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Encouraging state irresponsibility : resolution without punishment? International responses to the conflict… Zellman, Ariel David 2006

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E N C O U R A G I N G S T A T E I R R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y : R E S O L U T I O N W I T H O U T P U N I S H M E N T ? I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E S T O T H E C O N F L I C T IN D A R F U R , S U D A N A N D U N I N T E N D E D C O N S E Q U E N C E S . by A R I E L D A V I D Z E L L M A N B . A . , The University of British Columbia, 2005 A THESIS S U B M I T T E D IN P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R T H E D E G R E E O F M A S T E R O F A R T S in T H E F A C U L T Y OF G R A D U A T E S T U D I E S (Political Science) T H E U N I V E R S I T Y OF B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A August 2006 © Ar ie l Dav id Zel lman, 2006 11 Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of the international community's failure to punish Sudan as a means to bring an end to ongoing conflict in its western region of Darfur. Focusing on the actions and rhetoric of the United Nations Security Council with respect to its recent adoption of the "responsibility to protect" doctrine, it is claimed that the Council has emphasized the importance of its collective responsibility to protect innocents to the detriment of holding failed states accountable for their role in fermenting and/or exacerbating intrastate violence. While recognizing as legitimate the multiple factors responsible for the shift in international practice from imposing punitive measures against norm violating states to international and individual accountability, it is argued that all have resulted in the unintended consequence of vastly expanding an environment of impunity in which individual conflicts may eventually be arrested but the conditions allowing the outbreak of such violence remain unaffected. Moreover, this deferral of state-targeted punishment by the Security Council has ramifications beyond the individual case's borders such that failed states may no longer be held to account for their actions. This has resulted in the reinforcement of orthodox normative understandings and practical respect of sovereignty inappropriate to post-Cold War security realities further impairing the ability of the Council to ensure the preservation of international peace and security. As such, it is critical that the international community re-recognize the importance of state-targeted coercion as an instrument of multilateral diplomacy and as a legitimate means to maintain international order. Ill TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract • ii Table of Contents , iii Chapter I 1 Chapter II The Conflict in Darfur 10 2.1 Economic, Ethnic, and Political Conflicts and Inequalities 10 2.2 Regional Conflict as a Means of Government Control 14 2.3 Deconstructing Government and Regime Power Centralization 17 2.4 Realities on the Ground 20 2.5 International Response or the Lack Thereof 26 Chapter III The Responsibility to Protect? 35 3.1 State Sovereignty and R2P , 35 3.2 A Responsible International Community? 45 Chapter IV The Great Sanctions Debate 61 4.1 The Nature of the Crime Determines the (Non-)Punishment ....61 4.2 The Failure of Constructive Engagement 65 4.3 Humanitarian Concerns and Targeted Sanctions 69 4.4 But Do Sanctions Really Work? '. 75 Chapter V State Failure and State Responsibility 82 5.1 State Failure and Domestic Instability 82 5.2 Taking Responsibility while Granting Impunity 88 5.3 Ensuring Continued Impunity 93 5.4 Internationalizing Moral Hazard 98 5.5 Bad Normative Development 103 Chapter VI Conclusions I l l Bibliography 116 1 I With a considerable drop in the number of interstate wars over the last twenty years, the harsh realities of intrastate conflict have come to the forefront as the greatest challenge to international peace and security since the end of the Cold War. Unlike traditional definitions which limit warfare to violence between two or more states, intrastate conflict, is often characterized by government repression of domestic populations, fighting within the state between the government and rebelling armed groups, and violence between numerous non-state actors within its territory. Particularly prevalent in so-called weak and failed states, this threat to state security is particularly troubling for the safeguarding of a peaceful and stable international order which has long been premised on the normative practice of states' non-intervention in the internal affairs of their neighbours. As the attention of the international community has gradually shifted from a predominant focus on preventing interstate warfare to a more broad perspective including the containment and control of intrastate violence, this concept of sovereignty has consistently served as a substantial impediment to international action to discipline state perpetrators of violent crimes within their own territory. Although a crucial instrument in the prevention of interstate conflict, sovereignty has also served as both a legal and normative impediment to. effective international intervention in particularly obscene and destabilizing internal conflicts and a shield to regimes which perpetrate crimes against their own populace. While the shocking violence committed in the Balkans and Rwanda at the behest of the state in 1990s certainly were met initially with equally shocking complacency by the international community, these tragedies also led to a near universal understanding that sovereignty cannot legitimately be understood as granting a state broad impunity to violate the 2 basic human rights of its citizens. The subsequent rise and legislative adoption of the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine by both the UN General Assembly and Security Council in late 2005 and 2006 respectively has heralded a significant change in normative understandings of sovereignty which insist that states are not only entitled to a monopoly of political control within their territory but are responsible for the protection of their citizens. Furthermore, where and when the state itself is either unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, it has been recognized by these bodies that it is the responsibility of the international community to intervene to protect those innocents threatened by violence. . The most substantial challenge to this doctrine in recent years has been the ongoing conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan. Over the past three years of warfare between rebel forces and the state, the Sudanese government has been directly responsible for prosecuting and promoting near-genocidal violence against the region's local populace through direct assaults by the Sudanese armed forces on rebel-held territory and through material, logistical, and political support for Arab nomadic raiders known as janjaweed who have destroyed countless villages, driven the local populations from their homes, engaged in widespread rape, and occupied abandoned territory effectively "cleansing" these areas of their inhabitants. The United Nations has characterized the conflict as "one of the world's worst humanitarian crises," while the American administration under President George W. Bush declared the crisis genocide in 2004.1 Nonetheless, with approximately 300,000 people dead and millions more living as refugees and IDPs, the international community's response has been muted at best. In 2004, the National Congress Party (NCP) government under General Omar al Bashir agreed to the deployment of an African Union observer force (AMIS) in the region, now 1 J im YandeHe i , "In Break with U . N . , Bush Cal ls Sudan K i l l ings Genocide," Washington Post, 2 June 2005, A19 . " U N Ch ie f Cal ls Western Sudan 'World 's Worst ' Humanitarian Cr is is , " Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 M a y 2004, Lex isNex is Academic. 3 numbering approximately 7000 troops in all, but their mandate is considerably limited and their capabilities inadequate given their relatively poor training, limited interoperability, and finite resources. The United Nations Security Council has also heavily invested itself in addressing the conflict having passed numerous Chapter VII resolutions with reference to the Darfur conflict, calling on all parties to negotiate a peaceful settlement, imposing an arms embargo on "the Janjaweed" and other non-state actors in the region, and placing prosecution of those deemed guilty of war crimes under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Most recently, the Council imposed travel sanctions and asset freezes on four relatively low-ranking individuals involved in the conflict and opened the door to the replacement of AMIS by a UN-supported force, a move not supported by the Sudanese government, following a peace deal between the NCP and the largest rebel faction.2 While these measures have been designed to both deter and prevent future violence and reign in individual criminals and guilty parties, interestingly, no single international effort has sought to target or punish the most obvious accomplice: the Sudanese state itself. As such, it appears that this is the first instance in the post-Cold War era where an implicit case of ethnic cleansing and genocide has been deemed a threat to international peace and security and yet no punitive action has been taken against the state by the Security Council. Indeed, while the international response to the genocide in Rwanda was anemic at best, the Security Council did eventually place an arms embargo on MRND-controlled Rwanda, authorize a military intervention by the French-led Operation Turquoise (more aimed at preventing an RPF victory than halting the genocide), and effectively condoned the takeover by the state by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces led by now-Rwandan president Paul 2 U N Security Counc i l resolutions: 1556(2004), 1564(2004), 1574(2004), 1591(2005), 1593 (2005), 1672 (2006), 1679(2006) 4 Kagame. In the case of Bosnia, both coercive sanctions and military force were used (although with questionably effectiveness) to punish both the ethnic factions internal to the conflict and the Serbian "government" of Bosnia.4 Although in the case of Kosovo it was NATO which engaged in military actions to halt ethnic cleaning being conducted by Serbian forces over the objections of Russia, the Council imposed economic sanctions, authorized the deployment of an international security presence following the retreat of Serbian forces, and enforced a settlement on the Yugoslav Serbian state which placed Kosovo under UN administration.5 In all cases, the government in power was forced to take a significant measure of responsibility for violence on the ground and accept a resolution that either led to a change in government, the loss of a significant measure of control over the territory in question enforced by multinational forces, and/or mandatory multilateral economic and diplomatic sanctions directed against the state in question. In short, these governments were noticeably punished for their actions. Furthermore, all actions taken with the exception of the initial military actions in Kosovo were sanctioned 3 U N Security Counc i l resolutions: 918(1994), 929(1994) 4 Notable U N Security Counc i l resolutions under Chapter VI I with regard to this confl ict include: declaring and aff irming a comprehensive arms embargo on the (former) Socialist Federal Republ ic o f Yugoslav ia : 713(1991), 724(1991), declaring and aff irming a comprehensive economic embargo and diplomatic and travel sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro: 757(1992), 760(1992) (exempting sale o f medial supplies), authorizing the deployment o f U N P R O F O R : 761(1992), banning al l mil i tary flights aside from those o f U N P R O F O R in Bosnia-Herzegovina airspace: 781(1992), halting al l maritime shipping in and out o f Bosnia-Herzegovina: 787(1992), establishing an ad-hoc tribunal to prosecute war crimes being committed in the former Republ ic o f Yugos lav ia : 808(1993), establishing "protected areas" for IDPs within Bosnia-Herzegovina: 815(1993), extending the ban on mil i tary flights noting numerous violations: 816(1993), demanding an end to Yugoslavia-Montenegro's supplying o f Serbian paramilitaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 819(1993), reaffirming a continued limited economic embargo on Yugoslavia-Montenegro: 820 (1993), establishing an ad-hoc tr ibunalto prosecute war crimes being committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 827(1993), strengthening U N P R O F O R ' s mandate to al low greater uses o f force in protection o f safe areas: 836(1993), extending U N P R O F O R ' s mandate similarly in Croatia 871(1993), imposing individual sanctions on anyone supporting Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 942(1994), creating a rapid-reaction force within U N P R O F O R to ensure its abil i ty to monitor and enforce a ceasefire between belligerent parties: 998(1995), and authorizing the replacement o f U N P R O F O R by I F O R granting this multinational force the authority to use "a l l necessary measures" to affect the implementation of the Daton Accords: 1031(1995). 5 Relevant U N Security Counc i l resolutions under Chapter VI I in this case include: the imposit ion o f an arms embargo on the whole territory o f the Federal Republ ic o f Yugoslavia including Kosovo : 1160(1998), endorsement o f O S C E and N A T O efforts to evaluate the extent o f the violence: 1203(1998), and, fo l lowing unauthorized N A T O bombardments in Yugoslav ia , authorization o f an international security presence in Kosovo to deter further hostilities, demilitarize the K L A , and preventing the return o f Serbian pol ice, mil i tary, and paramilitary forces and a c iv i l administration to determine Kosovo 's future status: 1244(1999). 5 under Chapter VII authorizing the Security Council to conduct multilateral enforcement actions without the consent of the targeted state essentially violating its sovereignty. What can be made then of the international community's failure to punish the State of Sudan which has been so clearly responsible for a comparable level of violence? Why is it that the Security Council has been so hesitant to take decisive Chapter VII enforcement actions, particularly sanction directed against the state itself, and yet been reasonably open to measures to which the state consents and sanctions which target individuals and non-state groups involved in the conflict? Numerous factor must be considered to understand this outcome including concerns by members of the Security Council regarding their primary power interests, the humanitarian repercussions of such punishment, the actual effectiveness of military and economic coercion, the capacity of Sudan to reign in the violence, and the short-term consequences of choosing a strategy of punishment over reconciliation in resolving the conflict. Indeed, foot-dragging by the three western members, the US, UK, and France has been quite evident throughout the conflict having endlessly debated the merits of constructive engagement versus negative inducements in seeking compliance with human rights norms. Similarly, China and, to a lesser extent, Russia have been particularly active in obstructing attempts to hold Sudan to account for its role in the conflict. Not surprisingly, both retain economic and political interests in the continued existence of the current regime and have threatened to block and forced the dilution of a number of UN Security Council resolutions calling for action in the region. Complimented by these considerations guided by realpolitik is the concern that comprehensive sanctions are utterly ineffective and unnecessarily harmful to unintended targets including civilian populations and neighboring states. As such, the focus of sanctioning efforts has often 6 shifted to targeted sanctions which seek instead to minimize impacts on "ordinary citizens" and directly challenge the political and economic freedom of elites. Included in both of these explanations is the more pragmatic argument that has been argued contentiously throughout the economic statecraft literature, that sanctions simply do not work. Certainly, if military coercion has been shown to be inconsistently successful at target policy modification, why should economic coercion be any different? The success of sanctions, like that of military coercion, is greatly dependent on the relationship of the sender state to the target, the character of the respective parties' leadership, the international economic and political environment, the support maintained by either side, and the "functionality" of the target. In presupposing the success or failure of sanctions particularly addressing intrastate conflict, the target state's functional capacity to exercise Weberian sovereignty, that is to exercise a monopoly over the means of force within its territory, is indeed a primary analytic factor. Those states which are considered to be "failed" or "failing" are often assumed to lack the capacity to reign in widespread violence and chaos. As such, it is believed that sanctions or military coercion are unlikely to be effective in forcing the target to address violence on the ground or altering its behaviour. While this provides an appropriate justification for outside intervention to restore peace and security, a key element of the Responsibility to Protect, solutions which seek to halt violence while not addressing its initiators, particularly the target state, undermines the doctrine's primary message: that states are responsible for their actions and to their citizens. By failing to hold the state to account, such limited action in fact generates an atmosphere of impunity and moral hazard by which criminal behaviour by "failed" states is condoned and the international community is left solely responsible for its resolution. 7 In the case of failed states like Sudan, the decision not to employ state-targeted sanctions by the Security Council, whether motivated by realpolitik, humanitarianism, or sheer presumed pragmatism generates a new normative path in the conduct of international relations which in fact diminishes the expectation of responsibility of the state to its citizens, quixotically shifting the burden to token individuals and the international community. Indeed, it is apparent that the discourse of sanction ineffectiveness and state incapability are highly influential in this case in guiding the non-use of economic sanctions as well as more coercive military options which would punish the state for its behaviour. The push for "more effective" solutions centered on individual sanctions and consensual agreements between belligerent parties alone paradoxically may do more harm than good in the long run as both the state directly responsible for massive human rights violations remains unpunished and unreformed and the international community convinces itself of the effectiveness of what are, in effect, short term solutions adopting these strategies as the norm. Clearly this reasoning is not necessarily devoid of moral or practical considerations for the plight of the victims of Darfur and, accepting this logic, the argument that punishing Sudan is quite counterproductive is not entirely unreasonable. However, what the international community has either failed to consider or has chosen to ignore are the significant unintended consequences that are likely to result from non-punishment of the state. By seeking a mutually acceptable, negotiated resolution to the ongoing violence without breaching the question of state accountability, the international community is promoting a climate of impunity and irresponsibility of perhaps a worse character than had their been no international intervention at all. This far-from-benign neglect of this important element of conflict resolution is of great concern for it degrades the international community's ability to demand that Sudan take responsibility for the protection of its citizens. It also raises a concern 8 of moral hazard by which states may learn from this case that they can initiate or disproportionally respond to internal violence and expect a free ride if and when international efforts materialize to resolve the conflict. Finally, the international community's behaviour in this case raises the spectre of the development of a "bad norm" which would serve to legitimate future inaction and non-punishment in cases where state culpability in promoting internal violence is just as evident. Insofar as norms are understood as collective expectations for proper behaviour by states within the international system, inaction by the Security Council in particular can be seen as not only precedent setting but as legitimating rhetorical arguments of sanction ineffectiveness and state incapability.6 The reinforcement of these arguments by diplomacy motivated by realpolitik and humanitarian concern thereby create a quality of "oughtness" to their non-use shutting out the acceptable possibility of punitive measures in analogous cases. As such, while the decision to avoid the use of sanctions is itself contentious, of greater concern are the likely outcomes in international normative practice which fundamentally contest the weak and failed state's responsibility to protect its citizens and weaken the legality, legitimacy and resolve of the international community to hold them to account. In order to understand the likely outcomes of the current course of international practice with respect to Sudan, this thesis will explore and evaluate the themes and theoretical arguments regarding the development of the Responsibility to Protect and the use of multilateral coercion, particularly with respect to the employment of economic sanctions. To provide a solid grounding and reference to current affairs and topics relevant to the case study, an outline of the present conflict in Darfur will be provided along with a summary and analysis of the international response thus far. This will be followed by a discussion of the origins and content 6 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International No rm Dynamics and Pol i t ical Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 891. 9 of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, along with an evaluation of their application by the international community in Darfur. Next, the thesis will explore the efficacy of sanctions as an instrument of international diplomacy followed by a more in-depth examination of the various logics of non-punishment with regard to Sudan. Finally, the paper will analyze the unintended consequences of non-punishment, in this case particularly focusing on the effects of the "failed state" discourse on beliefs surrounding the inefficacy of state-targeted punitive measures. These outcomes range from the weakened ability of the international community to hold Sudan accountable for its role in the violence to the promotion of moral hazard encouraging irresponsible failed state behaviour globally to the greater risks of "bad normative development" which may solidify non-punishment as a viable and primary strategy in international attempts to diffuse conflicts such as the one raging in Darfur. In conclusion, the thesis will suggest potentially more appropriate policy prescriptions with regard to the present conflict and recommend the return to the use of punitive measures as legitimate instruments of international diplomacy particularly in the face of presumed cases of ethnic cleansing or genocide. In doing so, it will recommend how the international community can respond in this case despite legitimate concerns surrounding the harmful effects of punishment while fundamentally preserving the notion of sovereignty as responsibility as a solid and enforced expectation of international practice. 10 II: T h e C o n f l i c t i n D a r f u r 2.1 Economic, Ethnic, and Political Conflicts and Inequalities The present conflict in Darfur is one with deep historical roots in some respects dating back to the forcible inclusion of the independent Sultanate of Darfur into the newly formed Sudanese colonial state by the British-Egyptian Condominium authorities in 1916. Even prior to this, however, Darfur was of peripheral political concern to both Arab and Turkish Islamic empires as a distant, lawless region utilized primarily as a source of African slave labour, a stigma upon its indigenous Fur population even today. Ever since its annexation, the Darfur Sultanate now three administrative regions: North, South, and West Darfur, has remained in a subordinate and neglected position economically and politically with respect to the capitol of Khartoum and its surrounding area. Despite its enormous geographic area of about 500,000 square kilometers (Sudan itself covers 2.5 mil l ion square kilometers, almost five times the size of France) and being home to 6 mil l ion of Sudan's approximately 38 mil l ion inhabitants, Darfur has consistently received a far-less-than proportional share of economic and development aid from the central government leaving it as one of Sudan's most underdeveloped regions. 8 A lex de Waal and Yoanes Ajawin note the effect of relative depravation in Sudan's outlying areas: A huge proportion o f Sudan's national income is concentrated in Khartoum, the central region and major cities. Mass migration to Khartoum and other major cities is a manifestation o f these inequalities: mil l ions o f displaced people are ready to l ive in deplorable conditions in squatter settlements because life in the regions offers them neither hope nor security. 9 7 R. S. O'Fahey, State and Society in Dar Fur (London: Hurst, 1980), 13. 8 "Cr is is in Darfur," in International Cr is is Group [database online], [cited 2006]. Avai lab le from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2700&l=l. 9 A l ex de Waa l and Yoanes A jawin , ed. When Peace Comes, Civil Society and Development in Sudan (Lawrencevi l le, N J : Red Sea Press, 2002), 69. 11 Although economic underdevelopment is clearly not unique to Darfur, the region has figured even less than others in the central government's economic calculations as it is not a major hub of regional trade, is an inland region with no access to port facilities, and lacks abundant natural resources. Indeed, local livelihoods consist primarily of subsistence farming and nomadic cattle herding which are of very little interest to a regime desiring economic modernization and regional dominance.10 Although such occupations do not immediately concern Khartoum, rivalries between farmers and nomads has figured quite prominently in local aspects of Darfur's civil strife especially as increased desertification in the North has forced nomadic tribes to seek new grazing grounds farther south bringing them into conflict with established farming and pastoral populations over land-use. These struggles have only been exacerbated by almost interrupted drought since 1967 making access to water and arable land even more scarce and more relatively valued commodities.11 De Waal's study of famine in the region in the 1980s reveals that these conditions have led to a substantial decrease in landholder investments in cattle and a switch towards fanning resulting in more settled and concentrated towns and villages centred on agriculturally viable soil. In an effort to protect claims to increasingly scarce fertile land, particularly in North Darfur, owners have not allowed fields to lay fallow encouraging depletion of alluvial soils and have gone as far as to fence off fields and pastures in order to prevent access to non-community members.12 These more discriminatory landholding systems have resulted in increased conflict with more recently arrived nomadic tribes, generally identified as Arab, who 1 0 The recent discovery o f o i l in Darfur may change this although it has not had a noticeable impact on the internal nature o f the confl ict thus far. Ruth Gid ley , " O i l Discovery Adds N e w Twist to Darfur Tragedy," Reuters AlertNet, 15 June 2005, [database on-line], available from http://www.alertnet.Org/thefacts/reliefresources/l 11885496661.htm, Reuters Alertnet. ' 1 C . Huggins, "Communal Confl icts in Darfur Region, Western Sudan," in Africa Environment Outlook (Nairobi , Kenya : Uni ted Nations Environment Program, 2004), 2. 1 2 A l e x de Waa l , Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984-1985, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 47. . 12 themselves have had little respect for traditional land-use agreements between settled (primarily Fur and Masalit) and semi-nomadic (Zaghawa) populations, generally identified as African. A report by the United Nations Environment Programme published just prior to the present conflict notes that before 2003, the region had experiences some 40 intertribal conflicts over the past 20 years, primarily involving "tit-for-tat cattle-raiding and attacks on villages" by nomadic communities.13 Low levels of violence have remained constant over this time period with some 5400 people killed and 40,000 homes estimated destroyed in the 1980s and some 1800 violent fatalities between 1996 and 2000, although this violence is hardly comparable to the massive numbers of people killed and displaced over the past three and a half years.14 Furthermore, the common characterization of the present conflict as an ethnic dispute between "Arab" and "African" tribes is, in itself, quite problematic. Given historical demographic trends indicating high rates of intermarriage between groups, the result has been the development of a rather fluid concept of identity which attributes ethnic identity in some instances as much to livelihood as to parentage. As such, the highly normalized generational occupational mobility practiced by the local population by which Fur farmers became "Arab" nomadic herders and vice versa as dictated by economic necessity makes ridiculous the assigning of deep-rooted ethnic rivalry as the cause of conflict. O'Fahey notes in his study, State and Society in Dar Fur, "Such mobility suggests that tribal labels have only a limited ethnic content or stability and that mainly political mechanisms accounted for the preservation of territorially defined groups in an area of open frontiers. Changes in political allegiance [therefore] were later legitimized by changes in one's ancestors."15 He further explains how such self-made changes are evident in a number of circumstances, including in the existence of clan surnames of "Arab" 1 3 Huggins, ' 'Communal Confl icts in Darfur Region, Western Sudan," 2. 1 4 Ibid. 2. 1 5 O'Fahey, "State and Society in Dar Fur," 8. 13 groups having clear non-Arab roots and vice versa. For example, one clan of the Zaghawa bears the name Bedeyaat, etymologically related to the word Bedouin in reference to an ethnic Arab past.16 Such social divisions are further problematized in that almost the entire population of Darfur is Muslim, rendering religion, a key marker of ethnicity, irrelevant. Interestingly, although the Zaghawa have been targets of janjaweed and government attack, they are primarily pastoralists unlike the Fur and Masalit who are farmers, and, during the 1980s and 90s in particular, were often engaged in disputes over land-use with these two tribes prior to the present conflict.17 However, those conflicts most often resulting in inter-communal violence have, indeed, been between established tribal groups and "dar-less" nomads. Tensions between "established" groups and nomads have been further exacerbated by the regime as a means of currying favour with various tribal groups. This is hardly a new tactic as even prior to the most recent outbreak of violence in Darfur, the NCP government and its predecessors had established a practice of supporting nomadic herders against land-owning communities. Indeed settled populations have most often been those demanding recognition of regional grievances and lending support to rebel groups such as the southern-based, ethnic African Dinka-dominated Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Nomads, not nearly as tied to a specific territory, have been more easily manipulated by the government with promises of resource looting and gaining greater access to cattle grazing areas currently allocated to established populations. The fires of these local resource-based conflicts have been readily fanned by Khartoum which has found it easier to arm (or at the very least ignore the activities of) 1 6 A s such, it is more appropriate to refer to these groups in terms o f the present confl ict as "A f r i can i zed " or more often "A rab i zed " tribes rather than the more simplistic alternative. 1 7 Add ing further layers to the Darfur conflict, it is important to note that in neighboring Chad, the president Idriss Deby and much o f the pol i t ical elite are Zaghawa giving that country a vested interest in both the pol i t ical unrest in Darfur and the violence directed against their co-ethnics there. Ow ing to the Chadian Arab origin o f many o f those who presently are identified as janjaweed mil i t iamen, it is then not surprising that they should target Zaghawa populations as a personal agenda even beyond that o f the N C P . 14 tribal militias who would willingly raid the bases of support of domestic opponents for their own gain than to constructively address regional discontent or dispatch their own military forces, often conscripted from the same, presumably sympathetic, populations. 2.2 Regional Conflict as a Means of Government Control Specific examples of government-sponsored violence through nomadic proxies are plentiful throughout Sudanese modern history particularly since the rise of the NCP formerly National Islamic Front (NIF) government through coup in 1989 replacing the nominally democratic regime of Sadiq al Mahdi. Bringing the ongoing North-South civil war to a new level by providing more active support and arms than ever before to Arabized tribal militias as proxy paramilitaries to fight the SPLM/A, the NIF government gave them free reign to attack non-Arabized civilian populations beginning a process of widespread looting, violence, and ethnic cleansing in central and southern Sudan. Mansour Khalid writes, "The government's most odious war crime was the tribalization of the armed conflict. Admittedly, tribal militias were used since 1985 to create a buffer zone between combatants, but in the late years of al Mahdi's government and all through the NIF era, they became more vicious, as tribes were 18 armed to the teeth and set loose on the 'enemy'." As the first in modern Sudanese history to specifically call for the arming of tribal groups, al Mahdi sought to assist the beleaguered and demoralized Sudanese army against the SPLM/A. Norman Anderson recounts, The prime minister told [the Sudanese mil i tary command] to review their responsibilit ies; he was not convinced that they were using resources effectively and pointed to deterioration in f ield command. He thought that the army relied on a defense-oriented approach, al lowing the enemy a Mansour Kha l i d , War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries, (London; N e w York : Kegan Pau l ; Distributed by Columbia Universi ty Press, 2003), 238. 15 choice o f where and how to attack. He advocated " fedayeen" guerrillas to support regular operations. 1 9 Particularly salient comparisons of militia use with today's conflict in Darfur can be found in al Mahdi's employment of the muraheleen (Arabic for "nomads"), Arab militias from the Rizeigat tribes residing in South Darfur, bordering on the north of Bahr el Ghazal, who were employed as raiders against their southern Dinka neighbors in the 1980s. Resort to fedayeen or mujahedeen, references to Islamic tribal warriors, as a means to defense of the state and the regime was at first regarded by the NIF upon taking power as counterproductive, empowering future rivals. However, finding the military to be largely ineffective in the face of persistent local rebellion, it quickly adapted and perfected this strategy of proxy militia use as the centerpiece of its domestic security doctrine. Indeed, it continued the previous regimes policies by arming Chadian Arab nomads who had crossed into Darfur seeking grazing pastures for their flocks against local Fur and Masalit farming populations in the late 1980s and mid to late 1990s.20 Both regimes claimed to be acting in response to local insurgencies, in the former against the SPLM/A and in the latter against local "African" tribes armed, in part, by the government of neighboring Chad. By exacerbating local "ethnic" tensions, often based in part on conflicts over scarce resources and relative economic and political disenfranchisement as well feelings of ideological ethnic supremacy entertained by Arabized (and Africanized) tribal groups, the regime has succeeded to some degree in both repressing and containing regional rebellions and promoting the formation of new regional Arabized elites 1 9 G . Norman Anderson, Sudan in Crisis: The Failure of Democracy, (Gainsvi l le, F L : Universi ty Press o f F lor ida, 1999), 174-175. 2 0 "Sudan: Human Rights Developments," in Human Rights Watch [database online], [cited 2005]. Avai lab le from http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/africa/sudan.html. Anderson, "Sudan in Crisis: The Failure of Democracy," 228-230. 16 beholden to the regime for their status, wealth, and power at a much lower cost economically and politically than by employing their own forces. This counterinsurgency strategy has also largely succeeded in keeping various regional opposition groups disunited and vying for power amongst themselves and against local elements rather than directing the full force of their discontent against the government. Perhaps the most blatant example of government-initiated paramilitary use can be found in response to the rebellion of Nuba tribes in Kordofan in the late 1980s and early 1990s who also claimed significant political and economic marginalization by Khartoum. Declaring Jihad against the Nuba in 1992, the NIF not only trained and armed local Arabized militias to fight the insurgency along with the Sudanese military but also supported several power-hungry Nuba warlords which, although formally opposed to the government, were quite willing to attack their fellow tribesmen in return for looted resources and increased regional clout.21 The government's willingness to support non-Muslim Nuba as well as Muslim Arabs led to a split in the regime's leadership and a rebranding of the regime as the National Congress Party (NCP) signaling a decisive shift in the party's ideology from fundamentalist Islam to complete military control. With a similar campaign in Upper Nile Province in the South in 1998 in which government-sponsored militias attacked SPLM/A positions to secure oil drilling sites for foreign firms such as Calgary-based Talisman Energy, all pretense of the NCP's commitment to ah Islamist program was swept away. Furthermore, the government's Islamist figurehead and General Bashir's mentor, Hassan al Turabi, was removed from power and imprisoned in 2001 on charges of orchestrating a coup against his leadership.22 He was later released for lack of evidence, but imprisoned again in 2 1 A l ex de Waa l , "Massacre in the Mountains whi le the Wor ld Looked the Other Way , " Parliamentary Brief (August 2004): 15. 2 2 The N C P regime has al lowed the establishment o f "pol i t ical associations" independent o f the rul ing party since 1998 which may be elected to the legislative National Assembly but al l o f the twenty or so additional associations o f 17 September 2004 along with 72 others who were accused of plotting yet another coup. Released again in June 2005, he and his party have refused to participate in the new "national unity government'' with the SPLM/A and have sided with a coalition of other opposition groups including former PM al Mahdi's Umma party and has more recently publicly called for the overthrow of the current government.24 2.3 Deconstructing Government and Regime Power Centralization Although Turabi's ideological program for the NIF, including the imposition of a particular formulation of Shari'a Islamic law and the forcible Islamization of the whole of the Sudan in Taliban-like fashion encountered fierce opposition from the South and from marginalized non-Muslim populations throughout the country, he did command what little there was of the popular support for the regime. With his ouster, Bashir's hold on power has become more tenuous having essentially rejected the NIF's original Islamic agenda, de-legitimized Sudan's National Assembly and bureaucratic governing structure, and centralized political power down to a small military clique more concerned with the survival of their regime than the government or state itself. Even as the NCP have slowly dismembered the state bureaucracy and which the P C P is by far the largest must accept the national constitution which grants them no significant rights to poli t ical opposition. Furthermore, the National Assembly itself is significantly l imited in its powers by the National Congress, a smaller body o f interest groups answerable directly to the president. "Sudan," in C I A Wor l d Factbook [database online], [cited 27 March 2005]. Avai lable from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/su.html. International Commiss ion o f Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General (Geneva: United Nations, 2005), 19, [database on-line]; available from htrp://www.un.org/T^ews/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf. 2 3 Opheera M c D o o m , " I N T E R V I E W - Sudan A G Expects Death Sentence for Coup Plotters," Sudan Tribune, 27 March 2005, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=8734, Sudan Tribune. 2 4 "Turabi Slams Sudan Government but Renounces Vio lence," Agence France-Presse, 3 December 2005, [database on-l ine]; available from http://web.lexus-nexus.com, LexusNexus Academic. "Sudan's Turabi Cal ls for Popular Upr is ing, " Sudan Tribune, 19 M a y 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=l5748, Sudan Tribune. 18 security structures through sidelining the Sudanese Army in favour of tribal militias in domestic counterinsurgency operations, they have been engaged in a slow, but persistent process of building up of a parallel security structure loyal not to the state but to the regime itself. Institutionalized as the Popular Defense Force (PDF), this semi-formal paramilitary structure was legislated into existence in 1989 with the Popular Defense Act along with Turabi's other populist initiatives which promoted universal free education (instituted primarily in the North only), a new focus on rural populations including outreach to previously disenfranchised Muslims from remote areas such as the Fur in Darfur and the Beja in the East, and other "popular" security agencies such as the Popular Police Corps and Popular Neighborhood Committees. The Act defined the PDF as "Paramilitary Forces" whose objective is to "assist the People's Armed Forces and other regular forces whenever needed", "contribute to the defense of the nation and help to deal with crises and public disasters," and perform "any other task entrusted to them by the Commander-in-Chief himself or pursuant to a recommendation of the [PDF] Council." Information gathered by a commission formed by the Security Council indicated that members are recruited by orders from Army headquarters to the provincial governors to local officials and tribal leaders to provide volunteers who are then trained, provided with weapons and an army uniform and are then incorporated temporarily into the military command structure. Gabriel Warburg has further commented on the political purposes for the PDF's establishment noting, "[They] were intended to counter the popular support enjoyed by the Ansar and the KJiatmiyya, which the NIF sought to eliminate and replace. Of these, the PDF was the most significant, since its final aim was to replace the army and thereby 2 5 International Commiss ion o f Inquiry on Darfur, "Report o f the International Commiss ion o f Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General," 28. 2 6 Ibid.128-129, 19 eternalize Islamist rule as propagated by the NIF," the Ansar (Umma) and Khatmiyya being rival 27 Islamic parties. Following soon after the establishment of the PDF, the regime purged 40 percent of the officer corps from the national army and declared that the regular military would soon be entirely dissolved and reformed under the PDF. Termed by Bashir as "the legitimate child of the armed forces" and as "a school for national and spiritual education," all Sudanese civil servants and students of higher education were conscripted while service was opened to members of the Sudanese Army, Arab tribal militias from outlying areas, party volunteers, members of the NIF's shabab al-watan youth movement, and other able-bodied teenagers. The draft was then extended in 1994-5 to include every male living in Sudan between the ages of eighteen and thirty.28 Currently, the army remains the core of the Sudanese military but its independent influence has been severely weakened through control by hand-picked NCP loyalists. Although much protest followed its establishment, the PDF quickly became what it was intended to be; a diverse force utilizable in a variety of domestic security operations accountable only to the regime. As such, the NCP elites have succeeded in eliminating what could have potentially become their greatest internal threat, military coup, by largely dissolving the military itself in favour of decentralized and client-commanded paramilitary forces. While endowed with a trusteeship mission to carry out the will of the regime, militias participating in the network have been given a free hand to pursue their own limited regional material interests, largely appeasing any underlying grievances them may harbour towards the NCP government. Additionally, where the NCP finds it cannot effectively use the army due to difficult terrain, low morale, or 2 7 Gabr iel Warburg, Islam, Sectarianism, and Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyya, (London: Hurst & C o . , 2003), 210. 2 8 Ibid., 210-211. 20 opposition by soldiers to attacking the populations from which they were drawn, it can, within the PDF framework, turn to local tribal militias with preexisting local rivalries to carry out their counterinsurgency operations. This military structure has also been fluid enough to deal effectively with defections by the Rizeigat tribes of South Darfur who previously were armed to attack neighboring Dinka but have largely refused to participate in janjaweed forces in the present conflict against the Darfurian rebels. Having lost the support of one set of manufactured regional elites, the NCP has simply turned to the arming of other dispossessed nomadic tribes which are eager to enjoy the transitory support of the regime in return for land and plunder. In this way, the regime has largely avoided the deficiencies of paramilitary use as a short-term strategy with a seemingly endless supply of discontents and rivalries to foster throughout the country which make the need for long-term internal allies quite superfluous. The PDF remains a further functional element of the regime in that as a diversified paramilitary force rather than purely an agent of the state, the NCP's elite can plausibly deny responsibility for actions taken by tribal militia groups under the PDF umbrella claiming limited control or lack of knowledge regarding their activities. This certainly has been the case in the present conflict in Darfur. 2.4 Realities on the Ground The current violence in Darfur essentially began in April 2003 when the largest rebel group, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), composed of Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribesmen, launched a surprise attack on government forces at the airport in the North Darfur provincial capitol of al Fashir, damaging government aircraft and helicopters, and looting fuel, ammunition, and supplies. Aside from the serious economic and political grievances harboured by a large portion of the Darfurian population, Arabized and African tribes alike, the 21 SLM/A began the present rebellion in part as a response to their exclusion from the negotiations between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese. Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) over peace negotiations in the South which formally ended 12 years of civil war in 2005. They believed correctly that any settlement without the input and consideration of marginalized northern groups would lead to a narrow regionalized political solution rather than addressing as-prevalent state-wide inequities. A second rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a smaller mostly-Zaghawa Islamist insurgency, soon emerged and began coordinating their anti-government attacks with the SLM/A. Fighting was at first limited to exchanges between government forces and rebels in North Darfur, but was soon followed by its spread into West and South Darfur provinces with heavy bombing by the Sudanese Air Force from Antonov aircraft in addition to ground engagements with army infantry and tank regiments. By May 2003, the central government dismissed the Walis (governors) and other regional officials of North and West Darfur turning to direct military governance of the provinces and by August, 65,000 refugees had fled to neighboring Chad as a direct result of the bombings.29 In response to rebel attacks and with the acknowledgement that the rebellion could not be suppressed from air power or the insubstantial army presence in Darfur alone, the NCP began activating the local PDF structure in September 2003, recruiting and mobilizing local militias to supplement regular forces in September 2003. Although initially issuing a broad appeal for public defense against rebel attacks, Human Rights Watch reports that while Fur and Masalit volunteers were turned away, Arabs were often quickly recruited and given weapons. Meanwhile, NCP officials met directly with powerful Arabized tribal leaders in the region to Human Rights Watch, "Sudan; Darfur in Flames: Atrocit ies in Western Sudan," Human Rights Watch 16, no. 5(A) (2004), [journal on-l ine]; available from http://www.sudantribune.comyiMG/pdf/darfurinflames.pdf. 22 enlist their militias in support of the counterinsurgency operation.30 These "Arab" forces, known today as janjaweed, have been instrumental in the government's policy of "draining the swamp" through systematically attacking villages thought to be harbouring or sympathetic to rebel forces, often with the cover of air force bombardments, murdering, raping, and depopulating civilians in conflict areas. This is not to claim, however, that all Arabized tribes in Darfur support the government, as some prominent groups have even quietly sided with the rebels. The International Crisis Group (ICG) reports, M a n y Arabs in Darfur are opposed to the Janjaweed, and some are fighting for the rebels, such as certain Arab commanders and their men from the Misser iya and Rizeigat tribes. M a n y non-Arabs are supporting the government and serving in its army. However, the government has deliberately fed dangerous ethnic tensions in Darfur both to justify its continued reluctance to share power and as a means o f fighting the rebel l ion. 3 1 A key difference to note, though, between the Misseriya and Rizeigat tribes and those which are supporting the government and fighting as members of janjaweed militias is that although all are Baggara Arabs, a large Arabized pastoral group encompassing many residents of the Darfur region, the former two tribes enjoy an established dar (territorial administrative area) within the Darfur provinces while those which belong to the janjaweed do not.32 It is in large part this difference in status to which the NCP has appealed. What has been accomplished by the regime, then is not only a gain on supposedly rebel-held territory but the opening up of a great deal of land in which the ciar-less janjaweed may reside thus promoting the creation of a regional elite beholden to the NCP for its newly acquired local economic and political clout. 3 0 Human Rights Watch, "Targeting the Fur: Mass K i l l i ngs in Darfur," Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (2005), [journal on-l ine]; available from http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/darfur0105/darfur0105.pdf. 3 1 International Crisis Group, "Darfur Deadline: A N e w International Act ion P lan , " ICG Africa Report, no. 83 (23 August 2004), [journal on-l ine]; available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/ 083_darfu r_deadline_a_new_international_action_plan.pdf; accessed 30 August 2004. 3 2 Human Rights Watch, "Targeting the Fur: Mass K i l l ings in Darfur," 7. 23 One can understand both the "effectiveness" of such a policy and the impunity with which the janjaweed have acted through even a cursory examination of recent statistics which show that by February 2005 alone, at least 2 million people had been displaced as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and between 20,000 and 30,000 people had died from violence, malnutrition, and disease. Furthermore, by August 2004 alone, USAID reported that 395 villages in Darfur had been confirmed as destroyed and at least 121 as severely damaged, while Sudanese police forces have reported that as many as 2000 villages have been destroyed as of January 2005, with the vast majority of these having been since depopulated or occupied by janjaweed forces and allied tribesmen.34 Of these, most were exclusively inhabited by members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa, the largest tribes in the Darfur region with established djar (plural of dar), giving credence to both economic and "ethnic" justifications for conflict. Since the outbreak of violence, the contending rebel groups themselves have fragmented several times. The JEM split in 2004 with the formation of the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) whose leadership under Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri disagreed with the influence wielded by Hassan al Turabi over the group.35 The NMRD signed a cease-fire with the GoS in December 2004 leading the JEM to claim that the group was merely a "stooge" of the regime, but is also suspected of receiving support from Chad.36 Regardless, the NMRD threatened to end its ceasefire when it was not included in the AU-sponsored peace negotiations International Cr is is Group, "Darfur: The Fai lure to Protect," ICG Africa Report, no. 89 (2005), [journal on-line]; available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/hom_of_africa/089_darfur_me_ protect.pdf; accessed 10 March 2005. 3 4 U S A I D , "Sudan (Darfur) - Chad Border Region Conf i rmed Damaged and Destroyed Vi l lages," [Map] Darfur, Sudan (2004): [database on-line]; available from http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/images/ Darfur_Aug_2_vil lages.pdf. International Commiss ion o f Inquiry on Darfur, "Report o f the International Commiss ion o f Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General," 81. 3 5 "Chad-Sudan: H o w Credible is Darfur's Thi rd Rebel Movement?" IRIN, 17 January 2005, [database on-line]; available from http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_9118.html, NewsfromAfr ica.com. 3 6 Ibid., "Darfur: Background," M a y 2006 [cited 10 M a y 2006]. Avai lable from http ://hrw. org/backgrounder/africa/sudan0506/3 .htm. 24 between rebel group and the GoS in Abuja, Nigeria, and has been responsible for numerous attacks on and kidnappings of AU observer forces in West Darfur.37 The SLM/A also splintered in November 2005 when the rebel group held an election for leadership replacing incumbent Abdel Wahid al Nur from the Fur, the largest tribal group in Darfur, with Minni Minnawi, a Zaghawa. Both factions continued to claim leadership of the group and both continued to send representatives to negotiations in Abuja. Although months of tortuous negotiations produced the so-called Darfur Peace Accords (DPA) signed in Abuja, Nigeria between Minnawa's faction and the GoS in early May 2006, neither the JEM nor Nur's faction were willing to agree to the document which called for the disarmament of janjaweed militias, absorption of rebel forces into the Sudanese military, and inclusion of rebel leaders in the political hierarchy in Khartoum but failed to include a number of other rebel demands including compensation for victims.39 Soon after, reports began to surface that Minnawa's mostly-Zaghawa forces had begun attacking and kidnapping members of the rival SLM/A faction and allied Fur villages raising the spectre of a new dimension of ethnic violence.40 Under international pressure, three dissident leaders from Nur's SLM/A and the JEM publicly agreed to abide by the terms of the deal, according to the AU, while both Nur and Khalil Ibrahim, leader of the JEM, have called on the international community and Minnawi to reject 3 / I R I N , " S U D A N : Af r ican Un ion Soldier K i l l ed in West Darfur," Reuters AlertNet, 29 M a y 2006, [database on-l ine]; available from http://ww.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IPON/47669d2992473cd01126a648141d7952.htm, Reuters Alertnet. 3 8 "A f r i can Mediat ion Maintains S L M ' s Nour in Spite o f Latest Rebel Splits," Sudan Tribune, 10 March 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14477, Sudan Tribune. 3 9 Lyd ia Polgreen and Joel Br ink ley, "Largest Faction o f Darfur Rebels Signs Peace Pact," New York Times, 5 M a y 2006. "Highl ights o f Darfur Peace Agreement," in Af r ican Un ion [database online]. M a y [cited 15 June 2006]. Avai lable from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/News/Press/2006/May/Highlights_of_Darfur_Agreement.pdf. 4 0 Lyd ia Polgreen, "Vio lent Rebel Ri f t Adds Layers to Darfur 's M isery , " New York Times, 19 M a y 2006, [database on-l ine]; available from http://www.nytimes.com^2006/05/19/worla7africa/19sudan.html?pagewanted=l&ei=5088 &en=8ecae 1 af9597b933&ex= 1305691200&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss, N Y T i m e s . c o m . "Darfur 's M i n a w i Accused o f Attacking, Kidnapping Rebel Riva ls , " Sudan Tribune, 6 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16053, Sudan Tribune. 25 the DP A as a "weak and incomplete" agreement.41 Nur's faction has further demanded that any peace deal must include the unification of the three provinces of Darfur as a single administrative region with its own vice-presidential post in government, individual compensation to victims of violence, and guarantees for the safety of returning refugees and IDPs, while Ibrahim has stated that if no peace comes to Darfur, they will seek independence.42 Responding to General Bashir's offer of general amnesty to all signatories to the DPA issued on 11 June 2006 and the international community's calls for all rebel groups to join the DPA, the JEM and SLM/A al-Nur challenged both the NCP's monopoly on political power and the viability of the peace accords.43 More recently splits have emerged in Minnawi's own faction while Minnawi has tentatively threatened to withdraw from the DPA should the international community fail to send a UN peacekeeping force to replace AMIS. 4 4 Despite the signing of the peace accord, attacks by janjaweed militias have also continued including a raid on May 5 in the South Darfur village of Shearia which left 20-25 people dead.45 Furthermore, fighting has bled over into Chad with janjaweed assaults on both Darfurian refugees and Chadian citizens vastly increasing the risk of military confrontation between the neighboring states. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) "Dissident Rebels Ink Commitment to Darfur Peace Acco rd , " Sudan Tribune, 10 June 2006, [database on-l ine]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16117, Sudan Tribune. " T E X T - Darfur S L M Says A U Deal ' incomplete' , Demands U N Mediat ion," Sudan Tribune, 4 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16006, Sudan Tribune. 4 2 Ibid., "Darfur Rebel Group Says Independence is a Va l i d Alternative," Sudan Tribune, 2 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=15981, Sudan Tribune. 4 3 "Sudan Issues General Amnesty for Darfur Peace Signatories," Sudan Tribune, 13 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from hn^://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16162, Sudan Tribune. "Darfur Holdout Leaders Urge International Community to make Difference," Sudan Tribune, 15 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16198, Sudan Tribune. 4 4 "After 5 may Dea l , S L M M inaw i Faces Div is ions and Defections," Sudan Tribune, 20 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16283, Sudan Tribune. Associated Press and Sudan Tribune, " S L M ' s M inaw i Threatens to Quit Darfur Peace Dea l , " Sudan Tribune, 18 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16244, Sudan Tribune. 4 5 "Rebels Al lege Darfur Attack," Al Jazeera, 20 M a y 2006, [database on-line]; available from ht tp: / /engl ish.a l jazeera.net /NR/exeres/21BE7A3B-102B-48A4-B03D-49A791353EFD.htm, Aljazeera.net, 26 reported in early July climbing incidents of janjaweed raids claiming that they have become "more systematic and deadly over the past three months."46 Relations between the two countries are presently at an all-time low over counterclaims that Chad is supporting various Darfur rebel groups and that Sudan is supporting an armed rebellion against the Chadian government which is based out of Darrur. Following Chad's presidential election which affirmed Irdiss Deby's continued hold on power, rebels made an abortive attack on the capital of N'Djamena leading Chad to sever diplomatic ties with Khartoum.47 Instability has spread even further with attacks by Chadian rebels on the Central African Republic (CAR) in June 2006 in the border region shared between Chad, CAR, and Sudan along South Darfur province raising the spectre of increased instability and formal interstate war in the troubled region. 2.5 International Response or the Lack Thereof The UN Security Council first addressed the conflict in June 2004 with Resolution 1547 calling on the GoS and rebel groups to adhere to the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Accord signed in Chad between the parties in April 2004, however its primary focus was on the developing peace agreement between the Sudanese Government and the SPLM/A. 4 9 This was soon followed by a limited deployment of several hundred AU ceasefire monitors to the Darfur region in July 2004 accompanied by a new Security Council resolution which endorsed the deployment and invoked Chapter. VII calling on Sudan to disarm the janjaweed and imposing a 4 6 " U N H C R Concerned about Janjaweed M i l i t i a Attacks in Eastern Chad," in U N H C R [database online]. 6 June 2006 [cited 17 June 2006]. Avai lable from http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm7tbH NEWS&id=4485a8e54. 4 7 " U N - A U M iss ion Meets Chad 's Deby Over Darfur," Sudan Tribune, 17 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16230, Sudan Tribune. 4 8 "33 K i l l e d in Central A f r ican Republ ic Fight ing," CAW, 28 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.crm.com/2006/WORLD/africa/06/28/central.afr ican.republic.ap/, C N N . c o m . 4 9 U . N . Security Counc i l , 4988th meeting, "Resolut ion 1547 (2004) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1547) , 11 June 2004. 27 mandatory arms embargo on all non-state actors including the rebel groups, but not the regime itself. However, this resolution mentioned no imposition of concrete consequences for lack of adherence by any of the parties.50 Resolution 1564 passed in September noted the failure of Sudan to adhere to the ceasefire and reign in the janjaweed and called for the establishment of a commission of inquiry into human rights violations occurring on the ground in Darfur: the result being a report by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID) released in January 2005. Furthermore, the resolution hinted that sanctions involving Sudan's petroleum sector might be considered if Sudan failed to comply. By contrast, Resolution 1574 passed in November 2004, only two months later, commented very little on the situation in Darfur and made no mention of sanctions, instead praising the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan for reaching a peace agreement.51 This recognition of NCP movements towards reconciliation with the South with little focus on the continuing conflict seemed to convey the impression that the international community was content with verbal condemnation of activities by the NCP's proxies in Darfur rather than concrete action. There was much hope that the research conducted by the ICID would be instrumental in providing the international community with direction as to effective intervention strategies in Darfur. It did indeed provide a fair characterization of the conflict and identified numerous instances of both government and janjaweed as well as rebel atrocities committed throughout. However, the conclusions and recommendations of the report hinged on an attempt to clarify whether or not the violence could be characterized as genocide rather than proposing and U . N . Security Counc i l , 5015th meeting, "Resolut ion 1556 (2004) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1556) , 30 July 2004. 5 1 U . N . Security Counc i l , 5040th meeting, "Resolut ion 1564 (2004) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1564) , 18 September 2004. U . N . Security Counc i l , 5082nd meeting, "Resolut ion 1574 (2004) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1574) , 19 November 2004. 28 advocating strategies which could lead to an effective, executable international response. Resolving that genocide had not been committed, the report argued that the political motivation of the NCP was to fight an insurgency and not to target a particular population or ethnic group, although admitting that this had occurred to a great extent. The commission's report did condemn the human right violations occurring stating: The conclusion that no genocidal po l icy has been pursued and implemented in Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or through the milit ias under their control, should not be taken in any way as detracting from the gravity o f the crimes perpetrated in that region. International offences such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide. 5 2 Regardless, political squabbling over this term both prior and subsequent to the release of the report as well as the commission's recommendation that the case be referred to the ICC to prosecute those 51 individuals (names have yet to be released) whom the report deemed to be responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes have resulted in further stagnation of international action rather than producing concrete results and solutions. Indeed, the Sudanese regime itself has refused to allow prosecutions to occur outside its jurisdiction claiming such an action would violate its sovereignty in that it is both willing and able to judicially manage the criminal aspect of the conflict. Security Council Resolution 1593 passed March 31, 2005 with abstentions by permanent members China and the United States followed the recommendation of the ICID by acting under Chapter VII to grant the ICC jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions arising from the Darfur conflict.53 This resolution could become highly significant in the development of international law and the legitimization of the 5 2 International Commiss ion o f Inquiry on Darfur, "Report o f the International Commiss ion o f Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General," 4. 5 3 U . N . Security Counc i l , 5158th meeting, "Resolut ion 1593 (2005) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1591) , 31 March 2005. 29 ICC as it is the first time in its short history that the court has been given jurisdiction over the region controlled by a sovereign state. Such considerations however are dependent upon the ICC's demonstration that it can be effective in bringing the agents of recalcitrant regimes to justice. How prosecutions themselves will be carried out, however, with the GoS unwilling to surrender suspects to the international court, is another matter altogether with the regime having gone as far as to set up a special court of its own to address the conflict.54 A recent report by the Prosecutor of the ICC to the Security Council has indicated that this court has only conducted some "6 trials of less than 30 suspects" since its establishment in June 2005 with none of these crimes addressing serious violations of international humanitarian law.55 Human Rights Watch has further claimed, "Statements made by senior Sudanese government officials at the time [of the establishment of the special court] made clear that one goal in establishing the [court] was to divest the ICC of jurisdiction."56 As recently as June 2006, the GoS has continued to deny the legitimacy of ICC jurisdiction over the conflict even as the UN's Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has reported, "Domestic courts and other mechanisms purporting to address gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law were superficial and inadequate," and the necessity of ICC action in this Opheera M c D o o m , "Watchdog Cri t ic izes Sudan's Special Darfur Court," Washington Post, 8 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/ AR2006060801539.html, WashingtonPost.com. 5 5 I C C Off ice o f the Prosecutor, Third Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant ofUNSCR 1593 (2005) International Cr iminal Court, 14 June 2006), 5, [database on-line]; available from http:/ /www.icc-cpi. int / l ibrary/cases/OTP_ReportUNSC_3-Darfur_Engl ish.pdf, International Cr imina l Court. 5 6 Human Rights Watch, "Lack o f Convict ion: The Special Cr iminal Court on the Events in Darfur," Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, no. 1 (June 2006), [journal on-l ine]; available from http://hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/sudan0606/sudan0606.pdf; accessed 17 June 2006. 30 regard.57 Despite such denunciations of the Sudanese justice system, the ICC has yet to begin prosecutions or even release the names of any individuals under investigation. This.failure to act is further recognizable in several other resolutions on Sudan including 1590, passed in March 2005, which mandated the deployment of 10,000 UN peacekeepers for the South with no concrete steps for toward ending the violence in Darfur, stating namely that "there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur." Furthermore, with no mention whatsoever of the janjaweed, the resolution asserted only that the rebels, along with the NCP, must "resume the Abuja talks rapidly without preconditions and negotiate in good faith to speedily reach agreement." UN Security Council Resolution 1591, passed several days later, focused almost entirely on Darfur but accomplished little more than previous resolutions, noting the Sudanese government's failure to reign in the janjaweed, purportedly strengthening the existing arms embargo, and calling on all parties to return to the negotiating table. But rather than imposing sanctions against the government of Sudan, the resolution called for the freezing of assets of those individuals deemed responsible for the continued violence.59 Arguably, this move took considerable pressure off the NCP to reign in the janjaweed and rather placed the onus on the rebels to reach a settlement in line with the CPA between the GoS and the South. By taking both sanctions and armed intervention essentially entirely off the table, the Security Council seemed to have accepted Khartoum's argument that the regime must be not be threatened in order to ensure an effective peace in the South and stability in the Darfur region. 5 7 " I C C has no Jursidiction in Darfur - Sudanese Minister," Sudan Tribune, 15 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16208, Sudan Tribune. United Nations H igh Commissioner for Human Rights, Third Periodic Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in the Sudan Off ice o f the H igh Commissioner for Human Rights in cooperation with the Uni ted Nations M iss ion in Sudan, 2006), 14. C O U . N . Security Counc i l , 5151st meeting, "Resolut ion 1590 (2005) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1590) , 24 March 2005. 59 U . N . Security Counc i l , 5153rd meeting, "Resolut ion 1591 (2005) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1591) , 29 March 2005. 31 The passage of UNSC resolution 1672 in April 2006 identified four commanders from the Sudanese military, janjaweed militias, SLM/A, and NMRD respectively who will now be subject to comprehensive travel sanctions and foreign asset freezes. Although all have been deemed responsible for overseeing the perpetration of war crimes in the conflict, they are also relatively low-level players without significant foreign assets or a need to travel abroad beyond the porous and relatively unpatrolled Sudan-Chad border.60 The names of high ranking military and government officials within the NCP who have been on record as actively supporting the activities of the janjaweed militias and defending the tactics of the Sudanese military are glaringly absent from this list. With the failure of the larger international community to act, the AU has, from the beginning, assumed a primary role in mediating a resolution to the conflict. Although sponsoring numerous ceasefire initiatives between the GoS and rebel groups prior to the signing of the DPA, violations by both sides remain rampant. Indeed, promises by the GoS to disarm janjaweed militias found in the DPA are, in many ways, reiterations of past broken promises dating back to 2004, namely that "The [Government of Sudan] undertakes to expeditiously implement its stated commitment to disarm the Janjaweed/armed militias, bearing in mind the relevant UN Security Council resolutions."61 President al Bashir promised on June 19, 2004 to "disarm the Janjaweed" but rather than taking action to reign in government-sponsored militias, the Sudanese military instead took the opportunity to capture and imprison petty thieves and looters. The NCP has even claimed that violence committed by these groups is actually the 6 0 U . N . Security Counc i l , 5423rd meeting, "Resolut ion 1672 (2006) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1672) , 25 Apr i l 2006. 6 1 Protocol between the Government o f Sudan (GoS), The Sudan Liberation Movement /Army ( S L M / A ) and The Justice and Equal i ty Movement ( J E M ) on the Enhancement o f the Security Situtation in Darfur in Accordance with the N 'Djamena Agreement, Signed at Abuja, Niger ia on 9 November 2004, Witnessed by Af r ican Un ion : Agreements: Section 2(5). 32 responsibility of the S L M / A or J E M . 6 2 Further appealing to the "defensive nature" of the janjaweed, Bashir has claimed that to disarm them would be "to subject them to annihilation" by rebel forces. 6 3 The regime has also circumvented international sanction for their support of these militias by legitimizing their existence through further incorporated into the formal P D F command structure.6 4 Thus far, the N C P has also failed to disclose names of janjaweed commanders to either the U N Security Council or the A U observers to whom, according to both U N Security Council and A U Peace and Security Council resolutions, they are required to report. The A U mission in Sudan (AMIS) has encountered many additional problems though, not only with regards to Sudanese (and rebel) respect of their mandate but with a critical lack of funding and adequate personnel to accomplish their monitoring mission. Despite a decision by the A U Peace and Security Council in October 2004 to increase the size of A M I S to "3,320 personnel including 2,341 military personnel, among them 450 observers, up to 815 civilian police personnel, as well as the appropriate civilian personnel," less than half of this force had arrived and begun operations in Darfur by Apr i l 2005. 6 5 Sti l l the only armed monitoring force in the region, their numbers, now at approximately 7,000 soldiers with promises to expand to 10,000, are still hardly adequate to patrol the vast and underdeveloped area. 6 6 Furthermore, under a cripplingly weak mandate, A M I S is authorized only to report on ceasefire violations and cannot intervene in active conflict, take combatants into custody, or use their weapons to defend 6 2 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General," 35. 6 3 International Crisis Group, "Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan," 9. 6 4 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General," 35-36. 6 5 A . U . Peace and Security Council, 17th meeting, "Communique of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (2004)" (PSC/PR/Comm.(XVII)), 20 October 2004. 6 6 "Briefing on U.S. Efforts in Darfur and U.S. Efforts to Lead the U N Security Council and Work with the African Union and Other Nations on a Transition of the African Union Mission in Sudan to a U N Mission," in US Department of State [database online]. Washington, D C 3 February 2006 [cited 16 June 2006]. Available from http://www.state.gOv/p/af/rls/rm/2006/60376.htm. 33 anyone but themselves. Often cited as the first true test of the viability and cohesiveness of the African Union, the organization clearly does not have the resources to fulfill even this limited mission without substantial international support especially from the Western powers. The most recent resolution passed by the Security Council has been heralded as paving the way for the replacement of AMIS by a more effective UN force, yet the practical possibility of its deployment appears ever more remote. Acting under Chapter VII, the resolution affirms the signing of the DPA and: Cal ls upon the Afr ican Un ion to agree with the Uni ted Nations, regional and international organizations, and Member States on requirements now necessary, in addition to those identified by the joint assessment mission o f December 2005, to strengthen A M I S ' s capacity to enforce the security arrangements o f the Darfur Peace Agreement, with a v iew to a fol low-on Uni ted Nations operation in Dar fur . " 6 8 Although the AU has agreed to a UN takeover of the peacekeeping mission in Darfur, Sudanese officials have almost universally rejected the notion that blue helmets could be deployed in the region without the consent of the GoS.69 Indeed, the regime has been quite hostile to any prospect of international armed intervention with the speaker of the Sudanese National Assembly, Ahmed Ibrahim al Tahir declaring in September 2004, "If Iraq opened for the West one gate of hell, we will open seven such gates. We will not surrender this country to anybody."70 If Western countries in particular were already hesitant about the prospects of 6 7 E m i l y Wax , " A Peace Force with no Power; Af r ican Un ion Monitors in Sudan Face Frustrating L imi ts , " Washington Post, 11 December 2004, A l . 6 8 U . N . Security Counc i l , 5439th meeting, "Resolut ion 1679 (2006) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1679). 6 9 "Af r ican Un ion Agrees U N Takeover o f Darfur Peacekeeping," Sudan Tribune, 7 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16070, Sudan Tribune. Joyce Mu lama, "Sudan: N o Welcome Mat for the B lue Helmets," Inter Press Service, 14 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://allafrica.com/stories/200606150001.html, a l lAfr ica.com. 7 0 X inhua, "Sudanese Parliament Leader Warns o f West 's Interference," SPLMToday, 19 September 2004, [database on-line]; available from http://splmtoday.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4274, S P L M T o d a y . 34 committing troops to a peacekeeping effort in a chaotic and seemingly unmanageable conflict, warnings such as these have made them even more skittish. This coupled with fears of world (Muslim) denunciation for western intervention in yet another Muslim country following Afghanistan and Iraq has made even the potential for a viable UN peacekeeping deployment almost a moot point. Repeating such fears, United Nations special envoy to Sudan, Jan Pronk declared in February 2006 that sending a proposed NATO force to Darfur would be "a recipe for disaster... People would really start a Jihad against it."71 General Bashir was hardly less inviting when he declared several days earlier, "We are strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in Sudan and Darfur will be a graveyard for any foreign troops venturing to enter."72 More recently, Bashir went as far as to declare, "I swear that there will not be any international military intervention in Darfur as long as I am in power," and, "Sudan, which was the first country south of the Sahara to gain independence, cannot now be the first country to be recolonised."73 Moves by the Security Council to abstain from calling for a deployment fearing such violent response until the state's permission is obtained for the mission have only further weakened the impact of this Chapter VII resolution as have tenuous and obscure commitments by developed states to provide funding and manpower for such a force.74 " N A T O - L e d Force in Darfur would be 'recipe for Disaster' ," Sudan Tribune, 1 March 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article= 14309, Sudan Tribune. 7 2 "Darfur W i l l be a Foreign Troops' Graveyard - Bashir ," Sudan Tribune, 27 February 2006, [database on-l ine]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14272, Sudan Tribune, 7 3 "Sudan's Bashir Rejects Strongly U N Peacekeepers," Sudan Tribune, 20 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16282, Sudan Tribune. 7 4 In this regard, a recent spending b i l l proposed in the U S Senate has allocated $60 mi l l ion towards funding a U N -led peacekeeping force in Darfur may signal a reversal o f international inaction. However, this is clearly an insignificant commitment when compared with the forces and funding actually required to stabilize the region. Associated Press and Sudan Tribune, " U S Senate Al locates $ 6 0 M for U N Peacekeepers in Darfur," Sudan Tribune, 15 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16210, Sudan Tribune, 35 III: The Responsibility to Protect? 3.1 State Sovereignty and R2P As with all interventions aimed at restraining and disciplining a target state deemed to be violating international human rights standards, the most consistent normative stumbling block to effective multilateral action in Darfur has been sovereignty. Not surprisingly, the NCP has been adamant in its opposition to international intervention in the conflict calling the referral of judicial jurisdiction over war crimes in Darfur to the ICC and efforts to deploy a UN peacekeeping force in the region to be violations of Sudanese sovereignty.75 Efforts by members of the international community to obstruct intervention in Darfur have also hinged on questions of sovereignty. Notably China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has been a vocal defender of Sudanese sovereignty. Following efforts in the Security Council to place sanctions on Sudan in 2004, the People's Daily, official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, claimed, "[T]he Darfur issue completely falls within the realm of Sudan's internal affairs. Sudan is a sovereign country. Its demand and desire to solve its internal affairs should be fully 76 respected." Finally, those parties seeking the deployment of UN peacekeepers in the region under a Chapter VII mandate which should, theoretically, supercede questions of state sovereignty, are regardless seeking the consent of the GoS. Even as the AU accepted the principle of UN deployment to replace AMIS, Alpha Oumar Konare, head of the AU Commission, reiterated, "We have said we need the United Nations, but the conditions are clear -Gamal Nkrumah, "Eyes on Sudan," Al-Ahram , no. 737 (7-13 Apr i l 2005), [journal on-l ine]; available from http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/737/re6.htm; Internet; accessed 5 June 2006. Cathy Maj tenyi , " U N Security Counci l Delegation Meets with Sudan Over Darfur," Voice of America, 6 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://voanews.com/english/2006-06-06-voal9.cfm, V O A N e w s . c o m . 7 6 China Da i ly , "Sudan's Sovereignty should be Respected," People's Daily Online, 4 August 2004, sec. 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://english.people.com.cn/200408/04/eng20040804_151780.html, People's Da i l y Onl ine. 36 77 we have to respect Sudan's sovereignty." Similarly, a spokesman for the Security Council has emphasized, "Any international operation will not be carried out unless it is approved by the no present government in Sudan." Clearly, respect for the sovereign integrity of the state remains an overwhelmingly important factor guiding the international response to the crisis in Darfur. Defined by Max Weber as "[the] monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory," this longstanding and widely accepted interpretation of sovereignty has served as the fundamental building block of the international system since the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648.79 Although interference in the internal affairs of states has remained standard practice in international politics, the normative prohibition of such interference has exercised a strong influence over political and diplomatic discourse in the Western world in particular and served as the basis by which both the League of Nations and the United Nations were founded. Indeed, the United Nations Charter confirms, "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members," according all its members both the right to govern themselves free from external interference and the guarantee of multilateral international defense should this right be violated.80 Further, Article 2(7) affirms, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."81 As such, no state could again claim a legitimate right to the territory of another as with Nazi Germany and its 7 7 IR IN , "Sudan: Af r ican Un ion Cal ls for a U N Force in Darfur," All Africa. Com, 7 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://allafrica.corn/stories/200606070386.html, a l lAfr ica.com. 7 8 X inhua, " U N Not to Take Ac t ion in Darfur without Sudan's Approva l : Diplomat," People's Daily Online, 7 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://english.people.com.cn/200606/07/eng20060607_271633.html, People's Da i l y Onl ine. 7 9 M a x Weber, "Pol i t ics as a Vocat ion," in The Vocation Lectures (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004), 33. 8 0 Charter o f the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031; T S 993; 3 Bevans 1153, C h II, Ar t 2(1). 8 1 Ibid, C h II, Ar t 2(7). 37 program of Anschluss, Fascist Italy to Ethiopia, and Imperial Japan to Manchuria. Nor could the practice of colonialism be tolerated by which the internal affairs of a territorial unit were subject to the imperial designs of a foreign power. Furthermore, any intervention taken against the territory or political infrastructure of a target state from this point on could only be considered legally legitimate if requested by the state itself or if authorized under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter by the UN Security Council. The latter action would indicate a multilateral agreement by the major powers on the necessity of such a coercive action whether diplomatic, economic, or military in nature, to restore international peace and security. International military responses, or otherwise, on the behalf of states subject to aggression as envisioned by the Charter, however, rarely materialized during the Cold War era. Consequently the international effort to punish Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait in 1991 proved to be the exception rather than the rule in the modern era of peacemaking. Instead it became increasingly evident that conflicts within states rather than between them would form the greatest threats to international peace and security in the modern era. This realization was accompanied by a gradual evolution of the scope of the Security Council's Chapter VII powers. While UNPROFOR operated under a Chapter VII mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995, it was not until late in the conflict that the international force was given peace enforcement powers. Rather international efforts were initially focused on more traditional measures including the sanctioning of state parties to the civil war and the imposition of an arms embargo on all belligerent parties in the region. More groundbreaking were international efforts to stem the emerging internal chaos in Somalia. Responding to violence and widespread starvation following the collapse of its central government in 1992, the Council at first imposed an arms 8 2 See Ted Robert Gurr , Monty Marshal l , and Deepa Khos la , Peace and Conflict: A Global Survey (College Park, M D : Center for International Development & Conf l ict Management, Universi ty o f Mary land, 2003), [database on-line]; available from http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/CIDCMpeace.pdf. 38 embargo and then deployed fifty UN observers under the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNSOM) to monitor the situation. Yet with increased violence, the Council authorized the expansion of UNSOM as well as a US-led multinational force (UNITAF) which was given authority to "use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations." The deployment of this force without the consent of the host state as well as the eventual expansion of UNSOM to UNSOM II under a similar enforcement mandate represented a significant departure from established Security Council practice. In this manner, the Council asserted its authority to intervene to prevent violence within the state as a means to uphold its mandate to preserve international peace and security.83 Both operations were abruptly withdrawn in 1993 following the infamous "Black Hawk Down" killing of 18 marines by militia forces, but a new precedent had been set. Given that no governmental body existed at the time to claim a violation of sovereignty by the international community however, means that such fair-weather interventions could not provide strong evidence that the Security Council might authorize such actions where an identifiable sovereign body does exist. Indeed, while the spectacular failures of the international community in Somalia translated into severe apprehension and inaction in the face of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 allowing the deaths of tens of thousands neither did the Council nor any other body of the United Nations censure the standing Rwandan government despite the ongoing atrocities. The late (and largely ineffectual) Chapter VII authorization of the French-led Operation Turquoise following the climax of killing, however, did serve in some small part to reinforce the legitimacy of the Council's new mandate to interfere in cases of destabilizing internal violence.84 8 3 M ichae l Byers, War Law : Understanding International Law and Armed Conflict, (Vancouver: Douglas & Mclntyre, 2005), 26-27. 8 4 Ibid., 28-29. 39 Internal conflict, of course, has been inherently more problematic for bodies such as the United Nations to manage for they often require outside intervention to halt the violence, bring about a settlement between warring parties, and bring perpetrators of war crimes and atrocities to justice. Such intervention without the explicit approval of the government in power would most certainly constitute a violation of state sovereignty. However, in the light of convulsive internal violence, ethnic cleansing, and genocide in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda to name only a few of the many cases of the 1990s, the question of whether or not the international community has a "right of humanitarian intervention" to prevent further slaughter has inevitably clashed with the older "right of sovereignty." United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan put the dilemma best stating, "[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?"85 Clearly, given the fundamental importance of sovereignty as an ordering principle of international affairs, this concept could not be ignored as a relic of the past without enormous repercussions. In turn, few would argue that sovereignty should be a legitimate shield from international intervention to prevent widespread violence, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. Recognizing the need for new understandings and tools which preserved the "sanctity" of sovereignty yet affirming the necessity of a state's responsibility to protect its own citizens in September 2000, the Government of Canada and a number of major foundations announced the formation of the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) at a meeting of the UN General Assembly. The report, produced in 2001 entitled "The Responsibility to Protect," declared, "The defence of state sovereignty, by even its strongest 8 5 International Commiss ion on Intervention and State Sovereignty and International Development Research Centre, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), v i i . 40 supporters, does not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own people," and that, "Sovereignty as responsibility has become the minimum content of good international citizenship."86 Although bold and perhaps slightly premature in its normative pronouncements of accepted international practice, the document (colloquially known as R2P) was methodical in its efforts to reframe the debate surrounding humanitarian intervention. Rather than focusing on conflicting "rights" of the target state and external actors in a time of destabilizing internal violence, the report emphasized the moral and cooperative character of prevention of humanitarian crises. As such, it insisted that responsibility is intrinsically tied to sovereignty such that the primary burden of protection of a state's citizenry must lie with the state itself. However, where the state is either unwilling or unable to protect its population, notably in the context of failed states, it must be the responsibility of the international community to intervene. While the reevaluation of sovereignty as responsibility has yet to be established fully as a norm of international practice, the language of R2P was incorporated into the outcome document of the United Nations General Assembly High-level Plenary Meeting in September 2005. Paragraph 138 of the document stated: Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibil i ty entails the prevention o f such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. W e accept that responsibil ity and wi l l act in accordance with it. The international community should, as International Commiss ion on Intervention and State Sovereignty and International Development Research Centre, "The Responsibi l i ty to Protect : Report o f the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty," 8. 41 appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibil i ty and support the Uni ted Nations in establishing an early warning capabi l i ty. 8 7 The next paragraph further maintained that where peaceful means are inadequate and the state "manifestly" fails to protect its citizens, UN member states would take "timely and decisive" action, with Security Council authorization, to protect them from "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." The results of this meeting were further legitimated by the Security Council's passage of resolution 1674 in April 2006 which reaffirms paragraphs 138 go and 139 in the Outcome Document and the language of R2P. The adoption of the R2P doctrine by these critical international bodies has been a significant step towards its establishment as an intersubjectively understood re-definition of the fundamental concept of sovereignty. One of the primary strengths of R2P is its predominant focus on strategies of intervention for the international community to respond to cases of large scale losses of life or large scale ethnic cleansing in the context of intrastate conflict, particularly those forms of intervention which are "taken against a state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective" (emphasis added).89 These may include preventative measures such as NGO monitoring, diplomatic measures, and economic aid and coercive measures such as sanctions and criminal prosecutions, as well as military intervention as a last resort. R2P's detailed policy recommendations regarding preventative international intervention lay out reasonable and fairly non-invasive strategies which would do little to threaten all but the most repressive of target regimes' internal sovereignty, even in the traditional sense. While 8 7 "General Assembly — R 2 P Excerpt from Outcome Document," in Responsibi l i ty to Protect: Engaging C i v i l Society [database online]. 7 June 2006 [cited 2006]. Avai lab le from http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ index.php/united_nations/398?theme=altl. 8 8 U . N . Security Counc i l , 5430th meeting, "Resolut ion 1674 (2006) [Protection o f civi l ians in armed conf l ict ]" (S/RES/1674) . 8 9 International Commiss ion on Intervention and State Sovereignty and International Development Research Centre, "The Responsibi l i ty to Protect: Report o f the International Commiss ion on Intervention and State Sovereignty," 8. 42 instruments in this proposed "toolbox" for the "responsibility to prevent" include encouraging political reform, economic growth, and NGO observation of humanitarian conditions on the ground, they are meant to serve as buffers which could render unnecessary more coercive strategies including diplomatic, economic, and criminal legal sanctions.90 Similarly, the post-conflict "responsibility to rebuild" emphasizes international cooperation and assistance to rehabilitated or newly emerging regimes calling for international commitments to ensure economic development, security, justice, and reconciliation. Most importantly, this final step emphasizes the importance of respecting (or restoring) the target state's sovereignty and achieving domestic ownership of the political process.91 On the "responsibility to react" when preventative measures have failed, the document is even more methodical in detailing the means and conditions under which coercive intervention, the ultimate violation of traditional notions of sovereignty, may occur. Measures short of military action may include arms embargoes, ending of military cooperation, financial sanctions aimed at individuals or the state, economic sanctions, targeted economic embargoes, general or individual travel bans, and restrictions on membership in international or regional bodies. In terms of actual military intervention, R2P emphasizes, "All members of the United Nations have an interest in maintaining an order of sovereign, self-reliant, responsible, yet interdependent states," such that the international community must aim to do no harm. Intervention may indeed be harmful catalyzing the further destabilization of states, spread of conflicts across borders, and intensification of civil and ethnic strife such that military involvement must only occur when the "right authority" supports the action, there is "just cause" with the "right intention," it is taken as a measure of "last resort," "proportional means" are employed, and there 9 0 Ibid., 22-25. 9 1 Ibid., 44-45. 43 are "reasonable prospects" for success.93 Right authority refers to authorization by the UN Security Council, a legitimate and proximate regional security body, or a well-intentioned, multilaterally conceived, and generally internationally supported coalition of states, while just cause refers to a need to halt or avert large scale losses of life or ethnic cleansing.94 Right intention clearly refers to international intervention being motivated by these just causes rather than merely by narrow national interest; ideally such interventions would occur regardless of national interest.95 Last resort assumes that all previous strategies have already been employed or have been proven ineffective with respect to the target state while the proportional means limitation requires that "[t]he scale, duration, and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question."96 Finally, the notion that there must be reasonable prospects for success recognizes that intervention is neither always feasible nor reasonable in every case. Here R2P notes that while such realities are painful, the international community should focus on other elements of collective action which, at the very least, hold the target state to account.97 Although the document is particularly strong on delineating the responsibility of the international community to anticipate, react to, and rebuild following significant intrastate violence, it unfortunately fails to provide an adequate analysis of the expectations of state responsibility. Noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights followed by the "two Covenants of 1966, on civil-political and social-economic-cultural rights, affirm and proclaim 9 3 Ibid., 32. 9 4 O f course, legitimacy is in the eye o f the beholder. One need only recall the " legit imate" intervention by N A T O in Kosovo in 1999 which was strongly opposed by Russia. 9 5 In this respect, R 2 P may be overly ambitious as few states have been wi l l ing to commit troops to Chapter VI I peacemaking or peace enforcement missions where they lack pressing national interest. The fai led Amer ican intervention in Somalia between 1992-1994 after the collapse o f the Somal i government and the U N ' s final withdrawal in 1995 speak in large part to the unwill ingness o f states to commit l ives and resources to complex intrastate violence in the long run when motivated primari ly by humanitarian considerations. 9 6 Ibid., 37. 9 7 Ibid., 37. 44 the human rights norm as a fundamental principle of international relations," R2P is remarkably optimistic regarding the role of these documents as "the benchmark for state conduct" in the international system. 9 8 Although acknowledging that "there is not yet a sufficiently strong basis to claim the emergence of a new principle of customary international law," the report argues that emerging state practice indeed confirms the normative legitimacy of the responsibility to protect. 9 9 In this manner, R2P presumes that most states understand and attempt to exercise "responsible sovereignty," and therefore fails to directly engage the question o f what the international community must do to enforce its practice by recalcitrant states. Effective international intervention may indeed help bring an end to intrastate violence in the short term. Yet where efforts are focused, for all practical purposes, on restoring the status quo (as they have been in Darfur), they are also unlikely to bring about the structural changes necessary to fundamentally change state behaviour in the long run. Neglect of this important first half of the responsibility to protect doctrine is not altogether surprising given that the report is the product of an independent commission focused on intervention and state sovereignty whose mandate did not include analyzing the domestic behaviour of the target state beyond the international communities role in preventing violence. To provide prescriptions of how effective humanitarian intervention may be carried out, however, without fully understanding the implications of a state being "unwilling or unable" to protect its own citizens could lead to a fundamental misdiagnosis of both the causes of violence and its proper remedy. I b i d , 14. Ibid., 15. 4 5 3.2 A Responsible International Community? In order to judge the effectiveness of the application of the responsibility to protect in Darfur, one must first analyze the international response to the conflict in terms of the guidelines for intervention recommended by R2P. It is clear that the Security Council and the international community at large have failed to address the conflict at the prevention stage. This is hardly surprising as a true commitment to the "responsibility to prevent" requires, first and foremost, the knowledge that the seeds of such massive violence are even being sown. A n in-depth understanding of so-called root causes, necessitating the effective monitoring of the great many factors which may be precursors to violence and a particular political interest in and awareness of cases such as Darfur would be crucial to even the formulation of the idea o f a pre-emptive international response. Theoretically, this is where humanitarian N G O s and monitoring groups such as Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group should be of great use to the normalization and practice of this aspect of the R2P doctrine. However, where a case o f imminent conflict fails to directly threaten the national interests of the most powerful members of the international community or relevant regional bodies or where international intervention would threaten the interests o f said parties, it is unlikely that anything but the most adamant and politically-networked advocacy wi l l result in a proactive response. Given the undeniable frailty of the D P A and continued violence in the Darfur region, it would also be premature to speak in any length about the international community's efforts to fulfill a "responsibility to rebuild" let alone a sustainable resolution of the conflict. A s such, the most worthwhile evaluation of the international response must, at least in this case, rest with the "responsibility to react." Certainly, the international response has been far less than adequate and, in many ways, mirrors the complacency displayed in the face of genocide and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, 46 Bosnia, and Kosovo. As with these conflicts, the Security Council has largely failed to take a strong leadership role in placing forces on the ground which could separate the warring parties, and domestic political agendas of the Permanent Five (P5) members have severely impeded its ability to issue decisive resolutions which express unanimous moral revulsion at the situation on the ground and could effectively target the perpetrators of the conflict. However, whereas in previous conflicts, the Security Council did eventually enforce a range of punitive sanctions targeting the belligerent state parties, there have been no such moves in the case of Darfur. Rather, an examination of international efforts to bring an end to violence in Darfur have centered on diplomatically engaging the state, obstructing the activities of non-state armed actors, emphasizing individual accountability for human rights' violations committed, and seeking state consent prior to the deployment of any form of regional or international monitoring. What impact, if any, has this had on the international community's fulfillment of its responsibility to protect? In line with R2P's emphasis on attempting less intrusive and coercive measures prior to the contemplation of military intervention and the thesis' emphasis on the international community's failure to punish Sudan, the focus of this evaluation will be on the Security Council's multilateral use of non-invasive negative inducements including the imposition of sanctions in the military, economic, and political/diplomatic arenas, in order to bring about an end to the conflict. In terms of military sanctions, arms embargoes are a particularly important tool which can be used by the international community to stem the flow of armaments and spare parts to belligerent parties thereby reducing their respective war-making capacities. Furthermore, states which engage in military cooperation or provide training to targets' security bodies may end or withhold such training, although this strategy is presumably less effective if targets do not expect 47 their allies to support them in their domestic military campaigns. Thus far, the only move made by the Security Council in either regard has been to ban the sale of arms to non-state parties in Darfur through Resolution 1556(2004) and its "strengthening" with Resolution 1591(2005). This effort has been of only questionable effectiveness given weak border controls and the ready availability of small arms in the region. Although it is not entirely clear where the various rebel groups procure their arms, it is presumed that the Government of Chad has several groups with material support. The GoS has also speculated that various rebel factions have received arms from the National Democratic Alliance, an umbrella movement of Sudanese opposition parties based in Eritrea.100 In an interview with Amnesty International in 2004, Khalid Ibrahim of the JEM claimed, "The most difficult thing is not finding combatants in Darfur, but finding arms. About 90% of our armament comes from what we have captured from Sudanese army barracks."101 Janjaweed have also procured weapons by similar "informal means," but the line of supply enjoyed by those militias either incorporated into the PDF or formally cooperating with the state, of which the large majority appears to be, flowing directly from the Sudanese military is undeniable. The report by the ICID to the Security Council, for instance, provides detailed descriptions of cooperation between three major janjaweed encampments, one in each province of Darfur, and high-ranking members of the Sudanese military providing arms, ammunition, training, and salaries to militia members. With such evidence before the Security Council, their failure to impose an effective arms embargo against the state itself is all the more shocking. Amnesty International, Sudan: Arming the Perpetrators of Grave Abuses in Darfur Amnesty International, 16 November 2004), 37, [database on-line]; available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ AFR541392004ENGLISH/$F i l e /AFR5413904 .pd f , A I D O C Everything, 1 0 1 Ibid., 36. 1 0 2 International Commiss ion of Inquiry on Darfur, "Report o f the International Commiss ion o f Inquiry on Darfur to the Uni ted Nations Secretary-General," 35. 48 Resolution 1591, passed in March 2005, appears to extend the embargo imposed by 1556(2004) to "all parties of the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur." However, given that the embargo does not apply to "assistance and supplies provided in support of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement" reached between the SPLM/A rebels in the South and the GoS in 2004 and lacking a mechanism to monitor which arms are deployed to which region, this embargo has remained unenforceable.103 Corroborating this weakness, an expert panel appointed by the Security Council pursuant of Resolution 1591(2005), in their first report to the Council, confirmed multiple violations of the arms embargo by the GoS and recommended the extension of the embargo to the whole of Sudan. Even if these recommendations were to be followed through, the panel still advised the allowance of "appropriate exemptions" for the SPLM/A administered-Government of Southern Sudan (formed following the signing of the CPA) and the GoS. 1 0 4 It is unclear how these exemptions would be any better enforced even with the prospect of international monitoring given the NCP's track record of non-cooperation and non-compliance with Security Council resolutions. The panel's second report, released in April 2006, confirms continued non-compliance by the GoS and increased arms flows to both rebel and janjaweed forces from Chad and the Sudanese military respectively. The report also documents the use of white aircraft and helicopters similar to those used by the UN and AMIS by the Sudanese Air Force which has presumably led rebel groups to attack air transport used by 1 0 3 U . N . Security Counc i l , 5153rd meeting, "Resolut ion 1591 (2005) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1591) , 29 March 2005. 1 0 4 Sherrone Blake-Lobban, Ernst J . Hogendoorn, Eustace Ma inza , and Gerard P. M c H u g h , Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan Uni ted Nations Security Counc i l , 30 January 2006), 40, [database on-line]; available from http://www.iansa.org/regions/cafrica/ documents/Sudan-report-of-UN-experts-2006.pdf, International Ac t ion Network on Smal l A rms. 49 international monitoring forces.105 Both the transfer of this equipment to the territory of Darfur and its use constitute clear violations of the arms embargo. In part due to these continued violations, the United States and European Union have maintained arms embargoes of their own against Sudan since 1992 and 1994 respectively. Although initially put in place in response to the North-South civil war, they have since updated their sanction legislation to include the conduct of the GoS in Darfur as a legal basis for the continuation of their embargoes.106 Admittedly, this collective effort by 26 nations to at least minimally punish Sudan for its behaviour runs counter to the claim that the international community is moving away from the employment of negative inducements. But with little trade anyway between these states and Sudan, these efforts have been more symbolic than substantive in nature. Russia and China, on the other hand, have made a concerted effort to block an effective arms embargo of Sudan. Given both states' not-insignificant stakes in the arms trade in Africa as well as their diplomatic connections to Sudan, this is hardly surprising. The Globe and Mail reported in 2004 that the Russia had recently sold 12 MiG fighters to Sudan even as it campaigned for the removal of the term "sanctions" from Security Council resolutions that summer.107 Second after the US in the global arms trade, Dmitri Trenin, a military expert at the Carnegie Moscow Center, has argued, "Sudan is potentially a buyer in the future, and we don't have many buyers around.. .[Russia] is against sanctions primarily because those sanctions make Gerard M c H u g h , Sherrone Blake-Lobban, Eustace Ma inza , and Bernard Saunders, Second Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan Uni ted Nations Security Counc i l , 19 Ap r i l 2006), 16-18, [database on-line]; available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ issues/ sudan/2006/0416panelreport.pdf. 1 0 6 "Embargo Reference Chart," in U S Department o f State [database online]. Washington, D C 29 M a r c h 2006 [cited 20 June 2005]. Avai lable from http://pmdtc.org/country.htm., "International A rms Embargoes," in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [database online]. Stockholm [cited 2006]. Avai lab le from http://www.sipri.Org/contents/armstrad/embargoes.html#ai. 1 0 7 M a r k M a c K i n n o n , "Russia's Weapon Sales to Sudan Assai led," Globe and Mail, 12 August 2004, [database on-line]; available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2004/0812russia.htm, G loba l Po l i cy Forum, 50 1 0 8 some people happy, and they hurt Russian trade." Russia has preferred to portray its disagreement with an arms embargo and sanctions as more principled. In an interview with a Russian news agency, Konstantin Dolgov, Russia's ambassador to the UN, contended, "We have to encourage both sides, not penalize them. We are heading toward a new government. New people will be there. They have to have some time to deliver."109 However, if Russia has been a roadblock to effective intervention, China has been a concrete wall. In a June 2006 report, People's Republic of China: Sustaining conflict and human rights abuses, Amnesty International brought to light the enormous moral indiscretion practiced by China with respect to the arms trade marking it as "the only major arms exporting power that has not entered into any multilateral agreements which sets out criteria, including respect for human rights, to guide arms export licensing decisions."110 Not only have Chinese small arms "found" their way into the hands of janjaweed militias and anti-government rebels in Chad, but China has sold Sudan many of the helicopters and aircraft used in bombing campaigns and military trucks used by both Sudanese military and janjaweed commanders.111 Defending itself against the report, the Chinese government has claimed that it "takes a responsible attitude towards military exports" and exports a mere fraction of arms on the global market compared to the United States.112 Despite the ongoing conflict, however, Sudan and China have made commitments to increase military Scott Peterson, "Sudan's K e y Ties at the U N , " Christian Science Monitor, 31 August 2004, [database on-line]; available from http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0831/p01s02-wogi.html, csmonitor.com, 1 0 9 M O S N E W S , "Moscow Slams Plans to Impose Arms Embargo on Sudan," Sudan Tribune, 19 February 2005, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=8106, Sudan Tribune, ' 1 0 Amnesty International, People's Republic of China: Sustaining Conflict and Human Rights Abuses (London: Amnesty International, June 2006), 1, [database on-line]; available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ ASA170302006ENGLISH/$F i l e /ASA1703006 .pd f , A I D O C Everything. 1 1 1 Ibid. 12-22. 1 1 2 China Da i l y and X inhua, "Ch ina to Attend 1st Meet ing o f U N Human Rights Counc i l , " China Internet Information Center, 14 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/ Show_Text?info_id=171385&p_qry=sudan, China Internet Information Service. 51 cooperation and exchange.113 Given such irresponsible behaviour with regard to military sanctions, the international community under the auspices of the Security Council has largely failed to take even minimally effective measures to fulfill its responsibility to protect and hold the State of Sudan accountable for its actions in Darfur. As for economic sanctions, R2P suggests a number of targeted measures including financial sanctions targeting the foreign assets of the state, targeted armed groups, or individuals, restrictions on "income generating activities" such as oil production and their export, restrictions on access to petrol often necessary for military operations, and aviation bans preventing air traffic to and from the target state.114 In this respect, the Security Council has made some headway in applying individually-targeted sanctions however it has clearly failed to impose punitive economic sanctions against the state itself. Although Resolution 1564(2004) states that the Council will "consider" taking additional measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter, referring to non-military applications of coercion which may be employed by the Security Council, including "actions to affect Sudan's petroleum sector" as well as sanctions against the government and its leadership, Sudan's noncompliance, clearly documented by both humanitarian NGOs and independent commissions established by the Council itself, have not led to the imposition of economic sanctions.115 Indeed, 1591(2005) pulls back the threat of sanctions 1 1 3 X inhua, "Ch ina , Sudan to further Exchanges, Cooperation between Armed Forces," People's Daily Online, 29 November 2005, [database on-line]; available from http://english.people.com.cn/20051 l/29/eng20051129 224305.html, People's Da i l y Online. 1 1 4 International Commiss ion on Intervention and State Sovereignty and International Development Research Centre, "The Responsibi l i ty to Protect: Report o f the International Commiss ion on Intervention and State Sovereignty," 30. 1 1 5 Russia and China further expressed their opposition to this resolution saying that sanctions were counterproductive to the ongoing negotiations between the rebels and the GoS and would merely "complicate matters." U.N. Security Counc i l , 5040th meeting, "Resolut ion 1564 (2004) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1564) , 18 September 2004. Charter o f the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031; T S 993; 3 Bevans 1153: C h VI I , Art. 41. 52 significantly stating more ambiguously, "in the event that the parties fail to fulfill their commitments and demands as outlined in paragraphs 1 and 6, and the situation in Darfur continues to deteriorate, the Council will consider further measures as provided for in Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations."116 Rather, the focus of the Security Council's sanctioning efforts thus far has been to target individuals who "impede the peace process, commit violations of international law, or are responsible for military overflights of Darfur."117 Individual accountability for violations of international law in the conflict in Darfur has remained a prominent element of punishments threatened by the Council since 2004. However, since the passage of 1591 in March 2005, no other resolution has even mentioned the threat of sanctions or punitive actions against the state (or for the most part armed actors in the region). This has left individually targeted sanctions as the only means of punishment the Council appears collectively willing to employ. The authorization of ICC jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions in Darfur granted by Resolution 1593(2005), with abstentions by permanent members Russia, the United States, and China, has yet to bear fruit in terms of actual summons or prosecutions for any of the anonymous 51 individuals deemed by the ICID to be responsible for or to have knowingly allowed the committing of crimes against humanity in Darfur. It does appear however, to represent a more constructive step forward than the ineffectual arms embargo.118 In this regard, the passage of Resolution 1672(2006), with abstentions by permanent members Russia and China, imposing international asset freezes and travel bans on Major U N Security Counc i l , "Security Counc i l Declares Intention to Consider Sanctions to Obtain Sudan's Fu l l Compl iance with Security, Disarmament Obligations on Darfur," SC/8191 (18 September 2004): [database on-line]; available fromhttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc819l.doc.htm. 1 1 6 U . N . Security Counc i l , 5153rd meeting, "Resolut ion 1591 (2005) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S /RES/1591) , 29 March 2005. 1 1 7 B lake-Lobban et al . , "Report o f the Panel o f Experts Established Pursuant to Paragraph 3 o f Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan," 3. 1 1 8 International Commiss ion o f Inquiry on Darfur, "Report o f the International Commiss ion o f Inquiry on Darfur to the Uni ted Nations Secretary-General," 161-162. 53 General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan of the Sudanese military, Sheikh Musa Hilal, chief of the Jalul tribe in North Darfur and commander of the largest janjaweed force answerable to the NCP, Adam Yacub Shant, commander in the SLM/A, Field Commander Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri of the NMRD marks further progress in terms of addressing the climate of impunity which has flourished in Darfur. Yet, not only are these four relatively small players in the present conflict but there is little evidence that any hold significant foreign assets or would be particularly inhibited by travel restrictions. The panel of experts formed pursuant of 1591(2005) has indicated that they may have produced a more comprehensive list of individuals who they recommend be subject to sanction however these names have remained confidential.119 Not surprisingly, even this limited effort at sanctions led to predictable splits within the Council. Following the vote, American ambassador to the UN John Bolton expressed the belief that the passage of this resolution "constituted a first step by the Security Council in fulfilling its responsibilities," maintaining that this move would serve to strengthen the peace process. However Konstantin Dolgov, the Russian ambassador, explained his abstention arguing that while "[tjhere was no doubt that violations of international norms, including international humanitarian law, should not go unpunished," this resolution would be counterproductive in terms of bringing peace to the region. Wang Guangya, the Chinese ambassador, similarly argued that sanctions were likely to result in further victimization of the civilian population and that the Council should rather focus its energies on the political process in Darfur and "promote, assist and facilitate, rather than interfere in, the peace talks."120 With the conclusion of the DPA between the GoS and Minnawi's SLM/A, the Security Council has, in part, returned to the notion 1 1 9 M c H u g h et al . , "Second Report o f the Panel o f Experts Established Pursuant to Paragraph 3 o f Resolut ion 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan," 24. 1 2 0 U N Department o f Publ ic Information, News and Med ia D iv is ion , "Security Counc i l Imposes Travel , Financial Sanctions on 4 Sudanese, Adopt ing Resolut ion 1672 (2006) by 12-0-3," SC/8700 (25 Apr i l 2006): [database on-line]; available from http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2006/sc8700.doc.htm. 54 of collective accountability by threatening "strong and effective measures, such as a travel ban and assets freeze, against any individual or group that violates or attempts to block the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement."121 However, given that the state is party to the agreement and that it has not been punished at any other point in the conflict for failing to uphold the obligations imposed on it by the Council, this resolution may have served to further insulate Sudan from accountability for its conduct in Darfur. As with the failure to apply effective and far-reaching military sanctions, the blame for the conspicuous absence of multilaterally imposed economic sanctions through the Security Council can, in part, be laid at the feet of national economic considerations by its permanent membership. The United States, for its part, has maintained a comprehensive trade embargo and total freeze of Sudanese government assets since 1997 by Executive Order 13067 of then-President Bill Clinton for Sudan's role in supporting international terrorism, destabilizing neighboring governments, and committing gross human rights violations.122 This sanctions order was strengthened in 2006 by President George W. Bush freezing the property of all individuals identified by Security Council resolution 1672(2006) as well as any other individuals deemed to have threatened the peace in Darfur or American national who has provided military arms or assistance to rebel groups, the janjaweed, or the Government of Sudan.*23 In this sense, even the American individually-targeted sanctions go further than the Security Council's own measures by expressing willingness to sanction members of the government. Yet given the almost non-existent trade between the two states due to comprehensive sanctions, the actual efficacy of this 1 2 1 U . N . Security Counc i l , 5439th meeting, "Resolut ion 1679 (2006) [Report o f the Secretary-General on the Sudan]" (S/RES/1679) , 16 M a y 2006. 1 2 2 W i l l i am Jefferson Cl inton, "Execut ive Order 13067: B lock ing Sudanese Government Property and Prohibit ing Transactions with Sudan," Federal Register 62, no. 214 (5 November 1997): 59987-59990. [database on-l ine]; available from http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/13067.pdf, Federal Register. 1 2 3 George W . Bush, "Execut ive Order 13400: B lock ing Property o f Persons Connected with the Conf l ic t in Sudan's Darfur Region," Federal Register 7'1, no. 83 (26 A p r i l 2006): 25483-25485. [database on-line]; available from http://treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/13400.pdf, Federal Register. 55 move is highly questionable and represents more political posturing than a proactive response. Nonetheless, the United States remains the only permanent member on the Council to have imposed unilateral sanctions on Sudan. China has been, by contrast, the strongest opponent of economic sanctions in this conflict. Providing approximately 67% of Sudan's exports and buying 13% of its imports, this rising world power is Sudan's largest trading partner.124 China has increased its investment in Africa considerably with a 39% increase to over $32.17 billion in the first 10 months of 2005 alone primarily fueled by its growing consumption of foreign oil. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) has further reported that China accounts for 40% of the total growth in demand for oil worldwide over the past four years, also making it the world's second largest consumer of oil. 1 2 5 It has also reported that at least 70% of Sudan's export revenues are generated by the sale of crude oil. 1 2 6 Given the lack of western investment in the Sudanese oil sector, the Chinese government has been more than happy to establish deep economic and diplomatic ties with the NCP regime as its energy needs grow. China National Petroleum Corp, a Chinese government owned and operated company, owns a controlling 40 percent share of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Co, a consortium which operates most of Sudan's oil fields and has been at the forefront of promoting international investment in Sudan.127 It is further estimated that China imports some 10% of its oil from Sudan making it China's single largest Central Intelligence Agency, "Sudan." 1 2 5 "Ch ina-Af r ica Trade Jumps by 39%," BBC News, 6 January 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/business/4587374.stm, B B C News. Peter S. Goodman, "Ch ina Invests Heav i ly in Sudan's O i l Industry," Washington Post, 23 December 2004, A l . [database on-line]; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html, WashingtonPost.com. 1 2 6 Carmen J . Genti le, "Analys is : Sudan Flirts with O P E C Status," United Press International, 2 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://news.monstersandcritics.com/energywatch/features/ a r t i c l e l 169047.php/Analysis_Sudan_fl irts_with_OPEC_status, Monsters and Crit ics. 1 2 7 Goodman, "Ch ina Invests Heav i ly in Sudan's O i l Industry," 1. "Sudan Invest 2006: 2nd International Investment & Trade Conference for Sudan," in Min is t ry o f Investment o f Sudan [database online]. Khartoum [cited 2006]. Avai lable from http://www.sudaninvest.com/2006/ docs/index.aspx. 56 oversea petroleum investment. 1 2 8 With such great economic stakes in the future of Sudan, it is hardly surprising that the government would be so adverse to the imposition of economic sanctions. However, China has defended its Sudan policy arguing that it has nothing for which to apologize claiming that "economic embargoes and disengagement" are ineffective ways to promote good governance. 1 2 9 Whatever China's true motivation, the result is the same: the international community has failed to use any form of non-military economic coercion to target the state o f Sudan itself. Finally, in terms of political and diplomatic sanctions, R2P recommends imposing restrictions on diplomatic representation and travel, suspension of membership or expulsion from international or regional bodies, and refusing to admit a state to membership of an international, regional, or economic body. Arguably, this category represents the least intrusive and most benign of sanctions which, rather than materially punishing the target state for its behaviour, seeks instead to shame it into compliance with international human rights guidelines. Those sanctions which are least invasive, however, are often those requiring the most multilateral approach and may also have the most far reaching normative consequences. Indeed, expelling Sudan from the U N or the A U or the mandatory ejection of Sudanese diplomats from countries around the globe would amount to the world withdrawing recognition of the legitimacy of the state. A s such, it is hardly remarkable that such an action has never been taken by the Security 130 Council against even the most outcast of states. Similarly, the African Union, and its predecessor the Organization of African Unity, were founded in part on the principle o f 1 2 8 Liberation, "Ch ina Casts Shadow Over Chad-Sudan Conf l ic t , " Sudan Tribune, 26 Ap r i l 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=15262, Sudan Tribune. 1 2 9 Bridget Kendal l , "China Envoy Defends A f r i ca Pol icy , " BBC News, 4 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5045496.stm, B B C News. 1 3 0 The U N has refused in the past to recognize de facto governments ranging from Communist China to Rhodesia to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. However, with the exception o f replacing Taiwan's seat with Communist China in 1971, it has never formally withdrawn recognition o f any state. 57 i. maintaining old colonial boundaries and adhering to a strict policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of their neighboring states.131 Given that throughout the conflict, the AU has respected the ultimate authority of Sudan and has not attempted any actions to limit the "sovereignty" of the state in Darfur, expulsion or suspension of membership would not only be unprecedented but entirely at odds with the organization's raison d'etre. At the very least, the African Union was bold enough to deny Sudan its rotation in the seat of the AU presidency in January 2006 granting it instead to Congo-Brazzaville, although Bashir has been promised AU presidency in 2007.132 In a further blow to efforts at diplomatic isolation of the state, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has recently invited Sudan to join the exclusive cartel with full membership. Nigeria, as the only full member from Africa and current President of OPEC, has sought to increase its clout in the organization by extending an offer of membership to Sudan, which initially achieved observer status in 2001, and Angola, while Venezuela has lobbied for the inclusion of Ecuador in affect to counterbalance the Middle Eastern majority of OPEC states.133 It has been apparent that this decision was made relatively independently from considerations of Sudan's internal misconduct, and, therefore, it is much more likely that admission of Sudan into OPEC will result in a further burying of questions of the regime's responsibility for crimes in Darfur than a path of constructive engagement to bring a just end to the conflict. It could be argued that since both the UN and the AU cannot muster the authority nor the support to suspend Sudan's membership in their respective organizations, and economic players such as OPEC have focused on collective profits over national responsibility, it could be 1 3 1 Margaret P. Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, 2ndd ed. (Houndmil ls, Basingstoke, Hampshire; N e w York : Macmi l lan Press; St. Martin's Press, 1996), 53. 1 3 2 Associated Press, "Af r ican Un ion Leaders in Presidency Compromise," Guardian Unlimited, 25 January 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.guardian.co.Uk/sudan/story/0,,1694156,00.html, Guardian Unl imi ted. 1 3 3 Genti le, "Analys is : Sudan Flirts with O P E C Status." 58 worthwhile for other regional organizations to which Sudan is a member to take action. However, the organizations to which Sudan has the strongest ties, the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), have been the state's the most ardent defenders. According to an OIC delegation sent to Darfur in June 2004, both international aid agencies and the "Western media" have totally "misrepresented" the conflict and have maintained, "The representation that holds the Sudanese authority responsible for mishandling the victims in the Region, describing the situation as the worst humanitarian crisis is far from the reality".134 Despite the fact that every victim of this conflict has been Muslim, both organizations have refused to hold the NCP government accountable for its support of the janjaweed choosing Arab solidarity and status quo stability over promoting protection of co-religionists. Suggests Kamel Labidi, referring to both Saddam Hussien's gassing of the Kurds of Northern Iraq and the present situation in Darfur, "Such atrocious campaigns of ethnic cleansing in Iraq at the end of the last century and in Sudan today would have prompted deafening official and popular protests in Arab capitals had the victims been Arabs and the perpetrators non-Arabs."135 Following the passage of Resolution 1593(2005), both Libya and Egypt proposed several mini-summits of Arab states to resolve the conflict "internally" but they have been consistently postponed for "logistical reasons".136 The Arab League has more recently urged Sudan to accept UN peacekeepers in Darfur, however the League's Secretary General Amr Musa has argued that "consultations between the national unity government and the UN is the sole way for creation of an atmosphere K U N A , " A i d Agencies and Western Med ia have 'misrepresented' the Darfur Cr is is : O I C , " Darfur Information.Com, 1 July 2005, [database on-line]; available from http://www.darfurinformation.com/ inmisrepresented.shtml, Darfur Information.com. 1 3 5 Kame l Lab id i , "This Curious Silence in the Arab Wor ld , " Parliamentary Brief T 4 June 2006 (August 2004): 18: 1 3 6 Agence France-Presse, "Egypt Postpones Darfur Conference," Al Jazeera, 10 Ap r i l 2005, [database on-line]; available from ht tp: / /engl ish.a l jazeera.net /NR/exeres/9478DA3A-E834-481D-9FFA-DB4CA76D9F83.htm, Aljazeera.net. 59 of confidence and guarantees Sudan sovereignty."137 When presented with a clear opportunity to express political opposition to Sudan's actions in Darfur by canceling or relocating the Arab League summit scheduled to be held in Khartoum in March 2006, the Arab League utterly failed even to propose a change of venue.138 It almost goes without saying that the Security Council as well as other international governmental organizations have largely failed to place any sort of diplomatic restrictions on Sudanese officials in response to the conflict in Darfur nor have any further restrictions on travel been imposed beyond those named in Resolution 1672(2006). While individual states may maintain travel bans to and from Sudan, such restrictions are not multilaterally enforced and neither have any of the world's most powerful states imposed them. With non-existent political sanctions beyond simple "naming and shaming" at the international diplomatic level, significant roadblocks in the way of economic sanctions, the weak threat of international criminal prosecutions, and an only poorly enforced and ineffectual arms embargo, it is apparent that the international community has largely failed to exercise their responsibility to protect the innocents of Darfur and hold the state accountable for its role in the violence. R2P does clearly counsels that, should prior measures fail, armed intervention should be considered when authorized by the proper authority with just cause, when used as a last resort employing proportional means, and there are reasonable prospects for success. However, to assume that prior measures have failed would be to claim that they had been honestly attempted in the first place. This of course does not in itself nullify the legitimacy of demands by the United States, United Kingdom, and France and requests by the African Union for the deployment of a UN-led 1 3 7 S U N A , "Arab League Urges Sudan to Accept U N Troops in Darfur," Sudan Tribune, 5 June 2006. 1 3 8 A i d a A k l , "The Khartoum Arab League Summit," Voice of America, 27 March 2006, [database on-line]; available from http:/ /www.voanews.com/englisyarchive/2006-03/Khartoum2006-03-27-voa47.cfm, V O A N e w s . c o m . 60 force to replace AMIS. Indeed, even under its limited mandate, AMIS could perhaps have had the capability to separate and contain belligerent forces had it sufficient manpower, training, logistical support, integrated forces, and ample funding. However, given that this was the AU's first significant peacekeeping operation since its inception, it did not have the experience, funding, or technical expertise which the UN would have been able to bring to the table. Yet opposition to the deployment of a peacekeeping force under Chapter VII remains. Speaking after the vote on Resolution 1679(2006) recognizing the signing of the DPA and the AU's request for a UN assessment mission in the region, the Russian delegation claimed that its invocation of Chapter VII "did not change the character of the Council's decision on the Sudan, and did not predetermine the mandate of a future United Nations peacekeeping presence in Darfur." The Chinese ambassador was more forceful claiming that the context of the resolution was not consistent with Chapter VII and that its support of the resolution was to bolster the AU's role in securing the DPA rather than as to change the Chinese government's position on the peacekeeping. He further insisted that any deployment to Darfur required the "agreement and cooperation of the Sudanese government" calling this a basic precondition "for all peacekeeping operations."139 Yet even if the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Darfur with the state's consent would result in better protection for those most at danger from the ongoing conflict, it would still not likely result in the international community holding the GoS accountable for the violence in the region. As such, the atmosphere of violence might be controlled but the climate of impunity benefiting the state and to a lesser extent its proxies would remain unaffected. 1 3 9 U N Department o f Publ ic Information, News and Med ia D iv is ion , "Security Counc i l Endorses A f r i can Un ion Decis ion on Need for Concrete Steps in Transit ion to Uni ted Nations Operation in Darfur," SC/8721 (16 M a y 2006): [database on-line]; available from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8721.doc.htm. 61 IV: The Great Sanctions Debate 4.1 The Nature of the Crime Determines the (Non-)Punishment Clearly, given the rhetoric employed by members of the Security Council, the debate surrounding the use of sanctions and negative inducements in general extends further than both power politics and the particularities of this case. As has been demonstrated, protection of state sovereignty has remained a predominant concern in every decision by the international community to respond to this conflict. Reservations by China in particular about setting a precedent for humanitarian intervention in the face of massive human rights violations is certainly a driving motivation behind its adamant defense of traditional notions of state sovereignty.140 Further evidence that issues of sovereignty and not national interest of the P5 alone have been of considerable importance in determining the Security Council's decision not to impose sanctions can be found by comparing the present case with the international responses to another crisis triggered by Sudan under the same government. Such analysis confirms both the continued primacy of sovereignty as an inhibitor of international action and the most likely conditions under which punishment of a state by the international community through the Security Council is actually possible. Following an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by terrorists sponsored and protected by the then NIF government of Sudan, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1044(1996) demanding that it extradite the Indeed, the Chinese government is particularly sensitive to encouraging international behaviour which, in the future, could legitimate interference in matters they see as entirely internal; say should a crisis brew over Tibet or Taiwan. X inbo argues that this posit ion has not only l imited China 's wil l ingness to endorse even multi laterally conceived international intervention but it has kept the government from openly commenting on other states' internal affairs. W u X inbo , "Four Contradictions Constraining China's Foreign Po l icy Behavior," in Chinese Foreign Policy : Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior (Armonk, N . Y . : M . E . Sharpe, 2004), 60. 62 suspects to Ethiopia. After four months of Sudanese non-compliance and denials of responsibility, the Council passed Resolution 1054(1996) under Chapter VII declaring that should Sudan not extradite the suspects within 14 days of the resolutions' passage, it would impose significant diplomatic sanctions on Sudan including the drawing down of international diplomatic missions and restrictions on travel for members of the GoS and its military.142 Although both Russia and China abstained from the vote, expressing concerns about the specific terms under which sanctions would be imposed, the likelihood that sanctioning would only exacerbate tensions, and claiming insufficient evidence, neither stood in the way of its approval.143 It is notable that only 40 states reported compliance with the diplomatic draw-down and, of those, many only enforced limited reductions of staff.144 With continued intransigence by Sudan, in August 1996 the Council passed Resolution 1070 implementing mandatory reductions of foreign diplomats in Sudan, restrictions on the foreign travel of members of the Sudanese governing elite, and prohibiting the transit of Sudanese owned or operated aircraft particularly belonging to Sudan Airways to, from, and over the territory of any member of the United Nations within 90 days of the resolution's passage.145 1 4 1 U . N . Security Counc i l , 3627th meeting, "Resolut ion 1044 (1996) [Letter dated 9 January 1996 from the Permanent Representative o f Ethiopia to the Uni ted Nations addressed to the President o f the Security Counc i l concerning the extradition o f the suspects wanted in the assassination attempt on the life o f the President o f the Arab Republ ic o f Egypt in Add is Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995]" (S/RES/1044). 1 4 2 U . N . Security Counc i l , 3660th meeting, "Resolut ion 1054 (1996) [Letter dated 9 January 1996 from the Permanent Representative o f Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President o f the Security Counc i l concerning the extradition o f the suspects wanted in the assassination attempt on the l i fe o f the President o f the Arab Republ ic o f Egypt in Add is Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995]" (S/RES/1054) 1 4 3 U N Security Counc i l , "Security Counc i l Demands Sudan A c t to Extradite Suspects in Assassination Attempt o f Egypt ian President by 10 may, Or Face L imi ted Sanctions," SC/6214 (26 Ap r i l 1996): [database on-line]; available from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1996/19960426.sc6214.htmf 1 4 4 Richard W . Conroy, "The U N Experience with Travel Sanctions: Selected Cases and Conclusions," in Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft (Lanham, M D : Rowman & Lit t lef ield, 2002), 160. 1 4 5 U . N . Security Counc i l , 3690th meeting, "Resolut ion 1070 (1996) [Letter dated 9 January 1996 from the Permanent Representative o f Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President o f the Security Counc i l concerning the extradition o f the suspects wanted in the assassination attempt on the life o f the President o f the Arab Republ ic o f Egypt in Add is Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995]" (S/RES/1070) 63 Again, Russia and China abstained from the vote, both indicating that sanctioning of Sudan Airways represented an unacceptable escalation of sanctions against Sudan and expressing the belief that sanctions served more to isolate Sudan than to bring the sheltered terrorists to just ice. 1 4 6 Yet they did not block the resolution's passage. In the discussion period following the vote, France also took pains to indicate that Sudan should see the threat of sanctions not as a punishment but an "incentive" and as such, the Council should be careful not to penalize the "people of Sudan by making them suffer additional restrictions that could have serious humanitarian consequences." 1 4 7 However, a U N humanitarian impact report noted that such travel was beyond the means of most Sudanese citizens meaning that an enforced ban could in fact primarily ensure that the government rather than the people themselves were the target of sanctions although concerns regarding the transport of medical equipment and supplies by international aid agencies remained. Ultimately, Sudan failed to comply with the Security Council 's demands and sanctions legally went into effect, although the flight ban was never multilaterally enforced. 1 4 8 Sanctions were finally repealed in 2001 with Resolution 1372 following recognition by the Council for Sudan's efforts to comply with earlier resolutions and renounce terrorism. 1 4 9 Despite the limited impact of sanctions in this case, it remains notable that the Security Council did indeed formally impose them. Although the United States still considered Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism, this sanctioning effort was even more striking in that it did contribute to a change in domestic political behaviour. The eventual expulsion of A l Qaida leader Osama bin Laden from Sudanese territory in 1996 and the removal of his prime 1 4 6 U N Security Counc i l , "Minutes: 3690th Meeting o f the U N Security Counc i l , " S /PV.3960 (16 August 1996): [database on-line]; available from ht tp: / /daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N96/861/10/PDF/ N9686110.pdf?OpenElement. 1 4 7 Ibid. 16. 1 4 8 Conroy, "The U N Experience with Travel Sanctions: Selected Cases and Conclusions," 160. 1 4 9 U N Security Counc i l , "Security Counc i l L i f ts Sanctions Against Sudan," Security Council Press Releases SC/7157 (28 September 2001): [database on-line]; available from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/ sc7157.doc.htm. 64 domestic sponsor, Hassan al Turabi, from a position of political power in 2001, although also indicative of domestic political developments, were evidence that diplomatic and economic isolation of the regime, no matter how laxly enforced, were indeed influential and effective instruments of international censure.150 Yet while identical players had similar reservations regarding the application of sanctions in the 1996 case as they have had regarding Darfur, their tolerance for sanctions in the earlier instance were, at least on record, quite different. So what has separated one case from the next? The outstanding disparity between the two is obvious: while the first case constituted an act of aggression by Sudan against another sovereign state the second has been largely characterized as an internal conflict. It is true that the conflict in Darfur has bled across national borders and the Security Council has consistently characterized the conflict as a "threat to international peace and security" even recognizing its destabilizing impact on Chad, but unlike the crisis in 1995-1996, the Council has never identified the situation in Darfur as involving the violation of the legal jurisdiction or sovereignty of another state. Given their respective positions on the use of sanctions and international intervention (when authorized by the Security Council), Russia and China could therefore threaten to veto and force the dilution of resolutions imposing negative inducements in the case of Darfur where they could not ten years earlier and still claim politically consistent behaviour. Despite the fact that the formal imposition of sanctions in 1996 led to relatively ineffectual enforcement and compliance, all permanent members on the Council could agree that the violation of Ethiopia and Egypt's sovereignties through this assassination attempt deserved at least rhetorical condemnation supporting or at least failing to veto a resolution demanding a harsh international response. 1 5 0 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, 1st ed. (New York : Random House, 2002), 132-133. 65 4.2 The Failure of Constructive Engagement Beyond questions of sovereignty and the legitimacy o f international intervention, the P5 have also expressed rhetorically consistent misgivings regarding the employment o f sanctions in at least three areas: their relative utility versus positive inducements or so-called constructive engagement, their potential negative humanitarian impacts, and their overall effectiveness as an instrument of international diplomacy. A s for the relative utility of sanctions, it has been demonstrated that both Russia and China have argued consistently that sanctions result in international isolation of the target state and this, they believe, may not be conducive to international cooperation nor achieving compliance with international demands. Rather they have insisted that the international community and the U N Security Council in particular should be engaged in constructive dialogue and diplomacy with the target state. This position is conditioned on the belief that deviant behaviour has resulted from exclusion and the hope that full participation and recognition as equal partners in the society of states wi l l result in behaviour which is more in line with international demands. Given that the outbreak of the crisis in Darfur came at the heels of the signing of the comprehensive peace accord (CPA) between the GoS and the S P L M / A promising the formation of a new Government of National Unity, it is expected that the international community would be predisposed towards a strategy of constructive engagement. Indeed, it has been a long and difficult path to the formal end of c ivi l war, and many diplomats fear, not without reason, that punishing Sudan now could jeopardize not only the Darfur peace process but also the successful implementation of the C P A . Such views are reflected by the comments of French junior Foreign Minister Renaud Muselier who, in 2004, insisted, "[I]t would be better to help the Sudanese get over the crisis so their country is pacified rather than sanctions which would push them back to 66 their misdeeds of old."151 This statement is indicative of the conviction that ending the Darfur conflict can be accomplished through negotiations within the context of preserving the existing regime rather than requiring fundamental structural changes to the state even as evidence on the ground, past behaviour by the government, and demands by rebel groups would seem to indicate otherwise. In line with this position, France has maneuvered to revive economic ties with Sudan and to begin exploitation of its significant oil concessions in the south of the country which had been on-hold during the North-South civil war.152 The United States is also far from blameless for its continued, albeit behind the scenes, engagement of the NCP regime. Indeed, even as the Bush Administration condemned the violence in Darfur as genocide, the CIA continued to hold meetings with the head of the Mukhabarat, the Sudanese secret security body, Salah Abdallah Gosh, cited by Congress in 2004 as having been an architect of the conflict, over cooperation in the War on Terrorism on whose behalf it lobbied intensely to prevent his addition to the list of sanctioned individuals named in Security Council Resolution 1672(2006).153 Also, the State Department has removed Sudan from its list of states not cooperating on counterterrorism as well as improving Sudan's status on its human trafficking watch list even while it has paradoxically been retained on its list of state sponsors of terrorism. The idea of "constructive engagement" itself is hardly new and has been applied to numerous diplomatic relationships between states used primarily to encourage changes in domestic policies. Most famously, the Reagan administration in the United States followed a policy of constructive engagement with South Africa in the 1980s maintaining that through dialogue and prudent economic ties, it could persuade the regime to affect a peaceful and 1 5 1 "France Opposes U N Sudan Sanctions," BBC News, 8 July 2004, [database on-line]; available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/3875277.stm, B B C News. 1 5 2 "French O i l Group Total to Return to Sudan: Minister," Agence France Presse, 16 January 2004, [database on-line]; available from http://web.lexis-nexis.com/, LexusNexus Academic. 1 5 3 Mar isa Katz , " A very Long Engagement," New Republic (15 M a y 2006): 25. 67 democratic end to Apartheid. At the time, South Africa was seen as "a bulwark against communist influence" in the region and neither the U K nor the U S was wil l ing to support multilateral sanctioning of regime even as they universally condemned the practice of apartheid. A s such, not unlike the contemporary relationship between China (or Russia) and Sudan, sanctions and majority rule were seen as antithetical to American and British interests. 1 5 4 After intense domestic pressure in large part due to the eventual manifestation o f a global norm against racial discrimination, argues Klotz , the American administration tacitly acknowledged the failure of this policy in 1984 and imposed limited sanctions. 1 5 5 Write Ungar and Vale, "Having been offered many carrots by the United States over a period of four-and-a-half years as incentives to institute meaningful reforms, the South African authorities had simply made a carrot stew and eaten i t . " 1 5 6 After so many years of failing to impose any punishments of substance on South Africa for its domestic policies despite its clear violations of international human rights norms, the United States and its partners arguably helped entrench an environment of irresponsibility which not only empowered the regime but limited the capacity of the international community to address apartheid's inequities. As with Sudan, it was believed that the South African's government's hints at minor social reforms and the significant foreign investment by the "allied" western world in its economy would lead to gradual change, while Pretoria felt it could successfully continue to portray itself as a "protector of the Western way of life, a bastion of freedom, decency and economic development at the tip of a continent afflicted by tyranny, chaos and abject 1 5 4 Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Inequality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 455. 1 5 5 Ibid.: 473. 1 5 6 Sanford J. Ungar and Peter Vale, "South Africa: Why Constructive Engagement Failed," Foreign Policy (Winter 1985/86): 234. 68 157 poverty." The disparity between these two positions is obvious. Despite the clear failures of constructive engagement, other states have continued its practice, often presenting as with Darfur the very same arguments put forward by the Reagan Administration insisting that its particular case of interest is different. Indeed, the government of Canada has maintained a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba since 1994 which has, thus far, failed to yield any real change in Cuban domestic politics but has created an effective lobby o f business, tourism, academics, and N G O s which could preclude any effective change to the po l i cy . 1 5 8 Similarly, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( A S E A N ) has followed a policy o f constructive engagement with Burma, controlled since 1962 by a repressive military junta, by admitting it in 1997 while Nigeria and South African have, since 2003, advocated the use of constructive engagement and "effective diplomacy" with Mugabe's Zimbabwe rather than sanctions to change domestic political behaviour. 1 5 9 Neither diplomatic effort has succeeded while the measures taken to implement them would be quite difficult to reverse. This is not to argue that all instances of constructive engagement are doomed to failure or that sanctions are always the more productive option. What should be recognized, however, is that constructive engagement rarely constitutes benign politics; the use of this diplomatic instrument can be as damaging, i f not more so, to a states' foreign policy objectives than the benefits of its success. Just as American (and British) "constructive engagement" with South Africa merely empowered the Apartheid regime, it is quite apparent that Chinese and Russian (and even French) vocal denunciations of 1 5 7 Ibid.: 239. 1 5 8 Cristina Warren, "Canada's Pol icy o f Constructive Engagement with Cuba: Past, Present and Future," Background Briefing: FOCAL Research Forum on Cuba RFC-03-1 (May 2003): 10. 1 5 9 "Engaging Burma: The A S E A N Experience," in A S E A N Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus [database online]. 6 Ap r i l [cited 2006]. Avai lable from http://www.aseanmp.org/index.php'?option=com content& task=view&id=81 &Itemid=27. Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, "Zimbabwe: Niger ia, South A f r i ca Favour 'Constructive Engagement' with Zimbabwe," AHAfrica.Com, 7 February 2003, [database on-line]; available from http://allafrica.com/stories/200302080221.html, al lAfr ica.com. 69 sanctions and efforts to continue business-as-usual with the GoS have merely entrenched the climate of impunity enjoyed by Khartoum throughout the Darfur conflict. Likewise, American dependence on Sudan as an "al ly" against terrorism may ultimately prevent the U S from demanding the kind of structural political changes necessary to stem regional violence seemingly endemic to the regime. 4.3 Humanitarian Concerns and Targeted Sanctions Running perhaps even deeper than the optimistic hope that diplomatic engagement could lead to more positive outcomes than sanctions is the fear that such punishment could lead to further and greater humanitarian crises. In the contemporary international political arena, the employment of multilateral sanctions has increasingly come to be seen as largely ineffective in persuading target states to change their behaviour and unduly harmful to its unintended targets, the state's civilian population. Known in some circles as the "neutron bomb problem" in reference to the Cold War era development of a nuclear weapon capable of ki l l ing the population of an area while leaving its infrastructure intact, the concern is that sanctions may destroy a country's economy yet fail to affect the stability or behaviour of the targeted regime. 1 6 0 Many of these "lessons" have been drawn from the international community's experience in Iraq post-G u l f War between 1992 and 2003 by which the Baathist regime's skillful manipulation of the U N sanction further solidified Saddam Hussein's political base and correlated with widespread reductions of l iving standards and suffering by the common Iraqi citizen. Geoff Simons' bombastic book, Targeting Iraq, goes as far as to claim that economic sanctions imposed on Iraq following the G u l f War had such catastrophic consequences that its results should be most 1 6 0 Michael Mastanduno, "Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security: Agendas for Research," in Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security (London; Portland, O R : F. Cass, 2000), 295. 70 correctly labeled genocide. Accusing the British and American governments of wantonly punishing the innocent, he writes, "With Iraq accustomed to importing the bulk o f its food and medical supplies, a total blockade reinforced by unassailable military power was sure to have a devastating and speedy impact. It was not long before the embargo was striking at the most vulnerable Iraqis in their hundreds and thousands..." 1 6 1 Although such analyses grossly overestimate the intentionality of sanctions' negative externalities and oversimplify the apportioning o f blame for them to the U S and U K , the damaging impact o f U N sanctions remains a scar on the international conscience which has since consistently inhibited the use o f sanctions and directly challenged their efficacy. Indeed, as the international community has increasingly recognized the inherent correlation between the enjoyment of human rights and the promotion of economic development, any kind o f economic sanctions are quite likely to impair the achievement of both. Argues al-Anbari, "severe economic sanctions are bound to impoverish the majority of the population, cause hyperinflation, retard the agricultural, industrial, educational and health systems while spreading crime and corruption," while governing elite are likely to remain in power through utilization of the black market. 1 6 2 Andreas further contends that sanctions produce a criminalization of both state and society, and rather than succeeding in punishing a state for its behaviour the international community may encourage the degeneration of society. Most concerning, he writes, is the difficulty of returning a state which has grown accustomed to such social devolution to the practice of legal norms. He does not contend that sanctions are the sole force in producing social criminalization, "but rather that they produce much higher levels of 1 6 1 G . L. Simons, Targeting Iraq: Sanctions and Bombing in US Policy, (London: Saqi Books, 2002), 63-64. 1 6 2 A . A m i r a l -Anbar i , "The Impact o f United Nations Sanctions on Economic Development," in United Nations Sanctions and International Law (The Hague; Norwe l l , M A : K luwer L a w International, 2001), 376. 71 criminalization than would otherwise have been the case." 1 6 3 In an analysis independent of the causal effects of sanctions, but clearly relevant to the breakdown of state capacity, Wi l l i am Reno argues that in states with weak and internally insecure bureaucracies, elite players may turn to "warlord politics," that is informal economic and security arrangements, to maintain power. Forming these shadow state arrangements, he argues, "could leave rulers in a condition in which they pursue power through purely personal means and that pursuit becomes synonymous with and indistinguishable from their private interests. Rulers thus would jettison all pretenses o f serving the interests of a public that may contain dangerous rivals or unruly cit izens." 1 6 4 Clearly, where a society becomes dependent on the black market and the government increasing turns to shadow state operations to survive, the international community is both in a poorer position to influence the policies of the state and to prevent humanitarian emergencies. In a state such as Sudan which already exhibits many of these properties apparent through its internal security policies, any international coercive instrument which could catalyze further breakdown of formal state capacity is of great concern. Even when sanctions are imposed with built-in exceptions for humanitarian goods and supplies, the experience of hardships by the population is seemingly inevitable. A n d even then, the state is often responsible for the management of these exceptions or for the distribution of humanitarian goods as was the case with Iraq and the Oil-for-Food program. In this respect Margaret Doxy notes, [I]n a telling metaphor a 1930s commentator wrote that 'the acid o f exemptions w i l l eat the very heart out o f a sanctions regime.' If there is no system o f authorization for 'permitted' trade, the sanctions 'net' w i l l have enormous holes; on the other hand, processing applications for 1 6 3 Peter Andreas, "Cr iminal iz ing Consequences o f Sanctions: Embargo Bust ing and its Legacy," International Studies Quarterly, no. 49 (2005): 337. 1 6 4 W i l l i am Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 3. 73 sanctions and humanitarian effects was previously unknown, but simply that the case of Iraq represents the single most recognizable contemporary case of sanctions gone awry. Indeed, Gowlland-Debbas recounts that concerns over the humanitarian impact of sanctions have been at the centre of international efforts to use sanctions as a tool o f international diplomacy as early as the League of Nations in the 1920s. 1 6 8 Regardless both moral and international legal norms clearly dictate that such disproportionate punishment of civilian populations in particular cannot be considered a legitimate element of international practice. A s such, should sanctions to induce state compliance with international demands clearly threaten those who are not responsible for such behaviour, other avenues o f inducement must be found. 1 6 9 From this understanding arises the practice of "smart" or targeted sanctions. Included in this category are limited sanctions targeting particular economic sectors, financial sanctions freezing government or individual assets, and travel sanctions limiting the ability of government officials and other designated individuals to move outside the borders of their country as well as other formerly mentioned military and diplomatic sanctions detailed in the Responsibility to Protect. Targeted sanctions have been promoted as not only more morally sound but also inherently more effective at ensuring target compliance with international demands. The record on sanctions which target assets and income-generating activities of governments and rebel organizations is at least partially encouraging as is the more limited record on individually-targeted sanctions. Cortright and Lopez argue that freezes on the assets of the Yugoslavian government during the Bosnian conflict between 1992 and 1995 were 1 6 8 Vera Gowlland-Debbas et al . , United Nations Sanctions and Internatinal Law, (The Hague; Norwe l l , M A : Kluwer Law International; So ld and distributed in North, Central and South Amer ica by K luwer L a w International, 2001), 17. 1 6 9 Marco Sassoli, "Sanctions and International Humanitarian L a w - Commentary," in United Nations Sanctions and International Law (The Hague; Norwel l , M A : K luwer Law International; Sold and distributed in North, Central and South Amer ica by K luwer L a w International, 2001), 246. 74 instrumental in both limiting the resources of the state and pushing Milosevic towards peace negotiations. Although the state turned to the black market to circumvent sanctions, "these efforts were not sufficient to offset the impact of the asset freeze and the denial of access to financial markets in Europe and the United States." 1 7 0 European and American freezes on the assets of individual members o f Milosevic 's government between 1998 and 2000 complimented by more traditional economic sanctions in response to the conflict in Kosovo were also instrumental in removing the Serbian dictator from power. 1 7 1 Similarly, asset freezes and travel bans imposed on members of the Angolan rebel group U N I T A by the Security Council in 1993 and strengthened in 1997 have slowly succeeded in limiting the organization's assets as the U N ' s list o f sanctioned individuals has grown substantially from the initial 153. 1 7 2 Even the U N ' s efforts to freeze the assets of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and banning of travel by their officials prior to the American-led invasion in 2001, were instrumental in ensuring the continued diplomatic and economic isolation of the regime although they certainly did not change its pol icies . 1 7 3 However, where financial sanctions have been imposed multilaterally by the Security Council absent other enforcement mechanisms, success has been much more limited. Notably the failure of financial sanctions on Libya between 1993 and 1999 can be attributed in large part to the insistence by European countries that funds from oil sales be exempt from the freeze so as not to disrupt European oi l imports. 1 7 4 In another failure of targeted sanctions, travel restrictions and trade sanctions placed on the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Sierra Leone between 1997 and 2000 by the Security Council and the Economic Community o f West African 1 7 0 Cortright et al. , "Sanctions and the Search for Security : Challenges to U N Act ion, " 98. 1 7 1 Ibid., 101. 1 7 2 Ibid., 147. 1 7 3 Ibid., 120. 1 7 4 Ibid., 98-101. 75 States ( E C O W A S ) failed to limit the rebels' freedom o f movement and did not weaken their bargaining position vis-a-vis the weakened then deposed government. Unlike the Libyan case, the sanctions did succeed in delegitimizing its target but due to the failed nature of the state and its utter inability to control its own territory it could not enforce the sanctions' provisions. Furthermore, the R U F were only ultimately removed as a threat in 2000 with U N , E C O W A S , and British military intervention. 1 7 5 Rather than repeating the analysis of the lackluster implementation of targeted sanctions against Sudan in response to the conflict in Darfur, it suffices to say that given the lessons drawn from both the previous cases and Sudan, it remains apparent that the success of targeted sanctions is possible however their implementation requires the commitment of all relevant parties. Moreover, such sanctions appear to be more successful when coupled with other sanctions which in fact directly target the state or party of interest and not simply their functionaries. 4.4 But Do Sanctions Really Work? Although targeted sanctions have demonstrated a potential to avoid unintended impacts on civilian life, skepticism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions in general as a tool of foreign policy remains. Indeed, the question often arises as to whether states are even vulnerable to instruments of economic coercion i f not backed by the threat of force. Askari , et al. confirm this skeptical position arguing, The idea that economic sanctions can address foreign pol icy issues without military action requires a host o f requisite economic and pol i t ical conditions that are rarely found in the wor ld in Conroy, "The U N Experience with Travel Sanctions: Selected Cases and Conclusions," 160-161. 76 the right combination and at the right time. The prospects for economic sanctions to change another country's pol icies are rare, yet economic sanctions continue to be used l ibera l ly . 1 7 6 Such conditions substantially include but are not limited to the target's dependence on foreign trade to maintain its domestic economic status quo, the diversity of the target's import/export market, the elasticity of demand for the target's imports and exports, the (potential) existence of import-substitution markets within the state, the responsiveness and political vulnerability of the target to the needs of its population, the target's degree of political engagement with and/or isolation from the outside world, the presence of allied, adversarial, or neutral neighboring states, as well as the political willingness of sender states to bear economic costs associated with sanctioning. As such, it could be understood that the potential for successful sanctions to be imposed against Sudan are quite low. Indeed, the present regime has long survived without substantial international investment, and the elasticity of demand for its primary export commodity, oil, remains quite high. Furthermore, the regime is clearly unresponsive to the needs of its population-at-large, is only significantly politically engaged with staunch allies such as the Arab League and China and relatively benign partners such as the African Union and nearby African nations, and is not substantially threatened by neighboring states including Egypt, Chad, the Central African Republic, Uganda, Eritrea, or Ethiopia. Finally, the sender states which would bear the highest cost of sanctioning such as China and Russia refuse to do so. Drezner in part corroborates this argument indicating that where both sides have high conflict expectations, they will also both fear concessions which might leave them weak in the face of future conflict. Thus not only will credible commitments be less likely but if sanctions are actually imposed, the result is likely to be sustained deadlock rather than the preferred policy 1 7 6 Hossein Askar i , Economic Sanctions: Examining their Philosophy and Efficacy, (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2003), 28. 77 outcome for either side.177 This result is certainly evident on at least one end of the present diplomatic confrontation between Sudan and the Security Council through Sudan's combative rhetoric towards and complete rejection of international intervention. However Drezner further notes that studies statistically confirming the "failure" of sanctions may in fact be biased in that they do not account for cases where sanctions were threatened although not applied. Including this neglected sample reveals that the most successful uses of economic coercion are in fact observed before sanctions are even imposed. Although neither confirming nor denying the efficacy of sanctions, this conclusion does point to the potential deterrent value of negative economic inducements. Whether or not the credible threat of sanctions will have an impact on Sudan's behavior remains to be seen. Speaking to the same body of literature Schwebach writes, "An emphasis on trade as a weapon has led most sanctions research to focus on whether or not sanctions 'work' in the sense of brining about some kind of policy change in the target state. The vast majority of these studies have concluded that sanctions are generally ineffective in this regard."178 She points out though that the "success" of sanctions may be quite dependent on how the threat is perceived by the receiving party as well as the actual policy objectives leading to their application. Should the sender actually apply sanctions it could indicate that they do not expect the target to comply absent negative inducements, or, due to the costs incurred by the sender, it could communicate that the party is resolute in its demands and willing to follow through on substantive threats. Both the target's perception of the sender's resoluteness and their own ultimate willingness to concede or suffer economic harm as a result of non-compliance must be taken into consideration. 1 7 7 Daniel W . Drezner, "The Hidden Hand o f Economic Coerc ion," International Organization, no. 57 (Summer 2003): 647. 1 7 8 Valer ie L. Schwebach, "Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand Or a Lack o f Resolve?" in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice (Basingstoke; N e w York : Macmi l l an ; St. Martin's Press, 2000), 189. 78 Certainly targeted parties could have a number of responses to the threat or actual imposition of sanctions ranging from compliance to utter defiance. For instance, sanctions imposed against states such as Iraq resulted not in acquiescence to international demands or popular uprisings to protest abysmal living standards resulting from their state's designation as an international pariah but a rally-around-the-flag effect by which the leadership maintained both popular legitimacy and political power. The GoS has also succeeded to a more limited degree in promoting its own resurgent patriotism in the face of international criticism despite the fact that the UN has imposed only an ineffectual arms embargo and limited sanctions against individual perpetrators of violence. Furthermore, the regime has signaled that it may be willing to endure significant international censure thus weakening the perceived potential effectiveness of sanctions. Observations such as these should make perfectly clear to those who oppose sanctions for its tendency to strengthen defiant regimes that such responses may develop in response to any level of unwanted international involvement. In this respect, it has also been suggested that some regimes may even prefer accepting sanctions to acquiescing to international demands as it might further consolidate their political power and increase their domestic economic clout. Drezner argues that since sanctions hurt trade-oriented sectors of the economy while strengthening import-substitution sectors, exporters, which prefer acquiescence, are weakened while new and preexisting domestic allies can be cultivated and rewarded with state patronage. He further maintains that such a strategy is least effective where the state is troubled by domestic instability including ethnic cleavages and fragile government such that forces in favour of accommodation are likely to win out.179 While both points appear to be intuitively correct, the second in isolation of other factors cannot 1 7 9 Daniel W . Drezner, "The Complex Causation o f Sanction Outcomes," in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice (Basingstoke; N e w York : Macmi l lan ; St. Martin's Press, 2000), 214-215. 79 account for the persistent rejection of accommodation by states such as Sudan which has endured persistent economic weakness, governmental instability, and domestic insurgency even in the face of international pressure, however weakly enforced. A s previously noted, a synergy of Reno's theory of warlord politics with the criminalizing effects of sanctions suggested by Andreas could very well explain such non-compliance by failed states. However, sanctions may also be successful although in unexpected ways. Baldwin affirms, "Embargoes may trigger a sense of shame, impose a sense of isolation from the world community, signal a willingness to use more radical measures, or simply provoke reexamination of policy stances in the target country. A n y or all o f these effects can occur without any economic effects whatsoever on the target.,,i&0 Outcomes of coercive economic measures may take both time to manifest themselves and careful attention by the international community to comprehend them. Failure in this case may perhaps be more appropriately attributed, then, to an obvious lack of commitment by the international community to follow through on threats rather than any inherent shortcoming in the instrument of sanctions. Given that Russia and China, as the two members of the Security Council with the most significant economic and political clout in Khartoum, have been thus far unwilling to enforce punitive sanctions against Sudan, it would appear unlikely that any effort to punish Sudan through the Council would be particularly fruitful. While the remaining members o f the P5 have expressed a commitment to holding Sudan accountable for its failure to abide by international human rights norms, the threat of sanctions as by these states also rings hollow given both their lack o f leverage and lack of solid commitment to intervene in the Darfur conflict demonstrated by three years of relative inaction. However, rather than being designed to extract real concessions from the target regime, sanctions may be supported by a given state to placate domestic political demands for justice or seek 1 8 0 Dav id A . Ba ldw in , Economic Statecraft, (Princeton, N.J . : Princeton Universi ty Press, 1985), 63. 80 favour with a powerful ally; Given France's stated objections to the use o f sanctions in the case of Darfur, their delegation's support for resolutions 1564(2004) and 1591(2005) which both strongly threatened the imposition of sanctions provide plausible evidence for either motivation. A s such, it can be understood that not all states supporting calls for sanctions w i l l necessarily have a desire that they be employed or believe that they w i l l be particularly effective. Rather, such coercive measures may be supported for entirely symbolic reasons, i.e. in support of human rights or to protest the autocratic nature of the Sudanese government. Davidson and Shambaugh suggest, "[T]he effectiveness of symbolic sanctions or incentives may also be considered a function of the strength of the signal that they send and that this, in turn, is a function o f the costs born by the sender rather than the target." 1 8 1 Given that symbolic measures have little substantive impact on the target state, the cost for the employment of such sanctions falls disproportionally on the sender. The bearing of such costs signals resolve yet, taken alone, is unlikely to achieve much more. A s such, those states without significant economic stakes in the target can take the moral high ground on the international stage by imposing sanctions at little to no cost as is the case with the United States in Sudan, or they may openly support such moves to gain domestic and international prestige without necessarily any real commitment to their enforcement. Yet however substantively ineffectual these moves may be, choosing to participate in a sanctions regime, at the very least, signals a collective disapproval with the target's conduct. This is no minor achievement. Indeed, any multilateral employment of coercive means or threat thereof is much more than the sum of its parts; it normatively legitimates the international community's response to the target's actions and sets a precedent for future cases by which international 1 8 1 Jason Davidson and George Shambaugh, "Who's Af ra id o f Economic Incentives? The Eff icacy-External i ty Tradeoff," in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice (Basingstoke; N e w York : Macmi l l an ; St. Martin's Press, 2000), 45. 81 conduct may be guided. The very fact that the Security Council has taken upon itself to express regular disapproval and moral disgust with what is occurring in Darfur does signal a weak acceptance of the responsibility to protect and a desire to bring some resolution to the conflict. In this sense, efforts at condemning the violence in Darfur generated particularly by Council debates over the merits of the imposition of sanctions as well as the unilateral, although largely symbolic sanctions imposed by individual states have succeeded in a very limited fashion by keeping the conflict at the forefront of international attention. However, i f the aim is to inhibit, prevent, or halt violent behaviour by Sudan, those states upon which it is dependent must also be convinced to at least appear cost-acceptant in their diplomacy. Unfortunately, neither Russia nor China has exhibited this sort of flexibility nor have they expressed their intention to do so in the near future. Furthermore, statements and denunciations of the violence in Darfur by all members of the P5 are themselves irrelevant i f not supported by consistent international practice. 82 V. State Failure and State Responsibility 5.1 State Failure and Domestic Instability A further critical factor constraining the international response to the conflict in Darfur is Sudan's status as a failed state. Having topped the Fund for Peace's 2006 "Failed State Index" with an index score of 112.3 of 120 along twelve indicators each scored at over 9 out o f 10, Sudan's ranking surpassed even the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the collapsed state of Somal ia . 1 8 2 These social, economic, and political indicators include demographic pressures, refugee and IDP populations contributing to complex humanitarian emergencies, chronic and sustained human flight, legacies of vengeance-seeking and violent political grievance, uneven economic development along group lines, sharp or severe economic decline, criminalization of the state, deterioration of public services, widespread violations of human rights, the existence o f unaccountable security forces, the rise o f factional elites, and the intervention of external political actors. More generally, a failed state is characterized by the failure of the government to exercise a monopoly on the legitimate uses of force within its own territory, often explained as the result of inadequate postcolonial consolidation of the nation-state. This breakdown of Weberian sovereignty is most often accompanied by a significant decline in social welfare coupled with the debilitation of the institutions of state catalyzed by a rising level of violence directed against the regime itself. In distinguishing such a state, Rotberg writes, It is not the absolute intensity o f violence that identifies a failed state. Rather, it is the enduring character o f that v io lence.. . the fact that much o f the violence is directed against the existing government or regime, and the inf lamed character o f the pol i t ical or geographical demands for 1 8 2 "Fai led State Index 2006," in Fund for Peace [database online]. Washington, D C [cited 2006]. Avai lable from http://\vww.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php. 83 shared power or autonomy that rationalize or justify that violence in the minds o f the main insurgents. Lacking the widespread internal legitimacy commanded by functional regimes, a weak or failing state is consequently plagued by a chronic inability to bring stability to its political structures and security to its citizens, theoretically incapable of maintaining even the most basic elements of social and political order. Whi le state failure may be in part due to historical structural factors imposed by former colonial powers, collapse can also occur as a result o f self-interested political leadership or the simple disintegration of unsustainably conceived statehood. Whether because of the inherent weakness of state institutions, the tyranny of a given political leadership, or a combination o f both, Dorff notes, "the critical element of failure...becomes the erosion, loss, or 184 absence of legitimacy." This want of internal legitimacy is concerning for even the most autocratic of regimes given its potential to undermine the state's credibility on the regional and international stage and empower domestic challengers to its authority. Where some regimes facing these conditions have merely increased repressive domestic measures as with Iraq against its Kurdish and Shiite populations following the G u l f War, others increasingly turn to warlord politics to sap what wealth they can from the state largely ignoring the responsibilities of state as practiced by both Liberia and Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s. The N C P has chosen a different but equally destructive path resulting in what Prunier and Gisselquist have described as "successfully fa i led." 1 8 5 B y seeking to maintain its power by exacerbating regional conflicts through the support of proxy groups such as the janjaweed, it has catalyzed the 1 8 3 Robert I. Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, (Cambridge, Mass. ; Washington, D.C. : Wor ld Peace Foundation; Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 5. 1 8 4 Robert H . Dorff, "Fai led States After 9/11: What did we K n o w and what have we Learned?" International Studies Perspectives, no. 6 (2005): 23. 1 8 5 Gerard Prunier and Rachel M . Gisselquist, "The Sudan: A Successful ly Fai led State," in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Cambridge, Mass. ; Washington, D .C . : Wo r l d Peace Foundation; Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 104. 84 promotion of new regional elites beholden to the regime for their status and strengthened the authority o f the state's political centre by weakening its periphery. Given the regime's desire to maintain a monopoly on political power, having once resorted to a strategy of paramilitary use they have been condemned to a cyclical process of client promotion, threatening military and political advancement, and subsequent regime selection of new irregular forces to deal with formal clients. Apparent from the N C P ' s consistent use of proxy militias and their tendency to ultimately reject involvement in future campaigns once their own objectives have been achieves, this strategy has had far reaching consequences for the security apparatus of the Sudanese state. The breaking down of the government-accountable military in favour of a regime-based security system in the form of the P D F which neglects traditional state-based patronage networks and directly empowers regional elites, tribal militias, and regime-sanctioned paramilitaries has given the GoS greater freedom to repress internal political dissent while denying responsibility for their violent excesses. This security strategy has also allowed the regime to form temporary political alliances for the sake of mutual gains which they are relatively capable of abandoning either in the face of military failure of objective achievement. However, by disenfranchising the state security bureaucracy, the regime has also ensured a general dependence on shadow state networks which solidify the authority o f the regime but condemn it to a continued reliance on paramilitary power. This security strategy accompanied by corrupt internal political and economic policy has been instrumental to Sudan's failure as a functional state. Although benefiting the regime in the short-run, undercutting the ability of political and armed opposition groups to substantively challenge its authority, it has also led to a proliferation of rebel groups committed to achieving greater regional autonomy. For instance the use of Baggara Arab militias as regional proxy forces by the Mus l im Arab dominated regime was 85 particularly effective in punishing ethnic-African Christians and animists for their support of the S P L M / A . So long as this strategy was limited to the prosecution of the North-South civi l war, other predominantly Mus l im areas of Sudan could still support its use despite their own disenfranchisement given the religio-ethnic dimensions of the conflict. However, with the support of nomadic Arabized tribes against established Mus l im African farming and pastoral communities in the late 1980s and 90s, increased resentment soon took the form of armed opposition against the state in both Darfur and in the west among the Beja. The "resolution" o f the North-South c iv i l war and moves towards a national unity government has not led to an abandonment of this destabilizing security strategy. Yet what is perhaps more disturbing is that the international community has not forced the regime to confront its dependence on paramilitary use and delegitimize their employment as part of the more recent Darfur peace agreement. Even after the widely condemned use of janjaweed militias by the GoS in Darfur, provisions included in the D P A between it and Minnawi 's S L M / A details on line 408(c) how 1000 former rebel combatants wi l l be integrated into the P D F even while requiring the disarmament of "the Janjaweed/armed mil i t ias" . 1 8 6 A s the formal structure under which the employment of janjaweed was legally legitimated, efforts to reinforce this body are quite puzzling. Although lines 446 and 447 emphasize the requirement that the membership of the P D F and other formal state militias must be subject to c ivi l oversight and legal accountability, their continued existence parallel the formal Sudanese military is l ikely to remain a repressive and self-interested instrument of the regime. Indeed, i f the aim is to achieve thorough legal accountability then informal security bodies operating functionally as the private mili t ia of the N C P should be formally abolished. Darfur Peace Agreement. Signed at Abu ja , Niger ia on 5 M a y 2006. Witnessed by Af r ican Un ion , Niger ia , L ibya , U S A , U K , U N , E U , Arab League, Egypt, Canada, Norway, France, and Netherlands. http ://www. sudantribune. com/IMG/pdfyDarfur_Peac_Agreement-2 .pdf. 86 Movements towards limited reform o f the P D F rather than its abolishment clearly would do little to dilute Sudan's dependence on informal security services which, in part, made such massive human rights violations in Darfur possible. Moreover, relatively unqualified international endorsement of the D P A coupled with the ongoing failure of the Security Council to punish Sudan for its use of janjaweed grants a certain amount of implied legitimacy to the practice of employing proxy militias in intrastate conflict certainly unintended by the broader international community. Contingencies such as these within the D P A and failure by regional signatories and international observers to reject them not only represent a concern with meddling in the internal affairs o f a sovereign nation. Rather they reveal a much more fundamental preoccupation than the resolution of this conflict: the stability of the state. Since it is broadly understood that as a failed state Sudan is chronically threatened by violence both from sources within and beyond its control, even accepting the reality that the regime is responsible for both the employment of janjaweed militias and, by international law, their actions, does not necessarily mean that it has the capability, military or otherwise, to reign them in. A s such, logic dictates, punishing the regime may not prevent further violence on the ground but rather may accelerate the decline of an already relatively fragile state. A s the conflict has spilled across borders and violently affected its neighbors, Chad and C A R , ranked 6 t h and 13 t h on the 2006 Failed State Index respectively, raising the stakes of regional conflict, the international community has become increasingly alarmed and concerned with finding a solution to the violence in Darfur. 1 8 7 Consequently, the sheer sense of urgency generated by the unfolding regional chaos has led to relatively poor long-term planning by those externally involved in peacekeeping and the negotiation of the D P A . Disregarding the self-cannibalizing nature of the Fund for Peace, "Fai led State Index 2006." 87 N C P ' s administration of Sudan, the international community has placed its bets on avoiding initiatives which could potentially further destabilize the regime and therefore the state itself. Indeed, resolutions of conflict circumventing the punishment of a failed state complicit in such acts are in fact implicitly legitimated by R2P 's own criteria for international intervention to halt or avert large scale loss of life. B y asserting that intervention is justified where large scale losses of life "with genocidal intent or not" are the product of "deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation," R2P provides an embedded escape clause by which states characterized as failed may deny deliberate state action, particularly when employing paramilitary proxies (emphasis added). 1 8 8 Although this does not fundamentally change the nature of international intervention advocated by the responsibility to protect doctrine, given that failed states are understood to lack the capacity to control violent factions within their territory, the state's "status" could ultimately shield it from punitive measures. However, to acknowledge that the Sudanese government is dependent on the use of proxy militias is entirely different than to assert that the state is incapable o f cutting of their line of material support or taking steps to reign them in. Indeed, the GoS has demonstrated through its signing of the D P A that it is at least theoretically wil l ing to disarm janjaweed militias under A U supervision and, given that the Sudanese military remains their primary supplier of arms, a cutoff of military equipment would not likely lead to a sustained nor successful revolt by janjaweed forces. The Security Council 's failure to impose sanctions or even an arms embargo on Sudan, then, represents a fundamental vindication for the N C P ' s policy of pursuing security objectives through the employment of proxy paramilitary forces. Although it is unlikely that any regime would choose to employ such a destabilizing security strategy should their grasp on power not 1 8 8 International Commiss ion on Intervention and State Sovereignty and International Development Research Centre, "The Responsibi l i ty to Protect: Report o f the International Commiss ion on Intervention and State Sovereignty," 32. 88 already be severely compromised, the GoS has arguably made the "best" o f a bad situation. B y manipulating the international community's sensitivities towards weak and failing states, it has encouraged the sort of internal chaos that would in fact produce such conditions. A s such, the N C P has used its inability to independently reign in the janjaweed as a justification for why the state should not be punished for their employment and why the international community should encourage a resolution to the conflict which reinforces the political predominance of the regime. Collectively, the Security Council has accepted this argument, convinced by a limited willingness to comprehend the nature of the GoS 's security strategy of both its incapacity to reign in the violence and the necessity of diplomatic engagement above all other measures to resolve the crisis. It is thus presumed that a sustainable peace must seek not simply to address the grievances of the disaffected parties but also to bolster the state and strengthen its to deal with widespread violent criminality. 5.2 Taking Responsibility while Granting Impunity Although a more well-rounded analysis o f the conditions of conflict in Darfur quickly reveals the inadequacy of this approach, efforts by the international community, particularly those measures taken by the Security Council aimed at halting the violence have been well intentioned. While the present arms embargo has remained ineffectual and served primarily to protect the Russian and Chinese arms markets, this was surely not the intent. Rather, it was meant to prevent the flow of arms to belligerent non-state parties in the region while not threatening the security arrangements made between the GoS and the S P L M / A in the hard-fought negotiation of their Comprehensive Peace Accord. Similarly, efforts to diplomatically engage the regime through the office of the U N Secretary General, the Security Council in its 89 visit to Sudan in June, and the African Union through both state-authorized peacekeeping and facilitation o f negotiations between the rebels and the government did not intend to entrench the latter's authority. Rather, these parties sought to bring a negotiated end to conflict which did not threaten the "sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence" o f Sudan along broadly recognized principles of international statecraft thus ensuring the conception of a more stable and functional state. A s such, regardless o f the ineffectiveness o f these measures, they are notable in that the international community has even bothered to take them. Unlike cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the last decade, the conflict in Darfur has remained a pressing issue on the international agenda for which international governmental bodies and individual states have recognized requires considerable international involvement. A s such, the international community at large and, perhaps more importantly, the members of the Security Council have broadly acknowledged that an internationally recognized responsibility to protect does indeed exist. Yet even as the Security Council has set an important precedent by declaring its acceptance of the principles of R2P with the passage of Resolution 1674(2006) thus tacitly acknowledging that a failure to act in the case of Darfur constitutes an abrogation of this responsibility, so too the decision to avoid the use of. sanctions or any other instrument o f multilateral coercion against Sudan sets a disturbing precedent for the future. Through the international community's focus on the "ability" of the GoS to put a stop to violence in Darfur, it has ignored the question of its responsibility to protect its own citizens. Even U N Secretary General K o f i Annan has largely disregarded this responsibility in a recent B B C interview stating, "[I]f the Sudanese government had been able to protect the population in Darfur...we wouldn't 90 189 be having this conversation." Such a position is rather shocking coming from the man, who in his 2005 five year progress report on the fulfillment of the U N ' s Mil lennium Development Goals, boldly recommended: W e must...move towards embracing and acting on the "responsibi l i ty to protect"... The time has come for Governments to be held to account, both to their citizens and to each other, for respect o f the dignity o f the individual, to which they too often pay only l ip service. W e must move from an era o f legislation to an era o f implementation. Our declared principles and our common interests demand no less . 1 9 0 Whether or not this it is accurate to describe this as a case of idealist fervor crashing against the rocks of political reality, a central failing of the R2P doctrine, or a simple failure to act, the result is the same: Sudan is not being forced to take responsibility for its actions. Instead, the international community has pushed, in faltering delayed steps, to bring about a resolution to the conflict which seeks the cooperation and approval of the GoS while ignoring the long-term consequences of its failure to induce real reform and political change within the Sudanese government. Given the apparent weaknesses of the state and the regime's continued resistance to conforming to international human rights standards, it would be sheer fantasy to presume that any peace agreement absent radical structural reform wi l l have any effect on the improvement of domestic stability beyond extending the ability o f the N C P to impose its rule on and deny fair economic and political redistribution to disenfranchised regions such as Darfur. This much has been confirmed by U N Special Envoy to Sudan Jan Pronk who has recently recanted his support for the agreement in its present form. He has argued that i f the D P A is to be effective, it must 1 8 9 "Annan Decries Lack o f Pol i t ical W i l l on Darfur," Sudan Tribune, 30 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16449, Sudan Tribune. 1 9 0 K o f i Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for all (New York : Uni ted Nations General Assembly, 21 March 2005), 34-35, [database on-line]; available from http: / /daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf7OpenElement, O D S - U N . 91 acknowledge its rejection by much of the population of Darfur, its failure to include many rebel parties, and its weak provision for international oversight to ensure security, power-sharing, and compensation for victims of the conflict. In particular he cautioned, In Darfur the people who are the vict ims o f the war are turning against the D P A . Those who are on the side o f the government and o f the tribes and mil i t ia which were responsible for the ki l l ings and the atrocities welcome the D P A . I f the constituency o f Abdu l Wah id is not being brought behind the D P A , and i f the U N is seen as working together with the government and with M inn ie M i n a w i only, the U N risks to be seen as favoring the wrong side o f the conf l ic t . 1 9 1 By. effectively disarming the opposition morally and politically through the approval of peace agreements and militarily through their absorption into state security forces, a peace of sorts w i l l be imposed but it w i l l be one which affirms the present and morally unacceptable status quo. Wi th increasing concerns regarding the political stability of the region, rather than holding the regime to account its violations of international human rights norms, the Security Council has sought to endorse any solution, no matter how incomplete, to halt the implosion o f the entire region. Even the United States, which has been so adamant regarding the need to impose sanctions targeting the state through the Council , has taken this path with David Ranneberger, senior Sudan representative for the U . S . State Department, recently asserting, "The D P A is the only way for the people to achieve peace and stability... The U . S . is strongly committed to the D P A and believes it w i l l be successful." 1 9 2 This willingness by both the U S and the U N to endorse a peace treaty strongly rejected by the majority of its intended signatories cannot be ignored. In effect the Council 's course of action as well as that of its members have not only 1 9 1 "Weblog N r 26," in Jan Pronk.nl [database online]. 28 June [cited 2006]. Avai lable from http://www.janpronk.nl/ indexl20.html. 1 9 2 U P I , " U S Says Darfur Deal is the On ly W a y to Achieve Peace," Sudan Tribune, 30 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article= 16447, Sudan Tribune. 92 confirmed the myth of state incapacity in this case but led to the unintended consequence of undermining the notion of state responsibility fundamental to the principles of R2P. Although efforts to intervene and end the violence have weakly strengthened the expectation that the international community should take responsibility where and when the state is either unwilling or unable to. protect its citizens, the Council has in fact damaged the notion that weak and failed states in particular are, in the first instance, responsible for the protection of their citizens. In this sense, then, the international community has inadvertently given the N C P a free ride, effectively rewarding the regime for its role in the violence by endorsing a resolution to the conflict which not only fails to punish but strengthens its political power domestically and legitimacy internationally. Such failure to impose punitive measures, however, w i l l not have negative repercussions for the resolution of this conflict alone. Rather, the move to negotiations, diplomatic accommodations, consensual international force deployments, and "constructive" economic and political engagement in the place of internationally imposed penalties has led or w i l l l ikely lead to at least three unintended consequences: First, it has demonstrated to the N C P regime that it may continue to act with impunity in the present conflict without fear of international reprisal, demands for political reform, or commitment to even the limited principles agreed to in the D P A . Second, it has introduced a dangerous new element of moral hazard into the international system which supports the notion that "failed states" may engage in massive internal violence through barely veiled proxy forces without the expectation o f coercive international intervention, military or otherwise, leading to an internationally brokered settlement which is ultimately unlikely to destabilize the emergent status quo. Finally, with the signing of the D P A , the Council as a whole has grown more complaisant and convinced of the efficacy of the measures it has taken thus far to bring peace to Darfur. Not only wi l l this inhibit continued 93 engagement by the Council in ensuring a sustainable peace, but it may lead to a new and unfortunate norm of international practice which maintains that coercive intervention is unnecessary to arrest intrastate conflict, even those with dimensions o f ethnic cleansing and genocide. 5.3 Ensuring Continued Impunity The most obvious of unintended consequences of the Security Council 's failure to impose punitive measures against Sudan has been the emboldening of the regime to resist U N involvement, particularly in the form of peacekeeping, and the delay i f not abortion of implementation of the already limited provisions of the D P A . While there is no need to recount the increasingly belligerent rhetoric employed by the regime with each failure of the Council to authorize a Chapter VI I peacekeeping operation or punitive sanction against the state, it is clear from previously mentioned statements and the international response that they have generated alone that the GoS has learned that threats of violence w i l l be answered with increasingly cautious diplomatic engagement rather than international reprimand, rhetorical or otherwise. This lack of action coupled with openly acknowledged support for the regime by countries like China and members of the Arab League and OIC, it is hardly surprising that the N C P leadership has taken few threats by powerful countries such as the United States to send a N A T O - l e d U N force to Sudan seriously. Indeed, even while many have condemned the inadequacy of the D P A and the need to deploy a U N force from influential individuals such as Jan Pronk and K o f i Annan, to organizations like Amnesty International and International Crisis Group, to states including the U S and U K , many o f the same players have affirmed that the agreement is still the only way to a sustainable peace. 94 Most recently, the A U Peace and Security Council has announced its intention to impose individually-targeted sanctions in line with those imposed by the U N Security Council against "al l persons and groups undermining the Darfur Peace Agreement." 1 9 3 Given that the A U is the only international body directly involved in maintaining security on the ground in Darfur, this declaration amounts not only to an unqualified endorsement of the D P A "as is," but a commitment to be responsible for ensuring that no party challenges its implementation. However, given that the A U is not in the business of sanctioning its member states, such punishment is l ikely to be meted out against rebel violators such as the J E M and Nur 's S L M / A alone. A s with U N efforts in this regard, the GoS recognizes that such punishments are not likely to directly affect either their conduct or their ability to maintain power. What does concern the regime, however, is should A M I S be replaced with a U N force, its members might be more vulnerable to I C C extradition and prosecution at The Hague. Therefore, the government has made a concerted effort to strengthen the role of A M I S in Darfur in efforts to forestall a U N takeover. Wi th A M I S ' mandate originally slated to conclude in September 2006, a decision was made by the organization to extend the deployment to at least the end of the year at a recent A U summit in Gambia . 1 9 4 Although the A U still endorses a U N takeover, Bashir has remained adamant that no such replacement w i l l take place claiming that Sudan is even wi l l ing to bear the cost of an additional six months' deployment. 1 9 5 Wi th the state providing the funding, Sudan would have even greater leverage over A M I S ' enforcement capacity. Although hardly ideal, given the G o S ' stark rejection of U N forces and the Security Council 's determination to acquire 1 9 3 Ethiopian Herald, "Sudan: P S C Decides to Impose Targeted Measures Against Anybody Undermining D P A , " AllAfrica.Com, 29 June 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://allafrica.com/stories/200606290737.html, al lAfr ica.com. 1 9 4 Franz W i l d , " A U Summit Extends Peacekeeping in Darfur," Voice of America, 3 July 2006, [database on-l ine]; available from http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-07-03-voa4.cfm, V O A N e w s . c o m . 1 9 5 Associated Press, "Sudan Ready to Fund A U Peacekeepers in Darfur for 6 Months," Sudan Tribune, 3 July 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=16500, Sudan Tribune. 95 the state's consent prior to any operation, the option may be between continued A M I S deployment and no international monitoring force whatsoever. A s the GoS has thus far failed to noticeably implement any of the provisions of the D P A , again without any substantive outcry by the international community, it also seems highly unlikely that constructive progress is l ikely to be made in the near future. The recent formation of the "National Redemption Front" (NRF) rebel alliance between the J E M and a number of breakaway factions from al-Minnawi's S L M / A and their resumption of attacks against the state further threaten the possibility of any headway. Openly disregarding the cease-fire agreed to between all rebel groups and the GoS in Apr i l 2004, respected by none but never formally abrogated, the new group captured a town in North Kordofan province east of Darfur declaring their intention to continue on to Khartoum itself. 1 9 6 Although the members of the N R F were never party to the D P A , this could be the "legitimate" excuse the N C P needs to reactivate the P D F and continue its campaign in Darfur. Indeed, it would be difficult for anyone to condemn an effort by the Sudanese government to defend itself against rebels who ostensibly struck first. Regardless, international behaviour has set a clear precedent in this regard; even when counterstrikes degenerate into attacks on civilian populations as they most certainly w i l l , moral condemnations w i l l be issued but action w i l l not be taken. Indeed, the Security Council itself has embarrassingly failed throughout this conflict to even consistently cite the notion of state responsibility to its citizens which might set a rhetorical precedent for condemning this sort o f violence. Whi le the earliest Security Council resolutions issued in reference to Darfur were explicit in reaffirming the Sudanese government's "primary responsibility" to protect its population, maintain law and order, and respect human rights amounting to three of the four 1 9 5 Opheera M c D o o m , "Darfur Rebels End Truce with Attack," Reuters, 3 July 2006, [database on-l ine]; available from http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-07-03T135732Z 01 M C D 3 4 0 4 1 2 R T R U K O C 0 U K - S U D A N - D A R F U R . x m l , Reuters U K . 96 resolutions issued regarding Sudan in 2003, no single resolution of the seven in 2005 and five thus far in 2006 even mentioned such a passage. 1 9 7 This early acknowledgement o f "sovereignty as responsibility" by the Council could be dismissed as an effort to avoid the deployment of U N peacekeepers in Darfur as the details of the conflict were, as of yet, too murky to definitively judge whether an international force would be appropriate. However, the Council 's failure to reiterate this same passage coupled with other relevant concerns regarding the future stability of both the Sudanese state and the region, particularly after its formal endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect in Resolution 1674(2006), speaks much more definitively to its stress on international responsibility while neglecting accountability where the state of interest is deemed to be incapable of providing protection to its citizens. While the international community's failure to hold Sudan to account does not bode well for bringing about an immediate cessation of violence nor a just resolution to conflict, this does not necessarily mean that the chaos in Darfur w i l l never end nor does it preclude future international intervention should it spill across borders and truly erupt into interstate warfare which would threaten the stability of North Africa. It is quite likely absent the deployment of an effective peacekeeping force that the Sudanese government w i l l achieve a conqueror's victory in Sudan having achieved a mass displacement of established tribal groups in favour of nomadic groups supported by the state resulting in an endemic refugee crisis hardly uncommon in the region. Even with continued A M I S monitoring, the situation in Darfur may stabilize albeit in a manner which freezes the status quo and de-facto territorial partition already achieved through tribal "cleansing" brought about by janjaweed raids throughout the course of the conflict. Wi th A U sanctions in place against rebel leaders which are sure to continue to "undermine" the D P A , U N S C r e s . 1556(2004), 1564(2004), 1574(2004) 97 opposition groups wi l l lose the freedom to operate in the region as well as the sympathy of external powers exhausted with the ongoing conflict. It could be argued that such an outcome might be l ikely irrespective o f the potential for sanctions to be successfully imposed on the state noting that the regime has consistently rejected western and UN- led intervention. Indeed, i f the N C P principally believes the cost o f capitulation to be considerably higher than continued rejection of international demands, sanctions are not likely to be behaviour altering regardless of their stringency. Pointing to the example of Baathist Iraq in the interwar period from 1992 to 2003, the state endured one of the most stringent sanctions regimes ever imposed without resulting in a destabilization of the regime or a change in the political rhetoric of its leadership at tremendous human cost. What such an analysis neglects, however, is how successfully Iraq was ultimately contained despite criticism to the contrary, not to mention the complexity of the failures of the sanction regime's humanitarian aid exceptions. Furthermore, the punishment of Iraq symbolically demonstrated the international community's rejection of interstate warfare as an acceptable instrument of foreign policy. Confirmation of this norm through punitive measures in response to its violation was critical in asserting the international community's commitment to its preservation, particularly at the dawn of a new era of international relations following the end of the Cold War. While the case of Darfur is different on many levels, the symbolic importance of substantive action to assert the international community's acceptance of a prohibitory norm of genocide and ethnic cleansing, or even more generally o f a positive responsibility of the state to protect its citizens remains the same. Regardless of the questionable behaviour altering potential of sanctions in this particularly case, the symbolic importance of their imposition to punish gross violations of human rights norms by which all states claim to abide is essential for its preservation. 98 5.4 Internationalizing Moral Hazard Because the international community's failure to impose punitive measures has broad repercussions beyond the case of Darfur, the employment of sanctions is that much more critical. B y choosing negotiation and diplomatic engagement as their sole instruments of influence over the policy and behaviour of the Sudanese regime entirely displacing the credible threat of punishment against the state or even the government's most powerful leaders, the Security Council has signaled to other states similarly characterized as failed and engaged in perpetrating similar internal atrocities that they too can expect no substantive repercussions for their behaviour. Known in economic and legal circles as moral hazard, there is an increased risk given the international community's failure to punish Sudan that other states w i l l continue to engage in such behaviour with the presumption that they wi l l hot suffer negative consequences for their actions or may even benefit from them. Specifically, moral hazard refers to the "adverse effects, from an insurance company's point of view, that insurance may have on the insuree's behaviour." 1 9 8 A s such, those who feel they are secured against loss resulting from risky behaviour may be more prone to engage in it. Fischer more generally notes, "the idea o f moral hazard applies to any situation where a perceived reduction in risk it faces leads a party to take riskier action, or to neglect precautionary measures." 1 9 9 Most frequently used in the study o f international political economy, concern with moral hazard has been particularly salient when attempting to define the role of any "lender of last resort" to avert or stem financial crises in emerging market economies. With the prior existence of contingencies such as deposit insurance and government interest in attracting and maintaining outside investment, the moral hazard motivation for foreign speculation with the expectation of government (or international) bailouts 1 9 8 Roger Guesnerie, "Hidden Act ions, Mora l Hazard and Contract Theory," in (London: Macmi l lan , 1987), 1 9 9 Stanley Fischer, " O n the Need for an International Lender o f Last Resort," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 92. 99 in the incidence of failure is already prevalent. Given that lenders of last resort are l ikely to be unable to distinguish perfectly between crises warranted by poor domestic economic performance or policies and unwarranted crises resulting from nervous capital flight and both certainly generate a necessity for financial assistance, the tendency to encourage bad behaviour by investors is almost unavoidable. Such concerns in part stemmed from the behaviour of investors following the East Asian Economic Crisis in 1996, many of whom expected and often received large bailouts despite their investment in such "risky" volatile markets. 2 0 0 Such analyses may also be profitably applied to strategic political behaviour. For instance, critics of partition o f multiethnic states after c ivi l war have argued that support for the creation of one independent state may set a precedent by which other separatists groups in other states may demand similar political accommodations. 2 0 1 Among others, Kuperman has claimed that cases of humanitarian intervention in ethnic conflict such as Kosovo in 1999 may actually encourage political separatist groups to become violent in order to spark massive retaliation believing that "inevitable" international intervention w i l l lead to a greater likelihood of achieving their political goals. 2 0 2 Yet although such cautionary research may have conditioned the Security Council 's decision not to deploy peacekeepers without the consent o f the Sudanese government, it must be recalled that none of the rebel groups included independence for Darfur as part o f their original stated objectives but rather focused on obtaining an equitable share of political and economic representation for the region in the government itself. If intervention and other 2 0 0 Devesh Kapur, "The I M F : A Cure o f a Curse?" Foreign Policy, no. 111 (Summer 1998): 114-129. Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Capital Market Liberal izat ion and Exchange Rate Regimes: R i sk without Rewards," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 579, no. 1 (January 2002): 219-248. 2 0 1 James D. Fearon, "Separatist Wars , Partit ion, and Wor l d Order," Security Studies 13, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 394-415. Dav id Carment and Dane Rowlands, "Vengeance and Intervention: Can Third Parties Br ing Peace without Separation?" Security Studies 13, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 366-393. 2 0 2 A l a n J . Kuperman, "Suic idal Rebel l ions and the Mora l Hazard o f Humanitarian Intervention," Ethnopolitics 4, no. 2 (June 2005): 149-173. 100 punitive measures have been shunned in order to avoid empowering the armed opposition and emboldening rebel movements elsewhere in the world, the failure to punish Sudan has accomplished the opposite. In this case, rather than being concerned with encouraging risky financial investment or "suicidal rebellion," moral hazard has emerged from the particular form of diplomatic engagement chosen by the Security Council with the GoS absent disciplinary measures for gross violations of human rights norms. The Council 's efforts to engage with the regime to ensure the delivery o f humanitarian aid, secure the deployment of international peacekeepers, and bring potential non-state spoilers into compliance with the new peace agreement whilst avoiding concrete threats of punitive actions against the state have in fact dramatically reduced the risk of international punishment being employed against regime. In effect, the move away from state-targeted sanctions as a legitimate means of ensuring compliance with international behavioural expectations and towards cautious diplomatic engagement to the same ends has set an undeniably powerful precedent in international practice which may be viewed as an insurance policy against punishment for states involved in comparable activities. Without fear of reprimand, the Security Council has inadvertently promoted an atmosphere of impunity in which failed states like Sudan may engage in massive violations of human rights expecting the international community to respond with cautious diplomacy which coddles their respective regime and to intervene, i f at all , on the terms o f the given regime. The creation of this "normative" insurance provision inferred by Security Council resolutions and parallel individual and collective state action protecting irresponsible state parties from recrimination for massive violations of human rights is particularly concerning given a number o f persistent internal conflicts in states as troubled and weak as Sudan. One such 101 case is the long-ignored yet enduring "low-intensity" c ivi l war in the near collapsed state o f the Democratic Republic of Congo which has left an estimated four mil l ion dead since 1998. Although over 17,000 U N peacekeepers remain stationed in the troubled state, as the country nears its first multiparty election in 40 years, violence has continued. 2 0 3 Given that the U N has devoted so much of its energies into attempting to stabilize the state and its institutions, even as U N forces fight alongside the Congolese army against rebel groups, there remains some question as to how responsible both rebels and the state itself w i l l be in protecting innocents as well as how wil l ing the U N wi l l be to take disciplinary action against the state should elections ultimately fail and/or widespread violence resumes. Such concerns are also relevant in the case of Zimbabwe regarding the conduct of the Z A N U - P F led government under longtime leader Robert Mugabe. Although Zimbabwe has remained a weak state since its inception, its slide to failure was significantly accelerated in 1999 with the forced removal of white farmers from their land in the name of economic redistribution and the subsequent collapse o f the Zimbabwean economy due to widespread government corruption and patronage politics. The International Crisis Group has reported that not only has the banning of social protest led to increased domestic instability, but "[t]he crumbling economy has meant a loss of government revenues, and the military rank and file are being paid less and at irregular intervals, leading them into criminality, allegedly including cross-border armed robbery." 2 0 4 Due to charges of human rights abuses and election tampering, Zimbabwe's membership was suspended in the British Commonwealth was in 2002, and the country subsequently withdrew in December 2003 but no Eddy Isango, "Thirteen Dead in Elect ion-Campaign Vio lence in D R C , " Mail & Guardian, 1 July 2006, [database on-line]; available from http://www.mg.co.za/articlepage.aspx?area=/breaking_news/ b reak ingnews africa/&articleid=275989. M a i l & Guardian online 2 0 4 International Cr is is Group, "Z imbabwe's Continuing Self-Destruction," Africa Briefing , no. 38 (6 June 2006), [journal on-l ine]; available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/southern_africa/ b038_zimbabwe_continuing_self_destruction.pdf; Internet; accessed 10 June 2006. 102 other international punitive measures have been imposed since. Later in 2005, the state commenced Operation Murambatsvina, or "drive out the trash," in which police forcibly evicted some 300,000 urban poor from the capital of Harare particularly punishing those not loyal to the ruling party. Although the U N characterized the operation as "a grave violation of international human rights law and a disturbing affront to human dignity," no punitive action was taken against the state. 2 0 5 Wi th an already anemic response to the actions of the Z A N U - P F government, despite increased tension within the state, the party may rightly believe that i f the international community cannot be expected to respond to a clear case of government initiated massive population displacement and violence, they too could be absolved of responsibility for more "minor" levels of political repression. These, o f course, represent only two of many such cases o f failed states which may draw inappropriate yet logically consistent lessons from the precedent set by international inaction in Darfur. Yet it is l ikely far too early to observe any concrete manifestations o f this hazardous international climate aside from the continued failure o f diplomatic engagement in Sudan, and, as such, evidence o f increased international tolerance towards state irresponsibility can only be proven over time. Furthermore, none of this is to claim that the international community has been uniquely dismissive of this singular case in Darfur than they have of other equally horrific conflicts and cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide in the past. Inaction in the face of the Armenian genocide, the Shoah (Jewish Holocaust), Imperial Japan's massacres in China during the Second World War, Stalin's massive political "purges," the ki l l ing fields in Cambodia, and Iraq's Anfal campaign against the Kurds, all of which occurred within the last hundred years prior to the end o f the Cold War (to name only a handful of cases), clearly demonstrate that the 2 0 5 Alexandra Zavis , "Mugabe: Shades o f P o l Pot," Mail & Guardian, 24 June 2005, [database on-l ine]; available from http://www.mg.co.za/articledirect.aspx?articleid=243694, M a i l & Guardian online. 103 international community has never been particularly proactive in halting these atrocities. So why is the Security Council 's failure to act in Darfur any different? Unlike this contemporary case, the states responsible for these prior instances of genocide were never treated as i f they did not have the capacity to halt the kil l ing. Never before has it been assumed that there can be no coercive answer to such violence or that the employment of such coercion would actually undermine the ability of the international community to bring its perpetrators to justice. A t a time when the Security Council has so decisively declared that states must be held responsible for the protection of their citizens, its behaviour in response to the conflict in Darfur dictates that while the international community does indeed have a responsibility to protect, the state does not. 5.5 Bad Normative Development Therefore, the concern is not simply that the Security Council 's failure to punish Sudan w i l l allow a climate of impunity to thrive in Darfur or that other failed states wi l l follow suit, but that its actions may in fact undermine the very notion that failed states must be held to account should they consciously fail in their duty to protect the lives of their citizens. Ultimately, these developments are likely to fundamentally weaken the normative value of R2P. Mentioned throughout the thesis in reference to the protection of sovereignty and human rights, international norms are understood to have an important impact on defining and constraining state behaviour. While norms may originate from subjective ideas held by individual actors, in order to have such broad effects they must evolve into shared social understandings of what constitutes proper behaviour in the international system. 2 0 6 These intersubjectively accepted guidelines may be Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, (Ithaca, N . Y . : Cornel l Universi ty Press, 1996), 22. 104 expressed in international rules as with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the Geneva Conventions, upheld by institutional arrangements as with the United Nations, or may more simply be regularly articulated in international discourse. Having both constitutive and regulative effects, their affirmation wi l l theoretically contribute both to the constitution of the 207 moral identity of an actor and the dictation o f appropriate actions consistent with this identity. A s such, it can be reasoned that not only do norms provide standards for state action but they may be indispensable in constituting state interest. Indeed, argue Finnemore and Sikkink, "it is precisely the prescriptive (or evaluative) quality of 'outghtness' that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules," endowing the task of defending and upholding norms with a moral imperative o f sorts central to the identity o f the state. 2 0 8 Therefore, a state which genuinely professes a respect for human rights may also have an interest in ensuring the protection of innocents abroad just as a country under a liberal market economy w i l l likely have an interest in the expansion of free trade regimes. Even i f such interests are reducible to national interest, they are further reducible to the ideas which make up the state's collective understanding of what that national interest may be. These ideas, in turn, are not l ikely to formed sui generis, and are often impacted by ideas shared by other states and societies in the international system. One may then influence the other mutually constituting both international norms and state behaviour. Realists fundamentally challenge this assertion arguing that norms are merely reflective of global power distributions such that those states which are most powerful may institute, violate, and change norms as they see fit. Given that only great powers have the capacity to enforce such guidelines, they are only subject to them insofar as they are believed to be valuable 2 0 7 Peter J . Katzenstein and Social Science Research Counc i l . Committee on International Peace & Security, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New York : Columbia Universi ty Press, 1996), 5. 2 0 8 Finnemore and Sikk ink, "International N o r m Dynamics and Pol i t ical Change," 891. 105 for maintaining their absolute and relative strengths vis-a-vis other states. Critics of normative approaches have often used realist rationalizations in this fashion to dismiss the possibility that norms independent of power considerations may have causal force in determining state action. They would therefore assert that political (and economic) calculations by members of the Security Council are solely responsible for their decision not to employ state-targeted punitive measures against Sudan such that considerations of sovereignty or the like are merely a mask behind which these states have hidden their true intentions. Yet while cooperation and convergence on issues in the international system are undeniably dependent in many ways on power interests, the institutionalization of intersubjectively defined norms w i l l often have a motive force of its own. To assert that "moral" considerations regarding the violation of human rights in Darfur are completely absent from calculations regarding intervention would be to ignore the intense lobbying efforts of human rights groups, politicians, and diplomats within the domestic and international sphere, and the regular invocation of the founding principles of the western members of the Security Council in particular and the United Nations itself by all players to respond in some way to the violence. This prevalent discourse of 'oughtness' demanding action by the international community in Darfur is considerable evidence alone that normative factors are at work. This is not to claim, however, that the existence of norms assumes compliance. Rather, argues Katzenstein, emerging norms must compete with existing and perhaps countervailing norms and while they make new types of action possible, they neither guarantee nor determine a given result. 2 0 9 Certainly this is the case with the "responsibility to protect" as it challenges the predominance of preexisting understandings of sovereignty. But i f a norm cannot be necessarily Katzenstein and Social Science Research Counc i l . Committee on International Peace & Security, "The Culture o f Nat ional Security : Norms and Identity in Wor l d Pol i t ics," 106 identified through outcomes, how is one to find evidence of its existence? Legro cautions that there is indeed a tendency to provide tautological explanations of normative developments in that any number of independent effects could be attributed to the emergence o f a new norm. A s such, he counsels that norms must be identified by three criteria: specificity, durability, and concordance: that is how well guidelines of the norm are understood, how long they have been in effect, how successfully they weather challenges to their legitimacy, and how widely they are accepted in diplomatic discussion and treaties. 2 1 0 Similarly, Finnemore insists that norms may be recognized in patterns o f behaviour consistent with the norm and through their articulation in discourse given careful observation. 2 1 1 B y these criteria, the responsibility to protect may not have longevity on its side, but its regular invocation by influential humanitarian N G O s , bodies o f the United Nations, and state proponents in reports, institutional policy, and legally binding resolutions indicate a particular intersubjective acceptance of its basic precepts while its careful and detailed description and adoption in both R2P and subsequent U N conference documents and Security Council resolutions leave little room to misunderstand its intent. Yet as an emergent norm, the Responsibility to Protect clearly remains a malleable doctrine evidenced by a wide acceptance of the legitimacy of requirements for international responsibility and neglect o f the specificities of states' responsibilities to their citizens. Although norms of international behaviour including non-interference associated with sovereignty as well as respect of "universal human rights" have developed slowly and unevenly corresponding with internal and external pressures as well as cultural, political, and historical constraints, their acceptance by the international community at large signals an undeniable relationship between the behaviour of states and the norm's prescriptions. Thus violations of 2 1 0 Jeffrey W . Legro, "Wh ich Norms Matter? Revisi t ing the "Fai lure" o f Internationalism," International Organization 51 (1997): 33-35. 2 1 1 Finnemore, "National Interests in International Society," 23. 107 either normative guideline are met with moral reproach while conflict between the two clearly presents fundamental problems for standards of international practice. Obviously players w i l l value these "competing" norms differently. But while all w i l l not necessarily operationalize norms in precisely the same manner nor w i l l they always internalize its prescriptions, rhetorical engagement with its principles w i l l invariable influence the nature of their behaviour vis-a-vis other actors. A s such, the Security Council 's rhetorical acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine does indeed mark a significant step towards its recognition as a normative guideline of international practice. However since a norm's meaning is derived from both discursive employment and practice, the marked neglect of state accountability particularly with respect to practice wi l l l ikely lead to a withering o f this crucial "other h a l f of R2P. This attack on the nascent norm of "sovereignty as responsibility" fundamentally challenges the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's contention that the principles of R2P in fact reflect emerging state practice or even that they represent a credible benchmark for state conduct. Rather, the direction of normative development in this regard as demonstrated by the challenge posed by Darfur should more appropriately be branded not "sovereignty as responsibility" but a far less eloquent "international liability facing domestic incapability." While this proposition is not altogether deficient in that it affirms the necessity of external intervention in the face of massive internal violence, by encouraging the international community to presuppose state incapability as a necessary corollary to such conflict, efforts w i l l always focus on treating symptoms rather than root causes. Thus where the state itself is in fact responsible in great measure for provoking, sustaining, or exacerbating such conflict, assisting the regime in providing for its citizens' security may simply provide a short-term fix. Indeed, ensuring the continued "stability" of such a regime while pacifying internal violence merely 108 preserves these conditions for the resumption of conflict for a later date. A s failing to punish state violators o f international human rights norms wi l l l ikely have significant consequences beyond the present conflict in terms of fostering increased moral hazard, it should be acknowledged that the behaviour o f the Security Council in this conflict is potentially self-reinforcing. With the effective removal of state-targeted punitive measures from the Council 's agenda and the disappearance of references to state responsibility from resolutions regarding Sudan and its replacement by an agenda meant to address state incapability and individual accountability, there is the deep concern that its members may become convinced of the "effectiveness" or the relative "greater value" of these limited measures when faced with intrastate conflict within failed states. While few on the Council actually believe that the conflict in Darfur has come to any sustained resolution, the continued rejection of state-targeted punitive measures by Russia, China, and France as counterproductive and the seeming acquiescence of the U S and U K to relying on individually targeted sanctions and eventual I C C prosecutions as the sole multilateral means to ensure justice seem to indicate a decisive victory for proponents of non-intervention. Indeed, at this point it would appear that to employ coercive measures of any sort, particularly the deployment of uninvited peacekeeping forces, would require the unilateral initiative of individual members of the Council on par with the much debated N A T O intervention in Kosovo. Given that Security Council action is heavily dependent on legal and historical precedent, the abandonment of state punishment as a means of coercive diplomacy could also lead to similarly poor decisions in addressing future similar cases. Although Council deadlock could again be overridden by unilateral action, barring intervention to halt a clear cut case of internal genocide, such action would have little hope of obtaining the sort of international legitimacy provided by a 109 U N force backed by an unmistakably clear Council resolution to that effect. Neither would unilaterally imposed economic sanctions disregarded by much of the rest of the world, particularly the target state's most influential investors, have much effect on state conduct or on the acceptance of sovereignty as responsibility. While it is clear that sanctions have not been imposed on Sudan for a number o f reasons including narrow national economic interest of members of the P5, principled opposition to the use of sanctions as with China, reservations regarding their ultimate effectiveness as with France, and concerns with destabilizing an already weak and internally threatened state in an even more broadly volatile regional hotspot, the result remains the same: the Security Council has significantly contributed to the delegitimization of the expectation that all states should be responsible for the protection of their citizens and accountable for their failures. This reality represents movement towards the legitimization of a fundamentally bad norm in international affairs which, rather than ensuring the protection of innocents in conflict, w i l l ultimately reaffirm orthodox definitions of state sovereignty. B y granting Sudan broad impunity and freedom from accountability through its failure to punish the state for its conduct, the Council has bought into the belief that little can or should be done to regulate the internal affairs of the state. A s such, measures to alleviate human suffering must now be taken in cooperation with the GoS regardless of its complicity in the ongoing violence. Therefore efforts must be limited to providing humanitarian aid to civilian populations and support for a weak and broadly ineffectual A U monitoring force, both easily manipulated by the Sudanese leadership and its functionaries. More intrusive measures such as individually targeted sanctions w i l l remain ineffectual so long as they fail to target influential members of the regime while I C C prosecutions are likely to be indefinitely deferred by the state claiming sole jurisdiction and 110 adequate capacity to prosecute domestically. Although activist groups around the world are likely to continue to demand international action in Darfur and states with little investment in Sudan may eventually impose unilateral sanctions (driving Sudan further into the arms of demonstrably irresponsible powers such as Russia and China), deadlock in the Security Council is l ikely to continue. A s such, the view that negative inducements w i l l ultimately imperil peaceful progress in Darfur has clearly won the day and with it, the Responsibility to Protect has lost much of its credibility. What this half-acceptance o f R2P w i l l accomplish, however, is a commitment by the international community to assume the responsibility to protect innocents threatened by intrastate conflict within failed states without ensuring state reform in intervention's wake. For with the assumption of state incapacity comes the necessity for external agents to provide such protection. Certainly all failed states are not as "functional" as Sudan with many lacking an operational central government. Under these conditions intrastate conflict may commence without government (or lack thereof) incitement or encouragement thus displacing concerns with state accountability per say with the more elemental need for international intervention to separate combatants and rebuild the state. Here the need for international institutional assistance is almost undeniable. However, where the state classified as failed is essentially capable of limiting internal violence or even promotes said violence, cooperative assistance and protective measures on the state's behalf are futile i f not accompanied by punitive measures in response to their conduct. 2 1 2 Unfortunately, i f behaviour with respect to Sudan is any indicator, this is what can be expected as the international community's responsibility to protect is affirmed and the 2 1 2 5 t h and 9 t h on the 2006 Fai led State Index respectively. Fund for Peace, "Failed State Index 2006." I l l enforcement of a failed state's responsibility to its citizens is actively dismissed as destabilizing and counterproductive. V I . C o n c l u s i o n s In the end, the question must be asked, why does any of this matter? If failed states.are assumed to lack the capacity to protect their own citizens and a norm of "cooperative" intervention as imagined by R2P is truly recognized and practiced, lives may indeed be saved and massive suffering as is occurring today in Darfur may be checked by diligent international observation, naming and shaming of parties responsible for the violence, and greater engagement by such "rogue regimes" with the broader international community. Given that R2P 's stated mandate is to ensure protection for populations "suffering serious harm" and not to fundamentally change the nature of the state in which an intervention takes place, i f measures may be taken to avoid punitive sanction while still taking action to defend the innocent, theoretically success has been achieved. Indeed, the authors of R2P were particularly cautious regarding the aftermath o f military intervention emphasizing the limited intention o f intervention to be the speedy restoration of sovereignty and "not to change constitutional arrangements but to protect them." 2 1 3 B y this logic, less invasive punitive measures should much more so aim to avoid "regime change" in any form but rather ensure the continued exercise of state sovereignty while modifying certain unacceptable behaviours. While R2P asserts that the long-term goal of international actors should be to "do themselves out of a job" in post-conflict reconstruction, focusing solely on the immediate security situation without addressing the maladies o f the 2 1 3 International Commiss ion on Intervention and State Sovereignty and International Development Research Centre, "The Responsibi l i ty to Protect: Report o f the International Commiss ion on Intervention and State Sovereignty," 44. 112 regime which brought about conflict in the first place wi l l result in a job either half done or never accomplished. B y failing to hold the state to account for its actions, the international community w i l l preserve the conditions for conflict thus necessitating a permanent international presence or, in its absence, ensuring the eventual resumption of conflict. In this manner, punishment is not an end in itself nor merely a symbolic device meant to placate the consciences of the international community but a means to ensuring that the targeted state is sent the unequivocal message that its behaviour is entirely unacceptable and w i l l not be tolerated. Although this w i l l not deter the most determined of regimes from continued engagement in internal violence (thus necessitating an imposed international military presence), those leaders making rational calculations as to the long run benefit o f such violence versus the crippling consequences associated with being made an international pariah wi l l l ikely yield much more substantially to pressure than would a regime which believes it enjoys continued i f qualified support. Such punishment also sends the clear message to other states that they can neither expect to engage in such activities with impunity nor expect a free ride when the international community does in fact honour its obligations to responsible intervention. Insofar as the international order is premised on the respect of state sovereignty, it has also come to be recognized that this order must include a respect, both internally and externally, for human rights. While both the "responsibility to protect" and the notion of "sovereignty as responsibility" confirm this important element of order, implementation of the former without regard for the latter, particularly in the face of increased intrastate warfare and the ever present humanitarian and security risks posed by failed states, represents an incomplete commitment to its preservation. 113 Therefore it must be understood that a sustainable resolution to the conflict in Darfur cannot be achieved without ensuring that the N C P regime be held to account for its utter failure to protect its own population and its efforts to destabilize the region to tilt the balance o f power in its favour. The guilt o f the government in this regard is uncontestable but moves by the Security Council to circumvent coercive measures targeted against the state in order to achieve consensus have fundamentally undermined its ability to act as a responsible body to address these crimes. The more limited actions taken to shame the state with vocal denunciations of its conduct, assign the prosecution of individual criminals to the ICC, impose an ineffectual arms embargo, and enforce targeted financial and travel sanctions against relatively minor players may demonstrate that the Council is morally appalled by the conflict but it has and wi l l accomplish little to discipline the regime itself. This is not to claim that measures which target individuals such as those sanctions already applied or I C C prosecutions are entirely ineffectual. Indeed, i f the I C C prosecutor were to release the names of those whom the court is considering bringing to trial or i f the Council were to extend sanctions to more prominent individuals including more powerful members of the regime, both could provide a much greater deterrent. Similarly, a more comprehensive arms embargo which targets the GoS while exempting the nascent government in southern Sudan could indeed limit the flow of arms to the P D F , janjaweed, and other government sponsored proxy forces. A n expansion of any of the measures already in place as described would still largely avoid the humanitarian repercussions associated with comprehensive economic sanctions such as those imposed on Iraq and not fundamentally damage economic interests clearly so critical to members of the P5. Indeed, sanctions on Sudanese oil might be avoided altogether i f the assets of prominent regime elites were frozen and Sudanese government officials were designated persona non grata on the international stage. 114 Although this move would not bode well for encouraging global corporate social responsibility, effective punishments targeting the state would be finally imposed sending a clear signal the regime and other states contemplating similar behaviour of serious consequences for their actions. Such moves would also bolster the Security Council 's credibility by actively affirming its commitment to its mandate to ensure the continued maintenance o f international peace and security. Indeed, a disturbing track record by the Council of inaction in the face of intrastate violence has developed over the past decade belying the great optimism for a newly invigorated United Nations which followed the end of the Cold War. From its failure to deploy a Chapter VII mandated peacekeeping force in Rwanda to halt genocide in 1994, to its failure to respond to the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 necessitating N A T O intervention, to its weak response to over a decade of c ivi l war in the D R C , to its inaction in the face of the conflict in Darfur, the Council truly has risked making itself "irrelevant" as a trusted arbiter of international peace and security. Meanwhile regional security bodies and less internationally accountable ad-hoc coalitions o f states have taken up intervention duties in the world's most troubled conflict areas. This failure to act and to punish has also clearly been noticed by. states not engaged in massive intrastate violence but other potentially dangerous activities which threaten international peace and security. Indeed, in the ongoing diplomatic crisis over uranium enrichment in Iran, the political leadership of that country has openly flouted threats by the U S , U K , and France to impose sanctions with the knowledge that Russia and China, as in Sudan, are not likely to allow the approval of such punitive measures. Meanwhile, the erratic pariah state of North Korea has continued to engage in test launches of missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads with few 115 penalties imposed by the United Nations to curtail their activities. 2 1 4 While these cases are clearly different than the one facing the Security Council in Darfur, the disturbing precedent of inaction remains consistent. A s such, any substantive move taken by the Council to hold Sudan to account would l ikely be critical in lessening the danger that this critical body might in fact become an irrelevant actor in international affairs. If anything, it is time for the Council to overcome its squeamishness at inflicting penalties for plainly unacceptable state behaviour. The consequences o f haphazardly imposed and poorly enforced sanctions have been obvious for the world to see and have been terrible and ineffectual enough to result in a partial taboo against their use. Yet, in the case of Darfur or other comparable cases of massive internal violence morally equivalent to ethnic cleansing and genocide, the costs of failing to impose sanctions are perhaps even more severe. If the international community is truly to be committed to a responsibility to protect, it must also be wil l ing to enforce the idea that with sovereignty comes great responsibility. Where and when that responsibility is violated, it must be the duty of the international community to ensure that not only are innocents protected but that the guilty state itself is held to account. 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