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The effect of drama education on children's attitudes to the elderly and to ageing Bramwell, Roberta J. T. 1990

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THE EFFECT OF DRAMA EDUCATION ON CHILDREN'S ATTITUDES TO THE ELDERLY AND TO AGEING By ROBERTA J . T. BRAMWELL B.Sc., University of Glasgow, 1954 M.A., The University of Calgary, 1979 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF EDUCATION i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Educational Curriculum and Instruction We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1990 © Roberta J . T. Bramwell, 1990 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT Supervisor: Dr. Patrick Verriour The objective of this study was to support the claim that drama education is no "mere f r i l l " in the curriculum but is, in fact, important to the formation of attitudes and values in young people. The study moved in two directions. The literature was explored to establish a position on what is intended by the terms "attitude" and "drama education" and to demonstrate a connection between these two terms. Following a review of the literature which demonstrated that there was reason to believe that children's attitudes to ageing and to old people are less than ideal, the two strategies of a practical investigation were begun. In examining the attitudes of Grade 5 children to the elderly and to the ageing, quantitative and qualitative investigations were undertaken. The quantitative investigation employed the Children's Attitude Towards the Elderly (CATE) (Jantz, Seefeldt, Serock, and Galper, 1976) instrument to examine attitudes in one control and two experimental groups. The qualita-tive investigation consisted of the analyses of: (a) interviews with the teacher^, and children of both experimental groups during.and after the three units of drama education, (b) pre- and post-drawings by children from these groups, (c) the reflections written in their journals by children of the experimental groups after the drama education units, and (d) field notes taken during participant/observation in the drama classroom. The experi-mental groups were taught drama employing two different methods. Group A pursued the topic "Young People/Old People" in the drama classroom in child-directed drama, while Group B explored the same topic in teacher-directed i i drama. The results of both strategies were compared and contrasted under the rubrics of the theoretical positions on "attitudes" and on "drama education" adopted for the study. The research results converged to support the claim that, for the children of both experimental groups, doing drama had asssisted them as they rebuilt their attitudes to old people and to ageing. No such improvement had occurred for the Control Group. Positive attitude change consisted in (a) greater knowledge of old people and ageing, (b) a diminution in the fear of ageing and old people, (c) positive feelings toward the elderly, and (d) identification with the interests, feelings, goals, and means of elderly people. In addition, the qualitative study revealed that some children recognized that drama caused them to re-value the people in their own lives. i i i T A B L E OF CONTENTS P a g e A b s t r a c t , i i L i s t o f Tables x i i L i s t o f F i g u r e s x i i i L i s t o f Summary Charts x i v L i s t o f C h i l d r e n ' s Sketches and J o u r n a l R e f l e c t i o n s , P r e - and Post-Drama Educat ion xv Acknowledgements x v i D e d i c a t i o n x v i i CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 Overview o f the Study 1 O r g a n i z a t i o n o f the T h e s i s 4 2. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF DRAMA THEORY . 5 Drama Educat ion i n B r i t a i n 5 The Works o f Slade and Way 6 Peter Slade 6 B r i a n Way . 8 Summary o f the Work o f Way and Slade , 9 The Work o f B o l t o n 10 The Work o f Heathcote 22 North American A u t h o r i t i e s . 30 The Work o f Ward 30 i v Chapter Page The Work of Richard Courtney 33 Summary of Courtney's Work in Educational Drama 37 Summary and Critique of Authorities Discussed 37 3. APPROPRIATE ATTITUDES 39 Attitude as Word 39 Philosophical Ideas: Part 1 41 The Concept of a Person 41 Person as Being in the World ' . 43 Form-Yielding 44 Summary of Part 1 . . . 47 Form-Producing 48 Personal Subjective Meaning 48 Individual Value of Form Production 49 Public Assent to Individually Created Forms 49 Appropriate and Inappropriate Attitudes to Being in the World 50 Refusal of Form-Yielding or Form-Producing Capacities 51 Appropriate Attitudes and Strawson's Postulates of the Person 53 Philosophical Ideas: Part 2 54 Intention and Order . 54 Dialectic Tension 55 Summary of the Implications of Strawson's Position 56 v Chapter Page Individuals 57 Unexamined Form-Yielding 59 Incomplete Knowledge 60 Interpretative Errors 60 Dispositional Feelings . . . 62 Occurrent Feelings 62 Unexamined Behaviour . . . 62 Summary of Part 2 62 Dennett's Account of the Person 63 Verbal Communication, Third-Order Volitions, and Personhcod 64 The Mystery of the Person 67 Attitudes of Persons Toward Other Persons 67 Attitudes of Elderly Persons and to One's Own Ageing 69 Children's Attitudes Toward Old People 70 4. THEORY OF DRAMA 71 The Child's Action in a World 72 Characters 73 Events 74 Problem 74 Change 75 Inner Worlds 75 What is Drama? 76 Distancing 78 Action-Non Action 79 vi Chapter Page The Participants in the Space 80 Drama's Symbolic System 84 Central Research Question 87 5. ATTITUDE INVESTIGATED AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY 88 Literature on Ageism and Gerontophobia . . 88 Psychological Studies of Attitude to Ageing and to Old People 02 Children's Attitudes to Old People and to Ageing 94 Research on Ageism and Gerontophobia in Children's Literature 95 Perspectives and Rationale of the Study 98 Design of the Study 100 Structure of the Quantitative Investigation . . . . 100 Sampling 100 Experimental Group , 101 Population of St. John Fine Arts School 102 Control Group 103 Initial Procedures 103 Pre-Drama Motivation and Understanding 104 Attitude to be Examined 105 The Quantitative Investigation 105 The Qualitative Investigation 106 Analyses of Children's Art 106 Analysis of Children's Accounts 107 Analysis of Drama Scenes 107 v i i Chapter Page Validity and Reliability of Instruments 108 Quantitative Measures 108 Qualitative Measures 109 Collection of Data 110 Scoring of Tests 110 limitations of the Study , . I l l Positive Aspects of the Study 112 6. QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE INVESTIGATION 113 The Drama Teacher 113 The Teacher's View of Drama 115 The Teacher's Methods of Teaching Drama 116 What Happens in Drama for the Children? 118 Teacher's View of Ageing and of Old People 120 The Teacher and the Concept of Person 122 Summary of Ethnography 124 Drama Theory and the Teacher's Perspective on Drama 124 The Teacher and the Concept of a Person 125 The Teacher and the Elderly 125 Context of Study 126 Methods Employed in Teaching Drama 127 Details of the Methods 128 v i i i Chapter Page Children's View of Drama 132 What Drama is About 132 What Children Use in Doing Drama 134 The Purpose of Drama . 136 The Children's View of Old People After the Drama 141 How the Children's View of Old People Changed 145 The Children's View of Change in Their Own Attitudes . . 147 Summary of Insights into Attitude Change 151 Children's Private Journal Writing 152 Children's Pre- and Post-Test Drawings 157 Summary of Chapter 6 166 7. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 168 Background of the Study Groups 168 Ethogeny 168 Family Constitution 169 Siblings 171 Family Income 171 Parental Educational Levels . . . . . 172 Intellectual Profiles of Experimental Groups 172 Test of Comprehension 174 Intelligence Testing . . . . . 175 Test of Attitudes (CATE) 175 i x Chapter Page Pre- and Post-Test Results 176 Group A Results: Child-Directed Drama •. . 180 Group B Results: Teacher-Directed Drama 182 Summary of CATE Results and Initial Interpretation 187 Accounting for Variance 190 Correlations between Categories within CATE 190 Within-Category Correlations of Knowledge and Discernment 192 Correlation CATE/SES 195 Correlation of CATE with TOC 197 Correlations of CATE with IQ and Gender . . . . . 197 Summary of Chapter 7 200 8. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 201 Conclusions 202 Limitations of the Study 204 Implications of the Study 205 REFERENCES 207 APPENDICES 221 A. Letters Soliciting Research Participants 222 B. Parental informed consent release; SES form; transmission envelope; researcher's acknowledgement form 226 C. CATE Test and author's letter of permission . . . . . . . 232 D. TOC Test 244 E. Typical children's interviews 250 x Chapter Page F. Atypical children's interviews 261 G. A teacher interview 301 H. Field notes: Participant observation 339 xi LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Knowledge Category: Control, Pre and Post 178 2. Knowledge Category: Experimental A and B 178 3. Rapprochement Category: Control, Pre and Post 179 4. Rapprochement Category: Experimental A and B . . . . . . . 179 5. Phobia Category: Control, Pre and Post 181 6. Phobia Category: Experimental A and B 181 7. Discernment Category: Control, Pre and Post 183 8. Discernment Cateogry: Experimental A and B . 183 9. Knowledge Category: Experimental Group A 184 10. Knowledge Category: Experimental Group B 184 11. Rapprochement Category: Experimental Group A 185 12. Rapprochement Category: Experimental Group B 185 13. Phobia Category: Experimental Group A 186 14. Phobia Category: Experimental Group B 186 15. Discernment Category: Experimental Group A 189 16. Discernment Category: Experimental Group B 189 17. Correlations Between Categories . . 191 18. Significant Correlations Between Variables in Categories of Knowledge, Discernment, and Rapprochement 193 19. Significant Correlations of SES with Categories . . . . . . 194 20. Significant Correlations of TOC with Categories 196 21. Significant Correlations of IQ with Categories 198 22. Significant Correlations of Gender with Categories 199 x i i LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. Knowledge Category: Control, Pre and Post . . . . 178 2. Knowledge Category: Experimental A and B 178 3. Rapprochement Category: Control, Pre and Post 179 4. Rapprochement Category: Experimental A and B 179 5. Phobia Category: Control, Pre and Post • 181 6. Phobia Category: Experimental A and B 181 7. Discernment Category: Control, Pre and Post 183 8. Discernment Category: Experimental A and B 183 9. Knowledge Category: Experimental Group A 184 10. Knowledge Category: Experimental Group B 184 11. Rapprochement Category: Experimental Group A 185 12. Rapprochement Category: Experimental Group B 185 13. Phobia Category: Experimental Group A . . 186 14. Phobia Category: Experimental Group B 186 15. Discernment Category: Experimental Group A 189 16. Discernment Category: Experimental Group B 189 x i i i LIST OF SUMMARY CHARTS Chart Page A. Summary Chart of Family Constitution i n Percentages 170 B. Summary Chart of Number of Siblings i n Family 170 C. Summary Chart of Number of Sibl i n g s with Educational Levels 173 D. Summary Chart of Percentage Earnings of Families i n Groups 173 x i v LIST OF CHILDREN'S SKETCHES AND JOURNAL REFLECTIONS, PRE- AND POST-DRAMA EDUCATION Sketch Page I . Exp. Group A, Pre: Child's drawings 160 I I . Exp. Group A, Post: Child's drawings 161 III . Exp. Group B, Pre: Child's drawings 162 IV. Exp. Group B, Post: Child's drawings 163 V. Control Group, Pre: Child's drawings 164 VI. Control Group, Post: Child's drawings 165 Reflection VII. Exp. Group A, Post: Child's journal entry 153 VIII. Exp. Group A, Post: Child's journal entry 154 IX. Exp. Group B, Post: Child's journal entry 155 X. Exp. Group B, Post: Child's journal entry 156 xv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In this endeavour, my debts are many. The greatest academic debt is to my teachers and my supervisory committee and, in particular, to Dr. Patrick Verriour, my supervisor. Every member of my family has supported me, whether or not they approved of this enterprise. Among my family, special thanks go to my brother, Fergus John McCann, and to my daughter, Karen Anne Melling, who helped directly in so many ways. To my principal co-researcher, Kathleen Hanrahan, and to the Grade 5 school children of Brebeuf Elementary/Junior High School and St. John Fine Arts Elementary School, whose enthusiastic assistance was invaluable, I extend my sincere gratitude. I acknowledge, too, the support of my colleagues in the drama department at the University of Calgary. Above a l l , I thank my husband, who is a lodestone in my efforts to become a person and a scholar. xvi DEDICATION T h i s work i s dedica ted to my husband, Robert Dennis Bramwell, and t o my f a t h e r , A l l e n McCann, both of whom have supported and encouraged me as a person i n every way, and t o a l l c h i l d r e n whom drama educat ion c o u l d s e r v e . x v i i 1 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY Set designers in the theatre have two main purposes as they conceive of their mises en scene. The first is to construct a set which will work for the actors and for the audience. The second purpose is to build a set which is aesthetically satisfying. Central to both of these purposes is the conveying of the import of the play to be pre-sented. In this introductory chapter, the task of the writer is similar to that of the designer. As the setting for the study, this chapter must work in the sense that the reader must be able to refer to it and, in so doing, make its action components come to life as a real concern of real people. Complete aesthetic satisfaction is rarely achieved in the presentation of a play and it is even more rarely achieved in the creation of an aca-demic study. It is, however, partly attainable and, at least, the central conception must be made clear. This study is entitled, The Effect of D r a m a E d u c a t i o n on C h i l d r e n ' s A t t i t u d e s to the E l d e r l y and to A g e i n g . The general setting, then, is education. The particular setting is drama education. The purpose is to focus on drama education and, even more precisely, on an aspect of what engagement in drama education means for children and teachers. For the focus to become clear, the notion of drama education must be explicated. This notion is set in at least three contexts, and to provide a framework for the study, they must be clearly delineated as follows: (a) what is understood here as education, (b) what is understood as drama, and (c) what is understood as drama education. Each of these contexts has a history and each has proponents and detractors. The presentation of this research is offered in the context of a particular view of what I understand by education, in the context of a particular view of what I understand by drama, and, in the context of a particular view, rooted in both of these, of what I under-stand by drama education. My position on each of these is sketched below in order to provide the parameters within which the research was first conceived. 2 Education is a polymorphous concept with at least four forms. In one form it appears as training, in another it appears as instruction, in a third as initiation, and in a fourth as induction . "The third of these, initiation, is concerned with becoming familiar with social values and norms, and successful initiation leads to the ability to interptet sensitively the social environment" (R.D. Bramwell, 1990). It is the position of this thesis that all four forms are important but that the first three are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the real business of education which is induction into the "thought systems" of a culture. The thought systems of a culture are the means whereby members of a culture come to know and the knowledge acquired by those means. Furthermore, too much of our education has been predicated upon skill training and the acquisition of knowledge and too little on how we come to know. Recent studies in education which emphasize the practical knowledge of teachers and children, though not of recent origin, have reflected this concern (Elbaz, (1983), Connelly, and Clandinnen, (1987)). It is present as far back as Rousseau and is argued for in vari-ous forms by Pestalozzi (1801), Montessori (1912), Froebel (1897), Dewey (1897), Stenhouse (1975), and Bruner (1976) among others in education, and it is a central concern in the works of Rogers (1954) and Maslow (1971 )in the field of psychology. The question for the learner is: "What do I already know which will help to make full use of further knowledge and of the many different ways of coming to know?" The question for the teacher is: "How can I help children to make full use of what they know and how they know it in order to induct them into public knowledge and into (other) ways of knowing it?" This question is quite different from the one that teachers usually ask: "How can I give my students the knowledge that I have in the way in which I have it.? "or "How can I train them to do what I do in the way that I do it?" For me, the children's experience and that of the teacher are both employed in a joint re-creation of meaning which furthers the knowledge and the means to gain it of both parties. It is true that teachers generally know more than children and that they may understand more fully how to come to know but, sadly, the latter is not always the case. For example, we do not as members of a culture, come to know only through the use of word and number or through some technological extension of these (Gardiner, 1985). The two questions posed above are those which hold together the particular view of education which is the frame for this research, that is insistence upon the importance of the learner's experience and insistence upon the use of many ways of coming to know. 3 The particular setting deals with what we understand by drama and it also deals with how these two large concerns inform what we mean by drama education. It is necessary to begin by entering a disclaimer that "drama" does not mean "theatre". It means neither the presentation of plays for an audience nor the study of scripted works. As used in this thesis, drama means the creation of pieces of work drawn from the experience and imagination of the participants as they reflect upon some aspect of the human condition of interest to them. The particular aspect may be their choice, but it may also be proposed by the leader as a representative of their culture. In the present study, the leader is the teacher and the participants are students in her class. Since "to create" demands the use of a form to give the creation meaning, building a piece of drama involves coming to a meaning which is then given form. The drama is, in effect, a "coming to know" which reflects upon experience and employs that experience by embodying it in the action of imagined characters. The theory of drama is dealt with more fully in the body of the research. The work here has a more p r e c i s e intent. It centres on the relationship between drama and real attitudes in the real world. The position for the research is that drama may affect its participants' attitudes. The question then is: "What precisely does en-gagement in drama contribute to the education of children?" Negotiations in drama lessons help children to discover something of what it means to be human, and so this dissertation treats as central the question, "Is it possible that part of the participants' coming to know is a coming to know what their own attitudes are, what may be the attitudes of others, and what, in general, may be the attitudes of their society? Reflec-tion on all of these may then cause drama's participants to look once more at their own attitudes. Having delineated the general thrust for the investigation, a further question arose, namely: "What do we mean when we talk about attitudes?" The research literature in this area revealed the complex nature of attitudes. It also revealed that many of the investigations previously undertaken into attitudes had proceeded without a firm con-ception of what constitutes an attitude. In addition, it was discovered that little philo-sophical work had been done on the topic. Eventually, I decided to tease out from the philosophical literature a position on what attitudes will mean for this research. It was obvious at this stage of preparation that the study would have to be limited in some way. Accordingly, I cast about for a particular attitude or set of attitudes which would conform to the following criteria: (a) Important in the education of children, 4 (b) Important in the education of children but presently neglected, (c) of interest to children and (d) central to drama. Looking at these criteria, it seemed that attitudes to other persons would be those which were most appropriate to the research. The enquiry had now entered the ethical domain. Of these, it was decided to select an atti-tude or congeries of attitudes which also had importance for present-day society, namely, attitudes to old people and to ageing. This introduction should have made it clear (a) that the research for this study was based in a particular interpretation of what is meant by education and, (b) that the research dealt with two theoretical fields, drama and attitudes, both of which required explication before the investigation of its central problem could proceed. The thesis, then, consists of two parts: (a) the theory of drama and of attitudes and, (b) the investigation of the effect of a drama program on children's attitudes to old people and to ageing. Organization of the Thesis Offered in Chapter 2 is an interpretation of theories of drama in education as ex-pressed by outstanding educators. In Chapter 3, an argument is presented for my position on the possible meaning of attitudes. Detailed in Chapter 4 is an exposition of an aspect of my own theory of drama. Within the context so provided, the presenta-tion in Chapter 5 outlines the case for believing that children's attitudes towards old people and toward ageing are less than ideal in today's society. The design for the practical investigation is also presented in this chapter. The report on the data ob-tained by means of a qualitative investigation of what happens in drama for some children is given in Chapter 6. The empirical findings are reported in Chapter 7, and the conclusions and implications of the study are presented in Chapter 8. Chapter 2 5 HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF DRAMA THEORY This chapter containes an exploration of the dominant theories of drama in education in England, the United States, and Canada since the 1930s. The exploration provides an insight into how drama in education has come to be understood and articulates a theory of drama which links to the exploration of values and attitudes offered in Chapter 3. As a result, the chapter contains a basis for the enquiry of this thesis into the effect of drama on children's attitudes. The review relates accounts of drama in education to the investigation of attitudes and values, a link which is central to this study. In effect, the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 form the theoretical base from which this study proceeds. Contributions to the theory of drama in education from Britain, the United States are considered in addition to those from Canada, as these countries' contribu-tions were the historical precursors of drama in education in Canada today. The work of each major contributer from each country will be reviewed and summarized. DRAMA EDUCATION IN BRITAIN In the early part of the 20th century both Caldwell Cook (1917) and Mrs. Findlay Johnson (ca.1910) recorded their methods of using drama in the classroom. For Cook, the importance of the drama lay in the opportunity it offered the boys of the Perse School for active involvement in Shakespeare's works (Cook, C. 1917). He therefore advocated that the study of Shakespeare should be pursued by acting out the plays. This idea grew into a method of working in which all aspects of the production of the plays were, eventually, in the hands of the students. In the teaching of poetry, he estab-lished a choral speech approach to the works of well known poets. He encouraged his students to write their own poetry and finally developed strategies which enabled them to write their own plays. Johnson (1910) maintained that drama was the natural way for children to learn therefore, she used drama to teach the school curriculum and had no interest in the 6 production or in the writing of plays. These two pioneers were concerned with two quite different approaches to drama: the first might be considered a theatre approach based in the drama/theatre art form as an efficient way to learn, while the second might be looked on as using dramatic principles and procedures as a teaching method in the service of the curriculum. The work of Slade and Way In the 1940s and 1950s a third approach was developed. The works of both Peter Slade (1954; 1958.) and Brian Way (1967) were based in the idea that children's natural way of learning was through their own play, a theory was directly related to the natural-istic philosophy of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1762). Scientific studies of the play of young children by Piaget (1951) and the work of Montessori (1912) and of Froebel (1897) in education gave this approach a great deal of authority. Peter Slade. Peter Slade, however, discerned in the movement of children a natural development of artistic form and worked with Rudolph Laban (1980) and Anton Dolin (dancer) to help children develop their natural art form in movement by supplying skill training, and expo-sure to both formal dance works and professional dancers' expertise. The emphasis was upon the expressive and improvisational nature of the children's movement as it encapsulated their ideas. The development of those ideas was through the forms that the children employed naturally and the extension was through giving the work respect, in the teaching, by supplying skills and ideas for incorporating elements of form. The method evolved is sometimes called "Dance Drama", although, on occasion, speech was used in the works the children created. The children's bodies were seen as instruments of their expression and therefore the warm-up sessions and the teaching of skills formed an integral part of the lessons. Early in the training, the teacher offered a piece of music as a stimulus for creative expression. In addition, the teacher would sometimes give a voice-over narration as the children interpreted a story or music in action. At this stage, all the participants would be interpreting the music simultaneously. Later, in small groups, the children would choose a piece of music and collectively create a movement sequence. The original ideas would be refined as the children worked with their group and they would begin to develop a form for the piece. It was then that they cooperated with the teacher to learn 7 new skills or movements that would make the work more satisfying. If they felt it was appropriate, words or small scenes were added so that the result could communicate its meaning to an audience. Slade's (1954) main concern, in his first book, was to convey his sense of a form of children's art which evolved its own symbols in space. He emphasized the natural shapes that the children used and the sensitivity of the groups. The children developed social awareness by sharing life views and emotional responses and expressed their life experiences in their projected play. The book stressed absorption and spontaneity and the idea of children struggling with an art form as they discovered their own shapes and "time -beats." For the teacher, this meant striking a delicate balance between guiding the children toward neatness and precision and preserving spontaneity. Described by Slade (1975) as a "doing of life," the work culminated in performance, but it was a per-formance of child art, not theatre. He also felt that for youngsters at age 12 or 13 years this doing of life or unconscious art form dies out and that they are ready to tackle the-atre form. Slade did see the expressions of children as a natural evolution of form. He viewed the form as primarily an aesthetic one, and the critical reflection upon the form as aesthetic reflection. Within this constraint, however, he did deal with stories and themes which explored value and attitudinal conflicts. The focus in the educational en-deavours which Slade undertook was the "celebration of the child and the beauty of his works" (1954, page 2). In his work in therapy, however, Slade was very close to Strawson's description of the psychologists' mandate in making what was involuntary come under the conscious control of the patient (Strawson, 1974). Slade thought about the exploration of experi-ence, of attitudes, and of value concerns as it was extant in the drama work in three ways: 1. He described drama as "the doing of life." 2. He linked the drama to the play of children as a natural way of coming to know. 3. He was much criticized , in his early years, for practising a kind of therapy on the boys of East London when he worked to help them develop more accept-able social attitudes. Nevertheless, the drama which Slade did was centered in the aesthetic power of the children he taught and the bringing of that power into refined aesthetic expression. 8 Brian Way Brian Way was the other person to develop a new approach in the 1940 s and 1950 s. His work with children was not concerned with theatre or with performance of any kind. He saw drama in education as a development of the uniqueness of individuals, a process which should have as its goal the advancement of the whole person. This de-velopment was to occur through the exploration of self, of others, and of the objective world by the use of the senses and of concentration. Way viewed drama as a funda-mental, creative outlet for originality and personal expression. Through drama, the children came to know the resources they had, their creative power, and the worth of their intuition. Way (1967) described drama as a way of living and of knowing which transcends mere knowledge and is non-intellectual. In his book Development Through Drama. Brian Way (1967) described his philoso-phy and presented a series of exercises that would lead to the development of the whole person he described. He stated quite clearly that what he was concerned with was the development of people, rather than of drama. This humanistic trend, typical of his time, owes much to the work of Rogers (1954) and Maslow (1971) in psychology and, in the structure of the exercises, to the teachings of the early Stanislavski (1936). It is important to note here that Way (1967) took the Stanislavski System out of its context of the Moscow Art Theatre just as Lee Strassberg did in formulating his Method acting. Stanislavski's exercises to give life to technique-ridden actors were created with the basic assumption of and in the strict insistence upon the use of physical and vocal skills. These elements were missing from Way's work. Perhaps he viewed this aspect as purely an addition from theatre, while assigning his exercises in imagination and in emotion to the development of the human side of the actor. In terms of the discussion of values and attitudes, one might see Way's version of drama as a subjective expres-sion which allows the child to bring into consciousness the imaginative power which he/ she possesses. It also allows for the discovery of the power of the senses in their direct use in informing consciousness, in evoking images of experiences in the past, and in stimulating the imagination. The work described by Way also emphasized the use of the physical self as a vehicle for the expression of ideas. When they followed Way's ideas in the work, the children were expressing in a self-created form but they were not submitting that form to critical scrutiny using aesthetic, logical, or any other kind of criteria. 9 Just as Way used Stanislasvski out of context, so followers of both Way and Slade, by selecting those parts of their work that made sense to them, misrepresented the original philosophies. Followers of Slade took one of three directions: 1. Into therapy, either individual or social, as in the case of Aimes, Warren, and Watling (1986) and less directly in the case of Courtney (1987) and Moreno (1975); 2. Into dance drama which was much more rigidly controlled by Rudolph Laban's exercises and latterly by Martha Graham's as in the case of Veronica Sherbourne (1950) and many exponents of dance in the physical education field; and 3. Into mindless, emotional self-expression which led to much anxiety on the part of headmasters and other authority figures in British education (Allen, 1979). This last distortion of Brian Way's work led to an unhealthy anti-intellectualism among drama teachers. Such a philosophy served poorly the cause of drama in educa-tion as the 1960s drew to a close and the emphasis on self expression assumed more reasonable proportions in education. The phrase "shared ignorance" (Hornbrook,1985), a comment on group work, began to be bandied about among his detractors. Anti-intellectualism also led to a serious split in the ranks of those who taught drama, be-cause it was an avowedly anti- theatre approach. In England at this time (1960), much of the drama work done in schools centered around those involved in producing "The School Play" as an adjunct to their other school duties— usually the teaching of English in secondary schools ( Courtney, 1966). These drama teachers were themselves either steeped in the theatre tradition or had received elocution and some acting instruction in teachers' training colleges or at universities. This writer was among this number, al-though usually such teachers were drawn from the ranks of those who pursued an arts education at the tertiary level and therefore, brought to the work both a literary bias and a love of theatre. Summary of the work of Way and Slade In summary, both Slade and Way, as pioneers in educational drama, answered an educational need that was being made more and more explicit in the early years of their developing of a philosophy of drama. In response to this need, and to honour the con-tribution that the individual child makes to his/her education, Slade moved in the direc-tion of evocation and gentle structuring without loss of spontaneous expression of the child's own art form. Way moved toward the child-centred approach to self discovery. Thus, relating to others and to the objective world was ego-centred and emphasized the value of individuals while down-playing the functions of community. Slade's approach allowed of performance while Way's ruled out performance and concentrated on the child's discovery of his/her own resources. Both men were influential, were misunder-stood, and were misrepresented by their followers, so that serious divisions developed among drama teachers by 1965. These divisions may be seen as existing on a contin-uum from strict conformity in pursuing theatre art education to an unstructured self expression with the goal of discovering personal resources. Already, however, other drama teachers were at work and were asking hard questions about the role of drama in a child's education. Two of these, who have since become major international figures, were Gavin Bolton and Dorothy Heathcote. The work of Bolton One of the most prolific writers in drama in education is Gavin Bolton. His work is considered here in the order in which it appeared in print. The main points in each piece of writing are given and from these a summary of his point of view is constructed. Bolton (1966) used Piaget's concept of symbolic play in children as the basis for child drama. He made the point that the drama distorts reality by selecting only those aspects of the real which are of concern to the child. It might be argued that such selec-tion is the normal modus operandi for all persons when their attention is focused on that which is other. It might be more accurate to suggest that drama selects those aspects of meaningful experience which the child sees as central to that meaning. In the drama classroom, this symbolic play takes place in a collective social setting so the play has a collective meaning, and group responsibility and group decision making are fostered. Bolton discerned two distinct types of dramatic playing: make-believe and ritual. In the make-believe play, the children are carrying out a procedure very much like the symbolic play documented by Piaget. If, however, they have been given the content of their play in a story or in previously explored make-believe, then the playing is pared down to its essence and becomes ritualistic in form. These rituals help the children to examine central themes as they contribute to understanding. Both the playing and the 11 understanding represent a move toward the symbolic and the symbol in children's drama that is embedded in concrete action. This experience of the concrete "feeds children's understanding of the general" (Bolton, 1986, p.36). The teacher's responsibil-ity, in this interpretation of drama, is to secure involvement at the initial level and then to select for further exploration the "moments of greatest significance." Bolton saw value in sharing the created work as an occasional experience to give the children a sense of completion and he saw movement training as separate from drama. He also condemned the type of exercise based on "moving like X," and insisted on attention to the symbolic nature of drama. Bolton (1971) viewed both theatre elements and children's play as contributing fac-tors in educational drama. These elements combine to help children to learn about their feelings and attitudes; both theatre and play elements assist in refining such feelings and attitudes in the course of the drama. The purpose is to help children achieve under-standing of what it means to face facts, to interpret without prejudice, to identify with others, and to develop principles. The drama can achieve this understanding if it ad-dresses the theme(s) in the children's concrete doing in an imagined present. This view of drama relies on the ability of the teacher to discern such themes and then to work toward bringing them into consciousness through delineation. In his article, Bolton (1971) was dealing directly with the procedures whereby individuals become aware of and scrutinize their feelings and attitudes. Bolton's (1975) discussion of emotion returned to the idea of the central place of the symbol in drama with children. At this period, he was concerned that the children's immediate concrete response to the external event in the drama be subsumed ("it is minimally important and may disappear") in the perception of the event in symbolic terms. The emotional response is to the symbolic situation and is both personal and universal. Emotion and thinking which are inseparable achieve a meaning compatible with the symbolic context. Personal emotion relies on the emotional memory of the participants. In this latter concern, Bolton (1975) demonstrated an unstated link with the Stanislavski system. Three dimensions of meaning achieved in a piece of drama were delineated in a further article (Bolton, 1976.). The first level is in the actual context of the drama partici-pant. The second is the imagined concrete context with which the drama is concerned. The third is the symbolic level at which the drama has universal meaning. Each of these levels is important for the drama participant but the one central to the drama is the symbolic one. In this article, Bolton (1976) offered insight into the procedures which are central to the drama and which demand that the group negotiate what is, in fact, the case about the situation being explored in the drama. Both the subjective meanings in experience and the generally accepted meanings are submitted to scrutiny by the group with the help of the drama teacher. Later, a short article showed a tendency in Bolton's (1977a) work to move toward a direct link with the content of other subject areas in classroom drama. He made the point that the drama lesson should meet the objectives of the regular school curriculum at the same time as it meets the educational objectives of the art form. This is not the same thing as saying that drama is relegated to serving as a powerful teaching method: Bolton (1977b) returned to the art form in a second article in which he discussed the importance of psychical distancing in drama. The dialectical relationship between the concrete, imagined world in action in the drama and the selected features of the real world of the participant achieves this distance and allows the triggering of universal meanings. These meanings themselves provide distance in reflection. A second dis-tancing force is the time. Drama takes place in the here and now but employs the past in the service of: (a) the future commitment to altered stances of the participants, and (b) the consequences of the new meanings the participant achieves. Bolton acknowl-edged, here, a concern of Slade's with "beat" as an important aspect of time distancing. The beat concept was for Bolton, occasioned by the alternation between the present concern in concrete action and the universal meanings that are addressed. For Slade, this concept was much more tied up with the natural rhythms of the child's movement. Stanislavski (1949), in his idea of tempo-rhythm, united both of these conceptions and also related tempo-rhythm to a spatial component of relationships of the ensemble in constant adjustment to each other. For Stanislavski, the tempo-rhythm was controlled by the through-line of action of the play. Bolton (1977b) wrote of a spatial dialectic between the physical concrete context and the evoked imaginary context as a factor in distancing, but this may represent a sym-bolic-time distancing rather than a spatial one. It achieves spatial attributes only when it is consciously employed in refined symbolic action. Such a gloss may have been the intention in this article although it is not quite clear. The concept of distancing becomes an important one in Bolton's later writing, as he addressed the problem of projecting a participant into drama to decrease the emotional risk. This article, together with his later writing on the topic of distancing, makes clearer how the procedures of drama explora-13 tion make urgent the scrutiny of its central concerns as one clarifies group thinking in the service of the symbol which is to carry the meaning. The individual is no longer required to take the risk of scrutinizing personal behaviour but can transfer that scrutiny to the characters and situations which were created to be analagous. Bolton (1978a) also discussed the controversy "to show or not to show." In showing his/her work the child is moving from the perspective of participant, "me- making- it-happen" in the building stage, to the spectator stance of "it -is -happening -to -me" in the stage of honing works to refine and reach for the art form. While regretting the constant adoption of a showing mode, even when the work is not being shown in the drama classroom, Bolton made a case for the value of occasional showing to deepen children's understanding of their own drama. Bolton's (1978a) article showed a link with the James Britton (1970) theories of children's writing processes which were current at that time. Both Britton and Bolton recognized the point that public acceptance of a form as meaningful increases the value assigned to the form and, therefore, to the values and attitudes for which it is a vehicle. That many drama teachers avoid emotion by confining their classes to exercises, by limiting the work to the consideration of "nice" feelings, and by the use of feeling only in its adjectival sense, was a matter of regret for Bolton (1978b). He made the point that "significant feelings can only be wrought from significant thoughts" (1978b, p.101). For this reason, both significant experiences and appropriate form are required to achieve an emotional experience which acts as a verb in the drama. When this level of drama is achieved, emotions as an adjective and as a verb are both present and are interde-pendent. Some teachers may be uneasy with this level of emotional involvement, but Bolton pointed out that the emotion may be tempered by the fiction, by control, by the universality or the particularity of the meaning, or by the technique of distancing which characterizes the dramatic form. Again, the influence of both dispositional feelings (those which have become a habit in given situations) and of occurrent feelings (those newly evoked by a current situation) on the actions, values, and attitudes of characters in the drama makes its contribution to the depth of the scrutiny of value positions which the drama discipline pursues. Bolton's (1986) article probably written as early as 1979 entitled 'The Activity of Dramatic Playing" is arguably one of the most crucial pieces of writing about educational drama. In this article, Bolton analysed drama as an activity using the insights of Vygotsky into children's play. He analysed dramatic playing assigning its quality on the 14 continuum from experiencing to performing, and then confined his attention to the type of play which tends toward experiencing. In this type of play, he described three impor-tant factors for the drama teacher: (a) the quality of the experience, (b) the awareness of self, and (c) the meaning that the child intends to project by his play. The quality of spontaneity so much underlined by Slade was here given new insight as Bolton identi-fied the dialectic present in the quality of the experience as both active and passive, both constraining and liberating. This dialectic demands a commitment to the rules of the playing. As a result of ad-hering to the rules of make-believe, the child is released from the pressures of conform-ing to the real pressures of his everyday world. The discipline of the play rules results in personal freedom. This special quality occurs only in symbolic play and is not present in practice play. When it occurs in games, the rules are non- negotiable and therefore fixed from beginning to end, but in symbolic play they are always open to renegotiation. Secondly, Bolton made a distinction between self consciousness and self awareness and argued that a heightened self awareness is possible in symbolic playing. Again, this is achieved by the double context in dramatic playing and symbolic play because participants are in the fiction they have created and are also using personal experience in the real world to make that fiction ever more present for self so that they can live in it. Bolton described this as a metaphoric relationship of the two contexts which allows the child to explore the personal meanings that are present in the experience. In discussing possible meanings for two fictional children engaged in such play, Bolton demonstrated how natural symbolic play becomes dramatic playing when guided in a collective deci-sion-making process He emphasized the integrity required by the group to discover appropriate meanings that help the children to understand themselves and their world more fully. He pointed out that there are impersonal criteria of truth and merit which can be applied to meanings explored in this way and that these tend toward universal mean-ings and therefore toward art. In the last part of the article, Bolton (1986, p. 66) dealt with the implications of this theoretical position for teachers of drama. Here he emphasized a component of drama in education that is unique to the subject, namely, that of reaching toward feeling which is tied to judgement or appraisal and thus constitutes education of the participant's attitudes. Unfortunately, in the last part of this article, Bolton came down in favour of this new understanding of people which can adjust attitudes being left unstated and implicit. What seems to be central here was Bolton's concern that the emotions experi-enced in the past should not be revisited by the participants but that the emotion the participants feel be directed and evoked by the aesthetic form at the moment of the participant's involvement with it. He felt that to make such learning explicit, to "concep-tualize" it in addition to the "crystalizing" which takes place in the drama itself, involves, in some way, a pre-empting of an implicit knowing that is embedded in dramatic or the-atrical symbolization. An explicit post-dramatic reflection on valued learnings which "recollect in tranquility" the relation of the drama to past events like a post-theatrical reflection on theme, does not really diminish the drama theatre/experience. Rather, it heightens it, and sustains a sense of wonder in the participant. In addition, it provides the occasion for pedagogical reinforcement which works at an emotional, psychological level as well as at an intellectual level. In 1979, Bolton's first book, entitled Towards a Theory of Drama in Education, was published. A summary of the content is provided below, followed by a short commen-tary. Bolton described four types of drama then popular in British schools: (a) exercise, (b) dramatic play, (c) theatre, and (d) drama for understanding. Although he saw some value in all four types of drama, he maintained that only "type D" or (d) could adequately be defended as an educational enterprise. He supported this position by demonstrating that this type of drama is primarily concerned with a change in appraisal of the partici-pants which is an affective /cognitive development of value judgements. This change is brought about by the interaction of the two concrete contexts with which drama deals— the imagined, present context and the real-life experience the participant brings to the drama. Drama is facilitated by the symbolic use of actions as the participant moves from objective precision ( attending to the fact that, for example, glasses break) to subjective symbolisation ( attending to the aspect of personhood that is embodied in a gift). This move is made in the service of the three levels of meaning which the participant experi-ences simultaneously: (a) a collective attitude which is congruent with objective mean-ing, (b) the participant's feelings about those objective meanings, and (c) the personal feelings of the participant which are irrelevant to the objective meanings. As the partici-pant works in a group, personal feelings and meanings are subservient to those of the group, and the group's neutral consensus on observable facts takes precedence, as it is compared with the affective examination of value judgements. The individual is made aware of disparities in his/her thought and comes to new insights about the drama topic. When the actions are selected and carried out to express the group's meanings, the breaking of stereotypes occurs. 16 Before this sequence, which Bolton described can take place, the teacher must find the angle that will lead to new insights by selecting the action from what is initially cre-ated by the children and providing the value to be explored. As they explore, new atti-tudes are adopted and the participants experience a heightened awareness of the imagined situation which is seen from a viewpoint never adopted before. Thus, drama reaches for meanings which are beyond the literal through the concrete form and this symbolization stirs deep feeling. In this way, the participants feel their way into new knowledge in a dialectic between the concrete and the abstract. In the discovery of new insights, participants achieve a sense of autonomy and satisfaction as they adapt to what is worthwhile for them. It is their own discovery of principles, implications, conse-quences, and responsibilities in the objective world that gives them the right to express that discovery after reflecting upon it by distancing. Two aspects of the art form aid discovery and reinforce it in expression: (a) metaxis (Boal, 1979) or the real and the imaginary held in the mind simultaneously and (b) the aesthetic/referential attention which the form demands. The attention is referential be-cause it deals with an instance of a general case and it is aesthetic because the partici-pant has to struggle toward the best possible expression of the new understanding in action. The type D drama described here is a reframing of concepts already held. The teacher's responsibility is to structure the work so that this thinking from a different viewpoint will happen. Although Bolton did allow that exercise and dramatic play can evolve into type D drama, he dismissed both in this first book. Initial expression of a superficial view in dramatic play can create its own resonances as the procedure he described is in prog-ress, and the child is affirmed in using personal resources in its initial stages. Exercise can, and probably should, assist the child to greater freedom within the discipline of the art form as he/she gains greater control of individual resources. Exercise also aids the final aesthetic/referential attention, giving this phase of the work greater authority and fluidity and therefore increasing satisfaction. The natural artistic seeking of the child, which Slade (1954; 1958) most firmly asserted and which Way (1967) viewed as the sum total of development, are very important factors but are not given their due in Bolton's book. It must be noted here that the procedure of metaxis is vital to an understanding of children's drama. The procedure of metaxis is significant because both the imagining of the ideal and of its opposite allows the children to put into perspective their own 17 thoughts and feelings on the topic being explored. In addition, the negotiation with peers allows for an approximation of a normative position to emerge simultaneously. Dealt with here is the preliminary construction of principles which have grown out of the child's life experiences and out of his/her imagination and which are presently offered for scrutiny in the drama. Four articles by Bolton (1980 a, b, c, d) centred on the relationship between drama for the child in the classroom, theatre for the actor on the stage, and theatre for the child as audience. They will be dealt with together here as their main points are applicable across the continuum. Objects used in child drama focus the theme of the drama (the king's lost ring, for ex-ample, without which the unity of the kingdom will be destroyed); They are used sym-bolically to extend the character (the sword or scarf which enhance the courage or the frailty of the character), to establish context (the throne or the garbage can which are re-spectively central to the operation of the character), and to engage feeling more pre-cisely, because they are symbols and are evocative of images which either extend meanings or emphasize them. Thus, the use of objects in child drama serve an anala-gous function to objects on a stage for the actor. Like the actor, the child, too, chooses logical actions to express meaning and these are, both in their selection and in their sequence, drawn from common sense rules which operate in the everyday world. In the first two of the 1980 articles then, Bolton was moving back toward Peter Slade's view of the child as natural artist. In the later two articles, published the same year, he distinguished between the child and the actor. This distinction lies in the notion of the child "being in the drama" as contrasted with the actor acting to communicate meaning to an audience. It is the teacher who focuses meaning for the child by the use of the theatre elements of tension and contrast. What must be preserved for the child is the quality of spontaneity, the emphasis on adopting new viewpoints, and the insistence on social negotiations. Bolton implied, therefore, that these qualities are not of the essence for the actor, and one has to admit that this is true for many of those involved in today's theatre. It is just these qualities, however, that Stanislavski, (1936), Brook (1968), Benedetti (1976) and Growtowski (1968) have fought to reawaken in actors. These authors stand in a relationship to their actors very like that which Bolton has described as ideal for teachers of drama in education. The final article of 1980 contrasts drama in education and theatre in education, and seems, while asserting the value of theatre in education, to be concerned mainly with 18 what it cannot accomplish for the child. While both enterprises have the aim of chang-ing the child's understanding, in drama in education the children are the agents for the change as well as the recipients of a new perspective. Because in drama, participants stand in this dual relationship to their experience they, in concert with others, devise rules by which they will explore that experience. Through the abstraction of everyday situations, the child gains control over the social milieu (e.g. when they treat of an imaginary prince whose parents are separated) and this is the functional aspect of the drama in preparing the child for life. There is also a universal aspect, however because the drama unites the personal, subjective view to the more objective meanings which participants, with their fellow workers, can agree upon as the logical components of the drama's fiction. These ideas were more fully explored in a later article which Bolton (1981) sub-titled "A Reappraisal." ( Bolton, G. 1981). Here, he was at pains to emphasize that the view of drama as "doing" has ignored one central aspect of the work which is primary to its function in education. The main work is not bound up with what is done and its mean-ing but is concerned with the tension between the "particularity of the action and the generality of the meanings implied by the action," Bolton, (1981, p. 2). Drama cannot be claimed to be an escape because the rules demand an objective reflection upon the logic of the everyday to make decisions. The dual perspective of identifying with the fiction and being aware of that identification, in order to reflect upon and intensify the quality of life, is the very nature of being involved in drama. A further impetus toward objective reflection is inherent in the drama situation because of its nature as a collec-tive art. The participants, as they work in a group, represent commonly held beliefs and values. Meaning is therefore negotiated within the drama at three levels: (a) at the functional level of the reality of the action, (b) at the level of the significance of the action, and (c) at the level of the experience held by the participant at that present mo-ment. Drama must concentrate on the second level of significance so that the partici-pant becomes only subsidiarily aware of the other two. This means that the context be-comes less important as the significant meaning is spontaneously encountered by the participant in the drama. The teacher employs the techniques and the form of theatre to bring the participant to this encounter. In this article, Bolton (1981) is influenced by Heathcote and Slade from the drama world, and by Michael Polanyi's (1958) theories of tacit knowing and of focal and subsidiary awareness as he evolved a philosophy of drama. 19 Two articles in 1982 preceded the publication of Gavin Bolton's second book in 1984. In the first, he put his view of drama in the context of the other pioneers in drama in education and within the framework of epistemology (Bolton, 1982a). His concern was that the drama teacher must have clear and compatible views of drama, of educa-tion, and of how he/she conceives of knowledge. He saw Way's and Slade's work as based in a view which emphasized growth (development) and play. Heathcote, Ward, and Dewey he characterized as believing in stimulating engagement with the environ-ment to obtain insight into the solution of problems. Bolton (1982a) then offered a clear statement of his own view: Drama offers the development of minds, the growth of knowledge and the refine-ment and extension of the conceptual framework by which experience is ordered. The child combines the objective and subjective views of the external world and deals with philosophical questions which put him in touch with values, (p.241) For Bolton, drama is concerned with knowing about, with knowing how, and with the kind of knowing which leads to understanding the human condition. This is accom-plished by focusing, by the injecting of tension, and by the creation of meaningful sym-bols. The second 1982 article dealt with drama as learning, as art, and as aesthetic expe-rience. As learning, drama is concerned with understanding the objective world, its facts and its values. As art, the doing of drama is a personal engagement with the art form. The participant is led into an experience of the art form through the consciousness of the group that form is being created. As a result, the participant is disposed to expe-rience the aesthetic impact of the form ( Bolton 1982b). Bolton's second book makes a strong case for the consideration of drama as a respectable subject for study in schools. Drama is described as a way of knowing which looks beyond the facts to their implica-tions through structured artistic form. Its intent is to plumb the depths of aesthetic and spiritual knowing through the use of concrete imagined situations and through the use of symbolic theatre elements. It is a collective art in which the individuals attempt to draw a personal circle within a social context. It is not therapy but prevention because it both prepares the understanding to address future conflicts and brings understanding to past conflicts which was not formerly present. Dramatic playing is an intention to be, whereas performance is an intention to communicate. Control within the form should not come from what happens next but rather from a disposition to describe and to fore-shadow through the dynamic of the situation. To emphasize this position, Bolton (1982b) compared the works of Brian Way (1976) and Dorothy Heathcote (1978). Way isolated action, and was disposed toward exercise and the egocentric development of the child's resources. The work was short term and depended on a recall of emotion. Heathcote, on the other hand, has been concerned with what is outside the self. Drama is a group expression that celebrates what is com-mon between people. It is not direct, but only appears to be so as the participant links art with content to go beyond facts to more universal significance. Through drama, the participants go outward into the world in order to go inward to achieve detachment. In this way, they achieve a union of the arts and the sciences because by looking at the one you see the other. Bolton saw Heathcote's use of the teaching strategy of the mantle of the expert as being on the edge of society's rituals. Through this strategy, Heathcote achieved a literal and metaphorical juxtaposition of game and drama. The work is apparently non-serious in its frame, but is serious in its pursuit of what is quin-tessential.for that particular expert in real life for real life ends. The use of this strategy brackets, liberates, and protects the child within the make-believe of the child as expert. The child is easily engaged in the non-serious, which is short term, and from there must be led to the serious concerns the work implies. Drama's business is, according to Bolton, the intellectual and emotional understand-ing of serious concerns as it achieves its outcome. This achievement is made possible only by the injection of tension and by role. Tension is achieved by contrasts, by formal-ity, and by waiting. Role demands more maturity than that required by real life because it is an abstraction from life. The child is saying "I am to role X as my experience has led me to imagine an X." By this analogical relation to role, Bolton asserted that the child is distanced from his/her own experience and protected (sic) into emotion as he/ she brings X to life. The child submits to the role and is detached from it by the inter-play between the real and the fictitious, (i.e. by metaxis). The collection of Bolton's wide and penetrating insights in all of the above writings are brought into juxtaposition in his second book. Here the heritage of drama education, its relationships to theatre and to educational institutions, to game, to emotion and to art are brought together to build a strong case for drama as a "pivot" of the curriculum (1984 p.186) Two articles from 1985 were available for scrutiny. In the first, Bolton praised the early work of Way and Slade for responding to the needs of their time but has ad-dressed two misconceptions about drama that arose from their work (1985a). The first was an undue concern with plot which, in Bolton's view, limited spontaneity and de-tracted from the essence of drama which was the theme. The second was an over-emphasis on the uniqueness of the individual which detracted from the idea of drama as a collective art concentrating on what people share. Drama is a form of group symbol-ism seeking universal truths. The second 1985b article, again, insisted on three modes of drama, namely practis-ing, experiencing, and performing. Bolton has reinforced the idea of drama for under-standing which aims at engaging with knowledge, at either the contextual or at the generalized level, to reflect upon it. Here, however, he has tended to move drama away from the fiction of make-believe and place it in the context of game in Wittgenstein's sense of rule-based playing. He also returned to Polyani to locate the focal awareness of the participant in the game and not in the learning taking place. He wanted less precision about outcomes, less emphasis on living through drama, and the adoption of a more phenemonological position in relation to claims for knowledge and learning in drama. The drama is a reshaping of meanings by the child, as a result of experiencing the phenomemon of drama in action and becoming emotionally involved with matters of universal concern. In summing up Bolton's work, one could begin with the statement that drama in education takes place with a teacher and a group of individual participants. It is a col-lective art form in which meanings are negotiated between the individuals and the group. The negotiation of meaning involves a private individual negotiation, as a partici-pant compares previously held subjective values, on a matter of universal concern, with the more objective values of the group. It is a group negotiation of meaning as the group struggles to express in an imaginary situation their collective view of significant matters. They have some experience of such matters in everyday life and the drama demands that they look at them in some depth. Because these negotiations are carried on in action and in reflection, with the aid of elements of an art form, in an imaginary game-like situation, the participants are symbolically creating the meanings while at-tending to the doing. The insights which are gained are both affective and cognitive learning because (a) the art form has protected the students into emotion which they experience in the symbolic action they have created, and (b) the exploration is individu-ally and collectively owned by the participants and they are committed to it by negotia-tion. The area of knowledge which is explored and about which the participants come to a new insight is the domain of values. The participants achieve a reshaping of their understanding in this domain by the symbolic exploration in action of a fiction to which they apply their experience. This understanding of matters of universal concern is achieved tangentially as the participants attend to the concrete, evolving fiction. They achieve satisfaction in exam-ining and reordering their individual experience, in understanding others, in the resolu-tion of the fiction and in the intellectual and emotional investment they have made in achieving a dramatic form for their understanding. The teacher's function is to change the focus of the fiction to attend to matters of universal concern, to use the drama form to protect into emotion, and to intensify the involvement. Drama in education is an aesthetic reappraisal of values in concrete action in a fiction which is lived in a dynamic symbolic relation to past experience. The mode of enquiry is analogical and metaphorical. Bolton appeared to reject a further articulation of the understandings achieved in drama to attack head on the val-ues addressed in the work. It is the position of this thesis that the greater the clarity achieved by the participants, the greater the likelihood that the new values will become incorporated into the intentions of the individuals and thus become explicit in the actions of the individuals. Reflection on the form of the drama produced by the participants and translation of the central concerns into other forms will reinforce the knowledge attained and will encourage change. The Work of Heathcote Dorothy Heathcote was a weaver whose employer enabled her to take up a scholar-ship she had won to study acting at the Bradford Theatre School in England. Toward the completion of her acting training, she decided that she was the wrong size and shape to pursue an acting career and turned her talents to the teaching of children. She came to national attention in the field of education as a result of her work with delin-quent boys in Newton Aycliffe. She was employed by professor Brian Stanley as a trainer of teachers of the Froebel method, at the institute of education of the University of Durham and then was, later, appointed to the institute of education of the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne as a drama specialist. When that college was expanded to become an autonomous institution, she remained there, and after acquiring an M.A,, became a trainer of teachers of drama. While at Newcastle, she came into contact with Laurie Stenhouse, James Britton, James Moffat, and John Dixon. Her love of theatre, of literature and of language was reinforced by these great educators and her view of education expanded from a largely Froebelian perspective to a much larger vision. It is this larger vision which informs her work in drama in education and which is the main concern of this thesis. When asked what she teaches, Heathcote will reply that she teaches children and this is not a trivial remark although it would be more accurate today to say that she teaches persons. The remark derives from a Froebelian view of children as a seed to be nurtured, and deter-mines a philosophy of education which tends to see disciplines and subjects as largely irrelevant in their divisions, to the enterprise of education. People are learners, want to learn, and will enjoy learning if means can be found to help them to see that the learning make sense. Heathcote has found such a means and has evolved very careful struc-tures to facilitate the learning. Writing in 1971, she offered a definition of that means— drama. Drama is anything which involves people in active role taking situations in which attitudes not characters are the chief concern. It is lived at life rate and obeys the laws of suspension of disbelief, agreeing to pretence, employing all experience and imagination available in an attempt to create a moving picture of life which aims at surprise and discovery for the participants. (1971, p.1078) In 1972, she spoke of drama as a release of energy which contributes to the growth of children as they live through the drama to new insights into human actions and feel-ings. Drama should be used in the way that will most effectively aid the child to learn. It is a releaser of ideas rather than an interpretation of ideas as the participant considers his past, in the light of the drama experience, to move into the future with new insights. Therefore, what is selected for attention must lead to this kind of exploration. The for-mal theatre and the informal classsroom drama are but two views of the same thing (Heathcote,1972). Concern with the structure of knowledge and how it is dealt with in schools underlies Heathcote's 1975 article (Heathcote 1975). Here, she offered three ways in which drama can honour the ambiguity that exists in real life between the world of facts and its truths and the world of legend or saga with its kind of "truth." She called these: The Mantle of the Expert, Meeting the Role and Being Where You Are at the Present Time. The last demands that the participants face the chosen situation and work through it. Meeting the role demands that they meet the role as personifications of an imagined character and the mantle of the expert demands that they face the issues in a discipline as experts in that discipline. In all three cases, the chosen way of working has to bring the world of myth and that of facts together and encourage the search for more facts or myths to handle the problem presented until understanding is achieved. Role is signing not acting and the objects attached to the role become the means to extend belief, to further one of the searches, or to improve the clarity of the role and sharpen its focus. These three ways must be used within the device of a "frame" which attends to a central human issue. Thus, the possible frames for considering the building of a space craft might be "Do we have a right to spend money exploring space when people are starving?" or, more generally" Who decides?" or "How safe is it to travel in one of those things?" or "What does a spaceship builder contribute to our lives?" and so on. By 1978, Dorothy Heathcote was known on both sides of the Atlantic and in the Antipodes; thus the publication of Betty Jean Wagner's (1976) book Dorothy Heathcote:  Drama as a Learning Medium, was hailed with great joy by concerned teachers. The book offers several reasons why teachers should use drama and presents accounts and analyses of lessons taught by Heathcote to illustrate these functions of drama. The emphasis is on what children learn in drama and how they learn it. There are two basic premises: (a) that through "plummeting deep into feeling and meaning" children come to know in a new way; (b) That the use of symbols and of theatre elements in drama allows the participants to understand themselves in their society. (Wagner.1976, p.38) By joining the feelings the participants have experienced in the past with those of imaginary characters" distant in space, time or experience" the children come to under-stand the characters they adopt in,role after creating them in imagination. Thus, the first premise achieves an understanding of others through feeling with them, an empathy which is linked to analagous feelings the participant knows well. It goes beyond the facts of other cultures, other times, and other ways of life. It is a knowing how it is or was, rather than a knowing about. This first premise is a necessary condition of the second and is partly constituted by it. The second premise is that through the elements and the symbols of theatre (i.e., the tensions in its form and the release of those tensions), the participant builds, con-trols and examines the feeling of the other (a character the participant adopts for scru-tiny) in his/her own here and now. This is here described as left-hand knowing. The direction of this type of knowing towards cracking the codes of other subjects or toward the development of language is a large part of Heathcote's concern. The aids to enquiry which the teacher must provide in structuring and in shaping the learning in the lesson are the second concern of Wagner's book. Slowing the pace, challenging superficial thinking, distancing the children to allow for reflection, varying the register, focusing the action and the attention on the significant, and insisting on "the one big lie" to which all have agreed, are all vital strategies. Five ways in which this might be accomplished are: 1. Sharing her own point of view about values 2. Offering a conflicting view 3. Suddenly adding a condition to the agreed situation to change the focus 4. Inserting reflection periods and 5. Employing theatre elements of sound/silence, movement /stillness and light/dark. All these techniques are playwriting techniques which.capture meaning and,"hold it taut in the discipline of the art form"(Heathcote, 1980b. p.84). This form of learning through drama, is given authority by: 1. Its pedagogical structure 2. Its provision of a new way of knowing in the disciplines and 3. Its extension of language capacities. The pedagogical authority is achieved in the clear and logical consistency between formal, informal, and technical relationships. The formal relationship is between the individual and the culture— participants come to know what their culture accepts as knowledge about how things are with people in their world. The informal relationship is one in which the right to debate authority is given to the participant within the drama. The technical relationship is one in which everyone in the drama has the right to as-sume authority. All of these relationships are intrinsic to drama form and they are the basis of theatrical form. In a 1978 article Heathcote, turned her attention to drama in the service of the aca-demic disciplines to assist participants in "cracking the codes" (i.e., to discover meaning which is hidden by the syntax or by the structure of another discipline which is, as yet, imperfectly understood by the participant). The earlier idea of two forms of truth perdures, but the attention is directed to what disciplinary truths mean for ordinary people. Drama is seen as an unwinding mechanism which takes apart the cable of knowledge to search for meanings in its strands. In this article she uses the code of written text to demonstrate how drama can accomplish its unwinding. Using a set of colour graded cards to represent symbolically the different conceptions of love from modern times back to the conception of courtly love central to Troilus and Cressida she begins to crack that code. The cards have expressions of love written on them ranging from purple prose, through poetic expressions in literature, to the actual text. These are the facts with which the participants are brought into confrontation. From confrontation, the students were asked to choose the expression of love with which they most strongly identified. They explored the meanings in their chosen written declaration in group improvization. After the exploration, all the discovered meanings were put together into a journey which culminated in a confrontation with each of the characters in Troilus and Cressida (student teachers in role). The students then questioned the characters until they could understand courtly love. At the end, all the students wrote the text of Troilus and Cressida in their own words demonstrating and reinforcing their understanding of the concept. Heathcote's"! 981 article examined drama's concern with the structure of knowledge. It posited drama as an informal approach to knowing which uses the elements of theatre form to give it tempo and reflection while drawing its authority from group verification of truth. The outcome is satisfaction and the limiting factors are emotional involvement and belief. The modes of enquiry are through simulation, analogy, and role as "fixing devices." It is important to note here that the terms "simulation" and "role" were used by Heathcote in a very specific sense. Simulation refers only to events which set up the situations of the drama. It does not refer to any aspect of role. Role refers to the adop-tion of an attitude which might be looked upon as one facet of a character and should not be confused with acting. Professor James Eggleson conducted a taped interview with Dorothy Heathcote in 1982 after observing her teach. In that interview, she asserts that the function of drama in the schools is to add to the orthodox inquiry of the other disciplines an unorthodox way of looking at knowledge through "the theatre's art of signing." This art combines form, content, colour, space and light and it is this art that she borrows for the class-room, "because of the resonances the sign creates in the learning". In addition, drama moves into a special time and uses the mode of a negotiated fictional reality. Both signing and the special time of drama create another dimension in which meaning can be depicted. It is similar to the method used by scientists when they create new hy-potheses except that in drama that mental activity is manifested in behaviour. The children also meet the reality they see in a different way in drama because they are allowed to be infinitely skillful and infinitely resourceful. The teacher aids in this meeting by assuming the child has that power and also by taking over power to negoti-ate a deeper level of meaning. The teacher's intention is to ensure that there is no split between subjects in drama and the children's coming to know by means of a language of feeling. Scientific explanation and mythic explanation are equally valued and valuable, e.g., man's impact on landscape must be scientifically accurate in explanation but mythically established as an organic relationship. What people know about objects is joined with how they see themselves in relation to objects. Children in drama choose appropriate objects and rearrange them in the imaginary world so that they have ownership of the objects but only as they exist in a scientifically accurate way in reality. Once the appro-priation and rearrangement is accomplished the child can behave in an imaginary world which is not limited by artificial dissonances of subjects and one which benignly toler-ates a multiplicity of different kinds of knowledge. Therefore drama extends, elaborates and reinforces conceptual maps and also synthesises conceptual maps. Addressing the power of the time element in drama in a 1983 article, Heathcote explained that in other school subjects children deal with things that happen elsewhere than in their lives. In drama, the children are within the situation, seeing it from a pres-ent point of view. The pressure of the dramatic moment makes them draw on their experience to cope with the here and now. They have to find new ways of knowing to make new connections from those dormant past experiences. Although drama appears to move forward, it unpacks previously held conclusions because it stands still. "It is knowledge within the learner that creates the focus or drive that demands new essential knowledge" (Heathcote, 1983, p.697). Teachers must take a stance between knowing facts and knowing by intuition or knowing holistically. " As children grow and develop, it seems that the movement of one's life, who that self is, and the seeds that are there to be unfolded are the most important kinds of learning and discovery in our lives." (Heath-cote,1983, p.697). Heathcote saw children as too little in touch with the procedures of humankind's making and too much in touch with the products of that making. She in-sisted that one must create interactive knowledge by taking product knowledge back into previous personal knowledge. The teacher is also the inductor into society's values and is one side of the language dialectic. Books of all kinds are there, not just to be read and to be accepted, but also to be shouted at. Drama, therefore, must work at many dimensions of the sign and children must be viewed as crucibles of knowing which must be constantly stirred up. Heathcote's concept of the mantle of the expert was explored further in a 1985 article co-authored with Phyl Herbert. The child, in this conception, is the one who knows, in the mantle of a sociological / anthropological expert. This conception can inform all areas of the curriculum as an integrating force which is based in the social matrix of groups. The teacher can direct the child's energies to work at related tasks that are problems for the group. Learning then becomes a personal, conceptual, and social fluctuation within the power in the group. The teacher shares in the group's construction of knowledge and becomes an enabler. She negotiates her position in the group and protects their ignorance by demonstrating the value of what they know and enabling them to represent it symbolically. The purpose is to construct socially group images which illustrate the group's knowledge, and to use these to work through prob-lems. To do so the teacher must select the metaphor, define the task and the role, use teacher modelling, employ frame change to focus moves in attention, develop the im-ages of the place and situation for the drama, and rely on the ritual making power of the student. In sum, to read Heathcote, to watch her films, to listen to what others say of her and to read what others write about her is to misunderstand, at least to some extent, how she teaches drama. In this summary, therefore, an attempt is made to include this writer's idea of what it is like to be a participant in a drama led by her. In the writings about her and in her own writing we have the impression that she is deeply concerned about the children's understanding of the objective and of the mythic world. In other words, Heathcote's form of drama might be thought to be content-strong. The drama almost seems to be relegated to the position of a tool of learning in the domain of em-pirical knowledge and in the domain of values. Her second dominant concern appears to be the idea of empowering children by requiring that they view themselves as experts who are infinitely skillful and infinitely resourceful and who deal with issues. Indeed, she has said that her most important idea is the "Mantle of the Expert." It is, indeed, an idea of owerwhelming importance. It is psychologically important in its understanding of Maslow's concept of affirmation (1972). It is philosophically important in Lonergan's terms as self appropriation of knowledge and values (1978). It is important in terms of Dewey's theory of education (1938) as he discussed integration and recovery and is linked to Bruner's view of enabling the child (1970). Most importantly, for the present purposes, it is important in its relationship to the idea of giving and taking focus in the-atre which is the basis of ensemble playing (Stanislavski, C.1948). As a member of a Heathcote class, I was most conscious of this last aspect. Where I was most expert was in bringing my experience into the present situation of the drama and integrating it into the situation of the group. Yet it is an aspect of the work for which I could find no reference in the writings, tapes, or films. Even more important than the mantle of the expert, for this participant, was Heathcote's idea of brotherhoods. It is an idea that is found in theoretical literature in education, philosophy, psychology, and theatre, as is the mantle of the expert. In a drama room it is one of incredible power. As the participants moved along in the drama, believing in the fiction and creating the imagined world, Heathcote would suddenly inter-ject with, "As you stand there painting your bowls to offer to the Sun God, you are of the brotherhood of all men who have a talent to return to your deity." This interjection would plunge the work into an emotional and awe-inspiring level which lead the partici-pants into an intensely moving, highly controlled ritual, almost stunning in its beauty. This is true evocation of the natural art form, as Peter Slade (1954) so sensitively recog-nized, and it is seldom absent from Heathcote's work although it is not much empha-sized. To characterize her work as the use of theatrical forms as techniques for learn-ing other subjects is a distortion, in this writer's view. Beyond theatrical forms and in-cluding the use of them, she is able to move the participants into an engagement with the essence of the drama which is its themes. In so doing, she can produce beat and rythmn which infuse the knowing with emotional power. The knowing is secondary but firmly anchored in the art form. Heathcote's drama lessons are, if conceived of as serving learning or as cracking codes, nonetheless pure dramatic art and it is the art that puts the power in the children's hands. It is in the aesthetic experience of being in an art form and "held taut in it" that the participant is led to new understanding. All of the elements that have been so carefully worked out to help a teacher to use Dorothy Heathcote's drama methods will fail as drama, if the nature of the art form is not given in the experience of the drama that is done in her name. It will not fail in offering the improved form of learning described above. What is created in the classroom, how-ever, is more than the sum of all these parts—that is, it is art. As art it has "necessary but not sufficient conditions" (Weitz.1977.) and therefore the spectrum of attitudes and values into which the art enquires is bounded only by the complexities of the conditions of the person as being in the world and as person. Since both the person and, there-fore, the possibilities of the person's being in the world are endless and unknowable, drama then deals with the mystery as well as with that which is available for scrutiny. The discovery of this depth to the enquiry engenders wonder in the participants, an awareness of their own ignorance and a limitless curiosity. It is important to note, however, that participants in the drama classroom do not create art in every lesson. Such creation is a slow process and, as Heathcote has said, there will come a time when more and more power can be handed over to the children as they come to understand the art form. Then the teacher touches the work more and more lightly and suddenly it is there and they have made it. North American Authorities The development of an understanding of the role of drama in the schools has not been confined to Britain. In the early part of the century, the work of John Dewey had inspired Winifred Ward to initiate a program of drama/theatre into education. In her own university, there has been much support in the last 18 years for the work of Dorothy Heathcote who caused great consternation in the 1974 American Theatre Association convention in Minneapolis. Gavin Bolton, Brian Way, and Peter Slade have also visited the U.S.A. several times and their influence is present in certain areas, but for the ma-jority of American drama teachers, Winifred Ward and her pupil Gerry Brain Siks, have been the formative influences together with a strong theatre bias. The Work of Ward Winifred Ward, an American, worked for most of her life at the University of Illinois at Evanston. She became a national figure in drama in the U. S.A., both for her work in creative dramatics in classrooms and also for her contribution to theatre for children. Ward's (1930) first book, Creative Dramatics had the greatest influence on drama in the classrooms of the U.S.A.. Forty nine years later, the form of drama advocated here is present in a dissertation from Lehigh University (Pappas,1979) and a second edition of 31 a language arts text from Oregon published as late as1988 has a chapter which advo-cates like methods (De Haven.1988). Ward's first book is concerned with the use of narrative to allow children to act out the events the narrative contains. This method, she stated, causes the children to gain confidence and to become emotionally involved with the characters. A second book, published in 1939, entitled Theatre for Children set standards for what theatre could ac-complish for the child. Ward saw theatre viewing as a means of vicarious experience for the child, an experience which expanded horizons, prepared future audiences and provided possible future leisure-time activities (Ward, 1939). Either adults or children might be the actors in such theatre and the plays produced should vary according to the ages of the children. The examples illustrated in Ward's book show a concern with elaborate production of fairy tales, folk tales, and legends. A third book in 1952 remained locked into story line or plot but now there was free improvization of the characters' speech. Ward listed benefits of this activity: (a) the children think creatively and independently, (b) learn to cooperate socially, (c) under-stand the view points of others, (d) experience controlled emotional release, (e) learn to think on their feet, and (f) have fun from literature (Ward 1952). By 1957, however, Ward's perspective had shifted to embrace the idea of the child as playmaker in which he/she actively "tries on life" (Ward,1957). She defined playmak-ing as all forms of story-based or improvised drama which develop an idea into a plot with characters. Again, the work was to be an emotional outlet which developed self-expression and a feeling of worthiness while it improved social understanding and coop-eration. She advised integrating the subject areas into the playmaking and tying it together with story. This activity developed creative thinking, the ability to think on one's feet, and improved understanding through enlightened self interest and problem-solving. Ward approved and encouraged the therapeutic aspects of the work. Her book incorpo-rates sense awareness and brainstorming exercises and advocates emotion-filled ac-tion together with movement and voice training. All of the drama was to lead to evalu-ation by teachers and children in which attitudes and appreciations were to be valued above skills and facts. Drama was here characterized as the "moving force of life" leading to democratic living. In addition, in this later writing, Ward incorporated an idea which came into prominence later in the writings of Augusto Boal (1974) in theatre and in the writings of Paulo Freire (1970) in education. This idea is the notion of empower-ment of the participants in the drama. Because the drama is created by the children using their own imagination and experience, the children come to own the piece of drama they create. Dorothy Heathcote advocated the gradual handing over to the children of the decisions made in creating the drama as students become more profi-cient in the art form. As this investing of power in the drama takes place to an ever greater degree, the pieces produced come to represent more and more closely the convictions and the commitments of the group creating the drama. If the pieces pro-duced are then validated by the children's peers as true expressions of values and attitudes, the pieces created will themselves attain greater value and will allow in their creators a sense of satisfaction and eventually of pride. Thus, both a sense of owner-ship and a sense of the power of their own creations render the participants ever more committed to and competent in scrutinizing the complexities of the human condition through the drama. (Boal, 1977; Friere, 1970 (See also analysis in Chapter 3.) In 1960, Ward prepared a bulletin called "Drama With and For Children," for the U.S. Department of Health and Welfare (Ward, 1960). This document presented drama as a language art developing from the play of children which was guided by the teacher into an orderly creative process. -The drama was never to be written down, nor was it to be shown to an audience. It was a means to express creative thinking which provided the incentive for children to do research, to listen, and to evaluate. Ward made a plea for child drama as an art form and claimed that sense awareness was the beginning of aesthetic discrimination.(cf. Way, 1967). As she looked back on her career, in 1981, Ward's view of creative dramatics re-tained improvisation as its base (Ward, 1981). The claims she made for it were wide ranging. This form of drama led to personal and social development, allowed communi-cation of ideas, concepts, and feelings, and facilitated learning, values clarification and understanding. Her emphasis now was on the understanding achieved through acting out perceptions of the world. Ward pointed to the need to insist equally on logical think-ing and intuition. This combination personalized knowledge and yielded aesthetic pleasure. In sum, in the course of Ward's career, she moved from an emphasis on formal ideas in theatre and literature to an informal approach which builds its own form in the work the children create. From a dominant concern with story and plot line, her work evolved to an approach which had, as the central focus, the empowerment of the chil-dren and an eliciting of their natural aesthetic sense. However, today she is more hon-oured for her contribution to good theatre for children than she is for the development of children's classroom drama. Currently, many teachers in the U.S., believing they are following in her footsteps, cling to her earlier literary and theatrical ideas. Her later insights are " more honoured in the breach than in the observance." The Work of Richard Courtney One of the most prolific Canadian writers in drama education is Richard Courtney. His works began with a concern for the purpose of theatre in schools and moved through a consideration of classroom drama as a subject in its own right to a discussion of dramatic theory. The areas of his concern are:(a) research into drama in education, (b) clarification of dramatic theory and of the use of terms in drama, (c) attention to practice in drama to clarify its aims and goals and (d) use of drama in therapy. The following discussion concentrates only upon his theory of drama and his theory of drama in education. Courtney (1966) saw the school play as providing the content of a subject study, the means to that study and an outcome which is a demonstration of the creative life of the school. The means of inquiry in this subject study is improvization. This mode of en-quiry may lead to play-making or to the examination of a play text. Movement and speech are the tools of this enquiry and these make use of the play to refine skill in their use. The design skills for set, costume, light and sound serve to bring the school to-gether in a community enterprise which celebrates these combined efforts in a theatrical event. The school play complements a second type of activity which Courtney (1967) called classroom drama. In designing a school drama studio, he made provision for both types of activities. The classroom drama is concerned with 'Ihe natural development of the individual within his play." (1967, p. 2). It is both creative and therapeutic in its aid to natural development, and that development is a controlled, oral, physical, imaginative, social, intellectual, and aesthetic development. The assertion here is that drama is play-based. Drama as pretence, or as a response to stimuli which later moves into making up stories and acting them out, finally leads to the creation of plays or dance dramas. The development is linked to the way groups of children manipulate space. The idea of classroom drama as both creative work and as therapy is further devel-oped in Courtney's (1968) Plav. Drama And Thought, his major work in this realm. This extended work sees the imagination as a universal human capacity which is inherently dramatic. Therefore, drama is an all-embracing concept central to the whole growth of man. In the exercise of this capacity, the Apollonian use of reason and the Dyonysian expression of emotion come together to serve natural man in shaping thought. The imagination unites reason and emotion to this purpose. Evocation of the power of the imagination occurs through the senses and through play. When such natural evocation of the imagination is practised by imitating life, an art form is created. The constituents of the art form are the sensori-motor, the playing of role, and the aesthetic. The work of developing intelligence and of developing art are not separate. "Drama is an experi-ment with life in the here and now" (Courtney, 1968, p. 58). Courtney addressed the relation of imagination to dramatic art in 1971. He analysed the work of Sartre, Ryle, and Furlong, and espoused Furlong's ideas on the structure of the imagination to establish this relationship (Courtney1971). Drama is an analogue of imaginary life. The "identification" which people make in creating a character, or in relating to one, is based in the idea of action as externalized imagination through which people manipulate life. Therefore, pretence is a form of thinking (Courtney, 1971, p. 165). Courtney also linked Furlong's categories of "in imagination" and "with imagina-tion" to Peter Slade's conceptions of personal and projected play, respectively. Drama is, therefore, a synthesis of images arising from different sensory responses, both in imagination and with imagination, in action. This delineation of drama is more a fecund conception than that of imitation which relies on recalling and it produces creative work. Imagination masters internal life while action masters external life. When the two come together in imaginative dramatic play, they deal with the whole of peoples' exis-tence. Courtney (1971) linked the coming together of this duality to Piaget's operations of assimilating and accommodating, which he viewed as working together in drama. The actor, by thinking through this duality, both achieves the "real" in working "in imagi-nation" and "the mastery of the real" in working "with imagination." The application of Furlong's categories to drama yields stages in the use of the two types of imagination. The sequence, "percept—image—act," he concluded, is a basic human procedure in life and in art. The child through play, the adult through social roles, and the actor through characterization all use the sequence in action with other people. A 1973 article by Courtney described a continuum of spontaneity: at one end is the play of children and at the other is theatre. This model is a plausible one and is compa-rable to Bolton's (1974) thoughts which come from a different line of reasoning. Less plausible is his comparison of theatre and the other fine arts because it adopts the views that: 1. visual art works -sculpture and painting- are simply there in experience; 2. a musical work is constrained by conductor and composer; and 3. a work of dance is constrained by choreography; whereas 4. the theatre work is a reciprocal creation of form by actors and audiences. Courtney (1973) wanted, therefore, to establish the continuum of spontaneity from least in visual art to greatest in drama. I suggest this to be a misconception of each of these art forms and of the aesthetic dialectic itself. If it is not a misconception it is not, I suggest, a useful way of conceiving of them. If, instead of relying on spontaneity as the criterion in the argument offered here, Courtney were dealing with the interactive struc-turing of world views, the comparable insight might be more useful (see Chapter 3). Intentional use of spontaneity in the arts is, in my view, as varied as the artist's use of it and as varied as the audiences' responses will allow it to be. In an article entitled," The Discipline of Drama," Courtney (1977) attempted to estab-lish drama as a discipline whose framework is non-Aristotelian. Aristotelian frameworks are based in the literary form of playwriting, with acting and production as minor tech-niques within the art form. Non-Aristotelian approaches are those which are based in representation where production determines the art form. The non-Aristotelian ap-proach is holistic. In this approach, Courtney (1977) wrote, "Drama is the dramatic process in life as a whole and theatre is the art form of the life process" (p. 233). From our play we develop mental constructs by the interaction of our inner and outer worlds. Imagination and acting in a dramatic context are the "inherent components of natural human learning" (1979, p. 233). Theatre is not a metaphor for existence; it epitomizes it. It is the only one of the art works which exist in time and in flux, employing the whole human being as the main element of the form. It does not attempt the ideal, but at-tempts "significance in content and attempts a form which is the essence of conscious-ness" (1979, p. 237). Theatre form is a symbol of human existence and is apparent only in subsequent re-flection. It has its effect through a meeting of subjectivities (cf. Bruner's (1986) Actual  Minds Possible Worlds). The audience and the actors participate in an I/Thou relation-ship. Thus, it is an explanatory mode dealing with both existence and with natural phenemona. Theatre is equally valid for the subjective needs of child, adult, and actor. It is for all a "useful explanatory mode for coping with experience" (Courtney, 1977, p. 241). According to the level of development, it can satisfy both the dramatic and theatrical needs of an individual. It is interpretative reasoning which is meaning-giving since it involves re-cognition as a result of re-play which results in re-creation. The ideas of re-play, re-cognition, and re-creation are developed more fully in Courtney's 1982 publication Re-Plav. Here Courtney claimed that drama is central to art as a whole because it is central to the creation of meaning. Drama is persons in a context, in a culture, exploring a series of possible futures. It enquires into the dramatic nature of life and of education. In elementary school, this enquiry can lead to the basic language art and math skills which help children adjust to their existence. In secondary education, it should be a subject, as it treats meaning symbolically so that students discover new meanings in their existence. It should also, at this stage, be used as a teaching method, to provide a feeling base for learning and should infuse the whole cur-riculum. Because in drama actors use themselves, others, and objects as actual and as symbolic, they relate to everyday life and to an imagined world. Their enactment in this imaginary world provides a bridge between their inner world and their personal and cultural world, which has, as its focus, the dramatic act. They, themselves, become symbols of persons in the world and find a new way of re-cognising, that is, a new way of knowing. These insights offered by Courtney seem to be focused on what all aca-demic enquiries already do and on bringing these academic enquiries into a personal experience in drama. This approach is extremely worthwhile, since the complaints about present educa-tional institutions deal precisely with the lack of links to personal experience in what is taught. However, it is the position taken in this thesis that, while many such uses of drama are possible, and even in some contexts advisable, they do not constitute the core of the drama enquiry which addresses the values and attitudes of persons. In offering ritual, myth, and symbol as ways of knowing, Courtney has seen drama as using movement, sound, and being as the media of exploration. Within a role, moral values and community and inferential thinking provide the bases for logical thought. Because, in this process, meaning is intentionally created out of experience," transfer of meaning" is possible in drama and there is a motivation to learn which is concentrated and persistent (Courtney, 1982, p.22). Because it is an organic model of learning, it fosters creativity and giftedness, allowing children to develop as symbol makers ener-getically involved in the work of creation (1982, p.61). This view is too general and involves a tautology that weakens the persuasive power of the argument in this book. Courtney (1982) further claimed that the symbolic and abstractive development in drama, which organizes in wholes, is conducive to language learning and to language expansion and, therefore, leads to an understanding of literature (p. 68). Courtney also saw drama as therapeutic when there has been a misordering of experience. Finally, he saw it as leading to a deeper understanding of Canadian culture as people come to understand its symbolic actions because in drama the base in community action pro-vides a meeting of intentionalities. In such a meeting, one acknowledges others and their significant concerns. Summary of Courtney's Work in Educational Drama. In summary, Courtney has been greatly influenced by the work of Peter Slade (1954) in drama, by Marshal Mc Luhan (1967) in communication, and by Martin Buber (1965) in philosophical perspective, as he brought his considerable scholarship to bear on drama in education. In spite of vast differences in background, he shared, in his later writings, much in common with both Gavin Bolton and with Dorothy Heathcote. He shared the idea of a drama in education model which makes the inner outer, which reorganizes past events in the service of meaning, and which shapes future attitudes. Unlike these two latter authors, he has not taken a position on the definitive function of drama in education beyond this point. His position has been more general, in that it persists in adhering to the many purposes that drama can accomplish for people and, on the whole, he argued well for this position. Courtney, and indeed drama in education itself, is caught in a paradox. Because it uses whole human beings in its enquiry into the human condition, it can indeed turn its attention to any aspect of that condition whether that be therapy, the objective world, or the world of values. On the other hand, it is legitimate to ask what function it serves that is peculiarly its own as a discipline, as an art, or as a subject of study. In this writer's view, Courtney has not confronted this paradox. Summary and Critique of Authorities Discussed Slade's view is based in the child as the spontaneous and absorbed creator of an art form which educators can help to refine. The art form is based in children's movement which is central to their natural play and is cooperatively moulded in groups. Way wants drama to help children discover and express their inner resources. This discovery, through the senses and the expression, in using the whole person, is through a controlled and concentrated private or group form which they also discover. The educator, by providing stimuli to the senses, alerts the imagination and encourages the expression of its products. For Ward, children are interpreters and creators of stories who, through these activi-ties, discover their own values and the values of others. The educator encourages the interpretation and creation and helps children to give them form and to prepare their insights to be shown to others. She sees the work as empowering children and the sharing of the work as affirming them. Courtney sees drama as the doing of life to enable the child to re-cognise his atti-tudes and values through a re-play which re-creates past experience by enacting an imagined situation in a group. Dorothy Heathcote uses all the elements of theatre form, or whatever else that will help, gradually to hand power over to the children so that they can investigate, using their whole persons, both empirical and mythic knowledge. The educator's job is to negotiate the learning conditions and to insist on attention to universally significant meanings. Gavin Bolton advocates a tangential approach to the underlying values which are the central concern of the drama so that they are caught, not taught. The children's pur-pose is to explore the imagined situation using their past experience in action. The teacher's purpose is to demand logical thought and to insist on rigid attention to theme (significant and worthwhile concerns), so that the reflecting on the drama may cause a reappraisal of values and attitudes. Drama cannot continue in education to be all things to all persons. It can be, and probably is, both therapy and prevention. Social adjustment of behaviour undoubtedly occurs. Drama is a powerful teaching method for both the empirical and the mythic domains of knowledge. Anthropologically, it provides the ideal situation for participant observation to enable understanding between cultures and sub-cultures. It extends language and provides the means to experience many different speech registers. In its structures, drama is developmental^ related to play and is cognate with game-playing in its adherence to rules. Children can safely express themselves, create, and embody their imaginings' dreams and ambitions. They can rehearse life skills and prepare to become better teachers. But what is it as subject in a school or as discipline in a university? What is it, as Dewey asked in Art as Experience, that is "The signifi-cance that belongs to (it) when isolated in reflection?" (1934, p14). Chapter 3 39 APPROPRIATE ATTITUDES In the preceding chapter, theories of drama in education were dealt with. In the inter-pretation given, it became clear that drama was concerned with the experience of its participants, with their imaginations, with their attitudes and values, and with the rela-tionship that all of these had to the learning which takes place when participants play with these components in order to wrest meaning from their lives by creating an art form. In short, drama is a means of ordering what we come to know through being persons in the world. In this chapter, therefore, an attempt is made to made to clarify the connections between being a person in the world and one's attitudes. From a consideration of what it is to be a person, the concept of "attitude" is exam-ined through the philosophical ideas which underlie such a concept. The examination describes a possible structure of an attitude as an identifiable construct for a person at a particular time, and offers an explanation of what constitutes appropriate and less ap-propriate attitudes toward old people and toward old age. Finally, the related concepts of positive and negative attitudes, of strength of attitudes, of stereotypic attitudes, of gerontophobic attitudes, and of ageistic prejudices are considered and their relationship to the central concept of an attitude is examined. Attitude as Word The word "attitude" is widely used. It characterizes aspects of animate and inani-mate objects as well as characterizing human behaviour. In this thesis, the use of the word "attitude" to characterize rocks, plants, or animals is assumed to refer either to (a) the orientation or stance of an object within a context or (b) a metaphoric use: 1. The use of the word "attitude" to express an orientation within a context was origi-nally an aesthetic use of the term. It referred to the position and stance of a figure within a frame or within a context. This use may provide considerable insight into the concept of an attitude as it is to refer to human beings, and as such it will be employed to begin the analysis. 2. The metaphoric use, which assigned to inanimate objects the attributes of hu-mans, is found extensively in literature. The assumption of literary intent may be readily accepted in the case of rocks or plants, e.g. "the mountains frowned their disapproval of the scene" or "the attentive asters rustled appreciatively." However, this use is less readily acceptable in the case of animals. Metaphoric extension of the use of the word "attitude" into the realm of mental opera-tions is found in the early psychological literature. Metaphor was used in these early writings to characterize a phenomenon which the psychologist had discerned but for which there was not, as yet, any scientific definition. As a result of the use of the word in this psuedo-scientific sense, the distinction between true metaphoric (literary) use and "scientific" reference became blurred. Therefore, when animals are characterized as having an attitude, the extent to which the intent is concrete, metaphoric, or scientific may not be clear. It may be argued that the ascription of an attitude to an animal is a legitimate de-scription of the animal's observed behaviour. If, then, the use of the word "attitude" is limited to one instance or to many of observed behaviour, such arguments may have some justification. The position adopted here is that the word "attitude," as commonly used, ascribes to the actor who manifests a certain behaviour, much more than the behaviour concerned. Over long periods of use, the two meanings of the word have run together. Therefore, what is meant in ascribing an attitude is clear only when the context makes clear which of the meanings is intended. Attitude ascribes to an actor the quality of at least some emotional investment in the behaviour. For example, animals who "slink away" from a situation (observed behav-iour) often have ascribed to them an emotion of fear. There is little hesitation, too, in ascribing the emotion of anger to the behaviour of animals when their attitudes are described as "ferocious" or "threatening." The ascription of such emotional descriptions may not, in fact, be justified and may lie in the interpretation of the animal's behaviour which the human observer makes—an interpretation, moreover, which may owe more to the reactions of the human viewer than to any emotional investment by the animal. This thesis is not concerned with the attitudes of animals, nor indeed with whether or not one may justifiably talk about attitudes in animals whatsoever. The use of language has been raised at the outset to indicate two important questions in the consideration of human attitudes: (a) What position does human behaviour hold in the concept of an attitude? and (b) What role does interpretation of behaviour, whether in emotional or in any other terms, play in influencing what it is that one may justifiably designate as an attitude? There is a need to question why, if attitude is merely a synonym for behaviour, the word is used at all. These two behaviour-related concerns are discussed more fully at the end of the philosophy section of the chapter. PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS: PART 1 This thesis is concerned first of all with attitudes of persons to other persons. Specifi-cally, it is concerned with the attitudes of Grade 5 school children to elderly persons. It is also concerned, though perhaps less directly, with the attitudes of the Grade 5 chil-dren to the process of aging taking place in their own lives. The concept of a person Because this thesis is concerned with attitudes of persons, it is necessary, first of all, to be clear about the way in which one conceives of a person. P.F. Strawson, the Wayneflete professor of metaphysics at Oxford University, has been knighted for his contribution to philosophy. He has integrated metaphysics and linguistic philosophy and extended the scope of linguistic philosophy beyond the limits set by its more empirically oriented adherents. Strawson has pointed out that the idea of a person is a first-order concept. He asserted, in other words, that it makes no sense to conceive of some mental, intellectual or emotional entity divorced from a corporeal entity. Strawson ex-plained: What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness, and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, are equally applicable to a single individual of that type The con-cept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. (1966 pp. 135-137). From this postulate, and using the original meaning of the term "attitude" as that of stance or orientation to objects, "attitude"can be seen as a perspective from which to view persons as both corporeal entities and as states of consciousness. Stances which refer to persons, and in that reference intend to encompass the person's meaning for an observer, in phrases such as, "that is a good mind," are there-fore inappropriate. On the other hand, the phrase, "She/he has a good mind" is appro-priate, if such is the case, since the logically secondary nature of "mind" has been made clear. Strawson (1962) stated further that in dealing with the concept of person "we have to do with a class of predicates to the meaning of which it is essential that they should be both self- ascribable and other ascribable" (p. 137). Therefore, the concept of a person includes all aspects if, and only if, both consciousness and corporeality, are ascribed in equal measure to all others. All that we can discern in our own consciousness such as desires, wants, needs, goals, and means, or bodies such as pain or strength, must all be given equal recognition in the persons of others (whether or not we judge such to be demonstrated) before we can be said to realize fully the concept of a person. A logically appropriate attitude toward persons, as a result, will consist in recognizing the corpore-ality and the states of consciousness of all others as equally constraining as that of our own personhood. To say of others that they have no goals, or compassion, or capacity to love, while asserting or implying our own goals, compassion, or love, is to contradict Strawson's second postulate. Already we may discern the possibility of adopting postulates for the person other than those offered by Strawson. We may, for example, have a concept which regards states of consciousness of a person as logically prior to that of personhood. This would imply a different attitude toward the person and would affect other attitudes we might hold towards individual persons. For example, it would perhaps imply that we view the operation of conscious states as those to which we must attend in ascriptions of person-hood, thus largely discounting the corporeal aptitudes and capacities of the person. At the very least, we would view the physical capacities as less worthwhile than the mental capacities. Adoption of such a stance would then lead us to value chiefly those states of consciousness which an individual could demonstrate for us and to undervalue cor-poreal capacities. Our attitudes toward persons would then become attitudes toward demonstrated states of consciousness. Again, in examining the second postulate, if we hold to Strawson's first postulate of unified entity but ignore or deny the necessity that such an entity be other ascribable, then we have limited our stance to one which might be characterized as ego- centred. Such a stance is often demonstrated by young chil-dren when they are challenged about a behaviour and plead, "But mummy, I want to be good." What they very often mean is that they want to desire to be good. They see that they have demonstrated that they do not want to be good but plead that they have a second order volition to want to be good, rather in the fashion of a St. Augustine who prays "God make me good but not yet." If we claim that such small children have no second-order volitions, we may be ascribing to them a type of non-personhood which is not well founded (cf. Dennett, 1976). The ability or willingness to demonstrate any of the states of consciousness cannot be a criterion of personhood, since a lack of demonstration does not imply the lack of the state of consciousness. If we consistently follow a stance which asserts that only what is demonstrated is present, our views of persons will clearly be influenced by that stance—it will mould our views attitudes toward other persons. In acknowledging old persons only as both consciousness and as corporeal entity, we may ignore or deny their goals or their means while at the same time asserting the importance of our own. We may assume that their goals and means do not exist because they are not demon-strated or asserted. Such an assumption would be inappropriate under rigorous applica-tion of Strawson's two postulates. It-would constitute an inadequate attitude to a per-son. These basic notions will be central as we come to consider, later in the chapter, attitudes as they apply to relations between persons. Person as Being in the World Since, however, a person cannot be conceived of as existing without a context for that existence (i.e., as a human actor of some kind), we will consider now the human person as a being in the world. Strawson (1962) saw the human being in the world as existing in an A-Relation to that world; that is, the individual is both (a) affected by that world and (b) affects it. All that is external to the person will therefore be available to affect him/her and to be af-fected by him/ her. Social mores, physical environment, discrete objects, the world news, indeed, all that is other exist in these two types of dialectical relationships with the person (Riegal, 1979). By choosing either one of these stances to the world, the person adopts an attitude to himself/ herself as a being in the world. The two types of action specified by Strawson and based on the notion of form are form-producing and form-yielding actions. The concept of form used is one of discerned pattern, order, or structure in the latter use, that is, form yielding-F.Y., and of created pattern, order, or structure in the former use i.e., form producing-F.P. The following section contains on exploration of the two types of action delineated by Strawson and a discussion of their implications for clarify-ing appropriate attitudes to persons. Form-Yielding First we will deal with our stance as we yield to the form in what we experience as external to us. Strawson (1959) has conceived of the individual, when affected by externals, as adopting a form-yielding mode of action. When, therefore, individuals look at something, the sensation they experience will become, almost simultaneously, their perception of that object, or of those aspects of the object, to which they attend. This action might be described as" taking a look" ( Lonergan, 1978). At the level of naive realism, the assumption will be, in such a situation, that "what is" can be seen by taking a look. "I saw it, measured it, etc." is the reason and justification given for the explana-tion or description of the form observed. This is accurate if and only if, the "I" in the sentence is not forgotton. I choose for attention those aspects of the object that my experience has led me to recognize and make sense of. Which aspects of the object I select for my attention will make a crucial contribution to the attitude which an individual develops towards an object. The role which selection and attention play in their contri-bution to an attitude will depend on the experience of the person "taking a look." As we consider the form- yielding actions of the person, it is crucial to note that what will be-come meaningful to him/her in some way, is usually as a result of one of two ap-proaches to the object. The approach might be one of recognition of the object as belonging to a previously acquired category, that is, "Oh, that's a ." Or it might be one of non-recognition, that is, "What is that?". In the second case, the. examination must begin with the search for some aspect of the object, to which our attention was drawn by its salience, which we recognize from previous experience in order that we may begin to make sense of it. We may assert that, in this type of attention, we assign initial meaning to the object and then proceed to search it to achieve clarity in that meaning. The object guides our efforts. Thus: 1. F.Y., subject to previous experience either in categorization or in response to salience, is a response which is a relatively passive one in that the viewer accepts and inquires into aspects (generally easily available) of the form or partial form as given in the object. 2. Those aspects which we select to attend to are based on a subjective decision and lie in our experience as well as in our preferences. Therefore, both the attention, with its results, and the selection, which is subjective, must be scrutinized to see whether our conclusions about the object are justified. Meynell (1985), after Lonergan (1978), has suggested that verification of the results of the attention only, does not justify a conclusion by itself—selection, too, must be examined and justified. 3. We must, in effect, give good reasons to justify our subjective selection in order to achieve a critical realism ( cf. naive realism). Strawson's (1962) form yielding actions might be related to Bruner's (1976) notion of concept acquisition, to Witkin's (1976) notion of field-dependence, or to Piaget's (1976) notion of accommodation. Whatever the relationships, the adoption of a form-yielding stance carries with it an intention to attend to what is external to the self, that is, to an object of some kind which is other. In this attention the implication is that the actor is capable, by the exercise of his/her senses or some techonological extension of them, of discerning some aspect of the form that is intrinsic to the object of his/her attention. 4. An actor, in other words, is capable of discerning some part of what is in fact the case about the object in question. As a result, therefore, of the aspect to which the person chooses to attend, and of his/ her acceptance of what is in fact the case about that aspect of the object, the actor, in form-yielding operation, has adopted a stance or attitude to the object. Furthermore, the discernment and acceptance of form becomes the person's subjective experience of the object and constitutes his/her construction of that object's meaning for him/her in the world. 5. Persons are intending to make the object in the world meaningful to them as a result of attention to and examination of that which is other. Thus, the stance or attitude adopted has the added power of the meaning with which they have has invested it, as a result of their form-yielding efforts. It must then be the case that the meaning and the stance adopted, i. e., the attitude in our present construction, become inextricable and mutually support one another. For example , if we attend to the work habits of an indi-vidual we have selected those work habits for our attention. If then we note that there is much activity and little result from the work, we may take that to mean that the individual observed is not a very effective worker. 6. Our stance toward the individual will then be determined by the meaning for us, or by the value, which we place upon effectiveness in the given situation or context. If the value placed upon effectiveness is high in the context, we may be dismiss that individ-ual as a person. By selecting work habits for our attention and by arriving at a stance which is dismissive of personhood, both the objective evidence and the subjective se-lection have a part to play. In dismissing the person as a result only of the justified objective stance, we have ignored other aspects of the person and perhaps of the con-text and we have failed to provide justification for our selective attention. As a result, we have not only inadequately dealt with the concept of person, but we have also inade-quately scrutinized the form-yielding we have done. The dismissive stance we have adopted is unjustified. This we may describe as an inappropriate attitude. An appropri-ate attitude would be a stance arrived at as a result of a justified subjectivity, of a justi-fied objectivity, and of a justified interaction between the two. The judgements ren-dered, both subjective and objective, are a dialectical selection from both objective and subjective positions. The six points made above have rested both on the work of Strawson and on the works of the less well known Lonergan (1978) and Meynell (1985). It is the case that the work of Heidegger (1977) also supports the position taken here. In this difficult task of providing justification for the stances we take in adopting atti-tudes, Strawson has not failed us (Strawson 1966). The subjective component of the position just described is one application of the person as form producer. This aspect will be examined when we deal with the person being in the world as form producer in the next section. In endeavours of form yielding, however, it is often not possible to examine the ob-ject under consideration at first hand. So, in many instances, the form-yielding that we do is to a form discerned and interpreted by others and accepted in general by the society within which we live. In this latter case, we become acceptors of meaning rather than makers of meaning and such acceptance is, of necessity, more often unexamined than not. Our stances are often, in this instance, those we adopt from others without asking whether they are appropriate and without examining what relevant aspects of the object or context we have left out of consideration, that is, we accept without scrutiny the judgements and the attitudes of others. To extend the example cited above to this type of case, we may accept the judgement of another's inefficiency without asking how that judgement was arrived at, and without asking what considerations, other than ineffi-ciency, are relevant to the making of the judgement of the other as a person. We may, in addition, ignore or accept unquestioningly the subjective selections which have been made by the person offering the judgement. It may be, for instance, that the cited lack 47 of results, while it does not suit the individual making the judgement, may be a cause for approbation since it is the result of a painstaking checking of results, essential to the enterprise upon which he/she is engaged. Thus, if we are to claim that our scrutiny of others results in appropriate attitudes, form-yielding activities and the meanings we abstract from them should be carefully and thoroughly examined in context, with atten-tion to as many factors as possible, both in the context and in the person about whom we are making a judgement. Summary of Part 1 The above analysis on form-yielding activities of the person as being in the world, show that attitude or stance is inextricable from idiosyncratic meaning. What we know, as a result of what we select for our attention and as a result of the past meanings we can relate it to, is in this sense a subjective construction of knowledge. What is the case and the meaning together result in a judgement being made. Such a judgement must rely on good reasons as a result of close examination of the context and of any persons involved including the self. Given that all of the above steps have been fol-lowed by an individual, it might be claimed that such an individual has made a valid judgement and justifiably holds the stance or attitude he/she adopts which is based on the valid judgement. In short, we have the position of an appropriate attitude as a stance adopted as a result of a valid judgement which is based in careful examination of all aspects of context and of person which we can discern. Such a stance is supported by good reasons derived from the examination. ( The term "good reason" as it is used in this thesis refers to those reasons, within a particular situation, which by consensual agreement conform to present understanding of what is in fact the case.) This is a position of "critical realism" (Meynell, 1889) where "true objectivity lies in authentic subjectivity" (Lonergan, 1978). This analysis has resulted from reflection upon the postulates of Strawson (1966) and is supported by the insights of Heidegger (1977) as they operate in our lives. The position stated is conceived of as being an ideal posi-tion and, as such, would rarely be realized because of the stringency of its conditions. Socratic censure of the unexamined life appears to advocate a similar position and stringency. Form Producing The second activity of persons as beings in the world which Strawson (1966) de-scribes is that of form production. In the second half of the A-Relation the individual is seen as form-producing. Again, a similar notion occurs in Bruner (1976) as concept formation. Similar ideas are those of field independence (Witkin, 1976) and Piaget's (1976) notion of assimilation. In each case the actor assumes a greater measure of control and functions as a meaning-maker who creates forms by the manipulation of ideas and of objects. As we have seen, the form-yielding and form-producing activities may be all but inseparable. In this section, form production will be seen as the primary intention of the actor. Personal Subjective Meaning To make sense of the human condition of being in the world we create forms which aid in understanding that condition. The central focus of the actor's attention here seems to be on achieving insight into what might be the case. Some intermediate products of such activity might be hypotheses formulation, a tentative construction of an art form, or creating our construct of an individual whom we need to understand. The raw materials for such formulations or constructions are both the internal, sub-jective ideas and responses of the individual and the objective, external world which he/ she inhabits. Both ideas and external objects are manipulated by the actor to derive and to express new insights. In this case, the actor is actively creating what are to him/ her new idiosyncratic meanings i.e., personal meanings. There are five symbol systems which can be used to create such meaning embodi-ment. They are word, number, image, gesture, and sound (Dennett, 1985; Gardiner, 1980; Hirst, 1989). That these meanings are subjective in their initial formulations does not imply that they will remain in such a subjective and unexamined state. For such meanings to become other than particular in their application, for them to come to repre-sent insights which are of practical and widespread use in the life even of one individual, they must be scrutinized as to their applicability. In particular, it is by employing what we already know as a result of experience that we evolve personal meaningful forms. Also, the new form must represent for us a further insight that is worthwhile or we shall merely repeat what we already know. The insight will be worthwhile if it has value for our understanding but it will be more worth-while if it has utility in enabling us to attain a variety of understandings, i.e., if the insight is fecund. 49 Individual Value of Form Production Therefore, the value we place upon the forms we produce will have a spatio-temporal context. Such value will be rooted in what we have come to know and to value in the past. It will contribute to present understanding and it will have the potential to contrib-ute to future understandings. In each of the time frames, it will have either a wide rang-ing or a narrow applicability. Thus, its value is, in the individual personal sense, tied to both the contribution the insight makes in space-time and to the width of the applicabil-ity—in short, to its strength and to its fecundity. The claim to strength will be supported only by scrutinizing the insight for good rea-sons. Again, the scrutiny must begin with an examination of the meaning the insights hold and of the generalizability of such a meaning. Consider now the playwright building the characters in a play. What factors in the past of the character may be invented to provide good reasons for the character's present petulance? What present and future applications might be derived to support or to justify such petulance in the given circum-stances of the play? Is the character's petulance, experience, and justification appli-cable, directly or by analogy, to the real experience of the author? What factors have been omitted from consideration, and which selected for attention? Is the selection which has been made justified by good reasons and does it distort any aspect which is in fact the case? If such distortion occurs, can good reasons be provided to justify the distortion? Such questions are asked in the service of achieving a judgement about the value of the form produced by an individual. The form itself will reveal a meaning for the individual and as such will have a value for that individual. The scrutiny of the value in the way indicated will, at the individual level, either enhance or diminish the value of the form. Thus, the individual stance to the form will be either reinforced or undermined. Also, in the applicability of the form, its fecundity will be either reinforced or under-mined. If the insight is found to be fecund, the value will be increased for the individual and again the individual stance to the form will be reinforced. Public Assent to Individually Created Forms If the stance, on careful individual scrutiny, is reinforced, then the new insight must be submitted to public scrutiny to provide verification or falsification of the insight. In the case of our playwright, if the stances adopted by a character, the experiences of the character's past, the authenticity of the emotion in the given circumstances, and the future consequences of the character's actions find their resonances in the lives of the audience and provide valuable insight into what might be the case about some aspect of the human condition, then the insight becomes fecund in the lives of those audience members. Should public verification be obtained, then the individual attitude will be one of increased value accorded to the form. To determine an attitude to the form produced and toward its creator requires individual scrutiny and public scrutiny, careful examina-tion, providing good reasons based on the examination and honoring the form as a valid insight. Thus, in the case of an art work or of a scientific theory, as well as in the case of our assessments of other persons, individual scrutiny followed by public verification will result in either acceptance or in rejection of the form. Because the form is a new insight, it may well call into question previously accepted insights. Attitudes to the previ-ously accepted forms must therefore be re-examined in its light. Thus, in contrasting Strawson's two modes of being in the world, we note that, in form-yielding activities, the attention of the actor is other directed and the intention is to come to understand that which is other. In the case of form-producing activities the attention is inward and self-directed and the intention is to create forms to embody insights in a new structure of ideas and objects. In the former case, the question is, "What meanings exist in these?." In the case of the latter, the question is, "How can form be given to my ideas and these objects to embody new insights (meanings) ?" A P P R O P R I A T E A N D I N A P P R O P R I A T E ATTITUDES TO BEING IN T H E W O R L D In the above discussion we have seen that, in the case of both form-yielding and of form- producing activities of the person as being in the world, it is the making of mean-ings which is the intention that drives each action. In both cases, the endowing of an object or of an experience with meaning will lead to an attitude toward the object or the experience as a result of the value of its meaning. If the meaning attained is reinforced by past knowledge and by present and future applicability, the value of the meaning is enhanced. The validation or verification of such meanings will increase their value and reinforce a positive attitude adopted toward them. To provide such validation or verifi-cation, scrutiny of the meanings in their contexts must be carried out and good reasons for asserting their value must be found to justify the attitude adopted toward them. The selection for attention of aspects of objects, of situations, or of persons must also be justified. Without such a scrutiny and justification, the attitude adopted to the object or person as a result of its value cannot itself be justified. Individual scrutiny and valuing of objects and persons is further validated and verified by submitting the examination, justification, and insight to public assent or question. Inappropriate attitudes will consist in the refusal or resistance to any of these steps. Appropriate attitudes will therefore result from the conscientious following of such steps and from the arriving at a justifiable attitude based upon them. R E F U S A L O F FORM-YIELDING OR F O R M P R O D U C I N G C A P A C I T I E S Strawson's formulation arose as a result of his analysis of Kant's (1966) Critique of  Pure Reason. The two modes of action delineated by Strawson (1966) might be con-sidered also as two discrete stances adopted by an individual to his/her being in the world. If we consider one aspect of what we mean by an attitude as a stance adopted by a person, Strawson's modes may, in this sense, be thought of as constituting two quite different attitudes towards what we mean by being in the world. For example, those who consciously persist in choosing to operate in a form-yielding mode will cling to other-created forms. Their reliance is on the public assent which is accorded a par-ticular view of the matter and ignores the selections (including their own) which have been made to arrive at that view. This is one type of unjustifiable attitude. A possible consequence of such a choice, in the extreme case, would be to view the world as determining our actions in it, and the meanings drawn from its forms would assume a disproportionate predominance in our lives, for example, an "it is here in black and white" attitude to print. Yet it is also possible that many persons, in responding to their world by being affected by it, do not yield to the forms which others agree may be dis-cerned in it. Rather, they refuse to accept the evidence of their senses, of scientific explanation, or of good reasons and as a result they refuse to yield to what is generally accepted as being the case. They, quite simply, place their own construction upon it. We might in such a case, where there is rejection of right reason, or of justified true beliefs, or of both, view the reaction as irrational and characterize it as an unjustifiable attitude to what is in fact the case, for example, believing the world is flat. Equally, in the matter of form-producing activities of the person, there may be those who, in large part, neglect the exercise of form production. They prefer, instead, to view what is in dispute or what is available to them to mould into a new insight or artifact, either as incomprehensible or as already rigidly constrained in a form or within some limits. In the case of incomprehension, there is a part of experience which is rejected or not dealt with. In the case of constraints or limits accepted without good reason, there are those who, for example, cling to one school of painting and dismiss any other as bad art. Or there are those who, in conceiving of God, limit their conception to that promulgated by only one religion. In both cases there is an obvious curtailment of the activities of the person as a result of an incomplete conception of what it is to be a person. This leads to an inappropriate attitude to one of the possibilities of being in the world. We might be justified in claiming that such a person is limited as a person by an inappropriate attitude toward being a person in the world. This limitation will also re-strict, as Strawson has also pointed out, the concept of personhood when we apply it to our consideration of others. From the foregoing, it may be seen that the concept of personhood is weakened by the embracing of unexamined false belief, by failing to address the incomprehensible, and by adherence to limited beliefs. This shortfall is the result of inappropriate attitudes to the two basic form-yielding and form-producing activities of the person as being in the world, outlined in Strawson's work. The inappropriate attitude is due, in turn, to an inadequate conception of the person as being in the world or to an inadequate response to an adequate conception of a person as being in the world. We might therefore posit that the concept of the person and the concept of attitudes to the activities of a person are basic and mutually constitutive, that is, by allowing of unlimited possibilities in form production and unlimited capacity to yield to right reason and to justified true belief the person might be conceived of as untrammeled by inappropriate attitudes. By curtailing form production and refusing to yield to right reason and justified true beliefs, the person might be conceived of as being limited by inappropriate attitudes. But the emphasis must be that acceptance of discerned forms, or of those accepted by the wisdom of the day, is always provisional. The nurturing of a questioning and critical attitude to accepted and discerned forms would, under Strawson's construction, be a necessary condition of maintaining the fullest potential for form-producing activi-ties. Therefore, an adequate stance to form-yielding and form producing activities of the person is that of critical realism (Meynell, 1989). Such a stance implies reflection upon and scrutiny of objective, contextual, and subjective aspects of judgements. If we ac-cept that this latter stance is implied, we are close to Heraclitus's notion of constant flux. In other words, Strawson's formulation allows us to see that the state of our knowl-edge at any time provides both the challenge to our present knowledge and the impetus to create new forms of order, given that we see both modes of acting in the world as essential, that is, that we have appropriate attitudes based in our understanding of what it is to be a person. Both our present knowledge of what is, in fact, the case and of what is in dispute are the basic tools available to human persons as they strive to make sense of the world and of themselves in the world. A P P R O P R I A T E ATTITUDES A N D S T R A W S O N ' S P O S T U L A T E S OF T H E P E R S O N This analysis so far has relied on Strawson's (1962) three postulates on personhood. The first is that the concept of a person is logically prior to both the corporeality and the states of consciousness of the person. The second is that it is logically necessary that predicates which are self-ascribable are also other-ascribable. The third postulate is that the actions of a person as being in the world are either form-producing and/or form-yielding activities. The first postulate allows us to see that any attention to logically secondary aspects of the person without reference to the logically primary entity of person constitutes a distortion of the concept of a person. Therefore, stances adopted to selected aspects only are inappropriate ones. In this thesis, the original meaning of the word "attitude" as a stance adopted toward an object has been the one employed to examine the concept of an attitude. As a result of the first postulate, inappropriate attitudes to persons would be those that are adopted as a result of attention to some aspect of the person without attending to all other aspects which can be discerned and without attending to the awareness that there are aspects of the person which cannot be discerned. As a result of Strawson's first postulate, in what then would an appropriate attitude to persons consist? We must first of all admit that we can never know the complete entity that is a person. Therefore, an appropriate attitude would first have to be the same as that which we adopt toward the mysterious. Some aspects of such an attitude might be those of reverence toward the mysterious, the awareness of our own ignorance and a consequent quality of re-spect together with a desire to understand, that is, an insatiable curiosity and question-ing attitude. In the examination of the second postulate, appropriate attitudes seem to reinforce those discerned in the examination of the first postulate. If others are unknowable in their entirety then we have an unknowable self too. We now have some idea of respect and reverence for self as well as a humility in the face of our own ignorance and curios-ity and questioning of the unknown.—both self-ascribable and other-ascribable. As a result of the third postulate, we have argued that appropriate attitudes consist in continuous and rigorous scrutiny of the forms we produce and accept, of the values we place upon those forms, and of the attitudes we adopt to the meanings that those forms have for us, individually and publicly. In addition, consideration of the work of Lonergan (1978) and Meynell (1985) and Heidegger (1977) reveals the need for self scrutiny. This scrutiny can be accomplished only after careful examination and after justification of the values and attitudes discerned by the offering of good reasons. When such form-producing and form-yielding activities are directed toward the understanding of, the valuing of, or the attitude toward another person, some appropri-ate attitudes must consist in: (a) careful scrutiny of our own values, attitudes, and rea-sons as well as of the forms we accept or produce, (b) examination of what is, as well as of what might be the case, (c) consciousness of our own ignorance, and (d) respect for the mystery of persons as well as for their form producing and form-yielding activities.These four notions might be viewed as cornerstone conceptions of appropriate attitudes. PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS: PART 2 The second section of the philosophical inquiry into the concept of an attitude ex-pands the ideas of the first section by examining the practical actions of a person in the exercise of his/her form-yielding and form-producing capacities. Intention and Order Intrinsic to Strawson's (1968) analysis is the necessary condition of intention to be either form yielding or form producing. The person, as we have seen, can decide to limit or to refuse either mode. This does not mean that such intention is conscious, although the need to understand is often a conscious struggle. We might say that a primary intention is to understand or to make sense of both the self and what is other. This intention appears to be related in some sense to attitude. If self as person—or equally other as person—is misconceived (inappropriate attitude to person) then the intention to understand is restricted by an inappropriate attitude. That is, the acquisition of subjective meaning is impeded by inappropriate attitudes which consist of inadequate conception of the idea of a person. Intention here is concerned with the acceptance or the production of form. Joined to the notion of intention then, we have a picture of a person as one who intends to under-stand by creating order. The order the person intends is then the discernment of sub-jective meaning. Oakes (1988), in his analysis of Weber, points out that, Action defined by subjective meaning, as the logically required object of under-standing or interpretation [relies on]...intentions, beliefs, motives, purposes determined by value judgements....[and that]....character is formed by the choices made. Thus the ideas and ideals of actors lead to personal coherence which is potentially unlimited. When there is shared coherence we are moving towards some order under limits which produces ideal types which have cultural relevance, (p.32) Dialectic Tension The intended order has to be the ordering of something according to some criteria. One basic system for ordering would be what is true and what is not, another what is beautiful and what is not, and a third what is good and what is not. These would give rise to sense-seeking, justice-seeking and harmony-seeking as some order-making activities which are proper to a person as an intentional agent. In other words, the person would aspire to truth, to beauty and to goodness and would use his/her form-yielding and form-producing modes of action to reach for them. In reaching for beauty, for example, individuals would then both yield to the beauty in the forms they encounter and would also strive to produce beautiful forms. In reaching for truth, they would yield to forms which most truly represent what is, in fact, the case and would strive to discover forms which would more closely explain what is, in fact, the case. In seeking goodness, they would yield to the forms of goodness encountered and search for ways to create good forms. In all three searches, individuals would also be required to question and to be critical of all the extant forms and to justify the accep-tance or rejection of each. Equally, in form production, justification of each creation would be a necessary condition. The justification in each case would lie both in the reasons given and in the argument presented using those reasons. The submission of these reasons and arguments to public scrutiny and in the acceptance of the forms by others as meaningful, validates the form produced and validates the need to question further the form to discern its inadequacies. The ideal person as being in the world strives always to find deficiencies in the ex-tant forms of beauty, truth, and goodness, and equally strives to create forms which more nearly approach these ideals. Thus, these persons seeks to disorder and to order. Persons will only be ideal, however, if they assign to all other persons the same capacities and intentions. In short, appropriate attitudes to persons as beings in the world will include a conception of a person's capacity both to seek disorder and equally to seek its re-ordering and to assign to all others a like capacity and intention. The form-yielding and form-producing activities of the person are thus in constant dialectic both in themselves as actions and within the categories of order and disorder to which the person attends. Thus, the fact of being both form yielding and form producing produces a dialectic tension between what makes sense and what does not in the search for truth, between what is harmonious and what is not in the search for what is beautiful, and between what is just and what is not in the search for what is good. The need to flout or question existing accepted forms in this sense leads to new constructions and these new con-structions lead to further questions. Temporary resolution will lead to changes in the ways in which persons view the world, and therefore themselves in the world, even if they have achieved the ideal attitude to the person as being in the world. As individuals confront such temporary resolutions, they themselves are changed by the moment of resolution as they confront the present accepted order and adjust to it. Summary of the Implications of Strawson's position The consideration of Strawson's view of the person in the world as both form-produc-ing and form-yielding may then be seen as leading to the notion of the human person as an intentional maker of order. Confronting the dialectics of sense/non-sense, of har-mony/disharmony, and of justice/injustice, persons arrive, from time to time, at moments of balance, or of temporary resolution. In these moments, with reflection and scrutiny, persons have an ongoing and evolving insight into themselves as beings in the world and have re-constituted their self through developing this insight. Secondly, in the Strawson view, they will see all others as following exactly the same ongoing and evolu-tionary process of intentional order making and resultant self re-constitution. Thirdly, persons will not be viewed as sums of discrete parts—mind, body, emotion etc.—but as whole human persons who are primary actors in their efforts at sense-making, har-mony-seeking, and justice- seeking. The ideal person, then, as a result of being in the world, will have a critical and questioning attitude to all extant forms and will be continu-ally creating new forms as a whole human actor who reconstitutes self through criticiz-ing, questioning, and creating. This ideal person will also assign to others similar ca-pacities as they pursue like intentional activities as a necessary condition of being a person in the world. For such an ideal person, what are appropriate attitudes toward others? Before an attempt can be made to answer such a question, one must move away from the commonalities of persons as beings in the world and consider briefly what is meant by the individuality of individuals. Individuals It is widely accepted that the corporeal structure of each person is different from that of every other. The findings of genetics have been strong enough to demonstrate that this is, in fact, the case. Therefore, in our corporeal nature, a second order considera-tion, we can be thought of as individuals simply by attending to this fact. There are also those conditions or those contexts within which we come to attend to our world and to our concept of the self in the world which is commonly referred to as our nurturing con-text. Even siblings' individual nurturing context are vastly different. Their nature de-mands both that they attend to different aspects of their surroundings from their other siblings and that others treat them differently because they are perceived to be different in their natures. The physical conditions of the nurture of siblings may change drasti-cally and the social milieu may also be altered as new children are born. The experi-ences and reactions to those experiences build both upon the corporeal differences and on the diversity of contexts to emphasize the individuality of individuals. Both nature and nurture, then, contribute to the differences between individuals. As individuals, the value they assign to the various form-yielding and form- produc-ing activities which are available to them as persons in the world will then depend on their nature and upon their nurturing. The educational experiences that individuals receive, and their idiosyncratic responses to it, will further shape the pursuits, as per-sons in the world, which they deem to be worthwhile (Rorty, 1976). Thus, the second consideration of persons as individuals as well as persons in the world leads to idiosyncratic self-construction. The view which individuals then take of the activities of form yielding and of form production will be affected by their idiosyn-cratic nature and nurture. Suppose for a moment that all persons have an ideally realized conception of the person as being in the world. They will still have in their sense-making, harmony-seek-ing, and justice-seeking activities, to name only a few possibilities, certain individual aspirations and intentions which are more valuable to them than are others because of their nature and nurture. They will have predelictions, needs, wants and desires, per-ceptions, apprehensions and intuitions which will lead them to value the true, the beauti-ful, and the good to different degrees and, therefore, to assign effort to those pursuits which have the greatest value for them as individuals. Since this valuing will affect the selection, attention, concentration, and effort, it may reinforce the values themselves. As reinforcement takes place, one area at a time, it will, at any one time, appear as if the others are not valued at all. Then the stance or attitude of the individual will appear, at that time, to be positive to the central concern and neutral or negative toward other endeavours. As individuals move through the present concerns, one at a time, they give strong attention to one and cursory, or even no attention, to others. If, however, they reach a moment of balance or resolution, then reflection upon themselves as persons in the world will show a core of predominant concerns or values which tend to perdure as they move from one type of effort to another. In some individuals, the pursuit of truth predominates while less effort is expended on the search for beauty or goodness. In others, goodness will predominate and so on. For many people, it is likely that some aspect of each will be an important value and will be intermittently attended to, although one area is given the lion's share of their effort at any one time and even overall. That is, for each individual one might say there are cornerstone predelictions. This type of pattern might be described as the consistent core of values for that person and that core may have its own hierarchy which makes its demands for attention and effort on the selection. Thus, when an individual is acting without constraints, the selection for attention and effort should, in this construction, be evidence of a consistent core of values which determine an individual's attitudes or stance toward the areas to which he/ she chooses to attend. These ideas would support the view mentioned earlier that attitudes are realized in the behaviours that individuals choose to exhibit. While this thesis might be supported for the ideal person acting only with his/her need to pursue truth, beauty and goodness in mind, it can easily be the case that the pursuit is not the result of a need but of a want, a desire, or a predeliction. In this latter case, the behaviour may indicate to the observer, for example, the pursuit of an argument because of a positive attitude to the value of truth. In fact, the individual concerned may pursue an argument in the service of a desire for power and the pursuit of truth not their intention. Persons demonstrate their attitudes in either overt or covert ways. When the overt behaviours are true reflections of the attitudes of the individual, then one may say that they are acting honestly. When, in addition, such attitudes are consistent with the val-ues that a person holds, one may say that the person is acting with integrity. Such actions will have the effect of increasing the individual's self-regard (Penelhum,1976). Ideal persons then, are those who, as being in the world, act with honesty and integ-rity according to the values that they hold. They act with regard to the hierarchy of those values that they have determined. The attitudes of such persons to their own pursuits may then be characterized as honest and integrated. In characterising single attitudes as honest and integrated, ideal persons will be able to justify their position at the level of their adopted values and at the level of the hierarchical disposition of those values. Such people will carry through this value stance toward their ideals, as they take a consistent attitude stance toward particular instances. In addition, as they carry through this attitude into consistent actions, then their behaviour may indeed be a measure of their attitudes, and such attitudes may be truly appropriate. The second consideration of persons as individuals, as well as persons in the world, also leads to idiosyncratic self-construction. This construction of selves is, in part at least, a matter of acquiring attitudes which are positive toward those values they wish to pursue, and negative toward those values they choose to downplay. The choices made in the self-construction seem to be related to the nature and nurture of the individual. If one could conceive of a person who has a clearly articulated value hierarchy, who, with honesty, adopts attitudes which are entirely consistent with that hierarchy of values, and who carries those attitudes into consistent behaviour, it may still be the case that the chosen hierarchy of values has not been carefully examined. Unexamined Form-Yielding Unexamined form-yielding might occur when the values people espouse are those adopted as a result of the nurture they have received and which they never question. An example might be those whose backgrounds have caused them to live with the idea that, although one must be kind to black people, there is little reason to believe that blacks are other than an inferior race. If this stance is not questioned, a construction of the value of respect for persons as being limited in the case of blacks will ensue. Thus, while individuals behave with honesty and integrity when dealing with all other persons, they unconsciously apply the limited value to blacks without being aware that there is a flaw in the thinking they have used to apply the value in their attitudes. This is a case of accepting a false belief as a justified true belief and, because it results from lack of careful scrutiny of beliefs, might be considered as one form of prejudice (Alston,1968). Incomplete Knowledge A similar error may result when a value is accepted as justifiable by individuals when they are not in possession of all the facts, or when those persons believe they have considered all aspects of the value when they have, in fact, omitted some. This case we might characterise as one of partial knowledge of the value in question. Here, the attitudes adopted with honesty and carried into behaviour with integrity are based on a value which is flawed as a result of incomplete knowledge or understanding. This problem may occur as a result of errors in logical reasoning or as a result of as little as one error in a justified explanatory chain. (Alston, 1968.) One example of such a sincere error is seen in the acceptance of the myths or stereotypes about a particular race, gender, or age group. A person may genuinely believe that at a certain age an individual's contribution to society is over, may wish such individuals well as they begin a well earned rest, and may therefore adopt inappropriately condescending and unde-manding attitudes towards them as persons. While it may be true that elderly persons do require more rest, it may not in fact be the case. While it may be true that one of the obvious contributions to society is over at retirement, it is seldom the case that there are no other contributions that the elderly person does not need to and is not desirous of making. Interpretative Errors Knowledge of the values adopted may also be limited by interpretative errors. Some people may interpret the value of kindness, for example, as consisting in always offering approval to what others do, provided it is within the law. Thus, they may, by adopting this stance in their dealings with others, convey approval of inappropriate behaviour in others thereby reinforcing the negative values or attitudes of others. For example, they may impute to others the need to assert themselves when they are, in fact, manipulating or exerting unjustifiable power over others. Treating such behaviour with tolerance or kindness may lead to reinforcement of the inappropriate attitude. To offer unconditional acceptance of others without analysis of their behaviours according to appropriate value positions is therefore to mislead the other, no matter how kindly the intent. This, too, could be a basis for prejudice. Logical Errors Errors in logic can also mislead persons of scrupulous honesty and integrity as they strive to realize their values in consistent attitudes and behaviours. Assigning to indi-viduals the characteristics of some group to which they belong can often constitute one type of logical error: (a) Members of motor cycle gangs are violent-(b) James belongs to a motor cycle gang therefore, (c) James is violent. A second type of logical error is to assign to a group the characteristics of one, or of a few, of its members: (a) Bob and Elsie and Jack are black. (b) Bob and Elsie and Jack are shiftless, therefore, (c) All blacks are shiftless. It is not uncommon to hear intelligent, honest persons, who believe they are acting with integrity, advance such arguments and to support them with such expressions as "You would realize I am right if you had lived in the Southern States." Dispositional Feelings It is also possible to encounter with a particular group of persons a series of situ-ations which have aroused, time after time, anger or fear in a person. As a result, the person may develop a disposition to anger or fear against members of that group. The recent influx of Asians into the lower mainland of British Columbia has caused some people to become angry about the resultant high prices of homes in the area. This anger is directed largely toward the Asians. In addition, the Asian people, in order to express their culture in their new surroundings, have torn down existing homes and replaced them with structures which have changed the character of long- established communities. As they see their old way of life disappearing, long- time residents have become fearful for their own identity. The combined effects of fear and anger have led some long-time residents of the lower mainland to view the Asians as a threat, almost as adversaries, and, as a result, in spite of their best efforts to act with honesty and integrity toward others the established inhabitants are incapable of treating the Asian people as full human persons. This kind of response is a third basis for the growth of prejudice. Occurrent Feelings In particular situations individuals may also experience occurrent emotions, that is, emotions which are temporarily engendered by specific situations, which distort their judgement and therefore lead them to mistake the values applicable in the situation. For example, they may jump to the defence of a loved one impelled by the emotion of protective love in a situation where the loved one is in the wrong and may even have been the instigator of the dispute. Without the distortion of values caused by the emo-tional involvement, the individuals concerned would normally behave in a way consis-tent with their held values. Frequent distortion of this kind can also lead to a permanent distortion of the values concerned or equally lead to the emergence of a dispositional emotion. Both of these results can lead to inappropriate attitudes becoming established in persons, often without their complete awareness. Unexamined Behaviour Thoughtless behaviour, continually repeated, which is inappropriate and not called into question, may establish a pattern of behaviour or a habit in an individual which is largely unexamined. Such a pattern or habit may, if it is contrary to the values held before the habit was established, erode the commitment to those values and there-fore gradually permit the adoption of inappropriate attitudes ( Warnock, 1987). S U M M A R Y O F P A R T 2 The foregoing discussion has briefly highlighted some difficulties facing those who attempt, with honesty and integrity, to realize in their behaviour and attitudes the values to which they are committed. This attempt at realization is carried out by those who have ideally achieved an adequate concept of a person and who have made sincere efforts to articulate and justify the values they hold, to adopt stances which are appropri-ate to their values, and to behave in ways which are consistent with those values and stances. But, as has been shown: (a) adopting a false or incomplete belief, (b) making errors in interpretation or in logic, (c) being swayed by occurrent or dispositional feelings or (d) acquiring habits of behaviour which are unexamined and which weaken a commit-ment to values all can lead persons to some degree of distortion of appropriate attitudes or adoption of inappropriate attitudes. These can occur in persons of honesty and integrity with a fully developed concept of person as being in the world. The reality is that, for most people the concept of a person as being in the world is not fully developed and the distinction between a person's needs as person in the world and their wants, inclinations, and predelictions is not clearly held. In addition and as a result, their perceptions of others are often distorted and their values are unclear and unexamined. Therefore persons are more liable to errors in logic, in what is, in fact, the case and liable to err in the control of their habits, of their occurrent and dispositional feelings and of their interpretations. This discussion of persons, and its implications for how attitudes are conceived of has relied largely on the work of P. F. Strawson (1962). A philosopher from a totally different background, who has also addressed the question of how one conceives of persons is Daniel Dennet (1976). Therefore, to provide further support for the view presented it is necessary to examine the view of persons offered in his work. Dennett's Account of the Person. In Dennett's (1976) work persons are rational, intentional and conscious human beings who see themselves as such. Following Locke, Dennett sees the metaphysical notion of a person as being distinguishable from the moral notion of a person but has taken the stance that there is, "every reason to believe that metaphysical personhood is a necessary condition of moral personhood" (p177 ). He agreed with Strawson (1962) that states of consciousness and the attitude taken toward such states are mutually interdependent and necessary conditions of personhood, and agreed with the traditional position of persons as rational beings. He also adopted the notion of reciprococity of persons as a necessary condition citing, among others, Strawson's position which was adopted for the purposes of this study. Further, Dennet asserted that persons must be capable of verbal communication and that they must be self-conscious in order to achieve moral personhood. This last condition is the position which was argued for in the previous section of this chapter and is supported in Dennet's work by wide philo-sophical reference. Clearly, Dennet's account of a person conforms very closely with the one argued for here, although the method of argument differs greatly. Three sub-stantive differences remain: 1. Dennet's claim that verbal communication is a necessary condition of personhood—or at least of moral personhood 2. His claim that 3rd order volitions ( wanting to desire a good) are equally a necessary condition 3. The claim made here that we can never know all the necessary conditions of personhood and the question of the implications of that claim. Each of these disparities are dealt with in turn below: Verbal communication,Third-order Volitions, and Personhood. The basis of these claims is, as far as I understand Dennet's argument, that to achieve moral personhood a person must both be involved in reason-giving and persua-sion and must also act upon third-order desires. If we accept this first claim, however, we must designate those who are dumb or those who choose not to communicate verbally as lacking to some extent in moral personhood. It is entirely possible to con-ceive of a person who acts with the greatest moral probity and who, at the same time, refuses to indulge in reason giving because of lack of capacity, because of a recognition of the futility of defending an adopted position, or because of a stance of individual moral choice. With regard to the section of Dennet's argument which deals with giving oneself reasons, with asking oneself questions, and with entering into dialogue with oneself about one's own moral stances, there is no question that some form of dialogue is entered into. The question, (which in the view of this writer is unanswerable), is what forms such a dialogue might take? Since the majority of persons make use of verbal communication as a matter of course in entering into dialogue as we understand it, it is easy to make the assumption that such might be the form of discourse adopted in dialogues with self or others about moral stances of all kinds, including the transition from third-order to first order-desires. But it is not necessarily the case that such internal or external arguments are in the form of verbal communication and this claim is (a) too simple to cover our normal operation, (b) designates as non-persons those who are demonstrably full persons as we experi-ence them, and (c) puts a burden on the common operation of moral stance acquisition which is unrealistic. Let us treat of the three objections made here, in turn, as they apply to dialogue with self and with others. A point made earlier, that the stances we adopt are largely unex-amined, is germane. It is generally when we are challenged in some sense that we attend to making a case for our adopted stances. Indeed, we are often unaware of the precise nature of our stances, even less aware of the principles upon which we adopt them and, seldom, of our own accord, tease out the underlying value or values of which such principles are exemplars. We have to be pushed very hard before we will embark upon a rigorous scrutiny which bears upon any one of these three examinations, in a dialogue either with self or with others. As argued earlier here, such examinations are theoretical and ideal exertions, and whether they must be done, how much, and how well they are done, and whether or not they are couched in verbal form, are questions which are, in large part, unanswerable. The verbal dialogue is one which may be asserted to be the clearest and the most accessible to rational scrutiny, under one view of the matter. An alternative view is that it is not, in fact, our normal procedure. We tend to be in and to act through our experi-ence, informed by idiosyncratic past experience, according to our nature and to our nurture, and to adopt moral stances in the flux of circumstance and of social norms. Therefore, examining and reflecting upon such procedures would most naturally pro-ceed from an analogous type of enquiry and not from verbal argument or from verbal problem resolution alone. It is upon this crucial scenario of action/ reflection that the crux of this thesis rests. The objection to the exclusion from moral personhood of those who are incapable of verbal argument, of those who reject such argument as worthwhile or of those who believe that entering into such arguments with others is a form of usurpation of a per-sonal moral prerogative is, I believe, on two grounds: First our experience with full moral personhood in persons from each of the above categories militates against acceptance of such a position, for example, those who cannot speak or who cannot fully comprehend speech, and those who resist verbal, moral argument. This is not to suggest that indulging in or seeking verbal justification is a bad thing or a morally retrograde step. Rather, the position of this thesis is that it is valuable for many, perhaps even for most people, at some stage in the journey towards becoming ideal persons but that it is not a necessary condition for moral personhood. The second ground for objection is a reiteration of the position that verbal justifica-tions and persuasions, while they form some part of many people's way of life, are not a common modus operandi. Many persons live through a variety of gradations of unex-amined moral stances continually refining them toward some approximation of ideal stance without challenge or without the giving of verbal accounts and justifications. It may be the case that the process could be accelerated or refined by such verbal exami-nation. It may even be the case that for some people such verbal articulation is neces-sary for some reason. But it does not therefore follow that it is a necessary condition of moral personhood. However, it does follow that those who would concern themselves with moral attitudes, or with the changing of such, should be capable of orally express-ing the necessary justifications and it also follows that skill in the fashioning of argu-ments and in refining them are required to affirm moral positions and to clarify the quest for ideal positions for most people. They are especially required by those whose experi-ence, wants or desires tend to move them far from what we conceive of as ideal. The point is again that such spoken arguments, no matter how well crafted, are abstract and thus at a distance from life experiences. In the creation of drama pieces, the participant is not at such a great distance, in that drama consists in a reworking of the participant's own experiences, informed by imagination, in action and in reflection. An additional objection to Dennet's stance on spoken communication rests on the sheer impossibility of providing spoken reasons, and certainly of providing justification, for the multiplicity of stances which persons take in everyday intercourse. Continuous communication of this kind would lead to a situation in which there was little time left for action. Nonetheless, if we view the position adopted by Dennet concomitantly with the argu-ment offered so far in this thesis, it is clear that both lead to the conclusion that reason-giving of a rigorous kind is required. If not exclusively spoken then of what other kinds might it be? It might be a numerical persuasion that would alter a stance. Visual im-ages might provide guidance. A piece of music might illuminate the ideal. Acts of oth-ers might alter a position. Personal experience of the effects of inappropriate attitudes may demand a reasessment. There are many reason-giving means without the spoken 67 which are at a person's disposal. Among such means is drama creation. It must also be allowed that few of these means will suffice in and of themselves as reason-givers or as persuaders and that, for some people to become fully persons, the use of spoken means will in fact be necessary. All that is claimed here is that it is pos-sible that non-spoken factors can build up as strong an argument as words in working toward the attainment of an ideal personhood. The Mystery of the Person. The argument provided in this thesis has, on two occasions, pointed out that one can never come fully to know a person, that at the centre of each person, including the self, there is something unknown. Dennet, too, has acknowledged this mystery but has drawn no implications from it. His reasons for accepting this mystery are that the con-cept of a person is inescapably normative and that there are, therefore, no sufficient conditions for personhood. Perhaps aspiration to the ideal is a part of the mystery and perhaps that aspiration is, in itself, a necessary condition of personhood. Aspiration might, ip fact, be important. Attitudes of PersonsToward Other Persons The notion of justice as a guiding principle in our dealings with others is well estab-lished. It is widely adopted as a value. The traditional approach has been that good, right and truth are properties. Toulmin (1958) has shown that they are not correctly conceived of as properties which demand agreement / disagreement or conclusions, that, rather, they are acknowledged by the giving of worthwhile reasons. Toulmin stated that it is in the character of values that they evoke reasons. He argued, too, that subjec-tive notions of value do allow the idea of satisfaction and that, therefore, because we can conceive of everybody agreeing on ethical matters, we have the notion of agree-ment about the reasons evoked for seeing a value as worthwhile. Rawls (1971) appeared to agree with Toulmin (1958) about the ability of a group of people to agree about the value of justice. He stipulated, however, that a group of people could agree about what constituted the value of justice only if they were pro-tected in their deliberation as by a veil of ignorance which prevented them from knowing what personal goods would, as a result, accrue to them as individuals. Whatever the arguments against this method of examining what constitutes justice, the removal of desires and wants from the normal human equation did allow Rawl's argument to pro-ceed more clearly. The justice value would then allow of a society in which persons had the right to pursue their goals and to employ means to their goals which seemed to them to be appropriate, where to do so did not damage the goals or the means of oth-ers. Downie and Telfer (1969) have characterized the justice value as resting upon a principle of respect for persons, which implies an attitude of agape (a form of love) for the goals and means of others together with the attitude toward them of treating them as ends (i.e. in the sense of being valuable in themselves). This thesis has gone some-what further than the attitude of agape and the suggestion is made that a symbiotic relationship is the attitude that underlies the need to adopt the attitude of agape. This suggestion has been proposed on the basis of the notion, explored earlier, that individu-als are capable of personhood only inasmuch as and insofar as they are capable of assigning to other persons the same capacities as they ascribe to themselves. Thus, the principle of respect for persons would include the notion of agape but would be based in this necessary symbiotic condition of personhood. The attitude of respect for persons, however, implies a clearly defined range of practices which could achieve the status of virtuous acts. As Maclntyre showed so clearly(1981), "We have to accept as necessary components of any practice with inter-nal goods and standards of excellence the virtues of justice, courage and honesty"(p.191). If we can subsume honesty toward others under the concept of jus-tice, as Downie and Telfer have suggested, and if we can leave aside courage for the moment, it would seem that justice and its logical consequent— respect for persons through love and in symbiotic union— is likely to obtain for us positive self regard. The practice of the virtue of justice, then, through the principle of respect for persons and explicated in our attitude of loving symbiotic union with them in their goals and in their means is our route to positive self regard. Nor will the need for the virtue of cour-age be far behind in this endeavour since, as Mclntyre (1981, p.196) also pointed out, we cannot expect to be rich and famous but rather often misunderstood in the exercise of such practices. 69 Attitudes to Elderly Persons and to One's Own Ageing The focus of this thesis is on attitudes to persons and, in particular, on attitudes to elderly persons and to one's own ageing. In the remainder of this chapter, the stance chosen for examination focuses on the relationships between persons, and the attitudes discussed are those based on the second notion of Strawson (1962): to hold a concept of a person as form-yielding and as form-producing is to hold that the concept applies to all others and that all other persons have capacities and intentions to behave in a like manner. In concert with the virtue of justice, appropriate attitudes toward the aged will be those which fully recognize their form-yielding and form-producing capacities, and those which at the same time recognise their goals and their means to those goals. This state-ment implies: (a) an honouring of the value hierarchies of elderly persons, (b) the ability to discern their goals and means and to support the pursuit of those goals and the employment of those means, and (c) an interest in, as well as an effort toward, acquir-ing adequate knowledge about the elderly as persons. We must also have some sense that in following such attitudes we are working from a value base which sees the elderly as valuable in themselves and as necessarily valuable because they reveal our own value as persons in symbiotic union with them. Accordingly, our behaviour and our. feelings toward the elderly must be scrutinised in the light of our value stance and, in so doing, we scrutinize our attitudes. Attitudes toward our own ageing then will consist in seeing that as we age we move ever closer to the achievement of an ideal attitude to all persons, including the self. Therefore, ageing is a slow and gradual self-constitution towards an ideal self. Thus, attitudes toward the elderly and attitudes toward our own ageing support and reinforce one another. That such insights can only teach us what our dispositions to act should be and thus provide a moral framework for us, is in the nature of becoming persons and in particular in their aspirations as they conceive of the ideal. "What education in the virtues teaches me is that my good as a man is one and the same as the good of those others with whom I am bound up in human community" (Mclntyre, 1981. p.229). 70 Children's Attitudes Toward Old People We must expect that children of 10 to 11 years of age will be at the very beginning of the journey to create intentionally the self they wish to be. What the role of education of children's attitudes might look like, then, is one of bringing them to the understanding of the personhood of older people. This understanding would imply increasing their knowl-edge of old people, of their goals and of the means they use to reach those goals. It would imply bringing them to an understanding of the symbiotic nature of personhood. It would imply the eliciting from children of a questioning approach to their own attitudes and those of others. It would insist on the giving of good reasons for feelings, judge-ments, value hierarchies, and behaviour. It would, perhaps, involve some investigation of ideals and aspirations, and it would at all times demand a learning situation in which they themselves were viewed as gift and as gifted persons. Chapter 4 71 THEORY OF DRAMA The purpose of this chapter is to offer a theory of drama in education which will unite the conceptions expressed in Chapter 2 and relate them to this writer's experience in the classroom. The discussion is based on the notion that drama is a conscious at-tempt to scrutinize the actions of human beings in order that participants may come to an understanding of persons and, in so doing, may define more clearly for themselves which ideal and normative notions of personhood will stand for them. The central idea of drama which informs this chapter is that of drama as an art form. Therefore, it is the constraints of the art form in its demands for selections, logic and the offering of good reasons that provides the basis for the argument presented. A human life is a continuous carrying out of explicit and tacit intentions (May, 1969, p. 242; Rorty, 1976, p. 9). Intentions, as they define and are defined by enduring traits, are based in what is worthwhile. What is worthwhile to a person is normally designated as a value. To have a value means to have developed a set of principles about the value or to hold the value as a result of following principles which are consistent with what is right for an individual at a particular time (Peters, 1966, p. 114; Sesonke, 1964, p. 12). Following principles and allowing them to guide intention leads to actions, if those principles are seen as basic to human self-interest. Holding a value will lead to the sacrifice of desires, if the desires militate against principles when the principle is held strongly enough. The strength with which a principle is held will be affected by and will affect the intentions and the actions. Actions supporting intention which is determined by a principle, reinforce that principle; principles, which are used to inform or to evaluate acts or intentions, will, by the success or failure of these acts and intentions, reinforce or weaken the acts or intentions (Warnock, 1987, p. 90). Satisfaction will ultimately consist in the extent to which the acts or intentions provide positive self-regard for the person (Downie and Telfer, 1969, p. 87). If self regard is achieved, then the principle comes to be more firmly held than formerly, the intentions are more firmly directed, and the acts are more likely to follow intention. Thus, as more and more principles are more firmly held, the values from which they derive and which define the value for the individual become clearer. As values become clearer, they illuminate more subtle principles which then, in turn, come to be followed. Actions, then, are bellwethers of human intention, principles, and values. In their success or failure in increasing one's self regard, they are the means whereby people gauge the strength of their intentions, principles, and values and also the means whereby they evaluate them. The reasons people give for these successes or failures in achieving self regard are themselves subtle reflections on the domain of values. They are particular to that domain and, therefore, the quality of the reasons will deter-mine the quality of the evaluation. Acts are all human impingements upon the world outside the self, together with all intentional efforts made within the self, that is, actions, speech, and reactions together with thoughts, ponderings, efforts at understanding, and prayer. People are defined by their acts as persons. They judge themselves as persons by their acts. By their acts, they take the risk of weakening their self regard. Intention without action does not have the same moral power. Action without intention is expression of instinct or of emotion, or both, and only when it is joined to reflection can it enter the moral formation proce-dure described here. The Child's Action in a World Drama is action. Because it is removed from what is regarded as "real life", the risk involved in dramatic action is less than that in real life. Drama has rules that are differ-ent from real life. Persons involved in drama agree that all are going to create a world which in some sense exists only in the imagination (Bolton, 1984; Heathcote, 1975). It also exists, however, in some sense in the real world and it is both these senses that the teacher of drama must understand and use if drama is to exist in their classrooms. First, the imagination must have its base in reality and its logical sequence in reality ( Bolton, 1984 ). The world created in the imagination will rely for its constituent elements on sensory experiences which the children have had in the real world (Way, 1967). Even if the world they posit is made of gold with marshmallow hills and Coca-cola seas and has no gravity, the sensory nature of the chosen constituents, as the children know them, will determine the mode of life for its characters. That is, the qualities with which they endow their worlds will become the binding and limiting conditions of life for those 73 who live in them. The reasons given for inclusion or exclusion of certain acts will have direct reference to those limits. Situation The experience of the children will form the basis for the situation that they wish to or agree to explore (Bolton, 1976; Courtney, 1973; Heathcote, 1982). Drama proceeds from consensus about what is worthwhile to explore and about the imaginative condi-tions that will provide the rules for that exploration (Bolton, 1979 ; Heathcote, 1982). First, such consensus must be reached by recourse to the rules of negotiation which all children understand because they have experienced those rules in daily interaction. It is not merely a transaction that is entered into here but a true negotiation since, as Dorothy Heathcote said, "Transaction seems to deal with the obvious manifested. Ne-gotiation implies that I will myself to be the servant of the quality of the transactions that go on in that room" (Personal communication, 1982). This difference is understood in varying degrees by all the participants in the drama and must be thoroughly understood by the teacher. The situation, once defined by consensus, becomes a second binding and limiting condition of the drama. For example, if the group decides that the situation is a condi-tion of drought faced by villagers, then the children's real-life knowledge of the effects of drought on people, on animal life, on plants, and on the land, form the logical basis from which the drama proceeds. Again, the situation chosen must be seen by all to be worthwhile. The reasons offered for the choices of the acts which can take place in the situation must relate back to that situation— they are context-bound. Characters Once the rules are established from real life, the imagined situation is invested with characters (whether in role as attitude, in Heathcote's sense, or in more developed forms of role). These characters are drawn either from fantasy or from the real experi-ences of the participants. They must conform, however, to the behaviour that such characters would logically exhibit in the real world. Why? Because the only way the children can understand the behaviour of such characters is by endowing them with rec-ognizable attributes from their own experience. If they do not do so, they will be unable to believe in them or identify with them or with their problems. Thus, the characters will cease to have meaning for them and will therefore be unable to claim their sustained attention. So, in peopling the imagined situation, the real world is again present in the traits of the characters which are drawn from the children's experience. The world, as the children have experienced it, then determines the behaviour of the characters they create. This creation of characters is an individual activity and provides a third but individual limit on the drama. It is the testing ground to which the children refer when they evaluate the appropriateness of their characters' actions. The attitudes and values of the created characters must be appropriate both to the character as cre-ated, and to the experience the participants have had of attitudes, values and principles operating in the real world. Events When the characters begin to interact with one another, a series of events is cre-ated. These events will be built from imagination and from the child's experience of what makes sense, and what those kinds of characters might do if they existed. What makes sense and what people might do is again drawn from the experiences they have had. The nature of the chosen imagined event will also partially determine the action of the characters. If the actions first chosen for them do not conform either to the logic of the event itself, or to the picture of that character already built up, then the child must expand the character or alter the event (Bolton, 1976). Thus, a consensual judgement of the event provides a fourth limitation which the children have created and accept. Both logical consistency and character elaboration or alteration also derive from the real world experiences of the children. As events and characters resonate in this way, many possibilities are explored and they rely for their logical force on the close observa-tion and experiences the children have encountered in the real world. In other words, the characters will behave as real people have been perceived to behave in the children's real life whether they are panda bears, sunflowers, Martians, Vietnam veter-ans, embassy prisoners, or research scientists. The children are relying on reasons which they must show are logical for the choices they make (Bolton, 1976). Problem Drama's people taking part in events in the world created, in the situation and with the other inhabitants, face problems. All chosen problems again come from the per-plexities people suffer in like encounters in the real world. This is a fifth logical limitation. The intellectual, moral, or aesthetic efforts the characters must make to overcome or adjust to a problem are firmly based in the child's conception of people's real capabili-ties and real strivings in those areas. Again, and for the sixth time, the drama has been limited and this time by the logical consequences of earlier imaginative and reasoned choices. Change As the characters confront the problem chosen, in the chosen world, under the cho-sen conditions, and as they overcome or adjust to it, the characters themselves change, as do their relationships with others and with their world. What kind of change does the drama demand of those characters? It demands a change that is consistent with the child's conception of how real people change and how events can effect real relation-ships. Again, the seventh limit is imposed by the need which the children have to make rational decisions about how and why people do change. The ability to make such decisions is present in the childrens's repertoires and derives from their experience. From this analysis, it is clear that the imagination is invested in the creation of the drama at each of its necessary steps. It is also clear that the logical and rational de-mands of the drama are equally constitutive and that this constitution is intentional, achieved through rigorous thinking, supported by real experiences, and shaped indi-vidually with the constraints of the group which determine form. Therefore, the social construction of the drama as a cooperative art shapes form as it lends objectivity to its enquiry. Inner Worlds Each character, inhabiting the world negotiated for, involved in the events decided upon, faced with a problem in the situation with his fellow characters must, if consistent with the world which permeates the drama, have real thoughts and feelings. At this point in the drama, all the decisions that have created limits are at work refining and focusing the actions that the characters choose. The actions resonate in the minds of the children and they begin to think as the people in that situation might well do. As the embryonic "thinking like others" begins in the child, so too the feelings, inseparable from thought, begin to be experienced by the children (Bolton, 1978; Courtney, 1982; Heath-cote, 1982; Slade, 1954; Ward, 1957). As what is real in the drama evokes in the characters the thoughts and feelings which are themselves real, the child begins to invest self in the drama at a new level. But the dramatic push demands that, unlike real life, all relevant thoughts and feelings be expressed in action or recognised in reflection, so that true action may follow the honest thoughts and feelings of the characters. This is a push that the teacher must initially demand but which is necessary for the drama to become a group creation of meaning (Bolton, 1977; Heathcote, 1982 tape). In this series of moments of emotional union with the drama, when this level of in-volvement is accepted by the participants as logically necessary, all that has gone before and is now present in the work and in its focus becomes a living aspect of the human condition. It is then that the work begins to move into drama as form, which is informed by content and impelled by honest emotion; it has more than shape, it has its quintessential content in the real feelings and thoughts of the participant/characters. The images of self and of other in the character begin to meld. Recognition of this, the inner world of one's character, and the embracing of it as one's own for the duration of the drama, relies, for its honesty, on how true the thoughts and feelings of the charac-ters are to the real thoughts and feelings of the participants. The limit of honesty has been discovered and will now be the core of the drama. The art form has been born. In the interests of the pursuit of the above argument, one essential factor has not been dealt with. The limitations which have been discussed are joined at each stage by a further limitation, which is the necessity to select from experience in each case. If the participants insisted on including all the details of each experience, the drama created would be unbearably long and the point of it would be lost. As a result, the participants are forced to ask themselves at each stage, "What is it that is central, in the experiences that I have had, which will illuminate the present embodiment?" ( Reid, 1969). The economy of the art form and the selections it demands thus become clear to the chil-dren as they build their own drama. Indeed, it is often the case that, in early efforts, either not enough is offered to make the point of the drama clear, or, that too much is offered to make it accessible. The teacher then must help the children in the process of their selection until economy is achieved. What Is Drama? Drama is quite simply reflection on the human condition in action, in an imagined world, constrained by logical choices which are based in experience and informed by honest thoughts and feelings. Drama is, therefore, a moral endeavour as it addresses the moral questions occa-sioned by that world—it searches for what is good. It is an intellectual endeavour as it strives to make sense of that world—it searches for what is right. It is an aesthetic endeavour as it gives form to the understandings of the participants and as it detects rhythms and patterns—it searches for what is harmonious. It is a psychological endeav-our as it demands reflection upon and use of one's own understanding of one's own experiences, thoughts, and feelings—it is contemplative of self. Drama is an interper-sonal endeavour as the individual consciously recognizes the inner worlds of others—it seeks symbiosis. It is a comparative endeavour as individuals, in action, work through arguments and reflect upon their consequences—it is a mutual, logical creation. It is an inter-subjunctive endeavour as individuals create joint meanings—it is a seeking through community (Bruner, 1986, p. 58) In all, it is personally and subjectively consti-tutive, as the individual alternates between the demands of experience and of imagina-tion—a self-reconstruction. The objective reflections on experience under logical constraint rely on analysis and synthesis, and combine both the objective factual world and the subjective understand-ing of persons (in character creation) to achieve judgement. It is, in short, the child's philosophy in action, and depends for its power upon the investigation of the dialectic tensions between right and wrong, harmony and disharmony, and sense and nonsense. It is firmly rooted in the real world and uses the workhorse of the imagination to provide distance from that world and through that distance to achieve communion with what it is to be human. It is based in honesty and therefore calls forth trust. As a result, this philosophy in action has as its goal, and as a necessary condition, individual moral integrity. The intention to investigate what makes sense and does not, what is right and what is not, and what is beautiful and what is not, lies at the heart of the drama as it does in all modes of human enquiry. The intention is more ambitious than other modes of enquiry because it is focused on the central concern for what it is to be a person in the world. It is not focused on the intimate investigation of the objective world as is the case in science. Nor is it centred in the events that occur in the world, past or present, but rather on the meaning for the human being of those events and phenomena as they are explicative of what it is to be a person. The intention of drama, then, is to enquire into particular events and phenemona for the purpose of discovering what in general can be said to be right and true and satisfy-ing in being human. The mode of enquiry is to proceed by a series of acts of investiga-tion into a particular situation and, in concert with fellow investigators, to discover what meanings those particular acts reveal about people in the world. The meanings discov-ered will be available to society's understanding only if they are given a mode of ex-pression that will order them for society. The mode of expression is the art form which is both experienced and reflected upon. The foregoing has been an attempt to analyse what the form of all classroom drama evokes in its participants. Situation, events, characters, problems, and change are all basic to every drama no matter the genre or philosophy of drama espoused. It is not suggested here that any of these integral steps will automatically be of high quality, that the imagination will conjure up highly original worlds or situations, that the logic will be sound in every choice made, that the honesty will be complete or, that the child's experi-ence will always be sufficient to the task. On the contrary, the drama would have no place in education if these conditions were met. Indeed, they might be thought of as the goals of drama education. What has been presented thus far is the bare bones of the beginning of drama—its skeletal structure up to the moment of the first emergence of thoughts and feelings of a chosen character. The steps outlined can be, and often are, superficial in quality, particularly in the early stages of drama participation / investi-gation. Nor is it suggested that the order given in the argument is the order in which the drama investigation will proceed. That order will depend on the individual teacher and on the perceived needs of the children. What is being suggested is that choices are being made, that those choices depend on the logical manipulation of experience and on honesty, and that they are explicative of imagination at work in people as they distance themselves from everyday experience, reflect on it, and use it. The intention is enquiry into the meanings in being human in the world. The expression is an art form based in symbols that people create to order those meanings. Distancing Before further investigation of drama can proceed, it is necessary to examine in more detail what constitutes "distancing." Distance is created by the fact of an imagi-nary situation, characters, and events. These components are all to be incorporated into action, as if in the here and now. For each one of the components, the links to reality as experienced by each of the participants will be of varying strengths. Similarly, the thoughts and feelings of the characters, created in logic and imagination, will be close to, or will be distant from, the experiences of the participants. If any of the components closely mirrors an actual experience, then the imaginative context is likely to be superseded by a real, strong, or recent experience in life. In such a case, the distance required by drama will be lost and the participant may be exposed in reliving an event in the past. While it may be argued that such exposure will be therapeutic for the participant (see Courtney, 1982), it is important to remember that therapy, except in its most general and communal sense, is not and cannot be defended as being an aim of drama partici-pation in an educational setting. On the other hand, it is not possible to be conversant enough with every participant's background to provide absolute protection for all partici-pants from such a reversion into reliving. The important thing is to provide as many distancing pauses as possible while maintaining the flow of the drama. There is a vari-ety of techniques which can be employed to achieve this goal (seeBolton, 1984 ). The idea of distancing must be seen as central to drama so that "reflection in tranquility" can be achieved. Action-Non Action The deliberate devising described above is joined with spontaneous responding to what has been devised (Bolton, 1981.). Consequently, to say that drama is "doing" is to misunderstand its power. As Bolton has said, it is dependent on, and independent of, concrete action. The hard, logical thinking, the reflection on experience, the imaginative flight, and the relating of personally recognized thoughts and feelings to the universal experience, are all equally constitutive of drama. Doing as you have imagined, while using what is real, is the tension which both provides distance and involves one in the action one creates. Conforming to the demands of logic, while continuing to develop and expand an imaginary world, is a tension which empowers the doer as temporary bringer of order. Imaginative identification with a character, while attending to the logic of a shared event and the internal logic of experienced thoughts and feelings, is a two-way tension which is central to the action—without it the action is empty. All of the internal relation-ships between action, event, situation, characters, problems, and continuous relating of these to experience, create resonances within the dramatic form and, therefore, within the participant even if no one stirred throughout. This is what Dorothy Heathcote (1982 tape) meant when, in reply to Professor Eggleson, she declared that scientists are probably involved in drama when they are being creative. The difference is, of course, that the participant in drama is, at the same time, actively concretely creating in ongoing action, as he/she responds to reflection and to action. Central to the action, whether deliberative or spontaneous, is the participant. The Participant in the Space The participants in a drama, as has been seen, are related to their work in a delib-erative-intellectual, identificatory-emotional, and spontaneous- responsive mode. In this effort, they use their imagination to manipulate the skeletal structures of dramatic form. But, in a very real sense, they are neither the persons their experience has made them, nor the characters that they created while participating in the drama. Both personas allow them to see a third figure and that is the central figure in dramatic art. This figure exists as a result of looking at experience through both the personal lens of the lived experience of the participants and through the created lens of the imagined experience of the character. This figure defines itself intellectually by a comparison of the sense-making capacities of the other two. The participants define themselves morally by the value-making decisions of the other two. They define themselves aesthetically by the harmomy they find between the other two. They are icons of the present conceptions of the other two of what they hold in common to be the case. Icons are neither totally one nor totally other but live in both in the action. They are the formal self in dramatic action and they move and speak in the space. Because other people are involved in this same procedure with any participants, the formal persona is moulded by a collective vision which has been collectively negotiated through action and through deliberation in the skeletal drama form . They move, there-fore, in the space as their authors' conception among the conceptions of the author's fellow workers reflexively adjusting in moment to moment action . Evidence of the icons' presence is not hard to find. They are present in disagree-ments and in approval as the participants argue about what "everybody" does or agree on how amazing it is that people behave" just like that." The icons are there, as partici-pants discuss the drama to evaluate it. "He wasn't mean enough for X to happen," or "I had trouble believing in your character because—." They are there when participants discover how difficult drama is, and greet the returning drama teacher with the question "Does this mean we have to start thinking again?" The icons, as they are called here, are the shadowy figures who embody the goal in the struggle to get the characters in that situation under control and back into the character in action where they belong. This struggle is to disperse the shadows and embody the icon truthfully, rightly, and harmoniously. The difficulty is to envisage them clearly in imagination, to give them substance in the facts of the drama, to assign them right action in the circumstances given their character, and to find that movement which will epitomise their action in the space. It is the last activity that is the clue, for it is the first formal element in drama. It is the symbol used only in the drama art form—it is the gesture or gestus of Brecht (Brecht, 1936). As in all art forms, it is the how of the manipulation of the symbol within the form that allows of quality in its truth, in its Tightness, and in its harmony. The icon persona described here is a conceit. But the claim embodied in the conceit is an empirical claim. It would be possible and very revealing to study drama proce-dures from this point of view but the literature shows no evidence of this investigation in reports of research. The purpose of making the claim is to illuminate the symbol system central to the drama and used by the drama in its investigations. It is, however, what Growtowski (1968) referred to when he spoke of the immolation of the self, what Iris Murdoch (1977) meant when she spoke of acting as an "unselfing," and what Peter Brook (1969) has worked his whole life to reintroduce into a professional theatre strug-gling against ecconomic despotism and public, and well-earned, apathy. Why is it that the claim for the centrality of the symbol of gesture can be made? Surely when an audience sees a play the play is full of words and those words are central to the drama? This is, indeed, the public conception of what is meant by drama. To understand this apparent dissonance, it is necessary to return to the origins of drama in myth and in ritual. Scholars from all areas of dramatic activity have recognized movement and word and their interaction as the two phenomena basic to an understanding of drama and have linked them to ritual and to myth. In drama in education Bolton, Courtney, Heath-cote, Slade, Ward, Way and all their disciples recognize this connection. In theatre, whether as practitioners, critics, or theorists, Artaud, Boal, Brook, Coggin, Goethe, Growtowski, Hornby, Stanislavski, and States, have all detected such common factors with ritual and myth. In philosophy, this connection has also been asserted in the works of Cassirer, Dewey, and Langer. Ritual is a community expression of individuals' understanding of themselves in relation to their world and to themselves. It was always an attempt to bring meaning through creating some order in the beliefs held about persons and their world. This is poetically present in Clifford Geertz's (1977 ) account of the death ceremonies of a king observed by a Dutch explorer and interpreted by Geertz after long association with the inhabitants of Bali (1977). From the time of Homer, there is written evidence of the importance of myth, and in early Greek plays there is further evidence of those myths turned into ritual. This close connection of myth and ritual has led to a misconception about the relationship between narrative and play forms. Ritual and myth are, indeed, involved in the expression of the same central human concerns as are narratives and plays, but they are different forms (Bolton, 1981). One proceeds through action in its investigation, the other through events and actions which are described. The symbol of the first is gesture and of the second is word. This confu-sion is very old, simply because myths often took the concerns of ritual, expressed in public and abstracted action, and clothed them in story. Subsequently, too, the public enactment of the central concern of a well-known myth often formed the content of early dramas. However alike these forms of ritual and myth were, in the public mind and in overt structure, they were always radically different in the symbols they used. The symbols used in their investigation and the mode of enquiry are different. One might protest that the results were very similar. As participants in myth, people listened to them, and their involvement with them was intellectual and emotional through that listening. As participants in ritual, people looked at the action, and in the early days were represented within it by chorus, by movement, or by singing. In the choral repre-sentation of Greek theatre the members spoke for the people, commenting on the ac-tion of the characters. In older forms, the participation was by chant, by instrumental accompaniment, and by sympathetic movement evoked by the action, identifying with it and emphasizing it. In mythic form, participation was internal, through involvement with the plot and through a willingness to see when aided by description. In ritual, the looking, as it has become today in the theatre form, is essential to the understanding. In the early Greek culture, to hear a rhapsode recount a myth, any part of the town might become the venue for listening. Later, the myth or story teller visited homes where the people gathered to hear the story teller. But ritual, as far as is known, always had a special place within a community in which the ritual was conducted. This was not because it was associated with formal religion, because that ordering is of a later date, but rather because the need to understand themselves and their world was essential for survival for individuals and for the tribe. It was of primary importance, therefore, and as a result had a central place in the community. It was also through the rituals that young persons came to understand the meanings that their society had already wrested from experience. Unlike our forebears, modern society does not make attributions of cause as a result of awareness of the majesty of the skies or of the cyclical nature of the seasons. Nor is it seen it as a community responsibility to create common meanings out of the experi-ence of today's world. In institutions, in religion, in education, and in theatre, society has erected buildings particularly suited to carry on aspects of this endeavour. The majority of the activities carried on in these buildings is concerned mainly with the knowledge of the centuries dispensed with authority, in spite of the wisdom of Rousseau or Dewey. These activities may be directed to utilitarian ends, or to political ends, or even, as in the recent government interpretation of the B.C. Royal Commission, to the health and prosperity of the populace (1988). What is central to human life is left to the church, philosophers, a few playwrights and other artists to determine and to dole out to us for passive consumption. Thus, the populace has the findings of empirical science, which is beyond the comprehension of most of society and must therefore be accepted on faith, and the findings of scholars and artists about their insights into the human condi-tion. More than ever before in history, the populace are acceptors of meanings rather than makers of meanings. People can, of course, reflect on these meanings and arrive at an interpretation of them to help them make sense of their own particular worlds. The enormous advances in scientific understanding of the world, their very awe inspiring nature, have led society to look outside itself for understanding. Thus, even the advances that have been made are diluted, and that diluted understanding is brought to bear on the conduct of ordinary lives. People have lost the desire to take on the responsibility and to experience the joy of making their own idiosyncratic meanings in the commonly monitored understanding of a community. A community is needed which intends empathetic general understandings of humanness, respects individual contributions to insight, and celebrates in its investigations both the uniqueness of indi-vidual goals and means and the commonalities to be found in those goals and means (Mc Intyre, 1981, Ch. 18). These were the intentions of early ritual and their basis was communal action in reflection. They are the intentions of the drama art form. For each small tribe, the reflections on their experience which they chose as central to their ritual were, of course, different from all other tribes. Therefore, the intentional and important formulations in ritual expressed the culture of the tribe. They were universals for that tribe conceived as honestly as possible to ensure survival. As the world grows smaller, people are brought into contact with cul-tures whose rituals and beliefs have evolved to present-day formulations different from their own. Their dramas will reveal some beliefs and values held in common, and some that are widely different. As the drama develops, people must attend both to common-alities and to differences—to commonalities because wider revelation of joint beliefs draws people ever nearer to the truth; and to differences because people cannot cease to investigate good reasons either to entrench their own beliefs or to adjust them. What is dangerous is for a society to ignore them or to assume they are, in their own ideology, race, or society the sole repositories of truth. Always the drama must concentrate, as Bolton (1981) warned, on significance and search for good reasons. In so doing, drama relies on the direct gift from ritual of gesture as its primary embodiment. Thus, gesture informed by good reason and given power by its significance is primary in drama. Drama's Symbolic System The fundamental symbol of drama, the act in the space, sculpts that space and imparts life to it. It is not, however, except in very rare instances, a lone act. It is in that space first of all with the acts of other participants who sculpt the space too. The lone actor defines his/her own act by attention to its symbolic meaning for the drama and for his/her character in the drama. Then he/she must consider the relationship of that chosen act to the acts of other actors in the same drama and the same space. The primary concern as the actor makes this relationship is the joint meaning that any group of acts creates. This is the "what" of the act. It is the reason why preliminary work in drama is concentrated, and must be so, on precisely what each participant is to do. It is the reason that the analysis, presented here, began as it did. The second concern is to answer the question of how the space has been sculpted by the joint meanings of all participants. This concern is with the visual aesthetic and that symbolic form has its own constraints—harmonious combination of rythmn, dy-namic, pattern, line, and so on. This is the "how" of the act. As the participants sculpt in the space, make joint meanings with their group, and attend to the visual aesthetics of their actions, they must also ask if the joint meanings are clear. The clarity is not necessarily in view of a possible audience, but primarily to address the question of whether the meaning offered in gesture is dense enough by itself to carry the significant import of the drama. Where the action is judged to carry that meaning, or to express more than can be said, the action stands alone. Where this is not the case, words grow out of the necessity of meaning. Such words have their own resonances and those may be affirmative, depictive, explanatory, ritualistic, or relational. These features of word will be dealt with at another time. For the moment it is important to note that they grow out of the action. As the word is born out of the drama, its resonances subtly alter the acts and words waiting to be born in others, and they affect the subsequent acts of the speaker. In so doing they can threaten the significant central meanings which are always inexhaust-ible; for example, loneliness can never be completely explored—to attempt it would be to destroy the form. Therefore, the elements of economy and of precision enter the form to serve the "through line of action" which is to express as poignantly as possible the feeling struggle caused by the theme (Stanislavski, 1936). Again, it must be insisted that the beginnings of the drama form are being discussed here, and it is not claimed that great success in economy or in precision will occur, or that the skills are refined. The purpose here is to come to some understanding of drama in education and how it may best serve young people When this point is reached in the drama, it is time to clarify exactly what it is that the participants wish to say about the imaginary situation and characters they have created. At this point, or even before, both Bolton and Heathcote would intervene by changing the focus, introducing brotherhoods, or in some other way dropping to the universal. This is sometimes essential, but it is possible to elicit the main and significant concerns of the drama from the participants themselves. It is at this point that the drama asks to be slowed and re-explored to sharpen focus. The participants are often aware of this need and want the same as the art form wants—that it be about "something that's im-portant." This, too, is an empirical claim and might well, with profit, be investigated. The drama has now reached the point where all of its essential elements are extant as an art form, and the participants' basic symbols of act and of word are present in the space. They are present in the here and now of the imagined situation, characters, events, problems, and worthwhile, significant concerns which are firmly, rationally, and logically based in the past experience of the participants. It is then that the central symbol of the theatre form has come into being and that central symbol is presence. Now there is a choice. Does one withold the expertise of the theatre form which will free the child to become ever more expressive in act and in word, in rhythm and in sculpting, in giving and in taking focus, in stillness and in movement, in light and in dark, and in sound and silence? Heathcote (1983 ) would say that she works to improve language. Slade (1954) would offer gentle refining of movement skills without losing spontaneity to achieve, "Justice for the child and the beauty of its works" (p. 44). Are all the other skills to be allowed to operate only as they aid the child to build belief, or as they contribute to the moment of eliciting central concern, or of evoking reflection? To be quite clear, it should be pointed out that this is an ethical question, not a question of choice of pedagogies. Drama is an art form. That is its educational place (Allen, 1979). What would the ethic of the art form have to say about this choice? What would the idea of respect for persons have to say? If the claim is made that in drama the reappraisal of values gives a participant satisfaction, how much of a restriction has the teacher the right to put upon the quality of that satisfaction? If the claim is made that new insights or viewpoints are gained in drama, how much status are people willing to allow such insights by the care and attention lavished on them? For this writer the decision is clear. The work is refined and polished in respect for its intrinsic worth and to do so, skills are gently and carefully offered as they are required. The limit of what is offered is decided by what the participants are both capable of and willing to accept as they respond with integrity. This does not mean that participants are being prepared for performance—although for some drama teachers that is an adminis-trative expectation that must be resisted until the children will experience further satis-faction in it. Nor does it mean that the procedures of the elicitation of the art are ever subsumed under a welter of skill or exercise sessions. What it does mean is that, as in any other discipline, the skills are offered which are necessary to make a statement in that discipline—or, as in any other art form that is offered as an integral part of educa-tion—all the depictive tools and all the skill in their use that the participants are able to embrace joyfully. Drama is like other art forms in another important respect. It is also a discipline in the academic sense. It has a specific area of concern or body of knowledge which it ex-plores. This domain it shares with philosophy, namely, the domain of values and their function in human lives. It has a mode of enquiry which is pursued by a professional community of experts and which is the action/reflection dialectic. The experts in the discipline of drama are in many sub-specialties which include all the areas of theatre, of criticism, of theory, and of history (Hornby, 1977) as well as, in this century, the field of drama in education. Finally, they form a community of scholars who work to further the discipline in active cooperation. That schisms exist is a fact of academic life shared by many other disciplines. The concern in this chapter has been to offer a clear statement of the theoretical position on the topic for this thesis which is informed by the expertise of outstanding theorists in the field and by experience in the drama classroom. It was not expected that the drama teacher who was chosen as co-researcher for the thesis research would share this position. However, the position of the chief researcher (this writer) must be clear since it was from this position that the drama teaching, which formed an integral part of the study, was viewed, analysed, and is discussed here. Central Research Questions The position taken has viewed drama in education as an exploration of what meanings are to be found in the individual, both as person and as being in the world. The central research question of the thesis was, "What effect might a program of drama have on the attitudes of Grade 5 children toward aging and toward old people?" CHAPTER 5 8 8 ATTITUDE INVESTIGATED AND DESIGN OF THE STUDY This study was limited to the investigation of Grade 5 students' attitudes toward the elderly and toward ageing. The intention was to discover whether or not drama educa-tion, when it is used with children to investigate the topic of young people-old people, can cause their attitudes to the elderly and to ageing to change. Such an investigative stance in the thesis makes the assumption that children's attitudes in this regard need to be changed—that they are either less than ideal, inappropriate or negative. In this chapter a case for this pre-supposition is made. Literature on Ageism and Gerontophobia A recent study by Levin and Levin (1980) on prejudice against the elderly, sees the disciplines of physiology, psychology, and sociology, by reporting constantly upon nega-tive aspects of ageing, as contributing to a negative view of ageing and of old people. In such literature, Levin and Levin discerned a tendency to "blame the victim" for the crime. They argued that this tendency has caused the isolation of the elderly in society and that the elderly themselves, by adopting a strategy of disengagement, have exacer-bated this social distance between themselves and other age groups. They noted that similar reactions toward and by target groups are paralleled in examinations of racism and sexism. Among the aged, however, reactions vary from passive acceptance with concomitant self-devaluation to overt political activism, for example, in the activities of the Grey Panthers, a U.S. militant group of seniors fighting for seniors' rights. In this vigorous assertion of rights, evidence exists of an emerging "sub-culture," which could be interpreted as another sign-post pointing toward prejudice, and toward discriminatory practices in society. MacPherson (1983, p. 242) explained this social dynamic of response to negative attitudes at work by stating that society demands certain behaviours and attitudes of its members. This phenomenon, a kind of assimilation, he identified as the macrosystem. First, he explained that, by and large, the middle aged and the elderly accept this macrosystem. The young rebel, since their value systems challenge those of society. Second, he observed that, by accommodation, learned behaviours have caused the elderly to adapt continually to societal expectations. This individual adjustment he called the microsystem. Together, the two systems (macro and micro) produce and preserve views of ageing and of old people which influence the population at all levels, in their beliefs and attitudes. While views such as those of MacPherson (1983) and Levin and Levin (1980) might be dismissed as instances of social theorizing, it is worthwhile asking whether examples of the movements they have described exist in everyday experience, and whether they might shed light on how today's society views aging and the elderly. Consider the advertisements for such products as "Grecian Formula" and "Oil of  Olay." From the mere existence of such products, it would be reasonable to infer that there is at least a segment of the population that wishes to avoid the appearance of ageing. Is this a question of aesthetics? If so, should the public restrict its view of human beauty only to those of youthful aspect? If the concern is not aesthetic, is it that society believes either that some benefit might accrue, or that some hurt might be avoided, if one does not appear to be elderly? Whether the intention is to avoid hurt, to obtain a benefit, or to satisfy a youth-bound aesthetic, it would appear that ageing qua the look of ageing is what many wish to avoid. The notion that visible signs of ageing may lead to some hurt may be based in a perception of powerlessness in those who are old. It may equally be based in the view that external marks of age are linked to, or indicative of, some internal degeneration of mind or of spirit in those who are elderly. Similarly, if the intention is to acquire some benefit, then it would appear that there are benefits which society does not bestow on those who are old but reserves for those who are younger. Avoidance of the visible signs of ageing on aesthetic grounds unreasonably limits the domain of the aesthetic. On the other hand, older persons may believe in the pervasiveness of such a youth-bound aesthetic so that they are afraid to be judged as no longer attractive. Again, "The message that our culture often gives us is that love (making love and being in love) is only for the young and the beautiful. People over 65 are no longer interested in or suited for things such as romance and passion" (Bulcroft & O'Connor-Roden, p.989). It seems, therefore, that in the consideration of the prevalence of youth-preserving products, there is support for the notion that the macro system holds negative views of ageing. Since such products are financially successful, there is reason to believe that some elderly people are adapting to this (micro) view of society. Thus, there is at least one example of the interaction of the macro-system and of the micro-system, as MacPherson (1983) has suggested, as society constructs a view of old age and ageing. Telling examples of Levin and Levin's (1980) disengagement are advertisements of retirement villages. Recently, advertisements of retirement villages on television, in newspapers, and in magazines have increased in stridency and number. These vil-lages provide private homes, with minimum guest accommodation, arranged around a community centre where the social life of those in their later years may take place insu-lated from the intrusion of other age groups. Outdoor tasks, or pleasures, such as snow removal and gardening are handled for the residents and the homes are built to require minimum structural upkeep. "Senior centres," which provide day-time recreational facilities for the less affluent elderly, are similarly insulated from those who are younger. For the elderly who also have health problems, geriatric wards are provided where few younger persons, other than care-givers, are part of the daily life of the occupants. Variations of these types of facilities abound in today's society, and their common fea-ture seems to be the separation of the older generation from other age groups. Elders, viewing this phenomenon, might be forgiven for assuming that such separa-tion represents a societal intention and it is clear that, in large numbers, they seem to acquiesce. They make their lives within these limits and are, thus, in large part, cut off from the mainstream. As life pursued under this limitation becomes a habit, it would not be surprising if outside affairs diminished in importance relative to the concerns of their restricted world. Levin and Levin's (1980) use of the idea of disengagement by the elderly as a response to the provisions, if not the intentions, of society seems, at least to this extent, well-founded. If, on the contrary, the provision of such homes and facilities is a result of the desires or needs of the elderly and are not in any way the result of the desires of younger minds at work in society, then one must ask "Why does this group wish unilaterally to insulate itself from the rest of society?" In their book entitled Aging and Modernization . Cowgill and Holmes (1972) devel-oped a theory of ageing in a cross-societal perspective. As a result of comparing the roles and status of older people in 15 different societies, from the pre-literate to those of the greatest industrial development, they concluded that with increasing modernization the status of older people has declined. Cowgill's (1974) later reflection on the findings led him to extract four factors in the modernization process which were strong and persistent variables in their contribution to the devaluation of the elderly. He showed, by analysis, that these factors — health technology, economic technology, urbanization, and education—led to four states of affairs, each of which contributed to the lower status of the aged. These Cowgill (1974, p. 58) named "Generational Competition, Obsolescence of the Jobs of the Aged, Residential Segregation and Social Distance and the Inversion of the Status of the Societal Contribution of the Aged" (1974). Generational competition leads to the concept of retirement which, because of a predominant work ethic, has lowered the status of those not working. Obsolescence of the traditional occupations of the older segment has also contributed to the move to retirement. The attraction of the big city has meant that younger members of society have moved away from ageing parents—a social segregation of the elderly which, in Cowgill's view, leads to the cult of youth. Childern who were more educated than their parents no longer sought the wisdom older relatives had to offer and turned instead to books and data bases. All of these factors working together have led, in Cowgill's view, to the intellectual and moral segregation of older people. The data he collected, for all but one of the 15 societies examined, showed a steady decline in all these factors of the status of older people. The exception, Japan, showed a less sharp decline in all these factors of decreased status of older people. This exception was attributed to the Confu-cian ethic which demands respect for elders and worship of ancestors although, even in Japan, there was some decline. Persuasive as this theory was, and is, in explaining the negative attitudes toward the elderly found in investigations in the 1960s and 70s, Marshall (1983), in his review of subsequent work, pointed out that the theory is not as universally applicable as it first seemed. Work by Bengtson (1975) stressed the need for a clear distinction to be made between the societal process of modernization and the individual process of modernity whereby people are exposed to and adapt to the modernization going on around them. Hendricks (1980) concluded that there is a variation in the rate of modernization from society to society and within the different segments of a particular society, which denies the claim of a smooth and even decline in the attitudes toward the elderly. Thus, both the individual adaptation to modernization and the rate of societal change do alter the force of the explanations offered by the original modernization theory. However, subse-quent refinements do not alter the claim that there is, to a greater or lesser degree in modern societies, a tendency to devalue older people, when compared with more tradi-tional societies. The degree of devaluation which occurs will be determined partly by individual adaptation to modernization (modernity) and by the rate of modernization in a particular society. The literature of gerontology is replete with references to the myths and stereotypes which surround the subject of old people (Hendricks & Hendricks, 1979; Kart, 1974; Palmore, 1971). Other reported views are formed by myths or stereotypes about old age as a state, for example, the view that Shakespeare's seven stages of man is an immutable rule. Such literature implies that statements about myths and stereotypes either cause or contribute to negative attitudes toward ageing and old people. There is, however, a lack of clarity in both the explanation of what is to count as a myth or stereotype and in the nature and effect of any contribution to attitudes that they may make. The issues of logical errors, myths and stereotypes are related to the con-ceptions of attitude and prejudice discussed in Chapter 2. Psychological Studies of Attitude to Aaeina and to Old People In early studies by Tuckman and Lorge (1953; 1954) they investigated attitudes toward ageing. The distinction between attitudes toward aging and toward old people is not clear in those studies. Their earlier work with 147 graduate students as respon-dents, employed a questionnaire which examined misconceptions and stereotypes, and was entitled "Attitudes Toward Old People." However, an examination of the catego-ries employed in their instrumentation revealed that some items were concerned with the respondents' attitudes toward their own ageing or toward ageing as a concept. In 1954, Tuckman and Lorge reduced the size of the questionnaire in size and in-creased the study sample to investigate attitudes of 533 junior and senior high school students. The title they gave this study was "Attitudes of Junior and Senior High School Students Toward Ageing," but the questions included items which were clearly measur-ing attitude towards old people. Tuckman and Lorge (1953, pp. 249-260) concluded from the results that there was significant support for stereotypical attitudes toward the aged and toward ageing (1954, pp. 59-61). This lack of discrimination between what the scales measured and what they claimed to measure weakened the construct validity in each case. Kogan (1961, pp. 44-54), who was critical of this research, developed a new ques-tionnaire which distinguished between beliefs and attitudes and measured attitudes 93 only. Employing a Likert scale, he showed that negative attitudes toward the elderly were associated with (a) anomie, (b) negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities, and (c) negative attitudes toward a variety of physically handicapped groups. He concluded that (a) attitudes are multidimensional, containing elements of belief, feeling, knowl-edge, and behaviour, and, (b) there is some justification in characterizing society's attitudes toward the elderly as a form of prejudice. When Rosencrantz and McNiven (1969) tested 287 undergraduate students, they employed yet another scale which they created from the categories developed by Osgood, Succi, and Tannenbaum (1957). Osgoode et al. (1957) had investigated attitudes as multidimensional entities, and said of their instrument: This instrument allows the influence of connotative judgement, and total scores can be found in addition to more meaningful scores in each dimension. It is this latter exercise which is most important in research of this type, since we may gain an understanding of the interplay of the dimensions comprising an attitude, (p. 64) With this instrument, (Osgood et al 1957) these researchers found significant differ-ences in the attitudes of undergraduate students to varying age groups. The instrument attended to the connotations of words used to describe the feelings, beliefs, behaviours, and knowledge of the respondents, and used factor analysis to examine the data. The elderly (aged 65 years and over) were undervalued in the instrumental-effective dimen-sion and in the autonomous-dependent dimension (the first category includes actions of old people which affect the lives of others in some significant way while the second indicates the tendency of the elderly either to order their own lives or to allow others to do so for them). Older men were adjudged the least socially acceptable sub-group of the young, middle-aged, and elderly groups. The study also showed the effect on the respondents' attitudes of contact and experience with the elderly. Overall, this study confirmed the tendency, previously noted, to undervalue older people — a tendency leading to a lack of respect and, conceivably in the long run, to prejudice. In 1971, McTavish undertook a review of the research into attitudes toward the eld-erly in "Perceptions of Old People" in which was documented the devaluing of old people and old age as a state. McTavish (1971, p. 90) substantiated the complaints of Kogan (1961) and Rosencrantz and McNiven (1969) and praised the work of the latter for its multidimensional approach. In a more recent review of attitudes in general, Shrigley (1988) characterized attitudes as evaluative beliefs which predispose people to act in a certain way. Thus, the move in assessing attitudes appears now to preserve the multidimensionality aspect while assigning different weights to the dimensions of feeling, beliefs, knowledge, and dispositions to act. Over the last three decades, there-fore, the work of both Kogan (1961) and of Rosancrantz and McNiven (1969) appears to have been supported. Much of the work, cited above investigated the attitudes of respondents whose mean age would be in the late teens. However, the Kogan studies dealt with a much wider age range. As was argued earlier, the social milieu is likely to affect the attitudes of younger people and it is to studies of these younger people and their environment that this discussion must now turns. Children's Attitudes to Old People and to Aaeina Children's attitudes were examined more exhaustively in the years following McTavish's (1971) review (Borges & Dutton, 1976; Seefeldt, Jantz, & Glaper, 1977; Thomas & Yamamoto, 1975). In the Thomas and Yamamoto study, 1000 children enrolled in Grades 6, 8,10, and 12 were the subjects. Their attitudes were measured using three pictures of men of different ages and a semantic differential scale. The pictures were the basis for an essay written by the children, and the scale measured evaluative, feeling and potency dimensions in their attitude towards older people. A three-way analysis of variance (grade x gender x concept) was used to examine the data. The authors found that their results disagreed with the notion of uniformly negative attitudes towards old people, except for factors of activity and potency. Evidence of some negative feelings, some misconceptions, and some negative projections of behav-iour was found, but some positive results were also obtained for those factors. They, therefore, supported the view that attitudes are multidimensional, complex, and highly flexible. For these reasons, Thomas and Yamamoto (1975) suggested that negative attitudes towards the elderly "may be greatly influenced by realistic education, relative to the valuable contributions old persons can and do make in society" ( p. 128). Since pictures, essays, and a semantic differential measure were employed in this research and confirmed some evidence of stereotypy, it supplemented the earlier evidence of the existence in children of some negative attitudes toward the elderly. In their second study, Jantz, Seefeldt, Serock (1977) used the Kogan scales with tape-recorded oral responses to open-ended questions about the elderly and about old age. These were administered individually to 180 children, enrolled in Grades 3-11. Although the researchers found positive attitudes to the elderly in the children's ac-counts of their feelings, there were negative or stereotypical responses in knowledge about the elderly and in descriptions of behaviours with the elderly. Again, the study supported a predominantly negative view of the elderly as persons. The instrument used in the Jantz et al. (1977) work was chosen for an aspect of the present study. In 1976, Borges and Dutton examined the differences in attitudes of groups of re-spondents aged 6 to 65 years towards the process of aging. The young respondents were asked to project, on a Likert scale, how they would feel about being aged. Mean-while, the elderly were asked to list those periods of their lives which they recalled as having been good, less good, and so on. Young and middle aged persons were found ' to devalue the 65+ years life phase, but, in contrast, the elderly judged their old age to be as happy as their happiest times in childhood. This lack of agreement in the views of different age groups about the various phases of life indicated a tendency among the younger respondents in the study to devalue old age as a state. It also demonstrated that young persons and the middle aged were less than confident as they view their own futures. The study results did point to the need to alter attitudes about aging which the elderly themselves saw as untrue, and the data also indicated what appeared to be an ambient fear of aging (gerontophobia). In recent years, further research has confirmed these earlier findings of ageism and possible gerontophobia in children (Fillmer, 1984; Seefeldt, 1982, 1984, 1985; Tarrier, & Gomes, 1981; Weinberger, 1979; Wernick, & Manaster, 1984). As a result of these numerous studies over an extended period, there is strong support for the claim that there are negative attitudes to be found in children towards aging and towards old people. These studies were not confined to the North American culture but include work done in Peru and in Thailand; therefore, the results have shown some uniformity across three cultures. Such attitudes are a matter of serious concern. In addition to studying the attitudes in young children, some researchers have studied such influences as books, television and print advertising which might affect the attitudes of children. Research on children's literature is particularly significant for the present study. Research on Ageism and Gerontophobia in Children's Literature E. F. Ansello (1977) has been in the forefront of research in which books written for children are analysed to discover if they present negative or stereotypical views of ageing and old people. In his review of many studies of books for children, Ansello stated that such books are either ambivalent or negative in their attitudes towards older people. Older characters appear in lesser roles, are unidimensional rather than multidi-mensional, and lack development. Ansello (1977) noted the cumulative effect of this as a subtle stereotyping which portrays older people as "unexciting, unimaginative, not self disclosing and not self sufficient" ( p 215). Furthermore, he found that such portrayals encourage children 'lo love, pity, and avoid the old" (1977). In 1983, Pearson-Davies investigated children's theatre scripts and found more negative than positive character descriptions, either overt or implied. In addition, she observed that ridicule of some characteristics of older people was sometimes the cen-tral conflict in the plays she surveyed. Three-dimensional images of the elderly were rare. Of 430 characters, 53 (11.3%) were old, and of these, only three were developed. In 1976 and again in 1977, Peterson analysed the Newberry Medal Award books for adolescents. In the first batch, 51 of 53 books had at least one older character, but altogether, older characters numbered 159. As these represented 12% of all charac-ters, Peterson did not define this percentage as under-representation; however, since only 10% of the characters were older women, he categorized them as somewhat un-der-represented. As only 4.6% of the books contained details about the older charac-ters (conceived of as items of information), they could seldom have been major charac-ters. Peterson (1976) did not find older people portrayed as non-functioning or portrayed in a negative light, but did observe that the books suffered from "errors of omission rather than errors of commission" ( p. 321). He concluded that, "by reading these books teenagers will simply confirm their affiliation with the youth culture, to which soci-ety at large is subservient." (1976). Peterson's 1977 research confirmed these results: the attitudes portrayed had become even more negative. Agreement with these find-ings can be found as well in more recent research (Barnum, 1977; Vraney & Barrett, 1981). Studies of books written for elementary school children have included an equally negative prospect. (Ansello, 1978; Hurst, 1981; Kingston & Drotter, 1981; Lehman, 1985; Sera and Lamb, 1984; Seefeldt, et al., 1977; Serock, 1980). In addition, a study of the portrayal of the elderly in television commercials viewed by children showed equally negative portraiture (Serock, 1980). From such research, it appears that the view of the elderly promoted in some books for children is one which would reinforce any negative attitudes children may have. In the three previous chapters, attention given to establishing the basis from which the present investigation proceeds. The purpose of the discussion here was to establish that there is a need to be concerned about children's attitudes to the elderly. To this end, the research literature which dealt with attitudes towards the elderly and toward ageing was reviewed. Particular attention was given to the literature which included research into the attitudes of children to old people and ageing. In addition, research was reviewed on books written for children with themes portraying old age and old people. The conclusion that children may well hold negative attitudes toward ageing and old people was supported in the majority of the sources that could be located. Given that children have been found to hold such negative attitudes, and given that there are influences in their environment which could reinforce such attitudes, it was deemed likely that the group of children with whom the present research was carried out would exhibit some degree of less than desirable attitudes to the elderly and to ageing. Since this study was based on the notion that drama education may affect children's attitudes, an exploration of what is meant by drama education was conducted in Chap-ter 2. The work of drama educators from Britain, the United States, and Canada was reviewed to explicate the present understanding of that discipline and art form. Further-more, a statement of this writer's position on drama education was given in chapter 4 and supported by drama authorities where possible. This latter exposition was under-taken for two reasons: (a) to demonstrate the writer's perspective or bias as a partici-pant observer in the classroom of an other drama teacher, and (b) to form the basis for comparison and "thick" (Geertz, 1973) description of the drama encountered in the course of the research. The use here of the word "bias" must be understood in the context of the interpretative enquiry which was carried out. It does not necessarily carry a negative connotation, but rather represents the writer / researcher's point of view on important concepts at the heart of this study. Thus, the concepts of attitude, prejudice, stereotypy, gerontophobia, drama education, and research methods are those on which the researcher's stance must be made clear before the research is described. Chapter 3 established the writer's position on attitudes toward old people and toward ageing in order to set the stage for the research. Descriptions of what count as appro-priate attitudes to ageing and old people were cited from the discussions of personhood and of attitudes in the literature of ethics, law, and philosophy. The position adopted for this thesis was that an appropriate attitude to old people can be said to be respect for them as persons. Such an attitude can be described as having three characteristics: (a) the notion of symbiosis, (b) the notion of the right of the person to idiosyncratic goals, and (c) the notion of the right to choose the means to pursue such goals, provided that to do so does not interfere with the goals and means of others. Such attributes were based in the understandings that (a) the concept of what it is to be a person is central to the attitude one adopts toward others; (b) the proposition that what is self- ascribable must equally be other-ascribable if people to have an adequate concept of a person; (c) the notion that people must continually examine their own judgements for good reasons for the stances they adopt toward other persons; and (d) the awareness that since there are necessary but not sufficient condi-tions in all definitions of a person, they can probably never completely know a person, either self or other. Therefore, part of the respect we offer to ourselves and to others consists in the wonder one offers to oneself and to others consists in the wonder that is felt when in the presence of a mystery. Appropriate attitudes toward old people are seen to include: (a) honouring and mak-ing possible the achievement of their goals and means, (b) ascribing to old people the same capacities, thoughts, feelings, and reactions one ascribes to oneself, and (c) affirming the autonomy and mystery of the individual. These attitudes will result in (d) actions which strengthen that autonomy and which recognize, wonder at, and celebrate that mystery. These attitudes are symbiotic because in ascribing capacities, reactions, actions, and individuality, and in recognizing the personhood of the elderly, society is brought to knowledge of and wonder at the self, as they are by appropriately recogniz-ing the personhood of all others. In symbiotic action, agape is discovered with all per-sons. Respect for persons thus consists in agape rationally evoked in symbiotic aware-ness, scrutiny, attention and action. As well as a preliminary for the research, the posi-tion outlined in Chapter 3 was an explanation of this researcher's perspective in ap-proaching the investigation into attitudes toward the elderly. Perspectives and Rationale of the Study The study was designed after a review of the instruments available to measure children's attitudes to ageing and to the elderly. Even at the outset this researcher felt dissatisfaction with such instruments. Few offered the possibility of open-ended ques-tions and none was precise or subtle enough to elicit from respondents, in any illumina-tive detail, the reasons for the stances they might be willing to claim for those investi-gated. Understandably, such instruments were constructed with attention paid to the time it would take to administer them. As a result of these three limitations, a decision was made to carry out both a quali-tative study and an empirical investigation. Despite, the disadvantages mentioned, the decision was made to retain an empirical component, because the research was to be carried out with classrooms of children who worked in groups to create the drama. It was felt, therefore, that despite their drawbacks, empirical instruments would provide at least a profile of the attitudes of the children as a group before and after the drama. Such group profiles would be supplemented by the individual accounts given by the children of their attitudes at the beginning, during, and after the drama, and by the teacher accounts of the lessons, of the drama produced, and of her observations con-cerning the attitudes of the children. The researcher's field notes and the children's journals added to the data collection. Decisions about design were made as a result of the assessment of available instru-ments and of the conditions under which the research would take place. Such deci-sions were also indicative of the researcher's biases. Thus, three sets of researcher bias were present in the approach to this research as a project, in addition to those which emerge in the discussion of qualitative methods in Chapter 6. These biases were: 1. The bias in the position on attitudes adopted for the investigation (Chapter 3). 2. The bias inherent in the position on what the researcher means by the term "drama education" (Chapter 2). 3. The bias extant in the position taken on the appropriate means to investigate the problem. Choices were, however, supported by eminent scholars in the various fields. This in-vestigation was being conducted with a view to obtaining as thorough a picture as pos-sible of the effect of drama education on children's attitudes to the elderly, but it is being conducted with these biases in mind. Design of the Study A quantitative framework of pre- test post-test with control group and two experi-mental groups was decided upon. Within this framework, supporting it, providing addi-tional insights into it, and in interaction with it, Chapter 6, a qualitative investigation was designed. 100 The qualitative investigation comprises analyses of: 1. drawings created by the students, pre- and post test; 2. interviews with the drama teacher and with the students, conducted at the . beginning, during and after the investigation; 3. recollections of the drama work collected from randomly selected pairs of students and individuals, at the end of each of the drama sections; 4. drama work which was videotaped and analysed at the end of each drama section; 5. observations made in the drama classroom while the researcher participated in the drama work; and 6. students' journals as they reflected on the drama work they had done after their tasks were completed. In each of these six methodologies, transcripts of the taped interviews were offered to the respondents for scrutiny to see if their thoughts, feelings, and understandings were truly represented in the documentation. Alterations, deletions, and additions were then made to the transcripts. Thus, the meanings which emerged from the qualitative investigation were a joint construction by the respondents and the researcher together, as they examined and reflected upon the raw data collected. Chapter 6 provides more detailed explanation of the qualitative procedures adopted. Structure of the Quantitative Investigation This section contains descriptions of the sampling procedures, the groups of re-spondents, the instrument, the collection of the quantitative data, the scoring procedures, and the statistical manipulation. The results of this part of the investigation are given in Chapter 7. Sampling Since the experiment was conducted in school settings, with pre-determined groups of students (i.e., classes), no claim is made to random selection of respondents. In addition, the instrument chosen for the quantitative section of the study has no norms with which the results may be compared. For these reasons, no use is made of inferen-tial statistics in the presentation of the acquired data. 101 The selection of groups of children was limited by the willingness of the school au-thorities, and of the parents of the children concerned, to participate in the experiment. Grade 5 children were chosen as participantss because the psychological literature sug-gested that at around the age of 10 to 11 years, attitudes tend to become set. Permis- , sion to conduct the experiment was sought and obtained from school boards, principals, teachers, and parents of the children. Since qualified teachers of elementary school drama were, at the time, relatively rare in Calgary schools, it was necessary to select the experimental groups on the advice of the school board's director. Experimental Group. The school system chosen for the research was the Calgary (Alberta) Catholic School District #1. In discussion with the director of research for that school board and as a result of the researcher's background as a teacher in the St. John (Elementary) School of Fine Art in that system, it was decided that the students enrolled in Grade 5 at that school should form the two experimental groups. Both the director of research and this researcher felt that, as a result of a teaching background, the researcher would gain more ready acceptance there than elsewhere. Since the student participants would not be known personally to the researcher, the quantitative work would not be compro-mised. Ready acceptance by staff, the school principal, and the students was likely, as all had heard of the researcher or had been involved with her at one time. In addition, there was no other elementary school in the system in which drama was taught as a subject in its own right by a qualified drama teacher. Also, the role of researcher was seen as valuable to this particular school, which had opened just 4 years prior to the commencement of this research into drama. The reasons for the school's success have not as yet been investigated. Nor have the claims for academic or other gains by the students, as made by parents and teachers associated with the school, been substantiated by research. The school administrators welcomed any research done because they believe very strongly in the methods of edu-cation implemented in their school. They also believe that research into the whole field of attitudes is vital to the success of all children in school. For all of the above reasons, the Grade 5 students of the St. John School of Fine Art were chosen to form the study's experimental groups. 102 Population of St. John School of Fine Art. It is necessary to describe the population of the school in general terms because the children who attended this school at the time of this research came from all areas of Calgary ( a fairly large city of some 700,000 population) and their parents chose the school for a wide variety of reasons. First, there were those children who resided in that area of the city in which the school was situated. These children had priority for places in the school if they were proven members of the Catholic faith since there were no other elementary Catholic schools in the area. Such children may have had little interest in the arts and the same may have been true of their parents. They attended St. John school simply because it was close to their homes. On the other hand, some parents living in the area, who had heard of the school's reputation or who held an interest in the arts or in the type of education offered there, were at pains to discover their child's baptismal certificates in order to prove their child's right to attend the school. These children constituted the first group who attended St. John school. Children who resided in other areas of the city were bused to the school, free of charge. They were admitted on a first-come, first-served basis. It should not be as-sumed, however, that all those who were accepted applied because the children or their parents held an interest in the arts, or that they were convinced that education in and through the arts was a good thing. There were several identifiable groups of children who attended St. John school: (a) those who failed to make progress in more traditional classrooms; (b) those whose teachers or principals recommended the school as a result of behaviour problems exhibited by the children in their former schools; (c) those who were gifted but had not been challenged in regular classrooms; (d) those whose parents were interested or involved in the arts; (e) those who were the children of edu-cators and came because their parents held an understanding of the education offered there; (f) those, of course, who came because they thought they would be trained for "stardom" of one kind or another; and, finally (g) those small numbers who came to St. John because they were true artists in-the-becoming. As there was no added cost to attend this school, theoretically, its students could come from any financial background. In fact, the preponderance among enrolled chil-dren of well-educated parents meant that the earning power of the parent population was above average on the whole. There were a few children who came from very poor homes. 103 Control group. A discussion was initiated with the school board's director of research to enable the identification of a control group in a school which was likely to have a socio-economic status (SES) spectrum analogous to that of St. John. I accepted the recommendation of Brebeuf Junior High School and obtained permission from teachers and staff to pre-and post-test those students whose parents gave permission. Initial Procedures. Letters to parents requesting permission for their children to participate in the study were sent out with the students to 49 parents of the Brebeuf School control group (Appendix A ). These letters clearly stated that only 40 minutes of the children's school time would be taken up by the research. Similar letters were sent home to 68 parents of the St. John School two experimental groups. For these children, the time out of class was clearly stated to be 40 minutes. In addition, parents were advised that further 500 minutes of in-class drama time would be given over to the exploration of the theme "young people, old people". (Appendix A). For the control group, permissions to participate totalled 19 (39%) out of the possible 49. For the experimental groups, permission totalled 58 (85%) out of a possible 68. The parents were also asked to complete a personal information form along with the permission form (Appendix B). This second form dealt with the SES of the parents, their racial origin, and the country of their birth. For both the experimental and control groups, only one parent in each declined to complete the SES form. As a result of the permissions received, 19 students in the control group and 58 in the experimental groups were pre-tested. The student s were grouped as follows: 1. Experimental (or Drama) Group A, 31 students. Drama teacher facilitated child-directed drama with a minimum of teacher direction. 2. Experimental (or Drama) Group B, 27 students. Drama teacher employed a measure of control over the drama, that is, teacher-directed drama. 3. Control Group C, 19 students. Language-Arts teacher followed the regular school program. Each student was assigned a number so that all test results could remain confiden-tial. The empirical instrument, therefore, was employed to yield only group or sub-group scores. The art work was labelled by a code so that the group to which the child artists 104 belonged was hidden from all but the researcher. Tape recordings of children's inter-views were preserved but the speakers were not identified, either by locale or by their own names. Videotapes were treated in like fashion, that is the tapes were edited by the researcher to substitute pseudonyms for any names used in the talk and drama pieces created by the children. Informed consent without prejudice was obtained from all parties involved (Appendix B). Treatment The story, The Berenstain Bears and the Week at Grandma's (Berenstain & Beren- stain. 1986). wa