y straightforward matter. Later, when major policy decisions had to be made, the disunity that prevailed in Canton came to the surface. In early May there had been some doubt as to whether the conservatives in the movement would find i t possible to cooperate with the radicals. When Wang Ching-wei was asked in an interview on May 7th whether there were s t i l l people in Canton who could not forgive him for his past actions, he said he did not know the details, but certainly in the past few years i t would have been impossible to avoid having some points of disagreement.1^ He added that how that there was work to be done, everyone was needed, so no attention need be paid to those who did not forgive him. Nevertheless, he said he would not go to Canton because he had decided he could best help the opposition movement from the sidelines. The conservatives, led by Ku Ying-fen, f i n a l l y decided 68 • they could not afford to bar Wang from active participation, so he was duly invited to Canton. He accepted, but not before.a stone tablet commemorating the Canton Commune was removed from the city. It had listed Wang and Chang Fa-k'uei as Communists who were among those responsible for the incident. Wang and several other members of the Canton government were never able to shed their images as radicals. They were generally proud of their radical reputations, but they soon found that there were certain disadvantages inherent in them. Communism was p o l i t i c a l l y disreputable and engendered suspicion among most Chinese politicians. The Nanking authorities did their best to bring the Canton government into disrepute by linking i t to Communism in one way or another. Wang, Chang, and Ch'en Yu-jen were regularly used to this effect because of their l e f t i s t connections. Ch'en repeatedly found i t necessary to o f f i c i a l l y deny that he. was a Communist. Various alarming rumors circulated persistently throughout the summer: i t was said that Ch'en Tu-hsiu had arrived in Canton with eight assistants and 300,000 yuan to help the dissidents; and that Borodin and Galen had returned to China and were waiting in Kowloon while a Communist headquarters was set up in Canton. The rumors may have been farfetched, but the southern government f e l t obliged to counter each one with a formal denial. Cooperation among the various groups that had assembled in Canton proceeded f a i r l y smoothly at the outset, but deteriorated steadily thereafter. It was bound to since the goals of the participants differed sharply, with the main dichotomy sundering those who thought in national terms from those who thought in provincial terms. The 69 politicians who flocked to Canton, moreover, found themselves in a position similar to the one Sun Yat-sen had occupied in the early years of his revolutionary government. They had no independent military backing and were forced to rely on Ch'en Chi-t'ang, who controlled the local armed forces, for most of the military support that enabled the regime to defy Nanking. Only the complexity of the alliance in the south prevented Ch'en from gaining unfettered control of the movement. He was not the only wielder of military power in the area, for the Kwangsi Clique formed part of the coalition. Ch'en had to consider the consequences of too brash an assertion of his power. He might be isolated and rendered vulnerable to the central government i f Kwangsi opted to tread i t s own path, or even worse, to resume h o s t i l i t i e s with Kwangtung. Ch'en also stood to lose i f he alienated the politicians enough to bring about their departure, for they provided the Canton government with a large share of i t s legitimacy. The coalition stood in delicate balance, but any one of the groups that comprised i t had a certain degree of latitude and might, through astute manipulation of it s resources, bring pressure to bear on the other groups without causing the whole structure to f a l l apart. Constant tension was evident throughout the summer and f a l l as one group or another sought to have it s policies o f f i c i a l l y adopted by the Extraordinary Conference. A favorite method of applying pressure was for a politician to depart, singly or with his entire retinue, for the convenient haven of Hong Kong. Some, like Hsu Ch'ung-chih, l e f t permanently; others, like Wang Ching-wei and Sun Fo, l e f t and returned so often that they seemed to be commuting. This tactic was simple, but i t 70 got results i f the departing politician was important enough to jeopardize the opposition movement by withholding his support. Opposition to Chiang and his handling of government affairs was the main thread that bound the dissidents together. On this question they were, for the most part, genuinely united, though for the Kwangsi Clique i t seemed to be a matter of only secondary importance. The Kwangsi leaders were certainly opposed to Chiang, but they had come to believe through their past unfortunate experiences that i t was f u t i l e to try to overthrow him. It was an admirable goal, but was for them only a pleasant possibility that was overshadowed by the need to consolidate their position in Kwangsi. Wang Ching-wei wrote in an essay in early May, before he joined the Canton government, that everyone should unite for the general purpose of overthrowing Chiang and forget petty differences. Unity was possible i f everyone could agree on general theory. There were bound 19 to be differences on details, but they could be hammered out later. The problem was that the "details" loomed larger and larger as time went on. Most of the dissidents may have agreed that Chiang's "overthrow" was their goal, but they could not agree on how to achieve this aim, nor on precisely what was meant by his "overthrow." Were they willing to plunge the country into another catastrophic c i v i l war to achieve their ends? Should they be satisfied with a reduction in Chiang's power? Or should they press for his complete exclusion from the government? As Canton's situation vis-a-vis Nanking changed and various peace offers were made, these "details" assumed greater urgency than the general principle of "overthrowing" Chiang that had 71 originally united the dissidents. It was in reacting to the changing situation that Canton was weakest, for as new possibilities developed, detailed responses had to be formulated, and these were invariably sources of dispute. Nanking: The National People's Convention and the Fifth Plenum While the opposition government was being established in Canton, the National People's Convention proceeded on schedule in Nanking. It passed the draft provisional constitution, which was to come into effect on the 1st of June. The yueh-fa was not the monstrous document that some people had expected, but i t did l i t t l e to guarantee basic human rights. For example, Article 15 stated that a l l persons would have freedom of speech and publications, but added that "such liberty shall not be denied or 20 restricted except in accordance with the law." Qualifying clauses of this type are not uncommon in Western constitutions, and the provis-ional constitution of 1931 was modeled on Western declarations of rights. However, the efficacy of such constitutional guarantees depends entirely on the po l i t i c a l institutions that support them. As Sir Kenneth Wheare, the British authority on constitutional law has written, "It must be emphasized strongly that the extent to which rights can be guaranteed and preserved under this formula w i l l depend in the last 21 resort upon the restraint of the legislature." As recently as the end of 1930, the Chinese government had passed a new Press Law that was "not calculated to inspire confidence in the desire of the government 22 to be f a i r to anybody differing from i t . " It prohibited the 72 publication o f articles and news items "endangering public safety" or prejudicial to "good morals"; and i t banned the publication of anything that might be construed as an attack on the Kuomintang or on the Three People's Principles, or might be contrary to the interests o f the Chinese government and people. One could hardly expect a government that enforced laws of this i l k to have any serious intention of allowing the 'freedom o f speech and publications" i t proclaimed as a basic human right in the new provisional constitution. The same was true of the other rights promised by the document. The yueh-fa conferred expanded powers on Chiang K'ai-shek as the Chairman of the National Government. Now laws were to be promulgated and mandates issued on his signature alone; countersignatures from Yuan heads were no longer required. In addition, the five Yuan heads and a l l Ministers and chiefs of commissions were to be appointed or dismissed at the instance of the chairman of the government instead of by the State Council as a whole. Although the increment in Chinag's legal powers was not great in i t s e l f , i t represented but one increase in a continuing series. His c r i t i c s viewed i t as particularly ominous in combination with the "except in accordance with the law" clause attached to a l l guarantees of c i v i l rights in the provisional constitution. They saw his increased power over the promulgation of laws as an effective n u l l i f i c a t i o n o f these guarantees. What they wanted was a real constitution: not a meaningless piece o f paper f i l l e d with empty promises. The only way to achieve their object was to end Chiang's control o f the government. I f he could be replaced by less authoritarian politicians, namely themselves, then the democratic provisions of a yueh-fa might be genuinely carried out. 73 During the Fifth Plenary Session of the CEC-CSC in June, Chiang added fuel to the fires of distrust by further consolidating his position in Nanking. He was confirmed in his various concurrent posts and the composition of the Pol i t i c a l and State Councils was 23 altered to his advantage. The membership of both was expanded and former members who had joined the opposition movement, like Sun Fo, Ku Ying-fen, and Li Wen-fan, conspicuously failed to be reelected. Apparently satisfied with developments and wishing to demonstrate his unconcern for the efforts of the Canton government, Chiang K'ai-shek l e f t for Kiangsi after the Plenum to take personal command of a new campaign against,the Communists. Canton: The Extraordinary Conference In Canton, the Extraordinary Conference busied i t s e l f through-out the summer with po l i t i c a l measures designed to enhance i t s cre d i b i l i t y and legitimacy. It wanted to offer tangible evidence to China and the world that i t s demands were not opportunistic, and that i t could be relied upon to carry out reforms when and i f i t succeeded in ending Chiang K'ai-shek's stranglehold on the Nanking government. The dissidents drafted and promulgated a plan for local self-government which was to be f u l l y implemented by the 10th of October; they resolved to establish a training center to prepare Party personnel to carry out local self-government; they appointed a committee to draft a meaningful provisional constitution; they decided to hold a "truly representative" National People's Convention in November; they drew up a budget for the entire country and stipulated that a l l government financial trans-74 actions would be made public. A veritable flood of legislation passed from beneath their pens, but for a variety of reasons l i t t l e , i f any, of i t was systematically implemented. It is d i f f i c u l t to say whether or not the politicians ever seriously expected to put into effect locally a l l the laws and declarations they passed. Their attitude was ambivalent. They spoke of following the road of reconstruction in the territory they ruled so that they could not only overthrow Chiang K'ai-shek, but prevent any future dictators from arising. The implication was that they planned to turn the Southwest into a model for the rest of China and to over-throw Chiang by their example. Yet they made l i t t l e progress in this direction. It must be acknowledged that the possibility of implement-ing the legislation that was passed was severely limited. Ch'en Chi-t'ang, by virtue of his military power, had the final say in such matters, and he would not tolerate the enforcement of many of the new laws. He was content to let the Extraordinary Conference pass high-sounding legislation for i t s legitimizing value, but he would not permit i t to interfere with his actual administration of the province. The politicians were also handicapped by a shortage of time. Their stay in Canton, of uncertain duration to begin with, proved to be relatively brief, and the measures they adopted could not be implemented quickly. In addition, the dissidents often tended to be swayed by a strange faith that once legislation had been committed to paper and approved, the battle was won and the rest would take care of i t s e l f . Paper government, as this practice has been called, is a subject we shall return to in the next chapter. 75 The enactments of the Extraordinary Conference seem to have been intended mainly as manifestoes of future policies, as campaign promises that would be honored when the dissident politicians reached Nanking. Their sights were set on the national level of p o l i t i c s , and while implementation of their plans on the local level was considered desirable, i t was not considered imperative unless, perhaps, they were forced to stay in Kwangtung for a long time. It was an added bonus that would enhance their c r e d i b i l i t y , but i t seems to have been viewed largely as an instrument in the struggle against Chiang K'ai-shek. The Canton regime was hard pressed for money from the start. One of i t s earliest o f f i c i a l acts was to take over the local maritime 24 customs administration. Ch'en Chi'tang's troops surrounded the customs house on June 1Oth and ordered that a l l i t s revenue henceforth be retained in Canton instead of being sent to Nanking. A.C.E. Brand, the local Commissioner of Customs, at f i r s t refused, but after negotiations a modus vivendi was reached. The customs surplus of the city of Canton alone was estimated at 2,500,000 yuan per month. Five percent of this revenue would continue to be remitted to Nanking for the service of foreign loans, and the remainder would be retained locally. By the end of the month the southern regime had appropriated a similar share of the revenue of 10 other customs houses, ranging from Swatow to Nanning and yielding an additional several hundred thousand yuan each month. Nanking was either unwilling or unable to act as i t had the previous year when the Enlarged Conference took over the Tientsin customs, for i t did not close the affected customs houses and order that a l l duties on goods bound for the south be paid at other ports. 76 The customs takeover did not provide enough additional income to make ends meet, so Canton instituted a number of new taxes and tried to float several bond issues. New taxes were levied at various times on cigarettes, liquor, matches, paper, gambling, teashops, restaurants, and fresh produce bound for Hong Kong. Attempts were made to establish a rent tax and a business tax. Most of these impositions encountered heavy resistance and were never collected effectively. The bond issues suffered a similar fate. The f i r s t , floated in June for 10,000 yuan, was particularly embarrassing to the Canton government. It was discovered in July that the company engaged to print the bonds had printed an extra 4,000,000 yuan worth and sold them on their own at a discount. The discovery created a sensation, especially since i t came on the heels of a mysterious theft of 100,000 yuan in government funds from the Central Bank of Kwangtung. Another effort was mounted to float bonds in August, this time for 30,000,000 yuan to be secured on the customs surplus. At f i r s t , the Canton Chamber of Commerce f l a t l y refused to underwrite the issue. Eventually i t agreed to accept 10 percent of the bonds, but the government had gotten the message and postponed the issue indefinitely "because printing was not yet completed." Nothing further was heard of i t . Despite i t s patent ineptitude in collecting special levies, the Canton government did succeed in making some extra money from the bonds and new taxes, though i t is impossible to estimate how much. Most of the provincial revenue was immediately consumed by orders placed with foreign firms for munitions and military hardware; some of i t undoubtedly found i t s way into the private accounts of local 77 o f f i c i a l s . There never seemed to be quite enough money on hand to finance the normal operations of the government. In August, o f f i c i a l s were reported to be disturbed at not having received their July salaries, and there were even rumblings from the First Army Corps about not being 26 paid. However, the opposition movement somehow managed to carry on in spite of i t s financial d i f f i c u l t i e s . The Military Dimension The dissidents in Canton devoted a great deal of time, effort, and, i t was rumored, money to winning friends in areas of North China not f u l l y under the control of Nanking. The object was to confront Nanking with the possibility of a war on two fronts. Hardly a week passed without reports on the arrival in Canton of emissaries from one northern m i l i t a r i s t or another. Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, Shih Yu-san, Sun Tien-ying, Han Fu-chii, and even Sun Ch'uan-fang were represented. In July, Tsou Lu was sent to Tientsin, reportedly with a trunkful of money, to act as a permanent and readily accessible liaison with a l l 27 interested parties in the north. The timing of his departure may have been closely connected with the h o s t i l i t i e s Shih Yu-san initiated against the central government at almost precisely the same moment. There had been speculation that Shih was going to revolt against the central government as early as March, when he began detain-ing rolling stock on the Peiping-Hankow railroad. He had already established a reputation for himself as a perennial turncoat when he changed sides so frequently in the struggle between Nanking and the Enlarged Conference the previous year that he earned the sobriquet 78 28 "Shih San-fan," which might be translated as "tr i p l e crosser Shih." On this occasion, however, Shih returned the rolling stock to service in exchange for a subsidy from the government. In June he again began commandeering rolling stock, and speculation that he would commence military operations against Nanking revived. To forestall this eventuality, Chiang K'ai-shek sent Shao Li-tzu to meet a representative of Shih on neutral ground in Tsinan. The Central Government reported that the meeting was successful, and "satisfactory financial arrangements" 29 had been made for the support of Shih's army. This optimism soon proved to be misplaced. Shih was also negotiating with the dissidents in Canton, who apparently made him a more attractive offer, though he was by no means averse to accepting money from both sides at the same time. In mid-July Shih moved north from his base at Shunteh and occupied Shihchiachuang. Manchurian troops garrisoning the town were evacuated to avoid a clash. On the 20th, Shih and his subordinate generals issued a circular telegram denouncing Chiang K'ai-shek and 30 pledging their support to Canton. At the same time, they redoubled their negotiations with other northern m i l i t a r i s t s without whose support defeat was a certainty. They were badly outmaneuvered in this sphere by Nanking, and i t soon became clear that Shih was on his own. Canton gave him token military support by issuing a formal order for a Northern Expedition on July 21s.t, but l i t t l e was done to carry out the order. Some Kwangsi forces reached Chuanhsien (Ch'iian-chou) in northeastern Kwangsi on the 30th, and with no one to oppose them they actually 31 penetrated a few miles into southern Hunan by August 5th. However, no effort was made to advance farther, and the southern troops soon returned to Kwangsi. Yen Hsi-shan secretly returned to Shansi from his place of exile in Dairen on August 5th, intending to support the anti-Chiang 32 movement and to reestablish his authority in the province. He was transported from Dairen to Tatung in a Japanese aircraft, but his arrival came too late to be of any help to Shih Yu-san. At the end of July, Shih had found himself beset from three directions. Liu Chih was advancing against him from the south, Manchurian troops Were advanc-ing from the north, and Shansi forces were advancing from the west. The Shansi army may have entered the fight because Shang Chen, the Chairman of the Provincial Government, had learned of Yen Hsi-shan's 33 intended return to help Shih. He probably hoped to preclude that possibility, and thus save his job, by helping the central government to dispatch Shih as quickly as possible. He may also have been moved by financial considerations, for at the end of July, Nanking approved 34 a bond issue of thirty million yuan for the rehabilitation of Shansi. Without i t , Shang Chen would never have been able to finance the large deficits that his government had incurred over the past year. When Yen Hsi-shan nevertheless made his appearance in the province, Shang promptly resigned. Shih Yu-san's position, meanwhile, had become untenable, and the Shansi army had ironically played a part in making i t so. Contemporaries described his situation as being akin to that of a fish swimming in a cooking pot. Shih had a l i v e l y appreciation of his predicament: instead of trying to fight his way out of the 80 • encirclement, he fled toward Shantung, the only avenue l e f t open to him. He announced his retirement on August 8th and boarded a Japanese ship bound for Dairen on the 12th. The remnants of his troops, numbering some 20,000, were incorporated into the army of Han Fu-chli in Shantung as a partial reward for his neutrality in the conflict. No serious fighting had taken place during Shih's revolt; i t stood in stark contrast with the carnage occasioned by the Enlarged Conference's dispute with Nanking the year before. The entire course of the opposition movement in 1931 was, in fact, remarkable for i t s lack of bloodshed. The movement was almost purely p o l i t i c a l from start to finish. Nanking and Canton frequently exchanged threats of punitive military action, but they were careful to intersperse them with optimistic announcements that the dispute could and would be settled by po l i t i c a l means alone. Each side jockeyed for position and tried to demonstrate to the other that i t did not want military action but did not fear i t , and i f pushed too far would reluctantly have recourse to force of arms. Ch'en Chi-t'ang spent most of his time improving the defenses of Kwangtung. He used impressed labor to build miles upon miles of trenches and other fo r t i f i c a t i o n s , particularly in the East River d i s t r i c t . He was afraid that Chiang K'ai-shek might launch a punitive expedition and he knew that he did not have enough troops under his command to offer effective resis-tance. Ch'en combined his feverish construction of fortifications with a concerted drive to expand his army and to improve i t s quality. He ordered dozens of aircraft and other military hardware from abroad to strengthen his forces. His main fear was that Chiang would attack before he completed his preparations. 81 The Cantonese believed that the new anti-Communist campaign in Kiangsi, which began in June under Chiang K'ai-shek's personal command, was only a stratagem designed to camouflage Nanking's real intention, namely, to attack Kwangtung. Alarming reports of massed government troops on the borders of Fukien and Kiangsi were given credence throughout June and July. A great deal depended on which side Ch'en Ming-shu's 19th Route Army, stationed in southern Kiangsi to help in the campaign to suppress the Communists, chose to support. Canton maintained continuous liaison with the f i e l d commanders of the 19th in an effort to win a firm commitment of support from them. In the early stages of the opposition movement, both sides claimed to have their allegiance. On June 12th, after conferring with Generals Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai and Chiang Kuang-nai in Kanchow, Ch'en Ming-shu issued a circular telegram stating that the 19th Route Army would remain loyal to the central government and would continue to participate in 35 the campaign against the communists. Rumors that they were on the point of attacking Kwangtung spread like wildfire. However, i t soon became apparent that their "loyalty" to the central government amounted to l i t t l e more than neutrality. Ts'ai and Chiang stated that they 36 were fighting Communists and would not attack Kwangtung. They were, after a l l , Cantonese, and while they were willing to assist the government in the struggle against the Communists, they were not willing to attack their native province. Defensive considerations also played a part in Canton's refusal to give more than token support to the revolt of Shih Yu-san which i t had so actively encouraged. When i t actually took place, 82 the southerners probably saw is as a diversion that would occupy Chiang K'ai-shek for a while and delay any plans he might have in progress to attack Kwangtung. Of even greater importance in dictating the Extraordinary Conference's languid response to Shih's revolt was the disunity that manifestly prevailed in the south. Tension was evident between the military leaders of Kwangsi and Kwangtung, whose interests frequently did not coincide. As was mentioned earlier, Kwangsi had joined the Extraordinary Conference primarily to insure a period of peace with i t s neighbors. The main goal of the Kwangsi leaders was to rehabilitate their province and to consolidate their position in i t . . They gained more than just renewed communication with the outside world from their decision to join the coalition against Chiang K'ai-shek. Canton, in i t s eagerness to gain broader support for the movement and also to give Kwangsi an incentive to keep i t s troops out of Kwangtung, agreed to pay Kwangsi a regular subsidy in both money and military 37 supplies. The subsidy was, no doubt, quite important to the Kwangsi leaders, for their province had been impoverished by prolonged isolation and war. They seem to have repaid i t , at least in part, by 38 reviving the flow of opium to Kwangtung. Leaders of the two provinces, however, remained suspicious of each other. Complete reconciliation could not be.achieved over-night. Ch'en Chi-t'ang was determined to keep troops not directly under his control out of Kwangtung; similarly, the Kwangsi leaders did not want any "guest" troops in their province. Military adventures outside of their respective provinces held l i t t l e attraction for either group. Neither wanted to commit a large proportion of i t s military strength to a northern expedition and leave i t s home territory essentially unguarded. Kwangsi insisted that i t s troops would not 39 march on Hunan until Ch'en Chi-t'ang led his own troops northward. Under these conditions i t was extremely d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, to mount any sort of coordinated attack on Hunan or Kiangsi, and the failure to aid Shih Yu-san becomes more understandable. It would appear that neither the inclination nor the means to help him were at hand. Shortly after Shih's defeat, Nanking extended peace feelers to the south via a telegram sent by Chang Chi and Wu T1ieh-ch'eng, who were held in high esteem by Canton. The peace i n i t i a t i v e exaggerated existing tensions in the ranks of the dissidents to a c r i t i c a l degree. Ku Ying-fen and Ch'en Chi-t'ang had worked closely together from the start of the opposition movement. They had established a virtual monopoly of power in Kwangtung, with Ku at the helm p o l i t i c a l l y and Ch'en at the helm m i l i t a r i l y . ^ Their control was resented by other members of the Extraordinary Conference. The lat t e r , whether they were Western H i l l s a f f i l i a t e s or Reorganizationists, a l l had come to Canton with high expectations, only to find the local magnates firmly entrenched. The visiting politicians were kept busy with propaganda work and negotiations with wavering mi l i t a r i s t s and their represen-tatives, and active politics connected with the reorganization of the Kwangtung government was managed by Ch'en, Ku, and their followers. Some compromises were made, but not enough to satisfy the visitors. Ku in particular came increasingly under attack. The peace feelers extended by Nanking precipitated a c r i s i s , for the question of how to respond to them was obviously of major importance to the future of the movement. 84 • Canton s p l i t into two camps, one being in favor of pursuing the peace i n i t i a t i v e further, and the other being in favor of rejecting 41 i t unequivocally. Ch'en Chi-t'ang and Ku Ying-fen were the main exponents of the former view, and Wang Ching-wei was the main exponent of the latter view. Ch'en and Ku wanted to play i t safe. They argued that since Shih Yu-san had been totally routed in the north, i f the south launched an expedition by i t s e l f i t would be like driving sheep into the tiger's mouth, and defeat would be certain. In other words, they s t i l l had no stomach for military adventures outside of Kwangtung. They said that i f a no-war, no-peace situation persisted for a long time, i t would only enable their enemies to cause dissension among them, to divide and rule. Therefore, they advocated peace. Wang Ching-wei, the Kwangsi Clique, and others were unalterably opposed to what they considered a premature willingness to accept peace. They advocated a resumption of the Northern Expedition. Considering Kwangsi's past stand on this subject, i t is doubtful that they envisaged anything resembling a serious attempt to defeat Chiang K'ai-shek on the battlefield. But they f e l t that peace at this point would be disastrous, and some form of military pressure was needed to extract a favorable settlement from Nanking. A limited advance into southern Hunan might do the trick. It carried few risks since any move by Nanking to reinforce the weak garrison there would be severely hampered by the floods that had devastated the entire Yangtze valley. Most of the government troops in the area were forme'r subordinates of T'ang Sheng-shih, who was a member of the Extraordinary Conference, 85 . and they might be brought over to the southern cause. In addition, Ho Chien, the Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government, had recently been wavering in his support of Nanking. Ku and Ch'en, with their control of the po l i t i c a l and military machinery in Canton, succeeded in pushing through an endorsement of their standpoint. Wang Ching-wei saw that drastic action was necessary i f there was to be any hope of forcing the Extraordinary Conference to adopt his views. To dramatize his opposition, he announced that he was sick and l e f t for Hong Kong on August 15th with his wife, doctor, secretaries and entire retinue. His stratagem was somewhat unexpected and had an immediate effect. The leaders who remained in Canton feared that Wang's departure would irreparably weaken the Extraordinary Conference. A series of emergency conferences was held to resolve the situation, and Sun Fo was dispatched to Hong Kong to urge him to return. Wang refused. He was not convinced that Ku and Ch'en had any intention of accepting his demand that the peace overtures be rejected and the Northern Expedition be resumed. Indeed, their attitude was ambivalent: at f i r s t they agreed to Wang's demands and then they returned to their original position. Finally, a con-ference of military leaders was held on the 27th, and i t decided that a drive into Hunan would definitely be launched at the beginning of September. A telegram had already been sent to Nanking rejecting any talk of peace until a l l of Canton's previously enunciated demands had been met. Wang was satisfied and returned from his "sick leave" on the 29th. Kwangsi and Kwangtung troops began moving into southern Hu-nan from lines of departure at Chuanhsien (Ch' Lian-chou), Kwangsi, and 86 Pingshek (P 1ing-shih), Kwangtung in the f i r s t days of September. On the 3rd, Wang Ching-wei delivered a speech to explain Canton's military 42 operations. He emphasized that warfare could provide no basic solution and that national unity would ultimately have to be achieved peacefully and by po l i t i c a l means. Nanking, he said, had sought to oppose .the south by military means, and the south had no alternative but to reply in kind. Canton's attitude remained unchanged: i t did not seek military clashes, but i t did not fear them and was prepared to respond to a l l provocations originated by Nanking. His reasoning was rather fanciful, since Nanking had scrupulously avoided military clashes with Canton. By September 7th, the southern armies had passed Leiyang and Kiyang (Ch'i-yang) and were preparing to attack Hengyang (Hengchow) from two directions.^ They advanced at wi l l because a l l central government troops had been evacuated to Hengyang, which was to be their f i r s t line of defense. It is often alleged that Canton halted i t s drive in Hunan after the Japanese began their assault on Manchuria on September 18th. Cantonese propagandists were active in promoting this inaccurate view because i t served their purposes admirably. It showed that the southerners had the best interests of the country at heart: they were willing to halt a successful campaign in order to make national unity possible in the face of Japanese imperialism. What actually happened was that Ch'en Chi-t'ang suddenly recalled his troops from 44 southern Hunan on the 16th of September. Ho Chien reported with some surprise that his soldiers in Hengyang had awakened on the 17th to find that enemy troops in the area had vanished. Ch'en announced that a l l units under his command would be concentrated in the East River d i s t r i c t to prevent an invasion of Kwangtung by Nanking forces stationed in Fukien. He said he would take personal charge of the defense of the d i s t r i c t . Kwangsi had no intention of being l e f t out on a limb and hastily withdrew i t s army from Hunan. No fighting had 45 actually taken place, for the southerners never assaulted Hengyang. Ch'en Chi-t'ang's unilateral action was obviously a continuation of the dispute over how the Extraordinary Conference should react to the peace feelers extended by Nanking. It brought to an end the only military action, outside of Shih Yu-san's brief call to glory, to take place during the course of the opposition movement. Foreign Relations: Canton and Japan During the summer, the Nanking government was plagued by serious problems which could not but extend indirect aid to Canton. The Yangtze River overflowed in July, devastating thousands of square miles of farmland along i t s banks. Wuhan and other major c i t i e s were under water for weeks. It was the worst flood to take place on the 46 Yangtze since records began to be kept in 1868. The customs gauge at Hankow registered 53.6 feet when the river crested. By contrast, the second greatest flood, which occurred in 1870, registered only 50.5 feet. The disaster was an unforeseen strain on Nanking's resources, both financially and in terms of the effort required by re l i e f work. At the same time, the central government's preoccupation with extermination campaigns against the Communists diverted i t from the opposition movement in the south. Nanking considered elimination 88 . of the "Red menace" more important than solving i t s dispute with Canton. Meanwhile, China's relations with Japan deteriorated rapidly. Serious f r i c t i o n was already evident in early July, when a property rights dispute developed between Chinese farmers and Korean settlers at Wanpaoshan in Manchuria. Japanese police intervened in favor of the Koreans, and several clashes with local Chinese took place. The Nanking government viewed Japanese interference as a grave breach of China's sovereignty. Anti-chinese r i o t s , possibly instigated by the Japanese, soon erupted a l l over Korea. Hundreds of Chinese were ki l l e d or injured and a great deal of property was destroyed. Nanking's demands for reparations went unheeded. -In August, Captain Nakamura Shintaro of the Japanese army was summarily executed as a spy. He had been travelling in disguise on a mission to create disturbances in Inner Mongolia when he was apprehended. The Japanese government said he had been brutally murdered, but this time i t was Nanking's turn to refuse to make the reparations demanded. Emotions on both sides were raised to a fever pitch. The climax f i n a l l y came on the 18th of September, when the Japanese Kwantung Army engineered the well-known Mukden Incident. Before long, Japan had occupied the whole of Manchuria. The dissidents in Canton maintained close contact with Japan throughout the tempestuous summer, but their motives could hardly be described as a l t r u i s t i c . In June, Ch'en Yu-jen had an interview with Suma Yakichiro, the Acting Japanese Consul in Canton, and broached the subject of possible Japanese support for the 47 Extraordinary Conference. He told Suma that in recent talks with 89 certain Japanese o f f i c i a l s he had gained the impression that Japan was fed up with Chiang K'ai-shek and was thinking of making a deal with other politicians. He said that the Canton government needed help from Japan to get rid of Chiang's government and to replace i t with a modern administration. Ch'en asked i f the opinions of his Japanese confidants represented the o f f i c i a l policy of the Japanese government; whether Japan's policy toward Nanking was changing; and whether Japan had any concrete policy on the anti-Chiang movement. He said that the Canton government was prepared to send representatives to Tokyo to discuss these matters i f the Japanese government so desired. Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, wired back to say that the Chinese should solve 48 their own p o l i t i c a l disputes without any outside aid. He stated that his government had no intention of annexing any part of China, but hoped the Chinese recognized how important Manchuria was to Japan. Shidehara pointed out that representatives of Canton could not be o f f i c i a l l y invited to Tokyo since Japan did not recognize the Canton government. However, he added that i f they wanted to come anyway, Japan would not turn them away. Ch'en Yu-jen immediately prepared to leave for Japan. The Wanpaoshan affair and the anti-Chinese riots in Korea altered his plans only to the extent that he tried to keep his v i s i t secret. The "national" government must have hoped for substantial benefits from i t s overtures to Japan, for i t displayed remarkable indulgence toward the Japanese despite the mounting tension in Manchuria. On July 17th, for example, the State Council in Canton decided not to take, any o f f i c i a l action on the Korean incidents that had caused so much out-49 rage among most Chinese. It also prevented the anti-Japanese 90 boycott, which had spread spontaneously through most of north and central China, from being applied in the south. On the 22nd, i t was announced that Yamada Junsaburo had been appointed as "high advisor" to the 50 Canton government at a salary of 2,000 yuan per month. Yamada was 51 an old friend and colleague of Sun Yat-sen. He had worked at different times as a minor o f f i c i a l of the Mitsui Trading Company and as an o f f i c i a l of the South Manchurian Railway Company. He was the younger brother of Yamada Yoshimasa, who, in Sun Yat-sen's words, had become "the f i r s t foreigner to lay down his l i f e for the Chinese 52 Republic" in the Waichow rebellion of 1900. The younger Yamada had acted as a go-between in an agreement Sun Yat-sen had tentatively reached with Mori Kaku in 1913 to cede Manchuria in return for twenty million 53 yen and equipment for two divisions. Fortunately for Sun's reputation, this arrangement was never carried out. However, Canton's negotiations with Japan in 1931 began to take on a remarkably similar character. Ch'en Yu-jen arrived in Japan on July 22nd, accompanied by his wife and several secretaries, including Liu Chi-wen. His attempts at secrecy, including the use of various aliases, failed miserably. Nanking was not slow to summon Minister Shigemitsu and present him with a formal protest of Ch'en's v i s i t . A Kuomintang committee had to be restrained from breaking into Ch'en's cabin when he arrived; Japanese police surrounded the Kuomintang headquarters in Yokohama to prevent 54 further incidents. Ch'en had three interviews with Baron Shidehara in which he delicately and indirectly brought up the possibility of Japanese recognition of the Canton government and of Japanese provision 55 of military supplies to i t . Shidehara adopted a correct posture, 91 saying he was not in a position to give definite answers to these questions. Ch'en spent the remainder of his time in Japan visiting the Ministry of the Army, the headquarters of the General Staff, and various leading figures in the commercial and p o l i t i c a l worlds. When he arrived back in Canton on the 22nd of August, he expressed satisfaction with his v i s i t . He told Suma a few days later that, a l -though he doubted that there would be any concrete results from the t r i p , he believed that a "corner-stone" had been laid for future Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . ^ When the Japanese assault on Manchuria began on September 18th, Ch'en's v i s i t to Japan became quite an embarrassment to Canton. Newspaper accounts of the substance of his talks with Japanese o f f i c i a l s had not been far wrong despite the secrecy with which they were conducted. In the inflamed atmosphere prevailing after the Muken Incident, his motives came under violent attack. Ch'en was obliged to issue a number of statements explaining his t r i p . He categorically denied that he had gone to Japan "for some dark purpose -- to make a deal in arms or 57 beg for Japanese gold or sell Manchuria. . . ." He said that his purpose had been to discover i f a policy of friendship with Japan, as advocated by Sun Yat-sen, was feasible for China at that time. Not surprisingly, Ch'en's explanations were treated with scorn. Certainly his subsequent dealings with the Japanese -- for the Mukden Incident by no means caused him to sever his connections with them — belied his denials. He continued to report secretly to Suma on p o l i t i c a l conditions in China until well into December. Their discussions were fi n a l l y cut short only when Ch'en l e f t for Nanking, where he became Minister of Foreign Affairs. 92 In mid-September, during Canton's advance into Hunan, Ch'en Yu-jen became more insistent in his requests for arms from Japan. He asked Suma i f Shidehara had any intention of issuing an export permit 58 to Mitsui so that they could send arms to Canton. He said that i f the permit was refused, or decision on i t was delayed, i t would cause an unfavorable reaction to Japan in Kwangtung. This threat, such as i t was, could hardly have caused the Japanese much anguish. There is no record of any arms being exported, and Ch'en eventually seems to have dropped the subject. Generally, he took great pains to assure Suma of Canton's goodwill toward Japan, even after the Mukden Incident, When i t became necessary for the Extraordinary Conference to show i t s solidarity with Chinese public opinion and issue anti-Japanese state-ments, Ch'en Yu-jen warned Suma beforehand and told him not to pay 59 any attention to them. He even attacked Chang Chi for making a "rude" statement about Japan to the American Minister to China. Chang had said that China would cut off relations with Japan for f i f t y years i f the League of Nations did not bring pressure to bear on Japan. This denunciation of Chang to Suma is particularly ironic in light of Ch'en's later actions as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Nanking, as we shall see. During November, Ch'en Yu-jen pressed Suma to have his govern-ment cancel recognition of Nanking in favor of Canton. 6 0 He was s t i l l seeking to enhance the Extraordinary Conference's legitimacy, and to bring irresistable sanctions to bear against the Chiang K'ai-shek regime. Suma told him that such an action on the part of Japan would be contrary to international law. Ch'en paused and then said that Japan's policy in this matter would have a direct bearing on a "favorable" 93 resolution of Manchurian affairs as well as on Japan's position in the League of Nations. He strongly intimated that Japan would not be given control of Manchuria i f Canton was not given control of China proper. He said there was no eternal and reasonable solution to the Manchurian question outside of separate rule (fen-chih), and he there-fore hoped that Japan would show some determination and not worry about a small thing like international law. Ch'en stressed that Japan and Canton had an identity of interest in Chiang K'ai-shek's early resignation. Suma asked him what Kwangtung would do i f Chiang continued in his government posts even though Japan no longer recognized Nanking. Ch'en said he believed Chiang would resign even i f Kwangtung entered into direct and open negotiations with Japan. However, i f he refused to relinquish control of Nanking, the Cantonese would not hesitate to assassinate him -- even though i t was an "unfair" thing to do. Continuing negotiations of this type provided the backdrop for Canton's conditional approval of the peace overtures urgently renewed by Nanking in the wake of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The weight of public opinion l e f t the Extraordinary Conference no alternative but to make a positive response to the calls for national unity in the face of foreign aggression that emanated from the north in such profusion. The Mukden Incident may have come just in time to save Canton from another serious -- and possibly irreparable -- s p l i t on the question of making peace with Nanking. It is impossible to say what new fissures Ch'en Chi-t'ang's unilateral withdrawal from Hunan might have opened i f the Japanese onslaught had not intervened. In any case, Canton's provisional acceptance of the new Nanking peace 94 i n i t i a t i v e did not bring about instant national unity. Despite the pious calls for unity, neither side was immediately willing to capitu-late to the demands of the other. Reconciliation was achieved only after long months of incredibly complex negotiations. The Peace Conference and the Fourth Kuomintang Congress On September 28th, Chang Chi, Ch'en Ming-shu, and Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei arrived in Hong Kong for peace talks. The Extraordinary Conference was represented by Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, and Li Wen-fan, who insisted that two basic conditions be met before formal peace negotiations could ft 1 begin. F i r s t , Chiang K'ai-shek was to issue a circular telegram in which he announced that he would soon retire. The Canton government would simultaneously release a separate telegram in which i t announced it s imminent dissolution and i t s intention to send delegates north to confer on the formation of a united government. Second, the organization of the Nanking-Shanghai garrison command was to be altered so that Cantonese representatives could go north without fear of arrest. The southerners recommended that Ch'en Ming-shu and his 19th Route Army be given responsibility for garrisoning the area. Chiang K'ai-shek agreed to both conditions. The six peace delegates then drafted the two telegrams that were to be released simultaneously and sent copies to Chiang. He approved them in principle, saying that only the date of issuance and a few sentences needed revision -- something that could be discussed as soon as the Cantonese arrived in Shanghai. With basic agreement seemingly achieved, the delegates proceeded to Canton for further consultations. They immediately encountered opposition from Ku Ying-fen, Ch'en Chi't'ang and others, 95 . who accused Wang, Sun, and Li of disregarding the guiding principle of the southern position; that Chiang was to resign before any further talks were held. They were not satisfied with a mere de-claration of intent. Telegrams shot back and forth between Canton and Nanking in an effort to resolve the dilemma. Chiang K'ai-shek insisted that the dissidents come north f i r s t because i f they did not, there would be a hiatus in the national government. At such a c r i t i c a l time i t would be intolerable to have no one in charge of the government for even an instant; i f anything unfortunate happened, Canton would have to bear f u l l responsibility. Chiang said his retirement was no problem at a l l -- he would announce i t as soon as the Cantonese arrived to take over his duties. After several days of wrangling, the Extraordinary Conference agreed to send representatives to Shanghai for a preliminary peace conference before Chiang had actually stepped down. They stipulated that a firm date would have to be set for the announcement of his resignation. The Cantonese would not enter Nanking until the Shanghai talks had achieved concrete results. Indeed, they would not even go to Shanghai until Hu Han-min had been released from custody and the 19th Route Army had been transferred to garrison the Nanking-Shanghai area. When the preliminary negotiations were completed, the southerners issued a circular telegram in which they outlined some solutions for China's problems. The telegram called for opposition to Japanese aggression in Manchuria and the protection of Chinese sovereignty. It emphasized the need for diligence in strengthening the country and the w i l l of i t s inhabitants. The establishment of democracy in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's teachings was seen as a primary goal. Local self-96 government and basic human liberties like freedom of speech and of the press had to be instituted to insure that dictatorship would be banished forever. Military domination of politics and government had to be ended posthaste, for i t did nothing but cause chaos and disunity in the country. It must be replaced by c i v i l i a n control of the army. Some methods of achieving this were to abolish the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces so that national military power could not be centralized in the hands of one person; and to follow the principle of not having military and p o l i t i c a l regions coincide.' Financial administration must be made public, and people's representative organs must be given a voice in budgetary and other financial matters. A special committee comprised of representatives of the government and the people should be created to put China's finances in order. The principles contained in this telegram were to form the minimum basis for discussion at the forthcoming peace talks. Hu Han-min was released in conformity with the preliminary agreement reached in Canton. He arrived in Shanghai on October 14th, and immediately wired the Extraordinary Conference to send a peace delegation north. Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, Li Wen-fan, Wu Ch'ao-shu, Ch'en Yu-jen, and Tsou Lu were appointed as o f f i c i a l negotiators, and they landed in Shanghai on the 21st with an entourage of close to 100 people. While they were en route, Nanking gave an earnest of i t s good intentions by resolving to restore to f u l l membership in the Kuomintang a l l comrades who had been expelled since the Third Plenum of the Second CEC-CSC in March, 1929. Li Chi-shen was given his freedom on the 19th, and Chu Cheng and Fang Chen-wu followed him out of 63 captivity on the 23rd. 97 . The talks were scheduled to begin on the 26th, but had to be postponed until the next day when a delegate from the Nanking side, Li Shih-ts'eng, refused to come. On the 27th he s t i l l had not arrived and i t looked as though another postponement would be necessary. However, at the eleventh hour Li sent a wire authorizing Wu T'ieh-ch'eng to take 64 his place, and the meetings began. This type of obstructionism was typical of the entire conference. Almost a l l of i t was instigated by the Nanking leaders, no doubt because they were the ones who stood to lose the most power and influence in any peace agreement that was decided upon. The proceedings must have seemed too one-sided to them since almost a l l of the demands came from Canton. Nanking was unwilling to agree to arrangements that would shift the balance of power to the dissidents. Thus tentative agreements were reached, only to be re-pudiated shortly afterwards; provisos were attached to southern demands in order to modify their l i k e l y effects; and pressure of various kinds was brought to bear on the Cantonese to reach a quick accord without seeking too much from Nanking. Recesses were called on more than one occasion so that Chiang's representatives could return to the capital for instructions. Straightforward matters that did not infringe upon the in-terests of either side were dealt with swiftly. They included such things as the establishment of a joint foreign policy commission to handle foreign affairs, until a unified government was formed and the creation of a financial affairs commission to straighten out the nation's finances. The impasses came on more fundamental questions. Nanking was dead set against the changes Canton proposed in the organization of the government, particularly abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces and revision of the Organic Law to make the post of Chairman of the National Government largely ceremonial. In the latter proposal, executive authority was to be transferred to the head of the Executive Yuan, who would act in a capacity somewhat similar to that of a prime minister in a European government. In addition, the Chairman of the National Government was not to be allowed to assume other p o l i t i c a l or governmental positions. These measures were directed at Chiang K'ai-shek, who was both a military officer and the incumbent in a l l three offices mentioned. They were also designed, in more general terms, to prevent any individ-ual, and particularly a military man, from gaining dictatorial control of the country in the future. At the weekly memorial meeting on November 2nd, Chiang res-65 ponded with a v i t r i o l i c denunciation of the Cantonese negotiators. He accused them of insincerity, of trying to destroy the government, and of extending aid and comfort to Japan. He said that after recon-sideration of his former intentions he had irrevocably decided not to retire. The peace conference was jeopardized in the furor that ensued. Chiang dispatched Ch'en Ming-shu to Shanghai to explain to the southerners that he had been carried away by the emotions of a moment, and that they should not pay any attention to what he said. Publicly, he denied the accuracy of reports of his speech, and he released a carefully doctored version of i t as proof. After some anxious moments, feelings were soothed and the peace talks were enabled to continue. 99 . Nanking eventually accepted in principle Canton's plan for the reorganization of the government. The southerners, perhaps as a direct exchange, agreed that the provisional constitution passed in June would remain in effect. Wang Ching-wei stated in an interview that he had always advocated a provisional constitution, and he did not have to be i t s author i f the contents were appropriate.*^ Tsou Lu added that Canton had not yet o f f i c i a l l y endorsed or repudiated either the National People's Convention or the yueh-fa. With their public stand thus softened, they consented to let them stand. It was not much of a concession since i t is doubtful that they could have mustered the support necessary to overturn them. The dissidents had come to terms with reality on another issue as well. They dropped the demand they had made so insistently during the Enlarged Conference when they called for the convocation of the Third National Kuomintang Congress. They realized that even though they denied the legality of the Third Congress that had been held in 1929, they could not turn back the clock. Even with this problem out of the way, questions of how and when to convene the Fourth Congress proved to be a major source of dispute. The Canton delegation insisted that the Congress be delayed and that a l l members of the f i r s t , second, and third Central Executive and Supervisory Committees, excluding Communists and "reactionaries," be made automatic members of the fourth CEC-CSC. Nanking wanted the Fourth Congress to be held on schedule and to elect the new Central Committees freely. The dispute was not resolved until the final day of the peace conference, when i t was decided that Nanking and Canton would hold 100 separate Fourth Congresses at dates of their own choosing. Central Committee members from the f i r s t three Congresses -- a total of 112 people -- would become automatic members of the new CEC-CSC. Each section of the Fourth Congress was to elect an additional 24 f u l l and reserve members to bring the total up to 160. All resolutions of the peace conference had to be approved by the respective Fourth Congresses, and a l l resolutions of the Fourth Congresses had to be approved in turn by the unified First Plenary Session of the Fourth CEC-CSC. On November 7th, the peace talks ended with a rather pre-mature announcement that a unified China would soon be achieved. The Canton representatives decided that Wang Ching-wei, Tsou Lu, and Wu Ch'ao-shu would remain in Shanghai as a liaison with Nanking. The remainder of the delegation returned to the south to make a report and to attend the Fourth Congress. The Nanking section of the Congress convened without a hitch on November 12th. It was notable for i t s tranquility. No serious controversies marred i t s proceedings, and i t ended with due decorum on the 23rd. The Canton section presented a marked contrast. At i t s second formal session on November 23rd, i t resolved to repudiate some 67 of the decisions reached at the peace conference. It accepted the plans for the reorganization of the national government that Nanking had so reluctantly agreed to, but i t rejected out of hand the resolution that made members of the f i r s t three Central Committees automatic members of the Fourth CEC-CSC. The Cantonese now decided that everyone on the new Central Committees would be freely elected. Their decision 101 ironically brought them back in line with the original Nanking position their delegates had so obdurately rejected at the peace conference. Paradoxically, their motives were similar, but opposite, to those of Nanking. The southerners objected to the automatic arrangement be-cause i t would mean that they had played a part in returning Chiang K'ai-shek and his followers to the Central Committees. Nanking's objection, of course, had been prompted by a desire to prevent too many of its opponents from becoming CEC-CSC members. Canton also resolved to remove Chiang K'ai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang from the Party r o l l s . Sun Fo, Li Wen-fan, and.Ch'en Yu-jen, whose efforts at the peace conference were directly challenged by these resolutions, were indig-nant. They l e f t for Hong Kong the next day with somewhere between 68 160 and 250 sympathetic Congress delegates. Although details of the s p l i t in Canton are lacking, i t s basic outlines can be reconstructed with some accuracy. It seems to have been another manifestation of the continuing conflict between the local strongman and the v i s i t i n g politicians, or, to state i t in a broader context, between provincial interests and national interests. Ch'en Chi-t'ang's position in Kwangtung vis-a-vis the vi s i t i n g politicians had been materially weakened by the sudden death of Ku Ying-fen on October 28th. Ku had been his staunchest and most powerful po l i t i c a l a l l y . Ch'en had particularly valued Ku's support because he saw himself primarily as a military man and had l i t t l e confidence 69 in himself as a pure politician. Even with Ku's assistance, he had been unable to prevail against Wang Ching-wei in the August contest of w i l l s . As a result, he had unilaterally withdrawn his troops from 102 Hunan, and another confrontation had been in the offing when the Mukden Incident had fortuitously intervened. It had been no accident that the Extraordinary Conference's delegates to the peace talks had a l l been drawn from the ranks of the visiting politicians. They were probably as happy to leave as Ch'en was to see them go. Now the politicians had returned, Ku was dead, and Ch'en was feeling uneasy. He engineered the repudiation of the peace conference resolutions as a dramatic demonstration of his authority in Kwangtung.''0 The scenario rapidly grew more complex. The vi s i t i n g poli-ticians were so angered•by Ch'en1s recalcitrance that they decided to try to strike back with more than mere p o l i t i c a l maneuvers. In the idiom of Ch'en Yu-jen, they wanted to hit him with "an iron hammer," to deal him a knock-out blow so that he could not cause trouble again.^ They enlisted the aid of several military officers who were dissatisfied with Ch'en Chi-fang's behavior: Admiral Ch'en Ts'e (Ch'an Chak), commander of the Kwangtung Navy; Chang Hui-ch'ang, commander of the Kwangtung Air Force; and Ch'en Ch'ing-yun, commander of the Boca Tigris 72 (Hu-men)forts. Ch'en Ts'e moved part of his f l o t i l l a down the Pearl River to the vi c i n i t y of the Boca Tigris forts, and Chang trans-ferred a squadron of aircraft to Chung-shan hsien in preparation for an armed clash with Ch'en Chi-fang. When questioned by newsmen, of course, they denied that these troop movements were any cause for alarm. 73 They were only "maneuvers." It was widely rumored that the Kwangsi Clique would join in h o s t i l i t i e s against Ch'en, but at the last minute i t evidently decided that an attempted coup was not in i t s best interests 74 and declared i t s neutrality. 103 The situation was further complicated by Li Chi-shen's presence in the south. He had arrived in Hong Kong on November 10th, saying he had come to v i s i t his ancestral tombs in Kwangsi. Many observers believed he had reached an agreement with Chiang K'ai-shek, 75 who had promised his support in restoring Li to power in the south. One of the Japanese Consul' s informants reported more specifically that Chiang had provided Li with 2,500,000 yuan to induce Ch'en Chi-t'ang's 76 followers to desert him. Ch'en was certainly suspicious of his motives for returning, for he had Canton placarded with anti-Li propaganda. In the end, the tense situation was resolved without recourse to armed conflict. Hu Han-min and Wu Ch'ao-shu hastened from Shang-hai to Canton to mediate, arriving on November 27th. They presented the Fourth Congress delegates remaining in Canton with an elaborate face-saving formula to bring about a re c o n c i l i a t i o n . 7 7 It smoothed ruffled feathers on both sides by providing for the reversal of the decision to repudiate the peace conference resolutions without cancelling i t directly. The original resolutions would be allowed to stand, but they would be effectively neutralized by new resolutions that superseded them indirectly. The dignity of both sides would thus be preserved. After four days of discussion, Hu's prescription was accepted. On December 1st, the Congress resolved that the 112 members of the f i r s t three Central Committees would become members of the Fourth CEC-CSC by "free election." Each one would be "elected" individually, by majority vote, so that there would be no contradiction with the original resolution rejecting automatic apppointment. The letter, i f not the 104 s p i r i t , of the original was thus maintained. It was also resolved that a l l Kuomintang members, with the exception of Communists, who had been removed from the Party r o l l s previously were now reinstated. This decision restored the Party status of Chiang K'ai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang without pardoning them individually. Sun Fo, Ch'en Yu-jen, Li Wen-fan, Ch'en Ts'e, Chang Hui-ch'ang, and their followers returned to Canton on December 2nd on a special train sent by Ch'en Chi't'ang. The next day i t became evident that not everyone was satisfied with the formula adopted to bring about reconciliation. When i t came time to "elect" the Central Committees, one group remained adamant in i t s opposition to the system of selection. Fighting broke out in the Congress hall and two delegates, Chiao I-t'ang 78 and Li Hai-yun, were badly beaten. The pandemonium ended abruptly within half an hour when the Peace Preservation Corps arrived to restore order. Open antagonism seems to have spent i t s e l f in this brief inter-lude, and the remainder of the Congress passed without incident. The Central Committees were duly elected according to Hu Han-min's plan, and one other resolution of note was passed. It provided for the establishment of p o l i t i c a l , Party, and military committees at an 79 intermediate level -- below the national and above the provincial. They were ostensibly to make the transmission of orders from Nanking to the provinces in these three spheres more efficient. In reality, the resolution was later used by Ch'en Chi-t'ang and his cohorts as a justification for the creation of leadership organs whose sole purpose was to insure the continued independence of the Southwest. The Canton section of the Fourth Kuomintang Congress had wired Wang Ching-wei repeatedly to ask him to come south to join in 105 i t s deliberations. He had refused each request on one pretext or another. When the sp l i t over the repudiation of the Shanghai peace accords caused a considerable number of delegates to withdraw in protest, Wang seized the opportunity to strengthen his own pol i t i c a l position. He had been handicapped for years by his lack of an organized following represented on the highest councils of the Kuomintang and national government. When the s p l i t occurred, Wang saw that i t offered him an admirable chance to take preliminary steps toward correcting this deficiency. The opportunity was timely because he urgently needed to consolidate his position before the anticipated take-over of the Nanking government by the dissidents. He wanted to have a strong voice in the policy of the new regime. Wang wired the disgruntled delegates in Hong Kong to invite them to a conference in Shanghai. Over 100 responded to his c a l l , and they had a l l reached 80 Shanghai by December 2nd. The next day, Wang and his followers assembled at the Great 81 World amusement center to conduct their deliberations. There were now, in effect, three Fourth Kuomintang Congresses. Wang's only real purpose in holding the meeting was to insure that some of his supporters would be elected to the 24 new slots on the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees. He announced that the delegates in Shanghai would elect a proportion of the new committeemen equivalent to the percentage they represented of the total number of original delegates to the Canton Fourth Congress. By his calculation that meant 10 of the 24. A l i s t of the 10 people they decided upon was sent to the Canton Congress, which refused to recognize a l l but one, Chang Fa-k'uei, 106 who had already been independently elected in the south. Canton claimed ju s t i f i a b l y that the body convened by Wang had no legal right to elect anyone. This result was predictable and did not faze Wang in the least. He had staked his claim, and he lobbied tir e l e s s l y for his nominees during the next three weeks. The dispute continued intermittent-ly until December 23rd, when the second preparatory meeting of the First Plenum of the Fourth CEC-CSC decided that a final ruling was necessary on so that no more time would be wasted on the matter. Significantly, the meeting was Ho Ying-ch'in, a faithful follower of Chiang K'ai-shek. He and other Nanking partisans recommended that Wang's nine nominees be recognized as legitimate, blithely adding that Nanking should naturally be allowed to add nine more names to the Central Committee r o l l s in compensation. The Cantonese objected, saying that i f this were the case, they should also be allowed to add nine more names. The compromise that eventually emerged from the meeting recognized the nine men elected under Wang's auspices and authorized Nanking and Canton to add five and four Central Committee members respectively. Chiang K'ai-shek provided the support Wang needed to push through his nominees. Spurred by calculations of mutual advantage, the two leaders had been in secret communication since the end of 83 November. Wang's sub vosa contacts with the very man he had been trying to oust from power for so long constituted another aspect of his campaign to expand his p o l i t i c a l base. He was unwilling to enter Nanking as just one small part of a new coalition government; 107 he wanted to have sufficient influence to put some of his ideas into practice. He knew that Chiang K'ai-shek would continue to wield tremendous power through informal channels even i f he was forced to resign. It was therefore eminently logical for him to try to work out some sort of private arrangement with his long-time adversary. Chiang, for his part, realized that he would probably soon be forced to resign. He must also have calculated that his retirement was l i k e l y to be brief, but he did not want to leave anything to chance. It could only be to his advantage to reach an agreement with Wang, who was s t i l l one of the best known and most prestigious p o l i t i c a l leaders in China. The precise nature of the secret negotiations between Chiang and Wang is unknown. A source hostile to both claims that they con-84 eluded a firm compact consisting of four main points. (1) The Wang faction was to withdraw from the Canton Congress and come to Shanghai. (2) If Canton was resolute in i t s determination to overturn the resolutions of the peace conference, Wang's faction would inherit their mantle and continue to cooperate with Chiang K'ai-shek. The 24 new CEC-CSC positions allotted to Canton at the peace conference would, in this eventuality, revert to the Wang faction. (3) If the Canton Congress followed Hu Han-min's counsels and reversed i t s previous repudiation of the peace conference resolutions, the Central Committee members elected by the Wang faction in Shanghai would be safeguarded by Chiang's group and at least ten of them would be guaranteed recognition. (4) If the Wang Faction sincerely continued to assist Chiang during the First Plenum, Chiang would share po l i t i c a l power with i t . At least one Yuan 108 (the Executive Yuan), two ministries, and one commission would be turned over to Wang to f i l l . It seems doubtful, however, that any such concrete agreement was in fact reached. It is far more l i k e l y that matters of mutual interest were explored in a very tentative manner, to serve as a basis for possible future cooperation. Chiang K'ai-shek's Resignation and the Short-lived Sun Fo Government Pol i t i c a l events rushed headlong to their conclusion after the curtain dropped on the Canton section of the Fourth Kuomintang Congress. The pressure on Chiang -- from the dissidents, from massive student demonstrations against Nanking's policy toward Japan, and from the bankrupt state of government finances -- mounted unrelentingly. Chiang resigned from his substantive and concurrent posts on December 15th. An emergency session of the standing committee of the Central Executive Committee elected Lin Sen acting Chairman of the National Government and Ch'en Ming-shu acting head of the Executive Yuan to replace him. Only a few hours before his resignation, Chiang had taken some additional precautions against being permanently excluded from power. He had convened the 49th meeting of the State Council, with himself in the chair, and the session had resolved to completely 85 reorganize three key provincial governments. In each of them, the provincial government councils were replaced wholesale, and new men were appointed to take charge of a l l important provincial government positions. Ku Chu-t'ung was appointed chairman of the Kiangsu Government, Lu T'i-p'ing chairman of Chekiang, and Hsiung Shih-hui chairman of Kiangsi. Heads of the provincial reconstruction, finance, 109 and education departments were replaced. A l l the new appointees were reliable followers of Chiang K'ai-shek, and most of them were also military officers. With them emplaced, Chiang was assured of continued control of the Nanking-Shanghai area. He could "retire" without anxiety. Chiang retired just in time to save himself from some unpleasant-ness. Students protesting Nanking's policy toward Japan staged their most violent demonstration yet on the same day. They sacked the Foreign Ministry and clubbed o f f i c i a l s , and they swarmed into the outer court-yard of the building where the emergency CEC session was being held to consider Chiang's resignation. Ch'en Ming-shu, in what was probably his f i r s t task as acting head of the Executive Yuan, went out with Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei to talk to the students. He was promptly taken hostage and soundly beaten by the youthful patriots. Sobered by the experience, Ch'en warned that he would resort to extreme measures, i f necessary, to prevent further violence. When the students ransacked the building that housed the Central Daily News (Chung-yang jih-pao) and several government offices on the 17th, he was as good as his word. The next day troops rounded up the students and placed them on special trains standing by to take them home. When confirmation of Chiang K'ai-shek's resignation reached Canton, there was widespread celebration. December 18th was declared a holiday to commemorate the overthrow of dictatorship in China. In a more practical vein, the southerners dispatched a large delegation north to participate in the First Plenary Session, which was to form a new government. They swelled the ranks of the dissidents already in Shanghai, who moved on to Nanking on the 17th amidst much fanfare. no-Chiang K'ai-shek remained in the capital long enough to attend the opening ceremony of the First Plenum, but he then l e f t abruptly for Fenghua, his native village in Chekiang. He stated that he was going into complete retirement and would not even open letters or telegrams from Nanking. Just prior to his departure, he is alleged to have met secretly with Ku Meng-yu, Ch'en Kung-po, and Wang Fa'ch'in, 87 who were a l l acolytes of Wang Ching-wei. He told them briefly that in such a time of peril the nation needed a leader whom everyone trusted to manage i t s af f a i r s , and he hoped that Wang would be able to take up this d i f f i c u l t task. Wang himself had been confined to a hospital in Shanghai since December 12 th . He was suffering another of his recurrent attacks of diabetes, and was unable to take part in the First Plenum. The First Plenary Session passed rather peacefully. There was only one serious dispute, which was caused by the acid remarks of Wu Chih-hui, a firm supporter of Chiang K'ai-shek. When the question of responsibility for the loss of Manchuria was raised, Wu said i t could 88 not be assigned to Chiang K'ai-shek and Chang Hsu'eh-1 iang. He remarked that i t was caused by traitors within the country who were at that very moment before his eyes. The statement was an obvious reference to Canton's efforts to gain recognition and.assistance from Japan. Sun Fo, Li Wen-fan, and other Cantonese took umbrage and withdrew to Shanghai. They returned after they received a letter of apology and Wu was persuaded not to attend any more meetings. The Plenum concerned i t s e l f mainly with ratifying and signing 89 into law the agreements previously reached by Canton and Nanking. The plan for the reform of the government that had been tentatively accepted at the peace talks and the separate Fourth Congresses was approved, and the Organic Law was amended to make i t legally binding. Under the revised Organic Law, the Chairman of the National Government was divested of a l l "actual p o l i t i c a l responsibility" and transformed into a ceremonial figurehead. Leadership of the government was trans-ferred .to the head of the Executive Yuan. The State Council, the chairman of the government, and the five Yuan heads were to be "selected and appointed" by the CEC of the Kuomintang. It should be noted that this particular revision of the Organic Law brought i t into conflict with the provisional constitution, which the Plenum e x p l i c i t l y acknowl-edged to be the fundamental law of the land during the tutelage period. Article 74 of the provisional constitution stated that the heads of the five Yuan and the heads of the various ministries and commissions would be appointed by the national government (i . e . , the State Council) at the instance of the Chairman of the National Government. Other articles also conflicted, but such contradictions seemed to be of no concern to the eager law makers. They simply wanted to have something in the law books that would hinder -- and perhaps even prevent -- any individual from gathering too much power into his own hands. Other significant amendments of the Organic Law provided that: a l l mandates of the national government and orders for mobilization of military forces would be issued on the signature of the government chairman, but would not be effective unless they were countersigned by the head of the Yuan and Ministry concerned; before the promulgation of a permanent constitution, the Yuans would be responsible to the CEC; and one-half of the members of the Legislative Yuan would be elected from 112 people's organizations to increase popular participation in law-making. The constitution of the Pol i t i c a l Council was revised to make the membership of that body coincide with the membership of the CEC and CSC. A l l Central Committeemen became Ex officio members of the Poli t i c a l Council, but no one else could be appointed to i t . Under Chiang K'ai-shek's supervision, membership regulations had been altered in 1930 and 1931 to allow a certain number of people who were not members of the two Central Committees to be appointed, thus making i t easier to pack the Council. The Po l i t i c a l Council was a key policy-making body, and the reversion to the original membership formula marked another effort to make i t d i f f i c u l t for one person to gain too much power. The new Standing Committee of the Po l i t i c a l Council consisted of Chiang K'ai-shek, Wang Ching-wei, and Hu Han-min, who were considered to be the most important leaders in China, The chairmanship was to rotate among them. When i t came time to elect the new government, the dissidents, to no one's surprise, emerged in a dominant position. Lin Sen became Chairman of the National Government, Sun Fo became head of the Executive Yuan, Ch'en Yu-jen became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and 90 Huang Han-liang became Minister of Finance. Only the Ministry of Military Affairs remained the inviolable property of Chiang K'ai-shek's followers. Ho Ying-ch'in stayed on in f u l l control there. The portfolio was, no doubt, particularly important to Chiang since the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces had been abolished. The rosy glow of victory was not destined to remain with the dissidents for long. The New Year's message issued by Sun Fo in his capacity as head of the Executive Yuan was prophetic, for i t began with the statement that he knew he was not equal to the task of lead-ing the government, but would do his best. Another portent of what was to follow came on January 1st, when the new government was o f f i c i a l l y inaugurated: only two Yuan heads bothered to show up for the ceremony. On the same day, the "national" government of China in Canton declared i t s e l f dissolved, in accordance with previous agreement. However, i t was replaced by three organs designed to perpetuate the independence of the south: the Southwest Executive Section of the Central Executive Committee (Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yuan-hui hsi-nan chih-hsing-pu); the Southwest P o l i t i c a l Council of the National Government (Kuo-min cheng-fu hsi-nan cheng-wu wei-yuan-hui); and the Southwest Military Branch Council of the National Government (Kuo-min cheng-fu hsi-nan chlin-shih fen-hui). The resolution of the Canton Fourth Congress calling for new p o l i t i c a l , Party, and military organs below the national and above the provincial level was used to ju s t i f y their formation. The new government in Nanking was paralyzed from the day of its birth. Chiang K'ai-shek deliberately showed no interest in i t s problems while he ostentatiously strolled among the h i l l s of his native Fenghua. He withheld his and his followers support from Sun's regime and l e f t i t to i t s own devices. He wanted to give a graphic demonstration of his indispensability to the government. Politics were dominated by personal relationships, and without the poli t i c a l and financial support of Chiang's camp the new government was doomed, for there were no regularized institutions upon which i t 114. could f a l l back. There was no institutional means of circumventing Chiang's withholding of support. As one observer remarked at the time, "Despite his sportsmanlike retirement, he s t i l l holds a predominant in-91 fluence over state affairs. The nation can find no substitute for him." The national government was completely bankrupt. Early in January, Sun Fo announced that i t s monthly expenditures amounted to no 22,000,000 yuan, while i t s income was only 6,000,000 yuan. Deficit financing had been the rule in the past, though the discrepancy had never been so glaring. Vast quantities of bonds had been issued to make up the difference. Now, however, the Shanghai bankers whose support had been the sine qua non of Nanking's financial v i a b i l i t y , refused to make loans to the government or to accept i t s bonds. Their non-cooperation was probably spurred largely by government talk of a moratorium on domestic debt payments. It also seems l i k e l y that Chiang K'ai-shek and T. V. Soong encouraged the bankers to withhold their financial backing. Chiang cer-tainly made no effort to step in and use his broad influence in Shanghai financial circles to ra l l y support for the government. Nanking's fiscal condition was aggravated by i t s inability to collect i t s normal share of provincial and customs revenues. Chang Hsueh-liang retained the surplus from the Tientsin customs, though Canton 93 appears to have resumed normal payments to the central government. It was also alleged that the key provinces of the lower Yangtze region 94 conspired to withhold the revenue they normally remitted to Nanking. When one recalls Chiang's last-minute reorganization of the governments of these provinces before he retired, i t seems li k e l y that this was indeed the case. One newspaper summed up the predicament of the government 115 as follows: The southern faction, which was so sure of i t s e l f and so insistent that the old regime should vacate to give 'new blood 1 and higher ideals a chance, has been in office only a few weeks (?) and has found i t s e l f up against, not a theory, but the plain, hard fact that, its government on the brink of bankruptcy, with its outgoings three times i t s income, and with no immediate prospect of being able, without the help of the people whom i t s supporters so furiously opposed, to improve its financial situation. It is probably true that several provinces, out of loyalty to the old regime, are purposely boycotting Nanking, and instead of sending revenue to the National Government, are quietly appropriating i t for their own purposes.95 Huang Han-liang, the new Minister of Finance, eventually negotiated a loan from the Shanghai bankers, but i t proved to be too l i t t l e , and too late. The agreement came on the 22nd of January, and only provided the government with 8,000,000 yuan per month for two months, to "tide i t 96 over the c r i s i s . " It was not nearly enough to balance intake and out-flow, and by then the fate of Sun Fo's regime was already sealed. Sun went to Shanghai on January 8th and issued pleas to Chiang K'ai-shek and his followers to come to Nanking and take up their duties. The dissidents, despite their propaganda, had never intended to completely 97 exclude either Chiang or his leading supporters from the government. They knew that this was an impossibility, and tried only to lim i t Chiang's powers. He remained a member of the Central Executive Committee, and the First Plenary Session had elected him a member of the powerful three man Standing Committee of the Po l i t i c a l Council. Various of his followers remained ensconced in the Nanking government. However, the dissidents were naive indeed to believe that they could legislate curbs on the legal powers that might accrue to Chiang and then expect him to stay on in the government without protest. 116 Legal restraints could hardly be expected to be effective in a po l i t i c a l system that was so far from being institutionalized. Personal relationships, factional followings, and raw military might were the determinants of pol i t i c a l power, and laws were meaningless without firm institutions to back them. Chiang remained the most powerful man in China whether he held formal office or not. His opponents probably tried to curb his power by changing the laws because they had no other means at their disposal. They knew they could not compete with him in terms of client networks, factional followings, and military strength, so they turned to the laws. They hoped that they might at least hinder his pursuit of power and gain some say in the government for themselves. But when they asked Chiang to cooperate f u l l y with the new government when i t had just passed reams of legislation hostile to his ambitions, they were being truly unrealistic. The southerners were not unaffected by optimistic hopes that they might somehow muddle through. They seem to have misjudged the degree to which Chiang would passively obstruct their efforts. Sun Fo was obliged to spend a l l his time trying to persuade missing members of the government to come to Nanking. He was especially anxious to have the Standing Committee of the P o l i t i c a l Council -- Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, and Chiang K'ai-shek -- take up i t s duties. Hu refused, saying he was afflict e d with another attack of high blood pressure that would not permit him to take on any strenuous po l i t i c a l responsibilities. He had, in reality, broken irrevocably with Chiang K'ai-shek, and never again set foot in Nanking. Wang remained in a hospital in Shanghai. He asked that he be relieved of his job on the Pol i t i c a l Council for 117 the time being, and promised that he would take up his duties when he had recovered sufficiently from his ill n e s s . He was apparently genuinely 98 sick, though the degree to which his illness inhibited his activities did vary according to the p o l i t i c a l winds blowing in Nanking. Wang seems to have been holding out for a position in the government he con-sidered acceptable. Chiang K'ai-shek greeted Sun Fo's entreaties with a stony silence. As paralysis in Nanking increased, many of Chiang's a l l i e s 99 and followers made pilgrimages to see him and to discuss the situation. He was visited by Shao Yuan-ch'ung and Chiang Tso-pin on the 11th; by T. V. Soong, Huang Fu, Ma Fu-hsiang, and Chiang Kuang-nai on the 12th; by Ku Chu-t'ung, Chu Chia-hua, Chang Ch'iin, Huo Yao-tsu, and others on the 14th; and by Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang, Ch'en Kuo-fu, H. H. Kung, Chou Fo-hai and others on the 16th. Chiang sent a letter to Wang by courier on the morning of the 16th, and by evening Wang had arrived in Hangchow to meet with him. 1^ They conferred for over two hours the next day and then sent a telegram to Sun Fo saying they would come to Nanking in a few days, after Wang had had a chance to rest up for the journey. On the 18th, Chiang sent his private plane to Nanking to bring Sun and several other government leaders to Hangchow for a conference. Their discussions were not made public, but they must have finalized the p o l i t i c a l agree-ment whereby Chiang and Wang would come to the capital. It is possible that Sun agreed to step down as head of the Executive Yuan to make way for them. Wang Ching-wei arrived in Nanking on the 21st of January, and Chiang followed him the next day.10*1 Endless meetings were held to get 118 the government moving again. At a conference on the 24th, foreign policy was discussed, and the policy toward Japan advocated by Ch'en Yu-jen was decisively rejected. Its rejection precipitated the f a l l of the Sun Fo government. Since assuming office as Foreign Minister in Nanking, Ch'en had made a marvelous switch in his attitude toward the Japanese. He had become a hard-liner, insisting that China break diplomatic relations with i t s neighbor and resist Japanese imperialism by every possible means. Perhaps he was bothered by a guilty conscience. When his foreign policy was defeated, Ch'en resigned from the government and l e f t for Shanghai. Sun Fo resigned the next day, and a host of other government 102 o f f i c i a l s followed his example. Sun's resignation was rejected as a matter of form by an emergency meeting of the standing committee of the CEC, and a delegation was dispatched to Shanghai to induce him to return. He remained firm in his resolve; the new government was effectively at an end. Wang Ching-wei replaced Sun as head of the Executive Yuan on the 29th, T.V. Soong returned to the Ministry of Finance, and the other vacated positions were divided among the followers of Wang and Chiang K'ai-shek. Chiang himself continued to play hard to get. He insisted that he had returned to Nanking only in a private capacity, and i f he offered his opinions on any subject, i t was entirely up to the authori-ties whether they were accepted or not. He said he would aid the govern-103 ment as best he could, but would not assume any o f f i c i a l posts. Chiang was playing the role of the humble citizen to the h i l t and was biding his time until the proper opportunity presented i t s e l f for him to resume his duties o f f i c i a l l y . The fact that he was in "retirement" 119. did not prevent him from attending, and even chairing, government meetings. On January 29th, the day after the Japanese attacked Shanghai, the Polit i c a l Council established a Military Commission to provide cen-tralized supervision for China's armies. Chiang was appointed to the Commission but refused to accept the post. He did not find conditions sufficiently propitious to warrant his resumption of office. Neverthe-less, he found adequate scope for his military talents during the new emergency caused by the Japanese. Only in March, when the conflagration in Shanghai was over and the Pol i t i c a l Council had revised the regulations governing the Military Affairs Commission, did Chiang reluctantly agree to end his "retirement." The revision made the Commission chairman the equivalent of the now defunct Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces. Chiang was elected Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission on March 6th, but he s t i l l held out. High government dignitaries sent him a telegram urging him to take office "to deliver the country from 104 p e r i l , " but he continued to hold out. Only when Chu P'ei-te generously resigned as Chief of the General Staff so that Chiang could occupy the position concurrently, did he f i n a l l y agree to come out of "retirement." Chiang assumed office on the 18th of March. He had retrieved most of the legal powers that he had lost in December: on the pol i t i c a l side, he was a member of the standing committees of the CEC and the Poli t i c a l Council, and his followers were well represented in other high government and Party positions; on the military side, he was Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission and concurrently Chief of the General Staff. 120 The opposition movement of 1931 had failed to dislodge Chiang from his dominant position, but i t had succeeded in gaining more represen-tation in the Party and government for dissidents of various p o l i t i c a l hues. The Nanking government, even after Chiang's return in March, was composed of men representing a broader spectrum of poli t i c a l opinion than before he was forced to resign. People formerly labelled p o l i t i c a l criminals took an active part in the affairs of the capital, and the government could not help but be broadened to some degree in i t s outlook. Sun Fo's regime may have fallen ignominiously, but i t was replaced by a government headed by another dissident, Wang Ching-wei, who was able to collaborate with Chiang K'ai-shek for over three years. During this period, he had a chance to try to effect some of the programs demanded by the Extraordinary Conference. Unfortunately, the view from Nanking was not the same as the view from Canton or any of the other strongholds of opposition. When they were f i n a l l y given the practical responsibility of governing China, perennial dissidents l i k e Wang Ching-wei developed a different perspective from their new vantage point. Some would say i t was because they were really interested in l i t t l e outside of gaining power and position; others would say i t was because they found they could not do otherwise when confronted with the realities of the situation in the capital and the numberless impediments that blocked the way to the realization of their ideals. SECTION II PERSPECTIVES ON THE 1931 OPPOSITION MOVEMENT 122 CHAPTER III 'MOTIVATIONS OF THE PARTICIPANTS In Chinese Republican history, as with the history of other periods and other lands, i t is often d i f f i c u l t to ascertain the purely factual side of events, to discover what took place on a given occasion. Countless o f f i c i a l documents remain classified, there are great gaps in the sources available, and many of these sources con-tradict each other. When i t is already so d i f f i c u l t to reconstruct simple events, the task of reconstructing the motivations of the people involved assumes precarious dimensions. We are unable to monitor men's minds and must rely on their actions and words, the latter often being contrived to achieve a particular effect, to interpret their motivations. In other words, we must proceed in reverse: from result to intent instead of from intent to result. The process of recon-struction is hampered by calculated efforts on the part of the people under consideration to cast their actions in the best possible light. It is also hampered, in this instance, by the diversity of views that prevailed in Canton. It is impossible to give a single explanation that covers the motivations of such a varied group of individuals. Nevertheless, an attempt must be made, however tentative, to penetrate the barriers surrounding the motivations of the dissidents in 1931, or an understanding of the period cannot be achieved. Why was the movement launched in the f i r s t place? The provisional con-123 stitution dispute and the arrest of Hu Han-min may have been the imme-diate catalysts, but they were not at the root of the matter. Larger issues were clearly involved. Were the dissidents a l t r u i s t i c and self-less in their relentless efforts to topple Chiang K'ai-shek, as they and their supporters suggest? Was hatred of Chiang K'ai-shek perhaps an over-riding motivation that dwarfed a l l others? Was regionalism or, to phrase i t differently, local particularism, an important consideration? What about Chiang? What inspired him to handle the situation as he did? These three basic themes -- regionalism, hatred, and self-interest versus selflessness -- are the ones most commonly used to explain the opposition movement of 1931. They are, in fact, themes that are frequently invoked to explain many different aspects of republican history. In the suc-ceeding pages we shall explore each in turn and arrive at some tentative conclusions about their applicability to the 1931 opposition movement. We shall focus on the leading figures on both sides during the opposition movement as representative of the main motivations driving the p a r t i c i -pants in the dispute. Regionalism At f i r s t glance, the opposition movement of 1931 seems to bear many of the earmarks of regionalism. 1 A regional grouping consisting of Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces was pitted against the authority of the center. It institutionalized i t s opposition by establishing a rival regime that assumed a l l the functions of government in the area i t con-trolled. Furthermore, the composition of the movement was homogeneous, 124 with the leadership consisting almost entirely of southern Chinese, the vast majority of whom were natives of Kwangtung or Kwangsi. Very few men from other provinces joined the Extraordinary Conference, and those who did were not members of the top leadership echelon. They were present simply as members of the entourage of one or the other of the factional Wang Ching-wei or Sun Fo. The coincidence between the location of the movement and the provincial origins of the participants makes i t tempting to look no further and to classify the southern regime as a manifestation of regionalism or provincialism. In r e a l i t y , the opposition movement f i t no such neat category. Some of i t s members were indeed concerned primarily, sometimes exclusively, with regional or provincial interests. To them the province was paramount and everything else secondary. For other members of the Extraordinary Conference, however, the order of priorities was reversed. They focussed steadfastly on the national polity and the importance of a l l else was subsumed under i t . One might label the po l i t i c a l outlooks of these two groups as inductive and deductive respectively. This dichotomy was certainly not new to the south; i t had plagued the revolutionaries who had assembled in Canton under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen in the late teens and early twenties. The conflict between "the ideals of the national revolution and the regional loyalties and interests of Kwangtung province" has been described as the "central p o l i t i c a l fact" of the period of 2 collaboration between Sun Yat-sen and Ch'en Chiung-ming. It had not diminished in importance in 1931. We shall now examine the outlooks of the leading figures in the two contending parties. 125 Foremost among the regionalists was Ch'en Chi-t'ang. We might start by considering what motivated him to join the opposition movement in the f i r s t place. What, precisely, did he stand to gain from i t ? First and most importantly, participation offered him an opportunity to gain control of Kwangtung province. Ch'en's accession to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Route Army in 1929 had placed him in a position to compete for local dominance, but he had not been able to consolidate his position in the two succeeding years. The main obstacle to his ambitions was Ch'en Ming-shu, the Chairman of the Provincial Government, whom he had been unable to displace entirely. When Hu Han-min 's arrest in February, 1931 brought Ku Ying-fen to Canton to set about organizing a movement to oppose the central government, Ch'en Chi-t'ang was immediately interested. He saw that such a movement might offer him a chance to triumph in his rivalry with Ch'en Ming-shu. Ku's efforts could not have come at a better time for Ch'en Chi-t'ang since the most effective military force under Ch'en Ming-shu' s command, the 19th Route Army, was not in the province to support him. It had been transferred to Kiangsi to participate in the campaign against the Communists. After several weeks of secret planning, Ch'en Chi-t'ang heralded his adherence to the anti-Nanking coalition that was taking shape by delivering a scathing attack on Chiang K'ai-shek at a meeting of provincial leaders attended by Ch'en Ming-shu. The verbiage of the attack may have, been directed at Chiang, but i t also constituted an indirect challenge to Ch'en Ming-shu's authority in Kwangtung. Ch'en Ming-shu was certainly no devotee of Chiang K'ai-shek, but he did not have the forces at his disposal -- either military or p o l i t i c a l --126. to beat back the challenge extended by Ch'en Chi-t'ang and to reassert his authority over his rival for provincial power. He knew that i f i t came to a test of strength, his position would be extremely weak, so he 3 l e f t Kwangtung. Chiang K'ai-shek mistook his departure for a gesture of loyalty and summoned him to Nanking, where he was rewarded with posi-tions as deputy head of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Communications. Ch'en Chi-t'ang, meanwhile, was l e f t without any major com-petitors for control of Kwangtung. He had used the mounting sentiment against Chiang K'ai-shek as a lever with which to oust Ch'en Ming-shu. The tension between the two had been building up for some time and the situation would have come to a head eventually even without the convenient pretext of righteous struggle against Chiang's dictatorship. Ch'en Chi-t'ang had simply used this excuse to speed up the process and to lend legitimacy to his assumption of power. This does not mean that Ch'en was not sincerely disaffected with Chiang K'ai-shek and his Nanking regime. He probably was. But any such feelings seem to have been secon-dary to his desire to control Kwangtung. Once committed, Ch'en Chi-t'ang could not suddenly withdraw his support from the opposition movement without forfeiting much, i f not a l l , of his legitimacy. Such a loss might have been hazardous since he had just come to power and had not yet consolidated.his position. Ch'en Ming-shu's exit from the scene did not mean that everyone in Kwang-tung automatically supported Ch'en Chi-t'ang as the local strongman. In mid-May, for example, he attempted to disarm three regiments of the Peace Preservation Corps that had remained loyal to Ch'en Ming-shu. Two of the regiments, comprising 2500-3000 men, put up s t i f f resistance 127. 4 at Whampoa. It took three days of fighting, complete with air attacks, to suppress them. In June, two brigades of Ch'en Chi-fang's own troops 5 mutinied north of Canton and had to be disarmed. It was alleged that this incident was instigated by an agent provocateur in the pay of Nanking, and the man was summarily executed. In short, i t took Ch'en some time to establish firm control over the province even after he had eliminated his main rival for power. Control of provincial finances went hand in hand with military domination of Kwangtung. The allocation of revenue had been a constant source of f r i c t i o n between the two Ch'ens. Ch'en Chi-fang sought the lion's share of i t to maintain and strengthen the military units under his command, and Ch'en Ming-shu resisted his demands. With the latter's ouster, the former became the sole arbiter in a l l financial matters. He was free to allocate money as he saw f i t , and he used his new financial control to expand and improve the military establishment. During the summer of 1931 the newspapers were f i l l e d with reports of orders placed by the Canton government with foreign firms for armaments of various kinds. The drain they represented undoubtedly contributed heavily to the chaotic state of Kwangtung's finances during the Extraordinary Con-ference. The financial burden Ch'en assumed by allowing the opposition movement to be headquartered in Kwangtung does not seem to have been too great. The cost of c i v i l administration remained f a i r l y constant and the only added expenses of any magnitude seem to have been those incurred in trying to buy support for the southern regime. The most conspicuous examples of such bribery were those of Shih Yu-san and the Kwangsi Clique. 128. The amounts involved in either case are not definitely known, but Shih was rumored to have been paid off with 500,000 yuan,7 hardly a crippling burden i f the figure is accurate. The Kwangsi Clique was reported to be sending opium to Canton in return for i t s subsidy. Money payments of this type were always made with a specific object in mind, one whose realization would more than compensate for the expenditure. In Shih's case the object was to put pressure on Chiang K'ai-shek in North China, and in this i t was quite successful. The subsidy paid to Kwangsi helped to cement the peace that had so recently been established between that province and Kwangtung. More specifically, i t acted as an incentive for the Kwangsi leaders to keep their troops out of Kwangtung. The Cantonese were constantly -- and not at a l l unreasonably - haunted by the spector of invasion from Kwangsi. Thus, most of the expenditures that were made in the name of the Extraordinary Conference served purposes that were of use to Ch'en Chi-t'ang in consolidating his position in Kwang-tung. Even i f support of the Extraordinary Conference involved heavy, hidden financial burdens, they were only temporary. They amounted to l i t t l e when compared with the long-term financial control Ch'en Chi-t'ang gained when he acceded to power in Kwangtung, helped in part by the birth of the opposition movement. During the more than four years he reigned supreme in the province after 1931, he used provincial revenues to expand the five divisions under his control into three f u l l armies plus several independent divisions, and he increased the number of ai r -craft in his a i r force to over sixty machines, making i t a force to be reckoned with in national terms. He also launched a three year plan 129. for the economic development of the province, concentrating on light industry and improvement of communications. In addition, Ch'en himself 8 became an exceedingly rich man during his years as a regional satrap. Basically, then, Ch'en Chi-t'ang's motivations for supporting the Extraordinary Conference were closely connected with his struggle for hegemony in Kwangtung. As a contemporary observer remarked, "the new opposition administration . . . is nothing more nor less than p o l i -t i c a l and propaganda trimming for General Ch'en Chi-t'ang's independence movement, the motive for which was the control of Kwangtung province and the revenues thereof. The trouble at Canton, which had been developing for a considerable period, was primarily concerned with rival r i e s between g the two Ch'ens for the control of Kwangtung revenues." In other words, Ch'en used the nascent opposition movement to oust, or at least to speed the ouster of, his main rival for power and to gain p o l i t i c a l , military, and financial control of the province. After the i n i t i a l establishment of the southern government, he devoted himself to consolidating his power in Kwangtung for the remainder of what might be termed the Extraordinary Conference's " v i s i t " to Canton. The national aims of the opposition movement were only of secondary importance to him, except when they had a bearing on the local situation. Ch'en's order of priorities re-peatedly brought him into conflict with the visiting politicians, as we saw in the last chapter. The questions of how to respond to Nanking's August peace feelers and whether or not to i n i t i a t e a serious military campaign against the central government were two outstanding examples. In these cases, as in others, Ch'en's response was dictated by his desire to guarantee his control over an autonomous Kwangtung. 130 To Ch'en Chi-t'ang, as to Ch'en Chiung-ming before him, the province was paramount, and national affairs were of concern primarily insofar as they affected Kwangtung. It is worth noting in this regard that Chiang K'ai-shek denounced him as a second Ch'en Chiung-ming.10 Ch'en Chi-t'ang chose to devote himself exclusively to consolidating his hold on Kwangtung and was wary of i n i t i a t i n g any risky schemes out-side the province that might jeopardize his regional base. His ambitions never seem to have extended beyond the boundaries of his native province. He started his career there as a platoon leader and he reached the pin-nacle of his career there as the undisputed master of the province. Ch'en was elected to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in 1930, and he was appointed to a number of other positions at the national level in the years that followed. But he never went to Nanking to take office, and he evinced no interest in trying to translate these positions into a foothold from which he might expand his power to national dimensions. Outside of sinecures he accepted after he fled to Taiwan in 1950, Ch'en only occupied one position at the national level, and that was after his power in Kwangtung had been broken and the country was at war with Japan. At that point he was a p o l i t i c a l refugee with nothing to lose, and he served in the newly created post of Minister of Agriculture and Forestry from 1940 to 1942. Ch'en's attitude was somewhat unusual, for the acquisition of local or regional power generally led to aspirations of national scope. Expanding ambitions had been characteristic of almost a l l local mi l i t a r i s t s since the founding of the Republic, yet Ch'en's ambitions never seem to have gone beyond Kwangtung. Perhaps he was f u l l y satisfied 131 with the position he had forged for himself locally and simply did not aspire to anything more. Perhaps he suffered, as some of his contem-poraries claimed, from a lack of confidence in his a b i l i t i e s as a po l i -tician. Perhaps he feared the results of being cut off from his base of power i f he hastened precipitately to Nanking to seek greater glory. If he was not present in Kwangtung to safeguard his interests, someone else would undoubtedly become strong enough to replace him there. At the same time, Ch'en did not have the experience, the contacts, or the factional following necessary to build a position of strength in Nanking. He may, in other words, have r e a l i s t i c a l l y f e l t that he had l i t t l e to gain and everything to lose i f he made a premature foray to the capital in an effort to expand his influence. It is quite possible that in time, as his power and confidence increased, his ambitions would have escalated to the national le v e l , but that eventuality was precluded by his f a l l from power in Kwangtung in 1936. Regional power considerations also governed the decision of the Kwangsi Clique to join the Extraordinary Conference. The Kwangsi leaders had originally faced the question of which master to serve -- the national or the regional -- at the time of the Northern Expedition in 1926. The Clique's t r i p a r t i t e leadership had enabled i t to hedge i t s bets and keep a foot in both camps.^ Huang Shao-hsiung stayed in Kwangsi to maintain the provincial base of power, and Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen went north to assist in the national revolution. But their commitment to the nation was highly conditional, smacking more of personal empire-building than selfless devotion to a united China. They were trying to have the best of both worlds, and were unwilling to give up their 132 vested interests and subordinate themselves to a central government they did not control. The Kwangsi leaders could not resolve the conflict between their divided loyalties and, unable to make a firm choice between regional and national allegiance, they found i t impossible to serve both masters at once. In the end they overextended themselves and the decision was made for them. By 1929, their ambivalence and obstructionism had become intolerable to Chiang K'ai-shek's national government and his troops forced them to withdraw to the confines of their native province. They could consider themselves fortunate that Nanking was too weak to pry them loose from their provincial l a i r . The Kwangsi Clique made one other shortlived attempt to enter the national stage before i t became convinced of the f u t i l i t y of such ventures. In 1930 i t launched a military campaign, described briefly in Chapter I, in support of the Enlarged Conference. When this effort not only ended in defeat but resulted in the occupation of several ci t i e s in the eastern part of the province by Cantonese troops, the Kwangsi leaders were obliged to narrow their vistas and concentrate on consoli-dating their local control. The situation in Kwangsi at the end of 1930 was c r i t i c a l , for the province had been drained by the military campaigns of the preceding years. Without peace and reconstruction, i t faced complete economic col-lapse, as we have already indicated in Chapter I I . Thus, when secret agitation for an opposition movement began in 1931, Kwangsi joined the new coalition largely out of self-interest. Membership in the Extraordinary Conference offered a number of tangible benefits for Kwangsi. Hostilities with Kwangtung ceased and Cantonese troops withdrew from Wuchow and the other towns they occupied 133 i n the eas te rn p a r t o f the p r o v i n c e ; Kwangsi 's enforced i s o l a t i o n ended and t rade w i t h the o u t s i d e wor ld resumed; and a subsidy from Kwangtung helped the p rov ince to get back on i t s f e e t . In r e t u r n , the Kwangsi leaders d i d l i t t l e but mouth a n t i - C h i a n g K 'a i -shek slogans (which must have been q u i t e congenia l i n view o f t h e i r general a n t i p a t h y to h i m ) , and send t h e i r t roops a few uncontested mi les i n t o Hunan. The a l l i a n c e between Kwangsi and Kwangtung d u r i n g and a f t e r the E x t r a o r d i n a r y Conference was almost pu re l y nomina l . I t made few demands on e i t h e r p rov ince and p r o -mised t o end as soon as i t ceased t o serve the i n t e r e s t s o f one or the o t h e r p a r t y . But i t proved t o be q u i t e a durab le arrangement, s e r v i n g as a use fu l i ns t rument i n the s t r u g g l e o f each o f the two prov inces t o ma in ta in i t s autonomy. The Kwangsi leaders were thus f r e e t o devote themselves t o s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e i r p r o v i n c e , w h i c h , over the next few y e a r s , they sought w i t h some success t o t u r n i n t o a model f o r the r e s t 1 o o f China. During i t s remain ing years o f independence f rom c e n t r a l government c o n t r o l , Kwangsi earned "a r e p u t a t i o n f o r ordered progress 13 and good government u n r i v a l l e d i n Kuomintang C h i n a . " The v i s i t i n g p o l i t i c i a n s , as we have c a l l e d them, who f l o c k e d south t o j o i n the o p p o s i t i o n movement i n 1931 were b i r d s o f a d i f f e r e n t f e a t h e r f rom the l o c a l strongmen i n Kwangtung and Kwangsi. They thought p r i m a r i l y i n terms o f the n a t i o n r a t h e r than o f the p rov ince or the r e g i o n . When they had been i n Canton w i t h Sun Yat-sen a decade e a r l i e r , they had repea ted ly shown t h a t they would s a c r i f i c e p r o v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s to the cause o f the n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n . Time had done no th ing to change t h e i r bas ic o u t l o o k . The ambi t ions and v i s i o n s o f the v i s i t i n g p o l i -t i c i a n s were n a t i o n a l i n scope, and t h e i r careers were centered on the 134 national level of p o l i t i c s . Yet despite this national orientation, many of them had not entirely divested themselves of regional a f f i n i t i e s . Many of the tensions between these two elements in their thinking were brought into r e l i e f during the Extraordinary Conference. The fact that almost a l l of the vis i t i n g politicians were natives of Kwangtung was certainly not purely coincidental. The presence of some of them in Canton was at least partly a function of the growing . regional rivalry that s p l i t the highest levels of the Kuomintang. Broadly speaking, this competition for power pitted two groups against each other: one from Southwest China and the other from Southeast China. More specifically, the Cantonese were locked in struggle with a group from Chekiang and Kiangsu provinces -- in other words Shanghai and i t s environs -- that was led by Chiang K'ai-shek. The struggle, moreover, had been developing for years. Kwangtung was hallowed as the birthplace of the revolution. Sun Yat-sen, the apotheosized founder of the Kuomin-tang and "father of the nation" (kuo-fu), was a Cantonese. Most of his early revolutionary activities in China were centered on Kwangtung, and the overseas Chinese community from which he received so much support was predominantly Cantonese. Canton had later served as the headquarters for Sun's crusade, from the late teens until his death, to deliver China o from the warlords and to unify i t under the leadership of the Kuomintang. Not surprisingly, many of the earliest and most renowned revolutionaries were natives of Kwangtung, and they maintained a virtual monopoly of power within the Party for years. Gradually, however, as revolutionary ideas spread and the Kuomin-tang expanded, leaders from other areas began to gain influence. The 135 group from Chekiang and Kiangsu headed by Chiang K'ai-shek established i t s e l f as a powerful force within the Party. Before long, a regional polarity began to develop as the Cantonese struggled to maintain their influence against the inroads of the Chekiangese. With Chiang's meteoric rise following the death of Sun Yat-sen, the relatively junior Chekiang group gained ascendancy. After the Northern Expedition, Chiang availed himself of his preeminent position to staff as many of the highest Party and government posts as possible with men loyal to himself. He was extremely successful in consolidating his dominance at Nanking. The degree to which he had gained control of both the Party and the government by February, 1931 is indicated in appendices II and V, which show that a large proportion of his followers who were in office were natives of the Chekiang-Kiangsu region. The appendices clearly demonstrate the polarization that existed within the Kuomintang. For example, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Kwangtung accounted for 27 of the 43 top government and military posts listed in Appendix II; 17 of 27 seats on the Po l i t i c a l Council (Appendix V); and 22 of 36 seats on the Central Executive Committee (Appendix V). The Cantonese ran a close second to their rivals from the Southeast in terms of the number of positions occupied. In terms of actual power, however, they lagged far behind, for the offices they held were not of c r i t i c a l importance. Chiang controlled the key posts of Chairman of the National Government; Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces; head of the Executive Yuan; and at least six of the ten ministries, including the important ministries of Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, and Finance. He also held a comfortable majority in the highest Party 136. organs, the Central P o l i t i c a l Council and the Central Executive Com-mittee. In the process of inserting his own men into positions of authority, Chiang displaced many Cantonese, who keenly resented their eclipse from power. It is d i f f i c u l t to gauge the degree to which their resentment was stimulated by feelings of provincial pride and riva l r y , 15 but there can be no doubt that such sentiments played a part for some. In the early stages of the Extraordinary Conference, one of the specific charges leveled against Chiang K'ai-shek was "that the National Government established by General Chiang at Nanking was originally composed almost exclusively of Cantonese, but in recent months prominent Cantonese have 1 6 been dropped and Northerners substituted." It was reported that "those turned out of office return to Canton to t e l l of how shabbily they were treated." 1^ Some Cantonese were said to have viewed the arrest of Hu 18 Han-min, who was a native son, as "an insult to every man in Kwangtung." They seem to have interpreted the detention of Hu as part of a conspiracy by Chiang K'ai-shek to eliminate the influence of Kwangtungese in the government. Another, and particularly unequivocal, example of the i n -trusion of feelings of provincial loyalty was provided by Wu Ch'ao-shu when he resigned as Minister to the United States in June, 1931. The occasion for his resignation was an order he received .from Nanking to purchase a consignment of arms from the American government. He believed, rightly or wrongly, that these weapons would be used to suppress the Extraordinary Conference by force, and he turned in his morning coat with the statement, "I am a Cantonese." 137 Despite such e x p l i c i t l y parochial statements, provincial and regional sentiments should not be overemphasized as a motivation con-ditioning the actions of the visiting politicians who participated in the Extraordinary Conference. Different motivations very often overlapped, making i t d i f f i c u l t to t e l l where one stopped and another started. Even in a case as seemingly clear-cut as that of Wu Ch'ao-shu, provincial loyalty was not the sole, or perhaps even the main, consideration. As one newspaper remarked edit o r i a l l y , his resignation "cannot be attributed 19 solely to provincial amour-propre." He had originally blurted out his feelings in regional terms, but i t was clear from his subsequent expo-sitions of his views, which, i t should be noted, he could hardly make public while he remained an o f f i c i a l of the Chinese government, that he had many more substantial reasons for resigning. He had been dis-satisfied with the Chiang K'ai-shek regime for some time, particularly with i t s inept economic policy and i t s continued domination by military 20 men. The regionalism manifested by some of the visiting politicians was a hybrid variety that did not aim at gaining regional autonomy, but at gaining a greater share of power at the national level for a particular regional group. As such, i t differed greatly from the local particularism of men like Ch'en Chi-t'ang who never really transcended their provincial boundaries. The eyes of the vi s i t i n g politicians never l e f t the national level, even when they found themselves at the provin-cial level for a time. Sun Fo, Ch'en Yu-jen, Tsou Lu, Wang Ching-wei and company bi l l e d the Extraordinary Conference as a session of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees, the national directing 138 organs of the Kuomintang, and they established a government that pur-ported to be the sole legitimate national government of the Republic of China. Regional ties were always there to provide a reliable haven to which one could retreat i f the d i f f i c u l t i e s and frustrations at the national level became too overwhelming, but the vi s i t i n g politicians saw their stay in Canton as nothing more than a temporary measure, a mere way-station on the road to Nanking. When their demands were met satisfactorily, they l e f t their temporary headquarters in Canton to resume their careers at the nation's capital. We must also remember that many of the vi s i t i n g politicians had participated in other opposition movements that were neither based in their native province nor composed almost exclusively of men from the same province. The Peiping Enlarged Conference described in Chapter I is the best example. Its composition was quite heterogeneous, including Cantonese l i k e Tsou Lu and Wang Ching-wei in i t s highest echelons along with men from provinces as far apart as Szechwan (e.g. Hsieh Ch'ih) and Shansi (e.g. Yen Hsi-shan). This fact indicates that such opposition movements were manifestations of much more than just regionalism. We shall deal with their general significance in republican politics in the conclusion. The failure of the Enlarged Conference was highly instructive for the dissidents. It demonstrated the dangers inherent in establishing a rival government in North China, relatively close to Chiang K'ai-shek's bases of power. Canton, on the other hand, had many objective advantages to recommend i t . It was far from Chiang's bases of power and was se-parated from the central government by natural barriers and by a buffer-139. zone created by the Communists in Kiangsi; i t was on the coast and offered easy communications with the outside world; i t was near Hong Kong, which was a convenient haven for escape, >a potential source of financial support, and an entrepot where contact could readily be made with foreign commer-cial and diplomatic representatives; i t was the capital of a province with considerable economic resources, i f they could be tapped; i t bore the legitimizing aura of the birthplace of the revolution; and i t offered the best possibility of winning p o l i t i c a l and financial support from overseas Chinese, most of whom were from Kwangtung. In addition, Canton undoubtedly held a regional appeal for dissidents who were natives of the area. If, as we have argued, the vi s i t i n g politicians were, in spite of certain regional a f f i n i t i e s , basically committed to the nation and -it s strength and unity, why were they so willing to establish a rival government in the south that contributed to the fragmentation of the country? In generalized terms, opposition movements of this type were manifestations of the lack of stable po l i t i c a l institutions in China and of the failure of the Kuomintang to provide the country with a compelling po l i t i c a l ideology. In more specific and immediate terms, the main reason was that Chiang K'ai-shek controlled the Party and state apparatus in Nanking, and i t had become painfully apparent that he would brook no interference with policies he considered important. Genteel remonstration or disputation did l i t t l e or nothing to influence or alter his policies. It might gain a concession or two in inconsequential matters, but that was a l l . Serious opposition only resulted in expulsion from the Party, arrest, or worse, i f one was foolish enough to carry on one's activities 140 21 within Chiang's reach. Prisons housed many men who had offered him serious opposition, and cemetaries also housed their quota. Many of the politicians who joined the Extraordinary Conference had already been expelled from the Kuomintang, and Nanking had warrants out for their arrest. Under these conditions, major opposition movements like the Enlarged and Extraordinary Conferences were virtually the only effective method of impressing one's views on the government. The visiting politicians who assembled in Canton believed that they had a great deal to offer the country, that they could help to strengthen i t and improve i t s government. Most of them had a con-siderable amount of experience in the Party and the government, yet they found themselves increasingly excluded from power and replaced by less experienced men. One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of 22 Chiang K'ai-shek was, in fact, his disregard of Party veterans. There was, no doubt, an element of regional feeling, born of Kwangtung's mys-tique as the birthplace of the revolution, involved in this charge. One might read "Party veteran" as being synonymous with "Cantonese." Chiang certainly was resented because, in his rapid rise to power, he had bypassed many comrades of much longer standing in the revolutionary * 23 movement. But much more was involved. No one was satisfied with the state of the government of 1931, not even Chiang K'ai-shek and the Chekiangese who dominated i t . Precisely because he had dominated the Nanking government since i t s inception, Chiang had to take the respon-s i b i l i t y for i t s lack of success. It is highly questionable whether the dissidents in Canton could have done much better, but they had not 141 been given a chance. They could stand back and blame the wretched state of national affairs directly on the pernicious influence of Chiang K'ai-shek and his coterie. They believed that i f he had listened to them and carried out the programs they advocated, including c i v i l supremacy over the military, finances open to public scrutiny, the inauguration of local self-government, and everything else put forward by the Extra-ordinary Conference, the country would have been far better off. It was a situation typical of politics at a l l stages of maturity: those out of office f e l t they could do a better job than those in office. Because the "outs" in Canton had not had to face the actual d i f f i c u l t i e s of administering the country, their conviction that they could do better was a l l the stronger. In sum, a complex mixture of regional and national influences may be discerned in the opposition movement of 1931. A basic dichotomy existed between the outlook of the local strongmen in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, who thought primarily in regional terms, and the outlook of the visiting politicians, who, in spite of certain parochial sentiments, thought primarily in national terms. The marriage of convenience con-cluded by these two basically incompatible groups while they were in Canton together makes i t impossible to classify the Extraordinary Con-ference as a pure manifestation of regionalism, though regionalism of different types unquestionably played a significant part. Hatred The roles played by hatred and personal antagonism in the opposition movement deserve some comment because so many writers and 142 analysts have emphasized them as principal ingredients. The Western press in China constantly reiterated that the dispute between Nanking and Canton was not caused so much by differences of opinion as by per-24 sonal antipathy. Hatred of Chiang K'ai-shek was seen as a major element holding the Extraordinary Conference together, and personal dislikes were detected in many of the individual disputes that took place. In a few cases, hatred does seem to have played a significant role as a motivation. Hsu Ch'ung-chih, for example, had never forgiven Chiang K'ai-shek for shunting him aside in the re-allocation of power following the assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai in the f a l l of 1925. At that time, as we have already mentioned, Chiang suddenly disarmed Hsii's troops and incorporated them into his own unit. Hsu was forced into involuntary retirement in Shanghai. He played a very minor role in politics thereafter, and he blamed Chiang for his f a l l from promi-nence. It is l i k e l y that the l i v e l y distaste Hsu had acquired for Chiang as a result of this incident was a major factor in his eagerness to join both the Enlarged and Extraordinary Conferences. He probably saw them as opportunities both to venge himself on Chiang and to reassert himself in national p o l i t i c s . Personal antipathy for Chiang K'ai-shek may have been par-t i a l l y responsible for the support Teng Tse-ju and Hsiao Fo-ch'eng gave to the opposition movement, though i t is impossible to say with cer-tainty. The tenor of Hsiao's rhetoric against Chiang was much more 25 v i t r i o l i c than that of his colleagues. 1931 also marked a permanent break with Chiang K'ai-shek and the Nanking government for both men. Neither of them ever set foot in the capital again, and this may have 143 been because they detested Chiang. But other explanations can be put forward to account for their refusal to have anything further to do with the national government. Both men, for example, were in their s i x t i e s , and their advanced age may be sufficient to explain their p o l i t i c a l inactivity after 1931. Although they were nominal members of the South-west Executive Section of the CEC and the Southwest Pol i t i c a l Council of the National Government, two of the organs set up to maintain the autonomy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, they essentially lived in retirement until their deaths a few years later. Alternatively, Teng and Hsiao may have stayed in the south out of loyalty to Hu Han-min or out of abstract disapproval of the Nanking government rather than personal dislike of Chiang. Other cases in which there is evidence, however sparse, that hatred played a major role as a motivation are d i f f i c u l t to unearth. One possible example is that of Ch'en Ming-shu, whose decision to side with Nanking was closely related to his competition with Ch'en Chi-t'ang for power in Kwangtung. Friction existed between the two men ever since Ch'en Chi-t'ang became the commander of the 8th Route Army in 1929, but i t is d i f f i c u l t to gauge i t s extent. It would probably be an exaggeration to call i t hatred. A case in which there can be l i t t l e doubt that hatred was a strong motivation is that of Hu Han-min, but Hu cannot properly be called a member of the Extraordinary Conference since he was under detention during almost i t s entire course. There had long been f r i c t i o n and distrust between Hu and Chiang K'ai-shek. Hu developed a virulent antipathy for Chiang as a result of his arbitrary arrest, and he spent the rest of his l i f e plotting and propagandizing against Chiang. 144. For the most part, the participants in the opposition move-ment, contary to newspaper reports, do not seem to have been driven by hatred. The personal dislikes that did exist were not pervasive or strong enough to be described as a major causative factor. It is easy to see how the steady stream of denunciations of Chiang K'ai-shek that emanated from Canton might be taken to represent feelings of personal animosity. In actuality, they were just characteristic of p o l i t i c a l propaganda of the time, in which personal attacks and personal invective abounded. They were an added indication of the personal nature of Repub-lican p o l i t i c s . Chiang and his closest associates were being used as a focus of attack because of their dominant position in the government. Chiang had increasingly resorted to the arbitrary exercise of power --packing Party organs, arresting his opponents, suppressing criticism of the government, and the like -- yet he had l i t t l e to show for i t in terms of progress for the country. China was s t i l l not genuinely united, reconstruction and local self-government had s t i l l not begun, and most of the unequal treaties were s t i l l in effect. Chiang's dictatorial methods would probably have been treated more indulgently i f they had achieved some dramatic results. Since they had not, he was doubly damned in the eyes of many of his c r i t i c s , who both objected to the means he used and held him responsible for a l l the i l l s that beset the country. Their denunciations reflected personal dissatisfaction with his rule rather than personal antipathy. Had genuine hatred of Chiang been an important motivation for the politicians who assembled in Canton, they surely would not have found i t possible to work with him in the government thereafter. As we 145 have seen in Chapter I I , they never intended to exclude Chiang from the government entirely. Sun Fo, Lin Sen, T'an Chen, and others worked closely with him in the years following 1931. Tsou Lu, although he stayed on in Canton as chancellor of Chung-shan University and was a member of the Southwest pol i t i c a l organs, bore Chiang no personal i l l w i l l . He even f e l t some sympathy for him, i f we are to believe his 27 memoirs. Even Wang Ching-wei, who probably had more reason to detest Chiang than anyone else, collaborated f a i r l y harmoniously with him for well over three years. There is no evidence to suggest that hatred of Chiang played an important part in the attitude of regionalists l i k e Ch'en Chi-t'ang. Their opposition was conditioned largely by their desire to maintain the autonomy of the Southwest, and they would have countered anyone who dominated the central government with equal vigor. In short, personal enmity seems to have played only a marginal role in the 1931 opposition movement, and i t s importance was overemphasized in the press. Self-interest Versus Selflessness Whom are we to believe in the propaganda war that raged be-tween Nanking and Canton? Charges and countercharges of the most un-complimentary sort flew back and forth, with propagandists on both sides accusing their opponents of such vices as corruption, excessive ambition, opportunism, and selfishness. Who were the real v i l l a i n s of the piece, i f there were any? Unless we are prepared to ascribe saintly qualities to the leaders on either side of the po l i t i c a l fence in 1931 (as their 146 followers did), there can be no doubt that self-interest played a part in determining their actions. But i t is not very informative to say that self-interest played a part since i t generally is an ingredient in even the noblest endeavors. The essential question is one of degree. Did self-interest predominate? Or was i t only a secondary concern? Are the dissidents to be viewed cynically, as opportunists struggling largely to f u l f i l l their ambitions and to gain the emoluments of office? They admittedly sought power, and i t might be argued that their various plans for reform and reconstruction were but an elaborate fa$ade designed to conceal their baser motives. What of Chiang K'ai-shek, the man they regarded as Public Enemy Number One? Was he nothing but a repressive dictator, so consumed by personal ambition and a thir s t for power that he could think of nothing else? We shall start by considering some of the key elements in Chiang K'ai-shek's po l i t i c a l outlook so that we can better understand 28 his motivations in 1931. Nationalistic and authoritarian strains became apparent in his thinking very early in his career. They were already clearly evident in his earliest surviving essays, which appeared in Military Voice Magazine, a journal he published while in Japan in 1912. The recurrent themes in these articles were "the ideal of bene-volent dictatorship, the stress on national unity and p o l i t i c a l cen-tralization, the primacy of the military, and the precedence of nationalism . . . over democracy . . . and of po l i t i c a l revolution over social revo-29 lution." Chiang espoused these concepts with remarkable consistency throughout his later career. 147. He also demonstrated a sense of his own mission in l i f e at a very early date. While studying in Japan not long after the 1911 revolution, Chiang composed a poem for his cousin which ended with the following two lines: To bring a new dawn to our beloved celestial land is to f u l f i l l my duty; The aim of my eastward voyage is far from seeking military honors.30 His conviction that he was China's man of destiny became more pronounced as time went on. In 1921, for example, an entry in his diary proclaimed: "With an expansive and illumined mind, a firm and courageous s p i r i t , I w i l l cultivate a glorious stature so as to become illustrious through-31 out the world. It is evident what w i l l ensue therefrom." In a 1923 entry, Chiang wrote, "It is the w i l l of heaven that I undertake the 32 mission of the Party." He gave a perfectly explicit statement of his sense of destiny when he described his experiences during his kidnapping at Sian to the American reporter Hallett Abend. Chiang said in part: " . . . and then I prayed that i f God had really chosen me to lead China to her salvation he would now send me a sign -- would show me the way 33 to safety." One scarcely need add that God sent him the requisite sign in the form of two white hares that led him to a place of refuge. Although this incident took place in 1936, his Messian.ic convictions were already well-developed years earlier. As Pichon P. Y. Loh, one of Chiang's biographers, remarks, "In any event, before he was forty 34 there was 'no doubt' in his mind that he was China's man of destiny." With his predisposition toward benevolent dictatorship and his sense of his own mission, Chiang K'ai-shek did not feel that liberal 148' democracy, c i v i l control over the military, and effective constitutional restraints on the government held the solutions to China's immediate problems. They might be desirable as goals of the distant future, but Chiang believed that only more authoritarian methods could hope to cope with the situation for the present, though in the interests of his p o l i -t i c a l image he paid l i p service to more liberal concepts. He was com-pletely devoted to the unification and strengthening of the country, but he was convinced that they could be achieved only through military means. He believed, moreover, that he was to be the agent of China's regeneration. It is not surprising that Chiang was strongly attracted to fascist p o l i t i c a l ideas. There is considerable dispute among experts as to the precise definition of fascism. As S.J. Woolf has stated so p i t h i l y , "The word, unfortunately, has certain commode-like tendencies -- the more you stuff 35 into i t , the more i t takes." To purists, the term should only be used to described a particular p o l i t i c a l phenomenon, confined to a par-ticular area (Europe), during a particular period of time (between World Wars I and II). Its doctrines, as the products of aggressive nationalism, may have possessed many disorderly qualities, but, This is not to say that fascism has no distinctive positive content, that i t is merely a congeries of disparate national movements, a r t i f i c i a l l y drawn or forced together by German power in the 1930s. There were some common features even in the formative years, and afterwards, in the years of power, the various national movements, though independent in origin, borrowed ideas from each other and so helped to build up, retrospectively, a common ideology.36 Despite Mussolini's well-known statement that fascism was not for export, a fascist international was eventually established, and fascist-inspired 149 movements appeared in many areas of the world. A core of ideas can be identified that was basic to fascism and prompted widespread emulation. Above a l l , i t was highly nationalistic. More specifically, i t called for the total exaltation of the state and the complete subordination of the individual to i t . Sacrifice and d i s c i -pline were considered imperative, and to increase efficiency for the ultimate benefit of both the state and i t s individual components, society was to be totally militarized. Social Darwinism was an integral part of fascism that reached new extremes with master-race theories whose logical outcome was imperialist conquest of lesser races by the strong. Elitism was emphasized and found i t s highest expression in the form of a Leader who was essentially above the law and to whom everyone owed absolute obedience. The Leader was an embodiment of the l o f t i e s t ideals of the state. In assessing the influence of fascism on Chiang K'ai-shek, we must remember that the term "fascist" did not have the same pejorative connotation in China of the late 1920's and 1930's that i t has in the world today. Many Chinese did not look upon fascism as an evil aber-ration. On the contrary, some hailed i t as a progressive and efficient ideology that was singularly appropriate for China at that time. It appealed to many Chinese who, in their desperate search for an effective p o l i t i c a l formula, saw i t as a possible solution to the prevailing chaos. Fascism had, after a l l , achieved dramatic results after Mussolini became Premier in 1922 in ending social unrest and chronic p o l i t i c a l insta-b i l i t y in Italy, and i t seemed to be on the upswing as the "wave of the future" internationally. 150 • In the China of 1931, the extravagant hopes that had accom-panied the completion of the Northern Expedition in 1928 had been cruelly shattered. Many members of the Chinese e l i t e were becoming increasingly disenchanted with democratic institutions after witnessing the travesty of their application in the Republic ever since the 1911 revolution. As early as A p r i l , 1929, the North China Herald was prompted to remark: "If a Mussolini were to rise in China and take f u l l control of a f f a i r s , guaranteeing peace and security to l i f e and property, he would be hailed with rapture from one end of China to the other. She would not get democracy, but she would get tranquility, and that is what is needed 37 in China more than the vapourings of p o l i t i c a l propagandists." There was, moreover, growing doubt as to whether America and Britain were 38 models of democracy worthy of emulation. Their form of democracy was seen as a product of capitalism which was fraught with economic inequality 39 that enabled a powerful minority to control the government. If such a system were transplanted to China wholesale, i t s defects would accom-pany i t . One writer stated categorically that "we should not adopt the 40 left-over spit of capitalism and do i t reverence as an immutable law." When the Depression struck, doubts were reinforced, for i t seemed that democracy was on the decline, i f not on the way out. Roosevelt's New Deal appeared to many as a move away from democratic government in favor of authoritarianism. The disillusionment and despair generated by the failures of the Kuomintang government eventually led a number of prominent Chinese intellectuals like V.K. Ting (Ting Wen-chiang), T.F. Tsiang (Chiang T'ing-fu), and Ch'ien Tuan-sheng to espouse dictatorship as the only 151 41 answer to the country's problems. They did not deny the ultimate value of democracy, but they believed i t was inappropriate for China at that time. This did not mean that they supported Chiang K'ai-shek and the Kuomintang rule he dominated. On the contrary, they were se-verely c r i t i c a l of what they looked upon as Kuomintang misrule since 1928, and Chiang K'ai-shek certainly did not conform to their idea of a benevolent despot. However, i t indicates that Chiang's authoritarian bent was neither unique nor confined to military officers. It is d i f f i c u l t to say when Chiang's f l i r t a t i o n with fascism actually began. Perhaps i t is not important, for the basic convictions were there even i f they were not ju s t i f i e d in overtly fascist terms. Chiang was certainly, at the very least, well aware of fascism when he detained Hu Han-min in February, 1931. Let us consider some of the main 42 themes of the speeches he delivered shortly after the arrest. An exaltation of the nation comes out clearly in almost a l l of them; they called for the subordination of individual interests to national interests and for rigorous discipline; and they made i t clear that everyone had to be prepared to sacrifice anything from their personal freedom to their lives i f the nation was even to survive, much less prosper. In these speeches and others, Chiang stated his own readiness to die for his country. Was he simply giving hypocritical justifications of an ille g a l act that was actually designed to serve his own interests at the expense of those of the nation? It is a l l too easy to dismiss his constantly reiterated exhortations as exaggerated and hypocritical: obviously, we charge, Chiang was not really prepared to sacrifice his own l i f e , for his only interest was power; obviously he was exhorting 152. others to discipline and sacrifice only so that he could control them more effectively; obviously he considered himself above sacrifice and discipline. Paradoxically, there is some truth in a l l of these charges, but i t does not follow that he was a hypocrite. Although Chiang's public statements were not overtly f a s c i s t i c , the content of many of them, even at this early date, lends i t s e l f to a fascist interpretation. He was indeed exhorting others so that he could control them better, for he was the Leader, and to progress, the nation had to be disciplined and united behind him. In this context he regarded himself as above the law, though he had, as yet, only im-perfectly realized this vision. Chiang was undoubtedly perfectly sincere in stating that he would willingly sacrifice his own l i f e for the country. However, he would do so only i f i t served a purpose more worthwhile than his continued existence, and such a contingency was, of course, unlikely. Within this authoritarian and subcutaneously fascist frame-work, Chiang's reluctance to resign in 1931, as his opponents in Canton insisted he do, was eminently understandable. He f e l t that the nation would founder i f he was not at the helm to guide i t . He publicly denied that he aspired to dictatorial powers because the public was not yet ready to accept him as Leader. His denials were merely necessary con-cessions to public opinion. Nevertheless, Chiang's stand was decidedly equivocal. For example, by March, 1931. the rumors that he was planning to use the National People's Convention to make himself president of the National Government instead of merely chairman were so widespread that he found 43 i t necessary to make a statement on the subject. Chiang dismissed 153 the rumors as "too insignificant" and affirmed that "at present, China does not need a president." However, he added that everything is decided by the revolutionary environment and by revolutionary needs. If they were to call for a president, then no man could be opposed, and i f they did not, then no man could force the matter. Chiang stated that i f the national government lived up to it s responsibilities, there would be no need for a president. But i f the interests of the national revolution demanded i t , he would accept the post despite the abuse heaped upon i t and the odium attached to i t . In other words, i t remained an open ques-tion. Chiang intimated that he did not want the position but might be forced to accept i t because of his selfless devotion to the revolution. He knew that the position of president was not that of dictator or Leader, but he probably saw i t as a step in that direction. It was, in any event, to take several years before he had his de facto position as dictator legitimized. Only in 1938, after the all-out Japanese attack, did he succed in having himself named to the specially created post of Tsung-ts'ai (Director-General or Leader). When Chiang was eventually forced to resign in December, 1931, he must have been disappointed at what he could only look upon as an effort to interfere with the fulfillment of his, and thus the nation's, destiny. He had resisted strongly, although he must have been well aware 44 that he would soon be called upon to return. As we have seen in Chap-ter I I , he paralyzed the short-lived Sun Fo government by denying i t pol i t i c a l and financial support. When pleas for his return began to flow in as expected, Chiang bided his time for several weeks and did not o f f i c i a l l y end his retirement until March, 1932. This deliberate 154-delay on his part was calculated to impress others, once and for a l l , with his indispensability. t During his retirement, Chiang did some serious thinking on the p o l i t i c a l strategy he would adopt in the future to revitalize the government and the Party. He was already in possession of an essay by Liu..Chien-ch'unJ A Few Ideas for Reform of the Kuomintang, which suggested maintaining the outer husk of the Party while creating within i t an e l i t e "cotton cloth corps" {pu-i t'uan) which would "give sub-45 stance to the Party and create the Party's soul." Liu's essay had 46 been directly inspired by the rise of Italian fascism. The result 47 was the establishment of the Blue Shirt Society shortly after Chiang returned to Nanking in January, 1932. The Blue Shirts were influenced by fascism from the start, and Chiang began sending some of them to 48 Italy and Germany to study fascist techniques early in 1932. His fascist orientation had become more expl i c i t . The Blue Shirts soon became a force to be reckoned with in China, both within the Kuomintang and outside of i t . Chiang's efforts to militarize the nation had been evident well before he founded the Blue Shirts in 1932. It was no accident that he had for some time been careful to maintain control over the Ministry of Education, the Examination Yuan, and the Kuomintang's Masses Training Committee. These organs may not have been important to short term po l i t i c a l power, but he correctly perceived that they were of crucial importance in the long run as the media for nation-wide indoctrination. At f i r s t , educational policy had been l e f t largely to the educators, but by the Third Kuomintang Congress in 1929, the Party leaders had 155 "shifted their policy from one of collaboration with educators to con-49 trol over them." In other words, "indoctrinators had taken control 50 of educational policy away from educators within the party." The statement on the aims of education in the Republic of China approved by the Third Congress had included the affirmation that "sound character 51 for proper service to society and the nation should be cultivated." The military training programs Chiang instituted in schools and colleges gained tremendous momentum after the Mukden Incident. He delivered patriotic addresses at universities in which he stressed that 52 armies were essential for nation building. Chiang had a healthy respect for student energy, particularly after patriotic mass demonstrations, inspired by dissatisfaction with government policy in the face of Japanese aggression, reached a destructive crescendo in December, 1931. Violent 53 student agitation was partially responsible for his resignation, and he undoubtedly saw the militarization of education as a means of directing student energies into what he considered more constructive channels. Chiang's efforts at militarization were by no means confined to the schools. He envisioned a total militarization of Chinese society, hoping "to recreate the entire Chinese nation in the image of Japanese 54 military academy." In one speech, for example, he said: In fascism, the organization, the s p i r i t , and the a c t i v i t i e s must a l l be militarized. . . . In the home, the factory, and the government office, regardless of place, time, or situation, everyone's activities must be the same as in the army. . . . In other words, there must be obedience, sacri-f i c e , strictness, cleanliness, accuracy, speed, diligence, secrecy . . . and everyone together must firmly and bravely sacrifice everything for the group and for the nation.55 156. Many of his other pronouncements were in a similar vein, replete with 56 explicit endorsements of fascist doctrine. Such speeches were not for public consumption; they were delivered to the faithful and became a matter of record mainly as a result of the surveillance reports of Japanese agents, whose government naturally had an interest in Chiang's f l i r t a t i o n with fascism at that time. Publicly, Chiang continued to deny that he aspired to the position of Leader. In assessing the performance of Chiang K'ai-shek during the Extraordinary Conference and the events leading up to i t , we must bear in mind his basic authoritarian outlook and his growing fascist orien-tation. They go a long way toward placing his actions in the proper perspective. Neither in 1931 nor at any other time could Chiang be characterized as a power hungry self-seeker who sought private benefit at the expense of public good. He was unquestionably a patriot. He equally unquestionably sought power, but his efforts toward this end possessed an inner logic of their own and were j u s t i f i e d within his frame of reference, for he believed that his interests were identical with those of the nation. His firm conviction that he was the Leader the country so urgently needed was often a l l the j u s t i f i c a t i o n he required for actions and policies that others might c r i t i c i z e as arbitrary, un-warranted, or even against the national interest. What of Chiang's adversaries in Canton? In what light should their motivations be viewed? The diversity of outlook that existed among the dissidents makes the task of analysing their motivations d i f f i -cult. Nevertheless, some basic patterns can be discerned. The dicho-tomy noted previously between those of a predominantly regional outlook 157 . and those of a predominantly national outlook serves as a convenient starting point for discussion. The main aims of the regionalists like Ch'en Chi-t'ang and the Kwangsi Clique were quite limited in scope. For the most part, they did not even coincide with the main aims of the Extraordinary Con-ference, which were declared to be the overthrow of Chiang K'ai-shek's dictatorship and the reform of the national government. To be sure, the regionalists mouthed the f u l l litany of slogans c r i t i c a l of Chiang and the central government. They undoubtedly did so sincerely, for the shortcomings of the national administration were obvious to every-one. But this was a matter of purely secondary concern to them, because they were preoccupied mainly with questions of local power. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Ch'en Chi-t'ang helped establish the Extra-ordinary Conference largely so that he could become the sole master of Kwangtung. The Kwangsi leaders joined i t to end the c r i t i c a l economic and military situation which threatened their power in their native province. Neither Ch'en nor the Kwangsi Clique had any intention, after Chiang's resignation, of proceeding to Nanking to struggle for the imp-57 lementation of the programs put forth by the Extraordinary Conference. They were much too busy consolidating their local control, and their concern with the central government was limited to preventing i t from extending i t s authority to the Southwest. Basically, they used the opposition movement as a tool to assist them in the pursuit of local power. Their original decision to support i t emerges as a predominantly opportunistic one dictated largely by self-interest. 158 The fact that the regionalists used the Extraordinary Con-ference cynically does not mean that they were totally devoid of a l -truism. As we have already noted, in the years following 1931 both Ch'en Chi-t'ang and the Kwangsi Clique initiated many beneficial pro-grams in the provinces they controlled. Their rule brought relative security and prosperity to the Southwest after a long period of insta-b i l i t y and dislocation. Furthermore, they considered themselves to be true nationalists and devoted Party members. They ju s t i f i e d their self-image with a highly selective adaptation of Sun Yat-sen's writings, claiming that they were the founding father's only real disciples and that-Nanking had corrupted his doctrines. However, much of their self-righteous rhetoric was rooted in sophistry and rationalization, and they ignored the obvious ways in which their activities undermined both the Party and the nation. The positive accomplishments of the region-al ists were, in the end, more than matched by their negative ones, chief among which was, perhaps, their obstruction of national unity. They proved unable to transcend their parochialism and unwilling to relinquish their local vested interests. The careers of the visiting politicians had, in contrast to their regionalist hosts in Canton, been dedicated to the national revo-lution. Many of them were revolutionaries of long standing who enjoyed great prestige within the Kuomintang. Yet i t can be argued that a l l this really meant was that their aspirations were greater than those of the regionalists, that their ambitions were national in scope rather than just provincial. Did they use the Extraordinary Conference as nothing more than a vehicle for personal gain? One way to judge is to 159 compare their performance in office with the demands they made while out of office. Al l considered, the visiting politicians do not fare too badly in such a comparison. As soon as they arrived in Nanking they set about making changes with alacrity. First on their l i s t was reform of the government, the object being to reverse the trend toward concentration of power that had taken place under Chiang K'ai-shek's guidance. In order to insure that no one could gain dictatorial control over the government, the dissidents instituted various checks and balances, spread authority among several top positions, tried to guarantee c i v i l supremacy over the military, and eliminated or altered the posts from which Chiang had derived his legal powers. The specific measures they adopted have been described in Chapter II and need not be repeated here. With the po l i t i c a l reforms completed, the dissidents apparently thought they had assured themselves a certain amount of time in office. They were sadly mistaken. The new Sun Fo government was paralyzed from the start and lasted less than a month. Concrete measures for the imp-lementation of many of the demands made by the Extraordinary Conference had been deferred by the dissidents in the expectation that they would have more time in power. They had provided for the convocation of two meetings, the National Emergency Conference (Kuo-nan hui-i) and the National Salvation Conference (Chiu-kuo hui-i), which were armed with broad powers to decide on new plans in the realms of foreign relations, national defense, internal p o l i t i c s , and economics.^ No date had been set for the latter conference, but the former was to be held on February 1st. Its purpose was to assemble experts and men of a b i l i t y from a l l 16.0 over the country on a non-partisan basis and to gather the opinions of the people so that plans could be worked out to deal with the national c r i s i s . Sun Fo demonstrated that he did not intend to turn the National Emergency Conference into a rubber-stamp body when he appointed the delegates in January. The 189 men he named were not just Party hacks. They represented a wide range of opinion, and many of them were long-59 time c r i t i c s of the Kuomintang. Sun's government f e l l on January 25th, and the National Emergency Conference was postponed by the Japanese attack on Shanghai. When i t f i n a l l y met in A p r i l , after three more postponements, Chiang K'ai-shek was formally back in the saddle. He packed the Con-ference with 200 more delegates and restricted i t s deliberations to foreign aggression, flood r e l i e f , and suppression of Communists. Wang Ching-wei, who was then head of the Executive Yuan, collaborated in this endeavor, a subject we shall turn to shortly. Many of the men Sun Fo had appointed boycotted the proceedings in protest. Even so, dissatisfaction with the status quo was so profound that the carefully screened delegates who remained made proposals that must have come as a surprise to Chiang. To appease public opinion, the government was forced to announce a plan for the institution of representative assem-blies {ts'an-i hui) at the municipal, hsien, and provincial levels, fin though l i t t l e was done to put i t into effect. While in office, Sun Fo's regime gave several other indications that i t was making genuine attempts at overall reform. The Financial Affairs Commission, which had been established in November as a result of the Shanghai peace conference, was given expanded powers. It was 161 turned into the main decision-making body in government financial policy, and the Minister of Finance was to be i t s agent, with only limited powers of his own.61 The purpose was to seek the involvement of and to draw on the expertise of non-Party members from industrial, banking, and academic circles who had previously had l i t t l e influence in government policy. The Financial Affairs Commission withered on the vine after Sun Fo's government l e f t office. In late January, a plan was unveiled to reduce the army from over 120 divisions to 80 divisions. They were to be divided into two classes, each with a specified monthly allowance. The allocation 63 of government funds for purposes of c i v i l war was made i l l e g a l . M i l i -tary funds were to be used only for national defence and bandit suppres-sion. Sun's government also issued mandates abolishing censorship of newspapers and telegrams and expressing determination to eliminate cor-ruption. Local o f f i c i a l s were ordered to report a l l corrupt practices that came to their attention. Mandates of this type, of course, were l i t t l e more than declarations of good intentions. They remained confined to the realm of paper and had no practical effect. Chinese politicians consistently showed a fondness for and faith in simple invocation. As H.F. MacNair has written, "Concerning no country is i t more necessary to keep in mind the difference between theory and practice than in that of China. This truism appears not always to be understood even by the Chinese themselves, who often look upon an order, a plan, or a legal or constitutional provision as synony-64 mous with the application of the principle contained therein." As we have seen in Chapter I I , the dissidents certainly were not exempt from 162 this belief in magic formulas. The changes they made in the structure of government were a case in point. They resorted to changes in the organizational laws as a means of curbing Chiang K'ai-shek's power largely because they had no other means at their disposal that offered any hope of success. But they also seemed to have placed more confidence in the rewording of legal clauses than was warranted, hoping that somehow, once the new laws were on the books, they would work by some inner magic of their own. This was one aspect of the pervasive phenomenon which 65 Lloyd Eastman has labelled "paper government." Legal niceties, as we have mentioned, had l i t t l e effect in the absence of stable p o l i t i c a l institutions. Chiang wielded as much influence out of office as he did in office, and the dissidents' attempts to alter the balance of power were doomed to failure from the start. In another respect beside a faith in paper formulas, the d i s s i -dents demonstrated that they were not immune to the practices they had deplored in Chiang K'ai-shek, namely, patronage. It was no accident that the Cantonese staged a dramatic resurgence in the number of posi-tions they occupied in the Party and government. The reversal in the trend toward Chekiangese dominance is apparent in appendices II through VI. Individual politicians used cabinet posts like feudal f i e f s . Sun Fo arranged for his close associate, Huang Han-liang, to become Minister of Finance. Wang Ching-wei placed his loyal followers, Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yU, in the cabinet as the ministers of industry and railways respectively. It was common practice to replace the staff in minis-tries and bureaus down to the lowest clerks with each change of govern-ment. / 163 There were two principal reasons why no one could afford to forswear patronage. F i r s t , a leader was obligated to provide for his followers. If he proved unable to do so, he might lose their support and would find i t d i f f i c u l t to gain new recruits. Second, i f a po l i -tician wanted to accomplish something, particularly i f he wanted to make controversial changes, he had to have some clout. Well-placed supporters were imperative i f one's views were to carry any weight. It should be added that politicians were not always cynical and they might select their followers for positions because they genuinely be-lieved them to be the best-qualified people available. Bargaining for the allocation of positions, or the spoils, was therefore an integral part of the formation of new coalitions. Despite i t s shortcomings, which were not surprising within the context of Chinese p o l i t i c a l culture at the time, the Sun Fo govern-ment leaves the observer with an impression of sincerity. Its activities showed that the demands made by the dissidents from Canton were more than empty campaign promises. They derived from a real concern for the welfare of the nation. One might speculate that i f Sun's regime had been given more time, i t would have achieved more tangible results. As i t was, however, Sun's government misjudged the realities of power and never got off the ground. Wang Ching-wei showed a better grasp of the realities that eluded many of his associates from the Extraordinary Conference. As we have seen in Chapter I I , he held himself aloof from the First Plenary Session of the Fourth CEC-CSC and from the Sun Fo government i t created. He worked hard to increase the number of his followers in high government 164 • and Party positions, but he pleaded illness and refused to participate personally. Although Wang was genuinely sick, he was also playing a waiting game. He was willing to enter the government only under the proper conditions, and to that end he had been in communication with Chiang K'ai-shek since late November, 1931. The two leaders apparently did not come to a final agreement until their meetings in Hangchow on January 16th and 17th, 1932. Events moved rapidly after that. The Sun Fo government resigned within a week, and by the end of the month Wang was installed as Sun's successor in the Executive Yuan. A period of collaboration with Chiang K'ai-shek that was to last four years had begun. The tactics Wang adopted make him particularly vulnerable to charges of personal ambition and lack of principle. However, another interpretation is possible. It can be argued that though he was not without ambition, he did not seek a high post in the government primarily for this reason, but rather so that he could acquire enough authority to implement some of his plans for the reform and reconstruction of China. Without a position of strength, he could never hope to put his programs into operation. Wang's actions were dictated by an acute per-ception of the realities of power that existed at the time. He saw that no coalition that did not work out a satisfactory.arrangement with Chiang could survive. Sun Fo and his colleagues had adopted the wrong approach. After Chiang's resignation, they had legislated drastic restraints on the legal powers that might accrue to him and had then expected him to stay on meekly in a reduced capacity. When he did not, they were paralyzed and their f a l l was only a matter of time. Wang was 165 conveniently available as a replacement. The government he formed was acceptable because i t s t i l l included many dissidents and did not rep-resent a return to the status quo ante. Wang was also aware that his presence in the government would give i t much greater strength. Thus, public opinion was appeased and the government was able to begin functioning again after what amounted to a hiatus of over a month. Given the prevailing climate of opinion, i t is possible that the sequence of events as they transpired was inevitable. The process was almost dia l e c t i c a l : Chiang resigned in response to tremendous public pressure (thesis); he was replaced by his c r i t i c s , who soon proved their incapacity and his indispensability (antithesis); and f i n a l l y , he returned as part of a new coalition (synthesis). The sequence may not have been entirely orchestrated by Wang and Chiang, but both men seem to have anti-cipated what would happen. Was Wang acting opportunistically? Perhaps. But his calculations of reality told him that he would have to compromise in order to achieve any of his goals. The alternatives were to stay inflexible and achieve nothing; or to compromise and achieve at least some of his aims. Wang had failed to come to an understanding with Chiang since 1927, with the net result that he had had no part in the government for almost five years. Common sense dictated that he modify his approach, and the events of 1931 provided an ideal opportunity which he did not throw away. Wang did not forsake his basic principles by collaborating with Chiang K'ai-shek. He continued to have faith in democracy as the form of government appropriate to China, and he s t i l l emphasized the 66 need for more attention to reconstruction. However, he does seem to 166 have revised his timetable -- to have been willing to settle for less, later. Democracy became a less pressing issue for him after he joined the government. Thus we find him, for example, acquiescing in the restrictions that were placed on the National Emergency Conference. Some observers explain the change in his attitude purely in terms of cynical opportunism, but such an explanation does not do him justice. One contemporary journalist offer the following alternative as an explanation: This phenomenon is explainable in the fact that the Canton leaders when actually in power in Nanking find themselves faced with a different situation in national and inter-national affairs and cannot really carry out the policy which they might have advocated when out of office in Canton. Some would even go to the extent of saying that they are drawn in a whirlpool of Marshal Chiang's policy from which they can-not escape.68 Circumstances lend credence to this view. Wang may well have toned down his stand on local self-government and democracy as part of his agreement with Chiang K'ai-shek, and the perspective from Nanking was indeed different from that in Canton or any other center of dissident activity. Policies that may have seemed possible and desirable from exile suddenly appeared d i f f i c u l t and less pressing from Nanking. Wang himself wrote rather plaintively, "It is not the easy matter imagined by those who, unburdened by, or shirking, the responsibilities of State, look on and throw abuse at those who, in spite of everything, are ear-nestly doing the l i t t l e they can to refloat the Ship of State, for the 69 stranding of which we a l l have been responsible." 167 It should also be noted that Wang was never so naive as to believe that democracy could be achieved overnight. When he was in Canton chastizing Chiang for his failure to even begin training the people in democratic procedure, he was careful to point out that local self-government could not be completed r a p i d l y . 7 0 He said that i t would take time for a l l the preparatory conditions to be met in accordance with Article 8 of Sun Yat-sen's Outline of National Reconstruction. It would take even longer to realize democracy, since local self-government was only a pre-condition for i t . Wang had never maintained that the tutelage process would be rapid. Nor had he ever rejected Party tutelage as the method through which democracy should be introduced in China. To recapitulate briefly, the dissident politicians l i k e Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, and their colleagues were impelled to action by a complex interplay of motivations. They were no saints, and self-interest played i t s part in their a c t i v i t i e s . However, they can by no means be dismissed as the v i l l a i n s of the piece. Indeed, i t is d i f f i c u l t to find v i l l a i n s in the drama of the 1931 opposition movement. In the final analysis, sincere concern for the welfare of the country emerges as the most striking characteristic of leaders on both sides. Herein also li e s the tragedy, for, as Hollington Tong, Chiang K'ai-shek's o f f i -cial biographer, has written, "the struggle of power in China was rarely ideological; i t was always the movement across a continent of vast armies to the support of single individuals, each one of whom regarded himself, and was acknowledged by his followers as, the only saviour who could lead the millions of China from the chaos of warfare to the s t a b i l i t y of peace.' Everyone thought he had the only correct solution, and, as with the proverbial cooks, the resulting brew was often spoiled. 169 CHAPTER IV CONCLUSION The Extraordinary Conference was a f a i r l y typical manifesta-tion of large-scale p o l i t i c a l opposition during the Nanking decade. It was larger and more sophisticated than i t s predecessors and was in this sense the culmination of years of experimentation and effort, but i t followed a basic pattern that had been in evidence ever since the f a l l of the Manchus. Indeed, because i t was the child of conditions and attitudes that prevailed during much of the early Republic, the Extraordinary Conference serves as a useful case-study from which to draw generalizations about the nature of po l i t i c a l opposition during a considerable portion of that era. Our comments, however, w i l l be limited in time to the period prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, for a discussion of the changes that struggle wrought in the domestic Chinese po l i t i c a l scene are beyond the scope of this study. Similarly, our attention w i l l focus primarily on non-Communist pol i t i c a l opposition, not, of course, because Communist opposition was unimportant, but because i t played no part in the Extraordinary Conference and has thus been conspicuous mainly for i t s absence from the foregoing analysis. Communist opposition wi l l not be totally ignored in the discussion that follows, but by the same token i t w i l l be treated only peripherally. Satisfactory coverage could hardly be achieved without introducing a wealth of new material with l i t t l e relevance to the Extraordinary Conference which has been the main object of our investigations. In other words, we must be content to accept the limitations imposed on our generalizations by the choice of subject matter. It should be made clear at the outset that when we speak of po l i t i c a l opposition in the early Republic we are speaking of a phenomenon in which only a minute proportion of the population p a r t i c i -pated. Politics was the realm of the elite,.not of the common man. Peasant rebellions certainly took place, both in the late Ch'ing and during the Republic, but they lacked the organization and central direction that could transform them into movements of significance. This does not mean that the peasantry was not an object of frequent invocation, at least at the theoretical level. Most politicians claimed to be acting in the interests of the masses, even though their actions often belied, or at least did l i t t l e to substantiate, their affirmations. A.J.P. Taylor's observation on 19 century Europe applies equally well to China: "The masses were evoked as a shadowy presence off-stage, reinforcements that were not expected to appear."1 Even Sun Yat-sen, that well known revolutionary and "Father of the Republic," distrusted the masses and specifically rejected the concept of class struggle. After his death the Kuomintang, though i t benefitted from agitation among the masses during the Northern Expedi-tion, increased the gulf separating i t from the lower strata of society. Spurred by i t s fear of social revolution, the Kuomintang became increasingly a force of reaction as i t settled into i t s position of hegemony in Nanking. Chiang K'ai-shek believed that the f i r s t priority was national unification by military means, and his regime neglected the pressing need for social and economic reform in the countryside. Non-Communist dissident movements made no more effort than the central government to harness the power of the masses to their cause. Po l i t i c a l opposition remained an undertaking of the e l i t e . It was l e f t to the Communists to unleash the prodigious energies of the masses in the cause of the revolution, a task they performed with explosive results. The f i r s t and most overwhelming reality in republican politics was the predominance of the military. The inauguration of Yuan Shih-k'ai and Li Yuan-hung, both military men, as president and vice-president of China in early 1912 initiated a trend that continued into the era of Communist rule. The period was one of increasing violence, and mastery of the instruments of military compulsion became a requirement for po l i t i c a l leadership. Even such massive c i v i l i a n outbursts as the May 4^ h Movement could do l i t t l e to alter this basic reality. They might succeed in bringing about the resignation of a cabinet, but another general was always in the wings, waiting his chance to take over where his predecessor l e f t off. Virtually a l l changes of government were achieved by the sword or the threat of i t . A succession of military officers swept across the p o l i t i c a l stage at the head of their armies, each donning the mantle of national leader-ship until he was replaced by a more powerful r i v a l . The revolution of 1911 was halted before i t had a chance to run i t s f u l l course. The revolutionary leaders were acutely aware that widespread and prolonged violence, which could be anticipated i f the rising tide of revolution was not checked, would inevitably bring with i t foreign intervention and possibly partition. To prevent that 172 eventuality they were willing to accept a compromise that arrested the development of the revolution while guaranteeing the overthrow of the 2 Ch'ing dynasty. The destruction of the imperial system created a hiatus in governmental institutions which the revolutionaries were i l l -equipped to f i l l . They had l i t t l e or no practical experience in government and had not yet f u l l y assimilated the new po l i t i c a l concepts they proposed to implement in the country. When i t came down to the practical mechanics of organizing a viable new government, they were unable to provide the leadership or achieve the consensus that was required. That was perhaps too much to expect under the circumstances. The revolutionaries invoked republicanism as a panacea, but in reality i t was more a symbol of what they wanted China to have than something that could r e a l i s t i c a l l y be expected to take root overnight. They had stressed the negative part of their program -- the overthrow of the Manchus -- and maintained a naive faith that the vaguely defined positive part -- the establishment of effective republican institutions -- would somehow follow automatically. Their vision was s t i l l b o r n , and in i t s place the politics of militarism and violence flourished. Institutional change takes time even under ideal conditions, and the situation in China in the early years of the Republic did not even remotely approximate the ideal. There was no orderly transfer of power from the old imperial government to a new republican government. Instead, the military.soon proved i t s e l f to be the only institution with sufficient strength and organization to step into the gap and assume po l i t i c a l power. Civil i a n revolutionary leaders, armed with l i t t l e more than their vague hopes for a new order in China, soon found themselves hopelessly outmatched by mil i t a r i s t s with the instruments of physical coercion at their disposal. A certain amount might be accomplished through negotiation and compromise, but the ultimate determinant in politics was always armed force. The concept of a loyal opposition was not recognized as a basic precept; on the contrary, opposition was generally looked upon as a rejection of authority, as something to be stamped out, and not as a legitimate activity with 3 constructive potential. The traditional Chinese state had always lacked machinery for the legitimate expression of pol i t i c a l dissent, and the habits of mind cultivated over the centuries did not vanish with the destruction of the imperial order. When Sung Chiao-jen tried to create a loyal opposition and a responsible cabinet in late 1912 and early 1913, he was rewarded for his efforts with assassination. Arbitrary arrest, execution, and assassination became common tools of the p o l i t i c a l trade. As we have seen, the Kuomintang was no excep-tion despite i t s pretensions to superiority. When i t was in power after 1928, i t never succeeded in finding a way to integrate i t s c r i t i c s within i t s framework. It resorted to repression unless circumstances forced i t to adopt a more tolerant attitude. In such an atmosphere, the unarmed intellectual or politician faced tremendous d i f f i c u l t i e s , not to mention palpable physical danger, in any attempt he might make to influence government policy or to assume the reins of power. The possibilities for effective dissident action were severely limited by the nexus between coercion and polit i c a l power. Various methods were attempted with l i t t l e tangible success. Some politicians and intellectuals tried to work through the existing structure of government, remonstrating, protesting, and suggesting alternatives to the mil i t a r i s t s who were in control. The plethora of dismissals, resignations, and hasty departures for sanctuary in the foreign concessions among incumbents in the highest levels of government during the teens and 1920's, particularly in the cabinet and the presidency, testified to the inefficacy of this approach. Advice was not heeded unless i t coincided with the immediate needs of the dominant m i l i t a r i s t in Peking in his struggle against his adversaries. Here again, the accession to power of the Kuomintang in 1928 did not bring about any drastic change. Admittedly, the government was far more stable, but that was largely because i t s members were carefully screened before being appointed to office. Chiang K'ai-shek tried to insure that a l l key positions were occupied by his supporters, and he succeeded to a large extent. Nevertheless, he ar b i t r a r i l y arrested a man of Hu Han-min's stature when his stubborn opposition through regular channels became too annoying, and others like Wang Ch'ung-hui and Sun Fo resigned or were deprived of office. Intellectuals used several means to oppose or try to in-fluence the government, relying most heavily, as one would expect, on the pen. They wrote articles in journals and magazines, gave birth to a growing social literature, engaged in debates and direct criticism, and joined demonstrations. One major factor acted in favor of the intellectuals in their efforts to bring about change, and that was the need for legitimacy experienced by almost a l l republican governments. Support from intellectuals helped to confer a measure of legitimacy on the government that could not be matched by simple claims of right 175 . by virtue of might. The function intellectuals could perform as legitimizers applied not only to the Chinese public, but, perhaps more importantly, to foreigners. China needed foreign assistance in many spheres and i t could be secured more readily i f the government could be made to seem legitimate and proper. Most Chinese governments were also committed to the abolition of unequal treaties, including those providing for e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , and this could not be achieved unless foreign governments were convinced that China was becoming enlightened, democratized, Westernized, etc. Intellectuals, especially Western-educated ones, had some importance as interpreters of the Chinese scene to foreigners. Favorable evaluations from them tended to carry more weight with foreign governments. Intellectuals, then, could not be completely disregarded by the Chinese government. But their most potent weapon -- the denial of legitimizing support -- was a f r a i l instrument indeed when pitted against the coercive power that could be mustered by the government. The results achieved by intellectuals when they tried to influence the government generally would not, at least in the short run, encourage faith in the well-known piece of folk-wisdom proclaiming the pen to be mightier than the sword. They might, on occasion, gain a few concessions to their point of view, but i t was much more l i k e l y that they would be brutally repressed. Two graphic examples of the type of repression that took place are Chang Tso-lin's execution of Li Ta-chao and nineteen other Communists in 1927, and the Kuomintang's execution of six young l e f t i s t writers in early 1931. Apostles of radicalism were the main targets after 1927, but repression also 176 extended to other c r i t i c s of the regime, as we have seen in the case of various dissidents during the course of the opposition movements of 1930 and 1931. The types of limited and often hollow concessions that might be won by concentrated activity on the part of intellectuals are illustrated by the results of two events: the May 4 t n Movement in 1919 and the agitation for a provisional constitution between 1928 and 1931. These events showed that students might march in the streets by the thousand and intellectuals might engage in protracted vituperation of the government, but neither technique exerted a very profound influence on the immediate po l i t i c a l scene. The unparalleled May 4 t n demon-strations, in which the intellectuals played a leading part, secured the resignation of the Ch'en Neng-hsun cabinet, but i t was replaced by a cabinet that was equally under the thumb of the Anfu Clique. Not until i t s army was defeated on the battlefield in 1920 was the Anfu Clique ousted from power in Peking, and the Chi hii Clique that supplanted i t introduced no qualitative change in government. The intellectual ferment and activism of the May 4 t n era had many important long-term effects on the development of modern China, but i t s gains in the concrete, short-term p o l i t i c a l sphere were quite superficial. Similarly, the increasingly strident calls for a provisional constitution that flowed from the lips of intellectuals and politicians in the late 1920's were ignored or overruled until they were brought to an issue on the battlefield during the Enlarged Conference in 1930. Only then was Chiang K'ai-shek convinced of the expedience of pro-mulgating a provisional constitution. As we have seen, the document 177 he eventually produced not only failed to satisfy his c r i t i c s , but helped to create a new opposition movement, namely the Extraordinary Conference. In other words, nothing short of violence or the threat of violence seemed capable of effecting any significant changes in the p o l i t i c a l situation. By 1932, after years of ineffectiveness in the p o l i t i c a l arena, many intellectuals had become less sanguine about their prospects for transforming society. As Charlotte Furth has written, "Now they wrote more like members of the Western intelligentsia, as self-conscious outsiders and skeptical c r i t i c s of society, to whom alienation of the intellectual is an expected condition of modern l i f e 4 and impotence seems the natural companion to insight." Among members of the financial and business world, the chief weapon used to influence or oppose the government was control of the purse strings. Although l i t t l e research has been done on the subject, businessmen seem to have used their financial power sparingly and defensively in p o l i t i c a l affairs. M-C. Bergere has found that at the outbreak of the 1911 revolution, the commercial bourgeoisie "seemed less anxious to promote a new form of central government, however advantageous that might be for them, than to be allowed to go their own way, creating small islands of security where peace would prevail and 5 modernization could be introduced." Ingrained attitudes were d i f f i -cult to change and although the bourgeoisie underwent a brief flurry of p o l i t i c a l a c t ivity during the revolution, the influence i t exerted was generally indirect and i t s p o l i t i c a l interest lagged during the next few years. 178 The commercial class was in a rather d i f f i c u l t position, one that did not allow too much freedom of action. The government, by virtue of i t s superior coercive power, could make l i f e d i f f i c u l t for, or bring ruin to, businessmen and industrialists i f they refused to provide financial support. However, most republican governments relied heavily on the small, modernized sector of the economy for their revenues because they had l i t t l e control over the collection of the land tax and because a large proportion of the customs and salt revenues was already committed to the service of loans. Governments had to keep their exactions within certain bounds i f they did not want this v i t a l source of funds to dry up. A state of dynamic equilibrium therefore frequently existed between the two parties. The fervor of the May 4 Movement rekindled the p o l i t i c a l interest of the bourgeoisie. At the time, Chinese commercial and industrial interests were riding the crest of a wave of prosperity brought on by an exceptionally favorable concatenation of economic circumstances.6 The bourgeoisie's active involvement in the move-ment was in part a defensive reaction born of a desire to safeguard i t s new-found prosperity; but i t was also the demarche of a "conquering bourgeoisie" that had "decided to make i t s rights count."7 During the movement, i t was the concerted pressure exerted by bankers and the General Chamber of Commerce in the form of a general strike that was directly responsible for the dismissal of the three pro-Japanese ministers in the government. The bourgeoisie was changing, and as i t became larger and stronger i t began to lessen i t s isolation from the rest of society. 179 Its members started to realize that their fate was closely linked to the overall development of the economy, the state, and society, and their participation increased accordingly. Much of the change in attitude was brought about by younger members of the bourgeoisie. Often Western-educated, many of them had turned to commercial and industrial enterprises by choice rather than by inheritance or habit. They were generally better-informed and more open to change than the 9 leaders of the previous generation. Much of the p o l i t i c a l involvement of the bourgeoisie continued to be dictated by a desire to protect i t s own interests. However, i t s conception of i t s interests and i t s role in society became broader. In some cases, notably patriotic struggles against Japanese encroach-ments on Chinese sovereignty, the bourgeoisie acted with emotional disregard for i t s own material well-being. More commonly, the commercial class pressed the government for reforms that were of general value-to the country. The government and the bourgeoisie had an identity of interest in such measures as currency reform, fiscal rationalization, improvement of communications, and t a r i f f autonomy. They acted symbiotically in seeking improvements in these areas. After the Kuomintang came to power in 1928, business and financial circles sought to gain more po l i t i c a l leverage in the capital, a venture in which they enjoyed some success because of the government's dependence on domestic loans. The bourgeoisie demonstrated from time to time that i t could bring considerable pressure to bear on the govern-ment. The short-lived Sun Fo regime of early 1932, which was brought to i t s knees partly by the refusal of the Shanghai commercial e l i t e to 180 lend i t money or to buy the domestic bonds on which i t relied so heavily, was a case in point. In this instance the po l i t i c a l influence of the financial world was bolstered by several special circumstances, including the exceptional weakness of Sun's regime and the power Chiang K'ai-shek wielded behind the scenes. A stronger government might have been able to force compliance with i t s requests for money, but Sun's regime had no coercive instruments at i t s disposal. Moreover, i t exacerbated i t s . plight with desperate talk of a moratorium on domestic debt payments. The key to the opposition of businessmen and financiers on this occasion probably li e s here. They feared for the hundreds of millions of yuan they had poured into government bonds and they went into action to protect their investment. They were eager to speed Chiang K'ai-shek's return to Nanking so that greater s t a b i l i t y would prevail. Chiang may have encouraged, and almost certainly approved of, their efforts, which played a definite part in toppling the Sun Fo regime. Although the bourgeoisie occasionally did bare i t s teeth, as in 1919 and 1932, i t generally preferred to avoid direct clashes with the government. The chances of failure were simply too great, particularly as the power of the government increased during the 1930's. Dogged opposition always carried with i t the risk of crippling financial exactions, discriminatory regulations, and government take-overs. Unless i t had i t s back to the wall, the bourgeoisie generally tried to confine i t s efforts to influence the government to areas in which they had a common interest, or at least to matters that would not provoke direct confrontations. In short, the latent power the commercial e l i t e derived from i t s economic position served as a more 181 potent tool for po l i t i c a l opposition than most, but i t s t i l l had many limitations that could not be overcome. All p o l i t i c a l opposition was not condemned to failure. How-ever, dissidents who wanted results were often obliged to compromise their ideals and accept the dictates of a p o l i t i c a l world in which force reigned supreme. Many of them adopted a formula for p o l i t i c a l opposition that had begun to emerge in the earliest days of the Republic. It was not always effective, to be sure, but i t seemed to offer the only chance for success. In i t s simplest outlines, the plan dissidents increasingly employed was to procure military support, establish a t e r r i t o r i a l base -- preferably in a province as far away as possible from the seat of central power, and then declare their independence or found a rival "national" government to challenge the legitimacy of the one then in operation, the ultimate object being to replace i t . This basic schema, somewhat reminiscent of traditional rebellions in China, was followed by the revolutionaries in 1911, and i t continued to serve, with various refinements and modifications, as the blueprint for major opposition movements in succeeding decades. It was the formula used during the Second Revolution in 1913; the anti-monarchist movement in 1915-1916; the Canton government founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1917 and maintained with several breaks until the Northern Expedition; and most of the opposition movements during the Nanking decade, including the.Extraordinary Conference on which this study has focussed. Even the constant internecine s t r i f e among mi l i t a r i s t s attempting to expand their influence generally followed this basic 182 pattern in a least two of i t s three particulars. The m i l i t a r i s t s , needless to say, were already in possession of the f i r s t element, armed might; their power almost invariably emanated from a t e r r i t o r i a l base; and they not infrequently prefaced their military engagements with declarations of independence in an effort to give the appearance righteousness. For example, Tuan Ch'i-jui arranged for his supporters in eight provinces to declare their independence from the central government to protest his dismissal as Prime Minister in May, 1917. A scant three months later, after Tuan had been restored to the premier-ship, two Hunanese mi l i t a r i s t s declared their independence from Peking to prevent him from extending his influence to their province. In 1923, a coalition of m i l i t a r i s t s and politicians threatened to establish a new national government in reaction to Ts'ao K'un's engineered "election" to the presidency. Other examples abound, but those cited suffice to show that the actions of m i l i t a r i s t s often conformed to the postulated pattern. Communist po l i t i c a l opposition also f i t into this basic mold during the period under consideration, operating f i r s t in partner-ship with the Kuomintang from a headquarters in Canton and then in opposition to the Kuomintang from various bases in remote border areas. In the latter period, which commenced with the shattering of the united front in 1927, the Communists developed their own autonomous military capability in the form of the Red Army. Like other p o l i t i c a l d i s s i -dents, they had learned from painful experience that they could not hope to triumph without military power at their disposal. The Commun-ists also e x p l i c i t l y challenged the legitimacy of the Nanking regime 183 by establishing independent soviet governments in the areas they controlled. One of the earliest of these, centered on Juichin in Kiangsi province, clearly asserted i t s claim to national leadership by styling i t s e l f the Chinese Soviet Republic in 1931. However, this basic similarity of form between Communist and non-Communist po l i t i c a l opposition should not obscure the profound differences in ideology and organization that existed below the surface. Communist emphasis on socio-economic leveling and on mass mobilization in the country-side was particularly notable in this regard. It contrasted dramatic-a l l y with non-Communist neglect and fear of the masses, and played a major part in the ultimate victory of the Communists on the mainland. The opposition movements of the early Republic are commonly described as secessionist by both contemporary observers and later scholars. Such a characterization is misleading, for the efforts of the participants were directed toward the eventual unification of the nation under their auspices -- or at least under conditions more favorable to their interests -- and not withdrawal from i t . Declara-tions of independence and the founding of opposition governments were po l i t i c a l gambits, practices resorted to in the absence of stable po l i t i c a l institutions. As we have seen in the case of the Extra-ordinary Conference, there was virtua l l y no other way for a dissident to express his views and have them taken seriously by those in power. In such an unstable environment, opposition movements on the pattern described above achieved a quasi-institutionalized status. They might be described as a kind of primitive vote of no confidence 184 through which the shadow government of the opposition hoped to replace, or at least reach a new accommodation with, the government in power. Throughout the Republic, dissidents showed a remarkable in a b i l i t y to unite in their a c t i v i t i e s . During the warlord period proper, no m i l i t a r i s t was powerful enough to unify the country single-handedly, yet no one was able to put together a coalition to do the job. A balance of power was maintained and every time one group threatened to become too powerful, a new alighment was forged to pre-vent i t from expanding i t s control to encompass the whole of China. The Kuomintang was more successful in fashioning a winning coalition between 1924 and 1928, but i t , too, was racked by internal dissension. It succeeded in nominally unifying the country by the end of that period, but the position i t occupied in Nanking was that of a hegemon rather than that of an absolute ruler of the country. It immediately faced challenges to i t s authority from within i t s own ranks as well as from outside them. Chiang K'ai-shek. was the main object of attack because of his domination of the Party and the government. His r i v a l s , however, soon showed themselves to be totally incapable of uniting against him. One opposition movement followed another with no coordination whatsoever, and Chiang was able to crush each one in turn. In view of the obvious advantages of concerted action,, this persistent i n a b i l i t y to unite is not easy to explain. It seems to have been compounded of mutual suspicion, often with regional over-tones; a reluctance to make firm commitments of support unless success was guaranteed; and perhaps most important, an almost universal unwillingness to enter alliances as anything less than the 185 acknowledged leader. There was an abundance of leaders and a dearth of followers. Each faction had pretensions to supremacy and was loath to compromise i t s claims by playing a secondary role in any coalition, even a potentially successful one. The Enlarged Conference of 1930 represented the f i r s t halting attempt by the dissidents to close their ranks and unite in their struggle against Chiang. It posed a greater challenge to Nanking than i t s predecessors, but i t , too, was defeated after several months of bitter fighting. However, the dissidents had f i n a l l y recognized the value of burying their, differences, at least temporarily, and cooperating in their opposition a c t i v i t i e s . Within less than a year, another coalition of disgruntled m i l i t a r i s t s and politicians, the Extraordinary Conference, had been hammered together in Canton. As we have seen, i t was a highly unstable amalgam, but i t held together long enough to achieve a degree of success that set i t apart from other opposition movements of the period. It avoided the fate of military suppression that had befallen a l l of i t s predecessors, i t secured the temporary retirement of Chiang K'ai-shek, and i t brought a number of perennial dissidents back into the government. Although the Extraordinary Conference ultimately failed to make any radical changes in the Chinese polity, i t was responsible for the creation of a new and much more stable government coalition led by Chiang and Wang Ching-wei. The Extraordinary Conference represented a high water mark for large-scale p o l i t i c a l opposition movements during the Nanking decade. The pace of such movements slowed dramatically during the 186 years between Wang Ching-wei's installation in the Executive Yuan and the onset of all-out war with Japan in 1937. The most serious 1 0 of them was the Fukien rebellion of 1933, and Nanking not only quelled i t easily, but extended i t s authority over Fukien in the process. One reason for the relative calm that prevailed was the absorption by the government of some of i t s most influential and active c r i t i c s in 1932. Dissatisfaction remained, but i t had been effectively scotched. Hu Han-min fulminated and plotted from his retreat in Hong Kong, regional m i l i t a r i s t s struggled to maintain their autonomy, and various intellectuals continued, to c r i t i c i z e Kuomintang rule, but many of their erstwhile colleagues in dissent had become members of the government. The integration of the Reorganizationists into the Nanking regime was particularly t e l l i n g in this regard, for they had been at the fore-front of virtua l l y a l l of the turmoil between 1928 and 1932. Without them, the opposition found i t s e l f scattered and unable to coalesce. The raw material for an opposition movement with any hope of success was no longer at hand, and the power of the central government expanded steadily until the Japanese onslaught began. The bargaining for offices that procured several portfolios for Wang Ching-wei and his followers in 1932 was a normal part of forming governments during the Republic under both the warlords and the Kuomintang. The composition of the cabinet and the upper levels of the bureaucracy generally reflected the alignment of forces pre-vailing at any given time, with the dominant faction controlling the most important positions. Lesser posts were allocated for various reasons: to reward a l l i e s for services rendered; to win the i support of m i l i t a r i s t s or politicians of dubious loyalty; to keep potentially dangerous rivals in the capital where an eye could be kept on them; or to make room for an opposing faction that had become too powerful to be excluded. The division of portfolios was usually the subject of extended negotiations, and a l l concerned naturally tried to ensure that the apportionment was in their favor. The object was to enhance one's power and to gain control of valuable patronage jobs that could be used to reward one's followers. Another aspect of p o l i t i c a l opposition during the early Republic that deserves mention is the ideological dimension, or, more accurately, the lack of i t . If we define ideology as "a set of more or less persistent, integrated doctrines that purport to explain and ju s t i f y . . . leadership in the (political) system,"^ we find that genuine ideological differences only rarely intruded as fundamental causes of p o l i t i c a l s t r i f e . Certainly no one could accuse the mi l i t a r i s t s during the warlord period proper of being ideologically inclined. There was l i t t l e to choose from between the doctrine, i f we can call i t that, of one m i l i t a r i s t and the next. Their propaganda was bland and uncontroversial. It centered on generally recognized values that were d i f f i c u l t to dispute, and i t s tenor was didactic 12 and Confucian. It was used largely to clothe the .naked pursuit of power with some respectability, and i t was not very convincing. The Kuomintang consciously used ideology in i t s long struggle against the m i l i t a r i s t s , and i t s propaganda and indoctrina-tion a c t i v i t i e s , particularly i t s emphasis on nationalism, were instrumental in bringing i t to power in 1928. However, the Kuomintang 188 soon lapsed into ideological s t e r i l i t y . A step away from the old orthodoxy had perhaps been taken, but the net result was only the creation of a new orthodoxy. Sun Yat-senism reigned supreme and a l l po l i t i c a l disputes were played out within i t s vague and ambiguous frame-work. To proclaim adherence to any other doctrine was to be p o l i t i c -a l l y tainted, and the leaders of a l l opposition movements professed to be disciples of Sun Yat-sen. One might suspect that the protestations of Sun Yat-senism were a r t i f i c i a l and only served to cloak real ideological differences that lurked below the surface. Sometimes this was indeed the case. The Communists, for example, numbered among the multitudes claiming to be the true heirs of the immortal Dr. Sun, and their ideology certainly differed radically from that of the Kuomintang. However, one searches in vain for profound ideological differences in most other cases. There was widespread agreement on basic goals among members of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e , and ideological differences as often as not represented l i t t l e more than variations on the same theme. In addition to the basic issue of who was best qualified to govern, the main points of dispute usually concerned application and priorities rather than fundamental ideological premises. This was certainly the case with the Extraordinary Conference. Both sides in the conflict espoused essentially the same Sun Yat-senist program. Canton's complaints revolved around Chiang K'ai-shek's abuse of power and his failure to implement much of Sun's program. The personal short-comings of Chiang and his followers were cited as sources of dissatisfaction almost to the exclusion of a l l else. The dissidents 189 vigorously challenged Chiang's right and a b i l i t y to govern, but they offered nothing new in the ideological sphere. Each faction f e l t i t was uniquely qualified to lead China to a place in the sun and worked energetically to gain po l i t i c a l power commensurate with i t s pretensions. The same seems to have been true of other opposition movements during 13 the Nanking decade. Finally, we must attempt the d i f f i c u l t task of assessing, the part played by regionalism and i t s smaller-scale brethren, provincial-ism and localism, in republican p o l i t i c a l opposition. The continued fragmentation of China in i t s e l f t e s t i f i e s to the existence in key areas "of military and p o l i t i c a l centers that assumed some of the important functions of state but s t i l l remained within i t s framework." There is also abundant evidence of the persistence of regionalism in the more abstract sense of consciousness of and loyalty to a distinct region. Parochialism of this type had a long history in China and could not be eliminated at a stroke. Factions, both military and p o l i t i c a l , continued to be organized along regional or provincial lines; the primary allegiance of local satraps was normally extended to regional or provincial entities rather than to the nation; and power struggles, even in the capital, frequently had pronounced regional over-tones. An interview of 1934, cited in Donald G i l l in's study of Yen Hsi-shan, captures the s p i r i t of localism that persisted during the Republic: "The attitude of most of Yen's subjects toward his struggle with the central government was expressed by persons c r i t i c a l of him, who nevertheless when asked i f they preferred to be governed by Chiang K'ai-shek replied: 'God 190 forbid! We want a Shansi man for Shansi-'" The same attitude pre-vailed in many other areas of China. Even the relatively enlightened e l i t e was not immune to the pull of such regional loyalties, though these often made their appearance in hybrid and disguised forms that were part of a transition to new values. However, a cautionary note must be sounded. While regionalism unquestionably l e f t i t s mark on the Republic, i t should not be over-emphasized as a root cause of the chaos that prevailed. Chinese pol i t i c s were complex and regionalism was but one ingredient in their make-up. It is not adequate in i t s e l f to explain the continuous p o l i t i c a l and military s t r i f e of the period. We have already seen that several forms of regionalism played a part in the Extraordinary Conference. But we have also seen that in this instance, appearances were deceptive and the role of regional ism was not as important as i t might have seemed at f i r s t glance. The same is undoubtedly true in many other cases, and the' temptation to simplify complex situations by automatic-a l l y ascribing a predominant role to regionalism must be avoided. The influence of regionalism must be carefully evaluated in each case; i t can not be relied upon as a catch-all explanation of events. The seemingly endless outbursts of po l i t i c a l opposition that followed one upon another in the early Republic were a part of China's effort to achieve a consensus from which a new and stable p o l i t i c a l order could emerge. The 1911 revolution had tumbled the formal structure of a po l i t i c a l system that had lasted for millennia, and the task of building a new one to replace i t proved to be arduous and f u l l of p i t f a l l s . After the passing of the dynastic system much of the old order lingered on, persistently defying efforts at transforma-tion. Indeed, most of the men who sought to effect the transformation were themselves torn between two worlds. Traditional forces tugged at them at every turn, often in subtle and hidden ways. The forms pol i t i c a l opposition took reflected the tension between the new and the old. Regionalism, patronage, factionalism, personal p o l i t i c s and other practices that had a long history in China were combined, often in new hybrid configurations, with modern p o l i t i c a l techniques and ideals in movements like' the Extraordinary Conference. The f i r s t wave of revolutionaries belonged to a transitional generation. They struggled mightily to create a new synthesis for China, one that would restore the country to a position of strength and dignity in the modern world. The p o l i t i c a l s t r i f e that characterized the period was an integral part of this monumental struggle. Although the Kuomin-tang did not live up to i t s promise and ultimately failed to find the right formula, i t s years of trying served as a bridge which helped the Communists more than they would care to admit in achieving the new synthesis that had eluded their predecessors. F O O T N O T E S 192 ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE FOOTNOTES CVJR - China Weekly Review, ed. by J.B. Powell, Shanghai. CYB - China Year Book, ed. by H.G.W. Woodhead, Shanghai. FCYT - Fan-Chiang yu'n-tunq shih (A history of the anti-Chiang movement), ed. by Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien chun-jen she (Society of young Chinese military men; Canton, 1934). FRUS - Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, annual). JAS - Journal of Asian Studies,(Ann Arbor, Association for Asian Studies). "han-Sh5 und5"- "Showa 6-nen han-Sho undo kankei: Kanton Seifu ni taisuru Teikoku oyobi kakkoku no taido. Chin Yu-jin raich5 kankei" (Documents relating to the anti-Chiang movement in 1931: The attitude of the various countries and Japan toward the Canton Government. Documents relating to the v i s i t of Ch'en Yu-jen to Japan), June-August, 1931, PVM 57. Reel P 69. KWCP - Kuo-wen chou-pao (Kuo-wen weekly, illu s t r a t e d ) , Shanghai. NCH - North China Herald and Weekly Consular Gazette, Shanghai. "Shina nairan" - "Shina nairan kankei ikken" (Documents relating to internal disorder in China). "Showa 6-nen han-Sho kankei wahei kankei" (Documents relating to the anti-Chiang move-ment of 1931, and to peace), November, 1931 - March, 1932. S Reel S 657. SNTL - San-shih nien tung-luan Chung-kuo (Thirty years of China in turmoil), by Lei Hsiao-ts en, (Hong Kong, 1955). TKP - Ta-kung pao (L'Impartial), Tientsin. 193 INTRODUCTION FOOTNOTES 1 Romance of the Three Kingdoms, t r . CH. Brewitt-Taylor, 2 Vols. (Rutland and Tokyo, Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1959), I, p. 1. 2 Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 2nd edition, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 214. 3 Franz Michael, "Regionalism in Nineteenth Century China," introduction to Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army, (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1964), p. xxi. 4 Spector, p. 172. 5 See, for example, the origins of officers in the Anhwei Army listed in the table contained in Ibid., pp. 301-314. See Ibid., pp. 288-296 for a table l i s t i n g the origins of the advisors and other specialists in the employ of Li Hung-chang. For further information on the mu-fu system, including case studies of Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, see Kenneth E. Folson, Friends, Guests, and Colleagues, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968). See also Jonathan Porter, Tseng Kuo-fan's  Private Bureaucracy, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of Califor-nia TrTssTlWzTT^^ ^Yoshihiro Hatano, "The New Armies," in Mary C. Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), p. 375. Q Much of this paragraph is based on Stephen R. MacKinnon, "The Peiyang Army, Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Origins of Modern Chinese Warlordism," JAS_, 32.3 (May 1973), pp. 405-424. Professor MacKinnon casts doubt on the view, which has heretofore been held almost un-questioningly, that the Peiyang Army was a regionally based, private army similar to the Hunan and Huai armies and that i t played a major part in bringing about the warlordism of the early Republic. 194 Ernest P. Young, "Yuan-Shih-k'ai's Rise to the Presidency," in Mary C. Wright, ed., China in Revolution, pp. 425-428, stresses the problems Yuan had in his control of the Peiyang Army in 1911. He challenges the prevailing view that Yuan's control was firm. See also MacKinnon, "The Peiyang Army," esp. pp. 414-423. 10Young, "Yuan Shih-k'ai," p. 423. Yuan has traditionally been reviled as a man who achieved his position in the Republic through chicanery and raw military power. Professor Young argues persuasively that despite the suspicion with which some people viewed him, Yuan was chosen as the f i r s t President of the Republic by consensus, because most people f e l t he was the only person who could handle the position at that time. Jerome Ch'en, "Defining Chinese Warlords and Their Factions," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 30 (1968), pp. 565-567. 12 See Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, Chapter 11. 13 John Fincher, "P o l i t i c a l Provincialism and the National Revolution," in Mary C. Wright, ed.,China in Revolution, esp. pp. 223-225. 1 4 -This application of the concluding line of Voltaire's Candide is borrowed from Walter Gourlay. See his "The Kuomintang and. the Rise of Chiang K'ai-shek, 1920-1924," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1967, pp. 63-64. Professor Gourlay goes into con-siderable detail on the conflict between local and national aspirations that took place in Canton from 1920 to 1924. See also Winston Hsieh, "The Ideas and Ideals of a Warlord: Ch'en Chiung-ming (1878-1933)," Papers on China, Vol. 16 (1962), pp. 198-252. 15 For a discussion of federalism, see Jean Chesneaux, "The Federalist Movement in China, 1920-1923," in Jack Gray, ed., Modern China's Search for a Po l i t i c a l Form, (London, Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 96-137. 1 g See Wu Tien-wei, "Chiang K'ai-shek's March Twentieth Coup d'Etat of 1926," JAS, 27.3 (May 1968), pp. 585-602 for a detailed analysis of the coup. For a more thorough treatment of the struggles which we only touch upon briefly, see 0. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China, (New York, Columbia University Press, 19641, PP- 135-145. 195 CHAPTER I FOOTNOTES 'T'ang Leang-li, Wang Ching-wei, A Po l i t i c a l Biography, (Shanghai, China United Press, 1931), p. 188. T'ang further describes i t as follows: "A secret organization, with a definite constitution, i t comprises not only the leading personalities of the Left, but also the most active members of the rank and f i l e of the Kuomintang." o A convenient summary of the telegraphic war may be found in CYB, 1931, pp. 552-561. ""Donald G. G i l l i n , Warlord. Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province  1911-1949, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 111. 4CYB, 1931, p. 549. 5 G i l l i n , Warlord, pp. 111-112. 6Ibi_d., p. 112. ^Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard, eds., Biographical  Dictionary of Republican China, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1967-1971), I, p. 473. SNTL, p. 182 states that the two cliques had combined to support the revolt by the Kuominchiin in Honan in the f a l l of 1929. Partick Cavendish, "The 'New China' of the Kuomintang," in Jack Gray, ed., Modern China's Search for a Po l i t i c a l Form, (London, Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 153, states that the f i r s t contacts between Feng Yu-hsiang and the Reorganizationists took place in May, 1929. "T'ang, Wang Ching-wei, p. 216. T'ang was a devoted follower of Wang Ching-wei. His account of the Enlarged Conference reflects a decided Reorganizationist bias. For an account from the "Right," or Western H i l l s , point of view, see FCYT, Chapter 4. Taken together, and with the help of contemporary newspapers, these sources yield a reasonably balanced picture of the Enlarged Conference. Also see SNTL, pp. 156-180 for further perspectives. 196 V a n g , Wang Ching-wei, p. 217. FCYT, PP. 175-177 has a point by point explanation of the articles. 10FCYT, p. 182. SNTL, p. 165. FCYT, pp. 183-188 has a point by point explanation of the articles. 1 1 The National People's Convention (Kuo-min hui-i) was to be a special body that met only once to deliberate and resolve the pressing problems of the tutelage period. It is not to be confused with the National People's Congress (Kuo-min ta-hui), which was to adopt a permanent constitution and then continue as a permanent body meeting at least once every two years and maintaining a standing committee to carry on i t s work when the Congress was out of session. For further information on the differences between the two, see Wu Chih-fang, Chinese Government and P o l i t i c s , (Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1934), p.. 96. 12 The Outline of National Reconstruction (Chien-kuo ta-kang) is also frequently known as the Fundamentals of National Reconstruction. After Sun Yat-sen's death, this document became the main guide for the development of China by the Kuomintang. 1 3T'ang, Wang Ching-wei, pp. 219-220. 14FCYT, p. 194. 15SNTL, p. 183. G i l l i n , Warlord, p. 114. 1 6Johnson to Stimson, November 17, 1930, 893.00 P.R./39, FRUS, 1930, I I , p. 54. G i l l i n , Warlord, p. 114. FCYT, p. 125. 1 7 G i l l i n , Warlord, p. 115. 1 8 I b i d . , p. 114. 19FCYT, p. 233. CYB, 1931, p. 565. 20 Translated 1iterally,yueh-fa means "legal covenant." It is sometimes rendered as " b i l l of rights," but much more commonly as "provisional constitution." Yueh-fa and provisional constitution w i l l be used interchangeably throughout this study. 21 There are few figures available, perhaps because members of the Northern Coalition didn't want their meetings to take on the air of a rump parliament in the last days before i t announced the 197 constitution. According to bulletins released at T'aiyuan in the f i r s t part of October, fourteen people attended the meeting on the 3rd, while only 9 were l e f t by the 8th. See KWCP 7.41 (20 October, 1930), ta-shih, pp. 5-7. 22KWCP 7.43 (3 November, 1930), ta-shih,p. 1. FCYT, pp. 203-204. A copy of the T'aiyuan Constitution is to be found in Tsou Lu, Hui-ku lu (Memoirs), Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-k'an 665, (Taipei, Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, 1971), I I , p. 344 f f . The only English version available appears to be the one in Wang Ching-wei et a l . , The Chinese National Revolution Essays and Documents, (Tientsin, China United Press, 1931), pp. 132-168. 23 By this time Sun Yat-sen's posthumous apotheosis was well under way, and his bequeathed teachings (i-chiao) had become the gospel of the Kuomintang. The main writings of Sun that were taken collectively as the blueprint for the development of China under the Nationalists were The Three People's Principles (San-min chu-i), the Plan for the Revolution (Ko-ming fang-lu'eh), Outline of National Reconstruction (Chien-kuo ta-kang), Five Power Constitution (Wu-ch'Lian hsien-fa), The Theories of Sun Wen T"Sun Wen hsu'eh-shuo), and Sun's last testament. The Organic Law establishing the government in 1928 specified in i t s preamble that the Three People's Principles and the Five-Power Constitu-tion formed the underlying principles of the revolution. The cult of Sun Yat-sen was motivated partly out of genuine respect for the revolutionary leader's achievements and partly out of a desperate need for a symbol of legitimacy that would lend cohesion to the Kuomintang's efforts. Thereafter, p o l i t i c a l pronouncements and policies were almost always couched in terms of Sunist orthodoxy, for nothing else was considered to be as efficacious in terms of legitimacy. In death, Sun had attained a stature he never achieved in l i f e . The net result was probably rather s t u l t i f y i n g , since i t narrowed the options of the government by casting them solely in a san-min chu-i mold. However, the effects of this circumscription were mitigated by the vague and contradictory nature of Sun's teachings, which allowed people with widely varying views to j u s t i f y themselves with the same gospel. Thus we find the Communists describing themselves as the heirs of Sun Yat-sen whenever i t suited their purposes. More conservative dissident movements invariably attacked Nanking for corrupting or fa i l i n g to put into practice the teachings of Sun. 24 For a convenient l i s t of some of those expelled from the Kuomintang, including the offences they had committed, see Chi-lien, "Chung-kuo cheng-chih ho i pu-shang kuei-tao" (Why doesn't the Chinese government get on the right track?), KWCP 9.1 (1 January, 1932), ar t i c l e s , pp. 6-7. Boorman and Howard, eds., I I , pp. 293-294. 198 2 6 I b i d . , I, p. 473. 27FCYT, p. 79. 2 8 I b i d . , p. 147. CWR 51.12 (1 March, 1930), p. 449. NCH, 25 February, 1930, p. 303. 29FCYT, pp. 122-124 and p. 147. 3D Ibid., pp. 148-149. CWR 52.1 (1 March, 1930), pp. 9 and 38. CYB, 1931, p. 555. 31SNTL, p. 136. 32 Ibid., p. 136.. FCYT, p. 275. The phrase was also sometimes rendered as "military northern expedition, bureaucratic southern expe-dition" (chun-shih pei-fa, kuan-liao nan-fa). See Lloyd Eastman, "The Abortive Revolution, China Under Nationalist Rule 1927-1937," unpublished manuscript, p. 7. I am profoundly indebted to Professor Eastman for lending me a copy of his manuscript, from which I gained many new perspectives and insights. 33Eastman,~ "Abortive," pp. 9-12. 34 For example, see Chiang K'ai-shek's speech of 12 November, 1930, to the Fourth Plenary Session of the Third CEC-CSC, in which he launched a s t i f f attack on incompetence and corruption in the Party. KWCP 7.46 (24 November, 1930), articles, pp. 6-9. 35 For details, see Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 225-244. 36 Hu Shih, Liang Shih-ch'iu, and Lo Lung-chi, Jen-ch'u'an- lun chi (Collected essays on the rights of man; Shanghai, Hsin-yiieh shu-tien, 1931), p. 8. Emphasis in the original. 3 7Grieder, p. 240. 38 The memorial meetings were held by the Kuomintang every Monday morning in honor of Sun Yat-sen. They represented another aspect of Sun's deification, but they also frequently served as a forum for important p o l i t i c a l speeches. 199 39NCH, 14 September, 1929, p. 397. 40 uGrieder, p. 244. 41 A detailed discussion of the T'aiyuan Constitution is beyond the scope of this study, but an idea of what i t emphasized can be gleaned from the length -- shown in the text above both in terms of the number of chapters and the percentage of the total --of the chapters devoted to the various subjects i t covered. 42SNTL, p. 171. FCYT, p. 240. 43 Han Ssu, comp., K'an! Cheng-hsu'eh hsi (Look! the P o l i t i c a l Studies Clique; Hong Kong, Hua-nan ch'u-pan-she, 1947), p. 13. Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China 1927-1937, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 67. -44 JKP_, 1 November, 1930, p. 2. See also the rejoinders to the criticisms leveled by the editorial in TKP, 2 November, 1930, p. 4, and 3 November, 1930, p. 4. 45 T'ang, Wang Ching-wei, p. 215. 46KWCP 7.40 (13 October, 1930), ta-shih,pp. 2-4 and CWR 54.6 (11 October, 1930), pp. 202-204 contain the texts of the telegrams.' 4 7T'ang, Wang Ching-wei, p. 222. SNTL, p. 180. KWCP 9.4 (18 January, 1932), articles p. 5. CWR 56.2 (14 March, 193177 pp. 42-45. TKP, 8 October, 1930, p. 4. TKP remarked that Chiang's proposals reflected his personal views and did not recognize any part of the Enlarged Conference's program. Then the paper e l l i p t i c a l l y pointed out that the government and its opponents were now (by curious coincidence) largely at one in their solutions to Party problems and their policies for the future. 48KWCP 7.43 (3 November, 1930), ta-shih, p. 2. 49CWR 54.10 (8 November, 1930), p. 346. 50 For a more detailed account of these events, see James Shirley, "Control of the Kuomintang After Sun Yat-sen's Death," JAS 25.1 (November 1965), pp. 69-82. 200 51 See, for example, Lin Han-sheng, "Wang Ching-wei and the Japanese Peace Efforts," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1967, pp. 52-53. T'ang Wang Ching-wei, p. 109. Shirley, "Pol i t i c a l Conflict in the Kuomintang: The Career of Wang Ching-wei to 1932," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Berkeley), 1962, p. 127. SNTL, p. 191. Melville T. Kennedy Jr., "Hu Han-min: Aspects of his Pol i t i c a l Thought," Papers  on China, 5(Cambridge, Harvard University Committee on International and Regional Studies, 1950), p. 77. 52Mayer to Stimson, February 20, 1928, 893.00 P.R./3, FRUS, 1928, I I , p. 121. Harley F. MacNair, China in Revolution, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 132. Kennedy, "Hu Han-min," p. 79. Ch'ien, The Government and Politics of China, p. 96. 53 See Hu Han-min, "Hsiin-cheng ta-kang t'i-an shuo-ming shu" (An explanation of the proposed outline of p o l i t i c a l tutelage), KWCP 5.37 (23 September, 1928), articles,pp. 1-4, for a more detailed explanation of his plan. 54 According to Article 19 of the Outline of National Reconstruc-tion, the five Yuan were only to be established at the start of the constitutional period. Hu Han-min was f u l l y aware of this fact, yet he s t i l l considered the immediate institution of the five-power system essential. His willingness to violate Sun's timetable so blatantly is a measure of the strength of his feelings on the subject. 55 FCYT, pp. 252-253. Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and  Politics of China, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 153-155. 56KWCP 5.32 (19 August, 1928), articles,p. 4. , 5 7 I b i d . , pp. 1-2, and 5.33 (26 August, 1928), articles,p. 1. 5 8 I b i d . , 5.32 (19 August, 1928), articles, pp. 1-2, 5.33 (26 August, 1928), articles,p. 6. 59 Hu Han-min, "Ko-ming kuo-ch'eng chung chih chi-chien shih-shih" (A few historical facts about the course of the revolution), San-min chu-i yu'eh-k'an (Three peoples' principles monthly) 2.6 (15 December, 1933), pp. 102-103. FCYT, pp. 252-253. 6 0Hu Han-min, "Ko-ming kuo-ch'eng chung," p. 101. FCYT, pp. 252-253. ' 201 KWCP 6.12 (31 March, 1929), articles,p. 2. Chiang Yung-ching, "Hu Han-min hsien-sheng nien-p'u kao" (A draft chronological biography of Mr. Hu Han-min), Wu Hsiang-hsiang, ed., Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih ts'ung-k'an (Review of modern Chinese history), 3(1962), pp. 267-268. p. 98. 62 Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, 63 See, for example, Kennedy, "Hu Han-min," p. 81, and Kennedy, "The Kuomintang and Chinese Unification, 1928-1931," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1958, p. 71. 64 The relevant portion of the Ko-ming fang-lu'eh may be found in Kuo-fu ch'u'an-chi (Complete works of the founding father), comp. by the Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang chung-yang tang-shih shih-liao pien-tsuan wei-yuan-hui (Central Party history compilation committee of the Chinese Kuomintang; Taipei, 1965), 3 Vols., I, Part 3, p. 2. Instead of using the terms chun-cheng shih-ch'i (period of military government), hsiin-cheng shih-ch'i (period of tutelary government), and hsien-cheng  shih-ch'i (period of constitutional government), the Ko-ming fang-lu'eh uses the terms chun-fa chih chih (rule by martial law"), yueh-fa chih  chih (rule by provisional constitution), and hsien-fa chih chih (rule by constitution). It called for a yueh-fa to be drawn up for the intermediate period, which was to last for six years. Some argued that the Ko-ming fang-lu'eh was superseded by Sun's later writings, yet these same people generally didn't hesitate to draw on the former i f they were unable to ju s t i f y their proposals with the latter. 65 Hu Han-min, "Ko-ming kuo-ch'eng chung," pp. 114-115. SNTL, pp. 181-182 also reproduces part of the account. cc Pan Wei-tung, The Chinese Constitution, (Washington, D.C., Institute of Chinese Culture, 1945), p. 241. 67W.Y. Tsao, The Constitutional Structure of Modern China, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1947, p. 9. Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China, pp. 153-155. 68 Chiang Yung-ching, pp. 283 and 286 gives convenient summaries of some of Hu's speeches and essays against the dissidents. 69 SNTL, pp. 180-181. Lei's contention is indirectly born out by KWCP 7.40 (T3 October, 1930), ta-shih, pp. 2-4, which explains that although the telegrams were sent on October 3rd, there was a delay in transmission and they weren't received in Nanking for several days. Most newspapers did not print them until the sixth or later. 202 70SNTL, p. 181. 7^Chiang Yung-ching, p. 286. 72Hu's speech is in KWCP 7.46 (24 November, 1930), a r t i c l e s , pp. 2-5. This issue of KWCP contains a record of the Plenum's proceedings on pp. 1-20 of the articles section. For a glimpse of what went on behind the scenes, see Chiang Yung-ching, pp. 287-290. 73 Chiang Yung-ching, p. 287. Hollington Tong, Chiang K a i - shek Soldier and Statesman, (Shanghai, The China Publishing Co., 1937), Vol. 1, p. 313. 7 4Chiang Yung-ching, pp. 288-289. . 75 Chi-1ien, "Chung-kuo cheng-chih," p. 2, reproduces part of the a r t i c l e . 7fi Tien Hung-mao, p. 23. 7 7CYB, 1931, p. 568. 7 8S^TL, p. 182. 79KWCP 8.8 (2 March, 1931), ta-shih, p. 7. 80SNTL, p. 183. 8 10n the silver loan, see KWCP 8.9 (9 March, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 1-2. CWR 56.2 (14 March,1931), pp. 42-45. FCYT, p. 268. FCYT, a work written by Hu's followers, denies that the silver loan played any part in Hu's eventual arrest. The fact remains, however, that Hu had written articles in support of the loan, and Chiang K'ai-shek could hardly have approved. 82 For accounts of the arrest, see Hu Han-min, "Ko-ming kuo-ch'eng chung," pp. 109 f f . !_TL, pp. 183-194. FCYT pp. 256-257. Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, et _al., T'ao-Chiang yen-lun chi (Collected anti-Chiang messages; Canton, 1931), p. 62. 83KWCP 8.9 (9 March, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 1 & 4. NCH, 3 March, 1931, p. 282. 8 4Ge day Doran, 1932), p. 201 84 George Sokolsky, The Tinder Box of Asia, (New York, Double-203 85SNTL, p. 198. FCYT, pp. 276-282. ftp, NCH, 10 March, 1931, p. 318. FCYT, p. 276. FCYT incorrectly gives the date of the telegram as the 12th. R7 Q/KWCP 8.9 (9 March, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 4-5. SNTL, pp. 195-196. Apparently Hu was genuinely sick, though not seriously so. He himself later remarked that he was just suffering from a bout of nerves and high blood pressure caused by the shock of his arrest. 00KWCP 8.9 (9 March, 1931), ta-shih, p. 4. NCH, 10 March, 1931, p. 318. 89 Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo ejt aj_., T'ao Chiang, pp. 63-64. KWCP 8.10 (16 March, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 1-2. on FCYT, pp. 257-259. KWCP 8.10 (16 March,1931), ta-shih,pp. 2-3. NCH, 17 March, 1931, p. 355. 204 CHAPTER II FOOTNOTES ]CWR 56.13 (30 May, 1931), p. 486, 57.6 (11 July, 1931), p. 283. For further confirmation of the early i n i t i a t i o n of secret talks aimed at a starting a heterodox movement, see FCYT, pp. 275, 322, 342, SNTL, pp. 196, 199, Tsou Lu, pp. 326-327. NCH," 23 June, 1931, p. 395. ? Diana CM. Lary, "The Kwangsi Clique in Kuomintang P o l i t i c s , 1921-1936," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London University, 1968, p. 316. -I am indebted to Professor Lary for sending me a copy of her dissertation, which was extremely helpful to me in gaining a better understanding of the Extraordinary Conference. 3NCH, 5 May, 1931, p. 146, and 12 May, 1931, p. 187. The conference may have taken place on the 25th. The two articles conflict on the precise date. 4NCH, 5 May, 1931, p. 146. .5 See Appendix I for a translation of the telegram. 6Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, et_ al_., T'ao-Chiang, p. 77. 7KWCP 8.24 (22 June, 1931), ta-shih, p. 3. CWR 57.4 (27 June, 1931), p. 135. FCYT, p. 323. 8CWR 58.7 (17 October, 1931), p. 253. 9KWCP 8.18 (11 May, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 1-5. NCH, 5 May, 1931, pp. 146-147. CWR 56.10 (9 May, 1931), pp. 339-341. 10NCH, 19 May, 1931, pp. 218-219. 11FCYT, pp. 344-336. 12 Most of the text of the telegram is given in FCYT, pp. 310-311. 205 13 FCYT, p. 326. Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo et aJL , T'ao-Chiang, p. 65. China Mail, 27 May, 1931, p. 1. 14 The speech is recorded in FCYT, pp. 334-336. 1 50n the confusion, see CWR 56.13 (30, May, 1931), p. 459, and 57.1 (6 June 1931), p. 8. NCH, 26 May, 1931, p. 254. ^ 6For details of the formation of the new government, see FCYT, pp. 393-400. SNTL, p. 203. ^7The State Council consisted of: T'ang Shao-i, Wang Ching-wei, Hsiao Fo-ch'eng, Lin Sen, Ku Ying-fen, Sun Fo, Li Tsung-jen, Ch'en Chi-t'ang, Chiang Tsun-kuei, Tsou Lu, Hsu Ch'ung-chih, Teng Tse-ju, T'ang Sheng-chih, Li Lieh-chun, Ch'en Yu-jen, and Hsiung K'e-wu. Wu Ch'ao-shu was later added. Li Lieh-chLinremained in Shanghai and never took up his appointment. The standing committee consisted of T'ang Shao-i, Wang Ching-wei, Ku Ying-fen, Sun Fo, and Tsou Lu. Teng Tse-ju was later added. Li Wen-fan, Liu Chi-wen, Kuo T'ai-ch'i (Quo Tai-chi), Fu Ju - l i n , Ch'ii Fang-p'u, Feng Chu-wan, Mai Huan-chang, Teng Ch'ing-yang, and Ch'en Chung-fu comprised the Po l i t i c a l Council. Lo I -ch'un was later added. Li Wen-fan, Liu Chi-wen, and Mai Huan-chang made up the standing committee. See FCYT, pp. 393-400. SNTL, p. 203. 18FCYT, pp. 324-325. NCH, 12 May, 1931, p. 184. 1 9The essay is in FCYT, pp. 320-321. 20 ^ uPan, p. 249. 21 Sir Kenneth C. Wheare, Modern Constitutions, (London, Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 42. ?? Johnson to Secretary of State, 18 December, 1930, 893.00 P.R./40, FRUS, 1930, I I , p. 67. 23 An account of the Plenary Session is in KWCP 8.24 (22 June, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 6-8. 24 This discussion of the customs takeover is based on FCYT, p. 404. CWR 57.3 (20 June, 1931), p. 92, 57.4 (27 June, 1931), pp. 134-135, 57.6 (11 July, 1931), pp. 234-235. NCH, 16 June, 1931, pp. 363 and 365. 206 25 Information on the new taxes and bonds is widely scattered. See, for example, NCH, 23 June, 1931, p. 395, 28 July, 1931, pp. 112 & 118, 25 August, 1931, p. 254, 22 September, 1931, p. 405, 29 September, 1931, pp. 442 & 443, 5 January, 1932, p. 7. CWR. 57.2 (13 June, 1931), pp. 52 & 76, 57.7 (18 July, 1931), p. 255, 57.9 (1 August, 1931), pp. 338 & 362, 57.10 (8 August, 1931), p. 378, 57.12 (August, 1931), pp. 456-457, 57.13 (29 August, 1931), pp. 526-527, 58.2 (12 September, 1931), p. 78. 26CWR 57.12 (22 August, 1931), p. 457. 27CWR 57.8 (25 July, 1931),.p. 296. NCH, 28 July, 1931, p. 110. 28 James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu- hsiang, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 261~ on ^KWCP 8.24 (22 June, 1931), j i h - c h i , p. 1 , 8.25 (29 June, 1931), ta-shih, p. 4. CWR 57.3 (20 June, 1931), p. 91. JUKWCP 8.29 (27 July, 1931), ta-shih, p. 1. FCYT, pp. 422-425. 3 1KVO8.30 (3 August, 1931), j i h - c h i , p. 1, 8.31 (10 August, 1931), j i h - c h i , p. 1, 8.32 (17 August, 1931), ta-shih, p. 3. CYB, 1931, p. 544. CWR 57.11 (15 August, 1931), p. 418. FCYT, pp. 426-428. 32FCYT, p. 427. KWCP 8.32 (17 August, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 2-3. NCH, 11 August, 1931, p. 182. CWR 57.11 (15 August, 1931), pp. 416-417. 33 Gi11 i n , Warlord, p. 133. 34CWR 57,.5 (8 August, 1931), p. 375. 35KWCP 8.25 (29 June, 1931), ta-shih, p. 4. CWR 57.3 (20 June, 1931), p. 191. 36CWR 57.5 (4 July, 1931), pp. 172-173. 3 7See, for example, NCH, 2 June, 1931, p. 295. 38 The murky realm of opium trafficking is d i f f i c u l t to document, but the press was f i l l e d with reports that Kwangsi was sending opium to Kwangtung. See, for example, CWR 57.6 (11 July, 1931), pp. 211 & 213, 57.4 (27 June, 1931), pp. 134-135. 207 •3Q CWR 57.6 (11 July, 1931), p. 238. 40KWCP 8.26 (6 July, 1931), ta-shih, p. 5, 8.27 (13 July, 1931), ta-shih, p. 3. CWR 57.5 (4 July, 1931), pp. 174-175, 57.6 (11 July, 1931), pp. 237-238. 41 On the s p l i t resulting from the peace overtures, see CWR 57.12 (22 August, 1931), p. 457, 57.13 (29 August, 1931), p. 500, 58.1 (5 September, 1931), pp. 6 & 37. KWCP 8.36 (14 September, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 1-2. 42FCYT, pp. 449-453. p. 4. 4 3 I b i d , p. 448. KWCP 8.37 (21 September, 1931), ta-shih, 4 4See KWCP 8.37 (21 September, 1931), j i h - c h i , p. 1, 8.38 (28 September, 193TT, ta-shih, pp. 2-3. CWR 58.4 (26. September, 1931), p. 158, 58.5 (3 October, 1931), pp. 197-198. NCH, 22 September, 1931, p. 400. 45FCYT, pp. 469-470. 4 6CYB, 1931-1932, p. 385. 47Gaimusho, "han-Sho undo," (PVM 57), pp. 16-23. 4 8 I b i d . , pp. 24-30. 49CWR 57.8 (25 July, 1931), p. 295. 50CWR 57.9 (1 August, 1931), p. 338. NCH, 28 July, 1931, p. 115. 51 For further information about Yamada, see Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967, reprint of the 1954 edition), pp. 146, 165-166, & 171 5 2 I b i d . , p. 96. 5 3 I b i d . , pp. 165-166. °TWR 57.9 (1 August, 1931), pp. 332-333. 208 55Gaimusho, "han-Sho undo," (PVM 57), pp. 77-83, 202-237. The newspapers said there were only two meetings, but the Japanese transcripts record three of them. 5 6 I b i d . , pp. 101-104. 57CWR 58.13 (28 November, 1931), pp. 504-505. 58Gaimusho, "han-Sho undo," (PVM 57), pp. 115-118. 59Gaimusho, "Shina nairan," (S, pp. 274-276. fin Ibid., pp. 277-283, contains the. record of this discussion. Also see pp. 284-285. fil For information on the preliminary peace talks, see FCYT, pp. 457-461. CWR 58.6 (10 October, 1931), p. 239. 62FCYT, pp. 461-463. KWCP 8.42 (26 October, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 5-6. 6 3 I b i d . , ta-shih, p. 3. FCYT, p. 468. NCH, 27 October, 1931, p. 120. 6 40n the conference, see T'eng Hsia, "Shang-hai hui-i" (The Shanghai conference), KWCP 8.44 (9 November, 1931), articles,pp. 1-18. Also see FCYT, pp. 457-489. 65 Information about the speech and the controversy i t caused may be found in T'eng Hsia. "Shang-hai hui-i," pp. 8-11. FCYT, pp. 484-485. NCH, 2 November, 1931, p. 154. China Mail, 3 November, 1931, p. 12. Memorandum by the Minister in China (Johnson), 2 November, 1931, 893.00/11685, FRUS, 1931, I I I , pp. 354-357. 66KWCP 8.43 (2 November, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 6-7. 67FCYT, pp. 501-502. KWCP 8.47 (30 November, 1931), ta-shih, p. 2. 6 8Estimates of the number of delegates who departed vary widely. Newspapers at the time reported that 250 had l e f t , but sources friendly to Ch'en Chi-t'ang say that number was deliberately inflated by Sun Fo and Wang Ching-wei. They do concede, however, that "over 160" did leave. See FCYT, pp. 502, 514, 520, & 524. KWCP 8.48 (7 December, 1931), ta-shih, p. 6. CWR 59.2 (12 December, 1931), p. 41. 209 CQ °^ Gaimusho, "Shina nairan," (S, pp. 330-334. 7 0 I b i d . , pp. 330-334, 338-339, 368-371. CWR 58.13 (28 Novem-ber, 1931), p. 478, 59.1 (5 December, 1931), p. 8. NCH, 1 December, 1931, p. 298. 71Gaimusho, "Shina nairan," (S, pp. 368-371. 7 2 I b i d . , pp. 330-334, 359-360. KWCP 8.49 (14 December, 1931), ta-shih, p. 3. CWR 58.13 (28 November, 1937)7 p. 478, 59.1 (5 December, 1931), p. 9. 73CWR 59.1 (5 December, 1931), p. 9. 74Gaimusho, "Shina nairan," (S, pp. 359-360. CWR 58.13 (28 November, 1931), p. 478. 75NCH, 24 November, 1931, p. 271. 76Gaimush6, "Shina nairan," (S, pp. 402-404. 7 70n the formula and i t s acceptance, see FCYT, pp. 509-511. KWCP 8.48 (7 December, 1931), ta-shih, p. 6. CWR 59.2 (12 December, 1931), p. 43. 78FCYT, pp. 512-513. KWCP 8.48 (7 December, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 6-7. NCH, 8 December, 1931, p. 334. 7Q FCYT, p. 513. CWR 59.2 (12 December, 1931), p. 43. 80 Here again, the figures are in dispute. Even sources hostile to Wang concede that he eventually assembled 160 followers in Shanghai. Wang claimed the number was 250. Some of them seem to have come from places other than Canton, and this fact may account, at least in part, for the discrepancy. See FCYT, pp. 514, 520 & 524. KWCP 8.48 (7 December, 1931), ta-shih, p. 6." 81FCYT, pp. 519-529. KWCP 8.48 (7 December, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 6-7. Harold Isaacs, Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction, (Shanghai, the China Forum Pub!ishing~Co., 1932), p. 100. 8 2For details of the meeting, see FCYT, p. 544. KWCP 9.1 (1 January, T932), ta-shih, p. 8. 210 83Gaimush6, "Shina nairan," (S, pp. 324-326. FCYT, p. 521. Isaacs, p. 101. CWR 59.9 (30 January, 1932), p. 270. SNTL, p. 209. 84FCYT, p. 521. 8 5For details, see FCYT, p. 534, and T'eng Hsia, "Chiang Chieh-shih tz'u kuo-fu chu-hsi" (Chiang K'ai-shek resigns as Chairman of the National Government), KWCP 8.50 (21 December, 1931), articles p. 11. 8 6John Israel, Student Nationalism in China 1927-1937, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 75-76. 87FCYT, p. 543. 8 8 I b i d . , pp. 545-546. NCH, 29 December, 1931, p. 439. 89 For convenient accounts of the Plenum, see KWCP 9.2 (4 January, 1932), articles,pp. 1-13, and FCYT, pp. 545-549. 90 For a f u l l l i s t of the members of the new government, see Appendix II I . The dissidents were also well represented in less c r i t i c a l portfolios like the Ministries of Industry, Justice and the Railways. See Appendix VI for their representation on the highest Kuomintang Councils. 91CWR 59.8 (23 January, 1932), p. 246. 9? NCH, 5 January, 1932, p. 39. 9 3See CWR 59.7 (16 January, 1932), p. 207. This source claims that Canton also retained the customs surplus. However, Sir Frederick Maze, Commissioner of Customs, issued a statement refuting the persistent reports that Kwangtung and Kwangsi were retaining customs revenue. He said they resumed regular remittances to the central administration on January 1, 1932. See The China C r i t i c 5.5 (4 February, 1932), p. 152. Arthur Young, an advisor to the Nanking government, also said Canton resumed regular payments. See Arthur N. Young, China's  Nation-Building Effort, 1927-1937. The Financial and Economic Record. (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1971). 94 CWR 59.7 (16 January, 1932), pp. 201, 207. 9 51bid., p. 201. 211 96CWR 59.9 (30 January, 1932), p. 285. 97 Wu Ch'ao-shu had ex p l i c i t l y told the American Minister to China that Canton "did not wish to deprive i t s e l f of the very considerable talents of General Chiang K'ai-shek." See Memorandum by the Minister in China (Johnson), 2 November, 1931, 893.00/11685, FRUS, 1931, I I I , pp. 354-357. 98 Either he was genuinely sick or he was a superlative actor. Newsmen reported that he had d i f f i c u l t y walking and had to be supported by his assistants. He took sedan chairs for even the shortest trips because he was unable to cover the distance on foot. See, for example, KWCP 9.5 (25 January, 1932), ta-shih, p. 2, 9.6 (1 February, 1932), ta-shih, pp. 1-2. qq For l i s t s of his v i s i t o r s , see KWCP 9.4 (18 January, 1932), ta-shih, p. 6, 9.5 (25 January, 1932), ta-shih, p. 2. Chou Fo-hai's v i s i t on the 16th may seem surprising since his name is usually associated with Wang Ching-wei's wartime puppet government. However, in 1932 Chou was a Chiang K'ai-shek supporter and a ranking member of the CC Clique. 100KWCP 9.5 (25 January, 1932), ta-shih, p. 2. 1 0 1The date of Chiang's return is usually given as 21 January, the same day that Wang returned. This is incorrect, for Chiang spent the night .of the 21st in T'angshan, claiming heavy rain prevented him from continuing the short distance to Nanking. He had earlier told a reporter that he would enter Nanking the day after Wang Ching-wei. When Wang arrived at the Nanking railroad station there was a large crowd on hand in addition to the usual reception committee of government dignitaries. One might speculate that Chiang delayed his arrival because he did not want to compete with Wang for attention. See KWCP 9.6 (1 February, 1932), ta-shih, pp. 1-2. 1 0? Others who resigned included Li Wen-fan as Minister of the Interior, Ch'en Ch'u'n as Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister of the Interior, Fu Ping-ch'ang as Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Huang Han-liang as Minister of Finance, Yeh Kung-cho as Minister of Railways, and Ma Ch'ao-ch'un as Mayor of Nanking. 1 03 Ching Ch'ih, "Cheng-fu ch'ien-Lo shih yu pao-Jih chu'eh-tou" (The government moves to Loyang and vows to struggle resolutely against the Japanese attack), KWCP 9.7 (22 February, 1932), articles,pp. 4-5. KWCP 9.6 (1 February, 1932), ta-shih, p. 1. NCH 2 February, 1932, p.150. 104KWCP 9.11 (21 March, 1932), ta-shih, p. 6. 212 CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES 'See the introduction for a definition and discussion of regional ism. 2 Gourlay, p. 5. 3 This interpretation is somewhat impressionistic and derives from an examination and synthesis of broadly scattered sources. Some of the most important are: NCH, 5 May, 1931, p. 146, 12 May, 1931, p. 187. CWR 57.5 (4 July, 193lT7"pp. 169-170, 175. 4NCH, 19 May, 1931, p. 128. CWR 56.12 (23 May, 1931), pp. 412, 415. 5NCH, 30 June, 1931, p. 431, 7 July, 1931, p. 3. CWR 57.4 (27 June, 1931), p. 135, 57.6 (4 July, 1931), pp. 171, 174. 6KWCP 8.19 (18 May, 1931), ta-shih, p. 2. NCH, 12 May, 1931, p. 184. 7CWR 57.9 (1 August, 1931), pp. 336-337. Canton may have sent an additional one million yuan to Shih, though his revolt was so short-lived that i t probably would not have reached him. See Ibid., p. 362. 8 H a l l e t t Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1943), p. 198. Kurt Bloch, "Warlordism: A Transitory Stage in Chinese Government," American Journal of Sociology, 43.5 (March 1938), p. 698. Charles Drage, Two Gun Cohen, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1954), pp. 206-207. At the outbreak of the war with Japan, Ch'en Chi-t'ang was able to contribute between seven and ten million yuan to the Nationalist war chest without any d i f f i c u l t y . 9CWR 57.5 (4 July, 1931), pp. 169-170. °^By this time, Ch'en Chiung-ming had long been branded an arch-villain of the revolution. He was known as the man who had betrayed the immortal Sun Yat-sen. This exaggerated stereotype, of course, did not do Ch'en justice. For a more balanced assessment of 213 the part he played in the revolution, see Hsieh, "The Ideas and Ideals of a Warlord: Ch'en Chiung-ming (1878-1933)," and Gourlay, "The Kuomintang and the Rise of Chiang K'ai-shek, 1920-1824." ^Lary, pp. 309-310. 1 2 I b i d . , p. 363. 1 3 I b i d , p. 364. 1 4To get an idea of the degree to which this regional rivalry was reflected in the highest posts in the Party and government, both before and after the Extraordinary Conference, see Appendices II through VI. 1 5See, for example, TKP, 20 May, 1931, p. 4. 16CWR 57.2 (13 June, 1931), p. 46. 17NCH, 19 May, 1931, p. 224. 1 8 I b i d . See also FCYT, p. 244. 19NCH, 16 June, 1931, p. 363. 20NCH, 23 June, 1931, p. 394, 7 July, 1931, p. 3. 21 There are, for example, specific references to Chiang's repressive and authoritarian practices with regard to advice and criticism of his policies in the impeachment telegram of April 30, 1931. See Appendix I. ?? See, for example, FCYT, pp. 376, 440. Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, et al_., T'ao Chiang, p. 36. CWR 57.5 (4 July, 1931), p. 173. 23 See, for example, Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, et al_., T'ao  Chiang, pp. 65-66. 2 4See, for example, NCH, 19 May, 1931, p. 222, 13 October, 1931, pp. 43-44, 20 October, 1931, p. 86, 3 November, 1931, p. 155. CWR 56.13 (30 May, 1931), p. 458. See, for example, Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, et aj_., T'ao Chiang, pp. 74-77. 214 26 For concise accounts of the lives of Hsiao and Teng, see the entries in Boorman and Howard, eds., Biographical Dictionary of  Republican China, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1967-1971). 2 7Tsou Lu, I I , p. 329. 28 It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a comprehensive account of Chiang's ideology. We shall confine ourselves to key elements that help to explain his behavior in 1931-1932. Conspicuously absent from our discussion w i l l be any mention of the traditional and Christian strands in his thinking. For a f u l l e r treatment of Chiang's ideology, see Loh, "The Ideological Persuasion of Chiang K'ai-shek," Modern Asian Studies 4.3 (1970), pp. 211-238. Chester C. Tan, Chinese  Pol i t i c a l Thought in the Twentieth Century, (New York, Doubleday, 1971), pp. 162-175. 29 Loh, The Early Chiang K'ai-shek, p. 56. 30 S.I. Hsiung, The Life of Chiang K'ai-shek, (London, Peter Davies,1948), p. 46. 31 Loh, The Early Chiang K'ai-shek, p. 62. 3 2 I b i d . , p. 63. 33Abend, p. 234. 34 Loh, The Early Chiang K'ai-shek, p. 62. 35 S . J . Woolf, "Introduction," in S . J . Woolf, ed., European  Fascism, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 1. 36 H.R. Trevor-Roper, "The Phenomenon of Fascism," in Woolf, ed., p. 20. 37NCH, 6 A p r i l , 1929, p. 7. 38 See for example, Chi Lien, "Hsien-cheng neng chiu Chung-kuo?" (Can constitutional rule save China?), in KWCP 9.18 (9 May, 1932), a r t i c l e s , esp. p. 4. 39 Ibid. Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, et aJL , T'ao Chiang,pp. 19-20. 40 Chi Lien, "Hsien-cheng," p. 4. 215 41 For a fu l l e r discussion of the intellectuals who turned toward dictatorship, see Charlotte Furth, Ting Wen-chiang: Science  and China's New Culture, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 214-221. Eastman, "Abortive," pp. 229-256. See also Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, "Min-chu cheng-chih hu? chi-ch'u'an kuo-chia hu?" (Democ-racy? Dictatorship?), Tung-fang tsa-chih (The eastern miscellany), 31.1 (1 January, 1934), pp. 17-27, and Ting Wen-chiang, "Min-chu cheng-chih yii tu-ts'ai cheng-chih" (Democracy and dictatorship), Tu-li p'ing- lun (The independent c r i t i c ) , 133 (30 December, 1934), pp. 4-7. 4? See the speeches recorded in KWCP 8.9 (9 March, 1931), ta-shih,pp. 1, 4-5, 8.10 (16 March, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 2-3. For a later speech of related interest, see KWCP 8.37 (21 September, 1931), ta-shih, p. 4. 4 3 H i s statement may be found in KWCP 8.12 (30 March, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 3-4. Most writers insist on calling Chiang the president of China during the period under consideration. He was, in fact, Chairman of the National Government, and calling him president is patently incorrect. The problem is not merely one of a translator's discretion in rendering t i t l e s , for in 1931 the question of whether or not Chiang was trying to use the National People's Convention to change his t i t l e from that of chairman (chu-hsi) to that of president (tsung-t'ung) was of major significance. 44 Young, p. 103. 45 Eastman, "Fascism in Kuomintang China: The Blue Shirts," The China Quarterly 49 (January-March 1972), p. 2. 46 Ibid., p. 3. 4 7Blue Shirt Society (Lan-i she) was an unofficial name. For details on the various names of the Blue Shirts, see Ibid., p. 1. 48Eastman, "Abortive," p. 55. 49 Allen B. Linden, "Politics and Education in Nationalist China: The Case of the University Council, 1927-1928," JAS 27.4 (August 1968), p. 776. 5 0 I b i d . 5 1 Ibid.- p. 775. 216 5 2See, for example, NCH, 10 November, 1931, p. 192. 53 John Israel, Student Nationalism in China 1927-1937, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 75. NCH, 22 December, 1931, p. 402. 54 Eastman, "Fascism," p. 20. 55 D 0 I b i d . 56 Even the New Life Movement, which has often been described as a revival of traditional morality, derived much of i t s inspiration from fascism. See Ibid., pp. 18-22. 57 Li Tsung-jen went north as an observer, but he never l e f t Shanghai. 58T'eng Hsia, "Chiang Chieh-shih," pp. 3-4. KWCP 9.2 (4 January, 1932), articles,pp. 11-12. CO A l i s t of the delegates is in KWCP 9.6 (1 February, 1932), ta-shih, pp. 9-10. See also NCH, 26 January, 1932, p. 111. 6 0For the plan, see KWCP 9.17 (2 May, 1932), ta-shih, p. 10. See also Eastman, "Abortive," pp. 201-206. 61NCH, 12 January, 1932, p. 39. CWR 59.7 (16 January, 1932), p. 221. China Mail, 13 January, 1932, p. 5. 62NCH, 26 January, 1932, p. 110. CWR 59.9 (30 January, 1932), p. 286. 63NCH, 12 January, 1932, p. 39. China Mail, 12 January, 1932, p. 6. 64 / Harley F. MacNair, China in Revolution, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 159. 65Eastman, "Abortive," pp. 422-425. 66 See, for example, Wang Ching-wei, China's Problems and  Their Solution, (Shanghai, China United Press,~1934), passim. 217 See, for example, Eastman, "Abortive," p. 257. 68K.B. Vaidya, Reflections on the Recent Canton Revolt and  After, 2nd edition, (Canton, K.B. Vaidya for National Publishers, Ltd., 1936), Section 5, p. 3. 69 Wang Ching-wei, China's Problems, pp. 60-61. 70Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, et al_., T'ao Chiang, pp. 18-19. Hollington Tong, Chiang K'ai-shek Soldier and Statesman, (Shanghai, The China Publishing Company, 1937), I, pp. 319-320. 218 CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES 'A.J.P. Taylor, The Hapsburg Monarchy 1809-1918, (London, 1948), p. 30. 2Mary C. Wright, "Introduction," pp. 54-55, Harold Z. Schiffrin, "The Enigma of Sun Yat-sen," p. 473, both in Wright, ed., China in  Revolution, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968). 3Eastman, "Abortive," pp. 437-438. 4Furth, p. 199. 5 Marie-Claire Bergere, "The Role of the Bourgeoisie," in Wright, ed., p. 246. ft Bergere, "Le Mouvement du 4 Mai 1919 en Chine: La Conjoncture Economique et le Role de la Bourgeoisie Nationale" (The May 4th Movement in China: The economic situation and the role of the national bourgeoisie), Revue Historique (Historical revue), 241.2 (1969), p. 314. I would li k e to thank Professor Edgar Wickberg for bringing Mme. Bergere's articles to my attention. 7 I b i d . , p. 316. o Ibid., p. 317. See also Berg&re, "La Bourgeoisie Chi noise et les Problemes du Developpement Economique (1917-1923)" (The Chinese bourgeoisie and problems of economic development), Revue D'Histoire  Moderne et Contemporaine (Revue of modern and contemporary history), 16.2 (April-June, 1969), p. 251. 9 Bergere, "Le Mouvement du 4 Mai," p. 317. °^It can be argued that the Sian Incident of 1936 was the most successful opposition movement of the Nanking decade. Much mystery s t i l l surrounds the event, but i t does seem to have played a c r i t i c a l role in modifying Chiang's policy toward the Communists and in altering his policy toward Japan. However,. Chiang s t i l l remained in command, and in fact emerged from his kidnapping in a position that was in many ways stronger than before. 219 1'Robert A. Dahl, Modern Politic a l Analysis, (Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963), p. 20. 1 p Lucian Pye, Warlord P o l i t i c s , (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1971), Chapter 7, especially pp. 114-117. Jerome Ch'en, "Defining Chinese Warlords and Their Factions," pp. 570-572. 13 The Fukien Rebellion of 1933, although i t was more radical than other opposition movements of the period, was s t i l l not premised on profound ideological differences with Nanking. It is quite true that the rebels abandoned the Three People's Principles and adopted many slogans with a Communist ring to them. However, the program of reform and socialism they advocated, when stripped of i t s propaganda trimmings, does not seem to have differed greatly from Sun's program. Indeed, the Third Party, which played an important part in the Fukien Rebellion, was consecrated to the perpetuation of the ideals of Sun Yat-sen. Its members, appalled by CCP excesses and KMT reaction, sought to provide an alternative to these two extremes. For further information on the Fukien Rebellion, see Eastman, "Abortive," pp. 123-186. 1 4 G i l l i n , Warlord, p. 123. B I B L I O G R A P H Y 220 BIBLIOGRAPHY Sources in Western Languages: Abend, Hallett. My Years in China, 1926-1941. (New York, Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1943). Barnes, Joseph, and Field, Frederick, V. Behind the Far Eastern Conflict. (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1933). Bate, Don. Wang Ching-wei: Puppet or Patriot? (Chicago, Ralph Fletcher Seymour, 1941). Bates, M. Searle. "Toward an Understanding of Chinese P o l i t i c s , " Pacific Affairs 5.23 (March, 1932), pp. 218-232, Bedeski, Robert E.. "The Politics of National Unification: China,1928-1936," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Berkeley), 1969. . 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"Hu Han-min chuan" & 4 J (Biography of Hu Han-min), Kuo-shih-kuan kuan-k'an l ^ X ^ l <'j (Journal of the National Historical Commission) 1.1 (December, 1947), pp. 68-69. Nihon, Gaimusho ft ^ £f ^ (Japan, Foreign Ministry), "Kanton Seifu^no shogai jiken zassan" % ^f-^a) >f *•-{- | ii£ l)r& (Miscellaneous documents relating to the diplomatic acti v i t i e s of the Canton Government), January-May, 1931. S Reel S 16. . "Showa 6-nen han-Sho undo kankei: Kanton Seifu ni taisuru Teikoku oyobi kakkoku no taido. Chin Yu-jin raicho kankei" (Documents relating to the anti-Chiang movement in 1931: The attitude of the various countries and Japan toward the Canton Government. Documents relating to the v i s i t of Ch'en Yu-jen to Japan), June-August, 1931. PVM 57. Reel P 69. . "Shina nairan kankei ikken" ^m^^fA^-^ (Documents relating to internal disorder in China). 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Wang Ching-wei wen-ts'un il^iij X (Collected writings of Wang Ching-wei; Shanghai, Ch'i-chih shu-chii , 1935). . Sun Fo , et aK T'ao-Chiang yen-lun chi M i§-%'i$5-1& (Collected anti-Chiang messages; Canton, 1931). Yao Yii-hsiang >JL it! . Hu Han-min hsien-sheng chuan (A biography of Mr. Hu Han-min; Taipei, Chung-yang wen-wu kung-ying she 1954). A P P E N D I C E S 231 APPENDIX I THE CIRCULAR TELEGRAM IMPEACHING CHIANG K'AI-SHEK ISSUED ON APRIL 30, 1931, BY CENTRAL SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS TENG TSE-JU, LIN SEN, HSIAO FO-CH'ENG, AND KU YING-FEN Chiang K'ai-shek disregards the law and betrays the Party. The signs of his rebellious activities are clearly evident. We are respectfully setting forth a l i s t of his criminal acts so that the council can mete out punishment sternly. In view of the Chang Cheng-i - Su Chi-kang a f f a i r , i t would appear that Mr. Chiang has envy in his heart and his nature has become malicious. On the basis of his a b i l i t y in military command, Tsung-li (Sun Yat-sen) conferred upon him the duty of training troops. Tsung-li died before he could f u l -f i l l his allotted span, and Chiang availed himself of succeeding events to usurp military power. In the end he took over the central government and monopolized national power. He secretly planted his own minions and intimidated men of experience. A l l comrades respect Tsung-li's Testament and are worried about the danger which faces the nation. They appreciated Chiang's a b i l i t y and bravery and have gone along with him, but in the past few years they have not known what he was after. His recklessness and oppression are becoming more profound, and this breeds calamity. His.obvious excesses are herewith set forth so that they may be publicly judged. 1. Tsung-li was a staunch believer in the enormity of the responsibilities shouldered by our Party. Therefore, in the 1924 reorganization he divided Party responsibil-232 i t i e s among Party personnel and also vested the powers of the Party equally in a l l members. Never was there the least bit of selfishness. In Tsung-li's address to the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, he dis-coursed exhaustively on this subject. But Mr. Chiang, in his speeches and talks, says each time that there was mutual trust between Tsung-li and the Kuomintang, and i f you are in a period of autocratic monarchy and the monarch dies, then the great o f f i c i a l s must receive the mandate and manage government af f a i r s , carrying on his devotion to duty. (Chiang) a r b i t r a r i l y named himself to succeed Tsung-li. In the end, his actions turned this Party into his private preserve, he heaped slanders on Tsung-li, and he looked contemptuously upon Party personnel. There can be nothing worse than this. 2. The Chinese communist party plunders, burns, and k i l l s , and the tragedy of i t such that the sun no longer shines. Its members a l l have animal passions and they cause every-one's hair to stand on end. In the beginning, the territory they held securely was small and the mob they assembled did not exceed 100,000. This allowed early planning for. their destruction, and a brigade or a division would have been sufficient to exterminate them. But Mr. Chiang raised troops for his own private ends. Consequently, the people of the four provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Fukien had their livers and brains spilled on the ground, their cottages 233 were laid waste, they suffered deprivations and hardships, and they did not know where to lay their plaint. From last winter to the present, over twenty divisions of troops have besieged the area, but the order for a general attack has not yet been announced. So that these communist bandit dregs of humanity could occupy strategic areas, Shao L i -tzu and others supplied the enemy with military secrets. The bandits used these to make their plans and they were able to avoid the substantial and attack the weak. Our soldiers fled for their lives in exhaustion, and the flame of the bandits has remained very bright up to the present day. 3. The prohibition of factions within the Party is a regulation that the Party collectively decided upon. Mr. Chiang sent out his night-prowler Ch'en Kuo-fu and others who relied on their positions in the central government to seize and occupy the Party branches of each province. The leading figures in the entire Party -- Ting Wei-fen and others --contributed their talents and became his henchmen. They secretly organized in each province and their eager a c t i v i -ties thereupon helped Hopei, Kiangsu, Shantung, Hunan, and Hupei to form the so-called 'Grand Alliance.' The people were oppressed by the savagery and lust of this leader and his disciples. If there was an incident in some loca l i t y they would secretly scheme and wriggle like worms in order to respond to their enemy. At the conclusion of every military operation, the CSC would receive a string of 234 accusations. Since Ch'en Kuo-fu received protection from many quarters, he waited until the accusations were trans-ferred to the CEC for settlement and i t responded with a hundred reasons to let him go. The original case of the CSC, however, remains entirely intact and can be re-opened. 4. Sung Tzu-wen (T.V. Soong) was originally only a poor scholar. However, he obtained assistance from his relatives in high places, and within a few years he became very wealthy. The wealth he enjoyed was equal to that of a king. During the several years he has handled finances, from Canton to the capital in Nanking, he has never kept registers or sent in accounts of receipts and disbursements. At the Second Dis-bandment Conference in 1929, when the investigation committee ordered him to report on the state of finances, he made excuses, resigned, and absconded to Shanghai. During his term of office in Canton, the disbursements made in his name without receipts amounted to more than several million (yuan). The Kwangtung Finance Office and the Central Bank of Kwangtung s t i l l have the accounts and they are available for scrutiny. (Sung) also received bribes amounting to a million yuan from certain opium merchants and he has for a long time been reproached in foreign quarters. In the purchase of bank notes, he has sedulously collected commissions; he has gobbled up funds from opium and gambling; he has completely controlled the money market; and he has sold o f f i c i a l posts. In the past six years, finance has never been in order. The flood 235 of public debts already exceeds 400,000,000 odd yuan. Mr. Chiang gives him free rein to perpetrate his evil and turns a deaf ear to anyone v/ho would speak to him about i t . 5. Members of the Po l i t i c a l Studies Clique, though they have been on the Party r o l l s , have been rebellious ever since Mr. Yuan usurped power. Insignificant troublemakers like Chang Shih-chao and Yang Yung-t'ai either turn to the warlords or resort to propaganda in order to oppose our Party. They even calumniate Tsung-li and the situation is so extreme that there is nothing they w i l l not resort to. In 1918, when Tsung-li went south to uphold the law, Yang Yung-t'ai colluded with the Kwangsi Clique, usurped p o l i t i c a l power, and expelled Tsung-li. When the Cantonese army had to come to the aid of Kwangsi in 1921, Yang Yung-t'ai, under the false orders of the northern government, went in person to Leichow as an emissary of peace and opposed the righteous army to help extend the power of the Kwangsi rebels. Prior to 1926, not a day passed when the Shih-shih hsin-pao in Shanghai didn't carry an editorial attacking the Party. Among a l l comrades there was no one who was not indignant. Now Chang thrives as a high advisor to the General Head-quarters of the Kuomintang, and nothing is carried out without f i r s t consulting him. Mr. Yang constantly follows along at his side and takes part in secret plots, and other dregs of humanity who rely on others for advancement are f i l l i n g important positions everywhere. Needless to say, Mr. Chiang appreciated his s k i l l at machinations and made use of him as a henchman, not realizing that he might bite the hand that fed him. That is to say, the plots of the Pol i t i c a l Studies Clique are more to be feared than those of the communist bandits. It is no exaggeration to say that their mischief behind the scenes was responsible for the splits among the comrades of this Party in recent years. Tsung-li cared for his comrades and was only afraid that his care would not embrace a l l of them. He was always too lenient and was definitely not harsh in his demands. There-fore, the comrades devoted their lives to the Party and the country, and there were none who were disaffected. Since the despotism of Mr. Chiang began, those equal to him in station have been forced out and his subordinates have met with disaster. Comrade Hsu Ch'ung-chih devoted himself to the revolution and never rested; he rushed to Fukien and Kiangsi and his exploits were b r i l l i a n t . Mr. Chiang spied on him until he caught him off his guard and then snatched away his military authority. He compelled him to leave Kwangtung and usurped his position. The revolutionary Kwangtung army in the end was destroyed. Chang Kuo-chen, Yang Chin-lung, and Liang Shih-feng a l l devoted themselves to the revolution and were attached to Hsu's headquarters, and a l l of them have been led on to their deaths. Comrade Hu T'ieh-ch'eng performed Chiang's bidding, endeavored to purge communists, and swore to protect the Party. Mr. Chiang suddenly com-237 promised with Borodin and imprisoned Wu in the Tiger gate for over 170 days. Among the rest of our comrades i t is impossible to calculate the number that have been confined or destroyed by him. Only those who were used by him were allowed to do as they wished. Chiang i s , of course, envious of men of merit, and he is especially afraid of men of a b i l i t y . Therefore, to subvert and entrap these comrades, he f i r s t has to fabricate crimes for them and publicize these among our countrymen. He relies on defiling their reputations and disparaging their personalities. Chiang regards only himself as capable of serving as leader of the Party; no one can contend with him. Therefore, those who seek after the great powers he holds have false charges brought against them, though very few of them ever come to public t r i a l . Most recently, for example, the head of the Legislative Yuan, Hu Han-min, was escorted to T'angshan under guard on May 1st. Those who escorted him were Shao Yuan-ch'ung, a member of the Legislative Yuan, and Wu Ssu-yii, the Nanking Police Chief. On March 4th, Mr. Chiang wired Canton, stating, "... Mr. Hu Chan-t'ang (Hu Han-min) absolutely insisted that the deliberations of the National People's Con-vention should not extend to a provisional constitution. I was afraid that this would give rise to endless chaos in the Party and the country. On the evening of February 28th I discussed the matter exhaustively with him. Since his p o l i t i c a l views did not f i t i n , Mr. Hu wished to resign from a l l his substantive and concurrent posts. Moreover, he wished to select a quiet 238 place to live and declined to see guests. He has therefore gone to T'angshan today to live temporarily. The rumors that are abroad are absolutely without foundation. ..." This statement is diametrically opposed to the facts. Later, friends who returned to Canton from Nanking and comrade Hu's bodyguards related that on the night of February 28th, comrade Hu was detained and his bodyguards were forced to surrender their weapons. On March 1st he was escorted to T'angshan under guard. They related in detail the circumstances of his transfer to his private residence on 2 Dragon Lane (in Nanking) on the 8th. To this very day, the 2 Dragon Lane residence i s s t i l l heavily guarded by troops; communications with the lane are s t i l l cut off; and visitors who hasten to see him are s t i l l banned. At the weekly memorial meeting, Chiang spoke of the question of freedom of Party personnel; furthermore, he publicly stated that comrade Hu could not leave Nanking. His i l l e g a l arrest is already common knowledge to people outside of China, yet Mr. Chiang continues to mix up truth and f a l s i t y and to turn the facts upside down. He seeks thereby to completely cover the eyes and ears of the world with one hand. By his own account, he dealt with comrade Hu in this way just because Hu opposed the National People's Convention and f e l t that a provisional constitution should not be discussed. Considering i t from the point of view of discipline, under the system of democratic centralism, a l l Party personnel are required to obey resolutions (once they have passed). But before a decision has been reached, they have complete freedom of discussion. Whether or not the deliberations of the Convention should extend to the provisional constitution is another question entirely, and for the moment we w i l l not discuss i t . With a matter that had not yet been passed as a Central Executive Committee resolution, i t cannot be adjudged a breach of discipline i f comrade Hu was only dis-cussing i t in a private residence with a handful of people. Even i f we suppose that an order had been issued, the power (to give the order) would be exercised by the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees and not on Mr. Chiang's responsibility alone. Just because he did not agree with what other people advocated in this matter, Mr. Chiang imposed his view by military intimidation. How is this different from Yuan Shih-k'ai's using soldiers and police to surround Parliament? Con-sidering the affair from the legal standpoint, opposition to discussion of the provisional constitution by the National People's Convention cannot be considered criminal conduct. If comrade Hu did contravene the criminal code, the case should be investigated according to the law. Mr. Chiang and comrade Hu are of the same rank, and in the final analysis, under what authority is an important o f f i c i a l of the central government arrested and imprisoned? Tse-ju and others therefore conclude that comrade Hu never offended against Party discipline and that Mr. Chiang has acted in a fashion that is not permissable under the laws of the nation. If the leader of the entire country has no scruples about breaking the law himself, who can believe that he w i l l unite China? 240 Tse-ju and others have together traced Mr. Chiang's everyday behavior to i t s source, and right up to his most recent actions, he has never done anything that did not have his personal position as i t s motivating premise. He has long since set aside the Great Plan for the Party and the nation. He allows bandits to grow big and strong in order to show people that no one other than himself can pacify them; he has scattered the Party f a i t h f u l , wishing to make use of the repul-siveness of the enemy to enhance his own electoral position; he monopolizes fiscal powers in order to consolidate his own military power; he injures his fellow Party members and expels progressives from the Party to insure that he w i l l himself become i t s center of gravity; he speaks extravagantly of the law, yet this is for no other reason than his hope of effecting a presidential system so as to expedite the rapid realization of his presidential pipedreams. In sum, Mr. Chiang's crimes have been completely and utterly exposed. The forgiving s p i r i t the comrades had of old, in the hope that he would do an about face and repent the havoc he has caused in national a f f a i r s , is now hopeless. Heretofore, Tsung-li suffered great hardship to achieve his momentous deeds, the people made untold sacrifices for the revolution, and the struggles of our armed comrades have gone on year after year. The result has been to build up the personal position of Mr. Chiang, who deals with others by means of sneak thievery and dangerous deception and shamelessly places himself above the people. The morality which our country has had for thousands of years is precisely what Tsung-li struggled earnestly to restore, and Chiang has contributed ceaselessly to i t s destruction. We have become the 241 laughing stock of nations and w i l l be ridiculed by posterity. How can affairs so painful to the heart of China have reached this ex-tremity? Quiet investigation of the present central government under the management of Mr. Chiang shows that just and loyal comrades are plundered by his military power and the government is hacked to pieces by his set-up. Thus, corruption increases daily and is detested by the people. Tse-ju and the others really cannot bear to allow this to cause the Party and the nation to perish together. The responsibil-i t i e s of office make i t even harder to remain silent. The ancients said, "In that which the heart considers dangerous, one dares not f a i l to bring forth an indictment." Therefore, we hasten to enumerate his crimes and bring forward an impeachment, and we await i t s public resolution. Let a l l comrades who care about the Party and the nation urgently give consideration to this a f f a i r . Source: Kuo-wen chou-pao 8.18 (11 May, 1931), ta-shih, pp. 1-3. APPENDIX II THE NANKING GOVERNMENT AS OF 16 FEBRUARY, 1931 Position Incumbent Native Province Pro-Nanking Pro-Canton Ambivalent Unknown Chekiang Kwangtung SE China S China Other Legislative Yuan head Hu Han-min Kwangtung X X X Deputy head Lin Sen Fukien X X Judicial Yuan head Wang Ch'ung-hui Kwangtung X X X Deputy head Chang Chi Chi hii X X Examination Yuan head Tai Chi-t'ao Chekiang X X X Deputy head Sun Fo Kwangtung X X X Control Yuan head Yii Yu-jen Shensi X X Deputy head Ch'en Kuo-fu Chekiang X X X Executive Yuan head Chiang K'ai-shek Chekiang X X X Deputy head T.V. Soong Kiangsu X X Ministries: Interior Liu Shang-ching Liaoning X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Wu T'ieh-ch'eng Kwangtung X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Chang Wo-hua Anhwei X X Foreign Affairs Wang Cheng-t'ing Chekiang X X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Li Ching-lun Kwangtung (U.S. born) X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Wang Chia-chen Kirin X X Military Affairs Ho Ying-ch'in Kweichow X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Ch'en I Chekiang X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Ts'ao Hao-shen Kiangsi X X Aviation Administration Chang Hui-ch'ang Kwangtung X X X Navy Yang Shu-chuang Fukien X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Ch'en Shao-k'uan Fukien X X Administrative Vice-Minister ro ro APPENDIX II (continued) Position Incumbent Native Province Pro-Nanking Pro-Canton Ambivalent Unknown Chekiang Kwangtung SE China S China Other Finance . T.V. Soong Kiangsu X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Chang Shou-yung Kiangsu X X Administrative Vice-Minister Li T'iao-sheng Kiangsu X X Industry H.H. Kung Shansi X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Cheng Hung-nien Kwangtung X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Mu Hsiang-ylieh Kiangsu X X Education Kao Lu Fukien X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Li Shu-hua Chi hii X X Administrative Vice-Minister Ch'en Pu-lei Chekiang X X X Communications Wang Po-ch'tin Kweichow X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Yii Fei-p'eng Chekiang X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Wei I-fu Chekiang X X X Rai1 ways Sun Fo Kwangtung X X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Lien Sheng-hai Kwangtung X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Huang Han-liang Fukien X X Justice Po l i t i c a l Vice-Minister (and acting Minister Chu Lu-hou Chekiang X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Hsieh Ying-chou Kwangtung X X X Other Key Positions: Chairman of the National Govt. Chiang K'ai shek Chekiang X X X Commander-in-Chief of the Land Sea, and Air Forces Chiang K'ai-shek Chekiang X X X Chief of the General Staff Chu P'ei-te Yunnan X X Vice-Chief of Staff Ke Ching-en Kiangsu X X Totals: 28 6 4 5 11 10 18 15 10 ro CO APPENDIX II (Continued) Explanation: Pro-Nanking -- supported Nanking's (in other words, Chiang K'ai-shek's) position during the opposition movement of 1931; Pro-Canton -- supported Canton's position during the opposition movement, but were not actually members of the Extraordinary Conference in a l l cases; Ambivalent -- a special category for people like Lin Sen and Ch'en Ming-shu, whose positions were ambiguous. They hovered somewhere between outright support of either side or did not take a clear-cut stand and maintain i t throughout; Unknown -- those whose position in the dis-pute could not be determined with the information available; Chekiang -- natives of Chekiang province (this and subsequent headings are listed to show any cleavages along provincial or regional lines that may have existed); Kwangtung -- natives of Kwangtung province; SE China -- natives of Anhwei, Kiangsu, or Chekiang provinces; S China -natives of Fukien, Kwangtung, or Kwangsi provinces; Other -- natives of a l l other provinces not included in the previous headings. It should be noted that the political a f f i l i a t i o n s of many of the individuals listed in this and other appendices changed over time. The fact that someone supported Chiang K'ai-shek or Wang Ching-wei in 1931 does not mean that he necessarily did so a few years later. Many of the people listed in this and the other appendices were extremely d i f f i c u l t to categorize p o l i t i c a l l y , even though the sole criterion used was whether they supported Nanking or Canton during the Extraordinary Conference. Information was lacking for many of the lesser figures. The listings of p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n should therefore be treated as tentative. Nevertheless, they are of use in determining the general line-up of political forces in 1931-1932. Source: The source for the l i s t of incumbents in a l l positions listed was H.G.W. Woodhead, ed., The China Year Book, 1931, (Shanghai), pp. 577-599. Other information, including native province and political a f f i l i a t i o n , was culled from a variety of sources. Most of them were biographical dictionaries or yearbooks containing biographical information, but newspapers and several secondary historical works were also helpful. Among the most useful; The China Year Book, 1930-1938; Boorman and Howard, eds., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1967-1971); The China Handbook 1937-1943, (Chungking, Chinese Ministry of Information, 1943); The China Handbook, 1937-1945, (New York, Macmillan); Who's Who in China, 1931, (Shanghai, China Weekly Review); Kuo-wen chou-pao (Kuowen weekly, illustrated), (Shanghai); and Hung-mao Tien, Government and Polities  in Kuomintang China, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972), ro APPENDIX III THE NANKING GOVERNMENT AS OF 8 JANUARY, 1932 Position Incumbent Native province Pro-Nanking Pro-Canton Ambivalent Unknown Chekiang Kwangtung SE China S China Other Legislative Yuan head Chang Chi Chi hi i X X Deputy head T'an Chen Hunan X X Judicial Yuan head Wu Ch'ao-shu Kwangtung X X X Deputy head Chu Cheng Hunan X X Examination Yuan head Tai Chi-t'ao Chekiang X X X Deputy head Liu Lu-yin Kiangsi X X Control Yuan head Yii Yu-jen Shensi X X Deputy head Ting Wei-fen Shantung X X Executive Yuan head Sun Fo Kwangtung X X X Deputy head Ch'en Ming-shu Kwangtung X X X Ministries: Interior Li Wen-fan Kwangtung X X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Ch'en Ch1 tin ? X Administrative Vice-Minister P'eng Hsiieh-p'ei Kiangsi X X Foreign Affairs Ch'en Yu-jen Trinidad X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minster Fu Ping-ch'ang Kwangtung X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Kan Chieh-hou Kiangsu X X Mi 1itary Affairs Ho Ying-ch'in Kweichow X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Ch'en I Chekiang X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Ts'ao Hao-shen Kiangsi X X Aviation Administration Huang Ping-heng Chekiang X X X Navy Ch'en Shao-k'uan Fukien X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Ch'en Chi-liang Fukien X X Administrative Vice-Minister ro APPENDIX III (continued) Position Incumbent Native Province Pro-Nanking Pro-Canton Ambivalent Unknown Chekiang Kv/angtung SE China S China Other Finance Huang Han-liang Fukien X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Wu Shang-yin Kwangtung X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Lin K'ang-hou Chekiang X X X Industry Ch'en Kung-po Kwangtung X X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Kuo Ch'u'n-t'ao Hunan X X Administrative Vice-Minister Hsu Hsi-ch'ing X Education Chu Chia-hua Chekiang X X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Tuan Hsi-p'eng Kiangsi X X Administrative Vice-Minister ? Communications Ch'en Ming-shu Kwangtung X X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Ch'en Fu-mu Kwangtung X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Yu* Fei-p'eng (?) Chekiang X X X Ra i1 ways Yeh Kung-cho Kwangtung X X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Ch'ien Tsung-tse Chekiang X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Liu Chan-shao X Justice Lo Wen-kan Kwangtung X X X Politic a l Vice-Minister Ho Shih-chen Chekiang X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Cheng T'ien-hsi Kwangtung X X X Other Key Positions: Chairman of the National Govt. Lin Sen Fukien X X Commander-in-Chief of the Land,Sea, and Air Forces Post abolished Chief of the General Staff Chu P'ei-te Yunnan X X Vice-Chief of Staff Totals: 12 16 5 8 8 12 9 16 13 ro APPENDIX III (Continued) Explanation: Same as Appendix II. Source: Essentially the same as Appendix I I , except that the incumbents are not to be found in The China Year  Book. They are listed in the newspapers, including Kuo-wen chou-pao, Ta Kung pao, and the North China Herald. ro 4-— I APPENDIX IV THE NANKING GOVERNMENT AS OF 1 MAY, 1932 Position Incumbent Native Province Pro-Nanking Pro-Canton Ambivalent Unknown Chekiang Kwangtung SE China S China Other Legislative Yuan head Sun Fo Kwangtung X X X Deputy head T'an Chen Hunan X X Judicial Yuan head Wu Ch'ao-shu Kwangtung X X X Deputy head Chu Cheng Hunan X X Examination Yuan head Tai Chi-t'ao Chekiang X X X Deputy head- Liu Lu-yin Kiangsi X X Control Yuan head Yii Yu-jen Shensi X X Deputy head Ting Wei-fen Shantung X X Executive Yuan head Wang Ching-wei Kwangtung X X X Deputy head Ch'en Ming-shu Kwangtung X X X Ministries: Interior . Huang Shao-hsiung Kwangsi X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Kan Nai-Kuang (?) Kwangsi X X Administrative Vice-Minister Lo Kung-hua (?) ? X Foreign Affairs Lo Wen-kan Kwangtung X X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Kuo T'ai-ch'i Hupeh X X Administrative Vice-Minister Hsu Mo Kiangsu X X Military Affairs Ho Ying-ch'in Kweichow X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Ch'en I Chekiang X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Ts'ao Hao-shen Kiangsi X X Aviation Administration Huang Ping-heng Chekiang X X X Navy Ch'en Shao-k'uan Fukien X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Ch'en Chi-liang Fukien X X Administrative Vice-Minister Li Shih-chia (acting) Fukien X X ro C O APPENDIX IV (Continued) Position Incumbent Native Province Pro-Nanking Pro-Canton Ambivalent Unknown Chekiang Kwangtung SE China S China Other Finance T.V. Soong Kiangsu X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Chang Shou-yung Kiangsu X X Administrative Vice-Minister Li T'iao-sheng Kiangsu X X Industry Ch'en Kung-po Kwangtung X X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Kuo Ch'iin-t'ao Hunan X X Administrative Vice-Minister Hsu Hsi-ch'ing ? X Education Chu Chia-hua Chekiang X 0 X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Tuan Hsi-p'eng Kiangsi X X -Administrative Vice-Minister Ch'ien Ch'ang-chao Chekiang X X X Communications Ch'en Ming-shu Kwangtung X X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Ch'en Fu-mu Kwangtung X X X Administrative Vice-41inister Yu Fei-p'eng Chekiang X X X Railways Ku Meng-yu Chi hi i X X Pol i t i c a l Vice-Minister Ch'ien Tsung-tse Chekiang X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Tseng Chung-ming Fukien X X Justice Lo Wen-kan Kwangtung X X X Poli t i c a l Vice-Minister Ho Shih-chen Chekiang X X X Administrative Vice-Minister Cheng T'ien-hsi Kwangtung X X X Other Key Positions: Chairman of the national Govt. Lin Sen Fukien X X Chairman of the Military Affairs Commi ssion Chiang K'ai-shek Chekiang X X X Chief of the General Staff Chiang K'ai-shek Chekiang X X X Vice-Chief of Staff Huo Yao-tsu Hunan X X Totals 20 14 4 7 10 10 14 17 12 ro U3 APPENDIX IV (Continued) Explanation: Same as Appendix I I , except that the l i s t of incumbents was taken from the 1931-1932 China Year  Book, pp. 693-694. Source: Same as Appendix II. ro cn o 251 APPENDIX V THE HIGHEST COUNCILS OF THE KUOMINTANG IN FEBRUARY, 1931 Central Executive Committee Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 1 . Chiang K'ai-shek Chekiang N 2. Tai Chi-t'ao Chekiang N 3. Ho Ying-ch'in Kweichow N 4. Hu Han-min Kwangtung C 5. Sun Fo Kwangtung C 6. Ch'en Kuo-fu Chekiang N 7. Ch'en Ming-shu Kwangtung A 8. Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang Kiangsu N 9. Chu P'ei-te Yunnan A 10. Wu T'ieh-ch'eng Kwangtung N 1 1 . Sung Ch'ing-ling Kiangsu 0 12. Yii Yu-jen Shensi N 13. Sung Tzu-wen (T.V. Soong) Kiangsu N 14. Wu Ch'ao-shu Kwangtung C 15. Ho Ch'eng-chu'n Hupeh N 16. Li Wen-fan Kwangtung C 17. Wang Po-ling Kiangsu N 18. Shao Yuan-ch'ung Chekiang N 19. Chu Chia-hua Chekiang N 20. Chang Ch'Un Szechwan N 2 1 . Liu Chih Kiangsi N 22. Yang Shu-chuang Fukien N 23. Chou Ch'i-kang Kwangtung c 24. Ch'en Li-fu Chekiang N 25. Ch'en Chao-ying Chekiang N 26. Liu Chi-wen Kwangtung c 27. Liu Lii-yin Kiangsi A 28. Ting Wei-fen Shantung N 29. Tseng Yang-fu Kwangtung N 30. Fang Chiao-hui Hupeh N 3 1 . Wang Po-ch'un Kweichow A 32. Ting Ch'ao-wu Fukien N 33. Ch'en Yao-yiian Kwangtung c 34. Chang Chen Fukien N 35. Wang Cheng-t'ing Chekiang N 36. K'ung Hsiang-hsi Shensi N Totals: 24 7 1 4 252 APPENDIX V (Continued) Breakdown by Province: Native Province Amount Chekiang 8 Kiangsu 4 Kwangtung 10 Fukien 3 Shansi 1 Shensi 1 Shantung 1 Kiangsi 2 Hupeh 2 Szechwan 1 Kweichow 2 Yunnan 1 Reserve Members: Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 1. Liu Wen-tao Hupeh N 2. Lu T 1i-p'ing Honan N 3. Chang Tao-fan Kweichow N 4. Chao P'ei-lien Shansi 0 5. Miao Pin Kiangsu N 6. Kuei Ch'ung-chi Kiangsi C 7. Yii Ch'ung-chi Kiangsu N 8. Chiao I-t'ang Shensi C 9. Ma Ch'ao-chlin Kwangtung C 10. Ch'en Chi-t'ang Kwangtung C 11. Ch'en Ts'e Kwangtung C 12. Huang Shih Yunnan U 13. Miao P'ei-ch'eng Shansi N 14. Ch'eng T'ien-fang Kiangsi N 15. K'o Hsing-o Inner Mongolia N Totals: 8 5 1 0 1 253 APPENDIX V (Continued) Breakdown by Province: Native Province Amount Kiangsu 2 Hupeh 1 Inner Mongolia 1 Shensi 1 Shansi 2 Kiangsi 2 Hunan 1 Kweichow 1 Yunnan 1 Kwangtung 3 Central Supervisory Committee Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 1. Wu Chih-hui Chekiang N 2. Chang Jen-chieh Chekiang N 3. Ku Ying-fen Kwangtung C 4. Lin Sen Fukien A 5. Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei Chekiang N 6. Chang Chi Hopei N 7. Wang Ch'ung-hui Kwangtung A 8. Shao Li-tzu Chekiang N 9. Li Shih-tseng Hopei N 10. Teng Tse-ju Kwangtung C 11. Hsiao Fo-ch'eng Fukien C 12. En-K'e-Pa-T'u Inner Mongolia N Totals 7 3 0 2 0 Breakdown by Province: Native Province Amount Chekiang 4 Inner Mongolia 1 Hopei 2 Kwangtung 3 Fukien 2 254 APPENDIX V (Continued) Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 1. Ch'u Min-i Chekiang 0 2. Ch'en Pu-lei Chekiang N 3. Shang Chen Hopei U 4. Ch'en Chia-yu Hunan 0 5. Li Lieh-chun Kiangsi 0 6. Liu Shou-chung Shensi U 7. Lin Yu'n-k'ai Kwangtung C 8. Teng Ch'ing-yang Kwangtung C Totals: 1 2 3 0 2 Breakdown by Province: Native Province Amount Chekiang 2 Hopei 1 Shensi 1 Hunan 1 Kiangsi 1 Kwangtung 2 Central P o l i t i c a l Council Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 1 . Hu Han-min Kwangtung C 2. Chiang K'ai-shek Chekiang •N 3. Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang Kiangsu N 4. Sun Fo Kwangtung C 5. Yii Yu-jen Shensi N 6. Ting Wei-fen Shantung N 7. Ch'en Kuo-fu Chekiang N 8. Ho Ying-ch'in Kweichow N 9. Tai Chi-t'ao Chekiang N 10. Yang Shu-chuang Fukien N 11. Sung Tzu-wen Kiangsu N 12. Wu Chih-hui Chekiang N 13. Chang Jen-chieh Chekiang N 255 APPENDIX V (Continued) Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 14. Li Shih-tseng Hopei N 15. Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei Chekiang N 16. Ku Ying-fen Kwangtung C 17. Lin Sen Fukien A 18. Wang Ch'ung-hui Kwangtung A 19. Shao Li-tzu Chekiang N 20. Li Wen-fan Kwangtung C 21. Chu Chia-hua Chekiang N 22. Shao Yuan-ch'ung Chekiang N 23. Ch'en Li-fu Chekiang N 24. K'ung Hsiang-hsi Shansi N 25. Chang Hsueh-liang Liaoning N 26. Chang Tso-hsiang Liaoning N 27. Wang Shu-han Liaoning N Totals: 21 4 0 2 0 Breakdown by Province: Native Province Amount Chekiang 10 Kiangsu 2 Hopei 1 Shensi 1 Shansi 1 Shantung 1 Liaoning 3 Kweichow 1 Fukien 2 Kwangtung 5 Reserve Members: Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 1. Wang Cheng-t'ing Chekiang N 2. Wang Po-ch'un Kweichow A 3. Chu P'ei-te Yunnan A 4. Wu T'ieh-ch'eng Kwangtung N 5. Chang Ch'u'n Szechwan N 6. Ho Ch'eng-chu'n Hupeh N 7. Liu Lu-yin Kiangsi A 8. Ma Ch'ao-chun Kwangtung C Totals: 4 1 0 3 0 256 APPENDIX V (Continued) Native Province Amount Chekiang 1 Hupeh 1 Kiangsi 1 Kweichow 1 Szechwan 1 Yunnan 1 Kwangtung 2 Explanation: N - Pro-Nanking (see Appendix I I ) ; C - Pro-Canton (see Appendix I I ) ; 0 - long-time opponents of Chiang K'ai-shek who had nothing to do with the Extraordinary Conference; A - Ambivalent (see Appendix I I ) ; U - Unknown (see Appendix I I ) . Source: Same as Appendix I I , except the page references in the 1931 China Year Book are pp. 583-584. 257 APPENDIX VI THE HIGHEST COUNCILS OF THE KUOMINTANG IN JANUARY, 1932 Central Executive Committee Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 1. Chiang K'ai-shek Chekiang N 2. Wang Ching-wei Kwangtung C E 3. Hu Han-min Kwangtung C 4. Sun Fo Kwangtung C 5. Tai Chi-t'ao Chekiang N 6. Sung Ch'ing-ling Ho Ying-ch'in Kiangsu 0 7. Kweichow N 8. Ch'en Kuo-fu Chekiang N 9. Ch'en Ming-shu Kwangtung A 10. Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang Kiangsu N 11. Chu P'ei-te Yunnan A 12. Wu T'ieh-ch'eng Kwangtung N 13. Yii Yu-jen Shensi N 14. Sung Tzu-wen Kiangsu N 15. Ho Ch'eng-chiin Hupeh N 16. Wang Po-ling Kiangsu N 17. Shao Yuan-ch'ung Chekiang N 18. Chu Chia-hua Chekiang N 19. Yang Shu-chuang Fukien N 20. Liu Chih Kiangsi N 21. Chou Ch'i-kang Kwangtung N 22. Ch'en Li-fu Chekiang N 23. Ch'en Chao-ying Chekiang N 24. Ting Wei-fen Shantung N 25. Tseng Yang-fu Kwangtung N 26. Li Chi-shen Kwangsi 0 E 27. Fang Chiao-hui Hupeh N 28. Wang Po-ch'un Kweichow A 29. Ho Hsiang-ning Kwangtung 0 30. Fang Chen-wu Anhwei 0 E 31. Wu Ch'ao-shu Kwangtung C 32. Li Wen-fan Kwangtung C 33. Liu Chi-wen Kwangtung C 34. Liu Lu-yin Kiangsi A 35. Tsou Lu Kwangtung C 36. Yen Hsi-shan Shansi 0 E 37. Feng Yu-hsiang Anhwei 0 E 38. Chao Tai-wen Shansi 0 E 39. Li Lieh-chun Kiangsi 0 40. Po Wen-wei Anhwei 0 E 258 APPENDIX VI (Continued) Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 41. T'an Chen Hunan C 42. Shih Ch'ing-yang Inner Mongolia C 43. Hsiung K'e-wu Szechwan C E 44. Ch'en Yu-jen Trinidad C 45. Wang Fa-ch'in Chekiang C E 46. Ch'en Kung-po Kwangtung C E 47. Ch'eng Ch'ien Hunan 0 E 48. Ku Meng-yii Chi h i i C E 49. Ching Heng-i Chekiang C E 50. Kan Nai-kuang Kwangsi 0 E 51. Chu Cheng Hunan C 52. Shih Ying Hupeh N 53. Liu Shou-chung Shensi U 54. Ting Ch'ao-wu Fukien N 55. Chang Chen Fukien N 56. K'ung Hsiang-hsi Shansi N 57. Wang Cheng-t'ing Chekiang N 58. Chou Fo-hai Hunan N 59. Ku Chu-t'ung Kiangsu N 60. Hsia Tou-yin Hupeh N 61. Huo Yao-tsu Hunan N 62. Yang Chieh Yunnan N 63. Kuei Ch'ung-chi Kiangsi C 64. Ma Ch'ao-chun Kwangtung C 65. Ch'en Chi-t'ang Kwangtung C 66. Ch'en Ts'e Kwangtung C 67. Pai Ch'ung-hsi Kwangsi C 68. Li Yang-ching Kwangtung C 69. Yii Han-mou Kwangtung C 70. Lin I-chung Kwangtung C 71. Chang Hui-ch'ang Kwangtung C 72. Chang Ch' tin Szechwan N Totals: 31 25 11 4 1 15 Breakdown by Province: Native Province Amount Chekiang 10 Kiangsu 5 Anhwei 3 Shensi 2 Shansi 3 Hupeh 4 Kiangsi 4 259 APPENDIX VI (Continued) Native Province Amount Shantung 1 Chi h i i 1 Inner Mongolia 1 Hunan 5 Szechwan 2 Kweichow 2 Yunnan 2 Kwangsi 3 Kwangtung 21 Fukien 3 Reserve Members: Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 1. Teng Chia-yen Kwangsi u i 2. Mao Tsu-ch'iian Kiangsu C E 3. Li Tsung-huang Yunnan u 4. Pai Yun-t'i Inner Mongolia C E 5. Chang Chih-pen Hupeh C E 6. Fu Ju-lin Heilungkiang C 7. Chang Wei-ts'un u 8. Huang Shih Yunnan u 9. Chu Chi-ch'ing Liaoning 0 E 10. Ch'en Shu-jen Kwangtung c E 11. Miao Pin Kiangsu N 12. Ch'en Yao-yiian Kwangtung c 13. Liu Wen-tao Hupeh u 14. Lu T'i-p'ing Hunan N 15. Chang Tao-fan Kweichow M 16. Chao P'ei-lien Shansi 0 E 17. Yii Ching-t'ang Kiangsu N 18. Hsu'eh Tu-pi Chiao I-t'ang Shansi 0 E 19. Shensi c 20. Lu Chung-lin Chi h i i 0 E 21. Miao P'ei-ch'eng Shansi N 22. Ch'eng T'ien-fang Kiangsi N 23. K'o Hsing-o Inner Mongolia N 24. Ch'Li Fang-p'u c 25. Hsiao Chi-san Kwangtung M 26. Huang Hsli-ch'u Kwangsi c E 27, Chu Shao-liang Fukien N 28. Ch'eng T'ien-ku Kwangtung c 260 APPENDIX VI (Continued) Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 29. Lung Yu'n Yunnan 0 30. Chan Chii-ssu Kwangtung C 31. Hsieh Tso-min Kwangtung N 32. Huang Chi-1u Szechwan C 33. Ma Fu-hsiang Kansu N 34. Liang Han-ts'ao Kwangtung C 35. Ch'ien Ta-chun Kiangsu N 36. Kuan Su-jen ? C 37. Chang Li-sheng Chi h i i U 38. Huang Fu-sheng Szechwan C 39. Tuan Hsi-p'eng Kiangsi N 40. Li Jen-jen Kwangsi C 41. Cheng Chan-nan U 42. Tseng Chung-ming Fukien C 43. Chou Sung-shou ? U 44. Ts'ui Kuang-hsiu Kwangtung C 45. Lo Chia-lun Chekiang N 46. Chang Ting-fan Kiangsi C 47. Tai K'uei-sheng Fukien N 48. Li Ching-chai Honan N 49. Wang Ch'i Hunan U 50. Ho Shih-chen Chekiang C 51. Fan Y.ii-sui Shantung 0 52. Ch'en Fu-mu Kwangtung C 53. Tseng K'uang-ch'ing Szechwan N 54. Wang Mao-kung Hunan 0 55. T'ang Sheng-chih Hunan C E 56. Ch'en Ch'ing-yun Kwangtung C 57. Ku Cheng-kang Kweichow 0 58. T'ang Yu-jen Hunan 0 59. Yang Ai-yuan Shansi C 60. Wang Lu-i Shansi N Totals: 18 24 9 0 9 10 Breakdown by Province: Native Province Amount Chekiang 2 Kiangsu 4 Shensi 2 Shansi 4 Chi h i i 2 Hupeh 2 Kiangsi 3 261 APPENDIX VI (Continued) Native Province Amount Kansu 1 Honan 1 Hunan 5 Shantung 1 Liaoning 1 Inner Mongolia 2 Heilungkiang 1 Szechwan 3 Yunnan 3 Kweichow 2 Kwangsi 3 Kwangtung 10 Fukien 3 Unknown 5 Central Supervisory Committee Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 1. Teng Tse-ju Kwangtung C 2. Hsiao Fo-ch'eng Fukien C 3. Hsieh Ch'ih Szechwan 0 4. Ch'en Pi-chun Kwangtung (b. Penang) C 5. Wang Ch'ung-hui Kwangtung A 6. Wu Chih-hui Kiangsu N 7. Chang Jen-chieh Chekiang N 8. Lin Sen Fukien A 9. Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei Chekiang N 10. Chang Chi Chi h i i N 11. Shao Li-tzu Chekiang N 12. En-K'e-Pa-t'u Inner Mongolia N 13. Ch'u Min-i Chekiang 0 14. Liu Ya-tzu Kiangsu 0 15. Chang Hsueh-liang Liaoning N 16. Yang Hu Anhwei N 17. Chiang Tso-pin Hupeh N 18. Hung Lu-tung Chekiang N 19. Li Tsung-jen Kwangsi C E 20. Hsu Ch'ung-chih Kwangtung C 21. Hsiang Han-p'ing Kwangtung C 22. T'ang Shao-i Kwangtung C 23. Chang Fa-k'uei Kwangtung C Totals: 10 8 3 2 0 1 262 APPENDIX VI (Continued) Breakdown by Province: Native Province Amount Chekiang 5 Kiangsu 2 Anhwei 1 Hupeh 1 Chi h i i 2 Liaoning 1 Inner Mongolia 1 Szechwan 1 Kwangsi 1 Kwangtung 7 Fukien 2 Reserve Members: Members Native Province A f f i l i a t i o n 1. Yang Shu-k'an Szechwan U 2. Huang Shao-hsiung Kwangsi N E 3. Kuo Ch'iin-t'ao Hunan C E 4. Li Fu-lin Kwangtung C 5. P'an Yun-ch'i Chi h i i 0 6. Ch'en Pu-lei Chekiang N 7. Shang Chen Chi h i i . U 8. Ch'en Chia-yu Hunan 0 E 9. Lin Yiin-k'ai Kwangtung C 10. Teng Ch'ing-yang Kwangtung C 11. Lin Chih-mien ? C 12. Huang Chi-jen (Chou?) N 13. Miao P'ei-nan Kwangtung C 14. Fang Sheng-t'ao Fukien U 15. Li Ch'i-an ? C 16. Ch'en Chung-fu Kiangsu C 17. Teng Fei-huang Hunan 0 18. Sun Ching-ya Kiangsi C 19. Huang Shao-ku Hunan 0 20. Hsiao Chung-chen Hunan 0 21. Chi Liang ? N 22. Li Tz'u-wen 7 N Totals: 5 9 5 0 3 3 263 APPENDIX VI (Continued) Breakdown by Province: Native Province Amount Chekiang 1 Kiangsu 1 Chi hii 2 Kiangsi . 1 Hunan 5 Szechwan 1 Kwangsi 1 Kwangtung 4 Fukien 1 Unknown 5 Explanation: Same as appendix V, with one additional l i s t i n g , E, to indicate people who had been expelled from the Kuomintang and were reinstated only after the Shanghai peace talks between Nanking and Canton. It should be noted that the membership of the Central Pol i t i c a l Council in January, 1932 was the same as that of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees. Source: The l i s t of incumbents is from Kuo-wen chou-pao 9.2 (4 January 1932), articles,pp. 1-2. 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