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The conception of science as deductive formalism in the study of international politics : a critique Genco, Stephen James 1974

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The in  the  C o n c e p t i o n o f S c i e n c e as D e d u c t i v e F o r m a l i s m Study of International P o l i t i c s :  A Critique  by Stephen James B.A.,  Genco  Stanford U n i v e r s i t y , 1972  A Thesis Submitted i n P a r t i a l Fulfillment of the  Requirements  for  Master of in  the  the Degree  of  Arts  Department of  P o l i t i c a l Science  We a c c e p t  this  thesis  required  standard  as  conforming to  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH September,  1974  COLUMBIA  the  In  presenting  an  advanced  the I  Library  further  for  degree shall  agree  scholarly  by  his  of  this  written  this  thesis  in  at  University  the  make  that  it  purposes  for  may  for  is  financial  of  Political  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada  September 30,  1974  of  of  Columbia,  British  by  the  understood  gain  Science  Columbia  for  extensive  be g r a n t e d  It  fulfilment  available  permission.  Department  Date  freely  permission  representatives. thesis  partial  shall  Head  be  requirements  reference copying  that  not  the  of  agree  and  of my  I  this  or  allowed  without  that  study. thesis  Department  copying  for  or  publication my  i  ABSTRACT  This  thesis  examines  the  conception  formalism from  two  perspectives.  foundations  two  aspects  model of  of  explanation  Secondly,  i t  considers  international deductive It  that  conception  inadequate  both philosophically  scientific  development  scholars ive  in  this  conceptions  field of  favoring  put of  science.  the  use and  deductive  the  philosophical  deductive-nomological model of  of  theory.  these models  examines  in  international  science  as  deductive  and p r a c t i c a l l y  research  politics based  as  politics.  formalism  a model  and  for  recommends  upon more  in  several  forth  international  pursue  the  science  as  considers  hypothetico-deductive  have been  of  i t  science  conception:  and p o l i t i c a l  that the  the  this  arguments  politics  theories  concludes  and  of  First,  of  viable  is  the that alternat-  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page  I.  II.  III.  IV.  Abstract  i  Introduction A. The Role of Philosophy of Science i n Understanding S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science 1. Different Approaches to Philosophy of Science . . 2. How Can Philosophy of Science Help F a c i l i t a t e Better S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Research? B. The General Characteristics of Science 1. Explanation 2. Theory  1 3 3 7 19 20 21  The Philosophical Source: Formal Deductive Models of Explanation and Theory . . . . . A. The General Characteristics of Deductive Formalism . . 1. Deduction . 2. Abstraction 3. H i s t o r i c a l Note B. Deductive-Nomological Explanation: The Covering Law Model 1. Form 2. Content 3. Context of Evaluation 4. Context of Application C. Hypothetico-Deductive Theory 1. Form 2. Content • . . 3. Context of Application 4. Context of Evaluation . a. Discovery b. J u s t i f i c a t i o n  28 28 39 47 49 51 52 58 65 66 66 71  Arguments Favoring Deductive Formalism i n International P o l i t i c s and P o l i t i c a l Science A. Oran Young B. Morton Kaplan C. Davis Bob row D. David Easton E. William Rlker F. Robert Holt et a l G. A. James Gregor  79 79 84 86 86 88 89 92  Applications of Deductive Formalism i n International Politics A. Deductive Theories  .  .  23 24 24 25 27  96 97  iii Page 1.  Reaction Equations  2.  Game T h e o r y  3.  Economic  and  and  V. VI. .VII.  General  Riker's  97 100  of  Processes  C o l l e c t i v e Goods, and  b.  Race Models Studies  R a t i o n a l i s t i c Models  International a.  and Arms  Deterrence  Theories  Theory  of  .  Oligopolies, of  .  102  .  108  Bureaucracy,  Politics  Political  Coalitions  104 .  .  Conclusion  119  Footnotes  123  .Bibliography  144  iv  I t i s a strange science indeed which establishes as the ultimate test of t h e o r e t i c a l worth the r i g o r with which a methodological formulation i s defended rather than the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the hypothesis advanced. Norman Jacobson For the basic p r i n c i p l e of empiricism i s , a f t e r a l l , to increase the empirical content of whatever knowledge we claim to possess. Paul Feyerabend  There i s a story of a drunkard searching under a s t r e e t lamp f o r his house key, which he had dropped some distance away. Asked why he didn't look where he had dropped i t , he r e p l i e d , " I t ' s l i g h t e r here. Abraham Kaplan  I.  INTRO UCTION  For at l e a s t the l a s t twenty years —  perhaps we can best date i t  from the p u b l i c a t i o n of David Easton's The P o l i t i c a l System i n 1953 p o l i t i c a l science has entertained a nearly constant  'Great Debate  1  1  —  con-  cerning the methods, goals, and, occasionally, the epistemological  2 foundations  of the d i s c i p l i n e .  For the most part, this debate has been  conducted at the methodological  l e v e l ; f i r s t under the r u b r i c of " t r a d i -  tionalism versus behavioralism," alism versus post-behavioralism."^  and more recently i n terms of "behaviorBut other fronts have from time to time  been engaged, and today we can even boast, i f we are so i n c l i n e d , a t h r i v i n g l i t e r a t u r e devoted to debate about the Great Debate.  5  To a student of p o l i t i c s i n the 1970s, this legacy of self-consciousness i s at once challenging, perplexing, and f r u s t r a t i n g .  Within i t s  scope have appeared some of the best thoughts available on the nature of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l inquiry.  At the same time, i t has produced some of  the most simple-minded, polemical, and p r o f e s s i o n a l l y embarrassing rubbish to be found anywhere i n " s c h o l a r l y " w r i t i n g .  The challenge, of  course, i s to separate the wheat from the chaff, and thereby to gain some i n s i g h t i n t o the character of both p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y and the tools a v a i l able for probing i t .  This thesis i s meant to i l l u s t r a t e one possible way  of carrying out this task. The Great Methodological Debate has, with only a few important exceptions, exhibited a c r u c i a l flaw; i t i s s u p e r f i c i a l .  This s u p e r f i c i a l i t y  can be held responsible f o r i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c lack of focus, i t s redundancy, i t s confusion, and i t s f a i l u r e to resolve i t s e l f i n any fundamental way. I believe these f a l l i n g s are a r e s u l t of the paucity of t r u l y r a d i c a l -—  2  in the original sense of the term —  analyses of the foundations of the  different methodological positions advocated in the debate.  This type of  analysis has only recently begun to appear, most often in the 'debate about the debate' referred to above, and I, at least, am of the opinion that we need much more of i t . Such analysis is by definition, philosophical. And i f 6  the subject we are concerned with Is the science of politics, then the area within philosophy to which we should turn is philosophy of science. Thus,in this thesis I will examine a particular approach to the study of international politics in terms of its philosophical underpinnings. The term "science" is problematic; we can correctly speak of different "conceptions" of science. These conceptions, I hold, are at the roots of the different methodological approaches to the scientific study of politics that are the usual terms of debate.  If we can understand these conceptions  and appreciate their strengths and weaknesses, I believe we can say more about the potential success of the respective approaches than we can i f we merely examine the approaches themselves.  The conception of science often  referred to as deductive formalism constitutes an Important school in philosophy of science and, from our point of view, Is perhaps most prominently associated with the idea that the form and methods of the physical sciences are the proper models for emulation by the social sciences. The general principles of this conception are, with varying degrees of specificity, adhered to by many political and social scientists. The question of its adequacy as a model for inquiry is therefore an important one.  This is the  question I will examine in the following p^ges. I have focussed my analysis specifically on only one sub-field of  3  political  science,  not  any  imply  the most area  merely  a n d my d e s i r e  work  in  to  Another  approach  focus w i l l not, that  are  cases,  limit  problems should  of  a l l of  be  in  of  a  can a t t a i n .  study  of  international  as  well.  A.  The  1.  of  the to  Different  Approaches  there  the  us  Given  this  of  discussion is  portant  of  i s  to  the  meant  approaches,  the  the  critique  a whole  to  of  science.  science within  to  familiarize to  relevant  theoretical  deductive  in  This studies  a  few of  of  study. range  For of  the  focus one  of  applicab-  formalism  in  implications,  a l l of  for  the be  social science  S o c i a l and  P o l i t i c a l  Science  of  and  the  Understanding  of  to  homogeneity  broad  s c i e n c e subsumes  study  even,  delimitation  i t s  but  particular  relevant  deductive  and  a  does  examination.  extensive  of  in  Science i n  of  for  or  relative  efficacy of  to Philosophy  a r e many p h i l o s o p h i e s  present  the  this  among t h e  pleas  careful  focus  reference  from considering  overall  philosophy  attitudes  these  deserve  p o l i t i c s should,  Science  and  few eloquent  in  and  appearance  social sciences,  Thus,  Political  proaches  prevent  Philosophy  field,  a  that  p o l i t i c a l science as  Role  As a  field  recent  radical analysis  i t  to  the  social science.  i l i t y  relevant  the  examples  This  phenomena,  interests  to p o l i t i c a l science generally,  critical  advantages  i s  politics.  international  scope of  p o l i t i c s of  course,  confronted  not  international  the  factor  to  addressed  to  of  r e f l e c t s my s u b s t a n t i v e  international  formalist  study  s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of  part  literature.  the  the  the  highlight  quite Or,  an array  to  put  philosophy reader the ways  of  with  i t  of  ap-  another  science. the most  i n which  they  way, The  im-  4  i n t e r a c t , and ultimately c o n f l i c t , with each other.  This w i l l hopefully  c l a r i f y some of the more fundamental issues, which often remain i m p l i c i t , underlying much of the debate about deductive formalism we w i l l be concerned with further on. At the most general l e v e l , we can denote the scope or domain of philosophy of science, and observe how  i t contrasts to the domain of  science i t s e l f : The domain of any science i s the material of that part of the world with which i t i s concerned. The language of science consists of propositions about the world. The domain of the philosophy of science i s the a c t i v i t y of science. The language of p h i losophy of science consists of propositions about the a c t i v i t y of science. In an a r t i c l e devoted to a taxonomic overview of the f i e l d , Frnan McMullin notes that there are e s s e n t i a l l y two types of propositions made by philosophers of science when they address themselves to the question that i s our primary concern with reference to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s : How  does one  (an i n d i v i d u a l or a d i s c i p l i n e ) go about being  scientific?  The f i r s t type i s grounded upon considerations McMullin describes as "of the phenomelogical 'don't you see that i t must...' v a r i e t y , " whereas the second i s grounded upon "a chronicle of the strategies that 'successful' g s c i e n t i s t s have followed."  I f we were to attempt to draw a s i n g l e  demarcation l i n e for the purpose of d i v i d i n g philosophy of science into two camps, a l i n e between these two statements would probably be most successful.  For they lead to two quite d i s t i n c t senses of science.  In the  f i r s t sense, science becomes "a c o l l e c t i o n of propositions, ranging from reports of observations to the most abstract theories accounting f o r these  5  observations."  It i s , basically, "the end product of science."  In the  second sense, science i s "the ensemble of activities of the scientist in the pursuit of his goal of scientific observation and understanding." This includes science i n the f i r s t sense, but i s far broader and vaguer. In fact, as McMullin points out, i t would be impossible to convey this sense of science fully.  "The interest i n [science i n the second sense]  is only this, that i n a very definite sense, i t serves to explain how q  [science in the f i r s t sense] came to be formulated i n the f i r s t place." From these two senses of science, the two primary approaches within philosophy of science follow.  The best way to differentiate  these approaches i s to make explicit the warrants or justifications that each enlists in i t s defense.  McMullin bases his taxonomy on warrants of  two types; external to the practice of science, and internal.  External  warrants are also of two types, metaphysical and l o g i c a l . ^ A metaphysically-warranted  philosophy of science takes as i t s  starting point a general theory of knowing and being that i s prior to any analysis of the actual procedures followed i n science. science in light of this theory.  It examines  Such an approach i s taken, for example,  by Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes i n their philosophies of science. It i s clear that this type of procedure leads to propositions of the 'don't you see i t must...' variety mentioned above. Although obviously important, especially in a historical sense, we w i l l not have the opportunity to examine metaphysical philosophies of science i n this study. A logically-warranted philosophy of science also takes i t s j u s t i f i cation from outside the practice of science, but i n a different way. The  6  l o g i c i a n , a f t e r an examination of the p r a c t i c e of science, reconstructs what he sees as the i d e a l i z e d formal v e r s i o n of the l o g i c i n t r i n s i c i n science.  This reconstruction i s sometimes normative, but most o f t e n  purely r a t i o n a l . formal l o g i c .  I t s s t a r t i n g point i s the set of r u l e s that c o n s t i t u t e s  The purpose of science, once the reconstruction has been  achieved, i s to attempt to a t t a i n as close an approximation of i t s i n t r i n s i c l o g i c as p o s s i b l e .  The propositions of philosophy are thus  p r i m a r i l y p r e s c r i p t i v e . This i s e s s e n t i a l l y the approach to science taken by deductive  formalism.  An internally-warranted philosophy of science focusses on the ongoing p r a c t i c e of science i t s e l f , but i s more than a mere h i s t o r y o f science.  Although i t r e l i e s on a d e s c r i p t i o n of how s c i e n t i s t s work,  t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i s not produced as an end i n i t s e l f .  I t i s used t o  make p h i l o s o p h i c a l judgements about the adequacy of s c i e n t i f i c i n l i g h t o f the h i s t o r i c a l record.  research,  As McMullin puts i t , i n t e r n a l l y  warranted philosophy o f science ...often involves a c a r e f u l reading of the h i s t o r y of science as a warrant f o r the p h i l o p h i c a l claim made. Such work accomplishes both a h i s t o r i c a l and a p h i l o s o p h i c a l goal. The w r i t e r t r i e s to i l l u m i n a t e the h i s t o r i c a l instance w i t h a l l the relevant p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s he can produce so that', despite i t s s i n g u l a r i t y , he can understand i t as best he can. lie also uses the documented h i s t o r i c a l instance t o make a f u r ther p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t : i t serves not merely £^ as i l l u s t r a t i o n , but as evidence f o r t h i s p o i n t . This approach, i n v o l v i n g an i n t e r a c t i o n of h i s t o r y and philosophy, can be seen as p r e s c r i p t i v e as w e l l as d e s c r i p t i v e . I t s p r e s c r i p t i o n s cannot be construed  i n the sweeping sense of the above two approaches,  7  however, as i t s warrant i s merely the a c t i v i t i e s of 'successful' s c i e n t i s t s , not a metaphysical or l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e .  This type of ap-  proach, usually referred to as h i s t o r i c a l or contextual, i s followed by many of the c r i t i c s of deductive formalism to be discussed below.  This  i s not surprising, since the most vulnerable point i n the logician's programme i s h i s conceptualization of the 'logic i n t r i n s i c i n science'. In contrast, whatever i s ' i n t r i n s i c ' i n science should be most e a s i l y discovered through a meticulous examination of i t s h i s t o r i c a l development. These sketches of the d i f f e r e n t approaches to philosophy of science, i t seems worth stressing, are very substantial s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s . I have presented them as such here only f o r the sake of i l l u s t r a t i o n and easy d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  In f a c t , each approach i s f a r from monolithic  and contains many 'sub-approaches', some of which contradict each other i n fundamental ways.  In addition, there are even a few areas i n which  the approaches are quite compatible with each other i n their prescript tions or descriptions.  These subtleties w i l l become more apparent when  we come to a more detailed examination of deductive formalism i n section II.  For our present purposes —  1  exposing the casus b e l l i as i t were  —  these caricatures w i l l s u f f i c e . 2.  How Can Philosophy of Science Help F a c i l i t a t e Better S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Research? Up to this point, I have said very l i t t l e about the goals or under-  l y i n g assumptions of this thesis.  I would now l i k e to discuss these  issues more f u l l y , and at the same time note some more general  8  considerations concerning the relevance of philosophy of science to p o l i t i c a l inquiry.  In the above discussion of the Great Methodological  Debate, I posited that philosophy of science could help lead to a better understanding of the nature of p o l i t i c a l phenomena by establishing a level of analysis prior to the usual methodological one.  This conclusion i s  shared by John Gunnell, who states that "the development of complex analytical schema and quantitative techniques i s no substitute for philosophically specifying the character of social and p o l i t i c a l phenomena 13 and the nature of explanation." is hardly enough.  But merely making the claim, of course,  The question before us now must be:  better understanding be achieved?  How can this  In the process of answering this ques-  tion, I hope to be able to explain more precisely what this thesis i s meant to accomplish. I can identify at least three ways i n which philosophical speculation benefits p o l i t i c a l research:  (1) as a guard against personal biases,  (2) as a heuristic device, and (3) as a means of identifying and evaluating the explicit and implicit philosophical positions of other social scientists.  The last of these i s essentially how I intend to employ  philosophical analysis i n the present study.  We can consider each i n  turn. (1)  The 'value-free' social scientists has finally died a slow  and somewhat painful death, to the relief of most.  In his place we  now  have the 'value-conscious^ s o c i a l scientist , striving to make his value assumptions as explicit as possible.  The point of the matter i s that  some values are less valuable than others, especially when they inhibit  9  effective research.  The same holds for personal opinions. A philoso-  phical perspective can help a social scientist ascertain the Justifications for his values and opinions and evaluate them accordingly. In Eugene Miller's words: . . . i t is very difficult today for a political scientist to establish a direct relationship to the phenomena of political life and see political things as they are. From his undergraduate years, the political scientist is taught to see politics in terms of certain methodologies and conceptual frameworks. These become filters or screens that restrict and distort his vision of political reality. Before he can see political things as they are and understand them, the political scientist must identify his inherited opinions about politics and science and subject them to critical scrutiny. These inherited opinions are but residues and abbreviations of comprehensive philosophical statements that originated in the past. In order to clarify his opinions, therefore, the political scientist is forced to give attention to the history of philosophy, where speculation about politics is Inseparable from speculation about the character of human knowledge. By working his way back to the source of his opinions about political things and how to study them, he is able to understand these opinions more clearly and to assess them more accurately.^ Although i t is perhaps questionable that a l l opinions are inherited from comprehensive philosophical positions, i t seems certain that at least some are, and that these are susceptible to careful analysis. Thus, a consideration of philosophical issues can act as a guard against personal biases. It should be noted, of course, that such consideration must be made in the spirit of self-criticism, rather than self-justification, i f i t is to avoid merely hardening already held opinions and values.  10 (2)  When reading through the l i t e r a t u r e i n philosophy of science,  one cannot help but be struck by c e r t a i n p a r a l l e l s between the types of problems dealt with these and those dealt with i n s o c i a l science. The philosophy  of science i s often concerned with studying the s c i e n t i f i c  community or i n d i v i d u a l s c i e n t i s t i n terms of the s o c i a l m i l i e u w i t h i n which they function.  Consider the following passage from Abraham Kaplan:  Every s c i e n t i f i c community i s a society i n the small, so to speak,with i t s own agencies of s o c i a l control. O f f i c e r s of the professional associations, honored elders, editors of journals, reviewers, f a c u l t i e s , committees on grants, fellowships, and prizes — a l l exert a steady pressure f o r conformi t y to professional standards, as their counterparts i n the larger society provide sanctions f o r the more general norms. In c e r t a i n respects s c i e n t i f i c t r a i n i n g functions to produce not only competence but also a kind of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y , e s s e n t i a l to membership i n the professional community. Doct o r a l examinations, most candidates agree, have much i n common with the tortures of i n i t i a t i o n r i t e s — with the added t r i b u l a t i o n of fear of f a i l u r e : no one has ever had to repeat h i s Bar Mitzvah. 15  In t h i s context, the philosopher must face such problems, f o r instance, as the r e l a t i v e importance of 'causes' and 'reasons' i n the explanation of s c i e n t i f i c change, or the r e l a t i v e effects of ' i n t e r n a l ' or 'external-environmental' factors i n determining the structure o f a s c i e n t i f i c community a t a given time.***  Similar problems crop up con-  t i n u a l l y i n s o c i a l research. The manner i n which these problems are approached i n philosophy of science, therefore, can be seen as informative to the s o c i a l scientist.  As one example, we can consider how Stephen Toulmin relates some  of h i s conclusions concerning the structure of science to the structure of society:  u  In the case of science...the d i f f e r e n t concepts of a s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e are related more loosely than philosophers have assumed. Instead of being introduced at one and the same time, and a l l of a piece, as a s i n g l e l o g i c a l system with a s i n g l e s c i e n t i f i c purpose, d i f f e r e n t concepts and theor i e s are introduced i n t o a science independently, at d i f f e r e n t times and f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes. ...This means recognizing that an e n t i r e science comprises an ' h i s t o r i c a l population' of l o g i c a l l y independent concepts and theories, each with i t s separate h i s t o r y , structure, and implications. In sociology, likewise, the d i f f e r e n t i n s t i tutions of a society are related more loosely than has recently been assumed. Instead of being i n t e l l i g i b l e only i f considered a l l of a piece, as a s i n g l e integrated ' s o c i a l system', they need to be thought of i n more h i s t o r i c a l terms, since they were o r i g i n a l l y established at d i f f e r e n t times and with d i f f e r e n t ends i n view. ...This, too, means moving beyond the systematic theory of s o c i a l structure and the revolutionary theory of s o c i a l change which i s i t s a n t i t h e s i s , and allowing that e n t i r e s o c i e t i e s comprise ' h i s t o r i c a l populations' of i n s t i t u t i o n s , each with i t s own h i s t o r y and i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e . ^ Toulmin i s more f o r t h r i g h t than most philosophers of science In noting the l i n k s between h i s f i e l d and s o c i a l science.  To a s o c i o l o g i s t  d i s s a t i s f i e d with the adequacy of systematic sociology, or to h i s p o l i t i c a l science counterpart who maintains reservations about the u s e f u l ness of the ' p o l i t i c a l system' as a focus of a n a l y s i s , a comparison such as Toulmin's can prove of h e u r i s t i c value i n ordering h i s thinking about possible a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Many more examples could be c i t e d .  The  point i s that the emphasis and techniques employed i n philosophy of science are often refreshingly divergent from those i n s o c i a l science. As a r e s u l t , new perspectives on o l d problems can become a v a i l a b l e , and new d i r e c t i o n s i n research can be i n i t i a t e d .  (3)  I t seems safe to agree with M i l l e r ' s observation that " p h i l o -  sophy of science i s one major source of the p r e v a i l i n g opinions i n p o l i 18  t i c a l science about methodology." t i o n underlying the present study.  Indeed, this i s one important assumpAs a r e s u l t , i r r e s p e c t i v e of one's  personal views concerning either science or philosophy, at l e a s t a minimal understanding  of the d i f f e r e n t positions within the f i e l d can be extremely  valuable i n understanding  the arguments of other p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s who bother to be e x p l i c i t about the foundations of t h e i r thodological or t h e o r e t i c a l approaches.  me-  In some cases, a cursory ob-  servation of which philosophers of science are c i t e d i n the footnotes of an a r t i c l e can reveal more about i t s i m p l i c i t suppositions than w i l l a c a r e f u l reading of the text i t s e l f . I cannot go so f a r as M i l l e r , however, when he claims that p h i l o sophy of science "has exercised a tremendous influence over the minds of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , who  have l i t t l e choice but to keep up with  develop-  19 ments i n the philosophy of science and choose sides i n i t s disputes." In my opinion, the penetration has not yet been nearly as complete as he envisions, and t h i s leads to another assumption that underlies this thesis. Gunnell has pointed out that reference to philosophers of science need not necessarily Imply a f i r m acceptance or even understanding their positions.  of  "Although i n the l i t e r a t u r e of contemporary s o c i a l  science there are frequent references to c e r t a i n works i n the philosophy • of science and to philosophical issues r e l a t e d to methodology, these are more often i n the context of broad pronouncements and shibboleths r e l a t ing to the nature of science, i t s goals, and the character of i t s  13  reasoning." 20  My own  experience leads me  to conclude that t h i s com-  p l a i n t i s e s s e n t i a l l y correct; many p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , at l e a s t , appear quick to mouth formula-like platitudes about science with l i t t l e consideration of t h e i r philosophical foundations.  apparently One pur-  pose of this study, accordingly, w i l l be to put t h i s perception to a b i t more rigorous test, and attempt to discern how a c t u a l l y i s among  p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s who  prevalent this p r a c t i c e  claim adherence to the formal  deductive conception of science. Gunnell also makes a further indictment, a consideration of which w i l l occupy the bulk of this thesis.  He asserts that s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s '  u n c r i t i c a l acceptance of these s i m p l i s t i c pronouncements about science results from two unsubstantiated  assumptions; f i r s t , that the p h y s i c a l  sciences are the proper model f o r the development of the s o c i a l selences, and second, that the conception of science as deductive formalism i s an adequate representation of the structure and functioning of p h y s i c a l science.  He charges, however, that upon closer examination, both these  assumptions are i n c o r r e c t ; that s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s ...have dogmatically and s u p e r f i c i a l l y embraced a p a r t i c u l a r , and indeed c o n t r o v e r s i a l , model of science and a p o s i t i o n on the unity of empirical inquiry advocated by c e r t a i n philosophers of science without considering a l t e r n a t i v e views or the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of such a model to the problems of explanat i o n with which they are confronted. In other words, the so-called "behavioral" approach i n p o l i t i c a l science may be c r i t i c i z e d from at l e a s t two perspectives: f i r s t , the adequacy of both i t s understanding and a p p l i c a t i o n of the l o g i c of natural science, and, second, the relevance of the n a t u r a l i s t i c approach, even i f properly understood, f o r the explanation of s o c i a l phenomena.^1  14  I t i s c l e a r , to return to our f i r s t point, that i n order to eff e c t i v e l y evaluate Gunnell's assertion as to the "dogmatic and superf i c i a l " character of some s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s ' use of the deductive approach to philosophy of science, we must ourselves be conversant i n that f i e l d . Moreover, the outcome of such an evaluation could have a profound e f f e c t on the course of research, i f not throughout p o l i t i c a l science, at least on the part of c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s . ing  Thus, by i d e n t i f y i n g and apprais-  the p h i l o s o p h i c a l positions held by other s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , philoso-  phy of science can help f a c i l i t a t e better research. Essentially,  the present study can be seen as an attempt to carry  out an examination of the two accusations made by Gunnel1. done i n the following way:  This w i l l be  F i r s t , i n section I I , we w i l l c l o s e l y scru-  t i n i z e the deductive f o r m a l i s t conception of science i n order to ascert a i n i t s "relevance...for the explanation of s o c i a l phenomena," espec i a l l y the phenomena of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , as w e l l as i t s relevance to the task of explanation i n general. guide this inquiry w i l l be:  How  The underlying question that w i l l  can the deductive model of science help  students of International p o l i t i c s become better s c i e n t i s t s and conduct their d i s c i p l i n e i n terms of e f f e c t i v e and e f f i c i e n t s c i e n t i f i c dures?  Next, i n sections I I I and IV, we w i l l turn to a consideration of  p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s ' "understanding model.  proce-  and a p p l i c a t i o n " of the deductive  Section I I I w i l l be concerned with the question of  understanding.  We w i l l examine several prominent arguments put f o r t h by p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s i n favor of a deductive approach e i t h e r to the d i s c i p l i n e as a whole or to selected parts of i t , and attempt to ascertain the accuracy  15  with which these arguments r e f l e c t the philosophical p o s i t i o n they are advocating.  We w i l l be primarily interested i n why  these scholars  ueauctive formalism i s relevant to p o l i t i c a l science, and how  think  they pro-  pose the model can best be applied to s p e c i f i c problem areas.  In  section IV, we w i l l deal d i r e c t l y with applications of the deductive approach to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . how  The goal here w i l l be to discover  adequately deductive models perform i n terms of making i n t e l l i g i b l e  the empirical phenomena they examine.  This w i l l constitute a p r a c t i c a l  test of deductive formalism that w i l l supplement the philosophical test i n section I I .  I t w i l l also serve the further function of comparing the  methods used by deductively-oriented  p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s to those  presented i n the philosophical model.  A few words are i n order about why  t h i s examination w i l l be pre-  sented i n terms of a c r i t i q u e , as opposed to a mere appraisal or d i s cussion.  In e x t o l l i n g the virtues of r a d i c a l analysis above, I f a i l e d  to mention a d i f f i c u l t problem to which i t i s susceptible.  We might  r e f e r to t h i s as the problem of a " j u s t i f i c a t o r y regress."  Each l e v e l  of analysis seems to imply a more fundamental l e v e l , which most be amined i n order to j u s t i f y conclusions  reached at the f i r s t  ex-  level.  This second l e v e l then requires j u s t i f i c a t i o n at a t h i r d l e v e l , and on.  so  Eventually, however, although the exact point i s always somewhat  a r b i t r a r y , we must stop j u s t i f y i n g and accept some assumptions as s e l f evident, at l e a s t i n our own  eyes.  Otherwise, we are l i a b l e to lose  contact with the substantive problem that prompted the inquiry i n the  16  f i r s t place.  The reason this thesis has been characterized as a cri-*-  tique i s because, at t h i s most fundamental l e v e l , the assumptions about science I hold as self-evident are, as f a r as I can t e l l , contradictory to the most basic assumptions of deductive formalism.  So, i n order to  understand the thrust of this c r i t i q u e , these assumptions should be made explicit. I hold as self-evident the assumption that a science, f i r s t foremost, must be dedicated  and  to the e x p l i c a t i o n , to as great a degree as  possible, of the subject matter with which i t i s concerned.  This i s the  point underlying the quotes from Norman Jacobson and Paul Feyerabend which precede this introduction. litics —  no matter how  i t may be —  I t i s the content of i n t e r n a t i o n a l po-  elusive, a n a l y t i c a l l y obstinate, or ambiguous  which must be our f i r s t p r i o r i t y concern.  Thus, I also  hold as self-evident the assumption that i t i s fundamentally bad  science  to attempt to truncate or d i s t o r t a subject of inquiry i n order to mold i t to a preconceived notion of methodological necessity.  Conversely, i t  follows that i t i s good science to continually search f o r new methodolog i c a l techniques that better illuminate and adapt to the subject under consideration. These assumptions, I think, also underlie the work of Abraham Kaplan, and, f o r t h i s reason, the reader w i l l note h i s being referred to approvingly  at various points throughout this thesis.  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  Kaplan's conceptions of s c i e n t i f i c autonomy, logic-in-use, and reconstructed logic are relevant to the points under discussion. omy  The auton-  of inquiry must be a fundamental p r i n c i p l e of successful science.  Kaplan defines i t as follows:  17  ...the various sciences, taken together, are not colonies subject to governance of l o g i c , methodology, philosophy of science, or any other d i s c i p l i n e whatever, but are., and of r i g h t ought to be, free and independent. Following John Dewey, I s h a l l r e f e r to t h i s declaration of s c i e n t i f i c independence as the p r i n c i p l e of autonomy of inquiry. I t i s the p r i n c i p l e that the pursuit of truth i s accountable to nothing and to no one not a part of that pursuit i t s e l f . The d i s t i n c t i o n between logic-in-use and reconstructed  l o g i c i s equally  fundamental: . . . s c i e n t i s t s and philosophers use a l o g i c — they have a cognitive s t y l e which Is more or less l o g i c a l — and some of them formulate i t e x p l i c i t l y . I c a l l the former the logic-in-use, and the l a t t e r the reconstructed l o g i c . We can no more take them to be i d e n t i c a l or even assume an exact correspondence between them, than we can i n the case of the decline of Rome and Gibbon's account of i t , a patient's fever and h i s physician's explanation of i t . 2 3  The important thing to remember about logic-in-use i s that i t i s a variable concept; there are many d i f f e r e n t logics-in-use and the differences between them are not always susceptible to normative analysis.  In Kaplan's words:  That the world of ideas has no b a r r i e r s , within or without, does not c a l l for one true " l o g i c " to govern i t . The conviction that there i s such a l o g i c — as i t happens, ours — i s a parochialism l i k e those of which comparative ethnology made us p a i n f u l l y aware i n the course of the l a s t century. The myth of a "natural l o g i c " , defining a universal r a t i o n a l i t y , has been penetratingly analyzed by Benjamin Lee Whorf and his successors among l i n g u i s t s and anthropologists. Not only language and culture a f f e c t the logic-in-use, but also the state of knowledge, the stage of inquiry, and the s p e c i a l conditions of the p a r t i c u l a r problem. 24  Likewise, there are many reconstructed more susceptible  logics.  These, however, are  to normative judgement, at l e a s t among themselves.  18  Their  ultimate  reflect Thus,  the  "a  test,  however,  logic-in-use  reconstructed  of  must be  the  logic  the  activity  is  itself,  success with  i n  with  which  effect,  which  they a  they  are  concerned.  hypothesis."  A s w i t h o t h e r h y p o t h e s e s , a s t i m e g o e s o n i t may become more and more awkward t o " f i t " the h y p o t h e s i s to the facts — here, the facts constituted by the l o g i c - i n - u s e . It i s not a question of whether the f a c t s can be so construed» h u t r a t h e r w h e t h e r i t i s s t i l l w o r t h w h i l e t o do s o , whether the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n question continues to throw l i g h t on the sound o p e r a t i o n s actually being u s e d . " The of  this  assumptions  distinction:  constructed then  the  feeling  . •• , ,  •  ,  forth  to is  above can be  l o g i c - i n - u s e must be I  feel  that  d i s t i n c t i o n becomes  detrimental this  logic.  put  scientific shared by  i f  this  muddled,  progress  and  restated  concisely  analytically  rule  and  is  the  the  not  to  always kept  result  autonomy  prior  can be of  in  terms  rei n  mind,  seriously  inquiry.  Again,  Kaplan:  The g r e a t danger i n c o n f u s i n g t h e . l o g i c - i n - u s e w i t h , a p a r t i c u l a r r e c o n s t r u c t e d l o g i c , and e s p e c i a l l y a h i g h l y i d e a l i z e d o n e , i s t h a t t h e r e b y the autonomy  of science is subtly , . o f ,the l o g i c h a s t h e  subverted. e f f e c t , not  The n o r m a t i v e force necessarily of im-  proving the l o g i c - i n - u s e , but only of b r i n g i n g i t in c l o s e r conformity, w i t h the imposed r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . It i s often said that behavioral science should stop t r y i n g to i m i t a t e p h y s i c s . I believe that this recommendation i s a m i s t a k e : , the presumption i s certainly, i n favor of those operations of the unders t a n d i n g w h i c h have a l r e a d y shown t h e m s e l v e s t o be so.preeminently successful i n the pursuit of t r u t h . What i s i m p o r t a n t , . I b e l i e v e , I s , t h a t b e h a v i o r a l science should stop t r y i n g to i m i t a t e o n l y what a p a r t i c u l a r reconstruction claims physics to be. &  This precedes the  use  brings  this of  us,  then,  introduction.  deductive  to  the  This  formalism  to  point study pursue  made i n was a  the  third  prompted by science  of  quote  which  an o p i n i o n international  th-:.  19  p o l i t i c s i s akin to the drunkard's use of the s t r e e t lamp to f i n d h i s key. The l i g h t may be better for searching, but the prospects of success, which must be our ultimate concern, are better enhanced elsewhere. Merely to say a l l t h i s , of course, i s only a f i r s t step to producing a convincing argument.  A l l we have seen so f a r i s why this thesis  27 constitutes a c r i t i q u e .  Following a few more preliminary remarks con-  cerning the framework within which the analysis w i l l be made, I w i l l attempt to develop such an argument. B.  The General Characteristics of Science:  A Framework for Analysis i n  Terms of Form, Content, and Context Science, I have suggested, i s a problematic notion, amenable to various i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . This i s not meant to imply, however, that these d i f f e r e n t interpretations have nothing i n common.  In f a c t , there are  some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f science that are accepted as  legitimate by near  l y a l l philosophers of science and s c i e n t i s t s a l i k e .  These character-  i s t i c s , i t should be emphasized, cannot i n any way be construed as the 'core' or 'essence' of science simply because of their ubiquity.  More  c o r r e c t l y , they can be seen as the boundaries or framework within which the d i f f e r e n t interpretations become meaningful.  They are, i n themselves,  f a i r l y useless i n any r o l e except as organizing devices. The two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of science I w i l l use to organize this examination of deductive formalism are explanation and theory.  This choice  r e l i e s on what appears to be a general consensus that (1) explanation consists of making empirical phenomena comprehensible and i s a primary goal of science, and (2) theories make explanations comprehensible, and  20  thus contribute to this goal of science.  28  Of course, d i f f e r e n t approaches,  while agreeing as to these goals, are i n sharp disagreement as to how can be attained.  they  We can now attempt to o u t l i n e a framework within which  these views can be compared. 29 1.  Explanation Explanation i s certainly not the only goal of science; p r e d i c t i o n 30  and control are two others that immediately  come to mind.  These can be  considered i n l i g h t of t h e i r relationship to explanation, however, since the three of them are highly i n t e r r e l a t e d . occupy our attention further on.  For now,  Prediction, especially, w i l l we want to look at explanation  i n as broad a manner as possible i n order to ascertain i t s general characteristics.  These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , then, can be employed as categories  i n our examination  of deductive formalism.  Zn addition, they should be  capable of acting as a framework within which d i f f e r e n t approaches to explanation can be compared and evaluated.  ,.  At the most general l e v e l , we can say that a s c i e n t i f i c explanation is a  group of statements.  These statements must stand i n some sort of  r e l a t i o n - t o each other; that i s , the explanation must have a form.  This  ,form can. range anywhere from a t i g h t , purely l o g i c a l relationship to a loose, connotative structure. have a substantive content.  Secondly, a s c i e n t i f i c explanation must  This simply means that i t must explain 'some-  thing' ,,. and. this something must have a referent i n the -empirical ? l d . w <  Thirdly, the,explanation.must have a context. . There seem to be two r  of contexts that,influence an explanation.  r  types  The f i r s t might be c a l l e d the  -context of application , and i s the context within which the explanation  21  makes sense.  I t includes the t o t a l i t y of 'already understood'  things  which give p r i o r meaning to the terms and scope of the explanation.  The  second might be c a l l e d the context of evaluation, and i s the context withi n which the explanation i s judged.  I t includes the types of rules or  norms that are applicable to the explanation i n various circumstances. These three c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s —  form, content, and context —  appear to be  31 common to a l l explanations,  and w i l l constitute the framework w i t h i n  which we w i l l examine the deductive approach to explanation. The main problem we w i l l be interested i n i s that of explanatory completeness. planation? tics?  How  What, i n the deductive view, q u a l i f i e s as a complete ex1  i s this characterization relevant to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i -  Under what conditions are complete deductive explanations available  i n international p o l i t i c s and what research benefits can be accrued from them? 2.  32 Theory The framework we w i l l use to examine the deductive conception of  theory i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same as that used to examine explanation.  Thus,  the analysis w i l l be focussed of the form, content, context of a p p l i c a t i o n , and context of evaluation of deductive theories.  Theory, however, being a  b i t more complicated concept than explanation, encompasses a greater variety of problems.  Therefore, i n addition to the question of what  constitute a complete theory, we w i l l be concerned with the questions of how a complete theory can be b u i l t , and how built.  i t can be tested once i t i s  These questions are important to the development of a science of  international p o l i t i c s .  A proper consideration of them w i l l require an  22  extension of the above framework i n terms of a more c a r e f u l d i f f e r e n t i a tion of the context of evaluation of a theory. Philosophers of science say notoriously l i t t l e about the b u i l d i n g of theories, primarily because i t i s often an extremely subjective process and therefore d i f f i c u l t to analyze systematically.  The aost  common technique used to avoid discussion of theory b u i l d i n g i s to note that i t i s an aspect of the "context of discovery" as opposed to the "context of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . " the context of evaluation.  These are the two primary categories within They were introduced by Hans Reichenbach i n  1938 and have often proven quite valuable as a n a l y t i c tools.  The d i s t i n c -  t i o n i s based on the "well-known differences between a thinker's way  of 33  finding this theorem and his way of presenting i t before the p u b l i c . " The l a t t e r i s seen as susceptible to l o g i c a l analysis, while the former i s not.  Thus, "the act of discovery escapes l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s ; there are  no l o g i c a l rules i n terms of which a 'discovery machine' could be  con-  3A structed."  The delineation of the scope of the context of discovery  that i s , the decision concerning which parts of science are consigned i t and which parts are not — another.  N.R.  — to  varies from one approach to science to  Hanson, for example, i s p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned with 35  opening up to analysis as much of the context of discovery as possible. In the examination to follow, we s h a l l want to consider how  this problem  of the scope of the context of discovery i s handled by the deductive formalist approach to science, e s p e c i a l l y i n r e l a t i o n to what i t can  tell  us about theory b u i l d i n g , which, although a n a l y t i c a l l y stubborn, i s not completely immune to analysis, and i s an extremely important part of  23  successful s c i e n t i f i c practice. The testing of theories, i n contrast, i s always subsumed under the context of j u s t i f i c a t i o n  and has been subjected to several varied types  of systematic analysis.  The general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of theory testing  involve specifying an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the theory In terms of empirical referents, and then comparing this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to observation or experimentation.  Ideally, this comparison should r e s u l t i n either the con-  firmation or f a l s i f i c a t i o n of the theory.  Our analysis of the means em-  ployed i n testing deductive theories w i l l , accordingly, concentrate on these two processes of confirmation and f a l s i f i c a t i o n .  In summary, then, I have here attempted to sketch out the common framework within which the formal deductive conception of science can be evaluated and, as the opportunity a r i s e s , compared to other conceptions of science. follows.  I t s purpose i s to simplify and organize the discussion that  Thus, f u l l y aware of the fact that I am greatly simplifying  matters, the remainder of this thesis w i l l focus on science i n terms of explanation and theory.  These w i l l be analyzed i n terms of form, content,  context of application, and context of evaluation.  In a d d i t i o n , the con-  text of evaluation of deductive theories w i l l be analyzed i n terms of the contexts of discovery and j u s t i f i c a t i o n . II.  The Philosophical Source;  Formal  Deductive Models of Explanation and Theory We can now turn to a c r i t i c a l examination of the conception of science as deductive formalism that i s put forth i n the l i t e r a t u r e of  24  philosophy of science.  As mentioned above, the discussion w i l l be  oriented around the question:  How  can this conception of science help  f a c i l i t a t e a science of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s ?  In general, we  will  f i n d that the l i m i t a t i o n s of the approach are w e l l understood by i t s proponents, and that our c r i t i q u e w i l l only occasionally have to take note of the various c r i t i c s within the f i e l d such as the oriented philosophers of science. c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of  historically-  We w i l l f i r s t consider the general  the approach, then focus on the s p e c i f i c  models of explanation and  deductive  theory.  A.  The General Characteristics of Deductive Formalism  1.  Deduction Kaplan observes that "A great deal hinges on whether science i s  viewed as a body of propositions or as an enterprise i n which they are 36 generated, as product or process."  There seems to be no better  s t a r t i n g point f o r our examination of deductive formalism than to note  37 that i t i s the preeminent example of the study of science as product. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s concerned with the form of this product.  I t holds  that an adequate explanation or theory must be structured h i e r a r c h i c a l l y with each statement s t r i c t l y deducible from those above i t . quirement i s the sine qua non of deductive formalism.  This r e -  For i t has  the  e f f e c t of turning what would otherwise be an unrelated system of statements into a tautology i n which true premises must imply true consequences, i r r e s p e c t i v e of the content or context of e i t h e r . The deductive l i n k i s achieved through the l o g i c a l ooperation of modus ponens, which C a r l Hempel defines as "the 'rule of detachment',  25  of deductive D then P',  l o g i c , which, given the information that 'D  1  and also ' i f  are true statements, authorizes us to detach the consequent  'P' i n the conditional premise and to assert i t as a self-contained 38 statement which must then be true as w e l l . " explanation, May  Thus, with reference to  Brodbeck notes that:  I f the generalizations and i n d i v i d u a l statements of f a c t serving as premises are accepted as true, then, because of the t a u t o l o g i c a l connection, the conclusion must be true. This and this alone Is the v i r t u e of deductive explanation. Once such terms as 'must', 'guarantees', and ' l o g i c a l l y imp l i e s ' are c l a r i f i e d , then i t i s c l e a r why deduction, and deduction alone, ' j u s t i f i e s ' the conclusion. At the same time, i t i s also clear why any other kind of explanation of i n d i v i d u a l facts cannot possess this conclusiveness. E i t h e r the explanation i s deductive, or i t does not j u s t i f y what i t i s s a i d to explain.39 An analogous statement could be made with reference to theories; only a t a u t o l o g i c a l connection between assumptions and empirically relevant theorems can j u s t i f y the confirmation or f a l s i f i c a t i o n of a  deductive  theory. 2.  Abstraction The v i a b i l i t y of the deductive  l i n k depends upon an acceptance of  the f a c t that i t constitutes an abstraction from s c i e n t i f i c p r a c t i c e . This i s to say, r e f e r r i n g back to our discussion of the l o g i c a l approach i n section I, that the deductive e x p l i c a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c and theories Is not meant to be a description of how formulate explanations  explanations  s c i e n t i s t s actually  and theories, but i s instead an abstract recon-  s t r u c t i o n of the l o g i c a l form seen by deductivists as i n t r i n s i c i n that formulation.  In Hempel's words:  26  . . . t h e s e models a r e not meant to d e s c r i b e how working s c i e n t i s t s a c t u a l l y f o r m u l a t e t h e i r e x planatory accounts. T h e i r purpose i s r a t h e r t o i n d i c a t e i n r e a s o n a b l y p r e c i s e terms the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e and r a t i o n a l e o f v a r i o u s ways i n which e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e answers e x p l a n a t i o n - s e e k i n g why-questions. The c o n s t r u c t i o n o f o u r models t h e r e f o r e i n v o l v e s some measure o f a b s t r a c t i o n and o f l o g i c a l s c h e m a t i z a t i o n . I n t h e s e r e s p e c t s our concepts o f e x p l a n a t i o n resemble the c o n c e p t , o r c o n c e p t s , o f mathematical p r o o f ( w i t h i n a g i v e n mathematical t h e o r y ) as c o n strued i n metamathematics.^ A b s t r a c t i o n i s seen as n e c e s s a r y i f g e n e r a l i t y i s  to be a t t a i n e d .  G e n e r a l i t y , i n t u r n , a l l o w s the model t o be a p p l i c a b l e t o a maximum number o f c o n t e x t s .  T h u s , f o r example, E r n e s t Nagel d e c l a r e s :  I t i s w e l l to b e a r i n mind t h a t the u n u s u a l l y a b s t r a c t c h a r a c t e r o f s c i e n t i f i c n o t i o n s , as w e l l as t h e i r a l l e g e d "remoteness" from the t r a i t s o f t h i n g s found i n customary e x p e r i e n c e , a r e i n e v i t a b l e concomitants o f the quest f o r s y s t e m a t i c and comprehensive e x p l a n a t i o n s . Such e x p l a n a t i o n s can be c o n s t r u e d o n l y i f the f a m i l i a r q u a l i t i e s and r e l a t i o n s o f t h i n g s , i n terms o f which i n d i v i d u a l o b j e c t s and events a r e u s u a l l y i d e n t i f i e d and d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , can be shown to depend f o r t h e i r o c c u r r e n c e on the presence of c e r t a i n o t h e r p e r v a s i v e r e l a t i o n a l or s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e i n v a r i o u s ways an e x t e n s i v e c l a s s o f o b j e c t s and processes. A c c o r d i n g l y , to a c h i e v e g e n e r a l i t y of explanation for q u a l i t a t i v e l y diverse things, those s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s must be f o r m u l a t e d w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o , and i n a b s t r a c t i o n from, the i n d i v i d u a l i z i n g q u a l i t i e s and r e l a t i o n s o f f a m i l i a r experience. The a b s t r a c t n e s s  o f the d e d u c t i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f s c i e n c e must be  o f p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e r n t o those i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e development o f a science of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s .  F o r i t i m p l i e s t h a t the  model i s more an i d e a l ' m e a s u r i n g r o d ' f o r j u d g i n g a l r e a d y  deductive existing  27  s c i e n t i f i c explanations ducing such explanations  and theories than I t i s a 'blueprint' for proor theories i n the f i r s t place.  This Is not  necessarily grounds for r e j e c t i n g the model, however, since the value of> ideal-types for guiding actions i s w e l l known; at least as long as the i d e a l i s , i n f a c t , a true i d e a l f o r the a c t i v i t y which i t i s meant to guide.  Whether the deductive model i s such an i d e a l w i l l require  further analysis. 3.  H i s t o r i c a l Note The philosophical roots of deductive formalism are to be found i n  the epistemological movement usually referred to as l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m or l o g i c a l empiricism.  Under the influence of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand  Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and others, the movement began i n Vienna i n the 1920s as a reaction to the metaphysical German philosophies of the nineteenth century.  This new  approach advocated the l o g i c a l analysis  of s c i e n t i f i c concepts, statements, and explanations  as a means of  achieving an objective understanding of the empirical world.  Michael  Scrlven o f f e r s a t y p i c a l b r i e f description of the movement: Impressionistically speaking — and i n this area of the history of thought I do not believe we can be very precise — one thinks of the l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s as attacking nineteenth-century German metaphysics and what they c a l l e d psychologism i n the sciences (which sometimes included Gestalt theory and always included Verstehen theory),and as upholding the analytic-synthetic d i s t i n c t i o n , the d i s t i n c t i o n between the context of discovery and that of v e r i f i c a t i o n , the facts-value d i s t i n c t i o n , operationalism, v e r i f i c a t i o n i s m , phenomenalism, conventionalism, and formalism (especiall y i n the^philosophy of mathematics and i n the reconstruction of s c i e n t i f i c theories i n terms of 42 an uninterpreted calculus and correspondence r u l e s ) .  28  Unfortunately, i t i s beyond the scope of this thesis to trace the l i n k s between contemporary deductive formalism and the evolution of l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t thought, even though such a discussion would shed considerable l i g h t on the h i s t o r i c a l aspects of the issues with which we are concerned.  Instead, I w i l l merely note the lineage here, r e f e r  to some relevant l i t e r a t u r e i n the footnotes, and point out p a r t i c u l a r l y 43 s i g n i f i c a n t relationships as they become pertinent to topics at hand. B.  Deductive-Nomological Explanation:  The Covering Law Model  In this section, we want to consider the deductivist response to the question:  What constitutes a complete s c i e n t i f i c explanation?  We  w i l l attempt to c l a s s i f y this response i n terms of our four categories of form, content, context of evaluation, and context of a p p l i c a t i o n . Deductive-nomological  (D-N) explanation was f i r s t given e x p l i c i t  formulation as a reconstructed model of s c i e n t i f i c explanation by C a r l 44 Hempel and Paul Oppenheim i n 1948, Since then, the model has under45 gone some r e v i s i o n , as we s h a l l note where appropriate, but as a 46 whole i s s t i l l accepted  largely i n i t s o r i g i n a l form.  In their a r t i c l e ,  Hempel and Oppenheim propose four requirements for adequate s c i e n t i f i c explanation.  The f i r s t three are c a l l e d " L o g i c a l Conditions of Adequacy"  (R1-R3) and the fourth i s termed an "Empirical Condition of Adequacy" (R4).  The best way to approach the D-N model of explanation i s to  consider each of these requirements i n turn. 1.  Form The f i r s t requirement i s that deductive relationships must hold  between statements i n the explanation:  29  (RI)  The  plained;  sequence other  explanandum  the  of  the  words,  the  would not  constitute  explanans;  requirement  we d i s c u s s e d The case i t  being  for  the  adequate  out  the  con-  premises];  otherwise,  points  ex-  logical  i n  logically in  explanans  grounds  for  priority  the  of  logical  form  which  above.  second  is  merely  [the  is  a  information contained  ?  4  must be  explanandum must be  from the  explanandum.  This  explanans  deducible the  [that which  consequent]  the  requirement  form of  the  is  also  concerned w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l statements  form,  within  but  the  in  this  explanans:  (R2) The e x p l a n a n s must c o n t a i n g e n e r a l l a w s , and these must a c t u a l l y be r e q u i r e d f o r the d e r i v a t i o n of the explanandum. We s h a l l n o t make i t a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r a s o u n d e x p l a n a t i o n , however, that the explanans must c o n t a i n a ^ g l e a s t one s t a t e m e n t w h i c h i s n o t a law.... The  requirement  of  general,  difficult  question of  generated  much c o n t r o v e r s y ,  but  element  not  They  between Since  we w i l l  take  laws  are.  leads This  deductivists  the  nature  of  applicability of some  In  that  form.  Beyond t h i s ,  fundamental  p r e d i c a t e whose  a  conception of  insist  "fundamental," but  from a  immediately  time  to  and  to  issue  has  critics,  laws w i l l D-N  the  be  explanation  consider  i t  here.  universal is  only  i n d i s c u s s i n g the  Hempel and Oppenheim's clear.  laws  e x a c t l y what  themselves.  to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , closely  covering,  specifying  among d e d u c t i v i s t s  an i m p o r t a n t  or  law  can be  law.  meaning  must be a  law  finite  Finally, requires  a  in  general  true  (this  must be scope  l a w may  reference  law is  i t  is  c o n t a i n no any  not  t a k e n up  infinite  i f  to  is  in  completely in  R4)  scope i f  logically terms  particular  in  and i t  derived its  object  or  30  spatio-temporal fusion,  as  the  location.**  r e s u l t i n g debate  ther  attempts  more  differentiated  tiate ical  at  both of  q u i c k l y made  laws,  has  which  clear.  As  h a v e now  Specifically,  laws,  a result,  accidental  we  fur-  led  can  con-  to  a  differen-  universals,  empir-  tautologies.  noted are  laws.  imperfect  and  much room f o r  Hempel and o t h e r s  conception of  generalizations, Broadbeck  formulation leaves  c l a r i f i c a t i o n by  among p e r f e c t  laws,  This  3  a  d i s t i n c t i o n between  viewed  as  types  of  perfect  general  and  imperfect  laws:  Any l a w , whether i t i s about p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , persons, or s o c i e t i e s , i s 'imperfect' i f It does n o t p e r m i t us t o compute ( p r e d i c t o r p o s t d i e t ) the s t a t e o f the system, e i t h e r an I n d i v i d u a l o r a g r o u p , a t any moment f r o m i t s s t a t e a t one moment. . . . I n general, imperfect laws are i n d e f i n i t e w i t h respect to time, or hedged In by q u a l i f i c a t i o n , o r they are s t a t i s t i c a l . 5  Obviously, are  also  perfect  "the  deterministic admitted  longer  other  process  law-like  in  of  to  law  deductive no means  perfect  i n s u p e r a b l e . B u t either  of  linguistic  imprecise can  serve  these  Imperfect  laws,  explanations.  requires  knowledge.  that  Once  this  types  of  s t i l l laws  leaves to be  According  premises  this  the  however,  is  be  to the  grasped,  laws...no  matter  somewhat  distinguished  from  entities?  one. as  c o m e by."*"*"  formulating so-called universal  d i s t i n c t i o n between  important but a  hard  model by  laws  difficulty  How a r e  The  count,  are  deductive  appears  vague.  laws  considered permissible i n  Brodbeck,  the  0  the  a It  law is  and  an  accidental  important because,  basis  for  an  It  imprecise because,  universal  is  on Hempel's  e x p l a n a t i o n , whereas  an ac-  an  ac-  of  this  53 cidental  universal  cannot.  is  in  spite  31  important  difference,  universal  has  usually terms  yet  been  described  of  very  in  i.e.,  of  As  what  for a  i d e n t i f y i n g an  result,  accidental  universal  statements  then B would be  the  accidental  distinction  universals  are  is  not,  or  i n  examples.  " t e l l i n g and s u g g e s t i v e "  an a c c i d e n t a l  conditionals, case,  terms  a  means  formulated.  simplistic  Hempel notes whereas  no d e f i n i t e  (would  cannot, of  the  serve  form  have been)  difference: to  'If  the  "a  support  A were  case',  can,  counterfactual  (had  where  law  been)  in  the  fact  A  is  54 not  (has  lowing  not  been)  the  case."  To  illustrate  this,  he  notes  the  f o l -  examples: Thus, the a s s e r t i o n ' I f t h i s p a r a f f i n candle had been put i n t o a k e t t l e of b o i l i n g water, i t would have m e l t e d ' c o u l d he supported by adducing the l a w t h a t p a r a f f i n i s l i q u i d above 60 d e g r e e s c e n t i g r a d e (and the f a c t t h a t the b o i l i n g p o i n t o f w a t e r i s 100 degrees c e n t i g r a d e ) . But the statement ' A l l rocks i n t h i s box contain i r o n ' c o u l d not be used s i m i l a r l y to Support the c o u n t e r f a c t u a l statement 'If t h i s pebble had been put i n this box, i t would contain i r o n ' .  This  distinction is  cidental cific out  universal  one.  of  this  For box,  A similar contrast  to  sentences  where  i t  This put  is into  can  completely support  example, i t  the  would  left  of  the  by  according  universal,  type  b o i l i n g water,  the  some c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s ,  statement  'If  open whether  represented  unambiguous, however,  'If  contain iron'  difference,  an a c c i d e n t a l  i.e.,  is  not  or  not  i t  is  supported by  Hempel,  come  A w i l l 'If  not  in  this  would m e l t ' .  the  this  pebble had been  can support  A should  statement  then  to  this  i f  since  to  is  that  pass,  "a  the  pulled  law,  in  conditionals,  then so would  come t o  paraffin  spe-  universal.  subjunctive  fact  But  the  ac-  pass.""*^  candle same  B',  should  problem  be  32  described above also applies here. In s p i t e of these d i f f i c u l t i e s and ambiguities, however, most explications of the difference between accidental universals and laws revolve around these two arguments.^ Quite simply, these explications are unsatisfactory; they seem to add l i t t l e to what appears to be an i n t u i t i v e l y obvious difference between the two s p e c i f i c statements.  The more important question i s :  Why  does one counterfactual appear so obviously acceptable, while the other appears unacceptable?  The answer, I think, involves the nature of the  'background knowledge' or context that i s pertinent to each case.  This  can be i l l u s t r a t e d by making some modifications to the 'rocks i n the box' example.  Suppose we are given the following universal statement: ' a l l  i r o n rocks i n this box are magnetic'. cidental universal?  Is this a law or i s I t an ac-  Let us consider the counterfactual:  'If this i r o n  rock had been put i n this box, i t would be magnetic'• The question of whether this statement i s supported by the o r i g i n a l universal i s not obvious as i n the previous examples. gap i n our background knowledge.  The reason i s because there i s a  This gap prevents us from knowing  whether the box i s simply a cardboard box s i t t i n g on a table somewhere  —  i n which case the counterfactual i s not supported by the o r i g i n a l s t a t e ment, which then must be an accidental universal —  or i f the box i s  situated, say, within the f i e l d of a huge magnet —  i n which case,  because the rock would become magnetized when placed i n the box, the counterfactual would be supported by the o r i g i n a l statement, which then would be judged a legitimate law.  U n t i l the gap i s our background know-  ledge i s f i l l e d , u n t i l we know more about the location of the box, we  33  cannot make a judgement about whether or not the universal i s a law. Thus, the d i s t i n c t i o n between laws and accidental universals i s highly dependent on the question of context.  A law i s a law because, given the  context of the way we view the world, i t seems to f i t i n with other phenomena and processes we observe.  In contrast, an accidental universal  seems to contradict our background knowledge.  This d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l  become more clear when we come to examine further on the r o l e played by laws i n theories. The d i s t i n c t i o n among laws, empirical generalizations, and t a u t o l ogies can be explicated by a s i m i l a r argument. types of statements  Hanson defines the three  i n terms of the three dimensions of l o g i c a l space:  syntax, semantics, and epistemological status.  Although not himself a  deduct!vist, Hanson's argument i s quite amenable to the present ive p o s i t i o n .  deduct-  I t s p a r t i c u l a r value stems from the c l a r i t y with which  i t i l l u s t r a t e s the problems involved i n recognizing and c l a s s i f y i n g laws. Before considering Hanson's d e f i n i t i o n s , however, we must b r i e f l y note the rudimentary  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the three l o g i c a l  In terms of syntax, a statement  dimensions.  i s either synthetic or a n a l y t i c ;  that i s , i t i s either l o g i c a l l y consistent with i t s negative, or i t i s not. 58 not.  Perhaps this i s best i l l u s t r a t e d by examples.  The  statement  ' A l l Swedes have blond h a i r ' i s l o g i c a l l y consistent with i t s negative 'Not a l l Swedes have blond h a i r ' ; therefore i t i s synthetic. On the other hand, the statement  ' A l l bachelors are unmarried males' i s a n a l y t i c  because i t s negative, 'Not a l l bachelors are unmarried males', makes no sense i n l i g h t of the accepted d e f i n i t i o n s of 'bachelor' and  'unmarried  34 male'.  Thus, syntax involves the question of consistency.  In terms of  semantics, a statement i s either contingent or non-contingent; i t s claim to truth i s either vulnerable, e.g., on the way  that i s ,  the world i s ,  or on the rules of the game, or on the conditions of inquiry within a given context, or i t i s not.  The statement ' A l l Swedes have blond h a i r '  i s contingent on the observation of whether or not they a l l i n f a c t do have blond h a i r ; whereas the statement ' A l l bachelors are unmarried males' i s non-contingent,  i t s claim to truth i s n o n - f a l s i f i a b l e with reference  to anything outside i t s e l f . meaning or truth-content.  Thus, semantics involves the question of In terms of epistemological status, a s t a t e -  ment i s either j u s t i f i e d a p r i o r i or a p o s t e r i o r i ; that i s , i t s truth i s either evident by r e f l e c t i o n alone, or i t needs to be corroborated by experience.  The f i r s t of our examples i s obviously j u s t i f i e d a poste-  r i o r i whereas the second j u s t i f i e s i t s e l f and i s therefore a p r i o r i . Thus, epistemological status involves the question of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 59  According to Hanson,  empirical generalizations are synthetic,  contingent, and a p o s t e r i o r i .  ' A l l Swedes have blond h a i r ' , then, i s an  empirical generalization. Tautologies, i n contrast, are a n a l y t i c , noncontingent, and a p r i o r i . ology.  ' A l l bachelors are unmarried males' i s a taut-  (Note again that a D-N  explanation i s a tautology, and therefore  exhibits a l l tnese t a u t o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . )  But what about laws?  The problem seems to be that laws exhibit c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of both empiri c a l generalizations and tautologies.  Indeed, the history of debate con-  cerning the nature of laws has most often consisted of attempts to show that they are ' i n fact' either one or the other.  The present p o s i t i o n  35  taken by  deductivists  philosophers that But  laws they  This  are  science)  synthetic  are  also  to  fact  that  result,  the  comes  theoretical  true,  thus  that  matter,  the  down somewhere  certain  extent  however, law  is  structure  relative  is  a  in  So  Scriven  a  middle.  and i t s  It  a l l  holds  generalizations.  like  tautologies.  theoretical effect  is  of  tautologies)  a  the  law  puts  majority  empirical  (unlike  law would have  as w e l l .  As  the  imbedded i n  non-contingency  empirical generalizations.  great  non-contingent,  relative  usually  negation of  whole  its  a  for  and a p o s t e r i o r i , l i k e  a  non-contingency,  from the As a  of  (and,  of  usually  and  stems  structure.  negating  expected  differentiation  the  to  hold  from  i t :  reduction from a 'mere e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ' i s very r a r e l y e x p l a n a t o r y , and i t i s o n l y because laws u s u a l l y i n v o l v e more t h a n t h i s (as w e l l as l e s s ) that they carry explanatory force. (The f a c t t h a t they commonly r e f l e c t some u n d e r l y i n g p r o c e s s e s , a l b e i t i m p r e c i s e l y , a c c o u n t s f o r much o f t h e i n d u c t i v e reli a b i l i t y we a s c r i b e t o t h e m , a n d h e n c e f o r much o f our w i l l i n g n e s s to a l l o w contrary-to-fact inferences from them.) 6 0  Like  the  d i s t i n c t i o n between  t i o n between  laws  discussion of The  tween laws  on  and e m p i r i c a l  deductive  reason  laws and a c c i d e n t a l  i t  the  is  generalizations w i l l  theories  important  universals, be  this  distinc-  c l a r i f i e d by  our  the  differences  be-  and  empirical  below. to  be e x p l i c i t about  one hand and a c c i d e n t a l  universals  general  61  izations  on  occasions  that  accidental Meehl  notes  from the  the  other, the  so-called  universals that  is  or  because  charge  laws developed  in  has  of  the  of  social  social  b e e n made o n  social  empirical generalizations.  many p r o b l e m s  "incompleteness  the  s c i e i t i f i c  scientists'  science For  several  are  actually  example,  explanation nomological  Paul  result network."  36  Underlying  (derivationally  known laws ones are  but  —  the  true,  social  "true  t h e way  opher's al  of  they  some o f  universals.  biological  reasons  are.  viewpoint,  not  and s o c i a l  causally)  are  why"  laws  is  are,  that  not  derivable  (laws  of  also  while of  their  he  notes  of  same  difficulty  from the  cidental  universals  the  in  nature,  fundamental  w h i c h we h a v e b e e n  laws  odd  philos-  accident-  "laws"  structurea  l o g i c a l form  laws  physics).  However,  many  are  singly)is  that  from a  because  and h i s t o r y - d e p e n d e n t  so  very  nomologicals but  science  the  unknown  the known  dependent  way,  the  Furthermore,  the  This  and  science  of  special  they  (taken are  nomologicals  involved  grappling with  in  recognizing  ac-  here.  U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i t i s not always easy to a s c e r t a i n when a b i o l o g i c a l o r s o c i a l - s c i e n c e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ( t a k e n as t r u e and w e l l e v i d e n c e d ) i s r e a l l y a k i n t o to " A l l s i l v e r m e l t s a t 960.5° C . " — a n o m o l o g i c a l — a n d w h e n i t i s a k i n t o " A l l t h e c o i n s i n my pocket are s i l v e r , " an a c c i d e n t a l u n i v e r s a l . .... [The n o m o l o g i c a l ] g e n e r a l i z a t i o n i s a t h e o r e m w i t h i n a formalized p h y s i c a l theory (and, note c a r e f u l l y , would be n o n - t r i v i a l l y true f o r a l l w o r l d s on o u r w o r l d f a m i l y even i f no s i l v e r e x i s t e d o n some o f t h e m ) . In biology, the s t a t e m e n t " A mammal d i e s i f d e p r i v e d o f o x y g e n " i s o f t h i s s o r t , s i n c e i t s s t r u c t u r e dependence can a n a l o g o u s l y be r e p r e s e n t e d i n an adequate theoretical (anatomical + p h y s i o l o g i c a l ) d e f i n i t i o n of 'mammal.' By c o n t r a s t , t h e t a x o n o m i c g e n e r a l i z a t i o n " A l l mamm a l s h a v e p a i r e d g i l l - s l i t s a t some s t a g e i n t h e i r development" i s an a c c i d e n t a l u n i v e r s a l , as i s "If a s p e c i e s of animal has a h e a r t , i t has k i d n e y s . " These taxonomic p r o p e r t y c o r r e l a t i o n s a r e . . . " h i s t o r i c a l accidents," r e f l e c t i n g the course of evolution w h i c h c o u l d h a v e b e e n d i f f e r e n t g i v e n t h e same fundamental nomologicals but d i f f e r i n g i n i t i a l cond i t i o n s of the e a r t h . 6  Meehl's  conception of  and Oppenheim's  fundamental  than  Hanson's  i t  does  imbedded i n  to some  a  law  3  bears  and d e r i v e d  a  greater  laws  or  Brodbeck's  conception, which merely  theoretical  structure,  not  resemblance  requires  necessarily  the  to  Hempel  perfect that  a  laws law  be  theoretical  37  structure  of  fundamental physics*.  of  accidental  in  social science  two w a y s o f to  the  deductive  case,  over,  i t  can  social this  science  put  of  that or  i t  must be  reality, ation.  social i t  can  accept  there  is  science  equally  clear  admittedly,  social  science  i t  mean  to  are  (some,  places  is  that  As  result,  of  follow  a  no  social  reality.  indeed  in  terms  of  its  strategies  of If  laws  that  are  as  less  the  problem laws  appears  somewhat  The  this  social  that, in  to  be  damaging  in  in  the  for  in  the  improving social to  the  d e v e l o p i n g modes  of  Does exin  usually  is  incomp-  presently sheds  a  explanation, D-N m o d e l a n d , the  to  inadequate,  on  make  this  prior  D-N m o d e l o f  a p o s i t i o n to  to mold explanation to  means  i t  in  introduction to  understanding i t  are  is  a position analytically  compatibility with  con-  However,  inadequate  because  of  we  this  deductive  argument  explanation is  if  of  explanations  of  social the  light  More-  than others).  model i s  outlined in  In  science.  many  terms  former  laws.  principle.  are  unacceptable  logic  in  reliable  deductive  to mold explanation  trying  in  there  inadequate  i t  we m u s t ,  trying  strategy  regard  i f  terms  future  strategy  there  conception of  unavailable  a s s u m p t i o n s we  inadequate  a  which  conclude  far  the  reconstructed  Thus,  in  however,  Basically,  Meehl's  are  implausible  the b a s i c  not  concerning the  be  does  logic-in-use. it  one.  problem, both of  that  b u t we m u s t  atible with  case,  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s p o s i n g as  e x p l a i n i n g s o c i a l phenomena?  forth,  thesis;  important  this  clear  of  that  planation, terms  is  laws  mean  and e m p i r i c a l  o n e h a n d , we  i t  see  an  either  position.  would not  ception, we  is  handling  On t h e this  universals  In  social explanchoice reject rather,  contingencies  explanation that  of do  38  no* demand recourse to laws, so be i t . by Scriven, who  This i s the approach advocated  notes, for example, the r o l e of  truisms as opposed to  laws i n warranting h i s t o r i c a l explanations: [Truisms] are t r i v i a l , but they are not empty; and can only look l i k e shoddy p r e - s c i e n t i f i c laws, whereas h i s t o r i c a l explanations are neither shoddy nor pres c i e n t i f i c . The paradox i s resolved by seeing that the sense i n which good h i s t o r i c a l explanations are based on such truisms i s simply that the explanations can only be denied by someone who i s prepared to deny such an obviously true statement. The truism t e l l s us nothing new at a l l , but i t says something and i t says something true, even i f vague and d u l l . I t i l l f i t s into a deductive proof; but i t has no need to do so, since the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of an explanation i s a a context-dependent inductive procedure.64 I t i s not necessary to go into the d e t a i l s of Scriven's approach i n order to stress our main point, that an acceptance of Meehl's conception of laws requires the abandonment of deductive explanation of s o c i a l phenomena and the development of at l e a s t some a l t e r n a t i v e that i s more relevant to the problems and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the s o c i a l world. On the other hand, an acceptance of Hanson's l e s s stringent concept i o n of laws s t i l l confronts us with the problem of d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g among laws, empirical generalizations, and accidental universale.  In this  case, the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s even more d i f f i c u l t , since the d i s t i n c t i o n s among the three become quite obscure, as we have already seen. problem becomes more a p r a c t i c a l than a t h e o r e t i c a l one.  Thus, the  But once we  begin defining laws, and hence deductive explanations, i n terms of p r a c t i c a l considerations, we are weakening the l o g i c a l foundation of the deductive approach i n favor of a pragmatic one.  This i s a dangerous t a c t i c  because one goal of deductive fo-rmalism must be to define laws i n l o g i c a l  39  terms.  Otherwise, there can be no guarantee that the laws are true,  which means no guarantee that the deduction i s j u s t i f i e d , and therefore no guarantee that the explanation i s complete. which this conception  Thus, the d i f f i c u l t y i n t o  of laws leads us i s one of l o g i c a l adequacy, as op-  posed to the d i f f i c u l t y of p r a c t i c a l adequacy which characterized the previous 2.  conception.  Context The t h i r d requirement of D-N explanation involves the content o f  the explanans: (R3) The explanans must have empirical content; i . e . , i t must be capable, at l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e , of t e s t by experiment or observation. This cond i t i o n i s i m p l i c i t i n (R4); f o r since the explanandum i s assumed to describe some empirical phenomenon, i t follows from (Rl) that the explanans e n t a i l s at l e a s t one consequence of empirical character, and this f a c t confers upon i t t e s t a b i l i t y and empirical content.65 How the explanation i s to be tested i s a matter that i s not taken up i n much d e t a i l by Hempel and Oppenheim.  This i s because they are primarily  concerned that the statements i n the explanans be testable, not a c t u a l l y tested.  The purpose of an explanation i s to explain, not to be tested,  and this i s why (R3) i s i m p l i c i t i n (R4).  As a r e s u l t , the t e s t a b i l i t y  condition refers to t e s t a b i l i t y ' i n p r i n c i p l e ' , since, by the Empirical Requirement of Adequacy (R4), the statements i n the explanans are r e quired to be true i n the f i r s t place: (R4) The sentences c o n s t i t u t i n g the explanans must be true.66 This requirement has also l e d to much confusion and d i f f i c u l t y , as i s evidenced by Hempel and Oppenheim's own discussion of i t :  Th**: i n a sound -explaaafelon. th» -«lem«ats. coo— s t i t u t i n g the -explanans have to s a t i s f y some condition of f a c t u a l correctness i s obvious. But i t might seem more appropriate to s t i p u l a t e that the explanans has to be highly confirmed by a l l the relevant evidence a v a i l a b l e rather than i t should be true. This s t i p u l a t i o n , however, leads to awkward consequences. Suppose that a c e r t a i n phenomenon was explained at an e a r l i e r stage of science, by means of an explanans which was w e l l supported by the evidence then at hand, . but which has been highly disconfirmed by more recent empirical findings. In such a case, we would have to say that o r i g i n a l l y the explanatory account was a correct explanation, but that i t ceased to be one l a t e r , when unfavorable evidence was discovered. This does not appear to accord with sound common usage. 7 6  An a l t e r n a t i v e way posed by Hempel.  of dealing with this problem has also been pro-  He notes that "R4  characterizes what might be c a l l e d  a correct or true explanation. In an analysis of the l o g i c a l structure of explanatory arguments, therefore, that requirement may be d i s r e - .  68 garded.  I f we accept this modification, then the t o t a l i t y of D-N  ex-  planations becomes divided up into two groups somewhat as follows: . . . i n order to havs obtained The S c i e n t i f i c Explanation of a phenomenon one must have arrived at the true laws of nature and the true and comp l e t e p i c t u r e of the antecedent or i n i t i a l cond i t i o n s ; whereas to have A S c i e n t i f i c Explanation i s to have an account s a t i s f y i n g R1-R3.. .but not necessarily R4. At any stage i n the h i s t o r y of science, we can properly describe mankind as having A S c i e n t i f i c Explanation of a p a r t i c u l a r phenomenon, but r a r e l y — i f ever — can i t be claimed that The S c i e n t i f i c Explanation has been a r r i v e d a t . ^ 6  The problem i s that t h i s Jichotomization of D-N explanation simply does not work.  The reason i s because what has been referred to as A  S c i e n t i f i c Explanation i s a c t u a l l y no explanation at a l l , since i t i s false.  As we noted above, the purpose of s c i e n t i f i c explanation i s not  41  to be tested, but to explain.  In the deductive formulation of explana-  t i o n , therefore, t h i s means that the premises must be true (as emphasized by Hempel above with reference to modus ponens). The f a i l u r e to r e a l i z e this leads to errors l i k e the one involved i n the following passage from Brodbeck: Far from requiring "exact t r u t h " f o r i t s premises, a l l that the deductive model requires i s exact statement of a hypothesis about this truth. The hypothesis i s then tested by the "exact deduction" • • • «  In an explanation, the premises are not tested by the deduction;  the con-  sequent i s j u s t i f i e d by the conjunction of the true premises and the duction.  de-  To c a l l what Brodbeck has here described an "explanation" i s to  comr.lately o b l i t e r a t e the meaning of the term. Thus, we are brought back to the o r i g i n a l formulation, that adequate D-N  explanation requires true premises.  This requirement, Hempel  and Oppenheim's reasons f o r advancing i t notwithstanding,  has been sub-  jected to the c r i t i c i s m that i t i s simply  too stringent to be applicable  to any r e a l - l i f e s c i e n t i f i c explanation.  This i s a serious c r i t i c i s m f o r ,  as we have seen, a l o g i c a l reconstruction must take i t s warrant from the l o g i c i n t r i n s i c i n science, not from some a p r i o r i , metaphysical p r i n ciple.  I f deduction from true premises i s not a f a i r extrapolation from  the p r a c t i c e of science, then the model's adequacy i s put i n serious doubt. One variant of this basic c r i t i c i s m involves, once again, the nature of laws.  I t holds that a fundamental property of laws i s that they are  never l i t e r a l l y true.  Nothing i n our discussion of laws above seems to  d e f i n i t e l y contradict this p o s i t i o n , and i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that no  A2  r W u e t i u i o t !  -kae  •es7?*>  directly challenged i t .  However, i f accepted, i t  is irretrievably damaging to the D-N conception of explanation — which demands both true premises and laws as premises — since i t renders these demands incompatible.  In putting forth this specific criticism, Scrivan  makes the following remarks about the nature of physical laws: The examples of physical laws with which we are all familiar are distinguished by one feature of particular interest for the traditional [deductive] analyses — they are virtually a l l known to be in error. Nor is the error trifling, nor is an amended law available which corrects for a l l the error. The important feature of laws cannot be their literal truth, since this rarely exists. It is not their closeness to the truth which replaces this, since far better approximations are readily constructed. Their virtue lies in a compound out of the qualities of generality, formal simplicity, approximation to the truth, and theoretical tractability.?1 It is worthwhile to stress that this particular criticism refers to the deductive model's role in physical explanation, not merely its role in the problematic social context.  Thus, the points made here are even  more general than those made with reference to laws above.  In fact,  they strike at the very heart of the area where the deductive approach is usually regarded as most secure; the domain of physics.  We will be  able to pursue this argument in greater depth in relation to the discussion of deductive theories further on. These, then, are the four requirements of D-N explanation. The form of this type of explanation is represented in the following schema:  43 C  l»  C  2 ' *  ,  ,  Statements Antecedent Conditions  k  C  Logical  General  deduction  view,  a  essary  Explanans  Laws  Description of the E m p i r i c a l Phenomenon to be E x p l a i n e d  E  An e x p l a n a t i o n  of  that  'complete'  f u l f i l l s a l l explanation.  and s u f f i c i e n t  conditions  four  requirements  This  means  of  i t  adequacy  Explanandum  i s ,  on  includes  and  the  a l l  therefore  deductive  of  the  fully  nec-  accounts  73 for  the  phenomenon under  To  these  add a f u r t h e r to  i t  that  than "an  criteria proviso,  the  for  o r i g i n a l four  its  explanans,  if  for  predicting  the  said...concerning  The  taken  the  in  to  be  could warrant  false,  well-known  difference  tions,  causal  and  time,  not  This  fully  Consequently, of  attached  addition  adequate  could have served  characteristics  whatever  as  unless a  w i l l  explanation or  is  basis be  predic-  either. to  this  especially  adequate  in  is  Oppenheim  controversy  combined.  event  question.  logical  applicable  of  Hempel and  had more  requirements  account  event  explanation,  probably  a particular  i n i t i a l reaction  Obviously  complete  which has  explanation of  t i o n w i l l be  consideration.  in  p r o v i s o was terms  explanations. between  of  the  are  which the  point  claim  Elementary  correlations,  relationships, which  to  out  that  that  i t  must  predictions  examples,  such as  can generate  foundations  of  the  predicexplanations,  75 were put  forth.  d e f i n i t i o n of  As  a  result,  prediction,  non-explanatory  in  forecas ting:  Brodbeck  order  to  was  prompted  distinguish it  to  attempt  a  from prophecy,  clear or  44 If  by  'prediction.'  •a c l a i m  w i l l  that  occur , 1  being  able  any prophesy, time  a certain  t h e n we may c e r t a i n l y  to understand.  to  explain  given,  i n barometric  then  i t .  is  b u t who w o u l d b e w i l l i n g fared  the o r i g i n a l  simply  event  without  hand,  reasons  t h e e v e n t we s h o u l d b e  i f  can  able  6  definition i s  pressure  justification  after  7  or  predict  On t h e o t h e r  a p r e d i c t i o n we mean o n e f o r w h i c h  Brodbeck's  modified  we mean  a certain  by  be  at  at  hardly  certainly to say  i t  no b e t t e r ,  adequate,  however.  a good reason explains  a n d , as a  A sudden  for predicting  the storm?  a  Further  consequence,  drop storm,  attempts  Hempel  finally  position:  ••.the t h e s i s o f s t r u c t u r a l i d e n t i t y amounts t o t h e c o n j u n c t i o n o f two s u b - t h e s e s , namely (I) that every adequate explanation i s p o t e n t i a l l y a p r e d i c t i o n . . . ( i i ) that conversely every adequate p r e d i c t i o n i s p o t e n t i a l l y a n e x p l a n a t i o n . ...I w i l l argue that the f i r s t sub-thesis i s sound, whereas the second one i s indeed open to q u e s t i o n . 7  With  this  modification,  the thesis  of  planation  and p r e d i c t i o n  (but not the  can. i m p l y  prediction)  set  is  Although getting this  time  t o make  of p o l i t i c a l It  seems  this  of  of ourselves reference  we w i l l  of  scientists, consider  further  Oran Young  on ( w r i t t e n rather  that  b e t w e e n ex*-  complete  a b i t , i t to  explanation  i n  glibly  seems  propitious  the question of  t h e D-N m o d e l o f i n c l u d i n g some o f  i n section III,  modification i n the deductive  explanation and prediction.  examine  traction),  thesis  understanding  political  scholars  important  tionship w i l l  many  a l o g i c a l symmetry  aside,  a point with  scientists'  that  ely-oriented  ahead  7  accuracy  explanation. the  deductiv-  have f a i l e d  position concerning  For example,  1972; eight informs  the  us  years that  to  the  i n an a r t i c l e after  "many  at  Hempel's  note rela-  ye re-  investigators  45 p u r s u e -the development o f t h e o r i e s f r o m an i n t e r e s t i n e x p l a n a t i o n r a t h e r p r e d i c t i o n , even though the l o g i c a l s t a t u s of e x p l a n a t i o n and p r e d i c t i o n 78 i s t r e a t e d as i d e n t i c a l by most p h i l o s o p h e r s  of s c i e n c e . "  L i k e w i s e , D a v i s Bobrow, i n a n o t h e r a r t i c l e i n the same volume,remarks: E x p l a n a t i o n and p r e d i c t i o n have the same s t r u c t u r e but d i f f e r e n t s t a r t i n g p o i n t s . When we e x p l a i n something, we s t a r t from an o b s e r v e d outcome and work backwards to e x p l a i n i t . ...When we p r e d i c t something, we s t a r t w i t h a s e t o f p r i n c i p l e s and work out the consequences they i m p l y . ^ These f o r m u l a t i o n s a r e n e a t and s i m p l e , but i n c o r r e c t . they a r e r e m i n i s c e n t o f the "broad pronouncements and r e f e r r e d t o above by G u n n e l l  As  such,  shibboleths"  (p. 12) i n t h a t they f a i l t o r e f l e c t  an  80 adequate u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f the model they c l a i m t o r e p r e s e n t .  I t seems  a f a i r guess t h a t many p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s f o c u s on p r e d i c t i v e , r a t h e r than explanatory,  c r i t e r i a f o r t h e i r r e s e a r c h d e s i g n s not o n l y because  o f the p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t p r e d i c t i v e hypotheses a r e e a s i e r t o v e r i f y , but a l s o because of t h i s erroneous assumption t h a t p r e d i c t i o n , i f s u c c e s s f u l , w i l l s u f f i c e as e x p l a n a t i o n .  For now,  we  t h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s c e r t a i n l y not w a r r a n t e d by the D-N t i o n as i t i s p r e s e n t l y The  can o n l y say model o f  that  explana-  formulated.  a s p e c t o f the e x p l a n a t o r y - p r e d i c t i v e t h e s i s t h a t i s s t i l l  defended by the d e d u c t i v e  approach —  is potentially a prediction —  t h a t e v e r y adequate e x p l a n a t i o n  has a l s o come under a t t a c k .  At i t s  most s u p e r f i c i a l l e v e l , t h i s c r i t i c i s m n o t e s such o b v i o u s p o i n t s  as  the f a c t t h a t the e x p l a n a t i o n o f laws, w h i c h presumably h o l d a t a l l 81 t i m e s , can have no m e a n i n g f u l c o u n t e r p a r t  i n terms o f a p r e d i c t i o n .  At a more fundamental l e v e l , i t m a i n t a i n s  t h a t s c i e n t i s t s sometimes  employ c o m p l e t e l y  adequate e x p l a n a t o r y  arguments t h a t have no  capacity,  46  in  principle,  rounding  this  explanatory evolution  for  being  c l a i m has  account  is  understood  that  scientist  existence  of  cast.  Yet  having  great  of  often  to has  creatures  many  into  predictions.  focussed on  organic  legitimately  versally "No  converted  change  scientific,  put  used  of  novel  competent  a  this  scientists  in  this  account  to  less  have accepted  is  the  of  almost  uni-  observes  coming-into-  verified  Darwin's  the  theory  example,  foretell  s t i l l  sur-  whether  Darwin's  Toulmin, for  theory  species,  question of  forth  since  be n o n - p r e d i c t i v e . ever  the  The d e b a t e  his  fore-  theory  as  82 explanatory  power."  Similarly,  Scriven  concludes:  The most i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n t o b e l e a r n e d f r o m e v o l u t i o n a r y theory today i s a negative one: t h e t h e o r y shows us what s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s need not do. I n p a r t i c u l a r i t shows us t h a t one cannot r e g a r d e x p l a n a t i o n s as u n s a t i s f a c t o r y when t h e y . . . a r e n o t s u c h as to enable the event i n question to have been predicted.® 3  The ian  deductive  explanation is  response not  a  to  this  'complete'  critique  is  to  contend  scientific explanation.  that  Darwin-  Thus,  writes: The s t o r y o f e v o l u t i o n m i g h t t e l l u s , f o r e x a m p l e , that at a certain stage i n the process dinosaurs made t h e i r a p p e a r a n c e a n d t h a t , s o much l a t e r , they died out. Such a n a r r a t i v e account does n o t , o f c o u r s e , e x p l a i n why t h e v a r i o u s k i n d s o f dinosaurs with their d i s t i n c t i v e characteristics came i n t o e x i s t e n c e , n o r d o e s i t e x p l a i n why t h e y became e x t i n c t . Indeed, even the associated t h e o r y o f m u t a t i o n and n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n does not answer the f i r s t of these q u e s t i o n s , though i t m i g h t be h e l d t o s h e d some l i g h t o n t h e l a t t e r . Y e t , even to account f o r the e x t i n c t i o n of the d i n o s a u r s , we n e e d a v a s t a r r a y o f a d d i t i o n a l hypotheses about t h e i r p h y s i c a l and b i o l o g i c a l environment and about the species w i t h which they had to compete f o r s u r v i v a l . . . . T h e u n d e n i a b l y g r e a t p e r s u a s i v e n e s s o f T o u l m i n ' s argument w o u l d seem t o d e r i v e f r o m two m a i n s o u r c e s , a w i d e s p r e a d t e n d e n c y  Hempel  47 to regard the b a s i c a l l y descriptive story of evolut i o n as explaining the various states of the process, and a s i m i l a r l y widespread tendency to overestimate the extent to which even the theory of mutation and natural s e l e c t i o n can account f o r the d e t a i l s of the evolutionary sequence.84 We are, of course, i n no p o s i t i o n to evaluate Hempel's charge as to the l o g i c a l inadequacy of the Darwinian explanatory model.  This i s an  issue which must be l e f t to b i o l o g i s t s and paleontologists, not p o l i t i c a l scientists.  There i s ample evidence, however, that Darwinian explanation  i s accepted as a legitimate, or even preeminent, form of explanation by  85 many s c i e n t i s t s who are f a m i l i a r with i t .  Thus, we  are l e f t , once  again, with the question of deciding which holds p r i o r i t y i n cases of divergence, the reconstructed model of the " l o g i c i n t r i n s i c i n science" or the explanatory procedures employed by p r a c t i c i n g s c i e n t i s t s .  In  coming down on the side of procedures rather than formal l o g i c , we take a position s i m i l a r to Toulmin's, who responds to Hempel's analysis of evolutionary explanation as follows: The Darwinian account of the o r i g i n of species... could be matched against h i s formal models only by the unrealizable requirement that we know vastly more about the p r e h i s t o r i c course of events than we actually do know. Does this mean so much the worse f o r the Hempelian models? No, i t means so much the worse f o r the Darwinian theory. ...Note that by refusing the term "explanation" to the theory of mutation and natural s e l e c t i o n Hempel has i n mind no shortcomings of a b i o l o g i c a l nature. A l l he objects to i s the f a i l u r e of paleontologlcal reasoning to conform to h i s own a p r i o r i pat terns. 3.  Context of Evaluation We have already noted several times that the problem of evaluation  or testing i s of only minor importance to the D-N model of explanation.  48  This. Is. Jaecause # complete D»tt explanation JEonas, A e y l l t s g i s t i c tautology (assuming a l l four of i t s requirements are met)  and, as we have seen, the  truth-content of a tautology i s non-contingently determined.  There i s ,  however, a d i s t i n c t i o n made by deductivists with reference to explanations that bears a resemblance to the d i s c o v e r y - j u s t i f i c a t i o n d i s t i n c t i o n made with reference to theories.  This i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between the l o g i c a l  and pragmatic contexts of an explanation.  As Hempel describes i t :  . . . s c i e n t i f i c research seeks to account f o r empirical phenomena by means of laws and theories which are objective i n the sense that t h e i r emp i r i c a l implications and t h e i r e v i d e n t i a l support are independent of what p a r t i c u l a r individuals happen to test or apply them; and the explanations are meant to be objective i n an analogous sense. This i d e a l intent suggests the problem of constructing a non-pragmatic concept of s c i e n t i f i c explanation — a concept which i s abstracted, as i t were, from the pragmatic one, and which does not require r e l a t i v i z a t i o n with respect to questioning individuals any more than does the concept of mathematical proof.^7 The pragmatic elements of an explanation are e s s e n t i a l l y i t s psychological and Contextual elements.  They Involve such expressions as  'realm of understanding' and 'comprehensible', which cannot be incorporated Into a l o g i c a l analysis because they vary from one i n d i v i d u a l to 88 another.  Thus, these aspects are separated from those which can be  l o g i c a l l y analyzed. As we have seen, however, to the extent that laws cannot be defined l o g i c a l l y , pragmatics s t i l l Influence D-N explanations. On the other hand, to the extent that the analysis remains l o g i c a l , this d i s t i n c t i o n allows us to account, f o r some of the abstract character of the model.  I  49  4*  Context of Application A l l four of the requirements ©•£ D-N  areas of form and content.  By now  explanation are confined to the  i t should be c l e a r that the primary  purpose of the deductive approach i s to n u l l i f y the e f f e c t of context on i t s model of s c i e n t i f i c explanation i n order to make i t equally applicable at a l l times and i n a l l places.  This goal, or the acceptance of i t s  f e a s i b i l i t y , i s the assumption underlying the deductivist view of the symmetry of physical and s o c i a l science.  The difference between the two i s  i n terms of the context within which they operate.  I f these contexts  can  be rendered i r r e l e v a n t , then physical and s o c i a l science become l o g i c a l l y indistinguishable.  As Brodbeck makes c l e a r , " V i r t u a l l y a l l those who  ac-  cept the deductive model hold that i t applies not only to p h y s i c a l but also to human phenomena, whether i n d i v i d u a l or s o c i a l , whether i n the past 89 or i n the present." The goal of context-invariance was  i n h e r i t e d by deductive forma-  lism from i t s progenitor l o g i c a l positivism.  Toulmin notes the importance  of this goal i n the work of both Frege and R u s s e l l : For the early Russell, as f o r Frege, concepts and propositions remained i d e a l , timeless ent i t i e s which were captured at best incompletely by the c o l l o q u i a l words and sentences employed at one or another moment i n h i s t o r y . The true character of the timeless e n t i t i e s could be displayed only i n l o g i c a l terms, as a system of necessary r e l a t i o n s ; this meant that p h i losophers must develop a l o g i c a l symbolism and calculus, by which to extend Frege and Peano's treatment of arithmetical concepts, f i r s t to mathematics as a whole, and then to the remaining concepts of natural science and p r a c t i c a l l i f e . In this way, one might f i n a l l y separate o f f the philosophical analysis of concepts proper, which i s aimed at a formal system of  50  necessary r e l a t i o n s , both from the h i s t o r i c a l study of changes i n our c o l l e c t i v e conceptions and word-meanings, and from the psychological study of i n t e l l e c t u a l development i n the i n d i vidual. In this way alone we would be sure of escaping the twin heresies of psychologism' and the 'genetic f a l l a c y ' . 1  9 0  This project envisioned by l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m was, on to show, doomed from the s t a r t . a b i l i t y to j u s t i f y i t s own  as Toulmin goes  I t s fundamental flaw lay i n i t s i n -  claim to universal authority:  Universal authority may be claimed for an abstract, timeless system of ' r a t i o n a l standards', only i f i t has f i r s t been shown on what foundation the universal and unquali f i e d authority r e s t s ; but no formal schema can, by i t s e l f , prove i t s own a p p l i c a b i l i t y . U n t i l the problem of authority i s dealt with, our capacity to construct a l t e r n a t i v e l o g i c a l systems i s l i m i t e d only by our formal ingenuity. Given these a l t e r n a t i v e s , we must then face the a d d i t i o n a l question, 'Why are we to accept this formal analysis, rather than that?' — a quest i o n which i s , evidently enough, concerned less with the i n t e r n a l consistency than with t h e i r power to throw l i g h t on the merits of substantive arguments. * 9  Thus, present-day deductivists, i n contrast to t h e i r forebears, are c a r e f u l to emphasize the p r a c t i c a l benefits of the approach. for example, notes that the D-N  Hempel,  model " i s not, of course, susceptible to  s t r i c t "proof"; i t s soundness has to be judged by the l i g h t i t can shed on the rationale and force of explanatory  accounts offered i n d i f f e r e n t  92  branches of empirical science." D-N  Further, Hempel holds that although  explanation i t s e l f i s meant to be context-invariant, the decision  as to whether or not a p a r t i c u l a r phenomenon can be explained  deductively 93  i s context-dependent, and therefore subject to pragmatic judgement. We can conclude, accordingly, that the area i n which invarfance i s f e l t  I  51  t o be  achieved  Is  s t i l l  much o f  the  seen as  a by-product  quite  abstractness of  small.  that the  We  c a n also- n o t e ,  characterizes  effort  to  the  however,  deductive  o b t a i n even t h i s  that  approach  can  s m a l l degree  be  of  invarlance. It  would be  tiousness is  no  of  modem  longer the  deductive  posed  formulas  of  contrast  followers,  to  On t h e  banner  the  Is  most  the  product of  points  out,  a  "In  there  is  no  ature  seeking  that  the  the  meet  in  the  very  influential  indicators  goal of  quest  for  and knowledgeable  in  our  section  of  general  generally  case of  com-  adherents  their  to  more  the  zealous  deductively-  III.  the  to be  (H-D)  theory  recognized formulation..  elucidating  consensus  unravel  unity  carefully  discussion of  explanation, hypothetico-deductive  the  cau-  context-invariance  The  slogans  the  scientific  much a l i v e .  brash  of  Theory  singular,  to  imply  strikingly with  Hypothetico-Deductive D-N  these  s t i l l  some o f whom we w i l l  Unlike  that  contrary,  oriented p o l i t i c a l scientists C.  assume  deductivists  pursued.  under  approach  a mistake  the  found,  nature in  of  spite  d i s t i n c t i o n between  Ryan  theories,  an enormous  theories  not  As A l a n  scientific  of  is  l i t e r -  and such  close  94 relations minimize the  as  models, maps,  the  effects  formulations  and s e c o n d a r i l y differences comparison we  can  turn  of to to  of  metaphors,  of  this  lack  the  more  influential  Braithwaite,  of  and a n a l o g i e s / '  Nagel,  consensus,  the  overall  area  of  an e x a m i n a t i o n o f  Of  theory  With in  rely  but these  terms  of  order  they  on  Hempel,  there  are  also  are  minor  in  caveats the  to  heavily  primarily  course,  consider,  agreement. H-D  w i l l  deductivists;  and Popper.  o p i n i o n h e r e w h i c h we w i l l  I  In  in  relative  mind., roles  52  of  fpra,  content,  context  application,  and  context  of  evaluation.  .Form  1.  A good s t a r t i n g between  that  hypothetico-deductive  the  H-D  theory  point  link  of  of  for  a n d D-N  this  explanation.  theory  Deductive-Nomological  discussion is  "is  pattern  Willard  a natural of  a  consideration Humphreys  and p l a u s i b l e  explanation  i f  we  of  the  notes extension  assume  that  95 theories  are  assumption example,  comprehensive  is  fundamental  describes  theory  systems to  the  in  a  of  scientific  deductive  general  view  sense  explanations." of  as  theories.  This  Hempel,  for  follows:  T h e o r i e s are u s u a l l y i n t r o d u c e d when p r e v i o u s s t u d y o f a c l a s s o f phenomena has r e v e a l e d a system of u n i f o r m i t i e s that can be expressed i n the form of e m p i r i c a l laws. Theories then seek to a f f o r d a deeper and more a c c u r a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e phenomena i n q u e s t i o n . To t h i s e n d , a t h e o r y c o n s t r u e s t h o s e phenomena as m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f e n t i t i e s and p r o c e s s e s t h a t l i e b e h i n d o r b e n e a t h them, as i t were. These a r e assumed t o be governed by characte r i s t i c theoretical laws, or theoretical princ i p l e s , b y means o f w h i c h t h e t h e o r y t h e n e x p l a i n s the e m p i r i c a l u n i f o r m i t i e s that have been p r e v i o u s l y d i s c o v e r e d , and u s u a l l y a l s o p r e d i c t s 'new' r e g u l a r i t i e s of s i m i l a r k i n d s . In familiar  this  sense,  formulation,  the  purpose  "Statements  of  theories  is  of  individual  often fact  summarized by  are  explained  the  by  97 laws; in  laws  part,  are  by  principles  explained by  the of  terminology,  deductive  the  theories."  This  subsumption of  theory.  a hierarchical  Thus,  H-D  the  theories  conception  of  explanation  laws  under  is  the  constitute,  theory:  A h i e r a r c h i c a l t h e o r y i s one whose component laws a r e p r e s e n t e d as d e d u c t i o n s f r o m a s m a l l set of basic p r i n c i p l e s . A law i s e x p l a i n e d  in  achieved, overarching Kaplan's  I  53  by the demonstration that i t i s a l o g i c a l conse quence of these p r i n c i p l e s , and a f a c t i s e x p l a i n e d when i t i s shown t o f o l l o w f r o m t h e s e together with certain i n i t i a l conditions. The h i e r a r c h y i s a d e d u c t i v e p y r a m i d , i n w h i c h we r i s e t o f e w e r a n d m o r e g e n e r a l l a w s a s we move from conclusions to the premises which e n t a i l them. 9 8  Or,  in  Braithwaite's  set  of  hypotheses  ranged  in  such  words,  which  a way  "a  scientific  form a  that  deductive  f r o m some o f  system  [theory]  system;  the  that  consists  i s , which  hypotheses  of  is  as  premises  —  is  a  ara l l  the  99 other  hypotheses This  analogous present  aspect  to  the  of  content  in  fundamental The  theory  and  formal  the  aspect  D-N e x p l a n a t i o n .  opportunity  to  a s we m e n t i o n e d  see  how  closely  as  a  note  above, result,  theories  differ  Thus,  in  similarities a in  theory our  from  is  a  the  bebit  discussions  explanations  ways.  formal deductive  now m o r e  the  clearly  empirical  properties  nature  w h a t was  non-contingency with  network  of  laws  meant  generalizations  non-contingency  deductive  the  an e x p l a n a t i o n a n d ,  c o n t e x t we w i l l  see  relative  have  However,  than  examination of  to  —  corresponding formalism of  our  This  H-D  two m o d e l s .  complicated  trast  of  d i s c u s s i o n we w i l l  tween the more  follow."  of  results the  of to  by  the  the  theories  to  statement  from t h e i r As  the being  allow  theoretical  and a c c i d e n t a l  respect  theory.  H-D  that  they  to  context. laws,  universals,  theory  help  'locked into'  Hempel p u t s  us  in  extend We  can  con-  exhibit  a  constitute.  the  i t :  . . . A statement of u n i v e r s a l form, whether e m p i r i c a l l y c o n f i r m e d o r as y e t u n t e s t e d , w i l l q u a l i f y as a law i f i t i s i m p l i e d by an accepted theory (statem en t s of t h i s kind, a r e o f t e n r e f e r r e d t o as t h e o r e t i c a l laws); but even i f i t i s e m p i r i c a l l y  broader  54 w e l l c o n f i r m e d and p r e s u m a b l y t r u e i n f a c t , it w i l l n o t q u a l i f y as a law i f i t r u l e s o u t certain h y p o t h e t i c a l o c c u r r e n c e s . . . w h i c h an a c c e p t e d theory q u a l i f i e s as p o s s i b l e . 1 ° ° Thus,  the  difference  discerned by alone.  It  which ive  the  requires  the  statement  underlies  explanation to  an e x a m i n a t i o n o f  understanding  that  of  a  structure  can s t i l l  to be  the of  the  given  Hanson d e s c r i b e s  must  In  be h e l d  prior  this  to  elements  of  knowledge', to  the  the  the  the  context  then,  formal  in  within the  elements  logical,  be  statements  deductive  contextual  domain of  cannot  as  :  deducttheory of  an  opposed  analysis.  usually the  statements  theoretical  way, in  deductive  —  the  refer  to be  historical,  law-like  syntactical  'Background  law.  theory  analytically  the  term,  traditional the  and o t h e r  examination of  stands.  psychological or In  between laws  view of referred  empirical  H-D to  theories, as  content  the of  the  calculus the  formal —  theory.  is  held  As  i t :  . . . a s c i e n t i f i c theory is (ideally) a d e d u c t i v e s t r u c t u r e , an i n f e r e n t i a l r e t i c u l u m , an a l g o r i t h m , a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f which i s e x p l i c i t l y brought about by c o u p l i n g terms and f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s of the a l g o r i t h m to o b j e c t s and processes w i t h i n a subject matter. I n t e r p r e t i n g a t h e o r y i s something done to f o r m a l l y f i n i s h e d frameworks. I t i s some t h i n g clamped onto a theory; o r perhaps i t is "hooking" of theory to subject matter somewhat l i k e t h e h o o k i n g o f w i r e mesh o v e r t h e frame o f what w i l l become a modeled s t a t u e . ^ 1  L  This deductivists that  f o r m u l a t i o n , however, and n o n - d e d u c t i v i s t s  overemphasis  culus)  leads  to  has  alike.  on a x i o m a t i z a t i o n  a disregard  of  the  recently  (the  For  come u n d e r example,  process  substantive  of  attack  Hempel p o i n t s  formalizing a  import  from  of  the  out  cal-  theory.  55  "Generally speaking, the formalization of the i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e s as a calculus sheds no l i g h t on...interpretation.  I t sheds l i g h t at best on  102  part of the s c i e n t i f i c theory i n question."  Further, i n response to  the claim that axiomatization makes e x p l i c i t the foundation assumptions of a s c i e n t i f i c theory, Hempel notes that: ...axiomatization i s b a s i c a l l y an expository device, determining a set of sentences and exh i b i t i n g their l o g i c a l relationships, but not their epistemic grounds and connections. A s c i e n t i f i c theory admits of many d i f f e r e n t axiom* t i z a t i o n s , and the postulates chosen i n a part i c u l a r one need not, therefore, correspond to what i n some more substantial sense might count as the basic assumptions of the theory; nor need the terms chosen as primitive i n a given axiommatization represent what on epistemological or other grounds might q u a l i f y as the basic concepts of the theory; nor need the formal defini t i o n s of other t h e o r e t i c a l terms by means of the chosen p r i m i t i v e s correspond to statements which i n science would be regarded as d e f i n i t i o n a l l y true and thus a n a l y t i c . A s i m i l a r , but perhaps more far-reaching, c r i t i c i s m i s made by Hanson, who  also holds that formalism cannot be a n a l y t i c a l l y p r i o r to  interpretation: It i s not a question of meaning being pumped up (or "seeped up" or "zipped up") through an already designed algebraic formalism. Rather, the facts of s c i e n t i f i c l i f e require us- to attend to formalisms being pumped up...from algebraic expressions already r i c h with meanings, charged with s t r u c t u r a l representations of phenomena, and informative as to what matters most within our observational encounters in...science. Hanson goes one step further, however, and declares that the formal and interpretive aspects of a theory are, i n f a c t , indissoluble, and that any attempt to a n a l y t i c a l l y separate them must perforce f a i l to achieve a f u l l  56  understanding of the theory: To restrict one's philosophical attention, focusing now only on syntactical structure, and later on the host of semantic issues involving interpretation and meaning — this is to have failed to recognize that "physical theory" is an indissolubly complex concept to begin with. ...But complexity is not confusion. When analysis results in destroying complexity in the name of clearing up confusions, to that extent it destroys the concept in question. It slices i t out of existence. To talk of the formalism within a physical theory is not to be talking about the physical theory itself. To discuss only the "interpretation" of the theory is also not to be discussing the theory itself... . To chop theories apart into formalism and interpretation — and then to identify only the formalism with the "theory" — is the simple mistake of misplaced discreteness.^0  The reason Hanson can take this further critical step is because he is discussing scientific theories as produced by practicing scientists. Hempel, on the other hand, is discussing a certain reconstruction of scientific theories which, in his opinion, is problematic as a reconstruction, not as a theory.  He does not specifically challenge the  formalism-interpretation distinction here; he merely questions the emphasis on formalism. We will see further on, however, that other aspects of Hempel's latest position could be construed as rejecting this traditional deductivist distinction. These two criticisms are particularly valuable to our present concerns in that they illustrate quite well the tenuous relationship between scientific theories and axiomatized reconstructions of those theories. This tenuousness is worth stressing here, since i t is important not to make the mistake of confusing the two when considering the question of theoretical structure in international politics.  Hempel, who is always  57  careful  to  example, account the  avoid  that of  confusion, is  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n "was  the  actual  ongoing process  schematic  helpful  on  never  this  claimed  f o r m u l a t i o n and use  of  scientific  explication that  would  point.  of  inquiry; clearly  to  He e m p h a s i z e s ,  provide  theories  i t  was  exhibit  by  a  descriptive  scientists  intended, certain  for  in  rather,  logical  as  a  and  106 epistemological not  been  cases  of  so  One  had  of  to  such case  apply taken  is  that to  the J.H.  at  and  'put  cart  serious  the  for  the  future  the  scientific as  a  result  before  purpose  conduct  Woodger's  least  genetics  of  however,  sciences  concerning  concludes to  careful,  attempts  atizations tions  characteristics  of  of  of  of  this  —  Others  have been  horse'  and  develop  those  axiom-  recommenda-  sciences.  b i o l o g y . T o u l m i n  a x i o m a t i z a t i o n w h i c h was i f  a major  his  professional  obstacle  to  have  several  making p r e s c r i p t i v e  attempts to a x i o m a t i z e  part  i t  there  inquiry within  " c o u l d have been —  notice  the  theories."  meant  colleagues  progress  in  the  science." L i k e a good l o g i c a l e m p i r i c i s t , he i n t e r p r e t e d t h e o r e t i c a l statements i n g e n e t i c s as u n i v e r s a l or s t a t i s t i c a l c o r r e l a t i o n s between observable macroscopic characters i n animal populations. N e x t , he s e t about r e d e f i n i n g the term " g e n e " as an " i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e " i n the system of f o r m a l theorems l i n k i n g such o b s e r v a b l e c h a r a c ters. I n t h i s way h e p l a y e d down a l m o s t e n t i r e l y the c y t o l o g i c a l and b i o c h e m i c a l t h e o r i e s from w h i c h g e n e t i c s had s o much t o g a i n . Even h e u r i s t i c a l l y a x i o m a t i z a t i o n was i n t h i s c a s e a handicap r a t h e r than a help.-*0 8  In  summary,  oriented primarily elements  of  the  then,  i t  toward  theories  appears formal  have  that  w h e n H-D  criteria  tended  to  of  theories  adequacy,  atrophy.  the  have  been  empirical  Hanson has  put  i t  well:  58  Indeed, between  there  the  a...theory really  cay be  degree and If  the  is  if  sure  his  within  the  within  to be  not  is  elegance  at  the  of  built  applying  the  eye  is  on  themselves.^-  to  of  fixed  matter,  his  inelegant.  formal  remain  into i t  frontiers  subject  with  long  data  relationship  syntactically  concern  tention w i l l  elegance,  the  at-  intricacies  0 9  Content  2.  In w i l l  d i s c u s s i n g how H-D  take  ideas to  formal  investigator's  upon p e r p l e x i t i e s theory  inverse  the p o s s i b i l i t y  i n t r i c a t e phenomena  research.  But,  of  an  as  our  involve,  the  shift  introduction  to  specify as  the  ciples, linked to two  entities  theoretical  to  the the  other  of  hand,  These  cf  are  assumed  the  has  content,  subject. from  differ  earlier  Internal  formal  in  important  advocated  his  two k i n d s  These  the  interested  changed  we  formulations.  priorities  of  in  in  the  as-  mind. principles;  principles  "serve  'theoretical scenario': by  govern  the ways  phenomena of  they  posited to  of  emphasis  such,  contain  or  the  particularly  Hempel  "indicate  types  on  in  the  principles.  examined  two  As  and p r o c e s s e s  that  previously  explain."''"^ types  laws  problem  ideas  shift  be  theoretical setting  the b a s i c  on  favor  account,  and b r i d g e  the  deductivists',  degree,  on Hempel's  the  a  we w i l l  to what  principles  characterize  other  thesis,  latest  theories.  basically in  and  Theories, internal  is  handle  seen,  of  and most  this  c e r t a i n i n g why,  just  aspects  from h i s ,  this  Hempel's  as we h a v e  substantive  respects Since  standard  theories  are  theory,  them."  i n which  which  principles  the  the  the  as  Bridge  to they  well prin-  scenario  is  theory  is  intended  expressed  in  terms  vocabularies:  The f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e s w i l l t y p i c a l l y m a k e u s e o f a t h e o r e t i c a l v o c a b u l a r y V<y, i . e , , a s e t of terms not employed i n t h e e a r l i e r  of  59  d e s c r i p t i o n s o f , and g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s a b o u t , the e m p i r i c a l phenomena w h i c h T [the t h e o r y ] i s to e x p l a i n , but r a t h e r i n t r o d u c e d s p e c i f i c a l l y to c h a r a c t e r i z e the t h e o r e t i c a l s c e n a r i o and i t s laws. The b r i d g e p r i n c i p l e s w i l l e v i d e n t l y con** t a i n b o t h the terms of V and those o f the v o c a b u l a r y used i n f o r m u l a t i n g the o r i g i n a l d e s c r i p t i o n s o f , and g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s a b o u t , t h e phenomena f o r which the theory i s to account. This vocabulary w i l l thus be a v a i l a b l e and understood b e f o r e the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the t h e o r y , and i t s use w i l l be governed by p r i n c i p l e s which, at l e a s t i n i t i a l l y , are independent of the theory. L e t us r e f e r t o i t as the p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l , o r a n t e c e d e n t , vocabu l a r y , V^, r e l a t i v e to the t h e o r y i n q u e s t i o n . ^ T  x  Internal also  make u s e  measure culus  of  p r i n c i p l e s , although primarily of  the  empirical  employing t h e o r e t i c a l  p r e - t h e " re f i e a 1  vocabulary.  content  unavailable  d i s c u s s e d above.  that  is  Thus, to  they  the  Hempel d i s t i n g u i s h e s between  terms,  involve  axiomatized  the  two  concepts  a calas  follows: The a s s u m p t i o n , i n t h e s t a n d a r d c o n s t r u a l , of an a x i o m a t i z e d u n i n t e r p r e t e d c a l c u l u s as a c o n s t i t u e n t o f a t h e o r y seems t o m e . . . t o o b s c u r e c e r t a i n i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s h a r e d b y many s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s . For that assumption suggests that the basic p r i n c i p l e s o f the theory — those c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the c a l c u l u s — a r e f o r m u l a t e d e x c l u s i v e l y b y means o f a " n e w " theor e t i c a l v o c a b u l a r y , whose terms would be r e p l a c e d by v a r i a b l e s o r b y dummy c o n s t a n t s i n t h e a x i o m a t i z e d c a l c u l u s . . . . A c t u a l l y , however, the i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e s of most s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s employ not o n l y "new" t h e o r e t i c a l concepts but also " o l d , " or p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l , ones that are c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n terms of the antecedent vocabulary. For the t h e o r e t i c a l scenario i s normally d e s c r i b e d i n p a r t b y means o f t e r m s t h a t h a v e a u s e , and are u n d e r s t o o d , p r i o r t o , and i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f , the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the theory.^ 2  Hempel*s anchoring  modification of the  'theoretical' direction  of  the  calculus  empirical import of principles.  This  r e c o g n i z i n g the  the  can be  concept, theory seen  then,  directly as  i n d i s s o l u b i l i t y of  has  the  effect  to  its  most  an important form and  step  in  of  the  interpretation  60  advocated ening  by Hanson above.  t h e gap Still,  theory.  To  Moreover, i t i s an important  between a t h e o r y and internal principles  the e x t e n t  less-  i t s logical reconstruction.  alone are not adequate to c o n s t i t u t e a  that they are t h e o r e t i c a l  terms o f n o n o b s e r v a b l e s ) ,  step i n  t h e y must be  ( a b s t r a c t or defined i n  explicitly  linked  to  observable  e m p i r i c a l phenomena.  T h i s i s the r o l e of b r i d g e p r i n c i p l e s .  bridge principles...a  t h e o r y w o u l d h a v e no  "Without  explanatory power...it  would  113 a l s o be  incapable of t e s t . "  achieve  these purposes,  We  c a n c o n s i d e r two  In i l l u s t r a t i n g  how  bridge  principles  Hempel r e s o r t s t o examples f r o m p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e .  here:  I n the c l a s s i c a l k i n e t i c theory of gases, the i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e s a r e a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t gas m o l e c u l e s ; they c o n c e r n t h e i r s i z e , t h e i r mass, t h e i r l a r g e number; and t h e y i n c l u d e a l s o v a r i o u s laws, p a r t l y taken over from c l a s s i c a l mechanics, p a r t l y s t a t i s t i c a l i n nature, p e r t a i n i n g to the m o t i o n s and c o l l i s i o n s o f t h e m o l e c u l e s , and t o t h e r e s u l t i n g c h a n g e s i n t h e i r momenta a n d e n e r g i e s . The b r i d g e p r i n c i p l e s i n c l u d e s t a t e m e n t s s u c h a s t h a t t h e t e m p e r a t u r e o f a gas i s p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e mean k i n e t i c e n e r g y o f i t s m o l e c u l e s , a n d t h a t the r a t e s a t w h i c h d i f f e r e n t gases d i f f u s e through the w a l l s of a c o n t a i n e r are p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e numbers o f m o l e c u l e s o f t h e g a s e s i n q u e s t i o n and t o t h e i r a v e r a g e s p e e d s . By means o f such b r i d g e p r i n c i p l e s , c e r t a i n m i c r o - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a gas, which belong to the s c e n a r i o of the k i n e t i c t h e o r y , a r e l i n k e d t o m a c r o s c o p i c f e a t u r e s s u c h as t e m p e r a t u r e , p r e s s u r e , and d i f f u s i o n r a t e ; t h e s e can b e d e s c r i b e d , a n d g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g them can be f o r m u l a t e d , i n terms of an a n t e c e d e n t l y a v a i l a b l e v o c a b u l a r y , namely, t h a t of c l a s s i c a l t h e r m o d y n a m i c s . A n d some o f t h e f e a t u r e s i n q u e s t i o n m i g h t w e l l be r e g a r d e d as r a t h e r d i r e c t l y o b s e r v a b l e or measurable. B r i d g e p r i n c i p l e s , h o w e v e r , do n o t a l w a y s l i n k n o n o b s e r v a b l e s observables.  Specifically,  they  link  t h e "new"  vocabulary  of the  and theory  61  In question to an antecedently available vocabulary.  This antecedently  available vocabulary need not describe observable phenomena; i t may as w e l l describe other nonobservables which are held to be  just  understood  because of t h e i r p o s i t i o n within another, different, w e l l accepted theory. For example, when discussing Bohr's early theory of the hydrogen atom, Hempel notes that the bridge p r i n c i p l e s of the theory connect t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s ('atom', 'electron') to the wavelengths of c e r t a i n l i n e s i n the emission spectrum of hydrogen.  "These wavelengths are not observables  i n the ordinary sense of the word, and they cannot be simply of d i r e c t l y measured as, say, the length and width of a picture frame of the weight of a bag of potatoes." Their measurement i s a highly i n d i r e c t procedure that rests on a great many assumptions, including those of the wave theory of l i g h t . But i n the context we are considering, those assumptions are taken f o r granted; they are presupposed even i n j u s t stating the uniformity f o r which a t h e o r e t i c a l explanation i s sought. Thus, the phenomena to which bridge p r i n c i p l e s l i n k the basic e n t i t i e s and processes assumed by a theory need not be " d i r e c t l y " observable or measurable: they may w e l l be characterized i n terms of previously established theories, and their observation or measurement may presuppose the p r i n c i p l e s of those theories. Just as i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e s are introduced because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent In the axiomatized calculus, so bridge p r i n c i p l e s are i n troduced as an alternative to the other main constituent of the t r a d i t i o n a l H-D  conception; the correspondence rules,  of correspondence  Hempel'8 c r i t i q u e  rules i s e s p e c i a l l y pertinent to the concerns of thia-  thesls, since i t highlights some very important l i m i t a t i o n s of the standard deductive approach. Correspondence rules have usually been conceived as "a class of  I  62 sentences culus;  that  and  their  definitions, have  the  tences  assign  or  true  by  designation rules  status  empirical  of  of  as  content  to  operational  correspondence  metalinguistic  terminological  the  expressions  definitions,  conveys  principles  convention  or  the  which  of  the  cal-  coordinative  suggestion render  that  certain  they  sen-  legislation."  The s e n t e n c e s t h u s d e c l a r e d t r u e — l e t us c a l l them i n t e r p r e t i v e s e n t e n c e s — w o u l d b e l o n g to an o b j e c t language c o n t a i n i n g both the c a l c u l u s and the p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l terms employed i n the i n terpretation. The t h e o r e t i c a l t e r m s i n t h e c a l c u l u s a r e then b e s t thought o f as "new" c o n s t a n t s . that are being introduced i n t o the object language b y means o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e r u l e s f o r the purpose of formulating the theory. The i n t e r p r e t i v e sentences might have the form of e x p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n sentences (biconditionals or identities) f o r t h e o r e t i c a l t e r m s , o r they m i g h t be o f a more g e n e r a l t y p e . . . . B u t a t any r a t e , they would be s e n t e n c e s w h o s e t r u t h i s g u a r a n t e e d b y tljja c o r respondence r u l e s . The the  problem with  truth  of  impervious  a  to  statement empirical  presence  of  does  match w e l l  not  "scientific  this  such  formulation,  is  guaranteed  test  statements with  statements  definitions'...usually  by  Hempel's  in  the  revision  deductive  change  i n i t i a l l y  their  the or  that  actual  in  statement  becomes The  theories  theories,  response  once  rejection.  introduced by  status  is  reconstruction of  situation within are  view,  definition,  and subsequent  the  that  in  where  'operational to  new  empirical  118 findings tion is ality  and  theoretical  inappropriate  is  a passing  developments."  Here,then,  and Hempel a p p r o v i n g l y  trait,  significant  at  quotes  the moving  truth  Quine, front  by  conven-  "conventionof  science,  119 but  useless  way  to  in  classifying  interpret  this  the  sentences  criticism is  to  say  behind  the  lines."  that  Hempel  is  Another  rejecting  the  63  analytic-synthetic definition) with  the  d i s t i n c t i o n by  statements  possible  are  maintaining  seldom found i n  e x c e p t i o n of  the  truths  that  analytic  real-life of  logic  (true  theories.  by  "For,  and m a t h e m a t i c s ,  no  120 statement  enjoys  Hempel  is  shifting  of  deductive  the  Bridge  Before Hempel's  emphasis  as  opposed  rules,  are  and  developed of  the  H-D  of true  law  be  cannot  later  by  guaranteed  by  reticulum of  a  i t  a  one.  undergo  process  of  proving  a  between  the  to  the  to  law  to  H-D  adequately  be  true.  that  It  is  A further  For  Otherwise,  phenomena.  may b e  since  context  the  a  is  now,  necessary  the we  law  that  of  can the  the  latter  the  ever  be  truth  of  that  this  true  laws  the  up  dual  capable is  but  that  take  contradiction  a  the  is  t o p i c we w i l l  demands  of  condition,  s u b s t a n t i a t i o n must be a potential  of  From  of  course,  can note  test.  truth-content  critique no  by  here  contained within  requirement,  (which  empirical  a n d D-N m o d e l s ,  explain  follows  fact  This  to  a n d D-N e x p l a n a t i o n .  and Hempel's  that  generated  implications  the  question of  follows  theory.  and  i t  the  examine  i t  justification).  theoretical  the  aspects.  s h o u l d be mentioned  Moreover,  empirical verification  reference  rules  convention,  convention.  sufficient  is  aspects  and s u s c e p t i b l e  some o f  to  H .1) t h e o r y  correspondence  deductive not  of  This  again,  (analytic)  sentences  contingent  one p o i n t  once  (synthetic)  interpretive  come  Thus,  formal  empirical  w h e n we  theories.  by  the  consideration of  relationship  truth  its  empirically  a whole,  be  immunity."  from  the  as  proclaimed  with  to  reformulation  feasibility  law  to  a  d i s c u s s i o n of  is  away  to  justification  this  the  absolute  proceding  which w i l l  laws  kind of  reconstruction  principles,  correspondence  of  this  of created in  order  64  With t h i s point i n mind, we can now  turn to the c r i t i c a l  tions of Hempel'8 reformulation of the content of H-D  implica-  theories.  F i r s t , i t appears that the formalism-interpretation d i s t i n c t i o n has been d e c i s i v e l y rejected.  As we have seen, both i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e s  and  bridge p r i n c i p l e s contain t h e o r e t i c a l as w e l l as antecedently a v a i l a b l e terms.  As a r e s u l t , Hempel's new  construal  of accurately r e f l e c t i n g the formal and l i f e theories  i n t e r p r e t i v e aspects of r e a l -  than i s i t s deductive predecessor.This accuracy, however,  has been purchased at a high l o g i c a l p r i c e . new  i s better suited to the task  d i s t i n c t i o n i s not  As Hempel makes c l e a r ,  the  precise:  . . . i t should be e x p l i c i t l y acknowledged...that no precise c r i t e r i o n has been provided f o r d i s t i n guishing i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e s from bridge p r i n c i p l e s . In p a r t i c u l a r , the d i v i d i n g l i n e cannot be charact e r i z e d s y n t a c t i c a l l y , by reference to the c o n s t i tuent terms... .Nor i s the difference one of epistemic status, such as truth by convention versus empirical truth. The d i s t i n c t i o n i s , thus, admittedly vague. In order to introduce realism i n t o the deductive model, Hempel has to s a c r i f i c e analytic r i g o r .  had  This does not speak well for the adequacy  of the former model's conceptualization of the " l o g i c i n t r i n s i c i n science."  In f a c t , to the extent that i t eschews l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s ,  Hempel's reformulation does not speak w e l l f o r the adequacy of  the  122 l o g i c a l approach i n general. A second implication of Hempel's model follows from his i n c l u s i o n of antecedently available terms i n the vocabulary of the i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e s of a theory.  This i n c l u s i o n seems to imply that the u n i t of  meaningful analysis of the deductive approach should be s h i f t e d from  65 the i n d i v i d u a l to  the  that  terms  at  are  theory  cannot  in  those  the  employed  in  that  some o f  defined be  the  in  fully  other  of  these  in  tool  question  i t  Is  i s :  then  i t  are  f u l l  logically  a  attuned  to  the  Whereas  problems  general  or  l o g i c a l adequacy  in  As  of  such i t  the  existing may b e  theories,  applicable  in  the  semantic  until  social the  looking for of  theories,  before  social  other,  sources  'common-sense  evaluation  any  in  is the  of at  1  best,  and  required  for  evaluative  employed  hopelessly  new  account,  Further,  i t  theoretical  outside  of  our  analysis  of  the  economics.  deductive t o o l s more  explanation  ap-  interThe  analysis closely  theories?  D-N m o d e l o f  i n -  formal,  terms  on Hempel's  prerequisites  science  most  impossible.  science  other  equally  of  their  Application in  (Indeed,  involved  defined  of  deductive  a l l  terms  ex-  international  international politics  the  this  applica-  said  in  Do we w a i t  in  the  i n none  that  that  isolation.  for  emphasized repeatedly,  such i s o l a t e d  attained  understood i n  However,  long wait  do we b e g i n  science  given  evaluated,  s e c t i o n IV.)  deductive  be  can be  theories  explicitly  For  follows  a  u n d e r s t a n d i n g and e v a l u a t i o n  theories.  antecedently  or  Context of  the  is  notion in  contrary,  at worst.  w i l l  be  met  3.  A s we h a v e  deductive  are  theories  relatedness  are  can  On t h e  there  social  evaluating  isolated  an adequately  to  producing future  principles  obscure  pears  for  for  theories  these  therefore  an e q u i v a l e n t  analysis  be p u r s u i n g t h i s  theories.  theories,  i t  the meaning of  some d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m s  guide  ternal  and  to  admitted  to  a  we w i l l  other  central  once  implication leads  deductive  certain  to  are  meaning-  theory  model i s  to  terms which  For  contribute  no  in particular.  a  which  Thus,  politics  not  theories  i n d i v i d u a l theory.  understood,  theories.  of  family  relation  conjunction with  This tion  to  least  theory  cept  theory  we  66  emphasized the context of application over the context of evaluation, just the opposite approach is required in the present analysis.  Thus,  here we have very little to say that has not already been said with reference to explanation.  The goal of context-invariance is equally ap-  plicable to the H-D formulation. Moreover, the purpose of this goal is the same; to guarantee the formal indistinguishability of physical and social theories and thereby to unify the logical structure of a l l empirical science.  And, as we have seen, the goal s t i l l appears to be  far from attained. 4.  Context of Evaluation The importance of the context of evaluation to the H-D model of  theory reflects a fundamental difference between this model and the D-N model of explanation.  Quite simply, the difference is that hypothetico-  deductive theories are hypothetical.  They are subject to test, and to  subsequent revision or rejection i f necessary.  D-N explanations, on the  other hand, must be testable in principle, but, as we have noted, are not expected to fail such a test since their premises are required to be true in the first place.  There is no analogous requirement concerning  the truth of the premises of a theory.  As a result, the only way a  theory can be verified is through empirical testing.  This is why the  context of evaluation plays such a prominent role in the analysis of H-D theories, a.  Discovery As we observed in the introduction, the scope allotted to the con-  text of discovery by an approach to philosophy of science is an important  67  v a r i a b l e i n e v a l u a t i n g how h e l p f u l t h a t science its  i n need of procedural  guidelines.  goals of context-invariance  approach  demands  an extremely  aspects of science i n nature.  that  conception would be to a It  appears  that,  and l o g i c a l t r a c t a b i l i t y ,  large  context  could be construed  Wesley Salmon outlines  the  i n view of  the  of discovery,  young  deductive  including a l l  as p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r  general deductivist  historical  view:  I f one accepts the d i s t i n c t i o n between d i s c o v e r y and j u s t i f i c a t i o n as v i a b l e , t h e r e i s a s t r o n g temptation to maintain that this d i s t i n c t i o n marks the boundaries between h i s t o r y o f science and philosophy of science. History i s concerned w i t h the facts surrounding the growth and development o f s c i e n c e ; p h i l o s o p h y i s concerned w i t h the l o g i c a l structure of science, e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the e v i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s between data and hypotheses or theories. ...The items i n the context of d i s covery are p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y relevant to the s c i e n t i f i c conclusion; those i n the context of j u s t i f i c a t i o n are l o g i c a l l y relevant to i t . Since the philosopher of science i s concerned w i t h l o g i c a l relations, not p s y c h o l o g i c a l ones, he i s concerned w i t h the r a t i o n a l l y reconstructed theory, not by the a c t u a l process by w h i c h i t a came i n t o b e i n g . i ^ 2  Probably the deductive  the most approach  a formal sense, procedure. the study  this  s i g n i f i c a n t consequences offers  no s u g g e s t i o n s  is because  theory  view is  the  quest  for "rules  that  construction.  t h e r e can be no l o g i c a l r u l e s  Thus, Hempel disparages of scientific  for  of this  for such  of induction"  methodology:  G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , s u c h r u l e s w o u l d e n a b l e us to infer, from a given set of data, that hypothesis or generalization which accounts best for a l l the p a r t i c u l a r data i n the given set. But this oons t r u a l of the problem involves a misconception: While the process o f i n v e n t i o n by which s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o v e r i e s a r e made i s as a r u l e p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y g u i d e d a n d s t i m u l a t e d ' , h^. antecedent k n o w l e d g e o f  In a in  68 s p e c i f i c facts, i t s results are not l o g i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d by them; t h e way i n w h i c h s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses or theories are d i s c o v e r e d cannot be mirrored i n a set i n f erence.-'•24 We in  the  can conclude,  problems  such problems  of  are  logical  analysis,  rather,  is  on  of  nothing  rules  that  building  a product  testing.  general  therefore,  theory  have  of  or  say  As M c M u l l i n  inductive  deductivists methodology  creative to  of  are  and,  imagination  about  them.  not  interested  beyond  and  noting  impervious  Their  that  to  emphasis,  notes:  S c i e n c e [ i n the l o g i c a l sense] does not have a h i s t o r y , s t r i c t l y speaking; the t e n t a t i v e groping that precedes the f o r m u l a t i o n of concept o r axiom i s i n no way r e f l e c t e d i n t h e f i n a l p r o d u c t , and the only s p e c i f i a b l e methodology f o r s c i e n c e i s c l e a r l y that of l o g i c a l demonstration. ... The o n l y f r u i t f u l m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i s s u e s , theref o r e , c o n c e r n t h e way i n w h i c h d i f f e r e n t p r o p o s i - . t i o n s i n the s y s t e m are. r e l a t e d to one another, the types of i n f e r e n c e used to v a l i d a t e one p r o p o s i t i o n on the b a s i s of o t h e r s . What i s s o u g h t i s a l o g i c a l theory of confirmation which w i l l a l l o w one to j u s t i f y a " s c i e n t i f i c " p r o p o s i t i o n by a p p l y i n g a set of l o g i c a l r u l e s . . . t o the propositions c o n s t i t u t i n g the evidence.^25 This  strict  of  criticism,  On  the  one  at  a l l why  most  hand,  legitimate,  is one  dichotomization of  there  which are  cluster critics  overstated.  Thus,  and  item  the  same  has  been  subjected  around  either  who h o l d  that  Salmon notes cannot  be  of  the  that  both  to  various  two  sorts  conclusions.  distinction, "There  of  is  no  psychologically  while reason  and  126 logically  relevant  to  some  given  hypothesis.  maintains that sharp d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n a l y s i s of the concepts (as opposed  1 1  Similarly,  Hanson  discourages c r i t i c a l philosophical to t h e i r o r i g i n s ) u s u a l l y relegated  69  to the context of discovery: The slogan contrast between "the context of j u s t i f i c a t i o n " and "the context of discovery" i s often advanced to s t i f l e queries that are fundamentally conceptual i n character. Too many explorations into the concept of discovery have been dismissed by contemporary analysts as turning on issues of psychology and h i s t o r y , when i t i s our very ideas of discovery, of c r e a t i v i t y , and of innovation which are at issue i n such inquiries On the other hand, there are c r i t i c s who claim that no legitimate d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n can be made between the two contexts.  This view often  rests on the conclusion that the context of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s a pseudocontext, purportedly free of psychological influences, but i n r e a l i t y permeated by them.  As I s r a e l Scheffler puts i t :  I t has been suggested that the j u s t i f i c a t o r y processes of science themselves f a i l to objecti v i t y , that personal factors i n a c t u a l i t y permeate not only the genesis of theory but also i t s evaluation, and that psychology i s therefore c r u c i a l l y r e l evant to the explanation of both. The fundamental Reichenbachian distinction...has accordingly been rejected, together with h i s c o r r e l a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n between episteraology and psychology, neither d i s t i n c t i o n being capable of saving o b j e c t i v i t y as an actual feature of the processes of science.-*28  A s i m i l a r sentiment i s apparent i n Feyerabend's statement that "the theory which i s suggested by a s c i e n t i s t w i l l also depend, apart from the facts at h i s disposal, on the t r a d i t i o n i n which he p a r t i c i p a t e s , on his preferences, on his aesthetic judgements, on the suggestions of his f r i e n d s , and on other elements which are rooted, not i n f a c t s , but 129 i n the mind of the theoretician and which are therefore subjective." Feyerabend goes further, however, and posits that a firm adherence  70  t o the d i s c o v e r y - j u s t i f i c a t i o n d i s t i n c t i o n does not m e r e l y i g n o r e methodological  i s s u e s , but a c t u a l l y subverts e f f e c t i v e research.  In-  t e r e s t i n g l y enough, he bases t h i s argument on a view o f o b s e r v a t i o n guages as p r o d u c t s  of antecedently  s i m i l a r t o t h a t adopted by Hempel.  a v a i l a b l e theories that i s quite U n l i k e Hempel, however, who  the a n t e c e d e n t l y a v a i l a b l e n o t i o n s as a l r e a d y t e s t e d and  accepts  verified,  Feyerabend sees t h e i r use as i m p l y i n g t h a t they s h o u l d be s u b j e c t e d t e s t i n l i g h t o f the n o t i o n s of the new way  around.  I n t h i s way,  lan-  t h e o r y , and not j u s t the  to  other  o l d e r assumptions a r e c o n s t a n t l y b r o u g h t up  f o r r e a p p r a i s a l , and c o n c e p t u a l s t a g n a t i o n i s thereby  combatted:  Research a t i t s b e s t i s an i n t e r a c t i o n between new t h e o r i e s w h i c h a r e s t a t e d i n an e x p l i c i t manner and o l d e r v i e w s w h i c h have c r e p t i n t o the o b s e r v a t i o n language. I t i s not a o n e - s i d e d a c t i o n o f the one upon the o t h e r . Reasoning w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , however, presupposes t h a t one s i d e of t h i s p a i r , v i z . o b s e r v a t i o n , has f r o z e n , and t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e the o b s e r v a t i o n concepts a r e p r e f e r r e d to the p r i n c i p l e s o f a newly i n v e n t e d p o i n t o f view. ...[we] s h o u l d r a t h e r demand t h a t our methodology t r e a t e x p l i c i t and i m p l i c i t a s s e r t i o n s , d o u b t f u l and i n t u i t i v e l y e v i d e n t t h e o r i e s , known and u n c o n s c i o u s l y h e l d p r i n c i p l e s , i n e x a c t l y the same way, and t h a t i t p r o v i d e means f o r the d i s c o v e r y and the c r i t i c i s m o f the l a t t e r . . . 1 3 0  Thus, Feyerabend concludes  t h a t the j u s t i f i c a t i o n - d i s c o v e r y  t i n c t i o n i s detrimental to e f f e c t i v e research.  dis-  This view i s shared  by  131 others.  We  can take i t as one more p o i n t w o r t h y of n o t i c e i n our  e v a l u a t i o n o f the adequacy o f d e d u c t i v e f o r m a l i s m as a model o f s c i e n c e for international p o l i t i c s .  71  b.  Justification The  testing  T h i s i s because  o f H-D t h e o r i e s  the h i g h e s t  must be c a r r i e d out from the bottom u p .  l e v e l b""">the3es o f the theory a r e u s u a l l y  g e n e r a l as to have no d i r e c t e x p e r i e n t i a l o r o b s e r v a t i o n a l r e f e r e n t . B r a i t h w a i t e puts  so As  it:  As the h i e r a r c h y o f hypotheses o f i n c r e a s i n g g e n e r a l i t y r i s e s , the concepts w i t h which the hypotheses a r e concerned cease to be p r o p e r t i e s of t h i n g s which are d i r e c t l y o b s e r v a b l e , and i n s t e a d become ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' c o n c e p t s . . . w h i c h a r e connected to o b s e r v a b l e f a c t s by c o m p l i c a t e d logical relationships.^2 In o r d e r to t e s t these h i g h e s t  l e v e l hypotheses,  then, i t  is  necessary  to  make use o f the d e d u c t i v e i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s between hypotheses and absorb the t e s t i m p l i c a t i o n s of f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e o f the  the lowest l e v e l hypotheses upwards i n t o  the  theory:  The e m p i r i c a l t e s t i n g o f the d e d u c t i v e system i s e f f e c t e d by t e s t i n g the l o w e s t - l e v e l - h y p o theses In the system. The c o n f i r m a t i o n o r r e f u t a t i o n o f these i s the c r i t e r i o n by which the t r u t h o f a l l the hypotheses i n the system i s tested. The e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a system as a s e t of t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s deper/.s upon the ^3 e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f i t s lowes <:-level h y p o t h e s e s . Thus,  to use W . V . O . Q u i n e ' s apt metaphor, a theory meets e x p e r i e n c e  at i t s p e r i p h e r y .  134  There a r e two p o s s i b l e observations;  either  outcomes when a h y p o t h e s i s  comes i m p l i e s d i f f e r e n t  o r they w i l l n o t .  consequences,  the v e r i f i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e . is  tested  against  We w i l l  Each o f these o u t -  as w e l l as d i f f e r e n t p r o b l e m s , consider f a l s i f i c a t i o n f i r s t ,  l o g i c a l l y l e s s p r o b l e m a t i c , then w i l l  confirmation.  is  the o b s e r v a t i o n s w i l l be i n agreement w i t h e m p i r i c a l  p r e d i c t i o n s made by the h y p o t h e s i s ,  it  only  for  since  t u r n to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f  Karl  Popper,  legitimate  test  for  that  one,  has  asserted  can be  put  to  that  theories  f a l s i f i c a t i o n Is  by  experience.  the  He  only  writes:  ...I s h a l l c e r t a i n l y admit a system as e m p i r i c a l or s c i e n t i f i c only i f i t i s capable of being tested by experience. These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s suggest not that the v e r i f i a b i l i t y but the f a l s i f i a b i l i t y of a system i s to be taken as a c r i t e r i o n o f d e m a r c a t i o n . In other words, I s h a l l not require of a s c i e n t i f i c system that i t s h a l l be capable of being singled out once and f o r a l l , i n a p o s i t i v e sense; but I s h a l l require that i t s l o g i c a l form s h a l l be such t h a t i t c a n b e s i n g l e d o u t , b y means o f e m p i r i c a l test, i n a negative sense: i t must be p o s s i b l e f o r an e m p i r i c a l s c i e n t i f i c s y s t e m t o be r e f u t e d by experience. To and not  the  extent  Popper  single hypotheses,  falsification, refute  that  the  shown by Suppose  which must  theory  as  examining that  the  logic H  2 >  consequence i t  is  clear  must be  regarded  as  false.  deduced  from higher  level  place  discussing scientific conclude  at  the  best  of  falsification a bit •••  If  » H  at  Likewise, hypotheses  least  more  employed  H should turn out  that  one  i f  that  H',,  H'  of  the  H^ i s , ,  ...  of  these  must  also  be  false.  Thus,  the  in  to be  that  a  can  theory, This  can  in ,  be  precisely. deducing  the  falsified  by  hypotheses  H'  turn, then  H^  logically at  least  m  L l . one  of  systems  assertion  simplification.  are  n  his  periphery  at  E^,  a  that  is  H.  then  here  can only  take  a whole  hypotheses  observational experience,  we  is  implications of  the  observa-  136 tional ever, that the  falsification and  at  this  least  is  the  to  claim.  In  up'  p o i n t we  one h i g h e r  f a l s i f i c a t i o n of  seems  'seeps  a l l fact,  level the  into are  the  mainly  hypothesis  hypotheses  there  theoretical  is  interested must be  involved,  even a  serious  system. i n ,  false as  the  Howassertion  i n n o way  Popper's  question  implies  account  concerning  73  -whether any specific implicated higher levol hypothesis can he d««ieive>~ ly refuted i n such a case.  This i s emphasized by Braithwaite:  ...in the case of almost a l l scientific hypotheses, except the straightforward generalizations of observable facts which serve as the lowest-level hypotheses i n the deductive system, complete r e f u tation i s no more possible than complete proof. What experience can t e l l us i s that there i s something wrong somewhere i n the system; but we can make our choice as to which part of the system we consider to be at fault. In almost every system i t i s possible to maintain any one hypothesis i n the face of apparently contrary evidence at the expense of modifying the others. ...But at some time a point is reached at which the modifications i n a system required to save a hypothesis become more implausible than the rejection of the hypothesis; and then the hypothesis i s rejected.13' Thus, the logic of falsification i s much more complicated and ambiguous than Popper's formulation would lead us to believe.  If for a  moment we move beyond the logic to the pragmatics of falsification, we can note further that even the incontrovertible refutation of a complete theory does not necessarily imply i t s rejection.  In the absence of an  adequate alternative, scientists may be forced to retain the f a l s i f i e d theory for some time.  The classic example of this i s the numerous  problems that became evident with the Newtonian theory of gravitation throughout the 1800s.  Until Einstein's alternative emerged i n 1905,  however, there was no question of a simple discarding of Newton's formulation.  Although falsified i n many contexts, i t was, quite simply, 138  the best alternative available. The logic of falsification, although problematic, can at least be justified as valid i n terms o f deductive inference. No doubt this i s why  74  Popper f i n d s i t  so a p p e a l i n g .  Such i s not the case w i t h the l o g i c o f  c o n f i r m a t i o n , however, which i s based on i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e and i s therefore subject criteria.  to extreme d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n terms o f p u r e l y  T h i s can r e a d i l y be seen by r e c o n s i d e r i n g the  example o u t l i n e d above.  Suppose a g a i n t h a t  hypothetical  hypothes  a r e employed i n deducing the o b s e r v a t i o n a l consequence H . t i m e , however,  that  logical  Suppose  this  the outcome p r e d i c t e d by H i s observed to o c c u r .  t h e n , can we i n f e r about the h i g h e r l e v e l h y p o t h e s i s  H^?  The answer,  our j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s l i m i t e d t o the r u l e s o f l o g i c a l i n f e r e n c e ,  is  of confirming instances,  In f a c t ,  if  that  we cannot i n f e r a n y t h i n g about the t r u t h o f any o f the hypotheses the one ' c o n f i r m i n g ' i n s t a n c e .  What,  from  even i f we had a g r e a t number  the i n f e r e n c e would s t i l l be  unjustified.  There i s s i m p l y no l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n d u c t i v e l y l e a p i n g  from  139 a s i n g u l a r statement as Salmon puts i t ,  to a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l form.  "The main shortcomings o f the H-D method a r e  s t r o n g l y suggested by the f a c t t i o n a l evidence,  that,  g i v e n any f i n i t e body o f  t h e r e a r e i n f i n i t e l y many hypotheses  f i r m e d by i t i n e x a c t l y  observa-  which a r e c o n -  the same manner. "^"^  T h i s l o g i c a l t r u i s m stands i n obvious c o n t r a s t such ' u n j u s t i f i e d '  Thus  inferences  a r e made every day,  i n the a c t u a l p r a c t i c e o f s c i e n c e .  to the f a c t  and f o r good r e a s o n s ,  T h i s becomes u n d e r s t a n d a b l e when we  r e a l i z e t h a t these reasons a r e p r a g m a t i c and not l o g i c a l . ence to the q u e s t i o n o f c o n f i r m a t i o n , such pragmatic u s u a l l y i n v o l v e assessments port of a given hypothesis.  that  With r e f e r -  considerations  o f e i t h e r the e v i d e n t i a l o r t h e o r e t i c a l  sup-  Hempel notes s e v e r a l f a c t o r s which tend to  75  increase  the  in  of  terms  firmed  cision  and in  a hypothesis i t  has  diversity  of  tests  terms  these  already  confirmation in  times  of  more h i g h l y  passes  of  evidence,  the more  variety  also  level  measurement  in  our  confirmed when i t  In  it  regarded  of  implies of  the  tests  i t  new  tests  f r o m more  instance,  strongly  greater  greater has for  is  the  itself a s we  more  con-  the pre-  passed.  support,  a hypothesis  deducible  Por  more  the  and  theoretical  laws,  as  tested,  passed,  tolerances  terms  logically  can be  has  discussion of  is  given hypothesis.  favorably  c o n f i r m e d when I t  favorably.  seen  been  a  It  and  is then  have  highly  inclusive  hypotheses  141 or  theories These  a  that norms  deduct!vist  have independent of  point  t o o many p r a g m a t i c , tions this Bayes  into  the  c o n f i r m a t i o n can never of  Theorem i n  order  the  evidential  ment  i s ,  essentially, prior  to,  or  of  been  into  thesis,  view,  however.  This  p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and  context  d i f f i c u l t y has  evidential  to  inject  foundations "an  from,  is  because  who  calls  the  of...the results  satisfactory they  to  On S a l m o n ' s  view,  these  considera-  the  "plausibility  use  p l a u s i b i l i t y of testing  arguments  . . . a r e considerations r e l a t i n g to the acceptance or r e j e c t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses which, on t h e H-D a c c o u n t , m u s t b e j u d g e d e v i d e n t i a l l y i r r e l e v a n t to the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of the hypot h e s i s , b u t w h i c h a r e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , used by s c i e n t i s t s i n making d e c i s i o n s about such a c ceptance or r e j e c t i o n . T h e s e same i t e m s , o n t h e B a y e s i a n a c c o u n t , become e v i d e n t i a l l y relevant. Hence, the judgement of whether  of  arguments"  A plausibility  142 thesis."  allow  circumvent  advocates  directly  from  simply  unjustified  One a t t e m p t  a hypothesis.  assessment  apart  fully  Salmon,  what he of  be  logically  justification. suggested by  support.  a  arguhypo-  the  hypo-  76 s c i e n t i s t s are making d e c i s i o n s on the b a s i s of evidence, or on the b a s i s of various p s y c h o l o g i c a l or s o c i a l factors that are e v i d e n t i a l l y irrelevant h i n g e s c r u c i a l l y upon the q u e s t i o n of whether the H-D o r t h e B a y e s i a n a c c o u n t o f s c i e n t i f i c i n f e r e n c e i s more n e a r l y correct.i43 Salmon's  suggested  sleight-of-hand psychological their  than  an  factors  arbitrariness  reformulation actual  solution,  'evidential'  or  appears  however.  without  variability  to be more It  coming  to  a  definitional  merely grips  among i n d i v i d u a l s .  As  calls  with a  either  result,  144 this  approach,  like  others  similar  to  i t ,  does  not  contribute  to  ex-  145 tricating To  the  deductive  date,  the  compatible with  position  most h i g h l y  the  from i t s  developed  underlying  dilemma. potential  assumptions  of  solution  deductivism  that  seems  is  Rudolf  is  to  146 Carnap's a  logical  confirmation  function which w i l l  evidence that  as  a quantitative,  hypothesis  ceed,  the  and  purposes  of  logical  and  such  languages  the  therefore  logicality produce  on  degree  a purely  tion,  state  for  basis  a  consequence w i l l  of  satisfy  function with structure  science.  is  Whether  possible  principle,  arguments  that  confirmation of  an open q u e s t i o n .  The  of  for  others  and a g a i n s t  or  coefficient  body  of  the  the  twin At  simpler not  assert  than  far  too  i t  confirmation  be  be  he  is  only  required  that  quesof  able  for  the  task  to  to  model the  generalize  impossible in  complicated  suc-  in  formalized  to  for  ascertainable  requirements  able  claim is  Should  Carnap  that  create  of  and evidence  rigorously  he w i l l  that  of  deductive  present, to  and body  w i l l  hypothesis  Some c r i t i c s  are  goal  evidence.  a hypothesis  reference far  Camap's  given hypothesis  probabilistic  function is in  any  context-invariance.  whose of  function.  is  this im-  practice.^  go i n t o  here.  77  Suffice  i t  to  crucial problem w i l l  this  In  to say that the obstacles  light of this  along w i t h Hempel,  are  formidable, and a complete  certainly not  appear  discussion of logical  i n the near  solution  future.  c o n f i r m a t i o n , we can  conclude,  that:  The g r a d u a l e l i m i n a t i o n o f some among the c o n c e i v a b l e alternative hypotheses or theories can never, i t i s t r u e , narrow the f i e l d o f competitors to the p o i n t where o n l y one o f them i s l e f t ; h e n c e , we c a n n e v e r establish with certainty that a given theory is true, that the e n t i t i e s i t posits are r e a l . But to say t h i s is not to d i s c l o s e a p e c u l i a r f l a w i n our c l a i m s about theoretical e n t i t i e s , but to note a pervasive characteristic of a l l empirical k n o w l e d g e . 8 This  conclusion leads  perhaps  the most Up  to  to one more c r i t i c i s m o f the d e d u c t i v e  approach  telling of a l l .  this  p o i n t , we h a v e r e c o g n i z e d two p r i m a r y defenses  c e p t i o n o f s c i e n c e as d e d u c t i v e f o r m a l i s m . ample i n the quote  The f i r s t —  f r o m Hempel o n page 50 a b o v e ,  count should be accepted because  is  that  i t sheds l i g h t on the  the deductive  In  our e x a m i n a t i o n , however, we have n o t e d s e v e r a l p o i n t s where  Thus,  this defense The  in  second defense  the quote  and o n l y the  bond between premises  they alone can offer  the more fundamental.  to what  it  As  represented  i s based on the fact  This is  taken  empirical world.  to i m p l y  linkage will  A s Thomas Greene  that  those who p r e f e r  and  stresses,  or data must be deductive i n  not satisfy  that  conclus-  the hope of a c h i e v i n g t r u l y r e l i a b l e , o b j e c t i v e  the " p o s i t e d linkages between events kind of  deduct-  practice.  deductive models, guarantee a  and consequents.  cumulative knowledge o f the  Any o t h e r  the  decisive.  f r o m B r o d b e c k on page 25 above,  the deductive models, ive  i s by far  force  of empirical science."  considerably from actual s c i e n t i f i c  cannot be taken as  exac-  " r a t i o n a l e and  explanatory accounts  reconstruction diverges  branches  con-  represented,for  of  ive  offered i n different  of the  nature."  logical  they m i g h t d e s c r i b e as a c a s u a l d i s r e g a r d f o r the s t r i c t u r e s 149 methodology." Given t h i s view, i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to understand  precision of why  formal  78  deductivists may  come t o r e g a r d a gap between the d e d u c t i v e  p r a c t i c i n g s c i e n c e as a problem f o r s c i e n c e , not f o r  ideal  and  deductivism.  The p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n of l o g i c a l c o n f i r m a t i o n , however, throws t h i s whole l i n e of argument i n t o s e r i o u s doubt.  I t appears t h a t , to  e x t e n t t h a t the c o n f i r m a t i o n o f hypotheses i s p r a g m a t i c , the  "strictures  of f o r m a l methodology" a r e no more p r e c i s e o r c e r t a i n than those of o t h e r approach.  At t h i s c r i t i c a l j u n c t u r e , t h e n , the d e d u c t i v e  c e r t a i n t y and o b j e c t i v i t y b r e a k s down t o t a l l y . important  We  any  c l a i m to  can n o t e o n l y  one  i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s breakdown.  I t f o l l o w s from the u n a v a i l a b i l i t y of complete l o g i c a l t h a t the e m p i r i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t o f p l a n a t i o n cannot be f u l f i l l e d  ' . t r u e laws i n t h e D-N  i n terms o f the H-D  Because no laws can e v e r be a b s o l u t e l y c o n f i r m e d , cepted as u n q u e s t i o n a b l y  true.  confirmation  model o f  ex-  model of t h e o r i e s . none can e v e r be  ac-  Moreover, as Hempel and Oppenheim have  p o i n t e d o u t , a t r u e law cannot be r e p l a c e d by a h i g h l y c o n f i r m e d the t a u t o l o g i c a l q u a l i t i e s o f t h e model a r e t o be m a i n t a i n e d . r e s u l t , we  the  a r e l e d to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the D-N  As  one i f a  model i s a c t u a l l y not  a model o f t r u e e x p l a n a t i o n a t a l l , but i n s t e a d a c o n t e x t u a l l y bound, c o n t i n g e n t schema t h a t i s l o g i c a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m any o t h e r proach.  Thus, i t must be judged i n terms of the f i r s t d e f e n s e of  ap-  de-  d u c t i v i s m a l o n e , w h i c h , as we have seen, i s a q u e s t i o n a b l e d e f e n s e a t b e s t . I n c o n c l u s i o n , and b e f o r e t u r n i n g to t h e r o l e p l a y e d by formalism  i n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , we  the f o l l o w i n g passage from P a u l Feyerabend: ...the e n t e r p r i s e [or r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m ] soon got e n t a n g l e d w i t h i t s e l f . . . s o t h a t the main i s s u e i s now i t s own s u r v i v a l and not the  deductive can n o t e  79  structure survival to  of is  deny.  biology,  What or  ipating  science.  in  That  interesting I  do  deny  psychology i t .  this  struggle  to watch I is  that  for  am t h e  last  physics,  can p r o f i t  from  or  partic-  ...  T h i s can be shown b o t h t h e o r e t i c a l l y , by an a n a l y s i s o f some r a t h e r g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s o f the present s t a t e of the program of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , and p r a c t i c a l l y , by e x h i b i t i n g the s o r r y shape of the subjects (sociology; p o l i t i c a l science) w h i c h h a v e made a v u l g a r i z e d v e r s i o n o f the program t h e i r chief methodological guide. 1  III.  Arguments  Favoring  Deductive  Formalism  and P o l i t i c a l The b e s t  procedure  formalism  in  me,  consider  is  behalf this  to and  international  the  program should take  defenses noting they A.  of  the  deductive  have  of  in  Oran In  national  that  b e e n made  have  to  through  role  of  been  c o n c e r n i n g why  implementation. we w i l l  In  be  a  the  in  particularly  to  its  Accordingly, deductive next  considering  the  seems  i t .  a n d how while  deductive  i t  made  implement  p o l i t i c a l science,  formalism,  Politics  section  these  concerned  philosophical  with model  advocating. Young "The  Perils  Relations,"  about  portions  the  p o l i t i c a l science,  claims  arguments  developed problem  the  International  discussing  and  0  Science  how w e l l p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s u n d e r s t a n d  are  tions  up  in  politics  that  examine  be  follow  separately  attempts  section w i l l  w i l l  to  in  5  in  of  Odysseus:  Oran Young  the  state  and  the  field  of  some o f  this  On  observes  nature  of  and  that  'theory'  international  confusion  Constructing  to  Theories  "Confusion have  set  the  and  reached  relations."  1  5  1  problems  i  in  n  of  Inter-  misconcep-  monumental order  to  pro'cut  constructing  80  theories what he  about  i n t e r n a t i o n a l phenomena i n  considers  to be  a proper  perspective,"' "'''  he  1  d e f i n i t i o n of  proposes  theory:  A theory i s a set of general statements such that (1) some o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s ( t h e a s s u m p t i o n s o r premises) l o g i c a l l y imply the others (the theorems), and (2) the theorems c a n be c a s t i n t h e f o r m o f f a l s i f i a b l e p r e d i c t i v e statements about the real w o r l d . 1  This  above,  First,  its  verse  is  already  but  goal  is  is  theory  been  terms.  only  highest  level  as  a  be  set  deductively  the  similar  result  of  related  an e x p l i c i t p a r t from the  how  "current  theories  content  not  between  abstract  Without  these  to  any  problem of can be  dilemma" facing  theory or  and  achieves  theoretical  theoretical even a  a  an  the  this  excon-  has  between  preits  scope  nature  of a  and  its theory  non-explanatory these  deductive a  dis-  respects.  seen,  elements,  Thus,  constitutes  constructed, the  two  recognize  theoretical  d e f i n i t i o n of what  in  differentiated  empirical statements. of  H-D m o d e l  As we h a v e  failure  conception of the  of  the  make p r e d i c t i o n s , b u t  Young has  principles, or H-D  to  Young's  Second,  The  terms  form to  explanation.  employed  true.  in  d i s t i n g u i s h e d from an e x p l a n a t i o n or  Turning problem of  is  simplistic in  hypotheses.  cannot  as  often  discussed.  breadth  should be  more  can o f t e n be  and b r i d g e  theoretical  theory  p r e d i c t i o n , not  much l e s s  internal  of  3  conception of  cussed  planatory  5  theory  Young notes  terms  theory. to  what he  field:  It i s not d i f f i c u l t to construct l o g i c a l l y workable m o d e l s t h a t h a v e some b e a r i n g o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l phenomena, b u t no one has y e t c o n s t r u c t e d m o d e l s o f this type that y i e l d p r e d i c t i v e results which are at a l l impressive. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , one c a n b e g i n b y working out r i c h e r d e s c r i p t i v e frameworks or by  the describes  81  searching for e m p i r i c a l r e g u l a r i t i e s about i n t e r n a t i o n a l phenomena on an i n d u c t i v e b a s i s . However, so f a r e f f o r t s along these l i n e s have f a i l e d e n t i r e l y to lead toward the p r e d i c t i v e and (sometimes) m a n i p u l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s associated w i t h the development of viable theories. ^ 1 5  The " d i l e m m a , " then, of  i n v o l v e s the  l o g i c a l f o r m a l i t y on the  that we encountered whether  Hanson's  the  (p.  two  tional  58)  f a m i l i a r tension between  the  one hand and e m p i r i c a l r e l e v a n c e  i n the previous  observation  section.  on the  We c a n c o n s i d e r  concerning an inverse  seems to h o l d w i t h r e f e r e n c e  to  the  study  of  ently holds  to the  "there is  a powerful case  l o g i c a l models jLf one's theories  simplified  the  first  interna-  1 , 1 5 5  of the  the  last  Young  should be  apparreflected  is  that  construction of simplified the  He l i s t s  search  for  viable  seven reasons  two n o t i n g what he c o n s i d e r s  two a l t e r n a t i v e  be  A c c o r d i n g l y , he concludes  for emphasizing the  relations.  relations,  of a theory  constructed.  should  f i v e dealing w i t h the p o s i t i v e advantages  l o g i c a l models,  disadvantages  is  structure  principle objective  of international  choice;  of international  view that the  the method by which i t  fatal  between  phenomena.  employed i n developing theories  this  other  here  relationship  In deciding which of these three available strategies  in  demands  methods.^  6  F i r s t , the ultimate achievement of l o g i c a l closure i s always a necessary c o n d i t i o n for the development o f v i a b l e t h e o r i e s . . . . Second, s i m p l i f i e d l o g i c a l models sometimes play an important r o l e i n revealing the fundamental structure of a set of complex relationships even when the models are not s u f f i c i e n t l y r e a l i s t i c to y i e l d good p r e d i c t i o n s .  for of the  82 T h i r d . . .a w o r k a b l e l o g i c a l model[*s].. . c o r respondence w i t h the r e a l w o r l d can be improved by a d i s c i p l i n e d p r o c e s s o f r e l a x i n g c e r t a i n assumpt i o n s , i n t r o d u c i n g supplementary a s s u m p t i o n s , and so f o r t h . }  •  F o u r t h , ...the v e r y p r o c e s s of c r e a t i n g and manipu l a t i n g s i m p l e l o g i c a l models g e n e r a t e s a c r e a t i v e dynamic t h a t g r a d u a l l y l e a d s to the development of more s o p h i s t i c a t e d and r e a l i s t i c models. F i f t h , ...the e x p l a n a t i o n o f some e m p i r i c a l r e g u l a r i t i e s may i n v o l v e o n l y a s m a l l number o f f a c t o r s a n d . . . s i m p l e l o g i c a l models a r e more p o w e r f u l t h a n complex ones because they a r e more p a r s i m o n i o u s . S i x , . . . p r o j e c t s t h a t s t a r t out to maximize d e s c r i p t i v e a c c u r a c y w i l l seldom l e a d to the development o f v i a b l e t h e o r y . They w i l l o r d i n a r i l y produce l i s t s o f p o t e n t i a l l y r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s w h i c h a r e l o g i c a l l y unmanageable. T h i s i s the taxonomic f a l l a c y , and i t i s a l a r m i n g l y common among those who r e g a r d themselves as t h e o r i s t s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations. Seventh, . . . h e a v i l y i n d u c t i v e work...becomes an enemy of theory...when p r a c t i t i o n e r s become too wrapped up i n the s e a r c h f o r e m p i r i c a l r e g u l a r i t i e s . . . . They then f o r g e t t h a t t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s can o n l y s e r v e the cause of d e v e l o p i n g t h e o r i e s when they are c a r e f u l l y r e l a t e d t o the p r o c e s s e s o f c r e a t i n g l o g i c a l models and examining the a c c u r a c y of the p r e d i c t i o n s d e r i v e d from such m o d e l s . ^ 1 5  These reasons seem to depend on two b a s i c a s s u m p t i o n s , b o t h of w h i c h hover j u s t above the s u r f a c e of the argument.  The  f i r s t , of  course,  i s that the d e d u c t i v e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e o r y i s u n q u e s t i o n a b l y c o r r e c t . second i s t h a t the d e s c r i p t i v e and i n d u c t i v e methods themselves a r e n e c e s s a r i l y a n t i t h e t i c a l to t h e o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n , but  The not  t h a t the t h e o r i s t s 158  who  employ them are i n some way  incapable  of employing them c o r r e c t l y .  Thus, the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the f i r s t assumption i s a p r i o r i , the f i c a t i o n f o r the second i s ad hominem. c o u r s e of the argument.  justi-  These two assumptions c o n t r o l  the  83  Consider to address empirical the  the following reconstruction:  himself to  the  When Young f i r s t  question of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between  r e a l i t y , he had two p a t h s open to h i m .  c o m p l e x i t y o f r e a l i t y as  that might be compatible w i t h i t  i n the  introduction of this paper), one conception of theory  with Hanson's observation,  be molded to  theory only at  the  This  cause h i m to r e j e c t  he a p p a r e n t l y ternatives.  could not  conception of theory,  he accepted  to)  ways  course,  that reality  loss of considerable empirical  (or was u n w i l l i n g  As a result,  advocated  Upon choosing the second  his  of  c o u l d do w h a t h e d i d , w h i c h w a s  he d i s c o v e r e d , i n agreement  did not  accept  g i v e n and c o n s i d e r d i f f e r e n t  of making r e a l i t y compatible with i t .  and  conceptions  ( e s s e n t i a l l y the method  or he as  theory  He c o u l d e i t h e r  given and consider different  theory  to accept  decided  could  content.  however,  since  conceive of any v i a b l e a l -  the necessity  of sacrificing  the  content. Three of his  seven reasons  are merely vague promises  for making this  to r e t r i e v e  i t at  These promises, however, stand i n sharp  s a c r i f i c e (3,  some t i m e i n the  contrast  to  twice that descriptive richness and viable theory  4,  and  future.  the statement he  are  5)  essentially  makes  incom-  159 patible.  Of his remaining reasons,  first  assumption,  tion,  and the  undefined  two (6 a n d 7) a r e  remaining one  "fundamental  clude that his reasons are  (1)  is  a reaffirmation of  reaffirmations  (2) p o s i t s  structures"  one  a weak  of his  ("sometimes")  and l o g i c a l models.  o n l y become p l a u s i b l e i f h i s  accepted f i r s t . The importance o f Young's argument,  second  besides  assumpbetween  We c a n t h u s  two b a s i c  its  link  logical  his  con-  assumptions  weakness,  84  is  its  f a i l u r e to recognize a fundamental  namely, ing.  that  the model i s i n d i f f e r e n t  developing descriptive taxonomies,  empirical generalizations — rules  to d i f f e r e n t i a t e  that Young's argument theory,  therefore,  have seen, highly  the  is  any method —  build-  building  logical  inductively, inferring  equally j u s t i f i a b l e , since there are  various methodological procedures. i s h e l d to f o l l o w  his preferred  other  formalism,  the problems of theory  In terms o f the deductive approach,  models,  from his  To the  extent  deductive definition of  method i s p u r e l y ad hoc.  reasons he gives f o r  no  A n d , as  choosing this method are  we also  questionable. I n one sense,  however,  method c o u l d be seen emphasis content as  to  tenet of deductive  on the is  as  i t is  understandable  somehow i m p l i e d i n the  how Y o u n g ' s  preferred  deductive model.  The  form of a theory and the subsequent view that e m p i r i c a l  "hooked  indicating that,  onto" i n the  the  formal c a l c u l u s , could be e a s i l y  construed  conduct of i n q u i r y , a formal model should  f i r s t be developed, and o n l y l a t e r be g i v e n an e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n t . t h i s v i e w i n v o l v e s confusing the model,  l o g i c a l p r i o r i t i e s o f the  i n w h i c h the d i s t i n c t i o n i s a n a l y t i c a l , w i t h the  But  reconstructed  temporal  prior-  160 ities again,  of methodology, it  model,of B.  is important  i n which the d i s t i n c t i o n i s pragmatic. to keep  s c i e n c e as p r o d u c t ,  i n mind that H-D theory  not  is a  Once reconstructed  process.  Morton Kaplan Since  the mid 1950s, M o r t o n K a p l a n has been a proponent  principle of deduction while maintaining a skeptical attitude  of  the  toward  its  85  attainment in international politics.  In System and Process in Inter-  national Politics, he observes that "international politics, and social science generally, is so poorly developed that the construction of a precise deductive system would be more constructive and misleading than enlightening, [and] at this stage of development, some ambiguity is a good t h i n g . H o w e v e r , in his introduction to the paperback edition of System and Process in 1967, he acknowledges that progress is being made: I then [1957] did not know how to construct a strictly deductive theory which would cover the variables essential to a meaningful and useful theory of international relations. Since that time,'we have been working with the materials of the theory and we are reaching the point where at least one portion of the theory — that concerned with the "balance-of-power" international^^ system — is being developed with greater rigor. Kaplan's view that deductive theory is the goal of scientific inquiry stems from his study of the physical sciences, where i t is more commonly achieved.  In fact, he often begins his articles with a com163  parison of the state of theory in physical and social science. These comparisons usually lead, however, to somewhat pessimistic conclusions concerning the chances for deduction in social science; his above statement notwithstanding.  Thus, in 1969, we find Kaplan con-  cluding that "Deductive elegance, of the type obtained in physical 164 theory, is rarely if ever attained in the social sciences."  It ap-  pears, then, that in Kaplan's view deductive theory is the 'ideal'; seldom attained, but always pursued.  This somewhat pessimistic outlook  stands in sharp contrast to the more optimistic advocates of deductivism.  86  However, as the examination in the last section makes clear, even the quest for deductive rigor as an ideal can sometimes have stultifying effects on the course of research. C.  Davis Bobrow Another less than completely enthusiastic supporter of deductive  theory in international politics is Davis Bobrow. In an article appearing in the same volume as Young's, Bobrow adopts a similar definition of theory.  "By theory," he states, "we refer to a system of internally  consistent statements which allow us to explain or predict deductively." ^1  Like Young and Kaplan, he notes that this ideal is seldom attained. He is not, however, particularly concerned with this discrepancy, mainly because of his view that other products of international relations research are as valuable, or perhaps more valuable, than theory. "A catholic stance may be warranted if we regard theory construction as of a higher status than work directed toward other sorts of products.  I do  not so regard it and accordingly suggest a narrow and demanding formula166 tion." istic.  Thus, Bobrow's conception of theory is essentially opportunIt results more from a desire to make definite distinctions  among different research products than i t does from a careful consideration of the nature of either theory or deduction. D.  David Easton No overview of pleas for deductive formalism in political science  could ignore the extremely influential writings of David Easton.  In The  Political System, Easton explicitly draws his conception of theory from physical science.  Theory, "in its sophisticated state as found in physics  87 or economics, . . . i s  deductive,"  It begins with a few postulates of empirical r e f e r ence and from these deduces a series of narrower generalizations. From these i n turn stem singular generalizations capable of empirical proof. This i s a theoretical system which serves as an a n a l y t i c a l model of the concrete p o l i t i c a l system. I t i s conceivable that someday i n the s o c i a l sciences, such a framework might reach the stage of maturity associated with theory i n physics, f o r example. 7 16  The only s p e c i f i c method he advocates  f o r achieving this stage i n -  volves systematizing the 'basic assumptions' of the d i s c i p l i n e .  "[0]ne  cannot deny that behind a l l empirical research there are those basic assumptions with regard to the major variables i n the f i e l d and relations and that one way  their  of promoting the maturation of a d i s c i p l i n e  i s to r a i s e these assumptions to the point of consciousness f o r purposes 168 of  careful examination."  concerning how  Unfortunately, no prescriptions are given  this examination w i l l be able to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between  equally basic yet contradicting assumptions. Easton's conception of theory d i f f e r s e x p l i c i t l y from the H-D model i n the same way  that Young's conception d i f f e r s i m p l i c i t l y ; i t holds  that the highest l e v e l hypotheses of a theory are e s s e n t i a l l y empirical generalizations.  But, as we have seen repeatedly, the most general  postulates of a theory need not have "empirical reference," as Easton assumes.  Indeed, i t i s preferable that they do not, as Hempel makes  clear when he remarks that " i f science were...to l i m i t i t s e l f to the study of observable phenomena, i t would hardly be able to formulate any precise and general explanatory laws at a l l . . . . " " ^  9  Thus, Easton's  conception of theory exhibits an important misunderstanding  of i t s  88  philosophical source. However, by 1965, theory," apparently  Easton could r e f e r to a "revolution i n p o l i t i c a l  aiming i n the direction, of j u s t this model of  general  theory: ...given the very short time that the behavioral approach has been persuasive i n p o l i t i c a l research, i t may come as a pleasant surprise to discover that there are a respectable number of a l t e r n a t i v e conceptual approaches for the study of p o l i t i c a l l i f e or some of i t s major segments. Not that these conceptual structures are f u l l y developed or close to any i d e a l form. They do, however, constitute a beginning and a promise for the f u t u r e . ^ 1  0  This revolution, then, appears to be more one of intent than actual accomplishment.  I t also seems to be more problematic for the development  of a general deductive theory than Easton appears to recognize.  Once  again, inconsistencies between the d i f f e r e n t approaches are underplayed, and the problems involved i n synthesizing them into a general framework are not E.  confronted.  William  Riker  Like Easton, William Riker bases his advocacy of a deductive approach on the successes of physical science: What s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s have so greatly admired about the physical sciences i s the fact that these l a t t e r actually measure up to our notion of what science should be. That i s , they consist of a body of r e l ated and v e r i f i e d generalizations which describe occurrences accurately enough to be used for predict i o n . Generalizations within each science are r e l ated because they are deduced from one set of axioms, which, though revised from time to time, are nevertheless a coherent t h e o r e t i c a l model of motion.!72 He concludes that a science of p o l i t i c s must s t r i v e for the same structure.  89  By 1973, we f i n d h i m c l a i m i n g t h a t proliferate  new t h e o r i e s ,  "Political  science...is  beginning  new b a s e s o f e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  forms o f o r g a n i z a t i o n of knowledge.  It  to  and  i s even b e g i n n i n g to be  new  deduct-  . ,,173 method.  lve in  Riker's view of deductive hibits  two i m p o r t a n t  science  errors.  theory as  First,  to be a p r e d i c t i v e t a t h e r  he m i s t a k e n l y assumes from one set  of .axioms.  physical science is theories,  that  the  than explanatory  enterprise.  individual physical sciences  Second,  each  simply incorrect.  founded on completely different,  To assume  therefore,  is  a non-existent  general  to f a l s e l y j u s t i f y  ex-  considers  follow Each  i n reality a conglomeration of a great variety  assumptions.  physical science,  l i k e Young and Bobrow, he  This assumption is  many o f w h i c h are  tradictory  outlined i n these passages  of  even  theory  the quest  conin  for  general  174 theory  in political science. We w i l l  of  be c o n s i d e r i n g R i k e r ' s w o r k , and e s p e c i a l l y h i s  a deductive  theory  o f p o l i t i c a l c o a l i t i o n s , more f u l l y  formulation  i n the  next  section. F.  Robert Holt et The f i e l d  al.  of comparative p o l i t i c s claims a strong  deductively-oriented scholars. p o s i t i o n o f the to Y o u n g ' s . deductively  Robert H o l t and h i s  form and c o n s t r u c t i o n of  theories  Thus, H o l t and John Richardson, J r . connected  set  of propositions,  logical position with respect  associates  define  either  theory  a  identical  as  depending axioms  of  take  that is nearly  which are,  to one another,  contingent  on  "a their  or  175 theorems."  Similarly,  H o l t and John  Turner posit  a link  between  90  theory  and  reference entific  research  t h a t a l s o resembles t h a t put  to the source  of hypotheses, they  f o r t h by Y o u n g .  remark t h a t " I d e a l l y ,  research I n i t s simplest form i n v o l v e s , f i r s t ,  a hypothesis  With sci-  the deduction  f r o m a s e t o f t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , and  of  second, i n -  v e s t i g a t i o n s to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the f a c t s o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s p r e d i c t e d by  the hypothesis  manifest  t h e m s e l v e s e m p i r i c a l l y . " ^ " ^ They a r e  to p o i n t o u t , however, t h a t " L i t t l e r e s e a r c h lows t h i s  in political  quick  science...fol-  ideal." The m a j o r r e a s o n i s o b v i o u s . . . .The theoretical s t r u c t u r e of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e i s not d e d u c t i v e l y p o w e r f u l , and h e n c e t h e r i g o r o u s d e d u c t i o n o f h y p o t h e s e s i s , w i t h few e x c e p t i o n s , i m p o s s i b l e . Most h y p o t h e s e s t h a t a r e t e s t e d by p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s a r e e i t h e r t h e l o o s e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a r a t h e r amorphous t h e o r y or are the r e s e a r c h e r s ' hunches about a r e a s o n a b l e outcome of e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h .  It  i s p e r p l e x i n g t h a t H o l t and  Turner should  demand s u c h  strict  r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h e f o r m u l a t i o n , as o p p o s e d t o t h e t e s t i n g , o f theses.  C e r t a i n l y no  included, advocates  p o s i t i o n i n philosophy  this  'ideal'  of science,  of s c i e n t i f i c  research.  c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e y h a v e somehow managed t o c o n f u s e , o f H-D  theory  sources  t e s t i n g w i t h the processes  of hypotheses, contrary  deductivism We  can  only  l i k e Young, the  of hypothesis  t o H o l t and  hypo-  creation.  Turner, are i r r e l e v a n t  rules The to  testing. With reference would probably l o g i c a l models. starting  t o the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e o r i e s , H o l t and  Turner  a p p r o v e o f Young's p r e f e r r e d method o f b u i l d i n g H o l t and  Richardson's  from s c r a t c h i n order  simple  p r e f e r r e d method a l s o i n v o l v e s  to a c h i e v e  adequate deductive  theory:  91  The grand paradigms of Almond, Deutsch, Easton (ard for that matter, H o l t and Turner) are l i t t l e more than h e u r i s t i c schema. They present an i n t e r e s t i n g way o f l o o k i n g at p o l i t i c a l phenomena, but do l i t t l e m o r e . What i s needed i s c l e a r . First, a s m a l l group of t h e o r e t i c a l p r i m i t i v e s must be established. Second, a d d i t i o n a l concepts must be d e f i n e d u s i n g o n l y t h e s e t h e o r e t i c a l p r i m i t i v e s and some s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d l o g i c a l (or mathematical) operations. T h i r d , a set o f axioms must be developed using only the concepts and operations defined. Fourth, a set of p r o p o s i t i o n s must be deduced from these axioms for e m p i r i c a l testing. Fifth, criteria of a d m i s s i b i l i t y and r u l e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must be developed. Here  again,  an a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s mistakenly assumed  imply a temporal methodological prescription. and R i c h a r d s o n have at be  theoretical  least  i n nature.  ductive approach  noticed  In this  seems to be  that highest  respect,  litical note  the need  hand,  Holt  l e v e l hypotheses reading o f the  must de-  than Young i n considering the  that would be necessary  science, were  their  other  sound.  H o l t a n d R i c h a r d s o n go f u r t h e r of prerequisites  On the  to  to develop  f o r more r i g o r o u s  as  kinds  i f comparative p o l i t i c s , or  described here.  training in  In particular,  pothey  mathematics:  None of these steps except the f i r s t can be taken s a t i s f a c t o r i l y w i t h o u t the use o f some body o f r u l e s that e s t a b l i s h the p r i n c i p l e s for deduction. Our suggestion i s that p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s must turn to mathematics for these rules of l o g i c and that u n t i l t h i s i s done, the grand schemata w i l l remain e s s e n t i a l l y h e u r i s t i c . . . . [ W ] e can see no other way to i n t r o d u c e the n e c e s s a r y d e d u c t i v e power i n t o a p a r a d i g m . 179. This  appeal  question of the ity  to mathematics  relationship  of s o c i a l phenomena,  does  not  address  i t s e l f d i r e c t l y to  o f l o g i c a l r i g o r and the  however.  On t h i s  point,  the  empirical complex-  H o l t and Richardson  do  92 mention that new breakthroughs in mathematics may be necessary in order to accommodate the needs of deductive social sciences.  180  But their  primary means of dealing with this issue seems to be to drastically*delimit what counts as a 'problem' in political science: A science that is heavily committed to dealing with socially and morally relevant problems finds little use for this kind of paradigm or for the commitment to mathematics that i t requires. For political science to advance, i t must shed this professional ^g^ commitment to solving social and moral problems. This controversial solution certainly would limit the number of political problems; and those that remain might even prove to be more amenable to deductive procedures.  It is difficult to imagine, however, why 182  anyone would be interested in studying them.  The particular value of  Holt and Richardson's example is that i t shows more explicitly than most the kinds of sacrifices that might be necessary in order to bring together deductive theory and empirical reality. G.  A. James Gregor One advocate of deductive formalism whose knowledge of its philo-  sophical foundations seems more thorough than most is A.J. Gregor, He describes political science as a "partially formalized science."  Its  proper goal is to become "fully formalized." One attribute of a formalized science is formal theory, which Gregor defines more carefully than any of the above scholars: A theory, in a substantially formalized system, includes as constituents (1) an uninterpreted or formal calculus which provides for syntactical invariance in the system, (2) a set of semantic rules of interpretation which assign some determinate empirical meanings to the formal calculus thereby relating i t to an evidential or empirical  93 base, and (3) a model of the uninterpreted calculus, in terms of more or less familiar conceptual or visualizable materials . . . . x o  We can recognize this conception of theory as an almost verbatim account of jthat given in Nagel's The Structure of Science.  Since Gregor's  article was written in 1968, we cannot expect him to have been aware of Hempel's critique of this conception, which did not appear until 1970. Thus, so far, Gregor's view of theory is only susceptible to the c r i t i cisms put forth in the previous section, but not to the added criticism that i t fails to grasp the full deductive model of theory. Another benefit of Gregor's analysis is that he is explicit about why formal theory is necessary: ...formalization seeks to satisfy the minimal requirements of any serious knowledge enterprise: to provide for syntactical and semantic invariance without which reliable knowledge is simply not ,conceivable. ...Semantic and syntactical invariance afford the minimal necessary conditions for drawing out the testable implications of any set of empirical propositions, for identifying the locus in which false propositions are located when a hypothesis fails to meet empirical test, for coordinating research in order that separate findings support each other, for isolating the most strategic propositions for testing, and in order to provide the most parsimonious summary of actual or anticipated research efforts. ^ 1  Thus, in Gregor's view, "the requisite semantic and syntactic precision... are the minimal responsibilities implied in David Easton's injunction that the science of politics, in its effort at theory construction, attempt to meet the methodological requirements characteristic of the natural sciences."^^^ The problems with this formulation are two:  First, there are no  set "methodological requirements characteristic of the natural  94  sciences."  As P a u l Feyerabend  puts  i t :  The i d e a o f a method t h a t c o n t a i n s f i r m , unc h a n g i n g , and a b s o l u t e l y b i n d i n g p r i n c i p l e s f o r conducting the business of science gets i n t o c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t y when c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e r e s u l t s of h i s t o r i c a l research. We f i n d , then, that there i s not a s i n g l e r u l e , however p l a u s i b l e and however f i r m l y grounded i n e p i s t e m o l o g y , that i s n o t v i o l a t e d a t some t i m e o r o t h e r . Second,  even  invariance Both,  if  there were  would  not  a s we h a v e  terpretation  face of  distinction.  the  Gregor's than  to  any  that  most  of  failure approach the  present  the go  other  to  to  "all  frequently  properties  out  that  achieve  semantic absolute  to be  more  functional  p a r a s i t i c upon  identify  the  them.  formalism-in-  r e s t s on  the  untenable down  in  confirmation. akin  'scientific'  and  semantic  invariance breaks  to  scholars discussed here. to be  would  the window w i t h  while  appears  attempts  hostile  s y n t a c t i c a l and  Syntactical invariance  dichotomy,  pecially too  among  seen above,  analytic-synthetic the  be  such requirements,  are  Holt  and  Richardson's  Like  them,  abortive.  he  He i s  systems approaches,  w h i c h he  suggestive  and  analogy  holds es-  feels  are  metaphor, 187  trafficking light  of  on our  these  familiarity with  failings,  he  borrow  concepts from other  warns,  "involves  goal  advocates partially  considerable  directed  that  systems."  p o l i t i c a l science  formalized  sciences.  risk."  The d i s p o s i t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f some p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s to be u n c r i t i c a l l y accommodating to such b o r r o w i n g t h r e a t e n s to burden p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e as a knowledge e n t e r p r i s e w i t h an i n v e n t o r y o f vague and ambiguous c o n c e p t s l i t t l e c a l c u l a t e d to f u r t h e r the e f f o r t to e x p l a i n and p r e d i c t . ^8  To  In never do  so,  he  95  On t h e political  other  hand,  science  guidance.  "The  empirical  must  also  turn  like  Holt  toward  adoption of  physical  concepts  discipline entails  and R i c h a r d s o n , science  from a  he  concludes  and mathematics  for  formalized empirical or  minimum h a z a r d s i n c e  that  the  non-  implications of  such  189 assimilation about  how  concepts why we  this  I  to be  to  become  But  achieved, As  a  he has nor  result,  formalized, but  are  nothing  does we  he  are  left  in  to  say  reveal  what  i n f o r m e d as the  dark  to  con-  how.  l i s t  think  proaches  of  the  that  portrayed  in  Many,  examples  above  such  various as  are  taken.  deserves  the  c o u l d be  authors  have been  but which  ence.  specified."  assimilation is  should want  This  upon,  maximally  s h o u l d be borrowed o r why.  cerning  but  are  representative  An important  careful "scope  George  lengthened without  attention,  most  of  difficulty, the  a r e a we h a v e n o t is  and methods"  Graham's  of  much  the  ap-  touched  conception of  science  textbooks i n p o l i t i c a l  Methodological Foundations  sci-  for  190 Political  Analysis,  l i t t l e  mention of  Theory  and Method of  volved  In  take  an almost  alternative  attaining  deductive  possibilities.  Political deductive  purely  Analysis, theories  Others,  point  and  out  the  approach like  with  Meehan's  The  difficulties  i n -  explanations, but  interpret 191  this  as  that  I  an  i n d i c a t i o n of  have  come a c r o s s  physical proach — thesis.  science e v e n as Given  the  critically  and s o c i a l an  that  ideal many  inferiority  examine  science of  or  science  graduate  of  the —  p o l i t i c a l science. either  relationship  c r i t i c i s m s of  that  students  the  are  are  the  None  the  subject  introduced to  of  deductive of  ap-  this  these  issues  96 only through such textbooks, this narrowness of focus does not speak well for the education of methodologically well-rounded flexible political 192 scientists.  In conclusion, we can note that Gunnell s charge concern-  ing political scientists' poor grasp of the philosophical model of deductive formalism seems to be upheld, at least with reference to the small sample we have discussed here.  Most of these scholars seem to  emphasize only those aspects of the model which they find compatible with their own interests, and discard or ignore the rest.  Thus, for ex-  ample, most of these arguments are characterized by a great concern with form at the expense of content.  Only Holt and Richardson and Gregor  mention the problem of interpretation, and their handling of i t is inadequate.  Perhaps more disturbing, however, is the nonchalance with  which a l l these political scientists approach the possibility  of  drastically cutting back what they are willing to define as "political" in order to satisfy the formal requirements of their preconceived notions of theory.  We shall see in the next section that this tendency is even  more pronounced when attempts are made to actually implement deductive theories of international phenomena. IV.  Applications of Deductive Formalism in International Politics Several attempts have been made in the study of international po-  litics to develop deductive theories along the lines sketched out in Section II.  None has been considered fully satisfactory either by  their creators or their critics, but a l l have been praised at one time or another as important "first steps" in the direction of viable theory. Interestingly enough, the same cannot be said for the development of  97  deductive explanations.  To my knowledge there have not been any attempts  to produce strictly deductive explanations in the study of international politics or political science that resemble those advocated by Hempel and Oppenhein et al.  Some reasons for this will be considered further on,  but since these reasons are somewhat dependent upon some of the characteristics of the deductive theories that have been put forth, we should turn to these first. A. Deductive ^Theories 1.  Reaction Equations and Arms Race Models One area of international politics that has proven conducive to the  construction of formal theories is the study of arms races.  Building  upon the foundations laid down by Lewis F. Richardson, scholars such as Smoker, Caspery, Wolfson, Milstein and Mitchell, and others have attempted to develop mathematical models that effectively mirror the dynamics of 193 competitive military spending.  These models are not strictly de-  ductive in that the variables they deal with are related to each other through mathematical functions rather than deductive syllogisms.  But  such theories, which we might call systematic in order to distinguish them from pure deductive theories, can easily be converted to deductive form. In general, these arms race models bear a strong resemblance to the simplified logical models described above by Young.  They involve a  high degree of abstraction, usually being based upon simple stimulusresponse or "reaction-process" assumptions.  Thus, for example, they pay  little or no attention to internal decision-making processes or other  98  internal in  characteristics  attempting  to b r i n g  of  together  and e m p i r i c a l r e l e v a n c e . arms  race  literature,  nations.  In  Peter  a  As  a  logically recent  result tight  they  fare  theoretical  examination and  Bush makes  the  rather  structures  critique  following  poorly  of  the  observations:  F i r s t , q u a n t i t a t i v e models o f arms r a c e s cannot be t e s t e d w i t h a n y t h i n g approaching d e s i r a b l e rigor. Secondly, this a n a l y t i c a l approach is not now i n a p o s i t i o n t o o f f e r a c c u r a t e , quantitative predictions o f m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g . -^4 Busch  cites  and i n a d e q u a t e data  is  often  ample,  that  military  two b a s i c  theory.  reasons  The  unreliable.  the  Soviets  expenditures  data  for  these  problem i s  There  are  deficiencies;  a  double one.  good reasons  various  reasons  small quantity  were dependable,  available  data points  greatly  limits  as  the  l o n g as  downs  or  the  of  dynamics  the  set  new  of  relative  ingly,  many  arms  such as  race  necessary.  and  remain  those which  often  s t a b i l i t y was  use  30 y e a r s .  Models  are  operative. followed  the  In  recent  past,  1870 and  1914.  escalation  studies  only  System  actors,  the  In of  s t a t i s t i c a l measures  i n v o l v i n g new  between  conflict  of  themselves.  describe  dynamics,  new m o d e l s become  period  models  they  reorganizations,  world wars, Thus,  efficacy  reported  the  figures  ex-  their  last  the  as  for  the  even i f  well  to b e l i e v e ,  the  over  addition,  the  data  First  and Chinese have o f t e n manipulated  for  poor  last into  the Not  focus  as  adequate breaktwo motion.  longest surprison  this  195 period.  Since  only  22 a n d  the  lasted major In  obstacle terms  of  that  time,  29 y e a r s to  the  interwar  respectively  effective  theoretical  testing  and post-WWII p e r i o d s (so  of  far).  arms  race  d i f f i c u l t i e s , Busch's  This  is  have  probably  models. conclusion is  succint.  99  " I t i s not o n l y the case t h a t the important v a r i a b l e s cannot be measured • we do not r e a l l y know which v a r i a b l e s a r e important!""''^ d i f f e r e n t models emphasize d i f f e r e n t types of v a r i a b l e s .  Consequently, But the p a u c i t y  o f d a t a p r e c l u d e s a d e f i n i t i v e judgement as to which models a r e more adequate,  and thus b r i n g s to a s t a n d s t i l l the p r o c e s s o f c u m u l a t i v e c o r 197  r e c t i o n o f e r r o r s and t h e o r e t i c a l  improvement.  What then i s the use of mathematical models o f arms race? Busch's view,  the e m p i r i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l f a i l i n g s o f the approach  not c o m p l e t e l y negate i t s v a l u e . tant h e u r i s t i c  In  He h o l d s t h a t i t a l s o s e r v e s an  do  impor-  function:  The c o n t r i b u t i o n to be expected — indeed demanded — from such models i t t h a t they organi z e and c l a r i f y the v e r b a l concepts and t h e o r i e s which have been used to d e s c r i b e arms r a c e s and t h a t they e x p l i c a t e the o f t e n unsuspected i m p l i c a t i o n s o f our commonly used t h e o r i e s . The f u l f i l l m e n t o f these c r i t e r i a r e q u i r e s , t h a t every term i n the v a r i o u s e q u a t i o n s have a m e a n i n g f u l political definition. E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , every s p e c i f i e d f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p must be p o l i tically plausible. F i n a l l y , the mathematical i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the e q u a t i o n s must correspond with r e a l i t y . 1 9 8  In l i g h t o f these c r i t e r i a ,  i t appears  t h a t arms r a c e models i n  t h e i r p r e s e n t form a r e more a k i n to taxonomies than f u l l - f l e d g e d  H-D  t h e o r i e s , i n s p i t e o f the f a c t t h a t they p o s i t s t r o n g d e d u c t i v e i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s between v a r i a b l e s .  As we have seen, such i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s  are a n e c e s s a r y , but n o t s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r a complete H-D  theory.  To t r a n s l a t e Busch's c r i t i q u e i n t o the terminology i n t r o d u c e d i n s e c t i o n I I , arms r a c e models are inadequate i n terms of b r i d g e p r i n c i p l e s e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n c e , and a r e u n t e s t a b l e through e i t h e r  and  verification  100  or falsification* models —  e.g.,  substantiated. quirements 2.  It  also follows from this  Richardson's reaction equations Thus,  of H-D  the models f a i l  to meet  at  the  —  'laws'  are not  least  o f arms  A second area  theoretically  three minimal  re-  Studies  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s to which deductive  have been a p p l i e d i s  the  c h i e f means  study of deterrence of formalization.  strategy. In general,  .decision-making, or strategic  models  H e r e game game  interactions  theory  theoretic  models d e a l w i t h the problems of r a t i o n a l choice i n s i t u a t i o n s interdependent  race  theory.  Game T h e o r y a n d D e t e r r e n c e  has been the  that  involving  among  purpos-  199 ive actors.  Thus,  seems apparent. somewhat  t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y to problems of  However, their performance  capacity has  been  . 200 problematxc.  R i c h a r d Smoke n o t e s  that abstract,  used to study problems i n v o l v i n g situation which, fortunately,  deductive models were o r i g i n a l l y  the deterrence  to the study of less  catastrophic,  and c r i s e s ,  available,  a n d f o r w h i c h the game t h e o r e t i c In these cases,  the study o f arms  races,  has  applied  but more complicated cases such  of l i m i t e d wars  models have exhibited  much l i k e  focussed attention  considerations  unexamined.  theory is  i n a p p l i c a b l e to deterrence  is  less  reaction equations  o n . only s e l e c t e d  the problem, m a i n l y "commitment" and " s i g n a l l i n g , " and has  important  as  f o r w h i c h much e m p i r i c a l data  game t h e o r y ,  problems, but only that i t  i n  aspects  left  Smoke's complaint i s not  a  Thus,  But they have since been  deterrence  relevance.  of thermonuclear war;  has never had an e m p i r i c a l referent.  such models were p a r t i c u l a r l y valuable.  of  i n this  deterrence  that  other game  highlights  101 some aspects at the expense of others which might be equally important.  20]  In other words, the scope of game theory is inadequate for dealing with the complex totality of a deterrence situation. A similar point, which also has important implications for the deductive status of game theory, is made by Thomas Schelling. Schelling notes that unique deductive solutions to strategy problems are only available in "zero-sum" two-person games.  Such games may adequately  reflect the "all-or-nothing" nature of nuclear deterrence, but are much less applicable to the more subtle interactions that characterize crisistype situations.  For these cases, the so-called "mixed-motive" games,  in which the players have interests in common as well as in conflict, become more applicable.  But as Schelling points out, mixed-motive games  do not have a unique deductive solution,  "The principles relevant to  successful play, the strategic principles, the propositions of a normative theory, cannot be derived by purely analytical means from a priori 202 considerations." Thus, he concludes, "the mathematical structure... should not be permitted to dominate the analysis [since] some essential 203 part of the study of mixed-motive games is necessarily empirical." This seems to imply that with respect to those aspects of deterrence situations to which i t is most applicable, game-theory is often not completely deductive. Like arms race models, however, game theory is not put forward to stand or fall on its merits as a deductive or predictive theory, but is held by its supporters also to be important as a heuristic tool for organizing and conceptualizing.  Schelling, in particular, holds that the  102  rudiments which  of  game  theory  social scientists  can act  as  can pursue  a  framework, f o r  their  analysis  substantive  within  interests:  . . . w h a t may b e m o s t i m p o r t a n t t o a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t i s these rudiments. The r u d i m e n t s c a n h e l p h i m t o make h i s own t h e o r y , a n d make i t i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r problems that i n t e r e s t him. One o f the f i r s t t h i n g s t h a t s t r i k e a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t when he begins to experiment w i t h i l l u s t r a t i v e matrices is how r i c h i n v a r i e t y t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s c a n b e e v e n b e t w e e n two i n d i v i d u a l s and how many d i f f e r e n t  meanings there are f o r such s i m p l e n o t i o n s as " t h r e a t , " " a g r e e m e n t , " and " c o n f l i c t . " . . . Even the s i m p l e s t o f s i t u a t i o n s , i n v o l v i n g two i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h two a l t e r n a t i v e s a p i e c e t o c h o o s e f r o m , c a n n o t be e x h a u s t i v e l y a n a l y z e d and c a t a l o g u e d . Their p o s s i b i l i t i e s are almost l i m i t l e s s . For this reason, game t h e o r y i s m o r e t h a n a " t h e o r y , " m o r e t h a n a s e t o f theorems and s o l u t i o n s ; i t i s a framework for analysis. This subsume might his  far  the  be  claim  more  passage  than less  that  i t  is  of  the  to  different  except 3.  a i t  is  was  first  in  the Its  and  here  role  framework  as  inadequate  trivial  element it  a  of  theory  for  theory,  H-D  similar  and  therefore  to in  i t  to  We  reference analysis, is  those  to is  certainly of  arms  predictively  empirical  cases  because  assigning u t i l i t y  universal  to  laws  (read  values  'solutions')  instances.  a more in  no  only with  are  involved  contains  and R a t i o n a l i s t i c  formulated  formal  Schelling  even when a p p l i c a b l e  outcomes,  of  e m p i r i c a l s o c i a l phenomena.  deficiencies  empirically  at  its  inability  requirements  subjective  Game t h e o r y , It  By  theory.  the most  Economic  theory,  the  of  disagree with  untestable  basically  in  to  game  well  manifestation  theory.  than  race models; poor,  various  inclined  a  illustrates  Models  general  John von  of  International  level, Neumann  is  Processes  a product  and Oscar  of  economics.  Morgenstern's  103  c l a s s i c T h e o r y o f Games and E c o n o m i c B e h a v i o r . i m p o r t a n t a s s u m p t i o n w h i c h we have not y e t of  rationality.  u y j J  Thus, i t  discussed —  contains  the  assumption  This assumption is primarily responsible for  t h a t have been made i n d e v e l o p i n g d e d u c t i v e ,  one  the  axiomatic theories  gains  i n  the  206  field  of economics.  operationalized  I n v o n Neumann and M o r g e n s t e r n ' s  theory,  i t  o f the obvious g o a l of monetary  gain in  economic  i n terms  is  behavior: We s h a l l a s s u m e t h a t t h e a i m o f a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the economic s y s t e m . . . i s money, or e q u i v a l e n t l y , a single monetary commodity. This i s supposed to b e . . . i d e n t i c a l , even i n the q u a n t i t a t i v e sense, w i t h whatever ' s a t i s f a c t i o n ' or ' u t i l i t y ' i s desired by each p a r t i c i p a n t . . . . T h e i n d i v i d u a l who a t t e m p t s to a t t a i n these respective maxima i s also s a i d to act 'rationally'. 2  In a d d i t i o n to i t s  0  7  u s e I n game t h e o r y ,  attempts by both p o l i t i c a l  scientists  cept o f r a t i o n a l i t y from the  able i n political is problematic.  contexts  whole.  i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , as w e l l  of p o l i t i c a l behavior, ductive structure.  referred  such a  forth and,  as  a  con-  avail-  transfer result,  deductive  as p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e as  a  " r a t i o n a l i s t i c " models  We c a n b r i e f l y m e n t i o n some o f t h e more  i n order  this  source of  to as  other  Since  o f t e n become q u i t e s o p h i s t i c a t e d i n t h e i r  ones here and then examine one — i n more d e t a i l  to money,  the most prevalent  sometimes  transfer  of rational u t i l i t y readily  But solutions have been put  These theories,  to  the p o l i t i c a l sphere.  that i s analogous  economic models have become theories  and economists  economic to  there i s no q u a n t i f i a b l e measurement  there have been several  R i k e r ' s Theory of P o l i t i c a l  to a s c e r t a i n how i t handles  the  de-  important Coalitions  concept  of  -  104  political  r a t i o n a l i t y and how i t matches  up t o  the  requirements  of  H-D  theory. A.  C o l l e c t i v e Goods, O l i g o p o l i e s , Bureaucracy,  and General Theories  of  Politics Some a s p e c t s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s h a v e b e e n of problems  associated w i t h the  supply of  good c a n be g e n e r a l l y d e f i n e d as  c o l l e c t i v e goods.  In p o l i t i c a l  terms,  example, leaders  develop are  in order ferent  a theory  would be  to accrue p o l i t i c a l  from the  considered an  ex-  Norman F r o l i c h and Joe A. Oppenheimer,  for  of "entrepreneurial  c o n c e p t u a l i z e d as  A collective  s u p p l i e d to some member o f  national defense  ample o f a c o l l e c t i v e good.  terms  any good that cannot be w i t h h e l d  any member o f a s p e c i f i e d group once i t i s group.  analyzed i n  "entrepreneurs" gains.  international situations  politics" i n which  dispensing collective  They use  s u c h as  political  this  defense  scheme  alliances,  goods  to examine foreign  dif-  aid,  208  and m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . cept include studies „. 209 tion.  Other uses of the  of alliances,  Several social scientists n a t i o n a l s y s t e m and some o f Young observes uations  that the  on several  the  leadership,  have noted  and p o l i t i c a l  con-  participa-  a s i m i l a r i t y between  characteristics  international  c o l l e c t i v e goods  the  inter-  of o l i g o p o l i s t i c markets.  system resembles  such market  count:  . . . i t involves competitive-cooperative interactions among a l i m i t e d number o f p u r p o s i v e a c t o r s who have some c a p a c i t y to c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h e a c h o t h e r . Each of the actors i s a r e l a t i v e l y complex c o l l e c t i v e e n t i t y whose e x t e r n a l behavior i s often hard to capture i n simple models. The number o f actors i n the system i s v i r t u a l l y always greater than one.  sit-  105  But the number o f a c t o r s i s s m a l l enough so that e v e r y a c t o r c a n i n t e r a c t w i t h t h e o t h e r s as d i f f e r e n t i a t e d e n t i t i e s , rather than having to i n t e r a c t w i t h a l l the o t h e r s t o g e t h e r as an a g g r e g a t e d • and undifferentiated e n v i r o n m e n t . 2 1 0  The o n l y major a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s Kenneth Bounding s general  theory of c o n f l i c t , which is  1  on the  theory  idea to international p o l i t i c s  is  structurally  o f o l i g o p o l i e s i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h the r e a c t i o n m o d e l s  based and  211 game t h e o r e t i c  concepts  discussed above.  p l i c i t w o r k has been done i s t i c market  contexts  A third area  to  helping  the  not much  ex-  i n t e r n a t i o n a l system and oligopo-  together.  i n which r a t i o n a l i s t i c models have been applied i s  study of bureaucracies. able  t y i n g the  Beyond this,  T h i s can be seen as  at  study of international p o l i t i c s ,  least  indirectly applic-  e s p e c i a l l y i n terms  to develop v i a b l e models of n a t i o n a l actors  that w i l l  on some o f t h e i n t e r n a l c a u s e s  of international behavior.  rationalistic  this  approach  to  to b u r e a u c r a t i c  literature  of  shed  The  light  major  Anthony Down's Inside 212 Bureaucracy and Gordon T u l l o c k ' s The P o l i t i c s of Bureaucracy. These axiomatic, deductive theories stand i n i n t e r e s t i n g contrast to the other prominent  contributions  the  studies  are  e x e m p l i f i e d by the work of  213 Richard Neustadt and Graham A l l i s o n . F i n a l l y , a few a t t e m p t s have b e e n made to d e v e l o p g e n e r a l of p o l i t i c s based upon r a t i o n a l i s t i c assumptions  and economic  theories  models.  214 Among t h e s e have b e e n  theories  of democracy,  and of p o l i t i c a l  ex-  215 change.  Others,  s u c h as  the general  theory put  forth i n Riker  Ordeshook's An Introduction to P o s i t i v e P o l i t i c a l Theory, are extensive  i n scope.  Riker's theory of p o l i t i c a l  even  coalitions, with  and more its  106  broad range  of applications,  can be  seen  as  a general  theory  of  this  type. The c e n t r a l i t y o f the difficult social  concept  to overemphasize.  science  to  of r a t i o n a l i t y to  In a recent  work,  Riker  that of "mechanism" i n p h y s i c a l  these theories likens its  is  role  in  science;  . . . i t is clear that the assumption of r a t i o n a l i t y and the assumption of mechanism p l a y comparable roles i n the e x p l a n a t i o n o f the s o c i a l and p h y s i c a l worlds. The m e c h a n i c a l assumptions assert that there i s something about things that assures us they w i l l ( u s u a l l y ) move r e g u l a r l y , and the r a t i o n a l i t y assumption asserts that there i s something about people t h a t makes them behave ( u s u a l l y ) i n a regular way. In each case the function of science i s to generalize about the r e g u l a r i t i e s . 2 1 6 Further, b u i l d i n g i n the tulated served  he sees i t  the only adequate  social sciences.  r e g u l a r i t y " imposed by the  In this  base  regard,  for deductive  he contrasts  rationality principle with  regularity" associated with e m p i r i c a l - i n d u c t i v e methods;  l i k e a good d e d u c t i v i s t , the  as  that  the  former  is  theory  the the  . . . t h e n o t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y . . . i s one o f the ways by w h i c h we a r r i v e at the r e g u l a r i t y n e c e s s a r y f o r generalization. Whether or not i t i s better than s i m p l e o b s e r v a t i o n i s c u r r e n t l y the s u b j e c t o f some discussion i n p o l i t i c a l science... .As is apparent, we s i d e w i t h d e d u c t i v e methods and p o s t u l a t e d r e g u l a r i t y , l a r g e l y because we b e l i e v e them more eff i c i e n t than their alternative. By the method of postulated r e g u l a r i t y one can at least hope to avoid erroneous generalizations based on accident... although one cannot a v o i d e r r o r s o f o b s e r v a t i o n that occur with either method. A t the same t i m e , the method o f postulated r e g u l a r i t y i s p o s i t i v e l y more e f f i c i e n t , because i t permits the easy generation o f hypotheses and o f f e r s a s i n g l e and parsimonious explanation of behavior. As against  "ob-  holding  intrinsically superior  latter:  "pos-  to  107  this e f f i c i e n c y , the method o f observed r e g u l a r i t y i s ad hoc. No h y p o t h e s i s can be d e r i v e d w i t h o u t a set of p r i o r observations, and every hypothesis i s another kind of explanation. This often results i n a myriad of noncontradictory hypotheses that need theory to b r i n g them together. Even i f catalogued into hypotheses, behavior appears e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y complex, when, w i t h a simplifying and coordinating theory, much o f the c o m p l e x i t y d i s a p p e a r s . On the p r a c t i c a l grounds o f e f f i c i e n c y , t h e r e f o r e , we prefer postulated regularity. Hence, the notion of r a t i o n a l i t y must p l a y an extremely important r o l e i n our theory of p o l i t i c s . 2  This passage of  the  of  efficiency, it  of form over those  seems  C e r t a i n l y he must be  It  7  is particularly interesting  requirements  practiced,  1  prudent  of content.  espousal  efficiency for  what?  c o n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y w i t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g p o l i t i c s as^  not w i t h b u i l d i n g ' e f f i c i e n t '  o f good theories.  simplicity  explicit  To R i k e r ' s c r i t e r i o n  to add the p r o v i s o :  theories  should be emphasized that s i m p l i c i t y per  ponent  in its  is unnecessary  se  for  t h e i r own  sake.  i s not an i n e l u c t a b l e  As K a p l a n makes c l e a r , b l i n d a l l e g i a n c e as w e l l  com-  to  as a n t i t h e t i c a l t o h e a l t h y e m p i r i c i s m :  Why s h o u l d t h e s i m p l e r t h e o r y b e t h e b e t t e r o n e ? . . . What i s beyond dispute i s the p h y s i c i s t F r e s n e l ' s remark that "Nature doesn't care about mathematical difficulties." Indeed, the argument can sometimes be made a g a i n s t a t h e o r y ( f o r i n s t a n c e , a t h e o r y of human m o t i v a t i o n ) t h a t the t r o u b l e w i t h i t i s t h a t i t i s too s i m p l e ; n a t u r e sometimes seems to prefer complexity. More r e a l i s t i c a l l y , both sorts of cases must be acknowledged. " I f we s t u d y the h i s t o r y o f s c i e n c e , " says P o i n c a r e , "we see happen two i n v e r s e phenomena, so to speak. Sometimes s i m p l i c i t y hides under complex appearances; sometimes i t i s the s i m p l i c i t y w h i c h i s apparent and which disguises extremely complicated realities." The progress i n s c i e n c e i s not always i n the direction of simpler theory. A l l things considered, perhaps the best methodo l o g i c a l c o u n s e l as to the norm o f s i m p l i c i t y i s  108  Whitehead's: b.  "Seek s i m p l i c i t y and d i s t r u s t  Riker's Theory of P o l i t i c a l With the  now t u r n  Coalitions.  encountered  o f the n o t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n m i n d , we  A s we m e n t i o n e d  concept  utility  development  "rational utility."  scales  counterpart  above,  one o f the major  and monetary  Quite evidently,  units  in political science.  have at various  As a result,  holds  One, put  that any d e c i s i o n i s  of  difficul-  to p o l i t i c a l  of interpretation the  isomorphism  assumed by economics has  times been proposed.  and Howard R a i f f a ,  of rules  can  i n his Theory  i n applications o f r a t i o n a l i s t i c models  decision-making i n v o l v e s the the  218  Coalitions  to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f how R i k e r employs i t  Political ties  importance  it."  no  between  obvious  two a l t e r n a t i v e fotth by  for  approaches  R. Duncan Luce  r a t i o n a l as  l o n g as  it  219  represents  the preferred  objects  this  of  to  outcome o f the p e r s o n who makes  formulation, noting that although  irrational behavior,  which is defined out  the r a t i o n a l i t y c o n d i t i o n becoming "no more  i t  it.  solves  Riker the  of existence,  i t  problem  results  than a c o n d i t i o n for the  in ex-  220  istence makes  of participants  the  development  second approach This,  however,  rationality  is  who behave  i n a social situation."  of a subjective  to accept  u t i l i t y scale  impossible.  a more l i m i t e d d e f i n i t i o n o f  also presents a problem.  which show that  subject  the  scale  s c a l e o f money?" "*" Riker's solution is  to  the  the  The  "How can  i s more  c r i t i c i s m implied by those  of i n d i v i d u a l u t i l i t y i s not  i t  rationality.  As Riker puts i t ,  c o n d i t i o n be s t a t e d i n such a way t h a t i t  tautology but not  Thus  than  the a  experiments same as  a  2 2  to define r a t i o n a l i t y i n terms of the  concept  109  of  "winning."  "Politically  r a t i o n a l man i s  the man who w o u l d r a t h e r  win  222  than lose, the  regardless  o f the  stakes."  f o l l o w i n g form, w h i c h he h o l d s  He r e s t a t e s  this  to be both d e f e n s i b l e  definition  and  in  nontautol-  ogical: . Given social situations within certain kinds of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s (of w h i c h p a r l o r games, the market, e l e c t i o n s , and warfare are notable examples) and i n w h i c h e x i s t two a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n w i t h d i f f e r i n g outcomes i n money o r power o r s u c c e s s , some p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l c h o o s e the a l t e r n a t i v e l e a d i n g to the l a r g e r payoff. Such choice is r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r and i t w i l l be a c c e p t e d as d e f i n i t i v e w h i l e the b e h a v i o r o f p a r t i c i p a n t s who do n o t so choose w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y be so a c c e p t e d . 2 2 3  There are, of  of course,  a l l , i n order  still  to a v o i d b e i n g a t a u t o l o g y ,  condition of total knowledge. open to 22  the  participants  That  and i t s  First  d e f i n i t i o n demands  i s , "Every possible  course of  rewards  to  this  a condition for  Although Riker mentions  zero-sum games, he f a i l s  w h i c h he  feels  are  on n-person,  that such a condition is necessary terms of the the  rational.  above d e f i n i t i o n .  outcome  would revert  as  the  action  them must be known to  too r e s t r i c t i v e  to e x p l i c i t l y i n c l u d e i t  model, which is based  choose  the  formulation.  them  A  ..."  tics,  problems w i t h this  the  they  as  as  a model of  a condition for his  zero-sum games.  preferred  However, i t  Otherwise a l l participants the highest  behavior  that does not  is not  conform to  clear  the  covered by the  this  essentially  theory.  rational pursuit  in  merely  and  total knowledge condition implies that  can indeed occur, but  is  would  payoff,  d e f i n i t i o n to one o f a l l d e c i s i o n s b e i n g  behavior  poli-  f o r a r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n to be made  f e l t would lead to  Secondly, the  two-person,  irrational  Thus,  of "winning,"  a l l  110 either  i n terms  o f money, power,  from c o n s i d e r a t i o n as  that  the  universe  the  of cases i t  correspondingly decreased.  sion not  to  run for another  be argued Thus,  of power,  both i n order  to  has  he w i l l choose  require the  In spite  r e v i s e d form of the way;  that  the  Lyndon Johnson's  and success  a means  deciad-  to whether  together,  x amount  and u t i l i t y scales however,  Riker's  it  among  could them. y  common t o  How t h i s  them  approach  is not  he emphasizes  avoids  explicated that  non-obvious hypotheses  which can themselves  one  the deduction  be v e r i f i e d by  by  "this  r a t i o n a l i t y c o n d i t i o n can be v e r i f i e d i n o n l y  i s by showing that a model using i t permits  con-  and  o f money and  of measurement  rational response.  of these problems,  for  u t i l i t y scales  as  can  of Riker"s formulation of the  a choice between  the problem o f equating monetary Riker.  content  assuming an isomorphic u t i l i t y s c a l e  i f a participant  amount  power,  restriction  i n 1968 would not be  the problem of equating  By lumping money,  t h a t he i s  acceptable  For example,  i n terms  excluded  to e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y , we  T h i r d l y , t h e r e i s a q u e s t i o n as  really avoids  money s c a l e s .  Viewing this  t e r m as p r e s i d e n t  m i s s i b l e as p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o r dition of rationality.  theory  a l l o w s as  model i s  definition  i s by d e f i n i t i o n  "political behavior."  a bridging sentence connecting see  or success  of  experiment,  225  observation, verification,  and p r e d i c t i o n . we s h o u l d e x a m i n e  theory  is based,  these  assumptions.  B e f o r e we t u r n the  and the non-obvious  The second major assumption dition.  other  to  the problem o f  assumptions  hypotheses  that are  of Riker's theory  " I n a p p l i c a t i o n to s o c i e t y , " he notes,  upon which  "the  is  deduced  the  the from  zero-sum  zero-sum  con-  condition  Ill  is  the  requirement  that social situations  a way t h a t o n l y the  direct  be a b s t r a c t e d  c o n f l i c t s among p a r t i c i p a n t s  for study are  in  such  included,  and  226  common a d v a n t a g e s particularly mutual  are  ignored."  He i s w e l l  common s t a t e o f a f f a i r s  aware  that  this  is not  i n p o l i t i c s , t h a t some element  a  of  gain is usually evident. For example, he observes t h a t : ...one very i n t e r e s t i n g thing about p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s i s that people consent to remain i n them, even when they are on the l o s i n g side i n particular decisions. T h i s f a c t , w h i c h has i m pressed p o l i t i c a l philosophers at least since the time of P l a t o and which i s the o b s e r v a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r the innumerable and d r e a r i l y r e p e t i t i o u s theories o f s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , cannot be expressed i n terms of a zero-sum g a m e . 2 2 7  However, he m a i n t a i n s  that " s t i l l  we do f r e q u e n t l y  perceive what  we  228  imagine to be pure  conflict situations."  includes  and w a r s .  elections  Among such s i t u a t i o n s ,  He c o n c l u d e s ,  therefore,  he  that:  ...whether or not one should use the zero-sum model depends e n t i r e l y on the way one's subject i s commonly p e r c e i v e d . In discussing bargains, w h i c h are p e r c e i v e d as mutual g a i n , o f c o u r s e , a non-zero-sum model is probably best. On the other hand, i n d i s c u s s i n g e l e c t i o n s and wars, w h i c h are p e r c e i v e d as r e q u i r i n g i n d i v i s i b l e v i c t o r y , the zero-sum model i s probably best and I s h a l l use i t here when I w i s h to t a l k about these and other essentially political decisions. 2  It  is  clear  which restrict situations the  theory.  decisions" initial  that  the  this  content  assumption also of the  theory.  that i n v o l v e mutual g a i n become Thus, other  it  is difficult  than elections  conditions.  to  2  9  contains In this  bridging  case,  a l l  sentences political  inadmissible for study  i m a g i n e many " e s s e n t i a l l y  and a l l - o u t warfare  that satisfy  under political Riker's  112  The t h i r d b a s i c element is  the n-person  element  theory o f games.  can be seen as  theory.  It  In terms  c o n t r i b u t i n g to the  provides a sort  implications  of Riker's theory of p o l i t i c a l  formulation,  internal principles of  of formal c a l c u l u s , and contains  c a t i o n i n terms  the  to  assumptions.  Together, t h e s e t h r e e a s s u m p t i o n s foundation of the  this  substantive  s u c h as d e f i n i t i o n s and scope c o n d i t i o n s t h a t s e r v e  underlie the above  from them.  o f t h e H-D  coalitions  theory.  They are  combine to  taken as  form the  "given," subject  of lower l e v e l empirical hypotheses  Riker derives (1) The s i z e games, where players are r information, occur." 30  three such  axiomatic  that are  to  verifi-  deducible  hypotheses:  principle? "In n-person, zero-sum side payments are permitted, where a t i o n a l , and where they have perfect only minimum winning c o a l i t i o n s  2  (2) The s t r a t e g i c p r i n c i p l e : " . . . i n systems or bodies i n w h i c h the s i z e p r i n c i p l e i s operative, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the f i n a l stages of c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d and do move' t o w a r d a minimum winning coalition."231 (3) The d i s e q u i l i b r i u m p r i n c i p l e : " . . . i n systems or bodies where the s i z e and s t r a t e g i c p r i n c i p l e s are operative, the systems or bodies are themselves unstable. That i s , they contain forces leading toward d e c i s i o n and hence toward the elimination of participants."232 We c a n n o w t u r n t o t h e these hypotheses. tions  (2)  and  q u e s t i o n o f how R i k e r attempts  S i n c e p r o p o s i t i o n (1)  is  to  l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to  ( 3 ) , we can focus our e x a m i n a t i o n on i t .  This  verify proposi-  examination  s h o u l d i n t u r n p r o v i d e us w i t h an i n d i c a t i o n o f some o f t h e s t r e n g t h s weaknesses  o f the  proach i n  general.  theory as  a w h o l e , as w e l l as o f the r a t i o n a l i s t i c  and ap-  113 In order "analogous  to v e r i f y the  statement  about  size principle, Riker  the  f i r s t formulates  an  real world:"  In s o c i a l situations s i m i l a r to n-person, z e r o - s u m games w i t h s i d e p a y m e n t s , p a r t i c i p a n t s c r e a t e c o a l i t i o n s j u s t as l a r g e as they b e l i e v e w i l l ensure w i n n i n g and no l a r g e r . 2  He t h e n p r o p o s e s  3  3  to v e r i f y t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n the  following  way:  I have d e v i s e d two c l a s s e s o f s i t u a t i o n s i n which c o a l i t i o n s of the whole have been formed by r e a s o n o f some a c c i d e n t a l c i r c u m s t a n c e . Then I have shown that i n every instance i n t h e s e two c l a s s e s o f e v e n t s , the s i z e o f the c o a l i t i o n o f the whole, w h i c h according to the t h e o r y , has no v a l u e , has been r e d u c e d to a s m a l l e r s i z e t h a t has some v a l u e . Thus, the v a l i d i t y o f the s i z e p r i n c i p l e has been proved f o r these two c l a s s e s and, to the degree t h a t these classes are representatively drawn from zero-sum situations, i t is strongly implied that the s i z e p r i n c i p l e holds i n a l l other classes of events l i k e l y to occur i n the s i t uations from which these classes are drawn. J  The two c l a s s e s ing majorities  we w i l l  second class here. the outcomes  invoked by Riker i n v o l v e overwhelm-  i n American p o l i t i c s and w o r l d p o l i t i c s .  mainly interested phenomena,  of situations  i n the  implications of Riker's theory  S i n c e we for  only consider h i s argument w i t h reference The overwhelming m a j o r i t i e s  of total  in this  case  international to  theory.  the  from  wars.  e m p i r i c a l s i t u a t i o n and the i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e s of  Thus, Riker  the  result  The f i r s t step o f v e r i f i c a t i o n i n v o l v e s the s p e c i f y i n g o f between  are  notes:  The development i n the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y o f the system of European nation-states and the f a i r l y recent extension of t h i s system to the whole world created a pattern of international  links the  114  p o l i t i c s v e r y much l i k e a n n - p e r s o n players are the n a t i o n s . . . .  game.  The  [Occasionally international p o l i t i c s turns into a z e r o - s u m game a s w h e n t o t a l w a r h a s o c c u r r e d . . . . I f i t does become an a n a l o g u e o f a zero-sum game, the experience of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s a l s o becomes r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e about the m o d e l . 2 3 5 If  we  that  add  the  Riker's  assumption that three  underlying  the  players  act  rationally,  assumptions  are  satisfied  then  in  i t  cases  appears of  total  war. Next, size  he  gives  an  (empirical)  interpretation  of  the  (theoretical)  principle: I f one s i d e a c t u a l l y w i n s , t h a t i s , i f one s i d e i s exhausted b e f o r e the o t h e r , then v i c t o r y , by removi n g the l o s e r s , transforms a (probably minimal) winning c o a l i t i o n i n t o a grand c o a l i t i o n . . . . A s s u m i n g , as I s h a l l , t h a t w i n n e r s i n t o t a l war r e t a i n f o r some t i m e t h e z e r o - s u m h a b i t s o f t h o u g h t e n g e n d e r e d by t h e i r very p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i t , then they w i l l r e j e c t a c o a l i t i o n of the whole and b e g i n to s q u a b b l e among t h e m s e l v e s . Presumably they w i l l seek to s u b s t i t u t e f o r i t something that approaches a minimal winning coalition. If, in fact, they a c t u a l l y do s o , t h e i r a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s . . . v e r i f i c a t i o n of the s i z e p r i n c i p l e . 2 3 6 With his  is  able  war  to  in. the  theory  perform a  thus  hooked  test.  modern s t a t e  to  the  He e x a m i n e s  system:  the  subject the  matter  "three  at  hand,  instances  Napoleonic wars  and  the  of  Riker total  f i r s t  and  237 second world w a r s . " tion  that  into  opposing factions.  "In  each  emerged v i c t o r i o u s  r i a l ambitions of tion but eventual  The  P r u s s i a and collapse of  at  instance, the  Concert  he  end of of  observes,  the  Europe  Russia, World the League of  conflict divided  the  grand  quickly over  coalidivided  the.territo-  War I r e s u l t e d i n t h e f o r m a N a t i o n s , and W o r l d War II  115-  quickly  led to  the  C o l d War, i n w h i c h the  tempted  to marshall  U . S . and  the w o r l d i n t o opposing  amination of empirical data, the Western s t a t e system,  S o v i e t U n i o n at-»-  coalitions.  which includes  Riker reaches  the  From this  a l l cases of t o t a l war  the  exin  following conclusion:  . . . t h e w i n n i n g c o a l i t i o n s o f t o t a l war do not l o n g survive victory. Both i n the model and i n a c t u a l i t y they have become v a l u e l e s s . They die because v i c tory renders them nugatory. To w i n something o f value i n the next phrase f o l l o w i n g t o t a l war, the s i z e o f the w i n n i n g c o a l i t i o n must be reduced. From the evidence of t o t a l w a r . . . , the s i z e p r i n ciple i s thus a d d i t i o n a l l y verified.238 Does in  terms  this  of  t e s t v e r i f y the  the  requirements  shown here i s not minimal, become  as  less  that the  thus,  to i s not  this  it  as we h a v e  the h y p o t h e s i s  tend  but  be no.  the  terms theory  of the  This is  seen,  this:  test,  tend Riker  notes  coalitions  an i n c o r r e c t  lended  total wars,  coalitions.  resultant  to  infer-  v e r i f i c a t i o n can never  after  be  future credence  grand  No i n f e r e n c e s  coalitions  has  definitely  they  that R i k e r ' s t e s t has  up i n t o s m a l l e r  specific sizes  up.  given  What R i k e r  to become  only that  i f  may w e l l be d i s c o n f i r m e d i n a  the hypothesis  to break  particular  Riker's  must  explication of  break  the s i z e p r i n c i p l e , but  tend  In  In his  eventually  first place,  Secondly,  i n g the  coalitions  s i z e p r i n c i p l e demands,  t o t a l wars  absolute;  tions  that post-war  than maximal.  In the  case.  of H-D theory,  The answer,  s i z e p r i n c i p l e w i l l be proven i f a l l cases o f grand  following ence.  the  size principle?  coaliconcern-  can be drawn  from  test. of  the  requirements  of H-D theory,  of p o l i t i c a l coalitions  s h o u l d be noted  that i t  is  far  then,  it  is  from adequate.  i s much more a c c e p t a b l e  than,  for  clear  that  However, instance,  116  the  arms race and d e t e r r e n c e  of R i k e r ' s theory assumptions, between  its  is its  explicitness.  axioms, and i t s  these three levels, i t  cerning the pretation,  it  this  theory,  i s why i t  On these counts,  i s e x p l i c i t about Further,  by  its  is  its  at  also e x p l i c i t about  greatly l i m i t s the  its  least  the boundaries  i s r e l a t i v e l y easy  to  inter-  is  meant  are  distinct.  Somewhat  see how those  Riker's theory  scores  con-  professed  verification procedures.  therefore,  basic  differentiating  type of e m p i r i c a l behavior i t  but  virtue  procedures  high i n  terms  requirements. On the o t h e r  fundamental tions,  the  hand,  respects,  however,  First it  corrected,  of course,  At a more fundamental to  the  the inference  unique case.  theory  contains  implications of which are  i n Hempel's terminology, the  leads  It  The major  Braithwaite's requirement  Admittedly, this  i s e x p l i c i t about  ironically,  of H-D  fulfills  noting p r e c i s e l y the  empirical scope of the Finally  It  hypotheses.  levels of hypotheses.  to be a p p l i c a b l e to.  fail.  models discussed above.  theory  not is  far  the  of a class  A s we have s e e n ,  lacking in  several  t o o many i m p l i c i t  assump-  adequately  spelled out.  "elliptical."  This is  simply by making the level,  is  theory  implicit  easily  assumptions  than  of the  theory.  only a c l a s s of sub-maximal c o a l i t i o n s can be so deduced.  As a  the c o n c e p t o f minimum w i n n i n g c o a l i t i o n comes d a n g e r o u s l y c l o s e being a tautology  (the minimum winning c o a l i t i o n i s  in fact  to be minimum).  out  It  to  it a  s i z e o f the minimum winning  c o a l i t i o n cannot be deduced from the hypotheses  turns  explicit.  is also " p a r t i a l ; " that i s ,  of empirical cases rather  the exact  Thus,  that  Instead, result, to  coalition which  follows from the p a r t i a l i t y of  the  117  theory  that i t  extra-logical ences.  i s not  evidence i n order  In this  plausibility teristics  truly deductive.  regard,  are  forced to  employ  like  those  game t h e o r y ,  gains  contexts where i t s  its  a l l o w s us  c i p l e and the  empirical  deductive  charac-  example of R i k e r ' s Theory of P o l i t i c a l  to make some g e n e r a l  ap r o a c h b a s e d  remarks  upon i t .  about  Coali-  the r a t i o n a l i t y p r i n -  The main d i f f i c u l t y  faced by  a p p r o a c h i s what we have a l r e a d y o b s e r v e d Young a l l u d i n g to w i t h ence to  l o g i c a l models i n general;  namely,  t i c a l behavior is p r o h i b i t i v e l y narrow. as " p o l i t i c a l "  i n terms  of the  rationality principle is only a  in  this  of  each of  This narrowness  section.  these theories,  empirical relevance.  tempts to account  claim a broader  for.  a chapter  the  that this  defined  small  we h a v e  discussed  deductive  elegance  we c a n s a y w i t h some a s s u r a n c e  that  whatever  they e x h i b i t have been purchased  at  the p r i c e •  This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y dismaying when a theory range  of a p p l i c a b i l i t y than i t  theory  is such a prospect  s c i e n c e o f p o l i t i c s as is  poli-  political  a whole.  i n no way j u s t i f i a b l e .  atr  can j u s t i f i a b l y  e n t i t l e d "The Prospect of a Science of P o l i t i c s . "  the  have seen,  theories  to  For example, Riker's theory of coalitions is  implication is stitute  a l l the  A l t h o u g h we cannot here e v a l u a t e  deductive characteristics of  plagues  of interest  this  refer-  their a p p l i c a b i l i t y to  Or, conversely, what i s  f r a c t i o n of the myriad phenomena w h i c h are scientists.  infer-  weakest.  In c o n c l u s i o n , the tions  is  to j u s t i f y h i s supposedly deductive  his theory,  and value i n j u s t  Thus, Riker  introduced Thus,  and that i t  can  in  the . con-  Such an i m p l i c a t i o n , as  we  118  B.  Deductive Explanation As a result of this  discussion of deductive theories  t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , we a r e now i n a p o s i t i o n to see why t h e r e deductive explanations put actually fairly theories  simple.  forth i n the  We saw a b o v e  discipline.  that,  substantiating  them from below.  its  sources.  necessary  avoid the  and take  this  is unquestionably high. can take  If  the  explain  the  regarded  from these  as  being  two  f o r a law to adequately  that i t be true.  to mean t h a t  are  view,  The way theories  substantiation  fundamental problem concerning the  section II,  no  them from above and e m p i r i c a l l y  more h i g h l y confirmed the greater  p l a i n a s i n g l e phenomenon i s  The reasons  Accordingly, a law i s  One o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s  interna-  have been  on the d e d u c t i v e  e x p l a i n laws and laws e x p l a i n facts.  laws i s by t h e o r e t i c a l l y substantiating  in  F o r the moment, truth  law's  let  exus  of laws discussed  level of  i n  confirmation  law is very highly confirmed, then,  a syllogism for which i t  acts  as  a premise  to be a v i a b l e  we de-  ductive nomological explanation. From our examination o f deductive  theories  available in  t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , we c a n c o n c l u d e t h a t no h i g h l y c o n f i r m e d l a w s been generated. often not inferred  This i s p r i m a r i l y because  strictly deductive; laws i n the  are deductive,  i n which case  required fashion.  s u c h as  the  arms  or,  theories,  empirically false.  from them are  also false  it  In the  theories  i s impossible to cases  i n the  and hence  stricter Thus, the  have  themselves  where the  r a c e m o d e l s , we have seen  p r e d i c t i v e l y weak, they are  to put i t  the  interna-  that  are  test theories they  are  terminology of H-D laws that are  u n f i t as p r e m i s e s  deduced  for D-N explanations.  Therefore,  the  reasons  why  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l phenomena a r e :  in  international  strictly  true,  politics  or  and  (1)  (2)  even h i g h l y  of  the  the  put  forth  e x p l i c i t l y stated  to  them a l l ,  repeat  already to  separate  them a p p e a r s  argument  of  this  section w i l l  merely  and i m p o r t a n t (1) phy  of  tions  Most  By  able  to  as  result,  a  evaluate  weaknesses  it  to  its  as  simplified  the  difficulties  laws  available  available  its to  answer Since  paper,  i t  are  not  to  ones,  their  most,  these  seems  intricate  i f  not  unnecessary  I  We  have  think,  arguments  and  that  en-  Accordingly,  the  this  the  final  more  general  i t .  for  this  study  has  examining the  p o l i t i c a l science of  deductive  shown  that  underlying and  philoso-  assump-  international  f o r m a l i s m , we h a v e  been  a p p l i c a t i o n to p o l i t i c a l phenomena,  very a  its  fundamental  different specific  combatted inherent  a l l ,  conclusions  here.  limit,  recapitulation of  examine  to  to  own c o n c l u s i o n a n d  from  roots  application  d i s t i n c t i o n has  its  believe  to  from the  analytical  D-N- e x p l a n a t i o n s  few  counterproductive.  tool  to  have been able  sociated with  I  the  prior  separately  the  from the  follow  approaches  getting  are  more s p e c i f i c  a brief  a valuable  different  politics.  stands  importantly, is  the  me t o b e  that  very  introduction.  throughout  attempt  points  science of  thesis  are  attempted  complex arguments  to  adequate  those which  the  conclusions  gendered  there  have  especially  s u m m a r i z e d many  further  I  in  have been  no  C O N C L U S I O N  preceding pages,  questions  are  confirmed.  V .  In  there  types  subject  of  strengths problems  matter.  conceptual  c o n f u s i o n and  in  which  a study  and as-  This  proceeds  greatly  and,  120 simultaneously on several levels of A subsidiary aspect framework appears  of this point is  to employ t h i s  approaches (2)  I hope  this  the needs  a n a l y s i s has  and that  this  the unfortunate, tists  thesis  of political succeeded,  correct exist.  stands  as  To the  philosophy of science texts. that.  . , On the o t h e r plying  the very minimum, i n  extent  that  that i t  On the is  scihave  discouraging  among p o l i t i c a l  scien-  o f one or two w e l l - r e g a r d e d I have shown, i s  more  .  hand,  I hope  contrary,  methodological innovation.  (3)  many  to complex m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  The w o r l d , I hope  this  study w i l l  I h a v e t r i e d to make i t  the e m p i r i c a l content  that i t  to  these myths  not be i n t e r p e r t e d  that philosophy of science can solve a l l our problems  science.  degree  at  tendency  or e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l problems w i t h i n the pages  than  science.  a contribution toward  and a l l too p r e v a l e n t ,  in-  different  d e f i n i t i o n of science or the  to l o o k f o r q u i c k and s i m p l e s o l u t i o n s  complicated  approaches  i t would be  a problematic notion susceptible  the  e n t i f i c method s i m p l y do n o t been exposed,  form-content-context  framework i n an e x p l i c i t comparison o f  that science is  interpretations,  the  I n a more ambitious p r o j e c t ,  i n r e l a t i o n to  making clear  that  to be h e l p f u l i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g the various  to p h i l o s o p h y o f s c i e n c e . teresting  analysis.  T u r n i n g to somewhat  political  clear from the  beginning  of the p o l i t i c a l w o r l d w h i c h must  dictate  process. less  siderable evidence i n section II  general  that the  im-  in  P h i l o s o p h y o f science i s o n l y o f value to  illuminates this  ductive formalism is beset  as  i s s u e s , we have noted  c o n c e p t i o n o f s c i e n c e as  conde-  by many more d i f f i c u l t i e s than one w o u l d be  the  121  led  to b e l i e v e by examining the  tical  science.  tion that  the  to serious no need  deductive  This conclusion lends deductive models are  objections  to rehash  the  theories  and D-N explanations, out  i n any of the  writing  this  others,  and f e e l i t would p r o f i t  As a result,  The most  a product results  by i t s  of  from a property  to  is  note  views of laws i n H-D criticisms, is  not  consulted  as more tenuous  than  careful analysis  at  in the some  This is  that  against  form-  it.  the models  are  is Rather,  accepted  the deductive models  actually formulate  are  or implement  been emphasized  time  their and  unconcerned w i t h methodological  As a result,  for i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s must be  unpalatable  use o f deductive  approach and w e l l  As has  considerations.  been ignored,  (5)  the  accounts.  again by Hempel and others,  schemata  the  of international politics, I think,  how s c i e n t i s t s  and explanatory  or procedural  against  i n t r i n s i c to  philosophical adherents.  theoretical  of  I would like  the many c r i t i c i s m s t h a t c a n be p u t  not meant to r e f l e c t  has  from further  t e l l i n g argument  a l i s m as a model f o r a science  it  it  subject  Although there  of deductivisn I have  I regard  asser-  time. (4)  not  here,  contradictory  critiques  poli-  to G u n n e l l ' s f i r s t  unlike a l l the other  brought  i n social or  indeed "controversial" and  specific objections  c r i t i c i s m concerning the  future  credence  within philosophy of science.  that the  paper.  literature  t h e i r u s e as nugatory.  as by H o l t and R i c h a r d s o n , i t has  prescriptive When t h i s  l e d to  fact  particularly  conclusions. The d i s c u s s i o n i n s e c t i o n I I I  Gunnell's second assertion  seems to a t t e s t  that p o l i t i c a l  scientists  to  the  do n o t  accuracy fully  122  understand  the  deductive models  In l i g h t of the  study  as  and t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s .  a w h o l e , we can c o n c l u d e from t h i s  w o u l d p r o b a b l y n o t be o f much v a l u e to accurate  view o f the models  ence.  A more p r o f i t a b l e  search  for viable alternative  closely  the  (6) that  the  t i c s has result, rather  their  ive approach discussed that  is  have been  formal value.  i n many ways  response  combine l o g i c a l  we have.examined versely related.  of  of science  the  out by the analysis theories  to  defended  complementary  in section IV  to  as p o s s i b l e  of their  failing  study  this  to expend more energy  as  r i g o r and e m p i r i c a l breadth. Hanson claim that research  i n light of whatever  poliAs  a  deduct-  its philosophical failings  the  in political  is  heuristic  of the  Once again, is not  the  more  of international  i n terms  a whole has i n  All.the the  shown attempt-  evidence  two a r e  in-  we s h o u l d s t r i v e n o t  achieve b o t h maximum r i g o r and maximum b r e a d t h , skillfully  sci-  discipline.  This pragmatic  seems to support Thus,  more  that reflect  p r i m a r i l y from a lack of empirical relevance.  in section II.  the best  ing to  conceptions  to implement deductive  these theories than  on applying a  course would probably involve intensifying  The main p o i n t brought  suffered  i t  to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s o r p o l i t i c a l  epistemological concerns  attempt  concentrate  that  but  to balance  problem is under  them  to as  consideration.  123 VI. "New Y o r k ,  Alfred A.  Knopf,  FOOTNOTES 1953.  2 In i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , t h i s i s the second controversy to be dubbed a ' G r e a t D e b a t e . The f i r s t , w h i c h r e a c h e d a peak i n the l a t e 1940s, i n v o l v e d the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s o f r e a l i s m and i d e a l i s m as c r i t e r i a f o r g u i d i n g and e v a l u a t i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c y . See e s p e c i a l l y H a n s . J . M o r g e n thau, "Another 'Great Debate': The N a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t o f the U n i t e d States," A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e :review, v o l . 5 7 , n o . 4 (December 1 9 5 2 ) , p p . 961-88. The d e g r e e t o w h i c h t h i s e a r l i e r d e b a t e was c o n c e r n e d w i t h a c t u a l p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n c a n be c o n t r a s t e d t o t h e much l e s s " p o l i c y r e l e v a n t " * natuije o f p r e s e n t one throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e , i s now o n c e a g a i n b e c o m i n g p r o m i n e n t , h o w e v e r , and t h e i m a g i n a t i v e o b s e r v e r can n o t e t h e w e d d i n g o f t h e two d e b a t e s i n s u c h v o l u m e s as Raymond T a n t e r and R i c h a r d U l l m a n , E d s . , T h e o r y and P o l i c y In I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , P r i n c e t o n , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972. 1  3  See, e . g . , E a s t o n , o p . c i t . ; David Truman, "The Impact on P o l i t i c a l Science of the Revolution i n the Behavioral S c i e n c e s , " i n Research F r o n t i e r s i n P o l i t i c s and Government, Eds. S B a i l e y et a l . , Washington, The Brookings I n s t i t u t e , 1955; Herbert S t o r i n g , E d . , Essays on the S c i e n t i f i c S t u d y o f P o l i t i c s . New Y o r k , H o l t , R i n e h a r t , a n d W i n s t o n , 1 9 6 2 . With s p e c i a l r e f e r e n c e t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , see K l a u s K n o r r and James Roserau, Eds., Contending Approaches to International. P o l i t i c s , P r i n c e t o n , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969, e s p e c i a l l y a r t i c l e s by Hedley B u l l , "International Theory: The Case f o r t h e C l a s s i c a l A p p r o a c h , " and M o r t o n A . K a p l a n , " T h e New G r e a t D e b a t e : Tradition vs. Science i n International Relations." S e e , e . g . , D a v i d E a s t o n , " T h e New R e v o l u t i o n i n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , " A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, v o l . 6 3 , n o . 4 (December 1 9 6 9 ) , p p . 1 0 5 1 6 1 ; C h a r l e s A . McCoy and J o h n P l a y f o r d , E d s . , A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s : A C r i t i q u e o f B e h a v i o r a l i s m , New Y o r k , T h o m a s Y . C r o w e l l C o . , 1 9 6 7 ; S h e l d o n W o l i n , " P o l i t i c a l Theory as a V o c a t i o n , " American P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, v o l . 6 3 , n o . 4 (December 1 9 6 9 ) , p p . 1062-82. A 'post-behavioral' literature aimed d i r e c t l y at i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s has not appeared as y e t . See, howe v e r M a r s h a l l W i n d m i l . l e r , " T h e New A m e r i c a n M a n d a r i n ? * . , " T h e D i s s e n t i n g Academy, Ed. T h e o d o r e R o s z a k , New Y o r k , R a n d o m H o u s s , 1 9 6 7 , f o r p o s s i b l e directions of attack.  Thi3 l i t e r a t u r e i s a m a j o r s o u r c e f o r s o m e o f t h e i d e a s t o be d e v e l o p e d i n Shis t h e s i s . S e e , e s p e c i a l l y , M.W. J a c k s o n , " T h e A p p l i c a t i o n o f M e t h o d i n the C o n s t r u c t i o n o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e T n e o r y , " C a n a d i a n J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 5, n o . 3 (September 1 9 7 2 ) , p p . 4 0 2 - 1 7 ; P a u l F. K r e s s , "On Method i n S c i e n c e : A Reply to J a c k s o n , " and Jackson's r e j o i n d e r , "Words and the W o r l d : K r e s s a n d Some Dogmas o f P r a g m a t i s m , " C a n a d i a n J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 7, n o . 1 ( M a r c h 1 9 7 2 ) , p p . 1 4 3 - 5 4 ; J o h n G u n n e l l , "Deductio-a, E x p l a n a t i o n , and S o c i a l S c i e n t i f i c I n q u i r y , " American 5  124  Political  Science  responses  by  ibid., tical ber  pp.  berg,  S.  1247-62;  Inquiry,"  1972),  Review,  Arthur  pp.  Richard  vol.  63,  Goldberg,  E u g e n e F.  no.  A.  Miller,  American P o l i t i c a l 796-817;  Rudner,  responses  Martin  4  (December  James  Landau,  1969),  David  Review,  1233-46; rejoinder,  Historicism,  and  vol.  3  Braybrooke  and M i l l e r ' s  pp.  and G u n n e l l ' s  "Positivism,  Science by  Gregor,  66, no.  Poli(Septem-  aud A l e x a n d e r  rejoinder,  Rosen-  ibid.,  pp.  818-73. ^ R a d i c a l , o r , to use another neologism, m e t a - p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s has c e r t a i n l y n o t b e e n met w i t h i n d i f f e r e n c e b y t h e v a r i o u s c o m b a t a n t s . The r e a d e r h a s m e r e l y t o n o t e t h e v i t u p e r a t i v e e d g e e v i d e n t i n t h e a b o v e two symposia i n order to get a f e e l i n g f o r the r e a c t i o n . Such a response u s u a l l y means t h a t a t l e a s t some s e n s i t i v e n e r v e s h a v e b e e n t o u c h e d . To n o t e some e x a m p l e s o f r a d i c a l a n a l y s i s : four books which I f e e l have been i m p o r t a n t , i f n o t c o m p l e t e l y s u c c e s s f u l i l l u s t r a t i o n s a r e F l o y d W. M a t s o n , T h e B r o k e n I m a g e , New Y o r k , G e o r g e B r a z i l l e r , 1 9 6 4 ; A . R . L o u c h , E x p l a n a t i o n a n d Human A c t i o n , B e r k e l e y a n d L o s A n g e l e s , U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1 9 6 6 ; H e n r y K a r i e l , Open S y s t e m s , I t a s c a , 1 1 1 . , P s a c o c k , 1 9 6 9 ; and T h o m a s L . T h o r s o n , B i o p o l i t i c s , New Y o r k , H o l t , R i n e h a r t a n d W i n s t o n , 1 9 7 0 . ^M.W.  Jackson,  "Towards  the  43rd Annual Meeting  St.  Johns,  1971, p.  Studies  Philosophical sity  of 9  "The  in  the  Perspectives  Minnesota Press, Ibid.,  pp.  the  Science Canadian  History  of  Politics,"  Political  paper  Science  and Philosophy  Philosophy on Science,  1970, p.  presented  to  Association,  of  Science:  Ed.  R.  of  Science:  Vol.  Stuewer,  5,  A  Taxonomy,"  Historical  Minneapolis,  and  Univer-  31.  15-16.  "^Thie f o l l o w i n g  three  ^ I b i d . ,  emphasis  p.  a  75.  Ernan McMullin, in Minnesota  of  60,  paragraphs in  lean  heavily  on i b i d . ,  pp.  23-29.  original.  12 An examination of the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s to which t h i s a p p r o a c h i s s u s c e p t i b l e w o u l d make a n I n t e r e s t i n g t h e s i s i n i t s e l f . Unf o r t u n a t e l y , s u c h an a n a l y s i s i s o u t s i d e the scope o f t h i s e s s a y . This may l e a d t h e r e a d e r t o t h e e r r o n e o u s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e h i s t o r i c a l a p proach i s the " h e r o " o f t h i s a n a l y s i s , w h i l e the l o g i c a l approach i s the " v i l l a i n . " Although the.latter part is probably a f a i r interpretation, the f o r m e r i s more q u e s t i o n a b l e . A few b r i e f p o i n t s c a n b e made h e r e : , . Whereas the " t r a g i c . f l a w " of l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s i s a p r i o r i s m , t h a t o f historical analysis is relativism. The f i r s t g i v e s us r u l e s o f c o n d u c t , b u t why, s h o u l d we b e l i e v e t h e m ? . T h e s e c o n d i s e x t r e m e l y v a l u a b l e f o r ' falsifying l o g i c a l p r e s c r i p t i o n s , by showing t h e i r i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y to s c i e n c e a s i t i s p r a c t i c e d , b u t how c a n i t v e r i f y i t s own.prescriptions about " s u c c e s s f u l " s c i e n t i f i c p r a c t i c e ? How c a n d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l episodes be compared w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g to t r a n s - h i s t o r i c a l , a p r i o r i , .  125  p r i n c i p l e s of s u c c e s s and f a i l u r e . The answers a r e n o t s i m p l e . Thus, i n t h i s t h e s i s the " w h i t e h a t " w i l l be a s s i g n e d to h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s only i n i t s c r i t i c a l r o l e , not i n i t s p r e s c r i p t i v e r o l e . For a good summary o f t h e s e i s s u e s , see M i l l e r , o p . c i t . , e s p . p p . 806-17; and M a r t i n Landau, "Comment: On O b j e c t i v i t y , " A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e R e v i e w , v o l . 66, no. 3 (September 1972), pp. 846-56, esp. pp. 848-49. F o r a s o l u t i o n , s e e S t e p h e n T o u l m i n , Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , P r i n c e t o n , Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1972. 13 J o h n G. G u n n e l l , Problem of Explanation," p. 1 6 3 .  " S o c i a l Science and P o l i t i c a l Social Research, v o l . 35, no.  Reality: 1 (Spring  The 1968),  14  Miller,  op.  ^Abraham Publishing Co.,  c i t . ,  pp.  861-62.  K a p l a n , The Conduct 1964, p. 4.  of  Inquiry,  San  Francisco,  Chandler  ^ S t e p h e n Toulmin has most thoroughly and e x p l i c i t l y d e a l t with t h e s e two s p e c i f i c p r o b l e m s , e s p e c i a l l y i n Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g . They are of course, highly i n t e r r e l a t e d . On " r e a s o n s , " s e e p p . 2 2 2 - 4 2 ; on " c a u s e s , " pp. 242-60; and on the r e l a t i v e r o l e s o f i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s , p p . 200-22. These s u b j e c t s are a l s o c o n s i d e r e d , i f l e s s t h o r o u g h l y by o t h e r philosophers of science of various persuasions. See e s p e c i a l l y Thomas K u h n , The S t r u c t u r e o f S c i e n t i f i c R e v o l u t i o n s , 2nd e d . , e n l a r g e d , C h i c a g o , U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1970, Chs. V-IX; C a r l G. H e m p e l , A s p e c t s o f S c i e n t i f i c E x p l a n a t i o n , New Y o r k , T h e F r e e P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 , p p . 4 2 5 - 3 2 , 4 6 3 - 8 6 ; P a u l Feyerabend, " C o n s o l a t i o n s f o r the S p e c i a l i s t , " i n C r i t i c i s m and the Growth o f Knowledge, Eds. Imre Lakatos and A l a n Musgrave, Cambridge, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970. 17„ Toulmin,  op.  7  cit.,  p.  130.  18 Miller, 1  9  op.  c i t . ,  p.  862.  Ibid.  20 p.  Gunnell,  "Deduction,  Gunnell,  "Social  Explanation,  and  Social  Scientific  1233. 21 Science and P o l i t i c a l  22 Kaplan,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  3.  23 Ibid., 2  4  Ibid.,  p. pp.  8. 8-9.  25 Ibid.,  p.  10,  emphasis  in  original.  Reality,"  p.  167.  Inquiry,"  126  26 27  Ibid.,  p.  11.  A l t h o u g h e s s e n t i a l l y c r i t i c a l , t h i s study w i l l h o p e f u l l y be at least implicitly constructive. When we p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e deductive f o r m a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f s c i e n c e f a i l s t o come t o g r i p s w i t h certain c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , we w i l l i n e f f e c t be s t a t i n g a requirement t h a t an adequate c o n c e p t i o n o f s c i e n c e w i l l have to f u l f i l l . Thus, behind every c r i t i c i s m i s an i m p l i c i t recommendation. The p o s i t i v e statement of these recommendations must a w a i t a f u t u r e s t u d y , however. 28 At the r i s k of p r e s s i n g what might already appear an obvious p o i n t , I w o u l d l i k e t o e m p h a s i z e t h e p e r i p h e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e s e two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s to the p r a c t i c e of s c i e n c e . Kaplan, In d i s c u s s i n g a s i m i l a r  i s s u e , notes an analogy to b a s e b a l l . The g o a l o f b a s e b a l l i s w i n n i n g , * and t h e g o a l i s p u r s u e d by s c o r i n g r u n s when y o u a r e b a t t i n g and p r e v e n t i n g them when y o u a r e i n the f i e l d . To s a y t h i s i s t o s a y n o t h i n g a b o u t the d i f f e r e n t ways o f p i t c h i n g , h i t t i n g , or r u n n i n g b a s e s ; ways o f fielding; m a n a g e r i a l s t r a t e g i e s f o r p i n c h r u n n e r s and h i t t e r s ; ways o f s i g n a l l i n g , c o a c h i n g , o r m a i n t a i n i n g team s p i r i t . It merely d e l i m i t s the boundaries w i t h i n w h i c h t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s and s t r a t e g i e s go o n . Thus, c a l l i n g exp l a n a t i o n t h e " e s s e n c e " o f s c i e n c e i s as empty as c a l l i n g w i n n i n g the "essence" of baseball. K a p l a n , o p . c i t . , p. 27. 29 On e x p l a n a t i o n as a g o a l o f s c i e n c e , s e e , e . g . , E r n e s t N a g e l , "The Nature and Aim of S c i e n c e , " i n P h i l o s o p h y o f S c i e n c e Today, Ed. Sidney M o r g e n b e s s e r , New Y o r k , B a s i c B o o k s , I n c . , 1967, p. 5; Eugene Meehan, The T h e o r y and M e t h o d o f P o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s , Homewood, 1 1 1 . , D o r s e y P r e s s . B 6 5 , p. 8 8 ; T o u l m i n , o p . c i t . , p. 364; Hempel, A s p e c t s o f S c i e n t i f i c E x p l a n a t i o n , pp. 333-34. 30 See,  e.g.,  Nagel,  op.  c i t . ,  pp.  3-4;  Hempel,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  333.  31 These c a t e g o r i e s bear a f a m i l y resemblance to the f a m i l i a r three dimensions of signs or l o g i c a l space; syntax or s i g n d e s i g n , semantics o r meaning, and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a t u s o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The s i m i l a r i t y i s more t h a n a c o i n c i d e n c e , b u t l e s s t h a n an i s o m o r p h i s m . One p a r t o f the form o f an e x p l a n a t i o n i s the a n a l y t i c o r s y n t h e t i c form o f each o f i t s statements. L i k e w i s e , one p a r t o f the c o n t e n t i s the c o n t i n g e n t or n o n - c o n t i n g e n t s t a t u s o f t h e t r u t h of i t s s t a t e m e n t s ; and one p a r t o f the c o n t e x t c o n c e r n s w h e t h e r t h e s t a t e m e n t s a r e j u s t i f i e d a p r i o r i o r a_ posteriori. B u t e a c h c a t e g o r y i n v o l v e s many o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a s w e l l , as w i l l become c l e a r as the a n a l y s i s d e v e l o p s . On " s i g n s , " s e e C.W. M o r r i s , S i g n s , L a n g u a g e a n d B e h a v i o r , New Y o r k , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , 1946; on l o g i c a l space, see N.R.Hanson, O b s e r v a t i o n and E x p l a n a t i o n : A Guide t o P h i l o s o p h y o f S c i e n c e , New Y o r k , H a r p e r a n d R o w , 1 9 7 1 , p p . 4 9 - 5 2 . 32  e.g.,  cisco, 29;  On the  Willard  Freeman,  Kaplan,  bridge,  role  C.  op.  of  theory  Humphreys,  Copper,and c i t . ,  p.  i n making  Anomalies  Co.,  1968, p.  302; N.R.  Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y  Press,  explanations  and  Scientific  comprehensible,  106; Meehan,  Hanson,  Patterns  1961, pp.  70-71.  Theories,  of  op.  c i t . ,  San  pp.  Discovery,  see,  Fran-  128-  Cam-  127 33 Hans Relchenbach, Experience and Prediction, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938, p. 6. 34 Reichenbach, The Rise of S c i e n t i f i c Philosophy, Los Angeles and Berkeley, University of C a l i f o r n i a Piess, 1966, p. 231.  35  Hanson, Patterns of Discovery. See also Hanson, "Logical Positivism and the Interpretation of S c i e n t i f i c Theories," i n The Legacy of L o g i c a l Posit!vlsm, Ed. Peter Achinstein and Stephen F. Barker, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, pp. 57-84. ^Kaplan, op. c i t . , p. 7. 37 See, e.g., the discussion i n Richard Rudner, Philosophy of S o c i a l Science, Englewood C l i f f s , N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, pp. 7-8.. ^Hempel, Aspects of S c i e n t i f i c Explanation, p. 384. A second l o g i c a l operation, c a l l e d modus toHens, also achieves the deductive l i n k . In this case, we are given the Information ' i f D then P' and 'not D'. From this we can l o g i c a l l y deduce 'not P'. Thus, whereas modus ponens reasons from a p o s i t i v e conclusion, modus tollens reasons from a negative one. For a comprehensive source on deductive argumentation, see Irving M. Copi, Symbolic Logic, 2nd ed., New York, Macmillan Co., 1965. 39 May Brodbeck, "Explanation, Prediction, and 'Imperfect' Knowledge," i n Minnesota Studies i n the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 3, S c i e n t i f i c Explanation, Space and Time, Eds. Herbert F e l g l and Grover Maxwell, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1962, p. 239, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . See also, e.g., Hempel, "Inductive Inconsistencies," i n Aspects of S c i e n t i f i c Explanation, pp. 60-61. 40 Hempel, Aspects of S c i e n t i f i c Explanation, p. 412. 41 Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, New York, Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961, p. 11. M l c h a e l Scriven, "Logical Positivism and the Behavioral Sciences," i n Achinstein and Barker, Eds., op. c i t . , p. 197, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . 42  43 Several excellent introductions to the l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t movement are a v a i l a b l e . See, e.g., Achinstein and Barker, Eds., op. c i t . , especially the a r t i c l e by Herbert F e i g l , "The Origin and S p i r i t of L o g i c a l Positivism;" A.J. Ayer, Ed., L o g i c a l Positivism, Glencoe, 111., The Free Press, 1959, e s p e c i a l l y Ayer's "Introduction;" J.O. Ormson, Philosophical Analysis, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956; Paul A. Schilpp, Ed., The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, La S a l l e , 111., Open Court, 1963; V i c t o r Kraft, The Vienna C i r c l e , trans. Arthur Pap, New York, Philosophical Library, 1953; and Joergen Joergensen, The Development of L o g i c a l Empiricism, Chicago, Univers i t y of Chicago Press, 1951.  128 44  Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "The Logic of Explanation," Philosophy of Science, vol. 15 (1948), pp. 135-75; reprinted in Aspects of Scientific Explanation as "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," pp. 245-90. 45 The main revision has been the addition of a logically distinct class of complete scientific explanations — inductive and deductive statistical explanations — in the early 1960s. This addition is meant to f i l l the obvious gap in the model concerning statistical explanation, which is used quite extensively in a l l the sciences, physical as well as social. It constitutes in one respect a concession on Hempel's part in that i t retracts his earlier position that a l l explanation in science must be deductive. On the other hand, the new statistical model is intimately tied to the original model in that, although not deductive, i t is s t i l l explanation under subsumption of covering laws. The difference is that these laws are of the form "the probability that A is B, is p," rather than the nomological form "all A's are B's." This difference has important implications, but, unfortunately, I will be able to say l i t t l e about them in this thesis. Some aspects of the critique of D-N explanation will also apply to statistical explanation, such as those dealing with the adequacy of covering laws in guaranteeing complete explanations. But many others will be inapplicable and i t appears that a satisfactory account of statistical explanation would, quite simply, require another paper. For Hempel's treatment of statistical explanation, see "Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Sciencet Vol. 3, pp. 98-169; and Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 376-412. 46 It might be worthwhile to note here that D-N explanation is not synonymous with causal explanation, as many proponents of a deductive approach to social science seem to believe. Hempel points out that: Causal explanation in its various degrees of explicitness and precision is not...the only mode of explanation on which the D-N model has a bearing. For example, the explanation of a general law by deductive subsumption under theoretical principles is clearly not an explanation by causes. But even when used to account for individual events, D-N explanations are not always causal. Aspects of Scientific Explanation, p. 352. 47  Ibid., p. 247; also p. 337. 48  I b i d . , p. 248; also pp. 424-25.  49  I b i d . , pp. 264-69.  "^Brodbeck, op. c i t . , pp. 245-46, emphasis in original.  129  whether more of  exciting,  or  not  issue.  quantum p h y s i c s  in  they  are  See,  e.g.,  The  impossible  Broken  Matson's Image,  to  come b y  is  another,  discussion of  pp.  the  perhaps  implications  129-155.  52 Brodbeck,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  247.  53 Hempel, Philosophy of Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, p. 54  Natural 56.  Science,  Englewood  Cliffs,  N.J.,  I b i d . , emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . Hempel c r e d i t s the f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h i s d i f f e r e n c e t o N e l s o n Goodman, F a c t , F i c t i o n , and F o r e c a s t , 2nd e d . , I n d i a n a p o l i s , B o b b s - M e r r i l l C o . , 1 9 6 5 , c h . 1, "The P r o b l e m o f C o u n t e r factual Conditionals." Ibld.  5  5  5  ^Ibid.,  5  ^See,  emphasis  e.g.,  in  Nagel,  original. op.  c i t . ,  pp.  49-52.  58 The a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n h a s r e c e n t l y come u n d e r s t r o n g attack i n the philosophy of s c i e n c e . This a t t a c k focusses on the boundary l i n e between the two, w h i c h has proven to be l e s s d e f i n i t e than f i r s t thought. H o w e v e r , t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s need n o t c o n c e r n us h e r e , since we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h t h e d i s t i n c t i o n o n l y i n i t s b r o a d e s t s e n s e . The ambitious reader i s r e f e r r e d to W.V.O. Q u i n e , From a L o g i c a l P o i n t o f View, Cambridge, M a s s . , H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 3 , 2nd e d . , 1 9 6 1 , pp. 20-37. 59 Observation  .Philosophy 55-61;  the  and Hempel,  6 0  nesota  of  Michael Studies  and E x p l a n a t i o n ,  Social  Aspects  Scriven, in  Sciences,  the  of  p.  Scientific  "Explanations,  Philosophy  of  58.  London,  See  also  Alan  M a c M I l l a n and  Explanation,  Predictions,  Science,  Vol.  3,  pp.  Ryan,  Co.,  315-47.  and L a w s , " p.  The  1970, in  pp.  Min-  212.  ^ O n e i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n we h a v e n o t c o n s i d e r e d i s t h e difference between e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s and a c c i d e n t a l u n i v e r s a l s . If indeed t h e r e i s such a d i s t i n c t i o n , I t h i n k i t can be d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s : an e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n must be e q u i v a l e n t to a f i n i t e c o n j u n c t i o n o f s i n g l e o b s e r v a t i o n s , whereas an a c c i d e n t a l u n i v e r s a l can be i n f i n i t e i n scope. To r e t u r n t o t h e r o c k s , we c a n t h u s s a y t h a t ' a l l r o c k s i n t h i s b o x c o n t a i n i r o n ' i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f the number o f r o c k s i n t h e b o x and of any p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l r o c k . It i s an a c c i d e n t a l u n i v e r s a l . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , i f we s a y ' a l l 4 3 r o c k s i n t h e b o x c o n t a i n i r o n ' , our g e n e r a l i z a t i o n i s based on the c o n j u n c t i o n o f a f i n i t e number o f indiv i d u a l o b s e r v a t i o n s and i s an e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . It appears that a c c i d e n t a l u n i v e r s a l s a r e more e a s i l y c o n f u s e d w i t h laws than a r e e m p i r i c a l generalizations. But i t a l s o appears t h a t s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s a r e more l i k e l y to attempt d e d u c t i o n s from e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s than from a c c i d e n t a l universals.  130  62  Paul  E.  Meehl,  i n Minnesota Studies  Theories  in  and Methods  Stephen  Winokur,  emphasis  in  "Nuisance the  of  Variables  Philosophy  Physics  Minneapolis,  original.  of  and  the  Science:  and P s y c h o l o g y ,  University  of  Ex Post  Eds.  Vol,  4,  Facto  Michael  Minnesota Press,  Design,"  Analysis Radner  1970, p.  of  and  390,  63 Ibid., Michael  6 4  tions,"  in  Free Press,  pp.  390-91,  Scriven,  Theories  of  1959, p.  . ^Aspects 6  6  Ibid.  6  7  Ibid.  of  emphasis  "Truisms  History,'  458,  as  Ed.  emphasis  Scientific  in  original.  the  Grounds  Patrick in  for  Historical  Gardiner,  New Y o r k ,  ExplanaThe  original.  Explanation,  p.  248.  1964, emphasis  in  original.  68 Ibid., 6  9  Willard  fn.  added  in  Humphreys,  ^^Brodbeck,  op.  c i t . ,  op. p.  c i t . ,  pp.  69-70,  143, emphasis  in  emphasis  in  original.  original.  B r o d b e c k , " E x p l a n a t i o n , P r e d i c t i o n s , and L a w s , " p. 312. See a l s o S c r i v e n , "The Key P r o p e r t y o f P h y s i c a l Laws — I n a c c u r a c y , " i n C u r r e n t Issues i n the P h i l o s o p h y o f S c i e n c e , Eds. Herbert F e i g l and Grover Maxw e l l , New Y o r k , H o l t , R i n e h a r t , a n d W i n s t o n , 1 9 6 1 . 72 7 1  Aspects  of  Scientific  Explanation,  p.  249.  can b r i e f l y mention here three k i n d s of ' i n c o m p l e t e ' e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d h o w t h e y f a l l s h o r t o f t h e D-N i d e a l . ( 1 ) E l l i p t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n i s incomplete only i n the sense that the covering laws Involved are not s p e c i f i e d e x p l i c i t l y , u s u a l l y because of t h e i r obviousness. It i s e a s i l y made c o m p l e t e b y p e r f o r m i n g t h e r e q u i r e d s p e c i f i c a t i o n . (2) P a r t i a l explanation involves premises that l o g i c a l l y lead to a c l a s s of c o n c l u s i o n s r a t h e r t h a t the unique c o n c l u s i o n the e x p l a n a t i o n i s meant to e x p l a i n . It d i f f e r s from a s t a t i s t i c a l explanation i n that the l a t t e r a l s o l e a d s to a c l a s s of phenomena, b u t i s n o t meant to be any more s p e c i f i c . Note, incidently, that a s t a t i s t i c a l explanation, a l though not d e d u c t i v e , i s c o n s i d e r e d by Hempel to be complete by i t s own s t a n d a r d s . (3) A n e x p l a n a t i o n s k e t c h i s t h e l e a s t c o m p l e t e t y p e of explanation. I t i s l e s s s p e c i f i c and e x p l i c i t than a p a r t i a l e x p l a n a t i o n , and o f t e n c o n t a i n s vague hypotheses and p r o b l e m a t i c e m p i r i c a l references. For more d e t a i l s see Hempel, i b i d . , p p . 415-24. 7  4  Ibid.,  p.  249.  131  See,  e.g.,  Prediction," Toulmin,  Press,  N.R.  Foresight  1961, ch.  planation,"  Hanson,  "On  the  The P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e v i e w ,  and  Scriven,  "Truisms  "Explanations,  ^Brodbeck, ^Aspects  and Understanding,  2;  op.  of  c i t . ,  Symmetry  vol.  68  Indianapolis, as  the  Predictions,  p.  253,  Scientific  Between E x p l a n a t i o n  (1959),  Explanation,  Laws."  in  p.  349-58;  Indiana  Grounds  and  emphasis  pp.  for  and  Stephen  University  Historical  Ex-  original.  367, emphasis  in  original.  78 Oran Young,  International 79  Davis ibid.,  p. 80  "The  Relations," Bobrow,  Perils  Tanter  "The  of  Odysseus:  On C o n s t r u c t i n g T h e o r i e s  and U l l m a n ,  Eds.,  Relevance Potential  of  op.  c i t . ,  Different  p.  in  183.  Products,"  210.  A n o t h e r example can be f o u n d i n Graham A l l i s o n , Essence o f Decision: E x p l a i n i n g the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s , B o s t o n , L i t t l e , Brown, and C o . , 1 9 7 1 , p. 279. This i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g example of the use of philosophy of science positions for purely h o n o r i f i c purposes. Allison, on the page n o t e d , d e c l a r e s that he w i l l employ Hempel's concept o f e x p l a n a t i o n i n h i s s t u d y and t h a t t h i s i m p l i e s , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t " p r e d i c t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y the converse of e x p l a n a t i o n . " But the o v e r a l l argument o f the b o o k i s a c t u a l l y a v e r y p r o f o u n d c h a l l e n g e t o H e m p e l ' s p o s i tion, since i t holds that l o g i c a l l y incomplete explanations can adequately e x p l a i n the outcomes o f complex e v e n t s even when t h e p r e m i s e s o f these explanations c o n t r a d i c t each other. Thus, i t stands as an i m p o r t a n t v i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e v i e w t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g may b e b e t t e r s e r v e d b y t h e development of incomplete explanations w i t h i n c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t e d contexts t h a n by an attempt t o develop a s i n g l e , l o g i c a l l y - r i g o r o u s e x p l a n a t o r y framework. 81 See,  e.g.,  Scriveri,  "Explanations,  Predictions,  and L a w s , "  p.  179.  82 Toulmin,  Foresight  and U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  pp.  24-25.  83 Michael Theory," e.g.,  Kuhn,  Simpson, pp.  Scriven,  Science, op.  vol.  c i t . ,  " E x p l a n a t i o n and P r e d i c t i o n  30, p.  The M e a n i n g o f  no.  3374  (August  172; Kaplan, Evolution,  op.  28,  c i t . ,  New H a v e n ,  in  1959), p.  Yale  Evolutionary p.  477.  347; George University  See  also,  Gaylord Press,  1949,  261-62. 84 Aspects  of  Scientific  Explanation,  p.  370.  85 Method,  and h i s T.  See,  e.g.,  Berkeley, Critics,  Michael  G h i s e l i n , The  of  and  Systems Yearbook,  Harvard  Selective  vol.  Triumph of  California Press,  Cambridge, Mass.,  Campbell, "Variation  General  T.  University  14  University  Retention  (1969);  in  the  Darwinian  Press,  1973;  1969; David  Hull,  Socio-Cultural  Darwin  Donald  Evolution,"  T o u l m i n , Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , C h .  5.  132  86  Stephen  Toulmin, review  Aspects  of  Scientific  American, v o l .  214,  of  Aspects  no.  2  of  (February  Scientific 1966),  Explanation,  p.  130.  87  8  8  I b i d . ,  p.  Scientific  Explanations,  p.  426.  413.  89 Brodbeck,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  231.  90 Toulmin, 9  1  I b i d . ,  Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  p.  * 92  Aspects  p.  58.  63.  of  Scientific  Explanation,  p.  425.  93 ...quite  laws  plained  Ibid.  s p e a k i n g , a n o p i n i o n as  nature  surely  grounds or  broadly  hold in  cannot  alone,  empirical  and what phenomena  but  be  must  research.  formed on  be based  on  to  what  can be  ex-  analytic the  results  94 Ryan,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  76.  op.  cit.  95 Humphreys,  106.  96 Hempel,  Philosophy of  Natural  Science,  p.  70.  97 Gustav  consin Press, of  the  course.  Bergmann,  1957, p.  explanatory For  about  obey,  the  laws;  of  that  i s ,  Language  of  they  they  op.  p.  is  that  things  thev  of  that  Feigl  298,  the  c i t . ,  these  has  behave.  in  This  shared,  of  of  things  oblects  frame-  been  Eds.,  i n -  op.  c i t . ,  p.  71,  original.  99 R.B.  Braithwaite,  Scientific  Explanation,  U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1953, p. 12. ^^Philosophv of Natural Science,  p.  58.  Wis-  view  empirical  individual i t  129.  explain  observation  do  University  universally  and M a x w e l l ,  emphasis  p.  observable  in which they  Madison,  do n o t  do.  e x p l a i n why  in  not  op.  notes:  e x p l a i n why  established  c i t . ,  Science,  Meehan,  Sellers  those ways  Theories,"  of  theories  circumstances  original.  Kaplan,  also  observable  extent  behave i n  ductively  emphasis i n 98  laws,  various  work "The  Wilfred  Theories  to  See  purpose of  instance,  empirical  Philosophy  78.  Cambridge,  Cambridge  133  Hanson, " L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s m and the I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Scientific T h e o r i e s , " p. 58, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . The c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e o r y d e s c r i b e d here i s most o f t e n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the e a r l y l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s . See, e . g . , N.R. Campbell, Physics: T h e E~: e m e n t s , C a m b r i d g e , C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 2 0 , r e p r i n t e d a s F o u n d a t i o n s o f S c i e n c e , New Y o r k , D o v e r , 1 9 5 7 ; R.P. Ramsey, The F o u n d a t i o n s o f M a t h e m a t i c s , L o n d o n , R o u t l e d g e and Kegan P a u l , 1 9 3 1 ; R u d o l f Carnap, F o u n d a t i o n s o f L o g i c and M a t h e m a t i c s , C h i c a g o , U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1939. I t s t i l l a t t r a c t s many a d h e r e n t s , however. See, e . g . , B r a i t h w a i t e , op. c i t . ; H.E. Kyburg, P h i l o s o p h y of Science: A F o r m a l A p p r o a c h , New Y o r k , M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 6 8 ; P a t r i c k S u p p e s , " T h e D e s i r a b i l i t y o f F o r m a l i z a t i o n i n S c i e n c e , " J o u r n a l o f P h i l o s o p h y , v o l . 65 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 651-64. 102 C a r l G. Hempel, "On the ' S t a n d a r d C o n c e p t i o n ' of Scientific T h e o r i e s , " i n Minnesota Studies i n the Philosophy of Science: V o l . 4, 1  0  3  p.152.  I b i d .  104 Hanson,  Theories," ^  5  1 0 6  p.  148.  p.  84,  I b i d . ,  "Logical  emphasis  pp.  Hempel,  Positivism in  76-77,  "On  the  and  the  original.  emphasis  'Standard  in  Interpretation  of  Scientific  original.  Conception*  of  Scientific  Theories,  107 J.H.  bridge  Woodger,  The  Axiomatic Method  University  Press,  1 9 3 7 ; The  Toulmin,  review  of  Chicago, University 108  of  Chicago  Technique  Press,  Aspects  in  1939.  of  of  Biology, Theory  Scientific  Cambridge,  Cam-  Construction,  Explanation,  p.  133.  109 Hanson, " L o g i c a l T h e o r i e s , " p. 76. 1 1 0  p.  142.  Hempel,  "^^"Ibid.,  "On  the  p.  143,  p.  153.  Positivism 'Standard  emphasis  in  and  the  Conception  Interpretation  1  of  of  Scientific  Scientific  Theories,  original.  112 Ibid., 113 Hempel,  Philosophy  "On  'Standard  of  Natural  Science,  p.  74.  114 the  ^"'Philosophy  of  Conception'  Natural  Science,  of p.  Scientific 74.  Theories,  p.  144.  134  P r o b a b l y the most i n f l u e n t i a l p r e s e n t a t i o n of p r o a c h ' c r i t i c i z e d here i s E r n e s t N a g e l , The S t r u c t u r e reference to t h e o r i e s , Nagel s t a t e s (p. 90):  the 'standard apof Science. With  For the purposes of a n a l y s i s , i t w i l l be u s e f u l to d i s t i n g u i s h three components i n a t h e o r y : (1) an a b s t r a c t c a l c u l u s that i s the l o g i c a l s k e l e t o n of the e x p l a n a t o r y system, and that " i m p l i c i t l y d e f i n e s " t h e b a s i c n o t i o n s o f t h e s y s t e m ; (2) a s e t o f r u l e s that i n e f f e c t a s s i g n an e m p i r i c a l content to the a b s t r a c t c a l c u l u s by r e l a t i n g i t to the concrete m a t e r i a l s o f o b s e r v a t i o n a n d e x p e r i m e n t ; and (3) an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or model f o r the a b s t r a c t c a l c u l u s , w h i c h s u p p l i e s some f l e s h f o r t h e s k e l e t a l s t r u c t u r e i n more or l e s s f a m i l i a r c o n c e p t u a l o r v i s u a l i z a b l e materials. We w i l l n o t b e a b l e t o d i s c u s s t h e m o d e l c o m p o n e n t h e r e , s i n c e i t i s a h e u r i s t i c rather than l o g i c a l aspect of a theory. See N a g e l ' s a n a l y s i s o f models, i b i d . , pp. 95-97, 107-17; a l s o Kaplan, op. c i t . , pp. 258-93. Other important sources of the standard view i n c l u d e Braithwaite, op. c i t . ; Rudolf Carnap, "The Methodological Character of T h e o r e t i c a l Concepts," i n Minnesota Studies i n the Philosophy of Science: V o l . 1, The F o u n d a t i o n s of S c i e n c e and the Concepts of Psychology and P s y c h o a n a l y s i s , Eds. Herbert F e i g l and M i c h a e l S c r i v e n , M i n n e a p o l i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Minnesota P r e s s , 1 9 5 6 , p p . 3 8 - 7 6 ; C a r n a p , P h i l o s o p h i c a l F o u n d a t i o n s o f P h y s i c s , E d . , M. G a r d n e r , New Y o r k , B a s i c B o o k s , 1 9 6 6 . H e m p e l ' s own c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e c o n s t r u a l h e now c r i t i c i z e s h a s a l s o b e e n s u b s t a n t i a l . See h i s Fundamentals o f Concept F o r m a t i o n i n the E m p i r i c a l S c i e n c e s , V o l . 2, n o . 7 o f The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Encyclopedia of U n i f i e d Science, Chicago, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1952; and "The T h e o r e t i c i a n ' s Dilemma: A Study i n the Logic of Theory C o n s t r u c t i o n , " r e p r i n t e d i n Aspects of S c i e n t i f i c E x p l a n a t i o n , pp. 173-226. ^ 59,  " 0 n  7  the  emphasis  in  'Standard  Conception'  of  Scientific  Theories,"  pp.  158-  original.  lift Ibid.,  p.  159.  p.  160; quote  119 Ibid., in  The Ways o f  p.  112. 120 "On 1  2  1  Paradox  the  from W.V.O.  and Other  'Standard  Essays,  Conception'  Qulne,  "Carnap  New Y o r k ,  of  and L o g i c a l  Random H o u s e ,  Scientific  Theories,"  Truth,"  1966,  p.  161.  I b i d .  122 It m u l a t i o n be for  the  should be  stressed,  seen  throwing over  study  of  as  a  actual  however,  theories.  of  that  the  On t h i s  i n no way  can Hempel's  study  of  he  quite'explicit:  is  reconstructed  refor-  theories  135  Ibid.,  My m i s g i v i n g s d o n o t c o n c e r n t h e o b v i o u s f a c t that t h e o r i e s as a c t u a l l y s t a t e d and used by s c i e n t i s t s are almost never formulated i n accordance w i t h t h e s t a n d a r d s c h e m a ; n o r do t h e y s t e m f r o m t h e thought that a standard formulation could at best r e p r e s e n t a theory q u i c k - f r o z e n , as i t were, at a momentary s t a g e of what i s i n f a c t a c o n t i n u a l l y developing system of ideas. These o b s e r v a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t no t e l l i n g c r i t i c i s m s , I think.... 148.  p.  ^ \ f e s l e y Salmon, "Bayes Theorem and the H i s t o r y of S c i e n c e , " Minnesota Studies i n the Philosophy of Science: V o l . 5, p p . 6 8 - 6 9 , 'emphasis i n o r i g i n a l .  in  124 Carl In  Aspects  of  Hempel,  "Studies  Scientific  in  the  Explanation,  Logic  of  p.  emphasis  5,  Confirmation," in  reprinted  original.  125 McMullin,  op.  c i t . ,  pp.  12-13  emphasis  5  in  original.  126 Salmon,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  72.  127 Hanson, " L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s m and T h e o r i e s , " p . 74, e m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l .  the  Interpretation  of  Scientific  128 Merrill, attempt  Israel 1967, to  129  Scheffler,  p.  73.  refute  this  It  Science  and  Subjectivity,  s h o u l d be noted  notion.  that  Indianapolis,  Scheffler's  book i s  Bobbsan  P a u l Feyerabend, " E x p l a n a t i o n , Reduction, and E m p i r i c i s m , " i n M i n n e s o t a S t u d i e s i n t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f S c i e n c e : V o l . 3, p . 49, emphasis in original.  130 Theory j4,  p.  of 70,  Paul Feyerabend, Knowledge," emphasis  "Against  Minnesota  in .ordinal.  Method:  Studies  in  Outline  the  of  an  Anarchistic  Philosophy  of  Science:  Vol.  131 p.  See,  313;  tion,  e.g.,  Gunnell,  Kuhn,  "Social  op.  cit.,  Science  Explanation and S o c i a l  pp.  T o u l m i n , Human  8-9;  and P o l i t i c a l  Scientific  Reality,"  Inquiry,"  pp.  p.  Understanding, 170;  1238-39.  132 Braithwaite,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  v i i .  133 •"ibid.,  p.  13.  134 ...total  boundary  with  science  experience  justments  is  conditions  •have t o be  in  the  at  like  are  the  a  field  of  experience.  periphery  interior  of  r e d i s t r i b u t e d over  the  force A  whose  conflict  occasions field.  some o f  our  read-  Truth  values  statements.  "Deduc-  136  Re-evaluation evaluation  of  of  some s t a t e m e n t s  others,  because  interconnections...."  W V.O. op.  Quine,  c i t . ,  p.  From a  Logical  109.  Point  of  entails  of  their  View,  p.  re-  logical  42; quoted  in  Humphreys,  135 K a r l Popper, Logic E d i t i o n s , 1961, pp. 40-41, 136 Humphreys,  op.  of S c i e n t i f i c Discovery, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l  c i t . ,  p.  New Y o r k ,  Science  110.  137 Braithwaite,  op.  cit.,  pp.  19-20.  ' 138 See  the  discussion in  Kuhn,  op.  c i t . ,  pp.  72-74.  139 For  Max B l a c k , pp.  an e x c e l l e n t  "The  consideration  Justification  190-200. 140  Salmon,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  Hempel,  Philosophy  Salmon,  op.  of  77,  of  the  problem of  induction,  Induction,"  i n Morgenbesser,  emphasis  original.  in  see  Ed.,  op.cit.,  L.J.  Savage,  141 of  Natural  Science,  pp.  33-45.  142 c i t . ,  p.  80,  emphasis  in  original  143 Ibid.,  p.  81,  emphasis  in  original.  concept  of  "subjective  144 The  See,  e.g.,  of  Statistics,  inadequate  in  their  in  Goodman,  As  independent  only to  the  Foundations  op.  cit.  It  s h o u l d be  ability  contributions  confirmation, 145  they  are  New Y o r k , to  emphasized  leading  save  the  toward  e x c i t i n g and  probability"  Wiley,  1954; and  that  these  deductivist  in  "entrenchment"  solutions  point  a post-deductivist  promising.  of  are  view.  approach  Another, t a n g e n t i a l , problem r e l a t i n g to Salmon's approach i s this: Why s h o u l d o n l y p l a u s i b l e a r g u m e n t s b e a l l o w e d a s e v i d e n t i a l s u p p o r t f o r new h y p o t h e s e s ? As P a u l Feyerabend c o n t e n d s , Implausible a r g u m e n t s a r e a l s o o f t e n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c r e a t i n g f r u i t f u l new w a y s o f c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g and s o l v i n g problems. T h u s , he o b s e r v e s : ...I suggest i n t r o d u c i n g , e l a b o r a t i n g , and p r o pagating hypotheses which are inconsistent either with well-established theories or with w e l l established facts. Or, as I s h a l l express m y s e l f :  "Against 146 Chicago,  I suggest proceeding counterinductively to proceeding i n d u c t i v e l y . M e t h o d , " p. 2 6 , emphasis i n o r i g i n a l .  Carnap's  work  University  of  is  summarized i n  Chicago  Press,  The  1952;  in  addition  Continuum of and The  Inductive  Logical  Methods,  Foundations  of  137  P r o b a b i l i t y , C h i c a g o , U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago P r e s s , 2nd e d . , 1962. For a more e l e m e n t a r y a c c o u n t o f h i s b a s i c i d e a s , see C a r n a p , " S t a t i s t i c a l and I n d u c t i v e P r o b a b i l i t y , " i n The S t r u c t u r e of S c i e n t i f i c Thought, Ed. E.H. Madden, B o s t o n , H o u g h t o n - M i f f l i n C o . , 1960, p p . 269-79; and "The Aim of I n d u c t i v e L o g i c , " i n L o g i c , Methodology, and P h i l o s o p h y of Science," P r o c e e d i n g s o f the 1960 I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s , Eds. E r n e s t N a g e l , P a t r i c k Suppes, and A l f r e d T a r s k i , S t a n f o r d , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962, pp. 303-18. 147 Ed.,  The  Arthur op.  For  a  sample  Philosophy  Banks,  c i t . ;  of  the  of  Carnap,  Ernest  Salmon,  University  Hempel,  critique  Rudolf  J o h n Kemeny,  and Wesley  Pittsburgh, 148  of  The  of  Carnap's  op.  Nagel,  c i t . ,  Foundations  of  Natural  of  see  P.A.  especially  and H i l l a r y  Pittsburgh Press,  Philosophy  work,  articles  Putnam;  Scientific  1968.  Science,  pp.  80-81,  Schilpp,  Popper,  by  Inference,  emphasis  in  original. 149 Thomas G r e e n e , " V a l u e s a n d t h e Canadian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science, pp. 281-282. Great  p.  ^"^Paul  Feyerabend,  Past,"  181, emphasis ^•^Young, 1  5  2  "Philosophy  Minnesota Studies in  op.  in  original.  c i t . ,  p.  the  Methodology v o l . 3, n o .  of  Science:  Philosophy  of P o l i t i c a l Science," 2 (June 1970), A Subject With  of  Science:  a  Vol.  5,  179.  I b i d .  153 Ibid.,  references  Prediction, Natural 1  5  for  and  p.  Science  4  I b i d . ,  180.  this  It  is  worthwhile  definition of  'Imperfect'  p.  195.  p.  197,  theory  Knowledge,"  to note  that  Brodbeck,  Young  cites  "Explanation,  and Hempel, P h i l o s o p h y  as  of  155 Ibid.,  emphasis  in  original.  ^"^Young's p o s i t i o n concerning the r i n d u c t i v e theory b u i l d i n g procedures has few y e a r s . I n 1 9 6 8 , h e was a b l e t o make complementarity of deductive and i n d u c t i v  e l a t i v e m e r i t s of d e d u c t i v e and hardened considerably i n the last the f o l l o w i n g remarks about the e methods:  The c o n c e p t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n between d e d u c t i v e and i n d u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e s . . . t e n d s t o become h a z y i n t h e c o n t e x t o f many s p e c i f i c p r o j e c t s . Deductive statements are f r e q u e n t l y f o r m u l a t e d so s l o p p i l y t h a t their intellectual status is unclear. Inductive analyses are g e n e r a l l y based on at l e a s t hunches concerning causal connections. ...And, in  <5 138  addition, there i s frequently a back and.forth relationship between deductive and inductive operations. That Is, the inspection of empirical material on an inductive basis Is sometimes heuristic in identifying variables and generating insights for deductive formulations. And the resultant deductive formulations are apt to serve as guidelines i n directing inductive foraging operations. Oran Young, "A Systemic Approach to International Politics," Research Monograph No. 33, Center for International Studies, Princeton University, June 30, 1968, pp. 54-55. 157  Young, "The Perils of Odysseus," pp. 197-99.  158 This aspect of Young's critique of descriptive and inductive methods — that the fault lies with the practitioners, not the practice — is clearly evident i n his no-holds-barred attack on Bruce Russett, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor," World P o l i tics, vol. 21, no. 2 (April 1969), pp. 486-511. For Russett's reply, see Bruce Russett, "The Young Science of International Poltics," World P o l i tics, vol. 21, no. 4 (October 1969), pp. 87-94. 159  Young,"The Perils of Odysseus," pp. 196,198. "*"^As Nagel makes clear with reference to the model outlined above (fn. 116): We w i l l develop these distinctions i n the order just mentioned. However, they are rarely given explicit formulation i n actual scientific practice, nor do they correspond to actual stages In the construction of theoretical explanations. The order of exposition here adopted must therefore not be assumed to reflect the temporal order in which theories are generated i n the minds of individual scientists. Nagel, The Structure of Science, p. 90. ^^Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process i n International Politics, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 2nd printing, 1967, pp. 245-46. Ibid., "Preface to the Paperback Edition." 163  See, e.g., "Problems of Theory Building and Theory Confirmation in International P o l i t i c s , " In The International System: Theoretical Essays, Eds. Klauss Knorr and Sidney Verba, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 6-24; "The New Great Debate," in Knorr and Rosenau, op. c i t . , pp. 39-61; "Glimpses into a Philosophy of Politics," i n Macropolitics, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1969, pp. 3-48. 164 M.A. Kaplan, Macropolitics, p. 16. 1  139  ^"'Bobrow, 1  6  1 6 7  1  I b i d . ,  6  6  Easton, I b i d . ,  8  "^Hempel,  op. p.  cit.,  p.  209.  The P o l i t i c a l pp.  210.  System,  p.  58.  58-59.  Philosophy  of  Nati.tral S c i e n c e ,  p.  81.  ^ ^ D a v i d E a s t o n , A Framework f o r P o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s , C l i f f s , N . H . , P r e n t i c e - H a l l , I n c . , 1965, p. 19. 7  Englewood  * 171 For a s u b t l e e v a l u a t i o n of these d i f f i c u l t i e s , see K a r l Deutsch, T h e N e r v e s o f G o v e r n m e n t , New Y o r k , T h e F r e e P r e s s , 1 9 6 3 , C h s . I - I V . For a c r i t i q u e of the p l a u s i b i l i t y of a general theory of p o l i t i c s , see T h o r s o n , o p . c i t . , c h . 3. W i l l i a m H . R i k e r , T h e T h e o r y o f P o l i t i c a l C o a l i t i o n s , New H a v e n and L o n d o n , Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 2 , p. .3, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . 1  7  2  173 William Political 174 e n c e may ences as  Stephen  H.  Theory,  Riker  and P e t e r  Englewood  Ordeshook,  Cliffs,  N.J.,  An I n t r o d u c t i o n  Prentice-Hall,  Ins.,  to  Positive 1973, p.  Toulmin maintains that the g o a l of g e n e r a l theory i n s o c i a l s c i a c t u a l l y b e a s i g n o f i m m a t u r i t y , i f we t a k e t h e p h y s i c a l s c i an example: L a t e r s c i e n c e has demonstrated its maturity not l e a s t , i n the f a c t that s c i e n t i s t s have g i v e n up t h i s p r e m a t u r e l y g e n e r a l a m b i t i o n . Instead, p h y s i c i s t s a n d p h y s i o l o g i s t s now b e l i e v e that... we s h a l l do b e t t e r , i n t h e s e f i e l d s , b y w o r k i n g o u r way t o w a r d s more g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s p r o g r e s s i v e l y , r a t h e r than i n s i s t i n g on complete g e n e r a l i t y from the o u t s e t . And i f b e h a v i o u r a l s c i e n t i s t s e v e n tually reach a s i m i l a r conclusion — deciding t h a t 'human b e h a v i o r i n g e n e r a l ' . . . r e p r e s e n t s too broad a domain to be encompassed w i t h i n a s i n g l e body o f t h e o r y — t h a t c o u l d a g a i n be a s i g n o f maturity rather than defeatism. T o u l m i n , Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , p . 3 8 7 .  \ o b e r t H o l t and John R i c h a r d s o n , J r . , "Competing Paradigms in C o m p a r a t i v e R e s e a r c h , " i n The M e t h o d o l o g y o f C o m p a r a t i v e R e s e a r c h , Eds. R o b e r t H o l t a n d J o h n T u r n e r , New Y o r k , T h e F r e e P r e s s , 1 9 7 0 , p . 2 4 . 1  7  R o b e r t H o l t and John Turner, R e s e a r c h , " i n i b i d . , p. 6. 1 7 6  1  7  7  I b i d . ,  pp.  6-7.  "The  Methodology of  Comparative  x i .  140  178 179  1  and  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  p.  70,  emphasis  in  original.  I b i d . , p. 70. They a l s o a d d , s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h a t : I n m a k i n g a n a p p e a l f o r m o r e m a t h e m a t i c s , we a r e not t a l k i n g about s t a t i s t i c s . ... [ S t a t i s t i c s provides a science with a basis for rigorous induction. Our c r i t i q u e suggests t h a t the c r y i n g need i n comp a r a t i v e p o l i t i c s i s f o r more r i g o r o u s d e d u c t i o n and t h i s Is where mathematics, not s t a t i s t i c s , i s relevant. p. 7 1 , emphasis i n o r i g i n a l .  Ibid., '  Holt  8  0  I b i d . ,  p.  70.  *  181 Ibid.,  pp.  70-71,  see  also  pp.  26,  59.  18 2 „ HBolt and R i c h a r d s o n ' s i n h o s p i t a b l e a t t i t u d e toward s o c i a l l y r e l e v a n t p r o b l e m s may b e a b y - p r o d u c t o f t h e i r u n c r i t i c a l a c c e p t a n c e o f Kuhn's early formulations. F o r e x a m p l e , he s t a t e s i n The S t r u c t u r e o f Scientific Revolutions that: . . . t h e i n s u l a t i o n o f the s c i e n t i f i c community from s o c i e t y permits the i n d i v i d u a l s c i e n t i s t to c o n c e n t r a t e h i s a t t e n t i o n upon problems that he has good r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e he w i l l be a b l e t o solve. U n l i k e t h e e n g i n e e r , a n d many d o c t o r s , a n d most t h e o l o g i a n s , the s c i e n t i s t need not choose problems because they u r g e n t l y need s o l u t i o n and without regard f o r the tools a v a i l a b l e to solve them. In t h i s r e s p e c t , a l s o , the contrast between n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s a n d many s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s p r o v e s instructive. The l a t t e r o f t e n t e n d , as the former almost never do, to defend t h e i r choice of a research problem — e . g . , the e f f e c t s of racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n or the causes of the business c y c l e — c h i e f l y i n terms of the s o c i a l importance o f achieving a solution. Which group would one expect to s o l v e problems a t a more r a p i d r a t e ? Kuhn, o p . c i t . , p. 164. H o l t a n d R i c h a r d s o n ' s a t t e m p t t o make s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s more l i k e p h y s i c a l s c i e n t i s t s b y s t r i p p i n g away a l l t h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e about t h e i r s u b j e c t m a t t e r i s a c l a s s i c , i f somewhat h o r rendous, example o f p u t t i n g the p r i o r i t i e s o f form above those of c o n text. To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e i r v i e w s r e s u l t f r o m a r e a d i n g o f K u h n , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t h i s i d e a s h a v e r e c e n t l y come u n d e r i n t e n s e a t t a c k w i t h i n p h i l o s o p h y of s c i e n c e . See, e . g . , Lakatos and Musgrave, E d s . , o p . c i t . ; a n d T o u l m i n , Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , p p . 9 6 - 1 3 0 . For a more s p e c i f i c c r i t i q u e of a p p l i c a t i o n s o f K u h n ' s i d e a s t o p o l i t i c a l s c i ence, i n c l u d i n n H o l t and R i c h a r d s o n ' s , see Jerone Stephens, "The Kuhnian P a r a d i g m and P o l i t i c a l I n q u i r y : A n A p p r a i s a l , " American Joufaal o f P o l i t i c a l Science, v o l . 17, no. 3 (August 1973).  141  183 A. Analysis," p. 4 2 5 .  James G r e g o r , " P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e and the Uses o f F u n c t i o n a l American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, v o l . 62, no. 2 (June 1968),  1  8  4  I b i d .  1  8  5  I b i d . , Paul  p.  426.  Feyerabend,  "Against  Method," pp.  21-22.  187 Gregor, •  1  1  8  8  c i t . ,  p.  439.  I b i d .  8  9  op.  I b i d .  190 Waltham, M a s s . , Xerox C o l l e g e P u b l i s h i n g , 1971. See a l s o , e . g . , A . I s a a c , Scope and M e t h o d o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , Homewood, 1 1 1 . , D o r s e y Press, 1969. ^ ^Meehan's approach In t h i s volume i s at odds w i t h that taken i n h i s l a t e r E x p l a n a t i o n i n S o c i a l S c i e n c e , Homewood, 1 1 1 . , D o r s e y P r e s s , 1 9 6 8 , where he develops a s t r o n g case a g a i n s t the adequacy o f the d e d u c t i v e model o f e x p l a n a t i o n i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e . But t h i s second book, not b e i n g addressed s p e c i f i c a l l y to p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e , i s t e c h n i c a l l y not of the c l a s s o f t e x t b o o k s I am d i s c u s s i n g h e r e . N e i t h e r i s K a p l a n ' s The Conduct of Inquiry. Both these books, however, are o f t e n employed i n i n t r o d u c t o r y m e t h o d o l o g y c o u r s e s i n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e , t h u s a d d i n g some much n e e d e d balance. F o r f u r t h e r c o m m e n t s o n t h e r o l e o f t e x t b o o k s , s e e M i c h a e l W. Jackson, "Textbooks i n Social S c i e n t i f i c Education: A View from P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , " T h e New S c h o l a r , v o l . 3 , n o . 2 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , p p . 2 1 1 - 2 0 . 9  192 T h i s , of course, i s a main p o i n t graduate education i n p o l i t i c a l science. Vocation," op. c i t .  of Sheldon Wolin's c r i t i q u e of See " P o l i t i c a l Theory as a  193  See,  matical  Study  e.g., of  Lewis  the  Boxwood and Q u a d r a n g l e ,  Mathematical 63,  "The  Papers,  System," 41-62;  Arms  no.  Peace  William  Critique, 11,  of  no.  the  (1968),  Study,"  4  1  Race:  1960; Paul  pp.  pp.  of  War,  Smoker,  Peace  Society  Caspary,  1967),  "Fear  Research,  pp.  Jeffrey  International  "The  Arms  P i t t s b u r g h and in  vol.  "Richardson's Model,"  63-90;  S.  Race as  (International)  Peace Research  107-23;  of  of  151-92,  and an A l t e r n a t i v e (March  Arms a n d I n s e c u r i t y :  and O r i g i n s  A Wave M o d e l , " ' P e a c e R e s e a r c h  Research  Cold War,"  Simulation  Richardson,  Journal  (1966), R.  F.  Causes  International  Society  Wolfson,  Mathe-  Chicago,  Race:  pp.  no.  "  7  Races:  Studies  Closed  (1967),  V i e t n a m War  Quarterly,  Papers,  Mitchell, and  the  pp.  Description,  Mathematical  C.  A  55-  (International  an Open and  (International)  The  Arms  (1964),  Society  Arms  M i l s t e i n and W i l l i a m  Processes:  1  Papers,  Model of  Murray  the  A  vol.  Model  no.  9  "Computer  Pre-World  142 War  I  Naval 194  Race,"  Peter  What P r i c e New H a v e n  A.  Peace Research  Busch,  Vigilance?  "Appendix:  The  and London, Y a l e  Burdens  Society  Papers,  Mathematical  of  University  National  Press,  no.  12  Models  Defense,  1970, p.  (1970). of  Arms  B r u c e M.  194.  Races,"  Russett,  195 M i l s t e i n and M i t c h e l l , op. c i t . See a l s o t h e s t u d i e s o f t h e p r e - W o r l d War I p e r i o d by R o b e r t N o r t h e . g . , "Dynamics of I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t : Some P o l i c P o p u l a t i o n , Resources, and T e c h n o l o g y , " i n Tanter and pp. 80-122. 1  9  6  Bush,  op.  c i t . ,  p.  various quantitative and N a z l i C h o u c r i , y Implications of Ullman, op. c i t . ,  232.  197 For further c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n of reaction-process models, see C a s p a r y , o p . c i t . ; M a r t i n C. M c G u i r e , S e c r e c y and t h e Arms R a c e , C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . , H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 ; A n a t o l R a p o p o r t , F i g h t s , Games, and D e b a t e s , A n n A r b o r , U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1 9 6 0 ; Thomas L. S a a t y , M a t h e m a t i c a l M o d e l s o f A r m s C o n t r o l a n d D i s a r m a m e n t , New Y o r k , W i l e y , 1968; J o h n C. H a r s a n y i , " M a t h e m a t i c a l Models for- the Genesis o f War," World P o l i t i c s , v o l . 14, no. 4 (July 1962), pp. 689-99. 198 Busch,  op.  c i t . ,  pp.  194-95.  199 T h e b e s t o v e r a l l i n t r o d u c t i o n t o g a m e t h e o r y i s R. D u n c a n L u c e a n d H o w a r d R a i f f a , Games a n d D e c i s i o n s , New Y o r k , W i l e y , 1 9 5 7 . See also M a r t i n S h u b i k , E d . , Game T h e o r y a n d R e l a t e d A p p r o a c h e s t o S o c i a l Behavior, New Y o r k , W i l e y , 1 9 6 4 ; A n a t o l R a p o p o r t , T w o - P e r s o n Game T h e o r y , A n n A r b o r , U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1 9 6 6 , N - P e r s o n Game T h e o r y , A n n A r b o r , University of Michigan Press, 1970. Specific applications to i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s a r e o f f e r e d by M o r t o n K a p l a n , System and P r o c e s s i n International P o l i t i c s , C h s . 9 - 1 1 ; Thomas S c h e l l i n g , T h e S t r a t e g y o f C o n f l i c t , C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . , H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 0 , A r m s a n d I n f l u e n c e , New H a v e n , Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1966. ^ ^ F o r c r i t i q u e s o f t h e u s e o f game t h e o r y i n d e t e r r e n c e a n a l y s e s , see, e . g . , P h i l i p G r e e n , D e a d l y L o g i c , New Y o r k , S c h o c k e n , 1 9 6 8 ; A l e x a n d e r G e o r g e a n d R i c h a r d S m o k e , D e t e r r e n c e T h e o r y a n d P r a c t i c e , New Y o r k , Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974; K a r l Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, Ch. 4, The A n a l y s i s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , Englewood C l i f f s , N.J., P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1 9 6 8 , e s p . p p , 1 1 2 - 3 2 ; Thomas M i l b u r n , " T h e C o n c e p t o f Deterrence: Some L o g i c a l a n d P s y c h o l o g i c a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s , J o u r n a l o f Social Issues, v o l . 17, no. 3 (1961); Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and C o n s c i e n c e , New Y o r k , H a r p e r , 1 9 6 4 . 201 R i c h a r d Smoke, "The N o r m a t i v e - P r e s c r i p t i v e M o d e l o f Deterrence," mimeo., Harvard U n i v e r s i t y , 1972. This i s scheduled to appear as Ch. 3 o f George and Smoke, o p . c i t . Schelling,  The  Strategy  of  Conflict,  p.  163.  143 203 I b i d . , p. 162, emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . Thomas S c h e l l i n g , "What i s Game T h e o r y ? " i n Comtemporary P o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s , Ed. James C. C h a r l e s w o r t h , New Y o r k , The F r e e P r e s s , 1967, pp. 219-20. 205 Princeton, Princeton University Press,  1944.  206 F o r an i n c i s i v e c r i t i q u e of t h i s v i e w o f the c e n t r a l r o l e o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e t o economics, see M a u r i c e G o d e l i e r , R a t i o n a l i t y and I r r a t i o n a l i t y i n Economics, London, New L e f t Books, 1972. 207 van Neumann and M o r g e n s t e r n , op. c i t . , pp. 89. 208  .  Norman F r o l i c h and J o e A. Oppenheimer, An E n t r e p r e n e u r i a l Theory o f P o l i t i c s , u n p u b l i s h e d Ph. D. d i s s . , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y , 1971, " E n t r e p r e n e u r i a l P o l i t i c s and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " i n T a n t e r and U l l m a n , op. c i t . , pp. 151-78. 209 On a l l i a n c e s , see Mancur O l s o n , J r . and R i c h a r d Z e c k h a u s e r , "An Economic Theory o f A l l i a n c e s , " i n Economic T h e o r i e s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , Ed. B r u c e M. R u s s e t t , C h i c a g o , Markham, 1968, pp. 25-45, " C o l l e c t i v e Goods, Comparative Advantage, and A l l i a n c e E f f i c i e n c y , " i n I s s u e s i n Defense Economics. Ed. Roland N. McKean, New Y o r k , Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967, pp. 25-63. L e a d e r s h i p i s examined i n Norman F r o l i c h , Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Oran Young, P o l i t i c a l L e a d e r s h i p and C o l l e c t i v e Goods, P r i n c e t o n , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1971. Particip a t i o n s t u d i e s i n c l u d e Mancur O l s o n , J r . , The L o g i c o f C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n , Cambridge, Mass., H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965; A l b e r t and Raymond B r e t o n , "An Economic Theory o f S o c i a l Movements," American Economic Review, v o l . 59 (May 1969), pp. 196-205; R o b e r t H. S a l i s b u r y , "An Exchange Theory o f I n t e r e s t Groups," Midwest J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , v o l . 13 ( F e b r u a r y 1969), pp. 1-32. 210 Young, "The P e r i l s o f Odysseus," p. 191. On the a t t r i b u t e s o f o l i g o p o l i s t i c m a r k e t s , see P a u l A. Samuelson, Economics, 5 t h ed., New Y o r k , M c G r a w - H i l l , 1961, Ch. 25; and W i l l i a m J . F e l l n e r , C o m p e t i t i o n Among the Few, New Y o r k , A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1949. 211 Kenneth B o u l d i n g , C o n f l i c t and Defense, A G e n e r a l Theory, New Y o r k , Harper Torchbooks, 1962, see p. v i i i . 212 Anthony Downs, I n s i d e B u r e a u c r a c y , B o s t o n , L i t t l e , Brown, and Co., 1967; Gordon T u l l o c k , The P o l i t i c s of B u r e a u c r a c y , Washington, D.C, P u b l i c A f f a i r s P r e s s , 1965. 213 See, e.g., R i c h a r d N e u s t a d t , A l l i a n c e P o l i t i c s , New Y o r k , Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970; Graham A l l i s o n and Morton H a l p e r i n , " B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s : A Paradigm and Some P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s , " i n T a n t e r and U l l m a n , op. c i t . , pp. 40-79.  144 214  A n t h o n y Downs, A n E c o n o m i c T h e o r y o f D e m o c r a c y . New Y o r k , H a r p e r and Row, 1957; Gordon T u l l o c k and James M . Buchanan, The C a l c u l u s o f Consent: Logical Foundations of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Democracy, Ann Arbor, University of M i c h i g a n Press, 1965. 215 R.L. Curry and L.L.Wade, A Theory o f P o l i t i c a l Exchange: Economic Reasoning i n P o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s , Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . , P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1968. 216 Riker and Ordeshook, op. c i t . , p. 11. 217 218 219  Ibid., Kaplan,  pp.  11-12.  op.  c i t . , pp.  Luce and R a i f f a ,  follows:  cit.  emphasis  in original.  Riker paraphrases  this  assumption  G i v e n a s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h e x i s t two a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n l e a d i n g to d i f f e r e n t outcomes and assuming that p a r t i c i p a n t s can order these outcomes on a subjective scale o f preference, each p a r t i c i p a n t w i l l choose the a l t e r n a t i v e leading to the most p r e f e r r e d outcome. op. c i t . , pp. 18-19.  Riker, 2  2  0  lbld.,  P-  19.  2  2  1  Ibid.,  P-  20.  Ibid.,  P-  22.  Ibid.,  P-  23.  224 ^ I b i d . ,  P-  15.  222 Z  op.  317-18,  Z  Z  223  2  2  5  Ibid.,  P • 23.  2  2  6  Ibid.,  P-  27.  2  2  7  Ibid.,  P-  30.  2  2  8  Ibid.  2  2  9  Ibid.,  P-  31.  2  3  0  Ibid. P-  211  231 "-"•Ibid., 232 Ibid. J  as  145  233 Ibid., 234 Ibid., 235 Ibid., Ibid., 237 236  p. 47. pp. 54-55, emphasis in original. pp. 66-67. p. 67-68.  Ibid., p. 68. 238  I b i d . , p. 71.  146  VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY Achinstein, Peter and Barker, Stephen F. The Legacy of Logical Positivism. Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1969. Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston, Little, Brown, and Co., 1971. Allison, Graham and Halperin, Morton. "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications." Theory and Policy in International Relations., Eds. Raymond Tanter and Richard Ullman, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972, pp. 40-79. Ayer, A.J. 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